GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

15th November 1883, No. 6187.

Defences—Forts.

Read the following papers :—

No. 324. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department ; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1017-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 887-M.W., dated 17th September 1883, and with reference to para. 6 (*m*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following remarks regarding the Fort of Asirgarh, together with the views of the Government of India as to the future maintenance of this fort.

2. The Fort of Asirgarh was formerly regarded as the key of the Deccan, and occupying, as it does, the only depression in the Lalpura Range, and being practically impregnable, it was of very great importance. It does not, however, command the railway, which is of more importance than the road, and it is too small to contain a garrison of such strength as to be able to send out a force to act in the open country in the neighbourhood ; so that even if other considerations did not forbid any large force being locked up in such a position as this fort occupies, the fort has ceased to be of much importance in a military point of view, and cannot exercise any material influence in serious military operations in the future.

3. But the fort retains a good deal of its ancient prestige among the natives of Central India, and the possession of it is therefore of some political importance; it also proved a safe place of refuge in 1857-58 for the families of some European officials, and might again prove of service in the same way to Railway officials and their families and other officials of the district whose duties might require them to remain at their posts till possibly their retreat was cut off. For these reasons the fort should be kept up, but as a place of refuge only.

4. The proposals made up to date regarding this fort will now be considered in the light of the foregoing remarks.

5. In 1873, a Committee reported on Asirgarh and recorded their opinion that 54 rifled guns (40-20-12 and 6-pounders) and two 10-inch howitzers mounted in position, with 14 mortars (10-inch and $5\frac{1}{2}$-inch), a battery of 6-pounders, two batteries of mountain guns, and a battery of mitrailleuses, for general defensive purposes, was "the smallest possible armament suitable for the defence of the works," and they recommended 72 rifled guns and four 10-inch howitzers in position, and an additional battery of mountain guns and of mitrailleuses for general purposes ; they recommend also some 7″ B.L.R.guns, if procurable.

6. The garrison in time of peace should, according to this Committee, consist of—

1 garrison battery of Artillery,
2 companies of European Infantry,
2 ,, of Native Infantry,

which must, on any threatening of war, be at once increased to—

2 garrison batteries of Royal Artillery,
3 companies of European Infantry,
1 wing of Native Infantry,
½ company of Sappers and Miners,

but for thoroughly efficient defence the garrison should be—

2 garrison batteries of Royal Artillery,
1 field battery of Royal Artillery,
½ battalion of European Infantry,
1 ,, of Native Infantry,
1 company of Sappers and Miners.

These proposals necessarily carried with them proposals to construct barracks, magazines, store rooms, emplacements, &c., on a very extensive scale, in addition to costly repairs and additions to the existing works.

7. The proceedings of this Committee of 1873 are a striking instance of the way in which the considerations which should be kept in view in dealing with such matters are often completely lost sight of.

8. Practically no action was taken on this report, and, in 1879, another report was received through the Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces, regarding the armament of Asirgarh, on which the plans and estimates for remodelling the fort were being prepared by Captain Jenner, R.E. The total number of guns of position recommended was 28, of which 11 were $\frac{6}{8}\frac{4}{2}$-pounder R.M.L. guns, with a reserve of two 40-pounder R.M.L. guns, two 8″ or 10″ mortars, and two gatling guns.

9. Subsequently a further reduction of the proposed armament was suggested by Lieutenant-Colonel Stocker, R.A., and was approved by the General Officer Commanding the Mhow Division. The armament, according to this scheme, was to consist of—

8 $\frac{6}{8}\frac{4}{2}$-pounder R.M.L. guns,
4 10″ mortars,
2 6½″ M.L.R. howitzers.

10. Finally, in February 1882, the Defence Committee, after Brigadier-General Leslie, R.A., Inspector-General of Artillery, one of the members of the Committee, had been able to visit Asirgarh, submitted their recommendations. General Leslie reported that "the place is impregnable; absolutely so if held by a few infantry; and that mounting large and powerful guns on the works would only be wasting good money and shutting up troops who might be more usefully employed elsewhere. The artillery should be reduced to the lowest possible limits," which he considered to be two metrailleuses and six heavy guns.

11. The Defence Committee accepted the views of General Leslie and recommended that the armament should consist of—

2 40-pounder R.M.L. or B.L. guns on travelling carriages,
4 12-pounder R.B.L. guns with limbers complete,

and that certain works should be carried out for improving the state of the defences and providing casemated cover for men, stores, ammunition, &c., in the existing tykhanas.

12. These recommendations for the armament and remodelling of the Fort at Asirgarh were approved by the Government of India, and a project for carrying them out was called for.

13. In 1881, the Government of India sanctioned Rs. 25,000 for repairs to existing defences to render them secure against a sudden rush, or escalade, but

the work was deferred by the local administration, and Rs. 20,000 of the sum allotted was re-appropriated to other purposes.

14. During the current year also a project for constructing an improved entrance road to the fort, to cost Rs. 17,700, has been sanctioned, but no funds have yet been allotted for the work.

15. On this review of the case, the conclusions which the Government of India have come to are as follows:—

The fort should be put into a state of repair which shall render it secure against sudden attack, or escalade, so as to make it safe and suitable as a place of refuge.

The new entrance road should be constructed when funds can be provided.

No guns should be mounted in the fort, but the following armament shall be kept in store on travelling carriages ready to be removed to any point where they may be required:—

4 12-pounder R.B.L. guns.
2 machine guns.

The magazines and store rooms required to be provided by improvements to existing tykhanas.

16. The repairs to existing defences to render them storm-proof is, I am to say, the most urgent of the works required, and should be undertaken without unnecessary delay.

No. 1017-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

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(By Order.)

SIMLA, 19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 325. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1018-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1017-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*j*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated 3rd April 1882, I am directed to convey the following remarks and the conclusions of the Government of India regarding the Fort at Ahmadnagar.

2. Ahmadnagar is no longer an ordnance depôt, and the Army Reorganization Commission contemplated the entire withdrawal of the troops from the place. The Defence Committee, under these circumstances, recommend that nothing should be spent on the repairs of the fort, and that, on the withdrawal of the troops, the walls should be breached and the ditch filled up at certain points so as to render it incapable of defence.

3. There is, however, no immediate prospect of the troops being withdrawn from Ahmadnagar; and even if the troops were withdrawn, there would remain a considerable body of European and Eurasian residents connected with the civil government and the railway, &c., with a number of pensioners and others, who usually settle near a cantonment and would probably remain even if the troops were withdrawn. The position of Ahmadnagar is somewhat isolated notwithstanding that a railway now runs past it. The Government of India therefore consider that a place of refuge should be maintained there.

4. The old fort, though too large to answer perfectly for this purpose, is nevertheless in many ways very suitable. The walls are lofty and in good order; there is a good ditch with masonry counterscarp; the flank defence is efficient, and there is a clear glacis round the place. The fort also contains a number of buildings suitable for accommodating refugees, and a good magazine, as well as numerous recesses in the ramparts, which could be easily converted into expense magazines. The fort is also suitably situated between the city and cantonments.

5. The Fort of Ahmadnagar should therefore be maintained as a place of refuge, and such works as are necessary to place and maintain it in a defensible condition should now be carried out.

6. The armament for the fort should be suited to its function as a place of refuge only, and should consist of a few machine and light field pieces. The following armament is accordingly sanctioned:—

4 12-pounder R.B.L. guns,
2 machine guns.

The smooth-bore ordnance, with their stores at present in the fort, should be removed to the nearest arsenal.

7. The above armament is sanctioned for so long as the cantonment may continue to be occupied by European troops. If these are withdrawn, the scale of armament must be reconsidered.

No. 1018-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

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(By Order.)

SIMLA, (Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
19*th October* 1883. *Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.*

No. 326. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1019-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1018-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*i*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of the Governor in Council, the following remarks and conculsions of the Government of India regarding the Fort at Belgaum.

2. Belgaum is not an important strategical position, and there is no arsenal there now; and, in accordance with the principle of our military policy, that as large a part as possible of the army should be kept available to take the field, it is not desirable to maintain defences there on a scale to require a considerable body of troops to man them. Nor does it appear necessary to provide against a formal attack by a well-organized and powerful enemy. Viewed in the light of these considerations, the proposals of the Defence Committee, submitted in 1880 and 1881, which were approved by the Government of India, appear to be in excess of the requirements, and the acceptance of these proposals conveyed in this office letter, No. 1164-C. (*Defences—Forts*), dated 4th November 1881, is therefore cancelled.

3. There is, however, a large garrison at Belgaum, which, if required to take the field, would be obliged to leave invalids and non-combatants behind. Belgaum is also the head-quarters of a district, with a considerable number of civil officials, besides the miscellaneous unofficial Europeans and Eurasians always to be found settled near a large cantonment and civil station.

4. The position of Belgaum is too isolated to admit of these being removed to a place of safety. It is therefore necessary to maintain a place of refuge.

5. The fort is well suited for this, though on too large a scale, and it should therefore be maintained in a state of repair, but as a place of refuge only.

6. The following works should be carried out as funds become available:—

(i) Repairs absolutely necessary to the ramparts and ditch.
(ii) Improvements to the flank defence.
(iii) Provision of drawbridges.

7. It is now impossible, except at great cost, to provide a proper glacis; but strict measures should be taken to prevent any further encroachment being made, or cover erected.

8. The armament of the fort should comprise no heavy guns of position, but should consist of field and machine guns. The following armament is accordingly sanctioned:—

4 12-pounder B.L.R. guns,
4 machine guns.

No. 1019-M.-W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

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(By Order.)

SIMLA, (Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
19*th October* 1883. *Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.*

No. 327. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1020-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1019-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*c*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, of 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following remarks regarding the Fort at Neemuch.

2. In 1880, the Defence Committee reported that in their opinion "under the present, or at any rate the probable future, conditions of Neemuch, the retention of the existing fort is unnecessary and inexpedient, and that the defence of the railway station is all that need be arranged for at this place." In this view the Government of India concurred.

3. But a committee of local officers assembled to report on the defence of the railway station showed that this would be very difficult, while the fort was already there, and admirably suited to the requirements of the case. The report of this committee was submitted to the Defence Committee, and this body, with the fuller information before them as to the conditions of the place, decided that the existing fort is the only place at Neemuch capable of being utilised as a place of refuge. They also stated that Neemuch should not be deliberately deserted, and its retention in troublous times would be of importance. They accordingly recommended that the fort be maintained, the bastions to be prepared as emplacements for field guns, and provision made for storage of supplies and for 1,200 rounds of ammunition for field guns, or 200 rounds a gun for six guns; in peace time the fort to be occupied by European railway employés. The views of the committee as to the work required were given in further detail in their No. 228, of 23rd September 1882, forwarded to you with this office letter, No. 948-M.W., dated 5th October 1882.

4. For the armament of this fort the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay, recommends two rifled heavy field guns and two 8″ mortars.

5. The whole case has now been again carefully considered, and I am to state that the Government of India consider that, whether the European garrison is withdrawn or not, a place of refuge ought to be maintained at Neemuch. The walls of the fort are strong and have given practical proof of the security they afford against troops possessing only smooth-bore guns; the water-supply is sufficient, and there is accommodation for a considerable quantity of stores; while, on the other hand, the position at the railway station is defective in many respects for defence. The place of refuge should therefore be the existing fort.

6. The measures suggested by the Defence Committee seem all that are required, and I am to request that they may be now carried into effect.

7. As regards the armament of the fort, the Government of India do not consider that proposed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay, altogether suitable, and they approve of the following:—

2 12-pounder B.L.R. guns,
2 machine guns,

which is accordingly sanctioned.

No. 1020-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

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(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 328. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1021-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1020-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*b*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, of 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate the following remarks and the decision of the Government of India regarding the defences for Ajmere and Nusseerabad. These have been considered together, the latter place being only 15 miles from Ajmere, and connected with it by railway.

2. Ajmere occupies a strategical position of some importance, being situated in the middle of Rajputana at a railway junction. It is also of importance as being the head-quarters of the Rajputana State Railway, with important workshops, stores, &c. It is also the seat of the chief civil authority in Rajputana. Ajmere, therefore, is a point which should be made secure against any attempt likely to be made upon it.

3. But Ajmere is far removed from any probable scene of operations against a well-equipped and disciplined enemy; the only troops against whom it would be reasonable at the present time to take precautions in this part of the country are such as would be raised in that neighbourhood, ill-trained and badly equipped, who, at the utmost, could only bring smooth-bore guns against it.

4. Nusseerabad is only 15 miles distant and connected with Ajmere by railway. It becomes a question, under these circumstances, if it be decided that some defensive works are necessary, whether they should be at Ajmere or Nusseerabad, or at both places.

5. If the troops at Nusseerabad were never likely to be withdrawn from the neighbourhood of Ajmere, their presence, with the volunteers at Ajmere itself, might probably be relied on to prevent any rising at Ajmere or attack on the place.

6. But, as is stated in para. 10 of this department letter, No. 887-M.W., of 17th September last, it should always be a principle of our military policy to keep as large a part as possible of the army available to take the field. In accordance with this principle, the arrangements at Ajmere and Nusseerabad should be such as to admit of all or nearly all the troops at Nusseerabad being moved to a distance with a minimum of risk to the persons and property left behind. This involves the construction of defences at one or both places.

7. To provide defences at both places would, no doubt, add to the security of both places, provided the defences could be adequately manned. But this could not be done without interfering with the mobility of the regular troops. It would divide the defenders, and decrease their power of active defence, on which their supplies and eventual safety would largely depend, and it would increase the difficulty of relief. The Government of India therefore consider that there should be but one defensive position for Ajmere and Nusseerabad.

8. The question which then remains for decision, whether this should be at Ajmere or Nusseerabad, admits of little doubt. In time of trouble the workshops, &c., at Ajmere would be of greater value than the buildings at Nusseerabad; the volunteers who would constitute the main defence live at Ajmere; and Ajmere as the seat of the civil administration and the capital town of a British district is by far the more important place. The defensive position will therefore be at Ajmere.

9. The nature and extent of the works have now to be considered.

The objects to be attained are to provide a place of refuge for the civilians and non-combatants of Ajmere and its neighbourhood; to secure the railway workshops, stores, &c., from destruction; and, if possible, to maintain control over the city and environs of Ajmere.

10. A regular siege is not contemplated, but a sudden attack by an undisciplined enemy, against whom it would be necessary to hold out until the arrival of relief.

11. The defenders who can be relied on are about 150 railway volunteers, a few European infantry unfit for active service in the field, and a few civilians, in all perhaps 250 to 300 men.

12. A local committee, assembled under the orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Mhow Division, has recommended a series of detached works, enclosing an area of some six or seven square miles, with the native city in the heart of the enclosed area. These proposals seem beyond the range of practical discussion, and will not be further referred to.

13. The Defence Committee, whose report is enclosed, recommend that the railway workshops and storehouse be selected as the essential position to be defended and as the place of refuge; that the necessary works to give shelter and storage room for supplies be constructed; and that, to aid in the defence, two or three masonry block-houses be erected. They recommend that the masonry works should be carried out at once, and also that a definite project for the earthworks, barricades, &c., to complete the defences, should be prepared and kept ready. Taragarh, they consider, should not be accepted as an element in the defence.

14. These recommendations are approved by the Government of India.

15. The Defence Committee will now be requested to depute their Secretary to consider the subject on the spot, in consultation with the local Military, Public Works and Railway authorities, and then to submit a definite project for the works required, which will be afterwards worked out in detail in the Fortification Branch of the Office of the Inspector-General of Military Works.

16. The Fort of Taragarh should be maintained only as a sanitarium for the British troops at Nusseerabad.

No. 1021-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

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(By Order.)

SIMLA, (Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
19*th October* 1883. *Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.*

No. 329. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the President of the Defence Committee; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1022-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

With reference to your letter, No. 177, dated 19th September 1883, I am directed to forward, for information of the Committee, a copy of this department letter, No. 1021-M.W., of this date, addressed to the Government of Bombay regarding the defences of Ajmere.

2. It will be observed that the Government of India have accepted the general proposals of the Defence Committee on this subject.

