

Public Works (1899) Department.

RAILWAY BRANCH.

G.O., No. 731-32. Ry.

DATED 5th July 1899.

[Despatch Abstract.]

Accident near Annayanayakkannur
Station

Directing that a copy of the remarks are
by the Agent, S. L. Ry., on the report by the
Govt. Inspector of Ry., on the —, be forwarded
to the Govt. of India as asked for.

Endorsement forwarding a copy of
the above to the Govt. of India.

From

J. C. LYLE, Esq.,
Government Inspector of Railways,
Madras,

To

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT

(Through the Senior Government Inspector of Railways, Madras).

Madras, the 9th February 1899.

SIR,

In accordance with the orders contained in Government of India Circular No. 7, Railway, dated the 19th April 1895, as amended by Circular IX, Railway, of the 11th June 1898, I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, the result of the Joint Committee of Enquiry, held on the 5th November 1898, to investigate the circumstances attending an accident which occurred to No. 1 mixed train, at mile 322/11, near Ammayanayakkanur station, South Indian Railway.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

J. C. LYLE,
Government Inspector.

no 905 dt 16.3.99

Copy forwarded to A for
information and for submission
of his remarks on the Senior Govt
Inspectors report as required by
para 6 A of the accident rules.

sd. A. Bowley
for S. Govt Inspector

JOINT REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WHICH ASSEMBLED AT AMMAYANAYAKKANUR
ON THE 9TH AND 16TH NOVEMBER 1898 TO HOLD AN INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSE OF AN ACCIDENT
WHICH OCCURRED TO NO. 1 MIXED TRAIN, AT MILE 322/11, SOUTH INDIAN RAILWAY,
ON THE 5TH NOVEMBER 1898.

Composition of Committee.

F. F. Smith, Deputy Chief Engineer.	James Rice, Resident Engineer.
G. S. Bruce, Deputy Locomotive Supdt.	R. Sangar, Assistant Traffic Manager.
T. J. McCloughin, Deputy Traffic Manager.	P. Rothera, Assistant Engineer.

Description of accident.

No. 1 mixed train consisting of four wheeled coupled engine No. 176, 16 goods vehicles, 3 third class passenger carriages, and brake-van left Ammayanayakkanur, 320 M.S. 7 T.P., at the right time (5-33) on the morning of the 5th November 1898, and at mile 322/11 on a falling gradient of 1 in 275 the fourth and twelve following vehicles from the engine were derailed. Most of them completely capsized, and the leading wheels of the 1st third class carriage were derailed but not badly. No one amongst either the passengers (as far as is known) or the Company's servants received any bodily injury.

A sketch plan showing the position of the vehicles after the derailment and a copy of the working section showing the gradients are attached.

The weather was fine at the time of the accident (about 5-45), but there had been rain in the neighbourhood during the night.

Detailed statement of evidence.

Driver Fernandez states.—I was driver of No. 1 up-train on the morning of 5th November. I have been 9 years in the service and about 3 years working as a driver. I left Ammayanayakkanur at the right time 5-33. I was running at 22½ miles an hour. As soon as I passed the distant semaphore, I told the fireman to apply the brakes to steady the train as far as the crossing at 322/1. Finding my train steady, I slackened the brake and proceeded on. It was not raining and was light enough to see. I noticed nothing worth reporting. Suddenly I felt a jerk. I looked back and saw the truck capsized. I did not notice any unevenness in the running before I felt the jerk. I at once stopped my engine. The engine only went a few yards after I felt the jerk. I put on my brake after I looked back and saw the trucks capsized. I got off my engine and found the fourth truck from the engine capsized. I cannot describe the exact position of the trucks. I did not notice the condition of the road. The road was quite wet. The guard gave me a telegram which I sent to the Assistant Traffic Manager, at Madura. Mr. Sangar arrived shortly after. I have nothing further to say.

Driver Fernandez re-called.—When my engine came to a stand there was a space of about 3 or 4 trucks length between the last vehicle attached to my engine and the first derailed vehicle. After I felt the jerk I ran about 6 trucks length. When I backed my train I went about 2 trucks.

