M.R.O. 14—13,000—27-9-24

MADRAS RECORD OFFICE.

Government of Madras.

Revenue **DEPARTMENT.**

G.O. No. 1845 Press ~~Misc.~~

183. 184

Dated 9 — 8 — 1867.

Not to be folded or roughly handled

Proceedings of the Madras Government, Revenue Department, 9th August 1867.

No. 183. Read the following letter from NANJAPPA VANUVARAYA GOUNDEN, of Coimbatore District, to the Secretary to Government, Revenue Department, Fort Saint George, dated 22nd February 1867:—

1. In submitting the enclosed triplicate copies of my Memorial to the Right Honorable the Secretary of State for India in Council, permit me most respectfully to solicit of your Honor to take the following points into mature and deliberate consideration, and procure a favorable recommendation of my case from His Excellency the Governor in Council to the Secretary of State.

2. The grounds on which I claim the succession to the Sapatoor and Kotamputty Polliem are—

I. That petitioner is the chief eldest surviving son of the senior wife of the original grantee.

II. That the last incumbent having died without male issue, I have an undoubted right to the Polliem, according to the rule of succession hitherto observed from time immemorial by Government in nominating the successor.

III. That the adoption *said* to have been made by the last incumbent is illegal, and the will a forgery altogether, and concocted after his death by the friends, relations, and connections of the last incumbent's widow, and that for the following reasons:—

First.—The natural father died *twenty-two days* after his marriage.

Second.—He could not have been conscious of the existence of a child, since he could not have been aware of the pregnancy of his wife, and therefore could not have given permission to his wife to *give* a son in adoption.

Third.—Though he were alive, he could not have given his only son in adoption.

Fourth.—The widow cannot give her only posthumous son in adoption.

Fifth.—Such adoption cannot be valid, unless with the previous consent of her husband.

Sixth.—Even if the widow had given her only son in adoption, still it would not be valid, since she was and is in a stark state of insanity, and, according to both English and Hindu Law, the act of an insane person is not at all cognizable.

Seventh.—Such an illegal adoption has *never* been recognized by Government. Should such recognition be made, it will be the first instance in which the only son of the senior wife of the original grantee has been superseded by a member of the younger branch of the family by an alleged adoption, illegal in every way, and such an illegal adoption acknowledged. Even in a very late case, that of the Naragunti Polliem, the succession to the Polliem was decided according to seniority.

3. I therefore again request that you will be good enough to recommend my case to His Excellency the Right Honorable the Governor in Council, and procure me an order directing the registration of the Sapatoor and Kotamputty Polliem in my name, or to favorably recommend my case to His Excellency the Right Honorable the Secretary of State for India in Council.

Proceedings of the Madras Government, Revenue Department, 9th August 1867.

No. 184. ORDER THEREON, 9th August 1867, No. 1,845.

Miscellaneous.

Ordered that the Memorial received with the foregoing letter be despatched to Home Government, and that the Memorialist be informed of its despatch.

(True Extract.)

(Signed) W. HUDLESTON,
Secretary to Government.

Exd. S. T. Augustin.

TO

HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HONORABLE
HER MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL,


East India House, London.

The humble Memorial of Nunjappah Vanavaroya Gounden, son of Pirivianna Vanavaroya Gounden, original Grantee of the Samatoor and Kotamputty Polliem, in the Pollachy Taluq, District of Coimbatore.

HUMBLY AND RESPECTFULLY SHEWETH,

That your Lordship's humble Memorialist being aggrieved with the orders passed by the Government of Fort Saint George, with regard to his indisputable claim to succeed to the Samatoor and Kotamputty Polliem, he humbly and respectfully begs to appeal to your Lordship in Council, in the earnest and fervent trust that, after a full and mature consideration of the following points, Your Lordship in Council will reverse the decision of the local Government and cause him to be placed in possession of the Polliem.

2. From an inspection of the subjoined genealogical map, your Lordship will perceive that Memorialist's father Pirivianna Vanavaroya Gounden, the original grantee had two wives, by the first of whom he had two sons, and by the second two other sons.



* This is the party who is alleged to have been adopted by Soobooroya No. 5.

3. According to immemorial practice, as that which prevailed during the reigns of the native Rajahs and under the rule of the Mahomedan and the British Government, after the decease of Memorialist's father the said Pirivianna Vanavaroya Gounden, the Polliem was placed in the possession of his eldest son one Ramasawmy Vanavaroya Gounden, Memorialist's elder brother; and after his demise, it was registered in the name of his son, Memorialist's nephew No. 5 who died without male issue.

