

Public Works (1893) Department.

RAILWAY BRANCH.

G.O., No. 1371 R

DATED 15th November

[Despatch Abstract.]

Accident. — Proceedings, Judicial Department, Communicating letter from the District Magistrate, Kistna, forwarding a detailed report on the Railway — at Sitanagaram on 14th July 1893, recorded.

BACK PAPERS.

G.O.	No.	Department.	Date.	G.O.	No.	Department.	Date.
	1254	R	24-9-93				

FURTHER PAPERS.

G.O.	No.	Department.	Date.

Letter from the Government of India, P. R. D.,
No 513 R. G., dated 20th May 1893.

In continuation of the telegram;
From the Government of India to the Government
of Madras, N^o 512 R.L., dated 20th May 1893.
"Your telegram numbered and dated as
follows, A 7, 15th instant, East Coast Railway
will fall within Circle of Government Inspector,
Madras for inspection purposes.
Please arrange accordingly for inspection
of Kistna bridge and Rajahmundry section.
Letter follows."

connection with which the Bezuada Gadavari section of the East Coast Railway is worked, is under the Government Inspector of Railways, Madras, it will be convenient at all events for the present, for the East Coast line to be in his circle for ordinary inspection purposes.

2. For the purpose of enquiring into accidents on this railway, the case is different. For the investigation of accidents it will be more convenient that the line should be under the Government Inspector of Railways, Bombay, the Government of Bombay will be informed accordingly.

Code
Class.

INDIAN TELEGRAPHS.

Monthly
Number.

06625

To
(Office)

Madras.

From
(Office)

Harwar.

Words.

Day.

Hour.

Minute.

Official
Instructions.

64

15.

20.

15

To
(Person)

The Consulting
engineer for railways.

From
(Person)

agent S.
Mr. By By

3/4. while engine of.
16/35. o'clock. up. special
goods. was. passing the.
crossing at Kistna bridge
siding yesterday. one of
the n. g. s. r. wagons
apparently pushed by ~~coolies~~
coolies came in contact
with the engine tender third
class. broke thrown off and
line blocked. under guard
Janikupathy died of injuries
received.

64 Word Form.

Recd. from

LN.

Sent to

At

Hrs.

Mts. by

At

Hrs.

Mts. by

MADRAS 15-7-93

DRAFT TELEGRAM ~~URGENT~~
DEFERRED

T.

Sharwar

FR

To

Agent S. M. Ry

Fruecht

ER

Telegram des p^{re} au 19-7-93.

12. 25. 21

11/11/72

Received of
 J. H. H. H. H.
 the sum of
 \$100.00
 for the
 purchase of
 land in
 the town of
 H. H. H. H.
 and the
 interest on
 the same
 at the rate
 of 6 per
 cent per
 annum
 from the
 1st day of
 January
 1880 to the
 1st day of
 January
 1881.

50-741 ЗАЯС

Code Class.

To

Words.

Day.

Hour.

Minute.

Official Instructions.

From

From

To

(Person)

Consulting Engineer for Railways Madras

(Person)

Agent S. M.

326 Your telegram C 14 the accident occurred within the limits of the East Coast Railway.

32 Word Form.

Recd. from

LN.

Sent to

LN.

At

Mss.

Mts. by

At

Hrs.

Mts. by

Telegraph Master.

S. P. Co. - No. 363 F - 6-3 93 - 40,00,000.

QOTACAMUND 21-7-93

Inf despatch with 2 Encls.
21/7/93.

NOTE.

by the foot. No. 111111
Bamberg under
orders contained
in letter from foot
India 513 R.E. of
20 May. 93 copy
attached -

18

date

Station

From
No. 32 21-7-93 11

Copy to Manager

E. C. R. for

information

RAILWAY BRANCH.

PUBLIC WORKS SECRETARIAT,

Inf despatch with 2 Encls.

2 Encls.

21/7/93.

Judicial Department.



PROCEEDINGS OF THE MADRAS GOVERNMENT.

READ the following paper:—

From the Engineer-in-Chief,
East Coast Railway, dt 29th July 1893, No 5571.
250

In continuation of my telegram No 200
of the 17th July 1893, I have the honour to submit
hereunder, for your information, a copy of detailed
report dated 20th idem received from the Executive
Engineer No 1 Division East Coast Railway on the
accident of the 14th idem in which a native guard
of the S. M. Railway fastest train was struck
and knocked down by a broad gauge vehicle running
over his thigh, resulting in his death the next day
&c. A copy of Police report on the accident will
follow.

Enclosures.

Copy of letter No 1810 dated Korum the 20th
July 1893, from the Executive Engineer, No 1 Division,
East Coast Railway, to the Engineer-in-Chief,
East Coast Railway, Waltair.

Collision between B. G. truck and
M. G. Brake van at Sitamagram.

In,

In continuation of my telegram dated 15th July 1893, I have the honour to report that an accident occurred at Sitanagram on ^{the} evening of the 14th July 1893, owing to a loaded broad gauge coal wagon colliding with the tail of a Southern Maharatta coal train as it was approaching the Western Canal Bridge from the Coal Sidings. The guard of the metre gauge train was standing on the foot board of his brake, when the accident occurred and was thrown under the wheel of the B.G. truck, receiving injuries from which he died the next day. I enclose a copy of the Assistant Engineer's report from which it will be seen that the coolies in the face of repeated orders deliberately uncoupled and shunted a truck where it was known a train was working and so caused the accident. The S.W. Train had been shunting near the spot for three hours before the collision, so the men must have known there was some danger in moving a wagon near the bridge. To prevent similar accidents in future a stack of sleepers has been tied to the rails at a safe distance from the crossing and the S.W. Railway authorities have been asked to stop night shunting at Sitanagram.