Driver Fernandez re-called.—The Sub-Inspector arrived soon after Mr. Sangar left on the first occasion. The accident happened at about 5-45. Mr. Sangar came afterwards within about an hour, he may have been there about ½ an hour and then went away. The Sub-Inspector asked me the cause of the accident. I said I could see no cause for it (witness here admits in reply to questions by Mr. Bruce that he spoke to the Sub-Inspector about the axle boxes being the cause of the accident). Foreman Battensby asked me at Sholavandan what was the cause of the accident. I replied that the only thing I saw to account for it was a pair of wheels thrown out and the axle boxes broken.

First Fireman W. R. Jelly states.—Six years in the service and 4 years as fireman. After leaving Ammayanayakkanur after the driver shut off the steam I put on the brake going down the bank. Finding the train going steady after passing the first level crossing I took off the brake as we usually do. After going on a little further we felt a slight shock not much to be noticed. The driver ordered me to put on the brake just as the jerk happened. Am quite sure the brake was put on just as the jerk happened and there was no delay at all. On turning round and looking back we saw the trucks tumbling over. I cannot say whether the driver looked back before I did. This was the first time that I looked back. I remained with the engine.

Examined.—The train only went on a few yards after the jerk was first felt.

Second Fireman Muhammad Esuff states.—I have been seven years in the service and four months as fireman. I was putting on fuel. I was on the top of the tender and the engine gave a sudden jerk and was pulled back. Just

before this jerk took place the fireman was putting on the brake. The brake was put on because the train was going on very fast. The brake was being put on for fear the train should go too fast. I do not think the train was going faster than usual. I did not feel any jerk before the one above described. The engine was running quite steadily. The engine ran 2 or 3 posts after I felt the jerk before it was brought to a stand. Before backing the engine with the 3 vehicles attached up to the derailed vehicle there was a space of 3 posts.

Guard A. L. Anderson states.—Ten years service. On the morning of 5th November I was guard of No. 1 train. After leaving Ammayanayakkanur station I felt a jerk at about 322/11. Sudden shock. Before this I felt nothing peculiar. It was daylight at the time and not raining. As soon as I felt the jerk the train stopped. I did not put on my brake; there was no necessity to do so; the train stopped immediately. I got out of my van and saw the derailed vehicles. I looked after the passengers and found them all right. Then I went up to the driver. I saw the engine backing. I protected my train and asked the driver the cause of the accident. I telegraphed to the Station master. The train was going at about 22 or 23 miles an hour when I felt the jerk. The shock was not great enough to disturb me in my seat, except that I was jolted. When I first saw the engine it was in motion backing. The third wagon was then about 4 wagons length from the first derailed wagon. I asked the driver the cause of the accident and he said the axle box of wagon No. 385 was broken. I saw the axle box, it was broken. The driver said this was the cause of the accident. I felt nothing before the shock above referred to. The driver did not call for brakes. I know the call for brakes. I was the only guard in the train. The road was wet with recent rain. The ground was not sufficiently wet for my feet to sink in when walking.

Mr. R. Sangar, Assistant Traffic Manager, states.—I arrived at the scene of the accident at about 7 o'clock before the arrival of the break down gang from Madura. I found one carriage and 12 wagons derailed and overturned as shown in the sketch accompanying this evidence. I found the leading wheels of C.G.B. 385 detached from the body of the wagon and lying immediately behind the trailing wheels of the vehicles. These were the only wheels detached. The road underneath the damaged wagons was completely torn up. There were no marks upon the line in rear of the derailed wagon. I examined the line carefully. B. 385 was fully loaded with grain. The leading end of B. 385 was deeply buried in the bank. The ground was damp, but not sufficiently wet for one to sink into when walking over it. I examined the road carefully for 2 or 3 hundred yards behind the brake van and found no unusual marks on the rails or the road.

