Diary and Proceedings of the Select Committee at Fort St George

Commencing 4th January 1771.

1. Fort St George 4th January 1771

Friday 4th Jan.y

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pre Esq.r Governor. President
Warren Hastings Joseph Smith
Samuel Ardley

The Nabob sends Drafts of Letters proposed to be wrote to Mudaverow — Trumbeck Row and Moraris Row.

Mr. Stracey informs the Committee that he received this Morning from the Nabob a Note accompanying Drafts of Letters proposed to be wrote by Him to Mandaverow, Trumbeck Row and Moraris Row, translate & Copies of are entered in the Country Correspondence N.o 2, 3 & 4. The Committee having considered the same are of Opinion that the Complimentary — Professions of Friendship being such as generally are made in the Stile of the Country without implying any Engagement or Alliance are unexceptionable but that the great Satisfaction expressed at the particular Conquests made by Trumbeck Row from Hyder alley Cawn as well as Expressions of Joy and Pleasure at his Successes in General and also the Speaking of Hyder alley Cawn as the Enemy, are by far too strong and by no Means consistent with our present Situation and Circumstances, Agreed therefore that Mr. Stracey be desired to communicate these Sentiments to the Nabob verbally —

Observations thereon

Letter wrote to Mudaverow

The Committee being of Opinion that it may be proper to write to Mandaverow in Answer to and in Acknowledgement of his Letter received by Mr. Eckel. Mandaverow Sahafore a Draft is now wrote and approved as entered in Country Correspondence

2. Fort St George 4th January 1771.

Agreed that Mr Stracey communicate the same to the Nabob when he delivers the Message as above and desire his Sentiments thereon.

Resolved that a Letter be wrote to the Select Committee at Bengal advising them of the Arrival of Vacquils from Madavereow and the Soubah, and of our Situation with respect to the Nabob.

Read a Letter from the Nabob as entered in Country Correspondence N.5 enclosing one from Seyed Muckdoom Alby Cawn at Tritchinapaly advising of his having received one from the Killadar of Karoor setting forth that a Vacquil was going from Seringapatam to Tanjour, and Desiring that he may pass through the Circars Country without Molestation, and desiring to know what Answer he shall return thereto.

The President informs the Committee that he this Morning received a Letter from Lieutenant Col. Lang at Tritchinopoly to the same Effect, and that he purposes informing Col. Lang that he has nothing to do with Respect to the granting of Passes through the Circars Country, that his whole Attention must be confined to the Care of the Fort of Tritchinopoly, and the Discipline of the Troops, which the Committee approve, and a Letter to the Nabob in answer to that received from him is now wrote as entered in Country Correspondence N.6.

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
Sam. Treeby

3. Fort St. George 5th Jany 1771

Wrote the following Letter to the Select Committee at Fort William

To the Honble John Carter Esqr.

President & Governor &c. Gentlemen.

of the Select Committee at Fort William

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter to Select Committee at Fort William. —

We have been favored with your Letter of the 7th November enclosing extract from the Commands of the Honble Court of Directors Dated 23d March 1770 —

Vaquils from Madaverow and the Soubah arrived here some Days ago, both of them with Instructions to endeavor to obtain assistance from us. The first We have Reason to believe is countenanced by the Nabob who is desirous that we should comply with Madaverow's Request or rather demand. We are however resolved not to aid against Hyder Ally on the Contrary good Policy requires that he should be assisted, but we are prevented, by the Nabobs opposition from affording him any other than that of withholding our aid from the Morattas, so much is the Nabob inclined to favor the Designs of the Morattas against Hyder Ally, that he has declined to bear any Part of the Charges of the Field Operations against them, should they enter the Carnatic with a View to compell us into their Measures. The Nabobs Conduct in this and other Instances, his total disregard of our Remonstrances, and his opposition to our Measures are become so remarkable that we have no longer any Doubt of the Cause, it is apparent to us that his Dependance now is on the Crown and not on the Company; this temper and disposition of the Nabob, when we are scarcely able to find the Means of defraying our common Expences much less of equipping, and keeping an Army in the Field obliges us to remain entirely inactive and wait the Result of Measures which seem to threaten the

2. Fort St George 4th January 1771.

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Recommunicated the Nabob

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Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
Sam.l Foley

3. Fort St. George 5th Jan.y 1771

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To the Honble John Carter Esq.r

President & Governor &c. Gentlemen

of the Select Committee at Fort William

Honble Sirs &c.s

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4 Fort St. George 5th Janry 1771.

Ruin of the Carnatic.

Fort St George
5th Janry 1771.

We are
Honble Sir & Sir
Your most obedient
Humble Servants
Josias Du Pré
&c Committee

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pré Esqr Governor President
Warren Hastings Joseph Smith
Samuel Ardley

Monday
7 Janry.

No answer from the Nabob to the Letters of 20 and 26 December on the subject of a Money and Sepoys

The President informs the Committee that he has not yet received any answer from the Nabob to his Letters of the 20 and 26 December on the Subject of Sepoys and Money nor the least Intimation of his Intention, that having already borrowed about Pg. 35000 on the Company's Account, and made the advances for the current Charges of this Month (not including the Investment) there now remains in Cash no more than Pagodas 16000

Reasons for pressing the Nabob for an answer.

as the advices of the Morattas, both those under Trimbeck Row on the Balaghaut, and at Poonah, leave us still under the same apprehension of their sending a Party into the Carnatic, in order to compell us to join them against Hyder, and as we have the strongest Reasons to believe the Nabob favors their Plan, the Committee are of Opinion, that the unnecessary Delays, made by the Nabob in returning answers to our Letters are designed to hold us in Suspense, untill we shall be actually involved in Dangers and Perplexities, from which we may find it Difficult to extricate ourselves, without his assistance, in hopes that we shall then be obliged to adopt such Measures as he shall dictate, We have said We think the Nabob favors the Morattas

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See Minutes May

Morattas, we may say more - We think there is not the least Shadow of Doubt the whole tenor of his Conduct - the Spirit of his Declaration and arguments with the Committee - The Sentiments expressed in various Parts of his Letters - the general Opinion of the Country - his Conversations on public Durbar, which we learn by means of Secret Intelligence, all these conform and establish in our Minds as a Fact that he meant if possible to compel us to join the Morattas.

That his Delays are unnecessary will appear sufficiently by a Review of the Facts. The first Conversation the Committee had with him on the Subject of the Sepoys was the 31st July, in Consequence of which the Nabob wrote us a Letter of the 16th August and which the President answered the 3d September to which the Nabobs Answer notwithstanding our personal Application to him for the same on 31st October, was not received till the 1st December, when five other Letters being received from him at the same time, all very long, the translating them and considering the whole, necessarily employed so much time that the Presidents Answer could not be wrote, translated, and sent till the 20th December, 17 Days are since elapsed and we have not a Line of an Answer although the whole to be answered on the Subject of the Sepoys is this simple Question - whether he will or will not recommence us the Pay of 7 Battalions of Sepoys. On the Subject of Money the Committees first Proposition to him was in Committee the 31st October, as he then declined giving a verbal Answer, the President, wrote to him the 5th November, receiving no Answer to that, he again addressed him the 26th November, the Nabobs Answer was received the 2d December but being undeterminate, the Presidents Letter of the 20th and 26th December went in Reply to which we have received no Answer although the Answer Desired on the Subject of money is to this simple Question - whether

&c

Fort St. George 7th January 1771.—

He will reimburse us in Case of War the Money we have advanced on his Account for Current Charges.

Upon these Premises our Conclusion is formed Viz.t that his Delays are designed to hold us in Suspense thereby to involve us in Difficulties that shall oblige us to submit to the Terms he shall dictate.

If it should be objected that since our Opinion is so clear we ought not to have suffered ourselves to be thus duped, but to have prest him sooner to some decision. Our Answer is that we think so now as ourselves, but were unwilling, as we still are, to be more urgent than we have been, lest it should seem that We act with too little Consideration of his Dignity and Temper, and that mild, and soothing ways might have effected more than a peremptory, determined and unyeilding Conduct. The Nabob himself will say so, but we have experienced the contrary and yet not to give him any pretence to complain of rank Treatment We have and must continue to suffer all the Inconveniencys he may put us to by his equivocal Conduct. But now having remained in Suspence as long, We fear longer — than may consist with our Safety, It is resolved that Mr. Stracey do wait upon the Nabob with the following Message

Message to be sent by Mr. Stracey to the Nabob —

The Committee request the Nabob's answer to the President's Letters of the 20th and 26th December on the Subject of Sepoys and Money.

That the Committee have two very pressing Motives for desiring the Nabob will inform them of his Resolution on these Points immediately.

The 1st. That in the present critical State of Affairs it is necessary they should know what they have to trust to, that they may take such Measures, as the Nabob's Resolution shall render necessary for the Company's Affairs. —

The 2d that they every Day expect a Ship from Bengall which will very shortly sail for Europe, and they must advise the

Company

7. Fort St. George 7th January 1774

Company of whatever may be the Nabob's Revolutions, and their Treasures in Consequences

If the Nabob should say he is preparing an answer and will send it as soon as he can. Mr Stracey must then acquaint the Nabob that the Committee request to know what Day they may expect it, or that the Nabob will give the Committee leave to wait upon him, and receive it verbally. —

Jos: Du Bré

Warren Hastings

Sam: Treby

Fort St. George 10th January 1771

Thursday
10th Jany 1771

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pré Esq. Governor President
Warren Hastings Joseph Smith
Samuel Ardley.

The President informs the Committee that pursuant to the Resolution of the Committee the 7th Instant, Mr. Stracey had delivered to the Nabob the Message therein directed, and had reported to him the Nabob's answer to which Mr. Stracey immediately upon his return home, reduced to writing, and it as follows.

Mr Stracey's Report of the Nabobs answer to the Message sent him.

The Nabob's Answer to the Message from the Committee.

That on account of the Runnyaum, he had been deficient hitherto, in replying to the Governor's Letters, however at the Committee, now desired an Answer he would begin the same, and they should have it before the Dispatch of the Europe Ships.

In answer to the Committees Request, of his fixing a Day for the Receipt of the same, he said, he could not, but that as above, they should have it before the Dispatch of the Europe Ships.

And, in Reply to the Committees Request of an Interview with him (as he had not fixed a Day for the Receipt of his answer) he said that his House was there, and that he was obliged to them, however he could give them no other answer than the present by his Means.

The foregoing answer so strongly confirms the Opinion the Committee have Delivered in their said Minutes of the 7th Instt. that the Nabob's Delays do not proceed from Negligence but from Design in order to keep us in Suspence and thereby prevent us from taking Measures for our Safety in Time in hopes that when we shall be involved in Danger and Difficulty we shall be obliged to adopt his Measures to obtain his aid in order to extricate ourselves. We say his answer to

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our Message so strongly confutes this Opinion that we think it necessary to State, in more clear and direct Terms than we have hitherto done our Ideas of his Views and on what Grounds those Ideas are founded.

We hope it will not - and we think it cannot with Justice be imputed to the Board, or to the Committee as Unsteadiness that they sometimes change their Opinions on Part or even on whole, if such Reasons are assigned for the Change as have Probability to support them, and if granted, are sufficient to produce the Effect supposed. The man who should deliver an Opinion of the Secret Springs and wheels which produce a visible Motion ought not to be deemed an Ignorant Artist though he should have mistaken the Principle provided the Machinery he supposed were sufficient to produce the Effect, but he certainly would merit the Character of a candid Man, if upon discovering the Machinery he should acknowledge the Combinations more natural, and better contrived to produce the visible Effect than that which he had supposed. Although we have often disapproved the Nabob's Conduct his political Views in particular Instances and his ambition in all yet we have ever declared our Opinion of his Attachment to the Company, and to the Nation such Sentiments may be found in many Places of our Letters and Records and particularly in our Separate Letter ex Shannet dated the 27th June 1769 Para. 6. where we assign the strongest Reasons that can exist in Nature - Self Interest, our Judgment then might have been right and yet a different Judgment of his present Views may also be right for the same first moving Principle and Spring of Action may by an intervention of new Aids and Circumstances operate to a different End, We say this may be the Case, but we must confess at the same time that we have now some Doubts whether the Seeds of desire to free himself from the Company's Controul have not

not at all times exitted in him with equal Vigour and only wanted the proper Soil and Culture to bring them into Life, in a Word we think the Nabob is the same that he always was, but his Circumstances different, and we think our opinions of him, at different Times though seemingly different will be found consistent because they are founded on the same Principle Self Interest, and varying only according to Circumstances. The application of this exordium will be found in the Sequel.

So long as the Nabob had no apparent Support but the Company his Folly must have exceeded all Description had he openly attempted to seperate himself from them, for the Consequence must have been certain Ruin, if he has therefore concealed his real Views under repeated Declarations of Friendship and some occasional Acts, that might be construed to proceed from a Friendship, he has only acted a Part which common Policy and common Sense must ever dictate under parallel Circumstances. — We presume therefore to think that the Premises do no warrant the Conclusion if he be declared faithfull because he hath not been overtly unfaithfull, when it is apparent that he could not have been openly unfaithfull without incurring certain, at least probable Ruin. We could support this Reasoning by a thousand Instances drawn from our Records, but time and other Avocations will not permit. a few may suffice.

After the long Experience the Nabob has had of the superiority of the European Military Force over that of the Country, after the Experience he has had of the Company's Power in reconquering and of their Confidence in restoring and giving to him all that he now possesses had his Friendship to them been as sincere, his attachment as real, and his Dependance as firm as he has declared them to be, and as they are in England believed to be, he would not have been so anxious

at

Fort St. George 10th January 1771

as he has been to have the Company's Garrisons withdrawn from
his Forts, and the Sepoys entertained by the Company on his
Account disbanded. See Letter off Thames 27th June 1769 Par. 6
pretending Fears and Jealousies which had no reasonable
Foundation, and as they had none we must look upon them
as mere Pretences and seek for the Rise and Existence of that
anxiety in some more natural Cause. The desire of Independance
is innate, the Peasant feels it as well as the Prince, but it grows
with Prosperity, and in an ambitious Mind is not to be
repressed. The Desire of Independance We may therefore
without hazard of a Doubt assign to him as a Man, and
à fortiori as a Prince - ambition has always been given as
Part of his Character, we dare go further and give them both
as his ruling Passions - but the time is not yet fully come
to allow them free scope, the Scene however opens and partly
Discovers to us distant Objects.

We have not till lately had any Suspicions that
the Nabob ever purposed to raise himself to a State of Independance
through the Means of the French if such Ideas exist in him
We believe they are yet but in their Infancy, and we cannot
trace them further back than a few Months. We do not yet
pretend to affirm any thing upon this Subject but the Desire
that what we shall offer may be taken merely as political
Speculation which together with the Grounds and Reasons we
referred to the candid Judgment of our Superiors.

We believe it may be boldly affirmed that at
and from the Conclusion of the Treaty of Paris till lately the
11th article of it was not meant or understood in England, France
or India to mean more than an Acknowledgment of the
Nabob's Title in order to prevent the Rise of fresh Troubles between
the English and French, by setting up and supporting Other
Claimants

Fort St. George 10th January 1774

Gen.l Letter from
Land Rates 4th March
1775 Par. 11, 12, 13

Claimants under real or pretended Sanads from Superior
Princes. But now we understand — (see Sr John Lindays
Correspondence with us) — that the acknowledgment by the
said 11th Article is construed to be a Guarantee whereby the Nabob
becomes an ally of the Crown of Great Britain. The Article
is in every Respect as strong and conveys the same promise &
Spirit with Respect to the Crown of France as the Crown of
England, if therefore the Nabob by Virtue of that article is
become an ally of the Crown of England he is thereby to all
Intents and Purposes as much an ally of the Crown of France
and is it probable that the Court of France will decline or
omit to avail itself of the same Arguments which — but for
another Purpose, are used by the Court of England, to establish
an Interest and Connection that may restore them to a State
of equal Importance on the Carnatic with the English? and
is it probable that the Nabob — ambitious and desiring an
independance — should neglect so fair an Occasion of —
Counterballancing a Power, such as the English, of which
he has pretended to be so Jealous, and of which (whether
from Jealousy or ambition) it is most certain he wishes to
become Independant? but other Circumstances concur to favor
the Opinion that the Nabob projects a Connexion with
the French. —

It is become the Subject of Public Conversation
in the Country and obtains general Belief that the Nabob
is endeavoring by the Power of the Crown through Sr John
Lindsay to obtain Restitution of the Jaghire and to effect
that, it is represented that the Jaghire was taken from him
by Force, and that the Company and their Servants have
oppressed and tyrannised over him; and it is equally believed
that he is soliciting the Protection of the Crown to free him
from

from the Restraints and Controul under which he represents that he hath been held by the Company. whether these be Facts or not, we cannot take upon us to assert, it would be absurd to affirm as a Fact, what can only reach us by indirect and secret Reports, but we can affirm that the whole tenor of the Nabob's Conduct towards us, his utter Evasion of every Remonstrance we make, the Stile and Language of his Letters, and his close Connection with Sr John Lindsay and above all his Refusal to deliberate with us, are in Circumstances so strong that they leave but little Doubt on our Minds of his Views which we verily believe are to free himself entirely by means of the Power of the Crown; from all manner of Restraint and Controul of the Company, we do not mean that it is his wish to separate himself from them totally but to be on such Terms as that he may receive the Benefit of their Aid whenever he shall stand in Need of it merely as Allies, but that they shall have no more Power or Controul over him or any thing relative to him, than the Company in former times had over the Nabobs of the Carnatic.

We take this Principle as established and we have said that We believe he means to effect it through the Power of the Crown by the means of Sr John Lindsay

But what are his further views? his present Complaints are that he has been oppressed by the Company and their Servants. - when by the Power of the Crown he shall have annihilated the Company or divested them of all Power, is it possible to think him so ignorant and so weak as to believe that the present Favor shewn him by the present Ministers of the Crown (the real Design of which is too obvious to be mistaken) will extend so far and

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so long as to have the Interests of the Nation, and the individual at his Mercy? He hath had Experience enough of the Temper of the Crown Officers, he hath seen Admirals and Generals of the Crown in India he is no Stranger to what hapted at Manilla, he hath no Reason to think from their Conduct in the Carnatic that they are more disinterested than the Company's Officers, or that they will use Power with more Moderation; on the contrary he knows that the Company's Officers rise to Preferment generally by long Service and acquire their Fortunes gradually (we speak of the generality) and have not often great and powerfull Connexions at home to support them in Oppressions, and he knows too that it is most likely whenever the Military Power in India shall fall into the Hands of the Crown that the Principal Officers will be chosen from the first Families in Great Britain with a double View, the one that those Officers may create rapid Fortunes, the other that by conferring such beneficial Employs on powerfull Families that Power will become attached to the Crown which will thus acquire additional Influence and Ability to protect the favored Officers and for other Purposes. We have said he knows all this — We might boldly conclude it from the most simple & Reasoning. But we will add that it is no Secret in the Country that such Sentiments are really and actually entertained in the Durbar. This being the Case, can it be supposed — without supposing the Nabob weaker than Folly itself — that he could wish to see a Plan adopted — may that he should be himself the principle Instrument in forming, soliciting, and establishing a Plan whereby, to become independant of a Weak, and amenable Power, he should be subjected to the Coercion and Controul of a stronger Power

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Power from which there lies no appeal, the proposition is too absurd to be debated. His views therefore must be to become independant of the Company, by the Power of the Crown and taking the advantage of the Favor and countenance which must be shewn him by the Ministers of the Crown whilst they are struggling against the Remains of Power in the Company he certainly must mean to raise himself to an independance of the Crown also but by what Means? we have already stated the dangerous Doctrine lately broached which makes him to all Intents and Purposes as much an Ally of the Crown of France as of the Crown of England. That Doctrine must undoubtedly have taken its Rise in England, or St. John Lindsay in his public Character would not have adopted it in his Correspondence with us. the Nabob most probably did not remain long unconfirmed of a Matter of such Importance to his Views, accordingly soon after the arrival of Advices last Year from Europe, we find Hints occasionally dropping from him of a tendancy very different from any Scat he had ever before ventured to suggest. It will appear by our Minutes of the 6th June that in a Conference the Committee had with the Nabob upon the Measures to be taken in Case the French should land a Force in the Carnatic with hostile Views. the Nabob proposed to add to our own Force three Battalions of his Sepoys and two thousand Horse, but from the time the French should take the Field he would not answer for their Pay nor — Provision for them Vide Minutes 6 June 1770, also the Nabobs Letter of the 7th June 1770 entered on the Consultations Minutes of the 16th Paragraph and Remark U, what makes this seeming Indifference with Respect to an Event which formerly would have been more alarming to him than

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than to us, is, that at this Time advices were received that considerable Forces were arrived or expected at the Islands, and Rumors prevailed of great Enterprizes projected by the French for the Recovery of their Influence in India, which could not but have threatened him with Consequences the most fatal to his Power, unless he had formed some Project for warding off the impending Danger from himself. — This seems to have been but the Dawn of a new System, but the Nabob having since then had the Benefit of Sr John Lindsay's Presence, he speaks more plainly. "The French — says he in his Letter of the "26 November Last Paragraph and Remark G have no "Quarrel either with me or the People of my Country their Enmity "is to the English and their Places, but it is true also that on a "Account of the Strength of my Regard for the English they bear "me also an inveterate Hatred.

Our Opinions of these Passages is that they seem plainly indicate Notions of a neutral System on the Part of the Nabob between the English and French.

The President now lays before the Committee three Papers of Intelligence obtained by the means of certain of the Persons secretly employed by him for that Purpose which are as follow.

Intelligence received by different Hands as follows. —

Seneva saroie the French Vakeel who lately arrived with † Alchenapunt at Arcott is said to negotiate with the Nabob Duan him about some certain Districts round Pondicherry such as Valdore &c. to be added to their present Possessions of some Villages Alchenapunt declared to him the disagreement subsisting at present between the Nabob and the English Company and proposed certain Articles of Friendship to be entered in with the French

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on the side of the Nabob and said that he will soon set out to review the Country and then he will take an Opportunity of visiting the French Governor at Pondicherry, where he said every thing will be settled to the Satisfaction of both Parties, he intends to send away the Vackeel in a Day or two to Pondicherry. It seems the Great People maintain a Friendship with the French, at present more than ever, who are supplying the Great with Tents, Led, Brimstone and other Stores of War and it is talked they promised to send, or supply the Great People with small Arms

The Mustadaddies of the Nabobs Cutchery Fort St. Arcott and here talk publicly and privately as follows.

That a Disagreement arose between the Nabob and the Company, an Embassador from the English King came to the Nabob with certain Proposals and said that the Company's Possessions in this Country excepting their Fourts of Trade, shall be taken away from them in a short time, and to that End he shewed some Credentials to the Nabob, and desired him to explain his Case that he might represent it to the King, on this the Nabob laid his Case and Grievances before him and he wrote himself also to the King and appointed some Gentlemen in England to act as his Attorneys at the King's Court, and he is now preparing the Accounts of all the Money paid to the Company and their People ever since the time of Governor Saunders and he is also preparing the Accounts of the exorbitant Interest paid to the Company's People on the Monies he rent and likewise getting ready the Account of the Loss he sustained by the Farm of the Company's Jageer during these 7 Years; he seems to be very much displeased with the present Governor's Treatment by Reason that he press'd him hard to pay several Lacks of Money towards the Discharge of the Company's Debt and he expects soon

to

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to receive the Kings Sanad or Patent of Protection in a proper Form freeing himself from that of the Company. the Kings Embassador provided every thing to his Satisfaction on whom he depends very much which is not so agreable to his eldest Son. It is said that the Nabob told the Embassador that if 2 or 3000 of the Kings Troops is put under his Directions to act as he bids them, he will be able to add to the Carnatic several other Provincy and make suitable Return to his Majesty saying at the same time that the Companys Troops act as they please and dont regard his orders, he frequently and publicly complains that he was squeesed of his Money by the Company and their Servants under various Pretentions, and he has an Intention to renew the Farm of the Companys Jagcer, or continue the Said Possession of the same by any Means whatsoever as soon as the present Cowel is expired. For short since the Embassador's Arrival he looks upon the Companys People in a quite different Light. It is said also that he is now busy in preparing some Representations in writing consisting of several Sheets and some European Gentlemen residing in this Place are assisting in the same; they say he prepares these Representations in order to send to England by Doctor Boswell. He ordered the Manager of the Companys Jagcer to prepare Accounts for the Farm of the 7 Years setting forth his own Jamabendy which was more than the real Value and giving Credit for what was collected therefrom and then to make out a Balance, if the Accounts are stated in this Manner, there will appear very considerable Balance of several Lacks remaining Due on the said Jagcer, which he has a mind to produce as a Bar of the Company. intend to take away the said Jaghire from him at the Expiration of the present Cowel. The News of the Disagreement between the Nabob and the Company, and the Embassadors Transactions against

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the Interest of the latter is already spread through the Country Some are of opinion that the Nabob does not act right in contesting the Matter with the Company who were his Benefactors, and that if it was not for their Assistance he would not have been the Master of the Carnatic and others talk that his present manner of acting will in the End prove very fatal to his affairs.

A Mercar from the Southward gave the following Account

Jany. the 4th 1771.

At the time of Alchena Punto setting out from Arcott in order to review the Country, he dispatched the French Packet called Seenevasarow that came to him some time ago, to go before him, and stay at Trivattore the Capital of the Wandewash Country, which he accordingly did, and when Alchena Punt went to the said Trivatore he took with him and proceeded as far as Tondevanom from which Place he sent away the said Packet with a Direction to stay at Villyanallore (about 4 or 5 Miles to the Westward of Pondicherry) till he came there — The said Alchena Punt from Tondevanom proceeded to Arpaur, and Alattore to the eastward of the said Place. Her Franch Packet came and met him at the said Place to know his Pleasure to come to Pondicherry, he then said that he will come by the way of Rangapellai Choultry upon which a French Gentleman with black Head Servants of the Company and with the Music came to the said Choultry on the 27th Ultimo with a Design to meet him and conduct him to Pondicherry, but he instead of going that way went away to Villyanalore by another Road at which Place the French Company's Dubash met him with a customary Present on the 31st and desired to know his — Inclination to go to Pondicherry, to which his answer was that he wrote to the Nabob but has not yet received his — Answer, and added that as soon as he received the Answer, he will

Fort St. George 10th January 1771.

will call at the said Place, and so he left Nellyanallore and departed towards Velaporam &c.a —

Intelligence received by other Hands January 1771

The French at Pondicherry for sometime past have negociating with the Nabob and Alchenapunt to let them have the Management of the neighbouring Pargannas — namely Nellyanallore, Bagore, Velaporam &c.a promising to pay certain Rents, upon which they asked the French what Rents they would pay for them, they offered 60,000 Pagodas p.r Annum which they said was more than their real Worth but according to Alchenapunts Account it amounted to — Pagodas 70,000 or more, at Length the Nabob gave them to understand that he does not mind the Difference in their Offer but was he to let out those Countries to them at present, the English will be displeased with him so that their Affair remains unsettled to this Day.

It is talked by the French that they very soon expect Orders from Europe to regain their former — Jageer allotted to them by the Country Power During the Government of M.r Dupleix.

Although the foregoing Papers are no absolute Proofs they yet have Probability and therefore concur with what has already been said, to which if we add the Nabobs Demand that the 7 Battalions of Sepoys hitherto entertained and paid by the Company for his Account, be henceforth paid by his People and put under his Orders, the Measures he is taking for — incorporating and disciplining his own Sepoys, by the means of our Officers (See our Minutes of the 30th October 1770 of which We recommend the attentive Perusal, the extreme Delicacy he lately shewed upon Occasion of some French Deserters vide minutes of Consultation of 15th October 1770, all these — Circumstances

Fort St George 10th Jany 1771

Circumstances and the general Tenor of the Nabobs late Conduct, concur to establish in our Minds the Opinion we have herein before suggested which in Brief is this "that the "Nabob & views are under the present Favor and Countenance "of the Crown to make himself totally independant of the "Company, and then by Means of the Forces to counter "balance the Power of the Crown so as to be independant "of both and to throw his weight into either Scale as "may on different Conjunctures best suit his Interests. To these same Views of Ambition and Independance we have already in our former Proceedings and Addresses to the Court of Directors attributed the partial Attachment which the Nabob has for a long Time shewn to the Marattas, and the Arguments by which he has lately endeavored to draw us into an Alliance with them against Hyder Ally. He is sufficiently assured of our Determination not to submit to so dangerous a Measure, unless compelled to it by the last Necessity and therefore we believe he will endeavour to throw it possible to that Necessity. From his late Connections with Sr John Lindsay we might be justified in concluding without other Grounds, that he had taken Pains to convince his Majesties Plenipotentiary of the Necessity of engaging in that Alliance. But we have other Reasons to believe that Sr John Lindsay has very zealously espoused the same Opinion, because unless we are misinformed he makes no Secret of it. By this Means the Nabob may reasonably hope to interest the British Administration in the same Cause. If he succeeds in this (as it is most probable he will) whatever Part we take, he will have at least a fair Chance of being a Gainer by the Advancement of his primary Object.

If he can keep us in Suspense until the Marattas

Fort St. George 10th January 1771.

Marattas actually enter the Province they will send us without Money. He will not furnish us with any, we shall not be able to provide for the Pay of our Troops without him, we must therefore give up the seven Battalions of Sepoys to him, by which he will immediately acquire a respectable Force under his own Controul. This is one great Step to Independance, but we shall be obliged also to join the Marattas with him. — This will give him the Triumph which he has long sought, which is to convince the Country Powers that the Company's Forces are under his Guidance and Controul. Nor will Appearances only be against us, for the Marattas knowing the Reluctance with which we submitted to their alliance will give the Nabob all the Credit of it, and of Course they will either regard us with Jealousy and therefore unite with the Nabob to compel us to enter into all their Designs or we shall be treated as mere Mercenaries and Followers of the Sovereign of the Carnatic and obliged to submit to every Measure which his absolute will shall dictate to us. Thus he will at once attain that Independance which he so ardently aspires to, and We in our Turn must become the weaker Party and even sink to the meanest State of Vassalage — an Event which God avert from us

If on the other Hand we refuse under such Circumstances to give up to him the 7 Battalions of Sepoys, and to join the Marattas the Consequences as far as we know (for we have no certain Resources) the Consequences must be the Desertion of our Troops (which he who has the Means may immediately recruit) and Difficulties and Botheration without End. all which will be felt at home, all which will therefore be imputed to our want of Ability or

worse

worse, for who will take the Pains to investigate the evil
Consequences that would probably have happened had we
punished his Measures, the Evil felt is always the worst, and
every Man is ready to suppose a thousand Advantages from
every other possible Plan. The Court of Poytland already
prepossessed in Favor of the Nabobs Measures will enter
zealously into his Resentments against us for not adopting
them, they will join the popular cry against us, for our supposed
Misconduct and employ it as a valid Pretence for espousing
his Cause, and taking the Management of Affairs out of our
Hands, which will have been proved so unfit to hold them.
This therefore will tend to weaken, if not ruin, the Company's
Influence, to strengthen that of the Crown, and of Course
to aid his great Scheme of Independance.

That these Consequences are probable will be
readily allowed us; but that our Asiatic Power should
enter into such complicated Views, and hope to derive
an Advantage for the Prevalence of a mere Opinion on
advancing the Pretensions of the Crown over the Power
of its Subjects, will appear too subtle a Refinement to
those who are unacquainted with the Nabobs Character
and the Deference which his long Connection with
the English has given him in the Nature of Politics
of the British Government. He knows that the Power of
the Crown is circumscribed by certain Bounds and that
all its Acts must be grounded on the Laws or Usage
or obtain the previous Sanction of Parliamentary
Authority; he has heard for he has many Correspondents
in England, and many Britons here who carry him every
Tale with such Embellishments as they think will please
He has heard that one Argument used against the
Company

Fort St. George 10th Jany 1771

Company by the Ministry, is the want of ability in the Company's Servants to manage their Affairs, whence they are rashly plunged or ignorantly betrayed into ruinous Wars, and that as the Crown is now materially and immediately interested in the Administration of Affairs abroad it is necessary to place the Administration in abler Hands, that is to say in the Hands of the Servants of the Crown, there cannot therefore be a more direct Way to enable the Ministry to avail themselves of that argument to divest the Company of all Power, than by involving us in Difficulties from whence we should find it hard to extricate ourselves without his Aid, and there will not then be wanting arguments enough, and secretly without giving us any Opportunity of refuting them to prove that they were wholly owing to our Want of Ability and tis well if Want of Integrity be not added also, and he had had but too many Proofs that such Secret Representations have Weight.

All these Arguments being fully and maturely considered the Committee seeing clearly the Intricacy and Danger to which we are exposed which Way soever we turn, think it Adviseable nevertheless to avoid any decisive Resolution yet a while, as our Measures must be formed on the Nabob's, if he stands after all encumbrance as the sum he owes the Company for the Current Charges of 1770 and enable us to pay the 7 Battalions of Sepoys we must still undoubtedly continue to act upon the same Plan we have hitherto done, consulting with him the Measures, but if he refuse both as it will be impossible for us to pay all the Forces we

have

Fort St George 10th Jan.y 1771

have in the Carnatic, We must then concert some Method of relieving ourselves of a Part of the Charge, or at least employ them so as to ensure the Means of defraying it by securing the Collections in the North, these however are not to be considered as Resolutions but merely by the outline of a Dernier Resort. at present it is agreed to proceed no further than to press the Nabob for an immediate answer, a Draft of a Letter is accordingly now prepared for that Purpose as entered in Country Correspondence N.o 9 to be sent this Evening. —

Jon.a Duncan

Warren Hastings.

Sam.l Stratton

26 Fort St George 14th January 1771

At a Committee Present

Monday 14th Jan.y

Josias Du Pré Esq.r Governor President

Warren Hastings, Joseph Smith

Samuel Ardley.

Draught of a Letter to the Honble Court of Directors read approved, and ordered to be wrote fair, but not closed till the arrival of the Houghton, in case she should call here. that any other materials Occurrences which may happen before her arrival may be added.

Jos.r Du Pré

Warren Hastings.

27 Fort St George 18th January 1771.

At a Committee Present

Friday 18th Jany. Josias Du Pré Esqr. Governor President
Warren Hastings Joseph Smith
Samuel Ardley.

The President informs the Committee that yesterday in the Morning he had the Honor of a Visit from the Nabob at the Garden House — That after Compliments and introductory Conversation the Nabob asked when he intended to dispatch a Ship to Europe — The President informed him that we expected every Hour two from Bengal that one would be dispatched in 24 Hours after her arrival and the other in 20 Days. The Nabob asked how we could do that without his answer and then took out of his Pocket a Paper in the Persian Language which he said contained a few Memorandums concerning Some Explanations he wished to have respecting his Accounts &c and then he would immediately answer the President's Last Letters, the Nabob declared his good Inclination to do thereon whatever we should advise and protested that he had no Idea of a Separate Interest from the Company — The President assured him that nothing was further from his Thoughts than to press any thing contrary to their mutual Interest that what was essential to the Company's Interest it was his Duty to urge — but that on all Matters which did not essentially affect the Company's Interest the Nabob should ever find him readily and heartily disposed to oblige him to the utmost of his Power. the Nabob seemed extremely happy and the President promised to wait upon him in the Evening with Mr Peachey as Interpreter in order to explain the Matters on which the Nabob wanted Information.

Accordingly in the Evening the President waited upon the Nabob at his House The Nabob seemed to throw off all Reserve, conversed with chearfullness freedom and

26

Fort St George 14th January 1771

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Accordingly in the Evening the President waited upon the Nabob at his House The Nabob seemed to throw off all Reserve, conversed with chearfullness, freedom and

Fort St. George 18th Janry. 1771

good humour, the President did the same and perfect Up
harmony and friendship seemed to be restored. The Business
proposed and settled was in Brief as follows.

The Nabob said he observed that the Balance of
his Account with the Company the 30 April last was about
306000 Pagodas — That he had paid two Lacks in May
which he wished to have brought into the April Account
and that he would immediately send the 106000 remaining
Balance of the April account which he desired might also be
brought into that account that so his account might be
entirely clear to 30th April and then another Account of
Current Charges might begin — The President informed him
that our Books being compleated it was not possible to intro-
duce those Sums in our Books in the month of April last
but that it might be settled and explained by Letter which
would answer the same End with which the Nabob was
satisfied, and added that besides the Sum to compleat the
Ballance of the April Account he would pay two Lacks of Pagodas
in the Course of next Month the Nabob desired that agreeable
Discharge might be given him in full of all Accounts to the
30th April for a full and clear Explanation of this Matter
we beg leave to refer to the Nabob's Letter of the 28th. November
with the Committees Remarks thereon entered in Country
Correspondence N.o 192. and the President's answer of the
26th December N.o 211. The President endeavored to satisfy
him that it was not proper for us to give such a Release or
Discharge which ought to come from the Court of Directors
or their immediate Authority, but that we would write to
them, and inform them of the Nabobs Desire upon this
Subject, that we could not promise but believed they would
comply

 Fort St George 18th Jany 1771.

comply with his Desire

with Respect to the Sepoys, he said he thought more were charged in his account, than 7000 that he wished the Current Expences could be kept within the Sum of two Lacks of Pagodas p annum, the President informed him that was impossible, of that the Pay of 7 Battalions of Sepoys without any other Charge would amount to more, but that he might be at a certainty, the President promised him to draw out an account of the Pay of 7 compleat Battalions upon the present Establishment and proposed that the net amount p annum should be the Sum to be charged to him for the Pay of the Sepoys so that he would then be at a certainty as to their Pay, but that still there would remain many current Charges of the several Garrisons as well as occasional Charges of Batta when any Detachment should march and other incidental Charges with which the Nabob acquiesced —

The Nabob then said that a great many Stores brought back from Cacar of those which had been sent thither on the Expedition into the Balaghaut had been lodged at Vellour and that his account was debited for the same that he wished they might be brought back to Madras and that he might be credited for the amount. The President informed him that it would be attended with a very considerable Charge — nevertheless that if he desired it to be so, it should be so, but at the same time proposed, that as it was very proper such a Garrison as Vellour should be well supplied the Committee of Stores should examine the State of those now at Vellour, and draw out a List of what they judge to be a proper Store for the Garrison, that the same should then be laid before the Nabob, and if there appeared any Surplus, that Surplus should be transported to Madras if

he

30 Fort St George 18th Jany 1771

he Desired it, with this Proposal also the Nabob seemed satisfied.

He wished that his running account could be closed and settled annually in the Month of april and he would discharge it then, for that it perplexed his Accounts to have it remain to unlimitted terms by carrying the Ballances forward. that he should not mind paying a Little more (1000 Pagodas he said) than the Amount, to make good any Errors that might have happened rather than wait Months for the balancing the Companys Books — The President told him that we could not answer for the Accuracy of any Account that is to say its exact Agreement in Pagodas Fanams and Cash with the Companys Books untill those Books should be balanced but as a few Pagodas more or less would never make any Difference between him and the Company — The President promised to concert a Method whereby he might have his Account annually without Delay, and if upon balancing the Books there should appear any small Error, it should not be regarded on the one Side or the other with this likewise the Nabob expressed himself Satisfied

The Nabob then said he believed there was an Omission on the Credit Side of his account of about 1800 Pagodas for Grain sent from Arcott &c. into the Ballaghaut — the President said he could not upon the Memory say positively that he had been duly credited, but he believed he had, however that Matter should be immediately examined and if it had been omitted he should have Credit.

N.B. upon Enquiry it appears that Credit has been given for the same in the Books of the Commissary General.

here

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hereunder the Conference ensuing by with mutual Confidence
& and to mutual Satisfaction, and the Nabob promised to
write to the President before the Dispatch of the expected Ship.

Jos: Du Bré

Warren Hastings

Sam Ardley

32. Fort St. George 21st January 1771

Monday
21st Janry

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pré Esqr. Governor President
Warren Hastings
Samuel Ardley
General Smith indisposed

General Letter to the Honble Court of Dirs to go by the Ship Houghton which arrived Yesterday, read and signed — Ordered that the Packet be closed. —

Jos: DuPré
Warren Hastings.
Sam: Ardley

Fort St George 4th February 1771

At a Committee Present

Monday 4th February

Josias Du Pré Esqr. Governor President
Warren Hastings Joseph Smith
Samuel Middleton

This Morning the whole Council having visited upon the Nabob at his House at Chepauk to compliment him upon the Marriage of his two Best Sons Omdut-ul-Omrah and Madaur-ul-Mulk – after Breakfast the Nabob desired to speak to the Select Committee. the rest of the Council having taken their Leave. the Nabob informed the Committee that he had heard a Letter was preparing from his Creditors to him to be sent to the Governor and Council that they might forward it. That this made him very uneasy. That he desired we would save his Honor &c. – we replied that we had also heard such a Letter was in preparing; that we had not yet received it, and when we did, we should only forward it to him. he asked to what purpose that he did not know what Answer to give to it and desired our Opinion. We begged to know what were the Points of Difficulty that occurred to him and what he proposed, that being informed of these we might take the advice of the Council at large and that then we should be enabled to act as the Subject might require. He said the Matter in short was this – That he was desirous of paying his Creditors – that he had promised in Case the Companys Affairs should require it to assist us with Money as far as ten Lacks of Pagodas in Case of Peace and Tranquility in the Country over and above the two Lacks he stood engaged to pay us the End of this Month.

N.B. These ten Lacks he proposed to assist us with by Way of Loan – See his Letter of the 28th November and our Minutes of the 13th December 1770.—

That it would be impossible for him to pay his Creditors and assist

Fort St. George 4th February 1771

afford us with that Money also, and that he should be glad that we would consent to his paying the same to his Creditors by which he should save a Lack of Pagodas in the Year by Interest. — This is the Substance of what passed. We informed him that we would consult the Council and that we should then communicate further with him on this Subject. Agreed that these Minutes be communicated to the Council. —

The President reports to the Committee that he had yesterday another Conference with the Maratta Vacquil, In which he could learn no more than that he was sent here to sound our Inclination, and to know whether we would join the Marattas or not. The President desired to know what Plan he had to propose and what Advantages to offer, in Expectation that out of so extensive a Subject some Matter might arise from Procrastination But the Vacquil declined to advance beyond the simple Proposition before mentioned saying that if We should Declare our Inclination or good will to join Madaverow, he would then explain the advantages otherwise it would be to no Purpose but that he wished to know what we desired — To gain Time, the President told him that his concise Proposition was of too much Importance to be so hastily determined, that it was necessary to have the advice of the Council whose he should desire another Interview with him and thus the Conference ended — The President further informs the Committee that in the Course of this Conversation the Vaquil taking occasion to reproach us for our backwardness in assisting his Master, said that the King and the People of England were desirous of it. —

Draft of the Letter to the Honorable Court of Directors to go by the Vansittart, read and

approved

35 Fort St. George 4th February 1775

approved. Ordered to be wrote fair.

Jon. Du Bré

Warren Hastings

Sam. Hodley

36 Fort St George 6th February 1771

Wednesday 9th Febry

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pré Esqr Governor President
Warren Hastings Joseph Smith
Samuel Ardley

General Letter to the Honble the Court of Directors to go by the Vansittart read, and signed:— Ordered that the Packet be closed.—

Jos: Du Pré
Warren Hastings
Sam: Ardley

37 Fort St. George 7th February 1771.

The following Letter from the Select Committee at Fort William received the 29th Ultimo is now entered

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr.

President and Governor &c and to the Select Committee

Fort St George

Gentlemen

Letter from the Select Committee at Bengall Advising of the Progress of the Morattas against the Jauts Rohillas and Pattans and of their having advanced at Body as far as the Frontiers of Corahy ——

It is with great Concern that we acquaint You with our Apprehensions of an approaching War in this Part of India, at a Time when You are also in so much Expectation of Disturbances on the Coast, and when the Calamitous Situation of this Country from the Late Famine, must render for some Time our Finances deficient as to make it difficult for us to supply even the common Demands on this Presidency —

The Maratta Army commanded by Rain Chund Gunnes Tokojee &c. after having committed various Depredations on the Rajepoots entered the Country of the Jauts in the Month of February last under Pretence of supporting one of the Chiefs of that People who had already been greatly weakened by the war with the Sicks. They soon overcame the little Opposition which was made to them, and contrary to their invariable Practice in every former Invasion of Hindostan they took up their Quarters in the Jaut Country during the Rains. —

For the present Time Nudjebut &c Dowlah entered into an Alliance with the Morattas but probably with no other Intention than to avert their Army from his own Possessions, We were persuaded ourselves and it was the general Opinion in that Part of the Country that he would have dropped this Connection, and would perhaps have opposed his new Friends whenever he saw a Probability

38 Fort St George 9th February 1771.

Probability of their being obliged to desist from their attempt. So remove however the Jealousy which the Morattahs entertained of his Conduct, he sent his Eldest Son with a small Detachment to join their Army & immediately after which the old Nabob died on his way to Pudjeb Gun his principal Fortress.

We were very apprehensive that this Event might have induced the Morattas to attempt the Conquest of Delhie, as there was scarcely any thing to oppose their Progress and as their Success in such an undertaking would have so greatly encreased their Riches and their Influence, by the acquisition of a most extensive Country, and by the possession of the Kings Son.

But though they were strongly instigated to attempt this great and promising undertaking by Gazioden Cawn, and had Reason to expect Support at Delhie, they laid aside all attempts of this Nature, and having some time before settled with the Jautts for the Payment of a large Sum of Money they invaded the Countries of the Rohillas and Patans, little Opposition has been made to them, an Army has been collected under the Command of the two principal Chiefs, but has remained almost entirely inactive, has suffered the Morattas to overrun the whole Country, and to possess themselves of the strong Fortress of Ettawah on the only feeble Attempt which they made to check the Progress of the Enemy, they have shewed the most infamous Cowardice

Nothing remains unconquered in the abovementioned Districts, but the City of Furruckabad which it is said the Rohillas will defend but there is no Probability of their making any long or material Resistance.

Since

By Fort St George 7th February 1771

Since the Fall of Ettawah the Morattas have Advanced a Body of 10,000 Men to the Frontiers of Corah, have already made Irruptions into that Province, and have laid Claim to Part of the Dominions of the Vizier

The Conduct of the King of Vizier has been as heretofore mysterious and doubtfull. The former full of apprehensions for the Safety of his Son and without any Steadiness in his Temper or Caution in his Conduct declared his Resolution of going to Delhi, with or without our assistance, the Consequence and we believe the Intention of which must have been to throw himself into the Hands of the Morattas. But an unexpected Union in the Family of Nudjel ul Dowlah, and the sudden Invasion of his Dominions has according to our last advices induced him to lay aside his intended Expedition. The Vizier on his Part has been full of his usual Professions, but has suffered the neighbouring Powers to be crushed without advancing a Man to their assistance and has entertained a Correspondence with the Enemy under a Pretence altogether frivolous. —

In this Situation of Affairs we cannot but be apprehensive of an approaching war. The extraordinary Progress of the Morattas towards the Borders of these Provinces. Their Attack made on the Dominions of our immediate Allies, and the very suspicious Conduct of the King and Vizier have determined us to guard against those Dangers which seem to threaten us. We have therefore Ordered the 3d Brigade to march from Patna to the Banks of the Caramanassa, and are in daily Expectation of finding it necessary to order them to pass that Frontier. No Requisition has indeed been made to us by the King or Vizier but this is a Circumstance which has increased our Jealousy

and

and has therefore rather urged than repressed our Activity. Should the King and Vizier remain firm to their late Engagements with us, we are bound by Treaty and enjoined by the Honble Court of Directors to defend them in the Possession of those Countries which are now invaded or laid Claim to, and we would in that Case be desirous of shewing the most immediate Compliance with the Treaty and the most chearfull Support of our Allies. Should on the contrary any treacherous Engagements taken Place, should the Timidity of the King and the enterprizing Spirit of the Vizier prompt them to any Measures Dangerous to the Company, a vigorous Conduct on our Side is more, it is immediately necessary to be a check upon their Councils and to oppose the first Appearance of so formidable a Danger.

Before we came to this Resolution we had received the Advices transmitted to Governor Du Pré by Lieutenant Colonel Call and communicated by him to our President. We flatter ourselves that we may rely on this Intelligence, and are therefore persuaded that any Invasion of these Provinces by the French is neither formidable nor Yet to be apprehended.

