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MADRAS RECORD OFFICE

GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS

Financial DEPARTMENT

G.O. No. ~~B.P. No.~~ 597 Press ~~Mis.~~

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29TH JUNE 18 , 597, FINANCIAL.

GOVERNM OF MADRAS.

FINANCIAL DEPARTMENT.

READ—the following papers:—

From A. MACKENZIE, Esq., C.S., Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department (Public), to the Chief Secretary to Government, dated Simla, 31st May 1882, No. 930.

I am directed to acknowledge receipt of your letter to the Financial Department, No. 217, dated the 9th February last, submitting, with an expression of the concurrence of His Excellency the Governor in Council, a copy of the Proceedings of the Madras Board of Revenue of the 1st idem, in which the suggestions of the Government of India for the further extension of local self-government, as embodied in the letter from the Financial Department, No. 3375, dated the 10th October last, are discussed at length.

2. Both the Board of Revenue and the Madras Government point with legitimate satisfaction to the fact that throughout the Southern Presidency Municipal and Local Agency is already very extensively employed in connection with many branches of public business, and it is stated that His Excellency the Governor in Council does not see his way to adding to the list of these services.

3. The Governor-General in Council is glad to admit that, as regards the transfer of Provincial Services to Local Funds, more has perhaps been done in Madras than in any other part of India. But it by no means follows that real local self-government has as yet received any sufficient or adequate development. It is no doubt the case that the formal control and management of the Local Funds is, under the Act of 1871, entrusted to Committees composed, to some extent, of non-official members. But His Excellency in Council observes that while great stress is laid in your letter under reply, and also in the Board's Resolution, upon the amount and variety of the charges that are debited to Local Funds, but little is said with reference to the actual working and powers of the local Committees. It is, in fact, to be gathered from the Board's remarks that although the only direct official check exercised over the Committees is that involved in the presiding control of the Collectors and Divisional Officers, the Local Boards are regarded as institutions "still in their infancy," and requiring a considerable amount of official "restraint." In the matter of public works it is indeed admitted that a material addition might with advantage be made to their powers by which a vast amount of reference to the Board of Revenue would be saved. It may fairly be inferred from these statements that the administrative powers of the Local Boards have hitherto been extremely limited in character, and that they have not as yet been properly utilised as a means of training the people in the independent management of their own local affairs.

4. The views of the Government of India upon this subject have now been fully explained in the Resolution of this Department, No. 17—747-59, dated 18th May, and I am to express the earnest hope of the Governor-General in Council, that the Madras Government will reconsider the question in the light of the instructions therein conveyed. Generally speaking, it would seem that in Madras the official element on the Boards unduly preponderates, and that the local area of their jurisdictions is inordinately large. The Governor-General in Council does not consider that the

objections taken by the Board of Reve[illegible] paragraph 5 of their Resolution to the appointment of Sub-Committees [illegible] inconclusive. There would seem to be no reason why the Local Funds Circles [illegible] should be so large as to make it practically impossible for the non-official [illegible]ers of the Committees to be of any real use, or why under a system of smaller circle[illegible] work should not be done. Although the Madras districts are not so completely [illegible]divided for administrative purposes as those of some other Provinces, yet there [illegible]-Collectorates, and taluks in charge of passed Assistants, in many districts whi[illegible] [illegible]ht probably be made into Local Fund [illegible] without difficulty.

5. In paragraph 2 of your letter it is a[illegible]med that the Government of India are prepared to relieve the Municipalities of Po[illegible] contributions without any equivalent transfer of charge from provincial to local management. This is not the case. But I am to point out that under the head of Edu[illegible]ation there are still many items which might, in the opinion of the Government of India, be usefully transferred to local management. There is no apparent reason why the rest of the Government Primary Schools, and the control of Government Middle and High Schools, should not be handed over to properly-constituted Local Boards, as is now being done in other Provinces. The Madras grant-in-aid system seems pe[illegible] adapted to the successful working of such arrangements. It would not probably be either possible or desirable to transfer to local control such institutions as colle[illegible], attached collegiate schools, schools for Europeans and Eurasians, normal schools, [illegible]hed model schools, medical schools, surveying schools or other schools of techni[illegible] [illegible]ruction. But with these exceptions, the Governor-General in Council can see [illegible] reason for limiting the transference of educational institutions to the management [illegible] the Local Boards. The Department of Public Instruction would still maintain it[illegible] [illegible]ral control over the system of instruction. The Government rules for grants-in-[illegible] would still hold good. The local officers of the departments would work, accordin[illegible] [illegible] their rank, either as the advisers or as the agents of the Boards. In this way [illegible] would be no violent change of system, while local effort would be elicited, and the [illegible]ations of educational department and the local bodies be drawn closer together to [illegible] mutual advantage. Arrangements would have to be made regarding the appointment of teachers in the higher schools, in order to secure the selection of su[illegible] men; and many other points of detail would have to be considered and arranged; [illegible] there appears to be no insuperable difficulty in so settling matters as to meet the requirements of the Government system, while stimulating the interest of these lo[illegible] bodies in the cause of popular education.

6. I am also to invite the part[illegible] attenti[illegible] of the Madras Government to paragraph 21 of the Resolution of th[illegible] [illegible]artment [illegible] the 18th May, and to point out that it is an essential part of the Governm[illegible]t of Ind[illegible] scheme that the Local Committees should, as far as possible, be entrust[illegible] [illegible] the control of receipts and revenues as well as of expenditure.

7. The legislation necessary to [illegible] effe[illegible] to the arrangements suggested by the Government of India may most advant[illegible] [illegible] undertaken in the local Council.

Extract from the Proceedings of the G[illegible]vernme[illegible] of India in the Home Department, (Public), dated Simla, [illegible] May 1882, No. 17—747-59.

Read—the undermentioned papers:—

Home Department Circular No. [illegible]—70 to 76, dated 10th May 1881, calling for a report on the working of the elective system in Municipalities.

Replies to the above Circular:—

Letter from the Government of Madras, No. 14[illegible]4, dated 3rd August 1881.
" " " of Bombay, " [illegible], " 20th October 1881.
" " " of Bengal, " 608, " 12th July 1881.
" " " of North-Western Provinces and Oudh, No. 630, dated 7th September 1881.
" " " of North-W[illegible]stern Provinces and Oudh, No. 700, dated 24th September 1881.

Letter from the Government of Punjab, No. 300, dated 5th September 1881.
" " Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces, No. 2895-100, dated 6th August 1881.
" " Secretary for Berar to Resident at Hyderabad, No. 236, dated 21st June 1881.
Resolution of the Department of Finance, No. 3353, dated 30th September 1881.
Financial Department letter, No. 3513, dated 10th October 1881, to the Government of Bengal.
" " " " 3514, dated — October 1881, to the Government of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh.
" " " " 3515, dated 10th October 1881, to the Government of Madras.
" " " " 3516, dated 10th October 1881, to the Government of Bombay.
" " " " 3517, dated 10th October 1881, to the Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces.
" " " " 3518, dated 10th October 1881, to the Chief Commissioner of British Burma.
" " " " 3519, dated 10th October 1881, to the Chief Commissioner of Assam.
" " " " 3589, dated 13th October 1881, to the Government of the Punjab.

Resolution—

The Governor-General in Council in the Resolution of the Financial Department, dated the 30th September 1881, set out, for the information of the Local Governments, the principles upon which it was proposed to revise the agreements then in force for the administration of the Provincial Services, and to establish the decentralised system of finance on a uniform and extended basis. It was explained that intimately connected with this general scheme for the decentralisation of finance was the very important question of developing local self-government. Considerable progress in this direction had, it was admitted, been made since 1870. A large income from local rates and cesses had been secured, and in some Provinces the management of this income had been freely entrusted to local bodies. Municipalities had also increased in number and usefulness. But there was still, it was remarked, a greater inequality of progress in different parts of the country than varying local circumstances seemed to warrant. In many places services admirably adapted for local management were reserved in the hands of the central administration, while everywhere heavy charges were levied on Municipalities in connection with the Police, over which they had necessarily no executive control.

Paragraph 11 of the Resolution went on to say—

> "His Excellency the Governor-General in Council is therefore of opinion that the time has now arrived when further practical development may be afforded to the intentions of Lord Mayo's Government, and that the Provincial agreements should no longer exclude from all consideration the mass of taxation under Local and Municipal management, together with the similar resources still retained in Provincial control, and ignore the question of local self-government. The Provincial Governments, while being now largely endowed from Imperial sources, may well, in their turn, hand over to local self-government considerable revenues, at present kept in their own hands, but similar in kind to many which have long been 'locally' managed with success by Committees, partly composed of non-official members, and subject only to a general remedial control reserved to the State by the Legislature. At the same time, such item should be generally made local as the people are most likely to be able to understand the u[illegible] of and to administer well. His Excellency would therefore invite the Local Governments to undertake a careful scrutiny of Provincial, Local, and Municipal accounts with the view of ascertaining (1) what items of receipts and charge can be transferred from 'Provincial' to 'Local' heads, for administration by Committees comprising non-official and, wherever possible, elected members, and what items already 'Local' but not so administered, might suitably be so; (2) what redistribution of items is desirable, in order to lay on Local and Municipal bodies those which are best understood and appreciated by the people; (3) what measures, legislative or otherwise, are necessary to ensure more local self-government. Incidentally to the scrutiny they will probably notice, and might carefully consider, (4) ways of equalising Local and Municipal taxation throughout the Empire, checking severe or unsuitable imposts, and favoring forms most in accordance with popular opinion or sentiment. The Government of India have already made

some preliminary inquiries in the same direction, the results of which will shortly be communicated to the several Local Governments for consideration in conjunction with their own."

