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310 Fort St. George 22d April 1771.

Extracts of Letters from the Honble the Court of Directors.

Seperate General Letter Dated 20th December 1765.

Par. 8. By the Reduction of the Rebel Usoff Cawn We have at length the Satisfaction to find the Nabob placed in safe & peaceable Possession of all the Provinces subject to his Government, and We have given you our Thoughts above of some of the Measures which appear necessary to check Attempts from without & to preserve Peace & Tranquility within. Another Object which should equally engage your Attention is the Conduct of the Nabob himself towards the Company. It has hitherto been his immediate & undoubted Interest to act in concert & close Alliance with us and as it is our fixed Intention to support him in his Government. We hope he will continue to think himself bound by the same Ties, for We expect little from any other Motives to depend on our Support to solicit our Friendship and unite with us in Measures for the common Benefit, nevertheless as Opinions are apt to change with Times & Circumstances and perhaps the Seeds of Ambition which have hitherto been choaked by Distresses of various Kinds may in Prosperity and Affluence revive and shoot into Growths not altogether compatible with the System we should approve it seems therefore very necessary that such a precautionary Plan should be adopted as may without giving the Nabob any reasonable Cause of Disgust or Complaint preserve to the Company such a Degree of Power and Influence in the Province as may make any Attempts to our Prejudice dangerous to him and consequently subject

Less

his Actions to correspond so far as may be necessary. He has hitherto desired, at least acquiesced with seeming approbation that Garisons of our Troops should be placed in his Forts it is not improbable that after having some Time enjoyed the Blessings of Peace he may forget his own Weakness and not seeing Danger immediately before him wish to have his Protectors removed that he may seem to figure in a higher Character in the Eyes of his Subjects & Neighbours. Should such an Event happen it may require some Address to avoid given him Disgust and at the same Time a Degree of Firmness to persist in your present Plan, but persist you must for we esta-blish it as a fundamental Point that the Company's Influence and real Power in the Province cannot be any Way so effectually maintained as by keeping the principal Forts in our Hands but this should be so managed as that he may always think they are as in Reality we mean they should be kept for him as Nabob of the Province and to that end amongst other Regulations let the comman-ding Officers be confined solely to the Duty of the Garrison & subjected to such Rules as that the Nabob may have no reasonable Cause of Complaint.

Separate General Letter dated 25th March 1768

Par 8: The entire Reliance of the Nabob on the Company for the Protection of the Carnatic, you are according to our former Orders by all prudent Steps en-deavor to effect, and We doubt not of your benefiting yourselves of his apparently favorable Disposition to that Measure. We are desirous of his embracing our Protection rather from his own Inclination than that he should

unwillingly

unwillingly be prevailed on by You to do it.

9. The Force of Arguments advanced for placing the Defence of the Country in our Hands, and discharging most of his Sepoys cannot from Experience admit of Controversy and the introducing that System is of the utmost Importance from your Conclusion, that twelve Battalions less would be sufficient for the Defence of the Carnatic against all Invaders than are now kept up by the Company & the Nabob and as it appears it would be the Means of establishing Peace & Tranquility, encreasing his Revenues and very considerably Diminishing his Expences.

10. We are very sensible that in a Matter of such Delicacy you will have many Difficulties to encounter from his Apprehension that his Reputation and Authority will be lessened by it, and the Obstacles which his Dependants will throw in your Way to excite his Suspicions & Jealousy. Such Impediments we depend on your cautious Management to remove and that you will with the Tenderness and good Grace the Nicety of the Case requires, engage him without Disgust & by Degrees to discharge the whole of his useless Rabble and to depend entirely on our Troops for the Defence & Security of his Possessions.

Separate General Letter dated 19th. March 1774.

Par 37. From the whole Tenor of your Proceedings and from the whole Course of the War, We perceive the many Disadvantages the Carnatic labors under from the Want of some Uniformity of System between the Nabob & the Company, with respect to the military

military Establishment and Operations. As the Defence of the Carnatic always rests on the Company In Case of an Invasion, so it is reasonable & proper that the Nabob should submit to be controuled by them, with Respect to the Number & disciplining the Troops.

We come now to consider the Reflections made by Sir John Lindsay on Our Conduct With respect to the Nabob & the Rajah of Tanjour.

We have already said & We repeat that We look upon the Rajah's Conduct in taking up Arms against the Maravar and Nalooty Man in the manner he has done as unjustifiable; But We must, at the same Time Declare it as our Opinion, that the Nabob's earnest Solicitations for our proceeding immediately against him, do not arise from any Regard to the Maravar or Nalooty Man: or from any Desire of obliging the Rajah to make them Satisfaction; but from the Hopes he has that when we have once taken up Arms, we may be led to persevere untill We have annexed Tanjour to his Possessions — This We say We believe to be one among other Motives that influence the Nabob's Conduct. We are fully justified in these Sentiments from the whole Tenor of the Nabob's Behaviour towards the Rajah since the Conclusion of the Treaty in 1762 with which the Nabob was much Dissatisfied at the Time and he has taken every Opportunity since of endeavoring to engage us in a Quarrel with the Rajah and it has required the utmost Attention of this Government to preserve even the Appear

Fort St. George 22d April 1771.

ance of Harmony between them. The Court of Directors have fully expressed their Sense of the Treaty & of the Nabob's unfavorable Disposition towards the Rajah in the following Passages of their Commands.

Separate General Letter 30th December 1763

Par. 2d

Your making a Peace between the Nabob and the Rajah of Tanjour was an event so much to be Desired that We cannot but be highly pleased with it especially as the Terms are not only agreeable and advantageous to both Parties, but as in all Probability a Rupture with that Prince would have engaged us in the Quarrel as an Ally to the former & when once the Flame was lighted up there is no knowing how it might spread at a Time too when the State of our Military Force was not in a Condition for undertaking a new War besides involving us in most heavy Expences the certain Consequence of Military Operations.

3d

Your Proceedings in the whole of this Negociation have been judicious and Mr. Du Pré has acquitted himself therein in a very able & satisfactory Manner.

4th

The twenty six Lacks of Rupees which have been recovered by the said Treaty and are in full for all Arrears Due to the Nabob from the King of Tanjour is in Fact an happy Acquisition to the Company as it is to be applied towards the Discharge of the Nabob's Debt.

Separate General Letter 26th April 1765.

We are Sorry to find the Nabob unreasonably opposing the Repairs which the King of Tanjour is Desirous of making to the Banks of the Cavery. If the Nabob saw his Interest in the same Light We do he should

&c

Fort St. George 22d April 1771.

be desirous above all things of maintaining Peace & Friendship with the King of Tanjore, content himself with what he now possesses and study the Means of establishing Order and maintaining Tranquility in his Government. It is certain that the Nabob's Existence as such Depends on the Strength of the Company. He is too Sensible not to feel this and will not we hope take any Steps that may bring on new Troubles without your Concurrence. It is necessary that a Respectful Decency should be observed in all your Negociations with him, but at the same Time it is just and proper that in such a Case as this you should shew a Firmness becoming the Power you represent. You have guaranteed the Treaty made in 1762 between him and the King and have therefore a Right to interfere in the Subjects of Contention that may arise between them, Though not immediately expressed in the Treaty. In the present Dispute it seems to us very reasonable that the King should have the Liberty of repairing the Banks of the Cavery so far as he has in former Times been allowed to do and even more if new encroachments of the River should require it, provided the Nabob sustains no Damage or Injury thereby, and so far you will do right to insist on. This Justice requires and considering the two Powers in a political Light we think it is for our Interests that each should be maintained in his proper Rights.

Separate General Letter 28th Dec. 1765

Par. 1st

We are well pleased to learn that you have at last made the Nabob sensible how much it is his Interest to maintain a Friendship and Harmony

with

with the King of Tanjour, whether he is sincere or not. In these Professions it is well that he seems so and it must be your Care to keep him in that Temper and prevent his Attempting any thing unjustly to the Rajah's Prejudice, the great Reluctance he has shewn to suffer the Banks of the Cavary and Annacut to be repaired is no favorable Proof of the Disposition he bears towards the Rajah's Government. The Improvement & Extension of our Commerce on the Coast (an Object we have greatly at heart) depends so much on the Peace of the Carnatic that it becomes a necessary part of our System to watch over and preserve its Tranquility. This being established as a fundamental Principle, you must endeavor to form your Conduct thereon, and prevent as much as you prudently can one Power from encroaching on another.

Separate General Letter 4th March 1767.

Par. 17. We are well pleased that the King of Tanjour has fulfilled his Engagements and that there subsists a friendly Intercourse and Correspondence betwixt you & him. You must lose no Opportunity of raising in him the Idea of a firm Dependance on our Friendship. You will not want Opportunities We apprehend of giving Proofs of your Impartiality, for We discover in many Instances a Want of Cordiality between him & the Nabob, amongst others of great Injuries the Trichinopoly Country was like to sustain by the Tanjorians breaking down a Stone Annacut which upon Enquiry was found to be of no Consequence. We fear the Nabob will even be seeking Pretences to provoke him in Order to draw you into the Quarrel

in

Fort St. George 22d. April 1771.

in Hopes of annexing some Part of the Tanjour Country to his own and the River Cavery will afford numberless Subjects; It would therefore be well worth your Endeavors to obtain as precise an Account as can be got of the ancient usages & Rights which were acknowledged by the Kings of Trichinopoly & Tanjour respectively, touching the Waters issuing from that River and thereby you may be enabled on good Grounds to mediate in such Disputes without injuring the Nabob or / to gratify his Passions / sacrificing the Rights of the King.

It is true the Honble Court have since in their Commands of Duke of Grafton urged the Reasonableness that the Rajah should bear a Proportion of the Expence of the late War, & that Measures should be taken to compel him; However, whatever may be the Nabob's Motives for thus pressing us to a Measure for which we are not prepared and at a Time when We are threatened with Dangers which our utmost Efforts will We fear be insufficient to avert, We are clearly of Opinion that the Proceedings of the Rajah against the Maravar & Nalcotty Man & his Conduct in withholding the Tribute due from him would fully authorize our calling him to a severe Account; and We should not defer taking Measures for that Purpose, if our Situation in other Respects warranted such an Expedition. But in the present State of Affairs when we are threatened by the Morattas in these Parts, and the Soubah instigated by Tahut Beg Cawn is watching an Opportunity of raising Disturbances in the Circars it would be the Height of Imprudence to suffer either the Nabob's Solicitations or the Taunts & Reflections of Sir John Lindsay

to

Fort St. George 22d. April 1773.

to Drag us into a Measure which appears to us to be attended with so many Difficulties & Dangers.

A Draft of an Answer to the above Letter being prepared It is agreed to meet again tomorrow Morning to read & consider the Same.

The Secretary acquaints the Board that Mr. Tennier Surgeon's Assistant at Chingleput has proposed to find the Sick at that Garrison with Cotts, Bedding, Cooking Medicines, and all other Necessaries, Europe Medicines excepted at the Rate of 6 fans. p. Day the Same as is allowed at the other Garrisons which is approved.

Mr. Tennier Surgeon's Assistant at Chingleput contracts for supplying the Sick at that Garrison

Wm. Du Pré
Warren Hastings

John Smith
Geo. Stratton
Henry Brooke
John Whitehill
Geo. Mackay

328 Fort St. George 22d. April 1771.

Came in the following Letter from Colonel Campbell.

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr.
President & Governor &ca. Council of
Fort St. George

Vellore 20th. April 1771

Honble Sir & Sirs

r from Coll. Camp-
regarding Defi-
ies of Officers in
Brigade

Agreeable to the General Orders of the 17th. transmitted by the Town Major — I must acquaint you that the Batts. of Sepoys require the following Number of Ensigns to compleat them — the European Battalions being both compleat except one Ensign removed by the above General Order from the 2d. Battn. to the Northward

1st. Battalion Sepoys requires to compleat — One Ensign
2d. do. Three Do. one
being removed by the above Genl. Orders to the Northward.
5 Batt. One Ensign
10 Do. One do.
11 Do. One Do.
12 Do. Two Do.

I have not nominated any particular Gentlemen to any Corps as those appointed to the 2d. Brigade are not at all known to me — I must beg to assure Your Honor &ca. that I have never yet appointed an Officer to any particular Corps but with a View to the Good of the Service — and had I thought the Board expected that an Officer entrusted & honored with the Command of a Brigade of Troops, should trouble them with a Recommendation for the Appointment of an Ensign to any Battn. I should hardly have been so long remiss.

I always made it my Business to

send

Fort St. George 22d. April 1771.

send to the President a Monthly List of Officers belonging to each Corps of the 2d Brigade with a Column for the Number wanted to compleat. I am with Respect

Honble Sir & Sirs

your most obedient & most humt Servant,

Donald Campbell

At a Consultation, Present

Josias DuPré Esqr. Governor President

Warren Hastings Samuel Ardley

Tuesday 23d. April } John Smith, George Stratton

Henry Brooke, ———————

John Whitehill, George Mackay

Mr. Brackenbury indisposed

Draft of Letter to Sir John Lindsay approved

The Board having met pursuant to the Resolution of yesterday proceed to read and consider the Draft of the Letter proposed to be wrote to Sir John Lindsay, & having with the utmost Attention revised the same; it is approved as entered in the Subsequent Diary and ordered to be wrote fair.

Letter to the Nabob on the State of Affairs and his Proposal of assisting the Morattas approved.

The Draft of the Letter to the Nabob which was on the 15th Instant ordered to be sent round for the Perusal of the Several Members, is now read and approved and ordered to be translated.

Geo. Mackay

Jos. DuPré

Warren Hastings.

John Smith

Geo. Stratton

Henry Brooke

John Whitehill

330 Fort St George 25th April 1771 —

Dispatched the following Letters.

To Colonel Donald Campbell
Commanding at Vellour

Sir

We have appointed Mr Innes to be one of
the Surgeons at Vellour but he is Directed to continue at
Trichinopoly while the Troops remain in the South.

We have also appointed Mr Peters Surgeon
to proceed to Vellour to attend the Barrack & Regimental
Duty of the Garison

Mr Binny Surgeon's Mate is also
appointed to proceed to Vellour

We are Sir

Your most obedt Servants

Fort St George
25th April 1771.

To Du Pré
&c Council

To Lieutenant Colonel Lang
commanding at Trichinopoly

Sir

We have appointed Mr Lucas to be
one of the Surgeons at Vellour, but he is not to proceed to
that Place, until further Orders, when he is to be relieved
by Mr Davis who is appointed one of the Surgeons at
Trichinopoly in his Room. For the mean time Mr
Lucas will continue at Trichinopoly & Mr Davis to
attend the Vellour Detachment.

We have also appointed Mr Turing to be
a Surgeon at Trichinopoly to attend the Barrack & Regi-
mental Duty —

Mr

Fort St. George — 25th. April 1771 —

Mr. Duffin having on the 8th. Instant been appointed a Surgeon & ordered to relieve Mr. Peters in the Garrison of Madura you will be pleased to give him Instructions to proceed thither for that Purpose —

We are Sir

your most obedient Servants

Fort St. George
25th. April 1771.

Jos. Du Pré
&c Council

To Lieutenant Colonel Bonjour
Commanding at Madura
Sir

Letter to Coll. Bonjour advising of the Appointment of Mr. Duffin Surgeon at Madura.

We have appointed Mr. William Duffin to be Surgeon at Madura in the Room of Mr. Peters who is appointed to attend the Barrack & Regimental Duty at Villour to which Place you will order him to proceed on the Arrival of Mr. Duffin at Madura

We are Sir

your most obedient Servants

Fort St. George
25 April 1771.

Jos. Du Pré
&c Council

To Alexander Wynch Esq.
Chief at Masulipatam
Sir

Letter to Mr. Wynch advising of Mr. Kain's being appointed Surgeon at Ellore & Mr. Sinclair at Masulipatam.

Having appointed Mr. Kain to be one of the Surgeons at Ellore, he now proceeds accordingly. Mr. Sinclair is also appointed to be Surgeon at Masulipatam

We are Sir

your affectionate Friends

Fort St. George
25 April 1771

Jos. Du Pré
&c Council

J.

Fort St. George 25th. April 1771

To Captain George Browne
Commanding at Palamcotah

Sir

Mr. Whyte having on the 8th. Instant been appointed a Surgeon He is to remain and do Duty as such at Palamcotah.

We are Sir

Fort St. George
25 April 1771.

your most obedient Servants
Jon. Dall Pres.
&c Council

26th. The following Letter was this Day sent to Sir John Lindsay the Draft of which was approved in Consultation the 23d. Instant.

To Sir John Lindsay Knight of the Bath
His Majestys Minister Plenipotentiary
& Commander in Chief of His Majestys Ships
in India.

Sir

Letter to Sir John Lindsay in Answer to his on the Subject of an Alliance with the Maharattas & our Conduct with respect to the Nabob & the Rajah of Tanjour.

We have the honor to acknowledge the Receit of your Letter of the 19th Instant. in the first Paragraph you are pleased to say it is your Intention to work in the greatest Friendship and by no means to give the smallest Offence yet in almost every subsequent Paragraph you take Occasion under a Jumble Arrangement of Words to convey Sentiments & Fears manifestly intended to wound. We must take the Liberty to say they are unmerited but We confess we do not receive them unmoved for we are not yet arrived at that Degree of Apathy which makes no Distinction between intended Benefit and intended Injury. We shall beg Leave not to reply

reply to any parts of your Letter evidently Designed to irritate us because it is not our Intention in this Country to vindicate our Conduct — Proceed therefore Sir, as Offensive to Reproach Us are prepared to bear it all, since you tell us that it is done under the Sanction of The Character of His Majesty's Ministers: and the Time may come when the World will be enabled to judge whether your Conduct towards us arises from Zeal to Friendship or from partial Attachment to the Nabob, and Resentment against Us — and whether our Conduct proceeds from Perverseness or Folly, as must be inferred from your Letters, or from Necessity.

You are pleased also to tell Us you wish to have our Confidence and should be happy to give Us yours. We have in the Course of a long Correspondence given you the strongest Reasons why we cannot expose to you in Deliberation or otherwise all the State of the Company's Affairs: They are in brief, because your Powers were delegated to you secretly, and without the Knowledge of our Constituents & contrary to the Sense & Declaration of a General Court of Proprietors, and that We are consequently uninstructed on a Subject of so much Importance. We have said, & repeat that when that Obstacle shall be removed we will then act towards you with all Openness and Confidence and we have said and repeat that in the mean time we will do so in those Affairs which fall under your Consideration in the Character wherein you are known to our Employers and concerning which We are instructed. You inform Us nevertheless that you should be happy in giving Us your Confidence and

yet

yet from your Arrival here to this Time Negociations, Conferences and Business have been conducted between you and the Nabob Secretly and not a Tittle hath been communicated to Us by You of the Subject of those Negociations which if we may credit public Report tend to Deprive the Company of some of their Possessions. Publick Report tho' true is not sufficient Authority for a Decisive Judgment but as We have no means of obtaining a more precise Knowledge publick Report is sufficient to alarm and it would not be Strange if it Should cause Doubts whether the Secret Powers you brought out, were altogether intended for the Company's Benefit.

Passing over for the Reasons before given all those parts of your Letter which appear to Us to proceed from Resentment; the rest which is all We mean to reply to would come into a very narrow Compass if We could from the Words fix the precise and determine Sense, it may we think be clearly deduced and if We mistake not it is thus — By every Argument you enforce the Propriety and Advantage of entering into an offensive Alliance with the Morattas against Hyder Ally Cawn with whom we are engaged in a Defensive Alliance and yet you say you do not mean to give Us a positive Opinion of the Part We ought to take and that you do not take upon you to advise Us to assist the Morattas that is to say you urge, you press, you excite, you Stimulate — but you do not give an Opinion or advise. To a Proposition so indeterminate and seemingly contradictory, How Shall We reply? the most candid Way is to State it in every Different Mode of which it is capable and reply to each

Your

Fort St. George 25th April 1771

You say you never have been able to form what appears to you a reasonable Conjecture why the Offers of the Mahrattas have been treated with so much Contempt & Neglect and that the Carnatick should be exposed to their Depredations and the Company's Interests to Ruin & Distruction when advantageous Terms and very tempting Offers of Friendship have been so readily made — That a Time might come when the Company's Friendship being no longer wanted their Possessions &c would become a Prey to that Power whose Friendship they had despised — That the Friendship of the Marattas is preferable to War that they seem anxious to establish a Friendship with the English — That they have made consiederable Offers to obtain it; and perhaps now might be obtained if there was the least Appearance of an Inclination to pay any Attention to their proffered Friendship — That the Offers of the Marattas appear to you advantageous and that the Refusal of their Friendship will be next to a Declaration of War — That you do not advise us to assist the Marattas but you think their Friendship ought not to be despised.

Would it not be natural to conclude from these Passages that you really thought Peace & Friendship had been offered to us by the Marattas but that we rejected them? We know not upon what Grounds you form your Opinions or whether you have any Informations besides those which you receive from the Nabob & his Ministers European & Indian We know not whether the Nabob himself may not be deceived & credits the Intelligence of Spies placed upon us who knowing that the sure Way to obtain

obtain rewards is to give him Informations to the Prejudice of the Company's Servants scruple not to gratify him and serve themselves by Invention. However it be, the most favorable Opinion that can be formed of the Passages We have quoted is that you have been misinformed. permit us therefore to undeceive you by the formal Declaration which we now make that We never have Directly or Indirectly refused or rejected the Friendship of the Mahrattas but on the contrary that We have often Declared to the Nabob through whom all the Communication We have had With the Mahrattas has passed that Peace & Friendship with them was our earnest Desire. We have repeated these Sentiments in a personal Conference with their Vackeel, and by Letter to Mahadarow & we now make the same Declaration to you.

Having considered & answered the before quoted Passages as they simply Simply inactive Peace & Friendship with the Mahrattas We will beg Leave to consider them as they with the Addition of other Parts of your Letter imply an Offensive Alliance with them.

You say that at first you was anxious to suppose a Possibility of maintaining the Peace of the Carnatick by assisting neither (i.e. neither the Mahrattas nor Hyder) yet you could also foresee that good Policy would soon require a Part to be taken and that joining neither was by the Way either to obtain or to preserve Advantages & that the Time might come when the Company's Friendship (in this Place Synonimous with Offensive Alliance or Assistance) being no longer wanted their Possessions &c would become a Prey to that Power whose Friendship they had despised.

That

Fort St. George 25th April 1771.

That the Mahrattas have made very considerable Offers to obtain the Friendship of the English which you understand the Nabob has communicated to us — The Nabob having told us that the Mahrattas had made Offers for an offensive Alliance with us or for our Assistance against Hyder, Friendship here must again be understood as synonimous with offensive Alliance or Assistance you add that the Refusal of the Mahrattas Friendship will be next to a Declaration of War and should an inevitable War be the Consequence of assisting neither you ask which we think would be the most eligible Friend and which the most dangerous Enemy That if we Do not think ourselves in a Condition to assist / meaning as We must suppose the Mahrattas / with the Company's Forces or have any other Reasons for refusing them you think some other Expedient may be fallen upon and that is to give up to the Nabob the Troops under our Orders which he pays — and you again ask whether we can really think that it is in our Power to maintain Peace in the Carnatick and our Influence in India by assisting neither that however should the Situation of Affairs point out the Necessity of taking a Part and should a Destructive War be the Consequence of not embracing decisive Measures in time you think We should not be able to justify our Conduct.)

From all that you have said of the proffered Friendship of the Mahrattas considered with their additional Extracts We cannot understand your Meaning to be any other than a plain clear and Direct Proposition to us to enter into an offensive Alliance with the Mahrattas and to give them the Assistance of the Company's Forces to

subdue

 Fort St George 25th April 1771.

subdue Hyder Ally Cawn Because they have never made any Propositions to Us simply for Peace & Friendship but as We have always understood from the Natod (without whose as We have said before We have had no intercourse with the Mahrattas) that their Demands have been that the Company's Forces should join theirs for the Purposes above-mentioned in Consideration wherefor they would yield certain advantages and in a Conference our President and Mr. Hastings had with the Maratta Vackeel at the Natod's House (the Natod being present) the Maharatta Vackeel Declined to explain what Advantages the Mahrattas would give unless We would first declare Decitively that We would send our Forces to join them, Understanding your Proposals to be such as We have Stated, as such we proceed to answer it,

But first permit Us to apologize for the Liberty we shall take to quote your Sentiments Delivered at a private Conversation and to plead your Example in quoting in the Letter now before Us what our President said to you on the Subject of Gun Carriages which was also in a private Conversation.

We understand from our President & Mr. Hastings that in a Conversation which they had lately with you, you delivered it as your Opinion that the Company and of Course Their Representatives had no Right or Power from their Charters to commence Wars, or commit Hostilities and the Question being asked if it should so happen that the Company being Hostile Preparations against them and having Opportunity of giving a Decisive Blow to their supposed Enemy before he had actually committed Hostilities

whether

whether the Company could not, justify the taking such an Advantage you delivered it as your opinion that such a Step would be at their Peril as the Court might happen for that their Charter gave them no such Power. To this your Opinion permit Us to add that we have received Instructions very Lately from our Constituents strongly forbidding Us to enter into offensive Alliances & enjoining Us to avoid as far as in Us lies becoming Parties in any Disputes between the Powers of India. For which and many other cogent Reasons We have declined and do decline to engage the Company in an Offensive Alliance with the Mahrattas or to join any of the Company's Forces to theirs to attack Hyder Ally Cawn with whom this Presidency concluded a Treaty of Friendship and mutual Defence in the year 1769. It is not necessary to enquire here into the Cause or Expediency of making that Treaty nor as We conceive was it at all necessary to the Support of your Arguments / as tending to forward the public Service / to tell Us that Treaty which this Presidency thought proper to make was exceedingly Dishonorable, considering the Place where, the Time when, and the Manner how, and that it was not even expedient. We say Sir it does not appear to Us that you could propose to yourself any good to the Publick Service by thus upbraiding the Company's Servants upon a mere Opinion formed by the Rage of Party Zeal against the Company's Servants & which when candidly & dispassionately examined will be found to be so. This is not the Place to discuss the Point & We therefore decline it, but supposing the Treaty to be such as you state it the Treaty exists unless you have Power to break and dissolve it & have actually dissolved it. If you have such Powers & have exercised or intend to exercise them to that Purpose when you

shall think proper to signify to us what you shall have done We shall then have before us a Subject for our Consideration which We have not at present and shall then reply to it. But as nothing of this Kind hath yet been done or notified to us the Treaty with respect to us remains in Force, why We have not complied with the Terms by sending Assistance and not how to be explained, We trust that We have given sufficient Reasons to our Constituents to remove from Us the Imputation of Breach of Faith But what could remove from us that Imputation were We to direct Opposition to the Terms & Sense of the Treaty & contrary to your Sense of the Powers of our Charter to send a Force to attack that Power which by the Treaty we are engaged to defend Sept. you Sir & We have thought proper to entered Terms (which always wound more dangerously than direct Accusations because they mean whatever the Imagination of the Reader may suggest) to accuse Us of wanting that good Faith for which the English were ever so famous in India urge Us now by every Argument to the open Direct & publick Violation of that Faith. How shall we reconcile such Principles?

Having considered & answered your Proposition as it may be understood first to mean a mere Alliance of Peace & Friendship & Secondly as it has for its Object an Offensive Alliance and actual Junction of Force with the Mahrattas for the Purpose of attacking & subduing a Power whom We are under Engagements to Defend We proceed to consider the Alternative you propose, if we should not think ourselves in a Condition to assist the Mahrattas with the Company's Force or if We have any other Reasons for refusing them, which Alternative runs in the following

Words.

Fort St. George 25th. April 1775.

Words.

"That we suffer the Nabob to follow
"such Measures as he may think proper for the Peace and
"Tranquility of his Country and that those Troops under
"your Orders which he pays may be put under his Direc-
"tion for that Purpose.

To the first Part Viz.t "That We suffer
"the Nabob to follow such Measures as he shall think proper
"for the Peace & Tranquility of his Country" We say that
such a Proposition to Us hath no reasonable Foundation
and We least of all expected it from you, since it is apparent
that We have no power to controul the Nabob & that under
your Patronage & Sanction he hath withdrawn all Confidence
from the Company's Servants. Tho' he sometimes condescends
seemingly to consult Us merely by way of form or to draw
from Us Sentiments or Expressions to be laid before you.
However since you have thought proper to propose it to
Us, We answer to it without Reserve that We have not
restrained the Nabob, that We do not recollect that he ever
openly proposed or hinted to Us the Idea of acting separate
by from Us, except only in a Letter lately received from him
under Date the 7th Instant wherein he informs Us of the
Requisition of the Mahratta Vackil in the following Words
"The lately Person on the Part of the Mahratta is desirous of the
"Assistance of the Company's Troops & tells me in the Interim
"(before that is procured) to send my own Troops meaning there-
"by the seven Battalions of Sepoys in my Service, under your
"Charge, and my own Horse who are with me together with
"their military Stores".

The Nabob will no Doubt communicate

to

to you our Answer to him by which you will perceive that he is under no Restraint from Us that We refer it entirely to his own Judgement, to send his own Horse to the Mahrattas or not to send them as he shall think best, Desiring however that if he shall resolve to send them he will give Leave to the Company's Officers who are with them to rejoin the Company's Forces by which We Do not mean to Separate or withdraw the Company's Assistance from him as you will understand from the concluding Paragraph of our Address to him wherby We Declare it to be our firm Resolution to protect & Defend the Carnatick, his Person & Government to the utmost of our Power against all Invaders. Our meaning & Intention is plainly this; to avoid every Act that may engage the Company in an Offensive War or that may be construed an Act of Hostility contrary to your own Sense of the Powers granted to the Company by their Charter.

To the latter Part of your last mentioned Proposition Viz.t "That those Troops under our Orders "which the Nabob prays may be put under his Direction "&c.a" We reply that there are no Specifick Troops under our Orders which the Nabob prays. — Nevertheless as We think We understand what Troops you mean We shall explain that Subject & then reply to what We believe to be intended by your Proposition.

There Does not appear any written Agreement between the Nabob & this Government, concerning the Sepoys in Question but it appears that in the year 1765 It was represented by this Presidency to the Court of Directors that the Nabob desired that about

10000

1000 Sepoys might be continued in the Company's Service and that he would undertake to defray the Charges of such a Corps. The Court of Directors in answer thereto informed their President & Council that the Subject appeared to them to be of the greatest Importance, for altho' the Advantages immediately resulting were obvious Nevertheless they were apprehensive that Consequences dangerous tho remote might ensue if wise Precautions were not taken to prevent them that however upon the whole trusting that Prudence & Circumspection might guard against them they had resolved to comply with the Nabob's Desire. — Before We proceed it may not be improper to take Notice that it is nothing Strange that the Nabob should desire them that the Forces which were to defend the Carnatick should be under the Company's absolute Controul and should now wish to withdraw them. He then as he had for twenty years before relied solely on the Company for support concerted with their Representatives only the Measures proper for that Purpose and gave them the lead. But now that he hath apparently changed his System withdrawn his Confidence from Us and placed his Dependance immediately on the Crown. as it appears to Us. it is natural that he should wish to get the Forces also out of the Company's Hands. — But to return — The Court of Directors having resolved to comply with the Nabob's Desire but foreseeing great Dangers & Inconveniences therefrom in order to prevent them established certain, peremptory, clear and determinate Orders respecting the Establishment & Regulation of them. From the whole Tenor & Spirit of which Orders it is most clear that they utterly rejected the Idea

of

Fort St George 25th April 1771

of entertaining one Sepoy as the Nabobs, on the Contrary
every Precaution is taken to establish the whole Corps of
Sepoys as the Companys own proper Forces. accordingly
all the Sepoys entertained by the Company for the Protection
of the Carnatick and their own Possessions in it are raised
Cloathed, Officered, disciplined & paid alike, the British
Colours are alike born in every Battalion and there is not
the least Distinction between them. At first the Nabob
reimbursed at Times as was most convenient for him the
charge of about 10,000 Men after the War with Hyder Ally
Cawn he wished to have the whole disbanded, he was
however prevailed on to undertake the Reimbursement
of the Charge of about 7000 Men, and latterly a greater
Number of European Officers being added to them & the
Arrangement of the whole changed in some Respects
the Nabob after long Hesitation at length agreed to reim-
burse the Company the Charge of seven Battalions, but
the whole Number of Battalions the Company have in
their Service & Pay in the Carnatick is twelve, and the
Nabob is interested in the whole as 7 is to 12 but not
one individual Sepoy can be discriminated from the
rest as the Nabobs for they are all the Companys under
their own Separate and absolute Orders and to be employed
by them or their Representatives in the Defence & Protection
of the Carnatick and the Companys Possessions in it accor-
ding to their Judgement, and the Companys Servants are
equally responsible for the Acts of any Part of those Sepoys
as for the Acts of any other Part of the Companys Forces
our Answer therefore is clearly & determinately this, That
We have no Forces of the Nabobs under our Orders, but all

the

Fort St. George 25th April 1775.

the Forces We have under our Orders are the Company's and if the Nabob is not Satisfied to reimburse Us any Part of the Charge incurred in the Support of such a Military Establishment, to be employed according to our Judgement in the Protection & Defence of the Carnatick and the Company's Possessions in it's his Remedy is to Declare to Us that he will not & we Shall Thereupon take such Measures as under those Circumstances we Shall think most advisable. It is certain that such a Resolution on the Part of the Nabob would Distress Us. but yet even that Distress would be less than any other alternative that presents itself to Us. And our further Answer upon this Subject is that We cannot put any Part of the Company's Troops under the Nabob's Orders because We Should be equally liable for every Act they might commit as much as if they were committed by our own immediate Order, so that if We Should put any of the Company's Troops under the Orders of the Nabob & he Should join them to those Nabob has to make War upon a Power in Peace and Friendship with Us & whom by the Treaty We ought to assist & Defend, We should be as liable to the Consequences as if the Act were committed by ourselves, and according to your Construction of the Company's Charter We have no such Power.

What then remains to be done?

you have told Us that you have Plenipotentiary Powers from His Majesty to make Treaties with the Princes of India and you have in effect Declared your Opinion that Us have no Power to make offensive Alliances. You have told Us also in the Letter now before Us that it is your most earnest Desire to remedy as much as lies in your Power

every

very Inconvenience which We may think We labor under as things are at present circumstanced and you declare that the plenipotentiary Powers deputed to you from the Crown shall be wholly directed for the public good and to serve the Interests of the Company if We will but give you the smallest Hint how this may be done to the best Advantage: you have in many Places of your Letter now before Us upbraided Us exceedingly for not accepting any more for condemning & neglecting the Offers made by the Mahrattas of their Friendship, no such Offer having been made to Us as Friendship for Friendship We could neither accept or refuse it but if be offered to you or if you can procure it obtain it We do earnestly intreat of you to embrace it and We will Subscribe to it chearfully. If Peace & Friendship with them should not be obtainable on those simple Terms the only Expedient that suggests itself to Us is that which hath often been practised before in every Part of India the Payment of a Sum of Money by Way of Compromise, in the year 1757 such a Compromise was made with them and again in the year 1761 and they withdrew. At the same time we mention this Expedient We must confess We have little Hopes of its Success because if We may believe Reports (and We do not think it without Foundation) the Mahrattas are encouraged to make & persist in their Demands of Assistance from Us by the Nabob in Hopes to compel Us into an Offensive Alliance with them and We have no Reason to believe that he will desist so long as he shall be sustained and supported in that Plan by you, We do not mean to say that you are privy to the secret Encouragements given to the Mahrattas (if such there be) but that your support [illegible]

Fort St. George 25th. April 1775.

in the Plan of an offensive Alliance which We take from your Letter now before Us

If the Mahrattas will not give Us Peace & Friendship for Peace & Friendship, nor by compromise for Money We have no Alternative; for we are restrained by the Considerations herein before expressed from offensive Alliances We do not know the Extents of your Powers and Instructions; but We know our own & We know your Sense of them to be that they do not extend to the making offensive Alliances: permit Us then to ask whether it is generous to press & urge Us by Argument & Reproach to enter into such an Alliance with the Mahrattas which your declared Opinion is that We have no power to do &c. and then after all to add that you do not advise it? We know not whether your Powers can legally supply the Defect of ours, if not it is still more extraordinary that you should press & provoke Us to what our united Powers cannot effect. But if on the contrary you have such Powers and Instructions as you have often assured Us that the only Objects of your Commission were to promote the Interests of the Nation & of the Company & to retrieve the Honor of the English Faith and now repeat the Offer of the Sanction of your Powers We request to be informed to what Purposes & in what Manner you would propose to apply them? you know the Engagement by which We are bound to defend Hyder Ally although We cannot now comply with it. We have told you that our Employers forbid our forming offensive Alliances and you are of Opinion that the Powers of the Company's Charter do not extend to such Alliances.

And

Fort St. George 25th April 1775.

And now Sir having made a fair Exposition of the Case We beg Leave to appeal to the unprejudiced World whether We can properly be said to be the Judges in this great Cause, and whether the Peace & Tranquility of this Country are in our Power a Degree of Importance which you are pleased to give Us in Words in order to load Us with the Consequences of the combined Dangers Foreign & Domestick with which We are threatened.

You have in several Places in your Letter spoke of our Connection with Hyder Ally Cawn in such Terms as seem to imply an actual Design at this Time to give him assistance. Whatever our Ideas with upon this Subject in the Beginning the Nabob & you have put it out of our Power if We were so inclined, for We never Did and never could entertain the Thought of supporting him with the Company's Means alone independantly of the Power & Resources of the Carnatick much less in Opposition to them. This is well known to the Nabob & therefore We did conclude was not unknown to you. Nevertheless it has frequently been given out that We were determined to send Forces to assist Hyder Ally Cawn, and now, even now, whilst We are writing this Letter Intelligence is brought Us that it is circulated from the Nabob's Durbar that We are now determined to assist Hyder Ally Cawn. We can impute this to no other but one of these two Causes, either that the Nabob is determined to do Us all the Injury he can with the Mahrattas in Hopes under your Patronage and Support tho' probably unknown to you, of provoking them to attack the Company and thereby to compel Us to give them Assistance or that

Fort St. George 25th April 1771.

the Nabob placing too much Confidence in the Spies he employs
nor Us in Deceived by them As he does not place Sufficient
Confidence in Us to credit our Professions permits Us to
request that you will undeceive him.

You have quoted a Passage from a
Conversation between you & our President in which he
told you that Carriages for a Battering Train were
wanting, and you add that he said that even two Months
would scarce be Sufficient to put such a Body in Motion
as might be necessary to over awe the Rajah of Tanjore
He begs Leave to inform you that you misunderstood
him. He thinks he could not have said so because a Body
of Troops were then actually under Orders to march from
Vellour with a Field Train, more than Sufficient to overawe
the Rajah which Body actually marched with a large
Convoy of Stores to Trichinopoly, but that he said two
Months would scarce be Sufficient to prepare Carriages
for a battering Train and to convoy Stores to Trichinopoly
sufficient for an Expedition against Tanjore. We never
thought the Nabob desired to overawe the Rajah out of
any tender Regard to the Maravar, Nadaetty or Tonda-
man but to take up Arms against him with a View
to one or both of these Ends either to make an entire
Conquest of the Country of Tanjour and to annex it to
his Government, or to levy a Contribution on the Rajah
and to punish him for his Conduct. The Measures urg-
ed by the Nabob and supported by you would not in
our Opinion have answered either of those Ends but in
all Probability they would have produced another
Effect which there is reason to believe was what the

Nabob,

Fort St George 25th April 1777

Nabob had in View we mean to engage Us in Hostili-
ties with Tanjore before We were prepared to act effectu-
ally, well knowing that the Mahrattas would support
him, unless some Expedient was found to buy them off
and what Expedient could there be but the offensive
Alliance & Assistance which they & the Nabob are so
desirous of, the Nabob well knew We had no Resources
of our own to support Us under such an Embarrassment
We had told him so & applied to him to know what
certain Means he could ascertain of supporting a War in
such a Case, to which he hath replied in a Letter full of
as many Reflections as are contained in yours without
giving Us the least Satisfaction upon the Points which
most required it. We shall beg Leave to finish this Sub-
ject by Declaring that it is our Opinion Hostilities should
not be commenced against Tanjour, untill We are prepa-
red to execute effectually what We attempt & untill We
are freed from the Danger with which We are now threat-
ened by the Mahrattas: relieve Us from that & We undertake
to call the Rajah to a proper Account.

Your Recommendation to Us of the
Law of the Nabob's Creditors and Endeavour to excite in Us
some generous Sentiments for the Distressed Widow & Orphan
We ascribe to the same Cause which hath moved you to
entreat of Us in Friendship to consider the Nabob's In-
terests & the Company's as connected — to entreat of Us not
to allow the Influence of our Constituents materially to
suffer by an Attachment to a Party &c. — to recommend
a generous Support of the Prince of this Country and an
Observance of that public Faith for which the English were

one

me so famous in India. 'Tis easy for a flowing Pen to run thro' Pages of such Declamation. But how do such Passages agree with the Declaration in the first Paragraph of your Letter? to Direct — to entreat any one to do a thing is in effect the same as to say he does not do it, and they differ only in this that the open & Declared Attack is the most generous. We do not mean to refute such Imputations; to mention the Instances will be sufficient. We trust to give the unprejudiced World some Idea of the Treatment we receive from His Majesty's Minister.

We have said in a former Part of this Letter that the Nabob only condescends sometimes seemingly to consult Us merely by Way of Form or to draw from Us Sentiments, or Expressions to be laid before you. It seems necessary that We should produce some Instance. We have one; if there were no other, in your Letter now before Us, you tell Us you understand We have acquainted the Nabob that as His Majesty had sent out such extraordinary Powers to India, We could do nothing. It is very true that something of that Subject did pass in Conference between the Nabob & the President & Members of the Select Committee. Tho' then We had carefully avoided opening ourselves to the Nabob on that Subject for however difficult our Task was rendered by the Existence & Effect of those Powers, We saw no Good that could arise to the Company by explaining our Difficulties to the Nabob in whom we saw so strong a Disposition to withdraw his Confidence from Us and indeed We were always apprehensive that whatever We said would be told

again

again not to our Advantage. But at a late Conference where Matters seemed to be approaching to such a Crisis as required a full Declaration of what we could and what We could not do, having told the Nabob that We could not enter into an offensive Alliance with the Mahrattas he was at the same time told that We understood that you had plenipotentiary Powers to treat with the Princes of India. The Nabob was not desired either to inform you or not to inform you of what had passed but he himself repeatedly desired that what had passed might not be considered as publick Matter but as a private Conversation among Friends and particularly that it might not be quoted in Letters, yet We presume that it has been communicated to you: We are well pleased that it has, tho' We must say We wish it had produced a better Effect, and had led you to say what you thought necessary on the Subject with more Temper — You tell us that our want of Confidential Communication has almost if not altogether prevented the Intentions of your Commission — That We have absolutely refused to co-operate with you as Kings Ministers in any one thing for the publick Good — That you wish not Suffer us to avail ourselves of that Subterfuge, to wit that your Powers prevented us from doing our Duty — That we will not accept of the Assistance you have offered in Her Majesty's Name — and That no Pretence shall remain to answer any Purpose whatsoever of saying that you have either opposed or prevented us

We beg you will be pleased to point out in what Part of our Correspondence We have refused to co-operate

co-operate with you or have declined to accept of the
Assistance you have offered in His Majesty's Name.
We have refused it it is true to surrender into your Hands
the Company's Records because We conceive you have no
legal Power to demand them; and We have declined
to give you at large our Ideas upon the general politi-
cal State of Affairs in India; because We have no
Instructions from our Constituents to do so: but these an
mere negative Acts necessary for our own Justification
in the Trusts we are charged with and do not operate
in any Degree to the Obstruction of your Powers so
far as they may be legally carried into Execution for if
it had been thought essentially necessary to the Exertion
of those Powers that our Records or our General Ideas should
be joined to your Abilities, can it be doubted but that a
proper & legal Method would have been taken to obtain
them? It is plain therefore, that as no such Method was
taken, and as your Powers were sent out Secretly it was
intended that they should be used without them: We must
suppose this, or suppose that it was intended to obtain from
us unguardedly what our Constituents had refused.
But We have not only not prevented the Operation of
your Powers, We have assured you in the most precise Terms
that whenever you shall call upon us for our Opinion
on any Matter, We will give it to the best of our Judgment
and that we shall gladly accept of the Sanction of our
Sovereign's Name. Upon what Grounds then is it, may
We presume to ask? that you insult us with the oppro-
brious Term Subterfuge: or in what part of our Correspon-
dence with or our Conduct towards you have you discovered

such

Fort St. George 25th April 1771.

such a Tendency?.

