

THE DISORDERS INQUIRY COMMITTEE

EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

Disorders Inquiry Committee

VOLUME

I

DELHI



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Volume I

PART I

Minutes of Evidence, Delhi

At Delhi, Friday, the 31st October 1919.

P R E S E N T :

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. JUSTICE RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble PANDIT JAGAT NARAYAN.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

SARDAR SAHIBZADA SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. H. G. STOKES, C.I.E., I.C.S., *Secretary*.

Mr. P. L. ORDE, Superintendent of Police, C. I. D.

By the President—

Q. I understand, Mr. Orde, you are the Superintendent of Police in the Criminal Investigation Department ?

A. I was.

Q. You propose immediately to go to Mesopotamia ?

A. To Persia.

Q. Do you start on Friday ?

A. To-night.

Q. On the 20th April last, did you receive certain instructions as regards making investigations about the disturbances ?

A. Yes, Sir. I was told to make enquiries to find out particularly what organization, if any, was responsible for the riots and whether they had any connection with the riots in other parts of India.

Q. In connection with that investigation, you availed yourself of the means at the disposal of the department to find out the causes ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Speaking generally, what was the result of your enquiry ?

A. I found that there was no organized conspiracy to rebel against Government at least in Delhi. I could find no connection between the Delhi riots and those in other parts of the country, except, so far as I could see, that they all sprang from the same cause.

Q. As regards these occurrences in March what were the conditions as regards political and economic unrest that prevailed in Delhi so far as they came within your cognisance ?

A. Political unrest in Delhi had been increasing since 1917. It really started in 1917. It had been increasing ever since then. During the Congress it became very bitter indeed, and it had no chance of subsiding when Mr. Gandhi's passive resistance movement was introduced.

Q. That movement was introduced in consequence, as I understand, of the passing of what is known as the Rowlatt Act ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was that about the beginning of March ?

A. Actually in Delhi the first meeting in connection with Mr. Gandhi's movement was I think on the 7th of March.

Q. And at that meeting was an association formed ?

A. Yes.

Q. *Satyagraha Sabha* ?

A. Yes.

Q. What is exactly *satyagraha* ?

A. I understand that, literally translated, it is a society of soul-force.

Q. There were a certain number of signatures to that ?

A. I think 14 actually at the time. More joined later on.

Q. That new society held certain meetings ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did it resolve upon *hartal* for a particular day ?

A. It was not the Delhi society that resolved upon that. It was Mr. Gandhi's programme for the whole of India.

Q. As regards *hartal*, perhaps you would in your own words describe what that is.

A. *Hartal* is a shop-keepers' strike.

Q. It is not a general strike ; it merely closes the shops ?

A. I think it only refers to shop-keepers ; and to business generally.

Q. That was to be held on the 30th, was it ?

A. Originally it was to be held on the 30th and Mr. Gandhi changed his plans later on to 6th April instead. The Delhi *Satyagraha Sabha* did not follow this alteration and they held theirs on the 30th.

Q. Was the *hartal*, as declared for the 30th, generally recognised by the shop-keepers in Delhi ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What conclusion did you draw from that as to whether the organization was complete for the declaration of a *hartal* ?

A. The organization for the *hartal* was very complete. I did not conclude from that that the organization intended that *hartal* should end in violence.

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Mr. P. L. ORDE.

[Continued.]

Q. About this time there had been meetings in which the objects of the Rowlatt Act were explained or supposed to be explained to the people?

A. Yes; in nearly all these meetings held under the auspices of the *Satyagraha Sabha*, attempts were made to explain the Rowlatt Act.

Q. Do you know what explanations were currently given as to the objects of the Rowlatt Act?

A. There were various general ideas, I do not say that they were explained at these meetings, but they were generally believed throughout the city and were not contradicted at the meetings. One was that the police would have power to arrest any three or four men conversing together. Another was that nobody should be allowed to own more than a certain amount of land. Another, which I think started from Mr. Patel's Hindu Marriage Bill, was to the effect that the marriage dowry will be confiscated by Government. Others said that nobody would be allowed to marry without leave from Government.

Q. These rumours caused considerable excitement in the town prior to the *hartal*?

A. They caused a great deal of resentment against the Rowlatt Act.

Q. On the 30th, I think the riot broke out at the railway station?

A. Yes.

Q. What do you know about the riot?

A. I was not personally present at the riot. At the time the riot took place, I was with the Chief Commissioner. I only arrived at the station after the firing took place. I was on the spot immediately afterwards, but I did not actually see the riots.

Q. What measures were taken when you went to the spot to quiet the rioters?

A. There were troops picqueted at Queen's Road and there were more troops to clear the crowd. There was actually very little crowd when I got there.

Q. How far are you cognisant of the subsequent procedure of that day?

A. I was in the city the whole of the rest of the day. I went from the Town Hall. I went down to see that the Chief Commissioner's orders regarding a meeting which was taking place in the Pipla Park were being obeyed. I met the crowd coming back from the meeting and it was quite orderly. There was a large crowd following Mr. Shradhdhanand. Just before I reached there I met a picket of Manipuris detained at the station who were being sent to the *Kotwali* to act as a reserve. The crowd was coming along. The picket of Manipuris formed up at the side of the road to let the crowd pass. The non-commissioned officer in charge when he saw the crowd advancing told them to load; apparently one of the shots went off into the air. When I arrived I found Shradhdhanand and the crowd surrounding the picket and adopting a very threatening attitude. The picket did not understand what Shradhdhanand and the other people were saying. I persuaded Shradhdhanand to go away and promised that I would enquire and took the Manipuris to the *Kotwali*.

Q. The shot that was fired did not do any harm?

A. No.

Q. Did you make any enquiries as to how there was firing?

A. I could not understand what the Manipuris said. I had a constable and he explained how it happened.

Q. What else occurred on that day so far as your knowledge goes?

A. There was a great deal of boycotting of tram-cars going on. Then there was a large crowd outside the Town Hall preventing anyone from travelling in tram-cars. As the tram-car came past, the crowd attacked and made the people who were inside come out. Those who refused to come out were pulled out. I reported this to the Deputy Commissioner and he told me to restore order with the help of cavalry. I took a troop of cavalry to the Chowk and retained it there. I came back again. When I came, a crowd had gathered there. It was not a very big crowd. There were about 70 or 80 people.

Their attitude was really that of passive resisters. They made no attempt to get away, or rather, they let us ride through and then formed up again. After arguing with them for some time, I reported to Deputy Commissioner that I could only clear this place and stop this boycotting of trams by force. He did not want to have any riot that day. So he told me to let them alone. Meanwhile the tram-cars had ceased running. So there was no necessity.

Q. There was no force used on that day?

A. No.

Q. Is that account carried down to the end of the day? Were there further incidents?

A. The only other incident was that I received information that a corpse had been hidden in the mosque. I also heard that it was intended to take out a very big procession with the corpse in the middle of the night. I thought it was necessary to avoid that; it might lead to further riot. I went to the mosque and inquired about it. I found that the corpse had been dressed for burial and they were unwilling to let me have it. I did not want to press the point. I got an assurance from them that no procession would be taken out and that if necessary the corpse should be handed over to the authorities next morning. I left it at that.

Q. Then did you make provision on that day for the maintenance of peace during the succeeding days?

A. Yes, Sir. We still retained possession of the Queen's Gardens and the railway station. Both were strongly picqueted. We had troops both in the Queen's Gardens and at the railway station. Reserves were kept in the police station. I am not sure whether we had pickets out that night or not.

Q. During that day were there any meetings of the *Satyagraha*?

A. The only meeting that I remember was the one in the Chandni Chowk where I met Munshi Ram or Swami Shradhdhanand. I also met him again when I was clearing the crowd in front of the clock tower—the crowd that was interrupting tram-cars. I am not quite sure of this. The attacking of the tram-cars was on the 31st March.

Q. Did the crowd quiet down during the evening?

A. They were distinctly quieter but they had a very hostile feeling. They resented the shooting that had taken place.

Q. Following upon the incidents of the 30th could you describe briefly the subsequent incidents of the later days so far as they come within your personal knowledge?

A. Order was being gradually restored in spite of a number of meetings at which very violent speeches were made. I think on the third or fourth day shops began to open and they remained open until the 6th when there was a *hartal*. There was a meeting of the *Satyagraha Sabha* to discuss the question of a *hartal* on the 6th, and they decided eventually by majority that it should not take place. But there were other forces at work and it eventually did take place and was as complete as the one on the 30th.

Q. Did rioting take place?

A. No rioting. The city was very carefully picqueted.

Q. When did the next riot take place?

A. The next riot was on the 14th of April. There was a meeting convened by a man called Abdul Majid with names of some others who I think did not exist and this meeting was held in King Edward's Park.

Q. Where is King Edward's Park?

A. Near the Juma Masjid. During several days previous to this, attacks had been made on the C. I. D. both by speakers at meetings and in newspapers. The attacks were entirely false. For instance, one of them was that C. I. D. agents had been responsible for the original riot of the 30th.

Q. Was there any foundation for that?

A. None whatever; another was that the C. I. D. were preparing to throw pigs' flesh into mosques and beef into Hindu temples with the idea of destroying the Hindu-Moslem *entente* that had been taking place. There were various other statements made which enraged the people considerably against the C. I. D. At the begin-

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[Continued.]

ning of this meeting one of the speakers stood up and said "There is a C. I. D. man taking notes" pointing his hand to him. The crowd immediately turned round and attacked this man who was perfectly innocent. He was not a C. I. D. man at all. They found out their mistake. Some people recognised a head-constable of the C. I. D. and attacked him. He was assaulted very severely. Later on, a C. I. D. Inspector attempted to rescue this man and he was also very brutally treated and finally taken to his house practically naked and suffering badly from *lathi* blows on the head and body. That was the only rioting which took place until the 17th.

Q. Well, then what measures were taken to deal with the rioting which led to these incidents?

A. As soon as we got information we took the cavalry and a strong body of police out to the King Edward's Park, but by the time we had got there the crowd had cleared away and there was practically nothing more to be done. We took possession of the place and questioned some of the persons there, but there was nothing to show that it had anything to do with the rioting. We went to the C. I. D. Inspector's house and took him to hospital. This time there was a threatening crowd, but they did nothing except shout and jeer at us. One or two stones were thrown, but there was no actual attack. The immediate cause of the disturbance was the presence of a C. I. D. man.

Q. Was it in connection with Mr. Gandhi's arrest that these meetings took place?

A. It was on account of Gandhi's arrest and return to Bombay that these meetings took place.

Q. He was sent back to Bombay about the 10th?

A. Yes, Sir. It was known the same day and there was a crowd at the railway station waiting to receive him and his private secretary arrived in the train and told them what had happened. They went straight off and wrote accounts for the press and decided on their course of action. They announced a meeting which was held I think on the banks of the *Junna* the next morning and declared a *hartal*.

Q. In connection with the rioting on the 14th were military forces called out?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was there any shooting on that day?

A. None whatever. The next occasion was the 17th.

Q. What was the nature and cause of that?

A. The leaders had been given a final chance to try and get the crowd under control without again resorting to force. They had asked for police assistance to picket the Chandni Chowk and the side roads leading into it. Meanwhile they had promised to get the shops opened. They succeeded fairly well in opening the shops. A large number had opened but the turbulent element was going around behind them persuading the shop-keepers to shut again. The police had orders to arrest anyone found doing so. They arrested one man in the act. There was a tremendous outcry at once. People were rushing up and down the road shouting to the shop-keepers to shut up their shops at once. About twenty minutes or half an hour later the hooligans collected and tried to rush one of our police pickets that was armed. We had information before that they intended to rush small police pickets and take their rifles and ammunition, so we doubled all the small pickets and attached them to the larger ones. This picket was attacked with *lathis* and stones and eventually had to open fire. Meanwhile a head-constable who did not belong to the picket and who was walking along the road unarmed was attacked with *lathis* and very nearly killed. We found him senseless on the road afterwards. As soon as this police picket fired, within I suppose five minutes, the place was cleared and the hooligans fled at once and practically never appeared again.

Q. Were there any casualties, and, if so, how many?

A. I am afraid I do not know the exact number but I think there were about 20 wounded which were known and probably several more besides.

Q. Then after the 17th was there any further rioting which took place?

A. No rioting at all, Sir.

Q. Then you started your special investigation on the 20th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Well as regards these special investigations, which you made, just give us a little information. You allege that there were allegations made from outside that Delhi was responsible for agitation going on there. From what districts were allegations made?

A. Gurgaon, Rohtak, Karnal, Ambala, Bulandshahr and Meerut.

Q. Are these places in the Punjab?

A. Some in the Punjab and some in the United Provinces.

Q. In consequence of these allegations you were given instructions, I think, for investigation to be made?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think you have given a statement to each member of the Committee as to the results of the investigations with reference to what was discovered as regards each individual?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you find that there was any connection established between emissaries from Delhi and any local promoters of the disturbances outside?

A. I could find no real connection between any of them. The connection, if any, was extremely vague.

Q. Was there anything in the nature of propaganda from Delhi which encouraged disturbances and *hartals* outside Delhi?

A. It did that certainly, particularly in regard to the press.

Q. Were allegations made as regards economic pressure being brought to bear by Delhi merchants upon customers?

A. Yes, Sir. We had many allegations of that type.

Q. Did you investigate that matter too?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What was the result of your investigation?

A. Practically the same as our investigations regarding the emissaries and the fact that a number of them were found to be absolutely false.

Q. There was a strike which took place on a railway station, not far from Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. When did that occur?

A. I think it was on the 31st. I am not certain.

Q. Did you investigate the question whether that was connected with the disturbances in Delhi?

A. I had nothing to do with that case at all.

Q. But that was judicially investigated, I think, by another officer?

A. It was investigated by a special Superintendent of Police and tried judicially afterwards.

Q. The period of disturbances, I suppose, you place between the 30th March and 17th April, is that so?

A. Yes.

Q. Were placards of an exciting character appearing on the walls of the city?

A. A number of manuscript posters and placards appeared on the walls.

Q. What action did you take with reference to them?

A. We tried to trace all of these. We succeeded in tracing several and as soon as we found out who had posted these up we made enquiries from him and about him, trying to connect him with any of the local agitators.

Q. By the local agitators you refer to the leaders who had signed the *Satyagraha* vow?

A. Yes.

Q. But the result of your enquiry was that nothing was found to connect them with the agitators?

A. Yes.

Q. I mean the leaders and those responsible for the placards?

A. We found that there was no connection.

Q. Then the question you had to deal with was whether there was any indication of joint action here as well as in the Punjab?

A. Yes.

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[Continued.]

Q. What was the result of your investigation?

A. I could find no connection there again, except in so far that it was being done at least at the beginning of the *hartal* under the orders of Gandhi as was the case in the Punjab also, and of course the causes in both cases seem to be similar.

Q. Did you further consider whether Bolshevik influence was behind?

A. We could find no trace of that at all, Sir.

Q. What was the result in your mind then as regards the cause of the original riot? What was the result of your investigations?

A. The cause was a pure accident. The lower orders had become rather discontented owing to the high prices and the difficulty of living, and these political speeches to which they had been listening for some months had excited them to an extent which perhaps we hardly realized. When the *hartal* actually took place they responded to it in a manner which we never expected and which the politicians themselves did not expect. The lower orders had nothing to do and they were simply searching for mischief. They heard that a sweetmeat seller had refused to shut up his business and the attempts made by them to make the sweetmeat seller to shut up his shop were resented by the railway authorities and they went down to the station. When they got there, they refused to believe that nobody had been arrested or that anyone who had been arrested had been released and the result was a riot.

Q. You said that the leaders, after the *hartal* had developed in the sense that violence had occurred, assisted the authorities or did their best in preventing the spread of violence?

A. The majority of them did, yes.

Q. So far as the Delhi outbreaks were concerned was there any exhibition of *anti*-British feeling?

A. The feeling was actually *anti*-British, for instance, in the case of the conductors of tram-cars in particular. Tram-cars were extremely useful to the citizens of Delhi and there was no reason whatever for boycott except the fact that it was a company managed by Europeans.

Q. But was there any indication of anything like an organised endeavour to destroy property belonging to Europeans as against Indians?

A. None whatever.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Just one thing, Mr. Orde, about the picqueting of people outside tram-cars. Do you think that the motive for that fact was that it was an English company really? Has not that occurred in other places where the same fact is not to be found?

A. It might have been at the beginning, but I do not think it would have lasted. I do not think that it was pure mischief in this case because they tried and succeeded to some extent in getting hackney carriage-drivers to take passengers through the city at the same rate as the tram-car so that it was merely an attack on the tramway company and not on the tram-cars themselves merely out of mischief.

Q. Don't you think that it may be accounted for by the view that the tram-cars were plying for hire and not, so to speak, conforming with the *hartal* and carrying on business as usual when they wanted the business to stop?

A. It may have been the first day but not afterwards.

Q. This incident about the double picquet, that was on the 17th? Were you present on that occasion?

A. I was in the Town Hall. The picquet was about 200 yards up the Chandni Chowk.

Q. You were not there then?

A. Not at the moment.

Q. Can you tell me how many men were there in the double picquet?

A. I think in this particular one there were 14 excluding two head-constables.

Q. Do you know whether they fired once or more than once?

A. The firing was not very regular. I think practically all the men fired but there was no volley fire.

Q. Was it not firing to order?

A. The order was, I think, independent fire.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Mr. Orde, you have spoken of certain misrepresentations with regard to the provisions of the Rowlatt Acts?

A. Yes.

Q. Those misrepresentations, were they made by any of the Delhi leaders of the sort you have described?

A. Certainly none of the grosser misrepresentations.

Q. Did you assure yourself how the misrepresentations arose? Did any of the recognised leaders make any such misrepresentation such as you have described?

A. Certainly none of the grosser misrepresentations.

Q. I am only referring to such things as you described, such as that three persons standing together would be arrested, that the produce of land would be annexed, that no person would be allowed to marry without the sanction of Government; I mean misrepresentations of that kind. Were they ever made by any of the recognised leaders?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Now during this rioting on the 30th March, you also told us there was no attempt to attack property or life?

A. On the 30th March?

Q. Yes. There was an attack on the railway station and all that happened was the breaking of some glass panes on that day?

A. That was all the material damage one could see. A few flower pots were knocked over.

Q. And there was no attack on any public buildings or Government buildings or banks or anything of that sort?

A. No, excepting the railway station. The railway station was the only building of that sort.

Q. And in the further disturbances too on the 16th or the 17th there was no attack on property again?

A. The only attacks of any sort were when the crowd was going to or returning from some meeting. They broke a number of electric lamps in the street and dust bins.

Q. As the result of all these disturbances from the 30th of March to 7th April, the only material damage was with regard to glass panes, flower pots at the station and a few lamps?

A. Yes.

Q. That is all the material damage resulting from these disturbances?

A. I am not referring to the Shakurpur case. This refers to Delhi only.

Q. On the 30th March, there was a huge meeting which Shradhdhanand addressed?

A. Yes.

Q. Consisting of about 25,000 people?

A. I did not see the crowd at the time.

Q. That was quite an orderly meeting, and there was no disturbance?

A. I did not see myself.

Q. It was never reported to you that there was any disorder?

A. No.

Q. Then there were a few funeral processions in the city carrying the dead bodies of those that were killed by the fire?

A. Yes.

Q. Those processions consisted of very large numbers?

A. Yes.

Q. There were both Hindus and Muhammadans?

A. Yes.

Q. Those processions were orderly; they did not create any disturbances at all?

A. I cannot call them orderly.

Q. They did not create any row or any disturbance?

A. No.

Q. No attacks?

A. I believe not.

Q. After the 30th of March, the shops remained open for three or four days?

A. Yes.

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[Continued.]

Q. Information about the Punjab disturbances came here about the 10th April?

A. I cannot remember the exact date.

Q. It must be about the 10th or 11th when information reached here?

A. The actual disturbances took place on the 10th.

Q. The news of what happened at Amritsar did not lead to any disturbance in Delhi at all?

A. Not till the 14th.

Q. On receipt of information as to what had happened at Amritsar, there was no disturbance in Delhi at all?

A. There was not certainly. But precautions were taken to prevent disturbances.

Q. In fact, no attempt was made to disturb the peace?

A. No.

Q. Unrest did not begin till information arrived of the supposed arrest of Mr. Gandhi?

A. But that information arrived before the news of the Punjab and Amritsar disturbances.

Q. Is that so?

A. I think so.

Q. I am not quite sure myself; you may be right.

A. I am not quite certain.

Q. Leading members or other leaders in Punjab did not intend that there should be any violence at all?

A. The majority did not intend it in Delhi.

Q. You have also told us that they did their best in maintaining order?

A. The majority of them.

Q. Certainly the leaders?

A. Yes.

Q. Some of them enrolled themselves as special constables to assist the authorities?

A. They could hardly be said to have enrolled themselves.

Q. They were enrolled?

A. They were directed to.

Q. Do you suggest that they were against being enrolled?

A. My point is that they had no option.

Q. They were ordered to be enrolled: they did enrol themselves and did what was assigned to them?

A. Yes.

Q. They did not make any difficulties in the way of carrying out the orders?

A. They made some minor difficulties, but nothing very serious. I cannot speak from personal knowledge.

Q. On 6th April, you had general *hartals* as you had in other parts of the country over the Rowlatt Act?

A. Yes.

Q. That passed off peacefully?

A. Yes.

Q. Huge meetings were held in Delhi?

A. Yes, several meetings.

Q. All those meetings were orderly?

A. They did not result in any riot.

Q. The incidents of the 17th April were largely due to the arrest of a person who was trying to get shops closed.

A. Yes.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. You were not present at the time when the firing took place?

A. Not actually on the spot.

Q. You cannot yourself from your own observation speak of the attitude of the crowd when they were actually fired on?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Certain damage was done to the railway station?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that done after the arrest of these men or before the arrest?

A. I cannot say as I was not there till afterwards.

Q. Can you give the committee the names of the persons who were arrested?

A. I do not even know that anyone was arrested. I believe there were two men who were detained for a short time, but I have no personal knowledge of it.

Q. Do you know that an attempt was made to bail those persons, *i.e.*, to let them out on bail?

A. I do not know; I was not present at the time.

Q. You have no knowledge of what occurred at the railway station?

A. I did not arrive until the riot at the railway station was over.

Q. Is it a fact that the crowd remained at the railway station for about 2 hours before there was actual firing upon some of the men?

A. I believe so, in and around the railway station.

Q. Have you ever seen the men who were arrested or shot dead, and the so-called sweetmeat seller who was assaulted?

A. No.

Q. Did he make any complaint?

A. I do not know; he may have complained to the railway police. He made no complaint to me.

Q. Now would you agree with me that if the two men had not been arrested, or if the crowd had believed that they were not arrested, there would have been no riot, and no fighting and what subsequently happened would not have occurred?

A. If they had believed it.

Q. Supposing they learnt that the men had been bailed out, or the crowd had believed that no men of their party were under arrest, would the serious results have followed?

A. I was not there personally. My opinion therefore is not of very much use. From what I have heard, I should think that the riot would probably have occurred in any case.

Q. Is it not a fact that a number of the people who had remained outside the railway compound had gone twice inside the station and the railway authorities at the station were able to turn them out from the railway platform and they went out of the railway platform, *i.e.*, before these riots happened?

A. I was not present at the time.

Q. You were of opinion that there was no conspiracy to rebel against the British Raj?

A. Yes.

Q. The leaders of the *Satyagraha* movement did not favour an attempt to overthrow the administration?

A. They did not favour it.

Q. No doubt the arrest of Mr. Gandhi caused great dissatisfaction?

A. It did undoubtedly.

Q. Were you personally present in any of the meetings subsequently held where speeches were made?

A. No.

Q. When you met Swami Shradhdhanand, he was leading and taking the whole crowd with him?

A. I do not know if he was taking the crowd with him. A crowd of 3 to 4 thousand was following him.

Q. Was he in any manner ill-treated when he complained to you about a shot being fired. You said you would make an investigation. Was he in any way maltreated or abused?

A. Not in front of me.

Q. Is it or is it not a fact that at that time several Gurkhas or Manipuris threatened to shoot him?

A. Not in front of me. When the crowd came too close, the Manipuris lowered their rifles and threatened them, but beyond that, they did nothing.

Q. What you have described about what happened at the clock tower about the Manipuris, that is also not your personal knowledge; you heard from the constable?

A. That is the same incident.

Q. The only personal knowledge you have is the talk which you had when you just arrived at the time and when a complaint was made as to what had happened. Previous to that you had no personal knowledge?

A. No.

31 October, 1919.]

Mr. P. L. ORDE.

[Concluded.]

By *Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan*—

Q. Am I right in assuming that when you started your investigation into the causes of the disturbances at Delhi, they were believed to be part and parcel of a general all-India movement?

A. That was believed.

Q. In connection with that you made enquiries not only in Delhi, but also in the districts?

A. My enquiries were limited to specific allegations made with reference to emissaries from Delhi.

Q. I assume you enquired in those places also?

A. Enquiries were made. I was in correspondence with the Police Superintendents of those places.

Q. Did you also enquire whether *hartals* occurred in those places also?

A. I had that information already.

Q. Did any riots take place in those places?

A. I believe none.

Q. Did you enquire why there were no riots there?

A. I did not enquire.

Q. Don't you think it very important to enquire into that?

A. I have never heard that a *hartal* necessarily need end in riot. I was not surprised that there had been a *hartal* and there had been no riot. I did not see any necessity to enquire why there had not been a riot; I should be more surprised if there had been one.

Q. The riot in Delhi consisted of the breaking of window in the station and throwing certain stones? That is all?

A. I was not there on the site.

Q. Attempts were made to force people to get out? It is what I understand.

A. There was a certain amount of that.

Q. There was nothing else to your knowledge?

A. There was no other material damage done.

Q. Nobody else was molested in any way?

A. Certain number of people were molested; for instance, the servants of Europeans to some extent were hampered in buying food.

Q. On the 30th of March?

A. Yes. I met a European who complained that the crowd had forced him to stop his motor-car, and I think the hood of the motor-car was torn. He said he had only been allowed to go because he was not an official. That is all I remember.

Q. In connection with the incident of the Manipuris was any complaint at the time made to you by *Shraddha-nand* that violence had been offered?

A. He told me that the crowd had been fired upon by the Manipuris.

Q. And did you investigate that?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What was the result of the investigation?

A. As far as I could ascertain the non-commissioned officer in charge of the Manipuri picquet had ordered them to load when he saw the apparently threatening attitude of the crowd advancing upon him and in the act of loading one of the rifles had gone off in the air.

Q. There was no intention of aiming at anyone whatever?

A. No. In fact if a man from the Manipuri picquet had aimed, somebody in the crowd would have been hit as the crowd was very dense.

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The Hon'ble Mr. C. A. BARRON.

At Delhi, Monday, the 3rd November 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, KT.

SARDAR SAHIBZADA SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. H. G. STOKES, C.I.E., I.C.S., Secretary.

The Hon'ble Mr. C. A. BARRON, C.I.E., I.C.S., Chief Commissioner of Delhi.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Barron, you are the Chief Commissioner of Delhi?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I just want to get in your words if you know as to whether in March of this year there were existing causes of political and economical unrest and what those were?

A. Delhi was in a more excited state than usual in March owing to various political movements which had been more or less centering on Delhi for the past few months.

Q. Delhi had started to take a more active interest in political questions than had previously been the case?

A. Much more so than a few years ago.

Q. Was there a certain amount of feeling in connection with the economic conditions prevailing subsequent to the war?

A. The extremely high prices and the length of time that they remained high certainly had some effect on the poorer classes in creating an atmosphere which could easily be worked up into serious trouble.

Q. I think there was a good deal of political discussion during the Christmas holidays?

A. We had the meetings of the Indian National Congress and the Moslim League, and very nearly thirty other political and social societies met during the Christmas week in Delhi.

Q. Afterwards was Delhi affected by the agitation in connection with what is known as the Rowlatt Legislation?

A. Very much so. The Imperial Council was actually meeting in Delhi to pass the Rowlatt Act.

Q. When was the Rowlatt Act passed?

A. In the beginning of March.

Q. I think on the 7th of March Mr. Gandhi had a public meeting?

A. Yes; but there were meetings before this in February after the Bills had been published. There were two Bills.

Q. On the 7th of March was a local *Satyagraha Sabha* founded?

A. Yes, it was founded then. Mr. Gandhi came and held a meeting to inaugurate the *Sabha*.

Q. A number of the most prominent Home Rule Leaguers joined that *Sabha*?

A. About 13 or 14; at the commencement mostly members of the local Home Rule League.

Q. Was one of the objects of that association to have a *hartal* or a day of general abstinence or prayer?

A. That was a manifestation that came afterwards. The idea of the *Sabha* was to secure the repeal of the Rowlatt Act by passive resistance, as it is called, and disobeying of laws.

Q. The suggestion was that the *hartal* should take place on the 30th of March?

A. That was the original suggestion made from Bombay.

Q. I think before the 30th of March, Mr. Gandhi had altered his views as regards having a *hartal* on that date?

A. It was arranged that an All-India *hartal* should take place on the 6th April, the following Sunday.

Q. Did you in consequence of knowledge that this *hartal* was to take place make any arrangements as regards keeping order?

A. Police arrangements were made according to the information we received. But up till the evening of the 29th the information was that it was not certain whether the *hartal* on the 30th would be a general one or not.

Q. How do you account for the very general character of the *hartal* on the 30th?

A. The organization had eventually got to work more completely than we had expected.

Q. But orders, I think, were given that the police were to hold themselves in readiness in case of any disturbance?

A. Yes, all the police officers were ordered to be at their posts, and the police reserve was held in readiness in the lines at the various police stations under the orders of Mr. Marshall, the Superintendent of Police.

Q. You have given a detailed account of what occurred on the 30th of March in a letter, dated the 31st March, to the Secretary to the Government of India?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Is this (Enclosure No. 1*) the form in which you submitted that report?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You have also submitted to the Committee Colonel Beadon's inquest order?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And the Magistrate's orders in the riot case that resulted?

A. Yes, the riot of the 30th March.

Q. Was that Mr. Currie?

A. Lala Bishan Das was the Magistrate who tried that case.

Q. Now would you indicate shortly what was the result of the information that was put before you as to the events that occurred on the 30th?

A. The members of the *Sabha* and their associates having been successful in closing nearly all the shops in the city, some of them heard that the contractor for selling food and sweet-meats at the 3rd class entrance to the railway station was continuing his work, and a body of men went down to try and stop him. He objected and appealed to the railway authorities and the railway police. Two men, who were interfering with him, were arrested, and this led to the crowd invading the station to secure their rescue. Several of the railway officials were assaulted. A certain amount of railway property was destroyed, and the railway authorities had to call in assistance of some soldiers who were on the platform to drive the crowd out of the railway precincts. Informa-

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[Continued.]

tion as to this was sent up to the police lines and the reserve hurried down with Mr. Jeffreys. Mr. Marshall followed with Sowars. By the time they got down, as far as I was informed, the crowd had been pushed back to the railing in front of the station yard. Mr. Marshall tried to drive them back further on both sides down the Queen's Road and into the garden in front. They were assaulted with brickbats and stones and the situation became very serious. Endeavours were made to clear the crowd for nearly two hours. Mr. Currie, the Additional District Magistrate, had arrived on the spot sometime before, and he agreed that the military would have to fire on the crowd to get them away. Two volleys, I think, were fired. He then drove back the crowd with the assistance of more troops obtained from a train that was standing in the station yard. The crowd was gradually driven back through the Queen's Garden to the other side and down the roads. There the police tried to hold the west gate of the Garden but were again assailed with brickbats and stones and again a couple of volleys had to be fired which dispersed the crowd.

Q. What casualties were caused in consequence of the firing?

A. As far as we can discover eight people were killed on the two occasions and two more died two or three days afterwards in the hospital. There were only about a dozen people who came to the civil hospital for treatment of their wounds in addition to this.

Q. What was the age of the youngest who was killed or wounded?

A. Of the killed, 22 or 23 according to the Civil Surgeon.

Q. Among the wounded were there any young boys?

A. There were two or three boys of 12 or 13 years of age. All through the riot small boys were put in the front row and it was with difficulty that they were avoided in shooting.

Q. How do you account for so small a number of young boys being among the wounded?

A. That was due to the coolness of Sergeant Kemsley of the Bedfordshire Regiment who warned his men to shoot high in order to avoid the boys in the front line.

Q. Were you able to form any opinion as to whether any reckless firing took place or not?

A. No. It was very methodical and kept under complete restraint.

Q. Was the situation at the time when action was taken a very serious situation?

A. Very, I should say.

Q. Then I think a further draft of military came upon the scene in addition to those you have referred to?

A. Yes, to maintain order we got in some cavalry from New Cantonments. They paraded the Chandni Chowk, the precincts of the Queen's Garden and the road round about. This patrolling of the Chandni Chowk was effective in restoring order.

Q. In the evening was a request made to you as to the holding of a meeting that had been arranged before by the people themselves?

A. The question was whether such a meeting should be allowed in the existing condition of the city.

Q. What decision did you come to?

A. After discussing the matter with the principal speakers at the meeting I allowed the meeting to take place on condition that no inflammatory speeches were made and that after the passing of the resolution on the Rowlett Act the meeting was to disperse quietly and the people should go to their homes.

Q. Who were the three principal speakers you refer to?

A. One was Munshi Ram alias Shradhdhanand, the two others Muhammad Shuaib and Dr. Abdul Rahman. They came forward when I beckoned to them to come forward and talk to me.

Q. In point of fact did the meeting pass off without any further rioting?

A. Yes. They dispersed quietly.

Q. To what did you attribute that?

A. The show of military force that we had in the streets close by and at the Railway Station.

Q. After this meeting was there a shooting incident as regards the Manipuri regiment?

A. A man let off his rifle accidentally in the air when his native officer called on his men to load. They met the crowd, as they were coming back from the meeting, in the Chandni Chowk.

Q. That is the incident which Mr. Orde referred to?

A. Yes, he came up just in the nick of time and prevented any further trouble.

Q. About 7 o'clock did things appear to have quieted down?

A. When darkness came on the people seemed to have gone to their houses and the city was quiet.

Q. Were police and military disposition made at the Railway Station for the purposes of maintaining order? Were they made under your authority?

A. General Drake-Brockman was also there at the time. He and I were responsible.

Q. After the 30th March were there one or two other outbreaks in the city?

A. There was another riot on the 14th April and another on the 17th.

Q. I think there is a detailed record of the events day by day in your letter of the 17th April 1919, and also in Colonel Beadon's diary that you have submitted to the Committee. Now would you summarise, for our benefit, the situation as it was reported to you from day to day?

A. Talking first the 31st; that was chiefly occupied by the funerals of victims of the riot of the day before. On the 1st April shops began to open again.

Q. In connection with the funerals I think application was made to you as regards relatives getting the bodies?

A. Not exactly to me but to the Deputy Commissioner. He sanctioned it at once.

Q. Then you say shops began to open on the 2nd and 3rd things began to assume a more normal appearance?

A. There was a large meeting on Friday, the day for prayers in the Jama Masjid which led to a great deal of excitement. Hindus were admitted into the mosque and joined in giving lectures after the prayers.

Q. What date was that?

A. Friday, the 4th April.

Q. Then on the 5th the question was whether the general *hartal* ordered for the 6th would take place or not?

A. The local leaders, so far as we understood, did not wish it to take place, but they were overcome by their supporters and on the 6th a complete *hartal* did take place.

Q. There were no disturbances in connection with it?

A. We had very complete military and police arrangements.

Q. During this period posters were put up on the city walls?

A. I think they began after about the 10th, on places like the Clock Tower and other prominent places.

Q. Did you dispense with military assistance after the incidents of the 30th?

A. We sent the troops back to cantonments whenever we thought that it was safe to do so. We watched the situation very carefully. We did not wish to keep the troops out longer than was necessary.

Q. When did you know whether another *hartal* was to be held?

A. On the evening of the 5th we understood that it would be held in the next day. We called in the troops and posted them at their emergency stations.

Q. What do you mean by emergency stations?

A. Various important points in the city where they would be available at once.

Q. On the 6th April was there a complete *hartal* observed?

A. Yes; with the result that all the shops were again closed.

Q. Was there a large meeting in one of the mosques?

A. Yes, in the Fatehpuri mosque; that was again distinguished by Hindus being allowed to speak in the mosque.

Q. During that day was there any disturbance?

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[Continued.]

A. No actual disturbance. The city was in a very excited state.

Q. In the evening the British troops were withdrawn from certain points where they had been stationed?

A. Having had no actual trouble we thought it safe to let them go home.

Q. Were certain meetings allowed to be held on that day?

A. Yes, I think at Pataudi House and another in the Pipal Park. They helped to keep the crowd occupied.

Q. Is it your experience that if a crowd is unoccupied there is a danger of rioting?

A. They might at any time turn to looting shops or destroying property.

Q. On the 7th, 8th and 9th April were shops reopened?

A. They opened gradually.

Q. Did normal conditions appear to be returning?

A. They seemed to be.

Q. Was there still some excitement manifest in the city?

A. The speeches at the meetings did not help to quiet things. References were made to the people who had been killed in the riot as martyrs, and various exciting speeches were made.

Q. Now on the morning of the 9th of April was an order made by you with reference to Mr. Gandhi?

A. I got permission from the Government of India, to issue orders excluding him from Delhi and confining him to the Bombay Presidency.

Q. You requested authority to issue that order? What was your reason for asking for that authority?

A. He had inaugurated his passive resistance and disobedience-to-laws movement the day before in Bombay, on the 7th, and the presumption was that he was coming to Delhi to continue the movement. That would probably have led to his arrest, a possible attempt at rescue and a very serious disturbance with possibly great loss of life.

Q. You had suggested a similar step previously—on the 31st March?

A. Yes; immediately after the first riot when it was expected that he would probably come up to Delhi from Bombay.

Q. But at that time it was not considered necessary?

A. No; he had not openly defied the law at that time.

Q. Where was Mr. Gandhi stopped on his way to Delhi?

A. At a small station—Palwal—in the Punjab. An order had been issued excluding him from the Punjab.

Coming up by that particular line he had to pass through the Punjab, and as soon as he got into the Punjab the orders were served on him and he was sent back to Bombay.

Q. Was he not arrested?

A. Well, he was taken back under surveillance.

Q. When did it become generally known that Mr. Gandhi had been taken back?

A. It was known that evening. There were about 50 or 60 people at the Delhi station to await his arrival. His servant told them what had happened.

Q. Did you think it advisable to make special arrangements as regards keeping order for the 10th?

A. We took the same precautions as before expecting that the shops might again be shut.

Q. Was there a general closing of the shops on the 10th?

A. Yes, very complete again.

Q. Now so far as the leaders of the *Satyagraha* were concerned were they taking any part in the closing of the shops at this time?

A. I do not think so. The lower orders had got out of hand. The leaders were no longer able to control the crowd. That was the view of the principal men. The minor leaders were suspected of stirring up trouble from behind.

Q. Was it on this night that word came of the disturbances at Amritsar and Lahore?

A. Yes, at dinner time, on the night of the 10th.

Q. Did you anticipate any occurrence in Delhi in consequence of what you heard?

A. Yes; we were going to remove some of our military precautions. But we arranged at once to have them in full force again next morning in case of trouble.

Q. Did anything of serious note occur on the 11th?

A. No; but the collecting of crowds in the city looked unpleasant in places.

Q. Had your Deputy Commissioner several meetings with the leaders of the *Satyagraha* movement?

A. Yes; in order to try and see whether they could not get the *hartal* closed.

Q. Were these meetings successful?

A. They had very little result, from which we concluded that the leaders had lost control.

Q. On the morning of the 14th, did you get news of an incident that occurred at Shakurpur?

A. Yes; in the very early morning a telephone message was received by me that there had been a strike in the railway yard there and the mail train which left Delhi the evening before had had to be turned back.

Q. I think that matter was dealt with by Mr. Currie in his magisterial capacity in connection with a case that came before him?

A. Yes.

Q. You have submitted to us a statement of what occurred there?

A. Yes, a statement and a copy of his judgment.

Q. Was that incident, so far as you are aware, connected with the disturbances in Delhi?

A. Yes. It was probably caused by sympathy among the Railway people with the general stoppage of work in Delhi.

Q. During the course of the morning of the 14th, were certain reports received as regards people who desired to work but were not allowed to work?

A. Yes, the Railway authorities reported that their men were being stopped from coming to work, and some of the offices in the city and men in my own office reported the same thing.

Q. In consequence of that was any measure taken by you?

A. We decided to issue an order referring to section 188 of the Indian Penal Code, prohibiting and forbidding intimidation. If any one disobeyed the order and intimidated, he became liable to a small penalty under that section.

Q. Now was a report made to you by one of the banks as regards holding a holiday on the 14th?

A. Yes; I got a telephone message that the clerks in one of the banks were thoroughly frightened and their officers could not get any work out of them. I consulted the other banks and decided to declare a general holiday under the Negotiable Instrument Act. That holiday had to be maintained on the next two days.

Q. The four succeeding days were the Easter holidays?

A. From the 18th.

Q. Did you have a meeting yourself on the 14th in the Town Hall with some of the members of the Home Rule party?

A. I asked about a dozen leaders to come and meet me there to discuss the situation.

Q. And what occurred at that meeting?

A. They asked for time till next morning; they were to see whether they could not get the shops opened. I adjourned the meeting till 10 o'clock the next morning in consequence.

Q. After that meeting did an unfortunate incident occur at the King Edward Park?

A. Yes; a C. I. D. inspector was very badly assaulted at a meeting at the King Edward Park.

Q. Was there a public meeting taking place in the King Edward Park?

A. It was apparently called by some of the minor leaders, while I held the meeting in the Town Hall with the principal men.

Q. Did that meeting disperse on the appearance of the district magistrate and the troops?

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[Continued]

A. He rode up with a troop of cavalry from the Queen's Gardens as soon as he heard of the disturbance and the meeting melted away in front of him.

Q. Was there any firing on that occasion?

A. There was no firing.

Q. That incident is dealt with in the judgment of Mr. Currie of the 21st of July?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 15th of April had you further meetings with some of the leaders?

A. Yes; I had adjourned the meeting in the morning at which the leaders said that there were too few of them to make any real difference to the populace. They asked me to hold another meeting in the afternoon, at which a large number of the leading shop-keepers would be summoned. About 150 to 200 men must have been there belonging to the various trades.

Q. Where did these meetings take place?

A. In the Town Hall.

Q. Were there many crowds in the neighbourhood?

A. Crowds gradually collected in the Chandni Chowk outside during both meetings. The police and troops were guarding the Town Hall; the gates of the Queen's Gardens were shut to keep off the crowd that collected in the street outside. The crowds are supposed to have been collected on the rumour that we had brought the leaders together at the Town Hall in order to arrest them.

Q. What was the attitude of the crowd?

A. It became more and more threatening until the leaders appeared and the people saw that they were safe. Then they followed the leaders away. Towards the end of the second meeting it seemed to be touch and go whether there would not be a collision with the troops and police.

Q. Had any members of the crowd weapons?

A. A large number had big bamboo *lathis*.

Q. Towards the end of the afternoon of that day, were some of the shops opened?

A. A few shops were opened and we heard that a few goats had been slaughtered in the slaughter-house to show that that was open too.

Q. The prospects then looked better for the cessation of the *hartal*?

A. Yes; this got us out of the vicious circle we were in. The first business done in the morning is the opening of the slaughter-house. The Hindu shop-keepers had refused to open their shops at 8 or 9 o'clock, because the slaughter-house had not started at 5-30 or 6 a.m. Of course the slaughter-house people could adduce the same argument about the opening of their business before the shops opened. We got the slaughter-house opened that afternoon and also a few shops in the hope that all would open next morning.

Q. Was that on the morning of the 16th?

A. Yes.

Q. Were your hopes realized?

A. No. The slaughter-house was not opened; no butchers turned up to slaughter; and the arrangement was a *fiasco*.

Q. At this time what was the attitude of the leaders with whom you had had negotiations?

A. They seemed very anxious to put a stop to the disturbances. I think that at that time a good number of the leaders were really helping.

Q. On the morning of the 17th, were a number of shops open?

A. Yes; on the 17th they did open and we arranged for police protection to those that did.

Q. Where were these shops that opened situated?

A. A good many were in the Chandni Chowk, the principal bazaar in the town, and many of the suburban shops too were opened.

Q. On the opening of shops, did you take any measures as to protecting the people who wanted to open their shops?

A. We sent a number of police picquets down the streets to inspire confidence.

Q. The English banks in the Chowks also opened?

A. I asked them to open as an example to the rest of the bazaar, and they did so. They were only opened for a short time.

Q. Were these measures successful in bringing the strike to an end?

A. They might have been except for the hooligans who came behind the police picquets and tried to close such shops as were opening. This led to the arrest of one man and an attack on a police picquet.

Q. That was on the 17th?

A. Yes.

Q. What sort of attack was made on the police picquet?

A. I was not there myself. A large crowd attacked the picquet at the end of Ballimaran Street where it joins the Chandni Chowk and tried to get their carbines away from them. One head-constable was nearly killed by a blow on the side of the head; the weapon was a large bottle as far as could be learned afterwards. The blow smashed the whole of one side of his head.

Q. In consequence of that occurrence, the police used arms?

A. When they were afraid of being robbed of their carbines, the police did fire in self-protection.

Q. What was the result of their firing?

A. That seemed to restore immediately the authority of the police and stopped all further trouble. The crowd at once left the Chandni Chowk.

Q. How many people were killed or injured in consequence of the police firing?

A. Eighteen were reported wounded with buckshot, two of whom subsequently died.

Q. Did the military assist in putting down this disturbance?

A. We sent cavalry through the main bazaars and a detachment of Native Infantry went through others with the Deputy Commissioner.

Q. What action did the Infantry take?

A. If they saw any one with a *lathi*, they chased him; the *lathiwalas* at once dropped their *lathis* and fled; a large number of *lathis* were then picked up and brought in.

Q. At the commencement of this disturbance did the shops in Chandni Chowk close?

A. They closed at once on the cry being raised that a man had been arrested. The rumour was that a boy had been bayoneted and thrown into the Queen's Gardens. It was quite unfounded.

Q. I think earlier in the day you had troops placed at different points?

A. Yes.

Q. But they were not called upon on that date to take action?

A. No. They did not actually take part in the firing. They were on guard.

Q. In the afternoon did you make any notification under the Seditious Meetings Act?

A. Yes. The Government of India extended the Seditious Meetings Act to Delhi and I issued a notification prohibiting any further meetings in public places without permission.

Q. Did you report that action to Simla?

A. Yes, it was with the sanction of Simla that I took it.

Q. Did you consider whether it was necessary to declare martial law?

A. At that time immediately after this riot it looked as if it would be impossible to restore order without martial law, and I suggested to the Government of India that martial law should be extended to Delhi.

Q. And in reply to your request?

A. I was instructed to give my reasons more fully in writing. I submitted my report on the events of the day that evening, in which I said that I would consult the General Officer Commanding the Brigade and the Deputy Commissioner on the subject and would report next day.

Q. Fortunately you were able to dispense with the necessity of making a further application?

A. By the next day the situation had cleared to such an extent that I did not renew my application.

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[Continued.]

Q. The shops were opened on the 18th?

A. Most of the shops in the suburbs and a certain number in the main bazaars; the Chandni Chowk did not open properly till the 19th.

Q. On the 19th was the *hartal* brought to an end?

A. Yes, definitely closed.

Q. To what did you attribute the termination of the *hartal*?

A. Chiefly to the restoration of authority by the action of the police, and to a rumour which spread that martial law was about to be extended to Delhi if this had not already been done. The results of the application of martial law in cities in the Punjab were also becoming known. Another reason, of which it is impossible to estimate the exact force, was that the people were tired of the whole thing and of the losses they were suffering from their enforced idleness.

Q. Was this period through which you passed a difficult and anxious one for those in authority?

A. It was one of great tension and we were extremely anxious throughout the whole period lest there should be further collisions between the police and the troops and the people and there should be more bloodshed than had already taken place.

Q. In connection with the mobs that collected were there any that belonged to the criminal classes?

A. They were composed of the lower orders. A number of them belonged to what are called the inferior trades.

Q. Was there any danger of order being completely overturned?

A. There was not very much danger. We took complete precautions to prevent it. There would however have been a very serious disturbance and much loss of life if once it had started.

Q. Did anything happen to the local *Satyagraha Sabha*?

A. We learnt some days afterwards that the association had resolved to dissolve on the evening of the 17th. They burnt the list of members and all the papers on which the vows had been recorded.

Q. Have you had since that date any further *hartal* declared in Delhi?

A. We had one the other day. There was an arrangement for a *hartal* for the rest of India on the 25th April but that did not materialise. But we had one the other day on the 17th October.

Q. In connection with the action taken by the police and the troops what was the view you formed as head of the local Government here?

A. I thought they did their work with great restraint and in a very orderly fashion.

Q. Was any effort made about this time to alienate either the police or the military?

A. We had one case of a man entering the lines of the 69th Punjab at Raisina. He was a dismissed sepoy and tried to tamper with his ex-comrades. He was arrested and he is now serving a long term of imprisonment. There was another case reported of a man whom the men of the 16th Cavalry described as a "babu." They contented themselves with turning the man out of their lines. After that the General issued an order that any one coming into the lines for this purpose was to be arrested.

Q. During this period were false rumours in circulation as to occurrences elsewhere?

A. There were a number of these rumours as regards occurrences in the Punjab. For instance it was rumoured that the Golden Temple at Amritsar had been bombed, and that a party of Sikh girls were searched in a train with indignity. These were intended to stir up the Sikhs.

Q. Could you find out who was responsible for circulating these rumours?

A. No. They came down from further north. It was impossible to find out who circulated them. They appeared with comments in a number of newspapers.

Q. Of the local newspapers?

A. Yes, and papers published further down country in Bombay and Allahabad.

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Q. Circulating in Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. I do not know if you referred to them before but were there any rumours in circulation as to the effect of the Rowlatt legislation?

A. Very distorted descriptions were given of what the effect of the Act was to be.

Q. Were these rumours circulated in the town and also in the country districts?

A. Yes, they were put into very general circulation.

Q. What was the nature of the misleading remarks as regards the Rowlatt Act?

A. The principal one was that very extraordinary powers were to be given to the police to arrest two or three people seen talking together and to search houses, and also as regards interference with people carrying on their ordinary avocations.

Q. As regards the strike that took place, have you had any experience of similar strikes in Delhi before?

A. Yes. We have had strikes of individual trades. Once a few years ago the butchers went out on strike for a whole month but the rest of the town did not follow.

Q. This was a general strike?

A. It was enforced upon any one who did not wish to take part in it.

Q. Have you had any experience of a similar strike, so general as the present one?

A. Not personally. Never.

Q. Was it in your view necessary to employ military to deal with the situation that arose?

A. Absolutely. We could not have restored order without the assistance we got from the troops.

Q. Did you find traces of any organized attempt to destroy property or take life on the part of the crowd?

A. No. Not in Delhi.

Q. You have referred, I think, on one or two occasions to damage to property. The whole damage that occurred in Delhi was not a serious matter, was it?

A. The estimate made under the Police Act comes to about Rs. 36,000 and Rs. 68,000 for the extra police that had to be employed.

Q. Were public institutions attacked?

A. No, excepting the Railway Station.

Q. Did you see any indication of any special attack on Europeans?

A. No. There were a few cases where Europeans were made to get off their bicycles and get out of their motor cars. That was connected with the general *hartal*.

Q. As regards the people who were involved in the riots, a number of them were tried subsequently?

A. A good number.

Q. About when were they arrested?

A. Within the next few days when we were able to restore order and the police were able to get information.

Q. How did the trials proceed?

A. In the ordinary course under the Penal Code. The Shakurpur case was tried under the Telegraph Act and the Railway Act.

Q. Were there any orders issued during that time as regards the pre-censoring of newspapers?

A. Yes, about the 3rd week of April, orders were issued for the pre-censoring of four local papers.

Q. Which papers were these?

A. The "Congress". The "Vijaya," the "Inqilab" and the "Qaum".

Q. What was the effect of censoring these papers in your opinion?

A. It was entirely good. The "Inqilab" (the meaning of the word is revolution) and the "Qaum" ceased publication. The "Congress" and "Vijaya" after continuing for a little while also ceased publication. The two latter have since been revived.

Q. After these disturbances did Delhi settle down immediately to normal conditions?

A. Not entirely. There was a considerable amount of excitement owing to the news from the Punjab, Ahmedabad and other places. Also in the month of May there came the additional excitement of the Afghan war.

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The Hon'ble Mr. C. A. BARRON.

[Continued]

Q. After the Afghan war a public meeting was held I think on the 13th May?

A. Yes, it was a meeting convened by the principal leaders to express their loyalty to Government and detestation of the Amir's action in attacking India.

Q. Had that meeting a good effect on the people?

A. It was a good thing that such a meeting could take place, but I am not quite sure that it had very much effect generally.

Q. Did you hear any complaints about pressure being brought to bear by the Delhi merchants?

A. Yes, several complaints reached me towards the end of April from the neighbouring districts.

Q. You arranged that that matter should be investigated by the Criminal Intelligence Department.

A. Yes, we did our best to enquire into any of the charges that gave scope for investigation.

Q. The result of the investigation was given by Mr. Orde?

A. Yes.

Q. Then there was a matter brought to your notice as to propagandists going from Delhi into the neighbouring districts and causing agitation?

A. Yes, there were several allegations of that nature.

Q. What was the result?

A. It was very difficult to get any definite information. There were certain cases in which this was proved to be true and a number in which it was proved to be false.

Q. Did you have any investigation as to the Railway Strike?

A. A special investigation was made by an officer from the United Provinces Police to discover whether there was any organisation at the back of the Railway strike. The results were negative.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. I understand, Mr. Barron, that with the exception of the occasion when one of the Manipuri's rifles is said to have gone off, there were three occasions in all on which there was firing upon the crowd—one on the 30th March, the second a little later on at the Clock Tower, and the third the incident of the Ballimaran Street on the 17th. Is that so?

A. The first and second were practically all one transaction; they were within half an hour of each other. These were the only three occasions on which firing took place.

Q. On the 30th an attack was made at the Railway station?

A. I arrived soon after the second bout of firing. The station was clear but the place was littered with bricks and stones and the railing outside on the Queen's Gardens wall in front had been torn down.

Q. Did you notice anything else?

A. There were stones lying about inside the Garden gate. There were also a large number of stones and bricks at the Town Hall when I went there. Two dead bodies were brought into the station while I was there. The railings immediately in front of the railway yard were torn down—immediately in front of the main entrance—i.e., the railings of the Queen's Gardens on the other side of the road.

Q. The railing on the inner side—was that intact?

A. That is a brick wall.

Q. Did you proceed to the Clock Tower?

A. I rode there through the garden with General Drake-Brockman.

Q. When you got there what did you see?

A. By that time order had been restored—the Cavalry were in the Chandni Chowk—troops of cavalry were moving up and down.

Q. Was there any crowd in the Chandni Chowk near the Clock Tower?

A. There was a considerable crowd at some distance off more or less watching what was happening.

By Sir C. H. Setalwad—

Q. You told us that you instructed Mr. Orde to investigate the matter of these disturbances and various

allegations made in connection with them—in connection with emissaries and propaganda and he made a report? You have seen that report. We have been supplied with a copy. Do you agree generally with his conclusions?

A. On the whole I do.

Q. Was there any organised conspiracy—any attempt at rebellion against the British power?

A. No, we did not find any evidence to that effect.

Q. Was there any connection between the disturbances at Delhi and the disturbances in the Punjab and other places?

A. I would not quite say there was no connection. The causes of the disturbances in both places were very much the same.

Q. Do you suggest that somebody from Delhi went to stir up trouble in the Punjab and Bombay?

A. Well, the *satyagraha* movement had started in Bombay and the effect of that was felt in Delhi.

Q. Is there any evidence to suggest that people from Delhi stirred up disturbances either in the Punjab or Ahmedabad or vice versa?

A. No, I did not find any evidence to that effect.

Q. Now with regard to leaders and minor leaders. Who do you call minor leaders?

A. Men working immediately under the principal men.

Q. Can you name any?

A. I can give some names.

Q. Who are the principal leaders?

A. I will put men like Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari, Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh and Rai Sahib Peare Lal and two or three more men of that stamp. The minor leaders were men like for instance Shankar Lal, the Secretary to the local Home Rule League and Abdul Majid, a man who has been absconding ever since the King Edward Park riot, which he started. There was another man who might be called a minor leader named Abdulla, Churiwala.

Q. Do you agree that the principal leaders never intended to resort to violence and that they did their best to assist the authorities?

A. I am sorry to say that the results of their efforts were very small. They tried their best. They were not able to control the men immediately below them and several of the minor men were working against the bigger men.

Q. The whole damage done in Delhi during the disturbances was at the railway station. What happened at the railway station beside the breaking of the glass panes, the flower pots and the railing?

A. I forgot to mention that the Deputy Station Superintendent on the platform had his coat torn off his back. There was also a certain amount of municipal property destroyed on the evening of the 14th after one of the Town Hall meetings.

Q. You spoke of the total value of the property destroyed as Rs. 36,000. Have you made out any statements which we can see?

A. The District Magistrate has made out a list of claims. (a) I can produce that.

Q. Now during all these days there was no attack on life and property except what happened at the railway station. There was no other attack on life?

A. Well there was the murderous attack on the head-constable on the 17th.

Q. There was no organised effort to take life and property?

A. The only attacks were those that occurred in the riots which we have mentioned. There were no attacks on banks or public buildings in the same manner as occurred in other places.

Q. When did you go to the railway station?

A. I got there at about 4 o'clock.

Q. That was long after the incident at the railway station?

A. An hour afterwards.

Q. When did you first hear of the railway incident?

(a) See page 210.

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The Hon'ble Mr. C. A. BARRON.

[Continued.]

A. Between 12-30 and 1.

Q. You did not go there till 4 o'clock?

A. No; I sent the police.

Q. You told us that they were attempting to compel the sweetmeat seller to close his shop?

A. Yes.

Q. Who is this sweetmeat seller? Can you give us his name?

A. I cannot at present; but I have no doubt he can be produced. He is still I believe the contractor at the railway station.

Q. Then you say that among the people that were attempting to compel the contractor to stop his shop, two people were arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you give us their names as to who those people were?

A. They were released soon after and disappeared, as far as I know.

Q. You could not trace them?

A. No.

Q. And the crowd asked for their release?

A. Yes.

Q. And you said for one or two hours the crowd asked for their release and the police pressed them to leave the premises?

A. I am not sure about the two hours. We tried first of all to get the crowd away without making arrests.

Q. The crowd threw stones?

A. Yes, stones and bricks.

Q. Was any person injured?

A. All the British officers were struck on the head and shoulders.

Q. There was no serious injury?

A. Mr. Jeffreys and the senior superintendent of police were seriously hurt by brickbats. They had *topis* on, which saved their lives.

Q. No one was seriously hurt?

A. A number of soldiers reported themselves in hospital; but they were not done to death.

Q. The brickbats came on their *topis*?

A. Yes, and on their shoulders and body generally.

Q. Were any of them in hospital for treatment for any time?

A. I am not sure about that. One or two British soldiers were. Their names appear in the list filed with the Committee.

Q. That day, as you have told us, there was a meeting in the evening at which Shradhanand addressed people?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you go to the meeting yourself?

A. Yes, I went there.

Q. Was the meeting an orderly meeting?

A. I thought it was safe to allow it to continue.

Q. And the meeting dispersed quietly, except for the Manipuri incident, of which we know?

A. Yes.

Q. Was not the fact that the meeting was orderly due to the restraining influence that the leaders present at the meeting exercised?

A. They had promised that if I gave them permission to continue, they would restrain their language.

Q. You seem to imply that the fact that the meeting was orderly and dispersed quietly was due to the show of military force. Was it not also due in some measure to the restraining influence that the leaders there present exercised?

A. That is quite possible. I went down with a troop of cavalry to the meeting; there were other soldiers close by.

Q. On the 31st March, you had the funerals?

A. Yes.

Q. Those funeral processions were attended largely both by Hindus and Muhammadans?

A. There were very large crowds.

Q. Those processions passed off quietly; there were no disturbances?

A. No actual disturbances; there was a great deal of noise and shouting and clamour.

Q. There were no disturbances?

A. No actual breach of the peace.

Q. Then on the 4th April, you had the meeting at the Jama Masjid which Shradhanand addressed?

A. Yes.

Q. Those were also orderly meetings?

A. I would not call them very orderly.

Q. There was no attempt again at disturbances?

A. Nothing.

Q. Then on the 6th April, you had a general *hartal* as you had in almost all places in India?

A. Yes.

Q. That passed off very quietly and there were no disturbances on the 6th of April?

A. No.

Q. That *hartal* was on a very large scale in Delhi; that was a complete *hartal*?

A. Not more complete than the one on the 30th.

Q. It was as big a *hartal* as that of the 30th of March?

A. Yes, but there was this further element of disorderliness in it that people were prevented from using tram-cars and motor cars and bicycles. That was not so evident on the first day.

Q. On the whole the thing passed off very quietly? A. It did.

Q. Then you caused the order to be issued about Mr. Gandhi on the 9th April?

A. Yes.

Q. Don't you think that contributed considerably to excite the people?

A. It did excite them, but the result of Mr. Gandhi's coming here would, I thought, have been worse than the excitement produced by his being turned back to Bombay.

Q. Don't you think that he might have been very instrumental in pacifying people?

A. It did not look at all like that seeing the temper of the crowd at the moment.

Q. You know that he commanded great respect and influence with these crowds?

A. Yes.

Q. They were almost worshipping him as a hero?

A. So I understood.

Q. You know that Mr. Gandhi is the man who very openly and strongly preached against all violence?

A. Yes, but the results of his visits have elsewhere sometimes led to breaches of the peace.

Q. If he had been present in the crowd to stop violence, don't you think he would have been more likely to succeed than anybody else?

A. I think that the temper of the crowd was such that the only result of his coming here would have been violence.

Q. Then the news about the happenings at Amritsar and Lahore, you said, were received in the evening of the 10th?

A. In a private telegram which I saw.

Q. When did people in the town come to know about it?

A. The news may have spread on the 11th.

Q. Although that news about the disturbances at Amritsar and Lahore spread, there were no disturbances in Delhi consequent on that?

A. No; but the crowd became more sullen and the tension became greater.

Q. There were no actual disturbances following on the events that happened at Amritsar and Lahore?

A. No breach of the peace.

Q. With regard to the railway strike on the 14th at Shakurpur, do you agree with the result of Mr. Begbie's enquiry that the causes were mainly economic?

A. It would seem so, yes.

Q. And not political?

A. Political to the extent of sympathy with the *hartal* in Delhi.

Q. Except the reflex action of the *hartal* in Delhi, the causes mainly were economic?

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[Continued.]

A. I did hear that the Railway people were being taunted for not joining in the *hartal* and helping their brethren in the city.

Q. You agree with the conclusion that the causes were mainly economic?

A. Yes; I think on the whole they probably were.

Q. Then on the 14th, you issued some order under section 188 of the Penal Code. I do not quite follow that, Mr. Barron, because section 188 does not authorise the issue of an order. It only deals with the disobedience of an order lawfully promulgated and provides punishment. But it does not itself authorise the issue of any order.

A. We wanted to bring to the notice of the people that disobedience would be punished.

Q. I want to know exactly under what section or law you issued the order?

A. There is no section or law involved. It was a general order that people must not force others to shut their shops.

Q. Under section 188 of the Penal Code?

A. It is only shortening the description very considerably.

Q. Section 188 does not deal with the promulgation of any law?

[The President:—It presumes that a lawful order has been made.]

A. The order I issued drew attention to that section.

Q. Can we have a copy of the order?

A. A copy can be got. (a) I am not sure whether it was my order or the Deputy Commissioner's order, but it warned people to desist from interfering with people who opened their shops by the use of force, which would be regarded as illegal.

Q. On the 17th, the police attempted to arrest people who were interfering with the opening of shops?

A. They did arrest a man they found interfering with that.

Q. For disobedience of this order?

A. For interfering with the shopkeepers who were opening their shops.

Q. Was there any disobedience to your order issued on the 14th?

A. Yes; a man was arrested.

Q. Did the disturbance take place after the arrest or before the arrest?

A. It was caused by the rumour that was spread that the man who was arrested had been bayoneted and his body thrown into the Queen's Garden. Probably this caused the subsequent trouble.

Q. That it was a mere boy who had been cut with the point of a bayonet and his body thrown into the Queen's Gardens. That was the rumour that excited the crowd?

A. Naturally.

Q. Then you spoke of the meeting—going back to the 15th—that you had with the leaders and shopkeepers?

A. Yes.

Q. You said that the attitude of the crowd outside was threatening?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that due to the fact that they believed that the leaders were going to be arrested. That rumour spread abroad and that excited the crowd?

A. Yes.

Q. You spoke about the application of Martial Law in Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. That was on the 17th?

A. The afternoon of the 17th.

Q. Previous to that the Punjab Government had suggested that Martial Law should be extended to Delhi?

A. I am not sure whether it was previous or subsequent to that.

Q. I have got it in the papers. The Chief of the General Staff, Lahore to Simla—most strongly urges placing Delhi under Martial Law?

A. What is the date?

(a) See page 209.

Q. That is after the 17th, I am sorry. You are aware of that?

A. I did hear of that on the 20th.

Q. On that did Simla asked you to make any report? Did they ask your opinion about the suggestion of the Punjab Government?

A. They had my report of the 17th.

Q. What I want to know is whether on the suggestion of the Punjab Government made on the 19th April, the Government of India asked your opinion as to that suggestion?

A. I was consulted, but I am not sure that it was as early as the 20th. A day or two later I was consulted.

Q. You were consulted about this suggestion of the Punjab Government that Martial Law should be extended to Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you make any report?

A. I said it was not necessary to introduce Martial Law as the situation had cleared by that time.

Q. Will you make that report available to the Committee in a confidential manner?

A. Confidentially, I think, I could.

Q. Then you spoke about the attempts to alienate the police and military. You spoke of two people who had attempted to do that. Was there any organized or general attempt to do that? Or was this merely an isolated case? Was any evidence placed before you?

A. I should call spreading the stories about the Golden Temple and the Sikh girls and the robbing of zamindars of half their property under the Excess Profits Act and similar rumours as an organized attempt to get at the people.

Q. You referred to the tampering with the police and the military and you spoke of one Babu and a discharged soldier. Was there any organised attempt to tamper with the police or the military directly, apart from the general rumours?

A. Such rumours would affect the classes from which the police and the army are recruited.

Q. What I mean is whether any special attempts were made by sending emissaries as was the case in these two instances with a view to tampering with the police.

A. We did not hear of any except general abuse of the police when they were out doing their duty. They were very severely abused for doing their duty instead of siding with the disturbers of the peace.

Q. You spoke of the meeting that was held in connection with the Afghan war. That was in the beginning of May?

A. 13th of May, I think.

Q. You think that the people who held that meeting were really sincere in their convictions?

A. Yes, I quite admit that.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. You said that you discussed the question of the employment of the military with General Drake-Brockman and you decided, I believe, to send a picquet down to the railway station. Didn't you?

A. Yes, immediately we heard of the disturbance.

Q. You mentioned yourself that you had discussed it with General Drake-Brockman?

A. That came in, I think, about the arrangements made in the evening.

Q. Did you consult him about the employment of troops?

A. I did consult him at the very beginning.

Q. And then a picquet as a result of that was sent down to the railway station?

A. The picquet came from the Fort. That was obtained on an application direct from the railway authorities to the Fort.

Q. Did you discuss with General Drake-Brockman what was to be the strength of the force?

A. The strength is laid down under the Internal Defence Scheme.

Q. An officer and 30 men?

A. It was 25 or 30 men, I think.

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[Continued.]

Q. You were not concerned in the drawing up of the Internal Defence scheme?

A. That was done some years ago.

Q. Would you assert that that was a sufficiently strong picquet, if you had to decide the question, to deal with the sort of crowd that was reported to you to be present at the railway station at the time?

A. Yes, with the police that were available.

Q. You would not say that you were making too great a display of military force?

A. Far from it. That was the minimum.

Q. Would that apply to the Cavalry that were posted in Chandni Chowk?

A. We had two troops to start with.

Q. There also it was not a question of display of troops and it was not intended to excite the public more than was absolutely necessary.

A. Not at all. We had a machine gun as well from the Fort.

Q. Then you mentioned in another place that when the police picquet was attacked at the time that the head constable was grievously wounded, they fired on the crowd with buck-shot. Was that intended to save life as far as possible?

A. Yes; the police were only armed with buck-shot.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. What is the number of sweatmeat sellers at the station?

A. I am afraid I do not know.

Q. Was the crowd trying to insist upon closing the shops when the men were actually selling? You referred to a contractor.

A. I understand that the refreshment arrangements in the third class waiting rooms are given out on contract.

Q. May I know whether at this time the statements of these men have ever been recorded by the police or any authority?

A. I presume statements were taken in the riot case at the railway station. I am not quite sure.

Q. Have you any objection to allow us to see those statements?

A. None whatever.

(The President:—We might call them in as witnesses.)

Q. Is it not a fact that none of the mob entered the railway station till two persons were arrested by the police at the railway station?

A. I was not there myself.

Q. With regard to the results of your investigation, is it not a fact that as put down in your confidential report there was no riot and no mob tried to enter the railway station unless and until two persons were arrested by the police or the railway authorities?

A. The statements received showed that the mob had rioted and attempted to rescue the two men who had been arrested.

Q. That is an important point that up to the time they were not arrested the mob did not make any attempt to enter the railway station or make any disturbance?

A. I did not hear that they did.

Q. Is it not a fact that these two men were arrested for assaulting the sweatmeat sellers?

A. That is what I was told.

Q. In your statement you do not mention that on the 30th any attempt was made to assault Mr. Matthews?

A. No.

Q. From the fact that there is no mention either in your memorandum or in the diary which you prepared on the 17th I take it that this fact of the assault of Mr. Matthews was not mentioned to you on the 30th.

A. I am not sure whether it was brought to my notice at the time or not. I did not mention it in my report.

Q. According to your information it was after the people invaded the railway station that telephone was sent to the Fort for help?

A. So I understand.

Q. The mob was outside the station for at least two hours after the assault on the sweatmeat seller.

A. They surged on the platform but they were driven off with the aid of the soldiers who were there.

Q. After the assault the mob were outside the railway for at least two hours?

A. The whole incident took about two hours.

Q. How could that be? The telephone was at about 12 and the firing took place at 2-30?

A. The first firing was about 2.

Q. Were you or were you not informed that attempts were made by different people to get those men who were arrested on bail and that the railway authorities or the police refused?

A. I heard nothing of the sort.

Q. Were you informed that the mob entered the station not with a view to any damage but simply to solicit the authorities to release these men or to let them go on bail?

A. I understood their object was to rescue them.

Q. Is that within your personal knowledge?

A. That is what I heard.

Q. As a matter of fact till the time the crowd was fired upon when they were asked to disperse, their request and their cry was 'Release our men.'

A. The real explanation is, I think, that the unruly element in the mob refused to believe that the men had been released.

Q. That is your belief?

A. That is my version of it.

Q. Have you seen the *post-mortem* examination that was filed by Colonel James?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you give any reason why bullets and not buck-shot were used?

A. Bullets were used only on the first day and not afterwards.

Q. What is the explanation of the fact that bullets were used?

A. British soldiers are not served out with buck-shot. They were using service ammunition. The police are the only people who have got buck-shot.

Q. Is that the only explanation? You said the British soldiers had no buck-shot. It appears to me that half the wounded persons had gun-shot wounds and the other half had buck-shot wounds. How do you explain that?

A. My explanation is that buck-shot was used by the police and bullets used by the soldiers. The soldiers shot better than the police.

Q. You say that great care was taken that boys should not be injured? Is that opinion based upon the result of the *post-mortem* examination or upon the statement of the persons who were examined?

A. I think on the *post-mortem* examination and the result of the *post-mortem* examination showed that in the majority of cases the wounds were on the shoulder and on the high parts of the body.

Q. If you found that the majority were either on the chest, or head or leg what would be your opinion?

A. The chest would still be high.

Q. We were told that the boys were 7 and 8 years of age?

A. I was told that there were a number of small boys.

Q. And the age?

A. I understand 8, 9 and 10.

Q. Is it not a fact that on the 30th and 31st those who were riding tram-cars and tongas were made to get out and walk?

A. I think they were.

Q. From the 30th March to the 17th April not a single shop had been looted. What made you think that the shops would be looted?

A. There was always a danger of shops being looted. There was the possibility. There is always this danger when there is a *hartal*.

Q. Some witnesses said that many people had *lathis*? Can you give information as to whether any person except that constable received a *lathi* blow?

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[Continued.]

A. The police picquet was assaulted with *lathis*. I saw the *lathis* myself—several hundreds of them in the Chandni Chowk. That was on the 14th and 15th.

Q. What happened on the 17th? Can you place any fact before this Committee which will show that any *lathis* were used from the 30th to the 14th? Or any person received a *lathi* blow? Was any *lathi* wound received by any person on the 30th? It appears from the *post-mortem* reports that only pebbles and stones were mentioned?

A. The organization had not got to work.

Q. Have you any evidence to place before the Committee that any person was struck with a *lathi*?

A. No, bricks and stones were used.

Q. On the 17th the picquet was assaulted. Except the head constable can you name any other persons who were either produced in court or deposed before the police to support the police story except the actual police officers who were injured? Can you name any person?

A. I cannot name anybody but there must be some names.

Q. I want to know whether there is any evidence in your possession which may be placed before this Committee which would support the story which was put forward by the police that these people came and assaulted them?

A. I have no evidence beyond that produced in the trial.

Q. Is it not a fact that certain notices (a) were issued by Colonel Beadon to the public during these days between the 30th and 14th?

A. I think there were several notices.

Q. Can we get these notices?

A. Yes.

Q. Some objection has been taken by the public and by newspapers that they were not couched in proper language, is there any foundation for that?

A. I think office copies must be in existence.

Q. With regard to Sergeant Kemsley, whose deposition we have not got, is he going to be produced here?

A. He has been demobilized and sent to England.

Q. It appears from these papers that he made a statement. He is the principal man responsible for firing?

A. I think he put in a written statement.

Q. Is there any objection to his written statement being placed before the Committee?

A. None whatever. I fancy it was a report to his superior officer. (b)

Q. Is it not a fact that the object of the *hartal* from the 10th to the 14th was to get the order cancelled against Mr. Gandhi? A representation was made to you and you promised that you would forward this request to Government?

A. I was informed that it was dissatisfaction at this order that had started this fresh *hartal*. Later I was asked to cancel the order, which I explained I could not do, and I informed them that I would inform Government that the reasons alleged for the continuance of the *hartal* was the order against Mr. Gandhi.

Q. With respect to the 14 persons who were engaged in Delhi as special constables can we have information as to the conditions of their service? What were their duties, what clothes they had on, etc.?

A. I have no objection to placing these papers before the Committee. (c)

Q. You were never present at those meetings where these speeches were made? You only have second-hand knowledge?

A. That is all.

Q. According to you, you divide the leaders of Delhi into two groups—the major leaders and minor leaders. Can you name any major leader who in his speeches gave currency to false rumours or as a matter of fact falsely misrepresented the provisions of the Act?

A. These misrepresentations had taken place at a meeting held early in February; the names of the speakers were— (interrupted).

(a) See pages 208 and 209.
(b) See page 210.
(c) See page 211.

Q. You have selected the worst possible extracts from your local papers and placed them before the Committee. Do you think that these expressions were confined to the Delhi papers and that they were not universal expressions used everywhere?

A. Similar expressions were used elsewhere. Taking the extracts from the Delhi papers there are some here that are particularly bad—for instance from the *Vijaya* and the "Congress."

Q. My point is that in these extracts, there is no misrepresentation so far as I can see. The wording may be against persons and against authority. So far there is no misrepresentation there, i.e., from the 30th March to the 17th April?

A. On the 16th of March, the *Vijaya* came out with a black edging.

Q. Everywhere I saw many other papers coming out with black margin?

A. On the 16th February it contained a strong article.

Q. I am not talking about strong articles. Two or three rumours which you mentioned that the property of the zamindars will be confiscated, you spoke about the excess profits tax and that the police had been given very drastic powers and all those things. You said that there were two or three gross misrepresentations in Delhi. Can you point out to me any notes in the speeches of any of the leaders here, Swami Shradhdhanand and two or three people whom you call major leaders made in public?

A. There were misrepresentations in February by some of these principal leaders, in which the fact was concealed that the Rowlatt Act could not come into force unless Government thought it necessary to apply to a particular place. That is a most important omission; it disguised the whole effect of the Act.

Q. I take it that you say that the worst misrepresentation was that some one of these major leaders when he was addressing the meetings did not inform them that the Rowlatt Act will not come into force unless Government finds it necessary.

A. I call that a very serious misrepresentation.

Q. Is there anything else? In the period from 30th March to 17th April, or I will take the whole month of March, the worst misrepresentation made by these leaders was that they omitted to mention that when they were addressing audiences? Is there any other matter?

A. The effect of that omission was that Delhi people would think that the Act could be enforced at once.

Q. I am only confining myself to these major leaders. Is there anything else?

A. No, I cannot remember anything at the present moment.

Q. Then about certain other rumours which you mentioned to Sir Chimanlal Setalvad, were these rumours published in pamphlets and such things?

A. They were published in newspapers all over the country.

Q. The source of those rumours was not Delhi?

A. I do not think it could have been.

Q. These things were published in the vernacular and Anglo-vernacular papers, people read and believed them to be true?

A. I am afraid they did in some places.

Q. So far as these two men were concerned, they had no connection with either the *Satyagraha* society or Home Rule League or the major or minor leaders of Delhi. One of them was turned away and the other was convicted for tampering with the loyalty of the military?

A. I do not think any connection was ever established.

Q. Under which section of the Indian Penal Code was the man arrested on the 17th which was subsequently followed by the assault on the head constable and the picquet was rushed?

A. Section 188 would have been sufficient.

Q. He was arrested under section 188?

A. Under the order issued with reference to that section.

Q. Can any person be arrested under section 188?

A. I think so, there is nothing to prevent it. A man may be arrested if he is guilty of conduct likely to lead to a riot in the then condition of Delhi.

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[Continued.]

Q. Was not the number of the crowd which followed the dead bodies of 4 or 5 persons who were shot very large running to thousands?

A. So I was informed.

Q. No assault or no damage to property was caused on that day?

A. No, not during the funerals.

Q. So far as the Shakurpur incident was concerned, I think you agree with the report of Mr. Begbie that it was neither pre-arranged nor an organized thing and had no connection with Delhi—one or two persons were admirers of Mr. Gandhi and sympathisers of the movement. It was not an organized attempt by any person or body of persons in Delhi?

A. No general organization could be discovered.

Q. And *hartal* and all that was not pre-arranged?

A. We discovered that the idea came from Lahore on the 11th of April, 2 days before.

Q. Mr. Begbie has come to the conclusion that it was not pre-arranged?

A. We could not find any regular organization.

Q. I am not talking of organization. Was it a pre-arranged thing or not?

A. How far ahead do you mean? The first message about a strike appears to have been sent on the 11th April. The strike at Shakurpur took place on the night of the 13th.

Q. On what date was the boy who was whipped arrested?

A. On the 17th.

Q. That is the boy who was alleged to have been trying to induce people to close their shops?

A. Not the same boy; another boy altogether. This was a *Sadhu* boy who had been making himself very conspicuous throughout the disturbances with a stick almost as big as himself.

Q. You have stated that certain railway servants and one or two other persons have been frightened. I do not understand what you mean by 'frightened'?

A. People on their way to work were abused for going to work instead of joining in the *hartal*. It is very easy to frighten an ordinary clerk.

Q. The complaint which you have received was that certain people were going to office; they met certain persons on the road and those persons abused them for not abstaining from going to office?

A. The same thing happened to the railway coolies and workmen of every description.

Q. From the 30th up to the 7th are there any reports recorded at different police stations or any regular complaints filed by the shop-keepers who might have gone to the authorities and said that they were compelled against their wishes to close their shops? Are there any such records?

A. One of the most surprising things about the whole of the period was the extraordinary absence of reports at police stations; there were no such reports. If the absence of reports is an indication, there was no crime at all during the period.

Q. What I gathered from the trend of your statement was this. I can stand persuasion; I can stand force; I can persuade a man. Supposing I use force and make an actual assault, that would be a different matter. I want to know between the 30th March and 17th April, are there any regular complaints filed before you or the District Magistrate or have any police reports been recorded at different police stations by persons coming forward and saying "I was going to open my shop, so and so threatened me; I am afraid, therefore, I cannot open my shop." Have any such complaints been made to the authorities?

A. No, I do not think there are any complaints made to the police. There were complaints made to the railway authorities.

Q. That their servants were not able to buy things? The railway authorities complained that their servants could not purchase anything in the bazaar?

A. Yes; special arrangements had to be made to feed railway workmen inside the railway yard.

Q. About the causes of unrest which you have given, is it not a fact and don't you agree with me that the very fact that the capital of India has been shifted from Calcutta to Delhi, would tend to more political agitation in Delhi instead of it being a sleepy hollow as it was 10 years ago? Don't you think it would be more active?

A. I have stated that it is only natural.

Q. Will not the fact that council meetings are held here rouse the people here?

A. It would assist in the revival of political aspirations, I suppose.

Q. Was not your idea that one of the causes of unrest and discontent was that the Government was going to whittle down the Reforms Scheme?

A. I did not hear that.

Q. I believe that it is not your idea that anybody here in Delhi wanted to get rid of the British Government or sever its connection?

A. No, I do not think that was the intention.

Q. It may have been against persons in authority. It was not against the King-Emperor or against the British Government. I am obliged to ask you this question because in your statement you have put forward the word "*anti-British*." If you are prepared to allow me to say that by "*anti-British*" you do not mean *anti-Government*, I have no more to ask you.

A. It has not that application everywhere. There are one or two places—(interrupted).

Q. Therefore I mean to say that by that you do not mean that the idea was to turn out the British Government or sever the British connection or any disrespect meant to the King-Emperor or anything of that sort?

A. No, that was not the immediate object.

Q. Practically you came to the conclusion that the discontent was in the North-Western Railway Department and that was due to the fact that in every other railway redress was given to the railway servants; so far as the North-Western railway was concerned, the application of the staff for redress was not sympathetically heard?

A. No; I think that comes in Mr. Begbie's assistant's report.

Q. But the public agitation about the passing of the Rowlatt Bill was preceded in the case of the staff of Railways and specially on the North-Western Railway by the discontent over the inadequacy of the rates of their pay. Is that not so? That appears to be Mr. Begbie's report.

A. Yes; that is the result of his investigation.

Q. Whatever you said about the railway strike is completely based on the investigation of Mr. Begbie. I have taken this sentence from Mr. Begbie's report. Have you any reason to doubt the truth of this statement: "What occurred can be traced to the public agitation over the passing of the Rowlatt Acts preceded in the case of the Indian staff on railways and especially on the North-Western Railway with general discontent over the inadequacy of the rates of pay?"

A. I have not sufficient information to subscribe to that.

Q. That is the last report of Mr. Begbie?

A. You are trying to put Mr. Begbie's words into my mouth. I do not agree with his conclusion entirely, particularly his reference to "especially on the North-Western Railway." The discontent was general.

Q. I would read out one more sentence from your own memorandum. "The effect of the Afghan War in Delhi was however reported to have been a general rallying of the people towards the side of Government, the Hindus being thoroughly alarmed at the turn of events and the Muhammadans regarding the Amir's attack on the British power as a piece of insensate folly." Is that true?

A. That, I believe, is quite correct.

Q. One other point I wish to make clear and that is the connection of Delhi with other people. You clearly say that only a few cases were found to be correct and that the majority were found to be false?

A. We could not find evidence regarding all the charges and a number of them were found to be false.

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The Hon'ble Mr. C. A. BARRON

[Continued.]

By the Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith—

Q. In the narrative of events from the 30th March to the 16th April you said that it was a period of great tension?

A. It was.

Q. It became so menacing on the 17th that you applied to Government for the application of Martial Law?

A. Yes, after the rioting on the 17th.

Q. You were naturally very reluctant to apply for that?

A. I had been all along.

Q. You were trying by meetings with the leaders of the people to try and get the *hartal* brought to a close and law and order restored?

A. The Deputy Commissioner had meetings on the 11th and 12th and I had meetings on the 14th and 15th.

Q. And on the 10th when very bad news came from Amritsar it did not occur to you to apply at that time for Martial Law?

A. No.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. Could you tell us about what time and from what direction the crowd proceeded to the railway station on the 30th March?

A. I cannot tell you whether it went down the Queen's Road or through the Queen's Gardens. It could only come from that side.

Q. Those people who went into the station, were they part of the crowd, or did they precede the crowd, because it is understood that the crowd came to the station and entered the station yard with the object of having the two men rescued?

A. The crowd was in the third class refreshment room which is outside the station and has a separate entrance.

Q. The crowd came in there?

A. That is what I gather.

Q. My question is whether those two men who entered the railway station yard were the only men or whether there were any others besides?

A. There must have been more than two, but only two were arrested as being prominent.

Q. How many went in together?

A. I could not tell you that.

Q. Can you tell us the total strength of the crowd?

A. I was not there at the time. In my first report I said that several hundred men soon collected outside the station and invaded it with a view to rescue the men who were arrested. I could not give the exact number. The railway witnesses may know.

Q. How many were the people who entered the station yard?

A. It was described as several hundreds, roughly 300 or 400 probably, but the crowd went on increasing as long as the trouble lasted.

Q. About what time did they get to the railway station?

A. I think the first news of the trouble was about 12-30 P.M.

Q. This was the first news that you got about the crowd?

A. The first news that the police got. I got my information later.

Q. Which police station?

A. Mr. Marshall and Mr. Jeffreys saw a crowd collecting towards the railway station on their way back from their visit to the city.

Q. In what direction were they going?

A. They were coming back over the Dufferin Bridge. They saw the crowd there.

Q. Did they see the crowd going to the railway station?

A. The road leads perfectly straight to the station.

Q. Did they come back?

A. They came back and got the reserve police to clear the crowd.

Q. I want to make it clear whether they returned to you or separated?

A. They came to me at Metcalfe House. They did not know any details.

Q. When did the first report come as to the number of people at the railway station?

A. I gathered the information when I made enquiries at the railway station.

Q. Who arrested these two men?

A. The railway police.

Q. Who took them in custody?

A. The railway police and the station staff.

Q. Were they shut up in a room?

A. I do not know. I was not there.

Q. Did any of the crowd attack the railway staff in order to rescue the men?

A. Some of the railway police were assaulted and one of the railway staff had his coat torn off.

Q. I imagine a general scuffle ensued?

A. I do not know the exact details. I only collected what information I could and reported it as quickly as possible to the Government of India.

Q. What happened to those two men?

A. I understood that they had been let go.

Q. Do you know with what object the crowd stayed in the station?

A. They refused to believe that the men had been released.

Q. The release could have only happened in their presence?

A. It is a confined place. It might have happened in one part of the station without men in another part knowing anything about it.

Q. Did the people come out of the station out of their own accord?

A. They were pushed out by the British soldiers and the railway police.

Q. How many British soldiers and railway police?

A. There were a certain number of soldiers on the platform waiting for their trains. I am not talking of those summoned from the Fort. They assisted the police.

Q. About a dozen or two dozen?

A. I cannot say how many, 10 or 15 men I suppose.

Q. They were actually pushed by physical force?

A. I understood what is ordinarily meant by pushing a crowd out. It was physical force to some extent.

Q. Into the Queen's Road?

A. First of all into the vehicle stand. They were not got into the Queen's Road until the troops came out.

Q. They refused to leave?

A. So I understand.

Q. How many troops came from the Fort?

A. A detachment of about 25 men.

Q. And then they were forced back by Mounted Police?

A. A certain number of Mounted Police came and the crowd was gradually forced back. They refused to go and went on defying the police.

Q. They did not make any attempt to resort to violence?

A. They threw stones, bricks and things of that kind. They did it from the wall of the station yard. Unfortunately a part of the foot path on the other side of the road was being repaired at the time. There were bricks handy.

Q. How many people had collected about this time?

A. I could not say. The crowd went on increasing.

Q. What will be the total number?

A. I am afraid I could not say.

Q. They remained some time on the Queen's Road?

A. Yes. Attempts were made to drive them out. They had to be driven off and an attempt was made to drive them off by the sowars into the Queen's Garden and down the two ends of the road in front of the Queen's Garden. They remained there standing throwing bricks.

Q. This went on pretty well the whole time.

Q. Before firing did anybody remonstrate with them?

A. The officers present remonstrated with them for about half an hour; the railway officials, then Mr. Currie, the Additional District Magistrate, and the police officers Mr. Marshall and Mr. Jeffreys, they all tried to move them but they refused to go. By that time they did not have a special motive—the uncontrolled mob had taken charge.

Q. What was the object of the rising?

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[Continued.]

A. By that time it had developed into an attack on the police and soldiers—throwing brickbats and stones.

Q. Then, was the first round fired into the air to give them serious warning as to what was coming or not?

A. No, I do not think there was any preliminary shooting. The order was to fire two rounds into the crowd. The police were armed with buck-shot and the soldiers with rifle ammunition.

Q. Would it not have been enough if the police had fired with buck-shot?

A. The officers on the spot had to decide this and it was their business to do so. One of the British soldiers was attacked and there was an attempt to take his rifle. One man tried to snatch the rifle.

Q. Where was this man standing?

A. At the station entrance.

Q. I take it that the necessity for firing was that the crowd might overpower the military and police and that the disturbance would become greater if it was not directly checked?

A. If they had not been driven off all the traffic at this enormous junction would have been held up for an indefinite number of hours.

Q. What was the number of military and police in the Chandni Chowk?

A. There were about 12 British soldiers and about 15 policemen. That was all that could be spared to guard that particular point.

Q. Was there an attack there by bricks and stones?

A. They were attacked very severely there. The crowd surged in through the gates and attempted to drive back the police until the British soldiers came to their assistance—the attack was in the Queen's Gardens—they were pushing through the Chandni Chowk gateway in front of the clock tower.

By the President—

Q. Where is Mr. Marshall now?

A. Mr. Marshall's health broke down on the 4th April and he had to be sent home. He went on medical leave and has been given an extension of leave by the Secretary of State. He is in England at present.

Q. And Colonel Beadon?

A. Colonel Beadon has gone on leave to Australia and New Zealand. He went at the end of September. Sergeant Kemsley has been demobilized and sent home to England.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Can you give us any information about the bayonet wound that was received by a man as to whether the bayonet came out from the back or vice versa?

A. I am not quite sure which man you refer to, whether this is the person who tried to seize the rifle at the railway station. I cannot say how he was wounded.

By Mr. C. R. Das—

Q. On the 17th October there was a very big *hartal* in Delhi?

A. There was a more or less complete *hartal*, about 80 per cent. of the shops were shut, a number kept open till late on the previous night in order not to lose from the stoppage of business the following day.

Q. There was a large meeting in connection with that on that day at Delhi—as a matter of fact no police officer was present there in uniform?

A. No—I think there were none in uniform.

Q. There was no disturbance of any kind?

A. No disturbance resulted.

Q. I want to know is there any single instance of a disturbance during these days between March and April except in the presence of police officers?

A. It so happened that there were police present in every instance.

Q. There is an impression in the mind of the public that if the police are not present at these meetings or *hartals* there would be no disturbance.

A. I am afraid it is an unfounded impression.

Q. Are you aware that there is such an impression?

A. I have heard that there is such.

Q. Have not leaders told you in connection with the different incidents in Delhi that if you keep the police away there will be no disturbance?

A. Yes, they have told me so but there are limits.

Q. On the 30th you were told about that by Swami Shradhdhanand?

A. No, certainly not.

Q. You said you did not stop that meeting because you thought it was safe?

A. Yes.

Q. You wanted an assurance from Shradhdhanand that the crowd would quietly disperse after the meeting. He did give you that assurance and he told you that he would be responsible for it unless the police interfered when they were going back?

A. That is exactly the sort of remarks I should expect.

Q. Are you aware that when the mob was going home as it were after the meeting a shot was fired?

A. That has all been said already.

Q. You told Shradhdhanand that the police would not interfere with them after the meeting was over?

A. I told him that if the meeting broke up in an orderly fashion it would not be interfered with.

Q. Did you get any information that after the meeting was over there were any disorders?

A. No actual disorder but the mob was shouting and making a noise in the Chandni Chowk, so much so, that they frightened the non-commissioned officer of the Manipuris which resulted in a shot being fired by accident from a rifle which was being loaded.

Q. There was shouting?

A. Yes.

Q. That is why the shot was fired?

A. The shot went off by accident.

Q. You have told us that there were allegations made to you that the leaders were sending emissaries to different parts?

[The President.—We do not want to get the same points that have already been touched. I think you might indicate the question you want to ask. This matter has been fully gone into by several members of the committee.

Mr. Das—I quite realise that. Two points have been left.

President—What are the points?

Mr. Das—There was an enquiry and the man who was said to be an emissary was said to be connected with the police, and not with any of the leaders. That is the point I want to bring out.]

A. The question I suppose refers to a man who called himself Pyare Lal who said that he was a servant of Sultan Singh. I never heard that he was connected with the police. I think he is now in gaol for cheating.

Q. Did it not transpire in the course of the enquiry that he was in some way directly or indirectly connected with a police officer?

A. He had a lot of connection, because he was a well-known swindler.

Q. I mean to say that some police officer had got him to make these allegations?

A. I never heard that and I do not think that was possible.

Q. But you are thoroughly satisfied that neither Sultan Singh nor any of the leaders here had anything to do with Pyare Lal?

A. It was proved that he had given a wrong name. He was a common swindler.

Q. You have referred to many matters. May I take it that mostly it is information supplied by the police?

A. No. A great deal of it was supplied by inhabitants of Delhi and officers of other departments than the police.

Q. Some of it at any rate came from the police?

A. Certainly.

Q. With regard to the incidents of the 30th which you have received, is that police information?

A. Very little of it.

Q. Another point I wanted to ask is whether the sweet-meat seller was examined as a witness in the

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[Concluded.]

criminal trial which was held with reference to the occurrences of the 30th.

A. I am not sure; I could not say without examining the records.

Q. As a matter of fact, all these persons were being pushed from the station into the garden and from the garden outside. Is not that so?

A. That was what evidently happened.

Q. With regard to the disturbances which occurred near the Clock Tower, did it not arise in this way that

people wanted the dead bodies of their wounded men to be removed and the police would not allow it?

A. That may be so, but after a riot of that description, we could not allow the mob to dictate the procedure to be followed in the removal of dead bodies.

Q. With regard to the posters you mentioned, had you ever any occasion to enquire whether any of these posters were not put up by the Criminal Investigation Department?

A. A perfectly impossible and absurd suggestion.

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Mr. H. H. YULE.

At Delhi, Tuesday, the 4th November 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

SARDAR SAHIBZADA SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. H. G. STOKES, C.I.E., I.C.S., Secretary.

Mr. H. H. YULE, District Traffic Superintendent, East Indian Railway.]

By the President—

Q. Mr. Yule, are you District Traffic Superintendent of the East Indian Railway?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you at the station on the morning of the 30th March last?

A. Not before noon.

Q. When you arrived at the station at noon what did you find?

A. I found a crowd of about 300 or 400 people in the main entrance hall leading on to the platform.

Q. What was the crowd doing?

A. They were practically doing nothing except making a noise. They did not seem to have any real leaders.

Q. What happened after?

A. I spoke to a well-dressed man, a Muhammadan gentleman, who told me that one of their number had been arrested by the police. Of course I had already got that information on the telephone.

Q. And what happened after that?

A. I managed to persuade them to go outside the gate on my assurance that the police superintendent had been sent for to investigate the matter.

Q. What happened afterwards?

A. They kept on staying for about 20 or 25 minutes. I got the gates closed and I took an Indian ticket collector and tried to keep the mob out. Then stones were thrown at me.

Q. Did any stone hit you?

A. A stick hit me actually.

Q. About what time did that occur?

A. I think it is given in my evidence before the Deputy Commissioner at the time. It would be about 1-30 P.M.

Q. What was their object in breaking on to the platform?

A. Their idea was I think to release the men. I really do not know what the object was beyond that.

Q. Who had arrested the men?

A. The railway police in the West Hall.

Q. What made the railway police to interfere?

A. There was an assault on the Deputy Station Superintendent.

Q. Who was the Deputy Station Superintendent?

A. Mr. Matthews.

Q. Where is Mr. Matthews just now?

A. He is on leave for ten days just now.

Q. Short leave?

A. Yes.

Q. What did the crowd do when they got inside the station?

A. There was no opposition. They simply streamed across the platform. They did not know what to do. They had no real leader.

Q. Did they interfere with the management of the station?

A. Certainly, they stopped all work and two men actually threatened me personally.

Q. With violence?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you do?

A. I did nothing.

Q. How long did the crowd continue in the station?

A. I should not think more than two or three minutes. The Magistrate turned up and the word went round and the crowd promptly streamed out to interview him.

Q. That was Mr. Currie?

A. Yes.

Q. When they went out of the station on this occasion what happened?

A. They were crowding round his motor-car. Then I came back to the station and sent him a note that there were troops available at the station if he required them.

Q. What troops were they?

A. They were a detachment of the Manipuris returning from Mesopotamia.

Q. Why did you communicate that information?

A. The situation struck me as rather dangerous.

Q. Were efforts made to get the mob to disperse?

A. I did not see what happened. The next time I went, the mob had got out of the station compound and there was a cordon of police drawn up in front of the station on the Queen's Road and the mob were outside this cordon.

Q. Were the mob driven back from that position?

A. No. The next time I saw they had encroached on that position. I was not there all the time. I was coming back and seeing to things at the station and going out.

Q. You had your own business to attend to?

A. Yes.

Q. You know of course that firing took place?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you present when the firing actually took place?

A. I was actually having my lunch.

Q. How long before had you seen the mob?

A. I think about 20 minutes previously.

Q. At that time what opinion did you form as to the attitude of the mob?

A. I think they were very threatening indeed.

Q. Had the mob at this time or previously done any damage to property about the station?

A. Not intentionally. Only what a mob would do—such as bursting the gate and breaking into the station master's office. No intentional damage.

Q. Was any damage done which indicated an organized attempt?

A. No.

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Mr. H. H. YULE.

[Continued.]

Q. After the firing took place did you go out again?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And what did you see?
 A. The mob had disappeared right through the garden and I saw three bodies lying.
 Q. Do you know anything more about the other occurrences on the 30th?
 A. No.
 Q. What did you do after the mob left?
 A. I kept on till the evening till the military had posted all their guards.
 Q. What time?
 A. Must be about 3 or 4 P.M. I did not make a note at the time.
 Q. There was no further rioting at the station on that day?
 A. No.
 Q. Were you yourself cognisant of any occurrences in the immediate succeeding days?
 A. No. I am not personally cognisant of anything.
 Q. On the 6th April, I think, certain occurrences took place at one of your junction stations, Shakurpur?
 A. That is on the North Western Railway. I reported to the Chief Commissioner and he sent for the District Superintendent of that line.
 Q. There was a strike on that occasion?
 A. This was at Ghaziabad on the 6th April.
 Q. Did you investigate the cause of that strike?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What was it?
 A. Purely economic—about the question of pay and allowances.
 Q. Did it last any length of time?
 A. No. We settled it the same day.
 Q. On the 9th April Mr. Gandhi was turned back from entering the Punjab and on the following day I think news came of what had occurred at Amritsar. What effect had these circumstances upon the populace in Delhi?
 A. By all accounts they were very upset.
 Q. I think you had information about certain incidents in the way of cutting telephone and telegraph wires near Delhi?
 A. Yes. I received that from an officer on the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway and I advised the Chief Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of what I heard.
 Q. Was any serious damage done in connection with it near Delhi?
 A. It was not in my section. It was on the North-Western Railway.
 Q. About this time did you find that telegrams were arriving at the station?
 A. Yes. That very night I heard about the cutting of telegraph wires on the 11th and on the 12th.
 Q. What sort of messages?
 A. I have not got them. One said that the staff at a particular station had all struck work. They were bogus messages. One came from Karnal and another later on from Sonapat.
 Q. Who sent these messages?
 A. We could never find out.
 Q. Not up to this date?
 A. No. We could only suspect.
 Q. What was the object of these messages?
 A. To stop the work undoubtedly.
 Q. What action did you take in connection with them?
 A. I came to the office and sent my telegraph master to watch the particular wire over which those messages were being sent. There are four stations on that one wire. One station can signal to another station, but you cannot tell which station is signalling unless they give their names. This is called inter-through wire. All I did was to watch any such messages and stop them. I also sent an Inspector up to the points from which these messages were supposed to be coming by the train that night at 9-30 and he reported by wire at about 2 that all were untrue. He could not say exactly who sent the messages.

Q. Were any efforts made at or about this time to get your employees to strike?
 A. There was a move for a strike at the time. There was talk of strikes throughout railways in India at that time.
 Q. What efforts were made to induce your employees to strike?
 A. It was in connection with the *hartal*. In connection with the *hartal* on the 13th the subordinate menial staff at the station came to the station superintendent and informed him that they would have to stop work in another 24 hours as they would not otherwise be supplied with any more provision in the bazaars.
 Q. What reasons did they give for not being supplied with provisions?
 A. The reasons were that they continued to work.
 Q. If they were to be supplied with provisions, it was conditional on their stopping work?
 A. Yes.
 Q. How did you arrange it with the employees?
 A. I had a meeting and guaranteed to supply them with food.
 Q. And on that guarantee being given the men continued to work?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you about this time receive communications in the nature of threats?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What were they?
 A. They were vile letters addressed to me as to what would happen to me, my wife and my daughter with details put in.
 Q. Do you know from what source these came in?
 A. I was unable to trace the source. I made them over to the Criminal Investigation Department.
 Q. In consequence of this did you take any action?
 A. My wife was so nervous that I had to send her away.
 Q. Did you apply for police protection yourself in connection with anything at this time?
 A. I had at one time applied, I think. There was a patrol moving up and down my house. I do not actually recollect applying for police protection.
 Q. Had you any difficulty in getting your luggage at the station?
 A. I could not. I sent licensed coolies but they were turned back.
 Q. Turned back by whom?
 A. I was told by passive resisters. So I telephoned to the superintendent of police at the town hall to send a police guard.
 By Sir C. H. Setalvad—
 Q. You arrived at the station at noon?
 A. About noon.
 Q. And the firing took place at what time?
 A. I think I have that in the statement before the Deputy Commissioner.
 Q. We have not got a copy of that.
 A. I have not got it either.
 Q. Can you tell us from your recollection at what time the firing took place?
 A. It must have been later than 2 o'clock. I had just gone to lunch. I should say about 2-30 or 2-45.
 Q. And all this time you were on the station from noon till the actual firing had taken place?
 A. Yes.
 Q. When you arrived, the crowd numbered three or four hundred?
 A. So I estimated it.
 Q. At the time the firing took place?
 A. I should say double that number—800 or 1,000.
 Q. That was the largest strength of the crowd?
 A. I could not swear to that.
 Q. Now when you arrived, these people were on the platform?

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[Continued.]

A. Yes; a large number of them. The platform is divided by gates. Some were at the entrance hall and some on the platform, the total being about three or four hundred.
 Q. And they were, when you came, demanding the release of some person?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did they speak to you?
 A. I went and spoke to them.
 Q. How did you know that anybody had been arrested?
 A. On the telephone I was told that they had sent for police and when I asked they told me it was due to a *hartal* and a man being arrested.
 Q. Did they tell you how many men were arrested?
 A. I found that out afterwards. When I arrived I made enquiries and I understood from the railway staff that only one was arrested, but I believe the mob thought that two had been arrested.
 Q. When you came they were demanding the release of these people? Did they offer bail for them?
 A. No, I am not in a position to demand bail.
 Q. Did they offer?
 A. No.
 Q. When you arrived the crowd were not doing any mischief at all, were they?
 A. Not except stopping the traffic.
 Q. And when you spoke to the Muhammadans and Hindus they took the crowd out of the station compound?
 A. Only just outside the gates into the entrance hall. They were all jammed in the entrance hall.
 Q. Then when did they come out in the station compound altogether?
 A. After the arrival of Mr. Currie.
 Q. What time was that—between the crowd going into the entrance hall and the arrival of Mr. Currie?
 A. About 30 or 40 minutes.
 Q. What were they doing?
 A. Shouting and abusing and still demanding the release of these men.
 Q. Did any one tell them what had happened to the people they believed had been arrested?
 A. Yes, I did. I called the station master in front of them and informed them that the men were not in police custody. They would not believe me and they persisted in demanding the release.
 Q. When Mr. Currie arrived you found the crowd going to Mr. Currie to speak about it?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Then you sent a note to Mr. Currie saying that the military were available?
 A. Yes.
 Q. At that time how many police constables had you got at the station?
 A. I believe there were 6 or 8 standing there.
 Q. How many military?
 A. The troops actually available were the Manipuris—a double company of about 250.
 Q. And were they armed?
 A. They had their rifles and bayonets but no ammunition.
 Q. Were there any military or police with ammunition at the station?
 A. As soon as I got the mob outside the hall I put an armed guard over my armoury. There were only 4 armed men available.
 Q. Would it not have been possible to drive the crowd away which consisted at the most of a thousand people without firing?
 A. I should think so.
 Q. Then why was firing resorted to?
 A. I do not know. I did not see the firing.
 Q. In your opinion could the 200 Manipuris and the police have driven away the crowd?
 A. They certainly could have.
 Q. Why was not that done?
 A. I suppose Mr. Currie tried to do what I had tried—tried to get the leaders of the crowd to disperse it.

Q. Then why was it not possible later to do the same?
 A. Because the crowd was so much larger.
 Q. What was the strength of the crowd then—at the time when Mr. Currie came?
 A. About three or four hundred. Later on it numbered about a thousand.
 Q. The crowd at any time was not more than a thousand?
 A. It was about a thousand.
 Q. Would it not have been possible to drive them back with the assistance of the 200 Manipuris?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And what was the strength of the military that came in?
 A. About 30 men—they were all armed.
 Q. Had you any mounted police?
 A. I think there were a few.
 Q. With the assistance of that strength of police and military would it not have been possible to drive away the crowd from that place without firing—by the mounted men and the Manipuris and the British soldiers?
 A. I cannot give an opinion on that.
 Q. Where were you at the time?
 A. I was actually taking my lunch at the Munro Soldiers' Canteen at the station. I heard the firing but I never saw it.
 Q. You were there sufficiently long to say what was happening. Surely you can give me something of an opinion?
 A. I could not.
 Q. The crowd was not more than 300 or 400—you had 200 Manipuris, you had some mounted police. Was not that sufficient strength to drive away the crowd of people without firing, if the Manipuris had been called over?
 A. Yes.
 Q. If they had been called over in the first instance you could have driven the crowd away without firing?
 A. I had them standing to.
 Q. They were available if you wished them to take part in driving away the crowd. Then I want to know why was not that done. Why was not that resorted to without firing?
 A. I could not tell you because I did not know actually what led to the firing.
 Q. I put it to you that with the strength you had, it might have been possible to get rid of the crowd without resorting to firing, if the strength had been utilised in the first instance.
 A. I cannot say.
 Q. Do you know one Mr. Desai?
 A. I have met Mr. Desai in the Chamber of Commerce.
 Q. Is that the man who is connected with some mill?
 A. He was on the station on this occasion?
 A. I did not see him. That is not the man you speak of. He was a lad of about 16.
 Q. That is not the Hindu student you speak of?
 A. No. He was a lad of about 16.
 Q. With regard to the railway strike, it was threatened for a long time before?
 A. A general railway strike was being planned in India. We heard about it.
 Q. About the time of the Rowlatt Act agitation?
 A. Yes.
 Q. The causes were high prices and high cost of living?
 A. They were economic.
 Q. During all these days, there was no organized attack on life or property in Delhi?
 A. I heard of attacks; I have not seen any.
 Q. And there was no attack on Europeans as such?
 A. I have not heard of any.
 Q. There was no attack on any banks and public buildings, except what happened at the railway station?
 A. No.
 Q. With regard to the threatening letters that you received, on what day did you receive them?
 A. On the 13th of April.

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Mr. H. H. YULE.

[Concluded.]

Q. Have you got the letters ?
 A. They were made over to the Police, Criminal Investigation Department.
 Q. And you sent away your family ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did any other people send away their families ?
 A. Yes, Mr. Tapp, district judge.
 Q. You said your luggage was sent back by the passive resisters. Who told you that ?
 A. The *chaprasis* and the coolies who were going to fetch my luggage.
 Q. How would they know that they were passive resisters, i.e., those who stopped them from going to the station ?
 A. Nobody else would have any point in stopping them.
 Q. But there might be other persons ?
 A. There might.
 Q. You have no reason ?
 A. I certainly have reason.
 Q. Why do you say they were passive resisters who stopped them ?
 A. There was no body else. They were the people who were giving trouble at the time.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. You have given an estimate of the crowd. Did you see the crowd outside the station ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. How much space approximately would it have occupied ?
 A. It was along the whole front of the station and between the gates, right across and thick.
 Q. You are prepared to say that you would not admit that your estimate is a very rough one ?
 A. It is only based on experience of crowds. It would be about a train load, which is about 1,200.
 Q. My experience of crowds is considerable. Would you say that the crowd was about 20 times the number of people in this room.
 A. It is difficult to say, if you put it that way.
 Q. You would not think they were more ?
 A. It is difficult to judge of the number of people inside and outside in a confined space.
 Q. The number always looks more ?
 A. It looks more than what it is.
 Q. Do you think that if anything it would be more than 20 times the men in this room ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Considerably more ?
 A. No.
 Q. I do not know the number of people in this room. I should estimate that 20 times the number would make probably about 800. Do you think the crowd may have been greater than that ?
 A. Yes, because the estimate of the eye at the outside is a most deceptive thing.
 Q. You are prepared to admit that the estimate is under-rated ?
 A. Certainly. It is only by my experience of crowds. That is all.
 Q. It is possible therefore that in your opinion the crowd might have been greater than 800 or so.
 A. Yes, might be half as much again. My estimate is that.
 Q. Not more than that ?
 A. I do not think it would be more than that.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. How many shops of sweet-meat sellers are there at the station ?
 A. There is one contractor.
 Q. And there is a railway *thana* at the station somewhere there ?
 A. Yes, at the entrance of the court-yard of the station.
 Q. What is the distance from that place ?
 A. I think about 100 paces, but not directly accessible.
 Q. Is it not a fact that on your arrival, the crowd which you saw at the railway station was collecting in front of the railway police *thana* ?

A. No, Sir. That was not collected in front.
 Q. It was in front of the railway *thana* ?
 A. No.
 Q. And if it is stated by the witness that it was in front of the railway *thana*, that would not be correct ?
 A. It would be incorrect to say that when I arrived it was in front of the *thana*.
 Q. You have said that this arrest was made in connection with the assault on Mr. Matthews. You have no personal knowledge of it ?
 A. No, only hearsay.
 Q. Is it or is it not a fact that the sweet-meat seller was assaulted ?
 A. Yes, he was assaulted.
 Q. And that when they were assaulted, one or two men were arrested ?
 A. Not according to my information.
 Q. Is it not a fact that the mob before the arrival of Mr. Currie invaded the platform twice and on both occasions, on persuasion, they moved out of the platform ?
 A. Not after my arrival. They were on the platform when I arrived, they moved off and came back again and there was a rush afterwards.
 Q. Had they invaded the platform before your arrival ?
 A. I believe a small group had come along the platform before my arrival.
 Q. Before your arrival ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What was the object of these small groups of men ? Was it not for the purpose of asking the authorities to let the men arrested go on bail ?
 A. I am not aware of that.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. The crowd on the platform was stopping the traffic. Do I correctly understand you to mean that the mere fact of the presence of the crowd was interfering with the traffic and they were doing nothing actively to interfere with traffic ?
 A. That is correct.
 Q. Also when Mr. Currie came, the crowd went out of the station of their own accord ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Without anybody asking them to go ?
 A. As soon as Mr. Currie arrived.
 Q. Where did the arrest take place ? Was it in the 3rd class waiting room ?
 A. There are two third class halls, the east and the west. In the east is the sweet-meat seller and the west is the other hall.
 Q. The one nearer to the Dufferin Bridge ?
 A. The west is the one towards the Fort. The arrest was made in east hall.

By Mr. C. R. Das—

Q. Did you hear that there was a placard put up in the station saying that they would struggle to the last in connection with the Rowlatt Bill ?
 A. I heard that a placard was put up.
 Q. You also heard that the station superintendent, Mr. Matthews ordered that to be taken off ?
 A. He did so at the request of the police.
 Q. On the ground that it was objectionable ?
 A. On the ground that we do not allow placards to be exposed on our wall.
 Q. May I read Mr. Matthew's own statement ? "This placard, so far as I recollect, ended off— they would struggle to the last in connection with Rowlatt Bill." At the time after thinking over the matter and Mr. Lankester telling me it was objectionable, I gave one of the coolies orders to tear them." Is that correct ?
 A. I suppose it is.
 Q. Would this be correct that these men had succeeded in persuading the stall keepers to close their stalls, that the Station Superintendent's interference and the rough handling by the police led to a scene ?
 A. That is not correct.

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Mr. K. S. LAURIE.

Mr. K. S. LAURIE, District Engineer, East Indian Railway.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Laurie, you are the district engineer of the East Indian Railway, Delhi ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. On the 30th March, some time before 1 or about 1 o'clock you motored to the station at Delhi, along with Mr. Currie ?
 A. Yes, I was behind him in another motor.
 Q. How did you come to go there ?
 A. He just got notice on the telephone that there was trouble at the station.
 Q. It was in consequence of information you had as to the trouble ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. At what time did you arrive with Mr. Currie at the station ?
 A. I think it was about 1 o'clock ; I did not look at the time actually. It may have been a quarter or 10 minutes to 1.
 Q. What was the state of affairs at the station on your arrival ?
 A. There was a mob which I estimated at the time at about 4 to 5 hundred men. I afterwards worked it out at about 300 men actually in front of the Delhi railway police office. In the court-yard of the station they were throwing stones, shouting and making a lot of noise and the Delhi railway police were to a certain extent around them.
 Q. So violence was being threatened ?
 A. Undoubtedly.
 Q. Did anyone seem to encourage them to violence ?
 A. Yes ; there were two or three men under whose leadership the mob were.
 Q. Were any of them encouraging violence ?
 A. They were shouting, jumping about, and calling out different cries which seemed to be responded to by the men.
 Q. In what way were the men behaving ?
 A. They were shouting, jumping about and calling out cries which seemed to be responded to by the other men.
 Q. Did you hear any of the cries ?
 A. I distinctly heard one man call out "Burn the station down."
 Q. At this time were there any railway police about the place ?
 A. Yes. There were a certain number.
 Q. Did you form any opinion as to whether there were sufficient police to control the mob ?
 A. I went in the motor to see the police and the armed police and I warned them.
 Q. Then did you meet the Assistant Superintendent of Police ?
 A. I met him about a quarter of a mile from the station on the Dufferin Bridge.
 Q. Was that Mr. Jeffreys ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Was he accompanied by any men.
 A. He had about 40 men.
 Q. Were these members of the police force ?
 A. Armed police.
 Q. Were they moving in the direction of the station ?
 A. They were marching down to the station.
 Q. That was in consequence of the previous communication you made ?
 A. I think they had notice before I gave notice. They were turning out when I got to the police lines originally.
 Q. Did you see the Superintendent of Police at that time ?
 A. I went to his house and found him there.
 Q. Was that Mr. Marshall ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did he return to the station with you then ?
 A. No. Colonel Knollys went down with him to the station.
 Q. What time did you return to the station ?
 A. Almost at once. That would be perhaps 10 minutes. It is rather difficult to estimate time when you are motoring. I was not two minutes with Mr. Marshall.

Q. What was the state of affairs when you got to the station back ?
 A. The body of rioters was out in the main road with some police round them and the station yard was then clear.
 Q. Did the mob have anything in their hands ?
 A. Only sticks. They were very heavy ones.
 Q. In addition to those people that you referred to in the immediate neighbourhood of the station was there a large collection of people near about ?
 A. About the usual number of passengers and perhaps a few more than usual.
 Q. These were distinct from the crowd ?
 A. Absolutely distinct from the crowd.
 Q. Mr. Marshall arrived with a few mounted men and Mr. Currie, I think, was also present ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you see any military in the station ?
 A. Yes. There were some infantry.
 Q. Did the British infantry come from the Fort ?
 A. I was told so.
 Q. There were also a detachment of Manipuris who had come by train ?
 A. Yes, a detachment of about 250 men of Manipuris.
 Q. Had you time to study the crowd and form any opinion as to what they were bent upon ?
 A. They seemed to be out for a row. That was the main thing. Most of them had got clean clothes on and they seemed to be quite distinct from an ordinary mob just gathered together.
 Q. Did you make any suggestion to Mr. Currie as to the taking of any measures to cope with violence if it occurred ?
 A. The crowd was blocking up the road and having seen the damage done to the station there was no doubt that a certain amount of violence had to be anticipated. So I suggested that the crowd should be rounded up by arresting the ring-leaders.
 Q. Did you suggest how that could be done ?
 A. I suggested that he should bring the Manipuris out and surround them.
 Q. Did Mr. Currie assent to that suggestion ?
 A. He seemed to think that it was not necessary to do anything of that sort. He said that they would probably disperse in course of time.
 Q. Was the reason for the Manipuris not being brought forward due to the reluctance of Mr. Currie to take action ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. About this time did you see anything occur as regards the motor car that was passing ?
 A. The motor car was stopped by these people and the occupants were made to get out. They surrounded the car and would not let it go. They opened the door and told the people to clear out.
 Q. Was anything done in consequence of that ?
 A. Nothing at the time.
 Q. Did things get worse ? What happened after that so far as the crowd was concerned ?
 A. They were surrounded by the police. They were stopping all the traffic and making things difficult, shouting, brandishing their sticks.
 Q. Was anything done by way of preventing the crowd from advancing ?
 A. Mr. Currie gave instructions that they were to be moved off the road.
 Q. Was that done ?
 A. That was done.
 Q. How was that done ?
 A. The police formed a line and moved forward and stretched out. A few soldiers there came in between the police and pushed the crowd back through the gate into the Queen's Gardens.
 Q. Had the soldiers fixed bayonets ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did anything occur to the soldiers ?
 A. I saw one soldier hit over the head and the helmet

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Mr. K. S. LAURIE.

[Continued.]

Q. What happened then?
 A. Nothing really happened. The helmet protected him to a certain extent. He would have dropped down if he had not had that.
 Q. Was any man touched by a bayonet?
 A. Not that I saw of?
 Q. Did you see any effort to wrest the arms from the soldiers?
 A. The man who was hit, his rifle was actually held while he was being hit. With one hand the rifle was held and with the other the stick was used.
 Q. Meantime were the mob forced back through the crowd?
 A. The mob were forced back through the gates.
 Q. Were the palings broken?
 A. They forced open the palings in the Queen's Gardens.
 Q. How were the police and the soldiers situated at this time?
 A. The gates at the Queen's Gardens have return walls and the gates have narrow apertures. The walls come round in a circle. When the soldiers and the police and the mob were going through them they actually got smaller and smaller and the whole thing got into a jumble of human beings.
 Q. Did the police and the military follow the mob?
 A. The foot police and the military did not. I think the mounted police went into the gardens.
 Q. While the mob were being driven back were any missiles thrown?
 A. Not until they got into the gardens.
 Q. When they got into the garden were missiles thrown?
 A. Then stones began to be thrown.
 Q. On whom were stones thrown?
 A. On the police and the soldiers.
 Q. What sort of stones were these?
 A. First of all they were small stones. Eventually they were half bricks. Anything that was handy was taken up.
 Q. Did you see whether any of the soldiers or the police were struck by the bricks?
 A. I saw several of them hit. I saw the man next to me hit by a brick.
 Q. What will you say as to the temper of the mob?
 A. As nasty as it could be.
 Q. Was any one immediately near you struck?
 A. Yes. There was a big Pathan standing next to me and he was hit by the best part of a brick. It did not quite knock him down. He had a very big turban and that protected him. Otherwise, he would have been killed.
 Q. Did any of the missiles pass in your immediate neighbourhood?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did it strike you that they would have proved very serious if they had struck?
 A. Distinctly.
 Q. Where was Mr. Marshall then?
 A. He was inside the gardens. He was just inside the gate with the mounted police. They were in front.
 Q. Were missiles being thrown at them?
 A. Yes. I could see Mr. Marshall. He was hit several times. He was hit once in the helmet. I saw that distinctly.
 Q. Did you hear an order given to fire upon the crowd?
 A. I heard Mr. Marshall gave the order to fire. I did not hear of any other order.
 Q. What time would that be?
 A. I cannot tell that.
 Q. Did you see the effect of the firing?
 A. The crowd rushed off for the most part, but a few still remained and still continued to throw stones, from a long distance of course.
 Q. Even after the points were clear did they still continue to throw stones?
 A. They still continued to throw stones from a distance. We had stones amongst us.
 Q. When did you move off from this place yourself?
 A. Almost at once. I saw a large party going off to the west along the Queen's Gardens and I thought that

they might be doing damage on the railway and upon the railway houses.
 Q. With whom did you go on?
 A. I went with Colonel Knollys and I had the Manipuris with me.
 Q. What was your object?
 A. My object was to see that these lines were protected.
 Q. When you left were the military patrolling?
 A. We had not organized up to that time. As I have said stones were still coming along and they were getting the police together and the soldiers were being re-formed, but I did not actually take much note of that. I was anxious to get on.
 Q. Then after you had gone to see that the civil lines were protected did you return again to the station?
 A. That was some time afterwards—I should think the best part of an hour.
 Q. At that time was there a mob about the station?
 A. No, everything was clear.
 Q. Did you hear any sound?
 A. I heard firing from the city and the Chowk—I do not know the exact time. I then went on to Mor Sarai out towards the fort. We have a large number of quarters and I wanted to see that they were all right.
 Q. Was there a patrol sent out?
 A. I found a small patrol of British infantry.
 Q. Did you see anything occurring at the fort at about this time?
 A. There was a large crowd there. There was a party of cavalry and a couple of officers with them and they rode up towards the crowd and talked with the leaders of the crowd and then they retired to the road and I thought there was rather a nasty hum coming up from the crowd. Shortly afterwards other people came up dressed in *mufti* and they walked straight over to the crowd and the cavalry followed close behind and they talked with the leaders.
 Q. Was there anyone in front of the crowd on this occasion?
 A. There was a man in yellow clothes who seemed to be a leading person in that crowd.
 Q. Could you recognise him?
 A. No. I was not quite close enough. They were about 150 yards away.
 Q. What did you do after that?
 A. I went then to see the municipal officer and eventually out into the Chowk and we went down again to the fort and round our quarters and by that time the crowd had practically broken up as far as we could see.
 Q. Personally did you see anything more of rioting that day?
 A. No.
 Q. On the subsequent days I think you were in the city. Did you personally see anything of the subsequent occurrences?
 A. I was at the station several times when they were holding meetings and generally the rowdy element were outside the Queen's Gardens—round the gates there was a crowd of 50 to 100 men and they were always shouting and dancing about. On one day I actually saw a crowd there and a man quite decent looking drove up in a tonga I think and handed sticks out to the whole of the crowd.
 Q. What sort of sticks?
 A. They were heavy sticks about the thickness of my finger.
 Q. Were these sticks used by the crowd?
 A. Shortly afterwards a lot of people drove out from the Queen's Gardens and they spoke to the crowd and the crowd went away.
 Q. During the subsequent days were you frequently travelling on the line?
 A. I travelled on the line three times that month.
 Q. And did anything occur?
 A. Once going down to Ghaziabad some stones hit my carriage.
 Q. Did you form any opinion as to whether they were thrown at you or not?
 A. They were simply thrown at the train. Another time stones were thrown at me when I was inspecting. Three

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Mr. K. S. LAURIE.

