GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

8th May 1884, No. 2199.

Camps—Instructions.

Read the following paper:—

No. 105. *From Brigadier-General R. C. STEWART, Quarter Master General, to Lieutenant-Colonel A. KENNEY-HERBERT, Officiating Secretary to Government, Military Department; dated Ootacamund, 31st March* 1884, *No.* 2079.

I have the honor to report, for the information of Government, that, in compliance with the permission conveyed in Government Order, No. 6270, dated 21st November 1882, to hold a camp of exercise in the month of January 1884, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in G.O.C.C., No. 381, dated 1st August 1883, issued the necessary instructions for the assembly of the troops as per margin in the vicinity of Krishnarajpuram, eight miles from Bangalore.

Royal Artillery.

E/B, Royal Horse Artillery.
M/2nd, Royal Artillery.
I/3rd, „ „
S/1st, „ „
P/1st, „ „

Cavalry.

12th Royal Lancers.
1st Madras Light Cavalry.
2nd „ „ „

Infantry.

2nd Battalion, Royal Fusiliers.
1st „ Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
2nd „ South Wales Borderers.
2nd „ Middlesex Regiment.
Four Companies, "Queen's Own" Sappers and Miners.
5th Regiment, Native Infantry.
12th „ „ „
14th „ „ „
21st „ „ „
4th „ (Pioneers).
10th „ Native Infantry.
15th „ „ „
27th „ „ „
Madras Volunteer Guards.
Bangalore Rifle Volunteers.
Nilgiri „ „ (detachment).

2. The Government will observe that, in the selection of corps to attend the camp, every opportunity was taken of the annual relief of the season to assemble regiments and batteries destined to change their stations.

3. This course was adopted by the Commander-in-Chief in view of decreasing the expenditure as much as possible, and it was His Excellency's intention to have marched all the troops from their stations to the camp. Sir Frederick Roberts regrets, however, that the prevalence of cholera generally throughout the presidency necessitated subsequent alteration of this latter arrangement, and the movement by rail to the camp of several of the regiments which were under orders to proceed by route march.

4. The sites for the camps were personally inspected by the Commander-in-Chief, and it was ultimately decided to select very much the same ground as that on which the camp of exercise in 1874 had been held in the vicinity of Krishnarajpuram. The particular spots where the camps were located are noted on the map which accompanies this letter.

5. The country on which it was proposed to hold the camp was thoroughly surveyed by several officers under the superintendence of Captain Henry, R.E., and an excellent map on a two-inch scale produced, which was subsequently lithographed in the Revenue Survey Office and issued to all officers serving in the c[illegible].

6. The Commander-in-Chief's best thanks are due to Colonel Rogers, Superintendent, Revenue Survey, for the admirable manner in which these maps were printed, and for the rapidity with which they were produced.

CAVALRY BRIGADE.

Brigadier-General Sir Charles Gough, V.C., K.C.B., Commanding.
Captain Tuthill, 14th Hussars, Brigade-Major.
Captain Yates, R.H.A., Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.
Lieutenant Adye, 1st Cavalry, Hyderabad Contingent, Orderly Officer.

FIRST DIVISION.

Major-General Sir Charles Keyes, K.C.B., Commanding.
Major Hope, 1st Light Cavalry, Assistant Adjutant-General.
Colonel Swanston, 7th Native Infantry, Assistant Quarter Master General.
Major Tickell, Middlesex Regiment, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.
Captain Romilly, R.E., Field Engineer.
Major Dale, 31st Light Infantry, Assistant Provost Marshal.
Lieutenant Smythe, Royal Scots Fusiliers, A.D.C.

INFANTRY.

First Brigade.

Brigadier-General Gib, C.B., Commanding.
Major Money, Oxfordshire Light Infantry, Brigade-Major.
Lieutenant Radcliff, 25th Native Infantry, Orderly Officer.

Second Brigade.

Colonel Brett, Oxfordshire Light Infantry, Commanding.
Major Clerk, Infantry General List, Brigade-Major.
Lieutenant Molesworth, Royal Artillery, Orderly Officer.

SECOND DIVISION.

Major-General Prendergast, V.C., C.B., Commanding.
Lieutenant-Colonel Morton, 14th Hussars, Assistant Adjutant-General.
Lieutenant-Colonel Gatacre, Middlesex Regiment, Assistant Quarter Master General.
Major Hutchins, Infantry General List, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.
Captain Walker, 19th Native Infantry, Assistant Provost Marshal.
Lieutenant Donald, Royal Fusiliers, A.D.C.

INFANTRY.

First Brigade.

Brigadier-General Elles, C.B., Commanding.
Major Wratislaw, 22nd Native Infantry, Brigade-Major.
Lieutenant Currie, 20th Native Infantry, Orderly Officer.

Second Brigade.

Colonel Dixon, 8th Native Infantry, Commanding.
Captain Banister, South Wales Borderers, Brigade-Major.
Lieutenant Rowe, 8th Native Infantry, Orderly Officer.

7. The troops assembled on the 5th January, the last of the corps marching in on that day, and on the 7th January the work of the camp commenced.

8. It may be interesting to Government to know how the commands of divisions and brigades were distributed. I have the honor, therefore, to append the names of the officers commanding divisions and brigades and their staff officers.

9. The first week was devoted to brigade and divisional drills. During the second week, viz., from 14th to 19th January, manœuvres were executed on an extended scale—one division being moved to Nundidroog, thirty miles distant, for the purpose of operating against Bangalore, which was defended by the other division.

10. On Monday, the 21st, field firing at unknown distances was practised. On Wednesday morning an attack was made on a selected position by the first division, which performed a night march for this purpose. On Thursday, 24th, the troops marched past His Excellency the Governor, in the presence of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India; and on Friday and Saturday, 25th and 26th January, an assault at arms was held in Bangalore.

11. It is a matter of special gratification to the Commander-in-Chief that His Excellency the Governor was able to be present on the occasion of the march past of the assembled troops.

12. Sir Frederick Roberts feels sure the Government of Madras will appreciate the honor done to the Madras army by the presence of His Excellency Sir Donald Stewart, Bart., G.C.B., C.I.E., Commander-in-Chief in India, who arrived in the camp on the 14th January, and witnessed the manœuvres between the first and second divisions.

13. His Excellency has been pleased to express his approbation of the drill and appearance of the Madras army, and Sir Frederick Roberts is confident it will be as gratifying to the Madras Government, as it is to himself, to learn the opinion of this distinguished officer.

14. General the Honorable A. Hardinge, C.B., Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army, likewise honored the camp with his presence, arriving on the 14th January; and it has been an infinite pleasure to Sir Frederick Roberts to receive His Excellency on this the first occasion of his visiting the Madras presidency.

15. It is satisfactory to Sir Frederick Roberts to have to record that the various operations performed and attempted during the camp of exercise have met with success. Copies of each day's manœuvres with the remarks of the Umpire-in-Chief and an explanatory map are annexed, which will enable His Excellency the Governor in Council to judge of the character and scope of the operations.

16. The intelligence of the men and officers in the selection of the ground on the occasion of the field firing was marked, and the fire discipline, as displayed on

this occasion, speaks most highly for the training of the Native, as well as of the European army.

17. The night march was entirely successful, both columns arriving at the point of attack at the same moment. In thus attempting an illustration of this, the most difficult of all operations in the field, it is hoped that the lesson learnt will not be lost to those who took part in it.

18. Absence of a suitable piece of water near the standing camps and want of time interfered with the proposal for including amongst the operations to be carried out during the camp that of the crossing of an unfordable river by a mixed force of cavalry and infantry.

19. Sir Frederick Roberts was glad, however, to have an opportunity of letting the Commander-in-Chief in India witness, before His Excellency left Bangalore, the result of some practice in the execution of such an operation by a portion of the troops of the Bangalore division.

20. The Hebbal tank, a sheet of water some 600 to 700 yards wide at the points where crossed, of which about 200 to 300 yards were beyond the depth of a horse, was selected for the operation, in which a force of 113 cavalry and 167 infantry took part.

One squadron, 12th Royal Lancers, with regimental pioneers.
One squadron, 1st Light Cavalry.
One company, "Queen's Own" Sappers and Miners.
Four companies, 4th Pioneers.

21. The passage of the tank was most successfully effected under the direction of Lieutenant-General Payn, C.B., the cavalry swimming across, and the infantry being transported in cask rafts; the whole force was thus crossed in one hour and fifty-five minutes, excluding the time taken in construction of rafts; and Sir Donald Stewart was pleased to express his strong approbation of the operation in all its details.

22. In the opinion of Sir Frederick Roberts, the peculiar advantages offered by camps of exercise are not only the experience gained by staff and departmental officers and by the training of the individual soldier, but also the opportunity given to corps to meet together in the field, to witness, to compare, and to discuss the working of each particular branch, a feeling of rivalry being thus produced, which when indulged in in a kindly spirit does much in the cause of discipline and *esprit-de-corps*.

23. However great these advantages may be to any army, they specially apply to the Madras army, of which so many regiments are located for long periods together at single stations, and Sir Frederick Roberts feels sure that the camp of exercise just brought to a close has been exceedingly beneficial in this way.

24. *Telegraph.*—The head-quarter camp was connected with the Government telegraph office at Bangalore and the railway station, Krishnarajpuram, and the first and second divisions were connected with head-quarters by the field telegraph worked by the sappers under the able superintendence of Lieutenant A. C. Macdonnell, R.E.

25. The working of both Government and field telegraphs was exceedingly satisfactory, and Sir Frederick Roberts begs that his thanks may be expressed to the Superintendent of Government Telegraphs.

26. *Signalling.*—Communication by visual signalling, both by night and day, was maintained between all the camps throughout the period during which the troops were assembled under the intelligent supervision of Major E. Begbie (Infantry General List), Instructor in Army Signalling, and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India witnessed signalling, on a peculiarly foggy dark night, with Major Begbie's lamps between Nundidroog and His Excellency's camp, a distance of not less than twenty-five miles.

27. *Commissariat and Transport.*—The commissariat arrangements were supervised by Colonel J. C. Gunning, as Principal Commissariat Officer, and Colonel McInroy, as Officer in charge, Supply Branch, at the base; the transport arrangements by Colonel Hayter, C.B., Director of Transport.

28. The rations were good throughout, and no complaint has reached His Excellency of the quality or the sufficiency of the supply.

29. The present was the first occasion on which the new transport system has been tried, and His Excellency is glad to be able to report favorably of its working. The whole of the Bangalore division, the camp equipage for the head-quarter camp, and a great portion of the troops which marched, were moved by Government transport, and, with the exception of fifty carts hired during the extended manœuvres, the transport of troops was conducted without extra expense to Government.

30. His Excellency is glad to record his appreciation of the services of Colonel J. C. Gunning, Colonel McInroy, Colonel Hayter, C.B., and the officers attached to the supply and transport branches of the Commissariat department. These officers evinced a desire to comply with the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief and a readiness to meet all demands which rendered the task of the army staff officers much easier than it otherwise would have been, and materially added to the success of the manœuvres.

31. *Post Offices.*—Post offices were established at the head-quarter and the divisional camps; but His Excellency regrets that he cannot compliment the Postal department on the arrangements made on this occasion.

32. *Railway.*—*The Madras Railway Company* established a station at Krishnarajpuram, which was exceedingly convenient, but the arrangements at the station were defective, and the staff maintained there was quite inadequate to meet the ordinary traffic connected with the camp.

33. *Ordnance Department.*—Sir Frederick Roberts begs to bring to the notice of the Government the assistance rendered by the Inspector-General of Ordnance, and the indefatigable way in which the Ordnance department worked to construct His Excellency's camp equipage in time for the camp.

34. *Medical Department.*—The medical arrangements, under the superintendence of Surgeon-General Madden, were excellent. The health of the troops has throughout the camp been very good, and one regiment which had suffered much from sickness before its arrival considerably improved.

35. *Civil.*—The Commander-in-Chief cannot find words to express his appreciation of the assistance rendered by His Highness the Maharajah of Mysore and those officers of His Highness' Government deputed to attend the camp. His Excellency purposes to address the Mysore Durbar himself on this subject; but he wishes to record in this letter that nothing could exceed the cordial co-operation of Major Macintire, Deputy Commissioner, attached to head-quarters, and the civil officers attached to the divisions.

36. *Silladars.*—His Excellency's thanks are due likewise to the Maharajah of Mysore for having permitted a regiment of Silladar Horse to attend the camp of exercise, which, under the supervision of Colonel Hay, Military Secretary to His Highness, and under the personal command of Lieutenant R. G. Jones, 1st Madras Cavalry, rendered efficient service with the cavalry brigade.

37. *Provost Marshal Department.*—Excellent order has been maintained in camp by the provost department, and crime amongst the troops has been almost unknown.

38. *Umpires.*—His Excellency's thanks are due to all the officers of the Bengal army attending the camp, whose services were placed at his disposal to form the umpire staff, and likewise to those officers of the Bombay [illegible] enough to assist.

39. *Volunteers.*—It was a great gratification [illegible] to the Commander-in-Chief that the Madras volunteers and a portion of the Bangalore and Nílgiri volunteers, under the command of Colonel Ross Church, C.B., were able to attend the camp. The corps was attached to the first division, during the operations, 16th to 19th January, and in the night march, which [illegible] took part in the operations, 16th to exemplary, their discipline excellent, [illegible] conduct of the volunteers was most trying operations, and more especially [illegible] and their endurance during the somewhat regular troops.

40. In conclusion, I am desired [illegible] during the night march, equalled that of the Government of Madras for the hearty [illegible] to express His Excellency's thanks to the co-operation he has received from them in

all matters connected with this camp of exercise, without which it would not, His Excellency is well aware, have been brought to a successful conclusion.

41. This letter has been delayed in the hope of its being possible to submit with it a detailed statement showing the cost of the camp of exercise; as, however, it is understood that some further time must elapse before the accounts are ready, the Commander-in-Chief has decided not to wait any longer for the accounts, which will be transmitted on receipt.

DIARY OF MOVEMENTS, 1ST DIVISION.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES KEYES, K.C.B.

From 16th to 19th January 1884.

With reference to Camp General Order, $\frac{14}{C.E.}$, dated the 8th instant, the following General Idea of the Manœuvres, to be performed between the 14th and 19th instant, is published for information:—

The Southern Force, commanded by Major-General Sir Charles Keyes, K.C.B.—

Cavalry Brigade ..	2 Guns E/B., Royal Horse Artillery, 2 Squadrons, 12th Royal Lancers, 2nd Madras Light Cavalry, P/1 Royal Artillery, S/1 „ „ 2 Companies, Sappers and Miners,
1st Infantry Brigade ..	2nd Battalion, Middlesex Regiment, 5th Native Infantry, 21st „ „
2nd Infantry Brigade ..	2nd Battalion, South Wales Borderers, Volunteer Battalion, 15th Native Infantry,

is supposed to be a force of all arms occupying Bangalore, which, on hearing of the approach of an enemy from the north, has taken up a position on the site of its present camp.

The Northern Force, commanded by Major-General Prendergast, V.C., C.B.—

Cavalry Brigade ..	4 Guns E/B, Royal Horse Artillery, 1 Squadron, 12th Royal Lancers, 1st Madras Light Cavalry, Silladar Horse, M/2 Royal Artillery, I/3 „ „ 2 Companies, Sappers and Miners,
1st Infantry Brigade ..	2nd Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, 12th Native Infantry. 27th „ „
2nd Infantry Brigade ..	1st Battalion, Oxfordshire Light Infantry, 4th Pioneers, 10th Native Infantry, 14th „ „

is supposed to be a force of all arms arriving from the north for the purpose of attacking Bangalore, and on the evening of the 15th instant encamps in the vicinity of Nundidroog, north of an east and west line drawn through the 30th milestone on the Bangalore Chik-Ballapur road.

To carry out this idea, General Prendergast will leave his present camp, south of the railway, on the morning of the 14th instant and march towards Nundidroog, *viâ* Devanhalli.

General Prendergast will issue such orders as he may think necessary for the movement of his division, to ensure its reaching its camp near Nundidroog on the evening of the 15th instant.

The Commander of the Southern Force, having received information on the evening of the 15th instant of the arrival of the enemy near Nundidroog, will make such dispositions as may appear to him desirable to ascertain the movements and defeat the object of the enemy. The southern force will bivouac whenever it may be necessary for it to leave its camp, which will remain standing, and will not be liable to capture by the enemy.

On the morning of the 16th instant, General Prendergast will turn towards Bangalore with the object of advancing on it, and on his part will make such dispositions as he may think desirable.

The theatre of operations is limited to the country included in the maps already issued.

Operations will be carried on daily from 9 A.M. to 3 P.M., when the halt will be sounded, and no further movement will take place until 9 o'clock the following morning, by which hour troops will be in position on the ground occupied by them at 3 o'clock the previous afternoon.

Outposts will, however, be thrown out as on service (*vide* paragraph 24, page 6/c, "Bangalore Camp of Exercise Order)," after the halt has been sounded, and will not be withdrawn until the Divisional Commanders have satisfied themselves that their position has been made secure from sudden attack.

It is desirable that troops should be encamped or bivouacked as near as possible to the positions occupied by them at the close of each day's proceedings.

Camps, baggage, transport animals, and followers, are not liable to capture.

Detailed instructions regarding transport, supplies and further subsidiary orders regarding movements of contending forces will be issued to Commanders of Forces by the Quarter Master General.

Tuesday, 15th January 1884.

The troops in the first division camp remained quiet.

1 Staff Officer.
2 Volunteer Officers.
4 Staff Sergeants.
87 Volunteers.
12 Followers.

The Bangalore Volunteers, strength as per margin, joined the division, and camped on the left flank of the first brigade.

Wednesday, 16th January

The cavalry brigade (2 R.H.A. guns, 2 squadrons, 12th Lancers, and 2nd M.L.C.) and a company of mounted infantry left camp at 9 A.M. to reconnoitre along the whole front towards the north, with instructions to make a rapid advance, secure the two hills (3341 and 3212 on the map) about 5 miles north of Yellahanka, hold them as long as possible, in view to obtaining as much information as practicable of the movements of the northern army, and signal the same to divisional head-quarters. The bridge on the Nundidroog road, at Chik Jala, to be blown up should time admit, the enemy not to be engaged in a general manner.

At noon the two infantry brigades, each accompanied by a battery of field artillery, and a company of sappers, moved to the westward from camp, to secure positions fixed upon, prior to 3 P.M., to return to camp on completion of this object.

The first brigade occupied the high ground near the village of Tanisandra; the second brigade the high ground at the 6th milestone on the Nundidroog road.

No information having been obtained of or from the cavalry brigade during the day, the Major-General, accompanied by his staff, rode out to Baglur, the site appointed for the brigade to pitch its flying camp at. On reaching this village, it was found that the troops were locating themselves somewhat westward nearer to Satnur.

The Officer Commanding the Brigade reported that he had carried out his instructions as regards blowing up the bridge and securing the two hills, which he held for two hours and then retired, in face of superior force, to a general line extending from Avalhalli on the west to Budigere on the east.

Signallers had occupied both hills, but messages failed to reach divisional head-quarters from them.

It was further reported that two battalions of the enemy's infantry had entered Chik Jalla.

2 Staff Officers.
4 Volunteer Officers.
2 Staff Sergeants.
4 Drill Instructors.
203 Volunteers.
102 Followers.

The Madras Volunteer Guards arrived in the divisional camp at about noon, strength as per margin, and were attached to the second brigade.

Thursday, 17th January.

The infantry brigades occupied by 9 A.M. the same positions held at 3 P.M. yesterday.

All baggage and tentage for flying camp moved away at 9-30 A.M. under charge of the Divisional Transport Officer, with orders to be parked at Hebbal position, *i.e.*, that occupied by the second brigade, and there await orders.

The cavalry brigade had been instructed to fall back slowly on to Yellahanka, reporting to the Major-General there all possible information relative to the infantry of the northern army.

The first brigade moved up at about 9-30 A.M. to a small wood half a mile north of Tanisandra.

At 11 A.M. four companies of infantry were moved up from the second brigade to occupy Yellahanka, the mounted infantry having fallen back on that village. The remainder of the brigade advancing about a mile beyond the position held at 9 A.M., the field battery and

Gardner gun taking up a position behind the bund of a dry tank, to the left of the road, trained on Yellahanka. The four companies and mounted infantry were withdrawn from Yellahanka at noon, at which time the cavalry brigade had retired on that place.

The two R.H.A. guns took up a position on the high ground west of the village. After employing the enemy for some time on the westward of Yellahanka, the cavalry brigade had to retire, the enemy's infantry having occupied the village. The retirement of the cavalry was covered by the fire from the field battery of the second brigade.

It being evident that the main attack was being given from Yellahanka, the first brigade was signalled to, to move over as quickly as possible to Hebbal position, upon which the second brigade began slowly to retire, the enemy beginning to show on the Tinnulu heights, on our left front.

At 2-30 P.M. the second brigade had re-occupied its position of the morning, the cavalry brigade being in a tope near the village of Byatrayanpur, some half mile in advance to the left front.

The first brigade reached the Hebbal position at 2-40 P.M., and was ordered at once to take up a position on the south of Hebbal tank, which it secured by 3 P.M.

Camps were then pitched, pickets posted, and men broken off. The cavalry camped on the right flank of the second brigade in close proximity to water.

A detachment of Nilgiri Volunteers, numbering eighteen N. C. rank and file, joined the division standing camp.

Friday, 18th January.

Camps were struck and all tents and baggage loaded up by 7-30 A.M., and began to move off to the rear at 7-45 A.M., that of the second brigade across the Hebbal tank bund until 8-30 A.M., when the road was closed *pro tem.*

All transport was ordered to make its way back to standing camp.

At 9 A.M. the troops occupied their several positions of the previous evening.

The first brigade retired and took up a position on the high ground at the junction of the roads, south-east of Subedar's chutrum. The cavalry brigade retired and occupied the ground westward from the Hebbal tank to limits of the map, a small body being sent to watch the country eastward as far as Hennur.

After covering these retirements, the second brigade moved to the rear blowing up the bridge at the northern end of the Hebbal tank bund and occupied the Muntapum height, 3118 on the map at the point where the roads to Nundidroog and Tumkur cross.

The enemy's infantry and guns worked under cover of plantations and reverse slopes in such a manner that it was some time ere his movements began to declare, a front attack being expected owing to a wrong point of the compass having been signalled early in the day with reference to the advance of two battalions of his infantry, which were stated to be moving southward (westward being the direction). The attack eventually developed itself on our left, viz, between the two tanks east and west of the village of Mattikere.

To meet this, the first brigade took up a position in keeping with the configuration of the high ground northward and round eastward from Subedar's chutrum, whence the slopes towards the tanks alluded to formed a natural glacis.

Three guns were sent from the second brigade to reinforce the artillery of the first brigade which then at this hour, 11-30 A.M., consisted of three battalions of infantry and nine guns.

The cavalry brigade had, owing to advance of the northern guns and infantry, been withdrawn from its forward position and placed under cover about a mile east of Subedar's chutrum.

By 1-30 P.M. the northern cavalry and some infantry, supported by guns, had worked so much round the left flank of the southern force that the three guns of the second brigade were moved up from their hitherto position with those of the first brigade, and brought into action slightly to the south of junction of the three roads south-east of Subedar's chutrum; and eventually the battalion of infantry on the right of the second brigade was moved up to its left and thrown across from that point south-westerly on to the lower road leading to the Bangalore pettah.

The cavalry brigade being brought up on the left of this line to hold in check the advance of the northern cavalry.

During these changes, the remainder of the infantry of the first brigade had been gradually closed in and concentrated on the ground in the immediate vicinity of point of junction of the three roads.

The second brigade had by this thrown its right forward and was in a position to advance in a north-westerly direction, and attack in flank the infantry of the northern army working round to the left of the first brigade, the three guns on the western slope of the Muntapam hill covering the attack with a range of 1,900 yards.

At this juncture (2 P.M.), it being reported that the northern army had his cavalry, sixteen guns and five battalions of infantry, well on the left flank of the first brigade, southern force, firing ceased, and a fresh disposition of the latter troops was ordered, during which operations were directed to cease, and corps ordered to march to their respective camps.

The southern force reached its standing camp between 5 and 6 P.M.

Saturday, 19*th January*.

Troops in first division camp remained quiet.
The 10th M.I. rejoined from second division.

(Signed) N. SWANSTON, Colonel,
Assistant Quarter Master General.

DIARY OF MOVEMENTS, 2ND DIVISION.

MAJOR-GENERAL PRENDERGAST, V.C., C.B., COMMANDING.

14*th to* 19*th January* 1884.

With reference to Camp General Order, $\frac{14}{C.E.}$, dated the 8th instant, the following General Idea of the Manœuvres, to be performed between the 14th and 19th instant, is published for information :—

The Southern Force, commanded by Major-General Sir Charles Keyes, K.C.B.—

Cavalry Brigade.	2 Guns E/B., Royal Horse Artillery, 2 Squadrons, 12th Royal Lancers, 2nd Madras Light Cavalry, P/1 Royal Artillery, S/1 " " 2 Companies, Sappers and Miners,
1st Infantry Brigade.	2nd Battalion, Middlesex Regiment, 5th Native Infantry, 21st " "
2nd Infantry Brigade.	2nd Battalion, South Wales Borderers, Volunteer Battalion, 15th Native Infantry,

is supposed to be a force of all arms occupying Bangalore, which, on hearing of the approach of an enemy from the north, has taken up a position on the site of its present camp.

The Northern Force, commanded by Major-General Prendergast, V.C., C.B.—

Cavalry Brigade.	4 Guns E/B, Royal Horse Artillery, 1 Squadron, 12th Royal Lancers, 1st Madras Light Cavalry, Silladar Horse, M/2 Royal Artillery, I/3 " " 2 Companies, Sappers and Miners,
1st Infantry Brigade.	2nd Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, 12th Native Infantry, 27th " "
2nd Infantry Brigade.	1st Battalion, Oxfordshire Light Infantry, 4th Pioneers, 10th Native Infantry, 14th " "

is supposed to be a force of all arms arriving from the north for the purpose of attacking Bangalore, and on the evening of the 15th instant encamps in the vicinity of Nundidroog, north of an east and west line drawn through the 30th milestone on the Bangalore Chik-Ballapur road.

To carry out this idea, General Prendergast will leave his present camp, south of the railway, on the morning of the 14th instant, and march towards Nundidroog, *viâ* Devanhalli.

General Prendergast will issue such orders as he may think necessary for the movement of his division, to ensure its reaching its camp near Nundidroog on the evening of the 15th instant.

The Commander of the Southern Force, having received information on the evening of the 15th instant of the arrival of the enemy near Nundidroog, will make such dispositions as may appear to him desirable to ascertain the movements and defeat the object of the enemy. The southern force will bivouac whenever it may be necessary for it to leave its camp, which will remain standing, and will not be liable to capture by the enemy.

On the morning of the 16th instant, General Prendergast will turn towards Bangalore with the object of advancing on it, and on his part will make such dispositions as he may think desirable.

The theatre of operations is limited to the country included in the maps already issued.

Operations will be carried on daily from 9 A.M. to 3 P.M., when the halt will be sounded, and no further movement will take place until 9 o'clock the following morning, by which hour

troops will be in position on the ground occupied by them at 3 o'clock the previous afternoon. Outposts will, however, be thrown out as on service (*vide* paragraph 24, page $\frac{6}{c}$, "Bangalore Camp of Exercise Order,") after the halt has been sounded, and will not be withdrawn until the Divisional Commanders have satisfied themselves that their position has been made secure from sudden attack.

It is desirable that troops should be encamped or bivouacked as near as possible to the positions occupied by them at the close of each day's proceedings.

Camps, baggage, transport animals, and followers are not liable to capture.

Detailed instructions regarding transport, supplies, and further subsidiary orders regarding movements of contending forces will be issued to Commanders of Forces by the Quarter Master General.

DIARY OF MOVEMENTS, 2ND DIVISION.

MAJOR-GENERAL PRENDERGAST, V.C., C.B., COMMANDING.

On receipt of the General Idea of the Manœuvres. (Copy attached).

On Sunday, 13*th January* 1884, *the following D.O. issued.*

DIVISION Order by Major-General PRENDERGAST, V.C., C.B., Commanding 2nd Division.

13*th January* 1884.

1. The division will move to-morrow in the direction of Nundidroog in the following order and by the following routes :—

Cavalry brigade, *viâ* Budigere and Betkote to Devanhalli, sending a party along the Dod-Ballapur road, and searching the country north and west of the Yellahanka-Devanhalli road, especially all round Nundidroog.

The cavalry brigade will halt (Monday night) at Devanhalli ; the royal horse artillery will march *viâ* Bangalore and Devanhalli high road to Devanhalli and halt there for the night.

The royal artillery (two field batteries) will march to Devanhalli, *viâ* Hennur, south-west from the Chunam pits, and halt there for the night.

The first brigade will march to Chik Jala, *viâ* Rampur, at 7 A.M.

The Queen's Own Sappers will accompany this brigade.

The second brigade to Chik Jala, *viâ* Blaisewadi, at 8-30 A.M.

Cooked rations will be taken, all water bottles to be filled before leaving camp.

All wheeled transport to go *viâ* Bangalore, pack animals with the troops across country.

The P.M.O. will make such arrangements as he may think necessary to ensure a hospital being established at Chik Jala and Devanhalli before the arrival of the troops.

A Medical officer to be sent on in advance to test the water, to see to all sanitary arrangements, to inquire into sanitary state of villages *en route* and near camping grounds.

2. Quarter Masters, one from each brigade with the camp color men, will go on daily in advance to the new camping ground.

This party will be in charge of the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General ; a few entrenching tools should be taken.

To-day the Quarter Masters of the 14th and 27th N.I. will go on ; as much wheeled transport as possible should be sent on to-day under a Native Infantry guard.

Brigadiers will give their own orders regarding the move of their brigades.

All camp latrines are to be filled in before the regiments leave, and rubbish swept up.

On the evening of Tuesday the whole division will concentrate to the north of the 30th milestone on the Ballapur road in accordance with the General Idea.

Detailed orders regarding this will be issued to-morrow.

14*th January* 1884.

These orders were carried out.

The cavalry reached its camping ground about 5 P.M., and encamped on spot shown in the map.

The road was easy throughout, except the passing over the tank bund at Budigere, and the road at Bidarpur which was deep and soft (nearly 4 feet). Royal artillery could not cross at either of those places.

The squadron of silladars marching on the Ballatur road reached its ground about 5 o'clock. Length of march, 31 miles.

Its wheeled transport with the heavy grain kettles was late in coming up, but otherwise the march passed satisfactorily.

Length of march 28 to 30 miles.

The royal horse artillery reached its camp about 3-30 P.M., and encamped at spot marked in map.

The royal artillery (two field batteries) reached its camping ground at about I/3 R. A. 2-45 M/2 R.A. 2-15 respectively and encamped on spot marked.

The road was fairly good, but slightly swampy about Hennur and Booroodoogoon.

Length of march 23 miles.

The first brigade and sappers reached its camping ground about 3-15 o'clock, and encamped as marked in map. Length of march about 18 miles.

The road was passable to cavalry, infantry, and pack animals, but it was a very trying road for men and animals on account of the devious nature of the track, and in some places the thorns.

The second brigade and 10th Native Infantry reached its camping ground at about 4 o'clock, and encamped as shown in map. Length of march about 18 miles.

The road was passable for infantry throughout.

Camping grounds reported clean and villages healthy.

No sickness amongst troops.

Three cases were returned to Base.

D.O., 14th January. The division will concentrate to-morrow in the vicinity of the 30th M.S. (north of it) on the Chik-Ballapur road.

The squadron silladar horse marching to the west of Nundidroog will march *viâ* Dod-Ballapur and search the country *en route*.

This squadron will encamp near Shivadihalli.

The cavalry brigade and field batteries will march under the orders of their Brigadier and Officer Commanding, respectively.

The first infantry brigade will march at 9 o'clock.

The second infantry brigade will follow at 10 o'clock.

The road to be kept clear of baggage till the troops have passed.

The camping grounds to be left clean on the departure of the troops.

Attention is called to the order regarding men's water bottles to be filled before leaving camp.

15th January 1884.

The orders as issued were carried out.

4 Guns E/B. R.H.A. .. ..
1 Squad, 12th Royal Lancers ..
1 Madras Light Cavalry ..
3 Squad Silladars .. ..

The cavalry and horse artillery reached its camping ground at about 10-30 A.M. and encamped where marked on map.

The road is in good order.

Length of march 8 miles.

1 Squad Silladars .. ..

The squadron of silladar horse marching on the Ballapur road and across country reached its ground about 10-30 o'clock.

The road was good and passable everywhere.

Length of march about 10 miles.

M2/ R. A. .. .. ..
I/3 R. A. .. .. ..
7th Royal Fusiliers .. ..

The royal artillery reached its camp at about 10-15 o'clock—see map. Road good. Length of march 10 miles.

Sappers and Miners .. ..
12th N.I. .. .. ..
27th N.I. .. .. ..

The first infantry brigade and sappers reached its camp at about 2-15 P.M.—see map.

Length of march 15 miles. Road good.

43rd Ox. Lt. Iy. .. ..
4th Pioneers .. .. ..
10th M.N.I. .. .. ..
14th M.N.I. .. .. ..

The second brigade reached its camp at about 3 o'clock—see map. Road good.

Length of march 15 miles.

Camping grounds reported clean and villages healthy. No sickness amongst troops.

One case of anthrax occurred in 1st Light Cavalry on night of 14th January.

D.O., 15th January. 1. The 12th Lancers will march to-morrow *viâ* Devanhalli to Chik Jala preceded by scouts. The enemy is to be expected in the direction of Chik Jala.

The country is to be treated as a hostile one.

No village is to be passed unsearched, and all precautions taken to guard against surprise.

The cavalry will encamp to-morrow at Chik Jala.

2. The royal horse artillery will march *viâ* Devanhalli to Chik Jala and support the cavalry.

They will encamp at Chik Jala.

3. The royal artillery I/3 R. A. will march *viâ* Devanhalli in rear of the main body of the cavalry, escorted by one troop of silladars, it will encamp with the cavalry brigade to-morrow to save returning to the infantry encampment.

4. M/2 R.A. will march in advance of the second infantry brigade near which it will encamp.

5. The silladar horse will send the squadron that is encamped on the Dobbspet and Nundi roads to search the country as far as Spiramanhalli at the 16th M.S. on the Dod-Ballapur Yellahanka road. Their special duty will be to make themselves acquainted with roads and swamps through the country to their left and to join hands with the right of the cavalry.

The main body of the silladars will accompany the 12th Lancers squadron and R.H.A. Their scouts will prolong the scouts line of the Lancers to the left.

One troop will act as escort to I/3 R.A. (see D.O. 3).

6. The 1st Madras Light Cavalry will march *viâ* Devanhalli to Chik Jala and act as reserve to the scout line.

7. The first infantry brigade will march *viâ* Devanhalli to Kanamangala and encamp there. It will follow the second brigade.

8. The second infantry brigade will march *viâ* Devanhalli to Buvanhalli and encamp there.

9. The sappers will march with the first brigade, and will, if time permits, make a passable road round the north of Sadhalli.

10. Order of march will be as follows:—

The Cavalry Brigade at 9 A.M.,
I/3 R.A.,
M/2 R.A.,
2nd Infantry Brigade,
Sappers and Miners,
1st Infantry Brigade,

in succession as soon as the front of each is clear.

The baggage will not leave camp till all the troops are well clear of it, and must be kept on the left of the road to prevent a block.

Thirty rounds blank per man infantry and 10 per man cavalry will be carried. It will be drawn this evening.

16th January 1884.

Movements, Cavalry Brigade.

The orders were carried out as far as possible.

After passing Devanhalli the Madras cavalry threw out one squadron to the right of the road and the silladars one to the left.

The front of the brigade was protected by an advance guard 600 yards in front, and in this order the brigade proceeded towards Chik Jala, searching the villages near the road in passing.

On reaching the 15th milestone it was reported that the bridge over the tank was blown up and further advance by the road impossible.

On the brigade halting, fire was opened by the enemy from some Khêts across the tank and two guns R.H.A. having advanced too near the bridge in ignorance of its being blown up and being unable to reverse, were put out of action.

The southern fire was replied to by a dismounted squadron of Lancers and by two guns of R.H.A. who arrived before the bridge had been repaired. These guns rendered good service in covering the turning movement of the brigade.

They were supported by I/3 R.A. who had halted on the left of the road, the whole eight guns in action.

After a delay of about 30 minutes, the south-west of the road was reported clear of the enemy, so the 12th Lancers (Major Poole commanding) took ground to the west.

A squadron of Lancers of the southern force (Colonel Stewart commanding), who had been concealed behind the Khêts before mentioned, moved out to dispute their advance.

Both charged, but were stopped by a nullah which ran between them. The southern cavalry having no ammunition was obliged to retire (by decision of an umpire) before the northern cavalry, who, on seeing the dilemma, had promptly dismounted and opened fire.

In the mean time, three squadrons of 1st Light Cavalry and one of Silladar Horse had followed round the tank and round the hill. (3341).

The Lancers having advanced and dismounted, lined a bund east of 3341 hill, and fired into the southern cavalry in the village of Sennapanhalli, thus holding them engaged while the squadrons under Captain Hornsby completed the circuit of the hill, on to the road, south of the 13th milestone and the *Horse* under Major Hooper reached the village of Bet Halsur.

Information was now received that the southern cavalry was drawn up near the village of Sennapanhalli. Major Hooper charged up the hill, and the squadrons under Captain Hornsby were sent for to help. As they were proceeding towards Chik Jala, they met two guns moving at a walk on the road, captured them, and galloped to assist Major Hooper's charge; they arrived in time to do so. These guns had been firing from the rocks west of 3212 hill on our R.H.A. guns, who were still in action to the west of the road north of the 15th M.S. and where they remained under the orders of the Officer Commanding the Brigade for the remainder of the day, with the view of supporting cavalry movement from a distance. Both forces were ordered to retire by an umpire except the two squadrons under Captain Hornsby, who kept possession of the hill.

I/3rd R. A.

While this struggle for the ridge was proceeding, I/3 R.A., under Major Anderson, had followed the cavalry round the west of the hill and halted near the village of Bet Halsur. On the resumption of hostilities four guns advanced to the ridge, but the southern cavalry retired without fighting. An attempt was made to cut them off, but owing to a misunderstanding in an order the attempt was not supported and was defeated. I/3 R.A., now brought its six guns into action on the rocks and opened on the enemy's cavalry. (See map.)

The final position of the cavalry at end of day's proceeding at 2-10 P.M. was near the enemy's outposts on the high ground south of 12th M.S., main body at Suggatta rocks. (The detached squadron of silladars joined here at about 1-30 P.M.)

The artillery occupied the positions as under at the close of the day's proceeding—

2 guns E/B.R.H.A., at 14th M.S.
2 guns E/B.R.H.A., out of action.
I/3 R. A. on the rocky hill between Suggatta village and road a little north of west of the 12th M.S. M/2 in column of route south of 18th M.S.

The action terminated here by order of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and the two advanced batteries marched to their camping grounds, a little north of the 14th M.S. west of the road. M/2 to Bevanhalli.

A party of signallers (cavalry), consisting of thirteen men and three officers, accompanied cavalry and artillery moving on Chik Jala. On arriving at the 18th milestone, a party of four men and one officer was despatched to Sadhalli rock to watch Chik Jala and the whole country to the west. Another party of four men and one officer took up their position on the rock near 16th milestone, and the third party went on with scouts to 15th milestone, from which place they found the enemy, and signalled to rock near 16th milestone that the bridge was blown up, also that two of our guns were out of action in consequence of having attempted to cross it. The party at Sadhalli signalled to 16th milestone that the enemy's cavalry were working round west towards Narrainpur, which news reached Colonel Hooper, Commanding the Cavalry.

M/2 R.A. marched in front of No. 2 brigade and encamped just south of Havanalli.

The first brigade followed in rear of the second brigade to Kanamangala, where it encamped with the sappers.

The second brigade led the infantry division from Nundidroog to the 19th M.S. on the Chik-Ballapur road as far as Buvanhalli, where it encamped.

Outposts were thrown out from each camp as shown on the maps, and all precautions taken as if in presence of an enemy.

The outposts of the second brigade extended from Buvanhalli to Dod Sanne, those of the first brigade covering the ground from Kanamangala to Bachelhalli.

Headquarters encamped east of the 18th M.S. close to the road.

D.O., 16th January for 17th January.

The division will take up by 9 A.M. to-morrow the same position that it occupied at 3 P. M. to-day.

The cavalry will examine the country from Baglur on their left to Pollium heights and Tinnulu in centre, to Shingapur and Hospolia on their right.

Tinnulu height must be occupied.

The royal horse artillery and two field batteries will take position on the Suggata heights with the object of covering the advance of the infantry on Allalsandra woods and Yellahanka.

The first brigade and sappers will march in rear of second infantry brigade and will receive further orders at the 13th M.S.

The second brigade will move along the Yellahanka road and seize Yellahanka, and, if possible, the Allalsandra wood.

Cavalry will carry 10 rounds and infantry 30 rounds to-morrow of blank ammunition in pouch and on mules. It will be drawn this evening.

No baggage will leave camp till the troops have moved off. It will be kept on the left of the road to prevent a block. It will park near Yellahanka to the east of Puttanhalli.

Verbal orders.