Copy

Copy of letter No Nil dated Sitanagram the 18th July 1893, from the Assistant Engineer, Bezwada Sub-Division, East Coast Railway, to the Executive Engineer, No 1 Division, East Coast Railway.

With reference to the accident on the 14th July, I have the honour to inform you that the Contractor's Agent appears to have been absent on the evening of the accident which is stated to have taken place between 6 and 7 P.M. I myself had seen the trucks well clear of the crossing, that evening when going to meet the Vizam's Railway party at Bezwada so that the trucks must have been deliberately started off by the coolies in their anxiety to get the trucks close to the Bridge to save lead.

I would point out to you that if the contractor permitted the coolies to do what they liked with trucks during the night without supervision he has gravely neglected his duty.

I would also point out that I visit the place every evening and on the previous day. I had personally made every cooly get out of the trucks and hand shunt them back to a place of safety.

The contractor's Agent was present and I impressed on him that under no circumstances should the trucks go beyond the place I pointed out.

The accident appears to have been thus caused. Just as the brake van of the Southern Maharashtra Railway coal train was leaving the crossing on its way to Tadapalli the coolies in the coal truck started a truck off (which they had previously uncoupled) towards the Bridge. I do not think the accident could have been otherwise caused as there is a slight grade up to the Bridge and there was no wind, as the officers of the Nizam's Railway who were with me at the top of the Krishna Bridge at the time can testify.

The depositions of witnesses to the Police also show that the contractors coolies were working at the time. The coolies did not turn up to work for the next two days. The truck fouled the brake van of the foot board of which the guard was standing and derailed it badly injuring the native guard who has since died.

The S. M. Railway desire to hold an inquiry on or about the 22nd and I will under instructions from you, represent the East Coast Railway.

The Nizam's Railway should be informed in case one of them is to be present.

Order, 12th August 1873, No 1624.

Communicated to the Public Works Department (Railway Branch).

2. The District Magistrate of Godavari will be requested to submit a detailed report on the accident referred to for the information of Government.

(True Extract)

Imseemeth

Under Secretary P. W. D.

for Chief Secretary.

2/

To The Public Works Department. (Railway Branch).
" District Magistrate, Godavari.

2. 1. 8.

Gobt. of { 18 } Madras.

To

The Public Works Department
(Railway Branch)

Recd: 19. 8. 93

Proceedings, dated 12th August 1893,
No. 1624.

Subject.

Communicating to the P. W. D.
(Railway Branch) letter from the
Engineer in Chief East Coast Railway
submitting copy of a report on the
Railway accident near Western Canal
Bridges, Sitamangalam, Godavari
Dist^y and requesting the Dist^y Magistrate
of Godavari to submit a detailed
report on the accident referred to
for the information of Government.

Judicial Department.



PROCEEDINGS OF THE MADRAS GOVERNMENT.

Read the following paper:—

From the Manager and Engineer-in-Chief
East Coast Railway, dated 4th August
1893, No. 5711.

In continuation of this office
No. 5571 dated 29th July 1893, I have the
honour to forward therewith for your
information copies of the documents noted
below in connection with the late accident
at the Western Canal Bridge at Sitamangalam
resulting in the death of native guard
of the Southern Mahratta Railway.

1. Executive Engineer No. 1 Division No.
1841 dated 24th July 1893 with enclosures.

2. Manager and Engineer-in-Chief's
Nos. 5512 to 5514 dated 28th July
1893 to the addresses of Agent and
Manager, Nizam's Guaranteed State
Railway, Agent, Southern Mahratta
Railway & Executive Engineer No. 1 Division
East Coast Railway—

Order

Order 19th August 1893, Rte. 927
Communicated to the Public Works
Department (Railway Branch).
(True & Correct)

W. H. P. H.
Under Secretary
for Clipping

To
The Public Works Dept.
(Railway Branch)
with end^{rs} in orig. Ltr.
etc.

2.8

Accident at Sitanaagram on 14th July.
Evidence.

W. Day Chief Guard, S. M. Ry. has been
guard for 17 years was working at 16-30 special had
to make two trips Sadapally to Sitanaagram. Made
first trip and returned at 6. P. M. for 2nd trip with
36 empties, one load and two brakes. Shunting master
arrived at Sitanaagram put heavy brake into 2nd
line, drew a head and put train in, and finished
shunting. Started from the lower line. Engine was
working in front of train tender first with a
brakevan next to engine. Witness was in rear brake
with 10 loaded vehicles between Engine cleared the
crossing but the brakevan behind was run into at the
crossing. Before the accident saw three empty wagons
about the length of two wagons clear of the crossing.
Four other loaded wagons were several wagon lengths
from the empties. After the accident the four wagons
were next to the empty wagons. Cannot swear that the
coolies were working at the time of accident. Walked
along the train towards engine and gave driver orders
to start having received signal from both points
with flags.

Insistent driver of Special.