There is yet another Passage in your Letter of which we beg some Explanation — you say you think some Pains should have been taken to convince the Nabob how much the Company had his Prosperity at Heart. and instead of giving him Cause to be apprehensive for his Safety and that of his Country — instead of giving Encouragement by Inactivity to his Rebellious Subjects &c. We pass over the great & glaring Injustice you do us in the indirect Charge of not taking Pains to convince the Nabob and in the Direct Charge of encouraging his Rebellious Subjects: because there are so many bitter Passages of the same Kind and equally ill founded throughout your Letter that were we to note them all we should never have done but We cannot pass over in Silence a Passage which implies / We know not how it was intended / that the Safety of the Nabobs Person is in Danger from Us We cannot bring ourselves to believe you meant it as it stands: But as it is of great Importance that neither the Nabob, ourselves nor the World should remain in any Doubt of your Meaning, We must beg Leave to desire as an Act of publick Justice that you will remove the Ambiguity.

We have the Honor to be
Sir

Your most obedt & most humble Servants
Jno. Call Brt
&c. Council

Fort St. George
25th. April 1771.

Eame

Fort St. George 25th April 1771.

Came in the following Letter from Lieut Coll Lang

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr.
President &c Council of
Fort St. George

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter from Coll Lang

I have disapproved of such Part of the Proceedings of the late Court Martial as specified in your Letter & have also given out in Orders that your further Opinion thereupon will shortly be made known. Till then Lieut Colonel does no Duty, but remains no longer in Arrest. The General has desired the Perusal of the Court Martial — As soon as he returns it, I shall transmit it to you.

At the Desire of Muckdoom Ally Cawn I have augmented the Garrisons of Tritore and Aylore to one Company of Sepoys each & have also ordered a Company to garrison Cotalum.

By the latest Intelligence, the Mahrattas are collecting Provisions about Singaradeur: guess sending them through the Passes: but they penetrate no farther, nor have committed the smallest Hostilities in the Nabobs Country. I am

Honble Sir & Sirs

Your very humble &
obedient Servant
Rosdang

Trichinapolie
April 21st 1771.

26. Received the following Letter from Major Grain.

To

356 Fort St. George 25th April 1771.

To The Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr
President Governor & Council &c. of
Fort St. George.

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter from Major Green regarding the Stores &c.

Conformable to your Order transmitted to me by your Secretary the 20th Instant I have examined all the Store Rooms & Stores in the Garrison & find its would be attended with a great Expence & Trouble should any Material Alteration take Place till the Arsenal & the other necessary Buildings are compleat & fitt for the Reception of the Arms & Military Stores.

As I can be of no Use at present here, and you were pleased to give me Permission in your Letter of the 20th Instt to proceed to Bengall I shall embark on board the first Ship that sails and shall return with Pleasure whenever you are pleased to apply for me to the Honble the President & Council at Fort William.

I am
Honble Sir & Sirs
Fort St. George
25th April 1771

Your most obedient Servt
John Green

27th Wrote the following Letter to Lt Col. Lang.

To Lieutenant Colonel Lang
Commanding at Trichinopoly
Sir

Lt Col. Lang

We have received your Letter of the 13th Instant.

The

Fort St. George 27th. April 1771

The Number of four Hircarahs were allow-
2 for Trichinopoly in Time of Peace and Tranquility
when the Occurrences in the Garison & it's Environs were the
whole Care of the Commandant. But as it may be very
proper to increase the Number now that there are Appear-
ances of Troubles, for the Purpose of gaining Intelligence
We consent to your entertaining Six more in Addition to
those you already have but who are only to be kept up
so long as their Services are really necessary. We are

Fort St. George
27th. April 1771.

Sir
your most Obedt Servants
Jos. Du Pré
&c. Council

At a Consultation Present,
Josias Du Pré Esqr. Governor President,
Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley
John Smith, George Stratton
Henry Brooke, Richd. Brickenden
John Whitehill, George Mackay.

Monday
29th April

Major Braithwaite who arrived
at this Place the 22d Instant from Fort Marlboro' having
requested an Allowance for his Passage — It is Agreed
by the Majority of the Board that fifty Pagodas be allowed
him on that Account — And Ordered that the Military
Paymaster do settle the Pay due to him from 31 October
the Day to which he received Pay at Fort Marlboro' to this
Time

An Allowance of 50 Pags made to Major Braithwaite for his Passage from Fort Marlboro'

The Paymaster to adjust Major Braithwaite's Account of Pay.

Fort St. George 29th April 1771.

Time deducting the 300 Sp. Dollars advanced him by the President & Council there as advised in their Letter of 10 Oct.r to the other Departments.

Read the following Letter from Mr.

Walter Rop Munro.

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esq.r
President & Governor &c.a Council of
Fort St. George

Honble Sirs & Sirs

I Was yesterday honored (thro' your Secretary) with your Acknowledgment of my two former applications & an Offer of receiving me into the Service with the Rank of Mate with Pay only from the Time of my Acceptance.

Upon my Arrival at Madras about the 20th of January, I produced to the Governor my Commiss.n of Surgeon which was granted to me by the Court of Directors. He was pleased to acquaint me that as there were no vacant Surgeoncies on this Coast, I could not be received in that Rank.

After repeated Applications to the Governor, finding my Commission was directed to the President & Council of Fort St. George, & imagining the Determination depended upon them rather than any one Member, I sent you a Copy of my Commission requesting you to ratify the Terms of it, & appoint me the Rank & Pay to which it entitled me; proposing at the same Time (as the Governor had told me there was no Place for Surgeons) to officiate if necessary as an Assistant 'till a Vacancy should make Room for my Promotion. Instead of which,

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in the Answer you were pleased to favor me with the Authority of my Commission is entirely laid aside, an Offer made me of the Rank of Mate, and there being no want of Surgeons assigned as the Reason: notwithstanding that Since my Arrival here & at the very Time my Applications lay before the Board there have been no less than four Surgeons appointed three of whom were raised from Assistants & to whom on that Account my Commission gave me an undoubted Priority.

My Pay you are also pleased to inform me shall only commence from the Time of my accepting the Rank of Mate which I can't but think a Hardship because tho' I demurred on accepting an Assistantship I was from the Beginning willing to enter the Service on the Rank the Court of Directors had appointed me.

But as my Distance from England renders me in a Manner remediless I am under a Necessity of accepting any Terms you are pleased to offer and shall therefore patiently wait your further Orders.

I shall only further appeal to your Justice & Clemency whether after bearing the Expences necessarily incurred during a long Voyage. I should also be obliged to bear those of a Land Journey chiefly undertaken to be in Readiness for the Company's Service: which from a Presumption on the Validity of my Commission I expected would be refunded me, equally with the other Gentlemen who made the same Journey and who have all been since reimbursed

I have the Honor to be with the

greatest

360 Fort St. George 29th April 1771.

Fort St. George
April 29th 1771.

greatest Respect
Honble Sirs & Sirs
your most humble Servant
Wallerofs Munro

The President acquaints the Board that on Mr. Munro's Arrival he was informed by Some of the Contents of the Orders of the Court of Directors contained in the 88 Paragraph of their General Letter of 23 March 1770 relative to Persons permitted to proceed to India in the Capacity of Surgeons as also of the Agreement entered into by the Several Persons coming out in that Station and at the Same Time he was acquainted that the said Orders were in Consequence of representations made from hence against sending out Persons to be appointed Surgeons immediately on their Arrival, & that therefore He must not expect to be immediately taken into the Service as a Surgeon — that the President afterwards on the Application of Mr. George Smith & Mr. Pasley or Mr. Munro's Behalf gave them the like Information, & shewed the former the Orders of the Company on this Subject.

The Board having taken the above into Consideration are of Opinion that Mr. Munro ought to have remained satisfied with the Information given him by the President, as it could not be expected that We should suspend Gentlemen who have long served the Company, and that too in express Contradiction to our own Representations made to the Court of Directors and to which they had assented &c. and as We cannot but look upon the above Letter as wrote in very improper & Disrespectful Terms

Fort St. George 29th April 1781.

Terms as reflecting on the President & the Conduct of the Board, & which indicates but too plainly Mr. Munro's ungovernable Disposition: We are of Opinion that he ought not on any account to be taken into the Service — It is therefore Resolved that he be acquainted We have no Occasion for his Services in any Station whatever, & that the Circumstances of this Affair be communicated to the Court of Directors.

An Indent for Medicines for the Garrison of Vellour being laid before the Board is ordered to be complied with.

Read a Letter from the Nabob.

N85 with Pagodas 4000 on Account of Poonamalee Duc the 30 Instant — Ordered that the Receipt thereof be acknowledged.

Read a Letter from the Nabob as entered in Country Correspondence N86 enclosing an Indent for Stores for one of his Battalions of Sepoys, which is ordered to be complied with.

Wm. Du Pré
Warren Hastings

John Smith
Geo. Stratton
Henry Brooke

John Whitehill
Geo. Mackay

Fort St. George 30th April 1771

Came in Intelligence this Day that the Army under Trimbakjee had suddenly Decamped from before Syringapatam the Reason of which was reported to be owing to an Account received of Madavarow's Death which made it necessary for Trimbackjee to repair to Poonah.

May 1st Wrote the following Letter to Alexander Wynch Esqr. Chief at Masulipatam

To Alexander Wynch Esqr.
Chief at Masulipatam

Sir

We have this Day embarked on Board the Snow Speedwell two Effective Men & twenty three Invalids as p List enclosed: the latter are intended to do Duty in the Garrison of Masulipatam

Letter to Mr. Wynch advising of the Invalids &c embarked on board the Snow Speedwell for Masulipatam

The following Officers also proceed by the same Conveyance to join the Troops in the Circars viz.t

Lieut.t Monteith
Montgomery
Ensigns Read
Burn
Taylor
Lund

Enclosed is an Account of the Provisions put on board for the Use of the Men: You will be pleased to receive from the Commander what may remain after the Troops are landed.

Their Pay to the End of this Month has been advanced & they have received it for one Week. The Remainder is delivered to Lieut.t Monteith.

We are

Sir

Fort St. George May 1st 1771.

Fort St. George
1st. May 1771.

Sir

Your affectionate Friend &
Jos. Du Pré
& Council

2d. The President and Council having assembled this Morning at the Garden House, proceeded from thence to the Nabob's House at Chepauk, & presented to him with the usual Ceremonies the Letter & present of two Horses from the Company received for Mars.

3d. Came in the following Letter from Lt. Cotsford Resident at Ganjam to the President,

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr.
President & Governor at Fort St. George

Honble Sir,

Letter from Mr. Cotsford advising of the Expedition against Calliconte

In my Letter to the Board dated the 30th Ultimo I hope you will observe that the two Detachments were to have joined at Pourshetumjum by the 10th or 12th Ultimo since that Time having received the strongest assurances from the Rajah of Calliconte, that he wish'd escape to Ganjam to avoid his Brother Maunsing. I thought it most proper to postpone their March a few Days to give him Time to effect it before his Brother should have any Suspicion of his Intention which the March of our Troops would certainly occasion in Him.

On the 16th I received Intelligence that Maunsing had sent about 60 Peons to the Rajah & obliged him to come to him as to a Place of Safety. This News being confirmed no Time was lost for Captain Baudinel's Detachment from Itcheapore of 5 Companies of the 1st Circar Battalion from Aska joined the 20th at Ganjam and were put under

Fort St George 3d of May 1771.

under the Command of Captain Baudinel.

On the 24th this Detachment marched from Tangaun with two 6 Pr Field Pieces and pursuing the same Route which had been marched by Captain Casemore the preceding year, arrived at Murda-Sangaroon, on the 28th in the Afternoon a small Detachment was sent to look into Cattiwote. Where every thing appearing in the same ruinous State in which we had before left it, the March of the Detachment to that Place was unnecessary.

In the mean Time Captain Casemore had marched with the remaining five Companies of his Battalion and 2 3lbrs & arrived at Bembutty the 27th

On the 30th the Detachment under Captain Baudinel marched & arrived at Barbutty the same Morning as nothing had been done towards putting the two Redoubts which we had destroyed last year in a State of Defence neither did the Detachments meet with any Opposition on their March. On the 1st Captain Baudinel marched from Barbutty and arrived at the Village of Serdapore which lies about 7 Miles to the N.N.W.d of Barbutty and thro' a close woody Country for the most part but the Road good. The other Detachment remained at Barbutty to the End that the Communication might be kept open for Provisions. Two Miles from this Village about NNW lies the Fort of Pincally, the road to it is thro' a close woody Country & to prevent the Approach of an Enemy, at about half a Mile from the Village, a Breast Work is thrown up across the Road & extends to the right & left about 50 yards and again another about one Mile Distant from the first so that from the second Breastwork to the Fort the Distance

Fort St. George 3d May 1775.

tance is about half a Mile and the Fort is situated close to a Range of high Hills which separate the Zemindarries of Callicoote & Hautgur on that Side. — Close to the 2d Breastwork on the Right (advancing towards Pincally) there is a low Hill covered with small & large Trees in this Hill the Walls of the 2d Breastwork loses itself, and at the Bottom of the Hill and before the Breastwork, the Ground is cleared in such a Manner as that an Enemy posted in the Hill may have a fair View of Troops advancing to attack the Breastwork — The Road from the 2d Breastwork to the Fort is very rugged and irregular so that Cannon cannot without much Difficulty pass along it.

On the Approach of our Detachment towards Burbully, Hauw Sing retired with about 600 Sepoys to this Place, it being well situated for making a good Resistance, and also favorable for a precipitate Retreat.

On the 2d of April four Companies of Sepoys were advanced into the Woods under the Command of Lieut Evans who were soon established at the first Breastwork the Enemy having only fired a few Shot on them at their Entrance into it. From thence Lieutenant Evans proceeded forward with one Company to cover the Workmen who were employed in clearing the Road to the 2d Breastwork, he proceeded as far as the 2d Breastwork and finding the Enemy made no Resistance. He opened a Passage in the Wall sufficient for a Gun to pass thro' the Enemy in the Mean time, observing from the Hill, that there was but a small Force, collected themselves under it & made a Sudden Attack upon the Company on every Side, with great Shouts according to their Custom which coming so suddenly on the Sepoys they were seized with a

Panick

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Patrick & Fitz. Mr Evans together with a Serjeant in endeavouring to rally the Company were left entirely to the Mercy of the Enemy who cut them off immediately & followed the Fugitives as far as the first Breastwork where the other three Companies were posted. — In this Affair 4 Natives 6 Seapoys & Lascars & 1 Drummer were Killed & 12 Seapoys wounded. — On Enquiry it appeared that the Subedar of the Company was the first who set the Men so Scandalous an Example in Consequence He has been tried by a General Court Martial & is dismissed the Service.

The Road having been cleared and the Difficulties pretty well known Captain Bandinel marched on the 8th in the Morning with the Guns leaving his Camp standing with two Companies of Seapoys for its Safety. On the Arrival of the Detachment at the 2d Breastwork the Enemy kept up a very considerable Fire from all Parts of the Hill, and the Breast Work in Front so that Captain Bandinel found it necessary to detach two Grenadier Companies of Seapoys under the Command of Lieutenant Hughes to gain the Hill & Disperse the Enemy which the main Body marched in Front & cleared the Road thro' the Breastwork which had been stopped up again since the Evans' Death. — The Seapoys having gained the Hill & the main Body passed the Breastwork the Enemy gave way on all Sides, and Captain Bandinel marched immediately to the Fort having Scaling Ladders in readiness to mount the Walls as the Enemy were making the best of their Way over the Hills. The Fort which is very weak & small, not being in good Repair the Enemy did not think proper to stay in it so it was gained without

Fort St. George 3d. May 1771.

without Opposition. After Burning & Destroying all the Houses &c. there the Detachment returned again to Camp there being no Ground nearer the Place for encamping on. — In this Affair Lieutenant Hughes was Dangerously wounded, being Shot thro' the Body 1 Serjeant of Artillery, 1 Drummer, 12 Sepoys and two Lascars one Sepoy Killed. — We are now Destroying the Wood on the Hill the Breastworks & planting the Roads which is all that can be done in a Place of this Kind.

On the 31st. March the Rajah of Cattiecole Sound Means to escape from his Brother Mawen Sing & retired to the Mandgur Country where he was joined by 100 Peons which the Zemindar of Boroudi had in Readiness for his Assistance. I immediately sent him some Seapoys and on the 3d. of April he arrived at Canjam. — On the 9th. He joined our Detachment at Burbutty. When he immediately summoned the Fort of Murdagur which was held by 80 of Mawen Sings People, They did not give it up but left it in the Night, and the next Day a Jemidari Guard took Possession of it and in the Afternoon the Detachment left Burbutty & encamped there in being more convenient for the Rajah's Affairs and better Situated for forwarding Provisions to Capt Blandine

The Rajah accepts to Mr. Peterson

I cannot yet find out where Mawen Sing is retired to but many of his People have left him & I hope as the Rajah is with us the Affairs of the Zemindary will soon be properly settled. I am

Hon'ble Sir with the greatest Respect,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
Edward Peterson

Camp at Sidapour
April 14th 1771.

Received

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Recd the following Letter from Cuddalore.

To The Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr
President & Governor &c Council of
Fort St. George

Honble Sir & Sirs

I enclose you the Nabob's Account Current from the 1st May 1770 to 30th April 1771.

I am with Respect
Honble Sir & Sirs
Your most obedient and
most humble Servants
Geo. Dawson
Alex. Davidson
Ja. H. Casamaijor
Will. Maitland

Cuddalore
2nd May 1771.

At a Consultation, Present,

Josias Du Pré Esqr. Governor, President
Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley
John Smyth, George Stratton
Henry Brooke, George Mackay
John Whitehill,

Mr. Brereton indisposed.

Monday
6th May

Letter from General Smith read

as follows.

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr
President & Governor &c Council of
Fort St. George

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter from Gen. Smith on the subject of Cuddalore

In General Smith's Report to the Board

369 Fort St. George 6th May 1771.

respecting the Arrangement of the Troops it is observed that the two Brigades proposed would not be a sufficient force for the many Services required of them if we were to take under our Protection the Nabobs Territories from Cape Comorin to the Pallenaud, and as it was not then known whether His Excellency would consent to our augmenting the Seapoys on this Establishment to a Number sufficient to answer those Purposes no Alternative was therefore proposed.

I am of opinion after allowing the Number of Troops in the Circars for that Service and proper for the Garrisons on the Carnatick it would by no means answer the Intention to draw the Remainder together which will appear from an Estimate I do myself the Honor to lay before the President on the 10th of June, last to which I beg Leave to refer your Honor &c. wherein you will please to observe that upwards of ten thousand Seapoys and near a Thousand Europeans are wanting to the several Garrisons in the Carnatick without taking Cuddalore into Consideration

If the Board should be of Opinion that Madura, Trichinopoly, & Vellour, in our Possession with Kept the Nabob sufficiently dependant on the Company there then remains no Doubt with me of the Propriety of assembling, & keeping together a compleat Brigade for the Purposes mentioned in General Coote's Report: as the Battalion of Europeans, and Six of Seapoys with the Supernumeraries &c. not to be assembled would be sufficient to protect our own Possessions in the Carnatick and garrison the three Forts I have mentioned of the Nabob's and more I am of Opinion our present Establishment will not admit of. I cannot avoid remarking

remarking that in Case of a French War, and their Force being equal to ours, the Nabobs Troops alone can be little Depended on to Garrison the Forts that might be committed to their Care.

The Situation for cantoning the Troops should be as central, as possible, the Ground to build the Barracks on high & Dry with sufficient Supplies of good Water the year round all which might be found, near Wandewash, and the Neighbourhood would furnish Provisions. The most eligible Method would be to Draw Lines on a Plain fit for the purpose, and settle a Market of our own, clear of the Nabob's Garrisons.

I am of Opinion with your Honor viz.t that Pondamalee is not capable of containing a Battalion of Europeans, and the Inconveniences that must attend its being so near Madrass, are so many and great, I by no means ever thought it an eligible Situation, or could ever at Look, propose it, for any other Use than as Field Quarters to the Brigade.

Letter to Governing other Troops of Canal

I think Captain Tongue's non Commissioned Officers may be supplied by Captain Kirker of such Men as he can recommend to be qualified — and that the best Method of compleating both Corps with private, will be by Draughting them from the Recruits of this Season.

With Respect to the Purchase of Horses I confess myself at a Loss to point out any Method whereby the Board can receive much Satisfaction, as I never had occasion to buy more than what served my own Purposes, and those commonly from Gentlemen. I am told

Fort St George 6th May 1771.

to on enquiry that the Natives buys up every Horse brought into the Carnatick for Sale that at the annual Feast of Tripputy many Merchants bring their Horses to Market where the best Bidders may be supplied for ready Money. Arcot & the Place I have mentioned are the only two in this Country that Five Heads of which Cattle, are to be purchased. I believe Captain Hutchins at Vizagapatam could give the Board some Assistance in this Business.

respecting the Artillery Men attached to Sepoy Guns.

The four Artillery Men ordered to be attached to the two Sepoy Guns are by no means sufficient for that Service — in order to Man a Piece of Cannon a certain number of Men are necessary; the Size of the Gun makes no Difference in the working it. — A three Pounder requires seven Men viz.t 1 non Commissioned Officer at the Handspike to point the Gun — 1 Man to serve Cartridges — 1 to Sponge & ram home, 1 with the Haver sack, 1 in Charge of the Tumbril 1 to serve the Vent & 1 to Fire — these Men are as so many Parts of a Machine if one of them is wanting, the Rest can't move in Order. The fewer Men Number may work a Gun in a Slow Cannonade, but if Field Pieces are necessary at all, they should be brought quick. Our Worthy Masters are very right in directing that the Natives may be kept as ignorant as possible of this Department, and in order to obviate the Deficiency of Artillery Men — I think when a Battalion of Sepoys are sent on Service, a Brigade of three Pounders should be man'd from the Artillery, with their proper Complement & when it is convenient a Commissioned Officer from that Corps should be detached to command them

a1

Fort St. George the 6th of May 1771.

as We might then expect our Ammunition would not be thrown away. Our present Establishments of Artillery I imagine after our own Possessions and the Forts of Madura, Trichinopoly & Vellour are provided with Artillery Men, is sufficient to man one compleat Brigade both for the Europeans & Seapoys.

Our Establishment of Europeans will not admit of so great a Number of Serjeants being furnished to the Seapoy Battalions without injuring the Regiments, & it will be impossible to find sufficient who are qualified however as much may Dependon the Seapoys in Case of a national War, I am of Opinion they Should be compleated with Serjeants as far as they can be found capable, and if possible from Men who understand the Country Language

I entirely agree with your Honors not only that the Invalids with proper Care & Attention may be made very useful, but also in the manner you propose they may be formed and disposed of: if the Board mean the Companies are to be Stationed at Madras are to be in the Black Town — many of the Invalids are Drunken old Men, and if they had an Opportunity would debauch the young Soldiers in the Fort who are generally inexperienced. Lieut Corbett is a good Man, and as I believe he merits the Favor of the Board may very properly be appointed to a Fourth Company of Invalids

I am of Opinion that one non commissioned Officer & Six Private Artillery Men to Permacoil, and the same number to Tiagar will be

respecting the Number belonging to the Artillery

respecting the Proposal of forming the Invalids into Companies —

relation to the Artillery necessary at Tiagar & Permacoil

Fort St George 6th May 1771.

be quite sufficient for those Garrisons in time of Peace and that many of the old Artillery Men, amongst the Invalids, will answer in those Places, as well as the most effective Men we have in the Service.

recommends Lt. McClintock for the Command of Seapoys at Cuddalore.

I beg Leave to recommend Lieut. McClintock to the Command of the four Companies of Seapoys at Cuddalore, he is an active good Officer very capeable of that Duty & may be depended on.

I have the Honor to be with the greatest Respect

Trichinopoly
1st May 1771.

Honble Sir & Sirs
Your most obed. Servant
Joseph Smith

Observations & Reflections thereon—

The President having communicated to the Board the Estimate or State referred to by General Smith Dated 16th (not the 10th) of June it amounts to a Certainty, that if we were to garrison the Several Forts therein mentioned which in Case of a War are very important Posts We Should have no Army for the Field: and it is almost as certain that if they are trusted to the Natives People they would be Lost in the same Manner as all the new Conquests were, towards the Conclusion of the War with Hyder Ally — But in time of Peace it seems not necessary that We Should have Garrisons in them.

Our Application now to General Smith on the Subject of keeping a Body of Troops collected as recommended by him & General Coote was made with a View that we might be furnished with Materials for forming some precise Judgment of what might be

most

Fort St. George 6th May 1771.

most legible & thereupon to ascertain how far it might be practicable, & what Obstacles interposed for the particular Information of our Superiors before We can adopt any precise Plan: for in the present State of our Affairs & Connexions, We can do no more than temporize. The Buildings of Barracks and Accommodations for a compleat Brigade, consisting of one Regiment of Europeans with a Proportion of Artillery, and six Battalions of Sepoys must be an expensive Work — We conceive the Nabob will hardly consent to their being erected at his Expence, and We do not suppose the Company would be pleased that their Money should be expended in such a Work — But without determining that Point it is certain that We cannot at present spare Money, even if the Cost were to be reimbursed by the Nabob — If the Barracks should be erected at the Nabobs Expence, the Place may be chosen in his Jurisdiction: but if the Company is to bear the Charge, We think the Place should be chosen within the Bayshore. These Particulars appear proper to be represented home — But whilst it remains a Doubt, whether the Military Establishment will long continue on its present Footing whether the Seven Battalions of Sepoys whose Pay is reimbursed by the Nabob, may or may not be continued under the Company's Orders: & as that Point may be determined whether a new Plan may not be formed for the military Establishments of the Presidency & for the whole System. — all these Doubts considered, We think it advisable to leave the Troops in the Garrisons, as they have hitherto been until We shall receive further Instructions on this Head.

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The Board approve of the Method proposed by General Smith for draughting the Men for Captain Youngs Troop and which is accordingly to be adopted — And the President is desired to write to the Chief of Masulipatam, to inform himself whether good Horses can be procured from Hyderabad, by what Means & at what Prices — as also to Capt. Fletcher at Bengale — The President is also desired to speak to the Nabob on this Subject.

We understand General Smith's Opinion respecting the Sepoy Guns to be, that none should be attached to the Battalions as heretofore, but that whenever a Battalion or more of Sepoys be sent on Service, a Brigade of Guns, which is an indeterminate Number, be detached from the Artillery Corps, with the proper Complement of Men for that particular Service; which being ended the Guns & Men are again to rejoin the Artillery Corps — Agreed therefore to write to General Smith to know if that be his Meaning & if so that it be carried into Execution accordingly.

Ordered that the Sepoy Battalions be compleated with Serjeants in the Manner recommended by General Smith.

Resolved that the Invalids be formed into four Companies as before proposed and that Lieutenant Corbett be appointed a Captain & to command the 4th Company to be Stationed at Cuddalore.

Ordered that the Number of Invalid Artillery Men recommended by General Smith be sent to Permacoil & Tiagar

Agreed that Lieut. M.Pintock be appointed to command the four Companies of Sepoys at

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at Cuddalore, as recommended by General Smith.

Letter from Alexr Wynch Esqr Chief

at Mazulipatam read as follows.

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr

President & Governor &c Council of

Fort St George

Honble Sir & Sirs

I herewith transmit your Honor &c a Petition from the Widow of the late Lieutenant John Wilson, praying for the Allowance which the Widows of Officers are entitled to from the Fund appropriated for that Purpose by the Right Honble Lord Clive. I also send a Certificate from Colonel Hartz of the good Behaviour of Lieutenant Wilson, and which no more than corresponds with the Character which he universally bore.

I am with much respect

Honble Sir & Sirs

Mazulipatam

29th April 1771.

Your most obedient humble Servant

AWynch

Letter from Mr Wynch covering a Petition from the Widow of Lieut Wilson

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr

President & Governor &c Council of

Fort St George

The Petition of Hannah Wilson Widow humbly sheweth.

That your Petitioners late Husband Lieutenant John Wilson, died the 3d of this present Month of a Disorder contracted in the Honble Company's Service, and has left your Petitioner with a young Infant of six months old entirely unprovided with any future Subsistence or even the means of procuring a Passage for herself & Child to Europe. Having been informed that a Fund has been proposed

Petition of the Widow of Lieut. Wilson praying to partake of the Fund established for Invalids Officers &c.

Fort St. George 6th May 1771.

proposed to be provided for the Relief & Support of Persons in Such unhappy Circumstances by the Right Honble the Lord Clive: your Petitioner humbly implores your Honors to take Her Case into Consideration and so far befriend Her, as to recommend Her as an Object worthy of being admitted as a Partaker of His Lordship's Bounty.

And your Petitioner shall ever pray &c

Hannah Wilson

Cantonments at Ellore
23d April 1771

Certificate from Colo Hart of Lieut Wilson's good Behaviour.

This is to certify that the late Lieut. John Wilson Deceased, has behaved as a good & Brave Officer and Gentleman during the Time he had been under my Command, And also during the Time he had been in the Honble Company's Service that ever came to my Knowledge

Given under my Hand in Ellore this 25th Day of April 1771.

Simon Hart
Colo in the 1st Regt of Foot

To all whom it may concern

To be sent to Bengal

Resolved that a Copy of the above Letter &c be transmitted to the Gentlemen at Bengall and that it be recommended to them to comply with the Request therein contained.

Read the following Letter from Capt Burghall.

Letter from Capt. Burghall with a Bill for his Pay as Engineer & Capt. Commander of Artillery on the Fort St. Marlbro' Establishment from 31st Jany to 1st Inst.)—

Burghall.

Honble Sirs & Sirs

I have taken the Liberty to lay before you an Abstract of Pay Due to me from the Presidency of Fort St. Marlbro'.

If this Honble Board shall find it agreable

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agreable to the Intentions & Recommendations of that of Madras in my Regard, I flatter myself they will not refuse my humble Request to be pleased to order me Payment thereof on the Credit of that Presidency:

I am

Fort St. George
May 6th 1771

Gentlemen

Your obedient & most Devoted Servant
Geo. Burghall Engineer
& Commr. of Artillery at Fort Marlbro'

To the Honble President & Council
& the Trus & Assists at Fort St. George

To be paid.

It appearing to the Board that the Bill presented by Capt Burghall is drawn agreable to the Advices contained in the Letter from Fort Marlbro' of 10 Oct. 1770 entered in the Civil Department — Ordered That the same be discharged & Fort Marlbro' Debited for the Amount.

Read the following Letter.

Honble Sirs & Sirs

We the Officers who came out in the Duke of Portland beg Leave to represent that from the Ship's touching in at St. Jago, Rio de Janeiro, and the Cape of good Hope and the Delays made at those Ports We lost the inward Passage and were of course several Months longer in entering upon Pay than we otherwise should have been, and were at last disembarked at Anjango on the 8th December from which Place We made the Journey over Land at a very great Expence and were there obliged to leave our Baggage which We have only received by the Wilkins, Captain Brown on the 27th of the present Month very much damaged by the white Ants and that of some Officers except a few trifling Articles totally

Letter from Captains Douglas, Barclay & Campbell on Behalf of themselves & other officers saved in the Duke of Portland and Fort Britain, praying some Allowance in Consideration of their Journey &c.

Fort St. George 6th May 1773.

destroyed We humbly hope that in Consideration of the Expence We have been put to from the many Races we put into during the Passage But particularly the Journey from Anjengo and the Loss of Baggage You will be pleased to allow Us such Gratuity as may appear reasonable. We are by the absent Officers who came in the Duke of Portland authorized by them to make this Application and Capt. Douglas who sailed from England the same Day in the True Briton and arrived upon the Malabar Coast at the same Time and made the same expensive Journey over land / and whose Baggage is not yet arrived from Bombay / makes the same Representation for himself.

We have the Honor to be with great Respect

Hon'ble Sirs & Sirs

Your most obedient & very humble Servts

Fort St. George
30th April 1773.

Willm Douglas
Patrick Barclay
Willm Campbell

To be allowed Pay and Batta from their Landing on the Malabar Coast.

As We are sensible that the Officers for this Establishment arrived on the Duke of Portland & True Briton must have been at a considerable Expence in travelling from the Malabar Coast. It is agreed that they be allowed their Pay & Batta from the Day they landed on the Malabar Coast to their Arrival at their respective Destinations.

The President Lays before the Board the following Letter from Ensign Darke.

Letter from Ensign Darke desiring to resign the Service & remain in India until he can hear from England.

Honorable Sirs

I was entertained as a Cadet in the Honorable Company's

ever drawn for any either, as Cadet

I have wrote to my Friends in Ea-
ppointment from the Hoable Company
ing the greatest Reason to expect
may arrive which may be known
this Season I intreat the Favor of your
taying here untill I can receive
iends in England. I have the Honor
rable Sir

Your most respectful hum^e Servt.
Chas. Darke

Altho' the Orders of the Court of
in the 73 Paragraph of their Com-
h 1770 are very express against
who come out as Cadets & decline
Military to remain in India:

nevertheless

Notice was given to all the Settlement that the Ships Dispatch
Packet would be closed on the 25th. in the Evening and it was
closed accordingly. This Letter therefore is dated the 24th but
was not sent untill the 26th. about eight o'Clock in the Morn-
ing and the Egmont sailed by Gun shot in the Morning
of the 27th. — The Nabobs apparent Design is this that he
probably sent Some a Copy of this uncandid Letter, dated
the Day before the Ships Dispatch & no Copy being sent by
us it should appear that We have withheld a Paper which
he deems so material in his Cause, and having heard
(as indeed great Pains have been taken to inform the
whole Settlement) how much we have been censured upon
an Accusation (however unjust) of Suppression conclude
that Men so ill treated upon such Slight Grounds can have
little Support at home & may suffer the Same in the present
Case. From these & other Artifices of the like Kind Some Judg-
ment may be formed of our Difficulties in transacting
Business with such a Friend as he calls himself.

A Memo

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Company's Service the Latter end of 1769 and arrived at this Place in the Princess Royal last Season, Since my Arrival I have had the Honor to receive from you an Ensign's Commission dated the 16th. Day of November 1770.

As I have been greatly Disappointed in the Expectations I had formed in Europe, I beg the favor of you to receive it from me again, and to assure you that I shall ever retain a very lively Sense of the Honor I have received from the Company & yourself.

As I have never done any Duty for the Company nor rendered them any Service in a military Capacity, I could not think myself entitled to any Pay and therefore have never drawn for any either, as Cadet, or Ensign.

I have wrote to my Friends in Eu- to procure me an Appointment from the Honble Company as a Civilian, & having the greatest Reason to expect some Appointment may arrive which may be known by the Latter Ships of this Season I intreat the Favor of your Permission for my Staying here untill I can receive Advices from my Friends in England. I have the Honor to be. Honorable Sir

Your most respectful humble Servt.

Fort St. George
April 30th 1771.

Chas. Darke

Orders thereon

Altho' the Orders of the Court of Directors contained in the 73 Paragraph of their Commands of 23 March 1770 are very express against permitting Persons who come out as Cadets & decline continueing in the Military to remain in India;

nevertheless in Consideration of the Representation made by Mr. Darke It is agreed that his Resignation be accepted & that he be permitted to continue in India untill the Departure of the first Ships for England after the Arrival of the Latter Ships of this Season.

The following Remarks on the Nabobs Letter of 24th March & received 26 N°73 are now ordered to be entered.

Remarks on the Nabobs Letter dated 24th & received 26th March 1771 N°73.

Remarks on the Nabobs Letter N°73 on the Subject of Tanjore

Before We enter on the Remarks upon the Contents of the Letter, it is proper to observe that publick Notice was given to all the Settlement that the Ship Egmonts Packet would be closed on the 25th in the Evening and it was closed accordingly. This Letter therefore is dated the 24th but was not sent untill the 26th about eight oClock in the Evening and the Egmont sailed by Sun rise in the Morning of the 27th. — The Nabobs apparent Design in this Heat have probably sent Home a Copy of this uncandid Letter, dated the Day before the Ships Dispatch & no Copy being sent by us it should appear that We have withheld a Paper which he deems so material in his Cause, and having heard (as indeed great Pains have been taken to inform the whole Settlement) how much We have been censured upon an Accusation (however unjust) of Suppression concludes that Men so ill treated upon such Slight Grounds can have little Support at home & may suffer the Same in the present Case. From these & other Artifices of the like Kind some Judgment may be formed of our Difficulties in transacting Business with Such a Friend as he calls himself.

A Sketch

Fort St. George 6th May 1771.

A ..... A Sketch of the rise of the present Dispute and the Case of the Maravar Naatcotty & Tondaman entered on the Minutes of the Select Committee of the Instant will shew in the best manner we can how far those Polygars are dependant either on Trichinopoly or Tanjore. It appears to Us that the only Right over them is Power and that Constitutionally they are independant of both but Trichinopoly since it has been added to the Government of the Carnatick having been more powerful than Tanjour hath probably received more Submission from them — We do not mean this as Argument against calling Tanjour to account our Reasons are given in another Place and are of another Kind; We mean this as a fair State of the Case.

B ..... Trichinopoly was not reduced in the proper Sense of the Word by Subder Ally Cawn, it was treacherously seized in the Year 1736 by Chunda Saheb who together with Subdar Ally Cawn were sent by Ally Doft Cawn (the Father of Subder Ally and Father in Law of Chunda) to reduce it — In Orme's History Edition of 1763 Page 38 the Nabob says that Saadetulla Cawn the Subadar used to take every year from Trichinopoly & Tanjour, whatever Peishcush they thought proper — At the Time of settling the Treaty with Tanjour upon the best Enquiry that could be made it appeared that Tanjour never was absolutely conquered Zulphicar Cawn who was sent to reduce this Part of the Peninsula to the Mogul yoke proceeded no further than Gingee, and having reduced that he compromised with Tanjour for the annual Tribute or Peishcush of two Lacks of Rupees, the usual Durbar Charges, that is to say Fees & Presents to the Officers of the

Nabob's

Fort St. George 6th May 1781

Nabobs Court generally amounting to the same Sum:
This was the Ground upon which the Annual Pish-
cash was by the Treaty of 1762 settled at 5 Lacks of Pags.
it is very true that the Nabobs who succeeded Tulpheaun
Cawn exacted (notwithstanding the Compromise made
by that Nabob) both from Tanjour & Trichinopoly whatever
they had Power to extort — But what does this prove?
only that Nabobs have been Tyrants and have used their
Power to exact as much as that Power could obtain, and
that the Tributaries have resisted that Power as much as
they could — We are not acquainted with what happened
in Tanjour in the Time of Ally Dost Cawn but supposing
it to be as the Nabob States it what is the Result? That
the Rajah of Tanjour by the Superior Power of that Nabob
was in great Danger of losing his Life, and Kingdom —
but that he escaped with both by the still Superior Power
of the Mahrattas — The Expedition into the Tanjore Coun-
try concerted by Admiral Bickerton & Governor Boyer
proves nothing to the Points before us — it was founded
on true Asiatic Principles and as We think it does us
Honor to an English Admiral or English Governor We
beg Leave to draw a Veil over it — Those who may be
inclined to read it may find a better Account of it than
is given by the Nabob, in Orme's History Edition of 1763 Book
2 page 111 &c. — It seems as little to the Purpose to quote
what was done by Hidayet Mohey-eddeen Cawn & Chunda
— the Nabob was in no Condition at that time to give
the Rajah the Assistance he said he did: but if he did
give him any Support, 'twas for his own sake, and in a
joint Cause, as the Expedition of Hidayet Mohey-eddeen

Cawn

seeing the Mahrattas in a fair Way of getting Possession of the Mysore Country he has Hopes of support from them or even probably the actual Promise of Support. Some Promise of effectual Assistance We think he must have and as it is impossible he can hope for any help from Hyder who is not able to support himself, it cannot as We conceive be from any other but the Mahrattas.

D ..... It is hardly necessary to make any Remark on the Assistance given by the Nabob in the Defence of Madras, and in the Reduction of Pondicherry: the Transactions of those Times are recent & Publick and it might seem ungenerous to mention the great Distress to which he was reduced untile the Capture of Pondichery by the English Arms restored him to Splendor; but it is worthy of remark that from the Commencement of the National War between England & France, the Nabob considers himself as no Party in the War otherwise than as a voluntary Auxiliary to the English & that in Case of a future War he speaks of his intended Assistance merely as a voluntary Aid: and it is no Wonder he should so for if the 8th. Article of the Treaty of Paris be, as it has been explained to Us by Sir John Lindsay an Alliance with the Nabob and a Guarantee to him of the peaceable Possession of the Carnatic, France is as much his Ally & Guarantee as England: of Course a War between England and France ought not to affect him, who might upon this Reasoning remain perfectly neuter: and therefore in Case of such a War, if he should declare for the English it would be a more voluntary Aid — but were these the Ideas of the 8th Article of the Treaty of Paris at the Time

its

it was made? — as We have in other Remarks on former Letters of the Nabob spoke more at large on this Subject We refer thereto. It is unjust ungenerous & uncandid in the Nabob to say that We are inattentive to the Security Honor & Dignity of this Government for the same Imputations may be said on Us for refusing any Services the Nabob's Ambition or secret Designs may require of Us. Since in the present Case our not acting in the precipitate Manner which he desires does not proceed from Inattention but from our Apprehension of Danger from the Mahrattas and of the Nabob's Design to compel Us into an offensive Alliance with them.

E ——— This is an Instance of Misrepresentation and want of Candour so Striking that it scarcely requires a Remark. That the Rajah's Conduct was disapproved by this Government has been stated in many Places of the Records. We cannot say what verbal Answer was made by Mr. Bourchier but We think if he said that neither Money (the Pishcush excepted) or Troops could be demanded of the Rajah by Virtue of the Treaty of 1762 he said right. But the Rajah may nevertheless with great Propriety be called to Account if his Conduct be culpable in Instances not comprehended in the Subject of the Treaty of 1762, of the Rajah by his Original Tenure were obliged to furnish Troops that original Obligation still rests on him. For it was not diminished and could not be enforced by any subsequent Treaty. It is indeed generally understood that by the Custom of Indostan all tributary States are obliged to furnish Troops when called upon by the Power to which they are Tributary. but at the same time it is

certain

certain that the Compliance with such Demand depends on the Ability of such Power to enforce it: and such Compliance has generally been owing to temporary Convenience — in like Manner (as we have already said in these Remarks) the levying a Sum of Money can only be the Effect of Power. The Rajah has however given Grounds for many Pretences to treat him with Severity, he has not paid the Pesheush regularly — he did not furnish Assistance in the War, and he did furnish Provision and paid a Sum of Money to Hyder when he entered the Carnatick the Beginning of 1769, but in this he did no more than other Polygars who paid Money to save their particular Districts from Ravage, & which has not been alledged against them as a Crime: however We have not been influenced in his Favor by any of these Considerations, and have sufficiently explained in other Places our Intentions of calling him to Account at a proper & safe Time. If this Resolution the Nabob has had the strongest & repeated Assurances notwithstanding which he says "You now "tell me Likewise of not calling the Rajah to an Account, "&c." — which is not true, and a Reference to the Presidts Letter will prove that it is not — it is there said that 'tis not by virtue of the Treaty of 1762 that he is to be called to Account by us for his Transactions with the Maravar &c. but by Virtue of the Company's Friendship & Alliance with the Nabob — the Truth is that because We will not be compelled by the Nabob into Hostilities against the Rajah at the Instant that he would have us to answer his political Views & which We think Dangerous therefore it follows according to the Nabob's

Reasoning

Reasoning, that the Treaty was made only to bind them.
What Reply can be made to such Malevolence? it refutes
itself by its glaring Injustice.