2. Accordingly on the 10th October 1881 letters were addressed to the various Local Governments indicating those branches of expenditure which appeared to the Government of India most suited for local control, and inviting each Government to examine any other heads of account which might seem to cover items capable of transfer to such control. It was pointed out that it was not the intention of the Government of India that the proposed transfer of the control of expenditure of a specially local character to local bodies should involve any addition to existing local burdens; and it was therefore shown to be necessary to arrange for the simultaneous transfer of receipts sufficient to meet any net balance of additional expenditure which in any instance might arise. The receipts to be thus transferred should, it was suggested, be such as to afford a prospect that, by careful administration, with all the advantages due to local sympathy, experience and watchfulness, they would be susceptible of reasonable increase. In cases where larger assignments of funds were required, the receipts from pounds, or a share of the assessed taxes collected within the jurisdiction of a local body, were indicated as suitable sources of revenue to be made over. But on this, as on other points, a wide discretion was left to the Local Governments.

3. As regards the character of the local bodies to whom these powers of control and administration were to be entrusted, it was remarked that already in most parts of British India there were in existence Municipal Committees, whose powers might in many cases be advantageously extended, and District Committees for various purposes, which might very well be consolidated into single homogeneous working bodies, with ancillary subordinate Committees for each tahsil or sub-division of the district. It was suggested that the Magistrate and Collector should be President of the District Committee, and the Assistant or Deputy Magistrate in charge of the sub-division, President of the Subordinate Committees; but in each case the local bodies should, it was said, comprise persons not in the service of Government, and elected or nominated, as might seem best, in a proportion of not less than from one-half to two-thirds of the whole number of members. For the satisfactory development of this plan, it was admitted that legislation would probably be necessary in most Provinces, and the Local Governments were invited in their replies to explain the general outlines which such legislation should follow. In regard to this it was said—

> "Special attention will be required in settling the relations between the various local bodies and the officers of the general Administration, and in providing for a certain measure of control and inspection on the part of Government. It would be hopeless to expect any real development of self-government, if the local bodies were subject to check and interference in matters of detail; and the respective powers of Government and of the various local bodies should be clearly and distinctly defined by statute, so that there may be as little risk of friction and misunderstanding as possible. Within the limits to be laid down in each case, however, the Governor-General in Council is anxious that the fullest possible liberty of action should be given to local bodies."

4. The policy thus enunciated by the Government of India has, on the whole, been loyally, and in some cases cordially, accepted by the Local Governments, several of which have already drawn up schemes for giving effect to it, and have submitted these for the information of the Government of India. The Governor-General in Council desires to acknowledge the care and thought with which some of these schemes have been worked out. Upon each the Government of India will communicate hereafter its views in detail to the Local Government concerned. Mean time, however, it will be convenient that the Governor-General in Council should explain somewhat more fully than he has hitherto done the general mode in which he would wish to see effect given to the principle of local self-government throughout British India outside the Presidency towns. This is the more necessary, as further consideration of the subject and examination of the schemes prepared for the different Provinces have suggested the propriety of certain modifications of the plan sketched out in the Circular letters of the 10th October last.

5. At the outset, the Governor-General in Council must explain that, in advocating the extension of local self-government, and the adoption of this principle in the management of many branches of local affairs, he does not suppose that the work will be in the first instance better done than if it remained in the sole hands of the Government district officers. It is not, primarily, with a view to improvement in administration that this measure is put forward and supported. It is chiefly desirable as an instrument of political and popular education. His Excellency in Council has himself no doubt that, in course of time, as local knowledge and local interest are brought to bear more freely upon local administration, improved efficiency will in fact follow. But at starting there will doubtless be many failures, calculated to discourage exaggerated hopes, and even in some cases to cast apparent discredit upon the practice of self-government itself. If, however, the officers of Government only set themselves, as the Governor-General in Council believes they will, to foster sedulously the small beginnings of independent political life; if they accept loyally and as their own the policy of the Government; and if they come to realise that the system really opens to them a fairer field for the exercise of administrative tact and directive energy than the more autocratic system which it supersedes, then it may be hoped that the period of failures will be short, and that real and substantial progress will very soon become manifest.

6. It is not uncommonly asserted that the people of this country are themselves entirely indifferent to the principle of self-government; that they take but little interest in public matters; and that they prefer to have such affairs managed for them by Government officers. The Governor-General in Council does not attach much value to this theory. It represents no doubt the point of view which commends itself to many active and well-intentioned district officers; and the people of India are, there can be equally no doubt, remarkably tolerant of existing facts. But as education advances, there is rapidly growing up all over the country an intelligent class of public-spirited men, whom it is not only bad policy, but sheer waste of power, to fail to utilise. The task of administration is yearly becoming more onerous as the country progresses in civilisation and material prosperity. The annual reports of every Government tell of an ever-increasing burden laid upon the shoulders of the local officers. The cry is everywhere for increased establishments. The universal complaint in all departments is that of overwork. Under these circumstances it becomes imperatively necessary to look around for some means of relief; and the Governor-General in Council has no hesitation in stating his conviction, that the only reasonable plan open to the Government is to induce the people themselves to undertake, as far as may be, the management of their own affairs; and to develop, or create if need be, a capacity for self-help in respect of all matters that have not, for imperial reasons, to be retained in the hands of the representatives of Government.

7. If it be said that the experiments hitherto made in this direction have not been encouraging, the Governor-General in Council must avow his belief that the principle has not as yet been, in any general or satisfactory fashion, fully and fairly tried. There is reason to fear that previous attempts at local self-government have been too often overridden and practically crushed by direct, though well-meant, official interference. In the few cases where real responsibility has been thrown upon local bodies and real power entrusted to them, the results have been very gratifying. There is even now a vast amount of assistance rendered to the administration by Honorary Magistrates, members of Municipal Corporations and other Committees; and there is no antecedent improbability in the theory that if non-official auxiliary agency were more thoroughly organised and more fully trusted, there would be a speedy and marked improvement, not only in its amount, but in its efficiency.

8. Holding, therefore, that it is the duty and interest of the ruling power to take care that the further advance which it is now proposed to make in the direction of local self-government shall be, though cautious, yet at the same time real and substantial, the Governor-General in Council will proceed to indicate, for the guidance of the Provincial Administrations, the general principles upon which, in the judgment of the Government of India, these measures should be shaped. The subject may for the purposes of this Resolution be divided into two parts—the first, relating to the mode in which Local Boards, whether Municipal or District, should generally be constituted; and the second, to the degree of control which the Government should retain over such bodies, and the manner in which that control should be exercised.

9. In regard to the first of these points, the Governor-General in Council would observe that he is quite aware of the absurdity of attempting to lay down any hard-and-fast rules which shall be of universal application in a country so vast, and in its local circumstances so varied, as British India. It would be unreasonable to expect that any uniform system of local government could be applied with equal success in Provinces differing as the Punjab, for instance, differs from Madras, or Bengal from Burma. A large latitude of application must, therefore, in every case be left to the local authorities. Indeed, we are really as yet so much in the infancy of self-government, and have perhaps so little knowledge of the directions in which it would naturally develop itself among the people, that there is a distinct advantage in having different schemes tried in different places, in order to test by practical experience what arrangements are best suited to the ways of thinking, habits, and other idiosyncrasies of the heterogeneous populations of the Empire. But there are, nevertheless, fundamental principles which, after every allowance has been made for local peculiarities, must be universally followed and frankly adopted, if the system is to have anywhere a fair trial.

10. The Government of India desires, then, that, while maintaining and extending, as far as practicable, the plan of Municipal government in the cities and towns of each Province, the Local Governments will also maintain and extend throughout the country, in every district where intelligent non-official agency can be found, a net-work of Local Boards, to be charged with definite duties and entrusted with definite funds. The Governor-General in Council considers it very important that the area of jurisdiction allotted to each Board should in no case be too large. If the plan is to succeed at all, it will be necessary to secure among the members both local interest and knowledge. Experience proves that District Committees are, as a rule, very badly attended by members not actually residing in the vicinity of the head-quarters' station. Those who do attend have frequently no intimate acquaintance with the wants of outlying parts of the district. The consequence is, either that undue attention is given to the requirements of the immediate neighbourhood of the central station, or that the business falls entirely into the hands of the district officer, the Committee contenting itself with formally endorsing his proposals. Modifying, therefore, to some extent the suggestions made in paragraph 8 of the Circular letter of the 10th October last, the Governor-General in Council desires that the smallest administrative unit—the sub-division, the taluka, or the tahsil—shall ordinarily form the maximum area to be placed under a Local Board. He would not indeed object to even smaller jurisdictions where these were deemed suitable. In some Provinces it may be found possible to leave these Sub-divisional Boards to their own independent working, arranging for a periodical District Council, to which delegates from each Local Board might be sent, to settle such common matters as the rate of land-cess to be levied during the year, the allotment to be made of district funds, and other questions of general interest. In other Provinces, again, it may be thought best to have a District Board with controlling power over the smaller Local Boards. But whatever system is followed, the cardinal principle, which is essential to the success of self-government in any shape, is this, that the jurisdiction of the primary Boards must be so limited in area as to ensure both local knowledge and local interest on the part of each of the members.

11. The Municipal Committees will, of course, remain the local boards for areas included within town limits. The relations between such Municipal boards and the sub-divisional or district boards within whose jurisdiction the towns lie must be carefully settled in each case. In some instances the town boards will be left entirely independent and apart. In others it may be found desirable to give the rural boards a certain share in the settlement of questions of common interest. In others, again, the town boards would be required to send delegates to the District Board or Council.