After

After shunting was over, guard came up to engine and gave signal to start. Saw 2nd guard on foot board of 3rd class brakevan, started and went over crossing and saw line was clear. After passing the crossing, felt a jerk, shut off steam, looked back and saw a wagon had run into 3rd class carriage. Was running tender foremost and stopped with part of his engine, opposite gate lodge and part a little forward. Chain broke and engine uncoupled. Saw coolies when facing us for 2nd trip but did not observe them afterwards. Had a tail light on his engine.

Said Ismaul. Fireman had finished shunting started off and heard a bump, some of his tools fell down from tender, did not see the truck till after the collision, when the wagon was behind the engine; did not see wagons moving.

Kristuaji Rao. Shunting zemadar S. M. R. about the time of starting train 6.45 P.M. went to points near bridge and saw line was clear. Told guard, Day line was clear and gave him truck way bill. Guard told engine driver to go ahead. Train started after it had gone a little distance he heard a shock. Loaded wagons ran back engine ran on with wagon behind it. Wagon stopped with one pair of wheels over sleepers on bridge. Was on the points

man's side of line and got signal from gate keeper and pointsman. Walked alongside engine. The coolies were there while shunting was going on. After the accident saw no coolies. (Drew) received proper signal to start his train saw no coolies near empty wagons, while walking along line from engine towards the points.

Ramasawmy C. B. R. pointsman in charge of points on M. G. Coal siding. Train shunted for about half an hour, shunting zemadar gave signal all right. Engine and some of the trucks passed his points when one of the carriages fell down, could see nothing as the train was in front of him. Saw a few coolies standing about near empty wagons and saw other coolies working at loaded wagons at the time the train started but cannot identify them.

Said Makhtum C. B. R. gateman was employed in clearing the bridge of men, gave signal all was right, train went ahead. Engine got in front of him and he heard a shock. Saw contractors coolies working at unloading coal from loaded trucks while shunting was going on. Could not see any coolies near empty trucks.

Finding

We find that N. G. S. Ry. truck #701 was hand shunted by some persons unknown and collided with brake van leaving vehicle of S. M. Ry. special coal train as the latter was crossing the point causing the derailment of the brake referred to and injury to the guard from which he has since died.

We are of opinion that the shunting staff, consisting of a shunting Jemadar and two pointsmen failed to observe necessary caution in not satisfying themselves that there was no shunting going on on the broad gauge line before giving the signal to proceed. The Committee do not consider the Engine staff to blame as they acted under signals given by shunting staff.

The committee are satisfied that had the deceased guard paid proper attention to his work he would have seen the wagon moving and could have prevented the accident.

The committee suggest that as a precaution a moveable Scotch block be provided on the Main line in front of the bridge and that a yard foreman is necessary (to be paid by the Ry. uninterested) who will superintend handshunting and

and be responsible for the safe conduct of working
in the yard. The committee make this suggestion
as they consider handshunting in the yard indis-
pensable for the expeditious unloading of coal.

1/4 of J. Caglesome, asstg Engr. E. C. Ry.
Sd. G. H. Lindsley 1st asstg Loco. Supt. S. H. Ry.
Sd. W. Gaye. Traffic Manager, N. Y. S. Ry.
Sd. H. C. Houghton. asstg Engr. S. H. Ry.
Sd. G. P. George. asstg Loco. Supt. N. Y. S. Ry.

(True Copy)

Cert. No 60 dated Sitabganj 21st July 93.

Copy of letter No 478 dated 23rd July 1893,
from the Assistant Engineer, Kishna Bridge
Bezunda Sub-Division to the Executive Engineer
No 1 Division, E. C. Ry. Korum.

In forwarding report of the Committee of
enquiry on the accident at the Western Canal
Bridge I have the honor to report that the recommend-
ation of the Committee have been carried out and
a buffer stop provided though as it is on an up grade
and on a working line, I think a concession to the
negligence of the men employed. I would also point
out that the least the Railway concerned could do is
to see the last truck in each train made secure with a
sprag or chain or else provide that train with a brak-
man which precaution they must be bound to take on
any siding in their own lines. I have issued these
instructions to the Station Masters of the South
Mahratta and Vizian's Railway lines. The
Traffic Manager of the Southern Mahratta Ry.
has promised to send a responsible man to
look after the work in the yard. This as hand-
shunting is permitted is most necessary.

Copy of letter No 1841 dated Kowat, 24th July,
1893, from the Executive Engineer, No 1 Division
C. & P. R.; to the Engineer-in-Chief, East Coast R. N. S. S. R.

I have the honor to forward the Report
of the inquiry held on the 21st current at Seethanagram
by the officers of the three Railways concerned as to the
causes which resulted in an accident to the Southern
Mahratta Railway ballast train in which a guard
of that Railway was killed. The officers think
that a certain amount of hand shunting should
be permitted and a foreman to supervise this will
be appointed, but I consider the Vizian's Gua =
Kauked State Railway and Southern Mahratta
Railways should bear the whole cost of his services
as they alone are interested in the traffic there.

Copy of letter Nos 5512 to 5514 of 28th July 93,
from the Engineer-in-Chief, C.E. Ry. Warren, to the
Agent and Manager, Nizam's Guaranteed S. Ry. to the Agent
Southern Mahratta Ry. and to the Executive Engineer
No 1 Division, East Coast Ry.