3. I am now to request that the Secretary to the Defence Committee may be directed to visit Ajmere during the ensuing cold weather to confer with the Officer Commanding at Nusseerabad, the Secretary to the Agent to the Governor-General, Rajputana, and the Manager, Rajputana State Railway, and to study the subject on the spot; and that the Committee will then submit a definite project for the works required, which can afterwards be worked out in detail and estimated in the fortification branch of the office of the Inspector-General of Military Works.

4. I am, in conclusion, to remind the Committee of the absolute necessity of a most careful study of economy in their proposals, as in this way only will it be practicable to set about the construction of the works with reasonable speed, and to ask that the Secretary may be instructed accordingly.

No. 1022-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

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(By Order.)

SIMLA, (Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
19*th October* 1883. *Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.*

No. 330. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1023-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1021-M.W., dated the 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*n*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to convey, for the information of the Governor in Council, the following observations and orders relating to the fort at Hyderabad, Sind.

Hyderabad was the former capital of the Ameers of Sind, and has still a certain amount of prestige attaching to it. It is still the chief town of a large

district on the left bank of the Indus; it is a centre of the roads of that part of the country, the head-quarters of a large collectorate, of survey and canal establishments; the district, moreover, of which it is the capital is cut off from the railway by a great unbridged river, and is very inaccessible to troops from other directions. For these reasons Hyderabad will probably always have a garrison of some strength.

But, on the other hand, it could not become a point of strategical importance in great military operations, which would have to be held by a considerable body of troops; its garrison would in such a case either be withdrawn to more important positions elsewhere, or would, if the country round were disturbed, be acting against the local insurgents in the open.

Hyderabad therefore falls into the class of places, where, if any defences are constructed at all, they will take the form of "places of refuge" [see para. 2 (IV) of this department letter No. 887-M.W. of 17th September 1883].

2. In January 1878 it was decided that, as soon as the ordnance stores in the fort had been removed, the fort should be entirely done away with, and no proposal was made to construct any other place of refuge. But on reconsideration the Government of India are of opinion that, in view of the circumstances set forth above, and that there will always be a considerable number of civilians and non-combatants at Hyderabad, whom it might be impossible to remove at once to a place of safety on the occurrence of an outbreak when the troops of the garrison were required to move out into the open country, a place of refuge should be maintained at Hyderabad.

3. The efficiency and value of the fort there as a place of refuge was practically demonstrated in 1857. The condition of the works is such that, though useless against a disciplined enemy provided with artillery, they would be almost impregnable to an enemy without artillery, and they can be maintained in serviceable condition without great expense. The fort also contains sufficient accommodation to shelter a large number of persons, and to contain the necessary stores of all kinds; it appears, therefore, suitable as a place of refuge, notwithstanding its position closely adjoining the town.

4. I am accordingly to say that the Government of India concur in the recommendation of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army, which is understood to be endorsed by the Government of Bombay, to retain the fort as a place of refuge. But they consider that no large expenditure should be incurred upon it and no armament provided for it.

No. 1023-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

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(By Order.)

SIMLA, (Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
19*th October* 1883. *Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.*

No. 331. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; datea Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1024-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1023-M.W., dated the 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 7 (*a*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to convey the following remarks regarding the defences at Purandhur for the information of the Governor in Council,

Purandhur is a sanitarium situated about 20 miles from Poona, a station which must always be held in force. The place is not of any special value or importance either from its position or past history, and its garrison of invalids would unquestionably be withdrawn to assist in the protection of the important establishments at Poona in the case of serious emergency. The only defensive work which, therefore, appears to be required is a place of refuge to afford shelter for a short time to the non-combatants who might be surprised in the neighbourhood by a sudden outbreak, until they could be relieved and, if necessary, brought into Poona.

2. The history of this case illustrates the necessity for referring every proposal for erecting inland defences to some distinct principle, such as those which the Government of India endeavoured recently to lay down in this office letter No. 887-M.W., dated the 17th September 1883.

3. In 1873 two proposals were put forward for making the position at Purandhur an important fortress. In one the two forts of Purandhur and Wazirgurh were to be connected by two walls enclosing the ground on which the barracks stand, thus forming a continuous defensive enclosure with a perimeter of about 10,000 yards; the armament required for this large fort was not stated. In the other the Purandhur fort was to be the stronghold of the position, and Wazirgurh was to be partially dismantled. The armament in this case was to consist of 27 pieces of ordnance, including five $\frac{8}{3\frac{1}{2}}$-pounder rifled muzzle-loading guns and six mortars. Where the garrison was to come from for manning these guns, or against what sort of enemy the defence on this scale was contemplated, was not explained.

4. When these proposals were submitted to the Government of India, the scheme for enclosing the barracks by walls connecting Purandhur and Wazirgurh was preferred, and an estimate of the cost was called for. This amounted to Rs. 66,044.

5. The projects were then referred to the Defence Committee, who pointed out the unsuitability of both, and recommended that Wazirgurh should be selected as a keep to the whole position; that it should be repaired and cleared out, and emplacements for three 25-pounder rifled muzzle-loading guns constructed. These recommendations were approved by the Government of Bombay and then accepted by the Government of India.

6. The officers who drew up the annual report on the fort in 1831 took, however, a more practical, and as the Government of India now think a more sound, view of the real conditions of the case, and they recommended that no expenditure should be incurred on the defences, but that the stones of the existing forts should be gradually used up for building purposes in the station. The case was also ably reviewed subsequently by the Quartermaster-General, Bombay Army, in his report on the plans and estimates for carrying out the proposals of the Defence Committee, in which much the same views were expressed as in the annual report; but instead of the eventual entire demolition of the existing defences, it was recommended that a few minor improvements and repairs, in accordance with certain proposals of the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army, which accompanied the Quartermaster-General's report, should be effected with a view to rendering the place easily defensible for a time by a very small garrison. These views and recommendations were accepted by the Government of India.

7. The case has now been again reconsidered by the Government of India, and I am to say that the opinions expressed in the report of the Quartermaster-General, Bombay Army, No. 14-8—3378, dated the 12th October 1881, and the proposals of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay, which accompanied that report, have still the entire approval of the Government of India. The Governor-General in Council would wish that the work proposed should therefore now be carried out, if it has not already been done, and the defences maintained in a fair state of repair, so that they may be fit to serve as a place of refuge, but that no armament may be mounted on them.

No. 1024-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

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(By Order.)

SIMLA, (Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
19*th October* 1883. *Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.*

No. 332. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1025-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1024-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*h*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, of 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following remarks regarding the fort at Satara.

2. The position of Satara is important from a strategical point of view, commanding the only main line of communication in that part of the country. Satara is also important politically, for both the town and the neighbourhood contain the potential elements of disorder. The Army Organization Commission of 1879 recommended a normal and compulsory garrison of two companies of European infantry and one regiment of Native infantry for the place, which the Government of India consider should certainly always be held by European troops. They believe that the Government of Bombay will concur with them in this view.

3. The position is isolated, being 69 miles from Poona and 120 from Belgaum, and separated from these places by rivers and passes which could easily be held for a time by insurgents in time of disturbance. It appears therefore essential that the small European force which would have to suffice to control the Native city, keep in check the inhabitants of the surrounding districts, and protect the civil and non-combatant Europeans and loyal Natives should have some strong defensive position which could be held for a considerable time.

4. The fort of Satara appears to fulfil many of the conditions for this purpose. The natural defences are very strong, and can at small cost be rendered almost impregnable; the water-supply is sufficient, and could be improved so as to meet all requirements; the works command the Poona-Belgaum road, and dominate the town. These circumstances, and the consideration in which the fort is held by the Mahrattas, point to the strong desirability of making this fort the defensive position and place of refuge for Satara, notwithstanding a deficiency of accommodation for refugees and stores, and that it is commanded, though at a distance of 3,000 yards, by a spur of the Yavateshwar range; and the Government of India therefore on full reconsideration of the case adhere to the previous decisions that this fort shall be put into a state of defence and maintained in a fair state of repair.

5. I am to suggest that early measures may be taken to this end; also that all buildings within the fort which can be made suitable for habitation or the reception of stores may now be at once taken over and saved from further deterioration.

6. The fort has recently been placed under military charge, but the Government of India have no information as to the strength of the guards stationed in it. The city lies much nearer the fort than the cantonment, and is hidden from both the cantonment and civil station by a spur of the fort hill. Under these circumstances, it seems questionable whether the fort should be left in charge of a Native guard only; and I am to suggest, for the consideration of the Government of Bombay, whether, as there is good and suitable accommodation for Europeans within

the fort, a small detachment of European infantry, to be frequently relieved, might not with propriety be kept in it.

7. When this point is settled, the question of armament can be dealt with. It appears probable that some small armament of guns will be necessary, as the fort will not be a mere place of refuge to afford protection to civilians and non-combatants for a few days till they can be relieved, but will be permanently held by a small body of regular troops; and I am to invite the suggestions of the Government of Bombay on this subject, as to which the Government of India would observe that the armament should not be such as to invest the place with a fictitious importance, and make its capture a special object of attraction. No artillery men will probably be available to man the armament, and therefore rifled guns, which cannot be worked by untrained men, would not be suitable; the garrison will be small, and will be generally more useful with the rifle than with guns; costly emplacements and magazines are out of the question, and the magazine already existing, improved and sub-divided if necessary, may be taken to be the only accommodation of this kind likely to be available. Mortars are generally unsuitable for the defence of forts of this description, but in the present case a few might prove useful in overawing the city, but generally machine guns appear the most suitable for these weakly garrisoned places.

No. 1025-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 333. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1026-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of Military Department letter, No. 1025-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6, clause (*k*), of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following remarks and conclusions in respect to the fort at Sholapur.

2. In this office letter, No. 798, dated 27th November 1877, the Government of India decided to keep this fort in fair repair. The reasons which led to this decision were that Sholapur and Bellary are the only strong places on the long line from Poona to Madras; that Sholapur has some value in reference to the Nizam's dominions; and that, though only garrisoned by Native infantry, troops and guns could be easily pushed up from Poona.

3. In 1881, however, the Government of Bombay, in submitting * the annual reports on the forts in the Bombay presidency, recommended that the fort at Sholapur be dismantled, and that any funds available be spent on a more compact fort near the railway. This recommendation was based on the grounds—

* No. 2668, dated the 19th May 1881.

(i) that the existing fort is too close to the town;
(ii) that it is at a considerable distance from the railway;
(iii) that it is commanded by higher ground;
(iv) that it is too large;
(v) that its masonry is bad; and
(vi) that the towers on which the guns are to be placed require reconstruction.

It had further been decided that it was unnecessary to station any troops, European or Native, at Sholapur in future.

The reports, with the recommendation of the Bombay Government, were submitted to the Defence Committee, who concurred in the opinion of the Government of Bombay; and the Government of India accordingly sanctioned * the demolition of the fort.

* Military Department No. 1175-C., dated 11th November 1881.

4. The Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, however, on reconsideration now recommends that the fort be maintained till some work has been erected to protect the railway station, and to serve as a place of refuge for the civil residents of the country.

5. The Government of India, however, after full consideration are of opinion that the last decision arrived at in 1881, viz., that it was not desirable to retain this fort any longer—a decision concurred in by the Government of Bombay, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, the Defence Committee, and His Excellency the Governor-General in Council—should be adhered to. No troops are likely to be again stationed at Sholapur, so that in case of an *émêute* the civil residents would have to rely on themselves alone for safety till they could be relieved and removed to a place of safety. The fort in the absence of any troops to assist in its defence is unsuitable for a place of refuge, both on account of its position and also of its size, which is too great to admit of its being properly guarded by the few men who would take refuge there.

6. I am to request, therefore, that the fort may now be made over to the civil authorities, after such measures have been carried out as may be deemed necessary to render the fort incapable of being quickly made defensible against us. The fort having been thus dismantled, no further expenditure from military funds should henceforward be incurred for repair or other work connected with it.

No. 1026-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 334. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1027-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1026-M.W., dated the 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6 (*a*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, and para. 1 of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1572, dated the 28th March 1883, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following observations regarding Ahmedabad.

2. It has been decided† that a first-class ordnance depôt shall be maintained at Ahmedabad, and a scheme for constructing a fortified enclosure to contain the necessary buildings and which would also serve as a place of refuge was approved‡ in 1880 and is now in course of execution. There can be no question that these works, when completed, shall be maintained.

† Government of India, Military Department, No. 583, dated the 14th November 1876.

‡ Government of India, Public Works Department, No. 612-M.W., dated the 1st October 1880, addressed to the Government of Bombay, Public Works Department.

3. All requirements as regards defences at Ahmedabad will thus be met, and the old fort or Guicowar's Haveli, will no longer be required for any military purpose. From its position, and also being without any armament, it could not be a source of danger either to the new fortified position or to cantonments, while ts removal would cost a considerable sum. The Government of India have therefore no objection to the Guicowar's Haveli being handed over to the civil authorities as it stands, to be used either as a jail or for any other purpose to which it may be adapted.

No. 1027-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 335. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1028-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1027-M.W., dated the 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 7(*e*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following remarks and conclusions regarding Surat Castle.

2. The castle has been in civil charge since 1862, and contains the civil records and treasury; the service ammunition of the Native infantry regiment is also kept in it. But the works are not maintained in good repair, the gates especially being defective, and the whole is protected only by a guard consisting of one havildar and ten rank and file.

3. The known turbulence of the inhabitants of Surat, which so recently as 1879 showed itself in serious riots and necessitated the occupation of the castle in considerable force by Native troops, the important bridge, and the large body of British subjects and Europeans in the neighbourhood, render it desirable that there should be some place of refuge at Surat; and the castle, from its position and strength, as well also from its historic associations, seems well adapted for this purpose.

4. I am to say, therefore, that the Government of India are of opinion that the castle of Surat should be maintained in a fair state of repair, and that the military guard should be of sufficient strength to prevent any chance of success to a sudden attack.

5. As a consequence of this conclusion, the actual defences must be considered to be in military charge, the military authorities being responsible that any defects and disrepair of the works is duly brought to notice. The rest of the castle may remain, as at present, in civil charge.

6. The castle being merely kept up as a place of refuge seems not to need any armament.

No. 1028-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 336. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1029-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1028-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 7(*d*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to state, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, that the Government of India concur in the opinion that the fort at Bhuj must be retained according to treaty with the Rao of Cutch. Expenditure on it should, however, be limited to that absolutely necessary to keep the place from decay, and no armament should be placed in the fort.

No. 1029-M. W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 337. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1030-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1029-M.W., dated the 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 7(*b*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to state, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, that the Government of India approve of the fort at Siwri, near Bombay, continuing to be used as a powder magazine. It should, however, be no longer classed as a fort or place of refuge.

No. 1030-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 338. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1031-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1030-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 7 (*c*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to state, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, that the Government of India concur in the opinion that the fort of Sion, being of no importance, and being far off from Bombay, and too small to serve as a place of refuge, should not be retained as a fort. It may be transferred to the civil authorities, if no longer required for any military purpose, after being so far dismantled that it could not be occupied by any hostile force.

No. 1031-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 339. ORDER THEREON, 15th November 1883, No. 6187.

Communicated for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the Inspector-General of Ordnance, in continuation of Proceedings of Government, No. 5396, dated 5th October 1883.

(True Extract.)

Colonel,
Secretary to Government.

To the Quarter Master General.
" Inspector-General of Ordnance.
" Public Works Department.
" Political Department.
" Adjutant-General, for information.

Exd. P. L. Pereira.

No 3377 Way 26 6/11 Nov 83

Communicated &
Supt Engineers in
Continuation of
G.O. 2912 Way 15-11
Oct 1883

17-11-83

20/11

B No 2912 dr. 15.11 83

Supt Engineers.

Eye 20/11

Govt. of {1883} Madra.

MILITARY.

To

THE QUARTER MASTER GENERAL,
&c., &c., &c.

Dated November, 15th.

Issued

Recd. 17/11/83 *Encl.*

G.O., 15th November 1883, No. 6187.

No 3377 Way 26-11-83

NOVEMBER.
Nos. 324—339.

Defences—Forts.