It is however of the utmost Consequence that we should have every Intelligence of the Force and Intentions of the French as also of the Motions of the Mowattas on your Side. Your Situation Gentlemen enable You to procure better Intelligence from Mauritius and Pondicherry than it is in our Power to obtain; on the Informations therefore which We receive from your Honors &c. we chiefly depend in this matter, and We do not Doubt your giving us every Light You can. Your Zeal in so important a Subject, and at so critical a Season, We beg That You will

41 Fort St George 7th February 1771

will inform us of the Progress and Enterprizes of the Morattas in the Decan as well as of any Accounts You may receive of the Negociations of Cofsim ally Cawn. We shall continue to give you Gentlemen every Intelligence regarding the Situation of affairs here

and are

Gentlemen

Your most obedient

Humble Servants

John Cartier
Richard Becher
J. Alexander
Saml. Middleton

Fort William
2d Jany 1771

Monday
11th Feby 1771

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pré Esqr Gov.r President
Warren Hastings, Joseph Smith
& Samuel Ardley

The President lays before the Committee the following Paper of Intelligence received from the Nabob

Advice Paper from Tanjore

Advice of the Rajah of Tanjour's Delegates against the Marravar —

The Rajah of Tanjore having sent for Nersengaraw Brother to Gatfelya and Raguna draw Nephew to Gadaraw ordered them to go against Marvar with an Army of 1200 Horse, 2000 Sepoys and 4000 Peons with 8 Guns Large and small Gun Powder &c.a Stores of War and honored them with a Present of Cloth, they accordingly set out, about 11 o'Clock at Night and arrived at Tetecola, the said Rajah commanded all the Jamadars of Horses to go out Soon, saying that he had sent half Months Wages to the said two Sardars — Some Jamadars agree to it, and others are still arguing with them

him The Rajah has commanded the Baxey likewise to see the above army march soon, the Baxey has accordingly gave his Directions to the Jamadars &c. on that Head telling them at the same Time that their Pay was sent to the said Sardars to whom they should present the Number of their respective Troops and receive the Money — The Dubeer was also ordered to send his own Regiment likewise and he is about sending it along with Gopall Punt.

Maravers adversary and Veeracottar Sarvacar Agent to Mapela Davar came hither, the Rajah gave them Leave, On this, the said Sarvacar went to Canacasabapilla a Amildar of Negapatam and negociated with the People there that if they lend him 2 Lack of Checkrams with an assistance of Force and Provisions they will grant them Trimalvasul in order to build Gudy at that Place, On the Return of the said Sarvacar with the said assistance and Provisions to the said Sardars at Tekcola, it is resolved to unite all the Forces and march against the said Marvar and as soon as his Fort is taken, the Rajah has ordered to confer the Management of that Place to the said Mapala Davar. The Rajah undertook this affair at the Instance of Galpelya, but the Dubeer out of the future Consideration addressed to the Rajah that it was not proper Time to undertake the above Expedition but he received for Answer that he must not talk about that affair, on the Contrary he should act jointly with Galpelya whom he empowered upon that Business. —

The said Marvers adversary agreed to Deliver up all that Part of the Tanjore Country (which Marvar has possessed for this long Time) on the usual Footing and be answerable for the Revenues thereof from the Time it was due unpaid and likewise pay one Lack Checkrams more. —

The

43. Fort St. George 12th February 1771

The Rajah was resolved to go to Vadyargedy 2 Cos from addenghey with his whole army in 15 or 20 Days with a Design to stay there and afsist the said Maravers adversary —

The Presidents also Lays before the Committee two Papers of Intelligence from the Maravar to the same Effect, as also the Purport of a Letter from the Rajah of Tanjour to his Vaqueel here, Sambagee Punt, as communicated by the Latter and which are entered as follows.

Representation of the Transactions between the Rajah of Tanjour and the Maravar.

At the Death of the late Maravar his Son the present Maravar was established in the Succession and acknowledged by his People as their Lord — power excluding all others from having any thing to do with that Government. One Pitchepilla acts as a Dalvoy or General for the young Maravar with a full Power, This Dalvoy is said to profess great Regard and Friendship to the English Nation and to execute their Commands with the utmost Respect. The late Governor and Mr Call just before their Departure to England ordered Mudoo Kistna to write to the said Pitchepilla to procure some Turtles and upon his writing to him by their order, he procured them with the utmost Diligence and sent them in a Boat at his own Expence, the same Dalvoy continues now in the administration and employed a Vakeel at the Nabob's Court who came to Mudoo Kistna in a private Manner and spoke to him in the Manner following —

"The Rajah of Tanjore by Persuasion of some of the present Maravers Enemy who intend to usurp the said Government, detached an Army consisting of Horse and Foot with an Artillery, under the Command of some Sardars who marched and encamped near the Limits of my Masters Country with a Design to commence Hostilities, when

44. Fort St George the 11th February 1771.

"when the Nabob was acquainted with these Proceedings and "desired to write to the said Rajah to desist in his Hostile "Intentions, he instead of doing the same, talked of sending his "Order to Tondaman, and other Pallygars as well as to his "Sardars in Trichinapoly, Madura and Tinnavelly Countries "to assist my Master to oppose and to carry on a War with the "said Rajah which was contrary to my Masters Inclination, "The Nabob does this in order to ferment the Dispute between "my Master and the said Rajah, and to gain his Point in the "mean Time which is to catch at any Opportunity to reduce the "said Rajah according to his long med.tated Scheme" The said Vackeel desired Moodu Kistna to acquaint the Governor with the These Particulars and to desire him to enter into a proper Measure to put a Stop to the intended Hostilities of the said Rajah that the Country may remain in Peace and Safety for the public Good.—

The said Vackeel told Moodu Kistna that if what he spoke him as above reaches the Nabobs Ears, it will be attended with great Danger to him and his Masters Country, for which Reason he desired Care to be taken not to bring his Name in Question.—

Advice of some of the Rajah Troops having marched

Advice from Marravers Country

Dated the 29th of Janry 1771

Tanjore Army consisting about 2000 Horse and 10,000 Sepoys and Peons with seven or eight Guns marched about 7 Gentoo Leagues (which is reckoned about 28 Coss) to the Southward of Tanjore and arrived at a Place called Arundangy The next march will be in the Bounds of Maravers Country. The Rajah himself was determined to set out with Remainder of his army on Saturday the 2d Instant February and to that

End

45. Fort St. George 11th February 1771

And he formed his Camp without the Fort of Tanjore, it is said that he publicly declared to seize the whole of Maravers Country and to march as far as Ramanadapooram Capital of the said Country —

N.B. Maravers Vakeel has just now sent the above News which he said he received last Night, he says also that his Masters has wrote a Letter to the Nabob which will be presented to him this Morning. He Requests Letters to be wrote to the Rajah to desist in his Proceedings and says the sooner it is done the better, which is humbly recommended to your Consideration. —

The Substance of a Letter from the Rajah of Tanjore to his Vakeel. —

I received your Letter and observed its Contents you mentioned with Regard to Marraver that the Nabob had told the Governor that the said Marraver was his Polygar and that I unjustly undertook an Expedition against him I must therefore advise you that During the Time of my Grandfather he waged a War and placed one Bavany Sankar Marraver in the Government of Ramanadapooram where Pentoo King reigned at Trichinopoly, at that Time Marravers Country was divided into 3 Divisions, one my Grandfather gave to the said Bavany Sankar, one to Nalvooty who was a Relation to the said Bavany Sankar, and the other he reserved to himself and settled things accordingly by making Regulation of his Bounds to each Party. It is to be observed that the said Nalvooty in order to shew his Gratitude for the favor shewn him leaded 2 Magans out of his Division of the Country which remains to this Day under the Government.

Some Time after the Death of my Grandfather

and

 Fort St George 11 February 1771

and at the Time of Suboor ally Cawn and Chenda Saibs Troubles the Successor of the said Bavanny Sankar that held the N. E. Government of the said Ramanadapooram under the same Name of Marravar revolted and took Possession of the Division reserved as above to our Government. In the Time of the Government of the Nabobs Father, We sent our Forces and retook the said Division and held it under our Government for the Space of 15 Years, afterwards the said Marravar presumed and took it away from us by different Times, when Governor Du Pré came to get the Treaty signed We mentioned to him something of the said Marravers Invasion to which he answered that We were at Liberty to recover our said Country

At the Time of the Nabobs Expedition against the Commandant at Madura, We sent our assistance to the Nabob at his Request, We then told the Nabob that We wanted to clear our Country from the Hands of Marravar which he had unjustly possessed as above, but the Nabob desired us to differ till the said Expedition is over saying that he wanted to get the said Marravar to join him with his Forces at that Juncture, That the Recovery of our Country was delayd.

It is to be remarked that the said Marravar before the Death of my Father, grew very insolent, and attacked our army which was placed to guard our proper Limits and defeated the same in Conjunction with Nalcooty, and ever since which he began to grow more and more insolent and commit many Irregularities — As I cannot bear any longer their Insolence, and as they refused to comply with my just Demand of giving up my Country, I entered into a Resolution to recover it. —

The said Nalcooty who is in Union with Marravar seized and detained 4 Elephants coming to us

by)

Port St. George 11th February 1771

by Sea and refused to send them, which Insolence I cannot pass over.

By the foregoing you'll see that the Marraver and Nalcooty were established in the Government by our Predeceſſors, not only once but several Times which plainly and undoubtedly shews that they are our Pallegars, of whom we received Nazars several Times and they often joined their Troops to our own when required. —

You will therefore represent the above — Particulars to the Governor which are well known to the whole World, I enquire thoroughly into every thing and act as it has been customary in Times past, as you are well acquainted with the whole Transactions between us and Marraver, I repeat you'll explain them in a proper Light to the Governor who will find upon Enquiry that I have undoubted Right to check and subdue Marraver and Nalcooty. —

Opinion of the Committee thereon with Reflections on the Measures to be taken. —

The Committee is of Opinion that the Conduct of the Rajah of Tanjore is unjustifiable in the Light it appears to us at present; for if the Marravar Country is dependant on Tritchinopoly, as the Nabob alledges it is, to wage War or commit Hostilities against the Dependants of the Government of the Carnatic, is the same, as to take up Arms against the Carnatic, But whether it be dependant or not, in the Manner the Nabob claims it, certain it is that the Right or Pretensions of Tanjore are litigated, and therefore the Rajah, as a Party ought not to assume the Character of a Judge also — and although the Treaty entered into between the Nabob and the Rajah of Tanjore in 1762, and to which the Company became Guarantee, does not oblige us to interfere in the present Dispute

Fort St. George 11th February 1771.

Dispute, since that Treaty only regarded the Payment of the annual Tribute, and the Behaviour of Tremalrow Killedar of Arnee; nevertheless, as the Company have undertaken to support the Nabob in all his just Rights, where it can be done without manifest Risque to themselves; and as it is evident that the Ministry have of late warmly espoused the Nabob's Cause, we might expect to be censured as regardless of the Honor of the Nation, and the Interests of the Company, were we to remain passive Spectators of the Rajah's hostile Preparations; and we should, for these Reasons, think ourselves under a Necessity of taking Part in the Affair. But the Manner and Consequences demand previous and mature Consideration.—

The first Step is easy—it is to write to the Rajah, stating to him the Impropriety of his Conduct, and advising him to recall his Troops and to refrain from Hostilities against the Marcaivar; and we think it would be adviseable for our Letter to him, to urge, as a Motive for our interfering the abovementioned Treaty, particularly as the Rajah has lately intimated his Apprehensions that the Company's Guarantee would not avail him against the Designs of the Nabob* — if he should comply all will be well, we shall have done our Part, and saved our Honor.— But if he should not comply, what may be the Consequences? We must remain passive under his Refusal to comply with our Requisition, and thereby be more dishonored, than if we had not wrote to him on the Subject — Or — we must take Measures to compell him, But are we in a Condition to undertake a Military Expedition against him with any probability of Success? And if we fail, what may be the Consequences?

* Vide Minutes 9th Sept. 1770.—

First See our Calculate of Resources for Peace

or

Fort St. George 11th February 1791.

or War entered on Committee the 13th December it thereby appears that in Case of Peace, We shall be able to bear all our Expences, and provide a full Investment, and we cannot reasonably expect to do more.

Second, See minutes of Council the 4th Instant where our Reasons are stated for not opposing the Nabob's Desire to pay two Lacks of Pagodas to his Creditors, in Case of Peace and in that Case, We are to expect no other Tranquility, and no Assistance from him than a Reimbursement, in the Course of the Year, of the Current Charges We shall have advanced on the Year.

It is clear then that we have no Means of undertaking such a military Expedition upon our own Resources, otherwise than by stopping our Investment, and applying the Money which We should destine for that Service to the Charges of the War, for we expect no Assistance from Bengall — See the Select Committee's Letter from thence of the 2d January, entered in the preceding Diary —

But can We answer, can We be justified in stopping our Investment, or drawing on England for any Helps, in Case of Need — See the General Letter from England Dated 23d March 1770 Par. 56. and our Answer of the 1st Dated 6th February 1771 Par 25 & 32, The Conclusion is, that if we do, we are liable to the severest Censure, to the most humiliating Reproaches, and perhaps to ignominious Dismission.

But there is a previous Consideration, Are We obliged to interfere in the present Dispute at the Company's Expence? We think not — At whose Expence then? In the present Case, if We were to undertake an Expedition against Tanjore, it would be to vindicate the Rights of the Circar of

The

50. Fort St George 11th Febuary 1771

the Carnatic Payen Gaut, against the Misconduct of Tanjore
It seems then equitable, that the Carnatic should support the
Charge, and that if We are successful Tanjore should not only
be obliged to reimburse that Charge, but to pay smartly for the
Trespass. We should be justified in an Expedition against
Tanjore if the present Case had not happened / by the Company's
Orders of the 9th March 1769, our Reasons for not undertaking
it are contained in our Minutes of the 13th September 1769. Our
Reasons are as strong now — Our Objections, thus far, are only
in Respect to the Means of defraying the Charge — Suppose the
Nabob should undertake to supply us with Money, / are
there any other Objections?

See our Minutes of the 9th September last,
It thereby appears that the Rajah of Tanjore was greatly
alarmed at the Representations made by the Nabob to Sir
John Lindsay, and of the Countenance and Support given by
the latter to the Nabob, whereby he apprehended that the —
Company's Guarantee would avail him nothing against
the Designs of the Nabob —

We know that he hath maintained a
Correspondence with the Morattas by Letters and Vakeels
— We know also that a Vacquil lately went to him
from Hyder — But what Negociations are on Foot We
cannot tell — We know also that the Soubah instigated
by Fazul Beg Cawn is only waiting for a favorable Juncture
to make an attempt upon the Circars — If We should
march such a Force, it would be proper for an Expedition
against Tanjore, it would afford a favorable Opportunity
for Fazul Beg to make an attempt on the North, while
We should be thus engaged in the South — That We
might repel him with the Force We have at Ellour is more

than

51. Fort St George 11th February 1771

than probable, but it is certain that the Incursions of a few of Hyders Horse into the Jaghire in 1767 cost the Company upwards of Pagodas 27000 in Allowances for Damages, and Hostilities once begun We know not where they will end.—

We think it proper before We come to any Resolution, to Make these Considerations to the Nabob

Letter from Hyder Alley Cawn as entered in Country Correspondence N.o 15 alleging of the Justness of our Reasons for not sending a Person advising of Madaverow's Return to Poonah and of Trimbeck Row's having fallen back to Sherpe; of his Intention of recovering the Places taken from him and requesting our Assistance.—

Jon.n Du Pré

Warren Hastings

Sam.l Ardley

52. Fort St George 12th February 1781

Tuesday 12th Febry

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pré Esqr. Governor President
Warren Hastings Joseph Smith
Samuel Addeij.

Purport of a Conference with the Nabob on the Subject of the Rajah of Tanjour's Design against the Marcavar

The President informs the Committee that, assisted by Mr Hastings, he this Morning had a Conference with the Nabob, at which were present his two eldest Sons Omdut-ul-Omrah and Maidaur-ul-Mulk, on the Subject of the present Conduct of the Rajah of Tanjour towards the Marcavar or Naulcooty Polygar — That he explained to the Nabob our present Circumstances nearly as they are Stated in the Minutes of Yesterday, first our Difficulties with Respect to Money — The Necessity We are under by the Strictest Orders from Home not to fail in our Investments — That having at his Desire relingaished any Claim (We might have had (in Consequence of his Promise) to any Assistance by Way of Loan in Case of Need, and in Case of Peace, in order that he might pay Part of his Debt to his private Creditors, We had now no Resources but our Revenues; and what We may Receive from him in reimbursement of Current Charges for We could not expect one Rupee from Bengall. That being the Case it was out of our Power to bear the Charge of any Military Expedition, We then exposed to him the Danger to the Carnatic from the Morattas — from Hyder, if he should accomodate with them — and in that Case probably from both — and the Danger to the Circars from the Soubah, instigated by Fazul Beg Cawn, and the Consequences should any hostile attempts from these, oblige us to desist from an Expedition against Tanjour after — having

having drawn the Sword. — The Nabob allowed them
all, and said he could add many more, that if no
Expedition were ever to be undertaken, untill all Things
concurred to favor it, no Expedition could ever be undertaken
that in the present Case, the Honor of his Government
was immediately concerned, that if he did not protect one
Dependant, after having subdued that one, the Rajah
might proceed to another and another till he attempted
Trichinopoly itself. — Not to enter at large into a Recital
of Arguments the Nabob proposed that the President should
give out publickly, so that it might circulate, That he was
displeased with and resented extreamly the Conduct of the
Rajah, that he should write a threatening Letter to him,
and that the Commandant at Trichinopoly should be
ordered to mark out a Camp, to draw out Guns and
Stores, pitch Tents &c. and put on the Appearance of
Hostility. We replied that whatever might be the Result
in the End, We thought the Conduct as the Nabob proposed
it, liable to Objections, that he who loudly threatened first,
and beat his Adversary afterwards, gained no more Honor
or Advantage, that he who beat his Adversary without
Threatening — but he who threatened, and could not perform,
certainly suffered greater Dishonor than he who neither
performed nor threatened. That if the Rajah would
desist upon being wrote to, we should think, under our
present Circumstances, it would be wiser to let the Matter
rest there, untill it might better suit us to resume it,
than to plunge Ourselves into Troubles unnecessarily,
while Dangers threaten Us in other Parts. That therefore
We thought it might not be improper to write to the
Rajah, stating to him, and pointing out how unjustifiable

This

his present Conduct appeared, and advising him to desist;
and to enforce that Advice, We thought it might be proper
not to threaten him, lest he should not be able to
perform; but to give out, that as this is the Time of
Year when we take a Review in the several Garrisons
of the Warlike Stores, in Order to put them in a good
Condition, We found it necessary to remove some Guns
&c. from Vellore where there were too many, to
Trichinapoly, where many were wanting, and that it
would be necessary to escort this by a proper Detachment.
That the march of such a Force which notwithstanding
the professed Design would be otherwise understood might
awe the Rajah into a Compliance with our Requisition;
and that in such Case we should be under no Necessity
in Point of Honor, to proceed to open Hostilities, but
having accomplished the Declared Purpose of the March
of those Troops, Viz.t. to convey and lodge the Stores at
Trichinapoly, they may either remain or retire as the
Circumstances of the Case may require. But if the
Rajah's Obstinacy should make it necessary, and
Affairs on these Parts and the North should not prevent
the Troops and Stores will then be ready to enter the
Tanjore Country upon a Days Warning. The Nabob
seemed not to relish this cautious Plan — proposed that
He should disband some of our Sepoys, with the Intent
that they might be secretly enlisted by the Maravar, and
that he should instigate the great Maravar, Tondaman
Travancore and other Poligars to unite against Tanjore,
and that he should order his People from the Madura
and Tinnevelly Countries to assist — He said this would
end in the same; he would be obliged to support them,

and

and We to support him, and thus by indirect and feeble Beginning, We should by the Chain which binds the Interests of the Carnatic and the Company, be dragged into Military Operations, much more disadvantageously, than if We were to undertake them at once, upon a consistent and Spirited Plan. Upon the whole he desired to know our Conclusion. We said we could not declare away, that We had waited upon him to consult and concert the properest Measures, that We should now take the Opinion of the Council at large, and immediately inform him of the Result, but We begged he would excuse us for so often mentioning the Subject of Money, that it proceeded from Necessity for that even the March of the Troops as an Escort to the Stores proposed to be sent from Tellicherry to Trichinopoly, was an Expence we could not bear, and desired to know what we could be done in such Case - he desired We would make a Calculate of the Expence and he should then understand it as this whole Deliberation had passed without the least Appearance of Altercation, but in perfect good Humour the President added with the same Appearance of Cordiality) - And when Your Excellency shall have understood it, what will follow - he replied smiling, - I shall then know - whether it will be much or little. We thought best not to urge more, and here the Conference ended.

Agreed that the Substance of these and the former Minutes on that Subject be communicated to the Council for their Opinion thereon.

Jos: Du Pré

Warren Hastings.

Sam: Ardley

56. Fort St. George 13th February 1771.

At a Committee Present

Wednesday 13th Febry. Josias DuPré Esqr. Governor President.
Warren Hastings, Joseph Smith
Samuel Ardley.

Pursuant to the Resolution of Counsil of Yesterday, the Committee now proceed to open the several Packets directed to the Commissioners left at this Place, and which are as follow.

The Packets to the Commissioners opened.

Packet pr Houghton — Dated 10th Novr. 1769
Do pr Valentine — Duplicate of Do
Do pr Lord Mansfield Dated 23d March 1770 —

Resolved that Copies of the 66. and from the 69 Paragraph to the End of the Letter of the 23d March 1770. which alone have any Relation to the Affairs at Bengal, be transmitted to that Presidency, and that they be advised of the Precaution we have taken to prevent any of the Contents of the Packets from transpiring. —

Resolved also that the Copy of the General Letter to Fort William, and of that to the Select Committee under the Packet pr Lord Mansfield, be also forwarded to them.

Jos: DuPré
Warren Hastings.
Sam: Ardley

57. Fort St George 20th February 1771.

The following Letters were this Day wrote and dispatched
p. Snow Minerva and Experiment

Letter to Fort William with Extracts from the Packets directed to the Commissioners.

To the Honble John Cartier Esqr.
President and Governor &c. Council
at Fort William

Honble Sir & Sirs

In Consequence of your Letter to the Board of 10th Jany. it hath been referred to us to open the several Packets directed to the Commissioners left at this Place, and to transmit to your Honor &c. Copies of such Parts as relate to your Presidency, We now accordingly forward to You by the Minerva such Extracts as have the least Regard to the Company's Affairs under your Management.

It may be proper to acquaint You that we thought the utmost Precaution necessary to prevent any of the Contents of the Packets from transpiring, on which Account the opening them was referred to us, and no other Persons except the Secretaries, and the Asst. Secretary by whom they are copied are privy to them.

In the Packet to the Commissioners by the Mansfield, We found a Copy of a Letter from the Court of Directors to your Honor &c. which we now enclose. —

We are
Honble Sir & Sirs
Your most obedient
humble servants
Josias Du Pre
&c. Committee. —

Fort St George
20th February 1771.

58. Fort St. George 20th Febreuary 1771.

To the Honble John Cartier Esqr.
President and Governor &c. Gentlemen
of the Select Committee at Fort William

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter to Select Committee at Fort William on the Subject of Affairs at the two Presidencies

It is with much Concern We learn by Your Letter of the 2d January that You are apprehensive of Troubles from the Morattas particularly as We are far from being in a State of Security, or free from Danger on this Coast. In addition to the Apprehensions We have been under for some Time past from the Morattas and Soubah a new Scene hath opened in the Tanjore Country, which, we much fear, will compell us to take the Field in order to prevent the Encroachments which the Rajah of Tanjore is meditateing against the Marcawar, whom the Nabob alledges to be dependant on Trichinopoly; and in which Design there is Reason to believe the Rajah is encouraged by other Powers. Nevertheless as the Dangers which threaten you claim equal Attention with our own, it hath been resolved to send You two Hundred Men, of which you are advised by the Board. Our Establishment will indeed be thereby deficient, nevertheless as we shall have an Opportunity of replacing them from the Recruits from Europe sooner than We could supply You were we to miss this Opportunity, We judged it necessary to send You the said Reinforcement, which, being composed of Men that have been some Time inured to the Climate and are well disciplined, will we hope be a Seasonable Supply.

Our last Advices tell us that Madaverao had set out for these Parts, but was obliged by Sickness to return to Poonah. We cannot say whether his Indisposition

be

be real, or only a Pretence to cover any other Design — A Detachment is however said to be on the March to reinforce Trembeck Row in the Mysore Country, and which hath crossed the Jaugabadra, but as it advances very slowly and it begins to grow late in the Season, We are not without Hopes that We shall escape being molested by the Morattas this Year, and that they will not be able to reduce Hyder.

The Soubah instigated by Fazul Beg Cawn (who hath long had Designs upon the Circars) appears by no means well inclined towards Us, and we believe only waits for a favorable Opportunity to endeavor to recover the Circars.

From the present Conduct of the Morattas both in the North and in the South and from the Genius Spirit and Ambition of Madaverow, we are inclined to suspect that their Designs are not confined to the mere Collection of Choute, but extend to the subjugating the whole Peninsula. It therefore becomes necessary to keep the most watchfull Eye on their Conduct, and for which Purpose We request that you will advise Us from time to time of their Progress and Designs in the North, by which We may be able to form a Judgement of their Views in the South, and you may be assured We shall carefully advise You of any Intelligence We may receive regarding them in these Parts.

From all the Accounts that have reached Us regarding the French, We see no Cause at present to apprehend any Disturbances from them. Yet as it is probable that whenever they make an Attempt, it will be sudden, We shall be attentive to their Conduct, and

advise

58. Fort St. George 20th February 1771.

To the Honble John Cartier Esqr.
President and Governor &c. Gentlemen
of the Select Committee at Fort William

Honble Sirs &Sirs

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advise

60. Fort St George 20th February 1771.

advise you of any thing material that may happen

We have not been able to learn any thing of Coffimally fawn, and the Nabob informs us that he has heard nothing concerning him.

If Peace and Tranquility continue, We hope to be able to bear our Expences, and provide a good Investment, but nothing more — but should any Troubles arise in the Province, We must be greatly distressed for Money, at least We apprehend so, unless unforeseen Aid should relieve us, Since our Revenues must in that case necessarily fail, and our Expences be encreased —

In the Packet Directed to the Commissioners Mr Mansfield was enclosed a Copy of a Letter from the Court of Directors to you, which we now forward by the Minerva

We are

Honble Sirs &c &c

Your most Obedient

Humble Servants

Fort St George
20th February 1771 —

Josias Du Pré
&c Committee —

At a Committee Present

Josias Du Pré Esqr Governor President

Warren Hastings, Joseph Smith

Samuel Ardley.

Wednesday 20th Febry 5 o Clock PM —

The Board having referred it to this Committee to open the Packet directed to the Commissioners received this Day by his Majesties Ship Dolphin. The Committee accordingly proceed to open the same, and which is found to contain a Letter to the Commissioners Dated 27th June 1770, accompanying Copies of Letters to Bengall, Bombay and this Presidency.

As

61. Fort St. George 20th Feby 1771.

As it is probable that the Packet for Bombay, as well as that for this Presidency, must be enclosed in the Packet for Bengall. It is agreed to recommend it to the Board to open the Bengall Packet.

Jos: Du Pré

Warren Hastings.

Sam: Ardley

62. Fort St. George 28th February 1771.

Thursday 28th Febry.

At a Committee Present

Josias Du Pre Esqr. Governor President

Joseph Smith

Samuel Ardley

Mr Hastings absent

The President Lays before the Committee the following Paper of Intelligence

Translate of a Persian Paper, delivered by the Nabob to the Governor supposed to be an Extract from a Letter from his (the Nabobs) Intelligencer at Hyderabad.

Intelligence from Hyderabad of a Rupture alleg'd Intention of withdrawing himself and of the Intrigues carrying on between him Nazeb Caur Cawn and Tazul Beg

The Writer Says he was sent for, in the most private Manner by Rajah Jeggadeo, who told him to write to the Nabob that Rufsun alley Cawn being displeased at him (the Nabob) and the English, was thinking of withdrawing himself by any Way or Means from the Place he lived at, and proceeding to the Soubahs Court, where the Managers of his affairs are Nufseb Caur Cawn, and Zaubett Jung, with whom he has a close Friendship — that the said Rufsun alley Cawn was constantly writing Letters, complaining of the English, and had sent all his Jewels, Elephants, and Baggage to the said Nufseb Caur Cawn and Zaubett Jung; that the Cutten Zaubett Jung) had lately wrote repeated Letters to Ruccun ed Dowlah complaining of Ambarow, and desiring the Assistance of an Army & a Commandar, on the Rajahmundry and Ellore Districts and that he had likewise enclosed to Ruckan Drafts of Letters to the Governors of Madras and Mazulipatam drawn up by his own Secretary, conformable to which he desired Orders to them might be wrote and dispatched to Mahomed Maule, for him to negociate thereon — That this Matter, having been delayed, since the Receipt of the Drafts at Hyderabad,

Nufseb

Fort St George 28th February 1771.

Nujeeb Caun Cawn had the Night preceding this Conversation been very pressing with Ruckem and got them wrote - that he Juggadea hearing of the same went immediately to Ruccum and told him that if it was his Intention to comply with Taubett Jungs Desire to write both to the Nabob and the Governors, which he had accordingly done, desiring that a Guard of English Troops and two Gaurds of Company's Sepoys might be put under the orders of Taubett Jungs Brother who resided in the Districts of Paulancha and Cummumm - a Duplicate of which Letter to the Nabob had been given to Taubett Jungs Vackeel that the answer which it would be proper should come from them, should be to this Effect "That Orders had been sent to the English in those Parts which would be complied with by and by, but that the English were a little displeased with Taubett Jung for keeping of Hussun ally Cawns Effects" That Juggadeo then said he was a faithful Servant and well wisher of the Nabob, that he was concerned in the making of the Peace and Friendship and that it was his wish the said Friendship should continue firm and steady, but that Hussun ally Cawn, Nujeeb Caun Cawn, and Taubett Jung disagreable to the badness of their Dispositions and self-interested Views, were exerting themselves, to overset the same for which Reason it was incumbent on the Nabob, to think of some Means of punishing such Traitors that as for his Part, he was ready with his Life and Goods and would do every thing the Nabob desired, and that with the greatest Ease the putting of those Rascals to shame might be effected - The Writer of the Paper then says that he told the Rajah he would certainly advise the Nabob of all that he had said, but that his Letter to him also, was requisite, which he promised to send, desiring however that this Affair might be kept there,

with

 Fort St George 28th February 1771.

with the utmost Privacy — and the Writer says that the Rajah of his mentioning of this to him, made him swear to the keeping of it secret, and that he (the Rajah) at the same Time promised in the most solemn Manner that he was ready to shew his Fidelity to the Nabob.

Although the known Enmity which the Nabob bears towards Hussain Ally may possibly lead him to exaggerate Matters, nevertheless we are inclined to believe that the above Intelligence is not without Foundation, particularly as it is in some Measure confirmed by the Letter lately received from Ruccun ud Dowlah No 14 renewing the Complaints of Fazul Beg against Ashavarow. It is therefore necessary to keep a watchfull Eye on the Conduct of Hussain Ally Cawn, Nazeb Cawn Cawn, and Fazel Beg; for which Purpose it is resolved that a Copy of the said Intelligence be transmitted to Mr Wynch, who is to be instructed to obtain the best Information in his Power of the Intrigues supposed to be carrying on between them.

P. Du Pré

Warren Hastings.

Sam Ardley

65 Fort St George 1st March 1771.

Wrote the following Letter to Alexander Wynch Esqr.

To Alexander Wynch Esqr.
Chief at Mazulipatam

Sir

Letter to Mr Wynch with a Paper of Intelligence communicated by the Nabob directed to enquire into the Intrigues of Hussain ally of Nazeeb Caun Cawn and Fazul Beg Cawn and Fazul Beg

You will receive herewith a Paper of Intelligence from Hydrabad, communicated to us in Confidence by the Nabob, and which you will therefore be carefull to keep Secret.

Although the above Intelligence may not be entirely depended on, it nevertheless appears necessary that we should keep a very watchfull Eye on the Conduct of Hussain & Ally, Nazeeb Caun Cawn and Fazul Beg, and for which Purpose we have thought it expedient to transmit the same to you, that you may be attentive to their Motions; and we desire you will use all prudent Means in your Power to procure the most certain Information of their Designs. This is the more necessary as we have lately received a Letter from Ruccun ud Dowlah on the Subject of a Shamarow, which in some Measure confirms the abovementioned Advices. A Copy of Ruccun's Letter, and of this Presidents Answer are enclosed for your Perusal.

We are
Sir
Your affectionate Friends
Josias Du Pré &c Committee

Fort St George
1st March 1771

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pré Esqr Governor President
Warren Hastings
Samuel Ardley

Saturday
9th March

General Smith indisposed

In

66. Fort St. George 9th March 1771.

President's Minute regarding his Concern in the Contract &c. —

In Consequence of a Reference from the Board this Committee on the 13th Day of February last opened the Honble Company's Packets addressed to the Commissioners. In the 45 Paragraphs of the Letter dated the 23 March 1770, the Honble Court are pleased to express themselves thus. Paragraph 45. In many Parts of the above Charges against our Servants at Fort St. George, we cannot include those Members of our Council who did not arrive at the Presidency till our Affairs there were reduced to a very great Extremity &c.

— But in Regard to Enquiries into Complaints against the Contractor, adjusting his Claims on the Company, suppressing very material Papers which contained precise and positive Evidence against the Contractor there being Matters on the Consideration whereof, we must declare they have ought to have been engaged, it is therefore incumbent on them to justify the Part they have acted in all Proceedings thereupon &c.

As I am one of those who fall under the above Description it is incumbent on me to justify myself which I do by the following Declaration.

The President's Declaration in Justification of the Concern he had in the Contract. —

I arrived here the 13th of July 1768, and very soon after took Charge of the Export Warehouse, every one will readily conceive that to inform oneself thoroughly of the State of such a Department of the Affairs that had been given concerning the Investment of the whole Cash, how far they were or could be executed, together with every other Circumstance relative to so important a Branch of the Company Affairs was not the work of a Day, But besides these — Investigations, as the Honble Court had been pleased to appoint me to succeed to the Government — the very disordered State of our Affairs, the dangerous Crisis which seemed to be approaching, and my great Anxiety and

Desire

67. Fort St. George 9th March 1771.

Desire to qualify myself as much as I could to take an active Part in them, determined me to revise attentively the whole Proceedings of the Presidency. This added to the Business of my Department, and attendance on the Council and Committees, engaged me so closely for some Months that I seldom conversed with any Body on any other Subjects but those which related immediately to my Departments. I have at this Time but a faint Recollection that some Time after my Arrival, but how Long after I cannot trace, an Offer was made me of a Share in the Contract, but by whom it was offered, I declare solemnly, I do not know, Mr Call the Contractor was at Camp, I have looked over my Correspondence with him and find no mention of it, all I can say therefore is that some Time after my Arrival such an Offer was made me, I had not heard (for as I have already said I conversed little on the Town) of the Complaints which afterwards reached me relative to the Contractor, and not knowing, of any, but such as occurred in the prosecution of our Correspondence, which seem not to be Complaints against the Contractor, but a just State of Facts where the Cause of the Debility of the Cattle is generally assigned, high Rains, bad Weather and the Want of Forage, I say not knowing that any Complaints were levelled against the Contractor, I own I accepted the Offer, but I do solemnly, aver that I accepted it merely as a Matter of Course without a single Enquiry what Profit it yielded, nor did I ever enquire or learn what it yielded, or how the Profits arose until a considerable Time after the Abolition of the Contract and the formal Enquiry, made by the Board into the Conduct of the Contractor. It will I presume be readily believed that at the Time the Proposal was made to me and my Acceptance of it I did not know that there existed any Complaints at Complaints against

against the Contractor, since nothing but the greatest Degree of Infatuation, if I had known there were such could have induced me to risque any future Fortune and good Name for so inadequate a Consideration, however some Time after I had accepted it my Time and Avocations allowing me a greater Intercourse with the Settlement, I understood that many Complaints were made of the Contractor I frequently mentioned the Subject to the Governor and there were even is governme more especially, because I had inadvisedly (I must say) accepted of a Share, by which I was in some Measure become a Party, and I well recollect that hearing of some particular Complaint, I do not now well remember what, I desired the Governor to write to General Smith to give us a candid Statement of Facts, and lest the General should consider such a Letter from the Governor as a Matter of Form, I addressed him myself the next Day, conceiving that as I had no Concern in preceding Transactions he would think me under less Bias. The General will I hope excuse me for quoting a Passage from the private Letter I wrote him on the Subject, as it can do him no Prejudice, and may do me Service, it is as follows

11 November 1768

"The Governor wrote you last Night about certain
"Whispers relative to the Contractor and therefore I need not
"take up that Subject, nevertheless as I think it very
"necessary that the Truth should be known, that so
"the Grievances (if there be any) may be redressed, or that
"envious Reports (if such they be) may be overcome by
"Truth, I must add my Request that You will without
"Favor or personal Regard to any Man be full and
"explicit and depend upon it, that it shall be received with
Candour"

Candour." I quote this as a Proof that far from conniving
or meaning to connive at any Misconduct of the Contractor
I thought myself very essentially interested in bringing
his Conduct to a fair Examination. The critical Situation
of our Affairs in the Balaghaut at that Time, as I imagine
prevented General Smith from answering my Letter, or giving
any State of Facts to the Board as I desired, but finding a
Complaints daily circulating in the Settlement, and with a
much apparent Animosity, I moved the Board in December
for an whatever Form it may stand minuted and however
averse I am to Egotisms, my own Justification obliges me
to say, and insist, that it was I who moved the Board for the
Public Enquiry into the Conduct of the Contractor in December
1768, It was I who proposed and wrote the Letter which stands
minuted in Consultation the 21st December 1768 as quoted
in the 39 Paragraph of the General Letter 23d March 1770
and the Draught is now in my hand writing in the
Secretary's Office, and it was I who in the Month of February
1769 moved in Consultation the 13th for the Abolition of the
Contract. I do not mean or wish to have it understood that
the then Governor, or the rest of the Council, did not willingly
concur, I am speaking here only of my own Conduct, and these
Instances I quote in Proof, and I hope they will be sufficient
to prove that far from wishing to conceal any thing
relative to the Contract, I thought myself particularly
interested to bring every Thing fairly before the Public, and
to get it abolished as soon as it could be done. It is acknowledg'd
in Paragraph 20 of the General address to the Honble
Court of Directors under Date the 6th February last that the
continuing the Contract for an indefinite Term was wrong,
and that it was a blameable Conduct in the Members of the

Council

70. Fort St. George 9th March 1771.

Council to accept of Shares under the Contractor with which
Declaring it. I subscribed to that Acknowledgement there,
I repeat it here, I have been to blame - but I meant no Injury
to the Company, and although the Punishment inflicted
on me in the very severe and humiliating Censure, be greater
than the Sin which in me was not intentional, Yet I do not
complain of that Part, there was Cause for Reproof and the
Reproof must be applied to the Act which is apparent, and
not, to the Intent or the Heart which cannot be seen.

But the Honble Court will give me Leave
to Say, that in the Accusation of Suppression, I think myself
cruelly and most unjustly treated, there is a meanness and
baseness in such an Act which I utterly disclaim, and at
which my Nature recoils, the Fact is as stated in the Separate
General Letter of the 6th February last. The only Reason for
not entering it at the Time it was received was the Business
of the Dispatch, not being entered then, and being delivered
to Messieurs Call and Mackay it remained unentered
until the Enquiry upon their answer came regularly before
the Board, indeed so little Thought had I of Suppression that
it never occurred to my Mind that the Papers had not been
entered when received until the Receipt of the Accusation
led me to trace the Subject on the Records —

And the Accusation of Suppressing some Papers relative to Shares —

With Respect to the Part I have had in the
Enquiry into the Conduct of the Contractor that appears in
the Report of the Select Committee to which I have subscribed

Remark on some Passages of the Commissioners Letter

Letter to the Commissioners

PS.

The Honble Court are pleased to say, it
appears by the Records of this Presidency, that Doubts had
arisen to the President and Council themselves of the
Propriety of charging the Nabob with the Performance

of

71. Fort St. George 9th March 1771.

regarding the Charges of the Mysore War —

of his own Agreement, as it stands recorded in Consultation the 11th April 1768 and refer to the Nabob's Letter of the 15th March 1769 — and in the 42 Paragraph. The Minutes of Consultation relative to settling the Expences of the Mysore War are said to be contradictory to each other.

Remark

It does not appear that any Promise was made the Nabob that he should not be accountable for the Charges of the Mysore War, But it is very true that he was often told the Expences of the Mysore Expedition should not be inserted in his account — That is his account Current Expences but that the Charges of the Mysore War or Expedition, should be carried to a separate Head on your Books, that the whole might appear at one View, and not be blended with the Current Charges of the Carnatic — The Manner the Nabob has quoted this Proposal, for he does not call it a Promise, implies that he was given to understand he should not be answerable for the Reimbursement of those Charges, which is not probable, and nothing of that Tendency appears any where on the Records. The Doubt expressed by the President and Council in the 17th Paragraph of their Address by the Thames under Date the 27th June 1769 concerning the Propriety of charging the Nabob with the whole of the Expences of the Mysore war, seems not to have been a Doubt whether according to the Terms and Conditions, on which that particular Expedition was undertaken, the Nabob was justly accountable, but whether from a Consideration of the intimate Connection between the Interests of the Company and the Carnatic, the remote and immediate Causes of the war, its unfortunate Event, and the distressed Circumstances the Nabob was then supposed to be in — whether from these Considerations the Court of Directors might not think it proper

Fort St George 9th March 1771.

proper to waive the Right derived from the Letter of the 2d Agreement and voluntarily take a Part upon themselves. But even if these Considerations were to prevail, it is probable a great Error was committed in the Proportions which the Nabob's Revenues were supposed to bear to the Company's, the Nabob's being estimated too low, and the Company's too high. There are various Opinions of the Nabob's Revenues, the least is 70 Lacks, the most 150 Lacks, the Medium is 110 Lacks.

Letter

Par. 30 The Honble Court admit the Sentiments of the Governor and Council of Fort St. George on the critical Situation of his (the Nabob's) Affairs with the Company to be but too just; and the Conclusions they have made to be such as present Appearances warrant them to draw therefrom viz.—

31. Reflecting on their Experience of Mahamed Alley's faithfull attachment they are surprized at the Idea of reducing him to a mere nominal Nabob—viz

32. They observe such an Idea is repugnant to the Treaty of Paris—and viz

33 Recite the Governor and Council's Reasons for urging such a new Plan, and conclude with their Reasons against it

Remark.

Upon an attentive Perusal of the Letters from the Governor and Council by the Dutton and Thames under Date the 2d 9th March and 27th June 1769. The Honble Court deems not to have understood the Intent and Meaning of the Governor and Council on those Advices. The Honble Court acknowledge that their Sentiments are just and warranted. It does not appear in any Part of those Letters, that they recommend any Plan. If their Statement be just, was it a Fault in them to

Let

Fort St George 9th March 1771.

cary a just Statement of the affairs under their Charge before their Principals? Could they have been justifiable, if they had omitted to do so? The strongest Assurances were given in the first Letter that in their Conduct towards the Nabob they should carefully avoid giving him any Cause of Disgust: and yet the Honble Court in their Observation thereon accuse the Governor and Council of a Conduct tending to violate that form'd Alliance between the Nabob and the Company, which they have ever thought their Interest to maintain &c. And in the Letter by the Thames after having given an Account of the Difficulties they had experienced in their Transactions they say, in the 10 & 11 Paragraphs. They think those Details necessary not only to give an Idea of the past, but to enable the Honble Court to form their Judgement of the future. They state concisely the Dangers they apprehend by continuing the same System as adopting another and leave the Court to judge and conclude with earnestly requesting the Court's full and clear Sentiments and Directions for their future Guidance. If such clear and candid Representations acknowledg'd to be just and warranted do nevertheless give the Honble Court so much Offence and Alarm as those by the Duxton and Thames seem to have done, their Servants have very little Encouragement to communicate their Thoughts. —

See their Letter 10th November 1769 Par. 1 and 2. —

Jno Wm Bre
Warren Hastings.
Sam Ravenshaw

74. Fort St. George 13th March 1771.

At a Committee Present

Wednesday 13th March. — Josias Du Pré Esqr. Governor. President
Warren Hastings, Joseph Smith
Samuel Ardley.

The Committee reflecting that the honble Court have of late thought proper to construe their Orders strictly according to the Letter, without admitting any Circumstances, which may have caused a Deviation, think it necessary to consider very minutely the Orders now in being, which affect our present very critical Situation. —

What has already been said in our Minutes on this Department and in those of the Council on the Proceedings of the Rajah of Tanjore, and the several Letters received from the Nabob, with the Advice Papers accompanying the same, explains our Situation.

The Question is how far we are commanded or authorized to assist and support the Nabob's Government in the present Case?

In the Orders lately received by the Dolphin Frigate Dated the 27th June 1770 in Paragraph 3. We find this Passage

"We have here only to enjoin you to avoid as far as
"in your lies becoming Parties in any Disputes between the
"Powers of India, and to pay the most strict obedience to your
"Orders for confining your Views to our present Possessions, the
"Peace and Security of which are the utmost Scope of our wishes
"as they will necessarily tend to advance the commercial
"and vital Interests of the Company." Do these Orders include the Case of the Rajah of Tanjore now before us? or do they mean only to restrain us from Ideas of Conquest or Diversion of Territory, and from officiously interposing, without necessity in the Quarrels of the neighbouring Powers, not dependant on

The

the Nabob's Government ?

It is evident from this single Instance that Orders, however positive, made for general Purposes, can never compleatly embrace the infinite Variety of Circumstances, that must continually arise from our Situation; We therefore must have Recourse to Construction, and that Construction may be right or it may be wrong, as we happen to be successfull or otherwise. —

To the abovementioned Orders taken Literally are —

opposed the following.

Letter to the Commissioners 23. March 1770 Par

35 the whole but particularly this Part

You will not fail to assure him (the Nabob) on our
"Name that We cordially sympathize with him in his
"present unhappy Circumstances, that We will contribute
"all in our Power to protect the Carnatic, secure to him,
"as far as we may properly do it, all needful Consequence
"in the Eyes of Country Powers, maintain inviolably our
"Faith with him, and that We repose the highest Confidence
"in his Honor for fulfilling all his Engagements with the
"Company so soon, and by such reasonable Payments, as
"the Exigencies of his Affairs, and an Oeconomical
"management of his Finances may possibly enable him
"to perform.

Paragraph 37. "We are bound by the Treaty of Paris as
"we have observed already to acknowledge and strongly
"urged by Honor and Interest to support Mahomed Ally
"as Nabob of the Carnatic.

Paragraph 39 "That as we shall not suffer the least
"Injustice to be done us or the Nabob of Arcot by Country
"Powers without using all means in our Power to obtain
Reparation, yet we shall be no less carefull to punish

Us

Port St George 13th March 1771.—

our Servants should they at any Time so far forget their
"Duty and transgress our Orders as to invade the Dominions
"of those who desire our Friendship and do not forfeit it
"by becoming themselves the Agressors."—

In the separate Letter by the Thames dated
"the 27 June 1769 The Danger of assuming and supporting
the Character of Protectors of the Carnatic are clearly
"Stated— Paragraph 11 it is said "Konce you take up
"Arms you cannot lay them down at Pleasure although
"acting only as an Ally, the Company will be considered
"as the principal and the Nabob but as a Name, thus
"engaged the Charges of the War must be furnished by
"some means or other, and if the Nabob cannot or will
"not, the Company must, or abandon every Thing—
And again— "In Case of a fresh war before the Nabob shall
"have discharged his Debts, by what Means can the
"Charges be defrayed? it is evident that it will not be
"possible for him to lay by any Thing, if he will do
"justice to the Company, and his Creditors, it is equally
"evident that the ordinary Revenues uninterrupted
"would not suffice for the Exigencies of War, much less
"being as they are liable to Failure by the Ravages
"of a few Horse; it follows therefore that if the Company
"engage themselves in the Defence of the Carnatic,
"the Burthen must lie on them, and all the Expends,
"over and above what can be furnished by the Nabob
"out of the rising Revenues (for which two his Accounts
"must be taken and admitted without Controul) must
"be drawn from Your Treasury or Credit, as far as they
"will go; and when they are at an End, there the
"Contest must end— Upon which and the Alternative
equally)

77. Fort St George 13th March 1771.

"equally dangerous the Honble Courts full and clear Sentiments
"and Directions are requested for our future Guidance."

To the Governor and Council they are not pleased
to give any explicit Orders upon this Subject in answer
to the foregoing Representations their Sentiments and
Orders to the Commissioners are hereinn before quoted.
The Spirit as well as the Letter of which seem strongly
to enjoin the Protection of the Carnatic, as a System
necessary to the Company's Interest: and of Course if those
orders be so understood, those now lately received by the
Dolphin, as first Quoted, cannot at the same Time be
understood as intended to oppose our assisting the Nabob
in the present Case supposing the Hostilities committed
by the Rajah against the Marawar be construed an
Attack upon the Rights of the Carnatic, that the Peace
is thereby violated and the Honor of the Nabob's Government
wounded.