With reference to the recommendation of the
Committee sat at Sitapuram on 21st July 1893 to
enquire into the causes of an accident whereby a
Guard of the Southern Mahratta Railway was
killed, I agree with the recommendation made at
the enquiry that a shunting foreman should be
provided in the yard at the joint cost of the
Nizam's Guaranteed State Railway, the Southern
Mahratta Railway and the East Coast Ry.
Although the coal traffic solely concerns the two
former railways and it is only as a matter
of courtesy that they are permitted to tranship
within the Sitapuram construction yard,
yet a certain amount of shunting work occa-
sionally goes on for the East Coast Railway,
and I am prepared to accept one third
of the cost of the supervision. The man must be
appointed by the Executive Engineer, No 1 Div.
East Coast Ry. and he will be under the orders
of the Assistant Engineer, Sitapuram and one
third of his salary will be debited monthly to the
Nizam's Guaranteed State Ry. and Southern
Mahratta Railway respectively.

[1] W. CUNNINGHAM No. 7411

Gobt. of { 18 } Madras.

To

The Public Works Dept

Encls: 5

Recd: 28-8-93

Proceedings, dated 19 August 1893
R No. 927.

Subject.

Communicating copy of
letter from the Manager
& Engineer-in-Chief East
Coast Railway, forwarding
copies of certain documents
in connection with the
late accident at the
Western Canal Bridge
at Litana gram.

B. No. 1257 R 27 Sept 93.

Recorded

M R

26
9

To the Judicial Dept
with enclos. returned
info dated 27/9/93

Office of the Superintendent of Police,
Krishna District
Camp Duggirala
13th September 1893.

No 835 of 1893.

From

H. G. Prendergast Esquire
Superintendent of Police
Krishna District.

To

The District Magistrate
Krishna

Sir

Enclosures 3.

I have the honor to report that
I received a telegram on the evening of the 14th
July last from the Southern Maharashtra Rail-
way Station Master Krishna Bridge siding,
to the effect that an empty wagon of the
East Coast Railway came in contact with
the side end of the Southern Maharashtra
Special train's Engine tender and the latter's
3rd Class brake van was thrown off the line,
damaged, as the special train was passing
over the crossing near the Western Canal
Bridge and going towards Tadepalli Station
at 18.50, that day, and that Under-Guard
Janakipathy was severely injured.

2 As the Muharram was just beginning
and my presence at Masulipatam was absolu-
tely necessary, owing to the strained relation
relations between the Hindu and Mahom-
madan communities, and there was no Assis-
tant Superintendent in the District at
the time, I deputed Ag 1st Class Inspect

Mr. J. P. Norton to investigate. His report was not clear. He had not had any experience in such cases and many complicated questions remained unanswered.

3. I therefore reinvestigated the case as soon as I could, which was on the 1st 5th and 6th August, but even then I was unable to arrive at a conclusion for want of further information. Some of this I have since obtained, but the rest I have failed to get. ^{I cannot wait any longer & must leave it to you to obtain that information; what it is will appear from the sequel.}

4. During the construction of Krishna Bridge a narrow gauge line was laid down by the C. C. R. from Tadepalli Station of the S. M. R. to the Krishna Bridge works for the carriage of materials for the Krishna Bridge. On the opening of the bridge, the C. C. R. laid ~~down~~ down a broad gauge line from the Berwada Station of A. G. S. R. to a point marked A in the accompanying plan and a broad gauge line was also laid down on the Western Canal Bridge and towards A, as far as B, but these two lines were not at first linked. The point A being at the dead end of the broad gauge line a block was placed a few feet short of it.

5. It would appear that both the narrow and broad gauge are under the control of the C. C. R. But since the opening of the Krishna Bridge the A. G. S. R. has have been permitted to run coal and timber trains to the point A, and

the S. M. R. has been permitted to run to the point C and to tranship into its trains a part of this cargo at the siding between A and C and to carry it away to Tadepalli. The rest of the cargo was transhipped into boats in the Buckingham Canal, spanned by the Western Canal Bridge. The A. G. S. R. has no shunting to do at this station. It first takes away the empty wagons to Berwada and brings a full train which it leaves on the line. The line inclines up towards the Western Canal Bridge and therefore its wagons were not likely to foul the narrow gauge line unless the wagons were hand shunted over the crossing. I presume this was their reason for not locking the last wagon at the upper end of the incline, or leaving any one to superintend the unloading and transhipping which were carried out by a contractor's mastery of Coolies. The contractor is paid by the ton and he pays his coolies in the same way. The coolies therefore work as long as they ~~work~~ can and reduce the distance as much as possible between the wagons and the boats. The shortest possible lead between the boats and that to which the wagons were capable of being taken after the ^{broad} gauge lines were linked up and the block removed

Vide para 11

was ~~from~~ from the part of the combined line beyond the nose of the Switch. The line was linked up on the 24th or 25th June and the block removed at the same time, to allow of the Western Canal Bridge being tested. It then became necessary to take precautions against the contractor's Coolies running broad gauge wagons up to or beyond the crossing and thus fouling the narrow gauge line; I am of opinion that some person other than the contractor should have been placed at this transhipping siding to prevent the coolies from shunting the broad gauge wagons beyond the point ^{or} if it was undesirable to replace the block after the linking up. Who is responsible for neglecting this precaution I cannot say. The N. G. S. R. says these special trains are taken charge of by a Jamadar of the E. C. R. from the time they leave its Berwada Station. Mr. Eagleson, Asst Engineer E. C. R. maintains that this man does not take charge of the train, but merely rides on it to protect the Bridge work men. In reply to my questions, "What is the authority for the use of the Canal Bridge siding for loading and unloading there Coal and timber" and "What are the arrangements under which this is done," Mr. Eagleson writes as follows.