The object to-morrow will be to seize the Yellahanka cross roads and position to the west of it, having our advanced posts on the Tinnulu heights and Allalsandra wood.

All Commanders will use the greatest caution in the advance.

The scouting of the cavalry was performed to-day with too great rapidity and want of caution.

The object of the cavalry to-morrow is to manœuvre rather than fight, and, above all, to send the Major-General full information of all that takes place in its front to guide the advance of the main body.

The amount of news sent from the front to-day did not satisfy the Major-General.

17th January 1884.

The orders as given were carried out.

The cavalry brigade took up its position on the heights near Suggatta, where they were when the "cease fire" sounded yesterday.

Cavalry brigade.

The main body went westwards across the Yellahanka Dod-Ballapur road, driving back the southern cavalry before it, and having occupied the ridges near Dod Bettahalli, passed on to the heights near Tinnulu.

Two squadrons under Major Hooper advanced direct on Yellahanka, clearing the ground east of the road, and hearing the bridge was blown up and the village held by two dismounted squadrons of southern cavalry, kept them in check with two dismounted troops of the first cavalry until the arrival of the infantry at 12-30 noon.

The two squadrons then separated, one moved to the east under Major Hooper, and advancing along the east edge of Allalsandra wood, came up to the 15th N.I., which it took by surprise standing at ease, and cut them up. One squadron Mysore horse moved by the west of the village, clearing the ground south of Yellahanka.

Unfortunately it committed itself to a rash charge near the east of Tinnulu hill.

This charge was supported at long interval, but as fast as possible by two squadrons under Captain Hornsby and one under Colonel Parsons from the west, Major Hooper arriving from the 7th milestone with a squadron in time to assist.

This charge of Major Hooper (though the halt had sounded) was permitted by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to show what would have been done under ordinary circumstances in such a case.

This encounter took place just east of Tinnulu hill and between it and the S. end of Allalsandra wood.

Tinnulu heights were thus left in possession of the cavalry at the end of the day. The scout line extended as far as Shingapur to the west, and joined the right of the second brigade which was holding the S. edge of Allalsandra wood.

R.A.

The orders to the R.A. being "to concentrate on Suggatta rocks," the three batteries moved on to that point:—

I/3 R.A. arriving at 9 A.M.,
E/B.R.H.A. „ 9-10 A.M.,
M/2 R.A. „ 9-30 A.M.,

about three troops of the enemy's cavalry being visible massed on the crest of the hill near the 11 M.S., I/3 R.A. fired on them; after a few rounds they retired.

Orders were then given to R.H.A. "advance with cavalry and seize high ground evacuated by the enemy and shell him as he withdraws."

This advance covered by the other two batteries.

I/3 R.A. to move up and align themselves with R.H.A. as soon as established. E/B. and I/3 advance from here and M/2 move up to them, all 16 guns coming into action in line on high ground 400 yards north and west of 11th M.S.

Marked on map, 2nd position, 17th.

Marked on map, 3rd position, 16 guns on 17th.

At this point, about 11 A.M., orders were received from General Officer Commanding for M/2 R.A. to support advance of second brigade direct on Yellahanka village.

The battery did so, moving into position between hill 2992 and village of Manchalli, from which position it subsequently advanced in support of the infantry attack to a position in advance of the village of Jakkur, a little to east of south line of plantation.

Orders were now given for the other 10 guns to move to the west in support of the cavalry attack on Yellahanka from west covering advance of the second infantry brigade. This was done by successive advances of R.H.A. and I/3 R.A., each battery covering the advance of the other, and both supporting an attack by cavalry on the bund over Mullagoonapollium tank. Up to this time these 10 guns were only opposed by 2 R.H.A. guns of the enemy.

On the arrival at the south end of Mullagoonapollium bund about 1 P.M., orders were received from the General Officer Commanding to detach I/3 R.A. to assist the first brigade, who was then behind the crest of hill No. 3045 near to the west of the 11th M.S. on the Dod-Ballapur road.

This was done. The four guns E/B. R.H.A. then advanced with cavalry south-west under cover of the laterite hills into the position marked on the map (E/B. 6 position on 17th instant). From here they again advanced to hill Tinnulu where they came into action and supported the action of our cavalry at that place.

The day finished thus, all batteries returning to camp round Yellahanka village.

The first infantry brigade.

The first infantry brigade marched at 9-10 A.M. in rear of the second brigade in column of route. On reaching the 13th mile and 3rd furlong stone, this brigade was ordered to march due west by Nelkunteh to the Dod-Ballapur Yellahanka road, crossing the paddy south of Mudnahalli and to occupy hill No. 3045, there to await further orders. This it did.

On passing to the north of Gantiganahalli tank, a squadron of the enemy was seen on the south edge of that tank. This was signalled to the nearest signal station. The squadron of silladars, who had been marching separately, spoke this force * at Nelkunteh village, and then passed on to Puttanhalli, to join the remainder of the cavalry.

* 1st brigade.

The brigade reached hill No. 3045 without opposition, and took up a position about 1 P.M. At 2-5 P.M. it received orders to march to camp at Yellahanka, which it did.

Second infantry brigade.

The second brigade marched with advance and rear guard. At the 15th M.S. information arrived that the enemy's cavalry had been seen working east.

Flanking parties were thrown out to protect left and rear. At 10th M.S. orders were received from the Major-General to take Yellahanka.

43rd O.L.I. advanced in attack formation and occupied the village without opposition.

The centre arch of bridge at north entrance to village had been blown up by enemy, but no difficulty was experienced in passing through the march on either side.

One company 4th Pioneers and tools arrived at 12-45 P.M., and set to work to repair bridge. Bridge was passable at 1-15. Stems of trees cut in the vicinity were supposed to be laid across the breaches, branches of trees across them forming a corduroy road.

The troops extended on the south side of village and lay down.

The enemy's cavalry and artillery appeared in precipitate retreat at this junction down the Dod-Ballapur road, and crossing our front were exposed to a withering fire from one extended line.

Their artillery formed up just below the junction of the two roads apparently with the intention of opening on us, but abandoned the intention and withdrew to beyond Allalsandra, covered by a charge of the Lancers escort, who must have been annihilated by our infantry.

The advance was now continued southwards on either side of the road until the plantation was reached, when the greater part of the line was put into the wood, a half left turn being made.

The 43rd O.L.I. passed through the wood and found the southern end occupied by the 15th M.N.I. skirmishers, who were speedily dislodged and who, as soon as they emerged into the open, were cut up by a squadron under Major Hooper, 1st L.C. They were also exploded from their left by the 4th Pioneers extended line.

The "cease fire" now sounded, about 2-10 P.M., and the brigade marched to its camping ground just south of Yellahanka.

Signalling.

The infantry signallers took up position on the hill to the east of Chik Jala. A cavalry party was sent to Dod Bettahalli, where they arrived in about two hours after much trouble in avoiding the enemy's scouts, and signalled to the party on hill near Chik Jala that there was a squadron of enemy's cavalry and some infantry at the 13th M.S. on the road to Dod-Ballapur, who were marching to Yellahanka.

This news was sent to a third party at the 11th M.S. on the road to Yellahanka, where the General had taken up a position.

D.O. for 18th January.

The division will to-morrow take up the position it held this evening at 3 P.M., as follows:—

The 12th Royal Lancers and cavalry will hold Tinnulu hill with scouts pushed well forward; their left will touch the second brigade at Allalsandra wood.

Strength { 1 Squadron Lancers. 4 Silladars. 1st M.L. Cavalry.

The whole of the artillery of the division will mass behind Tinnulu hill as soon after 9 A.M. as possible, but only four guns will be in position on the hill.

1st Brigade, The Royal Fusiliers, Sappers, 12th N.I., 27th N.I.

The first brigade and sappers will advance from 3045 hill and move round the enemy's left *viâ* Hospoliah, Shingapur, Jalhalli, Tinnerinhalli, Yeshvantpur, and be south of the last-named village near Subedar's Chutrum by 12-30 noon, keeping west and under cover of the hills running north and south down the west of the map.

Two squadrons cavalry will be detailed with this brigade, a battery will be sent to aid it later in the day.

2nd Brigade, 43rd O.L.I., 4th Pioneers, 14th N.I., 10th N.I.

The second brigade, with the exception of the 10th N.I., will hold the Allalsandra wood and check any advance of the enemy in that direction; two regiments will be kept in reserve on the road. When opportunity occurs, it will leave the 43rd in the wood and pass two regiments under cover to the Tinnulu hill.

10th N.I.

The 10th N.I. will advance upon Tinnulu from their encampment direct.

Instructions will be sent to this brigade later on.

The cavalry will carry 20 rounds per man, the infantry 50 rounds per man, to-day in pouches and on mules.

The Officers Commanding Cavalry and R.A. will meet the Major-General at headquarters at 7-45 A.M. to-morrow.

The baggage will not move till 12 noon, and will move on left of the road, to keep it clear.

Verbal orders.

The chief points to be seized to-morrow by the cavalry are 3050 hill and cross roads near Subedar's Chutrum; all ground and villages over which they advance must be most carefully examined.

Signal stations will be established at Tinnulu and Dod Bettahalli at first. Communications must be kept up at all hazards with General Elles' brigade.

Headquarters will be established at 9 A.M. at Allalsandra wood, before 10 at Tinnulu, after probably at 3050 hill north of Jalhalli, later on at Subedar's Chutrum.

Word will be left at each place as to the Major-General's whereabouts.

The objection for the first brigade to-morrow will be to work round the enemy's left under cover of the ridge running from north to south down the west edge of the map and to take him by surprise, if possible, near the rifle range. The second brigade is expected to hold the enemy in front while this movement is being carried out.

The movement of the two regiments from the second brigade to strengthen the right centre attack will require care.

The success of the day will depend greatly upon the timing of the second infantry brigades. The 10th N.I. will protect the guns on Tinnulu and eventually advance.

18th January.

Those orders were carried out.

Cavalry.

The cavalry brigade paraded in rear of the Tinnulu heights, from which the ground for some four miles round is visible; the disposition of the southern troops was clearly seen and reported to the Major-General.

Two squadrons went towards the Hebbal tank as escort to the R.H.A., which took up a position on Pollium.

About 11-30 A.M. the advance of the first brigade was reported by signal, west of Hospoliah, and the main body of cavalry crossed the march about 800 yards from the head of Hebbal tank.

After some delay, owing to the village of Nagshettihalli being strongly held, the brigade advanced on to the Tumkur road, across the railway, and took up a position on the extreme right of the line, the Mysore Horse placing themselves about 500 yards on the left flank of the southern infantry completely concealed. Here they remained till the "cease fire" sounded at 2 P.M. (their work being done).

R.A.

In accordance with the orders received, the R.H.A. and R.A. massed on Tinnulu heights, but, as the enemy had withdrawn from his position of the previous evening, no firing took place. From this hill, at 10 o'clock, I/3 R.A. was ordered to proceed under cover of the laterite hills to join and cover the advance of General Elles' brigade moving to the west of Dod Bettahalli. By mistake M/2 R.A. accompanied this battery instead of coming on to Tinnulu hill. Orders were now given to the four guns R.H.A. to advance from Tinnulu hill and to occupy the position previously occupied by the enemy on the hill near the 6th M.S. near village of Pollium west of the road, for the purpose of answering the enemy's guns firing from N.E. corner of village of Nagshettihalli, and to cover advance of cavalry towards the south-west, and support infantry attack at that point. This they did; meanwhile M/2 and I/3 R.A., with the first infantry brigade, had arrived near the village of Jalhalli when the enemy's cavalry and R.H.A. were seen rapidly retiring from Nagshettihalli village in a southerly direction. The two batteries were then pushed rapidly on to a position under a natural mud parapet (varying from three to four feet in height), one battery on each side of the road east of village of Yeshvantpur. From this position, supported by infantry, they brought a heavy fire to bear on enemy's infantry. No guns of the enemy were at this time in position against them.

Marked on map. The M/2nd and I/3rd R.A. 1st fighting position on 18th.

Colonel Caine, A.A.G., R.A., the umpire attached, at this point rode up with a view of causing the enemy to retire, when almost immediately afterwards an umpire arrived from the other side stating that he had Sir H. Gough's orders to put one gun M/2 R.A. out of action for one hour and to retire M/2 R.A., the right battery. This was done. The four guns R.H.A. with the cavalry now arrived, and a road having been formed through the village of Yeshvantpur, the R.H.A. with cavalry moved in that direction and took up a position in a hollow lane, partially enfilading the enemy's position. They were shortly reinforced by M/2 R.A. here with five guns. The R.H.A. now moved on across the level crossing and took post on the rocky hill south-west of 3100 still further enfilading the enemy. M/2 R.A. was now moved on under cover of fire of R.H.A. into line with them. M/2 was afterwards moved still further to south-west on the next hill. Meanwhile orders had been left with O.C. I/3 R.A. to continue in action in his original position behind the mud parapet till a further direct advance could be made in support of infantry attack. This was done, and this battery eventually occupied the position previously held by the enemy.

Marked on map M/2nd 2nd position E/B 3rd position on 18th.

Marked on map E/B final position. M/2nd 3rd position on the 18th.

Marked on map M/2nd final position on 18th.

Marked on map I/3rd R.A. final position on 18th.

At this point the action closed and batteries moved to camp near the rifle range.

At 9 A.M. this brigade marched from hill No. 3045, under instructions from the Major-General, by the route indicated, under cover of hills about half a mile east of left edge of map, and behind hill No. 3050 deployed into line of columns at deploying interval two battalions in first line, one in second, marched west of summit and directed advance south-east on village of Jalhalli. On passing Dod Bettahalli signal station received a message from signallers that three battalions of enemy were marching west from the Muntapum. Cavalry joined soon after and reported all clear in front.

1st brigade.

10-15 A.M.

On reaching Jalhalli reports were received from cavalry that bund in front and road across causeway to east were clear. Two battalions were crossed by causeway, one by bund (12-10 o'clock).

11-40.

The brigade took up a first position as marked on map between villages of Martenhalli on left and Yeshvantpur on right, both being occupied; two battalions and sappers in first line, one battalion in second line.

Two battalions of enemy were reported on the right front, one on hill in centre. When in this position a despatch from Major-General was received that two battalions of second brigade were crossing marshes above Hebbal tank to join the first brigade.

12-40.

General officer commanding first brigade awaited their coming, and sent a request that they would take up position on left of his line, and informed them that as soon as they joined the right of the first brigade would work round to its right.

When the two battalions of the second brigade joined, an advance was ordered to the right front. At same time the battalion of the second line was ordered round to the right.

1 o'clock.

Operation continued. Subedar village was occupied, and a position taken up as marked on map. Ten minutes before "cease fire" sounded the right regiment of the first brigade was firing into two H.A. guns and a squadron of cavalry halted within 150 yards near a small trench at the fourth milestone on Tumkur road.

1-15 o'clock.

The guns were not in action.

The right rear of the first brigade was at this time supported by five Fd. A. guns, four H.A. guns, and three or four squadrons of cavalry.

This left was joined on to the second brigade.

The line was within 150 yards of the enemy, who was attacked on two sides.

The communication between the main signal stations on Tinnulu and the first brigade was excellent; an after knowledge of what had occurred proved the accuracy of the messages received.

The first brigade was handled in a masterly manner.

At 9 A.M. the second brigade occupied the following position:—The whole of the 43rd Light Infantry were in the plantation, on the east of which was a troop of cavalry (Major Hooper's).

2nd brigade infantry.

The 4th and 14th regiments were in reserve on the road behind the brow of the hill. The 10th Regiment was sent to the hill Tinnulu to act as escort to the artillery. On intimation being received that the hills on either side of road at Pollium were unoccupied, the brigade advanced down the road with scouts and skirmishers heading, and halted on the north side of the Hebbal tank. The brigade was then split up, the 43rd being left to act independently on the east of the Hebbal tank, and the 4th and 14th were detached under the brigadier to work round the west of tank and effect a juncture with the first brigade. These two regiments moved westward, and then crossed the marshy ground to west of tank and moved southwards. Infantry and artillery fire being heard due south, the advance was accelerated, and the regiments came into action on the slope due north of Yeshvantpur. Having joined both the first brigade on the right and the 10th regiment on the left, which regiment at this time was hotly engaged in endeavouring to turn the enemy's right flank, a general advance was then made on the key of the position,

which was speedily evacuated by the enemy, immediately after which the "cease fire" sounded. The 43rd at this time appeared on the left of the brigade, having worked its way up through a wood from the direction of Gangenhalli.

The final position of the first and second infantry brigades at the "cease fire" is shown on the map.

The 43rd had been ordered to advance by the Major-General, under cover of the Hebbal tank bund, and to occupy the wood adjoining the road between Hebbal and the rifle range. This they did, and were afterwards directed to close to their right to join the 10th. This order was well executed, and they arrived within a few yards of a battery of artillery unperceived on the left of the northern force.

43rd Oxf. L.I.

Orders having been given that communication by signal was to be kept up with General Elles' brigade, which was to make a flank march to the west behind Dod Bettahalli, and that all movements of the enemy's troops were to be sent by him, a party of signallers was sent to Tinnulu sand hills, who, with large telescopes, soon found out that a brigade was posted by the Muntapum, and that troops were moving westward to Yeshvantpur and Gedadhalli. Another party was posted on hill at Dod Bettahalli, who received all the news from the party at the sand hills, and sent it on by sowars to General Elles, who, by 10 A.M., was thoroughly acquainted with the disposition and numbers of the enemy opposing his advance.

Signalling.

The signalling party at the sand hills was placed at the foot of the hill facing north-west and was completely concealed from the enemy's signallers at the Muntapum and near Hebbal.

The party at Dod Bettahalli, who might have been read by the enemy's signallers at the Muntapum or elsewhere, had strict orders not to send any news to the party on the sand hills, save the "understood" and "not understood" signals. These orders were most strictly carried out.

Two of our parties could easily read two parties of the enemy's signallers, but they gained no information, as they seemed unable to find one another, and sent nothing but the "call up" signal.

One officer (Lieutenant Dyer, 2nd Middlesex Regiment) and two men signallers were captured near Pollium.

The division, with the exception of the 1st Light Cavalry, will march to camp near Kistnarajahpuram to-morrow morning.

D.O. 18th.

The first cavalry will remain at Hebbal till further orders on account of anthrax; the cavalry and artillery will march *viâ* lower road through cantonments, the infantry brigades will proceed by sapper lines and upper road; Brigadiers will issue their own orders as to hour. The 10th N.I. will rejoin the first division.

No baggage to leave camp till the troops have cleared. Carts will go by lower road; baggage animals by upper and across country.

These orders were carried out, and the second division reached its camp about noon.

(Signed) H. N. D. PRENDERGAST, Major-General,
Commanding Northern Force.

CAMP KISTNARAJAHPURAM,
24th January 1884.

OPERATIONS OF THE 16TH JANUARY 1884.

Dispositions of the Northern Force.

Major-General Prendergast on the 15th made the following dispositions for the next day:—

1. The main body cavalry brigade, under Colonel Hooper, reinforced by 1/3 R.A., to advance as rapidly as possible along the Devanhalli-Bangalore road, and endeavour to seize the high ground, south of Chik Jala, before the southern force could reach it.

Four guns E/B, R.H.A.; one squadron 12th Lancers; 1st Madras L.C.; two squadrons Silladar Horse; six guns I/3rd R.A.

2. One squadron Silladar Horse to move by the Dod-Ballapur road (it had encamped the night before at Tapshipur near the 39th milestone), gain touch with the scouts from the main body, and scour the country as far as the 18th or 19th milestone.

3. One squadron Silladar Horse to cover the left flank as far as Baglur and Budigere.

4. M/2 Royal Artillery, the wagons of I/3, and the second brigade, to move to Buvanhalli.

5. The first infantry brigade and sappers to Kanamangala.

6. Headquarters to 18th milestone.

7. Cavalry to be provided with twenty and infantry with fifty rounds ammunition.

8. Signal stations to be established at hills marked on the map—3103 and 3050.

Dispositions of Southern Force.

Major-General Sir Charles Keyes on the 15th made the following dispositions for the next day:—

1. The Officer Commanding the cavalry brigade was ordered—

(*a*)—To establish a cordon of observations on a line drawn east and west through the 14th milestone on the Devanhalli road, to watch and report movements of the enemy.

(*b*)—To gain possession, if possible, of Chik Jala, destroy the bridge north of it, and hold village with dismounted cavalry, so as to prevent repair of the bridge.

(*c*)—To establish signalling stations on hill No. 3212 or hill No. 3341.

Colonel Russell was informed of the intended position of the infantry brigades, and that a company of mounted infantry would follow the cavalry brigade up the Devanhalli road.

2. The first infantry brigade, P/1, R.A., and one company sappers to be in position between Geddalhalli and Tanisandra by 2 P.M.

3. The second infantry brigade, S/1, R.A., and one company sappers to be in position on the high ground, near the sixth milestone, on the Yellahanka road by 2 P.M.

4. The company of mounted infantry to follow the cavalry brigade.

5. Divisional headquarters to be at the tenth milestone on the Devanhalli road by 9 A.M., and all reports to be made accordingly.

Execution.

The cavalry brigade, with two guns R.H.A., southern force, started from its camp near the first division, and advanced rapidly in the direction of Chik Jala, which it reached soon after 10 A.M. and found unoccupied. One troop of 2nd Light Cavalry had been detached to watch the right flank east of the Bangalore-Devanhalli road, and to establish posts at Budigere and Kodagihalli villages.

9 A.M., two squadrons 12th Lancers, 2nd L.C., two guns E/B R.H.A.

The company of mounted infantry followed the main body and reached Chik Jala in time to support it.

The bridge on the causeway north of the village was at once prepared for demolition, the necessary appliances having been brought up by the pioneer troop of the 12th Lancers, and was destroyed on the approach of the northern cavalry.

Four guns R.H.A.

The cavalry brigade, northern force, proceeded as directed.

One squadron Silladar Horse watched the country on each side of the Yellahanka road, while the remainder of the brigade, reinforced by I/3 R.A. and covered by one squadron 1st Light Cavalry as an advanced guard, proceeded as fast as possible along the Bangalore road.

One squadron 12th Lancers, 1st L.C. Two squadrons Silladar Horse.

The advanced guard on reaching the causeway north of Chik Jala, about 11-15 A.M., found the bridge destroyed and the approach to it commanded by dismounted cavalry, well posted behind a wall. They were accordingly ordered by umpires to fall back.

11-15 A.M.

At 11-30 the four guns R.H.A. coming up at a gallop to support the advanced guard were suddenly brought up by the broken bridge and the fire of the dismounted cavalry and thrown into some confusion. Two guns were put out of action by the umpires.

11-30 A.M.

Finding the road thus barred, the northern brigade worked round to the west, with the object of threatening the enemy's rear and line of retreat. The 1st Light Cavalry crossed some swampy ground to west of road, and in going through the village were exposed to fire of mounted infantry in position about Chik Jala.

12 noon.

Eventually the brigade emerged on the high ground south of Chik Jala, thereby obliging the enemy to evacuate the position taken up by the dismounted troops, and made a hurried concentration.

Meanwhile two squadrons 1st Light Cavalry, having worked away more to the westward, came suddenly on two guns R.H.A. retiring along the road and captured them.

A series of charges now took place between the contending cavalry on the high ground south of Bet Halsur, the result being that the Umpire-in-Chief decided that both sides should withdraw, the southern ¼ mile, and the northern ¾ mile, and then halt for ½ hour.

When the movements re-commenced, six guns of the northern force were established on the aforementioned high ground, protected by rocky banks, with the object of supporting the further advance of their cavalry.

2 P.M.

The southern cavalry, however, retired, and on the "cease fire" sounding went off across country to camp at Baglur, beyond the line of tanks running west from the twelfth milestone.

3 P.M.

The northern cavalry with eight guns were now established south of Chik Jala.

Remarks by the Umpire-in-Chief.

Throughout the day the cavalry on both sides misconceived their first duty, and instead of doing their best to obtain information of the enemy's movements, their desire seemed to be to come into collision with each other. They acted as if they were advanced guards, and not as reconnoitering parties; the result was that each of the Generals in command was kept in the dark throughout the day as to the movements of the main body of his enemy.

Had it been the intention of either commander to occupy the high ground south of Chik Jala, with the idea of making tactical use of it, the endeavour to seize it would have been justifiable, but the position is not one of any real value, it can be easily turned, and to gain possession of it the cavalry of both sides had to be massed to an extent, which seriously interfered with their scouting and reconnoitering.

It is doubtful whether any advantage was gained by moving the infantry of the southern force until reliable information had been received as to the enemy's advance. The southern force was already in a central position and near a main road, by which it could have proceeded rapidly, east or west, as occasion demanded.

(By Order.)

(Signed) GODFREY CLERK, Brigadier-General,
Adjutant-General.

CAMP OF EXERCISE,
22nd January 1884.

OPERATIONS OF THE 17TH JANUARY 1884.

Disposition of Northern Force.

Major-General Prendergast made Yellahanka and the position south-west of it, from the Allalsandra wood to the hill above Tinnulu, his objective for the 17th.

With this view he ordered—

1. His cavalry brigade to advance as opportunity offered.

2. His second brigade (Colonel Dixon's) to advance by the direct road on Yellahanka. If it met with opposition, which was expected, Colonel Dixon was directed to try and work round the enemy's left flank.

3. His first brigade and sappers to advance along the Devanhalli road as far as the thirteenth milestone, when they would receive fresh orders, his intention being to move them thence across country to the Ballapur road, so as to be in a position either to assist the second brigade in their movement on Yellahanka, by a flank attack from the east, or to act as a reserve.

4. His horse artillery guns and two field batteries to be massed on the high ground near Sonnappanhalli to cover the advance of the infantry brigades, and disperse any masses of the enemy's cavalry.

Dispositions of the Southern Force.

Major-General Sir C. Keyes ordered—

1. His cavalry brigade to hold their ground as long as they could, and when compelled to withdraw to close, if possible, to the west of Yellahanka, or, if this was found to be impracticable, on that village where they would be supported by infantry fire.

2. His mounted infantry to Yellahanka, to be afterwards relieved by infantry.

3. His second brigade (Colonel Brett's) to occupy Yellahanka with half a battalion, relieving the mounted infantry, so as to cover the retirement of the cavalry brigade.

4. His first brigade (Brigadier-General Gib's) to advance from south of Tanisandra to north of Maistry Pollium, and wait there for orders.

5. His field batteries to remain attached to the infantry brigades, P/1 to the first brigade and S/1 to the second brigade.

6. Reports to be sent to him at the tenth milestone on the Devanhalli road.

Execution.

On the morning of the 17th General Prendergast's force resumed its advance covered by the fire of 16 guns.

9 A.M.

The bulk of the cavalry was on the right flank and gradually worked round the left flank of the southern cavalry brigade.

This turning movement of the northern cavalry brigade was supported by the fire of ten guns, M/2 having been detailed at 11 o'clock as an immediate support to the second infantry brigade.

At about 12-30 P.M. the officer commanding the southern cavalry brigade being outnumbered, and having only two guns with which to reply to the northern
12-30 P.M. ten, fell back from the line he had hitherto been holding in front of Puttanhalli.

Meanwhile the northern infantry was advancing along the Devanhalli road, their leading brigade (Dixon's) reaching the twelfth milestone at 10-30 A.M., and their rear brigade (Elles') the thirteenth milestone at 10-40 A.M.

Elles' brigade was then moved across country to the Ballapur road
10-30 A.M. and reached the eleventh milestone on that road at 12-40 P.M.

To give time for this turning movement Dixon's brigade halted for an hour and-a-half, during which M/2 Royal Artillery joined it, and thenceforward immediately supported its advance.

At 12-15 P.M. General Prendergast ordered Dixon's brigade to advance on Yellahanka, and finding it unoccupied his advanced guard, the 1st Battalion Oxfordshire
12-15 P.M. Light Infantry, was through the village at 12-45 P.M.

Just at this time the southern cavalry brigade was hurriedly falling back along the Ballapur road and came under the close fire of Dixon's advanced guard; in addition to this it found that the bridge south of Yellahanka had been prematurely broken up by their own sappers.

The umpires accordingly decided to place two guns and one squadron southern cavalry out of action.

Turning now to the movements of the southern force. At 10 A.M. Yellahanka was occupied by the 15th Native Infantry and the sappers from the second brigade.
10 A.M. Between 10-30 and 11 A.M. the bridges in, and south of, the village were blown up, and at 11-30 A.M. the infantry and sappers were withdrawn and the brigade took position on the ridge which crosses the road at the seventh milestone.

The 15th Native Infantry was on the east of the road in attack formation about 300 yards south of the Allalsandra wood. On the west of the road was the 2nd Battalion South Wales Borderers, also in attack formation, and about 300 yards in rear of the crest of the hill, and on the left was S/1 Royal Artillery. The volunteer battalion was on the extreme left near the Tinnulu hill, facing west.

The second brigade, northern force, lost no time in advancing against this position. The 2nd Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry in attack formation led and was followed by the 4th Pioneers, the 10th Native Infantry, and the 14th Native Infantry.

The Oxfordshire Light Infantry got into the wood and made their way through it, meeting with no opposition until they reached the southern edge of it, when they came on the 15th Native Infantry.

The second brigade, southern force, was at this time in the act of retiring, and the battery of artillery attached to it had already been withdrawn from the ridge, so that the brigade was in no position to withstand the attack made on it.

The 15th Native Infantry was attacked in front and flank, and was
2 P.M. charged by a squadron of the native cavalry. The umpires placed the regiment out of action.

M/2 Royal Artillery now came up on the east of the Allalsandra wood.

Meanwhile the northern cavalry brigade had reached the Tinnulu hill, manœuvring on the open ground on the enemy's left flank.

An indecisive charge between the cavalry on both sides brought the day's proceedings to an end.

At "cease fire" the positions of the contending forces were as follows:—

The first brigade, northern force, was still halted at the eleventh milestone on the Ballapur road, and I/3 Royal Artillery was at the ninth mile on the same road.

The second infantry brigade, with M/2 Royal Artillery, held the high ground above Yellahanka.

The cavalry was on the right, near Tinnulu.

The first infantry brigade, southern force, with its battery, having received orders to retire to the high ground about Hebbal covering Bangalore, was still on the march.

The second infantry brigade having already retired to the rocky ground abreast of the sixth milestone covered this movement.

Remarks by the Umpire-in-Chief.

The movements of the northern force call for no remarks; they were well conceived and accurately carried out. The cavalry was more judiciously handled than on the previous day, and although it was not very successful in discovering the whereabouts of the enemy, it effectually screened the advance of its own main body.

The cavalry of the southern force again failed to obtain intelligence of the enemy's movements, and once more showed a want of appreciation of the importance of intelligent scouting. When forced to withdraw, it would have done better had it done so to the west of Yellahanka, as directed by the General in command. The line of retirement it adopted caused it to be surprised by the enemy's infantry advancing under cover of Yellahanka, and enabled the enemy's cavalry

and artillery to occupy the high ground immediately east of Tinnulu. The forced and hurried retirement of the southern cavalry encouraged the second (Dixon's) brigade of the northern force to push on rapidly, and to complete the route of one of the battalions (the 15th Native Infantry) of the southern force.

The disposition of the southern force at this period was not such as to offer the best resistance. The 15th Native Infantry was drawn up in rear of the Allalsandra wood, thus neglecting the maxim that whenever infantry is halted in the neighbourhood of a wood, it should occupy the further edge of it. The enemy promptly took advantage of this omission, and aided by its cavalry was judged to have completely destroyed the 15th Native Infantry. This jeopardised the whole of the southern force. Of the second brigade (Brett's), one battalion (15th Native Infantry) had been put out of action, another battalion (the volunteers) was moving north-west towards Tinnulu, while the remaining battalion (the 2nd South Wales Borderers) having been posted at some distance on the reverse slope of the ridge was quite unaware of what was taking place on its immediate front and flank. No assistance could be looked for from the second brigade which, from its position on the low swampy ground near Tanisandra, could only move westwards in single file.

(By Order.)

CAMP OF EXERCISE, (Signed) GODFREY CLERK, Brigadier-General,
22nd January 1884. *Adjutant-General.*

MOVEMENTS OF THE 18TH JANUARY 1884.

Dispositions—Northern Force.

Major-General Prendergast ordered—

1. His cavalry, with the exception of two squadrons, which were to be attached to brigades, to form a screen in front of the division, and, supported by the 10th Native Infantry, to occupy the attention of the enemy along their front, while the first brigade (Elles') made its flank march. Their objective was eventually to be the Subedar Chutrum and the high ground to the east of it.

2. The four guns, E/B Royal Horse Artillery, and the two field batteries to be massed on Tinnulu hill, but not to show their strength at first.

3. The first brigade (Elles') and the Madras Sappers to move southwards from their position near the eleventh milestone on the Ballapur road, under cover of the hills which border the map, so as to be south of the village of Yeshvantpur by 12-30 P.M.

4. The 10th Native Infantry attached to the second brigade (Dixon's) to support the cavalry and guns at Tinnulu, and then to assist the cavalry in making a demonstration on the enemy's front. The remainder of the second brigade to hold the Allalsandra wood and the ridge near it in order to meet any attack that the enemy might make in that direction. Should no attack be made, the 4th Pioneers and 14th Native Infantry to move to their right and join the 10th Native Infantry, while the 2nd Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry moved up the road.

5. Infantry to carry fifty rounds per man of ammunition, cavalry twenty.

6. Signal stations to be established at Tinnulu, Dod Bettah, and the hill marked 3050.

7. Divisional headquarters to be at the Allalsandra wood at 9 A.M., at Tinnulu at 10 A.M., afterwards at the hill marked 3050, and finally at Subedar Chutrum.

Dispositions—Southern Force.

Major-General Sir Charles Keyes ordered—

1. Cavalry brigade to fall back covering the left flank of the troops retiring on the Muntipum, close to the third milestone on the Bangalore road. One squadron to watch the right flank as far as the Hennur road.

Reports to be sent in every half hour as well as whenever anything was seen of the enemy.

2. 1st Brigade.—To retire on the Muntipum, leaving the battery attached to it to cover the withdrawal of the second brigade.

3. 2nd Brigade.—To follow the cavalry brigade across the bund of the Hebbal tank, move to the Muntipum, and wait for orders.

4. Signal stations to be established on the rocky hill east of Hebbal, the Muntipum, and the cross roads marked 3100.

Execution.

Finding the Pollium hill and the plantations, which the second brigade of the southern force had occupied during the night, evacuated by the enemy, Major-General
10 A.M. Prendergast ordered his second brigade to advance, the 10th Native Infantry towards Nagshetihalli, and the artillery to prepare the way for the infantry.

The 2nd Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry having occupied Pollium, crossed the valley below the bund of the Hebbal tank and felt its way cautiously up the main road.

During this movement the battalion surprised the southern signalling party on the hill to the east of Hebbal. Major-General Prendergast thus ascertained that the southern General had been misinformed as to his operations, and was evidently expecting three battalions of the northern force to advance up the Devanhalli-Bangalore road.

Meanwhile the first brigade was working round to the west, and by 11-30 had reached Tinnerinhalli, having been joined *en route* by M/2 and I/3 Royal Artil-
11-30 A.M. lery. About the same time the northern cavalry, having been reinforced by four guns of E/B Royal Horse Artillery, moved to Mattikere.

Turning now to the southern force. Both brigades of infantry, with the two field batteries, had retired to the cross roads at the third milestone from Bangalore. Thence two battalions of the first brigade, with P/1 Royal Artillery, were sent to occupy a salient position near the fourth milestone along the Tumkur road. This force was soon joined by the third battalion of the brigade, together with three guns of S/1 Royal Artillery. The second brigade and remaining three guns of S/1 remained at the Muntipum above the aforementioned cross roads, and, with the exception of the volunteer battalion attached to it, which, with the assistance of two companies 2nd Battalion South Wales Borderers and some dismounted cavalry, repelled an attack made by the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, took no active part in the action which followed.

The position taken up by the first brigade was a strong one. It consists of a ridge running due north for about 1,400 yards from the cross roads near the fourth milestone on the Tumkur road. The highest point on the ridge is at the cross roads, and forms a strong left flank for a force facing west, while the north end of the ridge forms the right flank. The sides of the ridge slope gently to the west and north, and form a perfect glacis. The 21st Native Infantry was posted on a commanding position facing north and west, at the salient of the crest line of the ridge, where some broken ground resembling rifle pits afforded good shelter. The 5th Native Infantry was extended on their left, facing west, in a weak line across the Tumkur road, and alone guarded the extreme left of the position when the action began. Both battalions were extended in firing line, and a gap of some 500 yards separated them, in which space the guns of the defence came into action. The 2nd Battalion Middlesex Regiment was in support, more immediately behind the 21st Native Infantry. Brigadier-General Gib, C.B., commanded here.

At noon the leading troops of General Elles' brigade came on this position, and his batteries opened fire. One battery, the left one, was fairly concealed, but the right
12 noon. battery was exposed to a heavy fire from entrenched infantry. One of its guns was put out of action by the umpires, and both batteries were ordered to retire.

Meanwhile a hot infantry fire began on both sides. The 10th Native Infantry now advanced against the north-east side of the position, and being opposed by the 2nd Battalion Middlesex Regiment, which was very strongly posted (5½ companies being behind the bank of an artificial water channel running east and west and 2½ companies in a plantation projecting north on the extreme right), the attacking battalion was obliged to fall back.

About this time the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, moving up the road in attack formation, came on the volunteer battalion of the southern force, strongly posted in
12-15 P.M. a position east of the fourth milestone on the Devanhalli-Bangalore road. The volunteers were supported by two companies of the South Wales Borderers and by a dismounted squadron of Lancers on their right flank. The umpires therefore decided that the attack had failed, and ordered the Oxfordshire Light Infantry to fall back with the loss of one company. The remainder of the battalion then moved off to the right behind the shelter of the rifle butts.

At 12-45 P.M. the 4th Pioneers and 14th Native Infantry, having completed their move-
12-45 P.M. ment to the right, got touch of the first brigade, and came up between it and the 10th Native Infantry.

Major-General Prendergast then ordered a general advance south with these regiments, while Brigadier-General Elles with his brigade (the 2nd Battalion Royal Fusiliers, the 12th and 27th Native Infantry) attacked from the west, throwing forward his right flank as much as possible.

The attack on the left was supported by I/3 Royal Artillery; the flank attack was delivered by three battalions supported by the fire of nine guns (viz., four Royal Horse Artillery and five M/2 Royal Artillery), which came into action on an elevated position near the level crossing over the Tumkur railroad.

To this fire the artillery of the defence replied but feebly, while the Middlesex Regiment, being brought up on the left flank to support the 5th Native Infantry, uncovered the right to the attack of the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, which, working round west from the butts, had come up on the left of the 10th Native Infantry.

It was then decided that the position taken up by General Gib's brigade was no longer tenable.

The action of the cavalry brigades on both sides was mainly confined throughout the day to observation. The southern cavalry remained halted for some hours in rear of the village of Gedahalli, whence it was withdrawn to near Colonel Brett's brigade at the Muntipum, and at about 1-15 P.M. was hurried off to the extreme left flank of General Gib's position. The northern cavalry covered the flanks of the infantry brigades during their turning movement, and at the close of the day was concentrated to the south of the Tumkur road in rear of the right attack.

Remarks by the Umpire-in-Chief.

On this occasion, again, the plans of the northern commander were well considered and carefully executed. Having decided to operate by the west, he recognised the importance of turning his enemy's left, and succeeded in bringing a superior force to that of his adversary on the decisive point. By the capture of the signalling party on the rocky hill above Hebbal the officer commanding the northern army became aware that the southern commander had been misinformed as to his intentions, and that a very slight feint on his left (the east) would suffice to confirm his adversary in the belief that his own right was likely to be heavily assailed.

By retiring to the position formed by the angle of the Devanhalli and Tumkur roads, the southern commander took up the best line to achieve his object and secure the safety of Bangalore. He was again unfortunate in not receiving accurate information of the enemy's movements, and, instead of being able to bring his whole strength to meet the attack, he found himself engaged with three battalions and nine guns against seven battalions and fifteen guns. The position which the first brigade (Gib's) of the southern force held above the villages of Yeshvantpur and Subedar was strong and capable of a prolonged defence even against considerable odds; but as soon as the enemy gained possession of these two villages, and succeeded in working round the left flank of the southern army, that force was overmatched, and when it was found necessary to withdraw the 2nd Battalion Middlesex Regiment from opposing the left flank of the advancing (northern) force, for the purpose of reinforcing the left of Gib's Brigade, the position became untenable. The 1st Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry took advantage of this movement, and with great intelligence and appreciation of the ground, surprised 4 guns P/1 Royal Artillery, and at the same time threatened the rear of General Gib's Brigade. The occasion was one when a counter attack might have been advantageously made; the ground in the vicinity of the Rifle range is peculiarly adapted for such an operation, and had the 2nd Brigade (Brett's) of the southern force followed up the repulse of the 1st Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry by the Volunteers, Detachment South Wales Borderers, and dismounted Lancers, it would have come directly on the left flank of the 10th Native Infantry and the 2nd Brigade (Dixon's) of the northern force, at the time when these troops were committed to a front attack.

The southern cavalry remained inactive in the centre of the position for the greater part of the day, and apparently made no attempt to discover or retard the flank march of the northern force. Once the position 3100 was gained, it would have been scarcely possible for the southern army to prevent the northern army advancing on Bangalore. The latter force would undoubtedly have lost heavily, more especially when the left of the 1st Brigade (Elles') came under the fire of the 1st Brigade (Gib's) of the defence.