4. Agreeably then to the rule of succession which Government have all along adopted from the practice which was followed by the former Governments, and according to Hindu Law, Memorialist, as the head male representative of the family and the 2nd son of the 1st wife, who is called the Puttapa Stri, and as belonging to the elder branch of the family of the original grantee, should, in all right and justice have the Polliem registered in his name.

5. In contravention, however of the rule which has obtained not only in Memorialist's Polliem, but also in all other unsettled Polliems and ancient Zemindaries, Kolundeisawmi Vanavaroya Gounden, a great grandson of the grantee of the younger branch has been most unaccountably allowed to supersede Memorialist, who, as already shown belongs to the elder branch and is at present the head male representative of the family.

6. The only ground on which this unprecedented nomination was recommended by the Collector, concurred in by the Board of Revenue and sanctioned by Government is, that the said 10 Kulundeiasawmi Vanavaroya Gounden, was adopted by Memorialist's deceased nephew, 5 Soobooroya Vanavaroya Gounden the late Poligar.

7. If the Collector, or the Board of Revenue or Government themselves had been pleased to take Memorialist's claim into just and candid consideration, and the several grounds on which he bases his claim as brought to their notice on the 7th August 1866 in his printed Petition, (Vide enclosure A), no such decision, Memorialist feels assured would have been passed.

8. In that Petition the following points were submitted, viz :—

I. That the deceased Poligar, Petitioner's nephew did not have any intention or make it known to adopt a son.

II. That if he even had an intention to adopt a son, he did not intimate it either verbally or by letter to the Authorities, as is required by the Circular Orders and according to Hindu Law.

III. That the father of the alleged adopted son had pre-deceased him, and therefore it was not competent in the mother according to Hindu Law to bestow him.

IV. That according to the Shastras, an *only* son cannot be given in adoption.

V. That it is incompetent in a widow to bestow a *posthumous* and an *only son* in adoption without the previous consent of her deceased husband.

VI. Besides, the mother being insane could not have given her son in adoption, as any act done by an insane person is invalid. Should the contract be complied with, this will be the *first instance* in which the act of an insane person has been recognized.

VII. There was no necessity for an adoption, as Memoralist is nearest of kin to the late Poligar, and consequently entitled to succeed him.

VIII. That as the head male representative of the family of the elder branch by the senior wife of the original grantee, he ought not to be superseded by a great grandson of the younger branch.

9. The *first* point to which Memorialist would solicit the attention of your Lordship is, that the alleged adoption never could and never did take place, and that for the following reasons :—

For an adoption two things are absolutely necessary :—

I. That Memorialist's nephew should have expressed his intention to adopt a son in the presence of the principal members of the family, and

II. That his intention should have been intimated to the local authorities according to the Circular Orders of the Board of Revenue of the 16th July 1846, at page 405, Note I. vol 1, and according to Hindu Law as laid down in Mitacshara, Cap. I. verse 13, pages 310-11, in which it is given that "Having convened his kindred and announced his intention to the king." But there is not the slightest shadow of proof that Memorialist's nephew ever did one thing or the other.

10. That he could not have done so is deducible from the fact that Memorialist's nephew, the late Poligar was on his death-bed, and, as is alleged by his widow and other interested parties, expressed his intention just a single day before his death.

11. This will clearly prove to your Lordship that in the debilitated and insensible state he was in, he could not have made even a verbal declaration of his alleged intention.

12. The *second* point to which Memorialist would ask the attention of your Lordship is that, if even the late Poligar did express his intention to adopt a son, *it would be illegal*, according to Hindu Law. Thus in Morley's Digest, vol. I. page 16, para. 34, it is thus given, "An "alleged Dattaka adoption by a person in a state of insensibility from dangerous illness by a "verbal declaration and without performance of the prescribed ceremonies was held to be illegal "and invalid."

13. The widow of the late Poligar nor other of her friends presume to state that, in the insensible state the Poligar was in, the ceremonies which may not be dispensed with in the adoption of a son were ever performed; and hence the adoption was never made; and if made, illegal. This being the case, it will be clearly apparent that the will said to have been executed by Memorialist's nephew is a forgery, for, from his state of insensibility he could not make even a mere verbal declaration, how then could he execute a will? Were it his intention to make a will, without a doubt he would have had it registered according to Act XX of 1866, and made known his wishes to the local authorities. The fact is, that the statement about the adoption and the will was concocted after the death of Memorialist's nephew by the widow and her relations and friends, merely with the view of dispossessing Memorialist of his just rights. But surely, it is not just in Government to accept the false depositions of her friends and relations as true, and allow Memorialist to be superseded.