F ——— This is as void of Truth & Candour as
the rest — We need only refer to the Proceedings at the Time
& the Sentiments of the Court of Directors thereon (see their
Letter of 30 December 1763) To the Question, For what Pur-
pose was it We took the Agreement? the proper Answer
is — to Set reasonable Bounds to the Nabobs Ambition
& Injustice & to ensure to him the Payment of 26 Lacks
of Rupees & the annual Sum of four Lacks of Rupees
as a Stipulated Tribute or acknowledged Superiority.

— The Nabob having a few Lines before misquoted our
Words as Dissuading or forbidding him to call the Rajah
to an Account, now Says "By Gods Blessing I will
"call him to an Account" — The Nobility of the Nabobs
Style in the peremptory Declaration is deserving of
Notice, as it makes a Consciousness of Independency
to which he has had but very late Pretensions — Whether
he is right or wrong in this Conduct, We leave to Ca-
suists to Determine — We are clear in this Point, that
it is our Duty both as Company's Servants & British
Subjects to maintain their Power, & the national
Influence unimpaired in this Country & to oppose as
We can, his Views of Independency: for if he succeeds
in it We must in our Turn be dependent on him —
There is no Medium.

G ——— Our Application to the Nabob
was to know what Sums he could secure to us or what
certain Support he could give us in Case We should
undertake

undertake an Expedition against Tanjour at this Time and should thereby bring on ourselves an Attack from the Mahrattas or Sonbah before We should have accomplished our Views on Tanjour since We have no Resources of our own to bear us thro' such Difficulties — The Nabobs Answer to this is that in Case of Peace & Tranquility (which is not the Case of Difficulty We suggested) he will pay to the Company before the Expiration of the year the Money due to them but in Case of Troubles (which is the Case of Difficulty We suggested) he will pay, as far as he can without expressing any Sum so that it must at this Rate rest upon his Integrity, as it did at the Conclusion of the last War to swear that he cannot assist Us with any Money unless We will blindly adopt all his Schemes, one of which Schemes is (beyond all Doubt with Us) an offensive Alliance with the Mahrattas.

H———————— And therefore because these Matters relate to the Company's private Concerns they Do not enter into the Nabobs Consideration at all — We believe it but then it becomes by so much the more an Object of our first Attention and in Proportion as the Nabob disregards the Company's Interests We must in our Concerns with him be more guarded. The declared Intention of the Letter to the Nabob to which this is an Answer was to state to him the Difficulties which occurred to Us in prosecuting a War with Tanjour, and to know from him what Aid he could afford Us in the Removal of the first Difficulty namely Money — for we tell him that our own Means even in time of Peace, will hardly bear Us thro' our Current Expences — When our Means fail Us in time of

Trouble

Fort St. George 6th May 1771.

Trouble & We are loaded with an additional Burthen of a War extended probably to the most Distant parts of our Territories, as well as the Nabob's How are We to maintain that Burthen? was not this a necessary Question when We had so important a Subject before Us? when the Nabob so earnestly pressed the Invasion of Tanjour? Had We not a Right to expect an explicit Answer from him, before We could come to a Conclusion? An Answer he does give and it is worth analyzing. The Company says he have ever Love my current Expences, & have trusted to my Honor & future Abilety for being repaid — Therefor I have a Right to insist on their continuing to defray all my Expences both Current & extraordinary — the former We will repay — the latter which We tell him We cannot find Means to advance & will soon cease to Lacks, he will neither assist Us in maintaining nor will he promise to repay Us what We can contrive to lay out upon them — As to the Company's Wants & Expences, these he has no Concern in: his own must be first supplied, & Sink or Swim the Company must supply them — And for what? By what Obligation must they sacrifice all to his Interest, Ambition or Caprice? — Because he is the Company's firm Friend & has paid them more than a Crore & thirty Lacks of Pagodas principal, Money which they hazarded for his Safety & the Defence of his Gouvrament.

I ——————— We very well know that the Nabob swore over & over again he could not furnish Us with more Money than he did, (See our proceedings at & towards the Conclusion of the Peace) that when by this and other Distresses We were driven to the Necessity of making Peace

he

Fort St. George 6th of May 1771.

he then assured Us that he would & would bear the whole Charges of the War himself if We would continue it and pay an Army of 10000 Mahratta Horse besides — the Peace made he returned again to his former Protestations that he had no Money and would have had Us Disband 10000 Sepoys on that Account yet afterwards being pressed he paid above 16 Lacks of Pagodas between that time & June 1770 — This is the Nabob's good Faith — 'tis true the Nabob did propose to go to Camp determined as he said to drive the Enemy away or die in the Attempt — 'tis true he promised to pay off the Arrears of his own Horse — which had been a long Time lying inactive & refusing to act for want of Pay — 'tis true that he promised to bring off 5000 Hyder's Horse, to get a further Aid of Horse from Guddy — to engage the Polygars to send theirs — not one of all which Undertakings came to any thing, and altho' the Nabob after his Proposal of going to Camp was often pressed to do so and to put his Horse in Motion he could not be prevailed on to stir nor did any of his Horse move from Arcot until a very few Days before Hyder's Arrival at the Mount. Upon what Grounds then does he say that if his Advice had been followed the Disgrace would not have happened? Upon the Experience of the past We can venture to assert that We shall for ever be drawn into Disgrace if our Dependance be placed in him now that We have no Controul over him. We need make no remark on the Nabob's recital of the various Circumstances which ought to induce Us to undertake the Expedition against Tanjour without applying to him for Money — such as the Company's great Revenues on this Coast and in Bengal &c.a — if they do not speak intelligibly the

Nabob's

Fort St. George 6th May 1771.

Nabob's sense of the Obligation We are under to protect the Carnatick at the Company's own Risk nothing that We can say will set it in a clearer Light the Distresses the Country has suffered have certainly been great, but those by the Nabob's Oppressions We believe have been greater than all because they are without Intermission and the others are temporary by all which Oppressions We believe the Nabob has great Wealth in Store. We differ totally in Opinion from the Nabob, the Sending a Battalion of Sepoys &c. to encamp near Cullastah would have answered no other End than has been answered by marching a Detachment from Vellour to Trichinopoly which has served to awe the Rajah but has obtained no Satisfaction and it is not probable that Satisfaction can be obtained by any other means than the actual Attack of his Capital. Tis untrue that the Nabob was forbid to Send the People We sent him meaning our Officers commanding His Cavalry tis untrue We say in the Sense he quotes that Transaction, thus it was, he proposed to Send those Troops either to the Borders of the Tanjour Country or to join the Maravar and asked the President whether he would allow the Company's Officers to follow his Directions to which the President replied that he would, except only that they should not commit any Acts of Hostility without the express Permission and Authority of the Board upon which the Nabob promised to send to the President a Copy of his Instructions for the Proceedings of those Troops which he did not do, nor have the Troops marched. The Sending the Letter to the Rajah is of this Service that whenever We march against him, We have the just Plea, that he refused our friendly Council

and

and thereby has compelled Us to use Force.

K ~~~~~ We have sufficiently explained in other Places what were our Motives for encouraging Hyder with hopes of Assistance, But had it come to the Point of money alone We have no Doubts but that Hyder would have provided against that Difficulty & certainly We Should not have moved a Man untill he had provided against it. these invidious Reproaches prove more Strongly the Nabobs Animosity than any thing We can say. In May 1770 when Accounts were received of Madavarow's having taken some Places in the Mysore Country & of his Intention of remaining in the Balaghaut notwithstanding the Season of the year: from which it appeared that Procrastination would avail Us no longer & that we should soon be under the Necessity of assisting Hyder Ally or the Mahrattas. The Committee thought it expedient to consult with the Nabob with respect to the Part We ought to take in Case We were drove to that Necessity The Nabob urged the Propriety of joining the Mahrattas & the Committee on the other hands represented the Expediency of supporting Hyder Ally as a Barrier against them. But We do not remember that it was ever actually proposed to assist Hyder Ally and punish the Mahrattas. The Nabob took Care to obviate any Proposal of that Kind, by the inflexible & passionate Animosity which he Shewed to Hyder If we had ever formed such a Design it must have been with the Nabob's Concurrence – his hearty Concurrence – We might have undertaken to have obliged the Mahrattas to relinquish their Designs on the Mysore Country: not depending solely on the Ability we possessed, but on the Means he could furnish Us. – Without them We could

almost

almoth as ill Support a War with the Mahrattas only, as Alliance with Hyder as We could now a War with the Mahrattas & with Tanjour without an Ally. It seems more probable to Us that the Rajah is encouraged in his Conduct by the Mahrattas than that the Mahrattas will be encouraged by his Example it is the Interest both of the Mahrattas and the Rajah to weaken the Power of the Carnatick and they will disturb it whenever they can, the former to get the money, the Latter from Apprehension of Danger to himself if the Nabob should grow powerful.

L ——— We do not know what Expression of the Field Deputies the Nabob alludes to. Agreeable to desire he will explain it, as well as a Hint of the Tanjorine paying Money mentioned in the Passage of the Nabob's Letter referred to marked K.

M ——— In this Concluding Paragraph the Nabob in the fullness of his Hope & Expectation that under the the present Favor of the Crown he may obtain every Superiority and full Controul of the Company that in very plain Terms expresses the Cause of all the Heartburnings which have so clearly manifested themselves of Late — Had the Companys Troops — says he — after the taking of Pondicherry <u>been put under my Orders</u> the Late War and the present Business — meaning that of Tanjore — would not have come to the Pass they have — he even says he desired and it was promised him. We hope however for the Honor of the Governor & Council that no such Promise was ever made not even in the Hurry of Eastern Compliment — When our Army sat down before Vellour in the year 1761 the Nabob being present Mortiz Ally Cawn the Phouzdar of that Place upon a Cowle of Safety from the English Commanding

manding Officer — for he would not trust the Nabob — came out to pay the Nabob a Visit and to confer & compromise with him the Demand that had been made of Money, it happened to be a rainy Day & the Nabob received him in his Tent, after the first Ceremonies he expressed his Amazement that the Nabob should expose himself in a Tent on an open Plain in such Weather when his House was so near adding & pointing to the Fort — that is your House, — this Compliment to the Nabob then besieging the Fort was not more Outré than an Offer or Promise of putting the Company's Troops under his Orders would have been. We know not whether in that Case the late War or the present Business would ever have happened or whether the Company would have had any Existence now on the Coast, But we think had the Gov.r & Council given up themselves and the Company's Troops to the Nabob's Disposal it is not difficult to ascertain the Plan on which they would have been employed the Tenor of the Nabob's Conduct points out clearly that the Conquest of the Tanjore Country — of the Mysore Possessions in the Payen Ghaut and the Possession of the Decan are Objects of which his Ambition has never lost Sight, But what is more astonishing than all is that he should propose to effect these Purposes by the Assistance of the Mahrattas, who are themselves so manifestly aiming at the Conquest of the whole.

Lieut.t Adam Gordons

The President acquaints the Board that Lieutenant Adam Gordon died yesterday at Pomamalé

Lieutenants Bishop & Alex.r Gordon appointed Lieutenants

There being two Vacancies for Lieutenants in the Room of Lieutenant Gordon abovementioned &

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Lieutenant Evan Evans who was killed on the Expedition against Callicoole, as advised by Mr. Colsford in his Letter entered in the preceding Diary — Ensigns Benjamin Bevan Bishop & Alexander Gordon are approved Lieutenants in their Room.

The President lays before the Board two Letters from William Henry Elliott who was Dismissed the Service & had entered into the Nabobs Acting with that the Nabob having also turned him out of his Service, he was reduced to the greatest Distress: That he was ready to Deliver himself up: but requesting that he might not be sent to England where he had no Friends & desiring to be reinstated in the Nabobs Service: That the President had ordered the Secretary to acquaint him that in Consideration of his Distress he would be allowed 8 Pags. p.r Month untill the Departure of the first Ship for Europe: But as he had already deceived us by absconding, no Advance could be made him but if he could find Means of subsisting himself untill a Ship sails for England, the above Allowance would be paid on his embarking thereon — which the Board approve.

Jon. Du Pré
Warren Hastings.

John Smith
Geo. Stratton
Henry Brooke
John Whitehill
Geo. Mackay

Fort St. George 7th May 1771

Received the following Letter from Lieut Col. Lang.

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr.
President & Council of Fort St. George

Honorable Sir & Sirs

Letter from Lt Col Lang

I send herewith the Proceedings of the General Court Martial held on Lieut Collins.

delivers over the Command of Trichinopoly to General Smith

In Obedience to your Directions in your Letter addressed to the several Commanding Officers of our Garrisons I have resigned the Command of this Garrison to General Smith

I am
Honble Sir & Sirs
Your very humble & Obedient Servant
Ross Lang

Trichinapolie
May 2d 1771

9th Came in the following Letter from John Andrews Esqr. Chief at Vizagapatam.

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr.
President & Governor & Council of
Fort St. George.

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter from Mr. Andrews sends 3 Companies of Sepoys to Chicacole

Agreeable to your Commands of the 3d Instant. I immediately ordered three Companies of Sepoys to join the six Companies already at Cicacole & should have ordered two more had I not received a Letter from Mr. Colfords informing me that they had possessed themselves of Calicoole Fort & that the Rajah had surrendered himself to him which made it unnecessary

I am with respect
Honble Sir & Sirs

Your

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Vizagapatam
29th April 1771

Your most obedient
humble Servant
John Andrews

10th Wrote the following Letter to Chief & Council at Cuddalore

To George Dawson Esqr.
Chief &c. Council at Cuddalore
Gentlemen

Letter to Cuddalore with Report of Committee of Accounts.

Enclosed you will receive an Extract from the Report of the Committee of Accounts with our Orders thereon

We are
Gentlemen
Your affectionate Friends
&c Council

Fort St. George
10th May 1771

13th Recieved the following Letters.

To the Honble Josias Du Pre Esqr.
President & Governor & Co. Council of
Fort St. George

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter from Mr. Wynch advising of the Arrival of two Speedwells at Mazulipatam with Invalids.

I have had the Honor to receive your Commands of the 1st Instant by the Snow Speedwell. The Officers & Soldiers mentioned therein are landed, and the former with the two effective Soldiers will proceed to Ellore in a Day or two. I am with much Respect

Honble Sir & Sirs
Your most obedient humble Servant
Alexander Wynch

Mazulipatam
8th May 1771.

Letter from Chief. Bombay acknowledging the Receipt of the Orders for appointing Mr. Duffin to be Surgeon at Mocha.

Honble Sir & Sirs

I have received your Letter regarding the

Fort St. George 13th May 1775.

the Appointment of Mr. William Duffin Surgeon to this Garrison in Consequence of which Mr. Peters acting at present will proceed to Vellour on the Arrival of the other.

I have the Honor to be with profound Respect

Hon'ble Sir & Sirs

Your most humble &
most obedt Servant
A. Bonjour

Madura
the 7th May 1775.

Monday 13th May

At a Consultation, Present
Josias Du Pré Esqr Governor President.
Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley
John Smith, George Stratton
Henry Brooke Richd Brickenden
John Whitehill, George Mackay.

Read the following Report of Committee of Stores.

To the Hon'ble Josias Du Pré Esqr
President & Governor &c. Council of
Fort St. George

Hon'ble Sir & Sirs

Report of Committee of Stores with List of Stores to be sent to Trichinopoly recommending a Place may be built on the Island for Sift Powder

Having taken into Consideration Genl. Smith's Indent of Stores from Trichinopoly referred to Us by the Governor we have carefully compared it with the Store in this Garrison & at Vellour and are of Opinion that those mentioned in the accompanying List may be shared from the different Places specified therein. And with Respect to the Stores referred by General Smith to the Engineer we beg Leave to

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to lay before your Honor &c. a List of such as Lieut Colo Ross thinks may be necessary, but even this he cannot determine with any Degree of Precision, as he is unacquainted with the Nature of the Service they are to be employed in.

Having observed that great Quantities of Powder Dust are lost by its being sifted in an open Place We beg Leave to recommend that a Slight Building of 16 Feet by 12 be erected on the Island which the Engineer is of Opinion may be done with Propriety, and he will set about it immediately if it meets with your Approbation.

We are with Respect
Honble Sir & Sirs
your most obedient humble Servants
Geo. Stratton
J Butler
Patrick Ross
} Committee of Stores.

Fort St. George
8 May 1771.

Orders thereon

Ordered that the several Stores mentioned in the List accompanying the above Report except the Gunpowder be forwarded to Trichinopoly — and that a Building for sifting Powder be erected on the Island as recommended by the Committee.

Report of the Committee of Accounts read on which the following Orders are made,

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr.
President & Governor &c. Council of
Fort St. George

Honble Sir & Sirs

We have examined the Accounts of the Out Garrisons for the Month of February and have only the

Report of Committee of Accounts with Orders thereon.

Fort St. George 13th May 1771.

The following Remark to offer to your Honor &c.a
In the Paymasters Account from Orders Thereon
Vellour We observe he has charged The Military Storekeeper
for 750 Country Gunnies for Shot acquaints the Board that having
Bags &c.a at 3 ℔ Pag.a We are wrote to Mr. Monhouse on the
informed, that the Country Gun- Subject he was informed by him
nies are much better than those that the Gunnies were purchased
of Bengal Yet We cannot help in a hurry when they were much
observing that the Price is very wanted & that he was glad to get
high. them at any Price — with which
the Board are satisfied.

We are Honble Sir & Sirs

Fort St. George
18th April 1771.

Your most obedient humble Servants
Richd. Brickenden Warren Hastings.
Franc.s Sourdan Samel. Ardley
John Holland John Smith
Wm. Petrie Geo. Stratton

The Pitchcush to the Soubah due the 31st March paid

The President reports to the Board that Mr. Wynch has informed him that the Pitchcush of one Lack of Rupees to the Soubah due the 31st. March last has been paid him agreeable to the Treaty.

Mr. Wynch's Bill for Secret Services allowed

The President also acquaints the Board that Mr. Wynch had transmitted to him a Bill for Secret services amounting to Rupees 708 from 30 Sept.r last & which appeared very reasonable — ordered that the same be allowed.

Ens.n Moir Dies

The President acquaints the Board that Ensign Alex.r Moir died at Trichinopoly the 5th Inst.t

The Secretary lays before the Board a Letter from General Smith setting forth that Mr. John

Haigh

Fort St. George 13th May 1773.

Haigh who was Dismissed by the Sentence of a Court Martial & put on the List of Cadets had been strongly recommended to him by Colonel Hart for his good Behaviour. The President also acquaints the Board that Mr. Wynch had wrote to him to the same Effect.

Mr John Haigh appointed an Ensign

Ordered that an Ensign's Commission be granted to Mr John Haigh to rank from this Day.

The Nabobs Accounts not arrived from Madura & Palamcotah

The Commissary General Reports to the Board that the Nabob's Accounts are come in from the several Out Garrisons except from Madura & Palamcotah & that he cannot for want of these close the Account to be delivered to the Nabob.

Letter to be wrote the Paymaster.

Ordered that a Letter be immediately wrote to the Paymaster, acquainting him therewith, & that unless his Accounts were forwarded by the 1st. Instant he can assign very sufficient Reasons for their not having been transmitted agreeable to the Orders sent him he may expect our severest Censure.

Read the following Letters.

Sirs

Letter from Mr Jourdan on the Subject of Mr Bean's Demand on the Company.

I have received your Letter of the 6th with the Papers regarding Mr Bean inclosed.

It appears by the Manila Consultations Feb. 1761 that Mr Nodes Paymaster at Cavita having applied for an Assistant, Mr Bean who had lately belonged to the Havannah was recommended by Mr Drake as a proper Person for that Business and was accordingly appointed with an Allowance of thirty Dollars p Month, the same Pay as the former Assistant Lead had. But the Revenge having

arrived

arrived shortly after, I cannot say whether he went to Cavita in Consequence of that Appointment.

I do not recollect that the Council were consulted on any Application to Capt. Madge for Permission for Mr. Bean to remain.

The usual pay of a Monthly Writer was sixteen Dollars p Month but 30 Dollars were allowed to the Assistant at Cavita in Consideration of its Distance from Manila, which in many Cases caused an Increase of Expences.

I have long since explained my Reasons for refusing Charge of the Company's Cash at Manila, it is therefore unnecessary for me to add any thing on that Subject. Mr. Bean by the Desire of Mr. Drake attended to the Shipping of the Off.

I am Sir

Your most obedient Servant

Fran.s Sourdan

May 16th 1771.

To Mr. John Maxwell Stone
Secretary for the Military Department
at Fort St. George

Sir

Letter from Mr. Cowper on the same Subject

I have been favoured with your Letter of the 23d Ult.o accompanied by an Extract from the Orders of the Court of Directors of the 23d March 1770 and Copy of a Letter from Mr. Drake to the President and Council.

In respect to the Information required by the Court of Directors in the abovementioned Extract, I am to acquaint you, that I do not know whether Application was made to Captain Madge for Mr. Bean, by the

Fort St. George 13th. May 1771.

the Deputy Governor & Council or Deputy Governor only but I have the Heat, and intirely believe, that on Account of the Want of Hands for transacting the Company's Business he was applied for in order to be employed as an Assistants in one of the Offices. Nor do I remember the Time of his being entertained at Manila: but I imagine it may be easily ascertained by referring to the Date of his Discharge from the Ship Havannah. I do not recollect any other monthly Writers that served at Manila but the late Captain Hector Mackay who went on the Expedition as such & had the same Allowance continued to him that he received in that Character when at Madrass which was ten Pagodas or 16 Dollars p.r Mensem: but this Allowance was by no means adequate to the Expences of a Person in the Character of a Gentleman, even with the Strictest Oeconomy: & 30 Dollars appears to me but a very moderate one when compared with the high Prices which every necessary of Life then bore at Manila; in support of which Opinion besides what has been represented on a former Occasion it may not be unnecessary to observe here that the Deputy Governor & Council after due Enquiry and Consideration found it necessary to allow a Gratuity of 20 Dollars p.r Mensem to the Subaltern Military Officers. I am

Sir

Your most obedient Humble Servt.

D.r Cranfurd

Masulipatam
3.d May 1771.

Ordered that Copies of the foregoing Letter

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Letter to be transmitted to the Court of Directors

Read the following Letter from Ensign

Francis O'Donnell.

Gentlemen

Letter from Ensign O'Don. nell complaining of his not having received his full Batta from Mr Cotsford.

I find myself necessitated humbly to lay before you, the Injustice done me by Mr. Cotsford Resident at Ganjam in allowing me no Batta whatsoever for the Journey I made in May last pursuant to your Orders from Fort St. George, to Ganjam, nor any from thence to Aska where I went by his own Order, I acquainted him with this Resolution having already made him several Remonstrances to no purpose, I therefore request you would be pleased to order that I should be justified Having the Honor to be all Respect & Deference

Gentlemen

Your most humble & most obedient Servant

Fr. O'Donnell

Ensign 1st Circar Batt.

Vizagapatam
the 25th April 1771.

ordered that a Copy of the foregoing Letter be sent to Mr. Cotsford.

The following Letter from Sir John Lindsay received the 8th Instant it now read

Gentlemen

Madras 8th May 1771

Letter from Sir John Lindsay disapproving of our measures.

The Subjects of my two last Letters to you and of yours of the 25th Ultimo which I have had the honor of receiving appear to me of great Importance, and

merit

Fort St. George 13th May 1771.

merit in my Opinion a very cool & candid Discussion. I shall therefore endeavor to give every Explanation which you seem to think necessary — for I look upon it as an indispensible Part of my Duty to give my Sentiments of Measures with great Freedom. To Men I make no Application But, I should be unworthy of the Trust reposed in me, if I remained here an Idle Spectator, when I saw a political Management which I thought I had Cause to disapprove, and which from the Lights I have received, does not appear to me, by any Means the most eligible to promote to the best Advantage, the real Interests either of your Constituents or of the Publick. The Task is disagreeable, but I have the Misfortune, to think it necessary. I am not at all surprised then to see the harshest Constructions put both upon my Words & Actions. but I look on them with great Indifference. No Man wishes more to gain the good Opinion of Individuals than I do: but I will not pay too dear for it. As I am conscious of the Integrity of my Intentions, not even the threatened History of my Conduct shall deter: nor shall the more pleasing Consideration of partial Friendship induce me to deviate in the least from what I think my Duty to my Sovereign, to my Country, and even to your Constituents.

Arguing the Impropriety of the Peace with Hyder ally.

2.

As I look upon the Peace concluded between Hyder Ally and this Presidency in April 1769, as the principal Cause of the present threatening Appearance of Troubles which may be very ruinous to the Carnatick, and which may have very dangerous Consequences to the Company's Interests on the Coast of Coromandel and even to the British Influence in India. I took the Liberty to animadvert

animadvert upon it with that Freedom which I thought it Deserved. At the Time of concluding it Troubles and Embarassments were apprehended from the defensive Alliance, and political Necessity was assigned as the only excuse for it. From all the Accounts I have been able to procure of the Situation of Affairs at that Time I cannot be satisfied of the Expediency of the Measure: & I beg Leave to acquaint you that I have other Materials in my Hands, which I have not received, either from the Nabob or his Ministers such as I fancy you yourselves would allow to be authentic.

Disclaims all Partiality to the Nabob

3 Without the least Partiality to the Nabob (and I am ashamed Gentlemen you make this Explanation necessary) without the smallest Influence of Party Zeal or the most distant Idea of Resentment against you or any of the Company's Servants. — I endeavoured to State the Case to you fairly as it appeared to me. This you look upon as an Endeavour to urge, to press, to excite, to Stimulate — allow it — allow all I said to be Arguments to support the Cause I might have thought the most reasonable surely there is no Contradiction nor Impropriety in my telling you whom I have allowed to be Judges in so great a Cause: that notwithstanding all these I will not take upon me to advise or give an Opinion; but refer it to you who are well acquainted with Secret Springs of Action unknown to me: and who may have very substantial Reasons for following a System of Politicks totally different from what appears to me to be expedient.

Expediency of preserving Peace with the Mahrattas

4 The Mahrattas are most certainly

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certainly the greatest Power in India and at present exceedingly formidable. Therefore I repeat it that I think a Warr with them ought from every Principle of sound Policy to be avoided, as Affairs are at present circumstanced. Were all the three Presidencies united — were they unanimous in their Councils & vigorous in their Measures. Could they establish such an Alliance amongst the Indian Powers as to present a tolerable Prospect of Success — Then perhaps this great Power might be somewhat restrained, and by such Means their Consequence in India greatly diminished: But surely it is by no means advisable for this Presidency & the Carnatick with all the Assistance which Hyder Aly can give to provoke the Resentment of Mahadanow, who notwithstanding your firm Resolution to protect & defend the Carnatick and the Nabob's Person and Government may carry Fire & Sword into the very Heart of his Dominions: and then the Nabob may good Reason to be afraid for his Safety and that of his Country from other Hands than yours — It did not appear to me when I mentioned the Nabob being apprehensive for his Safety and that of his Country, that there was any great Necessity to make the Application to yourselves. But since you think there is an Ambiguity in the Expression Let this suffice to remove it.

To do every thing in my Power to

maintain and to preserve Peace in the Carnatick is one great Object of my Mission. It was this that made me express my Disapprobation of the Peace in 1769 as in short it appeared to me to lay the Foundation of new Warr which might be infinitely more Dangerous & of

much

My Answer to the Nabob's Proposal of a Commission for Meeting to be made by the Nabob with the Mahrattas

much worse Consequences than any thing to be apprehended from Hyder. It was this that made me wish the Conditions of that Treaty might not be fulfilled, as I foresaw a War with the Mahrattas as a certain Consequence, and it was at all to avoid this War by every possible Mean that drew from me my Letter of the 18th Ultimo. If this can be effected without sending Assistance either to Hyder or Mahdarow so much the better and it will make me exceedingly happy. But I know not whether the Nabob will agree to the Compromise which you propose as a Remedy. He may think it hard perhaps to be obliged to pay the Expence of Wars in which he only looked upon himself as an Auxiliary, and also to pay a Sum of Money to the Mahrattas who threaten his Country on Account of a Peace to which he neither consented nor approved. Nevertheless I will mention this Proposal to the Nabob. But I cannot urge him to it as an Affair either of Justice or Equity and I must leave him to judge of the Expediency and necessity. Though at the same time I beg Leave to assure you, that no good Office of mine shall ever be wanting to do every thing possible to preserve Peace in the Carnatick, Security to the Company's Possessions and to give every Assistance in my Power to their Servants.

6

It has ever been the farthest from my Mind to Stimulate or urge you to a War, when there was the most distant prospect of a Peace as an Alternative and my Ideas of the Measures which the Company's Representatives ought to prosecute in India are perfectly conformable to the Commands of your Masters. To become Parties in any Quarrels between the Country Powers is

by

Your proves of War, but that cannot be a reason, dissuading to be informed which part is most eligible to side with.

by no means the Business of a Commercial Body. But any thing I have advanced upon the Subject has been on the Supposition that a War with one or other of the two Powers was not to be avoided. If Peace could be obtained, and maintained, without assisting either the Mysoreans or Marhattas, I have told you it would make me exceedingly happy. But upon the Supposition it could not: I asked you which you thought the most eligible Friend and which the most dangerous Enemy?

Political Necessity may oblige us to break the Treaty with Hyder Ally

7 The same political Necessity which made you comply with Hyder's Terms, may in one Day perhaps make you break with him, however much against your Inclination. Should this happen the political Necessity must excuse the Breach of the Treaty. I could with with all my Heart that the Reputation of the English was as much respected as ever in India, and that Fidelity to every Treaty they ever made was inviolably observed. But this I am afraid would be difficult. I have heard it reported that the Nizam had joined the Marhattas and did intend to claim the Assistance you promised him by the Treaty of 1768. I do not lay the least Stress on Reports as there are many false for one that is true. But Supposing it was so would not you find some Difficulty in fulfilling both the Treaty of 1768 and that of 1769.

Necessity of maintaining the Treaty between the Nabob & Tanjour

8 This leads me to consider the Difference between the two Treaties mentioned in my former Letters. I mean the one between the Nabob & the Rajah of Tanjour and guaranteed by this Presidency and the other between this Presidency & Hyder Ally Cawn. The first you yourselves made, and every Article of it was framed under your Direction

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Direction — And to shew your Regard to the Peace & Tranquillity of this Country, you became bound to see both Parties fulfill the Terms of the Treaty. The Rajah is a Tributary of the Nabob, and the Nabob's Interests are so inseparably connected with yours that the establishing His Authority and strengthening His Hands is in fact serving yourselves — Nay instead of diminishing His Influence: if it was possible to make the Tributaries more dependant on the Nabob it would be much better for the Company's Affairs. As this Ally would in Proportion to his Strength have it in his Power to be a more usefull Friend. A strict Attention to the Terms of this Treaty fulfilled, is not only Politick and expedient. But it is easy & I should suppose always in your Power. For all these Reasons I recommend your assisting the Nabob as Guarantee to reduce the rebellious Rajah to his Obedience.

Danger of supporting Hyder Ally.

9 Your Treaty with Hyder Ally in 1769 appears to me in a very different Light. You received it from the Mouth of an Enemy whom it would seem you then thought your Superior: and what appeared to you to be political Necessity obliged you to acquiesce in the Terms. And as those Troubles & Embarassments which were foreseen have already in some Measure happened and may be still more Serious: I fancy it will be no easy Matter to fulfill the Terms without running the Risk of greater Dangers. Should the Mahrattas persist in their Requisition Do you think it will be for the Interest of your Employers to aid all for Hyder Ally: whose former Connexions with the French are well known. Who at this Day is receiving & entertaining both Men & Officers from that Nation: & whose Interests in every Respect

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will make it convenient for him to join our Enemy should ever a National War happen? — Hence in my Opinion it need not seem Strange, that I recommended supporting the Nabob's Authority over his own Subjects. Nor need it be thought extraordinary, should an unavoidable Necessity dispose such a Society which owes its Existence to the same Cause.

Unreasonableness of supposing that the Mahrattas are encouraged by the Nabob

10. I cannot persuade myself you are Serious when you mention the Nabob's encouraging the Mahrattas to persist in his Demands. The thing itself appears to me such an Absurdity that any Man should invite an Enemy to make Demands on him or his nearest Friends, when he knows & must foresee that the Consequence of a Refusal may be fatal to himself, and must be ruinous to his Country — And I have Ground to think that the Nabob knew too well who he had to deal with to expect that you would comply with their Requisitions without Serious Consideration or that they would have any Mercy on his Country should you refuse. The Experiment I think is too Dangerous to be hazarded by any Man of Sense, and therefore I cannot help thinking, that you are deceived by your Spies who think they do you a Service by bringing Reports to you without Foundation: Or even by making such themselves to answer a particular Purpose: which in the End may be found equally Disadvantageous both to the Nabob & to you.

Nothing binding to oppose the Company of their Possessions has ever passed between him & the Nabob.

11. As a Proof of the great Confidence you may place in Reports industriously propagated & carried, to your Presence, that happy Discovery of the Subject

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Subject of all the Conferences, Negociations and Business
I have been conducted so Secretly between the Nabob & me
since my Arrival, is one "That all these Views to Deprive
"the Company of some of, some of their Possessions."—
This Gentleman I Declare to you to be totally false, and
without the least Foundation: As I can with equal Truth
assure you, that no Such Intention was ever mentioned
or even Hinted, in any Part of the Conferences I have ever
had with the Nabob. I am happy in this Opportunity
to undeceive you in Such an essential Point, which
you will allow I hope, to be the only means in my Pow-
er to give you a precise Knowledge, of a Fact so interest-
ing. I never had any Intention of making a Secret to
you of what passed between the Nabob & me on Business
where either the Company or their Representatives were
concerned; neither is it any Part of my Intention to do
so — And therefore many things have been communicated
to you — and more may when the Expediency of Affairs
shall make it necessary. But as common Report has
been Deficient in some Particulars — and as the Gentle-
men from whom you receive your Information seem
either to have forgot or neglected to tell you, what has
made a Part of many a Conference I have had with the
Nabob: You will give me Leave to tell you, on many Occasions
I have heard the Nabob Speak of the Company with the
utmost Respect & Friendship: and he appeared to be highly
sensible of the Obligations he was under to them: But when
he saw others his Rivals & Enemies evidently preferred to
him by some of the Company's Servants, it hurt him ex-
cedingly. This certainly must have diminished
confidence, and give me Leave to ask you, as individuals,
if

if there be any one of Us all that would not have complained under such Circumstances? But even then the Nabob never utter'd a Word in my hearing against the Company whom he always calls his best Friends. I have always recommended Confidence & Harmony between him & the Company's Servants: and I wish with all my Heart it could be established on both Sides: to promote which I would gladly do any thing in my Power.

Regarding the introducing private Conversation into publick Letters

12

The first Conversation I had with your President of the two mentioned in our Letter was expressly on the Tanjore Affairs which I thought Business: Besides it was an Account of an absolute Fact, about the Want of Gun Carriages &c. Therefore I took the Liberty to mention it in my Letter. The other Conversation with the President & Mr. Hastings was positively agreed to be a private Conversation. Therefore all of Us might be a little free in our Opinion: when We were not considered in a publick Capacity: But whatever I might have said then, and notwithstanding of the excellent Purposes some of my Words have served in your Answer to my Letter. I now take the Liberty to assure you that no private Opinion of mine with Respect to the Company's making War or Peace, or any thing else shall ever affect the publick Business. And whenever I shall judge it necessary to put in Execution any part of the Powers with which I have the Honor to be invested — I shall be happy to communicate my Intentions to you & I shall be exceedingly grateful for your Advice & Assistance.

Does not blame Mr Lee not communicating with him.

When I say that the Want of

13.

confidential Communication has almost if not altogether prevented the Advantages which might have been

expected

expected from the Sanction of His Majesty's Authority to all your Negociations: I would be understood that it is by no means any Part of my Intention to blame you: but I cannot help regretting there has been the least Cause for any Altercation on this Subject: And I beg you would do me the Favor to look upon it in this Light. There does not appear to me any Necessity to adduce particular Instances of your refusing to Co-operate with me as King's Minister. The whole Tenor of your Correspondence from the Beginning and every thing that has passed between Us on that Head sufficiently evince that you do not acknowledge me in that Character. Neither do I pretend to blame you for it as it is possible you cannot do otherwise: but, I must likewise justify myself: when without acknowledging the Powers you seem to wish to charge to my Account whatever Consequences may happen by their Presence in India.

14 I have always understood, that the Nabobs Agreement to defray the Expences of seven Battalions of Sepoys which with other Expences the Company's Servants generally make amount to Four Lacks of Pagodas annually, was upon the Supposition that tho' under the Directions of the Servants of the Company they should be employed for the Defence of the Carnatick and for the Support of his Authority and Government. I find now however I have been egregiously mistaken: and that notwithstanding the immense Sums he pays to the Company, we cannot command the least Service from these Troops which he pays, nor is

Regarding the Sepoys &c.

there

there a Single Sepoy of all these which he can call his own.
It is not them paying Troops, it is only a softer Name
for paying an annual Tribute to the Company for Permis-
sion to the Prince of the Country to live unmolested by their
Servants in his own Dominions.

15. I acknowledge, that it appears
exceedingly Strange to me that the Authority of the Coun-
is suffered to be despised and insulted, and the Nabobs
other Tributaries who depend on him for Protection per-
mitted to be invaded & plundered by a Rebellious Rajah
when, the Money which he pays to the Company, if applied
to the Purposes for which it was intended would be Suffi-
cient to maintain a Body of Troops every way capable of
enforcing his Authority, and capable to oblige every Sub-
ject in his Dominions to pay that Respect to his Govern-
ment, which they ought. But it Seems these Troops are
by no Means intended to be of the least use to him, at least
he is not to be the Judge when they are necessary, nor how
they are to be employed. This is reserved for the Governor &
Council under whose Sole Direction they are to all Intents
and Purposes. And whatever he may think, Vile it is
their Pleasure they will not allow him the Smallest As-
sistance, Tho' repeatedly requested for the Support of his
Authority. — As it seems to be a fixed Maxim of Go-
vernment that these Seven Battalions of Sepoys which
the Nabob pays should be to all Intents & purposes as
much the Company's as any other Troops which they
pay out of their own Treasury — To make some Compensation
(I suppose) to the Nabob for the annual Revenue of about
four Lacks of Pagodas which he pays into your Cash, you

were

were some Time ago pleased to indulge him with a few of your Officers to assist in forming & disciplining some other Troops which he had under his own Orders: but the moment he thinks he wants their Service you order those Officers which you lent him, to leave him and to join their respective Corps to which you appointed them in the Company's Troops. These are not the means Gentlemen of convincing the Nabob that either the Company or their Servants have any great Regard to his Interest: and it is rather an uncommon Way of giving Proofs of Friendship.

Relative to the Proposal made him of obtaining the Mahratta Friendship.

16 I have already explained to you what occurred to me on the Subject of the Tanjore Business and with Respect to the present Situation of Affairs between the Maharattas and Hyder Ally. But your positive Declaration that you decline Compliance with the Maharatta Requisition fixes one Point. I wish with all my Heart the Blessings of Peace may be continued by any other Means And as I have already said in my last you Gentlemen are the Judges in this great Cause I have only taken the Liberty to mention what occurred to me on the Subject: but the Decision is left to you, who can best Answer for the Consequences. — It would perhaps be much better not to comply with the Requisition of Mahadarow, if it could possibly be avoided: but should this be impossible whether is it better to yield so far to the Necessity of the Times, and by granting Assistance to obtain the proposed Advantages — Or to persist in the Refusal, and by that Means to involve yourselves & the Nabob in a certain War with a Power greatly your Superior: and which may prove fatal to the Nabob's Safety & that of his Country, and ruin to the Company's Interest on the Coast of Coromandel? This

Consult

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However I submit to your Judgment.

17 You say no such offer as Friendship for Friendship has been made to you from the Maharatta & if it be to me your request my Acceptance of it, and that you will Subscribe to it chearfully. At the same time you acknowledge the Existence of your Engagements to assist Hyder Ally and that I know them. I likewise know, that when I came here you were determined to assist him and from the whole of your Reasoning upon this head it appears plain to me that it is not for want of Inclination to this Friend but Circumstances forbid your sending the Company's Troops to fight in his Cause against the Maharattas — and yet you desire me to embrace their Friendship and say you will subscribe to it. — Do you really think Gentlemen that I should be the Dupe of such a Piece of Absurdity? Upon what Terms can you expect to receive the Friendship of one Power while you acknowledge the Force of the Obligations you are under to assist their Enemy against them?

Regarding the Conduct of Tanjour

18 I know no Part of the Nabob's Instructions upon the Rajah of Tanjore but your Opinion that it is not out of any Regard to the Marcwar &c. But that he wants either to reduce the Tanjorine & make an entire Conquest of his Country, or to raise a Contribution on the Rajah & punish him for his Conduct. — This may be true as it is perfectly conformable to what I know of Indian Politicks, to punish the Man who disturbs their Government & raises Troubles in their Dominions & to make him as incapable of the like for the Future as possible. This is very natural and I believe a very prevailing political Maxim and which every Superior would put in Execution if he could. —

could. — At the Same Time it is but reasonable to suppose that he will have much more Regard for those who pay Obedience to his Government & who acknowledge his Authority than those who do not.

Reasonable to suppose that the Rajah is encouraged by Hyder rather than by the Mahrattas

19. At the Treaty of Peace concluded with Hyder in 1769 He then was the Friend of the Rajah of Tanjore and by his Influence with you the Rajah was included in the Treaty. — Now you make the Mahrattas Friends to the Tanjorine, and tell me, that it was the Nabob's Intention to involve you in a War with him before you was in a Condition to do it effectually on Purpose to engage you in Hostilities with the Mahrattas who you say would support the Rajah. It is very natural to think that Hyder ally will support the Rajah of Tanjour against his superior as he is an Enemy to the Nabob: Nay I have more Reason than common Report to suppose that he receives Encouragement from the French to raise Troubles in the Carnatick — and from the many Instances of Friendship which the French Liberally bestow upon Hyder — It is even reasonable to suppose that they will not be backward in encouraging the Rajah of Tanjour, who seems so well disposed to throw off the Nabob's Authority. — But I never one entertained a Thought that he was to receive Encouragement from every quarter and that the Mahrattas also were to be his Friends. You must have better Reasons I suppose to form this Piece of political Speculation than what I have heard given. That Mahadarow would support the Rajah of Tanjour because he was of a Mahratta Family. — Such Connexions I apprehend are neither common nor permanent in this Country. Interest generally is the ruling Bond of Union. — But this Argu-

ment

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ment as Stated in your Letter would have answered the like purpose whoever had been the Friend & whoever had been the Enemy.

respecting the word Subterfuge used by him

20 When the Nabob made me acquainted with your Declaration that "you could do nothing on Account "of the Presence of such extraordinary Powers from the Crown" It never once entered into my Mind that you had the smallest Intention of concealing such a Declaration: As it was an Affair of so much Consequence to us all. And surely it was a Matter of the utmost concern to the Nabob to whom such Requisitions were made from a Power whose Army were on his Frontiers & threatening an Invasion in Case of Refusal. to know the Determination of the Representatives of the Company, who had the whole Power of his Dominions almost in their Hands. And when one known to acquaint me with it who could alone remove the Obstacle. And what could I think of such a Declaration in such Circumstances, but that you were determined to remain inactive, and should bad Consequences follow or should such Conduct be blamed afterwards you had an Argument ready at hand of which you meant to avail Yourselves? "That the Presence of such "Powers from the Crown prevented you from doing your Duty" Such a Conclusion was very natural. Therefore I made Use of the word Subterfuge which appeared perfectly applicable in Such Circumstances. But as it has given you so much Offence, I'm Sorry for it: and if you think there is any other milder Expression that would have conveyed my Ideas of such Conduct with equal justice, I shall be very happy in the Change.

21. I am convinced that you had no Intention that this should be revealed to me there from your

own

own Manner of Stating it: but you say you are now well pleased. — Is this Fair Gentlemen? Is this Generous? to take a Resolution in your own Mind, of which I make no Doubt you meant to avail yourselves both to answer present & future Purposes and without giving me, or meaning that I should receive the least Knowledge of it to throw the whole Burthen of whatever might happen on me? no Gentlemen- you who have the whole Power of the Company in this part of India in your Hands and who also can command a great Part of the Force of the Carnatick, are much better able to combat combined Dangers both Domestic & Foreign: and that even the Idea of a supposed Restraint might no longer remain, I have declared & now repeat it, that His Majesty's Minister shall never oppose any Measure of yours for the public Good while I have the Honor to support that Character in India.