12. The local boards, both urban and rural, must everywhere have a large preponderance of non-official members. In no case ought the official members to be more than one-third of the whole, unless in places in which the elective system is followed, when there would be no ground for objecting to an elected member merely on the ground that he was in the service of Government. The Governor-General in Council is disposed to think that the non-official members of the boards should hold office for at least two years after election or appointment; but probably the best plan to follow would be that of the compulsory retirement by rotation of a fixed proportion of members, those retiring being eligible to sit again. A detail of this description may, however, fitly be left to the Local Governments.

13. Members of boards should be chosen by election wherever it may, in the opinion of the Local Governments, be practicable to adopt the system of choice. The Governor-General in Council does not require the adoption of the system of election in all cases, though that is the system which he hopes will ultimately prevail throughout the country, and which he wishes to establish now as widely as local circumstances will permit. Election in some form or other should be generally introduced in towns of any considerable size, but may be extended more cautiously and gradually to the smaller Municipalities and to backward rural tracts. Even as regards these last, however, the Governor-General in Council is disposed to think that if the Government officers cordially accept the principle, and set themselves to make it successful, a great advance might be made with comparatively little difficulty. Thus when the Local Governments had determined the nature of the qualifications suited to such a district (and these might ordinarily at first be fairly high), each sub-divisional officer might be instructed to prepare a list or register of candidates qualified to sit upon the local board, and might invite all those residing in any particular area, such as a police (thana) jurisdiction, to meet him on a day fixed at some convenient spot near their homes. He might then explain to them the objects of Government, and the nature of the duties they were invited to undertake, and call upon them to elect then or on a future day the number of representatives that had been fixed for the area in question. In the course of a few years, when the members of the board find that they have real powers and responsibilities entrusted to them, any Government interference will become unnecessary. The electors may safely then be left to conduct their own elections under such rules as may be from time to time laid down.

14. As to the system of election to be followed, the Governor-General in Council would here also leave a large discretion to the Local Governments. Experience is wanting to determine the most suitable general system for each province; and it is desirable that a variety of plans should be tried in order to a future comparison of results. The simple vote, the cumulative vote, election by wards, election by the whole town or tract, suffrage of more or less extended qualification, election by castes or occupations—these and other methods might all be tried. New methods, unthought of in Europe, may be found suitable to India; and after a time it will probably be possible to say what forms suit best the local peculiarities and needs of the different populations. The Provincial Governments should, through their district officers, consult the leading Natives of each locality, not only as to the possibility of introducing the elective system, but as to the arrangements most likely to meet the local circumstances; and should use every effort to make the schemes adopted as consonant as possible to the feelings and habits of the people.

15. Doubtless the first consequence of this mode of proceeding will be that the electoral system, viewed as a whole, will present for a time a very diversified appearance, and in some places arrangements made will turn out badly and call for change; but the Governor-General in Council is not disposed to attach undue importance to this. The problem before the Government is one of no slight difficulty; being that of discovering in what manner the people of the towns and districts of British India can be best trained to manage their own local affairs intelligently and successfully. The attempts hitherto made with this object have met with but little success. The best men in many cases do not at present present themselves as candidates for Municipal office. The number of voters is generally insignificant compared with the number on the registers. And yet there can be no doubt that among the more intelligent classes of the community there is a real and growing interest being taken in administrative matters. It may be suspected, therefore, that the cause of comparative failure in the efforts hitherto made is to be found rather in the character of those efforts than in the nature of the object pursued. They have been, it seems to the Governor-General in Council, wanting to a great degree in earnestness and in real endeavours to

adapt the system adopted to the feelings of the people by whom it has to be worked. If this is so, the remedy must lie in ascertaining by patient and practical experiment how best to call forth and render effective that desire and capacity for self-government which all intelligent and fairly educated men may safely be assumed to possess.

16. With a view to stimulating the candidature of men of respectable standing in Native society, and to mark the importance of the functions of these local boards in the eyes of Government, the Governor-General in Council is pleased to direct that the courtesy titles of "Rai (or Rao) Bahadur" or "Khan Bahadur" shall in all official correspondence be applicable to Native members of all local boards during their term of office.

17. Turning now to the second division of the subject—the degree of control to be retained by the Government over the local boards, and the manner in which that control should be exercised, the Governor-General in Council observes that the true principle to be followed in this matter is that the control should be exercised from without rather than from within. The Government should revise and check the acts of the local bodies, but not dictate them. The executive authorities should have two powers of control. In the first place, their sanction should be required in order to give validity to certain acts, such as the raising of loans, the imposition of taxes in other than duly authorized forms, the alienation of Municipal property, interference with any matters involving religious questions or affecting the public peace, and the like. (The cases in which such sanction should be insisted upon would have to be carefully considered by each Government, and they would at the outset be probably somewhat numerous, but, as the boards gained in experience, might be reduced in number.) In the second place, the Local Government should have power to interfere either to set aside altogether the proceedings of the board in particular cases, or, in the event of gross and continued neglect of any important duty, to suspend the board temporarily, by the appointment of persons to execute the office of the board until the neglected duty had been satisfactorily performed. That being done, the regular system would be re-established, a fresh board being elected or appointed. This power of absolute supersession would require in every case the consent of the Supreme Government. A similar power is reserved to the Executive Government under several English statutes; and if required in England, where local self-government is long established and effective, it is not probable that it could be altogether dispensed with in India. It should be the general function of the executive officers of Government to watch, especially at the outset, the proceedings of the local boards; to point out to them matters calling for their consideration; to draw their attention to any neglect of duty on their part; and to check by official remonstrance any attempt to exceed their proper functions, or to act illegally or in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.

18. It does not appear necessary, for the exercise of these powers, that the chief executive officers of towns, sub-divisions or districts should be Chairmen or even members of the local boards. There is indeed much reason to believe that it would be more convenient that they should supervise and control the acts of those bodies, without taking actual part in their proceedings. The Governor-General in Council is aware that many high authorities hold that the district officer should always be *ex-officio* Chairman of all the local boards within the district, and should directly guide and regulate their proceedings. This was indeed the view taken by the Government of India itself in the Circular letters of the 10th October last, so far as the constitution of district boards was concerned. But even then the Governor-General in Council did not see his way to accepting the principle in the case of Municipal boards; and further consideration has led him to the belief that, on the whole, it is better to lay down no such general rule in the case of any class of local boards. There appears to him to be great force in the argument that so long as the chief executive officers are, as a matter of course, Chairmen of the Municipal and District Committees, there is little chance of these Committees affording any effective training to their members in the management of local affairs, or of the non-official members taking any real interest in local business. The non-official members must be led to feel that real power is placed in their hands, and that they have real responsibilities to discharge.

It is doubtful whether they have, under present arrangements, any sufficient inducement to give up their time and attention to the transaction of public business. There is this further objection to the district officer acting as Chairman, that if the non-official members are independent and energetic, risk may arise of unseemly collision between the Chairman and the board. The former would be in a far more dignified and influential position if he supervised and controlled the proceedings of the Board from outside, acting as arbiter between all parties, and not as leader of any.

19. The Governor-General in Council therefore would wish to see non-official persons acting, wherever practicable, as Chairmen of the local boards. There may, however, be places where it would be impossible to get any suitable non-official Chairman, and there may be districts where the chief executive officer must for the present retain these duties in his own hands. But His Excellency in Council trusts that the Local Governments will have recourse sparingly to the appointment of executive officers as Chairmen of local boards; and he is of opinion that it should be a general rule that when such an officer is Chairman of any local board, he shall not in that capacity have a vote in its proceedings. This arrangement will, to some extent, tend to strengthen the independence of the non-official members, and keep the official Chairman, where there must be such, apart from the possible contentions of opposing parties.

The appointments of Chairmen should always be subject to the approval of the Local Government, but need not be always made by it. The Governor-General in Council would be glad to see the boards allowed, in as many cases as possible, to elect their own Chairman. But this matter is one which must be left to the discretion of Local Governments.

20. These, then, are the principles upon which the Governor-General in Council desires to see the experiment of local self-government introduced throughout the several provinces of India; and he would ask the Local Governments to revise their several schemes and shape any proposed legislation in general accordance with those principles. On such of the local schemes as have already come before the Government of India separate orders will, as already intimated, be passed in accordance with the foregoing exposition of policy. There are, however, one or two points to which attention has been drawn by a perusal of the orders of the Local Governments, which, though matters of detail, are still of sufficient importance to warrant their being noticed in this Resolution.

21. In the orders of the 10th October last the Government of India laid special stress on the importance of entrusting to the local boards, not merely the expenditure of fixed allotments of funds, but the management of certain local sources of revenue. Sufficient regard does not as yet appear to have been paid to this part of the scheme. Not only should every local board have the entire control over the proceeds of all local rates and cesses levied within its jurisdiction for its own special purposes, but along with the charge of any expenditure that is at present Provincial should be transferred, where possible, the management of equivalent revenue. The License Tax assessments and collections, for example, might very well be made over to the local boards, municipal and rural, in many parts of the country, subject to the control provided by the existing law. Pounds and ferry receipts have been already indicated as suited for transfer. The allotment of lump grants from Provincial Revenues should be reserved as much as possible to balance the receipts and expenditure of the local boards. The Governor-General in Council hopes that this part of the scheme will receive very careful consideration from all Local Governments with a view to giving full effect to the policy which the Government of India has laid down on this point.

22. Another point deserving of notice is the control that should be exercised over the execution of local works. It will not always be possible for a local board to entertain a competent Engineer of its own; and in any case, when Government buildings and important works of other kinds are made over for maintenance, there must be some effective guarantee for thoroughness of execution. It will probably be most convenient that, while all subordinate establishments are entirely under the control of the boards, Government should supply the District Engineer and furnish professional

supervision, the boards defraying in such manner as may be determined by the Local Governments with reference to the amount of work done for each board the payments to be made to Government on this account. Care must, however, be taken that the boards are left unfettered in the initiation and direction of operations, and that the Engineer is placed in the position of their servant and not of their master. The power of check vested in the District Officer will suffice to remedy any carelessness or improper working on the part of the boards. If this arrangement is carried out, it will probably be found possible to make over to the charge of the boards most of the public buildings in the districts, and other works of various kinds which would otherwise have to be kept in the hands of the Government officers. Double establishments will thus be avoided, and public money saved.