6. The siding in question is used as a ballast siding and it is therefore within the authority of the Manager of the Railway to use steam power on it.

5
No special sanction is required for using it for other than passenger trains.

(2) The coal trains belong to the Vizagam Railway entirely. The trucks and Engine, as also the Contractor's and Engine Staff all belong to the same Railway. The Vizagam Railway and S. M. Ry. are allowed the use of this siding as a matter of courtesy and all arrangements and expenditure on these trains must naturally be borne by them.

(3) A Jamadar is appointed by the East Coast Railway to signal trains over the Bridge, but this is in the interest of the East Coast Railway workmen who are constantly at work on the bridge.

7
It would appear therefore that practically a goods station and goods lines have been opened without authority and as matter of courtesy. It seems to me possible that the Jamadar signalling the trains over the Bridge should ^{+ 180, 181 and 182.} be considered a "Pilot Guard" (Railway Rules) and therefore in charge of the train. If so, one of his duties would be to see that the wagon nearest the crossing was secured against its fouling the narrow gauge line, and his other duties would be those detailed in ^{+ also 67.} Railway Rules 59, 60, and 63 (Extract appended for ready reference). If these were not the Jamadar's duties, then

was line link rem Can any Cool boys gave the pla the wa ran to I sp f le s. to b. w. i. to a. C.

they were certainly those of the Guard of N. G. S. Ry

8. Mr. Eagleson, writing to the Executive Engineer, No 1 Division E. C. R. on the 18th July says, "I would point out to you that if the contractor permitted the coolies to do what they liked with the trucks during the night without supervision he has gravely neglected his duty." There can be no doubt as to that, but at the same time some one else also neglected his duty in permitting the contractor to neglect his. The supervision should have been such that the contractor ~~not~~ ^{supervision} should have been able to permit his coolies to take such liberties with the line. However, even that would not have rendered the accident possible, if the precautions ^{presented} in Rule 59 had been taken. That there should be any doubt as to who was the person responsible under Rule 59 points to some neglect in all three Railway Administrations. To my lay mind it seems obvious that there should have been some person in charge of the operations at the siding who, not being the servant of any one of the Administrations, would guard the interests of all. This seems to be the opinion at which the Railways have arrived since. Mr. Eagleson informs me that a yard foreman has been appointed paid by the three Companies concerned.

9. That there was neglect on the part of the Contractor there can be no doubt. He left everything to his agent. Mr. Eagleson informs me that on the day before the accident he noticed that trucks that were being unloaded into boats were very close to the crossing and made the coolies hand shunt them back to A. He impressed on the Contractor's Agent that under no circumstances should the trucks go beyond the place pointed out. I found circumstantial evidence in coal droppings that trucks were unloaded up to the nose of the crossing. In order to make room for trucks yet to be unloaded, the empties would be pushed past the nose of the switch and even on to the Canal Bridge. On the evening of the accident Mr. Eagleson passed by the crossing on his way to Borwada about 5 P.M. At that time the trucks were well clear of the crossing and coupled. Coolies were still at work. Every cooly has been examined, but they all declare that not one of them was present when the accident occurred. This is necessarily false. The truck that collided with the train could not have been blown up an incline of 1 in 300 on such a calm evening, and no one but the coolies had an interest in pushing the trucks in that direction. This circumstantial evidence is corroborated by the oral evidence summarised in the next para.

10. Summary of Evidence.

W. Day. Chief guard S. M. Ry has been guard for 17 years.

Was working at 11.30, special had to make trip to Adipally to Sitana garum. Made first trip and returned at 6 P.M. for 2nd trip with 36 empties one load and two brakes. Shunting Master arrived at Sitana garum put heavy brake into 2nd line drew ahead and put train in and finished shunting. Started from the lower line. Engine was working in front of train tender first with a brake van next to engine. Witness was in rear ~~brake~~ with 10 loaded vehicles. Between engine cleared the crossing, but the brake van behind was run into at the crossing. Before the accident, saw three empty wagons about the length of two wagons clear of the crossing. Four other loaded wagons were several wagon lengths from the empties. After the accident, the four wagons were next to the empty wagons. Cannot swear that the coolies were working at the time of accident. Walked along the train towards engine and gave driver orders to start having received signal from both points with flags.

Ismail driver of special

After shunting was over, guard came up to engine and gave signal to start. Saw 2nd guard on foot board of 3rd class brake van. Started and went over crossing and saw line was clear. After passing the crossing felt a jerk. Shut off steam, looked back and saw a

wagon had run into 3rd class carriage. Was running tender foremost and stopped with part of his engine opposite gate lodge and part a little forward. Chain broke and engine uncoupled. Saw coolies when going in for 2nd trip, but did not observe them afterwards. Had a tail light on his engine.

Said Ismail, Fireman had finished shunting, started off, and heard a bump. One of his tools fell down from tender. Did not see the truck till after the collision when the wagon was behind the engine; did not see wagons moving.