Regarding the Nabob's want of Confidence in Company.

22. You say that under my Patronage & Sanction the Nabob has withdrawn all Confidence from the Company's Servants. The Nabob's real want of Confidence in the Company's Servants, I apprehend acknowledges a much earlier Date. Before I came to India, nay before I left England it was not unknown there. Even your own Constituents seemed sensible of it in sending a superintending Commission to India with Special Directions relative to the Nabob's Affairs. I do not think it necessary to particularize Instances. But whoever takes a Review of the History of the last War & attends also to the Circumstances of the Peace that followed it in 1769 with so little Appearance of Confidence between the Nabob and the Company's Servants — Do not then ascribe this Want of Confidence between you and the Nabob

to

to my Person: but Do me the Justice which the Cause
Deserves, and assign the true Reasons for it which you cannot
be ignorant of.

23. your charging the Nabob with en-
couraging and inviting the Mahrattas and with Intentions
of leading you into a War when not properly prepared for it
And that he propagates Reports to prejudice the Nabobs
Mind against you & to Do you every ill Office with them he
can — and that he places no Confidence in you now but
sometimes condescends seemingly to consult you by Way
of Form or to draw Sentiments and Expressions from You, to
Lay before me are certain Proofs of the very Little Confidence
you have in him. And if you have not much better reason
for such injurious Insinuations than the Reports of your Spies
you wrong him much. The Instance you have given of his
acquainting me that the Powers from the Crown prevented
you from Acting I have told you my Sentiments of already. I
must think it became him to tell me. He I am convinced
thought it necessary. & I should never have thought you
could have wished to conceal it. I am exceedingly sorry
for all this, as it may one Day be productive of very bad
Consequences

24 Your very liberal Use of invective, Reproach
Partiality & Resentment against the Companys Servants
Rage of Party Zeal &c.a I beg Leave to return you, as I have
no Manner of Occasion for such Materials. But you are
perfectly at Liberty to make Use of them in what manner
you please.

Necessity of taking immediate Measures

25. Upon the whole the Advantages to be
expected from the Friendship of the Mahrattas and a firm
Alliance between that Nation and the Company this all

their

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Their Presidencies does not seem to strike you in the same Light it does me. — I can perceive thro' the whole of your Reasoning that you are rather Led to adhere to your Engagements with Hyder as far as possible, whatever may happen for which you may have very substantial Reasons though I cannot see the Advantages of it either to the Publick or to the Company. Your own Opinion gives it against assisting the former — The Circumstances of the Times forbid sending Troops to the Latter. And your Accounts of the Commands of your Constituents would appear to be against entering into the Quarrel with either: Though I acknowledge, I cannot conceive how their Commands can be absolute in that respect. — As I think it is impossible they can foresee every particular Circumstance that may make a very different Conduct necessary. You say you do not think it is a proper Time to take such Measures as might be judged necessary with the Rajah of Tanjore as you are afraid of the Maharatta Power: but you desire to be freed of Apprehensions from them, and you engage to call the Rajah to an Account — and you propose a Compromise of Money to the Maharattas as was done in 1757 & 1761. — Upon all which just give me Leave to observe that whatever you do Gentlemen your Measures should be expeditious. — Time seems to press much. — The Maharattas are making great Progress & I think it is probable they will soon either deprive Hyder of the greatest Part of his Country or oblige him to accept of their own Terms — Should this happen, & should they lead their Victorious Army into the Carnatick, you cannot expect such good Conditions then as there is a Probability of your receiving now. Besides should Hyder agree

to

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to their terms it is very consistent with the Politicks of this Country to suppose that he will also take that Opportunity of making Reprisals on the Carnatick to make good the Losses he may have sustained from the Mahrattas. — And let me add that it will be much to the Disadvantage both of the Nabob & the Company should Hostilities be carried into the Carnatick — and it will be greatly against the national Reputation indeed should every Indian Power be permitted to make Demands on this Presidency when they think proper: and by the Force of Arms and an apparent military Superiority, to give Peace & War to the Company & their Allies at Pleasure.

26. Thus far Gentlemen I have thought necessary in answer to yours & though I have spoken my Sentiments of Measures with Freedom, I hope I have done it in such Terms as will convince you that my Intentions are to conciliate not to irritate. The Explanations I have given appear to me necessary for your Satisfaction: But it is not my Inclination to divert you from attending to Affairs of Consequence — Therefore if you please I will endeavor to state the Case fairly between you & me, and offer whatoccurs to me as the most effectual Mean of remedying as much as possible, the present Inconveniences on both Sides. — I am here with Powers from the Crown of a particular Nature which it is my Duty to execute as far as I possibly can to answer the Intentions for which they were sent. — You have the whole Authority of the Company and all their Power in your Hands, with no Directions (you say) from your Superiors to acknowledge me as King's Minister to the Powers in India: or to assist me in that Capacity. — Instead of complaining of a Restraint from Powers which have never

yet

yet been put in Execution — instead of plainly declaring or endeavoring to insinuate, that the Presence of His Majesty's Minister prevented the Company's Representatives from doing what they would otherwise have thought proper, for the Defence & Protection of the Carnatick and the Company's Possessions — Let me ask you if you don't think it would be much more for the Interests of your Constituents and now for your own Consequence and Reputation, to continue to discharge your Duty as if there were no Powers in the Country but your own? and if any thing occurs to me from what I can observe in the political State of this Country, or what I may think the Exigency of affairs may require — I will under the Sanction of the Character I have the Honor to bear, take the Liberty (with your Permission) of mentioning it to you. — Should it be proper it will not be the worse it comes from me. Should I be mistaken or misinformed — There can be no great harm surely in your undeceiving me. And should I ever find it necessary to put any part of the Powers of which I am possessed in Execution — I will immediately communicate such Intention of mine to you: And I shall be very happy in your Council, Advice & Assistance.

I have the Honor to be with Respect
Gentlemen
Your most obedient and
most humble Servant
John Lindsay

The following Observations & Remarks on the above Letter being read & approved are entered. & for the more easy referring to the several Passages remarked on

in

Fort St. George 13th May 07

Observations & Remarks on the above Letter.

it was necessary to Number the Several Paragraphs thereof

If it be Sir John Lindsay's Sole Intention to rectify a political Management which he thinks he has Cause to disapprove, & to promote the real Interests of the Company & the public, as he tells Us in this Letter & in his two former, to what Purpose does he recur to the Peace concluded with Nizam Alley? why repeat the whole Ca Lumny of a Treaty Dictated at the Walls of Madras? Nothing that he can Say or we can Do can obliterate the Past. The Peace is concluded & no Pretext has been furnish ed by Hyder Alley in any Part of his Conduct for breaking it The Treaty has been ratified & is in Force by which We are bound to be in Friendship with him & to Support him against all his Enemies except only such as he shall draw upon himself by being the Agressor. We cannot assist him therefore We Do not comply with that Part of the Treaty but we can observe a neutral Friendship towards him which We therefore are under the most Sacred Obligation to observe. If Sir John Lindsay can point out any Necessity for our taking other Measures than We have taken his recommending Such will be consistent with his declared Intention: but to censure a Conduct which is past & cannot be recalled, to ascribe every Evil that has happened since or may happen hereafter, to that Conduct, can serve only the Purposes of vilifying this Government & arming the Nabob with Arguments to Support all his Claims upon the Company, a Task ill becoming the national Representative

2. We Know not whence Sir John Lindsay has procured his Informations. If they are authentic he is inexcusable in aspiring what our Records

will

with prove to have no Foundation. If they are only partial Copies of Translations selected for the Purpose of condemning the Actions of the Board, they are not authentic Informations, tho' they may be faithfully copied or even tho' he should be possessed of the Originals themselves since it is only from the compleate View of the whole that has officially passed upon these Subjects that an authentic Knowledge can be formed.

3. We know not why Sir John Lindsay should be ashamed of our charging him with Partiality to the Nabob. If his Feelings have been excited upon our Account We will exculpate ourselves from the Shame of a false Imputation by giving our Reasons for this Charge of Partiality. It would be sufficient for this Purpose to enumerate all the Subjects of Dispute which have arisen between the Nabob & the Company since the year 1763 in which the Company obtained from him the Grant of the Jaghire to this Time & to produce the Reasonings of the Nabob & Sir John Lindsay upon them; in which it will be found that his Majesty's Plenipotentiary has in almost every Instance — in every one of Importance espoused the Cause of the Nabob urging the same Arguments & using even the same Turn of Expression with those made Use of by the Nabob adopting every political Measure & Principle espoused by the Nabob & joining even in the Enmity of his political Resentments — To Sir John Lindsay Sure that in this Conduct he was totally unbiassed by Partiality to one Side or Prejudice against the other? Will he assert or can he believe that the Conduct of this Government under so many successive Managers

Has

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has been so uniformly mark'd & iniquitous & that of the Nabob so invariably wise & just, as that in every Point of Difference he has been the Party injured, & we the Oppressors! If Sir John Lindsay will openly avow such an Opinion which may be demonstratively inferred from his Letters, he will assert a Fact which no Man exempt from the Rage of party Zeal will venture to apply to any State that ever had Existence. It would be a tedious Labor to apply to all the particular Instances, which will appear too strikingly to be missed by a candid & temperate Perusal of his Letters & the Nabob's written since his Arrival but We think a stronger Proof cannot be produced than in the Manner in which he professes our assisting the Mahrattas in the Letter now before us. The Nabob has been long soliciting us to join the Mahrattas against Hyder Ally — Sir John Lindsay has urged us to the same Measure in his two Letters preceding this & reproached us for our Indifference to the Interests of the public & the Company for not having before done it. The Arguments by which both support this Measure are Identical by the Same. But it is not in this Place that we shall examine them. It is true that that the last Letter from Sir John Lindsay set out with Expressions of great Diffidence & a professed Desire of being better informed on Subjects the Knowledge of which had been but imperfectly communicated to him. But the Counsel & Opinions which followed ill agreed with this humble Confession. These were peremptory, the Principles on which they were built insisted on as certain & the Reproaches which were cast upon us for not having adopted the Measures which he & the Nabob recommended must imply a thorough Conviction of the Propriety

of

of his Opinion or they are as repugnant to Candor as they are to Decency & good Manners — A Man uninformed may propose, may recommend. But to urge, to dictate to reproach ill become a Man professing Doubts & soliciting Information. We are Satisfied however with the Explanation now given us of this ambiguous Conduct since We now Learn that it was his Intention throughout to recommend an offensive Alliance with the Mahrattas. The Arguments urged in Support of this Expedient are so very much in the Spirit & Style of the Nabob that it may not be amiss to state both in their own Words & the same Reply may serve for both.

Nabob

(Committee Proceedings to May 7th Conference)

— But before you engage in so Hazardous an Enterprize, let us consider — were they unanimous in their Councils & vigorous in their Measures — Could they establish such an Alliance among the Indian Powers as to present a Tolerable Prospect of Success — Then perhaps this great Power might be somewhat restrained & by such Means their Consequence in India greatly diminished.

Sir John Lindsay

Letter 8 May 1775.

— Were all the three Presidencies so united — were they unanimous in their Councils & vigorous in their Measures — Could they establish such an Alliance among the Indian Powers as to present a Tolerable Prospect of Success — Then perhaps this great Power might be somewhat restrained & by such Means their Consequence in India greatly diminished.

— But before you engage in so Hazardous an Enterprize, let us consider — were they unanimous in their Councils & vigorous in their Measures — Could they establish such an Alliance among the Indian Powers as to present a Tolerable Prospect of Success — Then perhaps this great Power might be somewhat restrained & by such Means their Consequence in India greatly diminished.

many Preparations will be necessary. You must have a Fund in your Treasury of a Crore of Rupees to answer all the Exigencies of the War or you will be in Want when the Service will most require it. You must entertain a Body of 10,000 Horse, or your Supplies & Communication will be cut off. The Presidencies of Bengall & Bombay must be consulted & a Plan concerted for attacking Mahdeerow in all

his

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Nabob

Sir John Lindsay

His Dominions at the same Time: and all the Powers with whom they have any Connexion must be persuaded to join in Alliance with you.

(Letter 7th. April 1771)

The Town of Poona

Mad Dowrow's Place of Residence is near to Bombay. His Grand-Father, Father, & Himself have been possessed of Power for a great Length of Time but still has there never been a Quarrel between the English & them. On the contrary a good Understanding has always subsisted.

Letter 18th. April

The Mahrattas are acknowledged to be the most formidable Power in India & are in a Manner Neighbours to all the three Presidencies. It would appear then that their Friendship was for every Reason in the World preferable to a War. They seem anxious to establish a Friendship with the English. They have made very considerable Offers to maintain it &c —— They have always shewn a friendly Disposition to the Company & if there should be any threatening Appearance to the contrary the Connexion of this Presidency with their Enemy may in some Measure account for it.

Letter 7th. April

It was the Opinion of People before his Defeat, that Hyder was

Letter 18 April

I could foresee — that it was more than probable the

Mahrattas

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Nabob
was in no Condition to engage
the Mahrattas & now that the
Spirits of his People are broke by
the Dread of the Mahrattas Su-
periority he will on no Account
be able to take the Field

If (which God forbid) despair-
ing of Assistance from hence
they should hearken to Hyder's
Offers or after finishing their
Expedition against him, should
commence the Ravages & Devas-
tations in these Parts, all Safe-
ty either in my Country or
in the Possessions of the Compa-
ny will be at an End.

7 April

Whatever however is to be
Done the putting it into Exe-
cution immediately is best.
For another Interval of Leisure
or Opportunity will not
offer & when This is gone there
will remain nothing but to
regret the same.

Sir John Lindsay
Mahrattas of themselves would
in a short time oblige Hyder
to come to their Terms, even
should their Power be insuf-
ficient to take his Country
from him — That then the
Time might come when the
Company's Friendship being
no longer wanted, their Pos-
sessions Trade & Revenues in
the Carnatic would become a
Prey to that Power whose
Friendship they had despised.

8 May

— Whatever you do, your Mea-
sures should be expeditious.
Time seems to press much. The
Marattas are making great
Progress & I think it is probable
they will soon either deprive
Hyder of the greatest Part of
his Country or oblige him to
accept of their own Terms.
Should this happen & they
should lead their victorious Army
into the Carnatic, you cannot
expect such good Conditions then

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Nabob Sir John Lindsay.

Although it is no where the Custom for a Person with his Sword drawn to ask Friendship and Assistance, still Hyder Ally Cawn by practising a little the Art of plundering the Country saw the War concluded here upon his own Terms. From which Consideration I give it as my Opinion to assist the Mahratta before he Stretches out his Arm to plunder the Country, & requiring Assistance obtains it.

receiving now

—— And it will be greatly against the national Reputation indeed should every Indian Power be permitted to make Demands on this Presidency when they think proper & by Force of Arms have apparent military Superiority to give Peace & War to their Allies at Pleasure.

There cannot be a more Striking Example of a Connection of Sentiments or of Minds warped by the Heat of Party, than this common Argument of the Nabob & Sir John Lindsay which We look upon as an ample Justification of our Conduct, and a direct Refutation of their Doctrine. —— It is Dishonorable for a State to give assistance to a Power that claims it by Force of Arms. The Mahrattas claim our Assistance by Force of Arms for they threaten to ravage the Carnatic if We refuse it. Therefore We should give them Assistance. This may be asiatic Logic but We believe such a Syllogism never yet found Admission in any of the Schools of Europe.

There is no Doubt that the Mahrattas are the most formidable of all the Powers of India & by their Neighbourhood to our principal Possessions have it yet more in their Power to hurt Us. —— In these Premises We are all

agreed — In my Conclusion We also agree, namely that a Perpetual Peace & Amity with a Power so formidable, is preferable to War. Such this neither depends upon Us nor is to be expected. Present Peace, however is to be wished, provided it can be acquired without endangering our future Safety. The Nabob & Sir John Lindsay are of Opinion that for this Purpose We should enter into an offensive Alliance with the Mahrattas, for the Reasons assigned above, that is, because they are powerful, because they will in all Probability soon become Masters of the Mysore Country, because the Carnatic will then be exposed to their Ravages which We cannot prevent & because on the other Hand such a Proof of Friendship from Us will induce them to forbear any Hostilities against Us.

The Idea of binding the Mahrattas by the Ties of Gratitude, & Honor We believe never yet entered into the Imagination of any Politician in India except the Nabob & His Majesty's Minister. — We readily allow & are but too well convinced that the Power of the Mahrattas is much to be dreaded & that nothing but the Opposition they must meet with in the entire Reduction of Mysore can hinder them from over running the Payenghaut, But their only Motive for desiring our Alliance is that they may complete the Reduction of Mysore by the Capture of Seringapatam and Bangalore which it will be difficult to accomplish without the Aid of some European Force. Shall We then assist in the Removal of the only Bar to the Invasion of the Carnatic, or shall We wait inactive (for we can do nothing by ourselves) 'till the Resources of Hyder, the approaching Rains, or some unforseen Chance may possibly relieve Us from the dreaded Enemy?

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Enemy? Suppose but the Possibility of such an Event, yet is better to trust to that Desperate Chance than to assist in aggrandizing their Power, already too great in accelerating the Ruin of Hyder who at present stands as a Screen between Us & them, & expose the Safety of the Carnatic to their Mercy, on the weak Hope that their Gratitude & Honor will restrain them from availing themselves of an Opportunity which once lost may never be recovered, to complete the Conquest of this Peninsula by the Addition of the Payenghaut to their Acquisition of Mysoor. — the Worst that can be apprehended from their Resentment cannot exceed such a Catastrophe which We regard as certain if We prepare the Way to it by the Means advised by the Nabob & Sir John Lindsay.

The above Arguments alone are sufficient in our Minds to outweigh all the Reasons that have been urged to us in favor of an Alliance with the Mahrattas & We believe if any more or weightier could have been collected they would not have escaped the Penetration of the Nabob & Sir John Lindsay. And in these We have neither considered our Engagements with Hyder Ally nor the Interests of the Company in other Parts of India. The former have already been sufficiently discussed in other Places. For the Sake of Brevity therefore & for the Sake of avoiding a very obstinate Impediment let us for a Moment adopt Sir John Lindsay's convenient Doctrine of political Necessity & put the Treaty with Hyder Ally entirely out of the Question. We shall not find it so easy to elude the Objections that may arise from the Consideration of the Company's Interests in Bengal & Bombay. We have

been

bun authentically advised from the former Presidency that the Marattas have obtained very decisive Advantages against the Jauts & Rohillas, possessed themselves of the greatest Part of the Countries dependant on those Tribes & even made Incroads into the Dominions of our Ally Shuja Dowla. Later Advices in private Letters indeed but partly confirmed by the concurrent Intelligence communicated to us by the Nabob, add, that the Mahrattas are in actual Possession of Delhie, & the Provinces adjacent to it, that they are Masters of the Person of the Kings Son, have invited the King himself (with Professions of great Attachment) to take Possession of the Throne & Seat of his Ancestors. It is the Nabobs Opinion as it is ours & therefore will not be contested that the Aim of the Mahratta Government hath bun for some Time, at the Conquest of all Indostan. All their Operations since Mahdeerow's Accession to the Soveignty of that State have been manifestly & uniformly directed to that End. The Divided State of the other Powers of India, have contributed greatly to the Success of this Plan. The English Nation from its wealthy Possessions in Bengal, its extensive Connections & military Reputation are the most powerful, tho not the only Impediments of any Consequence to the entire Accomplishment of it. They certainly know this & this is one very natural Reason for their endeavouring to engage our Friendship or at least our Neutrality in these Parts where they are less apprehensive of our opposing their Progress from the Presentiment of future Danger: while the same Policy as naturally leads them to Deprive us of every Support, & to multiply the Number of our Enemies that we may be less able

to

to hurt them where they know that We shall take a Part against them. — This may be one good Reason, if not the principal, for their tempting offers to the King to relinquish our Protection & to put himself under Theirs. Since the Advantages which the mere Credit of the Royal Name would give might be as effectually obtained from his Son now in their Possession.

We confess ourselves not sufficiently instructed in all the political Principles which operate on the Minds of the People or Princes of Indostan, nor are we therefore competent Judges of the Advantages attendant on the Titles of legal Authority. But we conclude that they are attended with Advantages because they are assumed — & We know that they lose all their Effect if they have not the Stronger Sanction of Power & that their Influence is always proportionable to the Degree of that Power which maintains it. It is therefore a proper & natural Policy to endeavor to Deprive Us of the Influence of the King's Name with his Person.

In Short We have Authority to believe that the Mahrattas have invited & engaged the King in their Interests & threatened Shuja Dowla with an Invasion & that our fellow Subjects in Bengal are making Preparations for a War against them. — Is this a Juncture for Us to Strengthen the Hands of the Mahrattas who want but our Assistance to complete the Reduction of both the Carnatics who are only prevented by the Opposition made to them in Mysoor from uniting all their Efforts & pouring all the numerous Forces of their great Empire on that Part of the Company's Possessions on which

their

their very Being depends? — Can We, the Servants of the Company in opposition to their manifest Interests & in Defiance of their most peremptory Commands, assent to such a Proposition? Can His Majestys Ministers persist in so fatal a Counsel? Yes: for the Peace of the Carnatic, is the Object of his Mission, & the Nabob has told him that the Peace of the Carnatick depends upon our arming them with the most effectual Means of invading it, by assisting in the Destruction of Hyder Ally.

With Respect to Bombay We believe there is less Danger to be apprehended from the Mahrattas at that Presidency than in the other two. It is true that Poona their Capital lies very near to Bombay which is also at no greater Distance from Poona & has this additional Advantage over the Mahrattas that it can easier send an Army to Poona, than the Mahrattas can transport one to Bombay. — We do not suppose they are now in a Condition for such an Undertaking: but whenever a War shall be declared against them it is from thence that the most successful Efforts can be made, & perhaps it is the only Part of the Company's Settlements that will be a gainer by a successful War against the Maratta Power, by the Security of their Trade in Pepper & Sandal Wood on the Malabar Coast, & the immediate Acquisition of the Islands of Salsett & Bacaim — The Removal of present Danger, & the establishing future Security will be the only Trusts to be expected from it by the others.

The Nabob has repeated to Us more than once, the mighty Things that might be

Done

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done by the great Powers of the Company in the different Parts of India were they all made to co-operate steadily to one fixed End: an Observation which has always been introduced for the Sake of this Inference from our Want of Union that without it we can do nothing. Sr John Lindsay the faithful Follower of all his Maxims triumphantly displays the same mortifying Contrast, "Were all the Three Presidencies united" — were they unanimous he'd" — We thank him that he hath not been quite so unreasonable as the Nabob, in the Conditions on which he allows us to be upon a Footing of some Equality with the Mahrattas, for on his Postulata we think we might safely venture on a War with them were We as sure of the Conclusion which he draws from them. His own Words will best help us to illustrate this Position. — All the three Presidencies "are united by common Danger & common Interests — "Unanimity in their Counsels" may reasonably be expected, if we, where all aim at the same Ends, their mutual Safety & Advantage. — We hope their Measures will be vigorous The Trial only can prove it. — Many of the Powers of India are already engaged in one Cause against the Mahrattas tho' not in actual Alliance, & as Self Preservation is one of the most powerful Incentives in Nature We think it also as strong a Tie of Union as a Formal Treaty of Alliance. — We think such a Concurrence of Interests both presents a tolerable Prospect of Success, & with the former Advantages added promise Something more than a Possibility of restraining this great Power, & diminishing their Consequence.

Such we think might be the happy

Result

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Result of a War undertaken on the Grounds which We have Described Were these the only Requisites for it, Such it is certain that to undertake any Operations of this Kind with a Probability of Success there must not only be a perfect Union of the Presidencies in Measures but that all other Considerations of Investment & the particular Interests & Circumstances of either Presidency must give way for a Time, if this cannot be, nothing ought to be attempted Directly against the Mahratta Power more than what a System of Defence may necessarily require — but while a Want of Confidence subsists between the Nabob & Us & he is encouraged in an Opposition to the Company: — while His Majesty Minister maintains a Doctrine the reverse of the Measures which We would wish to pursue: & holds out the Treaty of Paris in Terrorem, if We Dare to step beyond the Line which the Nabob may prescribe: while We have every Reason to believe that his Representations & Opinions will be heard by the Ministry before Ours: while We are Doubtful of the Support which our Employers may give Us, & too recently feel the Smart of their late Resentments to hope for their partial Construction of our Conduct & Intentions: & lastly while there are Symptoms of an approaching War in Europe: — Under such Circumstances We cannot think of involving ourselves in a War for any Consideration. The Hazard would be too great to the Company, the Nation, Even to our own Characters & Fortunes. Much less can We incur the Hazards for the Support of a Power which is already too great for our Safety & which commands our Assistance with

the

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the Tone of Sovereign Authority.

5. ——— (Vide Remarks on Paragraph 3d.)

5. ——— We mentioned a Compromise of Money as the last Remedy, if the Mahrattas should invade the Carnatic. It was such an Expedient as hath been before practised, & such as the Nabob has been continually soliciting the Mahrattas to assent to: an Exemption from the Chouth being but another Name for an Exemption from Plunder, for which the Chouth is ever made the Pretence. — Sir John Lindsay will not surely call it Dishonorable (whatever the World may think of it) because he has in express Terms declared that he thinks We are unable to repell or Stand against an Invasion of the Mahrattas who in Spite of all our Efforts would carry Fire & Sword into the Heart of the Nabob's Dominions, & make a Prey of the Possessions Trade, & Revenue of the Company. — The very Idea of Honor is almost lost in so frightful a Picture. — If the Nabob's Government the Lives of his Subjects, & the Existence of the Company can be preserved by such a Purchase & must fall without it, We think it would redound highly to the Honor of those who should propose it. — But We beg Leave to say that We never did propose it for We do not yet think our Situation such as to warrant or require so desperate a Remedy. We mentioned it only as the last Resource under such Circumstances as by Sir John Lindsay's own Opinion would make it necessary. — Indeed his Objection doth not in this Place allude to the Dishonor of such a Compromise. He only doubts the Justice & Equity of making it at the Nabob's

Expence

Expence. Because the Nabob may think it hard perhaps to pay the Expence of Wars in which he only Looked upon himself as an Auxiliary: & also to pay a Sum to the Mahrattas who threaten his Country on Account of a Peace to which he neither assented nor approved.

It is not very easy to understand how the Nabob can look upon himself as an Auxiliary only in a War carried on for the Defence of his own Country. He has indeed often told us that He & the Company were embarked on the same Vessel, intimating by that Figure (as we have always understood it) that both were Sharers in the same Perils, not that he had derived any Hopes of Safety against the Storms which might assail us from the simple Consideration of his being merely a Passenger. Let it be granted however (for it is not material to the Point in Question) that the Nabob was but an Auxiliary in the last War with Hyder Ally. Does Sir John Lindsay infer that he will be but an Auxiliary in a War with the Mahrattas should they put their Threats in Execution? By the general Manner in which he expresses himself & by the new Motive which he assigns for those Threats, We fear he does. By what Authority does he declare that the Mahrattas threaten to invade the Carnatic because of the Peace of 1769? — Neither the Mahrattas themselves, nor the Nabob through whom we have hitherto maintained an Intercourse with them have ever given Us the least Intimation of it. It is true they threaten to invade the Carnatic, but their Reason for this Menace hath been plainly & repeatedly given Us both by the Nabob & Sir

John

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John Lindsay & by the Mahrattas themselves (vide Mr. Barrow's Letter) namely because We will not assist them against Hyder, not because We made Peace with Hyder in 1769.

In truth We do not believe that the Mahrattas ever thought of so weak a Pretext for making War with Us. — Should their Vackeel be prompted to adopt the same Language our Reply is obvious. We had a Right to conclude the Peace with Hyder. We broke no Treaty with the Mahratta State nor committed any Injury against them by it. We were even driven to it by Madowrow himself, who at the very Time that he was making Professions of Friendship & Promises of Assistance was preparing to invade the Carnatic, & had actually begun his March this Way when the Movements made by Jannooje in Berar diverted him from his Intention. — The Clause in the Treaty with Hyder which binds both Parties to mutual Assistance respects only such Enemies as shall be the Aggressors. If the Mahrattas are not the Aggressors in the present War, the Clause does not respect them. If they are & they therefore Declare War against the Carnatic, they will be equally the Aggressors in that War & We but Defendants. But even that Pretext is taken from them by the Promise which We have given & kept of a Neutrality & the Offer made them of entering into a formal Treaty of Friendship with them.

We should be ashamed to waste Time in replying to such groundless Pretences, were we not justly alarmed at the dangerous Conclusion for the

Sake

Sake of which they seem to have been introduced by His Majesty's Minister, who on equal Grounds may infer an everlasting Obligation on the Company to indemnify the Nabob from all Costs, Charges & Losses which the Company or himself may incur in the Protection of his Person & Government wherever & by whomsoever they may be invaded.

We appeal to our Constituents whether they consider this as a Proof of Sir John Lindsay's Zeal for their Interests — To us he appears in no other Light than as the determined Advocate of the Nabob.

7. We cannot help expressing our Surprize to hear Sir John Lindsay speak so lightly of the Faith of Treaties, after having upbraidingly reminded us of "that Faith for which the English were once so noted "in India". — The Same political Necessity which occasioned the Treaty with Hyder Ally, he thinks will excuse the Breach of that Treaty — How are the Cases similar? — In submitting to the political Necessity alluded to in the first Instance We broke no Treaty How thereupon does it follow that we are equally excusable in breaking the Treaty with Hyder from any supposed political Necessity? — Instances will sometimes occur in which it may become impracticable to fulfill every Condition of a Treaty. In such Cases political Necessity may be pleaded, as a Just Excuse for a Failure of Treaty: But the Distance, is very wide between the nonperformance of a Condition in a Treaty and the direct Violation of it. We do not afford Hyder Ally the Aid promised by Treaty, because We cannot.

But

But the political Necessity must be very urgent indeed & such as We hope never to experience, which shall oblige Us to Join in a War against him & seek his Destruction while We are under an Obligation to defend him.

9. Sir John Lindsay asks if it will be for the Interests of our Employers to risk all for Hyder Ally. — We might with equal Propriety ask him if he thinks it will be for the Interest of our Employers to risk all for the Mahrattas, or even for the Nabob. As he has never yet offered one Reason in Proof of our alledged Partiality to Hyder which he supposes so great as to dispose Us to sacrifice every Tie of Duty & the Interests of our Employers to it, it neither admits nor merits a Refutation. — It is however another Proof of his Readiness to adopt every Prejudice of the Nabob who we know has long held this Language. — As to Hyder-Ally's Connections with the French, We believe he would gladly unite with any Power on Earth that could give him the least Assistance to save him from impending Destruction. And can We impute it to him as a Crime who refuse him that Assistance?

11. We are very much pleased with this Assurance given Us by Sir John Lindsay & willingly do him the Justice to acknowledge that We were misled by Reports & Appearances to suspect him of a Design of which We now gladly acquit him. We had received Intimations that the Nabob had made an Offer to the Crown through Sir John Lindsay of the Sagheir Lands represented as forcibly taken from him & held on Conditions

which

which had never been performed. — It had ban also reported that he had offered to confirm the Grant provided an Obligation were laid on the Company to keep up a certain Force for his Service. — Other Surmises there were of an Application for a perpetual Lease, & even for the Restoration of that District to the Nabob.

The late Intimations given us in the Nabob's Letters of the supposed Conditions of the Grant & Allusions to the Manner in which it was obtained drew us more easily into the Belief that the above Reports were not without Foundation; since it was but a natural Conclusion, if the Nabob thought we had unjustly taken or kept Possession of his Lands that he should Desire to get them back again: or even knowing that they were justly obtained from him for past Services, and as a Pledge for the future Support of the Company, as his Intentions are now to place his Dependence elsewhere it could not be Surprizing that he should seek to recover them. We could not nor can now suppose that he would have Sorborne to make His Majesty's Minister acquainted with the Grievance which he sustained by our Possession of the Jaghire when he had unnecessarily told this Government of his Sense of the Right by which the Company held it. — We mention this only as a Justification of our Suspicions. — We knew Something was transacting which we could not see Bas it was impossible for a Minister of the Crown of England to negociate any Matter of Importance with the Nabob which should not affect the Company, We had a Right to form such a Conjecture of their Designs as the known Circumstances would

warrant

warrants. When we find ourselves mistaken we acknowledge it & when less Mystery is observed We shall be less suspicious.

It is true the Nabob always calls the Company his best Friends. It is the Ton of Oriental Politeness. The Nabob is always the most liberal in their Professions when he acts the most contrary to them: in the same Manner as Sir John Lindsay the Minister of a Western Court promises to mention a Supposed Proposition of ours to the Nabob but not to urge it as an Affair of Justice or Equity: which is in Effect to dissuade it: Does then civilly assures Us that no good Office of his shall ever be wanting to Do every thing possible to preserve Peace in the Carnatic, Security to the Company's Possessions, & to give every Assistance in his Power to their Servants.—

Expressions of this Kind are never to be taken in their Literal Acceptation, but may be very fairly & faithfully translated as the Indications which Conscience unwarily betrays of a Disposition or Conduct liable to a very different Construction.

13. Sir John Lindsay says "he Does "not Blame Us for not acknowledging him as Kings "Minister: but must justify himself when without "acknowledging the Powers, We seem to wish to charge to his "Account whatever Consequences may happen by their "Presence in India." The Term acknowledge is so indefinite that We chuse to explain in what Sense we do, or do not, acknowledge the Kings Minister & his Powers. We have no Doubt that Sir John Lindsay is a Kings Minister to the Princes of India, nor that he has Powers

from

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from the King to treat with them — Thus far We do acknowledge his Powers — Their Nature & Extent We know not. When he shall think proper to produce them & will convince Us of the Authority by which they can legally bind Us & regulate our proceedings, We will then act in due Conformity to them — In the mean time We shall continue to pay that Attention to them which the Interests of our Employers shall require, & no more.

As We do not wish to charge Sir John Lindsay personally with any Consequences that may happen by the Presence of his Powers in India We willingly leave his Justification of himself as it stands. But it is our Duty to point out to our Employers the Effect & Influence which those Powers have on their Affairs.

Sir John Lindsay hath indeed told Us that although he is possessed of such Powers yet He hath not made any Use of them, nor made them publick & that "should he ever find it necessary "to put any Part of them in Execution he will immedi- "ately communicate such Intention of his to Us" And he thinks that because he hath not yet employed them & We do not acknowledge them they cannot possibly prove of Detriment to Us We beg Leave first to say that He hath employed them, that he hath made them public though not perhaps with all the Formali- ties which should attend the Promulgation & Execution of them. They have been long communicated to the Nabob, & by him very Diligently reported to all the

World

World. — What more is wanting to the Promulgation of them? Sir John Lindsay hath formally notified to Us that he hath Powers to treat with the Princes of India, of course to conteract Us if he shall judge it necessary, in our Negociations. In Virtue of those Powers & under the declared Sanction of our Sovereign's Name, We have been enjoined to preserve the Peace of the Carnatic, when it pleased His Majesty's Ministers to charge Us with a Design of assisting Hyder Ally. By the same Authority We have been called upon to Break the Peace of the Carnatick, when it pleased His Majesty's Minister to favor the Nabob's Design of assisting the Mahrattas to destroy Hyder Ally, & of engaging in a precipitate War with the Rajah of Tanjour either of which would in our Opinion have proved fatal to the Peace of the Carnatic the great Object of his Mission.

— What more was wanting to the Execution of his Powers?

With Regard to their Effect, it matters not whether We acknowledge or Disclaim their Authority. In every Conference with the Nabob; in every Letter which We receive from him or from Sir John Lindsay: in every Debate upon the political Interests of the Company — even in our Finances: We virtually experience them Though no immediate Application be made of them. — of this We will give Instances. — When without a Single Voucher to enable him to judge he takes upon him to accuse Us virtually of the Baseness of making out false Accounts with the Nabob when he reproaches Us with endeavoring to keep the Nabob in a State of Dependency on the Company & supports him in every

Measure

Fort St. George 13th May 1771.

Measure that can render him independent: when he adopts every Sentiment of the Nabob, disputes the Right of the Company to their own Forces, to their own Territory (by annexing Conditions to their Possession of it which they do not acknowledge & which he cannot know to be true): when he providently furnishes the Nabob with a Pretext for loading the Company & perhaps the British Nation, with the Expences of all his future Wars: — When in every Matter of Difference between the Nabob & the Company in which the Sentiments of His Majesty's Ministers could be known We have found him invariably on the Side of the Nabob: — can We have a Doubt that he is the same zealous Advocate in others? — We are too well assured he is, & that the Nabob depends upon him & his Representations to the Court of England, for the Support of all his Claims on the Company & the Redress of all the Grievances which he has placed to their Account. It is very true that their Ascendant over the Nabob was very great and that in all weighty Matters which respected the Protection of his Country, in which they were often the Sole and always the chief Actors, they assumed the Lead. — Contests have often arisen between them as of necessity there must when the Interests of both are connected & we will suppose them to have been some times decided within by the actual Interposition of Power, or the Dread of it & of giving Offence when Argument hath proved ineffectual. — Nevertheless we will venture to affirm that no other Power on Earth would have shewn more Moderation in the Use of that Superiority

which

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which till very lately the Company have possessed over the Prince of this Country, created, established & maintained by them. — God forbid they should ever be totally Deprived of that Superiority, an Advantage by which alone the British Nation hold all their valuable Interests in this Part of India. — Yet it is past a Doubt that it now is, & must Remain Suspended so long as Sir John Lindsay, remains here, or his Powers are continued.

Every Requisition from Sir John Lindsay though not complied with alarms by the Dread of offending that Power whose Name is quoted in Support of it, & unavoidably checks & impedes us in every Measure which may clash with his Opinions when we have Cause to apprehend the Confirmation of them by an Authority which we may not contend with.

We need no other Proof of the Effect of Sir John Lindsay's Powers on our political Debates (were the above insufficient) nor indeed in our ordinary Arrangements, than the great Waste of Time given to long Literary Contests with the Nabob & Sir John Lindsay & the minute Argumentation which we have found it necessary to bestow on every Subject that may at any Time come before the Public, in Order to furnish our Constituents with Materials for the Justification of our Measures & the Maintenance of their own Rights & Privileges.

— Weak indeed must that State be which must subsist by a War of Words, & leave its Faculties suspended for the Business of Controversy & empty Speculation! — yet this is precisely our Case. Nor is this all. Should the Interests of the Company at any Time require a Pact to

be

be taken in extinguishing the Flames which the Quarrels of our Neighbours may have brought too near to our own Possessions. We dare not form Alliances, for his Majesty's Minister may involve us by contrary Engagements in the King's Name in an Opposition to our own. ——— We dare not declare War with any State for it may be in secret Alliance with the Crown of Great Britain, or may become an Ally to it by an Application to the King's Ministers.

We have said too that even in our Finances We feel the Deadening Effect of Sir John Lindsay's Powers: for we cannot be sure of obtaining a Pagoda of the Debt due from the Nabob to the Company which he may think proper to dispute - if he even withholds the whole We have no Means to enforce Payment; nor while he persevers in the same crooked & mysterious Politics which he hath lately followed can We depend on the Continuance of Peace in the Country, nor make any large Advances, even for the most essential Purposes lest we should be suddenly Distressed by Troubles brought on us through Means, which We have it not in our Power to foresee.

We have often had Occasion to mention among the ill Effects which result from the Presence and Influence of a King's Minister such ones with Appearances so little favorable to the Company the Loss of foreign Consequence which they must necessarily sustain in the Eyes of the neighbouring Powers. We might also add the Weakness which they have contributed to introduce in our internal Policy by the Diffidence & Discouragement which

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The Several Members of this Government naturally feel, in the Discharge of their respective Duties in a Colony whose Custom from the earliest Establishment hath in many Cases supplied the Want of Laws, when very undeviated residing under the Company's Protection sees a Servants of the Crown come amongst Us for no other visible Purpose but to Dispute the Rights & censure the Conduct of this Government. — But other Causes have also contributed to these Effects. — The Instances before alluded to which are corroborated by almost every Page of our Records for the last Months sufficiently prove that the Company's Interests, Influence & Authority have Suffered, & do Suffer most essentially from the Presence & Power of his Majesty's Minister in this Part of India.

11. In our Letter to Sir John Lindsay dated the 25 April, We gave him a clear, circumstantial, & candid account of the Manner in which the Additional 7 Battalions of Sepoys came to be charged to the Nabob's Account. — We hoped this Explanation (which We certainly were not under an Obligation to give him) would have Satisfied him with Regard to the Propriety of our Conduct, & that he would have been pleased with Such a Mark of our Attention But We are Sorry to find that instead of Acknowledgments We have Drawn upon ourselves additional, Reproach & most illiberal Invective We shall not here reply to it Otherwise than to remark that even allowing the Nabob's Right to the 7 Battalions of Sepoys, & allowing him the Right of making War & of involving the Company in Troubles at his own Pleasure yet Sir John Lindsay was under no Obligation

to

to insult on those Claims. As a Subject of Great Britain as a Minister of the Crown particularly charged with the Interests of the Nation. We know not how he will reconcile it to his Duty on either Character to have acted a Part so opposite to those Interests.

17. We did request Sir John Lindsay to accept of the Friendship offered by the Mahrattas "if the Offer was made to him" & promised "chearfully "to subscribe to it". We did also remind him "of "our Engagements to Hyder Ally Cawn" but he did not "acknowledge the Force of the Obligations We were under "to assist their Enemy against them". On the contrary We Declared, & in express Terms to Sir John Lindsay himself, that We would not assist Hyder Ally, because We could not: & our Offer of Friendship to the Mahrattas implied the same Resolution. Yet he asks Us "if We really think that he should be the Dupe of such "a Piece of Absurdity? And We might ask did Sir John Lindsay really think We made the Proposal to him with the Intention of deceiving him? that We wanted to allure him into an Alliance with the Mahrattas wantonly to bring Disgrace on the King's Ministers, prostitute our Sovereign's Name, expose our own Characters to Infamy, & the Interests of the Company to the Wrath of Government, & all the direful Effects of an Enemy irritated by so shameful a Delusion: without any possible Advantage to be even conceived from it, if it was our Intention (as he too plainly intimates) to assist their Enemy against them? The extreme Folly as well as Baseness of such a Design are We hope sufficient

to

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to prove the Impossibility of its Existence. — Though We were Sincere in the Offer which We made to Sir John Lindsay & would gladly have entered into a Treaty of Peace with the Mahrattas which should not bind Us to violate that Subsisting between Us & Hyder Ally, yet We confess We Did not at the Time believe that our Offer would be accepted & accepted nor that Sir John Lindsay himself thought the Mahrattas would be Satisfied with an Engagement of mere inactive Friendship from Us although he reproached Us with having rejected their proffered Friendship. — But on mature Reflection We are glad that he has thought proper to wave our Proposal because had he embraced it & the Mahrattas contrary to our Expectation had acceded to it We fear We should again have been involved in Consequences Similar to those produced by the new Construction of the 11th Article of the Treaty of Paris, & We should for ever have been tied to the Maharatta Alliance whatever might be their Conduct towards Us until it should please Sir John Lindsay or any future Minister of the Crown to set us free from an Engagement, which having received & but our Rejection the Ratification of His Majesty's Name might be deemed to require the Intervention of a Person authorized by His Majesty to remove so Sacred a Pledge; — For when We with that Bar remaining to act at any Time or on any Occasion against the Mahrattas would it avail Us any thing to plead that We were impelled by "political Necessity" or that they were the Aggressors, when We know how easy it is by Argument to blacken the fairest Conduct, where Proofs are to be

Brought

brought from such a Distance & a bare Denial is suf-
ficient to invalidate the Testimony of the most authentic
Facts with Minds prepared or predetermined to disbelieve
them? — We think it necessary to make this Confes-
sion though against ourselves, that we may obviate the
Apprehension which our Employers might otherwise
entertain of our joining with Her Majesty's Ministers in
any future Engagements which We shall carefully avoid
unless their Commands shall authorize it. — & Sure We
beg Leave to push in our Claim to the Indulgence of the
Court of Directors for any Errors into which We may be
inadvertently led by the Variety of Interests with which
We have to contend & the singular Delicacy of our Situ-
ation. Had We only common Enemies to deal with, We
should not be at a Loss. The Power of the Company
aided by the Strength & Protection of the British Govern-
ment would be sufficient to oppose the Attempts of all
Invaders. But when We see, or think We see our
most dangerous Enemies in those whom We dare not
name as such; when those who threaten to become our
Enemies enjoy the Countenance & Support of a Minister
of the King: when We must maintain the Rights of the
Company & defend their Interests against the Encroach-
ments of the Nabob, encouraged & supported even by Their
own Commands: it seems scarce possible to move without
running into the Face of Danger which assails Us from
every Quarter in such opposite Directions. History
furnishes numberless Instances of a Government di-
vided against itself; but We think ours is a new &
unheard Species of Government which must subsist

by

by reconciling the Extremes of Contradiction. It is at once our Duty to obey the Letter, & guard against the Spirit of the Orders which ought to be our Guide to act in apparent Opposition both to the Company & to the Nation, in Vindication of the Rights of the former & the Influence of both.