Correspondence containing the views of the Government of India as to the future maintenance of the several defensive works in the Bombay presidency, communicated to departments concerned.

GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

15th November 1883, No. 6187.

Defences—Forts.

Read the following papers:—

No. 324. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1017-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 887-M.W., dated 17th September 1883, and with reference to para. 6 (*m*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following remarks regarding the Fort of Asirgarh, together with the views of the Government of India as to the future maintenance of this fort.

2. The Fort of Asirgarh was formerly regarded as the key of the Deccan, and occupying, as it does, the only depression in the Lalpura Range, and being practically impregnable, it was of very great importance. It does not, however, command the railway, which is of more importance than the road, and it is too small to contain a garrison of such strength as to be able to send out a force to act in the open country in the neighbourhood; so that even if other considerations did not forbid any large force being locked up in such a position as this fort occupies, the fort has ceased to be of much importance in a military point of view, and cannot exercise any material influence in serious military operations in the future.

3. But the fort retains a good deal of its ancient prestige among the natives of Central India, and the possession of it is therefore of some political importance; it also proved a safe place of refuge in 1857-58 for the families of some European officials, and might again prove of service in the same way to Railway officials and their families and other officials of the district whose duties might require them to remain at their posts till possibly their retreat was cut off. For these reasons the fort should be kept up, but as a place of refuge only.

4. The proposals made up to date regarding this fort will now be considered in the light of the foregoing remarks.

5. In 1873, a Committee reported on Asirgarh and recorded their opinion that 54 rifled guns (40-20-12 and 6-pounders) and two 10-inch howitzers mounted in position, with 14 mortars (10-inch and 5½-inch), a battery of 6-pounders, two batteries of mountain guns, and a battery of mitrailleuses, for general defensive purposes, was "the smallest possible armament suitable for the defence of the works," and they recommended 72 rifled guns and four 10-inch howitzers in position, and an additional battery of mountain guns and of mitrailleuses for general purposes; they recommend also some 7″ B.L.R.guns, if procurable.

6. The garrison in time of peace should, according to this Committee, consist of—

1 garrison battery of Artillery,
2 companies of European Infantry,
2 ,, of Native Infantry,

which must, on any threatening of war, be at once increased to—

2 garrison batteries of Royal Artillery,
3 companies of European Infantry,
1 wing of Native Infantry,
½ company of Sappers and Miners,

but for thoroughly efficient defence the garrison should be—

2 garrison batteries of Royal Artillery,
1 field battery of Royal Artillery,
½ battalion of European Infantry,
1 ,, of Native Infantry,
1 company of Sappers and Miners.

These proposals necessarily carried with them proposals to construct barracks, magazines, store rooms, emplacements, &c., on a very extensive scale, in addition to costly repairs and additions to the existing works.

7. The proceedings of this Committee of 1873 are a striking instance of the way in which the considerations which should be kept in view in dealing with such matters are often completely lost sight of.

8. Practically no action was taken on this report, and, in 1879, another report was received through the Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces, regarding the armament of Asirgarh, on which the plans and estimates for remodelling the fort were being prepared by Captain Jenner, R.E. The total number of guns of position recommended was 28, of which 11 were $\frac{6}{3}\frac{4}{2}$-pounder R.M.L. guns, with a reserve of two 40-pounder R.M.L. guns, two 8″ or 10″ mortars, and two gatling guns.

9. Subsequently a further reduction of the proposed armament was suggested by Lieutenant-Colonel Stocker, R.A., and was approved by the General Officer Commanding the Mhow Division. The armament, according to this scheme, was to consist of—

8 $\frac{6}{3}\frac{4}{2}$-pounder R.M.L. guns,
4 10″ mortars,
2 6½″ M.L.R. howitzers.

10. Finally, in February 1882, the Defence Committee, after Brigadier-General Leslie, R.A., Inspector-General of Artillery, one of the members of the Committee, had been able to visit Asirgarh, submitted their recommendations. General Leslie reported that "the place is impregnable; absolutely so if held by a few infantry; and that mounting large and powerful guns on the works would only be wasting good money and shutting up troops who might be more usefully employed elsewhere. The artillery should be reduced to the lowest possible limits," which he considered to be two metrailleuses and six heavy guns.

11. The Defence Committee accepted the views of General Leslie and recommended that the armament should consist of—

2 40-pounder R.M.L. or B.L. guns on travelling carriages,
4 12-pounder R.B.L. guns with limbers complete,

and that certain works should be carried out for improving the state of th defences and providing casemated cover for men, stores, ammunition, &c., in the existing tykhanas.

12. These recommendations for the armament and remodelling of the Fort at Asirgarh were approved by the Government of India, and a project for carrying them out was called for.

13. In 1881, the Government of India sanctioned Rs. 25,000 for repairs to existing defences to render them secure against a sudden rush, or escalade, but

the work was deferred by the local administration, and Rs. 20,000 of the sum allotted was re-appropriated to other purposes.

14. During the current year also a project for constructing an improved entrance road to the fort, to cost Rs. 17,700, has been sanctioned, but no funds have yet been allotted for the work.

15. On this review of the case, the conclusions which the Government of India have come to are as follows:—

The fort should be put into a state of repair which shall render it secure against sudden attack, or escalade, so as to make it safe and suitable as a place of refuge.

The new entrance road should be constructed when funds can be provided.

No guns should be mounted in the fort, but the following armament shall be kept in store on travelling carriages ready to be removed to any point where they may be required:—

4 12-pounder R.B.L. guns.
2 machine guns.

The magazines and store rooms required to be provided by improvements to existing tykhanas.

16. The repairs to existing defences to render them storm-proof is, I am to say, the most urgent of the works required, and should be undertaken without unnecessary delay.

No. 1017-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA, 19*th October* 1883. (Signed) J. E. BROADBENT, *Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.*

No. 325. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1018-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1017-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*j*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated 3rd April 1882, I am directed to convey the following remarks and the conclusions of the Government of India regarding the Fort at Ahmadnagar.

2. Ahmadnagar is no longer an ordnance depôt, and the Army Reorganization Commission contemplated the entire withdrawal of the troops from the place. The Defence Committee, under these circumstances, recommend that nothing should be spent on the repairs of the fort, and that, on the withdrawal of the troops, the walls should be breached and the ditch filled up at certain points so as to render it incapable of defence.

3. There is, however, no immediate prospect of the troops being withdrawn from Ahmadnagar; and even if the troops were withdrawn, there would remain a considerable body of European and Eurasian residents connected with the civil government and the railway, &c., with a number of pensioners and others, who usually settle near a cantonment and would probably remain even if the troops were withdrawn. The position of Ahmadnagar is somewhat isolated notwithstanding that a railway now runs past it. The Government of India therefore consider that a place of refuge should be maintained there.

4. The old fort, though too large to answer perfectly for this purpose, is nevertheless in many ways very suitable. The walls are lofty and in good order; there is a good ditch with masonry counterscarp; the flank defence is efficient, and there is a clear glacis round the place. The fort also contains a number of buildings suitable for accommodating refugees, and a good magazine, as well as numerous recesses in the ramparts, which could be easily converted into expense magazines. The fort is also suitably situated between the city and cantonments.

5. The Fort of Ahmadnagar should therefore be maintained as a place of refuge, and such works as are necessary to place and maintain it in a defensible condition should now be carried out.

6. The armament for the fort should be suited to its function as a place of refuge only, and should consist of a few machine and light field pieces. The following armament is accordingly sanctioned:—

4 12-pounder R.B.L. guns,
2 machine guns.

The smooth-bore ordnance, with their stores at present in the fort, should be removed to the nearest arsenal.

7. The above armament is sanctioned for so long as the cantonment may continue to be occupied by European troops. If these are withdrawn, the scale of armament must be reconsidered.

No. 1018-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 326. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1019-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1018-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*i*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of the Governor in Council, the following remarks and conculsions of the Government of India regarding the Fort at Belgaum.

2. Belgaum is not an important strategical position, and there is no arsenal there now; and, in accordance with the principle of our military policy, that as large a part as possible of the army should be kept available to take the field, it is not desirable to maintain defences there on a scale to require a considerable body of troops to man them. Nor does it appear necessary to provide against a formal attack by a well-organized and powerful enemy. Viewed in the light of these considerations, the proposals of the Defence Committee, submitted in 1880 and 1881, which were approved by the Government of India, appear to be in excess of the requirements, and the acceptance of these proposals conveyed in this office letter, No. 1164-C. (*Defences—Forts*), dated 4th November 1881, is therefore cancelled.

3. There is, however, a large garrison at Belgaum, which, if required to take the field, would be obliged to leave invalids and non-combatants behind. Belgaum is also the head-quarters of a district, with a considerable number of civil officials, besides the miscellaneous unofficial Europeans and Eurasians always to be found settled near a large cantonment and civil station.

4. The position of Belgaum is too isolated to admit of these being removed to a place of safety. It is therefore necessary to maintain a place of refuge.

5. The fort is well suited for this, though on too large a scale, and it should therefore be maintained in a state of repair, but as a place of refuge only.

6. The following works should be carried out as funds become available:—

(i) Repairs absolutely necessary to the ramparts and ditch.
(ii) Improvements to the flank defence.
(iii) Provision of drawbridges.

7. It is now impossible, except at great cost, to provide a proper glacis; but strict measures should be taken to prevent any further encroachment being made, or cover erected.

8. The armament of the fort should comprise no heavy guns of position, but should consist of field and machine guns. The following armament is accordingly sanctioned:—

4 12-pounder B.L.R. guns,
4 machine guns.

No. 1019-M.-W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 327. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1020-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1019-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*c*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, of 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following remarks regarding the Fort at Neemuch.

2. In 1880, the Defence Committee reported that in their opinion "under the present, or at any rate the probable future, conditions of Neemuch, the retention of the existing fort is unnecessary and inexpedient, and that the defence of the railway station is all that need be arranged for at this place." In this view the Government of India concurred.

3. But a committee of local officers assembled to report on the defence of the railway station showed that this would be very difficult, while the fort was already there, and admirably suited to the requirements of the case. The report of this committee was submitted to the Defence Committee, and this body, with the fuller information before them as to the conditions of the place, decided that the existing fort is the only place at Neemuch capable of being utilised as a place of refuge. They also stated that Neemuch should not be deliberately deserted, and its retention in troublous times would be of importance. They accordingly recommended that the fort be maintained, the bastions to be prepared as emplacements for field guns, and provision made for storage of supplies and for 1,200 rounds of ammunition for field guns, or 200 rounds a gun for six guns; in peace time the fort to be occupied by European railway employés. The views of the committee as to the work required were given in further detail in their No. 228, of 23rd September 1882, forwarded to you with this office letter, No. 948-M.W., dated 5th October 1882.

4. For the armament of this fort the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay, recommends two rifled heavy field guns and two 8″ mortars.

5. The whole case has now been again carefully considered, and I am to state that the Government of India consider that, whether the European garrison is withdrawn or not, a place of refuge ought to be maintained at Neemnch. The walls of the fort are strong and have given practical proof of the security they afford against troops possessing only smooth-bore guns; the water-supply is sufficient, and there is accommodation for a considerable quantity of stores; while, on the other hand, the position at the railway station is defective in many respects for defence. The place of refuge should therefore be the existing fort.

6. The measures suggested by the Defence Committee seem all that are required, and I am to request that they may be now carried into effect.

7. As regards the armament of the fort, the Government of India do not consider that proposed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay, altogether suitable, and they approve of the following:—

2 12-pounder B.L.R. guns,
2 machine guns,

which is accordingly sanctioned.

No. 1020-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

No. 328. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1021-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1020-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*b*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, of 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate the following remarks and the decision of the Government of India regarding the defences for Ajmere and Nusseerabad. These have been considered together, the latter place being only 15 miles from Ajmere, and connected with it by railway.

2. Ajmere occupies a strategical position of some importance, being situated in the middle of Rajputana at a railway junction. It is also of importance as being the head-quarters of the Rajputana State Railway, with important workshops, stores, &c. It is also the seat of the chief civil authority in Rajputana. Ajmere, therefore, is a point which should be made secure against any attempt likely to be made upon it.

3. But Ajmere is far removed from any probable scene of operations against a well-equipped and disciplined enemy; the only troops against whom it would be reasonable at the present time to take precautions in this part of the country are such as would be raised in that neighbourhood, ill-trained and badly equipped, who, at the utmost, could only bring smooth-bore guns against it.

4. Nusseerabad is only 15 miles distant and connected with Ajmere by railway. It becomes a question, under these circumstances, if it be decided that some defensive works are necessary, whether they should be at Ajmere or Nusseerabad, or at both places.

5. If the troops at Nusseerabad were never likely to be withdrawn from the neighbourhood of Ajmere, their presence, with the volunteers at Ajmere itself, might probably be relied on to prevent any rising at Ajmere or attack on the place.

6. But, as is stated in para. 10 of this department letter, No. 887-M.W., of 17th September last, it should always be a principle of our military policy to keep as large a part as possible of the army available to take the field. In accordance with this principle, the arrangements at Ajmere and Nusseerabad should be such as to admit of all or nearly all the troops at Nusseerabad being moved to a distance with a minimum of risk to the persons and property left behind. This involves the construction of defences at one or both places.

7. To provide defences at both places would, no doubt, add to the security of both places, provided the defences could be adequately manned. But this could not be done without interfering with the mobility of the regular troops. It would divide the defenders, and decrease their power of active defence, on which their supplies and eventual safety would largely depend, and it would increase the difficulty of relief. The Government of India therefore consider that there should be but one defensive position for Ajmere and Nusseerabad.

8. The question which then remains for decision, whether this should be at Ajmere or Nusseerabad, admits of little doubt. In time of trouble the workshops, &c., at Ajmere would be of greater value than the buildings at Nusseerabad; the volunteers who would constitute the main defence live at Ajmere; and Ajmere as the seat of the civil administration and the capital town of a British district is by far the more important place. The defensive position will therefore be at Ajmere.

9. The nature and extent of the works have now to be considered.

The objects to be attained are to provide a place of refuge for the civilians and non-combatants of Ajmere and its neighbourhood; to secure the railway workshops, stores, &c., from destruction; and, if possible, to maintain control over the city and environs of Ajmere.

10. A regular siege is not contemplated, but a sudden attack by an undisciplined enemy, against whom it would be necessary to hold out until the arrival of relief.

11. The defenders who can be relied on are about 150 railway volunteers, a few European infantry unfit for active service in the field, and a few civilians, in all perhaps 250 to 300 men.

12. A local committee, assembled under the orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Mhow Division, has recommended a series of detached works, enclosing an area of some six or seven square miles, with the native city in the heart of the enclosed area. These proposals seem beyond the range of practical discussion, and will not be further referred to.

13. The Defence Committee, whose report is enclosed, recommend that the railway workshops and storehouse be selected as the essential position to be defended and as the place of refuge; that the necessary works to give shelter and storage room for supplies be constructed; and that, to aid in the defence, two or three masonry block-houses be erected. They recommend that the masonry works should be carried out at once, and also that a definite project for the earthworks, barricades, &c., to complete the defences, should be prepared and kept ready. Taragarh, they consider, should not be accepted as an element in the defence.

14. These recommendations are approved by the Government of India.

15. The Defence Committee will now be requested to depute their Secretary to consider the subject on the spot, in consultation with the local Military, Public Works and Railway authorities, and then to submit a definite project for the works required, which will be afterwards worked out in detail in the Fortification Branch of the Office of the Inspector-General of Military Works.

16. The Fort of Taragarh should be maintained only as a sanitarium for the British troops at Nusseerabad.

No. 1021-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA, (Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
19*th October* 1883. *Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.*

No. 329. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the President of the Defence Committee; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1022-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

With reference to your letter, No. 177, dated 19th September 1883, I am directed to forward, for information of the Committee, a copy of this department letter, No. 1021-M.W., of this date, addressed to the Government of Bombay regarding the defences of Ajmere.

2. It will be observed that the Government of India have accepted the general proposals of the Defence Committee on this subject.