[Continued.]

men were out in the open and one of them ran close up to the fence and hit the carriage with a brick.
 Q. On what date did that occur?
 A. That was in May—a considerable time after.
 Q. During the period of these disturbances did you notice whether the crowd adopted any special attitude towards Europeans or not?
 A. Yes, they used to jeer a good deal as we drove along the streets. Boys were the worst.
 Q. About this time had you difficulty in feeding your staff?
 A. We had great difficulty in feeding the staff. They were in a fix and the intention was to make the men strike and they refused to sell the necessities of life and the men came to us in great trouble and told us that we should help them out if they were to carry on their work.
 By Mr. Justice Rankin—
 Q. When the mob were fired at at the station where exactly were they?
 A. They were inside the garden about 50 yards from the gate. Inside the gardens there is a series of roads and there are sunken walls and sunken lawns on each side of those roads and they were mostly down in those lawns. If they had not been there I think there would have been heavier casualties.
 Q. I understand as regards one man who was hit that you saw him fall?
 A. I saw him.
 Q. Where exactly was that?
 A. That was at the end of the wall to the west of the gate about 60 yards from the gate.
 Q. Did you see any other men fall?
 A. I saw two or three men fall just about the same place.
 Q. If we take the soldiers first, where were they at the time they fired?
 A. The soldiers were behind the police. They formed the flank and they fired over the wall. The soldiers were actually in the Queen's Gardens road.
 Q. As regards the police where were they at the time?
 A. Most of them were in the garden.
 Q. What sort of firing was it? Was it independent—each man taking his own time after being given the order?
 A. Yes.
 Q. How long did the firing last?
 A. Well it is extraordinarily difficult to say although it could not have lasted very long it must have gone on for about 20 to 30 seconds. I do not think it was much more. It appeared a tremendous long time.
 Q. As regards the throwing of stones and bricks—did that continue, as I understand, not only up to the actual moment of firing but even afterwards?
 A. After they had stopped firing they were still throwing bricks and as I left the place in my car a stone fell on the road.
 By Sir C. H. Setalvad—
 Q. You arrived at the station with Mr. Currie?
 A. Behind Mr. Currie—I was in another car.
 Q. You say that you arrived there about 1 P.M.?
 A. It was about 10 to 1.
 Q. And when you arrived, where was the crowd?
 A. In the station yard—in front of the *thana*.
 Q. And that crowd numbered about 300?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And they were shouting and jeering and brandishing sticks and you distinctly heard one man say to burn the station.
 A. Yes.
 Q. That was never attempted?
 A. No, there was never an attempt at firing the station.
 Q. Nor were there any preparations which you could see?
 A. No.
 Q. Nor were there any preparations in their behalf that you could see?
 A. No.

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Q. When you saw the crowd, they were demanding the release of one or two people that they believed had been arrested?
 A. I did not hear that.
 Q. You never heard that at any time?
 A. No.
 Q. On that day or on any subsequent day?
 A. No.
 Q. You never heard of that at all?
 A. I never heard it from that crowd. I heard it from people afterwards.
 Q. When you arrived at the station, did any station authority or any person on the station tell you that the crowd were demanding the release of certain people whom they believed had been arrested?
 A. Not when I arrived; it was afterwards. The second time I arrived I was talking with the station superintendent and he said that the crowd had been demanding the release of the men.
 Q. And you became aware of the fact that the crowd had come initially to the station for the purpose of inducing the sweetmeat seller to close his shop?
 A. Yes.
 Q. That was the object with which they came?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Then why do you say, Mr. Laurie, that the intention of the crowd was merely for riot?
 A. If you can get a crowd to listen to anybody who is trying to speak to them, I think you are right; but with a mob of that sort, it is impossible to talk; they were shouting and dancing and they would not listen to anybody.
 Q. But initially they came for the purpose of inducing the sweetmeat seller to close his shop?
 A. So I heard.
 Q. And they believed that one or two of them had been arrested from the crowd.
 A. I believe that was what I was told.
 Q. They were demanding the release of the persons who were believed to have been arrested?
 A. They were doing a great deal more than demanding the release; they were trying to enforce it by smashing the things in the station.
 Q. They smashed up the glass panes?
 A. They smashed the glass panes and the huge iron gates and tore them out of their sockets.
 Q. When was that, before or after your arrival?
 A. Just before my arrival.
 Q. This crowd increased after you arrived?
 A. Not very much. There was a slight increase at the end.
 Q. What was the number of the crowd? Was it 800 or 1,000?
 A. I do not think there were more than 800 at the outside.
 Q. Was the crowd at the time the firing took place, more than 800?
 A. I do not think so.
 Q. Now the initial crowd was about 300 as estimated?
 A. Yes, I measured the place. I have seen lots of these riots. I actually measured the place the next day.
 Q. Was it more than 300?
 A. It is,—allowing 2 sq. ft. for a man.
 Q. When you arrived was the crowd driven out of the railway compound?
 A. No; that was while I was away.
 Q. Originally they were on the platform?
 A. They were in the station yard, in front of the Delhi railway police when I first arrived.
 Q. They were actually on the platform before your arrival?
 A. Yes.
 Q. From the platform they were driven into the railway compound and so you found them there when you were there?
 A. Yes.
 Q. After that they were put out of the railway compound on the road?

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[Continued.]

A. I found them on the road when I came back the second time.
Q. From the road, they were driven into the Queen's Gardens?

A. Yes.
Q. After that was done, the police and the military were available?

A. Yes.
Q. Up to that stage no firing seemed necessary?
A. No.
Q. Now at the time the crowd was in the Queen's Gardens, about 800 strong or about that, the authorities on the spot had at their command the police. What was the number of the police?

A. There were about 8 or 10 mounted men, I should think.

Q. Were there police not mounted men?
A. There were about 40 or 50.
Q. Then you had the British soldiers, about 30?

A. Yes.
Q. Then you had the Manipuris available at the station about 250 of them?

A. They were on the station behind, about 250.
Q. With all that strength available, as you have told us, would it not have been possible to drive a way 800 people from the Queen's Gardens and make them disperse without firing?

A. Not when they started trying and throwing stones. The trouble was when the stones began to fly.

Q. There was no firing till men were knocked about?

A. Until stones came in.
Q. Taking the strength you had at your command and the strength of the crowd in the Queen's Gardens, would it not have been possible to disperse them without firing?

A. After they got to the Queen's Gardens, my suggestion was to move them down to the Fort. I saw Mr. Currie and spoke to him that they should be moved towards the Fort and the ringleaders arrested. If that had been done, no firing would have been necessary. That was my idea at the time.

Q. That was not done?

A. That was not.
Q. Because, I take it, Mr. Currie was reluctant to take any such measures. Was that the idea?

A. That is the idea.
Q. He hoped that they would disperse?

A. Yes.
Q. After they were dragged into the Queen's Gardens, what was the difficulty in the way of driving them away with the strength that you had at your command?
A. Because the instant I got into the Queen's Gardens, throwing of stones commenced. There was no time in the meanwhile to act after they got into the Queen's Gardens.

Q. Before they got into the Queen's Gardens, they did not throw any stones?

A. No.
Q. Throwing stones began only after the crowd went into the Queen's Gardens?

A. Yes.
Q. The stones thrown were in large numbers?

A. Very large numbers.
Q. Where did they get the stones from? Was it from Queen's Gardens?

A. A wall was broken to start with. I think that supplied the bricks. Then Queen's Gardens furnished lots. I saw one man tearing up stones out of a drain. There were lots of drains there.

Q. Was anybody seriously hurt by these stones?

A. I believe so. I should think that several people who were standing next to me must certainly have been hurt.

Q. Nobody died?

A. No.
Q. How many people were in all hurt by the stones?

A. I did not make any enquiries. I saw lots of people.
Q. So far as you have been able to ascertain, was it a small number or large?

A. I should think 50 per cent. were more or less hurt with stones.

Q. Fifty per cent. of the police?

A. Yes.
Q. There was no serious injury?

A. I did not go round and look for that either.

Q. What was the distance between the crowd when they were in the Queen's Gardens and the police and the military. The crowd were pushed back by the police into the Queen's Gardens. They were in close contact.

A. Not in close contact at first and then when the stone throwing began, the crowd dispersed about 40 or 50 yards away and threw stones, where they got scattered about a good deal.

Q. What was the distance between the Queen's Gardens and the railway compound?

A. About 80 to 100 feet perhaps.

Q. You say that the mob had sticks. Had they?

A. Yes.
Q. Nobody was hit by stones?

A. They were; soldiers were hurt.

Q. How many of them?

A. I saw one.
Q. You spoke of an Indian coming in a tonga and distributing sticks to the crowd. On what date was that?

A. I should think somewhere about the 8th of April. I am not sure of that date.

Q. Somewhere about that?

A. Yes.
Q. Were any steps taken to find out who this man was?

A. No. It dispersed at once; he drove straightway afterwards.

Q. Did you report the incident at the time to any authority?

A. The police were actually there and saw it.

Q. Was any action taken to find out who this person was?

A. I could not tell you. The police would do that.

Q. You spoke of stones being thrown on train. Was the train moving at the time?

A. Yes, while the train was moving.

Q. What speed was the train going?

A. I could not tell you exactly; it would be between 20 to 40 miles.

Q. When a train was moving at 20 to 40 miles, do you think that any person outside could spot you in that manner and aim a stone?

A. When the bricks were thrown it might have been going at 10 miles.

Q. Now you spoke of the difficulty of feeding your staff. When was that? When did you first experience that difficulty?

A. I am afraid I have not taken note of the date.

Q. Was that in March or April?

A. That would be in April.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Your opinion was that the riots at Delhi appeared to have been organised by the *bantias* with an idea of keeping up the prices. They were joined by the lower classes (vagabonds) who would naturally welcome a riot. That is your idea.

A. I think that is wrong. I should say closing of the shops instead of riots.

Q. That was your opinion up to the 6th October and since you have changed it?

A. I think I was wrong.

Q. Now what reasons have you to change your opinion. You have stated that the crowd that was outside the railway station, was not of the lower class, they were not vagabonds, they were superior sort of men. They had white clothes, etc. To-day you have stated that.

A. I am referring in the one case to the whole question of the closing of the shops and so on. I used the word "riot" by mistake. I should say "closing of shops" and the "trouble." In the other case I am referring to the actual riots which took place.

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Mr. K. S. LAURIE.

[Continued.]

Q. When you received information of what was happening at the Railway station at your house, would it be 12-30?

A. I think that is about right. That is as near as I can give it.

Q. You say that the crowds were jeering and shouting?

A. On which occasion?

Q. In front of the police thana at the railway station.

A. Yes.
Q. I think you understand Hindustani and Urdu sufficiently well?

A. Yes.
Q. Could you kindly tell us what they were exactly saying in their own words?

A. No. I cannot. I am not a great linguist, though I can understand. I passed the lower standard in Hindustani and so on. As far as I could understand one or two men were distinctly shouting above the others making much more noise. There was a great deal of noise indeed. Every now and then it died down and then one or two men would shout and jump up.

Q. Was not the shout *Gandhi ki jai* and *Satyagraha ki jai*?

A. It might have been amongst them but it was not all.

Q. You cannot give the Urdu words used?

A. Not the whole lot, or the individual cries.

Q. About the damage done at the railway station, was it done intentionally or was it due to the fact that 300 or 400 people rushed to the railway station and they wanted to see the officials and, therefore, incidentally, certain panes were broken?

A. You cannot tear down heavy gates unless there is an intention. The gates at the railway station are heavy ones. There was a great deal of intention about it.

Q. That was subsequently?

A. That was after they were driven out of the station. They came rushing round the first class ticket office.

Q. I was talking of the first occasion when the crowd was inside the platform and some glasses and flower pots were broken?

A. Some chairs were broken too. The books were removed and thrown all over the place. The room was in a most awful condition.

Q. Can you give us the names of the sweetmeat sellers at the station?

A. I had nothing to do with the sweetmeat sellers. The only man I know is the old man Ganga Singh.

Q. He is a man who sells sweets?

A. He is a contractor.

Q. May I take it that Ganga Singh was not sitting in the shop?

A. He was always about there.

Q. He is not the man who actually sells sweets.

A. I do not know what his arrangements are. I cannot tell you. He is always known as the sweetmeat contractor.

Q. Who was the man who was actually assaulted?

A. When I got to the station I was told that Ganga Singh had been injured and besides that Matthews had his coat torn off his back. I saw that. These are things I actually saw.

Q. You were not actually present then?

A. I was not there. I was told by the people of what had happened.

Q. When the crowd was pressed back by the police and the military from the railway station, how many people were there in the Queen's Gardens? Were you in the front rank?

A. I was a long way behind, half way across the road at least.

Q. Is it not a fact that the walls were too high to climb up?

A. They broke down the walls.

Q. I understand from your evidence that the mob were forced through the gates and over the palings?

A. They were pushed back in the ordinary way and the palings broke down.

Q. It was the pressing of the crowd that broke down the palings?

A. Yes.
Q. Was the Pathan who was hit examined by any doctor afterwards?

A. I did not see him afterwards.

Q. Were there any people who did not report their injuries to the authorities and were not examined?

A. I know nothing about that at all.

Q. I believe you were all along with Mr. Currie from the railway station up to the time that the first firing took place?

A. When the firing took place Mr. Currie went forward and I stopped behind.

Q. How far were you behind?

A. I was standing on the pavement of the wall in front of the Railway station and I may have moved forward across the railway compound.

Q. Is it possible that you lost sight of Mr. Currie?

A. I did not see Mr. Currie when the firing took place at all. I do not know exactly where he was.

Q. You did see Mr. Marshall. You did hear him giving out the order to fire?

A. Mr. Marshall was on horseback. He stood well up above everybody else.

Q. How far were you from Mr. Marshall?

A. Thirty or forty yards.

Q. Is it not a fact that after the first firing a large part of the crowd which went away did so because there was their leader and he persuaded them to go back to the park?

A. Certainly not while I was there. I never saw him there at all.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. You have described the crowd at the railway station as being in a noisy and violent state, not ready to listen to any advice?

A. Yes.

Q. Did Mr. Marshall, Mr. Currie and other persons try to give the people advice and induce them to disperse peacefully? What were they doing?

A. Mr. Currie went forward. I did not go with him. I did not hear what passed on. I think Mr. Currie was very anxious to get them away.

Q. As a result of your observation during the whole of that incident do you think that in your own judgment the firing had become necessary at the time when it took place?

A. I think it was unavoidable. We should have had otherwise a great number of men killed undoubtedly. It was necessary on that account.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. If the crowd could be made to leave the station yard as well as the Queen's Road without the necessity of firing, what was the necessity of firing when they were pent up within the gardens? The gardens have high railings and it is not so easy to leave the gardens as an open space like the Queen's Road?

A. I do not think it makes very much difference.

Q. It will make some difference at any rate?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the necessity then if they were not trying to get out of Queen's Gardens?

A. They were throwing stones.

Q. Beyond throwing stones there was nothing else?

A. Nothing practically.

Q. Did an armoured car also arrive?

A. An armoured car did arrive.

Q. What was it like?

A. I did not get into that. It certainly looked like a quick-firing gun. I could not tell you when it arrived.

Q. Was it a machine-gun?

A. I think so.

By the Hon'ble Pandit M. M. Malavia—

Q. You were there when Mr. Marshall arrived or did he arrive before you?

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Mr. K. S. LAURIE—concluded.—GANGA SINGH.

A. I was there when Mr. Marshall arrived.
 Q. When the crowd was pushed into the garden, then they began to pelt the police with stones?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Will you kindly tell us roughly the distance between the crowd when it was inside the railings and the police and the troops. Would it be about 150 feet roughly?
 A. What the crowd actually did was to get under the walls and then they dislodged heavy stones and pieces of bricks.
 Q. What was the distance?
 A. About 150 feet. The crowd were actually under these walls. The lawns were sunken in and the crowd got under these lawns and lobbed the heavy stones on the top of the police. It was perhaps about 10 feet distant.
 Q. Were a number of boys in front of the crowds?
 A. There were a lot of boys. I should think about 20 or 30. Boys from 16 to 18.
 Q. These boys were in the front—probably they threw stones?
 A. I should think so.
 Q. You say that after the first firing took place the crowd got into the garden. From the place where the crowd was and where the police were you told the Committee that there was a distance of about 10 feet—could not the police or the troops have rushed forward and got hold of the man or boy? Was it not possible?
 A. There was this wall along the roads. The real danger was the big bricks which were being thrown up.
 Q. Could not the mounted police go?
 A. There were only 7 or 8 of them and there was a crowd of 800 so they could not do very much. These 7 or 8 men were jammed up in the gates and there was no chance of their getting out and the only way for them to extricate themselves was to go out in the road again.
 Q. At the place where the mounted police were, the stones were not thrown by the crowd who were just behind the mounted police?
 A. The first stones started I think right away from the places down the road from behind the railings and

walls and they pulled up some stones out of the drain I saw them actually doing that.
 Q. Was not the drain *paika*?
 A. I think it was *kachcha-paila*. The people who were hurt were some distance off. I gave the distance about 60 or 80 yards. They were all members of the police force and troops.
 Q. Could it not have been possible for them to rush forward and get hold of the man who had hurt them?
 A. They could not possibly get at them because of the wall.
 Q. You do not think it was possible for any of the police or troops to come forward and get hold of any of these assailants?
 A. I do not think they could. Mounted police are heavy men and they have got heavy arms. It is not their game.
 Q. Don't you think that the mounted force and the police that were behind could by rushing forward drive away this mob?
 A. No, because the mob was so scattered.
 Q. In the path from where these missiles came?
 A. They were coming from all sides.
 Q. Under those circumstances the police were absolutely helpless?
 A. They could not run after them as you suggest.
 Q. You told the Committee that stones continued to be thrown after a great portion of the mob had run off after the firing. What was the number of men left?
 A. There were some persons still left in the garden, some of the mob.
 Q. Can you give any idea of the number?
 A. No, they were all scattered all over the place—behind the trees, etc. I could not tell you. They were throwing stones from behind trees and some of them got into the drains and behind walls.
 Q. You say that they continued to throw stones after the firing had stopped. In view of the police and the troops being there you do not think that any of these men could be arrested by the police?
 A. Not at that time. They were all out.

GANGA SINGH.

By the President—

Q. What is your name?
 A. Ganga Singh.
 Q. What is your business?
 A. I am an Indian confectionary contractor.
 Q. Where?
 A. At the Delhi railway station.
 Q. Have you anything to do with the refreshments for the third class passengers?
 A. No. I have no third class refreshment room.
 Q. Were you at the station on the 30th March?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What occurred then?
 A. When I came from home in the west hall I was told by my assistant that the people wanted the shops closed. They were informed that the shops were intended for passengers not for city people and that it was not our own shop but we were simply working it. So by persuasion they went away. After a little while I went to the passenger platform. A man came running to me and told me that the people were forcing the closing of the shops. I went there and saw a large crowd and in the meantime some of the city men recognised me because I belong to this place. They said, "Now that you have come why not give orders for the shop to be closed?" I told them that it was not my personal shop and that I could not close it.
 Q. Was anything done to try and persuade you to close the shop?
 A. They said "You are our brother. You must help and join." I said "I cannot do that and if I am to lose I do not want any compensation but at the same

time I am not in a position to close it." Some of them said—"Since he won't close the shop better get hold of him." They were dragging me along. I was being dragged towards the entrance and in the struggle an iron bar struck me.
 Q. How many men were there?
 A. It may be about 20.
 Q. Did you see what occurred afterwards at the railway station?
 A. I had gone into the west hall.
 Q. They were throwing stones?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you make a complaint to anyone about what occurred?
 A. There was no officer on the platform. At the same time deputy superintendent Mr. Matthew was asking me. After they forced me some of them went to the station platform, and jumped over the iron gates. After that I was seated in the assistant station master's office. I did not get out because I was very much agitated at that time and they were also breaking the gate of the 1st and 2nd class passengers.
 Q. Did the crowd become a threatening crowd then?
 A. After I had seen this, I was very much puzzled at the time.
 Q. Was any number of the crowd taken into custody?
 A. I did not see myself. There was a cry of *pakara*.
 Q. You did not see anyone arrested?
 A. No. After I had received the hurt, my assistants took me away fearing that these men might harm me

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GANGA SINGH—concluded—Brig.-Genl. D. H. DRAKE BROCKMAN.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. After you were dragged in the manner you have described, you have no personal knowledge as to the events that happened afterwards?
 A. No.
 Q. When you were dragged, I understand you were so frightened that you went somewhere and shut yourself up?
 A. I did not shut myself up. But sitting in office may be called shutting or anything of the kind.
 Q. You were frightened and, therefore, you did not go out and see what was happening. You did not care to do that?
 A. No; I did not.
 Q. You sat in that room and never got out?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Out of about 20 people that were speaking and asking you to close the shop, did you recognise any one?
 A. They were brought before the city magistrate and I was called.
 Q. Out of the 15 or 20 people that asked you close the shop, there was no one that you knew before?
 A. No.
 Q. They were strangers to you?
 A. I do not know them. Any man can recognise me from my face. As I have been out of Delhi for a long time, I did not remember them.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Were you released at the gate?
 A. I was released because one of my servants asked them why they were dragging me.
 Q. You have stated that after you were released, you went to the station platform?
 A. Yes.

Q. But in the meantime, you said you heard certain people cry *pakara*.
 A. Yes, before I went to the shop.
 Q. That was before you were pulled?
 A. Yes, before I was pulled.
 Q. You were not beaten?
 A. No.
 Q. Your *pagri* was not thrown away?
 A. No. It got loose.
 Q. Your coat was not torn?
 A. No.
 Q. Did you or did you not hear afterwards that because you were pulled, one or two of the 20 people were arrested by the police?
 A. I do not remember. I only heard of it afterwards that some men were arrested but they were let off at the same time.
 Q. You did hear afterwards that some men were arrested and they were let off, some men of the crowd that had gathered?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What was the talk that you heard? Kindly give it in your own words?
 A. It was heard in the evening that some men were arrested or held by the police. I also heard at the same time that they were let off and were not then in custody.

By Mr. C. R. Das—

Q. Is it not a fact that the shops were closed by the persuasion of these men and afterwards the railway authorities objected?
 A. Nothing of the sort. My men were waiting; unless the master came they would not close it.
 Q. Were other shops closed?
 A. Not closed. The second shop was not closed, and the third the *lisuit-wala* shop was not closed.

Brigadier-General D. H. DRAKE-BROCKMAN, C. M. G., Commanding Delhi Brigade.

By the President—

Q. General Brockman, you were in command of the Delhi Brigade and the troops in the station of Delhi?
 A. I am, Sir.
 Q. Were you present at the time when the disturbances took place on the 30th March?
 A. I was present at Delhi but I was not actually present at the railway station when the first outbreak took place.
 Q. You know as to the military dispositions that were made at that time and subsequently in consequence of these disturbances?
 A. They were made by me in consultation with Mr. Barron.
 Q. On Sunday, the 30th March, did you observe the appearance of the city in the morning?
 A. No Sir, I was not in the town. I only got knowledge of the trouble on the telephone.
 Q. At about what time?
 A. Noon, about 12.
 Q. What happened then?
 A. I heard there was trouble at the station. We always have a picquet ready for emergency in the Fort. I ordered it to be sent down.
 Q. You sent down a picquet then?
 A. We keep an emergency picquet of about 30 men ready for an occasion like that.
 Q. How many men did a picquet consist of?
 A. Thirty British soldiers.
 Q. What ammunition had they?
 A. The regulation ammunition.
 Q. Was an armoured car also sent?
 A. We sent that. It was patrolling the streets.
 Q. Was it armoured with a machine gun?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. As to what happened I think you don't know personally?

A. I was not present.
 Q. Meantime had you any interview with Mr. Barron?
 A. We consulted together what further dispositions we should take.
 Q. What was the result?
 A. The result was that we decided to take dispositions to guard the Civil Lines with the Coke's Rifles. There was also an Indian Infantry regiment which happened to be a detachment of Manipuris who were temporarily halting here. We put them on to picquet the roads. They were used to guard the road. One armoured car came from the Fort.
 Q. I think you provided us with a copy of your entry in your diary?
 A. I have not that.
 Q. After the 30th did you send troops to any of the neighbouring points at Delhi?
 A. In the Queen's Gardens which we made our headquarters we had 180 men of the 76th Cavalry. I increased it by 40 more and 200 men of the Coke's Rifles were put there with the armoured car. There were 25 at the station.
 Q. In your opinion what was the advantage of these troops being sent to the outlying points?
 A. I got orders to send these. In my opinion it was a very sound thing to do because the Deputy Commissioner and others in the Civil Lines were very isolated and if any trouble arose there is absolutely no support. The police cannot be of much use in time of necessity. I received orders to send troops to the headquarters of civil districts such as Gurgaon and Rohtak.
 Q. As regards the special arrangements you made for the military assisting the police you mentioned what occurred on the 30th. What happened on the subsequent dates?
 A. On the 2nd April we withdrew the troops to the camp outside the Delhi Fort at the request of the

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[Continued.]

Magistrate, leaving just a detachment of Cornwalls in the Civil Police Lines for escort purposes. On the next day the 3rd we thought there might be some necessity for it. I warned two troops of the Oxforas to be ready at 6 A.M. to move if required. They were not actually asked to move. They remained outside the Delhi Fort then.

Q. On the 4th and 5th?

A. They were outside the Delhi Fort.

Q. On the 6th?

A. The Deputy Commissioner came to me the night previous and said that the position seemed to be serious, and asked for troops again. I ordered then to take up the same positions as on the 31st of March.

Q. On the 7th April shops were closed and the troops were in requisition?

A. Yes.

Q. They were withdrawn after the evening?

A. I asked the magistrate. He said there was no necessity for it. They retired to their headquarters.

Q. You did leave some as a reserve?

A. I left one company in the Police Lines. That was a convenient place for them.

Q. On the 8th and 9th things were quiet, I think, in the town?

A. Yes, quiet in that I was not asked for military assistance.

Q. On the 10th?

A. It was anticipated there might be trouble because Mr. Gandhi was prevented from entering the Punjab and we got prepared and brought in a force of cavalry from the New Cantonment to the camp outside the Delhi Fort.

Q. On the 11th, what arrangements did you make as regards troops for that day?

A. We had to send for the men again at the request of the magistrate. The cavalry came in and 100 rifles of the 2-55th I brought in as well. I sent 25 British troops to the station in addition to their one company in the police lines. The Indian Defence Force were occupied in their work and I thought it advisable to send a small guard for the Ghaziabad portion of the Indian Defence Force.

Q. The shops meantime continued to be closed?

A. They were closed all the time.

Q. On the 15th there was a strike and the military had nothing to do in connection with that?

A. On the 14th we heard rumours of trouble amongst the railway employees. I sent 25 British Rifles just as a precautionary measure to Ghaziabad which is a very important junction. There was a meeting in the Town Hall and very large crowds assembled but nothing actually occurred.

Q. Did detachments of the military guard any points in the city on that day?

A. The dispositions were the same as I recorded on the 11th.

Q. On the 15th was the disposition of the troops altered?

A. It was then that I got orders to send the troops to outlying districts.

Q. On the 16th things remained quiet and on the 17th there were attempts made to get all the shops closed?

A. Some shops tried to open but some men tried to close them and a picket was attacked. One policeman was very badly hit and the Infantry went out on parade through the streets. There was no firing. The mob cleared off when they saw the Infantry coming.

Q. On the 18th you referred to the condition of the city as being better and that the civil authorities did not consider there would be more trouble?

A. Yes, that is what they told me.

Q. In connection with what occurred upon the 17th did the police fire?

A. The police fired, not the military.

Q. On the 19th did the station so much improve that you were able to withdraw certain of the troops?

A. Yes.

Q. You mention in your diary the number that were withdrawn I think.

A. Yes, we withdrew practically all the way from the Town Hall which was our Headquarters. These were simply 100 men of the Coke's Rifles in the Civil Police Lines.

Q. During the period of the unrest were any attempts made to tamper with the loyalty of the troops in the station?

A. Two cases were brought to my notice, Sir. One was in the 2-55th and the other the 16th Cavalry. Unfortunately the men kicked the tamperer out of the lines. They called him a Babu. I was rather annoyed. I gave orders to hand him over to the civil police station and report it to the Deputy Commissioner. The second case was of a dismissed sepoy. He was handed over to the magistrate and tried and is undergoing 7 years' rigorous imprisonment. That effectually stopped any more attempts. There was also one other case in the bazaar where a man tried to sell seditious literature concealed in sweetmeat. We took action under the Cantonment Code. No other case was brought to my notice.

Q. From what you say about this period of disturbances, did you form any opinion as to the attitude of the civil authorities with reference to the occurrences?

A. Yes. I considered they were extremely moderate in their treatment of the crowd on two or three occasions even when they showed absolute defiance of authority.

Q. From your own observation did you form any opinion as to whether the crowd was bent upon violence or not?

A. I should say most certainly it was. When I went through the Queen's Gardens it was strewn with brick-bats. It was littered from the railway station to the Chandni Chowk.

Q. What date was that?

A. Thirty-first, when I met Mr. Barron and made arrangements.

Q. How many people collected in the crowd upon that date on the 30th?

A. It was reported to be about 700. I did not actually see it myself.

Q. Did you yourself see what weapons were used by the crowd?

A. Lathis.

Q. When were they used?

A. On the 15th when huge crowds assembled. When they raised their lathis it looked like a bamboo forest.

Q. Did you see any attempt at violence?

A. They got excited. They were jumping over the railings. They hit a sepoy.

Q. Did you form any opinion as to the attitude of the crowd?

A. Yes, it was most threatening.

Q. Was there a considerable irresponsible element?

A. Very great.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. I understand that on the 30th you went to the railway station after the firing had occurred. At what time of that day was that?

A. It was between 3 and 4 o'clock.

Q. At any rate after both the firing incidents were over?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the condition of the station and station yard?

A. The windows were broken, flower pots were smashed and the whole of the Queen's Garden's was covered with bricks and stones.

Q. There was a road in front of the station. What was the condition of that?

A. Yes.

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[Concluded.]

A. I did not see anything out of the ordinary. My attention was drawn to the station itself.

By Sir C. H. Setalwad—

Q. Did you see the crowd actually yourself assemble at the Town Hall?

A. That was the large crowd that assembled on the 17th. They were out of hand and that is the only crowd that I saw personally.

Q. There was a crowd at the Park?

A. That was on the 30th. I went down there with Mr. Barron. A huge crowd met at the Pipal Park to protest against the Rowlatt Act. I arrived there when they were dispersing.

Q. Now did that meeting pass off peacefully?

A. Yes. I came on towards the end.

Q. This was the crowd that was assembled outside the Town Hall when you were holding a meeting?

A. Yes, I was attending the meeting to confer with leaders to come to some arrangement.

Q. Did you hear that the crowds suspected some rumours had gone about that leaders at the meeting were going to be arrested?

A. Yes, I heard the rumour. I heard it afterwards.

Q. Was not the excitement of the crowd due to that rumour having spread?

A. Possibly.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. What is the total strength of the garrison you have at your disposal here?

A. I have got a whole cavalry regiment. At that time in April when the Kingsway garrison was done away with—a whole British infantry regiment—the Cornwalls in the Secretariat, a garrison battalion regiment in the Fort, who had just gone up to the hills, an infantry regiment at Raisina and an armoured car.

Q. Out of the total number of men could you say how many men at the time came in contact with the mob?

A. There were only 30 men and on the other days they were in readiness in the Town Hall. They were not actually called out.

Q. You then say that you employed the minimum amount of military forces necessary to deal with the mob?

A. Certainly. I could not have done with much less. Q. There was no unnecessary display of military in the streets?

A. Not in the streets. We did make a display the day the police picket was attacked and the havildar injured.

Q. The troops which dealt with the mob were armed with ball ammunition?

A. Yes. They were not armed with rifles that take anything else.

Q. You have got no knowledge of the mob yourself except the one mob you describe?

A. Except what I saw from day to day—people being pulled out of tongas—a few isolated instances.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. On the 30th you received a telephone message after 12 and the purport of that message was that a large crowd of natives had assembled outside the railway station and were molesting civilians intending to leave the station. The police being unable to quell the mob the civil authorities called on the military for assistance. That information was given to you on the telephone. You say that it assembled outside the railway station?

A. That is correct.

Q. I understand that you saw only two big crowds—one about 5 P.M. when you went with Mr. Barron to the meeting that was being held and the other in the Town Hall?

A. Yes.

Q. When you arrived at the station there was no crowd.

A. I gathered that from the reports I received of their attitude.

Q. I think you were for using more force than was actually used by the civil authorities?

A. I think we were very lenient in dealing with them.

Q. And had the matter been left to you, you would have used more force?

A. I should have first warned them.

Q. You would have used more force if they had not obeyed orders?

A. I probably think so.

Q. And you think that if more firing had been resorted to, it would have done a lot of good to these people?

A. Yes, it would probably have had a salutary effect.

Q. Had you any definite knowledge that any persons from Delhi went outside and fomented agitation and sent emissaries to other places?

A. My report was based on reports which I received from the Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon. I have no personal knowledge.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith—

Q. What was the feeling amongst the Indian officers and men in regard to these disturbances?

A. The ones I had a talk with, were astounded at the leniency. They could not understand it at all.

Q. Supposing the matter was left entirely to your own discretion, would you think you would be justified in firing at the crowd, such as the fire that took place.

A. I consider that the crowd was very threatening. I would warn them to disperse; if they did not, I should have to fire. Most undoubtedly so. The attitude was very threatening in any case, jumping out, stoning the police. The picket that I had was turned back.

Mr. C. R. Das—

Q. Can you tell us how many rounds of ammunition were given to the troops?

A. We stuck to the regulation which is 20 rounds of ammunition.

Q. That was given to them on that day?

A. Yes.

Q. How many bullets were actually used, the number of rounds fired?

A. I think about eighty-four.

Q. Now the cartridges that were given to them were service cartridges?

A. Yes.

Q. And they were Mark VII?

A. Those that were given to them—sometimes Mark VI and sometimes VII. I could not testify to that myself. I could verify and find that out.

Q. Now those that are Mark VII, are they not very deadly?

A. I do not think they are more deadly than any other bullet.

Q. Will not they cause big injuries?

A. No. I should say they are very humane.

(The President to Mr. Das:—I do not understand that on the assumption that military force had to be employed and shooting had to take place, a different kind of bullet should have been used than the one which in fact was used.)

Mr. Das:—My point is that care was not taken to make it as little injurious as possible.

The President:—You do not suggest that it is usual to employ a different bullet on such occasions and I do not understand that as your point.

Mr. Das:—Witness says that sometimes No. VI and sometimes No. VII were used. My submission is that No. VII was used.)

A. It is possible that it may have been used.

Q. Would it be right to say that this cartridge No. VII is capable of going clean through four persons, three or more persons standing one behind the other at close range?

A. It is possible; I have not tried it.

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Lieutenant E. J. H. SHELFORD.

Lieutenant E. J. H. SHELFORD, 1st Garrison Battalion, Delhi: da.

By the President—

Q. You are of the 1st Garrison Battalion?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On the 30th of March last, were you ordered to take charge of a picquet of men who were sent to the station?

A. I was, Sir.

Q. At what time did you receive the instruction?

A. About ten minutes past one.

Q. How was the picquet composed?

A. Thirty men and one officer.

Q. How were they armed?

A. With rifles, bayonets and 20 rounds of ammunition each.

Q. What was the ammunition?

A. Small arms ammunition.

Q. You left the fort at about half past one and when did you arrive at the station?

A. Ten minutes later.

Q. When you arrived at the station where did you go?

A. I had to get on to the platform of the station and go through the goods yard as the crowd was too dense to get into the main entrance.

Q. Did you form any opinion as to the numbers of the crowd at the time at the station?

A. I thought it would be between 1,500 and 2,000. It was rather difficult to judge, because I was on a level with the whole time.

Q. When you arrived at the side entrance of the platform, did you ask who was in charge?

A. I did.

Q. And whom were you referred to?

A. Mr. Currie.

Q. Did he indicate what should be done?

A. He told me that we must attempt to clear the crowd away from the station and the entrances.

Q. At this time what was the attitude of the crowd?

A. It was extremely hostile. They were very excited, they were shouting, throwing stones and bricks, waving sticks and throwing sticks and when they got near any European, they were hurting the European with the sticks.

Q. Did you see that yourself?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Where was the crowd situated?

A. It came from about half way across Queen's Gardens to the wall of the court yard of the station and it also extended to I should judge about 200 yards up Queen's Road.

Q. Were there many policemen about?

A. Quite a number; I could not say how many.

Q. Were there any soldiers so far as you saw?

A. The only soldiers I saw were men who were travelling through Delhi and who were held up at the station. There were 15 or 20 of them.

Q. After the interview with Mr. Currie, what did you do?

A. I went back to my men on the platform and marched them out to the front of the station and I extended them along the front of the station. Then for tactical reasons I divided them up into two parties, fifteen men under a sergeant who was with me, Sergeant Kemsley, and 15 men under myself. I told the sergeant that with his 15 men he must try to push the crowd back into Queen's Gardens and as far through Queen's Gardens as he could. I took my 15 men and tried to clear up Queen's Road, to leave all the entrances to the station free. I did that and posted sentries at the entrances to the station.

Q. Was the crowd driven into the Park?

A. They were driven almost as far as the gateway. I think the party under Sergeant Kemsley were on a level with the gateway.

Q. What action was the crowd taking at this time?

A. They were still throwing stones and bricks, waving sticks, shouting and when they got near any of the

soldiers or to any European they were hitting them with the sticks.

Q. What opinion did you form as to the necessity for using force to keep the crowd in order?

A. I thought it was very necessary to use force. Some time after we used force, it had absolutely no effect on them at all.

Q. I think you got another 15 non-commissioned officers and men about that time.

A. I was rather afraid that I had not enough men there with me; as I knew that there were some soldiers at the station, I went back to the station myself, had these soldiers armed from the ammunition store at the station and brought them out and put them with my men in Queen's Road.

Q. At this time were shots fired?

A. They had not been fired.

Q. When were they fired then?

A. They were fired soon after I brought these men out.

Q. Did the fire come from your detachment or from the other?

A. No, it came from the other party.

Q. I think you got a report from the sergeant at the time as to what had occurred?

A. When I heard the fire I went down. I left the party in Queen's Road under a sergeant of the Artillery that I got from the station. I left the non-commissioned officer who was passing through Delhi in charge of my party and I went to Sergeant Kemsley's party. I arrived just as they were finishing firing.

Q. Did you ascertain at the time how the firing had arisen?

A. At that moment there was not very much time to ascertain how it did happen.

Q. Did you see anything of people who had been wounded or killed by fire?

A. I saw two men who were killed at the station and I saw several wounded being taken away by their friends.

Q. Had your party to fire on the crowd at this time?

A. They did not fire into the crowd because I had to get permission from the Magistrate which I had not got then, and after Sergeant Kemsley's party had fired, they did show signs of retreating. I think the crowd withdrew towards the Town Hall and Chandni Chowk through Queen's Gardens.

Q. Did some native troops come out from the station?

A. Yes, very soon after that.

Q. Who were they?

A. Manipuris, I think.

Q. Did they take over Queen's Road?

A. They took over Queen's Road.

Q. What did you do with your party?

A. I took my party and joined them up with the remainder of my people and together they were 40 or 50 strong perhaps. We cleared the way to some extent. I then got just half way through the gardens when the crowd more or less retreated into the Chandni Chowk. I divided my party into three picquets. No. 1 picquet, I sent to the right of the gardens, No. 2 maintained a central position, about 100 yards to the rear of the Town Hall, and No. 3 went to the left of the gardens.

Q. After you had done that, did things quieten down?

A. They did.

Q. What did you do after that?

A. I went back to the station to see if there was any senior military officer there and also to get some more ammunition out of the ammunition store at the station and to see what ammunition they had there.

Q. At what time would that be?

A. I think it must have been half past two, or a little later than that, perhaps.

Q. When you were coming back, did you hear any fire?

A. I did.

Q. Where did that come from?

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[Continued.]

A. That came from near the Town Hall.

Q. Who was there in charge of the military forces? Sergeant Kemsley?

A. Sergeant Kemsley was in charge of the central picquet and they had gone forward to assist the police.

Q. At that time were the police being forced back?

A. In my absence when I went to the station, the crowd had returned, they had come into the Queen's Gardens again and attempted to force the police back. My picquet was behind the wall there and I think they saw what was happening and received signals from the police and went forward to their assistance.

Q. Did you arrive at the scene where this fire had taken place at the time it was taking place or after that?

A. I got there just as it was taking place. The order had been given and firing was taking place.

Q. Was the firing high or low?

A. I heard an order given there just as I arrived telling the men not to fire at the boys, but to fire at men. The fire was therefore rather high.

Q. Had there been any firing over the heads of the crowd?

A. Not to my knowledge; I saw none.

Q. Did you remain for any length of time in front of the Town Hall.

A. I remained there for some time after that. The firing of course was soon over and I think it succeeded in stopping the throwing of bricks and stones and so on and they were driven out of Queen's Gardens, a large number of them just outside the Queen's Gardens in the Chandni Chowk. I then had my men lined along the wall immediately in front of the Town Hall. I remained there until about 3-30.

Q. What did you do afterwards?

A. I received a verbal message from No. 1 picquet saying that there was a very large and angry crowd on the right of the gardens and they thought they had hardly enough men there. I managed to get 15 native men and one native officer. I took them round there to the right of the garden and remained in charge of that picquet myself.

Q. Until what time?

A. Until a quarter to six.

Q. At that time did you do anything further?

A. The crowd rather dwindled while I was there and when I left it was fairly quiet.

Q. When did you leave?

A. I left at quarter to 6.

Q. I see from your report that you were relieved at 7-30 P.M.

A. At 15-45 my party was relieved by one officer and 30 men from the Fort. I took my party to the back of the station where we remained as reserve.

Q. Was that the only occasion on which you were called in to render assistance to the civil authorities?

A. I went a number of times after that.

Q. Had you yourself to do anything with it? I mean you personally.

A. I went out in charge of a party of men in the Town Hall on succeeding days.

Q. Did anything occur? Had you to employ force on any of the succeeding days in connection with anything that occurred?

A. No, Sir.

Q. You were just in charge of a force that was standing by to render aid to the civil authority if necessary?

A. Yes. On the following days as far as I remember we merely lined the wall in front of the Town Hall. There was a very large crowd on a number of days. But they remained outside the walls.

By Sir C. H. Sealvad—

Q. When you arrived at the station would the crowd have numbered 1,500 to 2,000?

A. I am not sure. It might have been 1,500. It would not be less, I am rather liable to underestimate it on account of the fact that I was standing on the same level as the Queen's Road. I could not say as to how far they extended across the gardens.

Q. That may lead you also to a wrong estimate the other way?

A. It was an extremely thick crowd. It was certainly not less than 1,500.

Q. If Mr. Laurie and other witnesses said it was about 800 you would not contradict them?

A. I should not agree with them. My opinion is that it was from 1,500 to 2,000.

Q. Are you prepared to maintain that although other witnesses say it was not more than 800?

A. I am quite prepared to maintain my statement.

Q. When you arrived where was the crowd?

A. Immediately outside the station yard.

Q. They were outside the yard on the road?

A. Yes.

Q. You say they backed into the garden?

A. Into the gardens up Queen's Road.

Q. How many men were with you then, I mean the military?

A. Just at that time I had 30 men and one sergeant.

Q. Police?

A. I could not tell you the number of police. There were a number about.

Q. And you had about 250 Manipuris available at the station?

A. I should think they were about that number. They came out to line the Queen's Road. I did not hear the number and could not say exactly how many.

Q. They were on the station then available?

A. Anyway they arrived half an hour later. I did not see them at the station then.

Q. Supposing they were available, with them and with your military and the police would it not have been possible to push the crowd further back and make them disperse without fire?

A. It would not have altered the spirit of the crowd at all.

Q. My question is supposing you had these 250 Manipuris. With them and with the military and the police would you not have been able to disperse the crowd?

A. You mean by pushing the crowd?

Q. Yes.

A. I do not think so.

Q. Why do you say so?

A. The crowd was very deep. They had a lot of strength behind them. Merely pushing in the opposite direction is not going to do any good.

Q. You had also the mounted police?

A. As far as I remember there were quite a few mounted police.

Q. The whole strength would have been 300 including the Manipuris?

A. About 380.

Q. With the number of available men you had would not the crowd have seen that you had sufficient men and would have themselves dispersed without the necessity for firing?

A. I think if the thing was to be done by moral effect a small party of British soldiers ought to have done it.

Q. Don't you think that with 300 armed soldiers you could have impressed the crowd much more?

A. I think the crowd would have remained there however many men came on.

Q. You think that the crowd would not have dispersed unless they were fired upon whatever the number of soldiers.

A. I am of that opinion.

Q. Even if you had 2,000 strong to present against them, that show of force would not have dispersed the mob?

A. I think so. That is my opinion.

Q. Then with regard to the crowd, you single out the Europeans as having been attacked. Did they not strike the Indian police and military?

A. I saw them strike Europeans. I did not see them strike the Indian police.

Q. You seem to suggest that the crowd were in a mood to single out Europeans and strike them. If the Indian

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Lieutenant E. J. H. SHELFORD.

[Continued.]

police and the military were sufficiently near, would not the crowd have struck them also?

A. The Indian police were quite as near to the crowd as the soldiers.

Q. Did the crowd discriminate between the Europeans and the Indian officers and they attempted to strike the former and let alone the Indian officers?

A. All I saw was that they struck European soldiers. I did not see them strike Indian officers.

Q. Was it an intentional discrimination on their part?

A. My opinion was that the dislike of Europeans was very much in evidence on that day.

Q. Your view is that there was such manifestation of discrimination on the part of the crowd?

A. I do not think I can answer anything more than I have done.

Q. The firing near the Town Hall took place later?

A. I came up while the firing was going on.

Q. You do not know how exactly it became necessary?

A. I know how it became necessary. The crowd surged in again from the Chandni Chowk into the Queen's Gardens and tried to force back the police picquet.

Q. Where were the Manipuri soldiers at that time?

A. They were holding Queen's Road and protecting the front of the station.

Q. They were near by, available?

A. Yes, 5 minutes away.

Q. Could you not have pushed back the crowd into the Queen's Gardens with the number of soldiers that were available?

A. My other answer applies to that as well. That is my opinion.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. I want to ask you one question. I take it that you mean to say that the total number of troops were about 300 and the crowd were about 1,500. Do you mean to imply that 300 men could not by physical force push back 1,500 men if the men did not want to go?

A. To some extent I imply that. The soldiers were at the same time under the disadvantage of being hit with stones and bricks.

Q. In other words one man cannot push back 5 men if the 5 men do not want to go.

A. Yes.

Q. If there had been a great many men, more soldiers in keeping with the number of the crowd, still the crowd would not have been willing to go if you had tried to push them back?

A. Yes. I do mean that.

Q. I want to ask you a question about the nature of the ammunition. Is it the ordinary service ammunition? Is it the same as those used by the troops in the field?

A. Yes.

Q. Supposing you had not fired at that particular time that you did, what do you suppose would have happened?

A. Well, the crowd were ill-treating the men under me with bricks and stones and some of them received very nasty cuts. One man in particular I know received a knock on the head. He was unable to carry on.

Q. I take it that that would have been the fate of all the men and that within a certain time they would all have been knocked out?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. All the officers and soldiers who were injured reported their injuries on that very day and that they formed part of your diary. Is that so?

A. Yes.

Q. The total number of persons injured is 14 according to your list. That is the whole amount of injury that was reported so far as your party is concerned?

A. Yes, the whole.

Q. After the first firing what became of some of the wounded persons who were taken by the crowd?

A. The two who were killed were brought into the station and I think one or two others who were hit were taken away by their friends in the crowd.

Q. Is it not possible that the second time when the crowd rushed they were coming for the purpose of demanding the dead? All those persons who were wounded?

A. I think not. There was no demand made by the crowd for the return of the dead body. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Before the second firing you say that you heard the order that the men were told not to fire at the boys.

A. It was shouted out while I was there. I do not know anything about the first volley. It was not ordered before the first volley. It was ordered before the second. I know nothing about it.

Q. Is it not a fact that Sergeant Kemsley was in doubt or confused as to who gave the order to fire on the crowd?

A. I think he was ignorant as to the names at the time; but the names were found out later.

Q. I think 87 rounds were fired altogether. Ordinarily speaking how many people would be injured? Do you think that 87 rounds were fired and that only two persons got killed?

A. It is very difficult to say. I cannot say. I think more ought to have been hit than were actually hit. I take it that the men were taking as their mark the men and not the boys.

Q. What was the age of the boys you saw in front of the crowd?

A. About 10 or 12 years of age. I do not think I saw any younger than that.

Q. We have been informed by another witness that they were about 20 or 21 years old.

A. I do not think I saw any one younger than 10 or 12.

Q. How many boys were there and how many deep were they?

A. The boys were scattered here and there. They were mixed up in the crowd.

Q. Was any warning given to the crowd before the firing took place?

A. Mr. Currie had been trying to speak to them for sometime.

Q. And you say that you heard Mr. Currie say "Unless you disperse I will order the military to fire"?

A. No. Mr. Currie was talking to them and I know that he was asking them to disperse. I cannot tell you what he was saying as I do not know Hindustani.

Q. So far as you are concerned you did not hear anybody speak out in Hindustani to the crowd "Now take care—the order to fire will be given unless you disperse."

A. I know that they were being spoken by the police and by Mr. Currie. I know they were asking them to disperse.

Q. Before actually the order to fire was given was intimation given to the crowd "Now look here, things have gone too far—I will order the men to fire unless you clear out"?

A. I cannot say exactly that it was given in that manner.

Q. You say that when you arrived at the station you saw Mr. Currie and that the crowd were throwing stones. Well, as a matter of fact two other witnesses have said before the Committee that the stone-throwing did not take place until the crowd were driven into the Queen's Gardens. Are you prepared to modify your statement?

A. Certainly. I saw stones being thrown as soon as I went down to the station.

Q. As to your guess as to the number of men?

A. It would be about 1,500.

Q. Did you in your diary say that there were several thousand strong?

A. I said several thousand strong and as I wrote that I would stick to it.

Q. At the time that you arrived the road before the station was clear?

A. No, it was by no means clear.

Q. There was no large body or crowd?

A. Yes, there was a very large body. The crowd was so large that I could not get into the station by the main entrance. I had to get on the platform by the side entrance. It was just a few yards from where Mr. Currie was standing.

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Lieutenant E. J. H. SHELFORD—concluded—Mr. M. M. L. CURRIE.

Q. Do you know whether the whole of this crowd was in the compound of the railway station and inside the gate and that seven sowars were able to disperse them just immediately before your arrival from the railway compound.

A. No, I do not think so.

Q. After they were driven inside the Queen's Gardens and supposing they were allowed to remain and that your party and police came back to the station what would have happened?

A. They would immediately surge back to the station.

Q. What for?

A. I cannot tell. They attempted it when they attempted to force the police picquet down near the Town Hall.

Q. Was the only object of that crowd to get back the persons that were actually killed?

A. I do not think that can have been the object, because the dead bodies were brought into the station by their own friends and every one in the crowd, I should think, was able to see them being brought into the station by them.

Q. Mr. Currie was actually with you when you arrived at this crowd?

A. He was seen there.

Q. If they were so disposed, was it not possible to assault Mr. Currie previously?

A. They did attempt to.

Q. To assault Mr. Currie, or was it only stone-throwing? Did they make an assault on Mr. Currie with lathis? Did you see that?

A. I do not think they assaulted with lathis.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith—

Q. I think you said to the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan that 14 of your men were bruised?

A. Yes, 14.

Q. Thirty men were bruised altogether?

A. Roughly 50 per cent. were hurt or bruised.

Q. That is a very big average?

A. Yes.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan

Q. When you arrived at the scene at the station, I take it that the crowd or the bulk of the crowd was in Queen's Road between the railway station and the Queen's Gardens. Is it not so?

A. I should think that half the crowd was in Queen's Road and half in Queen's Gardens.

Q. Will it be about a thousand that were on the Queen's Road?

A. About a thousand or twelve hundred on the Queen's Road.

Q. The whole front of the station at Queen's Road as far as the station was very crowded?

A. Yes.

Mr. M. M. L. CURRIE, I.C.S., Additional District Magistrate, Delhi.

By the President—

Q. Are you Additional District Magistrate of Delhi?

A. I was.

Q. On 30th March, you were in charge in that capacity?

A. Yes.

Q. Was Colonel Beadon away?

A. Yes.

Q. I think you made a report as to what had occurred to the Deputy Commissioner?

A. Yes.

Q. Did Colonel Beadon return on the 31st?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore as regards the events subsequent to the 30th are you not in the same position to give a connected narrative as you are with reference to the events of the 30th?

A. No.

Q. Did you push the people into the Queen's Gardens by force? Or did they go away themselves?

A. They did not go there willingly. My men had to gradually work their way and people were forced back by the military hardly as far as the Queen's Gardens.

Q. How far?

A. As far as the gateway of the Queen's Gardens.

Q. Practically the first line of the crowd might have been just outside?

A. Yes.

Q. The rest must be inside practically?

A. Yes.

Q. Would it not have been easier for the crowd to have dispersed in the Queen's Gardens where there is greater space and more room for standing. It was not so thick a place as they were when standing on the road?

A. I think they were quite as thick, because they were all flowing towards the gate.

Q. In spite of that they could not come out? They were trying to get out, but they could not?

A. They refused to go any further back.

Q. They could have done that, but they did not do it?

A. They did not attempt to do it. They refused to go back and came to hand grips with my men.

Q. There was no scuffle with the military?

A. It was merely from the fact that my men did not retaliate. Some of the Indians rushed forward and hit my men with sticks.

Q. The fact is that they did not come out—the bulk of them did not come out?

A. They did not come after they had been pushed in.

By Mr. C. R. Das—

Q. The bullets which were used were Mark VII?

A. Yes.

Q. So far as you know was there any arrangement made for ambulance?

A. There were hospitals and people got to the station.

Q. Did you see them?

A. I could not see them.

Q. Was there any arrangement made?

A. I could not say.

Q. You said that some of the wounded were removed to the station. Did you see them being removed?

A. I saw them being removed.

Q. How long after the firing was that?

A. Very shortly afterwards. I mean as soon as the fire was over.

Q. Who removed?

A. People from the crowd.

Q. Removed them to the station?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it a fact that they were dragged to the station?

A. No. They were carried, they were not dragged.

Q. Did you see any wounded men at the station?

A. No.

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Mr. M. M. L. CURRIE.

[Continued.]

Q. Did he propose to make a round in his car?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you accompany him?
A. No.
Q. About this time I think Mr. Jeffreys rang you up?
A. He rang me up at my bungalow to ask if Mr. Marshall was there.
Q. When did you receive word that there was trouble at the station?
A. Just about 1 o'clock.
Q. What was the communication you had?
A. It was very confused. I could not distinguish exactly what was being said. There was a telephone to the effect that there was trouble going on there.
Q. What did you do after receiving that communication?
A. I started to go down there calling *en route* at the Chief Commissioner's.
Q. When you arrived, did you see Mr. Laurie there?
A. He followed my car down to the station.
Q. What was your object in seeing the Chief Commissioner before proceeding?
A. To ask him to warn the military authorities and to inform them of the trouble.
Q. When did you arrive at the station?
A. Shortly afterwards.
Q. With Mr. Laurie?
A. He arrived just after me.
Q. What was the state of affairs that you found there?
A. There was a crowd in the station yard, a very noisy crowd, with the *kotwal* reasoning with them in the middle of them.
Q. Was the crowd doing anything?
A. They were shouting and making a noise.
Q. At the time you arrived had they destroyed any property or anything of that sort?
A. I learnt afterwards that they had.
Q. Where was the crowd when you arrived at the station?
A. The station yard was full and people were overflowing in the road outside.
Q. Actually inside the station, was there none?
A. That I could not say. I was not inside.
Q. What did you do?
A. I asked the *kotwal* what the trouble was. I learnt that two men had been arrested and the crowd was demanding their release. As a matter of fact, they had been forcibly rescued, I understood. So I assured the crowd that the men were not in custody, that enquiries would be made and told them to go away.
Q. What action did the crowd take?
A. They stayed there and went on making noise.
Q. Did you form any opinion as to the size of the crowd?
A. It is very hard to say because I was in the middle of it so to speak. I could not say from a general point of view.
Q. Did it amount to hundreds?
A. Oh, yes. It grew largely and rapidly.
Q. Did Mr. Jeffreys arrive on the scene about this time?
A. Yes.
Q. By whom was he accompanied?
A. He had some police with him.
Q. Did he take any action?
A. He cleared the station yard.
Q. At this time were not missiles being thrown by the crowd?
A. They threw some small stones or bits of brick.
Q. On whom?
A. Mr. Jeffreys.
Q. Had the crowd in their hands anything besides stones?
A. Sticks and *lathis*.
Q. What were they doing with them?
A. Waving them.
Q. Now, did you learn from Mr. Jeffreys that Mr. Marshall was coming along with some force?
A. He eventually arrived. He had police *sowars* with him and he had also some extra foot police.
Q. Did Mr. Marshall arrive shortly after this?

A. Yes.
Q. Who asked for military assistance?
A. I understand both the Chief Commissioner and the railway people.
Q. Did the picket of 30 men arrive at the same time as Mr. Marshall?
A. The picket did arrive.
Q. Was not that Lieutenant Shelford?
A. I believe so.
Q. When that picket arrived what action was taken?
A. We proceeded to try to clear the Queen's Road in front of the station.
Q. What action did the crowd take?
A. I was with the part that went towards the Queen's Gardens and when we got inside the gate we were subjected to a very heavy stone-throwing, brick-throwings.
Q. You went along with the crowd into the garden?
A. Yes.
Q. As they were driven back?
A. Yes.
Q. Before you got into the garden had there been any bricks or missiles thrown?
A. Yes.
Q. After you got in they continued to be thrown?
A. On a larger scale.
Q. Did you form any opinion as to the character of the crowd at this time with reference to the prospects of order being maintained?
A. I should say that that section of the crowd was out for trouble.
Q. Were many stones being thrown?
A. Yes.
Q. And what else besides?
A. It was bricks mostly.
Q. At whom were these missiles thrown?
A. At every one, the police, myself and every one.
Q. At this time what cause of resentment did you give to the crowd?
A. None as far as I can see.
Q. Except that the crowd had been pushed back to clear the road, you had not employed any force upon any members of the crowd?
A. No.
Q. Would you describe the nature of the violence used at this time by way of throwing of bricks and stones?
A. There was a very heavy fusillade of these bricks. After every one cleared away the ground was littered with them.
Q. Did you see many people hit by the crowd?
A. I saw Mr. Marshall hit. I was hit myself.
Q. About where?
A. On the helmet.
Q. But for your helmet that would have been a severe blow?
A. I think so; it made a dent in my helmet.
Q. About this time were you the magistrate responsible for considering whether the crowd shall be fired upon to disperse?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you reluctant to give the order to fire?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you consider whether it was necessary to give the order to fire?
A. Bricks were being thrown as Mr. Marshall tried to clear the crowd with his *sowars* and he came back and said to me that he would have to fire. I said "very well."
Q. And then you gave the order to fire?
A. I told him he could fire. He gave the executive order I presume.
Q. On the order to fire being given what was done?
A. Certain shots were fired by the police and also by the picket of Bedfords.
Q. Not the whole lot. A section was with us.
Q. On the firing taking place what action did the crowd take?
A. They ran away and dispersed.
Q. Was any railing bounding the path torn down?
A. Yes.

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Mr. M. M. L. CURRIE.

[Continued.]

Q. How did that come about?
A. I could not tell you, I did not see that.
Q. I think you noticed as a result of the firing that certain casualties had occurred?
A. Yes.
Q. How many did you observe?
A. Two.
Q. That is a case of two killed?
A. Yes.
Q. What happened to the bodies of these men?
A. They were removed.
Q. By whom?
A. I do not know exactly who it was. I gave instructions for them to be removed.
Q. Did you know that some Manipuri men were in the station?
A. Yes.
Q. What happened to them?
A. Mr. Yule told me that these men were there and that they had been taken out of the train and as soon as they had been armed I called on them for their services.
Q. About this time had you an interview with a man who was in or about the crowd?
A. He told me his name was Swami Shradanand. He used to be known as Munshi Ram.
Q. What passed between you and him?
A. As far as I recollect he said that this was an extremely regrettable incident.
Q. Were you in close touch with Mr. Barron at this time?
A. He telephoned down and then I went up and saw him.
Q. What was your object?
A. To arrange for further military assistance, especially to hurry up the cavalry, if possible.
Q. What opinion did you form as to the prospects of the crowd dispersing?
A. I thought that if they cleared from the railway station we should have some breathing space.
Q. I think you went from the Chief Commissioner's house to Mr. Orde's. Did you see General Brockman?
A. We all went to General Brockman.
Q. Was that with a view to getting further military assistance?
A. Yes.
Q. Meantime did you come to any resolution as regards prohibiting meetings being held?
A. A meeting was advertised to take place in the Queen's Gardens and one in the Pipal Park.
Q. Did you issue those orders?
A. I wrote them and gave them out to Mr. Marshall. They were never published as far as I know.
Q. In fact was the meeting held in the Pipal Park that evening?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you go back to the railway station?
A. Yes.
Q. About what time?
A. I suppose about 3-30 p.m.
Q. When you reached the station what was the condition of affairs there?
A. The place had been cleared by then.
Q. Did you learn then as regards the disturbance that had taken place at the Town Hall?
A. Yes.
Q. You were not present there?
A. Yes.
Q. In consequence of that disturbance was a party of Manipuris sent for?
A. Yes.
Q. What were they sent for?
A. To strengthen the picket there.
Q. And some troops under Captain Brown arrived in the afternoon?
A. Yes.
Q. What were they told off to do?
A. They were told to go down the Queen's Road and come back to the Town Hall *via* Chandni Chowk.

Q. Did you yourself proceed to the Town Hall after that?
A. Yes.
Q. In whose company?
A. With the Chief Commissioner and General Brockman.
Q. When you arrived at the Town Hall what did you find was taking place?
A. We learnt that a meeting was going on in the Pipal Park.
Q. Did you go there?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you find there?
A. The meeting was in progress and Swami Shradanand was standing on a table. I do not know whether he was actually addressing the crowd or not.
Q. Did you or any member of your party have a discussion with any person who was going to address that meeting?
A. We had a discussion with Dr. Abdur Rahman and Shwaib.
Q. What was the conversation you had with them about?
A. As to the nature of the meeting. Then Swami Shradanand came and also discussed the nature of the meeting and what he proposed to do.
Q. Was any undertaking given by these gentlemen as to what would take place at the meeting?
A. They undertook that only resolutions condemning the Rowlatt Act would be passed and that the meeting would disperse peacefully.
Q. What time would that be—the time you had an interview with him?
A. I should think about 5 o'clock.
Q. The meeting I think did take place?
A. Yes.
Q. Were there any disturbances in connection with that meeting?
A. No.
Q. Were there any further disturbances that night?
A. Well, a shot was fired accidentally by the Manipuris but I was not there.
Q. I think an arrangement was made as regards the turns of duty?
A. Yes.
Q. And you and Mr. Orde remained at the railway station till about midnight?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. In connection with the subsequent events after the 30th and 31st March was there a meeting of some of the local leaders in the Town Hall?
A. Well they were local notabilities.
Q. What was the object of that meeting?
A. To reassure the people and to try and get them to co-operate in restoring order.
Q. There were processions in connection with the funerals of the people who were unfortunately killed each day?
A. Yes.
Q. Was any force used on that day to disperse any crowds?
A. No.
Q. Then between the 1st April and 9th April what was the condition of affairs generally?
A. There was a general under-current of excitement but outwardly things were quiet.
Q. What kind of excitement was there?
A. There were large crowds in the streets moving up and down doing nothing.
Q. On the 10th of April what occurred?
A. The shops were shut again.
Q. I think Mr. Gandhi had been turned back from Palwal the previous day?
A. Yes.
Q. Were rumours current in connection with the occurrence?
A. One rumour was that there had been a collision between some troops and that the people were trying to rescue him at Palwal.

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Mr. M. M. L. CURRIE.

[Continued.]

Q. Did these rumours cause considerable excitement among the people?

A. I believe so.

Q. Was a *hartal* determined upon again?

A. Yes. They closed the shops.

Q. I think it continued from the 10th onwards for some days?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you hear on the 10th of the occurrences at Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. And on hearing that what did you do?

A. I took Mr. Carnegie round to Colonel Beadon.

Q. Why was that?

A. Mr. Carnegie wanted to go to Colonel Beadon to inform him.

Q. Were you afraid of the disturbances in Delhi?

A. I was anxious to make arrangements to meet any disturbances that might take place. It was my business to bring an important piece of news to my superior's notice.

Q. Did you take any action on that day personally?

A. No.

Q. From the 11th to the 13th the shops remained shut?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any rumour about a railway strike at this time?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the attitude of the crowd during this period of the *hartal*?

A. It gradually became threatening. It was distinctly threatening on the occasion of the meeting with the leaders.

Q. What occurred on the 14th within your actual knowledge?

A. Well I heard a rumour that there had been an attack on the Alliance Bank. I telephoned and enquired and was told that there was an assault on the C. I. D.

Q. There was also a railway strike and a trial in connection with that? Did you preside over that?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 15th April was there a meeting between official representatives and some representatives of the people?

A. There were two meetings.

Q. Were you present at the meetings?

A. Yes.

Q. What took place?

A. The morning meetings practically resulted in the conclusion that the leaders were unable to get the shops reopened and they suggested a conference with the leading men in the different trades, and that took place in the afternoon.

Q. At this time did you form any opinion as to the desire of the people with reference to resuming business?

A. The bulk of the merchants were rather tired of the *hartal*. From what was said at the time it seemed it rested with one or two of the leading cloth merchants.

Q. At the time when the second meeting took place was there a crowd collected?

A. A very large crowd.

Q. What was it composed of?

A. There were *lathiwalas* in it. There was a rumour that the crowd had collected because they thought that the leaders had been arrested because there was a *hartal*.

Q. What is your opinion as to the temper of the crowd?

A. It was very ugly.

Q. What do you mean by ugly?

A. They were ripe for mischief.

Q. Did they do anything in the way of destroying any property?

A. They broke some of the electric globes of the lamps and battered the municipal dust bins.

Q. I do not think that what occurred there led to any force on the part of the police or military?

A. No.

Q. On the 10th did the shops remain closed?

A. Yes.

Q. They began to open again on the 17th?

A. Yes.

Q. Did all the shops open or only a certain number of them?

A. It was rather hard to say because some of them opened and put up their shutters again. There was a tendency to open.

Q. Was any action taken to prevent the opening of the shops?

A. The leaders were going round trying to get them to open but there were small gangs of hooligans going round to get them shut again.

Q. As a result of that did you take any action to the preventing of shops being opened?

A. I had no authority.

Q. Was it resolved that people preventing shops being opened should be arrested?

A. I think so.

Q. And you know that one man was arrested for preventing a shop being opened. What was the consequence of that man being arrested?

A. A crowd of *lathiwalas* and people began to collect and went down the streets towards Fatehpuri Mosque.

Q. Where were you?

A. I was in the Town Hall.

Q. Did you hear anything that had occurred?

A. I heard some shots and saw some tongas galloping past the Town Hall.

Q. Do you know what led to the shooting?

A. I tried the case.

Q. In your judgment I think the cases are detailed as they came before you?

A. Yes.

Q. Did that day practically mark the close of riots in Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you form any opinion as to whether there were elements in the crowd that were not subject to restraint by the so-called leaders of the people?

A. Certainly, there was the ordinary rough element you get in all cities.

Q. In your opinion were the measures taken in excess of what were required in order to keep that unruly element under? Were such measures in your opinion necessary to maintain order?

A. Certainly anything we did was absolutely necessary.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Were you at the station, Mr. Currie, as an additional magistrate? I take it you were the senior civil magistrate present on the spot?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore you would have had the difficult duty of deciding whether to call upon soldiers and such persons to assist the civil police or not?

A. Yes.

Q. You admit you got instructions that day?

A. Shortly after.

Q. What time did you leave actually the station precincts?

A. That must have been about 2-15 when I went there to see the Chief Commissioner.

Q. When were you first told that there was a party of Manipuris at the station?

A. I think it was after we cleared the station yard—I am not certain.

Q. When you arrived, the crowd was very much smaller than it afterwards became?

A. Yes.

Q. At the time you arrived, some people were probably in the station itself?

A. I can only speak of people being in the yard and road outside.

Q. A little later after Mr. Jeffreys came; he managed with his police to clear the yard?

A. Yes.

Q. At a later stage still, there was this effort to clear the road and get the crowd into the garden?

A. Yes.

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Mr. M. M. L. CURRIE.

[Continued.]

Q. You say you learnt of the existence of the Manipuris about the time the station yard was being cleared?

A. About the time the yard had been cleared, so far as I recollect.

Q. Do you remember an incident that Mr. Laurie has spoken about? He told us that he suggested to you to bring the Manipuris out and surround the people and arrest all the ring-leaders when they were on the road.

A. I remember the suggestion to bring the Manipuris out and I said I would not have them unless they were armed.

Q. At that time do you remember exactly what stage things had got to? Was the crowd on the road or on the station yard?

A. I cannot recollect. My best recollection is that it was after we got them out of the yard.

Q. You take the view, I understand, that it would be an extremely wrong thing to try and use any troops if they were not armed. Is that for the purpose of endeavouring to handle any unruly mob?

A. They were armed with *kukris*.

Q. You take it that it is wrong to take soldiers without ammunition?

A. I think it would be rather folly to do so.

Q. You insisted therefore on their being armed before you used them?

A. Yes.

Q. In the end I think they were not used until after the firing had taken place?

A. No.

Q. Then they were simply used for the purpose of holding Queen's Road and trouble was going on elsewhere?

A. A picquet was sent to the Town Hall.

Q. That was rather later, was it not? What time of day was it?

A. That was at about 3-30 or 3-45.

Q. What time of the day was it when you first heard of any party of Manipuris?

A. It might be about 2-15.

Q. That was after the firing had occurred at the station. In the meantime had they been armed from the station armoury?

A. I suppose so.

Q. Do you know for certain?

A. I did not see myself; I have been told.

Q. Can these Manipuris people talk to the citizens of Delhi and be understood by them?

A. No. There might be one here and there, but I understand nobody except the officer could understand their language.

Q. Therefore they were not the best troops to take part in policemen's work?

A. No.

Q. If I follow the narrative correctly they did not seem to be throwing bricks and stones before the crowd was pushed off the Queen's Road through the gate?

A. Yes.

Q. But that after the crowd was pushed back from the Queen's Road through the gates, then it was that they became worse, the stoning became worse and the firing had to take place. Is that so?

A. Yes.

Q. In view of the fact that the people were pushed down the Queen's Road, did you think that there was no hope of a similar incident happening?

A. I could not say.

Q. If the Manipuris were used to push the crowd back down the road, did you contemplate taking that measure?

A. Part of the British picquet went down the road towards the Mor Sarai side and the police and a few British troops tried to clear the second crowd absolutely in front of the station.

Q. It was that which led to a further fusillade of stoning?

A. Yes.

Q. At the time when you sanctioned firing, by what you said to Mr. Marshall, you were standing as I understand, fairly near the gate. Is that so?

A. Just inside the garden side of the gate.

Q. And from there you could see the exact state of the mob and what it was doing?

A. Yes. The mob, all that time, having got into the garden, were in that open space in front of the gate inside the garden where the various roads meet.

Q. At the time you sanctioned firing, you thought it was necessary?

A. Absolutely.

Q. The whole time that you were at the station, I take it, you were talking to one person or another and doing your best to get the crowd dispersed?

A. Yes, in the yard.

Q. Did you find any signs that the crowd was listening to what you said and were likely to follow it?

A. I should think from the din that nobody except those beside me could have heard me.

Q. You did your best throughout the whole time to persuade them to go away?

A. Yes.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You arrived at the station with Mr. Laurie?

A. Simultaneously.

Q. That was at about 1 p.m.?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Laurie says that when he arrived the crowd in the station compound was about 300. Do you agree with that?

A. I could not form any real estimate, because I did not survey it from a distance; I was in it.

Q. Mr. Laurie has said that it would be about 300. What do you think?

A. I should put it at 500 or 600, but as I was in it, I would not like to be definite at all on the point.

Q. Mr. Laurie says that the crowd increased later and says it would be about 800 to 1,000. Is that in your view a correct estimate?

A. That depends on what point of time you are speaking of.

Q. He says at no time it was more than about 1,000.

A. Personally I should have thought it was more than that.

Q. What do you put it at?

A. It was impossible to form any real estimate, because I was not in a place where I could see the whole crowd at one and the same time. Some were in the garden and some were in the Queen's Road.

Q. What is your estimate for the crowd?

A. About 2,000.

Q. You said that Mr. Marshall arrived with the police. Was that soon after you arrived?

A. After we cleared the station yard.

Q. You first came to the station yard. You had the assistance of the police?

A. Yes, of the policemen brought by Mr. Jeffreys.

Q. How many men were there?

A. I could not tell you.

Q. Roughly you must have seen the people clearing the yard?

A. About a dozen actually engaged in clearing the crowd in the yard.

Q. Mr. Marshall's policemen also arrived after that?

A. Yes.

Q. Then Queen's Road was cleared later?

A. Yes.

Q. Who cleared that?

A. The police, the *sowars* and the British troops.

Q. How many were they in all?

A. I could not tell you the number.

Q. Thirty British troops?

A. Yes.

Q. How many *sowars*?

A. There were not very many of them; I could not tell you the exact number.

Q. About 50?

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Mr. M. M. L. CURRIE.

[Continued.]

A. Hardly as many as 15.
 Q. About 10?
 A. Yes.
 Q. The police were about 10 or 12?
 A. We got more police by then.
 Q. How many?
 A. I could not tell you. One line was drawn across to prevent the mob.....(interrupted).
 Q. Can you give me a rough estimate?
 A. I could not give you a rough estimate, because I did not estimate the number at the time.
 Q. Surely you saw them. Were they 20, 30, 40, 50?
 A. I could not tell you at all. I did not have any police report.
 Q. The police, the *sowars* and the regiment people were able to clear the Queen's Road?
 A. Yes.
 Q. They drove the crowd into the Queen's Gardens?
 A. One section of it.
 Q. And where was the rest of the crowd?
 A. The rest went peaceably down the road.
 Q. We are now dealing with the turbulent part of the crowd. You had not very much to do with the position of the crowd?
 A. I was not with the party that cleared them off.
 Q. When the crowd was pushed away from the Queen's Road into the Queen's Garden by the police, the *sowars* and the military, you had 30 people?
 A. I think so.
 Q. This part of the crowd was dealt with by those of the British soldiers and the police that you had and the *sowars* that Mr. Marshall brought?
 A. Yes.
 Q. At this time where were the Manipuris?
 A. In the station.
 Q. Can you tell me whether the Manipuris were supplied with ammunition from the armoury at the station?
 A. I cannot tell you.
 Q. That must have been certainly when they moved forward, i.e., about 2-15.
 A. Somewhere about then.
 Q. If you had so desired they could have been supplied with ammunition earlier?
 A. That I do not know.
 Q. You never enquired about it?
 A. I do not quite appreciate the point.
 Q. Did you not consider the desirability of supplying the ammunition earlier to the Manipuris?
 A. I was not aware that there was any ammunition there at all.
 Q. When were you apprised of the existence of the Manipuris at the station?
 A. As far as I recollect after the crowd was driven out of the station yard. I am not quite certain on that point.
 Q. Did it strike you that if you had the assistance of these Manipuris, 250 men, and the police and the British soldiers and the *sowars*, it would have been possible to disperse the crowd from the Queen's Gardens without resorting to fire?
 A. The whole thing is that we never thought we should have to resort to fire when we started to disperse the crowd.
 Q. You never considered this possibility that you might have been able to clear the crowd in the Queen's Gardens by taking the assistance of the Manipuris who were about 250 strong?
 A. They were unarmed at the time or armed only with *kukris*.
 Q. You could have armed them earlier if you had so desired?
 A. It did not occur to me at the moment.
 Q. When the firing was suggested you did not consider the alternative of meeting the situation in the manner I have suggested?
 A. There was no time to consider anything. We had to act.
 Q. Was stone-throwing going on at this time?
 A. To a moderate degree.

Q. How long was the throwing of stones continued? For over an hour?
 A. Not so long as that. There was a little stone-throwing when we cleared the yard and then there was some after we had cleared the yard. There were some more stones while we were waiting for Mr. Marshall's reinforcements. And when we were in the gate we got a regular fusillade of stones. Men were being hit all round.
 Q. When Mr. Marshall suggested that firing would be necessary you accepted his opinion?
 A. Yes, it coincided with my own.
 Q. Mr. Laurie suggested to you the surrounding of the crowd by the Manipuris and the soldiers?
 A. I do not recollect any such suggestion. He may have done so. Such a row was going on that I cannot say whether he did or did not. Any number of people volunteered their suggestions at the time.
 Q. On the 31st you had the funerals of those that died on the 30th? Were they very largely attended?
 A. Many thousands attended.
 Q. Did they consist of Hindus and Muhammadans?
 A. It is rather hard to say. I could not tell you.
 Q. Did you not see the crowd yourself?
 A. I saw the crowd going down the Chandni Chowk in the distance. I was in the Town Hall. I was not there the whole day.
 Q. Surely you can say whether there were Hindus and Muhammadans?
 A. Yes, there were, but whether they went to the burning ghat or cemetery I could not say.
 Q. They were following the dead body in procession and the whole thing passed off peacefully and there was no disturbance?
 A. Yes.
 Q. On the 6th April you had a general *hartal* again?
 A. I believe so.
 Q. That again passed off without any disturbance.
 A. Yes.
 Q. On the 10th news came of the arrest of Mr. Gandhi?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And also I suppose that day or the next day news of the happenings at Amritsar and Lahore?
 A. I suppose it got in early next morning.
 Q. Was there any disturbance in consequence?
 A. Of course the mob was left in possession of Chandni Chowk practically. They were allowed to move as they liked.
 Q. When they are not interfered with, they did not resort to any disturbance?
 A. They did not attack us.
 Q. They did not cause any disturbance or resort to any violence when they were left alone?
 A. They interfered with the passengers in the tram cars.
 Q. They did not cause any disturbance or resort to violence?
 A. They did not attack us. I consider pulling people out of tram cars is a disturbance.
 Q. They did not cause any disturbance or resort to any violence except that they compelled people to go out of tram cars?
 A. Yes.
 Q. On the 15th April you spoke of the meeting in the Town Hall. Was there any idea of arresting any of the leaders of the people?
 A. Not, as far as I know.
 Q. There was a rumour that they were going to be arrested. There was no foundation for that?
 A. No.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. When you arrived at the station Mr. Yule was present?
 A. Yes.
 Q. He told you (I will give you your own words) "Trouble had arisen owing to some persons trying to force the sweetmeat contractor—Ganga Singh was, I think, the name—to cease selling to the passengers. On his refusal he had been assaulted. The railway staff

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[Continued.]

had gone to his assistance and had seized two of his assailants. The crowd had then tried to force their way into the station but had eventually been driven out." That was the information you got as soon as you arrived at the station?
 A. Yes.
 Q. After the first firing you said that the corpses were removed by your order?
 A. To the railway *thana*.
 Q. Is it or is it not a fact that for the next 26 hours these corpses were not handed over to their relations and it was after the Chief Commissioner kindly interfered that the corpses were handed over?
 A. I cannot tell you.
 Q. You were in charge on the 30th and 31st?
 A. Not on the 31st.
 Q. You do not know when these corpses were handed over to their relatives?
 A. No.
 Q. Is it or is it not a fact that the authorities were approached on the 30th and morning of the 31st and they tried their best to obtain the dead bodies from the possession of the police?
 A. I do not know that.
 Q. Nor heard of that?
 A. Not to my recollection.
 Q. Is it or is it not a fact that some of the leaders tried to see the wounded persons on the 31st?
 A. That I do not know.
 Q. Coming to the incident of Swami Shradhdhanand I will just give you his version of the affair and ask you whether he is correct. "I went to some Europeans of whom one was Mr. Currie, city magistrate, and asked them to tell me the true facts. They treated me with indifference, Mr. Currie actually turning his back upon me. I told him that I was taking the people away to the meeting ground although early, and he ought not to irritate people by making a display of military and machine guns. The whole crowd, some three to four thousand, followed and thousands had preceded us and about 15 thousand assembled on the Pipla park grounds."
 A. I did not know who he was at the time.
 Q. Was there not a large crowd at the time you had conversation with Swami Shradhdhanand?
 A. The crowd had left before he arrived.
 Q. May I understand that when you had this conversation there was no crowd?
 A. As far as I recollect.
 Q. Is it not a fact that just within 5 or 10 minutes of the first firing the crowds wanted to enter the Town Hall?
 A. I was never present on the second occasion.
 Q. Is it or is it not a fact that this meeting was going to be held about 5 or 6 in the evening and as a matter of fact it was on account of this fracas that took place at the railway station that the meeting was held before the time announced?
 A. I do not know what the announced time was.
 Q. At what time did you reach the place?
 A. Somewhere about 5 as far as I recollect.
 Q. What was the number of the crowd?
 A. About 300 or 400 I should think.
 Q. Now about that accident; you said a shot was fired accidentally. You have no personal knowledge and you depend entirely upon a report given by the non-commissioned officer of these Manipuris or some statement made by themselves or by some police officers. I take it that that statement was made either by the Manipuris or some police officer?
 A. That is the report which reached me. The only thing that I was told was that one shot had been fired.
 Q. Now you never cared to know from the 30th March to the 17th April as to what was being said in the newspapers either by the Associated Press or any other newspapers? Have you read Shradhdhanand's statement?
 A. If it was published in the *Pioneer*, I probably should have read it.

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Q. Did you make any enquiries as to whether the statements made by him were true or false?
 A. No. I had no reason to do so.
 Q. At least you were here as Additional District Magistrate even after the arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel Beadon?
 A. Yes.
 Q. That all strangers who have no business in Delhi and who have come merely to use the place as their headquarters for agitation be excluded, that the local press and irresponsible presses should be under censorship—that meetings on private premises should also be controlled—was this suggestion made by Lieutenant-Colonel Beadon to the Chief Commissioner?
 A. He may have done so.
 Q. Do you know anything about it?
 A. I do not know that it was officially made.
 Q. A suggestion made by Lieutenant-Colonel Beadon to the Chief Commissioner?
 A. I am not aware of that.
 Q. Now you presided over the court that decided the assault of the 17th. Is it not a fact that except the police version and that of the constable who was actually in it no other evidence was produced before you and that you had to decide that case simply and solely on the evidence of this kind?
 A. I think there was one unofficial witness—a *chaprasi*.
 Q. You know Khan Sahib Imam-ud-din, inspector of police?
 A. Yes.
 Q. He was there at the station when you arrived?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Was he not in your presence trying to persuade the crowd to go away, to move out of the road?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And did not he give you the information that he several times asked the crowd to move but they said "we are prepared to go away, but we will not go away unless our men are released?"
 A. They would not believe him that they were not in custody. What he told me was that they were asking for the release of these men and they would not believe when he told them that their men were not in custody.
 Q. And these negotiations were being carried on through one man Bishen Sarup?
 A. Possibly.
 Q. He was the very man who was run in for causing the riot at the railway station?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you see the injury caused to Madho Parshad, the other man who was run in?
 A. I saw him in court.
 Q. Do you remember as to whether a bayonet thrust was given?
 A. I know nothing about that.
 Q. Except the stone throwing was any man—any European—actually assaulted in your presence during that time that you left the railway station till the time you reached the Town Hall?
 A. No.
 Q. You saw no other assault except stone throwing?
 A. Not during that period.
 Q. When you arrived you were surrounded by crowds which according to your estimation numbered 500 and if they wanted they could very easily have assaulted you?
 A. I advanced into it.
 Q. You were not wholly unprotected?
 A. I had the *kotwal* with me.
 Q. You said that the crowd were shouting—is it a fact that they were shouting or were they appealing to you about two men?
 A. They may have been.
 Q. I think you write evidence that is produced by you in the language of Delhi, Hindustani, and you can understand it very well?
 A. Yes.
 Q. From the shouts of the crowd and from what was going on so long as you were in the station yard, could

Q

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[Continued.]

you make out that there was any incitement to violence or to assault anybody or to do any other mischief?

A. I do not really recollect hearing anything or any particular phrase.

By Mr. C. R. Das—

Q. You heard of the popular movements in Delhi, such as the Indian National Congress, Home Rule League, etc.

A. Yes.

Q. You are not in sympathy with these movements?

A. It is rather a hard question.

Q. Do you think them mischievous? You may be right.

A. I could not say, but certain aspects of these movements are mischievous.

Q. Certain aspects of them are mischievous?

A. Some of them.

Q. The same idea prevails amongst the police officers usually in Delhi?

A. I could not tell you.

Q. Haven't you had any discussions with them about these popular movements?

A. We have not specifically sat down to discuss them.

Q. I am not suggesting anything, but you might have discussed with them casually or in any way. They are not favoured by the police generally?

A. I suppose not.

Q. You know the popular leaders at Delhi, people who are looked upon as leaders?

A. Some of them.

Q. You know Hakim Ajmal Khan?

A. Yes.

Q. Sultan Singh?

A. Yes.

Q. Dr. Ansari?

A. I have never heard of him.

Q. Pyare Lal?

A. Yes.

Q. At the time when it was suggested to you that the crowd should be fired upon, did it strike you to send for some of these leaders to disperse the crowd?

A. I did not know who the leaders of that particular movement were.

Q. Any of the popular leaders?

A. No.

Q. As a matter of fact, you now know that where there were popular leaders, there was no disturbance and they have got control over the crowd.

A. At any rate when there is an adequate display of force.

Q. At the meetings where they undertook that no disturbances would take place, I do not think that you have ever found any sort of disturbances?

A. No disturbance took place in such a place.

Q. You said that you had determined to drive the crowd into the Queen's Gardens?

A. Yes, inside it.

Q. Up to that time, nothing serious had happened. I take it that themen were demanding the release of the persons who had been arrested.

A. I understand that they forcibly rescued them.

Q. You have got no personal knowledge of it?

A. No.

Q. Up to that time when you were determined to drive the crowd into the Queen's Gardens, they were only asking for the release of the arrested men?

A. I saw that the station windows were in a broken condition.

Q. By their shouts all that they wanted was to get release for these arrested persons. Is not that so?

A. That is what they said.

Q. How were they driven into the Queen's Gardens?

A. They were pushed.

Q. In what way?

A. We just rode through them and they gave way before the horses' hoofs.

Q. I suppose if the *souars* had continued to do so, they would have cleared.

A. No, because they started stoning these *souars*.

Q. After they got into the Queen's Gardens?

A. Yes.

Q. The whole difficulty arose out of what actually happened between these people and the stall-keepers. That is how it began?

A. I believe so.

Q. Would I be right in saying that as a matter of fact the shops had been closed?

A. What shops?

Q. Sweetmeat shops?

A. No, I did not hear of that.

Q. May I read a line from the statement of the evidence of Mr. Mathews of the trouble. He says, "I was informed that of the mob which had been turned out of the west hall, a large number from the road had gathered in the east hall and they already forced the stall-keepers to close their stalls". Do you know anything? As a matter of fact, the shops had been closed and afterwards the railway authorities objected?

A. I was not there.

Q. Did you hear of it?

A. I do not recollect hearing that they had been closed.

Q. The shops had been closed and the railway authorities did not like it at all and they objected and the whole trouble began in that way?

A. I do not know.

Q. Supposing I put it in this way that these men succeeded in persuading the stall-keepers to close their stalls and that the station superintendent's interference and rough handling by the police led to a scene and the arrest of these men. At that time did you ever hear anything like this?

A. I only heard that they had attempted to force the stall-keepers to close, that he had been assaulted and these two people had been arrested.

Q. So far as you know was there any investigation made as to how or why the quarrel took place at the station?

A. I could not tell you.

Q. In the course of the evidence we have heard of major leaders and minor leaders. Do you know these two men, Shankar Lal, Secretary of the Home Rule League, and Abdulla?

A. I have heard of Shankar Lal. I am not certain about the other man.

Q. None of them were convicted for any offences up to now?

A. Shankar Lal has been convicted; I do not know about the other man.

Q. With regard to the occurrences of the 17th you tried him?

A. Yes.

Q. Would I be right in saying that the arrest of Gauri Shankar was the spark that started the thing? Was he tried for an offence under section 506?

A. The arrest of Gauri Shankar led to a lot of unrest.

Q. In the course of the trial, you examined a witness of the name of Muhammad Haya, a head constable?

A. Yes.

Q. Is this the way in which he described the fire. "We had no orders as to where to fire. Some people came to Ballimaram before the fire. I do not know if they came after the fire. When I gave the order to fire, all fired."

A. I suppose it is a judicial record. I cannot recollect.

Q. As a matter of fact, the order was given by a head constable on that occasion to fire?

A. I believe so.

Q. Was he a young man of 22?

A. I do not know his age.

Q. And he has since been promoted?

A. Possibly.

By the Hon'ble Pandit M. M. Malaviya—

Q. When you, Mr. Currie, reached the inside gate of the Queen's Gardens for the purpose of quelling the riot, was your strength greater than when you reached the station?

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[Concluded.]

A. Yes, it would have been. I was acting with a view to protecting the station.

Q. Your capacity to quell the crowd was much greater at the time when you found yourself at the gate than when you were in the station yard or on the Queen's Road.

[The President:—Very much depends upon the relative forces at his command and the violence of the crowd.]

Counsel:—I just draw his attention. There were only 30 British soldiers. He had got 250 Manipuris by this time, armed according to his statement.]

A. They came out afterwards.

Q. You have said in the statement that you would not agree to their being put on to take part in quelling riot until they were armed. That is what you said in answer to Mr. Justice Rankin. They had been armed before they came to Queen's Road?

A. Yes.

Q. Before you were inside the Queen's Gardens?

A. No.

Q. But they had been armed shortly after that?

A. They came out after the fire.

Q. Can you say with your experience as a magistrate that the mounted police and the troops could not by riding into the crowd drive the crowd from inside the garden?

A. They tried and failed.

Q. My point is, could not the mounted police by riding through the crowd drive them further back into the garden? Can you honestly say that the mounted police who succeeded in taking the crowd from the railway station yard into the Queen's Road and from the Queen's Road into the Queen's Gardens would have failed in driving the people farther from the Queen's Gardens to inside the garden?

A. They did but failed. They were subjected to a very heavy stone firing.

Q. Do you mean to say that as soon as you got the crowd into the garden they began to throw stones?

A. You can understand 6 or 7 police mounted men pushing through that narrow gateway might clear it.

When they got out into the open space, they could not.

Q. Was an attempt made there?

A. Yes.

Q. How long after did firing take place? How long after you reached inside of the Queen's Road, was the order to fire issued?

A. I suppose after a minute or two.

Q. So that the attempt of the mounted police to disperse the crowd from into the garden lasted only a minute or two.

A. I went and tried to drive them back.

Q. At the moment when the crowd had to be scattered did you feel that the situation was such that there was imminent danger to life to any individual by the action of the crowd. Can you honestly say that? Did you compare the danger in the one case and in the other?

A. I will say that on such occasions you don't sit down and consider such as you would do sitting calmly in an arm-chair. You act as you think best.

Q. Regardless of consequences?

A. No.

Q. You mean to tell the committee that in your opinion the possible danger of the crowd hitting by stones weighed against the probable danger of several men in the crowd being deprived of their life and limb?

(Witness did not answer this question.)

(Sir C. H. Setalvad:—The witness said that the Manipuris were armed with kukries.)

(The President:—I think that is down.)

By the President—

Q. There was a question about giving the dead bodies to the relatives. Was there any delay in connection with that, and if so, what was the cause?

A. I do not know anything about that, Sir. I was not in charge after Colonel Beadon's return.

Q. In considering the question of whether it is essential to fire did you consider it your duty as a magistrate to maintain order?

A. Certainly, and to protect the railway station.

Q. If finally the crowd got out of hand and order ceased to exist then there will be indiscriminate massacre, the exact consequences of which you cannot foresee?

A. Once the crowd gets out of command it may do anything.

Q. In your opinion had such a point arrived when it was essential in the discharge of your duty to take the steps which in fact you took?

A. Yes.

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Mr. J. CARNEGIE.

At Delhi, Wednesday, the 5th November 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble PANDIT JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

SARDAR SAHIBZADA SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. H. G. STOKES, C.I.E., I.C.S., Secretary.

Mr. J. CARNEGIE, Agent, National Bank of India, Delhi.

By the President—

Q. You are Mr. Carnegie of the National Bank of India, Limited, Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. You were in Delhi on the 30th of March?

A. No; I was out of Delhi.

Q. Were you in Delhi from the 31st?

A. Yes.

Q. Was your bank closed for several days in April?

A. It was closed on the 14th, 15th and 16th, if I remember correctly.

Q. Then on the 17th?

A. We opened the bank on the 17th.

Q. About what time in the morning?

A. About 10 o'clock. It may have been a few minutes after 10.

Q. Where is your bank?

A. It is at the top of the Chowk, at the Clock-end of the Chowk, near the mosque.

Q. Was the Chowk at that time quiet?

A. It was quite quiet.

Q. Were many of the shops opened?

A. Most of the shops were open; a few still remained closed.

Q. Did anything occur about mid-day?

A. There was a disturbance at about 12 o'clock.

Q. What was the cause of that?

A. News came to me at about 11-30 or 12 that a man had been arrested at the Clock Tower.

Q. And what did you see then?

A. The Chowk was absolutely full of people yelling and shouting.

Q. Had they anything in their hands?

A. They were armed with *lathis*.

Q. What were they doing with them?

A. They were banging them on the ground and shouting.

Q. Did you form any opinion as to what the intention of the crowd was or what it was likely to do?

A. I was afraid that they would probably attack the banks and shops.

Q. What action did you take?

A. I closed the street door of the bank immediately.

Q. Did you communicate with anyone?

A. I telephoned to the chief commissioner and also to the superintendent of police.

Q. I think your bank was not attacked?

A. No, they did not attack my bank.

Q. Did you hear any firing?

A. I heard several shots; they might have been volleys. I could not say.

Q. Did you look out after hearing the fire?

A. I went and looked into the street; I could see nothing; then I immediately came back as I thought they might probably fire up the Chowk.

Q. Did you look out again?

A. I was looking out for some time.

Q. What did you see there?

A. After the fire, people commenced to run up the Chowk side of the street.

Q. What sort of people were they?

A. To me they appeared to be the poorer class of people.

Q. Was anything thrown at you at the time?

A. Yes, a little boy threw a piece of brick.

Q. What was the effect of the fire on the crowd?

A. After the fire the crowd seemed to be very much afraid.

Q. So far as the better class of citizens were concerned, did you see anything to suggest that they were encouraging this mob?

A. No; just the very reverse.

Q. Did the mob appear to you to have got completely out of hand?

A. Opposite the bank they appeared to be completely out of hand, as far as the crowd that I saw.

Q. From their attitude did you form any opinion as to the probability of violence being done?

A. Certainly before the fire, I thought there would have been violence.

Q. As regards the duties of the police on that occasion, did you think they were easy or difficult?

A. The police had a very difficult time of it on the 17th.

Q. After the 17th, I think there was practically no further trouble.

A. No more trouble at all.

Q. As regards the authorities during this time, can you say whether they were constantly on duty?

A. They were practically on duty day and night.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. On the 31st March, you drove to the Chowk?

A. Yes.

Q. There was no attempt made to molest you in any way?

A. No.

Q. Then on the 10th April or on the 11th, news arrived here about the happenings at Amritsar and Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. When was that known to the people here? I suppose a day or two afterwards.

A. I knew it on the 10th.

Q. It became known afterwards in the town?

A. Yes.

Q. In consequence of that there was no disturbance in Delhi at all, till you came to the 17th, so far as you know?

A. There was no disturbance for a day or two after the Amritsar affair.

Q. In consequence of that there was no disturbance in Delhi?

A. As far as I remember there was no disturbance in Delhi for a day or two afterwards.

Q. At any time was any attempt made to attack your bank or any other banks in Delhi?

A. No attempt was made on the National Bank or any other bank at all.

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Mr. J. CARNEGIE—concluded—Mr. H. V. B. HARE-SCOTT.

Q. There was no attempt on your panes?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. You say in your memorandum that you have submitted that the bulk of the people dislike the police?

A. Yes.

Q. Why do they so dislike them?

A. I could not reply to that. I think that dislike of the police has been for some time in Delhi.

Q. For some years?

A. Yes.

Q. What sort of people are they who dislike the police?

A. Merchants, shop-keepers that I have spoken to.

Q. You do not know the reason?

A. I could not tell the reason.

Q. But there is the fact that the police have been so disliked for many years by all people with whom you have come in contact?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith—

Q. When the news reached you of the events at Amritsar and of the murder of your brother officer, you were naturally very anxious, were you not?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. What view did the banks take as to the safety of the banks?

A. They were very concerned. I think the Bank of Bengal got a guard. But we did not get a guard for some time after.

Q. Then you closed your bank for some time after news came from Amritsar?

A. No, we did not close the bank for a day or two afterwards; probably two or three days.

Q. You got permission from the Chief Commissioner to do so?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ask him for permission?

A. I do not know. He was arranging for closing the banks for a few days, until we saw how the situation was going.

Q. And the banks thought it highly expedient to close?

A. We considered it advisable to close for a few days.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. On the 17th when there was that mob outside your bank, did you safeguard your bank?

A. I knew there were picquets, but I did not think them safe.

Q. Because there was no police protection at all? Had the people been left to do what they liked, as has been suggested, what would have been the result of that?

A. I doubt if the bank would have been safe. It only required one man to lead them on.

By Mr. C. R. Das—

Q. On the 17th the mob was in an excited condition near your bank?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know what was the cause of that excitement?

A. I do not know.

Mr. H. V. B. HARE-SCOTT, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence and Senior Superintendent of Police, Delhi.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Hare-Scott, you are the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and Senior Superintendent of police at Delhi?

A. I was in those days.

Q. I think you were not in Delhi on the 30th March?

A. I arrived on the morning of the 5th.

Q. Upon your arrival in Delhi did you discuss the situation with the Chief Commissioner?

A. With the Chief Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner.

Q. In the afternoon of that date you went round the principal streets of the city and did you visit the different police stations?

A. Yes.

Q. And discussed the situation?

A. Yes, with the officers there.

Q. On that date was business in the city going on as usual?

A. Yes, except that trams were being interfered with, and the streets appeared to be sullen.

Q. Was it uncertain then whether a *hartal* would be held on the following day?

A. Yes, it was uncertain. We could not get definite information.

Q. Was not closing of the shops on the 6th contrary to the advice which the leaders of the *Satyagraha Sabha* had given to the people?

A. I had no definite information about it. My information was very vague.

Q. Did you late in the evening drive with Mr. Orde round to the District Magistrate?

A. Late in the evening after dinner.

Q. You decided to send for a gentleman who had taken active part?

A. Yes, Hakim Ajmal Khan. He arrived there at mid-night.

Q. From the conversation you had what conclusion did you come to as to the probability of *hartal* being observed?A. We came to the conclusion that the *hartal* was certain to take place. He told us that all the efforts of the leaders had failed.

Q. Did he say anything as to who had taken charge of the mob?

A. I do not remember his saying that. We concluded from what he said that the leaders had lost all influence in that way and that the lower classes had taken the situation in their own hands.

Q. In that meeting did you come to any conclusion as to the arrangements to be made?

A. We decided to occupy the Town Hall with the troops and made arrangements accordingly. We put up picquets at the posts decided on.

Q. All the shops were shut on the 6th April?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there a big meeting in the morning at the Fatehpuri Masjid?

A. There was a big meeting at the Fatehpuri Masjid which lasted for a short time.

Q. And later in the day there were other meetings?

A. Yes.

Q. In what state was the city during that day?

A. There was a great deal of excitement all day long. There were shouts of "*Gandhi ki Jai*." Otherwise, there was no serious disturbance or marked demonstration on that day.

Q. Was it decided to withdraw the troops from the Town Hall?

A. At nightfall, to come on again next morning.

Q. On the 7th and 8th how was the situation?

A. The situation was normal more or less, outwardly at any rate.

Q. Did you yourself examine the police arrangements?

A. Yes, and drafted fresh orders to meet any emergency.

Q. And those orders were approved?

A. Both by the Chief Commissioner and the General Officer Commanding the station.

Q. Why did you draft these fresh orders?

A. The old orders were out of date and did not meet the new conditions. I also found that full use was not being made of the police.

Q. On the 8th you learnt that Mr. Gandhi had left Bombay for Delhi?

A. On the evening of the 8th we got a telegram.

Q. You consulted the Chief Commissioner?

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Mr. H. V. B. HARE-SCOTT.

[Continued.]

A. After first consulting the District Magistrate.
 Q. And did you depute Mr. Jeffreys to serve the order on Mr. Gandhi?
 A. He served the order on Mr. Gandhi at Muttra before he entered the Punjab.
 Q. On the arrival of the train at Delhi it became known that Mr. Gandhi did not arrive?
 A. Yes, on the arrival of the train at the station.
 Q. Were you at the station?
 A. Yes.
 Q. How many people were there?
 A. Fifty or sixty men had come to receive him.
 Q. Did you give orders to the police in connection with that?
 A. The police were asked to hold themselves in readiness in case of trouble and troops were also ordered in.
 Q. On the morning of the 10th was general *hartal* declared?
 A. Yes.
 Q. In consequence of that what disposition did you make?
 A. Police picquets were again posted to the places decided upon and troops were kept in readiness in the Queen's Gardens.
 Q. Did the 10th pass off quietly?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And did you relieve any of the troops then?
 A. We had arranged to allow the cavalry to return to the cantonment and to withdraw the police picquets but as soon as we got news of the trouble at Amritsar we cancelled the orders.
 Q. Did the shops, but for a short interval, continue closed from the 10th to the 17th?
 A. On the 9th practically all the shops remained closed in the main city.
 Q. On the 11th did you strengthen the military force?
 A. On the 11th we got about 100 Indian infantry and the railway station was picketted by the British infantry.
 Q. As regards the arrangement was it a matter for consideration each morning?
 A. It was done more or less permanently during this period between the 11th and the 18th. Troops were kept in readiness about that period.
 Q. Were you riding through the town daily at this time?
 A. Every morning.
 Q. What opinion did you form as to the temper of the mob?
 A. The temper was gradually worse and worse during this period and the news coming from Lahore and Amritsar had a bad effect. A number of small parties of ruffian boys turned out in the streets interfering with the servants of Europeans obtaining supplies and preventing people from proceeding to work. During this time the town was in the hands of the mob pretty well.
 Q. On the morning of the 14th there was news of a strike at one of the big railway stations.
 A. At the Shakurpur station and then more reports came in as regards intimidation of persons going to their work and offices in the railway station.
 Q. Did you consider whether it was necessary to take drastic action at this time?
 A. We tried to persuade the leaders during this time but they seemed to have lost all control over the mob and seemed to be absolutely impotent.
 Q. You had meetings on different dates?
 A. On the 11th and 12th and 13th the District Magistrate and I had meetings.
 Q. Did you lay the situation before the District Magistrate?
 A. Yes.
 Q. That was Colonel Beadon?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And in consultation with the Chief Commissioner?
 A. And also the General Officer Commanding. It was decided to summon all the leaders to the Town Hall and issue an order under section 188 of the Indian Penal Code.
 Q. What order was it?
 A. It is more of a warning order directing people not to do certain acts.

Q. The meeting was held in the Town Hall that afternoon?
 A. Yes, at 3.
 Q. At the request of the leaders was time given to them to make arrangements?
 A. Yes, to put a stop to the *hartal* and to stop trouble if they could.
 Q. Some time after this you received news of an incident which occurred at King Edward Park?
 A. We received the news of a riot in which an inspector and head constable of the Delhi C. I. D. were assaulted. They attended a meeting.
 Q. What meeting was that?
 A. It was a meeting convened spontaneously by some irresponsible *satyagrahis* and Home Rulers so far as I can make out.
 Q. What date was that?
 A. On the afternoon of the 14th.
 Q. Did you receive information as to the disturbance?
 A. Yes. The District Magistrate and I received information and we proceeded to the spot with a troop of cavalry and a party of police.
 Q. Did you proceed to the house of the police inspector?
 A. We proceeded there and found that he was seriously injured. We removed him to the hospital.
 Q. Where was he hit?
 A. About the back and the head so far as I can remember.
 Q. On the morning of the 15th was there a meeting?
 A. There was another meeting in the Town Hall in the morning. The leaders had failed to bring about the end of the *hartal* and they confessed it at the meeting and suggested that representatives of the various trades should be summoned later in the afternoon.
 Q. When did the later meeting take place?
 A. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon.
 Q. So far as the shop-keepers were concerned what was the attitude as regards their desire to open their shops?
 A. A certain number seemed willing to open but there was still a most stubborn and hostile element amongst them who were opposed to opening the shops.
 Q. Towards the end of the proceedings did you form any opinion as to the probability of the shops being opened?
 A. I was very doubtful about that. While this meeting was being held, there was a large crowd outside in the Chandni Chowk near the Clock Tower.
 Q. Did any of the crowd have any weapons in their hands?
 A. A certain number were armed with *lathis*.
 Q. Was there any attempt to break into the garden?
 A. They tried to force the police picquets at one or two points. We then had to call up the infantry and line them in front of the Town Hall.
 Q. On that day was there any collision between the military and the crowd?
 A. There was no actual collision.
 Q. On the 16th what was the situation like?
 A. The day passed off very quietly although the situation was very tense, the slightest incident might bring on trouble; and it was useless to look to the leaders to do anything.
 Q. Did you have a meeting with the District Magistrate?
 A. I had a meeting with the District Magistrate, and we suggested that we must take action.
 Q. What resolution did you come to?
 A. We arranged to send out police patrols to arrest persons who were committing acts of lawlessness. Till then the police had been inactive.
 Q. Did you think that if such means failed you would have to call in the military?
 A. If we failed the only help would be to hand over the situation to the military authorities.
 Q. Later in the evening a certain number of the leaders had a meeting with Colonel Beadon?
 A. Yes. Their leaders came and they had a meeting at Colonel Beadon's house.
 Q. Were you present at that meeting?
 A. Yes.

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Mr. H. V. B. HARE-SCOTT.

[Continued.]

Q. What passed there?
 A. The District Magistrate explained the situation and told them that this sort of thing could not go on and that severe action would have to be taken and they said that they were working all day in enrolling volunteers and decided to make another effort to get the shops to open the next morning. They also asked me whether I was willing to give them police assistance. I agreed to that.
 Q. Coming to the morning of the 17th what occurred then?
 A. On the morning of the 17th the District Magistrate and I went down to the Town Hall. The leaders were out from early that morning persuading the shopkeepers to open their shops and their efforts were fairly successful. After about 9 o'clock a large number of shops were open but little business was being done.
 Q. On this occasion when the leaders were persuading the people to open their shops did you observe an element in the crowd attempting to undo the work of the leaders?
 A. Not at the beginning. They came later. The whole proceedings appeared to be forced and unlikely to last.
 Q. Did you make any dispositions of the police?
 A. It was then that I ordered the police patrol which we had raised the previous night to help the leaders and arrest any persons threatening shopkeepers.
 Q. Was there a man arrested?
 A. A man was arrested.
 Q. What was the cause?
 A. It was reported that he was threatening a shopkeeper who had opened his shop. The police arrested him and brought him to the Town Hall where he was produced before the Magistrate.
 Q. What occurred then?
 A. Shops were immediately closed. The shopkeepers and leaders had disappeared and the riotous element crowded into the Chandni Chowk and soon after a party was seen hurrying towards the Fatehpuri Mosque.
 It was evident that something was happening in that direction. The cavalry were ordered to the Fatehpuri Mosque to see what was happening and to intercept the crowd but before they started shots were heard from the direction of the Fatehpuri Mosque and in a very brief space of time the streets were clear of the people.
 Q. Were you present at the firing?
 A. No. I was in the Town Hall at the time. A police picquet came doubling up the Chandni Chowk and they were attacked by the crowd and they were forced to fire.
 Q. Did you see the police force on that occasion?
 A. I found a head constable lying in the street. He was very seriously assaulted. He was assaulted with a big bottle or *lathi*. He was badly cut about the head and face and was taken into the Town Hall. I saw him the next morning in the hospital. His condition at the time was serious.
 Q. Did you go through the main bazar?
 A. The district magistrate and I went with the Indian infantry and Mr. Orde with the cavalry. We found the crowd dispersed everywhere. There were very few people about.
 Q. Was order then restored?
 A. Order was practically then restored.
 Q. About this time some special police constables were appointed under the Police Act; was there any grievance about wearing uniform?
 A. They did not want to wear uniform.
 Q. Was there any objection to wearing uniform?
 A. They did not want to wear the uniform and I personally did not ask them to. I had badges printed for them but they were not required to wear uniform.
 Q. When was the *hartal* brought to an end?
 A. The *hartal* ended on the 19th. All the shops were open that morning.
 Q. After that date was there any further trouble?
 A. No.
 Q. To what did you attribute that sudden stoppage?
 A. There were several reasons for that. I think the people were heartily tired of the whole business. They began to realise the loss and trouble they were bringing upon themselves. The leaders had been discredited and

the people believed that they had lost their support. Rumours were also current that Martial Law had been established and finally after their attack on the picquet they received a real lesson.
 Q. After your arrival on the 4th of April in Delhi on how many occasions were troops used?
 A. On two occasions—once at the park and on the 17th of April after the riot in the Chandni Chowk.
 Q. Was there in your opinion any unnecessary display of military force?
 A. No, I do not think so.
 Q. Although they were used on those two occasions they were kept continually ready?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Was not that trying to the troops?
 A. It was very trying especially as the temperature was high.
 Q. What was the temper of the troops?
 A. The temper of the troops was excellent. They were very patient.
 Q. During this time what sort of time did the police have?
 A. The police had a very trying time in spite of great provocation by the mob. I may also add that there were attempts made to tamper with them. There was one specific case where proceedings were taken against a man under the Defence of India Act. The mob called out to one of the picquets and asked them to come over to their side.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Was the meeting that was held on the 6th of April a very large one?
 A. It was a big meeting.
 Q. The meetings that were held during the latter part of the day, were they also large meetings?
 A. I have no information. It was reported that they were fairly well attended.
 Q. There was no disturbance that day?
 A. No.
 Q. The news of the happenings at Amritsar and Lahore—that was received here the next day?
 A. The news was received on the evening of the 10th.
 Q. And the news coming here no disturbances occurred in Delhi?
 A. No actual disturbances.
 Q. You said that though the military were actually used on two occasions, the 14th and 17th, they were kept in readiness in the Queen's Gardens to meet eventualities?
 A. During that period.
 Q. Were any machine guns kept there?
 A. Yes, I believe there was a machine gun.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. You say a machine gun was there—was it on one of the armoured cars?
 A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You said that in order to help the leaders you ordered the police to arrest the people who were interfering with the shop-keepers on the 17th?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Was it the request of the leaders that they wanted help from you? Did they ask 'Kindly help us with your police'?
 A. They did not put it that way. They decided to open the shops; they made an effort and they asked for police help.
 Q. Can you kindly give that in your own words?
 A. That is practically what I understood them to say.
 Q. What were the words used by them?
 A. I am not sure exactly what they were.
 Q. Were they 'Kindly help us'?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Was it Hakim Ajmal Khan who said that?
 A. I cannot exactly remember who said the words. All the three were there.

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Mr. H. V. B. HARE-SCOTT.

[Continued.]

Q. Was not the demonstration at the Town Hall in support of the leaders on a rumour that they were going to be arrested?

A. The reason given by the people was that they believed that the leaders were going to be arrested.

Q. It seemed to you to be a correct explanation?

A. It is quite possible.

Q. You have yourself stated "It seemed to me to be more a demonstration in favour of the support of the leaders than anything else." Is that so?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore no doubt their attitude became more and more definite the longer the proceedings lasted.

A. Yes.

Q. In your morning rounds you found that the temper of the crowd was becoming worse and worse?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you kindly explain how you came to that conclusion? Is that from what you saw and heard?

A. Yes, from their attitude, they were jeering at any show of authority and their temper was altogether bad; that was the general impression that I formed.

Q. Was there any show of authority by you?

A. Men were arrested.

Q. You yourself stated that.

A. It was the general impression I formed on going through the town.

Q. You cannot give us anything more definite than what you have stated?

A. The temper of the crowd was exceedingly bad and was getting worse daily. I understood this partly from the reports received and partly from what I saw myself.

Q. From the 6th up to the 17th, you were present at many of the meetings that were held between the officials and the so-called leaders of the people, major or minor?

A. I was present.

Q. Do you remember that anyone of them ever represented this fact to the authorities that they did not want any police interference?

A. Yes, I am afraid they did. One gentleman asked me to tell the inspector of the city not to come outside the police station. I thought it very absurd for a man of his position to make; I told him so at the time.

By Mr. C. R. Das—

Q. Could you tell us what was the cause of the *hartal* of the 6th?

A. The *hartal* of the 6th was held all over India; the day was fixed by Mr. Gandhi; and it was held in accordance with the general instructions received all over India from Mr. Gandhi.

Q. That was held on the 30th?

A. I was not here on the 30th. I cannot say anything about the 30th.

Q. Did you hear of any notice issued by the Deputy commissioner shortly before the 6th referring to these men as *badmashes*?

A. I believe there was something of that sort before I came. The notice was issued by the District Magistrate. That happened before I came here.

Q. Did that cause any resentment among the people?

A. I believe it probably did.

Q. Did you come to know that when the leaders asked them not to hold this *hartal* again, they said as they were called *badmashes*, they would have the *hartal*?

A. I do not know anything about that.

Q. With regard to the order on Mr. Gandhi, will you tell the committee what were your reasons for asking for an order?

A. I thought the arrival of Mr. Gandhi in Delhi would cause excitement and lead probably to further disturbances. I thought it extremely inadvisable that he should be allowed into Delhi.

Q. Do you know of any instance all over India where there has been any disturbance in the presence of Mr. Gandhi?

A. I cannot speak as to that. My own opinion was that if he came, there would be trouble.

Q. My question is whether you have heard of any disturbances where Mr. Gandhi was present?

A. I could not tell you that. I have not been following Mr. Gandhi's movements.

Q. Not even through papers?

A. I am not prepared to go by newspaper reports. I had not first hand information about that.

Q. Is it not a fact that wherever Mr. Gandhi had been, there had been no disturbances at all; in fact, in Bombay he was assigned by the Government, if I may say so, to stop disturbances?

A. They were unable to prevent any riots. Mr. Gandhi has got a great deal of influence in Ahmedabad; he was unable to prevent any trouble there.

Q. But the trouble arose in his absence and he went there?

A. I do not know whether he was there or not.

Q. It never struck you that the presence of Mr. Gandhi would quiet the trouble?

A. I took into consideration everything, and came to the conclusion that his presence would not stop the disturbances.

Q. With regard to the occurrences of the 17th, is it not a fact that on the night of the 16th, you had a message over the telephone from Hakim Ajmal Khan requesting you not to send the police to the city first thing in the morning?

A. Yes.

Q. The leaders were trying to get the shops opened?

A. Yes.

Q. You and Colonel Beadon were riding out near the clock tower, right through the Chandni Chowk. Is it not a fact that Sultan Singh came up to you and told that the shops were being opened and that if you rode in the bazaar, their work would be difficult?

A. I do not remember that at all.

Q. The leaders wanted you not to send the police to the city and said that if you did that there would be no disturbance?

A. I do not understand the alteration now made. They said that the police should not be sent first thing in the morning.

Q. As a matter of fact, you are aware that the police are not liked by the people here?

A. By a certain class of people, probably.

Q. The class of people connected with these movements, the Congress and the Home Rule League?

A. I cannot give any opinion on that. Generally, I do not know.

Q. On the 17th of April, I believe, the order with regard to the special constables was made?

A. Yes.

Q. You were not in want of constables?

A. We needed assistance.

Q. You were not in need of 14 constables from respectable citizens of Delhi? Were you really in want of men?

A. We wanted special constables to maintain order and to exercise influence. We did not want men numerically.

Q. Then was not the order made with the object of humiliating these men?

A. I do not think so. Assistance was required to maintain order and to assist the police.

Q. That is the form of the order, but was not the real object to humiliate? Was it not taken by the people in that way?

A. If they took it in that way, I could not help it.

Q. As a matter of fact, there was a meeting at which they passed a resolution protesting against it the next day?

A. I am not aware of that meeting. I left shortly after that.

Q. What work did you give to these 14 constables?

A. I gave them instructions to assist the police in maintaining order.

Q. Were they put in particular parts of the town? Staying at corners?

A. They were given beats to go round. They had to walk about the corners.

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Mr. M. V. B. HARE-SCOTT—concluded.—Mr. R. C. JEFFREYS.

Q. Were they asked to wear *pagris*?

A. No.

Q. Was there an aeroplane brought here?

A. An aeroplane was brought here one day.

Q. On what day?

A. On the 15th.

Q. That was the day on which the meeting in the Town Hall was held?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you aware that that led to the impression about the intended arrest of the leaders?

A. They said so; it was ridiculous.

Q. With regard to the arrest of Gauri Shankar what was the impression of the public? Were the public under the impression that he was wounded?

A. It was not within my knowledge.

By the President—

Q. In connection with the aeroplane that you referred to, what did you do?

A. The aeroplane arrived only the day before. The intention was to get some bearings and it hovered over the city only to see how it could work, if it were required.

Q. The aeroplane was not actually employed?

A. No.

Mr. R. C. JEFFREYS, Additional Superintendent of Police.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Jeffreys, are you the Additional Superintendent at Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 29th March did you receive orders from the senior superintendent of police to visit on the morning of the 30th all the city police stations?

A. Yes.

Q. With what object?

A. To find out whether the police arrangements that had been ordered were being properly carried out and to form an opinion on the state of the feeling in the city and on my return to make a report to the senior superintendent of police.

Q. Then you made the visit early in the morning?

A. Yes.

Q. What time was it?

A. I started about 9-45 with the City Inspector in his trap.

Q. What points in the city did you visit?

A. I went to the Kashmir Gate police station and then to the main Kotwali police station and from there to the Sadar Bazar police station and the Faiz Bazar police station and Hauz Qazi police station.

Q. At that time did you notice crowds in the street at all then?

A. The first crowd I met was about 100 yards west of the Clock Tower.

Q. Before that did you have any complaint made to you?

A. At the Kotwali station I met a European on foot who informed me that he had been told to get out of his tonga by a crowd that was collected at the western end of the Chandni Chowk. He said that the crowd though peaceful had been so insistent that he had no hesitation in complying with its demand.

Q. Then you proceeded in the direction of the Chandni Chowk?

A. I did, and about hundred yards west of the Clock Tower, I saw this crowd of 500 or 600 persons loosely filling up the whole of the roadway of the Chandni Chowk. As we approached, a number of individuals ran towards us holding up their hands and shouting to us to stop. They did not actually interfere with us and we drove amid repeated cries of "shame" and "*Gandhi ki Jai*."

Q. Were these cries addressed to you?

A. Yes, Sir. When we were clear of the crowd, we turned the trap and re-entered the crowd.

Q. What happened?

A. The majority ran away and the City Inspector called out loudly that quiet and order should be maintained. We again turned and continued our journey. The crowd immediately re-assembled and loudly called out after us. The crowd was composed for the greater part of quite young boys of the lower classes. I saw no well-dressed men. We went to the Sadar police station then. Just beyond the bridge there was a crowd of some 200 to 300 persons.

Q. How far?

A. From the end of the Chandni Chowk it is about 400 or 500 yards, perhaps a little more.

Q. Were numbers of people assembled?

A. There was a shop which was open and about 200 or 300 men were standing in front of the shop. The crowd let us through in silence. They were urging the owner to close his shop.

Q. In consequence of what?

A. I imagine on account of the crowd.

Q. Was the owner anxious to open the shop?

A. The owner was standing on the verandah of his shop and protesting. We remained at the post for about 10 minutes. On our return the crowd again let us through but on this occasion a good deal of miscellaneous shouting occurred.

Q. Where did you go then?

A. We went to the Hauz Qazi police station by the Ajmer gate and then to the Faiz Bazar police station. Near the former station a small crowd collected but not on our route. A well dressed Muhammadan priest was turned back by this crowd but was not asked to leave his tonga.

Q. Did you see that?

A. I saw him coming back. We asked him what was the reason. He said that the crowd did not allow him to go through but allowed him to remain in the tonga.

Q. About this time were the trams running?

A. I do not think so. From there we went on to Mr. Marshall's house.

Q. Had people been turned out of tongas?

A. There was this European gentleman I met at the Kotwali. He had definitely been turned out.

Q. Were any other people turned out?

A. On our way when we got to the Fort end of the Chandni Chowk there were two ladies there who had also been turned out of their tongas. We also stopped a couple in a tonga when they were proceeding up the Chandni Chowk and told them that it was no use going because they are sure to be turned out of the tonga.

Q. Did you make a report?

A. I reported to Mr. Marshall. He asked me to go and see things for myself.

Q. At that time was the crowd law-breaking?

A. At that time the crowd was noisy and intimidating. It was not actively law-breaking, but passively. It was holding up all traffic, of shops, commerce and industry and the like.

Q. Did it appear to you that there will be danger of a conflagration?

A. I thought as the day went on they would probably get more excited. Every time they succeeded in turning people back, there was a shout of triumph and every time they failed to turn back there was a shout of anger. So the probability was that as the day passed they would get hotter and hotter.

Q. You made the second visit to the city in company with Mr. Marshall?

A. I went with Mr. Marshall in his car. We went along the same road to begin with. On the way a certain number of boys called out to us to get out and walk. The crowd that was at the Chandni Chowk was

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[Continued.]

still there but it was not so thick. They behaved in exactly the same way, rushed out and tried to make us stop. The shops had closed. Then we went on to Hauz Qazi. Mr. Marshall decided to go by the Lal Kuan Bazar instead of going by Faiz Bazar, and about 300 yards from the police station we were stopped by a crowd which completely blocked the narrow road to a considerable depth.

Q. You could not proceed?

A. We could not possibly go through.

Q. Had you any conversation with the crowd?

A. The car stopped. The crowd implored us to drive back, but we distinctly heard people calling out 'get out and walk.' The City Inspector got out of the car to move the men out of the way. There he was severely hustled. He is a lame man and not very active. He was pushed about all over the place but I did not see any blow struck by anybody. Then a constable who was on duty there, came running up from behind with a *lathi* in his hand and this was snatched out of his hand. I got out of the car and went towards the City Inspector. This moved the crowd back and allowed the City Inspector to return towards the car. But as the man came back towards the car all the crowd came surging back again. They swarmed round the car. One man implored him to go back and a good deal of noise and shouting went on.

Q. You were in progress in the ordinary execution of your duty?

A. I went to see what the town was like, a thing which one is quite entitled to do. When these people were all over the car, Mr. Marshall decided to go back and started the engine. As soon as the engine started, there were angry shouts and the crowd got hold of the car wherever they possibly could. The hood was badly broken and there was grave danger of the glass screen in front being broken in the same way. Mr. Marshall began backing the car and the temper of the crowd at once improved. He went back for a few yards and then unfortunately one of the wheels stuck in the drain.

Q. How did you manage to get it out?

A. The chauffeur raised the car and drove it rapidly and the crowd came running in afterwards. When we got more or less opposite the Hauz Qazi police station a body of constables came running out with police *lathis* in their hands and the crowd bolted.

A. We had a discussion with the City Inspector. It was quite safe to advance again but Mr. Marshall came to the conclusion that it was best not to, so we watched.

Q. At about what time was that?

A. It was about 12-30.

Q. Did you go to the railway station after that?

A. We went round the Bastion Road and when we got to the Dufferin Bridge we saw a crowd on the Queen's Road opposite the railway station and the city inspector got out of the car to see what was happening. Meanwhile we went to report to Mr. Barron.

Q. Did you hear that a serious riot was taking place?

A. We had some discussion with Mr. Currie and he decided to take us along to the General Officer Commanding the station. We had just started when we met a mounted police constable who gave a note to Mr. Barron to the effect that there was serious rioting taking place at the railway station. We at once drove to the police lines where I took charge of the foot reserve consisting of one sub-inspector, 3 head constables and 32 foot constables, and the constables were armed with ordinary muskets and 13 rounds of buckshot per man. They had no ball. I took a mounted constable's horse and rapidly marched this force to the railway station. Mr. Marshall had given me orders to clear the railway station and the road in front of the railway station, and he said that he would collect mounted police and bring them along. As we got near the station by the Dufferin Bridge, I found Queen's Road fairly full of men.

Q. Did you form any opinion as to numbers?

A. I could not tell; I should think there were about 150 men at the time; when we got near the western gate of the railway yard, I stopped the constables and formed

them up in a line across the road and I myself rode into the station yard. It was absolutely packed with men, and amongst them I found Mr. Currie on foot.

The crowd was shouting and making a noise.

Q. What attitude did the crowd have towards you?

A. When I arrived, my armed men were round the corner and could not be seen. They surrounded me and began poking my horse with their sticks with the obvious idea of driving me out. The horse backed out from this crowd into the road and the crowd followed me. On the road, they saw these armed men who were moving forward in compliance with a signal which I had arranged. The crowd then very hastily withdrew into the courtyard again. They went down the road where they met reinforcements which consisted of the people whom I had driven out of Queen's Road and again started shouting.