18, 19. Sir John Lindsay says "It is very "natural to think that "Hyder Ally" (who is unable to "support himself) "will support the Rajah of Tanjore "against his Superior because he is an Enemy to the "Nabob". & That the French have given him Encouragem.t But he cannot conceive why the Mahrattas should be the Rajah's Friends. The Reasons are plain, because it is for their Interest to raise Troubles in the Carnatic & the Rajah has Money which a Mahratta cannot resist. — Whether the Ties of Affinity or Religion have any Influence in the political Connexions of this Country we will not here examine — The Discussion would be tedious & to the present Point unnecessary.

20, 28 As a Proof that We had no Intention or Thought of concealing from Sir John Lindsay the Declaration which We made to the Nabob concerning the Effect of His Powers, We need only appeal to the Testimony of almost every Letter that We have written to Sir John Lindsay in which the same Sentiments are repeated. — But of this We shall say more in our Reply.

The Assurance that "His Majesty's "Minister shall never dispose any Measure of ours for "the Public Good while he has the Honor to support that "Character in India", affords us little Consolation. — He has told us too before that the Powers given him were intended

intended to promote the "real Interests" of the Company. It matters not for what Purpose they were intended, or what his Intentions while he makes himself the Judge of what is for the public Good & of what will promote the real Interests of the Company, & under that Plea opposes us in all the Measures We take for the same Ends.

23. On this Subject so much has been said in various Parts of our Minutes & Letters to Sir John Lindsay that it is unnecessary to repeat it here, as nothing is urged by Sir John Lindsay to refute our Suspicions: And as to our want of Confidence in the Nabob which he declares to be proved by these Allegations. We have nothing to reply. If it be a Crime We plead guilty to the Charge.

25. It is true We are "led to adhere to "our Engagements with Hyder as far as We can" — with safety to ourselves — but not "whatever may happen" that is at all Risks. We have also "substantial Reasons "for it." — But "the Circumstances of the Times forbid sending "Troops to the Latter" and "the Commands of our Constituents "do forbid our entering into the Quarrell with either." For what Use are these Premises thus Made by Sir John Lindsay if he persists in requiring us to take a Part w.ch he believes to be repugnant to our Inclinations: contrary to our Conviction founded as he supposes on very substantial Reasons; & to the Commands of our Superiors. Some better Reason ought surely to have been given to remove our Scruples than the supposed Latitude allowed us to break such Commands as the Circumstances of the Times may render impracticable or improper: Some more modern

Argument

Fort St. George 13th. May 1775.

Argument for making those Commands to comply with his Opinion in Contradiction to our own than that "He cannot see the Advantages of it".

The rest of this Paragraph upon the short Time allowed Us to deliberate & the Danger of incensing the Mahrattas & Drawing their victorious Arms on the Carnatic We have replied to already — (V. Remarks on Par)

26. The Substance of this concluding Paragraph is a State of the Case between Sir John Lindsay & this Government and the Means of remedying the Inconveniencies arising from it. This in brief is as follows. Sir John Lindsay is here with Powers from the Crown of a particular Nature. — We have the whole Authority of the Company & our Directions to acknowledge those Powers. — He therefore recommends to Us to act as if there were no Powers in the Country but our own. to receive his Advice when it is good & undeceive him where he is mistaken, & lastly to counsel, advise & assist him in the Execution of his Powers, when he shall find it necessary to put them in Execution, of which he will previously inform Us.

"To act as if there were no Powers in "the Country but our own", when we are informed & believe that he has Powers to counteract, & possibly to supercede Ours would be highly indiscreet, were we able, to act with that Freedom: but We cannot because of the Secret Influence of his Powers on the Nabob, with whom the Company are most essentially concerned & without whom they cannot act.

We can & will gladly receive his

Advice

Advice when it is good: & will readily undeceive him when We find his Views tend to injure the Company's Interests even though the Attempt should again draw upon us a Return of Reproach & Invective.

But to counsel, Advise & assist him in the Execution of his Powers is what We can by no means promise: because from past Experience of his Conduct & the Principles which he professedly follows, We verily believe that they never will be executed but to serve Purposes widely different from the Interests of the Company.

Ordered that an answer to the foregoing Letter be prepared.

Wm. Du Pré
Warren Hastings.

John Smith
Geo. Stratton
Henry Brooke

John Whitehill
Geo: Mackay

461 Fort St. George 21st May 1771

Wrote the following Letter to Fort William p Ship Royer

To the Honble John Cartier Esqr.
President & Governor &c Council at
Fort William

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter to Fort William regarding Mrs Wilson's Application

We inclose you herewith a Copy of a Petition from Mrs Hannah Wilson Widow of Lieutenant John Wilson Deceased lately belonging to this Establishment as also Copy of a Letter from Mr. Wynch & a Certificate from Colonel Hark of his good Behaviour: & We take the Liberty to recommend her as a proper Object to partake of the Benefit arising from the Fund established for the Relief of Disabled Officers & Soldiers & their Widows.

Lieutenant John Wilson arrived here as a Cadet 2d June 1768 was promoted to Ensign 22d Octr 1768 & to Lieutenant the 10 Septr 1770 and died the 3d April 1771. We are

Honble Sir & Sirs

Your most obedient Humble Servants

Fort St. George
21st May 1771.

For Du Bré
& Council

Monday
27th May.

At a Consultation Present
Josias Du Bré Esqr. Governor & President
Warren Hastings — Samuel Ardley
John Smith — George Stratton
Henry Brooke — Richd Brickenden
John Whitehill — George Mackay.

Draught

162 Fort St. George 27th May 1773.

Draught of a Letter to Sir John Lindsay in Answer to his of the 8th. Instant read & approved & ordered to be wrote fair

Report of the Committee of Accounts read on which the following Orders are made

To the Honble Josiah Du Pré Esqr.
President & Governor &c. Council of
Fort St. George

Honble Sir & Sirs

We have examined the Accounts of the Out Garrisons for the Month of March & beg Leave to make the following Remarks on the Paymaster's Accounts from Trichinopoly.

Report.	Orders in Consequence
Trichinopoly	
1 The Paymaster has charged for a Hire to the 2 Cos. of Infantry & one to the 2 Cos. of Artillery, but as the Troops are in Cantonments We submit it to the Consideration of your Honor &c. if these Charges should be admitted.	1 as these Troops were on actual Service on their March from Vellour to Trichinopoly & are still held in Readiness for Service, Agreed that the Allowance for Hires be continued.
2. The Paymaster has charged for a Working Party of Sepoys 2320 Fanams without expressing when or how they were employed.	2d Ordered that this Charge be explained.
3. The Paymaster in his Accounts transmitted to the Commissary	3d Ordered that the Commissary general be credited and

Draft of Letter to Sir Lindsay approved

Report of Committee of Accounts with Orders thereon

163 Fort St. George 25th May 1774

Report
Commissary General has charged Pag.s A for the Allowance to the Quarter Mr. Serjeants: this We understand is always paid by the Military Paymaster.

Orders in Consequence
& the military Paymaster Debited for this Charge.

A. The Paymaster — Ordered accordingly.

Has blended the Accounts of the Garrison of Pulicat with those of the Detachment from Vellour, but We are of Opinion they Should be kept Separate.

We are
Hon.ble Sir & Sirs
Your most obed.t humble Servants
Charles Smith
Sam.l Ardley
Sam.l Jourdan
John Smith
John Holland
Geo. Stratton
Wm. Petrie
Rich.d Brickenden

Fort St. George,
15th May 1774.

Letter from Mr. Archdale Palmer Paymaster at Madura &
Palamcotah, read as follows.

To the Hon.ble Josias Du Pré Esq.r
President & Governor &c.a Council of
Fort St. George

Hon.ble Sir & Sirs

Letter from Mr. Palmer with his Accounts & urging Sickness as a Reason for not sending them before.

I have duely received your Orders communicated by Mr. Sec.y Stone and am infinitely concerned at your Displeasure on not earlier receiving the enclosed Accounts.

J

16A Fort St. George 25th May 1771.

I take the Liberty of acquainting you that I have for some time past enjoyed but a very indifferent State of Health having been troubled with Hysterick Fits and a Giddyness in my Head which much prevented my Attention to Business. in one of these Fits I was reduced so low as the Surgeon told me he could scarce discern any Pulse. I hope therefore these Circumstances be a sufficient Apology. I take the Liberty of acquainting you that the particular Accounts of the Disbursements of the 1st Article on the debit Side of my Account with the Nabob was transmitted sometime ago to the then Commissary General. I therefore wait your further Orders concerning any Duplicate of them. I remain with due Respect.

Hon'ble Sir & Sirs

Your most obedient faithful Servant

Archdale Palmer

Paymaster

Madurah
19th May 1771

Upon Reference to the Accounts accompanying the above Letter it appears that they are not those which Mr. Palmer was ordered to send. But as Indisposition appears to have been the Cause of this Mistake, the Board are induced to overlook it, however should Mr. Palmer continue incapable thro' Sickness to conduct his Employ he must be relieved. And as the Nabob is very pressing for his Account, It is Ordered that the Commissary General do form an estimated Account from the preceding Months of the Expences incurred at Madurah & Palamcottah.

Read a Letter from the Nabob as entered in Country Correspondence No 93 representing that the Collectors belonging

ers thereon

r from the Nabob
laining of the
abongs raised by
ny Naiur &c.

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belonging to Tanjour Sawmy Naiur & the Renter of Tanjore are raising Disturbances in the Circars Districts that it would be easy to punish Sawmy Naiur & to turn out the Renter of Tanjour but that He the Nabob was apprehensive they would take Refuge in the Mayore Country — The President also acquaints the Board that the Nabob had informed him that one Moodu Naiur was concerning in the Disturbances raised by Swamy Naiur — The President at the same time Lays before the Board the Purport of a Letter from Hyder Ally Cawn to his Vaquil N°11 advising that the said Swamy Naiur had also committed Depredations in the District of Caroor and that some Colleries belonging to the Madura Country had been plundering & raising Disturbances in the Dindigule Districts — and desiring that Orders might be sent to the Manager at Madura to punish the said Colleries To which the President acquaints the Board the Nabob had assented & had promised to furnish him with a Letter to his Shoudar at Madura for that Purpose.

Orders in Consequence

It being necessary to preserve the Peace of the Country as far as in Us lies, It is Resolved that Orders be sent to General Smith to take proper Measures in Conjunction with the Nabobs Manager for proceeding against the said Sawmy Naiur & Moodu Naiur & all others concerned in committing Disturbances in the Circars Districts — And that Major Bonjour be directed to afford all the Assistance in his Power to the Nabobs Manager at Madura in punishing the Colleries who have been guilty of committing Depredations in the Dindigule Country.

Read

Fort St. George 27th. May 1771.

Nabob lends £50,000 for his Creditors.

Read a Letter from the Nabob as entered in Country Correspondence advising of his having Sent Pagoda 50.000 to Mr. Johnson for his Creditors.

Mr. Alexander Dugod appointed Practitioner Engineer

There being a Vacancy for a Practitioner Engineer, and Mr. Alexander Dugodd who came out in the Military on the Seahorse in 1768 being particularly recommended as appears from the following Certificates It is agreed that he be appointed thereto.

Certificate of Colo. Forde regarding Mr. Dugodd.

This is to certify that Mr. Alexander Dugodd has during the Time he has been under my Command behaved diligently & attentively, & that I have seen nothing in his Conduct, since I have known him any Way to his Disadvantage.

Fort St. George
14th. May 1771

Patrick Ross

Certificate of Capt. Montresor regarding Dugodd.

This is to certify that Mr. Alexander Dugodd has acted as Draughtsman from the Month of August 1768 & has during that Time behaved with the greatest Diligence & Sobriety & is justly entitled from his Capacity to any Preferment the Honble President & Council chuse to honor him with

May 15th 1771

Wm Montresor

Read the following Letter from the Cadets arrived on the Morse for Bengall

To the Honble Josias Du Pre Esqr.
President & Governor &c. Council of
Fort St. George

Honble

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Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter from the Cadets arrived on the Morse for Bengal Desiring an Advance of 200 Rupees each.

Having been Subject to many very Heavy Expences in so long a Passage, as one Year in the Morse. We the Subscribers Sercunto, Cadets for Bengal humbly request your Honor &c &c will be pleased to make Us Some Allowance for the same: and as We understand that in Application from Several Officers & Cadets for this Presidency you have allowed them four Months' Pay: We have to request that You will grant to Us the Same Indulgence after the Rate of Pay to Cadets in Bengal being 50 Rupees p Month & flatter ourselves your Honors &c will not think Such an Allowance too great: being scarcely sufficient to enable Us to Defray our present Expences & others incurred by our Staying so long at Different Ports in our Passage here. Should you think this Allowance too great We readily Submit it to you to make Us such a Compensation as you may Judge necessary.

We are with great Respect
Honble Sir & Sirs

Your most obedient Humble Servts

Willm Kirk — Willm St Jno Foster
Nath: Alexander — Robt Phillips
Tho: Bradley — John Bushby
Jas Harrison — G. Major Hamilton
Richard. Morgan

agreed that an Advance of 200 Rupees each be made to the Cadets arrived on the Morse for Bengall, on their giving an Acknowledgment to account for the Same on their Arrival at that Presidency.

WP

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Mr. Brickinder acquaints the Board that he has received a Letter advising that Ensign James David Mallortie Died at Tellicherry the 19th March last.

The President acquaints the Board Lieutenant Macnamara Davis died yesterday at this Place.

There being a Vacancy for a Lieutenant of Artillery by the Death of Lieut. Davis. Lieutenant Fire Worker John Drummond is appointed thereto to rank from the 26th Instant.

Wm. Du Pré
Warren Hastings.

John Smith
Geo. Stratton
Henry Brooke

John Whitehill
Geo. Mackay

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The following Letter to Sir John Lindsay, Draft of which was approved last Consultation was this Day sent to him

To Sir John Lindsay Knight of the Bath
His Majesty's Minister plenipotentiary
& Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Ships
in India

Sir

Letter to Sir John Lindsay in Answer to his of 8 May

We flattered ourselves that the very plain & Direct Answers We gave in our last Letter of 25th April to the Points proposed to Us in your Letter of the 18th of the same Month might have saved Us from further Pressure on those Subjects: and left Us at Liberty to Dedicate our Attention to those Duties which are more than Sufficient to engage it, without such Contentions — But your Reply of the 8th Instant convinces Us that We are not to hope for Respite.

We have not time for Controversy nor even for Argument to support our Conduct, but even if We had We should beg Leave to decline it because it does not appear to Us that you have any legal Powers to question Us: and because We find no traces in your Writings of a Disposition to entertain one favorable Sentiment of any one of our Measures — It is true, We did in our last inform you of our Resolutions on the Propositions you made to Us, and of the Reasons on which they were founded; but in Doing so We Did not mean to acknowledge any Right in you to require, or any Obligation in Us to give you Information of our Resolutions or Explanation of our Conduct. And this Declaration We think it proper now to make to

prevent

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prevent the Construction of Precedents & to reserve our Rights. At the Same time We confess it was not through Inadvertence that We communicated our Intentions & Circumstances to you so openly — Our Intention was to try whether it were possible to put an End to the Contention which you have commenced & thus maintain against us, by a plain, candid & precise Answer to your several Propositions — What is the Effect? It has only served to produce Sixteen Pages of Animadversion — It is not strange that Differences should sometimes happen between the Nabob & the Company for altho' it were much to be wished their Views should in all things be the same, yet it is very natural they should disagree in many Points. It has often been the Case in the Course of their long Connection: Yet those Differences were always conciliated, & would not now in all Probability have arrived at the dangerous Crisis to which they are brought had not the Nabob been taught to believe that the Company's Power in India was on the point of falling into other Hands — These Circumstances considered We say We do not think it strange that he should differ with us on publick Measures But when you inform us, that you are invested with Powers from the Crown & commissioned to superintend the Interests of the Nation, to support the Company's Government & promote their Interests & when you tell us that you mean to write to us in all Friendship from such Declarations We ought to expect temperate & impartial Disquisition & candid Judgment Whether the Tenor & Tendency of your Letters indicate such a Disposition, or betray the Spirit of an Advocate for a Cause which needs be supported We refer to the

Opinion

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of others — We shall only beg Leave to make a few Strictures in some Passages as Examples.

As it is not our Purpose in this Address to offer any Arguments in Support of our Measures but only to Shew the Spirit & Tendency of your Animadversions in their true Light We shall beg Leave to take them as they occur without Regard to Connection.

Vide Par: 3.

There certainly is no Contradiction or Impropriety in stating a Case fairly & referring it to the Judgment of another without advising or giving an Opinion on it ourself — But pressing & urging is not stating and it differs from advising only in this, that it is more forcible — We should have been thankful for a fair State of the Case — the Advantages & Disadvantages of both Sides would then have appeared in their proper Colours We appeal to yourself whether We had any Reason to look upon that as a fair State which left us in Doubt whether you meant to accuse us of contemning & refusing the Marhatta Friendship, which you said had been offered to us: or whether your whole Charge was for refusing to enter into an Offensive Alliance with & to assist them We are of Opinion that you meant both; it is certain however that you Support the Propriety of an Offensive Alliance with the Marhattas without stating one Disadvantage that may result from it; Is that a fair State of the Case? You say they are the greatest Power in India, and exceedingly formidable — and therefore allow us to do — exceedingly Dangerous — You think that if the three Presidencies were united in their Councils and could establish Alliances among the Indian Princes, this great

Vide Par. 4.

Power

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Power might be somewhat restrained and their Consequence greatly diminished. One great Object in sending out the Commissioners as We understand was to unite the three Presidencies in Councils & in Measures: & the same Ideas it may reasonably be supposed will still prevail, at Home. Bengall was but lately threatned with an Invasion of Mahrattas & is not now free from Apprehensions. Bengal is engaged in a powerful Alliance against them — the Nabob & you oppose our uniting with Bengall in Councils and in Measures: and then because We cannot so unite with them the Result of your Arguments is that We ought therefore to unite with the Mahrattas to crush the Powers who Stand in Opposition to them & thereby as a natural Consequence, Strengthen and increase their Power, the more effectually to enable them to bend their whole Force against Bengall which Stands in Opposition to them: and which is by far the most valuable of the Company's Possessions in India. —

Vide Par. 2.

You say that you think a War with the Mahrattas ought from every Principle of sound Policy to be avoided, as Affairs are at present circumstanced — We say so too — But is that the Point now in Question?

Vide Par. 4.

You say that it is by no means desirable for this Presidency & the Carnatic, with all the Assistance that Hyder can give to provoke the Resentment of Madavarow — Is this a fair Statement? after you have been informed in our last Letter that We Do not mean to assist Hyder Ally? the Question as We understand it from your Letter is whether We shall unite with the Mahrattas to make War upon Hyder Ally & take the

Provocation

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Provocation We give to Mahdavarow is by not uniting with him.

Vid: Par: 5:

Upon the Subject of a Compromise with the Mahrattas for Money, you say the Nabob might think it hard to pay the Expences of Wars in which he only looked upon himself, as an auxiliary, & also to pay a Sum of Money to the Mahrattas who threaten his Country on Account of a Peace, to which he neither consented nor approved — You tell Us you have authentic

Vid. Par: 2:

Materials in your Hands — the more is our wonder for we find no Agreement between your Dear Bought authentic Materials. When in the year 1767 Hyder Ally from Coimbettore threatened the Carnatic, when, about the same time Hyder Ally obtained from the Soubah a Sanad for the Carnatic, and entered into an Alliance with the Soubah against the Carnatic: was the Nabob only an Auxiliary to the Company in the Measures for opposing those Designs? When in 1768 he entered into a formal Agreement with the President & Council, touching the Charges of the Expedition into the Balaghaut in Expectation of a favorable Issue was he merely an Auxiliary? When Madavarow in 1768 while he was negociating with the Nabob touching an Union united with the Soubah in an intended Invasion of the Carnatic could that be the Effect of the Treaty of 1769? or was not in Effect the Treaty of 1769 the immediate Consequence of that threatened Invasion? If you have authentic Materials We beg you will do yourself the Justice to read them dispassionately & compare them with the

Sentiments

Sentiments you have now expressed on these Subjects: & having done so We could almost venture to refer it to your Decision whether those Sentiments seem most like the genuine Production of a Mind disposed to give every Assistance to the Company's Servants in the forced Construction of a determined Advocate.

Vid. Par. 6

You ask, of Mahaderow or Hyder Ally which We think the most eligible Friend, & which the most Dangerous Enemy? The Question is short, but it involves much matter and would require a long Investigation, and much Disquisition: because, to Do Justice to the Subject it would be necessary to state the particular Circumstances under which it might be supposed that either was to become the Friend or the Enemy; to set future Dangers in Opposition to temporary Gain & to state the direct & collateral Interests & views of the Parties — as We have no Time for such a Work & if We had We have informed you why We should decline it, We must leave the Question unanswered.

Vid. Par. 8.

We have told the Nabob repeatedly that We Disapprove the Conduct of the Rajah of Tanjore and We informed you in our last that once relieved from our Apprehension of the Mahrattas and the Nabobs Desire to entangle Us with them, We would undertake to call the Rajah to an Account: We thought that a Declaration so frankly made, might have satisfied a Friend to the Company: yet you resume the Subject enter into the Nature of the Treaty, shew Us how much we are bound to do — that which We told you We were willing to do — The Relation in which

The

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The Rajah Stands to the Nabob — How inseparably the Nabob's Interests is connected with the Company's and how easy as well as Politick it would be for Us to see that Treaty Fulfilled. Why was so much trouble taken in this Detail? was it to give to the World (whomever these Materials shall come before it) a fairer or a clearer View of our Intentions than We had given in a few Words in our Last Letter? Was it to impress the Reader with an Opinion that We did not mean what We said: and therefore that you, who have no Right to urge, was under the Necessity of urging Us Still further? Or, was it merely to gratify the Nabob?— We do not know.

Vide Par: 9

Supposing the Treaty of 1769 were received from the Mouth of an Enemy, do your repeated Upbraidings in chosen Terms alter the Nature of the Treaty or have any one Purpose but that of gratifying the Nabob? Not satisfied with this Taunt you say "We then thought that Enemy our Superior." We should have thought it the Part of one charged with the Interests of the Nation, commissioned to promote the Company's Interests & in all Friendship to assist their Servants. We say We should have thought it the Part of such an one to hide a National Disgrace, if such there were, and not to blazon it to the World. We cannot conceive how it was in any wise necessary that you should speak of the Peace in 1769 in the reproachful manner you did in order to secure the Peace of the Carnatic in 1771. If it had been necessary to speak of it at all, to state its Terms. The means of complying with it, or the Means of breaking it sum the only requisite Points but the Time when, the Place where, & the manner

Now

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how it was made, had nothing to do with the future Peace of the Carnatick, & was therefore understood by us as an intended Reflection, the more bitter because you knew from our former Declaration, we could give you no Explanations and that your Decision in such terms must go forth to the World, for every Man to add his own Ideas of Time, Place & Manner, and this surely could be done with no friendly Intention to the Company's Servants. Why the Treaty of 1769 was received from the Mouth of an Enemy; whether that Enemy were through our superior, or whether any other & what Necessities were the Cause of that Treaty will appear from authentick Materials; if you have such they might inform your Letter. The Troubles & Embarrassments which you say were foreseen at the making of the Treaty, were equally foreseen the year before, and every year before: else why should the Nabob have been so long desirous of obtaining from the Mahrattas at almost any Price an Ultrunghaut? which when obtained would probably avail him as much as the Cowles of Security they often grant to Districts for valuable Considerations and plunder them the next Day. — You ask whether it will be better for the Interest of our Employers to risk all for Hyder Ally? And we beg leave to ask, whether that Question is meant to convey a fair Idea? Where is it, We beg to know, that you find any traces of an Intention in us to assist Hyder Ally for the Sake of Hyder Ally? No Doubt he will throw himself into the Arms of France & he must be Senseless not to do it, when he finds not only that he cannot obtain Assistance

from

from England, but that the Nabob is his Declared Enemy that he wishes to join, at all Risks with the Mahrattas to Subdue him, & is using every Endeavor to make the English his Enemies too.

Vid: Par. 80

We were Serious, & very Serious in our Opinion that the Mahratta was encouraged to persist in his Demand of Assistance from us, for We believe the Nabob wishes it Still more than the Marattas, for the temporary Advantage he will gain by it, & to give a Proof to the World, that, by your aid he can now compel us into his Measures: & as We have given him no Cause to hope that we will voluntarily enter into an offensive Alliance with them, by what other Means could he hope to obtain it? We Do not place much Faith in publick Reports, but when they so perfectly coincide with every precedent Fact & with the Principles of a known Plan they have some Weight. We never said that the Mahrattas were invited or that the first Idea was suggested to them by the Nabob, their Claim upon the Carnatick for Chout has been asserted whenever it was convenient to them, & twice of late Years, as We mentioned in our last it has been compromised with them: We Do not know whether the Chout has now been demanded and the Assistance as an Alternative for this Matter has not been clearly explained to us and We believe it will be no easy matter even for you to get at the Truth. But We believe the Mahrattas had rather at this Time have our Assistance than the Chout because by our Assistance they hope totally to Subdue Hyder Ally & that done what shall prevent them from getting their Chout from the

Carnatick

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Carnatick afterwards and probably the Carnatick itself.

2d Part: 11.

We Did not say We had discovered what had passed in your Secret Negociations with the Nabob, if we had really made a Discovery We Should have taken the Liberty to tell you frankly what We had discovered: We Spoke of Reports, which joined to the Sense the Nabob has expressed in Letters to Us on the Subject of the Jaghire so Different from what was ever understood before, gave Us, We thought, just Alarm. We rest Satisfied under your Assurances that it has not been proposed to deprive the Company and for what has been proposed on the Subject of the Jaghire We must wait the Event of Time. — We too have heard the Nabob Speak of the Company with Respect & Friendship, for the Company which might perhaps have continued to this Day, had he not thought he Saw their Power in the Wane: This is the Cause of his withholding his Confidence, not that he Saw his Rivals & Enemies evidently preferred to him by Some of the Company's Servants for he never Said it & he might as well Say that the Soubah his Rival & Enemy was preferred to him because the Company & their Servants refused their aid to place him in the Musnud of the Decan, and expel Nizam Alley: Such We know is the Language of the Nabob & perhaps under like Circumstances, Such amongst Us as are prone to Jealousy & absorbed by Ambition would in like Manner complain: but ought We to expect a Repetition of such Sentiments, natural as they may be in the Nabob from one acting in the Character you have announced to Us?

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Vid: Par: 12

We are indeed very sorry that there
should have been Occasion to introduce the Subject of pri-
vate Conversation in our publick Letters, but as you did
introduce a Part We thought We had as good a Right
to introduce any other Part: by what you now say on
that Subject it should seem that you would have the
first Conversation you had with our President consider-
stood as a publick one, on Business, and the second a
private one. Our President begs Leave to recall to your
Remembrance, that the apparent Purpose of the Visit
you honored him with was to communicate to him
a private Letter you had received from England which
introduced again the Subject of your Powers, and a Desire
on your Part to be informed whether we had not received
Instructions thereon from the Court of Directors: and that
Subject led the Conversation to that of Tanjour, in the
Conclusion our President proposed to wait upon you
with Mr. Hastings to reconsider & discourse further of
what had then passed: they accordingly did wait on
you, and then the Conversation was positively agreed
to be private: but altho' the first was not positively &
expressly agreed to be so, could the Communication of a
private Letter be considered as publick Business or is it
reasonable to consider the formal Continuation of a
Subject as private Conversation & the previous & intro-
ductory Conversation as publick? and when that which
you think made the first Conversation a Matter of
publick Business was a Subject on which We conceive
you have no Right to require publick Information
from us until your Powers are known & acknowledged?

We

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Vis: Par: 13:

It is a great Satisfaction to Us that you See the Propriety of our Conduct in Respect to your Powers and that you do not Blame Us: But we beg Leave to Say you do not State this Matter between Us as We think it ought to Stand; the whole Tenor of our Correspondence does indeed evince that We decline to communicate with you Confidentially in the Character of Hrs Majestys Minister to the Princes of India, for the Reasons we have given at Large. Such We beg Leave to Say that We have never refused to co-operate with you for the public good nor have you ever proposed to Us any one Subject in which you desired Us to co-operate with you. We are ready & willing to co-operate with any Man living, whether he have Powers from the Crown or not in whatever shall appear to Us to be for the public Good. We do not wish to charge you personally with any thing for as We know not your Powers & Instructions neither are We competent nor Do We pretend to judge, whether you act up to them or beyond them: But if We are involved in Difficulties by the means of those Powers, We must address ourselves to you who execute them and who attack our Conduct; We are only Defendants.

2d Par: 14

The Expences of Seven Battalions of Sepoys, with other Expences you say the Company's Servants make amount to about four Lacks of Pagodas Annually: If We understand any thing of the Force of Words, to make an Account amount to a Sum, is to make out a false Account. Have you authentic Materials to justify this Imputation? Or is it made merely

as

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as the prosperd advocate of the Cause you have taken in Hand? If other Proofs were wanting this alone might suffice as an Example of the friendly Aid We are to expect from your Powers. It were too great a Humiliation even to deny the Charge. We receive & regard it as We ought.

you thought the 7 Battalions of Sepoys were to have been employed for the Defence of the Carnatick & for the Support of the Nabobs Authority and Government — But you find yourself egregiously Mistaken — Is it because We refuse in the Moment you & the Nabob think it proper, to commence Hostilities against Tanjore, Or is it because We refuse to enter into an offensive Alliance with the Mahrattas that you find yourself thus egregiously mistaken? and is this a fair State of the Case? We leave it to the Judgment of those who shall read & consider both Sides of the Question. — But the Nabob cannot command the least Service from those Troops nor can call one of the Sepoys his own, — The Nabob has ever found Us ready to execute any Service for him with the Company's Troops when those Services could be undertaken without too great Peril, 'tis true, that he never did and God forbid that he ever should command the Company's Troops. You say then it is not praying Troops it is only a softer Name for praying an Annual Petition to the Company for Permission to the Prince of the Country to live unmolested by their Servants in his own Dominions. — We thank you Sir for giving Us so many striking Proofs of your Disposition towards

Us

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As the World might otherwise have thought your Declaration of Friendship & Assistance to the Company & their Servants had some Foundation: these & other Instances Stand well, in Contrast. It is not then you say Paying Troops — Granted. We never said it was. But by what Kind of Deduction or Proof do you make it out that 'tis a Sum Paid to live unmolested of the Company's Servants? an Accusation so much out of and so void of Foundation claims the same Consideration that We gave to the Accusation of making the Nabob's Account amount to four Lacks of Pagodas. We have granted that it is not paying Troops — but We do not grant that it is a Tribute, it is a Reimbursement of Charges the Company is put to in maintaining an additional Body of Troops entertained by them at the Nabob's own Desire, at a time when they were his chief Support, as they had been for twenty Years before, and he found the Advantage of it; Now he not only wishes to withdraw those Forces from the Company but even desires the Command of the rest, his Letters shew it: All this is very natural to Ambition even in a moderate Degree, for all Men desire Independance, and most the Power of Controul, But how does it consist with the Character of one charged with the national Interests and with the Support of the Company's as you tell Us you are to inculcate & encourage in him such Ideas: it is indeed but a Continuation of the Doctrine you promulgate for having by your Exposition of the 11th Article of the Treaty of Paris taught (what

We

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We believe he never had any Idea of) that he is by that
Article under the Guarantee & become an Ally of the Crown
of Great Britain, if that be admitted it follows as absolutely
and incontroulably that he is to all Intents & purposes
as much an Ally and as much under the Guarantee of
the Crown of France: having taught him this, the next
Step is to make him independant of the Company &
that these are his Ideas is very plain from his Letters: he
has told Us in them more than once, that in Case of a War
between the two Nations, he shall not consider himself
as a Party, and that what Assistance he may furnish
must be considered as a voluntary Act of Friendship, and
that he will not even promise to pay them after the Enemy
shall be in the Country: if this Doctrine be consistent with
the national Interest, We frankly confess We have hitherto
been mistaken: We will venture to say it is very dange-
rous to the Company's and we always thought that the true
Interests of the Company & that of the Nation were one, but
Principles differ with the Times.

Vide Par: 15

'Tis Strange to you that the Authori-
ty of the Circar is suffered to be despised and insulted &c.
& whatever the Nabob may think, till it is the Pleasure of
the Governor & Council they will not allow him the Smallest
Assistance, tho' repeatedly requested for the Support of his
Authority. Can you venture to give this forth to the World
as a fair & candid State of the Case? a Difference of Opinion
arises between the Nabob & the Governor & Council as to the
Propriety of sending an Expedition the Nabob wishing, as
We verily believe to involve Us in Trouble with the Mahrat-
tas, for the Purposes We have before explained, proposes Us to
instant Hostility, before We are prepared to act effectually.

explain

We

We on the other hand propose to prepare every thing for an effectual Expedition, but to defer Hostility or even a Declaration untill we can undertake it with less Danger from the Mahrattas and with a reasonable Hope of Success; Upon these different Ideas of Measures you pronounce, that it is Strange, the Authority of the Circars is suffered to be despised, and insulted. & yet you begen your Letter with saying that the Matters you are to treat of merit a very cool & candid Discussion! But further you Say, the Governor & Council will not allow the Nabob the Smallest Assistance to support his Authority, till it is their Pleasure — if you could for once have refrained from dipping your Pen in Gall and instead of — "till it is their Pleasure" — had wrote — till in their Judgments it appear expedient. We should have agreed with you that it is so — but that We act so Arbitrarily as to do, or not to do, because it is our Pleasure, it an exaggeration little becoming a Friend. Before We leave this Subject permit us to ask whether you think We are answerable for the Measures We take in the Nabob? if We are answerable, Upon what Grounds do you judge that the Nabob ought to decide of the Measures? & if it be true that We are to decide of Measures for which We are answerable upon what Grounds do you censure Us for Deciding? You Suppose that the Nabob has been indulged with a few Officers to form & discipline his Troops, as soon Compensation for the annual Revenue of about four Lacks of Pagodas, which he pays into our Cash, permit Us to say the Supposition has not even the Semblance of Probability. tis not possible you should be ignorant that We have Garisons in the Nabob's Forts

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of Palamcotah — Madura — Trichinopoly — Tiagar
Permacoil — Vellour — Amboor — Angole and occa-
sionally in others. Doth His Majesty's Ministers & the Compa-
ny's Friend think it reasonable that the Company should
bear all the Charges of these Garrisons besides the Pay of the
Europeans which they do bear? — That they should keep
all these supplied with military Stores of every kind at
their own Expence? — That they should supply the Nabob's
own Troops with Arms, Accoutrements and Stores grate-
that they should bear the Charge of Bullocks, of Tents
of Batta &c in the Field & receive no Recompence. The
Reimbursement of Sums so expended you call an annual
Revenue. Is this the proper Use, or perversion of Words?
If such be the Doctrine which your Powers & your Instruc-
tions enjoin you to maintain against Us, We beg you will
excuse Us from Submitting thereto untill you shall make
it appear that those Powers are Legal, to compel & bind Us
to an innovation so prejudicial to the Company's Interest.
Those Officers were sent for the Purposes you say Viz.t to form
& discipline the Nabob's Troops, but does it follow from thence
that We should authorize them to commit Acts which We
dare not do ourselves? And yet, in the very Letter wherein
you maintain such Propositions as these, you say, you are
ashamed We made it necessary for you to say you had not
the least Partiality to the Nabob, that you was not under
the smallest Influence of Party Zeal, & bore no Resentment
against Us or any of the Company's Servants! — the World
will Judge.

In your Letter of the 18th April, what
you said on the Subject of the Mahrattas consisted of two Parts.
— in the one you reproached Us for condemning & neglecting

their

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their Friendship, which you said they had proffered — or the other you urge the Propriety of assisting them — To the first We replied that no such Offer had been made to Us as Friendship for Friendship: if it should be made to you or if you could procure it We desired you would & We would Subscribe to it — To this you reply by asking Us whether we really think that We should be the Dupes of such a Piece of Absurdity: by which Question We understand that you refuse to accept of the Offer or to procure it if you can — Give Us leave to clear ourselves of the Absurdity, Let it fall where it may — We are engaged in a Treaty with Hyder Ally by which it is agreed that in Case the Country of either shall be attacked, the other shall furnish aid, in Case the Party attacked shall not have been the Agressor — Political Necessity, you say which made Us comply with Hyder's Terms may one Day make Us break with him, however much against our Inclination and that the political Necessity must excuse the Breach of Treaty — you say you know we were determined to assist Hyder Ally: & that it is not for want of Inclination that We do not do it now; but because Circumstances forbid our sending the Company's Troops to fight in his Cause against the Mahrattas — Now then by your own Arguments, We are by political Necessity restrained from complying with the Terms of the Treaty — Political Necessity you say may excuse even the Breach of it — Political Necessity may then excuse the Non Compliance with it — that Conclusion must follow — There is no Absurdity then in not complying with it: for whatever is the Effect of Necessity is not absurd: & being thus circumstanced: it

cannot

Par. 17

Par. 7.

Par. 17.

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cannot be absurd to accept of the Mahrattas Friendship, which shall not bind us to attack Hyder Ally, if it be not absurd under the same Circumstances, to join the Mahrattas to attack him: a Measure you now support. Thus far We think it is clearly proved from your own Arguments. That We should be guilty of no Absurdity in giving the Mahrattas our Friendship for theirs: and We did not think when We were writing to you, We were at the same Time writing to the Mahrattas: and as We never have made any Declaration to them of the Force of the Obligation We are under to assist Hyder Ally against them we do not conceive it would be an Argument put into their Mouths against our receiving from them what you said they had offered & which indeed seemed not improbable; for, if We judge rightly of their Designs, they are to subdue entirely the Mysore & Bidnore Countries with whatever is now possessed by Hyder Ally: they are it is true greatly superiour to him in the Field, but they probably have thought that it might prove difficult & tedious to possess themselves of his Places of greatest Strength & therefore have been pressing in their Demands of Assistance from us to effect these Purposes by the Means of our Artillery, & superior Knowledge in the Art of besieging — But if such Assistance could not be obtained then it seems not improbable that they would accept of Friendship for Friendship whereby at least they would be freed from the Apprehensions of our assisting Hyder Ally which would be no small point gained: for if they thought that our Artillery & Knowledge might ensure to them the Conquest of the Strong Places, the same Artillery & Knowledge might secure those Places against them —

Having

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Having thus We think proved that it would not be absurd in Us to accept of the Maratta Friendship circumstanced as We are, we will with your Leave consider whether you would become a Dupe in accepting of it for Us. — You have told Us that to preserve the Peace of the Carnatic, is one great object of your Mission, that its Peace & Tranquility are in great Danger from the Mahrattas; You urge by every Argument the Necessity of joining with them against Hyder Ally to avert this Danger which you have also said the Powers of our Charter do not legally authorize Us to do, — you have assured Us that you have Powers under the Great Seal of Great Britain to make Treaties with the Princes of India — you have called upon Us to co operate with you & have pressed Us to accept of the Sanction & Support of His Majesty's Name, — a Striking Instance wherein you may be of Assistance to Us — The Mahrattas you said had offered Us their Friendship and We contemned & neglected it. — We gave you the strongest Assurances to the contrary, Requested your Assistance to procure it for Us — you answer that you will not be the Dupe of such an Absurdity in Us: How then is it possible that you should be the Dupe of what is not? — But without further Enquiry, grant your whole Argument, whatever it be, to be good & solid — Let it be allowed for a Moment that our Request was as absurd as you would have it. — What follows? We know not the Extent of your Powers: but it should seem that this were precisely the Case, wherein those Powers might operate to your own Honor & the Advantage of the Publick by interposing them against the Dangers, which threaten

the

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the national Interests, the Company's & the Carnatick's, thro' our Absurdities, want of Abilities or Want of Integrity. If you are so well convinced of these & of the Efficacy of your System, why will you not take the Risk upon yourself? But they were not intended for these Purposes, We know not what they were intended for, unless to be held forth as a Terror to urge Us into Measures too dangerous for you to charge yourself with, and to enable you thus to Snare Us with Contention, if We refuse to become responsible for them. However it be in this We think you will find our Instance wherein We have requested you to co-operate with Us, & you decline it.

Vid: Par: 18. Permit Us to ask whether you well informed yourself of the general Tenor of the Conduct of the Maravar & Naaleeoty towards the Nabob's Government of late years, when (meaning them) you speak of the natural Regard the Nabob owes to those, who pay Obedience to his Government above the rebellious Rajah? We believe you will not find it very conformable to these Ideas.

Vid: Par: 19 You have intimated to Us and the Nabob hath often told Us, that Hyder Ally is reduced to a desperate State of Distress, and that his totall Ruin seems to be at hand — In this Situation nevertheless you think it more natural, that the Rajah of Tanjour should expect Support from him in his present Conduct than that he the Rajah should look for that Support from the Mahrattas. — The Entanglements of Indian Politicks, are great because they are but temporary, & have rarely a permanent Object in View but they are natural because they are dictated by the present Necessity

&

if

of those who govern & are perhaps more obvious on that account than the Politicks of Europe, where the Secret Interests of Individuals and the Influence of Party have often a very large Share in the public Transactions. It was a natural & obvious Policy in Hyder to interest himself for Tanjore at the Time of making the Treaty of 1769: It is now as natural that the Mahrattas should offer Support to Tanjore, and encourage the Rajah to raise Troubles in this Country as well to employ our Attention at home & prevent our taking a Part against them, while they are prosecuting their Designs against Mysoor, as to weaken & embarrass Us by intestine Divisions, if they have any Views of invading the Payen Ghauts. — The former Connexions of Hyder & the present supposed Connexions of the Mahrattas with Tanjore are thus easily reconcileable to the same Principles. But it is scarce possible to imagine that Hyder who is unable to maintain himself against the Mahrattas and whose only Hope of Safety is in Our neutrality should at such a Time wantonly provoke Our Enmity for the Sake of a Connection, which could yield him no the possible Advantage.

P. 20 & 21

You State an ideal Case in which you suppose Us to have certain Secret Intentions, and then ask whether We think it fair & generous? We answer No, certainly, we should not, were the Case as you State it. But upon what do you ground your Case — only this — you are convinced We had no Intention that What we said to the Nabob on the Subject of your Powers, should be revealed to you then. But if that Conviction have no

Foundation

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Foundation both the Case & the Question have no Reference to any thing real; and, allow us to say, that very probable Circumstance is against him. A Party Writer against the Company hath said, that they have established it as a Rule to employ in their Governments only Men of the meanest Parts who by their Education are excluded from the Knowledge of any one Human Principle except Commerce and whose natural Talents will never supply the Want of Experience. We must have been the most senseless of these Creatures of a Earth-born Creators as the Writer calls them to have said any thing to the Nabob so pointedly as is stated in our Letter to you of the 25th. of April & have said it with an Intention to conceal it from you; when it was most apparent to us that the Sum of the several Matters the Nabob proposed at the Conversation with our Committee had been previously concerted with you — such at least was the Belief — is it then probable that We should say to him what We wished to conceal from You? and why should we wish to conceal it? Was there any impropriety in it? We had before made Declarations to you in our Letters more than once to the same Effect, but without Conviction you could not have stated your Case & Question. — The World will judge.