3. I am now to request that the Secretary to the Defence Committee may be directed to visit Ajmere during the ensuing cold weather to confer with the Officer Commanding at Nusseerabad, the Secretary to the Agent to the Governor-General, Rajputana, and the Manager, Rajputana State Railway, and to study the subject on the spot; and that the Committee will then submit a definite project for the works required, which can afterwards be worked out in detail and estimated in the fortification branch of the office of the Inspector-General of Military Works.

4. I am, in conclusion, to remind the Committee of the absolute necessity of a most careful study of economy in their proposals, as in this way only will it be practicable to set about the construction of the works with reasonable speed, and to ask that the Secretary may be instructed accordingly.

No. 1022-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA, (Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
19*th October* 1883. *Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.*

No. 330. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1023-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1021-M.W., dated the 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*n*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to convey, for the information of the Governor in Council, the following observations and orders relating to the fort at Hyderabad, Sind.

Hyderabad was the former capital of the Ameers of Sind, and has still a certain amount of prestige attaching to it. It is still the chief town of a large district on the left bank of the Indus; it is a centre of the roads of that part of the country, the head-quarters of a large collectorate, of survey and canal establishments; the district, moreover, of which it is the capital is cut off from the railway by a great unbridged river, and is very inaccessible to troops from other directions. For these reasons Hyderabad will probably always have a garrison of some strength.

But, on the other hand, it could not become a point of strategical importance in great military operations, which would have to be held by a considerable body of troops; its garrison would in such a case either be withdrawn to more important positions elsewhere, or would, if the country round were disturbed, be acting against the local insurgents in the open.

Hyderabad therefore falls into the class of places, where, if any defences are constructed at all, they will take the form of "places of refuge" [see para. 2 (IV) of this department letter No. 887-M.W. of 17th September 1883].

2. In January 1878 it was decided that, as soon as the ordnance stores in the fort had been removed, the fort should be entirely done away with, and no proposal was made to construct any other place of refuge. But on reconsideration the Government of India are of opinion that, in view of the circumstances set forth above, and that there will always be a considerable number of civilians and non-combatants at Hyderabad, whom it might be impossible to remove at once to a place of safety on the occurrence of an outbreak when the troops of the garrison were required to move out into the open country, a place of refuge should be maintained at Hyderabad.

3. The efficiency and value of the fort there as a place of refuge was practically demonstrated in 1857. The condition of the works is such that, though useless against a disciplined enemy provided with artillery, they would be almost impregnable to an enemy without artillery, and they can be maintained in serviceable condition without great expense. The fort also contains sufficient accommodation to shelter a large number of persons, and to contain the necessary stores of all kinds; it appears, therefore, suitable as a place of refuge, notwithstanding its position closely adjoining the town.

4. I am accordingly to say that the Government of India concur in the recommendation of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army, which is understood to be endorsed by the Government of Bombay, to retain the fort as a place of refuge. But they consider that no large expenditure should be incurred upon it and no armament provided for it.

No. 1023-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA, (Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
19*th October* 1883. *Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.*

No. 331. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; datea Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1024-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1023-M.W., dated the 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 7 (*a*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to convey the following remarks regarding the defences at Purandhur for the information of the Governor in Council.

Purandhur is a sanitarium situated about 20 miles from Poona, a station which must always be held in force. The place is not of any special value or importance either from its position or past history, and its garrison of invalids would unquestionably be withdrawn to assist in the protection of the important establishments at Poona in the case of serious emergency. The only defensive work which, therefore, appears to be required is a place of refuge to afford shelter for a short time to the non-combatants who might be surprised in the neighbourhood by a sudden outbreak, until they could be relieved and, if necessary, brought into Poona.

2. The history of this case illustrates the necessity for referring every proposal for erecting inland defences to some distinct principle, such as those which the Government of India endeavoured recently to lay down in this office letter No. 887-M.W., dated the 17th September 1883.

3. In 1873 two proposals were put forward for making the position at Purandhur an important fortress. In one the two forts of Purandhur and Wazirgurh were to be connected by two walls enclosing the ground on which the barracks stand, thus forming a continuous defensive enclosure with a perimeter of about 10,000 yards; the armament required for this large fort was not stated. In the other the Purandhur fort was to be the stronghold of the position, and Wazirgurh was to be partially dismantled. The armament in this case was to consist of 27 pieces of ordnance, including five $6\frac{1}{2}$-pounder rifled muzzle-loading guns and six mortars. Where the garrison was to come from for manning these guns, or against what sort of enemy the defence on this scale was contemplated, was not explained.

4. When these proposals were submitted to the Government of India, the scheme for enclosing the barracks by walls connecting Purandhur and Wazirgurh was preferred, and an estimate of the cost was called for. This amounted to Rs. 66,044.

5. The projects were then referred to the Defence Committee, who pointed out the unsuitability of both, and recommended that Wazirgurh should be selected as a keep to the whole position; that it should be repaired and cleared out, and emplacements for three 25-pounder rifled muzzle-loading guns constructed. These recommendations were approved by the Government of Bombay and then accepted by the Government of India.

6. The officers who drew up the annual report on the fort in 1831 took, however, a more practical, and as the Government of India now think a more sound, view of the real conditions of the case, and they recommended that no expenditure should be incurred on the defences, but that the stones of the existing forts should be gradually used up for building purposes in the station. The case was also ably reviewed subsequently by the Quartermaster-General, Bombay Army, in his report on the plans and estimates for carrying out the proposals of the Defence Committee, in which much the same views were expressed as in the annual report; but instead of the eventual entire demolition of the existing defences, it was recommended that a few minor improvements and repairs, in accordance with certain proposals of the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army, which accompanied the Quartermaster-General's report, should be effected with a view to rendering the place easily defensible for a time by a very small garrison. These views and recommendations were accepted by the Government of India.

7. The case has now been again reconsidered by the Government of India, and I am to say that the opinions expressed in the report of the Quartermaster-General, Bombay Army, No. 14-8—3378, dated the 12th October 1881, and the proposals of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay, which accompanied that report, have still the entire approval of the Government of India. The Governor-General in Council would wish that the work proposed should therefore now be carried out, if it has not already been done, and the defences maintained in a fair state of repair, so that they may be fit to serve as a place of refuge, but that no armament may be mounted on them.

No. 1024-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

No. 332. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1025-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1024-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*h*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, of 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following remarks regarding the fort at Satara.

2. The position of Satara is important from a strategical point of view, commanding the only main line of communication in that part of the country. Satara is also important politically, for both the town and the neighbourhood contain the potential elements of disorder. The Army Organization Commission of 1879 recommended a normal and compulsory garrison of two companies of European infantry and one regiment of Native infantry for the place, which the Government of India consider should certainly always be held by European troops. They believe that the Government of Bombay will concur with them in this view.

3. The position is isolated, being 69 miles from Poona and 120 from Belgaum, and separated from these places by rivers and passes which could easily be held for a time by insurgents in time of disturbance. It appears therefore essential that the small European force which would have to suffice to control the Native city, keep in check the inhabitants of the surrounding districts, and protect the civil and non-combatant Europeans and loyal Natives should have some strong defensive position which could be held for a considerable time.

4. The fort of Satara appears to fulfil many of the conditions for this purpose. The natural defences are very strong, and can at small cost be rendered almost impregnable; the water-supply is sufficient, and could be improved so as to meet all requirements; the works command the Poona-Belgaum road, and dominate the town. These circumstances, and the consideration in which the fort is held by the Mahrattas, point to the strong desirability of making this fort the defensive position and place of refuge for Satara, notwithstanding a deficiency of accommodation for refugees and stores, and that it is commanded, though at a distance of 3,000 yards, by a spur of the Yavateshwar range; and the Government of India therefore on full reconsideration of the case adhere to the previous decisions that this fort shall be put into a state of defence and maintained in a fair state of repair.

5. I am to suggest that early measures may be taken to this end; also that all buildings within the fort which can be made suitable for habitation or the reception of stores may now be at once taken over and saved from further deterioration.

6. The fort has recently been placed under military charge, but the Government of India have no information as to the strength of the guards stationed in it. The city lies much nearer the fort than the cantonment, and is hidden from both the cantonment and civil station by a spur of the fort hill. Under these circumstances, it seems questionable whether the fort should be left in charge of a Native guard only; and I am to suggest, for the consideration of the Government of Bombay, whether, as there is good and suitable accommodation for Europeans within

the fort, a small detachment of European infantry, to be frequently relieved, might not with propriety be kept in it.

7. When this point is settled, the question of armament can be dealt with. It appears probable that some small armament of guns will be necessary, as the fort will not be a mere place of refuge to afford protection to civilians and non-combatants for a few days till they can be relieved, but will be permanently held by a small body of regular troops; and I am to invite the suggestions of the Government of Bombay on this subject, as to which the Government of India would observe that the armament should not be such as to invest the place with a fictitious importance, and make its capture a special object of attraction. No artillery men will probably be available to man the armament, and therefore rifled guns, which cannot be worked by untrained men, would not be suitable; the garrison will be small, and will be generally more useful with the rifle than with guns; costly emplacements and magazines are out of the question, and the magazine already existing, improved and sub-divided if necessary, may be taken to be the only accommodation of this kind likely to be available. Mortars are generally unsuitable for the defence of forts of this description, but in the present case a few might prove useful in overawing the city, but generally machine guns appear the most suitable for these weakly garrisoned places.

No. 1025-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 333. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla,* 19*th October* 1883, *No.* 1026-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of Military Department letter, No. 1025-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6, clause (*k*), of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following remarks and conclusions in respect to the fort at Sholapur.

2. In this office letter, No. 798, dated 27th November 1877, the Government of India decided to keep this fort in fair repair. The reasons which led to this decision were that Sholapur and Bellary are the only strong places on the long line from Poona to Madras; that Sholapur has some value in reference to the Nizam's dominions; and that, though only garrisoned by Native infantry, troops and guns could be easily pushed up from Poona.

3. In 1881, however, the Government of Bombay, in submitting * the annual reports on the forts in the Bombay presidency, recommended that the fort at Sholapur be dismantled, and that any funds available be spent on a more compact fort near the railway. This recommendation was based on the grounds—

* No. 2668, dated the 19th May 1881.

(i) that the existing fort is too close to the town;
(ii) that it is at a considerable distance from the railway;
(iii) that it is commanded by higher ground;
(iv) that it is too large;
(v) that its masonry is bad; and
(vi) that the towers on which the guns are to be placed require reconstruction.

It had further been decided that it was unnecessary to station any troops, European or Native, at Sholapur in future.

The reports, with the recommendation of the Bombay Government, were submitted to the Defence Committee, who concurred in the opinion of the Government of Bombay; and the Government of India accordingly sanctioned * the demolition of the fort.

* Military Department No. 1175-C., dated 11th November 1881.

4. The Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, however, on reconsideration now recommends that the fort be maintained till some work has been erected to protect the railway station, and to serve as a place of refuge for the civil residents of the country.

5. The Government of India, however, after full consideration are of opinion that the last decision arrived at in 1881, viz., that it was not desirable to retain this fort any longer—a decision concurred in by the Government of Bombay, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, the Defence Committee, and His Excellency the Governor-General in Council—should be adhered to. No troops are likely to be again stationed at Sholapur, so that in case of an *émêute* the civil residents would have to rely on themselves alone for safety till they could be relieved and removed to a place of safety. The fort in the absence of any troops to assist in its defence is unsuitable for a place of refuge, both on account of its position and also of its size, which is too great to admit of its being properly guarded by the few men who would take refuge there.

6. I am to request, therefore, that the fort may now be made over to the civil authorities, after such measures have been carried out as may be deemed necessary to render the fort incapable of being quickly made defensible against us. The fort having been thus dismantled, no further expenditure from military funds should henceforward be incurred for repair or other work connected with it.

No. 1026-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 334. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla,* 19*th October* 1883, *No.* 1027-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1026-M.W., dated the 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6 (*a*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, and para. 1 of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1572, dated the 28th March 1883, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following observations regarding Ahmedabad.

2. It has been decided† that a first-class ordnance depôt shall be maintained at Ahmedabad, and a scheme for constructing a fortified enclosure to contain the necessary buildings and which would also serve as a place of refuge was approved ‡ in 1880 and is now in course of execution. There can be no question that these works, when completed, shall be maintained.

† Government of India, Military Department, No. 583, dated the 14th November 1876.

‡ Government of India, Public Works Department, No. 612-M.W., dated the 1st October 1880, addressed to the Government of Bombay, Public Works Department.

3. All requirements as regards defences at Ahmedabad will thus be met, and the old fort or Guicowar's Haveli, will no longer be required for any military purpose. From its position, and also being without any armament, it could not be a source of danger either to the new fortified position or to cantonments, while ts removal would cost a considerable sum. The Government of India have therefore no objection to the Guicowar's Haveli being handed over to the civil authorities as it stands, to be used either as a jail or for any other purpose to which it may be adapted.

No. 1027-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 335. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla,* 19*th October* 1883, *No.* 1028-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1027-M.W., dated the 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 7(*e*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following remarks and conclusions regarding Surat Castle.

2. The castle has been in civil charge since 1862, and contains the civil records and treasury; the service ammunition of the Native infantry regiment is also kept in it. But the works are not maintained in good repair, the gates especially being defective, and the whole is protected only by a guard consisting of one havildar and ten rank and file.

3. The known turbulence of the inhabitants of Surat, which so recently as 1879 showed itself in serious riots and necessitated the occupation of the castle in considerable force by Native troops, the important bridge, and the large body of British subjects and Europeans in the neighbourhood, render it desirable that there should be some place of refuge at Surat; and the castle, from its position and strength, as well also from its historic associations, seems well adapted for this purpose.

4. I am to say, therefore, that the Government of India are of opinion that the castle of Surat should be maintained in a fair state of repair, and that the military guard should be of sufficient strength to prevent any chance of success to a sudden attack.

5. As a consequence of this conclusion, the actual defences must be considered to be in military charge, the military authorities being responsible that any defects and disrepair of the works is duly brought to notice. The rest of the castle may remain, as at present, in civil charge.

6. The castle being merely kept up as a place of refuge seems not to need any armament.

No. 1028-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 336. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla,* 19*th October* 1883, *No.* 1029-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1028-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 7(*d*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to state, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, that the Government of India concur in the opinion that the fort at Bhuj must be retained according to treaty with the Rao of Cutch. Expenditure on it should, however, be limited to that absolutely necessary to keep the place from decay, and no armament should be placed in the fort.

No. 1029-M. W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council.

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(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 337. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla,* 19*th October* 1883, *No.* 1030-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1029-M.W., dated the 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 7(*b*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to state, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, that the Government of India approve of the fort at Siwri, near Bombay, continuing to be used as a powder magazine. It should, however, be no longer classed as a fort or place of refuge.

No. 1030-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 338. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1031-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1030-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 7 (*c*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to state, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, that the Government of India concur in the opinion that the fort of Sion, being of no importance, and being far off from Bombay, and too small to serve as a place of refuge, should not be retained as a fort. It may be transferred to the civil authorities, if no longer required for any military purpose, after being so far dismantled that it could not be occupied by any hostile force.

No. 1031-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 339. ORDER THEREON, 15th November 1883, No. 6187.

Communicated for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the Inspector-General of Ordnance, in continuation of Proceedings of Government, No. 5396, dated 5th October 1883.

(True Extract.)

(Signed) E. L. HANKIN, Colonel,
Secretary to Government.

To the Quarter Master General.
" Inspector-General of Ordnance.
" Public Works Department.
" Political Department.
" Adjutant-General, for information.

Exd. P. L. Pereira.

Govt. of {1883} Madras.

MILITARY.

To

THE QUARTER MASTER GENERAL,
&c., &c., &c.

No: 3377 W of 26th Nov/83

Communicated to Superintending Engineers in continuation of G.O. 2912 W of 15th October 1883

Lof 6.B.
A.S.

Dated November, 15th.

Issued

Recd. *Encl.*

G.O., 15th November 1883, No. 6187.

No: 3377 W of 26th Nov/83

NOVEMBER.
Nos. 324—339.

Defences—Forts.

Correspondence containing the views of the Government of India as to the future maintenance of the several defensive works in the Bombay presidency, communicated to departments concerned.

S. Ees.

With Order

GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

15th November 1883, No. 6187.