(By Order.)

(Signed) GODFREY CLERK, Brigadier-General,
Adjutant-General.

CAMP OF EXERCISE,
22nd January 1884.

FIELD FIRING.

Field firing will be carried out by the force, as per margin, under Command of Major-General Prendergast, V.C., C.B., on Monday the 21st instant.

2 squadrons 12th Royal Lancers.
2 squadrons 2nd Light Cavalry.
2 batteries Royal Artillery.
2nd Division.

This force will rendezvous at the Hudi crossing, south of the railway, at 9-30 A.M. on Monday the 21st, ready to move when ordered.

The conditions under which this practice will be carried out should assimilate, as near as possible, to those of actual service. In this view the position and its approaches should be carefully reconnoitred, and reported on by the cavalry, and the disposition for the attack, made accordingly.

It is very desirable that all three arms—cavalry, artillery, and infantry—should be engaged, and that as many guns and men should be brought into the fighting line as the ground will admit of.

General Idea.

An enemy coming from the north finds his opponent (General Prendergast) too strong and retires northward. On Sunday 20th General Prendergast has received information as to the enemy's line of retreat and whereabouts, and determines to find him next day and attack him at all hazards.

The Position.

The position to be attacked is an isolated ridge of laterite and red clay, 950 yards long by 70 to 180 yards deep.

During the night of the 20th January, this position will be prepared by trenches being dug, and dummies and screens, representing a certain force of artillery and infantry, being put up.

It will not be approached nearer than 150 yards by the infantry, nor 400 yards by the Cavalry.

It will be discovered to the attacking force by the occasional explosion of small mines, &c., and will be marked by red flags on its east and west limits. The positions of the batteries will be marked by blue flags.

General Instructions.

The advance of the force will be limited on the east by a line drawn north and south through the tenth milestone on the Kolar road; and on the west by a similar line through the Kristnarajpuram crossing.

To avoid any chance of accidents, and to ensure the safety of the villagers, &c., the attack made by General Prendergast must be a front one, no turning movement being allowed.

For the sake of safety, the front of the attack at 2,400 yards from the centre of the position must be limited to two miles, or at the outside 4,000 yards. This distance gradually narrowing as the position is approached.

To prevent the chance of the flanks of the attacking force firing into each other, two officers will be detailed by the Assistant Adjutant-General for Musketry to each flank, to see that the troops do not extend beyond certain fixed lateral lines.

The artillery will be provided with 12 rounds of Shrapnell and common shell per gun; the cavalry and infantry, 10 rounds per man.

The small arm ammunition will be served out under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Division. Not more than half of the above quantities to be issued before the attack begins.

Care should be taken that the line of the attack does not become too crowded as the position is approached. With this view, the ammunition should be served out in unequal quantities. As the ammunition is expended the men will fall out and represent casualties.

The following points will be carefully considered and reported upon:—

(*a*) The methods of obtaining and retaining the correct distances.

(*b*) The description of the fire used by all arms, and the effect of the same on the position generally.

(*c*) The mode of serving out the ammunition in the field.

(*d*) The use made of signalling in conducting and controlling the operations.

(*e*) Officers Commanding Regiments, Batteries and Battalions will submit the usual field firing reports, through their respective Brigadiers, to the General Officer Commanding the Division, who will forward them, with his remarks, to the Adjutant-General, Headquarters.

The Assistant Adjutant-General for Musketry will place himself in communication with Captain Macintire, Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore, in view to the inhabitants of the villages situated in the neighbourhood of the position being duly warned, and also in order to steps being taken to prevent villagers or their cattle crossing the area in rear of the position during the time field firing is being carried on.

The Brigadier-General Commanding the Cavalry Brigade will be good enough to detail a Squadron of Silladar Cavalry, under a British Officer, to help the Civil authorities in keeping the ground clear.

The Officer Commanding the Squadron is to be directed to report himself to the Assistant Adjutant-General for Musketry, at the Head-quarters Camp, at 7-30 A.M. on the 20th instant, for orders.

Remarks by the Umpire-in-Chief.

Tactically considered, the advance to the attack of the position was a failure. Great delay occurred in carrying out the "idea,"—attributable mainly to two reasons:—

(1) During the cavalry reconnoissance, the infantry and artillery were kept too far in rear.

(2) The main approaches to the position, viz., the Rampur tank bund, and the two fords across the stream had not been definitely assigned to the various portions of the attacking force. The guns, which were pushed ahead of the Infantry, took the narrow and dangerous track on the tank bund, and eventually coming to a standstill, blocked the roadway for a considerable time to the advance of the Infantry.

The cavalry reconnoissance was well executed and excellent reports of the ground crossed over, as well as of the enemy's position, were sent back by its officers.

The cavalry, on the other hand, advanced closer to the position than would have been possible in warfare, and the support to the dismounted parties were kept in the open at a short range from the guns and rifles of the enemy's entrenchments.

The artillery in column of route on the tank bund was exposed to the distant fire (at a range of some 3,000 yards), of the artillery of the defence. The guns could easily have crossed by the Western, or "No. 1" ford, the banks of which might, if necessary, have been quickly levelled off by means of picks and shovels.

A better position for the guns was to have been found on comparatively high ground to the north-west of Rampur village. There, they would have entirely avoided hampering the infantry, and would have been able to enfilade, somewhat, the defensive position, while at the same time covering the infantry attack.

The infantry brigades both crossed by the same narrow bund, and were then like the guns exposed to the artillery fire of the defence. When they had gained the further side of the marshy tract, they made somewhat dangerous flank march across the enemy's front.

That the infantry or part of it could have crossed the stream was shown by the fact that one of the battalions of the 1st Brigade, 2nd Division, when returning to camp, was able to cross near ford No. 1 without difficulty.

When at last the attack commenced, the practice of the artillery was good, the ranges were quickly found both by trial shots and range finders, and the shell fire was well sustained.

Having once found the range and being within effective distance of the position, there would seem to have been no object in advancing the batteries by such a short distance as 300 yards. The limbers too were unnecessarily exposed.

The infantry fire began too feebly: eventually, however, it was well sustained with considerable effect, and the battalions were in hand throughout the practice.

Great credit for the preparation of the position over night is due to Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton, R.E., Major Symons, Assistant Adjutant-General for Musketry and Lieutenant MacDonnell, R.E., who carried out their part of the programme with ability under considerable difficulty.

(By Order.)

(Signed) GODFREY CLERK, Brigadier-General,
Adjutant-General.

DIARY OF MOVEMENTS OF 1ST DIVISION.

UNDER ORDERS OF MAJOR GENERAL SIR C. KEYES, K.C.B.,

In connection with "Night March," Tuesday and Wednesday, 22nd and 23rd January 1884.

NIGHT MARCH.

General Idea.

Information having been received that an enemy arriving from the north has taken up his position on the rocky ridge lying between the villages of Mitganhalli, Hosur and Belhalli, about six miles north north-west of the 1st Division Camp, the General Officer Commanding that division receives orders to make a night march on the position and to assault it shortly before daybreak on the morning of the 23rd instant.

General Instructions.

1st Division.	To carry out the above general idea, Major-General Sir Charles Keyes, K.C.B., with the troops under his command as per margin will move from his camp on the night of the 22nd instant, in two columns, for the purpose of advancing on the position.
1 squadron. 12th Lancers. 2 squadrons. Silladars.	

The composition and time of departure of these two columns will be arranged by the General Officer Commanding, after such hasty reconnoissance as he may be able to make, and

with due regard to the nature of the ground each column may have to pass over; the object being that both should arrive simultaneously at the point of attack.

One column will proceed *viâ* Rampur, point 2973, and a little to the east of Kadagrahar forming for assault in the valley to the east of Sonapanhalli and Hosur.

The other column will proceed *viâ* Margondahalli, Chansandra, Blasewall and Kannur forming for assault behind the village of Belhalli.

Communication by visual signalling between these two columns should be maintained wherever possible during the night march, provided this can be done without its being observed by the enemy.

Each gun and man to be provided with 10 rounds of blank ammunition.

General Keyes will dispose of the cavalry portion of the force as he may think best, the object being to pursue the enemy after he has been beaten from the ridge.

Major-General Keyes will communicate immediately with the Brigadier-General Commanding the Cavalry Brigade and intimate his wishes as regards the movement to join his division of the cavalry detailed in paragraph 1, General Instructions.

Position.

The position as indicated in the general idea (1st paragraph) will be occupied by a skeleton enemy, under command of Captain Henry, R.E., with two companies of Sappers, which will move out under orders to be issued by the Officer Commanding, R.E., on the afternoon of the 22nd instant.

TUESDAY AND WEDNESDAY, 22ND AND 23RD JANUARY 1884.

Reconnoissance, 1st Brigade.

At 3-30 P.M., on Tuesday, 22nd January, the Assistant Quarter Master General, accompanied by the Brigade Major of the 1st Brigade, was directed to make a reconnoissance of, and report on, the best route by which the 1st Brigade (right column) could move during the night, from camp on to the position indicated in the printed instructions for a "Night March," received at noon.

The route followed outward was from camp across the Rampur tank bund, thence following a cart track almost due north to a single tree, occupying a position on the map about that marked 2973. Thence a cart track slightly east of the village of Kadagrahar, on wards between the bed of an old tank to the left, and a high contour to the right. Thence slightly to the west of north, skirting round the eastern margin of some very broken ground, and working westward round its northern limits. Thence in an irregular manner from north-westerly to south-westerly and westerly, to a small tank and some ruined muntapums. At this point the track trended away north-westerly, and a westerly compass bearing was followed down the valley east of Sonnappanhalli to a small single tree near four upright stone slabs, at the foot of the opposite slope of the valley, and north-east of the village.

The whole of this route, from the one tree at point to 2973 until the valley was reached, passes through very thorny scrub—impassable, except by picking one's way,—the cart track followed being in places barely traceable by day.

The distance of this route from Rampur is roughly $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Time taken from camp $1\frac{3}{4}$ hour.

The continuous red line on the map attached indicates this route.

The homeward route followed was a cart track from the vicinity of the eastern slopes of the valley, across the end of the higher contour, between it and the village of Golhalli, in a south-easterly direction. Crossing the southern end of the paddy flat east of the latter village, thence across the tail end of the tank south-west of Kadagrahar and on to the one tree at point 2973.

Throughout this route, the track is well defined, excepting at one spot crossing some flat rocks about a mile beyond the one tree,—the country passed through being much more open and easier of passage.

From the one tree, the outward route was retraced.

The distance to Rampur, about $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles; time occupied to camp, one hour.

The dotted red line on the map indicates the return route, as far as the one tree.

Reconnoissance, 2nd Brigade.

*The D. A. Q. M. General and the Brigade Major, 2nd Brigade, being directed to make a hasty reconnoissance of, and report on, the line of route considered best for the 2nd Brigade in the night march, went out in the afternoon of the 22nd January and ascertained that it would be possible for the brigade to march almost in a direct line N. W. by N. from its parade to Belhalli. The only difficulty being the bund between Chansandra and Blasewall which was rendered practicable for guns and cavalry during the afternoon, by the aid of a fatigue party.

*The above reports of the reconnoissance and operations of the 2nd Brigade are based upon the letter (attached) of the D. A. Q. M. G., 1st Division.

Reports accordingly having been made to the Major-General Commanding the Division, he decided to accompany the right column in person, and issued the following orders:—

Orders issued.

1. The 1st Brigade to leave camp at 11 P.M., and move by the Rampur-Golhalli route.
   On reaching Rampur, communication by signalling to be established with the left column at Blasewall, and on the right column reaching point 2973 communication to be established with the left column at point 2975; if, however, it be found impracticable to communicate between the latter two stations, the right column not to be detained at point 2973 beyond 2-30 A.M. on the 23rd, but moved on so as to reach the valley east of Sonnappanhalli by 5-30 A.M.
2. The 2nd Brigade to move from Camp at 10 P.M. and follow the Blasewall-Kannur route.
   On reaching Blasewall, communication by signalling to be established with the right column at Rampur, and on reaching point 2975, communication to be established with the right column at point 2973; but if it be found impracticable to communicate between the latter two stations, the left column not to be detained at point 2975 beyond 2-30 A.M. on the 23rd, and must be in position behind Belhalli by 5-30 A.M.
3. P/1 Royal Artillery to accompany the 1st Brigade.
   S/1 Royal Artillery to accompany the 2nd Brigade.
4. The cavalry to follow the 2nd Brigade and to expect further instructions on the 2nd Brigade taking up its position near Belhalli.

Right Column.

The 1st Brigade, right column, (P/1 R. A. Middlesex Regiment, Volunteer Battalion, 5th and 21st M. I.) was under arms, and moved off at 11 P.M. The infantry crossing the Rampur tank bund—the artillery (route thus indicated on the map —. .—. .—. .—. .—) crossing the swampy ground below bund, at the so-called ford about a mile east of the bund; having passed which, it drew up at Rampur, awaiting the crossing of the infantry. The battery reached Rampur at midnight—the infantry had not entirely crossed over the bund until 1-30 A.M. on the 23rd.

At about 1 A.M., on Wednesday, 23rd January, it was ascertained by means of visual signalling that the left column had crossed the swamp south of Blasewall, and was moving northward.

At 1-30 A,M., the right column advanced from Rampur, reaching the one tree at point 2973 at 2 A.M., where a halt for half-an-hour was made to allow of the column closing up. From this spot, visual signalling was again established with the left column.

At 2-30 A M., the right column again moved on, all lights being put out, save one, and halted at 3-40, after crossing the paddy flat east of Golhalli; progress having been checked for some moments *en route*, owing to loss of track at the rocks alluded to above.

Visual signalling was again established with the left column from this spot.

The column again moved forward at 4 A.M, and reached the eastern slopes of the Sonnappanhalli Valley at 5-10 A.M., and there formed line of $\frac{1}{4}$ columns.

A reconnoissance was at once made over the high ground in front, towards the position held by the enemy.

The troops were brought forward, artillery on the right, Middlesex Regiment and Volunteers in the fighting line, 5th and 21st, M. I., in support and reserve, which order of advance was preserved, until the enemy was discovered by his opening fire at about 6 A.M.

The artillery after firing a few rounds changed ground so as to enfilade the enemy, and the attack of the fighting line became general.

Left Column.

*The 2nd Brigade, left column, S/1st R. A. 2nd S. W. B., 10th and 15th N. I., and the cavalry, 1 squadron 12th Lancers, 3 squadrons Silladar Horse, was under arms and moved off shortly after 10 P.M. The route taken was along the high ground leaving Margondahalli well to the east—course by compass N. W. by N. —At Chansandra the head of the column was checked to allow the whole brigade to come up. The bund was then crossed, the head of the column reaching Blasewall at 12 midnight, and the whole brigade being over by 12-30 A.M. on Wednesday, 23rd January, when communication was established with the right column at Rampur where the Major-General Commanding was present.

The column then moved forward reaching point 2975 at 1-15 A.M., when a halt of about one hour was made and visual signalling again established with the right column, then at point 2973.

At 2-10 A.M., the column again marched leaving Gooby to the east and point 3006 slightly to the west. Kannur was reached at 3 A.M. A signalling party being left here, the D. A. Q. M. General led the advanced guard cautiously towards Belhalli, which was reached at 3-4 A.M.

The infantry brigade formed up south of the village, the artillery took up a position behind the high ground between Belhalli and oyil and the cavalry in the direction of Booroodoogoon. These positions were maintair ntil 5-30 A.M., when the infantry formed for attack and advanced on the enemy's position veen Belhalli and Mitganhalli.

The cease fire sounded at about 6-30 A.M.

Troops returned to camp at about 10 A.M.

*See foot-note on page 26.

From Major ARTHUR TICKELL, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, 1st Division, to the Assistant Quarter Master General, 1st Division; dated Camp, 23rd January 1884.

I have the honor to report that on receiving the orders for the night march on the 22nd instant, and being ordered to guide the 2nd Brigade under Colonel Brett *viâ* Margondahalli, Chansandra, Blasewall, and Kannur, I made a hasty reconnoissance of the country during the afternoon, and ascertained that we could march almost in a direct line north-west by north from the 2nd Brigade parade ground to Belhalli. The only difficulty being the bund between Chansandra and Blasewall: by the aid of a fatigue party this was rendered practicable for the guns and cavalry during the afternoon, and I obtained guides from the villages. The brigade assembled on the 2nd Brigade parade ground at 10 P.M., shortly after which we commenced the march, keeping the high ground and leaving Margondahalli to our right,—course by the compass north-west by north—at Chansandra we halted a short time, to allow the whole brigade to come up and then proceeded to cross the bund. The head of the column was over and reached Blasewall by 12 o'clock and the whole brigade up by 12-30. This we communicated by visual signal to General Sir C. Keyes who was with the 1st Brigade—and proceeded on the march. The head of the column reached point 2975 at 1-5 A.M. and the whole brigade reported up at 1-15 A.M. Here we halted for about an hour, and got into communication by signal with the 1st Brigade when they reached point 2973. At 2-10 A.M., we again marched leaving Gooby to our right, and point 3006 slightly to our left, reaching Kannur about 3 A.M., where we left the signal party. I proceeded then with an advance guard of the South Wales Borderers; cautiously in the direction of Belhalli, which we reached at 3-45 A.M., and the infantry brigade formed up, just south of the village. The artillery took up a position behind the high ground between Belhalli and Koyil, and the cavalry in the direction of Booroodoogoon. These were our positions until about 5-30 A.M., on the 23rd, when the infantry were formed up for attack, and advanced on the enemy's position between Belhalli and Mitganhalli.

NIGHT MARCH, 22ND JANUARY 1884.

General Idea.

Information having been received that an enemy arriving from the north has taken up his position on the rocky ridge lying between the villages of Mitganhalli, Hosur and Belhalli about six miles north north-west of the 1st Division Camp, the General Officer Commanding that Division receives orders to make a night march on the position and to assault it shortly before daybreak on the morning of the 23rd instant.

General Instructions.

1. Major-General Sir C. Keyes, K.C.B., with the force noted in the margin, will move from his Camp on the night of the 22nd instant in two columns for the purpose of attacking the enemy's position.

1 Squadron 12th Lancers.
3 Squadrons Silladar Horse.
P/1 Royal Artillery.
S/1 Royal Artillery.
1st Brigade—
2nd Batt. Middlx. Regt.
Volunteer Battalion.
5th M.N.I.
21st M.N.I.
2nd Brigade—
2nd Batt. S.W. Borderers.
10th M.N.I.
15th M.N.I.

2. The composition and time of departure of these two columns will be arranged by the General Officer Commanding after such hasty reconnoissance as he may be able to make, the object being that both columns should arrive simultaneously at the point of attack.

3. One column will proceed by Rampur, point 2973, and a little to the east of Kadagrahar, forming for assault in the valley to the east of Sonappanhalli and Hosur.

The other column will proceed *viâ* Naragondahalli, Chansandra Blasewall and Kunnur, forming for assault behind the village of Belhalli,

4. Communication by visual signalling between these two columns should be maintained whenever possible during the night march, provided this can be done without its being observed by the enemy.

5. General Keyes will dispose of the cavalry portion of his force as he may think best, the object being to pursue the enemy after he has been beaten from the ridge.

6. Each man and gun is to be provided with ten rounds of blank ammunition.

7. The position as indicated in the general idea will be occupied by a skeleton enemy consisting of two Companies of Sappers under the Command of Captain Henry, R.E., Assistant Quartermaster-General.

Dispositions by the Major-General Commanding the 1st Division.

Major-General Sir C. Keyes, K.C.B., after a hasty reconnaissance of the position and the roads leading to it, ordered—

(1) The 1st Brigade to leave Camp at 11 P.M., and move by the Rampur route.

On reaching Rampur, communication by signalling was to be established with the left column at Blasewall, and on the right column reaching point 2973, communication was to be established with the left column at point No. 2975; but if it was found impracticable to communicate between the latter two stations, the right column was not to be detained at point 2973 beyond 2-30 A.M. on the 23rd, and must reach the valley east of Sonnappanhalli by 5-30 A.M.

2. The 2nd Brigade to move from camp at 10 P.M., and follow the Blasewall route.

On reaching Blasewall, communication by signalling was to be established with the right column at Rampur, and on reaching point 2975, communication was to be established with the right column at point 2973, but if it was found impracticable to communicate between the latter two stations, the left column was not to be detained at point 2975 beyond 2-30 A.M. on the 23rd, and must be in position behind Belhalli by 5-30 A.M.

3. P/1 Royal Artillery to accompany the 1st Brigade.
S/1 do. do. 2nd Brigade.

4. The Cavalry was to follow the 2nd Brigade was informed that further instructions would be issued to them on the 2nd Brigade taking up its position near Belhalli.

Execution.

The two columns moved off as directed, and followed the routes indicated in the general instructions.

Communication by signal was established between Blasewall and Rampur, so that the two columns started simultaneously from those two places at 1-30 A.M. on the 23rd.

At 1-50 A.M., communication was opened between point 2975 and point 2973.

The right column reached Sonnappanhalli at 4-15 A.M., and from thence General Keyes sent instructions to the left column to get into attack formation behind Belhalli, remain there till daybreak and then attack; should, however, the attack on the right commence earlier, the left column was at once to conform to the movement and attack the enemy's position in flank.

The cavalry was at the same time directed to move to their left towards Booroodoogoon and be prepared to cut off the retreat of the enemy.

The right column then advanced a little, and General Keyes rode forward at 5-30 A.M., and was just able to recognise the position.

The Infantry of the right column were then extended for attack and the guns were moved to the right so as to enfilade the enemy's position.

The left column conformed to the movements of the right and the attack was delivered simultaneously from both flanks.

Remarks by the Umpire-in-chief.

The night march as a march was an unqualified success, and credit is due to the Commander and to the troops engaged in it, for the way the "idea" was carried out.

The brigades arrived before the position under cover of darkness with time to spare before making a simultaneous attack on it.

The ground to be traversed by the troops was difficult, and no marked features, natural or artificial, existed to assist the guides of each column in finding the way.

It was hopeless to expect that a real surprise could be effected, as the enemy was necessarily aware of what was intended, but the operation would have had more the appearance of reality had the position been carried at dawn by one simultaneous rush on the part of each brigade, instead of by the alternate rushes of smaller bodies.

The guns were well posted for enfilading the position, and the cavalry would inevitably have cut off the fugitives.

(By Order.)

(Signed) GODFREY CLERK, Brigadier-General,
Adjutant-General.

REPORT OF THE PASSAGE OVER THE HEBBAL TANK BY A DETACHMENT OF THE BANGALORE GARRISON.

Division and Cantonment Order.

"The following force will parade in Drill Order at the Casuarina Tope north of the Hebbal Tank at 10 A.M. on Wednesday, the 30th January 1884:—

1 Squadron 12th Royal Lancers with Regimental Pioneers.
1 Do. 1st Light Cavalry.
1 Company "Queen's Own" Sappers and Miners.
4 Companies 4th Pioneers.

This force will represent the advanced guard of an army marching on Bangalore and which finds the country in front inundated and passable only by crossing the Hebbal Tank.

Cavalry to be furnished with 10 rounds of blank ammunition per man; Infantry with 20 rounds per man."

Width and depth of the tank.

The width of Hebbal Tank where the 12th Lancers crossed is 720 yards, and the maximum depth, 8 feet. The horses of the 12th Lancers had to swim a distance of 300 yards.

Where the 1st Light Cavalry crossed, the width of the tank is 630 yards with a maximum depth of 6½ feet; the horses swam a distance of 200 yards.

Six cask rafts were constructed—two by the 12th Lancers, and four by the Sappers. The Lancers took 15 minutes to construct their rafts, the Sappers took 20 minutes.

Manufacture of rafts.

Strength of Infantry conveyed over.

One hundred and sixty-seven of all ranks 4th Pioneers were conveyed across the tank on rafts made by the Sappers.

Number of men and horses that swam across.

Fifty-one men and horses of the 12th Lancers swam across the tank. Seventeen horses crossed at the western end of the tank which is fordable.

Sixty-two men and horses of the 1st Light Cavalry swam across.

Time occupied in swimming the horses.

The horses of the squadron 12th Lancers and 1st Light Cavalry were taken across by troops. Each troop of the Lancers took about 15 minutes to swim across the tank. The troops of the 1st Light Cavalry took 8½ minutes each to swim over.

Summary.

Summary.

Fifty-one men and horses of the 12th Lancers, and sixty-two men and horses of the 1st Light Cavalry swam across the tank; the men's clothes, arms and accoutrements and the saddles were taken over on rafts. One hundred and sixty-seven Infantry were conveyed over on rafts. In an hour and fifty-five minutes from the time the horses and rafts commenced to move across, the force had landed and was prepared to resist an attack, or advance into the enemy's country.

BANGALORE,
6th February 1884.

(Signed) W. PAYN, Major-General,
Commanding, Bangalore Division.

No. 106. ORDER THEREON, 8th May 1884, No. 2199.

The Governor in Council having perused the report upon the camp of exercise recently held in the vicinity of Bangalore, together with the diaries of manœuvres attached thereto, congratulates His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief upon the complete success of the undertaking.

2. His Excellency concurs with Sir Frederick Roberts in the opinion that the presence of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India during the operations was a subject of general gratification, and is happy to have this opportunity of placing on record the appreciation of the Madras Government of the honor done to the army of the presidency by Sir Donald Stewart.

3. His Excellency learns with much satisfaction that the drill and appearance of the Madras troops met with the approval of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India. The favorable opinion of so distinguished an officer cannot but be highly encouraging to all who have the efficiency and welfare of the army at heart.

4. The foregoing letter will be communicated to the Right Honorable the Secretary of State for India, the Governments of India and Bombay, the Resident

in Mysore, with reference to paras. 35 and 36, and to the following departments and officers:—

Revenue Department,	with reference to para.	6
Public Department,	do.	31
Public Works Department,	do.	25 and 32
Commissary-General,	do.	27 to 30
Inspector-General of Ordnance,	do.	33
Surgeon-General, Her Majesty's Forces, Madras,	with reference to para.	34

No. 107. *To the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department; dated 8th May* 1884, *No.* 2200.

No. 108. *To the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated 8th May* 1884, *No.* 2201.

No. 109. *To the Resident in Mysore; dated 8th May* 1884, *No.* 2202.

(True Extract.)

(Signed) A. KENNEY-HERBERT, Lt.-Col.,
Offg. Secretary to Government.

To the Quarter Master General.
" Adjutant-General.
" Revenue Department.
" Public Department.
" Public Works Department.
" Commissary-General.
" Inspector-General of Ordnance.
" Surgeon-General, Her Majesty's Forces, Madras.
" Commandant, Madras, Volunteer Guards.
" " Bangalore Rifle Volunteer Guards.
" " Nilgiri Volunteer Rifles.

Exd. E. C. Shunker.

P.W.Cn° 437

Govt. of {1884} Madras.

MILITARY.

To

THE QUARTER MASTER GENERAL,
&c., &c., &c.

Dated May, 8th.

Issued

Recd. 23/5/84 *Encl.*

G.O., 8th May 1884, No. 2199.

No. 1390 W dy 3-6-84

MAY.
Nos. 105—110.

Camps—Instructions.

Camp of Exercise.—Report on the — held in the vicinity of Bangalore in January 1884, perused with satisfaction.

GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

8th May 1884, No. 2199

Camps—Instructions.

Read the following paper:—

No. 105. *From Brigadier-General R. C. STEWART, Quarter Master General, to Lieutenant-Colonel A. KENNEY-HERBERT, Officiating Secretary to Government, Military Department; dated Ootacamund, 31st March* 1884, *No.* 2079.

I have the honor to report, for the information of Government, that, in compliance with the permission conveyed in Government Order, No. 6270, dated 21st November 1882, to hold a camp of exercise in the month of January 1884, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in G.O.C.C., No. 381, dated 1st August 1883, issued the necessary instructions for the assembly of the troops as per margin in the vicinity of Krishnarajpuram, eight miles from Bangalore.

Royal Artillery.

E/B, Royal Horse Artillery.
M/2nd, Royal Artillery.
I/3rd, „ „
S/1st, „ „
P/1st, „ „

Cavalry.

12th Royal Lancers.
1st Madras Light Cavalry.
2nd „ „ „

Infantry.

2nd Battalion, Royal Fusiliers.
1st „ Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
2nd „ South Wales Borderers.
2nd „ Middlesex Regiment.
Four Companies, "Queen's Own" Sappers and Miners.
5th Regiment, Native Infantry.
12th „ „ „
14th „ „ „
21st „ „ „
4th „ (Pioneers).
10th „ Native Infantry.
15th „ „ „
27th „ „ „
Madras Volunteer Guards.
Bangalore Rifle Volunteers.
Nilgiri „ „ (detachment).

2. The Government will observe that, in the selection of corps to attend the camp, every opportunity was taken of the annual relief of the season to assemble regiments and batteries destined to change their stations.

3. This course was adopted by the Commander-in-Chief in view of decreasing the expenditure as much as possible, and it was His Excellency's intention to have marched all the troops from their stations to the camp. Sir Frederick Roberts regrets, however, that the prevalence of cholera generally throughout the presidency necessitated subsequent alteration of this latter arrangement, and the movement by rail to the camp of several of the regiments which were under orders to proceed by route march.

4. The sites for the camps were personally inspected by the Commander-in-Chief, and it was ultimately decided to select very much the same ground as that on which the camp of exercise in 1874 had been held in the vicinity of Krishnarajpuram. The particular spots where the camps were located are noted on the map which accompanies this letter.

5. The country on which it was proposed to hold the camp was thoroughly surveyed by several officers under the superintendence of Captain Henry, R.E., and an excellent map on a two-inch scale produced, which was subsequently lithographed in the Revenue Survey Office and issued to all officers serving in the camp.

6. The Commander-in-Chief's best thanks are due to Colonel Rogers, Superintendent, Revenue Survey, for the admirable manner in which these maps were printed, and for the rapidity with which they were produced.

CAVALRY BRIGADE.

Brigadier-General Sir Charles Gough, V.C., K.C.B., Commanding.
Captain Tuthill, 14th Hussars, Brigade-Major.
Captain Yates, R.H.A., Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.
Lieutenant Adye, 1st Cavalry, Hyderabad Contingent, Orderly Officer.

FIRST DIVISION.

Major-General Sir Charles Keyes, K.C.B., Commanding.
Major Hope, 1st Light Cavalry, Assistant Adjutant-General.
Colonel Swanston, 7th Native Infantry, Assistant Quarter Master General.
Major Tickell, Middlesex Regiment, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.
Captain Romilly, R.E., Field Engineer.
Major Dale, 31st Light Infantry, Assistant Provost Marshal.
Lieutenant Smythe, Royal Scots Fusiliers, A.D.C.

INFANTRY.

First Brigade.

Brigadier-General Gib, C.B., Commanding.
Major Money, Oxfordshire Light Infantry, Brigade-Major.
Lieutenant Radcliff, 25th Native Infantry, Orderly Officer.

Second Brigade.

Colonel Brett, Oxfordshire Light Infantry, Commanding.
Major Clerk, Infantry General List, Brigade-Major.
Lieutenant Molesworth, Royal Artillery, Orderly Officer.

SECOND DIVISION.

Major-General Prendergast, V.C., C.B., Commanding.
Lieutenant-Colonel Morton, 14th Hussars, Assistant Adjutant-General.
Lieutenant-Colonel Gatacre, Middlesex Regiment, Assistant Quarter Master General.
Major Hutchins, Infantry General List, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.
Captain Walker, 19th Native Infantry, Assistant Provost Marshal.
Lieutenant Donald, Royal Fusiliers, A.D.C.

INFANTRY.

First Brigade.

Brigadier-General Elles, C.B., Commanding.
Major Wratislaw, 22nd Native Infantry, Brigade-Major.
Lieutenant Currie, 20th Native Infantry, Orderly Officer.

Second Brigade.

Colonel Dixon, 8th Native Infantry, Commanding.
Captain Banister, South Wales Borderers, Brigade-Major.
Lieutenant Rowe, 8th Native Infantry, Orderly Officer.

7. The troops assembled on the 5th January, the last of the corps marching in on that day, and on the 7th January the work of the camp commenced.

8. It may be interesting to Government to know how the commands of divisions and brigades were distributed. I have the honor, therefore, to append the names of the officers commanding divisions and brigades and their staff officers.

9. The first week was devoted to brigade and divisional drills. During the second week, viz., from 14th to 19th January, manœuvres were executed on an extended scale—one division being moved to Nundidroog, thirty miles distant, for the purpose of operating against Bangalore, which was defended by the other division.

10. On Monday, the 21st, field firing at unknown distances was practised. On Wednesday morning an attack was made on a selected position by the first division, which performed a night march for this purpose. On Thursday, 24th, the troops marched past His Excellency the Governor, in the presence of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India; and on Friday and Saturday, 25th and 26th January, an assault at arms was held in Bangalore.

11. It is a matter of special gratification to the Commander-in-Chief that His Excellency the Governor was able to be present on the occasion of the march past of the assembled troops.

12. Sir Frederick Roberts feels sure the Government of Madras will appreciate the honor done to the Madras army by the presence of His Excellency Sir Donald Stewart, Bart., G.C.B., C.I.E., Commander-in-Chief in India, who arrived in the camp on the 14th January, and witnessed the manœuvres between the first and second divisions.

13. His Excellency has been pleased to express his approbation of the drill and appearance of the Madras army, and Sir Frederick Roberts is confident it will be as gratifying to the Madras Government, as it is to himself, to learn the opinion of this distinguished officer.

14. General the Honorable A. Hardinge, C.B., Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army, likewise honored the camp with his presence, arriving on the 14th January; and it has been an infinite pleasure to Sir Frederick Roberts to receive His Excellency on this the first occasion of his visiting the Madras presidency.

15. It is satisfactory to Sir Frederick Roberts to have to record that the various operations performed and attempted during the camp of exercise have met with success. Copies of each day's manœuvres with the remarks of the Umpire-in-Chief and an explanatory map are annexed, which will enable His Excellency the Governor in Council to judge of the character and scope of the operations.

16. The intelligence of the men and officers in the selection of the ground on the occasion of the field firing was marked, and the fire discipline, as displayed on

this occasion, speaks most highly for the training of the Native, as well as of the European army.

17. The night march was entirely successful, both columns arriving at the point of attack at the same moment. In thus attempting an illustration of this, the most difficult of all operations in the field, it is hoped that the lesson learnt will not be lost to those who took part in it.

18. Absence of a suitable piece of water near the standing camps and want of time interfered with the proposal for including amongst the operations to be carried out during the camp that of the crossing of an unfordable river by a mixed force of cavalry and infantry.

19. Sir Frederick Roberts was glad, however, to have an opportunity of letting the Commander-in-Chief in India witness, before His Excellency left Bangalore, the result of some practice in the execution of such an operation by a portion of the troops of the Bangalore division.

20. The Hebbal tank, a sheet of water some 600 to 700 yards wide at the points where crossed, of which about 200 to 300 yards were beyond the depth of a horse, was selected for the operation, in which a force of 113 cavalry and 167 infantry took part.

One squadron, 12th Royal Lancers, with regimental pioneers.
One squadron, 1st Light Cavalry.
One company, "Queen's Own" Sappers and Miners.
Four companies, 4th Pioneers.

21. The passage of the tank was most successfully effected under the direction of Lieutenant-General Payn, C.B., the cavalry swimming across, and the infantry being transported in cask rafts; the whole force was thus crossed in one hour and fifty-five minutes, excluding the time taken in construction of rafts; and Sir Donald Stewart was pleased to express his strong approbation of the operation in all its details.

22. In the opinion of Sir Frederick Roberts, the peculiar advantages offered by camps of exercise are not only the experience gained by staff and departmental officers and by the training of the individual soldier, but also the opportunity given to corps to meet together in the field, to witness, to compare, and to discuss the working of each particular branch, a feeling of rivalry being thus produced, which when indulged in in a kindly spirit does much in the cause of discipline and *esprit-de-corps*.

23. However great these advantages may be to any army, they specially apply to the Madras army, of which so many regiments are located for long periods together at single stations, and Sir Frederick Roberts feels sure that the camp of exercise just brought to a close has been exceedingly beneficial in this way.

24. *Telegraph.*—The head-quarter camp was connected with the Government telegraph office at Bangalore and the railway station, Krishnarajpuram, and the first and second divisions were connected with head-quarters by the field telegraph worked by the sappers under the able superintendence of Lieutenant A. C. Macdonnell, R.E.

25. The working of both Government and field telegraphs was exceedingly satisfactory, and Sir Frederick Roberts begs that his thanks may be expressed to the Superintendent of Government Telegraphs.

26. *Signalling.*—Communication by visual signalling, both by night and day, was maintained between all the camps throughout the period during which the troops were assembled under the intelligent supervision of Major E. Begbie (Infantry General List), Instructor in Army Signalling, and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India witnessed signalling, on a peculiarly foggy dark night, with Major Begbie's lamps between Nundidroog and His Excellency's camp, a distance of not less than twenty-five miles.

27. *Commissariat and Transport.*—The commissariat arrangements were supervised by Colonel J. C. Gunning, as Principal Commissariat Officer, and Colonel McInroy, as Officer in charge, Supply Branch, at the base; the transport arrangements by Colonel Hayter, C.B., Director of Transport.

28. The rations were good throughout, and no complaint has reached His Excellency of the quality or the sufficiency of the supply.

29. The present was the first occasion on which the new transport system has been tried, and His Excellency is glad to be able to report favorably of its working. The whole of the Bangalore division, the camp equipage for the head-quarter camp, and a great portion of the troops which marched, were moved by Government transport, and, with the exception of fifty carts hired during the extended manœuvres, the transport of troops was conducted without extra expense to Government.

30. His Excellency is glad to record his appreciation of the services of Colonel J. C. Gunning, Colonel McInroy, Colonel Hayter, C.B., and the officers attached to the supply and transport branches of the Commissariat department. These officers evinced a desire to comply with the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief and a readiness to meet all demands which rendered the task of the army staff officers much easier than it otherwise would have been, and materially added to the success of the manœuvres.

31. *Post Offices.*—Post offices were established at the head-quarter and the divisional camps; but His Excellency regrets that he cannot compliment the Postal department on the arrangements made on this occasion.

32. *Railway.*—The Madras Railway Company established a station at Krishnarajpuram, which was exceedingly convenient, but the arrangements at the station were defective, and the staff maintained there was quite inadequate to meet the ordinary traffic connected with the camp.

33. *Ordnance Department.*—Sir Frederick Roberts begs to bring to the notice of the Government the assistance rendered by the Inspector-General of Ordnance, and the indefatigable way in which the Ordnance department worked to construct His Excellency's camp equipage in time for the camp.

34. *Medical Department.*—The medical arrangements, under the superintendence of Surgeon-General Madden, were excellent. The health of the troops has throughout the camp been very good, and one regiment which had suffered much from sickness before its arrival considerably improved.

35. *Civil.*—The Commander-in-Chief cannot find words to express his appreciation of the assistance rendered by His Highness the Maharajah of Mysore and those officers of His Highness' Government deputed to attend the camp. His Excellency purposes to address the Mysore Durbar himself on this subject; but he wishes to record in this letter that nothing could exceed the cordial co-operation of Major Macintire, Deputy Commissioner, attached to head-quarters, and the civil officers attached to the divisions.

36. *Silladars.*—His Excellency's thanks are due likewise to the Maharajah of Mysore for having permitted a regiment of Silladar Horse to attend the camp of exercise, which, under the supervision of Colonel Hay, Military Secretary to His Highness, and under the personal command of Lieutenant R. G. Jones, 1st Madras Cavalry, rendered efficient service with the cavalry brigade.

37. *Provost Marshal Department.*—Excellent order has been maintained in camp by the provost department, and crime amongst the troops has been almost unknown.

38. *Umpires.*—His Excellency's thanks are due to all the officers of the Bengal army attending the camp, whose services were placed at his disposal to form the umpire staff, and likewise to those officers of the Bombay army who were good enough to assist.

39. *Volunteers.*—It was a great gratification to the Commander-in-Chief that the Madras volunteers and a portion of the Bangalore and Nílgiri volunteers, under the command of Colonel Ross Church, C.I.E., were able to attend the camp. The corps was attached to the first division, and took part in the operations, 16th to 19th January, and in the night march. The conduct of the volunteers was most exemplary, their discipline excellent, and their endurance during the somewhat trying operations, and more especially during the night march, equalled that of the regular troops.

40. In conclusion, I am desired to express His Excellency's thanks to the Government of Madras for the hearty co-operation he has received from them in

all matters connected with this camp of exercise, without which it would not, His Excellency is well aware, have been brought to a successful conclusion.

41. This letter has been delayed in the hope of its being possible to submit with it a detailed statement showing the cost of the camp of exercise; as, however, it is understood that some further time must elapse before the accounts are ready, the Commander-in-Chief has decided not to wait any longer for the accounts, which will be transmitted on receipt.

DIARY OF MOVEMENTS, 1ST DIVISION.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES KEYES, K.C.B.

From 16th to 19th January 1884.