Order —

Ordered that a copy of the above Resolution be forwarded to the Local Governments and Administrations and to the Departments of the Government of India noted on the margin for information, and that it be published in the Supplement to the *Gazette of India*.

Madras.
Bombay.
Bengal.
North-Western Provinces and Oudh.
Punjab.
Central Provinces.
British Burmah.
Coorg.
Assam.
Hyderabad.
The Department of Finance and Commerce.
The Public Works Department.

(True Extract.)

A. MACKENZIE,
Secretary to the Government of India.

ORDER—dated 29th June 1882, No. 597, Financial.

In their Resolution, dated the 18th May 1882, No. 17—747-59, the Government of India have recorded at length their mature views on the important subject of local self-government; and in the marginal letter the Governor-General of India in Council has commented on the statements placed* before him by this Government.

No. 930, dated 31st May 1882.

* Letter, No. 217, Financial, dated 9th February 1882.

2. While accepting, as a whole, the broad principles which have been laid down by the Viceroy in Council, this Government deem it desirable—

(1) to set before the Government of India, the system of local self-government actually in force in this Presidency; and

(2) to discuss the ways in which it may be possible to enlarge the scope of that system.

3. For this purpose His Excellency in Council resolves to appoint a Committee, nominating, in the first instance, the gentlemen marginally named, to consider the subject and report what can be done to carry into effect the views of the Viceroy, with due regard to the stability of existing Municipalities and Local Fund Boards.

President.
Hon. H. E. Sullivan.
Members.
Mr. E. Forster-Webster.
Col. R. H. Sankey, R.E., C.B.
Mr. H. B. Grigg.
„ H. E. Stokes.
M.R.R. Sashiah Shastri, Avargal, C.S.I.
„ P. Chentsal Rao, Avargal.
Mr. R. S. Benson, Secretary.

4. The President of the Committee will have liberty to add to the Committee, especially by calling in the aid of native officials and non-officials of experience. The correspondence which has already passed regarding this matter, and the notes which have been recorded from time to time, will be placed at the disposal of the Committee, as indicating the direction in which Government are disposed to think that extended powers may be safely granted, and the points which should especially occupy their attention.

(True Extract.)

C. G. MASTER,
Chief Secretary.

To the Hon. H. E. Sullivan.
„ E. Forster-Webster, Esq.
„ Colonel R. H. Sankey, R.E., C.B.
„ H. B. Grigg, Esq.
„ H. E. Stokes, Esq.
„ the Hon. A. Sashiah Shastri, C.S.I.
„ M.R.R. P. Chentsal Rao, Avargal.
„ R. S. Benson, Esq.

Exd. J. Wright.

[illegible]

FINANCIAL.

[illegible]

No. [illegible]

Extract from the Proceedings of the Governme of India in the Home Department,—(Public),—dated Simla, th 18th May 1882.

READ the undermentioned papers:—

Home Department Circular No. 4—7 to 73 dated 10th May 1881, calling for a report on the working of the elective system in municipalities.

Replies to the above circular:—

Letter from the Government of Madras, No. 1404, dated 3rd August 1881.

" " " of Bombay, " 3510, dated 20th October 1881.

" " " of Bengal, " 603, dated 12th July 1881.

" " " of North-Wester n Provinces and Oudh, No. 630, dated 7th Septe ber 1881.

" " " of North-Weste n Provinces and Oudh, No. 700, dated 24th Septe mber 1881.

" " " of Punjab, No. 00, dated 5th September 1881.

" " Chief Commissioner of the C ntral Provinces, No. 2395-100, dated 6th August 18 81.

" " Secretary for Berar to Resi dent at Hyderabad, No. 2, dated 21st June 1881.

Resolution of the Department of Finance, No 3853, dated 30th September 1881.

Financial Department letter No. 3513, dated 10th October 1881, to the Government of Beng al.

" " " " 3514, dated October 1881, to the Government of the North -Western Provinces and Oudh.

" " " " 3515, dated 10th October 1881, to the Government of M adras.

" " " " 3516, dated 10th October 1881, to the Government of B ombay.

" " " " 3517, dated 10th October 1881, to the Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces.

" " " " 3518, dated 10th October 1881, to the Chief Commissioner of British Burma.

" " " " 3519, dated 10th October 1881, to the Chief Commissioner of Assam.

" " " " 3589, dated 18th October 1881, to the Government of the Punjab.

RESOLUT ION.

THE Governor General in Council in the Resolution of the Financial Department, dated the 30th September 1881, set out, for the information of the Local Governments, the principles upon which it was proposed to revise the agreements then in force for the administr ation of the Provincial Services, and to establish the decentralised system of finance on a uniform and extended basis. It was explained that ultimately connected with this general scheme for the decentralisation of finance was the very important question of developing local self-government. Considerable progres s in this direction had, it was admitted, been made since 1870. A large income from local rates and cesses had been secured, and in some provinces the manage ment of this income had been freely entrusted to local bodies. Municipalities had also increased in number and usefulness. But there was still, it was remarked, a greater inequality of progress in different parts of the cou[illegible] than varying local circumstances seemed to warrant. In many places ser[illegible] admirably adapted for local management were reserved in the hands of [illegible] central administration, while elsewhere heavy charges were levied on Mu[illegible]ipalities in connection with the police, over which they had necessarily no [illegible]xecutive control.

Paragraph 11 of the Resolution went on to say—

"His Excellency the Governor Gene[illegible] in Council is therefore of opinion that the tions has now arrive[illegible] further [illegible] development may be afforded to the intentions of Lord Mayo's Government, and that the [illegible] arrangements should no longer exclude from all consideration the [illegible] of Location [illegible] Local and Municipal management, together with the similar resources still retained in [illegible] Provincial control, and [illegible] the question of local self-government. The Provincial Govern[illegible] while being now largely endowed from Imperial sources, may well, in their turn, [illegible] hand over to local self-government considerable revenues, at present kept in their own ha[illegible] but similar in kind to many which have long been 'locally' managed with success by C[illegible] committees [illegible] composed of non-official members, and subject only to a general control [illegible] control reserved to the State by the Legislature. At the same time, such items should be gene[illegible] ally made [illegible] as the people are most likely to be [illegible] to understand the use of and to administ[illegible] very well. His Excellency would therefore invite the Local Governments to undertake a caref[illegible] scrutiny of Provincial, Local, and Municipal accounts, with the view of ascertaining (1) [illegible] what items of receipt and charge can be transferred from 'Provincial' to 'Local' heads, [illegible] for administration by Committees composing non-official and, wherever possible, elected [illegible] members, and what items already 'Local,' but not so administered, might suitably be so; (2) what redistribution of items is desirable, in order to lay on Local and Municipal bodies [illegible] which are best understood and appreciated by the people; (3) what measures, legislativ[illegible] or otherwise, are necessary to ensure more local self-government. Incidentally to these enquiries [illegible] they will probably notice, and might carefully consider, (4) ways of equalising local and [illegible] imposed taxation throughout the Empire, making [illegible] severe or unsuitable imposts, and favouring [illegible] more in accordance with popular opinion or sentiment. The Government of India [illegible] made some preliminary enquiries in the same direction, the results of which will [illegible] shortly be communicated to the several Local Governments [illegible] consideration in conjunction with their own."

2. Accordingly on the 10th October 1881 letters were addressed to the various Local Governments indicating [illegible] those branches of expenditure which appeared to the Government of India [illegible] most suited for local control, and inviting each Government to examine any oth[illegible]r heads of account which might seem to cover items capable of transfer to suc[illegible] control. It was pointed out that it was not the intention of the Government [illegible] of India that the proposed transfer of the control of expenditure of a speciall[illegible] local character to local bodies should involve any addition to existing local burdens; and it was therefore shown to be necessary to arrange for the simu[illegible]taneous transfer of receipts sufficient to meet any net balance of additional ex[illegible]penditure which in any instance might arise. The receipts to be thus transfe[illegible]red should, it was suggested, be such as to afford a prospect that, by careful administration, with all the advantages due to local sympathy, experience an[illegible] watchfulness, they would be susceptible of reasonable increase. In cases w[illegible]here larger assignments of funds were required, the receipts from pounds, [illegible] a share of the assessed taxes collected within the jurisdiction of a local bod[illegible], were indicated as suitable sources of revenue to be made over. But on this [illegible] as on other points, a wide discretion was left to the Local Governments.

3. As regards the character of the local bodies to whom these powers of control and administration were to be entrusted, it was remarked that already in most parts of British India there [illegible] were in existence Municipal Committees, whose powers might in many cases [illegible] advantageously extended, and District Committees for various purposes, wh[illegible]ch might very well be consolidated into single homogeneous working bodies, with ancillary subordinate committees for each tahsil or sub-division of [illegible] the district. It was suggested that the Magistrate and Collector should be [illegible] President of the District Committee, and the Assistant or Deputy Magistrate in [illegible] charge of the sub-division, President of the subordinate committees; but in e[illegible]ch case the local bodies should, it was said, comprise persons not in the [illegible]ervice of Government, and elected or nominated, as might seem best, in a p[illegible]roportion of not less than from one-half to two-thirds of the whole number of members. For the satisfactory development of this plan, it was admitted th[illegible] legislation would probably be necessary

in most provinces and the Local Governments were invited in their replies to explain the general outlines which such legislation should follow. In regard to this it was said—

> "Special attention will be required in settling the relations between the various local bodies and the officers of the general Administration, and in providing for a certain measure of control and inspection on the part of Government. It would be hopeless to expect any real development of self-government, if the local bodies were subject to check and interference in matters of detail; and the respective powers of Government and of the various local bodies should be clearly and distinctly defined by statute, so that there may be as little risk of friction and misunderstanding as possible. Within the limits to be laid down in each case, however, the Governor General in Council is anxious that the fullest possible liberty of action should be given to local bodies."