There remains still a further Consideration
The Governor and Council thought they foresaw the
great Distress and the great Danger to which the Company's
Possessions must unavoidably be exposed, in Case they
should be involved in War, either by the Invasion of
Foreign Enemies immediately, or consequentially as
Defenders and Protectors of the Carnatic if they should be
destitute of any Resource besides the ordinary Revenues
as they become payable, and such Assistance as may be
given by the Nabob; because the rising Revenues are
liable to Failure immediately by the Devastations of
an Enemy, and the Assistance of the Nabob is precarious
for as we cannot controul him, he will give his aid so long
as he pursues his Plans and Ideas, and may withhold it
whenever

whenever We differ from them, they therefore took the
Liberty of proposing a Reserve against Exigencies. We
must beg Leave to say that notwithstanding the
Displeasure which the Honble Court hath been pleased
to express, We think it was their indispensable Duty to
make such a Remonstrance, and to state the manifold
Dangers attending the Companys Affairs under their
Management which is but a Part, We do not presume
to say that it would have been Right as respecting
the whole. The whole does not fall under our Cognizance
and if the State of Affairs at home are such as not
to admit of Salutary Measures abroad, the Governor and
Council having done their Part by representing stand exculpated
and We have only to follow the Orders We receive. We are
forbid to make any Reserve untill our Investments shall
have been carried to their Full Extent (See General Letter
to the Military Department Dated 23d March 1770 Para
22,23,24) as such Investments are the only Means by
which the Engagements to Government, can be made good
and other Burthens supported.

Hon.ble Minutes
13th December
1770

In another Part of our Proceedings it is Demonstrated
that Supporting the Country to remain in Peace, our
Resources may extend to the Discharge of our Current
Expences, to the providing a Full Investment and but little
more; In the Estimate of Expences we have greatly reduced
the Sums which ought to be laid out in Fortifications,
Buildings, Repairs and Gun Carriages, an Hospital is
absolutely necessary so is an Arsenal, Magazines and
Granaries are also essential, the West Face of Fort St. George
is in a Dangerous State, upon that however we must
wait for Orders from Home, but Gun Carriages both for the

Field

To Fort St. George 13th March 1771.

Field and Garrison are an Object of the first Attentions

We have Stated to the Nabob in the President's

Letter of the 20th February N.33 the Necessity we are under

of providing a full Investment, We have informed him

fully and clearly that We have no Means of our own to

support the Charges of a War - We beg Leave to refer to that

Letter - We have yet received no answer thereto So Soon

as the whole our Situation in few words is this

By the Orders hereinbefore quoted to the

Commissioners and by the general Tenor and Spirit of

many Orders from the Court of Directors to the Governor

and Council, the Peace of the Carnatic and the Honor of

the Nabobs Government is to be defended and vindicated.

The Nabob does insist that the Marrawar is a dependant

of Trichinopoly, which is annexed to the Government

of the Carnatic. Therefore the Marrawar is a dependant on

the Carnatic - the Nabob does strenuously insist that the

Honor of his Government is dangerously wounded by the

hostile proceedings of the Rajah of Tanjore, In the

Commands of the Honble Court to this Department dated

17th March 1769 they recommend an Expedition against

Tanjore, it is most manifest by the Advices from the Honble

Court received last Year that they look upon the Rajah

of Tanjore as one too much favored by this Government

We have Reason to believe Sr John Lindsay is sanguine

for calling the Rajah of Tanjore to an account - From

all these Premises the Conclusion that seems natural, is,

that if we do not give the Nabob all the Aid he requires,

we shall be represented as refusing the Company's

Protection to the Nabob refusing our Aid to secure the Peace

of the Carnatic to vindicate the Honor of the Nabobs

Government

Government, to Support his Consequence in the Eyes of the Country Powers. By Some this Conduct may be construed an Infraction of the Treaty of Paris and may probably will be imputed to a perverse Opposition to the Nabob's Measures. By others a Breach of the Company's Orders and a Violation of their Faith, which they promise to maintain; From these Premises therefore it follows that We must assist the Nabob.

Suppose we assist him and are unsuccessful — The Rajah of Tanjore already has and will no Doubt further remonstrate that the Pr arrears is no more a Dependant on Trichinopoly than he is on Tanjore, that he pays Tribute to neither but has presented Nuzzars to both, as suited with the Circumstances of the Times, It is not probable that the Nabob will, even if he can, put a Sum of ready Money in our Hands sufficient to bear us through all Events of the war, It is not improbable, but that whilst we are engaged in the South the Soubah instigated by Hyder Beg Cawn, may make Some attempt on the Circars on the North, It is not improbable but that the Morattas Southern the Rajah of Tanjore is allied, may make a Diversion in his Favor by Sending a Body of Horse into the Carnatic, or even into the Tanjore — in either of these Cases our Revenues will fail, we shall not be able to make an Investment nor even to defray our Charges, the Company will be distressed at home by the Pressure of Government, and Proprietors — what Construction may then be put on our Conduct? For Arguments to be used against us by a Ministerial Men, We refer to a Tract entitled, The true Alarm, The Company's Servants may know

Some thing

See Committees Minutes 11th Febry.

81. Fort St. George 13th March 1771.

Something of the Commerce of India, but of the Principles of Government they are utterly ignorant, they are however to a Man rapacious, ready upon every Occasion to plunge the Company into war, thereby to create Opportunities to themselves of plundering the public, and the Conclusion upon the whole is, that Men of more Honor, Virtue, and Integrity, of greater Abilities, and more principles in the Acts of Government should be employed, and such are only to be found amongst the Servants of the Crown. By our Constituents the Construction may be that We are forbid by Orders so to recently received, as those by the Dolphin, to make ourselves Parties in the Disputes between the Powers of India and commanded to confine our Views to the Peace and Security of the Company's present Possessions. That Hostilities committed by the Rajah of Tanjore upon a Polygar whose Dependance on the Carnatic was a doubtfull Point, and whose Right to Protection was therefore Doubtfull could not materially affect the Peace of the Carnatic, and therefore we ought not to have suffered ourselves to be Seduced into Measures, which might endanger the Peace of the whole, Draw on ourselves the attacks of our ambitious Neighbours, and expose the Company's Revenue, the Failure of which must deprive them of the Means of fulfilling their Engagements to Government &c. and even risque the Safety of their Possessions by wantonly bringing on ourselves a War without any apparent Means of Supporting it, and that under Pretence of Supporting the Nabob's Consequence in the Eyes of the Country Powers, vindicating his Honor, which was not materially injured in a Matter of doubtfull Right,

and

and of protecting the Peace of the Carnatic which was not — apparently broken. — —

To all which we can only say That under Orders and Systems which may be so variously construed, it is probable nothing but great Success can save us from severe Censure whatever Course we take. we have already wrote to the Rajah of Tanjore but have not received any Answer We are not prepared with a Sufficient Number of Guns and Stores at Trichinopoly, nor of Troops for an Expedition against Tanjore - We see no use in making any Declaration of our Intentions untill we are prepared to execute them. The Morattas in the Balaghaut have lately been joined by a Reinforcement of 10 or 12 Thousand Horse from Poonah, and the Party under Gopaul Hurry, which some time ago had been dispatched from Trumbuck Row's Army towards Adoni, has also rejoined; and Hyder has taken the Field. If the Morattas do not enter the Carnatic before the End of April, it is much less probable that they should attack it after that Time than now. it will be difficult from May to October for an Army of ravaging Horse to find Provender and Water. it would be rash therefore to commence Hostilities against Tanjore at present as the Nabob wishes, since we are not prepared to execute it effectually, and we think ourselves yet in Danger of the Morattas. It is however our Intention to collect together at Trichinopoly as expeditiously as we can, Troops & Artillery and Stores; in the mean Time if Matters can be accommodated upon an honorable Footing, we are clearly of Opinion it would be better to do so than to draw the Sword, But if that cannot be effected, we do not see how we can with any Degree of Propriety &

Should

Fort St George 13th March 1771.

Should we have Means avoid compulsive Measures, But we will form no decisive Resolution on this Subject nor even declare our Intention further than is hereinbefore Declared, untill we shall be ready to execute what we may resolve to undertake. –

The following Letter from the Select Committee at Fort William received the 11th Instant is now read.

To the Honble Josias Du Pre Esqr.

President and Governor &c.

Gentlemen of the Select Committee

at Fort St George

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter from Select Committee at Bengale apprehend disturbances from the Morattas Proposes to assist us if necessary with Money

We have been favored by the Receipt of Your Letter of the 3d Ultimo.

It is with much Concern we observe by Your Accounts of the critical Situation of Affairs in the Carnatic, and the Opposition which attends your Measures from the mistaken Policy of the Nabob, from whom you must so much rely for your Resources on Some of Trouble your Situation at this Period is made — particularly unfortunate, as you will have learnt from our last Letter the appearance there is of our Tranquility in these Provinces being disturbed by the Incursions of the Morattas.

Since our Advices to you of that Date we have received Intelligence that they have settled Terms with the Rohillas, and are uniting with an Intention of invading these Provinces; and appearances afford us some Reason to expect their speedy Incursions into the Dominions

of

8th Fort St. George 13th March 1771.

of his Majesty and the Vizier, although we have so great a Prospect of being shortly involved in Troubles ourselves nevertheless should the Nabob still remain Deaf to your Representations, and persist in refusing his assistance, We shall be ready to afford you every Succour in our Power.

We are

Hon^ble Sir & Sirs

Your most obed^t

Humble Servants

John Carter
Claud Russell
Charles Stuart

Fort William
the 7th Feb^y 1771

H. R.

Agreed that the Receipt of the above Letter be acknowledged, and that the Gentlemen at Bengall be informed that from the late Change in the Nabob's Conduct towards us, and his Agreement to pay the Current Charges in Case of Peace and Tranquility, we flatter ourselves we shall not be under the Necessity of drawing on them which we are sensible would, in their present circumstances Situation be very inconvenient to them; and we therefore avoid, unless we are absolutely obliged to it. —

P. Vansittart

Warren Hastings

Sam^l Ravenshaw

85. Fort St. George 18th March 1771.

Received the following Letter from Alexander Wynch Esqr.

To The Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr.
President and Governor, and the Rest of
the Gentlemen at the Select Committee
at
Fort St. George

Honble Sir and Sirs

Letter from Mr. Wynch on the Subject of the Intrigues of Hyder ally &c.

I have had the Honor to receive your Letter of the 1st Instant, accompanied by a Translate of one from Rucoun ud Dowlah to the President, a Copy of the Presidents Reply, and a Paper of Intelligence communicated to you by the Nabob Walaw Jaw.

Some time ago also received a Letter from Rucoun ud Dowlah, to the same Effect, and near by in the same Words, with the translate you have sent me, but as it did not appear to me to contain any thing new I thought it unnecessary to trouble the President about it. Applications of the same Nature had been made in several of his former Letters, with those in the one I have mentioned, without any other deviation, than that he is now rather more particular in his Requests & so far complied with them as to order a Guard of a Havildar a Naigue and Sixteen Sepoys from Kondapillee, to be Stationed at a Village called Anna Davam in the Chintalapoody Zemindary, with Orders to do every thing in their Power to prevent the Incursions he complains of. The Proposal made to the Duan by Fazul Beg Cawn, of sending Troops into the Circars to secure the Followers of Shavarow, though but a Proposal, is not a little insulting. Yet I do not imagine that it is any fresh Proposal, but

one

Fort St. George 18th March 1771.

one mentioned some Months ago in a Letter from Rucoun ud Dowlah to me, a Copy whereof I transmitted to the Council and answered it agreable to the Draft they were pleased to send me for that Purpose: in Consequence of this Answer I received a Letter from Fazal Beg, containing many & ye apologies for the Proposal, and Professions of attachment to the Company. Glad he and the other Persons said to be confederated with them, really conceived any Designs to our Prejudice, I do not see that our Stationing the Guards Rucoun ud Dowlah applies for, could in the least forward their Designs, but the contrary, and his application is a therefore some Proof to me, that they do not entertain any, or at least that they have no Intention to execute them at present. the Guards, were his Request complied with, would not be of such Force as to weaken us, by dispersing our Troops, for he can only mean to have five small Parties of Sepoys, of the Strength of that I have named to be Stationed at Ammur Dewan; and these, by being attended by Persons, who could procure and send us Intelligence of what passed in Cummamet and Palawandah, would serve as a Check upon their Conduct. Upon the whole I am of Opinion that at present nothing more is meant or intended, but to prevail upon us to do all we can for preventing the Incursions of Ashavarow's Followers. —

The Information concerning Hyder Ali by appears to me to be entirely groundless His Situation and every Circumstance of his late Conduct forbid it them least Credit. I will grant that he is by no means satisfied in his present State, and that he had once enjoyed Power and longs to enjoy it again; nor do I allow myself to be so far deceived, as to place the smallest Reliance, upon his

confidence

constant Declarations of invariable Attachment to the English
For I take it as a safe and not an uncharitable Maxim, that
there are few or none of his Complexion and Cast, bound to us
by any other Principle than that of Self Interest, and by this
alone would I weigh the Accusation against him. Hyder an
Ally, while he continues with us, and acts faithfully, has
a certain and genteel Maintenance from the Revenue of
his Jaghire, his Wives, Children, and almost every other
Relation he has, reside at Mazulipatam, from whence they
could not be removed, but with our Knowledge and permission.
and his Houses and Gardens at Mazulipatam are of
considerable Value. What Inducement is there then to
make him leave what he is now in Possession of, at the
Certainty of having his Family seized and detained by us?
If the Soubah is reconciled to him, his Peace must have been
made but very lately, for besides the Resentment occasioned
by the assistance he rendered the Company in taking
Possession of the Circars, it is to his Influence and Persuasion
he ascribes the Treachery of Jaffeir Beg Cawn in delivering
up the Fort of Commamet; it is however not impossible
but the Soubah, through the Mediation of Hyder's
Friends may have forgiven him for these Offences, yet it is
very unlikely, that he would afterwards place Confidence
in him or confer upon him any Post of Importance —
This is nothing more than barely stating the manner
in which he is now circumstanced, and it appears to me
sufficient to discredit the Correspondence he is accused
of, by which he must expose himself to the Danger of
Punishment, for a Crime from whence he could not hope
for any Advantage. The Elephants and Jewels mention'd
were sent to Hyderabad in October last together with some

Horses

Horses; he communicated to me his Intention of sending them, and procured a Dustuck for their being allowed to pass through the Cowcars. He was at that Time much distressed being indebted to the Cowcars, as well as the Company, and had prest for Payment, he therefore sent those Articles to Fazul Beg Cawn, in Order that he might purchase them, or lend him Money and keep them in Power untill he Should be paid. Fazul Beg purchased the Horses and Elephants, and sent him the Amount of them, together with a Sum which he lent him, three thousand Pagodas whereof I received in a Payment of the Rent of Wallaar Tammaloo and Droah for last Years.

Notwithstanding the Opinion I have here expressed, with Respect to the Intelligence you have been pleased to send me, Your Honor & Co may be assured, that I shall be as watchfull of the Motions of the Persons who are therein accused, as if I really believed them guilty.

I am

with much Respect

Honble Sir and Sirs

Your most obedient

Hble Servant

Alexr Wynch.

Rajahmundry
19th March 1771

At a Committee Present

Saturday
23d March

Josias Du Pré Esqr Governor President

Warren Hastings

Samuel Ardley

General Smith absent

Draft

89 Fort St. George 23d March 1771.

Draft of a Letter to the Honble Court of Directors to go by the Egmont, read and approved, Ordered to be wrote fair.

Wm. Du Pré
Warren Has Tings.
Sam. Ravenscroft

90. Fort St. George 25th March 1771.

Monday 25th March

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pré Esqr. Governor President
Warren Hastings Samuel Ardley

General Letter of this Date to the Honble Court of Directors to go p. Ship Egmont, read and signed, Ordered that the Packets be closed.

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings.
Sam. Ardley

At Fort St George 28th March 1771.

Thursday 28th March

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pré Esqr. Governor President
Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley.

Letter from the Rajah of Tanjore read as entered on Country Correspondence No. 67 a Copy of which was transmitted to the Court of Directors ff Ship Egmont & under Cover to Mr. Secretary Michell —

Observations on the King of Tanjours answer to the President's Letter.

The Committee after having well considered the Tenor of said Letter remark particularly the following Passage towards the Conclusion Viz.t "I have finished the affairs relative to Marrawar and confirmed him in his Business. The affair with Madooray remains to be finished which I shall also finish" which being an Answer to the Presidents Letter No. 24 representing to him the Impropriety of his Conduct and the Expediency of desisting from Hostilities against those Polygars cannot well be understood otherwise than as a Defiance. But the Committee far from thinking that such a Declaration should determine us hastily into Hostilities before we are prepared to give a decisive Blow, consider it rather as a Confirmation of the Opinion we have before declared — that the Rajah Does not depend solely on his own Strength, but has Promises of Support from the Morattas as mentioned in the Boards Remarks on Sir John Lindsays Letter. We do not mean to deliver as Facts our Opinions of the Dark Designs of Princes and Potentates whose Interest it is to deceive us, and into whose Cabinets We have no certain Means of penetrating and whilst We are bound by every Tye of Honor, and good Policy, to conceal the Means by which We obtain even such Lights as we do acquire. We shall therefore (not being

able

92 Fort St. George 28th March 1771.

able to produce more Authentic Vouchers) only declare it to be our Firm Opinion founded not merely on a Conjecture but on Strong and concurrent Circumstances That the Views of the Nabob, the Morattas, and the Rajah are as follow.

That the Morattas have been earnestly desirous of engaging us in an Offensive Alliance not for our Assistance in the Field which they do not want being Superior there to Hyder, but by our Assistance to reduce the Strong Holds in the Mysore Country and totally extirpate Hyder, and by Such an Alliance to prevent us from Assisting Hyder.

That they have been encouraged by the Nabob to believe that they might threaten and compel us into Such an Alliance, By the Term encourage we mean to say that we believe the Nabob hath expressed to them his own Readiness and good Inclination to enter into an Offensive Alliance with them but that he cannot bring us over, that he wishes to have us brought over, and that he hath insinuated they Should have his hearty Concurrence thought not openly to hostile Measures to accomplish it.

That the Nabob is desirous of Such an Alliance with the Morattas from whom he expects to obtain in Return the Mysore Countries on this Side the Pass.

That the Rajah of Tanjore has long been but Since the Arrival of Sr John Lindsay more than ever apprehensive that the Nabob has determined to conquer the whole Tanjore Country, whenever he shall be

From all which the following results.

That

Fort St George 24 March 1771.

That the Rajah wishes to involve the Carnatic in Troubles because his Safety depends on the Inability of the Nabob to disturb him. —

That the Mavattas may have excited or encouraged the Rajah to this Conduct in order to engage us in a War which would prevent us from assisting Hyder, and consequently the more readily compel us into their alliance to prevent their Hostilities whilst we should be thus engaged.

That the Nabobs views are the same as the Mavattas which we think is clearly proved by his strongly urging us to take the Field with a small Detachment where could do nothing Effectual, and that once engaged in the War, we are then at his Mercy, and under his Controul.

These Opinions are in Effect the same as are delivered in the Remarks on Sr. John Lindsay's Letter We repeat them here that a Chain of our Ideas may appear on these Proceedings, and that our Resolutions may in the same Place be supported by the same Reasons on which they are founded. The Resolutions already taken and which we continue is to proceed in making all the Preparations of Stores &c at Trichinopoly but not to Declare our Intentions, until we shall be ready to execute them.

The President informs the Committee that having often revolved in his Mind the Subject of the Expedition against Tanjore, and foreseeing many Difficulties besides the mere Practicability of such an Expedition, he hath loosely cast some Minutes on Paper not as his ultimate and decisive Opinion, but as hints to be well weighed and considered

Fort St. George 28th. March. 1771.

considered and that the Members of this Committee may have time and Opportunity to do so, and be prepared when the time, or if the time should come for determining decisively thereon he Lays the same before the Committee and desires that they may be entered merely as Hints, they are as follows. —

Sketch

1st An Account has been drawn out of what Articles and Stores are wanting to compleat General Smiths Indent. what Part can be supplied — from whence and where.

2d The Commissary General has had Notice that he may provide the Bullocks to convey them, as expeditiously as possible.

3d The Remains of the 2d Battalion of the 2d Br[igade] be ordered to Vellour, and there leaving the[re] such a Garrison as may be necessary, the Rest to be or[dered to] Trichinopoly. —

4 At the same time that this Detachment [is] to move all the Nabobs Troops that can be spa[red to be] Expeditious to move towards the Frontiers.

5 Article 3 and 4th to be so executed only in Case [the] should be ultimately resolved on when Stores [are] good forwardness, and if the Aspect of Morattas and [Hy]
Soubah should not make it prudent to desist. —

Considerations

The Company's Orders are uniform in many repeated Passages against extending the Nabobs Dominions or their own — and their general Ideas of Hereditary Right in the Dependants of the Carnatic. See General Letter 4th March 1767 Paragraphs 3.

In many Letters they bear themselves equally between the

the Rights of the Nabob, and those of the Rajah and cannot in any Place that I can find intimate a direct Intention of conquering the Tanjour Country, though their Orders evidently lead to a Conquest. In their Letter to the Board of the 17th March 1769 and Select Committee they recommend our giving the Nabob all Assistance We can, to compel the Rajah to bear a reasonable Quota of the Charges of the War, but no Idea of a Conquest is suggested if he should comply.

Supposing We should think it adviseable to undertake an Expedition what are to be the Objects and what the Terms and Conditions to be proposed to the Nabob. These Points occur, to be maturely weighed.

Why should We undertake an Expedition against the Rajah of Tanjore?

1. Because the Company direct it in their Letter of the 17th March 1769. See their Reasons.

2. Because the Rajah hath attacked the Dependants of the Nabob's Government, whereby the Nabob's Honor and Consequence is wounded and thereby the Peace of the Carnatic endangered.

3. Because the Rajah hath not paid the Pistacash due in July 1770 conformable to the Treaty of 1762 to which the Company became Guarantees.

Why should We not undertake an Expedition against the Rajah of Tanjore?

The various Reasons are assigned not absolutely against it but as Doubts, Difficulties and Dangers, in the Minutes of the Committee of the 11th. February and 13th. March and Remarks on Sir John Lindsay's Letter of the 22d. March.

The Result is that we go on with all possible Expedition preparing and sending to Trichinapoly, the Stores and Artillery wanted to give probable Hopes of Success in

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96. Fort St. George 28th March 1771.

on an Expedition leaving the Point as yet undetermind and of Course undeclared whether we shall undertake an Expedition or not? because no one advantage can possibly be obtained by making a Declaration now - because Such a Declaration may subject us to many Disadvantages whether we finally determine on an Expedition or not? because the various Circumstances that may attend our Situation at the time, when we shall be ready must then Determine us - such as ways and means - War or Peace in Europe and the advices thereon - the aspect of the Morattas - the aspect of the Soubah - the Temper of the Nabob -

But supposing us ready prepared for an Expedition, what are the Objects, and what the Conditions with the Nabob -

The Object.

1st. To obtain Reparation for the Injury done to the Nabob's Government, by the Rajah's taking up arms as aforesaid -

2d. To obtain Payment of the Arrears of Peischcash -

3d. To obtain an Indemnification or Reimbursement of the Charges of the Expedition -

4th To obtain a Sum of Money from the Rajah as a Punishment for his Conduct - as a Recompence for the Hazards of the Expedition, and as a Quota for the Charges of the Mysore War.

2d. Is it probable that the Nabob will ascertain to us the certain Means of supporting the Charges of the Expedition?

It is probable that he will not put into

our

97. Fort St. George 28th March 1772.

out Hands the Means?

2w. Can We place any Dependance on the General Promise of as much Assistance as he can give?

We cannot place any absolute Dependance on such a Promise, neither ought we wholly to reject it.

Qu. What are the Company's Ideas on this Subject in ordering an Expedition against Tanjour. See Letter to the Select Committee 17th March 1769 Par. 5, 6, 7, 8.

They seem not to have an Idea of any such absolute Means being put into our Hands by the Nabob, because the principal Object of the Expedition is to get Money from Tanjour to pay the Nabob's Debt, supposing therefore that he had not Means of his own, and consequently that he could not advance for the Charges of the Expedition.

Qu. Then if We undertake the Expedition and fail, who shall bear the Charges? or if successful, who is to enjoy the Fruits?

It is clear from the Tenor of the Nabob's Conduct that he will not come to any precise and determinate Agreement in Respect to the Charges.

2w. If he persists in this Line, shall We refuse to go against the Rajah?

That were dangerous, for the Company do not require Us to make such Stipulation — We shall be accused of refusing our Aid — Breach of Faith — Breach of the Treaty of Paris &c. &c. &c. as in Remarks on St. John — Lindsay's Letter.

2w. Shall We then undertake it at all Hazards at the Company's Risque?

That were equally dangerous, for if We are not successfull the Fault will be all laid at our Door: the Nabob will refuse to reimburse the Charge, the Officer of the

P.R. Fort St George 28th March 1771.

The Crown as far as we can judge from his present Conduct will support the Nabob the Company will remain saddled with the Expence and nothing will remain for us, but Shame, Opprobrium and Reprobation. —

2d. What then is to be done, tis plain we are in equal Danger of Blame whatever Course we take — a middle one, will be safest.

2d. But what is that middle Course? This or none — Leave every thing undetermined and referred to be settled between our Employers and the Nabob, what-ever may be the Event, upon a candid Representation of Facts and Circumstances. —

2d. But shall we settle nothing with the Nabob? —

Yes, so much as follows; We ought to endeavor to settle and agree with him. Supposing we should hereafter determine that the Expedition may be undertaken

1st. That the Expedition be undertaken bona fide each Party to contribute every aid possible of Money Men, Stores and Provisions

2d. That an exact Account be kept of the whole Charge, and of what supplied by each. —

3d. The Surplus if any to be deposited under two Locks if required; — one Key to be kept by the Nabob and one by us, upon Condition that in Case of Troubles in the Carnatic, this Surplus shall be applied as far as it will go in the Charges of Defence — in Case of Peace and Tranquility, the same to remain so deposited until the Nabob and the Company, shall settle the mode of Application or Division.

4th If the Rajah should not compromise for a

Sum

Sum of Money, but obstinately refusing should compel us to an Extremety — If we should be successfull and take the Fort of Tanjore — What shall be Done then?

1st We Garrison the Fort, not for the Nabob not for the Company but in Trust, and subject to the Agreement that Shall be made between our Employers and the Nabob on that Subject.

2d That the Affairs of the Revenue of the Country be administered by Delegates, one on the Part of the Nabob, and one on the Part of the Company, the Money arising to be disposed of in the same Manner as above proposed, in Case a Sum be received as a Compromise.

NB. The last Article is subject to great Difficulties, and will require much modelling.

The President informs the Committee that he had Declined accepting the Present of a Dress mentioned in the Rajah of Tanjore's Letter, for the Reasons given in Consultation of the 4th March last, for refusing a Present then sent, and as the same came by the Hands of the Vercarrah who carried the Letter from the President to the Rajah, and returned with his Answer.

The Committee are of Opinion, that it would be highly improper that the said Present should be received, considering the Terms on which We are at this Time with the Rajah, and the very unusual Manner, in which the same was sent. It is therefore resolved, that the same be delivered to the Vacquil, who is to be informed that his Master must not expect

that

100. Fort St George 28th March 1771.

that any Complimentary Presents be received from him, until he gives a more satisfactory account of his Conduct.

Wm. Aldrich

Warren Hastings.

Sam. Stratley

Fort St. George 1st. April 1771.

At a Committee Present

Monday. 1st. April 1771.

Josias Du Pré Esqr. Governor President
Warren Hastings — Samuel Ardley

The Nabob having desired a Conference with the Committee at the Garden House, the Committee accordingly met him there this Morning and several Hours were spent in a deliberation on the present State of Affairs with Respect to the Morattas, in the Close the Nabob Desired that this Conference might not be considered as a public one, and consequently that nothing of what had passed should be entered on our Minutes and that he would write to us on the Subject, We promised him that it should be as he desired. In expectation therefore of his Letter and in Consequence of our Promise We say no more here. ——

Jos: DuPré
Warren Hastings.
Sam Ardley

100. Fort St. George 28th March 1774

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Account of his Conduct.

Wm. Du Bré
Warren Hastings.
Sam. Ridley

101 Fort St. George 1st. April 1771.

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Warren Hastings.
Sam Ardley

102. Fort. St. George 3d. April 1771.

At a Committee Present

Wednesday Josias Du Pré Esqr. Governor President
3d. April 1771 Warren Hastings Samuel Ardley

The President Lays before the Committee a Paper of Intelligence received this Day the Substance of which he thinks may be depended upon, having before received several Articles of Intelligence through the same Channel which have proved to be facts.

Intelligence received 3d April 1771

The Nabob by his Devan Cojah Hussein Cawn desired Madavarow Sadasive the Maratta Vackel to write to Madavarow against the Rajah of Tanjore and to let him know that he is acting against the Polegars dependant on his Government of Trichinopoly and receiving Monies from them contrary to his loyalty On this, the said Madavarow Sadasive told the Devan that before he knows what the Rajah of Tanjore has to say upon that Subject, it will be imprudent, in him to write to his Master concerning it and then questioned or addressed to him in the Manner following

"When I demanded the Nabob to send an Assistance of the Troops to my Master, he was pleased "to say that a Difference is subsisting between him "and the Company wherefore they pay no Regard to "his Requests of detaching Troops, that he wrote to Europe "and expects to receive Orders and proper Sirdars shortly "to act according to his Directions when he said he will "be able to comply with my Masters Desire, but now "I see that the Nabob has deceived me by Treating to "me as aforesaid

Fort St. George 3d April 1771.

"The Rajah of Tanjore, if the Disagreement really
"subsisted between him and the Company as he had
"told me, How could he have prevailed on them to join
"their Army in the Manner aforesaid? This his Doings
"against the Rajah of Tanjore will incur my Master's
"Displeasure consequently cause great Troubles, you'll
"therefore speak to the Nabob to decline his hostile
"Intentions against the Rajah who is a Kin to our
"Sovereign Sawarajah and my Master Madavarow has
"a great regard to him because he is of the Royal Family"
The said Dewan, having communicated the foregoing
to the Nabob returned for answer that the Nabob
has only ordered the Troops to assist Nalcooty in case
the Tanjore Rajah attempted to attack his Country and
that at present he has no Intention to act against
the Rajah - It is said that Madavarow Sadasive Spoke
to the Nabob in Person some things concerning the
above Particulars and that the Nabob gave him an
answer much to the same Purport, as the Dewan did
to the said Madavarow Sadasive as above.

The Remarks which naturally occur, are

1st That if the Intelligence be true, what we have often
suggested is now proved viz. That the Nabob instead
of negociating with the Morattas on his own
behalf and the Company's as one Interest has
endeavored to persuade the Morattas that he is well
inclined to assist them but that we are the only
Obstacles - which indeed is true although it may
not be proper or consistent to make such a

102. Fort. St. George 3d. April 1771.

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Warren Hastings Samuel Ardley

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Fort St. George 3d. April 1771.

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Declaration to the Morattas. ~

2d

Fort St. George 3d April 1771.

2. That he has wrote to Europe &c. which we also believe to be true — in the mean time what the Influence of this Government must now be, on the Opinion of the Country Powers needs no Comments.

3. That the Nabob shares the Fate of all double dealers who are not believed even when they speak the Truth, — although he hath told the Marattas the Truth & they doubt him, and we must add that we believe if they had not doubted him they would before this have tryed the Scheme of Compelling us into their Alliance but doubting of the Nabob's Assurances they pursue their own Plans

4th. That the Rajah of Tanjore has assurances of Support from the Marattas.

5th That the Nabob is consistent in this. That having urged us to Hostilities with the Rajah before we are prepared to effect any thing material, he now denies it to the Marattas and throws the March of the Detachmt upon us as a mere Act of our own — 'Tis impossible the Nabob could have ever doubted of the Marattas supporting the Rajah, and if so, to what Motive can we possibly impute his urging us so strongly, and prevailing on Sir John Lindsay to urge us as in his late Letter to commence Hostilities against Tanjore, but that of embroiling us with the Marattas — and what Views could he have from that Quarrell but the Accomplishment of his favorable Scheme of compelling us through necessity into the Offensive Alliance with the Marattas. —

Read a Letter from Hyder Ally Cawn as entered in Country Correspondence N° giving an Account of the

105 Fort St. George 3d April 1771.

Action between him and the Morattas and referring to his Vackeels for further Particulars.

The President acquaints the Committee that having in Consequence of the foregoing Letter conversed with the Vacqueels, they had delivered to him the following Representation.

The humble Representation of the Vackeels of Nabob Hyder Ally Cawn Behader.

Purport of what our Master directed us to represent to your Honor is as follows.

"The Honble Company entered into a defensive "Treaty with me so that as they are Sensible for Strict "Observance or Performance of that Engagement so I do not "doubt but they will be attentive to what they have agreed "besides if they undertake to assist me, it would be the same "thing as if they had fenced their Barriers to their own "Country and consequently will be attended with a general "Benefit of both the Countries that is belong to the English "and my own and moreover it will not only be a means "to spread a good Reputation of the English Nation for the "Performance of the Treaty but will lay me under very "heavy Obligations to them and consequently will bind me "for ever to render all the Services in my Power for their "Good and Benefit At present I offer to the Honble Company "a Sum of Rupees 800,000 provided they send their Assistance "to me".

The foregoing is humbly recommended to your Serious Consideration not doubting that your Honors Goodness will comply with our Masters Request

Representation of the Vackeels of Nabob Hyder ally Cawn Behader for His Honors private Perusal.

Dur

104 Fort St. George 3d April 1771.

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Representation of the Vackeels of Nabob Hyder ally Cawn Behader for His Honors private Perusal.

Dito

106 Fort St. George 3d April 1771.

Our Master offers a present of Rupees 300,000 to your Honour provided you be pleased to cause an Assistance to be sent to him —

W. Hastings acquaints the Committee that the Vackeels also made him an Offer verbally of a Lack of Rupees in case Assistance were sent to their Master.

The Committee having taken the foregoing into Consideration, are still of the Opinion repeated by expressed in our Proceedings, that it would be for the Interest of the Carnatic that Hyder Ally Cawn should be supported against the Morattas, as he is the only Check to their Power in these Parts — Nevertheless We have long laid aside all thoughts of supporting him as it would be a dangerous for us alone and without certain Resources, to act on such a Plan, which the Nabob continues determined against it, and on the contrary is exerting every Means in his Power to induce us to enter into an offensive & allyance with the Morattas to subdue him — But even were this Difficulty removed, the late Orders, received by the Dolphin (Vide Page 3) "We enjoin you to avoid, as far as in you lies, becoming Parties in any Disputes between the Powers of India" — Would be a Bar — We are therefore of Opinion that it will be proper to defer sending any answer to Hyder Ally Cawn for the present —

The President lays before the Committee the following State of the Transactions between Trichinapoly and Tanjour with Respect to the Rights over Marawar and Nalcotty and Tondaman —

Brief State of Transactions between Trichinapoly & Tanjore with Respect to the Rights over Maravers Nalcotty and Tondaman. —

The

107. Fort St. George 3d April 1771.

The best Accounts learned of Marravers Establishments are, that he enjoys his Government from several Centuries even from the time of the Gentoo Kings who reigned over this Country —

As to his dependency, it is generally talked of to be on the Government of Trichinopoly, but by natural Rights and Custom of the Country Government, He whom is powerfull and Strong makes the weak his Dependants by Force of Arms obliging him to comply with his Demands not confining himself to the Regularities observed by most of the European Princes, whose Governments and Constitution of Laws are quite different to that of India. Thus by the above Rights and Custom the Country Powers when in a prosperous State, interfere with things that are not properly connected to them, and assert a Right to such their Proceedings under any pretence whatever which is not easily determined by Questions and Arguments — To convince you clearly of the Practice of the above Customs, it is thought necessary to observe a few Instances relative to Hyder, who after his Return from the Carnatic went and received Sundry Sums of Money from several Polygars and Zemindars who were known to be his Dependants on the Cudapah and Cundanore Governments. What Right had he then to do so while they were Dependants on different Governments? But Force of Arms is the thing that asserts or maintains all Rights and Privileges in this Country or overrules them — How be it, as it is now required to procure some Accounts of Maravar and Naboody, and to know how and in what Manner the Tanjoreans have had Connections with them, the same is gained as follows:

That in the Year of Manmada Sanvetcher answering the Year Christ 1716 Viziaraguneda Marravar

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108 Fort St. George 3d April 1774

held the Government of Ramanadaporam, at that time the present Tanjore Rajahs Predecessors marched their Troops against him. The Government of Trichinapelly did on their Part Send their Assistance to the said Maravar notwithstanding the Tanjoreans prevailed and took Possession of a Part of the said Maravers Country at length this Dispute was carried before the Diwan of Nabob Saudatulla Cawn who in those Days marched to the Southward to receive his Peishcash from the Government of Trichinopoly and Tanjore, on this the said Diwan by Order of his Master settled the said Difference under certain Restrictions to be observed by either Party with Regard to the Possession of the Countries, and so it remaind till the Death of the said Maravar which happened in the Year Viswavasenvitcher or of Christ 1725, at which one Tandertaver succeeded him soon after, one Bavane Sunker under Pretence of being of Kin to the said Vizia ragunad went to the Tanjore Rajah who was the present Rajahs Grandfather and offered to give him certain Countries provided he undertook and settled him in the Government of Ramanadaporam, on this the said Rajah detached his General Anundarau Cashva together with the said Bavane Sunker to that purpose. The said Tandertaver on his Part applied to the Trichinopoly Government for Assistance who sent a Force with their General Sambiah, at length the Tanjoreans defeated both the said Tandertaver and his Confederate Troops and so cut off the said Tandertaver with the present Tondarmans Predecessors who also assisted the said Tandertaver and placed Bavane Sunker in the Government and obtained the Countries he promised

Some

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Some time after Bavane Sunker was plaid in the Government, one Cattataver Uncle to the said Tandertaver on the Mothers Side, went and made interest with the Tanjoreans with a Promise of great Reward provided they settled him in the Government of Ramanadapooram. This and some other ill Behaviour of the said Bavane Sunker, induced the Tanjoreans to undertake the Cause of Cattataver and accordingly sent an Army who reduced Bavane Sunker whom they took Prisoner and placed Cattataver in the Government, of whom they obtained certain Districts; Some time after which Bavane Sunker who was their Prisoner, prevailed on the Tanjoreans with a Promise of a greater Advantage if they would again undertake his Cause, which they did by sending one Lodjee with a proper Force but Cattataver had the good Luck to Defeat them, so that they retreated to Tanjore, On this, Cattataver retook all that Part of the Country which he ceded to them, at the time he was placed in the Govern.t. Thus it remained a considerable time, afterwards during the time of Pertapsing the present Rajahs Father, Manojey marched at the Head of the Tanjore Troops and took Possession of the Districts which Cattataver ceded and retook them afterwards as above, and he made a further attempt to possess more of Maravers Country but to no purpose, soon after which Damodra Pillah the late General of Marrawar, retook all that Manojee had possessed and wanted to clear the Fort of Arundangoy &c which still remained in the Hands of the Tanjoreans being Part of a Cession made to them at first by Bavane Sunker, at that time the Nabob requested the said General to assist him in his Expedition against Madura and desired the

General

Fort St. George 3d April 1771.

General to defer his Design 'till that affair was over, and then to clear his Country. To this End he got Mr. Lawrence to Speak to him Likewise. It is said the Nabob told the Same to the Tanjoreans about clearing the Countries regarding Marravar which they requested of him at the time of their Joining assistance to Madura.

Now the present Rajah having march'd against Marravari Country, not only cleared all that Part of his former Possessions ceded to him by several Marravirs namely Bavane Sunkar, Cattatavar &c. but took some more Districts all the above Transactions between the Marravari and Tanjore Rajahs beginning from Vezivaragunad Marravar as aforesaid happened in the Space of fifty or sixty Years past.

As to Malcooty, he was formerly a petty Polygar or Watcher on Marravars Country, but being of the same Cast with Marravar the said Vezivaragunad gave his Daughter in Marriage to him and by that Means granted him some Districts, but soon after Bavane Sunker was placed in the Government of the Tanjoreans as aforesaid, he went and join'd the said Malcooty who fled and joined Cattatavar when the Tanjoreans undertook the said Cattatavar's Cause, and as soon as Cattatavar was settled in the Government by the Defeat of Bavane Sunker, the Tanjoreans prevailed on Cattatavar not only to restore Malcooty what he was dispossessed of by Bavane Sunker but likewise to grant him some more Districts, ever since which, Malcooty's Power has encreased by the above acquisitions which is the Reason that the Tanjoreans say that they have raised him to Power.

With

111 Fort St. George 3d April 1771.

With Regard to Tondaman who is generally talked of as being Dependant on the Governmt. of Trichinopoly, he has continually had some Disputes and Skirmishes with the Tanjoreans concerning the bounds of each others Districts which were settled or drop'd by either according to the Opportunities and Conveniences they met with, sometimes the Tanjoreans disturbed Tondamans Country who on his Part did the same when he found a favorable Opportunity. —

As to the Elephants seized and detained by Nalcooty, and wrote for by Hyder Ally Cawn to the late Governor, they are the Property of the Tanjore Rajah but a Storm driving the Ships (in which they came loaded) to one of Naalcoty's Ports, he seized them as his Rights according to the Country Customs and detained them ever Since not regarding whose Property they were and wrote the same in answer to the late Governors Letter Sent him on that Subject. —

Upon Enquiry it appeared that neither Marrawar nor Nalcooty ever paid any regular or yearly Tribute to the Governments of Trichinopoly, which according to the Power and opportunity they met with received Sums of Money from them by Way of Nazar or Presents — With Regard to Tondaman they did the same. —

From the foregoing Accounts and which from the best Information we have been able to procure We believe to be true, it appears that Power is the only Arbitrator of Rights and that established usage or Titles cannot

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cannot exempt one State from a Dependance on another when superior Force prevails, nither can they enforce such Dependance where Power is wanting.)

Jon. Du Bré

Warren Hastings.

Sam Ravenshaw

113 Fort St. George 4th April 1771.

Wrote the following Letter to Select Committee at Fort William.

Select Committee

To the Honble John Cartier Esqr.
President and Governor &c. Gentlemen
of the Select Committee at Fort William

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter to Fort William advising of the Conduct of the Rajah of Tanjour of the Defeat of Hyder ally and of our Hopes that we shall not be obliged to draw on them

We have been favored with the Duplicate of your Letter of 7th February.

It gives us much Concern to observe that your Apprehensions of Disturbances from the Morattas are increased and the more so as Our Situation on this Coast becomes every Day more precarious. The Tanjore Rajah is still engaged in his Operations against the Maravar as advised of in our Letter of the 20th February. We are sensible of the Impropriety of his Conduct, nevertheless We have not made any Declaration of our Resolution on this Subject, as We have great Reason to believe the Rajah would be supported by the Morattas were We to commence Hostilities against him, which must involve us in great Difficulties, since We have no Resources of our own to support us in such a contest, and consequently must fall entirely under the Will of the Rajah, whose great Object has long been to engage us in our offensive Alliance with the Morattas, which we decline.

Hyder Ally has lately been defeated in an Engagement with the Morattas and obliged to retreat with Precipitation to Seringapatam. This gives us fresh Cause to apprehend we shall not long remain unmolested by the Morattas.

The

Ma Fort St George 4th April 1771.

The Nabob having promised to defray
our current Expences on his Account, in Case of Peace
and Tranquility. We have that single chance to enable
us to support the Burthen of our Expences without
having Recourse to your Assistance, and you may be
assured nothing but the utmost Extremity shall oblige
Us to avail ourselves of the Latitude you have given us
for that Purpose.

We are

Fort St George
4th April 1771.

Honble Sir & Sirs

Your most obedient
Humble Servants
Josias Du Pré
&c Committee

Received the following Duplicate Letter from the Select
Committee at Fort William, The Original of which is not
yet come to Hand.

Select Committee

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr
President and Governor &c. Gentlemen of the
Select Committee at Fort St George

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter from Select Committee at Fort William - desire we will detain 200 Recruits if necessary above of the Marattas being in Possession of Delhi and the Kings Family

Our last bore Date the 7th February
since when we have received your Favor of the twentieth
We return you our best Thanks
Gentlemen for the two hundred Men you have been
pleased to send down to this Presidency for though we
flatter Ourselves we are now not likely to be employed
in the Field for the next six Months, yet as our
Regiments as well as the Artillery want full one Third

&c

115 Fort St. George 13th May 1771.

to compleat to their proper Establishment, we must acknowledge this to be a very seasonable Supply, but as requested should you find the Assistance given us may have rather distressed yourselves, that you would detain an equal Number of Recruits which may be sent out by the next Ships for this Presidency.

In our last we informed you that the Moratta Force was before Furruckabad and the Chiefs were settling Terms with the Rohillahs and that when these were settled we expected they would unite and make an Irruption into the Carnatic Province. Though these Conclusions were the most natural to be drawn from the Situation that affairs were then in yet a few Days convinced us they were only founded on Probability. Early in February the different Chiefs of the Moratta by Name Rasnchunder Gunnies, Tokoje, Holkar Mahoje Sindeah and Bissaje Pundit & the nominal Dewan of Madaverow removed suddenly from the Neighbourhood of Furruckabad and directed their March to the Capital (Delhi) which in a few Days they reached and are at this Time in Possession of it and of the whole Royal Family. This Manœuvre at the time it happened was entirely unexpected and was imputed to the March of part of our Army to the Carnatic and to the well known Dissensions and Disagreements among the different Chiefs - however it now appears it was precipitated in some Measure from the imprudent and improper Advice given them by the King himself but with a View to induce them to suspend their Operations and Thoughts of electing a new King rather than they should implicitly follow it, and the two

foregoing

Fort St. George 13th May 1771.

Foregoing Reasons might also have had their Weight to so sudden Removal — The Distance of the Morattas at it's time and their present Inaction with the advanced Season of the Year gives us Hopes that they will not soon return again to the Southward and should they return after the Rains are over we have Reason to believe such an Alliance may then be form between the Vizier and the Rohillas as may prove a more formidable and vigorous Opposition, to their Encroachments than they have hitherto met with —

We lately Ram Chunder Gunnies was allowed to have the Chief Command though the Opposition, hired with from Tukoje Holkar and Mahajee Sindia in his different Plans too plainly proved his Authority was disputed — at present Bissagie Pundit, support by Sindeah has the Chief Command and the Insign of Commander in Chief has been delivered up to him by Ram Chunder Gunnies and which is supposed to be by the Express orders of Madaverow.

We are

Hon^ble Sir & Sirs

Your most obedient, hum^ble Serv^ts

John Cartier

Claud Russell

Charles Gloyer

Fort William
the 10th March 1771

To which the follow^g Answer was returned.

To the Hon^ble John Cartier Esq^r
President and Governor & Gentlemen
of the Select Committee at Fort William

Hon^ble Sir & Sirs

Your

Letter to Select Committee at Fort William in answer

In Fort St. George 20th May 1771

Your Favor of the 10th March reached us the 2d. Instant.

We flatter ourselves we shall be under no Necessity of detaining any Part of the Recruits intended for your Presidency this Season, and we beg you will be apprized that nothing but the most pressing Occasions shall induce us to take Steps on the contrary of the Recruits You may expect should be insufficient to compleat your Establishment, we shall readily assist you as far as we are able, and your Exigence may require

In our Letter of the 6th Ultimo we advised you Hyder Ally's having been defeated by the Morattas and Triemback Row and that he had been obliged to retire to Seringapatam.

The Moratta Army immediately invested that Place, and continued before it till the latter End of Jul, when they suddenly decamped and moved so far distant from it. Various Reasons have been assigned for this sudden Motion but We impute it to Want of Forage and Provisions, We however hope will give Hyder Ally Time to recover himself and fit Seringapatam in a proper State of Defence.

We know not what may be the next Step of Morattas, but it is said their Designs are against Biddenore Country. We shall however constantly advise You of their Motions, as their Operations in these Parts in the North may in some degree be affected by e other. and we shall be obliged to you if you will in like Manner continue to communicate

what

118 Fort St George 20th May 1771.

what mates Occurrences in their Operations may
happen in y^r Parts.