With reference to Camp General Order, $\frac{14}{C.E.}$, dated the 8th instant, the following General Idea of the Manœuvres, to be performed between the 14th and 19th instant, is published for information:—

The Southern Force, commanded by Major-General Sir Charles Keyes, K.C.B.—

Cavalry Brigade ..
- 2 Guns E/B., Royal Horse Artillery,
- 2 Squadrons, 12th Royal Lancers,
- 2nd Madras Light Cavalry,

1st Infantry Brigade ..
- P/1 Royal Artillery,
- S/1 " "
- 2 Companies, Sappers and Miners,
- 2nd Battalion, Middlesex Regiment,
- 5th Native Infantry,
- 21st " "

2nd Infantry Brigade ..
- 2nd Battalion, South Wales Borderers,
- Volunteer Battalion,
- 15th Native Infantry,

is supposed to be a force of all arms occupying Bangalore, which, on hearing of the approach of an enemy from the north, has taken up a position on the site of its present camp.

The Northern Force, commanded by Major-General Prendergast, V.C., C.B.—

Cavalry Brigade ..
- 4 Guns E/B, Royal Horse Artillery,
- 1 Squadron, 12th Royal Lancers,
- 1st Madras Light Cavalry,
- Silladar Horse,

1st Infantry Brigade ..
- M/2 Royal Artillery,
- I/3 " "
- 2 Companies, Sappers and Miners,
- 2nd Battalion, Royal Fusiliers,
- 12th Native Infantry.
- 27th " "

2nd Infantry Brigade..
- 1st Battalion, Oxfordshire Light Infantry,
- 4th Pioneers,
- 10th Native Infantry,
- 14th " "

is supposed to be a force of all arms arriving from the north for the purpose of attacking Bangalore, and on the evening of the 15th instant encamps in the vicinity of Nundidroog, north of an east and west line drawn through the 30th milestone on the Bangalore Chik-Ballapur road.

To carry out this idea, General Prendergast will leave his present camp, south of the railway, on the morning of the 14th instant and march towards Nundidroog, *viâ* Devanhalli.

General Prendergast will issue such orders as he may think necessary for the movement of his division, to ensure its reaching its camp near Nundidroog on the evening of the 15th instant.

The Commander of the Southern Force, having received information on the evening of the 15th instant of the arrival of the enemy near Nundidroog, will make such dispositions as may appear to him desirable to ascertain the movements and defeat the object of the enemy. The southern force will bivouac whenever it may be necessary for it to leave its camp, which will remain standing, and will not be liable to capture by the enemy.

On the morning of the 16th instant, General Prendergast will turn towards Bangalore with the object of advancing on it, and on his part will make such dispositions as he may think desirable.

The theatre of operations is limited to the country included in the maps already issued.

Operations will be carried on daily from 9 A.M. to 3 P.M., when the halt will be sounded, and no further movement will take place until 9 o'clock the following morning, by which hour troops will be in position on the ground occupied by them at 3 o'clock the previous afternoon. Outposts will, however, be thrown out as on service (*vide* paragraph 24, page $\frac{6}{c}$, "Bangalore Camp of Exercise Order)," after the halt has been sounded, and will not be withdrawn until the Divisional Commanders have satisfied themselves that their position has been made secure from sudden attack.

It is desirable that troops should be encamped or bivouacked as near as possible to the positions occupied by them at the close of each day's proceedings.

Camps, baggage, transport animals, and followers, are not liable to capture.

Detailed instructions regarding transport, supplies and further subsidiary orders regarding movements of contending forces will be issued to Commanders of Forces by the Quarter Master General.

Tuesday, 15th January 1884.

The troops in the first division camp remained quiet.

1 Staff Officer.
2 Volunteer Officers.
4 Staff Sergeants.
87 Volunteers.
12 Followers.

The Bangalore Volunteers, strength as per margin, joined the division, and camped on the left flank of the first brigade.

Wednesday, 16th January

The cavalry brigade (2 R.H.A. guns, 2 squadrons, 12th Lancers, and 2nd M.L.C.) and a company of mounted infantry left camp at 9 A.M. to reconnoitre along the whole front towards the north, with instructions to make a rapid advance, secure the two hills (3341 and 3212 on the map) about 5 miles north of Yellahanka, hold them as long as possible, in view to obtaining as much information as practicable of the movements of the northern army, and signal the same to divisional head-quarters. The bridge on the Nundidroog road, at Chik Jala, to be blown up should time admit, the enemy not to be engaged in a general manner.

At noon the two infantry brigades, each accompanied by a battery of field artillery, and a company of sappers, moved to the westward from camp, to secure positions fixed upon, prior to 3 P.M., to return to camp on completion of this object.

The first brigade occupied the high ground near the village of Tanisandra; the second brigade the high ground at the 6th milestone on the Nundidroog road.

No information having been obtained of or from the cavalry brigade during the day, the Major-General, accompanied by his staff, rode out to Baglur, the site appointed for the brigade to pitch its flying camp at. On reaching this village, it was found that the troops were locating themselves somewhat westward nearer to Satnur.

The Officer Commanding the Brigade reported that he had carried out his instructions as regards blowing up the bridge and securing the two hills, which he held for two hours and then retired, in face of superior force, to a general line extending from Avalhalli on the west to Budigere on the east.

Signallers had occupied both hills, but messages failed to reach divisional head-quarters from them.

It was further reported that two battalions of the enemy's infantry had entered Chik Jalla.

2 Staff Officers.
4 Volunteer Officers.
2 Staff Sergeants.
4 Drill Instructors.
203 Volunteers.
102 Followers.

The Madras Volunteer Guards arrived in the divisional camp at about noon, strength as per margin, and were attached to the second brigade.

Thursday, 17th January.

The infantry brigades occupied by 9 A.M. the same positions held at 3 P.M. yesterday.

All baggage and tentage for flying camp moved away at 9-30 A.M. under charge of the Divisional Transport Officer, with orders to be parked at Hebbal position, *i.e.*, that occupied by the second brigade, and there await orders.

The cavalry brigade had been instructed to fall back slowly on to Yellahanka, reporting to the Major-General there all possible information relative to the infantry of the northern army.

The first brigade moved up at about 9-30 A.M. to a small wood half a mile north of Tanisandra.

At 11 A.M. four companies of infantry were moved up from the second brigade to occupy Yellahanka, the mounted infantry having fallen back on that village. The remainder of the brigade advancing about a mile beyond the position held at 9 A.M., the field battery and

Gardner gun taking up a position behind the bund of a dry tank, to the left of the road, trained on Yellahanka. The four companies and mounted infantry were withdrawn from Yellahanka at noon, at which time the cavalry brigade had retired on that place.

The two R.H.A. guns took up a position on the high ground west of the village. After employing the enemy for some time on the westward of Yellahanka, the cavalry brigade had to retire, the enemy's infantry having occupied the village. The retirement of the cavalry was covered by the fire from the field battery of the second brigade.

It being evident that the main attack was being given from Yellahanka, the first brigade was signalled to, to move over as quickly as possible to Hebbal position, upon which the second brigade began slowly to retire, the enemy beginning to show on the Tinnulu heights, on our left front.

At 2-30 P.M. the second brigade had re-occupied its position of the morning, the cavalry brigade being in a tope near the village of Byatrayanpur, some half mile in advance to the left front.

The first brigade reached the Hebbal position at 2-40 P.M., and was ordered at once to take up a position on the south of Hebbal tank, which it secured by 3 P.M.

Camps were then pitched, pickets posted, and men broken off. The cavalry camped on the right flank of the second brigade in close proximity to water.

A detachment of Nilgiri Volunteers, numbering eighteen N. C. rank and file, joined the division standing camp.

Friday, 18th January.

Camps were struck and all tents and baggage loaded up by 7-30 A.M., and began to move off to the rear at 7-45 A.M., that of the second brigade across the Hebbal tank bund until 8-30 A.M., when the road was closed *pro tem.*

All transport was ordered to make its way back to standing camp.

At 9 A.M. the troops occupied their several positions of the previous evening.

The first brigade retired and took up a position on the high ground at the junction of the roads, south-east of Subedar's chutrum. The cavalry brigade retired and occupied the ground westward from the Hebbal tank to limits of the map, a small body being sent to watch the country eastward as far as Hennur.

After covering these retirements, the second brigade moved to the rear blowing up the bridge at the northern end of the Hebbal tank bund and occupied the Muntapum height, 3118 on the map at the point where the roads to Nundidroog and Tumkur cross.

The enemy's infantry and guns worked under cover of plantations and reverse slopes in such a manner that it was some time ere his movements began to declare, a front attack being expected owing to a wrong point of the compass having been signalled early in the day with reference to the advance of two battalions of his infantry, which were stated to be moving southward (westward being the direction). The attack eventually developed itself on our left, viz, between the two tanks east and west of the village of Mattikere.

To meet this, the first brigade took up a position in keeping with the configuration of the high ground northward and round eastward from Subedar's chutrum, whence the slopes towards the tanks alluded to formed a natural glacis.

Three guns were sent from the second brigade to reinforce the artillery of the first brigade which then at this hour, 11-30 A.M., consisted of three battalions of infantry and nine guns.

The cavalry brigade had, owing to advance of the northern guns and infantry, been withdrawn from its forward position and placed under cover about a mile east of Subedar's chutrum.

By 1-30 P.M. the northern cavalry and some infantry, supported by guns, had worked so much round the left flank of the southern force that the three guns of the second brigade were moved up from their hitherto position with those of the first brigade, and brought into action slightly to the south of junction of the three roads south-east of Subedar's chutrum; and eventually the battalion of infantry on the right of the second brigade was moved up to its left and thrown across from that point south-westerly on to the lower road leading to the Bangalore pettah.

The cavalry brigade being brought up on the left of this line to hold in check the advance of the northern cavalry.

During these changes, the remainder of the infantry of the first brigade had been gradually closed in and concentrated on the ground in the immediate vicinity of point of junction of the three roads.

The second brigade had by this thrown its right forward and was in a position to advance in a north-westerly direction, and attack in flank the infantry of the northern army working round to the left of the first brigade, the three guns on the western slope of the Muntapam hill covering the attack with a range of 1,900 yards.

At this juncture (2 P.M.), it being reported that the northern army had his cavalry, sixteen guns and five battalions of infantry, well on the left flank of the first brigade, southern force, firing ceased, and a fresh disposition of the latter troops was ordered, during which operations were directed to cease, and corps ordered to march to their respective camps.

The southern force reached its standing camp between 5 and 6 P.M.

Saturday, 19th January.

Troops in first division camp remained quiet.
The 10th M.I. rejoined from second division.

(Signed) N. SWANSTON, Colonel,
Assistant Quarter Master General.

DIARY OF MOVEMENTS, 2ND DIVISION.

MAJOR-GENERAL PRENDERGAST, V.C., C.B., COMMANDING.

14th to 19th January 1884.

With reference to Camp General Order, $\frac{14}{C.E.}$, dated the 8th instant, the following General Idea of the Manœuvres, to be performed between the 14th and 19th instant, is published for information :—

The Southern Force, commanded by Major-General Sir Charles Keyes, K.C.B.—

Cavalry Brigade.	2 Guns E/B., Royal Horse Artillery, 2 Squadrons, 12th Royal Lancers, 2nd Madras Light Cavalry, P/1 Royal Artillery, S/1 " " 2 Companies, Sappers and Miners,
1st Infantry Brigade.	2nd Battalion, Middlesex Regiment, 5th Native Infantry, 21st " "
2nd Infantry Brigade.	2nd Battalion, South Wales Borderers, Volunteer Battalion, 15th Native Infantry,

is supposed to be a force of all arms occupying Bangalore, which, on hearing of the approach of an enemy from the north, has taken up a position on the site of its present camp.

The Northern Force, commanded by Major-General Prendergast, V.C., C.B.—

Cavalry Brigade.	4 Guns E/B, Royal Horse Artillery, 1 Squadron, 12th Royal Lancers, 1st Madras Light Cavalry, Silladar Horse, M/2 Royal Artillery, I/3 " " 2 Companies, Sappers and Miners,
1st Infantry Brigade.	2nd Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, 12th Native Infantry, 27th " "
2nd Infantry Brigade.	1st Battalion, Oxfordshire Light Infantry, 4th Pioneers, 10th Native Infantry, 14th " "

is supposed to be a force of all arms arriving from the north for the purpose of attacking Bangalore, and on the evening of the 15th instant encamps in the vicinity of Nundidroog, north of an east and west line drawn through the 30th milestone on the Bangalore Chik-Ballapur road.

To carry out this idea, General Prendergast will leave his present camp, south of the railway, on the morning of the 14th instant, and march towards Nundidroog, *viâ* Devanhalli.

General Prendergast will issue such orders as he may think necessary for the movement of his division, to ensure its reaching its camp near Nundidroog on the evening of the 15th instant.

The Commander of the Southern Force, having received information on the evening of the 15th instant of the arrival of the enemy near Nundidroog, will make such dispositions as may appear to him desirable to ascertain the movements and defeat the object of the enemy. The southern force will bivouac whenever it may be necessary for it to leave its camp, which will remain standing, and will not be liable to capture by the enemy.

On the morning of the 16th instant, General Prendergast will turn towards Bangalore with the object of advancing on it, and on his part will make such dispositions as he may think desirable.

The theatre of operations is limited to the country included in the maps already issued.

Operations will be carried on daily from 9 A.M. to 3 P.M., when the halt will be sounded, and no further movement will take place until 9 o'clock the following morning, by which hour

troops will be in position on the ground occupied by them at 3 o'clock the previous afternoon. Outposts will, however, be thrown out as on service (*vide* paragraph 24, page $\frac{6}{C}$, "Bangalore Camp of Exercise Order,") after the halt has been sounded, and will not be withdrawn until the Divisional Commanders have satisfied themselves that their position has been made secure from sudden attack.

It is desirable that troops should be encamped or bivouacked as near as possible to the positions occupied by them at the close of each day's proceedings.

Camps, baggage, transport animals, and followers are not liable to capture.

Detailed instructions regarding transport, supplies, and further subsidiary orders regarding movements of contending forces will be issued to Commanders of Forces by the Quarter Master General.

DIARY OF MOVEMENTS, 2ND DIVISION.

MAJOR-GENERAL PRENDERGAST, V.C., C.B., COMMANDING.

On receipt of the General Idea of the Manœuvres. (Copy attached).

On Sunday, 13th January 1884, *the following D.O. issued.*

DIVISION Order by Major-General PRENDERGAST, V.C., C.B., Commanding 2nd Division.

13th January 1884.

1. The division will move to-morrow in the direction of Nundidroog in the following order and by the following routes :—

Cavalry brigade, *viâ* Budigere and Betkote to Devanhalli, sending a party along the Dod-Ballapur road, and searching the country north and west of the Yellahanka-Devanhalli road, especially all round Nundidroog.

The cavalry brigade will halt (Monday night) at Devanhalli ; the royal horse artillery will march *viâ* Bangalore and Devanhalli high road to Devanhalli and halt there for the night.

The royal artillery (two field batteries) will march to Devanhalli, *viâ* Hennur, south-west from the Chunam pits, and halt there for the night.

The first brigade will march to Chik Jala, *viâ* Rampur, at 7 A.M.

The Queen's Own Sappers will accompany this brigade.

The second brigade to Chik Jala, *viâ* Blaisewadi, at 8-30 A.M.

Cooked rations will be taken, all water bottles to be filled before leaving camp.

All wheeled transport to go *viâ* Bangalore, pack animals with the troops across country.

The P.M.O. will make such arrangements as he may think necessary to ensure a hospital being established at Chik Jala and Devanhalli before the arrival of the troops.

A Medical officer to be sent on in advance to test the water, to see to all sanitary arrangements, to inquire into sanitary state of villages *en route* and near camping grounds.

2. Quarter Masters, one from each brigade with the camp color men, will go on daily in advance to the new camping ground.

This party will be in charge of the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General ; a few entrenching tools should be taken.

To-day the Quarter Masters of the 14th and 27th N.I. will go on ; as much wheeled transport as possible should be sent on to-day under a Native Infantry guard.

Brigadiers will give their own orders regarding the move of their brigades.

All camp latrines are to be filled in before the regiments leave, and rubbish swept up.

On the evening of Tuesday the whole division will concentrate to the north of the 30th milestone on the Ballapur road in accordance with the General Idea.

Detailed orders regarding this will be issued to-morrow.

14th January 1884.

These orders were carried out.

The cavalry reached its camping ground about 5 P.M., and encamped on spot shown in the map.

The road was easy throughout, except the passing over the tank bund at Budigere, and the road at Bidarpur which was deep and soft (nearly 4 feet). Royal artillery could not cross at either of those places.

The squadron of silladars marching on the Ballatur road reached its ground about 5 o'clock. Length of march, 31 miles.

Its wheeled transport with the heavy grain kettles was late in coming up, but otherwise the march passed satisfactorily.

Length of march 28 to 30 miles.

The royal horse artillery reached its camp about 3-30 P.M., and encamped at spot marked in map.

The royal artillery (two field batteries) reached its camping ground at about I/3 R. A. 2-45 M/2 R.A. 2-15 respectively and encamped on spot marked.

The road was fairly good, but slightly swampy about Hennur and Booroodoogoon.

Length of march 23 miles.

The first brigade and sappers reached its camping ground about 3-15 o'clock, and encamped as marked in map. Length of march about 18 miles.

The road was passable to cavalry, infantry, and pack animals, but it was a very trying road for men and animals on account of the devious nature of the track, and in some places the thorns.

The second brigade and 10th Native Infantry reached its camping ground at about 4 o'clock, and encamped as shown in map. Length of march about 18 miles.

The road was passable for infantry throughout.

Camping grounds reported clean and villages healthy.

No sickness amongst troops.

Three cases were returned to Base.

D.O., 14th January. The division will concentrate to-morrow in the vicinity of the 30th M.S. (north of it) on the Chik-Ballapur road.

The squadron silladar horse marching to the west of Nundidroog will march *viâ* Dod-Ballapur and search the country *en route*.

This squadron will encamp near Shivadihalli.

The cavalry brigade and field batteries will march under the orders of their Brigadier and Officer Commanding, respectively.

The first infantry brigade will march at 9 o'clock.

The second infantry brigade will follow at 10 o'clock.

The road to be kept clear of baggage till the troops have passed.

The camping grounds to be left clean on the departure of the troops.

Attention is called to the order regarding men's water bottles to be filled before leaving camp.

15th January 1884.

The orders as issued were carried out.

4 Guns E/B. R.H.A.	The cavalry and horse artillery reached its camping ground at about 10-30 A.M. and encamped where marked on map.
1 Squad, 12th Royal Lancers ..	
1 Madras Light Cavalry ..	
3 Squad Silladars	

The road is in good order.

Length of march 8 miles.

1 Squad Silladars	The squadron of silladar horse marching on the Ballapur road and across country reached its ground about 10-30 o'clock.

The road was good and passable everywhere.

Length of march about 10 miles.

M2/ R. A.	The royal artillery reached its camp at about 10-15 o'clock—see map. Road good. Length of march 10 miles.
I/3 R. A.	
7th Royal Fusiliers	
Sappers and Miners	The first infantry brigade and sappers reached its camp at about 2-15 P.M.—see map.
12th N.I.	
27th N.I.	

Length of march 15 miles. Road good.

43rd Ox. Lt. Iy.	The second brigade reached its camp at about 3 o'clock—see map. Road good.
4th Pioneers	
10th M.N.I.	
14th M.N.I.	

Length of march 15 miles.

Camping grounds reported clean and villages healthy. No sickness amongst troops.

One case of anthrax occurred in 1st Light Cavalry on night of 14th January.

D.O., 15th January. 1. The 12th Lancers will march to-morrow *viâ* Devanhalli to Chik Jala preceded by scouts. The enemy is to be expected in the direction of Chik Jala.

The country is to be treated as a hostile one.

No village is to be passed unsearched, and all precautions taken to guard against surprise.

The cavalry will encamp to-morrow at Chik Jala.

2. The royal horse artillery will march *viâ* Devanhalli to Chik Jala and support the cavalry.

They will encamp at Chik Jala.

3. The royal artillery I/3 R. A. will march *viâ* Devanhalli in rear of the main body of the cavalry, escorted by one troop of silladars, it will encamp with the cavalry brigade to-morrow to save returning to the infantry encampment.

4. M/2 R.A. will march in advance of the second infantry brigade near which it will encamp.

5. The silladar horse will send the squadron that is encamped on the Dobbspet and Nundi roads to search the country as far as Spiramanhalli at the 16th M.S. on the Dod-Ballapur Yellahanka road. Their special duty will be to make themselves acquainted with roads and swamps through the country to their left and to join hands with the right of the cavalry.

The main body of the silladars will accompany the 12th Lancers squadron and R.H.A. Their scouts will prolong the scouts line of the Lancers to the left.

One troop will act as escort to I/3 R.A. (see D.O. 3).

6. The 1st Madras Light Cavalry will march *viâ* Devanhalli to Chik Jala and act as reserve to the scout line.

7. The first infantry brigade will march *viâ* Devanhalli to Kanamangala and encamp there. It will follow the second brigade.

8. The second infantry brigade will march *viâ* Devanhalli to Buvanhalli and encamp there.

9. The sappers will march with the first brigade, and will, if time permits, make a passable road round the north of Sadhalli.

10. Order of march will be as follows:—

The Cavalry Brigade at 9 A.M.,
I/3 R.A.,
M/2 R.A.,
2nd Infantry Brigade,
Sappers and Miners,
1st Infantry Brigade,

in succession as soon as the front of each is clear.

The baggage will not leave camp till all the troops are well clear of it, and must be kept on the left of the road to prevent a block.

Thirty rounds blank per man infantry and 10 per man cavalry will be carried. It will be drawn this evening.

16th January 1884.

Movements, Cavalry Brigade.

The orders were carried out as far as possible.

After passing Devanhalli the Madras cavalry threw out one squadron to the right of the road and the silladars one to the left.

The front of the brigade was protected by an advance guard 600 yards in front, and in this order the brigade proceeded towards Chik Jala, searching the villages near the road in passing.

On reaching the 15th milestone it was reported that the bridge over the tank was blown up and further advance by the road impossible.

On the brigade halting, fire was opened by the enemy from some Khêts across the tank and two guns R.H.A. having advanced too near the bridge in ignorance of its being blown up and being unable to reverse, were put out of action.

The southern fire was replied to by a dismounted squadron of Lancers and by two guns of R.H.A. who arrived before the bridge had been repaired. These guns rendered good service in covering the turning movement of the brigade.

They were supported by I/3 R.A. who had halted on the left of the road, the whole eight guns in action.

After a delay of about 30 minutes, the south-west of the road was reported clear of the enemy, so the 12th Lancers (Major Poole commanding) took ground to the west.

A squadron of Lancers of the southern force (Colonel Stewart commanding), who had been concealed behind the Khêts before mentioned, moved out to dispute their advance.

Both charged, but were stopped by a nullah which ran between them. The southern cavalry having no ammunition was obliged to retire (by decision of an umpire) before the northern cavalry, who, on seeing the dilemma, had promptly dismounted and opened fire.

In the mean time, three squadrons of 1st Light Cavalry and one of Silladar Horse had followed round the tank and round the hill. (3341).

The Lancers having advanced and dismounted, lined a bund east of 3341 hill, and fired into the southern cavalry in the village of Sennapanhalli, thus holding them engaged while the squadrons under Captain Hornsby completed the circuit of the hill, on to the road, south of the 13th milestone and the *Horse* under Major Hooper reached the village of Bet Halsur.

Information was now received that the southern cavalry was drawn up near the village of Sennapanhalli. Major Hooper charged up the hill, and the squadrons under Captain Hornsby were sent for to help. As they were proceeding towards Chik Jala, they met two guns moving at a walk on the road, captured them, and galloped to assist Major Hooper's charge; they arrived in time to do so. These guns had been firing from the rocks west of 3212 hill on our R.H.A. guns, who were still in action to the west of the road north of the 15th M.S. and where they remained under the orders of the Officer Commanding the Brigade for the remainder of the day, with the view of supporting cavalry movement from a distance. Both forces were ordered to retire by an umpire except the two squadrons under Captain Hornsby, who kept possession of the hill.

I/3rd R. A.

While this struggle for the ridge was proceeding, I/3 R.A., under Major Anderson, had followed the cavalry round the west of the hill and halted near the village of Bet Halsur. On the resumption of hostilities four guns advanced to the ridge, but the southern cavalry retired without fighting. An attempt was made to cut them off, but owing to a misunderstanding in an order the attempt was not supported and was defeated. I/3 R.A., now brought its six guns into action on the rocks and opened on the enemy's cavalry. (See map.)

The final position of the cavalry at end of day's proceeding at 2-10 P.M. was near the enemy's outposts on the high ground south of 12th M.S., main body at Suggatta rocks. (The detached squadron of silladars joined here at about 1-30 P.M.)

The artillery occupied the positions as under at the close of the day's proceeding—

2 guns E/B.R.H.A., at 14th M.S.

2 guns E/B.R.H.A., out of action.

I/3 R. A. on the rocky hill between Suggatta village and road a little north of west of the 12th M.S. M/2 in column of route south of 18th M.S.

The action terminated here by order of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and the two advanced batteries marched to their camping grounds, a little north of the 14th M.S. west of the road. M/2 to Bevanhalli.

A party of signallers (cavalry), consisting of thirteen men and three officers, accompanied cavalry and artillery moving on Chik Jala. On arriving at the 18th milestone, a party of four men and one officer was despatched to Sadhalli rock to watch Chik Jala and the whole country to the west. Another party of four men and one officer took up their position on the rock near 16th milestone, and the third party went on with scouts to 15th milestone, from which place they found the enemy, and signalled to rock near 16th milestone that the bridge was blown up, also that two of our guns were out of action in consequence of having attempted to cross it. The party at Sadhalli signalled to 16th milestone that the enemy's cavalry were working round west towards Narrainpur, which news reached Colonel Hooper, Commanding the Cavalry.

M/2 R.A. marched in front of No. 2 brigade and encamped just south of Havanalli.

The first brigade followed in rear of the second brigade to Kanamangala, where it encamped with the sappers.

The second brigade led the infantry division from Nundidroog to the 19th M.S. on the Chik-Ballapur road as far as Buvanhalli, where it encamped.

Outposts were thrown out from each camp as shown on the maps, and all precautions taken as if in presence of an enemy.

The outposts of the second brigade extended from Buvanhalli to Dod Sanne, those of the first brigade covering the ground from Kanamangala to Bachelhalli.

Headquarters encamped east of the 18th M.S. close to the road.

D.O., 16th January for 17th January.

The division will take up by 9 A.M. to-morrow the same position that it occupied at 3 P. M. to-day.

The cavalry will examine the country from Baglur on their left to Pollium heights and Tinnulu in centre, to Shingapur and Hospolia on their right.

Tinnulu height must be occupied.

The royal horse artillery and two field batteries will take position on the Suggata heights with the object of covering the advance of the infantry on Allalsandra woods and Yellahanka.

The first brigade and sappers will march in rear of second infantry brigade and will receive further orders at the 13th M.S.

The second brigade will move along the Yellahanka road and seize Yellahanka, and, if possible, the Allalsandra wood.

Cavalry will carry 10 rounds and infantry 30 rounds to-morrow of blank ammunition in pouch and on mules. It will be drawn this evening.

No baggage will leave camp till the troops have moved off. It will be kept on the left of the road to prevent a block. It will park near Yellahanka to the east of Puttanhalli.

Verbal orders.

The object to-morrow will be to seize the Yellahanka cross roads and position to the west of it, having our advanced posts on the Tinnulu heights and Allalsandra wood.

All Commanders will use the greatest caution in the advance.

The scouting of the cavalry was performed to-day with too great rapidity and want of caution.

The object of the cavalry to-morrow is to manœuvre rather than fight, and, above all, to send the Major-General full information of all that takes place in its front to guide the advance of the main body.

The amount of news sent from the front to-day did not satisfy the Major-General.

17th January 1884.

The orders as given were carried out.

The cavalry brigade took up its position on the heights near Suggatta, where they were when the "cease fire" sounded yesterday.

Cavalry brigade.

The main body went westwards across the Yellahanka Dod-Ballapur road, driving back the southern cavalry before it, and having occupied the ridges near Dod Bettahalli, passed on to the heights near Tinnulu.

Two squadrons under Major Hooper advanced direct on Yellahanka, clearing the ground east of the road, and hearing the bridge was blown up and the village held by two dismounted squadrons of southern cavalry, kept them in check with two dismounted troops of the first cavalry until the arrival of the infantry at 12-30 noon.

The two squadrons then separated, one moved to the east under Major Hooper, and advancing along the east edge of Allalsandra wood, came up to the 15th N.I., which it took by surprise standing at ease, and cut them up. One squadron Mysore horse moved by the west of the village, clearing the ground south of Yellahanka.

Unfortunately it committed itself to a rash charge near the east of Tinnulu hill.

This charge was supported at long interval, but as fast as possible by two squadrons under Captain Hornsby and one under Colonel Parsons from the west, Major Hooper arriving from the 7th milestone with a squadron in time to assist.

This charge of Major Hooper (though the halt had sounded) was permitted by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to show what would have been done under ordinary circumstances in such a case.

This encounter took place just east of Tinnulu hill and between it and the S. end of Allalsandra wood.

Tinnulu heights were thus left in possession of the cavalry at the end of the day. The scout line extended as far as Shingapur to the west, and joined the right of the second brigade which was holding the S. edge of Allalsandra wood.

R.A.

The orders to the R.A. being "to concentrate on Suggatta rocks," the three batteries moved on to that point:—

I/3 R.A. arriving at 9 A.M.,
E/B.R.H.A. „ 9-10 A.M.,
M/2 R.A. „ 9-30 A.M.,

about three troops of the enemy's cavalry being visible massed on the crest of the hill near the 11 M.S., I/3 R.A. fired on them; after a few rounds they retired.

Orders were then given to R.H.A. "advance with cavalry and seize high ground evacuated by the enemy and shell him as he withdraws."

This advance covered by the other two batteries.

I/3 R.A. to move up and align themselves with R.H.A. as soon as established. E/B. and I/3 advance from here and M/2 move up to them, all 16 guns coming into action in line on high ground 400 yards north and west of 11th M.S.

Marked on map, 2nd position, 17th.

Marked on map, 3rd position, 16 guns on 17th.

At this point, about 11 A.M., orders were received from General Officer Commanding for M/2 R.A. to support advance of second brigade direct on Yellahanka village.

The battery did so, moving into position between hill 2992 and village of Manchalli, from which position it subsequently advanced in support of the infantry attack to a position in advance of the village of Jakkur, a little to east of south line of plantation.

Orders were now given for the other 10 guns to move to the west in support of the cavalry attack on Yellahanka from west covering advance of the second infantry brigade. This was done by successive advances of R.H.A. and I/3 R.A., each battery covering the advance of the other, and both supporting an attack by cavalry on the bund over Mullagoonapollium tank. Up to this time these 10 guns were only opposed by 2 R.H.A. guns of the enemy.

On the arrival at the south end of Mullagoonapollium bund about 1 P.M., orders were received from the General Officer Commanding to detach I/3 R.A. to assist the first brigade, who was then behind the crest of hill No. 3045 near to the west of the 11th M.S. on the Dod-Ballapur road.

This was done. The four guns E/B. R.H.A. then advanced with cavalry south-west under cover of the laterite hills into the position marked on the map (E/B. 6 position on 17th instant). From here they again advanced to hill Tinnulu where they came into action and supported the action of our cavalry at that place.

The day finished thus, all batteries returning to camp round Yellahanka village.

The first infantry brigade marched at 9-10 A.M. in rear of the second brigade in column of route. On reaching the 13th mile and 3rd furlong stone, this brigade was ordered to march due west by Nelkunteh to the Dod-Ballapur Yellahanka road, crossing the paddy south of Mudnahalli and to occupy hill No. 3045, there to await further orders. This it did.

The first infantry brigade.

On passing to the north of Gantiganahalli tank, a squadron of the enemy was seen on the south edge of that tank. This was signalled to the nearest signal station. The squadron of silladars, who had been marching separately, spoke this force * at Nelkunteh village, and then passed on to Puttanhalli, to join the remainder of the cavalry.

* 1st brigade.

The brigade reached hill No. 3045 without opposition, and took up a position about 1 P.M. At 2-5 P.M. it received orders to march to camp at Yellahanka, which it did.

The second brigade marched with advance and rear guard. At the 15th M.S. information arrived that the enemy's cavalry had been seen working east.

Second infantry brigade.

Flanking parties were thrown out to protect left and rear. At 10th M.S. orders were received from the Major-General to take Yellahanka.

43rd O.L.I. advanced in attack formation and occupied the village without opposition.

The centre arch of bridge at north entrance to village had been blown up by enemy, but no difficulty was experienced in passing through the march on either side.

One company 4th Pioneers and tools arrived at 12-45 P.M., and set to work to repair bridge. Bridge was passable at 1-15. Stems of trees cut in the vicinity were supposed to be laid across the breaches, branches of trees across them forming a corduroy road.

The troops extended on the south side of village and lay down.

The enemy's cavalry and artillery appeared in precipitate retreat at this junction down the Dod-Ballapur road, and crossing our front were exposed to a withering fire from one extended line.

Their artillery formed up just below the junction of the two roads apparently with the intention of opening on us, but abandoned the intention and withdrew to beyond Allalsandra, covered by a charge of the Lancers escort, who must have been annihilated by our infantry.

The advance was now continued southwards on either side of the road until the plantation was reached, when the greater part of the line was put into the wood, a half left turn being made.

The 43rd O.L.I. passed through the wood and found the southern end occupied by the 15th M.N.I. skirmishers, who were speedily dislodged and who, as soon as they emerged into the open, were cut up by a squadron under Major Hooper, 1st L.C. They were also exploded from their left by the 4th Pioneers extended line.

The "cease fire" now sounded, about 2-10 P.M., and the brigade marched to its camping ground just south of Yellahanka.

The infantry signallers took up position on the hill to the east of Chik Jala. A cavalry party was sent to Dod Bettahalli, where they arrived in about two hours after much trouble in avoiding the enemy's scouts, and signalled to the party on hill near Chik Jala that there was a squadron of enemy's cavalry and some infantry at the 13th M.S. on the road to Dod-Ballapur, who were marching to Yellahanka.

Signalling.

This news was sent to a third party at the 11th M.S. on the road to Yellahanka, where the General had taken up a position.

The division will to-morrow take up the position it held this evening at 3 P.M., as follows :—

D.O. for 18th January.

The 12th Royal Lancers and cavalry will hold Tinnulu hill with scouts pushed well forward; their left will touch the second brigade at Allalsandra wood.

Strength { 1 Squadron Lancers. 4 Silladars. 1st M.L. Cavalry.

The whole of the artillery of the division will mass behind Tinnulu hill as soon after 9 A.M. as possible, but only four guns will be in position on the hill.

The first brigade and sappers will advance from 3045 hill and move round the enemy's left *viâ* Hospoliah, Shingapur, Jalhalli, Tinnerinhalli, Yeshvantpur, and be south of the last-named village near Subedar's Chutrum by 12-30 noon, keeping west and under cover of the hills running north and south down the west of the map.

1st Brigade, The Royal Fusiliers, Sappers, 12th N.I., 27th N.I.

Two squadrons cavalry will be detailed with this brigade, a battery will be sent to aid it later in the day.

The second brigade, with the exception of the 10th N.I., will hold the Allalsandra wood and check any advance of the enemy in that direction; two regiments will be kept in reserve on the road. When opportunity occurs, it will leave the 43rd in the wood and pass two regiments under cover to the Tinnulu hill.

2nd Brigade, 43rd O.L.I., 4th Pioneers, 14th N.I., 10th N.I.

The 10th N.I. will advance upon Tinnulu from their encampment direct.

10th N.I.

Instructions will be sent to this brigade later on.

The cavalry will carry 20 rounds per man, the infantry 50 rounds per man, to-day in pouches and on mules.

The Officers Commanding Cavalry and R.A. will meet the Major-General at headquarters at 7-45 A.M. to-morrow.

The baggage will not move till 12 noon, and will move on left of the road, to keep it clear.

The chief points to be seized to-morrow by the cavalry are 3050 hill and cross roads near Subedar's Chutrum; all ground and villages over which they advance must be most carefully examined.

Verbal orders.

Signal stations will be established at Tinnulu and Dod Bettahalli at first. Communications must be kept up at all hazards with General Elles' brigade.

Headquarters will be established at 9 A.M. at Allalsandra wood, before 10 at Tinnulu, after probably at 3050 hill north of Jalhalli, later on at Subedar's Chutrum.

Word will be left at each place as to the Major-General's whereabouts.

The objection for the first brigade to-morrow will be to work round the enemy's left under cover of the ridge running from north to south down the west edge of the map and to take him by surprise, if possible, near the rifle range. The second brigade is expected to hold the enemy in front while this movement is being carried out.

The movement of the two regiments from the second brigade to strengthen the right centre attack will require care.

The success of the day will depend greatly upon the timing of the second infantry brigades.

The 10th N.I. will protect the guns on Tinnulu and eventually advance.

Those orders were carried out.

18th January.

The cavalry brigade paraded in rear of the Tinnulu heights, from which the ground for some four miles round is visible; the disposition of the southern troops was clearly seen and reported to the Major-General.

Cavalry.

Two squadrons went towards the Hebbal tank as escort to the R.H.A., which took up a position on Pollium.

About 11-30 A.M. the advance of the first brigade was reported by signal, west of Hospoliah, and the main body of cavalry crossed the march about 800 yards from the head of Hebbal tank.

After some delay, owing to the village of Nagshettihalli being strongly held, the brigade advanced on to the Tumkur road, across the railway, and took up a position on the extreme right of the line, the Mysore Horse placing themselves about 500 yards on the left flank of the southern infantry completely concealed. Here they remained till the "cease fire" sounded at 2 P.M. (their work being done).

In accordance with the orders received, the R.H.A. and R.A. massed on Tinnulu heights, but, as the enemy had withdrawn from his position of the previous evening, no firing took place. From this hill, at 10 o'clock, I/3 R.A. was ordered to proceed under cover of the laterite hills to join and cover the advance of General Elles' brigade moving to the west of Dod Bettahalli. By mistake M/2 R.A. accompanied this battery instead of coming on to Tinnulu hill. Orders were now given to the four guns R.H.A. to advance from Tinnulu hill and to occupy the position previously occupied by the enemy on the hill near the 6th M.S. near village of Pollium west of the road, for the purpose of answering the enemy's guns firing from N.E. corner of village of Nagshettihalli, and to cover advance of cavalry towards the south-west, and support infantry attack at that point. This they did; meanwhile M/2 and I/3 R.A., with the first infantry brigade, had arrived near the village of Jalhalli when the enemy's cavalry and R.H.A. were seen rapidly retiring from Nagshettihalli village in a southerly direction. The two batteries were then pushed rapidly on to a position under a natural mud parapet (varying from three to four feet in height), one battery on each side of the road east of village of Yeshvantpur. From this position, supported by infantry, they brought a heavy fire to bear on enemy's infantry. No guns of the enemy were at this time in position against them.

R.A.

Marked on map. The M/2nd and I/3rd R.A. 1st fighting position on 18th.

Colonel Caine, A.A.G., R.A., the umpire attached, at this point rode up with a view of causing the enemy to retire, when almost immediately afterwards an umpire arrived from the other side stating that he had Sir H. Gough's orders to put one gun M/2 R.A. out of action for one hour and to retire M/2 R.A., the right battery. This was done. The four guns R.H.A. with the cavalry now arrived, and a road having been formed through the village of Yeshvantpur, the R.H.A. with cavalry moved in that direction and took up a position in a hollow lane, partially enfilading the enemy's position. They were shortly reinforced by M/2 R.A. here with five guns. The R.H.A. now moved on across the level crossing and took post on the rocky hill south-west of 3100 still further enfilading the enemy. M/2 R.A. was now moved on under cover of fire of R.H.A. into line with them. M/2 was afterwards moved still further to south-west on the next hill. Meanwhile orders had been left with O.C. I/3 R.A. to continue in action in his original position behind the mud parapet till a further direct advance could be made in support of infantry attack. This was done, and this battery eventually occupied the position previously held by the enemy.

Marked on map M/2nd 2nd position E/B 3rd position on 18th.

Marked on map E/B final position. M/2nd 3rd position on the 18th.

Marked on map M/2nd final position on 18th.

Marked on map I/3rd R.A. final position on 18th.

At this point the action closed and batteries moved to camp near the rifle range.

At 9 A.M. this brigade marched from hill No. 3045, under instructions from the Major-General, by the route indicated, under cover of hills about half a mile east of left edge of map, and behind hill No. 3050 deployed into line of columns at deploying interval two battalions in first line, one in second, marched west of summit and directed advance south-east on village of Jalhalli. On passing Dod Bettahalli signal station received a message from signallers that three battalions of enemy were marching west from the Muntapum. Cavalry joined soon after and reported all clear in front.

1st brigade.

10-15 A.M.

On reaching Jalhalli reports were received from cavalry that bund in front and road across causeway to east were clear. Two battalions were crossed by causeway, one by bund (12-10 o'clock).

11-40.

The brigade took up a first position as marked on map between villages of Martenhalli on left and Yeshvantpur on right, both being occupied; two battalions and sappers in first line, one battalion in second line.

Two battalions of enemy were reported on the right front, one on hill in centre. When in this position a despatch from Major-General was received that two battalions of second brigade were crossing marshes above Hebbal tank to join the first brigade.

12-40.