Defences—Forts.

Read the following papers:—

No. 324. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1017-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 887-M.W., dated 17th September 1883, and with reference to para. 6 (*m*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following remarks regarding the Fort of Asirgarh, together with the views of the Government of India as to the future maintenance of this fort.

2. The Fort of Asirgarh was formerly regarded as the key of the Deccan, and occupying, as it does, the only depression in the Lalpura Range, and being practically impregnable, it was of very great importance. It does not, however, command the railway, which is of more importance than the road, and it is too small to contain a garrison of such strength as to be able to send out a force to act in the open country in the neighbourhood; so that even if other considerations did not forbid any large force being locked up in such a position as this fort occupies, the fort has ceased to be of much importance in a military point of view, and cannot exercise any material influence in serious military operations in the future.

3. But the fort retains a good deal of its ancient prestige among the natives of Central India, and the possession of it is therefore of some political importance; it also proved a safe place of refuge in 1857-58 for the families of some European officials, and might again prove of service in the same way to Railway officials and their families and other officials of the district whose duties might require them to remain at their posts till possibly their retreat was cut off. For these reasons the fort should be kept up, but as a place of refuge only.

4. The proposals made up to date regarding this fort will now be considered in the light of the foregoing remarks.

5. In 1873, a Committee reported on Asirgarh and recorded their opinion that 54 rifled guns (40-20-12 and 6-pounders) and two 10-inch howitzers mounted in position, with 14 mortars (10-inch and 5½-inch), a battery of 6-pounders, two batteries of mountain guns, and a battery of mitrailleuses, for general defensive purposes, was "the smallest possible armament suitable for the defence of the works," and they recommended 72 rifled guns and four 10-inch howitzers in position, and an additional battery of mountain guns and of mitrailleuses for general purposes; they recommend also some 7″ B.L.R. guns, if procurable.

6. The garrison in time of peace should, according to this Committee, consist of—

1 garrison battery of Artillery,
2 companies of European Infantry,
2 ,, of Native Infantry,

which must, on any threatening of war, be at once increased to—

2 garrison batteries of Royal Artillery,
3 companies of European Infantry,
1 wing of Native Infantry,
½ company of Sappers and Miners,

but for thoroughly efficient defence the garrison should be—

2 garrison batteries of Royal Artillery,
1 field battery of Royal Artillery,
½ battalion of European Infantry,
1 ,, of Native Infantry,
1 company of Sappers and Miners.

These proposals necessarily carried with them proposals to construct barracks, magazines, store rooms, emplacements, &c., on a very extensive scale, in addition to costly repairs and additions to the existing works.

7. The proceedings of this Committee of 1873 are a striking instance of the way in which the considerations which should be kept in view in dealing with such matters are often completely lost sight of.

8. Practically no action was taken on this report, and, in 1879, another report was received through the Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces, regarding the armament of Asirgarh, on which the plans and estimates for remodelling the fort were being prepared by Captain Jenner, R.E. The total number of guns of position recommended was 28, of which 11 were $\frac{6}{3}\frac{4}{2}$-pounder R.M.L. guns, with a reserve of two 40-pounder R.M.L. guns, two 8″ or 10″ mortars, and two gatling guns.

9. Subsequently a further reduction of the proposed armament was suggested by Lieutenant-Colonel Stocker, R.A., and was approved by the General Officer Commanding the Mhow Division. The armament, according to this scheme, was to consist of—

8 $\frac{6}{3}\frac{4}{2}$-pounder R.M.L. guns,
4 10″ mortars,
2 6½″ M.L.R. howitzers.

10. Finally, in February 1882, the Defence Committee, after Brigadier-General Leslie, R.A., Inspector-General of Artillery, one of the members of the Committee, had been able to visit Asirgarh, submitted their recommendations. General Leslie reported that "the place is impregnable; absolutely so if held by a few infantry; and that mounting large and powerful guns on the works would only be wasting good money and shutting up troops who might be more usefully employed elsewhere. The artillery should be reduced to the lowest possible limits," which he considered to be two metrailleuses and six heavy guns.

11. The Defence Committee accepted the views of General Leslie and recommended that the armament should consist of—

2 40-pounder R.M.L. or B.L. guns on travelling carriages,
4 12-pounder R.B.L. guns with limbers complete,

and that certain works should be carried out for improving the state of the defences and providing casemated cover for men, stores, ammunition, &c., in the existing tykhanas.

12. These recommendations for the armament and remodelling of the Fort at Asirgarh were approved by the Government of India, and a project for carrying them out was called for.

13. In 1881, the Government of India sanctioned Rs. 25,000 for repairs to existing defences to render them secure against a sudden rush, or escalade, but

the work was deferred by the local administration, and Rs. 20,000 of the sum allotted was re-appropriated to other purposes.

14. During the current year also a project for constructing an improved entrance road to the fort, to cost Rs. 17,700, has been sanctioned, but no funds have yet been allotted for the work.

15. On this review of the case, the conclusions which the Government of India have come to are as follows:—

The fort should be put into a state of repair which shall render it secure against sudden attack, or escalade, so as to make it safe and suitable as a place of refuge.

The new entrance road should be constructed when funds can be provided.

No guns should be mounted in the fort, but the following armament shall be kept in store on travelling carriages ready to be removed to any point where they may be required:—

4 12-pounder R.B.L. guns.
2 machine guns.

The magazines and store rooms required to be provided by improvements to existing tykhanas.

16. The repairs to existing defences to render them storm-proof is, I am to say, the most urgent of the works required, and should be undertaken without unnecessary delay.

No. 1017-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 325. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1018-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1017-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*j*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated 3rd April 1882, I am directed to convey the following remarks and the conclusions of the Government of India regarding the Fort at Ahmadnagar.

2. Ahmadnagar is no longer an ordnance depôt, and the Army Reorganization Commission contemplated the entire withdrawal of the troops from the place. The Defence Committee, under these circumstances, recommend that nothing should be spent on the repairs of the fort, and that, on the withdrawal of the troops, the walls should be breached and the ditch filled up at certain points so as to render it incapable of defence.

3. There is, however, no immediate prospect of the troops being withdrawn from Ahmadnagar; and even if the troops were withdrawn, there would remain a considerable body of European and Eurasian residents connected with the civil government and the railway, &c., with a number of pensioners and others, who usually settle near a cantonment and would probably remain even if the troops were withdrawn. The position of Ahmadnagar is somewhat isolated notwithstanding that a railway now runs past it. The Government of India therefore consider that a place of refuge should be maintained there.

4. The old fort, though too large to answer perfectly for this purpose, is nevertheless in many ways very suitable. The walls are lofty and in good order; there is a good ditch with masonry counterscarp; the flank defence is efficient, and there is a clear glacis round the place. The fort also contains a number of buildings suitable for accommodating refugees, and a good magazine, as well as numerous recesses in the ramparts, which could be easily converted into expense magazines. The fort is also suitably situated between the city and cantonments.

5. The Fort of Ahmadnagar should therefore be maintained as a place of refuge, and such works as are necessary to place and maintain it in a defensible condition should now be carried out.

6. The armament for the fort should be suited to its function as a place of refuge only, and should consist of a few machine and light field pieces. The following armament is accordingly sanctioned:—

4 12-pounder R.B.L. guns,
2 machine guns.

The smooth-bore ordnance, with their stores at present in the fort, should be removed to the nearest arsenal.

7. The above armament is sanctioned for so long as the cantonment may continue to be occupied by European troops. If these are withdrawn, the scale of armament must be reconsidered.

No. 1018-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

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(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 326. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1019-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1018-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*i*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of the Governor in Council, the following remarks and conculsions of the Government of India regarding the Fort at Belgaum.

2. Belgaum is not an important strategical position, and there is no arsenal there now; and, in accordance with the principle of our military policy, that as large a part as possible of the army should be kept available to take the field, it is not desirable to maintain defences there on a scale to require a considerable body of troops to man them. Nor does it appear necessary to provide against a formal attack by a well-organized and powerful enemy. Viewed in the light of these considerations, the proposals of the Defence Committee, submitted in 1880 and 1881, which were approved by the Government of India, appear to be in excess of the requirements, and the acceptance of these proposals conveyed in this office letter, No. 1164-C. (*Defences—Forts*), dated 4th November 1881, is therefore cancelled.

3. There is, however, a large garrison at Belgaum, which, if required to take the field, would be obliged to leave invalids and non-combatants behind. Belgaum is also the head-quarters of a district, with a considerable number of civil officials, besides the miscellaneous unofficial Europeans and Eurasians always to be found settled near a large cantonment and civil station.

4. The position of Belgaum is too isolated to admit of these being removed to a place of safety. It is therefore necessary to maintain a place of refuge.

5. The fort is well suited for this, though on too large a scale, and it should therefore be maintained in a state of repair, but as a place of refuge only.

6. The following works should be carried out as funds become available:—

(i) Repairs absolutely necessary to the ramparts and ditch.
(ii) Improvements to the flank defence.
(iii) Provision of drawbridges.

7. It is now impossible, except at great cost, to provide a proper glacis; but strict measures should be taken to prevent any further encroachment being made, or cover erected.

8. The armament of the fort should comprise no heavy guns of position, but should consist of field and machine guns. The following armament is accordingly sanctioned:—

4 12-pounder B.L.R. guns,
4 machine guns.

No. 1019-M.-W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 327. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1020-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1019-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*c*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, of 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following remarks regarding the Fort at Neemuch.

2. In 1880, the Defence Committee reported that in their opinion "under the present, or at any rate the probable future, conditions of Neemuch, the retention of the existing fort is unnecessary and inexpedient, and that the defence of the railway station is all that need be arranged for at this place." In this view the Government of India concurred.

3. But a committee of local officers assembled to report on the defence of the railway station showed that this would be very difficult, while the fort was already there, and admirably suited to the requirements of the case. The report of this committee was submitted to the Defence Committee, and this body, with the fuller information before them as to the conditions of the place, decided that the existing fort is the only place at Neemuch capable of being utilised as a place of refuge. They also stated that Neemuch should not be deliberately deserted, and its retention in troublous times would be of importance. They accordingly recommended that the fort be maintained, the bastions to be prepared as emplacements for field guns, and provision made for storage of supplies and for 1,200 rounds of ammunition for field guns, or 200 rounds a gun for six guns; in peace time the fort to be occupied by European railway employés. The views of the committee as to the work required were given in further detail in their No. 228, of 23rd September 1882, forwarded to you with this office letter, No. 948-M.W., dated 5th October 1882.

4. For the armament of this fort the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay, recommends two rifled heavy field guns and two 8″ mortars.

5. The whole case has now been again carefully considered, and I am to state that the Government of India consider that, whether the European garrison is withdrawn or not, a place of refuge ought to be maintained at Neemuch. The walls of the fort are strong and have given practical proof of the security they afford against troops possessing only smooth-bore guns; the water-supply is sufficient, and there is accommodation for a considerable quantity of stores; while, on the other hand, the position at the railway station is defective in many respects for defence. The place of refuge should therefore be the existing fort.

6. The measures suggested by the Defence Committee seem all that are required, and I am to request that they may be now carried into effect.

7. As regards the armament of the fort, the Government of India do not consider that proposed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay, altogether suitable, and they approve of the following:—

2 12-pounder B.L.R. guns,
2 machine guns,

which is accordingly sanctioned.

No. 1020-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 328. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1021-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1020-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*b*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, of 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate the following remarks and the decision of the Government of India regarding the defences for Ajmere and Nusseerabad. These have been considered together, the latter place being only 15 miles from Ajmere, and connected with it by railway.

2. Ajmere occupies a strategical position of some importance, being situated in the middle of Rajputana at a railway junction. It is also of importance as being the head-quarters of the Rajputana State Railway, with important workshops, stores, &c. It is also the seat of the chief civil authority in Rajputana. Ajmere, therefore, is a point which should be made secure against any attempt likely to be made upon it.

3. But Ajmere is far removed from any probable scene of operations against a well-equipped and disciplined enemy; the only troops against whom it would be reasonable at the present time to take precautions in this part of the country are such as would be raised in that neighbourhood, ill-trained and badly equipped, who, at the utmost, could only bring smooth-bore guns against it.

4. Nusseerabad is only 15 miles distant and connected with Ajmere by railway. It becomes a question, under these circumstances, if it be decided that some defensive works are necessary, whether they should be at Ajmere or Nusseerabad, or at both places.

5. If the troops at Nusseerabad were never likely to be withdrawn from the neighbourhood of Ajmere, their presence, with the volunteers at Ajmere itself, might probably be relied on to prevent any rising at Ajmere or attack on the place.

6. But, as is stated in para. 10 of this department letter, No. 887-M.W., of 17th September last, it should always be a principle of our military policy to keep as large a part as possible of the army available to take the field. In accordance with this principle, the arrangements at Ajmere and Nusseerabad should be such as to admit of all or nearly all the troops at Nusseerabad being moved to a distance with a minimum of risk to the persons and property left behind. This involves the construction of defences at one or both places.

7. To provide defences at both places would, no doubt, add to the security of both places, provided the defences could be adequately manned. But this could not be done without interfering with the mobility of the regular troops. It would divide the defenders, and decrease their power of active defence, on which their supplies and eventual safety would largely depend, and it would increase the difficulty of relief. The Government of India therefore consider that there should be but one defensive position for Ajmere and Nusseerabad.

8. The question which then remains for decision, whether this should be at Ajmere or Nusseerabad, admits of little doubt. In time of trouble the workshops, &c., at Ajmere would be of greater value than the buildings at Nusseerabad; the volunteers who would constitute the main defence live at Ajmere; and Ajmere as the seat of the civil administration and the capital town of a British district is by far the more important place. The defensive position will therefore be at Ajmere.

9. The nature and extent of the works have now to be considered.

The objects to be attained are to provide a place of refuge for the civilians and non-combatants of Ajmere and its neighbourhood; to secure the railway workshops, stores, &c., from destruction; and, if possible, to maintain control over the city and environs of Ajmere.

10. A regular siege is not contemplated, but a sudden attack by an undisciplined enemy, against whom it would be necessary to hold out until the arrival of relief.

11. The defenders who can be relied on are about 150 railway volunteers, a few European infantry unfit for active service in the field, and a few civilians, in all perhaps 250 to 300 men.

12. A local committee, assembled under the orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Mhow Division, has recommended a series of detached works, enclosing an area of some six or seven square miles, with the native city in the heart of the enclosed area. These proposals seem beyond the range of practical discussion, and will not be further referred to.

13. The Defence Committee, whose report is enclosed, recommend that the railway workshops and storehouse be selected as the essential position to be defended and as the place of refuge; that the necessary works to give shelter and storage room for supplies be constructed; and that, to aid in the defence, two or three masonry block-houses be erected. They recommend that the masonry works should be carried out at once, and also that a definite project for the earthworks, barricades, &c., to complete the defences, should be prepared and kept ready. Taragarh, they consider, should not be accepted as an element in the defence.

14. These recommendations are approved by the Government of India.

15. The Defence Committee will now be requested to depute their Secretary to consider the subject on the spot, in consultation with the local Military, Public Works and Railway authorities, and then to submit a definite project for the works required, which will be afterwards worked out in detail in the Fortification Branch of the Office of the Inspector-General of Military Works.

16. The Fort of Taragarh should be maintained only as a sanitarium for the British troops at Nusseerabad.

No. 1021-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA, (Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
19*th October* 1883. *Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.*

No. 329. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the President of the Defence Committee; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1022-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

With reference to your letter, No. 177, dated 19th September 1883, I am directed to forward, for information of the Committee, a copy of this department letter, No. 1021-M.W., of this date, addressed to the Government of Bombay regarding the defences of Ajmere.

2. It will be observed that the Government of India have accepted the general proposals of the Defence Committee on this subject.

3. I am now to request that the Secretary to the Defence Committee may be directed to visit Ajmere during the ensuing cold weather to confer with the Officer Commanding at Nusseerabad, the Secretary to the Agent to the Governor-General, Rajputana, and the Manager, Rajputana State Railway, and to study the subject on the spot; and that the Committee will then submit a definite project for the works required, which can afterwards be worked out in detail and estimated in the fortification branch of the office of the Inspector-General of Military Works.