Sub-Inspector Robert Pillay states.—10 years in the service and ¾ years on Madura-Ammayanayakkanur section. I last examined the part of the line where the accident took place on Friday, the 4th. I walked from Ammayanayakkanur to Sholavandan. The line was in good condition throughout. I do not know if there was any rain in the vicinity of the accident, but on the night of the 4th there was slight

rain at Sholavandan. I came by trolley to the scene of the accident and arrived there before the break-down train came from Madura. When I arrived I found the driver and guard sitting down near vehicle 385. I asked the driver what was the cause of the derailment. He said the axle-box was broken and the wheel got off from the line. I asked the driver to show me the broken axle-box and the wheel and the truck. He took me to the place where the axle-box was lying. I tested the gauge on either side of the derailed vehicles and found no defect in the line. I did not see any marks on the rails, although I walked a post north and south beyond the derailed vehicles. I did not examine the broken axle-box. The driver showed me only one box lying on the right hand side of the truck. I cannot identify it again as I have seen several other broken boxes since. I saw the short piece of broken rail taken out of the bank from under the truck 385. I cannot say which end of the short rail was uppermost.

Locomotive Foreman W. Battensby states—18 years continual service and 7 years as Locomotive Foreman. I arrived at the spot at 10 o'clock and started to work at the north end of the train and re-railed third-class carriage 475 and B 359. At first I saw the driver of the derailed train at Sholavandan and I asked him at what speed he was running at the time of the derailment. He said he thought he was running at about 25 miles an hour. I asked him if there was anything on the line. He said he did not notice anything particularly wrong. I noticed that he had three trucks attached to the engine. The part of the broken head stock with Jones' buffer attached which belonged to the next wooden covered goods was firmly attached to the last vehicle. I had no more time at that station as I wanted to get to the scene of the accident. On arriving at the scene of the accident, I found eight trucks derailed seriously, some of them being capsized and one iron covered goods and third-class carriage derailed near the line at the north end of the derailment. I saw Mr. Sangar and asked him if they were all loads. He said, Yes. I then asked him if he could kindly get them unloaded for me. The road under the southernmost derailed vehicle was very little damaged. The right hand rail under the third-class carriage was apparently in its original position, but the left hand rail was pushed

outwards from its position about 4 inches. The road under B. 559 the right hand rail had not shifted but the left hand rail shifted out very much, so that I had to get a spare rail and put under the left hand side of the truck in order to run the truck clear. The road beyond the last-named vehicle was completely torn up. I first saw the broken rail projecting from under B. 385, about 20 feet from the corner of it. The short piece of this rail was embedded in the bank under truck 385. The fish-plate end of this short rail was uppermost. I remember seeing two broken axle-boxes near iron truck B. 385. They were south of the leading wheels of truck 385 and on the right side of the line. I examined the boxes and consider that they have been broken by the derailment, because the sides were broken and also the recesses the axle guards work in. I have no experience of axle-boxes breaking in rough shunting.

Locomotive Foreman Hart states—Service 22 years and 8 months and 16 years Locomotive Foreman. When I arrived at the scene of the derailment, I began to work to clear B. 385. The truck was in the position as shown in the sketch. I started on the south end of the truck as it was buried in the ballast and, after jacking it up, I traversed it over to where the line was and kept it upon the jacks till the road was put into gauge and I could run a trolley under the south end. There was only one pair of wheels in the truck at the trailing end and finding the jaws of the axle guard in right side opened out thereby preventing the axle-box being kept in position, I took those wheels out and placed another trolley under the end. The leading wheels of this truck were north of the truck. Whilst I was lifting the trailing end of the truck I saw a short piece of rail embedded in the ballast. I tried to take it out but could not do so. I saw a broken axle-box lying close to the truck and I examined it and found it was a clean brake throughout the casting. Beyond the air holes in the centre of the casting I did not notice any defect. The trailing axle-boxes were intact.

Driver Battensby recalled—I found it necessary to put in a good deal of packing when jacking up the vehicles owing to the soft state of the road. I found the greatest difficulty in dealing with the trucks immediately north of the powder van which was lying on its left side on the left side of the line.

Finding of the Committee.

The Joint Committee deferred arriving at a finding on the 9th November 1898 and re-assembled on the 16th November 1898 at Ammayanayakanur station, and, accompanied by Mr. J. C. Lyle, Dy. Con. Engr., further examined the derailed vehicles which were all collected at the station. The scene of the accident was also inspected and the following finding was recorded.