General officer commanding first brigade awaited their coming, and sent a request that they would take up position on left of his line, and informed them that as soon as they joined the right of the first brigade would work round to its right.

When the two battalions of the second brigade joined, an advance was ordered to the right front. At same time the battalion of the second line was ordered round to the right.

1 o'clock.

Operation continued. Subedar village was occupied, and a position taken up as marked on map. Ten minutes before "cease fire" sounded the right regiment of the first brigade was firing into two H.A. guns and a squadron of cavalry halted within 150 yards near a small trench at the fourth milestone on Tumkur road.

1-15 o'clock.

The guns were not in action.

The right rear of the first brigade was at this time supported by five Fd. A. guns, four H.A. guns, and three or four squadrons of cavalry.

This left was joined on to the second brigade.

The line was within 150 yards of the enemy, who was attacked on two sides.

The communication between the main signal stations on Tinnulu and the first brigade was excellent; an after knowledge of what had occurred proved the accuracy of the messages received.

The first brigade was handled in a masterly manner.

At 9 A.M. the second brigade occupied the following position:—The whole of the 43rd Light Infantry were in the plantation, on the east of which was a troop of cavalry (Major Hooper's).

2nd brigade infantry.

The 4th and 14th regiments were in reserve on the road behind the brow of the hill. The 10th Regiment was sent to the hill Tinnulu to act as escort to the artillery. On intimation being received that the hills on either side of road at Pollium were unoccupied, the brigade advanced down the road with scouts and skirmishers heading, and halted on the north side of the Hebbal tank. The brigade was then split up, the 43rd being left to act independently on the east of the Hebbal tank, and the 4th and 14th were detached under the brigadier to work round the west of tank and effect a juncture with the first brigade. These two regiments moved westward, and then crossed the marshy ground to west of tank and moved southwards. Infantry and artillery fire being heard due south, the advance was accelerated, and the regiments came into action on the slope due north of Yeshvantpur. Having joined both the first brigade on the right and the 10th regiment on the left, which regiment at this time was hotly engaged in endeavouring to turn the enemy's right flank, a general advance was then made on the key of the position,

which was speedily evacuated by the enemy, immediately after which the "cease fire" sounded. The 43rd at this time appeared on the left of the brigade, having worked its way up through a wood from the direction of Gangenhalli.

The final position of the first and second infantry brigades at the "cease fire" is shown on the map.

The 43rd had been ordered to advance by the Major-General, under cover of the Hebbal tank bund, and to occupy the wood adjoining the road between Hebbal and the rifle range. This they did, and were afterwards directed to close to their right to join the 10th. This order was well executed, and they arrived within a few yards of a battery of artillery unperceived on the left of the northern force.

43rd Oxf. L.I.

Orders having been given that communication by signal was to be kept up with General Elles' brigade, which was to make a flank march to the west behind Dod Bettahalli, and that all movements of the enemy's troops were to be sent by him, a party of signallers was sent to Tinnulu sand hills, who, with large telescopes, soon found out that a brigade was posted by the Muntapum, and that troops were moving westward to Yeshvantpur and Gedadhalli. Another party was posted on hill at Dod Bettahalli, who received all the news from the party at the sand hills, and sent it on by sowars to General Elles, who, by 10 A.M., was thoroughly acquainted with the disposition and numbers of the enemy opposing his advance.

Signalling.

The signalling party at the sand hills was placed at the foot of the hill facing north-west and was completely concealed from the enemy's signallers at the Muntapum and near Hebbal.

The party at Dod Bettahalli, who might have been read by the enemy's signallers at the Muntapum or elsewhere, had strict orders not to send any news to the party on the sand hills, save the "understood" and "not understood" signals. These orders were most strictly carried out.

Two of our parties could easily read two parties of the enemy's signallers, but they gained no information, as they seemed unable to find one another, and sent nothing but the "call up" signal.

One officer (Lieutenant Dyer, 2nd Middlesex Regiment) and two men signallers were captured near Pollium.

The division, with the exception of the 1st Light Cavalry, will march to camp near Kistnarajahpuram to-morrow morning.

D.O. 18th.

The first cavalry will remain at Hebbal till further orders on account of anthrax; the cavalry and artillery will march *viâ* lower road through cantonments, the infantry brigades will precede by sapper lines and upper road; Brigadiers will issue their own orders as to hour. The 10th N.I. will rejoin the first division.

No baggage to leave camp till the troops have cleared. Carts will go by lower road; baggage animals by upper and across country.

These orders were carried out, and the second division reached its camp about noon.

(Signed) H. N. D. PRENDERGAST, Major-General,
Commanding Northern Force.

CAMP KISTNARAJAHPURAM,
24*th January* 1884.

OPERATIONS OF THE 16TH JANUARY 1884.

Dispositions of the Northern Force.

Major-General Prendergast on the 15th made the following dispositions for the next day:—

1. The main body cavalry brigade, under Colonel Hooper, reinforced by 1/3 R.A., to advance as rapidly as possible along the Devanhalli-Bangalore road, and endeavour to seize the high ground, south of Chik Jala, before the southern force could reach it.

Four guns E/B, R.H.A.; one squadron 12th Lancers; 1st Madras L.C.; two squadrons Silladar Horse; six guns I/3rd R.A.

2. One squadron Silladar Horse to move by the Dod-Ballapur road (it had encamped the night before at Tapshipur near the 39th milestone), gain touch with the scouts from the main body, and scour the country as far as the 18th or 19th milestone.

3. One squadron Silladar Horse to cover the left flank as far as Baglur and Budigere.

4. M/2 Royal Artillery, the wagons of I/3, and the second brigade, to move to Buvanhalli.

5. The first infantry brigade and sappers to Kanamangala.

6. Headquarters to 18th milestone.

7. Cavalry to be provided with twenty and infantry with fifty rounds ammunition.

8. Signal stations to be established at hills marked on the map—3103 and 3050.

Dispositions of Southern Force.

Major-General Sir Charles Keyes on the 15th made the following dispositions for the next day:—

1. The Officer Commanding the cavalry brigade was ordered—

(*a*)—To establish a cordon of observations on a line drawn east and west through the 14th milestone on the Devanhalli road, to watch and report movements of the enemy.

(*b*)—To gain possession, if possible, of Chik Jala, destroy the bridge north of it, and hold village with dismounted cavalry, so as to prevent repair of the bridge.

(*c*)—To establish signalling stations on hill No. 3212 or hill No. 3341.

Colonel Russell was informed of the intended position of the infantry brigades, and that a company of mounted infantry would follow the cavalry brigade up the Devanhalli road.

2. The first infantry brigade, P/1, R.A., and one company sappers to be in position between Geddalhalli and Tanisandra by 2 P.M.

3. The second infantry brigade, S/1, R.A., and one company sappers to be in position on the high ground, near the sixth milestone, on the Yellahanka road by 2 P.M.

4. The company of mounted infantry to follow the cavalry brigade.

5. Divisional headquarters to be at the tenth milestone on the Devanhalli road by 9 A.M., and all reports to be made accordingly.

Execution.

The cavalry brigade, with two guns R.H.A., southern force, started from its camp near the first division, and advanced rapidly in the direction of Chik Jala, which it reached soon after 10 A.M. and found unoccupied. One troop of 2nd Light Cavalry had been detached to watch the right flank east of the Bangalore-Devanhalli road, and to establish posts at Budigere and Kodagihalli villages.

9 A.M., two squadrons 12th Lancers, 2nd L.C., two guns E/B R.H.A.

The company of mounted infantry followed the main body and reached Chik Jala in time to support it.

The bridge on the causeway north of the village was at once prepared for demolition, the necessary appliances having been brought up by the pioneer troop of the 12th Lancers, and was destroyed on the approach of the northern cavalry.

Four guns R.H.A. The cavalry brigade, northern force, proceeded as directed.

One squadron 12th Lancers, 1st L.C. Two squadrons Silladar Horse. One squadron Silladar Horse watched the country on each side of the Yellahanka road, while the remainder of the brigade, reinforced by I/3 R.A. and covered by one squadron 1st Light Cavalry as an advanced guard, proceeded as fast as possible along the Bangalore road.

The advanced guard on reaching the causeway north of Chik Jala, about 11-15 A.M., found the bridge destroyed and the approach to it commanded by dismounted

11-15 A.M. cavalry, well posted behind a wall. They were accordingly ordered by umpires to fall back.

At 11-30 the four guns R.H.A. coming up at a gallop to support the advanced guard were suddenly brought up by the broken bridge and the fire of the

11-30 A.M. dismounted cavalry and thrown into some confusion. Two guns were put out of action by the umpires.

Finding the road thus barred, the northern brigade worked round to the west, with the

12 noon. object of threatening the enemy's rear and line of retreat. The 1st Light Cavalry crossed some swampy ground to west of road, and in going through the village were exposed to fire of mounted infantry in position about Chik Jala.

Eventually the brigade emerged on the high ground south of Chik Jala, thereby obliging the enemy to evacuate the position taken up by the dismounted troops, and made a hurried concentration.

Meanwhile two squadrons 1st Light Cavalry, having worked away more to the westward, came suddenly on two guns R.H.A. retiring along the road and captured them.

A series of charges now took place between the contending cavalry on the high ground south of Bet Halsur, the result being that the Umpire-in-Chief decided that both sides should withdraw, the southern ¼ mile, and the northern ¾ mile, and then halt for ½ hour.

When the movements re-commenced, six guns of the northern force were established on the

2 P.M. aforementioned high ground, protected by rocky banks, with the object of supporting the further advance of their cavalry.

The southern cavalry, however, retired, and on the "cease fire" sounding went off across

3 P.M. country to camp at Baglur, beyond the line of tanks running west from the twelfth milestone.

The northern cavalry with eight guns were now established south of Chik Jala.

Remarks by the Umpire-in-Chief.

Throughout the day the cavalry on both sides misconceived their first duty, and instead of doing their best to obtain information of the enemy's movements, their desire seemed to be to come into collision with each other. They acted as if they were advanced guards, and not as reconnoitering parties; the result was that each of the Generals in command was kept in the dark throughout the day as to the movements of the main body of his enemy.

Had it been the intention of either commander to occupy the high ground south of Chik Jala, with the idea of making tactical use of it, the endeavour to seize it would have been justifiable, but the position is not one of any real value, it can be easily turned, and to gain possession of it the cavalry of both sides had to be massed to an extent, which seriously interfered with their scouting and reconnoitering.

It is doubtful whether any advantage was gained by moving the infantry of the southern force until reliable information had been received as to the enemy's advance. The southern force was already in a central position and near a main road, by which it could have proceeded rapidly, east or west, as occasion demanded.

(By Order.)

(Signed) GODFREY CLERK, Brigadier-General,
Adjutant-General.

CAMP OF EXERCISE,
22nd January 1884.

OPERATIONS OF THE 17TH JANUARY 1884.

Disposition of Northern Force.

Major-General Prendergast made Yellahanka and the position south-west of it, from the Allalsandra wood to the hill above Tinnulu, his objective for the 17th.

With this view he ordered—

1. His cavalry brigade to advance as opportunity offered.

2. His second brigade (Colonel Dixon's) to advance by the direct road on Yellahanka. If it met with opposition, which was expected, Colonel Dixon was directed to try and work round the enemy's left flank.

3. His first brigade and sappers to advance along the Devanhalli road as far as the thirteenth milestone, when they would receive fresh orders, his intention being to move them thence across country to the Ballapur road, so as to be in a position either to assist the second brigade in their movement on Yellahanka, by a flank attack from the east, or to act as a reserve.

4. His horse artillery guns and two field batteries to be massed on the high ground near Sonnappanhalli to cover the advance of the infantry brigades, and disperse any masses of the enemy's cavalry.

Dispositions of the Southern Force.

Major-General Sir C. Keyes ordered—

1. His cavalry brigade to hold their ground as long as they could, and when compelled to withdraw to close, if possible, to the west of Yellahanka, or, if this was found to be impracticable, on that village where they would be supported by infantry fire.

2. His mounted infantry to Yellahanka, to be afterwards relieved by infantry.

3. His second brigade (Colonel Brett's) to occupy Yellahanka with half a battalion, relieving the mounted infantry, so as to cover the retirement of the cavalry brigade.

4. His first brigade (Brigadier-General Gib's) to advance from south of Tanisandra to north of Maistry Pollium, and wait there for orders.

5. His field batteries to remain attached to the infantry brigades, P/1 to the first brigade and S/1 to the second brigade.

6. Reports to be sent to him at the tenth milestone on the Devanhalli road.

Execution.

On the morning of the 17th General Prendergast's force resumed its advance covered by

9 A.M. the fire of 16 guns.

The bulk of the cavalry was on the right flank and gradually worked round the left flank of the southern cavalry brigade.

This turning movement of the northern cavalry brigade was supported by the fire of ten guns, M/2 having been detailed at 11 o'clock as an immediate support to the second infantry brigade.

At about 12-30 P.M. the officer commanding the southern cavalry brigade being outnumbered, and having only two guns with which to reply to the northern
12-30 P.M. ten, fell back from the line he had hitherto been holding in front of Puttanhalli.

Meanwhile the northern infantry was advancing along the Devanhalli road, their leading brigade (Dixon's) reaching the twelfth milestone at 10-30 A.M., and their rear brigade (Elles') the thirteenth milestone at 10-40 A.M.

Elles' brigade was then moved across country to the Ballapur road
10-30 A.M. and reached the eleventh milestone on that road at 12-40 P.M.

To give time for this turning movement Dixon's brigade halted for an hour and-a-half, during which M/2 Royal Artillery joined it, and thenceforward immediately supported its advance.

At 12-15 P.M. General Prendergast ordered Dixon's brigade to advance on Yellahanka, and finding it unoccupied his advanced guard, the 1st Battalion Oxfordshire
12-15 P.M. Light Infantry, was through the village at 12-45 P.M.

Just at this time the southern cavalry brigade was hurriedly falling back along the Ballapur road and came under the close fire of Dixon's advanced guard; in addition to this it found that the bridge south of Yellahanka had been prematurely broken up by their own sappers.

The umpires accordingly decided to place two guns and one squadron southern cavalry out of action.

Turning now to the movements of the southern force. At 10 A.M. Yellahanka was occupied by the 15th Native Infantry and the sappers from the second brigade.
10 A.M. Between 10-30 and 11 A.M. the bridges in, and south of, the village were blown up, and at 11-30 A.M. the infantry and sappers were withdrawn and the brigade took position on the ridge which crosses the road at the seventh milestone.

The 15th Native Infantry was on the east of the road in attack formation about 300 yards south of the Allalsandra wood. On the west of the road was the 2nd Battalion South Wales Borderers, also in attack formation, and about 300 yards in rear of the crest of the hill, and on the left was S/1 Royal Artillery. The volunteer battalion was on the extreme left near the Tinnulu hill, facing west.

The second brigade, northern force, lost no time in advancing against this position. The 2nd Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry in attack formation led and was followed by the 4th Pioneers, the 10th Native Infantry, and the 14th Native Infantry.

The Oxfordshire Light Infantry got into the wood and made their way through it, meeting with no opposition until they reached the southern edge of it, when they came on the 15th Native Infantry.

The second brigade, southern force, was at this time in the act of retiring, and the battery of artillery attached to it had already been withdrawn from the ridge, so that the brigade was in no position to withstand the attack made on it.

The 15th Native Infantry was attacked in front and flank, and was
2 P.M. charged by a squadron of the native cavalry. The umpires placed the regiment out of action.

M/2 Royal Artillery now came up on the east of the Allalsandra wood.

Meanwhile the northern cavalry brigade had reached the Tinnulu hill, manœuvring on the open ground on the enemy's left flank.

An indecisive charge between the cavalry on both sides brought the day's proceedings to an end.

At "cease fire" the positions of the contending forces were as follows:—

The first brigade, northern force, was still halted at the eleventh milestone on the Ballapur road, and I/3 Royal Artillery was at the ninth mile on the same road.

The second infantry brigade, with M/2 Royal Artillery, held the high ground above Yellahanka.

The cavalry was on the right, near Tinnulu.

The first infantry brigade, southern force, with its battery, having received orders to retire to the high ground about Hebbal covering Bangalore, was still on the march.

The second infantry brigade having already retired to the rocky ground abreast of the sixth milestone covered this movement.

Remarks by the Umpire-in-Chief.

The movements of the northern force call for no remarks; they were well conceived and accurately carried out. The cavalry was more judiciously handled than on the previous day, and although it was not very successful in discovering the whereabouts of the enemy, it effectually screened the advance of its own main body.

The cavalry of the southern force again failed to obtain intelligence of the enemy's movements, and once more showed a want of appreciation of the importance of intelligent scouting. When forced to withdraw, it would have done better had it done so to the west of Yellahanka, as directed by the General in command. The line of retirement it adopted caused it to be surprised by the enemy's infantry advancing under cover of Yellahanka, and enabled the enemy's cavalry

and artillery to occupy the high ground immediately east of Tinnulu. The forced and hurried retirement of the southern cavalry encouraged the second (Dixon's) brigade of the northern force to push on rapidly, and to complete the route of one of the battalions (the 15th Native Infantry) of the southern force.

The disposition of the southern force at this period was not such as to offer the best resistance. The 15th Native Infantry was drawn up in rear of the Allalsandra wood, thus neglecting the maxim that whenever infantry is halted in the neighbourhood of a wood, it should occupy the further edge of it. The enemy promptly took advantage of this omission, and aided by its cavalry was judged to have completely destroyed the 15th Native Infantry. This jeopardised the whole of the southern force. Of the second brigade (Brett's), one battalion (15th Native Infantry) had been put out of action, another battalion (the volunteers) was moving north-west towards Tinnulu, while the remaining battalion (the 2nd South Wales Borderers) having been posted at some distance on the reverse slope of the ridge was quite unaware of what was taking place on its immediate front and flank. No assistance could be looked for from the second brigade which, from its position on the low swampy ground near Tanisandra, could only move westwards in single file.

(By Order.)

(Signed) GODFREY CLERK, Brigadier-General,
Adjutant-General.

CAMP OF EXERCISE,
22*nd January* 1884.

MOVEMENTS OF THE 18TH JANUARY 1884.

Dispositions—Northern Force.

Major-General Prendergast ordered—

1. His cavalry, with the exception of two squadrons, which were to be attached to brigades, to form a screen in front of the division, and, supported by the 10th Native Infantry, to occupy the attention of the enemy along their front, while the first brigade (Elles') made its flank march. Their objective was eventually to be the Subedar Chutrum and the high ground to the east of it.

2. The four guns, E/B Royal Horse Artillery, and the two field batteries to be massed on Tinnulu hill, but not to show their strength at first.

3. The first brigade (Elles') and the Madras Sappers to move southwards from their position near the eleventh milestone on the Ballapur road, under cover of the hills which border the map, so as to be south of the village of Yeshvantpur by 12-30 P.M.

4. The 10th Native Infantry attached to the second brigade (Dixon's) to support the cavalry and guns at Tinnulu, and then to assist the cavalry in making a demonstration on the enemy's front. The remainder of the second brigade to hold the Allalsandra wood and the ridge near it in order to meet any attack that the enemy might make in that direction. Should no attack be made, the 4th Pioneers and 14th Native Infantry to move to their right and join the 10th Native Infantry, while the 2nd Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry moved up the road.

5. Infantry to carry fifty rounds per man of ammunition, cavalry twenty.

6. Signal stations to be established at Tinnulu, Dod Bettah, and the hill marked 3050.

7. Divisional headquarters to be at the Allalsandra wood at 9 A.M., at Tinnulu at 10 A.M., afterwards at the hill marked 3050, and finally at Subedar Chutrum.

Dispositions—Southern Force.

Major-General Sir Charles Keyes ordered—

1. Cavalry brigade to fall back covering the left flank of the troops retiring on the Muntipum, close to the third milestone on the Bangalore road. One squadron to watch the right flank as far as the Hennur road.

Reports to be sent in every half hour as well as whenever anything was seen of the enemy.

2. 1st Brigade.—To retire on the Muntipum, leaving the battery attached to it to cover the withdrawal of the second brigade.

3. 2nd Brigade.—To follow the cavalry brigade across the bund of the Hebbal tank, move to the Muntipum, and wait for orders.

4. Signal stations to be established on the rocky hill east of Hebbal, the Muntipum, and the cross roads marked 3100.

Execution.

Finding the Pollium hill and the plantations, which the second brigade of the southern force had occupied during the night, evacuated by the enemy, Major-General
10 A.M. Prendergast ordered his second brigade to advance, the 10th Native Infantry towards Nagshetihalli, and the artillery to prepare the way for the infantry.

The 2nd Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry having occupied Pollium, crossed the valley below the bund of the Hebbal tank and felt its way cautiously up the main road.

During this movement the battalion surprised the southern signalling party on the hill to the east of Hebbal. Major-General Prendergast thus ascertained that the southern General had been misinformed as to his operations, and was evidently expecting three battalions of the northern force to advance up the Devanhalli-Bangalore road.

Meanwhile the first brigade was working round to the west, and by 11-30 had reached
11-30 A.M. Tinnerinhalli, having been joined *en route* by M/2 and I/3 Royal Artillery. About the same time the northern cavalry, having been reinforced by four guns of E/B Royal Horse Artillery, moved to Mattikere.

Turning now to the southern force. Both brigades of infantry, with the two field batteries, had retired to the cross roads at the third milestone from Bangalore. Thence two battalions of the first brigade, with P/1 Royal Artillery, were sent to occupy a salient position near the fourth milestone along the Tumkur road. This force was soon joined by the third battalion of the brigade, together with three guns of S/1 Royal Artillery. The second brigade and remaining three guns of S/1 remained at the Muntipum above the aforementioned cross roads, and, with the exception of the volunteer battalion attached to it, which, with the assistance of two companies 2nd Battalion South Wales Borderers and some dismounted cavalry, repelled an attack made by the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, took no active part in the action which followed.

The position taken up by the first brigade was a strong one. It consists of a ridge running due north for about 1,400 yards from the cross roads near the fourth milestone on the Tumkur road. The highest point on the ridge is at the cross roads, and forms a strong left flank for a force facing west, while the north end of the ridge forms the right flank. The sides of the ridge slope gently to the west and north, and form a perfect glacis. The 21st Native Infantry was posted on a commanding position facing north and west, at the salient of the crest line of the ridge, where some broken ground resembling rifle pits afforded good shelter. The 5th Native Infantry was extended on their left, facing west, in a weak line across the Tumkur road, and alone guarded the extreme left of the position when the action began. Both battalions were extended in firing line, and a gap of some 500 yards separated them, in which space the guns of the defence came into action. The 2nd Battalion Middlesex Regiment was in support, more immediately behind the 21st Native Infantry. Brigadier-General Gib, C.B., commanded here.

At noon the leading troops of General Elles' brigade came on this position, and his batteries opened fire. One battery, the left one, was fairly concealed, but the right
12 noon. battery was exposed to a heavy fire from entrenched infantry. One of its guns was put out of action by the umpires, and both batteries were ordered to retire.

Meanwhile a hot infantry fire began on both sides. The 10th Native Infantry now advanced against the north-east side of the position, and being opposed by the 2nd Battalion Middlesex Regiment, which was very strongly posted (5½ companies being behind the bank of an artificial water channel running east and west and 2½ companies in a plantation projecting north on the extreme right), the attacking battalion was obliged to fall back.

About this time the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, moving up the road in attack formation, came on the volunteer battalion of the southern force, strongly posted in
12-15 P.M. a position east of the fourth milestone on the Devanhalli-Bangalore road. The volunteers were supported by two companies of the South Wales Borderers and by a dismounted squadron of Lancers on their right flank. The umpires therefore decided that the attack had failed, and ordered the Oxfordshire Light Infantry to fall back with the loss of one company. The remainder of the battalion then moved off to the right behind the shelter of the rifle butts.

At 12-45 P.M. the 4th Pioneers and 14th Native Infantry, having completed their move-
12-45 P.M. ment to the right, got touch of the first brigade, and came up between it and the 10th Native Infantry.

Major-General Prendergast then ordered a general advance south with these regiments, while Brigadier-General Elles with his brigade (the 2nd Battalion Royal Fusiliers, the 12th and 27th Native Infantry) attacked from the west, throwing forward his right flank as much as possible.

The attack on the left was supported by I/3 Royal Artillery; the flank attack was delivered by three battalions supported by the fire of nine guns (viz., four Royal Horse Artillery and five M/2 Royal Artillery), which came into action on an elevated position near the level crossing over the Tumkur railroad.

To this fire the artillery of the defence replied but feebly, while the Middlesex Regiment, being brought up on the left flank to support the 5th Native Infantry, uncovered the right to the attack of the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, which, working round west from the butts, had come up on the left of the 10th Native Infantry.

It was then decided that the position taken up by General Gib's brigade was no longer tenable.

The action of the cavalry brigades on both sides was mainly confined throughout the day to observation. The southern cavalry remained halted for some hours in rear of the village of Gedahalli, whence it was withdrawn to near Colonel Brett's brigade at the Muntipum, and at about 1-15 P.M. was hurried off to the extreme left flank of General Gib's position. The northern cavalry covered the flanks of the infantry brigades during their turning movement, and at the close of the day was concentrated to the south of the Tumkur road in rear of the right attack.

Remarks by the Umpire-in-Chief.

On this occasion, again, the plans of the northern commander were well considered and carefully executed. Having decided to operate by the west, he recognised the importance of turning his enemy's left, and succeeded in bringing a superior force to that of his adversary on the decisive point. By the capture of the signalling party on the rocky hill above Hebbal the officer commanding the northern army became aware that the southern commander had been misinformed as to his intentions, and that a very slight feint on his left (the east) would suffice to confirm his adversary in the belief that his own right was likely to be heavily assailed.

By retiring to the position formed by the angle of the Devanhalli and Tumkur roads, the southern commander took up the best line to achieve his object and secure the safety of Bangalore. He was again unfortunate in not receiving accurate information of the enemy's movements, and, instead of being able to bring his whole strength to meet the attack, he found himself engaged with three battalions and nine guns against seven battalions and fifteen guns. The position which the first brigade (Gib's) of the southern force held above the villages of Yeshvantpur and Subedar was strong and capable of a prolonged defence even against considerable odds; but as soon as the enemy gained possession of these two villages, and succeeded in working round the left flank of the southern army, that force was overmatched, and when it was found necessary to withdraw the 2nd Battalion Middlesex Regiment from opposing the left flank of the advancing (northern) force, for the purpose of reinforcing the left of Gib's Brigade, the position became untenable. The 1st Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry took advantage of this movement, and with great intelligence and appreciation of the ground, surprised 4 guns P/1 Royal Artillery, and at the same time threatened the rear of General Gib's Brigade. The occasion was one when a counter attack might have been advantageously made; the ground in the vicinity of the Rifle range is peculiarly adapted for such an operation, and had the 2nd Brigade (Brett's) of the southern force followed up the repulse of the 1st Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry by the Volunteers, Detachment South Wales Borderers, and dismounted Lancers, it would have come directly on the left flank of the 10th Native Infantry and the 2nd Brigade (Dixon's) of the northern force, at the time when these troops were committed to a front attack.

The southern cavalry remained inactive in the centre of the position for the greater part of the day, and apparently made no attempt to discover or retard the flank march of the northern force. Once the position 3100 was gained, it would have been scarcely possible for the southern army to prevent the northern army advancing on Bangalore. The latter force would undoubtedly have lost heavily, more especially when the left of the 1st Brigade (Elles') came under the fire of the 1st Brigade (Gib's) of the defence.

(By Order.)

(Signed) GODFREY CLERK, Brigadier-General,
Adjutant-General.

CAMP OF EXERCISE,
22nd January 1884.

FIELD FIRING.

Field firing will be carried out by the force, as per margin, under Command of Major-General Prendergast, V.C., C.B., on Monday the 21st instant.

2 squadrons 12th Royal Lancers.
2 squadrons 2nd Light Cavalry.
2 batteries Royal Artillery.
2nd Division.

This force will rendezvous at the Hudi crossing, south of the railway, at 9-30 A.M. on Monday the 21st, ready to move when ordered.

The conditions under which this practice will be carried out should assimilate, as near as possible, to those of actual service. In this view the position and its approaches should be carefully reconnoitred, and reported on by the cavalry, and the disposition for the attack, made accordingly.

It is very desirable that all three arms—cavalry, artillery, and infantry—should be engaged, and that as many guns and men should be brought into the fighting line as the ground will admit of.

General Idea.

An enemy coming from the north finds his opponent (General Prendergast) too strong and retires northward. On Sunday 20th General Prendergast has received information as to the enemy's line of retreat and whereabouts, and determines to find him next day and attack him at all hazards.

The Position.

The position to be attacked is an isolated ridge of laterite and red clay, 950 yards long by 70 to 180 yards deep.

During the night of the 20th January, this position will be prepared by trenches being dug, and dummies and screens, representing a certain force of artillery and infantry, being put up.

It will not be approached nearer than 150 yards by the infantry, nor 400 yards by the Cavalry.

It will be discovered to the attacking force by the occasional explosion of small mines, &c., and will be marked by red flags on its east and west limits. The positions of the batteries will be marked by blue flags.

General Instructions.

The advance of the force will be limited on the east by a line drawn north and south through the tenth milestone on the Kolar road; and on the west by a similar line through the Kristnarajpuram crossing.

To avoid any chance of accidents, and to ensure the safety of the villagers, &c., the attack made by General Prendergast must be a front one, no turning movement being allowed.

For the sake of safety, the front of the attack at 2,400 yards from the centre of the position must be limited to two miles, or at the outside 4,000 yards. This distance gradually narrowing as the position is approached.

To prevent the chance of the flanks of the attacking force firing into each other, two officers will be detailed by the Assistant Adjutant-General for Musketry to each flank, to see that the troops do not extend beyond certain fixed lateral lines.

The artillery will be provided with 12 rounds of Shrapnell and common shell per gun; the cavalry and infantry, 10 rounds per man.

The small arm ammunition will be served out under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Division. Not more than half of the above quantities to be issued before the attack begins.

Care should be taken that the line of the attack does not become too crowded as the position is approached. With this view, the ammunition should be served out in unequal quantities. As the ammunition is expended the men will fall out and represent casualties.

The following points will be carefully considered and reported upon:—

(*a*) The methods of obtaining and retaining the correct distances.

(*b*) The description of the fire used by all arms, and the effect of the same on the position generally.

(*c*) The mode of serving out the ammunition in the field.

(*d*) The use made of signalling in conducting and controlling the operations.

(*e*) Officers Commanding Regiments, Batteries and Battalions will submit the usual field firing reports, through their respective Brigadiers, to the General Officer Commanding the Division, who will forward them, with his remarks, to the Adjutant-General, Headquarters.

The Assistant Adjutant-General for Musketry will place himself in communication with Captain Macintire, Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore, in view to the inhabitants of the villages situated in the neighbourhood of the position being duly warned, and also in order to steps being taken to prevent villagers or their cattle crossing the area in rear of the position during the time field firing is being carried on.

The Brigadier-General Commanding the Cavalry Brigade will be good enough to detail a Squadron of Silladar Cavalry, under a British Officer, to help the Civil authorities in keeping the ground clear.

The Officer Commanding the Squadron is to be directed to report himself to the Assistant Adjutant-General for Musketry, at the Head-quarters Camp, at 7-30 A.M. on the 20th instant, for orders.

Remarks by the Umpire-in-Chief.

Tactically considered, the advance to the attack of the position was a failure. Great delay occurred in carrying out the "idea,"—attributable mainly to two reasons:—

(1) During the cavalry reconnoissance, the infantry and artillery were kept too far in rear.

(2) The main approaches to the position, viz., the Rampur tank bund, and the two fords across the stream had not been definitely assigned to the various portions of the attacking force. The guns, which were pushed ahead of the Infantry, took the narrow and dangerous track on the tank bund, and eventually coming to a standstill, blocked the roadway for a considerable time to the advance of the Infantry.

The cavalry reconnoissance was well executed and excellent reports of the ground crossed over, as well as of the enemy's position, were sent back by its officers.

The cavalry, on the other hand, advanced closer to the position than would have been possible in warfare, and the support to the dismounted parties were kept in the open at a short range from the guns and rifles of the enemy's entrenchments.

The artillery in column of route on the tank bund was exposed to the distant fire (at a range of some 3,000 yards), of the artillery of the defence. The guns could easily have crossed by the Western, or "No. 1" ford, the banks of which might, if necessary, have been quickly levelled off by means of picks and shovels.

A better position for the guns was to have been found on comparatively high ground to the north-west of Rampur village. There, they would have entirely avoided hampering the infantry, and would have been able to enfilade, somewhat, the defensive position, while at the same time covering the infantry attack.

The infantry brigades both crossed by the same narrow bund, and were then like the guns exposed to the artillery fire of the defence. When they had gained the further side of the marshy tract, they made somewhat dangerous flank march across the enemy's front.

That the infantry or part of it could have crossed the stream was shown by the fact that one of the battalions of the 1st Brigade, 2nd Division, when returning to camp, was able to cross near ford No. 1 without difficulty.

When at last the attack commenced, the practice of the artillery was good, the ranges were quickly found both by trial shots and range finders, and the shell fire was well sustained.

Having once found the range and being within effective distance of the position, there would seem to have been no object in advancing the batteries by such a short distance as 300 yards. The limbers too were unnecessarily exposed.

The infantry fire began too feebly: eventually, however, it was well sustained with considerable effect, and the battalions were in hand throughout the practice.

Great credit for the preparation of the position over night is due to Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton, R.E., Major Symons, Assistant Adjutant-General for Musketry and Lieutenant MacDonnell, R.E., who carried out their part of the programme with ability under considerable difficulty.

(By Order.)

(Signed) GODFREY CLERK, Brigadier-General,
Adjutant-General.

DIARY OF MOVEMENTS OF 1ST DIVISION.

UNDER ORDERS OF MAJOR GENERAL SIR C. KEYES, K.C.B.,

In connection with "Night March," Tuesday and Wednesday, 22nd and 23rd January 1884.

NIGHT MARCH.

General Idea.

Information having been received that an enemy arriving from the north has taken up his position on the rocky ridge lying between the villages of Mitganhalli, Hosur and Belhalli, about six miles north north-west of the 1st Division Camp, the General Officer Commanding that division receives orders to make a night march on the position and to assault it shortly before daybreak on the morning of the 23rd instant.

General Instructions.

1st Division.	To carry out the above general idea, Major-General Sir Charles Keyes, K.C.B., with the troops under his command as per margin will move from his camp on the night of the 22nd instant, in two columns, for the purpose of advancing on the position.
1 squadron. 12th Lancers. 2 squadrons. Silladars.	

The composition and time of departure of these two columns will be arranged by the General Officer Commanding, after such hasty reconnoissance as he may be able to make, and

with due regard to the nature of the ground each column may have to pass over; the object being that both should arrive simultaneously at the point of attack.

One column will proceed *viâ* Rampur, point 2973, and a little to the east of Kadagrahar forming for assault in the valley to the east of Sonapanhalli and Hosur.

The other column will proceed *viâ* Margondahalli, Chansandra, Blasewall and Kannur forming for assault behind the village of Belhalli.

Communication by visual signalling between these two columns should be maintained wherever possible during the night march, provided this can be done without its being observed by the enemy.

Each gun and man to be provided with 10 rounds of blank ammunition.

General Keyes will dispose of the cavalry portion of the force as he may think best, the object being to pursue the enemy after he has been beaten from the ridge.

Major-General Keyes will communicate immediately with the Brigadier-General Commanding the Cavalry Brigade and intimate his wishes as regards the movement to join his division of the cavalry detailed in paragraph 1, General Instructions.

Position.

The position as indicated in the general idea (1st paragraph) will be occupied by a skeleton enemy, under command of Captain Henry, R.E., with two companies of Sappers, which will move out under orders to be issued by the Officer Commanding, R.E., on the afternoon of the 22nd instant.

TUESDAY AND WEDNESDAY, 22ND AND 23RD JANUARY 1884.

Reconnoissance, 1st Brigade.

At 3-30 P.M., on Tuesday, 22nd January, the Assistant Quarter Master General, accompanied by the Brigade Major of the 1st Brigade, was directed to make a reconnoissance of, and report on, the best route by which the 1st Brigade (right column) could move during the night, from camp on to the position indicated in the printed instructions for a "Night March," received at noon.

The route followed outward was from camp across the Rampur tank bund, thence following a cart track almost due north to a single tree, occupying a position on the map about that marked 2973. Thence a cart track slightly east of the village of Kadagrahar, on wards between the bed of an old tank to the left, and a high contour to the right. Thence slightly to the west of north, skirting round the eastern margin of some very broken ground, and working westward round its northern limits. Thence in an irregular manner from north-westerly to south-westerly and westerly, to a small tank and some ruined muntapums. At this point the track trended away north-westerly, and a westerly compass bearing was followed down the valley east of Sonnappanhalli to a small single tree near four upright stone slabs, at the foot of the opposite slope of the valley, and north-east of the village.

The whole of this route, from the one tree at point to 2973 until the valley was reached, passes through very thorny scrub—impassable, except by picking one's way,—the cart track followed being in places barely traceable by day.

The distance of this route from Rampur is roughly 5½ miles. Time taken from camp 1¾ hour.

The continuous red line on the map attached indicates this route.

The homeward route followed was a cart track from the vicinity of the eastern slopes of the valley, across the end of the higher contour, between it and the village of Golhalli, in a south-easterly direction. Crossing the southern end of the paddy flat east of the latter village, thence across the tail end of the tank south-west of Kadagrahar and on to the one tree at point 2973.

Throughout this route, the track is well defined, excepting at one spot crossing some flat rocks about a mile beyond the one tree,—the country passed through being much more open and easier of passage.

From the one tree, the outward route was retraced.

The distance to Rampur, about 4½ miles; time occupied to camp, one hour.

The dotted red line on the map indicates the return route, as far as the one tree.

Reconnoissance, 2nd Brigade.

*The D. A. Q. M. General and the Brigade Major, 2nd Brigade, being directed to make a hasty reconnoissance of, and report on, the line of route considered best for the 2nd Brigade in the night march, went out in the afternoon of the 22nd January and ascertained that it would be possible for the brigade to march almost in a direct line N. W. by N. from its parade to Belhalli. The only difficulty being the bund between Chansandra and Blasewall which was rendered practicable for guns and cavalry during the afternoon, by the aid of a fatigue party.

*The above reports of the reconnoissance and operations of the 2nd Brigade are based upon the letter (attached) of the D. A. Q. M. G., 1st Division.

Reports accordingly having been made to the Major-General Commanding the Division, he decided to accompany the right column in person, and issued the following orders:—

Orders issued.

1. The 1st Brigade to leave camp at 11 P.M., and move by the Rampur-Golhalli route.
   On reaching Rampur, communication by signalling to be established with the left column at Blasewall, and on the right column reaching point 2973 communication to be established with the left column at point 2975; if, however, it be found impracticable to communicate between the latter two stations, the right column not to be detained at point 2973 beyond 2-30 A.M. on the 23rd, but moved on so as to reach the valley east of Sonnappanhalli by 5-30 A.M.
2. The 2nd Brigade to move from Camp at 10 P.M. and follow the Blasewall-Kannur route.
   On reaching Blasewall, communication by signalling to be established with the right column at Rampur, and on reaching point 2975, communication to be established with the right column at point 2973; but if it be found impracticable to communicate between the latter two stations, the left column not to be detained at point 2975 beyond 2-30 A.M. on the 23rd, and must be in position behind Belhalli by 5-30 A.M.
3. P/1 Royal Artillery to accompany the 1st Brigade.
   S/1 Royal Artillery to accompany the 2nd Brigade.
4. The cavalry to follow the 2nd Brigade and to expect further instructions on the 2nd Brigade taking up its position near Belhalli.

Right Column.

The 1st Brigade, right column, (P/1 R. A. Middlesex Regiment, Volunteer Battalion, 5th and 21st M. I.) was under arms, and moved off at 11 P.M. The infantry crossing the Rampur tank bund—the artillery (route thus indicated on the map —. .—. .—. .—. .—) crossing the swampy ground below bund, at the so-called ford about a mile east of the bund; having passed which, it drew up at Rampur, awaiting the crossing of the infantry. The battery reached Rampur at midnight—the infantry had not entirely crossed over the bund until 1-30 A.M. on the 23rd.

At about 1 A.M., on Wednesday, 23rd January, it was ascertained by means of visual signalling that the left column had crossed the swamp south of Blasewall, and was moving northward.

At 1-30 A,M., the right column advanced from Rampur, reaching the one tree at point 2973 at 2 A.M., where a halt for half-an-hour was made to allow of the column closing up. From this spot, visual signalling was again established with the left column.

At 2-30 A M., the right column again moved on, all lights being put out, save one, and halted at 3-40, after crossing the paddy flat east of Golhalli; progress having been checked for some moments *en route*, owing to loss of track at the rocks alluded to above.

Visual signalling was again established with the left column from this spot.

The column again moved forward at 4 A.M., and reached the eastern slopes of the Sonnappanhalli Valley at 5-10 A.M., and there formed line of ¼ columns.

A reconnoissance was at once made over the high ground in front, towards the position held by the enemy.

The troops were brought forward, artillery on the right, Middlesex Regiment and Volunteers in the fighting line, 5th and 21st, M. I., in support and reserve, which order of advance was preserved, until the enemy was discovered by his opening fire at about 6 A.M.

The artillery after firing a few rounds changed ground so as to enfilade the enemy, and the attack of the fighting line became general.