We are

Honble Sir & Sirs

Your most obedient

Humble Servants

Josias DuPré & Committee

Fort St George
20th May 1771

At a Committee Present

Josias DuPré Esq^r Governor President

Wednesday Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley

5th June

Letter from the Select Committee at Fort William
read as follows

To the Honble Jo^s DuPré Esq^r

President and Governor Fort St George

& the Gentlemen of the Committee

Honble Sir & Sirs

We did ourselves the Honor to
address you the Date the 10th March since when
we have receiv^d no Letter from Your Presidency.)

An Event which in its Consequences
is likely to give material Change to the Politics of
this Part of In: we are very apprehensive is on the
Points of happening, and of which we think it is our
Duty to inform you.—

Now were made acquainted—
Gentlemen in Last that the Marattas had quitted
the Country of the Rohillas and had proceeded by
Forced Marches the Capital which they were in
Possession of, as [illegible] use of the King's Family, that this

Letter from Select Committee at Fort William advising of the King's Resolution to put himself under the Protection of the Marattas. and of the French Master attendant and Pilot having left Chandernagore.

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as he knew in Spite Friendship and alliance with the English, and that any Demand made upon him at the Head of an Army, Laying waste his Country, would be answered by the English Forces in all Parts of India, who never would suffer a People under their Protection to be distressed and plundered under any Pretence whatsoever, that Accounts should be settled between their respective Agents in the usual Manner, and that if any thing was due from the Nabob of Arcott your good Offices should be employed in bringing the Matter to an amicable Conclusion.

A true Extract
Geo. Skipp
Secry.

Observations thereon.

The President acquaints the Committee that Hyder Alley's Vacquil had applied for a Supply of Fire Arms, and that he has been informed that our Situation was such as prevented our taking any Measures at this time.

It gives us great Satisfaction to find that the Ideas of the Honble Court expressed in the above Extract, relative to the Merattas and Hyder are entirely conformable to our Sentiments, and the Measures which We have pursued, notwithstanding the earnest Solicitations of the Nabob, so warmly supported by Sir John Lindsay for an offensive Alliance with the Merattas, Agreed therefore that the Gentlemen at Bombay be particularly informed of our Situation, and of the Impossibility of our affording any Assistance to Hyder Ally by Reason of the Opposition we met with from the Nabob. But as the assisting him with a Supply of Fire Arms, may be of essential Service to him, and as the Gentlemen at Bombay acquaint us that they have furnished him with

Fort St. George 5th June 1771.

To be desired to Supply Hyder ally with 2 or 3 Thousand Stand of Arms which Shall be replaced from hence.

with all they can Spare. It is also agreed to recommend it to them to Send him if possible a further Supply of two or three Thousand Stand, and that they be acquainted We will take the first opportunity of replacing them from hence.

Expediency of keeping Bullocks ready.

The President acquaints the Committee that the Bullocks which went with the last Convoy of Stores to Trevenallour are returned, and that as we may daily expect advices from Europe, He thought it expedient to defer sending any more Stores to Trichinopoly, untill it be known, whether there is Peace or War; particularly as Trichinopoly is sufficiently supplied — That he thinks it necessary that the Bullocks should be kept in Pay that we may be as well prepared as possible to act as Occasion may require — which the Committee approve and the President is desired to converse with the Nabob on the Subject, and endeavor to obtain his

The Nabob to be consulted thereon.

Consent thereto.

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
Jam. Sadleir

130 Fort St. George 8th June 1771.

Wrote the following Letters, pursuant to the Resolutions of last Committee.

Select Committee

To Sir John Lindsay Knight of the Bath
His Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary
and Commander in Chief of His Majesty's
Ships in India.

Sir

Letter to Sir John Lindsay.

The Select Committee at Bengall have acquainted us that the Master Attendant at Chandernagore with most, if not all of the French Pilots, had left that Place, in order, as was apprehended, to prevent their falling into our Hands, in case of a war between the two Nations, and that they might be in Readiness to facilitate any attempts the French may have in View against Bengall — Upon Enquiry we learn that the Master Attendant whose Name is Verlé is arrived at Pondicherry, but we have not been able yet to learn whether any of the other Pilots are there also.

The Master attendant, we are informed has the Command of a trading Vessell, and has imported sundry Merchandize at Pondicherry, whether his Objects were merely Trade, or whether a View to the possible or probable Arrival of a Fora from France, in case of a War, we are unable to conjecture; But under such doubtfull Circumstances, we beg Leave to submit to your Consideration whether it may be proper (in Case you should not have any more material Service for his Majesty's Ships under your Command) to order one to cruize off Ceylon, that in Case of the Appearance of a French Squadron we may be enabled to send the most speedy Advice to the Gentlemen

Fort St. George 8th June 1771.

at Bengall that they may have time to remove the Buoys on the River, and to take such other Measures as may be necessary for their Security

We have the Honor to be

Sir

Your most obedient & most humble Servants

Josias DuPre & Committee

Fort St. George
8th June 1771.

Select Committee

To the Honble William Hornby Esqr

President & Governor &c Gentlemen
of the Select Committee at Bombay

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter by Bombay

We have been favored with your Letter of the 6th May & Duke of Portland with the several Papers enclosed.

Hyder Ally Cawn immediately after his Defeat retreated to Seringapatam which Place was invested with Troops by Col. Wood who remained before it till the latter End of April, when he secretly decamped and moved some Coss Distant therefrom. This Motion we imagine to have been occasioned by the Want of Water, Provisions and Forage. We know not what the Marattas may next attempt, We shall be ever ready to advise you constantly of any material Occurrences that may happen.

It gives us great Satisfaction to find from the Extract of the Commands of our Honble Masters transmitted in your abovementioned Letter that their Ideas of the Expediency and Necessity of supporting Hyder Ally as a Barrier to the Marattah Power in these Parts, are entirely conformable to our Sentiments on this Subject - Indeed we are so thoroughly

continued

convinced of the Propriety of this System, that we think Measures ought long since to have been taken to support him with the Power and Resources of the Carnatic, those Powers and Resources are not under our Controul and stand in Opposition to such Measures, Thus circumstanced it is impossible for us on the Part of the Company to adopt measures which do so immediately affect the Carnatic not only without the Nabobs Concurrence but in direct Opposition to those which he so strenuously recommends which are to enter into an Offensive Alliance with the Marattas to subdue Mysore although he must be sensible, that once effected, the Carnatic must necessarily fall a Sacrifice to their ambitious Views In this System the Nabob is warmly seconded by Sir John Lindsay who has not failed to urge and press us thereto by every possible Argument ——

Although it is impossible for us as we have before said to think of undertaking an Expedition in Favor of Hyder Ally without the Hearty Concurrence and Assistance of the Nabob, since the Revenues of the Carnatic are in his Hands, and without them it would be in Vain for us to attempt any thing, We shall nevertheless persist in refusing our Acquiescence to the Plan so strenuously recommended by the Nabob or to any Measures, which may tend to increase the Power of the Marattas, whose Views evidently tend to the entire Conquest of India. By the last Accounts from Bengall We learn that they were in Possession of Delhie and of the Kings Family and that they had sent the most pressing Invitations to him to come to take Possession of his ancient Seat of Government, and which the Gentlemen at Bengall write us he seemed determined to accept, notwithstanding all their Remonstrances to the contrary. The Marattas certainly look upon the English as the principal Obstacle to their Views of

Fort St. George 8th June 1771

of universal Conquest, and their Designs in endeavoring to get the King out of our Hands into their's are evidently to lessen our Influence, and to increase their own ——

Under these Circumstances convinced as we are of the Propriety and Expediency of supporting Hyder ally against the Marattas, but utterly incapacitated from taking any Measures for that Purpose, We observe with pleasure that your Honor &c. have furnished him with Arms, and could wish you had been able to have afforded him a more ample Supply — But as you acquaint us that you could not assist him further, and as it is impossible for us to send him any supply directly from hence, We take the Liberty of acquainting you that if you can assist him with two or three thousand Stand more, you may depend on their being replaced from hence by the first Conveyance that may offer for your place which will probably be in September or October next

We are

Honble Sir & Sirs

Your most obedient

humble Servants

Josias Du. Pré

for Committee

Fort St. George
8th June 1771.

St. Thome June 10th 1771

Gentlemen

Letter from Sir John Lindsay — Orders the Hawke to cruize off Ceylon

I have the Honor of acknowledging the Receipt of your Letter of the 8th Instant and shall immediately dispatch his Majesty's Sloop Hawke on the Service you propose.

I esteem myself much obliged to You for every Opportunity you give me of being useful and I shall be happy at all times to testify the Regard with which

134 Fort St. George 10th June 1771.

which I have the Honor to be

Gentlemen

Your most obedient and

most humble Servant

John Lindsay

Josias Du Pré Esq.r &c.
Select Committee

Tuesday
11th June.

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pré Esq.r Governor President
Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley

The Nabob's Report of his Conference with the Nabob regarding the Bullocks —

The President reports to the Committee that agreable to the Resolution at last Meeting he waited on the Nabob and represented to him that as Trichinopoly was amply supplied with Stores for its Defence and as we were in daily Expectation of the Arrival of Ships from England by which we should learn there was War or Peace in Europe, He thought it adviseable to defer sending any more Stores to Trichinopoly for the Present; but that the Bullocks should be kept in Readiness, that in Case we should have nothing to apprehend from the French, we might be enabled to forward the Remainder of the Stores judged necessary for the Expedition against Tanjore — To which the Nabob replied, that he did not see how we could act at all, and that therefore if Trichinopoly were sufficiently supplied, He thought there was no Necessity for keeping up the Bullocks. However in the End he did not object to their being kept in Readiness for the present —

The Nabob informd of the Proposal of sending more Stores to Trichinopoly. —

The President further acquaints the Committee that in Consequence of the Resolution of the Board yesterday for sending to Trichinopoly the Stores which the Committee of Stores reported might be spared, He desired

Mr.

Fort St. George 11th June 1771

Mr Stracey to wait on the Nabob, and to acquaint him that as the Bullocks which went with the last Convoy of Stores to Trevenallore, were returned, and were here ready he thought they might be sent with a further Convoy to Trichinapoly. To which Mr Stracey reports that the Nabob replied that, as there was no Probability of a sufficient Respite from the Marattas to enable him to undertake an Expedition against Tanjore, He desired that the Bullocks might be discharged, unless it were judged necessary to send a further Supply for the Defence of Trichinapoly, in which Case they might be kept up.

The Nabob declines the Expedition ag.st Tanjore.

When we consider the earnest and repeated Solicitations urged by the Nabob to engage us in an Expedition against Tanjore particularly in his Letter of the 24th March entered in Country Correspondence N.o 3. wherein he tells us that the Rajah is encouraged in his Proceedings, by the Example of Hyder Ally who over ran the Country with six or seven thousand Horse and that therefore he the Rajah Chief of two or three Thousand Horse, thinking we can do nothing against Horse, has with all Confidence fallen upon the Marravars, When we consider the Taunts and Reflections cast on us by Sir John Lindsay for refusing to comply with the Nabob's Requisition of proceeding immediately against Tanjore, at a time when we were unprepared to undertake an Expedition effectually, We we consider that our Apprehensions from the Marattas are not now near so great as at the time when the Nabob and Sir John Lindsay so earnestly press'd the Expedition, since most of the Grain is now collected in the Different Forts, which would render it difficult for an Army of Marattas to subsist and they could

Reflections thereon

could expect to gain little by Plunder. all these Circumstances considered it appears strange that the Nabob should so suddenly alter his Opinion and should now decline entering on the Expedition wherein he so lately and so earnestly urged us to undertake — The want of Confidence and a free and candid Communication of Ideas between the Nabob and the Company's Servants renders it impossible for us to say for certain what may be the Nabob's Motive for this sudden Change; but we are of Opinion it can only be accounted for upon these Principles — We have often in the Course of our Proceedings expressed our Opinion that the Nabob encouraged the Morattas in their Demands of Assistance from us, in order to compell us into an offensive Alliance with them, and for which Purpose we think it was that he so earnestly urged us to an Expedition against Tanjore before we were prepared, being sensible that the Morattas would espouse the Cause of the Rajah, and enter the Carnatic on his Support; in which Case he judged we should be so involved in Difficulties, as to be obliged to acquiesce in his Measures for an offensive Alliance with them. In these Sentiments we are in a great Measure justified by the advice Superintendent on our Proceedings 3d April, whereby it appears that the Maratta Vacquil had strongly remonstated against any Hostilities being commenced against the Rajah, from which it is evident, that they meant, to support him in Case he were attacked. To this Time we had only represented to the Nabob the inexpediency of an offensive Alliance with the Morattas. But as the Letters to him and Sir John Lindsay of the 23d April express our determined Resolution, not to enter into such an Alliance, the Nabob now perceives that he

Supposed Reasons for the Nabobs Conduct.

he can have no Hopes of engageing us in such a Measure, even if we were involved in the Difficulties, which we believe, he was desirous of bringing on us; and that therefore his Views in drawing the Morattas into the Carnatic would be frustrated; and he could only expect, to have his Country plundered and laid waste, without answering any one of the Ends he had proposed thereby. On these Grounds we think it very natural that the Nabob should be Desirous of keeping the Morattas out of his Country, and that he should now decline the Expedition against Tanjore which he apprehends would be a Means of bringing them into it. But as the discharging the Bullocks at this critical Juncture, when We are in hourly Expectation of receiving Advices of the utmost Importance from Europe, is a Matter that requires very mature and serious Deliberation; It is agreed to request of the Nabob to give the Committee a Meeting that We may enter with him into a full Discussion thereof — and in Case he should persist, in his Resolution of having the Bullocks discharged, it must be represented to him, that as the greatest Part of our Force is collected at Trichinopoly and a considerable Quantity of Stores for the intended Expedition against Tanjore, it will be to no Purpose to keep the whole there, should the Nabob determine on not proceeding against Tanjore; but after supplying Trichinopoly the Remainder must be drawn from thence for the Security of the other Parts

The Nabob to be consulted by the Committee, regarding the Expediency of keeping up the Bullocks.

* * * \

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of Bullocks will be required.

Tho. Du Bré

Warren Hastings.

Jam. Hodges

139 Fort St. George 12th June 1771

Wrote the following Letter to Select Committee at Fort William 12th June.

To the Honble John Carter Esqr.
President, and Governor &c. Gentlemen
of the Select Committee at Fort William

Honble Sir & Sirs

Your Favor of the 20th April reached us the 28th Ultimo.

We are much concerned at the Resolution, you acquaint us the King has taken to put himself into the Hands of the Morattas; as such an Event must, we apprehend, greatly increase their Influence, and of Course promote their Views, which evidently tend to the entire Conquest of Indostan.

We have made Enquiry regarding M. Verlet and find that he is arrived at Pondicherry We have not yet been able to learn whether the Pilots are there also. Sir John Lindsay, in Consequence of our Application to him, has ordered the Rawke Sloop to cruize off Ceylon, that in Case of the appearance of a French Squadron, we may have the most early Intelligence and be able to send you Advice in time to remove the Buoys in the River, and to take such other Precautions as may appear expedient.

Nothing material has happened between the Morattas and Hyder Ally since our last Advices of 20th May; the former still remain some Coss Distant from Seringapatam.

Hyder Ally continues to press us for Assistance, which We have it not in our Power to grant,

as

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as it is impossible for us to attempt any thing without the Revenues and Resources of the Carnatic, which are entirely under the Controul of the Nabob who on the other Hand earnestly presses us to a Junction with the Marattas to subdue Mysore - In this System he is warmly seconded by Sir John Lindsay, who has urged every possible Argument to induce us to come into the Nabobs Measures - We have told them plainly that we never can acquiesce in a Plan which appears to us so dangerous in itself, so inconsistent with our Engagements, and so contrary to the Interests & Views of the Company's other Settlements -

We are

Hond.le Sir & Sirs

Your most obedient

Humble Servants

Josias Du Pré & 5 Committee

Fort St. George
12th June 1771

At a Committee Present

Wednesday 12th June 1771. Josias Du Pré Esq.r Governor President

Warren Hastings, Samuel Aroley

The Committee having waited on the Nabob, the Conference was opened by the President, by observing that as the Bullocks were returned, from carrying the last Convoy of Stores to Trevanullore, and were lying idle at Madras, at a very considerable Expence the Board had proposed their re employment, by sending them again to Trevanulore, with such small Stores, as would be absolutely Sential for the carrying on the Expedition against Tanjour, and at the same time could be spared from Madras, without Danger, supporting, even our Advices from Europe, should announce a War, with France to acquaint his Excellency of all which W. Stracey

2D

Fort St. George 12th June 1771

had been sent, the Preceding Day, — that the Report, Mr.
Stracey had made of his Gallency's Reply was, that he had
understood from the Governor, that the Stores already sent
to Trichinopoly were sufficient for the Defence of the Place,
and that the Governor did not propose any more
till the Receipt of Advices from Europe, that the Monsoon,
would never give the necessary Respite for undertaking an
Expedition against Tanjore, and therefore, as the Situation
of his affairs, was such, as to render it absolutely necessary
he should attend to every Expence how trifling soever
it might be, and could wish, that the Governor would
Dismiss those Bullocks from the Service, that is to say
if the Stores already sent to Trichinopoly, were sufficient
for its Defence — if not, to send such Stores, so necessary,
and that, in Case of the Expedition against Tanjore, being
afterwards determined on, 5000 Bullocks, if wanted might
then be procured — The President, then went on and said
that it was in Consequence of this Reply, that the
Committee had requested the Honor of An Interview with
him — that it was very true, he the President had
informed his Excellency, that the Stores, already sent to
Trichinopoly, were sufficient for its Defence, and he still
thought so, that it was very true, also, He informed him
Excellency, that he did not propose sending any more
Stores, till the Arrival of a Ship from Europe; but on Enquiry
having found, that the Stores, which it was now proposed
to send might be spared, without any Danger to the
Defence of Madras, the Consideration of the great Expence
of the Bullocks, then lying idle, had induced the Board
to propose the same to his Excellency — that, as that
Expence, however, was borne by him, with him it certainly
rested,

rested to have the said Bullocks employed or discharged - that the Expence of the Stores already sent to Tanjour was doubtless great, for the whole of which as was customary he had been Debited in the Account, Lately Delivered, but as many of those Stores were for Field and other Services and would not be required for the defence of that Place on the Leeward Side, or happy Accomplishment of the Expedition against Tanjour, many of those Stores, might be expected to be returned, when (as was customary also) due Credit would be given for all such Stores so returned. In Reply to all this, the Nabob said that he was very sensible of the truth, of his having received, in the Account, for all Stores, that might be returned to Madras; but that he did not see, there was any likelihood of the Expidition being carried into Execution, for that there were three Obstacles - the French - to whom he heard the Rajah had sent a large Sum of Money - and which he was very capable of doing - Hyder - with whom the Rajah had been negociating, and by whose Means he was in hopes of obtaining, sooner or later, an acquittal of the Peischcash — and the Marattas — of whom, it was well known the Rajah had desired Assistance. The President, in answer to this said that indeed, matters were now come to such a Pass between the Rajah, and the Company and his Excellency by the great Lengths which the former had gone that he really believed the Rajah would join any Power whatever against them, which made the Reduction of His Force therefore so much the more essential both to the Carnatic and the Company that an Expedition of this Nature was doubtless never to be undertaken without Risque; and that it certainly was not impossible, but it might be attended with the bringing in of the Marattas, but then, that their coming now, was much less to be apprehended

Fort St George 12th June 1771

apprehended than when the Expedition was first propos'd by His Excellency, the Sumbat Crop, the most valuable of any being at that time on the Ground and of Course exposed to their Ravages - that with Regard to the French, it was indeed most probable they would join the Rajah as soon as they were in a Condition for that Purpose, but the same instead of being an Objection, was a most powerfull Argument of the necessity of hastening the Expedition before they were so, and with Respect to Hyder there appeared little Likelihood of his being able to afford the Rajah any Assistance, in his present Circumstances - that if the keeping of the Bullocks in the Service, had been meant, for the transporting of Stores from one Garrison to another and not with a View of employing them on the Expedition against Tanjore, there was not room even for a Shadow of Consideration what to do with them - their Dismission would immediately have taken Place, but as the Committee had ever informed him that the calling the Rajah to an Account at a convenient time and Season was their Object, so it remained still, and that it was the Effect which the Dismission of the Bullocks must have upon that Measure (the rendering the same abortive at least for sometime) which had made them trouble him upon this Occasion, to know his fenal Determination, on so material a Point.

The Nabob on this replying that he was under the Order of the Committee herein, meaning, as is supposed, to shelter himself under that Expression, the Committee told him by no manner of Means - that, as beforementioned, the Charge of the Bullocks being defrayed by him - with him it entirely rested to have them Kept up or Discharged -

The Nabob then said that he must beg Leave to ask three

Questions

16th Fort St. George 12th June 1771.

Questions of the Committee relative to their Object, in this Expedition - to wit, - Whether the same was merely the chastising of the Rajah - Or his Chastisement, and the Recovery of a Sum of Money also, as a Reparation for the Insult committed to the Circar? Or, whether the Object was the Conquest and taking Possession of his Country?

The Committee on Reply thereto said, that in their Opinion if the Rajah could be brought to the Payment of a large Sum of Money, and to submit to such Regulations, as may be judged proper to remove all Apprehensions of him in future - it would be better to agree thereto, and not proceed to the Extremity mentioned in the last Question however as they doubted very much whether the Rajah could be brought thereto without proceeding to that Extremity it was necessary to adapt our Preparations to that End.

The Nabob said, he agreed entirely with the Committee in their Opinion in this - however he begged leave to ask one more Question - to wit, To whom was the Money that might be taken from the Rajah to belong? The Committee replyed to him - that they thought the Expences of the Expedition should be first paid out of it, and then his Private Creditors - To both which the Nabob seemingly with great Joy, consented, observing that the former was certainly exceedingly just and that the Company by the latter would confer the greatest of Obligations upon him by freeing him, from the Burthen of his Debts - After this, he said, he could make no Objection, to the sending away the Stores necessary for the Expedition, provided it could be done in the Space of a Month, or in two Trips of the Bullocks which the Committee told him

they

145. Fort St. George 12th June 1771.

they believed might be effected.

I am &c.

Warren Hastings.

Sam. Ardley

146 Fort St. George 14th June 1771.

Arrived this Day the Ship Queen with a Packet from the Court of Directors containing a Letter from the Court of Directors dated 30th Novr. 1770. Copy of one in the Separate Department, and his Majestys Speech.—

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pré Esqr. Governor President
Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley

Saturday 15th June

The Committee taking now under their Consideration the Commands of the Honble Court of Directors of the 30th November 1770 recved Pp. Queen think it proper to recite in a summary Manner what has passed on the Subject of the Nabob's Creditors in order to determine whether any and what Measures are to be taken in Consequence of the Order now received.—

It was agreed between the Nabob and the Select Committee in December 1769. See Select Committee Proceedings from September to that time—That the Nabob should pay to the Company Twenty five Lacks of Pagodas from that time to the End of June 1771— of which thirteen Lacks by the End of June 1770 and the remaining 12 Lack by Instalments by the End of June 1771.—

The Nabob compleated his Payments punctually to the End of June 1770.—

In the Sum of 25 Lacks of Pagodas agreed as aforesaid to be paid by the Nabob, part of the Charges of the Mysore War was included and an Ajustment was to have been made concerning the same in such Manner as the Court of Directors should determine.—

The Advices which were received Last year by the Mansfield under Date 23d March 1770 far from authorizing the President and Council to demand any thing

Fort St. George 15th June 1771.

Thing from the Nabob on Account of the Mysore War severely censured them, and from the whole tenor thereof strongly indicated an Opinion that the Nabob had been very ill treated in that Transaction which was therefore taken out of the Hands of the Governor and Council and referred to the Commissioners and such appeared to be the Extreme Caution and tenderness towards the Nabob that the Commissioners who were empowered to decide upon every things else were restrained in this — See Sep. General Letter 23d March 1770. Par. 30 and were only to enquire, to investigate and State the matter to the Court of Directors that they might determine thereon and so public was the Discontents of the Court of Directors on this Subject that it was very confidently given out here, and by some then lately arrived who might well be supposed to know much of the Sentiments of the leading Gentlemen in the Direction that the Company would take upon themselves the whole Charges of the Mysore War and exonerate the Nabob. Such were the Assurances the Nabob had, and such the Confidence which he placed in those Assurances that he declined paying any Part of the twelve Lacks of Pagodas which he had engaged to pay from June 1770 to June 1771 — the Board could not insist upon it, as those 12 Lacks included Part of the Charges of the Mysore War which as has been already said was referred home. On this Subject the Board in their Military Department explained their Sentiments to the Honble Court in their Address by the Lapwing Dated 12th October — Their Letters to the Nabob Dated as under

5th Novr 1770 — No 176
26th Decr 1770 — No 186
20th Decr 1770 — No 209

The

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The Minutes of Committee on the same Subject dates the 31st October 13th December.

The Nabobs Letters on Reply Dated as under

28th November 1770 N.o 192

29th November 1770 N.o 193

will fully explain the Conduct of the Committee and shew that although they were not authorized to demand any thing of the Nabob on account of the Mysore War they used their Endeavors to persuade the Nabob to comply with his Engagement of December 1769 subject to future Adjustment but lacking of Success in their Endeavors they nevertheless would not relinquish the Right of being reimbursed the Current Charges expended by the Company on the Nabobs Account, and accordingly they have obtained compleat reimbursement and Payment of the Account to the End of April 1770 — they have received several Sums as hereunder expressed on Account of the Current Charges from 1st May 1770 to Ultimo April 1771 and have the Nabobs Promise shortly to discharge compleatly the Ballance of that Account, and to pay in the Course of the Year from 1st May 1771 to Ultimo April 1772 at the End of every three or four Months (in Case of Peace) the Current Charges of those Periods Although the Nabob hath thus as above Stated declined to perform his Engagement with the Committee in December 1769 yet the Sums received from him from that time to this as well on Account of that engagement as on account of the Current Charges paid and advanced by the Company for his Service are as follows.

Vide Letter to the Nabob N.o 114 Dated 24th May 1770

1771 Jan.y 7

received to that time 13,00881.23.61

received 1,05602.21.41

Fort St. George 15th June 1771.

Brought over 16,06484.9.22

1771		
February	received	1,00000.-.-
March	Do	85000.-.-
April	Do	15000.-.-
June	Do	1,00000.-.-
		17,06484.9.22

So that instead of 25 Lacks of Pagodas from December 1769 to June 1771 which the Nabob by his agreement ought to have paid he hath actually to this Time paid no more than — 17,06484.9.22

We expect to receive from him Shortly the Balce of this Acct to 1st April 1771 — 126606.10.47

Which Balance being paid the whole Receipts from the Nabob from Decr 1769 will be — 18,33090.13.69

After that we had used all our Endeavors to prevail on the Nabob to assist us with more money on the Company's Account — that our Endeavors had proved ineffectual and that we had agreed with him for the Payment of the Current Charges. The Nabob then proposed to us to pay off ten Lacks of Pagodas of his Debt to his Creditors on the Course of the current Year in Case of Peace and Tranquility. The Board took the Matter under Consideration See Minutes of Consultation Military Department the 4th February 1771. and being of Opinion that we had no Right to demand of the Nabob any Payment on Account of the Charges of the Mysore War for the Reason therein set forth, it followed that compleat Reimbursement of the Current Charges was all we had any Right to insist on and beyond that Sum all that the Nabob could pay to his private Creditors we not only ought to assent to, but consistently with the

Company's

150 Fort St. George 15th June 1771.

Companys Orders we were to endeavor ourselves to obtain. We therefore assented to the Nabobs Proposition to pay 10 Lacks of Pagodas to his private Creditors in the Course of the Current Year.

It remains now to consider the Spirit of the Orders lately received by the Queen from the Honble Court Dated 30th November 1770 — digest them with what hath passed from the Beginning on this Subject, and then determine whether any New Measures are to be taken on this Subject. —

In Paragraph 9 They are pleased to inform us that "as it is possible some Arrangement or Compromise "may have been made by the Commissioners in Consequence "of the Instructions given them in March 1770 on this "important Subject they have only to enform us how far "they are disposed to enter into an Accomodation with "the Nabobs private Creditors."

And the Accomodation proposed is expressed in Paragraph 10 to this Effect.

"That although the Nabob may not have "compleated the several Installments by which he has "agreed to clear his Debt to the Company by the End of "June 1771 yet that the Sums which he shall pay after "that Period as far as the annual Amount of 8 Lacks "of Pagodas be equally divided between the Company and "his private Creditors. But that all he shall pay annually "above 8 Lacks be applied to the Discharge of his Accounts "with the Company.

The first Observation which occurs is, that this proposed Accommodation was not intended to supercede or disannull any Arrangement that might have been made

Fort St. George 15th June 1771.

made by the Commissioners previous to the Receipt of it - The Commissioners not arriving, the ordinary Government there was obliged to act, it cannot therefore Reason be supposed to disannull their Acts founded on Necessity and the Spirit of the Orders they had received more than those of the Commissioners - The Arrangemts then that have been made previous to the Receipt of the Orders now under Consideration stand unrevoked.

The next observation which occurs and is striking is that although the Orders of last year charged the President and Council with making the Company the Principals in the Hyder Ally, left it doubtfull whether they meant to charge the Nabob with any Part whilst public Report gave Grounds for Belief that they did not mean to charge him with any Part, and whether they did or not, Still the whole was referred to the Consideration of the Commissioners, not to determine, but that they might State and refer it home - Yet the above quoted Orders lately received seem to countenance and approve of receiving the Mysore War Charges from the Nabob for in speaking of the Sums which the Nabob agreed with the Comonittee in December 1769 to pay by June 1771. The Honble Court call the whole his Debt to the Company now a Part of the Charges of the Mysore war was included in the Sums he was to pay by June 1771. But as this Sense is only implied we cannot understand it as a Revocation of the express Order of Reference to the Commissioners, on the contrary we think it may very naturally be understood to mean that whatever may have been received be retained, subject to future adjustment, Upon the whole we are therefore of

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of Opinion that no Alteration can be made in the
Arrangements as they now stand. —

Jon. Du Pré

Warren Hastings.

Jam. Stables

153. Fort St. George 18th June 1771.

Recd the following Letter Ypr Pattamar from the Select Committee at Fort William.

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr
President and Governor &c. Members of the
Select Committee at Fort St. George

Honble Sir & Sirs

Since our Letter under Date the 20th Ultimo which informed ypow of the Situation of Affairs in this Quarter. The King has actually left Allahabad and is proceeding by slow Marches through the Korbah Province. General Barker who has our Directions to attend him to the Frontiers is not without Hopes that the King will be prevailed upon to return to Allahabad on account of the Rainy Season which is near at Hand. This is however a Circumstance of great uncertainty, and as many important Events may take Place on his joining the Marattas, we are desirous to avail Ourselves of every Opportunity the Suspension of all Military Operations during the rainy Season may afford us to obtain such Information of affairs at your Presidency as may not only prevent our adopting Measures which might run counter to those you may think necessary to observe but enable us to cooperate with your Presidency in any Plan which may be thought eligible for the General Safety of the Companys Possessions. With such Lights before us, and the Commands of the Court of Directors which may soon be expected we may possibly be able to dissuade the King from renewing his favorite Scheme should he now return to Allahabad, or

Letter from Select Committee at Fort William - Hope the King may be prevailed on to return to Allahabad. Represents the Necessity of the Several Presidencies cooperating upon one Plan &c.

in

15th Fort St George 18th June 1771.

in Case he should not return to guard against the bad Consequences which must be apprehended from the Intrigues of the Morattas when in Possession of the Person of the King for which Reason We shall be anxious to Know the Issue of your present Negociation with the Morattas and Hyder Ally.

We are with Esteem
Honble Sir & Sirs
Your most obedient
Humble Servants
John Carter
W. Aldersey
Thos Kelsall
Charles Floyer

Fort William
the 17th May 1771

In Consequence of which the following Letter was this Day sent by Patamar to Bombay

To the Honble William Hornby Esqr
President and Governor &c Gentlemen
of the Select Committee at Bombay
Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter to Bombay with Consideration arising from the above Letter from Bengall

A Duplicate of our Letter of the 8th Instant now waits on your together with a Letter under your Address received yesterday from the Select Committee at Fort William.

If the Letter we now enclose from the Select Committee at Bengall be, as we have reason to believe it is on the Subject of the King's Resolution to put himself into the Hands of the Morattas your Honors &c will thereby be informed that the Gentlemen of Bengall wish to know your Sentiments and ours with Respect to future

Fort St. George 19th June 1771

future Measures and this we consider as done in the very Laudable Intention of concerting if possible some general and uniform Plan and System in which the three Presidencies may cooperate for the General Safety: In the same Intention we have and shall continue to communicate to you and to them the Circumstances of our Political Connexion. To enter at Large into all the Considerations which may immediately or collaterally touch the separate Interests or even Safety of each Presidency is not necessary on this Occasion the Proposition that seems to us to be clearly deducible from the Letter we have received and which we believe you will now receive from the Select Committee at Bengall is this.

Suppose the King should actually put himself into the Hands of the Mahrattas and that they under the Sanction of his Name should in effect Govern the Government of the Empire will — can — the three Presidencies unite in oppressing them, should they require more of either than an inactive Peace and Friendship on our Part — Or — shall we adapt their System and Government and be content to hold what we may be permitted to hold under their favor immediately or nominally under the King?

As we are intermediate between you and Bengall we take the Liberty of stating this Proposition thus clearly which we think is deducible from the Bengall Committee Letter in order to save time in the Correspondence; and for the same Reasons we think it necessary to make our Declaration to You as we shall to them in the following clear and candid Manner.

From

156 Fort St George 19th June 1771.

From the Tenor of many Letters received from the Court of Directors for several Years past & from their Sentiments clearly expressed to you in the Extract from their Commands dated 30th June 1769 which you have been pleased to communicate to us — and from our own Conviction of the Great Danger to every Part of India from the encreasing Power of the Morattas. We are of Opinion that the three Presidencies ought to unite in opposing the Pretensions and Demands of the Morattas should they require more of either than an active Peace and Friendship. But we must add that we are cramped and limitted by Circumstances which do not affect either of the other two Presidencies. We are chained to the Nabob of Arcot who will not co-operate with us, and we understand from Sir John Lindsay that the Nabob is taken especially under the Protection of the Crown by the 11th Article of the Treaty of Paris in such manner as that in Matters which respect the Peace of the Carnatic we cannot act without him. So that we can engage for no more than this, That We will heartily concur with You and the Presidency of Bengall in opposing the Morattas should it be necessary as far as We can possibly go without subjecting the Company or ourselves to an Imputation of a Breach of the said 11th Article of the Treaty of Paris which as far as we can judge from the temper of the Times drawn from the Spirit of Sir John Lindsay's Proceedings, might subject the Company to a forfeiture of their Charter. This may embarrass us in our Measures, but shall not restrain us from employing the Company's Troops in the Support of the common Interests or Safety of the Company whenever or whenever

they

157 Fort St. George 19th June 1771

they may be endangered.—

We are

Hond.le Sir & Sirs

Your most obedient

Humble Servants

Josias Du Pré

& Committee

Fort St. George
19th June 1771.

Wrote the following Letter to Select Committee at Fort

William

To the Hond.le John Carnier Esq.r

President and Governor &c. Gentlemen

of the Select Committee at Fort William

Hond.le Sir & Sirs

Since our Letters of the 12th and 15th

Letter to Select Committee Bengal on the same subject

Instant which went in Duplicate to P. Hibernia and Albion, We have received your favor of the 17th Ultimo.—

We entirely concur with Your Honor &c. that in the present critical Situation of Affairs every possible Precaution should be taken that the Proceedings of one may not clash with those of another in Matters of General Concern but that they may all act upon one uniform System; and as far as possible co-operate with each other for the General Good — and as we are sensible that nothing can so effectually promote this Good End, as a free and candid Communication of the Situation and Ideas of each other, We shall always without reserve, advise you and the Presidency of Bombay of every particular Circumstance which can any ways affect the Interests of either, and as we are convinced that your Desire of being particularly informed of the State of Affairs

at

Fort St. George 27th June 1771

as this Presidency proceeds from the same View, We have thought it necessary to state to the Gentlemen at Bombay the Proposition which appears to us deducible from your abovementioned Letter, and which we have accordingly done at the time we forwarded to them the Letter You Sent Us under their address, this appeared the more necessary in order to save time in Correspondence and that they might as soon as possible be informed of our Ideas and Situation, For the same Reason we shall also take the Liberty of stating the same Proposition to your Honr &c., as it is upon that you seem to be desirous of having our Sentiments. If we have mistaken your Meaning We beg you will set us Right as to the Points on which you wish we should give you our Opinion. The Proposition which appears to us deducible from your Letter is as follows Viz.ᵗ Supposing the King should actually put himself into the Hands of the Marattas and that they under the Sanction of His Name should in Effect assume the Government of the Country, will you join the three Presidencies unite in opposing them should they require more of either than an entire Peace and Friendship on our Part? Or shall We adopt their System and be Governed, and be content to hold, what we may be permitted to hold under their Favor immediately, or Nominally under the King? Having thus stated the Proposition, we shall make our Declaration to you, as We have done to the Gentlemen at Bombay, in the following clear and candid Manner.

From the Tenor of many Letters received from the Court of Directors for several years past, from an Extract from their Commands of 30th June 1769

159 Fort St George 27th June 1778.

transmitted to us by the Gentlemen at Bombay (a Copy of which comes enclosed, and from our own Conviction of the great Danger to every part of India from the encreasing Power of the Marattas, we are of Opinion that the three Presidencies ought to unite in opposing the Pretensions and Demands of the Marattas, Should they require more than inactive Peace and Friendship, But we must add that we are cramped and limitted by Circumstances which do not affect either of the other two Presidencies we are chained to the Nabob of Arcot, who will not cooperate with us and we understand from Sir John Lindsay that the Nabob is taken especially under the Protection of the Crown by the 11th Article of the Treaty of Paris, in such Manner as that in Matters which respect the Peace of the Carnatic we cannot act without him, So that we can engage for no more than this That We will heartily concur with you and the Presidency of Bombay in opposing the Marattas, Should it be necessary, as far as we can possibly go, without subjecting the Company or ourselves to an Imputation of a Breach of the said 11th Article of the Treaty of Paris, which, as far as we can judge, from the temper of the times, drawn from the Spirit of Sir John Lindsay's Proceedings, might subject the Company to a forfeiture of their Charter. This may or may embarrass us in our Measures but shall not restrain us from employing the Company's Troops in support of the Common Interests or Safety of the Company, wherever and whenever they may be endangered.

Mr Dawson Chief at Coddalore writes that he is informed by the Danish Missionary at that Place, that a Ship is lately arrived at Tranquebar from Copenhagen

160 Fort St George 27th June 1771

Copenhagen that she was at the Cape in February where She met with three French Ships, but the Missionary could give no particulars regarding them — That French Commissaries from the Islands were at the Cape collecting Provisions, and it was reported that the Troops at the Islands to the Number of 4000, were under Orders to embark at the Shortest Notice.

We are
Honble Sir & Sirs
Your most Obedt
Humble Servants
Josias Du. Pré &c

Fort St George
27th June 1771.

At a Committee Present
Josias Du. Pré Esqr Governor President
Warren Hastings Samuel Ayley

Tuesday
2 July

The President informs the Committee that having waited upon the Nabob this Morning in Company with Mr Hastings the Conversation was opened by Him the President by observing that at the last Meeting between his Excellency and the Committee, it had been agreed to send away the small Stores then prepared, but to detain the remaining Capital Stores until we should be at a certainty respecting war or Peace in Europe, by which time his Excellency was pleased to observe we should have a clearer insight into Matters here and be better able to judge of the Propriety or Impropriety of carrying the Expedition against Tanjore, into Execution — That the Receipt of advices from Europe purporting the accomodation of the Disputes between our Court and that of Spain was the Occasion of his present Visit, to consult with his

Fort St. George 2d. July 1771.

Excellency what was further to be done, respecting the important Business of Tanjore. — That his Excellency was the properest Judge thereof, knowing so thoroughly, the whole of the Rajah's late Conduct, and his present State and Disposition and being at the same time well acquainted with the Views and Intentions of the Morattas and the Soubah, and the Condition of the Company's Treasury — To all this, the Nabob replied, that he would very Frankly and freely, mention his Sentiments, however he should be glad previously to be informed of his the President's Opinion of the Morattas that as to the Soubah he might be considered as a Woman with the Appearance only of a Man — a Beard — The President said, that without the least Reserve, he would give his Opinion as desired — which was — that there was all Reason to think if we undertook the Expedition against Tanjore, the Morattas would make some Attempts, in the Rajah's Favor either by entering the Carnatic, or by joining him with a Body of Troops, and thereby harrassing our Operations — that with Respect to the Soubah whatever he might be in himself, there were not wanting People to instigate and push him, and that he the President did not esteem him, either the Friend of the Company or the Nabob, but as a Man waiting merely for an Opportunity to shew his Disposition towards them to advantage — The Nabob then took up the Argument and said, that this was a Point, the Consideration of which required Time, that the beginning an Expedition indeed was easy, but the End the Conclusion thereof, how that was likely to turn out, was the Matter to be attended to that the present proposed Expedition considered merely in itself was certainly proper, and if we could be once at Ease with Regard to the Morattas, required not the least Consideration — that the

Morattas

Fort S.t George 2.d July 1771

Morattas however were a People actuated by no Impulse but that of Money, and would certainly, be of his side, that paid the most, and that the Rajah had Money, he none — that the Rajahs Vackeel had been negociating with Fromlock Row for an Assistance of 20,000 Horse, and had been answered that the same Number would be sent under Madarah to settle the Coimbettore Country, and would be ready to act, as occasion might require, but that as to granting Assistance, separate and distinct therefrom, he must write to Maudhorow — that Maudhorow had dismissed Hyder Vacquil from his Court, and at his Request had given him leave to proceed to Fromlock Rows Camp to negociate concerning a Peace — that the Zemindars of the Balaghaut, attending on Fromlock Row, having desired permission to return to their respective Countries, as Peace was going to be concluded with Hyder — Fromlock Row, had told them, that Hyder was such a Fellow that no Dependance was to be put upon him, and that besides he had an Expedition against Arcot — upon hearing which, the Zemindars had remained quiet, — that the Moratta Troops it was true were heartily tired of their present Expedition and if not reinforced that Fromlock Row might yet be obliged to give it up — that he had however, taken all the Forts, between Seringapatam, and Bednore and it was said was to receive a Reinforcement of 10,000 Horse — that the Rajah, under pretence, of going to worship at a Pagoda, proposed having an Interview with the Governor of Negapatam to remain with him, for some time, and even to put himself, under the latter Protection — that the French benefited extremely by the Rajahs Country under it's present Government & that of the same way

taking from him Pondicherry even would become like
Karical - that it was natural for them therefore to
wish the Rajahs Country to remain as it is that the
Rajah might act as a Counterpoize to him the Nabob
in the same Manner, as he was Desirous that the
Morattas Should not extirpate Hyder, but that if possible,
their Power Should remain in such an equipoize, as
neither to preponderate - The Nabob then referred
to a Message he had sent the President the preceding
Day, by the Means of Mr Stracey purporting that as
well the French Dutch, as Danes were assisting the Rajah
underhand with Europeans, by dismissing them from
their Service and giving them leave to go to him - and
concluded the whole with repeating that the Point in
Question, required time for Deliberation - The President
observing that the Rajah had given even no opening for
accommodating Matters - the Nabob said - no - nor
will he let You even remain in quiet, Should you
wish to do it, for if you do not go against him, he will
not impute the same to Regard, but Fear, and to its not
Suiting your Convenience, and will himself proceed -
against Tondaman, and then against Warriorpollam
and Aleanoor, the turned out Zemendars of which Places
he may afford Protection to - The President informing
the Nabob that the Convoy of small Stores was arrived at
Cuddalore and desiring to know whether Bullocks Should
be ordered from Trichinopoly to carry those Stores to that
Place - the Nabob said Yes - The President then acquaint
the Nabob, that he certainly might take whatever time
he thought proper, to reflect on the Point in Question
and that he the President would only beg Leave to -

recommend

Fort St. George 2d July 1771.

recommend to his Consideration in the Course of those Considerations Reflections the following Circumstances — to wit — The State of the Company's Treasury and Resources — That the Charges of Bullocks &c were still going on — That if the Expedition, even was it to be determined on as that Day, it would be the End of the Month before every thing could possibly be ready to commence it, and that the Monsoon was at no great Distance, when no Operations could go on — To which the Nabob said that he was very sensible of all this, that we should continue to send on the Stores necessary, until a Determination was come to what to do further, but that the President might See from the Tenor of his Discourse, that Determination depended upon the Marattas.

Jon. Du Pré

Warren Hastings

Jam. Graeme

165 Fort St. George 9th July 1771.

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pre Esq.r Governor President
Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley

Tuesday
9th July

The President informs the Committee
that having received a Message from the Nabob, purporting his
Desire of seeing him, he the President had waited upon him
yesterday when the Nabob informed him that his Reason for
desiring the Visit was, that before any Arrangements were
finally determined and agreed on he might be able to ascertain
in some Measure the Money, Bullocks, and Provisions which
would be requisite for carrying on the Expedition against Tanjor
and at the same time gain some Intimation of our Intention
respecting the following Points - to-wit, In Case of the
Prosecution of the Expedition, and obtainment of a Sum of
Money - what was to be done with that Money? or, in
Case of the Reduction of the Country, what was to be done
therewith? That the Nabob having desired him the President
to consider of these Points and to give him an Answer
thereto, he had thought it necessary to assemble them the
Committee to have their Advice and Opinion thereon - The
Committee thereupon taking the same into Consideration
are of Opinion, that the Nabob should be acquainted with
all frankness and Candor of what occurs to them on the
said Points; but that it be represented to him at the same
time in the strongest Manner, that in Case by the Rajah's
refusal of paying an adequate Sum of Money the putting
in Execution the last mentioned Point (the Conquest of the
Country) should be judged necessary and meet with happy
Success either of the Arrangements now proposed respecting it
and what may then take Place must be regarded as merely
temporary

temporary; until the Company's Pleasure be known, whose Orders thereon on our Part, must be implicitly obeyed.—

With Regard to the first Point, the Division of the Money which may be taken from the Rajah, it is the Opinion of the Committee, That in the first Place the whole of the Money which may be due to the Company on Account of Current Charges at that Period including those of the Expedition (the Expences of the Mysore war excepted) be fully discharged, and that the remainder of the Money taken be appropriated to the Payment of the Nabob's private Creditors.— With Regard to the last Point, what is to be done with the Country in Case of its being taken? it is the Opinion of the Committee that, as the tenor and Spirit of the Company's Orders are every where uniform in pointing out that it is by no means their wish or Desire to subvert the established Government of any Power with whom they have any political Connection, but only that the same be modelled in such Manner as not to hurt or prejudice their Interests or that of the Carnatic, they think it would be better to restore the Rajah or some near Relation of his Family to the Administration, he paying such Pischeash to the Circar as shall be judged proper and assigning an adequate Revenue for the Payment of all Charges of the Expedition and for the Maintenance of a Garrison to be kept within the Fort of Tanjore, on the Part of the Company and a sufficient Body of their Troops for the Protection of the Country.— Or if that Mode is not agreable to the Nabob that the Revenues of the Country be put under his Management and Direction and the Fort remain in our Hands both in Deposit, until the Company's Pleasure be known, the Revenues however subject in the first Place to the purposes aforesaid, and to the

167 Fort, St. George 9th July 1771.

the Residue to be applied as shall be agreed between him and the Company.

& With Regard to the Money Provisions and Bullocks which will be necessary, it is agreed the Commissary General and Agent be desired to form an Estimate thereof supposing the Expedition to continue for three Months.

Jon. Dk Bré
Warren Hastings.
Sam. Ardley.

168 Fort St. George 11th July 1771

At a Committee Present
Josias Du. Pré Esqr. Governor President
Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley.