Q. Did you go towards them?

A. I rode forward in order to continue the retreat. They began to advance on me. This forward movement I checked by pushing forward some of the unarmed constables who had been present before my arrival. I then formed the conclusion that with the small force at my disposal it would be quite impossible to overawe the crowd into dispersing. I had my 32 men plus a certain number of whom the City Inspector had collected earlier in the day.

Q. How many would they amount to?

A. About 15 or 20.

Q. You formed the conclusion that the police was insufficient?

A. I looked at this crowd and as they did not appear to be intent on any particular acts of violence I decided to let them stand by until such time as reinforcements reached me, more especially Mr. Marshall's mounted men.

Q. How was the crowd drawn up at that time?

A. They were in the shape of a D.

Q. Did you hear about the riot that had occurred at the station?

A. I then discussed the matter with Mr. Currie and he told me that there had been a row at the railway station and I saw a lot of broken glass, broken wood-work and flower pots. All the traffic to and from the station was entirely stopped.

Q. What was the attitude of the crowd?

A. At that time the crowd was gradually creeping forward and as reinforcements came they pushed forward. This rush had to be stopped as they were coming near the armed men so I collected all the unarmed constables and officers who were there leaving the armed men in a body. I sent them up to the crowd to push it back or at any rate prevent it coming forward. This to a certain extent had the desired effect. It did not stop the crowd but it slowed the movement down. At about 2 P.M. an armoured car came from the fort and the crowd moved out to let this through. It took up a position opposite the station on the garden side of the road. This also had a certain effect in slowing the crowd down.

Q. When did Mr. Marshall come up?

A. He came up about a quarter of an hour later.

Q. Whom was he accompanied by?

A. He was accompanied by Mr. Brown who is a police subordinate and I think 8 mounted men.

Q. Were they police?

A. Yes.

Q. I think you called to the crowd to make way.

A. They made way and the armed constables also made way. I told him what had happened there. A minute before three bricks had been thrown from the Queen's Gardens, one of which hit me on the hand. The position was becoming dangerous. Mr. Marshall saw this and determined to push this crowd into the garden, and ordered me to hold the road with the rear rank and to bring up the front rank of the armed men behind his mounted constables. I explained these orders to the men and was beginning my advance when I saw some 20 British soldiers doubling towards the garden gates where

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[Continued.]

Mr. Currie, Mr. Marshall and the mounted men were advancing under a shower of stones and bricks.

Q. What was the attitude of the crowd at this time?

A. They were simply pelting us with *lathis* and bricks.

Q. The crowd were pretty well driven into the corner?

A. Yes, except a few who were left on the eastern side.

Q. Had they been throwing missiles before?

A. They were being pushed back into the garden.

Q. After the crowd was actually pushed back into the garden what did they do?

A. They were pelting us with stones.

Q. Were any of your men injured?

A. They were all hit. I was hit on the top of the head.

Q. Did the situation appear very grave?

A. It appeared desperate. The crowd was very close.

Q. Was the order to fire given?

A. I heard Mr. Marshall call out to Mr. Currie that we shall have to fire. I did not hear anything more as I was very nearly thrown off my horse. And a moment later I heard Mr. Marshall give the order to fire which I repeated to my men. This firing took place for a few seconds and I heard Mr. Marshall order to cease fire.

Q. Before the firing took place were efforts made to disperse the crowd?

A. We prayed and negotiated with the crowd and we made all sorts of promises to the leaders of the crowd. We went round and harangued them personally. They absolutely declined to move.

Q. As a result of the firing did you notice anything?

A. I saw two men on the ground. I did not see any wounded men.

Q. Were there many bricks and stones?

A. The whole of that open space in front of the gate was littered with bricks and stones and there were also a very large number of *lathis* also lying on the ground.

Q. How long did the firing last?

A. About three seconds.

Q. After the order to cease fire was given was there further firing?

A. Not a shot. It stopped immediately.

Q. What did you do then?

A. I then advanced the foot constables to the embankment opposite the gate and overlooking the *faqir's* tomb in the garden below and began working down the roads to right and left leading towards the Town Hall.

Q. When did the Bedfords arrive?

A. There were 20 men who doubled across.

Q. Were there any Manipuris there?

A. By this time a contingent of Manipuris whom I had not previously noticed came out and were clearing the garden.

Q. Was the crowd dispersing after the fire?

A. As we advanced, there were several small groups of the crowd in the garden and they all ran away from us as we advanced. We advanced up to that cross road which runs east to west through the garden, the police picquet came up with me. I asked them to stop there and as I would advance my police up to the Town Hall, I did not want crowds to be formed behind me. The men were accordingly posted in that corner and we went up towards the Town Hall. The people with me were one sub-inspector and about 12 of the original front rank of my armed constables; 4 or 5 constables were with *lathis* in their hands.

Q. In what direction was the crowd moving?

A. They were moving out towards the Chandni Chowk through the gardens.

Q. What direction did you take?

A. As they seemed perfectly peaceful, I told the sub-inspector to move right up to the gate of the Chandni Chowk and prevent the crowd from returning. I myself went round the western side. Then I rode back to Mr. Marshall at the railway station to report to him.

Q. After your return, did you hear news about a further riot?

A. After my return I received news of a row near the Town Hall. Mr. Marshall told me to go there and that he would send 40 Manipuris as a reinforcement. I rode up across the bridge and found a large crowd yet inside the western gate of the gardens with my police force in front of them.

Q. Was the crowd doing anything?

A. They were chucking stones again.

Q. What sort of stones?

A. Stones and bricks.

Q. Were they large?

A. Not particularly large.

Q. Were they doing injuries to your men?

A. They were hitting them.

Q. Were the stones so large as to cause any serious injury to your men?

A. That did not happen; it might have. I rode up to this picquet and saw that there was very great danger again of being overwhelmed by rush either from the front or on either flank especially through the line of bushes. So I withdrew the picquet slowly down the road until we were on a level with the front face of the Town Hall, where the large flank was, and very slowly withdrew the police.

Q. At that time, you did not fire?

A. No firing so far. As soon as I arrived on the spot the stone throwing increased very distinctly. We were all hit and the horse I was on was hit time and again; finally I got off the horse and the horse bolted. At that time some of the constables asked my permission to fire. I refused to give permission, because the British troops were coming up behind and I hoped that their presence would frighten the crowd and would avoid the necessity of firing. There were at least three unarmed constables right up in the front of the crowd praying the crowd to go away. But the crowd continued to advance. The remaining three constables were out of the way and the crowd came forward.

Q. Did they begin to pelt you again?

A. The bricks continued through the bushes on the road. I was always afraid of men coming up through the bushes. I looked round and found that the British soldiers were still some distance off. They appeared to be advancing slowly. It was absolutely impossible to delay firing any longer and therefore I directed the last four armed constables on the right of my line to fire into the crowd at my right and into the bushes.

Q. How far was the crowd away then?

A. Two men were within arm's reach and the crowd was about 10 yards away.

Q. Would you describe the exact situation?

A. The front row was simply thick with boys; the first half were boys; behind these were men on the right climbing over the wall. That is why I chose the right. One reason was that the men were there and people were coming through the bushes just as the two men had already done. The remaining 8 or 9 armed constables who were with me, I told them not to fire and they did not fire. The 4 men whom I ordered to fire, fired one volley and I saw one man drop. There may have been more. The others did not fire. The crowd, however, was not particularly impressed by this and continued to advance and stone-throwing continued.

Q. Was the first volley fired in the air?

A. No.

Q. You fired at the crowd?

A. Yes.

Q. You did not see those who were affected by the fire?

A. Certainly I saw one man was dropped.

Q. It did not apparently deter the crowd?

A. Not in the least; they continued to advance, and throw bricks; the people were very close to us then. So I told the whole line to fire. The whole line consisted of about 12 or 13 armed constables. I also told them not to fire at these boys who were in front and they should try and avoid them. We were very fortunate and we did avoid them. It was not an effective volley; owing to the tremendous amount of noise going on and to the brick-

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ing that was going on, it did not seem to have very much effect. The crowd continued to advance, but it stopped just at the instant of fire, which seemed for a second or two. During this time the British picquet arrived and formed up on my left. I closed the policemen in the right and these men in the left. The crowd again began coming forward. I think there were some shots fired in the air, later on, not by the police.

Q. Was that not immediately after this?

A. It was a matter of a minute or half a minute.

Q. How did it come about that shots were fired in the air? That I do not quite understand.

A. When the British came alongside us, the crowd more or less halted then, they did not go away and they continued to stone. Some began to come through the road over the bushes. The sergeant in charge of the picquet was close to me. I warned him "we shall probably have to shoot in a minute or two." Just as I was giving this order to him, the British party fired off two volleys in the air.

Q. What was the effect of firing in the air? Was the crowd immediately discharged?

A. These two volleys went off into the air. I forbade the constables from shooting; they did not shoot. The crowd charged the British party, they then lowered their rifles and put a volley into them and that finished the business. The crowd then bolted. We advanced up to the gate about 25 or 30 yards alongside our party. I went out into the Chandni Chowk to see whether the crowd had dispersed. I saw three or four men being carried away and we recovered the bodies that were left behind. There was one man inside the gates. He was alive. The second was on the verandah of the first shop west of the gate. I think these men were hit by the first police volley and there were three bodies on the road. I got these bodies in and others were brought in by me and placed on the verandah of the Town Hall offices.

Q. What happened subsequently?

A. Nothing very important. Mr. Marshall had arrived and took over charge from me. He brought his 40 Manipuris who guarded the Town Hall I think. We closed the gates, took over the Queen's Gardens and we returned to the railway station to await the cavalry which had been sent for.

Q. Was there a meeting in the afternoon?

A. The cavalry turned up about half an hour later, at 3-45 p.m. Mr. Marshall told me that a meeting was being held at the Pipla Park (also called the Congress ground), illegally, without a license and he asked me to take the cavalry there and clear the crowd. After having done so to come down the Chandni Chowk and clear off any crowds and report to him. I went off, the cavalry arrived at the Pipla Park ground where there was a meeting going on in the corner. Mr. Munshi Ram was conducting the meeting. I had a conversation with him, he assured me that the meeting would be peaceful. I said if it was peaceful, we had no particular objection to it. It seemed to me to be perfectly peaceful at the time, and so I left the place. Chandni Chowk was more or less free and clear of people. I went to the Town Hall and reported to the senior officers.

Q. Had you anything to do in connection with the arrangements made for dealing with the subsequent outbreaks?

A. I was not in charge of any arrangement made afterwards. From time to time, I was put in charge of bodies of men, but I was not in any way responsible for the arrangements.

By Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Coming to the incident at the station, Mr. Jeffreys, on the 30th, you came up with your armed party, you told us, and left your men across the road and you rode into the station yard. Was there a considerable number of people in the station yard?

A. The whole yard was packed.

Q. The way in which the station yard was cleared was that the crowd was taken back by the horses into the road?

A. They were drawn; they were never driven out.

Q. About the incident at the Clock Tower, when you got up there to the gate, did you gather from anything that you saw or heard whether the crowd passing through the gate had any specific common object?

A. No, beyond the desire to harm the police.

Q. Did anybody shout out to you asking for liberty to pass through and give any reason for his request?

A. None whatever.

Q. At the Clock Tower, as I understand you, from first to last, the fusillade of bricks continued?

A. Yes.

Q. As I understand at the Clock Tower you from first to last suffered a continued fusillade of bricks. Can you just tell me where the crowd got their bricks from?

A. From road metalling I imagine.

Q. Was there any considerable number of bricks and stones at the Chandni Chowk on the spot at that time?

A. I do not know that.

Q. So far as your experience went at the Clock Tower the practice of firing into the air by the British Infantry was not apparently very successful?

A. It was absolutely disastrous.

Q. Did you that day or the next day have anything to do with the detachment of Manipuris that were entrained at Delhi station?

A. That evening I was sent off to arrange for a picquet of Manipuris. When I went there it was absolutely impossible to make myself understood. They did not understand English or Urdu. I had to come back and tell the officers that they could not understand anything of what I said. There was only one man in Delhi who could talk to them and that was their British officer.

Q. From what you say they were not ordinary Gurkhas?

A. No.

Q. Were they armed with kukris?

A. I do not know.

Q. Did you see from what you saw of them whether they were infantry accustomed to behave as infantry or whether they were a labour detachment or what sort of troops they were?

A. I could not judge. I saw very little of them.

Q. May I take it as regards firing that in all cases the police, when they fired, fired buckshot? That was the one thing they were armed with as regards ammunition just as the British Infantry were armed with ordinary .303?

A. Yes.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. About the morning of the 30th you spoke of people being turned out of their tonga. Was that part of the programme of the crowd to stop all business that day?

A. I understand so. Yes.

Q. You said they implored Mr. Marshall to go back. They did not threaten?

A. As I said a certain number of people implored us touching our feet and a certain number so to say commanded us.

Q. Those who actually asked Mr. Marshall did so respectfully?

A. Those that asked Mr. Marshall did so, but others were not so.

Q. I think you told us that the number you found on the Queen's Road when you arrived at the station was about 100?

A. Quite a small number.

Q. And when you went into the station yard you found a large crowd and Mr. Currie in the midst of it?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you give some estimate of the number?

A. I was inside the station for about a fifth of a second. I could not give you any idea.

Q. When you got there you saw Mr. Currie in the midst of the crowd; they were not assaulting Mr. Currie? Mr. Currie was talking to them?

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[Continued.]

A. He was in the middle with people all round him. I saw he was not assaulted.

Q. Nor did they assault you? They could have done it if they wished to?

A. No doubt. There were lot of sticks about.

Q. Then you said that for an hour and a half you were negotiating and talking with the crowd and haranguing the leaders. What were those negotiations?

A. There was one gentleman—I think Bishan Sarup was his name—wanted to know whether we had arrested two men or not.

Q. They were asking whether two of their men had been arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. The negotiations were with regard to the release?

A. There was Bishan Sarup. There was that boy who was beaten later on in the day and one or two others. They were taken to the railway station lock-up. They were shown that we had not the two men.

Q. This must have occupied considerable time. Mean-time the crowd was waiting?

A. The crowd was coming forward the whole time.

Q. The crowd was not turbulent then, when the leaders were talking and negotiating?

A. They were not fighting us. They were holding up traffic.

Q. They were not assaulting you? They were quiet so far?

A. To that extent, yes.

Q. Then were you able to satisfy the leaders that these men had not been arrested?

A. Not in the least. They wanted all sorts of things. They wanted us not to prosecute anybody which is highly illegal.

Q. Did they make any other remarks?

A. They asked all sorts of absurd questions about myself and particularly the City Inspector because they knew him.

Q. About this time the crowd was driven from the Queen's Road to the Queen's Gardens?

A. Yes, with the reinforcements to Mr. Marshall's mounted police.

Q. How many men had you at your command?

A. There were about 8 or 9 mounted men and there was the same old crowd that we had all the time.

Q. You thought that if you had more reinforcements you would be able to overawe the crowd?

A. Originally, yes.

Q. If at that time the 250 Manipuris had been made available to you do you think you could have successfully overawed the crowd?

A. It would have been a hideous massacre. Nobody could understand and give orders to the Manipuris. They would have killed the first man who provoked them.

Q. They had their non-commissioned officer?

A. Nobody else could talk to them.

Q. Surely if he was on the spot with them he could command them?

A. I doubt it. That is only my private opinion. There would have been huge casualties if you had employed them.

Q. That is a matter of opinion?

A. I have given it as my private opinion.

Q. Where were they at this time?

A. I do not know that. I was impressed with the fact that nobody could talk to them. If you had taken the whole lot of them there would have been a hideous massacre.

Q. Supposing you did not take 250?

A. But your original question was 250?

Q. Supposing that we modify it and supposing that you took only a sufficient number of Manipuris with the British officer in command, 50 or 60 or whatever you thought was necessary, with them and the police that you had got, could you have overawed the crowd?

A. I very much doubt it. It would have been inadvisable to introduce a single Manipuri. I had personally nothing to do with them.

Q. I put it to you as a hypothetical case. Supposing you had these reinforcements you could have overawed the crowd without resorting to fire?

A. I doubt it. It is the good old story that if you hit you must expect to be hit back. The Manipuris would certainly have got excited and would have massacred a huge number.

If you will refer to my original statement near the Town Hall you will notice that the police officers asked me for permission to fire and I had to harangue them and say "No." I told them that the British were just coming and all that sort of thing. Otherwise, they would have lost their temper.

Q. The real difficulty was the language?

A. The whole story was that. I did not know anything about them particularly.

Q. About the Clock Tower incident what was the number of the crowd there?

A. It filled up half the circle round the Clock Tower. It also filled up about 25 to 30 yards inside the gardens.

Q. Could you not give me any estimate of the number?

A. I am afraid not.

Q. You said that the British picquet came in later on. If they had come in time to assist, you could have avoided fire?

A. I know as a matter of fact we were in great funk about the assistance. It was not fast enough in coming. They took time in arriving. When you are in grave danger you want help damned quick.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. The police were armed with buckshot. I take it that the object was to save life?

A. The orders were that we should fire with buckshot in preference to ball.

Q. Then you were quite a long time standing under the fire of those bricks and stones?

A. The troops and the police and Mr. Marshall were being bricked before I arrived on the spot and they were being bricked before we came up.

Q. I take it that it is a nasty experience being hit and not returning fire?

A. I was hit myself about three times.

Q. You had a certain amount of that experience?

A. It is a most trying experience. I experienced it very much indeed.

Q. Practically anybody who experienced that would require a large amount of patience and forbearance?

A. Anybody would.

Q. Under those circumstances the shooting occurred?

A. It was absolutely necessary. At the railway station if we had not fired at that precise moment we would have had a hand-to-hand tussle between members of the crowd and members of the British troops and police. They would have been snatching the rifles out of the men's hands. At that stage you must either bayonet a man or shoot him.

Q. And the calling out of the Manipuris in your opinion would have been worse?

A. I think so myself.

Q. Even if they were disciplined troops?

A. I do not like to criticise—it would have been most undesirable.

Q. You do not think that one British officer could command a company.

A. In street fighting it is impossible.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You say in your written statement that the "Manipuri contingent whose presence I had not previously noticed was similarly clearing the garden on my left and the Queen's Road in the direction of the Lothian Bridge." What was the strength of that contingent?

A. I do not know.

Q. How many did you see doing this work?

A. I did not see them at all.

Q. As a matter of fact the Manipuris were employed in pushing back the crowd before the second firing took place?

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[Continued.]

A. I know nothing about that.

Q. This statement was not your own personal knowledge—you were informed of it. Were any persons killed by these Manipuris?

A. I have no idea.

Q. Why were they not employed before the first firing?

A. It never rested in my hands to make a decision.

Q. Up to 2-15 P.M., there was no stone throwing?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Up to 2-15 P.M., and the first time that the stone was thrown, you saw Mr. Marshall coming?

A. Yes.

Q. At the time the order to fire was given was the crowd warned of what was going to happen, were they told "now look here, we have done our best and if you will not move, the order to fire will be given?" Was any such warning given to the crowd?

A. I do not know.

Q. How far were you from Mr. Marshall?

A. About two yards.

Q. And the order for firing was given by Mr. Marshall. Did Mr. Marshall proclaim this to the crowd? Possibly you must have heard. If such warning was given, is there any reason for you not to hear it?

A. Every reason. There was appalling noise.

Q. Now you have said in several places that the crowd was creeping forward. Was not this due to the fact that the crowd was increasing, people from behind pushing the crowd and of course naturally in a large crowd people will creep forward?

A. I have already explained that it was for that reason.

Q. Do you think that the poking of the horse was done with a view to hurting you? What was their object?

A. The object was to prevent me going where I had a legitimate right to go and if possible to make that prevention as offensive as possible.

Q. Where did you intend going at that time?

A. To the courtyard.

Q. Hamid-ud-din Khan Sahib was there in the crowd?

A. I did not see him at the time.

Q. Was he also prevented from going there?

A. He arrived there an hour earlier than I did.

Q. You said before that when you saw Mr. Marshall coming you asked the crowd to move out of the way and they allowed Mr. Marshall to go and still you say that they poked your horse?

A. I have also said that the number of men behind the D. was very small. A very small number of people would find it very difficult to stop 10 mounted people.

Q. Can you give us any idea as to how many rounds were fired?

A. No.

Q. If, say, about 20 or 30 persons fired, at the same time, how many casualties would there be?

A. It would depend on the shooting. If the men were excited they might hurt nobody.

Q. If the shooting party had a crowd of two or three thousand people and the distance is only two yards how many casualties would there be?

A. I really have no idea. It is a matter for an expert.

Q. Are there any police regulations about firing?

A. There are. They are to be found in the Appendix to volume II of the Punjab Police Rules.

Q. What is the rule laid down if the police want to disperse a crowd?

A. The order is that they should fire over the heads of the crowd.

Q. Is there anything about firing at people's feet?

A. If you fire with buckshot it is useless aiming at people's feet.

Q. What became of the two men that were wounded at the railway station?

A. The original two, the last I saw of them was that they were being put into a Red Cross van to be carried off to hospital.

Q. After they had been wounded?

A. They were then taken into the yard.

Q. Do you know whether they died immediately afterwards?

A. One man was dead.

Q. Now you have stated that at that time for about an hour and a half negotiations were being carried on between the *kotwal* and crowd and yourself about the release of these two men and you have stated that two or three men supposed to be the leaders of that crowd were shown all over the place just to satisfy them that there was nobody in police custody at the station and that the people arrested had been forcibly released?

A. Yes.

Q. If the persons were forcibly released by the crowd, then where was the need of taking those leaders all over the places to assure the crowd that there was no one under police custody?

A. Because the leaders were sure that the men had not been released.

Q. You had no personal knowledge that they were rescued?

A. I personally was not at the railway station. But I know from subsequent enquiries that they were released.

Q. If, for instance, I had forcibly released the persons from your custody and I make a demand again for the release, the proper answer would be to ask why I made that demand when I had already forcibly rescued them?

A. Because the crowd is not a single unit. The first 20 people of the crowd rescued the men. The remaining number, whatever it was, did not believe that. We therefore assured them that they had been rescued. The leaders continued to say that they did not believe us. I said "all right come and see." That seems very reasonable.

By Mr. C. R. Das—

Q. Mr. Jeffreys, have you heard of the Indian National Congress, the Home Rule League and the *Satyagraha* movement?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it not a fact that the attitude of the police is against these movements?

A. No. That is a question of policy.

Q. I am asking you whether the attitude of the police officers in Delhi is or is not against these movements?

A. Very much against when they start throwing bricks and stones.

Q. Nothing about bricks; as an abstract movement?

A. We do not care two straws for any movement.

Q. You have got no opinion upon that whatever?

A. No.

Q. The officers never discussed these movements?

A. Not officially.

Q. Between themselves? Would I be right in saying that as a matter of fact that police officers generally—I am confining myself to this district—when they discuss these movements, they discuss them unfavourably?

A. I do not know. I find more interesting things to talk about.

Q. You never talk about these?

A. Occasionally, but I have no great interest.

Q. You have never expressed yourself against these movements?

A. I do not understand what you are driving at. I do not mind in the least about these movements. When they throw bricks, then we object.

Q. Is it not a fact that you police officers in Delhi have constantly expressed yourselves against these movements?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Am I right in saying that as a matter of fact throughout these days, commencing from the 30th March till the 17th April, there never has been a single disturbance in the city except when the police were there?

A. You are absolutely wrong. Every day without exception there were large crowds holding up all shops in Delhi. All commerce and industry was held up. All traffic, except traffic in tongas, which were over-

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Mr. R. C. JEFFREYS.

[Continued.]

loaded, was held up. The policemen were threatened, jeering at policemen, endeavouring to do the same to railway servants, upsetting all merchandise; Europeans were put to considerable difficulty, all illegal.

Q. About the disturbances that you have spoken of in your evidence here, i.e., the disturbances of the 30th, 14th, etc., all these disturbances happened when the police were seen?

A. Policemen who were near the disturbance were always attacked.

Q. I do not agree with your idea of disturbances. The shops were closed. That is a matter of opinion; I do not want to discuss that with you. About the disturbances that you have referred to, none of them took place in the absence of a policeman?

A. Yes; I have only talked of cases where police were present.

Q. Am I right in saying that between those two dates, there never has been a riot except in the presence of a policeman?

A. You are wrong.

Q. Can you mention any riot during these days where there was no policeman?

A. I forget the exact dates. There was a meeting at which Mr. Barron met the leaders in the Town Hall. I think on that day there were such riots.

Q. That is on the 15th?

A. Yes, on the 15th the crowd smashed practically every lamp post, and they broke a municipal sentry box; the police were not present there.

Q. Do you know of any official documents about these riots? Was there any complaint about these riots?

A. We had complaints from the Electric Tramway people. They complained of the loss of property.

Q. That is the only riot that you can think of?

A. No. My cook was troubled by 10 persons.

Q. Were there any such occurrences such as those that took place near the station or anywhere else or at public meetings?

A. Those are the things that I am talking of.

Q. Did they in your opinion require firing?

A. How can I give you any information when I was not present?

Q. When you arrived at the station on the 30th March, did you see any riot?

A. There was a riot going on the moment I arrived.

Q. Do you mean to say that a riot was going on when you arrived there?

A. I have already told you that on the fifth second of my arrival there was a riot against me.

Q. As soon as you got there, the riot began?

A. Yes.

Q. I take it that before that the Chief Commissioner had not received any notice of a riot?

A. He got first information as far as I know from that mounted constable that I was referring to in my statement.

Q. Before you arrived at the station, according to your statement, the Chief Commissioner could not have received any intimation of a riot?

A. He did receive information, to which I have referred in my statement.

Q. Was it another riot?

A. That is the original attack on the contractor.

Q. Can you tell me why is it that directly you appeared there, the riot began?

A. Because I was alone there.

Q. Would it have been due (i.e., the throwing of brickbats) to the way in which your men dealt with the crowd?

A. Not in the least.

Q. Were any brickbats thrown that time?

A. Not when I arrived.

Q. No brickbats were thrown before you?

A. I was never inside the yard.

Q. Did they all clear out? Were there brickbats?

A. I did not see any brickbats lying about.

Q. When you went there, the crowd in the Queen's Road showed a tendency to keep out of the way?

A. Yes.

Q. Just in the same way as when Mr. Marshall came?

A. Yes.

Q. Before the firing was ordered, were the police officers directed to see their bullets?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. How many *sowars* were available at that time?

A. I could not give you any idea; at that time I was not employed with them in any way.

Q. You have not the slightest idea as to how many of them were in Delhi?

A. There were about 40.

Q. I take it that that number could be had at that time?

A. Mr. Marshall tried to get them, but he could not.

Q. How far is the police lines from the station? Is it some 8 or 10 minutes walk?

A. About that.

Q. These mounted police are in the Police Lines?

A. Yes.

Q. You say that the first thing that was done was to drive the crowd into the Queen's Park?

A. Into the gardens.

Q. And that was done by the mounted police?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it by riding through?

A. I could not tell you. I was at that moment giving orders to my men telling off one half and asking the other half to follow behind.

Q. You did not see the beginning of the advance?

A. Not absolutely. When I finished giving orders to my men, I saw these people.

Q. You were present when Mr. Marshall gave the order to fire. You heard that?

A. Yes.

Q. If any warning had been given by Mr. Marshall I take it that you would have heard it?

A. Not necessarily. There was so much noise.

Q. How many constables were there before the firing?

A. At that time there were my 16 armed constables. There were 16 armed constables near the gate. There were the *sowars*, about 8 or 10 of them, and there was a miscellaneous crowd of about a dozen unarmed constables *plus* the British.

Q. Would the number of constables be 70 altogether?

A. It was nothing like 70. I would not be able to say that.

Q. That was what you said, Mr. Jeffreys—that there were about 70 constables and 20 British soldiers present when the firing took place?

A. It might be about that. I am not prepared to swear to any particular number. It might be about that number.

Q. That is what you have given in your evidence before the Court. (Counsel read here the relevant portion.)

A. That would be correct.

Q. You told the Committee that rifles were being snatched?

A. I was on the extreme left. On the extreme right they were snatching rifles. I did not see. I explained in my evidence before the Court that I could not fire at people's feet. You fire to kill, as contrasted with making a noise. I did not mean as contrasted with wounding. It is necessary to fire to kill.

Q. Then the rules require that as little injury should be done as possible under the circumstances?

A. Yes.

Q. I am now asking you about what occurred near the Town Hall? Did the crowd, when it was fired upon, try to enter through the Clock Tower gate?

A. They were already inside the garden.

Q. Did it strike you why they were going there?

A. It did not, indeed.

Q. Did you form any opinion as to why having come out of the park they had again gone into the park and which way they were going?

A. The desire was to go back, not to be driven back.

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—Subedar Major HAMID KHAN.

Q. You were there when the dead bodies had been taken to the station?

A. I should not think so. I did not know where the dead bodies were. Subsequently, of course, I knew. At that moment I did not know.

Q. Did it not strike you that they were going to get the dead bodies?

A. I did not worry about that.

Q. Their only object was to get the dead bodies and the wounded men. Even then it is necessary to fire?

A. Not at all. It is necessary to fire upon them if they throw bricks at you. That is my contention.

Q. Are you aware of any circular issued by the Deputy Commissioner, I believe it was on the 4th April, referring to those men engaged in the *hartal* as *badmashes*?

A. I know nothing about it.

Rai Sahib Mr. RAJ NARAYAN, Barrister-at-law, Government Pleader.

By the President—

Q. You are a barrister at Delhi, and a Government pleader. Now, in connection with the riots at Delhi, have you personally any knowledge?

A. None except what I heard.

Q. Are you a resident of Delhi?

A. I am.

Q. Were you going about the streets during that time?

A. I used to go to court every day.

Q. Personally did you see anything of the riots?

A. Nothing actually of the riots. I saw the condition of the streets.

Q. What was that?

A. The shops were closed and people were roaming about.

Q. During the *hartal* the lawyers attended the courts as usual?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Could you form any opinion during that time as to whether there was anything provocative in the action and the attitude of the police or military?

A. Not that I could see.

By Sir C. Setalvad—

Q. You said that there was nothing provocative in the attitude of the military or police. You were never present at any place where the military and police acted?

A. No.

Mr. J. FAIRLEY, Superintendent, Telegraphic Engineering, Delhi.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Fairley, are you superintendent of the Telegraph Engineering Department?

A. I am, Sir.

Q. During the period of the riots, was there a certain destruction to property?

A. I found there was from the official records.

Q. On what days do those records show there was damage to the lines or to the wire?

A. On the 14th April.

Q. And on any other date?

A. So far as Delhi province is concerned no other date except on the 16th April when the telephone lines in the city were destroyed.

Q. By whom was the damage done?

A. We did not investigate that matter. We reported the matter to the police in the usual way.

Subedar Major HAMID KHAN, 2-55th Coke's Rifles.

By the President—

Q. What is your regiment and what is your rank?

A. The 2-55th and I am a Subedar-Major.

Q. What part of India do you come from?

A. I am a resident of Hoti Mardan in the district of Peshawar.

Q. What nationality are you?

A. I am a Pathan.

Q. During the riots in March and April where was our regiment?

A. My regiment was stationed in Raisina.

Q. Did you send a company to the bazar for the purpose of keeping order?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you in the city every day?

A. Yes, I came every day.

Q. Were you in mufti on those occasions?

A. Yes, I was in mufti.

Q. Can you describe what sort of crowds you saw?

A. I saw crowds armed with *lathis*. They were all arching just as troops.

Q. On what occasions did you see them?

A. I cannot remember the exact date but it was during the month of April.

Q. Did you see those crowds taking any action against anyone?

A. I saw them dismounting people from the trams.

Q. Did you hear any cries made by the crowd?

A. They cried that in the disturbances the military lie on their side.

Q. Was any reference to British rule made by the crowd?

A. No; the crowd seemed to be bent on creating a disturbance. They broke dust-bins and struck electric poles with *lathis*. Their attitude was threatening.

Q. Can you describe how many the crowd were on these occasions, i.e., in what numbers?

A. The crowd that I saw varied in different places. In some places it was 300, in some 400, 50 in other places and even 10 in some places.

Q. Did you form any opinion as to whether military assistance was required to keep order in connection with the crowds that you saw?

A. Military assistance was very essential, in my opinion, and if it had been sought earlier, there would have been no disturbance.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You were coming here into the town when your company was stationed in the town. Were you coming here on duty or for what purpose?

A. I had to go to the city and the bazar.

Q. In the town did you come on duty or did you merely come to see people in the town?

A. I had orders to go and see whether the people stood in need of something and to lecture to them if they behaved well.

Q. How often did you come into the town during those days?

A. Throughout, every day when the company was here.

Q. Your statement that you came here every other day is not correct?

5 November 1919.] Subedar Major HAMID KHAN—concluded—Resaldar KALA SINGH—Jamadar GHULAM NABI.

A. When my company was in the Fort, I had no need to come to the bazar every day.

Q. When was your company removed to the Fort?

A. I do not remember the correct date. It may be about the 6th or 7th April.

Q. After that you did not come to the bazar at all, i.e., after you went to the Fort?

A. I did not.

Q. You came to the bazar when your company was stationed in the Town Hall?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me when you first came in connection with your company? On what date?

A. I do not remember.

Q. What time of the day did you come to the town?

A. There was no fixed time; sometimes in the morning.

Q. Usually when did you come?

A. There was no fixed time.

Q. Surely you remember when you did in fact come?

A. Sometimes in the morning and whenever I had leisure.

Q. You spoke of the crowd shouting about the Rowlatt Act, and saying that the military would be on their side. In what language was the crowd saying that?

A. That was in Hindustani.

Q. Could you distinctly follow and understand what they were saying?

A. Yes.

Q. How far were you when they were so shouting?

A. I was in their midst.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. Did you have any conversation with any of the inhabitants when you came in the town?

A. They had a talk with me, because they did not know that I belonged to the military.

Q. What did they say when you had the conversation?

A. They were all against the Rowlatt Act, and one person who had a cigarette, took it out as that was against the new law which was being promulgated.

Q. Is that all that they said or discussed? Was there any mention about the feeling of the army and things of that sort?

A. It was said that if a disturbance was created, the military would side with them. These people addressed the crowd saying that men will create disturbance about the Rowlatt Act and that the military would not obey the command of their officers and without any doubt they would render help.

Q. Was anything further elicited in your conversations beyond that statement?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble M. M. Pandit Malaviya—

Q. Will you tell the committee in how many places and from how many persons you heard these conversations that you have mentioned about these things?

A. In two different places, just at Fatehpuri and where the Chandni Chowk begins and on two days. There is a bath near the Fatehpuri mosque and somewhere near the mosque; on different dates.

Q. From whom did you hear?

A. There was a crowd; I heard from the people who were close to me.

Q. Was it only on one day that you heard?

A. I heard it on two different dates.

Q. When did you hear the second time? At what distance of time after you heard the first?

A. I heard it twice. I am not sure whether it was the second day or the third day.

Q. Did you bring this to the notice of your superior officer?

A. No. Because I did not think it to be so very important and moreover I did not know that I was to give evidence before this Committee.

Resaldar KALA SINGH, 16th Cavalry.

By the President—

Q. Were you at Delhi during the period of the riots from the 30th March to the 11th April?

A. I was.

Q. During the time that you were in Delhi with your squadron, had you occasion to be about the city yourself?

A. Not without the British officers.

Q. You were there in company with British officers?

A. Under them.

Q. Did you see crowds about?

A. Yes.

Q. On what occasion did you see?

A. I saw a big crowd on the evening of the 30th March.

Q. Where was it?

A. It was towards the east of the Chandni Chowk and towards the west of the Fort.

Q. Was that crowd doing anything?

A. That crowd was being lectured by Munshi Ram.

Q. Was there any disturbance there?

A. No, they were simply standing and they were lectured by Munshi Ram.

Q. Did you see the crowds on any other occasion during this period?

A. There were always big crowds in the city.

Q. What was the attitude of the crowd towards the military?

A. When we used to go into the city the attitude of the crowd, which generally consisted of boys and low class men, was not good. They always used to speak abusive language and especially *bandar*. I have never heard big men speak like this.

Jamadar GHULAM NABI, 2-55th Coke's Rifles.

By the President—

Q. Were you sent with a detachment of men to Delhi for protective duties?

A. I was sent with a detachment stationed near the Town Hall.

Q. How many men were there?

A. About 180.

Q. Where were they posted?

A. At the Town Hall.

Q. They were at different places?

A. 50 were near the Hauz Qazi, 40 at the railway station and the rest near the Town Hall.

Q. Were there large crowds in the Chandni Chowk on that date?

A. There was a large crowd.

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5 November 1919.] Jamadar GHULAM NABI—concluded—Jamadar JAN MUHAMMAD—SWAMI SHRADDHANAND.

A. They were simply shouting and there was no use speaking to them. They acted foolishly.

By Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Did you see the man after he was injured or did you see him when he was injured?

A. I saw him after he was injured, not while he was injured.

By the President—

Q. Were you at Delhi during the period of the disturbances?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you see of the disturbances?

A. Personally I saw nothing. I heard from the men who were passing our lines.

Jamadar JAN MUHAMMAD, 2-69th Punjabis.

By the President—

Q. I want to ask you one question. Was any effort made to undermine the discipline of your force at all?

A. The Commanding Officer issued instructions that discipline should be observed while all these disturbances were going on throughout Delhi and we Indian officers and other non-commissioned officers were very careful in those days.

Q. Was any attempt made to tamper with the military?

A. There was one man of our own regiment, discharged some time ago. He joined our regiment in 1918 from the 2-98th Infantry. He created certain nuisances in the regiment. He incited a certain man to desert from the service of his regiment. He was afterwards handed over to the police. The General Officer Commanding and the police inquired into the matter and in the end he was sentenced to 7 years' rigorous imprisonment.

SWAMI SHRADDHANAND.

By the President—

Q. You are an inhabitant of Delhi? You were resident here during the period of these disturbances?

A. Yes.

Q. At one time you were in the legal profession?

A. I gave it up in 1898.

Q. Well, during the time that the Rowlatt Bill was passing through the Council there was a considerable amount of feeling about it?

A. Yes. I had been reading the speeches of the members in Council and reading newspapers and my special attention was drawn to a manifesto of Mahatma Gandhi.

Q. You became associated, I think, with his movement?

A. I signed his vow.

Q. What is this *satyagraha*?

A. *Satyagraha* is a pledge taken to commit no violence to person or property and when necessary to refuse to obey any laws which a man considers to be against the principles of justice and liberty.

Q. According to the vow, who is to judge as to whether a law is to be obeyed or not?

A. Mr. Gandhi appointed a committee and that committee were the judges. By signing the *satyagraha* vow a member of the society was bound to disobey any law that he was told to do so by the council and if he agreed to that.

Q. From the point of view of keeping public order is not that rather a dangerous vow to take?

A. It was not against public order.

Q. If you teach that doctrine generally to masses of people they will have no difficulty in carrying out their doctrine?

A. But the principal part of the *satyagraha* vow is that there should be no violence to personal property and there ought to be no resistance to authority whenever they wanted to be arrested. The *satyagraha* did not recognise the obligation of obedience to the laws that are in force. It does recognise that and that is the reason why Mahatma Gandhi always exhorted people to give in.

Q. I think you spoke of one or two different places in connection with these *satyagraha*.

A. Yes, in several places.

Q. And a resolution was given by the *satyagraha* society to observe the 30th of March as a day of fasting and humiliation?

A. Yes. By Mahatma Gandhi a manifesto was issued calling upon the people to celebrate the second Sunday after the signing of the Rowlatt Act by the Viceroy to be observed as a day of humiliation and prayer.

Q. Humiliation and prayer involved the suspension of business. It necessitated entire abstinence from work?

A. Yes.

Q. And therefore involved the closure of shops?

A. Yes. And places of business. It was to be all voluntary. For instance, on the 6th of April no compulsion was used. In fact the *Satyagraha Sabha* passed a resolution. I have filed a copy with statement, and we exhorted them not to observe that again because we had once observed it on the 30th. It was all voluntary.

Q. In your statement you say a meeting was to be held—what meeting was that?

A. That was the meeting that was to be held on the 30th March, at about 5 o'clock.

Q. Where was it to be held?

A. In the Pipla Park.

Q. Now, as regards the 30th of March, I think practically all the shops were shut in the town?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you attend the morning service?

A. Yes.

Q. And after attending the morning service you passed through the city? At that time had the tramcars ceased to run?

A. They had ceased to run at half-past eight.

Q. And were tongas plying for hire?

A. Some tongas belonging to their own proprietors were running.

Q. Did you see anything of the mob preventing the people riding in tramcars or in tongas?

A. There was one case that I noticed. A gentleman was going the next morning. They implored him to get down because it was their day of mourning. He came down and began to walk. There was another case where ladies were driving in a tonga. They made them get down. Then they were told "Are you not ashamed? They are ladies?" Then they kept quiet. They told the coachman to get up and drive away.

Q. Did you learn that some disturbances had taken place on the station? Somewhere near 12 o'clock.

A. I should say it was about 2. I reached my place at 2.

Q. Then did you go to the railway station?

A. I immediately proceeded to the railway station.

Q. When you arrived at the railway station what did you see?

A. When I reached the west side of the foot-path on the west side of the station I found there were some hundreds there and they told me what I have written in my statement. They said that machine-guns had been fired indiscriminately and about a dozen had been killed or wounded and that the bodies were being dragged into the station. That was the report that was made to me. I then proceeded to the railway station and there were

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[Continued.]

several European gentlemen and I addressed to each and everyone "what is the matter—will you tell me?" I found out afterwards one of them was Mr. Currie.

Q. You did not know Mr. Currie?

A. We knew each other afterwards. They did not pay any attention to what I said. They were very indifferent. Mr. Currie said something in a very indifferent tone. I said "I am taking away all these men, please do not display any military or police force and do not excite them." So I left the station. I might tell you that I wanted to go through the gate on the east side, but there were Manipuris. I called them Gurkhas but I now find they were the Manipuris; so I took them on the other side to Fatehpuri.

Q. You did not see what had occurred in connection with the Town Hall incident?

A. The crowd followed me and it began to swell. When I left the station there were some hundreds, 500 or 700. People were coming from Fatehpuri. They all joined me. I thought they were going to the meeting, but they all followed me. The crowd swelled to some 3,000 when I reached the Town Hall gate. When I reached the western gate of the Town Hall, there were not more than 100 or 125 persons there and one of them was shouting, making a great noise and crying in piercing voice, "Let me have the dead body at once." I told them to come away. I added "There has been firing at the railway station; we ought not to be here." Some 50 or 60 came away.

Q. What time was that?

A. It might be half-past two or a little after that. I reached the railway station at quarter past two. It must have been 2-15 or 2-30. Someone was making a noise and would not listen to me. So I took away the other men; and those who were pacified followed me. I left for the meeting. When I left, I left only 20 or 25 men with that man who was making a noise. He said some relation of his had been killed and they would not give him the dead body. Then I reached the place of meeting; it must have been at 3 o'clock or a little earlier.

Q. I think you had an interview with some authority before you held the meeting.

A. It was afterwards. The meeting was going on. When I reached the place of meeting, there were already some thousands there. There was a crowd of 15,000 and I began to address them. I had hardly proceeded for a few minutes. I asked them to take their places and not to mind the shooting. They were listening. Then two persons came running from the Town Hall side and said that a machine gun had again been fired and you are preaching *shanti*. I tried for some five minutes and they were all quiet. Then came some *sowars*, and I think perhaps the Sikh soldier who was sitting here. He had *sowars* with him and Mr. Jeffreys and one military officer also came. I had a talk with them, which I have given here. I told the Chief Commissioner, Mr. Barron, that it was a peaceful meeting. He said that if it was a peaceful meeting, they would not interfere. But a brickbat, he said, passed him just then. I said I did not notice any brickbats. I asked the people whether they noticed any brickbats and they said they did not see. The officers then said that if it was a peaceful meeting, they would withdraw. They went away. The place being insufficient, we removed to the *maidan*, because people were pouring in. It was said that the crowd would have been more than 25,000, 30,000 or 40,000, but my estimate was 5,000 men; not less than that. I began with a prayer. I was just going to begin when the same *sowars*, the Chief Commissioner, the Additional District Magistrate, Mr. Currie, with Khan Sahib Hamiduddin, *kotwal*, all at once came, and the armoured motor was just then near the road in front of us. And then that interview took place. Mr. Currie had a whip in his hand and made sign to me with that whip to call me. I made a remark that I am not a criminal. "If you want to say anything you can say from there and I will reply from this place." Then I was told by somebody who were there that the Chief Commissioner said that he could not speak loud and asked me to go round. I went there, I had a talk with the Chief Commissioner. He asked me what meeting it

was. I said it was intended to pass a resolution against the Rowlatt Act and send it to the Secretary of State. Then he asked at what time the meeting could disperse. I replied it would disperse at 6-30. Then I asked him whether there was any machine gun-fire at the Clock Tower? He said "no." Then I said I would assure the people that no body has been killed.

The Chief Commissioner then said that rifles had been fired. Then I asked him how many were killed and how many wounded. He could not say that. Then he asked who would be responsible for this meeting dispersing peacefully. I told him that I would be responsible, but if the police or military should interfere, then I would not be responsible. He said that nobody would interfere. The meeting dispersed peacefully. I called upon all the people to follow me, i.e., those who had to go through the city, and they followed me. It was a very orderly crowd; it was not like an unruly crowd; they were peacefully going. They may have been saying *Candhi-ji ki Jai, Hindu-Moslem ki jai*. They might have been shouting. There was no other thing. When I was taking the crowd and when we were some distance from the Clock Tower, I saw Manipuris (I then thought they were Gurkhas) in the middle of the road. They were facing bothways. On seeing us they at once left for the foot-path. I thought they had gone to the foot-path in order to allow us to pass quietly, but the fact was that all of them faced this way and they became what is called "attention." They had their rifles and were doing something with the rifles. I had passed the whole of that file and some 4 or 5 files had already passed when I heard a gun shot. I just turned round and people said there was firing. I at once turned back, went on the foot-path and there were 4 or 5 Manipuris in front of me. I asked them in Hindustani, "What foolishness is this? Why did you fire?" At once their rifles were aimed at my breast. They said that they would pierce me. Then people were becoming a little excited. I asked them to keep quiet as they had taken a vow. Then some 8 or 9 more rifles were levelled and I remained standing with folded hands. People became excited. An European on horseback, whom I subsequently learnt to be Mr. Orde of the Criminal Intelligence Department came. I told him that I was simply waiting for him and showed him the scene. As soon as he came, the rifles went down. I asked Mr. Orde whether he heard the gun shot and asked him to make enquiries. He said he was enquiring about it. Then I left.

Q. Did the firing do any injury to anyone?

A. It did not.

Q. Have you no doubt that it was fired accidentally?

A. No. It did not do any injury, because the crowd was not unruly; there was no confusion; they were marching like soldiers. There was space between files; perhaps the shot went through the space between the two files and therefore it did not injure anybody. I cannot say for certain; it may have been an accident, but at that time it did not appear to me to be an accident.

Q. The Manipuris do not speak Hindustani?

A. I have talked to them here. They did not go away that very day. The next day we were taking three biers to the cremation ground, and then the Manipuris were on a train and they had to leave after 2½ hours. People took the biers and then they wept. I saw the Manipuris then; they beckoned by placing the hand on the head, meaning that it was our fate and that they were not to blame. Two of them told me that they were very sorry that this occurred. We never knew what would occur and we never fired. They were talking broken Hindustani, but we understood it.

Q. When was that?

A. It was on the 31st evening.

Q. After that, what did you do?

A. After that we went quietly. We had not passed Fatehpuri when the armoured car passed us 4 or 5 times, it went round and round and came again; and then I reached my house and all was over.

Q. I think you mentioned you attended the funeral procession?

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[Continued.]

A. Yes in the morning. Hakim Ajmal Khan was in that procession. I met him there for the first time. I did not know him before. I also joined and when we reached the cremation ground another corpse was also taken and we saw their faces and everything. People said "we want to see them." They said *darshan karo*. The coffin was opened and I found a large slash. The whole of the face had gone and there was a wound here and a wound there. And then we harangued the people there, myself and Hakim Ajmal Khan. We told them to go and open their shops. "What was done was done and they ought to quietly submit."

Q. Did they open the shops?

A. I came away and they had not opened the shops as yet. Then we arranged a meeting of the city leaders to go to the Chief Commissioner and beg for the dead bodies and the wounded, because the dead bodies and the wounded had been taken away on the evening of the 30th March to the police hospital as I learnt afterwards. They were kept in the police station. They were kept there for the whole night. It was the next afternoon that the Chief Commissioner took all these gentlemen, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh and others. He took them to the railway hospital. There they heard that all the bodies had been taken to the civil hospital. The dead bodies, five of them, were given to the people at about 3 or 3-30 P.M., on the 31st of March. Those two bodies were buried in the morning and in the evening three were taken to the cremation ground. They were Hindu bodies. Two Muhammadan bodies were taken to the graveyard.

Q. On the next day I think you had a meeting with Mr. Orde?

A. The next day I went earlier to the Clock Tower. I had exhorted the people on the cremation ground on the evening of the 31st. I told them to go and open their shops and to begin business from the next day. They agreed but they told me that I ought to come with the Delhi leaders and if we came there all the shops would be opened. I went there. Hakim Ajmal Khan came and others came and they agreed to open the shops.

Q. Were the shops opened?

A. They were going to open the shops. Then some of them came running to the railings of the Queen's Gardens. When I went there they said that there had been again a display of military. Then I and Hakim Ajmal Khan went in. The sentry opened it for us and then we asked Mr. Orde to take away the military and the police and not to display them. Then we would get the *hartal* opened at once. Then he went and spoke on the telephone to Colonel Beadon. After a time he came and said "All right. The Deputy Commissioner agrees and I will remove the police." He began to move the police and the military and we at once began our work and at half-past 12 we had the shops open.

Q. On what date?

A. On the 1st of April.

Q. Was business then resumed on the 1st of April?

A. Yes. Then there was one hitch. When I was returning that evening after opening the last shop, Suwalas shop, the last bazar in Delhi, some one came and told me that the military and the police were again being displayed at the Clock Tower. I was driving in a carriage. I saw a military officer. I recognised it was General Drake-Brockman and Mr. Orde was on foot or horseback. There were some police, soldiers and their *sowars*. They were just in front of the Clock Tower in the middle and there was a crowd there. When I reached there I said to Mr. Orde "What is this?" Mr. Orde said "You promised to get the shops opened within four hours." I said "You are mistaken, I did not make any such promise. You make a mistake. We did not know that the Deputy Commissioner gave only four hours." Then I asked the crowd why they were there. They said that they simply came to see the police and the military and find out why they were there. At the time the military and the police came the shops were again closed. I said to Mr. Orde that if he would kindly withdraw the troops the whole crowd would then disperse. Mr. Orde

talked to the Officer Commanding and they began to move. When they entered the Queen's Gardens the whole crowd followed me and they dispersed and then there was no difficulty. The next day, i.e., from the 2nd business was resumed.

Q. On the 3rd did you see any occurrences?

A. No, Sir. There was nothing on the 3rd. Business was going on as usual. Normal conditions had been restored on the morning of the 2nd. There was no further trouble.

Q. On the 4th?

A. That is Friday. That is a day of *namaz* to the Muhammadans. They always have *hartal* for half-a-day every Friday. So the Muhammadans had gone to pray and the Hindus were also standing outside. I was not there. It appeared that the Muhammadans invited their Hindu friends to come into the mosque instead of waiting outside. I was at my house. I had no intention of going.

Q. That was a very unusual thing. How do you explain that?

A. It was of course unusual. The Hindus and Muhammadans thought that they were fellow-sufferers. They had both men killed on their side and they found it was no use quarrelling with each other and there was a *rap-prochement* and therefore the Hindus were called in. I was at my lodging. Some 10 or 12 people, Hindus and Muhammadans, came running to me and told me that they were looking for me and asked me to come to the Juma Masjid. I accompanied them and then I saw that Hindus and Muhammadans were joined there. Then they prayed for the souls of the dead and they dispersed quietly. There was no disturbance that day too. But on that very evening Colonel Beadon called a meeting of the *raies* and officials and there he read out a notification printed in Urdu. I have filed it with my statement. I thought of translating it but it is not good to translate. The reply was in English and we sent a copy to Colonel Beadon. In Colonel Beadon's notification the unfortunate word was used *badmashes*. He said that *badmashes* came from outside and they attempt to mislead the people.

Q. If violence were used towards the police and the military and bricks and stones were thrown, then could not men be called *badmashes*?

A. That is a different thing. Bad characters are called *badmashes*.

Q. What exactly is the significance of the term "*badmash*"?

A. A *badmash* is one who is called upon to give security for good behaviour according to the Criminal Procedure Code. The fact is that the people were very much annoyed. In the notice he read out at the meeting he said "If you go and close the shops the Government does not care. You should yourself suffer." That was not a proper way of putting things, it was an unfortunate way of putting things. They were posted all over the city and on the 5th, there was great excitement on account of this. He had attacked *Satyagraha Sabha*. We took his notice and sent a reply to him and posted translation of that notice in Urdu all round the city. There was nothing further on the 5th. But on the 5th we held a meeting of the *Satyagraha Sabha*. We had wired to Mahatma Gandhi. He said "I do not know that you celebrated that day on the 30th March. You may not have any more *hartal*. Simply hold a meeting and pass a resolution on the 6th April, Sunday."

Q. Did you advise the people not to have a *hartal* on the 6th?

A. In that meeting we decided it unanimously and then we printed notices and big posters and posted them all round the city.

Q. Afterwards on the 6th notwithstanding your advice the shops observed *hartal*?

A. There was complete *hartal*.

Q. If you had any influence with the people how do you account for that fact?

A. They were going to celebrate *hartal* on the 6th throughout India.

Q. Did not that look as though the people were out of command?

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[Continued.]

A. We gave them advice just as friends do. They were prepared to suffer. I should not call it being out of hand.

Q. Anyhow there was a *hartal* on the 6th and did it continue on the 7th?

A. On the 6th morning there was a meeting at the Fatehpuri Masjid and then we went to consult the authorities about holding a meeting. They had prohibited meetings in the Pipal Park and Edward Park. Then two members of the *Satyagraha Sabha* went and consulted Mr. Currie and Colonel Beadon and they agreed. They said "you keep the people employed and we do not object." Then we held a meeting at noon in the Edward Park.

Q. On the 6th?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you held a meeting at Edward Park at noon on the 6th?

A. Yes. There were a few thousands here and then they dispersed and then we held another meeting in the evening at Dr. Ansari's house and there we had a big crowd.

Q. There was a large crowd at Dr. Ansari's house?

A. Yes. On that day the crowd was rather big as they had come from the adjoining villages and after that they dispersed quietly. On the 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th there was nothing. All was quiet except that Colonel Beadon had given notice that the relations of those who had been killed or wounded might make their statements before him but the people replied that they had no faith in him, so practically no one came to him.

Q. They did not come because of that notice?

A. They were openly shouting because he has called us *badmashes*.

Q. I think you arranged for Mr. Gandhi's arrival.

A. People here wanted to have a meeting and we also thought that if Mahatma Gandhi came and gave his message to Delhi it would have a very good effect on the people. We were trying our best. The people responded and they kept their temper but I think that if Mr. Gandhi came it would be a great help and the people would remain quiet, so I sent a wire to Mr. Gandhi. He said: "Will Tuesday do? I said: Thanks. Then he said: "I am coming, but there ought to be no demonstration" because he was not in good health.

Q. You were at the station to meet him?

A. We kept it to ourselves but somehow people got an inkling because we were going to the station. Some 30 or 40 people were at the station. I am living in the new bazar. A military regiment passed from that place and there was a display of military. I did not know what it had meant and then we went to the railway station. There were an unusual number of Criminal Investigation Department men. The train was late and we enquired and they said it is to time. When the train came in I noticed all the Europeans in their compartments. When they saw us they put their heads out and they said "Arrested," and we were surprised at this. His private secretary got down and we were told that Mr. Gandhi was arrested so we quietly left the station. I then took him home and he left the next day. He had brought a message from Mahatma Gandhi to his countrymen. It was now known to everyone. It appeared in the newspapers so he wrote out that message. It was typed that night and sent round. He left by the morning train and the next day there was a *hartal*.

Q. It came off in spite of your advice?

A. I did not give any advice. There was a complete *hartal*. The news had spread about the city so I thought it advisable to go and give the message of Mr. Gandhi to the people.

Q. I think the *hartal* was continued for several days.

A. Yes. It was afterwards continued. In the morning we held a meeting on the banks of the Jumna and then I read out the message of Mahatma Gandhi and in the evening we held a meeting and we passed a resolution.

Q. This time you were advising the people to open their shops?

A. Not that day but the next day. I wanted to advise the people. On the 11th they said unless we hear any thing about Mahatma Gandhi—because he has been arrested—we will continue the *hartal*. I kept quiet. On the 12th I received a wire from Mahatma Gandhi saying that he had arrived and had been released. At the same time he said "must seek real rest" which meant that he was coming again so on receiving that wire I again wired when are you coming? Then a wire came: "Please no procession no *hartal*." Then we called a meeting on the 13th of April. It was a Sunday.

Q. That day word came of the occurrences at Amritsar?

A. We learnt of it practically on the evening of the 10th. On the 11th everybody knew but there was no excitement among the crowd because we were always speaking. I was in it and I can tell you that on the 11th and 12th I had to address 10, 12, 13 meetings in the day. I went and spoke to them to keep their temper. They said "we will keep our temper. We will commit no violence. We will simply suffer." That was all that they replied.

Q. There were no disturbances on the 11th?

A. On the 13th we held a meeting and there I read out a telegram from Mahatma Gandhi to the people and then they said "We do not believe—it may have been sent by him" and when I said "you ought to believe me" they said "all right" and a resolution was passed to the Viceroy saying that people had no confidence in the local authorities so they did not appear before them for investigation, and asking that independent enquiry might be made. I left the meeting and was going in the motor car with Sultan Singh and Dr. Ansari when the people boarded it and said "You have been called by the Deputy Commissioner. He is going to arrest you as he arrested Kitchlew and Satyapal so you must not go." I said "no." I had not received any notice and I was not going and that I did not know anything about it. In the evening after the meeting I repeated the assurance that I would not go. "Please do not go and if you go allow us to come." I was not going. But when the motor car left we heard that Hakim Ajmal Khan and Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh had been called by the Deputy Commissioner." I said "you drop me at my place and then go." On the morning of the 14th this news spread—the people suspected that the Criminal Investigation Department men were spreading this news that the leaders were to be arrested. There were fourteen or twenty-one warrants on the table of Colonel Beadon and they are going to be arrested.

Q. Why did they suggest that the Criminal Investigation Department were doing that?

A. In order to terrorize people but I had no first-hand information. I can only say that on the 14th this excitement went on when a meeting was called in the Town Hall where I would not go unless I received a written invitation. I was not going. I was at home and Hakim Ajmal Khan, Rai Bahadur and other leaders went to the Town Hall. As I was staying at my lodging in the afternoon a crowd came rushing in; I said "what is the matter" and when they saw me they said "it is all right. A man went round in the *sadar bazar* saying that you were being taken to the railway station and there was a special train standing there to take you to some unknown destination. I told them it was nothing."

Q. Had these people anything in their hands?

A. They had *lathis* in their hands. It appeared that on the spur of the moment they picked up what they could get. Some were empty-handed. When I reassured them that I was here they left. On the same day another meeting was called to advise men for having the *hartal* ended on the next day. It came afterwards. I went there and no sooner I went there after three-quarters of an hour some people came and told me that there was a great disturbance in Edward Park, that the military had come and that some Criminal Investigation Department officers had been beaten. I at once took a car and went there with Dr. Ansari. When we arrived it appeared that everything had been finished. We did not see what had occurred. We heard that some people had gone to Dr.

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Ansari's house so we went there. When we reached the house we were told that the people who came had left and then came a message by telephone from Hakim Ajmal Khan. He said Colonel Beadon is wiring that there is no medical assistance available. Will you try to have some one to see Faqir Muhammad, Criminal Investigation Department Inspector. Dr. Ansari took his medical bag with him and we drove to the inspector's house. We heard that he had been taken to the civil hospital so we went there. A nurse was also attending him and I, Hari Ram and Dr. Hari Shankar. On enquiry we were informed that it was a simple hurt. We were reassured and then we left. That was on the 14th.

Q. You say that the constable on that occasion had been seriously wounded?

A. The doctor said it was a simple hurt. He was hurt in several places; I sympathised with him and he said "It is not the head only. They have beaten me on my body."

Q. The attitude of the crowd must have been ugly?

A. I was not there.

Q. Was it on the 15th April?

A. At about 10 o'clock of the night of the 14th, I received a letter from Colonel Beadon saying that the Chief Commissioner wanted me at the Town Hall, and that he would be glad to see me there; and he wanted my help. On the morning of the 15th before going to the Town Hall, I and Hakim Ajmal Khan thought that we must try something. So we at once motored to the *sadar bazar* and induced the butchers there to open work. They were agreeable. They said, if you come again, we will have the whole shops opened. Then I went with Hakim Ajmal Khan to the Town Hall. There was a crowd outside. It was not very threatening at that time. A few people might have had *lathis* in their hands. The others had not, but *lathis* were in evidence then. I went in. Colonel Beadon then told me that the people were very boisterous and asked me to quiet them. I went out and then they began to shout *Gandhi-ki-jai*. I asked them to remain quiet and they did so. Unfortunately after me, Colonel Beadon came.

Q. Can you tell me how you could readily make them quiet, when you could not get them to open their shops?

A. There were reasons, and I will tell you afterwards. The reasons came on the 16th also. Unfortunately Colonel Beadon came again. There were again shouting. When I turned to know why they shouted, there was Colonel Beadon behind. I told them to keep quiet. I began to talk to Colonel Beadon; then they were quiet. In the morning it was decided to call the representatives of all business, some 40 or 50 men, to induce the men to open their shops. In the evening, I and Hakim Ajmal Khan went round and people at once obeyed and said they would open their business. Hindus especially said that as these men had abstained from killing cows for such a long time, we would not open our shops unless they opened. So they began business and I and Hakim Ajmal Khan held discussions. Mr. Barron and some armed military officers were sitting there. Mr. Barron asked us how the *hartal* was going to end. I said "Release Mahatma Gandhi. I will not talk about the Rowlatt Act." Of course, people have held meetings. The *hartal* and all that was due to Mahatma Gandhi's arrest. If he was released at once, I thought it would be over. He told me that he had no hand in it. He replied that I knew his difficulties. Then he showed me on the morning of the 15th a telegram from the Viceroy. One was that Mr. Gandhi had delivered a lecture in Gujrat, he got it translated. There was a telephonic communication from Simla to Mr. Barron. Then there was another communication from the Government of India. Because the Punjab Government was pressing, they said that martial law should be introduced here. I read it and kept it to myself. Then I thought I should try my best to open the shops. That was the reason why I went to the butchers again. Then I talked to Mr. Barron, who said that he could not do anything as regards Mahatma Gandhi's release. I said that he could convey a message to the Viceroy. He knew it already, but yet he could

put it before him. If he did that people would be satisfied. So he put it. The next question was why was the *hartal* being continued. Then it was asked why people did not obey us as regards the *hartal*. They said that Government was going to arrest all leaders, that they did not begin this *hartal* at our requisition, if they ended it on our requisition, the authorities would have positive proof that it was we that were continuing the *hartal* and, therefore, they would arrest us, the leaders.

Q. Did that occur to the ordinary persons, as it did to you?

A. I was reasoning with them. People asked us why we asked them to close the *hartal* as they did not begin it on our requisition. That was one of the reasons given by them. On the 15th, there was a big crowd near the Town Hall and *lathis* were in evidence. I have to admit that. I saw that it was getting very serious. When I went out, I was re-assured of the attitude of Mr. Barron. His attitude was very sympathetic, and all that could be desired. I was talking to him. I do not remember the exact words. But what I understood him to say was that he did not like a drop of blood to fall in the capital. Then I thought that a very good solution was going to be made. Then Mr. Barron read out that notification, a copy of which I have put in.* The original signed by Mr. Barron is also there.

Q. Is that the proclamation of the 15th?

A. Yes. It was distributed on the morning of the 16th. Then Mr. Scott, of the police came and said to me that they were making a great row at the gate of the railway station and asked me to go at once. I took the first car and went there. I found them quiet. But on seeing me they began to say *Gandhi-ki-jai*. I asked them to keep quiet. They said "no." They said that we would be arrested and pointed to the aeroplane. While we were sitting in the Town Hall, the aeroplane was encircling, and going round and round the Town Hall.

Q. Was that a strange sight for Delhi?

A. It was a strange sight that day. It was going over the Town Hall. Several people came and told me at noon that an aeroplane was going to the Town Hall in the morning, then it came to my lodging. I told them that it was a mistake. They thought that the aeroplane would alight on the roof of the Town Hall and take away all the leaders. That was their idea. Mr. Barron's notification was then translated. He put it in my hand and asked me to go. When I came out, I wanted some conveyance and I stopped a little. I saw that the crowd was getting impatient. So I jumped over the railing and beat the dust drums and some of them were holding their *lathis* up and were going to attack one or two electric *satyagrahis*. I then halted and said that they were not true *satyagrahis*, that they had taken a vow not to cause violence, that they were causing violence and therefore they would use spiritual force alone and not do any other thing. I then took them to Dr. Ansari's place. There was no further trouble. We explained the notification to them and we quietly dispersed.

Q. Was that on the 17th?

A. On the 16th we tried our best to have the shops opened. They were opening; on one side of the Chandni Chowk several bazars were opened. When they saw then came for a ride through the city. They at once closed their shops. Because people said that he called them to do all these; therefore they shut the shops. They said they were not going to open their shops. Again there was the difficulty; we tried the whole day up to noon. But we could not succeed. We succeeded in opening some of the shops. We met in consultation at about 1 o'clock in Hakim Ajmal Khan's house. Then came the news that the additional picket was being withdrawn. Then came the intelligence that the regular police were being withdrawn. It was then creating a very serious

* Appendix XI, page 214.

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effect. Then we thought what was the reason. I afterwards learnt that the authorities thought that there was going to be an attack on the civil station. So Mr. Orde said. We thought that they were withdrawing the police in order to show us that without the police we could not manage the city. We at once called people to enrol themselves as volunteers and we gave them a badge.

They guarded the city the whole night. The police were withdrawn and the people were on guard. Then I do not know what happened. Hakim Ajmal Khan and Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh were holding meetings. I was sleeping. At about 12 o'clock in the night Hakim Ajmal Khan, Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh, Dr. Ansari and others went and woke me up and said that Colonel Beadon and Mr. Scott are offering the assistance of the police to us. They said that the police will be at our disposal and you can use them as you like in keeping those unruly persons in hand, who would not open the shops. I told them that my opinion was that if the police came I would have nothing to do with it. They said that they will once more go to Colonel Beadon and Mr. Scott and speak to them. I told them that I would come in the morning and have the *hartal* ended if there were no police; Hakim Ajmal Khan sent me his car and I thought the matter had been settled. By about 11 the whole of the Chandni Chowk was open. The *Naya Sarak* was open and business was commencing. When I returned to the Chandni Chowk I saw a *posse* of constables, some 15 or 16 with regulation *lathis* and they were driving the people. Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh and Piere Lal, the motor proprietor, were there. I spoke to them and then Piere Lal went and spoke to Mr. Scott. The reply came "What do you mean? Are the police to be excluded from the city?" We then went to Chauri Bazar and then from the shop of Jankidas, Sultan Singh spoke to Colonel Beadon. Sultan Singh spoke at my dictation. We said to Colonel Beadon "Please withdraw the police for two hours and then everything will be all right." Then he said "Do you mean to say that the British Raj is at an end? I am sending Mr. Scott." So we kept quiet. But Mr. Scott never came. I was in the car when some men came running and said that some men had been arrested at the Clock Tower, and they were taken bleeding to the Town Hall. I, Sultan Singh, and Piere Lal motored at once and Hakim Sahib and Dr. Ansari on the other side. When we reached the Clock Tower there was some excitement and the people said "Look here, you have got our shops opened and here our man has been dragged bleeding. You have ruined us." They were very much annoyed with Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh and Piere Lal. I told them to go away and I got down. I said "You are very excited. Do you want to break any head down?" Then they kept quiet. They said that a boy was bayoneted and taken bleeding to the Town Hall.

Q. That was a mere rumour about the bayonetting of the boy?

A. He was arrested, no doubt. All this was mere rumour. But they were telling so. I said "I will go and find out what is the matter." When I wanted to go to the Town Hall the people again followed my car and said "We would not allow you to go. They would kill you." Then I went to Ajmal Khan and there I wanted to speak by telephone. I rang up but nobody gave any reply, and I was about to go to the Town Hall again to find out when I heard the news of firing. Then I hastened to the Town Hall. People were trying to keep me back. I said "I must see." I saw the wounded coming in a very bad condition. Then we opened Hakim Sahib's house and they went on coming. About 10 of them came there and 2 were in a very critical condition. I then telephoned to Dr. Hari Shankar. It was his duty to attend to such cases. He was in charge of the eyes, nose and ear ward. He very kindly came down and first aid was given and he took them away, and then when I came out Hakim Sahib and Dr. Ansari had gone to the Town Hall from the other way. I have no first hand knowledge of this. They told me they had gone to the Town Hall. They asked Colonel Beadon to show them

the bodies. There was a boy called Gauri Shankar. He was 20 years of age. There was no wound. It appears that when he was being brought there was a slight scratch and some dust on his body because he was not coming peacefully and that was all. Then we told Colonel Beadon to give this boy to us, that we would then show him to the people and that they would be calm at once. He thought about two minutes and refused, saying that the prestige of the Government would suffer. That was all what happened on that day. Of course on the 18th they were going to open the shops but they heard that one of those men who had been wounded was dead. Then all the shops were closed and people followed the bier of that man. Thousands followed and at the burial-ground intelligence came that some of the most respected leaders of the people had been made special constables. In the burial-ground a resolution of protest was passed against it.

Q. With what object were they made special constables?

A. They were made special constables to be disgraced and humiliated before the police.

Q. I thought it was dignified to be a special constable?

A. The object of Colonel Beadon in appointing the special constable came out afterwards. The next day Colonel Beadon issued a notice.* I read that notice about the special constables. He said, "I am not satisfied with the way in which the special constables are working. They must be given *pagris*, batons, must go and sleep in the *thanas* near their houses. They must be taken with head-constables on errands to search houses. They must report about suspicious characters especially about political suspects and all that." All this was simply to humiliate them.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Where is that notice?

A. I think Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh will be able to give you a copy or you can send for a copy from the Deputy Commissioner's office. It was issued. There are about 1,500 men in the police force here. They don't want an addition of 14. On the 18th, I exhorted them to open the shops, business began as usual. The next day when I went after 8, I saw every shop open and business was going on as usual.

Q. On the 19th of course things became more or less normal?

A. Yes. I think it became normal on the 19th. On the 20th there was excitement on account of the special constables. They were released on the 20th or the 21st, and after that everything was quiet. It was Mr. Barron who got it cancelled.

By the President—

Q. What was the order about the special constables?

A. I think Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh will be able to tell you. He showed the notice to me. It was published in the papers.

By the Hon. Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Prior to the end of March last you had been resident in Delhi for some considerable time?

A. Yes. Since the 2nd of December 1918.

Q. I suppose your work takes you to a good extent into the *bazar* in contact with the Indians who live there?

A. Yes.

Q. I take it that you were very well known in the Delhi *bazar* at the beginning of this year?

A. Even before that I was known here because I used to come here for preaching work.

Q. I think you left Delhi since March for other work and came back again on March the 22nd?

A. Yes.

Q. So far as your work in connection with the *satyagraha* propaganda was concerned was it from about the 22nd March when you were speaking and teaching with reference to that society?

A. From March 14th perhaps. I left Delhi.

Q. I am referring to Delhi only?

A. From the 22nd.

* See page 205.

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[Continued.]

Q. Throughout January and February of this year your work in Delhi has not been in connection particularly with the *satyagraha* movement?

A. Not particularly.

Q. Now from the 22nd until the end of March I think you held certain preliminary meetings?

A. Three preliminary meetings.

Q. And those meetings were in connection with the All-India project of Mr. Gandhi to have a *hartal* on the 30th?

A. Yes.

Q. And the preliminary meetings I take it were devoted to expounding the principles that underlay the proposed *hartal*?

A. The meetings were held in order to expound the principles of *satyagraha*.

Q. And this question came up at the meeting of the 27th? The *hartal* was decided upon a few days before the 30th?

A. Yes.

Q. The bulk of your work prior to that was upon general principles and also to protest against the Rowlett Bill?

A. Yes.

Q. Now was the intention of the *hartal* as discussed at your meeting simply that those persons who so desired should cease work and have a day of fasting and humiliation or was it intended that the *hartal* should, if possible, be made universal?

A. We gave notices of it. Mr. Gandhi gave his notice in the papers. The intention was that the *hartal* should be voluntary and nobody ought to be compelled to join if they did not like it.

Q. You did not want your disciples to go about the *bazar* and leave the people no option to join?

A. No; we did not want that.

Q. Do you agree with me that from the end of March until the middle of April the public of Delhi were in an unwanted state of excitement for some reason or another?

A. That is a general statement because on some days there was no excitement at all. On other days there was.

Q. Do you think that the public in Delhi were in an unusual state of excitement?

A. After the firing of the 30th there was unusual excitement which we tried our best to quiet. On the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th there was no excitement except the excitement about Colonel Beadon's notice. That was the only excitement.

Q. Then do you think that Colonel Beadon's notice would have produced excitement if the Delhi public had been in an ordinary condition of mind?

A. It would have excited them. The people were talking because there was some difficulty about the *Ram-lila* affair two years before, and Colonel Beadon's notice contained some unfortunate remarks and then there was a general *hartal*.

Q. In ordinary times that notice would have produced excitement?

A. The people knew that Colonel Beadon had put certain unfortunate expressions in his notice before that even and so they were excited again.

Q. When you refer to Colonel Beadon's notice you refer to the one in which he described the station riots and called the people *badmashes*?

A. Yes, and then there was another. He said if you do not open your shops you will suffer, the Government does not care. This also they thought was unsympathetic.

Q. As I understand the unfortunate events from the 30th were not only never intended by you or your associates and they came as a surprise to you?

A. They did.

Q. I notice in your statement many references to rather wild and exaggerated rumours. Let me just remind you that when you heard of the railway station incident first you were told that the machine-gun had fired indiscriminately upon the crowd?

A. That was said by the (interrupted)

Q. And at the Town Hall gate you were told that machine-guns were there again?

A. Yes.

Q. Then there was this rumour about your being taken up in an aeroplane?

A. Yes.

Q. That the aeroplane had been seen going from your house to the Town Hall and there was a rumour about a young man who was arrested and that he had been picked up bleeding? Do you think that in ordinary times the people of Delhi would have given any credence to such rumours as that?

A. No, not in ordinary times.

Q. As a matter of fact the position was such that any rumour against the authorities or the police found much wider circulation than usual?

A. Not against all. It was especially against Colonel Beadon and against the police—*kotwal*—Khan Sahib Hamid-ud-din.

Q. As regards Mr. Barron was there any rumour?

A. The people did not believe any rumour against him.

Q. I am talking of the police—the Criminal Investigation Department—rumours about unreasonable action on their part were finding very ready circulation?

A. Yes, against the police and Colonel Beadon.

Q. Now according to your teaching prior to the 30th March can you tell me this; supposing two men were arrested by the police and the mob desired their release and supposing they hung about the station, throwing bricks or anything of that sort, making traffic impossible and rendering the police unable to discharge their duties, would that be taken as passive resistance or would it be taken as active resistance according to the teachings of the *Satyagraha Sabha*?

A. If they blocked the roads and stood simply demanding the release of the two arrested persons and did not resort to violence I would not call it against the principles of *satyagraha* but if they blocked the roads and stopped all traffic I would call it so.

Q. If they simply waited there and did nothing amounting to violence?

A. What I heard was that there was only a party of 4 or 5 people in the first instance.

Q. I want to know if there was anything in your teaching to encourage the Delhi public to suppose that they could assemble in large numbers and block all traffic though they did not throw any bricks or resort to any violence, and be doing nothing wrong? Is there anything in the teaching of *satyagraha* to lead the Delhi public to suppose that?

A. We said nothing about assembling in large numbers.

Q. I will tell you quite frankly why I ask you that question. There is some evidence before the Committee that the crowd at the station was composed of respectable people at any rate to a large extent. What I ask is whether respectable men if they were in a reasonable state of mind, where two men have been arrested justly or unjustly, should think they were entitled to assemble there in large numbers and refuse to leave until they got the men released. Is there anything in your teaching to encourage the people in that idea?

A. There was nothing in our teaching which encouraged them to do that.

Q. You would not countenance any such notions yourselves? It was never your intention as regards your preliminary meetings that anything of the sort should be made possible?

A. No.

Q. Apart from rumours it looks as if at this time some of the people were entertaining quite incorrect notions of what was just and reasonable. For instance, I understand it suggested that when the crowd was pushed back to the Town Hall and the police was blocking the way the crowd thought it right and reasonable to insist on going through those gates and in the act overpowering the police to recover immediately the bodies of those persons who had been shut up at the station. Can you throw any light upon why any number of respectable

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[Continued.]

people should have thought it a sensible or permissible thing to do?

A. What I actually saw was there were more than 100 people and they were sight-seers. There was one man who demanded the dead body of some relation of his.

Q. I understand that you were present at the Town Hall at the time of firing there?

A. I went by the Town Hall before that.

Q. I shall come to that incident in a moment. On one occasion you told us you were holding a number of meetings in a single day? Were there large numbers of people assembled?

A. In some places 500, in some places 600 or 700. My idea was that they should not assemble in large numbers and thought that if they heard some sermons and something about *satyagraha* they might remain occupied.

Q. That is a rather important point, Swami. I do not know if you have got in India a proverb like the one we have—Satan finding mischief for idle hands to do—Have you got an Indian proverb like that?

A. Yes.

Q. I suppose most countries have. What was your object after the 30th in having all these meetings? Was it to occupy the crowd and keep them from trouble or was it to continue the agitation against the Rowlett Act?

A. I am speaking about the period after the 10th April when Mahatma Gandhi was arrested. After that the *hartal* continued only till the 31st.

Q. Let us take it by stages. From the 30th March after the incident at the railway station and at the Town Hall on that evening you took away, I understand you to say so, a great many people round the station partly to keep out of trouble and partly to occupy them and make things easy. When you held the actual meeting, what was the subject about? Were the speeches still against the Rowlett legislation or what was the object and purport of the meeting?

A. The people met first on one side of the Pipal Park when I reached there. Then the drift of the speeches was in order to calm the people after the firing. In the middle of that people came running and they said that they had been fired at the Clock Tower also. Again I was trying to pacify them.

Q. Was the object simply to pacify the people?

A. To pacify the people and afterwards we went to the great *maidan* after Mr. Barron left. Two or three speeches were made against the Rowlett Act. A resolution was passed which was wired to the Secretary of State and the Viceroy.

Q. Just after this unfortunate incident, on that very evening, the meeting was for continuing the agitation against the Rowlett Act?

A. I will tell you gradually. On the 30th there was no meeting. On the next day we took two dead bodies to the graveyard and after they were buried I and Hakim Ajmal Khan harangued the people to go and open the shops.

Q. The purport of the meeting was to stop the *hartal*?

A. Yes. When we came there a deputation consisting of Hakim Ajmal Khan, Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh and others went to the Deputy Commissioner and the Chief Commissioner. They got permission to have the dead bodies. So they got the dead bodies, 5 corpses at about 3 p.m. Then the dead bodies were taken to the graveyard and cremation ground. Thus passed the whole of that day.

Q. You had no more meetings that day?

A. No more meetings. On the 1st we had the *hartal* opened. On the 1st we had no meeting. On the 2nd there was no meeting. On the 4th there was prayer in the Jama Masjid and I was told that I was called. I went there and then we dispersed. On the 5th there was no public meeting. There was one meeting on the evening of the 4th of the *Satyagraha Sabha*. We decided upon issuing a notice not to have any *hartal* on the 6th. On the 6th there were again prayers for the dead in the Fatehpuri Mosque in the morning. That noon, as I have

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stated in my statement, we discussed the position with the District Magistrate and he allowed us the use of either the Pipal Park or Edward Park and we held a meeting there on the 6th.

Q. What was that meeting about?

A. It was simply to keep people occupied, because they were in large numbers. They had nothing to do and lectures were delivered upon the use of *swadeshi* and on the principles of *satyagraha*.

Q. May I take it from you that from the 30th of March until the 10th of April, which is all I am dealing with at the moment, there was nothing in your meetings which would keep the public in a state of excitement?

A. There was nothing.

Q. After Mr. Gandhi had been prevented from entering Delhi did you hold protest meetings in connection with that?

A. Yes, we heard of it on the night of the 9th. On the 10th Mahatma Gandhi sent a 'Message to my countrymen.' That message was printed here and that message was to be read to the people. For that purpose a meeting was held in the morning on the banks of the Jumna.

Q. And on the 10th?

A. Yes. That was the meeting in the morning. In the evening we held a protest meeting and passed a resolution. I will read out the resolution. It simply purported to say that Mr. Gandhi had acted on his resolution and that others should also follow him. This was the resolution:—

"This mass meeting of the citizens of Delhi calls upon every Indian to do his duty by his country by following the noble and inspiring example of Mahatma Gandhi at Palwal and seek the withdrawal of the Rowlett legislation or seek imprisonment."

Q. Do you suggest that the resolution of the meeting was addressed by the people in a way that would encourage collision with the authorities?

A. No. I do not think so, it did not lead to anything, because it ended peacefully and quietly.

Q. Perhaps you are not responsible for the wording of the resolution; it might have been got up in a hurry. Don't you think that the wording of the last part of the resolution was a general invitation to collision with the police?

A. Not that; Mahatma Gandhi was arrested because he was coming here and an order was passed under those laws. That is what I think of it. As regards the Rowlett Act, I have said what I had to say in a public letter to Mahatma Gandhi, that if an order came to me under the Rowlett Act, I would not obey it and would submit to arrest. It is the same about the Defence of India Act. If I thought that any order under those Acts was unjust, that was my idea.

Q. Did you contemplate that the Rowlett Act was coming into effect the next day?

A. Not the next day. It was a matter of principle.

Q. When did you have the next meeting of protest against Mr. Gandhi's arrest?

A. So far as I remember, there was a meeting on the 13th of April.

Q. What was that?

A. I have given the resolution which was passed there. There were two objects in holding that meeting. One was I had given notice of Mahatma Gandhi's wire to the public through the papers. Mahatma Gandhi wanted to end the *hartal*. He was not under arrest now; he was free; so they ought to end the *hartal*. But nobody believed it. Then that day I received the other telegram from Mr. Rudra, the President of the St. Stephen's College. We both went to the meeting and read out the telegram that Mr. Gandhi was free and they ought to end the *hartal*. The other object was to protest against the investigation which Colonel Beadon had set on foot.

Q. Investigation of what?

A. Colonel Beadon had issued a notice. It was not a printed notice. It was to the effect that people ought to come and give information about the killed and the wounded before him.

Q. You held a meeting to protest against that too?

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[Continued.]

A. We held a meeting and appointed a non-official commission to enquire. It was doing its work. In that meeting we passed a resolution and sent it to the Viceroy. This was the resolution:—

"This mass meeting of the citizens of Delhi protests against the investigation instituted by the Delhi executive of the incidents of March 30th on the ground of destruction of lives of harmless people and innocent citizens. And that they cannot in principle of justice and equity be allowed to sit as judges on their own actions and prays the Imperial Government to depute a few officials from outside Delhi in order to co-operate with non-officials appointed by people for investigation of the case and the causes which led to that." This was on the 13th April.

Q. At that time, the *hartal* had not yet stopped?

A. No.

Q. Are you surprised that your efforts to get the *hartal* to stop were not very successful when you were addressing meetings and passing resolutions? Do you think it was very wise on your part? These had nothing to do with the *hartal*?

A. The *hartal* continued first on account of the arrest of Mr. Gandhi up to the 13th. Then, as I told you, people came in large numbers, and surrounded my car and told me not to go to the Deputy Commissioner, because he would arrest us.

Q. But no more really important meetings took place before the 17th?

A. I do not remember.

Q. Swami, you seem to remember the details very clearly?

A. There is no mention of any meeting in my statement on the 14th. There might have been Town Hall conferences on both days. There was a meeting on the 14th. I have said, I was not there. I heard that the Criminal Investigation Department people were there.

Q. I just want a word or two about the police, as I think on several occasions when you thought the *hartal* might have been brought to an end, you attribute your inability to get the shop-keepers to resume, to the presence in the street of Colonel Beadon, the other police and the military. Is that so?

A. Yes, I have given details.

Q. Can you account for the fact why people in these excited times should feel aggrieved by the presence of the assistant commissioner, the police and the troops in the street? Can you explain to me why it should be a grievance in these times that police troops should be about their duty in the public street?

A. People attributed everything to the mistake of the first fire and because they thought that innocent and harmless people had been fired at. That was the reason why, whenever the military and the police were displayed, they resented it.

Q. After the unfortunate incidents of the 30th, the bazar people were a bit above themselves, I suppose, excitable and unreasonable in that direction?

A. Yes, after 30th, they were.

Q. As regards the *Satyagraha Sabha* itself, it has been stated in some of the papers that on some date, that body held a meeting and passed a resolution to dissolve and to destroy the papers in connection with the society. Can you tell us the fact about that?

A. The fact is that when Mahatma Gandhi went to Bombay he gave public notice in the papers that he suspended his *sabha*, because people were in a state of excitement and unless that excitement subsided and the whole country was ready to abide by the principles of *satyagraha*, he did not think he should begin, but that he would begin as soon as they are imbued with the real spirit of *satyagraha*. He thought that *satyagrahis* were responsible for everything which occurred in the country. But he left it afterwards. That was the original statement. I was a *satyagrahi* before I joined Mahatma Gandhi's society. *Satya* means truth, *Agraha* means holding or preserving to hold-truth. That was my principle. This *sabha* came into existence simply in order to protest against the Rowlatt Act and for civil disobedience of us for that. When he suspended that, I thought there was no use of the *sabha* and of my continuing to be a member. I wrote out my resignation. I was the president then. When I read that to the *sabha*, they also said that if it was suspended, there was no need of the *sabha*, because Mahatma Gandhi had ordered suspension of all those and that they need not enquire and wanting a list of all persons who joined the *Satyagraha Sabha*. I knew that practically only 14 or 15 people had been explained the principles. A number of those who had joined did not know each other and they were never explained the principles. The idea of some of the members was that the police wanted a list in order that they might find out their address and trouble them. They were common men who had joined us. So they told practically the deputy inspector of police who came, "You know our names. Whatever you want to do, do to us. We are 14 or 15. There is no need of that list."

Q. Was the list destroyed because it might fall into the hands of the police?

A. Yes.

Q. You said just now that the principles had not been explained to those who joined the *sabha*. Had not you been busy day in and day out explaining the principles to those who would listen?

A. There was no time specially to call and know who they were, because several of them joined on the 29th and there was firing on the 30th. Therefore we could not get acquainted with each other after that.

Q. People who joined must have known something about the principles of *satyagraha* and something of Mr. Gandhi. You do not suggest that your society had a lot of members who joined it because they knew what it was?

A. Of course any member of the society knew that.

Q. They knew that it was against the Rowlatt Act?

A. Yes, we have had two meetings. We did not know those people personally. All the members did not know each other personally, except the 14 or 15 who were meeting every day.

Q. According to you the *Satyagraha Sabha* had done nothing illegal?

A. No.

Q. What is your ground for supposing that there would be any trouble, as you put it, against some ordinary members, as distinct from the leaders of a perfectly legal society?

A. This might be the reason. The sub-inspector had asked whether two persons belonged to the *Satyagraha Sabha*. I said the list was not with me; the list was with the Secretary and asked him why he inquired. It appeared then that they wanted to implicate *satyagrahis* men who were considered to form part of these assemblies, as Shankar Lal was arrested and afterwards honourably acquitted. I told him the facts which had occurred. I said—"Don't you want a list?" He said, "yes." I said "All right, then go to the Deputy Commissioner and get me a letter and I will send you the list." He said "I have nothing to do with the Deputy Commissioner. Mr. Scott has asked for a list." I told him "All right, bring a letter from Mr. Scott." He went away and did not turn up.

Q. So this list was destroyed?

A. Yes. I was told that the Criminal Investigation Department were enquiring about those who were implicated.

Q. So at that time you were not willing to furnish the list and what made you change your mind?

A. I did not, but took a different view. Some members said there will be those poor people who will be troubled.

Q. Did you object to destroy those series of documents?

A. They feared they might come to me.

Q. And they then said that they had destroyed it?

A. It was destroyed.

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[Continued.]

Q. Those papers contained not only a list of members but they also contained the signed vows that people had taken?

A. It was a list of members. About 30 or 35 gave in signed vows.

Q. Were those signed vows destroyed at this time?

A. That I do not know.

Q. As I understand it at the time these documents were destroyed it was apprehended that the police would want them in connection with certain prosecutions?

A. It was apprehended that when the police got their members they would come and arrest those people of the *satyagraha*. No *satyagrahi* was ever arrested except Shankar Lal who was honourably acquitted.

Q. Up to and including the 29th March—the moment the *hartal* broke out on the 30th March—there were incidents—the interruption of the tramway. Is that so?

A. There was a boycott of the tramway not only up to the 19th but it continued up to perhaps the 24th or 25th. I did not see.

Q. Is not the case that the boycott of the tramways commenced at once on the morning of the 30th March? Is that so or not?

A. Yes.

Q. As the *hartal* was to be purely voluntary it rather broke down from the very beginning. As I understand it not only did the people refrain from using the tramway but those people who wanted to use them were interfered with on the 30th of March.

A. I never saw anything with my own eyes. On the 30th I saw the trams had stopped.

Q. When did you see them stop first on the 30th?

A. At half past eight or nine when I was going to my church. On my return I found that the trams had stopped.

Q. Do you think it possible that the trams stopped merely because sufficient people were not forthcoming to board them or because they were interfered with?

A. I did not see.

Q. About the incident at the railway station you arrived actually at the railway station after the firing there was over?

A. Yes.

Q. That is to say, after the road in front of the station had been clear by getting people through the gates and the police began to follow the crowd. From what you heard, could you form any opinion as to how long it had been before you arrived? Did you arrive immediately afterwards or some half an hour afterwards?

A. It might have been about 15 or 20 minutes.

Q. At the time when you arrived there was no crowd in the road?

A. No.

Q. Where were the people?

A. All the people who had been fired at went again through the garden to the other side but I was coming from the west side. I said yesterday there were some 6,000 or 7,000 people. They told me what had occurred. I took them away and other people joined us. I went to Fatehpuri because I could not go this side.

Q. First of all you had a talk with some people at the station including Mr. Currie?

A. Yes.

Q. I see in your statement that you were taking the people away to the meeting ground—you mean the people on the footpath?

A. Yes.

Q. You had been told that a machine-gun had fired indiscriminately into the crowd and I suppose Mr. Currie did not discuss things with you?

A. Yes.

Q. You saw Mr. Currie at or about the station?

A. Yes. And I returned back to the west, and the people followed.

Q. I understand from that, you then entered the Queen's Gardens on the west side and down into Chandni Chowk to the western gates near the Clock Tower?

A. Yes.

Q. And you passed the western gates near the Clock Tower on your way to the Pipal Park?

A. Yes.

Q. I understand that at the time you passed the western gate near the Clock Tower the firing at these gates had not occurred?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see the firing yourself with your own eyes?

A. No.

Q. You did not know of the firing till you were in the Pipal Park when somebody came and told you. What makes you think that at the time you passed the western gate near the Clock Tower the firing had not yet occurred?

A. When I reached Pipal Park a gentleman was addressing an audience. He went on speaking for 15 minutes. I spoke for 20 minutes when two people came running and said "firing is going on."

Q. Supposing they were inaccurate as to the time the firing had taken place. Then of course you had no other means of telling when exactly the fire took place?

A. No.

Q. When you passed these western gates, could you tell me what you saw at the gates themselves as you passed?

A. There were two policemen inside the door. They were standing sentry and near the door was one man who was crying for the dead body of his relation and there were about 125 men there in all. He was very violent because he wanted the dead body. I told him to come away but he would not hear me. Others joined and they said he will come of himself when you leave. I left and some followed. The others remained.

Q. Do you mean the door of the Town Hall?

A. The western gate of the park.

Q. There were only two policemen at the gates?

A. Yes. There may have been others inside where the gates close and open. They were closed.

Q. Were the two policemen inside of the gates?

A. In the Park side. The people were outside.

Q. If there had been a barricade of police or military the crowd would try to force their way through?

A. I would have noticed that. There was nothing of that sort at the time.

Q. And this particular man who was asking about the dead body of his relatives he was making his request to these two policemen?

A. Yes.

Q. Quite a reasonable thing to do?

A. Yes.

Q. On the night of the 30th March you held a meeting and you were coming back followed by a large crowd which were marching in orderly file. Can you give me any idea of the number of people who were following up to the time you got to the Town Hall?

A. There must have been thousands but I cannot give you the exact number. At any rate, there was a large crowd.

Q. How many were marching abreast?

A. I think half the street.

Q. When you came towards the Town Hall you noticed in front of you certain soldiers on each side of the road whom you took from their hats to be Gurkhas?

A. They were not on both sides. They were in the middle. They were facing both ways.

Q. They were standing back to back in the middle of the Chandni Chowk. Whereabouts exactly?

A. I think a little to the west side of the Bank of Bengal.

Q. Would that be east or west of the Clock Tower?

A. That is east of the Clock Tower.

Q. Would it be far from the eastern gates of the Queen's Gardens?

A. Yes, it was at some distance.

Q. Can you remember how many of the soldiers there would be?

A. I cannot give you the exact number. There might have been 20 to 30. Not more than that.

Q. As you were approaching this gate, they all went to one side of the road? Which side?

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[Continued.]

A. It was the Queen's Gardens side of the road.

Q. You said that you noticed an order given to come to attention and that the men were doing something to their rifles? Do you happen to know—perhaps it is not in your line—whether a soldier is loading his rifle or not?

A. I did not particularly notice.

Q. They were manipulating and doing something to their rifles?

A. They were changing the position of their rifles. They were just in shoulder arms.

Q. They were not doing any thing beyond changing the position as far as you remember?

A. I cannot say. I am not certain.

Q. As you saw them, a rifle went off? It does not appear to have hit any body?

A. It did not.

Q. Of course at that time you did not know with what object and in what manner the gun had gone off?

A. No.

Q. You immediately turned round to deal with the position as best as you could?

A. Yes.

Q. When you turned back you told us you asked them why they were firing on innocent peaceful people?

A. I asked them why they committed this foolishness. I spoke in Hindi.

Q. Did you address yourself to the soldiers in general or to any particular man?

A. To them in general. Those who were in advance must have heard me.

Q. Can you tell me whatever reply was made, did it come from one man or from more than one man?

A. I first asked the Gurkhas the meaning of this. Then two men levelled their rifles at me and said *tum ko chhed denge*. Whether all of them said that or not, I cannot say.

Q. You cannot say whether one or more than one said?

A. Yes.

Q. You are sure that one not only said by his action but said in word?

A. Yes.

Q. Then what happened?

A. I folded my arms and said that they may fire. I cannot say how many but 8 or 10 rifles were levelled and then there was a general voice *tum ko chhed denge*.

Q. It was a general voice?

A. It was not one man. Several men were speaking.

Q. I understood you to say that the crowd said something and then you told the crowd to keep back. I understood you to say that the crowd did stop back and obey you?

A. They did. I was standing and those rifles were levelled at me. Mr. Orde came on horseback from the other side. I told him that I was waiting for him to see the scene. I did not know it was Mr. Orde of the Criminal Investigation Department. I thought it was some European officer. Then the rifles went down at once.

When I asked Mr. Orde whether he heard a gunshot he said that he would be enquiring about it and then I left.

Q. What about the *kukri*?

A. Then I left with the crowd. We had gone about 4 or 5 paces when a man with *kukri* came and began to brandish it. People were going resenting it but I simply laughed and the man became ashamed and went away.

Q. If it be the case, I do not say it is, that these men who fired in the air were nervous and excited and if the man who flourished his *kukri* seemed to have been in an excited state, were these troops good enough to use in connection with the disturbances?

A. You mean the Manipuris?

Q. Yes. Did you think they were nervous and excited or were they cool and collected when you saw them?

A. I did not notice anything.

Q. With reference to what you said about Mr. Orde, don't you think that at the time Mr. Orde could not very well make enquiries?

A. It is quite possible that he could not. But in my opinion he ought to have made the enquiry at once.

In fact, I wrote in my statement that he enquired of the head constable. There was one policeman present. I went away and Mr. Orde might have enquired afterwards.

Q. You referred several times to the hostility of the crowd particularly to Colonel Beadon. So far as the riot at the station was concerned and the firing near the station was concerned, I do not understand that Colonel Beadon had anything to do with that personally at all?

A. He was not here at that time.

Q. Apart from the complaint about the circular, what you said about the special constables, is it directed against Colonel Beadon or Mr. Scott?

A. Against Colonel Beadon, and against Mr. Scott too; perhaps.

Q. And there was a complaint against him in respect of that notice?

A. Yes, it appeared on the 4th April.

Q. Apart from these complaints against Colonel Beadon I have not noticed in connection with these disturbances any other complaints against Colonel Beadon?

A. This was the only one. It started some trouble.

Q. That notice was rather a longish one?

A. It was in Urdu. Colonel Beadon said that he had originally drafted this notice and this was translated by somebody. I do not know.

Q. All I have got of that notice is a translation made in the office of this Commission?

A. It was translated by others also.

Q. I do not know if it is a matter of importance. You will be able to tell from recollection the passage in which it occurs in the English translation that has been made by the office. I will read the previous sentence also.

"The persons who had determined to close their shops had taken the law into their own hands and brought undue pressure to bear upon other shopkeepers to get their shops closed." Undue pressure is a better phrase than moral compulsion which is mine. "The result was that the bazar was closed; a large number of persons had nothing to do. A mob of hooligans (equivalent to *badmashes*) caused disturbance at the Railway station and the *satyagraha*, passive resistance in name only, had at once altered into a riot which Government can never tolerate." That is the passage. Can you tell me which is worse, to be called a *badmash* or a *bandar*?

A. *Badmash* is worse; a naughty child may be called a *bandar*.

Q. Does not the same thing apply to both words? It depends on how they are used?

A. Yes, that is what I am saying. The whole of this notice was very irritating.

Q. There are not many people in India who can lay their hand upon their hearts and say that they never called a servant a *badmash*?

A. That is another thing. A man may call his son a *badmash*.

Q. Is it a term of endearment?

A. Out of love. It all depends on the way in which it is used. A man can call his son a *badmash* in love. It all depends upon the way in which it is said. We knew he put it alluding to the *Satyagraha Sabha*. *Satyagraha Sabha* had to send a reply to it.

Q. Let me put it to you this way, supposing I am a peaceable person in the ordinary way and for some reason or other may have excitement. For some reason or other if a crowd of people who are with me are stoning the police, do you think it would be a very great hardship on me and any men in the crowd for a local authority to refer to me and the other people as *badmashes*? Do you think it would be something to resent very much?

A. It is not a matter of opinion. I am giving you simply what it led to. They resented this. I do not know how.

Q. I want to be satisfied that the popular resentment and slighting of the police could have been due in any noticeable manner to a common-place phrase like this in this report.

A. Did not I tell you before that people at that time were telling me that he has abused us in this way, he has

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[Continued.]

been referring to us as *badmashes* and that might be the reason they had in their minds.

Q. I think you told us, *swami*, that whenever you were using your influence with the people to get them to close the *hartal*, there always seemed some unfortunate event that prevented your being successful. The arrest of Mr. Gandhi, for instance, might have made your task much more heavy. I daresay that in anything that the police did at this time, it was impossible for them to do right to a great many of the citizens of Delhi. Now you say when the station riot broke out, they ought to have sent a motor car to you (I do not say for you particularly but for some one of influence). Don't you think that if that had been done, there was a great risk again that some unfortunate event would be shown as a reason for not following your advice?

A. I cannot say.

Q. Don't you think that the populace would say "They arrested these two men, etc. and would not obey *swami* this time?"

A. I don't think so. It is egoism to say so. If I or Hakim Ajmal Khan or any of us had been there, it would have been quiet.

Q. It was not the fault of the police that they did not have the luck to have you there in time?

A. No, I cannot say that.

By Sir C. H. Setalwad—

Q. *Swamiji*, when was the *satyagraha* vow taken by you in Delhi?

A. It was publicly taken by me on the day when Mr. Gandhi came up first.

Q. Can you give me the date?

A. I do not remember, it may be the 6th or 7th March.

Q. When was the *Satyagraha Sabha* formed in Delhi?

A. About the 7th March.

Q. How many members joined then?

A. Some 15 or 16. I do not recollect the exact number at that time.

Q. What was the total strength at any time, the largest number that joined the *sabha*?

A. Not more than 110 or 120.

Q. Outside the membership, you were preaching *satyagraha* doctrines to other people?

A. Yes.

Q. The doctrines of *satyagraha* so far as I understand are abstaining from violence and upholding truth?

A. Yes.

Q. Inviting suffering on yourself and thereby ultimately moving the hearts of the authorities?

A. Exactly.

Q. The programme of breaking laws was also for the purpose of inviting suffering on yourself?

A. Yes.

Q. Now I think you grant that ordinary people have not the high ideals and intellectual calibre of yourself and Mr. Gandhi?

A. If you do not include me, I will say "yes."

Q. Therefore I take it that the *satyagraha* doctrines such as you have described are too subtle for them to understand and too difficult for them to follow in practice?

A. Yes.

Q. The real *satyagrahis*, in the sense you have described them, never intended violence?

A. They never intended.

Q. You say there was nothing in your teaching to create violence?

A. No.

Q. You also grant that carrying of *lathis* and throwing bricks and stones were certainly opposed to *satyagraha*?

A. Yes.

Q. In fact, however, in Delhi, violence did occur?

A. Yes.

Q. And people did carry *lathis* and throw brickbats?

A. Yes.

Q. You yourself were very much surprised at the results that came?

A. Yes.

Q. You were not prepared for those results?

A. I was not prepared. I never thought that people will be so unsympathetically treated.

Q. Leave that alone for the moment. Although your real teachings were of the character you described, that is, they were too subtle for the ordinary people to follow and understand, in fact it led to violence?

A. Yes, it led to violence.

Q. And you yourself were really aghast at the unfortunate results that happened?

A. Yes.

Q. Actually on the 17th March you have told us that you dissolved the *Satyagraha Sabha*?

A. Not on the 17th. It is a mistake.

Q. I am not particular about the date. You did actually dissolve the *sabha*?

A. Yes.

Q. You released people from their vows?

A. Yes.

Q. Because you thought that when they took those vows, they never thought that the results would be what they actually were?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it true that you yourself wrote an open letter to Mr. Gandhi, which you published in the papers to the effect that the *satyagraha* movement was not suited to political propaganda in this country and that you would have nothing to do with it?

A. I wrote a letter. The words are a little different.

Q. I want the general purport of it. It was that you thought that the *satyagraha* movement was unsuited to the conditions obtaining here?

A. I thought the *satyagraha* started by Mr. Gandhi—civil disobedience of laws—was unsuited. The movement of Mr. Gandhi as regards civil disobedience being part of *satyagraha* was unsuited to the conditions in this country.

Q. And that you would have nothing whatever to do with it thereafter. Is that so?

A. The reasons are given in that letter.

Q. I am not concerned with the reasons. Is not this the general result of what you were saying? Was it not your attitude? You thought that the propaganda of civil disobedience as part of *satyagraha* was impracticable and was unsuited to the conditions obtaining in this country.

A. Yes.

Q. And therefore you came to the conclusion and told Mr. Gandhi that you would not participate in that movement?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you got that letter? I read it at that time. It is a matter of curiosity. I want a copy.

A. I have got my draft of that letter.* (Here the witness handed over the original draft letter.)

Q. Then you said that a non-official commission had been appointed. Who were the members of the committee?

A. Hakim Ajmal Khan, Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh, Abdur Rahman, Pyare Lal (pleader), Dr. Shroff (medical gentleman) and a few others.

Q. Was that committee to hold an inquiry?

A. Yes. It had several sittings.

Q. Were their conclusions and the evidence produced published anywhere?

A. The enquiry was still incomplete. The Hon'ble Pandit Moti Lal Nehru was the president. Unfortunately, Mr. Gandhi was arrested and all these things happened. So the commission never finished its work.

Q. Was any evidence taken before that commission?

A. A lot of evidence was taken. I was myself examined.

Q. Were any of the people who were actually at the railway station examined, for instance, when the fire accident occurred?

A. Several of them were examined.

Q. Are they going to be produced before this Committee?

A. I think one or two of the members of the commission will be put in.

Q. Did this commission begin its labours at that time?

* Not filed.

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[Continued.]

A. It must have been on the 2nd or 3rd of April. I do not remember the exact date.

Q. While these incidents were still going on?

A. Yes.

Q. On how many days did it work?

A. About five or six.

Q. It could not have made any appreciable progress?

A. They examined some 50 or 60 witnesses.

Q. As regards the firing that took place on the 30th and 17th you were not present at any one of them and therefore you are not in a position to say that the situation on the spot justified the firing?

A. No, I could not say that.

Q. Your case generally is that the police interfered and the unpopularity of Colonel Beadon added very much to the trouble. That is your case?

A. Yes.

Q. Colonel Beadon's unpopularity has been of long standing in Delhi?

A. It has been of long standing since the unfortunate affair of Ramlila. It was two years ago.

Q. Colonel Beadon has been unpopular ever since and anything that comes from him is suspected?

A. Yes.

Q. If anything is done by somebody else, it would not be interpreted in that manner. In his case, it is different. That is the attitude and frame of mind of the people towards Colonel Beadon?

A. As far as I know.

Q. You say that the police interference added to the trouble? Are the police very much despised in Delhi?

A. They are disliked.

Q. The police here are despised by the people more than in any other place. What is the reason?

A. One reason is that the police try to suppress public activity.

Q. That is, the police and Colonel Beadon are acting together?

A. Yes.

Q. They try to put down political agitation?

A. Yes.

Q. You speak of funeral processions on the 24th of April?

A. They joined together.

Q. As far as this understanding between Hindus and Muhammadans is concerned has it not been going on for some years?

A. At this time it culminated.

Q. It has been going on for some time?

A. You may say that—for a year or two.

Q. On the 5th of April you issued posters and notices advising people to end the *hartal*—not to have a *hartal* on the 6th. They did not follow your advice?

A. Yes. They did not.

Q. Did you realise then that you had lost control of the people in Delhi?

A. I never realised that.

Q. What happened on the 10th of April and subsequent dates you attributed mainly I think to the arrest of Mr. Gandhi. In your statement about various things having been done, the people suspected that they were done by the Criminal Investigation Department people—that they were spreading rumours that the leaders were going to be arrested. Have you any tangible evidence about this—what the Criminal Investigation Department people were doing?

A. I have given two instances. Here is a third. On the 14th of April when I was at my house people came running to me and said I was going to be arrested and taken away to the railway station. The man who came told me that one of them was a Criminal Investigation Department man, who went running saying "swami has been taken to the railway station" and there was a special train standing there to take me away.

Q. The man who did that was a very foolish man?

A. He was a Criminal Investigation Department man. The people told me that he was a Criminal Investigation Department man.

Q. Do you know who he was?

A. I did not see. The man who gave me the message was Jamna Das of Sadar Bazar.

Q. Who was the Criminal Investigation Department man?

A. I do not know. There was one Criminal Investigation Department man. I think Dr. Ansari will be able to give you his name.

Q. To whom do you attribute the various things you said in your statement about those rumours that leaders were going to be arrested. Was that rumour more readily received by the people from the fact that the leaders in the Punjab were arrested already?

A. They were always talking of the *satyagraha*.

Q. And they had come to know that the leaders had already been arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. They accepted them more readily than they otherwise would have done?

A. Yes.

Q. With regard to misrepresentations of the Rowlatt Act were any people working with you or members of the *Satyagraha Sabha* who were responsible for these misrepresentations?

A. No, not one of them.

Q. At that meeting which you held in connection with the Rowlatt Act were any such misrepresentations made?

A. No such misrepresentations were made.

Q. Did you notice any notices which were put up misrepresenting the provisions of the Act?

A. No, I did not see a single one.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. You say that when the Moslems and Hindus assembled in the Jama Masjid to pray on the 30th of March machine-guns and armed military and police were aggressively inclined?

A. I did not mean that they were aggressively inclined. They were near the Jama Masjid. They were going through the street.

Q. They did not do anything. They were simply there?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. May I take it that up to 1893 you had nothing to do with politics?

A. I had nothing to do with politics up to 1893.

Q. You first of all joined the Indian National Congress in 1893? After this you severed your connection with that body?

A. Yes, after the end of that year.

Q. You are also an *arya samajist* and a very prominent member of the *Arya Samaj*?

A. Yes. You may say so.

Q. And your work as an *arya samajist* and the personal charge of the *Gurukul* have been appreciated by the people of your province?

A. Sir James Meeson had been four times to the *Gurukul*. Lord Hardinge and Lord Chelmsford, the present Viceroy, also paid visits and they appreciated the work very much.

Q. Had you as an *arya samajist* anything to do with this Rowlatt Act or the *Satyagraha* movement?

A. As an *arya samajist*—no.

Q. Now the first time I think you again took to politics was in the month of March. Then you could not be one of those agitators who were disturbing the peace of Delhi?

A. No, I could not be.

Q. A memorandum has been filed before us on behalf of the All-India Congress Committee regarding the Delhi disturbances and as I would like points cleared up, I will ask you to do so.

A. I will try my best.

Q. I want to clear what is your case on behalf of the people of Delhi. You say about two alleged riots on the 30th March 1919. I want to know as a matter of fact whether you admit or not that there was a riot at the railway station. As to one of these, I want to know what your case is with reference to the statement of the head of the All India Congress Committee?

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[Continued.]

A. Then it is better to ask the Hon'ble Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya. He will be able to explain it to you.

Q. Then you cannot explain these things?

A. I can give you my personal views if you like.

Q. You say about certain alleged riots. The question is whether there was or was not a riot at Delhi on the date in question?

A. How can I say that?

Q. What is the case of the people of Delhi which you are going to put forward before this Committee?

(The President:—It is hardly a question of the case of the people of Delhi.)

Q. Can you say whether there was any stone-throwing by the crowd that had assembled at the railway station?

A. There was some stone-throwing.

Q. What is your case as to whether stones and bricks were thrown by the crowd in the Queen's Gardens?

A. Yes. They began throwing stones when they were pushed into the Queen's Gardens.

Q. Again as regards the Ballimaran affair what is your version?

A. From what I have heard I have come to the conclusion.....

(The President:—A gentleman who comes should hardly be asked about his opinion of hearsay testimony which has been put before him.)

Q. Is it not a fact, as regards the use of the word "badmash" used either by Mr. Barron or Colonel Beadon that everything depends upon the man and the intention with which he uses the word?

A. That is what I said.

Q. Does not that word "bandar" signify simply agility and red face and that there is no moral reflection upon character?

A. Yes.

Q. In your statement you alleged that certain posters were pasted and certain rumours were circulated by some persons to the Criminal Investigation Department. Can you give us any further tangible facts upon which you would like this Committee to come to the conclusion that this was so? On the present evidence before us, I am not satisfied.

A. I cannot give their names. I have given it in my statement that shops being opened on the 31st, Hakim Ajmal Khan and Mr. Desai know it, there was one Muhammadan gentleman whom I saw at Dr. Ansari's house. We thought he might be some friend of us. We went to the slaughter house and the men were ready to begin work. But the Muhammadan gentleman wanted to speak. He got up and said that without seeing Mahatma Gandhi we cannot open the shops and so on. Afterwards I found out that he was a man who belonged to Criminal Investigation Department.

Q. What were the facts upon which you came to the conclusion that he was a Criminal Investigation Department man?

A. It is very difficult to say now. I will tell you the true facts. I would not give you names, I mean the man who gave me the information. One Inspector of the regular Criminal Investigation Department told me that this man is directly under Sir Charles Cleveland. There were several respectable people who told me that this was a Criminal Investigation Department man and from this I concluded that this man belonged to the Criminal Investigation Department.

Q. Is it not a fact well-known to every one, I mean to say the people, that the Congressmen, the *satyagrahis* and the Home Rulers are not liked by the police? Is that the general impression?

A. It is.

Q. Is it not a fact that many times trouble has been brought to innocent persons on account of their activities?

A. I say that is so.

Q. Is it not a fact that the seed of this Hindu-Muslim unity was laid in December 1916 in the Congress at Lucknow?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it not a fact that this year even so recently as three weeks ago all over these provinces Muhammadans

voluntarily gave up cow sacrifices on the *Bakr-id* day in regard to the sentiment of the Hindus?

A. In several places.

Q. Therefore would you consider it to be very unnatural that when this process of unity was going on and when the people of Delhi supposed that they were common sufferers in the cause of *satyagraha* you were allowed to enter the mosque?

A. There was not the least surprise about it.

Q. The time is in favour of this unity in the political circumstances of India?

A. Yes.

Q. Now with regard to your resolution on page 16 of your statement after the arrest of Mr. Gandhi, may I take it that what you meant was that there should be no resort to violence but that every one must submit to authority and to arrest if any? I do not think that your position is to justify the excesses of the mob?

A. Not in the least.

Q. It is perfectly legal for the authorities to have anybody arrested, however high he may be, and there was no reason for the crowd to come to the station with *lathis* and to assume a threatening attitude and ask for the release of the men. You don't contend that the action of the crowd in this respect was justified?

A. No. I remonstrated with them.

Q. Is it not a fact that some people were forced out of their tongas on the 30th?

A. I did not see any. I cannot say from my personal knowledge. They were respectfully asking the people to get down.

Q. You have heard the evidence of what happened between the mob and the sweetmeat sellers. You have heard the evidence of the old man. Is there any reason to disbelieve his statement?

A. I cannot say whether that was a fact or not.

Q. Do you think it was a reasonable attitude to take that Colonel Beadon should not show his face in the Chandni Chowk or anywhere in the city?

A. I would not call it reasonable; it was the fact.

Q. Do you think it the duty of the authorities who were responsible for maintaining peace and order to always consult leaders before taking any action which they considered advisable in the circumstances?

A. It all depends upon the way people think. I think it is better to consult the leaders and try to do what they advise rather than resort to extremes.

Q. Supposing that is not done, do you attach any great blame on the authorities?

A. I cannot say. I simply say that it is better to take the people into confidence.

Q. It might have been better had it been done in the first instance on the 30th. Do you mean to say that it should be done every day, every hour, as questions arise before you? They are responsible for the maintenance of peace and order.

A. I do not say that.

Q. It is said there was an excessive show of authority. Beyond what you have stated, are you prepared to give any other facts which might lead us to conclude that there was an excessive show of authority?

A. When there was no reason at all, the military were paraded in the streets. That I would call an excessive show of authority. I am not prepared to say anything.

Q. From your evidence I conclude that the assault on the Criminal Investigation Department man and the assault on the head constable had no connection with *satyagraha*. They were individual actions of certain persons in Delhi, because the people were against the police and the Criminal Investigation Department.

A. Yes, that is my view.

Q. They had nothing to do with *hartal* or *satyagraha*?

A. No.

Q. It is clear that you, the leaders of Delhi, were doing your best to get the shops opened. Suppose it be true that your endeavours were frustrated by some body of hooligans, who as soon as you left the place threatened and induced the shopkeepers to close the shops, would

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[Continued.]

or would not the authorities be justified in taking some action against those persons?

A. They would be justified in taking action against those persons.

Q. From what you know of the crowd, if those two men at the railway station had not been arrested or if when bail was offered, it had been accepted, would there have been all these unfortunate subsequent circumstances?

A. I do not think so. From what I know of Delhi people and the crowd, I think everything would have passed quietly. There would have been no disturbance if the two persons had not been arrested.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. About the resolution passed at the meeting of the 10th you said that this indicated that there must be no resistance to authority?

A. Yes.

Q. What do you mean by saying that every Indian should do his duty and seek the withdrawal of the Rowlatt legislation or his own imprisonment?

A. We had not come to civil disobedience of laws as yet. It meant that just as Mahatma Gandhi was undergoing arrest by civil disobedience of laws, it was our duty also to follow him, and when arrested, to retreat to jail.

Q. In order to get arrested, what was to be done? What was an Indian to do in order to get arrested?

A. Mahatma Gandhi was selling proscribed literature. He was bringing out a paper without having given a declaration. Whatever law was decided upon by the Committee had to be civilly disobeyed. If he was arrested, he should quietly go to jail and suffer.

Q. You mentioned in one place that there was some delay in giving up the dead bodies to the relatives on the 31st March. What actually did that delay amount to?

A. I learnt they were taking them from the railway station to the police hospital.

Q. Did you make any complaint to the police hospital?

A. Yes. When the wounded and the dead were taken to the railway platform they remained there for some three hours. That is my information. Then came the railway doctor. He was ordered to take them to the police hospital of the city. The doctor said there were no sufficient arrangements for dressing these people in the police hospital. They were actually taken to the police hospital in the evening. They remained the night there. The next morning after some 24 hours after the shot was fired, they were taken to the civil hospital, then they were properly dressed.

Q. I was asking about the delay in handing over the dead bodies?

A. The dead bodies were handed over just at the time when the wounded were taken there.

Q. I suppose that it was probably thought necessary in order to have definite information as to the cause of death to have the dead bodies examined by expert. In fact here we have the statement of the civil surgeon.

A. The civil surgeon never visits the police hospital, Colonel James is in charge.

Q. There are accounts of seven post-mortem examinations performed on the 31st.

A. That was made in the civil hospital, 27 hours after the first shot was fired.

Q. The post-mortem examination I suppose would take time?

A. The post-mortem examination only took till 1 or 2 o'clock. Then the dead bodies were being delivered. Colonel James did not examine all these 7 bodies on one and the same day. Two came afterwards.

Q. Are you referring to the dead bodies at the railway station, Clock Tower or anywhere?

A. I refer to both the dead and the wounded.

Q. What is the suggestion about the delay in handing over the dead bodies?

A. The idea is that the authorities did not want to deliver the dead bodies and wounded men to the people. They did not want to hand them over to the people, because that would excite the people. That might have been the reason. They ought to have delivered the dead bodies at once on the 30th. They did not do it

Q. About Colonel Beadon's notice about *badmashes*, I think you said there was a second passage that people objected to.

A. The second passage was this: "If the shops were closed, Government did not care. Government would not lose anything. The loss is for you."

Q. I have got what I understand is the translation. I cannot read the Hindustani version. It runs like this: "I warn my countrymen by this notice not to be induced by persons to close the shops. If you close your shops, you hurt yourselves. You may hurt innocent victims, but you do not hurt the *sarkar*."

A. I will tell you one fact more, which coupled with this will give the true situation. When Colonel Beadon came the next day he referred to a speech of mine and alluded to mischief-makers coming from outside, and others who were trying to help us. That was the meaning put upon it by the people.

Q. The rest of the notice does not seem unsympathetic?

A. No; it is not.

Q. He said that the *sarkar* had no wish to see riots and that he was surprised. He wanted you to realise how much Government servants feel. Therefore he asked for information about the killed and the wounded. You would not call that an unsympathetic notice?

A. It all depends on the way. He made an appeal and nobody responded to it. Why was that? When the people appealed, several thousands came in response. You read the reply of the *Satyagraha Sabha*; I was the president of the *sabha* then. We drafted and sent a reply, which is on the file.*

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. You were the member explaining all the doctrines of *satyagraha* in Delhi?

A. I was one of the members. There were Dr. Ansari and others.

Q. You were also one of them?

A. Yes.

Q. Here is the English version of the vow of *satyagraha*: "Being conscientiously of opinion that the bills known as the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, No. 1 of 1919, and the Criminal Law Emergency Powers, No. 2 of 1919, are unjust and opposed to the principles of liberty, justice and the elementary rights of individuals on which the safety of the community as a whole and the State itself is based, we solemnly affirm that if the above two bills become law, until they are withdrawn, we shall refuse civilly to obey these laws and such other laws as the committee to be hereafter appointed may think fit and we further affirm that in this struggle, we will face authority and refrain from violence to person or property." Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Now it is stated here you shall have to disobey civil law. What do you mean by that?

A. It is not criminal disobedience. For instance, a man is asked not to enter the Punjab. Well, he says, "I think it is my right and I will come." If he is arrested he will go quietly.

Q. That is with reference to Mr. Gandhi, but take for instance the case of an ordinary citizen of Delhi, how will he disobey civil laws?

A. For instance there is a law that a man must not make a noise in the public street and if he makes a noise he disobeys the law. Take another instance, an article appears in the Anglo-Indian papers suggesting that a religious book of the *Arya Samaj* might be proscribed. Well, if that is proscribed I will keep that book with me whether they imprison me or do anything with me—I will keep the book. That will be civil disobedience of law.

Q. Supposing a thief comes to me and hands over to me stolen property. I keep this—would that be criminal or civil?

A. That would be criminal. That is morally different.

Q. If a man keeps property and he does not think it to be stolen, yet his vow is to keep stolen property?

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[Continued.]

A. It is a question of truth or falsehood.

Q. What does civil disobedience of law mean?

A. Mr. Gandhi has explained that. I have explained it.

Q. Give me a definition. I take it that you cannot define.

A. I will define it by example. I have already defined it. Q. You must have explained it to the crowd by examples, by illustrations and suggestions. You cannot expect the crowd to understand merely by giving one or two illustrations. There are different conditions to be considered?

A. We only asked the crowds to disobey civil laws. Those who had taken the vows were studying and nothing was to be done unless the committee decided.

Q. The object of the *satyagraha* propaganda was that everybody should take the vow, was it not?

A. Yes.

Q. It was. Very well then if you address a meeting of a thousand people your object would be to endow them all with *satyagraha*?

A. No. Not all. We told them plainly that it was very difficult. If all could be, all should be.

Q. Then before they took the vow you would have to explain what you meant?

A. It is explained afterwards that there should be no violence.

Q. How do you explain it intelligently?

A. A definition would never mean anything. We gave it by way of illustration—that in disobeying civil laws no criminal force ought to be used—simply suffering ourselves.

Q. Suffering yourselves is no disobedience?

A. No violence to any other man.

Q. Then it is attempted suicide?

A. That is against truth. I am sorry I cannot admit that.

Q. Disobedience whatever it was not to be confined merely to the Rowlatt Act but also any other laws which the committee would dictate. Who was the authority who was going to appoint a committee—does it refer merely to Delhi or to the whole of India?

A. Bombay had its own committee under Mahatma Gandhi. Delhi would have its own.

Q. Each place must appoint its own committee in order to decide as to the law that particular town was going to obey or not—there may be differences of opinion—a committee in Bombay might decide upon certain laws and a committee in Delhi might decide otherwise?

A. That was the reason why I suggested a central committee but he did not agree to it.

Q. I am taking an extreme case—suppose everybody became a *satyagrahi* in every village and country, would each village and town have a committee of its own?

A. Every province must have a committee.

Q. That provincial committee was to dictate to the people as to what laws to obey and what laws not to obey and this committee was going to be elected?

A. I will give you a rough idea of what was intended. Districts appoint their own representatives. They meet in a central place and they then appoint an executive committee and that executive committee was to decide.

Q. The executive committee was the committee to be appointed by the representatives of the various districts in the province?

A. They were appointed from among members.

Q. And what was going to be the number of the committees?

A. That was not decided.

Q. How were the committees to act?

A. Those rules were not given.

Q. Have you got any rules in Delhi?

A. None whatever.

Q. Here everybody was expected to take this vow and bind himself in future to disobey civil authority?

A. I told you what was intended.

Q. But the committee might not be unanimous. People are asked to vow that they should disobey any laws which this committee dictates—don't you think that would mean anarchy? These are laws we cannot obey and nobody else will obey?

A. Yes.

Q. With reference to the incident of the dead bodies, is it not a fact that the police hospital is in the Civil Lines?

A. Yes.

Q. And the Civil Hospital is near the Jama Masjid?

A. Yes.

Q. If the dead bodies had been taken to the Civil Hospital, great crowds would have turned up and there

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SWAMI SHRADDHANAND.

[Continued.]

would have been considerable excitement and resentment on the part of the people?

A. I did not suggest that they ought to have been taken to the civil hospital. I said that they ought to have been handed over to their relatives. This was not done.