Left Column.

*The 2nd Brigade, left column, S/1st R. A. 2nd S. W. B., 10th and 15th N. I., and the cavalry, 1 squadron 12th Lancers, 3 squadrons Silladar Horse, was under arms and moved off shortly after 10 P.M. The route taken was along the high ground leaving Margondahalli well to the east—course by compass N. W. by N. —At Chansandra the head of the column was checked to allow the whole brigade to come up. The bund was then crossed, the head of the column reaching Blasewall at 12 midnight, and the whole brigade being over by 12-30 A.M. on Wednesday, 23rd January, when communication was established with the right column at Rampur where the Major-General Commanding was present.

The column then moved forward reaching point 2975 at 1-15 A.M., when a halt of about one hour was made and visual signalling again established with the right column, then at point 2973.

At 2-10 A.M., the column again marched leaving Gooby to the east and point 3006 slightly to the west. Kannur was reached at 3 A.M. A signalling party being left here, the D. A. Q. M. General led the advanced guard cautiously towards Belhalli, which was reached at 3-4 A.M.

The infantry brigade formed up south of the village, the artillery took up a position behind the high ground between Belhalli and Koyil and the cavalry in the direction of Booroodoogoon. These positions were maintained until 5-30 A.M., when the infantry formed for attack and advanced on the enemy's position between Belhalli and Mitganhalli.

The cease fire sounded at about 6-30 A.M.

Troops returned to camp at about 10 A.M.

*See foot-note on page 26.

From Major ARTHUR TICKELL, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, 1st Division, to the Assistant Quarter Master General, 1st Division; dated Camp, 23rd January 1884.

I have the honor to report that on receiving the orders for the night march on the 22nd instant, and being ordered to guide the 2nd Brigade under Colonel Brett *viâ* Margondahalli, Chansandra, Blasewall, and Kannur, I made a hasty reconnoissance of the country during the afternoon, and ascertained that we could march almost in a direct line north-west by north from the 2nd Brigade parade ground to Belhalli. The only difficulty being the bund between Chansandra and Blasewall: by the aid of a fatigue party this was rendered practicable for the guns and cavalry during the afternoon, and I obtained guides from the villages. The brigade assembled on the 2nd Brigade parade ground at 10 P.M., shortly after which we commenced the march, keeping the high ground and leaving Margondahalli to our right,—course by the compass north-west by north—at Chansandra we halted a short time, to allow the whole brigade to come up and then proceeded to cross the bund. The head of the column was over and reached Blasewall by 12 o'clock and the whole brigade up by 12-30. This we communicated by visual signal to General Sir C. Keyes who was with the 1st Brigade—and proceeded on the march. The head of the column reached point 2975 at 1-5 A.M. and the whole brigade reported up at 1-15 A.M. Here we halted for about an hour, and got into communication by signal with the 1st Brigade when they reached point 2973. At 2-10 A.M., we again marched leaving Gooby to our right, and point 3006 slightly to our left, reaching Kannur about 3 A.M., where we left the signal party. I proceeded then with an advance guard of the South Wales Borderers; cautiously in the direction of Belhalli, which we reached at 3-45 A.M., and the infantry brigade formed up, just south of the village. The artillery took up a position behind the high ground between Belhalli and Koyil, and the cavalry in the direction of Booroodoogoon. These were our positions until about 5-30 A.M., on the 23rd, when the infantry were formed up for attack, and advanced on the enemy's position between Belhalli and Mitganhalli.

NIGHT MARCH, 22ND JANUARY 1884.

General Idea.

Information having been received that an enemy arriving from the north has taken up his position on the rocky ridge lying between the villages of Mitganhalli, Hosur and Belhalli about six miles north north-west of the 1st Division Camp, the General Officer Commanding that Division receives orders to make a night march on the position and to assault it shortly before daybreak on the morning of the 23rd instant.

General Instructions.

1. Major-General Sir C. Keyes, K.C.B., with the force noted in the margin, will move from his Camp on the night of the 22nd instant in two columns for the purpose of attacking the enemy's position.

1 Squadron 12th Lancers.
3 Squadrons Silladar Horse.
P/1 Royal Artillery.
S/1 Royal Artillery.
1st Brigade—
2nd Batt. Middlx. Regt.
Volunteer Battalion.
5th M.N.I.
21st M.N.I.
2nd Brigade—
2nd Batt. S.W. Borderers.
10th M.N.I.
15th M.N.I.

2. The composition and time of departure of these two columns will be arranged by the General Officer Commanding after such hasty reconnoissance as he may be able to make, the object being that both columns should arrive simultaneously at the point of attack.

3. One column will proceed by Rampur, point 2973, and a little to the east of Kadagrahar, forming for assault in the valley to the east of Sonappanhalli and Hosur.

The other column will proceed *viâ* Naragondahalli, Chansandra Blasewall and Kunnur, forming for assault behind the village of Belhalli,

4. Communication by visual signalling between these two columns should be maintained whenever possible during the night march, provided this can be done without its being observed by the enemy.

5. General Keyes will dispose of the cavalry portion of his force as he may think best, the object being to pursue the enemy after he has been beaten from the ridge.

6. Each man and gun is to be provided with ten rounds of blank ammunition.

7. The position as indicated in the general idea will be occupied by a skeleton enemy consisting of two Companies of Sappers under the Command of Captain Henry, R.E., Assistant Quartermaster-General.

Dispositions by the Major-General Commanding the 1st Division.

Major-General Sir C. Keyes, K.C.B., after a hasty reconnaissance of the position and the roads leading to it, ordered—

(1) The 1st Brigade to leave Camp at 11 P.M., and move by the Rampur route.

On reaching Rampur, communication by signalling was to be established with the left column at Blasewall, and on the right column reaching point 2973, communication was to be established with the left column at point No. 2975; but if it was found impracticable to communicate between the latter two stations, the right column was not to be detained at point 2973 beyond 2-30 A.M. on the 23rd, and must reach the valley east of Sonnappanhalli by 5-30 A.M.

2. The 2nd Brigade to move from camp at 10 P.M., and follow the Blasewall route.

On reaching Blasewall, communication by signalling was to be established with the right column at Rampur, and on reaching point 2975, communication was to be established with the right column at point 2973, but if it was found impracticable to communicate between the latter two stations, the left column was not to be detained at point 2975 beyond 2-30 A.M. on the 23rd, and must be in position behind Belhalli by 5-30 A.M.

3. P/1 Royal Artillery to accompany the 1st Brigade.
S/1 do. do. 2nd Brigade.

4. The Cavalry was to follow the 2nd Brigade was informed that further instructions would be issued to them on the 2nd Brigade taking up its position near Belhalli.

Execution.

The two columns moved off as directed, and followed the routes indicated in the general instructions.

Communication by signal was established between Blasewall and Rampur, so that the two columns started simultaneously from those two places at 1-30 A.M. on the 23rd.

At 1-50 A.M., communication was opened between point 2975 and point 2973.

The right column reached Sonnappanhalli at 4-15 A.M., and from thence General Keyes sent instructions to the left column to get into attack formation behind Belhalli, remain there till daybreak and then attack; should, however, the attack on the right commence earlier, the left column was at once to conform to the movement and attack the enemy's position in flank.

The cavalry was at the same time directed to move to their left towards Booroodoogoon and be prepared to cut off the retreat of the enemy.

The right column then advanced a little, and General Keyes rode forward at 5-30 A.M., and was just able to recognise the position.

The Infantry of the right column were then extended for attack and the guns were moved to the right so as to enfilade the enemy's position.

The left column conformed to the movements of the right and the attack was delivered simultaneously from both flanks.

Remarks by the Umpire-in-chief.

The night march as a march was an unqualified success, and credit is due to the Commander and to the troops engaged in it, for the way the "idea" was carried out.

The brigades arrived before the position under cover of darkness with time to spare before making a simultaneous attack on it.

The ground to be traversed by the troops was difficult, and no marked features, natural or artificial, existed to assist the guides of each column in finding the way.

It was hopeless to expect that a real surprise could be effected, as the enemy was necessarily aware of what was intended, but the operation would have had more the appearance of reality had the position been carried at dawn by one simultaneous rush on the part of each brigade, instead of by the alternate rushes of smaller bodies.

The guns were well posted for enfilading the position, and the cavalry would inevitably have cut off the fugitives.

(By Order.)

(Signed) GODFREY CLERK, Brigadier-General,
Adjutant-General.

REPORT OF THE PASSAGE OVER THE HEBBAL TANK BY A DETACHMENT OF THE BANGALORE GARRISON.

Division and Cantonment Order.

"The following force will parade in Drill Order at the Casuarina Tope north of the Hebbal Tank at 10 A.M. on Wednesday, the 30th January 1884:—

1 Squadron 12th Royal Lancers with Regimental Pioneers.
1 Do. 1st Light Cavalry.
1 Company "Queen's Own" Sappers and Miners.
4 Companies 4th Pioneers.

This force will represent the advanced guard of an army marching on Bangalore and which finds the country in front inundated and passable only by crossing the Hebbal Tank.

Cavalry to be furnished with 10 rounds of blank ammunition per man; Infantry with 20 rounds per man."

Width and depth of the tank.

The width of Hebbal Tank where the 12th Lancers crossed is 720 yards, and the maximum depth, 8 feet. The horses of the 12th Lancers had to swim a distance of 300 yards.

Where the 1st Light Cavalry crossed, the width of the tank is 630 yards with a maximum depth of 6½ feet; the horses swam a distance of 200 yards.

Manufacture of rafts.

Six cask rafts were constructed—two by the 12th Lancers, and four by the Sappers. The Lancers took 15 minutes to construct their rafts, the Sappers took 20 minutes.

Strength of Infantry conveyed over.

One hundred and sixty-seven of all ranks 4th Pioneers were conveyed across the tank on rafts made by the Sappers.

Number of men and horses that swam across.

Fifty-one men and horses of the 12th Lancers swam across the tank. Seventeen horses crossed at the western end of the tank which is fordable.

Sixty-two men and horses of the 1st Light Cavalry swam across.

Time occupied in swimming the horses.

The horses of the squadron 12th Lancers and 1st Light Cavalry were taken across by troops. Each troop of the Lancers took about 15 minutes to swim across the tank. The troops of the 1st Light Cavalry took 8½ minutes each to swim over.

Summary.

Summary.

Fifty-one men and horses of the 12th Lancers, and sixty-two men and horses of the 1st Light Cavalry swam across the tank; the men's clothes, arms and accoutrements and the saddles were taken over on rafts. One hundred and sixty-seven Infantry were conveyed over on rafts. In an hour and fifty-five minutes from the time the horses and rafts commenced to move across, the force had landed and was prepared to resist an attack, or advance into the enemy's country.

BANGALORE,
6*th February* 1884.

(Signed) W. PAYN, Major-General,
Commanding, Bangalore Division.

No. 106. ORDER THEREON, 8th May 1884, No. 2199.

The Governor in Council having perused the report upon the camp of exercise recently held in the vicinity of Bangalore, together with the diaries of manœuvres attached thereto, congratulates His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief upon the complete success of the undertaking.

2. His Excellency concurs with Sir Frederick Roberts in the opinion that the presence of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India during the operations was a subject of general gratification, and is happy to have this opportunity of placing on record the appreciation of the Madras Government of the honor done to the army of the presidency by Sir Donald Stewart.

3. His Excellency learns with much satisfaction that the drill and appearance of the Madras troops met with the approval of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India. The favorable opinion of so distinguished an officer cannot but be highly encouraging to all who have the efficiency and welfare of the army at heart.

4. The foregoing letter will be communicated to the Right Honorable the Secretary of State for India, the Governments of India and Bombay, the Resident

in Mysore, with reference to paras. 35 and 36, and to the following departments and officers:—

Revenue Department,	with reference to para.	6
Public Department,	do.	31
Public Works Department,	do.	25 and 32
Commissary-General,	do.	27 to 30
Inspector-General of Ordnance,	do.	33
Surgeon-General, Her Majesty's Forces, Madras,	with reference to para.	34

No. 107. *To the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department; dated 8th May* 1884, *No.* 2200.

No. 108. *To the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated 8th May* 1884, *No.* 2201.

No. 109. *To the Resident in Mysore; dated 8th May* 1884, *No.* 2202.

(True Extract.)

(Signed) A. KENNEY-HERBERT, Lt.-Col.,
Offg. Secretary to Government.

To the Quarter Master General.
" Adjutant-General.
" Revenue Department.
" Public Department.
" Public Works Department.
" Commissary-General.
" Inspector-General of Ordnance.
" Surgeon-General, Her Majesty's Forces, Madras.
" Commandant, Madras, Volunteer Guards.
" " Bangalore Rifle Volunteer Guards.
" " Nilgiri Volunteer Rifles.
"

Exd. E. C. Shunker.

P. W. D

Govt. of {1884} Madras.

MILITARY.

To

THE QUARTER MASTER GENERAL,
&c., &c., &c.

PUBLIC WORKS SECRETARIAT
MADRAS

Dated May, 8th.

Issued

Recd. *Encl.*

G.O., 8th May 1884, No. 2199.

No. 1390 W of 3rd June/84

MAY.
Nos. 105—110.

Camps—Instructions.

Camp of Exercise.—Report on the — held in the vicinity of Bangalore in January 1884, perused with satisfaction.

Without order

No. 1390 W of 3rd June/84

Communicated
to the Chief Superintendent
of Telegraphs Madras
Division, and to the
Consg. Engr. for Kyp.
with reference to paras
25 and 32 of the
Quarter Master Generals
letter
Do/ J. S. S.

Chief Supt of Telegraphs
Madras Dr.

Consg. Engr. for Kyp

GOVERNMENT [illegible] MADRAS.

MILITARY D[illegible]ARTMENT.

[illegible]NTS.

8th May 1884, No. 2199.

Camps—Instructions.

Read the following paper:—

No. 105. *From Brigadier-General R. [illegible]. STEWART, Quarter Master General, to Lieutenant-Colonel A. KENNEY-HERBERT, Officiating Secretary to Government, Military Department; dated Ootacamund, 31st March* 1884, *No.* 2079.

I have the honor to report, for the information of Government, that, in compliance with the permission conveyed in Government Order, No. 6270, dated 21st November 1882, to hold a camp of exercise in the month of January 1884, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in G.O.C.C., No. 381, dated 1st August 1883, issued the necessary instructions for the assembly of the troops as per margin in the vicinity of Krishnarajpuram, eight miles from Bangalore.

Royal Artillery.

E/B, Royal Horse Artillery.
M/2nd, Royal Artillery.
I/3rd, „ „
S/1st, „ „
P/1st, „ „

Cavalry.

12th Royal Lancers.
1st Madras Light Cavalry.
2nd „ „ „

Infantry.

2nd Battalion, Royal Fusiliers.
1st „ Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
2nd „ South Wales Borderers.
2nd „ Middlesex Regiment.
Four Companies, "Queen's Own" Sappers and Miners.
5th Regiment, Native Infantry.
12th „ „ „
14th „ „ „
21st „ „ „
4th „ (Pioneers).
10th „ Native Infantry.
15th „ „ „
27th „ „ „
Madras Volunteer Guards.
Bangalore Rifle Volunteers.
Nilgiri „ „ (detachment).

2. The Government will observe that, in the selection of corps to attend the camp, every opportunity was taken of the annual relief of the season to assemble regiments and batteries destined to change their stations.

3. This course was adopted by the Commander-in-Chief in view of decreasing the expenditure as much as possible, and it was His Excellency's intention to have marched all the troops from their stations to the camp. Sir Frederick Roberts regrets, however, that the prevalence of cholera generally throughout the presidency necessitated subsequent alteration of this latter arrangement, and the movement by rail to the camp of several of the regiments which were under orders to proceed by route march.

4. The sites for the camps were personally inspected by the Commander-in-Chief, and it was ultimately decided to select very much the same ground as that on which the camp of exercise in 1874 had been held in the vicinity of Krishnarajpuram. The particular spots where the camps were located are noted on the map which accompanies this letter.

5. The country on which it was proposed to hold the camp was thoroughly surveyed by several officers under the superintendence of Captain Henry, R.E., and an excellent map on a two-inch scale produced, which was subsequently lithographed in the Revenue Survey Office and issued to all officers serving in the camp.

6. The Commander-in-Chief's best thanks are due to Colonel Rogers, Superintendent, Revenue Survey, for the admirable manner in which these maps were printed, and for the rapidity with which they were produced.

Captain T... 19th ...
Captain Yates, R.H.A., D...
Lieutenant Adye, 1st Ca... ...derabad Co...ntin... ...Orderly Officer.

FIRST DIVISION.

Major-General Sir Charles Keyes, K.C.B., Commanding.
Major Hope, 1st Light Cavalry, Assistant Adjutant-General.
Colonel Swanston, 7th Native Infantry, Assistant Quarter Master General.
Major Tickell, Middlesex Regiment, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.
Captain Romilly, R.E., Field Engineer.
Major Dale, 31st Light Infantry, Assistant Provost Marshal.
Lieutenant Smythe, Royal Scots Fusiliers, A.D.C.

INFANTRY.

First Brigade.

Brigadier-General Gib, C.B., Commanding.
Major Money, Oxfordshire Light Infantry, Brigade-Major.
Lieutenant Radcliff, 25th Native Infantry, Orderly Officer.

Second Brigade.

Colonel Brett, Oxfordshire Light Infantry, Commanding.
Major Clerk, Infantry General List, Brigade-Major.
Lieutenant Molesworth, Royal Artillery, Orderly Officer.

SECOND DIVISION.

Major-G... ...l Prendergast, V.C., C.B., Commandi...
Lieuten... ...olonel Morton, 14th Hussars, Assist... ...jutant-General.
Lieuten... ...onel Gatacre, Middlesex Regi... Assistant Quarter Master Gene...
Major ..., Infantry General List, Deputy ...istant Quarter Master General.
Captain Walker, 19th Native Infantry, Assistant Provost Marshal.
Lieutenant Donald, Royal Fusiliers, A.D.C.

INFANTRY.

First Brigade.

Brigadier-General Elles, C.B., Commanding.
Major Wratislaw, 22nd Native Infantry, Brigade-Major.
Lieutenant Currie, 20th Native Infantry, Orderly Officer.

Second Brigade.

Colonel Dixon, 8th Native Infantry, Commanding.
Captain Banister, South Wales Borderers, Brigade-Major.
Lieutenant Rowe, 8th Native Infantry, Orderly Officer.

last of the corps marching in on that day, and on the 7th January the work of the camp commenced.

8. It may be interesting to Government to know how the commands of divisions and brigades were distributed. I have the honor, therefore, to append the names of the officers commanding divisions and brigades and their staff officers.

9. The first week was devoted to brigade and divisional drills. During the second week, viz., from 14th to 19th January, manœuvres were executed on an extended scale—one division being moved to Nundidroog, thirty miles distant, for the purpose of operating against Bangalore, which was defended by the other division.

10. On Monday, the 21st, field firing at unknown distances was practised. On Wednesday morning an attack was made on a selected position by the first division, which performed a night march for this purpose. On Thursday, 24th, the troops marched past His Excellency the Governor, in the presence of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India; and on Friday and Saturday, 25th and 26th January, an assault at arms was held in Bangalore.

11. It is a matter of special gratification to the Commander-in-Chief that His Excellency the Governor was able to be present on the occasion of the march past of the assembled troops.

12. Sir Frederick Roberts feels sure the Government of Madras will appreciate the honor done to the Madras army by the presence of His Excellency Sir Donald Stewart, Bart., G.C.B., C.I.E., Commander-in-Chief in India, who arrived in the camp on the 14th January, and witnessed the manœuvres between the first and second divisions.

13. His Excellency has been pleased to express his approbation of the drill and appearance of the Madras army, and Sir Frederick Roberts is confident it will be as gratifying to the Madras Government, as it is to himself, to learn the opinion of this distinguished officer.

14. General the Honorable A. Hardinge, C.B., Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army, likewise honored the camp with his presence, arriving on the 14th January; and it has been an infinite pleasure to Sir Frederick Roberts to receive His Excellency on this the first occasion of his visiting the Madras presidency.

15. It is satisfactory to Sir Frederick Roberts to have to record that the various operations performed and attempted during the camp of exercise have met with success. Copies of each day's manœuvres with the remarks of the Umpire-in-Chief and an explanatory map are annexed, which will enable His Excellency the Governor in Council to judge of the character and scope of the operations.

16. The intelligence of the men and officers in the selection of the ground on the occasion of the field firing was marked, and the fire discipline, as displayed on

...signalling was to be established with the left ...reaching point 2973, communication was ...975; but if it was found im... ...colum... ...as, however, ...this, the ...elapse before ...the lesson learnt will

41. The night march ...der... ...point of attack at the same moment. ...in thus ... ...most difficult of all operations in the field, not be lost to those who took part in it.

18. Absence of a suitable piece of w... ...near the standing camps and want of time interfered with the proposal for ...luding amongst the operations to be carried out during the camp that of the c... ...ng of an unfordable river by a mixed force of cavalry and infantry.

19. Sir Frederick Roberts was glad, however, to have an opportunity of letting the Commander-in-Chief in India witness, before His Excellency left Bangalore, the result of some practice in the execution of such an operation by a portion of the troops of the Bangalore division.

20. The Hebbal tank, a sheet of water some 600 to 700 yards wide at the points where crossed, of which about 200 to 300 yards were beyond the depth of a horse, was selected for the operation, in which a force of 113 cavalry and 167 infantry took part.

One squadron, 12th Royal Lancers, with regimental pioneers.
One squadron, 1st Light Cavalry.
One company, "Queen's Own" Sappers and Miners.
Four companies, 4th Pioneers.

21. The passage of the tank was most successfully effected under the direction of Lieutenant-General Payn, C.B., the cavalry swimming across, and the infantry being transported in cask rafts; the whole force was thus crossed in one hour and fifty-five minutes, excluding the time taken in construction of rafts; and Sir Donald Stewart was pleased to express his strong approbation of the operation in all its details.

22. In the opinion of Sir Frederick Roberts, the peculiar advantages offered by camps of exercise are not only the experience gained by staff and departmental officers and by the training of the individual soldier, but also the opportunity given to corps to meet together in the field, to witness, to compare, and to discuss the working of each particular branch, a feeling of rivalry being thus produced, which when indulged in in a kindly spirit does much in the cause of discipline and *esprit-de-corps*.

23. However great these advantages may be to any army, they specially apply to the Madras army, of which so many regiments are located for long periods together at single stations, and Sir Frederick Roberts feels sure that the camp of exercise just brought to a close has been exceedingly beneficial in this way.

24. *Telegraph.*—The head-quarter camp was connected with the Government telegraph office at Bangalore and the railway station, Krishnarajpuram, and the first and second divisions were connected with head-quarters by the field telegraph worked by the sappers under the able superintendence of Lieutenant A. C. Macdonnell, R.E.

25. The working of both Government and field telegraphs was exceedingly satisfactory, and Sir Frederick Roberts begs that his thanks may be expressed to the Superintendent of Government Telegraphs.

26. *Signalling.*—Communication by visual signalling, both by night and day, was maintained between all the camps throughout the period during which the troops were assembled under the intelligent supervision of Major E. Begbie (Infantry General List), Instructor in Army Signalling, and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India witnessed signalling, on a peculiarly foggy dark night, with Major Begbie's lamps between Nundidroog and His Excellency's camp, a distance of not less than twenty-five miles.

27. *Commissariat and Transport.*—The commissariat arrangements were supervised by Colonel J. C. Gunning, as Principal Commissariat Officer, and Colonel McInroy, as Officer in charge, Supply Branch, at the base; the transport arrangements by Colonel Hayter, C.B., Director of Transport.

28. The rations were good throughout, and no complaint has reached His Excellency of the quality or the sufficiency of the supply.

Captain T... 14th ... Majo...
Captain Yates, R.H.A., D... ...tant Qu...
quarter... ieutenant Adye, 1st C... ...derabad Co...

...p equipage for ... the troops which marched, were moved by Government transpo... ...e exception of fifty carts hired during the extended manœuvres, the transport of troops was conducted without extra expense to Government.

30. His Excellency is glad to rec... his appreciation of the services of Colonel J. C. Gunning, Colonel McInroy, Col... Hayter, C.B., and the officers attached to the supply and transport branches of ... Commissariat department. These officers evinced a desire to comply with th... ...ishes of the Commander-in-Chief and a readiness to meet all demands which rendered the task of the army staff officers much easier than it otherwise would have been, and materially added to the success of the manœuvres.

31. *Post Offices.*—Post offices were established at the head-quarter and the divisional camps; but His Excellency regrets that he cannot compliment the Postal department on the arrangements made on this occasion.

32. *Railway.*—The Madras Railway Company established a station at Krishnarajpuram, which was exceedingly convenient, but the arrangements at the station were defective, and the staff maintained there was quite inadequate to meet the ordinary traffic connected with the camp.

33. *Ordnance Department.*—Sir Frederick Roberts begs to bring to the notice of the Government the assistance rendered by the Inspector-General of Ordnance, and the indefatigable way in which the Ordnance department worked to construct His Excellency's camp equipage in time for the camp.

34. *Medical Department.*—The medical arrangements, under the superintendence of Surgeon-General Madden, were excellent. The health of the troops has throughout the camp been very good, and one regiment which had suffered much from sickness before its arrival considerably improved.

35. *Civil.*—The Commander-in-Chief cannot find words to express his appreciation of the assistance rendered by His Highness the Maharajah of Mysore and those officers of His Highness' Government deputed to attend the camp. His Excellency purposes to address the Mysore Durbar himself on this subject; but he wishes to record in this letter that nothing could exceed the cordial co-operation of Major Macintire, Deputy Commissioner, attached to head-quarters, and the civil officers attached to the divisions.

36. *Silladars.*—His Excellency's thanks are due likewise to the Maharajah of Mysore for having permitted a regiment of Silladar Horse to attend the camp of exercise, which, under the supervision of Colonel Hay, Military Secretary to His Highness, and under the personal command of Lieutenant R. G. Jones, 1st Madras Cavalry, rendered efficient service with the cavalry brigade.

37. *Provost Marshal Department.*—Excellent order has been maintained in camp by the provost department, and crime amongst the troops has been almost unknown.

38. *Umpires.*—His Excellency's thanks are due to all the officers of the Bengal army attending the camp, whose services were placed at his disposal to form the umpire staff, and likewise to those officers of the Bombay army who were good enough to assist.

39. *Volunteers.*—It was a great gratification to the Commander-in-Chief that the Madras volunteers and a portion of the Bangalore and Nílgiri volunteers, under the command of Colonel Ross Church, C.I.E., were able to attend the camp. The corps was attached to the first division, and took part in the operations, 16th to 19th January, and in the night march. The conduct of the volunteers was most exemplary, their discipline excellent, and their endurance during the somewhat trying operations, and more especially during the night march, equalled that of the regular troops.

40. In conclusion, I am desired to express His Excellency's thanks to the Government of Madras for the hearty co-operation he has received from them in

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DIARY OF MOVEMENTS, 1st DIVISION.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES KEYES, K.C.B.

From 16*th to* 19*th January* 1884.

With reference to Camp General Order, $\frac{14}{\text{C.E.}}$, dated the 8th instant, the following General Idea of the Manœuvres, to be performed between the 14th and 19th instant, is published for information :—

The Southern Force, commanded by Major-General Sir Charles Keyes, K.C.B.—

Cavalry Brigade ..	2 Guns E/B., Royal Horse Artillery, 2 Squadrons, 12th Royal Lancers, 2nd Madras Light Cavalry,
	P/1 Royal Artillery, S/1 ,, ,, 2 Companies, Sappers and Miners,
1st Infantry Brigade ..	2nd Battalion, Middlesex Regiment, 5th Native Infantry, 21st ,, ,,
2nd Infantry Brigade ..	2nd Battalion, South Wales Borderers, Volunteer Battalion, 15th Native Infantry,

is supposed to be a force of all arms occupying Bangalore, which, on hearing of the approach of an enemy from the north, has taken up a position on the site of its present camp.

The Northern Force, commanded by Major-General Prendergast, V.C., C.B.—

Cavalry Brigade ..	4 Guns E/B, Royal Horse Artillery, 1 Squadron, 12th Royal Lancers, 1st Madras Light Cavalry, Silladar Horse,
	M/2 Royal Artillery, I/3 ,, ,, 2 Companies, Sappers and Miners,
1st Infantry Brigade ..	2nd Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, 12th Native Infantry. 27th ,, ,,
2nd Infantry Brigade ..	1st Battalion, Oxfordshire Light Infantry, 4th Pioneers, 10th Native Infantry, 14th ,, ,,

is supposed to be a force of all arms arriving from the north for the purpose of attacking Bangalore, and on the evening of the 15th instant encamps in the vicinity of Nundidroog, north of an east and west line drawn through the 30th milestone on the Bangalore Chik-Ballapur road.

To carry out this idea, General Prendergast will leave his present camp, south of the railway, on the morning of the 14th instant and march towards Nundidroog, *viâ* Devanhalli.

General Prendergast will issue such orders as he may think necessary for the movement of his division, to ensure its reaching its camp near Nundidroog on the evening of the 15th instant.

The Commander of the Southern Force, having received information on the evening of the 15th instant of the arrival of the enemy near Nundidroog, will make such dispositions as may appear to him desirable to ascertain the movements and defeat the object of the enemy. The southern force will bivouac whenever it may be necessary for it to leave its camp, which will remain standing, and will not be liable to capture by the enemy.

On the morning of the 16th instant, General Prendergast will turn towards Bangalore with the object of advancing on it, and on his part will make such dispositions as he may think desirable.

P. W. D

Govt. of {1884} Madras.

Captain T... 14th R... Major
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quarter... ieutenant Adye, 1st C... derabad Co...

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is supposed to be a force of all arms occupying Bangalore, which, on hearing of the approach of an enemy from the north, has taken up a position on the site of its present camp.

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To carry out this idea, General Prendergast will leave his present camp, south of the railway, on the morning of the 14th instant and march towards Nundidroog, *viâ* Devanhalli.

General Prendergast will issue such orders as he may think necessary for the movement of his division, to ensure its reaching its camp near Nundidroog on the evening of the 15th instant.

The Commander of the Southern Force, having received information on the evening of the 15th instant of the arrival of the enemy near Nundidroog, will make such dispositions as may appear to him desirable to ascertain the movements and defeat the object of the enemy. The southern force will bivouac whenever it may be necessary for it to leave its camp, which will remain standing, and will not be liable to capture by the enemy.

On the morning of the 16th instant, General Prendergast will turn towards Bangalore with the object of advancing on it, and on his part will make such dispositions as he may think desirable.

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Govt. of {1884} Madras.

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p equipage fo... ...which marched, were moved by ...exception of fifty carts ...during the ...troops was conducted with ...lowing morning, by which hour ...the transport of ...m at 3 o'clock the previous afternoon.

Outposts will, however, be ... on service (*vide* paragraph 24, page 6, "Bangalore Camp of Exercise Order)," after the halt has been sounded, and will not be withdrawn until the Divisional Commanders have satisfied themselves that their position has been made secure from sudden attack.

It is desirable that troops should be encamped or bivouacked as near as possible to the positions occupied by them at the close of each day's proceedings.

Camps, baggage, transport animals, and followers, are not liable to capture.

Detailed instructions regarding transport, supplies and further subsidiary orders regarding movements of contending forces will be issued to Commanders of Forces by the Quarter Master General.

Tuesday, 15th January 1884.

The troops in the first division camp remained quiet.

1 Staff Officer.
2 Volunteer Officers.
4 Staff Sergeants.
87 Volunteers.
12 Followers.

The Bangalore Volunteers, strength as per margin, joined the division, and camped on the left flank of the first brigade.

Wednesday, 16th January

The cavalry brigade (2 R.H.A. guns, 2 squadrons, 12th Lancers, and 2nd M.L.C.) and a company of mounted infantry left camp at 9 A.M. to reconnoitre along the whole front towards the north, with instructions to make a rapid advance, secure the two hills (3341 and 3212 on the map) about 5 miles north of Yellahanka, hold them as long as possible, in view to obtaining as much information as practicable of the movements of the northern army, and signal the same to divisional head-quarters. The bridge on the Nundidroog road, at Chik Jala, to be blown up should time admit, the enemy not to be engaged in a general manner.

At noon the two infantry brigades, each accompanied by a battery of field artillery, and a company of sappers, moved to the westward from camp, to secure positions fixed upon, prior to 3 P.M., to return to camp on completion of this object.

The first brigade occupied the high ground near the village of Tanisandra; the second brigade the high ground at the 6th milestone on the Nundidroog road.

No information having been obtained of or from the cavalry brigade during the day, the Major-General, accompanied by his staff, rode out to Baglur, the site appointed for the brigade to pitch its flying camp at. On reaching this village, it was found that the troops were locating themselves somewhat westward nearer to Satnur.

The Officer Commanding the Brigade reported that he had carried out his instructions as regards blowing up the bridge and securing the two hills, which he held for two hours and then retired, in face of superior force, to a general line extending from Avalhalli on the west to Budigere on the east.

Signallers had occupied both hills, but messages failed to reach divisional head-quarters from them.

It was further reported that two battalions of the enemy's infantry had entered Chik Jalla.

2 Staff Officers.
4 Volunteer Officers.
2 Staff Sergeants.
4 Drill Instructors.
203 Volunteers.
102 Followers.

The Madras Volunteer Guards arrived in the divisional camp at about noon, strength as per margin, and were attached to the second brigade.

Thursday, 17th January.

The infantry brigades occupied by 9 A.M. the same positions held at 3 P.M. yesterday.

All baggage and tentage for flying camp moved away at 9-30 A.M. under charge of the Divisional Transport Officer, with orders to be parked at Hebbal position, *i.e.*, that occupied by the second brigade, and there await orders.

The cavalry brigade had been instructed to fall back slowly on to Yellahanka, reporting to the Major-General there all possible information relative to the infantry of the northern army.

The first brigade moved up at about 9-30 A.M. to a small wood half a mile north of Tanisandra.

At 11 A.M. four companies of infantry were moved up from the second brigade to occupy Yellahanka, the mounted infantry having fallen back on that village. The remainder of the brigade advancing about a mile beyond the position held at 9 A.M., the field battery and

(2) The main approaches to the position, vi... across the stream had not been de... attacking force. The guns, which ... narrow and dangerous track on t... standstill, blocked the roadway fo... Infantry. The rou...

Yellahanka at noon, at which time ... was well executed ...

The two R.H.A. guns took up a ...sition ... that ... employing the enemy for some time on the westward ... the cavalry brigade had to retire, the enemy's infantry having occupied the village. The retirement of the cavalry was covered by the fire from the field battery of the second brigade.

It being evident that the main attack was being given from Yellahanka, the first brigade was signalled to, to move over as quickly as possible to Hebbal position, upon which the second brigade began slowly to retire, the enemy beginning to show on the Tinnulu heights, on our left front.

At 2-30 P.M. the second brigade had re-occupied its position of the morning, the cavalry brigade being in a tope near the village of Byatrayanpur, some half mile in advance to the left front.

The first brigade reached the Hebbal position at 2-40 P.M., and was ordered at once to take up a position on the south of Hebbal tank, which it secured by 3 P.M.

Camps were then pitched, pickets posted, and men broken off. The cavalry camped on the right flank of the second brigade in close proximity to water.

A detachment of Nilgiri Volunteers, numbering eighteen N. C. rank and file, joined the division standing camp.

Friday, 18th January.

Camps were struck and all tents and baggage loaded up by 7-30 A.M., and began to move off to the rear at 7-45 A.M., that of the second brigade across the Hebbal tank bund until 8-30 A.M., when the road was closed *pro tem.*

All transport was ordered to make its way back to standing camp.

At 9 A.M. the troops occupied their several positions of the previous evening.

The first brigade retired and took up a position on the high ground at the junction of the roads, south-east of Subedar's chutrum. The cavalry brigade retired and occupied the ground westward from the Hebbal tank to limits of the map, a small body being sent to watch the country eastward as far as Hennur.

After covering these retirements, the second brigade moved to the rear blowing up the bridge at the northern end of the Hebbal tank bund and occupied the Muntapum height, 3118 on the map at the point where the roads to Nundidroog and Tumkur cross.

The enemy's infantry and guns worked under cover of plantations and reverse slopes in such a manner that it was some time ere his movements began to declare, a front attack being expected owing to a wrong point of the compass having been signalled early in the day with reference to the advance of two battalions of his infantry, which were stated to be moving southward (westward being the direction). The attack eventually developed itself on our left, viz, between the two tanks east and west of the village of Mattikere.

To meet this, the first brigade took up a position in keeping with the configuration of the high ground northward and round eastward from Subedar's chutrum, whence the slopes towards the tanks alluded to formed a natural glacis.

Three guns were sent from the second brigade to reinforce the artillery of the first brigade which then at this hour, 11-30 A.M., consisted of three battalions of infantry and nine guns.

The cavalry brigade had, owing to advance of the northern guns and infantry, been withdrawn from its forward position and placed under cover about a mile east of Subedar's chutrum.

By 1-30 P.M. the northern cavalry and some infantry, supported by guns, had worked so much round the left flank of the southern force that the three guns of the second brigade were moved up from their hitherto position with those of the first brigade, and brought into action slightly to the south of junction of the three roads south-east of Subedar's chutrum; and eventually the battalion of infantry on the right of the second brigade was moved up to its left and thrown across from that point south-westerly on to the lower road leading to the Bangalore pettah.

The cavalry brigade being brought up on the left of this line to hold in check the advance of the northern cavalry.

During these changes, the remainder of the infantry of the first brigade had been gradually closed in and concentrated on the ground in the immediate vicinity of point of junction of the three roads.

The second brigade had by this thrown its right forward and was in a position to advance in a north-westerly direction, and attack in flank the infantry of the northern army working round to the left of the first brigade, the three guns on the western slope of the Muntapam hill covering the attack with a range of 1,900 yards.

At this juncture (2 P.M.), it being reported that the northern army had his cavalry, sixteen guns and five battalions of infantry, well on the left flank of the first brigade, southern force, firing ceased, and a fresh disposition of the latter troops was ordered, during which operations were directed to cease, and corps ordered to march to their respective camps.

The southern force reached its standing camp between 5 and 6 P.M.

P. W. D

Captain T... 14th ...
Captain Yates, R.H.A., D... ...tant Qu...
Lieutenant Adye, 1st C... ...derabad Co...

...p equipage fo... the ... which marched, were moved by ... exception of fifty cart... during the ...ent transpo... the transport of troops was conducted ...

(Signed) N. SWANSTON, Colonel,
Assistant Quarter Master General.

DIARY OF MOVEMENTS, 2ND DIVISION.

MAJOR-GENERAL PRENDERGAST, V.C., C.B., COMMANDING.

14th to 19th January 1884.

With reference to Camp General Order, $\frac{14}{C.B.}$, dated the 8th instant, the following General Idea of the Manœuvres, to be performed between the 14th and 19th instant, is published for information :—

The Southern Force, commanded by Major-General Sir Charles Keyes, K.C.B.—

Cavalry Brigade.	2 Guns E/B., Royal Horse Artillery, 2 Squadrons, 12th Royal Lancers, 2nd Madras Light Cavalry,
	P/1 Royal Artillery, S/1 " " 2 Companies, Sappers and Miners,
1st Infantry Brigade.	2nd Battalion, Middlesex Regiment, 5th Native Infantry, 21st " "
2nd Infantry Brigade.	2nd Battalion, South Wales Borderers, Volunteer Battalion, 15th Native Infantry,

is supposed to be a force of all arms occupying Bangalore, which, on hearing of the approach of an enemy from the north, has taken up a position on the site of its present camp.

The Northern Force, commanded by Major-General Prendergast, V.C., C.B.—

Cavalry Brigade.	4 Guns E/B, Royal Horse Artillery, 1 Squadron, 12th Royal Lancers, 1st Madras Light Cavalry, Silladar Horse,
	M/2 Royal Artillery, I/3 " " 2 Companies, Sappers and Miners,
1st Infantry Brigade.	2nd Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, 12th Native Infantry, 27th " "
2nd Infantry Brigade.	1st Battalion, Oxfordshire Light Infantry, 4th Pioneers, 10th Native Infantry, 14th " "

is supposed to be a force of all arms arriving from the north for the purpose of attacking Bangalore, and on the evening of the 15th instant encamps in the vicinity of Nundidroog, north of an east and west line drawn through the 30th milestone on the Bangalore Chik-Ballapur road.

To carry out this idea, General Prendergast will leave his present camp, south of the railway, on the morning of the 14th instant, and march towards Nundidroog, *viâ* Devanhalli.

General Prendergast will issue such orders as he may think necessary for the movement of his division, to ensure its reaching its camp near Nundidroog on the evening of the 15th instant.

The Commander of the Southern Force, having received information on the evening of the 15th instant of the arrival of the enemy near Nundidroog, will make such dispositions as may appear to him desirable to ascertain the movements and defeat the object of the enemy. The southern force will bivouac whenever it may be necessary for it to leave its camp, which will remain standing, and will not be liable to capture by the enemy.

On the morning of the 16th instant, General Prendergast will turn towards Bangalore with the object of advancing on it, and on his part will make such dispositions as he may think desirable.

The theatre of operations is limited to the country included in the maps already issued.