4. The policy thus enunciated by the Government of India has, on the whole, been loyally, and in some cases cordially, accepted by the Local Governments, several of which have already drawn up schemes for giving effect to it; and have submitted these for the information of the Government of India. The Governor General in Council desires to acknowledge the care and thought with which some of these schemes have been worked out. Upon each the Government of India will communicate hereafter its views in detail to the Local Government concerned. Meantime, however, it will be convenient that the Governor General in Council should explain somewhat more fully than he has hitherto done the general mode in which he would wish to see effect given to the principle of local self-government throughout British India outside the Presidency Towns. This is the more necessary, as further consideration of the subject and examination of the schemes prepared for the different Provinces have suggested the propriety of certain modifications of the plan sketched out in the Circular letters of the 10th October last.

5. At the outset, the Governor General in Council must explain that, in advocating the extension of local self-government, and the adoption of this principle in the management of many branches of local affairs, he does not suppose that the work will be in the first instance better done than if it remained in the sole hands of the Government district officers. It is not, primarily, with a view to improvement in administration that this measure is put forward and supported. It is chiefly desirable as an instrument of political and popular education. His Excellency in Council has himself no doubt that, in course of time, as local knowledge and local interest are brought to bear more freely upon local administration, improved efficiency will in fact follow. But at starting there will doubtless be many failures, calculated to discourage exaggerated hopes, and even in some cases to cast apparent discredit upon the practice of self-government itself. If, however, the officers of Government only set themselves, as the Governor General in Council believes they will, to foster sedulously the small beginnings of independent political life; if they accept loyally and as their own the policy of the Government; and if they come to realise that the system really opens to them a fairer field for the exercise of administrative tact and directive energy than the more autocratic system which it supersedes, then it may be hoped that the period of failures will be short, and that real and substantial progress will very soon become manifest.

6. It is not uncommonly asserted that the people of this country are themselves entirely indifferent to the principle of self-government; that they take but little interest in public matters; and that they prefer to have such affairs managed for them by Government officers. The Governor General in Council does not attach much value to this theory. It represents no doubt the point of view which commends itself to many active and well-intentioned district officers; and the people of India are, there can be equally no doubt, remarkably tolerant of existing facts. But as education advances, there is rapidly growing up all over the country an intelligent class of public spirited men, whom it is not only bad policy, but sheer waste of power, to fail to utilise. The task of administration is yearly becoming more onerous as the country progresses in civilisation and material prosperity. The annual reports of every Government tell of an ever-increasing burden laid upon the shoulders of the local officers. The cry is everywhere for increased establishments. The universal complaint in all departments is that of overwork. Under these circumstances it becomes imperatively necessary to look around for some means

of relief; and the Governor General in Council has no hesitation in stating his conviction that the only reasonable plan open to the Government is to induce the people themselves to undertake, as far as may be, the management of their own affairs; and to develop, or create if need be, a capacity for self-help in respect of all matters that have not, for imperial reasons, to be retained in the hands of the representatives of Government.

7. If it be said that the experiments hitherto made in this direction have not been encouraging, the Governor General in Council must avow his belief that the principle has not as yet been, in any general or satisfactory fashion, fully and fairly tried. There is reason to fear that previous attempts at local self-government have been too often overridden and practically crushed by direct, though well-intentioned, official interference. In the few cases where real responsibility has been thrown upon local bodies and real power entrusted to them, the results have been very gratifying. There is even now a vast amount of assistance rendered to the administration by Honorary Magistrates, members of Municipal Corporations and other Committees; and there is no antecedent improbability in the theory that if non-official auxiliary agency were more thoroughly organised and more fully trusted, there would be a speedy and marked improvement, not only in its amount, but in its efficiency.

8. Holding, therefore, that it is the duty and interest of the ruling power to take care that the further advance which it is now proposed to make in the direction of local self-government shall be, though cautious, yet at the same time real and substantial, the Governor General in Council will proceed to indicate, for the guidance of the Provincial Administrations, the general principles upon which, in the judgment of the Government of India, these measures should be shaped. The subject may for the purposes of this Resolution be divided into two parts—the first, relating to the mode in which local boards, whether municipal or district, should generally be constituted; and the second, to the degree of control which the Government should retain over such bodies, and the manner in which that control should be exercised.

9. In regard to the first of these points, the Governor General in Council would observe that he is quite aware of the absurdity of attempting to lay down any hard-and-fast rules which shall be of universal application in a country so vast, and in its local circumstances so varied, as British India. It would be unreasonable to expect that any uniform system of local government could be applied with equal success in provinces differing as the Punjab, for instance, differs from Madras, or Bengal from Burma. A large latitude of application must, therefore, in every case be left to the local authorities. Indeed, we are really as yet so much in the infancy of self-government, and have perhaps so little knowledge of the directions in which it would naturally develop itself among the people, that there is a distinct advantage in having different schemes tried in different places, in order to test by practical experience what arrangements are best suited to the ways of thinking, habits, and other idiosyncrasies of the heterogeneous populations of the Empire. But there are, nevertheless, fundamental principles which, after every allowance has been made for local peculiarities, must be universally followed and frankly adopted, if the system is to have anywhere a fair trial.

10. The Government of India desires, then, that, while maintaining and extending, as far as practicable, the plan of municipal government in the cities and towns of each province, the Local Governments will also maintain and extend throughout the country, in every district where intelligent non-official agency can be found, a network of local boards, to be charged with definite duties and entrusted with suitable funds. The Governor General in Council considers it very important that the area of jurisdiction allotted to each board should in no case be too large. If the idea is to succeed at all, it will be necessary to secure among the members both local interest and local knowledge. Experience proves that District Committees are, as a rule, very badly attended by members not actually residing in the vicinity of the head-quarters' station. Those who do attend have frequently no intimate acquaintance with the wants of outlying parts of the district. The consequence is either that undue attention is given to the requirements of the immediate neighbourhood of the central station, or that the business falls

entirely into the hands of the district officer, the Committee contenting itself with formally endorsing his proposals. Modifying, therefore, to some extent the suggestions made in paragraph 8 of the Circular letters of the 10th October last, the Governor General in Council desires that the smallest administrative unit—the sub-division, the taluka, or the tahsil—shall ordinarily form the maximum area to be placed under a local board. He would not indeed object to even smaller jurisdictions where these were deemed suitable. In some provinces it may be found possible to leave these sub-divisional boards to their own independent working, arranging for a periodical District Council, to which delegates from each local board might be sent, to settle such common matters as the rate of land cess to be levied during the year, the allotment to be made of district funds, and other questions of general interest. In other provinces, again, it may be thought best to have a District Board with controlling power over the smaller local boards. But whatever system is followed, the cardinal principle, which is essential to the success of self-government in any shape, is this, that the jurisdiction of the primary boards must be so limited in area as to ensure both local knowledge and local interest on the part of each of the members.

11. The Municipal Committees will, of course, remain the local boards for areas included within town limits. The relations between such municipal boards and the sub-divisional or district boards within whose jurisdiction the towns lie must be carefully settled in each case. In some instances the town boards will be left entirely independent and apart. In others it may be found desirable to give the rural boards a certain share in the settlement of questions of common interest. In others, again, the town boards would be required to send delegates to the District Board or Council.

12. The local boards, both urban and rural, must everywhere have a large preponderance of non-official members. In no case ought the official members to be more than one-third of the whole, unless in places in which the elective system is followed, when there would be no ground for objecting to an elected member merely on the ground that he was in the service of Government. The Governor General in Council is disposed to think that the non-official members of the boards should hold office for at least two years after election or appointment; but probably the best plan to follow would be that of the compulsory retirement by rotation of a fixed proportion of members, those retiring being eligible to sit again. A detail of this description may, however, fitly be left to the Local Governments.

13. Members of boards should be chosen by election wherever it may, in the opinion of the Local Governments, be practicable to adopt that system of choice. The Governor General in Council does not require the adoption of the system of election in all cases, though that is the system which he hopes will ultimately prevail throughout the country, and which he wishes to establish now as widely as local circumstances will permit. Election in some form or other should be generally introduced in towns of any considerable size, but may be extended more cautiously and gradually to the smaller municipalities and to backward rural tracts. Even as regards these last, however, the Governor General in Council is disposed to think that if the Government officers cordially accept the principle, and set themselves to make it successful, a great advance might be made with comparatively little difficulty. Thus when the Local Governments had determined the nature of the qualifications suited to such a district (and these might ordinarily at first be fairly high), each sub-divisional officer might be instructed to prepare a list or register of candidates qualified to sit upon the local board, and might invite all those residing in any particular area, such as a police (thana) jurisdiction, to meet him on a day fixed at some convenient spot near their homes. He might then explain to them the objects of Government, and the nature of the duties they were invited to undertake, and call upon them to elect then or on a future day the number of representatives that had been fixed for the area in question. In the course of a few years, when the members of the board find that they have real powers and responsibilities entrusted to them, any Government interference will become unnecessary. The electors may safely then be left to conduct their own elections under such rules as may be from time to time laid down.