Q. Don't you think that when a large crowd had assembled it was not a easy thing to find out who the relatives were?

A. It was not a question of finding them. They came forward and were asking for the dead bodies. They came to Hakim Ajmal Khan and Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh. They went in deputation with a view to get the dead bodies on behalf of the relatives.

Q. Did Hakim Ajmal Khan and Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh know where the dead bodies had been taken to?

A. Not that day. On the 31st they went to the Chief Commissioner and then got the bodies in the afternoon.

By Mr. C. R. Das.—

Q. I want to ask you about the *satyagraha* movement. There are two separate things. One is the spirit of *satyagraha* and *satyagraha* as applied to the Rowlatt Bills?

A. Yes, that is so.

Q. Is the spirit of *satyagraha* in any way against the maintenance of public order?

A. Not in the least.

Q. Does it imply any resistance to authority actively?

A. No. I have given the meaning of the words.

Q. Are not there two injunctions? One is not to disobey authority and the other is not to commit any violence against personal feelings and property?

A. That is so.

Q. As applied to the Rowlatt Bill, the Rowlatt Bills were considered objectionable as you have said and civil disobedience does it not mean that you disobey but not with any violence or show of force or anything like that?

A. That is what I have been trying to make clear.

Q. With regard to the laws to which the principle is to be applied, they are laws which go against your conscience? I shall give you two concrete instances. Take the case of the Hindu. Supposing that one of the sacred books of the Hindus such as the Gita were proscribed, according to the *satyagraha* movement you ought not to part with that book and you ought to suffer the consequences patiently and submissively. In the same manner take the case of a Muhammadan. Supposing the Koran or the Bible in the case of a Christian were proscribed, you ought not to part with the books but suffer the consequences submissively?

A. That is the principle.

Q. Now about what you have told us about the meeting of the 30th March. There is some confusion with regard to the object of that meeting. I do not say it was intentional at all on your part. The meeting that was announced to take place at a particular hour did take place and one other meeting took place before that. May I take it that there were really two meetings that day?

A. They were held in one and the same place.

Q. The one that was held before the appointed hour was with the object of pacifying people and at the appointed hour you passed a resolution which had been arranged beforehand?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, *swamiji*, you were asked a great deal about the excitement of the people of Delhi and I think you told us that on the 30th March there was practically no excitement till the arrest of Mr. Gandhi?

A. Yes.

Q. And then you held a meeting and passed a resolution?

A. Yes.

Q. Now you were asked whether it was proper that a resolution like that should be passed when the people were in an excited condition?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it proper in your opinion that when the people were excited an order such as the one passed on Mr. Gandhi should have been passed?

A. No.

Q. If this is so, there is nothing improper in passing a resolution such as the one you passed?

A. No: I never thought it improper.

Q. Will you kindly look at page 16 of your note. You see the last words "or seek imprisonment." Do they not refer to what was actually done by Mahatma Gandhi?

A. Yes. It was in conformity with the message.

Q. With regard to the *Satyagraha Sabha*, you said that the papers were destroyed?

A. The register, not the paper.

Q. Because it might fall into the hands of the police. What was the apprehension? Was it that the police would make a proper or improper use of it?

A. They would make an improper use of it. I said that they might implicate those men.

Q. What do you mean by implicating these men?

A. In order to show that *satyagrahis* took part in it.

Q. Justly or unjustly?

A. Unjustly.

Q. As a matter of fact you are aware that one of the *satyagrahis*, the secretary of the Home Rule League, Sankar Lal, was implicated in one of these?

A. He was the treasurer of the *Satyagraha Sabha*.

Q. He was implicated in connection with the meeting of the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. He was honourably acquitted?

A. Yes.

Q. Kindly refer to page 13 of your statement. You refer to certain incidents about the Criminal Investigation Department. You have referred to an incident on the 31st March. Did that take place in your presence?

A. Yes, in my presence.

Q. Who is Mr. Desai?

A. Yes.

Q. Kindly refer to page 13 of your statement. You refer to certain incidents about the Criminal Investigation Department. You have referred to an incident on the 31st March. Did that take place in your presence?

A. Yes, in my presence.

Q. Who is Mr. Desai?

A. Mr. K. A. Desai was the secretary of the *Satyagraha Sabha*.

Q. The other question referred to in page 13, did that happen in your presence?

A. They all happened in my presence.

Q. I believe there is an incident with reference to a *sadhu* boy. What is the name of the boy?

A. Saraswati Gir.

Q. Was he in Delhi at any time?

A. He was arrested on the 17th April and was flogged.

Q. After that he went to the Punjab and was in the hands of the police?

A. In the Gurgaon district of the Punjab.

[The President:—What part of the statement does this refer to. There should be some notice as to what the point is. It is quite impossible for this matter to be investigated into suddenly in this way before the Committee.]

Mr. Das:—I am referring to statement recorded by the police.

The President:—There is nothing in *swami's* statement as to that before us. I do not see it has any bearing as to the cause of the riots or as to the measures taken by the civil and military authorities in order to deal with the situation.

Mr. Das:—I am in your Lordship's hands. If it is at all important that the Criminal Investigation Department were helping these disturbances by their conduct, if that is relevant, I want to show that they are trying to foment disturbances.

The President:—I do not think we can go into a matter of that sort of which there has been no notice.]

Q. With regard to the night of the 16th, something happened. Is what you state in your note quite correct according to your personal knowledge? People came to your house and woke you up and told you that the police should not be sent to the city and so on. All that is true?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you in any way say that the *satyagraha* movement itself led to any violence in Delhi?

A. I never said that and never meant it,

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Rai Bahadur SULTAN SINGH.

Rai Bahadur SULTAN SINGH, Banker, Delhi.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Sultan Singh, you are a banker in Delhi?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you see any of the disturbances that took place on the 30th?

A. No, Sir.

Q. You did not see anything?

A. I did not come out of my house after the disturbances took place that day.

Q. Well then, in connection with these disturbances, what was it that first came under your personal knowledge?

A. On the morning of the 31st, I went to Hakim Ajmal Khan's house. On the way I found a crowd of people collected round all the leaders who happened to be there and asking them that their (the people's) wounded and dead should be delivered first before business was resumed.

Q. I think there were cremations or burials on the 31st?

A. Several people came to my house and asked me to see Hakim Ajmal Khan, so that we may arrange that the injured and wounded on the previous day were delivered to the people. I then went to my house and from there I went to Hakim Ajmal Khan's house, and there was a big crowd accompanying the funeral procession of a dead body that was lying overnight in the mosque near Hakim Ajmal Khan's house. After the people came back after burying that dead body, I saw Swami Shraddhanand and Hakim Ajmal Khan asking people to resume business. That was about 11 o'clock in the morning. I was also surrounded by the crowd, and they said that they were not going to resume the business until they had performed the funeral ceremonies of the dead.

Q. After these ceremonies were performed, business was resumed? That is on the 31st?

A. We did not know what the casualties were. I, Hakim Ajmal Khan and a few others went to the house of the Chief Commissioner and represented to him that there was great excitement among the people; because the people want to see their wounded and dead.

By Sir C. H. Setdewad—

Q. That was on the 31st?

A. Yes, about midday. The Chief Commissioner kindly accompanied us to the police hospital. When we reached the police hospital, we found that there was no dead body there, and the wounded that were lying there were just then sent to the civil hospital. Then the Chief Commissioner led us to the Deputy Commissioner's house. He went inside the house of Colonel Beadon and asked us to see him. Then I, Hakim Ajmal Khan and two or three others went inside Colonel Beadon's room and represented matters to him. Then he gave permission that the dead could be delivered at the civil hospital. Then we all came back to the civil hospital and there we found that several dead bodies had been sent away from the police hospital to the civil hospital. The Surgeon-General was there. After the *post-mortem* was over he delivered four or five dead bodies in our presence. There was a crowd of ten thousand people in the hospital compound. The dead bodies that were delivered to the people were carried in a procession. We then left the hospital. There were several Hindu and Muhammadan corpses, and they were all taken together. All the people left the hospital compound together; the Muhammadans went to the Muhammadan graveyard and the Hindus went to the cremation ground. That was in the evening and there was no business resumed on that day.

Q. Business was resumed for a time that day?

A. No, because it was quite dark when the bodies were cremated as the bodies were delivered at 5 o'clock, and they were not disposed of till late in the evening. We pacified the people and came to the relatives of those who were wounded. The relatives of the wounded were

allowed to visit the wards and we ourselves visited several wounded.

Q. I think after business was resumed, there was the *hartal* declared for the 6th of April?

A. No, Mr. Gandhi had declared the 6th of April, but by some misunderstanding the Delhi people had declared it earlier. The *hartal* was fixed for the 6th but the members of the *Satyagraha Sabha* and others also did not want a repetition of the *hartal* on the 6th and a notice was published asking the people not to observe the *hartal* again as it was unnecessary.

Q. In spite of the efforts so made to prevent the people from holding the *hartal* on the 6th, was the *hartal* held?

A. No particular efforts were made, because it was anticipated that the *hartal* would not take place. But they wanted to keep company with the rest of India, and then some people said that owing to the notice that was issued by Colonel Beadon in which the word *badmash* was used, they were not going to open the bazar simply by the threat of the Deputy Commissioner. They came to the meeting in front of Colonel Beadon himself and they also told him that. They said they resented the meaning of certain words and therefore they said that they would not open their shops or resume their business.

Q. That was before the 6th? Did you not observe that Colonel Beadon had used those words with reference to the people who had done violence?

A. People generally thought that the word *badmash* had reference to them as a whole, because they were all respectable people, cloth merchants and others. They said "Well, you want us to open the shops, but how is it that the head of our district called us *badmashes* at the same time?"

Q. When you read Colonel Beadon's notice yourself, you did not assume that the word *badmash* applied to all people but only to those who had done violence at the station?

A. Yes, the word *badmash* is such that it is damaging to one's character. I would not approve of the word *badmash* even though it is used with reference to a poor man.

Q. It is synonymous with the English word hooligan?

A. All I can say is, it is damaging to one's character. In England, I am afraid, we know people throwing stones and assaulting?

A. I would not call them *badmash*. The word *badmash* is something very damaging to one's character. The word "hooligan" does not carry the same derogatory sense as the word *badmash*. That is my opinion.

Q. Anyhow, nothing serious happened on the 6th although the *hartal* was observed?

A. No, Sir, nothing serious happened.

Q. There was a *hartal* for several days after 10th?

A. Yes, Sir, there was no *hartal* between the 7th and 10th. It was begun again on the 10th.

Q. The closure of the shops that was started on the 10th continued practically till the 16th of April?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. During that time you had several meetings with the Chief Commissioner or the authorities?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What was the object with which those meetings were held?

A. The Chief Commissioner was trying to pacify the people and asking them to resume their business without any harsh measures. That was the Chief Commissioner's object.

Q. Was not that manifestly his desire?

A. Yes, and people quite appreciated it, and things got easier after the handbill which he issued.

Q. There was a disturbance on the 14th. Did you know about that?

A. I was at Hakim Ajmal Khan's house. A report came that at Edward Park some Criminal Investigation Department officer had been assaulted.

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Rai Bahadur SULTAN SINGH.

[Continued.]

Q. You did not see the assault?

A. No.

Q. Later on, on the 17th April, there was a serious outbreak again?

A. No, there was no outbreak, but by the arrest of a young unruly spirit who was asking some of the shopkeepers not to open their shops, there was excitement among the people.

Q. Now, as a law-abiding citizen, Mr. Sultan Singh, would you not admit the right of the police to arrest some one who is preventing another man who is doing business?

A. In a period of exceptional excitement people sometimes become unreasonable and a certain amount of leniency is quite expected.

Q. Leniency is sometimes thrown away in moments of excitement?

A. But such depends upon the discretion of the person of the authorities. Anyhow, there was no serious outbreak, and the shops were opened, and we were surprised at this when we passed through Chandni Chowk.

Q. So far as the person who was arrested, nothing was done to him?

A. Nothing was done to him, but the people who had surrounded him said, rightly or wrongly, that he was thrown over the railing and done to death.

Q. What grounds had the people in making that statement?

A. In front of the Town Hall, there is a big oval open space which was full of several hundreds of people. They could not see what was going on inside the Town Hall. They might have seen the police constables catching hold of this person and carrying him over the railing, and they thought the man was thrown over. Of course, Hakim Ajmal Khan went by the other way to find out the true facts, and I also got down from my motor car.

Q. In consequence of what has happened to this man did not the mob start to attack the police on the 17th?

A. That I did not see. But when I left the car I saw people abusing us saying: "You advised us to open the shops, while our own people are being dragged like dogs." Of course the people were so excited that I thought it best to leave my car there and went to Hakim Ajmal Khan's house. I left the car there only.

Q. The temper of the people was rather dangerous at that time, is it not?

A. They were excited at that time, because they had a suspicion that the man had been dealt with very harshly or injured or done to death.

Q. I think you heard the firing?

A. A few seconds before that the firing took place. Till then, there was no attack on the police. I walked all the way, and the crowd followed me.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. You know, Rai Bahadur, that the efforts to induce the shopkeepers on the 17th to open their shops were the result of very careful and anxious preparation not only by the authorities, but they were made in consultation with some of the leaders?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I mean the position was such on the night of the 16th, that they were trying very strenuously to continue the peaceable methods and bring the *hartal* to an end?

A. Yes, Sir. The whole thing is, people did not want it to be understood that they had resumed business under compulsion of the police. Therefore, we requested the authorities to keep the police in the background as much as possible, till the business was resumed completely.

Q. You do not suggest that, if somebody was really interfering with this last chance of enabling the *hartal* to come to an end without resort to any exceptional measures, that the police were not thoroughly justified in arresting any person who was trying to undo the work of not only the police, and the authorities, but of the leaders?

A. There was a batch of hooligans, or by whatever name you may call them, from the morning, and we were asking the police not to interfere, and we ourselves asked them to resist from mischief. I did not see the arrest of this man, but early in the morning I myself had remonstrated with several people, youngsters and boys, who were telling the shopkeepers to close.

Q. That is not the point. Don't you think the police would have taken upon themselves a very great responsibility if they had made up their minds in advance on the morning of the 17th to keep their hands behind their backs and not to arrest any hooligans who attempted to undo the good work of yourself and other people, don't you think that it would have been a very serious resolution on their part?

A. Well, if they had continued that practically for another two hours, the whole *bazar* would have been opened. I mean they did not interfere from morning till 11 o'clock. We requested the police to give us the chance to prevail upon the people without their interference.

Q. Anyhow, you do not suggest that as the result of absolute non-interference, there was really any excitement or provocation or excuse to a reasonable-minded people?

A. Well, in a matter of excitement, people do not reason very cogently, and if the police had kept up the same attitude which they had kept up from morning onwards for another two hours, nothing would have happened. That is my opinion.

Q. You understand the difference between expecting the people to be reasonable up to a time and blaming the police for doing something right because an unreasonable people unreasonably resented their interference? The police did not do anything illegal?

A. That of course I am not competent to say. I mean they could have very well arrested the man. Sometimes there were batches of people who wanted the shopkeepers to close their shops, and this incident occurred after 12. When the whole *bazar* was opened, we were in different parts of the town.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You were not present on any of the occasions on which the firing took place?

A. No, Sir.

Q. And therefore you are not in a position to judge whether the circumstances on the spot were of such a character as to justify the firing?

A. Because I was not present there.

Q. You spoke of Colonel Beadon's notice and people complaining of the word *badmashes* in it. When people complained of that word, did you care to look at the notice yourself and see in what connection that epithet was used?

A. I was present at the meeting, where Colonel Beadon himself was present, and people were objecting to the word in his own presence, and Colonel Beadon explained that it was a mistake in translation.

Q. Were you satisfied that it was a mistake?

A. I did not pay much attention to that, but people very much resented it.

Q. When people resented the use of that word, did you care yourself to examine the context in which that word was used and whether that word was justifiable or not?

A. Well, I did not care to do that. I thought that as Colonel Beadon had given an explanation that it was an error of Hindustani translation, I did not think of it any more.

Q. Were you a member of the *Satyagraha Sabha* in Delhi?

A. No, Sir. I never joined it.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. You say in your memorandum that "in the excitement of the moment some brickbats are said to have been thrown by some unruly spirits, the crowd being roughly handled by the police." This crowd was

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[Continued.]

not armed even with sticks? Is that your impression still?

A. I hold the same opinion.

Q. You continue then "Assuming these facts to be correct, there was no justification or necessity for firing on both occasions..... The crowd could have been dispersed by less drastic measures, such as are found sufficient in similar circumstances in other parts of the world." Supposing those facts were not correct, that is to say, supposing a great many brickbats were thrown and the crowds were armed with sticks, would you be prepared to modify that statement that the crowd could have been dispersed by less drastic measures?

A. If I were convinced that the crowd was sufficiently armed and was unable to offer serious resistance to the troops or police who may have been present at the station, then I would modify it.

Q. That is to say, if at least 50 per cent. of the police force and the military on duty received injuries from the crowd in a few minutes time, you consider that the crowd was offering some resistance?

A. Unless the mob or crowd was armed. An unarmed crowd is no match to an armed force.

Q. But an armed man is not necessarily more than a match for an unarmed man if the former does not use his weapon?

A. Quite so.

Q. You must admit then that under these circumstances a crowd would be a nasty thing to face?

A. Yes, an armed crowd would be a nasty thing to face. It would be a much worse thing to deal with it than an unarmed crowd.

Q. You say that you yourself did not care to face it because it was an angry crowd?

A. That was on the 17th.

Q. You think that the situation could have been modified under different conditions?

A. Yes.

By Mr. C. R. Das—

Q. With regard to the arrest of the man on the 17th, are you aware that he was charged under section 506 of the Code?

A. Yes, I am aware of that. He was charged under section 506 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Q. And that is a non-cognizable offence and the police have no power to arrest anybody without a warrant?

A. Yes, according to the Criminal Procedure Code.

[The President:—I thought the Indian law was different from the law, as we understand it in the West, that if the police see a man committing an offence they have the right to arrest him at once.]

Mr. Das:—Under the Indian law it can only be done in a certain class of offences.

The President:—It is purely a legal question. It is not suggested in the statement that there was anything illegal about it.

Mr. Das:—I asked him, because it was put to him whether the arrest was perfectly justified.]

By the President—

Q. How do you know that the man was arrested under a certain section of the Criminal Procedure Code?

A. I have served as an Honorary Magistrate, and I know the section.

Counsel. I suppose if a policeman sees a man committing an offence, he is entitled to arrest him in India just as is the case, so far as I know, in every other civilized country?

A. There are two kinds of offences, so far as I know. There are some offences in which the police cannot interfere without a complaint being filed in the court.

Q. Supposing the policeman had asked this man to go away and did not arrest him, would it not have served the purpose equally?

A. After taking down his name the policeman could have asked the man to go away from there.

Q. Nothing would have happened then?

A. No excitement would have been caused.

Q. I believe you are a member of the Legislative Council?

A. I was, Sir.

Q. And you were appointed as a special constable, on that date?

A. On the 18th April.

Q. After you were appointed a special constable, was there any other order passed on you by Colonel Beadon?

A. Yes, an order was passed by which I was required to put on a *pagri* or badge and sleep in the *thana*, and this order we considered very humiliating. We represented matters through a friend to the Chief Commissioner, and I think in the evening that order was rescinded.

The President:—Then you never did comply with anything?

A. I reported myself at the *thana* in the piercing hot weather which I was never accustomed to, and some of us, men like Rai Saheb Peare Lall, who is a senior member of the Bar, were very much humiliated, and if I am allowed to do so, I will produce a copy of this order which I copied myself at the police *thana*. (Here the witness produced the copy of the order.)

Mr. Das:—You mean the original order.

A. Colonel Beadon handed over the order to the *thanedar* in our presence, and Colonel Beadon did not even care to speak. He came on horse back to the *thana* and handed over the order, and the *thanedar* gave that order to us. I wanted the original of that. He said, "No, you cannot get the original, you simply sign your name." Then I made a copy of it myself.

Q. Then and there?

A. Then and there.

Q. And the paper which you have handed up is a correct copy?

A. It is correct, it was copied by myself.

Q. In what light did you take the order appointing you as a special constable?

A. We thought we could not serve any real purpose, and that the order was served on us to humiliate us in the eyes of the public.

Q. In your opinion was there any real necessity for it?

A. I did not think there was any necessity, because we were helping the authorities without being appointed as special constables. I do not think we could have done any more service by being appointed as special constables.

Q. You say in your statement that you were subjected to abuse by the crowd? Why was it?

A. People said "Oh, you induced us to open our shops and now you see a fracas between the people and the police picket; men have been wounded and injured; this is the result of your asking us to open the shops." Whether they said this rightly or wrongly, I can't say, but this was what they said.

Q. Did you tell the people that there would be no police interference?

A. It was arranged that there should be no police interference.

Q. Arranged with whom? Was it arranged with the authorities?

A. A telephone was sent from Hakim Ajmal Khan's house after midnight that the assistance of the police would not be required.

Q. Sent to whom?

A. Sent to Colonel Beadon's bungalow. We sent to his house at 10 o'clock at night, to ask him to arrange that the hooligans are prevented from entering the *bazar*. We thought that there would be no objection to that, but when we saw Swami Shradhdhanand he said that the people were in such a mood that they would not like police interference at all. Over this question the leaders had some difference with Swami Shradhdhanand.

Q. What matter was discussed with Swami Shradhdhanand?

A. He said that people would not like the sight of the police.

Q. Upon that, that message over the phone was sent?

A. Upon that we came to Ajmal Khan's house to go to Colonel Beadon.

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Rai Bahadur SULTAN SINGH—concluded—Mr. S. K. RUDRA.

Q. Did you get a reply ?
 A. I think he replied that it would be all right.
 Q. In connection with these questions which have been asked it was on the 17th April that you were appointed a special constable ?
 A. I think it was on the 18th.
 Q. It was on the 17th that orders were issued appointing special constables ?
 A. We received the order on the 18th.
 Q. At that time there were no special conditions attached to the appointment ?
 A. No, I do not think so.
 Q. It was later on that the special conditions to which you objected were attached. In consequence of a report

he was not satisfied with the way in which the special constables had been working. That was the ground upon which it was proved that it was necessary to have these special conditions complied with. Afterwards it was represented that these special conditions were objectionable and they were not insisted upon. Is that so ?
 A. They were not put into force. We obeyed all the same. As soon as we received orders we reported ourselves at the *thana* and represented matters.
 Q. When you represented matters, conditions were altered ?
 A. Conditions were just the same.
 Q. Did you supply yourself with a police badge or pugri ?
 A. A badge was handed over to me.

Mr. S. K. RUDRA, Principal, St. Stephen's College, Delhi.

By the President—

Q. Did you see anything of the disturbances that took place on the 30th March ?
 A. Not on the 30th of March.
 Q. You cannot tell us anything of what occurred ?
 A. I heard from people.
 Q. Have you any personal knowledge ? What is the first matter that was brought to your notice in connection with these disturbances ?
 A. I was sitting in my verandah which overlooked the main street and I saw a number of motor cars rushing past by the church to Kashmir Gate. A friend of mine had just arrived to see one of the old pupils in the city, and he told me that he had been stopped. He was coming in a carriage. He was asked to alight from the carriage and then he had to walk.
 Q. What date was that ?
 A. The 30th March. Of course I knew that this would happen and the streets were absolutely empty. There were no carriages plying for hire. By 12 o'clock there was hardly a carriage. It was perfectly quiet. Then at about one or two o'clock I heard motor cars rushing past my house and then some armoured cars. I heard afterwards that trouble occurred.
 Q. You did not come out yourself ?
 A. I did not come out that evening.
 Q. I think you saw the processions on the 1st ?
 A. There is a mistake about that date. It ought to be the 31st March. I went down in order to see how things were going on. I walked up the road that goes past the railway station. I did not see anything which drew my attention as to ravages or anything of that kind. Bricks were lying about but nothing unusual. Then I went through the Queen's Gardens gate just opposite the railway station, and I was going towards the Town Hall, but I was stopped by the police who told me that I could not pass that way, and I heard a good deal of noise proceeding evidently from Chandni Chowk. I came back and I walked to Chandni Chowk towards the evening. I retraced my steps and by the time I got there I found a funeral procession coming along and there was a huge party of people and this sight filled me with emotion. It was a silent crowd. All the house-tops were simply covered with people who were looking at the procession. The only sound that was heard was from the people who came in advance asking other people to fall in with the crowd. I followed the procession. I saw a very remarkable sight—the Muhammadans carrying the Hindu dead—a thing which I have never seen.
 Q. There was no disturbance ?
 A. Nothing at all. The next few days there was nothing very remarkable.
 Q. But later on in April, did you observe excitement in the crowds ?
 A. There were all excited on April 6th, for instance, which was a day of mourning. It was observed all over India. It was a Sunday and I walked out after service to see what was going on. I came to the Fatehpuri mosque, and I walked down Chandni Chowk.

I went through Egerton road through the bazar and then I went to King Edward's Park but all that I saw was that the shops were all closed, people in knots reading newspapers and one person was even spelling out words and others hearing but there was no disturbance of any kind whatever. I think that it was a very wise thing that there was a meeting at King Edward's Park and then again that same evening there was a very huge meeting at Dr. Ansari's place. The whole city not having any occupation, I think those meetings were really quite good.

Q. From that day on did you observe anything as regards excitement ?

A. Nothing very much but all the excitement came afterwards. Things were subsiding chiefly, I think, to the wisdom of our Chief Commissioner who withdrew the military. The people were tremendously pleased. Swami Shradhdhanand himself felt very grateful and that produced a sort of confidence in the administration. They knew that so long as Mr. Barron was guiding things there was a real source of strength there.

Q. In connection with the disposal of the police and military about this time did you see anything provocative in their action ?

A. Every time there was a parade of military strength people felt irritated. I did not see that myself but I heard it. They felt—you can if you like bring your whole military strength against us but why should you do this ? That was the general temper of the people.

Q. From what you saw was there anything as though the military or police were indulging in action calculated to provoke action ?

A. No, nothing.

Q. Did it look as though the police or the military were indulging in acts that were calculated to provoke the people ?

A. Nothing has come under my personal knowledge.

Q. As regards the incidents that took place upon the 14th and 17th, may I take it that you were not present on the scene ?

A. I do not know what you are referring to. Can you kindly give me the incident you refer to ?

Q. On the 14th, there was an incident when an inspector of the Central Intelligence Department was assaulted ?
 A. I was not there. I heard a great deal about it.

Q. And then shooting began on the 17th ?

A. I heard about it. I was going to Cook's office for some purpose, and I heard that there was shooting. The shops in my part of the city were open, but the moment the news of the shooting came the shops were closed.

Q. You did not see what led to the shooting ?

A. The news came to us between 11 and 12. It was about mid-day.

Q. You could not form an opinion as to the attitude of the crowd ?

A. I could not.

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Mr. S. K. RUDRA.

[Continued.]

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Are the police in Delhi much disliked ?
 A. The police in Delhi are very much disliked.
 Q. More than in any other place ?
 A. I do not know how things are going on in other places. But certainly I can say that the police in Delhi are very much disliked.
 Q. Why are they so much disliked ?
 A. For the very simple reason of their improper gains. They are always pressing for improper gains.
 Q. They behave towards the people in an oppressive manner ?

A. One or two things came under my own personal observation. For instance, I saw a policeman stopping wagons and carts coming from the country into the city, and demanding from the villagers some portion of the things which they were carrying. Near the railway station a lot of oppression goes on. I believe that is the reason. There may be other reasons.

Q. You speak in your statement about Colonel Beadon's notice. Is Colonel Beadon unpopular with the people of Delhi ?

A. The real thing is that Colonel Beadon is liked in one way and disliked in another way. That is the truth. The thing is that he has done a great deal for Delhi and he is known to be a straight and, if you will kindly pardon my saying so, a blunt, straightforward man. He has his own ideas of things and when he thinks that his own way of doing things is best, holding the powers that he does, he more or less gets things done in his own way. For that reason he is not liked. The real acute thing arose during the Ramliia and Muharram festivals.

Q. It was about two years ago. Since then things have not improved ?

A. The dislike has increased since then. I am afraid it is that. The masses of Delhi were more or less inactive. Delhi was supposed to be a sleepy hollow sort of place, but Delhi has quite changed—completely changed—and it is on account of that.

Q. I believe Colonel Beadon has not reconciled himself to that change ?

A. He has found it exceedingly difficult. He is a very well meaning person. I have had the pleasure of working with him in certain respects. It was a most unfortunate notice and I found it out when I was walking through the city streets on the 6th.

Q. This notice created great annoyance in the city ?

A. It did, and the people said "We are not going to open the shops." There was no *hartal* on the 6th, as far as we know, but for this notice. It practically put the people's backs up.

Q. You refer to the principal leaders enrolled as special constables on the 18th ?

A. This was done I believe after the city was handed over to the citizens of Delhi for one night. The police was entirely withdrawn. I could not give you the exact date, but the next morning the people said "we could not get any sleep." The self-constituted citizen constables shouted all night so loud and long that people could not sleep.

[The President :—They wanted to go back to the old police.]

A. Probably it was the night of the 16th. There was another exciting thing in connection with that. I was walking through the Chandni Chowk. I was not allowed to walk on the side walk.

Q. I understood you to say that the police were withdrawn ?

A. I believe so. I do not think there was a single policeman. That is the general impression. I did not see many policemen. When I was walking on the side walk, I was told to get down from that. I asked why that was so, and I found that the reason was that undesirable people might break open the locks and rob the shops and that was the way they kept order that night.

Q. What was the feeling about the enrolment of the special constables ?

A. It caused considerable resentment. The authorities may have had the best of intentions. A large number of them happened to be my old pupils, I mean the special constables, and respectable *raises* and men in the professions. They were asked to be special constables, and people felt that the position was humiliating.

Q. That was done to humiliate them ?
 A. I do not think the authorities could enter into our feelings. The day when we have our police as efficient as the London police, and as honest as the London police it would certainly be an honour to be special constables. It is not appreciated at the state of things here.

Q. The police carry such a reputation here that it is no honour to be included among the police ?

A. That is what is generally supposed, and then with regard to the orders I do not know whether I can volunteer the statement. It was very disappointing. I felt exceedingly anxious because I knew that if the orders for the special constables had been enforced there would have been more trouble.

Q. You mean that if they were continued as special constables and if the subsequent orders had been enforced there would have been trouble ?

A. There is no doubt about it.

Q. But when they were enrolled ?

A. Only people rather laughed about it.

Q. There was no need for enrolling them as special constables ?

A. That is very difficult for me to say. The authorities evidently thought that they would be able to control the city in that way. That much may be good, but the subsequent rules that were framed must have been exceedingly difficult to carry out. It was again due to the Chief Commissioner's splendid action that the whole thing subsided as soon as the special constables were disbanded and peace came again to the city.

Q. You do not suggest that the constables were the cause of disorder ?

A. No.

Q. Were you connected in any way with the *satyagraha* movement in Delhi ?

A. I am not a member of the *Satyagraha Sabha*. I am privileged to call Mr. Gandhi my friend.

Q. You have not taken the *satyagraha* vow ?

A. I have not. I do not belong to the society.

By Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You went with the dead bodies to the burial ground and you heard the address of Swami Shradhdhanand. Did that address exercise a very great restraining influence or did it excite people ?

A. It was one of the very best addresses I have ever heard. It seemed to soothe the feelings of the mob that had been excited. It really lifted people up into a spiritual level altogether. I was able to join and follow in everything and in the prayer that was offered.

Q. From what you say may I understand that you were every day out in the city ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did not the leaders and the *raises* of the city try their best to help the authorities during the period of disturbance ?

A. Their very best. There is not the slightest doubt about that.

Q. Is it not a fact that the leaders and *raises* of the city had no sympathy with the so-called excesses that were done by the mob, such as stone-throwing and brick-throwing ?

A. They were not in sympathy. They tried their very best to get the shops opened, to make people reasonable. The reply given was "We are not always to be led by you," and the leaders were in a very awkward position for a time.

Q. But there was a feeling of indignation as to what happened on the 30th March ?

A. Certainly.

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Mr. ISLAMULLAH KHAN.

Mr. ISLAMULLAH KHAN, Municipal Commissioner and Honorary Magistrate.*By the President—*

Q. Are you, Mr. Islamullah Khan, a municipal commissioner and honorary magistrate, Delhi?

A. Yes, My Lord.

Q. On the 30th of March, you had gone out of the city in the morning?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you return to the city in the afternoon?

A. Yes.

Q. What time?

A. It was about 1-30 or 2.

Q. Would you tell us what you saw in the station when you arrived?

A. When I came up to the station, I found that the station was simply packed with men. After enquiry it was found that a crowd at the station had come up there to shut the shops. I saw they were making a lot of fuss and confusion.

Q. Did the mob come out of the station?

A. I saw them coming out of the railway station.

Q. Before they came out, did you see any destruction of property?

A. No. I did not see myself, but I heard that lots of losses were made at the railway station.

Q. When you came out, what further, did you see?

A. I met Mr. Currie, our Additional District Magistrate, and I saw that when the mob came out of the railway station, they were making a lot of fuss and confusion.

Q. There were no brickbats and stones thrown over the officers?

A. No.

Q. Had the crowd anything in their hands?

A. They had sticks.

Q. Do you mean *lathis*?

A. Yes.

Q. What sort of crowd was that?

A. I could not exactly tell you. It was composed of the riffraff of the country. That is what I think.

Q. At whom were they throwing missiles?

A. They were throwing at the officers and Government servants who were there.

Q. Was the crowd in your opinion a dangerous crowd?

A. Their attitude was very threatening indeed and very provocative.

Q. Did you know that the mounted guard had been sent for?

A. I saw them coming up.

Q. Were you at the station at the time the firing took place?

A. No, I was not there.

Q. You left just before?

A. Yes.

Q. Just before you left, what was the attitude of the crowd?

A. They were throwing brickbats and stones over the officers and trying to attack them, but they were getting back, I do not know by what force.

Q. Did you see officers and officials of the Government actually struck?

A. No.

Q. You saw the missiles being thrown?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you form any opinion as to whether that was a safe place to be in?

A. I did not think it was safe.

Q. You were afraid of very serious consequences?

A. Yes, I thought so.

Q. When you heard the firing, were you surprised that it had been necessary to fire?

A. Seeing the attitude of the people and the position of the Government servants, when they were surrounded by such a provocative mob, I thought it was necessary to disperse the crowd by frightening them away.

Q. Did you think that if the crowd had not been dispersed, it might have very serious consequences?

A. In my opinion it was.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. When did you alight at the station from the train?

A. It was about 1-30 or 2 p.m.

Q. When you alighted at the station was the mob on the station platform?

A. The mob was on the platform, where the train came in. The mob was right in front of the central gate.

Q. Inside the gate?

A. On the platform.

Q. Where was Mr. Currie at the time?

A. He was not there. When I came to the station I met him on the steps of the station.

Q. Mr. Currie was in the station yard?

A. He was not on the platform, but I met him at the entrance gate of the railway station.

Q. What do you mean? The gate of the railway station yard or the railway platform?

A. The gate of the entrance of the station.

Q. That is the entrance leading from the road to the station yard?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Currie was there?

A. Yes.

Q. While the mob was on the platform?

A. Yes.

Q. That is there was no crowd round Mr. Currie?

A. When I came out of the station, the mob followed me.

Q. When you first came, the mob was on the station platform?

A. Yes.

Q. When you came out, the mob also came out?

A. After 5 or 10 minutes.

Q. When you first came out, there was no mob in the yard?

A. I did not see any mob, I saw Mr. Currie.

Q. You saw Mr. Currie without any crowd there?

A. Yes.

Q. What was Mr. Currie doing there without any crowd?

A. He was coming to the station. He was going into the station and he met me on the steps of the railway station.

Q. When you were coming out of the platform, Mr. Currie was ascending the station steps?

A. He was coming into the station.

Q. At the entrance of the road? Is it the place where the carriages stop and passengers get into the station in the railway compound?

A. Yes.

Q. He was about to come on the steps when you were coming out?

A. Yes.

Q. At the time there was no crowd in the station at all?

A. The crowd was on the platform.

Q. Was this about 1-30?

A. Some time about that.

Q. When you saw Mr. Currie ascending the steps of the platform, the crowd came out after that?

A. Yes. They flocked into the railway compound.

Q. I see from your statement that you stated you stayed with Mr. Currie for about one hour?

A. Yes.

Q. That was in the railway compound yard?

A. At the road.

Q. Did you remain with Mr. Currie in the compound itself?

A. Yes for 5 or 6 minutes.

Q. You and Mr. Currie went out afterwards?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was the crowd then?

A. The crowd stopped movement in the enclosure of the railway station, then they went out into the road.

Q. Did you and Mr. Currie go out first or did the crowd go out first?

A. I cannot remember whether we followed the crowd

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Mr. ISLAMULLAH KHAN.

[Continued.]

Q. When you and Mr. Currie went to the road, the crowd was there also?

A. Yes.

Q. You remained on the road with Mr. Currie for one hour?

A. Yes, for about an hour.

Q. During that one hour, were you surrounded by the crowd?

A. Yes, myself, Mr. Currie and the other officers.

Q. Who were the other officers?

A. I saw Imam-ud-din, inspector of police, and other officers. I do not exactly remember.

Q. You referred to only one. You cannot name any other?

A. No.

Q. Yourself, Mr. Currie and Mr. Imam-ud-din were there for one hour and the crowd was surrounding you?

A. Yes.

Q. What were you three people doing standing for one hour?

A. They were saying that we ought to release the people the police arrested.

Q. What were you doing, three people, standing?

A. To appease the mob.

Q. What did you do?

A. I was a silent spectator; I was simply stunned.

Q. You were so stunned by the sight?

A. Yes, Mr. Currie asked me to stay with him. He gave me no orders to go to the crowd and say anything.

Q. Did he give you any orders to stay with him?

A. He did not order, but I stayed with him.

Q. Why did you stay?

A. I did not know why he asked me.

Q. Did you ask him why he wanted you?

A. I did not.

Q. You did nothing standing for one hour. You cannot say anything as to the purpose for which Mr. Currie asked you to be there for that time.

A. I thought he wanted my help.

Q. Did you in fact, render any help?

A. I did not, nor was I asked to do so.

Q. You were not asked and therefore you did not?

A. Yes.

Q. All the time, brick and stone-throwing went on?

A. Occasionally brickbats were coming.

Q. Were you hurt yourself?

A. No.

Q. Was Mr. Currie hurt?

A. No.

Q. Was Imam-ud-din hurt?

A. No.

Q. You did not see anybody hurt for one hour?

A. No.

Q. Then you have said in your statement that messenger after messenger was sent from your home. How many messengers?

A. Two or three men.

Q. Those messengers were able to get through the crowd and come to you?

A. Yes.

Q. The crowd did not stop them from coming?

A. No.

Q. Was it a very orderly crowd that allowed your messengers to come in?

A. They did not think that they were doing any harm to the mob.

Q. What did the messengers tell you, that you were wanted at home?

A. Yes.

Q. Why were you wanted?

A. They said that some sort of riot was going on in our neighbouring street, and one of the cars of the English officers was stopped and they were got down forcibly.

Q. Did you ask Mr. Currie's permission to go?

A. I could not see him, because he was away from me. I went away.

Q. Were you with Mr. Currie all the time?

A. No; I was not with Mr. Currie all the time.

Q. What were you doing standing there? Mr. Currie was attending to his duties. You alighted from the train in the ordinary course and wanted to go home.

What were you doing there waiting for one hour?

A. I was waiting only for his orders. I thought he might ask me for some help on the spot.

Q. In the expectation that Mr. Currie might give you some orders?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ask for any orders?

A. No.

Q. Did he ever give you any orders?

A. No.

Q. When you went home, you passed through the crowd?

A. Yes.

Q. Nobody disturbed you?

A. No.

Q. They allowed you to go?

A. Yes.

Q. No brickbats at all?

A. No.

Q. Did you mention it to anyone—what you had seen?

A. I told my people what I had seen in the station.

Q. Was it found out that you were in a position to make a statement?

A. Yes, I mentioned it.

Q. When did you mention it?

A. I do not remember exactly.

Q. How many days after the 30th? Did you mention it only now?

A. I do not exactly remember.

Q. A month or so from now?

A. Most probably. That would be about October.

Q. You narrated it for the first time to the Chief Commissioner in October.

A. I do not exactly remember.

Q. I want to know what you actually did?

A. It is very hard to remember.

Q. Surely you know when you mentioned this incident that you saw to any authority either the Chief Commissioner. It might be in August or September?

A. I cannot exactly tell you that.

Q. Can you tell me to whom you mentioned it first—when you in fact informed an officer of what you are telling us now?

A. I cannot say whether it was the Chief Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner.

Q. When did your train arrive?

A. It was about half-past one or two.

Q. So long as you remained there the demand of the crowd was to release the persons who had been arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. And according to you, you heard the reply that was given that they had been released?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the demand that their men should be released made by the crowd in your presence or not?

A. I heard the crowd saying so.

Q. What was the reply that was given?

A. I did not hear the reply, but I was told that it was given.

Q. Who informed you?

A. The other people in the crowd.

Q. The other people of the crowd informed you. Can you name any of the crowd? You had a talk with the crowd?

A. Yes.

Q. Imam-ud-din or Mr. Currie or any of the officials did not inform you as to what became of those men who had been arrested?

A. No.

Q. Had you any knowledge that the crowd forcibly rescued those two men?

A. No. I have no knowledge.

Q. So long as you were there can you say whether any *lathi* blow was aimed at any officer or Imam-ud-din or at any of the officers?

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Mr. ISLAMULLAH KHAN—concluded—Mr. K. A. DESAI.

A. I cannot exactly say.
 Q. If you remember you can say so, Was any *lathi* blow aimed at any of the officers?
 A. They were thrown. I do not know whether they were aimed at any particular officer.
 Q. *Lathis* were thrown. There must have been about more than a dozen lying at your feet where you were standing?
 A. I did not see any *lathis*.
 Q. Did you see any motor car?
 A. No. I did not see.
 Q. Was there any trap—any kind of conveyance?
 A. I cannot say.
 Q. Was there any person on behalf of the crowd who was taking messages and carrying messages between the crowd and the officers?
 A. I saw one man.
 Q. And you must have heard the conversation which he had with the officer?
 A. No. I did not hear.
 Q. Then up to the time that you were there no police or military had arrived till that time?
 A. I saw a mounted guard coming.
 Q. What was the strength of that mounted guard?
 A. About 20 or 30?
 A. I am not quite sure.
 Q. Possibly 7 or 8?
 A. Well, more than 7 or 8.
 Q. Were there any Europeans with that mounted guard?
 A. I cannot remember.
 Q. You are an honorary magistrate—probably you know all the police officers of this place?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Was there any policeman who was known to you going with that guard?
 A. I do not quite remember.
 Q. You know Mr. Jeffreys—you must have seen him?
 A. Well, I have seen him.
 Q. You know that Mr. Jeffreys is a police officer in Delhi?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What was your idea—did you want that the crowd should be frightened or be actually fired upon?
 A. I thought it would be quite sufficient to frighten them away.
 Q. After they went out—after they left the platform and went into the courtyard and from the courtyard they went on into the road, did that crowd ever come into the yard again?
 A. I never saw.

Mr. K. A. DESAI, Manager of the Birla Mills.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Desai, are you the manager of the Birla Mills?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Were you connected with the *satyagraha* movement?
 A. Yes.
 Q. You signed on the 7th March, did you?
 Q. I do not remember the date. I signed it.
 Q. You were in Delhi on the 30th March?
 A. Yes.
 Q. You said that perfect peace and order was maintained. Did you see any people being asked to get down from *tongas*?
 A. They respectfully requested them to walk out as a matter of humiliation.
 Q. They all acceded to your request?
 A. The majority acceded to our request.
 Q. What time did you go to the station?
 A. At about 11.
 Q. Was there a crowd at the station?
 A. Very small crowd.
 Q. What time would it be?
 A. From eleven to half past one.

Q. You were there for such a long time—did you see a contingent of the Manipuris?
 A. I do not remember.

By S. rdar Sahib-ada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. You have told us that you are an honorary magistrate—I take it that you are a man of influence in the town?
 A. I cannot say that.
 Q. In your opinion you do not seem to carry any influence in any part of the city?
 A. I cannot say. I am not conscious of any.
 Q. When Mr. Currie stopped you evidently he wanted your help?
 A. Most probably.
 Q. Did you make any attempt to go and speak to the crowd and disperse it?
 A. No. I was waiting for his instructions.
 Q. Didn't you suggest it to Mr. Currie?
 A. No. I did not.
 Q. You did not think it was your duty?
 A. I thought it was but I was waiting.
 Q. Whether it occurred to you or not it was your duty under the circumstances of the case to suggest to Mr. Currie if you wanted his orders?
 A. I was with him and I thought he would ask me to do something. I did not want to take the initiative myself.
 Q. You saw some very important occurrences, did you not think it necessary to report as soon as possible to any of the authorities—or the next day?
 A. The officers concerned were present, and Mr. Currie would inform all the officials concerned.
 Q. Did you go and report to the Chief Commissioner?
 A. I might have gone after a month or when the matter came up for discussion.

By Mr. C. R. Das—

Q. How long have you been an honorary magistrate?
 A. About a year.
 Q. You were appointed then at the time of these occurrences. Now you know that there was a trial with reference to that occurrence. Were you a witness in that trial?
 A. No.

By the President—

Q. Do you know whether a person who was accused in that particular trial committed any act of violence or not at the railway station?
 A. I have not seen it myself personally.

Q. Were you there until the firing took place?
 A. I was not there.
 Q. How long before the firing had you left?
 A. I had left as soon as the machine-gun arrived.
 Q. When you were there, were there many people on the platform of the station?
 A. About 50 people.
 Q. What were they doing?
 A. They were on one side and the soldiers were beating them from the other side. These people wanted to go in.
 Q. Were the soldiers amusing themselves with beating them?
 A. There was a sort of *fracas* between them and the people.
 Q. I do not quite follow. Where was this?
 A. On the platform at the second class entrance gate. The people were on one side of the portico and the soldiers were inside the platform.
 Q. Were the soldiers trying to prevent the people from getting on to the platform?
 A. Yes.
 Q. At what time was it?

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Mr. K. A. DESAI.

[Continued.]

A. 11-15 or 11-30 just as I arrived at the station.
 Q. Was this before the crowd had asked the sweetmeat-seller to close?
 A. After. I went to the station after having heard that two people had been arrested.
 Q. That occurred before 11 o'clock?
 A. It may be about that time. I came to the Chandni Chowk, and there I heard that something had taken place at the railway station and that two men had been arrested.
 Q. Did you make any enquiry as to why they had been arrested?
 A. I asked the inspector of police afterwards. He said that he had no man in his custody.
 Q. Was that not so?
 A. The people did not believe it. I did declare it to the public.
 Q. So far as you know that information was not accurate?
 A. I could not say for certain. Had they taken me to the spot immediately, I might have believed. At that moment I did not see the *hawalat*.
 Q. Why did not they go?
 A. They did not believe the inspector.
 Q. What did they then do?
 A. Anyhow, they said "get us our men back."
 Q. What else occurred?
 A. The inspector of police came from behind. He broke open the door and whipped the people who were inside the room. I told the inspector it was not fair to whip the people.
 Q. Was it not necessary to get the station cleared?
 A. They might also have been asked to go. They did not do any mischief. They simply asked for the release of the two boys. They did not break anything.
 Q. Where were the men who had been supposed to have been arrested?
 A. I do not know.
 Q. Do you know why they had been arrested?
 A. It was said that they had gone there to get the sweetmeat shops closed.
 Q. Did you come out of the platform and go in front of the station?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Were there many people then?
 A. Not more than 50 or 60.
 Q. Were they never more than that?
 A. Outside the portico there were about 300 or 400.
 Q. When did the military come there?
 A. I did not see any military come there till I left. I only saw the police guard and the machine-gun which had arrived.
 Q. Were the crowd throwing stones?
 A. Not a single stone was thrown until I was there. I left at about 1-30.
 Q. Not a single stone was thrown?
 A. Nor was a single man assaulted.
 Q. Were you surprised when the military had been called?
 A. When I was talking to the district traffic superintendent to release the two boys, the military and the police came in and I asked him what was the necessity for this.
 Q. Were the crowds getting larger as you waited there?
 A. Until the time I left it was 400 or 500 men.
 Q. Where were the military placed?
 A. I did not see any military until I left.
 Q. You say in your statement here during the meeting 50 lancers.....
 A. That was in the evening, Sir.
 Q. The crowd was perfectly quiet?
 A. Up to the time I was there, except that they cried out for the release of the two boys.
 Q. Nothing else was done? Who broke the glass doors?
 A. There were a few people inside the room of the station superintendent demanding the release of the two men. But Inspector Hamid-ud-din forced open the door and that was the cause of the glasses being

broken. Then he went on whipping the people and the people were forced out forcibly.
 Q. You said that the inspector was whipping the people. With what was he whipping?
 A. He had a baton with leather laces.
 Q. Who was that?
 A. Inspector Hamid-ud-din.
 Q. Was he alone?
 A. He was followed by half a dozen police-men.
 Q. When you found that there was no one in custody, did you tell the crowd to disperse?
 A. I did request them to go away.
 Q. You were unsuccessful?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Then you went away?
 A. When I saw the machine gun coming, I thought the whole crowd would be more excited, I retired with the idea that the leaders of the city could do something.
 Q. Where did you go?
 A. I went towards the side of the Home Rule office.
 Q. And what happened then?
 A. I there stayed for some time and one man of the Criminal Investigation Department came and said to me and Lala Shankar Lal that we were requested by Imam-ud-din to go to the station and persuade the crowd.
 Q. What time was it?
 A. Just as we arrived.
 Q. Did you do that?
 A. We did start. I told Lala Shankar Lal that Hakim and some other leaders were coming by the Chandni Chowk side. I also offered bail for these two boys.
 Q. What was the use of offering bail when they were released.
 A. He did not tell me that they were released. He never said that he had no boys in his custody there.
 Q. When you offered bail what did he say?
 A. He had no man in his custody; that was the only reply he gave me thrice.
 Q. After you had been to the Home Rule office, where did you go?
 A. I went to the Congress grounds taking the crowd saying that there will be a different meeting there.
 Q. Was there a crowd there?
 A. A meeting was arranged there; there was a crowd.
 Q. And what happened at the meeting?
 A. After some time, 50 lancers and officer came with them. *Swami* was talking. I also requested to know what he wanted there. Then he asked why people were throwing stones and he wanted an assurance that that would not happen. I told him that provided he went away with his men, the meeting would go on peacefully, and no stones would be thrown. He asked me to declare it to the meeting. I declared and then they retired.
 Q. Was that the second meeting?
 A. That was the first meeting. At the second meeting the Chief Commissioner came.
 Q. The second was later on?
 A. That was about half an hour later.
 Q. Did the Chief Commissioner come there?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Was the second meeting a large meeting?
 A. It was a very largely attended meeting.
 Q. You do not know anything about shooting on other occasions?
 A. I was never present at the time of the actual fire.
 Q. Is it your evidence that the crowd had no sticks or *lathis*?
 A. They had no *lathis*. Some might have had walking sticks, but no *lathis*.
 Q. Did you pass the place next day?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you see any of the railings broken down?
 A. I did not see any of the railings broken or any perceptible damage.
 Q. Was there any trace of stones?
 A. No.
 Q. Bricks?
 A. No.

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Mr. K. A. DESAI.

[Continued.]

Q. Was the place just as if there had been no other currence on the preceding day?
A. There was nothing at all to indicate that there had been stone throwing or riot.
Q. Was it your desire that the *hawal* should stop on the 30th.
A. Yes.
Q. Did you endeavour to fulfil your desire?
A. The next morning, i.e., on the 31st, I endeavoured.
Q. Did the shops begin to open?
A. Some of the shops were being opened.
Q. Did you see anything of the disturbances on the 4th?
A. No, as soon as I received information, I went to the spot. The whole thing had practically ended.
Q. You make a certain statement as regards an officer of the Criminal Investigation Department making a remark to you "Why do you open the shops?"
A. He was an ordinary constable; he was a Muhammadan with a red turkish cap.
Q. What was his name?
A. I did not enquire his name. I reported that matter to the inspector of the Criminal Investigation Department.
Q. Had you ever seen him before?
A. I saw him taking notes.
Q. Because he was taking notes, you think he was a Criminal Investigation Department man?
A. He was taking notes in front of the speeches at public meetings.
Q. Is that the only reason?
A. He did tell me that as he was in the Criminal Investigation Department and wanted to take notes, he should be put on the front.
Q. You do not know his name?
A. I reported to the superintendent, Criminal Investigation Department.
Q. Do you know whether he was really a Criminal Investigation Department man?
A. I could recognise him.
Q. What object had the Criminal Investigation Department in saying "Why do you open shops?"
A. I could not say what object he had, except to justify their own actions.
Q. How to justify their actions?
A. That the people were rowdy and not in a peaceful condition.
Q. Had the statement made any effect upon the people?
A. Yes.
Q. I am not sure on what date it occurred.
A. It was on the 31st morning.
Q. Did you see anything that occurred on the 17th?
A. No.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. You referred to one man who happened to say to you on the 31st that he was a member of the Criminal Investigation Department. I will just read to you your statement. You were of opinion that the Criminal Investigation Department had not fairly "conveyed the fact in a true light to their superiors," and you knew at one or two places when you were "trying to persuade the people to open shops, there were a few men of the Criminal Investigation Department" (not one man) "whom you could recognise if shown to you who spoke out from the crowd certain sentences, such as "Why do you open shops, our dead are not returned as yet, the leaders have been brought up by the Government" and such other sentences." It was not a case of one man?

A. There were several instances. There were many men whom I suspected. One man I actually know, as I had given him a seat to take down notes at a previous meeting.

Q. You say here that there were a few men of the Criminal Investigation Department?

A. That was my information at the time that they belonged to the Criminal Investigation Department.

Q. In the station superintendent's office on the 30th March, were there a great many people in the crowd?
A. About 40 people crowded in the station superintendent's office.
Q. And that was the time when you say that he began thrashing the crowd to get out?
A. Yes, with a stick.
Q. In the same way, I think the city inspector came in from the back door?
A. Yes.
Q. Had the station superintendent been able to get the crowd away by himself?
A. The crowd was also assaulting him.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. I want to know if that happened after you came to the station. When you came to the station what did you first observe?
A. I went to the platform side. On one side there were 30 men trying to go to the other side. There were soldiers beating with sticks.
Q. How many soldiers were there?
A. About 6.
Q. How many people were there on the other side?
A. About 30.
Q. Were they armed?
A. They were simply trying to break open the door. The soldiers were attacking. There was no possibility of beating, but by means of sticks through the gates, they drove them back.
Q. Then what happened next?
A. I saw it was impossible to go in that way. I wanted to go to the other side. The door was closed. Then I came back again. By that time, the door was open. The crowd had gone. I went to the station superintendent's office.
Q. How did the mob go?
A. I do not know that.
Q. You first saw 6 or 7 soldiers. How do you account for the door thus opening and people going in?
A. It may have been done forcibly.
Q. When you came back, were the soldiers there?
A. They were not there. I do not know when they retired.
Q. Did you go to the platform?
A. Yes.
Q. Where did you find the 30 or 40 people?
A. They were inside the station superintendent's room.
Q. As soon as the crowd went in, it was beaten back?
A. I did not go inside. I stayed outside.
Q. In the room were the superintendent and the 30 or 40 people?
A. Yes.
Q. Where was the station superintendent? Was he surrounded?
A. He was on one side facing the 30 or 40 people.
Q. What was he doing?
A. He had a cane stick with a leather covering. He was trying to drive away the people who were doing nothing to him. They would have assaulted him.
Q. Did you see anything that they did to him?
A. His coat was torn. Just when this was going on, a police inspector with a guard came from behind and drove away the crowd.
Q. The police inspector and guard came and forced open the back door and pushed these people?
A. About a dozen, I think.
Q. Were they railway police?
A. No. City police.
Q. When they came in what happened?
A. The crowd came out running.
Q. The crowd ran out and the inspector behind them?
A. Then they were moved out of the platform and brought out into the portico—brought near the steps in the yard.
Q. Then what happened?
A. I went to the inspector and had a conversation with him.

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Mr. K. A. DESAI.

[Concluded.]

Q. The inspector who came with these people? Where was he?
A. He was now at the steps of the portico.
Q. And what conversation did you have?
A. That "it was very unfair that you should have beaten these fellows." I demanded the release of those two men.
Q. That was the first time that you had any conversation with anyone?
A. Except when I took the help of a Criminal Investigation Department man to go to the station superintendent.
Q. What did he tell you?
A. He was abusing all *satyagrahis* and the crowd.
Q. He knew you?
A. No. He did not know me.
Q. Then what happened?
A. I said "It is very unfair—please deliver those two men and the whole trouble will be over. If you want I will stand bail." But he said he had no men in his custody. Then I went and told the people who had collected not to do anything otherwise some further trouble will ensue. I then went to the district traffic superintendent. The crowd was in the yard.
Q. What was happening during the half hour?
A. The crowd were simply yelling. I went to the district traffic superintendent.
Q. Where was he?
A. He was standing near the Wheeler's stall.
Q. Do you know his name?
A. Mr. Yule.
Q. You went up to him?
A. I spoke to him. I told him that the whole trouble will be over if you release those two boys.
Q. What did he say?
A. "Let the Chief Commissioner and the military come." I again went to the station superintendent.
Q. You mean the man who had come in charge and somebody else had come into the room—and you went to him? Do you know his name. And what did you tell him?
A. Please release the men and everything will be over. But he knew nothing. I again came to the inspector and he told me to go and see the *hajat* to see if anybody was there. There was nobody there, and I declared this to the crowd but they said they did not believe me. They began yelling and went on yelling.
Q. Then what happened?
A. When these things were going on I told Imam-ud-din to do something—in the meantime let us go and bring some new leaders.
Q. You thought that it would be necessary—you were powerless to do anything further?

A. I thought so.
Q. Up to that time there was no police beyond what you have described? No armed police or anything of the sort?
A. There were about 25 men.
Q. Then you left?
A. As I was leaving, I saw machine-guns.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. In your statement you allude to a meeting and you said that the people were quiet throughout—there were heaps of stones lying about but not a single stone was thrown in spite of the guard? What do you mean by the guard?
A. There were mounted motor-cars with a machine-gun going round about—all this having been done twice.
Q. How many motor cars?
A. About three. At least I saw one mounted gun and soldiers going round about.
Q. How many soldiers?
A. About 6.
Q. Well, six soldiers in each motor car—that would be about 18 to 20 and you say that 18 to 20 soldiers and one machine-gun in a crowd of 25,000.....
A. A body of lancers were there.
Q. That would make a total of 78 to 80 military—is that a great military display where there are 25,000 people—is not that exaggerated?
A. But I think it was a sort of display.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. The statement which you made to-day about your being present at the railway station on the 30th, and about your making a statement to get the people released and approaching the authorities did you make this statement soon after the occurrence?
A. This was the statement filed by me before the non-official enquiry, and it was published in nearly all the leading dailies.
Q. Had the crowd any assurance in what the inspector was telling them—did they believe him?
A. They had no faith in him.
Q. It has been alleged that the boycott of the tramcars subsequent to the 30th March and 6th April was due to anti-British feeling?
A. Not at all.
Q. Was the manager of the company approached?
A. I saw him once. But he sent a reply although he had not received letters sent by the committee. He sent the reply which I have appended. (The reply was here read out by the member to the witness—page 196.)

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LALA SHANKAR LAL.

At Delhi, Friday, the 7th November 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. JUSTICE RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B.,
K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble PANDIT JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

SARDAR SAHIBZADA SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. H. G. STOKES, C.I.E., I.C.S., Secretary.

LALA SHANKAR LAL.

By the President—

Q. Are you the Managing Director of the Delhi Swadeshi Co-operative Stores, Limited?

A. Yes, My Lord.

Q. You took the satyagraha vow?

A. Yes, My Lord.

Q. What did you do on the 30th?

A. A meeting was announced to be held on the evening of the 30th.

Q. Were you at the station or in the streets on the morning of the 30th?

A. No, not in the morning.

Q. Did you see anything of what occurred at the station?

A. I went to the railway station at noon and I saw the station in the condition which I have described in my statement.

Q. Can you describe to us what you saw at the station?

A. When I reached the Clock Tower I was told that two volunteers had been arrested but I afterwards ascertained that they were not volunteers but some other persons. I then proceeded to the railway station and I stationed two of the volunteers at the gate towards the Fatehpuri Mosque not to allow any persons to go to the railway station.

Q. Who were the two men that you posted at the gate?

A. They belong to the Home Rule League Volunteer Corps.

Q. What were their names?

A. One name was Abdulla Churiwalla and the name of the other person I do not remember.

Q. What were they supposed to do?

A. They were asked not to allow any persons to go to the railway station.

Q. Why was that?

A. Because I heard that there was a large crowd at the railway station and I did not want the crowd added to and that two men had been arrested.

Q. Did these two men prevent people going to the station?

A. I do not know.

Q. What did you see at the railway station yourself?

A. When I arrived at the railway station I saw that a large number of people had assembled there and they came towards me. I asked them why they had assembled there and I was told that two men had been arrested and were roughly handled by the police. I got on to the wall and addressed the crowd that they were satyagrahis and that they should not use violence in getting the persons released. "We will file a regular application in court and see that the persons were released. The fate of the satyagrahis was to suffer themselves—to go to jail rather than get others released by force."

Q. Did you find out anything about the men that were supposed to be arrested?

A. I do not know who were the men that had been arrested but a sadhu boy came and told me that his brother was one of those who was arrested.

Q. Who was that sadhu boy?

A. Saraswati Gir.

Q. What has become of him?

A. I heard afterwards that the boy went to Gurgaon.

Q. Did you make enquiry personally as to the men having been arrested?

A. I enquired from the people and was told that two men had been arrested.

Q. Did you make any enquiry from officials as to whether any men had been arrested?

A. I spoke to Mr. Desai and asked him to go and speak to the station authorities to release the men who had been arrested and he was ready to stand security.

Q. Who?

A. Mr. Desai.

Q. Did you hear anything that Mr. Desai said about that?

A. I did not hear Mr. Desai on coming out of the railway station compound.

Q. I want to know what you yourself heard from someone?

A. I did not make any enquiries personally.

Q. Did you ascertain at this time that no men were under arrest?

A. The boy was creating a noise that his brother was there.

Q. Did you ascertain at the time that there were no men under arrest?

A. The police said that they had no persons under arrest but the people did not believe that.

Q. What did the people do?

A. The people were asking for the persons to be released—and they will go away—and if any bail was offered they were ready to offer it.

Q. Were the people throwing stones or using sticks?

A. During my stay I did not see any stones being thrown.

Q. Were you there when the firing took place?

A. I left long before that.

Q. When you left where did you go?

A. I went to the Home Rule League office.

Q. Did you see any of the subsequent occurrences that day?

A. I did not see with my own eyes. When I reached the Clock Tower I saw two dead bodies being brought in a tonga and two or three wounded persons.

Q. I think on the 6th there was a hartal again?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you take any action on the 6th yourself?

A. Yes. The satyagrahis and other respectable citizens of Delhi assembled at Dr. Ansari's consulting room,

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LALA SHANKAR LAL.

[Continued.]

and he advised that a public meeting should be held as quickly as possible in order to keep the people occupied.

Q. By occupying them and so preventing disturbance?

A. Yes, and on that Mr. Rauf Ali, Barrister-at-Law, went to ask permission of the Deputy Commissioner to hold such meetings.

Q. On the 6th there were several meetings held?

A. Three meetings.

Q. Did you see anything of the disturbance on the 14th?

A. There was a meeting in the Edward Park and some affray took place.

Q. On the 17th did you see anything?

A. Nothing in my presence.

Q. When the shops were shut from the 10th to the 16th did you make any effort to get them opened?

A. Dr. Ansari, Hakim Ajmal Khan and others went round the streets requesting people to open their shops. A notice was also issued and amongst the signatories I was one asking people to resume business.

Q. And the people resumed business?

A. People said that if the order against Gandhi was cancelled they would open.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. There is just one thing I want to ask you. You and some friends of yours before the 30th went round amongst the shopkeepers. Did you not ask them to observe hartal on the 30th?

A. Yes.

Q. In your statement you say that you requested them humbly to close their shops on the 30th. Did they willingly accede to your request?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you also impress on them that nothing was to be done to compel people who was not willing?

A. Yes.

Q. At that time did you anticipate that some of the higher spirits might want to bring compulsion upon the people?

A. Arrangements were made that volunteers should be detailed in the streets with instructions not to allow any force or compulsion to be used.

Q. You thought that possible and took precautions?

A. Certainly.

Q. You thought it also possible that people might roam about in large numbers?

A. We requested them not to roam about.

Q. On both points trouble did occur in the end?

A. No trouble on the 30th till 12 noon, when two people were arrested and all the trouble arose from that.

Q. What was the size of the crowd at this time?

A. The crowd increased to a large extent when the news reached the city that two persons had been arrested.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You were treasurer of the Satyagraha Sabha?

A. Yes.

Q. The Sabha was dissolved on the 17th April?

A. I did not know that. I read that the Sabha was dissolved when I was in jail. Although I was out of jail on the 17th I was not informed of that.

Q. You were arrested on the 20th April?

A. Yes.

Q. For what?

A. For an assault or rather alleged assault on a Criminal Investigation Department Inspector. I was honourably acquitted from the Court.

Q. On the charge of?

A. I was an organizer of the meeting.

Q. Is this assault on the Criminal Investigation Department at the meeting of the 14th April?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was this meeting held?

A. Edward Park.

Q. Were you present at that meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. Were the Criminal Investigation Department people there?

A. The Criminal Investigation Department people are present in every meeting.

Q. In this meeting also?

A. Yes.

Q. It was the Criminal Investigation Department man who was assaulted?

A. I heard that the man who was assaulted was Faqir Muhammad, and also head constable Daud Ali.

Q. You say you left the meeting before that took place?

A. Abdul Majid was speaking something. I arrived just at the station when he said the words which led to the disturbance.

Q. You came into the meeting when Abdul Majid was speaking?

A. Yes.

Q. What happened?

A. He said something and people got up. There was a great row.

Q. They seemed to be provoked by what Abdul Majid said?

A. Yes. People began to fly towards the gate facing the parade ground. Afterwards I heard that there were some Criminal Investigation Department people taking notes. I then left the meeting.

Q. Why did you leave the meeting?

A. Because I thought the occurrence of the 30th March may not be repeated. I went to the Congress office to phone to Hakim Ajmal Khan.

Q. Then you were arrested on the 20th?

A. Yes.

Q. On the charge of having assaulted?

A. There were four charges. The first was that I was present at the meeting, secondly that when the Criminal Investigation Department man was beaten I was laughing, and thirdly a pistol was snatched from the Criminal Investigation Department man. The fourth was that I ordered people to destroy certain papers taken away from a certain Criminal Investigation Department man. These were the allegations.

Q. You were arrested on the 23rd?

A. Yes.

Q. You were not let out on bail?

A. Not only that, they accorded me very bad treatment.

Q. Did you apply to be let out on bail?

A. I applied several times, I think twice or thrice.

Q. Who applied?

A. My counsel.

Q. To whom did you apply?

A. To the District Magistrate, Mr. Currie, and then to the Sessions Judge.

Q. They refused bail?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you put on trial?

A. Yes, before Mr. Currie.

Q. He acquitted you?

A. Yes.

Q. You do not know what happened in connection with the dissolution of the Satyagraha Sabha?

A. No.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. When was the Satyagraha Sabha dissolved?

A. It was dissolved on the 17th; I heard afterwards.

Q. Was there a meeting on the 20th?

A. Yes.

Q. You did not see the notice of meeting for dissolution?

A. I did not receive any notice of meeting for dissolution of the Sabha.

By Mr. C. R. Das—

Q. You were also the secretary of the Home Rule League?

A. Yes.

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LALA SHANKAR LAL—concluded—RAM BHAROS.

Q. How many days were you in jail before you were acquitted?

A. Some three months.

Q. You said that you told the people at the railway station that they were *satyagrahis* and that they should go home. To that what did the people say?

A. People said that they were willing to go home, but they wanted to know what was the fault of their men who had been arrested. If the men should be released on bail, they would offer bail up to any amount. That convinced me.

RAM BHAROS.

By the President—

Q. What is your occupation?

A. I am employed in a firm known by the name of G. R. Beri.

Q. What were you doing on the 30th March?

A. I was employed in the same firm. The shop was closed. I took a bill to the enquiry office at the railway station.

Q. For what purpose?

A. I took a bill for a pair of shoes that a gentleman had purchased at the shop.

Q. Where is Beri's shop?

A. In the Chandni Chowk.

Q. What did you do when you got to the station?

A. I saw a few persons standing and requesting the shopkeepers to close their shops.

Q. What shops?

A. Ordinary shops of sweetmeat sellers.

Q. Did you see that on your way to the station?

A. In the passengers' waiting hall at the station.

Q. Was anything done to make the contractor close his shop?

A. Nothing was done.

Q. What was the crowd doing to induce the contractor to close his shop?

A. They were requesting and asking in a polite manner.

Q. How many were making this request?

A. Some 10 or 15.

Q. Do you know the names of any of these 10 or 15?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever seen any of them before?

A. No.

Q. Did you go to the enquiry office?

A. I could not reach the enquiry office.

Q. What happened then?

A. Seeing that there was a crowd there, I stopped and did not go further.

Q. What happened to you?

A. A Christian officer came to the spot, and asked that the persons standing there might be arrested.

Q. Who was to arrest?

A. He asked the police to arrest those people who were gathered there.

Q. Were the people that he asked to be arrested quiet and doing nothing?

A. They were standing there quiet and doing nothing at the time.

Q. Were they impeding the traffic?

A. No.

Q. Were any people arrested?

A. Three men arrested, two others excluding myself.

Q. Who were the other two?

A. I do not know.

Q. Were you arrested by a railway policeman or by a city policeman?

A. By the railway police.

Q. Where were you taken?

A. I was taken round the platform to the police office at the railway station.

Q. Were you detained there?

A. I was detained there for 15 minutes. I asked the police authorities why I was arrested; on that I was beaten and throttled and put to other inconveniences.

Q. Upon that you asked Mr. Desai to go to the station authorities?

A. Yes.

Q. You said that after the riot and before the fire began, you left?

A. Yes.

Q. Why did you leave?

A. I left in order to inform the leaders, as I thought that if they were there they might possibly disperse the crowd.

Q. By whom were you so beaten?

A. By policemen.

Q. Do you mean the railway police?

A. Yes.

Q. What weapon were you struck with?

A. I was slapped.

Q. Were you beaten hard?

A. I felt it at that time, but I did not receive any serious injuries.

Q. Did you make any complaint about the treatment you received?

A. I did not make.

Q. Did you have any friends in the crowd?

A. I had no friends in the crowd.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Up to the time of your arrest the people in the station were quite quiet and not even impeding the traffic?

A. They were quite quiet and were not at all impeding the traffic.

Q. You say that the order was given by a Christian officer—by the police to arrest those people there?

A. The order was for those who had gathered there to be arrested.

Q. Did that mean to arrest the whole of the people there—the 10 or 15 men?

A. The order was for all to be arrested but only three of them were actually arrested.

Q. Can you explain why in your written statement before this Committee you say when you reached the waiting hall a Christian officer who did not look to be an European ordered the police constable to arrest the people who were kicking up a row?

A. They were not kicking up a row. They were only requesting in a polite manner the shopkeepers to close their shops.

Q. When you were taken to the railway police office how many people were in that office?

A. One officer and two clerks.

Q. Did you sit down quietly?

A. I sat there quietly.

Q. And how long had you been sitting quietly before you asked the cause of your arrest?

A. After five minutes I enquired the cause of my arrest.

Q. And up to that time if I gather correctly you had not been interfered with?

A. No. I was not interfered with.

Q. When you asked for the reason of your arrest they began to trouble and slap you? How long after was this?

A. Practically immediately.

Q. Who slapped and troubled you?

A. The police.

Q. What do you mean by the police? Do you mean one man or the three men?

A. Only one man—he was not in uniform—he was in *mufti*.

Q. Before he did that what had he been doing—was he at his desk writing?

A. When I reached the office, that man was standing.

Q. Did he slap you about the face?

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RAM BHAROS.

[Continued.]

A. I was slapped on the face and I was given some blows on the back and ribs.

Q. Did he do that with his hands?

A. With his fist.

Q. You say you made no complaint at the time?

A. I made no complaint at the time.

Q. You made no complaint to any police authority or magistrate?

A. I did not make any complaint.

Q. You did not report to any hospital?

A. No.

Q. You say at the time that you were not seriously injured?

A. I was not wounded and I did not receive any serious hurt.

Q. Were there marks on your throat?

A. I had no marks but for some time I was feeling dazed on account of the throttling.

Q. Are you right in saying that you were not in your senses on account of the thrashing?

A. After being thrashed I was in the office for only 15 minutes.

Q. You said you were dragged to the police office. Why didn't you go peaceably yourself after you had been arrested?

A. I was going peaceably but I was pushed.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You were in the employ of G. R. Beri. What salary did you draw then?

A. Rs. 20.

Q. How many years had you been in their service?

A. For the last five years.

Q. Are you an inhabitant of Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. And this Mr. Beckett at the enquiry office did you know him before?

A. I had been to him on two previous occasions. I went to him with the same bill.

Q. He bought from your firm only once?

A. He made a purchase only once.

Q. Did he not pay the money on those occasions?

A. There was a small amount outstanding on the bill.

Q. What was the amount of the bill?

A. Rs. 16.

Q. What amount was outstanding when you went there on the 30th March?

A. Rupees 6-8, Rs. 10 had already been paid on order.

Q. Was this Rs. 6-8 paid at any time?

A. Rupees 2-8 is still outstanding. He is paying it by instalments.

Q. Are you still with this firm?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you produce the account of this gentleman with regard to this bill?

A. With the permission of the proprietor, I can do so.*

Q. These incidents that you have spoken of—did you mention it to anyone?

A. I mentioned it at the shop where I am employed. I mentioned it to my proprietor.

Q. Did he not advise you to complain about the matter to the authorities?

A. He only advised me to make a complaint before the Commission appointed.....

Q. Did you go to the non-official commission and give evidence?

A. Yes.

Q. On what date?

A. I do not remember.

Q. What month?

A. April.

Q. You say that after some time you were released. When you were released, did you come out of the station by the gate by which you entered?

A. I went out by the other gate.

Q. Was the crowd still there when you came out?

A. Very few of the crowd were left.

Q. The crowd had all gone away?

A. Only a few people were present at the time I came out.

Q. On the station yard, was there a crowd when you came?

A. No.

Q. When you came out of the station platform into the station compound there were no people?

A. Only a few.

Q. Were any people collected outside the station compound on the road?

A. There was no large crowd.

Q. When you passed that place, you did so easily?

A. Yes.

Q. You did not find or hear any people asking for the release of the people that had been arrested?

A. I did not hear.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. You say that the crowd was imploring the shopkeepers to close their shops. In what way were they imploring them, were they threatening them or were they simply asking them to be kind enough to close their shops?

A. They were only imploring them, requesting them in a polite manner.

Q. And what was the shopkeepers' reply to that?

A. A few of the shopkeepers had closed and a few were closing.

Q. They were complying with the request?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they make no objection?

A. No.

Q. Were you one of those who were imploring the shopkeepers?

A. I was not one of those.

Q. Two other persons were arrested with you. Did they take part in imploring the shopkeepers?

A. I do not know.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. How far is the third class waiting room from the road?

A. It is close by, at a small distance.

Q. Where are these sweetmeat shops?

A. They are underneath a shed.

Q. How many such shops are there?

A. About 4 or 5 approximately.

Q. You said that you left the station by another gate? Which gate? Near the police station there is a gate which leads to the road, you left by that gate?

A. The same gate of the door of the *thana* that leads on to the road.

Q. Were the three men that were arrested standing before the sweetmeat seller's shop under the shed or were they among the men who were standing in the compound?

A. They were members of the crowd that was standing before the sweetmeat shops.

Q. What happened to the other two men that were arrested? Were they or were they not taken to the office when you were there?

A. They were not taken.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith—

Q. What time was it when you got home?

A. I do not know what time it was, I think about midday.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. From which direction were you approaching the station when you went there from the shop? Where is the shop?

A. The shop is in the Chandni Chowk.

Q. You went through the Queen's Gardens. By which gate did you come out?

A. By the gate just opposite to the railway station.

Q. Where is the enquiry office where you were taking the bill? In which part of the station?

A. On the platform where first class tickets are sold.

* Vide page 96. Evidence of Mr. Gopi Krishna Beri.

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Q. Is there not some distance between that and the third class waiting room ?
 A. There is a little distance.
 Q. What was the necessity to go to the third class waiting room ?
 A. I saw the crowd of a few persons. That is why I went there.
 Q. Did you see any crowd outside on the road ?
 A. As soon as I got out of that gate of the Queen's Gardens, I saw a number of men just at the gate leading to the third class room.
 Q. I believe that the third class waiting room is very crowded ordinarily. What was there specially to make you go inside ?
 A. Nothing special.
 Q. Did you hear any noise or anything to attract your special attention ?
 A. I did not notice anything special.
 Q. Instead of going into the enquiry office, which was nearer to you and where you had to go, you walked into the third class waiting hall.
 A. When I saw the crowd there, I went straight to see what was going on; otherwise I would have gone straight to the enquiry office.

Haziq-ul-Mulk HAKIM MUHAMMAD AJMAL KHAN.

By the President—

Q. You are a resident of Delhi ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Were you one of them who took the 'satyagraha' vow ?
 A. No.
 Q. Have you any personal knowledge of the incidents of the 30th March ?
 A. I have no personal knowledge.
 Q. Were you in the streets on that day ?
 A. I was not out in the streets.
 Q. On the 31st March did you see a funeral procession ?
 A. I accompanied one of the funeral processions.
 Q. Did you preach at one of the meetings that were held that day ?
 A. Swami and I.
 Q. What advice did you give the people as regards the opening of shops ?
 A. I advised the people to open their shops.
 Q. Did the people assent to your course ?
 A. So far as could be ascertained at the meeting the people assented.
 Q. From the 1st April did the shops begin gradually to open ?
 A. The shops began gradually to open.
 Q. Was there another 'hartal' held on the 6th ?
 A. Another 'hartal' was held.
 Q. Did you give any advice with reference to whether that 'hartal' should be held or not ?
 A. I and several others advised that the 'hartal' on the 6th should not be held.
 Q. Was it in spite of your advice and of other people of influence that the 'hartal' was held ?
 A. I and the others did not exhort the people very much because they expected that the 'hartal' will not be observed, as a message had been received from Mr. Gandhi and as the 'hartal' had previously been observed on the 30th; so we did not make any further efforts.
 Q. After the 6th did the shops begin to open ?
 A. The shops began to open after the 6th.
 Q. On the 10th was a 'hartal' again declared; did that continue from the 10th till the 17th ?
 A. A 'hartal' was again declared on the 10th on account of the orders passed against Mr. Gandhi and it continued till the 17th.
 Q. On the 14th were certain Criminal Investigation Department officers roughly handled by the crowd in King Edward's Park ?
 A. They were.
 Q. Did you see anything of that occurrence ?

Q. Were those two men arrested before you or while standing there or before you were arrested, or simultaneously with you ?
 A. Simultaneously, just at the same time when I was arrested.
 Q. Were they also pushed or dragged ?
 A. I do not know whether they were dragged or what happened to them. When I got to the police *thana*, there was no one.
 Q. How were you taken ? What do you mean by dragging ?
 A. I was not actually dragged, but was pushed.
 Q. Pushed from behind ?
 A. Yes, at which I felt insulted.
 Q. You have not given any reason why you did not make any complaint ?
 A. Because I did not expect that the complaint would be listened to.
 Q. Why ?
 A. I was advised by my friends, shopkeepers, to make the complaint before the commission of enquiry, i.e., the non-official commission.
 Q. Did they give any reasons ?
 A. They simply advised and did not give any reasons.

A. No.
 Q. On the 17th did anything occur within your knowledge ?
 A. On the 17th the 'hartal' had practically ceased through the efforts made by the meeting, and the shops in the Sadar Bazar and in the Chandni Chowk and other streets had resumed business.
 Q. Were you in the street on that day in company with Dr. Ansari ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did anything occur ?
 A. On the 17th I was with Dr. Ansari and on the arrest of a man the shops were again closed.
 Q. Do you know why the man was arrested ?
 A. I heard that the man was requesting shopkeepers to close their shops. That was why he was arrested.
 Q. Did you go to the Deputy Commissioner in the Town Hall ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And did you request him to release the man ?
 A. I requested him twice.
 Q. What answer did the Deputy Commissioner make to your request ?
 A. The reply was that if the man was let off the people would be encouraged again. That is the reason why he did not agree to let him off.
 Q. Do you know what happened to that man who was arrested ?
 A. I heard that the man was thrown over the railing into the Queen's Gardens and I also heard that he had been wounded with a bayonet but when he was brought to me I examined him and saw that there was no truth in the rumour.
 Q. Was the man quite uninjured ?
 A. He received a very slight scratch.
 Q. Do you know how he received that scratch ?
 A. No.
 Q. What happened to the man ? Was he retained in custody ?
 A. He was in custody at the time and when I and others wanted to have a look at him we were told that he was in the lock-up.
 Q. Do you know what happened to him afterwards ? Was any charge made against him ?
 A. He was sentenced to three months' imprisonment but I do not know under what section.
 Q. Did you see any firing on that occasion yourself ?
 A. I only saw one firing—the firing that was done at the Town Hall.
 Q. Was that on the 17th ?

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Haziq-ul-Mulk HAKIM MUHAMMAD AJMAL KHAN;

[Continued.]

A. Yes.
 Q. What did you see at the time of the firing ?
 A. Before the firing, some persons came running from Ballimaran Street and said that they were fired at. When they were passing by the road that goes opposite the Town Hall they were fired at.
 Q. Did you see them fired at ?
 A. I saw them fired at. I came out from the Town Hall at that time.
 Q. Who fired—was it the police or military ?
 A. I cannot say exactly, but as far as I remember it was the police.
 Q. From where did they fire ?
 A. From that part of the street that leads into the Queen's Gardens.
 Q. How many of the police were altogether ?
 A. About 20 or 25. Those who fired were not more than 20 or 25.
 Q. Did you hear any order given to fire ?
 A. I did not hear.
 Q. Were stones being thrown or any missiles being thrown by the people ?
 A. Nothing was being thrown at that time.
 Q. Did you see any stones thrown by the people ?
 A. No.
 Q. Had any of the mob any weapons in their hands ?
 A. They were running very fast and I did not see any weapon.
 Q. Could you not see any lathis in their hands ?
 A. No.
 Q. Were any people killed or injured in consequence of the firing ?
 A. I did not see any man killed or wounded on account of the firing that was done at the Town Hall.
 Q. How long did you wait at the Town Hall ?
 A. Half an hour or three quarters of an hour.
 Q. Was everything quiet when you left ?
 A. When I left the Town Hall there was no crowd and no noise.
 Q. Had the crowd entirely dispersed ?
 A. That had entirely dispersed at the time when I left. I heard that there were a number of people at Ballimaran.
 Q. Did the firing to which you have referred take place before the firing in Ballimaran Street ?
 A. After the firing at the Ballimaran. This was the last firing.
 Q. How do you account for the fact that you make no reference to that in your statement ?
 A. Some facts have been left out because I was not here. Then I had lot of other things to attend to. Some other points have also been left out.
 Q. Was the firing that you saw from the Town Hall over the heads of the people ?
 A. I think it was over.
 Q. And whether it was done in consequence of any order or not, you cannot say ?
 A. I did not hear any order. The officers who were with me in the Town Hall gave no order. Whether any other officer gave it I do not know.
 Q. Were you inside the Town Hall when this took place ?
 A. I came out when the firing took place. I was inside the verandah and a few other officers were outside on the road.
 Q. Did you actually see the guns of the men who fired the shots or did you just hear the sounds and assume that the sounds had come from guns ?
 A. I saw the man, saw the guns and also the firing.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—
 Q. When you went to the Town Hall to ask Colonel Beadon to release this arrested man, some friends of yours went with you ?
 A. Dr. Ansari.
 Q. Did he come out of the Town Hall with you in the end ?
 A. Yes.

Q. Was he also inside the verandah at the time when you have been speaking of ?
 A. So far as I remember I was with him.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—
 Q. You and your family occupy a very high position in Delhi ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. You exercise considerable influence over the people in Delhi and have been in touch with them ?
 A. I have some influence.
 Q. Can you tell me in your own way the causes which led to the events which took place in March and April in Delhi ?
 A. I think that if the mistake that was committed at the railway station had not been committed nothing would have happened in Delhi.
 Q. Were there any predisposing conditions in Delhi which made it possible for these events ?
 A. Since Delhi became the Imperial city, political movements began. By means of meetings, papers and associations, attempts were made to awaken the people in a legitimate manner and also efforts were made that the people may properly understand what was passing in the world in these days.
 Q. What was the attitude of the local authorities towards these movements ?
 A. The local officials did not like these movements. By officials I refer to Chief Commissioner, Mr. Hailey, Deputy Commissioner, Colonel Beadon and the Superintendent of Police and the responsible officers of the police.
 Q. The police usually were against these movements ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Their view is generally there should be no political agitation in Delhi ?
 A. Their view was there should be no agitation in Delhi; so far as I know or understand these officers did not want any political movements in Delhi.
 Q. Naturally they came to dislike those leaders of the people who started these movements in Delhi ?
 A. They did not like those who took a leading part in these movements.
 Q. Were they very much against the meeting of the National Congress being held in Delhi ?
 A. So far as I am aware they did not like it.
 Q. Did the starting of these movements which were in this manner disliked by the authorities create a feeling of tension between the authorities and the public and their leaders ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. While things were in this state, came the Rowlatt Bill and the agitation following that ?
 A. Yes. There were considerable difficulties in getting space for holding public meetings and that also indicated the attitude of the officers towards these movements.
 Q. Do you mean space for holding National Congress meetings or what ?
 A. Political public meetings.
 Q. There was always difficulty created in the way of your getting place for meetings ?
 A. Yes. We were not allowed to hold meetings in places where we thought they ought to be held.
 Q. How long has this been going on ?
 A. The Seditious Meetings Act has been in force in Delhi from last April and since that time there had hardly been any meetings. We had only one or two—and we got permission for that.
 Q. When did Mr. Hailey leave Delhi administration ?
 A. It is less than a year since he left.
 Q. How long was Mr. Hailey Chief Commissioner of Delhi ?
 A. He was Chief Commissioner since Delhi became the capital (12th October 1912).
 Q. Was there any general public dissatisfaction as to Mr. Hailey's administration of Delhi ?
 A. I cannot say. Different people may have different opinions. A certain portion of the town did not like it.

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Haziq-ul-Mulk HAKIM MUHAMMAD AJMAL KHAN.

[Continued.]

Q. So far as you yourself, the leaders of Delhi and the people with whom you are in touch are concerned, was there a general dissatisfaction of Mr. Hailey's administration, specially with regard to his attitude towards political movements?

A. So far as I am aware of the feelings of the leaders of these movements, Mr. Hailey did not like them and consequently of course they did not like Mr. Hailey's way of treating them.

Q. For how many years has Colonel Beadon been Deputy Commissioner in Delhi?

A. He has been Deputy Commissioner for a number of years. I could not say exactly for how long he was here. He was Deputy Commissioner before Delhi was declared the capital of India.

Q. What was the attitude and mind of the people towards Colonel Beadon?

A. Generally he was not liked.

Q. Why was he not liked?

A. There were various reasons. His general treatment was harsh and he mostly devoted his attention to municipal affairs. He did not look to other matters and also sometimes he was not very nice in treating people. There was some difference of opinion as to how the *Dasakra* procession should proceed about two years ago, and his ultimate decision did not please the public.

Q. We heard the same thing of the *Ramlila* procession?

A. Yes.

Q. A couple of years ago there were various prosecutions started by Colonel Beadon against certain leaders in Delhi? If I remember aright Asaf Ali was prosecuted?

A. There was a case against Asaf Ali, but I could not say exactly.

Q. These prosecutions were in connection with their addressing public meetings?

A. Yes.

Q. These people were acquitted?

A. They were acquitted but they were ordered not to speak in public afterwards.

Q. Various orders of that character were issued against people not to speak at meetings?

A. I have no recollection excepting these two men.

Q. All you have told us had produced a feeling of considerable tension between those in authority in Delhi and the public generally and their leaders?

A. Yes.

Q. Then again the Rowlatt Bill last year?

A. Yes.

Q. In connection with that you are aware that there was general opposition throughout India to those bills?

A. Yes.

Q. And legislation was opposed almost unanimously by all the Indian members of the Imperial Legislative Council?

A. Yes.

Q. In connection with that there were meetings in Delhi—did you take part in those meetings?

A. Yes.

Q. Those meetings and the agitation against the Rowlatt Bill were disliked by the authorities in Delhi? I take it?

A. I have no special knowledge about these meetings whether they were disliked or not.

Q. I understand you to say that the feeling between the authorities and the people was of such a character that the people were prone to view with suspicion any act of the officials and to misunderstand it?

A. It had reached that stage.

Q. When?

A. About a month or two before—or in April.

Q. That was the state of things when Mr. Barron became Chief Commissioner. When did Mr. Barron become Chief Commissioner?

A. He succeeded Mr. Hailey.

Q. Do you think that the state of feeling between the authorities and the people that you have described is in some measure responsible for the events that actually occurred?

A. It was one of the factors that led to these incidents.

Q. May I know what is your opinion as to the measures that were adopted for dealing with the situation that arose? Take for instance the 30th of March. You were not present at the station when the firing took place so you are not in a position to judge whether the circumstances on the spot were of such a character that would justify firing?

A. I cannot say from personal knowledge.

Q. After the events at the station you have knowledge as to what happened in connection with the dead and wounded? What the authorities did in connection with that?

A. I have no personal knowledge.

Q. With regard to the giving over of the dead bodies to their relations I want to know what personal part you took in the negotiations. What was the attitude of the authorities in this instance?

A. As regards the giving back of the bodies there was nothing objectionable so far as the bodies were concerned and the attitude of the Chief Commissioner was quite correct. Four or five people were asked by the public to see the Chief Commissioner and to request him that the dead bodies both of Hindus and Muhammadans should be given back to their relations and also that the police force and the military that were in the Town Hall should be so removed as may not be in the view of the general public and that those who had been wounded should be permitted to go back to their relations' houses. Five men went to see the Chief Commissioner, Rai Sahib Pyare Lal, Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh, Abdul Rahman, Pyare Lal, the Motor Proprietor, and Hakim Ajmal Khan (witness). The Chief Commissioner paid very great attention to what we said and he immediately sent for his motor car and went to the police station.

Q. This was on the 31st?

A. Yes. When we went there, there were no dead bodies in the hospital as they had been transferred to the civil hospital. After that we went to the Deputy Commissioner. First the Chief Commissioner interviewed the Deputy Commissioner and afterwards he told us that we should go and make our request to the Deputy Commissioner and put our request before him. He acceded to our request but his manner and tone were not satisfactory. Then we went to the civil hospital. The dead bodies were handed over to the relations. As regards those who had been wounded there were two classes of people, those who had been severely wounded and those who were not. The authorities said that in the case of the severely wounded it would be better for them in their own interests that they should be attended to in the hospital and that it would be some time before they could leave the hospital. As regards the others they said that they had no objection. This was explained to the public and they were satisfied.

Q. The dead bodies were then returned on the evening of the 31st.

A. About 4 P.M. on the 31st.

Q. So that from noon on the 30th to the evening of the 31st the bodies were not handed over to their relations?

A. Yes.

Q. During this time were the relations demanding the dead bodies?

A. Yes, and generally all people had been asking for them and then we formed a sort of deputation to see the authorities.

Q. The demand was being made from the beginning?

A. Yes.

Q. This delay in handing over the dead bodies, did it create any resentment on the part of the people?

A. Yes.

Q. The police and the military were brought in on the 17th. What do you think of the measures that were taken to keep order?

A. I am not in a position to answer this general question, unless I am asked in detail.

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Haziq-ul-Mulk HAKIM MUHAMMAD AJMAL KHAN.

[Continued.]

Q. During these days, from 30th March to 17th April in your view, was there any unnecessary display of military and police authority?

A. Generally, the sight of the police and the military aroused the feeling of the people. It would have been more advisable if the authorities, supposing they thought it necessary to have police precautions, if they had kept them in the background and were not so much shown.

Q. Why were the people so irritated at the sight of the police?

A. Generally in India the relations between the police and the people are not friendly, especially in Delhi during those days.

Q. In India, are the police very much disliked? Are they hated by the people?

A. Especially in these days they were very much disliked. They are generally disliked everywhere; they are disliked in Delhi also.

Q. Do you think that if the police and the military had not been called in during these days, order could have been preserved?

A. The police did not interfere with them—therefore nothing happened.

Q. My question is, during these days could order have been maintained without the police and the military?

A. In my view I do not think there would have been any breach of the peace. Perhaps the utmost that might have happened would have been the breaking of a few windows of the railway station. Nothing more would have happened if the police and military were not there.

Q. Is it your view that it was the interference of the police and the military that caused the disturbances? Is that what you suggest?

A. If the police and the military were not there, it is very obvious that no fire would have taken place.

Q. Could order have been maintained?

A. All that might have happened is the breaking of a few windows and nothing more.

Q. There would have been no disorder except the breaking of windows?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 16th, the police were withdrawn from the town. Is that so?

A. Yes. Very few policemen were left.

Q. Was that in pursuance of the suggestion that you and the other people had made that the police should be withdrawn?

A. Repeated requests were made. I cannot exactly say if the withdrawal of the police was due to that.

Q. The police were not there on the 16th. Was there any disorder?

A. No disorder took place on the 16th.

Q. You had various meetings with the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner about ending the *hartal*.

A. They were on the 14th and 15th. There were consultations with the authorities, the Deputy Commissioner and Mr. Scott about the *hartal*.

Q. What was the attitude of Colonel Beadon at these meetings?

A. I did not notice anything special at these meetings, except some expressions in the proclamation that was issued in the meeting at the Town Hall.

Q. Complaint has been made about some proclamation. We have heard that. To your knowledge were the people irritated over the expressions used in that notification?

A. When he was asking many people to stop the *hartal* many people said that he called them *badmashes* and so they would not open their shops.

Q. Your efforts to get the *hartal* to end were not very successful on the 14th and 15th?

A. No.

Q. What was the reason?

A. Because there were other people who were trying to induce people to keep the *hartal*. Once we saw that we made further efforts and collected people and volunteers to speak to people and to lecture to them on the

advisability of opening shops; ultimately on the 17th we succeeded.

Q. On the 15th when you had the meeting with the Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner at the Town Hall, there were large crowds collected outside the Town Hall?

A. Yes.

Q. They believed the rumour that was spread that the leaders were going to be arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the foundation for that?

A. I could not give the exact reasons. Probably the leaders were going to the police. There were the police and the military. People imagined they were to be arrested.

Q. Had the news of the arrest of various leaders in Lahore and Amritsar arrived in Delhi at that time?

A. Very likely.

Q. Did that contribute in some measure to this rumour spreading?

A. That should be the main reason.

Q. You were a member of what is called the non-official commission that was constituted soon after these disturbances?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you hold your meeting? How many meetings had you?

A. About 15 or 16 meetings.

Q. You yourself attended the meetings?

A. Yes, I attended all the meetings except 5 or 6.

Q. What did the commission ultimately do? Did you arrive at any findings and made any report?

A. When they came to know of the appointment of this commission they stopped further proceedings.

Q. When did they hold the last meetings? Somewhere in April?

A. I cannot say. They did not hold any meeting after April.

Q. The appointment of this committee was never suggested till long after that.....

A. When they finished recording the evidence.

Q. Where is the record of the evidence?

A. It was with the Secretary when the work was finished.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. You said that one of the causes of dissatisfaction with the authorities in Delhi was the difficulties they put in the way of holding meetings—in the way of giving you accommodation. Do you mean they refused to give you accommodation when it was available?

A. It was available and not given.

Q. Is it not a fact that last Christmas the military authorities hired a site for the Congress meeting that they held in the Pipla Park?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Not reported.

A. On the midnight of the 16th the district magistrate was informed that police help was not required by the people. At about 1 A.M. I went to Mr. Scott and telephoned to Dr. Ansari and I phoned to the District Magistrate informing them.

I was present at the majority of the political meetings held here about that time and at none of these meetings was there a misrepresentation about the Rowlatt Act. I and Rai Bahadur Pyare Lal read out the sections of the Act which were objectionable and explained their meaning.

There would have been no difficulty about offering bail for the release of that man even if the amount of bail would have been Rs. 50,000—the man who was arrested on the 17th.

I am quite certain that had that man not been arrested, what subsequently followed would never have occurred.

When I replied to Sir Setalvad that the crowd would have broken only windows I was referring to the 30th and not the subsequent date.

7 November 1919.] Haziq-ul-Mulk HAKIM MUHAMMAD AJMAL KHAN—concluded—MR. GOPI KRISHNA BERI—
LALA BISHAN SARUP.

I am not prepared to swear that there would have been no riot if the two persons at the railway station had not been arrested. I told the people that such things would not have happened if they had not been arrested.

Q. Assuming that most of the people who were collected before the station were there for two hours, nothing serious would have happened in the meantime had Hindu and Muhammadan leaders been called?

A. I am almost certain that nothing further would have happened.

By the Honble Mr. Thomas Smith—

Q. I gather that the police were so disliked that you preferred them to stand aside and do nothing?

A. I cannot make a general statement. It depends upon circumstances.

Q. If circumstances which lead to the presence of troops to bring quietness and to restore order would lead to trouble it would be better not to bring the police in evidence. Do not police have their duties?

A. They have their uses.

Q. You would not welcome their interference under certain conditions?

A. They are for the good of the people of course.

By Sir C. H. Selalwad—

Q. Were you enrolled as a special constable?

A. No.

MR. GOPI KRISHNA BERI.*

By the President—

Q. You see the bill. Can you say whether the bill was presented on the 30th March 1919?

A. He paid Rs. 4 on the 27th and promised to square the account by the 30th. The shop was closed on the 30th. I sent my man that day to get the amount.

Q. If your shop was closed, why didn't you give him a day's rest?

By Mr. C. R. Das—

Q. You were one of those that asked for the ground on which the Congress was held. Before that, was there an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner that no political meetings should be held in public places without licenses?

A. Yes.

Q. At that time Mr. Barron was Chief Commissioner?

A. Yes, it was before that.

Q. You referred to Ramlila. Was there any *hartal* on that occasion?

A. There was.

Q. It lasted for 11 days?

A. I cannot say exactly.

Q. Was there any disturbance on that occasion?

A. There was no disturbance.

Q. In October, i.e., last month, there was a *Khilafat* day and *hartal*?

A. There was no disturbance on that date.

Q. You said in your evidence before the Committee that you could not open the shops because although you were trying to persuade people to open the shops, there were other people who were persuading them not to open?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you tell us whether they were public men or Criminal Investigation Department men?

A. I cannot say definitely whether he was a Criminal Investigation Department man.

A. He came to my house. When all the market was closed, I was not going to open my shop. He had the bill. I asked him to go and collect the money. That was the reason why I sent him.

Q. To collect the balance of Rs. 2 and odd?

A. Yes.

* Vide p. 91. Evidence of Ram Bharos.

LALA BISHAN SARUP, Coal Merchant.

By the President—

Q. Are you a coal merchant in Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you present at a meeting of the 29th March in the Pipal Park?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that the night before the *hartal*?

A. Yes.

Q. Was any resolution come to as regards the proceedings connected with the *hartal* at the meeting?

A. Lectures were delivered at that meeting. Mahatma Gandhi had declared about the Rowlatt Act. It was also told at that meeting that people had to fast the next day.

Q. What was the resolution that was come to? Was it that volunteers should offer their services for succeeding days?

A. No resolution to that effect was passed.

Q. Did you volunteer to offer your services as a volunteer for the next day?

A. I offered my services.

Q. Why?

A. Because it was declared at the meeting that volunteers were needed to go round the city and be stationed at different places—to disperse the people that were gathered at certain places.

Q. So you thought that there was a risk of crowds gathering and peace being disturbed?

A. There was no risk as to breach of peace being caused.

Q. On the next day did you in fact act as a volunteer?

A. I worked in the capacity of a circle inspector.

Q. What do you mean by that?

A. I was not stationed at a particular spot but I had to go round the whole city to see that the other volunteers were working.

Q. What duty did you expect the other volunteers to discharge?

A. It was their duty to see that no violence was used by anyone, to compel shopkeepers to close their shops and to see that no loss was caused to the shops that were closed.

Q. Were you constituting yourself as a force to take the place of the police force?

A. I worked side by side with the police.

Q. With a view to assisting the police?

A. Yes.

Q. If you thought that volunteers were necessary to assist the police you must have anticipated the possibility of disturbance?

A. It very often happens that on occasions like this the police use undue force.

Q. The volunteer corps was organised in order to see that no force was used?

A. It was not specially with a view to please the police but to help their own brethren.

Q. On the morning of the 30th were you at the station?

A. Not in the morning but in the afternoon.

Q. Why did you go to the station?

A. I went to the station on being informed that some of the volunteers had been arrested and that there was some disturbance.

Q. Do you mean that some of your volunteer force had been arrested by some of the police at the station?

A. I was told that some of the men of the volunteer force had been arrested.

7 November 1919.]

LALA BISHAN SARUP.

[Continued.]

Q. Do you say now that in fact any member of the volunteers was arrested?

A. As no regular list of volunteers was prepared therefore I am not in a position to say as to whether any volunteer was arrested and what happened to him.

Q. If you were told that volunteers had been arrested were you not told of the names that were arrested?

A. It was a rumour and on hearing that rumour the volunteers came to me.

Q. When you arrived at the station what did you find?

A. I saw that there were about 1,000 to 1,200 men assembled there.

Q. Were any officials there?

A. Hamid-ud-din, the city inspector, and the Sessions Judge were present at the time.

Q. Were Mr. Jeffreys and Mr. Currie there?

A. They came a little after that.

Q. Was the crowd of people doing anything when you arrived?

A. Some were sitting, some shouting and others lying down on the ground—others entreating that the persons who had been arrested may be released.

Q. Were stones being thrown?

A. No stones were being thrown.

Q. Were there any sticks in the hands of the mob?

A. There were no sticks.

Q. Had any damage been done to any of the station buildings?

A. It had occurred before I arrived at the station. I was told that a few window panes and flower pots had been broken.

Q. Did you find out whether anyone had been arrested by the police?

A. I was told by Inspector Hamid-ud-din that the two persons who had been arrested were let off.

Q. Did you inform the crowd of that?

A. I informed the crowd at once.

Q. Did the crowd disperse on the news that the persons were not under arrest?

A. The people objected saying that the persons had been arrested in their presence and they were surrounding the station because they had not been let off in their presence.

Q. What did the crowd proceed to do when they remained on after they had been informed that the persons were released or were not in custody?

A. The people shouted *Mahatma Gandhi ki jai* and such like phrases and said that they would not leave the place as long as they were satisfied that the people had not been released.

Q. Were the people cleared from the station into the park?

A. The crowd when I reached the station was on the road. Then Inspector Hamid-ud-din came and read out a written document to the effect that the two persons who had been arrested were released and that no case was to be instituted against anyone and when he read it out the crowd at once dispersed.

Q. Was this before any firing took place?

A. This took place before the firing.

Q. Is it your opinion that the crowd had been dispersed before any firing took place?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you explain then how the firing took place?

A. On leaving the road the crowd got into the garden and on getting into garden they divided themselves up into three parts on the two roads. When they had divided themselves up I was in the middle of the road pushing the people backwards.

Q. If the people had dispersed, as you say they had dispersed when you intimated to them the announcement you had got, why did you push them back?

A. The majority of the crowd had dispersed, some 800 or 900 and about 50 or 60 I think were there. These were being pushed back.

Q. Did you observe a picket of military come out?

A. I observed the picket was stationed at the very gate.

Q. Why had the picket been stationed at the gate did you suppose?

A. I was of opinion that the picket was stationed there in order to prevent people, who had dispersed, from coming back.

Q. At this time or prior to the firing did you see any missile thrown by any member of the crowd?

A. As long as that man Devi Pershad was not fired on, no missile of any kind was thrown by the public.

Q. According to your evidence no brick, no stone or anything else was thrown by any member of the public on any member of the police, military or any official until that firing had taken place?

A. There were no stones or brick-bats in the Queen's Gardens. There were only lumps of small clay.

Q. What occurred afterwards so far you saw?

A. Immediately afterwards, firing took place. On the side I was standing, i.e., the Ahmadpai Sarai, the crowd dispersed.

Q. Was there any firing on the side on which you were?

A. No firing.

Q. How far were you from the place where the shots were fired?

A. About 20 or 25 paces.

Q. After the firing what did the crowd do?

A. There was no crowd. People ran away hearing the shots.

Q. Did you notice the ground in front of the railway station?

A. I went back to the Chandni Chowk. I did not see the road in front of the station. I accompanied a few of the wounded.

Q. When you left, how many people were there in the station?

A. When I left there were no persons left on the road. They were all in the garden, and if they got there afterwards I do not know.

Q. Did you see any soldiers on the road between the Town Hall and the station?

A. I saw soldiers at the gate and on the road between the Town Hall and the statue of the Queen Empress.

Q. Did you speak to any one in authority on the date?

A. I spoke to a European, but I do not know his name. So far as I know he did not belong to the Delhi police.

Q. Did you make any request to him or to any one in authority?

A. I requested him that the crowd there wanted the wounded to be made over to them. I asked him to accede to their request and to resort to lenient methods.

Q. At what time did you make this request?

A. At 3 or 3-30 P.M.

Q. Was that after the second fire had taken place in the Chandni Chowk?

A. It was 6 or 7 minutes before the second firing.

Q. At this time were not the streets in a state of turmoil?

A. Thirty or forty young boys were standing near that lane and some others were standing in front of that gate requesting the making over of the wounded. The streets were not in a state of turmoil.

Q. Where were the wounded?

A. The wounded were lying in the Queen's Gardens. I had taken away a few of them.

Q. Why did not you make your request to get the wounded before you left the station where the wounded were?

A. There were 3 or 4 persons with me. One had taken a wounded each. At the station one wounded was lying there. I posted one Ganga Sahai to bring the dead body.

Q. Was this in Chandni Chowk where you made this request? And if you really wanted it, I want to know why you did not ask some one near the place where the wounded were, if you wanted to take charge at once?

A. I had accompanied those wounded. I had left and then I was not allowed to enter the garden again. The man whom I had posted to bring the wounded who were lying behind was also not allowed to pick up the wounded and take them along.

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LALA BISHAN SARUP.

[Continued.]

Q. Were you near the place where the fire took place on the second occasion of the 30th.

A. I was very close.

Q. Did you see Mr. Jeffreys on that occasion?

A. I saw Mr. Jeffreys.

Q. Where was he?

A. Inside the Queen's Gardens just close to the gate leading to the gardens from the Chandni Chowk.

Q. Did you see any missile being thrown at you and Mr. Jeffreys before the fire took place?

A. Mr. Jeffreys was on horse-back facing the side where the youngsters were standing and I saw that his horse was at once frightened and might have been hurt by stone or something.

Q. Is your evidence that only one small stone was thrown by a small boy before the fire?

A. Two or three stones were thrown by the small boys.

Q. Were the stones thrown in the direction of the police?

A. Not particularly against the police, because the British troops and the Gurkhas were also standing in the same place.

Q. Were they thrown at the soldiers at the place?

A. No distinction was observed because the British troops were also standing at the same place.

Q. How many shots did you hear fired?

A. Twice with an interval of 5 minutes each at the railway and twice at the Chandni Chowk with an interval of 15 or 20 minutes.

Q. After this shooting, did you leave the Chandni Chowk and go to the Pipla Park? Did you see Mr. Currie at the time?

A. I left Chandni Chowk and saw the Chief Commissioner, Mr. Currie and the city inspector in the Pipla Park.

Q. Did you attend a meeting in the Pipla Park?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you with Swami Shradhdhanand after the meeting?

A. I was with the Swami narrating to him all that had happened.

Q. After the meeting, were you near when a shot was fired in the Chandni Chowk by a Manipuri or a Gurkha?

A. I heard a shot was fired.

Q. Did you see how the shot was fired?

A. I did not see how the shot was fired because I had gone ahead with the Swami.

Q. Was the shot fired on the Swami or after Swami and you had passed?

A. Both of us had got ahead and the shot was fired. One shot was fired at the mob or aimed at any body.

Q. What tribe did the soldiers belong to?

A. They were Gurkhas.

Q. Are you sure of that? Are you quite certain?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know the difference between the Manipuri soldiers and the Gurkha soldiers?

A. There is difference between our features and theirs, but I could not distinguish between Gurkhas and Manipuris.

Q. At this time did Mr. Orde arrive?

A. Mr. Orde arrived when the Gurkhas were levelling bayonets against the Swami and repeating the words "will pierce your throat, better go away".

Q. When did Mr. Orde arrive?

A. The Swami went and spoke to Mr. Orde that such and such a thing had happened and he told me that he would enquire into the matter and then I left.

Q. Were you charged in connection with these occurrences with any offence?

A. I was charged with offences under sections 145, 147, 332 and 397.

Q. And what happened?

A. I was honourably acquitted.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Coming to the incident at the station on the 30th March—the very first shot that was fired—who fired it and who was fired at?

A. The very first shot was fired by some of the British troops. It was fired at Debi Pershad.

Q. Did it hit him?

A. He was hit in the hand.

Q. And was that before or after somebody bayonnetted him?

A. It was simultaneous.

Q. Where was Debi Pershad at that moment with reference to Queen's Road?

A. The troops were stationed just at the gate and Debi Pershad was standing quite close to the picket.

Q. Was he on the garden side or was he on the Queen's Road side of the picket?

A. On the garden side.

Q. He was within the garden on the road?

A. Yes.

Q. At the moment he was fired at and bayonnetted what was Debi Pershad doing?

A. I saw him going that side.

Q. Did you see where he was going?

A. He was going towards the British troops.

Q. He was approaching the British troops and he got near to them?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you actually see him and noticed him at the time he was bayonnetted?

A. He yelled out and this drew my attention and I looked back.

Q. I understand that you did not see what he was doing the moment before he was bayonnetted, but you only had your attention drawn to him after he uttered a cry?

A. My attention was drawn when he cried out.

Q. That was the first firing. Before that occurred had you seen the crowd when it was in Queen's road?

A. A little before the firing I saw the crowd on Queen's Road.

Q. Is it or is it not a fact that the crowd was removed from the Queen's Road opposite the station compound through the gates into the Queen's Gardens by being pressed back by sowers of police or soldiers?

A. As soon as the document handed to me by Inspector Hamid-ud-din was read out the crowd, some 800 or 900 left the place.

Q. For where?

A. Left for their homes.

Q. I understand that it is not a fact that the crowd that was on the station road—Queen's road—was pressed back by troops and police through the western gates of the Queen's Gardens. I understand that it is not a fact at all that the police and military did not press the remaining 20 that were left behind. They were pressed back by you and Inspector Hamid-ud-din through that western gate into the garden and not by the police and military?

A. They were pressed back by me and the Inspector. Q. Two people—only two of you—pressed them back and in some cases requested them?

A. We pressed them and wanted them to go back.

Q. When did you notice any movement on the part of the British troops?

A. The British troops were behind them and they had their rifles and they were following them showing their rifles towards them. They were some 15 or 20 paces behind and they were regularly following them.

Q. The mob was 20 paces away and receding at the time, and up to that time is it correct to say that you saw nothing in the way of stones, bricks or sticks or any sort thrown by the crowd at anybody?

A. None of them threw any bricks or stones or lathis.

Q. Nothing had been thrown by anybody in the crowd?

A. Nothing was thrown before the time that Debi Pershad was wounded.

Q. You said that you got a written document from Hamid-ud-din which you read to the crowd?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know where that writing is now?

A. I placed it before the non-official commission.

Q. Did you leave it with them?

A. Yes.

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LALA BISHAN SARUP.

[Continued.]

Q. When the British picket barred the entrance to the gardens at the western gate you were inside in the road in the garden?

A. I was standing on the road that parts into two directions in the gardens.

Q. How far from the gate?

A. About 20 or 25 paces from the picket.

Q. Were there any members of the crowd between you and the crowd?

A. No, with the exception of Debi Pershad or Debi Sahai.

Q. Did you know this man before?

A. No.

Q. At the time this man was bayonnetted by a British soldier, there was no member of the crowd nearer to the troops than by about 20 paces or 25 paces to the place where this man was?

A. There was no one except him. People advanced towards that side on hearing the cries.

Q. On hearing the cries, will you tell me exactly what the people did? Did they advance towards the troops?

A. At the time Debi Sahai cried out, 200 or 250 people were divided into two batches, 50 on one side and the rest on the other side that leads to the Ahmadpai Sarai. The road again divides into two.

Q. What did they do?

A. On the side of the road on which I was one of the crowd threw a walking stick and I with the help of two or three others from amongst the mob pressed the crowd back and the other 50 that were standing on that side threw clumps of earth and small pieces of clay which they could lay their hands on.

Q. You said that somebody threw a cane and two or three of them pressed others towards the gate towards the British picket? What did they do?

A. They were pressed back towards the Clock Tower.

Q. Away from the British picket at the western gate further away into the garden towards the Clock Tower side?

A. Yes.

Q. The other group, what did they do?

A. The other part when they threw mud and clumps of earth were fired upon by the troops.

Q. The other part, when they threw mud, did they too make for the Clock Tower or remain where they were or did they go towards the British picket?

A. They did not go towards the British troops. They ran in different directions.

Q. At the time the British picket fired was the crowd actually running away from them or did the crowd not begin to run away from them until all the firing had been done?

A. Immediately after the firing commenced persons were hit and they began to run away.

Q. Can you give me any idea why these two crowds threw clumps of earth at the troops before they fired?

A. I did not get any time. Otherwise, I would have got on to the other side and stopped the people from doing that.

Q. May it have been as much as five minutes?

A. Only an interval of two or three minutes.

Q. During the time that you were there were any of the railings except the Queen's Gardens from the Queen's Road round about the western gate, were they pushed over or were they intact?

A. The railing was not in any way damaged because there are three entrances into the garden and there was quite enough space for 250 men to pass through.

Q. No one tried to go to the Queen's Road?

A. If an effort was made permission would not have been granted.

Q. Did you go up to the picket to rescue Debi Sahai?

A. As soon as he was wounded, I told Inspector Hamid-ud-din that the person was wounded. He told me that if I wanted to take him to the hospital, I could take him or that he would send him to the hospital. So I took him to the hospital.

Q. And then did you take Debi Sahai to the hospital or did you go back to the Clock Tower?

A. Yes.

Q. How long was it before there was first any firing?

A. About 15 or 20 minutes.

Q. How long was it before the police or military began to bar the way through the gate?

A. I was engaged in arranging for these conveyances and when I finished that work, I saw that there was a crowd and that the gate was barred.

Q. At the time you first noticed that, how many were there in the crowd?

A. Some 50 of them were just at the gate and some 40 on the side of the lane close to the garden.

A. There were two other persons present there and I directed those two men to take Debi Sahai to the hospital. They were pressing the crowd backwards.

Q. But what crowd was there to press backwards at that time?

A. There was a crowd of 100 or 150 men.

Q. I understood them to run away towards the Clock Tower upon the troops firing?

A. The firing commenced one or two minutes after I had taken Debi Sahai from that place.

Q. Before the troops fired was there a crowd at all?

A. After the troops fired the crowd went back to the Clock Tower.

Q. I ask you again, did you after that attempt to go back to the British picket or did you go back into Queen's Road yourself?

A. I made no attempt to get to the British picket. I got on so far where the wounded were lying on the road.

I went there with three or four others to take up the wounded.

Q. After giving some assistance to the wounded, you went towards the Chandni Chowk. Is that so? Before you went towards the Chandni Chowk did you meet anybody?

A. I did not notice any special individual. I only saw persons coming to that side, some of whom enquired whether firing had taken place at the railway station, and told them to go back.

Q. When you got to the Clock Tower, i.e., the Chandni Chowk side, what were the police then doing?

A. When I reached the Clock Tower, so far as I remember, there were no police there; there might have been one or two constables.

Q. Where were the one or two constables?

A. There might have been. I did not see any constable.

Q. Did you see the crowd at the gate?

A. There was no crowd at that time. There were 5 or 7 persons.

Q. At the time when there was no crowd, did you notice any policeman?

A. I did not pay any attention to that.

Q. Did you stay at the gates for any length of time?

A. I did not stay at the gate.

Q. Where did you go?

A. I went to make arrangements for tongas and ekkas.

Q. Where?

A. First I went to Fatehpuri and got hold of a tonga and then to the Clock Tower side and got hold of an ekkas and got the wounded.

Q. Did you bring them back through the Clock Tower gate into the park and put the wounded in these vehicles?

A. I brought the wounded and placed them near the Clock Tower already.

Q. How long did the getting of tongas and putting the men in occupy?

A. About half an hour approximately.

Q. When that was finished, did you go back to the Clock Tower gate and stay there or did you go away?

A. As soon as I placed the wounded in the tongas, some persons assembled there near the Clock Tower who said that some wounded had been left in the garden.

Q. Was it towards the end of this half an hour?

A. This occurred within this half hour.

Q. Did the crowd begin to assemble round the gate during the half an hour?

A. Yes.

Q. How long was it before there was first any firing?

A. About 15 or 20 minutes.

Q. How long was it before the police or military began to bar the way through the gate?

A. I was engaged in arranging for these conveyances and when I finished that work, I saw that there was a crowd and that the gate was barred.

Q. At the time you first noticed that, how many were there in the crowd?

A. Some 50 of them were just at the gate and some 40 on the side of the lane close to the garden.

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[Continued.]

Q. Were the gates open or shut?
A. The gates were shut.

Q. Did you see any throwing of stones or bricks at that time?
A. So far as I remember, nothing was thrown before. Some small boys threw some stones into the gardens through that small wall.

Q. Did they get into the right of the military and the police?
A. I could not judge whether it was right or left.

Q. Did they go from that side of the lane or not?
A. From the side of that lane.

Q. Now had your attention been called to the military barring the way of this crowd before the volley was fired?
A. I reached the place some 15 or 20 minutes before the volley was fired.

Q. So that you were there to see what led up to the volley?
A. Yes. When the boys got into the garden the police ran towards them.

Q. What did you see?
A. The police ran after these two boys and then I saw Mr. Jeffreys and his horse bolted either through being hit by a stone or what I do not know.

Q. Apart from stones which may have struck Mr. Jeffreys at the time the order was given there was no stone thrown that you saw?
A. I think there were no big stones to be found at that place. There were a number of small boys at the place and they might have thrown some lumps of earth.

Q. Was anything thrown by the crowd that you saw?
A. I saw that there was a lot of dust in the air on that side.

Q. How many times did you hear firing?
A. Twice with an interval of 15 or 20 minutes. There was a special reason for the second volley being fired because the persons who had been arrested were being dragged like dogs into the garden.

Q. Into the garden through the gates?
A. One of the gates was open and through that gate. One of the halves of this western gate was being opened and the bodies were being dragged by the British soldiers through the gates.

Q. Dead bodies?
A. Some wounded and some of them were crying.

Q. How many did you see dragged?
A. Two.

Q. And both of them were people who were yelling as they were being dragged?
A. Both of them were yelling.

Q. Did you see a volley fired into the air?
A. No. The Indian police fired blank cartridges and the British soldiers shot real cartridges.

Q. Is it the case that after the blank was fired the crowd tried to surge in upon the military and police guarding the road and that on that the military fired again?
A. It was at one and the same time. The police fired blank and the troops fired real cartridges.

Q. These people who were dragged back through the gates—were they lying in the Chandni Chowk at first or were they people who had come through the railing?
A. One of them fell just in the middle of the road.

Q. And where did the other fall?
A. On the pavement close to the Kachcha Kabal Attar.

Q. Did the British troops open the gate and get into the road and drag these two people from the road through the gate into the garden where they were?
A. Yes. I thought this was very cruel—nothing more cruel than to see them dragging wounded men. They were dragged by the legs.

Q. The cruelty consisted of catching hold of his leg and dragging them along the road?
A. Yes.

Q. Were these people lying at the feet of the crowd at the time?

A. The crowd was not there. As soon as the firing took place the crowd had receded.

Q. And this man was shot while running and he fell in the middle of the road—the crowd were behind him.

A. It was this cruel dragging of these two wounded men that caused the crowd again to do something.

Q. Now what did they do?
A. They came forward and pleaded that it was very cruel, and that it should not be done.

Q. Where were you standing yourself at this time.
A. I was standing at the time where there is a trough.

Q. How far away from the gate?
A. A distance of about 20 or 25 paces from the gate.

Q. When they said that this *zilm* had commenced, what happened?
A. When they were doing this they were pressed back, treated roughly and fired at once again and this time the firing commenced and the firing sent the shots to the inside of the shops also.

Q. They were fired upon simply for asking that this *zilm* should be stopped?
A. Some 3 or 4 of them had also thrown small pebbles and pieces of stone.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. When you first came to the station in the morning on hearing that some volunteers had been arrested, did you meet any volunteer at the station when you arrived?
A. It was not in the morning. It was at about noon. I met one volunteer from whom I enquired what had happened. He said that two or three persons came to the station and requested one of the sweetmeat-sellers to close his shop. Other shops in the city had been closed. It was the day after the fair at Garmuktesar. A train was about to leave at about this time. A request was made. So far as I could ascertain the seller was willing to close his shop. Mr. Matthews came to the spot and he treated the persons and even the passengers very roughly.

Q. Where was the crowd?
A. The crowd was at the Queen's Road.

Q. You were also in the Queen's Road?
A. Yes.

Q. What time was this?
A. 1 P.M.

Q. Was there any officer besides Hamid-ud-din there?
A. Mr. Knollys, the sub-inspector, Pandit Shiva Prasad and others were there.

Q. Did Hamid-ud-din give you in writing at this time or any time that the men who had been arrested had been rescued by mob?
A. He did not tell me this.

Q. Not on the 30th March?
A. No, he did not tell me on that day.

Q. Is he a police inspector?
A. Yes.

Q. Where is he?
A. In Delhi.

Q. Is he still in Delhi?
A. Yes.

Q. This man Devi Prasad is in jail?
A. Yes.

Q. At the time when the firing took place the crowd only consisted of about 200 or 250 people?
A. Yes.

Q. Not more than that?
A. Yes.

Q. And when the second firing took place at the Clock Tower later how many you say were present?
A. The mob near the Gardens including small boys came up to something like 100 but there were thousands standing in front and on the roofs of houses.

Q. How many were in the street?
A. There was no one in the road.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. You told Mr. Justice Rankin that two volleys were fired?
A. Yes.

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[Concluded.]

Q. You say that on the second occasion the soldiers fired with double force? What is the meaning of that?
A. What I mean is that persons standing in front were hit and the shots got inside the shops also. That is what I meant.

Q. That can have no meaning. However, we shall pass on. Further on in your statement you say that the butchery that was going on about this time was pitiable. Which time are you referring to?
A. What I mean is that after the first volley was fired I described the sight of the wounded as something very cruel.

Q. You say that the butchery that was going on was pitiable?
A. I never used the word 'butchery' in my original statement. All that I said was that the sight excited pity. I do not know how my statement in the vernacular has been translated.

Q. The translation is wrong then?
A. I never used the word 'butchery.'

Q. During the fire at the railway station, were there any mounted police present?
A. They were present.

Q. Where were the mounted police at the time that the firing took place?
A. On the road.

Q. Not in the garden?
A. No.

Q. When you arrived at the station, at 1 o'clock in the afternoon, the crowd was in the Queen's Road. Was the whole of the crowd on the Queen's Road or partly in Queen's Road and partly in Queen's Gardens?
A. Part of it was inside the Gardens.

Q. Coming through the Gardens and joining the crowd on the road?
A. Yes.

Q. How far did the crowd extend on the Queen's Road?
A. Five or six paces. The police had formed themselves up into a circle on the road.

Q. They were standing in a circle on the road and the crowd was around them. Is that so?
A. Yes.

Q. Was there an empty space in the centre?
A. Yes.

Q. The police made a ring?
A. Yes.

Q. Was the crowd around?
A. Both on the station side and Queen's Gardens side and Dufferin Bridge side and Fort side; on three sides.