Operations will be carried on daily from 9 A.M. to 3 P.M., when the halt will be sounded, and no further movement will take place until 9 o'clock the following morning, by which hour

(2) The main approaches to the position, vi... across the stream had not been de... attacking force. The guns, which ... narrow and dangerous track on th... standstill, blocked the roadway fo... Infantry.

The cavalry reconnaissance was well execute... ...over ..., however, be throw... position, were sent ... Camp of Exercise Order,") after the hand, adven...ed ... until the Divisional Commanders have satisfied themselves tho... made secure from sudden attack.

It is desirable that troops should be encamped or bivouacked as near as possible to the positions occupied by them at the close of each day's proceedings.

Camps, baggage, transport animals, and followers are not liable to capture.

Detailed instructions regarding transport, supplies, and further subsidiary orders regarding movements of contending forces will be issued to Commanders of Forces by the Quarter Master General.

DIARY OF MOVEMENTS, 2ND DIVISION.

MAJOR-GENERAL PRENDERGAST, V.C., C.B., COMMANDING.

On receipt of the General Idea of the Manœuvres. (Copy attached).

On Sunday, 13*th January* 1884, *the following D.O. issued.*

DIVISION Order by Major-General PRENDERGAST, V.C., C.B., Commanding 2nd Division.

13*th January* 1884.

1. The division will move to-morrow in the direction of Nundidroog in the following order and by the following routes :—

Cavalry brigade, *viâ* Budigere and Betkote to Devanhalli, sending a party along the Dod-Ballapur road, and searching the country north and west of the Yellahanka-Devanhalli road, especially all round Nundidroog.

The cavalry brigade will halt (Monday night) at Devanhalli; the royal horse artillery will march *viâ* Bangalore and Devanhalli high road to Devanhalli and halt there for the night.

The royal artillery (two field batteries) will march to Devanhalli, *viâ* Hennur, south-west from the Chunam pits, and halt there for the night.

The first brigade will march to Chik Jala, *viâ* Rampur, at 7 A.M.

The Queen's Own Sappers will accompany this brigade.

The second brigade to Chik Jala, *viâ* Blaisewadi, at 8-30 A.M.

Cooked rations will be taken, all water bottles to be filled before leaving camp.

All wheeled transport to go *viâ* Bangalore, pack animals with the troops across country.

The P.M.O. will make such arrangements as he may think necessary to ensure a hospital being established at Chik Jala and Devanhalli before the arrival of the troops.

A Medical officer to be sent on in advance to test the water, to see to all sanitary arrangements, to inquire into sanitary state of villages *en route* and near camping grounds.

2. Quarter Masters, one from each brigade with the camp color men, will go on daily in advance to the new camping ground.

This party will be in charge of the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General; a few entrenching tools should be taken.

To-day the Quarter Masters of the 14th and 27th N.I. will go on; as much wheeled transport as possible should be sent on to-day under a Native Infantry guard.

Brigadiers will give their own orders regarding the move of their brigades.

All camp latrines are to be filled in before the regiments leave, and rubbish swept up.

On the evening of Tuesday the whole division will concentrate to the north of the 30th milestone on the Ballapur road in accordance with the General Idea.

Detailed orders regarding this will be issued to-morrow.

14*th January* 1884.

These orders were carried out.

The cavalry reached its camping ground about 5 P.M., and encamped on spot shown in the map.

The road was easy throughout, except the passing over the tank bund at Budigere, and the road at Bidarpur which was deep and soft (nearly 4 feet). Royal artillery could not cross at either of those places.

The squadron of silladars marching on the Ballatur road reached its ground about 5 o'clock. Length of march, 31 miles.

P. W. D

Govt. of {1884} Madras.

Captain [illegible] 14th [illegible] ... p equipage for [illegible]
Captain Yates, R.H.A., D[illegible] ...tant Qu[illegible] ...derabad Co[illegible] the [illegible] which marched, were moved by
[illegible]tenant Adye, 1st C[illegible] ... exception of fifty [illegible] hired during the
transpo[illegible] ... was conduct[illegible]
the transport of troops [illegible]

(Signed) N. SW[illegible]
Assista[illegible]

The royal [illegible] ... P.M., and encamped at spot marked in map.

The royal artillery (two field batteries) reached its camping ground at about I/3 R. A. 2-45 M/2 R.A. 2-15 respectively and encamped on spot marked.

The road was fairly good, but slightly swampy about Hennur and Booroodoogoon.

Length of march 23 miles.

The first brigade and sappers reached its camping ground about 3-15 o'clock, and encamped as marked in map. Length of march about 18 miles.

The road was passable to cavalry, infantry, and pack animals, but it was a very trying road for men and animals on account of the devious nature of the track, and in some places the thorns.

The second brigade and 10th Native Infantry reached its camping ground at about 4 o'clock, and encamped as shown in map. Length of march about 18 miles.

The road was passable for infantry throughout.

Camping grounds reported clean and villages healthy.

No sickness amongst troops.

Three cases were returned to Base.

D.O., 14th January. The division will concentrate to-morrow in the vicinity of the 30th M.S. (north of it) on the Chik-Ballapur road.

The squadron silladar horse marching to the west of Nundidroog will march *viâ* Dod-Ballapur and search the country *en route*.

This squadron will encamp near Shivadihalli.

The cavalry brigade and field batteries will march under the orders of their Brigadier and Officer Commanding, respectively.

The first infantry brigade will march at 9 o'clock.

The second infantry brigade will follow at 10 o'clock.

The road to be kept clear of baggage till the troops have passed.

The camping grounds to be left clean on the departure of the troops.

Attention is called to the order regarding men's water bottles to be filled before leaving camp.

15th January 1884.

The orders as issued were carried out.

4 Guns E/B. R.H.A. .. .. 1 Squad, 12th Royal Lancers .. 1 Madras Light Cavalry .. 3 Squad Silladars	The cavalry and horse artillery reached its camping ground at about 10-30 A.M. and encamped where marked on map. The road is in good order. Length of march 8 miles.
1 Squad Silladars	The squadron of silladar horse marching on the Ballapur road and across country reached its ground about 10-30 o'clock. The road was good and passable everywhere. Length of march about 10 miles.
M2/ R. A. .. .. .. I/3 R. A.	The royal artillery reached its camp at about 10-15 o'clock—see map. Road good. Length of march 10 miles.
7th Royal Fusiliers .. .. Sappers and Miners .. .. 12th N.I. .. .. .. 27th N.I.	The first infantry brigade and sappers reached its camp at about 2-15 P.M.—see map. Length of march 15 miles. Road good.
43rd Ox. Lt. Iy. .. .. 4th Pioneers .. .. .. 10th M.N.I. .. .. .. 14th M.N.I.	The second brigade reached its camp at about 3 o'clock—see map. Road good.

Length of march 15 miles.

Camping grounds reported clean and villages healthy. No sickness amongst troops.

One case of anthrax occurred in 1st Light Cavalry on night of 14th January.

D.O., 15th January. 1. The 12th Lancers will march to-morrow *viâ* Devanhalli to Chik Jala preceded by scouts. The enemy is to be expected in the direction of Chik Jala.

The country is to be treated as a hostile one.

No village is to be passed unsearched, and all precautions taken to guard against surprise.

The cavalry will encamp to-morrow at Chik Jala.

(2) The main approaches to the position, vi[illegible] across the stream had not been de[illegible] attacking force. The guns, which [illegible] narrow and dangerous track on t[illegible] standstill, blocked the roadway fo[illegible] Infantry.

The cavalry reconnaissance was well execute[illegible] over, as [illegible] position, were sent [illegible] cavalry.

They will encamp at Chik Jala. [illegible] hand, adv[illegible]d [illegible] body of the

3. The royal artillery I/3 R. A. will march *viâ* De[illegible] cavalry, escorted by one troop of silladars, it will encamp with the cavalry brigade to-morrow to save returning to the infantry encampment.

4. M/2 R.A. will march in advance of the second infantry brigade near which it will encamp.

5. The silladar horse will send the squadron that is encamped on the Dobbspet and Nundi roads to search the country as far as Spiramanhalli at the 16th M.S. on the Dod-Ballapur Yellahanka road. Their special duty will be to make themselves acquainted with roads and swamps through the country to their left and to join hands with the right of the cavalry.

The main body of the silladars will accompany the 12th Lancers squadron and R.H.A. Their scouts will prolong the scouts line of the Lancers to the left.

One troop will act as escort to I/3 R.A. (see D.O. 3).

6. The 1st Madras Light Cavalry will march *viâ* Devanhalli to Chik Jala and act as reserve to the scout line.

7. The first infantry brigade will march *viâ* Devanhalli to Kanamangala and encamp there. It will follow the second brigade.

8. The second infantry brigade will march *viâ* Devanhalli to Buvanhalli and encamp there.

9. The sappers will march with the first brigade, and will, if time permits, make a passable road round the north of Sadhalli.

10. Order of march will be as follows :—

The Cavalry Brigade at 9 A.M.,
I/3 R.A.,
M/2 R.A.,
2nd Infantry Brigade,
Sappers and Miners,
1st Infantry Brigade,

in succession as soon as the front of each is clear.

The baggage will not leave camp till all the troops are well clear of it, and must be kept on the left of the road to prevent a block.

Thirty rounds blank per man infantry and 10 per man cavalry will be carried. It will be drawn this evening.

16th January 1884.

Movements, Cavalry Brigade.

The orders were carried out as far as possible.

After passing Devanhalli the Madras cavalry threw out one squadron to the right of the road and the silladars one to the left.

The front of the brigade was protected by an advance guard 600 yards in front, and in this order the brigade proceeded towards Chik Jala, searching the villages near the road in passing.

On reaching the 15th milestone it was reported that the bridge over the tank was blown up and further advance by the road impossible.

On the brigade halting, fire was opened by the enemy from some Khêts across the tank and two guns R.H.A. having advanced too near the bridge in ignorance of its being blown up and being unable to reverse, were put out of action.

The southern fire was replied to by a dismounted squadron of Lancers and by two guns of R.H.A. who arrived before the bridge had been repaired. These guns rendered good service in covering the turning movement of the brigade.

They were supported by I/3 R.A. who had halted on the left of the road, the whole eight guns in action.

After a delay of about 30 minutes, the south-west of the road was reported clear of the enemy, so the 12th Lancers (Major Poole commanding) took ground to the west.

A squadron of Lancers of the southern force (Colonel Stewart commanding), who had been concealed behind the Khêts before mentioned, moved out to dispute their advance.

Both charged, but were stopped by a nullah which ran between them. The southern cavalry having no ammunition was obliged to retire (by decision of an umpire) before the northern cavalry, who, on seeing the dilemma, had promptly dismounted and opened fire.

In the mean time, three squadrons of 1st Light Cavalry and one of Silladar Horse had followed round the tank and round the hill. (3341).

P. W. D.

Govt. of {1884} Madras.

Captain T... 19th ... ...tant Qu...
Captain Yates, R.H.A., D... ...derabad Co...
Quarter...ieutenant Adye, 1st C...

...p equipage fo...
...the ... which ... were moved by
... exception of fi... thus holding them ... the
...mment transpo...
...ons, the transport of ... was co...ed the village of Bet Halsur.

Information ... southern cavalry was drawn up near the village of Sennapanhalli. Major Hooper charged ...up the hill, and the squadrons under Captain Hornsby were sent for to help. As they were proceeding towards Chik Jala, they met two guns moving at a walk on the road, captured them, and galloped to assist Major Hooper's charge; they arrived in time to do so. These guns had been firing from the rocks west of 3212 hill on our R.H.A. guns, who were still in action to the west of the road north of the 15th M.S. and where they remained under the orders of the Officer Commanding the Brigade for the remainder of the day, with the view of supporting cavalry movement from a distance. Both forces were ordered to retire by an umpire except the two squadrons under Captain Hornsby, who kept possession of the hill.

While this struggle for the ridge was proceeding, I/3 R.A., under Major Anderson, had followed the cavalry round the west of the hill and halted near the village of Bet Halsur. On the resumption of hostilities four guns advanced to the ridge, but the southern cavalry retired without fighting. An attempt was made to cut them off, but owing to a misunderstanding in an order the attempt was not supported and was defeated. I/3 R.A., now brought its six guns into action on the rocks and opened on the enemy's cavalry. (See map.)

I/3rd R. A.

The final position of the cavalry at end of day's proceeding at 2-10 P.M. was near the enemy's outposts on the high ground south of 12th M.S., main body at Suggatta rocks. (The detached squadron of silladars joined here at about 1-30 P.M.)

The artillery occupied the positions as under at the close of the day's proceeding—

2 guns E/B.R.H.A., at 14th M.S.
2 guns E/B.R.H.A., out of action.
I/3 R. A. on the rocky hill between Suggatta village and road a little north of west of the 12th M.S. M/2 in column of route south of 18th M.S.

The action terminated here by order of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and the two advanced batteries marched to their camping grounds, a little north of the 14th M.S. west of the road. M/2 to Bevanhalli.

A party of signallers (cavalry), consisting of thirteen men and three officers, accompanied cavalry and artillery moving on Chik Jala. On arriving at the 18th milestone, a party of four men and one officer was despatched to Sadhalli rock to watch Chik Jala and the whole country to the west. Another party of four men and one officer took up their position on the rock near 16th milestone, and the third party went on with scouts to 15th milestone, from which place they found the enemy, and signalled to rock near 16th milestone that the bridge was blown up, also that two of our guns were out of action in consequence of having attempted to cross it. The party at Sadhalli signalled to 16th milestone that the enemy's cavalry were working round west towards Narrainpur, which news reached Colonel Hooper, Commanding the Cavalry.

M/2 R.A. marched in front of No. 2 brigade and encamped just south of Havanalli.

The first brigade followed in rear of the second brigade to Kanamangala, where it encamped with the sappers.

The second brigade led the infantry division from Nundidroog to the 19th M.S. on the Chik-Ballapur road as far as Buvanhalli, where it encamped.

Outposts were thrown out from each camp as shown on the maps, and all precautions taken as if in presence of an enemy.

The outposts of the second brigade extended from Buvanhalli to Dod Sanne, those of the first brigade covering the ground from Kanamangala to Bachelhalli.

Headquarters encamped east of the 18th M.S. close to the road.

D.O., 16th January for 17th January.

The division will take up by 9 A.M. to-morrow the same position that it occupied at 3 P. M. to-day.

The cavalry will examine the country from Baglur on their left to Pollium heights and Tinnulu in centre, to Shingapur and Hospolia on their right.

Tinnulu height must be occupied.

The royal horse artillery and two field batteries will take position on the Suggata heights with the object of covering the advance of the infantry on Allalsandra woods and Yellahanka.

The first brigade and sappers will march in rear of second infantry brigade and will receive further orders at the 13th M.S.

The second brigade will move along the Yellahanka road and seize Yellahanka, and, if possible, the Allalsandra wood.

Cavalry will carry 10 rounds and infantry 30 rounds to-morrow of blank ammunition in pouch and on mules. It will be drawn this evening.

(2) The main approaches to the position, vi... across the stream had not been de... attacking force. The guns, which ... narrow and dangerous track on t... standstill, blocked the roadway fo...
Infant... The ...

Verbal orders.

... and position as well execute... heights and ...tion, wer... wo...t...

All Commanders will use the greatest caution in...

The scouting of the cavalry was performed to...day with too great rapidity and want of caution.

The object of the cavalry to-morrow is to ma...nœuvre rather than fight, and, above all, to send the Major-General full information of all that takes place in its front to guide the advance of the main body.

The amount of news sent from the front to-day did not satisfy the Major-General.

17th January 1884.

The orders as given were carried out.

The cavalry brigade took up its position on the heights near Suggatta, where they were when the "cease fire" sounded yesterday.

Cavalry brigade.

The main body went westwards across the Yellahanka Dod-Ballapur road, driving back the southern cavalry before it, and having occupied the ridges near Dod Bettah...lli, passed on to the heights near Tinnulu.

Two squadrons under Major Hooper advanced direct on Yellahanka, clearing the ground east of the road, and hearing the bridge was blown up and the village held by two dismounted squadrons of southern cavalry, kept them in check with two dismounted troops of the first cavalry until the arrival of the infantry at 12-30 noon.

The two squadrons then separated, one moved to the east under Major Hooper, and advancing along the east edge of Allalsandra wood, came up to the 15th N.I., which it took by surprise standing at ease, and cut them up. One squadron Mysore horse moved by the west of the village, clearing the ground south of Yellahanka.

Unfortunately it committed itself to a rash charge near the east of Tinnulu hill.

This charge was supported at long interval, but as fast as possible by two squadrons under Captain Hornsby and one under Colonel Parsons from the west, Major Hooper arriving from the 7th milestone with a squadron in time to assist.

This charge of Major Hooper (though the halt had sounded) was permitted by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to show what would have been done under ordinary circumstances in such a case.

This encounter took place just east of Tinnulu hill and between it and the S. end of Allalsandra wood.

Tinnulu heights were thus left in possession of the cavalry at the end of the day. The scout line extended as far as Shingapur to the west, and joined the right of the second brigade which was holding the S. edge of Allalsandra wood.

R.A.

The orders to the R.A. being "to concentrate on Suggatta rocks," the three batteries moved on to that point:—

I/3 R.A. arriving at 9 A.M.,
E/B.R.H.A. „ 9-10 A.M.,
M/2 R.A. „ 9-30 A.M.,

about three troops of the enemy's cavalry being visible massed on the crest of the hill near the 11 M.S., I/3 R.A. fired on them; after a few rounds they retired.

Orders were then given to R.H.A. "advance with cavalry and seize high ground evacuated by the enemy and shell him as he withdraws."

This advance covered by the other two batteries.

I/3 R.A. to move up and align themselves with R.H.A. as soon as established. E/B. and I/3 advance from here and M/2 move up to them, all 16 guns coming into action in line on high ground 400 yards north and west of 11th M.S.

Marked on map, 2nd position, 17th.

Marked on map, 3rd position, 16 guns on 17th.

At this point, about 11 A.M., orders were received from General Officer Commanding for M/2 R.A. to support advance of second brigade direct on Yellahanka village.

The battery did so, moving into position between hill 2992 and village of Manchalli, from which position it subsequently advanced in support of the infantry attack to a position in advance of the village of Jakkur, a little to east of south line of plantation.

Orders were now given for the other 10 guns to move to the west in support of the cavalry attack on Yellahanka from west covering advance of the second infantry brigade. This was done by successive advances of R.H.A. and I/3 R.A., each battery covering the advance of the other, and both supporting an attack by cavalry on the bund over Mullagoonapollium tank. Up to this time these 10 guns were only opposed by 2 R.H.A. guns of the enemy.

P. W. D

Govt. of {1884} Madras.

Captain Yates, R.H.A., D... ...derabad Co... the ... which marched, were moved by ... thus holding ... during the

...ieutenant Adye, 1st C... exception of fi... the hill west of the ... of the

...ment transpo... ...s, the transport of ... was co... the vil.

Informatic... ...e souther... cavalry was advanced with cavalry south-west under cover of the laterite hills into the ... the hi... marked on the map (E/B. 6 position on 17th instant). From here they again advanced to hill Tinnulu where they came into action and supported the action of our cavalry at that place.

The day finished thus, all batteries returning to camp round Yellahanka village.

The first infantry brigade. The first infantry brigade marched at 9-10 A.M. in rear of the second brigade in column of route. On reaching the 13th mile and 3rd furlong stone, this brigade was ordered to march due west by Nelkunteh to the Dod-Ballapur Yellahanka road, crossing the paddy south of Mudnahalli and to occupy hill No. 3045, there to await further orders. This it did.

On passing to the north of Gantiganahalli tank, a squadron of the enemy was seen on the south edge of that tank. This was signalled to the nearest signal station. The squadron of silladars, who had been marching separately, spoke this force * at Nelkunteh village, and then passed on to Puttanhalli, to join the remainder of the cavalry.

* 1st brigade.

The brigade reached hill No. 3045 without opposition, and took up a position about 1 P.M. At 2-5 P.M. it received orders to march to camp at Yellahanka, which it did.

Second infantry brigade. The second brigade marched with advance and rear guard. At the 15th M.S. information arrived that the enemy's cavalry had been seen working east.

Flanking parties were thrown out to protect left and rear. At 10th M.S. orders were received from the Major-General to take Yellahanka.

43rd O.L.I. advanced in attack formation and occupied the village without opposition.

The centre arch of bridge at north entrance to village had been blown up by enemy, but no difficulty was experienced in passing through the march on either side.

One company 4th Pioneers and tools arrived at 12-45 P.M., and set to work to repair bridge. Bridge was passable at 1-15. Stems of trees cut in the vicinity were supposed to be laid across the breaches, branches of trees across them forming a corduroy road.

The troops extended on the south side of village and lay down.

The enemy's cavalry and artillery appeared in precipitate retreat at this junction down the Dod-Ballapur road, and crossing our front were exposed to a withering fire from one extended line.

Their artillery formed up just below the junction of the two roads apparently with the intention of opening on us, but abandoned the intention and withdrew to beyond Allalsandra, covered by a charge of the Lancers escort, who must have been annihilated by our infantry.

The advance was now continued southwards on either side of the road until the plantation was reached, when the greater part of the line was put into the wood, a half left turn being made.

The 43rd O.L.I. passed through the wood and found the southern end occupied by the 15th M.N.I. skirmishers, who were speedily dislodged and who, as soon as they emerged into the open, were cut up by a squadron under Major Hooper, 1st L.C. They were also exploded from their left by the 4th Pioneers extended line.

The "cease fire" now sounded, about 2-10 P.M., and the brigade marched to its camping ground just south of Yellahanka.

Signalling. The infantry signallers took up position on the hill to the east of Chik Jala. A cavalry party was sent to Dod Bettahalli, where they arrived in about two hours after much trouble in avoiding the enemy's scouts, and signalled to the party on hill near Chik Jala that there was a squadron of enemy's cavalry and some infantry at the 13th M.S. on the road to Dod-Ballapur, who were marching to Yellahanka.

This news was sent to a third party at the 11th M.S. on the road to Yellahanka, where the General had taken up a position.

D.O. for 18th January. The division will to-morrow take up the position it held this evening at 3 P.M., as follows:—

The 12th Royal Lancers and cavalry will hold Tinnulu hill with scouts pushed well forward; their left will touch the second brigade at Allalsandra wood.

Strength { 1 Squadron Lancers. 4 Silladars. 1st M.L. Cavalry.

The whole of the artillery of the division will mass behind Tinnulu hill as soon after 9 A.M. as possible, but only four guns will be in position on the hill.

(2) The main approaches to the position, vi... across the stream had not been de... attacking force. The guns, which ... narrow and dangerous track on th... standstill, blocked the roadway fo... Infantry of the last-n... ing west and is well execute... west of the ma... ion, were ...

Fusiliers, Sappers, 12th N.I., 27th N.I. The ...

Two squadrons cavalry will be detailed with th... later in the day.

2nd Brigade, 43rd O.L.I., 4th Pioneers, 14th N.I., 10th N.I. The second brigade, with the exception of the 10th N.I., will hold the Allalsandra wood and check any advance of the enemy in that direction; two regiments will be kept in reserve on the road. When opportunity occurs, it will leave the 43rd in the wood and pass two regiments under cover to the Tinnulu hill.

10th N.I. The 10th N.I. will advance upon Tinnulu from their encampment direct.

Instructions will be sent to this brigade later on.

The cavalry will carry 20 rounds per man, the infantry 50 rounds per man, to-day in pouches and on mules.

The Officers Commanding Cavalry and R.A. will meet the Major-General at headquarters at 7-45 A.M. to-morrow.

The baggage will not move till 12 noon, and will move on left of the road, to keep it clear.

Verbal orders. The chief points to be seized to-morrow by the cavalry are 3050 hill and cross roads near Subedar's Chutrum; all ground and villages over which they advance must be most carefully examined.

Signal stations will be established at Tinnulu and Dod Bettahalli at first. Communications must be kept up at all hazards with General Elles' brigade.

Headquarters will be established at 9 A.M. at Allalsandra wood, before 10 at Tinnulu, after probably at 3050 hill north of Jalhalli, later on at Subedar's Chutrum.

Word will be left at each place as to the Major-General's whereabouts.

The objection for the first brigade to-morrow will be to work round the enemy's left under cover of the ridge running from north to south down the west edge of the map and to take him by surprise, if possible, near the rifle range. The second brigade is expected to hold the enemy in front while this movement is being carried out.

The movement of the two regiments from the second brigade to strengthen the right centre attack will require care.

The success of the day will depend greatly upon the timing of the second infantry brigades. The 10th N.I. will protect the guns on Tinnulu and eventually advance.

18th January. Those orders were carried out.

Cavalry. The cavalry brigade paraded in rear of the Tinnulu heights, from which the ground for some four miles round is visible; the disposition of the southern troops was clearly seen and reported to the Major-General.

Two squadrons went towards the Hebbal tank as escort to the R.H.A., which took up a position on Pollium.

About 11-30 A.M. the advance of the first brigade was reported by signal, west of Hospoliah, and the main body of cavalry crossed the march about 800 yards from the head of Hebbal tank.

After some delay, owing to the village of Nagshettihalli being strongly held, the brigade advanced on to the Tumkur road, across the railway, and took up a position on the extreme right of the line, the Mysore Horse placing themselves about 500 yards on the left flank of the southern infantry completely concealed. Here they remained till the "cease fire" sounded at 2 P.M. (their work being done).

R.A. In accordance with the orders received, the R.H.A. and R.A. massed on Tinnulu heights, but, as the enemy had withdrawn from his position of the previous evening, no firing took place. From this hill, at 10 o'clock, I/3 R.A. was ordered to proceed under cover of the laterite hills to join and cover the advance of General Elles' brigade moving to the west of Dod Bettahalli. By mistake M/2 R.A. accompanied this battery instead of coming on to Tinnulu hill. Orders were now given to the four guns R.H.A. to advance from Tinnulu hill and to occupy the position previously occupied by the enemy on the hill near the 6th M.S. near village of Pollium west of the road, for the purpose of answering the enemy's guns firing from N.E. corner of village of Nagshettihalli, and to cover advance of cavalry towards the south-west, and support infantry attack at that point. This they did; meanwhile M/2 and I/3 R.A., with the first infantry brigade, had arrived near the village of Jalhalli when the enemy's cavalry and R.H.A. were seen rapidly retiring from Nagshettihalli village in a southerly direction. The two batteries were then pushed rapidly on to a position under a natural mud parapet (varying from three to four feet in height), one battery on each side of the road east of village of Yeshvantpur. From this position, supported by infantry, they brought a heavy fire to bear on enemy's infantry. No guns of the enemy were at this time in position against them.

Marked on map. The M/2nd and I/3rd R.A. 1st fighting position on 18th.

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Captain T... 14th ... ... the ... which marched were ... he had ... the

Captain Yates, R.H.A., D... ...derabad Co ... exception of ... thus ... on for one hour and to retire M/2 R.A.,

quarter ... lieutenant Adye, 1st C... ... e. The four guns R.H.A. with the

... nment transpo... ... es, the transport of ... R.H.A. ... having been formed through the village

sition on ... of Yeshvantpur, the R.H.A. with cavalry moved in that direction and

Marked on map M/2nd final position on 18th. took up a position in a hollow lane, partially enfilading the enemy's position. They were shortly reinforced by M/2 R.A. here with five guns.

Marked on map I/3rd R.A. final position on 18th. The R.H.A. now moved on across the level crossing and took post on the rocky hill south-west of 3100 still further enfilading the enemy. M/2 R.A. was now moved on under cover of fire of R.H.A. into line with them. M/2 was afterwards moved still further to south-west on the next hill. Meanwhile orders had been left with O.C. I/3 R.A. to continue in action in his original position behind the mud parapet till a further direct advance could be made in support of infantry attack. This was done, and this battery eventually occupied the position previously held by the enemy.

At this point the action closed and batteries moved to camp near the rifle range.

At 9 A.M. this brigade marched from hill No. 3045, under instructions from the Major-

1st brigade. General, by the route indicated, under cover of hills about half a mile east of left edge of map, and behind hill No. 3050 deployed into line of columns at deploying interval two battalions in first line, one in second, marched west of summit

10-15 A.M. and directed advance south-east on village of Jalhalli. On passing Dod Bettahalli signal station received a message from signallers that three battalions of enemy were marching west from the Muntapum. Cavalry joined soon after and reported all clear in front.

On reaching Jalhalli reports were received from cavalry that bund in front and road across

11-40. causeway to east were clear. Two battalions were crossed by causeway, one by bund (12-10 o'clock).

The brigade took up a first position as marked on map between villages of Martenhalli on left and Yeshvantpur on right, both being occupied; two battalions and sappers in first line, one battalion in second line.

Two battalions of enemy were reported on the right front, one on hill in centre. When in this position a despatch from Major-General was received that two batta-

12-40. lions of second brigade were crossing marshes above Hebbal tank to join the first brigade.

General officer commanding first brigade awaited their coming, and sent a request that they would take up position on left of his line, and informed them that as soon as they joined the right of the first brigade would work round to its right.

1 o'clock. When the two battalions of the second brigade joined, an advance was ordered to the right front. At same time the battalion of the second line was ordered round to the right.

Operation continued. Subedar village was occupied, and a position taken up as marked on

1-15 o'clock. map. Ten minutes before "cease fire" sounded the right regiment of the first brigade was firing into two H.A. guns and a squadron of cavalry halted within 150 yards near a small trench at the fourth milestone on Tumkur road.

The guns were not in action.

The right rear of the first brigade was at this time supported by five Fd. A. guns, four H.A. guns, and three or four squadrons of cavalry.

This left was joined on to the second brigade.

The line was within 150 yards of the enemy, who was attacked on two sides.

The communication between the main signal stations on Tinnulu and the first brigade was excellent; an after knowledge of what had occurred proved the accuracy of the messages received.

The first brigade was handled in a masterly manner.

At 9 A.M. the second brigade occupied the following position:—The whole of the 43rd Light

2nd brigade infantry. Infantry were in the plantation, on the east of which was a troop of cavalry (Major Hooper's).

The 4th and 14th regiments were in reserve on the road behind the brow of the hill. The 10th Regiment was sent to the hill Tinnulu to act as escort to the artillery. On intimation being received that the hills on either side of road at Pollium were unoccupied, the brigade advanced down the road with scouts and skirmishers heading, and halted on the north side of the Hebbal tank. The brigade was then split up, the 43rd being left to act independently on the east of the Hebbal tank, and the 4th and 14th were detached under the brigadier to work round the west of tank and effect a juncture with the first brigade. These two regiments moved westward, and then crossed the marshy ground to west of tank and moved southwards. Infantry and artillery fire being heard due south, the advance was accelerated, and the regiments came into action on the slope due north of Yeshvantpur. Having joined both the first brigade on the right and the 10th regiment on the left, which regiment at this time was hotly engaged in endeavouring to turn the enemy's right flank, a general advance was then made on the key of the position,

(2) The main approaches to the position, vi... across the stream had not been de... attacking force. The guns, which ... narrow and dangerous track on th... standstill, blocked the roadway fo... Infantry ... ed on ...

wood from the direction of Gangenhalli

The final position of the first and ... well execut... were s... the map.

The 43rd had been ordered to advance by the Major-General, under cover of the Hebbal tank bund, and to occupy the wood adjoining the road between Hebbal

43rd Oxf. L.I. and the rifle range. This they did, and were afterwards directed to close to their right to join the 10th. This order was well executed, and they arrived within a few yards of a battery of artillery unperceived on the left of the northern force.

Orders having been given that communication by signal was to be kept up with General Elles' brigade, which was to make a flank march to the west behind Dod

Signalling. Bettahalli, and that all movements of the enemy's troops were to be sent by him, a party of signallers was sent to Tinnulu sand hills, who, with large telescopes, soon found out that a brigade was posted by the Muntapum, and that troops were moving westward to Yeshvantpur and Gedadhalli. Another party was posted on hill at Dod Bettahalli, who received all the news from the party at the sand hills, and sent it on by sowars to General Elles, who, by 10 A.M., was thoroughly acquainted with the disposition and numbers of the enemy opposing his advance.

The signalling party at the sand hills was placed at the foot of the hill facing north-west and was completely concealed from the enemy's signallers at the Muntapum and near Hebbal.

The party at Dod Bettahalli, who might have been read by the enemy's signallers at the Muntapum or elsewhere, had strict orders not to send any news to the party on the sand hills, save the "understood" and "not understood" signals. These orders were most strictly carried out.

Two of our parties could easily read two parties of the enemy's signallers, but they gained no information, as they seemed unable to find one another, and sent nothing but the "call up" signal.

One officer (Lieutenant Dyer, 2nd Middlesex Regiment) and two men signallers were captured near Pollium.

D.O. 18th. The division, with the exception of the 1st Light Cavalry, will march to camp near Kistnarajahpuram to-morrow morning.

The first cavalry will remain at Hebbal till further orders on account of anthrax; the cavalry and artillery will march *viâ* lower road through cantonments, the infantry brigades will proceed by sapper lines and upper road; Brigadiers will issue their own orders as to hour. The 10th N.I. will rejoin the first division.

No baggage to leave camp till the troops have cleared. Carts will go by lower road; baggage animals by upper and across country.

These orders were carried out, and the second division reached its camp about noon.

(Signed) H. N. D. PRENDERGAST, Major-General,
Commanding Northern Force.

CAMP KISTNARAJAHPURAM,
24th January 1884.

OPERATIONS OF THE 16TH JANUARY 1884.

Dispositions of the Northern Force.

Major-General Prendergast on the 15th made the following dispositions for the next day:—

1. The main body cavalry brigade, under Colonel Hooper, reinforced by 1/3 R.A., to advance as rapidly as possible along the Devanhalli-Bangalore road, and endeavour to seize the high ground, south of Chik Jala, before the southern force could reach it.

Four guns E/B, R.H.A.; one squadron 12th Lancers; 1st Madras L.C.; two squadrons Silladar Horse; six guns I/3rd R.A.

2. One squadron Silladar Horse to move by the Dod-Ballapur road (it had encamped the night before at Tapshipur near the 39th milestone), gain touch with the scouts from the main body, and scour the country as far as the 18th or 19th milestone.

3. One squadron Silladar Horse to cover the left flank as far as Baglur and Budigere.
4. M/2 Royal Artillery, the wagons of I/3, and the second brigade, to move to Buvanhalli.
5. The first infantry brigade and sappers to Kanamangala.
6. Headquarters to 18th milestone.
7. Cavalry to be provided with twenty and infantry with fifty rounds ammunition.
8. Signal stations to be established at hills marked on the map—3103 and 3050.

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quarter Lieutenant Adye, 1st C... ...ment transpo... was ordered ... The
...uvres, the transport of ... R.H.A. ... and ... brigade having was ordered—

(*a*)—To establish a cordon of observation stations on a line drawn east and west through the 14th milestone on the Devanhalli road, to watch and report movements of the enemy.

(*b*)—To gain possession, if possible, of Chik Jala, destroy the bridge north of it, and hold village with dismounted cavalry, so as to prevent repair of the bridge.

(*c*)—To establish signalling stations on hill No. 3212 or hill No. 3341.

Colonel Russell was informed of the intended position of the infantry brigades, and that a company of mounted infantry would follow the cavalry brigade up the Devanhalli road.

2. The first infantry brigade, P/1, R.A., and one company sappers to be in position between Geddalhalli and Tanisandra by 2 P.M.

3. The second infantry brigade, S/1, R.A., and one company sappers to be in position on the high ground, near the sixth milestone, on the Yellahanka road by 2 P.M.

4. The company of mounted infantry to follow the cavalry brigade.

5. Divisional headquarters to be at the tenth milestone on the Devanhalli road by 9 A.M., and all reports to be made accordingly.

Execution.

The cavalry brigade, with two guns R.H.A., southern force, started from its camp near the first division, and advanced rapidly in the direction of Chik Jala, which it reached soon after 10 A.M. and found unoccupied. One troop of 2nd Light Cavalry had been detached to watch the right flank east of the Bangalore-Devanhalli road, and to establish posts at Budigere and Kodagihalli villages.

9 A.M., two squadrons 12th Lancers, 2nd L.C., two guns E/B R.H.A.

The company of mounted infantry followed the main body and reached Chik Jala in time to support it.

The bridge on the causeway north of the village was at once prepared for demolition, the necessary appliances having been brought up by the pioneer troop of the 12th Lancers, and was destroyed on the approach of the northern cavalry.

Four guns R.H.A.

The cavalry brigade, northern force, proceeded as directed.

One squadron 12th Lancers, 1st L.C. Two squadrons Silladar Horse.

One squadron Silladar Horse watched the country on each side of the Yellahanka road, while the remainder of the brigade, reinforced by I/3 R.A. and covered by one squadron 1st Light Cavalry as an advanced guard, proceeded as fast as possible along the Bangalore road.

11-15 A.M.

The advanced guard on reaching the causeway north of Chik Jala, about 11-15 A.M., found the bridge destroyed and the approach to it commanded by dismounted cavalry, well posted behind a wall. They were accordingly ordered by umpires to fall back.

11-30 A.M.

At 11-30 the four guns R.H.A. coming up at a gallop to support the advanced guard were suddenly brought up by the broken bridge and the fire of the dismounted cavalry and thrown into some confusion. Two guns were put out of action by the umpires.

12 noon.

Finding the road thus barred, the northern brigade worked round to the west, with the object of threatening the enemy's rear and line of retreat. The 1st Light Cavalry crossed some swampy ground to west of road, and in going through the village were exposed to fire of mounted infantry in position about Chik Jala.

Eventually the brigade emerged on the high ground south of Chik Jala, thereby obliging the enemy to evacuate the position taken up by the dismounted troops, and made a hurried concentration.

Meanwhile two squadrons 1st Light Cavalry, having worked away more to the westward, came suddenly on two guns R.H.A. retiring along the road and captured them.

A series of charges now took place between the contending cavalry on the high ground south of Bet Halsur, the result being that the Umpire-in-Chief decided that both sides should withdraw, the southern ¼ mile, and the northern ¾ mile, and then halt for ½ hour.

2 P.M.

When the movements re-commenced, six guns of the northern force were established on the aforementioned high ground, protected by rocky banks, with the object of supporting the further advance of their cavalry.

3 P.M.

The southern cavalry, however, retired, and on the "cease fire" sounding went off across country to camp at Baglur, beyond the line of tanks running west from the twelfth milestone.

The northern cavalry with eight guns were now established south of Chik Jala.

(2) The main approaches to the position, vi... across the stream had not been de... attacking force. The guns, which ... narrow and dangerous track on th... standstill, blocked the roadway fo... Infantry.

The ... the day the cav... well execut... of doing their best to obtain informa... come into collision with each other. ...n, were s... reconnoitering parties; the result was that each of ... throughout the day as to the movements of the main body of his enemy.

Had it been the intention of either commander to occupy the high ground south of Chik Jala, with the idea of making tactical use of it, the endeavour to seize it would have been justifiable, but the position is not one of any real value, it can be easily turned, and to gain possession of it the cavalry of both sides had to be massed to an extent, which seriously interfered with their scouting and reconnoitering.

It is doubtful whether any advantage was gained by moving the infantry of the southern force until reliable information had been received as to the enemy's advance. The southern force was already in a central position and near a main road, by which it could have proceeded rapidly, east or west, as occasion demanded.

(By Order.)

(Signed) GODFREY CLERK, Brigadier-General,
Adjutant-General.

CAMP OF EXERCISE,
22nd January 1884.

OPERATIONS OF THE 17TH JANUARY 1884.

Disposition of Northern Force.

Major-General Prendergast made Yellahanka and the position south-west of it, from the Allalsandra wood to the hill above Tinnulu, his objective for the 17th.

With this view he ordered—

1. His cavalry brigade to advance as opportunity offered.

2. His second brigade (Colonel Dixon's) to advance by the direct road on Yellahanka. If it met with opposition, which was expected, Colonel Dixon was directed to try and work round the enemy's left flank.

3. His first brigade and sappers to advance along the Devanhalli road as far as the thirteenth milestone, when they would receive fresh orders, his intention being to move them thence across country to the Ballapur road, so as to be in a position either to assist the second brigade in their movement on Yellahanka, by a flank attack from the east, or to act as a reserve.

4. His horse artillery guns and two field batteries to be massed on the high ground near Sonnappanhalli to cover the advance of the infantry brigades, and disperse any masses of the enemy's cavalry.

Dispositions of the Southern Force.

Major-General Sir C. Keyes ordered—

1. His cavalry brigade to hold their ground as long as they could, and when compelled to withdraw to close, if possible, to the west of Yellahanka, or, if this was found to be impracticable, on that village where they would be supported by infantry fire.

2. His mounted infantry to Yellahanka, to be afterwards relieved by infantry.

3. His second brigade (Colonel Brett's) to occupy Yellahanka with half a battalion, relieving the mounted infantry, so as to cover the retirement of the cavalry brigade.

4. His first brigade (Brigadier-General Gib's) to advance from south of Tanisandra to north of Maistry Pollium, and wait there for orders.

5. His field batteries to remain attached to the infantry brigades, P/1 to the first brigade and S/1 to the second brigade.

6. Reports to be sent to him at the tenth milestone on the Devanhalli road.

Execution.

9 A.M.

On the morning of the 17th General Prendergast's force resumed its advance covered by the fire of 16 guns.

The bulk of the cavalry was on the right flank and gradually worked round the left flank of the southern cavalry brigade.