Vide Par. 22.

You are perfectly right — the Nabob's Want of Confidence in the Company's Servants does acknowledge an earlier Date than the Time of your Arrival, & if any thing We have said implies the Contrary We did not mean it. What We mean to say is that the Arrival of such Powers has greatly increased the Distance between Us and rendered the Restoration of Confidence impossible — of which a few

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few Words may evince the Truth. The Nabob wishes to controul Us. He proposes to Us what he desires to have done & We, who are to be responsible for what We do, do not think it Adviseable to comply. He complains to you, as to a Power whom he hopes to find a Redress: & thereupon you who have no Rights that We know of to assume any Direction of the Company's Affairs take upon you nevertheless to chide and tutor Us, to put Us in Mind of our Duty, to tell Us how ill We treat the Prince of the Country, how much We neglect the Interests & thereon, that of the Nation, & that of the Company, to recommend Measures to Us for redressing all these Grievances which seem all to be taken for granted and to saddle Us with all the ill Consequences that may happen to the Carnatic. Need more be said to evince the Impossibility of the Existence of Confidence under such Circumstances? The World will Judge. One thing appears to Us most clear. That the Interests of the Nation, the Company's & the Carnatick's cannot better under a more dangerous System than the present.

Par: 25. You say it will be greatly against the national Reputation indeed should any Indian Power be permitted to make Demands on this Presidency when they think proper & by the Force of Arms and an apparent military Superiority to give Peace & War to the Company & their Allies at Pleasure. All this is perfectly just. The Mahrattas have been threatening the Carnatic with Fire & Sword, if We do not send the Company's Forces to assist them in the Reduction of the Possessions of Hyder Ally Cawn with whom We are in Alliance. How will it

consist

consist with the national Reputation to be thus compelled by a Mandate from Poonah tendered by a Vaqueel in Madras? Yet the Nabob says it must be done & you recommend it.

We cannot speak to your Intentions but allow us to say that your Words appear to us more aptly chosen for the Purpose of irritating, than of conciliating; for where we acknowledge no Legal Power to censure, Censure, at any rate, from such an Hand, even were it Just must irritate. You propose to us to continue to do our Duty, as if there were no Power in the Country but our own — which is to propose an impossibility, — yet we certainly shall continue to do our Duty & should have done so without that Advice, for whenever we act suitable to the Circumstances of the Times We do our Duty, however short that may be of what it might have been had those Circumstances been different. — And here We Desire to take our Leave of Controversy with you. We have not time for such Employments — if the Company had thought we should have been their Harrassed they would probably have engaged a proper number of controversial Writers in their Service — We leave you the Field open — Advise us to our Duty, — Censure us for neglecting it — Reproach us for ill-using the Prince of the Country — continue to plead his Cause against the Interests & Rights of the Company, & tell us it is for the Benefit of the Nation — assert what you please — be as Severe as you please — We shall be silent here, and if We reply at all, it shall be in another place —

We

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We have the Honor to be
Sir

Your most obedt & most humble Servants
Jon. Du Pré
& Council

Fort St. George
29th May 1771.

30th Dispatched the following Letters.

To Brigadier General Joseph Smith
Sir

Enclosed you will receive a Copy of a Letter from the Nabob, complaining of Disturbances committed in the Circars Districts, by the Collectors belonging to Tanjour Tawmy Nainr & the Renter of Tryjour, the Nabob has also represented that one Moodu Nainr is concerned with the said Swamy Nainr in the Disturbances raised by him — Hyder Ally's Vaquel has likewise delivered to us the Purport of a Letter from his Master complaining of the Depredations committed by the said Swamy Nainr in the Districts of Canor.

As it is necessary to preserve as far as in us lies the Peace of the Country & to punish such Lawless Ravagers, We Desire you will consult with the Nabob's Manager with Regard to the Force that may be necessary to expel the said Swamy Nainr & Moodu Nainr & if means can be found to secure their Persons, it will be rendering a very essential Service, as this Man has frequently been the Cause of Troubles & Disturbances in the Country — You will also be pleased to take such Measures

Fort St. George 30th. May 1771.

Measures as may appear to you expedient & prudent for protecting the Circar from the Ravages of the Colleries or Shurs — you have herewith Duplicate of a Letter from the Nabob to his Manager Sujd Mucklooor alby Cawn Directing him to give you the necessary Information regarding their Business & all the Assistance in his Power.

You have also herewith a Letter to Lieutenant Colonel Bonjour which comes under a Flying Seal for your Perusal; Directing him to assist the Nabobs Manager at Madura all in his Power in punishing the Colleries belonging to the Madura District who are said to be committing Ravages in the Dindigull Country.

The President has communicated to Us that part of your Letter to him representing that many Demands are made by the Nabobs People for small Detachments for collecting the Revenues, the Impropriety of permitting the Sepoys to be dispersed on such Services & of suffering the two Companies to remain at Tottem & Cottallam alias Wallour, which are entirely Defenceless and without either Stores or Provisions for the Troops.

When We ordered those Places to be garrisoned by two Companies of Sepoys it was to prevent the Country from being plundered by Straggling Parties of the Mahratta Horse who were said to be in the Neighborhood; But it never was our Intention that those or any other Sepoys belonging to the Company should be employed in collecting the Revenues, as We are convinced they would thereby soon become no better than

the

Fort St George 30th May 1778

the Nabob's common Tibbendy — We shall therefore leave it to you to withdraw those Seapoys if you think it necessary & to take such Measures to preserve the Peace & Security of the Country to the Southward as shall appear to you advisable —

The Secretary has acquainted us that you had represented to him that the Bullocks allowed to the Sepoy Battalions doing Duty at Trichinopoly were insufficient to supply them with Water & had desired that Buckalls might be allowed in their Room, agreable to the Regulations which We approve and Orders are now sent to the Paymaster for that Purpose.

We are

Sir

Your most obedient humble

Servants

Jo: DuPré

&c. Council

Fort St. George
30th May 1778

To Lieutenant Colonel Bonjour
Commanding at Madura

Sir.

L. Col. Bonjour regarding the Nabob's Colleries

You have herewith a Letter from the Nabob to Sheik Mehyeddeen Jemydar his Sowkdar at Madura directing him to use his utmost Endeavors to punish the Colleries belonging to the Madura District who have been guilty of committing Depredations in the Dindigul Country — A Translate of the said Letter comes enclosed for your Perusal: and We desire you will consult with the said Manager & afford him all the Assistance in your Power, for that Purpose & for preserving the Peace

and

Fort St. George 29th May 1771

and Tranquility of the Nabob's Country.

We are

Fort St. George
30th May 1771.

Sir

Your most obedient Servants
Jo: Du Pré
&c. Council

To Mr. James Hay
Paymaster at Trichinopoly

Sir

Letter to Paymaster at Trichinopoly directing Puckallies instead of Bustis to be employed to the Sepoy Battalions.

General Smith having represented that the Bustis allowed to the Battalions of Sepoys stationed at Trichinopoly are insufficient for the Purpose of fetching Water — & desired that Puckalls may be employed in their Room: I am directed by the President & Council to desire that you will on the Receipt hereof cause Puckalls to be employed to the Sepoy Battalions in the Room of Bustis agreable to the Regulations — I am

Bustys

Bustys

Sir

your most obedient & humble Servant
J. M: Stone

Fort St. George
30th May 1771

31st. The following Letters were this Day wrote,

To Brigadier General Joseph Smith

Letter to Genl. Smith on the several subjects of this Letter of 30th May relative to the Disposition of the Troops, Corps of Cavalry Sepoy Guns, Sepoy Sergeants & Invalids

Sir

We have lately received your Letter of the 1st. May.

Having

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Having considered the State &
Distribution of the Troops which you delivered to the Presi-
dent in June last, it appears evident that of all the Forts
mentioned therein & which are of Importance in Case of a
War were to be garrisoned by us, We should have no
Army for the Field: and it is almost as certain, that if
they are entrusted to the Nabob's People, they would be Lost
in the same Manner as all the new Conquests were towards
the Conclusion of the War with Hyder Ally. In time of
Peace indeed it does not appear necessary that We should
have Troops in any others than those already garrisoned
by the Company.

We are sensible that many Advan-
tages would arise from keeping one Brigade always together
in Readiness for Field Service, but when We consider the
very great Expence that must attend the building Barracks
& Accommodations for a compleat Brigade which We
have no Reason to expect the Nabob will consent to defray
& which the Company cannot: when We are in Doubt
how long the Military Establishment may continue
on its present footing, whether the seven Battalions of
Sepoys whose Pay is reimbursed by the Nabob may or
may not be continued under the Company's Orders: that
that Point may be determined whether an entire new
Plan may not be adopted for the military Establishment
– All these Doubts & Difficulties considered We are of Opinion
that the Troops should remain in the several Garrisons
as they have hitherto been, until We can receive
further Instructions on this Subject.

We approve of the Method you
propose

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proposal for Draughting the Men for Captain Runyon's Troop of Cavalry, & for which We shall give the necessary Orders when the Recruits arrive.

With respect to the Sepoy Guns We understand your Opinion to be, that none should be attached to the Battalions as heretofore: but that whenever a Battalion or more of Sepoys be ordered on Service that a Brigade, or a certain Proportion of Guns with the proper Complement of Artillery Men to be detached from the Artillery Corps for that particular Service: which being ended the Guns & Men are to rejoin the Artillery Corps. If this be the Plan you would recommend, We entirely approve thereof, & desire you will give Orders to your Brigade for carrying the same into Execution: & as soon as We receive your Answer, Orders shall be given for that purpose to the 2d. Brigade.

We approve of your Proposal that the Sepoy Battalions be compleated with Serjeants as far as capable Men can be found: and you will please to give Directions accordingly.

We have given Orders that the Invalids be formed into four Companies to be Stationed as We before proposed.

Six Invalid Artillery Men with a non Commissioned Officer have been sent to Permacoil & the like Number to Siagar agreable to your Recommendation and Orders have been given for Lieut. M.Clintock to proceed to Cuddalore & take upon him the Command of the four Companies of Sepoys at that Place.

We are

Sir,

recommend-dation

500 Fort St. George 31st May 1771.

Sir,

Fort St. George
31st May 1771.

Your most obedient humble Servants
Jos. Du Pré
&c. Council

To Alexander Wynch Esqr.
Chief at Maslipatam

Sir,

to Maslipatam Vizagapatam & Completion of the Establishment of Sepoys

1st We have hitherto been employed in forming & regulating the Troops Kept up for the Service of the Carnatic, agreable to the Establishment directed by the Commands of the Court of Directors received the last Season, We shall now communicate to you such Parts as may be necessary for your Information.

2d The European Infantry & Sepoys are to be formed into two Brigades, each Brigade to consist of one Regiment of two Battalions of European Infantry & Six Battalions of Sepoys.

3d Each Battalion of European Infantry is to consist of one Grenadier Company and eight Battalion Companies.

4th A Grenadier Company is to consist of—

Capt.	Lieut.	Serjts	Corpls	Drummers	Private	Totale
1	1	5	5	3	87	105

5th A Battalion Company is to consist of—

Capt.	Lieuts	Ens	Serjts	Corpls	Drums	Private	Totale
1	1	2	4	4	2	50	64

6th The Field Officers to each Regiment are to be 1 Colonel, 2 Lt Colonels, & 2 Majors.

7th Exclusive of the above Establishment

Six

501 Fort St. George 31st. May 1771

Six Battalions of Sepoys are to be Kept up for the Service of the Northern Circars each Battalion to consist of

Capt	Lt.	Engs	Serj.	Comm.	Sub.	Jem.	Havr.	Navg.	Col.	Drum	Fluck.	Prog.	Total
1	5	5	10	1	9	20	60	60	10	10	10	860	1063

8. You will therefore be pleased to order the Sepoy Battalions under your Orders to be formed agreable thereto.

9. There being ten Subaltern European Officers to a Battalion of Sepoys instead of two, their Duty will not be near so hard as formerly, We have therefore ordered that the additional pays of the Lieutenants doing Duty with the Sepoys be reduced to Five Pagodas pr Month & that of the Ensigns to four Pagodas pr Month each — And as there are ten Serjeants appointed to a Battalion, of these two of them are to receive in future only three Pagodas pr Month in addition to their Pay as Serjeants, the one as Serjeant Major, the other as Quarter Master Serjeant, the other Serjeants are to receive only one Pagoda pr Month in Addition to their Pay — These Deductions are to take place from the 1st July next.

10th As it may be difficult to compleat the Sepoy Battalions with Serjeants agreable to the foregoing Establishment, We recommend that it be done as far as capable Men can be found with out distressing the Regiments, and you will be pleased on the Application of Mr. Andrews & Mr. Colebrooke to compleat the Battalions under their Orders with Serjeants as far as you are able & in proportion to the Number attached to the Number attached to the Battalions under your Command

502 Fort St. George 31st. May 1771

Command.

11. The Honble Court of Directors have been pleased to order that the Sepoys before appointed to assist in working the 3 lbr. Guns attached to each Battalion be withdrawn, and Artillery Men employed in their Room: but as this would too much divide the Artillery Corps we have wrote to General Smith on the Subject, as soon as We receive his Answer you shall be furnished with Orders respecting the Plan to be adopted.

12. Having thought proper to form the Invalids on this Establishment into four Companies one of them is ordered to do Duty at Masulipatam & We have appointed Captain Black to the Command thereof

We are

Fort St. George
31 May 1771

Sir

your affectionate Friends
Jos. Du Pré
&c. Council

The same to Messrs. Andrews & Cotsford except the last Paragraph and the latter part of the 10th which is as follows: And We have directed Mr. Wynch on your Application to him for the Number of Serjeants you may require to assist you as far as he is able & in Proportion to the Number attached to the Battalions under his Orders.

June 1st
Nabob's accot.

The Nabob's Account being finished is now sent them, with a Letter entered in Country Correspondence N° 102

Fort St. George 10th. June 1775.

At a Consultation Present

Josias Du Pre Esqr. Governor President

Warren Hastings. Samuel Ardley

John Smith. George Stratton

Henry Brooke

John Mitchell. George Mackay

Mr. Brickenden indisposed

Monday 10th. June

Read the following Letter from

John Andrews Esqr. Chief at Vizagapatam.

To the Honble Josias Du Pre Esqr.

President & Governor &c. Council of

Fort St. George.

Honble Sirs & Sirs

In a Letter I had the Honor to address the President the 20th. January Last, I acquainted them with the Behaviour of Linga Bopatee Rajah of Madagadoor & Vizack Bopatee Rajah of Gulcondah, — That they were then preparing to disturb the Country and that I had ordered four Companies of Sepoys to join Lieutenant Lamotte who was then at Madagadoor with two Som after they withdrawing their Force, I again called on the four Companies truly sensible of the Expence of Money, Loss of Men, & other Inconveniences that are the Results of commencing Hostilities with these People I have made it my Study to preserve Peace so long as I could do it consistently with the Honour & Interest of my Employers — In the present Case I have advised Vizack Bopatee not

Letter from Mr. Andrews advising of his having ordered a Detachment to assist Sitteramanaka, in reducing Linga Bopatee the Gulcondah Rajah & Vizack Bopatee to Obedience

Fort St. George 10th June 1771.

not to quarrell with the Company & gave Linga Bopatee every opening to return to his allegiance as the enclosed Letters will Shew your Honor &c. but instead of taking my Advice or embracing the Opportunity I received a Letter from Sitteramanaiki a few Days past advertising me that Linga Bopatee had taken the Field assisted by Virah Bopatee Brother and two thousand of his Men. I have therefore ordered five more Companies of Sepoys to join the two at Madagalor & proceed with the Rajah against them which I hope your Honor &c. will approve. The Work will not be difficult, their Force being unequal even to the Rajahs alone in the Field. The Gulgundah Rajah has paid no Tribute for many Years nor has he since I came here ever Sent a Letter or a little Fruit, as an Acknowledgmt. of his Dependance which was before customary. I hope therefore your Honor &c. will approve of his being now made tributary to the Company in Such Sum or more as he heretofore paid.

That your Honour &c. may the better understand the Situation of Linga Bopatee I beg Leave to refer you to mine of the 5th August 1770 He was drove out of Madagalor together with Narraindoo in our Pursuit after that Rajah, & took Shelter in the Gulgunda Country

I am with Respect
Honble Sir & Sirs
your most obedt humble Servant
John Andrews

Vizagapatam
15th May 1771

To

505 Fort St. George 10th of June 1771.

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr.
President & Governor &c. Council of
Fort St. George.

Honble Sirs & Sirs

Letter from Mr. Andrews with Copy of one to Vera Bopatee

Since I had the Pleasure to address your Honor &c. the 15th I have been informed that Lunga Bopatie & his adherents were retreated into Gulgunda — That Vera Bopatie might have only himself to blame for any Trouble that might ensue when our Sepoys were ready to march to join the Rajah, I wrote him another Letter, copy of which comes enclosed, I have not yet received his Answer — As to Lunga Bopatie he is Vizeramrauze's more immediate Object, as the Madagalor Country is a Part of Nundapoorum & should pay him eighteen Thousand Rupees ff Annum though I believe he did not get any thing last Year nor indeed seldom does without Force — I suppose during the Time of the Late Vizeramrauze, Gen. Caputrauze & the present Vizeramrauze he has had his Country taken from him at least Six Times — as any thing occurs I shall not fail to advise your Honors &c.

Lunga Bopatie & Vizeramrauze's Object

ought to pay 18000 Rupees ff Annum

I am with Respect
Honble Sirs & Sirs
Your most obedient humble Servant
John Andrews

Vizagapatam
18 May 1771

Observations thereon

Altho' We should not look upon a Tribute of 18000 Rupees ff Annum as an Object of sufficient Importance to induce Us to undertake Military Operations

Operations against the Hill Polygars which have always been attended with Difficulties & Expence, nevertheless as We have engaged to support Sittenamraudu against the refractory Polygars dependant on him, We acquiesce in the Measures taken by Mr. Andrews for that Purpose. He should however have obtained our Concurrence before he proceeded to Extremities:— of which he is to be advised & desired to explain a seeming Contradiction in his Letters: as in his first Letter he says that he hopes we will approve of Linga Bopatee, the Gulgunda Rajah's being now made Tributary to the Company: and in his Letter of the 18th he represents him as Tributary to and dependant on Sittenamraudu.

Letter from Mr. Coltsford Resident at Ganjam read as follows.

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr.
President & Governor &c. Council at
Fort St. George

Honble Sir & Sirs

From Mr Coltsford on Account of proceedings with respect to Munda Row Callicoote Zemindar & his Behaviour &c.

I have duely received your Letter of the 3d Ultimo.

By my Letter of the 15th Ultimo to the President you will have been informed of our Proceedings in the Callicoot Zemindary.

Munda Rauze the Zemindar having given the most convincing Proofs of his Desire to act in Obedience to the Company's Authority first by informing me of the true State of his affairs and afterwards by coming to Ganjam, while our Detachment was in his Country, I have

assured

Fort St. George 10th June 1771.

assured him (in Conformity to what I had before wrote to him) that he may depend on having the Protection of the Company and that he will not be removed out of his Zemindary seeing that Mismanagement in his affairs is the Cause that he is so far in Arrear and which has entirely proceeded from the wicked Conduct of his Brother Maun Sing. I have also intimated to him that I shall be attentive to his Concerns so far as the Payment of his Arrears due to the Company makes necessary.

Since Maun Sing has been drove from Punealley the Party for the Rajah has daily increased however the former appears to have had very great Influence in that Part of the Zemindary which is a fine Valley running under the Hills which separate it from the Zemindaries of Hauteur & Jaggernaut, and is divided from the other Parts of Calicoote by thick Woods so that it is a Country entirely seperated from it, and was formerly an independant Zemindary. As the taking Care of this Country with a Detachment would be attended with more Expence than the Worth of it and the quitting it entirely leave to Maun Sing the Means of Supporting himself & his Poms for some time (the Situation of his Country making it easy for him to lie in Security without quitting it altogether) I recommended to the Rajah the withdrawing the Inhabitants into another Part of his Zemindary for the present year, This he has attempted to do, but without Effect, it appearing very plain that they are too well affected to Maun Sing. I desired the Rajah to give the Inhabitants repeated Notice to quit their Villages but

Fort St. George 10th June 1778.

but finding it vain, I was constrained to order all the Villages lying close to the Hills to be destroyed and the Woods contiguous to them Scoured, Where a large Quantity of Paddy was found in different Parts which was burnt (not having the Means of conveying it off) Several Poms were also overtaken in the Woods who were immediately put to Death by the Seapoys. Since this Transaction many of the Inhabitants have removed with their Cattle to other Parts of the Zemendary, such Villages as are at some Distance from the Hills & lie within our Protection have not been destroyed especially as the Inhabitants of them have paid their Obedience to the Rajah.

The Pancally Country is supposed to be worth about 30000 Rupees, about 12000 of which is for the present year Destroyed. — This Country has been in the hands of Maun Sing for these 8 years past, not indeed as a Jaguire, but nevertheless he has always kept the Revenue to his own Use under the Pretence of maintaining a Body of Poms for the Rajah's Protection, & hence it proceeds that he has been so much attached there.

I have this Day seen a Vaqueel from Maun Sing who was ordered to inform me that his Master was very Sensible how bad his Conduct had been and that if his Fault could be this time passed over He was willing to do whatever I should command him. — I gave him for Answer that his Conduct had been inexcusable, Such that if he came to Ganjam & made his Submission in Person, He might be

assured

spared of having his Life spared Him, Who far above his Deserts and that I would endeavor to prevail on the Rajah to pardon Him also that what Further concerned him, depended on the Future, therefore nothing could be said on it. — I have some Hopes that this may be effected and shall use my utmost Endeavors to bring it about, as it will put an immediate Stop to the Troubles in the Calliecote Country and give the Company great Power there in Future. It will also greatly Strengthen the Company's Authority all thro' the District as Maun Sing is (with Reason) considered by the other Zemindars as the best qualified to assist the Government of any amongst them. —

Should He come to Ganjam I shall endeavor to make him pay all the Expences incurred in Consequence of marching against him, and insist upon his not interfering in the Affairs of the Zemindary until the Company receives the Arrears of Peishcush due from it. — As this Zemindary has not paid its Tribute for some Years past and Maun Sing having had the principal Authority during that Time it may reasonably be supposed that He has the Means of defraying the above Expences.

I have no Doubt of the Success of our Proceedings against Calliecote as We have searched every part of the Zemindary & are well acquainted with its Strength & moreover by leaving the Rajah with us the Country will be entirely settled I hope in two Months on a Supposition that Maun Sing should not give himself up.

As

5to. Fort St. George 10th June 1771

As your Honor &c. observe that the present State of Affairs requires that the utmost Precaution should be used in engaging in Military Operations I shall not fail to pay due Attention thereto.

In the Course of our Proceedings against Callicoot I have had Occasion to observe that the Zemindars of Havelgur & Goorsur (but particularly the former) are greatly troubled at the Influence we have gained in that Zemindary in Consequence of the Rajah's applying to the Government for Protection, neither that Maun Sing omitted to instill into them, the great Detriment it may be to their own Affairs in future if they do not now assist him against the common Enemy of them all. But I have endeavord to shew them by my Treatment of the Rajah of Callicoot and in other Circumstances that have offered that it is contrary to our Maxims of Government to oppress any of them and equally an Object of our Attention to prevent Oppression in others living under the English Government and that the Conduct of Maun Sing has been the Cause of the Troubles which have arisen in that Zemindary. — I do not think they will openly assist him tho' it is probable the Zemindar of Havelgur will not refuse him a Place of Security and maintain him privately, But I shall be careful how I make this the Subject of Complaint against him, in Consequence of the Substance of your above Letter. I am Honble Sir & Sirs

with the greatest Respect

Your most dutiful Servant,

Edward Colebrooke

Ganjam
May 10th 1771.

The

511 Fort St. George 10th. June 1771.

M.r Cotts Lords Conduct approved.

The Board entirely approve of M.r Cotts Lords Conduct with Respect to the Tadicorah Rajah, & his Brother as well as regarding the Villages of that District lying under the Hills.

The President lays before the Board the following Letter from M.r Wynch.

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr.

Honble Sir

Letter from M.r Wynch advising of the Death of Athavarow & his Brother in Law who were killed at Bardachelum

A Hircarrah that I posted on the Borders of the Cummumeh, is come in with Advice of the Death of Athavarow, He was got to Bardachelum & many of His People were come over to Him: It is said that Allias Beg hearing where He was, made a forced March of about 20 Cos & surprised Him: He endeavored to defend Himself, but was Shot with a Couple of Balls when He fell, and immediately His Head was Severed from His Body, I believe He has left no Children ...,

I am most respectfully

Mazulipatam, Honble Sir,

23.d May 1771. your most obedient Humble Servant

J.n Wynch

P. S. Since writing the above I have received a Confirmation of it also that his Brother in Law Chundria fell with him & that both their Heads are sent to Fazul Beg.

Report of Committee of Stores read as follows

To

512 Fort St. George 10th June 1771.

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr.
President & Governor &c.a Council of
Fort St. George

Honble Sir & Sirs

We beg Leave to lay before your Honor &c.a Extracts of our Proceedings for your Approbation and remain with great Respect

Honble Sir & Sirs

Your most obedient & very humble Servants

Geo. Stratton,
J. Butler
Patrick Ross

Fort St. George
10th June 1771.

Extract of the Minutes of the Committee of Stores held at the Contractors yard for building Gun Carriages the 31st May 1771. Present

George Stratton Esqr.: Lieut.Coll.: Butler & Lieut.Col.: Ross.

Orders thereon

Para 1. — The Contractors for Gun Carriages having signified that they have the following Carriages ready to be delivered Viz.t

8..6 Pounders
1..18 Pd.r
1..8 Inch Howitzer } with Limbers
2..5½ Inch Do.
8 & 12 Tumbrils.

The Committee are therefore met to survey them & it with much Satisfaction

We

we observe that they are extremely well finished; & We should do great Injustice to the Contractors were We not at the same Time to declare it as our Opinion that their Carriages are far Superior to any ever made in India and equal to any sent by Lieut: Col: Butler & Ross in Europe in which the Inspector of Stores & all the Artillery Officers in Garrison assembled on this Occasion concur.—

Resolved that they be receiv.d.

Approved

Para 2.— Having taken into Consideration the Nature of such Carriages as may be immediately wanted, the Returns of Stores at this Place, & the different Garrisons being referred to; We are of Opinion that the following should be immediately set about: Viz.t

12.. 12 Pd.r Field Carriages
12.. 3 Br.r D.o
30.. 18 Br.r Garrison D.o } Field Wheels
810– 24 Pd.r D.o — D.o } which will have

As the Charge for making Gun Carriages &c.a according to the Estimate of Peace & War entered on the Proceedings of Sel: Committee the 13th Dec.r last brought Pag.e not to exceed 25000 — It is agreed that this Paragraph be referred back to the Comm.d of Stores who are to ascertain which of these are absolutely necessary for the Defence of Madras, Vellour, & Trichinopoly — & whether some Truck Carriages may not be proper

for

have recommended to be made with 10 Spokes & 4 Feet high: the Cheeks to be 10 f. 10 I. long & to have Trunnion Linings

We are likewise of Opinion that 12 Transport Carriages should also be immediately set about as those in Store here as well as those in the Out-Garrisons are much out of Repair, but as none are mentioned in the Contract Messrs. Jourdan & De Souza are asked at what Price they will undertake to make them: they propose to do them for Pags. 155 each, or to submit the Price to the Committee. Reference being thereupon had to the Cost of Transport Carriages made in the Company's Carpenter's Yard by the Engineer We find they have been charged as follows.

Decr 1764	2 Carriages @ Pags	162	20	38
Augt 1766	1 D:	225	20	29
April 1769	11 D:	2175	23	58
	14 Carriages	Pags 2483	0	28
	The Medium Price of wch is Ps	177	12	70

For Yellour & Trichinopoly instead of Trail Carriages.

The Committee to call upon the Engineer to lay before them a Calculate of the Expence of the Iron Work Timber & Labour required for a Transport Carriage & which is to be produced to the Board.

Ps 325. 4. 76

Ps 1932. 9. 3

Paid 3. 1771

Defer'd

515 Fort St. George 10th June 1771.

Para 3. With Respect to the 3 Pdrs we are of Opinion that the abovementioned are absolutely necessary; as it is represented to us that those attached to the Several Battalions of Seapoys are much worn & many unfit for Service, besides that Some of the Battalions have no Guns.

Deferred any Resolution on this Paragraph untill We receive General Smith's Answer relative to the Sepoy Guns attached to the Sepoy Battalions.

Agreed that the aforegoing Minutes be laid before the Board for their Approbation.

A true Extract Andrew Majendie
Clerk to the Com: of Stores

Extract of the Minutes of the Committee of Stores held in Fort St. George the 5th June 1771.

Present

George Stratton Esqr. Lieut Colo: Butler
Lieut: Colonel Ross.

The Committee having met in Consequence of a Letter from the Governor to re-examine the List of Stores for Trichinopoly which at a former meeting they had agreed might be Shared are still of Opinion that they may all be sent when ready, even Should a War be Declared, except the

Following

Ordered that they be got in Readiness & Sent away accordingly.

cannot be paid till the next half year.

Application of General Smith requesting Lieut. Ross's Rank in consequence of a Commission from the Court of Directors

The Secretary lays before the Board a Letter from General Smith enclosing a Copy of a Commission granted by the Court of Directors to Lieutenant David Ross attested by Mr. Colford at Ganjam, in Consequence of which the General represents he should take Rank from 14 July last.

Observations & Orders thereon.

By the List of Lieutenants sent out the last Season Mr. David Ross is appointed a Lieutenant next after Lieutenant George Clarke; But as the Court of Directors in the 95: Para: of their Commands of the 23d March 1770 acquaint us that Mr. David Ross one of the Lieutenants mentioned in the said List having been appointed a Cadet for Bengall, they would send Orders to that Presidency for his repairing to his Station on this Coast, and as Mr. David Ross who has applied to General Smith came out a Cadet for this Establishment on board the Plassey in the year 1769 We apprehend there must have been some Mistake — It is therefore agreed to request of the Gentlemen at Bengall to inform us whether any Person of that Name is ordered by the Court of Directors to be removed from that Presidency to this.

The President acquaints the Board that having some Doubt whether Mr. Alexander Mitchele who has been appointed a Practitioner Engineer, had the Company's Licence for being in India, He directed the Secretary to write to his Brother Major Mitchell on the Subject — and he now lays before the Board the following Letter received from Major Mitchele in Answer.

Sir

523 Fort St. George 10th June 1771.

Sir

Letter from Major Mitchell regarding his Brother's coming to India.

Having this Day received a Letter from Mr. Secretary Stone informing me that a Doubt had arose, whether my Brother Alexander lately appointed an Engineer on this Establishment came out to India with the Permission of the Court of Directors or Had Their Leave to remain in the Country & desiring to be informed how this Matter stood; I take the Liberty of addressing my Reply immediately to you who was the kind Instrument of his Appointment.

My Brother, Sir, came out to India about Seven years ago on board one of the Charter party Ships in the Station of a Midshipman, and was persuaded on his Arrival at Madrass to remain in the Country, where he has been ever since, consequently has no Permission from the Court of Directors.

May I hope, Sir, in Addition to your former Goodness that you will be pleased to interest your self in obtaining the Consent of the Court of Directors for his being continued in the Service which I am the rather encouraged to ask of you, as I have the Pleasure to add without the Partiality of a Brother that his Behaviour in the Station you procured for him has given general Satisfaction.

I have the Honor to be with much Gratitude & Respect,

Sir

your obliged & very obedient Servant

A. Mitchell

Masulipatam
28th May 1771...

Agreed

Fort St. George — 10th. June 1771

Referred to the Directors.

Agreed that this Matter be represented to the Court of Directors who are to be informed that at the time Mr. Mitchell was appointed a Practitioner Engineer We concluded he had the Company's Permission for being in India — But as a Commission has been granted him It is agreed that he be continued on the List of Engineers untill the Company's Pleasure can be known.

6 Bonds &c. on 55000 Pags. Creditors.

Read a Letter from the Nabob as entered in Country Correspondence, N.o 97 advising of his having sent Pags. 55000 to Mr. Johnston for his Creditors.

Read a Letter from the Nabob as entered in Country Correspondence N.o 1 with Pags. 1000 on Account of the rent of Permanaka due the 31 Ultimo — Ordered that the Receipt thereof be acknowledged.

A Mistake having been discovered in the Nabob's Account sent him the 15th. Instant as he is therein debited for the Charge of Sepoys both on the Old & new Establishment and as the Nabob is by that Means overcharged so considerable a Sum as Pags. 52196.34.72 It is agreed that he be informed of the Mistake which will reduce the Ballance due from him to Pags. 226606.4.47

The President acquaints the Board that he has received a Letter from General Smith recommending Mr. Edward Pearce (who was dismissed by the Sentence of a Court Martial & put upon the List of Cadets) for a Commission, His Conduct having been to the Satisfaction of his commanding Officer.

Agreed

525 Fort St. George 10th June 1771.

Agreed that he be appointed an Ensign to rank from this Day.

Mr. Edward Pearce appointed Ensign

Jon. Du Pré
Warren Hastings.

John Sorrick
Geo. Stratton
Henry Brooke
John Whitehill
Geo: Mackay

Fort St. George 13th June 1771

Wrote the following Letters.

To John Andrews Esqr.
Chief at Vizagapatam

Sir.

To Mr. Sydenham
subject of his
ngs with ye
Linga Bopa
and Bopatee

& 18th Ultimo

We have received your Letters of the 15th

Althi We should not think a Tribute of eighteen Thousand Rupees pAnnum an Object of sufficient Importance to induce Us to engage in Military Operations against the Hill Polygars, in which We have constantly experienced many Difficulties: nevertheless as We have engaged to support Sitteramrauze & to assist him, in reducing any of the rebellious Polygars dependant on him, We acquiesce in the Measures you have commenced against Linga Bopatee, the Rajah of Gulgunda & his Adherents. In future however We recommend that you inform Us fully of all Circumstances & wait our Orders before you proceed to Extremities with any of the Zemindars or others —

We cannot avoid observing that in your Letter of the 15 May, you say that you hope We will approve of the Gulgunda Rajah's being now made tributary to the Company in such Sum as he heretofore paid or more — and in your Letter of the 18th. You express yourself as follows" As to Linga Bopatee he is "Vizziaramrauze's more immediate Object as the Madagalo Country is a part of Nundapooram & should pay "him 18000 Rupees pAnnum &c." These Passages require Explanation as by the first it appears that you think

Linga

527 Fort St. George 13th. June 1771.

Linga Bopatee might to be made tributary to the Company & by the latter that he is dependant on & tributary to Setteramraujee. We therefore desire you will clear up this Matter.

We are
Sir
Your affectionate Friends
Jo: Du Pré
& Council

Fort St. George
13th. June 1771.

To Mr. Edward Colsford
Resident at Ganjam

Sir

Letter to Mr. Colsford approving of his Conduct regarding the Collector Zemindar &c.

We have received your Letter of the 10th. Ult. and entirely approve of your Proceedings with Respect to Murda Tauke the Zemindar of Callicoote, his Brother Maundeng, and of the Measures you took regarding the Villages lying close to the Hills & which you acquaint Us could not be protected without great Expence and Difficulty.

We are
Sir
Your affectionate Friends
Jo: Du Pré
& Council

Fort St. George
13th. June 1771.

Ships Queen & York 15th. arrive.

Arrived this Day the Honble Company's Ship Queen with 4 Cadets 5 Serjeants 2 Corporals & 69 Private on board. as also the Ship York with 1 Cadet, 1 Serjeant 2 Corporals & 48 Private.

Ship Salisbury arrives 15th.

Arrived this Day the Honble Company's Ship Salisbury with 3 Cadets 3 Serjeants, 1 Fifer & 13 Private.

18th Came

528 Fort St. George 15th June 1771.

18th Came in the following Letter from Lieut Coll. Bonjour.

Honorable Sir & Sirs

from Lt Coll. Bon. in Answer to that the Board regard the Nabob.

I have received your Letter inclosing a Direction from the Nabob to the Manager of this District which I have delivered and determined upon assisting him with three Companies of Sepoys: they are to relieve different Posts occupied by his own, with which he expects to suppress the Depredations of the Colleries complained of by the Inhabitants of Dindigull. The said Manager has represented to me that he would be obliged to dispose part of his Troops into Places which he intends to take & which he says should be repaired in order to keep in awe the troublesome Neighbors he has to deal with; the Total of those Troops being only four Companies of Seapoys with one hundred & fifty Cavalry, he also says the Number cannot be sufficient for that Purpose: it must certain if he is obliged to the Division he makes of them, that Disposition cannot be but of a weak Influence, so he can neither depend upon his Revenues, or Security of the People he is to protect, for which it becomes necessary to have a reserve Situated at Anoor which Place is about thirty Miles to the West of Madurah & forty to the South South East of Dindigull, this Reserve to move immediately upon any Complaints & punish severely those Disturbers of the publick Tranquility.

I have the Honor to be with a profound Respect

Honble Sir & Sirs

Your

Fort St. George 18th. June 1771

Madura
10th June 1771.

Your most humble &
most obedient Servant
A Bonjour

At a Consultation, Present.
Josias DuPré Esqr. Governor, President
Monday — Warren Hastings, Samuel Ardley
25th June — John Smith, George Stratton.
Henry Brooke, ———————
John Whitehill, George Mackay.
Mr. Brickenden indisposed.

The Select Committee represent to the Board that in case of a War with France, it will be necessary that a large Quantity of Grain should be collected at Cuddalore since it is probable that some of His Majesty's Ships may be Stationed off that Place it being a Windward Port — In Consequence of which the following Letter is now wrote to the Chief & Council at Cuddalore.

To George Dawson Esqr. Chief
& Council at Cuddalore.
Gentlemen

Letter to Cuddalore directing them to procure 10000 Pagodas worth of Paddy.

As by Advices from Europe We understand that a War was likely to break out, in which Case it may be expedient that His Majesty's Ships should be stationed off Cuddalore, it being a Windward Port & where it will therefore be necessary a sufficient Supply of Provisions should be collected — We desire you will on the Receipt hereof purchase to the Amount of ten thousand Pagodas

530 Fort St. George 28th June 1771.

Pagodas worth of Paddy to be laid up in Store to answer any Emergency

We are

Gentlemen

Your affectionate Friends

&c Council

Fort St. George
28th June 1771.

Read the following Letter from Alex.r Wynch Esq.r Chief at Mahulipatam

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esq.r
President & Governor &c Council of
Fort St. George

Honble Sir & Sirs

I have received your Commands of the 31st of last month.

Herewith I have the Honor to transmit you Copy of a Letter addressed to me by Major Mitchell in Consequence of his visiting the different Forts & Posts in the Circars. On such Parts whereof as may appear necessary I shall take the Liberty to remark & offer my Opinion.

The Chief & Council, have in a Letter to the President & Council, dated 22d September 1767 represented the Redoubt at Bezoara to be of no manner of Use towards securing the Circars against the Approach of an Enemy & accordingly proposed that the Guns & Stores in it should be removed to Rondapillee, & the Redoubt itself Demolished & abandoned. The President & Council, in their Reply of the 9th of that Month for the Reasons given by the Chief & Council, approved of removing the Guns & Stores but

Directed

Letter from Mr. Wynch containing his Remarks on Major Mitchell's Report of the State of the General Garrisons in the Circars and recommending that Mahulipatam be made the Head Quarters for Troops

Fort St. George 24th. June 1771.

Decided that the Works of the Redoubt should be let remain as they then were incase of its being afterwards found of Use. The Guns & Stores were removed accordingly and the Redoubt is now guarded by a few Seapoys Detached from the Garrison of Kondapillee.

What Major Mitchell observes with regard to the present decayed State of the Fortress of Kondapillee & the improper Extensiveness of its Works hath on former Occasions been represented & I believe is very just: But with respect to erecting another Fort on the Plain in its Neighborhood I am still of the Opinion given by the Chief & Council in their Letter to the President & Council of the 13th. October 1768 that We are not yet sufficiently acquainted with the Geography of the Country to determine upon that Point nor can We be so until the Circars, particularly the Western Borders of them undergo an actual Survey which I think ought to be begun as soon as possible, but cannot well take place untill your Honor &c. are pleased to send the Captain & Lieutenant of Engineers mentioned in your Letter of the 3d. April.

The Fort of Ellore I believe was never considered as a Place of Defence nor thought of any other utility than to serve as a Barrack Walk for the Troops canton'd there, The Proposal of removing the Europeans from Ellore to Maslulipatam, entirely coincides with my own Sentiments — To the Arguments made Use of by Major Mitchell, I shall only add one that if During the present System the Apprehension of an Attack upon Maslulipatam should render it necessary

to

to order Thither the Troops cantoned at Ellore, the Country would immediately be alarmed & the Inhabitants of it would conclude that the Company's Affairs were in a very desperate Situation. The Difficulties & Inconveniences that would naturally resull from thence are too obvious to require enumerating. Such were those Troops instead of being at Ellore to be Stationed at Masulipatam, the latter would be constantly prepared and the Circars equally as well guarded as they are at present. Should this proposed Alteration take place, I do not imagine that it would be necessary to keep more Stores at Ellore than two 24 & two 12 Pdr. Iron Guns with a proper Quantity of Ammunition for them. Those Guns in the rainy Season or while the Ground is Wet, could not easily be transported from Masulipatam should it be necessary for the Troops to take the Field then; they are now kept at Ellore in order to be at hand for any Service that may require them on this Side of the Guadavery & two Twenty Four Pounders are also kept at Samalacotah in case of their being wanted in the Circar of Rajahmundry Instead of the Force proposed to be left at Ellore by Major Mitchell, I imagine that four Companies of Seapoys & a few Artillery Men to take Care of the Stores would be sufficient.

In Consequence of a Representation made from hence, the President & Council directed the Fort of Rajahmundry to be abandoned. There are no Guns or Stores in it: but a Serjeant & Jemadar's Guard of Seapoys are detached thither from Samalacotah for the Security of the Boats on the River.

Experience

533 Fort St. George 28th. June 1771.

Experience has sufficiently shewn that nothing but facing the Curtains & Parapetts at Samalacotah with Brick Work can possibly preserve them from the Havock made by the Rains the Expence of repairing which will, in a very short time exceed what would be the charge of executing the other; & it ought likewise to be considered that untill the Breaches made yearly by the Rains can be repaired that Fort is not in a State of Defence.

I am most respectfully
Masulipatam Honble Sir & Sirs
15th June 1771. your most obedient & humble Servant
A Wynch

To Alexander Wynch Esqr.
Chief of Masulipatam.

Sir

Major Mitchell's Report of the State of the several Forts in the Circars &c.

Finding when I came to take Charge of the Fortifications & other public Works carrying on within the Circars that besides the Defences of Masulipatam there were several other Works of Consequence carrying on at some of the out Garrisons particularly at Ellore & Samalacotah, I represented to you the Necessity of my making a Tour thro' the Several Garrisons & Forts within your Jurisdiction in order to make myself well acquainted with their present Condition so as to enable me to judge in Regard to the Propriety of the Works now carrying on & to qualify myself for giving the necessary Directions towards compleating them which I could no otherwise Do than by viewing them on the Spot.

This

Fort St. George 24th June 1771.

This Proposal having met with your Approbation I have accordingly visited all the Posts occupied by the Honble Company's Troops within the Limits of the three Circars immediately dependant on Maslulipatam & shall now proceed to Lay before you my Remarks & Opinion concerning each of them according to the Order in which I visited them which was as follows Viz.t Besoara, Kondapillee, Ellore, Rajahmundry, & Samalacotah.