Q. Not on the station side?
A. Not on the side near the passenger hall.

Q. How many police were there making this ring?
A. About 200 or 250.

Q. Were they mounted or unmounted police?
A. Two or three officers and Hamid-ud-din were mounted. With the exception of the officers, there was no mounted police (Mr. Jeffreys, Mr. Currie and Mr. Knollys were the officers).

Q. Were there any military about there?
A. The military were standing on the pavement.

Q. Were they outside the railway compound or inside?
A. Outside the railway compound.

Q. How many military were there?
A. About 50 or 55 British troops.

Q. Not mounted?
A. No.

Q. What I understand is this: on one side of the station were the British infantry, and on the other three sides were the police. It was a sort of square made leaving out the station side. Is that what you mean?
A. The crowd was round that ring formed by the police.

Q. The police were standing in a circular position?
A. Yes.

Q. The crowd were surrounding that ring behind the police?
A. Yes.

Q. So the police were really surrounded by the crowd?
A. The police were surrounded by the crowd, and whenever some officers came in, they went to him and implored him to have them released.

Q. When the police inspector came, was Mr. Currie present at the time?
A. Yes.

Q. When this crowd dispersed, as you said, in different directions and 200 or 250 went into the Gardens, I take it that the road was practically clear of the crowd?
A. There was no crowd on the road so far as the public is concerned. There might be some of the police.

Q. Then you persuaded the crowd both by imploring and pushing to go into the gardens?
A. Yes.

Q. When you got inside the gardens extending on the top of the road which branches into two or three directions, then were you followed by the police and the military, or what happened?
A. I was followed by the police and the military to some distance.

Q. The whole police of about 250 followed you?
A. The persons who had formed themselves into a circle, had no guns, those that had guns followed.

Q. They were not all armed?
A. Those who had formed themselves into a circle had no guns.

Q. Where were they?
A. They were standing on the pavement just near the third class waiting hall; the British troops were on the pavement in front of the station.

Q. How many were the armed police?
A. About 60 or 70.

Q. All those followed you?
A. Some 60 or 70 of the armed police and 25 or 30 of the British troops followed me.

Q. Where did they stop? Did they form into one line?
A. They barred the way leading to the Queen's Gardens; some of them stopped actually inside the gate and others extended onto the pavement.

Q. How many gates are there?
A. There are three entrances leading into the Queen's Gardens. It has three divisions.

Q. So I take it that they formed into one line?
A. I did not count how many lines there were. There was one line in front. There might have been some behind that.

Q. The firing on the crowd was from this line?
A. Yes, it was from this line.

By Mr. C. R. Das—

Q. You said that the inspector gave you a paper in writing which you read out to the crowd. Was that paper produced at the time?
A. It was not produced.

Q. Was not the inspector examined in your case?
A. The Inspector admitted in court that he gave that document to me.


[The President:—I do not understand the reference being made to it. He said it was not produced.]

Mr. C. R. Das:—The fact was admitted at the other trial.

The President:—In criminal trials the only proof is the document.

Mr. C. R. Das:—They generally prove it. The Inspector's evidence is the only record. You can send for it.]

Q. You were examined by the so-called non-official commission?
A. I was examined by the non-official commission. I gave a statement and also submitted the statement to the newspapers.



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Dr. M. A. ANSARI.

At Delhi, Saturday, the 8th November 1919.

P R E S E N T :

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. JUSTICE RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble PANDIT JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

SARDAR SAHIBZADA SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. H. G. STOKES, C.I.E., I.C.S., Secretary.

Dr. M. A. ANSARI.

By the President—

Q. Dr. Ansari, you are a resident of Delhi, and have been interesting yourself in the affairs of the city for a considerable time?

A. Yes.

Q. You were absent from Delhi from the 26th March to 2nd April?

A. Yes.

Q. You have no personal knowledge of what occurred during these days?

A. No.

Q. Did you know the proposal to have a *hartal* on the 6th April?

A. I read about it when I was away from Delhi.

Q. Did you countenance the holding of a *hartal* on the 6th, or did you endeavour to prevent it?

A. I came back to Delhi, and I together with other members of the *Satyagraha Sabha* in a meeting decided that there should be no *hartal* on the 6th in Delhi.

Q. Were you informed of the meeting at the house on the 6th?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the object of that meeting?

A. The object of the meeting was that we expected that after our attempt there was not going to be any *hartal*, but when we found that the *hartal* had taken place, we got together to devise means to take away the loitering crowds from the centre of the city and give them some employment in the shape of addressing meetings and such things.

Q. I do not think I need trouble you with the events of that day because you have spoken about it already. In fact it passed off quietly?

A. Yes.

Q. On the following two days business was resumed in the town?

A. Yes.

Q. On the afternoon of the 9th.....

A. That is a mistake in printing. It is the evening of the 9th.

Q. On the evening of the 9th, news reached Delhi that Mr. Gandhi had been turned back?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you and the other local *satyagrahis* take up any position with reference to the holding of the *hartal* at this time?

A. We tried to end the *hartal*.

Q. Were you adverse to its being held on the 10th?

A. Yes.

Q. Were your efforts to prevent its being held or to prevent its being continued successful?

A. They were partially successful on several occasions. We got the shops opened in a great many parts of the town on two or three occasions; but again they were closed.

Q. Why were they closed again?

A. The first reason was that the people were very much averse to ending the *hartal* and there were other

contributory causes. For instance, one was the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi. The other was the news from Punjab of events happening there and other places.

Q. I think on the 10th Swami Shradhdhanand had addressed a large meeting and advised them to bring the *hartal* to an end?

A. Yes.

Q. But that advice was not taken by the people?

A. No; on the 10th the advice was not taken.

Q. On the 12th and 13th, I think an enquiry was held at the Town Hall?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there crowds in the streets about this time (12th and 13th)?

A. On the 12th and 13th, there were not very large crowds roaming about in the streets.

Q. Were there not large crowds of people congregating from time to time?

A. Yes, more than the normal; I was really thinking of very large crowds. They were never very, very large crowds on the 12th and 13th, so far as I can remember.

Q. On the evening of the 13th or on the 13th, some time, was there a meeting between the officials and certain of the leaders of the *satyagraha* movement? Was it not at that time admitted that the *hartal* was doing no good and it was advisable to bring it to an end?

A. Yes; there was a meeting at the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow, at least there was an informal discussion. He asked Hakim Ajmal Khan and one or two people to go there and discuss the situation.

Q. Were you at this meeting?

A. I was.

Q. What was the view put by the officials before you and the other *satyagrahis*?

A. I was the only *satyagrahi* at the meeting.

Q. Who were the other two gentlemen?

A. Hakim Ajmal Khan and Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh.

Q. What was the official view given to you as regards the necessity of bringing the *hartal* to an end?

A. That the *hartal* was not doing any good to the town and things could not be allowed to go on as they were at the time and Government would soon take measures to keep the shops open.

Q. If the *hartal* was continued, was there any doubt in your mind that disorder would ensue?

A. We did not think that there would be any disorder unless there was any interference on the part of the police.

Q. Knowing human nature as you do, Dr. Ansari, had you any doubt that the indefinite continuance of the *hartal* in a city of the size of Delhi would lead to disorder?

A. Disorder always takes place between two parties. Our experience in Delhi was that on all occasions when there was no interference from outside, the masses

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Dr. M. A. ANSARI.

[Continued.]

behaved most wonderfully. There was no disturbance of any kind. There was absolute quiet.

Q. Would you call it absolute quiet and peace to go to the station and prevent people from selling what they want to sell? Would you approve of that conduct from the point of view of a citizen desirous of the maintenance of order in the city? Would you approve of the conduct of people who would go and prevent others from doing lawful acts, to sell?

A. Provided no force is used and only inducement is made, I do not think it is at all illegal.

Q. Would you approve of masses of people going and attempting by persuasion to prevent other people from perfectly lawful acts?

A. I do not think masses did go.

Q. I am putting it to you in the abstract. Would you characterise that as a lawful act?

A. It is not very desirable, but by itself it would not upset things very much.

Q. I put another abstract question to you. Supposing the authorities with, a view to preventing interference with the legitimate trade of others, have to take into custody temporarily or permanently people who are so interfering with others, would you consider it a lawful act to attempt to get these people away from the constituted authority?

A. If the action of the authorities is lawful, I think the demand would not be right on the part of the public.

Q. I presume further that you would disapprove either of actual violence or of a show of violence?

A. Yes, it would not be right.

Q. Do you know about the occurrences of the 14th. Were you present at the assault that was made?

A. I was not present there. I arrived there after the crowd had dispersed.

Q. As a leading citizen, I suppose, you would not approve on any ground of an attack being made upon police officers who were discharging their duty?

A. No, I would not.

Q. On the 14th was there a meeting again at the Town Hall between some of the leaders and some of the officials?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you present at that meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the situation in the city still further discussed?

A. Yes, Sir. It was.

Q. Was it evident to you that the situation in the city was causing the officials considerable anxiety?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you any doubt that they conscientiously felt that the situation was critical?

A. They felt it.

Q. Did you see then so far as the officials were concerned anything else than a desire to discharge their duty in maintaining order in the city?

A. So far as the general attitude of the officials was concerned I think they wanted everything to go on smoothly except that they made some mistakes.

Q. You think that the action of the officials was open to criticism in certain respects. Had not the meetings with you and the other leaders taken place simply on account of the desire of the officials to do what was in their power to restore order?

A. That was the desire, Sir.

Q. What do you think of the propriety of the officials making preparations to deal with disorder in the event of disorder arising when the situation was critical? I mean by having the police force or even military force in readiness to quell anything in the nature of a riot?

A. No, Sir. It was not that that I objected to. But it was the patrolling of forces in the city and in the state of the public mind that obtained at the time it was very undesirable to do that and it produced just the opposite effect of what is intended.

Q. I thought from the point of view of people in the west accustomed to things there, patrolling in the street

by police force and military is an indication of the intention of the authorities to maintain order?

A. Yes. It is not that that I question. But it is the effect that was produced on the masses and it must have been known to the authorities that it did produce such an effect.

Q. Again, I must put to you a theoretical question. If the masses dispersed peaceably and do not indulge in riotous or disorderly conduct why should they object to patrolling of the streets?

A. Because the masses felt that they were injured, that they had received an injury on the 30th of March, that the treatment given to them was not right and that instead of conciliatory attitude on the part of the authorities a show of force was exhibited. That is why they resented it.

Q. You don't suggest that the show of force of either the military or the police constituted a provoked attitude towards the crowd?

A. I am not alleging that at all.

Q. Still less are you alleging that any one in authority was goading either the police or the military into such provocative action?

A. I have not said that, Sir.

Q. When you were having your meeting in the Town Hall, I think there was some rumour got up among the people that you had been arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. There was no ground for that?

A. None to our knowledge.

Q. Again, I have been struck in the course of this enquiry with the readiness with which false rumour arises in Delhi and circulates. Can you account for that?

A. I do not think it is the least peculiar. These rumours almost start everywhere in times of this peculiar kind.

Q. There were so many false rumours and they seem to have been all unfounded and to have sprung up almost in no time?

A. I think for instance the arrest of the leaders at Amritsar might be really the thing which gave the idea to the people and perhaps they started the rumour in some way or other.

Q. By the arrest you mean the injunction placed upon them to reside outside certain areas?

A. I mean the actual arrest.

Q. On the 14th there was a revolver sent to your house. Would you explain that incident?

A. I have explained it in my statement. I was not there at the time. I was present at Hakim Ajmal Khan's house at a conference that was going on there. A telephone message was sent to me from my house that a number of people had gone there with a revolver. I at once sent a message to take it back and deliver it to the Deputy Commissioner. It was done.

Q. On the morning of the 15th the Chief Commissioner, I think, read the *communiqué* that had been issued by the Government of India. What was that?

A. It was with reference to the using of all the resources of the Government to quell any disturbance or anything like that.

Q. I think a suggestion was made by you and others that there should be a general meeting of leading men of all trades to persuade them to resume business?

A. Yes.

Q. Did such a meeting take place?

A. Yes, Sir, the same afternoon.

Q. Were the shopkeepers willing to open their shops?

A. Yes Sir. But they stated their objections and that was the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi. It was in fact represented that the Chief Commissioner should convey to His Excellency their desire that the orders passed on Mahatma Gandhi should be withdrawn. They also mentioned their apprehension about the leaders and they also criticised a hand-bill which was circulated under the signature of the Deputy Commissioner in which certain objectionable words were used.

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[Continued.]

Q. Did you read that proclamation yourself? Did you see any serious objection to it?

A. There was a very strong word used in that, Sir.

Q. Supposing it was the case that on the 30th there had been a crowd that had thrown bricks and otherwise assaulted the police and people in authority, would you consider the use of the word *badmash* inapplicable?

A. *Badmash* is one of the strongest words that can be used. It means a scoundrel or a rogue.

Q. That is the sort of expression that one would use in connection with an unruly crowd in England?

A. I would think a hooligan is a better word. Anyhow, that was the word used and exception was taken to it.

Q. Was it not a little sensitive on the part of these people who had simply closed their shops, who had done nothing in the way of forcing others and had not participated in any act of violence or committed any act of disorder to consider the use of the word *badmash* in the connection in which it was used objectionable?

A. I have explained the meaning of the word in Urdu. It means something very strong and it was taken exception to. That is a fact and it was openly criticised in the presence of the Deputy Commissioner on that day.

Q. I think in the afternoon there was a meeting between the authorities and the tradesmen and the leading citizens of Delhi. Did large crowds assemble when the meeting took place?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the business resumed after the meeting?

A. Not that same evening but on the next day shops were opened at least near the Chandni Chowk, Sadar Bazar and Khari Baoli but they were again closed.

Q. What was the reason for that?

A. I think, Sir, that at that time the difficulty was as regards the butchers and as regards the other townsmen. The butchers open the slaughter house very early and then the rest of the town opens the business, and unless the butchers open their business the others do not. The slaughter houses were opened but the rest of the town did not on this day. Next day the butchers seeing the townsmen did not open the shop, shut up the slaughter houses also and so the shops which were open, on hearing that the slaughter houses had not been opened, also shut up.

Q. Have you any doubt that there were many in the crowds who were opposed to the opening of the shops in the town?

A. I have myself run out many a time to people who I knew did not want the shops to be opened.

Q. Did they form the disorderly portion of the crowds?

A. I did not see these people using any force or threatening the people or doing anything of that sort.

Q. Of course that may have been done although you did not see it?

A. It may have been done but it was never brought to my notice. I think that we were working all the time in this connection.

Q. On the morning of the 17th, were people going back to business and shops opening again?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In the middle of the day where were you?

A. In the middle of the day Hakim Sahib and myself went to my residence to have our midday meal.

Q. Were you motoring about the town when some people came up and gave you some information?

A. We were just returning motoring when we saw an excited people closing their shops and when they saw us they came to us.

Q. Why had the shops that had opened closed?

A. Because of the arrest of a person who was supposed to have been coercing some shopkeepers to close their shops.

Q. As a law-abiding citizen do you object to a man preventing others from opening, being arrested?

A. The arrest itself in normal times certainly would not be objected to, but at a time like this when the least little action is liable to be magnified I think it would be called injudicious.

Q. If you did not arrest the one man who was doing it you might encourage others to repeat his action when they know they can do it with impunity?

A. The whole of the place was open already—business was going on and there was no fear of any untoward thing happening.

Q. But the man who was arrested, was he not arrested upon the ground that he was trying to force people to close shops?

A. Yes. We spoke to any number of people and we sent them back.

Q. That may have been so in some cases but so far as the local authorities were concerned were they not bound to maintain order by preventing people doing it?

A. It had this unfortunate effect.

Q. Apart from that fact that no notice would be taken of the action in normal times?

A. I think that it was not right.

Q. At a time like this—you must mean a time when there was very exceptional excitement among the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. And there was great danger of the mob indulging in acts of rioting?

A. I would not say that—but misunderstandings are very easy.

Q. Was the rumour as regards this man being arrested that he had been thrown out of the window of the Town Hall and was killed or something of that?

A. The actual words which we were told that this man who was arrested was pierced with a bayonet and dragged through into the Town Hall.

Q. I think you went shortly after hearing this rumour into the Town Hall?

A. We went straight into the Town Hall.

Q. Was there the slightest foundation for the rumour?

A. No. The man had his garment torn in one or two places and he had some scratches about his body.

Q. Do you know how he got those scratches?

A. I think in the struggle to get away when he was arrested.

Q. After you had got into the Town Hall did you hear the firing that had taken place in Ballimaran street?

A. Yes. We heard distant firing towards Ballimaran street.

Q. Did you see the crowd running out of that street after the firing took place?

A. We saw a crowd running away from that side towards the clock tower.

Q. And as the crowd were running, were some shots fired that you had heard?

A. Yes.

Q. Were these shots fired at the crowd or into the air?

A. I think over the heads of the crowd.

Q. Merely for the purpose of scaring them away. There was no question of firing at the crowd?

A. Yes.

Q. As we have already been told things quietened down; there was no further necessity to resort to firing or any thing of that sort?

A. No Sir.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Were you president of the *Satyagraha Sabha*?

A. Yes, Sir, before Swami Shradhdhanand took the position.

Q. And when did you cease to be the president?

A. I think after my return, about the 5th or 6th of April.

Q. When you ceased to be president, was that because you were in less sympathy with that particular body or was it for some other reason?

A. I took up the office on condition that I should be relieved as soon as Swami Shradhdhanand came and took up the presidency.

Q. Then the society itself was dissolved, was it not, some little time after the beginning of April? What happened?

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[Continued.]

A. It was in abeyance. That is to say the president of the central organization, Mahatma Gandhi, issued a declaration that for the time being he wanted the activities of the *Satyagraha* movement to be in abeyance and all the organization which of course are naturally affiliated to the central organization followed suit?

Q. What time was that?

A. I should think about the middle of April.

Q. I think that the date—17th—was mentioned in this connection?

A. Yes. Something like that.

Q. The action taken by the *Satyagraha Sabha* in Delhi was not influenced by incidents that had happened in Delhi on previous days but entirely by the general position of the society and Mr. Gandhi's proclamation?

A. There were local considerations also.

Q. What were they?

A. One of the local considerations was this, that the police wanted the names of the members of the *Satyagraha Sabha*—while the leading members of the *Satyagraha Sabha* were quite well known, the general members who were people who belong to the middle classes—their names were not known and we did not want to give their names.

Q. Was that the reason for going into abeyance?

A. Well that was one reason.

Q. Could you just tell me what the other reason was?

A. The other reason I have already said—indication from the central body to put an end to this, and another reason was that we ourselves owing to local conditions thought that here too we could not go on with the work of the *Satyagraha Sabha*; so we put a stop to it for the time being.

Q. By what you have just said you mean that in the particular circumstances of Delhi that the *Satyagraha Sabha* work led to more trouble than it anticipated.

A. No Sir, I did not mean that. What I mean is that for the work of the *Satyagraha Sabha* we want absolute tranquility and we want no passions. We want people to be absolutely in their normal state. Then only we can practice *satyagraha*, but here owing to circumstances over which the *Satyagraha Sabha* had no control as the feelings of the people were rather high, we could not do so. To give you an instance, if we had, say, disobeyed certain laws and gone to jail, that going to jail might have entailed difficulties which we did not want.

Q. Apart from dissolving the society or putting it in abeyance, I think certain documents were destroyed. Were they not? Can you tell me what the nature of those documents was?

A. A list of those who had enrolled themselves.

Q. Had the society at that time any other document apart from the list of members?

A. It had certain printed literature, leaflets, etc.

Q. Apart from that did it have minutes of the proceedings?

A. Yes; there were few meetings held of the *Satyagraha Sabha*; there would be minutes of those meetings.

Q. Did it have accounts? Did the treasurer keep the accounts?

A. There were no accounts to keep.

Q. At the time you destroyed the list of members, was that done by a resolution of a meeting of the society?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you remember who were the people that decided upon the destruction of the list?

A. Members of the executive committee of the *Satyagraha Sabha*.

Q. Who were they?

A. Swami Shradhdhanand, Mr. Desai, Dr. Rahman, myself and there were one or two people, I am not quite sure.

Q. Now at the time that was resolved upon was it known to you whether the documents were wanted for the purpose of any judicial proceedings?

A. Yes. We did not know for what purpose, but we knew that the police wanted it.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Are you a resident of Delhi or are you coming from some other part?

A. My original home is in the United Provinces.

Q. How many years have you been in Delhi?

A. About 9 years now.

Q. You have settled down here, practising your profession here?

A. Yes.

Q. I understand you take a leading part in all movements in Delhi?

A. I do my best to serve the people.

Q. You are in touch with the public of Delhi and have considerable knowledge of what is going on?

A. Yes.

Q. After you settled down in Delhi, what was the state of Delhi as regards political movements, i.e., when you first came to Delhi nine years ago.

A. There was not much political life in Delhi.

Q. After that was there political life? When did political life begin?

A. Since Delhi has been made the Capital; one can say that the political life in Delhi dates from that time.

Q. Since then have there been various political movements in Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. You have taken part in them?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. May I know what your experience is as to the attitude of the authorities towards those political movements?

A. The authorities as a rule are opposed to all political movements in Delhi.

Q. When you say that they are opposed to those political movements can you explain what tangible form their attitude took?

A. First of all as regards the use of public places a lot of trouble was created in obtaining the use of public places for holding meetings and such other things. We had to furnish the names of members, names of speakers, the time, etc., previously. Very often it is very difficult to do so precisely. The time for holding the meeting is allowed when it is not suitable for the people to attend.

Q. Have you to obtain permission to hold any meeting at all in Delhi and have you to hold the meeting at the prescribed time?

A. Yes, if the meetings are to be held in public places. If we get the use of the Town Hall or the Queen's Gardens, we must finish our meeting before dusk and we have to give the names of speakers beforehand and no other speakers are allowed to address except those whose names are given.

Q. Restraint is put by the authorities upon public movements in holding meetings, of a character which are preventive?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the attitude of the police towards these movements?

A. The police are also opposed to these.

Q. When the Congress was held in Delhi in 1918, difficulties were thrown in the way?

A. The Deputy Commissioner wanted the Congress to take a license, which difficulty was got over by paying rent, although it was nominal, and making the place private.

Q. What do you mean by license?

A. Taking a license for permission and giving the names of the speakers and all those things.

Q. If you hold it in a public place, then you have to obtain a license giving beforehand the names of the speakers and other particulars, and if you hold it in a private place then it is not necessary?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore by paying rent for the place for holding the meeting, you technically made it a private place so as to escape these restraints?

A. Yes.

Q. There was a meeting of the Moslem League held about the same time in Delhi?

A. Yes.

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[Continued.]

Q. You were the Chairman of the Reception Committee?

A. Yes.

Q. You made a speech as the Chairman of the Reception Committee?

A. I did.

Q. Was that speech proscribed by the authorities?

A. It was, but not in Delhi.

Q. The Punjab and the United Provinces authorities proscribed it?

A. Yes.

Q. Delhi did not do that?

A. Yes.

Q. So far the attitude of the Delhi authorities was more sympathetic than the attitude of the Punjab and the United Provinces authorities?

(The President.—Not more sympathetic, but more lenient.)

A. Yes.

Q. Were any restraints put at the same time about speeches made in public places?

A. Yes.

Q. In what manner?

A. There was the Seditious Meetings Act here, I think, from the 17th April.

Q. I am now taking the period previous to these disturbances in Delhi. For some time there have been efforts made to secure unity between the Hindus and Muhammadans?

A. Yes.

Q. That is going on for some years now?

A. Yes.

Q. What has been the attitude of the Delhi authorities with regard to that?

A. I cannot say. To my knowledge, I can say nothing for or against.

Q. You have formed no view about it?

A. To my knowledge nothing has come which I can say against or in favour of this.

Q. What has been the attitude of Deputy Commissioner, Colonel Beadon, towards this?

A. His attitude was very harsh and unsympathetic all along, towards people in general and specially towards those who were connected with political movements.

Q. Has there been, as you say, for some time tension between the authorities and the public?

A. Yes, ever since these political movements commenced in Delhi, all along there has been some tension.

Q. Has that made the people ready to resent and misunderstand the acts of the officials which possibly, under normal conditions, they would not?

A. I would not say that that would make people misunderstand their actions.

Q. They would certainly view their actions with some suspicion?

A. Yes.

Q. There has been some trouble over what are called *Ramkila* processions?

A. Yes.

Q. How did that trouble arise?

A. The authorities were very much unfavourable to the Hindu community and they resented it and observed *hartal* for several days.

Q. For 10 or 11 days on that occasion?

A. Yes.

Q. When did this take place, in what year?

A. A couple of years back, last year or the year before last.

Q. Was it in 1917 or 1918?

A. I think it was very likely in 1918.

Q. Then came the Rowlatt Bill last year?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there very great opposition to that in Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. Were meetings held in connection with the Rowlatt Acts?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the attitude of the authorities towards that?

A. The attitude was the same, i.e., opposition. Almost all the meetings had to be held in private places.

Q. The *satyagraha* movement was started in Delhi in the beginning of March?

A. Yes.

Q. You were the first president?

A. Yes.

Q. You know the principles of *satyagraha* well, I suppose?

A. Yes.

Q. The principles as stated are that there is to be no violence of person or property, that suffering was to be invited by those practising *satyagraha* in order to move the authorities by their suffering and thus secure ultimately the repeal of the Rowlatt Acts. Is that the object with which it was started?

A. Yes.

Q. You told us that it enjoins that there should be no passions and no feelings?

A. Yes.

Q. Don't you think that *satyagraha* so enunciated is rather difficult to the ordinary mind to grasp?

A. I think that India is essentially a religious country and in the mind of the masses any creed which is religious takes a very strong hold. *Satyagraha* as such is such a creed and I think the masses follow it most extraordinarily implicitly.

Q. Does not the *satyagraha* creed require that people will have to raise themselves to a high level and eschew feelings and passions?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You grant that ordinary people constituted as the world is even in India, cannot eschew feelings and passions. You don't expect the ordinary masses to raise themselves to a high selfless level?

A. Every one is not a *satyagrahi*.

Q. It is very difficult to get the ordinary masses to raise themselves to a high selfless level and practise the principles of *satyagraha* as they ought to be practised.

A. I have answered that before. I do not think it is very difficult in India.

Q. My question is that ordinary people as they are in this country would find it very difficult to rise to that high level of a selfless ideal?

A. I admit the difficulty.

Q. Will you grant that if this is the position the ordinary masses as they are constituted in this country cannot rise to that high level? Will you answer my question—yes or no—and then give your explanations for it?

A. It is difficult.

Q. If that is so, is it not a dangerous weapon to place in the hands of the ordinary masses for the purposes of political propaganda?

A. Well, Sir, if you will allow me to answer that—

Q. I want a definite answer—yes or no—and then you can explain.

A. I will say that after training and preparing the people it is not difficult.

Q. As they are, it is?

A. How can anybody practise it unless he is prepared for it? We do not want to make *satyagrahis* unless they are prepared for it.

Q. You grant this, that till the masses are prepared to raise themselves to the level that I have mentioned it is not possible for them to practise *satyagraha* in the particular way enjoined?

A. We are not taking *satyagrahis* indiscriminately.

Q. Unless people are trained prior to their becoming *satyagrahis* it is impossible for them to practise it really?

A. Yes.

Q. Now *satyagraha* as you have explained, is that not intended to prevent violence and such occurrences as took place in Delhi?

A. It is not due to *satyagraha*.

Q. It is not due to *satyagraha* in the sense that the tenets of *satyagrahis* do not countenance it. It is part of the *satyagraha* movement to have civil disobedience of law. That was part of the *satyagraha* movement?

A. In Delhi we did not disobey any law.

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[Continued.]

Q. As part of the *satyagraha* propaganda Mr. Gandhi initiated the civil disobedience of law. Did you not anticipate that if you put before the people the idea of disobeying law without themselves having reached a high level of selflessness, untold results might follow?

A. No. I would not say that we have put before the masses of Delhi the idea of civil disobedience of law at all. This question was never placed before the masses of Delhi.

Q. In Delhi you and certain other members took the *satyagraha* vow, and the *satyagraha* vow is a disobedience of certain laws?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore you did notify to the public that you, at any rate as one of the signatories, were going to adopt disobedience of laws as part of your programme?

A. Yes.

Q. To an ordinary man not having raised himself to the level of the real *satyagrahi* it would only appeal to him in this way that disobedience of laws was going to be part of the political propaganda?

A. I do not think so if it is properly explained under what conditions laws are to be disobeyed.

Q. It is always difficult to explain these things to large masses.

A. We do not accept the vow unless and until a person has studied it thoroughly.

Q. You will not allow any person to take the *satyagraha* vow unless he has really understood the principles of *satyagraha*. What I am putting to you is that when it becomes known to the public that the leaders of Delhi, including yourself and others, have taken a vow, part of which enjoins people to disobey certain laws, would it not lead people to suppose that following the leaders they can also disobey laws as part of the political propaganda?

A. No. Excuse me, Sir. This is not putting it fairly, because if that would follow then we cannot utter a single word without producing extraordinary results on the public. When we make a declaration of a thing, we mention all the provisos and safeguards and see that the public understands them.

Q. Do you suggest that the ordinary people in the streets understand all those subtle provisos and difficult hedging round of conditions?

A. I don't think it is subtle at all. It is very plain. In fact *satyagraha* is very ancient in India and the ordinary mind grasps it.

Q. There are many things ancient in India, but the ordinary masses have unfortunately forgotten them?

A. That is not at all my experience of the *satyagraha* movement.

Q. When you started the *satyagraha* movement and this vow, did you consider the aspect that I am putting to you, that it may lead, so far as the masses were concerned, to untold results?

A. We took every precaution to avoid any kind of misunderstanding.

Q. What precaution?

A. We explained it on every occasion. In fact, we did not allow people to take vow until we made absolutely certain that they understood.

Q. You explained at the meetings that there was to be no violence?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. In fact the things that occurred at Delhi, were they consistent with the principles of *satyagraha*? Take for instance what happened at the railway station? The crowd attempted to rescue people at the railway station, threw stones and compelled people to shut their shops?

A. I think they would have happened, whether there was *satyagraha* or not.

Q. We are assuming for the moment that in spite of the efforts that you made to make the people understand the principles of *satyagraha*—did not that show that it is very difficult to make the ordinary people really grasp and understand the real principles of *satyagraha*?

A. It is not that so?

A. I would say that the cause of the *satyagraha* of the people in Delhi was much more under control than it would have been otherwise.

Q. That is your view?

A. Yes.

Q. In present circumstances particularly at Delhi to adopt *satyagraha* is part of the political movement?

A. I have explained the reasons already.

Q. Was not this one of the reasons?

A. I have said that considering the public excitement we thought that.....

Q. It was the public excitement that caused the *satyagraha* to be a part of the political propaganda?

A. Not at that time.

Q. Afterwards Swami Shradhdhanand openly recognised this and put it in his letter to Mr. Gandhi and he for one took up the position he would have nothing with *satyagraha* as part of the political propaganda? You knew that. You yourself took the same view at that time?

A. Yes.

Q. You refer to the attitude of Colonel Beadon during those days and also to notices that were issued and also to some speech that he made at a municipal commissioners' meeting? May I know what that was?

A. The general trend of it was the same. He attacked agitators.

Q. Have you got a copy of that speech?

A. I have not got a copy but it was published in the "Pioneer."

Q. Did that cause irritation?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you present at the meeting?

A. I am not a member of the municipal committee.

Q. What date was this?

A. I think it was about the third week of April.

Q. You were attending these meetings with the Deputy Commissioner and the Chief Commissioner and the leaders on the 14th and 15th. What was the attitude of Colonel Beadon towards the leaders?

A. Colonel Beadon was rather impatient, at times sulky and snappish.

Q. The most of the time the talking was done with the Chief Commissioner and his attitude was everything that could be desired?

A. Yes, Sir.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. You say that the presence of the troops in the streets was much resented by the crowd. Granted that the intention of the authorities was good would you say that the number of troops that appeared in the streets was excessive or greater than the circumstances warranted?

A. It was not the number at all; it was their presence that was resented.

Q. You do not think there was an unnecessary display?

A. There were various numbers patrolling at different times and I do not think that the crowd minded the number of troops but it was their patrolling that was disliked. I have no idea of the numbers.

Q. There was a tendency to exaggerate the numbers, was there not?

A. Yes, there was a tendency.

By Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Is the *hartal* a new thing?

A. No, it is not a new thing in India.

Q. Is it not a fact that the majority thinking that their grievances are not listened to by the authorities, have wished to focus their attention on certain of the grievances during the last 15 or 20 years? Is it not a fact that during these 20 years in order to get their grievances removed pleaders and other people have had recourse to *hartals* hundreds of times in different cities?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. From what I understand is that the *satyagraha* of Mr. Gandhi adopted this *hartal* for the purpose of expressing grief at the passing of the Rowlatt Bill?

A. It is no part of the *satyagraha* movement at all.

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[Continued.]

Q. The *hartal* was no part of the *satyagraha* movement?

A. No.

Q. Then I take it that you are only a *satyagrahi*. It is possible that what happened was some people brought pressure to bear upon unwilling persons to close their shops. It was not part of *satyagraha*?

A. No, Sir.

Q. This *hartal* was not observed in any way to intimidate Government?

A. No, Sir. No intimidation was intended at all but it was a sign of general mourning.

Q. To show that the whole masses and the country were with those persons who made their speeches in the Legislative Council and who opposed the movement—to prove that those views were not their own views but the view of every person in India?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You attended a number of meetings in the month of March and April in Delhi since the Rowlett Bill was before the country. You attended meetings before the Bill and even after the passing of the Bill; to the best of your knowledge were any deliberate misrepresentations made by these speakers in Delhi?

A. Never Sir. On the contrary every possible misunderstanding was removed. I remember our leading pleader Babu Peare Lal read the Rowlett Bill clause by clause and explained it thoroughly to the public and no misrepresentation was ever made at any meeting.

Q. Is it not a fact that during the 16th, 17th and 18th a number of wild rumours were spread by the crowd about the Germans?

A. It is a fact.

Q. Was it not believed by the people in this province that an aeroplane was seen—the Germans were sitting in the aeroplane and drinking tea and that some hot drops of tea fell on some persons and then they went away? Was it not believed by three-fourths of the population and various other rumours?

A. Yes.

Q. Now about arrests—is it not fact that during these years certain arrests were made in a similar way—that the person to be arrested either was sent for by the authorities—or did something and there and then was arrested. There was nothing extraordinary if you had been arrested after you had been called to the Town Hall.

A. No, Sir.

Q. There is no doubt from your evidence that a certain person was preventing people from opening their shops. What was the status of that man?

A. I think he was a servant of a shopkeeper.

Q. Did he have any influence over the crowd?

A. No.

Q. Could he have succeeded in getting 100 or 200 shops closed?

A. I do not think.

Q. I understand from your evidence that during these 15 days you with others were constantly patrolling and going about from place to place?

A. Yes, to find out what was happening.

Q. After the 30th was the using of force to close shops widespread?

A. Certainly not.

Q. May I take it that people trying to influence poor people to close their shops was not very widespread?

A. No.

Q. Is there any special law in Delhi whereby you are required to give the names of speakers and to hold meetings within a certain time? Or was it exercised just as the presidents of municipalities exercise?

A. I do not know.

Q. What I understand is that so far as other big city municipalities are concerned, there is the Municipal Act which vests all the public places in the municipality. If anybody wants to use a public place, he has to get permission from the Chairman of the Municipal Board. Was it in the exercise of that power or is there any special law?

A. We had to give information to the Superintendent of Police, i.e., the information about the names of speakers and all that.

Q. Under what law?

A. I cannot give you the law just now.

(Sir C. Setalvad—Under some rules framed under the Defence of India Act, I suppose.)

Q. The Defence of India Act was not in force at Delhi?

A. It was.

Q. Your speech was proscribed after a long time?

A. After over a month, nearly two months.

Q. You were making a sort of special pleading for the recognition of the claims of Muhammadans at the Peace Conference?

A. Yes.

Q. It appears to me that that is the general attitude of every Muhammadan in India?

A. It is exactly the same.

Q. About the Khilafat also?

A. Yes.

(The President:—I think it is beyond our scope—it is a big question.)

Q. Were the authorities informed on the night of the 16th that there should be no picket and patrolling by the police on the 17th?

A. Yes, I telephoned to the Deputy Commissioner and Hakim Sahib telephoned to the senior superintendent to make absolutely certain that there was no mistake about that.

Q. The police cannot hold any judicial inquiry. You are aware of that?

A. Yes.

Q. Regarding the destruction of the papers referred to, that is the list of members, were you or were you not afraid, if the list came into the hands of the police some of those members might be implicated as being one of the crowd?

A. It was because we feared that we would be molested, that we destroyed the list.

By Mr. C. R. Das—

Q. With regard to the *hartal*, I see from your statement that there have been previous *hartals* in Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. I believe on the death of Queen Victoria and King Edward VII there were *hartals* in Delhi to express their sorrow?

A. Yes.

Q. I believe that in 1917 there was a *hartal* by the people of Delhi to express their dissatisfaction with the orders of the authorities regarding the *Ramlila* procession?

A. Yes.

Q. That lasted for 11 days?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any the least disturbance on that occasion?

A. Not in the least.

Q. Was there any interference by the police on that occasion?

A. No.

Q. Now with regard to the *satyagraha* you have been asked a lot of questions. May I put just one question. As a matter of fact it is only a small number of persons that the vow was administered?

A. Yes.

Q. So far as you are aware, was any *satyagrahi* convicted of any offences of violence or of any offences?

A. No, not at all.

Q. What is the maximum number of those to whom the vow was administered in Delhi?

A. I think between 100 and 150.

Q. It has been alleged that *satyagraha* was the cause of disorders in Delhi during March and April. Is there any truth in the allegation?

A. Not the slightest truth.

Q. You were asked about the impossibility of the masses in India to appreciate the principles of *satyagraha*. The

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principle of *satyagraha* is like the principle of a great religious truth?

A. Yes.

Q. It is always impossible for anybody and every body to act up to the highest ideal of any religion?

A. Yes.

Q. In the course of these days, in the lectures which preceded the disturbances was anything referred to by way of civil disobedience? Did you ask the public to offer any civil disobedience of any kind?

A. No.

Q. According to *satyagraha*, civil disobedience is to be practised by those to whom vows are administered?

A. Yes.

Q. Would vows be administered to anybody who is trained up and who in the opinion of the committee is fit to practise the principles of *satyagraha*?

A. Yes.

Q. That is to invite suffering on himself?

A. Yes.

Q. May I ask in what sense could it be said that by preaching the principles of *satyagraha* a dangerous weapon was put into the hands of the public?

A. I do not understand that myself.

Q. Have you any the least reason to suppose that any weapon dangerous or otherwise was put into the hands of the public?

A. No.

Q. If you tell them not to lose their temper, tell them to be patient, tell them not to be violent, not to exercise violence of any description, is that putting any dangerous weapon into the hands of the public?

A. On the contrary it is restraining them from such acts.

Q. I am referring to these people being called *badmashes* by the Deputy Commissioner. If the people thought that no force was used to have the shops closed (I am not asking you whether it was so or not, that is for the Committee to decide) and that stones were thrown only when they were provoked by harsh treatment and assault by the police, do you think that these people could be called unduly sensitive if they resented being called *badmashes*?

A. Not at all.

Q. So far as you are personally concerned, you do not know what actually happened at the station?

MUHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN, Vakil.

By the President—

Q. You are a vakil in Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you in Delhi during the period of the disturbances?

A. I was all along here.

Q. Did you see any of the incidents that occurred?

A. If you mean the shooting incidents, I did not see them.

Q. Any knowledge that you may have as to the condition of the crowds at or previous to this time must be a mere matter of hearsay?

A. I can say that up to the 29th March, immediately preceding the 30th March, there was of course nothing threatening about the crowd. Even on the 30th March when I saw the crowd in the morning at about 9 or 9-30, they were in the street and roaming about here and there. But there was nothing threatening in their attitude. Then I saw people requesting passengers in tram cars to get down and also men in tongas to get down and walk.

Q. What justification had the crowd in asking that?

A. It is not thought proper on a mourning day to go about in carriages, I am talking of India particularly. To go on foot is a mark of mourning.

Q. Did you hear the shooting near the Chandni Chowk?

A. I was not in the Chandni Chowk.

Q. As regards the rest of the period did you see anything on the 14th April?

A. No.

Q. As to whether any force was applied to have the shops closed or whether any provocation was given to the people or if any stones were thrown you have got no personal knowledge?

A. No.

Q. This man Gauri Shankar was arrested. With your experience of Delhi, I am putting this to you, supposing this man had simply been removed without arrest and taken into custody, do you think it would not have served the purpose equally well?

A. Certainly, and the *hartal* would not have taken place at all that day and there would have been no trouble whatever.

Q. Or if this man had been released?

A. No trouble would have taken place.

Q. Knowing Delhi as you do and the excited condition of the people to which you have referred, if you had the power at that time would you not have brought this man out and shown to the people?

A. That is what we intended to do.

Q. That was not allowed?

A. No.

Q. With regard to the register of names of members of the *Satyagraha Sabha* did you apprehend that if the police got that list, they would run a false case against those men?

A. They would molest these people in various ways.

Q. With regard to the public meetings, there was an order passed by Colonel Beadon prohibiting public meetings in public places without taking out a license?

A. Yes, under the Police Act, I think.

Q. At the time of the Congress you have told us that you were asked to take out a license?

A. Yes, for the Congress.

Q. You were asked to supply them with a list of the speakers, the resolutions and so forth, which was absolutely impossible and unheard of.

A. That order was absolutely unreasonable and could not be done.

[The President:—That was some time before these disturbances?

Mr. Das.—The Congress was held a couple of months ago, in December. It was an order which no human being could comply with.]

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MUHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN—concluded—Mr. SHIV NARAIN.

that he could not appoint me under a particular section. I called on Colonel Beadon but he would not see me.

Q. Did you have any duties to perform as a special constable?

A. None whatever. That exactly shows that there was no reason for appointing us as special constables except to insult. I shall just give you the feeling. If there was to be anything to be really done by us and Government really needed our help then it would be an entirely different matter. By ordering us to do nothing and just giving us the name of special constable the Government tried to show that we were a sort of ring-leaders.

Q. You were appointed special constable on the 18th and the last disturbance took place on the 17th and there was no necessity for the special constables?

A. Just after the shooting incident, if you will hear what followed, there was absolute quiet in the town and no one could even doubt that there would be any disturbance. Seeing that there was not even any apprehension of a disturbance, it shows that the order was not really necessary.

Q. That is a little critical. Those in authority after the disturbance on the 17th might expect that there would be repetition of disorder and might have taken precautionary measures?

A. The order was passed on the night of the 17th and conveyed to us on the morning of the 18th. The police were 1,500 strong. An addition of 14 is not going to help very much.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Is it not a fact that you became subject to police rules and regulations and could be punished departmentally for any breach of discipline?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. Did they punish you in any way?

A. No. The order was given on the 21st morning. It was withdrawn the same evening through the intervention of the Chief Commissioner.

By the President—

Q. You were quite pleased at that?

A. We were very sorry that the order was given. We were very thankful to the Chief Commissioner for his intervention.

By Mr. C. R. Das—

Q. You were one of the persons who recorded the evidence before the non-official commission. The record of that is with you?

A. Yes, I have got that.

Q. With reference to this incident of the special constable, will you give us the names of the persons?

A. I have given 14 names in my statement.

Q. They are very respectable citizens of Delhi?

A. Most of them.

Q. Can you say that the order was passed on you because further disturbance was anticipated and the police force ordinarily employed for preserving the peace is not sufficient?

By the President—

Q. You are a vakil in Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you in Delhi during the period of disturbances?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. Did you personally see anything happening in connection with the disturbances?

A. Do you mean to ask me about the shooting affair or anything about the attitude of the crowd?

Q. Were you at the station on the 30th March?

A. No. The ordinary police were 1,500 strong.

Q. Can the special constables in any way add to the strength of the force?

A. Not in the least.

Q. You were all along trying to help the authorities in any way they suggested?

A. That is not denied by the Government. I have been trying to do my very best.

Q. This order was given to you on the 18th?

A. Mr. Scott gave it.

Q. Were you given any work?

A. None whatever except that of attending at the Town Hall. We waited for three hours.

Q. Were there any orders on the 18th?

A. Mr. Jeffreys told me that the orders were that I was to go to Sabzimandi and report myself in the *thana* there, patrol in that locality and come back at 10.

Q. You reported yourself?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any likelihood of any disturbance in Sabzimandi?

A. No.

Q. It is about two miles from the city?

A. About a mile and a half.

Q. That is on the 19th?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you given any work on the 20th?

A. I 'phoned to Mr. Scott who was in the Town Hall. I was told to call at the Town Hall again at 10 A.M. No work was given on the 20th.

Q. On the 21st was any work given?

A. I went again for orders at 6, and 'phoned up Mr. Scott. He had probably gone to Simla, but I was told to attend the police station at 8.

Q. Did you go there at 8?

A. We went there at 8 and at about 8-30 Colonel Beadon gave me the order which I have put in with my statement.

Q. Which order?

A. The order in which we were asked to wear *pagris*, sleep in *thana* and so on.

Q. That order was passed on the ground that you were not doing satisfactory work?

A. Yes that is what is said.

Q. Is there any truth in that statement?

A. None to my knowledge.

Q. Did you refuse?

A. In spite of the protest which I had put in I had decided to carry out the orders till my application was disposed of. But we were never called upon to do any work. We were not given any work except patrolling in Sabzimandi. We did that.

Q. When was this order cancelled?

A. This order was withdrawn at 5 P.M.

Q. When the order was withdrawn did you go to Colonel Beadon's house?

A. It was withdrawn by him at the instance of the Chief Commissioner. We went to the Chief Commissioner and he told us to go to Colonel Beadon and that he would withdraw the order.

Q. Did Colonel Beadon say anything?

A. He thanked us for the work we had done.

Mr. SHIV NARAIN, B.A., LL.B., Vakil.

A. No I was in the Chandni Chowk on the morning of the 30th.

Q. Were you there at the time of firing?

A. Yes, I was in my office at the time of firing.

Q. Where is your office?

A. My office is just opposite to the eastern gate of the Queen's Gardens opening into the Chandni Chowk.

Q. What did you see?

A. I was standing in the balcony. I saw people coming from the stationside through the Queen's Gardens into the Chandni Chowk. I was just looking at it when

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Mr. SHIV NARAIN.

[Continued.]

I saw that the gate of the gardens just opposite to my office, i.e., the eastern gate of the gardens, was closed; the main gate as well as the two side gates. Then sometime after I saw, so far as the other gate was concerned, i.e., the western gate or the gate on the Fatehpuri side, people coming out of the gardens into the Chandni Chowk and trying to get into the gate again. I also saw from my office that there were boys of young age as well as young men standing on the road and on the *patri* or footpath opposite the Queen's statue or opposite the Town Hall. I saw that just as people were coming and going and they were being driven, some little bits of stones or bricksbats were thrown into the gardens. The police at that time consisted, to my information, of 10 to 15 in number and they were standing on the road which lay between the front portion of the Town Hall and the footpath inside the gardens. There was an officer of the police. I don't know whether he was a military officer or a police officer. From what I made out he was a police officer. He was with constables. I did see from my balcony later on that there was shooting.

Q. Did you see just what had occurred before the shooting?

A. I saw the shooting near the western gate of the Queen's Gardens.

Q. Were there no stones thrown at the police officers?

A. There were, as I have already submitted.

Q. Did you see whether the crowd was excited?

A. I could not see whether the crowd was in an excited state or not but their movements showed that they were in a state which was not normal.

Q. Did they proceed to violence?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Why not?

A. My reasons for that are that when they were driven out they did go out of the gate and it was not that they persisted in remaining and sticking to one particular spot.

Q. Was the crowd a changing crowd and were additional people joining it?

A. I could not see if it was a changing crowd. I could not see from that distance.

Q. How many shots were fired?

A. I did not count.

Q. After the firing of the shots what did you do?

A. After the firing of shots I went and sat in my office and began to do some work.

Q. Did you actually resume your work?

A. Not for some time, but later on, not quite usually my professional work, of course. It was not necessary for me to do any part of it. I could certainly have gone on reading papers.

Q. You did not go to the Town Hall or to the authorities?

A. Not at that time or on that day.

Q. Then did you see what occurred on any of the other days at the King Edward Park on the 14th or 17th?

A. I was at my office again.

Q. Did you see what occurred in the Town Hall?

A. If you allow me to describe what I did see I am prepared to relate it or would you like to ask me particular questions?

Q. In the first instance did you see anything that occurred in the Town Hall or in the Ballimaran?

A. I did not see.

Q. Tell us what you did see in that street?

A. Early in the morning on the 17th: we were all in the Chandni Chowk; I mean Hakim Ajmal Khan, Rai Bahadur Piro Lal, R. B. Sultan Singh, Dr. Ansari, and some others. We were trying to persuade shopkeepers to open their shops. We managed, as a matter of fact, and the shops were actually opened both in the Chandni Chowk, Sadar Bazar and other places where we had been. It was about 10-30 that I came back to my office after ascertaining that all shops had been opened. At about between 11 and 12, I was at my office. As I was there I heard that shops in other parts of the city had also been opened. All of a sudden I heard some cry and I went into the verandah of my office and from there I saw that a certain boy was taken into custody by the

police and was dragged to a short distance up to the railings of the Park where the Queen's Statue is and from those railings thrown over the railings into the Park and from the Park taken through the gate in the railings or the wall on the other side behind the Queen's Statue and then into the Town Hall.

Q. What was the height of the railings?

A. Something like 6 feet.

Q. Was he lifted over?

A. He was lifted over by three constables and there were two constables inside. They passed him over to the constables to the other side. Unfortunately they could not take the boy in their lap. I cannot say whether it was intentional on their part or whether they meant to save that unfortunate incident, but then he was picked up and taken through the gate. The gate was opened and he was taken to the Town Hall.

Q. Did you see what occurred afterwards?

A. I heard shots fired.

Q. You merely heard them. Did you go down from your office when you saw these incidents?

A. I did not go down from my office immediately as I saw the incidents and it was only after a short time that shots were fired. What I saw was that an ordinary man seeing what had happened, the arrest of the boy, went round saying what had happened and people began closing their shops.

Q. Did you know that what was said by the crowd was that the boy had been bayoneted?

A. I did not hear any such remarks at that time. That was wrong.

Q. Was the crowd looking menacing?

A. The people were there and all shops were open.

Q. It was quite possible that the people might come and attempt forcibly rescuing them?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think that he had been arrested because he endeavoured to get the shopkeepers who had opened their shops to close them?

A. I have no personal knowledge.

Q. How old was the boy you refer to?

A. I could not say very well.

Q. He was subsequently charged with some offence—was he not?

A. I think he was taken into the Town Hall and there and then convicted.

Q. He must have been tried by some magistrate?

A. Magistrates were always in the Town Hall, because they were actually spending the best part of their day there.

Q. I think you are one of the special constables and you heard what the last witness said? Do you agree with his views upon this?

A. I certainly do agree with him.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. On the 30th March when you saw what happened, were the crowd throwing stones?

A. I could not tell you what they were throwing.

Q. They were throwing missiles?

A. There was something of the kind thrown. There were mostly boys. I could see the boys doing something.

Q. Where were the boys—mixed in the crowd or on the *patri*?

A. Some of them were on the footpath, but if there were any boys directly in front of the gate or on the road I could not see them, because of the Clock Tower.

Q. Why do you say boys were throwing stones—why not other people?

A. I did not see the other people. All that I could see was what was happening on the footpath—which was just in front of my house.

Q. What was the number of the crowd that you observed?

A. As I observed I could not see what really was the number of crowd on the road in front of the gate because my sight was cut off by reason of the Clock Tower coming in between.

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Mr. SHIV NARAIN—concluded—SHAM LAL.

Q. What was your estimate of the crowd which was attempting to get inside the gate?
 A. The crowd was attempting to get into the gate and coming back again.
 Q. Why did they come back again—were they being pressed by the police?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you observe the military and the police?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Were the police and military driving the crowd out of the compound?
 A. The police was driving out the crowd.
 Q. How long did this last?
 A. I believe it lasted for about 10 or 15 minutes.
 Q. During all that time were stones being thrown?
 A. Not all that time, but at times during this interval there was this throwing of brickbats.
 Q. How far were you from the actual place where the crowd was?
 A. I would estimate the distance to be something like 100 feet.
 Q. From where you were you could not observe what was exactly happening between the crowd and the police?
 A. I was not in a position to observe that. My view of the road was obstructed, not the view inside the garden.
 Q. Were the police specially sent for?
 A. I could not say. I simply saw that the military had come and at the time the military came they occupied the place the police had been occupying. The military came from inside the garden from behind the Town Hall. At about that time the police moved towards the right on to the footpath in the Queen's Gardens. That is they were facing Chandni Chowk with their backs to the station side.
 Q. Did you observe what happened between the military and the crowd?
 A. I was between the two.
 Q. After the military came and posed themselves in the place where the police were, was there any throwing of stones—did the throwing of stones continue or not?
 A. I think it did but in a very small measure.
 Q. And this was followed by firing. How many volleys were fired?
 A. I could not say that.
 Q. How many people were shot by the firing?

By the President—

Q. What is your age?
 A. 12 or 13.
 Q. Where do you stay?
 A. At the Sadar Bazar railway station.
 Q. When did you go to the Clock Tower on the 30th of March?
 A. I went to Clock Tower about 2-30 or 3.
 Q. Were you doing anything at the Clock Tower?
 A. Shouting was going on, people were going into the gardens and I stayed and saw what was going on.
 Q. Were people doing anything else than shouting?
 A. Some of them were throwing stones.
 Q. Who were throwing stones?
 A. People standing outside the garden.
 Q. Were these the men that composed the people that were throwing the stones?
 A. Yes.
 Q. At whom were the stones being thrown?
 A. At the British soldiers and the police.
 Q. Were the people throwing stones shouting anything?
 A. They were shouting.
 Q. What were they shouting?
 A. I could not distinctly follow.
 Q. Did you hear anything of what the crowd was saying when throwing stones at the police and military?
 A. I did not understand.
 Q. Did you hear some firing?

A. I could not say actually how many people were shot but I can say that one or two after being shot were brought from or near about the gates of the garden inside the garden.
 Q. After the firing did the crowd disperse or did they continue to remain where they were?
 A. I did not observe because of the Clock Tower.
 Q. The crowd that was fired at was not the same crowd that was facing the military?
 A. That was the same crowd but it was hidden from my sight because of the Clock Tower.
 Q. You could not observe what was happening between the military and the crowd?
 A. I could not see the military firing and therefore I could not see what was happening.
 Q. Did you observe anything which led to the firing?
 A. I did not observe anything which led to the firing. The firing took place at Ballimaran Street.
 Q. All that you observed was that the boy was brought into the Town Hall?
 A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You said that you saw two men were shot down on the 30th March and that you saw them being dragged. How were they dragged and who dragged them?
 A. I saw one of them certainly being taken as if he was being dragged—on the footpath first and then somewhere on the stairs of the Town Hall or the Health Office side. As to the other I could not say whether he was being dragged.

By Mr. C. R. Das—

Q. About your being appointed a special constable—I want to know what work you were given to do?
 A. They had practically no work for me. All they asked me to do was to go and see if I could find one Abdul Majid who was suspected of having excited the crowd on the evening of the 14th when that incident of the Criminal Investigation Department happened.
 Q. It was well-known in Delhi that that man had left and yet you were asked to find him out?
 A. I think it was known that he had left Delhi but I was told by Mr. Orde himself to go.
 Q. And did you find him?
 A. No.

SHAM LAL.

A. The first two or three fires were with blank cartridges and people got back and shouted that they were firing blank cartridges.
 Q. Were the people not afraid then?
 A. As no body fell, they were not frightened and then they rallied forward.
 Q. Did they start throwing stones again at the police and military?
 A. They only shouted. I did not see anyone throwing stones.
 Q. Do you mean that there were no stones thrown after the fire that you described as blank fire?
 A. I did not see any.
 Q. What happened to you?
 A. I was standing there when the actual cartridges were fired and I was hurt in the thigh.
 A. Were you wounded by the shot?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What were the people near you doing just before you were wounded?
 A. They were standing and seeing what was going on inside the garden.
 Q. Were they boys or men who were throwing the stones?
 A. Grown up men.
 Q. Were people both inside and outside the garden at this time?
 A. Both inside and outside.

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SHAM LAL—concluded—CHIDAMI LAL.

Q. Was the gate of the garden open?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Where were the soldiers and the police standing at the time?
 A. On the road just opposite the Town Hall near the place where lantern is placed.
 Q. Do you know whether any attempt was made to get the crowd to go away or not?
 A. No attempt was made.
 Q. Did you see who was in charge either of the police or the military?
 A. I did not see.
 Q. How many police did you see?
 A. Some 6 or 7.
 Q. How many soldiers did you see?
 A. About 8.
 Q. Was there a great deal of noise going on at the time?
 A. A great deal of noise was going on. I could not understand what was being said.
 Q. Did you know whether or not any attempt was made by anyone in charge of the police or of the soldiers to get the people to go away before the firing?
 A. I was standing in the midst of the crowd; I did not see.
 Q. Could you hear whether anything was said?
 A. I did not hear.
 Q. After you were wounded where were you taken?
 A. I fell down and when people began to fall on me I got to my senses and ran.
 Q. Were you able to run?
 A. I had a *dhoti* and a *langota* and I pressed them and went away.

By Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Are you all right?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Perfectly all right?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you see a *sahib* on a horse?
 A. I did not see.

Q. Did you see three or four policemen fire at anybody on the west side of the gate?
 A. The police did not fire.
 Q. You did not see whether that firing was before blank volleys were fired?
 A. I did not see.
 By Sir C. H. Setalvad—
 Q. You came from the Sadar station?
 A. Yes.
 Q. When you came near the Clock Tower did you come behind the crowd or facing the crowd?
 A. I was at the pavement just near the gate of the garden.
 Q. When you saw the crowd first was the crowd facing you?
 A. I came from Fatehpuri side to the pavement of the place near the garden where the crowd was.
 Q. From where you were, could you see both the police and the crowd?
 A. I could not see the police as there was a number of men between me and the police.
 Q. When you got mixed in the crowd you could not see what the police and the military were doing?
 A. I could not see.
 Q. Because you were surrounded by people?
 A. Yes.
 Q. You merely heard the shot and you were struck?
 A. Yes.
 Q. You say that pebbles and stones were thrown? How did you see that?
 A. When stones were thrown a man could see it even from a distance.
 Q. When you were coming from a distance you saw stones being thrown?
 A. I saw that when I was coming and also when I was standing.
 Q. When you were standing there, were people throwing stones?
 A. Persons in the garden were throwing the stones and persons just opposite the gate of the garden were also throwing stones.

CHIDAMI LAL.

By the President—

Q. What do you do?
 A. I sell *Pakauris* (made of oil and gram flour).
 Q. How old are you?
 A. I am 20 years of age.
 Q. Where were you on the 30th of March last?
 A. I went to the Jumna River and thence I proceeded to my home through the Queen's Gardens.
 Q. Were you on the main station that morning?
 A. I was not at the station.
 Q. Did anything happen to you on that day?
 A. Nothing.
 Q. Were you not struck by a shot that day?
 A. No.
 Q. What is your father's name?
 A. Lala Ram.
 Q. Were you near the Clock Tower?
 A. I was inside the gardens.
 Q. Was anything happening in the gardens?
 A. There was a large crowd of men there.
 Q. What was the crowd doing?
 A. They were shouting *Gandhi maharaj ki jai*.
 Q. Were they throwing anything?
 A. No.
 Q. Did you hear any firing?
 A. I was struck whilst I was running.
 Q. How were you struck?
 A. I was running when I was struck in the elbow and rib.
 Q. Where were you running?
 A. I was running towards the Town Hall.
 Q. Were you struck in the front or in the back?
 A. At the back.

Q. And what happened, did you fall down?
 A. Seeing blood coming out and my shoes getting wet, I fell down when I was running.
 Q. After you fell down what happened?
 A. I know nothing of what happened.
 Q. Were you taken to the hospital?
 A. I do not know who took me to the hospital but I was taken to the hospital.
 Q. Were you attended by the doctor?
 A. I was attended there by the doctor.
 Q. Did you see from what place the shots were struck?
 A. From the side of the railway station.
 Q. I thought you said you were in the Queen's Gardens. Were you in the gardens when you were struck?
 A. When I was shot I fell down near the Town Hall, on this side of it.
 Q. Were many people running when you ran?
 A. All the men were running.
 Q. How many?
 A. Ten or twelve thousand.
 Q. Were the people in a state of great excitement?
 A. They were not in a state of excitement. They were running away.
 Q. Did you stand with the crowd for any length of time before you ran away and the shot was fired?
 A. I stood with the crowd.
 Q. For how long?
 A. For about 5 or 6 minutes.
 Q. During that time was the crowd throwing stones?
 A. No; there was no throwing of stones.
 Q. Could you see whether they were being thrown into the Queen's Gardens or on to people standing near the station?

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CHIDAMI LAL—concluded—SEVA RAM.

A. I did not see any stones being thrown.
 Q. Could you have seen?
 A. No.
 Q. Was that because of the number of people that were between you and the road opposite the station?
 A. It was because of the number of persons between me and the road.

By Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. You have told us when you fell down after running for sometime that you were near the Town Hall.
 A. Yes.
 Q. Where were you when you were actually struck with the bullet?
 A. I was near the gate that leads to the station.
 Q. Had you been standing there for some time?
 A. I was there for about 5 or 6 minutes.
 Q. And was it after you were struck that you commenced to run?
 A. Before I was struck—I was struck whilst running.
 Q. What made you run?
 A. I saw other people running, so I also ran.
 Q. Do you know what made them run?
 A. I did not know why they were running.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. When you reached the crowd you told us there was a crowd of ten to twelve thousand?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Where were they?
 A. Some of them inside the garden and some of them were outside the garden.
 Q. Did you form any estimate of them?
 A. That was the approximate number.
 Q. What did you judge from—how many are there in this room?
 A. About a hundred.

Q. The crowd that you saw was 100 times this?
 A. About a 100 times.
 Q. And what were they all doing?
 A. Shouting *Gandhi ki jai, Gandhi ki jai*.
 Q. Were they doing anything else?
 A. Nothing else.
 Q. Were they throwing stones?
 A. No.
 Q. None of them?
 A. Not one of them.
 Q. Not a single one—no earth, no stones—nothing—no one had anything in their hands?
 A. They were quietly standing there and shouting *Gandhi ki jai*.
 Q. Did you see what led to the firing?
 A. I do not know.
 Q. From where you were you could not see the police and the troops?
 A. I could see from where I was standing—I could see the police and the troops.
 Q. And you could see the crowd immediately in front of the police?
 A. I could not see the crowd.
 Q. And did you see what was happening between them—the crowd and the police?
 A. I saw nothing.
 Q. They were standing there quietly?
 A. The police were standing quietly and the people were only shouting.
 Q. The mob was only shouting and suddenly the shots were fired?
 A. I know nothing about it.
 Q. You were there—you were shot yourself?
 A. I know that the shots were fired.
 Q. Did you see them actually firing?
 A. I was shot whilst running. I did not see the actual firing.

SEVA RAM.

By the President—

Q. What do you do?
 A. I am a shopkeeper.
 Q. How old are you?
 A. About 30 or 32.
 Q. Were you in Delhi on the 30th March last?
 A. I was in Delhi on the 30th March.
 Q. Where is your shop?
 A. Inside a lane known by the name of Haveli Quli Khan.
 Q. Did you close your shop on the 30th?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Why?
 A. All the other shops were closed so I closed my shop.
 Q. At what time did you close your shop?
 A. From the very morning.
 Q. After you closed your shop what did you do?
 A. I went home and slept.
 Q. How long did you sleep?
 A. Till about 2 or 2-30.
 Q. When you awakened up at 2-30 what did you do?
 A. I was going towards the shop which I intended to open and to sit there because I had been lying down.
 Q. Why did you want to open your shop?
 A. I wanted to sit—not to sell. I wanted to sit because I had been lying down.
 Q. Where do you stay?
 A. I reside at Nilkatra.
 Q. Going from the house where you stay to your shop through what part of the town did you pass?
 A. There are three roads that lead to my shop. That day I went through the road by the side of the garden.
 Q. Is that the direct road from the house to your shop?
 A. Just the same—it makes no difference.
 Q. When you reached the garden what did you do?
 A. When I was going I saw a large number of people standing at the shops and shouting like jackals.

Q. Was there a large crowd?
 A. About two or three thousands.
 Q. Were you inside the gardens?
 A. In the lane outside the gardens.
 Q. Was that outside the gardens near the station or near the Town Hall?
 A. Near the Town Hall.
 Q. Did you go towards the station?
 A. I did not go towards the station; as soon as I reached the corner of the street, I was wounded.
 Q. Did you see what had occurred before any shots were fired at all?
 A. I did not see anything before, because I had just come.
 Q. Is it the case then that as soon as you joined this large crowd of people and when you were near the Town Hall, you were wounded by a bullet?
 A. I was at a distance from the crowd because the crowd was on the other side of the road and I was just at the corner of the street. I was looking at the crowd standing on the shops when I was struck.
 Q. Were you alone?
 A. I was alone.
 Q. Was there none near you?
 A. No.
 Q. How near was the nearest person to where you were?
 A. I was moving, I was not standing. There was no one near me. Persons were on the shop just in front of me.
 Q. Where did the bullet come from?
 A. It came from the gardens.
 Q. Did you see who fired it?
 A. I did not see.
 Q. Were there any people between you and the place from which the shot came?
 A. There were no persons between me and the place where the bullets came.

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SEVA RAM.

[Concluded.]

Q. Is that all you know about the occurrence?
 A. That is all.
 Q. After you were struck by the bullet, what happened to you?
 A. I fell down feeling giddy and I did not know who took me to the hospital.
 Q. Were you taken to the hospital?
 A. When I came to my senses, I found myself in the hospital at 9 in the night.
 Q. How long did you remain in the hospital?
 A. Three months. I have still got wound.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. How far were you from the western gate leading from the gardens to the Chandni Chowk while you were struck?
 A. About 24 feet.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You were about 24 feet from the gate?
 A. Yes.

Q. When you were at the gate, there were no people at all?
 A. No.
 Q. When you came, the crowd was in front of you?
 A. Just in front of me. The crowd was facing the gardens.
 Q. How many people were in the crowd?
 A. A large number, some 3 or 4 thousand. They were all standing on their shops.
 Q. Were any people on the road?
 A. The road was quite clear.
 Q. Did you see the police there?
 A. They might have been on the other side of the road; there was no one just opposite the lane where I was standing.
 Q. You came from a side lane?
 A. Yes.
 Q. You were standing at the entrance of that lane?
 A. I had not yet reached it.
 Q. When you were struck you were still in the lane?
 A. I was still inside the lane.

10 November 1919.]

Dr. ABDUR RAHMAN.

At Delhi, Monday, the 10th November 1919.

P R E S E N T :

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. JUSTICE RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B.,
K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble PANDIT JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

SARDAR SAHIBZADA SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. H. G. STOKES, C.I.E., I.C.S., Secretary.

Dr. ABDUR RAHMAN.

By the President—

Q. Are you Dr. Abdur Rahman?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you associated with the *satyagraha* movement in Delhi?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Had you had any official position in that movement?

A. Yes, I was one of the general secretaries.

Q. Where were you on the 30th of March?

A. I was in Delhi on that day.

Q. Where did you go?

A. I left my house and went to stay at the Fatehpuri Mosque.

Q. Was that early in the morning?

A. Yes, Sir, it was at about 7 o'clock, about that time.

Q. In what condition was the city when you went there?

A. The Fatehpuri? There was a crowd of people standing there.

Q. I think there was no general stoppage of business?

A. No, Sir, there was none.

Q. How long did you remain at the Fatehpuri?

A. It may be for about half an hour and more.

Q. Where did you go after that?

A. I went to the Sadar Bazar and also to Chauri.

Q. Did you personally see either of the occurrences at the railway station or in the Chandni Chowk?

A. No, Sir, I was not present when firing took place.

Q. In these succeeding days were you associated with other leaders of the *satyagraha* movement and other gentlemen and were any endeavours made to bring the *hartal* to an end?

A. You mean Sir, on the 30th?

Q. Also on days subsequent to 30th?

A. As we had a complete *hartal* on the 30th, we tried that no *hartal* should take place on the 6th.Q. As regards the *hartal* that took place on the 6th, that was contrary to the desire of the committee. You wished business to go on on the 6th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. A general *hartal* was held on that day?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Subsequent to the *hartal* on the 6th did you desire that a *hartal* should take place on the 10th?

A. I had no time to think about it. When we received news about the arrest of Mr. Gandhi I had no time to think what to do.

Q. When you found that *hartal* had taken place did you try to bring it to an end on the 10th or on the subsequent days?

A. We tried on the 10th. We took people out and held two mass meetings to keep the people occupied.

Q. Did you try to bring *hartal* to an end on the 10th?

A. At the meetings of the 10th we begged people to open their shops on the 11th and on the 11th we tried our best.

Q. Did the people assent to your request that the *hartal* should be brought to an end or did they want to continue it for some days after?

A. In fact they did want to continue it.

Q. Did you and other gentlemen have meetings from time to time with those in authority?

A. Yes, Sir, we had.

Q. With what object were those meetings held?

A. In order to take steps that no disturbances take place in the city and that people should resume their business.

Q. Have you any doubt that *hartal*, if it had continued might have resulted in serious consequences, such as disorder and riot?

A. It did not take place here. I was in Delhi.

Q. Did you hear what occurred on the 14th?

A. I was not in Delhi on that day.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. I understand that two meetings were held on the 10th and that at those meetings, as we understand, you asked the people to open their shops?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. From the 1st of April to the 5th of April, as I understand, the *hartal* was not effective?A. There was no *hartal* from the 1st to the 5th of April.

Q. Then it broke out on the 6th?

A. We really intended to wait for the all-India movement but the *hartal* on the 6th is due to the resentment the people had felt, as I have mentioned in my statement, at the notice of the Deputy Commissioner and the *communiqué* of the Home Department.Q. Is it not the case that Mr. Gandhi wished you to have an all-India *hartal* not on the 30th of March but on the 6th April?

A. In the beginning we mistook the message. We were to have it on the Sunday next after the passage of the Rowlatt Bill. We recommended for the 30th and as everything was arranged in fact we could not change it for the 6th. Later on we did not try and as 30th had been fixed we did not want to have it on the 6th.

Q. People in fact, did have it on the 6th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. From the 1st to the 5th they did not have any *hartal*?

A. Yes, they did not. I mean the notice came out on about the 4th, I am not quite sure about the date.

Q. Is it your evidence that the wish to have a *hartal* on the 6th was due to the fact that the people had resented the Deputy Commissioner's notice or was it, due to some other local causes?A. I can positively say that I am not sure about it but I heard people saying that they would not listen to us or look at the notice as they called us *badmashes*.

Q. Did you read the notice, Doctor?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. You agree it did not call all the people in Delhi *badmashes* or even the people who were taking part in the *hartal*; it called people *badmashes* who had taken part in the riot at the station?

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Dr. ABDUR RAHMAN.

[Continued.]

A. Yes, Sir, people who were present at Delhi. They were Delhi people and not outsiders. There must be a lot of people at the station who were not throwing stones or rickbats.

Q. You would not suggest that the notice called such people *badmashes*?

A. If I remember it referred to Delhi people.

Q. You also take it from me that the translation furnished to us is perfectly clear?

A. That was not at least the idea of the people. I do think that this was one of the causes.

Q. What were the other causes?

A. *Communiqué* coming from the Home Department.Q. Is there any other cause as there was a *hartal* all over India?

A. I think all these three together. There may be some other cause.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You spoke of people resenting certain expressions used by Colonel Beadon in his notice?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What was the attitude of the people towards Colonel Beadon in Delhi generally? Was he a popular officer or an unpopular officer?

A. I don't think he was very popular.

Q. Was he popular at all?

A. When I say I don't think that he was popular I cannot say that he was popular in Delhi.

Q. Was Colonel Beadon an unpopular officer?

A. Yes, I think, he was.

Q. And had he been so unpopular for some years in Delhi?

A. Yes, I think, he was for some years.

Q. Was the situation that the people, owing to that unpopularity of his, viewed with suspicion anything that came from him and were more ready to resent it than anything from any body else?

A. Very likely.

By the Hon'ble Mr. T. Smith—

Q. On the morning of the 30th you saw some men requesting people to leave conveyances and walk on foot?

A. Yes, on the 30th.

Q. Did you disapprove of it?

A. Yes, I did. I told them to stop asking people to get out of their tongas. They stopped in my presence.

Q. On that day you were out from 7 A.M. to 12 noon and you visited several places, did you see any crowds about?

A. I saw, as I have mentioned, a crowd at the Fatehpuri.

Q. A big crowd?

A. About something like below 100.

Q. Farther off in the Chandni Chowk?

A. No crowd, of course people were passing on the footpath.

Q. They were making no noise?

A. Of course they were making a noise and were talking to one another.

Q. Were they raising their voice loudly?

A. They were certainly making a noise, speaking to each other.

Q. Loudly?

A. Of course.

Q. Were they excited?

A. They were not very much excited at that time.

Q. You were in your house from 12 to 3. It was then that you came to know of the disturbances at the station?

A. Yes, when I left my house at 3-30. When I reached the corner of the Queen's Gardens I came to know about that time.

Q. You were one of the secretaries of the *satyagraha*?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. Does it not suggest a breakdown of your organization that, though you had volunteers to keep the peace, you, the general secretary, were kept in absolute ignorance?

A. I was not the only general secretary; I was one of them and I was not informed in fact.

Q. It rather suggested that your organization broke down?

A. It is your suggestion.

Q. Were you not rather surprised that you were not informed? You, who were general secretary?

A. People after this incident were so much excited that very likely they forgot to inform me.

Q. But they left you, an important official, in absolute ignorance of what was going on?

A. They did not inform me.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. Are you a native of Delhi?

A. No.

Q. Since how long have you been in Delhi?

A. Since August 1913.

Q. Then do I take it that since that time you have been intimately connected with popular movements in the city?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you must also have some experience of the *hartal* that took place two years ago on account of the difference of opinion about the *Remila* procession?

A. Yes.

Q. That *hartal* continued for about 11 days?

A. It did continue for some time.

Q. Was there any disturbance on account of the *hartal* then?

A. No.

Q. Any disposition on the part of the people to loot or annoy anybody?

A. No.

Q. Then this *hartal* that took place on the 30th of March, what was the object of that *hartal*?

A. It was a day of mourning.

Q. A protest against the Rowlatt legislation?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell the Committee as to the general attitude of the authorities towards the popular movements that were going on in Delhi, generally speaking?

A. It was not very pleasant. I mean the attitude was rather unsympathetic towards us.

Q. And did it cause any feeling of resentment towards the authorities?

A. Yes, it did.

By Mr. C. R. Das—

Q. You said in the morning you saw people requesting other people to leave their conveyances and walk on foot, did you see any force or threat applied?

A. No.

Q. I wanted to ask you particularly about the dead body at the Imli Mosque—just tell us what you know about it.

A. It was between 7 and 8 in the evening of the 30th that I reached Hakim Sahib's house, but he was not in. I was just about to leave his house when I was informed by the people that the police and military officers and others were demanding the body of a Mussalman lying in the Imli Mosque.

Q. A body of one of those who were killed in the riot?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you hear of any machine-guns?

A. Yes, I heard that they had brought a machine-gun and had brought rifles.

Q. And after that?

A. After that I went to the Imli Mosque, but by the time I arrived there the police and the military had left.

Q. After that, next morning?

A. The next morning again people came to my house to ask me to go down to that place because the police were again demanding the dead body.

Q. Did you go to the mosque?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see the police and the machine-gun?

A. No, they had left. On the morning of the 31st they had left before I arrived.

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Dr. ABDUR RAHMAN—concluded—GIRDHARI.

Q. And after that what did you do ?

A. I asked the people and they said, "either you get permission from the Deputy Commissioner or any other official to remove the body to the graveyard in order to bury the man according to Muslim rites, or they should not demand the body until the relations of the dead man come to Delhi." Then I went to the Town Hall and I found the *otwal* there and told him the whole thing was very serious, and that he had better give the permission otherwise something serious might take place. He saw my point and he said he wanted only the examination of the body by some doctor. I said "I am a doctor, I can examine the body and give the report." So he gave the permission—a written permission, and I took the permission and was coming back when I met Hakim Sahib on the road and I consulted with him and said "do not you think it would be best to remove this funeral and that we should go along with the funeral, so that most of these people...."

Q. But did you go back to the mosque ?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And did you see the dead body ?

A. Yes. I examined it with Dr. R. C. Sen.

Q. What did you see ?

A. He had a bullet wound over the neck piercing one of the main arteries and another on the chest.

By the President—

Q. About that *hartal* that took place two years ago, which you said lasted 11 days, was that a generally-observed cessation of work ?

A. Amongst the Hindus, Sir, it was.

Q. But not amongst the Muhammadans ?

A. No.

Q. And even amongst the Hindus was it anything like universal ?

A. As far as I remember I think it was universal.

Q. On that occasion was it entirely voluntary ?

A. I think so, Sir.

Q. And was any effort, so far as you know, at that time made by any one who was observing the *hartal* in the sense that they did no work but kept the time as a time of mourning, to get other people who did not want to observe it to follow their example ?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. You cannot remember whether there was any effort made to persuade others than those who were observing it to observe the *hartal* ?

A. I do not remember.

GIRDHARI.

By the President—

Q. How old are you ?

A. About 20 years of age.

Q. Did anything occur in Queen's Gardens on the 30th of March last ?

A. I was in the Queen's Gardens ; I was coming from the Jumna after bathing ; there was a crowd and I was standing in the midst of the crowd when I received some wounds from buckshot.

Q. How long had you been in the crowd before you were shot ?

A. About 20 minutes.

Q. During that time what had the crowd been doing ?

A. They were shouting *Gandhi ki jai*, all of them.

Q. Were stones being thrown ?

A. They were not throwing stones at that time. When the people began to run, a few small boys threw pebbles.

Q. Before the people began to run had no stones been thrown at or in the direction of the police or military ?

A. No stones were thrown before the people began to run.

Q. Are you quite sure of that ?

A. I am quite certain no stones were thrown before that.

Q. How far from the railway station were you at the time ?

A. I was near the gate of the Queen's Gardens, not distant from the railway station.

Q. Did you see that any people had been driven by the police and the military from the road into the garden ?

A. They were driven into the garden from the road.

Q. At the time when they were driven did you see any stones or mud or any missile thrown by anybody ?

A. When the people were actually driven into the garden then some of the boys threw pieces of stones or pebbles.

Q. Did you see Mr. Currie in the garden ?

A. I do not know Mr. Currie. I saw a *Sahib*.

Q. Did you see a policeman near him ?

A. There was a policeman.

Q. Were there several policemen ?

A. I did not see it clearly but the *Sahib* on horseback had 10 or 12 policemen who had accompanied him.

Q. Did you see any military there, any soldiers ?

A. I did not see any soldiers there.

Q. Did you see from what point the shot came that wounded you ?

A. From the station side.

Q. Did you notice that the *Sahib* you saw or others wanted the crowd to go away ?

A. They were driven back and the people receded willingly.

Q. If the crowd were going back willingly how did they get into the Chandni Chowk before the shots were fired ?

A. Many of them had left and some remained there. I cannot say why they too did not leave.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You say you came from the Jumna ? By what road ?

A. From the Kauriapul side there is a well at the corner of one of the gates. From there I saw a crowd of people.

Q. You saw the crowd from outside the garden ?

A. Just near the railing of the garden.

Q. On what road, on the road facing the station or some other road ?

A. I was inside the garden walking by the side of the railing.

Q. From where did you enter the garden ?

A. From the gate that is in front of the Kauriapul, the wooden bridge.

Q. You came from the back of the crowd ?

A. There was a crowd outside on the road and also just at the place where I was inside the garden.

Q. When you came was the crowd in front of you ?

A. I found the crowd outside on the road and also inside.

Q. The crowd was driven from the road into the garden after you arrived ?

A. Some ten minutes before.

Q. You saw that being done ?

A. Yes.

Q. When you came what was the number of the crowd on the road ?

A. That was a large crowd. So far as I recollect it was some 2,000 or 3,000.

Q. Do you mean the whole crowd inside and also outside the garden ?

A. Including all.

Q. You saw the crowd on the road being driven into the garden.

A. Yes.

Q. When you came and saw the part of the crowd on the road, was any one of them throwing stones or *kankar* or mud before going into the garden ?

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GIRDHARI.

[Continued.]

A. The crowd on the road did not throw any stones or any missile when they were driven inside the garden. Then some of the boys threw *kankar*.

Q. Was it on a large scale ?

A. Only on a small scale.

Q. You say that many people went away ?

A. Many of them went away.

Q. Was it a large portion of the crowd ?

A. The majority had left.

Q. Those that remained in the garden what were they doing ? Were they trying to come on to the road again ?

A. They were not trying to go back to the road. They were only standing.

Q. When you came and observed all this, did you get yourself mixed in the crowd ; where were you standing at the time of firing ?

A. I saw the crowd running and I was one of those who were running.

Q. Did the running begin after the fire ?

A. When the crowd heard fire.

Q. I ask you whether it is anterior to that. At that stage where were you ? Were you apart from it ?

A. I was in the midst of the crowd but was standing on one side just near the garden wall that goes from the gate.

Q. Then you could observe what was happening between the crowd and the police standing on the gate of the garden ?

A. I could see and saw that the police were driving the people into the garden.

Q. What were the people doing ?

A. They were running away ; they were pushing them back.

Q. Were you and the crowd throwing stones ?

A. Grown up men were running ; only small boys were throwing stones.

Q. Did you observe stones in the hands of the crowd ?

A. I saw them in the hands of the small boys and saw them actually throwing stones.

Q. Had the crowd *lathis* in their hands ?

A. No.

Q. Had they sticks in their hands ?

A. Some of them had.

Q. Did you see any one throwing *lathis* ?A. I did not see any *lathis* there.

Q. Did you see actually where the military were firing ?

A. I did not see where the guns were being levelled and fired.

Q. Did you start to the place where firing was taking place ?

A. I was going to the garden.

Q. Did you turn back and go ?

A. I turned back to go towards the Clock Tower.

Q. By what road you were going to the Clock Tower ?

A. From the road that goes to the soldiers' canteen.

Q. Then you heard the fire ?

A. Yes.

Q. And you were struck by the fire ?

A. Yes.

Q. What part were you struck ?

A. At six places : on the back, just on the armpit.

Q. How far were you at the time when you heard the shot ?

A. More than 50 paces.

Q. Were there any people at that time or were you solitary ?

A. There were only one or two men just close by.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. You say that you only saw boys ?

A. Yes.

Q. How old were the boys ?

A. They were boys between the age of 10, 12, 15, younger than me.

Q. No one elder than you ?

A. I could not see clearly in the crowd.

Q. Did you throw any stones ?

A. I did not ; I speak the truth.

Q. What was the size of the stones the boys threw ?

A. Small stones.

Q. As big as this ? (an inkstand on the table was shown to the witness).

A. Not so big as that.

Q. Where did you get the stones from ?

A. There was earth dug up somewhere and there were also stones lying.

Q. When men ran away boys threw stones ?

A. Grown up men ran away ; some boys also ran away ; some that were there were throwing stones.

PART II

Written Statements of Witnesses.

Mr. P. L. ORDE, Superintendent of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Delhi.

1. I was instructed on the 20th April 1919 to take up the enquiries into the disturbances which occurred in Delhi from the 30th March to the 17th of April 1919, with the particular object of bringing to light the extent and methods of the organization believed to be responsible for the disturbances and its connection, if any, with similar outbreaks in other parts of India. Two statements (pages 3—8) have been prepared by my assistant Lala Buland Iqbal regarding the allegations against Delhi of having despatched emissaries and exerted undue pressure on surrounding districts to promote unrest. These statements are attached to this report and I will comment on them later. In the course of enquiries full use has been made of the various cases prosecuted by the regular police; prominent politicians have been examined, suspected persons have been subjected to surveillance and every possible clue has been carefully followed up. The result, it must be admitted, is largely negative, for the very good reason that, so far as we have been able to ascertain, the rioting was not the outcome of a deliberate conspiracy against the British *Raj*, but the natural consequence of a combination of economic hardship and political unrest.

2. *Conditions in Delhi in March 1919.*—There is no need in this report to deal with the first half of this combination and I will merely discuss the second. Political unrest in Delhi had been steadily increasing since the establishment in 1917 of a local branch of the Home Rule League. There has been a constant flow of speakers from other provinces, whether attending meetings of the Imperial Legislative Council or for other purposes, and these politicians have succeeded in imbuing the hitherto peaceable citizens of Delhi with an insatiable taste for anti-government oratory. This appetite was further whetted by the orgy of irresponsible speech-making which was inflicted on Delhi during the sessions of the Congress and Muslim League in December 1918. The progress of the Rowlatt Bills through the Legislative Council, and the uncompromising attitude of the Indian members of the Council towards these unpopular measures afforded to both indigenous and imported agitators a fresh opening, of which the fullest advantage was taken. It will be seen then, that by the middle of March 1919, the public mind was in a most receptive condition for the assimilation of Mr. Gandhi's passive resistance movement and its objectionable but inevitable consequences.

3. *The local satyagraha sabha.*—The local *satyagraha sabha* dated from the 7th March 1919 on which day a public meeting was held and a list of fourteen members read out. These original members included Dr. Ansari (President), Munshi Ram alias Swami Shradhdhanand, Hasrat Mohani of Aligarh, Dr. Abdur Rahman, Shankar Lal, Shiv Narain Haksar, Miss Gmeiner, Shuaib, Indra and his wife and others. The most noticeable of those who refused to accept Gandhi's doctrine were Hakim Ajmal Khan and Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh. The legal element also remained conspicuously aloof, probably actuated more by fear of disbarment than by any feelings of delicacy about embarrassing the Government. The new society held several more meetings in promotion of the *hartal* which had been fixed for the 30th March. By the 29th March the organizers were confident of securing a fairly successful shopkeeper's strike, and apparently for this reason were unwilling to risk a possible failure by postponing the *hartal* to the 6th April in pursuance of Gandhi's alteration of plans. It appears that Gandhi's orders regarding postponement were not even communicated to the general public.

4. The plans of the organisers were well laid. The scope and objects of the Rowlatt Act had been grossly misrepresented, the more active members of the *sabha* had assiduously canvassed the shopkeepers and when it seemed that the Muhammadan public were not evincing sufficient interest, the services were enlisted of a popular preacher, who had done much to stimulate interest in the Muslim League in December and who won over his wavering co-religionists by a misleading but spirited lecture on the 29th March.

5. *The riot of the 30th March.*—The universal character of the *hartal* which followed on the 30th March was unexpected both by officials and by the politicians themselves, who were completely taken by surprise. Such shopkeepers as endeavoured to carry on their business were soon surrounded by disorderly mobs and were compelled to close their shops through fear of loot and destruction. Passengers in tramcars and vehicles of all sorts were forced to descend and continue their journey on foot. Finally, word went round that two ardent spirits, who had tried to compel the sweetmeat contractors at the Railway Station to shut up shop, had been arrested. The result was an immediate descent upon the Railway Station, where, though every attempt was made to convince the mob that no one was under arrest, the police and troops were eventually compelled to fire in order to disperse the rioters. The latter fled, but rallied by the Town Hall and were only finally scattered after another burst of firing.

6. It does not appear that the *satyagraha sabha* contemplated such acts of violence as led to the riot at the railway station. Some of the less important members of this *sabha* were undoubtedly to the fore in removing passengers from tramcars and instigating acts of minor lawlessness; but once matters began to take a serious aspect the more responsible *satyagrahis* apparently did their best to avert an outbreak. Such influence as they possessed, however, was purely for evil, and control had passed out of their hands. The losses caused by the firing had exasperated the people, and though temporarily cowed, the feeling against Government was most noticeable.

7. It is unnecessary for me to summarize the incidents on the days following the 30th March, since a full description of these events has already been given in several places.

8. *Extra-provincial activities of local agitators.*—While the city of Delhi was in this disturbed condition, allegations were made that the local conspirators were despatching emissaries to rouse the country side and that local merchants were bringing economic pressure on their customers in the *mofussil* to join the campaign. The result of enquiries into the charges against each individual will be found in the statements attached to this report. The information received was in many cases too vague to be of any use. In no case has any connection been established between any alleged "emissary" and the local promoters of the disturbances, and in the two most important cases—those of Raghunath Pershad alias Peare Lal and Saraswati G.R. the *sadhu* boy—it has been proved that the former described himself as an emissary in order to make money, and the latter from a desire to add to his importance. In any case the alleged propaganda does not seem to have gone beyond a few attempts to induce other towns to observe a *hartal*.

9. Enquiries into the economic pressure applied by wholesale merchants of Delhi to their customers elsewhere have met with a very similar result. It is probably true

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that some firms did ask their customers to observe *hartal*, but so many of the allegations have been proved to have been due to spite or jealousy that it would be unjustifiable to assume the guilt of such firms as are not in a position to disprove the charges. Careful enquiries, accompanied by an examination of the books, were made in each case when the firm mentioned could be traced. It does not seem that Delhi was responsible for anything more than the usual political influence which is naturally exercised by every large city on the surrounding districts.

10. *Wire-cutting on the railway.*—Allusion must also be made to the railway strike and wire-cutting offences at Shakurpur Station on the North Western Railway near Delhi. This case has been dealt with judicially and was investigated by another officer, who was unable to trace any connection between this outrage and the political agitators of Delhi.

11. *Seditious posters.*—The affixing of seditious posters in prominent places was a common occurrence during the disturbed days. These were removed as soon as possible by the police. In several cases the offenders were traced by the Criminal Investigation Department but for various reasons it was decided not to prosecute. In no case was any of these men found to have been working on behalf of the leaders, and their action appears to have been the result of political excitement.

12. *Connection with Bombay and the Punjab.*—It was at first assumed that the outbreaks in the Bombay Presidency and the Punjab, occurring more or less simultaneously with those at Delhi, were the result of a far reaching conspiracy to rebel against the British Raj. Allegations were common that the whole of these disturbances originated from Delhi and that Delhi emissaries had been sent in large numbers to rouse the country-side. It was declared, by the Anglo-Indian press particularly, that Bolshevik influence was behind the whole of these apparently co-ordinated outbreaks. We have been unable to find the slightest corroboration for these statements in spite of a protracted and energetic enquiry. The original riot was due, as I have shown, to the effects of high prices and political agitation (which included gross misrepresentation of the Rowlatt Bills) on the lower orders. I am convinced that such a disturbance was not wanted by the leaders, the majority of whom were horrified at the result of their activities and worked hard during the following days to get their errant followers under control. It is particularly noticeable that the disturbances at Delhi were not characterised by those lamentable anti-British acts of aggression which were the main feature of the disorders in the Punjab. The feeling was undoubtedly anti-British, and, if there had been any conspiracy to rebel against Government, it would have been easy to have directed the mob against banks, post offices and other public buildings. But none of these were touched; there was no attempt to invade the Civil Lines and the only material damage caused by the mob was the breaking of some panes of glass in the railway station on the 30th March and the destruction of a few electric lamps and dustbins—the property of their own municipal committee. The only feature of the disorders which can be ascribed to the deliberate machinations of the agitators was the

cowardly attack on Criminal Investigation Department officers on the 14th April, since the attacks on the police on the 17th April were the work of pure hooligans.

13. *Responsibility for the outbreak.*—The main responsibility for these disorders must lie with those who promoted the agitation against the Rowlatt Bills. The principal members of the *satyagraha sabha* have already been mentioned. They should be divided into two classes, consisting firstly of those who soon realised the impracticability of the movement and the danger of its continuance, and, secondly, of those who either failed to realize this or else deliberately and malignantly contrived to continue the agitation. In the first category may be placed those who were principally responsible for the dissolution of the *satyagraha sabha* after the 17th April. The *Sabha* was dissolved and its records destroyed, partly because the more responsible members had realized the dangers of the movement and partly because they were unwilling to subject the more innocent members of the Society to the annoyance of police enquiries. It is unnecessary here to discuss the second category.

14. *Conclusion.*—To sum up: the conclusions to which these enquiries have led me are that the disturbances were not due to a conspiracy to rebel against the British Raj. It was never intended by the members of the *satyagraha sabha* or by others who fostered the agitation, that their activities should result in violence. There is no doubt that the misrepresentation of the Rowlatt Acts had aroused strong feeling, and this is not a matter for wonder, since it was freely rumoured that the Acts gave power to the police to arrest any four men seen conversing together, that any land in excess of 50 bighas would be confiscated by Government, and other such absurd fallacies. The riots occurred, however, simply because the men who had inflamed the mob were incapable of controlling it and not because they favoured an attempt to overcome the administration by force. It has been argued that if Gandhi had not been arrested, the second outbreak would not have taken place. Though somewhat discredited now, Gandhi was then a popular hero, and his arrest was undoubtedly the cause of much dissatisfaction. At the same time, there is no possible doubt that the result of a visit from him—at a time when the people were again settling down to their normal occupations—would have merely unsettled them once more, particularly as he would undoubtedly have made capital out of the order excluding him from the Punjab, and would have started forth from Delhi on a deliberate and well-advised infringement of this order, to say nothing of the probability that he would commit some illegal act which would have necessitated his arrest in Delhi. Such procedure could not have failed to rouse intense excitement which might well have culminated in a catastrophe such as occurred in the Punjab. The disorders in Delhi were unconnected with any disturbances elsewhere in India, except in so far as they were due to similar causes. They were due partly to economic distress occasioned by the war, and partly to protracted political agitation culminating in a violent campaign against the unpopular Rowlatt Acts. It should be added that this political agitation was, almost exclusively, the work of men who are not natives of Delhi.

APPENDIX.

[The appendix dealt with Delhi emissaries in, and the influence of Delhi merchants on, the United Provinces and the Punjab, and gave the results of inquiries into specific allegations (cf. secs. 9 and 12). It has not been reproduced in printing.]

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To understand the political atmosphere prevailing in Delhi in the end of March 1919 it is necessary to recapitulate briefly the history of the town in connection with Indian politics during the past few years. Ten years ago the public of Delhi took but little interest in political events. There were isolated cases, some of which have

become notorious, of men belonging to Delhi who took a prominent part in agitation elsewhere in India and abroad, but the people of Delhi as a whole did not appear to concern themselves with such things. So much so was this the case that when the election of members for the Punjab Legislative Council was introduced, Delhi, though

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it was the largest city in the province, failed to secure an elected representative when included in an electoral circle consisting of the districts of the Ambala and part of the Jullundur Division. The representation of Delhi on the Council was secured by the nomination of a prominent citizen by the Lieutenant-Governor, and through the Punjab Chamber of Commerce, whose headquarters are at Delhi. Since the separation of Delhi from the Punjab in 1912 the Imperial Enclave has not been directly represented on any Legislative Council. This is to be remedied in the reformed Councils, the proposals for which include a Delhi representative on the Imperial Legislative Assembly. But for the past seven years the interests of Delhi have been left to self-constituted champions from other parts of India, whose ignorance of local matters really affecting its citizens can only be measured by the distances separating their homes from Delhi and Simla.

2. This leads to the remark that Delhi and the surrounding country, though annexed to the Punjab in 1858, always retained a distinctive individuality and never became essentially merged in that province. From the time when Delhi was the seat of the Moghul Empire its leading families have maintained their connection with those of Hindustan proper, of which the Delhi territory composed the northern part. Its wealthier merchants, who are mostly wholesale dealers and bankers, in their business relations were much more intimately connected with the business houses of the large cities of Hindustan and Rajputana and the sea-ports of Bombay and Calcutta than with the towns of the Punjab. The majority of these two classes are not interested in politics.

3. A change took place, not unnaturally, when Delhi from being a quiet *mufassil* city, chiefly engaged in money making, was changed into the Imperial Capital by the Royal Announcement at the Durbar in December 1911. The city and its doings then gained an attraction for politicians and public men from other parts of India which they had not possessed before. Not only politicians, but unfortunately men of a different character also had their attention directed to Delhi. Revolutionary conspirators did not spare the place until they had gained for it a most unhappy notoriety in the outrage on the Viceroy's life in December 1912, which, though there were some Delhi men connected with the disgraceful deed, was chiefly the work of anarchists from another province.

4. In 1912-13 an element of unrest was introduced by the starting of the "*Hamdard*" and "*Comrade*" newspapers, and by the activities of the *Khuddam-i-Kaaba* Society, founded to work up Muhammadan sympathy with Turkey in the Tripoli and more especially the Balkan war. No exception could be taken to this display of sympathy in itself, but the agencies at work unfortunately mingled with it resentment against the apparently passive attitude of the British Government. These agencies as also the agency which despatched the medical red crescent mission to Turkey were all controlled by men from outside Delhi. The entry of Turkey into the great European war rendered the position of Muhammadans one of no little difficulty, but on the whole their attitude locally was one of commendable restraint.

5. Political unrest in Delhi may be said to date more immediately from the establishment in 1917 of a branch of the Indian Home Rule League founded by Mrs. Besant in September 1916. It is an interesting fact that the lead in founding this branch was taken by an Australian lady of theosophist and German extraction. The section of the Delhi public which joined the League was not a large one, but it contains several prominent citizens. This marks the entry of prominent local men into the all-India political arena, as distinct from the discussions on religious questions in which the Maulvis of Delhi had always taken a leading part in conjunction with their co-religionists in the other large towns of Hindustan. Since 1917 there has been a constant flow of political speakers from other provinces, whether attending meetings of the Imperial Legislative Council or for other purposes, and some of these politicians have succeeded in imbuing the hitherto peaceable citizens of Delhi

with a most unfortunate taste for *anti-Government* oratory. This influx culminated in Christmas week of 1918 in the convening of the annual sessions of the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League, together with some 29 other political and social conferences and gatherings, at Delhi. This, the 33rd session of the Congress, was far from being a harmonious one. A considerable and influential number of the political leaders belonging to the moderate party abstained altogether from attending the session. The machinery of the Congress was captured by the extremist party, behind whom the younger men with little or no political experience ranged themselves. The few moderate leaders who attended obtained a hearing at the meetings with difficulty, their speeches, even those of the hitherto most respected, being subjected to frequent interruptions. This was the natural consequence of the unrestrained language used in the speeches of some of the extremist leaders, extracts from which are given in an Appendix to this Memorandum. A feature of interest in the proceedings was the reiterated demand for speeches in Hindi instead of in English, and generally it was noticeable that any *anti-British* sentiment or reference was received with approval and applause. The more experienced and worldly-wise of those who had previously been regarded as in the front of the extreme section became seriously alarmed, and at one time it appeared probable that there would be a serious split, and that Mrs. Besant and the members of her Home Rule League would have to secede and form an independent party. This split was averted at the time, but the President, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, had a difficult task in maintaining an outward show of unity in the Congress itself. The recent visit to England of an independent Home Rule League deputation, distinct from the Congress deputation, in connection with the Reforms Scheme would, however, indicate that the friction has since come to a head. The meetings of the Muslim League, in which it may be remarked that the influential conservative sections of Delhi Muhammadans took no part or interest, were over-shadowed in importance by the meetings of the Congress, but the tone of the proceedings at the League meetings was set by the extremist pan-Islamic section, and Dr. Ansari, the President of the Reception Committee, in his address utilised the occasion to deliver a strongly worded appeal to religious passions on such subjects as the Khalifate and the guardianship of the Holy places. This address was published in pamphlet form and was proscribed by the Punjab Government. It is reproduced in Enclosure 7.* Throughout both sessions considerable activity was displayed in advocating the identity of interests and sympathies of Hindus and Muhammadans.

6. After a brief rest from the orgy of political oratory delivered during the Christmas holidays, politics were revived at a garden party given on the 26th January by some Delhi Muhammadans at which resolutions were passed demanding immediate full provincial autonomy and the adoption of the Congress-League Scheme for the Central Government. This was followed on the 28th January by a fairly well attended lecture delivered by Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya in which he advocated the starting of Congress Committees in every *Mohalla* and village. A further meeting was held on the 3rd February to protest against the Rowlatt Bill and Excess Profits Tax which were about to be introduced in the Imperial Council. About this time three mushroom newspapers were also started named the "*Congress*," the "*Qaum*" and the "*Inqilab*." These, with the "*Vijaya*," started in December, chiefly distinguished themselves by virulent comments on the Rowlatt Bills, and in the end of February the security of the "*Vijaya*" Press had to be enhanced from Rs. 500 to Rs. 2,000, while the editor and printer of the "*Inqilab*" were warned.

7. On the 7th March Mr. M. K. Gandhi of Bombay held a public meeting to inaugurate his passive resistance movement in Delhi. On the same day a local *Satyagraha Sabha* was founded with a membership of 15 persons

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who had by that time taken the *Satyagraha* vow. These were the more prominent local Home Rule Leaguers, but very few were really residents of Delhi. The principal members were Dr. Ansari of Ghazipur in the United Provinces (President), Munshi Ram (*alias* Swami Shardhanand) of Jullundur and the Kangri Gurukul, Hasrat Mohani of Aligarh, Dr. Abdul Rahman of Bara Banki, Shankar Lal of Patiala, Shiv Narain Haksar of Delhi, Miss Gmeiner (the Australian, already mentioned), Mohammad Shuaib of Aligarh, Indra (son of Munshi Ram) and his wife. Several prominent residents, who were approached by the organisers, refused to subscribe to the vow, the most noticeable being Hakim Ajmal Khan and Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh. The legal fraternity also kept themselves aloof from the movement, under the well-founded belief that it was illegal and contrary to the conditions of their enrolment as pleaders and advocates.

8. On the top of all these predisposing causes of excitement came the speeches delivered in the Imperial Legislative Council during the discussion on the "Rowlatt" Bills. Several of the non-official members prophesied that their passage would be followed by a prolonged agitation throughout British India, and some went so far as to say that the agitation would be of a nature such as Government had never seen before. After the first day's debate but few of the leading citizens of Delhi attended in the galleries of the Council Chamber, and from this one might judge that their personal interest in the Bills was small. But the speeches of the members opposing the Bill were reproduced in full in the Vernacular Press, which did not of course devote the same amount of space or attention to the speeches of the official members who explained the necessity for the Act and the moderation of its provisions. The public which depends on these newspapers for its news was therefore presented with a very one-sided and distorted view.

9. Thus the ground was well prepared for agitation and misrepresentation among the lower and more ignorant classes. When the agitation was at its height it was found that misrepresentation was not confined to the "Rowlatt" Act, but that the distortions of that Act were. The Excess Profits Tax and the new Income Tax Act lent themselves to the misrepresentation that all property was to be confiscated by Government up to at least half a man's possessions, including not only those of city people but of the agriculturists in the villages, and that a most inconvenient and utterly unjustifiable incursion into honest traders' profits was to be introduced. The Patel Marriage Bill (introduced by a non-official member of Council) could be and was distorted into an intention by Government to interfere with orthodox Hindu marriage customs! Many other false rumours were industriously and successfully circulated. Under the "Rowlatt" Act itself the police were credited with an almost unlimited power of search in private houses, and with authority to arrest summarily any three persons seen talking together. The high prices of most of the common necessities of life caused by the war, which, instead of falling on the conclusion of the armistice, appeared to be only rising to almost unendurable heights, formed another indictment against the Government. The British Government, if it was all powerful, and if it had successfully defeated its enemies as it announced, should have been able to reduce prices by executive order or other authoritative action. The economic hardship caused by high prices should not be forgotten as providing a fruitful soil in which the professional agitator could sow his poisonous seed. Another economic cause, which was assigned at the time for the unexpected prolongation of the *hartal*, was the effect of the sudden drop in the price of cotton and woollen goods in the Delhi market when peace came in sight. Large dealers in piece goods who had bought at high rates were faced with considerable losses, and it was actually alleged that it was to the interest of these men to foment the trouble and keep the city in a disturbed state; in the hope that the price of the goods on their hands might be raised and their losses thus reduced. It was in conditions such as these that, following Gandhi's lead, the local *Satyagraha Sabha*

held meetings in the latter half of March to promote his passive resistance movement. The Vernacular Press took good care to keep the embers alive.

10. The suggestion that the 30th of March should be observed as a day of fasting and *hartal* was mooted at these meetings and in the Press about a week before, but up to the evening of 29th March the information collected by the police was to the effect that the idea had not really caught on, and that though a number of Hindu shop-keepers were likely to be persuaded to close their shops, against their own real wishes, very few Muhammadans were expected to follow their example on the 30th. The number of signatories to the *Satyagraha* vow was said to have been about 120—not an alarming number in a large city with a population of nearly a quarter of a million. Later it was discovered that a local Maulvi, a popular preacher who had done much to stimulate interest in the Muslim League meetings in December, had won over a number of his wavering co-religionists by a misleading but spirited lecture delivered on the 29th of March. The alteration in Gandhi's plans for a day of general humiliation to be celebrated on the following Sunday, the 6th of April, instead of on the 30th of March, was not communicated by the *Sabha* to the general public at Delhi. The Senior Superintendent of Police, however, took the usual precautionary measures indicated to be necessary on the information received and the police reserves in the lines and at the various police stations were ordered to hold themselves in readiness in the morning.

11. A detailed account of the events of the 30th March will be found in my letter No. 45-C-Home, dated 31st March 1919, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department (page 128), in Colonel Beadon's Inquest order (page 134) and in the Magistrate's order, dated 30th September 1919, in the Riot case (page 148). A résumé of these reports may be found useful.

12. The universal character of the *hartal* of the 30th of March was, it must be confessed, a surprise to the officials, as it was also apparently to the organisers. In the morning a number of shop-keepers in the outlying bazars, more especially in the suburbs, endeavoured to carry on their work as usual but were induced by disorderly mobs to close their shops through fear of being looted. No cases of looting were, however, reported. The strike was gradually enforced on the tramways and vehicles of all sorts, passengers in which were made to descend and continue their journey on foot. The only place, however, where any actual disturbance took place was at the main railway station. There, what was at first a small mob attempted to prevent the railway contractor from supplying food and sweetmeats to travellers. This led about mid-day to a scuffle with the railway authorities, and such troops as were present in the railway station and others summoned from the Fort had to be utilised with the police to clear the station precincts. This could not be effected without recourse to firing on the mob, after Mr. Currie (Additional District Magistrate), who had hurried to the railway station on hearing of the riot, Messrs. Marshall and Jeffreys of the Police, Mr. Yule, District Traffic Superintendent, and others, including some of the British soldiers and many of the police, had been struck and wounded by stones and bricks with which they were assailed by the rioters. Their numbers had rapidly increased during the period of close upon 2 hours in which the police had been endeavouring to disperse the mob before the order to fire was given. On being cleared away from the railway precincts the rioters were, with military assistance, gradually driven through the Queen's Garden into the Chandni Chauk. There the police closed the west gate of the Queen's Garden, and attempted for some time to hold the position passively. The mob however continued to stone and threatened to overcome the police and the small detachment of British Infantry which had come to their assistance, and firing had again to be resorted to. This was limited to two volleys and succeeded in causing the mob to disperse.

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13. The casualties as ascertained at the time and in the subsequent inquest proceedings were 8 men killed, and 2 more died of wounds during the following week. The number of wounded who came for treatment at the Civil Hospital was only 10 or 12. The age of the youngest of the men killed was reported as 22. Three boys of 12 and 13 were among the wounded, but none among the killed. That there were not more casualties among the boys whom the mob put in their front line, is due to the steadiness and discipline of the British Infantry under Sergeant Kemsley of the Bedfordshire Regiment, who directed his men to shoot high and so avoid injuring any boys as far as possible.

14. Throughout this regrettable incident the police and British Infantry employed to quell the riot behaved with great restraint, and, as I reported at the time, a very sudden and awkward situation was tackled with great firmness by Messrs. Currie and Marshall. A want of decision on their part might have had much more serious consequences. Further disorder was checked by the prompt arrival, about 3-30 P.M., of Indian Cavalry from the new Cantonments. The cavalry patrolled the Chandni Chauk and the roads adjacent to the Queen's Garden, while in the course of the afternoon British Infantry pickets were stationed at the city gates.

15. The patrolling of the Chandni Chauk restored order to such an extent that in the evening Mr. Currie and I were enabled to permit a meeting to take place between 5 and 6 P.M. at the Pipla Park which had been previously arranged for the Queen's Garden. This meeting was got through without disorder, in accordance with the undertaking given to me by its organisers Munshi Ram, Mahmud Shuaib and Abdul Rahman of the *Satyagraha Sabha*. It dispersed quietly, a result only attributable, in my opinion, to the show of military force known to be available. But it was followed by an unfortunate incident which should perhaps be mentioned as much was made of it at the time in the Vernacular Press. About 6 o'clock a small party of the Manipuri Regiment proceeding to reinforce the Kotwali, the main city police station, met a large crowd of persons in the Chandni Chauk following Munshi Ram home from this meeting. The Manipuri Native Officer in charge, not understanding the language or the meaning of the shouts of the crowd, and being afraid that his small party would be attacked and overcome, lined up his men and ordered them to load. During this process one of the men accidentally let off his rifle in the air. Munshi Ram and the crowd with him thinking they were being fired upon were naturally much excited and a fracas appeared imminent. Fortunately at this moment Mr. Orde, Superintendent of Police, rode up and getting between the parties explained matters and succeeded in getting the Manipuris into the Kotwali. The crowd was so close to the soldiers that if the sepoy had actually fired at any one instead of into the air he could not possibly have missed hitting some one at any rate.

16. After about 7 o'clock, when darkness began to come on, there seemed to be no reason to anticipate any further trouble, nor did anything untoward occur during the night. The necessary military and police dispositions were made at the railway station. No trouble was reported from any other parts of the city on the 30th March.

17. A full record of the events in Delhi, day by day from the 31st March to the 17th April, will be found in my demi-official letter to the Home Secretary, No. 55-C-Home, dated 17th April 1919 (page 130) and also in Colonel Beadon's diary of the same period contained in his letter No. 9-C, dated 20th May 1919 (page 132). These accounts also may perhaps usefully be summarised.

18. On the 31st March and 1st April there was a good deal of excitement in the city in connection with the funerals of the victims of the riot. All the shops remained closed; turbulent mobs prevented the trams and other vehicles plying; and very large mixed crowds of Hindus and Muhammadans attended the funerals. On the afternoon of the 1st, however, after the last funeral, the situation cleared a little and a few shops began to open. On

the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th April the bazars remained open, and it was decided to withdraw all troops from the city, except a guard of 25 Native Infantry at the railway station. But there was still evidence of a considerable amount of excitement; meetings were being held at which the speakers indulged in very unbridled language calculated to keep alive the tension; the local Vernacular newspapers were publishing violent articles (for specimens see page 143 *et seq.*); seditious posters inciting to revenge and murder (specimens on page 147 *et seq.*) were found posted in prominent places in the city, and credence was being given to wild rumours of every description. The most noticeable incident perhaps was the appearance of the Arya Samajist, Munshi Ram, on the pulpit of the Jama Masjid, and his being allowed to address the assembly after the Juma prayers on Friday, April the 4th. (This usurpation and the headstrong thoughtlessness of the crowd which permitted it and even egged him on, have since been strongly deprecated by orthodox Muslim opinion). The tram-cars continued to be boycotted as belonging to a British Company. Up to the evening of the 5th it remained doubtful whether Delhi would celebrate another *hartal* on Sunday, the 6th, in accordance with Gandhi's revised programme for the rest of India, or be content with the exploits of the previous Sunday. The information received was that the *Satyagraha* leaders deprecated a second *hartal*, but that by this time they had lost control of their followers, and the direction of events had passed to a few minor Hindu agitators and the low class Muhammadan element. Consequently it was decided to resume the previously arranged dispositions of troops and police at the Town Hall, Queen's Garden, railway station and other important points by an early hour next morning.

19. On the 6th April a complete *hartal* duly took place; all the shops in the city were closed; and Hindus were again admitted to a large prayer meeting at the Fatehpuri Mosque. But the day passed without disturbance, and in the evening the British troops at the Town Hall and railway station were withdrawn. In order to occupy the crowds the Deputy Commissioner allowed meetings at the Edward Park and Dr. Ansari's house.

20. On the 7th, 8th and 9th April the shops were reopened and normal conditions appeared to be returning though there was evidently a good deal of excitement beneath the outward calm. This excitement was chiefly kept alive by wild speeches at meetings and by obnoxious articles in the local Press. On the morning of the 9th April the Government of India sanctioned my issuing orders excluding Mr. M. K. Gandhi, who had the day before deliberately defied the law in Bombay, and was then reported to be on his way up-country from Delhi and directing his return to the Bombay Presidency. This was a step of which I had suggested the advisability to the Government of India on the 31st March, in view of what I then regarded as a situation fraught with very dangerous possibilities should Gandhi decide to inaugurate his disobedience-to-laws campaign in Delhi. As this campaign had not at that time gone beyond words and newspaper articles, the Government of India did not consider the issue of restrictive orders against Gandhi to be necessary. By the 8th April the situation was rendered more difficult in Delhi through the fact that a few days before the Punjab Government had issued an order excluding him from the Punjab. On the 9th, after his exploits in Bombay, it became obvious that we could only anticipate some action on his part which would necessitate his arrest in Delhi if he were allowed to enter the city, and in the then temper of the mob this might have been followed by the most serious consequences. Mr. Gandhi was however successfully intercepted on the borders of the Punjab and sent back to Bombay.

21. Early on the morning of the 10th April, anticipating a recrudescence of the strike when the news of Gandhi's arrest should become known, the police and the troops again took up their emergency positions. Though the shops in the main bazar remained closed throughout the 10th the situation remained quiet, and the day passed off with a mass meeting at the Burning Ghats. In the

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evening it was reported that the *Satyagrahis* intended to remain firm to their oath, but that there should be no *hartal* next day. Consequently it was arranged that the cavalry should return to Cantonments, and the police should be withdrawn from their emergency stations. The receipt late that night of the news of the outbreak at Amritsar and the murder of two Bank Managers there caused a hurried cancellation of these arrangements and on the 11th it became evident that the bazars would again be closed. The day passed without incident though there were indications of increased unpleasantness in the temper of the crowd. The spread of the news of events at Amritsar and Lahore had a very bad effect, and it was considered necessary to strengthen the military guards at the Town Hall and railway station. On the 11th, 12th and 13th the Deputy Commissioner had several interviews with the leaders of the people in an endeavour to secure the opening of the shops and slaughter-house. These interviews were more or less fruitless as the leaders had evidently lost control, but the 12th and 13th, particularly the latter, passed off quite quietly, many of the people being engaged on the 13th in celebrating the *Baisakhi* festival, which fell due that day.

22. Early in the morning of the 14th April a fresh piece of very disquieting news was received to the effect that a strike had occurred at the Shakurpur Goods Station on the Southern Punjab Railway during the night. The mail train for Lahore which left Delhi the evening before had to be brought back in the morning. The matter of this strike and the cutting of telegraph wires at Shakurpur are dealt with in Mr. Currie's judgment dated 30th July 1919 in the case *Crown versus Hari Chand*, etc. (page 160 *et seq.*).

23. During the course of the morning several reports were received of intimidation of people going to their work in offices and at the railway station, and of shopkeepers who ventured to commence opening their shops. An order under section 188, Indian Penal Code, was therefore issued forbidding such intimidation. On a report from one of the English Banks that their clerks were unwilling to work, the other Banks were consulted, and on their representation that if one closed all must close the day was declared a public holiday under the Negotiable Instruments Act. This holiday had to be maintained on the 15th and 16th and eventually the 17th April. The succeeding four days were the Easter Holidays. On the afternoon of the 14th I held a meeting at the Town Hall with the leading members of the Home Rule party who were the only persons who appeared to have retained any authority over the mob. This was adjourned to the next morning, to see how far the leaders could induce the people to close the *hartal*. Soon after this meeting had ended a very unfortunate incident took place at the King Edward Park, where two Criminal Investigation Department Sub-Inspectors, attending a *Satyagraha* meeting in their official capacity, were assaulted, one of them very seriously. This meeting dispersed on the appearance of the District Magistrate with a troop of cavalry. This incident is dealt with in Mr. Currie's judgment dated 21st July 1919 in the case *Crown versus Shankar Lal*, etc. (page 150 *et seq.*).

24. On the 15th April two meetings were held with a number of the leaders and more prominent shopkeepers, which were attended by all the civil officers and by the General Officer Commanding and the Officers Commanding the Detachments of troops stationed in the city. These meetings are fully described in my letter of the 17th April (page 21). Towards the close of both the meetings there was a distinct element of danger in the presence in the Chandni Chauk of a large crowd who had collected on a rumour that the leaders had been summoned to the meetings in order to be arrested. In the afternoon this crowd was reinforced by a large number of *lathiwalas*, and at one time it appeared hardly possible that a collision with the police and the troops could be avoided. No actual collision however took place, and at the close of the meeting leading men such as Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari and Munshi Ram were able to persuade the

crowd to follow them away from the Town Hall. Towards the end of the afternoon meeting it was announced that the slaughter-house had been opened, and later a few shops in the bazar opened for a short time. The prospects of the *hartal* coming to a close therefore appeared better than at any time during the previous six days.

25. On the 16th April these hopes however were not realised, but as the holding of any further meetings would have almost certainly led to a collision between the large mob of *lathiwalas* and the police and troops, the continuance of efforts to induce the shops to open had to be left in the hands of the leading men who were by this time undoubtedly making genuine efforts in this direction. These efforts bore fruit on the morning of the 17th when a large number of shops were opened in the Chandni Chauk and several of the smaller bazars were fully opened. Police patrols were sent out to prevent interference by the mob with persons wishing to open their shops. The English Banks in the Chauk also reopened at my request in order to set an example to the bazar. The unruly element in the mob, however, prevented the cessation of the strike, and the arrest about 1 P.M. of a hooligan who, with a crowd of supporters, was threatening well disposed shopkeepers, brought matters to a head. A large crowd invaded the Chauk from the side streets, and a determined attack was made on a small police picket at the mouth of Ballimaran street.* A Head Constable was severely wounded on the head and very nearly killed; other members of the police force were injured and attempts were made to seize their carbines. The police had to fire in self-protection and to clear the rioters, with the result that 18 persons were wounded with buckshot, of whom 2 subsequently died. This action had the result of rapidly dispersing the mob, who were prevented from reassembling by the sending of the squadron of cavalry in the Queen's Garden through the main bazars. A body of Indian Infantry also participated in the demonstration and captured a large number of *lathis*, but the troops were not called upon to fire owing to the almost instantaneous dispersal of the rioters. Some arrests of persons who had been prominent in the disorder were made and quiet was restored in a very short time and maintained throughout the afternoon. All the shops in the Chandni Chauk had of course closed at the commencement of the disturbance, at the beginning of which the English Banks were also closed. Police guards had some days earlier been placed on the Banks, and fortunately nothing untoward happened there.

26. In the course of the afternoon I obtained the sanction of the Governor-General in Council to the extension of the Seditious Meetings Act, 1911, to Delhi, and a notification under section (2) thereof was issued prohibiting all meetings in public places without the previous sanction of the District Magistrate. At the same time I reported to Simla by telephone that the situation appeared so threatening that I doubted whether order could be restored without the application of Martial Law. In reply to my request for the extension of Martial Law to the city, I received instructions from the Government of India to represent my reasons more fully in writing.

27. The necessity for making a further application for the extension of Martial Law however happily did not arise, because on the morning of the 18th April the situation cleared almost as if by magic. It was reported that many of the shops in the suburban area were opened on the afternoon of the 17th and they remained open on the 18th. The shops in the Chandni Chauk followed suit on the 19th when the *hartal* was brought completely to an end. The predominant reason for this change in the attitude of the people was no doubt the fact that they were heartily tired of the strike and of the trouble and serious pecuniary losses it was causing them. A rumour that became current that Martial Law had either been established, as instanced by the action of the police on the 17th, or was on the point of being established, was said to have also contributed to this end. A further

* For detailed facts see Mr. Currie's judgment dated 20th June 1919 in case *Crown versus Jitu*, etc. (page 155 *et seq.*).

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reason assigned at the time was that no pressure to open their shops had been brought to bear on the 18th, and the people therefore felt that they were choosing their own time for doing so. Thus this strike, which began on the 10th April, was brought to a close.

28. During this period of very serious tension and excitement in the city, the danger which appeared most to be feared, so far as the authorities were concerned, was that they might be forced into the false position of creating a conflagration by taking action which might be misinterpreted. No such accusation has, so far as I am aware, ever been brought against the authorities or the police in regard to the incident of the 17th April. It appears to have been generally recognised that the mob by their gratuitous and brutal assault on the Ballimaran police picket had only brought their punishment on themselves, and that the action taken by the police in self-defence was fully justified. A very significant fact, which only came to light several days later, was the dissolution of the local *Satyagraha Sabha* on the evening of the 17th April. The principal members of the committee held a meeting, at which it was recognised that the passive resistance movement had developed into something that the majority of the signatories could not possibly have contemplated at the time they subscribed to the *Satyagraha* vow. It was, therefore, felt that the members of the *Sabha* ought not to be held to be bound by their vow, unless they were given an opportunity of reconsidering their position in the light of the events of the past fortnight. The result of the discussion on this point of view was that it was decided to dissolve the *Sabha* forthwith, and to burn the list of members together with the papers on which their taking of the vow was recorded. Immediate effect was given to this decision. No more has been heard of this particular movement in Delhi.

29. The steady conduct of the police and troops, employed on the irksome duty of standing by throughout a prolonged period of strain, has already been alluded to in connection with particular incidents. This steadiness was put to severer tests than the mere carrying out of the duties allotted to them without provoking collisions. The police, for instance, were freely abused for continuing to serve an alien Government instead of ranging themselves on the side of their countrymen. One of the most disquieting reports received during the time of greatest tension was that of an attempt by a lately dismissed ex-spy of one of the Native Infantry regiments in the New City Cantonment to tamper with the fidelity of his late comrades. He was promptly arrested and sentenced to a long term of imprisonment. The Indian officers and men of another regiment stationed close by had already dealt themselves with a "babu" making a similar attempt by turning him out of their lines. But more serious still was the evidently organized campaign made by agitators in the Central Punjab to tempt men from their allegiance. The wickedly false rumours spread abroad that the Golden Temple at Amritsar had been bombed, and that a party of Sikh girls had been searched with indignity in a train for *Kirpans*, reached the Sikhs in Delhi, and naturally created some excitement. It should not be overlooked that the lies industriously circulated about the "Rowlatt" and other Acts mentioned in paragraph 9 above, were calculated, and apparently designedly so, to move deeply the feelings of the agricultural classes from whom the vast majority of our Indian troops and police are drawn. The confiscation of all landed property and the profits therefrom above a certain amount or value, and interference with domestic habits and customs, were fictions evidently invented to test severely and possibly undermine the faithfulness of the armed forces of the Crown. That this sinister agitation had no effect upon the Indian regiments stationed in Delhi and the local police, speaks highly of their moral discipline and common-sense. Their conduct was worthy of all praise, and stood out in pleasing contrast to that of the easily gulled populace of the towns.

30. There have been previous instances of strikes of even longer duration in individual trades in Delhi, but

not, for many years at any rate, of such a prolonged strike of this general nature. It was however known from the first that a very large proportion of those involved were being forced to participate against their own wishes and interests. The situation was thus one in which it appeared to be possible to allow the economic factor to exert its influence in rallying all peacefully disposed persons to the side of law and order. That this factor had a great effect in bringing the strike to an end can hardly be doubted. It was also largely instrumental in producing in the public a state of mind antagonistic to a renewal of any such senseless and discredited agitation. But to give this factor time to come into play necessitated the adoption of a waiting attitude on the part of the civil authorities. This attitude had its only justification in the knowledge that an ample body of troops was immediately available to suppress any open outbreak. Without the assistance rendered by the military force, readily placed at our disposal by Brigadier-General Drake-Brockman and, occupying an ideal strategic position in the Queen's Garden and Town Hall, such an attitude might very well have become at any time impossible. At the same time it is only right to state that there were no signs of any organized attempts by the mob to attack property or human life, except during the two actual riots of the 30th March and the 17th April. On the afternoon of the 14th April a certain amount of Municipal property was damaged, but no cases of looting in the bazars were reported. Nor did the mob ever make a move towards the Civil Lines, or make any attack on public institutions or European places of business, as was unfortunately the case elsewhere. On the 3rd May I was able to report to the Government of India that since the 19th April business in the City and suburbs had been carried on in an orderly and peaceful manner, and that there had been no reports of further disorder or lawlessness, though it was premature to say that Delhi had settled down to entirely normal conditions, as there was reason to believe that an under-current of unrest still existed in consequence of what had happened here and elsewhere. The arrests of the persons involved in the three riot trials which have already been mentioned were effected gradually in the following few weeks without further trouble. Rumours that were set about that a fresh *hartal* was to be held on Friday, the 25th April, in sympathy with a similar movement which was being engineered in Bombay for that date, did not eventuate in anything of the kind taking place. The leaders who had organised or acquiesced in the organisation of the general strike earlier in the month, and who had recognised their inability to check the forces thus set loose, resolutely set their faces against the repetition of any such risk to the public peace. A number of them—14 in all—had been enrolled as Special Constables by the District Magistrate on the 17th April for a few days under the Police Act, and thus given an authority which as private citizens they had not previously possessed. The extension of the Seditious Meetings Act to Delhi, and the consequent prohibition of public meetings at which exciting speeches could be delivered, also contributed in a large measure to the restoration of a calmer atmosphere. Orders of pre-censorship issued to the four local newspapers the "*Vijaya*," the "*Congress*," the "*Inqilab*" and the "*Qaum*" in the third week of April, when our strengthened Criminal Investigation Department had time to examine their publications, had a considerable effect in attaining this object.