14. Again the *third* point is, that no adoption could have taken place since the father of the alleged adopted son pre-deceased him.

15. In Morley's Digest, page 18, para. 52, it is stated that "a boy cannot be adopted, "although his natural father should have consented to the adoption if the latter should not "have lived to make the gift of his son." Again in page 17, para. 40, it is thus laid down. "The "adoption of an only son is invalid, unless the natural father deliver his son to the adoptive "father."

16. From the foregoing quotations, your Lordship will perceive that three things are requisite to make an adoption valid, viz :—

I. That the natural father should have lived to make the gift of his son.

II. That he should have made a delivery of his son, and

III. That the adoptive father should have received him.

17. That none of the above conditions were fulfilled as regards the alleged adoption will be clearly evident to your Lordship, from the simple and undeniable fact that the natural father of the alleged adopted son died just 22 days after his marriage, and that therefore he could neither bestow his son, (of whose existence he could not have been aware) nor, consequently could have been received by his alleged adoptive father.

18. Memorialist would still futher represent that, if even the alleged adoption had been made, it would still be invalid, on the principal that an *only* son cannot be given in adoption, and this is.

19. The *fourth* point to which Memorialist solicits the attention of your Lordship, that AN ONLY SON CANNOT BE GIVEN IN ADOPTION.

20. *First*, as with regards the natural father giving away his only son in adoption the Hindu Law is thus distinctly laid down :—

In Mitacshara, the principal Law book on Inheritance, and admitted on all hands as of the highest authority, Cap. I. verse II. page 310, it is given, "an only son must not be given (not "accepted), for Vashishta ordains, let no man give or accept an only son." In the note given to the above quotation it is stated. "Let no man give or accept an only son, for he is (destined) "to continue the line of his ancestors," and Sir Thomas Strange, in Vol. I, page 73, Edition 1st thus expresses himself; "For the interest that every Hindu father has in his own obsequies "restrains the parting for adoption either with his *eldest* or with an *only* son; it being of such "comparative importance to him that they should be performed by a son of his own."

21. From all the above quotations it will be seen that there are insuperable objections to *an only son* being given in adoption, viz., that he has to continue the line of his ancestors and perform the obsequies of his father.

22. *Second*, as with regards to the bestowal of an only son by the mother alone, the law according to Hindu Standard works is equally as emphatic: Sir Francis Macnaughten in his considerations of Hindu Law, page 208 states, "I am not aware of any thing in the Hindu Law "less contestible than this, that a woman cannot give her son in adoption without the permission "of her husband." Vashista says, "Let not a woman give or accept a son without the consent "of her lord." Upon this, Sri Natha Bhatta observes, "the donation or acceptance of a son by a "wife without the consent of her husband is what IS INVALID." What can be more clearly and distinctly laid down than the principle here enunciated? Nothing can be less contestible than that a woman cannot give her son in adoption without the permission of her husband. As already stated, no permission could have been obtained by the widow from her husband, he having demised 22 days after his marriage. This principle is still further borne out by Colebrooke in his Digest of Hindu Law, Vol. III. page 262, line 6, in which he states, "that "should the man be deceased, the child must not be given by the woman without the assent of "her husband *declared* before his death as ordained by a special text."

23. From this quotation your Lordship will observe that the father of the allged adopted son could not have *declared* his wish that his son should be given in adoption before his death as the child was not in existence, nor was he at all cognizant that his wife was *enciente*.

24. THIRD. A higher and religious motive precludes a Hindu from bestowing an only son in adoption. Sir T. Strange, Chap. III. Volume I. page 61, states, that the primary object "of marriage with the people in question being the birth of a son * * * * *, the future beatitude

"of the man, depending, according to Hindu Law, and the performance of his obsequies as the "means of redeeming him from an instant state of suffering from death."

25. The above will further prove to your Lordship that the mother of the alleged adopted son had no right to give the *only* son of her deceased husband in adoption. As immediately shown above, the object of marriage among Hindus being to beget a son in order to perfect their bliss in a future state: nor can any one, unless without the personal cognizance and presence of the father, deprive him of the prospects of Salvation by giving away an only son in adoption. *No more serious evil can be anticipated by a Hindu than not to have a son to perform his funeral obsequies*, and thereby procure him a state of beatitude at once after his decease.