The Redoubt of Besoara is a small Square Fort capable of containing between two & three hundred Men Situated on the Eastern Bank of the River Kistnah about fifty Miles to the North West of Maslulipatam: — It was built by Us soon after getting Possession of the Circars in Order to Secure a narrow Pass formed by the River & a Range of Mountains extending from its Banks a great Way into the Country in a North East Direction: Thro' this Pass Lies the great Road that Leads from the Circars to the Commaneh & Golgondah Countries and in general to the Dominions of the Soubah of the Decan which extend along the back of our Possessions — As this Pass was formerly looked upon as almost the only Communication between our Possessions & those of the Soubah it was consequently regarded as a Post of some Consequence — But since We are become better acquainted with the Geography of the Country We have discovered several other Passes and some within a few Miles of this equally practicable for the Passage of an Army: consequently this Post is found to be

of

of Little or no Use & is therefore in a great Measure de-
serted having only a few Sepoys on it by way of Guard
Detached from the Garrison of Rondapillee — As it has
been run up in a hurry being built of rough Stones
without any Cemint, and having of Late years since
the Discovery of it's little Importance been a good deal
neglected it is falling very fast to Ruin and in my
Opinion is not worth repairing: Nor do I think
the Situation of Consequence sufficient to justify
the Expence of building another: consequently no-
thing more need be said about it.

Within Sight of Besoara, at
the Distance of about ten Miles to the North West, is
situated the Fortress of Rondapillee, this consists
of two Seperate Forts an upper & a Lower: the Latter
which has been built principally with a View of pre-
venting the Approach to the other is situated at the
Foot of a very high Mountain or rather Ridge of
Mountains on the Summit of which is built the
upper Fort. This Mountain is part of a very ex-
tensive Range of Hills, running along the East
part of the Circars, and extending, I have Reason
to believe tho' with Several Intervals from the Sou-
thermost to most Northerly Extremity of the Circars
Viz. that is from the Banks of the Kistnah to the Country
behind Ganjam, in the Direction of South West & North
East nearly parallel to that of the Coast forming a
Frontier between the Circars & the Dominions of the
Soubah — With regard to the Fortress of Rondapillee as
there are very distinct Plans of it both here and at

Madrass

Fort St. George 24th June 1771.

Madrass it will be unnecessary to descend to a minute Description of it: Let it suffice to observe in general that both the upper & lower Fort are so very extensive & are so much fallen to Decay having large Breaches in every Side that they may both be regarded as in great Measure untenable by any Force We can afford to leave there, even against a Country Power: nor could the Works here be repaired in any tolerable Degree without an immense Expence: It is at present Garrisoned by Four hundred Sepoys which may be of Service in time of Peace in keeping the neighboring Country in Awe; But in Case of a War a much greater Number would run the Risk of falling a Sacrifice to the first Enemy, who, not frightened by Appearances only which it must be confessed are formidable, should dare to attack it — For this reason I apprehend it will soon become necessary to abandon it altogether which was the Cause that in the Representation I sent you from thence of the ruinous Condition of the Barracks of that Garrison instead of recommending their being rebuilt which would have been attended with a very considerable Expence I only proposed some trifling repairs to be made to some Moorish Buildings which will very well answer the Purpose of Barracks for as long a time as the Company will probably think proper to continue a Garrison there That Proposal you was pleased to approve of — Which I condemn the Forts of Kondapillee I think it may Duly at the same time to observe that the Plain in it's Neighborhood affords the most important Situation for a

Fortified

Fort St. George 21st. June 1771

Fortified Place of any I have seen in India — In the first Place it would be admirably situated to prevent any Incursions into the Circars either from the Soubah or from Balaklet Jung as neither of these Powers could well approach our Possessions without coming very near it. — On the other hand in case of our carrying on an offensive War with either it would serve as a Key to the Dominions of both & would be most commodiously situated as a Magazine of Provisions & Place of Arms from whence our Army might be furnished with every thing they wanted — I need not tell you Sir who have been on the Spot that the Possessions of the Soubah lie immediately open to it & it is only distant a few Hours march from the very Center of Balaklet Jung's Country. & if it is considered how much this last mentioned Prince is known to be under French Influence and what Numbers of Frenchmen are now in his Service it will not be difficult to conceive of what Importance this Port would be both in Respect of Offence & Defence in Case of a War with that Nation: To conclude as it would be in the Direct Road, from the Circars to the Carnatick it would be extremely useful in this Respect in Case of any of our Forces marching to the Assistance of the one or the other. — For all these Reasons I am induced to give my Opinion that when the Evacuating & Dismantling of Rondapillee is resolved upon, a Substantial little Fort capable of being Defended by a Small Number should be constructed upon the adjoining Plain. — The Ruins of Rondapillee would furnish excellent

Stone,

Fort St George 21st June 1771.

Stone for building at an easy rate and Abundance of Lime is to be had in the Neighborhood so that it would not be a Work of great Expence. — On the whole I am convinced that many Advantages would result from the Execution of this Plan to which the only Objection that can be offerd is the Expence: With regard to which as I apprehend the additional Security it would afford to our Possessions in the Circars from which the Company derive such considerable Revenues, has been clearly demonstrated, I do not therefore think it ought to prevent it's being carried into Execution. — Seeing it therefore as I do in this Light I must request of you Sir to communicate this Representation together with your Sentiments upon it to the President & Council at Fort St George.

I come now to Ellore in Regard to which I am informed that a Plan has been transmitted to the Presidency at Madrass and approved of there for enlargeing that Fort by pushing Down the North Point in order to make Room for compleating Barracks for one Battalion of Europeans, three Battalions of Sepoys & a Company of Artillery. As I am by no means convinced of the Necessity or even Propriety of this Enlargement, but on the contrary am inclined to think that it would be putting the Company to a very great Expence to very little Purpose I must beg Leave to lay before you the Grounds upon which I have formed this Opinion which I flatter myself will be taken into Consideration, both Here & at the Presidency before any Part of the intended Alterations & Inlargements

are

are ordered to be carried into Execution.

In the first Place I take it for granted that as soon as the Fortifications of Mafulipatam which are now in great Forwardness are nearly Completed & that proper Barracks are got ready for the Reception of the Troops, a proper Garrison for the Defence of the Place will constantly reside there: this can hardly be doubted if the great Importance of this Capital of the Circars is duly considered — As long as We possess Mafulipatam, We in great Measure secure the Possession of the Circars: — Should We for want of a proper Garrison or by any other Accident, lose the former, the Latter would probably fall, of course: By leaving the Garrison cantoned at so great a Distance as at Ellore (which indeed can hardly be supposed will be allowed much longer to be the Case) I do affirm that in Case of an European War the Garrison of this Capital is very liable to be shut up & consequently the Place to be taken: — Taking it for granted then that a proper Garrison (which I apprehend ought not even in times of Peace to consist of less than One Battalion of Europeans & at least one compleat Battalion of Sepoys together with a Company of Artillery) will soon be ordered to reside here there will then remain for the Defence of the three Circars dependant on Mafulipatam, according to the present Establishment, two Battalions of Sepoys which are to be divided amongst the Forts of Samalacotah, Ellore & Kondapillee: — What Purpose then can it be supposed would be

answered

answered by building expensive Barracks at Ellore
for the whole Military Force of the three Circars? — For
my own Part I regard Ellore as a Place hardly defensi-
ble against even a Country Power & by no means to
against Europeans: To be made otherwise it must be
pulled down & rebuilt: and not only so, but the whole
Pettah which is very large & close to the Fort must be
removed. Neither of these will probably take place;
At the same time it must be confessed that its
central Situation between the Rivers Kistnah and
Guadavery & between the Forts of Samalacotah and
Kondapillie renders it a proper Situation in which to
have stationed a small Battering Train & a Proportion
of Ammunition for the Service of the Army in the
Field, which could not at all Seasons of the Year be
easily transported from Masulipatam: But for
this Purpose I think a Battalion of Sepoys or even
less with a few Europeans & Artillery, would form a
sufficient Garrison: At least I am certain this is
more than it's Proportion according to the present
Military Establishments of the Circars, For this Reason
also there are at present Barracks nearly compleated
& I do not think that any more should be built, but
that all Expedition should be used in the Construction
of Barracks here in Order to make Room for some of
the Troops now at Ellore.

The next Place in order is the
Fort of Rajahmundry situated on the Eastern
Bank of the River Guadavery about the Distance of
fifty Miles from the Sea: concerning which as it is a

Place

Fort St. George 25th. June 1771

Place of no Strength and in a manner abandoned by us having only a few Sepoys in it by Way of Guard nothing farther need be said.

The last & only Post remaining to be described is that of Samalacotah. This was formerly like the present Fort at Ellore a Country Mud fort of a Quadrangular Figure. It is situated about half Way between Rajahmundry & the Sea and being the only Post of any Consequence in this Part of the Country, a considerable Sum of Money has been expended in rendering it a Place of some Strength: For this Purpose the old round Towers have been converted into Small Bastions which are faced with Brick: nevertheless as the Curtains are still of Mud they are constantly tumbling down in different Places & Stand in continual need of Repair, as are likewise the Parapets & Rampart which have no Lining or Revetiment to support the Earth are continually washing Down by the heavy Rains: Had it been resolved at first to have lowered the Profile of this Fort, which I think is higher than is necessary & to have revetted the whole with Brick which is the only effectual Method of preventing the Havock made by the Rains I think it would in the End have been less Expensive to the Company than by doing it only in Parts, as has been done hitherto — It is true an Experiment was made to face the Curtains with Sod, which it was thought would answer; but in the Space of a few years the greatest Part of this Revêtement tumbled into the Ditch. I am still of Opinion that the cheapest & indeed the only Method of compleating this Fort will

&c

be to go on, as soon as the Bastions are compleated &
face the whole of the exterior Talus of the Curtains, as
well as the interior Slope of the Rampart with Brick
Work: The same must be done to the Parapets all
round — Nothing but this will prevent the Works from
tumbling to pieces every rainy Season — There are good
Barracks nearly compleated within the Fort for a Bat-
talion of Sepoys & the Officers Quarters for this Battalion
are now constructing, agreable to the late increased
Establishment of Sepoy Officers: Some new Guard Rooms
are likewise ordered to be built & a few small Storehouses
will be wanting — I shall conclude my Remarks
on this Fort with an Observation which holds equally
good in Respect to every Mud Fort I have yet seen in
the Country, which is, That it would be much less
expensive for the Company to build, new Forts from the
Foundation in those parts of the Country where Forts
are absolutely necessary, rather than take Possession of
any Country Forts alltho' ready built to their Hands, as
these last are not capable of making any considerable
Resistance if regularly attacked by a European Force &
are besides in continual Want of Repairs.

I ought not to conclude this Letter
without mentioning that having been informed, before I
set out on this Tour, That there was good Teak Timber to
be found & in great Abundance, in the Country above
Rajahmundry & within the Limits of the Company's
Possessions which might probably be procured cheaper
than that from Pegu by transporting it down the
River Guadavary, I resolved to pay a Visit to the Places

where

Fort St. George 24th June 1771

where this Timber was said to grow, in order to inform myself thoroughly on this Subject, which I thought might turn out to be of Importance: I accordingly reached the Woods but found that almost all the large Trees within the Limits of the Rajahs Dependent on the Company had already been cut Down — That the best Timber grew in the adjacent Country belonging to the Sou-bah & possessed by Ibrahim Beg & that altho' Leave might probably be obtained to cut it Down there, yet the Expence of Land Carriage in conveying it to the Banks of the Gundavery from which I judged it to be near Sixty Miles distant would be too considerable to turn to any Account — As much had been said, tho' but little known in regard to this Teak Timber before, I thought that the Result of an Enquiry made on the Spot might not be unsatisfactory. I have the Honor to be very respectfully

Sir,

Your most obedient & most humble Servant

(Signed) A.r Mitchell

Masulipatam
3.d June 1771.

Observations &
Orders thereon

With regard to Major Mitchells Proposal of erecting a new Fort in the Plain near Ronda-pilly the Board agree in Opinion with the Hon.ble Mr. Lynch that before We determine on building any new Forts it is absolutely necessary that We should have a more accurate Knowledge of the Geography of the Country a Survey of which should be taken as soon as possible, in which should be ascertained the Limits of the Circars, the Bear-ings & Distances of the several Places the most remarkable

Passes

Passes & the Roads Leading to them.

As to the Proposal of removing the Troops from Ellour to Mahulipatam — We are clearly of Opinion that there ought to be in Mahulipatam Barracks & Accomodations for the whole of the Troops appointed for the Service of the Circars. But as We have already been at some Expence on the Works & Quarters at Ellour those that are begun should be compleated since it will always be prudent to keep a Garrison there & it may be expedient at Times to have the whole of the Troops collected there, We are also of opinion that the Removal of the Troops from Ellore to Mahulipatam had better be deferred for the present by reason of the Alarm which it might at this Time occasion & which We think would be equally great as if they were removed on Mahulipatam being threatened with an Attack & by Reason of our being in some Doubt with respect to Healthfulness of Mahulipatam which has generally been represented as unhealthy on Account of its Situation, & particularly

Circars Cons. 12 Nov. 1765. in Mr. Calls Report Laid before us in Nov. 1765 — As to Samalcotah It is Resolved that an Estimate be made of the Expence of Facing the Curtains with Brick.

Letter from John Andrews Esq.

chief at Vizagapatam read as follows.

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esq.
President & Governor &c. Council of
Fort St. George.

Honble Sirs & Sirs

Under Date of the 15. & 18. last.

I

Letter from Mr. Andrews
advising of Vira Bobaks's
having submitted &
agreed to pay 5000
Pags annually.

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I addressed your Honor &c. respecting the Affairs of Gulgundah I have now the Pleasure to acquaint you, that upon the near Approach of the Company's & Rajah's Troops to that Place Vera Bopatie thought proper to send his Vackeel, acknowledging his Errors in acting against the Company promising never to do the like again, & agreeing to pay a yearly Tribute of 5,000 Rupees — In Consequence ordered the Troops to return.

In a Letter addressed your Honor &c. the 6th March last, I mentioned his not having paid Tribute for Seventy Years past, but upon further Information, I find he paid a Tribute of 3000 Rupees p Annum to Annawaidu Cacon which is about Forty Years since — He pleaded former Customs, that I told him I might have consented to, had not his Conduct been so notorious — As it was I would not agree to less than 5000 Rupees which I hope will meet with your Honor &c Approbation. I am with respect

Honble Sirs & Sirs

Your most obedient
humble Servant.
John Andrews

Vizagapatam
18th June 1771.

Agreed to defer replying to the above Letter till We receive Mr. Andrews' Answer to our Letter of the 13 Instant.

The Secretary lays before the Board the following Letter from Mr. Cotsford.

To John Maxwell Stone Esqr.

Sir

I

546 Fort St. George 25th June 1771.

I have received your Letter Dated the 16th Ult. inclosing the Copy of a Letter from Mr. O Donnell to the Board containing a Complaint of Injustice in my Conduct towards him.

Mr. O Donnell came from Madras on Ship-board as far (I think) as Barva in this District. I did not know what his Allowance to be as Cadet, and therefore two Days after his Arrival wrote to the Governa for Information, an Extract from which Letter comes inclosed, but my Letter was not answered which I impute to an Error in myself as I now think I should have addressed the Board thereon. Soon after Mr. Donnell left this District. Respecting Mr. O'Donnell's Batta to Asks, I have made Enquiry about it & inclose you Mr. Maunsell's Words thereon.

Mr. O Donnell, in the Letter now enclosed me says "I acquainted him with this Resolution" (to address the Board I Suppose) "having already made "him Several Remonstrances to no Purpose". I declare he never acquainted Me of any Such Resolution, & the only Remonstrances he made to me are the accompanying Original Letters Which He Sent me from Cuncole.

This is all that I know respecting the Injustice which Mr. O Donnell has had Done him by Me & which I request you will lay before the Board.

I think it will be readily perceived that my Conduct has been greatly misrepresented thro' the inconsiderate Procedure of Mr. O Donnell & indeed I hope this Matter will not be suffered to remain in its present State, being an Examination therein will

remove

Fort St. George 25th June 1771.

remove any Notions that might be entertained to my Pre-
judice.

I am,
Sir,

Your most obedient
humble Servant,
Edward Colpoys

Ganjam,
June 3d 1771.

Certificate of Mr. Maunsell having received his Batta to Aska.

Mr Colpoys having applied to me to Know whether Mr. O Donnell had received Batta for travelling from Ganjam to Aska, In Answer I have to inform him that there was on that Account two Days Batta entered in my Disbursements for the Month of October 1770. Agreeable to Instructions received from Mr. O Donnell by Letter directing me to draw it & keep the Amount on my hands, on Account of Money he borrowed at Ganjam.

R.t Maunsell

orders thereon.

Ordered that Mr. O Donnell be paid his Sea Batta from hence to Ganjam — But as it appears by Mr. Maunsell's Certificate that he has received his Batta from Ganjam to Aska, his Conduct appears very culpable for making any Demand on that Account.

Read the following Letter from

Ensign Ralph Ford.

Honble Sirs & Sirs

Letter from Ensign Ford regarding his rank

I beg Leave to lay before you a few Occurrences previous to my Admission & relative to my present Station in the Service of the Honble East India Company: If the Request I make in Consequence appear reasonable

it

Fort St. George 25th June 1771.

it will require little Apology: And if you think it improper: Apologies I am persuaded will have no Effect.

On the 23d. Day of October 1761 I has the Honor of being appointed by his Majesty an Ensign in the 101st. Regiment of foot, then commanded by Lieut: Colonel Patrick M.c Donald, (the present Lord Dumfries) and afterwards by Colonel John Scott who now commands the 26th Regiment. And I am confident they will do me the Justice to say that my Character was unexceptionable & unsuspected.

When I entered a Cadet in the Service of the East India Company I was so far from being aware that my Commission of Ensign would be of any Advantage to me that I sailed from England without knowing that an Officer was to be appointed that Season: and I even received Assurances to the contrary.

Judge then how great must have been my Disappointment to find that all the Officers of the Year were appointed to rank in this Service by the Commissions they bore in the Kings: And that in consequence of such Appointment, Officers of Rank in the Kings Service, inferior to my own became Lieutenants whilst from my Ignorance & Want of Application I procured the Appointment of Cadet only.

I am induced to make this Representation, from a Hope that the Worthy Courts will think me justly intitled to that Rank which I should have borne by a proper Application on Entrance into their Service — Lieut.t Clotworthy Thomson who came out last year was originally appointed a Cadet, but

procured

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procured this Rank by a subsequent Application. I flatter myself with the same Indulgence & I shall have no Doubt of succeeding if my Request appear equitable & your Honor &c will be pleased as such to recommend it to the Honble Court. I am

Honble Sirs & Sirs

your most obedient
humble Servant
Ralph Ford

Fort St. George
23d June 1771.

To the Honble Josiah Du Pre Esqr.
President & Governor &c. Council
Fort St. George.

To be referred to the Company.

Agreed that Ensign Ford's Case be represented to the Court of Directors & that they be informed that he is an Officer who bears an exceeding good Character.

Letter from Mr. Archdale Palmer
Paymaster at Madura & Palamcotah

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr.
President & Governor &c. Council of
Fort St. George

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter from Mr. Palmer desiring to come to Madras on Account of his Health.

having enjoyed but an indifferent State of Health lately, I request your Permission to return to Madrass for the Re establishment of it. As I have never been reimbursed the Amount of the Disbursements made by me on Account of the Nabob I entreat your Indulgence to introduce the same in my Account with the Commissary General.

I remain with Respect

Honble

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Madurah
6th June 1771

Honble Sir & Sirs

Your most obedient Servant
Archdale Palmer
Paymaster

agreed that Mr. Palmer be permitted to come to Madras & that Mr. Cumming be appointed Paymaster & Storekeeper at Madurah & Palamcotah in his Room.

Read the following Letter from Captain Norris Commander of the Ship Morse

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr.
President & Governor &c. Council,
Fort St. George

Honble Sir & Sirs

In consequence of a very extraordinary long Passage from England to Madras, the Brandy put on board by the Honble Company at Madeira for the Use of the Military on the Morse having proved greatly insufficient: On it's being expended, I thought it my Duty as well from the Dictates of Humanity as a Zeal for the Service of the Honble Company to continue to them their usual Allowance from my own Stock being perfectly convinced of its conducing to the Preservation of their Healths added to which on our Arrival at the Cape on their general Petition for Liberty to go on Shore to refresh themselves after long Confinement and the Field Officers belonging to the Honble Company on board being of Opinion it would be proper to indulge them in their Request and might be

of

Fort St George 25th June 1771.

of Service to their Healths, I complied & ask the same time supplied them with trifling Sums respectively to purchase such little necessaries they might be in want of. An Account of the whole I have taken the Freedom of inclosing for the Inspection of the Honble Board, which I flatter myself will meet with their Approbation and hope they will take the same into consideration, and give Orders for the reimbursement of the Amount if it shall appear to them (as I am well assured it must) just & equitable. I have the Honor to be with all due Respect,

Honble Sirs & Sirs

Your most obedient & most obliged humble Servant

John Horne

Fort St George
17th June 1771

The Bill accompanying the above Letter for Necessaries & Liquor supplied the Military amounting to £77.7.– or Pags 201 – 34 – 34 & 7/8 ps Pagoda is also read.

agreed that this Matter be referred to the Court of Directors.

To be referred to the Company.

Letter from Mr James Skene Surgeon of the Ship Morse read as follows.

Honble Sirs & Sirs

Permit me to inform you that at Surgeon of the Ship Morse, I applied to your Secretary for the Allowance as in your preceding Voyages granted me for my Attendance on the military Passengers. Such was

Letter from Mr Skene Surgeon of the Morse desiring an allowance for his attendance on the Officers & Cadets by that Ship.

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was informed by him that the Board at present allow only for the Soldiers & nothing for Officers or Cadets. I therefore take the Liberty to address your Honor &c. & hope the Singularity of my Case will plead for my being thus troublesome, the Length of our Voyage requiring an Attendance equal to two common Passages. The Number of Officers & Cadets &c exceeding that of the Soldiers — The most severe Illnesses of which, fortunately all recovered) attacking only the Officers & Cadets, & how far I discharged my Duty in my Attendance, Major Vaughan & the rest of the Military Gentlemen can inform You with more Propriety than myself & permit me only to advance as a Proof of the Satisfaction of at least the Majority I have refused pecuniary Offers from some of them since their Arrival; not only from any Expectation of an Allowance from the Board but from a Sense that those Gentlemen had undergone an unexpected tedious & expensive Passage.

I hope the Singularity of these Circumstances will appear to your Honor &c. deserving of your Attention, & that you will be pleased to grant me such an Allowance for my Attendance on & Medicines given to the Officers & Cadets who came out in the Morse as shall appear to you adequate to the Expence & Trouble

I have the Honor to be with great Respect

Honble Sir & Sirs

Your most obedient Servant

Ja. Skene

Black Town
June 12th 1771

Not Granted

As it has not been usual to make any

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any Allowance to the Surgeons for their Attendance on Officers & Cadets agreed that Mr. Skene's Request be not complied with.

(2.) The Secretary Lays before the Board a Letter from Mr. Hay, Storekeeper at Trichinopoly enclosing an Indent for Medicines for the Use of that Garrison which is referred to the Surgeons to be complied with.

Ensign Sutherland drowned.

(4th) The President Lays before the Board a Letter from Major Desplaces commanding at Vellore, advising that Ensign Axel Sutherland had been Lost Drowned at that Place the 18th. Instants.

In Consequence of an Order of Consultation the 8th. April, the Commissary General & Military Paymaster lay before the Board the following Regulations for keeping the Nabobs Accounts in future, Viz.t

Regulations respecting the keeping the Nabob's accounts & the Arms &c. supplied the Sepoy Battalions

1st. That a Sett of Books be kept by the Commissary General in which shall be entered the particulars of all Receipts & Payments made on the Nabobs Account. 1st. Approved

2d. That the Gentlemen of the several Employs be Directed to send in Bills to the Commissary General, and receive the Amounts at the End of every Month for all Disbursements made by them in the Nabob's Account and that the Military Storekeeper do also receive from them 7/12th. of the Amount of Arms, Stores, Ammunition & Accoutrements issued by the military Storekeeper to the Seapoy Battalions at this Place and Conjiveram, and as the 2d. Approved

Nabob,

Nabob pays the whole of what are sent to
the Out Garrisons We recommend that the
be credited in the General Books at the end
of every Year for 5/12th of the Amount of such
Arms &c.a as may be issued to the Seapoys
at the Out Garrisons a regular Account of
which should be kept by the Several Store-
Keepers who are to send a Monthly Return
of such Issues to the Military Storekeeper.

3d That the Paymaster at Cud- 3d Approved
dalore should draw Monthly on the Com-
missary General for all Disbursements
made by him on the Nabob's Account
instead of introducing the same into his
Books & in like Manner the Military
Storekeeper there should also draw on the
Commissary General for 7/12th of the
Amount of the Arms, Stores &c.a issued
by him to the Seapoy Battalions.

4th That the Military Pay- 4th Approved
master should pay not only the mili-
tary but all the Seapoys at the Out Gar-
risons, an Account of which should be
monthly transmitted to him by the
different Paymasters & that at the End
of every Month he draws on the Commis-
sary General for the Sum of Pag.
being the Monthly Payment of seven com-
plete Battalions of Seapoys.

5th As it will be impossible 5th Approved
for

for the military Paymaster to keep his Accounts in the manner now observed, We recommend that he forms a Sett of Books for this Purpose, opening different Heads for the Payments made by him & that at the End of every year he makes a Report to the Board thereof.

6th That the Commissary General should also pay all other Disbursements made at the different Out-Garrisons on Nabob's Account on the same Manner as he does at present. 6th Approved

7th That the Nabob be Debited for all advances made out of Cash to the Commissary General, by which Means his Debt can be ascertained at the End of every Month. 7th Approved

8th That the above Regulations take place from the 1st. of last May and that the Accountant be directed to make Adjustments conformable thereto. 8th Approved

Letter from Sir John Lindsay read as follows

Madrass 22d. June 1771

Gentlemen,

After acknowledging the Receipt of your Letter of May the 29th without taking Notice of many stirring Circumstances unworthy of such a Correspondence, I shall enter at large into a Subject of much more Consequence

Josias Du Pre Esqr.
President &c Council
Fort St. George

Consequence & give you proofs of the most unlimited Confidence. I mean to open my Mind to you freely concerning the present State & Situation of this Country which if it produce no other Effect will serve to convince the Disinterested, that I have had other Reasons for directing my Conduct, than Partiality on the one Side or prejudice on the other. I do not mean in this to confine myself to the Detail of a Settlement, or simply to attend to the Interest of a particular Presidency but to consider the Subject in the most extensive Points of View wherein the Influence of the British Nation in India makes the principal Object. To endeavor to maintain and establish which becomes a Duty in every faithful Subject: and the more distinguished the Character, the more indispensible the Duty. And the Man who can point out a mean of securing the National Interest in India, by a rational Plan of Politicks capable of as much Permanency as the Nature of the Indostan Government with an European connexion will admit, must have merit with his Country. The Attempt is Laudable & therefore I shall take the Liberty to communicate my Sentiments on the Subject to you without the least Intention of Schooling, advising, or tutoring. The reading will require a very short Space of time which you may even do at your Leisure, & to answer it none.

2. In the Beginning of 1766 when General Caillaud led an Army against the Northern Circars & by a military Decision transferred the Property of that extensive Country from Nizam Ally Cawn, Subah-

dahr of

date of the Decan to the Company they themselves were principals: The Assistance given from the Nabob could only be as an Auxiliary. Though this Transaction had the Sanction of a Phirmaund from the Emperor then in the Power of the Company, it could not fail of provoking to the last Degree the resentment of Nizam Ally, who was the acknowledged immediate Superior of those Countries: He accordingly prepared for War, called in the Maharattas to his Assistance & threatened both the Circars & the Carnatic with an Invasion. To prevent this Storm General Caillaud negociated a Treaty at Hyderabad in the November following in which the Nabob Wallajah was not named. And though it be mentioned in the Treaty that the Body of Troops to be granted was only to settle his Government yet it would appear from what followed that Engagements had been entered into to assist the Subahdar to deprive Hyder Ally of part of his Country which he was to be put in Possession of probably to indemnify him for the Loss of the Circars now ceded to the Company. For an Army joined him under Col. Smith & marched against Hyder Ally, in which the Nabob was not a Principal. For no Advantage was to accrue either to him or to the Carnatick from this Undertaking, nevertheless it involved him in a War & tho' an Auxiliary only in the strictest Sense of the Word, his Connection with the Company & the Assistance he afforded in Men & every Necessary for the Army made him appear as a Principal in the Eye of an Enemy. Hence it was that the Subahdar when he left the Company's Army and

joined

joined Hyder, gave him (Hyder) Sanads for the Carnatick & Since it was that in 1767 an Invasion was threatened from the Coimbettore Country by the united Armies of Nizam Ally and the Mysorean. That indeed the Nabob & his Country became principally concerned Tho Such were the Means of bringing it about.

3. The Treaty of 1768 freed the Company and the Carnatick from this Enemy for the time; but the whole of Nizam Ally's Conduct added to his natural Character make him but a very precarious Friend. This is sufficiently evinced by his so readily entering into Hyder Ally's Views: which Lays a very reasonable Foundation for Suspecting that the Injury he had received from the Company appeared to him of such a Nature as not to be easily forgiven and that he will be ever ready to Strike on the first Opportunity of attempting to regain that part of his former Dominions or to Satisfy his Revenge on those who had deprived him of them. — Hence by this Transaction We See in the Prince of the Decan an Enemy entailed on the Company & the Carnatick

4. A grant of the Dewanee of the Mysore Country from the Subahdahe to the Company appears as the 10th Article in the Madrass Treaty of February 1768 And by the Ninth Hyder is declared a Rebel and deprived of his Dominions. To effect this a War is to be prosecuted with Vigor against the then Possessor of the Mysore in which as the Company were to be the Superiors of the Country to be conquered they appeared as Principals: & the Nabob even then, as

an

an Auxiliary only. For his Situation made it necessary for him to join in all Wars — No alternative being left.

5. However by the Agreements entered into by the Presidents & Council & the Nabob in the April following, It appears that he is to be connected with the Government of the Country when conquered on Condition of paying all the Expence of the War, the Maharatta Chouth, & the Decan Revenue and provided the Company approved of the Arrangements But as this Reserve of the Discretional Approbation of the Company who were in fact to be the Nabobs Superiors, put it in their Power to annex what Conditions they pleased to his Government. He cannot in Strict Truth be looked upon even here as a Principal, He appears upon the Face of the whole as an Auxiliary. And should Success crown their Arms, the Company to whom the Dewanie of the Mysore was granted were to reward his Services for certain Considerations with the Management of the Country.

6 The War proved unsuccessful. Hyder invades the Carnatick, a Peace was concluded, including very different Arrangements to which the Nabob did not consent — And both the Conditions of Agreements and their Expectations fell together.

7 Hyder Ally having deposed his Master, the Rajah of Mysore & having acquired the Government of the Country by his Sword, began very early to form Connexions with the French and upon every Occasion gave them evident Proofs of his Friendship

ships till the Capture of Pondicherry annihilated their Power in Indostan. It is evident that this Presidency always looked upon him with a Suspicious Eye They hoped little from his Friendship, supposed him a Friend to the French not to be trusted & his total Destruction was what they anxiously sought after. This was not unknown to him. And it is not to be supposed that he can forgive them easily for obtaining the Declaration & Grant contained in the Treaty of 1768 — Not to much for the Influence it might have in depriving him of his Dominions, but from the Disposition it made evident in them to destroy Him. He was fortunate in the War, made a daring Push and was successfull. He dreaded the Power of the Mahrattas, & as the Friendship of the English was necessary to him at that time, there being no European Power in the Country but themselves or any other from whom he could expect to be effectually assisted, if driven to an Extremity, he sought their Friendship and like an able Politician took the most effectual Steps to obtain it.

8. However this Connexion of his with the Company, appears to be exceedingly precarious. And Eagle's Arrival from Europe with Stores & Officers — The Europeans to be furnished from Pondicherry to be put under this Frenchman's Command prove that this Connexion is not a new Creation: and that his Intention has been from the Beginning uniformly the same. He undoubtedly looks upon them as his natural Allies, the Advantages he expects from them

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are greater than he has any Reason to hope for from the English, as he has, no doubt, an Eye upon part of the Carnatick at least should they be able to prevail in India. But his present Situation will prompt him to offer every possible Concession to the Company as a Power who can so easily decide his fate; and as he is an able Politician, he well knows how to suit himself both to Men & times. — But should a National War happen and should the French bring a Force into this Country, I think there is every Reason in the World to suppose Hyder would join them, to be revenged on the Nabob and on the Company, and to reimburse himself on the Carnatick for what he has paid to the Marattas or otherwise.

— & in Proportion as he may be supported now he will be the more formidable Enemy then. — All this is very natural, & corresponds exactly with your Definition of this Country Politicks.

9. The Marattas profess an immense Extent of Country, they are active, warlike, & can bring a very numerous Army into the Field. Though devided into Districts under the Orders of inferior Chiefs, yet they all acknowledge the Superior Power of Mahaderow and yield that Kind of Obedience to him which of late Years has made their Influence in India so great as it is at this Day. Their Government appears to me to be a Species of the Feudal, the most perfect of its Kind of any at this Day in the East, perhaps in the World. They have gained great Advantage over every opponent to the Northward. The King may at the Instant be in their Power & they have no Enemy to the Southward

Southward to deal with but Hyder who cannot be supposed to resist their Power long. Their Force consisting chiefly in Cavalry, their Incursions are Sudden & their Motions rapid; Skilled in all the Address of predatory War they can over run a Country at Pleasure, & cannot be easily restrained by Armies consisting chiefly of Infantry & Cannon tho' by no Means equal to them in a regular Battle.

10 They have for many years past shewn a peaceable Disposition towards, and a Wish to be on a friendly Footing with the English. They have been Witnesses of their Success, and are naturally led to prefer their Friendship to any other European Power in Indostan. They are Neighbors to all the three Presidencies & no Doubt expect great Advantages from such an Alliance: Knowing well the great Superiority of our Infantry & Cannon, they appear ready to grant such in their Turn as are at least equal for aught I know, greatly superior to what can either be expected or obtained from any other Power: & with at least as great a Probability of Fidelity in the Performance, & Permanency in the Friendship as can be expected from any Nation in India.

Yet their Want of Fidelity & Disregarding the Force of every Obligation, breaking to day an Agreement of Yesterday without the least regard to the most sacred Treaties are Offered as Objections to a Mahratta Alliance. — In this I apprehend they are much on a Footing with many other

Princes

Princes in Indostan. But I can suppose them capable of this to those greatly their inferiors whose Power they despise and whose Dominions are at their Mercy but I can hardly think them so blind to their own Interests as to push this in Practice with those whose Friendship they court & whose Power they respect. And an effectual Remedy is at least the first Remedy in such a Case as to give them an Example of the most scrupulous Fidelity in Treaties & the most steady Attachment to Friends: To keep a jealous Eye over their Conduct with the greatest Appearance of Confidence and to be always so respectable as to convince them of our Ability as Friends & that we can be Dangerous Enemies.

11. But the greatest Objection to an intimate Connexion with the Mahrattas is their being so formidable & powerfull, consequently dangerous. The Force of this I allow, but what is to be done? — Was it possible to establish any thing like a regular political System including all the Powers of this very extensive Country Measures might be much easier condescended upon. This however I take to be absolutely impossible Their Politicks generally being the Production of a Day depending on the Whim, Passion, Resentment or Caprice of the Prince or of his Minister, without the least consideration whether for the Interests of his Country or not. Hence the Foundation of many Wars & very sudden & extraordinary Revolutions.

12. In the present Case, two Propositions seem to offer themselves as Objects of our Consideration. — First Whether the Power of the Mahrattas, and their being

being so formidable makes them so dangerous to the English Interest in India, that they should be looked upon as Enemies? — Or, Secondly whether We should endeavor to cultivate that friendly Disposition which they shew towards our Nation? And by a Propriety of Conduct endeavor to gain every Advantage to be acquired by an intimate Connexion, with so great a Power, who have scarce any thing left to expect in India. While every possible precaution is taken in case of Disappointments — and every wise Measure embraced to make the Advantages probable, and the Disadvantages avoidable?

13. If the first should be judged an eligible Measure. The Presidencies should be united their whole force should be called forth & put upon the most respectable footing. There should be fully Treaties and Alliances entered into with other Indian Princes capable of supplying our Deficiency of Cavalry. Plans of Operations uniformly concerted & regularly executed — By such Means perhaps there might be a Probability of Success. — But there appears to me so many Difficulties in concerting, establishing & executing such a Plan that I am afraid it is next to impossible. And even after all, I should suppose such a Business more eligible for a great Nation to undertake & to carry through than the Company with all the force they have in India. Their Treasury I am afraid is unequal to such an Undertaking, I know not how far the different Presidencies as they are left to judge for themselves, might see the Propriety of such a Plan. The Indian Alliances where then are

so

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so many jarring Interests to reconcile may not be to be depended upon — And there are so many unforseen Circumstances which might occur in the Execution of Operations so very intricate, precarious and extensive that I should doubt of its Success were the Plan ever so well concerted & were the Prospects ever so flattering.

Were the Presidencies to unite against the Maharattas Depending upon their own force and the Resources of Bengall & the Carnatick alone, their Deficiency of Cavalry, allowing them rich enough, would put an effectual Bar to Success — They might make a very powerfull Impression on the Maharatta Country: but they could not prevent the Desolation of their own. — And should any one of the Presidencies be weak enough to commence Hostilities against such a Power they not only expose themselves & the Country of their Friends more immediately connected with them: but they give Ground to such an Enemy to lead an Army into, to distress, & lay waste every other Place within their Reach where the Company have any Influence, Interests, or Connexion

III. On the other hand, were We to evade the friendly Disposition of the Maharattas, and to prefer a Connexion with them to every other Indian Nation, what are We to expect? — The present Prospects of Advantages are very considerable, equal, perhaps superior to what the Company can expect from any other Power. The Plan of Operations is much more simple, as there would be but one Power to manage instead of many — And when We find ourselves incapable of making War upon a powerfull Nation with any Prospect of Success

or

or Hopes of Advantage; Surely it is a pleasing Alternative to receive their Friendship when tenderd. And if not offered it would do no Discredit to our Judgment Should We Shew a Disposition to acquire it & an Inclination to cultivate it. In the present Case what some may allidge as Reasons for keeping a jealous Distance from the Mahrattas, appear to me as so many Reasons for seeking their Friendship. They are now in a most prosperous Way, they have scarce a Rival left in India: Is it not reasonable then to wish to be well with such a Power who are in a Manner at this Time Arbiters of India, & may still be more so. If We Shew an Inclination to be their Friends now, they may be grateful, if We do not, We have no Right to expect favor from them.

15. Was such a Connexion to take place, no one could be so weak as to think of an Alliance for a particular Presidency only. The View must be great & extensive. It must be for all the Company's Possessions in India, With the English Nation as a Nation & not for any one particular Spot. The Dangers then of exposing Bengal or any one of the Company's Settlements by concluding an Alliance with them here falls to the Ground. This considered with Impartiality appears to be so advantageous to them as Well as to Us that the Probability of Success is in it's favor. For they as the Necessity of having a Connexion with a European Power, & it is very evident that without a Country Friend, the Influence of any European Power must be small in India. The Mahrattas & the English closely connected might mutually Serve one another

So

so effectually as to give Law to the whole Country in their respective Capacities: Their force would be irresistable and it would be very difficult for the French or any other Europeans to acquire a Footing here.

16. All This is upon the Supposition that a firm Alliance could be established. Which I am in great hopes might if any proper Measures were entered into for that purpose. To give them Assistance against Hyder is what they want, & it is upon these Conditions such great Advantages are proposed. yet were We very serious in our Inclination to Live on an intimate Footing of Friendship & Strict Alliance with them We know not what might be granted, what might be accepted, and what given up. And tho' I cannot see any Reason for that Friendship which is to establish'd between Hyder & this Presidency so very different from what they formerly thought of him, when there was thought to be no Safety but in his Destruction; and that the old Rajah or any other Manager in the Mysore would be better than him: Yet of Affairs are so Situated that the Maharatta Terms cannot be complied with such a Power should not be neglected: And this Vaqueel who is the Representative of such a great Prince as Mahadarow ought to be treated with a Deference due to the Nation: and it does not appear to be the best Policy to countinance & encourage Hyder's Vaqueel who is his Enemy, while Sesporow Mahadarow meets with a Treatment so very different.

17. The Observations of the Governor of Fort St. George on the Treaty of 1769 with Hyder make it evident

evident that the Defensive Alliance was looked upon as a dangerous Concession: both because it obliged this Presidency to support the Interests of that Man who had always been an Enemy to the Company, who had given Proofs of the greatest Friendship to the French, who had been joined to them by Treaties and who was united with them in one System of Politicks in which the French Interest against the Company's in Indostan was one great Point; & Hyder's or Chunda Saibs Claims upon the Carnatick against the Nabob was another.— And also, this Support to him was a most certain Mean of kindling a War in the Carnatick by engaging in Hostilities against the Mahrattas who were Hyder's Enemies. Circumstances are by no means altered — Hyder seems as much disposed to the French & they to him as ever. Proofs of which We are receiving every Day — Such this Presidency from a System of Politicks totally different from the former, seemed to shew the greatest Inclination to rush into those very Inconveniencies which were foreseen & regretted by themselves. And they given that Assistance to Hyder which they seemed so well disposed to do, in all Probability, the Carnatick and even the Company's Jaghire had long ago been laid Waste and had suffered all the Miseries of War.. The Mahrattas would have been their declared Enemies and they might by that piece of Conduct have involved the other Presidencies in War as well as themselves. And what might have been the Consequence to the Company's Affairs I know not.

18. Should a national War happen

of which at present there Seems to be a great Probabi
lity; and Should the French Land a Body of Men in
India from the Mauritius which is by no means unlike
ly, Hyder will without the least Possibility of a Doubt,
join them, not So much from any new Considerations
as the force of the former Friendship, & to compleat the
Execution of a Plan long concerted & which the Superi-
ority of the English & their Allies alone prevented — In
such a Case what an Advantage it would be to have
the Friendship of the Maharattas to trust to! Is it not
to be feared that the French may endeavor to gain
them also? — even now perhaps they meditate such a
Connexion. The People of this Country judge much
from Appearances they See that at this time you are by
much the greatest European Power in India & they
respect you — A Friendship might therefore be expec
ted on very advantageous Terms, but Should a French
Force arrive, the Case may be greatly altered — And it
is a dangerous Measure to neglect cultivating a
Friendship which is foreign may be wanted in case of
Necessity, till that Necessity becomes urgent. I

19. I think there is great reason to
believe that the Rajah of Tanjour receives Support from
the French. neither is it improbable that he has entered
into connexions with them suitable to their present
situation, their future Prospects & his own. — I cannot
think that any Man will Suppose that the French
give Men, Arms, Stores, & Officers to Hyder without
some Object in view: Surely not such of Friendship to
the English. — This unites the Connexion between them,

the

the Mysoreans & Tanjorine — At present Hyder is not able to support himself scarce & certainly cannot send any Assistance to another; but that awaits a future Day. — We will use every Mean to get support from the English while he can; & when his Affairs are settled by the Friendship of this Presidency he will most pro= bably give them Cause to return to their former Opinion that he is not to be trusted. And the Rajah of Tanjour to gain an Independance for himself with which no Doubt the French flatter him will thro' the great Favor of this Presidency demonstrate himself an usefull Ally to our Enemy, worthy of their Friendship and unworthy of the Lenity which has been shown him from hence.