31. The main factor which in the succeeding few weeks prevented a sense of complete tranquillity being restored in Delhi was the outbreak of the Afghan war in the beginning of May, and the reports and rumours of consequent trouble on the North-West Frontier. The effect of the Afghan war in Delhi was, however, reported to have been a general rallying of the people towards the side of Government, the Hindus being thoroughly alarmed at the turn of events, and the Muhammadans regarding the Amir's attack on the British Power as a piece of insensate folly. In this connection it may be mentioned that the citizens of Delhi held, with permission, a public

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meeting in the Queen's Garden on the 13th of May, at which a resolution supported by some twelve speakers of varying shades of political thought, was passed expressing the profound loyalty of the citizens of Delhi and their faithfulness to their King-Emperor, their disapproval of the Afghan Ruler invading their country without any excuse, and their readiness to assist the Government in every way, coupled with a request that the Government of India should adopt a policy of moderation and conciliation so that calmness and satisfaction might be restored in the country. Slightly belated though this pronouncement was, it was in a sense satisfactory that the leaders were able to summon and hold such a meeting.

32. To complete this narrative it is necessary to refer to the complaints made from time to time that pressure was brought to bear by the Delhi merchants on the people of outlying districts to join in the *hartal*, and that emissaries spreading sedition infested the neighbouring districts, and also to suspicions of propaganda work among railway and telegraph subordinates emanating from Delhi. It is obvious that a large commercial centre like Delhi, with trade ramifications all over the surrounding country, would naturally exercise a considerable influence in such a matter as the general cessation of buying and selling. Many towns to the north, and more particularly to the south and east of Delhi, look towards the place for a lead, and keep a vigilant eye on its doings not only on account of its traditions as the ancient Moghul Capital of the Empire, but also now that it has again become the Imperial Capital. There is no doubt also that the Arya Samaj has obtained a fairly firm footing in the neighbouring districts of Rohtak and Gurgaon, and that leading men there would take their cue from prominent Arya Samajists in Delhi. But in considering the question of emissaries leaving Delhi for propaganda work it has to be remembered that hundreds, if not thousands of people from outside come to Delhi daily from all the neighbouring country-side for the transaction of business or as mere sight-seers or travellers through this important railway junction, and that in times of excitement such people would carry back to their native towns and villages the most wonderful stories of the happenings in the Imperial City. Delhi cannot therefore avoid the consequences incident to its position. Definite information of the activities of emissaries from Delhi and of the exertion of trade pressure on business firms outside was not received by the authorities here till the fourth week of April. On examination it appeared that most of this information related to the first ten days of April when the general strike movement was at its height. This delay rendered an investigation of the complaints extremely difficult. After the 23rd of April, when a conference on the subject between certain officers deputed by the Punjab Government and the Delhi authorities took place, arrangements were made for a better co-ordination of information, but no very tangible results were attained. Efforts have been made to investigate all complaints which were sufficiently definite to afford grounds for investigation. The result is tabulated in the statement attached to the memorandum furnished by Mr. Orde, Superintendent of Police, Criminal Investigation Department. It will be seen that in very few cases was the complaint substantiated, and in several cases the charges were found to be false and due to private enmities, one rather prominent case specially reported from the Meerut District being found to be the work of a swindling impersonator. In addition to these investigations, complaints having been made that emissaries were touring the neighbourhood in motor cars, action was taken at the time to restrict the hiring of cars and to watch and record the movements of motors leaving Delhi either for the Punjab or the United Provinces. This action also was attended with practically no result in bringing suspicion home to any particular individuals. It cannot, of course, be asserted that no such evil influences emanated from Delhi, but the only satisfactory proof of such activities is the capture of an emissary when at work on his evil propaganda. It is remarkable how few cases of this nature were brought to light.

33. There at one time appeared to be considerable ground for supposing that underhand influences were at work in fomenting a railway strike and trouble among the telegraph (railway) staff. A special agency was deputed by the Government of India to investigate this particular feature of the prevailing disorder. Mr. A. F. K. Begbie of the United Provinces Railway Police, Agra, took up the enquiry on the 29th April and concluded his investigation on the 22nd July. The result of this prolonged investigation, spread over lengthy portions of several railways, is given in Mr. Begbie's report of the 29th July which formed an enclosure to my letter No. 172-C.-Home, dated 13th August 1919, to the Home Department (page 159). It will be seen that the conclusion arrived at by Mr. Begbie and his assistants was that no trace could be found of any organization worthy of the name working to bring about strikes among the Indian staff on the railways. There had for some time been general discontent on some of the railway lines running into Delhi over the inadequacy of rates of pay during a protracted period of high prices and economic unrest. The origin of troubles such as arose on the night of the 13th April at the Shakurpur Goods Station just outside Delhi, could only be traced to sympathy with the *hartal* then in progress in Delhi city and with the passive resistance movement started in connection with the "Rowlatt" Bills, of the provisions of which the railway staff were profoundly ignorant. This sympathy found occasion to express itself on the receipt by the Shakurpur staff of an inflammatory message telegraphed from Lahore on the 11th April. But beyond the somewhat frequent sending of excited "practice" messages between the railway telegraph staff, no definite seditious organization could be discovered. The results, like those of Mr. Orde's investigation into emissaries and propaganda, were rather negative, but so far as they went the trouble on railways should apparently be ascribed primarily to economic rather than to political causes.

Enclosures—

1. Letter to Home Department, 31 March 1919.
2. Ditto 17 April 1919.
3. Ditto 24 May 1919.
4. Letter from Deputy Commissioner, 20 May 1919.
5. Inquest Order by District Magistrate.
6. Note by Mr. R. C. Jeffreys, S.P.
7. Speech by Dr. M. A. Ansari.
8. Abstracts from Indian newspapers.
9. Seditious Posters.
10. Judgment in Railway Station Riot Case.
11. Ditto Edward Park Riot Case.
12. Ditto Ballimaran Riot Case.
13. Investigations into agitation on railways.
14. Judgment in Shakurpur Strike Case.

Letter No. 45-C.-Home, dated Delhi, the 31st March 1919, from the Hon'ble Mr. C. A. Barron, C.I.E., to the Hon'ble Sir J. H. DuBoulay, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

It will be some little time before a full report can be prepared on the circumstances attending the regrettable disturbance yesterday. Beadon and his officers are busy guarding against any recrudescence of trouble. But I imagine the Government of India will wish to have a preliminary report explaining how the disturbance arose and the steps taken to deal with it, to supplement the telephonic messages of last night and today.

About a week ago a suggestion was made at meetings and in the Delhi Press by persons who had taken Gandhi's *Satyagraha* vow that Sunday, the 30th, should be observed as a fast and by a *hartal* as a protest against the passing of the Rowlatt Bill. But up to the evening of the 29th our information was to the effect that the idea had not caught on and that the *hartal* was likely to be a fiasco. In a report received by me on Saturday evening the number of signatories to the vow had been only about 120, though efforts were being made to increase the number. Very few Muhammadans were expected to close their shops on

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Sunday, but a fair number of Hindus were likely to be persuaded to do so against their own real wishes. However Mr. Marshall, the Senior Superintendent of police, took the usual police precautionary measures, and ordered all the reserves in the Lines and at the various police stations to be in readiness.

On Sunday morning Mr. Jeffreys, the additional Superintendent, under Marshall's orders, visited all the stations, and about 10-30 reported that he had found things generally quiet in the city with the exception of a few bands of boys who hooted. The shops generally were shut and those who had opened theirs were being induced to close them, while efforts were being made to extend the *hartal* to the tonga drivers and compel all passengers to walk. Between 11-30 and 12-30 Marshall and Jeffreys drove through the main bazars from the Fort to the Sadr Bazar and round by the Ajmer Gate to the Lal Kua Bazar. Up to this point all had gone well, but here their car was stopped by the crowd near the Hauz Qazi Police station and they had to return by the Ajmer Gate. Marshall then drove to Metcalfe House to report to me, as Beadon was away from Delhi for the last Saturday and Sunday holidays. We decided to ask the General Officer Commanding to bring in some troops as a precautionary measure. While driving to see him we met a messenger from the police lines with information that a large crowd was behaving riotously at the railway station. We therefore motored direct to the police lines where a reserve of 37 police of all ranks was in readiness. These were despatched at once to the station under Jeffreys, Marshall remaining to bring on any other men he could collect. I myself drove on to find the General who had unfortunately just changed his residence, as I was myself doing on Sunday. We arranged to call in two troops of Cavalry from New Cantonments (there being none at Kingsway, the squadron there having moved out on the 28th) and to order a hundred men of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry to stand by at Kingsway.

Mr. Currie, Additional District Magistrate, had proceeded to the railway station. About 2-45 he reported that events there had taken a serious turn and that after clearing the station the police and a small detachment of the Bedfords, who had been sent from the Fort in response to a call from the railway authorities, had been compelled to fire on the mob to clear the Queen's Road and the Gardens in front of the station. Two of the rioters had been shot. Learning on the telephone that the cavalry had started from their lines at 2-15 and would be at the Station by 3-30, I drove at once to the General and arranged with him to bring in the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry company to picquet the Kashmir and Mori Hazari maidan. We ascertained over the telephone that the armoured car had also gone from the Fort to the station and that the Queen's Gardens had been cleared, a party of 250 Gurkhas (afterwards found to be Manipuris returning home from Mesopotamia) who happened to be in a train in the station yard having been requisitioned to assist in the clearing. In the absence of any report of any further disturbance elsewhere these military arrangements appear to be sufficient and the General and I decided to go down to the station.

The origin of the trouble there was an attempt by some youths to prevent the railway contractor for supplying food to the 3rd class passengers, from carrying out his duties, and make him observe the *hartal*. On his refusal he was assaulted and the railway police and staff arrested two of his assailants. Several hundred men of the mob which soon collected outside invaded the station to rescue them. A complete stoppage of the work of the station was thus threatened. The station was cleared by the police assisted by various British soldiers who are fortunately to be found in some numbers on the Delhi platform at most hours of the day at present, and help was requisitioned from the Fort as the attitude of the mob was very threatening. On Marshall's arrival about 2 p.m., with a mounted Inspector and 7 sowars, he found his foot police under Jeffreys and a party of some 20 to 30 British

Infantry surrounded by a shouting mob in the Queen's Road in front of the station. The mob was so close to the men protecting the station entrance that one of them in attempting to snatch his rifle from a British infantryman was bayoneted, it is not known yet whether with fatal results or not. To relieve the pressure Marshall with his Inspector and sowars charged the crowd and drove them into the Queen's Gardens and down the road to the left and right. For some time the rioters had been throwing stones and bricks at the police and soldiers, and among others Currie, Marshall, Jeffreys and Mr. Yule, District Traffic Superintendent, East Indian Railway, were struck on their helmets. The police had by this time been contending with the mob for close on a couple of hours without succeeding in driving them off, and Currie and Marshall came to the conclusion about 2-30 that further postponement of sterner measures would only lead to infinitely greater bloodshed. The order to fire a couple of rounds was therefore given. Two of the rioters fell. The remainder broke up, and the police and infantry were then able to drive them back through the Gardens which were cleared in about half an hour. Picquets were placed up to the Town Hall, the Manipuris being utilised to line the road around the Garden. The crowd maintained its threatening attitude in the Chandni Chauk, and Marshall, on riding up after hearing a couple of shots from the direction of the Town Hall, found about 15 British Infantry and 15 police being heavily stoned. When the police and infantry attempted to retire the mob surged over the railing into the garden. It appeared inevitable that some of our men would soon be seriously injured. Marshall tried to frighten the rioters off by directing his force to fire a couple of rounds over their heads. This had the reverse effect; finding that no one was hurt they rushed on. The order was then given to fire on them, the force being cautioned to avoid hitting boys a large number of whom were in the mob. Two or three rounds per man were fired and three men were seen to fall, but others must have been hit. This ended the trouble, the rioters dispersing.

This must have taken place soon after 3 p.m., and I only heard of the final phase when I reached the station shortly before 4 p.m. General Drake-Brookman arrived about the same time, and after hearing the reports of what had occurred we rode to the Town Hall, where some cavalry had by this time been stationed in the Chandni Chauk and all was quiet, though the street was full of somewhat excited sight-seers.

A mass meeting to protest against the Rowlatt Bills had previously been arranged to take place in the Queen's Gardens at 5 p.m. This being out of the question, I heard that the meeting was collecting at the Pipla Park where the Congress *Pandal* had been. I accordingly rode there with Mr. Currie and some 20 cavalry intending to disperse the meeting if there were any signs of its becoming disorderly. A parley with the Chairman, Mahatma Munshi Ram (or Swami Shradhdhanand as he is now called), the prime mover in the *Satyagraha* business in Delhi, and two other prominent men, Shuaib and Doctor Abdur Rahman, ensued. They assured me that at the meeting only one resolution asking the Secretary of State to withhold his assent to the Act lately passed would be proposed. I informed them that if that was all that happened and if the crowd then dispersed in a quiet and orderly manner, no one would interfere with it, but I warned the speakers of the possible effect of inflaming the people's passions. The crowd which may have contained some 1,500 men, mostly of the young shopkeeper, and possibly student class—chiefly Hindus—at Munshi Ram's instance assured me that they would disperse quietly. After addressing a few words of exhortation to them I withdrew and sent the sowars back to the railway station. The Chandni Chauk and Fatehpuri Bazar by which I went back was quite quiet though of course full of people. This was shortly before 5 p.m. and I learnt afterwards that the meeting which was expected to last till dark at 6-30 broke up quite quietly a little before 6. This I attribute to the military force the participants had seen or heard of in show of the streets.

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After waiting to learn that all was quiet, and making the necessary dispositions for the night the General and I returned home at about 7-45. Nothing untoward occurred during the night.

The casualties from the two firing incidents were regrettably heavy. Altogether so far as I have been able to learn 8 men were killed, and some 12 or 13 have been treated for wounds at the Civil Hospital. But none of the killed were boys nor was the machine gun on the armoured car used, in spite of rumours and newspaper assertions to the contrary. These results are very serious to have arisen from an unexpected incident that presented no appearance at the outset of developing into anything of this nature. But I consider that the police and the British infantry employed to quell the riot behaved with great restraint, and that a very sudden and awkward situation was tackled with great firmness by Messrs. Marshall and Currie. A want of decision on their part might have had much more serious consequences. Experience has again shown that firing over the heads of a riotous mob is not effectual in bringing a turmoil to a close. That further trouble did not follow we owe to the promptness with which the troops summoned to the aid of the civil power appeared on the scene. I have already expressed to General Drake-Brockman my thanks for all the assistance he and his men rendered.

To-day though the shops in the main bazars have not been opened all has been quiet. Most of the shops in the side bazars were open in the morning when I rode round and the railway station precincts were humming with travellers as usual. Some shops in Chandni Chauk and other big bazars were I hear opened in the morning but closed again. I have interviewed some of the leading men of the city, and they told me that this was due to the desire of the relatives to bury their dead and recover their wounded for home treatment before business was resumed. This was effected this afternoon, and I have hopes that ordinary business will be resumed tomorrow morning. An element of excitement in the presence of troops at the Town Hall has been removed by withdrawing them out of sight. Military and police picquets have been placed at the essential points, and Beadon, who returned early this morning, has informed me this evening that he considers the situation well in hand. The leading men whom I interviewed assured me of their anxiety to restore confidence and a normal state of affairs to-day if possible. As they belonged chiefly to the Home Rule party, but were men who refused to sign the *Satyagraha* vow, I trust they have realized the disastrous effects which may follow from the stirring up of movements which the originators cannot control.

P.S. No reports of any trouble in other parts of the city yesterday or to-day have been received from the police stations.

2

Letter No. 55-C.-Home, dated the 17th April 1919, from the Hon'ble Mr. C. A. Barron, C.I.E., I.C.S., to the Hon'ble Sir J. H. DuBoulay, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., I.C.S.

The following account will explain the situation in Delhi as it stands to-day and how it has been arrived at.

On the morning of the 1st April, after the burial the evening before of most of the men who fell on the 30th March, the streets assumed a more normal appearance but some roughs were moving about the Chandi Chowk molesting the shop-keepers who had opened their shops. Cavalry patrols were sent to clear the street and met with fair success. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon the situation was much improved and a number of shops were opened. On the 2nd April order was so far restored that we arranged for the withdrawal of all troops from the city, except a guard of 25 Native Infantry at the railway station. Nothing remarkable occurred on the 3rd April, but learning in the evening that specially large prayers were being arranged at the Jama Masjid on Friday the 4th the police were directed to take up their emergency posts early that morning. On the 4th the Jama Masjid prayer meeting passed off without any disturbance, but was remarkable for the fact that a number of Hindus were invited into

the mosque and the Arya Samajist Munshi Ram (Swami Shraddhanand) was allowed to address the assembly from the pulpit. The possible consequences of this step have I think only been realized by a few of the more far-sighted Muhammadans.

On the 5th the situation was normal except for the fact that the tramways were being boycotted and tongas were carrying people at much reduced fares. No definite information could be obtained as to whether the *Satyagraha* *Hartal* on Sunday the 6th was to be observed in Delhi or not. Late at night however the District Magistrate and Senior Superintendent of Police came to the conclusion that the leaders had lost control of their followers and that the lower class Muhammadans had taken charge and were out of hand. It was decided with the General Officer Commanding to have troops at their previously arranged emergency stations by an early hour next morning.

On the morning of the 6th all the shops in the city were again closed, but the prayer meeting at the Fatehpuri mosque lasted only a short time and dispersed quietly. The day passed without disturbance, and in the evening the British troops at the Town Hall and at the station were withdrawn.

The situation was normal on the 7th, the Indian troops being withdrawn in the forenoon and the police picquets after dark. On the 8th though outwardly all was calm we were rendered anxious by the news that Gandhi intended to come to Delhi on Friday. The situation here was, as I informed you by telephone, rendered more difficult through the fact that the Punjab Government had issued an order excluding him from the Punjab, which I had been asked to cause to be served upon him should he come to Delhi and express the intention of proceeding towards the Punjab. As Gandhi had only the day before deliberately defied the law in Bombay we anticipated some similar defiance in Delhi and could only foresee serious trouble if he had to be arrested here. I suggested that perhaps the best course would be if the Bombay Government could be induced to prevent his leaving the Presidency for some weeks.

In the evening we received definite information that Gandhi had already left Bombay, and, as you are aware, the Government of India on the morning of the 9th sanctioned the issue of orders directing his return to Bombay. I need not detail the successful arrangements made to serve the Punjab and Delhi orders upon him with the result that he went back to the Presidency. The news of his non-arrival became known of course when the train arrived in the evening without him; only about fifty men came to the station to meet him and they left quietly after ascertaining the fact from his servants. The emergency police arrangements had been made in case of trouble, and a squadron of cavalry had also been brought in to the Fort in the course of the evening, moving after dusk into the Queen's Garden.

By the morning of the 10th the news of Gandhi's arrest spread throughout the city. A general *hartal* was declared and a mass meeting arranged at the Burning Ghats on the Jumna. This passed off quietly with few speeches, but the shops in the main bazars remained closed though it was reported that business was being done by back doors and in the side bazars. The situation however remained quite quiet, and in the evening on receipt of a report that at a big meeting at Ansari's it had been resolved that there should be no *hartal* the next day though the *satyagrahis* should remain firm, it was arranged to allow the cavalry to return to Cantonments and withdraw the police from their emergency picquets keeping them however concentrated. These arrangements were promptly cancelled on the receipt at dinner time of a private message announcing the catastrophe at Amritsar.

Early on the 11th it was evident that the shops were again to be closed and as the temper of the crowd appeared unpleasant, and news of the outbreak at Lahore had also arrived, it was decided to strengthen the Queen's garden force with 100 Native Infantry and to picquet the railway station with British troops. The day however passed without incident though the Friday prayers at the Jama Masjid were attended with some excitement. In the even-

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evening the District Magistrate interviewed a number of leading men who were genuinely horrified at the news from Amritsar and promised to try to stop the *hartal*. The Editor of the "*Hindi Samachar*" was also called up and ordered to contradict a false account of the proceedings at Palwal when Gandhi was arrested, in which he alleged that British and Indian troops had been employed. The Editor's denial in his issue of the 12th not being satisfactory a contradiction and apology was later dictated to him which he published in the issue of the 13th.

On the 12th the shops remained closed, but the tone of the crowd appeared to be a little better. In the evening Beadon, Scott and I interviewed Hakim Ajmal Khan who regretted his inability to control the butchers and secure the opening of the slaughter house which is of course the first business to be started in the early morning. He advised that no authoritative action should be taken on Sunday, the 13th, with reference to the *hartal* which he hoped would come to an end on Monday. Sunday was a very quiet day in the city, many of the people being engaged in the *Baisakhi* holiday. In view of the fact that all the shops remained closed the military and police arrangements in force were continued.

Early in the morning of the 14th news arrived of the strike at the Shakurpur Goods Station on the Southern Punjab Railway. The mail train which left Delhi the evening before had to be brought back in the morning. During the course of the morning a good many reports were received of intimidation of persons going to their work in offices and at the railway station and of shopkeepers who ventured to commence opening their shops. We therefore decided to issue an order under Section 188, Indian Penal Code, forbidding such intimidation and it was arranged to announce this from the Town Hall in the afternoon. One of the English Banks reported that its clerks were unwilling to work and in consultation with the Bank of Bengal, and other Banks, who represented that if one closed all must close, I decided to declare the day a public holiday under the Negotiable Instruments Act. This holiday had to be maintained on the 15th and 16th.

At the meeting at 3 p.m. on the 14th at the Town Hall with the leading members of the Home Rule party, who were the only persons who appeared to have retained any authority in the city, we decided to give them till 10 o'clock next morning to see whether their influence could bring the *Hartal* to a close. Soon after this meeting had ended a very unfortunate incident took place at the King Edward Park where two Criminal Investigation Department Sub-Inspectors attending a *Satyagraha* meeting officially were assaulted, one of them rather seriously. This meeting was dispersed by the District Magistrate with a troop of cavalry.

On the morning of the 15th there were no signs of the *Hartal* stopping. At the meeting at 10 a.m. with the Home Rule leaders I impressed upon them the gravity of the position, rendered still more grave by the news which had arrived of the loss of life at Amritsar and Ahmedabad in riots arising from a similar situation. I read to them the Government of India, Home Department, Resolution, dated 15th April, which I had just received, and I also informed them of Gandhi's pronouncement, dated 14th instant, deprecating all violence, *hatalas* and disobedience of police orders which I had just received by telegram. They evidently realised the seriousness of the occasion, but said that 10 or 12 of them were not sufficient to bring about the end of the *hartal*. They therefore advised the collection of a number of leading men of all the trades of Delhi in the afternoon. Accordingly at 3 p.m. another meeting was summoned which was attended by about 150 tradesmen. During this meeting the news arrived that the leaders had been successful in getting the butchers to open the slaughter house and to kill a few animals to show that their *hartal* was at an end. The *Chowdhris* of the butchers assured the District Magistrate and myself that the slaughter house would certainly be opened next morning. Most of the Muhammadan shopkeepers and many of the Hindus agreed to open their shops, though there was evidently a recalcitrant element among the

Hindu cloth merchants and provided they did not succeed during the night in upsetting the arrangements arrived at there appeared to be a fair prospect of the bazar opening next morning.

Towards the close of both of these meetings there was an element of danger in the presence in the street outside of a large crowd who it appeared had collected on the rumour that the leading men were about to be arrested. A certain number of the crowd in the morning had *lathis*, but the evening crowd was much larger and the *lathiwalas* were very conspicuous. There was however no collision with the police or the military and the crowd dispersed with Munshi Ram, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari and the other leaders when they left the meeting.

At the second meeting I was informed that the only reason for the second *hartal* was the order issued against Gandhi and I was urged to withdraw the order as far as Delhi was concerned. I pointed out the impossibility of this and also how ineffectual it would be, as Gandhi had been confined to the Bombay Presidency by an order issued there. In the end I undertook to convey to the Government of India the reason for the second *hartal*, which I did by telephone that evening. In order to bring the meeting to some conclusion I issued a notice containing this promise and also stating that there was no foundation for the suspicion said to be entertained by the crowd that it was the intention of the authorities to arrest the leaders with whom the Deputy Commissioner and I had been in conference for the past few days. The notice also announced to the people that the butchers had that afternoon opened their slaughter house, and that meat was for sale in the Sadar Bazar, and I pointed out the danger of this amount of progress being lost if the Hindu shopkeepers failed to carry out their part of the undertaking and did not open their shops at once. Later in the day a certain number of shops were opened for a short time and the prospects of the *hartal* being brought to a close appeared better than they had been at any time during the past six days.

On the morning of the 16th these good hopes were however dismally falsified. The slaughter house did not open in the early morning and the shops in the bazar remained closed throughout the day. It would have been extremely dangerous to summon any further meetings and run the risk of an almost certain collision between the large mob of *lathiwalas* and the police or the troops. The leading men such as Hakim Ajmal Khan, Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh, Dr. Ansari, Munshi Ram and others were making genuine efforts to collect a number of assistants to help them to induce the shopkeepers to open and all we could do was to await the result of their efforts. The tone of the city was bad and the danger which appeared to me most to be feared was that while quiet was maintained we might be placed in the false position of having created a conflagration. The situation remained very tense and serious.

This morning to our great relief the efforts of the friendly leaders at last bore fruit and during the course of the morning a large number of shops were opened in the Chandni Chauk and several of the smaller bazars were being fully opened. Arrangements had been made to assist these efforts by police patrols to control any interference. The police had orders in one or two favourable localities to arrest any persons molesting people going to their work. The English Banks in the Chauk also reopened at my request in order to set an example to the bazar generally. The unruly elements in the mob, however, collected gradually and attempted to destroy the good work which was being done. The situation became a threatening one at 12-30 p.m. owing to the arrest of a hooligan who was trying to close shops with a crowd of supporters, and matters were brought to a head by the mob attacking the picquet placed at the junction of Ballimaran and the Chadni Chauk. One Head Constable was very seriously wounded on the head by *lathi* blows and other members of the police force were struck. The police had to fire to clear the rioters and it is now known that 15 were wounded with buckshot and have been received in hospital. The squadron of cavalry in the Queen's Gardens was sent

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through the principal bazars, the mob immediately dispersing before them. A few arrests were made including that of a boy dressed in Sadhu's clothes who has been very prominent in the disorder throughout, and who was, I am informed, identified as having been present at the riot at the railway station on the 30th March. The cavalry demonstration took place at about 1 P.M. and a body of Indian Infantry also participated, but the troops were not called upon to fire owing to the rapid dispersal of the mob. Quiet was restored in a very short time and has been maintained throughout the afternoon. All the shops in the Chandni Chauk had of course closed at the commencement of the disturbance. Nothing untoward happened at the English Banks which were also however closed early in the disturbance.

The efforts made in the past few days to restore law and order through the people themselves have miserably failed just as there appeared a prospect of their succeeding. The sullen temper of the mob makes it extremely doubtful whether order can be restored without very forcible methods. The District Magistrate is arranging for the arrest of certain persons known to be fomenting trouble and has appointed several of the prominent citizens special police officers under Section XVII of the Police Act. I applied this afternoon for the extension of the Seditious Meetings Act, 1911, to the Province, and under the sanction just received I am issuing a notification under Section II thereof. The history of the past week renders it doubtful whether law and order can be really restored with the extension of Martial Law in the city. On this subject I will further consult the Deputy Commissioner, Senior Superintendent of Police and the General Officer Commanding Brigade, and communicate the result later.

3

Letter No. 122-C-Home, dated Delhi, the 24th May 1919, from the Hon'ble Mr. C. A. Barron, C.I.E., I.C.S., to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.

In continuation of previous correspondence on the subject, I have now the honour to forward a copy of a letter No. 9-C.,* dated the 20th May, from the Deputy Commissioner of Delhi, containing his report on the recent disturbances in Delhi City. A copy of the inquest order† is also enclosed. As I have already furnished several reports of these events I do not consider it necessary to review Colonel Beadon's report at any length. I think it will be found to agree substantially with the earlier accounts which I have given of the origin and continuance of the trouble.

I would invite the special attention of the Government of India to paragraphs 13 and 15 of Colonel Beadon's letter, which raise important questions regarding the policy to be pursued in future towards political agitation in Delhi. As a former Deputy Commissioner of Delhi for three years prior to its being declared the Capital of India I can endorse all that Colonel Beadon says regarding the freedom of the city from the excitement and turmoil which accompany politics in India. His picture of the present state of Delhi is not overdrawn, and it is difficult to see how any approach to the previous peaceful state of affairs is to be re-introduced unless some steps such as are indicated in paragraph 15 of the report are adopted. At the same time, I recognize that the action suggested must be part of a general policy towards political agitation, the decision regarding which must be taken by the Government of India in consultation with the Local Governments concerned. Delhi cannot be treated by itself either as a special plague spot on the map of India, or as a sanctuary from which we can hope to exclude all agitation which is permitted elsewhere. Beyond recommending Colonel Beadon's views, with which I am in agreement, to the earnest consideration of the Government of India, it does not appear that any useful purpose would be served by my enlarging on the subject at the present stage.

* Enclosure 4, page below.
† Enclosure 5, page 134.

In conclusion I desire to endorse Colonel Beadon's commendation of the troops and the police and the officers mentioned in paragraph 16 of his letter. The temper of the troops and their officers called out to assist the civil power was admirable throughout, and they deserve the thanks of Government. To Colonel Beadon himself and to Messrs. Hare-Scott, Orde and Jeffreys of the police, and also to Messrs. Currie, Lane-Roberts and Barry of the Civil Service, who shared as Magistrates with the police the trying ordeal of remaining on the *qui vive* throughout the disturbances, I personally owe a deep debt of gratitude for their assistance throughout a time of much anxiety, and I trust that their services will be suitably recognized by Government.

4

Letter No. 9-C., dated Delhi, the 20th May 1919, from Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Beadon, I.A., Deputy Commissioner, Delhi, to the Hon'ble Mr. C. A. Barron, C.I.E., I.C.S., Chief Commissioner, Delhi.

In compliance with Punjab Government letter No. 1420, dated 26th November 1907 (with which was forwarded Government of India, Home Department, letter No. 2886, dated the 1st November 1907), I have the honour to send you, for the information of the Government of India, my account of the disturbances which have taken place in Delhi during the period March 29th to April 19th, 1919. I have made no formal report before, because you have been present yourself and have been cognizant of what has taken place. As the period of tension was somewhat protracted, I think perhaps it will be simplest to make my report in the form of a diary.

March 30th.—On this date rioting, which was the outcome of the *hartal* and so-called passive resistance, took place. The details will be found in the proceedings of the inquest on those who met their death during the rioting. I attach a copy of the finding, so I need not dilate further on the happenings of this day, beyond recording that a large meeting which was held in the Pipla Park to condemn the Rowlatt Act passed off fairly quietly.

March 31st and April 1st.—On account of the rioting and the consequent deaths of some ten adult citizens, the city was in a very disturbed and excited state. The Home Rule and *Satyagraha* leaders were very busy holding meetings and fomenting the excitement, and much the same conditions existed as on the previous day; the *hartal* was closer if possible, and turbulent crowds were preventing trams and vehicles from plying; wild telegrams were being sent to newspapers and leading agitators throughout India. Very large crowds of mixed creeds attended the funerals of both Muhammadans and Hindus at the burial ground and burning ghats. So far as we (authorities) were concerned we consolidated our position by occupying the Town Hall and Queen's gardens and keeping out police picquets at important points in the city, we devoted our energies to preventing rioting by a show of force, but took no action in the way of arresting the turbulent, as such would merely have brought on serious disturbances. In the afternoon of April 1st His Excellency the Viceroy's train halted at Delhi for about half an hour and the general position was explained.

April 2nd, 3rd and 4th.—The *hartal* came to an end on the 2nd and the shops remained open, but the excitement still remained and there was a good deal of minor lawlessness. The newspapers "*Congress*," "*Vijaya*," "*Hindi Samachar*" and "*Inqilab*" were writing wildly; undesirable posters were appearing, rumours of railway strikes and such like were prevalent. But nothing very tangible occurred and, but for the general discomfort of indeterminate expectancy, the city seemed to be returning to normal conditions. On April 4th (Friday) a great gathering took place in the Jama Masjid, at which Munshi Ram gave a lecture: the crowd then visited the hospital to see the wounded but no disturbance occurred. We authorities spent our time reviewing the situation and generally preparing to cope with more efficiency with any outbreak which might occur. On the morning of April 4th the Senior Superintendent of Police (Mr. Marshall) was

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relieved of his duties as his health had broken down and Mr. Hare Scott started from Simla to take over charge.

April 5th.—The trams were still boycotted and the people had started utilizing the *tongas* (much over loaded) to take their place at cheap rates—a somewhat different phase to that which had maintained earlier. During the day it was definitely decided by the populace—and not the so-called leaders—that the *hartal* was to be repeated on the following day. Late at night I had a long conference with police officers and Hakim Ajmal Khan, at which it transpired that the leaders were at a complete discount. The low class Muhammadan element with a few of the minor Hindu agitators had come into power and matter looked serious. We decided to again occupy the Town Hall and Queen's gardens and, by the former disposition of police and military, to be in a position to cope with any threatened disturbances.

April 6th, Sunday.—The *hartal* took place and there was a huge Muhammadan meeting at the Fatehpuri mosque, to which Hindus were admitted. In order that the crowds might be given something to do, I allowed meetings to take place at Edward Park and at Dr. Ansari's house, and so the day passed off without any untoward incident.

April 7th, 8th and 9th.—Normal conditions seemed to have returned, though there was still excitement amongst the masses, excitement which was kept alive by speeches at meetings and the obnoxious tone of the press, both local and external. Mr. Hare-Scott had time to examine the police dispositions and we were able to devise an emergency scheme, greatly surpassing anything that we had before. News came of Mr. Gandhi's departure from Bombay, so arrangements had to be made to serve the order issued by the Punjab Government before he could enter the Punjab Province—and for the enforcement of that order. Into the details I need not enter. A crowd of about 60 people assembled at the Delhi station at 9.30 P.M. to meet Mr. Gandhi, but of course they had to go away disappointed.

April 10th—15th.—The police and troops had to again take up their positions as on the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest becoming known on April 10th, the shops throughout the city closed forthwith. During my rides through the town I found the tone of the crowds becoming worse and the mere appearance of a European caused the small parties, which assembled everywhere, to burst into cries of admiration for Mahatma Gandhi. The news of the happenings at Amritsar and Lahore were having a very bad effect; so far as the authorities were concerned there were only two courses to pursue, the one to avoid any action which would cause a disturbance and the other to keep the police and troops in position and readiness. The shop-keepers were genuinely sick of the *hartal*, but could not open their shops for fear of the rioting mobs. Interviews with so-called leaders which I held on the 11th, 12th and 13th, with a view to breaking the *hartal* showed most clearly that the leaders were impotent and as matters were becoming worse through the troubles on the railway and surrounding districts of the Punjab and through the boycott, which was spreading so as to prevent the servants of Europeans (especially) and public bodies obtaining supplies, it was determined to bring matters to a head on April 14th. Leaders were summoned to a more formal meeting at the Town Hall and we entered on a period, as already described in your letter to the Government of India, of negotiations in hopes that the leaders would be able to avert rioting. Into the details of the meetings I need not enter: it will suffice to say that no real progress could be reported. It is possible that the *hartal* might have been ended on the 15th by the exertions of the leaders, but by chance on the evening of the 14th excitement was increased by the rioting at the Edward Park, on which occasion a serious assault was made on the Criminal Investigation Department Inspector Faqir Mohammad. The assault itself was fortuitous and unpremeditated.

April 16th.—The *hartal* continued, but the city was extraordinarily quiet and orderly, owing I gather to the

knowledge that severe measures were being taken in the Punjab. Late this night I sent for Dr. Ansari, Hakim Ajmal Khan and Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh. I warned them clearly that we could no longer tolerate this mob law, which was preventing the shops opening and that, if the *hartal* continued for this reason, I should on the morrow ask the military authorities to take over charge. I explained that civil authority was based on the supposition that the populace were law abiding and ready to obey, but that in contrary circumstances order could be maintained only by the use of force, which might eventuate in Martial Law. I told them that if they made a genuine effort to open the shops, I guaranteed on my part to isolate the city from the suburbs by police picquets and to arrest people who by threats prevented shops opening. The deputation left promising action.

April 17th.—It must be confessed that the leaders, especially Hakim Ajmal Khan worked very hard. During the night they organized volunteers and they were all out early persuading shop-keepers to open; mobs were out too, but it spite of their presence a large number of shops were opened though little business was being done. About mid-day the police patrol opposite the Town Hall arrested one man of a knot who were threatening shop-keepers and immediately there was wild excitement: the shops all closed in a few seconds and the *badmash* element crowded into the Chandni Chauk in hundreds. In the course of half an hour the climax was reached: a police Head Constable was murderously assaulted and a determined attack was made on the small picquet at the mouth of the Ballimaran street. The police in self-preservation opened fire and the crowds were rapidly dispersed. Eighteen persons are known to have been wounded of whom two subsequently died. I myself with the Senior Superintendent of Police went through the main bazars with a few Pathan soldiers and impressed on the *lathiwallas* that they would be happier elsewhere. Suitable judicial punishments were inflicted on the men who had been arrested and on a Sadhu boy who had been a public nuisance with his preachings and boastings for some days. Some of the leading agitators were made special police under the Police Act. The upshot was that order was restored.

April 18th and 19th.—The suburban shops opened on the 18th, but in the city where the riot took place the people had not quite recovered. A funeral of a "victim" had to be got through and minor leaders, who had supplanted the discredited leaders, were still inclined to be active. However on the 19th all shops opened and since then the city has returned to normal conditions, which fortunately have not been disturbed even by the news from Ahmedabad, the Punjab or Landi Kotal. The subsequent period has been spent in inquiries by police and altogether some 25 persons have been arrested for offences connected with the disturbances.

Reviewing the period of the disturbances dispassionately, I feel that we must be thankful that, although the period was so long and although we have passed through so much anxiety, we have come through the troubles on the whole happily, especially when we consider what has happened elsewhere. It was certainly very unpleasant, and even derogatory, to feel that in respect to minor lawlessness police control was temporarily withdrawn, but the very protraction of the period of discomfort has brought home to the loyal populace of Delhi that the political leaders have feet of clay and that it is Government and Government alone who can keep order. In fact a few days of mob rule in the city has convinced the politicians, in a way that nothing else could have convinced them, that their agitation has recoiled and must ever recoil on their own heads. "Peace hath its victories no less than war."

The cause of the troubles requires rather lengthy explanation. It will, I imagine, be readily recognized that before the Durbar Delhi was a simple *mofussil* town, with little knowledge of politics, with no political agitators beyond a few anarchists whose machinations were circumscribed after the Delhi-Lahore conspiracy trial, with no indigenous press and with no special aspirations. (The wealthier of the citizens are mostly

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men who are wholesale dealers in cloth, iron, paper, apparel, oilman stores, hardware, etc., which are distributed all over Northern India and the lower classes are these who perform humbler duties and who are dependent on the traders). Since Delhi became the Capital all this has changed, for the place has been flooded with agitators and politicians from all parts of India and has been the scene of countless political demonstrations and meetings. I will mention only the more important.

The troubles began in 1912 and 1913 when Muhammad Ali started the "Hamdard" and "Comrade" and also the Khuddam-i-Kaaba Society through which he boomed the Turkish connection seizing the opportunity of the Tripoli war to excite Muslim feeling: like himself all his lieutenants were outsiders from various parts of the United Provinces. In 1917 the Home Rule League opened a branch. Then the deputation to His Excellency the Viceroy on the subject of the Press Act brought into Delhi the journalistic scum of India (including Horniman) for an appreciable period: similarly all the political extremists gathered in Delhi to present their addresses to His Excellency the Viceroy and Secretary of State. Every cold weather the Legislative Council assembles and the extremist members—all foreigners to Delhi not content with inflicting their *copia verborum* on the Council, have spent their leisure hours in exhorting the local politicians. Only last winter we had political India present attending Congress, the Muslim League and some 20 more conferences in Delhi. The violent speeches about the Rowlatt Act were delivered in Council here in Delhi and during the past 18 months we have had billeted on Delhi several outside agitators, whose names probably are already well known to Government. In addition several Vernacular presses, financed by political reformers and manned entirely by an outside staff, have started and have been pouring forth inflammatory articles. It is indeed a fact that not 30 of the true residents of Delhi have taken an appreciable part in all this movement, so it cannot be gainsaid that Delhi has been suffering from repeated injections of political virus.

Now to meet this insidious political attack I have done all I can under the law. In every case security has been taken from Presses: in many cases the security has been enhanced, and as soon as the Home Rule movement showed itself in its true colours, I used the Police Act to prevent all public meetings in public places and all processions except under license. Such action is the absolute limit of the District Magistrate's powers. The local administration interned Muhammad Ali and Shaikat Ali and incidentally closed down their press, but beyond that really nothing has been done to cope with the political movement.

May I frankly point out that the position of the District Magistrate of Delhi has become an impossible one? Every order that he passes for the good of the people is misquoted and misrepresented in the papers, in which he is vilified as a tyrant whenever his orders clash with the Home Rule tenets. He cannot even decide as to what route a procession is to follow without questions and even debate in the Supreme Council: and public newspapers, especially in Bombay and the United Provinces of extreme views, have abused both him and the Chief Commissioner week in and week out. This has been going on steadily since October 1917 and yet Government have never taken any action to support their servants or even protect them from wild calumnies and libels. Nor has Government taken any steps to keep the presses within bounds in general matters. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the situation in Delhi has become so bad that the first *hartal* resulted in rioting and protracted disturbances.

I assume that it will be realized that I write in no tone of complaint, nor with any intention of being disrespectful to any individual or office: I have indeed little personal interest in the matter, for after a very few months I hope to be *functus officio*. But the time has arrived when we have to face facts, and it would be craven dishonesty on my part to write merely to please those who will have to deal with this subject. If the Government of India wish

to keep the Capital peaceful and contented (and it is to Delhi that Northern India looks at all times for a lead), it is essential that a *reasonably firm policy be adopted in future*. Not a tyrannical policy, but a simple common-sense policy of control.

I strongly advise action on these lines. *Firstly*, that the local administration be directed to exclude from Delhi any stranger who has no business in Delhi and who has come merely to use the place as his headquarters for agitation. Just as Australia after a time struck at the dumping of convicts—so should Delhi now object to the dumping of agitators from other provinces. *Secondly*, that local presses and irresponsible presses in other provinces also should be put under censorship. It can surely be no hardship to a press or to a newspaper to be compelled to submit to the censorship of a respectable educated subject of His Majesty? As matters stand at present the papers are edited by, usually youthful, firebrands who have no sense of the responsibilities of their position or the ordinary decencies of journalism. If only Government could see some of the creatures who start presses and papers their literary productions would cause no wonder. *Thirdly*, that public meetings whether on public or private premises be properly regulated. The Police Act can deal with meetings in public places, but more than this is required. Action under the Police Act merely drives the agitators to holding meetings on private premises and, for the control of such, Act VI of 1907 should be put in force (as it has been lately) the moment occasion arises. I, as a practical District Officer, offer this advice for what it is worth. If it is followed, Delhi will in future cause Government no anxiety: I only ask Government to give Delhi a chance by instituting a *Cordon Sanitaire* which will keep out disaffection.

In conclusion I beg to call attention to the names of certain officers who deserve the commendation of Government for their service during the past April. Brigadier General Drake-Brockman, C.M.G., called out his troops willingly in aid of the Civil Power and we are most grateful to him for his prompt and continued action: the troops themselves performed cheerfully and patiently their tedious duty of standing by. The police too deserve every credit for their conduct through a period of anxiety. Mr. Hare-Scott, Senior Superintendent of Police and Mr. Orde, Superintendent of Police, were of course a great source of confidence to all with whom they came in contact: so it is superfluous for me to write about them. Mr. Jeffreys, Assistant Superintendent of Police, did excellently; he was very cool on several critical occasions of actual rioting being present on every occasion and he executed the mission involving the arrest of Mr. Gandhi with complete tact.

5

Order by Lieut.-Col. H. C. Beadon, District Magistrate, Delhi.

This is the file of the inquest proceedings held by me consequent on the death of nine persons (names given later) who were either killed outright or died of wounds received during the riots in Delhi on March 30th, 1919.

The inquest was to have been held on April 14th at the Town Hall, but Delhi was in such a disturbed state that I thought better to postpone the inquiry. Hearings however took place after due public notice on March 28th and 29th at which several European witnesses were examined. These witnesses had mostly sent me in written statements, and for this reason they were summoned. The public were invited by advertisement in the local papers and by notices posted in various parts of the city to come forward and give evidence at the *Kacheri* on May 3rd, but none came and so the inquest proceedings have been closed.

The evidence of the Civil Surgeon (Lieutenant-Colonel James, I.M.S.) shows that the causes of death were as follows:—

Ram Kishan, son of Bhagwas Das, age 22, septic poisoning caused by gunshot wounds. The deceased received 2 gun-shot wounds in the thigh and

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buttock. He stated he was shot near the Clock Tower. Died April 6th or 7th.

Ram Singh, son of Indar Bal, age 28. Bullet wounds in abdomen. Died April 3rd.

Gopi Nath, son of Chhedu Lal, age 30. Internal hemorrhage and shock due to two gun-shot wounds. Died March 30th.

Abdul Ghani, son-in-law of Imam-ud-din, age 25. Hemorrhage due to bayonet wounds. Killed near Clock Tower, 30th April 1919.

Mohammad Din, son of Khuda Bukhsh—apparently Din Mohammad. Hemorrhage due to bullet passing through body causing internal injuries. Killed 30th March 1919.

Ram Chand, brother of Cheddard Mal. Hemorrhage due to perforation in the intestines. Killed near Clock Tower. Killed 30th March 1919.

An unknown Mohamadan, age 45. Fractured skull, probably caused by bullet fired at close range. Killed 30th March 1919.

Ram Lal, son of Gopi Pershad, age 33. Shot through the body—internal injury. Killed 30th March 1919.

Radha Saran, son of Chandu Lal, age 22. Bullet wound in brain. Killed 30th March 1919.

(In addition a man called Hashmat Ullah appears to have been shot dead, but he was not taken to the hospital and I have recorded no evidence concerning him.)

From the evidence given by the Civil Surgeon it is fairly obvious that the deceased persons met their death by violence and that the actual causes of death are those shown in his recorded statement.

It therefore remains for me to decide as to whether any person or persons are liable to be prosecuted for causing their death.

From the evidence before me the story of the rioting is as follows:—

The passing of the Act through the Legislative Council which is popularly known as the Rowlatt Act had resulted in the local Vernacular presses of Delhi (as elsewhere) indulging in extravagant language and there had been meetings in Delhi condemning the Act. There were vague rumours of a *hartal* as a sign of mourning to take place on a date which was not fixed, but they were so very indefinite that the Delhi authorities saw no reason to take any special precautions and I myself left Delhi on March 28th on a couple of days' leave. On March 29th evening, however, a report came in to the effect that the next day (Sunday, March 30th) was to be observed as a day of *hartal*, and it was understood that the newly formed society called the *Satyagraha Sabha* were to manipulate it. Unobtrusive police precautions were taken by the Senior Superintendent of Police, in that police reserves and police in the *thanas* were to be held in readiness for emergencies. On the morning of the 30th Mr. Jeffreys, Superintendent of Police, went round the city to see that the preparations were satisfactory, and at about 10-30 A.M. he reported to the Senior Superintendent of Police that a *hartal* was in progress and that the crowds in the city were disorderly, at all events in the Chandni Chowk near the Sadar Railway bridge and near Hauz Qazi and further that people were being prevented from riding in tongas by the mobs.

The Senior Superintendent of Police (Mr. Marshall) then went to the city himself in his car with Mr. Jeffreys and the Kotwal, when these facts were not only verified but found to have become intensified; the car itself was stopped in Lal K. Bazar by a threatening crowd and the party were lucky in escaping unhurt, a fact which was due entirely to the proximity of the Hauz Qazi *Thana*.

Recognising the serious position, the Senior Superintendent of Police went to inform the Chief Commissioner sending the Kotwal to deal with crowd, which they saw on the Queen's Road towards the railway station. A mounted sowar arrived soon after at the Chief Commissioner's house with a note to say that there was rioting going on at the railway station, so the two police officers left hurriedly to collect men from the police lines, leaving

the Chief Commissioner to arrange with General Officer Commanding the Delhi Brigade for the despatch of troops.

It appears that a mob of people—presumably some of those who had been enforcing *hartal* and stopping vehicles—had invaded the railway station with the object of closing down the shops of the station sweetmeat vendors, who supply passengers with food and refreshments. A European had been pulled out of a tonga and the driver assaulted and the precincts of the railway station were the scene of more disorderly conduct. At least one man was arrested by the railway police and rescued by the mob and Mr. Mathews, the Assistant Station Superintendent, was assaulted, his coat being torn off his back. A very excited crowd of rowdies invaded the railway station breaking flower pots and damaging railway property.

The mob eventually were persuaded by Mr. Yule, District Traffic Superintendent, and others to leave the platform, being doubtlessly influenced by the presence of the railway police: but they soon streamed in again. Mr. Currie, Additional District Magistrate, arrived on the scene and the mob were again induced to leave the platform. By this time armed police, a small detachment of British soldiers (Bedfordshire Regiment) and a force of 250 Manipuris, who had been detained, were in occupation of the station and the mob had no opportunity of again forcing an entrance.

They remained however creating a disturbance in the station yard and in the road outside with the object of releasing men whom they imagined had been arrested, and they would not go away. The police (sowars and foot) under Messrs. Marshall and Jeffreys (who had now arrived) together with the British Infantry picket then drove the crowd off and into the Queen's gardens opposite, and both police and troops were utilised to prevent the crowd returning to the station.

The upshot was that crowd became more and more unruly and excited and proceeded to attack the forces present with sticks and stones. Matters came to such a pass that for the protection of the troops and police, many of whom had been hit including Mr. Marshall, Mr. Jeffreys, Sergeant Kemsley, and even Mr. Currie himself, Mr. Currie sanctioned fire being opened, both police and troops firing a few rounds. As soon as the crowd began to withdraw, the order to cease fire was issued. Two rioters were killed inside the Queen's gardens and doubtless more were wounded.

As the crowd did not even then disperse entirely, the police with a stiffening of a few British soldiers under Sergeant Kemsley advanced through the Queen's gardens and, without any further use of actual force, drove the crowd back to the Chandni Chauk, where the police passively held the west gate of Queen's gardens near the Town Hall. The crowd augmented, excited, and emboldened attacked the police again: unarmed police tried to get the mob to listen to reason and being in the way, Mr. Jeffreys could not take immediate action. The crowd continued stoning the police, so fire was again opened by the police only, but the mob remained undeterred. By this time Mr. Marshall had arrived and he directed the few British soldiers under Sergeant Kemsley to fire two volleys—action which caused the mob to disperse. Apparently four men were known at the time to have been killed and several wounded.

This is a brief history of the affair as culled from the reports of the officials concerned, reports which I have no reason of any kind to doubt. When I arrived back in Delhi early the next morning and heard of the riots I inspected the two spots. I found the precincts of the railway station littered with stones and rubble and about 30 yards of the railing on the east of Clarke Gate torn down. I also found the vicinity of the Town Hall near the east gate of the Queen's gardens littered with stones and rubble.

The reports on the file show that out of the British Infantry picket of 30 men at the railway station, 17 had reported injuries and 21 of the police force had reported injuries. These lists do not include minor injuries which were not reported, nor do they bring to light the fact

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Note by Mr. R. C. Jeffreys.

that the Additional District Magistrate (Mr. Currie), the Senior Superintendent of Police (Mr. Marshall), the Superintendent of Police (Mr. Jeffreys), the District Traffic Superintendent (Mr. Yule) and others were struck by missiles. Mr. Jeffreys was struck several times and even disoriented.

In view of these facts it seems to me to be obvious that the authorities concerned were fully justified in firing on the mob and they are entitled to all the immunity furnished by Chapter IX of the Criminal Procedure Code. I find that the deceased persons on whom this inquest is held met their death at the hands of the State Forces who were lawfully engaged in dispersing an unlawful assembly. It must be obvious to the public that the true responsibility for this lamentable loss of life must lie on the heads of those leaders who have spread false reports about the Rowlatt Act, who have been vilifying Government at meetings and in the local Vernacular Press and who, by initiating this useless *hartal*, turned loose in Delhi the crowd of excited unemployed, who at once turned to acts of mischief.

6

Note by Mr. R. C. Jeffreys, Superintendent of Police, C.I.D., on political speeches delivered in Delhi during the winter 1918-19, with extracts from newspaper articles published prior to and during the disturbances, and copies of posters (page 38) found in public places.

The appetite of the Delhi public for political meetings has been rapidly increasing since a branch of the Home Rule League was started in 1917. In December of that year, Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh invited the Indian National Congress to hold its next sessions in Delhi, and the Reception Committee, in order to instil into the Delhi people an adequate degree of enthusiasm, embarked on a comprehensive scheme of propagandism in the autumn of 1918. A large number of meetings were held and well known lecturers from other provinces were imported, lest public interest in matters political might flag. It is unnecessary to quote from any of the speeches delivered at these earlier meetings: suffice it to say that they admirably served their purpose of preparing popular enthusiasm for the most violent and aggressive sessions in the history of the Congress. Both in the Subjects Committee and in the Congress itself the ultra-extremists held complete sway. Mrs. Besant, Mr. B. N. Sharma, Mr. Jamnadas Dwarkadas, Mr. Jinnah—leaders whose reputations had been made by their fearless abuse of Government—were reviled and insulted because even they could not find it in them to support the revolutionary policy of the Congress. The following quotations from speeches made by different delegates at these sessions are typical of the attitude adopted by this body, which claims to represent, but in reality creates, political opinion in this country.

Mr. M. M. Malaviya, in his presidential address, said: "When our English brethren came here they said to us 'We have come here only for a short time. We will go back the moment you are in a position to take up the management into your hands.' Yes, but the temptation is a thing which is a very great evil. They will stay in the country everlastingly. We loved them and worshipped them as we would worship those who attended on us during our illness as though they were so many incarnations of God. But what has happened? They have occupied all the highest and the best posts in the administration in the country and they little care for the interests of the sons of the soil. For 150 years they have so ruled us that we have become unfit to rule our own country and they now suggest that we are not fit for self-Government."

Speaking on the "Partition of rights" resolution, Mr. Khaparde said "I am the owner of my house but I am expected to live in the stable and allow others to live in the house, who have come here to make money. I must accommodate them in the central part of my house and starve but feed them and serve them."

Pandit Ambika Prasad argued: "If in 150 years the British Government could not teach us the art of self-government and pass its test when should we expect them to teach us the art? They have failed so far, and therefore we want to dispense with the services of these teachers. We pay them to do their work honestly by us as their pupils and not that they should do dishonest work." He later explained that he did not wish to send the English out of the country. "We want them but we do not want bureaucratic rule."

Referring to the report of the Rowlatt Commission Mr. B. C. Pal said:—"This much I will tell you that these recommendations if carried out will perpetuate a very pernicious and a very harmful and a very repressive provision of the Defence of India Act, perpetuate it in the permanent statute book. Are you going to allow it?"

Dr. Kitchlew on the right of self-determination resolution said:—"We should say that we are fit for the right, that we shall take it, that we shall not fear to take it. Our gospel should be, do whatever you like, we shall take it. We have the courage to do so. Now the fact of the matter is that if we have really the courage we need not waste time in passing resolutions. We need not also press our demand for the thing. The thing will come to us of itself. Let the courage be there and let it be genuine."

Mr. Abdul Qasim said "The British people are not against India. The Bureaucracy are against her."

The spirit engendered by these and other speeches may be judged by the following speeches made late in the proceedings. Mr. Chaudhri Peru Singh (tenant delegate) said:—"We want to join our educated brethren in demanding *Swaraj*. We shall take it if it is not given, by our constant agitation alongside the agitation of our educated countrymen. There is no question of asking for *Swaraj*. The question is of taking *Swaraj*. I shall briefly tell you why we shall take *Swaraj*. We shall do so because the authorities always give us a lot of trouble."

The president in his final address remarked that some Indians were ready to wait. "Other brethren there are at the same time who are a bit impatient. They in plain words say to the Government, 'whether you give it (full responsible government) willingly or unwillingly matters not to us. But if you decline to give it to us as soon as we want it then mind you we will take it from you.' Now, gentlemen, we in this Congress are bent on helping the people who a-gue in this manner."

Such was the spirit of the Congress proceedings. The Muslim League notoriously takes its cue from the Congress and it is unnecessary to examine its debates with great detail. It will suffice to remark that the methods employed to create enthusiasm and to stampede opinion into the ultra-extremist camp met with as great success as in the Congress *pandal*. Most violent speeches were delivered at preliminary meetings: the Subjects Committee was purged of the slightest symptom of moderation or restraint: finally Dr. Ansari's opening speech* can only be described as astounding. It resembled the sermon of a fanatic rather than the address of a politician, and amounted to a condemnation to death of our Ally the King of the Hedjaz and an exhortation to *jehad* if Mesopotamia, Arabia and Palestine were not restored to Turkey. The speech was supported throughout by quotations from the *Quran* and the *Hadis* and had an extraordinary effect on the audience. Many of the more reasonable Muhammadan leaders abstained from further attendance at the League, but the great majority were galvanised into the most intense sympathy with Turkey. As they dispersed members were heard cursing the destroyers of Islam and a strong anti-British feeling was evident. The text of the speech is reproduced in an appendix.

This spate of oratory was followed by a comparatively calm month devoted to the processes of digestion. It must be remembered that the number of residents who actually heard the speakers was very small. During

* Enclosure 7, page 138.

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uary verbatim reports of the speeches filled the columns of the political newspapers. These were perused with interest: the more ambitious even learnt lengthy tracts by heart with a view to the improvement of their own methods of address. The occasion soon arose that the news of the intended introduction into the Council of the Rowlatt Bills. Meetings of denunciation were held with ever-increasing frequency, and the speakers on showed that the Christmas week conferences had left their mark. In this they were aided by the limitations of their ostensible subject. It was soon apparent that the details of an intricate piece of legislation were not such as to rouse a largely illiterate audience. Later speakers gladly passed away into the more general topics of British ingratitude, repression and deceit. On these could be declaimed the most arresting phrases culled from Congressional records. There was the further advantage that speakers need not trouble to read the bills themselves. From this sprang those erroneous beliefs that were to cause so much trouble later. "Omnibus" speeches, ranging from Turkish affairs to the operations of the Press Act, created the wildest delusion as to the scope of the Bills. Perhaps the commonest misconception was that which combined the Rowlatt and the Excess Profits Bills into a single engine of wholesale confiscation and arrest. As early as the 17th of February a pleader, Rai Sahib Pearey Lal, delivered a rambling tirade likely to produce just such an impression. The thread of this discourse passed from the Rowlatt Bills to Indian Reforms and thence through trial by jury, assaults by Europeans, India's war services and the progress of education back to the Rowlatt Bills and a peroration on the taxation of excess profits. It is not unreasonable to suppose that his bewildered auditors fixed, if on anything, on the two factors which seemed to threaten their persons and their purse.

Meanwhile, the press had completed its record of the Congress and League speeches. The editors gladly seized the new topic. Moving on lines already examined, article followed on article denouncing the proposed legislation as typical of the prevailing repression of legitimate hopes and expectations. The *Vijaya*, the *Inqilab* and the *Congress*, the last in particular under the influence of the Allahabad *Independent*, served to create a general feeling of fear and anxiety. Various extracts are reproduced* and serve to show the lines of attack. Detailed criticism was generally avoided. When employed it was frequently mistaken as to facts, though this was probably unintentional. The effect, however, was still further to widen in the popular mind the scope of the Bills. But for the most part these Bills were used only as a peg on which to hang in great confusion every kind of grievance. It cannot be doubted that the writers gradually convinced themselves that the Rowlatt legislation outweighed in importance every other interest including the Reforms Scheme itself. Non-official members of Council were urged to sacrifice everything for the opposition of the Bills. When the Council met there were, of course, but very few auditors in the galleries. The opposition speeches were, however, rapidly communicated to the press and were widely discussed and applauded. Vague rumours of passive resistance had for some time been current, but had met with a poor reception outside the limited circle of the Home Rule League office. When these crystallised into Mr. Gandhi's *Satyagraha* vow Dr. Ansari and Swami Shradhdhanand were among the first to sign. The latter apparently decided in early March to devote himself to the propagation of this doctrine in Delhi. However, Hakim Ajmal Khan refused to join and by the 7th March there were only 15 signatories. On that date a well-attended meeting was held in the Piplal Park, the chief attraction being Mr. Gandhi himself. Passive resistance and the taking of the vow were strongly urged, and a resolution to that effect was carried unanimously. It may here be remarked that at this meeting, the starting point of the intensive campaign for passive resistance and to that

* Enclosure 8, page 148.

extent the source of the impending trouble, not one single speaker was a native of Delhi. Dr. Ansari and Hasrat Mohani come from the United Provinces. The Bombay Presidency contributed Mr. Gandhi. Swami Shradhdhanand and his son Indrajit hail from Jullundur, Hafiz Abdul Aziz from Karnal and M. Shankar Lal from Patiala State. The city of Delhi either had bred no man to voice its wrongs or was unaware of those wrongs until those gentlemen gathered from without to force them on its notice.

The effect of this meeting was marked. The number of signatories of the vow swelled within a week to 120, shopkeepers and business men forming the majority. Propaganda was continued with energy, more especially in the press, but no large meeting was called until the 24th March. This attracted some 2,000 persons and the tone of the speeches, though still restrained, was noticeably more heated than on the previous occasion. Swami Shradhdhanand in particular went somewhat out of his way to attack the police and especially the staff of the C. I. D. This topic was to become a favourite opening gambit for speakers in the ensuing days. The matter is worth emphasising in connection with another feature of the passive resistance campaign. All instructions issued from Mr. Gandhi and his circle alone. Local leaders were granted little or no discretion. The result was that when Mr. Gandhi postponed the date of *hartal* by a week and when the local *hartal* occurred on the original date, the passive resisters of Delhi were still unaware of what laws they were intended to resist. They were willing to comply with their instructions but no instructions had issued. The speakers experienced the same difficulty. To discuss the Rowlatt Act was hopeless. The ground of general grievances had been covered *ad nauseam*. The subject of police dishonesty and oppression was, therefore, very welcome. It needs, however, little discernment to observe the danger of lecturing on police brutality to an uneducated and rough audience who are enquiring what precisely it is which they should resist. It is almost courting trouble to tell such people, as Swami Shradhdhanand did at this meeting on the 24th March, that the police arranged dacoities which were attributed to demobilised soldiers in order to ensure the passing of the Rowlatt Act—an Act which might save the public from a few scoundrels but would hand it over to the mercies of the many scoundrels of the C. I. D. That the audience proceeded at the first suitable moment to assault these police and C. I. D. officers can occasion little surprise.

During the final week the agitation increased in vigour. Several newspapers appeared in black borders to indicate mourning. Meetings attended by some 5,000 men were held on the 27th and the 29th March. At these latter meetings the tone of the speeches was distinctly violent. Maulvi Ahmad Said inflamed himself to the point of fanaticism and upbraided Muhammadans who were not prepared to die for their holy places and their *Khilafat*. The oppression of Islam by Europeans was without parallel. To do good to Europeans was to do evil to their country. Swami Shradhdhanand urged the audience to disobey any orders issued by the soldiers, of whom government had summoned 4,000. On the 30th at a meeting held immediately after the collision with the police and the troops, the language used was pacific, though the Swami again grew more excited as he proceeded. On the 31st the funerals of five men shot on the previous day afforded an opportunity for further excited speech making. On the 1st and 2nd April the leaders endeavoured to restore order, but another funeral on the 3rd was marked by Maulvi Ahmad Said saying that a gardener watered a weak tree with the blood of a goat. Their tree would flourish exceedingly, but the blood of many more men than of those who had given their lives on the 30th March would be necessary. The next day the Swami was permitted to speak from the pulpit in the Jama Masjid and this unprecedented situation led him to urge the people to show no fear if half their number was slaughtered instead of 40 or 50. By this day a number

Continued.]

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Dr. M. A. Ansari's speech.)

of most violent and seditious posters had been found pasted on walls. Many were frankly murderous. Translations of some of the worst are recorded in an appendix.* The number known or believed to have been posted was nearly a hundred. From the 4th to the 14th April much the same conditions obtained. Swami Shradhanand, Maulvi Ahmad Said and M. Abdul Majid were the worse speakers. Their subjects were the martyrdom of the deceased, continuance of the *hatal* and the iniquities of the C. I. D. These resulted in the long anticipated assaults on police officers on the 14th and the 17th April.

Meanwhile, the attitude of the press was atrocious. The conduct of the police and of the troops was declared to be wantonly murderous; not the slightest provocation had been offered: every action taken by the authorities had been illegal: government servants lusted for blood. The *Vijaya*, edited by the son of Swami Shradhanand, was perhaps the most infamous. The *Congress*, however, ran it close. Even when quiet had been at length restored and the *hatal* had ceased, their efforts continued. Pre-censorship of their contents had to be enforced and with the application of the Seditious Meetings Act, the violent and sustained agitation by a very few individuals of the otherwise peaceful city of Delhi was brought to a conclusion.

ALL-INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE 11TH SESSIONS, DELHI,
30TH DECEMBER 1918.

Speech delivered by Dr. M. A. Ansari, Chairman, Reception Committee.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

Members of the All-India Muslim League, Ladies and Gentlemen,—

I have been entrusted with the duty of welcoming you, on behalf of the Muslim citizens of Delhi, to this ancient city, which was once the seat of Muslim power and glory and the home of Muslim civilization and culture; and which has, alas! also seen their gradual decline and decay. This assembly of Mussalmans, from all parts of India, awakens in one's imagination the memory of many a brilliant gathering which, in the palmy days of its Muslim Rulers, Delhi must have witnessed. It was this city from where such great saints as Khwaja Qutbuddin Bakhtiar Kaki, Sultan Nizam-uddin Aulia, Khwaja Baqi-Billah, Shah Kalimullah Jahanabadi and famous divines as Sheikh Abdul Haqq Muhaddis Dehlavi, Shah Fakhr-ud-din, Shah Abdul Aziz (may the blessings of God be upon them all) sent forth the light of Muslim religion, Muslim theology and Islamic philosophy, not only to the four corners of India but beyond its geographical limits, to Bokhara and Samarkand, to Persia and Baghdad and even to Mecca and Medina. It was Delhi that gave to India that beautiful language which is the offspring of all that is sweet in Arabic, Persian and Turkish on one side and Sanskrit and Prakrit on the other. From the mere *lingua* of the camp followers it rose to the eminence of being designated the Urdu-i-Maulla of the Red Palace and gradually it became the acknowledged literary, economic and political language of the country. It was Delhi again which blended the Indian with the highly polished Persian Art, and gave to the world that eminent poet, Sufi and genius, Amir Khusru, and the great philosopher-poet Asadullah Khan Ghalib. Delhi, under its Muslim name Shahjahanabad, with its Jama Masjid, the Diwan-i-Aam and the Diwan-i-Khas, shall always give to India the highest place in the world of architecture, as much as that lofty monument, the Qutub Minar, holds high the mighty power of the Faith to which it was consecrated as one of the towers of the Masjid-i-Quwwat-ul-Islam. Time has not yet effaced the landmarks of Islam in the history of this country nor has the dust of centuries buried the footprints of our

* Enclosure 9, page 147.

ancestors. Gentlemen, I welcome you to the cradle of Islamic civilization in India and to the city of Muslim memories.

Our departed friends.

Since we met last at Calcutta, we have lost some of our leading men and sincere and zealous workers. The death of Nawab Haji Muhammad Ishaq Khan at this most momentous period of the history of our country, has removed from amongst us not only a true patriot but also a great champion of the rights of progressive Muslim India. He had a courage which did not fail at the critical time and his support one could rely upon even during the most adverse circumstances. The late Justice Khan Bahadur Mian Muhammad Shah Din leaves a gap in our society which it will be difficult to fill. As a great lawyer and scholar he was held in high esteem in our community. Another and a still more painful loss has been that of Sheikh Wilayat Ali, Qidwai, of Barabanki, who was snatched away, in the prime of life, from a most fruitful literary career. As a humourist *Bamboozee* was unequalled. His numerous sketches in *The Contrade* and *The New Era* form classics that will always keep his memory fresh and green. Last of all, we mourn the death of that silent worker, great thinker and philosopher, Dr. Abdur Rahman, Bijnori, who, in his simplicity and modesty coupled with great learning, reminded one of the scholars and masters of early Islamic days. The Muslim University, whenever it comes into existence, will bear the impress of his mind for always. The Sultanias College, a child of his imagination, will not receive his fostering care and Muslim education in India will be the poorer in the loss of its best champion. He was devoted to the service of Urdu and at the time of his sad death, at the beginning of a promising career, he was engaged in writing a learned introduction to the *Divani-i-Ghalib*, shortly to be published by the *Anjuman-i-Taraqq-i-Urdu*. May Almighty Allah give their souls eternal rest and peace. Amen!

Muslim world situation: Temporal Power of Islam.

Gentlemen, we are meeting to-day at a very critical period in the history of the world. The Great War, in which the nations of the East and West were engaged, has come to an end and bloodshed and carnage have ceased. But, although the war is over, our anxieties have only begun. Momentous issues hang in the balance and the entire course of human history is to be determined, at least for a very long time to come, by the decisions of the Peace Conference. It is an anxious moment for every nation, but for the Mussalmans it is especially so. Never in their varied history of over 1,300 years have they been faced with a situation as it is to-day.

Gentlemen, the British Government, in its international engagements and relations, has always claimed, as a matter of right, the attention of the world because the King of England rules over the largest number of Muslim subjects. But it must be remembered that every right has a corresponding duty and responsibility, which a Government, howsoever strong, cannot afford to ignore. The time has now come when the Mussalman subjects of His Majesty demand that the Ministers of the Crown, who are in charge of the destinies of the British Empire, shall do their duty by the Mussalmans of India.

We all know how Islam has suffered in its temporal power since the latter half of the nineteenth century. Each succeeding generation has witnessed the gradual disruption of the House of Islam. Divers reasons have been brought forth and plausible explanations have not been wanting; lofty political doctrines have been invented to screen aggressive designs and humanitarian principles have been advanced to justify the acts of robbery done to Islamic Kingdoms. The *white man's burden* too has been paraded before an innocent and all-believing world. But bereft of all the verbiage of innocent-looking doctrines and high-sounding principles, this tragedy can be traced to the common dislike of the Muslim or the avarice and greed of the chancelleries of Europe.

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That belt of Muslim States which once extended from the shores of the Atlantic to the confines of the Chinese Empire has, bit by bit, shrunk to a mere shadow. In Europe, the Northern littoral of the Black Sea, Wallachia, Roumelia, Greece and Macedonia have been lost, one after the other, in quick succession. In Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Tripoli and Egypt are gone. Caucasus and the Khanates of Central Asia shared the same fate, and the integrity and independence of Persia, after the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, is a huge political joke. Even the bedouin of the African and Arabian deserts is being seduced to give up his nomadic life and take to the refinements of *cafes chantants*. Turkey, which has fought the battles of Islam for many centuries, is in imminent and grave danger of being parcelled out into small States to the great detriment of the Muslim world.

The Khalifat.

It is an acknowledged fact of history that in 918 A. H. (1518 A. C.) the last Khalifa of the house of Abbas, Muhammad Abbasi of Egypt, transferred, with the consent and concurrence of the Mussalman people, the office and dignity of the Khalifat and the spiritual sovereignty of Islam along with the symbols of this exalted office, the sword, the standard and the cloak of the Prophet, to the Osmanli Sultan Salim, the Great. The Sultan, accompanied by Muhammad Abbasi, took these holy relics to Istanbul. It is from this day that the Sultans of the house of Osman have received the honoured appellations of *Khalifat-ul-Mussalmin*, *Sultan-ul-Islam* and *Khadim-ul-Haramain-ish-Sharifain* and the Mussalmans of the world have recognised them as their spiritual *Imams* and the successors of the Messenger of God. Not only in the *harams* of Mecca and Medina but throughout the wide expanse where the religion of Islam is practised, prayers for their success and glory are offered every Friday and on the occasions of the two *Ids*.

Sharif Barakat of Mecca, on getting a *firman* from Sultan Salim, acknowledged him as Khalifa and ordered the name of the Turkish Sultan to be introduced in the prayers. No Sharif has, since then, questioned the authority of the rulers of Turkey and even Sharif Husain recognised the Sultan as the lawful Khalifa and submitted to his spiritual overlordship.

During the course of the present war, actuated by personal ambitions and selfish interests, Sharif Husain raised the standard of revolt against the unquestioned Khalifa of Islam, whom he himself had recognised as such. By this action of his he not only disregarded a rule of political morality, but, according to Muslim belief and religious teaching, broke an explicit and clear commandment of God and His Prophet. It has been distinctly ordered in the Holy *Quran* that:—

فان بغت احدهما على الاخرى فقاتلوا التي تبغي حتى تفي الى امر الله

"If one party become disloyal to the other (which is in power), fight against the one that has become disloyal until it return to the bidding of God." [Ch. 26; S. 49; V. 9]

and the Prophet has said that:—

سيكون هناك هزات فمن اراد ان يفرق امر هذه الامة ورض جميع فامروهم بالذيف كانا من كان

"Various dissensions shall take place after me. If any one attempts to divide the unity of my people, kill him with the sword, whosoever he be."

[SAHIH MUSLIM.]

The scholars and divines of Islam in commenting upon this *hadis* have said that:—

ادفع من خرج على الامام بالسيف و ان كان انكس و اعلمه و زبر ان الله احق اولي

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"Behead the person who revolts against the Imam even if he be superior and more exalted (than the Imam himself) and even if you also consider him to be in the right and more exalted."

The Prophet has further said that:—

اذابوع الخلفين فقاتلوا الاخر منهما

"If allegiance is demanded for two Khalifas, kill the latter among them."

[SAHIH MUSLIM.]

These are the definite and conclusive injunctions which leave no room for doubt, and, therefore, on religious grounds, the revolt of the Sharf transgresses the law of Islam and consequently is totally *HARAM* (forbidden and sinful).

The Holy Places.

The most important duty of the Khalifa is to keep the Holy Places under Muslim protection. This protection means nothing less than the complete and unquestioned sovereignty of the Sultan over them and their immunity from interference on the part of non-Muslims. It must not be lost sight of that every age has its special needs and requirements and with the change of times these needs and requirements also change. No sovereign to-day can discharge this great religious duty, satisfactorily and faithfully, unless the essentials of modern civilization are within his reach. He should, in the first place, command the sympathies and support of the people whose holy places he guards and protects. The economic and natural resources at his disposal should be adequate and effective to enable him to defend these places. His councillors and ministers should be well-versed in modern arts and sciences and they should possess sound experience of modern diplomacy and statecraft. He should be well-equipped with all the latest weapons of war. For the last four hundred years, in the opinion of the Mussalmans, no Muslim sovereign has satisfied the above conditions better than the Sultans of the Turkish Empire. It is the firm conviction and deliberate judgment of the Muslim world that, from the time of Sultan Salim down to the present day, the house of Osman has discharged its duties in respect of the holy places, to its entire satisfaction. Therefore, His Imperial Majesty Sultan Wahid-ud-din Muhammad VI is the one and the only Mussalman who is and can be the rightful Commander of the Faithful and the Khalifat-ur-Rasul, capable of protecting the two *harams* along with the other Holy Places of Islam and of successfully combating against the intrigues and secret machinations of non-Muslim Governments.

That the opinion of the Mussalmans alone is the determining factor in this matter was officially acknowledged by Lord Robert Cecil, on behalf of His Majesty's Government on November the 29th, 1917.

"Mr. King asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, since the outbreak of War, Russia had any communications with this country relative to the proposals that the Sultan of Turkey should no longer be recognised as Khalifa; if so, what attitude was then assumed on behalf of this country; and whether he will now declare that the Khalifate is a question for Islam alone to decide?"

LORD R. CECIL: The answer to the first part of the Hon. Member's question is in the affirmative, but His Majesty's Government have never departed from the attitude that the question of the Khalifate is one for Muslim opinion alone to decide."

[Parliamentary Debates: Commons; Vol. XCIX, page 2192.]

We demand that this decision of the Government be put into practice and be not relegated to the domain of pious hopes and broken promises.

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Jazirat-ul-Arab.

What are the Holy Places of Islam? The greatest authority that a Musalman can quote in proof of his contention, next to the *Qur'an*, is that of the *ahadees*. It is reported that the Prophet once said:—

أخرجوا المشركين من جزيرة العرب

"Remove the non-Muslims from the *Jazirat-ul-Arab*."

[SAHIH BOKHARI AND SAHIH MUSLIM.]

The same tradition is reported by Hazrat Ibn-i-Abbas in the following words:—

إن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم أرحمني ثلاثة أخرجوا

المشركين من جزيرة العرب

"The Prophet, may the blessings and peace of God be upon him, had left three things as legacy, one out of which was 'remove the non-Muslims from the *Jazirat-ul-Arab*.'"

[SAHIH BOKHARI AND SAHIH MUSLIM.]

The question naturally arises as to what is meant by *Jazirat-ul-Arab*? No explanations could carry greater weight than those given by Arabian scholars and Arabic lexicons.

جزيرة العرب ما احاطه به بحر الهند و بحر الشام ثم

دجلة والفرات

"That which is surrounded by the Indian Ocean and the Sea of Sham (Syria) and also by the Tigris and Euphrates."

[QAMUS.]

Then again it is said that:—

جزيرة العرب ما بين عدن ابين الى اطوار الشام في

اطول واما في العرض فمن جدة وما والايمان شاطئ

البحر الى ديف العراق

"*Jazirat-ul-Arab* extends from Aden to the mountains of Sham in length; and in breadth from Jeddah and the Sea Coast to the agricultural lowlands of Iraq (Mesopotamia)."

[LISAN-UL-ARAB.]

Further, the reason for its being called the "Island of Arabia" has been explained thus:—

كل هذه المواضع انما سببت جزيرة لان بحر فارس و بحر

الحبش و دجلة و الفرات قد احاطوا بها

"All these lands are called *Jazirat-ul-Arab* because they are surrounded by the Sea of Fars (Persian Gulf) and the Sea of Abyssinia and the Tigris and the Euphrates"

[LISAN-UL-ARAB.]

The injunction, that non-Muslims should not rule over the smallest portion of the *Jazirat-ul-Arab*, was given because in this portion of the world are situated the cities consecrated by the religion, history and traditions of the Musalmans. In it are buried all the prophets, imams and divines of Islam and from the midst of its desert started that world-force which has not yet exhausted itself and which according to the faith of the Musalmans, will endure till the Day of Judgment.

Mecca.

In the *Jazirat-ul-Arab* is situated the Holy City of Mecca which contains the *Baitullah*, the first house of God, built by Abraham and reconstructed by the last of the prophets, towards which the Musalmans of all climes and countries turn their faces five times a day. It is the birthplace of the Prophet and it was to Mecca that he addressed the words:—

"O land of Mecca, I love thee better than any other portion of God's earth and if my people had not driven me out I would never have forsaken thee."

Surrounded by Mina, Arafat and numerous other places, a visit to which is an essential part of the Haj every inch of Mecca and the land around it is sacred territory, where, never since the days of Abraham, has a bird been shot or a tree felled. For, has not Allah himself said:—

أولم يروا أنا جعلناه حرمًا آمنا

"Do they not behold that We have made Mecca a sanctuary." [Ch. 21; S. 29; V. 67.]

Medina.

Yasrib, where the Prophet found safety and a home after his migration from the city of his birth, became renowned as the *Madinat-un-Nabi* or "the city of the Prophet." God named it *Taiba* or *Taba* (holy) as the Prophet once said:—

إن الله سمي المدينة طيبة

"God has named it the holy city." [SAHIH MUSLIM.]

Medina was raised to the high dignity of a *haram* (sanctuary) by the Prophet who said:—

إن إبراهيم حرم بكة فجعلنا حراما و اني حرم

المدينة الخ

"Abraham made Mecca a *haram* and I declare Medina to be one....." [SAHIH MUSLIM.]

"It is of this city that the Prophet declared:—

من زاري متعمداً كان في جواردي يوم القيمة و من سكى

المدينة و صبر على بلانها كنت له شهيدا و شقيعا يوم القيمة

و من مات في حب الحرمين لبنة الله من الامنين

يوم القيمة

"He who comes with the intention of seeing me will be near me on the Day of Judgment; I shall be his witness and intercede on his behalf on the Day of Judgment who adopts Medina as his home and bears its hardships with patience while he who dies within the holy precincts of Mecca or Medina will be immune from punishment on the Day of Judgment." [MISHKAT: BATHAQI.]

A major portion of the Divine Book was revealed in Medina and from there were issued the orders and instructions which gave final shape and form to the constitution and organization of the Islamic Theocracy. Medina again was the centre from which radiated the resplendent rays of the Light of Islam and it was here that the mortal remains of the Prophet were entrusted to the earth.

Mecca with its *Baitullah* and Medina with its *Rauza-i-athar* are together called the *Haramain-ish-Sharifain* and in the words of the Holy *Qur'an*:—

إنما المشركون نجس فلا تقربوا المسجد الحرام بعد

عامهم هذا

"Those who join others with God are unclean, so let them not come near the Sacred Mosque after this their year." [Ch. 10; S. 9; V. 28] non-Muslims are forbidden to enter them.

Jerusalem and Palestine.

Bait-ul-Muqaddis, "city of the Holy House," is also held sacred by the Musalmans. This was the city towards which, not only all the prophets of *Beni Israel* turned their faces in prayers, but it was also the *qibla* of the Prophet of Islam and his followers for full 14 years. After the *Kaaba*, the *Masjid-il-Aqsa* of Jerusalem

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Baghdad.

is the first house of God in Islam. It has been referred to in the *Qur'an* in connection with the *Mi'raj* where it is said:—

سبحن الذي أخرجني مني ليلامس المسجد الحرام الى المسجد الأقصى الذي باركنا حوله

"Glory be to Him Who took His servant a journey by night from *Masjid-il-Haram* to *Masjid-il-Aqsa* whose precincts we have blessed." [Ch. 15; S. 17; V. 1.]

Allah ordered Moses to remove his shoes in its vicinity in the words:—

إنك بالواد المقدس طوي

"Thou art in the holy valley Tuwa."

[Ch. 16; S. 20; V. 12.]

Just as President Wilson would refuse to hand over the government of the United States to the head of some forgotten Red Indian tribe or just as the whites in the European colonies would decline to withdraw in favour of the native aboriginals or even just as we ourselves would oppose a revival of the Bhil and Gond Empire in India, Palestine cannot be handed over to the Zionists, whose sole claim to that land is, that centuries before the birth of Christ, the ancestors of the wandering sons of Israel had once lived in it. The achievements of Salah-ud-din Ayyubi and the blood of millions of *mujahids* did not flow, in the days of the Crusades, to lose it to a people who cannot put forward any recognisable claim to it. The Muslim rulers of Palestine have, as acknowledged by Christians and Jews themselves, always kept the door open to all. It has given no amount of pain and much resentment has been created, among the Musalmans of India, to see that the attitude of their own Government, in connection with this matter, has been diametrically opposed to their wishes and sentiments.

"Mr. King asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (on the 19th November 1917) whether the desire of the Government to see established a Jewish Zionist nationality in Palestine has been communicated to the Allied Powers, especially to France, Russia, Italy and the other Allied States; and whether it is one of the Allied war aims, or only a British war aim, to set up a Zionist community in the Holy Land?"

Mr. Balfour: No official communication has been made to the Allies on the subject, but His Majesty's Government believe that the declaration referred to would meet with their approval. His Majesty's Government hope that the establishment in Palestine of a national home of the Jewish people will result from the present war."

[Parliamentary Debates: Commons; Vol. XCIX, page 838.]

This decision on the part of the Cabinet was served out to us here, in India, by Reuter and the Official Censor with the following addition:—

"(His Majesty's Government) will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being understood that nothing will be done to prejudice the civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish communities, in Palestine or the rights and political status of the Jews in any other country."

Nedjeff and Karbala.

Nujaf-i-Ashraf contains the sacred remains of Ali, the Lion of Allah and Khalifa of Islam. He is regarded as the fountain-head of the different schools of spiritualism by the *Sufis*.

In *Karbala-i-Mualla* is buried the greater martyr of Islam, Husain-ibn-i-Ali, who gave his life to uphold right against wrong.

Baghdad with its mausoleum of Shaikh Abdul Qadir Jilani is the centre of the *Qadiriya* school of *Sufis* which claims millions of votaries among the Musalmans all the world over. The names of Maruf-i-Karkhi, Ibn-i-Jauzi, Imam Ghazzali and that greatest of Muslim jurists Imam Abu Hanifa endear the city of Baghdad to the heart of every Muslim.

His Majesty's Declaration.

The Government of India published on behalf of His Majesty's Government on behalf of the Governments of France and Russia, a declaration on the 2nd November 1914 which says:—

"In view of the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Turkey, which to the regret of Great Britain has been brought about by the ill-advised, unprovoked and deliberate action of the Ottoman Government, His Excellency the Viceroy is authorised by His Majesty's Government to make the following public announcement in regard to the Holy Places of Arabia including the Holy Shrines of Mesopotamia and the port of Jeddah, in order that there may be no misunderstanding on the part of His Majesty's most loyal Muslim subjects as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government in this war in which no question of a religious character is involved. These Holy Places and Jeddah will be immune from attack or molestation by the British Naval and Military Forces so long as there is no interference with pilgrims from India to the Holy Places and Shrines in question. At the request of His Majesty's Government, the Governments of France and Russia have given them similar assurances."

I leave it to you, Gentlemen, to judge how far even this most carefully worded proclamation, has been carried into effect.

Muslim States.

Essential though they are to the Musalmans, these are not the only questions they desire to see settled to their satisfaction. There is another question of vital importance to the peaceful evolution of the human race which awaits our immediate and careful attention. This war, Gentlemen, has demonstrated, if any demonstration were needed, the instability of the present order of the world. It was the logical outcome of the policy of selfish aggrandisement and exclusive national ambitions pursued by the nations of the West who placed their national interests above the liberty and freedom of other nations. This general holocaust of the best and the choicest of the human race would have taken place for nothing if we did not realize this fact and reconstruct the world on principles which would for ever preclude any chance of the domination of one portion of humanity by another and would give equal and fair chance to all nations to contribute to the efforts of MAN to realize himself. I have already reviewed the painful history of the fate of Muslim peoples before you. As men and as Musalmans we cannot be indifferent to the fate of 400 millions of our co-religionists in the world. We are deeply interested in their future and demand that not only the integrity and independence of the present Muslim States be maintained intact but the wrong done to the Arabs of North Africa and the Tartars and Turks of Central Asia be redressed and all these peoples be given a free chance of determining their own form of government. In this connection, Gentlemen, I feel it my bounden duty to offer, on your behalf and mine, our grateful thanks to that acknowledged intrepid leader of India, Mr. M. K. Gandhi, who is never afraid to speak out the truth and who has, by his noble actions, endeared himself as much to the Musalmans as to the Hindus. In his famous letter of the 29th April 1918, addressed to His Excellency the Viceroy, he has laid down the correct definition of Indian Nationalism and explained the attitude that should be adopted by Indian politicians towards Muslim sentiments.

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Musalmans in India.

Looking back to the last four years of war through which we have passed, one can only characterise this period, so far as the relations of the officials and the Musalmans are concerned, as one varying from bias against them to that of antipathy, suspicion, mistrust and even dislike. The apparent cause of this attitude seems to be the entry of Turkey in this war against England and her Allies. In this choice of the Turks the Musalmans of India had no hand. Indeed, it can be authoritatively stated to the contrary that what little influence they possessed in this matter was used to dissuade the Turks from pursuing the course which they did. Neither did the Musalmans fail in their duty to urge their own Government to adopt a policy of reconciliation and not coerce the Turks to join its enemies. Our sympathies for the Turks are well-known and patent. The Musalmans, however, exercised admirable self-control over their feelings and, in spite of innumerable provocations, proved successful under the severest tests. As if the anxieties and agonies of the war were not sufficient, nearer home in India, we were being subjected to a treatment which no self-respecting people would have tolerated. Had it not been that our rulers were engaged in a struggle of life and death the Musalmans would have taken such constitutional measures as would have compelled attention.

Muslim Internment.

Eminent Muslim divines and acknowledged political leaders have been deprived of their freedom and liberty on the flimsiest pretexts. Those of us who have been fortunate enough to receive the attentions of the all-powerful C. I. D. know full well how its secret machinery works. No wonder if the authors of the Arabian Nights, *Tilism-i-Hoshnuba*, and *Qissa-i-Hatim-Tai* jump out of their graves to pay homage to the great masters of the C. I. D. for their creative imaginations and inventive faculties. To give to their fabrications the sorely needed touches of reality and truth it has now become common practice to appoint official commissions and committees of inquiry which invariably put their seal of approbation and finality on them. While the Musalmans are keenly feeling the absence of men like Maulana Mahmud Hasan, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Mr. Shaukat Ali and his brilliant brother Mr. Muhammad Ali, and host of others, a greater tragedy has been and is being enacted in the marshy and malarial lowlands of Bengal, where the youth and intellect of that unhappy province has been imprisoned and put in shackles.

Muslim Press.

Gentlemen, you are all aware of the methods adopted by the bureaucracy to strangle the Muslim Press and to destroy the organs of Muslim public opinion one by one, so much so, that in the whole of India not a single free Muslim newspaper exists to-day. Our voice has been silenced and we have been prevented from carrying our views to the public, the Government and the British Democracy. Where the omnivorous Press Act could not catch its prey, the Defence of India Act was brought to assist it in devouring, one after another, the *Zamindar*, the *Muslim Gazette*, the *Comrade*, the *Hamdard*, the *Tauhid*, the *Tarjuman*, the *Sadqat*, *Al-Hilal*, *Al-Balagh*, the *New Era*, *Jamhur* and many others.

Muslim Meetings.

The lack of sympathy for Muslim views and grievances has been further evidenced by the repressive policy adopted in the stopping of the meeting at Calcutta in September last. The objects of this meeting were not only perfectly lawful but involved a question vitally connected with the religious sentiments of the Musalmans, who were justified in their wish to give expression to their natural resentment at the insulting and vile references made to the Holy Prophet's tomb. The action of the Bengal Government in this matter was

highly unjust, partial and one-sided and the responsibility for the loss of life and property rests entirely on its shoulders.

Gentlemen, you will thus observe that the two avenues of ventilating their grievances, a free press and the right of association, have been closed to them.

Separate Muslim Representation.

As a further evidence of the changed "angle of vision" on the part of the Government to the detriment of the rights of our community, I would refer you to the adverse and unfavourable remarks made by Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford on the question of separate electorates and communal representation, which is the life and soul of all our political activities of the present day. In view of the solemn pledges given to us by the Government and in view of the understanding arrived at between our Hindu brethren and ourselves and in our own interests, we cannot "release" the Government of its pledges and promises. The absence of any representative of the Musalmans of India from the deliberations of the Imperial Conference has added to this feeling of neglect, which has been further intensified by their non-representation at the War Cabinet and still more at the Peace Conference, where questions affecting the very existence of the Musalmans are to form subjects of discussion. No non-Muslim, however sympathetic or friendly he may be, can claim to speak on Muslim questions with authority nor can he put the Muslim case in so forcible and convincing a manner as would be expected from a Musalman.

Religious Liberty.

Finally, there is a growing feeling among the Musalmans that attempts have been made to interfere with the religious liberty guaranteed to them under the Proclamation of 1858, which is the fundamental basis of their allegiance to the Crown. The indirect influence brought to bear upon the managers of mosques to remove the name of the *Khalifat-ur-Rasul* from the Friday prayers and the peregrinations of certain persons in search of signatures on the *fatwa* purporting to declare the rebel Sharif of Mecca as the future Khalifa of the Musalmans, are matters which cannot be ignored. The continuance of the cruel and unjust incarceration of Mr. Shaukat Ali and his brother Mr. Muhammad Ali, because they prefixed a few important sentences, regarding their allegiance to God and their adherence to the faith of Islam, to the undertaking sent them by the Director of the Criminal Intelligence Department, gives an added credence to this feeling. It is our duty, as law-abiding citizens, to beg the Government not to allow this feeling to take root in the minds of the people.

Hindu-Muslim Unity.

So far, Gentlemen, I have discussed topics which affected the Musalmans alone. But that does not mean that I am not keenly interested in the problems of our motherland. I have heard it said that the extra-territorial patriotism of the Indian Musalman is opposed to Indian Nationalism and that he would be prepared "to sacrifice the whole of India for an inch of land in Gallipoli." This is a travesty of truth not sanctioned by facts. The Musalmans have fought the battles of India shoulder to shoulder with their Hindu brethren, their political programme has come in line with that of the Hindus, the Hindu-Muslim *rapprochement* entered into at Lucknow has, year after year, gained strength and vitality and I believe that as time goes on we shall understand each other better and any causes of friction that remain, shall cease to exist. It is my firm conviction that a true Musalman is always a good Nationalist. If we sympathise with the Musalmans of Turkey and Persia, we have also proved that we are second to none in our sincere advocacy of the rights of our countrymen in foreign lands and it was left to an Indian Musalman—Ahmad Muhammad Kachalia—to

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fight the battles of India in South Africa and fill the place vacated by that dauntless champion of our rights, Mr. Gandhi. But while anxious to fight for the common rights of the two communities, the Musalman is determined to maintain his position in this country and will jealously guard all his legitimate rights. It has pained me beyond expression to read the harrowing details of the barbarous treatment meted out by the Hindus of Katarpur to the unoffending and innocent Musalmans of that place. It is impossible to put into words the feelings of indignation and anger that are present in the hearts of every one of us here. Incidents like these embitter the relations between the two communities and strike at the very root of the *entente cordiale*. I appeal to my Hindu brethren to take effective measures to prevent any recurrence of such deplorable incidents. If it is necessary for the Musalmans to co-operate with the Hindus to realize their political ideals, the Hindus too cannot fulfil their national destiny by excluding the Musalmans. Accommodation, not retaliation, should be the motto of both of us.

Self-Determination.

It would be impossible to conclude my remarks without clearly putting before you the situation which this world war has created. Out of the welter and blood of the Armageddon have emerged certain definite principles on which will be based the foundations of a new and better world.

These principles were enunciated by the President of the American Republic and accepted by the statesmen of the leading nations of the world. They have been repeated, explained and amplified, time after time, until no doubt has been left in the minds of men that their application will be universal and not confined to the geographical limits of a country or continent, nor will they be circumscribed by the prejudices of race, colour or creed. To my mind there is but one single doctrine in which is focussed the entire thought of the whole human race. This doctrine, Gentlemen, is the doctrine of self-determination. If every nation, small or large, weak or strong, free or under subjugation, is given the chance to realize itself and to determine its own destiny, without any outside intervention, it will develop its own form of government, its own national culture and its own peculiar civilization. It is only on such lines that free nationalities could expand and develop and it is only under such conditions that the world could be made fit to live in. The phrase "subject nationality" would then be obsolete and there would be no such thing as national greed or aggression. The world would then consist of a sisterhood of free and trusting States, each helping the other for the common good of mankind.

It was to facilitate the establishment of this happy order that India contributed so lavishly in men and money, and in the final reconstruction of the world she cannot be left out. The blood of her sons has not flowed on the continents of Europe, Asia and Africa to win freedom and liberty for other nations and perpetuate her own bondage. The tradition and history of the Hindus and Musalmans support her claims to recognition. The Hindus possessed a civilization which preceded even those of Greece and Rome and long before the modern Western world had emerged out of its darkness she possessed democratic institutions in her village *panchayats*. Her guilds of artisans and traders and the constitutional limits placed on the powers exercised by her rulers, as we find them described in her ancient books, leave no doubt in our mind that she had attained, at that early period of the world's history, a standard of liberty which would entitle her to be recognized as a leader of democracy in our own day.

Democracy is the very essence and life-breath of Islam. The world cannot show a spectacle of such absolute equality and fraternity as the assemblage in the plains of Arafat, during the Haj, of millions of Musalmans dressed in white unsewn garb with shaved

heads and bare feet obliterating all distinction between the rich and the poor, the king and the subject, the master and the slave. Can the world preach equality in a clearer and more effective manner than when Allah made His Messenger declare:—

قل إنما أنا بشر مثلكم

"Say, I too am a human being like unto you." [Ch. 16; S. 18; V. 110.]

Apart from this perfect equality in matters of religion the same spirit permeates all the social and political institutions of Islam. Students of history are fully aware how, in the reign of that greatest of Muslim *Khalifas* Umar-ibn-ul-Khattab, the poorest of Musalmans criticised, most freely and fearlessly, the actions of the Khalifa. How on one occasion when Umar asked his hearers at a congregation as to what they would do if he did not rule them according to the law of the *Sheriat*, a wild bedouin, imbued with the true spirit of Islam, unsheathing his sabre retorted, that he would bring the *Khalifa* to the right path at the point of the sword. This is not an isolated instance. Muslim history abounds in them. The vicissitudes of time might have somewhat suppressed the latent instincts inherent in the two great peoples inhabiting India, but given full opportunities of development, they are bound to regain their former splendour and greatness.

If Ireland, in spite of her hostile attitude even during the war, can bring forward her interesting doctrine of "suppressed sovereignty" and compel English ministers to grant her Home Rule, if England and her Allies can champion the cause of Poland, the Czech-Slavs and the patched up and degenerate nationalities of the Balkans, if it is proposed to breathe new political life into the dead remains of the Armenian kingdom and if the scattered sons of Israel are to be once more gathered into the folds of Judah, equity and justice, political honesty and loyalty to the principles, accepted and preached by the statesmen of Europe and America, demand that India shall not be deprived of her innate right to determine her future and control her destinies.

If the claims of India are not satisfied, from the point of view of the Indians, the Great War shall have been fought in vain.

8

Abstracts from the Indian newspapers published in the Delhi Province.

The Rowlatt Bills.—The *Vijaya* of the 2nd February 1919 has an article entitled "A pistol levelled at our breast." The editor complains of the indolence of Indians and urges them to realise the nature of the measures which are being enacted to take their very lives from them. Indians, he says, are allowed neither to speak, nor to write, nor to hold private meetings. The Rowlatt Commission, he says, will always be a blot on the English administration of India. The unrest in India is merely a reflection of the defects of the Government. He criticises the two bills on the usual lines and describes them as unreasonable and obnoxious. India, he says, is like a patient in bed who is too ill to get up and take his medicine and merely cries instead.

The *Vijaya* in its issues of the 4th and 5th February 1919 contains further instalments of the article entitled "A pistol levelled at our breast" which appeared in the same paper of the 2nd February 1919. The editor remarks that in every city there is some house or other known as "the house of ghosts." Every one avoids a house which has gained such notoriety. Similarly India is becoming a house of ghosts, which follow men wherever they go. Those who dabble in politics have ghosts always around them in the form of the Sedition Act, the Press Act, the Defence of India Act and the "Our will is law" Act. When the big ghost of the police comes to assist these ghosts the poor Indian trembles indeed. Now the kind Government is creating another big ghost in the form of the Emergency Act. The

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editor repeats the usual arguments against this Act, which he says is "Nadirshahi" in its literal sense. Such measures, he says, are the real source of distrust of Government. Indians realise that Government has no confidence in them and tries to keep them blind, and therefore they cannot trust Government.

Formerly, though deprived of their freedom, wealth and honour, Indians felt that they were being governed in justice. Now even that consolation has been taken from them. Formerly it was believed that even if the demons of the Criminal Investigation Department submitted a false report the matter will be cleared up in the courts. This is no longer the case since two of the Punjab leaders were expelled without any charge. Since then this belief has been receiving shock after shock.

Justice, he continues, is disappearing from India and when there is no justice left the roots of the British administration will be severed. A point of the bill, which has not been openly stated as yet, is that it will authorise the police to use any and every means to extract information. He asks what these means can be but the torture of unfortunate persons by beating them, hanging them up face downwards and flogging them, etc. Government, by passing such bills, is trying to acquire powers which were considered objectionable in the hands of the Tsar of Russia and the Sultan of Turkey. No Government can pretend to be civilised which legalises such powers.

In conclusion he deplores the apathy which prevails in India and urges Indians to start an unprecedented agitation.

The *Vijaya* of the 16th February 1919 contains an article on the Rowlatt Bills. The editor points out that Government cannot be unaware of the storm of indignation which these bills have aroused throughout India. He therefore suggests that if Government, in spite of the unanimous opposition of Indians, is obstinate enough to pass the bills, the day on which they are passed should be celebrated everywhere as a day of mourning. On that day, he says, newspapers should have a black border and every one should wear a badge of mourning, while a general *hartal* should be proclaimed and meetings held on the 11th day after the passing of the bills. The *hartal* should continue until the bills are repealed.

The *Vijaya* of the 4th March 1919 remarks that since widespread agitation has failed to break down the stubborn attitude of Government in the matter of the Rowlatt Bills, nothing remains, but to resort to passive resistance. The editor in a strongly worded article urges Indians to follow the heroic Mr. Gandhi and to suffer now rather than endure the noose of the black bills.

The same paper of the 7th March 1919 contains a similar exhortation.

The passive resistance.—The *Vijaya* of the 16th March 1919 is edged with black as a sign of mourning on account of the passing of the Rowlatt Bills.

The same paper of the 19th March 1919 expresses appreciation of the progress of the passive resistance movement, and urges the people of Delhi to subscribe to the *Satyagraha Sabha* whether they have taken the vow or not.

The same paper of the 21st March 1919 predicts a terrific political upheaval in India, due to the refusal of Government to pay any attention to the demands of the peoples' representatives. Such an upheaval can only be checked by passive resistance. Any attempt to discourage passive resistance will result in disaster.

The *Vijaya* of the 28th March 1919 urges the Delhi public to attend a large passive resistance meeting at which light will be thrown on the broken promises of the British Government and Mr. Gandhi's message will be delivered.

The same paper of the 4th April 1919 extols the work of the *Satyagraha*, who alone were responsible for getting the shops opened.

The same paper of the 6th April 1918 contains a forcible criticism on a manifesto issued by the District Magistrate,

which is described as highly insulting to the passive resisters.

The same paper of the 14th April 1919 gives publicity to a letter asking whether Government servants are Indians since they have not joined the *hartal*. The same question is asked of khansamahs, bearers and other domestic servants. The editor says that it is difficult to answer these questions and those to whom they are addressed should give a reply.

The arrest of Mr. Gandhi.—The *Vijaya* of the 11th April 1919 announces the arrest of Mr. Gandhi and urges the people to observe *hartal* and to attend indignation meetings.

The same paper of the 12th April 1919 writing on the same subject brackets Sir Michael O'Dwyer and Colonel Beadon as the two lions of the Government under whose orders Gandhi was arrested. The editor praises the bravery of these two officials and congratulates them on causing the awakening of the country. Their names will live for ever in the history of tyrannised India.

The same paper has an article entitled "Declaration of War" in which the editor says that the whole of India is at present a jail, where no one is allowed to speak freely, to write freely, or to keep anything written or printed in his house. People may not congregate and talk freely. India is already a jail and the Rowlatt Acts will transfer it into a black hole. He urges admirers of Mr. Gandhi to follow him into jail since it is shameful that their leader should be left there alone. They should break various laws and suffer imprisonment.

The Criminal Investigation Department.—The *Vijaya* of the 9th April 1919 contains violent attacks on the Criminal Investigation Department. The editor accuses members of this department of provoking the riot on the 30th March 1919 by stirring up the peaceful crowd, and reciting seditious poems. They later intimidated the shop-keepers from opening their shops and spread lies among the people in order to maintain the unrest. They were the men who put up seditious posters on the Clock Tower.

The same paper of the 14th March 1919 contains similar attacks, placing all responsibility for the riots on the Criminal Investigation Department.

The Delhi riots.—The *Vijaya* of the 1st April 1919 has an article entitled "the bloody scene of Delhi." The editor expatiates on the peacefulness and widespread character of the passive resistance movement on the 30th March 1919, and says that the *hartal* was observed even in small side streets where the influence of the political agitators could not possibly have had effect. The article proceeds with the following head lines:—A grand strike in Delhi—Scenes of hope and fortune—Horrible Murder—The machine gun and the subjects—8 men killed and 40 wounded. The editor describes the auspicious opening of the 30th March, which will leave an imperishable memory. All was peaceful till about noon, when anxious news of a disturbance in Lal Kuan arrived. The Superintendent of Police was stopped in his motor car, police arrived and beat the people and two men were arrested.

Under the heading "Murder" the editor described how two men were arrested at the Railway Station for asking the shop-keepers to close their shops. A crowd gathered and demanded their release, when armed police and soldiers arrived with a machine gun. The crowd was unarmed and could easily have been pacified, but the soldiers had been idle for long and wished to prove their loyalty. At once the machine gun began to fire and the troops to use their bayonets. The English soldiers fought far more zealously than they had fought against the Germans. Within a moment 26 peaceful unarmed Indians were wounded. Two men died at once and the rest were dragged like dead dogs to the Railway Station.

A similar description of the second riot follows. The editor comments caustically on the heartless cruelty and diabolical tyranny of the "Nadirshahi" Government. The same paper of the 2nd April 1919 contains another article on the same subject. The editor accuses

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the authorities of spiriting away many of the corpses in order to show that the loss of life was small. He gives a heart-rending account of the burial of one of the victims.

The same paper contains an article from the *Hindustani* contrasting the savagery exhibited on this occasion with the scene when His Excellency the Viceroy was bombed. To this day the gallant police have been unable to find the thrower of that bomb, though they have hanged and jailed many innocent men in his name. The writer falsely accuses the City Inspector of firing the first shot and urging the English soldiers to use their machine gun.

The same paper contains letters from various eye-witnesses giving similarly objectionable and inaccurate accounts.

The same paper of the 3rd April 1919 remarks that most of the people shot down by the machine gun were children under 12 years of age. It also gives currency to a rumour that a woman was amongst the victims.

The same paper of the 4th April 1919 says that it is rumoured that the police will be severely punished for not treating the crowd with greater severity. It contains several notes attacking the City Inspector and asks for information regarding certain persons who are alleged to be missing since the riot. The editor admits that the machine gun was probably not used. He alleges that in the second riot only one stone was thrown by a small boy. He describes the official communiqué as a mass of falsehood, and says that the people are now no longer blinded by such tricks.

The same paper of the 14th April 1919 protests violently against the District Magistrate's proposal to hold a public enquiry into the Delhi riots. The editor is shocked at the idea that one who has committed the murder, whose clothes are stained with the blood of the martyrs, should be allowed to hold an enquiry into the cause of their deaths. The enquiry is to be held in the Town Hall near which the blood of innocent children was shed, and into which their corpses were dragged like the carcasses of dogs. The floor of this building is still stained with the blood of martyrs. Those under whose orders guns were fired and bayonets used will act as judges of the outrage. The editor expresses the utmost indignation at this breach of the principles of civilisation and humanity.

A brutal punishment.—The *Vijaya* of the 22nd April 1919 publishes a long and highly inaccurate statement by Saraswati Dev, a Sadhu boy who was sentenced to 15 stripes in connection with the recent disturbances. The editor protests strongly against this brutal punishment and asks if no law exists in Delhi now.

The appointment of special constables.—The *Vijaya* of the 22nd April 1919 protests against the enrolment of special constables, by which respectable citizens have been subjected to insult. The editor enquires why no European merchants have been enrolled.

The Rowlatt Bills and the disturbances.—The *Vijaya* of the 20th April 1919 considers that the cause of all the disturbances which have taken place is the Rowlatt Bills. The only way to cure an ailment is to remove its cause and Government should therefore abandon its policy of utter disregard of public opinion. Instead of adopting this obvious course the Government of India have authorised provincial Governments to use repressive legislation in order to crush the unrest. The result is to be seen in the Punjab, where the tyranny practised finds no parallel even in Russia or Belgium. The policy of coercion can only end in the ruin either of the rulers or of the subjects. Pacific measures should be adopted and it should be announced that His Majesty the King-Emperor has refused sanction to the Rowlatt Bills and that martial law has been withdrawn. There is no need to apply special legislation to any province and internecine must be released. Thus, and thus only will peace be restored.

The *Inqilab* in its first issue dated the 5th February has an article entitled "The coming dreadful danger."

The editor says that the more the subject races display their humility and poverty, the further entitled are the ruling nations to push their subjects into the pit of degradation, until at last nothing remains for them but a disgraceful death. India excels in negligence and want of ambition, and it is therefore right that she should be the most degraded nation in the world. India has only her humility to thank for the oppressive enactment, introduced to break the neck of her people. When India willingly placed the noose of the Press Act round her neck she opened the way for the Defence of India Act, and when even the cruelties of this Act failed to arouse her, it was decided to legalise the proposals of the Rowlatt Commission and thus to complete the misfortune and disgrace of a subject people.

The editor asks whether the disloyalty of Indians has reached such a pitch that it is necessary to pass measures which were only meant for the dark ages of barbarism. With civilised governments laws become more lenient as the people advance in culture. India has been educated by Great Britain for 150 years, yet every five or ten years the rulers introduce measures which add to their despotism and power to exercise tyranny. The cruel and merciless way in which the Press Act and the Defence of India Act have ruined the political spirit of India, brought the lives of newspapers to an end and deprived innocent Indian leaders of their liberty, makes us shed tears of blood. Our wounds had not yet healed before Government decided to pass another "Nadirshahi" law. He asks if the Indian Penal Code was not strong enough to clear India of a handful of anarchists. He deplores the existence of a revolutionary movement, but cannot view with equanimity the passing of a law which will endow the authorities with tyrannical powers and which will leave the liberty of Indians at the mercy of "those persons" whose hands will become all the stronger through the measure.

He expresses surprise that the Rowlatt Commission submitted proposals for ending the anarchical movement by coercion, without throwing any light on the reason for the existence of such a movement, and the best methods for removing the causes. He regards coercive methods as useless, since experience shows that the innocent suffer with the guilty. It is strange that responsible people in India and England acknowledge the loyalty of the country at the same time as they enforce such despotic measures. Is this the reward for India's services? The victory of Russia shows the result of such repressive methods. They may create a lull at first, but this lull is merely like the calm surface of the ocean when the waves are working beneath it. It ferments and boils like the lava of a volcano which finally bursts and creates a scene like the day of the resurrection. He warns the authorities that such laws are ruinous for the country and the Government alike and urges Indians to protest with such vigour as to shake the very walls of Government House.

The *Inqilab* of the 12th February 1919 attacks the Rowlatt Bills with the usual arguments and urges the Indians to hold mass meetings of protest all over India.

The paper of the 20th February 1919 congratulates the non-official members of the Legislative Council on their forcible and courageous speeches in opposition to the bills, and urges them to continue their efforts. Popular leaders are urged to adopt passive resistance if the bills are passed.

The Passive Resistance movement.—The *Inqilab* of the 12th March 1919 accuses the Moderates of cowardice and treachery for signing the report of the Select Committee on the Black Bills and for opposing Mr. Gandhi's passive resistance movement.

The same paper attacks Mrs. Besant for limiting her resistance to the Rowlatt Bills. The editor remarks that passive resistance to these bills alone is useless since they will not affect the general public.

The *Inqilab* of the 12th April 1919, a special "Shahid" number, with black edges, says that the place round the Clock Tower, should, as Mr. Asaf Ali suggests, be named

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the Khuni Chauraha in memory of the Delhi martyrs, just as the Khuni Darwaza was so called in order to remind the people of the mutiny. The editor compares the *hartal* of the 30th March 1919, with that of the 6th April. The lack of disturbance on the latter date proves that the riots on the 30th March were entirely due to the desire of the authorities to shed some blood. He considers that the firing was utterly unjustifiable, that the official communiques are false, and that the local authorities were responsible for all the bloodshed.

The *hartal* of 20th April 1919 ascribes the responsibility of the bloodshed which occurred on the 17th April 1919 to the police. The paper contains a description of the excited state of Delhi and thinks that the British have lost their sense of justice.

The Rowlatt Bills.—The *Congress* of the 10th February 1919 contains a letter signed "A Home Ruler." The writer says that in spite of the unanimous opposition of the Indian members, the Rowlatt Bill has been referred to a Select Committee. Indian members must now refuse to join the Select Committee and should allow the bill to come before the Council without their consent. If the bill is then passed they should leave the Council Chamber.

Secondly, he urges the need of holding indignation meetings throughout the country to protest against the bills, and suggests that Tilak should be asked to have the question taken up in Parliament.

Thirdly, when the bill is passed, Indians and their leaders should resort to passive resistance. He urges the leaders in particular to set the example. If the Government of India is bent upon filling Indian jails with innocent people and on ruling through the Criminal Investigation Department instead of the Chief Court and High Court judges, let the jails be filled with true sons of the motherland. If Government attaches more importance to the opinion of a police constable than to that of a national leader there is no remedy but to go to jail. Life in India nowadays is no better than a life in jail. He concludes with an exhortation to adopt passive resistance.

The *Congress* of the 12th February 1919 contains a letter from "a Home Ruler" complaining that India is burdened every day with fresh chains of slavery. The new bills, the writer says, will rob India of the few remnants of her political freedom. He urges Indians to oppose the bills with all their strength by means of passive resistance.

The same paper of the 14th February has a leading article accusing the Government of trickery in limiting the bill to a period of three years in order to cajole the Moderates into giving it their support. The editor warns the Moderates against this snare and urges them to oppose the bill unanimously.

The same paper's condemnation of the bills is continued in its issues of the 15th and 17th February. The editor opposes the bills in the strongest terms and urges Indians to continue agitating until they are withdrawn.

The *Congress* of 20th March 1919, which bears black edges as a token of mourning, contains an article entitled "The funeral of liberty." The editor describes the Rowlatt Bills as the reward of India's meritorious services in the war, and says that it is merely due to India's weakness that her chains of slavery have been made heavier. The scene in the Council Chamber depicted the helplessness of righteousness and liberty and the worship of falsehood by those in authority. The feeble voice of subjugated India was powerless to prevent the erection of the gallows and noose which will shortly be placed round this country's unhappy neck. This dreadful demon of death and destruction will strangle political life in India, and the tree of freedom will be utterly uprooted.

The *Congress* of the 2nd April 1919 condemns the firing as unnecessary and says that at the Clock Tower the people were shot down without an order from a

Magistrate and without any provocation. The casualties are estimated at about 60.

The Delhi Riots.—The same paper of the 3rd April 1919 accuses the Government of attempting from the first to break the calm and excite the people by parading armed men in Delhi. The editor says that the object of the authorities was not merely to disperse the mob otherwise the wounds would have been in the legs and not in the hearts and heads of the people. The heartless cruelty and merciless butchery shown to the people of Delhi on the 30th March 1919 will never be forgotten.

The same paper of the 4th April 1919 remarks that Government should confiscate all the bricks and stones in India since these are obviously dangerous weapons and Indians using them deserve instantaneous death. The editor continues on this theme and says that the disturbance was not due to the passive resistance movement but to the desire of the local administration to see some Indians weltering in gore.

The same offensive article is continued in the same paper of the 5th April 1919. The editor congratulates the authorities on their gallantry. The mob had no machine guns with which to shoot its enemies, no bayonets to thrust mercilessly into the bodies of its opponents, no clubs, even, with which to belabour its foes. But the attitude of the mob became so threatening that stones actually began to be thrown, and for this crime instantaneous death was the only fit punishment.

The *Congress* of the 20th April 1919 asks how the people of Delhi can be expected to end the *hartal* after such bloody events as occurred on the 17th April 1919. The editor lays the whole blame for this fracas on the police who were needlessly interfering with the rights of the people.

The same paper resents the appointment of certain gentlemen as special constables.

The same paper of the 22nd April 1919, in the course of an exaggerated account of the funeral of a victim of the riot of the 17th April 1919, says that the previous funerals were on such a grand scale that the people were very anxious to see more such displays. The authorities are to be thanked for fulfilling this desire of their subjects so soon.

The Passive Resistance.—The *Qaum* of the 24th March 1919 also appears with black edges. The editor likens the day on which the Rowlatt Bills became law to those black days on which Hussain, the grandson of the Prophet, was killed at Karbala and on which Ramchandariji was banished by his father for 14 years. This is the funeral day for 30 crores of living Indians. He criticises bitterly the obstinacy of the proud officials, intoxicated as they were with love of prestige, and indignant at the opposition of India, their slave. He warns Government that insurrection is the invariable result of coercion and tyranny. The existence of anarchy was due to Lord Curzon's stringent policy, and Sir Michael O'Dwyer's oppressive rule was responsible for the conspiracies in the Punjab. Indians must join the passive resistance movement, since it is better to die than to lead the disgraceful life of a slave.

The same paper contains a long article proving that passive resistance is an ancient Islamic custom.

The Delhi Riots.—The *Qaum* of the 18th April 1919 says that Government alone is responsible for the deaths of both Indians and Europeans, since the sole cause of these disturbances was the passing of the Rowlatt Bills. He asks ironically if these acts have brought the result which they were designed to produce—the maintenance of peace.

The *Qaum* of the 24th April 1919 protests against the opening of fire by police on the mob on the 17th April 1919. The editor falsely states that the people had given back the rifles to the police when the latter opened fire. There was no reason for slaughter when the arms had been returned and the pacific intention of the people was manifest.

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9
TRANSLATIONS OF CERTAIN SEDITIOUS POSTERS ISSUED
DURING THE DISTURBANCES.

No. 1.

Our God has become kind to us.—O, Our Hindu and Muhammadan brethren, the end of these monkeys* has come near. They want to die. Hindu and Muhammadan brethren should now spend their days without fearing anyone. God will soon annihilate them from this world, because these tyrants have shot many of our innocent brethren. The Lame One† has been turned out from here, he should be killed wherever found by anyone. The tramway is used by the employees of the company, and not by the public. No one should therefore get into a tram seeing these persons seated in it.

No. 2.

City brethren.—All Muslim brethren are informed and with folded hands I beseech you to give up smoking cigarettes and also to forsake everything of these Kafirs. You should think for a moment what tricks these Kafirs have played with us. On the one hand they have killed our men and then these sons of incest demand subscriptions from us for the wounded. These Kafirs do not feel ashamed but sons of pigs demand subscriptions from us. These sons of pigs should so far as possible be placed before the mouth of the gun; and as to the Lame son of incest if Government kills him well and good otherwise people will eat his flesh.

No. 3.

The day for prayers and mourning.—O, Hindus and Muhammadans, congratulations for this day. My dear brethren, many of our brethren died as martyrs in the path of God in the affair that took place at the Railway Station. I did not know that the monkeys would treat our Hindu and Muhammadan brethren like this. If I had known of it I would have put an end to them there and then. Well, tell them now that they should be on the alert, I will certainly take my revenge from them and I am the same man who threw the bomb in Delhi. I am now present in Delhi, if any one can arrest me he may do so. It will be seen on Sunday. Brethren, do not be afraid of any monkey and kill the Lame City Inspector wherever you find him, because he is our enemy. You should be courageous at all times. I will do the same work on Sunday as I did in throwing the bomb and will certainly take my revenge from the monkeys. I am the same Bengali. *Salaam* to all brethren.

No. 4.

Shri Ganesh. (Picture of two pistols.) Om.
O God, come I have brought ruin for the Viceroy. O, God, we will die, aliens have sucked our blood. Shri. All men should know that to-day is the day of mourning and better than many a day of rejoicing. O, you should not be afraid of anyone. Two hundred of us have come here and everyone of us possesses the same kind of pistol, the picture of which is given above. We hear that many men have been killed. I will take the revenge of everyone. I will despatch him whom you call the Lame One to the next world. We will see how they open fire now. I am the same man who bombed the Viceroy.

No. 5.

SIR, Greetings. We beg to state that all of you are trying conjointly, but it is to be regretted that we are enclosed here, have been imprisoned in a cage. You should therefore, on this occasion, try to take us out, all the big "Raikes" consulting each other. If God wishes, you will receive great help from us. It is to be regretted that we are helpless on this occasion and cannot get hold of no opportunity, as long as you people

* Europeans.
† The Lame One, i.e., Khan Sahib Sayid Hamid-ud-Din, City Inspector of Police, who is lame and was believed to have started the firing.

do not come here and use force. We can render great assistance and can sacrifice our lives and there are very brave and gallant men here. For God's sake you should try all of you and should come here all at once. No Government man should, however, know of it. *Salaams* from everyone to everyone.

We hear all the occurrences every day and all of us pray that God may bring the day soon when you may succeed in your desires and Islam may make progress, Amen! Do not delay this matter and do not be neglectful. We only need to know the time and the place. We are all having great hopes and we have no other source of help but you. This slip should reach all the patriots.

No. 6.

SIR, Greetings. I request all of you—Are you Hindus and Muhammadans not our brethren that you have men armed with guns stationed to guard us? If we have union amongst us, we will not be afraid of this guard, etc., even though a gun might open fire at us. We never go against our word; don't you know us, we are Indians:—

These Englishmen will come to an end one day gradually, and
One day, O, Hindus and Muhammadans, your religion will prevail (verse).

O, brethren, don't break union otherwise the same will be the case as happened when the fox caused disunion and the lions ate the prey.

O, brethren, don't you break union
It is not good for you, and we
Are not aliens to each other (verse).

The notifier.—The same who threw the bomb on the Viceroy.

Writer.—The whole of India.

Note.—Anyone who meddles with this notice may his mother be divorced.

No. 7.

An important notice, dated 25th April 1919.—INHABITANTS OF INDIA AND OF THE CITY OF DELHI.—You would have seen the notice issued in your city, by the "sweet knife" (a wolf in sheep's clothing), the Chief Commissioner. But take care, Mr. Beadon acts foolishly, and the Chief Commissioner creates tender feelings in your hearts by means of legal and polite words. You should therefore not attend to what he writes or says or to his tricks. Let him chatter. Don't you know how many of your fellow countrymen he has despatched to the next world, how many men have been killed through his kindness and up till now thousands of your brethren are being killed? Bear it in mind that the English are no longer fit to rule over this country. She came to get fire but became the mistress of the house. The Nawabs, the Rajas and the kings shall also have to bear it in mind.

No. 8.

Notice addressed to the public of the City of Delhi.—I inform all Hindu and Muhammadan gentlemen and give them the usual oath, namely, the Hindus are given as oath of the Ganges and the cow and the Muhammadan that of the Quran, that they should not go against it:—

DEAR BRETHREN. You must of course know what the Deputy Commissioner wrote in the notice issued by him. Well, you are now informed that it is just like the fact that he cut our nose first and is now wiping off the blood by his handkerchief or another example of it would be that of a wicked woman throwing fire into a heap of dry husk and then standing apart. Dear brethren, how very sad it is that quite a number of your brethren have been killed; how many of them have been cruelly massacred; blood of innocent persons has been shed and atrocities perpetrated; and if you people act according to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner it would be very sad indeed and most shameful. I once again give you the same oath as above. Dear brethren; think

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it over most carefully that you have to die after all sooner or later; no one can escape death. You should not care for your life; because if you prove cowards at a time when most of your brethren have been killed when will you prove of any use? If you want to enjoy you should work courageously. A man who undergoes hardships first enjoys afterwards. Accordingly I request every Hindu and Muhammadan not to allow their enthusiasm and zeal to subside on account of the deception of these men. I give you the oaths mentioned above. I swear by God that I care not even if my life is sacrificed in the cause of religion or the public.

A TRUE FRIEND AND
WELL-WISHER OF THE PUBLIC.

10

JUDGMENT DATED THE 30TH SEPTEMBER 1919 IN
RAILWAY STATION RIOT CASE OF 30TH MARCH 1919.

IN THE COURT OF LALA BISHAN DAS, B.A., MAGISTRATE,
1ST CLASS, AT DELHI.