4. I am, in conclusion, to remind the Committee of the absolute necessity of a most careful study of economy in their proposals, as in this way only will it be practicable to set about the construction of the works with reasonable speed, and to ask that the Secretary may be instructed accordingly.

No. 1022-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA, (Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
19*th October* 1883. *Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.*

No. 330. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1023-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1021-M.W., dated the 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*n*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to convey, for the information of the Governor in Council, the following observations and orders relating to the fort at Hyderabad, Sind.

Hyderabad was the former capital of the Ameers of Sind, and has still a certain amount of prestige attaching to it. It is still the chief town of a large

district on the left bank of the Indus; it is a centre of the roads of that part of the country, the head-quarters of a large collectorate, of survey and canal establishments; the district, moreover, of which it is the capital is cut off from the railway by a great unbridged river, and is very inaccessible to troops from other directions. For these reasons Hyderabad will probably always have a garrison of some strength.

But, on the other hand, it could not become a point of strategical importance in great military operations, which would have to be held by a considerable body of troops; its garrison would in such a case either be withdrawn to more important positions elsewhere, or would, if the country round were disturbed, be acting against the local insurgents in the open.

Hyderabad therefore falls into the class of places, where, if any defences are constructed at all, they will take the form of "places of refuge" [see para. 2 (IV) of this department letter No. 887-M.W. of 17th September 1883].

2. In January 1878 it was decided that, as soon as the ordnance stores in the fort had been removed, the fort should be entirely done away with, and no proposal was made to construct any other place of refuge. But on reconsideration the Government of India are of opinion that, in view of the circumstances set forth above, and that there will always be a considerable number of civilians and non-combatants at Hyderabad, whom it might be impossible to remove at once to a place of safety on the occurrence of an outbreak when the troops of the garrison were required to move out into the open country, a place of refuge should be maintained at Hyderabad.

3. The efficiency and value of the fort there as a place of refuge was practically demonstrated in 1857. The condition of the works is such that, though useless against a disciplined enemy provided with artillery, they would be almost impregnable to an enemy without artillery, and they can be maintained in serviceable condition without great expense. The fort also contains sufficient accommodation to shelter a large number of persons, and to contain the necessary stores of all kinds; it appears, therefore, suitable as a place of refuge, notwithstanding its position closely adjoining the town.

4. I am accordingly to say that the Government of India concur in the recommendation of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army, which is understood to be endorsed by the Government of Bombay, to retain the fort as a place of refuge. But they consider that no large expenditure should be incurred upon it and no armament provided for it.

No. 1023-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA, (Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
19*th October* 1883. *Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.*

No. 331. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; datea Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1024-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1023-M.W., dated the 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 7 (*a*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to convey the following remarks regarding the defences at Purandhur for the information of the Governor in Council,

Purandhur is a sanitarium situated about 20 miles from Poona, a station which must always be held in force. The place is not of any special value or importance either from its position or past history, and its garrison of invalids would unquestionably be withdrawn to assist in the protection of the important establishments at Poona in the case of serious emergency. The only defensive work which, therefore, appears to be required is a place of refuge to afford shelter for a short time to the non-combatants who might be surprised in the neighbourhood by a sudden outbreak, until they could be relieved and, if necessary, brought into Poona.

2. The history of this case illustrates the necessity for referring every proposal for erecting inland defences to some distinct principle, such as those which the Government of India endeavoured recently to lay down in this office letter No. 887-M.W., dated the 17th September 1883.

3. In 1873 two proposals were put forward for making the position at Purandhur an important fortress. In one the two forts of Purandhur and Wazirgurh were to be connected by two walls enclosing the ground on which the barracks stand, thus forming a continuous defensive enclosure with a perimeter of about 10,000 yards; the armament required for this large fort was not stated. In the other the Purandhur fort was to be the stronghold of the position, and Wazirgurh was to be partially dismantled. The armament in this case was to consist of 27 pieces of ordnance, including five $\frac{6}{32}$-pounder rifled muzzle-loading guns and six mortars. Where the garrison was to come from for manning these guns, or against what sort of enemy the defence on this scale was contemplated, was not explained.

4. When these proposals were submitted to the Government of India, the scheme for enclosing the barracks by walls connecting Purandhur and Wazirgurh was preferred, and an estimate of the cost was called for. This amounted to Rs. 66,044.

5. The projects were then referred to the Defence Committee, who pointed out the unsuitability of both, and recommended that Wazirgurh should be selected as a keep to the whole position; that it should be repaired and cleared out, and emplacements for three 25-pounder rifled muzzle-loading guns constructed. These recommendations were approved by the Government of Bombay and then accepted by the Government of India.

6. The officers who drew up the annual report on the fort in 1831 took, however, a more practical, and as the Government of India now think a more sound, view of the real conditions of the case, and they recommended that no expenditure should be incurred on the defences, but that the stones of the existing forts should be gradually used up for building purposes in the station. The case was also ably reviewed subsequently by the Quartermaster-General, Bombay Army, in his report on the plans and estimates for carrying out the proposals of the Defence Committee, in which much the same views were expressed as in the annual report; but instead of the eventual entire demolition of the existing defences, it was recommended that a few minor improvements and repairs, in accordance with certain proposals of the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army, which accompanied the Quartermaster-General's report, should be effected with a view to rendering the place easily defensible for a time by a very small garrison. These views and recommendations were accepted by the Government of India.

7. The case has now been again reconsidered by the Government of India, and I am to say that the opinions expressed in the report of the Quartermaster-General, Bombay Army, No. 14-8—3378, dated the 12th October 1881, and the proposals of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay, which accompanied that report, have still the entire approval of the Government of India. The Governor-General in Council would wish that the work proposed should therefore now be carried out, if it has not already been done, and the defences maintained in a fair state of repair, so that they may be fit to serve as a place of refuge, but that no armament may be mounted on them.

No. 1024-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA, (Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
19*th October* 1883. *Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.*

No. 332. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1025-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1024-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*h*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, of 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following remarks regarding the fort at Satara.

2. The position of Satara is important from a strategical point of view, commanding the only main line of communication in that part of the country. Satara is also important politically, for both the town and the neighbourhood contain the potential elements of disorder. The Army Organization Commission of 1879 recommended a normal and compulsory garrison of two companies of European infantry and one regiment of Native infantry for the place, which the Government of India consider should certainly always be held by European troops. They believe that the Government of Bombay will concur with them in this view.

3. The position is isolated, being 69 miles from Poona and 120 from Belgaum, and separated from these places by rivers and passes which could easily be held for a time by insurgents in time of disturbance. It appears therefore essential that the small European force which would have to suffice to control the Native city, keep in check the inhabitants of the surrounding districts, and protect the civil and non-combatant Europeans and loyal Natives should have some strong defensive position which could be held for a considerable time.

4. The fort of Satara appears to fulfil many of the conditions for this purpose. The natural defences are very strong, and can at small cost be rendered almost impregnable; the water-supply is sufficient, and could be improved so as to meet all requirements; the works command the Poona-Belgaum road, and dominate the town. These circumstances, and the consideration in which the fort is held by the Mahrattas, point to the strong desirability of making this fort the defensive position and place of refuge for Satara, notwithstanding a deficiency of accommodation for refugees and stores, and that it is commanded, though at a distance of 3,000 yards, by a spur of the Yavateshwar range; and the Government of India therefore on full reconsideration of the case adhere to the previous decisions that this fort shall be put into a state of defence and maintained in a fair state of repair.

5. I am to suggest that early measures may be taken to this end; also that all buildings within the fort which can be made suitable for habitation or the reception of stores may now be at once taken over and saved from further deterioration.

6. The fort has recently been placed under military charge, but the Government of India have no information as to the strength of the guards stationed in it. The city lies much nearer the fort than the cantonment, and is hidden from both the cantonment and civil station by a spur of the fort hill. Under these circumstances, it seems questionable whether the fort should be left in charge of a Native guard only; and I am to suggest, for the consideration of the Government of Bombay, whether, as there is good and suitable accommodation for Europeans within

the fort, a small detachment of European infantry, to be frequently relieved, might not with propriety be kept in it.

7. When this point is settled, the question of armament can be dealt with. It appears probable that some small armament of guns will be necessary, as the fort will not be a mere place of refuge to afford protection to civilians and non-combatants for a few days till they can be relieved, but will be permanently held by a small body of regular troops; and I am to invite the suggestions of the Government of Bombay on this subject, as to which the Government of India would observe that the armament should not be such as to invest the place with a fictitious importance, and make its capture a special object of attraction. No artillery men will probably be available to man the armament, and therefore rifled guns, which cannot be worked by untrained men, would not be suitable; the garrison will be small, and will be generally more useful with the rifle than with guns; costly emplacements and magazines are out of the question, and the magazine already existing, improved and sub-divided if necessary, may be taken to be the only accommodation of this kind likely to be available. Mortars are generally unsuitable for the defence of forts of this description, but in the present case a few might prove useful in overawing the city, but generally machine guns appear the most suitable for these weakly garrisoned places.

No. 1025-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 333. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1026-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of Military Department letter, No. 1025-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6, clause (*k*), of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following remarks and conclusions in respect to the fort at Sholapur.

2. In this office letter, No. 798, dated 27th November 1877, the Government of India decided to keep this fort in fair repair. The reasons which led to this decision were that Sholapur and Bellary are the only strong places on the long line from Poona to Madras; that Sholapur has some value in reference to the Nizam's dominions; and that, though only garrisoned by Native infantry, troops and guns could be easily pushed up from Poona.

3. In 1881, however, the Government of Bombay, in submitting * the annual reports on the forts in the Bombay presidency, recommended that the fort at Sholapur be dismantled, and that any funds available be spent on a more compact fort near the railway. This recommendation was based on the grounds—

* No. 2668, dated the 19th May 1881.

(i) that the existing fort is too close to the town;
(ii) that it is at a considerable distance from the railway;
(iii) that it is commanded by higher ground;
(iv) that it is too large;
(v) that its masonry is bad; and
(vi) that the towers on which the guns are to be placed require reconstruction.

It had further been decided that it was unnecessary to station any troops, European or Native, at Sholapur in future.

The reports, with the recommendation of the Bombay Government, were submitted to the Defence Committee, who concurred in the opinion of the Government of Bombay; and the Government of India accordingly sanctioned * the demolition of the fort.

* Military Department No. 1175-C., dated 11th November 1881.

4. The Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, however, on reconsideration now recommends that the fort be maintained till some work has been erected to protect the railway station, and to serve as a place of refuge for the civil residents of the country.

5. The Government of India, however, after full consideration are of opinion that the last decision arrived at in 1881, viz., that it was not desirable to retain this fort any longer—a decision concurred in by the Government of Bombay, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, the Defence Committee, and His Excellency the Governor-General in Council—should be adhered to. No troops are likely to be again stationed at Sholapur, so that in case of an *émêute* the civil residents would have to rely on themselves alone for safety till they could be relieved and removed to a place of safety. The fort in the absence of any troops to assist in its defence is unsuitable for a place of refuge, both on account of its position and also of its size, which is too great to admit of its being properly guarded by the few men who would take refuge there.

6. I am to request, therefore, that the fort may now be made over to the civil authorities, after such measures have been carried out as may be deemed necessary to render the fort incapable of being quickly made defensible against us. The fort having been thus dismantled, no further expenditure from military funds should henceforward be incurred for repair or other work connected with it.

No. 1026-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 334. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1027-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1026-M.W., dated the 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6 (*a*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, and para. 1 of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1572, dated the 28th March 1883, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following observations regarding Ahmedabad.

2. It has been decided† that a first-class ordnance depôt shall be maintained at Ahmedabad, and a scheme for constructing a fortified enclosure to contain the necessary buildings and which would also serve as a place of refuge was approved‡ in 1880 and is now in course of execution. There can be no question that these works, when completed, shall be maintained.

† Government of India, Military Department, No. 583, dated the 14th November 1876.

‡ Government of India, Public Works Department, No. 612-M.W., dated the 1st October 1880, addressed to the Government of Bombay, Public Works Department.

3. All requirements as regards defences at Ahmedabad will thus be met, and the old fort or Guicowar's Haveli, will no longer be required for any military purpose. From its position, and also being without any armament, it could not be a source of danger either to the new fortified position or to cantonments, while ts removal would cost a considerable sum. The Government of India have therefore no objection to the Guicowar's Haveli being handed over to the civil authorities as it stands, to be used either as a jail or for any other purpose to which it may be adapted.

No. 1027-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 335. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1028-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1027-M.W., dated the 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 7(*e*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following remarks and conclusions regarding Surat Castle.

2. The castle has been in civil charge since 1862, and contains the civil records and treasury; the service ammunition of the Native infantry regiment is also kept in it. But the works are not maintained in good repair, the gates especially being defective, and the whole is protected only by a guard consisting of one havildar and ten rank and file.

3. The known turbulence of the inhabitants of Surat, which so recently as 1879 showed itself in serious riots and necessitated the occupation of the castle in considerable force by Native troops, the important bridge, and the large body of British subjects and Europeans in the neighbourhood, render it desirable that there should be some place of refuge at Surat; and the castle, from its position and strength, as well also from its historic associations, seems well adapted for this purpose.

4. I am to say, therefore, that the Government of India are of opinion that the castle of Surat should be maintained in a fair state of repair, and that the military guard should be of sufficient strength to prevent any chance of success to a sudden attack.

5. As a consequence of this conclusion, the actual defences must be considered to be in military charge, the military authorities being responsible that any defects and disrepair of the works is duly brought to notice. The rest of the castle may remain, as at present, in civil charge.

6. The castle being merely kept up as a place of refuge seems not to need any armament.

No. 1028-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 336. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1029-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1028-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 7(*d*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to state, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, that the Government of India concur in the opinion that the fort at Bhuj must be retained according to treaty with the Rao of Cutch. Expenditure on it should, however, be limited to that absolutely necessary to keep the place from decay, and no armament should be placed in the fort.

No. 1029-M. W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 337. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1030-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1029-M.W., dated the 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 7(*b*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to state, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, that the Government of India approve of the fort at Siwri, near Bombay, continuing to be used as a powder magazine. It should, however, be no longer classed as a fort or place of refuge.

No. 1030-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 338. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1031-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1030-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 7 (*c*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to state, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, that the Government of India concur in the opinion that the fort of Sion, being of no importance, and being far off from Bombay, and too small to serve as a place of refuge, should not be retained as a fort. It may be transferred to the civil authorities, if no longer required for any military purpose, after being so far dismantled that it could not be occupied by any hostile force.

No. 1031-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

No. 339. ORDER THEREON, 15th November 1883, No. 6187.

Communicated for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the Inspector-General of Ordnance, in continuation of Proceedings of Government, No. 5396, dated 5th October 1883.

(True Extract.)

(Signed) E. L. HANKIN, Colonel,
Secretary to Government.

To the Quarter Master General.
" Inspector-General of Ordnance.
" Public Works Department.
" Political Department.
" Adjutant-General, for information.

Exd. P. L. Pereira.

Govt. of {1883} Madras.

MILITARY.

To

THE QUARTER MASTER GENERAL,
&c., &c., &c.

No: 3377 W of 26th Nov/83

Communicated to Supy. Engineers in continuation of G.O. 2912 W of 15th October 1883

Sof C. B.
C. S.

Dated November, 15th.

Issued

Recd. *Encl.*

G.O., 15th November 1883, No. 6187.

No: 3377 W of 26th Nov/83

NOVEMBER.
Nos. 324—339.

Defences—Forts.

Correspondence containing the views of the Government of India as to the future maintenance of the several defensive works in the Bombay presidency, communicated to departments concerned.

S. Ees.

With Order

GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

15th November 1883, No. 6187.

Defences—Forts.

Read the following papers:—

No. 324. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1017-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 887-M.W., dated 17th September 1883, and with reference to para. 6 (*m*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following remarks regarding the Fort of Asirgarh, together with the views of the Government of India as to the future maintenance of this fort.