According to the evidence the following factors have to be considered as possibly contributing to the accident:—(a) The axle-boxes of B. 385. (b) Possible obstruction on the line. (c) Excessive speed and sudden application of brake. (d) Condition of rolling stock. (e) State of the road.

(a) Having examined the axle-box in which the honeycombing at the bottom of the box was alleged as a possible cause of fracture, it was decided that this defect was in such a position that it could in no way affect the strength of the casting, whilst the direction of the fractures showed that they had been caused by the box being crushed against the hornstays—an effect of the wheels being wrenched out of their place in the accident.

(b) There was no reason to suppose that the accident was caused by an obstruction on line.

(c) The guard's evidence and the fact that none of the passengers or train staff complained of any bodily injury, notwithstanding the train having been pulled up so suddenly, makes it reasonable to conclude the train was not running at excessive speed, and this being the case there was no need for any such sudden application of the brake as to account for the accident.

(d) The whole of the stock was recently departmentally examined and marked "P" as having been fitted with the stronger axles. Its running gear was declared in good order and fit for the maximum speed for goods vehicles. The wagons were again examined by the Committee at Ammayanayakanur station and nothing was found to lead them to suppose that the stock was otherwise than in good condition before the accident.

(e) We have therefore to fall back on the state of the road.

We examined the line in the rear of the derailed vehicles and found loose keys some defective and some out of the jaws altogether, also a broken pot sleeper. From this we infer that the road at the site of the accident which at the time of our inspection had been restored was in a similar condition. There was also, as the evidence discloses, a broken piece, 25 inches long, off the end of a rail (under wagon B. 385) which was embedded in the bank with fish bolt holes uppermost.

We believe that this fracture was due to a sudden blow resulting from a slack joint under a rail which the nature of the fracture shows to be of defective material and that it was the immediate cause of the derailment of wagon B. 385. We think it most probable that this was the first vehicle derailed.

FRANCIS F. SMITH.

GRAHAM S. BRUCE.



T. J. McCLOUGHIN.

No. $\frac{402}{98}$

S. I. R.

PLAN SHEWING POSITION OF TRUCKS AFTER
THE ACCIDENT TO NO. 1 TRAIN ON NOVEMBER 5TH 1898

Scale 20ft. = 1 Inch



Reg. No. 4832
Copies 70

(SD.) T. H. LE MESURIER.
for Agent.
Trichinopoly.
7-12-98.

(SD.) FRANCIS F. SMITH.
for Chief Engineer.
Trichinopoly.
18-11-98.

Litho., Survey Office, Madras.
1899.

The Traffic Department member of the Committee, Mr. T. J. McCloughin adds the following remarks to the finding :—

"I do not think that the fracture in the rail was the immediate cause of the derailment. In my view the circumstances point to there being a defect at the joint of the rail that was afterwards found broken. The right leading wheel of wagon B. 385 in the act of derailing, struck the rail and thrust it outwards until it broke when the broken piece of rail was projected or pushed forward and buried end up under the wagon."

Appendix A—Damage done to permanent-way—Estimated cost Rs. 450.

1 rail	Broken.	8 fish plates	Broken.
6 rails	"	50 bolts	"
150 pot sleepers	"	200 cotters	Buried in ground.
70 tie bars	"	200 gibs	"

Conclusion.

I agree with the finding of the Committee that the speed of the train could not have been excessive. The fracture of the rail was such as would be caused by a lateral and not by a vertical blow. I am therefore of opinion that the state of the road must be held responsible for the accident. Probably the key of the sleepers next the joint was missing and the oscillation of the train caused the flange of one wheel to strike the rail at such a point that the maximum possible shock occurred at the point of fracture. I see no reason to suppose that the accident was caused by unequal springs as the speed was slow, much slower than that at which the same train must have run at other parts of its journey.

MADRAS,
9th December 1898.

J. C. LYLE,
Government Inspector of Railways.

Remarks by the Senior Government Inspector.