Criminal Case No. 94—2 of 1919.

THE CROWN Complainant,
versus
Accused.

- (1) Chhiddami Lal, son of Ram Sarup.
- Banla of Delhi. (2) Muhammad Rafi, son of Karim Ullah, Barber.
- (3) Debi Pershad, son of Shib Sahai.
- (4) Chhote Lal, son of Lachmi Narain. (5) Bishen Sarup, son of Bhagwan Das. (6) Girdhari, son of Makhan Kahar. (7) Jugal Kishore, son of Mathu Mal. (8) Ganga, son of Sewak Ram. (9) Sewa Ram, son of Nannhe Mal. (10) Jumma Khan, son of Umar Din. (11) Kali Charan, son of Dwarka Das. (12) Suraj, son of Pat Ram, of Delhi.

Charge under sections 147, 145, 332, 341, Indian Penal Code.

Date of institution in court—8th July 1919.

Sentence.—Accused No. 3 Debi Pershad, to undergo two months' simple imprisonment under sections 145, 147 and 332, Indian Penal Code. The sentences for all offences should run concurrently. The rest of the accused acquitted or case withdrawn against them.

Judgment.

The facts of this case are briefly as follows:—
On 30th March 1919 a *hartal* was observed in the City of Delhi to protest against the passing of the Rowlatt Act. All shops in the city were closed. When some people came to know that the stalls at the railway station were open, they went there and forced the shop-keepers to close down their shops at once. When this news reached the Deputy Station Superintendent, he came, asked the people to go away, as the closing of the shops at the station would interfere considerably with the convenience of the travelling public including women and children, but to no effect. The crowd began to increase in number, became more and more unruly and excited, and went so far as to assault the Deputy Station Superintendent. Several blows were given to this officer by his person and his coat was also torn in bits. The Sub-Inspector and the Police constables of the Railway Station thereon dragged the Deputy Station Superintendent from the mob, and arrested the man who had assaulted and caused hurt to this officer in the discharge of his duty as a public servant. Seeing that one of their companions had been arrested by the police, the mob became excited that it invaded the railway station breaking flower pots and glass panes and damaging railway property. The man arrested was also forcibly rescued from the custody of the police. When the mob demanded release of the

man arrested, although they were repeatedly assured by the authorities that the man had been already released but the mob did not believe this, and went on creating a disturbance more and more and refused to disperse despite the repeated requests and orders of Mr. Currie, Additional District Magistrate, and other officers who had arrived at the scene by this time. The mob assumed a hostile attitude, and went so far as to attack the authorities and the police with pieces of stones and brick bats. The result was that the Additional District Magistrate was compelled under the circumstances to assent to firing, and the assistance of the mounted police and a small detachment of British soldiers was invoked for this purpose. As soon as firing was opened the crowd began to disperse, and the Additional District Magistrate then at once ordered to cease the fire.

This occurrence was then taken in hand by the police who challaned twelve accused under sections 145, 147 and 332, Indian Penal Code. When this case came up for trial before me, it was withdrawn by the Public Prosecutor against nine accused who were discharged, by me. Practically there were left only three accused, Ganga, Bishen Sarup and Debi Pershad who were placed on trial before me. Out of these three accused Ganga was discharged by me by my order dated 15th August 1919, as he was deaf and dumb and was quite unable to understand the object of the unlawful assembly. I have now to see what proof there is on the file against these two accused, Bishen Sarup and Debi Pershad.

There have appeared for the prosecution 12 witnesses in all. Out of these witnesses the statements of Munshi Azharul Haq, Sub-Inspector, Railway Police, Lieutenant Shelford, and Messrs. Currie and Matthews simply show that the mob was an unlawful assembly to all intents and purposes and that it used force and violence. These witnesses are, however, unable to identify any of the accused.

The fifth witness in the case is Khan Sahib Hamid-ud-Din, Inspector of Police. After describing all that happened at the railway station this witness says as regards Bishen Sarup that he asked people to disperse, and that he (Bishen Sarup) was in fact carrying his messages to the mob. According to the statement of this witness Bishen Sarup did not beat or attack any person, but on the other hand he was carrying messages and orders of the witness to the mob and *vice versa*.

Khan Sahib Hamid-ud-Din is a very reliable witness, and his statement is decidedly in favour of Bishen Sarup. As regards the other accused Debi Pershad the witness says that when it was decided to push back the mob into the Queen's Garden and they entered it, stones and brick bats were thrown at them by the mob which was headed by Debi Pershad. The witness further says that Debi Pershad then had a cane or stick in his hand and was in front of the mob. Also that he then struck the witness with that cane or stick, and also struck others.

The next witness is Inayat Hussain, Head Constable, who says that a man whose name is not known to the witness was arrested by the Sub-Inspector and handed over to the witness with the direction that he should be taken to the *thana*, as he had assaulted the Deputy Station Superintendent, that the witness took that person to the *thana*, and that in the meanwhile a crowd of people rushed into the railway *thana* and forcibly took away that man. The witness is not positive about the identity of Debi Pershad.

The next witness Pandit Sheo Pershad, Sub-Inspector, says that he also received injury on his right shin as a result of a stone thrown at him by one of the members of the mob.

As regards Bishen Sarup he says that he saw him talking to the City Inspector (Khan Sahib Hamid-ud-Din) from a distance of 20 or 25 paces and heard him say that all Hindus and Muhammadans would not go back without getting the men released. This statement at its best cannot prove anything against Bishen Sarup. The Inspector of Police has said that Bishen Sarup was

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acting as a messenger between him and the people. These words of message were not his own words but those of the mob which he carried to the Inspector.

The eighth witness in the case is Ata Muhammad, Head Constable, who prepared the statement of injuries marked P. A. These injuries were inflicted on Debi Pershad accused as the result of firing.

The ninth witness in the case is Dr. Johnson, who examined Debi Pershad and whose result of examination is down in the English part of the statement marked P. A. He had five injuries in all which were caused by bullets and bayonets.

He also examined M. Chet Singh, Sub-Inspector, and Khan Sahib Hamid-ud-Din, Inspector, whose results of examination are down in documents marked P. B. (a) and P. B. (b) respectively.

The tenth witness in the case is M. Chet Singh, Sub-Inspector, who says that the rioters gave different threats and were armed with *lathis*, and that they refused to go unless their men were released. He also identified the three accused, Ganga, Bishen Sarup and Debi Pershad. Ganga has been already let off. As regards Bishen Sarup the witness says that he was heading the mob but he did not hear him say anything.

This statement cannot incriminate Bishen Sarup in any way especially when there is direct evidence on the file to show that he was taking part in order to assist the authorities and not to take the law into his own hands.

As regards Debi Pershad accused the witness says positively that he first gave a *lathi* blow to the City Inspector, and then attempted to snatch a bayonet from the hands of a European soldier.

The witness also says that he received an injury on his left hand.

The eleventh witness in the case is Mr. Jeffreys. He does not identify any of the two accused now in court, and his statement does not go to show anything except this that there was an unlawful assembly at the station, that it began to use violence and force and poked at the witness and his horse with *lathis*.

The last and twelfth witness in the case is Munshi Sajjad Hussain, who says that he saw Bishen Sarup accused on 30th March, that Bishen Sarup made him get down from the Tramcar in which he was riding at about 9 A.M.

This witness also continues that after "zuhar" prayers he took a tonga to see the condition of the city, and went with Abdul Rahman and Babu Rahmat Ulla in the tonga towards the Clock Tower, that when they reached there, Bishen Sarup asked Abdul Rahman who was on the front seat to leave the tonga, that Abdul Rahman said in reply that the decision of the question whether they should leave the tonga or not depended upon Babu Rahmat Ulla, that thereon Bishen Sarup said that it was no time of bluffing and bloodshed had taken place, and that he also used the following words:—

خون سروس پر سوار ہے - مارینگے اور میرینگے اور تمکو
تازنگہ پر نہیں جائے دینگے -

The witness also deposes that when he heard these words, he asked Babu Rahmat Ulla to get down and that they then left the tonga.

This witness was produced according to the prosecution story to show the attitude of Bishen Sarup accused both before and after the occurrence at the railway station.

M. Sajjad Hussain was not only further cross-examined by the accused but he was also called as a defence witness by Bishen Sarup. In further cross-examination M. Sajjad Hussain admitted that Babu Abdul Rahman was examined by the police in his presence, and that he did not mention the name of Bishen Sarup. This is probably the reason why Abdul Rahman was not called as a witness for the prosecution in this case.

I have perused the statement of this witness before the police, and it differs from the statement made by the witness before me.

In his capacity as a witness for the defence this M. Sajjad Hussain (see D. W. 23) has said that he did not remember who stopped his tonga. He also says that Bishen Sarup asked him not to go inside the garden saying that firing had taken place. He admits indirectly that he was not pulling on well with Bishen Sarup, and that both of them were writing a good deal against each other in papers. The fact appears to be that both M. Sajjad Hussain and the accused Bishen Sarup are contemporaries. They are editors of different papers and differ in their views. They have therefore been using bad language against each other and cannot be called on good terms. It is also in evidence that M. Sajjad Hussain deposed against Bishen Sarup in a former case. In these circumstances the charges levelled by M. Sajjad Hussain against Bishen Sarup should be received with caution especially when there has come forward not a single man to support the allegations made by Sajjad Hussain, nor did Sajjad Hussain himself go to the police to make any report of this occurrence against Bishen Sarup. The interests of justice therefore demand that the evidence of Sajjad Hussain being inimical and biased should be brushed aside.

Bishen Sarup has denied the charge. He says that he was never a member of the unlawful assembly, that having heard that a number of men had gathered at the railway station, he went there to eliminate chances of mischief and to induce people to disperse and go away. According to his version his whole object in going was to help the authorities to control or to disperse the crowd and that whatever he did in conveying the message of the authorities to the people or of the people to the authorities was inspired with the same object. He also says that he was certainly present there as stated until after firing had taken place and he offered to help the injured out of sheer humanity.

In order to prove his assertions the accused Bishen Sarup has called 40 witnesses, out of whom seven were dispensed with and one was M. Sajjad Hussain who has been already referred to by me. Out of the remaining 32, Banke Rai, Ganesh Das and Jaggan Nath corroborate the statement of the accused that he was sitting by them in the *baithak* of Lachhu Misser and that hearing that there had taken place a disturbance at the railway station the accused left them and went off. Thirteen witnesses who are all men of position and respectability depose that the accused Bishen Sarup belongs to various societies whose sole object is to serve the people and that he bears an excellent character.

Five witnesses have been produced to prove that the accused was inducing people to go away and disperse, while four have come forward to depose that the accused met them on the day of the occurrence, and did not ask them to close their shops.

Pandit Nanhe Missar has come forward to depose that the accused Bishen Sarup was in his house till 11-30 A.M. in connection with the performance of the funeral ceremonies of his mother.

Nawab Mirza has come forward to prove that Sajjad Hussain gave evidence against Bishen Sarup.

Three witnesses have been produced to show that although shops had been closed on 30th March yet no force was used by anybody.

Reading the defence, and the defence evidence with the prosecution evidence I think I can safely say that Bishen Sarup is innocent, and that he did not do anything from which it may be inferred that he was a member of the unlawful assembly or used any force or violence in pursuance of the common object of the unlawful assembly. I therefore acquit Bishen Sarup accused honourably.

As regards the second accused Debi Pershad his guilt is more satisfactorily established by the evidence of Khan Sahib Hamid-ud-Din and Sirdar Chet Singh. According to the statements of these witnesses which are quite free from bias and prejudice Debi Pershad was a member of an unlawful assembly and as such used force and violence.

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This evidence for the prosecution has not been rebutted by the accused Debi Pershad at all. Debi Pershad denies the charge and says that on 30th March 1919 when he was going from his house to "Nili Chhatra," he saw a fairly large crowd of people collected outside the railway station, that he went inside the crowd out of curiosity, that even in the crowd, he found it almost impossible to find his way out, that eventually he elbowed his way to the front of the crowd in the hope of making his escape but he soon found that he had diminished his chances of escape to impossibility, that while he was trying to find his way back, he was carried off his feet by an irresistible rush of the crowd and was thrown so close to the soldiers standing with fixed bayonets that before he could stand on his legs again, he felt the thrust of a sharp weapon into his left side and in turning to look he found that a British soldier had bayoneted him, that when the crowd in front turned about in the meanwhile, he also began to run in pain and dismay, that when firing took place he received several shots on the back of his right hand, that he then fell unconscious and was taken to the hospital where he remained for several days, that his injury is a permanent one and has disabled him for ever, that he had no stick in his hand, nor does he carry it as a rule, and that he did not hit any person at all.

This accused has called four witnesses, Basu Lal, Bishambar Nath, Durga Pershad and Rai Sahib Lala Ambe Pershad. Rai Sahib Lala Ambe Pershad says that he knows this accused to be a good character, and did not ever hear any complaint against him.

Basu Lal says that the accused is a good man and leads a religious life. He also says that he never saw any stick in his hand and admits that he did not go himself to the railway station on the day in question.

Bishambar Nath says that the accused is in the habit of going to "Jumna Ji," and "Nil ki Chatra" at about noon time on every Sunday. He also says that he saw him going that day to the Jumna with a rosary in his hand, and that the accused is a good man of religious ideas. The witness admits in cross-examination that he himself was not present at the railway station at the time of the alleged occurrence.

Durga Pershad simply deposes that the accused bears an excellent character, and is not a quarrelsome man at all. He also deposes that he never saw him carrying any stick in his hand. The witness has admitted in his statement that he does not know anything about the alleged occurrence.

This kind of evidence cannot benefit the accused at all. That accused may be a good, or a bad man, is not in point. The question is whether he was a member of an unlawful assembly and whether as such he used force or violence or not. As already remarked by me two witnesses for the prosecution have identified the accused as a member of that unlawful assembly and have deposed unhesitatingly that he attacked the Inspector with the stick in his hand and gave him hurt. The fact that the accused received some injuries as the result of firing is another positive and clear proof of the accused's taking part in the unlawful assembly. The explanation which the accused has given for his going to railway station and for receiving injuries is too meagre and cannot hold water. I therefore reject it as worthless.

The learned counsel for the accused drew my attention to the facts that there was no unlawful assembly at all and that the mob was quite justified in demanding the release of the man who was arrested, as the police had no power to arrest that man, the offence of assault being incognizable. I do not agree in this view of the case. The assault was made on a public servant in the discharge of his duty as such, and so the police was quite competent to arrest the man under section 332, Indian Penal Code, which is a cognizable offence.

I have already said that there is a large volume of most disinterested and reliable evidence on the file which clearly shows that the mob at the railway station was an unlawful assembly which had taken the law into their own hands. I have therefore no hesitation in saying

that the accused Debi Pershad is guilty of the offences with which he has been charged, viz., of offences under sections 145, 147 and 332, Indian Penal Code.

The next question is what punishment should be given to the accused. Ordinarily I would have given a most deterrent punishment in such a case, but the fact that the accused has already suffered a good deal on account of injuries received by shots and bayonets which have disabled him permanently from eking out his livelihood, I think the ends of justice demand that I should deal with him most leniently. I consequently sentence him to undergo simple imprisonment for two months under each section, but at the same time direct that the sentences for all offences should run concurrently.

11

JUDGMENT DATED THE 21ST JULY 1919 IN EDWARD PARK RIOT CASE OF 14TH APRIL.

IN THE COURT OF M. M. L. CURRIE, Esq., I.C.S., ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTRATE AT DELHI.

Criminal Case No. 22-2 of 1919.

THE CROWN Complainant,
versus

(1) Shankar Lal, son of Hira Lal, (2) Bhawan Kishore, son of Nawal Kishore, Panseller (3) Shamsuddin, (4) Shahabuddin, (5) Fiyaz, (6) Karim Bakhsh, son of Buali Bakhsh, Tinsmith, (7) Thana, (8) Ambe Pershad, (9) Sobha Ram, (10) Fakhruddin, (11) Mohamed Rafik, (12) Chand Khan, (13) Ata Mohamad, (14) Karim Bakhsh alias Banda, (15) Abdul Majid (absconding), (16) Kallan, (17) Yashin, son of Mohamad Ibrahim, (18) Said, son of Mohamad Ibrahim, (19) Abdur Rahman of Delhi Accused.

Charge under sections 332, 333, 395—1429, Indian Penal Code. Trial held on 2nd May 1919.

Sentences.—(1) Shankar Lal (6), Karim Bakhsh—Acquitted. (2) Bhawan Kishore to undergo 2 years' rigorous imprisonment including three months in solitary confinement. (17) Mohamad Yashin, (18) Mohamad Said—Both accused to undergo 3 years' rigorous imprisonment each including 3 months in solitary confinement. (16) Kallan (absconding) now surrendered to be dealt with separately. (15) Abdul Majid, (19) Abdur Rahman—both absconding Accused (3) Shamsuddin, (4) Shahabuddin, (5) Faiyaz, (7) Thana, (8) Ambe Pershad, (9) Sobha Ram, (10) Fakhruddin, (11) Muhammad Rafik, (12) Chand Khan, (13) Ata Muhammad, (14) Karim Bakhsh alias Banda, Discharged.

Judgment.

The disturbance, out of which this case has arisen, took place on the afternoon of April 14th at the Edward Memorial Park. To understand the evidence, a brief description of the place must be given. The Memorial Park is a garden between the Khas Road and Machli-walan and in front of the Jama Masjid. It slopes down from the pedestal to the Khas Road which separates it from the Camp de Mars. In the garden there is a pedestal for a statue. This pedestal is surrounded by pavement and that again by a path separating it from the grass plots. The most striking feature of the pedestal is the plinth which is some three feet above the pavement; this was the spot from which the speakers addressed the meeting.

The main events are not disputed; it is merely the connection of the individual accused with them that is

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contested. The following is a brief account of what happened:—

A meeting collected in the Park, apparently more or less spontaneously, though some manuscript notices are mentioned in the F. I. R. The crowd was first addressed by a Sadhu boy, who also read a poem about Mr. Gandhi. Then another man got up to speak but his remarks being, it seems, very confused, he was stopped and made to sit down by the meeting. Then one Abdul Majid (absconding accused) got up and delivered an inflammatory speech against the Rowlatt Act, comparing it to a cup of poison and the Press Act to a sword. In the course of his speech he pointed out to a man who was taking notes and whether or not he actually used the words C. I. D. in referring to him, it is obvious that the mob certainly understood him to refer to Criminal Investigation Department reporters. The immediate result was that a section of the crowd stood up and attacked the man who was taking notes; he was apparently a student and did not belong to the Criminal Investigation Department. Certain members of the crowd pointed out this fact and drew attention to members of the C. I. D. whom they did know. In consequence of this, H. C. Imdad Ali was assaulted and robbed of his papers and the other contents of his pockets. He was dragged and hustled out of the Park into the Khas Road. Inspector Sat Narain succeeded in getting him into a tonga and he eventually made his escape and took refuge at the Alliance Bank. While the attack on Imdad Ali, was in progress, Inspector Muhammad Fakir tried to intervene with the result that he was denounced as a C. I. D. officer and the attention of the mob was diverted to him. He was very severely handled, his clothes were torn and his revolver and cartridges taken from him. It would appear from the police diaries and the evidence of W. D. I. (a) Bai Mukand Das that one section of the mob pursued him towards his house. A large part of the crowd however moved off to Dr. Ansari's house in Daryaganj. This resolution was taken after certain papers taken from Imdad Ali had been partially read out by the Approver Muhammad Fiyaz. The pistol and cartridges taken from the Inspector were displayed to the crowd and it was to take them to Dr. Ansari that the crowd went to Daryaganj. On arrival at Dr. Ansari's house it was found that he was absent. The pistol and cartridges were accordingly made over to his servant Muhammad Ghalib, W. P.-4. This man, on receipt of telephonic instructions from Dr. Ansari, took them and handed them over to the Deputy Commissioner.

While the mob was at Dr. Ansari's, some one brought news that the police and cavalry had arrested some men and the mob moved off with a view to rescuing them. No further fracas however occurred. The mob seems to have dispersed to their homes.

The above are the salient facts of the case. There are naturally numerous discrepancies as regards the exact details and the police seem to have had difficulty in getting people to come forward as witnesses.

Before proceeding to consider the cases of the individual accused, there are certain legal points raised by Mr. C. B. Das on behalf of his client Shankar Lal and accepted as generally applicable to the cases of their respective clients by the other counsel that call for notice and may be conveniently disposed of at this stage.

In the first place, Mr. Das argued that his client had no part in the convening or regulating of the meeting. This may be admitted. He also argued that the meeting did not become an unlawful assembly till Abdul Majid incited it to attack the C. I. D. and his argument is that his client could not know that it was likely to lead to an assault on the C. I. D. and that there is nothing to show whether his client approved or not of Abdul Majid's speech. This point I will deal with later. He also argued that it could not be anticipated that C. I. D. men who were not actually taking notes would be assaulted. On this point I am unable to agree with him as it was

obvious from the temper of the meeting that once an assault on the C. I. D. was started any one recognised as a member of that force would be likely to be assaulted.

Secondly, he argued that the charge under dacoity could not be considered to be part of the common object of the unlawful assembly. In this connection he quoted 20 Weekly Reporter Cr. V.; 61 P. R. 1887; and 16 P. R. 1915. These rulings lay down principles for the guidance of courts in determining whether offences committed in conjunction with riotous assemblies fall within the two parts of section 141. It is merely a question of applying these tests to the facts of a particular case and in this connection I cannot do better than quote the words of Mr. Justice Phear in 20 Weekly Reporter 5. He remarks that "Even when it is proved that the specified offence was committed by one of the members of the assembly during, so to speak, the pendency of that assembly, it yet remains an issue of fact to be determined on the evidence whether that offence was committed in prosecution of the common object." In the present case the unlawful assembly's object was to overawe the members of the C. I. D. and prevent them from performing their duty in taking notes or listening to the speeches with a view to reporting them later. It was obvious that such an attempt would lead to the seizure from the C. I. D. officials of any papers found in their possession, and with a mob already excited it would be contrary to all reasonable expectations to expect that the assailants would be content to stop at seizing papers only. It seems to me that any reasonable person would expect them to seize any property found on the C. I. D. specially any documentary matter or any weapons. I therefore think that the offence of dacoity can fairly be charged against the accused in the present case as it was an offence that was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly and thus falls within the second part of section 149.

Thirdly, it is argued that the assault on Inspector Muhammad Fakir took place outside the Edward Park and hence cannot be considered as part of the same transaction as the assault on Imdad Ali which started inside the Park. I cannot follow the reasoning of this argument as it is clear from the evidence that though the assault on Imdad Ali started inside the Park yet his assailants followed him on to the road outside the Park and continued to assault him till he got away in the tonga, when they seem to have concentrated their attentions on the Inspector. Thus this is clearly all one and the same transaction.

Fourthly, it has been argued that the charges suffer from vagueness in that they did not specify the particular duty in the discharge of which the C. I. D. men were assaulted. The defence counsel seem to labour under the idea that the only duty of C. I. D. men was to take notes and that this should have been specified. However it is obvious that it is also a business of C. I. D. men to listen to the speeches and observe the demeanour of the crowd with a view to reporting afterwards. In any case, I think the charge is perfectly clear and that the defence knew very well what case they had to meet. In passing I may note that Mr. Asaf Ali propounded a novel theory that neither Imdad Ali nor Inspector Muhammad Fakir were on duty at the time. Imdad Ali says he was not on duty and in the next breath says that he was sent to attend the meeting by Inspector Muhammad Fakir. The obvious meaning of this is that he was not on duty before but was detailed on special duty by the Inspector.

Under these circumstances, it is obvious that the Inspector himself was present on duty and in any case any C. I. D. men attending a public meeting must be considered to be on duty as it is his general duty to collect and report any information that comes to his knowledge. This argument that these two men were not on duty carries no weight whatever.

Fifthly, it is argued by Mr. Das that the first and second charges are wrongly worded. He argues that the common object in the charge must be specifically stated in the exact words of section 141, and in support of this he

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relies on 61 P. R. 1887. There is, however, a later ruling, 16 P. R. 1915, which completely covers this point. In any case, the charge, as framed by me, clearly indicates that it is under the first part of section 141 that the common object of the unlawful assembly falls. The actual wording is that of section 332, which is really more precise and detailed.

There remains one other legal point not dealt with by Mr. Das but elaborated at length by the other counsel, i.e., the question as to whether the injuries inflicted on Inspector Muhammad Fakir amount to grievous hurt or not. It is obvious that no individual injury amounted to grievous hurt. The question as to whether the cumulative effects of these injuries produced such results that the case falls under the eighth sub-clause of section 320, that is to say, whether they were such that the Inspector during a space of 20 days was in severe bodily pain or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.

W. P. 10 Mr. Johnson, Assistant to the Civil Surgeon, details a list of 19 injuries sustained by Inspector Muhammad Fakir, none of them grievous.

Lala Hari Ram, House Surgeon at the Civil Hospital, Delhi, deposes that the Inspector was admitted into the hospital on the 14th of April and left without notice on the 16th after which date he saw him roughly twice a week, the last occasion being on the 31st of May. His opinion was that the Inspector's mental condition was unreliable or in other words, he was suffering from a nervous breakdown. He has given his reasons for this opinion in the course of the lengthy cross-examination to which he was subjected. On the other hand, Rai Bahadur Hari Shankar, W. D. 15, the Eye Specialist of the Civil Hospital, deposes that he saw Muhammad Fakir on the day he was brought in the hospital and once or twice later in the wards. Then from the 9th of May he saw him at frequent intervals in connection with his eyes and ears. His opinion is that the Inspector was perfectly sane and in no way suffering from a nervous breakdown. He ascribes the headaches and vertigo of which the Inspector complained as due to eye strain, and the buzzing in the ears might be due towards adhesive catarrh in the ear. This witness appeared to me to be ready to ascribe the whole of Muhammad Fakir's symptoms to eyestrain owing to the fact that his glasses had been broken during the riot, in fact, his attitude was typically that of a keen specialist.

In view of the conflict between the two opinions I called Lieutenant-Colonel James, the Civil Surgeon. He is very definite in his opinion that Muhammad Fakir was suffering from what may roughly be termed a nervous breakdown. He had a persistent delusion that his life was in danger. As he points out that it is not difficult for a practised medical man to detect whether or no patient is simulating a disease. It is obvious that both he and L. Hari Ram were convinced that Muhammad Fakir was somewhat unhinged mentally, they had no suspicion that he was malingering and therefore obviously there was no reason for them to resort to any of the so-called tests referred to in their cross-examination.

The defence have insinuated that Muhammad Fakir has exaggerated and in fact simulated a worse condition than his actual state with a view to supporting a claim he has preferred on account of his injuries and also with a view to avoiding having to appear in court in this case. In this connection it is pointed out that on his case sheet it is noted when he left hospital that he had "no special complaint to make" and also that on the 15th of May he appeared at an identification parade conducted by Mr. Sohan Lal. In view of the nature of his injuries, it is clear that he would have no special complaint to make as his trouble was the general state of his health as a result of the severe maltreatment he had received.

As regards the second point, I would only remark that we have no evidence beyond that of the investigating officer, B. I. Zahur Ahmad, to show what condition the Inspector was in when he appeared at this parade which in any case took place a month after he received these injuries. On the whole, the balance of the medical evidence appears to me to show that Muhammad Fakir

was suffering from a nervous breakdown which would render him unfit for more than 20 days to pursue his ordinary avocations. The assault on him would thus fall within the scope of section 420, clause 8.

Finally, there is one other matter bearing on the cases of all the accused which may be dealt with at this stage, that is to say, the weight which should be attached to the evidence of W. P. 3 Muhammad Fayaz who took a leading part in the proceedings and has now turned approver. In this connection, the defence have referred me to 14 P. R. 1894 while the Public Prosecutor relies on 2 P. R. 1917. These rulings lay down principles for weighing the evidence of approvers. In the present case the approver was arrested on the 29th of April, he made a statement to the police on the 30th and when the challan was filed in court on the 1st of May he was remanded to police custody. Now his statement of the 30th of April is, I find, substantially the same as that he has made in court. A statement of his was also recorded by Mr. Roberts to much the same effect. In the present case though these statements do not vary appreciably yet I think that this is a case in which the evidence of the approver requires a certain amount of corroboration before it can be accepted as reliable. In the first place, I was by no means favourably impressed with his demeanour when under cross-examination, and the results of the cross-examination show that he has been mixed up in a good deal of litigation.

Secondly, his arrest took place 15 days after the disturbance at the Edward Park, and though no doubt this delay in the investigation of the case was largely due to the then disturbed local conditions yet it creates a certain amount of doubt in one's mind. Again it is unfortunate that no statement of his was immediately recorded on the day of his arrest. For these reasons I think his evidence is not entitled to very great weight unless fully corroborated. There is no doubt that his account of what happened is substantially true, the question is, how far his evidence is true, when dealing with the actions of particular individuals.

Turning now to the cases of the individual accused, I will take the case of Shankar Lal first. In the first place, Mr. Das propounded the argument that abetment cannot take place after an offence has been committed, in support of which contention he quoted 2 Cal. Weekly Notes, page 81, 4 Cal. Weekly Notes, page 645 (27 Calcutta L. R., page 1041) and from this he deduces that as he could not have been charged with the abetment of the offences he cannot be charged in connection with them under section 149, Indian Penal Code. This argument appears to be put forward more particularly as regards the alleged burning of the papers and giving directions as to the disposal of the revolver. As I understand the case, however, the object of the prosecution in producing this evidence (the value of which I shall discuss later) was merely to show in the first place that Shankar Lal continued to remain a member of the assembly after it had become unlawful and as a matter of fact took a somewhat prominent part in its proceedings.

Secondly, the Public Prosecutor suggested that Shankar Lal might be held to have committed offences to which sections 412, 201 and 204 might be applied. I have not however charged Shankar Lal with these offences and I think that even if they were proved, they would still be part and parcel of the more serious charge under sections 149—395.

To consider the evidence, it is admitted that Shankar Lal was present at the commencement of the disturbance. We have to determine whether he took any part in the proceedings of the assembly after it became unlawful and when he left it. In this connection the timings of the affair are of some importance. Mr. Bose has urged that the times given by Inspector Sat Narain are reliable. I am inclined to accept them myself. The Inspector says that he reached the meeting about 5-15 while the Sadhu boy was speaking, then a man spoke who was very soon out short by the crowd, then Abdul Majid spoke for 2 or 3 minutes and the disturbance took

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place, this would make the first assault on the note-taking student take place about 5-25. The other witnesses' statement mostly make the meeting begin about 5 P.M. with the commencement of the Sadhu boy's speech and recitation. This is not inconsistent with the Inspector's timing and I think we may fix the time of the commencement of the riot as between 5-20 and 5-25.

Inspector Sat Narain says that Shankar Lal arrived either just as the boy was finishing or as Abdul Majid was beginning to speak. Shankar Lal himself says that he mounted the plinth just as the disturbance was beginning—that would be a few minutes after Abdul Majid had started speaking. The approver W. P. 2 says he himself arrived while Abdul Majid was speaking and that Shankar Lal was already there. W. P. 3 says Shankar Lal arrived while the Sadhu boy was speaking. W. P. 5 states that he arrived while the Sadhu boy was speaking and that Shankar Lal was already there. W. P. 6 says Shankar Lal arrived while the Sadhu boy was speaking. W. P. 7 merely says that Shankar Lal was sitting there. Similarly, the remaining prosecution witnesses do not specify the time of his arrival. I think we may accept it that he reached the meeting while the Sadhu boy was on his feet and got on to the plinth while Abdul Majid was speaking. This is quite consistent with the evidence of W. D. 11, 13 and 14.

We must now consider what Shankar Lal is said to have done after his arrival. Most of the allegations are contained in the statement of the approver, and it will be necessary to see how far they are supported by the other evidence; there are however two other points not mentioned by the approver with which I will deal first. Inspector Sat Narain says that when the assault on Imdad Ali took place, Shankar Lal and Abdul Majid laughed. No one else mentions this detail and from what I have seen of the accused in court I do not attach any weight to it as his cast of features is such that he frequently appears to be grinning in a sort of cynical way without reason. W. P. 6 says that Shankar Lal put up Abdul Majid to speak but this is flatly contradicted by W. P. 7 and is not corroborated by any one. It may therefore be left out of account.

The approver's statements are as follows:—After the assault on Imdad Ali the papers taken from him were brought to Abdul Majid and he (the approver) started to read them out. Shankar Lal however took them from him and gave them to a Hindu lad to burn and they were burnt. Then the pistol and cartridges taken from Inspector Mohammad Fakir were brought to the platform and after some discussion it was decided by Abdul Majid and Shankar Lal that they should be taken to Dr. Ansari's house. The whole crowd moved off to no. 1 Daryaganj. The approver says that Shankar Lal accompanied them though he admits that he did not see Shankar Lal at Dr. Ansari's.

Now as regards the burning of the papers W. P. 5 says that he saw Fayaz the approver give them to Shankar Lal after reading them but did not see what happened to them after that. The circumstances under which this witness came to give evidence render it necessary to accept his statements with caution. W. P. 9 the Reverend J. Waiz Lal saw the papers burning but does not identify any of the accused. W. P. 15 Mahbub says that Fayaz gave the papers to Shankar Lal; he says nothing about the burning of them. I consider however that no weight should be attached to this statement as I find that in his statement recorded under section 164, he speaks of Abdul Majid handling the papers and never mentioned the name of Shankar Lal at all. In fairness however I should note that it was his evidence as against other accused that it was desired to secure at that time; the omission however is strange. W. P. 18 says that Shankar Lal was standing behind Fayaz when he produced these papers and that when he had read them one of the men behind him took them from him; in cross examination he says he thinks that probably it was Shankar Lal who took it as he was the most intelligent man there.

Shankar Lal himself denies having had anything to

do with the papers. His three eye-witnesses of course corroborate.

A perusal of the *ziminis* shows that no one mentioned the papers before the arrest of Fayaz with the exception of W. P. 18, Mansabdar Khan, who then as now merely said that Shankar Lal probably took them from Fayaz. The weight to be attached to this lack of evidence however is somewhat discounted by the fact that all the C. I. D. witnesses had left the meeting before the episode occurred. Further the early stages of the enquiry appear to have been directed more to the detection of the section of the mob who followed Inspector Mohammed Fakir to his house than to those who too part in the earlier proceedings in the Edward Park.

I am not prepared to find on the evidence that it proved that Shankar Lal had anything to do with the destruction of the papers. He may have been present when they were brought and read by the approver but in the circumstances he is entitled to the benefit of the doubt on this point.

Shankar Lal's connection with the sending of the pistol to Dr. Ansari rests solely on the word of the approver and I am not prepared to take that uncorroborated.

Shankar Lal made a statement in court and subsequently filed a written statement. He states that his political views are opposed to force. He went to the meeting out of curiosity as he saw it was being held but as soon as it became disorderly he went off to the Congress Committee's office to summon some of the leading citizens to come and stop the disturbance. When he got to the Parade Ground he saw some cavalry proceeding to the Edward Park. He met some friends at the Congress Office and they telephoned to Hakim Ajmal Khan and Mr. Desai was sent to Dr. Ansari's. Finally they returned to the Edward Park to find the whole place deserted. He has produced a number of witnesses. W. D. 7 and 8's evidence has no direct bearing on the events of the 14th. W. D. 9, 10 and 12 corroborate him as regards what happened at the Congress Office and their statements may be accepted as correct; if the time of his arrival is correctly given, viz., 5-30 he must have left the meeting early. W. D. 11, 13, 14 and 30 deal with his presence at the meeting and his leaving it when the disturbance started though W. D. 11 says that Shankar Lal stayed about 5 minutes on the platform after the row began.

Reviewing the evidence as against him I think it may be said that Shankar Lal arrived after the meeting had started, he got on to the plinth which served as platform. He would be in sympathy with the meeting but when the assault on the C. I. D. officials began or rather perhaps when it became apparent that matters were likely to become serious, he left the meeting and went to the Congress Committee Office to inform his leaders. Thus he severed his connection with the unlawful assembly at an early stage. It is not proved that he took any active part in inciting the mob—that was done by Abdul Majid. He certainly did not personally assault any of the C. I. D. I therefore hold that he should be held not guilty of the offences with which he has been charged. I accordingly acquit Shankar Lal.

I will now take up the case of Bhawan Kishor. This man was arrested on 29th April the same day as Fayaz, the approver, from which Mr. S. N. Bose deduces that either Fayaz gave his name or the same person as got Fayaz arrested got Bhawan Kishor arrested; an argument which carries no conviction to my mind. The principal witness against Bhawan Kishor is W. P. 3 Imdad Ali. He states that when the mob excited by Abdul Majid's remarks about the note-taking C. I. D. started to assault a student who had a book in his hand, this accused said it was wrong to beat an innocent student; there (pointing to witness) was a C. I. D. man. Witness denied the impeachment but accused repeated it and was backed up by a chauffeur (apparently Kallan absconding accused) who hit the witness on the head with a *lathi*. Thereon a number of people assaulted him. He was robbed then of his papers and cash. Inspector Muhammad Fakir came to his aid but was also denounced

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as belonging to the C. I. D. and assaulted. Witness got near the gate and there saw various other C. I. D. officers. Some people got witness into a tonga and after some further stoppages and beating he made his escape and took refuge in the Alliance Bank. In cross examination the witness states that he may have omitted to describe Bhawan Kishor in his first verbal statement as he was not in full possession of his senses after the handling he had received. He, however, described him in his written statement, which he sent to Sub-Inspector Amjad Ali who commenced the inquiry in this case. This statement is borne out by the police diaries. Inspector Sat Narain W. P. 1 generally corroborates the witness but was unable to identify any of the assailants. W. P. 2 the approver says that Bhawan Kishore pointed out Imdad Ali as a C. I. D. man after telling the crowd not to beat the innocent student. Mr. Bose lays stress on the fact that he does not mention that the accused detained Imdad Ali, a point mentioned by that witness. This seems to me a trifling omission, as it was quite likely that Fayaz could not see in the crowd what exactly happened. This witness states that on a card among the papers brought to him was the name of Imdad Ali. W. P. 5 merely deposes that Imdad Ali was beaten by a large crowd, he does not identify the accused. W. P. 6 also deposes to the assault and says that he himself was pointed out as a C. I. D. man and assaulted. He does not mention this accused. W. P. 7 Sohan Lal says he saw Bhawan Kishor there and that he said the boy who was being attacked was a student; he pointed out Imdad Ali as a C. I. D. man who should be beaten. In cross examination he states that he gave the name of the accused the next day. This is not quite accurate when compared with the *ziminis* as the investigation did not start till the 17th, the F. I. R. being recorded on the 16th. However the witness appears to have named this accused and described on the first day of the inquiry, so that his statement is substantially accurate. W. P. 14 says he saw Bhawan Kishor in the crowd but did not see him do anything to Inspector Muhammad Fakir; from what he says in cross examination it would seem that he was not in a position to see the assault on Imdad Ali. W. P. 8 definitely states that Bhawan Kishore hit Inspector Muhammad Fakir with a stick. The other witnesses do not mention this accused. From this and the fact that W. P. 13 Hidayat Ulla who says he could recognise Imdad Ali's assailants Mr. Bose seeks to impugn the veracity of the other witnesses. In a case of this sort where an excited mob is engaged in assaulting several people, it is quite possible for one witness to notice one person or one episode and for another quite close by not to see it. Mere omission of a man's name by witness in such a case is no proof that the man was not there.

Mr. Bose has laid stress on the fact that the name of Bhawan Kishor does not appear in the *chalan* of the 20th April but that *chalan* was admittedly incomplete and very little progress had been made in the inquiry. Bhawan Kishor denies that he was at the meeting and alleges that he was at his *pan* shop in the Chaori Bazar which he says he kept open throughout the *hartal* period. In his defence he has produced seven witnesses, W. D. 1a (whose evidence was early recorded at the request of the accused as he was leaving for Bombay) and 1 to 6. The first six witnesses depose to their eating *pan* at Bhawan Kishor's shop on the day of the riot at the time the riot must have been in progress. The reasons they give for remembering this circumstance are various and not very convincing. Mr. Bose suggests that they may remember the fact because Bhawan Kishor is an educated man, which is exceptional for a *pan* seller. W. D. 6, Thana Mal, was originally it seems arrested in this case but afterwards released. He states that he was in Bombay on the day of the trouble. He is apparently produced to discredit the evidence of Hidayat Ulla who was the person who mentioned his presence. Hidayat Ulla however has not given any evidence implicating Bhawan Kishor. My criticism of the defence evidence is that it is of the variety that can easily be procured and

is worth very little. On the other hand the prosecution evidence is perfectly straightforward. The accused can give no reason why he should be falsely accused by these witnesses. He has an artificial eye it appears which is a point on which the witnesses lay stress in their descriptions and which marks him out. The reason for the delay in his arrest may possibly find an explanation in the statement of his own witness W. D. 4 that the accused's shop was shut after the 17th April.

I hold that the presence of Bhawan Kishor at the unlawful assembly on 14th April is clearly proved. He was an active member of that assembly in that he pointed out Imdad Ali as a C. I. D. man who should be assaulted. He seems to have personally assisted in assaulting Imdad Ali by detaining him and may have been one of the assailants of Inspector Mohammad Fakir, though the evidence on this point is not sufficient to enable a definite conclusion to be formed. As a member of an unlawful assembly he is responsible for all the acts performed in pursuance of the common object of that assembly, to wit, the assaults resulting in the causing of simple hurt and grievous hurt respectively to Imdad Ali and Mohammad Fakir while in the discharge of their duty as C. I. D. officers and the dacoity committed on them. I therefore find Bhawan Kishor guilty of offence under sections 332, 333 and 395, Indian Penal Code, read with section 149. As he was more particularly concerned in the assault on Imdad Ali, I sentence him under sections 149-332 to two years' rigorous imprisonment, three months to be in solitary confinement.

I will now take the case of Karim Bakhsh. The approver says that this accused was with the two men who brought the Inspector's pistol and cartridges to the platform. The only other witness who identifies him is W. P. 12 who says that he was with Shankar Lal when the lectures were being given. In cross examination he says he saw him when the pistol was brought. He further admits that he saw the accused in the *hawalat* in the morning before the identification parade, which detracts from the value of his evidence as pointed out by his counsel who quotes in this connection 1915 Cr. L. J. p. 25 and 1918 Cr. L. J. p. 53. However he says that he knew him before and described him as Rahim Bakhsh, *tinwala*.

The accused says he was lying ill at home at the time and has been accused by Fayaz out of enmity. He has produced five witnesses, two as to his illness W. D. 16 and 18, and two as to the alleged enmity W. D. 19 and 20; the remaining witness W. D. 17 gave him a good character. This evidence is not very convincing.

On the evidence I am not prepared to convict this accused as I do not think there is sufficient corroboration of the approver's statement. I therefore acquit the accused Karim Bakhsh.

The case of the remaining two accused, the brothers, Said and Yahsin, may be now considered. These two lads are alleged to have taken the pistol, cartridges and trousseau of Inspector Fakir Muhammad to the platform and there displayed them to the mob. These articles were then taken to Dr. Ansari's house, where the pistol and cartridges were made over to Ghalib who on instructions from Dr. Ansari made over the weapon and ammunition to the Deputy Commissioner. The broad fact is not disputed; the point for consideration is the part played by the accused. The approver Fayaz says that the pistol containing 4 cartridges and 13 loose cartridges were brought together with the trousseau to Abdul Majid, who counted the cartridges and put them in Yahsin's cap. Yahsin had brought the cartridges and Said the pistol. They were then displayed to the crowd. Finally the approver took them to Dr. Ansari's. When it was found that the Doctor was not there, the lads proposed to throw them into a well but he stopped them and handed over the pistol and cartridges to Ghalib. The approver states in cross examination that he knew these two accused well, though in answer to another counsel he said he had asked their names. He explains that this was merely to make sure of them. His explanation of how he came to say that the weapon was six

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chambered when it is really five chambered is obviously absurd and merely made for the sake of trying to explain his mistake. This point however is unimportant as there is no doubt that the pistol in court is the one taken from the Inspector.

Ghalib W. P. 4 says that the approver made the pistol over to him and took the cartridges from another man and handed them to him. He professes to be unable to identify the accused. On his return from handing the revolver and cartridges over to the Deputy Commissioner, he found the piece of trousseau in a palm tub.

W. P. 12 Najmuddin says he saw both accused beating the Inspector. Said took the pistol and Yahsin the cartridges in a cap to Abdul Majid who signed for them to display them to the crowd. He also saw the trousseau but does not say in whose possession they were. In cross examination he further states that these two and others were grappling with the Inspector and tearing off his trousseau as someone had said he had a pistol. He identified the two accused at the thana, when they were by themselves in the lock up.

W. P. 13 Hidayat Ulla who made a plucky attempt to help the Inspector saw Said with the pistol and Yahsin with the cartridges displaying them to the crowd. He also says he saw them during the assault on H. C. Imdad Ali, though he does not specify them as among the assailants of that officer. He knew the accused previously but did not know where they lived.

W. P. 14 Muhammad Bashir says Said had the pistol and Yahsin the cartridges which he displayed in a cap. As regards the reliability of this witness on this point I am somewhat doubtful as he did not mention these details when examined by the police.

W. P. 15 Mahbub says Said displayed the pistol and Yahsin the cartridges in a cap. They said they had been snatched from the C. I. D. man.

W. P. 16 Mustafa Khan says that the man who actually seized the pistol from the Inspector was one Abdur Rahman absoonder.

The accused plead an *alibi* and ascribe their inclusion in the case to enmity with Fayaz, the approver. Two witnesses as to the alleged enmity have been produced, W. D. 28 and 29, the former is obviously trying to tell a tutored story which he has forgotten, while the latter is equally unconvincing. In this connection I should note that W. P. 1, a Sub-Inspector, Zahur Ahmad, in cross examination states that they were mentioned before the arrest of Fayaz. This is correct as from the diaries I find that the police were searching for them as early as 23rd April whereas Fayaz was not arrested till the 24th.

As regards the *alibi*, W. D. 21 merely testified to their good character. W. D. 22 states that they pray regularly in his mosque at Kishanganj; this does not help as he says he was not in Delhi on 14th April. W. D. 23 and 24 testify to their praying regularly but will not commit themselves to saying that the accused were saying their prayers in the mosque at Kishanganj on the day of the riot. W. D. 25 says he saw them standing under the mosque on the 14th April about 4 P.M., this would not prevent their being at the Edward Park about 5 P.M. and in any case this witness is not convincing. W. D. 26 their employer says his workmen work from early morning to the *magrab* prayers. None of his men left work during the *hartal*. Nobody would leave without his permission and knowledge. This however is not very conclusive as he admits that his men get paid by the number of penny whistles that they turn out.

W. D. 27 a fellow workman gives evidence to much the same effect. In short of the defence evidence it may be said that it proves nothing in favour of the accused's *alibi*.

As regards the prosecution evidence Mr. Asaf Ali contends that it is vacillating and contradictory; therefore the accused cannot be held guilty; in this connection he quotes XX Cr. L. J., p. 370. He tries to make out that the approver denied knowing them, though in cross examination he admits knowing them. I am however unable to say that the approver anywhere

denied knowing them. He further urges that there is contradiction because the approver says they said they had snatched the pistol from the C. I. D. whereas Hidayat Ulla says merely that they said the pistol had been taken from the C. I. D. There is no contradiction here.

Another point he takes is that it must be proved that the accused personally committed the offence. In support of this he quotes XVI Cal. p. 442 and 3 C. W. N. p. 174. The latter ruling is not in my library as it is an unauthorised report and counsel has not given it to me with the other books he has sent for perusal; I have not therefore referred to it. The former ruling merely held that separate sentences for rioting and grievous hurt are not legal where it is found that such persons individually did not commit any act which amounted to voluntarily causing hurt but were guilty of the offence under section 149 of the Penal Code. Thus this does not help him.

On the slender basis of a statement by W. D. 30 that people were saying that the Inspector had drawn his pistol and it had been snatched from his hand by a tongawala together with the remark of W. P. 9 that he heard them crying seize the pistol, Mr. Asaf Ali argues that no offence of dacoity was committed as the pistol was merely seized in self-defence to prevent the Inspector using it. This is absolutely contrary to the evidence of Hidayat Ulla and the other prosecution witnesses. His argument that no dacoity was committed because there was no dishonest intent is equally unconvincing.

On the evidence I hold it proved that Said and Yahsin were in possession of the Inspector's revolver and cartridges almost immediately after they had been snatched from him. They took them to Dr. Ansari's and there handed them over. They were clearly members of the unlawful assembly they probably took part in the assault on the Inspector though the evidence in regard to this is not so strong, as that relating to the revolver and the cartridges. They are therefore guilty under section 149 of all the offences committed by the unlawful assembly, viz., offences under sections 332, 333 and 395. In view of the ruling however they should only be sentenced on one count. I therefore sentence Said and Yahsin under sections 149-395 to undergo three years' rigorous imprisonment each, three months to be in solitary confinement.

This case has been somewhat protracted partly owing to the difficulties with which the police had to contend in the course of the investigation and partly owing to the necessity of giving rather long adjournments to suit the convenience of the defence. The police diaries are voluminous and it has taken me a considerable time to go through them.

Of the absoonder accused Kallan has surrendered himself recently and will be dealt with separately.

Abdul Majid and Abdur Rahman are still absoonder; proceedings under sections 87, 88, Criminal Procedure Code, will be taken against them.

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JUDGMENT DATED THE 26TH JUNE 1919 IN BALLIMARAN RIOT CASE OF 17TH APRIL.

IN THE COURT OF M. M. L. CURRIE, Esq., I.C.S., ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, WITH SECTION 30 POWERS, AT DELHI.

Criminal Case No. 24-2 of 1919.

CROWN versus Complainant

(1) Jitu (absoonder); (2) Abdulla; (3) Nathu; (4) Muhammad Din; (5) Yahsin Beg; (6) Ohote Lal; (7) Kanhaiya Lal; (8) Abdul Shakur; (9) Mian Hussain; (10) Muhammad Ahmad; (11) Jamir-ur-Rahman; (12) Kundan of Delhi.

Accused.

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Charge under Sections 332-199, 149-325 and 147, Indian Penal Code. Trial held on 5th May 1919.

Sentence.—Accused Chhote Lal and Kundan each to undergo five years' rigorous imprisonment, three months to be in solitary confinement. Accused Abdul Shakur and Mian Hussain each to undergo three years' rigorous imprisonment, three months to be in solitary confinement. Accused Nathu to undergo imprisonment till the court rises. Accused Muhammad Din to undergo six months' rigorous imprisonment, one month to be in solitary confinement. Other accused except Jitu (absconding) are acquitted. Accused Jamir-ur-Rahman discharged.

Judgment.

This case in which the accused have been charged with offences under Sections 147, 149-325, 149-332, has arisen out of an *emeute* which took place in the Chandni Chowk on 17th of April. The facts briefly are as follows:—

A tonga drove down the Chandni Chowk from the direction of the clock tower towards Fatehpuri containing 3 or 4 passengers and these people were shouting out that the police had bayoneted a man and thrown him into the Queen's Gardens. They said that the people should shut their shops and go there. A crowd began to collect armed with lathis and bamboo tree guards. It surged apparently towards the clock tower and later returned. The first thing that happened was a murderous assault on Turab Ali, Head Constable at a point between Bombay Azim Hotel and the corner of Ballimaran. When the crowd reached Ballimaran it assumed a threatening attitude towards the police picket on duty there, ordering them to surrender their arms. The police begged the crowd to desist but the crowd would not listen to them. Eventually the crowd attacked the picket with lathis and stones and the Head Constable in charge finally gave the picket orders to fire. Thereupon the crowd scattered to some extent and the police picket were able to make good their retreat to the Town Hall.

Before proceeding to deal with the cases of the individual accused there are certain general observations which it is necessary to make. In the first place some of the defence counsel have argued that the assault on Head Constable Turab Ali was a totally different transaction from the attack on the Ballimaran picket and cannot therefore be tried in one and the same case. It is obvious from the perusal of the evidence that this contention cannot be sustained. The rumour that the police had bayoneted a man infuriated the crowd and appears to have been directly responsible for the assault on Turab Ali. The crowd having tasted blood then went on and attacked the police picket. A consideration of the evidence and the relative position of the various places show clearly that the assault on Turab Ali was an act of the same unlawfully assembly as attacked the police picket.

Secondly it has been objected that there is some discrepancy as to what the rumour was regarding the bayoneting. The police witnesses who were members of the picket, W. P. 4, 5, 6, 8 and 16 say that the tonga-wala or his passengers merely cried out that one man had been bayoneted. W. P. 1 says that the rumour was 4 men had been bayoneted. W. P. 2 speaks of 2 men. Considering that these two witnesses were some distance further down the Chandni Chowk than the picket I do not regard this as any very serious discrepancy. It is natural for a false rumour to rapidly become exaggerated and apparently the rumour of the bayoneting arose from the arrest and removal to the Town Hall of a man who was afterwards convicted of intimidating shop-keepers.

The third point that calls for consideration is the question of identification of the accused. In the first place it is objected that with the exception of W. P. 1, 2 and 3 all the other identifying witnesses are policemen who were on duty with the picket. Now it seems to me that these policemen are naturally the people best

qualified to give evidence as to who assaulted them. In a case of this description it is almost impossible to obtain any independent evidence. A perusal of the police diaries shows that the police made every endeavour to obtain independent testimony but all the persons they examined professed ignorance of the identity of any rioters, many of them alleging probably with a considerable amount of truth, that as soon as the disturbance commenced they retired to shut themselves up in their shops. Further it is alleged that the identification is unsatisfactory because the identifying witnesses were frequently present at the Kotwali. Now considering that the witnesses are policemen and also considering the then state of affairs in Delhi; it appears to me that this was unavoidable. Most of the accused were as a matter of fact arrested by men who identified them. Again exception is taken to the fact that the detailed descriptions of the accused were not given by these witnesses in the first instance. This objection appears to me to be somewhat hypocritical. The state of affairs at the time was abnormal and the statements of the members of the police picket were recorded in a very summary fashion as was natural under the circumstances. Apart from this it is only to be expected that a man who has taken part in an affair of this nature should in the first place only be able to describe one or two of his assailants whose identity particularly impressed itself on his mind. He would however very probably be able to identify others when confronted with them, as the sight of them would refresh his memory. I therefore do not consider that very much can be made of this argument.

Fourthly it was objected that some of accused were not arrested for a considerable time after the riot. This again is exactly what one would expect. The accused were collected gradually as various witnesses recognized them in the streets and arrested them. It is quite possible that some of them may have been out of Delhi as was certainly the case with Kundan accused. A perusal of the *ziminis* shows that besides the accused now in court a number of other people were arrested and released owing to insufficient identification. Generally speaking the police seemed to have proceeded with great discrimination.

Some of the defence counsel I may note have argued that the whole of the evidence given by the police witnesses is to be mistrusted on the ground that the police find themselves in an awkward position owing to having opened fire on the mob and therefore are seeking to justify their action by securing a conviction in the present case. In fact one counsel went so far as to propound the theory that possibly the picket never had been attacked but had fired spontaneously on the crowd in a spirit of revenge when they learnt of the murderous assault on Head Constable Turab Ali, but this theory is amply controverted by the fact that a number of the constables forming the picket have marks of various injuries on their bodies. I see no reason to discredit the evidence on this ground.

For convenience sake I may here give a tabular statement showing the dates of arrest of the respective accused—

Name of person arrested.	Date of arrest.
Abdulla and Nathu	19th April.
Muhammad Din and Yahsin	20th April.
Chhote	27th April.
Kanhaya Lal	28th April.
Abdul Shakur	29th April.
Mian Hussain and Muhammad	
Ahmad	30th April.
Kundan	1st May.

I will now turn to a consideration of the cases of the individual accused.

I will deal first with the case of Chhote and Kundan who have been identified as among the assailants of Head Constable Turab Ali. From the evidence of W. P. 7 coupled with that of Lieutenant-Colonel James, C.I.E., I.M.S., Civil Surgeon, W. P. 17, it is clear that Turab Ali had a very narrow escape from death. As a result

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of the injuries he received he has lost one eye and it has been necessary to remove a good deal of the bone of his upper jaw, his brain also appears to have been somewhat affected, and he is not in a condition to make any deposition in court.

As against Chhote and Kundan we have the evidence of W. P. 1 Rahimuddin and W. P. 2 Azimuddin, his son, who keep the Bombay Azim Hotel in Chandni Chowk. From their evidence it appears that they were in the verandah of their hotel which commands a full view of the Chandni Chowk. After the arrival of the tonga which spread the rumour of a man having been bayoneted it appears that Turab Ali was walking along with a bottle in his hand. Four men assaulted him and finally he was stretched senseless on the ground. Others also apparently beat him while on the ground. Out of these 4 both witnesses identify Chhote and Kundan who came from the shop of Sham Lal Panwari who is their employer. This shop is at the entrance of Kucha Ghasi Ram on the opposite side of the road from the hotel and in full view of the hotel.

W. P. 1 mentions that Nawab Qasim Ali of Meerut was sitting with him in the verandah and the defence have objected that this man was not produced. A reference to the *ziminis* however shows that he stated that he was unable to identify any of the accused and therefore I fail to see what the use of producing him would have been. Both witnesses agree that Kundan was the first who attacked Turab Ali. Exception has been taken to the fact that apparently W. P. 1 first mentioned what he had seen to Sub-Inspector Nazirul Hak of Sabzi Mandi apparently quite casually, but I do not see how this can be held to vitiate his evidence as he is a resident of the Sabzi Mandi ilaga at Bara Hindu Rao, though of the Sabzi Mandi situated in the Chandni Chowk. It has been said that this shows that he was prompted by enmity but surely had this been the motive actuating him he would have imparted the information to the Kotwali police who had already started their enquiries into the case.

W. P. 5 Lance-Head Constable Karim Bukhsh identifies Chhote as among the assailants of the picket, no one else however corroborates this; I do not therefore attach great weight to this piece of evidence.

Both the accused allege that they were in the *pan godown* of their master Sham Lal which is situated in Gali Bhaironwali round the corner of Kucha Ghasi Ram and out of sight of the chowk as may be seen from the sketch I have made and placed on the file. Chhote Lal alleges that he had a quarrel with the hotel proprietor over the non-return of some broken soda water bottles, while Kundan alleges enmity on account of his refusal one day to carry a pot of water for the hotel keeper when the *bhishti* had not come. W. P. 1 Rahim Uddin denies any quarrel with Chhote over soda water bottles and denies dealing with him though he is not prepared to say that the hotel servants have not got things there. His son W. P. 2 says the hotel servants get ice from Chhote's shop. Neither of them were questioned about the alleged enmity with Kundan. In their defence these men have produced 7 witnesses W. D. 24 to 30. Of these W. D. 25, Sham Lal, their master, states that both the accused were in his godown from 10 A.M. to 4 P.M. He is naturally a partial witness. W. D. 24 Muhammad Ishak has the next godown and says he saw Chhote there about 11 A.M. or 12. This does not help as the riot was in the afternoon. W. D. 26 says on his way to draw water he passed the godown and saw both accused there from 11 to noon and again about 12-30. W. D. 27 also claims to have seen both accused there but is by no means convincing. These are the witnesses to the *alibi* and as I have pointed out the evidence of Muhammad Ishak who might have carried some weight does not help the accused in the least. The other evidence is valueless. The remaining three witnesses W. D. 28, 29 and 30 depose to a quarrel between Chhote and a somewhat nebulous *hotelwala*. They are extremely unconvincing. Kundan produced no evidence on the subject of his alleged enmity.

On a review of the evidence I think the evidence of W. P. 1 and 2 is worthy of credit and proves conclusively that Kundan and Chhote Lal headed the assault on Head-constable, Turab Ali. There were many others in the mob and it is of course impossible to say who struck the blow which actually caused the grievous hurt. The accused were, however, members of the unlawful assembly and as such are liable. I therefore convict Chhote Lal and Kundan of an offence under Section 149, Indian Penal Code, read with Section 325. Being members of the unlawful assembly they are also technically guilty of the offence of rioting under 147 and also of the offence under Section 149 read with 332. In view, however, of 31 P. R. 1916 to which I have been referred I will only sentence them under 149-325.

To turn now to the case of the remaining accused who are alleged to have taken part in what may be called the second act of the drama, viz., the attack on the police picket on duty at Ballimaran. As regards these accused we have to rely entirely on the evidence of the constables composing the picket except indirectly in the case of four accused whose presence in the neighbourhood is conclusively proved by their having been hit with buck-shot. I have carefully examined the police diaries with a view to seeing how far the evidence may be relied on.

The first accused is Kanhaya Lal whose defence is an *alibi* in support of which he has produced some fairly good evidence. He is identified as having been among the rioters by W. P. 4, 5 and 6. He appears to have been mentioned early in the proceedings but was not arrested till 28th April. The statements made by the Principal witness W. P. 4 Muhammad Afzal in cross-examination with regard to the arrest of this accused are so evasive and unsatisfactory that I am doubtful as to whether he really took part in the riot. I therefore acquit him.

The next accused is Muhammad Ahmad who has been identified as present by W. P. 4, 5 and 8. From the *ziminis* it appears that he was called into the Kotwali as an outsider with others among whom certain suspects were placed for the purpose of an identification parade. He was then identified by two constables, one of whom does not now identify him. He immediately said that his shop had been open all the time and he had never been near the riot. This statement was to some extent corroborated by certain persons among whom were some of the witnesses who have now been produced in his defence. In the circumstances I think his may be a case of mistaken identity. I give him the benefit of the doubt and acquit him.

The third accused is Abdul Shakur. He is identified by W. P. 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13. There appears to be no reason to doubt his identification, though some of the witnesses are wrong in the date they give for his identification when under cross-examination. His defence is that he was away for the day at Nizam Uddin. In support thereof he produced 5 witnesses W. P. (sic) 1 to 5. W. D. 1 says he went there by the same train and in the same carriage as accused. W. D. 2 says he was at Nizam Uddin with W. D. 5 Ata-ur-Rahman the accused joined them about noon and stayed with them till about 5 P.M. W. D. 2 says they sat on a durrie while W. D. 5 says it was *chitai* which he had spread. W. D. 5 also tells a highly improbable story of his utilising the services of the accused as a nurse for his small girl for the day. He also says they all drove home together in a ghari leaving the shrine about 5 P.M. a point on which W. D. 2 is strangely silent.

W. D. 3 says that he went to get soda water and Abdul Shakur said he was going to Nizam Uddin; this was about 10 A.M. About 2 hours later he went to get more soda and found Abdul Shakur had gone. W. D. 4 says Abdul Shakur left him in charge when he went to Nizam Uddin about 9 A.M. He returned about 5 P.M. He says he sold 2 bottles of lemonade to W. D. 3 about 11 or 12. He also says that the day before he was arrested a party of police came and that one havildar who from

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his description might be W. P. 5 spoke quietly to Abdul Shakur.

This defence evidence rings false from beginning to end and I see no reason to disbelieve the prosecution witnesses in the case of this man. I therefore hold it proved that Abdul Shakur was one of the assailants of the picket and convict him of an offence under Section 149-332. He is also guilty of offences under Section 147 and 149-325 as a member of the unlawful assembly.

The next two accused are Chhote Lal and Kundan with whose case I have already dealt.

The sixth accused is Yahsin. He was wounded in the right shoulder with buck-shot. His defence is that he was a mere passer-by taking some food to his brother-in-law. He is only identified by one witness W. P. 5. Karim Bukhsh Lance-Head Constable. His pleader S. N. Bose urges that his may be a case of mistaken identity and that the real riot was in the chowk and not inside Ballimaran where the accused was hit according to his own statement. This is not convincing in view of the evidence given by the prosecution. He has produced two witnesses who say that he had some roti with him; W. D. 7 says he saw him before the firing. While W. D. 6 says he saw him lying there with the roti beside him afterwards. As only one witness identifies him in court as having been among the assailants, I am prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt and accept his version that he was a mere passer-by.

The 7th accused Abdulla was hit in the chest. He says he was standing at the gate of the Imliwala mosque after saying his prayers. Only W. P. 8 Abdul Aziz identifies him. He has produced 4 witnesses W. D. 34 to 37 who testify that he is a good and peaceful student of the Naumania School. This evidence is not of much value. However, the position of the gate of the Imliwala Mosque with reference to the picket's station is such that he might have received his wounds as he states, if he was looking on at the riot. I will give him the benefit of the doubt and acquit him.

The 8th accused is Mian Hassan, who has been identified by W. P. 4, 5, 8, 9 and 14 as one of the assailants. His defence is that he was at home on the day of the riot. He alleges that he has been arrested because he refused Tufail Ahmed W. P. 9 a bribe when he was going to report the loss of a bundle of fents at the Kotwali. He produced three witnesses. Of these one W. D. 14 is to prove his *alibi* on the day of the riot while the other two W. D. 13 and 15 depose in a most unconvincing manner as to Tufail Ahmed's attempt to extort a bribe from the accused. I see no reason to doubt the prosecution evidence in the case of this accused. He was clearly one of the assailants of the picket. I therefore find Mian Hassan guilty of an offence under Section 149-332 and guilty technically under Sections 147 and 149-329.

The next accused is Nathu, who was hit in the leg with buck-shot. His defence is that he was going to get medicine for a dog from the Veterinary Hospital. He is identified by W. P. 4, who says he threw stones. He has produced defence evidence in the shape of his master W. D. 31 and two others who say that he is a good boy. I think it highly probable that he joined in the riot in a fit of boyish exuberance. I therefore find him guilty of an offence under Section 149-332 and also technically guilty under Sections 147 and 149-325.

The last accused in court is Muhammad Din, who was one of the injured. His defence is that he was going to get *ata* at a shop in Ballimaran where apparently it was being sold at cheap rates when he was shot. He produced two witnesses who say that they found him wounded in Ballimaran. He is identified by W. P. 5 as one of the assailants of the picket. His pleader argues that the fact that he was found in Ballimaran shows that he was a mere sight-seer as the rioters were not in Ballimaran but only in the Chowk. As I have already remarked in the case of Yahsin, this theory is opposed to the weight of the evidence and in any case the fact that he was seen wounded in Ballimaran after the riot does not show in the least where he was when he was hit

especially as his own witness W. O. 39 says he was able to walk. I see no reason to doubt the prosecution evidence and convict Muhammad Din of an offence under Section 149-332. I also find him technically guilty under Sections 147 and 149-325.

We now come to the question of sentence. Those accused whom I have convicted I have found guilty of offences under Sections 147, 149-325 and 149-332. Following 31 P. R. 1916 I will only sentence them on one count each.

Chhote Lal and Kundan I have held were among the assailants of Head-Constable Turab Ali, the appropriate section under which to sentence them is therefore 149-325. Turab Ali was very badly knocked about and the accused are lucky in that he has survived. The assault was a most unprovoked one and a heavy sentence is called for. The maximum penalty under Section 325 is 7 years. I sentence Chhote Lal and Kundan each to five years' rigorous imprisonment, three months to be in solitary confinement.

For the remaining accused the most appropriate section under which to sentence them is 149-332, for which the maximum penalty is 3 years. The offence they have committed is a serious one.

Abdul Shakur was obviously prominent in the assault as so many of the picket have been able to identify him. I sentence him to three years' rigorous imprisonment, three months to be in solitary confinement.

Mian Hassan has also been identified by a number of witnesses. I sentence him also to three years' rigorous imprisonment, three months to be in solitary confinement.

Nathu is a mere boy of about 13 years of age. He has been sufficiently punished already by the time he has spent in lock-up. I sentence him to imprisonment till the court rises.

Muhammad Din does not appear to have been very prominent and has also suffered some injury. I will deal leniently with him and sentence him to six months' rigorous imprisonment, one month to be in solitary confinement.

I have not imposed fines on any of the accused as from their status there would be little chance of recovering any fine that might be imposed.

I should note that the kit of the police picket was stolen but there is nothing on the record to connect the present accused directly with the theft.

In conclusion I may remark that from the evidence the police appear to have acted with great forbearance in face of much provocation.

Jitu accused is absconding, proceedings under Sections 87-88, Criminal Procedure Code, will be taken in his case.

13.

INVESTIGATIONS INTO AGITATION ON RAILWAYS.

Letter No. 172-C.-Home, dated the 13th August 1919, from the Hon'ble Mr. C. A. Barron, C.I.E., Chief Commissioner, Delhi, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 153-C.-Home, dated the 7th July 1919, I have the honour to forward Mr. Begbie's final report on his enquiries into the existence of a railway strike organisation during the April disturbances. I also enclose for the information of the Government of India a copy of the judgment* pronounced on the 30th July 1919 by the Additional District Magistrate, Delhi, in what is known as the Shakurpur wire-cutting and railway strike case. Mr. Currie's judgment gives an admirable resumé of the facts connected with the strike among the railway staff at Shakurpur on the night of the 13th April and shows, I think, that the decisions to try the case in the ordinary courts, and not to import a charge under Section 121, Indian Penal Code, have been justified.

In addition to the judgment I have perused the evidence given at the trial bearing on the subject of the telegrams which passed between Delhi and Shakurpur urging

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the staff to strike. The first message from Delhi was received at Shakurpur about 9-30 A.M. on the 12th April and was addressed to telegraph offices, postal offices and railway offices to the effect that Gandhi had been arrested and they should leave work. Though this telegram led to some discussion, no strike took place that day. About the same time on the morning of the 13th, a second message was received from Delhi which the Shakurpur signaller had repeated. It was as follows:—"All railways, Great Indian Peninsula, Rajputana-Malwa Railway, Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway and offices leave work to-night from 0 hours undoln (sic) passive resistance A. H. H. Gandhi, arrested modl (sic) from Indian Brothers." The meaning of the mutilated words could not be given by the witnesses. This message, and a visit of some of the staff to Delhi to learn what was happening there, led to the strike on the night of the 13th. The evidence proves that the strike was planned to show sympathy with the *hartal* then in progress in Delhi City, to mourn the arrest of Gandhi and to carry out his passive resistance movement, in which the railway staff had been upbraided by men in Delhi for doing nothing to render assistance. This bears out the conclusions of Mr. Begbie and his officers that there was no anterior organisation to foment strikes on Indian railways.

3. The "Indian Brothers" message was traced back by Mr. Begbie's officers from Delhi to Etawah where its origin can be ascribed to the same cause. There seems also to be sufficient reason for holding that the first message suggesting a railway strike came to Delhi from Lahore at midday on the 11th April. This was a much more alarming message than the others, as it alleged that troops and the public were affected, that Lahore was being looted and that the men on the North-Western Railway had decided to strike. But even this telegram does not point to any previous organisation. The "Rowlatt" message and the others mentioned in Mr. Begbie's report were not received at Shakurpur. I think that if any organisation had been at work, beyond the passive resistance and *hartal* movements engineered in the large cities and towns, some trace of it would have been discovered by Mr. Begbie and his officers during the 12 weeks for which this enquiry lasted.

Letter No. 8, dated the 29th July 1919, from Mr. A. F. K. Begbie, Superintendent, Government Railway Police, Agra (United Provinces.)

Since the date of my last report (No. 7 of July 3rd) enquiries have been prosecuted in Delhi, Allahabad, Karnal and Umballa, but without any definite results. My officers did not succeed in connecting the "Rowlatt" message with any definite act of collusion between discontented signallers and political agitators. Their conclusions are embodied in the attached finding, with which I agree generally. This finding bears out my own opinion that there was no organisation worthy of the name to bring about strikes amongst the Indian staff on railways. What occurred can be traced to the public agitation over the passing of the Rowlatt Acts, preceded in the case of the Indian staff on railways, and especially on the North-Western Railway, with general discontent over the inadequacy of the rates of pay.

In accordance with instructions received from the Chief Commissioner this special enquiry was brought to a conclusion on July 22.

Report by Inspector Khairat Nabi and Sub-Inspector Raghu-nath Prasad, dated the 22nd July 1919.

FINDING.

We were deputed to enquire into the origin of the under-mentioned Praetice message intercepted at Bina and Agra Fort on 12th April 1919 and at Kharagpur and Patna on

the day following and to find out if there was any organisation in existence as to a general strike by Indian staffs on the railways in India.

"On receiving words 'the Rowlatt' Indian military soldiers decided to strike in Punjab as well as East Indian Railway, and Oudh and Rohilkhand Railway. Telegraph to Great Indian Peninsula and Bengal Nagpur Railways to look out and do needful at once."

The office of origin was not stated in the Bina message. The Agra message was purported to have emanated from Secretary, Parel (Bombay) and the Kharagpur and Patna ones from Secretary, Delhi.

Patient and careful enquiries have been made by us for about three months and we now proceed to write our finding in the following terms:—

There were agitations in almost all parts of India in connection with the Rowlatt Bills passed into law by Government of India in March last. The well-known Indian leader Mr. M. K. Gandhi preached *Satyagraha* (Passive resistance) in protest of these Bills and actually visited Delhi (the seat of the Government) on March 7th. Some 15 influential men, such as Dr. Ansari, Swami Shradhdhanand and Lala Shankar Lal of the city, took the vow and a *Satyagraha Sabha* was formed. A meeting was held by these *Satyagrahis* on March 27th, Swami Shradhdhanand being in the chair, and the public (Government and Railway employees not excluded) were requested to keep fast and suspend their work on Sunday, the 30th March, as a mark of their utter dissatisfaction with the newly-passed laws. The portions of the speeches made on the occasion and having reference to the terms of our enquiries were as follows:—

"The fast is not to be regarded in any shape or form in the nature of a hunger strike or as designed to put any pressure upon Government."

"Employees, who are required to work even on Sundays, may only suspend work after obtaining previous leave."

"I do not hesitate to recommend these suggestions for adoption by public servants, for, though it is unquestionably the right thing for them not to take part in political discussions and gatherings, in my opinion, they have undoubted rights to express on vital matters their feelings in the very limited manner herein suggested."

These cautiously-worded speeches, which by themselves did not directly invite Railway employees to go on strike, in our opinion, fanned the flame of agitation amongst such of the railway staff as were half literate and already discontented owing to economic conditions prevailing in the country. There was a *hartal* in the city on March 30th: and a mob attacked the railway station. The city again went on strike on April 6th, the date of the general *hartal* all over India, as suggested by Mr. Gandhi. Meetings were held in almost all important centres of the country in protest of the Rowlatt Acts and, further disturbances being apprehended by Government, Mr. Gandhi was arrested at Palwal on the night of April 9th-10th and some leaders at Amritsar and other places in the Punjab on April 10th. In protest against these arrests, Delhi, Amritsar, Lahore and some other cities went on strike on that date (10th) and continued doing so for several days. A rumour was afloat in Lahore on April 11th that the Indian military soldiers there had decided to side with the public if the Government interfered with the *Satyagraha* movement. Lahore is the headquarters of the North Western Railway which practically possesses the monopoly of railway traffic in the Punjab. The employees of this railway had, from 4 or 5 months previously, been clamouring for increase in their salaries and their applications had not till then (April 10th) met with sympathetic consideration. They had, some time before the *hartal* troubles, threatened superior authority with a strike if their prayers were not acceded to. Discontented as they were, one of them (probably Signaller Ghulam

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Hussain, Lahore) sent a verbal message to Delhi at about 12 hours on April 11th, saying that—

- (1) the public had gone against Government ;
- (2) the Indian soldiers had decided to strike ;
- (3) the city (Lahore) was being looted ;
- (4) they (railway servants) also had decided to strike, and
- (5) other railways should be asked to follow suit.

This message was received at Delhi by Signaller Rup Ram who informed other signallers working in the Telegraph office. Delhi is an important railway centre from which, unlike Lahore, several railways (East Indian Railway, Oudh and Rohilkhand Railway, Great Indian Peninsula, Bombay, Baroda and Central India, metre gauge, North Western Railway, etc.) radiate. Among the signallers present at Delhi were Shyam Lal and Fazl Elahi who lived in the city and at the instance of agitators had a few days previously been asking other railway servants to go on strike in sympathy with the *Satyagraha* movement. They appear to have consulted on the matter with some of the leading members of the city in the course of the day (11th April) and forwarded the messages to the other railways on the day following (April 12th) in terms of the messages forming the subject of our enquiry. There were no strikes on any railway except the North Western Railway in obedience to this invitation, which goes to show that there was no previous organisation in existence to bring about strikes on railways. The message itself would appear to be a suggestive one, which excluded the idea of any such organisation. Another point in support of this opinion will be found in a letter published in "the Independent," dated 16th April 1909, under the signature of one Bashir Ahmed of Delhi. He sent this letter to the press a few days after the *hartal* of the 10th and *inter alia* suggested therein that Government and Railway employes should also have gone on strike along with the citizens. With the exception of a few employes of the East Indian Railway, and Oudh and Rohilkhand Railway at Delhi, none at other stations appear to have been consulted as to the contemplated strike before the despatch of the "Rowlatt" message from Delhi.

Owing to high prices caused by the world-wide war, the employes of each and every railway had, long before the circulation of this message, applied for increase in their pay, a matter of purely economic nature. With the exception of the North Western Railway, the authorities of almost all other railways had promised to make a suitable increase in the salaries of their men and the latter were not affected by the "Rowlatt" message which was of a political nature. The North Western Railway men took advantage of the Punjab disturbances and attempted to embarrass the Railway Administration and consequently the Government at the (supposed) right moment.

The following stations of the North Western Railway actually went on strike and the reason of other stations not doing so will be found in the fact that either suitable military arrangements had already been made at those stations or there was lack of unity among the staff :—

- | | |
|----------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1. Delhi-Kishanganj. | } Branch line on 14th April 1919. |
| 2. Shakurpur. | |
| 3. Jakhal. | |
| 4. Bhatinda. | |
| 5. Bahawalnagar. | } Main line on 15th April 1919. |
| 6. Samasata. | |
| 7. Khanewal. | |
| 8. Ambala. | |
| 9. Multan city. | |

Nos. 1 to 6 struck work in obedience to two Practice messages (Indian Brothers' ones, which will be dealt with shortly) received from Delhi and Nos. 7 to 9 on telegraphic instructions from Lahore. The strikes at Nos. 2, 5 and 7 were somewhat serious and the staff responsible were prosecuted. The rest were dealt with departmentally.

The Indian Brothers' messages were traced back to Etawah where a discontented Signaller Gokal Behari Pande had played the leading part. They invited all

railway servants and Railway Mail Service employes to go on strike, in sorrow for Mr. Gandhi's arrest.

Besides the above, there were short strikes by the clerks of the District Traffic Superintendent's office, Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway (metre gauge), the students of the East Indian Railway Training School and some coolies at Delhi on April 10th just after the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest was received there. There had been a short strike at Ghaziabad (East Indian Railway) on April 6th, which was more economic than political.

The whole thing, it would appear, was done on the spur of the moment after the arrest of Mr. Gandhi and other leaders and the supposition that there was an organisation in existence to bring about a general strike on railways before the disturbances in the Punjab or elsewhere is not substantiated by our enquiries.

The "Rowlatt" message was in all probability drafted in Delhi where the Lahore verbal message was apparently delayed for about 24 hours. It may be noted here that after the first disturbance on March 30th, the citizens of Delhi were divided in opinion as to the next *hartal* on April 6th and a notice was in fact issued by the *Satyagraha Sabha* on the 5th that there should be no *hartal* on the 6th, but the party headed by Maulana Abdul Majid, Lala Shanker Lal and Mr. Indra induced the public not to obey this notice. It is strongly suspected (though actual proof could not be obtained owing to the Hindu-Muhammadan unity in the city) that Signallers Shyam Lal (since resigned) and Fazl Elahi as well as Panna Lal (a notorious Arya Samajist and follower of Swami Shradhanand who was dismissed on April 2nd, on some departmental charge but lived in the city during the *hartal* days) mixed with these citizens and had the "Rowlatt" message drafted for circulation. The sender's name was given as "Secretary, Delhi" to carry greater weight.

As regards the message intercepted at Agra, the sender's name "Secretary, Patel" was undoubtedly fictitious and was inserted with the same object. In our opinion this message was sent by Jhansi to Agra.

Besides making local enquiries at the stations concerned, records of the Criminal Investigation Department and Railway Administrations at Lahore, Delhi and other places were consulted but no indication of the supposed "organisation" was discovered.

The "Rowlatt" message was not intercepted at Patna and our enquiries went to show that it was never signalled along the East Indian Railway system.

The message intercepted at Kharagpur was received there from Katni (*via* Bilaspur) which had received it from Delhi through Allahabad or Bina. Those intercepted at Bina and Agra had been received from Jhansi, which had, in its turn, received them from Delhi direct or through Allahabad. The message travelled up to Kharagpur on the Bengal Nagpur Railway and down to Itarsi on the Great Indian Peninsula Railway.

No records are kept of practice messages and it was with great difficulty that we were able to trace the origin of the messages under enquiry. Moreover the telegraph system is so constituted that it is impossible to attempt to fix the responsibility for the transmission of unwritten messages upon any individual signallers, a fact admitted by all the railway authorities interviewed by us during our enquiries.

14
JUDGMENT DATED THE 30TH JULY 1919, BY MR. M. L. CURRIE, ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, ON THE STRIKE AT SHAKURPUR.

IN THE COURT OF M. M. L. CURRIE, ESQ., I.C.S., ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTRATE AT DELHI.

Criminal Case No. 143-3 of 1919.

Trial held on 16th May 1919.

CROWN

versus

Complainant,

- (1) Hari Chand, son of Moti Ram, A. S. M., Shakurpur, (2) Kanhaiya

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Lal, son the Chand Mal, correspondence clerk, (3) Madho Parshad, son of Sundar Lal of G. I. P. Railway, (4) Hari Narain, son of Kishan Narain, Cabinman, G. I. P. Railway, (5) Wilayati Ram, son of Nihal Chand, Surveyor, Bhatinda District, (6) Nasir, son of Karim Bakhsh, Shunting Jemadar, Shakurpur, (7) Alladia, son of Juman, Pointsman, Shakurpur, (8) Alladia, son of Amir Ali, Cabinman, Shakurpur, (9) Abdur Rahim, son of Abdur Rahman, Chaprasi at Shakurpur, (10) Murad, son of Sikan-dar, Lampman, Shakurpur, (11) Umrao, son of Galar, Gateman, Shakurpur, (12) Gopi Ram, son of Hari Ram, Shedman, Shakurpur, (13) Pita, son of Gobind, Greaser, Shakurpur, (14) Agha Husain, son of Wilayat Husain, Porter, Shakurpur, (15) Sham Bihari Lal (approver)

Accused.

Charge under Section 25, Telegraph Act with 109, I. P. C. and Section 24 of Indian Defence (Consolidated) Act.

Sentences.—Accused No. 15 Sham Bihari Lal (approver) acquitted. No. 11 Umrao, discharged. No. 4 Hari Narain, acquitted. No. 3 Madho Pershad, discharged. No. 1 Hari Chand to undergo 2 years' rigorous imprisonment including three months' solitary confinement. No. 2 Kanhaiya Lal to undergo 18 months' rigorous imprisonment, including 2 months' solitary confinement. No. 5 Wilayati Ram to undergo 18 months' rigorous imprisonment including 2 months' solitary confinement. No. 6 Nasir to undergo 1 year's rigorous imprisonment including 1 month's solitary confinement. No. 8 Alladia, Cabinman, to undergo one year's rigorous imprisonment including one month's solitary confinement. No. 7 Alladia, Pointsman, to undergo 2 years' rigorous imprisonment including 3 months' solitary confinement. No. 9 Abdur Rahim to undergo 2 years' rigorous imprisonment including 3 months' solitary confinement. No. 12 Gopi Ram to undergo three years' rigorous imprisonment, including 3 months' solitary confinement. No. 10 Murad to undergo 6 months' rigorous imprisonment. No. 13 Pita to undergo 6 months' rigorous imprisonment. No. 14 Agha Husain to undergo 6 months' rigorous imprisonment.

Judgment.

The accused in this case are charged with offences in connection with the strike that took place at Shakurpur station on the night of the 13th-14th April, in the course of which some of the telegraph wires were also cut.

In writing this judgment I think it will be convenient if I first give an account of what happened merely dealing with the broad outlines of the approver's story and leaving the consideration of details till I come to deal with the cases of the individual accused. I will then consider how far the approver's story is corroborated and after that proceed to deal with the various legal questions raised and certain other matters of general interest. Finally, I will consider the cases of the individual accused.

Sham Bihari Lal, W. P. 1, was one of the ringleaders in this strike. The prosecution against him has been withdrawn and he has been produced as a Crown witness. He is the only witness who gives a connected account of the whole affair. His story is as follows :—

On the 11th of April he reached Shakurpur on transfer from Chishtian and was due to go on duty at 2 A.M. on the night of the 13th. On the morning of the 12th between 9-30 and 10 A.M. Karnani Dhan, signaller, received a practice message from Delhi to the effect that all railways were going to strike at midnight as Mr. Gandhi had been arrested. This message was shown by the signaller to Babu Rustom Ali, Assistant Station Master, in

the presence of various other clerks. It was apparently discussed and finally torn up. About 11-30 P.M. Hari Chand came and fetched Sham Lal, signaller, from his quarters in which the approver was also living and said that he was going to the station to find out if any other wire had come. About a quarter of an hour later he returned and said that no news had come and they had better continue to work until a further wire was received.

On the 13th of April between 9-30 and 10 A.M. another message was received by Babu Sham Lal, signaller. This message was mutilated and the approver himself sat down at the telegraph instrument and got it repeated from Delhi. It was to much the same effect as the message received the day before. Accidentally a carbon copy of this message was also made. Hari Chand took one copy to the Assistant Station Master on duty, Amir Ali, and the meaning of the wire was discussed. About 11-30 A.M. the approver and a party of other railway employes went to Delhi by goods train; with the exception of Karnani Dhan, the whole party got down at the Sadr Junction Cabin. Some of them went up into the Sadr Junction Cabin and asked the Babu there whether he was ready to strike. They then communicated on the telephone with another Cabin. After that they went to the A. D. C. Cabin and interviewed the Babu there. They left him and met two Great Indian Peninsula Railway Babus and went on towards the Central Cabin. While the Shakurpur party went to the Delhi North Western Railway Goods Office, two Great Indian Peninsula Railway Babus went towards the East Cabin. At the North Western Railway Goods Office a clerk informed them that he knew nothing about the strike except that the East Indian Railway porters had left work that day. It appears they also visited the North Western Railway Loco Shed at Delhi. Eventually they returned to Shakurpur by the 9 Up train which reaches there about 5 P.M. They then dispersed to their quarters. About 6-30 P.M. a meeting was held in front of Hari Chand's quarters and it was decided to stop work at 2 A.M. that night. Various members of the party which had been to Delhi assured the meeting that the Great Indian Peninsula, East Indian Railway and North Western Railway men were also ready to strike. About 8 P.M. another meeting gathered in front of Kanhaiya Lal's quarters. At this meeting Harballab Das and Ramji Das, Yard Foremen, pointed out that it was futile to strike at 2 A.M. as a number of men went off duty then and would not be implicated in the strike. It was therefore eventually decided that the strike should commence at midnight. Actually the strike seems to have commenced at 0-40.

Jai Narain, the Assistant Station Master on duty, refused to strike or make over charge to Amir Ali before 2 A.M. He was hustled out of the telegraph office to which he had gone and all lights and signals were extinguished. At that time 227 Up goods was standing by the distant signal. Shortly afterwards it tried to enter the yard. The shed clerk Gopi Ram came to the station and he and others proposed to pull up the line and cut the telegraph wires and burn the station. Some of the men thought this was going too far but their protest was of no avail. The gangmate however refused to lend them a wrench so the design to destroy the line was frustrated. However Gopi, the approver, and others boarded 227 Up Goods and compelled the driver to back it some distance. One Sampat had pulled his son, Sheo Nath, off the train and beaten him. When the train stopped, the party got down and tried to cut the wires with a couple of axes, failing in this Gopi Ram went and got a file, a hammer and a cold chisel from the driver's tool box. The wires were then cut and the tools returned.

The wire cutting apparently took place about 1-45 A.M. The party then returned to the station. Next morning the Station Master arrived with the police about 8 A.M. Finally, the staff resumed duty about 3 P.M. and the A. T. S. and D. L. O. arrived after this from Bhatinda.

A further piece of information is given by Harballab Das, W. P. 8, who says that about 7 A.M. on the morning of the 14th Hari Chand and Alladia, Cabinman, started

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for Delhi to obtain help from the *Satyagraha* Committee. This is indirectly corroborated by the evidence of Mr. Starr, the Station Master, Shakurpur, W. P. 2, who says that when he was returning in the morning from Delhi to Shakurpur he met Alladia, pointsman, Hari Chand, Assistant Station Master, Nasir, Shunting Jamadar and another menial who had *lathis* in their hands.

The Defence Counsel have enunciated the usual platitudes on the subject of the evidence of approvers. I will therefore now examine the evidence with a view to seeing how far Sham Bihari Lal's story is corroborated by other witnesses.

W. P. 2, Mr. Starr, the Station Master, corroborates generally as regards the occurrence of the strike, though naturally not acquainted with the details at first hand. He also indirectly corroborates the approver in respect of the expulsion of Jai Narain from the Station Office and the backing of the goods train. He says he heard sounds of slaps and blows from the station and also shouts, and while on his way to Kishanganj he passed the goods train and afterwards heard it being backed.

W. P. 3, Harballab Das, corroborates the approver as regards (i) the receipt of the wire on the 12th, (ii) the meeting at Hari Chand's quarters, (iii) the meeting at Kanhaya Lal's quarters, (iv) the expulsion of Jai Narain from the Station Office on his refusal to strike, and (v) talk of Gopi Ram as regards the pulling up of the line, burning the station and cutting the wires, Sampat's removal of his son, Sheo Nath, from the wire cutting party, and the backing of the 227 Up Goods Train.

W. P. 4, Kallan Das, guard of the goods train, and W. P. 22, Thakur Das, the driver, corroborate as to the backing of the train and the seizure of tools by Gopi Ram.

W. P. 5, Amir Ali, Relieving Station Master, corroborates as regards the receipt of the wire on the 13th and also as to the expulsion of Jai Narain.

W. P. 6, Shubrati, corroborates the actual wire cutting and also (in cross-examination) the removal of Sheo Nath by his father Sampat.

W. P. 13, Ram Pal, Gang mate, corroborates the statement that he refused to give Gopi Ram the wrench for pulling up the line.

W. P. 14 and 15 merely prove that the telegraph wires were cut.

W. P. 18, Jai Narain, corroborates the story of his refusal to strike, as a result of which he was hustled out of the office and assaulted. According to him Karnani Dhan, Signaller, was with him at the time which is corroborated by Karnani Dhan in the course of his cross-examination.

W. P. 20, Karnani Dhan, corroborates the approver as regards the receipt of a message on the 12th of April. This witness, I may remark, was in an extremely nervous condition.

W. P. 21, Sham Lal, is rather an unsatisfactory witness. He testifies to the receipt of the wire, but appears to have combined in his version the separate wires of the 12th and 13th. His cross-examination tends to show that he is in sympathy with the defence.

Of the remaining witnesses, Mangal Singh, W. P. 19, merely gives evidence with reference to the supply of provisions at his shop at Shakurpur. Other witnesses corroborate the approver as regards the movements of the party that went to Delhi on the 13th. They are W. P. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16 and 17. I shall have occasion to consider their evidence in greater detail at a later stage.

It will thus be seen that the approver's story is amply corroborated as regards its salient features. The details will naturally be considered when we come to deal with the cases of the individual accused. It must be remembered that with the exception of Jai Narain and possibly Karnani Dhan, and of course Mr. Starr, the Station Master, all the witnesses from Shakurpur more or less participated in the strike. Hence they are not likely to say more than they can help. It is evident also that the approver Sham Bihari Lal has somewhat minimized his own share in the strike. From the evidence of other witnesses and also from the perusal of the *zimnis* it is clear that he really

was one of the ringleaders. However he everywhere admits his presence even if he tries to minimize what he actually did or said. I think that his statement may generally be relied upon. The argument of one counsel that the whole story of the expedition to Delhi is a fabrication is amply refuted by the evidence of the various cabinmen and clerks who were visited by the party.

To turn now to a consideration of various general and legal points. The first point I will consider is the contention that the employees at Shakurpur are not Government servants. It is urged that they are not employees of the North Western Railway but of the South Punjab Railway. The line running through Shakurpur is undoubtedly the property of the South Punjab Railway, but equally undoubtedly it is worked by the North Western Railway. There is no evidence to show that there is any South Punjab Railway service. It is admitted that people employed on this section of the line are liable to be transferred to any other station on the whole of the North Western Railway system. It appears to me patent that the question of the ownership of the line has nothing to do with the case. The line is worked by the North Western Railway with their own staff and as a part of their own system. Their employees have no concern with the exact relationship existing between the North Western Railway which is a State Railway and the South Punjab Railway Company. It is obvious that throughout the accused regarded themselves as employees of the North Western Railway. I therefore hold that there is no force in this argument.

The second point for consideration is the question of the sanction for these proceedings. This consists of a report by the Senior Superintendent of Police proposing to initiate a case under Rule 24 of the Defence of India Rules against 10 persons who induced or attempted to induce the railway staff at Shakurpur and also the East Indian Railway and Great Indian Peninsula staffs at Delhi to strike or fail in their duties as Government servants. On this the District Magistrate wrote "sanctioned." This report and order were filed as Ex. P. A. In the course of arguments the Public Prosecutor produced a report by the Deputy Superintendent of Railway Police, which is obviously the basis of the report of the Senior Superintendent of Police. This report and the Senior Superintendent of Police's report are dated the 11th of May and the District Magistrate's sanction is the 12th of May.

The defence counsel contend that this sanction is insufficient as it is vague and does not specify the names of the accused.

The rulings quoted by both the defence and the prosecution refer to cases in which sanction under sections of the Criminal Procedure Code is required before a court can take cognizance of certain specified offences. Thus Section 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code lays down that a complaint made by order or under authority from the Local Government or some officer empowered by the Governor-General in Council in this behalf is necessary. These rulings and any arguments based on them appear to me to be quite beside the point, in view of the wording of No. 30 Defence of India Rules which runs "No court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under these rules unless . . . a District Magistrate . . . has by order in writing consented to the initiation of the proceedings." This appears to me to be a totally different procedure to that prescribed in the Criminal Procedure Code which demands a formal complaint. In that case Government initiates the proceedings, under the Defence of India Rules all that is required is the acquiescence of the District Magistrate in the initiation of the proceedings; that is clearly present in this case. I therefore hold that the sanction or rather the consent to the initiation of the proceedings is sufficient.

In this connection some of the defence counsel have argued that the sanction only applies to the attempt to induce men belonging to the East Indian Railway and Great Indian Peninsula Railway to strike. As however in the Superintendent of Police's report the railway staff at Shakurpur is specifically mentioned, it is clear that

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the North Western Railway staff was also contemplated, and in any case I think the section is sufficiently wide to cover the case of North-Western Railway men at Delhi.

Another point taken is that the sanction is dated the 12th of May, whereas the First Information Report was dated the 19th of April, the first *chalan* the 12th of May, and the second *chalan* the 15th of May. The explanation of this is that the investigation was started in connection with the cutting of the telegraph wires, an offence under section 25 of the Indian Telegraph Act. It was only after the sanction obtained on the 12th of May that the charge under the Defence of India Rules was added. Thus naturally the first *chalan* only mentions the names of eight men concerned in the wire-cutting charge under the Telegraph Act. It is the *chalan* of the 15th, that contains the names of those accused of an offence under the Defence of India Rules.

The third point is the question of misjoinder. Some of the accused have been charged with an offence under the Telegraph Act at Shakurpur, others with an offence under the Defence of India Rules, at Shakurpur, and others again with the same offence at Shakurpur and Delhi. It is contended by the defence counsel that this constitutes misjoinder of charges. I am referred to 18 Cr. L. J. p. 664 (a ruling by the Judicial Commissioner of Sind) and 17 P. R., 1917. The Public Prosecutor also relies on the latter ruling and contends that section 239, Criminal Procedure Code, covers this case. To my mind it is patent that the attempt to persuade the people at Delhi to strike, the actual strike that was induced at Shakurpur and the wire-cutting are all one transaction displaying the continuity of action and purpose on which stress is laid in 17 P. R., 1917. This view seems to me to be fully borne out by the narrative that I have given at the beginning of this judgment.

The wire-cutting was an act of sabotage such as usually accompanies strikes of this nature and therefore may clearly be considered part of the transaction.

Fourthly, it has been argued that section 149 is inapplicable. This contention is based on two grounds—First Mr. Bose in a very involved argument tried to make out, as far as I could follow him, that where every one was ready to strike there could be no unlawful assembly whose common object was to induce people to strike. This contention is entirely based on the fallacious hypotheses set up by him that every one at Shakurpur and elsewhere was ready to strike whereas the evidence shows conclusively that several of the men at Shakurpur, for instance Jai Narain, were not anxious to strike, and in fact refused to do so though they were eventually compelled to stop work by the action of others. The second contention is that the case does not fall within the scope of section 141, Indian Penal Code. It clearly comes, however, within the scope of section 141(3) as the definition of "Offence" as used in section 141 given in section 40, Indian Penal Code, effectively disposes of Mr. Bose's contention that offence in this context must be construed as an offence of the nature of mischief or trespass.

Fifthly, Mr. Asaf Ali has argued that Rule 24 of the Defence of India Rules must be read as a continuation of rule 23 and that therefore Government servants must be narrowed down to members of the Military or Police service of His Majesty. This argument is effectively disposed of by a perusal of the present rule 24 as amended by Notification No. 699, dated the 25th of April 1919, which after the words, "servants of His Majesty," added "or of any railway company." In any case a perusal of the Defence of India Rules would convince any one that each rule is a separate entity with no reference either to what precedes or what follows.

Sixthly, it was argued that as force was used to bring about the strike, so rule 24 did not apply as that only deals with inducement. Personally I can imagine no stronger proof of attempt of inducement than the ultimate resort to force, which is typical of the so-called peaceful picketing associated with strikes.

Seventhly, another point to which the defence counsel devoted a great deal of time is the nature of the strike,

that is to say, whether it was due, as they contend, to purely economic causes or whether it was part of a political agitation. In this connection it is clear that wires were being sent along the railway advocating a strike and mentioning that Mr. Gandhi had been arrested. The exact wording of these messages does not appear to me to be of any great importance. According to one version given by the approver the word *Satyagraha* was mentioned in one of these messages and this is corroborated by Sham Lal though Karnani Dhan says that in the message he received the word did not occur. However this point is of little importance. To prove that the strike was an economic one the defence have put in a number of exhibits to prove that after the strike was over and the men had returned to duty, the railway authorities made arrangements for the supply of cheap grain by breaking open some wagons that were standing in the goods-yard and by sending supplies from other stations. These exhibits are D. C. a telegram despatched on the afternoon of the 14th April by the Stationmaster, Shakurpur, to Bhatinda asking for supplies of *ata*, D. D. a wire of the same date to the Stationmaster, Bahadurgarh, D. H., I. and J., to show that a Rations Special was despatched to Shakurpur, D. M., letter dated the 19th May and D. L., another letter dated 25th May relating to the removal of provisions from the wagons. In addition D. E. and F. give the names of the men supplied with provisions and D. G. are receipts therefor, and D. K. is the cash remittance receipt book for the amounts realised from them.

In commenting on this I may remark that in view of the rates charged for provisions as given by Mr. Starr in his cross-examination on p. 59, *viz.*, rice at 7 seers and wheat at 10 seers per rupee, it is no wonder that there was a large demand for these provisions.

From the evidence of the shopkeeper and Mr. Starr, I think it is clear that there was no such acute shortage of provisions at Shakurpur as the defence tried to make out. In fact one of the accused Alladia, pointsman, produced two witnesses to say that he was giving a marriage feast on that day. It is possible that people may have had some difficulty in getting provisions in Delhi itself as the *hartal* was still in progress. The conclusion I would draw is that at any rate the ringleaders were inspired by the prevalent agitation. It is possible that they were more easily able to enlist the sympathies of the menial staff in consequence of the very high current prices. After the strike had collapsed they would naturally try to make out that it was a purely spontaneous result of hardships arising from the difficulty in procuring provisions. In any case as the Public Prosecutor very cogently pointed out the fact, if proved, that the strike was purely due to economic causes would only be an extenuating circumstance with a view to mitigating punishment.

Having thus cleared the ground I will now proceed to consider the evidence as against the individual accused in detail. The most convenient course will be to consider first the case of Hari Narain, a cabinman on the Great Indian Peninsula Railway at Delhi, accused No. 4, as he is concerned only in what happened during the visit of the Shakurpur party to Delhi. The approver's story contains some gaps, which are probably due to the fact that he was not questioned in great detail on this point. However, it contains the main features. He states that he, Hari Chand, Wilayati Ram, Alladia, cabinman, Nasir who are all accused in this case, Karnani Dhan, signaller (a witness), Prem, Dip Chand and Muhammad Din, who have not appeared, went to Delhi from Shakurpur in the forenoon of the 13th by a goods train. With the exception of Karnani Dhan they all alighted at the Delhi Sadr Junction cabin.

Hari Chand and Wilayati Ram went into the cabin which belongs to the East Indian Railway. They called the others up. Hari Chand did all the talking and asked the clerk Amir Bakhsh regarding his intentions in connection with a strike as he had heard from Wilayati Ram that he had been ready to strike on the 12th, Amir Bakhsh and Hari Chand then spoke on the telephone with another cabin. This is generally corroborated by W. P. 9, Amir

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Bakhsh, who says that 6 or 7 men came to his cabin. Hari Chand, Wilayati Ram and the approver came inside. Nasir stood at the door and the rest on the steps. They said they were North-Western Railway men, his telephone rang and he attended to it. Hari Chand asked him whether they were doing anything about the difficulty in getting provisions and whether he knew anything of a Great Indian Peninsula strike. He refused to call up the Great Indian Peninsula cabin and finally at the suggestion of the approver Hari Chand rang up the Durbar cabin. They said they were going to meet two Great Indian Peninsula babus at the A. D. C. cabin and left.

From this point the approver has given a very condensed version. He says the party went to the A. D. C. cabin, where Hari Chand asked the clerk his intentions. When they went down they met the two Great Indian Peninsula babus (i.e., Hari Narain and Madho Pershad). They went on towards the central cabin. The two Great Indian Peninsula men went towards the East Cabin towards the Power House (i.e., beyond the station), while the others went to the North-Western Railway goods office. The Great Indian Peninsula men said they would arrange about the strike and meet them later. At the North-Western Railway goods shed they met one Jaswant Rai and learnt that the East Indian Railway porters had struck. After settling everything they left for Shakurpur by 9 Up which leaves at 4-46 p.m.

Other witnesses fill in this with considerably more detail. W. P. 10 and 17 deal with the visit to the A. D. C. cabin. The former says 10 or 15 men visited his cabin but professes to be unable to identify any one except the approver. W. P. 17 identifies Hari Chand, Wilayati Ram, Nasir, Alladia, cabinman, the approver and Hari Narain and Madho Pershad.

W. P. 11 Himmat Singh, the cabinman at the East Indian Railway West Cabin, which is next the A. D. C. cabin says he was visited by the approver, Hari Chand, Hari Narain, Wilayati Ram, Nasir and Alladia, cabinman. He refused to strike.

Jaswant Rai has not been produced to corroborate the visit to the North-Western Railway goods shed. Apparently, however, visits were paid to the North-Western Railway engine shed and the East Indian Railway East Cabin. It is not however clear whether the Shakurpur people visited the shed before they went to the East Cabin, or after.

Regarding the visit to the engine shed we have the evidence of W. P. 7, Abdul Ghani, head fitter, W. P. 8, Kishori Lal, relieving shed clerk, and W. P. 16, Panna Lal, fuel munshi. All these men agree that only four men visited their shed, viz., Hari Chand, the approver, Wilayati Ram and Hari Narain. W. P. 7 says it was Sham Bihari who spoke about a strike. W. P. 8 says that Sham Bihari and Hari Narain especially spoke and W. P. 16 says all four said *strike karo*.

As regards the visit to the East Cabin we have the evidence of the cabinman W. P. 12, Sham Behari Lal, II. He says that the two Great Indian Peninsula men Hari Narain and Madho Pershad came first and that after some 5 or 7 minutes Sham Behari, Hari Chand and Wilayati Ram joined them. They said they would strike at midnight and asked whether he would join. He refused. Madho Pershad announced his intention of going to Shahdara to arrange a strike there.

Now there can be no doubt that the Shakurpur party did visit Delhi with the object of arranging if possible with men employed on the Great Indian Peninsula and East Indian Railway and the local North-Western Railway that they should strike simultaneously. This was done in pursuance of their common object which was to foment a strike at Shakurpur, which naturally would be materially assisted if the other broad gauge lines at Delhi struck also. As rule 24 of the Defence of India Rules stood at the time before its amendment by the Notification of 25th April the incitement of the Great Indian Peninsula and East Indian Railway men to strike constituted no offence in itself as they were not Government servants. I therefore had to discharge Madho Pershad. I charged Hari Narain with an offence under section 149, Indian Penal

Code, read with rule 24, Defence of India Rules, and also under rule 24 by itself on the strength of his visit to the North-Western Railway shed. As however the witnesses W. P. 7, 8 and 16 agree in saying that only 4 men visited their shed, it cannot under section 141 be held that they constituted an unlawful assembly at that moment. The evidence of these witnesses is hardly sufficient to warrant a conviction for the actual personal commitment by Hari Chand of an offence under rule 24 of the Defence of India Rules, it seems to me that it would be somewhat straining the law if I convicted him of abetment of the offence. I therefore acquit Hari Narain on these technical grounds. His defence I should note was an *alibi* but the evidence produced in support of it was most unconvincing and appeared to me to be concocted. I have no doubt that he took the part ascribed to him, though owing to the then state of the law he escapes the consequence of his acts.

In view of the above decision it will be impossible to convict any of the accused in respect of what they did at Delhi. The evidence is however still important in so far as it reveals their frame of mind and in some cases the part they took in the subsequent proceedings. It also corroborates the approver's story and in certain cases tells against the defence evidence that has been tendered. I may therefore remark here that I consider that this evidence proves that the approver Hari Chand, Wilayati Ram, Nasir and possibly Alladia, cabinman, though his defence evidence throws some doubt on this, came to Delhi on the 13th April and devoted most of their time in Delhi to inquiries regarding the temper of other railway employees in the event of a strike and certainly in some cases urged them to join in.

Before leaving this subject I should note that the defence have commented on the fact that Karnani Dhan was not questioned as regards the expedition to Delhi. As he did not get down with the rest at Delhi Sadar Junction Cabin and had no knowledge of their subsequent movements I fail to see why he should have been questioned by the prosecution. The defence could have questioned him if they liked but refrained from doing so. In the circumstances I do not think any inference is to be drawn from the fact that he does not speak of this visit to Delhi since as I have previously remarked he was distinctly nervous when giving his evidence.

I will now consider the case of those accused who took part in fomenting the strike, leaving the wire-cutting party for subsequent consideration as a group. Hari Chand, accused No. 1, was an Assistant Stationmaster at Shakurpur station and according to the approver was one of the ring-leaders in the strike. He was in the sick report and his relief Amir Ali, W. P. 5, reached Shakurpur on the 12th morning. I have already dealt with his proceedings at Delhi and will now consider the evidence relating to the part played by him at Shakurpur. I will first take the approver's evidence and note how far it is corroborated. The approver states Hari Chand was one of those present when Karnani Dhan showed the message of the 12th to Rustam Ali and said they should strike. W. P. 3, Harballab Das, corroborates, so does W. P. 21, Sham Lal, though this witness appears to have mixed up the messages of the 12th and 13th giving details about the message of the 12th which properly refer to that of the 13th. He appears to have seen both messages. His evidence is not worth much in view of his absurd story (told in cross examination of the approver regarding his statement) The approver further states that Hari Chand telephoned the contents of the message to the Loco shed. About 11 p.m. Hari Chand came to him and Sham Lal and then went and inquired if there was any further news, later returning and saying none had been received.

On the morning of the 13th a message was taken by Sham Lal and the approver. It was accidentally duplicated and Hari Chand took one copy to the Assistant Stationmaster, Amir Ali, the approver and Sham Lal accompanying him. This is corroborated by W. P. 5 Amir Ali who came on duty at 10 a.m. on the 13th. The approver further says that Hari Chand told the contents of the telegram to the menial staff, some of whom were

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sitting about there. After this comes the expedition to Delhi with which I have already dealt. After their return Hari Chand summoned a meeting at his quarters about 6-30. Hari Chand said that it had been arranged with the East Indian Railway, Great Indian Peninsula, and North-Western Railway cabins to strike and that they should do the same. He was corroborated by the approver, and others. They got the meeting to swear to strike. This is corroborated by W. P. 3.

A second meeting was held in front of Kanhaya Lal's quarters. Hari Chand and others admitted that they had approved the arrangement come to at the previous meeting to strike at 2 a.m. Ramji Lal and Harballab Das objected that midnight was better as that would imply oate every one. It was accordingly finally agreed to strike at midnight. W. P. 3, Harballab Das, corroborates except that he denies that he advocated a midnight strike. This is not a serious discrepancy as he naturally tries to minimize his own part in the proceedings.

When the strike started Hari Chand was one of those who sent the approver to try and find out what other stations were doing in the matter. He also sent for Amir Ali to come and relieve Jai Narain who refused to stop work. He telephoned to Gopi Ram at the Loco shed to draw the engine fires. He made enquiries of Delhi Kishanganj about the Up Mail which never got as far as Shakurpur that night. There is no direct corroboration of these details but W. P. 5, Amir Ali, says that he was sent for about 0-30 to relieve Jai Narain though he was not due to do so till 2 a.m. and that Jai Narain denied having sent for him and refused to stop work, till forced to do so. Jai Narain, W. P. 21 corroborates this. Both these witnesses state that Hari Chand was present at the time and thus indirectly corroborate the approver. I may note that Jai Narain says that the approver was the person who actually pulled his hand away from the telegraph instrument.

This is all that the approver has to say against Hari Chand. W. P. 3, Harballab Das however says that Hari Chand definitely urged him to stop work at about 11-30 or 11-45 p.m. He further adds that the next morning Hari Chand and Alladia started to try and get help from Delhi. This is more or less corroborated by W. P. 2, Mr. Starr, the Stationmaster, who states that on his way back to Shakurpur which he reached about 8 a.m. on the morning of the 14th he met Hari Chand and others armed with *lathis*. This witness also saw Hari Chand and others later in the morning returning from Cabin but does not know what they had been doing there. He regarded Hari Chand as one of the ring-leaders in the strike.

To turn now to the defence, Hari Chand says that he was suffering from rheumatism contracted in Mesopotamia. He reported sick and came off duty on the 11th at 5 p.m. His relief Amir Ali, W. P. 5, arriving next morning so that he did not go on duty again. He was living with Kanhaya Lal who told him on the 12th that there would be nothing to eat next day. In fact he only got some milk. He denies leaving his quarters on the 13th. He alleges that the approver has only accused him to save his own skin. He winds up with the complaint that he has been summarily dismissed by the railway authorities and states that he was commended for good work in Mesopotamia.

In his defence he produced the Sub-Assistant Surgeon, Railway Hospital, Jhind, W. P. 16, who says that he treated Hari Chand for rheumatism. The medical officer also saw him and said he would recommend a transfer to a different climate and recommended him for a month's leave from the 15th. The witness, however, does not help the accused as he says the rheumatism was merely chronic and not acute. He could walk about as well as the witness had ever seen him and was capable of doing his usual work. I may note that Hari Chand's relief, W. P. 5, says that Hari Chand was all right when he saw him. W. D. 19 tells an unconvincing story of going to try and get medicine from Hari Chand on the 13th and finding him lying on a cot. This witness goes so far as to say that he does not know if there was a strike

though he is a shunting jemadar at Shakurpur and was merely on the sick list with sore eyes. W. D. 20 an old friend from Delhi says that the 13th was a holiday and he went to see Hari Chand whom he found ill and stayed the night there returning on foot next morning about 4 a.m. to Delhi. He too professes ignorance of any stoppage of work at Shakurpur. He is unconvincing. Even more unconvincing is W. D. 21, a villager of the adjoining village of Madipur who says that he went to the station to ask about a train, failing to find Hari Chand went to his quarters and found him lying there groaning. He also saw a babu there and first picked out Wilayati Ram accused as the man instead of the preceding witness. W. D. 22, a shunting driver, says he did not see Hari Chand on the night of the 13th. This does not help accused as this witness says he remained in the yard and did not go to the station which was the scene of Hari Chand's activity. W. D. 44 says he heard Hari Chand was commended for good work in Mesopotamia where the witness was himself. W. D. 17 says the same, while W. D. 18 gives him a good character. All these three men are fellow station-masters. Their evidence does not help us in determining the guilt of the accused in a case like the present, at the most, if accepted, it might be a reason for dealing leniently with him, if convicted.

Reviewing the evidence I come to the conclusion that the evidence of W. D. 19, 20, and 21 is worthless, while that of the remaining witnesses does not help the accused in this case, if anything the evidence of W. D. 10 goes against him, as showing that he was quite able to get about and was not incapacitated as he alleges. In arguing the case Mr. Bose described the story of the expedition to Delhi as an entire fabrication on the strength of a few discrepancies in the evidence. These were mostly of the most natural type such as the approver describing a man as being willing to strike, whereas the man himself very naturally declares that he refused to strike. I have already held that Hari Chand was one of the party who went to Delhi since in addition to the approver we have the evidence of W. P. 9, 11, 12 and 17 against him. Mr. Bose further argued that there was no reason why Hari Chand should be at the station when the wires arrived as he was not on duty. Apart from the possible explanation that he was there because he expected that messages would arrive, it seems to me quite natural for a man off duty to hang about the office gossiping with his fellow clerks instead of sitting by himself alone in his quarters, as apparently Hari Chand had not got his family at Shakurpur. I hold therefore that the prosecution evidence is substantially true and that Hari Chand took an active part in promoting the strike at Shakurpur.

To take now the case of Kanhaya Lal accused 2, correspondence clerk, at Shakurpur. The approver states that he and Hari Chand said that the message of the 12th meant that there was to be a strike. This is in cross-examination. On the 13th he was present at the office when the message received that morning was taken and discussed. That morning the approver handed him his arrival report. He was not one of the party that went to Delhi. He was present at the meeting at Hari Chand's quarters and advocated a strike. He arrived late at the second meeting which was held in front of his own quarters. He was one of those who sent the approver to find out what was happening elsewhere when the strike had actually begun.

W. P. 3, Harballab Das, corroborates the approver as to Kanhaya Lal's presence at both meetings. He says that it was the accused and Hari Chand who got the meeting to swear to strike. He also says that he spoke at the second meeting.

He was one of the party seen returning from Cabin on the morning of the 14th by Mr. Starr who regarded him as one of the ring-leaders.

In his statement the accused lays stress on the difficulty of obtaining provisions, he says he asked the Stationmaster to make arrangements on the 13th and was told to send a Chaprasi to Delhi, he sent Parshadi, pointman, who returned empty-handed saying the people had beaten

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him. Accused took him to the Stationmaster to whom he repeated his story. About 6 p.m. on his way to his quarters, he again spoke to the Stationmaster on the subject. Next morning he stayed away till 2-30 p.m. as he saw there was an uproar. He has been summarily dismissed. He attributes his inclusion among the accused to a quarrel with the approver at Bhatinda.

Mr. Starr denies that Parshadi made any complaint to him. Parshadi himself (W. D. 10) merely says that he was sent to Delhi by Kanhaya Lal but failed to get *ata* as the shops were shut, he told Kanhaya Lal but makes no mention of having been beaten or speaking to the Stationmaster. W. D. 11 says that on the 13th some menials complained to Kanhaya Lal about the shortage of provisions and that he took them to the Stationmaster. This witness left for Bhatinda at 5 p.m. W. D. 9, a trains clerk at Shakurpur whose quarters are next but one to those of accused, says he saw him in his quarters about noon. He professes ignorance of any meeting in the quarters and says there were complaints of provision shortage. W. D. 12 is produced to try and show enmity between the accused and Sham Behari Lal, the approver. His statement is not very convincing. The two remaining witnesses W. D. 13 and 14 merely speak to the accused's good character, they are fellow railway men.

On reviewing the evidence I see no reason to doubt the prosecution view that Kanhaya Lal was one of the minor leaders in the strike.

The next accused whose case has to be considered is Wilayati Ram, accused No. 5, surveyor. As against him there is the evidence that shows that he was one of the party who went to Delhi. According to the approver he was at the first meeting at Hari Chand's quarters and corroborated him as regards the readiness of the Delhi railwaymen to strike. He was also one of the leaders at the meeting in front of Kanhaya Lal's quarters. These statements are corroborated by W. P. 3, Harballab Das.

The accused's own story is that he went from Shakurpur to Bhatinda on the 11th and stopped there on the 12th and 13th to show the plan of the Delhi ballast siding to the Executive Engineer, only returning on the 14th to Kishengunj. On the way at Shakurpur he was urged by Sham Behari and Harballab to get down and join the riot. He denies knowing these men before. The evidence produced in support of this story requires very careful consideration as if it were made out, grave doubt would arise as regards the accuracy of the approver's statement. W. D. 2, Mr. Robey, the Executive Engineer of Bhatinda, identifies his initials on a slip dated the 12th April and an indent dated the 15th made out on the authority of the slip for the supply of a *chagul* to the accused. He does not remember the accused showing him any plans of the Delhi ballast siding and says that he would not go through plans with a surveyor on a Sunday. The 13th April I should note was a Sunday. These two documents are exhibits D. a-1 and a-2. W. D. 1 proves that he made them out at the request of Wilayati Ram. Both documents were prepared on the 12th on which day Wilayati Ram was in his office till mid-day or 1 p.m. There is a train leaving Bhatinda for Delhi about 2-30. W. D. 3 the head draftsman whose subordinate the accused is, wrote the slip D. a-2 and sent it to W. D. 1, he cannot say if it was before or afternoon. He further states that Wilayati Ram had brought a plan of the new siding and that he did not leave his office till 4 p.m. He however says that the accused announced his intention of commencing work on the 13th and says he told him that as it was a Sunday he could do as he liked. This evidence must be accepted as proving the presence of the accused at Bhatinda on April 12th but this would not prevent his being at Shakurpur by the early morning of the 13th, as I find in the railway time-table that in addition to the train timed to leave Bhatinda at 2-20 p.m. which he might perhaps have caught there is another passenger train leaving at 11-23 p.m. and reaching Delhi Kishengunj at 9-7 a.m.

The accused however has attempted to prove his presence in Bhatinda on the 13th. W. D. 6 says he met

the accused on the platform at Bhatinda on the night of the 13th and had a talk with him. The accused gave him a message for his brother Khairati Lal at Kaithal. This witness however admits that the accused reminded him of the date when asking him to give evidence so that no weight attaches to his evidence. W. D. 5 for whom formerly the accused acted as an 'arriya' says he saw him at Rohtak Station in the train about 8 a.m. on the 14th. I do not attach much weight to this evidence. If these two men were telling the truth one would expect to find that the accused had travelled with his friend W. D. 6 as far as Narawana, where the branch line to Kaithal takes off. Finally the accused's brother Khairati Lal produced a postcard marked D. b addressed to him by the accused from Bhatinda and dated 13th April. The whole tenor of this postcard is such that it sounds as if it were written to support the *alibi*. It says that he had reached Bhatinda on the 11th and was going that night towards Delhi. His address would be Kishengunj. It is strange that when writing he did not ask for the pyjamas and shirts, which he wanted made quickly, instead of relying on the message by W. D. 6. So much for the nature of the postcard, the question arises as to its postmarking. It bears the postmarks of the Bhatinda R. M. S. and Kaithal. The month April and the time of delivery 3 p.m. are clear enough in the Kaithal postmark but the day of the month is undecipherable, the postcard having been folded and thus rubbed at this point. As regards the Bhatinda postmark this shows "13 Ap 19" apparently but it is an extraordinary and suspicious coincidence that under this postmark there are distinct traces of another postmark, the date of which is undecipherable. Under these circumstances I am unable to accept the postcard as genuine. I may also remark that it is strange that Khairati Lal should have kept such a very ordinary card. The remaining two witnesses W. D. 7 and 8 are merely as to his character. To sum up I consider that the evidence of the various witnesses, viz. W. P. 9, 11, 12 and 17 who depose to the accused being one of the party who visited them at Delhi on the 13th and who have no earthly reason for falsely accusing this man must be accepted. This coupled with the statements of the approver and Harballab proves his presence at Delhi and Shakurpur on the 13th and thus effectually disposes of the very doubtful evidence purporting to prove his presence at Bhatinda on that date, though he was undoubtedly there on the 12th. I therefore hold that the evidence proves that Wilayati Ram was one of the strike-leaders on the 13th.

The next accused is No. 6, Nasir, shunting jemadar. According to the approver he was at the Delhi expedition. He attended the meeting at Hari Chand's and corroborated him as to the readiness of the Delhi men to strike. He was also present at the second meeting in front of Kanhaya Lal's. As regards the Delhi visit he was identified by W. P. 11, 17 and as visiting their respective cabins.

He was met armed with a *lathi* in company with Hari Chand and others on the morning of the 14th by W. P. 2, Mr. Starr, who regarded him as a leader. W. P. 3 corroborates the approver as to his presence at both meetings and in cross-examination says he spoke at the second meeting. W. P. 18, Jai Narain, says he was present when the strikers expelled him from his office and with Baz Khan took him as far as D. Cabin.

The accused states that his children were ill and one had died so that he was not going anywhere. He was on duty from 2 a.m. till 10 a.m. on the 13th. About noon Rama Nand called at his quarters and he gave him some medicine for his eyes. At 6 p.m. he went on duty again. He went to see No. 101 apparently about 11-30 and returned about 0-30. A crowd was collecting and saying that Mr. Starr had gone to Delhi and they would leave work as no arrangements had been made for feeding them. They all sat down and so did he.

He produced W. D. 19, Ram Anuj, who says he got medicine for his eyes from accused and W. D. 34, who is also a shunting jemadar and remembers that they went off duty together on the 13th at 10 a.m. and went

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to their quarters. About 2-30 or 3 he heard Nasir's wife crying and went to inquire. Nasir told him she had remembered her dead daughter.

The defence evidence is negligible and the best his pleader can do for him is to argue that, as he was on duty till 10 a.m. he would probably have gone to bed then and that he is only a shunting jemadar and if he did go to Delhi there was no offence in that. I see no reason to doubt the prosecution evidence which shows that Nasir was one of the leaders among the menials.

I will next take the case of Allahdia, cabinman, accused No. 8, as he is the only remaining accused who is not alleged to have taken part in the wire-cutting. Against him the approver deposes that he was one of those who went to Delhi, that at the first meeting he corroborated Hari Chand as to the readiness of the Delhi men to strike, that he was present at the second meeting and finally that he was one of those who seized Jai Narain when he was forced to stop work. W. P. 17 and 11 identify him as among those who visited their respective cabins at Delhi on the 13th. W. P. 2, Mr. Starr merely mentions him as one of the ring-leaders. W. P. 3 corroborates as to his presence at both the meetings and says he spoke at the second. He also says that the accused and Baz Khan had hold of Jai Narain near the D. cabin after he had been expelled from the office. He further says that Allahdia started next morning with Hari Chand to obtain help from Delhi. W. P. 18, Hari Narain, says that the accused came to his office about 0-5 and threw his keys on the table and said he was going to stop work, all the signals had been put out, he had pushed them out. Accused's duty was from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. Later he was among those who prevented the witness from continuing to work; this witness however does not mention Allahdia as one of his actual assailants.

The accused says he went on duty at mid-day on the 13th. About 4 p.m. after passing 9-Up he went to the station where the men were collecting. They said they had reported to the *sahib* that some arrangement for supply of provisions should be made. He went back to his cabin and worked till 0-30 when Jai Narain telephoned to him to bring the keys. He took the keys to him and on coming out found men in the verandahs and near D. cabin. They said they could not work as they were starving. They all sat down and he sat down too. Later they all went to their homes. He produced two witnesses. W. D. 42, a cabinman deposes that after an 18 hours spell he made over charge to Allahdia. The 18 hours spell was due to the day being Sunday when the shifts change. W. D. 43, a pilot jemadar says that he also went on duty at noon as Allahdia did. He saw him at his cabin three times, viz., about 5 p.m., 6 p.m. and 7-30 when taking out trains.

The duty register, Ex. D. N., shows that the turns of duty of Allahdia and Mam Chand, W. D. 42, were, viz. :—

	For the week ending 13th April 1919.		For the week ending 13th April 1919.
Mam Chand	18 to 6	Allahdia	18 to 6
Allahdia	6 to 18.	Mam Chand	6 to 18.