2. The Fort of Asirgarh was formerly regarded as the key of the Deccan, and occupying, as it does, the only depression in the Lalpura Range, and being practically impregnable, it was of very great importance. It does not, however, command the railway, which is of more importance than the road, and it is too small to contain a garrison of such strength as to be able to send out a force to act in the open country in the neighbourhood; so that even if other considerations did not forbid any large force being locked up in such a position as this fort occupies, the fort has ceased to be of much importance in a military point of view, and cannot exercise any material influence in serious military operations in the future.

3. But the fort retains a good deal of its ancient prestige among the natives of Central India, and the possession of it is therefore of some political importance; it also proved a safe place of refuge in 1857-58 for the families of some European officials, and might again prove of service in the same way to Railway officials and their families and other officials of the district whose duties might require them to remain at their posts till possibly their retreat was cut off. For these reasons the fort should be kept up, but as a place of refuge only.

4. The proposals made up to date regarding this fort will now be considered in the light of the foregoing remarks.

5. In 1873, a Committee reported on Asirgarh and recorded their opinion that 54 rifled guns (40-20-12 and 6-pounders) and two 10-inch howitzers mounted in position, with 14 mortars (10-inch and 5½-inch), a battery of 6-pounders, two batteries of mountain guns, and a battery of mitrailleuses, for general defensive purposes, was "the smallest possible armament suitable for the defence of the works," and they recommended 72 rifled guns and four 10-inch howitzers in position, and an additional battery of mountain guns and of mitrailleuses for general purposes; they recommend also some 7" B.L.R. guns, if procurable.

6. The garrison in time of peace should, according to this Committee, consist of—

1 garrison battery of Artillery,
2 companies of European Infantry,
2 „ of Native Infantry,

which must, on any threatening of war, be at once increased to—

2 garrison batteries of Royal Artillery,
3 companies of European Infantry,
1 wing of Native Infantry,
½ company of Sappers and Miners,

but for thoroughly efficient defence the garrison should be—

2 garrison batteries of Royal Artillery,
1 field battery of Royal Artillery,
½ battalion of European Infantry,
1 „ of Native Infantry,
1 company of Sappers and Miners.

These proposals necessarily carried with them proposals to construct barracks, magazines, store rooms, emplacements, &c., on a very extensive scale, in addition to costly repairs and additions to the existing works.

7. The proceedings of this Committee of 1873 are a striking instance of the way in which the considerations which should be kept in view in dealing with such matters are often completely lost sight of.

8. Practically no action was taken on this report, and, in 1879, another report was received through the Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces, regarding the armament of Asirgarh, on which the plans and estimates for remodelling the fort were being prepared by Captain Jenner, R.E. The total number of guns of position recommended was 28, of which 11 were $\frac{6}{3}\frac{4}{2}$-pounder R.M.L. guns, with a reserve of two 40-pounder R.M.L. guns, two 8″ or 10″ mortars, and two gatling guns.

9. Subsequently a further reduction of the proposed armament was suggested by Lieutenant-Colonel Stocker, R.A., and was approved by the General Officer Commanding the Mhow Division. The armament, according to this scheme, was to consist of—

8 $\frac{6}{3}\frac{4}{2}$-pounder R.M.L. guns,
4 10″ mortars,
2 6½″ M.L.R. howitzers.

10. Finally, in February 1882, the Defence Committee, after Brigadier-General Leslie, R.A., Inspector-General of Artillery, one of the members of the Committee, had been able to visit Asirgarh, submitted their recommendations. General Leslie reported that "the place is impregnable; absolutely so if held by a few infantry; and that mounting large and powerful guns on the works would only be wasting good money and shutting up troops who might be more usefully employed elsewhere. The artillery should be reduced to the lowest possible limits," which he considered to be two metrailleuses and six heavy guns.

11. The Defence Committee accepted the views of General Leslie and recommended that the armament should consist of—

2 40-pounder R.M.L. or B.L. guns on travelling carriages,
4 12-pounder R.B.L. guns with limbers complete,

and that certain works should be carried out for improving the state of the defences and providing casemated cover for men, stores, ammunition, &c., in the existing tykhanas.

12. These recommendations for the armament and remodelling of the Fort at Asirgarh were approved by the Government of India, and a project for carrying them out was called for.

13. In 1881, the Government of India sanctioned Rs. 25,000 for repairs to existing defences to render them secure against a sudden rush, or escalade, but

the work was deferred by the local administration, and Rs. 20,000 of the sum allotted was re-appropriated to other purposes.

14. During the current year also a project for constructing an improved entrance road to the fort, to cost Rs. 17,700, has been sanctioned, but no funds have yet been allotted for the work.

15. On this review of the case, the conclusions which the Government of India have come to are as follows:—

The fort should be put into a state of repair which shall render it secure against sudden attack, or escalade, so as to make it safe and suitable as a place of refuge.

The new entrance road should be constructed when funds can be provided.

No guns should be mounted in the fort, but the following armament shall be kept in store on travelling carriages ready to be removed to any point where they may be required:—

4 12-pounder R.B.L. guns.
2 machine guns.

The magazines and store rooms required to be provided by improvements to existing tykhanas.

16. The repairs to existing defences to render them storm-proof is, I am to say, the most urgent of the works required, and should be undertaken without unnecessary delay.

No. 1017-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA, 19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 325. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1018-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1017-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*j*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated 3rd April 1882, I am directed to convey the following remarks and the conclusions of the Government of India regarding the Fort at Ahmadnagar.

2. Ahmadnagar is no longer an ordnance depôt, and the Army Reorganization Commission contemplated the entire withdrawal of the troops from the place. The Defence Committee, under these circumstances, recommend that nothing should be spent on the repairs of the fort, and that, on the withdrawal of the troops, the walls should be breached and the ditch filled up at certain points so as to render it incapable of defence.

3. There is, however, no immediate prospect of the troops being withdrawn from Ahmadnagar; and even if the troops were withdrawn, there would remain a considerable body of European and Eurasian residents connected with the civil government and the railway, &c., with a number of pensioners and others, who usually settle near a cantonment and would probably remain even if the troops were withdrawn. The position of Ahmadnagar is somewhat isolated notwithstanding that a railway now runs past it. The Government of India therefore consider that a place of refuge should be maintained there.

4. The old fort, though too large to answer perfectly for this purpose, is nevertheless in many ways very suitable. The walls are lofty and in good order; there is a good ditch with masonry counterscarp; the flank defence is efficient, and there is a clear glacis round the place. The fort also contains a number of buildings suitable for accommodating refugees, and a good magazine, as well as numerous recesses in the ramparts, which could be easily converted into expense magazines. The fort is also suitably situated between the city and cantonments.

5. The Fort of Ahmadnagar should therefore be maintained as a place of refuge, and such works as are necessary to place and maintain it in a defensible condition should now be carried out.

6. The armament for the fort should be suited to its function as a place of refuge only, and should consist of a few machine and light field pieces. The following armament is accordingly sanctioned:—

4 12-pounder R.B.L. guns,
2 machine guns.

The smooth-bore ordnance, with their stores at present in the fort, should be removed to the nearest arsenal.

7. The above armament is sanctioned for so long as the cantonment may continue to be occupied by European troops. If these are withdrawn, the scale of armament must be reconsidered.

No. 1018-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

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(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 326. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla,* 19*th October* 1883, *No.* 1019-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1018-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*i*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of the Governor in Council, the following remarks and conculsions of the Government of India regarding the Fort at Belgaum.

2. Belgaum is not an important strategical position, and there is no arsenal there now; and, in accordance with the principle of our military policy, that as large a part as possible of the army should be kept available to take the field, it is not desirable to maintain defences there on a scale to require a considerable body of troops to man them. Nor does it appear necessary to provide against a formal attack by a well-organized and powerful enemy. Viewed in the light of these considerations, the proposals of the Defence Committee, submitted in 1880 and 1881, which were approved by the Government of India, appear to be in excess of the requirements, and the acceptance of these proposals conveyed in this office letter, No. 1164-C. (*Defences—Forts*), dated 4th November 1881, is therefore cancelled.

3. There is, however, a large garrison at Belgaum, which, if required to take the field, would be obliged to leave invalids and non-combatants behind. Belgaum is also the head-quarters of a district, with a considerable number of civil officials, besides the miscellaneous unofficial Europeans and Eurasians always to be found settled near a large cantonment and civil station.

4. The position of Belgaum is too isolated to admit of these being removed to a place of safety. It is therefore necessary to maintain a place of refuge.

5. The fort is well suited for this, though on too large a scale, and it should therefore be maintained in a state of repair, but as a place of refuge only.

6. The following works should be carried out as funds become available:—

(i) Repairs absolutely necessary to the ramparts and ditch.
(ii) Improvements to the flank defence.
(iii) Provision of drawbridges.

7. It is now impossible, except at great cost, to provide a proper glacis; but strict measures should be taken to prevent any further encroachment being made, or cover erected.

8. The armament of the fort should comprise no heavy guns of position, but should consist of field and machine guns. The following armament is accordingly sanctioned:—

4 12-pounder B.L.R. guns,
4 machine guns.

No. 1019-M.-W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 327. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla,* 19*th October* 1883, *No.* 1020-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1019-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*c*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, of 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following remarks regarding the Fort at Neemuch.

2. In 1880, the Defence Committee reported that in their opinion "under the present, or at any rate the probable future, conditions of Neemuch, the retention of the existing fort is unnecessary and inexpedient, and that the defence of the railway station is all that need be arranged for at this place." In this view the Government of India concurred.

3. But a committee of local officers assembled to report on the defence of the railway station showed that this would be very difficult, while the fort was already there, and admirably suited to the requirements of the case. The report of this committee was submitted to the Defence Committee, and this body, with the fuller information before them as to the conditions of the place, decided that the existing fort is the only place at Neemuch capable of being utilised as a place of refuge. They also stated that Neemuch should not be deliberately deserted, and its retention in troublous times would be of importance. They accordingly recommended that the fort be maintained, the bastions to be prepared as emplacements for field guns, and provision made for storage of supplies and for 1,200 rounds of ammunition for field guns, or 200 rounds a gun for six guns; in peace time the fort to be occupied by European railway employés. The views of the committee as to the work required were given in further detail in their No. 228, of 23rd September 1882, forwarded to you with this office letter, No. 948-M.W., dated 5th October 1882.

4. For the armament of this fort the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay, recommends two rifled heavy field guns and two 8″ mortars.

5. The whole case has now been again carefully considered, and I am to state that the Government of India consider that, whether the European garrison is withdrawn or not, a place of refuge ought to be maintained at Neemnch. The walls of the fort are strong and have given practical proof of the security they afford against troops possessing only smooth-bore guns; the water-supply is sufficient, and there is accommodation for a considerable quantity of stores; while, on the other hand, the position at the railway station is defective in many respects for defence. The place of refuge should therefore be the existing fort.

6. The measures suggested by the Defence Committee seem all that are required, and I am to request that they may be now carried into effect.

7. As regards the armament of the fort, the Government of India do not consider that proposed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay, altogether suitable, and they approve of the following:—

2 12-pounder B.L.R. guns,
2 machine guns,

which is accordingly sanctioned.

No. 1020-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 328. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1021-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1020-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*b*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, of 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate the following remarks and the decision of the Government of India regarding the defences for Ajmere and Nusseerabad. These have been considered together, the latter place being only 15 miles from Ajmere, and connected with it by railway.

2. Ajmere occupies a strategical position of some importance, being situated in the middle of Rajputana at a railway junction. It is also of importance as being the head-quarters of the Rajputana State Railway, with important workshops, stores, &c. It is also the seat of the chief civil authority in Rajputana. Ajmere, therefore, is a point which should be made secure against any attempt likely to be made upon it.

3. But Ajmere is far removed from any probable scene of operations against a well-equipped and disciplined enemy; the only troops against whom it would be reasonable at the present time to take precautions in this part of the country are such as would be raised in that neighbourhood, ill-trained and badly equipped, who, at the utmost, could only bring smooth-bore guns against it.

4. Nusseerabad is only 15 miles distant and connected with Ajmere by railway. It becomes a question, under these circumstances, if it be decided that some defensive works are necessary, whether they should be at Ajmere or Nusseerabad, or at both places.

5. If the troops at Nusseerabad were never likely to be withdrawn from the neighbourhood of Ajmere, their presence, with the volunteers at Ajmere itself, might probably be relied on to prevent any rising at Ajmere or attack on the place.

6. But, as is stated in para. 10 of this department letter, No. 887-M.W., of 17th September last, it should always be a principle of our military policy to keep as large a part as possible of the army available to take the field. In accordance with this principle, the arrangements at Ajmere and Nusseerabad should be such as to admit of all or nearly all the troops at Nusseerabad being moved to a distance with a minimum of risk to the persons and property left behind. This involves the construction of defences at one or both places.

7. To provide defences at both places would, no doubt, add to the security of both places, provided the defences could be adequately manned. But this could not be done without interfering with the mobility of the regular troops. It would divide the defenders, and decrease their power of active defence, on which their supplies and eventual safety would largely depend, and it would increase the difficulty of relief. The Government of India therefore consider that there should be but one defensive position for Ajmere and Nusseerabad.

8. The question which then remains for decision, whether this should be at Ajmere or Nusseerabad, admits of little doubt. In time of trouble the workshops, &c., at Ajmere would be of greater value than the buildings at Nusseerabad; the volunteers who would constitute the main defence live at Ajmere; and Ajmere as the seat of the civil administration and the capital town of a British district is by far the more important place. The defensive position will therefore be at Ajmere.

9. The nature and extent of the works have now to be considered.

The objects to be attained are to provide a place of refuge for the civilians and non-combatants of Ajmere and its neighbourhood; to secure the railway workshops, stores, &c., from destruction; and, if possible, to maintain control over the city and environs of Ajmere.

10. A regular siege is not contemplated, but a sudden attack by an undisciplined enemy, against whom it would be necessary to hold out until the arrival of relief.

11. The defenders who can be relied on are about 150 railway volunteers, a few European infantry unfit for active service in the field, and a few civilians, in all perhaps 250 to 300 men.

12. A local committee, assembled under the orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Mhow Division, has recommended a series of detached works, enclosing an area of some six or seven square miles, with the native city in the heart of the enclosed area. These proposals seem beyond the range of practical discussion, and will not be further referred to.

13. The Defence Committee, whose report is enclosed, recommend that the railway workshops and storehouse be selected as the essential position to be defended and as the place of refuge; that the necessary works to give shelter and storage room for supplies be constructed; and that, to aid in the defence, two or three masonry block-houses be erected. They recommend that the masonry works should be carried out at once, and also that a definite project for the earthworks, barricades, &c., to complete the defences, should be prepared and kept ready. Taragarh, they consider, should not be accepted as an element in the defence.

14. These recommendations are approved by the Government of India.

15. The Defence Committee will now be requested to depute their Secretary to consider the subject on the spot, in consultation with the local Military, Public Works and Railway authorities, and then to submit a definite project for the works required, which will be afterwards worked out in detail in the Fortification Branch of the Office of the Inspector-General of Military Works.

16. The Fort of Taragarh should be maintained only as a sanitarium for the British troops at Nusseerabad.

No. 1021-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA, (Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
19*th October* 1883. *Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.*

No. 329. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the President of the Defence Committee; dated Simla,* 19*th October* 1883, *No.* 1022-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

With reference to your letter, No. 177, dated 19th September 1883, I am directed to forward, for information of the Committee, a copy of this department letter, No. 1021-M.W., of this date, addressed to the Government of Bombay regarding the defences of Ajmere.

2. It will be observed that the Government of India have accepted the general proposals of the Defence Committee on this subject.

3. I am now to request that the Secretary to the Defence Committee may be directed to visit Ajmere during the ensuing cold weather to confer with the Officer Commanding at Nusseerabad, the Secretary to the Agent to the Governor-General, Rajputana, and the Manager, Rajputana State Railway, and to study the subject on the spot; and that the Committee will then submit a definite project for the works required, which can afterwards be worked out in detail and estimated in the fortification branch of the office of the Inspector-General of Military Works.

4. I am, in conclusion, to remind the Committee of the absolute necessity of a most careful study of economy in their proposals, as in this way only will it be practicable to set about the construction of the works with reasonable speed, and to ask that the Secretary may be instructed accordingly.