Kristnaji Row, Shunting Master S. M. Ry. About the time of starting train 6.45 P.M. went to points near bridge and saw line was clear. Told guard Day line was clear and gave him truck way bill. Guard told engine driver to go ahead. Train started after it had gone a little distance, he heard a shock. Loaded wagons ran back. Engine ran on with wagon behind it. Wagon stopped with one pair of wheels three sleepers on bridge. Was on the points man's side of line and got signal from gate keeper and points man. Walked along side engine. The coolies were there while shunting was going on. After the accident saw no coolies. Driver received proper signal to start

his train. Saw no coolies near empty wagons which were below point A. While walking along line from engine towards the points. Engine passed him near point A and obscured the B. G. wagons.

10
Ramaswami, C. C. Ry. points man in charge of points on M. G. coal siding. Train shunted for about half an hour, shunting Jamadar gave signal all right. Engine and some of the trucks passed his points when one of the carriages fell down, could see nothing as the train was in front of him. Saw a few coolies standing about near empty wagons and saw other coolies working at loaded wagons at the time of the train started but cannot identify them.

Said Markham, C. C. Ry. gateman was employed in clearing the bridge of men; gave signal all was right train went ahead. Engine got in front of him and he heard a shock. Saw contractor's coolies working at unloading coal from loaded trucks while shunting was going on. Could not see any coolies near empty trucks.

11. It will be remembered that Mr. Eagle soon saw the trucks well clear of the crossing about 5 P. M. As he had only the day before that marked the point beyond which trucks were not to be taken, it may be assumed that they were not far from that point. The shunting master, Rastnaji Rao wishes to make out that they had not moved from that position. If his evidence be accepted it will follow that the trucks moved from about the point A to the crossing and reached it before the tender was clear of the crossing while the train was going from the point opposite to that at which the stationary trucks were

11
obscured to his view to the crossing. This was manifestly impossible, as the train was moving at the rate of ^{3 miles} an hour and it would have been equally impossible if the train was moving at not more than 3 miles an hour. The trucks could not have been hand shunted at more than $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles an hour up the incline of 1 in 300. It follows then that the truck which collided was much nearer to the crossing at the time the train was started under the order of the shunting Master. He says he saw no coolies near the empty wagons and said Markham corroborates him on this point. Ramaswami's evidence that a few coolies were standing about near the empties does not necessarily impugn the correctness of these statements, as opinions may differ as to what was near. It may be taken for granted therefore that there were no coolies pushing the empties themselves or so near that they could have pushed the empties on to the crossing after the train started. From the chief Guard's evidence as to the position of the loaded trucks immediately after the occurrence, it is plain that they had been hand shunted on to the empties. Mr. Eagle and Mr. Norton found one empty which was the one that collided, uncoupled, the other two coupled together but not to the loaded wagons and four loaded wagons detached from the train coupled to each other. It must have taken a considerable time to handshunt these four loaded wagons, detached

from the train beyond point A, on to the empties; certainly a very much longer time than the train took in going from below the lower crossing to the upper. This operation must therefore have been observable by the shunting Master. This being the last train of the day, no doubt the coolies were preparing to make their own arrangements to diminish their labour. It is evident from the statement of the Chief Guard that the coolies had moved three empties to within a short time distance of the nearest lead (vide my para 5). From the way in which these wagons were found coupled, it is evident that, first, one was moved up, and then two. This must have been after 5 P.M. As only one wagon was moved first, it seems probable that the other two were not quite unloaded at the time that was moved. That would bring the moving of other two nearer 6 P.M. It must have been intended to move these empties on to the Canal Bridge when the train had passed and thus make room for the loaded ones. When the loaded wagons were moved, the coolies could not have expected to get them to the empties before the train had passed. They evidently miscalculated the time, or the train was longer in starting than they expected it to be. Unfortunately they must have run the loaded wagons on to the empties just as the Engine got to the crossing. The coupled empties would not be jerked far, but the uncoupled one at the end would be short on a wagon's length or even two.

I am inclined to think that the Chief Guard misjudged the distance at which the empties were from the crossing and that the actual distance was only one wagon's length or even less. Had the distance been greater, the truck would have been practically stationary by the time it came in collision with the train and I doubt whether under those circumstances it would not itself have been derailed, instead of ripping off the foot board of the brake van and derailing it. The under Guard Janakipuz was standing on the foot board of the derailed brake van and was thrown under the wheel of the B.C. truck. The evidence as to whether the wheel passed over his leg or merely on to it and back is conflicting. The recollection of the witnesses who went at once to his assistance as to his position in relation to the wheel is confused. If the wheel passed over his leg, I think it would be proof that the truck was not two lengths from the crossing when it was jerked forward.

12. The Chief Guard was in the rear brake van keeping a lookout on the outside of the curve and he would naturally not observe the imminence of the danger after the train started, but he admits that he saw three empty wagons within two wagons length of the crossing and that coolies were working at the loaded wagons.

1 The least that he should have done under the
circumstances was, to see that the brakes of the
2 empties were down. Vide rule 60. This he failed to
do. This was equally the duty of the shunting
3 Master and he also failed to do his duty. The
4 duties of a shunting Master, so called, are not
laid down but Rules 59, 60, 61 and 67 clearly
5 apply to him. Under rule 96, the driver and
6 fireman were responsible to a certain extent,
7 but they also appear to have been careless.