Of the 20 vehicles behind the engine and tender, three next the tender and three at the rear of the train were not derailed. The remaining fourteen vehicles were all badly derailed. It is important to notice that all in front of the eighth vehicle from the tender were *pulled* apart, while those in rear of that vehicle were *pressed* more or less together. The leading pair of wheels and axle of this eighth vehicle were found in rear of its trailing wheels. The disturbed piece of road was 40 feet greater in length than the uninjured train. A broken piece of rail, 25 inches long, was found under the particular vehicle above referred to, and the rail from which it was broken was found displaced from its chairs, but more or less *in situ*, about three or four waggon lengths in rear of the vehicle which I believe to have been the first to get derailed.* The train would therefore appear to have run some three or four waggon lengths after the derailment of waggon B. 385, the vehicles in front of that waggon continuing to be pulled by the engine while those behind it were huddled together.

I conclude that missing keys in the neighbourhood of the broken rail caused severe oscillation which, being emphasised by a slack joint at the place of fracture, caused the fracture to occur, derailing B. 385.

My opinion formed during a recent inspection is that, with the present mail train speeds, the South Indian Railway Company require a better class of permanent-way inspectors than the Chief Engineer at present employs. I am of opinion that a good foreman platelayer ought to be got out from England for the upkeep of the road, for in many places it is not up to the standard demanded by the present speeds.

MADRAS,
19th January 1899.

FRANCIS J. E. SPRING,
Senior Government Inspector.

South Indian Railway.

Copy of a letter, No M.R./5310/622, dated 27th March 1899
from the Chief Engineer, South Indian Railway,
to the Agent, South Indian Railway.

Your Inward Register No. 4514

The Report of the Senior Government Inspector on the
Derailment at mile 322/11 on 5th November 1898

I wish, although this matter has, I presume been finally pro-
nounced upon, to make a few remarks on the finding of the Senior
Government Inspector.

There is nothing as far as I can see in the evidence to
lead to the supposition that the train ran for 3 or 4 waggons'
length after the derailment and I do not understand from what
source he has obtained the information that the short piece of
broken rail was carried on for 3 or 4 waggons' length from the
longer piece which was in situ. The small piece of rail was found
under the truck B 385 and this truck stood just over the frac-
ture. The broken rail was as far as I can remember one forming
the left side of the road facing south and the piece was broken
from the north end.

I think every one that was present at the accident is of
opinion that the train was suddenly checked and that the truck
B385 did not move its own length but became at once embedded
in the ground.

The figures on the sketch sent from my office recording the
length of the train as it stood before the accident, are wrong;
the length of the vehicles was 241 feet, not 225 ft 4 inches.

The road disturbed and relaid was 10 lengths of 24 feet
rails or 240 feet and there were about 25 feet of road to be

TRICHINOPOLY.

11th April 1899.

Accompaniment to the Agent's letter No.

of 18

(True Copy)

W. Le Mesurier
for Agt. Agent

Eng. No. 1 TO E. R. S. C. No. 1904 of 1899
LETTER NO. 330 of 11 4 99
FROM

Copy continued.

straightened under the derailed 3rd class carriage and at the South end of vehicle A 761. This shows, I think conclusively, that the train was brought to a sudden stop and that it did not run on as derailed trains generally do for some distance before being brought to a stand still.

With reference to the state of the road there is the evidence of Mr. Sangar, an independent officer, and who was first on the spot; he walked along the line from Ammayanayakanur to the scene of the accident and he carefully examined the road for 2 or 3 hundred yards in the rear of the derailed train for any marks that might lead up to the cause of the derailment. He has told me that he is certain, if any key had been missing or fallen out, that he would have noticed the fact. The Committee who examined the road on the 16th. 11 days after the accident, did find many shrunken and defective keys and one or two instances of keys having slipped from the jaw of the chair and from this it is judged that keys were missing on 5th. The Driver and Firemen all state their engine was running steadily up to the time the jerk caused by the derailment was experienced.

In connection with accidents to trains in the year 1893 there had been no accident to the fast running train that had not been satisfactorily accounted for. In 1891 and 1892 there were 3 accidents, all attributed to trains meeting with obstructions; in 1897 there were also 3 accidents, one caused by a broken axle, 2 by obstructions; in 1898 no accident occurred. It is therefore not these well fitted and braked trains that come to grief but the Mixed and Goods trains which are timed for a slower speed. That such should be

AGENT'S OFFICE,
TRICHINOPOLY.
11th April 1899.

Accompaniment to the Agent's letter No.

of 18

(True Copy).