No. 1022-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA, (Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
19*th October* 1883. *Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.*

No. 330. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla,* 19*th October* 1883, *No.* 1023-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1021-M.W., dated the 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*n*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to convey, for the information of the Governor in Council, the following observations and orders relating to the fort at Hyderabad, Sind.

Hyderabad was the former capital of the Ameers of Sind, and has still a certain amount of prestige attaching to it. It is still the chief town of a large

district on the left bank of the Indus; it is a centre of the roads of that part of the country, the head-quarters of a large collectorate, of survey and canal establishments; the district, moreover, of which it is the capital is cut off from the railway by a great unbridged river, and is very inaccessible to troops from other directions. For these reasons Hyderabad will probably always have a garrison of some strength.

But, on the other hand, it could not become a point of strategical importance in great military operations, which would have to be held by a considerable body of troops; its garrison would in such a case either be withdrawn to more important positions elsewhere, or would, if the country round were disturbed, be acting against the local insurgents in the open.

Hyderabad therefore falls into the class of places, where, if any defences are constructed at all, they will take the form of "places of refuge" [see para. 2 (IV) of this department letter No. 887-M.W. of 17th September 1883].

2. In January 1878 it was decided that, as soon as the ordnance stores in the fort had been removed, the fort should be entirely done away with, and no proposal was made to construct any other place of refuge. But on reconsideration the Government of India are of opinion that, in view of the circumstances set forth above, and that there will always be a considerable number of civilians and non-combatants at Hyderabad, whom it might be impossible to remove at once to a place of safety on the occurrence of an outbreak when the troops of the garrison were required to move out into the open country, a place of refuge should be maintained at Hyderabad.

3. The efficiency and value of the fort there as a place of refuge was practically demonstrated in 1857. The condition of the works is such that, though useless against a disciplined enemy provided with artillery, they would be almost impregnable to an enemy without artillery, and they can be maintained in serviceable condition without great expense. The fort also contains sufficient accommodation to shelter a large number of persons, and to contain the necessary stores of all kinds; it appears, therefore, suitable as a place of refuge, notwithstanding its position closely adjoining the town.

4. I am accordingly to say that the Government of India concur in the recommendation of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army, which is understood to be endorsed by the Government of Bombay, to retain the fort as a place of refuge. But they consider that no large expenditure should be incurred upon it and no armament provided for it.

No. 1023-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA, (Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
19*th October* 1883. *Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.*

No. 331. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; datea Simla,* 19*th October* 1883, *No.* 1024-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1023-M.W., dated the 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 7 (*a*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to convey the following remarks regarding the defences at Purandhur for the information of the Governor in Council,

Purandhur is a sanitarium situated about 20 miles from Poona, a station which must always be held in force. The place is not of any special value or importance either from its position or past history, and its garrison of invalids would unquestionably be withdrawn to assist in the protection of the important establishments at Poona in the case of serious emergency. The only defensive work which, therefore, appears to be required is a place of refuge to afford shelter for a short time to the non-combatants who might be surprised in the neighbourhood by a sudden outbreak, until they could be relieved and, if necessary, brought into Poona.

2. The history of this case illustrates the necessity for referring every proposal for erecting inland defences to some distinct principle, such as those which the Government of India endeavoured recently to lay down in this office letter No. 887-M.W., dated the 17th September 1883.

3. In 1873 two proposals were put forward for making the position at Purandhur an important fortress. In one the two forts of Purandhur and Wazirgurh were to be connected by two walls enclosing the ground on which the barracks stand, thus forming a continuous defensive enclosure with a perimeter of about 10,000 yards; the armament required for this large fort was not stated. In the other the Purandhur fort was to be the stronghold of the position, and Wazirgurh was to be partially dismantled. The armament in this case was to consist of 27 pieces of ordnance, including five $\frac{6}{3\frac{1}{2}}$-pounder rifled muzzle-loading guns and six mortars. Where the garrison was to come from for manning these guns, or against what sort of enemy the defence on this scale was contemplated, was not explained.

4. When these proposals were submitted to the Government of India, the scheme for enclosing the barracks by walls connecting Purandhur and Wazirgurh was preferred, and an estimate of the cost was called for. This amounted to Rs. 66,044.

5. The projects were then referred to the Defence Committee, who pointed out the unsuitability of both, and recommended that Wazirgurh should be selected as a keep to the whole position; that it should be repaired and cleared out, and emplacements for three 25-pounder rifled muzzle-loading guns constructed. These recommendations were approved by the Government of Bombay and then accepted by the Government of India.

6. The officers who drew up the annual report on the fort in 1831 took, however, a more practical, and as the Government of India now think a more sound, view of the real conditions of the case, and they recommended that no expenditure should be incurred on the defences, but that the stones of the existing forts should be gradually used up for building purposes in the station. The case was also ably reviewed subsequently by the Quartermaster-General, Bombay Army, in his report on the plans and estimates for carrying out the proposals of the Defence Committee, in which much the same views were expressed as in the annual report; but instead of the eventual entire demolition of the existing defences, it was recommended that a few minor improvements and repairs, in accordance with certain proposals of the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army, which accompanied the Quartermaster-General's report, should be effected with a view to rendering the place easily defensible for a time by a very small garrison. These views and recommendations were accepted by the Government of India.

7. The case has now been again reconsidered by the Government of India, and I am to say that the opinions expressed in the report of the Quartermaster-General, Bombay Army, No. 14-8—3378, dated the 12th October 1881, and the proposals of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay, which accompanied that report, have still the entire approval of the Government of India. The Governor-General in Council would wish that the work proposed should therefore now be carried out, if it has not already been done, and the defences maintained in a fair state of repair, so that they may be fit to serve as a place of refuge, but that no armament may be mounted on them.

No. 1024-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

No. 332. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1025-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1024-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6(*h*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, of 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following remarks regarding the fort at Satara.

2. The position of Satara is important from a strategical point of view, commanding the only main line of communication in that part of the country. Satara is also important politically, for both the town and the neighbourhood contain the potential elements of disorder. The Army Organization Commission of 1879 recommended a normal and compulsory garrison of two companies of European infantry and one regiment of Native infantry for the place, which the Government of India consider should certainly always be held by European troops. They believe that the Government of Bombay will concur with them in this view.

3. The position is isolated, being 69 miles from Poona and 120 from Belgaum, and separated from these places by rivers and passes which could easily be held for a time by insurgents in time of disturbance. It appears therefore essential that the small European force which would have to suffice to control the Native city, keep in check the inhabitants of the surrounding districts, and protect the civil and non-combatant Europeans and loyal Natives should have some strong defensive position which could be held for a considerable time.

4. The fort of Satara appears to fulfil many of the conditions for this purpose. The natural defences are very strong, and can at small cost be rendered almost impregnable; the water-supply is sufficient, and could be improved so as to meet all requirements; the works command the Poona-Belgaum road, and dominate the town. These circumstances, and the consideration in which the fort is held by the Mahrattas, point to the strong desirability of making this fort the defensive position and place of refuge for Satara, notwithstanding a deficiency of accommodation for refugees and stores, and that it is commanded, though at a distance of 3,000 yards, by a spur of the Yavateshwar range; and the Government of India therefore on full reconsideration of the case adhere to the previous decisions that this fort shall be put into a state of defence and maintained in a fair state of repair.

5. I am to suggest that early measures may be taken to this end; also that all buildings within the fort which can be made suitable for habitation or the reception of stores may now be at once taken over and saved from further deterioration.

6. The fort has recently been placed under military charge, but the Government of India have no information as to the strength of the guards stationed in it. The city lies much nearer the fort than the cantonment, and is hidden from both the cantonment and civil station by a spur of the fort hill. Under these circumstances, it seems questionable whether the fort should be left in charge of a Native guard only; and I am to suggest, for the consideration of the Government of Bombay, whether, as there is good and suitable accommodation for Europeans within

the fort, a small detachment of European infantry, to be frequently relieved, might not with propriety be kept in it.

7. When this point is settled, the question of armament can be dealt with. It appears probable that some small armament of guns will be necessary, as the fort will not be a mere place of refuge to afford protection to civilians and non-combatants for a few days till they can be relieved, but will be permanently held by a small body of regular troops; and I am to invite the suggestions of the Government of Bombay on this subject, as to which the Government of India would observe that the armament should not be such as to invest the place with a fictitious importance, and make its capture a special object of attraction. No artillery men will probably be available to man the armament, and therefore rifled guns, which cannot be worked by untrained men, would not be suitable; the garrison will be small, and will be generally more useful with the rifle than with guns; costly emplacements and magazines are out of the question, and the magazine already existing, improved and sub-divided if necessary, may be taken to be the only accommodation of this kind likely to be available. Mortars are generally unsuitable for the defence of forts of this description, but in the present case a few might prove useful in overawing the city, but generally machine guns appear the most suitable for these weakly garrisoned places.

No. 1025-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 333. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No. 1026-M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of Military Department letter, No. 1025-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6, clause (*k*), of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following remarks and conclusions in respect to the fort at Sholapur.

2. In this office letter, No. 798, dated 27th November 1877, the Government of India decided to keep this fort in fair repair. The reasons which led to this decision were that Sholapur and Bellary are the only strong places on the long line from Poona to Madras; that Sholapur has some value in reference to the Nizam's dominions; and that, though only garrisoned by Native infantry, troops and guns could be easily pushed up from Poona.

3. In 1881, however, the Government of Bombay, in submitting * the annual reports on the forts in the Bombay presidency, recommended that the fort at Sholapur be dismantled, and that any funds available be spent on a more compact fort near the railway. This recommendation was based on the grounds—

* No. 2668, dated the 19th May 1881.

(i) that the existing fort is too close to the town;
(ii) that it is at a considerable distance from the railway;
(iii) that it is commanded by higher ground;
(iv) that it is too large;
(v) that its masonry is bad; and
(vi) that the towers on which the guns are to be placed require reconstruction.

It had further been decided that it was unnecessary to station any troops, European or Native, at Sholapur in future.

The reports, with the recommendation of the Bombay Government, were submitted to the Defence Committee, who concurred in the opinion of the Government of Bombay; and the Government of India accordingly sanctioned * the demolition of the fort.

* Military Department No. 1175-C., dated 11th November 1881.

4. The Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, however, on reconsideration now recommends that the fort be maintained till some work has been erected to protect the railway station, and to serve as a place of refuge for the civil residents of the country.

5. The Government of India, however, after full consideration are of opinion that the last decision arrived at in 1881, viz., that it was not desirable to retain this fort any longer—a decision concurred in by the Government of Bombay, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, the Defence Committee, and His Excellency the Governor-General in Council—should be adhered to. No troops are likely to be again stationed at Sholapur, so that in case of an *émêute* the civil residents would have to rely on themselves alone for safety till they could be relieved and removed to a place of safety. The fort in the absence of any troops to assist in its defence is unsuitable for a place of refuge, both on account of its position and also of its size, which is too great to admit of its being properly guarded by the few men who would take refuge there.

6. I am to request, therefore, that the fort may now be made over to the civil authorities, after such measures have been carried out as may be deemed necessary to render the fort incapable of being quickly made defensible against us. The fort having been thus dismantled, no further expenditure from military funds should henceforward be incurred for repair or other work connected with it.

No. 1026-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 334. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No. 1027-M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1026-M.W., dated the 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 6 (*a*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, and para. 1 of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1572, dated the 28th March 1883, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following observations regarding Ahmedabad.

2. It has been decided† that a first-class ordnance depôt shall be maintained at Ahmedabad, and a scheme for constructing a fortified enclosure to contain the necessary buildings and which would also serve as a place of refuge was approved ‡ in 1880 and is now in course of execution. There can be no question that these works, when completed, shall be maintained.

† Government of India, Military Department, No. 583, dated the 14th November 1876.

‡ Government of India, Public Works Department, No. 612-M.W., dated the 1st October 1880, addressed to the Government of Bombay, Public Works Department.

No. 338. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1031-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1030-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 7 (*c*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to state, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, that the Government of India concur in the opinion that the fort of Sion, being of no importance, and being far off from Bombay, and too small to serve as a place of refuge, should not be retained as a fort. It may be transferred to the civil authorities, if no longer required for any military purpose, after being so far dismantled that it could not be occupied by any hostile force.

No. 1031-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of the Governor in Council.

* * * * *

(By Order.)

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 339. ORDER THEREON, 15th November 1883, No. 6187.

Communicated for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the Inspector-General of Ordnance, in continuation of Proceedings of Government, No. 5396, dated 5th October 1883.

(True Extract.)

(Signed) E. L. HANKIN, Colonel,
Secretary to Government.

To the Quarter Master General.
" Inspector-General of Ordnance.
" Public Works Department.
" Political Department.
" Adjutant-General, for information.

Exd. P. L. Pereira.

3. All requirements as regards defences at Ahmedabad will thus be met, and the old fort or Guicowar's Haveli, will no longer be required for any military purpose. From its position, and also being without any armament, it could not be a source of danger either to the new fortified position or to cantonments, while ts removal would cost a considerable sum. The Government of India have therefore no objection to the Guicowar's Haveli being handed over to the civil authorities as it stands, to be used either as a jail or for any other purpose to which it may be adapted.

No. 1027-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council.

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(By Order.)

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

No. 335. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1028-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1027-M.W., dated the 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 7(*e*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to communicate, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following remarks and conclusions regarding Surat Castle.

2. The castle has been in civil charge since 1862, and contains the civil records and treasury; the service ammunition of the Native infantry regiment is also kept in it. But the works are not maintained in good repair, the gates especially being defective, and the whole is protected only by a guard consisting of one havildar and ten rank and file.

3. The known turbulence of the inhabitants of Surat, which so recently as 1879 showed itself in serious riots and necessitated the occupation of the castle in considerable force by Native troops, the important bridge, and the large body of British subjects and Europeans in the neighbourhood, render it desirable that there should be some place of refuge at Surat; and the castle, from its position and strength, as well also from its historic associations, seems well adapted for this purpose.

4. I am to say, therefore, that the Government of India are of opinion that the castle of Surat should be maintained in a fair state of repair, and that the military guard should be of sufficient strength to prevent any chance of success to a sudden attack.

5. As a consequence of this conclusion, the actual defences must be considered to be in military charge, the military authorities being responsible that any defects and disrepair of the works is duly brought to notice. The rest of the castle may remain, as at present, in civil charge.

6. The castle being merely kept up as a place of refuge seems not to need any armament.

No. 1028-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council.

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(By Order.)

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

No. 336. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1029-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1028-M.W., dated 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 7(*d*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to state, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, that the Government of India concur in the opinion that the fort at Bhuj must be retained according to treaty with the Rao of Cutch. Expenditure on it should, however, be limited to that absolutely necessary to keep the place from decay, and no armament should be placed in the fort.

No. 1029-M. W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council.

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(By Order.)

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

No. 337. *From Colonel G. CHESNEY, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department; dated Simla, 19th October* 1883, *No.* 1030-*M.W.*

Defences—Forts.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1029-M.W., dated the 19th October 1883, and with reference to para. 7(*b*) of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1828, dated the 3rd April 1882, I am directed to state, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, that the Government of India approve of the fort at Siwri, near Bombay, continuing to be used as a powder magazine. It should, however, be no longer classed as a fort or place of refuge.

No. 1030-M.W.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council.

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(By Order.)

(Signed) J. E. BROADBENT,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

SIMLA,
19*th October* 1883.

Govt. of {1883} 3

MILITARY.

To

THE QUARTER MASTER GENERAL,
&c., &c., &c.

of

No: 3377—W of 26th Nov/83

Communicated to
Superintending Engineers
in continuation of G.O. 2912 W
of 15th October 1883

Sof b. B.
N. S.

Dated November, 15th.

Issued

Recd. *Encl.*

G.O., 15th November 1883, No. 6187.

No: 3377 W of 26th Nov/83

NOVEMBER.
Nos. 324—339.

Defences—Forts.

Correspondence containing the views of the Government of India as to the future maintenance of the several defensive works in the Bombay presidency, communicated to departments concerned.

S. Es.

With Order