26. The object of marriage being thus distinctly laid down, it is for your Lordship to adjudge what right or authority can the widow of the deceased husband or any other person have, in depriving him of his only means of escape from *Put*, "a place of horror to which the "manes of the childless are supposed to be doomed, there to be tormented with hunger and "thirst for want of those oblations of food and libations of water at prescribed periods, which "it is the pious and indispensable duty of a son to offer." (Vide Sir T. Strange, pages 61 & 62, Edition 1st.) Further, Sir Frances Macnaughten states at page 208, para. 4 that, "in the Baha-"rata, we find the mother is the fosterer; that the son is of the father—he is *that very person* "by whom produced."

27. Perhaps, in apparent opposition to the above, may be the Decree of the late Sudder Court in No. 5 of 1817, (page 157, Select Decrees, Vol. I.) wherein it is stated that although "the "wife may not have obtained the consent of her husband during his life-time to give their "child in adoption, it is nevertheless competent to her, having obtained the consent of father, "brothers, &c. to give her younger son in adoption."

28. Your Lordship will be pleased to note that in the above decree, *it is only competent in a widow to bestow a younger son, in a case of distress only*, and not that of an only posthumous son, unauthorized by her husband, as the widow in the present case is said to have done, and that by an insane woman.

29. Another decision passed by the High Court given in Decree No. 412 of 1862, page 54, Vol. I. in regard to the validity of the adoption of an only son is altogether inapplicable, since it is dissimilar from the adoption alleged to have been made by Memorialist's nephew. For in the case alluded to in the above decree, the natural father had himself given his son in adoption, though he thereby forfeited his future prospects of Salvation; whereas in the present instance the natural father had died long before the birth of his son, that is, just 22 days after his marriage, and did not give his son, who was not in existence at the time of his demise in adoption.

30. Further, Memorialist would beg to submit that the only single Decree of the High Court above noted does not constitute in itself accepted law; the more especially, as it is in direct opposition to the universally acknowledged principles of Hindu Law and contrary to the numerous decisions passed by many Judges of the late Sudder Adalut Court, who were guided in all their decisions, in which, one and all were unanimous on the construction placed by the learned pundits of the Court, on the original texts of the most celebrated works of Hindu Law, and acknowledged by all as of the highest and incontrovertible authority. Besides, perhaps some other Judge of the High Court may hereafter express an opinion contrary to the decision of the present Judges, coinciding with Hindu Law and the decisions of the late Sudder Adalut Court; and what then will be the result? Which decision would hold good in law?

31. From all the foregoing considerations, your Lordship cannot but perceive, that according to Hindu Law and the practice prevalent throughout all Southern India, it is incontestable

XII. And lastly, there was no necessity for an adoption to have been made by Petitioner's deceased nephew, and even if he did make the adoption, it would have been only for the performance of his funeral obsequies and not to the succession to the Polliem which is entirely in the gift of Government, and who cannot allow a great grandson of the younger branch to supersede the son of the elder branch of the family of the original grantee.

39. Memorialist's claim to succeed to the Polliem being therefore clear and indisputable, it is incomprehensible how the Government of Fort Saint George could allow him, the 2nd and only living son of the Puttapa wife to be superseded by the great grandson of the original grantee by the junior wife, contrary as it is, as has been distinctly and incontestably proved to Hindu Law, and the numerous decision of the highest judicial authorities in Southern India, as as also to the Rule invariably observed by Government themselves. It is unquestionably the prerogative of Government to bestow their vested rights of the Polliem on whom they choose ; but in exercising that right hitherto, they always observed the Rule of succession as obtains in settled Polliems : viz :—that of appointing the nearest of kin and next heir to the original grantee. If this were done in Memorialist's case, no question would be raised, and Memorialist would be saved a long course of litigation, which, in his present circumstances would inflict on him a serious hardship, which Government themselves would be the cause by bestowing the Polliem on a wrong party contrary to all precedent contrary to Hindoo Law, contrary to the rulings of the highest Judicial authorities of Southern India, and contrary also to the principle hitherto observed by the Government of Fort St. George. His Excellency the Right Honorable the present Governor in Council have, under date the 20th August 1866, No. 2,145, passed a decision to the following effect, para. 1. " The estate of Samatoor and Kotamputty being unsettled Polliems, the " succession to them depends entirely and solely on the will of Government.