W. Le Mesurier
for Agt. Agent

South Indian Railway

Copy of a letter No. M.S. 18310/533 dated 27th March 1899 from the Chief Engineer, South Indian Railway, to the Agent, South Indian Railway.

Your letter No. 18310/533

The Report of the Senior Government Inspector on the Derailment at mile 830/11 on 24th November 1898

I wish, should this matter be, I presume been finally pronounced upon, to make a few remarks on the findings of the Senior Government Inspector. There is nothing as far as I can see in the evidence so far as the supposition that the train ran for 3 or 4 wagon lengths after the derailment and I do not understand from what source he has obtained the information that the short piece of broken rail was carried on for 3 or 4 wagon lengths from the longer piece which was in situ. The small piece of rail was found under the truck 3 225 and this truck stood over the last turn. The broken rail was as far as I can remember one foot from the left side of the road facing south and the piece was broken from the north end.

I think every one that was present at the accident is of opinion that the train was suddenly checked and that the truck 3225 did not move its own length but came at once embedded in the ground.

The figures on the sketch sent from my office regarding the length of the train as it stood before the accident are wrong; the length of the vehicles was 341 feet, not 325 as 4 inches.

The road disturbed and raised was 10 inches of rails on 240 feet and there were about 25 feet of road to be

Copy continued.

any bad road was made. That after the rain that had then but recently fallen there might have been slight slacks at some part of the line, cannot be denied.

AGENT'S OFFICE,
TRICHINOPOLY,
11th April 1899.

Accompaniment to the Agent's letter No.

of 18

(True Copy).

W. Le Mesurier
for Ag. Agent

Copy continued.

the case tends to prove that the Standard of Permanent Way on this line is a high one. At the time of the accident the supply of keys on the Contract for the Gifford year was just coming in and there is no doubt that keys were in the road that were not up to the mark and which would have been removed if the stock had not run out.

I am at one with the Senior Government Inspector in his opinion that our P.W. Inspectors are not in all cases, men of ability; we have some very poor specimens but still the South Indian Railway has during past years, had the reputation for keeping up a very good Standard of Permanent Way. I have often considered the advisability of getting from England 2 or 3 men of the stamp of Mr. Bird, but these men are often torn out of the country and I have to be satisfied from trying for them.

One cause regarding this accident does not appear to have been considered and that is "Pouling"; it is not an impossibility for now the short piece of rail became separated from the adjoining rail because on shortening the fish bolts, it not easily caught and the fish bolts were as short and clean as when the rail was made with the exception of one very tiny abrasion on the edge of one of the bolts. The end of the rail which was facing the train is also damaged but it is on the side and this was, in all probability, done when it was separated. The impression that the bolts were suddenly stretched and that it did not run for any distance as detailed before is most improbably so, points to something exceptional about this accident. The rail train had passed over this spot but a few hours before and no report of

Copy continued

any bad road was made. That after the rain that had then but recently fallen there might have been slight rises at some part of the line, cannot be denied.

No. 330

File 19.4.99

SERIAL No. 22

South Indian Railway Co., Ltd.

AGENT'S OFFICE,

TRICHINOPOLY, 11th April 1899.



From

THE AGENT,

SOUTH INDIAN RAILWAY,

To

THE GOVERNMENT INSPECTOR

FOR RAILWAYS,

MADRAS.

Sir,

520 With reference to your endorsement No 905 dated 16th March 1899 regarding the derailment at mile 322 on 5th November 1898, I have the honor to forward a copy of the Chief Engineer's letter No. M. R. / 5310 A of 27th March 1899.

I have the honor to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant.

One Enclosure
Red.

M. Spalding
Ag. Agent

AGENT'S OFFICE
TRICHINOPOLY
11th April 1899

Handwritten signature/initials

D. A. R. Cho 816
 23/6/99
 Papers re. accident at
 Annamayanayakanur is not
 here. The other references in
 the Govt of India letter ^{are} marked
 in the case put up re. accident
 at Sivas junction. Please
 say whether this paper
 can go to Madras for
 necessary action.

A.R. Please put ^{23/6}
 up papers.
 23/6/99
 Papers put up.