13. Thus the neglect of the three Railway
8 Administrations to appoint a yard fore-
man to supervise the unloading and loading
9 and the carelessness and neglect of duty on
the part of the S. M. R. Shunting Master, Chief
10 Guard, Driver and Fireman rendered
the accident possible; but it might still
11 have been prevented had the Under Guard
12 Janatapathy taken the least notice of what
the coolies were doing. Nothing but gross care-
13 lessness on his part could have prevented
14 his seeing the imminence of the danger in
time to signal it. He as well as the rest
15 took it for granted that the coolies would
16 take care.

14. Janatapathy was at his own request
17 conveyed by the next mail train to Nara-
saraspeta, where his brother is employed
18 as Civil Apothecary. He was dead by the
19 time the train reached Narasarpeta. An
inquest was held and a verdict of acci-
20 dental death brought in. The person chiefly
21 responsible for the accident was, I think with
the committee of the Railway Engineers,
(an extract from whose decision I enclose)
the deceased Under Guard. But as I have

stated above the three Administrations and
the train staff, including the shunting
Master are also responsible. I don't how-
ever, consider that it is necessary to proceed
criminally against any of them.

15. The station Master who sent me the
first telegraphic report was merely the
nearest station Master. He was in no way
responsible. His only duty in connection with
these operations is to send in every day at
5 P. M. a truck report giving the number
of loaded wagons and empties on the siding.
He is in charge of the telegraph Office
beyond the Canal Bridge and looks to
the locking of the points at the crossing
where the C. C. R. narrow gauge line joins
the main line of the S. M. R.

16. The Executive Engineer No. 1 Division
C. C. R. informs me through the Asst.
Engineer that the rules relating to ballast
trains apply to the working of coal trains
at Sitana garam but he does not quote his
authority. Neither have the Station Masters
of Tadipalli and Berwada been able to
show me any authority for running trains
to this siding and leaving them there to
be dealt as it pleased the contractor.

17. The deceased had no one dependent
on him. His brother the Civil Apothecary
at Narasarpeta presented a petition
to the Inspector who began the Police in-
vestigation in this case, in which he stated

that the fact that Mr. Eagleson replaced after the accident the block that was removed when the Bridge was tested showed that the E. C. Ry. was responsible for the accident.

Mr. Eagleson explains that the block was only necessary when there was a dead end and not after the line was linked up, as the rules provided for the protection of the line from fouling. As however no one had been appointed to see to the observance of rules, he, in the interests of humanity and not because it was his special duty, took this method of ensuring the non-recurrence of such accidents pending the appointment of a yard foreman.

18. Mr. Eagleson's theory that a single empty wagon was run along side of the train and into it is untenable in the face of the Chief Guard's oral evidence as to the position of the seven wagons nearest the crossing immediately after the collision. Had a single empty wagon been run quickly up, it would undoubtedly have suggested danger to every one; but the slowly moved loaded train of four wagons would not be so suggestive of danger, and it was quite possible that the deceased Guard expected that the coolies would stop before they collided with the empties, or that, being ignorant that the empties were not all coupled together with their brakes down, he did not fear the empties being jerked on to the crossing even if the loaded wagons were chunted right on to them. This blind trust in the chances in his favour may well be

characterised as gross carelessness. Mr. Eagleson's theory would suggest that he had the foolishness to race the empty wagon for a considerable distance. The decision of the Engineer seems to favour Mr. Eagleson's theory, but I am not certain of this. This, however of no importance, as, for quite other reasons, I come to the same conclusion, i.e. that the deceased's rashness was the last straw that broke the camel's back.

I have the honor to be
Sir

Yours most obedient servant

(Signed) H. G. Prendergast

District Superintendent of Police

Copies forwarded to the Inspector General of Police, Madras through the Dy Inspector General of Police, A. R. and to the Asst. Engineer No 1 Division, E. C. R. Bezawada.

(Enc. 1)

J. M. A. [Signature]

20/11/1901

cc. District Superintendent

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
Extract from the Decision of Railway
Engineers

The committee are satisfied that
had the deceased (Native) guard paid
proper attention to his duty he would
have seen the wagon moving and
could have prevented the accident."

(Signed) H. G. Prendergast
District Superintendent of Police

(Witness)
J. M. O'Brien
J. M. O'Brien

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Extract from the general Rules for working
Railways under construction
1891.

Protection of lines
obstructed.

59. Before the commencement of any loading or other operation by which any line of rails may be fouled or obstructed, the person in charge of such operation must see that all necessary steps are taken for the protection of the line during such obstruction.

Persons responsible
for shunting

60. Drivers and guards or other persons in charge of such operations must see that the shunting of trains is performed only at such times and in such manner as will not incur danger.

Shunting on
inclines

61. When vehicles are shunted at places situated on steep gradients, proper precautions must be taken to prevent any vehicle from running down the incline; as sufficient number of brakes must be put on, and sprags or hand scotches used, when necessary, to prevent the possibility of any vehicle running away. At such places a supply of scotches must be kept for the purpose.

Trains stopping
between stations.

63. Trains, the working of which requires that they must stop outside station limits, when not working on a blocked section (either as contemplated under absolute block rules, or temporarily, under orders from the authorized officer, or by means of a

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written and signed understanding between Station Masters and Guards), and trains or parts of trains which have broken down or become detached between stations must be secured and protected by the Guard, hand signals or detonators being placed half a mile on both ^{sides} or in the direction from which a ~~train~~ train can arrive.