" 2. The Governor in Council resolves in the exercise of their prerogative to declare " Kolandeisamy Vanavaroya Gounden (the adopted son of the late Poligar) to be Poligar of " Samatoor and Kotamputty in the Polachy Taluq of the Coimbatore District."

And this decision is declared to be final as stated in their endorsement on Memorialist's Petition, No. 2,229, which runs thus, " Copy of G. O. 20th August, No. 2,145 will be given to " Memorialist with the intimation that it is final."

In reference to this most unjust and illegal decision, Memorialist would respectfully submit that Government have indeed an undoubted right to nominate the successor to an unsettled Polliem, but though they have the prerogative, they have never exercised that right in an arbitrary manner, but always sacredly observed the principle of primogeniture as is declared in the Hindoo Laws and Shastras. Surely Government in the exercise of the prerogative would not bestow the Polliem on any passing stranger who may have as much right to the Polliem as Kolandeisamy Gounden himself. Further, now that a permanent sunnud is about being issued, it will be inflicting a positive injustice on Memorialist if it should be made in the name of Kolandeisamy Gounden and not in that of Memorialist, who will in consequence be subjected to great destitution, and involved in interminable litigation.

Memorialist therefore most humbly solicits your Lordship to be graciously pleased with reference to the foregoing grounds to reverse the decision of the Local Government and passan order, directing the Polliem of Samatoor and Kotamputty to be registered in his name.

For which act of justice and goodness.

Memorialist as in duty bound,

Shall ever Pray.

MADRAS,
3rd October 1866.

that an *only* son may not be given away in adoption by the natural father, and that the natural mother cannot bestow an *only* son in adoption after the demise of her husband unauthorized by him.

32. But in addition to what Memorialist has above submitted, proving the impossibility of the alleged adoption having been made, there is still another stronger reason, showing that the alleged adoption could not have been made, and that is, that the natural mother has been all along in a state of stark insanity, incapable of performing a single act under the influence of her right and proper senses.

It is according to both Hindu and English Law that any act done by an insane person is null and void. Sawyer's Manual, Edition of 1861, page 23. Cap. iii. para. 89, in which it is stated that "a lunatic is incapable of contracting arises from an *expressed assent*, because he is "incapable of assenting." Hence also the alleged adoption said to have been made by the widow is invalid.

33. There are also, Memorialist would humbly submit, other considerations quite as cogent as those already submitted, to show that the alleged adoption could not have been made, and these are that, in the first place, there was no necessity for such an adoption to have been made in regard to the succession to the Polliem, inasmuch as Memorialist was, as the uncle of the late Poligar and the head male representative, and the son of the original grantee by his senior wife, his indisputable successor; and in the second place, there was no distress in a spiritual sense, whereby the deceased Poligar should have made the adoption in view to have his funeral ceremonies performed, since he had Memorialist, his next of kin and heir and other near cousins, all of whom were bound to perform his funeral obsequies, whether he adopted any one of them or not, they being his *Sapindas*.

34. Such being the facts of the case as respects the illegality and irregularity of the alledged adoption, and the right of Memorialist, according to the practice hitherto observed by Government with regard to the succession to unsettled Polliems, there was no necessity whatever for Government to refer the matter to Mr. Mayne, the Advocate General for his opinion and to be guided or biassed by it. That gentleman may or may not have been prepossessed in favor of the adoption and prejudiced against Memorialist's claim to the succession, consequent of his having been engaged, as Memorialist is given to understand by Memorialist's opponents to prepare the Petition which was submitted to the Board of Revenue. Were that opinion unfettered and given in accordance to the principles of Hindu Law, and if the points submitted by Memorialist were before him, it would assuredly have been given in Memorialist's favor, *negativing the adoption as invalid.* And even now, if the opinion of the Advocate General be compared with the authorities quoted in this Memorial, it will be found to be illegal and contrary to Hindu Law.

35. But as already stated, there was no necessity whatever for the local Government to refer to the Advocate General for his opinion, for in all cases of a similar nature, Government, who are at present composed of the highest Revenue and Judicial Officers in the Presidency have invariably conferred the Polliem on the eldest male representative of the elder branch of the family. For instance, in the case of the Bungari Polliem, the late Poligar had married two wives on one and the selfsame day; but the second married was the first to beget a son, and the first married brought forth a son afterwards. But how did Government decide in the matter? Not for the eldest born, but for the son of the 1st married wife, though born subsequently. This decision was passed this year by the selfsame Members of Council who are at present in office; the principle observed being that the eldest male representative of the elder branch had the preference to succeed though younger in years to his elder brother by the 2nd married wife. Innumerable other instances of a like nature can be adduced, whereby Memorialist, as the head male representative of the elder branch of the original grantee's family should be nominated to the succession.