The President acquaints the Committee
that in the Evening of the Day the last Committee was
held he had the favor of a Visit from the Young Nabob
on the part of his Father who it was evident came on the
part of his Father to learn his the President's Opinion on
the two Points referred to his Consideration by the Nabob
as mentioned in the Minutes of the last Committee, that he
the President therefore with all frankness acquainted him
of what had been determined on at that Committee taking
Care to inforce to him, that should the Expedition through
Necessity, be carried to the Extremity, mentioned in the last
Point (the absolute Reduction of the Country) either of the
proposed Arrangements respecting it which may then be
adopted, must be regarded as merely temporary, subsisting
only untill the Company's Pleasure be known, whose Orders
on our Part must be implicitly obeyed. That the Young
Nabob after attentively hearing all this left him, and he
the President the next Evening, being that of Yesterday, waited
upon the Nabob to inform him thereof when it appeared
he had already fully apprized of it by his Son, for before he
the President, could in any Manner enter upon the Sentiments
of the Committee respecting the last Point or Question, the
Nabob turned the Discourse by observing the great Probability
there was of the Morattas penetrating into the Carnatic,
in Case of the Expedition proceeding, but said if the President
would do as he desired, he might take it upon himself
which was to send for the Morattа Vackeel and for him
(the

Fort St George 11th July 1771

(the Nabob) and the President to sound the said Vacquil at a Distance, respecting the Business, and in case the Purport and Substance of his Answer should be such as to signify an Inclination to act as a Mediator therein, to proceed a little further, by stating to him the many and great Favors which have been conferred on the present Rajah and on his Father by the Nabob, the ill Return he has met with and the extraordinary Instances of Contumacy and Insolence shewn by the present Rajah in withholding the Stipulated Pishcash for two Years and in undertaking Expeditions & against the Zemindars of Maravar and Nalcotty &c Dependants upon the Carnatic, in direct Contradiction both to the Letter and Spirit of the Treaty concluded in 1762 and to every Idea of Subordination and good Government that if the Vackeel seemed sensible of the Justice and Force of these Arguments and offered to take upon himself to the bringing the Rajah to Reason the (the Nabob) thought it would be better to agree to it, whereby we should get the Morattas on our Side, or if we could avoid the Pretence of the Mediation of their Vackeel have an Opportunity of once commencing our Operations against the Fort without receiving any Molestation from them, it would be an amazing Point gained — That on his the President's expressing his Apprehensions lest the Mediation proposed should in any Manner tend or lead to an offensive Alliance with the Morattas, an Alliance which being contrary to the Spirit of all the Company's Orders, could not be acceded to — the Nabob said he would take the utmost Caution in sounding the Vackeel, and if it was agreeable to the President would see the Vackeel first by himself when, if he found all things right, he would desire the President also to give him an

an Interview, but if not would drop it. That he the President assented to this, but took an Opportunity likewise to put the Nabob upon his Guard in the strongest Manner against giving an Opening or making any Advances to the Vackeel which he could not immediately close, or, with honor retract, to that no Disgrace in any Shape might be incurred by any Communication made to the Vacqeil — That the Nabob promised to use all Circumspection therein, and if the President disapproved of the Measure to drop it even entirely, but that he the President had signified to him it was by no means his design to put a Stop to it, but merely to prevent all the Difficulties and Dangers which occurred to him therein.

Nt. Du Pré

Warren Hastings

Sam Gribbell

171. Fort St. George 14th July 1771.

Received the following Letter from the Select Committee at Fort William.

To the Honble Josias Du Pre Esqr.
President & Governor &c. Gentlemen of the
Select Committee of Fort St. George

Gentlemen

Letter from Select Committee at Bengall advising of Disputes among the Morattа Chiefs, which with the Approach of the Rains they hope will prevent the King's joining the Morattas

Since our last to your Presidency We have been favored with your two Letters Dated 4th April and 20th May.

We are concerned to hear the Morattas have been so successfull against Hyder Ally, but hope their Disappointm.t at Seringapatam, may prevent its being attended with so disagreable Consequences as might have been otherwise apprehended.

We are much obliged to you Gentlemen for the Promise of Aid should our Affairs require it, but have the Pleasure to inform you that there is little Probability of our Tranquility's being disturbed, the Morattas remaining still at Delhi and Disagreements subsisting amongst themselves which will take up their attention untill the rainy Season sets in. The Mogul still continues to move by slow Marches to the Capital and is now on the Confines of Corah, but from the near approach of the rainy Season, he will not probably be able to proceed much further. The Vizier's Remonstrances to the Mogul on the Measures he is pursuing have been equally unsuccessfull as ours, and perceiving his determined Resolution to proceed, He thinks both his Character and Interests equally concerned to furnish the Mogul an Honorable Escort, under the Command of his Son, accompanying him to his Capital. The Vizier appears to act on a proper Plan on this Occasion, and it may besides have the advantage of making the Mogul in some Degree less dependant on the Morattas.

We

172 Fort St. George 18th July 1771.

We are with great Esteem
Gentlemen
Your most obd.t Hble Servants
John Carter
Wm. Meeresey
Hon.d Kelsall
Charles Floyer

Fort William
4th June 1771.

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pré Esq.r Governor &c.a Presidents
Warren Hastings. Samuel Ardley

Thursday
18th July

Letter from the Rajah of Tanjore read as entered in Country Correspondence No 121 setting forth the long Friendship & subsisting between his Family and the Nabob and the Company, the Assistance he and his Father have at different Times afford them and promising to pay the Rest of the Peshcash sooner or later provided the Nabob and the Company are desirous of maintaining the old Friendship with him.

Ordered that a Copy thereof be sent as a Member in the Packet to the Court of Directors per Duke of Portland.

Draught of a Letter to the Honble the Court of Directors to go per Ship Duke of Portland read and approved.

Ordered that the same be wrote fair.

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings.
Sam.l Ardley

173 Fort St. George 20th July 1771.

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pré Esqr Governor President
Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley.

Saturday
20th July 1771

General Letter of this Date to the
Honble the Court of Directors to go p. Duke of Portland
read and signed.

Ordered That the Packets be closed.

Jos: Du Pré
Warren Hastings
Sam: Ardley

176 Fort St. George 22d. July 1771.

Received the following Intelligence from Tanquebar, in Consequence of which an additional Letter of this Date was wrote to the Court of Directors to go P. Ships Duke of Portland.

Extract of Intelligence brought by a Danish Ship that arrived at Tranquebar from the Island of Mauritius the 18th. in 29 Days received at Fort St. George 22d. July 1771.

Intelligence from Tranquebar of the French Forces arrived at the Islands &c.

The Crown Prince of Denmark Captain Jasper Wedth in the Service of the Danish Company arrived at the Island of Mauritius the Latter End of March in hopes to purchase a Cargo of Coffee — The French would not deal with them, nor let them proceed to the Coast but laid an Embargo on them for three Months, under a Pretence that the Ship was English Property, and Came there as a Spy.

The Danish Captain Supercargo and a Passenger agree to the following Accounts —

That during the three Months they lay at the Mauritius about 14 Sail of French Ships arrived from different Ports of France with Troops and warlike Stores, and particularly a large Quantity of Gunpowder — Six of the said Vessels said From Brest, and gave out that their Destination was for Martinico with 1500 Soldiers — but the Captains had Orders to open their Instructions in a certain Latitude when they were ordered to the Mauritius — The Force they have at the Islands they call ten thousand effective Men, but the above Gentlemen say there may be about six or thousand Regulars, about two thousand Creolians and a thousand Cafferays who are all exercised daily, and they have two general Field Days a week — That all their Ships from Bengall, China, and Pondicherry are stopped and most Part of their Cargoes landed — That six of the most c

Capital

175 Fort St. George 22d. July 1771.

capital Vessels of the Company are fitting for Men of War, three of which were compleated with two Tier of about 60 Guns each the other three appeared smaller - They have five Kings Frigates from 24 to 18 Guns all ready, one of 24 Guns sailed the 19th. June on a Cruize - The Day the Danish Ship sailed there were in the Harbour 16 large Transport Vessells and about 6 small Indian Vessels, all which were preparing and fitting for the Sea, and they gave out that they only waited the Arrival of their Provision Ships from the Cape of Good Hope and four Men of War and 12 Transports from Europe, when they would embark the greatest Part of their Force for India.

Provisions of all Kinds are very scarce at the Island, and the Inhabitants cannot make use of their Stock, but are obliged to bring it to the Soldiers Market. They have Six Ships constantly employed to the Cape and Madagascar for transporting of Provisions.

23d. Wrote the following Letters.

To Sir John Lindsay Knight of the Bath
His Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary
and Commander in Chief of His Majesty's
Ships in India

Sir

Letter to Sir John Lindsay with the above Intelligence.

We have the Honor to enclose you the accompanying Intelligence received yesterday Evening from Tranquebar.

We have the Honor to be

Sir

Your most obedient
Humble Servants

Fort St George
23 July 1771.

Jos: Du Pré &c. Committee

176 Fort St. George 23d July 1771.

To the Honble John Carter Esqr
President & Governor &c Gentlemen
of the Select Committee at Fort William
Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter to Select Comm.
at Bengall with
the same Intelligence.

We have received your Favor of the 5th Inst and hope that the Approach of the rainy Season, together with the Divisions among the Maratta Chiefs may prevent the King from persisting in his Resolution of putting himself into their Hands of the Marattas.

Having last Night received some Intelligence brought by a Danish Ship from the Islands, we have thought it necessary to transmit you a Copy thereof.

We are
Honble Sir & Sirs
Your most obedient
Humble Servants
Josias Du Pre & Committee

Fort St. George
23d July 1771

To the Honble William Hornby Esqr
President & Governor &c Gentlemen of
Select Committee at Bombay
Honble Sir & Sirs

and to Bombay.

Having last Night received some
Intelligence brought by a Danish Ship from the Islands,
We have thought it necessary to transmit you a Copy
thereof.

We have
Honble Sir & Sirs
Your most obedient
Humble Servants
Josias Du Pre & Comm.

Fort St. George
23d July 1771

177. Fort St. George 24th July 1771.

At a Committee Present

Josias Du. Pre Esqr. Governor President.

Warren Hastings. Samuel Ardley

Wednesday 24th July.

Purport of a Conference between the Nabob and the Presidency on the Subject of the Measures with Respect to Tanjore and leaving the Negociation wholly to the Nabob.

The President informs the Committee that on the 22d Instant, he had a Conference with the Nabob and informed him of the Purport of the Letter received from the Rajah of Tanjore and the advices from the Islands respecting the Force of the French there, also of the Receipt of a Letter from General Smith signifying that if the Expedition against Tanjore was to be put into Execution, it ought to be determined on immediately, for even in that case it would take to the End of August before every thing could be completely ready for the commencing thereof. The Governor then begged the Nabob to acquaint him of his Sentiments respecting what was to be done further in the Tanjore Business? The Nabob said if things could not be accomplished according to our Wish it was better to remain quiet. The Governor desired to know his Meaning in the words remain quiet, whether or no they implied a total Silence and Inactivity, as well respecting the Expedition, as Negotiation? The Nabob replied, as to the Latter, the Rajah in his Letter "to you has cut that short," by saying "that if the Company's "Security to the Treaty and Friendship with him are to remain "as before, the Peishcash may be paid some times sooner or "later, And as to the former, if the Results thereof, is likely to be merely the above – the Obtainment of the Peishcash (the Amount of which the Expences of the Troops had already cost him) it was much better to remain quiet; however that after seeing the Accounts of the Money, and the Lists of Provisions, Bullocks &c which would be necessary for carrying

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carrying on the Expedition; and which he had before desired the Governor to prepare; after examining his own Ability to supply them, and after considering the Advantages and Disadvantages of this Business, he would acquaint the Governor very frankly of what occurred to him thereon and with what he would be satisfyed. The Governor promised to send the Account, and Lists desired, and the next day sent the Rajah, and expressed his Readiness to act according to the Nabob's advice in this Business - he observed however that respecting the remaining entirely quiet, thereon, he the Nabob had before said, that the Rajah would not suffer us to remain so, but would be the Aggressor himself and oblige us to fight, and that he should be glad the Nabob would give him his Sentiments of what answer should be returned to the Rajah's Letter. The Nabob replied there was no Doubt of the Truth of what he had before said, that the Rajah would not remain quiet, and that he now began to talk to his People of demanding the Chellumbrum Country - that as to the Expedition against him, if it was not done now it might another time, as by Gods Blessing there was no want, no Deficiency of Years either in the Existence of the Company, the Lives of himself and Children, or in their Friendship to each other, that after seeing the Rajah's Letter, he would acquaint the Governor of what occurred to him respecting the Reply, and as above, give him an answer to the whole Business; upon seeing the Account of Money and Lists of Provisions &c., which would be required for the Expedition; and that if the same were sent as the next Morning, he would wait upon the Governor in the Evening, and inform him of his said answer. The Governor said he would not trouble him, but come to his House, and so the Matter ended.

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That the next Day being Yesterday he again waited upon the Nabob and presented to him the Account of extra Charges which would be monthly incurred in Case of the Expedition proceeding against Tanjore - also a List of the Grain, Bullocks Sheep &c. which would in that Case be monthly required, and a translation in Persian of the Rajah's Letter - after which he told the Nabob that as Letters were daily coming in from General Smith, pressing that a Determination be immediately had on the Proceeding, or non Proceeding of the Expedition against Tanjore, he must request the favor of his Sentiments and Resolution thereon - It appeared soon, that the Nabob's Resolution was for the Latter (the non proceeding of the Expedition) and that an Accommodation of Matters for the present at least by Negotiation was the Mode he had adopted, to favor which he desired the Troops might still be kept at Trichinapoly. The Governor said that as Negotiation seemed to be his Determination, there were three Modes of doing it, either that the Governor and Council should with his Leave and Permission appear therein as the Principal Actors and Mediators - Or, that it should be carried on jointly by him (the Nabob) and the Governor and Council - Or, that he the Nabob should alone negociate the same, and the Governor and Council no appear therein, but only underhand give him all the Support in their Power. The Nabob approved of the Latter, objecting to the Governor & Council's interfering in this Business in any Manner publicly, or receiving any Information therein but through his Means, as he said this was a Business which belonged to him. He desired the Governor therefore in answer to the Rajah's Letter to tell the Vacqueel, that he was astonished his

Master

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Master should write in the Manner he had done "That "if the Friendship was maintained and increased, the "Pishcash might be paid sometimes sooner or later," and then to tell him that he the Governor was ready to shew his Friendship to his Master, but that he must satisfy the Nabob to whom this Matter belonged — In short as the Nabob termed it, the Governor was to make the Vacquil despair of an Accommodation of Matters — The Nabob promised to acquaint Mr. Dubré from time to time of the Progress of the Negociation.

The President thinks it necessary here to add, that as he has frequently before, so he has now by Means and Agents (which it is not proper to disclose, and which he never will disclose to the Public) obtained some hints of what has passed in the Deliberation of the Nabob with those he consults, and is well assured that the Nabob, jealous of the Company's appearing of more Consequence than himself if the Negotiation were to be conducted publicly by the Governor and Council Committee or Governor is determined to throw every difficulty he can in the way, in Case the Board or Committee should resolve to negociate an Accommodation as Mediators by demanding an excessive Sum of the Rajah as an Indemnification, and by insisting on other Terms, which it is not probable the Rajah will ever comply with.

Reflections and Considerations thereon

The Committee taking under their most serious Consideration the present State of affairs and the Reports made by the President of his Conferences with the Nabob the 22d & 23d Instants, take the three following Points as certain and established beyond any Doubt.

First Point

That the Nabob is averse at this Time to a Military

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Expedition against Tanjore —

Second Point

That the Nabob is equally averse to any Negotiation to be publickly conducted by the Company's Representatives.

Third Point

That the Nabob is inclined to accommodation with the Rajah if the Negotiation be entirely left to himself without the public Intervention of the Company's Representatives but supported nevertheless by the Company's Power merely as auxiliary. —

Upon which the following Questions arise

Questions proposed

First Question

Is it proper (all Circumstances considered) that the Expedition be immediately undertaken?

Second Question

If it be proper — Shall it be undertaken whether the Nabob consent or not?

Third Question

If it be resolved that the Expedition shall not take place contrary to the Nabob's Initination and Consent — shall a Negociation take place in Preference to total Inactivity and Silence?

Fourth Question

If the third Question be determined in favor of a Negotiation, shall that Negotiation be conducted by the Company's Representatives as Mediators and Guarantees of the Treaty of 1762?

Fifth Question

If the Fourth question be resolved in the Negative — shall the Negotiation be left entirely to the Nabob in manner he proposes?

For

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For the Sake of Perspicuity we shall first record the Resolutions of the Committee, and shall then offer at Large the Reasons in support of such Resolutions.

To the First Question

It is the Unanimous Opinion of the Committee that notwithstanding the many Dangers which threaten in Case the Expedition be undertaken, yet that the Dangers which threaten if it be not undertaken are greater, that of two Evils the least should be chosen, and therefore that the Expedition Ought to be undertaken.

To the second Question

It is the Opinion of the Majority that although they agree that the Expedition Ought to be undertaken, Yet that it cannot with any degree of Safety or Prudence be undertaken contrary to the Nabob's Inclination and Consent. It is therefore Resolved so far as depends on this Committee that the Expedition be not undertaken because the Nabob is averse thereto.

To the Third Question

In Consequence of the Resolution against the Expedition, It is the Unanimous Opinion of the Committee that Negotiation be tried in Preference to total Inactivity and Silence.

To the Fourth Question

It is the Opinion of the Majority that the Negociation be not conducted by the Company's Representatives as Mediators and Guarantees of the Treaty of 1762 and it is so Resolved accordingly

To the Fifth Question

It is the Opinion of the Majority that the Negotiation be left entirely to the Nabob in the manner he proposes

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And it is so Resolved accordingly

We shall now offer our Reasons in Support of the several Resolutions above recorded.

Reasons for the Unanimous Opinion on the first Question.

Reasons for the foregoing Resolutions.

We are unanimously of Opinion that the Expedition Ought immediately to be undertaken

1st Because it seems the most ready and probable Means of bringing the Rajah to a speedy and honorable Submission.

2d Because to suspend the Expedition at this time when so short an Interval is left before the setting in of the Monsoon, in order to negociate, is in effect to give up the Expedition entirely for this Season, since it is more than probable that the Rajah will designedly procrastinate and prolong the Negociation in that very Intention.

3d Because if the Rajah's Submission to safe and honorable Terms be not speedily effected, the consequences may prove fatal to the Carnatic and the Company's Possessions under this Presidency, as it is beyond a Doubt that the French have a great Force at the Islands ready to embark for India, and as our Advices inform us that it is with difficulty so large a Force can be subsisted there, it is probable they will employ them as auxiliaries to such of the Country Powers as shall solicit their Assistance and offer them terms of Advantage — It is probable therefore that they will unite with Tanjore who can offer Terms of Advantage, and will most probably solicit their Aid if we stand as Adversaries to him.

4th Because such a Junction might relieve the French from that Distress which is most likely to prove their Ruin — the want of Money — which the Rajah's Treasury

Treasury can well afford as is generally believed, and thereby give them a Footing which may enable them soon to acquire such a Superiority as it would not be in our Power to withstand.

Note — If the French should land a considerable Force which is expected, and join Tanjore against the Nabob it must inevitably engage the two Nations English and French in an auxiliary War — The French have nothing to lose on the Coast of any Consideration but Pondicherry, which it would not be in our Power to take, and would be subsisted for a time from the Tanjore Treasury — the Company have a great Deal to lose and have nothing to depend on but their own Revenue (for the Nabob engages to assist them with Money &c. only in Case of Peace and Tranquility) and their own Revenue must fail whenever their Possessions are disturbed by War.

5th. Because the Morattas have declared their Resolution of invading the Carnatic, and if Tanjore should not be reduced to proper terms immediately, and before Peace between the Morattas and Hyder should take Place, the Power of Tanjore and the French cooperating with, the Morattas or in arms against us at the Same time, would be irresistable, more especially as we must ever expect attempts from the Soubah against the northern Circars whenever we shall be involved in Danger in the South, And Because we must add to this what seems more dangerous than all the Rest, the want of Confidence between the Nabob and the Company, the Countenance and Support given to him by the Ministers of the Crown and the great Diffidence which must necessarily hang over the Minds of

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the Minds of the Company's Servants oppressed and perplexed by the Powers of Prerogative entrusted to the Minister of the Crown who Conduct, as is deducible from his Writings and his actions, is adverse.

6 Because the late Advices from Europe afford the strongest Cause to apprehend that a War is at no great Distance, and if in the Interval which is yet left for Action, the Rajah can be reduced to proper Terms, it may deprive them of the best Reasons they could otherwise have.

Reasons for the Resolution of the Majority on the Second Question.

Although the Majority unite with the Minority fully and clearly upon the first Question, for the Reasons before given their Opinion is to be understood as expressed that the Expedition Ought to be immediately undertaken, and that were they Principals acting for themselves and not accountable they Should Resolve immediately to undertake it; But as Agents accountable they think it neither safe nor prudent to undertake it immediately.

1 Because it is contrary to the Nabobs Proclamation, and if it be undertaken it must be undertaken without his Concurrence and Approbation.

2 Because the Company have so plainly shewn in their Letters that they consider this Government as culpable — as actuated by personal Prejudices in their Contests with the Nabob — charge this Government with a Conduct tendency to violate that firm alliance between the Nabob and the Company &c. and in their Letter to the Commissioners — Dated the 23d March 1770 in Paragraphs 30, 31, 32 and 33, although they admit the Representations made by this Government in their Letters by the Dutton and Thames in Respect to the Nabob and the Connection with him to be just

past, which Representations shewed the Necessity of a Controul over him, Yet they refuse (on terms which even indicate anger that the Idea was suggested) to give their Government any sort of Controul over him express their Apprehensions of the dangerous Consequences it might have with Respect to other Country Powers, and of the Embarrassments it might lead them into with the Gawn, and enjoin the Commissioners to assure the Nabob of their Resolution to give him all necessary Consequence in the Eyes of his Neighbours.

3. Because to undertake the Expedition contrary to the Nabobs Inclination would be to controul him and in his Opinion to diminish (instead of support) his Consequence in the Eyes of his Neighbours.

4. Because whether we consider ourselves as Guarantees to the Treaty of 1762 — as allies to the Nabob — Or merely as Auxiliaries, the Matters in Dispute regard immediately the Interest of the Nabob, but those of the Company only Consequentially. Because the Company as well as the King's Minister have set before our Eyes the 11th Article of the Treaty of Paris and tell us of the Consequences if we break it. Because to enter into a War and engage the Nabob therein contrary to his Inclination might be construed a Breach of the said Article and not only involve us personally in Ruin but subject the Company to a forfeiture of their Charter.

5th. Because the Nabob is of Opinion — we are of Opinion — All Men are of Opinion that if we were now to march against Tanjore, the Marattas would send some Horse into the Carnatic to create a Diversion, which, though not so pernicious as when the Sunnabaw Crops is on the Ground would nevertheless greatly distress the Country — Because the Nabob has over and over again told us verbally and in writing that

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he cannot engage to assist us either with Money or a Provision if the Morattas invade the Country and in all his Engagements has constantly annexed the Condition of Peace and Tranquility. Because we have not a Fund of our own to support us in a War, and our only Resource — our Territorial Revenues — must fail whenever the Morattas invade us. Because we have all Reason to believe that neither the Nabob nor the Ministers of the Crown would be displeased to see us driven to Distress by our own Measures taken contrary to the Nabobs Inclination that therefore far from hoping for Assistance from him we rather think he would counteract us to bring on that Distress in hopes still of compelling us to an Offensive & Alliance with the Morattas, as the only Relief though a temporary one. And finally because as we imputeless a great Measure the injurious treatment we have met with from the Public on account of the Peace with Hyder Ally to the false and malicious Representations which have been made of our Conduct either by the Nabob or his Agents because the Peace though an Act of Necessity was contrary to his Inclination and not negociated by him — So we have all Reason to expect that our Conduct in this Respect will be assigned to Motives which do not exist that we shall be traduced and blackened and that the Nabobs Representations will be avouched and supported by the Ministers of the Crown —

6. Because the wisest and best supported Measures cannot ensure Success Because We despair of being able to put the Army in the Field with every Article and every Convenience required by the Commanding Officer — Because a deficiency in any of these, will throw the blame of Failure should it so happen

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happen upon us — Because We have all Reason to believe from the Past, that the Court of Directors will give Judgment in Favor of their Military, against their Civil Servants. And finally because however upright, however judicious our Conduct may be, we have not a Ray of Hope that a Vindication of our Conduct will any where be listened to. The Nabob is against us — The Kings Minister is against us — The Ministry of Course against us — May God grant that the Parliament be not as much against us — The Orders of the Court of Directors against us — The Court of Directors of Course against us — The whole Military Corps inevitably against us — Every Man's Hand and Heart against us — and nothing for us, but a Consciousness of our own Integrity.

Reasons &c. for the Resolution on the Third Question.

These are so obvious that it were wasting Time to say why — if an Expedition do not take Place it is better to try a Negociation than to remain totally silent, and inactive — the former affords some Chance of Accommodation if an Appearance be made at the same time of a Resolution to recur to Arms in Case of Need — but the latter can be productive of nothing but certain Disgrace and probable Ruin.

Reasons for the Resolution of the Majority on the Fourth Question

We are of Opinion that the Company's Representatives do not take upon them the Negotiation for an Accommodation with Tanjore.

1 Because the Nabob objects to it

2 Because if the Company's Representatives were to undertake it in Opposition to the Nabob's Consent, We cannot

cannot Doubt but that the Nabob would throw every Obstacle in his Power in the Way — Our Intelligence informs that he would — and if we had no such Intelligence we should be as fully convinced of it from the Tenor of his Conduct. We perceive therefore that it would be impossible to accomplish any Accommodation on Terms to which the Nabob would assent — The Consequence must be that we should be obliged to sustain the Disgrace of relinquishing unaccomplished what we had undertaken or accomplish it on Terms against which the Nabob would protest.

3 Because the manifest Reason of the Nabob's Objection to our Negociating is that by raising our Importance in the Eyes of the Country Powers it would proportionally diminish his — Because it is the Company's Order to the Commissioners to support his Consequence in the Eyes of his Neighbours — Because to negociate and settle Terms for the Nabob and the Carnatic contrary to the Opinion of, and in Opposition to the Nabob would be to controul the Nabob which we are forbid to do — Because it might be construed a Breach of the 11th Article of the Treaty of Paris endanger us personally so we know not what Penalties and Subject the Charter to forfeiture.

4 Because if we were to accommodate on terms contrary to the Nabobs Opinion we strongly apprehend the like misrepresentations and the like Consequences therefrom as are expressed in Articles 5 & 6 of Reasons for the Resolution on the Second Question.

5 Because for all the Reasons aforesaid we cannot reasonably hope for a successfull and to our Negociation that no good can proceed from it, But on the Contrary that Disappointment, Disgrace and inextricable Difficulty would

would be the probable Consequence.

Reasons in Support of the Resolution of the Majority on the Fifth Question.

We are of Opinion that the Negociation be left wholly to the Nabob in the Manner he proposes, that is to say that the Company's Representatives do not publicly interfere but to give the Nabob all possible Support by an apparent Resolution to use Military Compulsion if Negotiation fail.

1 Because this is conformable to the Nabob's Desire and Covenant to the Spirit & Letter & every Letter of the Company's Orders.

2 Because we do believe that the Nabob seeing the Danger that surround him & the Disgrace that must attend both him and us if after having compelled us to proceed thus far in our Military Preparations & all hostile intentions should silently be dropped & wishes heartily and truly that an Accomodation could be brought about. Because We think there is at least a Probability that it may be effected by the Nabob assisted by the Appearance of Resolution on our Part to support him with Military Force in Case of Need, And Because We think the effecting it on a firm Footing, that is to say, under the solemn Sanction of the Company may as effectually prevent the Dangers we apprehend from the French (as hereinbefore expressed) should they unite with Tanjore while we stand in Enmity with him & As if Tanjore were actually reduced or conquered and our Reason for this Opinion is, that Tanjore can have no Grounds, no natural Tendency to a Preference of our Friendship with the French rather than with Us but the contrary and as we have on other Places of our Proceedings expressed our Opinion that the Nabob's Conduct hath

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some Measure proceed from his Apprehensions of the Nabob and the Disability of the Company to protect him against the Nabob supported by the Minister of the Crown. So it is our Opinion that were he reinstated in the former Confidence he had of the Company's impartial adherence to the Treaty of 1762 he would never put himself into the Hands or Power of the French.

3 Because we have no Cause to infer from any Orders we have received from the Company that they wish the Fort and Country of Tanjore to be conquered, and the present Possessors dispossessed, but on the contrary that they would not have either their Possessions or those of the Nabob extended, or the hereditary Possession of Territory dispossessed but only that they should be reduced to such Terms as may give safety to the Carnatic and their own Possessions.

4. Because if an accomodation can be effected by the Nabob to his own Satisfaction, whether we are considered as Guarantees to the Treaty of 1762. As Allies or Auxiliaries we have no Right to dispute it, and if the Doctrine on the 11th Article of the Treaty of Paris be just, it would be dangerous to dispute it, but that Doctrine is inculcated not only by the Minister of the Crown, but by the Court of Directors also, therefore if we dispute the Nabob's Right to settle his own Concerns, it must be at our own Peril - there are many - very many things which we would venture to do at our Peril for the public Good had we but Grounds to hope for Candor in the Judgment to be passed on our Conduct - but we have declared solemnly - judging from the past, that we have no such Hope - the extreme Rigour with which this Government has been treated - grounded as we think on the malicious Misrepresentations of interested and revengefull Persons

has

has banished Hope, and when we consider the New Enemies that have assailed us - their Designs - their Means and their Powers - Nothing remains for us but Despair.

In Support of the foregoing Arguments it is necessary to quote some of the late Orders of the Court of Directors -

General Letter 13th November 1769 Par. 4. "But now "Part of your said Advices we cannot help at present "animadverting upon, and that is your Conduct towards "the Nabob of Arcott, as represented in your additional "General Letter of the 8th March last - It is to our "Astonishment that by your said Letter we discern an "Inclination on your turning to violate that firm Alliance "between the Nabob and the Company, which we have "ever thought our Interest to maintain; and the more "so, as his Majesty by the 11th Article of the last General "Treaty of Peace has agreed that in order to preserve "future Peace on the Coast of Choromandel and Orixa, "the English shall assist Mahomed Ally Kawn "for Lawfull Nabob of the Carnatic.

Par 5. "This seeming Inclination in you towards breaking "with the Nabob, did induce us to desire the Superintending "Commissioners by our Letter of 26th September last that "they would not fail to repair first to Fort St George, that "the most vigorous Measures might be pursued in "carrying on the War against Hyder Ally, in order to "procure a Safe and Honorable Peace. The said Commis- "sioners were also desired to exert themselves in the most "effectual Manner firmly to support the Company's "Faithfull Ally the Nabob of Arcott" and to that End we "informed them that they might expect the strongest

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Reinforcements from home &c.

Genl Letter 23d march 1770

Par 11. You have contrary to our express Injunctions, afforded but too much reason for all the Country Powers around you to suspect us of encroaching Designs against their Possessions and Tranquility &c.

Remark — would there not be the strongest Cause for such an Imputation on the Case of Tanjore if we were declaredly to undertake the Conquest of it — a contrary to the Nabobs Inclination for whom alone we are authorised by our Constituents to act against Tanjore? would not the Nabob himself, alarm the Country Powers? it cannot be doubted.

Genl Letter 23 March 1770

Par 12 Our ancient Ally the Nabob on whose Economy and attention to the Improvements of his Revenues our Welfare so much depends, and which it was our Duty to promote, has been by you dragged or allured into new and most alarming Difficulties, and from all your Promises, he has only acquired a most formidable and inveterate Enemy, Destruction to his Country, and a ruinous Accumulation of Debt and of his Faith and Honor — (Good God! Faith & Honor) prevail not over his Distresses, what have we not to expect may be the Consequences in Case of an European War? &c.

Remarke — The Measures which occasioned the foregoing Paragraph proved unsuccessfull, and though the Nabob was not only consenting to them, but was even an Instigator, yet as they terminated unfortunately this Government is accused of dragging and

allureing

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Remark on them after what has already been said.

To the Foregoing we beg Leave to add the following Extract from whence alone we derive our especial Commission to invade Tanjore. We say our especial Commission because the Company's Sentiments expressed in former Letters in Respect to Tanjore are very Different, Vizt. in their Letter

General Letter to the Select Committee 17th March 1769 Par. 78

Remark We are by no means left to act according to our own Judgment and Discretion - The Expedition is wholly to be undertaken for the Nabob's Benefit to Levy a Sum of Money - We are enjoined to support the Nabob's Pretension on the Rajah of Tanjore, and if the Rajah shall refuse we are then to pursue such Measures as the Nabob may think consistent with the Justice and Dignity of his Government We are not allowed to judge of that Consistency, it is left wholly to the Nabob.

If the Nabob then refuse his Assent to the Reduction of Tanjore, tell us he is satisfied to accomodate his Difference with the Rajah on Terms - it is without any Colour of Authority that we go further and at our great Peril.

Jno. Du Pré

Warren Hastings

Sam. Stratton

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Wrote the following Letter to the Court of Directors which was Sent to Bombay with the following Letter to be despatched overland

To the Honble William Hornby Esqr
President and Governor &c. Gentlemen
of the Select Committee at Bombay

Honble Sir & Sirs

Enclosed we Send your a Duplicate of our Letter of the 23d. Instant with a Packet to the Honble the Court of Directors, which we request may be forwarded overland with all Expedition.

We are
Honble Sir & Sirs
Your most obedient
Humble Servants
Josias Du Pre' &c. Comm:

Fort St. George
27th July 1771

Saturday
27th. July

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pre' Esqr. Governor President
Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley

Substance of a Conversation between the President and Tanjour Vaquil respecting the Negotiation being left to the Nabob.

The President informs the Committee that in Consequence of the Resolution taken at the last Committee the 24th. Instant, Vizt. That the Negotiation with Tanjore for an Accomoda-tion proposed by the Nabob be left to his Management under the Support of the Company, He the President did on the 25th. Instant send for the Tanjore Vackeel, and after a proper introductory Discourse setting before him the Steadiness with which the Company had on their Part maintained their Guarantee of the Treaty of 1762 - their Resolution to have preserved the same Conduct and the friendly Advice that had often been given to his

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his Master informed him that as much as the Company have wished to preserve Peace and Tranquility, and to maintain the Friendship which was established by the Treaty of 1762 They were equally determined to preserve their Honor and Dignity, and to suffer no Infraction with Impunity — That his Masters Conduct had been so very exceptionable that we could no longer look on it with Indifference and were determined to support the Nabob in all his just Pretensions on the Rajah That as these Matters were the immediate Concern of the Nabob the President advised him to wait upon the Nabob immediately if his Master wished to avoid the necessary Consequences of his late Conduct. The Vackeel seemed much surprized alarmed, Said his Master had in his Letter to the President referred the Differences between him and the Nabob, to the Company, and wished we would take upon us to mediate between them — The President however repeating his Advice that he should go to the Nabob, he said he would and then withdrew — But sometime after desired another Audience having something material to communicate — being admitted he begged that he might be permitted freely to disclose some Matters relative to this Subject which affected it essentially and which it might be material for him the President to know, and desired what he should say might be kept inviolably secret — he then said that he was much alarmed at being desired to go to the Nabob, as such a Reference seemed to imply an Opinion or Declaration that the Company's Guarantee of the Treaty of 1762 was at an End, for which Reason he thought it necessary to mention what had come to his Knowledge — That some of the Nabob's Principal Courtiers — Venkatrow the Cajancey or Treasurer — Auseem Cawn the Duan Mootiver Cawn &c. had declared that the English had formed the Design of taking Tanjore Fort and Country for themselves, that they

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they the English were a bad People, but that the Nabob would by no Means consent thereto and would use his Endeavours to prevent it: That he the Vackeel had immediately sent this Intelligence to his Master, who in answer thereto told him that he did not give any Credit to the Declarations of the Nabob's Courtiers and as a Proof that he did not, he was ready and willing to settle Terms of Accomodation under the Guarantee of the English on whose Faith and Promise he would rely but that he would never trust the Nabob without the Security of the English as he well knew the Nabob's Intentions were to accomodate Matters for the present, but that he had bad Intentions whenever an Opportunity should offer in future, he added that the following Information he had from the Morattas Vackeel himself (Madarow Sadasive) Viz. That the Nabob had within these ten Days past or thereabouts sent for him (Madarow Sadasive) and told him a great Deal of the Conduct of the Rajah of Tanjore which he represented to be very bad and injurious to him (the Nabob) to which the Morattas Vackeel replied that the Rajah's Conduct did not appear to him altogether such as it was represented but that if it were agreable to the Nabob he would write to the Rajah in Order to bring about an Accomodation that the Nabob replied it was necessary he should first propose it to the Governor and have his Consent, because as the English were Guarantees of the Treaty of 1762 they would take offence if any Accomodation should take Place without their Concurrence That the Matter rested here for some Days when the Morattas Vacquil pressing the Nabob to come to some Resolution whether he the Vackeel should write to the Rajah or not, the Nabob told him that he had mentioned it to the Governor who did not approve of it, and the Reason the Nabob assigned for the Governor's Objection was that

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that if an Accomodation should be brought about by the Means of the Morattas he the Governor would get nothing by it himself. To all which the President replied that he could not at this Time enter into an Explanation of these Subjects and could only repeat his Recommendation to the Vaquil to wait upon the Nabob without Delay.

The President adds that he has had Information of the Declaration of the Nabobs Courtiers touching the Designs of the English upon Tanjore, through another Channel and before the Conference abovementioned with the Tanjore Vaquil.

The President desires that it may be remarked that the Nabob imputes the Reluctance of the Committee to throw the Negotiation or rather Mediation into the Hands of the Morattas Vaquil, to the Presidents personal Objection Viz.t that he should get nothing by it. These Injuries we must be content to bear, the same Motives may be and probably are imputed to every Measure in which We differ from the Nabob they are the more cruell, because they are not capable of Refutation by Proof, for what Proof can ever be brought of such a Negative.

The President further informs the Committe that the next Day being Yesterday he waited on the Nabob, inform'd him of what he had said to the Tanjore Vaquil of his advising him to wait on him the Nabob and of his the Vaquils Promise to do so. and added that having now done all that he could for the present consistently with the Plan proposed what remained rested wholly on him the Nabob that he begged Leave however to repeat and enforce the Observations he before made in the Course of their Deliberations Viz.t That the Season was now far advanced that it seemed probable the Rajah would use Delays, Procrastinations and Evasions in order to waste time untill the Approach of the Rains shall put it out of our Power to use Military Compulsion

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that to prevent the Effect of such a Design it seemed necessary to press the Rajah to our immediate Conclusion — The Nabob said that he was perfectly of the same Opinion and that he would press matters forward as much as possible.

Jon. Du Pré

Warren Hastings.

Sam Ardley

Fort St. George 29th July 1771.

At a Committee Present

Monday 29th July

Josias Du Pré Esqr Governor President

Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley.

The President informs the Committee that Yesterday Morning the Nabob's three Sons called upon him at the Garden House — the Eldest informed him that he was commanded by his Father to communicate as follows — Viz^ts That the Tanjore Vacquil had been with him that without reciting all that had passed the Nabob made several Demands which he mentioned and to the best of the Presidents' Recollection were as follows.

1st That the Arrears of Peiscash should be paid with Interest, as the Nabob had assigned it to his Creditors.

2d That whatever had been taken from Moravar should be given up to the Nabob.

3d That a Sum should be paid to the Nabob as an Indemnification for the Charges he had been put to in Military Preparations to do himself Justice.

4th That the Rajah shall give no Aid nor Assistance of any kind to the Enemies of the Circar

5 That whenever the Circar shall be involved in War or Trouble the Rajah shall upon Requisition send a Quota of Troops to join and assist the Circar.

That to these Demands the Vacquil replied he had no Power to settle these Matters but that he would write to his Master — being asked how long it would be before he expected to receive an Answer he replied in about 15 or 20 Days.

That the Nabob thereupon recollecting what the President had urged at the last Conference concerning the Rajah's Delays, and being convinced that nothing but a waste of Time would

would be the Event of a Negotiation here with the Vacqueel thought more spirited Measures might be necessary immediately to support a Negotiation to be opened at Trichinapoly to which Place he proposed sending a proper Person.

To which the President replied that he would wait on the Nabob in the Evening to deliberate further on Measures.

That accordingly he did wait on the Nabob in the Evening who having related the Substance of what is hereinbefore inserted, added that he purposed to send his eldest Son Omdet-ul-Omrah Behauder to Trichinopoly there to conduct the Negotiation and his second Son Muddaur-ul-Mulk Behauder to have charge of supplying the Army with Provisions — That he thought it would now be necessary to put on the Appearance of a determined Resolution to use Military Compulsion if an immediate Compliance and Submission to the Terms demanded be not made —

That he the President assured the Nabob that every Measure should be immediately taken to give him the most effectual Support and as it might be necessary that the Army should take the Field he desired the Nabob would give the necessary Orders that the Army might be effectually supplied with Provision, to which the Nabob replied that We might rely on him and that he wished the Conduct, Management and Direction of the Buzar might be entirely left to him - adding that he did not propose it on Account of the Duties he should receive from it, for he would very willingly give the Amount of them whatever it might be to the Commanding Officer, to which he the President replied that the Nabob's Generosity was well known to all the World, that whatever he thought proper on that

Occasion

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Occasion must be an act of his own free Will and Pleasure and that the Direction and Controul of the Buzar would be left entirely to him,

All which the Committee approve. Agreed that a Report be made this Day to the Board of the present State and Circumstances of Affairs between the Nabob, the Rajah &c. with the Opinion of this Committee as to the Measures taken, and to be taken, That whatever be done in this important Business be done with the full Concurrence of the Board.

Jno. Call Esq.
Warren Hastings.
Sam. Treadway

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At a Committee Present

Saturday 10th August — Josias Du Pré Esqr. Governor President
Warren Hastings
Samuel Ardley

The President informs the Committee that he had communicated to the Nabob a Translation of the Letter proposed to be wrote to the Rajah of Tanjore approved in Consultation the 5th Instant N°29. That the Nabob approved the whole except only the concluding Passage Vizt "As the Company is Guarantee of the Treaty of 1762 I am obliged to support him therein"; upon which he remarked that the Expression "the Company is Guarantee" appeared to him improper, that it should be was and not is, as the Treaty exists no more. — The Alteration proposed by the Nabob is no otherwise material than as it is declaratory of his Sense and Intention to annihilate entirely the Treaty of 1762 in Order to free himself from the Company's Guarantee, for if the Company were Guarantee of the Treaty of 1762 — They are obliged to see so much of it performed as has not been done. When a Rupture happens between States all Treaties between them prior to that Rupture are thereby disannulled or at least suspended, each Party will endeavor to gain what advantage he can and upon a Restoration of Peace the former Treaties may be restored to the State they were in before the Rupture or others may be Substituted.

The President further informs the Committee That in a Conversation with the Nabob Yesterday, the Nabob in Confidence opened his Mind more freely and clearly upon the Subject of the present Transactions relative to Tanjore than he had ever done before. In times past such confidential Communications were not reduced to writing, but in these dangerous

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Jno. Du Pré

Warren Hastings.

Sam. Treveloff

Fort St. George 10th August 1771

At a Committee Present

Saturday 10th August

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Warren Hastings
Samuel Ardley

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dangerous times it is necessary that the Grounds of our Resolutions appear, and if the Judgment formed thereon be wrong it is fit we receive the Censure it deserves, if right the Commendation. The President therefore communicates the Substance and Spirit of his Conversation with the Nabob to the Committee which he thinks himself obliged to do as their Resolutions on the Point in Question is necessary and it is impossible for them to form a proper Resolution unless they have the necessary Materials.

Upon Reference to the Minutes of this Committee of the 9th July it will appear that the Nabob had desired to be informed of the Intentions of the Committee on certain Points Viz. If a Sum of Money were obtained from the Rajah, what was to be done with it? Or in Case of the Reduction of the Fort and Country how they were to be disposed of? That the Committee thereupon declared what they judged to be most proper on those Cases, and resolved to communicate such their Opinion frankly to the Nabob. It further appears by the Minutes of the 11th July, That the young Nabob had been sent by his Father to the President to learn the Sense of the Committee on those Points — That the President had fully and clearly communicated the same — That in a subsequent Conference which the President had with the Nabob it appeared the Nabob had been informed of the whole by his Son that he apparently declined a discussion of them and proposed an Expedient to bring about a Reconciliation with the Rajah by the Means of the Maratta Vacquil. It will further appear by the Minutes of the 24th July that in a Conference with the Nabob on the 22d he at last seemed averse to hostile Measures stated difficulties and hinted the pecuniary grant at present and deferring an Expedition to another time. That in another Conference on

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on the 23d. – the Nabob had expressed his disinclination to an immediate Expedition, chusing rather an accomodation with the Rajah to be negotiated by himself without the Interposition of the Company, but desiring nevertheless their Support of his Measures. It will appear further by the Minutes of the 24th. that the Committee taking the whole seriously under their Consideration had come to the Resolution for the Reason there given to leave the Negotiation to the Nabob, and to give him all necessary Support. By the Minutes of the 29th. It appears that the Nabob had opened his Demands to the Tanjore Vackeel – that finding the Negotiation at this Place would be attended with numerous Delays had proposed to send his Ebberticon to Trichinopoly – and desired that we would support him with the Appearance of Resolution to compell the Rajah by Military Force if necessary.

It appears from the whole of these Transactions that the Nabob has latterly been averse to a Military Expedition against the Rajah of Tanjore. The Committee in many Places of their Minutes have expressed their astonishment that the Nabob who in the beginning – that is to say when the Rajah took the Field against Morraver – was so urgent with us for immediate Hostilities, and was so warmly supported therein by the Minister of the Crown, at a time when we were not prepared to act effectually – and when the Marattas might with every advantage have entered the Carnatic – should so suddenly change his Opinion and oppose a Military Expedition when we were prepared to act with Vigor and when there appeared far less Danger of the Marattas the Cause to which the Committee in their Opinion assigned that Change, was that when the Nabob urged us Hostilities he hoped to entangle us with the Marattas and thereby

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thereby compell'd us into an Alliance with them from our Necessity
but that Since our absolute Declaration against such an Alliance
he had lost that hope, and therefore saw no Good but much Injury
to his Country should the Marattas enter it in Support of
Tanjore. However well grounded this Opinion may be there
are other Causes for the Nabobs late Objections to Hostility which
without invalidating the Reasons on which that Opinion was
founded are separate and distinct from them. The Committee
indeed have long suspected that the Nabobs Objection to a
Military Expedition against Tanjore arose from a Jealousy of
our keeping the Conquest (if any were made) for the Company
but wanted Sufficient Grounds to deliver that Opinion formally

The President informs the Committee that the
Nabob has explained himself on this Subject, and that Matter is
now made clear. That in Conference with him Yesterday the
Nabob made this Proposal Viz.t That in Case of proceeding to
Extremities with Tanjore and that the Fort and Country Should
be taken, if we would deliver up the whole into his Hands as We
had done other Dependancies on the Carnatic he would pay ten
Lacks of Pagodas to the Company — That if this were refused, he
confessed that he had his Fears and Apprehensions, and according
as this Proposition succeeded or not, to his Measures must be
modelled. — To which he the President replied that as We had
no Orders or Instructions from the Company respecting the
Conquest of the Tanjore Country and consequently could have
none respecting the Disposal of it, all that We desired in
Case We should be led to the Conquest of it by the Rajahs refractory
Conduct, was to have all definitive Arrangements respecting
the same entirely to the Company and the Nabob, for that
having no Powers to make any definitive arrangement
were We to make any arrangements they could not be
binding

PS
Subpart of a Conference
between the Nabob
and the President on
the Subject of suffering
the Fort and Country
of Tanjore if taken to
fall into his Hands.

binding untill they had the Sanction and Approbation of our Superiors and therefore We wished not to make any but to leave the whole to the Nabob and the Court of Directors who would probably wish to pay the Compliments themselves to the Nabob of Yielding to him the entire Possession and not to follow our Lead in a Matter of that Importance, and in the meantime it was our Desire to leave the Management of the Country and the Revenue to the Nabob and only to keep Possession of the Fort untill we should receive Orders from home. The Nabob replied that the Condition of our keeping the Possession of the Fort was the Matter he objected to. That he considered the Fort and Territory of Tanjore as a Zemindary dependant on the Carnatic in the same Manner as any other Zemindary or Polygary, that We had assisted him to reduce many of these which had rebelled and never before made any Difficulty to put the whole into his Hands as properly belonging to his Government, and that the Company never claimed any Right to them, and that now in the present Case, the Claim of keeping Possession of the Fort alarmed him. That for from making any Objection to the receiving a Garrison of the Company's Troops into the Fort whenever there should be Occasion, he should desire and Solicit it, to place a Garrison in it and to change Ours selves with its Defence and Protection in the same Manner as he desired us to garrison Trichinopoly and Velour, but that it must rest in his Discretion, and not be considered as a matter of Right in the Company. That in answer to what the President had urged of the Inutility of making any immediate Arrangement since any Such Arrangement must be Subject to the Approbation or Disapprobation of the Court of Directors, he Said the Argument on the other Side was equally

Strong

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Strong, for if the whole were Suffered to fall into his Hands in Like Manner as other appendages to the Carnatic under Like Circumstances had been given up to him, and if the Company Should not approve of it, they would have as much Right to require other Conditions at any time hereafter as they have now, and who could doubt their Power and Ability to resume it or any other Part of the Carnatic if they thought fit. — That he desired the President would Seriously reflect on the whole and let him know what he might depend on, which Should determine him accordingly. ——

Upon all which the President desires the Opinion of the Committee. —

Consideration and Opinion of the Committee thereon

The Committee having maturely and Seriously considered the whole deliver their Opinion in manner following.