87. The person placing vehicles on any line, or securing wagons siding, either within or without the station limits, in sidings or moving vehicles which may have been placed there shall be responsible for leaving them properly secured. No vehicle shall be left in any siding outside station limits without the wheels being secured, clear of all running lines.

96. Every Guard, Driver and Fireman, when travelling, must keep a good look-out, and should they see any reason to apprehend danger, they must use their best endeavours to attract the attention of each other and give notice of the apprehended danger.

Regulations for working single lines of railway on the system termed "Pilot Guard" in Rule 3. Section 11.

This system is only to be held as applicable to short Branch lines.

180. The Pilot Guard will be distinguished by a red dress or badge and no train or engine shall, under any circumstances, be allowed to start trains

Pilot Guard, when practicable to accompany every train except on.

be allowed to run on the line unless it is either accompanied or personally started by the Pilot Guard wearing such dress or badge.

181. The Pilot Guard will, when practicable, accompany every train, but when it is necessary to start two or more trains from one end of the portion of line under his control before a train has to be started from the other end, the Pilot Guard must furnish the Guard in charge of each train not accompanied by himself with a printed Pilot Guard's ticket, where such are provided, properly filled up and signed and personally start such train, and must himself accompany the last train. The ticket will apply only to the single journey to the station named on it, when it must be immediately given up to the person in charge of the station and all tickets so given up must be immediately cancelled.

Driver to see Pilot Guard. 182. The Driver must not start his train without seeing the Pilot Guard. But if the Pilot Guard does not accompany the train, the Driver must not start until he has received from the Guard of his train the Pilot Guard's ticket authorizing him to proceed.

A Driver working an engine, unaccompanied by a Guard, must observe

the
down

Nose of Crossing

Nose of switch

Western Canal Bridge

Boats

Nose of switch

Scale - 50 feet = one inch

16-9-93

(S. C. J.)

(S. C. J.)

EAGLESON

ASSISTANT ENGINEER

N. I. DIVISION

E. C. RY

16-9-93, 110 Am. Engineering Office

Dis No 756. Krishna District Magistrate's Office
Camp Raywada. 21-9-1893

From J. N. Atkinson Esq.
District Magistrate, Krishna.

The Chief Secretary to Government
Judicial Department
Madras.

Sir,
In reference to G. O. no 1624
12.8.93, calling for a
a detailed report on the accident that occurred
at Sithanagarani on 14th July, I have the honor to
forward herewith copy of a report which I have
received from the Superintendent of Police. The report
is full & clear, & needs no amplification.

2. I have no doubt that the conclusion arrived at
by the Superintendent of Police, as to the manner in which
the accident was caused, is the right one. Primarily the
blame rests on the coolies who shunted the Broad Gauge
wagon on to the narrow gauge train, & secondarily
on those who failed to take necessary precautions
to guard against the occurrence. It is certain
however that it would be impossible to attach
criminal responsibility to any one, more especially
since, as it seems to me, the deceased must have
been more careless than any one else. He must
have seen the B. G. wagon running into his brake van,
& nothing surely would have been easier than to jump
out of danger's way.

3 One obvious moral to be deduced from this
unfortunate occurrence is that the sooner the present

olour arrangements at Sithanagarum, are altered the better. Sithanagarum is now practically a railway station with few if any of the paraphernalia of a station.

4. The assistant Engineer Byawada Sub division in the 2^d para of his letter dated 18.7.1893, communicated in the G.O. under reference speaks of the contractor neglecting his duty in permitting the coolies to do what they liked with the trucks during the night. A contractor's duty is to take care of his own interests. His obligation under his contract is another thing. If his action or neglect mentioned by the asst. Engr. constitutes a breach of contract, he can be held responsible, but I do not suppose the contract bond contains any reference to the shunting of trucks at night. The fault lies with the Railway administration which has given the contractor the opportunity for doing "what he likes with trucks during the night."

5. I like the opportunity therefore of once more urging that no delay be allowed to occur in carrying out the determination of Government to have the transshipping station at Byawada.

6. I would further suggest that for the convenience of the canal trade, a siding be run down from the main line to the bank of the

western Delta main canal, where the coal lies, at or about the point marked "Boats" in the sketch accompanying the Police Superintendent's report. Had such a siding been in existence the late accident could not have occurred: & it would effectually prevent the contractor's men shunting trucks about on the main line.

I have the honor to be

Sir

Your most obedient servant

J. D. Attwood

As District Magistrate

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Office
 Judicial Department 1893



PROCEEDINGS OF THE MADRAS GOVERNMENT.

Read the following paper:—

From the District Magistrate, Madras, d
 21st September 1893 No 456, forwarding
 report on the railway accident at Litha-
 -magaram.

Order 20 October 1893 No 2197.
 Communicated to the
 Public Works Department (Railway
 Branch).

[Extract]

M. S. S. S.
 Under Secy P.W. D.
 for Chief Secy.

The Public Works Department (Ry Branch)
 with papers in original

209

Gobt. of {1893} Madras.

To

The P.W. Dept
Railway
Branch

Received 10.5.93
10.5.93

Proceedings, dated 20 10 1893,
No. 2197

Subject.

Copy letter from the
District Magistrate
Kistna, forwarding
report on the Railway
accident at Satta
nagar on 14th
July last
B. No 1371 R 8/15-11-93.

Recorded

J.C. 21.41 / 7/11 R.
1000-20-2 93.