36. The principle on which Government have invariably acted with reference to the line of succession is, that which universally prevails. That principle is thus given by T. L. Strange in his Manual of Hindu Law, para. 309, by which, first the "son, and son's son, and next by his grandsons succeed." Memorialist is the first wife's son; how then can the great grandson by the 2nd wife of the original grantee be allowed to supersede him?

37. Furthermore, your Lordship cannot but must have understood that the adoptions of the Tanjore and Mysore Rajahs were disallowed, and according to the decisions which were passed in those most two important cases, the same rule should have been observed in nominating to the succession of the Memorialist himself to an unsettled Polliem, and in setting aside the alleged adoption. Besides, there was an actual necessity for an adoption to be made in both the above instances, as neither the Tanjore and Mysore Rajahs had no male heirs whatsoever, and hence their need of an adoption both to succeed to their respective kingdoms and to perform their funeral obsequies. In the case of Memorialist's nephew, there was no such necessity, and hence Memorialist's claim to succeed is doubly strengthened.

38. In recapitulation of all the foregoing considerations Memorialist would submit

I. That no adoption was made.

II. That if such adoption was made, it were illegal.

III. That the boy being an only and posthumous son, he could not be given in adoption.

IV. For it were necessary for the natural father to bestow the son, but which he did not do, as he died long before the birth of his son, that is, 22 days after his marriage.

V. That it were incompetent for the widow to give an *only* posthumous son in adoption without the consent of her husband before his decease.

VI. That thereby she would deprive her husband of his only hopes of Salvation.

VII. That illegal as it would have been on the part of the widow to give her only and posthumous son of her deceased husband away in adoption; if she had done so, it becomes *still more illegal, and in fact impossible and improbable from the glaring fact of her being in a state of perfect and stark madness.*

VIII. That the illegality of the alleged adoption is still further seen from the fact that it is said to have been made a day before the decease of the late Poligar whilst he was in a state of insensibility from dangerous illness. But even that was not the case, and the whole statement about the adoption and the will is absolutely false and a forgery, it having been concocted after his demise and supported by the friends and connections of the widow of the late incumbent, or otherwise it would have been registered according to Act XX of 1866.

IX. That the opinion given by the Advocate General does not at all accord with Hindu Law, as is laid down by the highest and most approved authorities which are quoted above.

X. The Polliem being an unsettled one is indivisible, and as Memorialist is at present the head male representative, being the 2nd son by the senior wife of the original grantee, whereas the alleged adopted son belongs to the youngest branch and also the great grandson of the original grantee by his junior wife, the Polliem, without reference to the validity or invalidity of the adoption should in all fairness and justice be conferred on him.

XI. No member of a younger branch can supersede one who belongs to the elder branch from the Polliem being an unsettled one and a Military fief; nor has it been ever permitted by Government, not a single instance can be adduced where a member of the younger branch has been allowed to supersede a member of the elder branch, that is, while a son of the senior wife is in existence.

No

Ordered that the Memorial
received with the foregoing letter
be dispatched to Home Government.
& that the Memorialist be informed
of its dispatch.

J. P.
9th Augt 1845

Recd 1st Sept
Lord Aberdeen
Answd 9th Sept 1845

1 July 68 No 586-89-20 Aug 68 497-498-99-500

Rev: 1867: Oct 5
No 4 Court Fee Rs 1-12-0 of 1867

No: 1751.

From Nanjappa
Vánuvaraya Gounden
of Coimbatore Dist.

Dated
Rec'd 9 July 1867
3 Encls

Submitting a Memorial in Triplicate to the address of the Secy of State for India, Stating that he is the elder son of the original Grantee, that the last incumbent died without issue & the Petr has thereby a right to the Poliem with reference to the Rules of Succession dated 14 1845 by Govt until an order

Petitioner to be informed that the Memorial cannot be received, as it is addressed to the Secretary of State for India, and that he should address it to the Government of Madras.

Reported to Govt
Lr 12 Aug. Dis. No. 45. of 67 Mis.

No 283-184.

Rec'd 6/3/68