20. First when the English Compa= ny established themselves in Asia, it was by Friendship & Favor. It is but lately that the Imperial Phirmaund & Sanads from the Subahdahs have given them their Sove= reign to Conquests & have established Legal Rights to Coun= tries taken from others by the Sword. — Formerly their Dependance was on the Prince of the Country, they courted his Friendship, honored his Person & respected his Power. — Things are greatly altered now. — Yet however powerfull, I am fully persuaded that the most effectual Means of making an Interest perma= nent & lasting in this Country, are, Gentleness & Lenie= ty in the Company's Servants to the Natives — an Endea= vour to gain their hearts by Affability & to win their Favour by Moderation. — To shew the Strictest Regard to Justice in all their Transactions even when they are

concerned themselves, either with the High or Low. To make all Ranks of Men under the respective Governments feel the happy Influence of the British Constitution — To shew the greatest Fidelity to all their Treaties with the Princes of the Country — To gain their Confidence by Attention to their Interests — and to make their Partiality & Friendship to those who have been old Friends to the Company and to the Nation, so marked & evident that they may not only feel the happy Influence themselves: but that all the Princes of Indostan may be Witnesses of it. By such Means their Friendship would be courted by the Great & their Protection sought after by all Degrees of Men. — I do not say that this would have been the Means to have gained the Advantages the English now enjoy; but when once the Natives were convinced of their Superiority and Military Prowess, then such Treatment and Behaviour would in all Probability have had the best Effects.

21. The Relation between the Nabob of the Carnatick & the Company can be best ascertained by a Retrospect to what has happened ever since their first Connexion.

22. When the Nabob Mahomed Alleybawn succeeded his Father who was killed in 1749 in an Engagement with an Army under Murzaphaling & Chunda Saib and a Detachment of French who joined them: the Presidency of Fort St. George thought proper to take a Part, and accordingly afforded their Protection to the present Family. This in all Probability they the more readily granted as they had experienced Mahomed Alley's

Partiality

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Partiality to the English in his Father's Life time, and as they judged this the most effectual measure for restraining the Progress of the French who at that time aspired & were making large Steps to the Supremacy in India. It was their own Interest: therefore & the Interest of the Nation that made them espouse the Cause of the present Nabob and his steady Attachment to them ever since has proved him worthy of their Friendship. At first, the Europeans appeared as Auxiliaries in the Armies of two Indian Princes contending for the Government of a Country: but the Interests of their respective Masters were so much concerned that they were in fact Principals — For on the Success of Chunda Saib, or the Party which M.r Dupleix espoused depended the Superiority of the French: and the Influence of the English was inseparable from the Safety of the Nabob Mahommed Ally Cawn.

23. A short time however put things upon another Footing — And a national War ensuing made the English & French principals in that Contest which ended in the total Destruction of the Power of the latter in India.

24. That the Nabob was supported by the English in his Dominions is evident, & that he would have lost them without their Assistance is not to be denied. Therefore he is gratefull, and has given them many Proofs of it. But it is also evident that his Safety was necessary to their Interests & their maintaining his Authority was to make it useful to themselves. Steady in his Attachment he firmly refused many tempting Offers from the French & other Enemies to the English.

And

And in the National War he & his Country suffering every Inconvenience attending it, he became as much a Principal as any of the two contending Powers, though the Cause of the Quarrel could not be said to be his. He took it upon himself to pay the Expence of the Siege of Madrass. The Siege of Pondicherry he paid, besides many other very heavy Expences: which involved him in an immense Load of Debt, being obliged to borrow large Sums of Individuals at a very high Interest, that the Company might be Quit of the Charge of the War. Happy, however at the Peace, to find himself so much distinguished by the Nation as to be included in the Treaty and to be named as an Ally of His Majesty he set himself to make the most of an exhausted Country in order to pay that Load of Debt into which the War had involved him.

25. At the Desire of the Governor & Council of Fort St. George, he gave the Company one Grant after another till their Jaghire Revenue arose to it's present amount. This like all their Grants in Indostan was conditional, a Reward for past Services & an Obligation for the future — to assist with a Body of Troops to protect that Country of which their Estate made a considerable Part, and on the Safety of which depended the Security of their own Possessions: And to support the Circar in the Government of his Dominions. This points out one Relation between the Nabob & the Company. He, the Prince, the Superior that gives — They, the Receivers by the very Act of which they acknowledge his Title as Prince of the Country, & his Legal Rights

to

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to give: for upon his Authority the whole of theirs is established.

26. The Company having become such considerable Landholders in this Country, turned their thoughts to defend those Dominions effectually where they enjoyed such large Possessions and proposed to garrison Towns for the Protection of the Circar & to maintain Troops disciplined in the European Manner on Condition that the Nabob would pay a certain Proportion of Expence. To this he agreed, but frequently requested that it might not exceed two Lacks of Pagodas, representing that his Country could not afford more. — And in Governor Palk's time he understood that it was settled at three Lacks annually and that no more was on any Account to be demanded the Presidency engaging to maintain a certain Number of Troops & certain Garrisons for his Service; — However this Expence has been encreasing every Year. The Nabobs Proportion of Troops is the Same. The Garrisons are the same. This Year a profound Peace. No Appearance of extraordinary Expence that any Measures undertaken can justify. And the running Expence has arose to above Five Lacks of Pagodas. — Now there is another Relation between the Nabob & the Company — To protect & defend his Country with a certain force he pays so much Money: in this Respect they are hired Auxiliaries to the Prince of the Country: but by being in Possession of most of his Strong Places: The Troops being Officered by the Company & the Garrisons entirely under their Orders, they have it in their Power to give

Laws

Law to the Carnatick. Without the Concurrence of this Presidency he can do nothing. They are Arbiters of Peace and War, and even if one of his own Tributaries refuse the Pishcush, the Payment of which they had guaranteed, without them he cannot call him to an Account & they do not think it expedient to do so. Hence in the present Case it has happened — that the Rajah of Tanjour refuses to pay his Tribute; & he has plundered the Marwar & Naalcoty so much that they are not able to pay theirs. All these, the increased running Expences, the great Sums he has lately paid to the Company, the heavy Debt to Individuals which hangs over his Head, makes it no Matter of Surprize that the Nabob should express his Distress for want of Money: and be uneasy at the Prospect of a heavy Demand from the Mahrattas as a Chout.

27. Thus we need be the less surprized at when we consider the Nabob's present Situation, the State of his Finances, & his Mode of raising Money. The Relation between the Nabob & the People he governs is to be considered in two different Lights. One Part of his Country more immediately under his Government looks upon him as their Lord & Master to all Intents & Purposes — the whole Property is his. It is an Estate to be husbanded by Attention and Improvement & the Profits of which constitute a Revenue which makes the principal Part of the Nabob's Finances. But however considerable these may be, they are still precarious easily affected by a Variety of Weather, insufficient or unseasonable Rains & the Failure or Mismanagement

of

of the People under him. His Expences may be encreased by unforesean Accidents happening to Tanks Villages or Farms, by Inundations, Storms &c. for as the Sole Profits are his he must bear all the Losses also. But above all things a War is the most Destructive to his Interests & ruinous to his Revenues; if at a Distance from his Dominions, by Draining the Country of necessary Hands: Since Cultivation in many Parts must cease and in others be greatly Diminished: if at home by the Desolation and Destruction it carries along with it. and wherever it is whether at home or abroad, by the immense Expence that attends it. Peace therefore in his Country should be the Nabobs natural Policy & to maintain it by every possible Mean, his constant Attention. Nither does it appear to me that any thing should make him swerve from pacifick Measures, but to resist an Attack, to repel Injuries, or by a well timed Stroke to put it out of the Power of an Enemy to disturb the Tranquility of his Country. And from what I have been able to learn these have all along been the Nabob's ruling political Maxims. He never has sought for War, but when the ambitious Views, or extensive Schemes of others made it necessary for him to take a Part, he then, as every one in such a Situation would naturally do, tried to make the best terms he could for himself. It was the Prospect of a Negociation of this Kind, which brought him to Madras when he expected to have had the Management of the Circars under the Direction of the Company: but after he arrived & had expended a large Sum of Money in supporting an Interest there

and

and had offerd them their own terms the Governor & Council did not judge it expedient to let him have it. He was in the same Situation with Respect to the Mysore when he made the Agreement with the Governor & Council in April 1768 — And I have great Ground to think, if ever his Ambitious Views led him to think of the Decan Musnud. It made a part of that great & extensive Plan of Conquest which distinguished the daring European Politicians of that Æra in India.

28. There is another part of the Carnatick which stands in a different Relation to the Nabob. These are the Rajahs, Zemindars, & Polygars who acknowledge his Authority as their immediate Superior, & pay him Nuzzer & Pishcush accordingly. — This Superiority he enjoys as a Grant from the great Mogul, confirmed to him by Ulteemghaws and Phirmaunds from Delhi, & repeated Sanads from the Decan Durbar. I know well the Insufficiency of all these Legal Grants in a Country where Right is decided by the Sword, and where Superiority of Power gives the best title to a Dominion; but the Resources of the Carnatick, and his Connexion with the Company have it very much in their Power to make his Authority very respectable through the whole Extent of his Dominions.

29. Of all those Princes over whom the Nabob has a Right to claim a Superiority the Rajah of Tanjour makes the most considerable figure. He has a fine fertile rich Country, an excellent Indian Army and full Treasuries.] He is young & seems to have a Warlike and enterprizing Disposition. His views are evidently

evidently to assert an Independency and his Wish to be free of any Obligation to the Nabob of the Carnatick. His Refusal to pay his Tribute as settled by Treaty sufficiently evinces this: But resolved not to stop here, his Attack of the Marwar and Naalcoty makes his Thirst of additional Territory evident.

30. His former Tribute to the Nabobs of the Carnatick used to be much more considerable, besides the large Sums which they used to draw from him at certain times according to the Political Maxims of India. I do not mean by this to blame the Treaty of 1762 as the particular Situation of Affairs at that time might make Peace with him necessary on any Terms. But besides the Loss of this Revenue to the Nabob, besides rejecting his Authority withdrawing his Tribute & denying him Subjection; he plunders the other Polygars and disqualifies them from paying their Yearly Revenue also. By which Means the Nabobs Finances are greatly diminished, his Authority, lessened and his natural Force by no means equal to what it would otherwise be. — And should a War happen, this Defection may be attended with much worse Consequences, for it seems to be natural after what the Tanjorine has already done, that he will join the French: & so, from the Situation & resources of his Country, his Men & Money, he may prove an excellent Friend to them & a dangerous Enemy to the Company.

31 I shall not enter into a Recapitulation of what the Conduct of the Marwar & Naalcoty has been; I consider them only in the present point of

of

of View, as dependants of the Nabob of the Carnatick to whom they pay a yearly Revenue & in Return for which they expect the Protection of the Circar. But they have been attacked & plundered by the Tanjorine, which renders them incapable of paying their Tribute. They have applied to the Nabob for his Protection & Assistance who must wait with Patience till the Presidency of Fort St. George shall judge it expedient.

32. The Nabob's long Connexion & his own Inclination bind him to the English. He knows also & acknowledges the force of every possible Obligation which unites him to them; but adds to all these, his own Interest which is of all others the strongest Political Tye, makes his Safety wrapped up in theirs. This being the Case, his Country, his Resources, & himself are to be depended upon. And therefore it follows as a natural Consequence that the more extensive his Dominions, the more firmly his Government is established, the more compliat his Authority, the greater his Revenue and the fuller his Treasury, they have the more to trust to in time of Necessity. The supporting him is in fact adding to the Strength and Security of the Company. And the weakening him or suffering him to be so, must in the End turn out to their own Disadvantage.

33. From a Variety of Circumstances the Intentions of the French against the Company's Possessions in India is much to be suspected. I shall therefore suppose a National War near at hand and endeavor to apply the foregoing Observations to that particular

particular Period. The Subahdahr of the Decan is but a very precarious Friend, and I think has shewn his Disposition sufficiently to suspect that he will take the first Opportunity to break with the Company. — I have said nothing as yet of Balalet Jung, because his Power is not so very considerable; but the Body of French in his Service shews where he inclines: with these what Influence he may have in the Country & the Situation of his Dominions in the Neighborhood of the Company's Circars, may make him no despicable Enemy. I have already given my Reasons why I think Hyder Ally & the Rajah of Tanjore will act against us in a National War. — In such Circumstances where can we have a Friend but the Maharattas, and where Resources but in the Carnatick? And should the Opportunity be neglected of improving the favorable Disposition of the one, & should the Strength & Riches of the other be diminished or impaired to what a Situation may the Company's Affairs be reduced in this part of India? But the Views from the Maharatta Alliance are much more extensive: Bengall will experience its happy Influence in the highest Degree — And Bombay will reap Security and Supplies which otherwise they would find extremely difficult to procure. — Such a Connexion would keep every other Indian Power at bay & from you would have little to apprehend from any Force the French could bring into this Country. — But should the Opportunity be lost & the Maharattas Join the French I can see little Safety in all the Alliances you can make with any other Country Powers in Indostan.

34. These

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34. These appear to me to merit very serious Consideration indeed and in my Opinion deserve something more than an inactive waiting for an Event which may be attended with such Consequences.

35. Thus Gentlemen have I fairly openly & candidly made you acquainted with what has been the Foundation of my Letters to you, without the least Reflection on you, Resentment against you, or Partiality to the Nabob. — If any thing appears to condemn any of the Measures of the Company's Servants it cannot be ascribed to me as a Fault. — And if any thing looks favorable for the Nabob, it is because I look upon it to be a just & true Representation of his Case. — And it is this that you are to expect from His Majesty's Minister, who finds himself in such a Situation by the Honor His Majesty has done him, that however he might be led by private Opinion or Connection, He is obliged in Duty to yield that to the publick Concern. He thinks he has done no more than his Character required, & as We are all liable to err, it is possible that both he & the Company's Servants might not have been always in the right.

36. Here this should have ended, had not your last Letter contained some Passages which seem to require a little Explanation from me. I shall do this in as few Words as possible & repeat as little of your Letter as I can — A great Deal of it being quite enough to be seen once upon Paper.

37. your President was right, I did introduce my Conversation at the first Visit with

with shewing him a private Letter from England: that however Did not affect the Business that followed, the Subject of which was the Tanjour War & was afterwards to be discussed in a Visit which he proposed to honor me with at my house in Company with Mr. Hastings. I can have no Objection to a formal Continuation of the same Subjects being looked upon as Publick: It is certainly right & proper but as Digressions very often happen even when not expressly for Business, and Subjects may be introduced totally foreign to the Subject in Hand: these Parts even of a Public Interview are always held Sacred by Men of Honor and Principle; and I call them private. Some such Digressions made a Part of that Conversation which would make but a very indifferent Appearance if introduced to the Publick but it is a Meanness I despise and it never shall be said I took an ungenerous Advantage. For my own part I am not all ashamed of any thing I advanced, what concerned publick Business ought to be known & I shall look upon it with great Indifference tho' my private Opinions are told to all the World. These I have already said shall never affect publick Business in the smallest Degree.

35. My Expression of the Company's Servants generally making the annual Expence of the Carnatick amount to four Lack of Pagodas, did not appear to me ambiguous. But I see now that it may mean a false Account this however can only proceed from an industrious Endeavor to put the worst Construction upon every thing. — An Account, the particulars

of

of which are specified & regularly vouched for, is a true Account. An Account wherein one or more particulars are false is a false Account. But an Arbitrary Account wherein the particulars are neither specified nor vouched for cannot be said to be either true or false: But must be said to amount to such a Sum at present and when the composing particulars are Sum and vouched for the Truth of it will appear. This last Definition is perfectly applicable to the Accounts which you give in to the Nabob: And when all the particulars are Specified & vouched for they will no Doubt appear true Accounts.

39. It matters Little under what Names or Articles the Monies paid by the Nabob are stated provided he be satisfied with the Justice of the Charge which every Individual from Prince to Peasant, European or Indian, has a Right to. But I am convinced that he means that the Amount of the Current Expences, as they are called, should be for the Maintenance of Troops &c.a in Field or Garrison for the Defence of the Carnatick & for the Support of his Government. If these Conditions are fulfilled the Monies are well applied — If not, the End is not answered. I shall leave the Application of this to yourselves.

Every one no Doubt ought to be perfectly at Liberty to judge for themselves in many Cases — This Indulgence must be given to your Delicacy in supposing yourselves answerable for the Actions of your Officers, Should they act with the Nabobs Troops or in the Assistance of any other Power with whom you did not

not chuse to enter into an Alliance yourselves. However the Crown of Great Britain does not refuse to suffer Officers to ack in the Russian Army against the Turks tho' yet are in Alliance with both. They are neither looked upon as Allies or Auxiliaries, But tho' born British Subjects these Officers for the time being are to all Intents & Purposes to be considered as Subjects to the Power they Serve. The Crown of Great Britain may with-draw them if they please. In this your Authority resembles theirs; but they have not done so, nor Signified that they will. In this you are unlike.

21. To be Friends & Enemies with the same Power & at the same time is a Contradiction in itself. But the Mahrattas & Hyder Ally are Enemies. The Conclusion therefore is plain. While you acknowledge the Force of your Obligation to assist Hyder Ally against the Mahrattas and desire me to accept the Friendship of the Latter & that you will acquiesce in it is a Self Contradiction which is an Absurdity. And give me leave to tell you that the Expression of your Letter of the 25th April that I "know the Engagement by which you are bound to defend Hyder Ally "altho' you cannot <u>now</u> comply with it" did not by any Means convey the Idea to me which these Words in yours of the 20th May are made to express. "That I "have been informed in your last Letter that you do "not mean to assist Hyder Ally". May take them both together no Person who chuses to give an honest Opinion upon Matters of such Moment will allow that either, or even both are expressed in so clear & positive

terms

terms, as to lay a Foundation for an Application to such a Power in such Circumstances. You ought to have been more positive in your Declaration that you would not send Assistance to Hyder Ally, before you has boldly asserted that I would find one Instance wherein you "had requested me to co-operate with you & that I declined "it". And you would have done so and in another manner too, had you had the least Inclination, that I should interfere in the Business or Co-operate with you. — However since I think I can perceive that you would wish the World to believe that you were willing to give up that Part of the Treaty of sending Assistance to Hyder — Only tell me so honestly & plainly, and, if I can have any Influence with the Marattas, every thing I can do shall be freely exerted for the Peace or Safety of the Carnatick.

42. You say that you did not think "when you were writing to me you were at the same "time writing to the Marattas, & as you have ne- "ver made any Declaration to them of the Force of the "Obligations you are under to assist Hyder Ally against "them, you did not conceive it would have been an "Argument put in their Mouths against your receiv- "ing from them what I said they had offered." You might even have been positive in this, & with more Justice. In such Reasoning, every probable Conjecture every political Possibility comes with great Propriety either from the Mouth or Pen of a Friend, that We may know & embrace every Advantage and that We may avoid every Appearance of Danger. — As such,

every

very Argument of mine was offerd to your Considera-
tion. Could I in sending them to you be supposed
by common Sense to be putting them in the Mouth
of the Maharattas? — You have anxiously sought
their Friendship in former Times, & have dwelt upon
the Advantages accruing to both from such a Connexion
witness the Instructions given to Nagarow in October 1767.
and upon this I founded part of my Reasoning on the
Subject. But if you read with Attention the Memo-
rial delivered into Council on the 18th December 1770
from Mahadarow by his Vaiquil at Madrass you will
find the Maharattas not deficient of Information
about your Obligations to assist Hyder & without my
putting Arguments in their Mouth, they seem to be
pretty well acquainted with Facts to lay a Founda-
tion for sound reasoning on the Subject.

13. However to prevent any Pos-
sibility of a Mistake again, I beg Leave to tell you I
am writing to you & not to the Nabob or to the Ma-
harattas: and shall tell you with great Plainness
that the many Inconveniences the Nabob has suffered
from those who ought to have been his Protectors, &
of specious Appearances would have done might
have been supposed his Friends, are very well known
both here & at home. Instances on this Head are quite
unnecessary. — They are numerous, and your own
Memory might supply you with plenty could you
adduce them without Prejudice. With respect to the
Nabob Mahomed Ally Cawn's Dependance on the Com-
pany I drop this Subject — To any other Answer

necessary

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necessary than this, His Majesty has declared him
his Ally, and it becomes not me who am a dutiful
Subject & who have the greatest Respect for whatever
proceeds from the Throne to dispute a Doctrine my
most gracious Sovereign has taught me? But if
any other be necessary to you, let me tell you that I
have good Authority for saying it was a Part of the
Company's Instructions to some of their most respec-
table Servants "That in pursuing the Measures nec-
"sary to establish a Peace in India on a Solid & perma-
"nent Basis, they were enjoined to provide effectually
"for the Honor & Security of their faithfull Ally, Ma-
"homed Ally Cawn Nabob of Arcot." — You may speak
of Dependance and give it a peculiar Meaning of
your own — His Majesty & your Masters have na-
med him an Ally, are not these the great Judges of
the National Concerns & the Interest of the Company
— And in this they agree — It would ill become me
then to declare a Difference. You may. — Any Argu-
ments or Endeavours of mine to "provide effectually
"for the Honor & Security of such a faithfull Ally"
you may call Partiality or by whatever Name you
please, it matters little: while such proceed from
the Solid Principles of Justice, and Equity, which
do not change with the times and such you may al-
ways expect from me, while I have the Honor to act
in that Character which I have announced to you —

In one of your former Letters you
ask, "How is it possible that you should proceed in
"any thing with Confidence and Spirits, when for aught
"you

A.

"you knew the Commission which I have may either oppose
"your Measures, or render them abortive"? — This I think
I have answered before to the following Purpose, that it is
by no Means likely I should ever have opposed or
rendered abortive any measure of yours for promoting
the real Interests of the Company. I have often repeated
this Declaration and am still of the same Way of think-
ing. The above is the most positive Opinion you ever
offered me on the Subject: but it is very different from
what you said to the Nabob particularly as Affairs were
then circumstanced. On his applying to you to know
what must be done when the Rajah of Tanjore had refu-
sed to pay his Pishcush and had attacked some other of the
Nabob's Polygars, robbed & plundered them both of Land &
Money, which would in all Probability prevent them
from paying the ordinary Revenue; And the Mahrat-
tas threatening an Invasion from another Quarter. —
"You could do nothing in Account of the Presence of such
"extraordinary Powers as I enjoyed in India," you said. —
This appeared to me too critical a time to make unnece-
sary Difficulties. — And had you intended that this
should have been declared to me there were many Ways
of doing it. — It would have been friendly & I should
have received it with Gratitude from your own Mouth. —
Had you desired the Nabob to have told me: or had you been
pleased to signify it by any other Messenger, I should
have been much obliged to you. Neither of all this were done.
You say the Nabob was not desired either to <u>inform</u> me
or <u>not to inform me</u>; which shews plain enough that
though the matter was of great Moment, you were

exceedingly

exceedingly indifferent whether it was told me or not. This is the most favorable Construction it will bear: But when you add that it was the Nabob's Request that it should not be considered as publick Matter: but as private Conversation &c.a and your acquiescing in this, when I was so much concerned sufficiently Justifies my Conviction of your Intentions. This is no ideal Case. — Your positive Assertion that I oppose your uniting in Councils & Measures with Bengal is very Strange indeed. How can I oppose a thing I know nothing of? I neither know how far your Measures & Counals agree or wherein they Differ. I must know this before I can oppose. — However as you have chosen to interpret the Arguments I have offered to your Consideration against assisting Hyder Ally in this manner I beg leave to answer as follows. — The Presidency of Bengal are engaged in a powerfull Alliance (you say) against the Marattas. The Intent must be to keep them out of the Country. I can suppose them with their Indian Allies capable of doing so from their great Power their numerous Cavalry & from the Situation of the Country: But can any Man be so weak as to flatter himself with the Hopes that the Force of this Presidency with all the Power of the Carnatick could have prevented the Marattas from over-running & laying waste this Country had you thought it expedient to send assistance to Hyder Ally? Surely not. — It was this made me give my Opinion against provoking the Marattas to a War: and if the Nabob has opposed you it does not appear very unnatural if he foresaw that the Measure would be attended with ruin to his Country. But if the Company's

Servants

Servants are engaging in Alliances against the Mahrattas every where & supporting their Enemies, pray where is the Wonder that those Presidencies are under Apprehensions of an Invasion? — Could a Friendship be established with that Power on the large & extensive Plan which I have taken the Liberty to propose to your Consideration, all Apprehensions from that Quarter might I hope be of very little Consequence.

15. As you seem to be so exceedingly hurt about my taking Notice of the Treaty of 1769 give me leave to explain myself to you. — Sometime before that Period the English had attained an astonishing Influence in Indostan. The French Power annihilated in this Country, Bengal & the Circars under the Government of the Company. The Subahdar after his Army united with Hyder's had sustained a remarkable Defeat obliged to make Peace — And the Company's Army making War upon Hyder with the declared Intention of taking the Mysore from him. This very Man by a happy Military Manoeuvre, passed their Armies, entered the Carnatick, and when almost at the Gates of Madras he sent for Deputies from the Presidency of Fort St. George where tho' with almost a handful of Men only, and Armies near him who had proved themselves greatly his Superiors: He gave a Peace in such terms as he chose to dictate. And the Influence that this Transaction of 1769 had upon the English Reputation in this Country, I am afraid is but too much concerned with the present Posture of their Affairs on the Coast of Coromandel in 1771. — It

was

was this Gentlemen that made me think the mentioning such a Transaction necessary without suspecting it would have Hurt you so much who are so capable of defending every Measure you embrace by force of Argument. And the Troubles & Embarrassments which you yourselves foresaw at the Conclusion of the Treaty were in Consequence of the Defensive Alliance which you were obliged to enter into from Political Necessity; This could have little Connexion with the Year before when you had drove Hyder before you & threatened both his Capitals with a Siege.

16. You say that the Nabob has declared "that in Case of a War between the two Nations he shall "not consider himself as a party, & that what Assistance he offers must be considered as a voluntary Act "of Friendship & that he will not even promise to pay "them after the Enemy shall be in the Country". I have always understood from every thing the Nabob has said to me that he looks upon his Interest as inseparable from the English Nation; & that he would not only do every thing in his Power to assist them but that in Case of a National War he would encrease the Establishment of Troops under the Company's Orders with two Thousand good Serviceable Horse and three Battalions of Seapoys; which added to the Seven make Ten Battalions paid by him — And all this without any Expence to the Company: besides two Thousand draught & Carriage Bullocks, Grain, Bullocks for Slaughter, Sheep &c.a — And in Short that he always would give every Assistance in his Power. And indeed it appears to me

that

thats sound Policy will Direct him to Do so. Of all this I understand you have had ample Information. But as it is impossible to say how long a national War may last when once begun, it could be by no means unreasonable in the Nabob, or any one else in his Situation to be cautious of entering into Engagements to pay the whole Expence of Sieges & Armies when his Country may be ruined by the Share he is obliged to take in the Quarrel between England & France merely from his Connexions with the Company. And should he contribute largely towards defraying such Expences as may be incurred, surely We ought not to deny him the Privilege of declaring its to be a voluntary act of Friendship. He gave sufficient Proofs of his generous Assistance last War: And tho' such may be for the immediate pecuniary Advantage of the Company: yet it never can be consistent with the national Justice to oblige the Nabob of the Carnatick to pay the whole Expence of National Wars began without his Knowledge, with political Views and upon politi-cal Principles to which he is a Stranger. Neither can I ever be persuaded that it can be either for the Interest of the Nation or the Company to exhaust a Country of so much Consequence to both by exorbitant Demands in a short Space of time to answer present Views and particular Purposes at the Risk of loseing the Friendship & weakening the hands of the Princes of the Country: when with proper Management a constant Revenue might be obtained secured by the Ties of Friendship and established by a Conviction that the Protection of-fered them by the English was essentially necessary

to

to their Preservation and that of their Country.

47. As to this Political Writer who has so much alarmed you by his Abuse, surely our Argument has nothing to do with him. However I think it is very much in your Power to convince him that he is much Mistaken & to prove to him beyond a possibility of a Doubt that you are very capable of many other things besides Commerce. — And Controversial Writers you might have had in Abundance, but few, very few indeed of your Abilities. Of these the World may judge.

48. It is too trifling to make any Observation on your complaining of my Letter as containing sixteen Pages of Animadversions. Your preceding Letter of thirty Pages, & the succeeding one of Strictures exactly of the same Number, I hope will apologize for mine.

49. There are so many Reasons which could be adduced in Supports of that Political System which I have judged the most rational that I would not Hesitate a Moment to take the Risk upon myself But a Wish to learn from your superior Knowledge led me into the Argument: that We might if possible be of the same Opinion made me lay mine freely before you: And that I might not diminish your Consequence in the Eyes of the People here made me desire that you might be the principal Actors. The Honor & the Reputation of every thing would have been yours while I enjoyed the Self Satisfaction in private of having done my Duty. I have the Honor to be with Respect

Gentlemen

Your most obed.t & most humble Servant

John Lindsay

Having

59 Fort St. George 24th June 1771.

Having in our Letter of the 29th May to Sir John Lindsay informed him that there We meant to put an End to a Correspondence of Controversy with him that We had no time for such Employment, that therefore We should leave the field open to him & that whatever he should assert, We should be silent here, and if We replied at all it should be in another Place: He hath taken the Advantage of it, indulged his Partiality, misrepresented Facts & expressed his Animosity in illiberal Insinuations. We mean to adhere to our Declaration as We find nothing in his Letter of the 22d June now before Us which makes a reply to him on any wise necessary. But We shall beg leave to make some Remarks thereon for the Information of our Constituents.

Paragr: 1.

We believe indeed that Sir John Lindsay has & has all along had other Motives for his Conduct besides Partiality on the one Side or Prejudice on the other: Those have grown out of the great & capital Object, which, We judge, to be the discovering or creating some Cause, which may give the Ministry the Appearance of a legal Hold on the Company whereby they may subject it to their absolute Controul — Till this Letter Sir John Lindsay's Arguments have been confined to the particular Affairs of this Presidency his Informations appear to have been all taken from the Nabob whose Views & political System he hath adopted & supported against the Interests of the Company & in our Judgment against the Interest of the Nation. Now, in order to prove that he is not partial to the Nabob, he hath extended his Plan & formed a political

political System for all the three Presidencies in India, but whatever temporary Advantages it may present if it should be found to be ultimately dangerous far from proving his Impartiality it will prove that he would not only plunge Us into immediate War, but would change the whole political System of India, in order to accommodate it to the temporary Views of the Nabob. Of this however We shall not take upon Us to Judge. Such a System might have been properly recommended to the Commissioners had they arrived, because they had Power over the whole — or it may properly be addressed to the Court of Directors who controul the whole, but to Us who have no Direction but in the particular Department assigned Us it is out of its place. We shall therefore beg leave to refer to the Consideration of the Court of Directors all Such Parts of this Letter as recommend a general System for India, observing only that in our Opinion a partial Opposition to the Mahrattas; or a partial Union with them, for the temporary Views of each Presidency, respectively as the Case may require at the Time cannot tend to general Advantage ultimately; tho' it may answer present Purposes. It appears more consistent that there Should be a general League of Opposition against them or a general Alliance of Friendship with them: And the great points to be considered, are, whether the Company in their several Presidencies are or can by any Exertions be rendered equal to such a general Opposition — if they are not & can not be made so, it may bring on Ruin — The Alternative is a general Union with them as recommended

mended by Sir John Lindsay, and the Point to be consi-
dered is whether by increasing & rendering uncontroulable
a Power already dangerous, certain Ruin will not be the
consequence. all which We beg Leave to Submit.

Para 2.

In the military Decision at Sir John Lindsay is pleased
to call the Act of taking Possession of the Northern Circars
by Genl. Caillaud, the Nabob was neither principal
nor Auxiliary, he had nothing to Do with it. That the
Jealousy of the Soubah was thereby excited is true but
it had also other very powerfull & concurrent Causes.
The Political Enmity which had subsisted between
Salabad Jung and the Nabob is well known from the same
Causes there was not greater Cordiality between Nizam
Ally Cawn the Successor of Salabad Jung and the Nabob:
And this political Enmity was increased to a personal
Animosity, by the Nabobs Negociations & Endeavors to
depose Nizam Ally Cawn and acquire for himself the
Government of the Decan in the Relation of which Transac-
tions We need not be more particular as they have
already in their proper Place, been communicated to the
Court of Directors. It was this Jealousy and Resentment
of the Soubah against the Company for taking Possession
of the Circars, and against the Nabob for endeavoring
to Divest him of his Government and to Seat himself,
on the Musnud which Suggested to Hyder Ally Cawn the
Idea of an Union with the Soubah for a Double Attack on
the Circars in the North & the Trichinopoly Country
in the South; a Treaty was thereupon set on foot nego-
ciated between the Soubah & Hyder Ally by the Nabobs

Brother

Fort St. George 24th. June 1771.

Brother Mauphoos Cawn: who in Disgust had fled to the Soubah from his Brother's Court, an offensive Alliance against the Company & the Carnatick was soon concluded and to return the Injury offerd to the Soubah by the Nabob a Sanad was granted by the Soubah to Hyder Ally Cawn for the Government of the Carnatick Payen Ghauts. In Consequence of this Alliance, the Soubah prepared for Action, and Hyder Ally assembled his Forces at Coimbettoor and threatened the Tuchinopoly Country when an Army of Mahrattas entering the Sura Country, obliged him for that time to abandon the Enterprize in Order to oppose them, Affairs were in this Situation when it was thought advisable to enter into a Negociation with the Soubah which ended in the Treaty of Edwabad. It is true that it was then Agreed that an Attempt should be made to reduce the Power of Hyder which was growing Dangerous; but this entirely regarded the Interests and Safety of the Carnatick, & not of the Circars. for it was the Nabob's Pretensions to the Musnud of the Decan which had procured for Hyder Ally a Sanad from the Soubah for the Carnatick Payen Ghauts, to assert which he had threatened the Tuchinopoly Country from Coimbettoor and the Expedition against him was planned on the Part of this Government with a View to check the Growth of Hyder's Power and thereby prevent his Designs against the Carnatick. This is the true State of Affairs at that Time. What then shall We say of Sir John Lindsay's Representation of them in this Paragraph? one of these two must be allowed, either that he wilfully misrepresents Facts which We cannot think

Sir

he would Do — Or that he takes upon him to write confidently upon the Information received from an interested Party whose Tales are received by him as Proofs of Holy Writ. If what We have said be admitted the impartial will judge whether the Nabob in these Transactions ought to be considered as a principal, or merely as an Auxiliary.

3.

Experience has taught Us to look upon Indian Alliances as very precarious, No Dependance ought to be had on the Friendship of any — no not One — We look upon Sc. Saml Ally, not as a precarious Friend but as a Secret Enemy, both to the Company & the Nabob: there is one Way of making him as much a Friend as any Indian Prince is capable of being, and that is by keeping a Body of European Troops with him as the French Did but the Remedy We fear would prove worse than the Disease.

4.

To ensure Credit to one's Assertions it is necessary to write with Diffidence, Modesty, & Caution on those Subjects, which We do not understand; and to assert Solely & positively those Facts only, which are clear & incontrovertible. We take upon Us to assert in Contradiction to Sir John Lindsay that the Company were not to appear in the Character of the Superiors of the Country to be conquered. They were to Stand in the Character of Dewan, the Family of the Mysore Rajah was to be restored to the nominal Superiority but the Nabob was to have the real Power of the Government — the

Office

Office of Diwan is only the Superintendant of the Revenue the office of Governor is the Superior — It is not our Intention in this Explanation to enter into a Justification or Condemnation of the Plan, We speak only to the Assertion made by Sir John Lindsay.

5.

The original Object of the War with Hyder was to reduce his Power which was grown dangerous to the Carnatick Payen Ghaut for the Government of which he had obtained a Sanad from the Soubah: Upon this Ground the Nabob, or, in other Words the Carnatick became the principal & the Company who in their own Possessions, had little to fear from Hyder, were only Auxiliaries.

6.

The Nabob was himself in a great Measure the Cause of the unfortunate Conclusion of the War — All the Conquests from the Baramaul to Coimbatour were put into his Hands, except Cvaad, the Sepoys he placed in the Forts for their Defence were neither paid nor were the Forts provided with any Provision, or means of Resistance so that when Hyder marched down Suddenly into those Countries in Decr 1769 every Place surrendered upon his Appearance before it without firing a Gun — had any one Fort resisted but two Days Major Fitzgerald with his Detachment in pursuit of Hyder would have reached him, & probably have prevented all the Disasters which ensued — And how could the Nabob expect that We should continue a War at the Risk of every thing the Company possessed

prospect on the Coast, when he received us in the pro-
mised Supplies of Money? — When We had in Ourselves
no Resources, but the Stock of Money then in the Treasu-
ry, which would not have defrayed the Current Charges
two Months and that gone We had no means even of
paying our Troops in Garrison — but enough has been
said on this Subject in other parts of our Proceedings —
to little purpose indeed — it is not alone of Sir John Lind-
says Partiality that We complain — Our Representations
supported by incontestible Facts and clear Deductions
seem to have been totally disregarded & nothing is cre-
dited but the monstrous Exaggerations & malevolent
Representations of Men, influenced & borne away by
personal Resentment & Animosity. It may not
be amiss however to State the Arguments made Use
of by Sir John Lindsay for saddling the Company with
all the Costs of the War. — It was intended Vaguely
(as Sir John Lindsay himself represents it) that the
Nabob was to benefit by the War with Mysoor, if it
proved successful. It did not prove successful & peace
was concluded, including Arrangements to which the
Nabob did not consent And both the Conditions of the
Agreement & the Expectations fell together. That is
because the Expectations of the Nabob & of the Company
were not fulfilled therefore the Company only should
be the Sufferers: & all the Charges of that War which
the Nabob engaged to pay in Consideration of the Advan-
tages expected from it were no longer to be placed to
the Nabob's Account, because his Expectations were
disappointed, but to the Company's whose Expectations

were

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Following Articles.

No Gunpowder [illegible]

No Field Spare or Howitzers

can be Spared except 2

18 Pds. with Carriages

No 3 Pr. Grape Shot

Nor Shells fixd with Flannel Cartridges

A true Extract Andrew Anderson

Clerk to the Com.r of Stores.

The President acquaints the Board that having consulted with General Smith the following method had been proposed for the more regular Distribution of the half Mounting to the Sepoy Battalions — which is approved.

Ordered that the Agent for making up Sepoy Slops do provide & deposit in the Hands of the Storekeeper of each Garrison a certain & sufficient Quantity of Slops — that the Captain of the Battalion do draw either upon the Agent, or the Storekeeper at the Out Garrison as may be most convenient for such Slops as he may from time to time want for the Battalion — and his Receipt is to be the Storekeeper's Discharge — That the Captain do issue them to the Subadar of each Company taking his Receipt to be entered in a regimental Receipt Book to be kept for that Purpose: which Receipts shall be the Captain's Discharge — What Bullocks Coolies &c may be wanted for carrying the Slops that may not have been issued to the Sepoys when the Battalion marches must be provided at the Publick Expence — Resolved

that

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That Copies of the foregoing Order be sent to the several Out Garrisons to be given out in General Orders.

Read the following Letter from Lieut. Lieutenant Logan.

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr.
President & Governor &c. Council of
Fort St. George

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter from Lieut. Logan Desiring to proceed to England for his Health

I am extremely sorry to trouble your Honors with this Application but hope my present Situation will plead my Excuse.

For a considerable Time past I have been afflicted with so bad a State of Health, and which has of late so much increased that it is now become the Opinion of the Surgeons that I can only hope for a Recovery by means of a Voyage to Europe as the inclosed Certificate will show, I must therefore beg your Permission to proceed to Europe on the Duke of Portland or first Opportunity and that you will be pleased to mention my unfortunate Situation to the Honble Court of Directors in such a Manner that I may again return to India without Prejudice to my Standing in the Service in Case of the Recovery of my Health

I am with the greatest Respect
Honble Sir & Sirs
Your most obedient & humble servant
John Logan
Lieutenant

Fort St. George
3d June 1771.

Pass

Fort St. George 3d. June 1771

Certificate

There are to certify that Lieut. John Logan having had for many Months repeated Attacks of Bilious remitting & intermitting Fevers which he contracted on Service to the Northward has had his Constitution so re-laxed & weakened by them Fevers now subject to relapses that a Voyage to Europe is become necessary for the Re-establishment of his Health

Gilbert Pasley
Samuel Scott } Surgeons

Agreed that Lieut. Logan be permitted to proceed to England agreeable to his Request & that his Case be represented to the Court of Directors.

Vacancy

Wm Jenkin Davis
to Lieutenant

There being a Vacancy for a Lieutenant in the Room of Lieut. Logan Ensign Wm Jenkin Davis being the next for Promotion is appointed thereto.

Letter from Lieut. Fireworker James Foley read as follows.

To the Honble. Josias Du Pré Esqr.
President & Governor &c. Council of
Fort St. George,

Honble Sir & Sirs

from Lt. Fireworker Foley desiring Leave to go to England on Account of Family affairs

I beg Leave to acquaint you that by last Letters I have received from home I am advised that the Situation of the Affairs of my Family since the Death of my Mother renders my Return to Europe highly necessary: I take the liberty to entreat that your Honors will be pleased to permit me to leave the Service for a short

Fort St. George 10th June 1771

short time & to appoint me a Passage in the Portland, and from the generous Indulgence which your Honors are ever ready to shew the Company's Servants I am further emboldened to intreat, that your Honors will be pleased to make such favorable mention of me to the Honorable Court of Directors, as may secure to me my Return to the Service with my proper Rank. Your Honors conferring on me this important Favor must ever merit my most grateful Thanks.

I have the Honor to be
Honble Sir & Sirs
your most obedient & very humble Servant
James Foley

Madras
June 3d 1771.

Granted.

agreed that Lieutenant Forrester Foley be permitted to return to England agreable to his Request & that the Court of Directors be informed that he bears a good Character from his Commanding Officer.

Read the following Letter from Ensign Robert Forbes.

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esqr.
President & Governor &c. Council of
Fort St. George

Honble Sir & Sirs

Letter from Ensign Forbes desiring some Allowance for his Passage &c...

I take the Liberty of acquainting you that I am one of the Cadets belonging to this Establishment who came out in the True Briton to the Malabar Coast in November last.

The

Fort St. George 10th June 1771.

The reason of my being so long absent from my Duty is owing to my not having been able to defray the Expence of a Land Journey from Cochin hither so that I was obliged to go to Bombay to get a Sea Conveyance.

The Length of the Passage from England & touching at the Brazils &c.a has put me to many unavoidable Expences which could not have happened had the Ship come directly here & as I understand your Honor &c.a have thought it reasonable to make some Allowance on this Account to the Officers & other Cadets who were aboard of the True Briton & Duke of Portland, I humbly request the same Indulgence may be shewn to me. I am most respectfully.

Honble Sir & Sirs

Your most obedient & most humble Servant,

Robert Forbes

Fort St. George
2d June 1771.

Agreed that Ensign Forbes be allowed his Pay from the Day of his Arrival at Cochin: & Batta for his Journey from thence to this Place, allowing 25 Miles p.r Day.

Letter from Mr. Alexander Donaldson Cadet for Bengall, to the President read.

To the Honble Josias Du Pré Esq.r
President & Governor of Fort St. George
Honorable Sir.

I presume to take the Liberty of acquainting

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acquainting you that I am one of the Cadets come out in the Duke of Portland to Bombay in January last and that I belong to the Bengall Establishment, the Length of my Passage from England with my Staying at Bombay 3 Months & upwards has put me to a great Deal of Expence & as I am informed that your Honor has been pleased to advance the other Cadets Sum belonging to Bengall Some money to defray their Expence, may I most humbly request that the Same Indulgence will be Shewn me—

My Expence Since & untill my Arrival at Bengall I reckon will amount to 3 or 400 Rupees will I expect you will be pleased to Order one, I have the Honor to be most respectfully

Honble Sir

Your most obedient & most humble Servant

Alexr. Donaldson

Fort St. George
2d. June 1774

To be advanced 200 Rupees.

agreed that Mr. Donaldson be advanced Rup. 200 the Same as the Cadets arrived in the Morse, on his giving an Acknowledgment to account for the Same on his Arrival at Bengall.

Major Braithwaite applies for his Gratuity.

The President acquaints the Board that Major Braithwaite had applied to him for a Proportion of the Gratuity Fund as a Major on this Establishment from the 31st. October last: at which he represents that he gave up all Emoluments at Fort Marlboro' —

Resolved that Major Braithwaite be allowed his Gratuity from that time: but as the Account Gratuity for the last half Year has been closed it cannot

Not in Consequence

time