14. As to the system of election to be followed, the Governor General in Council would here also leave a large discretion to the Local Governments. Experience is wanting to determine the most suitable general system for each province; and it is desirable that a variety of plans should be tried in order to a future comparison of results. The simple vote, the cumulative vote, election by wards, election by the whole town or tract, suffrage of more or less extended qualification, election by castes or occupations—these and other methods might all be tried. New methods, unthought of in Europe, may be found suitable to India; and after a time it will probably be possible to say what forms suit best the local peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of the different populations. The Provincial Governments should, through their district officers, consult the leading Natives of each locality, not only as to the possibility of introducing the elective system, but as to the arrangements most likely to meet their local circumstances; and should use every effort to make the schemes adopted as consonant as possible to the feelings and habits of the people.

15. Doubtless the first consequence of this mode of proceeding will be that the electoral system, viewed as a whole, will present for a time a very diversified appearance, and in some places arrangements made will turn out badly and call for change; but the Governor General in Council is not disposed to attach undue importance to this. The problem before the Government is one of no slight difficulty; being that of discovering in what manner the people of the towns and districts of British India can be best trained to manage their own local affairs intelligently and successfully. The attempts hitherto made with this object have met with but little success. The best men in many cases do not at present present themselves as candidates for municipal office. The number of voters is generally insignificant compared with the number on the registers. And yet there can be no doubt that among the more intelligent classes of the community there is a real and growing interest being taken in administrative matters. It may be suspected, therefore, that the cause of comparative failure in the efforts hitherto made is to be found rather in the character of those efforts than in the nature of the object pursued. They have been, it seems to the Governor General in Council, wanting to a great degree in earnestness and in real endeavours to adapt the system adopted to the feelings of the people by whom it has to be worked. If this is so, the remedy must lie in ascertaining by patient and practical experiment how best to call forth and render effective that desire and capacity for self-government which all intelligent and fairly educated men may safely be assumed to possess.

16. With a view to stimulating the candidature of men of respectable standing in Native society, and to mark the importance of the functions of these local boards in the eyes of Government, the Governor General in Council is pleased to direct that the courtesy titles of "Rai (or Rao) Bahadur" or "Khan Bahadur" shall in all official correspondence be applicable to Native members of all local boards during their term of office.

17. Turning now to the second division of the subject—the degree of control to be retained by the Government over the local boards, and the manner in which that control should be exercised; the Governor General in Council observes that the true principle to be followed in this matter is, that the control should be exercised from without rather than from within. The Government should revise and check the acts of the local bodies, but not dictate them. The executive authorities should have two powers of control. In the first place, their sanction should be required in order to give validity to certain acts, such as the raising of loans, the imposition of taxes in other than duly authorised forms, the alienation of municipal property, interference with any matters involving religious questions or affecting the public peace, and the like. (The cases in which such sanction should be insisted upon would have to be carefully considered by each Government, and they would at the outset be probably somewhat numerous, but, as the boards gained in experience, might be reduced in number.) In the second place, the Local Government should have power to interfere either to set aside altogether the proceedings of the board in particular cases, or, in the event of gross and continued neglect of any important duty, to suspend the board temporarily, by the appointment of persons

to execute the office of the board until the neglected duty had been satisfactorily performed. That being done, the regular system would be re-established, a fresh board being elected or appointed. This power of absolute supersession would require in every case the consent of the Supreme Government. A similar power is reserved to the Executive Government under several English statutes; and if required in England, where local self-government is long established and effective, it is not probable that it could be altogether dispensed with in India. It should be the general function of the executive officers of Government to watch, especially at the outset, the proceedings of the local boards; to point out to them matters calling for their consideration, to draw their attention to any neglect of duty on their part, and to check by official remonstrance any attempt to exceed their proper functions, or to act illegally or in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.

18. It does not appear necessary, for the exercise of these powers, that the chief executive officers of towns, sub-divisions or districts should be Chairmen or even members of the local boards. There is indeed much reason to believe that it would be more convenient that they should supervise and control the acts of those bodies, without taking actual part in their proceedings. The Governor General in Council is aware that many high authorities hold that the district officer should always be *ex-officio* Chairman of all the local boards within the district, and should directly guide and regulate their proceedings. This was indeed the view taken by the Government of India itself in the Circular letters of the 10th October last, so far as the constitution of district boards was concerned. But even then the Governor General in Council did not see his way to accepting the principle in the case of Municipal Boards; and further consideration has led him to the belief that, on the whole, it is better to lay down no such general rule in the case of any class of local boards. There appears to him to be great force in the argument that so long as the chief executive officers are, as a matter of course, Chairmen of the Municipal and District Committees, there is little chance of those Committees affording any effective training to their members in the management of local affairs, or of the non-official members taking any real interest in local business. The non-official members must be led to feel that real power is placed in their hands, and that they have real responsibilities to discharge. It is doubtful whether they have under present arrangements any sufficient inducement to give up their time and attention to the transaction of public business. There is this further objection to the district officer acting as Chairman, that if the non-official members are independent and energetic, risk may arise of unseemly collision between the Chairman and the board. The former would be in a far more dignified and influential position if he supervised and controlled the proceedings of the Board from outside, acting as arbiter between all parties, and not as leader of any.

19. The Governor General in Council therefore would wish to see non-official persons acting, wherever practicable, as Chairmen of the local boards. There may, however, be places where it would be impossible to get any suitable non-official Chairman, and there may be districts where the chief executive officer must for the present retain these duties in his own hands. But His Excellency in Council trusts that the Local Governments will have recourse sparingly to the appointment of executive officers as Chairmen of local boards; and he is of opinion that it should be a general rule that when such an officer is Chairman of any local board, he shall not in that capacity have a vote in its proceedings. This arrangement will, to some extent, tend to strengthen the independence of the non-official members, and keep the official Chairman, where there must be such, apart from the possible contentions of opposing parties.

The appointments of Chairmen should always be subject to the approval of the Local Government, but need not be always made by it. The Governor General in Council would be glad to see the boards allowed, in as many cases as possible, to elect their own Chairman. But this matter is one which must be left to the discretion of Local Governments.

20. These, then, are the principles upon which the Governor General in Council desires to see the experiment of local self-government introduced

throughout the several provinces of India; and he would ask the Local Governments to revise their several schemes and shape any proposed legislation in general accordance with these principles. On such of the local schemes as have already come before the Government of India separate orders will, as already intimated, be passed in accordance with the foregoing exposition of policy. There are, however, one or two points to which attention has been drawn by a perusal of the orders of the Local Governments, which, though matters of detail, are still of sufficient importance to warrant their being noticed in this Resolution.

21. In the orders of the 10th October last the Government of India laid special stress on the importance of entrusting to the local boards, not merely the expenditure of fixed allotments of funds, but the management of certain local sources of revenue. Sufficient regard does not as yet appear to have been paid to this part of the scheme. Not only should every local board have the entire control over the proceeds of all local rates and cesses levied within its jurisdiction for its own special purposes, but, along with the charge of any expenditure that is at present Provincial should be transferred, where possible, the management of equivalent revenue. The License Tax assessments and collections, for example, might very well be made over to the local boards, municipal and rural, in many parts of the country, subject to the control provided by the existing law. Pounds and ferry receipts have been already indicated as suited for transfer. The allotment of lump grants from Provincial Revenues should be reserved as much as possible to balance the receipts and expenditure of the local boards. The Governor General in Council hopes that this part of the scheme will receive very careful consideration from all Local Governments, with a view to giving full effect to the policy which the Government of India has laid down on this point.

22. Another point deserving of notice is the control that should be exercised over the execution of local works. It will not always be possible for a local board to entertain a competent engineer of its own; and in any case, when Government buildings and important works of other kinds are made over for maintenance, there must be some effective guarantee for thoroughness of execution. It will probably be most convenient that, while all subordinate establishments are entirely under the control of the boards, Government should supply the district engineer and furnish professional supervision, the boards defraying in such manner as may be determined by the Local Governments with reference to the amount of work done for each board the payments to be made to Government on this account. Care must, however, be taken that the boards are left unfettered in the initiation and direction of operations, and that the engineer is placed in the position of their servant and not of their master. The power of check vested in the district officer will suffice to remedy any carelessness or improper working on the part of the boards. If this arrangement is carried out, it will probably be found possible to make over to the charge of the boards most of the public buildings in the districts, and other works of various kinds which would otherwise have to be kept in the hands of the Government officers. Double establishments will thus be avoided, and public money saved.

ORDER.—Ordered, that a copy of the above Resolution be forwarded to the Local Governments and Administrations and to the Departments of the Government of India noted on the margin for information; and that it be published in the Supplement to the *Gazette of India.*

Madras.
Bombay.
Bengal.
N.-Western Provinces and Oudh.
Punjab.
Central Provinces.
British Burma.
Coorg.
Assam.
Hyderabad.
The Department of Finance and Commerce.
The Public Works Department.

(True Extract.)

A. Mackenzie

Secretary to the Government of India.

Gov. Central Branch Press, Simla.—No. 164 H. D.—19-5-82.—42.

Finl (1883) DEPARTMENT.

Municipalities)

From

Govt. of India
Home Deptt

No. 747-59.

Dated 18

Received 26 May.

Enclosures

SUBJECT.

Subsequent No. 1449

Working of the elective system in Municipalities.

For

No. 1449. Financial DEPARTMENT.

12

From The Government of India
Home Departt.
dated 18 May 82

Seen.
Most of the suggestions are actually in force in this Presidency.

FOR ORDERS.

It will be best to wait for the communication promised in the fourth paragraph (28) before taking any action?

Our letter d/ 9 Feb 1882 No. 217 replying to Financial letter from India d/ 10 Oct 1881 No. 3515 is not quoted in the preamble to the current paper but reference

is made to claus
frecently in
paragraph 4
of the Resolutions

GHC

FOR ORDERS.

14

No. 930

FROM

A. MACKENZIE, Esq., c.s.,
Secretary to the Government of India,

To

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS.

Home Department.
Public

Simla, the 31st May 1882.