This turning movement of the northern cavalry brigade was supported by the fire of ten guns, M/2 having been detailed at 11 o'clock as an immediate support to the second infantry brigade.

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brigade ... To establish a cordon of observation ... at 10-30 A.M., and their rear brigade (Elles') the thirteenth milestone at 10-40 A.M.

10-30 A.M. Elles' brigade was then moved across country to the Ballapur road and reached the eleventh milestone on that road at 12-40 P.M.

To give time for this turning movement Dixon's brigade halted for an hour and-a-half, during which M/2 Royal Artillery joined it, and thenceforward immediately supported its advance.

At 12-15 P.M. General Prendergast ordered Dixon's brigade to advance on Yellahanka, and

12-15 P.M. finding it unoccupied his advanced guard, the 1st Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry, was through the village at 12-45 P.M.

Just at this time the southern cavalry brigade was hurriedly falling back along the Ballapur road and came under the close fire of Dixon's advanced guard; in addition to this it found that the bridge south of Yellahanka had been prematurely broken up by their own sappers.

The umpires accordingly decided to place two guns and one squadron southern cavalry out of action.

Turning now to the movements of the southern force. At 10 A.M. Yellahanka was occupied

10 A.M. by the 15th Native Infantry and the sappers from the second brigade. Between 10-30 and 11 A.M. the bridges in, and south of, the village were blown up, and at 11-30 A.M. the infantry and sappers were withdrawn and the brigade took position on the ridge which crosses the road at the seventh milestone.

The 15th Native Infantry was on the east of the road in attack formation about 300 yards south of the Allalsandra wood. On the west of the road was the 2nd Battalion South Wales Borderers, also in attack formation, and about 300 yards in rear of the crest of the hill, and on the left was S/1 Royal Artillery. The volunteer battalion was on the extreme left near the Tinnulu hill, facing west.

The second brigade, northern force, lost no time in advancing against this position. The 2nd Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry in attack formation led and was followed by the 4th Pioneers, the 10th Native Infantry, and the 14th Native Infantry.

The Oxfordshire Light Infantry got into the wood and made their way through it, meeting with no opposition until they reached the southern edge of it, when they came on the 15th Native Infantry.

The second brigade, southern force, was at this time in the act of retiring, and the battery of artillery attached to it had already been withdrawn from the ridge, so that the brigade was in no position to withstand the attack made on it.

2 P.M. The 15th Native Infantry was attacked in front and flank, and was charged by a squadron of the native cavalry. The umpires placed the regiment out of action.

M/2 Royal Artillery now came up on the east of the Allalsandra wood.

Meanwhile the northern cavalry brigade had reached the Tinnulu hill, manœuvring on the open ground on the enemy's left flank.

An indecisive charge between the cavalry on both sides brought the day's proceedings to an end.

At "cease fire" the positions of the contending forces were as follows:—

The first brigade, northern force, was still halted at the eleventh milestone on the Ballapur road, and I/3 Royal Artillery was at the ninth mile on the same road.

The second infantry brigade, with M/2 Royal Artillery, held the high ground above Yellahanka.

The cavalry was on the right, near Tinnulu.

The first infantry brigade, southern force, with its battery, having received orders to retire to the high ground about Hebbal covering Bangalore, was still on the march.

The second infantry brigade having already retired to the rocky ground abreast of the sixth milestone covered this movement.

Remarks by the Umpire-in-Chief.

The movements of the northern force call for no remarks; they were well conceived and accurately carried out. The cavalry was more judiciously handled than on the previous day, and although it was not very successful in discovering the whereabouts of the enemy, it effectually screened the advance of its own main body.

The cavalry of the southern force again failed to obtain intelligence of the enemy's movements, and once more showed a want of appreciation of the importance of intelligent scouting. When forced to withdraw, it would have done better had it done so to the west of Yellahanka, as directed by the General in command. The line of retirement it adopted caused it to be surprised by the enemy's infantry advancing under cover of Yellahanka, and enabled the enemy's cavalry

(2) The main approaches to the position, vi... s the stream had not been de... ...g force. The guns, which ... n... dangerous track on th... st... ...cked the roadway fo... In...

... The southern cavalry ... well execut... to push on rapidly, and to complete th... ...on, were se... the southern force.

The disposition of the southern force at this pe... ...tance. The 15th Native Infantry was drawn up in rear of the Allalsandra wood, thus neglecting the maxim that whenever infantry is halted in the neighbourhood of a wood, it should occupy the further edge of it. The enemy promptly took advantage of this omission, and aided by its cavalry was judged to have completely destroyed the 15th Native Infantry. This jeopardised the whole of the southern force. Of the second brigade (Brett's), one battalion (15th Native Infantry) had been put out of action, another battalion (the volunteers) was moving north-west towards Tinnulu, while the remaining battalion (the 2nd South Wales Borderers) having been posted at some distance on the reverse slope of the ridge was quite unaware of what was taking place on its immediate front and flank. No assistance could be looked for from the second brigade which, from its position on the low swampy ground near Tanisandra, could only move westwards in single file.

(By Order.)

CAMP OF EXERCISE, 22nd *January* 1884.

(Signed) GODFREY CLERK, Brigadier-General, *Adjutant-General.*

MOVEMENTS OF THE 18TH JANUARY 1884.

Dispositions—Northern Force.

Major-General Prendergast ordered—

1. His cavalry, with the exception of two squadrons, which were to be attached to brigades, to form a screen in front of the division, and, supported by the 10th Native Infantry, to occupy the attention of the enemy along their front, while the first brigade (Elles') made its flank march. Their objective was eventually to be the Subedar Chutrum and the high ground to the east of it.

2. The four guns, E/B Royal Horse Artillery, and the two field batteries to be massed on Tinnulu hill, but not to show their strength at first.

3. The first brigade (Elles') and the Madras Sappers to move southwards from their position near the eleventh milestone on the Ballapur road, under cover of the hills which border the map, so as to be south of the village of Yeshvantpur by 12-30 P.M.

4. The 10th Native Infantry attached to the second brigade (Dixon's) to support the cavalry and guns at Tinnulu, and then to assist the cavalry in making a demonstration on the enemy's front. The remainder of the second brigade to hold the Allalsandra wood and the ridge near it in order to meet any attack that the enemy might make in that direction. Should no attack be made, the 4th Pioneers and 14th Native Infantry to move to their right and join the 10th Native Infantry, while the 2nd Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry moved up the road.

5. Infantry to carry fifty rounds per man of ammunition, cavalry twenty.

6. Signal stations to be established at Tinnulu, Dod Bettah, and the hill marked 3050.

7. Divisional headquarters to be at the Allalsandra wood at 9 A.M., at Tinnulu at 10 A.M., afterwards at the hill marked 3050, and finally at Subedar Chutrum.

Dispositions—Southern Force.

Major-General Sir Charles Keyes ordered—

1. Cavalry brigade to fall back covering the left flank of the troops retiring on the Muntipum, close to the third milestone on the Bangalore road. One squadron to watch the right flank as far as the Hennur road.

Reports to be sent in every half hour as well as whenever anything was seen of the enemy.

2. 1st Brigade.—To retire on the Muntipum, leaving the battery attached to it to cover the withdrawal of the second brigade.

3. 2nd Brigade.—To follow the cavalry brigade across the bund of the Hebbal tank, move to the Muntipum, and wait for orders.

4. Signal stations to be established on the rocky hill east of Hebbal, the Muntipum, and the cross roads marked 3100.

P. W. D.

Govt. of {1884} Madras.

Captain T... 14th ... Captain Yates, R.H.A., D... Lieutenant Adye, 1st C... ...stant Qua... ...derabad Co...

...p equipage for ... the ... which ... were moved by ... quarter... exception of the following dispositions ... the next ... Government transpo... manœuvres, the transport of ... was ... r By brig... was or... nither second brigade of the south n force ... acuated by the enemy, Major-General ... his second brigade to advance, the 10th Native In- ... establish a cordon of obser... towards Nagashetiham, ... ry to prepare the way for the infantry.

The 2nd Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry having occupied Pollium, crossed the valley below the bund of the Hebbal tank and felt its way cautiously up the main road.

During this movement the battalion surprised the southern signalling party on the hill to the east of Hebbal. Major-General Prendergast thus ascertained that the southern General had been misinformed as to his operations, and was evidently expecting three battalions of the northern force to advance up the Devanhalli-Bangalore road.

Meanwhile the first brigade was working round to the west, and by 11-30 had reached Tinnerinhalli, having been joined *en route* by M/2 and I/3 Royal Artillery. About the same time the northern cavalry, having been reinforced by four guns of E/B Royal Horse Artillery, moved to Mattikere.

11-30 A.M.

Turning now to the southern force. Both brigades of infantry, with the two field batteries, had retired to the cross roads at the third milestone from Bangalore. Thence two battalions of the first brigade, with P/1 Royal Artillery, were sent to occupy a salient position near the fourth milestone along the Tumkur road. This force was soon joined by the third battalion of the brigade, together with three guns of S/1 Royal Artillery. The second brigade and remaining three guns of S/1 remained at the Muntipum above the aforementioned cross roads, and, with the exception of the volunteer battalion attached to it, which, with the assistance of two companies 2nd Battalion South Wales Borderers and some dismounted cavalry, repelled an attack made by the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, took no active part in the action which followed.

The position taken up by the first brigade was a strong one. It consists of a ridge running due north for about 1,400 yards from the cross roads near the fourth milestone on the Tumkur road. The highest point on the ridge is at the cross roads, and forms a strong left flank for a force facing west, while the north end of the ridge forms the right flank. The sides of the ridge slope gently to the west and north, and form a perfect glacis. The 21st Native Infantry was posted on a commanding position facing north and west, at the salient of the crest line of the ridge, where some broken ground resembling rifle pits afforded good shelter. The 5th Native Infantry was extended on their left, facing west, in a weak line across the Tumkur road, and alone guarded the extreme left of the position when the action began. Both battalions were extended in firing line, and a gap of some 500 yards separated them, in which space the guns of the defence came into action. The 2nd Battalion Middlesex Regiment was in support, more immediately behind the 21st Native Infantry. Brigadier-General Gib, C.B., commanded here.

At noon the leading troops of General Elles' brigade came on this position, and his batteries opened fire. One battery, the left one, was fairly concealed, but the right battery was exposed to a heavy fire from entrenched infantry. One of its guns was put out of action by the umpires, and both batteries were ordered to retire.

12 noon.

Meanwhile a hot infantry fire began on both sides. The 10th Native Infantry now advanced against the north-east side of the position, and being opposed by the 2nd Battalion Middlesex Regiment, which was very strongly posted (5½ companies being behind the bank of an artificial water channel running east and west and 2½ companies in a plantation projecting north on the extreme right), the attacking battalion was obliged to fall back.

About this time the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, moving up the road in attack formation, came on the volunteer battalion of the southern force, strongly posted in a position east of the fourth milestone on the Devanhalli-Bangalore road. The volunteers were supported by two companies of the South Wales Borderers and by a dismounted squadron of Lancers on their right flank. The umpires therefore decided that the attack had failed, and ordered the Oxfordshire Light Infantry to fall back with the loss of one company. The remainder of the battalion then moved off to the right behind the shelter of the rifle butts.

12-15 P.M.

At 12-45 P.M. the 4th Pioneers and 14th Native Infantry, having completed their movement to the right, got touch of the first brigade, and came up between it and the 10th Native Infantry.

12-45 P.M.

Major-General Prendergast then ordered a general advance south with these regiments, while Brigadier-General Elles with his brigade (the 2nd Battalion Royal Fusiliers, the 12th and 27th Native Infantry) attacked from the west, throwing forward his right flank as much as possible.

The attack on the left was supported by I/3 Royal Artillery; the flank attack was delivered by three battalions supported by the fire of nine guns (viz., four Royal Horse Artillery and five M/2 Royal Artillery), which came into action on an elevated position near the level crossing ove'rthe Tumkur railroad.

To this fire the artillery of the defence replied but feebly, while the Middlesex Regiment, being brought up on the left flank to support the 5th Native Infantry, uncovered the right to the attack of the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, which, working round west from the butts, had come up on the left of the 10th Native Infantry.

(2) The main ... ches to the position, vi... across the ... had not been de... attacking ... The guns, which ... narrow and ...ngerous track on th... standstill, blocked the roadway fo... Inf... the ...

...ovaction of the cavalry brigades was well execute... to observation. The southern cavalry re...ition. ... sent ... Gedahalli, whence it was withdrawn to near Colonel ...ced ... about 1-15 P.M. was hurried off to the extreme left flank of General Gib's position. The northern cavalry covered the flanks of the infantry brigades during their turning movement, and at the close of the day was concentrated to the south of the Tumkur road in rear of the right attack.

Remarks by the Umpire-in-Chief.

On this occasion, again, the plans of the northern commander were well considered and carefully executed. Having decided to operate by the west, he recognised the importance of turning his enemy's left, and succeeded in bringing a superior force to that of his adversary on the decisive point. By the capture of the signalling party on the rocky hill above Hebbal the officer commanding the northern army became aware that the southern commander had been misinformed as to his intentions, and that a very slight feint on his left (the east) would suffice to confirm his adversary in the belief that his own right was likely to be heavily assailed.

By retiring to the position formed by the angle of the Devanhalli and Tumkur roads, the southern commander took up the best line to achieve his object and secure the safety of Bangalore. He was again unfortunate in not receiving accurate information of the enemy's movements, and, instead of being able to bring his whole strength to meet the attack, he found himself engaged with three battalions and nine guns against seven battalions and fifteen guns. The position which the first brigade (Gib's) of the southern force held above the villages of Yeshvantpur and Subedar was strong and capable of a prolonged defence even against considerable odds; but as soon as the enemy gained possession of these two villages, and succeeded in working round the left flank of the southern army, that force was overmatched, and when it was found necessary to withdraw the 2nd Battalion Middlesex Regiment from opposing the left flank of the advancing (northern) force, for the purpose of reinforcing the left of Gib's Brigade, the position became untenable. The 1st Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry took advantage of this movement, and with great intelligence and appreciation of the ground, surprised 4 guns P/1 Royal Artillery, and at the same time threatened the rear of General Gib's Brigade. The occasion was one when a counter attack might have been advantageously made; the ground in the vicinity of the Rifle range is peculiarly adapted for such an operation, and had the 2nd Brigade (Brett's) of the southern force followed up the repulse of the 1st Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry by the Volunteers, Detachment South Wales Borderers, and dismounted Lancers, it would have come directly on the left flank of the 10th Native Infantry and the 2nd Brigade (Dixon's) of the northern force, at the time when these troops were committed to a front attack.

The southern cavalry remained inactive in the centre of the position for the greater part of the day, and apparently made no attempt to discover or retard the flank march of the northern force. Once the position 3100 was gained, it would have been scarcely possible for the southern army to prevent the northern army advancing on Bangalore. The latter force would undoubtedly have lost heavily, more especially when the left of the 1st Brigade (Elles') came under the fire of the 1st Brigade (Gib's) of the defence.

(By Order.)

(Signed) GODFREY CLERK, Brigadier-General,
Adjutant-General.

CAMP OF EXERCISE,
22nd January 1884.

FIELD FIRING.

Field firing will be carried out by the force, as per margin, under Command of Major-General Prendergast, V.C., C.B., on Monday the 21st instant.

2 squadrons 12th Royal Lancers.
2 squadrons 2nd Light Cavalry.
2 batteries Royal Artillery.
2nd Division.

This force will rendezvous at the Hudi crossing, south of the railway, at 9-30 A.M. on Monday the 21st, ready to move when ordered.

The conditions under which this practice will be carried out should assimilate, as near as possible, to those of actual service. In this view the position and its approaches should be carefully reconnoitred, and reported on by the cavalry, and the disposition for the attack, made accordingly.

It is very desirable that all three arms—cavalry, artillery, and infantry—should be engaged, and that as many guns and men should be brought into the fighting line as the ground will admit of.

P. W. D

Govt. of {1884} Madras.

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Captain Yates, R.H.A., D... ...derabad Co... exception of the following dispositions ... next

quarter... Lieutenant Adye, 1st C...

...ernment transpo... was ... nith... (General Prendergast) too ... n fand

...noeuvres, the transport of ... r By brig... was or... ...east has received information ... to the

...establish a cordon of obser... ...stations or... ...d determines to find him next day and attack him at

...towards N... far hazards.

The Position.

The position to be attacked is an isolated ridge of laterite and red clay, 950 yards long by 70 to 180 yards deep.

During the night of the 20th January, this position will be prepared by trenches being dug, and dummies and screens, representing a certain force of artillery and infantry, being put up.

It will not be approached nearer than 150 yards by the infantry, nor 400 yards by the Cavalry.

It will be discovered to the attacking force by the occasional explosion of small mines, &c., and will be marked by red flags on its east and west limits. The positions of the batteries will be marked by blue flags.

General Instructions.

The advance of the force will be limited on the east by a line drawn north and south through the tenth milestone on the Kolar road; and on the west by a similar line through the Kristnarajpuram crossing.

To avoid any chance of accidents, and to ensure the safety of the villagers, &c., the attack made by General Prendergast must be a front one, no turning movement being allowed.

For the sake of safety, the front of the attack at 2,400 yards from the centre of the position must be limited to two miles, or at the outside 4,000 yards. This distance gradually narrowing as the position is approached.

To prevent the chance of the flanks of the attacking force firing into each other, two officers will be detailed by the Assistant Adjutant-General for Musketry to each flank, to see that the troops do not extend beyond certain fixed lateral lines.

The artillery will be provided with 12 rounds of Shrapnell and common shell per gun; the cavalry and infantry, 10 rounds per man.

The small arm ammunition will be served out under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Division. Not more than half of the above quantities to be issued before the attack begins.

Care should be taken that the line of the attack does not become too crowded as the position is approached. With this view, the ammunition should be served out in unequal quantities. As the ammunition is expended the men will fall out and represent casualties.

The following points will be carefully considered and reported upon:—

(*a*) The methods of obtaining and retaining the correct distances.

(*b*) The description of the fire used by all arms, and the effect of the same on the position generally.

(*c*) The mode of serving out the ammunition in the field.

(*d*) The use made of signalling in conducting and controlling the operations.

(*e*) Officers Commanding Regiments, Batteries and Battalions will submit the usual field firing reports, through their respective Brigadiers, to the General Officer Commanding the Division, who will forward them, with his remarks, to the Adjutant-General, Headquarters.

The Assistant Adjutant-General for Musketry will place himself in communication with Captain Macintire, Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore, in view to the inhabitants of the villages situated in the neighbourhood of the position being duly warned, and also in order to steps being taken to prevent villagers or their cattle crossing the area in rear of the position during the time field firing is being carried on.

The Brigadier-General Commanding the Cavalry Brigade will be good enough to detail a Squadron of Silladar Cavalry, under a British Officer, to help the Civil authorities in keeping the ground clear.

The Officer Commanding the Squadron is to be directed to report himself to the Assistant Adjutant-General for Musketry, at the Head-quarters Camp, at 7-30 A.M. on the 20th instant, for orders.

Remarks by the Umpire-in-Chief.

Tactically considered, the advance to the attack of the position was a failure. Great delay occurred in carrying out the "idea,"—attributable mainly to two reasons:—

(1) During the cavalry reconnoissance, the infantry and artillery were kept too far in rear.

(2) The main ...ches to the position, vi... across the ... had not been de... attacking ... The guns, which ... narrow and ...ngerous track on t... standstill, blocked the roadway fo... Infantry.

The cavalry reconnoissance was well execute... over, as well as of the enemy's position, were sent...

The cavalry, on the other hand, advanced ... possible in warfare, and the support to the dismo... range from the guns and rifles of the enemy's ent...

The artillery in column of route on the tan... to the distant fire (at a range of some 3,000 yards), of the artillery of the ... ...est could easily have crossed by the Western, or "No. 1" ford, the banks of ... comm... ...cessary, have been quickly levelled off by means of picks and shovels. ...but if it ... found...

A better position for the guns was to have been left ...d on comparatively high ground to the north-west of Rampur village. There, they would ...ve entirely avoided hampering the infantry, and would have been able to enfilade, somewhat, the defensive position, while at the same time covering the infantry attack.

The infantry brigades both crossed by the same narrow bund, and were then like the guns exposed to the artillery fire of the defence. When they had gained the further side of the marshy tract, they made somewhat dangerous flank march across the enemy's front.

That the infantry or part of it could have crossed the stream was shown by the fact that one of the battalions of the 1st Brigade, 2nd Division, when returning to camp, was able to cross near ford No. 1 without difficulty.

When at last the attack commenced, the practice of the artillery was good, the ranges were quickly found both by trial shots and range finders, and the shell fire was well sustained.

Having once found the range and being within effective distance of the position, there would seem to have been no object in advancing the batteries by such a short distance as 300 yards. The limbers too were unnecessarily exposed.

The infantry fire began too feebly: eventually, however, it was well sustained with considerable effect, and the battalions were in hand throughout the practice.

Great credit for the preparation of the position over night is due to Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton, R.E., Major Symons, Assistant Adjutant-General for Musketry and Lieutenant MacDonnell, R.E., who carried out their part of the programme with ability under considerable difficulty.

(By Order.)

(Signed) GODFREY CLERK, Brigadier-General,
Adjutant-General.

DIARY OF MOVEMENTS OF 1ST DIVISION.

UNDER ORDERS OF MAJOR GENERAL SIR C. KEYES, K.C.B.,

In connection with "Night March," Tuesday and Wednesday, 22nd and 23rd January 1884.

NIGHT MARCH.

General Idea.

Information having been received that an enemy arriving from the north has taken up his position on the rocky ridge lying between the villages of Mitganhalli, Hosur and Belhalli, about six miles north north-west of the 1st Division Camp, the General Officer Commanding that division receives orders to make a night march on the position and to assault it shortly before daybreak on the morning of the 23rd instant.

General Instructions.

1st Division.

1 squadron. 12th Lancers.
2 squadrons. Silladars.

To carry out the above general idea, Major-General Sir Charles Keyes, K.C.B., with the troops under his command as per margin will move from his camp on the night of the 22nd instant, in two columns, for the purpose of advancing on the position.

The composition and time of departure of these two columns will be arranged by the General Officer Commanding, after such hasty reconnoissance as he may be able to make, and

Captain Yates, R.H.A., D... derabad Co...
...lieutenant Adye, 1st C...
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each column may have to pass over; the object ...t the point of attack.
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the ... exceptirgondahalli, Chansandra, Blasewall and Kannur ...walli.
...tween these two columns should be maintained ...ded this can be done without its being observed

(a)—To establish a cordon of obser... d determ...

... towards Nagshetihalli, ... rounds of blank ammunition.
...hazards. ... portion of the force as he may think best, the

object being to pursue th... *The Positi*...een beaten from the ridge.

Major-General Keyes ... an isolated ridge ...mediately with the Brigadier-General Command-ing the Cavalry Brigade and ...s as regards the movement to join his division of the cavalry detailed in para... 1, this P... Instructions.

...a ce...

Position.

The position as indicated in the general idea (1st paragraph) will be occupied by a skeleton enemy, under command of Captain Henry, R.E., with two companies of Sappers, which will move out under orders to be issued by the Officer Commanding, R.E., on the afternoon of the 22nd instant.

Tuesday and Wednesday, 22nd and 23rd January 1884.

Reconnoissance, 1st Brigade.

At 3-30 P.M., on Tuesday, 22nd January, the Assistant Quarter Master General, accompanied by the Brigade Major of the 1st Brigade, was directed to make a reconnoissance of, and report on, the best route by which the 1st Brigade (right column) could move during the night, from camp on to the position indicated in the printed instructions for a "Night March," received at noon.

The route followed outward was from camp across the Rampur tank bund, thence following a cart track almost due north to a single tree, occupying a position on the map about that marked 2973. Thence a cart track slightly east of the village of Kadagrahar, on wards between the bed of an old tank to the left, and a high contour to the right. Thence slightly to the west of north, skirting round the eastern margin of some very broken ground, and working westward round its northern limits. Thence in an irregular manner from north-westerly to south-westerly and westerly, to a small tank and some ruined muntapums. At this point the track trended away north-westerly, and a westerly compass bearing was followed down the valley east of Sonnappanhalli to a small single tree near four upright stone slabs, at the foot of the opposite slope of the valley, and north-east of the village.

The whole of this route, from the one tree at point to 2973 until the valley was reached, passes through very thorny scrub—impassable, except by picking one's way,—the cart track followed being in places barely traceable by day.

The distance of this route from Rampur is roughly $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Time taken from camp $1\frac{3}{4}$ hour.

The continuous red line on the map attached indicates this route.

The homeward route followed was a cart track from the vicinity of the eastern slopes of the valley, across the end of the higher contour, between it and the village of Golhalli, in a south-easterly direction. Crossing the southern end of the paddy flat east of the latter village, thence across the tail end of the tank south-west of Kadagrahar and on to the one tree at point 2973.

Throughout this route, the track is well defined, excepting at one spot crossing some flat rocks about a mile beyond the one tree,—the country passed through being much more open and easier of passage.

From the one tree, the outward route was retraced.

The distance to Rampur, about $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles; time occupied to camp, one hour.

The dotted red line on the map indicates the return route, as far as the one tree.

Reconnoissance, 2nd Brigade.

* The D. A. Q. M. General and the Brigade Major, 2nd Brigade, being directed to make a hasty reconnoissance of, and report on, the line of route considered best for the 2nd Brigade in the night march, went out in the afternoon of the 22nd January and ascertained that it would be possible for the brigade to march almost in a direct line N. W. by N. from its parade to Belhalli. The only difficulty being the bund between Chansandra and Blasewall which was rendered practicable for guns and cavalry during the afternoon, by the aid of a fatigue party.

* The above reports of the reconnoissance and operations of the 2nd Brigade are based upon the letter (attached) of the D. A. Q. M. G., 1st Division.

Orders issued.

Reports accordingly having been made to the M... decided to accompany th... following orders:—

1. The 1st Brigade to leave camp at 11 P.M., ...
   On reaching Rampur, communication by ... column at Blasewall, and on the right ... to be established with the left column at ... ticable to communicate between the la... detained at point 2973 beyond 2-30 A... the valley east of Sonnappanhalli by 5...
2. The 2nd Brigade to move from Camp at ... route.
   On reaching Blasewall, communication b... established with the right column at Rampur, and on reaching ...5, communication to be established with the right column at point 2973; but if it be found impracticable to communicate between the latter two stations, the left column not to be detained at point 2975 beyond 2-30 A.M. on the 23rd, and must be in position behind Belhalli by 5-30 A.M.
3. P/1 Royal Artillery to accompany the 1st Brigade.
   S/1 Royal Artillery to accompany the 2nd Brigade.
4. The cavalry to follow the 2nd Brigade and to expect further instructions on the 2nd Brigade taking up its position near Belhalli.

Right Column.

The 1st Brigade, right column, (P/1 R. A. Middlesex Regiment, Volunteer Battalion, 5th and 21st M. I.) was under arms, and moved off at 11 P.M. The infantry crossing the Rampur tank bund—the artillery (route thus indicated on the map —. .—. .—. .—) crossing the swampy ground below bund, at the so-called ford about a mile east of the bund; having passed which, it drew up at Rampur, awaiting the crossing of the infantry. The battery reached Rampur at midnight—the infantry had not entirely crossed over the bund until 1-30 A.M. on the 23rd.

At about 1 A.M., on Wednesday, 23rd January, it was ascertained by means of visual signalling that the left column had crossed the swamp south of Blasewall, and was moving northward.

At 1-30 A.M., the right column advanced from Rampur, reaching the one tree at point 2973 at 2 A.M., where a halt for half-an-hour was made to allow of the column closing up. From this spot, visual signalling was again established with the left column.

At 2-30 A.M., the right column again moved on, all lights being put out, save one, and halted at 3-40, after crossing the paddy flat east of Golhalli; progress having been checked for some moments *en route*, owing to loss of track at the rocks alluded to above.

Visual signalling was again established with the left column from this spot.

The column again moved forward at 4 A.M., and reached the eastern slopes of the Sonnappanhalli Valley at 5-10 A.M., and there formed line of $\frac{1}{4}$ columns.

A reconnoissance was at once made over the high ground in front, towards the position held by the enemy.

The troops were brought forward, artillery on the right, Middlesex Regiment and Volunteers in the fighting line, 5th and 21st, M. I., in support and reserve, which order of advance was preserved, until the enemy was discovered by his opening fire at about 6 A.M.

The artillery after firing a few rounds changed ground so as to enfilade the enemy, and the attack of the fighting line became general.

Left Column.

* The 2nd Brigade, left column, S/1st R. A. 2nd S. W. B., 10th and 15th N. I., and the cavalry, 1 squadron 12th Lancers, 3 squadrons Silladar Horse, was under arms and moved off shortly after 10 P.M. The route taken was along the high ground leaving Margondahalli well to the east—course by compass N. W. by N. —At Chansandra the head of the column was checked to allow the whole brigade to come up. The bund was then crossed, the head of the column reaching Blasewall at 12 midnight, and the whole brigade being over by 12-30 A.M. on Wednesday, 23rd January, when communication was established with the right column at Rampur where the Major-General Commanding was present.

The column then moved forward reaching point 2975 at 1-15 A.M., when a halt of about one hour was made and visual signalling again established with the right column, then at point 2973.

At 2-10 A.M., the column again marched leaving Gooby to the east and point 3006 slightly to the west. Kannur was reached at 3 A.M. A signalling party being left here, the D. A. Q. M. General led the advanced guard cautiously towards Belhalli, which was reached at 3-4 A.M.

The infantry brigade formed up south of the village, the artillery took up a position behind the high ground between Belhalli and Koyil and the cavalry in the direction of Booroodoogoon. These positions were maintained until 5-30 A.M., when the infantry formed for attack and advanced on the enemy's position between Belhalli and Mitganhalli.

The cease fire sounded at about 6-30 A.M.

Troops returned to camp at about 10 A.M.

* See foot-note on page 26.

y Assistant Quarter Master General, 1st Division, to
ral, 1st Division; dated Camp, 23rd January 1884.

iving the orders for the night march on the 22nd
d Brigade under Colonel Brett *viâ* Margondahalli,
a hasty reconnoissance of the country during the
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r I had obtained guides from the villages. The brigade
d deter at 10 P.M., shortly after which we commenced the
Margondahalli to our right,—course by the compass
alted a short time, to allow the whole brigade to
l. The head of the column was over and reached
Blasewall by 12 o'clock and the whole brigade up by 12-30. This we communicated by visual
signal to General Sir C. Keyes who was with the 1st Brigade—and proceeded on the march. The
head of the column reached point 2975 at 1-5 A.M. and the whole brigade reported up at 1-15 A.M.
Here we halted for about an hour, and got into communication by signal with the 1st Brigade
when they reached point 2973. At 2-10 A.M., we again marched leaving Gooby to our right,
and point 3006 slightly to our left, reaching Kannur about 3 A.M., where we left the signal
party. I proceeded then with an advance guard of the South Wales Borderers; cautiously in
the direction of Belhalli, which we reached at 3-45 A.M., and the infantry brigade formed up, just
south of the village. The artillery took up a position behind the high ground between Belhalli
and Koyil, and the cavalry in the direction of Booroodoogoon. These were our positions until
about 5-30 A.M., on the 23rd, when the infantry were formed up for attack, and advanced on
the enemy's position between Belhalli and Mitganhalli.

Night March, 22nd January 1884.

General Idea.

Information having been received that an enemy arriving from the north has taken up his position on the rocky ridge lying between the villages of Mitganhalli, Hosur and Belhalli about six miles north north-west of the 1st Division Camp, the General Officer Commanding that Division receives orders to make a night march on the position and to assault it shortly before daybreak on the morning of the 23rd instant.

General Instructions.

1. Major-General Sir C. Keyes, K.C.B., with the force noted in the margin, will move from his Camp on the night of the 22nd instant in two columns for the purpose of attacking the enemy's position.

1 Squadron 12th Lancers.
3 Squadrons Silladar Horse.
P/1 Royal Artillery.
S/1 Royal Artillery.
1st Brigade—
2nd Batt. Middlx. Regt.
Volunteer Battalion.
5th M.N.I.
21st M.N.I.
2nd Brigade—
2nd Batt. S.W. Borderers.
10th M.N.I.
15th M.N.I.

2. The composition and time of departure of these two columns will be arranged by the General Officer Commanding after such hasty reconnoissance as he may be able to make, the object being that both columns should arrive simultaneously at the point of attack.

3. One column will proceed by Rampur, point 2973, and a little to the east of Kadagrahar, forming for assault in the valley to the east of Sonappanhalli and Hosur.

The other column will proceed *viâ* Naragondahalli, Chansandra Blasewall and Kunnur, forming for assault behind the village of Belhalli,

4. Communication by visual signalling between these two columns should be maintained whenever possible during the night march, provided this can be done without its being observed by the enemy.

5. General Keyes will dispose of the cavalry portion of his force as he may think best, the object being to pursue the enemy after he has been beaten from the ridge.

6. Each man and gun is to be provided with ten rounds of blank ammunition.

7. The position as indicated in the general idea will be occupied by a skeleton enemy consisting of two Companies of Sappers under the Command of Captain Henry, R.E., Assistant Quartermaster-General.

Dispositions by the Major-General Commanding the 1st Division.

Major-General Sir C. Keyes, K.C.B., after a hasty reconnaissance of the position and the roads leading to it, ordered—

(1) The 1st Brigade to leave Camp at 11 P.M., and move by the Rampur route.

On reaching Rampur, communication by signalling was to be established with the left column at Blasewall, and on the right column reaching point 2973, communication was to be established with the left column at point No. 2975; but if it was found impracticable to communicate between the latter two stations, the right column was not to be detained at point 2973 beyond 2-30 A.M. on the 23rd, and must reach the valley east of Sonnappanhalli by 5-30 A.M.

2. The 2nd Brigade to move from camp at 10 P.M., and follow the Blasewall route.

On reaching Blasewall, communication by signalling was to be established with the right column at Rampur, and on reaching point 2975, communication was to be established with the right column at point 2973, but if it was found impracticable to communicate between the latter two stations, the left column was not to be detained at point 2975 beyond 2-30 A.M. on the 23rd, and must be in position behind Belhalli by 5-30 A.M.

3. P/1 Royal Artillery to accompany the 1st Brigade.
S/1 do. do. 2nd Brigade.

4. The Cavalry was to follow the 2nd Brigade, and was informed that further instructions would be issued to them on the 2nd Brigade taking up its position near Belhalli.

Execution.

The two columns moved off as directed, and followed the routes indicated in the general instructions.

Communication by signal was established between Blasewall and Rampur, so that the two columns started simultaneously from those two places at 1-30 A.M. on the 23rd.

At 1-50 A.M., communication was opened between point 2975 and point 2973.

The right column reached Sonnappanhalli at 4-15 A.M., and from thence General Keyes sent instructions to the left column to get into attack formation behind Belhalli, remain there till daybreak and then attack; should, however, the attack on the right commence earlier, the left column was at once to conform to the movement and attack the enemy's position in flank.

The cavalry was at the same time directed to move to their left towards Booroodoogoon and be prepared to cut off the retreat of the enemy.

The right column then advanced a little, and General Keyes rode forward at 5-30 A.M., and was just able to recognise the position.

The Infantry of the right column were then extended for attack and the guns were moved to the right so as to enfilade the enemy's position.

The left column conformed to the movements of the right and the attack was delivered simultaneously from both flanks.

Remarks by the Umpire-in-chief.

The night march as a march was an unqualified success, and credit is due to the Commander and to the troops engaged in it, for the way the "idea" was carried out.

The brigades arrived before the position under cover of darkness with time to spare before making a simultaneous attack on it.

The ground to be traversed by the troops was difficult, and no marked features, natural or artificial, existed to assist the guides of each column in finding the way.

It was hopeless to expect that a real surprise could be effected, as the enemy was necessarily aware of what was intended, but the operation would have had more the appearance of reality had the position been carried at dawn by one simultaneous rush on the part of each brigade, instead of by the alternate rushes of smaller bodies.

The guns were well posted for enfilading the position, and the cavalry would inevitably have cut off the fugitives.

(By Order.)

(Signed) GODFREY CLERK, Brigadier-General,
Adjutant-General.

REPORT OF THE PASSAGE OVER THE HEBBAL TANK BY A DETACHMENT OF THE BANGALORE GARRISON.

Division and Cantonment Order.

"The following force will parade in Drill Order at the Casuarina Tope north of the Hebbal Tank at 10 A.M. on Wednesday, the 30th January 1884:—

1 Squadron 12th Royal Lancers with Regimental Pioneers.
1 Do. 1st Light Cavalry.
1 Company "Queen's Own" Sappers and Miners.
4 Companies 4th Pioneers.

This force will represent the advanced guard of an army marching on Bangalore and which finds the country in front inundated and passable only by crossing the Hebbal Tank.

Cavalry to be furnished with 10 rounds per man."

Width and depth of the tank.

The width of the Hebbal Tank where the 12th Lancers crossed is 720 yards, and the maximum depth, 8 feet. The horses of the 12th Lancers had to swim a distance of 300 yards.

Where the 1st Light Cavalry crossed, the width of the tank is 630 yards with a maximum depth of 6½ feet; the horses swam a distance of 200 yards.

Manufacture of rafts.

Six cask rafts were constructed—two by the 12th Lancers, and four by the Sappers. The Lancers took 15 minutes to construct their rafts, the Sappers took 20 minutes.

Strength of Infantry conveyed over.

One hundred and sixty-seven of all ranks 4th Pioneers were conveyed across the tank on rafts made by the Sappers.

Number of men and horses that swam across.

Fifty-one men and horses of the 12th Lancers swam across the tank. Seventeen horses crossed at the western end of the tank which is fordable.

Sixty-two men and horses of the 1st Light Cavalry swam across.

Time occupied in swimming the horses.

The horses of the squadron 12th Lancers and 1st Light Cavalry were taken across by troops. Each troop of the Lancers took about 15 minutes to swim across the tank. The troops of the 1st Light Cavalry took 8½ minutes each to swim over.

Summary.

Summary.

Fifty-one men and horses of the 12th Lancers, and sixty-two men and horses of the 1st Light Cavalry swam across the tank; the men's clothes, arms and accoutrements and the saddles were taken over on rafts. One hundred and sixty-seven Infantry were conveyed over on rafts. In an hour and fifty-five minutes from the time the horses and rafts commenced to move across, the force had landed and was prepared to resist an attack, or advance into the enemy's country.

BANGALORE,
6th February 1884.

(Signed) W. PAYN, Major-General,
Commanding, Bangalore Division.

No. 106. ORDER THEREON, 8th May 1884, No. 2199.

The Governor in Council having perused the report upon the camp of exercise recently held in the vicinity of Bangalore, together with the diaries of manœuvres attached thereto, congratulates His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief upon the complete success of the undertaking.

2. His Excellency concurs with Sir Frederick Roberts in the opinion that the presence of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India during the operations was a subject of general gratification, and is happy to have this opportunity of placing on record the appreciation of the Madras Government of the honor done to the army of the presidency by Sir Donald Stewart.

3. His Excellency learns with much satisfaction that the drill and appearance of the Madras troops met with the approval of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India. The favorable opinion of so distinguished an officer cannot but be highly encouraging to all who have the efficiency and welfare of the army at heart.

4. The foregoing letter will be communicated to the Right Honorable the Secretary of State for India, the Governments of India and Bombay, the Resident

in Mysore, with reference to paras. 35 and 36, and to the following departments and officers:—

Revenue Department,	with reference to para.	6
Public Department,	do.	31
Public Works Department,	do.	25 and 32
Commissary-General,	do.	27 to 30
Inspector-General of Ordnance,	do.	33
Surgeon-General, Her Majesty's Forces, Madras,	with reference to para.	34

No. 107. *To the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department; dated 8th May* 1884, *No.* 2200.

No. 108. *To the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated 8th May* 1884, *No.* 2201.

No. 109. *To the Resident in Mysore; dated 8th May* 1884, *No.* 2202.

(True Extract.)

Lt.-Col.,
Offg. Secretary to Government.

To the Quarter Master General.
" Adjutant-General.
" Revenue Department.
" Public Department.
" Public Works Department.
" Commissary-General.
" Inspector-General of Ordnance.
" Surgeon-General, Her Majesty's Forces, Madras.
" Commandant, Madras, Volunteer Guards.
" " Bangalore Rifle Volunteer Guards.
" " Nilgiri Volunteer Rifles.

Exd. E. C. Shunker.

No. 1390 W a/3d June/84

Comd to the Chief Supdt of Telegraphs Madras Dn and to the Comy Genl for Nyp with advertences to paras 25 and 32 of the Dr Mr Genls letter —

CH. 26-5-84

27.5.84

Chief Supdt of Telegraphs Madras Dn

Comy Genl

72/5. 27/6 4/6

1884, No. 2199.

Assistant Quarter Mas 1st Division; Vol. of 1884

MILITARY.

To

THE QUARTER MASTER GENERAL,
&c., &c., &c.

(10)

20 S.C

6. S.C

Dated May, 8th.

Issued

Recd. 23/5/84 *Encl.*

G.O., 8th May 1884, No. 2199.

No. 1390 W a/3d June/84

MAY.
Nos. 105—110.

Camps—Instructions.

Camp of Exercise.—Report on the — held in the vicinity of Bangalore in January 1884, perused with satisfaction.

2 Copies Sent to OOC

Write to Madras

Sent to Deputy Asst Genl