1st.

Considering the short Space of time which remains for Military Operations before the Rains — That it is highly probable the Rajah will never Submit to safe and honorable Terms without Military Compulsion — and That a Suspense of Measures and consequently a waste of time may prove more fatal to us than almost any decisive Resolution we think it highly necessary that a clear and determinate answer be given to the Nabob. — and that a Resolution of the Board is necessary for that Purpose. —

2d.

From the Declaration made by the Nabob as hereinbefore States, and from all Antecedent Circumstances, we are of Opinion that it may be taken for Granted that the Nabob will not consent to our Proceeding to Extremities with the Rajah whatever political Necessity there may be, unless we consent to give the whole Conquest (Should any be made) into his Possession as a

211. Fort St. George 10th August 1771.

Matter of Course. —

3d

That if We refuse our Consent to the Nabob's Proposition his Fears and Jealousies of the Company will be so quickened and strengthened as that he will be induced to accept of any Terms from the Rajah rather than run risk even the Commencement of Hostilities lest any Conquest should fall into and be retained in our Hands. —

4th

That if the Nabob under such Improvisions should accept of Terms dishonorable or disadvantageous to himself, to whatever Cause it may be imputed it will evidently appear as the Effect of some present Necessity. The Rajah knowing himself obnoxious on that Account both to the Nabob and to the Company will conclude that Hostilities will of Course be renewed against him whenever a more favorable time shall offer, or whenever the present Obstacles are removed; and to + prevent them will naturally throw himself into the Arms of the French who from equal Necessity will urge him by every + Argument and Incentive to the Same alliance. —

5th

That although as aforesaid the Rajah will never consent or Submit to terms Safe and honorable to the Company and the Carnatic with't Military Compulsion nor even untill he shall be driven to extreme Danger; yet that Seeing the Approach of Danger he may for present Convenience comply with terms such as may Save him at Liberty and with Power both which he will probably use upon the very first Opportunity to unite with the Enemies of the Carnatic in order to free himself from his Apprehensions of the Nabobs Designs against him. —

6th

Fort St. George 10th. August 1771.

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Fort St. George 10th. August 1771.

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211. Fort St. George 10th August 1771.

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6th

Fort St. George 10th August 1771.

6th

That if Military Operations should be commenced and prosecuted even to the endangering of the Capital and the Rajah to save himself from impending Ruin should submit to terms such as the Nabob shall dictate without the Guarantee of the Company they will be dangerous because the Rajah will never place any dependance on the Nabob's Faith (See Committee Minutes 27 July) and consequently will as the most natural means of relieving himself from it unite with the French, the Consequences of which are stated in our Minutes of the 26th July.

7th

That unless we comply with the Nabob's Proposition he will never consent to our again becoming Guarantees to any Treaty with the Rajah — nor consent to our reducing the Fort of Tanjore (the only effectual Security if we are not Guarantees) consequently that time will be wasted, a vast Expence incurred and we shall be left after all without Money and in a much worse condition than we are at present. —

8th

We have already delivered our Opinion in Committee the 24th July that We cannot justify proceeding on Hostility without the Nabob's Consent and consequently if the Nabob at any Period shall inform us that he has accommodated his Differences with the Rajah and is satisfyed — if We proceed further it must be on the Company's Account Solely — the War then will be a War of the Company's as Principals and at our own Peril, and we know from the Declarations of the Ministry of the Crown, that the Ministry will be against Us in such a War. It follows from these Premises that we are entangled on Dangers every Way. The Nabob will never consent to our Guarantee. The Rajah will never be satisfyed without our

Guarantee

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Guarantee, he will not abide by a Treaty concluded on Terms that shall bear too hard upon him — nor trust to one on his own Terms. — It seems therefore that no Safe terms can be made, and that Safety can be ensured only by the Reduction of the Fort - but the Nabob will not consent to the Reduction of the Fort unless We consent to his Proposition, and we dare not proceed without him. What must be the Consequences? tis hard to say — We see nothing at present but certain Danger, and probable Ruin, because if the Matter were to remain as now undecided between the Nabob and us, the Nabob more fearfull of us, even than of the Enemy here contending with, will be as ready to betray the Interests of his real Friends as to subdue the Pride and Power of the Rajah his Enemy, and while we remain thus uncertain of what the Nabob will do, but almost certain that it will be short of what he should do, We could not stand justified in our own Opinion for exposing the Company to the Hazards of War without even a hope of an adequate Advantage in procuring future Security to their Possessions and to the Carnatic. —

It has been agreed by the Majority (per Minutes 24th July) that we are not warranted in proceeding without the Nabobs Consent, The whole Matter then circumstanced as we now are, seems to be reducable to this Question.

Which is most Dangerous to the Company to let the whole Conquest (Fort and Country of Tanjore) if there should be a Necessity of putting our Operations to that Event go immediately into the Possession of the Nabob as a Matter of Course

Or

That the Rajah be left in Power under a Compromise from which we think he will endeavor to free himself by an Union

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Union with the French

We have given our Reasons in the Minutes of the 24th July why we think it dangerous to leave the Rajah with Power in a State of Fear and apprehension of the Nabob, and we think there needs not much Argument to prove that under such Circumstances he will naturally Seek the Aid of the French who under their Circumstances would as naturally unite with him, if it were necessary to explain a Subject already So plain, much more might be Said, we conclude with our Opinion that it would be impolitic and dangerous to the last Degree now that things have been brought to the State they are with the Rajah to leave him the Power of uniting with the dangerous Enemies of the Company and the Carnatic and therefore that he ought to be totally Subdued, or at least reduced to such Terms as shall put it out of his Power to become dangerous. But as we See no Probability of effecting either so long as the Nabob shall remain Jealous of our Designs to withhold from him any Part of what Shall be (if any thing be) acquired and equally Jealous of our even appearing as Parties in any Negotiation or Compromise. —

We are therefore further of Opinion that of two Evils we ought to chuse the least and that it is less dangerous to let the Conquest if any be made past as of Course into the Nabobs Hands and Possession than that the Rajah should be left dissatisfied as he must certainly will be and with Powers to become Dangerous which as aforesaid, we think must be the Consequence of any Compromise made by the Nabob under the Influence of his Fears and Jealousies of Us. —

In delivering this Opinion We do not forget the Opinion we gave in our Address to the Honble Court of Directors under Date the 31st January 1770 Par. 4. We remain fully

and

Fort St. George 10th August 1771

and clearly of the same Opinion; neither do We see Cause to change in one Tittle the Opinions we have expressed in our former Minutes particularly those of the 9th July of the Propriety of keeping the Fort of Tanjore in our own Hands should it be taken We are clearly of Opinion that We ought to retain it if We could, and that we ought not to yeild the Point to the Nabob if greater apparent Dangers were not incurred by refusing it, But as We think a present Acquiescence with the Nabob's Proposition the least of the Dangers which surround us, though it leads to danger, so we are of Opinion it ought now to be complied with as an Act of political Necessity.—

We deliver it further as our Opinion that tho' although it leads to Danger it is not immediately dangerous for there is no doubt but that while We have Garrisons in the principal Forts of the Carnatic and have on Foot such a Military Establishment as the present We may with great Ease controul the Nabob should it be necessary and should we be authorized to do so—at present we have no Authority to controul him It is not necessary here again to State the Sense of the Court of Directors on this Subject or the Spirit of the Ministry, or to say any thing more of the 11th Article of the Treaty of Paris hung over our Heads in terrorem We have been sufficiently explicit in former Minutes particularly those of the 24th July with Extracts annexed as Pieces Justificatives, if we may be permitted to use the French Phrase. The State of Affairs here will be clearly before our Superiors at home, they will also have our Opinion of what may be expected as natural Consequences of encreasing the Nabob's Power—if they and the Ministry should continue of Opinion that the Nabob's Fidelity and Attachment is such that the Encrease of his Power is the same as an Encrease

F

of the British Power on the Coast the Resolution of leaving the whole Conquests, if any be made, in his Hands must be approved and we shall only be liable to Censure for having doubted of the Propriety of doing so, — If, on the other hand it Should be thought that Such an Encrease of Power in the Nabob may become dangerous — the Remedy is at hand and there only and legal Orders to the British Delegates of the National Power on this Coast may model and restrain it within Such Bounds as Shall be thought fit —

It remains to consider the Nabob's Offer of Ten Lacks of Pagodas to the Company if we resign the Fort and Country entirely into his Hands should they be conquered. Upon which we are of Opinion,

That we ought not to receive that, or any other Sum, or any Consideration of what kind soever by way of Compensation, Compact, or Agreement for resigning to him the said Conquests should they be made, Because we mean to leave the Company at full Liberty to make what Arrangem.ts they shall think best in these Respects. But if we were to receive any Consideration for resigning the Conquests the publick Faith must be pledged for the Performance of the Agreement and the Company could not deviate therefrom without an apparent and dangerous Breach of that Faith, we are therefore of Opinion that if it be necessary to take the Fort and Country of Tanjore that the Nabob be tacitly left in Possession of the whole in the same Manner as has before been done when Worriorpollam, Arialoor and other Polygaries were reduced as a matter of Course and without any Declaration respecting the Same and that if the Nabob shall think proper to give the Company ten Lacks of Pagodas or any other Sum as a Voluntary Gift for their friendly aid, it be

received,

received, subject to the future Pleasure of the Court of Directors.

Many other Arrangements may become necessary in Case of reducing Tanjore, such as the Military Force necessary for its Defence, But it is evident that such Propositions now will excite the Nabob's Fears and Jealousies as much as a Resolution to retain the Conquest - if any thing of this kind be to be effected, it must be by removing his Jealousy in the first Instance - But to say the truth We have little Expectations of his ever consenting to the Company's keeping up under their own Controul any other Forces for the Protection of his Possessions since he has so strenuously objected even to the 7 Battalions of Sepoys now entertained by the Company on his Account in the Carnatic and since he is so warmly supported therein by the Minister of the Crown

The following Letter from the Select Committee at Fort William received the 3d. Instant is now read.

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr.
President and Governor &c. Committee
at Fort St. George

Honble Sir and Sirs

Letter from Sel. Committee at Bengall. Hope the Rains and the Disunions among the Maratta Chiefs may prevent the King's putting himself into their Hands —

We did ourselves the Honor to address You under Date the 6th. of June, since which time little Alteration in the Affairs of this Part of India has happened.

By our last Advices from General Sir Robert Barker, the King remained in the same Situation as before informed you, and would remain there till he had Answers to the Letters which he wrote to the Maratta Chiefs — The Marattas have constantly increased their Demands as the King

Fort St. George 10th August 1771

being advanced towards the Capital, so that it is scarcely possible to form an accurate Judgement whether he will prosecute his Expedition or return again to Allahabad; at all Events the Expedition must be delayed till the Rains are over.

The Moraltas it is reported are still at Variance among themselves. Ramchunder Gunnis disgusted, has departed the Capital, and made some Marches towards the Deccan. Tuckoree Holkar has followed him with a View of reconciling Matters and to persuade him to return, which if not effected, he intends to proceed with him. In this Case it is much doubted whether Bussajee Pundit can with Security to himself remain in the Capital in the Rains. This is the whole Intelligence that we have received regarding their different Chiefs. Should any thing further occur You may depend upon being immediately informed of it

We are with Esteem

Honble Sir & Sirs

Your most obedient

humble Servants

John Carter

Wm. Mowsey

Thos. Kelsall

Charles Floyer

Ordered that the Receipt of the above Letter be acknowledged, and that the Select Committee be advised of the Measures we are taking with Respect to Tanjour.

The President acquaints the Board that he has paid 100 Pagodas for secret Services in procuring

219. Fort St. George 10th August 1771.

Intelligence from Condicherry, which is ordered to be
reperused.

Jon. Du Bré

Warren Hastings.

Sam. Treby

220 Fort St. George 21st. August 1771.

Wrote the following Letter to Select Committee at Bengall.

To the Honble John Cartier Esqr.
President and Governor &c. Gentlemen
of the Select Committee at Fort William.

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter to Sel. Committee at Bengall advising of the Army's having taken the Field in Support of the Nabob's Demands on Tanjore

Since our Letter of the 23d. Ultimo a Duplicate of which hath been forwarded, We have received your Favor of the 23d June, and sincerely hope that the Differences among the Maratta Chiefs may tend to lessen their Power, and prevent the King from putting himself into their Hands.

In our former Advices you were acquainted with our Apprehensions that the Conduct of the Rajah of Tanjore would compell us to have Recourse to Arms; it is now necessary to inform You that We have been under the Necessity of putting the Army on the Field in Support of the Nabob's Demands on him.—

Hostilities have not Yet been commenced, but We do not expect that Matters can be accomodated without proceeding to ∞ Extremities—The Nabob hath sent his eldest Son to manage this Negotiation, and as We have no time to spare before the Monsoon, We hope the Operations will commence by the beginning of next Month.

By the last Accounts We have received, an Accomodation between Hyder Ally and the Marattas seems likely to take Place—But Should such an Event happen We hope the approaching Monsoon will prevent our being interrupted in our Operations against Tanjore, which We flatter Ourselves will be over before the Rains set in—

We are

Honble Sir & Sirs

Your

221 Fort St. George 22d. August 1771

Your most obedient
Humble Servants
Josias Du Pré & Committee

Fort St. George
21st. August 1771

At a Committee Present

Thursday 22d. August — Josias Du Pré Esq.r Governor President
Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley

Packet Ypr Lord North opened.

The Fort North having arrived this Day a Packet
received by her from the Honble the Court of Directors to this Committee
is opened and found to contain a Letter from them Dated 22d. March
last, respecting the Nabobs Debt to Individuals, But the
Propositions therein mentioned, and which We are directed to

The Propositions respecting the Nabobs Debt to Individuals not received

consider as their positive Orders for our Guidance are not enclosed

The President Lays before the Committee the following
Intelligence communicated to him by Captain Preston Commander
of the Asia, arrived this Day.

Intelligence from the Boards of the French Force

About the End of April two French Ships who
put in at Rio Janeira for Water &c.a informed the Governor that
they were Part of Squadron, their Number We could not learn;
however six more lay off Cape Frio and the Isle of Grande, the
rest were to join them about the Cape of Good Hope, and to
rendezvous at Mauritius. The Troops on board consisted of about,
eight Thousand, among which were the Normandy Regiment
Cluses, and Taylors.

Captain Prestons Friend who informed him,
added that they were bound to Pondicherry from thence to join
Hyder Ally &c.a

Asia sailed from St. Helens the 16th of
January — arrived at Madeira the 27th. touched at
Rio Janeiro the 11th May, sailed the 21st. — at Johanna
the

222 Fort St. George 22d August 1771.

the 19th July — at Fort St. George the 22d. of August.

Jon. Du Pré

Warren Hastings.

Sam. Hedley

Fort St. George 8th September 1775

At a Committee Present

Sunday 8th September

Josias Du Pré Esqr. Governor President
Warren Hastings Samuel Ardley

The Honble Company's Ship Spike having arrived this Day, a Packet directed for this Committee is opened and found to contain another Transcript of the Letter from the Court of Directors of 22d March last, but the Propositions therein referred to are not enclosed.—

Packet &c Spike opened

Propositions not enclosed.—

Ordered that Duplicate of our Advices to England &c. Portland, and those sent by the Way of Bombay to be dispatched over land, with Triplicate of those &c Egmont be prepared to be sent to Bengall, to be forwarded from thence by their first early Ships.—

Duplicate and Triplicate of last advices to England to be sent via Bengall

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings.
Sam. Ardley

224 Fort St. George 16th September 1771

Wrote the following Letter to Select Committee at Bengall.

To the Honble John Cartier Esqr.
President and Governor & the Gentlemen
of the Select Committee at Fort William

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter to Select Committee with Dispr and Transp. of Advices to England

The accompanying Packets for the Honble the Court of Directors, the Secret Committee and the Chairman and Deputy Chairman We request may be forwarded by the first Ship from your Presidency.

We are
Honble Sir & Sirs
Your most obedt.
Humble Servants
Josias Du Pre & Committ.

Fort St George
16th Sept 1771

Thursday 19th September

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pré Esqr. President Governor
Warren Hastings Samuel Ardley,

Packet ex Rochford opened

The Packet received this Day ex Ship Lord Rochford from the Court of Directors being opened is found to contain another Transcript of their Commands of the 22d March last respecting the Nabob's Debts to Individuals – But

Propositions not received

the Propositions thereon referred to are not enclosed.

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings.
Sam. Ardley

225. Fort St. George 28th September 1771.

Received p. Pattamar the following Letter from the Select Committee at Bombay.

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr.
President and Governor &c. Members of the
Selct Committee at Fort St. George

Honble Sir & Gentlemen

Letter from Sel. Comm. at Bombay, on the subject of the Proposition made to them respecting the Conduct to be observed towards the Morattas — Desire a supply of Fire arms may be sent for Hyder Ally —

We have been duly favored with Your Letters of the 8th and 19th June and 10th Ultimo.

The Gentlemen of the Select Committee at Bengall in the Letter You enclosed us did not desire to know our Sentiments with respect to the Measures necessary in the present Situation of affairs to be pursued, as Your Honors &c. supposed they did; it contained only a simple Relation of the Several Incidents which have lately happened.

As those Gentlemen therefore have made no Proposition to us for entering on one general Plan or given us any Insight into the Measures they proposed or wished to pursue, and as We are not sufficiently enabled to judge from what Your Honors &c. have wrote on that Subject. We can therefore only say that the Measures which may be adopted by the other Presidencies shall at all times meet with our Support as far as the Commands of our Honble Masters, our Ability and Ideas of their Interest will admit.

It is necessary however that Your Honor &c. should be informed that our Treasury is so low, and our Resources so few, as will by no means admit of our assisting the Presidency of Bengall against the Morattas should they adopt such Measures, was our Force on this Side even equal to such Undertaking and more particularly would it be

out

Fort St. George 28th September 1771.

out of our Power to afford any Assistance, as most of our Resources Sea as they are, would unavoidably fail on our entering into a War with them.

We concur with Your Honrs &c. in Opinion of the Necessity of supporting Hyder ally against the Morattas as a Barrier to their over grown Power. Yet such is our Situation with Respect to the Morattas as to put it out of our Power to give him open Assistance, but as Your Honor &c. can afford so large a Supply of Arms of which Hyder stands much in need, and which We cannot spare. We request you will please to send them hither by the first Opportunity by Means of the Factory at Onore. We shall be enabled to forward them to him.

Enclosed is a Packet for the Gentlemen of the Select Committee at Bengall which We request you will transmit to them as soon as possible.

We are with Esteem

Bombay Castle
31st August 1771.

Honble Sir & Sirs

Your most obedient humble Servants

William Hornby
David Wedderburn
W. Taylor
John Watson
William Shaw

P.S. Your Favor of the 26th Ultimo enclosing an Extract of Intelligence and Duplicate of that of the 23d has just been received with the Packet for the Honble Company enclosed, which shall be duly forwarded.

In Consequence of which the following Letter was immediately wrote to the Select Committee at Bengall.

To the Honble John Cartier Esqr
President and Governor & Gentlemen
of the Select Committee at Fort William
Honble Sir & Sirs

To

227 Fort St. George 28th. September 1771

Letter to the Sel: Committee at Bengall with Extract of the above Letter from Bombay and advice of the progress of the Army against Tanjore

The enclosed is an Extract of a Letter We have this day received from the Select Committee at Bombay in answer to what We wrote them on the Subject of your Letter to Us of the 17th. May. We also wrote your Honor & Co. on the same Subject under date 27th. June & 7th. Inst. The Season is now so far advanced that we are in hourly Expectation of the arrival of the Letter Ships from Europe by which it is probable such Instructions will be received from the Court of Directors as may guide the Measures of the three Presidencies in respect to the Marattas, We shall in the mean time continue to observe as We have hitherto done, a Neutrality between the Marattas and Hyder Ally unless absolute Necessity should oblige us to act.

In our Letter of the 21st. Ultimo your Honor & Co. were advised of our having been obliged to take the Field in support of the Nabobs Demands on the Rajah of Tanjore — As the Rajah did not shew any Inclination to accede to the Requisitions made by the Nabob, the Army marched from the Plain of Trichinapoly on the 13th. Instant and arrived before Vellum, a strong Fort, situated about 6 Miles South of Tanjore on the 16th. On the 20th a Battery was opened against the Place, which We got Possession of the same Night, the Enemy having abandoned it — By the last Letters from General Smith he proposed being before Tanjore on the 23d.

The enclosed Letter from the Select Committee at Bombay under your address was received this Day.

We are
Honble Sir & Sirs
your most obed.t humb.l Servants
Josias Dupré & Committee

Fort St. George
28th. Sept.r 1771.

228 Fort St. George 7th. October 1771

Received this Day pr. Ship Madras Merchant the undermentioned Letters from the Select Committee at Bengall Viz.t

Duplicate of a Letter of 18th. July (the Original of which has not been received)

Letter of 27th. July

Letter of 12th. September

Monday 7th October

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pre Esqr. Governor President
Warren Hastings. Samuel Ardley

The following Letters from the Select Committee at Fort William received the 5th. Instant are now read.—

Letter from Select Committee at Bengall acknowledging the Receipt of our Letters respecting the French.

To the Honble Josias Du Pre Esqr.
President &c. Members of the Select Committee
at Fort St. George

Honble Sir & Sirs

We now acknowledge the Receipt of Your Favors under Date the 12th. and 15th. Ultimo, and you may depend upon our paying the utmost attention to the Nature of the Advices contained in the Letter; Whatever may be the Consequences resulting from them, every thing in our Power shall be done in order to be prepared and We are ready to carry into Execution any Instructions We may hereafter receive on this Subject.

We are

Fort William
the 18th. July 1771

Honble Sir & Sirs
Your most obed.t Humble Servants
John Carter
Saml. Middleton

229 Fort St. George 7th October 1771

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr
President &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee
of Fort St. George

Honble Sirs & Sirs

We have been favored with your Letter of

Letter from Select Committee at Bengall on the subject of the Proposition made to them respecting the conduct to be observed towards the Morattas

the 27th June.

Whatever may be the Event of His Majesty Shaw Allum's Connexion with the Morattha Powers, if they should aim at obtaining more from us than inactive Peace and Friendship, either to engage us in an Alliance to promote their own ambition, or insist upon their demand of the Chout for these Provinces, we mean not to submit to either the one or the other, nor indeed to receive any Law, which may tend to give additional Strength to that Power, this Conduct We shall invariably observe, while we have Sufficient Power to resist them. The different Powers in these Parts of Hindostan have felt so severely the Yoke of their Oppressions that it is natural to believe they wish for an Opportunity to shake it off; but knowing themselves a proper Confidence is wanting which obliges them to Submit to their present Situation;

Should the Morattas on the Presumption of having the King with them, force them to issue Mandates inconsistent with the welfare of the Company, they will be disregarded, and should they from that Disobedience, pretend to a Power of supporting His Majesty's authority, attack our Possessions or those of our Allies, We have no doubt but we shall give them a sufficient Check, and should we be obliged to act as Principals we have every Reason to expect some Endeavors to relieve themselves, will be exerted by those

who

Fort St. George 7th October 1771.

who have most felt their grievous Oppression. However while the greatest Part of Hindostan are their Enemies, their Policy We imagine will direct them to avoid an open Rupture with Us, which must answer no other Purpose than raise an almost general Opposition to their Measures.

We are too well acquainted with the prevailing Policy of the Morattas, for universal Power and Conquest, to be entirely easy at the Success of their Operations in that Part of India; at the same time We are satisfied any Appearance of vigorous Measures by a Union of the few independant Powers remaining would be sufficient to defeat them, but such an Exertion is rather to be wished for than expected, and We now begin to believe no effectual Opposition will take Place, unless We should unavoidably be engaged in the Quarrel.

This We shall, as far as may lay in our Power, endeavor to shun, for fear that any Hostilities committed on our Side be resented by Madaveroa in the Carnatic, which in the present Disposition of its Nabob may be productive of many Inconveniences to your Administration; on the other Hand, should you be included in a War with the Morattas from whatever Cause it may be, you may depend on every Assistance from Us, and the most effectual Assistance must prove in our Opinion a Diversion in their Eastern Provinces as Malwar &c. but this can only be attempted when our Minds are quieted as to the Designs of the French in this Country.

The Rains have suspended every Military Operation of the Morattas; and their Chiefs with their Army still continue at Delhy, and in its Neighbourhood, distracted with Divisions and Disagreements

Fort St. George 7th. Octobers 1771

among themselves, they hesitate not to commit the most Striking Acts of Disobedience to the Express Orders of their General Master Madahrow. What new Plan of Measures they may proceed upon towards the Middle of October We have not been able to learn.—

The King has proceeded as far as Furruckabad the Chief City and Residence of the late Patan Chief Ahmut Cawn Bungush, whose Son he is now treating with to confirm to him the Succession of his Father's Country — His Negotiations with the Morattas are in the Same train they were three Months ago, and apparently as far from being finally settled as they were at that time. Whether the Practice of Impostures Deceptions and a Spirit of Procrastination which the Morattas have exhibited in the Course of their Negotiations with the King will at Length disgust him so much as to lead him to break off any farther Connexions with them, a short time must determine; for should he in Spite of the disrespectfull and insidious Treatment he has already experienced proceed towards the Capital when the Rains are over, it will be evident he will run all Risques for the mere Chance of his Personal Appearance giving a favorable turn to his Affairs.—

Upon General Barker's taking Leave to his Majesty, he was pleased to express the most favorable Sentiments of our Nation, and with the most Solemn Declarations he affirmed, that whatever might be his own Fortune, he should ever retain a true value for the Friendship We have Shewn him, nor ever give his Sanction to any Measures repugnant to the Interests of the Company. Whatever Weight may in General be given to Declarations of an Asiatic Prince there may be Reason to believe those of the King most Sincerely meant, and from the Conflict of

Passions

Fort St. George 7th October 1774.

Passions which seemed there totally to possess him, that
his Heart was too much engaged to be capable of Deception.

We are with Esteem
Honble Sir & Sirs
Your most obedient
Humble Servants
John Carter
J. Middleton
Wm Aldersey

Fort William
the 27th July 1774

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr
President &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee
at Fort St. George

Honble Sir and Sirs

Letter from Lt Col. at Bengall advising of the Morattas having delivered over the City of Delhi to the Kings Ministers, who prepares for his March from Furruckabad.

We have received your Favor
of the 21st Ultimo,

As there has been a Necessity for
your Troops to take the Field in Support of the Nabobs
Demands on the Rajah of Tanjore, We heartily wish
that every Purpose intended to be effected by them will be
concluded before the approaching Monsoon gives any
Probability of Obstruction to their Operations.

The Morattas have at Length delivered over
the City and Fort of Delhy to His Majestys Officers and he is
now in Consequence preparing for his March from
Furruckabad towards the Capital.

Seven Lacks of Rupees has been the Sum
Stipulated for the Patan Succession of which His Majesty has
only received a Part, but the Vizier has become Security
for the Payment of the

Fort St. George 7th October 1771

Still continues with as much Inveteracy as ever.

We are

Honble Sir & Sirs

Your most obedient

Humble Servants

John Cartier

Sam.l Middleton

William Aldersey

Fort William

the 12th September 1771.

As We may expect to receive by the latter Ships the clear and precise Orders of the Court of Directors with respect to the Conduct they would wish us to observe towards the Morattas, it is unnecessary to enter further at present on this Subject. We are however well pleased that the Ideas of the Gentlemen at Bengall touching the Same, are entirely conformable to our own, as expressed in our Letter to them of the 27th June last.

Draught of a Letter to the Honble the Court of Directors to go by His Majestys Ship Stag, read and approved, and ordered to be wrote fair.

Wm. Aldersey

Warren Hastings.

Jam.s Hartley

234 Fort St. George 8th October 1771

The following Letter was this Day wrote to the Select Committee at Bombay, to go by His Majesty's Ship Dolphin.

To the Honble William Hornby Esqr.

President and Governor &c. Gentlemen

of the Select Committee at Bombay

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter to Sel. Comm. at Bombay. in Ans. to their Letter of 31st August on the Subject of the Morattas and advising of the Operations against Tanjore.

We take the Opportunity by His Majesty's Ship Dolphin to acknowledge the Receipt of your Favor of the 31st. August which reached us the 28th Ultimo. As We have all reasonable Hopes that the Latter Ships of the Season will bring us full Instructions on the Subject of the Morattas and Hyder Ally, We think it most advisable to let the Subject rest for the present.

We have lately been under the Necessity of having Recourse to Arms to enforce the Nabob's Demands on the Rajah of Tanjore — The Army under the Command of General Smith accordingly marched from the Plain of Trichinopoly on the 13th September towards Tanjore, on the 16th they arrived before Vellum a Strong Fort Situated about 6 Miles S.W. of Tanjore, which was taken Possession of by our Troops on the 20th the Garrison having abandoned it. On the 23d the Army moved and encamped before Tanjore, and We are in daily Expectation of hearing that Batteries are opened against the Place.

By the last Advices Hyder Ally remained in Seringapatam, and the Morattas were employed in ravaging the Country — Negotiations for Peace are carrying on, but we cannot say how they may end — We have Reason to hope that the Season is too far advanced for the Morattas to

235 Fort St. George 9th October 1771

the Carnatic, and that our Operations against Tanjore will not be interrupted by them.

We are

Honble Sir & Sirs

Your most obedient

Humble Servants

Josias Du Pre &c. Comm.

Fort St. George

8th October 1771.

At a Committee Present

Wednesday 9th October

Josias Du Pre Esqr. Govr. President

Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley.

Letter to the Honble Court of Directors to go by

His Majesty's Ship Stag read and Signed. Ordered that

the Packet be closed.

Jos: Du Pré

Warren Hastings.

Sam Ardley

236 Fort St. George 11th October 1771.

Wrote the following Letter to the Select Committee at Bengall —

To the Honble John Cartier Esqr.
President and Governor &c. Gentlemen
of the Select Committee at Fort William

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter to Sel. Comm. at Bengal —

Since our Letter of the 28th Ulto. Duplicate of which comes inclosed the Madras Merchant which arrived here the 5th Instant brought us your following Favors Viz. Duplicate of one of the 18th July (the Original of which has not been received) that of the 27th July & that of 12th Ultimo.

We are still in hopes that the latter Ships will bring us the clear and precise Orders of the Court of Directors with Respect to the Conduct they would wish us to observe towards the Marattas and Hyder Ally, in the meantime it is with great Satisfaction We observe that your Ideas on this Subject entirely conformable to those expressed in our Letter of the 27th June, and in which We still continue. —

On the 23d September our Army arrived before Tanjour, and broke Ground on the 29th On the first October the Enemy made a very vigorous Sally on the Covering Party but were drove back with considerable Loss — a Battery was opened against the Place on the 2d which in a great Measure silenced the Fire of the Enemy, and by the last Accounts from the Army which are dated the 5th affairs went on very well

Enclosed is a Letter from the Select Committee at Bombay under your Cover &c. — We are

Honble Sir & Sirs, Your most obedt. Hble Servants

Josias Du Pre & Committee

Fort St. George
11th October 1771. —

237 Fort St. George 12th. October 1771

Saturday 12th. October

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pré Esqr. Govr. President
& Warren Hastings Samuel Ardley

Letter from Hyder Ally Cawn received as entered in Coventry Correspondence N.143 Setting forth the Designs of the Morattas to invade the Carnatic after they shall have established themselves in the Balaghaut and urging therefore the Expediency and Necessity of a firm Union with him to oppose them, as well from the Terms of the Treaty as from mutual Interest.

The President acquaints the Committee that the Vacquils had informed him that they were instructed by their Master to represent that their Master had no ill Will to the Nabob, but that he was desirous to be on the most friendly terms with him, and to engage in the mutual Support of each other against the Morattas as a Proof of which and of their Masters Desire of commencing a friendly Correspondence with him, they were charged with a Letter of Condolence to the Nabob on the death of the Begum. The President also acquaints the Committee that He communicated to the Nabob the Letter from Hyder Ally as also the Purport of what the Vacquils had represented respect. their Masters Desire of a Union with the Nabob; that the Nabob thereupon informed the President that it had been intimated to him that Hyder ally had proposed making an Offer to the Company of the Baramahal Country, with the Districts of Salem and Ahtoor, and twenty Lacks of Rupees for their Assistance and that if his Proposals were not accepted, the Vacquils had Instructions to apply to the French for aid, upon which the Nabob observed that the Offer proposed to be made by Hyder Ally to obtain the Company's Assistance appeared improper as their

Friendship

Fort St. George 12th October 1771.

Friendship and Support were not to be purchased by Money but that of Assistance were to be given, Hyder Ally should agree to be answerable for all the Damages the Carnatic should sustain thereby. The Nabob added that the Contents of the Letter from Hyder Ally regarding the Designs of the Morattas were he believed true, that he had received the like Intelligence from the Morattа Camp, as well as from Basalet Jung by whom he was referred to Saffder Jung, who had represented that He the Nabob was the only Moorish Power capable of making any Opposition to the Morattas, and therefore proposed and recommended a Junction between him the Nabob and Basalet Jung for that Purpose. That the Nabob seemed at a Loss how to act with Respect to the Letter sent him by Hyder Ally, and desired the advice of the President thereon, who had recommended his receiving the Letter privately.

The Committee think it unnecessary here to repeat their Opinion frequently expressed of the Expediency of supporting Hyder Ally against the Morattas, for the Reasons set forth in many Parts of their Proceedings provided the Revenues and Resources of the Carnatic were under our Controul. We Sincerely hope that the Colebrooke and Lord Holland may bring us the clear and precise Ideas and Instructions of the Court of Directors, on a Subject of so much Importance; in the mean time it appears expedient to assure Hyder Ally of our good Inclination to support him from Friendship and mutual Interest, but that we must wait for Instructions from our Superiors on this Subject before we can take any decisive Measure. A Draught of a Letter is therefore now prepared, which the President is desired to communicate to the Nabob.

Read a Letter from the Board of Revenue

239 Fort St. George 12th October 1771.

as entered in Country Correspondence No 1464 requesting the Interposition of the President in Settling the Disputes between him the Rajah and the Nabob — A Letter from the Rajah to Moodoo Kistna is also read No 145 to the same Purport, enclosing a List of the Demands made by the Nabob, and referring to the Vacquils —

The President acquaints the Committee that the Vacquil mentioned in the Letter to Moodu Kistnah is not arrived, that the Letters were sent by an inferior Person, who, on the Presidents representing to him the Impropriety of his Master's late Conduct, and the little Regard he had paid to the repeated Advice given him by the President, had endeavored to exculpate his Master by laying the Blame on Gullabellapah, the Person now entrusted with the Management of Affairs — The President further informs the Committee, that he communicated the above Letters to the Nabob, who recommended that the Rajah should be referred to Umdut-Ul-Omrah the Nabobs Eldest Son to whom the Management of the Negotiation was now entrusted which the Committee approve.

Jo: Du Pré
Warren Hastings.
Sam Stratton

Fort St. George in the

the Letter from the Nabob dated the 27th
the last Demands he would unfortunately propose
as he was then communicated to the Nabob and approved
by him was this Day translated and sent away.

Friday
1st. November

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pre Esqr. Govr. President
Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley

Advice of Peace being concluded with the Rajah of Tanjore

The President lays before the Committee a Letter received this Morning from General Smith dated the 27th October advising that the Nabob Umdut ul Oomrah had that Morning wrote him a Letter informing him that he had signed the Articles of Peace in Consequence of the Rajahs accepting the Terms offered him, and therefore desiring that Hostilities might cease, which the General had complied with agreable to the Instructions sent him at the Commencement of the Campaign. General Smith further advises that Nazeal Cawn and Syed Muckton ally Cawn were returned to the Fort, and that the Treaty was to be ratified the next Day the particulars of which he the General purposed communicating in his next as far as should comport his Knowledge.

We cannot avoid expressing our Surprize to learn from the abovementioned Letter that a Treaty of Peace has been so suddenly concluded - It is certain that General Smith frequently advised us that Negotiations were carrying on: but as We engaged in the Expedition with a professed Intention of bringing the Rajah to the Nabobs Terms and the Nabobs Son was sent to negotiate them, it was necessary that a Negotiation should be carried on, at the same time that our Operations were prosecuted with all possible Vigor, and

as the General informed Us that the Rajah would never consent to the Demands which the Nabob's Son insisted determined not to recede from, We could never suppose that an Accommodation would take Place thus suddenly and conclusively, especially after the Rajah's Conduct had compelled Us not only to appear before the Place, but to carry on our approaches even to the effecting almost a practicable Breach, and when we were given to understand by the last Advices that the Troops were in great Spirits and eager for the Assault — We could not imagine that at such a Crisis any other Terms would have been accepted than the Surrender of the Fort at Discretion — However as we are yet unacquainted of the Conditions on which a Peace has been concluded, and have no Intimation of the Grounds and Reasons for such a Measure, We must keep our Judgement suspended, untill We can obtain a full and particular Account of all Circumstances — For which Purpose a Draught of a Letter is now prepared to be wrote to General Smith from the Board and for that Purpose it is agreed to Summon the Council immediately.

Read a Letter from Hyder Ally Caun as entered in Country Correspondence No. 150 setting forth the Propositions repeatedly made to him by Tourmbeck Row for accomodating Matters, and invading this Province, which he had refused to comply with, in Consideration of his Engagements with the Company, and desiring to know in what Manner he shall act.

The President acquaints the Committee that Hyder Allys Vacquils had informed him of their having received advice that a Peace was on the Point of being concluded, that Tourmbeck Row had expressed a Desire of seeing

Tupoo

250 Fort St. George 19th October 1771

Letter to Hyder Ally

The Draft of the Letter to Hyder Ally Cawn resolved on at the last Committee as entered on Country Correspondence No. 146 having been communicated to the Nabob and approved by him was this Day translated and sent away.

Friday 1st. November

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pre Esqr. Govr. President
Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley

Advice of Peace being concluded with the Rajah of Tanjore

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Fort St. George 1st November 1771

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240 Fort St. George 19th. October 1771

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Friday 1st. November

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Josias Du Pre Esqr. Govr. President
Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley

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Fort St. George 19th. October 1771

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At a Committee Present

Josias Du Pre Esqr. Gov.r President
Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley

Friday
1st. November

Advice of Peace being concluded with the Rajah of Tanjore

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Fort St. George 1st November 1771

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Tupoo

Fort St. George 1st November 1781.

Seapoy Sail, for which purpose Hyder Ally had sent for him to Syringapatam, and that it was generally thought a Peace would soon take Place.

The abovementioned Letter from Hyder Ally Cawn seems evidently calculated to involve us in a disagreeable Dilemma, of which he may avail himself, whatever Part We may take. If We promise him assistance, there is no Doubt but he will refuse complying with the Demands of the Morattas, in the hope of being able to oblige them to desist therefrom — if We decline giving him a direct answer, and continue to amuse him with the Hopes of assistance, He will make a Merit with the Morattas, by arguing the Expectation he hath of our Support and Aid, notwithstanding which he is ready to make up Matters and to enter into an Alliance with them against the Carnatic Payen Ghaut. If We absolutely refuse our assistance, it will give him a Pretext for breaking off his Engagements with us, and joining the Morattas — Under these Circumstances We do not see what other Answer we can return him than to refer him to our Letter of the 16th October and to repeat to him our Expectations of receiving in a short Time Orders from Europe, without which We are not empowered to act. —

Wm Du Pré
Warren Hastings.
Jno Auriol

243 Fort St. George 5th Novr 1771

Dispatched the following Letters to Bengall and Bombay the 1st & 2d to Tappalths and the latter & 3d to Pattamar.

To the Honble John Cartier Esqr
President and Governor &c. Gentlemen
of the Selct Committee at Fort St. George

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter to Sel. Comm. at Bengall advis. of the Peace between the Nabob and the Rajah of Tanjore

In our Letter of the 11th October & Duplicate Galley Dupplicate of which went by the Four Friends, we advised you that a Battery was on the 2d October opened against Tanjore. The Approaches were carried on against the Place till the 27th when a practicable Breach was nearly completed at which time Matters were made up, and a Peace concluded between the Nabob and the Rajah.

We are

Honble Sir & Sirs

Your most obedient
Humble Servants
Josias DuPre & Comm.

Fort St. George
5th November 1771.

To the Honble William Hornby Esqr
President and Governor &c. Gentlemen
of the Selct Committee at Bombay

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter to Bombay to the same Purport.

In our Letter of 8th October which has been forwarded in Duplicate, We advised you that our Army was encamped before Tanjore, and that we were in daily Expectation of hearing that Batteries were opened against the Place. — On the 2d of October a Battery was opened and

Fort St. George 5th. November 1771.

and the Approaches were carried on with a good Prospect of Success till the 27th. when a practicable Breach was nearly compleated, at which time Matters were made up and a Peace concluded between the Nabob and the Rajahs.

We are

Fort St. George
5th November, 1771.

Honble Sirs & Sirs
Your most obedient
Humble Servants
Josias Du Pre &c. Comm.

Thursday 7th. November

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pre Esqr. Governor President
Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley.

Letter from the Nabob representing the ill behaviour of the Maravar and Nalcotty Polygars and desiring that a Force may be sent to reduce them.

Read a Letter from the Nabob received the 2d. Instant as entered in Country Correspondence No. 152, Setting forth that the Maravar and Nalcotty Polygars had not sent any Assistance to the Army against Tanjore either of Men or Provisions Although required to do so; that they have neglected paying their Stated Pishcash, that they give Protection to the Colleries and Thieves of the Madura and Tinnivelly Countries and that they keep Possession of some Districts belonging to Madura. For which Reasons he is desirous of sending his Son with a proper Force with full Powers to punish them and desires that some European Infantry and Artillery with some Battalions of Sipoys under the Command of a carefull Officer may be employed on this Service.

The President acquaints the Committee that the Nabob Yesterday Morning earnestly requested that this Board would immediately come to some determination

on the Subject of the above Letter, while the Troops are now
collected in the South, that he might send the necessary
Instructions to his Son, and call on the Rajah of Tanjore and
Tondaman to send their Troops. That when the President
desired to be informed what were the Nabob's Intentions in
this Expedition, he said he meant to exterpate those Poligars
entirely.

Opinion of the Committee thereon.

The Committee think it unnecessary at present
to enter into a Discussion of the Propriety or Expediency of com-
plying with the Nabob's Requisition, especially as Matters are not
yet We understand, finally concluded at Tanjore, and nothing
can We apprehend, be attempted during the Rains; and by the
time they are over, We may be able to determine, from the
Situation of affairs with Respect to the Morattas and Hyder
ally, how far it may be prudent to undertake an Expedition.
In the mean time We are of Opinion that General
Smith should be instructed to obtain the best Information
he can with Regard to the Nature of the Country, the
Number and Strength of the Forts, what Troops are kept
up by the Marawar and Nalcooty Polygars, and the Force that
will be required to reduce them, and to advise us thereof,
giving his Opinion at the same time, whether it will
be more advisable to attempt it immediately or wait
until the Rains are over, that We may take our
Measures accordingly. Should it be thought prudent to
undertake the Expedition either during or after the Rains.
And as the giving the Marawar and Nalcooty Polygars
any Alarm, may be attended with bad Consequences,
whether We do or do not resolve to proceed against them;
General Smith is to be desired to be carefull that the
Intimation given him do not transpire. ——

246 Fort St. George 7th. November 1771.

To be communicated to the Board. —

Resolved that the Nabobs Letter and the abovementioned Minute be communicated to the Board, and if approved, that Advice be sent to General Smith accordingly. —

Jon. Du Pré
Warren Hastings.
Lawr. Sulivan

Fort St. George 21st November 1771.

At a Committee Present

Thursday 21st Nov.r

Josias Du Pre Esq.rs Gov.r President
Warren Hastings, Sam.l Ardley

The Nabob presses the Expedition ag.st the Maravar and Nalcooty Polygars.—

The President acquaints the Committee that the Nabob had been very earnest on pressing the Expedition against the Maravar and Nalcooty Polygars. That he had not been able to give the Nabob any determinate Answer thereon as the Committee had deferred entering into a Discussion of the Propriety or Expediency of the Measure, at least until General Smith could give us his Opinion on the several Points recommended to his Enquiry and Consideration in the Letter from the Board of the 7.th Instant. The President further acquaints the Committee that he has this Day received a Letter from General Smith dated 17.th advising that he had not been able to obtain the Information required by the Board regarding the Maravar and Nalcooty Polygars but hoped in a short time to be able to furnish the Board with the necessary Information on this Head. That as the Nabob is continually pressing him, the President on the Subject, he thinks it necessary that the Committee should no longer delay taking the Matter under their Consideration that he may be enabled to give the Nabob such Answers as may be conformable to the Sentiments of the Committee.—

Considerations thereon

The Committee thereupon now proceed to enter into a Discussion of the Propriety and Expediency of complying with the Nabobs Requisitions in sending a Force immediately to reduce the Maravar and Nalcooty Polygars

248 Fort St. George 21st. November 1771

Polygars.

The Principal Objection which occurs to the undertaking that or any other Expedition at this Juncture is, the Probability of the Morattas entering the Province, while our Troops are employed at such a Distance as to prevent our assembling a sufficient Force to oppose their Ravages; and We have all Reason to believe that the Designs of the Morattas are to invade the Country, unless the Nabob can find Means to compromise with them for a Sum of Money.

However striking this Objection may at first View appear, We think it is not of sufficient Weight to prevent our taking immediate Measures for reducing the Maruwar and Nalcotty Polygars to a proper State of Subjection if their Reduction be desirable in other Respects.

We have frequently in our Proceedings expressed our Opinion drawn from Experience in the late War, that were our Force of Infantry much greater than it is, We could never hope to prevent the Ravages of Horse and were all our Troops collected in the most advantageous Stations, a few Thousand Cavalry would overrun the Country without our being able effectually to hinder their Depreda=tions. The Force required will not leave our Garrisons so bare as to expose them to Danger, and there is no Reason to suppose that the Morattas will venture to bring Heavy Artillery to attempt the Reduction of any of them: they will know such an Attempt would expose them to a Defeat and to the Loss of their Guns and Baggage. Their Views will be confined to Plunder, and the obtaining a Sum of Money from the Nabob.

Had the Expedition against Tanjore been undertaken at that Season of the Year when it was first

proposed, We are of Opinion still as we were then, that the Morattas would have made an Effort to assist the Tanjorians Our Advices from the Maratta Army for sometime past mention the pressing Instances of the Rajah of Tanjore to Trimbeck Row for immediate Assistance, and his Promises of giving it. By our last Intelligence We are informed that Bills for a very considerable Sum sent by the Rajah were received by Trimbeck Row who having thereupon called a Council, It was resolved to leave Part of the Army to oppose Hyder, and to march with the rest to the Relief of Tanjore. But it must be observed that the Letters which accompanyed those Remittances represented the Siege of Tanjore as advancing and the Place to be in great Danger of falling if not speedily relieved, and at the Receipt of the Letters it was not known to the Maratta Army that a Peace was concluded. We remain therefore in Doubt whether upon the Receipt of the News of the Peace the Morattas will desist from their abovementioned Intentions of entering the Payenghaut immediately, or not. If they should pursue that Design, We must in a very few Days hear further of their Motions, and if they should pass the Ghauts, it is certain We must for the present desist from all thoughts of reducing the Marawar and Nalcotty Polygars, and collect a Force nearer the Centre. If upon the News of a Peace with Tanjore they should desist for the present, but still keep in Reserve their Design of invading the Payen Ghaut, which We think is most probable in that Case it is likely they will not carry that Intention into Execution till the latter End of January or February unless they should sooner conclude a Peace with Hyder, Our Reason for this Opinion is that from January to May, an Army of Morattas might best be subsisted in the Province, and their Ravages would be most severely felt, the

Crops

Fort St. George 21st. November 1771

Corps being then on the Ground, part unreaped, and part in Stacks, and but little secured in the Forts. If therefore it were in our Power with the Infantry to prevent their Ravages We may hope that the Expedition proposed against Maruwär will be over before that time comes when the Depredations of the Marattas are most to be apprehended.