99) Department.
 P. W. R.
 CURRENT No. 816.

From The Govt of India

No. 570 R.T.

Dated 15th June 1899
 Received 23^d — do —
 Registered — do —
 Enclosures
 Spare copies

SUBJECT.


Accident near Annamaya-
 nayakkanur Station, S. R.

Stating that the Govt
 of India await the
 remarks of the Agent
 in connection with the
 report by the Senior Govt
 Inspector of Ry. Madras
 on the ———

From
 THE AGENT,
 SOUTH INDIAN RAILWAY,
 Trichinopoly.
 To
 THE GOVERNMENT INSPECTOR
 OF RAILWAYS,
 Madras.
 Dated
 Received
 No.
 189
 ENCLOSURE.

No.	Date.
-----	-------

No. _____ Date. _____



No. 570 R.T.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT.

Railway Traffic.

To

Simla, the 15th June 1899.

Sir,

to

PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT,
RAILWAY BRANCH.

C. No.

816
23.7.99

NOTE FOR S.

to in the letter from the Senior Government Inspector of
Railways, Madras, vide his No. ^{S. 11} 17 of the 4th May 1899.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

W. J. M. M. M. Captain R.E.,
Offg. Under Secretary.
S. 11

Documents accompanying.

Nil.

In serial 20 of
the case "Accident near
Ammayanayakkannur" the
Agent's remarks were called
for under para 6 A of the
Accident rules. In reply
the Agent forwarded a copy
of his Chief Engineer's letter
(Enclosure to S. 22) but this
was "filed" at Madras. As
it is required if a copy of same
may be sent to the Govt of
India.

29.6.99
Yes copy of A's letter
with enclosure.

J. L.
29.6.99.

The remarks in para 3
of India's letter are submitted
for order. The procedure hitherto
adopted by this office viz
that of the Senior Govt Insp.
and the Secretary addressing
the Govt of India in the

Case 52 (57)

matter of accidents would
appear to be correct but
the Govt. of India requires
the correspondence to go to
them through the Local Govt.

+ Serial 20 of
Case No. 100
reporting accidents

In its Circular No VII Railway
of 18.7.95. clause 3 para 1 of
the Resolution, the Govt. of India
laid down that the reports
will be submitted through the
Senior Govt. Inspector & nothing
is said about the Local Govt.

In Enclosure 13 to the same
Circular which are specimen
forms of the report it will
be seen that the Govt.
Inspector addresses the Govt.
of India through the P.G.I.,
but it is nowhere stated that
the P.G.I. sh. forward the
report through the Local
Govt.

S No 39 of the
same case.

In its letter No 688 R.I.
of 23.11.95 addressed to the P.
G.I. the Govt. of India requested
that in order to avoid
"unnecessary correspondence"
"Govt. Inspectors will when

they decide that an enquiry
is unnecessary, inform the
Govt. of India by letter of their
decision."

The Govt. of India has
on several occasions addressed
the Senior Govt. Inspector
direct such through the
Local Govt. please see Serials
45, 71, 73, 74.

356

The matter seems quite
clear. The reports of
accident are submitted by
or through the Senior
Govt. Inspector to both
the Govt. of India & the
Local Govt. a copy of the
report also goes to the Agent
for his remarks. The Agent's
remarks of the railway when
administrations must, when
received, be forwarded through
the Local Govt. to the
G. of I.

Jd
20.6.99.

Form No. *12*

PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT,
RAILWAY BRANCH.

Papers to be read in Proceedings:—

Letter from the Secy in respect of Railways,
Madras to Secy to the Govt of India No 904 dt 16.3.88.
Engr to A. No 905 dt 16.3.88.
Letter from A. No 330, dated 11.4.88 with Encls.
" " the Secy India, No 570 R.I. dt 15.6.88

ORDER.

No 731. Dtd 5/7/99

A copy of letter No 330
(with Encls.)
dated 11th April 1888 from
the Secy. P.W.D. will be
forwarded to the Govt of
India with reference to para
1 of its letter read above.

No 732. Rtd 5th July 1888.

Forwarded.

To A Secy from Govt.
ER. 20/2/00

To Engr. Secy from Govt.

for R
8/17/99