SIR,

I AM directed to acknowledge receipt of your letter to the Financial Department, No. 217, dated the 9th February last, submitting, with an expression of the concurrence of His Excellency the Governor in Council, a copy of the Proceedings of the Madras Board of Revenue of the 1st idem, in which the suggestions of the Government of India for the further extension of local self-government, as embodied in the letter from the Financial Department, No. 3375, dated the 10th October last, are discussed at length.

2. Both the Board of Revenue and the Madras Government point with legitimate satisfaction to the fact that throughout the Southern Presidency Municipal and Local Agency is already very extensively employed in connection with many branches of public business, and it is stated that His Excellency the Governor in Council does not see his way to adding to the list of these services.

3. The Governor General in Council is glad to admit that, as regards the transfer of provincial services to local funds, more has perhaps been done in Madras than in any other part of India. But it by no means follows that real local self-government has as yet received any sufficient or adequate development. It is no doubt the case that the formal control and management of the local funds is, under the Act of 1871, entrusted to Committees composed, to some extent, of non-official members. But His Excellency in Council observes that while great stress is laid in your letter under reply, and also in the Board's Resolution, upon the amount and variety of the charges that are debited to local funds, but little is said with reference to the actual working and powers of the local Committees. It is, in fact, to be gathered from the Board's remarks that although the only direct official check exercised over the Committees is that involved in the presiding control of the Collectors and Divisional Officers, the Local Boards are regarded as institutions 'still in their infancy,' and requiring a considerable amount of official 'restraint.' In the matter of public works it is indeed admitted that a material addition might with advantage be made to their powers by which a vast amount of reference to the Board of Revenue would be saved. It may fairly be inferred from these statements that the administrative powers of the Local Boards have hitherto been extremely limited in character, and that they have not as yet been properly utilised as a means of training the people in the independent management of their own local affairs.

4. The views of the Government of India upon this subject have now been fully explained in the Resolution of this Department, No. [illegible], dated 18th May, and I am to express the earnest hope of the Governor General in Council that the Madras Government will reconsider the question in the light of the instructions therein conveyed. Generally speaking, it would seem that in Madras the official element on the Boards unduly preponderates, and that the local area of their jurisdictions is inordinately large. The Governor General

in Council does not consider that the objections taken by the Board of Revenue in paragraph 6 of their Resolution to the appointment of sub-committees are by any means conclusive. There would seem to be no reason why the local fund circles in Madras should be so large as to make it practically impossible for the non-official members of the committees to be of any real use, or why under a system of smaller circles good work should not be done. Although the Madras districts are not so completely sub-divided for administrative purposes as those of some other provinces, yet there are sub-collectorates and taluks in charge of passed assistants, in many districts which might probably be made into local fund circles without difficulty.

5. In paragraph 2 of your letter it is assumed that the Government of India are prepared to relieve the municipalities of police contributions without any equivalent transfer of charge from provincial to local management. This is not the case. But I am to point out that under the head of Education there are still many items which might, in the opinion of the Government of India, be usefully transferred to local management. There is no apparent reason why the rest of the Government primary schools and the control of Government middle and high schools, should not be handed over to properly-constituted local boards, as is now being done in other Provinces. The Madras grant-in-aid system seems peculiarly adapted to the successful working of such arrangements. It would not probably be either possible or desirable to transfer to local control such institutions as colleges, attached collegiate schools, schools for Europeans and Eurasians, normal schools with attached model schools, medical schools, surveying schools or other schools of technical instruction. But with these exceptions, the Governor General in Council can see no reason for limiting the transference of educational institutions to the management of the local boards. The Department of Public Instruction would still maintain its general control over the system of instruction. The Government rules for grants-in-aid would still hold good. The local officers of the department would work, according to their rank, either as the advisers or as the agents of the boards. In this way there would be no violent change of system, while local effort would be elicited, and the relations of the educational department and the local bodies be drawn closer together to their mutual advantage. Arrangements would have to be made regarding the appointment of teachers in the higher schools, in order to secure the selection of suitable men; and many other points of detail would have to be considered and arranged; but there appears to be no insuperable difficulty in so settling matters as to meet the requirements of the Government system, while stimulating the interest of these local bodies in the cause of popular education.

6. I am also to invite the particular attention of the Madras Government to paragraph 21 of the Resolution of this Department of the 18th May, and to point out that it is an essential part of the Government of India scheme that the local committees should, as far as possible, be entrusted with the control of receipts and revenues as well as of expenditure.

7. The legislation necessary to give effect to the arrangements suggested by the Government of India may most advantageously be undertaken in the local Council.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,

A. Mackenzie

Secretary to the Government of India.

Financial (1882) Depart^t

From

The Govt of India
Home Department

Dated 31st May/82
Recd 10th June/82

CURRENT No. 1593

Local Self
Government

1

10

Note for C. No 1593

1 In the 21 Districts of the Madras Presidency there are 32 Local Fund Circles and 48 Municipalities

2 The area within the Municipalities is excluded from the area under the control of the Local Fund Boards

3 The Boards themselves are distinct [illegible] the Acts provide

Acts III & IV of 1871 (Madras)

provide that the Collector of the District should be ex officio President of each Board whether Local or Municipal

4. Local Boards are appointed by Govt under the restriction that non official members must be in numbers at least equal to those holding Govt appointments

5. Limited Municipal Boards are composed of official and non official members the

G.O. 7 April '79 No. 668 R.

G.O. 1st May '82 No. 423

To India 3d Aug/81 No 1404

the former being not more than half the whole number. The Act however provides that Commissioners may be elected by the rate-payers and accordingly the privilege has been conceded to 10 Towns (Cuddalore being the most recent addition) though elections have actually taken place in four only. The correspondence shews that the principle was not cordially accepted by all the Commissioners [illegible] consulted. A petition has recently been received against the election system being adopted in Cuddalore and the Petitioners propose that the management of the Municipality should be entrusted to the Local Fund Board. On the other hand the President of the Mangalore Municipal Commission × has written to propose that the privilege of electing a portion of the Board may be extended

No 1547/82

× 26 April 188[illegible] No 40

2

Sec 10 Act III of 1871 (Madras)

18

to that Municipality which in 1874 was averse to the notion

~~7~~ 6. The Municipal Act also contains a provision for the election by the Commissioners of their Vice President when the Governor in Council may think such a system advisable. Advantage of this has been taken in several instances.

7. Perhaps there can be no objection to giving the power of electing Commissioners

6

to any Municipality which may claim the privilege on a representation by the majority of the rate payers

8 This would be in accordance with the spirit of the Resolution of the Govt of India

9 No such system of election is now possible under the Local Funds Act. The law would have to be altered if it is considered desirable to permit elections and this could be done by [illegible] the

Election of Commissioners by the rate-payers.

Sec. If at any time it shall appear to the Governor in Council to be advisable that a certain number of the Commissioners of any town shall be appointed by election by the rate-payers, it shall be competent to the said Governor in Council to take measures for the election of such Commissioners by the rate-payers, subject to such rules and orders as may be passed by the Govt. The persons so elected shall continue in office three years, or until their successors have been elected, and shall be eligible for re-election. The Governor in Council may, from time to time accept the resignation of any of the Commissioners so elected, or may remove any of such Commissioners for misconduct or neglect of duty

Sec 38 Act III of 1871

the addition of a section on the lines of section of Act III of 1871. The rules to be passed would have to be framed carefully.

10. There is one point of difference between the Municipal and Local Boards which should be noticed.

11. Municipal Boards are empowered to levy rates and taxes and to exempt persons from taxation but in the case of [illegible] Fund Cesses [illegible] the

that power is vested in Sec 36 Act IV of 1871

Government i.e.

12. The degree of liberty already exercised by Municipalities seems sufficient. The question arises whether a similar concession is to be made in the case of ~~Local~~ Funds Boards.

13. The provisions of the Local Fund Act are ~~in substance~~

that for the development of communications education and sanitation the Government shall

[illegible]

Constitute Circles within which ~~the Act shall~~ [illegible]

They shall appoint Local Fund Boards (Section 4) for the administration of the funds raised for the purposes of the ~~Act~~ of which Board (section 5) the Collector shall be President, and shall be vested (section 23) with the entire executive power of the ~~Board~~ whose resolutions shall be carried into effect by him, he being directly responsible

for

for the due fulfilment of the purposes of the Act and being empowered (Section 24) to appoint such executive establishment as the Local Fund Board shall think necessary and proper and on such salaries as the Board may think reasonable, the Government having power to dictate as to number and salaries;

That to provide the necessary funds the Government may (Sec 36)

levy

levy any or all of certain specified taxes, rates and tolls;

That the Collector of the district (Secs 47, 63, &c) shall realise these revenues for the Local Fund;

That the President under Government Orders (Sec 35) shall direct in what Bank or Government Treasury the collections shall be lodged;

That Local Fund Boards shall furnish annual budget estimates (Section 30) and accounts of receipts and expenditure in such form and at such

times

times as (Section 32)

and that the [illegible]ts shall [illegible] by such officers and in such manner as the Governor in Council may direct,

That it shall be competent to [illegible] (section 28) to appoint officers to inspect or superintend the operations of the Local Fund Boards the [illegible] to be borne rateably by the Local Fund Boards of all Circles,

para 10 Resolution 18 May '82

para 4, letter 31 May 1882
No. 930

14. The Govt of India were [illegible] that these circles should be formed on the basis of the smallest administrative unit the sub division, the Taluk or the Tahsil being the maximum area to be placed under a Local Fund Board.

Now however they seem to admit that the Sub Collectors and Head Assistant's Divisions might be taken as separate Circles.

15. Supposing that each District was thus sub divided

so

we should [illegible] at best be Local Fund Boards to deal with instead of half that number. Now experience has shown that the present arrangement under which a District has been divided into two Circles has not answered and in more than one instance it has been considered desirable to amalgamate such circles as the disadvantages arising from separation

were

20 × 3 = 60.