We come now to consider how far it is consistent with the Interest of the Company, in the present System with the Nabob to assist him in reducing the Maruwar and Nalcooty Polygars to a proper State of Dependance, and We are clearly of Opinion that whether the Power of the Carnatic be in the Hands of the Nabob or the Company, it is equally for the Interest of the Company that the Several Polygars should be kept in such a State of Subjection as to prevent their being able to raise any Disturbances or Troubles in the Country. The Maruwar & Nalcooty Polygars have generally been looked upon as ill affected towards the Nabob's Government, and their late Conduct in declining to send any Assistance to the Army before Tanjour, evidently shews that they were not well wishers to the Enterprize, not that they bear any good Will to Tanjour which would equally excite their Jealousy were it to attain an Independancy, but because the Nabob's Power becomes dangerous to them as it becomes stronger, there needs no Argument to prove it. These Polygars affect Independance, but being Tributaries to the Trichinopoly Circar, the Nabob's Aim is to devest them of all Power, and to reduce them to a State in which they may easily be controuled, they know it, and from a dread of his increasing Power there is little Reason to doubt but they would have availed themselves of the first favorable Opportunity of joining

Fort St. George 21st November 1771

with the Rajah or any other Enemy in any attempt against the Nabob by which they might hope to render themselves less dependant. And although the Fort of Villum and Telladdy on the Hands of the Nabob is a great Check on the Rajah's Conduct at present, yet We may look upon it as certain that he will not remain easy under such Restraint, but will take the first favorable Opportunity either by an Alliance with the French or any other Power to acquire his former Influence in which We may expect the Maravar and Naalcotty Polygars will join with a View of securing their own Independancy and which they may do to great advantage by an Attack on the Madura Country, if Measures are not taken to prevent them.

The foregoing Reasons together with the repeated Orders of the Court of Directors for our supporting the Nabob's Government and rendering him respectable in the Eyes of the Country Powers induce the Committee to be of Opinion, that the Expedition should be undertaken without Loss of time. But We are at the same time of Opinion that We ought to govern ourselves by the Spirit of the Company's Orders under Date the 16th March 1767 Par 3 and consequently that the total Extirpation of the Maravars and Naloody should not be the Object proposed, which we believe to be the Nabob's real Intention but only to reduce them to a proper State of Subjection and Obedience, by seizing their Forts and strong Holds and by such other Means as to prevent their being able to withold their Stated Pishcash, or to become troublesome in future. We are of Opinion that this Declaration should be made to the Nabob on our Part and a promise desired on his that he will not compromise or make up Matters with them before the work is compleated by subjecting them in the Manner proposed, unless We shall concur with him in the Necessity of desisting.

Sp

Fort St. George 21st. Novr. 1771.

If therefore the Nabob can be brought to consent to the above Propositions, Viz.t To confine our Operations solely to the reducing the Marawar and Naaloor Poligars to a proper State of Dependancy without proceeding to an entire Extirpation of them, and not to make up Matters untill they are so reduced, but that the Officer Commanding this Expedition shall have full Power to carry on his Operations in such a Manner as he shall judge will best answer our View; in that Case We are of Opinion that Provisional Instructions should be prepared and sent to General Smith if it appears to him from the Accounts he may receive of the Nature of the Country, and the Number and Strength of the Forts and Forces of the Polygars, that they may be so reduced by the Month of January at the farthest; In such Case that he do immediately set about making the necessary Preparations for carrying the same into Execution.—

Agreed that this Minute be communicated to the Board, and if approved by them, that the President be desired to confer with the Nabob on the Subject.

Jon.a Du Bré

Warren Hastings.

Sam.l Ardley

253 Fort St. George 22d Novr. 1771

The following Intelligence was this Day recived from the Nabob.

Purport of the Advice from the Moratta Camp
Dated the 10th Novr. 1771 and recd by the Nabob y. 22d Novr. 1771.

Trumbeckrow intends to have 10000 Horse under the Command of Sakaramburry in the Balaghaut and himself to march to the Plains of Ossore and Aunikel, and from thence to send Balaventraw's Son to the Assistance of Tanjore. Subbarauw the Tanjore Vacquel presented Trumbeckrow a Bill for 5 Lacks of Rupees with a Pair of Pistols, he brought the Rajahs Letters to him and to the other Sardars. Trumbeckrow told him that he will defer his Campaign against Hyder and go to the Assistance of his Master, so that he ordered the Vacquil to go along with Balaventraw's Son, and gave answers to the Rajahs Letters. Trumbeckrow directed Narsingraw Gauick Vaidey, Vankajee Mooty, Cadapah and Cundanore Troops as also the Polgars of Chittel Durg and Hurpenhully &c. to accompany him — He joined 4000 Horse belonging to the Circar to the said Sakarumburrys Command — The Tanjore Circar represented to Trumbeckraw through the Means of Balaventraws Son that he should send away the Nabobs News Writer and that of the English out of the Camp but he did not consent to it, saying, that his Army is very Superior, so that there was no Matter who comes in or goes out of it, at Length he told him that he will give Orders accordingly. The Marattas took Possession of Garycode and demolished it after plundering the same — The Army moved from the said Place and arrived near Bussohully one Cos from Meddore and is fighting there — Sakaram in his Return from Nagapour took Possession of Beerhully and plundered the same — The Tanjore Vacquil being asked concerning the Army in the Carnatic, he informed —

Trumbeckrow

Fort St. George 22d Novr 1771

Trimbeckrow as follows — 7000 Europeans, 10,000 Sepoys, 4000 Horse and 20 Guns now before Tanjore to which half of the Troops from the Garrison of Ambare and Sattgada as well as Bangar Yachem Naicks Force &c. joined — the Vackeel told him further; that if He (Trimbeckrow) enters the Gaut at this time, Ambore and Sattgada will be easily taken, That the Nabob has 100 Horse and 500 Sepoys with him, That the English at Madras have only 700 Europeans and 1000 Sepoys and that there was sufficient Water and Grass to be got for the Moratta Army, Trimbeckrow told the Vackeel that He wrote several Letters to the Nabob concerning Tanjore but received no answer, That Madanarow sent Letters and insisted upon his sending Assistance to Tanjore, and that if the Nabob finishes the Tanjore affair before he enters the Payen Ghaut and sends his Troops to join him as he promised He will then write in the Nabobs Behalf to Madanarow — Morrari Row told me that if the Nabob makes Peace with the Tanjoreans and acquaints him with it, He can prevent the Moratta Army from entering the Gaults — Hyders Vacqeel told Trimbeckrow to restore Colar and write to Madanarow about Balapour but he answered him that he is going to Tanjore and that Narrain Row will soon come, when he will tell him of it. It is talked here that Narrain Row with 20,000 Horse arrived at Kistna River, That 4000 of them arrived at Tungabadra and that 500 Horse with a proper Sardar joined the Army. If the Morattas should arrive towards Baramahal, Some Hircars should be placed at Ambore and Malapaudy.

Purport of Advices from Arcot, Dated the 19th Novr 1771.

255 Fort St. George 22d November 1771.

News was brought that Vankitrow Relation to Trimulraw from Vellour sent twenty Sepoys to Arnie Country and seized 1000 Cattle &c but 2 Peons belonging to Tachoreans fired against them upon which they left the Cattle and went away.

News was brought also from Vanambaddy and Tripatore that the Poligar of Coimbettore by Permission of Trimbuckraw comes along with Balaventraw's Son who intends to enter the Ghaut with 10,000 Horse through Cangondy Canama to take Possession of Sagadave &c. The said Balaventraw's Son is now at Chinnapatnam and not yet moved from thence.

The foregoing Intelligence agrees with the Advices received by the President, except that we had no Account of the March of Narrain Raw's ——

Monday 25th Nov. 71

At a Committee Present

Josias Du Pré Esqr. Governor President

Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley

The President acquaints the Committee that by Intelligence Papers received from the Balaghaut he learns that Trimbeck Raw had determined to enter this Provence, and for which Purpose he had detached Balaventaraw's Son with a Body of 10 or 12 thousand Horse as an advanced Party who had arrived within a few Cos of Ghotah. That he the President had conversed with the Nabob on the Subject, who informed him that he had received the same Intelligence — That he imputed this Resolution of Trimbeckraw to two Motives — The first that having received Bills for a considerable Amount from the Rajah of Tanjore, and which were not payable unless Assistance were

Sent

sent to the Rajah - and hearing that Matters were likely to be accomodated he had made this Motion to convince the Rajah of his Readiness to assist him on the Receipt of the Bills - That in Case the Rajah should compromise his Disputes with the Nabob, the Trimbeckrow might insist on the Amount of the Bills, alledging that it was the Rajah's own Fault in making Peace, and not waiting the Arrival of the Troops which were marching to his assistance - The other Motive assigned by the Nabob was that he had advice that Narrain Row Brother to Madarow is appointed to the Command of the Troops in the Balaghaut, and upon his Arrival Trimbeckrow's Powers will cease, who is therefore desirous of collecting what he can previous to Narrain Row's Arrival. That the Nabob then proposed sending a Message to Trimbeckrow through the Means of Madarow Sabaseo the Moratta Vaqueel to the following Effect. That he learns that Trimbeckrow is advancing this Way with an Intention of entering the Payen Ghauts. That Mr. Trimbeckrow has been frequently advised that the English could not take Part in the War in the Balaghaut without Orders from Europe, that those Orders might now be daily expected to arrive that he the Nabob would advise him not to make any Attempts before they arrived, since if they were for the English to assist him, he might expect their Aid, and if they were not authorised to do so, he should be frankly informed of it - But that in Case he undertook the Province or committed the least Hostility in it. He must not expect the Assistance of the English Should the Orders they may afterwards receive empower them to join him.

The Committee are of Opinion that the Motives assigned by the Nabob for this Motion of the Morattas

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are natural and probable — and they much approve of the
× Message proposed by the Nabob to be sent to Trincombecrow.

For. Du Pré

Warren Hastings.

Jon.a Ariell

258 Fort St. George 27th Novr. 1771

Received the following Letter from the Select Committee at Bombay by the Way of Anjengo

To the Honble Josias Du Pre Esqr.
President and Governor &c. Gentlemen of
the Select Committee at Fort St. George

Honble Sir & Gentlemen

Letter from Bombay enclosing Copies of Letters from Mr. Sibbald and Hyder ally Avisg of the Situation of the latter, of his application for Assistance and desiring to know how far We can cooperate with them should they determine to assist him —

We addressed You last under the 31st. Augt. a Duplicate of which has already been forwarded to You —

Having received a Letter from the Resident at Onore containing an Account of the present Posture of affairs between the Nabob Hyder ally and the Morattas, We enclose Copy thereof for your Honor & Cs. Information, as also a Copy of two Letters from the Nabob, one of which is directed to the President, the other to the Resident at Onore.

The Nabob hath therein earnestly applied for Assistance both from You and Us, without which We have reason to think he will fall a Sacrifice to the superior Power of the Morattas. We therefore much wish to do every thing in our Power to prevent such an Event, entirely concurring in Opinion with our Honble Masters of the Necessity of supporting Hyder Ally as a Barrier to the Morattas Power.

But as it is necessary We should be more precisely informed of the Situation of the Nabobs Affairs of his Wants and Offers in Case of our affording him Assistance, and particularly whether he can or will deposit a Sum of Money beforehand adequate to the Expence which We may incur in assisting him, and without which, It will be totally out of our Power to do it. We have therefore directed Mr. James Sibbald to write him fully on the Subject, from Onore

Fort St. George 27th November 1771

Onore, and get his answer with the utmost Expedition for the above Purpose, and we shall not fail to advise Your Honor &c. with the Result.

And in the meantime We request your Honor &c. will particularly inform us, whether, in case We should afford Hyder Ally assistance against the Morattas, you will or can cooperate with us in support of him and to what Extent.

We are with Esteem
Honble Sir & Gentlemen
Your most obedient Hble Servants
William Hornby
W. A. Price
David Wedderburn
Nathl Stackhouse
John Watson
William Taylor

Bombay Castle
21st October 1771

P.S. We are concerned to advise you that the Packet you forwarded us to be dispatched over-land for the Honorable Company has miscarried by the Capture of the Vessel in which it was sent from hence by the Sangariens.

To the Honble William Hornby Esqr.
President and Governor and the rest of the Select Committee
at Bombay

Honble Sir & Sirs

In Consequence of your Orders for keeping you advised from time to time of the Operations of the Morattas against the Nabob, I have paid particular Attention to the Means for procuring certain Intelligence of their Motions, as well as of the Nabobs Situation, and as the Mode the Morattas have adopted this Season for destroying Hyder's affairs, not only shew their determination of totally reducing him, if in their Power, but at the same time the great Probability that Matters between them will be brought to a Crisis before the Expiration of another Season, it will I presume be thought a Consideration worthy your Honors &c. Notice

and

Fort St. George 27th November 1771.

and Attention.

The Morattas after the Defeat given the Nabob on the 7th March, when he was obliged to retire within the walls of Syringapatam, encamped in a manner that Place, and contented themselves with firing upon the Town from a great Distance for upwards of twenty Days. But this the Nabob no further regarded, than as it prevented his drawing Supplies for his Army from the Country round him. He flattered himself the approach of the Rains would as heretofore oblige the Morattas to evacuate his Country during that Season, as being the Conditions promised the greatest part of the Solgery which compose their Armies. The Nabob was sensible a Cessation of Hostilities for the Space of six Months would give him time to repair his Losses in Troops, that in the Absence of the Morattas he should be able to retake his Forts and Places in his Possession, and be in a Condition to stand upon the defensive when they might enter his Country in the Month of November. But very contrary to these expectations of Hyder, the Moratta Grand Camp under the Command of Trumbeck Row retired from Syringapatam about the Middle of April, and after laying waste the Nabob's Countries in the Biddenore Districts fixed their Encampment for the rainy Season at Tennerghiree being in the Center of the Nabob's Country and in the high Road both to Syringapatam and Biddenore. Since taking up their Quarters at Tennerghiree they had detached large Bodies of Horse and Foot for bringing the Country on all Sides under their Subjection, and have absolutely reduced some considerable Forts within two days way of Biddenore itself. So effectually have they cut off Hyder's Communication with this latter place (so far as extends to the drawing of Succours

from

Fort St. George 27th November 1771.

from thence / that even his Hircarrahs are obliged to take their Route through the Coorga Country, and down to Mangalore. The Opening a Communication with Biddenore being of the last Importance to his affairs, he has made several Attempts to Effect it but all have proved unsuccessfull, and a Body of 500 Horse escorting 20 Peices of Cannon with other Military Stores from Biddenore in the beginning of June were interrupted by the Morattas and fell into their Hands.

As the Nabob from the Situation of his Enemy added to the small Body of Troops now in Biddenore must be under some Apprehensions for the Safety of that Place, he absolutely determined about two Months ago at Syringapatam in the Command of his Brother in Law, and of coming himself to Biddenore. For which purpose he demanded a Passage through the Coorga Rajah's Country and absolutely made over to the Rajah a considerable District contiguous to Mangalore for his Permission which was granted, but just at that Juncture a Body of the Moratta Army moving suddenly towards the Borders of the Coorga Country left Hyder no room to doubt of the Rajah's Treachery. It is therefore supposed he will not put himself in his Power.

The Morattas being now in the Heart of the Nabob's Country and nothing to stop their Progress but the Severity of the Season, it is to be expected that their most vigorous efforts will very shortly be exerted for accomplishing their Designs, and that therefore the Nabob's Situation may be looked upon as critical and distressed. The Morattas by being in Possession of the greatest Part of his Mysore or Country at the same time both prevent his raising Troops and drawing the necessary Supplies for his Army. The

Scarcity

Fort St George 27th November 1771.

Scarcity of Grain is very great, so much that he has turned all the Inhabitants out of the Town, and for want of Forage he has lost more than half of his few remains of Horse.

Yesterday I received a Letter from him for the Honble the President which I now transmit, and have thought it not improper to enclose for your Honor & Hs Notice a correct Translation of his Letter to me received at the same time.

I am &c &c

Chas 9th Sept 1771.

James Sibbald

The Letters from Hyder Ally Cawn to the Governor of Bombay and Mr Sibbald were entered in Country Correspondence No 162 & 163 representing the Necessity of our taking Part with him against the Morattas, who threaten to invade the Carnatic

In Consequence of which the following Letter was immediately wrote to Bombay

To the Honble William Hornby Esqr
President and Governor &c Gentlemen of the
Select Committee at Bombay

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter to Bombay
21st October

We have this Instant received your Letter of the 21st October and reply to it immediately

From the Beginning of the present Contest between Hyder ally Cawn and the Morattas, We have been of Opinion, that it would be best and most conducive to the future Security of the Company's Possessions in India to support Hyder ally Cawn in case he should at any time be in danger of sinking under the superior Power of the Morattas

but at the same time We were of Opinion that We should forbear to take any Part in this Contest untill such a Crisis should happen and thereby render it necessary. — This was merely an Opinion which however desirous We might be of carrying it into Execution from a full Conviction of its Propriety, We saw clearly We should never be able to bring into Practice, because the Plan and System of the Nabob of Arcott stood in direct Opposition to it, and the warmest Representations have been made to us by him and by the Kings Minister to assist the Morattas to reduce Hyder Ally which We refused to comply with. It is true that the tenor of all the late Letters from the Court of Directors indicate their Opinion to be that the Power of Mysore should be supported as a Barrier against the Morattas, yet in one of their late Letters they enjoin us not to interfere in the Quarrels of the Neighbouring Powers unless there should be an absolute Necessity, which proviso must always remain to be construed after the Event. We have not failed to represent to the Court of Directors the Situation of their Affairs and Connexions under this Presidency and particularly by the Lapwing — We have not to this Hour received any other Orders than such as We have mentioned above, but We may reasonably hope and expect to receive their decisive Directions on this very important Subject by the Lord Holland which sailed as we are informed the 1st of June, or by the Britannia which was to sail about the middle of the same Month, in Expectation of Instructions. We have to this time temporised with both with the Morattas and with Hyder Ally, and must continue to do so untill We receive further Instructions from our Constituents unless we should be compelled to act by being attacked which at this time seems not improbable as our Advices from the Balaghaut are repeated and strong that Trimbeck Row hath taken the Resolution

of

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of moving towards the Borders of the Carnatic Payen Ghaut.

We have lately received from Hyder Ally Cawn's Letters of the same tenor as that he wrote to you and Mr Sibbald. We send you herewith a Copy of our Answers to him.

Your Honor &c desire to be informed how far We will or can cooperate with you in support of Hyder Ally in Case you should afford him Assistance against the Morattas. We could answer to this Proposition with the greatest Precision if it were in our Power to determine and execute, Your Honor &c will clearly perceive by what We have already said that it does not rest with Us; We have reason to believe that both the Nabob and the Kings Ministers have made Representations on this Subject to Europe and as their Plan is diametrically opposite to ours We cannot even conjecture what Orders We shall receive but should the expected Orders authorize Us to assist Hyder Ally still it will rest in a great Measure with the Nabob to unite, to assist to oppose, or to remain inactive, so that while We shall have concerted Measures with him upon the Orders We may receive, it will not be in our Power to give your Honor &c any Assurance of the Support We shall be able to give you. Our Sentiments are nevertheless the same as they have always been from the Beginning of the Contest.

We are

Fort St. George
27th November 1771

Honble Sir & Sirs
Your most obedient humble Servants
Josias Du Pré &c Committee

To Peter Ellwin Wrench Esqr
Chief and Factors at Anjengo
Gentlemen

The

Fort St. George 27th November 1771

The accompanying Packet for the Select Committee at Bombay We request you will be pleased to forward with all possible Dispatch.

We are
Gentlemen
Your most obed.t humble Servants
Josias Du Pré &.a Committee

Fort St. George
27th Nov.r 1771

29th Received this Evening Advice that a Party of Moratta Horse had advanced as far as Calacharaccum which they had plundered.

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pré Esqr. Governor President
Warren Hastings, Samuel Ateley

Thursday 5th Dec.r

The President lays before the Committee the following Letter & a Delivered to him by the Nabob.

Translate of a Letter from Trimbeckrow Row to Madaverow Sadasive the Moratta Vacquil dated 20th November, as entered in Country Correspondence.

NB. This Letter is worthy of attention, and is therefore entered here, also at full Length with Remarks.

Extract of a Letter from Trimbeckrow to Maudhoorow Sadasive. —

Dated 20th November 1771

Letter	Remarks
A. In the Beginning of your Letter you tell me that the Nabob had sent his Troops to Tanjore to demand the annual Pishcash from	A. The Nabob it is certain did inform the President on the Beginning of the Expedition against Tanjore that it was necessary to

Fort St. George 5th December 1771.

From thence which had not been received for two Years past who expressed his Apprehension and that although it was by no means the Nabob's design to take which had been made, and the that Country still there was no formidable Army which was doubt but Soubahs receive Letters assembled were not intended From them, purporting on various Modes their Inability of making and Charges of the Rajah. but in resistance, to which however I should pay no Regard, but keep a Measure of which the Morattas in Nine the Nabob's form friendship and that of Anundarow whom you had dispatched would acquaint me of all Particulars. to amuse the Maratta Vaquil should certainly not remain Pacifick Spectators. Accordingly the Nabob did assure Madanrow Sadasive that his Intention was only to call the Rajah to a proper Account for his disobedient Conduct, take from him the Pishcash and some Consideration for the Charges of the Expedition, as other Soubahs had done, that no doubt the Rajah seeing his Errors would repent and comply, and Matters would end properly: but that if the Morattas interfered, the Rajah would be encouraged in his Obstinacy, and compel us to the Necessity of taking his Fort from him. At the same time the Nabob said these were only Pretences to grant the Morattas, and prevent their disturbing our Operations but

that it was necessary to take the Fort and totally reduce the Rajah who was now become dangerous.

B. You doubtless remember that you wrote to me, and the Nabob informed the President Message you sent me by the said Row In hopes of the Nabobs friendship, agreable to what I wrote to you I did not agree to send Assistance to the other Side but dismissed Ammendarow with all Speed. No effect however of your Negotiation have I yet seen.

B About the same time but desired them it might be kept a profound Secret, that he had so settled Matters with the Moratta Vackeel that he hoped we should have no disturbance from the Morattas during the Tanjore Expedition, the harm by which it was to be effected was a present of a Lack of Rupees to Trumbeck Row and near three Lacks more in Presents to other Sardars and to the Vackeel, upon which the Vackeel had promised to write Trumbeck Row. At the time of writing the Letter on which We are now remarking, this Money had not been paid, and therefore says Trumbeck Row No Effect of your Negotiations have I yet seen. The Money however is now paid which probably may appease the angry Chief for a while. See the Nabobs Letter to Trumbeck

Row

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Rec'd entered on Country Correspondence No 165 and dated 29th November.

C. And I am continually receiving Letters from Tanjore advising of the Batteries being advanced close to the Ditch of the Fort. That every Morning or Evening it was expected to be Stormed that they (the Tanjorians) had no further Ability of assistance and that the Gintoo Government Nabob and join with him in there would be lost. It appears to me that the Nabob keeps you the Army by Promises, sweet words and a great deal of kind treatment, and as I do not see his View to the Reduction of the Place, having entirely erased from his Mind, the Promise which he made to you, and as to us, he thinks We are totally engaged on the Expedition against this Raigne.

C. Notwithstanding what he says in this Paragraph Friesbeck, Rous had actually rec'd the News of the Peace with Tanjore but it suited his purpose to conceal it. The Plain meaning is this. You, says he to the Nabob are sensible that I am receiving Succours from the Coast and join with him in the presence of succouring Tanjore which I find the Nabob means to take.

D. His Engagement to you was that in six Weeks time, measures would be taken for assisting Government, that Orders were coming from Europe, and that he would give you an Answer, and that in the interim the Country in the Payen Ghaut

D. About the Beginning of September at the time the army was in Malvan, and about the time that the Arrangements relates in the Notes A. & B. were made, the Nabob informed the President that the Marattá Vaequel was more urgent than

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which was to have been given to ever for a decisive answer to this
him as a Jaghire should not be Proposition about Assistance, and
laid waste. All which were polite it was necessary at all Events to
-al Expressions, and I am surprized find some Expedient for a delay
that you with all your Wisdom, that would carry us near the time
did not see into them. At all of the Dains, as we might hope the
Events however I am not to blame Tanjore Expedition would be at an
What has been said on this Side End, he desired the President would
has been done, you swallow dust give the Vackeel a Meeting and
and write what is not performed endeavor to put him off with
Now also you have wrote me a Copies, accordingly the Nabob and
long Letter, but do not mention the Vackeel met the President at
a Syllable of Matters being in the Garden House. After much
adjusted with Tanjore — the War Conversation in the usual asiatic
Stile continues — God forbid it Manner about it and about it
should so happen, but if the the Vackeel said he had been in
Fort of Tanjore which Serviment waiting a long time him to little
esteems on the same Light as Purpose, that our waiting for
Poonah should be lost, which Orders put him in mind of a
way shall be able to shew our Debtor who as a General Answer
Fans? At last instead of friendship to all his Creditors wrote over
We must have Enmity with His door come and be paid tomorrow
the Nabob. I see by your Man — they came again and again
-ner of writing, that after the and found it was still tomorrow.
Business is ruined you will tell He was answered that our Letter
me you did not imagine it would Ships might certainly be expected
be so. I think it necessary to to arrive before the Change of the
Send an army in the Payen Monsoon, which would be on
Ghaut to lay waste the Country about six Weeks. That no doubt
of the Navigue. Acquaint me in that time We should receive
now of the real State of Matters Orders, and he should have an
there answer

there, and do not bring a bad Character upon yourself in the Opinion of Government. You tell me that Peace has probably been made with Hyder Naique since these Orders, what I am astonished. What then? — Why then he was told there is such a Weather and they might take what Steps they pleased. Person as you there on they thought proper. We could not assist them, but must take the Part of Government, and the say no more — this — but must Nabob such a firm Friend of his also keeps you there in hopes mentioned in Note B. provided of Assistance, how should Peace a promise from the Nabob that be made. Even now our Friends We should not be disturbed for ship still remains and if the six Weeks —

Nabob looking forward will make
Peace with the Rajah of Tanjore
in an equitable Manner.

E. And send to the Assis. E. It is worthy a remark
tance of the Government the that not only in this Letter, but
same Body of Troops as is employ'd in the whole Course of the
there, he will acquire a Name Morattа Negotiation very little
and experience the Friendship attention has been paid by them
of the Governments. to the Company's Government
here. We have been invited to
an Interview when it suited a
present purpose, but every thing
has been managed by the Nabob,
and when Sir John Lindsay was
here, much Court was paid to
him also. Accordingly the
Company's Forces are generally
spoken

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spoken of in all the Letters and advices from the Moratta Camp as if they were at his Command. We expect you to join us and bring with you the Frenchmen or the English — this is the usual Stile. —

I have left 10000 Horse opposed to Hyder Naigue and am advanced myself with the main Body of the Army near to Bengalore. I have dispatched Kisthna Row Balawunt with 15,000 Horse and 10000 Pundarahs towards Kistnaghery and its my Design likewise to proceed there myself by and by. Send me an Answer to this Letter with the utmost Expedition.

The Report of the Hircarrahs who brought this Letter.

They say they set out the 20th November and at Cuddapatnam met the Hircarrahs who carried the News of the Peace with Tanjore. Triumbeckrow's Army was then three days Journey from Cuddapanatum.

Translate of a Letter from Morare Row to the Nabob Dated 24th November as entered in Country Correspondence No 167 urging the Nabob to send Assistance to Triumbeckrow and either to pay a Visit to him, or send his Son Conduct Al Omrah advising of Triumbeckrow's Arrival near the Passes; whom he had prevailed on not to enter them. Recommending to the Nabob to pay Triumbeck Row a Visit or send his Son, and offering to come himself to the Nabob when every thing will be settled.

Translate of a Letter from Morare Row to his Vackeel Seereputtrow dated 23d November 1771 No 168 inviting him to represent to the Nabob the Impropriety of his having undertaken an Expedition against Tanjore and neglected that

that on the other side the Paper - That he and Trumbeck Raw would have obliged the Rajah to submit to proper terms. That Trumbeck raw had proposed sending 15000 Horse to the Rajah's assistance and to enter the Paper with 20000 more, that he had accordingly arrived between Bodicotah and Ancaugery - That he had dispatched 12000 Horse into Hyder's Country on this Side the Paper - Recommending that the Nabob send an Army of Europeans, Sipoys, and Artillery to the assistance of the Morattas, when the Management of the Country on the other Side of the Paper will fall into the Nabob's Hands.

The following Extracts of Intelligence received by the Nabob and delivered by him to the President at the same time are also now read.

Extracts of Intelligence received by the Nabob from the Moratta Army under date the 28th of Novr 1771

Advise that the 25th in the Evening Trumbeckraw sent for Appajee Ram, Hyder Nauguies Vackeel and asked him what his Master had wrote? That the Vackeel told him, his Master had mentioned he would pay the Sum of fifty Lacks of Rupees in ready Money, and give Soucar Bills for twenty more, payable at a fixed Period, and would also send his Son Tuppo with a Force to meet him, to which Trumbeckraw replied, telling him to inform his Master in four days he would acquaint him. The Intelligence then says that Trumbeckraw's Intention, in this, that as by the advancing of his Troops the affair of Tanjour has been adjusted, a terror must now be struck in the whole Country the Chout that is to be given by the Nabob paid (a Lack of Rupees more or less) assistance obtained - and if the Nabob will not

and

come to see him, that one of his Sons would come, and Peace being established that he then should proceed against Hyder with the Troops of assistance, so obtained – And, if the Nabob would neither give Money nor Assistance, but be in Friendship with Hyder, the Ghauts passed and an expedition undertaken against the Arcot Country – That the 26th of November Appajee Ram received further Letters from Hyder telling him at all Events to make Peace, and that he would agree to send assistance in Consequence of which the said Appajee Ram went to Morarow and acquainted him thereof, after which they both went to Trumbeck Row and the former told him "You have hitherto for Ever of no Opinion, your desires were not complied with, I have now a Letter from my Master, saying he will comply therewith, Shew your Kindness therefore and make Peace, the Sum of fifty Lacks of Rupees shall be paid to you in ready Money, and a Sowcars Bill given and Tippoo Saib will come to your assistance with 2000 Horse 4000 Foot and ten Peices of Cannon" That after this Morarow also to Trumbeck Row "Hyders Vacqueel says he will act agreable to your desire give up therefore such of the Districts you have taken as may appear to you proper and somehow or other make Peace." to which Trumbeck Row replied after my arrival in the Arcott Country, I will give an Answer respecting this Business – the Case is that if the Nabob will make Peace and send his assistance, Bengaloor must be taken, but if they being in Friendship with Hyder, neither make Peace, nor send assistance, but on the Contrary come to make War against us in that Case some Favor must be shewn to the Naique, the whole of the Countries I have taken from him, Chickballapore excepted, restored to him – what Money he gives, accepted – his assistance taken and then we must proceed against the Arcott Country – the Nabob it is true, is in

† supposed to mean the Nabob and the English –

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in Friendship with Seringapatam but he may possibly think I am insolent and must be punished and on that Account has entered into no Negotiation, nor even sent away my Vackeel. That after this Conversation, Trimbeckrow and Morarow, had a private Conference together, and it was determined to dispatch Letters to the Nabob which, accordingly each of them has done, That Tupoo Hyders Son had attacked the Detachment under Waumanrow (which had attempted the Siege of one of Hyders Forts) Defeated the same and took fifty Horses and an Elephant in Consequence of which Waumanrow had wrote to Trimbeckrow for a Reinforcement of 4000 Horse but no answer had been sent to his Letter, at the time of this Intelligence being despatched, That upon the March of the Moratta Army lately Hyders Horse likewise had attacked the Rear thereof, and carried off three Camels Load of Artillery Stores and four Camels and between 50 and 60 Bullocks Load of Baggage belonging to the Army That Secret Advice had been received at the Moratta Camp that Hyder had collected together 6000 Horse 10000 Sepoys and 10,000 Carnatic Peons and had got fifty Peices of Cannon, ready & mounted upon their Carriages — That upon the Representation of a Persian in the Moratta Camp to Morarow, that if the Army was to proceed to the Circar Country (where there are a great many Pagodas the Country would be plundered and that he Morarow as a Friend to the Nabob and Mussulmen should prevent the Army passing the Ghauts, Morarow said that he had wrote a Letter to the Nabob to which, if a proper answer was received, it was well, if not he would go himself to the Nabob, taking with him only a Palankeen and two Horses, persuade the Nabob and bring him back with him, the Intelligencer here says, he is of Opinion that an Answer should

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should be soon dispatched to Moranow's Letter - for if not, he thinks the advanced Part of the Army will pass the Ghauts That Fruinbeckrow had received a Letter from Opperow, advising of his having crossed the Pass of Rauccotah and arrival in the Country towards Poulcaut and Singarapettah and that Fruinbeckrow in Consequence of the great distance, Apparow's and Womanrow's Corps were from him, would march from Hyssoor by the Road of Boddecotah, cross the Coopum Pass and proceed towards Cauverepatam and Kistnaghery -

The Committee think it necessary to observe that the Advices we receive from the Nabob upon any critical Occasion generally lead to the Question, and support the Measures the Nabob wishes us to take. Hyder ally in the above Intelligence Paper is represented as not only soliciting for Peace, but offering to join the Morattas to enter this Provence - This is contrary to our Advices, and the President acquaints the Committee that Hyder allys Vacquils had assured him that although their Master had a Vacquil with Fruinbeckrow, yet there was one Article insisted on which their Master would not consent to Viz.h To join the Morattas to invade the Arcott Country. How far the Nabob's Intelligence may be depended on, or what Credit may be given to our Advices and the Assurances of the Vacquils We cannot say -

The President acquaints the Committee that the Nabob had informed him that from the above Letters and Intelligence, he thought there was now no Room to doubt but the Morattas would enter the Provence and therefore desired that the Committee would immediately deliberate on the Measures to be taken -

It is with infinite Concern the Committee observe

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observe that notwithstanding the repeated and earnest Representations of the Board and this Committee in their Several addresses of 31st January, 6th April, 25 June — 10th August, and 29th September 1770 to the Court of Directors of the very critical Situation of affairs with respect to the Morattas and Hyder ally, which were so fully and clearly explained, in Order to enable them to give us their Sentiments and Orders with Respect to the Conduct they would with us to observe in so important and interesting a Matter. We still find Ourselves not only without Orders but without the least Intimation of their Opinion thereon. So is true that the Expectation and non arrival of those Orders have furnished us with a Plea for Procrastination for some time past; But we fear that will no longer avail us, at least with regard to the Morattas, whom (as we are told) nothing will divert from their Intention of entering this Province, but our sending a Force to assist them in reducing Mysore.

The Committee think therefore they can no longer delay taking under their most serious Consideration the Measures necessary to be pursued in this critical Juncture; and although Our Sentiments thereon should not be conformable to the Orders We may hereafter receive, Yet we can never be accused of rashly adopting Measures without having first fully explained all Circumstances to the Court of Directors and waited their Orders as long as possible consistently with the safety of the Carnatic and the Security of the Company's Possessions.

The better to enable the Committee to determine on this important Subject, it is necessary to state in brief the present Situation of the Morattas, Hyder ally, the Nabob and Ourselves.

The Morattas have now been engaged in a

continued War of two Years with Hyder Ally, and have shewn a determined Resolution to destroy him, and annex the Mysore Dominions to their present Possessions. The Mysore Country is already impoverished and depopulated, and all but the principal Forts have fallen into the Hands of the Morattas. The Nabob assures us that they have cut off all Communication with the Biddenore Country, from whence Hyder used to draw his Supplies and as he is unable to oppose them in the Field he can have nothing to depend on but the Provisions laid up in his Principal Forts, which must of Course be greatly exhausted. The Morattas have published their Intentions of invading the Carnatic and have actually advanced to the Borders and some Straggling Parties have plundered Caliapauk. The Nabob is of Opinion they will certainly enter the Provence as soon as the Season shall favor them which will be about the Beginning of January when the Crops are on the Ground, from which time they will have till the Latter End of April to ravage and lay waste, even should they propose returning into their own Country this Season. By late Advices We learn that Narrain Row with a Body of 20,000 Horse was on his March to join them, and whether they be intended to reinforce the Troops now in the Balaghaut, or to relieve some of those who have been long on Service, such a Body of fresh Troops will be a great Addition to their Strength.

With Respect to the Nabob he seems as well he may, to be under great Apprehensions of the Consequences of their entering the Provence, and declares that as the Country will be entirely ruined, the Army will have nothing to subsist on but the Grain in the Forts. That it will be utterly out of his Power to furnish any money

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Money for the Expences of the Troops beyond what now due from him for the Current Charges amounting to about four Lacks of Pagodas.—

"With Regard to Ourselves We have not the Means of providing Supplies for the Army or of procuring Money for our current Expences, but by the Assistance of the Nabob. The whole Revenues and Resources of the Carnatic are in his Hands, and when the Country is ravaged and Destroyed they must of Course fail.

This being the present State of affairs it remains to be considered what Measures appear the most eligible for the Security of the Carnatic and the Company's Possessions in it and for this end there appear but three Modes to be pursued.—

1st. "Either to join the Marattas which may for the present prevent their entering the Provence, or

2dly To join Hyder Aly, provided he can furnish Money for the Expences of the Army, and can procure sufficient Supplies of Provision for their Subsistence, or

3dly To collect together a Body of Troops in some central Position, where they may best oppose the Enemy either by Detachments or otherways and be enabled to cut off the Supplies from the Maratta Army.—

"With respect to the first Proposition of joining the Marattas, it might here appear needless after having so fully and clearly expressed our Sentiments on the Subject in many Parts of our Proceedings and in our Letters to the Court of Directors, to enter into a fresh Discussion thereof, it might suffice to declare that our Sentiments continue invariably the same. Nevertheless the Committee think it necessary now to recite the Reasons and "Motives which have weighed with them against such a "Measure, that the whole

may

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may appear at one View and which will come properly under the following Heads.

1st. The Orders of the Company

2dly Our Treaties and Engagements with Hyder Ally

3dly The Opinion of the other Presidencies, and

4thly The Dangers and fatal Consequences to be apprehended from such a Measure.

Although We have not yet had any answer from our Constituents to our repeated Representations of the Embarrassments We labor under for want of their clear and precise Instructions, with Respect to our Conduct in the present critical Situation of affairs, Yet it is evident from the whole Spirit of their Orders to this and the other Presidencies for some Years past, that they look upon the growing Power of the Morattas with Jealousy and apprehension and that they esteem it a very dangerous System to lend them any Assistance to reduce or weaken the few remaining Powers of India capable of opposing their ambitious Views which evidently tend to the Conquest of all Indostan. In these Sentiments, We have repeatedly expressed our clear and hearty Concurrence. We cannot therefore suppose that the Orders We may receive will be contradictory to or inconsistent with them; especially when it will appear to the Court of Directors from our late Advices that there is every Day fresh Cause to be apprehensive of the growing Power of the Morattas, by reason of the Advantages they have acquired in the Northern Provinces and the Superiority they have gained over Hyder Ally.

We come now to the 2d Consideration which hath weighed with us in refusing to assist the Morattas Viz. Our Treaty and Engagements with Hyder Ally: — In

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In the Article of the treaty with Hyder ally respecting the assistance to be afforded to either Party it is provided nevertheless that if the Party requiring such assistance shall have been the Aggressor, the other Party shall not be obliged to furnish any aid. This Clause was inserted, as We expected that he might by Acts of Hostility bring a War upon himself, and We should then stand excused from assisting him without a Breach of our Engagements, in Case We found it inconsistent with the Interests of the Company, or inconvenient to our affairs to afford him any Support. We will not pretend to say that the attack made on him by the Marattas was occasioned by the Steps he took after the Conclusion of the Peace in 1769, which however were sufficient to give Umbrage. We believe that their Attempts to subdue him would have been equally the same, had he refrained from whatever might be construed an Aggression against them. He had not discharged the Sum he had agreed to pay them upon a Compromise with them in 1767 his Military and Enterprizing Genius made him a dangerous Neighbour to them and such a one as might, if suffered to acquire more Strength, most effectually oppose their Plan of Conquest in the South. These were Motives sufficient to draw on him the Maratta War which has oppressed him now more than two Years. Nevertheless as his Conduct towards his Neighbours in levying Contributions on them, and even not sparing some Districts belonging to the Marattas, or under their Protection may without forcing the Sense be construed an Aggression in Respect to them: The Clause in the Treaty so furnishes us with a just Plea to decline assisting him. But although We thus stand excused from complying with his Requisitions for

that We could not without a manifest Breach of the Treaty
assist his Enemies, and we have declared to him, that although
many Circumstances have prevented our uniting with him,
yet that he may be assured We will not take Part with the
Marattas against him.

We next proceed to the third Consideration
against assisting the Marattas Viz^t. The Opinion of the
other Presidencies.

The very valuable and extensive Possessions
which the Company enjoy in Bengall together with the
Advantage Derived from their Trade on the Malabar Coast,
are certainly Objects which demand our most earnest
Attention to the Security and Permanency of which We
ought to pay the greatest Regard in all Our Engagements.
The Nabob is desirous of assisting the Marattas and is supported
by the Kings Minister, his not under any compulsion or
Restraint from Us, and is at Liberty to pursue such Steps as
he shall judge most conducive to his own Interest. But
if his Plans and Measures are opposite to the System
recommended by the Company, shall We suffer Ourselves to
be dragged into them contrary to our Judgment and contrary
to every Warrant of our Constituents? It was from an
earnest Desire that the three Presidencies might act
upon one uniform Plan, and that no Measures might
be adopted at one Presidency which should any Ways
clash with the Interests or Views of the Others, that We have
constantly communicated to the Gentlemen at Bengall
and Bombay our Ideas and Opinion on the State of affairs,
and there is no Point which has been more attentively
discussed by the several Presidencies than that now before
us, and no one in which We have more clearly and expressly

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expressly concurred in Opinion — We could therefore never be justified in an Alliance with the Morattas in direct Opposition to the Sentiments of the other Presidencies, and after a clear and manifest Conviction of the Danger of such a Measure. It has been the constant and uniform tenor of the Company's Recommendation to this, and the other Presidencies to be mutually assisting to each other and to concert Measures for that Purpose and they expressly tell us that Bengall is the Object of their greatest Attention and that this Presidency is only valuable as a Barrier to it. We have in former Minutes referred to the many Passages in the late Letters from the Court of Directors which express their Sense of the Power of the Morattas, the Danger of raising that Power, and the Expediency of supporting the Power of Mysore as a Barrier against it in the South; We refer to them again. Vizt.

Vide Sep. Gen. Let. 16th Mar. 1769 Par. 25: Letter to Bl. Bombay 17th Mar. 1769 Par 253.

Extracts of Letters from the Honble the Court of Directors.—

Separate General Letter 25th. March 1768

Par 45. The Morattas instead of being reduced, are like to be aggrandized by the Conquests of the Mysore Dominions which brings them so much nearer to the Carnatic, the Soubah's Weakness and Indigina Sum beyond all Relief, and Hyder Ally is less formidable to the Soubah and the Morattas are more likely to be an Enemy to Us, and to embrace every Opportunity of disturbing the Carnatic.

General Letter 13 May 1768

Par 7 It is with the utmost Concern We find that the Victory you have gained tends to involve Us still farther in this Chaos of

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that you should still think your Enemy so formidable as to call in Foreign Assistance, though you have a moral Certainty, that the Attack of the Soubah's Dominions from Bengall must oblige him to a precipitate March to his Capital, and though the Mysore Dominions and Hyder ally's Possessions on the Malabar Coast all lay exposed to your Attacks. That you should have Recourse to the Morattas for that Assistance is still more alarming, and from the Spirit of your Negotiations with Manderavv, and your wild Proposal to Bengall, of putting up one of Shaw Allum's Sons, We fear all the Barriers to the Maratta Power will be broken down, and that they will add the Decan and Mysore Dominions to their extensive Empire, and hasten that Event you designed to avert, We mean their Conquest of the whole

Par. 2. We Should have hoped that the Experience of what has passed in Bengall would have Suggested the proper Conduct to you, We mean when our Servants after the Battle of Buxar projected the Extirpation of Sujah Dowlah from his Dominions, and the giving them up to the King, Lord Clive soon discerned the King would have been unable to maintain them, and that it would have broken down the Strongest Barrier against the Morattas and the Northern Powers, and therefore wisely restored Sujah Dowlah to his Dominions, such too Should be your Conduct with Respect to the Nizam and Hyder ally, neither of whom is it our Interest Should be totally crushed.

Separate General Letter 17th March 1769.

Par. 3. In our Letter of the 25th March last, We gave You our Sentiments at large with Respect to the

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the Negotiations with the Soubah of the Decan and the Consequences apprehended from the Treaty You has entered into with him, and by our before mentioned Letter under Date the 13th May. We expressed the Dangers We apprehended from Your calling in the Morattas to your Assistance.

Par. 17. Your Proceedings of the 28th April still leave us reason to apprehend You may enter into Engagements with the Morattas for a Body of Horse which We think will have very fatal Consequences by harrassing and laying to waste your own Country as well as the Enemies, and We apprehend notwithstanding the vast Sum of Money they will cost, they will be of very little use, it not being probable they will expose themselves much for our Service, and when You have Occasion to disengage Yourselves from them, Disagreeables may arise of dangerous Consequences.

Letter to Select Committee 11th March 1769

Par. 4. Judge then our Anxiety at seeing a System adopted so repugnant to our Views as that of supporting Mahomed Ally in the Mysore Country. We repeat We shall not think ourselves secure, while We have a Subsidiary Army in that Country, nor till we see it given to some Power who may be an useful Ally should we ever have Occasion to call in the Assistance of a Country Power.

General Letter 30th June 1769

Par. 5. We must say that upon Principles of Policy We wish for a Peace with Hyder Naigue whenever it can be obtained upon the most moderate Terms, for our Policy is to avoid every thing that tends to the Increase of the Maratta Power, which is evidently the Misfortune of this War for

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the Proposers of new Provinces to be added to the Dominion of the Morattas already possessed of half the Mogul Empire.

Par. 6. Whether the Morattas have accepted or not of your Offer, certain it is, they will make the most use they can of the Embroils of others. it is by this Conduct they have arrived to their present Degree of Power, and our best Policy is to check their Growth by every Opportunity, or at least to avoid lending our own Force to their Aggrandizement, which We certainly do as often as We engage in Wars with the few remaining Chiefs of India, who are yet capable of coping with them.

7th. Nizam Alley and Hyder Naigue are two of those Chiefs, and it is our true Interest to preserve good Understanding with them.

Separate General Letter 23d. March 1770.

Par 12. The Morattas and Hyder you say were at War, and it undoubtedly was our Interest on many Accounts, to see the Power of the Morattas, if not of both the contending Parties weakened, but by no Means to interfere in the Dispute, Every Moratta that fell in the Contest might almost be considered as one of our Enemies slain. But you have diverted Hyder —

The Court are if possible still more explicit in their Orders to Bombay.

See Extracts sent us by the Select Committee there in their Letter of the 5th May 1771 from the Honble Company's Commands under date 30th June 1769 entered on the Minutes of this Committee 5th June last, in which they expressly say that the whole tenor of their Letters to the other Presidencies

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is to the same Effect — Accordingly in our Correspondence with them Considerations on the Subject of the Marattas it appears that they adhere to the System recommended by the Court of Directors and Bombay enters so heartily into their Ideas, that they are on the Eve of actually declaring on Terms of Peace alliance even in Opposition to the Marattas. Supposing then that we were even so well inclined to gratify the Rajah — to indulge his Revenge against Hyder Ally Cawn, and gain him the present favor of the Marattas by sending the Company's Forces to conquer for them the Mysore Country and establish their Power at our Door; how could we justify thereby opposing the Company's Forces of this Presidency by acting with the Marattas, to the Company's Forces of the Bombay Presidency that may be acting with Hyder Ally? for we have reason to believe from their last Letter of the 21st October that they will send him aid, if he supplies them with Money. 2 We are aware of the Answer, for it is already used by Persons of high Character — it is this — Orders from home can only be temporary and as times and Circumstances change so Measures and Systems ought to be changed. It is a sensible Observation and as a general Maxim We adopt it. Let us consider how it may be applied to the particular Case before us — 3 When this Presidency in the Year 1769 was on the very brink of Ruin for want of Money, and by that want was compelled to conclude a dishonorable Peace, strongly impressed with the Necessity of establishing some Resource in time of Danger and in failure of ordinary Supplies, We ventured to recommend to Bengall the making a prudent Reserve, and Bengall as strongly convinced as We, concurred in Opinion with us. Private or Personal Motives could not possibly have any Part in this Proposal — Safety to the Company's valuable

valuable Possessions was the sole Object — tis true we had no express Authority to make such a Proposal, but there were no Orders against it; and we surely had the general Authority implied in our Trust of doing the best in our Judgment for its Preservation in Cases unprovided for. Had We erred in Judgment, as the Intention was laudable, and on public Motives We should have thought it might have sufficed to say the Plan was not suitable to the Circumstances of the Company's Affairs at home, and therefore at all Risques must be laid aside. But we are not to expect such Gentleness. We are stigmatized for making a Peace to which we are compelled for want of Money to wage War. We are harshly censured for proposing Means to avoid such another — Disgrace or worse. This is the Language in which we were reprimanded. We are told that nothing but Infatuation could have produced a System of guarding against distant Evils abroad, by suffering the Company to sink under immediate Distress at home / the distant Evils were those of War with the French, the Marattas, or other powerfull Neighbours of which we are on constant Danger, the — immediate Distress at home, is the Necessity of paying a large specific Sum to our own Government, which ought to protect us, and a large dividend to the Proprietors of Stock who have their Capital at Stake — We are commanded to lay aside so destructive a Plan — to wit, that of guarding against Dangers abroad, by curtailing present advantages at home. And a positive Injunction is added in these Words — "That you do not at any time engage in Plans of so "important a Nature without our knowledge and "Concurrence, as it behoves you to concert with us only "such Systems as materially affect the very Existence of the

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"the Company"? — And after this — Shall we either deviate Ourselves, or concert with the other Presidencies a Deviation from a General System established for all of them? A System which does indeed most materially affect the very Existence of the Company? Forbid it Prudence!