Eg. Chingleput and Saidapet have been amalgamated and Cuddalore & Vridachalam

were found to more than counterbalance the supposed advantages of smaller [illegible] and closer supervision.

16. When legislation was originally proposed for the administration of Local Funds the [illegible] of [illegible] taluk as the unit was considered and put aside on account of the multiplication of budgets, reports and [illegible] involved not to mention the difficulty of obtaining a fit body to supervise the working.

17. These objections still hold good more or less. It would seem advisable on the whole

to

to let this modification stand over for the present. Some changes will be necessary in the areas of [illegible] Circles, when the proposed new Districts are constituted, and these should suffice. Meanwhile the system of election might be inaugurated.

18 - The Govt. of India consider,* from the information recently furnished them that in Madras the official element on the boards unduly preponderates and they urge the consideration of the remarks recorded in paras 17 et seq. of their Resolution dated 18th May.

Now

* para 4, letter 31st May 1882, No 930.

19 - Now according to these remarks the effect would be to place the District Officer altogether outside the Board and to leave the management to a non-official chairman to be if possible elected by the Commissioners.

20 - It is not easy to understand how the supervision contemplated in para 17 of the Resolution is to be exercised if the Collector or Sub Collector is to have no voice in the deliberations. It is even now difficult enough to keep up acquaintance with the [illegible]

ins and outs of local details and this difficulty would be much enhanced if the only channel of information was a record of proceedings received long after the meetings were held. The additional correspondence involved would be no light burden to an overworked divisional officer. It would be ~~quite~~ sufficient if Vice Presidents of Boards generally were non-officials (if procurable) so that the working of the Circles might be fully open to the cognizance of the non-official element in the Board. The public Press anticipate that non-official Chairmen or Vice Presidents would be paid and certainly this will be necessary if good work is to be expected. Indeed it would be unreasonable to expect a man to give up his whole time without an honorarium of some kind.

21. The great additional labour and responsibility involved by the transfer to Local Boards of the execution of local ~~public~~ works is a further reason why the supervision of the District Officer

G.O. 22d March 1880, No. 689.

Officer should be close. This threw an additional expenditure of [illegible] lakhs into the hands of Local Fund Boards in 1880/81.

Pages 204 & 205, Administration Report for 1881.

22. With reference to the remarks of the Govt. of India about control of education being vested in Local Boards it is observed that the whole primary education of the country up to the fourth standard at least is already in their hands, and with reference to the status of these Commissioners there is about enough for them to attend to. Primary schools are

increasing

increasing all over the country. The Boards already appoint (through their Presidents) the teachers and pass the bills for payment of results. They have every opportunity of visiting and inspecting the schools.

[illegible]

Local Self Govt.

H.E. the Governor & circulate

C12/6

I suppose we ought to reply to Mr Mackenzie's letter of May 31st setting before the Government of India without entering into controversy the broad facts of our System of Local Self-Government and explaining in what ways we proposed to enlarge its scope.

We could I presume allow all Municipalities which ask for the right to elect their own non-official representatives. Would there be any decisive objection likewise to allow all the Municipalities to elect their Vice-Presidents?

We might revise the services now committed to them and substitute in all cases some other burden for the charge of the Police.

With regard to Local Fund Boards we might I presume safely somewhat increase their numbers & introduce the principle of election in say ten selected Boards promising to do more ~~go further~~ as soon as we found that the new arrangements were working well. Could they be [illegible] their own [illegible] of might [illegible] Vice President be elected in the ~~selected~~ ten?

I should like to go as far in the ~~direction~~ of increasing the powers of the people as my Colleagues think we safely [illegible] further and I would ~~[illegible]~~ to a clear exposition of the present working of our local institutions to make the Govt. of India understand that our S. govt. is ~~[illegible]~~, so far as it goes, real not 'formal' and that accepting entirely the Viceroy's principles we are prepared to follow him ~~[illegible]~~ as fast as a conscientious study of the circumstances of South India ~~[illegible]~~ will permit us to do.

I am writing privately to the Viceroy in this spirit.

Mr Mackenzie's letter is another shocking example of the want of knowledge of our affairs in those who surround the Throne.

MGD

June 19/82

I cannot say that I accept entirely the Viceroy's 'principles' ~~except that~~ I must, I suppose. Let us have a Committee, Mr Webster, Mr Stokes, Mr Barlow, Mr Grigg (perhaps they had better [illegible] Mr Sullivan [illegible]) with Mr Benson as Secy — to consider & report what can be done, with the least chance of upsetting the two words 'local bounty' & 'municipalities'. Perhaps Col. Sankey or Col. Hasted [illegible] to be asked [illegible] the Committee. [illegible] 19/6

Local Self Government

I am quite prepared to accept the principles laid down in the resolution of India provided that in ~~appl~~ giving effect to them the brake is applied in the manner suggested by H.E. the Governor. Although in some parts of the country local self government shows signs of vigorous growth I fear that over a large portion of this Presidency local institutions must still be regarded as in their infancy and unfit to run alone. But Rome was not built in a day ~~[illegible]~~ are only 10 years old and the progress which has already been made in some districts gives every ground for anticipating that as education advances and (what is only of recent growth) a public spirit [illegible] is created, the [illegible] of the power to [illegible] their own affairs [illegible] wide [illegible] [illegible]

Administration must not be ~~imposed~~ thrust on the people - they must seek for it - Remember until they do it [illegible] concluded that they are unprepared [illegible] the task. What falls to me to do is to remove any obstacle in the way of a community desirous of advances tending to improve, to aid their initial efforts, to hold them up when they trip and set them on their feet when they fall, to guide & encourage them until the time comes when they can [illegible] support from [illegible].

This process of education was commenced in 1871 and [illegible] is now to consider in what manner and to what extent it may be expedient to develop the system - I appreciate Mr Carmichael['s] [illegible] that he should be but invited to come to a [illegible] after the matter has been well sifted thoroughly by a committee [illegible] which I should have much pleasure in presiding. Mr Stokes [illegible] [illegible] & [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Mr [illegible]

Should propose Mr Logan as the representative of a community differing in many respects from the people in other parts of the Presidency - The subject is one of ~~great~~ sufficient importance to warrant his being put on special duty for another month or two and he could at the same time complete his Malabar report - I should take the Northern Circars the represented and in this view to make Mr Leman a member of the Committee. He need not be put on special duty but could come up to Ootacamund from time to time having charge of ~~the~~ his District [illegible] Collector.

The points indicated in the Governor's minute are those to which the attention of the Committee should be chiefly directed.

Fresh legislation to a slight extent will I think be needed -

[illegible] the [illegible] [illegible]

the personnel of
the Com[illegible] are
proposed by [illegible]
Chair[illegible]
[illegible]
21/6/82

61

Papers to be read in Proceedings :—

Jun 30

Again G.O., dated 188 No.

Current No. 1593 of 1882, dated 31st May from the Govt. of India

Current No. 1449 of 188 , dated from

Order 29th June 82 No. 597

In their Resolution dated the 18th May 1882, No. 17/[illegible], the Government of India have recorded at length their more matured views which they have been led to entertain on the important subject of local self government since the [illegible] letter of the [illegible] last, No. 3515; and in the marginal letter [illegible] Governor [illegible]

Governor General of India in Council has comments on the statements placed before them by this Government.

While accepting, as a whole, the broad principles which have been laid down by the Viceroy in Council, the Government deem it desirable

(1) to set before the Government of India, without entering into controversy, [illegible] completeness of local self government actually in force in this Presidency and

[illegible]

and,

(2) to discuss the ways in which it may be possible to enlarge the scope of that system.

3 For this purpose His Excellency in Council resolves to appoint a Committee, nominating in the first instance the gentlemen marginally named to consider the subject and report what can be done to carry ~~out~~ into effect the views of the Viceroy, with due regard to the stability of

President.

Hon'ble A.C. Sullivan

Members.

Mr. E. Forster Webster
Col. R.H. Sankey. R.E., C.B.
Mr. A.B. Grigg
Mr. H.E. Stokes
M.R.Ry. ~~P. [illegible]~~ P. Chentsal Rao Avl
Mr. R.S. Benson — Secy.
M.R. Sashiah Sastri Avl
C.S.I.

of existing Municipalities
and Local Fund Boards.
The President of the
Committee will be at
liberty to add to the
Committee, specially by
calling in the aid of
native officials and
non-officials of expe-
rience. The corres-
pondence which has
already passed regar-
ding this matter, and
the notes which have
been recorded from time
to time, will be placed
at the disposal of

the

the Committee, as indica-
ting the direction in
which Government are
disposed to think that
extended powers may be
safely granted, and the
points which should
especially occupy their
attention.

E.W.

To
The Hon'ble H. E. Sullivan 6
C. Forster Webster Esqre. 3
Col. R. H. Sankey, R.E. C.B. 3
H. B. Grigg Esqre. 3
H. E. Stokes Esqre. 3
The Hon'ble A. Seshiah Sastri C.S.I. 3
M.R.Ry. P. Chentsal Rao Avargal 3
R. S. Benson Esqre. 3

Desp. 10/7/82

CURRENT 0.

1449} +
1593}

Approved in Comm
29.6.52

16-8-08

21-10-10

19-11-10

10-1-12 B III

6-2-13 B IV

18-8-15 B. IV

22-10-22 B

21/9/24 V

10/10/27 II

PRESS.

Fin. Department.

G.O. dated 29 June/82

No. 597

First copy sent to Press

Returned for signature

Despatched in print.

[Despatch Abstract.]

Decentralisation scheme

Appoints a Committee to report what can be done to carry into effect the views of the Viceroy on the subject of the extension of local self government.