We come now to the fourth and last Consideration against an Alliance with them. Viz.: The Dangers and Fatal Consequences to be apprehended from such a Measure.

We believe no one can doubt but the views of the Morattas evidently tend to the Subjection of all India; this has been manifested by their Conduct for some Years past, but more especially of late, and the Advantages they have gained over the Jauts and Rohillas, the obtaining Possession of the Person and Family of the Mogul, together with the Superiority they have acquired over Hyder Ally are Circumstances but too favorable to their ambitious Designs. Their Purposes would be answered in several ways if we could be prevailed on to lend the Company's Force to their Assistance; first it would ensure to them the Conquest of the Mysore Country, the principal Forts of which, without our Aid may yet hold out a long time, and put them to the Expence of a great Force to starve them out. If we join them they must see that neither Bengall or Bombay can oppose them, for they cannot think the Company's System so absurd as that one Presidency shall oppose another, but if we do not join them, they know that Bengall and Bombay too look upon them with jealous Eyes. If we once join them, we must not expect that our Labors will end with the Reduction of Mysore, We must follow them to the Conquest of Bidenore

and

and wherever they please to carry, or fight our Way back through them, and through a vast and desolate Country without Provisions and thus our Strength being wasted in making Conquest and acquiring Wealth and Strength for them. What shall afterwards give Protection to the Carnatic and the Company's Possessions under this Presidency. The Nabob will answer it in two Words, and the late Plenipotentiary would echo back his reply.

Maratta Faith - Maratta Faith! Of all the faithless Powers on Earth, the Maratta is most faithless, and shall We then submit our Necks to such a Yoke? Some Excuse may be made for the Nabob, but what shall be said for the late ~~~ Plenipotentiary, who, charged with the Honor of the Crown could nevertheless humble himself before the Musnud and ~ submit to become the Instrument of insulting Us. Wantonly insulting Us with the time when, the Place where and the manner how the Peace was made with Hyder. A Peace to which the want of Aid from his Bol compelled Us, and yet without a Blush could urge Us to comply with the Threats of a Maratta Chief, and at all Perils send the Company's Forces the British Forces to his aid! Such are the Honors the late ~~~ Plenipotentiary endeavored to acquire for the Crown of Great Britain! The Honor of humbling the East India Company before the Throne of Mahomed Ally Cawn. Hyder Ally was the Power in the South best able to withstand their efforts and oppose their Designs. The reduction of him they therefore looked upon as a necessary Step to their Views of Universal Conquest; and it is certain that were they once possessed of the Mysore Country, the Carnatic would be next exposed to their Ravages, by which means the Country must be ruined, and if We have not Money to pay our Troops and Provisions to subsist them, the Forts, must soon fall into their hands.

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This Decan has now but little Power of resistance, and would become an easy Prey to them, and they would then be enabled to bend their whole Force against the Northern Powers. These are the Consequences naturally to be expected from the Reduction of Mysore, and although the Nabob may flatter himself that a Junction with the Morattas to enable them to accomplish it, might for the present free himself from their Ravages; We are fully persuaded that such a Measure would in the End be productive of ruin to the Carnatic and the Company.

From all which Reasons and Considerations the Committee are clearly of Opinion that they ought not to enter into an Offensive Alliance with the Morattas, and that the Nabob should be acquainted that we never will engage in such a Measure, unless commanded to do so by the Court of Directors.

We come now to the second Proposition Viz.t To join Hyder ally provided he can furnish Money for the Expences of the Army and can procure Supplies of Provisions for their Subsistence.

We have in our Deliberations on this Subject repeatedly declared it as our Opinion, that the supporting of Hyder Ally, that is the Mysore Government as a Barrier to the Maratta Power would tend the most effectually to secure the Peace and Tranquility of this Province, and that in case the whole Power and Resources of the Carnatic were at our Command, such a System would be the most prudent and eligible. But while the Nabob not only objects to such a Measure, but urges the Propriety of joining the Morattas to subdue Mysore, and in which he has been supported by His Majesty's Ministers, it would be imprudent in the Company alone to undertake it, as not having the Means of carrying

it in Execution, and as it might cause the Separation of Interests which We ought as far as possible to avoid. We have annexed to the Proposition, the Condition of Hyders being able to furnish Money and Provisions, since without them it would be impossible to undertake any thing in his Support. With Regard to Money, We know not how far his abilities may extend, but as to Provisions We think it impossible he should be able to furnish such Supplies as would suffice for our army unaccustomed to the Hardships the Country Troops often suffer. We had proof enough of this in the late War. In this State of uncertainty, and considering the Nabobs utter Aversion to any Measures in Support of Hyder ally, We think We ought not to join him or make any Declaration in his favor; particularly as such a declaration would in fact be an open Declaration of Offensive War against the Morattas, which might endanger the Company's Charter. At last such has been the Doctrine of His Majesty's late Ministers. If We are attacked it will be necessary we should take Measures for our Defence, and whatever Steps shall appear expedient for that Purpose will be justifiable. Which brings us to the third and last Proposition Viz.t

To collect a Body of Troops in some central Position, where they may best protect the Country either by Detachments or otherways, and distress the Enemy by cutting off their Supplies.

We have frequently declared it as our Opinion that it is impossible for Infantry effectually to prevent the Ravages of Horse. In these Sentiments we still continue. We are nevertheless of Opinion that we ought to oppose them as far as We are able, and it is not impossible but but by vegorous and active Measures, some Advantage might be

be gained, or at least that the Enemy may be so distressed by having their Convoys intercepted as to be obliged to abandon the Province. Whereas were we to put the Troops into Garrison and suffer the Enemy to ravage and lay waste at Pleasure, our Resources and Provisions would be exhausted to no Purpose, and no one advantage could accrue. We are therefore of Opinion that General Smith should be instructed, after placing sufficient Garrisons in the Forts in the South, to hold the Remainder of the Army in readiness to march, that the Nabob be consulted with Regard to the most proper Station and the Supplies of Money and Provisions he can furnish. and as it will be necessary to prevent if possible Hyder Ally from making up Matters with the Morattas, which he will no Doubt do if he hath no Hopes of assistance from us, the Committee are of Opinion that a Letter should be wrote expressing our good Inclination towards him, but that we are at present unable for want of Orders from Europe to take any Measures; that those Orders are shortly expected, and that in the mean time he be desired to inform us what assistance of Money and Provisions We may expect from him in case the Orders we may receive should authorize us to join him.

Agreed that the foregoing Minutes be communicated to the Council.

The following Letters from Trumbuck Row and Morari Row to the Nabob which were intercepted yesterday inclosed in a Note from the Nabob were now read. No 170 from Trumbuk Row accusing the Nabob of making use of Evasions instead of sending assistance which is contrary to the old Friendship subsisting between the Nabob and Maudavow — That he Trumbukrow had understood from Morari Row that the Nabob was determined to join him to be revenged of Hyder — That Madaverow Sadasive had wrote him two months

 Fort St. George 5th. December 1771.

Months ago, that the Nabob and the President had solemnly promised that Assistance should certainly be sent in six Weeks; instead of which the Nabob had proceeded against Tanjore. That he had sent a Force to Succour the Place and proposing to mediate between the Rajah and the Nabob and then to unite in the Circars Affairs.

N°. 171 From Vizarat Row accusing the Nabob of not performing his Engagements, recommending the settling with Tanjore and joining in the Circars Business agreable to his Promise —

The Committee think it only necessary to observe on the above Letters, that without forcing an Inference it should seem from them as well as from other Letters and Advices from the Balaghaut that the Nabob has not contented himself with barely making Excuses for not complying with the Demands of the Morattas for Assistance, but that he has gone further — that he has actually promised it — and which he might be induced to do from three Motives — The first, that by promising to assist the Morattas in the Reduction of Mysore, in which they would acquire great Advantages, he hoped to prevail on them to defer their Demand on him for Chouth — Secondly as he hoped to annex to his Possessions the Baramahal Country &c. which appeared by the Letters he lately received from Trimbeckrow had been promised him as a Jaghire. And thirdly to gratify his Revenge, as is expressed in Trimbeck Rows Letter. The Nabob it is true well knew how averse We have constantly been to such a Measure, but he has all along entertained hopes that either by the Influence of His Majesty's Ministers, or

the

294 Fort St. George 5th December 1771.

this Distresses to which he might be able to expose us, he should compel us to adopt his Plans.

Jon. Du Bré

Warren Hastings.

Sam. Treveley

295. Fort St. George 10th December 1771.

Dispatched the following Letters to Bengall and Bombay
the first Pr. Tapall the other Via Anjengo.

To the Honble John Cartier Esqr.
President and Governor &c. Gentlemen
of the Select Committee at Fort William

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter to Bengale advising of the motions of the Morattas and desiring assistance of Money.

Our Advices for some time past have given us Cause to apprehend that the Designs of the Morattas were to invade this Province with a View of compelling us into a Junction with them against Mysore: and we now think it necessary to acquaint you that the main Body of their Army is already on this Side the Passes, and considerable Detachments have been made into the Baramahel Country which lies also on this Side, and belongs to Hyder Ally — Straggling Parties have actually entered this Province and plundered some Villages, but their actions have been disavowed by the Moratta Vaqueel at this Place, and they have retired out of the Country, carrying with them their Plunder We also learn that a Reinforcement of 20,000 Horse under the Command of Narrain Row is on the March from Poonah: and we have all Reason to believe that a very formidable Invasion will be made on this Province.

The Morattas still persist as we have before advised you, in demanding the assistance of the Company's Forces against Hyder Ally, and we persist in refusing them. — The Nabob, who, supported by Sir John Lindsay, urged us in the warmest Manner to unite with the Morattas, finding us determined against such a Measure ceases to press us so violently but still retains the same Sentiments.

Hearing

Fort St. George 10th December 1771.

Having wrote in the Strongest Manner on this Subject to the Court of Directors in every Letter from January 1770 to the Despatch of the Lapwing in October 1770 without receiving a Word of Reply to this time, We cannot doubt but that the advices expected by the Lord Holland will bring Us decisive Instructions. Our present Resolution therefore is to hold ourselves in Readiness, but to take no Hostile Step, unless the Carnatic shall be attacked, untill We receive Instructions.

We have already said that We expect the Carnatic will be Strongly invaded, in that Case our Army must take the Field - Our Expences will be great, our Means inadequate - but we have no Choice - That Nabob tells Us that if the Province is invaded he shall not be able to supply Us with Money - We cannot therefore place any Dependance on Him - Our own Resources such as We can depend on will not extend beyond the Expences of four or five Months - We beg therefore to be informed whether you can give us any, and what Assistance in Specie; for we do not think We shall be able to negotiate Bills on your Presidency for any ~~~ considerable Amount. We are apprehensive that this may be distressing to you; but as our Exigencies will probably be very great, We doubt not but you will assist Us all in your Power.

We are
Honble Sir & Sirs
Your most obedient humble Servants
Josias Du Pre & Committee

Fort St. George
10th December 1771

To the Honble William Hornby Esqr.
President and Governor &c. Gentlemen of
the Select Committee at Bombay

Honble Sir & Sirs

A

Letter to Bombay.

A Duplicate of our Letter of the 27th November now waits on you.

Since the Date of our abovementioned Advices the main Body of the Morattas under Trimbeck Row has advanced on this Side the Passes and considerable Detachments have been made into the Baramahul Country, which also lies on this Side and belongs to Hyder Ally — Straggling Parties have also entered this Province and plundered some Villages; but their Actions have been disavowed by the Moratta Vaiquil at this Place, and they have retired out of the Country carrying their Plunder with them. We also learn that a Reinforcement of 20,000 Horse under the Command of Narrain Row is on the March from Poonah, and we have all Reason to believe that a very formidable Invasion will be made on this Province.

The Morattas still persist as we have before advised You in demanding the Assistance of the Company's Forces against Hyder Ally. The Nabob who supported by Sir John Lindsay, urges us in the warmest Manner to unite with the Morattas finding us determined against such a Measure ceases to press us so violently, but still retains the same Sentiments — Having wrote in the Strongest and clearest Manner on this Subject to the Court of Directors, in every Letter from January 1770 to the Dispatch of the Latevia in October 1770 without receiving a word of Reply to this time, We cannot doubt but that the Advices expected by the Lord Holland will bring us decisive Instructions. Our Resolution therefore is to hold ourselves in Readiness but to take no hostile Step, unless the Carnatic shall be attacked, until We receive Instructions — We shall not fail giving You the most early Advice of the Measures We may adopt not doubting but you will co-operate with Us as far as you may)

Fort St. George 10th December 1771.

may be able.

I We are
I Honble Sir & Sirs
Your most obedt Hble Servants
Josias Du Pre & Committee

Fort St. George
10th December 1770.

To Peter Amyatt Wrench Esqr.
Chief & the Factors at Anjengo

Gentlemen

Letter to Anjengo

The accompanying Packet for the Select Committee at Bombay, We request you will forward with all possible Expedition.

I We are
Gentlemen
Your most obedt Hble Servants
Josias Du Pre & Committee

Fort St. George
10th December 1771.

Wednesday 11th December

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pré Esqr. Governor President
& Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley

Letter from Tyab Ally Cawn received the 6th Instant read as entered in Country Correspondence N.° 174 advising of his having met of Regard to his Friendship and Engagements to the Company peremptorily refused the pressing Solicitations of the Morattas to join in an Invasion of the Carnatic Payenghaut towards which they had advanced that he had dispatched 5000 Horse to watch their Motions, recommending that Detachments be posted at the Passes of Changama and Amboor to prevent their entering the Country, and that the Inhabitants be directed to secure their Cattle and Effects in the Woods & Forts.

Fort St. George 11th Decr 1771

The President also lays before the Committee the following Intelligence received Yesterday from the Nabob

Purport of the Advice from the Balaghaut to the Nabob — Dated the 7th December 1771

Advice from the Balaghaut of the Proposals made by Hyder to join the Mharattas in an Invasion of the Carnatic.

Hyders Vacquil applied to Triumbeckrow and after Delivering his Master's Letter to him told him by his Master's Order that if he would make Peace with his Master before he enters the Payen Ghaut, he was willing to send an Assistance of a Force along with Macktoom Nauck to enable him (the said Triumbeckrow) to take Possession of all the Arcott Forts, and to commonit hostilities as far as Madras, he told the same thing to Morare, but Triumbeckrow answered, that as his Master did not hearken to him before, he had no occasion to talk about it at present and he added that if he was unable to do what he talks of, he will then ask for his Assistance. On this, the said Vackel got one Gadavabut to speak to Triumbeckrow that the Nabob always made an Excuse to send his Assistance, saying that the Europeans were not under his Direction, if so, how come they to fight the Tanjorians according to His Direction? which Triumbeckrow communicated to Morrari Row who spoke in Favor of the Nabob, that it was not a right to comply with Hyders Request but it was better to be in Peace and Friendship with the Nabob, as it will be impossible for Hyder to cope against the European Force; Triumbeckrow answerd him to endeavor to send for the Nabob soon to join him, Morari replied that by the time the Army arrives at Kistnaghurry the Vackeel and the Assistance from the Nabob will join him, Morari seeing me and the Company's Servant, told us the same and

and said that I should write to the Nabob to act in such Manner, that what he Spoke to Triumbeckrow may stand good, that the Nabobs Country may be saved from Plunder and that the Vackeel may soon come to the Army, while it may remain at Trenamel that the Assistance may be sent for from the Nabob, It seems the Intention of the Morattas is to forme a Design against Amboor and Santgada as they gained Intelligence that there are no more than 500 Men in each Fort, and a few Men in Mallapady – a Maratta Sardar from Poonah is arrived with 10000 Horse at Chitraguel, and has been wrote to by Triumbeckrow to take that Poligar's Forces with him and proceed towards Siddenore, Triumbeckrow has also wrote to the different Poligars to join him with their Forces, and acquainted them that he is making preparations of War. –

The Pindary Horsemen that plundered Calasavauck arrived in the Army on the 4th and sold some Cloth in the Bazar upon which Triumbeckrow took away the Bales of Cloth they brought, punished, and imprisoned them, some Pindaries sold Cloth in Morari's Camp who used them in the same Manner, and tis true that a strict Order had been given for them not to plunder Arcott Country but now if the Nabob does not send his Answer soon, to the Letter he wrote to him, his Country will be disturbed more than what was already done by the Pindaries, and he added that it was better for the Nabob soon to send his Vackeel and the Answer;

Purport of the Advice from Cudapah annexed to the Nabob dated the 7th December 1771

Triumbeckrow

Fort St. George 11th. December 1771.

Trimbuckrow lay encampid at Kistnagery and is erecting Mourchas — Vamanrow is near Serunga-patnam — It is talkd that Morari comes to Vencataghury with 7000 Horse — That the Company's Circars as Jr. Orders from Madras sent Some Circars & a News Writer both to Vamanrow and apparaw's Camp, and that Tupoo Saib is arrivd at Bengaloor, to collect a Force and to attack Vamanrow by Night —

The Committee think it only necessary to remark that the foregoing Intelligence differs very widely from the Professions made by Hyder Alley in his abovementiond Letter — how far the one or the other may be depended on, it is impossible to say — the Committee however think that at all Events means should be tried to prevent an Accomodation between them, as a Junction against the Carnatic would probably be the Consequence, and the draft of the Letter to Hyder Alley being prepared, a Postscript is now addd thereto acknowledging the Receipt of his above-mentioned Letter, expressing our Satisfaction at his refusal to the Moratta Proposal, and assuring him, that we still retain the same favorable Sentiments towards him which we have frequently expressed — And resolved that the Same be communicated to the Board for their Approval.

The President lays before the Committee a Note from the Nabob accompanying a Translation of a Letter from Trimbuckrow to Mahaverow Sadasive the 3d. Instant as entered in Country Correspondence N. 777 advising of his having passed the Ghaut of Bodicotah with a Design of settling the Circars affairs in the Barhamall recommending that the Vacquil proceed to him with a

trusty

Fort St. George 11th December 1771

trusty Person from the Nabob, and that a Person be sent to the Nabob from Tiumbackrow, whose affairs will be settled to their mutual Advantage.

As the whole of this Business is now before the Board, Resolved that the above Letter be communicated to them.

Jos: Du Pré
Warren Hastings.
Sam Ledley

Fort St. George 14th December 1771

Saturday 14th December

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pré Esqr. Governor President
Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley

Read a Letter from the Nabob as entered in Country Correspondence No. 180 on the present State of affairs, and containing his Reasons for joining the Morattas.

As there are some Passages in the said Letter which require Explanation, independant of the Arguments urged by the Nabob in support of his Plan, the Committee think it proper to enter the said Letter on their Proceedings, with such Explanatory Remarks as appear necessary, and which is accordingly done as follows

Letter from the Nabob dated and received 13th December 1771

A. In my Letters some time ago I acquainted you particularly of the Force and Power with Mauderow Sadasheo as of the Morattas, and their promise appears by Minutes of Committee that in case We assist them in the 1st February 1771 he was punishing Hyder ally Cawn, they will deliver up the Country he had to offer, he declined to belonging to the Payen Ghaut, mention any thing untill We and shew us other Instances of their kindness.

Hitherto by our joint Scheme of informing them, that the whole Matter had been wrote to the Gentlemen in Europe and that Orders were expected from thence, We have pasted the

Remarks on the Letter from the Nabob dated the 13th Dec. 1771.

A. Tis true the Nabob has told to join or not join the Morattas.

Fort St. George 14th December 1784

the Same over in such Man-
ner that They have not thought
of entering into this Country
but have allways enquired
concerning their Request. Now
however considering the great
Length of time which it has
taken to receive the Letters from
Europe, they are come into the
Payen Ghaut Country, and
intend if assistance is granted
them, agreable to their Desire
to perform their former pro-
mise of kindness; but if not,
(suspecting the Same to proceed
from a Consideration of an
Engagement of Friendship to
Hyder Ally Cawn) they intend
to lay waste my Country.
Accordingly, whether it was
with a View of striking a
Terror, throughout the Country
or, that the Same was done,
through a Mistake of the
Pundaurams (from whichever
it proceeded) but immediately
on their passing on this Side
of the Ghauts, and making a
Motion in some of the Villages,
such as Calicpauk &c. the
Inhabitants of the Country on

whom its Cultivation depends
and who in this dry Season with
the Water from the Wells had
sowed a little Grain and were
waiting for the time of reaping
the same, greatly alarmed, fled
with their Women, Children,
and Cattle to Places of Safety, by
which the Grain so sowed has
suffered greatly - My Situation
is such, that out of the Collections
from the Country to the Company
may be paid, in lieu of the Current
Charges - to the Creditors, also,
may be given, and the Charges
of the Sipoys in my Service,
with my own necessary Expences
may likewise be carried on -
God forbid it should so happen,
but if nothing is received from
the Country, I have no Means
whatever, of supporting all these
Charges, and in Case of the Moratta
Army, coming into this Country
and their disturbances happening
therein, I do not think, that a
Single Village, will remain in
Quiet, nor the Inhabitants or
their Cattle, in safety - for the
Country, will in a very short
time, be laid waste, and cannot
recover

Fort St. George 16th December 1771

recover itself for a great length
of time, in which Case it will
be out of my Power to procure
either Grain or Money even
from any Part, or to send
Provisions from one Place to
another - In those Forts
indeed, where Grain has been
laid up in Store, in some
Sufficient for the People there,
for a term of six Months,
and in others still more,
Sufficient for the fighting
Men, in the Company's Army
- that is ready - but my
Apprehensions are, where
we are to get Grain, after the
Army, and the Garrisons, shall
have expended the above. I
understand from you, that the
Company themselves have no
Money. Should it be thought
that by joining with, and
the Assistance of, Hyder Ally
Cawn, their Ravages may be
stopt, the same is by no
means practicable, for, even
when the said Cawn was in
the Height of his Power he could
not stand against them, and
what can he do now that Cawn

is so much curtailed? what Motive can there be, to induce me to consent to my Country being ruined, and its Inhabitants plundered of Lacks by being at Enmity with the Morattas?

B. Their Chastizement by the Mode you propose does not appear to me, possible.

B When the President communicated to the Nabob the Opinion of the Board (See their Minutes of the 13th Instant) the Nabob said that since we were resolved not to join the Morattas his Country must be totally ruined for he was of Opinion that we could not prevent their plundering and burning, neither could we come up with them, for they would not fight us, which brought on the following Conversation.

Pr. I think so too

Nab. Then how can you think of making War with them?

Pr. I do not but if they make War on us, we must defend Ourselves.

Nab. Well, and how will you defend yourselves?

Pr. In the first Place all the Grain in the Country should be immediately secured in the Forts.

Nab. The foreign Grain has been laid in ever since July, there has been little Since.

Pr. What belongs to the Inhabitants should also be secured.

Nab. There is but little remaining, the Inhabitants have been living

Time. living on it, and is very near consumed by this time

Pr. So much the better, the Morattas will find nothing here to subsist on, how will they be able to obtain Supplies of Provisions

Nab. Oh! They have Lacks of Banyanes that bring them constant supplies, all the Country is open to them through Cuddapah quite to Poonah.

Pr. Then I think the Plan of Operation should be this Instead of harrassing our Troops as we did the last War and by which I think we could not prevent their plundering the Country, We should keep in their rear, and apply our whole attention and endeavor to cut off their Supplies, great Pains should be taken to obtain good and timely Information of their Convoys of Provisions, and as they must come through some of the Passes, We should endeavor to intercept them, I think this Plan may be attended with Success and though it will not prevent their ruining the Country this time, it may oblige them soon to retire from it.

Nab. You never can prevent them getting Supplies

G If this Plan indeed I G This Plan is for the three have repeatedly mentioned in Presidencies to form a general or Conversation, could be adopted Confederacy with the Powers who in some Measure, the Effentials are Jealous of the Morattas and For that purpose might be got attack them at once on all sides together; but in the present Bengal on the Side of Malva, Situation of affairs I think Bombay to march to Poonah and the entering into a War with this Presidency on the Seona side or

Fort St. George 14th Decamber 1771

thinn is begetting fresh Distur. or by assisting the other Presidencies.
banas in the Country and after
sustaining vast Cost, sacrificing
the Lives of many Europeans
and exerting ourselves herein
even for Years, it does not
appear to me possible, to extir-
pate them, — As I am in every
Sense the Company's first Friend
as they are my Benefactors and
the Protectors both of myself
and Country, and as the Tranqui
=lity of my Country, is the Means
of carrying on their Trade, I
have therefore, for the Informa-
tion of you, the Company's
Representative here, wrote this
plainly, in order that you may
advise me (whose good is includ
in that of the Company) of what
you may think to most beneficial
for the Tranquility and Prosperity
of the Country, the Safety of its
Inhabitants and the Company's
Trade — It is not with a View
of supporting the Morattas I
write this — My objects therein
are the Tranquility and Protection
of my Country (the Inhabitants
of which it is my Duty to take
Care of) and the Consideration
that

Fort St. George 14th December 1771

That in the present Situation of affairs, those Objects cannot be obtained, but by giving them assistance — Every Letter and every Intelligence I have received from the Morattas I have immediately sent to you — that you might be informed of its Contents — now likewise I send you enclosed the following Letters & Vizt from Mauderow Pundut Purdaund both to you and Me — a Translation of One from him to Maudhoojee Sattashee, and a Letter from Rajah & Burbur regarding the Situation of the People of this Country.

What can I say more.

The Committee think it unnecessary here to recapitulate the many Arguments and Reasons against acquiescing in the Plan recommended by the Nabob of joining the Morattas against Hyder Ally, it will be sufficient to return him an Answer requainting him that We can by no means impute the present Conduct of the Morattas to any Suspicions they have entertained that our Refusal to comply with their demands and Threats is in Consequence of our Engagements with Hyder Ally This is evinced by their Conduct in engaging in a Confederacy against this Province in 1768 when we were actually at War with Hyder Ally and which we have no doubt they would have carried into Execution had not Mr Sauvage been called off to reduce Tanjore. It will be also necessary to acquaint the Nabob that notwithstanding the Insult offered to this Government in demanding Assistance with Threats in case of Refusal, and which the Nabob stiles a Request, we are utterly averse to War, and are desirous of living in Peace with the Morattas; that We are determined not to commence Hostilities untill We are actually attacked, when We must defend Ourselves in the best Manner We are able. That the Orders of our Constituents, which must be our Guide, will not

Fort St. George 14th December 1771

not allow us to entertain a thought of assisting the Morattas — That these Orders can however only affect the Troops under our Command, that the Nabob is at Liberty to take such Measures as He shall judge best for the Security of his own Country, tho' We cannot avoid declaring as our Sense and clear Opinion that whatever Advantages he may promise to himself by gaining the present Favor of the Morattas in assisting them to reduce the Mysore Country that such a Measure will in the End be productive of certain and utter Ruin to this Province.

A Draught of a Letter to the Nabob to the foregoing Effect being prepared. Resolved that it be communicated to the Council for their Approbation.

Jno. Du Pré

Warren Hastings.

Sam. Sadley

312 Fort St. George 19th December 1771.

Received the following Letter & Copy pack from the Select Committee at Fort William

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr.
President & Gentlemen of the Select Committee
at Fort St. George

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter from Sel. Committee at Bengall advising that the Mogull had advanced only a few Cos beyond Furruckabad and that his slow Progress seems to be owing to Dissentions among the Maratta Chiefs.

We have been favored with your Letter under Date the 28th. September enclosing an Extract of one to you from the Select Committee at Bombay.

By the Cabul Dawks, his Majesty was encamped at Noby Gunge, some Distance beyond Furruckabad. The slow Progress he has made on the Prosecution of his Expedition seems to have been occasioned by the total want of Unanimity in the Maratta Councils. The Dissentions among their several Chiefs procrastinate their Plan of giving him assistance, and will probably prevent their undertaking any thing of Consequence, in the Course of the present favorable Season, at last nothing appears to us that can, at this time enable us to form any Opinion of their Intentions.

We are

Honble Sir & Sirs

Your most obed.t humble Servants

John Cartier
Saml. Middleton
Claud Russell.

Fort St. George
10th November 1771.

Thursday 19th Dec.r

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pré Esqr. Gov.r President
& Warren Hastings, Samuel Ateley

The

Fort St. George 19th December 1771.

The President acquaints the Committee that he this Morning waited on the Nabob to converse with him on the Subject of Money, and to request from him Copies of such Letters and Papers as might give the Committee any Insight into the Causes, Motives and Reasons for concluding the Treaty with Tanjour, and which appeared the more necessary, as the Delay which had already happened in this Business would have but a bad appearance - To which the Nabob replied that we should have had them before this time, but that he had been waiting for some Letters and Papers regarding the Subject, and that we should soon be furnished with the whole.

The Nabob then proceeded to express his Concern at the distressed State of his Country, and his apprehensions from the threatened Invasion of the Morattas - That in this Situation he thought it proper to consult the Admiral, who, he understood was not well pleased that he had not been advised with the present State of affairs - To which the President replied that he was also ordered by the Company to consult with the Admiral on all Occasions, where the Aid and Assistance of His Majesty's Squadron might be required - But that there was another Person here - The Nabob asked who? The President answered - His Majesty's Minister to the Princes of India, - regarding whom he had no Instructions - The Nabob Replied - I know but one - the Person mentioned to me in his Majesty's Letter, and it is necessary I should consult with him - To which the President replied - By all means Sir, take such Measures for the Peace and Security of your Country, as may appear to you proper - I must make the Company's Orders the Line of my Conduct. -

The Nabob proposes to consult Sir Robert Harland on the present State of affairs.

The

314 Fort St. George 19th December 1771.

Opinion of the Com: with Regard to the Expediency of the Squadron's appearing on the Malabar Coast, in Case of a Moratta Invasion

The Board having concurred in Opinion with the Committee with Regard to the Expediency of making every possible Preparation for our Defence in Case the Morattas should enter the Province, and the Committee being of Opinion that the appearance of his Majesty's Squadron on the Malabar Coast where the Morattas have several Ports and Ships, would greatly favor our Operations should we be compelled into Hostilities. It is proposed that a Letter be wrote to Rear Admiral Sir Robert Harland, acquainting him of our Situation of the Threats of the Morattas, and of our Sentiments with Regard to the Service the Squadron under his Command might be of, in Case we were obliged to have Recourse to Arms in our own Defence. Agreed therefore that a Draught of a Letter be prepared to that Effect to be laid before the Board for their Approbation.—

Jon. Duncan

Warren Hastings.

Sam. Sotheby

315 Fort St. George 21st December 1771.

Wrote the following Letter Pr. Tappall to Secret Committee at Fort William.

To the Honble John Carter Esqr.
President and Governor &c. Gentlemen of
the Select Committee at Fort William

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter to Sel. Comm. at Fort William advising of our Situation, of our advices from Bombay of our resolution to take no hostile step untill attacked. Desiring to be informed how far the other Powers may be brought to act against the Morattas, and that one of their Cutter Ships may touch here to convey our advices.

We wrote you last under date the 10th Instant a Duplicate of which comes enclosed. Since when we have been favored with your Letter of the 10th November.

In our abovementioned Letter We advised you of our apprehensions of an Invasion from the Morattas who had advanced on this Side the Passes of their Demand of assistance from the Company of the Nabob's Desire that We should unite with them, and of our Resolution not to commence Hostilities, but to make Preparations for our Defence. It is now necessary to acquaint you that the Demands of the Morattas for aid are more peremptory than before, and that Sir Robert Harland His Majesty's Plenipotentiary, who till this time had not publicly interfered in the Business hath espoused the Nabob's Cause in Favor of an alliance with them. A System so contrary to the Sentiments of the Court of Directors as well as to our own Judgment and so repugnant to the Plan which your Honor and the Presidency of Bombay seems to us to have adopted that We have declared to the Nabob our Resolution not to accede to his Proposition, and the Moratta demand, unless We shall receive the positive Commands of our Constituents to do so, which We can never expect, after they have so repeatedly and clearly expressed their apprehensions to this and the other Presidencies of the growing

Power

Power of the Morattas, and the Dangers of any Measures which may tend to increase it. In these Sentiments your Honor &c. have repeatedly expressed your hearty Concurrence; and the Gentlemen at Bombay are so fully convinced of the Propriety thereof, and of the Expediency of supporting Hyder Ally Cawn as a Barrier to the Morattas, that they have instructed Mr. Sibbald their Resident at Onore to learn from Hyder ally Cawn, whether he can and will Depositt a Sum of Money adequate to the Expence they may incur in affording him assistance. We have hitherto declined making any Declaration in favor of Hyder ally, as such a Declaration would in fact be a Declaration of War against the Morattas. In order however to keep up his Spirits and prevent his concluding a Peace with the Morattas We have desired he will inform us what Supplies of Money and Provisions he can furnish, should the Orders we expect soon to receive from Europe authorize us to assist him. It is nevertheless our present Resolution not to commence Hostilities against the Morattas unless they shall compel us to do so by an actual Invasion of the Carnatic.

From the foregoing Account of our Situation your Honor &c. will perceive that we cannot expect long to remain in Peace; and as it appears to us that a Diversion on your Part of India might favor our Operations against the Morattas, should We be attacked by them, We should be glad to be informed how far it might be practicable to encourage the Powers on your Neighbourhood to act against them. We do not mean by this to recommend to you any Measures which in your Judgment may be prejudicial to the Safety and Interest of this Company's Affairs under your management

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Powers who have lately suffered by the Encroachments of the Morattas, would readily embrace such an Opportunity of recovering their Possessions and Influence: and We are fully assured that your Honor &c. will exert every Means in your Power consistently with your own Security, for our Support. And for this Purpose We shall constantly advise you of every material Occurrence.

The Gentlemen at Bombay write us that they purpose dispatching the Deptford to fill up at this Place, but as it is uncertain when she may arrive, and as it is necessary in the present critical Situation of affairs that the Court of Directors should have the most early Intelligence of every Occurrence; the President and Council now address your Board to request that one of your Cutter Ships may be ordered to touch at this Place, to convey to this Company duplicates of our Advices as well as such further Intelligence as may be necessary for their Information.

We are
Honble Sir & Sirs.
Your most obed.t Hble Servants
Josias Du Pré &.c Committee

Fort St. George
21st. December 1771

Received this day the following advice from the Moratta Camp.t

Advice from the Moratta Camp. Dated 17th Dec.r 1771.

Advice from the Moratta Camp.t

On the 15th. Instant in the forenoon Trumbeck Row sent his Garrison to the Castle of Bujjingagada and the Moratta Flag was hoisted on the same, he got the late Killadar of Jagadavy, who is now with him to write to the Killadar of Kadore Gada situated 5 Cos to the north East of Jagadavy & summoning him to surrender, but the Killadar returned an answer

Answer signifying his Resolution to fight —

Trisumbuckrow received Letters from Madanow Sadasiva at Madras by a Camel setting forth that the Nabob had complained to him very much about his Troops plundering Calastaruck and some Villages about Trichinapoly and that while he the said Madanrow Sadasiva was negotiating for a Cessation it was not proper to ravage the Nabobs Country, upon which Trisumbuckrow and Morari having consulted together wrote to Balawantraw's Son upon that Head, and it is now talked in the Camp that they have determined to send Beeroy Appaiey with Orders to the said Balawantraw's Son to return and to draw near their Camp — Answers were sent to the said Madanrow Sadasiva by the Camel on the 16th as it is said to make the Nabob easy about what had passed and it's said also that they have also sent Letters to the Nabob upon the same Subject —

Appaiey Ram Vackeel to Hyder was ordered to return to his Master about settling some certain Points with him, the Vackeel sent his Baggage before him to Kistney Ivey and went to Morari's Camp on the 16th where I saw him, and on my entering into Conversation he spoke to me in the Manner following.

"Trisumbuck tried all he could to prevail on "my Master Hyder, either to join himself or to send his Son with a Force to bear Company and to act in Conjuncture with him, promising a favourable Issue of a Peace, but could not succeed, now he says he will be content only with his Forces under the Command of any his Sardars, I told him in plain terms that as Hyder was bound by an Oath in his Treaty with the English Company, he will on no

Fort St. George 21th. December 1771.

excepting that Point, Hyder might be prevailed on to join his Troops to assist him against his other Adversaries, on this Trumbuckraw related to me of Mahomed Ally Cawns faithless Behaviour towards him and of his Disappointment shewing his own Letters to me at the same time, and at length he desired me to return to Hyder, and try once more to settle it with him according to his Desire, but I have a strong Notion that Hyder will never agree to assist the Morattas in their intended Invasion against the Arcot Country. —

It seems the said Vackeel will leave the Camp in a day or two.

News was brought that Ebram Saib Killadar of Bungalore is dead — Trumbuckrow has sent a Camel to Seringa to bring him a true Account thereof — It rains here for three two days and the Army remains to this day on the Plains of Sagadavy. —

Thursday 26th. Dec.

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pré Esqr. Governor President
Warren Hastings Samuel Ardley

The President acquaints the Committee that notwithstanding the Nabob's Promise to discharge the amount of the Current Charges, due the 31st. October last & amounting to about four Lacks Pagodas, on the Receipt of some Bills which he expected from Tanjore, as recited in the Minutes of Consultation of 25th. November last, and notwithstanding He the President hath taken every Opportunity of pressing him on the Subject, by representing our great Distress for Money to defray our Current Expences, We received on the 24th. Instant a Message from the Nabob, purporting that he understood that the Creditors intended to apply to him for the right

eight Lacks of Rupees the amount of two years Tribute received from the Rajah of Tanjore, and which had been assigned over to them, and as such an Application would distress him extremely, he requested that the Board would not him allow him to deduct that Sum out of the four Lacks of Pagodas he had promised to pay the Company as abovementioned, or that in case he paid the four Lacks to the Company, that they would lend him two Lacks of Pagodas to enable him to satisfy the Demands of his Creditors. The President further informs the Committee that he therefore waited on the Nabob and after repeating to him our great Distress for Money, and assuring him that we had not a Pagoda either in our Treasury or Cash to defray the Charges which will be incurred at the End of this Month at this Place and the several Out Garrisons, he informed the Nabob that after the very earnest and repeated Representations that had been made to him on the Subject, he the President could not help expressing his Surprize at the Application now made by the Nabob which implied a Disbelief of the Presidents Assurances of our Distress for Money, and must necessarily involve us in many disagreable Altercations. The President then repeated his Representations to the Nabob, and called his Son Seyd Ali Mulok to bear witness of what he said, that our whole Dependance for our Current Charges and necessary Expenses was on the four Lacks of Pagodas which he the Nabob had promised to discharge; that the Company had been so distressed for Money that he the President had been obliged to advance 13,000 Pagodas to answer our immediate Wants, that if the Troops in the several Out Garisons were not paid, he the President could not be answerable for the Consequences; that it would be

321 Fort St. George 26th December 1771

provide for the Security of Fort St. George. That the Nabob then promised to send one Lack of Pagodas the next Day, and that the Nabob had accordingly sent Yesterday Pagodas 30000 and promised to send the remaining 20000 Pagodas in a Day or two. ⊙ ——

Jon. Duncan

Warren Hastings

Jam. Graeme

At Fort St. George 30th December 1771

Record'd Appoints the following Letter from Select Committee at Fort William

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr.
President &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee
at Fort St. George

Hon'ble Sir & Sirs

Letter from Sel. Committee at Bengal. Rise of the Moratta Chiefs intent to meet the King.

Yours Letter of the 5th Ultimo conveyed to us the agreeable Information of a Peace being concluded between the Nabob and the Rajahs of Tanjore, to the Satisfaction of all Parties, and we now congratulate you on the Occasion.

The King still retains Possession of his Encampment at Naby Gunge, and We have received Advice that one of the Moratta Chiefs with a large Detachment had set out from Delhi to meet him. How far this Junction will affect the present Tranquility, We know not, but there does not seem any immediate Disturbance to be apprehended from it.

We are
Hon'ble Sir & Sirs
Your most obedient Hble Servants
John Cartier
William Aldersey
Samuel Middleton

Fort St. George
6th December 1771

Monday
30th December
7 o'clock P.M.

At Committee Present
Josias Du Pré Esqr. Governor President
Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley

The Hon'ble Company's Snow Minerva arrived this Evening from Bengall with a Packet from the Hon'ble the

323 Fort St. George 30th. December 1771.

The Court of Directors received there Ships Lord Holland, the Same is now opened and is found to contain,

Letter from the Court of Directors to this Committee 10th. April 1771

Additional Do. 25th. Do. 1771

Copy of Letter from the Agents of the Nabob's Creditors 10th. Do. 1771

Packet from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors to this Committee 8th. May 1771

Agreed to meet tomorrow Morning to take the Same into Consideration.—

Jon. Duncan
Warren Hastings.
Sam. Stratton

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Tuesday 31st. December

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pré Esqr. Governor. President
& Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley.

The Committee now proceed to read and deliberate on the Advices received last Night from the Honble Court of Directors.

It is with the greatest Satisfaction the Committee observe the Approbation expressed by the Court of Directors, of our Conduct with Respect to the Morattas Hyder Ally, the Nabob, and His Majesty's Ministers, and the Confidence they are pleased to repose in our best Endeavors to secure and promote the Interests of the Company. As We are now furnished with the Orders of the Court of Directors which clearly evince their Disapprobation of our interfering in the Quarrels of the Country Powers; and earnestly recommend our confining our Views solely to the Defence of the Carnatic, and the Companys Possessions, the Committee are of Opinion that the Nabob should be made acquainted therewith, and with our fixed Resolution to observe the Line prescribed by our Superiors — And as We can no longer have a Pretext for declining to give the Morattas a plain and direct Answer to their Demands of Assistance, and as the delaying it can answer no good End, the Committee are of Opinion that a Letter should be wrote to Trevanduck Row an answer to those received from him as recited in the Minutes of Consultation of this Day, in which he should be informed, that having now received the Orders of the Company on which they earnestly desire to maintain Peace and Friendship with every one, and

325 Fort St. George 31st December 1771.

We cannot Send the Company's Troops to his Assistance, nor to the Assistance of any one else.

As the whole of our Procedings with Respect to the Morattas, Hyder Ally, the Nabob, and His Majesty's Minister are before the Board, Resolved that the Sentiments of the Company on these Subjects be communicated to the Council together with these Minutes. ——

Jon: Duncan

Warren Hastings.

Sam: Sydney

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Fort St. George 7th October 1771

Still continues with as much Inveteracy as ever.

We are

Honble Sir & Sirs

Your most obedient

Humble Servants

John Cartier

Sam.l Middleton

William Aldersey

Fort William

the 12th September 1771.

As We may expect to receive by the latter Ships the clear and precise Orders of the Court of Directors with respect to the Conduct they would wish us to observe towards the Morattas, it is unnecessary to enter further at present on this Subject. We are however well pleased that the Ideas of the Gentlemen at Bengall touching the Same, are entirely conformable to our own, as expressed in our Letter to them of the 27th June last.

Draught of a Letter to the Honble the Court of Directors to go by His Majestys Ship Stag, read and approved, and ordered to be wrote fair.

Wm. Aldersey

Warren Hastings.

Jam.s Hartley

234 Fort St. George 8th October 1771

The following Letter was this Day wrote to the Select Committee at Bombay, to go by His Majesty's Ship Dolphin.

To the Honble William Hornby Esqr.

President and Governor &c. Gentlemen

of the Select Committee at Bombay

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter to Sel. Comm. at Bombay. in Ans. to their Letter of 31st August on the Subject of the Morattas and advising of the Operations against Tanjore.

We take the Opportunity by His Majesty's Ship Dolphin to acknowledge the Receipt of your Favor of the 31st. August which reached us the 28th Ultimo. As We have all reasonable Hopes that the Latter Ships of the Season will bring us full Instructions on the Subject of the Morattas and Hyder Ally, We think it most advisable to let the Subject rest for the present.

We have lately been under the Necessity of having Recourse to Arms to enforce the Nabob's Demands on the Rajah of Tanjore — The Army under the Command of General Smith accordingly marched from the Plain of Trichinopoly on the 13th September towards Tanjore, on the 16th they arrived before Vellum a Strong Fort Situated about 6 Miles S.W. of Tanjore, which was taken Possession of by our Troops on the 20th the Garrison having abandoned it. On the 23d the Army moved and encamped before Tanjore, and We are in daily Expectation of hearing that Batteries are opened against the Place.

By the last Advices Hyder Ally remained in Seringapatam, and the Morattas were employed in ravaging the Country — Negotiations for Peace are carrying on, but we cannot say how they may end — We have Reason to hope that the Season is too far advanced for the Morattas to

235 Fort St. George 9th October 1771

the Carnatic, and that our Operations against Tanjore will not be interrupted by them.

We are

Honble Sir & Sirs

Your most obedient

Humble Servants

Josias Du Pre &c. Comm.

Fort St. George

8th October 1771.

At a Committee Present

Wednesday 9th October

Josias Du Pre Esqr. Govr. President

Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley.

Letter to the Honble Court of Directors to go by

His Majesty's Ship Stag read and Signed. Ordered that

the Packet be closed.

Jos: Du Pré

Warren Hastings.

Sam Ardley

236 Fort St. George 11th October 1771.

Wrote the following Letter to the Select Committee at Bengall —

To the Honble John Cartier Esqr.
President and Governor &c. Gentlemen
of the Select Committee at Fort William

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter to Sel. Comm. at Bengal —

Since our Letter of the 28th Ulto. Duplicate of which comes inclosed the Madras Merchant which arrived here the 5th Instant brought us your following Favors Viz. Duplicate of one of the 18th July (the Original of which has not been received) that of the 27th July & that of 12th Ultimo.

We are still in hopes that the latter Ships will bring us the clear and precise Orders of the Court of Directors with Respect to the Conduct they would wish us to observe towards the Marattas and Hyder Ally, in the meantime it is with great Satisfaction We observe that your Ideas on this Subject entirely conformable to those expressed in our Letter of the 27th June, and in which We still continue. —

On the 23d September our Army arrived before Tanjour, and broke Ground on the 29th On the first October the Enemy made a very vigorous Sally on the Covering Party but were drove back with considerable Loss — a Battery was opened against the Place on the 2d which in a great Measure silenced the Fire of the Enemy, and by the last Accounts from the Army which are dated the 5th affairs went on very well

Enclosed is a Letter from the Select Committee at Bombay under your Cover &c. — We are

Honble Sir & Sirs, Your most obedt. Hble Servants

Josias Du Pre & Committee

Fort St. George
11th October 1771. —

237 Fort St. George 12th. October 1771

Saturday 12th. October

At a Committee Present
Josias Du Pré Esqr. Govr. President
& Warren Hastings Samuel Ardley

Letter from Hyder Ally Cawn received as entered in Coventry Correspondence N.143 Setting forth the Designs of the Morattas to invade the Carnatic after they shall have established themselves in the Balaghaut and urging therefore the Expediency and Necessity of a firm Union with him to oppose them, as well from the Terms of the Treaty as from mutual Interest.

The President acquaints the Committee that the Vacquils had informed him that they were instructed by their Master to represent that their Master had no ill Will to the Nabob, but that he was desirous to be on the most friendly terms with him, and to engage in the mutual Support of each other against the Morattas as a Proof of which and of their Masters Desire of commencing a friendly Correspondence with him, they were charged with a Letter of Condolence to the Nabob on the death of the Begum. The President also acquaints the Committee that He communicated to the Nabob the Letter from Hyder Ally as also the Purport of what the Vacquils had represented respect. their Masters Desire of a Union with the Nabob; that the Nabob thereupon informed the President that it had been intimated to him that Hyder ally had proposed making an Offer to the Company of the Baramahal Country, with the Districts of Salem and Ahtoor, and twenty Lacks of Rupees for their Assistance and that if his Proposals were not accepted, the Vacquils had Instructions to apply to the French for aid, upon which the Nabob observed that the Offer proposed to be made by Hyder Ally to obtain the Company's Assistance appeared improper as their

Friendship