A manuscript note on the first page of the book points Mam Chand's explanation of how the change of shift is effected being correct. From this register however W. D. 43's story of going on duty at noon appears doubtful. For the first week there appears only two pairs of pilot jemadar in the Up yard and these exchanged shifts for the second week, Shadi is not one of them, he and his mate make their first appearance in the second week with a shift from 20 to 8 in the case of Shadi.

This evidence makes me somewhat doubtful as to whether Allahdia was one of those who visited Delhi. He ought to have been on duty at Shakurpur it seems at the time. I am however satisfied that he took a fairly

prominent part in the proceedings at Shakurpur and was one of those who forced Jai Narain to stop work.

This disposes of the cases of those who did not take any part in the wire-cutting; I will now deal with the cases of the remaining accused, viz., Allahdia pointsman and Abdul Rahim who are alleged to have actually cut the wires and Gopi Ram, Murad, Pita, and Agha Hussain who abetted them. I should note that I discharge Umrao who was said to have been one of the abettors as he was a one-armed man who could not have done such.

The approver gives the story as follows:—About the time that the strike commenced No. 227 Goods reached the signal. It ought to have been taken into the yard and remaneshalled into No. 101 Up. Hari Chand telephoned to Gopi Ram however to draw the fire of the engine in the shed. Gopi Ram came to the station. Jai Narain had been turned out of the office and the staff were hanging about. Gopi Ram proposed to pull up the rails and tried to get a wrench for the purpose from Ram Pal, who refused to give it. Gopi Ram then suggested cutting the wires and burning the station. The approver says he and Sham Lal protested that this was too serious a matter but Gopi Ram would not listen and made the approver go with him. He took the approver, Harballab Das, Abdur Rahim, Shobrati, Pita, Murad, Agha Hussain, Allahdia, pointsman, and Sheo Nath to No. 227 Goods which was standing at the signal. They all got on to the engine and Gopi made the guard back the train. Before they started however Sampat arrived and pulled off his son Sheo Nath and took him away beating him. The train was backed for a mile or so and then they got down. Abdul Rahim was sent up the pole and endeavoured to cut the wires with an axe. When he failed Gopi Ram went and got a file, hammer and cold chisel from the engine tool-box. Abdur Rahim cut 7 or 8 wires with the file but failed to cut the last. However Allahdia climbed up and cut that. In cross-examination the approver gives the detail that some of them had to hold up the pole; this little detail bears the stamp of truth as naturally the pole would tend to lean inwards with the weight of the uncut wires when the counter strain was removed by the cutting of the wires on the other side. The party then boarded the engine again and went as far as the distant signal whence they proceeded to the station on foot.

W. P. 3, Harballab Das, says that it was Gopi who proposed the cutting of the wires. He and the approver took some men to the train. Allahdia, pointsman, Sheo Nath Shobrati, Murad, Agha Hussain, Pita, Umrao and Abdur Rahim went, witness went too but left when the train started to back. Sampat arrived and removed his son Sheo Nath. In cross-examination he says that Sham Bihari did not protest against the proposal to cut the wires but actually supported Gopi in it; this is very probably true.

W. P. 6, Shobrati, says that Gopi and Sham Bihari made him stop work. About 1 or 1-30 they proposed to cut the wires and wreck the line. They made him go with them. Sampat rescued his son Sheo Nath. After getting down from the engine Gopi told him to climb up and cut the wires but he refused and Abdur Rahim was sent up. He and Allahdia cut the wires about 2 or 2-30 a.m. He also describes the pole as leaning and being propped up by some of the party.

W. P. 13, Ram Pal, corroborates as to his refusing to give Gopi a wrench to wreck the line.

W. P. 4, the guard, and W. P. 22, the driver, of the Goods train 227 depose that they found the signal against them. Eventually the lamp was extinguished. They started to move in on their own responsibility. Then a party came and made them pull up and then back the train as far as the fog-signal post. They got down and some of them later returned and seized some tools from the engine tool-box. These they returned later. The driver took his train back to the signal and waited there till next morning when the police arrived with the stationmaster and the train was piloted into the

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station. The driver says no one travelled on the train on the way back. He further says that Gopi personally backed the train part of the way and that he was among those who came for the tools. Gopi is the only man he identifies. The guard however identifies the approver also and says that the rest sat on the foot board. In the guard's rough journal Ex. D. S. it is noted that the delay was due to a strike of the signal staff. The defence attempt to make capital out of the fact that no mention is made of the backing of the train. The natural explanation is that the guard and driver did not expect this to come to light and saw no need to lay themselves open to a charge of dereliction of duty when they could truthfully ascribe the delay to the strike.

The backing of the train is corroborated by W. P. 2, Mr. Starr, who heard the sound of it.

The evidence of Mr. De Panning W. P. 14, and the linesman, W. P. 15, proves that the wires were cut and so does the fact that Mr. Starr was informed at Delhi Kishenganj from Delhi ballast siding that communication with Shakurpur was interrupted. All Mr. De Panning can say is that he detected the break between 6 and 7 A.M. Mr. Bose argues that it cannot therefore have been cut much before that as it would have been detected. However it must be remembered that it was a Sunday night and there may not have been much traffic. I do not attach much weight to the argument. Mr. Bose also urges that as in other places it may have been cut by the neighbouring villages but there is nothing to support this theory. The object of cutting the wires was of course to hamper communication.

I will now consider the statements of the accused. Allahdia, pointsman, No. 7 accused says he went at noon, about 10 P.M. he went asleep at his points and did not wake till 1 A.M. when the row started. He saw men sitting about between the station and the quarters and they said they had stopped work because no arrangement had been made about food. He stopped work too. He denies having any share in cutting the wires and says he has been accused owing to enmity with Shabrati.

He produced two witnesses, W. D. 27 and 28, who say that they attended a marriage feast which he was giving that night. This story in itself rings false and in any case directly contradicts the accused's own statement that he was asleep at his points from 10 P.M. till 1 A.M.

Abdur Rahim accused No. 9 chaprasi to Mr. Jacob the yardmaster denies having anything to do with the wire-cutting and says that he was at home that night. Apparently he lives in Madipur which is less than a mile from the station. He produced three Madipur men, W. D. 29, 30 and 31, who say he was asleep at home that night. Their evidence however is not very convincing.

Murad, accused No. 10, a lampman, says he went to sleep in the lamproom about 10 P.M. and did not wake till 6 A.M. when he discovered there had been a strike. He ascribes his inclusion among the accused to enmity with the approver on account of his refusal to give him some oil. He produced two witnesses. W. D. 32 professes entire ignorance of there ever having been a strike. W. D. 33, Mohammad Bashir, trains clerk, says that he too had gone to Murad to get oil for his house but Murad said he had none. Sham Bihari came too and asked for oil and was told there was none but witness saw no quarrel. This evidence does not help the accused.

Accused, No. 12, Gopi Ram, shedman, says that he received a memorandum from Jai Narain to supply power for 101-Up goods. He called the driver and fireman. About 0-30 the driver came and said no Jemadar had come to take the engine, he should phone to the stationmaster to send one. Accused says he rang up the stationmaster. He was told that work had stopped and he should stop too. He went to the station and found every one had collected and had stopped work. Jai Narain told him it was due to the failure of the stationmaster to arrange for food. Sham Bihari Lal told him to stop work and draw the fire. Accused told him to mind his own business, he would not stop work. Sham Bihari threatened revenge. Accused

then returned to the shed and sent back the driver Shibbu as there was no hope of the train starting. The fires were bunked. He went to sleep in his office. About 5 A.M. he got up and wrote his diary and at 6 made over to Ram Chand and went home. He denies going to No. 227 Goods and cutting the wires.

He has called 4 witnesses in his defence. It is strange however that his counsel refrained from asking Jai Narain any questions in cross-examination that would tend to corroborate his story. Mr. Starr has produced the memorandum from Jai Narain which is marked demi-official.

W. D. 23 produces the diary and duty list made out by Gopi Ram marked D. p and q. These were given him by the foreman to produce. I shall discuss these documents later. W. D. 24, the driver Shibbu, says he was due to leave at 0-55 and had to leave the shed 15 minutes before that. No one came so he went to Gopi who said he would let him know the cause of the delay a little later. About 20 or 25 minutes later Gopi said there was no one at the station. Gopi then went to his office and witness went about 4 A.M. to the running room.

W. D. 25, Allahdia, Shunter, and W. D. 26 Sanwalia, fireman, both say that after Shibbu complained to Gopi, the latter said he would go to the station. He returned in 20 or 25 minutes and said there was no one at the station. He then went off and lay down in the running room.

As regards this evidence it may be partly true, the vital point being whether Gopi was only away for some 25 minutes. It would be extremely easy for these men who work under his control to minimise the time of his absence, with a view to proving that he could not have gone on the wire-cutting expedition and returned within the time he was away. In the circumstances I do not attach much weight to their evidence.

Now as regards the diary, little weight can be attached to this document, Ex. D. p. It was written up by the accused himself next morning and contains a statement which even according to his own statement must be considered false, viz., all train engines left shed to time. The duty list D. P. has no particular significance except as showing that Shibbu was on duty with engine 1618 as he says. I have dealt with most of the pleader's arguments in commenting on the evidence. I should note however that he urges that Ram Pal's evidence has merely been introduced to create prejudice. As to this I need only say that had Ram Pal not been produced the defence would have promptly commented on the absence of corroboration of this part of the approver's story. His last suggestion is that his client has merely been accused because he is a large and stalwart man. Certainly the accused Gopi Ram is the biggest of the accused who are mostly rather small men but I fail to see any point in the suggestion.

The accused himself insinuates that he figures among the accused owing to Sham Bihari's desire to be revenged because he refused to join the strike. A reference to the police inquiry however shows that several statements had been made mentioning his name before the night of the 23rd April, which was the time when he, the approver and others, arrived back from Bhatinda under a military escort.

Accused No. 13, Pita, a greaser, says he was on day duty on the 13th and went to his quarters at 4 P.M.

He professes ignorance of anything else and states that he has enmity with Harballab Das, yard foreman. He produced two witnesses who testify that his work is day duty. Both however disclaim any knowledge as to his whereabouts on the night of the 13th. Thus their evidence in nowise helps the accused.

The last accused Agha Hussain says he went to the yard to examine empty wagons about 10 P.M. On his return he found the staff sitting about. He sat down and went to sleep. He also alleges enmity with Harballab Das. He produced no defence.

Weighing this evidence I see no reason to doubt the prosecution story that Gopi Ram headed a party which

The Hon'ble Mr. C. A. BARRON (Enclosure :—Judgment in the Shakurpur Strike Case. Mr. H. H. YULE.

cut the wires. Abdur Rahim and Allahdia, pointsman, were the men who actually did the cutting. The other accused Murad, Pita and Agha Hussain accompanied the party and thus abetted the offence. I should note that the approver Sham Bihari probably took a far more active part in this affair than he would have us believe.

Turning now to the question of the exact sections under which the accused should be convicted, I think in view of the conclusions I have reached concerning the expedition to Delhi that they should only be convicted for what they did at Shakurpur, their proceedings at Delhi being merely considered as preliminary to that. There can be no doubt that Hari Chand and his friends constituted an unlawful assembly when they held the meetings at his quarters and those of Kanhaya Lal. They are thus liable under Section 149, Indian Penal Code.

Hari Chand has been charged under rule 24 and also under rule 24 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code. The evidence clearly proves that he took an active part in persuading the railway employees at Shakurpur to strike and thus to fail in their duty as Government servants. I regard him together with Gopi Ram and Sham Bihari Lal as one of the ring-leaders. I therefore convict him of an offence punishable under rule 24 of the Defence of India Rules. In consideration of his service in Mesopotamia I sentence him only to two years' rigorous imprisonment, three months to be in solitary confinement. Having convicted him of the principal offence it is unnecessary to pass a sentence under the same rule read with section 149.

Kanhaya Lal, accused No. 2, also took a prominent part in the meetings. I therefore convict him of an offence punishable under rule 24 of the Defence of India Rules and also under the same rule read with section 149. I sentence him on the former count to undergo eighteen months' rigorous imprisonment, two months to be in solitary confinement.

Wilayati Ram, accused No. 5, also took part in the meetings but does not seem to have been so active as the preceding accused. I therefore find him guilty of an offence under section 149, Indian Penal Code, read with rule 24 of the Defence of India Rules and sentence him to eighteen months' rigorous imprisonment, two months to be in solitary confinement.

Nasir, accused No. 6, appears to have been a leader among the menials and took part in the expulsion of Jai Narain. I therefore find him guilty of an offence punishable under rule 24, Defence of India Rules, and also under the said rule read with 149, Indian Penal Code. As these menials were probably to some extent misguided by the clerical staff, I will deal leniently with them. I sentence Nasir to one year's rigorous imprisonment, one month to be in solitary confinement.

Accused No. 8, Allahdia, cabinman, undoubtedly took part in the strike. He was regarded as a minor leader; I find him guilty of an offence punishable under rule 24, Defence of India Rules, and also of an offence under the said rule read with section 149. I sentence him on the principal charge to one year's rigorous imprisonment, one month to be in solitary confinement.

We come now to the cases of the men who cut, or abetted the cutting of, the telegraph wires.

Allahdia, pointsman, accused No. 7, and Abdur Rahim, accused No. 9, have been proved to have actually cut the wires. I therefore find them guilty of an offence under section 25 of the Telegraph Act. Having regard to the fact that they were largely the tools of others, I will not inflict the maximum sentence on them. I sentence Allahdia, pointsman, and Abdur Rahim to undergo each two years' rigorous imprisonment, three months to be in solitary confinement. I also find them guilty of an offence under section 149 read with rule 24, Defence of India Rules, but as it was part and parcel of the same transaction I do not pass a separate sentence on this count.

Gopi Ram, accused No. 12, took the most prominent part along with the approver in promoting the wire-cutting with a view to interrupting communications with other stations. He was present and aided by getting tools. I convict him accordingly of an offence under section 25 of the Telegraph Act read with section 114, Indian Penal Code. As I regard him as primarily responsible for the commission of this crime I sentence him to three years' rigorous imprisonment, three months to be in solitary confinement.

I also find him guilty of an offence under rule 24, Defence of India Rules, read with section 149 and also of an offence under rule 24 itself in that he caused various railway employees to fail in their duty as Government servants. This however is all part of the same transaction culminating in the cutting of the wires. I therefore do not pass a separate sentence on this count.

The remaining accused, Murad No. 10, Pita No. 13, and Agha Hussain No. 14 are mere lads. They were undoubtedly present at and thus abetted the cutting of the wires, I therefore find them guilty of an offence punishable under section 25, Telegraph Act, read with 114, Indian Penal Code. In consideration of their youth and the fact that I regard them as mere tools in the hands of Gopi Ram and others, I merely sentence them to undergo six months' rigorous imprisonment apiece. I convict them also under section 149 with rule 24 but as they have already been sufficiently punished I pass no sentence on them on this count.

I may note in conclusion that I have not sentenced any of the accused to fines as their convictions will presumably entail their dismissal from Railway service where they have not already been dismissed.

Mr. H. H. Yule, District Superintendent, East Indian Railway, Delhi. (25th October 1919.)

The unrest, which showed itself in the city of Delhi on the 30th March in connection with the first hartal, culminated in a riot at the Railway station, due to an attempt by the *Satyagraha* advocates to compel the Indian refreshment contractor there to close his shops. This resulted in an assault on the contractor, and intervention of the railway officials and railway police. The course of events is fully detailed in my evidence recorded by Colonel Beadon, Deputy Commissioner. The rioting on this occasion appeared to me to be unpremeditated.

II. The next incident of importance was a threatened strike of railway employees at Delhi and Ghaziabad Junctions fixed for Sunday 6th April; information of this was received on the 3rd April, steps were immediately taken to ascertain the causes, which were found to be economic, i.e., delay in payment of grain compensation allowance and minor individual complaints. On Saturday it was hoped the unrest had been allayed; on Sunday, however,

a small section of the staff at Ghaziabad stopped work, but were quickly brought to reason and resumed work unconditionally after I had seen them. This movement was essentially economic.

III. On the 9th April, Mr. Gandhi was turned back from entering the Punjab, and on the 10th or 11th news was received of the Amritsar disturbances. On the 11th the Governor of Bombay passed through and news was heard of the Ahmedabad riot and also I received information concerning the cutting of telephone and telegraph wires round Delhi. On the 12th bogus telegrams that stations were closing on the Delhi-Umbala-Kalka line were received and, accordingly, I went down to the station about 9 P.M. and took measures to prevent transit of messages through Delhi, also sent an Inspector to visit suspected points, and keep on the move during the night.

IV. On the 13th I learnt that pressure was being brought on to the subordinate Indian staff to strike, this pressure took the form of refusing to serve them

Mr. H. H. YULE—concluded—Mr. K. S. LAURIE.

in the bazaars with the necessities of life. The men were called up at 8 P.M. and I arranged matters by guaranteeing supply of food stuffs, which was made in due course.

V. On this date I received threatening letters, and also sent my family to the hills. I had to get police protection to bring my luggage along the Queen's Road to the station, due to picketting by *Satyagrahis* at the Dufferin Bridge.

Mr. K. S. LAURIE, District Engineer, East Indian Railway, Delhi. (6th October 1919.)

On Sunday 30th March 1919 at about 12-30 hours, Mr. Yule, district traffic superintendent, East Indian Railway, came to my house and told me that he had just had a telephone message from the station, stating that a mob had damaged railway property there and had assaulted the staff. He suggested that as I had a motor car I should go for a magistrate and warn the reserve police at once. I accordingly motored round to the police lines and found a message had just arrived and they were turning out, and I then went round to Colonel Beadon's house, the Chief Commissioner's office and eventually found Mr. Currie at the Chief Commissioner's house. We both motored to the station and found an excited mob inside the railway station approach. I noted the ground occupied by this mob in the front of the Government railway police office and measured it the following day with a view to check numbers—allowing two square feet per man it consisted of about 300 persons. There were three or four leaders shouting and inciting the others to burn the station. As I saw the Government railway police could not control them I motored off to hurry up the reserve police and met the Assistant Superintendent, and about forty armed police on the Dufferin Bridge marching down to the station. The Assistant Superintendent said that the Superintendent was behind so I went on to inform him of the situation. I found him at his house with Colonel Knollys getting ready, and with Colonel Knollys, returned to the station. I found the mob in the main road, they had not increased in numbers but were anything more excited. This mob were armed with heavy sticks, were quite by themselves in front of the armed police and shouted continually to the onlookers to join them. There was a big crowd about but it did not join the actual rioters and was kept at a distance by a few ordinary constables, and made no attempt to join the actual rioters. Mr. Marshall arrived with a few mounted men, and Mr. Currie was present. In the station were over 250 men of a Manipuri regiment who had come in by train and some forty men of a British regiment who I understood had come from the Fort. There were some fifty other British soldiers who had come in by train and these were promptly given arms and ammunition from the Indian Defence Force armoury as news came in of further excited mobs in the city. There was ample time to study the rioters who I believe consisted for the most part of lower class shop-keepers with few lower class Muhammadans. They appeared to work under definite leadership and were undoubtedly organized to a certain extent. I suggested to Mr. Currie that he should bring the Manipuris out of the station and move the crowd nearer the Fort where the leaders could be arrested but he replied that he thought they would disperse and was unwilling to take action. Some little time after this a motor car came along the road—the rioters stopped it and made the occupants get out. Even then Mr. Currie took no action but eventually they became so threatening that I heard him give instructions that the road should be cleared and the rioters pushed into the Queen's Gardens. This was accordingly done, the police moving forward in line with the mounted men in front and the soldiers following and filling in the blanks in the police lines. The men who had fixed bayonets, carried their rifles at the "port," and I saw a rioter seize a soldier's rifle with one hand while he brought his stick down on his helmet with the other. The mob were forced through the gates and over the palings (which they broke) and the police and soldiers were jammed up together in the return walls of the gates and did not follow the mob into the gardens. It

was at this time stone throwing commenced, large stones being used, and even bricks from the drains and walls were hurled. I walked toward the British officer to tell him to disengage his men from among the police as they were all mixed up together but could not find him. A pathan gentleman standing next to me was felled by a brick on the head but his *pagri* saved him or I believe he would have been killed. Many police and soldiers were hit and I narrowly escaped a rock myself. Mr. Marshall who was in front and had now gone through the gates, shouting to the mob to stop, was hit several times, he was on a big horse and afforded a splendid mark. The mounted men followed him into the garden and the mob fled behind the walls and for about fifty feet down the roads keeping up a rain of missiles. I heard Mr. Marshall give the order to fire as men were being hit and severely knocked about; there appeared no help for it. I saw one of the men who was a leader fall, a man I had particularly marked down as a ring-leader—several other men fell as well and the "cease fire" was called. The mob was even then throwing stones but a large party dashed off westward. I then went off with Colonel Knollys and an armed party to make sure that Civil Lines were protected and remained patrolling from Kashmir Gate to the Ridge until the military arrived from Kingsway. On going back to the station I found the mob had left, but shortly heard two volleys from the direction of Chandni Chowk. I then went down behind the Mor Serai East Indian Railway quarters to look up the position there and found a patrol already out, sent, I heard, by Mr. Yule. The cavalry were in front of the Fort by the end of Chandni Chowk with a large crowd, headed by a man in *sadhu's* clothes, in front of them. After some conversation between the officer and this man the cavalry retired, the mob jeering and shouting after them but not attempting to assault them. I then saw some civilians arrive who with the cavalry went towards the crowd and spoke to the *sadhu*. As this place seemed well protected we went back to the station and then, as the station guard appeared reduced to a minimum, we went towards Chandni Chowk through the Queen's Gardens eventually going out into the Chowk and driving down it to the Fort, and so back to my house. I was constantly at the station on the following days and on several occasions saw considerable crowds brandishing sticks and shouting. On one occasion I saw a crowd standing in front of the station, while a meeting was going on in the Town Hall, when a well dressed native drove up and distributed sticks to all who had not got them.

On the following days too reports as to railway strikes kept coming in and armed guards had to be put on the trains. I went out on the line on the 10th, and I had a stone thrown at my carriage near Ghaziabad and as late as the 6th May, a brick was deliberately thrown at me, sitting at my carriage window near Kunukshetra. At stations crowds came down to meet the trains and were insolent to Europeans and on one occasion some passengers stopped an Express between stations (by means of the communication cord) and jeered at the guard when he went to see what was wrong. I was on that train.

We had great difficulty over feeding our staff. The shopkeepers refused to sell food to any railway man, for they refused to stop work during the *hartal*, and so we distributed necessities from the stocks at the goods shed. My own servants, who are not Delhi men, were warned that if they came to the lazars to buy food they would be beaten, and my neighbour's khan-

Mr. K. S. Laurie—concluded—Brigr.-Genl. D. H. DRAKE-BROCKMAN.

sama, when he had bought things, was beaten and all his purchases looted from him. It was not till after Easter that things became normal.

The riots at Delhi appear to have been organized by the *banias*, I believe, with an idea of keeping up prices; they were joined by the lower class vagabonds who

would naturally welcome a row. As the roads to the Punjab were crowded by people leaving the city, mostly women, I do not consider they were in touch with the rioting that occurred in the Punjab. This exodus filled the Grand Trunk road on the 1st and 2nd April, and they would hardly have fled that way had they expected riots on the road.

Brigadier-General D. H. DRAKE-BROCKMAN, C.M.G., Commanding Delhi Brigade, Delhi. (16th October 1919.)

1. I am in command of the Delhi Brigade and the troops in the station of Delhi, and was present at the time when the disturbances took place on the 30th March last and during the subsequent *hartal* and unrest which lasted for some time, afterwards up to the 19th April when all troops were finally withdrawn at the request of the civil authorities.

2. On Sunday the 30th March all appeared peaceful though all shops were closed, but owing to the contractor for food for third class Indian passengers at the railway station refusing to close his arrangements (which are made by the railway authorities for the convenience and comfort of Indian passengers) at the demand of the rowdy element which had collected at the railway station to compel him to do so, trouble ensued through this large crowd getting out of hand and using force for their purpose. The railway authorities intervened for the protection of their employes and the crowd commenced using force by throwing brickbats at all they saw and breaking the windows of the station, etc.

3. As the civil police present at the station were not sufficient to cope with this crowd which numbered several hundreds, the civil authorities present telephoned for military assistance to come to their aid and in response to this appeal a picket of 30 British soldiers of the 1st Garrison Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment from the garrison of the Fort who were immediately available as the nearest troops, were sent up at once to the scene of the disturbance, under the command of a British officer. I received this message at my residence at Curzon House shortly after 12 noon and ordered up the picket at once, each man taking 20 rounds pouch ammunition laid down in the regulations. One armoured car was also sent. This car armed with a machine gun, however, did no firing whatever but was useful in patrolling the streets. What actually happened when the picket arrived I leave to the officer, Lieutenant Sheldford in command, to relate himself.

4. In the meantime, while I was at the telephone at Curzon House, Mr. Barron, the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, arrived and we then arranged what troops should be called out in aid of the civil power, to quell this rising. The Chief Commissioner was under the impression that the squadron of cavalry was still in Probyn Lines just beyond the Civil Lines, but I had given permission for it to rejoin its head-quarters at New Cantonments on the 28th April as it facilitated the training of the regiment. Accordingly the dispositions made were as follows:—

- (1) Detachments of the 2-4th Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry from the Secretariat, strength 20 rifles each, to guard the city gates leading to the Civil Lines, in order to protect the Civil Lines.
 - (2) 40 Sowars from New Cantonments to the Queen's Gardens near the Town Hall. Increased later to 80.
 - (3) A detachment of Manipuris passing through Delhi en route to Lansdowne on return from Field Service, were employed temporarily to picket the roads till relieved by the 2-55th Coke's Rifles, on the morning of the 31st March.
 - (4) 1 Armoured car.
- All the above on the 30th March 1919.

- (5) 200 rifles of the 2-55th Coke's Rifles to the Queen's Gardens in relief of the Manipuris.
- (6) 25 rifles of the 2-55th Coke's Rifles to the main railway station. Above two, (5) and (6) on the 31st March.

I attach a copy of the diary I kept which will give events as they occurred daily. The Coke's Rifles on the 31st March, sent from their detachment, 25 rifles to each of the 3 main police posts in the city as a reinforcement to the civil police, the remainder being at head-quarters at the Town Hall in the Queen's Gardens.

5. Later on as unrest began to appear in the districts around Delhi, owing to agitators making Delhi their centre of sedition and sending out emissaries to create trouble in the neighbouring civil districts of Rohtak and Gurgaon, detachments of troops were sent to each of these places to support the civil authority and enable them to carry on the administration. This undoubtedly was a good thing to do as it showed the populace that troops can come quickly and keep order and it gives the necessary confidence and support to civilians who are alone and isolated in these outlying districts. Also it possibly prevented the necessity for any further action by troops, as movable columns, owing to the presence of the troops nipping in the bud any incipient trouble that might have been brewing. These 2 detachments were sent out on the 15th April and not finally withdrawn till the end of July.

The Railway Security Scheme for the safeguarding of the railway was put into force from the 27th May. But detachments had already been sent out to the two stations of Ghaziabad and Serai Rohilla.

6. During this period of unrest two attempts were made to tamper with the loyalty of the Indian troops in this station. One man described as a "Babu" was kicked out of the lines of the 2-55th Coke's Rifles by the Indian officers and men themselves as they were so indignant at his having the impertinence to try that game on.

As, however, this was not sufficient I issued orders that they were not simply to turn them out of the lines but to seize them and hand them over to the nearest civil police post with a full report to the Deputy Commissioner. A second attempt was made later in another regiment, the 2-69th Punjabis, by a man of the regiment who had been dismissed sometime before for misconduct. He was caught and my instructions carried out with the result that this man was tried by the magistrate and sentenced to 7 years' rigorous imprisonment. This effectually nipped it in the bud as no further instances have occurred or been brought to notice. One, a follower only in the regimental bazaar of the 92nd Punjabis in New Cantonments, was later suspected of wrapping up his goods that he sold, sweetmeats, etc., in seditious literature and so he was dealt with under the Cantonment Code and turned out of cantonments.

7. Throughout the whole of this period I personally was much struck with the moderation and forbearance exhibited by the civilian authorities in their dealings with these riotous crowds and their representatives. At the large meeting convened by Mr. Barron, the Chief Commissioner, at the Town Hall, on the 15th April to discuss matters in order to come to some amicable arrangement, I was particularly struck with the great tact and command of temper that he displayed, if I may be allowed to say so, as it looked to me that

Continued.]

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day that the so-called leaders of the people were not out in any way to really help and settle matters but passive resistance was only too evident. The crowd that had collected that day too really as a rescue party so it appeared to me, was most threatening and matters nearly came to a head that afternoon owing to the threatening attitude of the crowd which numbered several thousands all armed with lathis, many of whom were beginning to jump over the iron railings and openly threatening the police cordon in front of the Town Hall, so much so that I was forced to reinforce them with the Coke's Rifles. One lathi-wala (all were armed with lathis) raised his lathi to strike, without any provocation, one of the sepoys who being a frontier Pathan was not going to take it without retaliating, only the policeman nearest drove him back before the sepoy could bayonet him as he was preparing to do in self-defence. Also this day shortly before, some of the crowd were caught jumping over the wall among the trees behind the Town Hall into the gardens, armed some with knives but were caught and turned back by a picquet.

In all my conversations with Indian officers and men this was the prevailing opinion, i.e., that the Government was much too kind and lenient in the way that they dealt with these rioters. Whenever I asked for men from any regiment, always double the number required or asked for, invariably volunteered to come down and quell the trouble.

During the insolent and truculent behaviour of the crowd on the 15th April at the Town Hall when I was standing in the line of police and sepoys, one of the sepoys of the 2-55th Coke's Rifles said to me "Oh! Sahib! just for 5 minutes!" meaning that he would like to have had 5 minutes in dealing with the insolent truculent scoundrels opposite.

Composed as the crowd was of the scum of Delhi city, I am of firm opinion that if they had got a bit more firing given them it would have done them a world of good and their attitude would be much more amenable and respectful, as force is the only thing that an Asiatic has any respect for.

DIARY OF DELHI DISTURBANCES.

March 1919.

Sunday, 30th.—Received message from civil power asking for the help of the military shortly after midday to disperse the mob at the station. All shops closed.

Picquet of 30 rifles of the Bedfords under a British officer sent from the Fort immediately. 250 armed Manipuris in trains in Delhi station, en route for Lansdowne acted as Reserve to this Picquet in picqueting the roads. Also a few British soldiers passing through were armed from Indian Defence Force Armoury and acted as support to Bedfords. Detachments of 2-4th Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry were brought in from New Cantonments. Armoured car sent to station. At request of civil authority present mob were fired on, as they were using force by hurling bricks, etc., and driven across Queen's Gardens into Chandni Chowk and on reaching Town Hall had to be fired on again. This dispersed them, and no further disturbances occurred that day.

Monday, 31st.—Armoured car and cavalry patrolled principal streets. 2-55th Coke's Rifles relieved Manipuris at station who proceeded on their journey to Lansdowne. All quiet. Casualties reported from previous days firing 7 killed and several wounded. Meeting of protest against Rowlett Bill took place at 5 p.m. in Pital Park and dispersed quietly.

Disposition of troops as follows:—

80 Troopers, 16th Cavalry	} Queen's Gardens.
200 Rifles, 2-55th Coke's Rifles	
1 Armoured Car	

* Kashmiri Gate, Mori Gate, Pul Muthai and Tis Hazari, 20 rifles each.

25 Rifles, 2-55th Coke's Rifles Railway Station (main).

April 1919.

Tuesday, 1st.—Troops still in position. All quiet. Shops closed.

Wednesday, 2nd.—All troops with the exception of 25 Rifles, 2-55th Coke's Rifles at railway station withdrawn to the Rest Camp outside Delhi Gate of the Fort. 2-4th Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry withdrawn to Kingsway except one company to Civil Police Lines as a Reserve.

Thursday, 3rd.—Queen's Gardens opened. Two troops of 16th Cavalry were ordered to be saddled up and remain in readiness at 6 a.m. No change in dispositions. All quiet. Shops closed. Troops not required.

Friday, 4th.—No change in dispositions. All quiet. Shops closed.

Saturday, 5th.—No change in dispositions. All quiet. Shops closed. Received visit from Deputy Commissioner, midnight, who said that situation might be serious and asked for troops again.

Sunday, 6th.—Troops took up their positions as on the 31st. Marched at 7 a.m. All quiet. Shops closed.

Monday, 7th.—All shops closed. Troops still in position. Withdrawn after dark to their regimental headquarters. One company of 2-4th Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry remained in Civil Police Lines, as a Reserve.

Tuesday, 8th.—All quiet. All shops closed.

Wednesday, 9th.—All shops closed. All quiet during the day. One squadron 16th Cavalry brought to Rest Camp outside Delhi Gate of Fort in anticipation of trouble on news of Gandhi's arrest at Palwal Station, Great Indian Peninsula Railway. All quiet.

Thursday, 10th.—All shops closed. One squadron 16th Cavalry sent to Town Hall at 7 a.m. Armoured Car also in readiness. Cavalry returned to Regimental headquarters, New Cantonments at night. Deputy Commissioner again sent me a letter at 12 midnight by Mr. Orde, Criminal Investigation Department Police, asking for troops again.

Friday, 11th.—All shops closed. Squadron 16th Cavalry recalled from New Cantonments. 100 rifles 2-55th Coke's Rifles to Queen's Gardens. 25 Cornwalls to railway station. One Company Cornwalls in Police Lines. 12 Rifles, 2-55th Coke's Rifles to Ghaziabad for guard over Indian Defence Force Armoury there.

Saturday, 12th and Sunday, 13th.—No change in dispositions. All quiet. Shops closed. District Traffic Superintendent telephoned General Officer Commanding re signs of unrest among railway employees. Deputy Commissioner asked General Officer Commanding to come to railway station, but all was quiet.

Monday, 14th.—Shops still closed. 25 Rifles 2-4th Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry sent to Ghaziabad to guard Railway Station, as reports from railway authorities anticipated trouble among employees.

Shops closed. No change in dispositions. All quiet. Meeting of citizens and civil at Town Hall at 3 p.m. Some large crowds assembled in Chandni Chowk. Nothing happened. Special party of 50 Rifles of 2-4th Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry sent to Kishanganj station by train to clear line on request of district traffic superintendent, returned in the morning, but kept ready standing to in barracks.

Tuesday, 15th.—Shops still closed. 100 Rifles—25 British and 75 Indians sent to Gurgaon and to Rohtak—25 British and 75 Indian. Later 75 Indians from Gurgaon sent to Rewari railway station on account of anticipated trouble. British troops later relieved by Garhwals of 2-39th G. Rifles. Meeting in Town Hall at 10 a.m. Re-assembled at 3 p.m. Huge crowds in Chandni Chowk which became rather threatening; at the end of the meeting some armed with lathis jumped over railing, undoubtedly a regularly organized rescue party. Reinforced the civil police by 2-55th Coke's Rifles. Armoured car ready for action. No collision.

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the crowd dispersing gradually as Indian members dispersed, but it was "touch and go" and very nearly came to a head accidentally through a lathi-wala threatening a Pathan sepoy of 2-55th Coke's Rifles with his lathi.

Wednesday, 16th.—All quiet. Shops still closed. Attitude uncertain. Special party of 50 Rifles Cornwalls which was held in readiness for eventualities ordered to stand down. All other dispositions same as yesterday.

Thursday, 17th.—All quiet, some shops open Chandni Chowk. Dispositions unaltered.

Shortly after noon small crowd went round trying to close shops. Police picquet trying to make arrests was attacked and opened fire causing some casualties by Fatehpuri Mosque. One police Havildar badly hurt. Cavalry and 2-55th Coke's Rifles went out and dispersed mob without firing. All shops closed immediately this incident happened. The rest of the day was quiet. Seditious Meetings Act brought into operation in Delhi Province by order of the Government. Despatched detachments and escorts to complete Railway Strike Scheme, North-Western Railway.

Friday, 18th.—Situation better. The civil authorities consider there will be no more trouble. Some shops are open. Dispositions are the same as already reported.

2nd-Lieutenant E. J. H. SHELFORD, 1st Garrison Battalion, Bedfords, Delhi (2nd April 1919.)

I have the honour to report that on Sunday, the 30th March 1919 at about 1-30, I was in the Fort and received a verbal message from the Station Staff Officer, to the effect that a party of 30 men were to proceed at once to the main railway station. I found and reported the same to Captain Tod who ordered me to take charge of this party.

One non-commissioned officer and 30 men were paraded at once armed and carrying 20 rounds of ammunition each, we left the Fort at 1-30, arriving at the station at 1-40, where I gained the platform by a side entrance in Queen's Road.

Here I immediately asked who was in charge and was referred to Mr. M. M. L. Currie (Additional District Magistrate) who was then outside the front entrance to the station. He said we must force back the crowd who at that time consisted of one seething mass, brandishing sticks and throwing stones and extending from the front courtyard of the station to half-way across Queen's Gardens and a good way up to Queen's Road. There were a number of police there, but, except for a few soldiers who happened to be on the station amounting to about 15, no other troops at all.

I then came back and fetched my party and extending them along the front of the station proceeded to force the crowd back into Queen's Gardens, and also eastward along Queen's Road, the police working with my men and filling in the gaps. I then put Sergeant Kemsley in charge of the right half of the party and I took the other half. I then gave my party "change direction left" and forced back the crowd several hundred yards up Queen's Road, so it will be seen that I was necessarily away from the other half of the party at this time.

The crowd seemed to grow angrier and sent over a perfect fusillade of bricks and stones and, where possible, used sticks as well, so that I thought it was quite time to fire and went back to see if I could get orders to do so, but I could not. I could not see Mr. Currie, but there were other civilians there who had been with him, and although I did not know who they were, I took them to be civilian authorities, but I could get no orders to fire from them.

I then raised another 15 non-commissioned officers and men, who had been armed from the Station Armoury and took them back to assist my men in Queen's Road, and I put a sergeant of the Artillery in charge of this party.

Casualties yesterday inflicted by the police on rioters are known to be 15, one died in hospital to-day, all quiet to-day. Shops in Sadar Bazaar and Sabzi Mandi open, those in Chandni Chowk still closed. Delhi Flour Mill guarded by 2 non-commissioned officers and 6 British troops and strong police picquet. Railway Strike Scheme detachments sent to Sarai Rohilla and 25 more British troops to Ghaziabad as ordered by wire to-day making the full complement of 45 as per scheme, 12 Rifles, 2-55th Coke's Rifles withdrawn from Ghaziabad.

Saturday, 19th.—Situation improved. All shops open. Troops out in aid of civil power are being withdrawn at magistrate's request as follows:—

40 Troopers—16th Cavalry to their head-quarters, New Cantonments.

40 Troopers to Probyn Lines.

25 Cornwalls from station to Regimental headquarters.

100 Coke's Rifles to Civil Police Lines temporarily

The company of Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry reserve to Civil Police Lines withdrawn to Battalion headquarters. Armoured Car to Fort. Troops out now are only those at Rohtak and Gurgaon and as per Railway Strike Scheme.

I then heard shots being fired by Sergeant Kemsley's party and made my way back there, leaving the Artillery Sergeant in charge of Queen's Road, so that I got to the party in Queen's Gardens just as they were firing the last volley. What had happened here was told to me by Sergeant Kemsley and was as follows:—

"The crowd there had become extremely fierce and was trying to push back the troops and police. Mr. Currie had tried to say a few words to them, but had been personally attacked, sticks and bricks being used. Captain Marshall (Indian Police) then suggested to Mr. Currie that it was quite time they fired on the crowd and Mr. Currie said "Yes, Fire". Captain Marshall then ordered his police to fire over the heads of the crowd, and Sergeant Kemsley ordered the 15 men under him to do likewise.

"Then an order was given to fire into the crowd, Sergeant Kemsley thinks, by Captain Marshall, and Sergeant Kemsley ordered his men to fire two volleys into the crowd, which was done."

Here I personally saw two men who had been killed who were eventually brought into the station and several wounded who were taken away by the crowd. (It is rather difficult to say whom some of the orders were given by, hence Sergeant Kemsley's doubt as to who gave the order to fire into the crowd, as both he and myself had not seen the police officers or the civilian authorities before.)

The crowd then quieted down and withdrew towards the Town Hall and Chandni Chowk, and some native troops were brought out of the station and took over Queen's Road, so I took all my men into the Queen's Gardens and cleared the natives who remained to the other side of the Town Hall. I divided my men into three picquets—No. 1 on the right of the Gardens under the senior private (Private Griggs)—No. 2 in the centre under Sergeant Kemsley and No. 3 to the left under the Artillery Sergeant; all then seemed very quiet and the police had formed a line level with the Town Hall.

I then went round to see the positions of the picquets, and then back to the station to see about getting more ammunition down, and to see if I could find any one to report to or to ask for further orders.

As I was coming back, I heard a volley being fired and found Sergeant Kemsley with his 12 men had gone down to the Town Hall to assist the police who were

Continued.]

Lieutenant E. J. H. SHELFORD.

being forced back by the crowd who were using stones, brick and sticks very freely. Mr. Jeffreys, Assistant Superintendent of Police, was in charge here, and Captain Marshall and I arrived practically at the same time, and Captain Marshall then took matters into his own hands and ordered two volleys to be fired into the crowd. I was present, but did not give the actual order—the men were told not to fire at the boys but only at the men.

The first volley which I heard had been fired over the heads of the crowd at the orders of Mr. Jeffreys. (There were four of the crowd killed, and several wounded which I saw personally but the crowd was also taking some wounded away.)

I then stayed here and we formed a line along the railings in front of the Town Hall, and although the crowd was still large they discontinued using violence. I then received a message from Private Griggs saying there was a large crowd at the right hand corner of the Gardens and he thought he ought to have more men as they were very threatening, so I was given 1 native officer and 15 native troops which I took round there; the crowd however dispersed without being fired on. Nothing of any importance happened before I was relieved about 6-30 p.m., when I took my party to the station as reserves and I was eventually relieved there at 7-30 p.m., when I took my party back to the Fort.

Lieutenant E. J. H. SHELFORD.

[Continued.]

Letter, dated Fort Delhi, the 30th March 1919, from 2nd-Lieutenant E. J. H. Shelford, Bedford Regiment, to the Station Staff Officer, Delhi.

I have the honour to submit, herewith, my report on the disturbance in the neighbourhood of the station and Queen's Gardens this afternoon.

REPORT.

By—2nd-Lieutenant E. J. H. Shelford.

Subject—Disturbance at Delhi, 30th March 1919.

Date.	Time.	Place.	REMARKS.	Date.	Time.	Place.	REMARKS.
30th March, 1919.	H. M. 13 10	Fort.	I received orders from Officer Commanding Fort to proceed to Delhi main station with a party of one non-commissioned officer and 30 men.	30th March 1919.	H. M. 14 30	Queen's Gardens.	continued to press forward the infantry and police fired in the crowd (three deaths).
	13 40	Station	I arrived at the railway station, making my way on to the platform by an entrance 200 feet east of the main entrance.		15 00		The crowd then fell back across Queen's Gardens in the direction of the Town Hall. I then brought all my men into Queen's Gardens and split them up into three picquets and matters quietened down somewhat. I then went back to the station for further orders and to report to Mr. M. M. L. Currie, and, in my absence, the crowd again surged forward and Sergeant Kemsley, acting on his own initiative, took the centre picquet as far as the Town Hall to assist the police in keeping back the crowd, and received orders from the police to fire one volley over their heads; the crowd were then more hostile using bricks and stones freely, and as I arrived back Captain Marshall (senior police officer) gave permission to fire and two volleys were fired into the crowd, causing four deaths and several wounded.
			I reported to Mr. M. M. L. Currie who ordered me to use my men to force back the crowd of natives from the station, who were extremely hostile and several thousands in strength.		15 15	Do.	We were reinforced by 50 native troops.
			I brought my men out of the main station entrance and with the police forced back crowd within the entrance of Queen's Gardens and eastward along the Queen's Road. The crowd then became much more hostile, using bricks, stones and sticks freely. I took charge of the party in Queen's Road and my sergeant (Sergeant Kemsley) took charge of the party in the Queen's Gardens. I went back to the station and found 15 non-commissioned officers and men, British, who were passing through Delhi—these non-commissioned officers and men were armed from Station Armoury and brought out to reinforce my men. Up to this point I could get no permission to fire, although in my opinion it was very necessary.		15 30	Do.	I received a report from the right picquet saying that there was a threatening crowd at that side of the gardens, and I was given one native officer and 15 native other ranks to take there, but the crowd dispersed without being fired upon.
	14 15		The crowds in Queen's Gardens were using force to force the police and the party of infantry under Sergeant Kemsley back on the station when order was given to fire by civilian authority. One volley was fired over their heads, and as they still		17 45	Do.	My party was relieved by one officer and 30 other ranks from the Fort and we returned to the station as reserves.
					19 30	Do.	We were relieved and returned to the Fort.

I beg to state that, in my opinion, it was quite necessary to fire upon the crowd and that during my absence with the other half of my party, Sergeant Kemsley was perfectly right in taking orders from the civilian authorities to do so, and I commend his behaviour.

Lieutenant E. J. H. Shelford—concluded—Mr. M. M. L. CURRIE.

List of men of 1st Garrison Battalion, Bedford, injured on 30th March 1919.

No. 24223 Private Hollingdale—Hit on leg with brick. Still got scar. Hit on topee. No scar.
No. 49951 Private Chambers—Hit on jaw by flying piece of wood.
Hit topee by stone. Topee slightly damaged.
No. 24395 Private Erwood—Hit on shoulder by small stone outside Town Hall. No scar.
No. 59068 Private Suckling—Hit on topee by stone. Topee slightly damaged.
No. 59057 Private Richardson—Hit twice on chest by small stones. No damage.
No. 23898 Private Griggs—Very badly bruised on left arm; still attending hospital.

No. 59023 Private Fieldes—Hit on knee with stone, bruised.
No. G. 35403 Private Anderson—Hit on both shoulders and left leg with pieces of bricks; still pain in left leg.
No. 32644 Private Clark—Hit on back of head. Scar now nearly healed. Was giddy, sick and unable to take part in proceedings.
Sergeant Kemsley—Hit twice on topee with stones, once on left shoulder (bruised), once on right wrist (bruised).
Private Hedson—Finger cut with stone. Hit by four stones on chest and slightly bruised. Hit twice with stones on right leg and bruised. Handle of bayonet dented by flying brick.
Private Morris—Brick on right knee. Slightly bruised.
Private Taylor—Hit on helmet with brick. No damage.
2nd-Lieutenant E. J. H. Shelford—Hit on topee by brick.

Written Statement of Mr. M. M. L. CURRIE, Additional District Magistrate, Delhi, dated the 20th October 1919.

On March 30th as Colonel Beadon was away from the station, I was in charge as additional district magistrate. An account of what happened on that date as far as I was actually an eye-witness is contained in my report submitted to the Deputy Commissioner (Appendix attached, page 177.) This report constituted my evidence in chief in the inquest inquiry conducted by Colonel Beadon; as it was written while the events were fresh in my memory, I leave it verbatim as my statement with regard to the events of the 30th March.

Colonel Beadon returned on the morning of the 31st and took charge. Hence as regards events subsequent to the 30th March I am unable to give a connected narrative or explain how various situations arose or the considerations which determined the method of handling them. I can merely deal with what I saw during my spells of duty and what came to my knowledge judicially in connection with the cases arising out of these disturbances which I tried as a magistrate. I should mention here that while troops were posted at the Town Hall, one magistrate (Mr. Roberts, Mr. Barry or myself) and one superintendent of police were always on duty day and night.

March 31st.—On the 31st March a meeting of local notables was convened at the Town Hall. It was hoped as a result of this that the bazar would resume business next day. Large crowds attended the funeral processions of those who had been killed the previous day.

April 1st to 9th.—From April 1st to the 9th, to outward appearance the condition of affairs was gradually improving, though there was a certain amount of simmering excitement in the crowd. This was particularly evidenced in the determined boycott of the trams on some of these days. On the night of the 9th Mr. Gandhi who was on his way to Delhi was stopped at Palwal and sent back to Bombay.

April 10th.—The news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest had spread throughout the city on the morning of April the 10th. It led to a crop of wild rumours. A general closure of the shops took place.

On the night of the 10th while I was at dinner Mr. J. Carnegie, manager of the National Bank, came round to my bungalow with a private telegram giving the news of the tragic outbreak at Amritsar. I drove him round to see Colonel Beadon. We found Colonel Beadon and Mr. Hare-Scott at the Police Lines, whither they had gone on receipt of a copy of the same message. I was sent to fetch Mr. Tallack, Agent of the Bank of Bengal.

April 11th to 13th.—The shops remained shut. There was a rumour of an intended strike on the East Indian Railway. On the 12th the crowd was distinctly noisy and remained in the streets till about 8-15 p.m. An inflammatory notice which had been posted up was brought in. The crowd was getting newspapers dealing with the Amritsar affairs at the office of the "Congress" newspaper.

April 14th.—After my arrival at Kachari some lawyers came and told me that they had been stopped on their way to the courts and forced to leave their carriages and proceed on foot. They suggested that the courts should be closed.

The head clerk and the treasury officer also came in and reported that some of the clerks had been intimidated and had had to make their way to office by a round-about route.

I reported these facts to the Deputy Commissioner and on my return to Kachari found that the pleaders had left.

In the afternoon a meeting was held at the Town Hall at which it was decided to give the Home Rule party leaders till 10 a.m. next day to make efforts to get the shops opened.

In the evening a rumour reached me that the Alliance Bank had been attacked. On telephoning to the Town Hall I learnt that this was false but that a Criminal Investigation Department officer had been assaulted. This affair was subsequently the subject of judicial proceedings, known as the Edward Park Riot case. My judgment* in that case (Appended to Chief Commissioner's Memo.) gives an account of what happened. I may note, however, that that judgment only deals with the evidence actually produced in court against the accused who were being tried at the time; it does not deal at all with the proceedings of the section of the mob which, I believe, pursued sub-inspector Muhammad Fakir to his house and threatened to burn the house.

I may remark that the obvious origin of the rumour of the attack on the Alliance Bank is to be found in the fact that head constable Imdad Ali took refuge there after he effected his escape from the mob who assaulted him.

On the 14th news had been received of the stoppage of the Bombay mail at Delhi Kishanganj the preceding night and the strike of the railway staff at Shakurpur station some 4 or 5 miles out of Delhi. I have dealt with this strike in my judgment† in what came to be known as the Shakurpur case (Appended to Chief Commissioner's Memo.).

April 15th.—A meeting was held in the morning with the leaders, who had failed to persuade the shops to open. They suggested that the leading men of the various trades should be summoned to a meeting in the afternoon. This was done. At the afternoon's meeting it was announced that some butchers had been persuaded to slaughter a few animals at the slaughter house as a sign that they would resume slaughtering next day. After considerable discussion with Dr. Ansari and others a notice was drafted and issued by the Chief Commissioner. My impression of the feeling of the meeting was that the bulk of the traders were really anxious to resume business but that the attitude of some of the leading cloth dealers was doubtful and that much depended on the action they eventually decided to take.

* Page 150.

† Page 160.

Mr. M. M. L. CURRIE.

[Continued.]

While the meeting was in progress, a very large and noisy crowd collected in front of the Town Hall. It contained a large hooligan element armed with lathis and obviously ripe for mischief. The crowd was said to have collected under the impression that the leaders had been called to the meeting with a view to their arrest and deportation. The temper of the crowd was such that in my opinion the slightest thing would have provoked a serious disturbance. At the close of the meeting the crowd dispersed in the wake of the leaders. They battered the municipal dust bins and broke a number of electric lights.

April 16th.—The shops did not open on the 16th, though the leaders were making strenuous efforts. A small fire was reported at the army clothing godown in the Dufferin Bridge market.

April 17th.—On the morning of the 17th the shops began to reopen and the banks reopened. There were however small knots of hooligans moving about and endeavouring to force shop-keepers who had opened to close again. It had been decided that if a favourable opportunity occurred the police should arrest some of these hooligans. Accordingly, shortly after noon the police attempted to arrest some men who were threatening a shop-keeper opposite the Town Hall who had opened his shop. They seized one man and hurried him across the road into the Town Hall. The news spread like wildfire and a crowd rapidly collected and surged down the Chandni Chowk towards the Fatehpuri Mosque. I was the magistrate on duty at the time and informed Colonel Beadon on the telephone and he reached the Town Hall promptly. The Chief Commissioner arrived soon after. We suddenly heard shots from the direction of the Fatehpuri Mosque. It transpired that the police piquet at the corner of Ballimaran had been attacked and had been compelled to fire. The facts as far as I could ascertain there are given in my judgment* in the Ballimaran riot case (Appended to Chief Commissioner's Memo.). Colonel Beadon went with a party of the Rifles down the Chandni Chowk and the cavalry were also sent out. Neither force encountered opposition as the crowd hurriedly dispersed.

I was left at the Town Hall during this affair to attend to any telephonic reports that might come in from other parts of the City.

This outbreak practically marked the close of the mob trouble in Delhi. The hooligan element in the mob who had got completely out of the control of the leaders were brought to their senses by the firm action of the police piquet. They seem to have been under the impression that they could defy, assault and insult the police with impunity, as long as they carefully avoided coming into collision with the military. The firing by the Ballimaran piquet showed them that there was a limit even to the forbearance of the police and did much to restore the prestige of the police which had undoubtedly suffered during the preceding days.

After April 17th the City rapidly settled down and by the close of the Easter holidays business was being carried on as usual. Probably the news of the proclamation of martial law in the Punjab played a large part in bringing about this result.

General Observations.—There are a few general observations on this *émute* that occur to me. I must however premise that I was not in touch with Delhi politics prior to the disturbances.

The first point is the cause of the disturbances. The trouble started obviously in the *Satyagraha Sabha's* organisation of a *hartal* as a protest against the Rowlatt Acts. Nominally this was to be a purely voluntary movement, but it naturally led to endeavours on the part of various minor and irresponsible sympathisers to compel those who did not agree with them to come into line. In fact the inevitable consequence of such a movement unless the leaders have absolute control over their followers is the introduction of picketing and the intimidation, if nothing worse, of those who are regarded as

"blacklegs." In the case of railways and similar services such a strike is bound, when the participants are temperamentally excitable as is the case with Indians or the Latin races in Europe, to lead to acts of sabotage such as occurred at Shakurpur and elsewhere.

Secondly, the history of the trouble in Delhi clearly demonstrates that while it is easy to inflame and excite a mob, it is a far more difficult task to quiet it. The Delhi mob had been excited by the harangues of political agitators for many months. All sorts of wild rumours were current as to the provisions of the Rowlatt Act. The result was that the mob very rapidly got beyond the control of the leaders. I think that at any rate after the receipt of the news of the outbreak at Amritsar, the Delhi leaders made genuine and strenuous efforts to bring the *hartal* to a close; their failure shows that they had lost control of their followers.

Thirdly, as regards the strike at Shakurpur, I may perhaps be permitted to offer a few remarks as I heard the case and naturally in the course thereof perused the records of the police enquiry. The first point I should like to emphasise is that in my opinion it was the clerical staff who instigated and led the movement. Apart from the practice messages referred to in the evidence in the Shakurpur case, it was clear from the police file that practice messages relating to the action to be taken had been passing between various stations. The opinion I formed was that at any rate at Shakurpur there were a few men who were in sympathy with the political agitation and that they played upon the prevalent economic discontent caused by high prices to provoke a strike among the rest of the staff.

Fourthly, I must record my opinion that the police and military throughout displayed the greatest tact and forbearance.

APPENDIX.

I submit herewith my report on Sunday's events. About 8-30 a.m. on March 30th Haji Abdur Rahman came and told me that he had had a message to the effect that some persons were trying to compel the closure of his shop in Sadar Bazaar. I sent him on to Mr. Marshall.

About 10-30 or a little later Mr. Marshall came round to see me. He did not appear to anticipate trouble and informed me that he had reserves of police at the police stations. He proposed to make a round in his car. While we were talking Mr. Jeffreys rang him up and he returned to his bungalow to hear what Mr. Jeffreys had to say.

About 0-50 I received a telephone call from the Kotwal saying that there was trouble at the station, but I was unable to obtain any clear idea of what was happening. I went round to Metcalfe House to see the Chief Commissioner* and arrived there simultaneously with Mr. Laurie, Executive Engineer, Railway. We found the Chief Commissioner had just left with Mr. Marshall. We accordingly went to the Railway Station which I reached about 1-10.

There was a mob in the station yard who were very noisy. They were under the impression that some of their friends were in the custody of the railway authorities. The Kotwal assured them that there was no one in custody. The Kotwal and I reasoned with them and I directed them to move off. It was, however, impossible to make oneself heard.

Mr. Jeffreys arrived with some police reserves and we cleared the station yard. A few small brickbats were thrown at Mr. Jeffreys. The crowd were waving sticks.

Mr. Jeffreys told me that Mr. Marshall was coming with some police sowars. Mr. Yule told me that the trouble had arisen owing to some persons trying to force the

* I may supplement this report by explaining that my reason for going to see the Chief Commissioner at Metcalfe House on my way to the Railway Station was that I knew he was moving into Metcalfe House from his camp that day and I was doubtful if I should catch him on the telephone. I wished to ask him to have the military in readiness. There had just been a change in the command and I did not know who was commanding the station at the moment.
M. M. L. C.
29-10-19.

Mr. M. M. L. CURRIE—concluded—Mr. J. CARNEGIE.

sweet-meat contractor (Ganga Singh was, I think, the name) to cease selling to the passengers. On his refusal he had been assaulted. The railway staff had gone to his assistance and had seized two of his assailants. The crowd had then tried to force their way into the station but had eventually been driven out.

An armoured car arrived and shortly after Mr. Marshall came up with a few police sowars about 1.45. A picket of 30 men of the Bedfordshire Regiment arrived. We determined to try and clear the road in front of the station. A portion of the crowd by the gates of the Queen's Gardens resisted but we drove them inside the gates of the Queen's Gardens. There had already been some brick throwing but as we entered the Gardens, we were met by a fusillade of bricks and sticks. Mr. Marshall was hit on the head by a large brick and I was also hit on the helmet. (I subsequently learnt that Mr. Marshall had been hit in all by three missiles at least.) The crowd was unmanageable and in a very ugly temper. I accordingly assented to Mr. Marshall's request to be allowed to fire on the mob. A few irregular volleys were fired by the police and a small party of the Bedfords. The crowd began to run and I ordered the Cease Fire, which was promptly obeyed. I then saw that two men were lying dead on the road to the right of the entrance to the Gardens. A portion of the iron railings had been torn or pushed down. Colonel Knollys, Messrs. Laurie, Yule and Glegg and a number of railway subordinates were present. The corpses were removed.

A party of 250 men of the Manipuri Regiment were in the station. 200 of these had been armed and these were brought out to line the Queen's Road. The armoured car was despatched to patrol towards Dufferin Bridge and Civil Lines.

A man in an ascetic's dress came up and spoke to me. On enquiry he told me his name and added that he had formerly been known as Munshi Ram of the Gurukul. I was not at the time aware that he was one of the organisers of the movement, so did not pay very great attention to him. As far as I recollect, he said that it was a regrettable occurrence, that they had been merely trying to get their brothers to close their shops. To which I replied that that was the sort of thing that led to these disturbances.

The Chief Commissioner rang up Mr. Marshall who informed him of what had happened. After some five minutes, as things seemed to have quieted down, I decided to go and see the Chief Commissioner with a view to securing further military assistance. I accordingly motored to Mr. Orde's bungalow where I found the Chief Commissioner between 2.15 and 2.30. He, Mr. Orde and myself then proceeded to Curzon House to see General

Mr. J. CARNEGIE, Agent, National Bank of India, Limited, Delhi.

Of the riot which occurred in Delhi on 30th March this year I can say very little, as I was out shooting that day (Sunday), and I only learned late in the evening that there had been a serious riot at the Delhi main station, and that either the police or military had to fire on the rioters to restore order. I was told some days before by merchants and others coming into the bank that all business was to be stopped on the 30th, and the day devoted to fasting and prayer as a protest to the passing of the Rowlatt Bill. The chief objection to the Bill, as far as I could make out from conversations with merchants and shopkeepers—a class I come a good deal in contact with, was that it gave greatly increased powers to the police, and this idea seemed to have got firmly fixed in their heads. It is no secret that the bulk of the people in Delhi thoroughly dislike the police.

When I went to the office on Monday, the 31st March, I found the Chowk crowded with people whose mood seemed to me to be more sullen than excited. I drove quietly up the Chowk without being molested in any way, but at the same time I had an uneasy feeling as if some

Drake-Brockman with a view to obtaining further military assistance and arranging for picquets on the roads from the City. This was arranged and I wrote an order* prohibiting the proposed meeting in the Queen's Gardens and Pipal Park. I then went to fetch Mr. Roberts as I wanted another European magistrate and he was not on the telephone. I reached the railway station about 3.30. The Chief Commissioner had told me he was coming down to the station, so I waited for him. I learnt that there had been further fracas near the Town Hall. Mr. Roberts was despatched with a party of Manipuris to strengthen the guard there.

Two troops of the 16th Cavalry under Captain Browne arrived about 3.45 and were sent to clear the lower part of Queen's Road and make their way to the Town Hall via Chandni Chowk. The Chief Commissioner arrived shortly before 4 p.m. and the General a few minutes later. We then proceeded to the Town Hall, where we found the Cavalry had arrived. We learnt that a meeting was being held on the Congress Pandal ground and went there. We found Munshi Ram presiding. I called him up and he eventually came and the Chief Commissioner after some discussion with Munshi Ram, Abdur Rahman and another Muhammadan announced that the meeting might continue. These men undertook that there should only be one resolution condemning the Rowlatt Act and that the meeting would disperse quietly. This took place roughly between a quarter to five and five. They said the meeting would be over by 6.30.

We then returned to the station via Chandni Chowk. The dispositions of the various picquets were arranged.

About 6.30 I motored up to the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow to ascertain how I could get into communication with him. I wired to him about 7 o'clock. Turns of duty were arranged and Mr. Orde and I remained at the railway station till we were relieved at midnight by Messrs. Marshall and Roberts.

There was no further disturbance that night. The above is what I actually saw and took part in. I was further informed that Mr. Marshall's car had been held up in the Lal Kuan bazaar when he was going round in the morning, that Mr. Rodden in his car had been assaulted shortly before my arrival at the Station. The casualties according to my information were 2 killed and 2 wounded at the entrance to Queen's Gardens and 4 killed and some 14 wounded at the Town Hall. In addition it was later learnt that one body had been removed and probably a considerable number of wounded.

* As regards the order prohibiting the meetings in the Queen's Gardens and the Pipal Park. I may note that I gave this order to Mr. Marshall, but took it back from him after the Chief Commissioner had agreed to allow the meeting at the Pipal Park to continue. As far as I know this order was not published by Mr. Marshall.

M. M. L. C.

trouble was pending. The shops remained closed. By the 2nd April the streets were in a normal state and the shops had re-opened. For a few days business in the Chowk went on smoothly, then came the news of the arrest of Mr. Gandhi near Delhi, and the disturbances commenced again. On the evening of the 10th April, I received news by wire from Lahore of the terrible tragedy which had happened in Amritsar. News of the happenings in Amritsar trickled through to the Delhi bazaar, and I think it was generally known on the morning of the 13th what had actually happened in Amritsar. On the 14th the Chief Commissioner ordered the Banks to close until further notice. On the 17th the Banks reopened—the authorities apparently thinking that it was reasonably safe for them to do so, and anxious no doubt to bring about a normal state of things again. I opened the National Bank on the 17th about 10 a.m., and the Chowk was then quiet with about three-fourths of the shops open. About mid-day the news came to me that a man had been arrested by the police near the Clock-Tower for trying to intimidate shopkeepers by shouting that

Mr. J. CARNEGIE—concluded—Mr. HARE-SCOTT.

their shops would be looted if they were not closed. The arrest caused a very sudden disturbance and in a few minutes after the news reached me, the Chowk was filled with a howling mob armed with lathis. The disturbance was so sudden that it seemed to me as if the rioters had been held in readiness somewhere. With our Amritsar Branch's experience vividly before me, I gave orders for the doors to be closed and the cash and all records to be put in the strong room. I then telephoned to the Chief Commissioner and Superintendent of Police explaining the position. The mob did not attack the Bank and the news came to me that they were busy attacking the police. I then heard several shots or volleys fired and soon afterwards saw the rioters running as fast as they could up the side streets—old men and young boys being amongst them. They all seemed to be of the poorer classes and I cannot recall having seen a single respectable looking person amongst them. Shortly after the firing the Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police came up the Chowk with some Indian Infantry and police, and I was escorted with my assistant to the

Town Hall. On the way a small boy threw a piece of brick at us from one of the side streets but otherwise nothing happened. The rioters seemed to be thoroughly cowed by the police fire. I have no doubt about it however that had I gone into the street before the police fired I would have been attacked and most likely killed. As regards the conduct and behaviour of the better class people, such as merchants and shopkeepers, I can say that it was very good throughout the disturbances. There may have been one or two exceptions, but the general body of this class gave no support to the rowdy elements, and it seemed to me that they were beginning to think that the authorities were too lenient with the rioters. The police had a difficult task, especially on the 17th April, when the rioters made a dead set at them. We had no more trouble after the 17th, and it must have been a great relief to all concerned. It goes without saying that the authorities had a most anxious time for over three weeks, and I can say from personal knowledge that they were always ready day and night to be at the danger point.

Mr. H. V. B. HARE-SCOTT, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence and Senior Superintendent of Police, Delhi. (23rd October 1919.)

On the afternoon of the 4th April I received urgent orders from the Government of India, to proceed immediately to Delhi to take charge of the appointment of senior superintendent of police in the place of Mr. Marshall whose health had broken down.

I arrived in Delhi on the morning of the 5th April and in the forenoon discussed the situation with the Chief Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and Mr. Orde, Superintendent of Police, Criminal Investigation Department.

In the afternoon I rode through the principal streets of the city with Mr. Orde and visited the police stations where I saw the Indian officers and discussed matters with them.

In the city business was going on as usual, and except for the fact that the tramways were being boycotted and that the people in the streets and shops appeared to be sullen I noticed nothing particularly abnormal.

During the day no definite information could be obtained as to whether the *Satyagraha hartal* on Sunday the 6th was to be observed or not. Late in the evening Mr. Orde reported that the shops would probably be closed but the position was not clear. He and I consequently drove round to consult the District Magistrate, and we decided to send for Hakim Ajmal Khan at whose house meetings had been held during the day in connection with the *Satyagraha* plans. Hakim Ajmal Khan arrived about 11.30 p.m., and from what he told us we came to the conclusion that *hartal* would be observed, that the leaders had lost control and that the lower class Muhammadans and Hindus had taken charge and were out of hand. We therefore decided to occupy the Town Hall with troops and to have the troops and police at their previously arranged emergency stations by an early hour.

On the 6th April all the shops in the city were closed. In the morning there was a big meeting at the Fatehpuri Masjid which lasted only a short time, and later in the day meetings were held at the Edward Park and Dr. Ansari's house. Although there was a good deal of excitement in the city throughout the day and bands of boys and roughs patrolled the streets calling out *Gandhi ki jai*, the day passed off without disturbance or any marked demonstration probably owing to the precautions that had been taken.

It was decided to withdraw the British troops from the Town Hall and railway station at nightfall to come on again in the morning.

The situation on the 7th and 8th April was more or less normal. The troops were withdrawn on the 7th in the forenoon and the police picquets after dark the same day.

I examined the police arrangements and drafted fresh orders for the concentration of the police and military in the event of an emergency, which were approved by the Chief Commissioner and the General Officer Commanding. This was found necessary as the existing orders were somewhat out of date and not adapted to the changed conditions in Delhi whereby the troops other than those in the Fort are stationed at a long distance from the city. They also provided for a larger and more complete concentration of the police.

On the evening of the 8th April definite information was received that Gandhi had left Bombay for Delhi and the Punjab. The Punjab Government had issued an order excluding him from the Punjab, which was passed to me by the Chief Commissioner to serve on him should he come to Delhi with the intention of proceeding to the Punjab.

Although the situation was outwardly calm in Delhi, the arrival of Gandhi would undoubtedly have revived excitement, and I feared that the service in Delhi of the Punjab order of exclusion might lead to serious trouble. I accordingly suggested and the District Magistrate agreed, that the Punjab Government order should be served at Muttra before Gandhi entered the Punjab district of Gurgaon and that the Superintendent of Police, Gurgaon, should be instructed to arrest him at the Palwal station should he disobey the order. Mr. Jeffreys, Superintendent of Police, Delhi, was deputed by me to serve the order and he left for Muttra by the Bombay Mail on the morning of the 9th April. The action we had taken and the proposal to arrest Gandhi at Palwal were reported to the Chief Commissioner, who with the sanction of the Government of India issued orders under the Defence of India Rules directing Gandhi to return to Bombay and prohibiting him from entering Delhi. These were handed over to the Superintendent of Police, Gurgaon, who had come into Delhi in response to a telegram despatched the previous night. He left for Palwal about mid-day. The Punjab and Delhi orders were successfully served respectively by Mr. Jeffreys at Kosi Kalan and by the Superintendent of Police, Gurgaon, at Palwal. Gandhi having elected to disobey the Punjab Government order, he was removed from the train at Palwal and sent back by the first train towards Bombay.

News of his non-arrival in Delhi became known when the train he was travelling by arrived without him. I was at the station to meet the train. Only about 60 or 80 men came to the station to meet him, and they left quietly after ascertaining the facts from a servant of Gandhi. The police were ordered to hold themselves in readiness in case of trouble and a squadron of cavalry was brought in from New cantonments to the Fort in the

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course of the evening, moving into the Queen's Gardens after dark.

By the morning of the 10th April the news of Gandhi's arrest spread throughout the city and a general *hartal* was declared. Police picquets were again posted at the points previously arranged, and the troops were kept in readiness in the Queen's Gardens. The day passed off quietly, and as the situation appeared hopeful it was arranged to allow the cavalry to return to cantonments and to withdraw the police picquets keeping them, however, concentrated. These arrangements were promptly cancelled on the receipt of a message announcing the outbreak at Amritsar.

The shops in the city were closed again on the 11th April, and but for a brief effort to open them on the 17th April the *hartal* continued up to the 18th April in the suburbs and to the 19th April in the city proper. On the 11th April on account of the serious news from Amritsar and Lahore, the Queen's Garden was strengthened by 100 Indian Infantry and the railway station was picqueted with British Infantry. During this period—11th to 18th April—the police picquets were posted daily at the emergency points and the troops were held in readiness.

I rode through the town daily and found the temper of the crowd becoming worse and worse. The news of the happenings in Amritsar and Lahore was having a bad effect. Small parties of roughs and boys patrolled the streets shouting *Gandhi ji ki jai* and interfering with and preventing servants of Europeans, the railway and public bodies from obtaining supplies and proceeding to work. On the morning of the 14th April news was received of the strike of the Shakurpur Goods Station on the Southern Punjab Railway resulting in the holding up of the Up Punjab Mail at Kishanganj, and in the course of the morning reports were received more frequently of intimidation of persons going to their work in offices and at the railway stations. It was clear that the time for taking action had come. Interviews with the leaders on the 11th, 12th and 13th April showed that they were impotent and that the mob were out of hand. I laid the situation before the District Magistrate, and in consultation with the Chief Commissioner and the General Officer Commanding it was decided to summon the leaders to the Town Hall, to issue an order under section 188, Indian Penal Code, forbidding intimidation of persons which was to be read out by the District Magistrate at the Clock Tower and to make a demonstration of troops and police through the main streets of the city. The meeting with the leaders was held at the Town Hall at 3 P.M. and at their request they were given by the Chief Commissioner until 10 A.M. next day to try and exercise their influence in bringing the *hartal* to an end. Soon after this meeting an unfortunate incident occurred at Edward Park where an inspector and a head constable of the C. I. D. staff were assaulted when attending a meeting which had been convened, apparently more or less spontaneously, by some irresponsible *satyagrahis* and Home Rulers. On receiving information of the disturbance the District Magistrate and I proceeded with a troop of cavalry and party of police to Edward Park, but by the time we arrived there the crowd had dispersed. We then proceeded to the house of Inspector Fakir Muhammad, and finding that he was seriously injured removed him to hospital.

On the morning of the 15th it was evident that the leaders had failed to bring about the end of the *hartal* and they confessed as much at the meeting held in the Town Hall at 10 A.M. In the afternoon another meeting was held by the Chief Commissioner which was attended on the suggestion of the leaders by the leading men of the trades in Delhi. Although several of the shop-keepers appeared to be prepared to open their shops, there was evidently a stubborn and hostile element among them, and at the end of the proceedings the prospect of the shops opening next day seemed to me to be doubtful. While these meetings were being held, a large crowd collected in the street outside, a certain number being armed with *lathis* whose attitude was defiant. No serious attempt however was made to break into the gardens, and there

was no collision with the police or military. The crowd dispersed when the leaders left the meeting. It seemed to me to be more a demonstration in favour or support of the leaders than anything else.

The 16th April was a quiet day, but the situation was tense and it was evident that it was useless to look to the leaders to do anything. They were powerless to put an end to the unrest which they had themselves fostered. If law and order was to be established it was clear that the authorities would have to take action. I accordingly informed the District Magistrate that next day I proposed to send out strong police patrols to arrest persons committing acts of lawlessness and that, if we failed to restore order, the only alternative would be to ask the military authorities to take over charge. Late in the evening Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari and Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh were summoned to the house of the District Magistrate who explained the situation to them. They said they had been working all day and had enrolled volunteers to help them and that they would make a genuine effort to open the shops. I offered them the help of the police, if necessary, to which they agreed.

On the morning of the 17th the leaders were out early persuading shopkeepers to open. These efforts were fairly successful and by about 9 o'clock a large number of shops were opened but little business was being done. I rode round the city with the District Magistrate and then proceeded to the Town Hall from where I watched the proceedings. The whole proceedings appeared to me to be forced and unlikely to last. Mobs were out trying to undo the good work of the leaders. I accordingly ordered out strong police patrols armed with *lathis* with orders to arrest any one threatening or forcing shopkeepers to close. About midday a police patrol opposite the Town Hall arrested a man who was threatening a shopkeeper and immediately there was a wild excitement. The shops were closed in a few seconds. The shopkeepers and leaders disappeared, and the riotous element crowded into the Chandni Chowk. Soon after parties were seen hurrying towards the Fatehpuri Mosque, and, as it was evident that something was happening in that direction, the cavalry were ordered out with instructions to ride round by Ahmadpuri to the Fatehpuri Mosque. Before they started however shots were heard from the direction of the Fatehpuri Mosque, and in an incredibly short space of time the streets were clear of people. A police picquet came doubling up the Chandni Chowk and reported that they had been attacked by a large crowd and had been forced to fire in self defence. Some of the men bore marks of injury, and they stated that a head constable and brought into the Town Hall. The District Magistrate and I with a small party of Indian infantry and Mr. Orde with the cavalry went through the main bazars. The crowds had dispersed everywhere and very few people were to be seen anywhere. The result was that order was restored, tension was relieved and the police after a period of forced inactivity were now in a position to enforce law and order.

The District Magistrate sanctioned the appointment of some leading men as special police under the Police Act to assist in maintaining law and order.

The *hartal* ended on the 19th since when there was no further trouble. Several reasons probably contributed to this sudden change in attitude of the people. They were heartily tired of the business and had begun to realise the loss and trouble they were bringing on themselves; the leaders had been discredited, and owing to their efforts on the morning to open the shops the people believed that they had lost their support; a rumour was current that martial law had been established or was about to be; the attack on the picquet was made by the real riotous and unruly element, and they had received a salutary lesson.

During the period covered by the foregoing statement the troops were used on only two occasions, namely, on the 14th April when the riot occurred in the Edward Park and on the 17th April when they marched through

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the streets after the disturbance in the Chandni Chowk. But they were almost continuously kept ready in case of emergency, the cavalry and Indian infantry in the Queen's Gardens and the British infantry in the police lines with picquets at the railway station and the Mori and Kashmere gates. This tedious duty of standing by for many days under trying conditions was performed cheerfully and patiently and the temper of the troops throughout was excellent.

The police had an extremely trying and anxious time. They were continuously concentrated and provided picquets daily for the emergency points in the city and suburbs. They exercised commendable restraint, and forbearance in spite of grave provocation in the form of abuse and threats by the mob. As far as I can remember, no case of misconduct was brought to my notice. The detailed disposition of the police force is given in the statement attached to the orders regarding the concentration of the Police in case of an emergency.

Perhaps a comparison of the state of Delhi in 1919, as compared with the condition of affairs when I knew the place as Superintendent of Police in former days will not be out of place here. I was Superintendent of Police in Delhi from 1907 to 1912, before it became the capital of India. In those days Delhi was a *mufussil* town, subordinate to the Punjab Government with little knowledge of politics, with no political agitators, and with no special aspirations. The press was more or less local and of little importance. The leading men were well disposed and had influence in their respective communities, and their assistance was sought with good results on administrative matters.

Mr. R. C. JEFFREYS, Additional Superintendent of Police, Delhi.

1. On the 29th March 1919, I received orders from the senior superintendent of police to visit on the morning of the 30th March 1919, the four city police stations to find out whether the police arrangements were being properly carried out and to form an opinion on the state of feeling in the city. On completing my tour I was to make a personal report to the senior superintendent of police.

First visit to the city.

2. At about 9.45 A.M., I set out with the city inspector in his trap. We went to the Kashmir Gate police station and then to the Kotwali police station *via* the Lethian Bridge. At the latter police station I found a European on foot who informed me that he had been told to get out of his *tonga* by a crowd that was collected at the western end of the Chandni Chowk. He stated that the crowd though peaceful had been so insistent that he had no hesitation in complying with its demand. I ordered two mounted constables to follow and the city inspector and I proceeded in the direction indicated.

3. About 100 yards west of the Clock Tower I saw a crowd of 500 to 600 persons loosely filling up the whole of the roadway of the Chandni Chowk. As we approached, a number of individuals ran towards us holding up their hands and shouting to us to stop. They did not actively interfere with us and we drove through amid repeated cries of "shams" and *Gandhi ji ki jai*. When we were clear of the crowd the City Inspector turned the trap and re-entered the crowd. The majority ran away. The city inspector called out that quiet and order should be maintained. We again turned and continued our journey. The crowd immediately re-assembled and loudly called out after us. The crowd was composed for the greater part of quite young boys of the lower classes. I saw no well dressed man.

4. We went to the sadar police post. Just beyond the bridge there was a crowd of some 200 to 300 persons opposite a shop which was open. The crowd let us

With the transfer of the capital to Delhi all this has changed. It is now an isolated centre where people of all classes and shades of opinion from all parts of India congregate and where political and religious matters of all kinds are discussed and propagated. Political agitators frequent the place and keep alive agitation and political activity. The result is that some of the local leaders, who formerly interested themselves in local matters, have now taken to politics and influenced by outside agitators are ready to join in any agitation that may be on foot. They exercise considerable and unhealthy influence but are incapable of giving any useful assistance to the administration. Others who have kept aloof from politics have been driven into obscurity and are unable to exercise any influence over the people who have been unsettled by the political activity and agitation going on in their midst.

As compared with former times the lack of support and influence of the leading men and the way they kept in the background was most noticeable during the trouble.

The District Magistrate, as head of the administration, was formerly looked to for guidance and advice in all matters. His influence is now overshadowed by the Imperial Government and Council, and his time being occupied with municipal affairs and projects for the improvement and extension of Delhi he is unable to give the same attention to the general administration of the city as he did formerly.

I have said nothing about the cause of the trouble because I think the local officers who were in Delhi before the disturbance and made enquiries afterwards are in a better position than I am to give evidence on this point.

through in silence. They were urging the owner to close his shop. We remained at the post for about 10 minutes. On our return the crowd again let us through, but on this occasion a good deal of miscellaneous shouting occurred. We went to the Hauz Qazi police station by the Ajmer gate and then to the Faiz Bazar police station. Near the former station a small crowd was collected but not on our route. A well dressed Muhammadan priest was turned back by this crowd but was not asked to leave his *tonga*. We then went by the Fort to Mr. Marshall's house. My impression was that the trams had already ceased to run. Several Europeans had been turned out of their *tongas* on the Chandni Chowk.

5. Mr. Marshall was then out but returned at about 11.15 A.M. I made my report to him of the police arrangements and of the events noted above. My opinion was that the people were noisy and intimidating but were not actively law-breaking. Practically all the shops were shut and tempers were likely to rise with the passage of time, for success or failure in stopping traffic seemed alike to have an inflammatory effect.

Second visit to the city.

6. Mr. Marshall decided to visit the city himself. He set off in his motor car with his chauffeur, the city inspector and myself. We went by the Fort to the Chandni Chowk. On the way a few boys called out to us to get out and walk. West of the Clock Tower the crowd I had met on my first visit had thinned somewhat. They behaved in a manner similar to that on the former occasion. Further on the crowd opposite the shop had departed. The shop was closed. Following the route I had previously taken we reached the Hauz Qazi police station. Mr. Marshall decided to proceed by the Lal Kuan Bazar. About 300 yards beyond the police station we were stopped by a crowd which completely blocked the narrow road for a considerable depth.

7. The crowd implored us to drive back though some voices told us to walk. The city inspector got out of

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the car to move the men out of the way. He was severely hustled though I saw no blow struck. A constable ran up with a stick. It was snatched out of his hands. I got out of the car and went towards the city inspector. This had the effect of moving back the crowd sufficiently to admit of his return. However the men came with him and swarmed all over and round the car. Mr. Marshall decided to go backward, but as soon as the engine began to work, angry shouts arose and the body of the car was seized by every man who could get to it. The wood work of the hood got broken and there was danger of the glass screen being similarly handled. Mr. Marshall began backing the car and the temper of the crowd at once improved. Unhappily one wheel got into the drain at the side of the road and the car stuck. However the chauffeur raised the car and taking the wheel drove the car backwards at considerable speed out of the crowd. A body of constables came running out of the Police Station armed with sticks and the crowd fled. My impression of this incident is that the crowd was generally good tempered but contained a number of violent persons who would certainly have started a dangerous fight if we had continued to oppose their wishes. The time was about 12-30 p.m.

8. Mr. Marshall then decided to make a report of the state of affairs to the Chief Commissioner and for this purpose drove by the Burn Bastion Road to the Dufferin Bridge. At this point we saw a crowd opposite the railway station. The city inspector left the car with a view to dispersing this crowd. We went on to the Chief Commissioner's house. He decided to consult the General Officer Commanding, Dehra Dun Brigade, and we had just started in his car to do so when we met a mounted constable carrying a note to the effect that a serious riot was taking place at the railway station. We at once went to the police lines where I assumed charge of the Foot reserve consisting of 1 sub-inspector, 3 head constables and 32 foot constables armed with muskets, bayonets, and 13 rounds of buckshot per man. I took a mounted constable's horse and rapidly marched this force to the railway station. My orders were to clear the station, the yard, and the road in front of the station. Mr. Marshall said he would follow with a body of mounted constables.

Third visit to the city.

9. Approaching the station I found the Queen's Road fairly full of men and the station yard thickly packed. I drew up my men with fixed bayonets across the road in two ranks a few yards west of the western gate of the station yard and myself rode into the yard. There I saw Mr. Currie, additional district magistrate, on foot in the midst of a large and shouting crowd. On my arrival the whole crowd turned towards me and began poking, not striking, at the horse's head and body with their sticks. The horse backed out into the road and the crowd followed with a great deal of noise. On issuing on to the road, however, they saw the line of constables moving forward in compliance with my signal and hastily withdrew not into the yard again but down the road for some 50 yards where meeting large reinforcements they halted and again set up their shouts. I rode forward to continue their retreat but they stood firm and indeed began to advance on my right flank through the Queen's Gardens over the railing which for a space of some 50 yards had been thrown down. This forward movement I checked by pushing out some of the unarmed constables who had been present before my arrival. I then formed the conclusion that with the small force at my disposal it would be quite impossible to over-awe the crowd into dispersing. As they did not appear to be intent on any particular acts of violence I decided to let them stand by until such time as reinforcements, more especially Mr. Marshall's or other mounted men, should reach me. The time was about 1-45 p.m. The position was in the shape of a D, the straight upright representing the armed constables drawn up, across the road, and the curved line the face of the crowd, distant as its furthest point some 50 yards. On

top was the station yard more or less empty of men and at the bottom was a crowd reaching well into the gardens over the broken railing. As a few men were collecting behind the upright I turned the rear rank of the armed men about who thus stood back to back.

10. I then discussed the matter very briefly with Mr. Currie who told me that there had been a row in the station. I saw a lot of broken glass and woodwork and a number of broken flower pots. The increasing size of the crowd, however, demanded my full attention. Traffic to and from the station yard and up to the road was entirely stopped. The face of the crowd, or the curve of the D, was also constantly creeping forward. This had to be stopped or at any rate slowed down. I collected every constable and officer I could find except the armed men and sent them up to the crowd and myself rode round the edge. This had in part the desired effect. At about 2 p.m., an armoured motor car came from the direction of the Fort and took up a position opposite the station on the garden side of the road. This also to some extent hindered the gradual advance of the crowd. At about 2-15 p.m., when the creeping advance was nearing the point at which the danger of being suddenly rushed was becoming very great three stones were lobbed up from the gardens. One of them struck me on the left wrist. I warned my men to be ready at a moment's notice and was moving to warn Mr. Currie when I saw Mr. Marshall and some 8 or 10 mounted men coming from the Dufferin Bridge. I called out loudly to the armed men and to the small crowd behind to make way for the horsemen which they did.

First use of firearms.

11. Mr. Marshall noted the extreme danger of the situation. He determined to push the crowd away into the gardens and ordered me to hold the road with the rear rank and to bring up the front rank of the armed men behind his mounted constables. I explained these orders to the men and was beginning my advance when I saw some 20 British soldiers doubling towards the garden gates where Mr. Currie, Mr. Marshall and the mounted men were advancing under a shower of stones and sticks. I rode up and helped some of the mounted men to charge a crowd that were throwing stones, etc., from the road that runs inside the gardens on the left of the gate. I halted the mounted men after some 50 yards and returned to the gate. I noticed that my men had not yet drawn swords and I was beginning an order to them when two bricks hit me one on the left side of the head and one on my helmet. At the gate stones were falling in showers heavily from the front and very heavily from the right. As I approached I saw a whole brick with mortar adhering to it hit Mr. Marshall on the front of his helmet. It nearly knocked him off his horse. I heard him call out, "Currie, we shall have to fire down there on the right." I was then nearly thrown from my horse who had been repeatedly hit. A moment later I heard Mr. Marshall give the order to fire and I repeated the order to those of the armed foot constables who were near me. Until I repeated the order not a single shot had been fired although the men were armed, and lost their alignment, and had been repeatedly hit. A few seconds later I heard Mr. Marshall order "cease fire." The fire immediately ceased. I do not think a single round was fired after this order was given. The crowd was running away. On the path to the right I saw two men on the ground who had been shot. One had his brains blown out and the other was also I think dead. The ground by the gate was thickly littered with bricks and stones and a number of heavy sticks. The time was about 2-30 p.m.

12. I advanced the foot constables to the embankment opposite the gate and overlooking the *jaqir's* home in the garden below and began working down the roads to right and left leading towards the Town Hall. A party of British troops who were I believe Bedfords was working on my right. The Manipuri Contingent whose presence I had not previously noted was similarly clearing the garden on my left and the Queen's Road

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in the direction of the Lothian Bridge. The Queen's Road in the direction of the Dufferin Bridge was still being held by the rear rank of my original armed party. As we advanced through the garden small crowds that were returning to the station ran away. At the cross road running east and west through the gardens I asked a party of British troops, about 12 in number, to halt to prevent crowds forming behind my police whom I advanced up the road to the Town Hall. My party consisted of a sub-inspector, about 12 armed constables and four or five constables without muskets. There were a lot of men in front of us but no particular crowd. As they seemed to be moving into the Chandni Chauk of their own accord I told the Sub-Inspector to move up to the garden gates and prevent them from returning. I myself rode through the western side of the garden and back to Mr. Marshall near the station. Except for the two men mentioned in paragraph 11, I had seen no one either killed or wounded.

Second use of firearms.

13. Very shortly after my return I received news that a row was beginning near the Town Hall. Mr. Marshall promised to send me 40 Manipuris as reinforcements. I rode up past the British picquet and found a large crowd some 10 yards inside the western gate with my police force some 20 yards from them. Stones were being thrown. As there was imminent danger of our being overwhelmed by a rush directed either frontally or through the bushes on our right, I withdrew my men down the road step by step until we were level with the forward face of the Town Hall where the peril of being outflanked was largely reduced. I signalled to the British picquet behind me to come up to my help and very slowly withdrew the police. The stones were coming very thickly and we were all repeatedly hit. At one point my horse reared up on his hind legs and being then hit on the side of the head by a stone he fell over sideways. I managed to get off uninjured. Some of my men then asked for permission to fire; I refused as the arrival of the British soldiers might I hoped suffice to frighten away the crowd. Another point was that at least three unarmed constables were in the front of the crowd imploring them with clasped hands to cease the attack. Fortunately, I was able to attract the attention of these men who moved away to the left. On their departure the crowd surged forward and at least two men advanced through the bushes on my right and began pelting us at very close range. I looked round but found that the British soldiers were still a long way off and appeared to be advancing slowly. It became absolutely necessary to delay firing no longer. I therefore directed the last four armed constables on the right of my line to fire a volley into the crowd on my right in the bushes and climbing over the wall. Here alone were men in the front of the crowd. Facing me the first half dozen rows of the crowd were all young boys who were throwing pebbles, the heavy stones were coming over their heads from the men behind. My four

men fired a volley and I saw one man drop. The four men who had fired, reloaded, and awaited orders. The others in obedience to my orders withheld their fire although they had been and were being very frequently struck and their muskets were loaded and ready for use. The crowd however continued to move forward and the stone throwing was not diminished, I therefore told my men to aim at the men over the heads of the boys in front and ordered one general volley. This was fired somewhat raggedly, probably owing to the difficulty of hearing orders amid the prevailing uproar, but I do not think that any man fired more than one shot. The crowd checked sufficiently to permit of my closing my men to the right side of the road to admit the British picquet on my left who had then arrived. This movement was carried out effectively and with little confusion. The crowd stood fast and continued to throw stones. Their spirit had not been cowed as our previous firing, having as I have explained being directed fairly high, had caused few casualties on the absolute face of the crowd. I was about to warn the British sergeant to prepare for action when the British party fired 2 volleys into the air. It appeared that Mr. Marshall and a British subaltern of the Bedfords had arrived and given the order. I did not at the time notice either of them as I at once turned to prevent my own men firing. On seeing and hearing these two ineffective volleys the crowd charged us. The British immediately put a volley into them and broke them up. No policeman fired a shot after the first arrival of the British picquet. As soon as the crowd broke I ran up to the gates with my men, aligned them along the railing and myself with two men went out into the Chandni Chauk. The crowd was running away. I saw three or four men being carried away. There was one man inside the garden by the gates. He was alive. There was a second on the verandah of the first shop west of the gate. This was I think the man hit by the first police volley. There were three bodies on the other side of the road. These last were I think dead. I summoned assistance to carry them away but one body was removed down a lane running south from Chandni Chauk before I could prevent it. The others I placed on the west verandah of the Town Hall Offices. The time was then about 3-15 p.m.

14. By this time Mr. Marshall had posted strong forces at the Town Hall. He and I returned to the station to await the arrival of the cavalry. These arrived at 3-45 p.m. Mr. Marshall directed me to take them to the Congress ground and to send away the crowd that had collected there and then to clear the Chandni Chauk. On arrival at the Congress ground I found Munshi Ram conducting an orderly meeting and after some talk with him I decided to permit the meeting to remain. I promised to the Town Hall *via* the Chandni Chauk which I found reasonably clear. Later I returned to Munshi Ram's meeting with the cavalry accompanied by the Chief Commissioner, the additional district magistrate and some police officers. Mr. Barron spoke to Munshi Ram and decided to permit the meeting to remain.

15. I saw no further trouble that day.

Rai Sahib Mr. RAJ NARAYAN, Bar-at-Law and Government Pleader, Delhi. (15th October 1919.)

1. Ever since the declaration making Delhi the Capital of India, many things cropped up to prejudice public feeling against Government. There is no doubt of these things being looked upon as resulting from acts of Government officials which however well intended were highly unpopular. I mention a few of these, namely:—
 - (a) The manner of trial and punishment awarded to offenders in connection with bomb cases.
 - (b) The passing of municipal building bye-laws and their being strictly followed.
 - (c) The supposed inadequacy of compensation paid for lands acquired for the capital.
 - (d) The closing of the wells.

- (e) The mode of dealing with objections to Income Tax assessments.
- (f) The introduction of various forms of Income Tax and the imposition of Super-Tax.
- (g) The internment of two Muhammadan gentlemen of Delhi.
- (h) Recruiting methods said to have been adopted in some of the Districts.
- (i) The methods followed by Criminal Investigation Department.
- (j) Stopping of Ramlila procession.
- (k) Cutting down trees of Chandni Chowk.

2. The passing of the Rowlatt Act came, and as the public feeling was already strong against extraordinary

Rai Sahib Mr. RAJ NARAYAN—concluded—Mr. J. FAIRLEY.

methods of trial of offenders, utterances against the measure were readily accepted. In fact the public mind was predisposed. The ground was ready for the seed thrown in.

3. The public had been reading in newspapers the suggestions of Mr. Gandhi and the subject was talked about very freely. The ignorant followed the advice of what they considered the more advanced. *Hartal* was advocated for, and observed on the 30th March 1919.

4. Some of the advocates of shop closing were not content with having closed their own shops or business but made it their business to see that others also closed; one would see along the streets groups of people of this kind.

5. Trouble first arose at the railway station. From evidence tendered both for and against the prosecution, in the railway station riot case, which I conducted for the Crown, it appeared to be common ground that some of the advocates of shop closing entered the railway station with the object of getting the shops in the passenger halls closed. On interference by the railway police and the station master a mob collected and began to damage the building and assaulted the station master. It was also common ground that the incident immediately preceding the damaging of the building, was the arrest, by the railway police, of one or two men who according to the railway police committed the assault, and according to the defence, did nothing. The inspector, the superintendent, and the additional superintendent of police and the additional district magistrate arrived with whatever little force of police they could collect. They received hits of brick-bats. The military were sent for and arrived. The mob would not disperse. Ultimately order to fire was given by the police. My own idea is that if mounted police or militia were available in sufficient numbers firing could have been avoided. Casualties and injuries received added fuel to the fire.

6. The *hartal* of 30th was a mistake. Mr. Gandhi had originally fixed this as the date of the *hartal*, but subsequently changed it. This change was not known to his supporters in Delhi and the mistake was not discovered till after the 30th. The second *hartal* commenced on the 6th April before the first one was over and was prolonged on account of Mr. Gandhi's arrest or restraint on his movements which was made a grievance of.

7. The effect of this prolonged *hartal* was that hundreds of people of rough classes and youths were left without work and money. Their sole occupation was to loiter about the streets, to help in the closing of the shops, and listen to the speeches delivered at public places.

8. From the commencement of the *hartal* the attitude of the police was one of toleration except when they were directed or felt compelled to fire.

9. The second case which I conducted for the Crown is known as the Edward Park riot case and relates to incidents of the 14th April. One of the speakers there alluded to the Criminal Investigation Department people

making notes against them, whereupon, it is common ground, the mob picked out and attacked the Criminal Investigation Department men, two of whom were severely handled.

10. On the 17th April when efforts were being made to induce people to open their shops and people were doing so, an offender according to the version of the prosecution was arrested and taken to the Town Hall where a temporary police station and court room had been formed. This was taken advantage of by the roughs, three of whom ran in a tonga notifying that three men had been injured and taken to the Town Hall by the police, and urging that the shops should be closed again, and to beat the police. The shops closed again and the mob commenced to attack the police, wherever they were found. Turab Ali, head constable, was the first to be handled and received grievous hurt. The mob then attacked a police picquet stationed at Ballimaran Street. The picquet men were driven out and had to fire in self-defence. This incident was made the subject of a trial which I conducted. This is how I came to know the facts.

11. The question whether there was necessity for firing is not free from difficulty. A person raising such a point must put himself in the position of those who had to fire. The situation on both occasions was serious. Those responsible for the maintenance of peace and order had to think and decide at the spur of the moment. On the other hand responsible officers were bound to give the matter their best consideration. The issue therefore appears to be whether the officers in charge came to the decision after such consideration as a prudent officer ought to bestow, or were they actuated by feelings of malice, hatred, contempt or retaliation. There is no reason to attribute any of the said motives.

12. The lawyers continued to attend courts during the *hartal*. On the 14th of April some of them were approached, and it was suggested that they should cease work, ostensibly to join the carriers of the suggestion in getting the shops opened. The fact is that the shop keepers were suffering great loss and were sick of the affair, yet none of them dared open his shop. They were also jealous of those who continued in work.

13. My impressions about the whole affair based on what I heard in the course of the cases, and conversations are as follows:—

- That the *hartal* was the result of suggestions to accept which the Delhi public was predisposed.
- That after its commencement the so-called leaders lost control and could not stop it.
- The police acted generally with great tolerance.
- The direct actions of the Chief Commissioner were highly praised and popular and ultimately resulted in the opening of the shops.
- The promoters or supporters of the *hartal* underestimated the mischief it might result in, as it did.

Mr. J. FAIRLEY, Superintendent, Telegraph Engineering, Delhi Province.

Mr. W. D. Macgregor, Superintendent of Telegraph Engineering, was in charge of the Delhi Division when the civil disturbances took place in April 1919. He is now on leave in the United Kingdom and will not return till the 29th February 1920.

2. In April 1919, the Director General of Posts and Telegraphs called for a report on the damage done to the property of the department, and I enclose an extract from that report so far as it concerns the Delhi Province. I also enclose an extract from the monthly report of "Interruptions" to telegraph communication.

3. It will be seen from the enclosures that the telegraph lines which lie within the Delhi Province were only affected by the disturbances at one place, viz., at Shakurpur railway station, 8 miles from Delhi, on the southern Punjab line which runs from Delhi to

Bhatinda. At this place all the wires (Nos. 3, 10, 16, 18, 23 and 64, and five wires which belong to the department and are rented to the North Western Railway) were cut and 16 insulators were broken between the distant signal and the railway station.

4. With regard to "Telephone" lines, the trunk line from Delhi to Simla was not touched. The only damage done was in Delhi city where a "Junction box" (where underground cable is joined to overhead wiring) was opened at 12-30 on the 16th April 1919 and the fuses and lightning arrestor carbons were removed and thrown away, thereby interrupting 9 subscribers' lines: the parts destroyed were replaced 2 hours later.

5. On both of the above occasions the damage was repaired by the Indian subordinate staff of the department.

[Continued.]

Mr. J. FAIRLEY.

Letter No. 902-14, dated Delhi, the 8th May 1919, from the Superintendent, Telegraph Engineering, Delhi Division, Delhi, to the Director, Telegraph Engineering, Northern Circle, Lahore.

With reference to your No. 1081-19, dated 29th April 1919, I have the honour to give the following details of damage done to lines due to the recent disturbances:—

(2) On the 14th April 1919, the 3 Lahore wires (10, 23, and 64), 3 combined office wires (3, 16 and 18) and the 5 railway wires running along the Southern Punjab Railway were reported "interrupted" from 6 hours. Intimation of this was received at about 7-30 and a

party in charge of sub-inspector Nathoo were got ready within half an hour. They left at 8 and found all the wires cut and 16 insulators broken inside the distant signal of Shakurpur railway station about 8 miles from Delhi. Communication was restored at 14 hours. Duration 8 hours. Sub-inspectors Nathoo and Rampal and linemen Bengali Kashi Ram, Chait Ram, Janki and Rampershad did good work on this occasion.

(3) No damage was done to instruments and batteries in the Division.

POSTS AND TELEGRAPHS (TELEGRAPH ENGINEERING). PERMANENT LINES (DEPARTMENTAL TELEGRAPH WIRES). Interruption Report of the Delhi Division for the month of April 1919.

Interruption Report of the Delhi Division for the month of April 1911

Referring No. (Annual).	In Imp. or T.	On what wires. Nos.	Name and length of Section* thus:— To Miles.	PARTICULARS.					Fault where localised.	Fault where found.	Cause of fault, etc., stating whether due to faulty construction or maintenance of line, and whether defect has been remedied and steps taken to prevent recurrence. Explanation of any delay in restoring communication and remarks in case the divisional superintendent considers the fault lasted longer than it should have done.	Class of fault.
				COM-MENCED.		CEASED.		DURATION.				
				Day	Hour.	Day	Hour.					
1	E.	32	(EXTRACT.) Agra—Delhi	4	9	4	17	8	57 miles from Agra.	56 miles from Agra.	Piece of wire wound maliciously round insulator and stalk.	B.11
2	IN	1, 2, 30, 31, 33 17, 15.	Delhi—Ambala Ambala—Saharanpur.	13	8	13	15	7	148 miles from Delhi.	148 miles from Delhi.	All wires cut maliciously by some persons near distant signal Barara, North Western Railway.	B.11
3	IN	18, 72. 3, 10, 16, 18, 23, 64.	Ambala—Roorkee Delhi—Rohtak	14	6	14	14	8	5 to 10 miles from Delhi.	8 miles from Delhi.	All wires cut maliciously by some persons near distant signal Shakurpur, North Western Railway.	B.11
4	IN	5	Julana—Rohtak,	15	9	15	17	8	Not localised.	2 miles from Delhi—Rohtak.	Wire cut maliciously by badmashes.	B.11
5	IN	40	Agra—Hathras	22	...	22	...	2	At Hathras	At Hathras	Wire cut near distant signal Hathras, Oudh and Rohilkhand Railway. (Sic.)	B.11

Railway (United Pro

Notes on above—

- This was found 56 miles from Agra, between Aligarh and Hathras on the East Indian Railway (United Provinces).
 - " " " 148 " from Delhi, between Ambala and Saharanpur on the North Western Railway (Punjab).
 - " " " 8 " from Delhi, between Delhi and Rohtak on the North Western Railway (Delhi).
 - " " " 2 " from Rohtak, between Rohtak and Jind on the North Western Railway (Punjab).
 - " " " at Hathras on the Oudh and Rohilkhand Railway (Sic.) (United Provinces).
- (The last item was not included in the monthly statement as it did not exceed 2 hours duration.)

Jamadar JAN MUHAMMAD—concluded—SWAMI SRADDHANAND

The people who were more or less innocent but allowed themselves to be drawn into the affairs by the *badmashes* who were the real offenders, are still afraid that they are going to be punished by imprisonment or other means.

They therefore hope that, if a great deal is said about the severity of the punishment that Government has already inflicted, it is likely that no further punishment will be given them.

SWAMI SRADDHANAND at present resident of Delhi.

I entered the "Sanyas Ashrama" in the middle of April 1917. My previous name was Munshi Ram. I began life as a pleader at Jullundar (Punjab) in the beginning of 1884 A. D. and remained practising there till March 1898 when I threw up the work on conscientious scruples. I found that one could not act as a successful advocate without resorting to means which I thought objectionable. During all this time I devoted myself, in my spare moments, to the religious work of the *Arya Samaj*. In the year 1893, when the session of the Indian National Congress was to be held at Lahore (Punjab) and the late Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji was to preside, I joined the Congress party wholeheartedly, but at the end of the year I was disgusted with the way politicians worked and severed my connection with all political propaganda. After throwing up the work as a pleader I retired for contemplation and at the end of five months came to the conclusion that the one needful quality which my countrymen lacked was character without which no nation could either be built or raise its head. I then devoted myself heart and soul to the founding of the *Gurukula* at Kangri which does the work of character-building on the ancient Aryan lines. I left my home at Jullundar for the jungle where the *Gurukula* was to be located, gave away my library, my belongings and even my house and garden at Jullundar to the funds of the Institution and worked as its governor and *acharya* for more than sixteen years, when I retired as a *sanyasi*. After leading a life of religious study and contemplation for another five months I made a preaching tour in the Punjab, passed the summer and the rainy seasons of 1918 in the Garhwal District (distributing relief to the famine-stricken) and on 2nd December 1918 settled at Delhi in order to complete and print "A History of the *Arya Samaj*" on which I had been engaged for some time.

Connection with Satyagraha.—In February 1919, the debates on the (what were called) Rowlatt bills was in full swing in the Legislative Council and my attention was specially drawn to them by Mahatma Gandhi's manifesto and proposed vow of *satyagraha* for civil disobedience of laws. The struggle against these Bills appeared to me something higher than mere political propaganda work and I took the vow of *satyagraha* in the beginning of March 1919. On 10th March 1919 I left for Baroda and Bombay in order to study the technical and industrial institutions of the country for drawing up a scheme of techno-industrial course of instructions in connection with the *Gurukula* (private university) at Kangri. I spoke on *satyagraha* and the Rowlatt Bills at Bombay, Surat, Broach and Ahmadabad and returned back to Delhi on March 22nd. Then came Mahatma Gandhi's manifesto exhorting all Indians to observe the second Sunday after the signing of the passed Rowlatt Act by the Viceroy, as a day of humiliation and fasting when all business was to be suspended, people were to fast and hold protest meetings against the Rowlatt Act and for petitioning the King-Emperor to veto the passed bill. We fixed the 30th March 1919 as the day of humiliation and fasting and held preliminary meetings on March 24th, 27th and 29th. At the meeting of March 27, I presided. In my concluding speech (as reported in the daily *Vijaya* of 29th March) I am reported to have added one more condition to Mahatma Gandhi's manifesto, i.e. "Every person should on that day, meditate for half an hour and pray to *Parmatma* that he may turn the hearts of our opponents.....with the exercise of will-power we could impress the hearts even of King-Emperor George, the Premier and Mr. Montagu sitting in

England." And a poster giving instructions for the observance of the day of humiliation was sent round and published in the local dailies. It ran as follows:—

What is to be done?

- (1) The 30th of March should be celebrated as a day of mourning.
- (2) Beginning from the night of March 29th all should fast till the night of 30th March.
- (3) After finishing all other daily duties, should sit in a quiet place and should pray to the *Parmatma* that He might give us the power of endurance, guide our *sarkar* in the path of rectitude and put an end to the troubles of Mother *Bharat*.
- (4) Closing all business and shops, etc., should spend the day in wishing well for the country, in reforming his own mind and in philanthropic work.
- (5) Every woman, man and child should attend the evening meeting at 5 o'clock.

The Delhi *Morning Post*, dated 30th March 1919, came out in the evening of 29th with a leading article on this in which it most mischievously suggested that the Delhi leaders were inducing people to fast so that they might be lashed to fury. We again held another preliminary meeting on March 29th in which a speaker read out and commented on the leading article of the *Morning Post*. I was presiding on that day also and remembering the concluding speech of Sir William Vincent in the Imperial Legislative Council of India at the passing of the Rowlatt Bill into Act where he had insinuated that passive resistance was sure to be turned into active resistance by men other than Mr. Gandhi, I made the following prophetic remarks in my concluding speech. I said: "The suggestion of the Anglo-Indian paper may have a hidden meaning. The local authorities might try to prove Sir William Vincent a true prophet and therefore I exhort you all not to allow them to make you a scape-goat in this....." What occurred on the 30th of March 1919, to my knowledge, was written by me on the morning of the 31st of March 1919, at the request of the Reporter of the Associated Press at Delhi, when all occurrences were fresh in my memory. That statement of mine appeared in about all the dailies of India and I now put it before the Committee of Enquiry as a true statement of facts then known to me.

Incidents of March 30th, 1919.

On Sunday, March 30th, every shop and business place was closed from the morning. Returning from the morning service in the local *Arya Samaj* Mandir, I patrolled through the city. Tramcars had ceased plying because none would use them, and even tongas, etc., had stopped and all was quiet with thousands of peaceful subjects walking on the foot-paths. I returned to my place after 12 noon intending to go to the meeting after four.

At two, some gentlemen came running from the railway station saying that as some people asked the station shops to close, a European railway official came and threatened them. When told it was no business of his to interfere, he had whistled to the police, who took two men out of the collected mass in custody. The masses said that if their men were given up they would go away. Then the police began to belabour them with sticks and soldiers with a machine-gun were arriving when they left to report to me.

SWAMI SRADDHANAND.

[Continued.]

Firing near the railway station.

I left immediately for the railway station. There I heard that the machine gun had fired indiscriminately and about a dozen had either been killed or wounded, the bodies being dragged into the station yard. Those hit, included a railway passenger with one woman, so they said.

I saw Gurkhas coming running from the opposite side. British soldiers were already there. I went to some Europeans, of whom one was Mr. Currie, city magistrate, and asked them to tell me the true facts. They treated me with indifference, Mr. Currie actually turning his back upon me. I told him that I was taking the people away to the meeting ground, although early, and he ought not to irritate people by making a display of military and machine guns. The whole crowd, had three to four thousands, followed and thousands had preceded us and about fifteen thousands assembled on the Piplal Park grounds.

Fighting near the Clock-Tower.

The number was swelling and had risen to 25,000 and I was addressing them, exhorting them to act like *satyagrahis* and to control their sorrow and anger, when intelligence reached that *gora* (British) soldiers had fired near the Clock-Tower and that another dozen or so had been pierced with bullets. Some began to be excited and I again managed to pacify them.

The military and the protest meeting.

But then two British military officers on horse-back came in full speed with some *sowars* and wanted to talk to me. I went out and asked the officers the meaning of this interference. I said that it was a meeting of peaceful citizens and they were exasperating the people by a show of military aggression. The officer said he would not interfere with the peaceful meeting, but a brick-bat had just passed him. I replied that I had not noticed any brick-bat passing and asked the audience who said they had noticed nothing. The officer went away with the *sowars*, saying that it was not their object to disperse a peaceful meeting.

The Chief Commissioner and the protest meeting.

The crowd was becoming huge and after putting up a platform in the maidan, we removed there. The crowd, some 40,000 people, had hardly settled itself and after exhorting them in the name of *satyagraha* to remain calm I had hardly commenced a prayer to the Almighty when the same *sowars* came galloping again with a Muhammadan police officer, Mr. Currie and the Chief Commissioner. In the meantime a machine gun had rattled to the very door of the meeting in the maidan. I had to come down from the platform and had to go to the Chief Commissioner who asked me what we were going to do and how long the meeting would last. I answered that a resolution of protest against the Rowlatt Bills would be sent to Mr. Montagu and the meeting would last till 6-30 P.M. He asked me about the speakers and their names were given. Then he told me that if I gave an assurance that the feelings of the people would not be stirred and that the crowd would quietly disperse to their homes, he would not interfere with the meeting.

In reply I said "I am personally responsible and I had been pacifying those whose relatives had been shot and wounded but if on our way back your military gave trouble again I will not be responsible. Then the responsibility will rest with you." I explained all the facts and said "Intelligence has come that a machine gun again discharged a volley near the Clock-Tower." The Chief Commissioner said in reply that no machine-gun was fired near the Clock-Tower. I said in that case I could reassure the people saying that no people had been injured near the Clock-Tower. The Chief Commissioner, on this quietly said that rifles had been fired and not a machine gun. Then came further enquiry from me. "Was any body injured?" the reply was "I do not know and therefore cannot say."

Then the Chief Commissioner told me to give a message of his to the people to act on the instructions of Mr. Gandhi and create no disturbance. I was all along speaking in a loud voice which thousands heard. Then I mounted the platform and asked the assembled people about what I had been telling them. They all said that they would never depart from the principles of *satyagraha*. Whatever oppression they suffered they would bear with patience.

The Chief Commissioner went away saying that if the meeting dispersed quietly, neither the military nor the police would interfere. The meeting then went on. The resolution to be sent to Mr. Montagu was adopted unanimously.

People calm under extreme provocation.

I asked the huge audience to follow me and to leave quietly when nearing their residences. We were walking in order. When we were nearing the Clock-Tower, Gurkhas were in the middle of the road, in double file facing both ways. On seeing us they marched to the right foot-board. We thought they had left the road in order to enable us to proceed but when we reached near them, a rifle was fired into the crowd. There was a stir and a deep tone of resentment among the crowd. But I asked all to halt and they obeyed. In my *sanyasi* dress I went up to the foot-path alone and asked the Gurkhas why they were firing on innocent peaceful people. Two rifles were immediately pointed at me and they began saying in a very insolent tone *tum lo chhed denge* (we will pierce you). I stood quietly before them and said: "*Main khara hun, goli maro*" (I am standing, fire). At once eight or ten more rifles were aimed at my breast and insolent threats went on.

The crowd could contain itself no longer and was about to rush, when a wave of my hand and a short appeal to their vow stopped them. But they were saying "let us die and not you, let us die." The rifles had remained pointed at my breast for some three minutes, when a European on horseback approached and asked the only police-man present whether he had ordered firing. I stepped forward and asked the European officer whether he had heard the rifle fire. He impatiently answered that he was enquiring about it.

I then left, with the people following me. Then there was a strange sight. A Gurkha came near me brandishing his naked *kukri* right and left. No one being cowed down he left. The machine-gun motor was rattling away encircling us, with the gun constantly pointed at us, and with the hand of the gunner on it. The crowd was neither cowed down nor impatient.

At Fatehpuri I sent many of them home, but again many followed till I reached my place where all (Hindus and Muhammadans) took affectionate leave of me.

I have no sense of resentment against the military or the Government officials but those whose relations have been murdered or wounded are inconsolable and in the whole population of Delhi is a sense of insecurity and complete distrust in the justice of the officers in charge here. A helpless people, specially imbued now with *satyagraha* principles, will keep quiet but this shedding of blood on a bloodless day will not pass unnoticed by the Master of the Universe.

How the first Hartal came to an end?

I will now give my impression of doings at Delhi after the 30th of March 1909. On the morning of 31st March I joined the funeral procession of two Mahammadans who had been killed by rifle shots on the previous day. About fifty thousand people followed the biers to the funeral ground. Although armoured car, with machine-gun, rattled in our rear to the very graveyard, the people kept their temper well and when I and Hakim Ajmal Khan harangued them for self-restraint and opening of shops they all with one voice agreed; but while we were thinking of getting the shops opened, in the afternoon dead bodies were recovered, mainly through Mr. Barron's kindness, 27 hours after being

Continued.]

SWAMI SHRADHDHANAND.

shot, from the authorities and several wounded arrived in the civil hospital. Out of these, two biers went to the graveyard followed by some 15 thousand men and three went to the Hindu cremation ground followed by about 30 thousand people. Although the relations of the dead were in great grief and all the people were in mourning there was no sign of hostility or violence towards the Government. On the cremation ground I exhorted the people to open their shops and begin business from the next morning. On the morning of April 1st, 1919, I reached the Clock-Tower rather early. Some two thousand assembled within 5 minutes and I harangued them. They were about to go for opening their shops when some of them pointed towards the Town Hall where the military were being provokingly displayed and strong police guards were stationed at both the gates of the municipal gardens facing the Chandni Chowk. By this time the crowd had increased to about five thousands. I and Hakim Ajmal Khan Sahib asked the sentry to unlock one of the doors of the municipal gardens and going in asked Mr. P. L. Orde, C. I. D., police superintendent, (who appeared to be in charge of the police and the military) to take away the military out of sight so that we might feel no difficulty in having the shops opened. Mr. Orde said he would consult the Deputy Commissioner and went to the telephone. He returned after a short while and ordered the military to go out of sight. After thanking him, we left.

All the leaders now made a round of the city and by 12 A.M. all the shops (even in the remotest parts) were opened and business resumed. While I was returning from Suiwala Bazar, after having the last shop opened, I got intelligence that the military and the police were again in evidence near the Clock-Tower in the bazar. I hastened to the place and found a posse of armed police, some cavalry sowars and infantry in the chowk near the Clock-Tower with the military commanding officer on horseback and Mr. Orde on foot.

I asked Mr. Orde the meaning of all this and he replied that as the leaders had not succeeded in getting the shops opened and as a great crowd had assembled he was obliged to bring in the military and armed police. I asked the people why they were there and the reply was that they were simply attracted by the sight of the military and that all the shops had remained open but that when the military came some of the shops near the place where the military came in evidence closed for very fear. I asked Mr. Orde to move away the police and the military and I would be responsible for the crowd. I also said that if the military remained provocatively in sight he would not (sic) be responsible if any disturbance occurred. Mr. Orde at once complied with my request and moved away the military and the whole crowd dispersed within ten minutes.

Further provocation by the authorities.

Business was resumed and every thing was going on as usual. Thus passed the 2nd and the 3rd of April, but on the 4th of April 1919, Lt. Colonel Beadon, the Deputy Commissioner, called a meeting of the Government officials and the *raies* of the city and read out his memorable printed notice* to the public dated 2nd April in which he called the crowd which had assembled on the Railway station as a mob of *badmashes*. In the evening the same printed notices were pasted at different parts of the city and there was great commotion. (I attach to this a copy of the printed notice in original Urdu). Then Lt. Colonel Beadon published a notice calling upon the relations of the killed and the wounded to go and lay their grievances before him at the Town Hall. But people had lost all faith in his justice and nobody responded to the call. The local *satyagraha sabha* drafted a reply to Lt. Colonel Beadon's incorrect statement and issued a counter-notice† which was distributed on the morning of April 6th 1919. (I attach a copy of that reply marked exhibit B.) This reply of the

satyagraha sabha will show that as we, in Delhi, had already celebrated the day of humiliation and prayer on March 30th, we proposed simply to hold a protest meeting in the evening and had no intention of calling upon the people to close their business on April 6th, 1919, which was announced by Mahatma Gandhi, was to be observed as a day of humiliation and prayer throughout India. The local *satyagraha sabha* passed a resolution and posted big posters‡ to the effect in the city. (I produce a printed copy of the notice in Urdu C.)

The doings of the C. I. D.

It is necessary at this place to emphasize that the work of calming the perturbed minds of the people by the office-bearers of the *satyagraha sabha* and the other Delhi leaders was made difficult by the mischievous actions of the C. I. D. people. On the 31st of March 1919 while I, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Mr. K. A. Desai and others were trying to get shops opened two or three men were found haranguing people not to open shops until the dead bodies were restored. One of them was recognised by Mr. Desai to be a C. I. D. man and Mr. Desai ran to catch him. But the man disappeared among the crowd. Again on the 1st of April while I with R. B. Sultan Singh got shops, on one line from Fatehpuri to the Clock-Tower, opened, we saw a crowd being addressed by somebody behind us. We turned back and standing on R. B. Lala Sultan Singh's carriage, I asked the man (a Muhammadan) what his object was. In a tone which appeared to me to be affected, he said "How can you understand the feelings of those who have had their relations killed? If any relation of yours had been killed you would never have advised the ending of the *hartal*." I asked him point blank, "What relation of yours has been killed?" The man appeared to be non-plussed and just at that moment one of the assembled hundreds recognised him as a member of the C. I. D. No sooner was the remark made than the man disappeared as if the earth had swallowed him. Then on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th of April hand-written posters appeared on the walls of the Clock-Tower inciting people to murder the Kotwal. This was also considered to be the work either of the C. I. D. or of the police, and the same view appeared in the Indian dailies. Moreover during all this time, several persons, whom I afterwards found to be C. I. D. men used to come to me at different times and to submit schemes of violence and I had to speak for hours to convert them to the *satyagraha* principles of non-violence and self-suffering.

There is another matter to which I want to draw attention. The authorities needlessly paraded the military (foot and sowars) in the *bazars* and the streets of the city, but the people were exhorted by their leaders to keep their temper and the people did it admirably. They were specially irritated when on the 4th of April Musalmans and Hindus assembled in the Jama Masjid to pray for peace to the souls of martyrs of the 30th of March 1919. The machine-gun and armed military and police were aggressively in evidence. But the huge assembly (some 35 thousands) dispersed from Jama Masjid peacefully and quietly.

Such was the condition of affairs when the sun rose on Sunday, the 6th of April, and people saw with surprise another complete *hartal*. All business was literally stopped. In the morning thousands assembled in the Fatehpuri mosque to pray for the souls of the dead. At noon some 15 to 20 thousands assembled in the Edward Park. Almost all the Delhi leaders were present and there were lectures on *satyagraha* and *swadeshi*, and people were exhorted to restrain themselves and not to feel any resentment. In the evening there was a huge gathering at Dr. Ansari's compound in Daryaganj. More than a lakh people assembled and there were some 8 overflow meetings. Not a single *lathi* was in evidence and the proceedings came to an end peacefully and calmly. No police or military was in evidence near the meeting

* Appendix I, page 208.
† Appendix IX, page 212.

‡ Appendix X, page 214.

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[Continued.]

place and therefore no cause for irritation. Up to the evening of the 9th April 1919, there was calm in the city.

The people of Delhi had been pressing me to ask Mahatma Gandhi to come and give his *darshan* to the thousands who had learnt a new spiritual lesson from him. As I heard that Mahatmajee was going on tour to the Punjab and Sindh I wired to him to break journey at Delhi. I did this because I was certain that Mahatma Gandhi's personal contact with the people will make our task of infusing the principles of *satyagraha* into them easy. Mahatmajee wired saying that he could leave Bombay on Tuesday evening. I wired back saying that we were thankful for his telegram and then the following telegram was received by me from him on April 8th, 1919: "Reaching to-morrow evening. Please keep my arrival strictly private; can bear no public demonstration." I showed this telegram to the other office holders of the *satyagraha sabha* alone and did not think it advisable to inform the general public as any public demonstration would have told upon the health of Mahatmajee.

The police and the military were, however, in full display and Lancers began to patrol the city from 7-30 P.M. more than two hours before the time of arrival of the train. When I, with some other friends, reached the Delhi junction railway station the several platforms were brimming over with the C. I. D. people and the issue of platform tickets was stopped. The train was late coming because of Mahatma Gandhi's arrest at Palwal. When, however, the train steamed in the station, the European travellers, seeing us awaiting Mahatmajee's arrival, waved their hands exultingly and spoke only one word "arrested!" Then Mr. Mahadeva Desai, Mahatmajee's Secretary, came out and confirmed the news saying that he had Mahatma Gandhi's message to deliver to us.

Mahatma Gandhi's message and the evening meetings.

Mr. Mahadeva Desai wrote out Mahatma Gandhi's "Message to my countrymen" and we got it typed in the night. It was sent round to the papers. On the morning of April 10th there was again a complete *hartal*. As there was no time for circulating notices, I left my lodging at about 7-30 in the morning. People assembled in large numbers in the way and the news spread within half an hour that Mahatma Gandhi's message was to be read on the banks of the Jumna River to the assembled people. At 9 A.M. about 20 thousand people (ladies and gentlemen) had reached the place of the meeting. The message, which is now a classical document, was read and explained by me and prayers were offered to the Almighty for his long life and the success of the *satyagraha*.

In the evening there was another huge gathering numbering about seventy thousand people. The principal resolution, put forward, said:—

"This mass meeting of the citizens of Delhi calls upon every Indian to do his duty by his country and following the noble and inspiring example set by Mahatma Gandhi at Palwal, seek them withdrawal of the Rowlatt legislation or his own imprisonment."

Another C. I. D. attempt at disturbance.

When the resolution was about to be put to the vote a strange incident occurred. A man who was standing at the farthest corner of the audience said in a shrill, piercing voice, "Stop; what are you doing? At Palwal 300 goras (British soldiers) have been killed and a thousand *lathis* with *lathis* are bringing Gandhi here. How dare you pass this resolution?" The audience was thunderstruck and the chairman was at a loss what to do. I once got up and said loudly, "I have definite information that Gandhiji was taken to Mathra last night and his carriage was attached to the Bombay mail this morning. This appears to be a C. I. D. man, do detain him." But the man disappeared. Suspicions about his being a C. I. D. man was confirmed because at least one inspector, two deputy inspectors and a dozen other

C. I. D. men were present and nobody tried to arrest the man who was spreading such horrible, untrue rumours.

The *hartal* continued on the 11th and on the 12th although the leaders of the people tried to have the shops opened. But whenever we tried to get business resumed the people were ready with the answer that they would not end the *hartal* until Gandhiji was set free. On the morning of April 12th, I received a wire from Bombay, which ran as follows:—

"Just arrived and discharged from custody.... Will inform later. Regret loss life some places. Absolutely necessary people restrain themselves and avoid violence. Please repeat this Lahore, Amritsar, etc., Gandhi." On this I wired the following message to Lala Duni Chand at Lahore and Lala Kanhaya Lal at Amritsar:—

"Just received wire from Bombay. Mahatma Gandhi released. He regrets loss of life; counsels restraint and avoiding violence. I, too, strongly urge calm restraint. Will wire further particulars when received. God and Truth guide you all."

Armed with this authority I gave public notice of this in the local newspapers and called upon the people to end the *hartal*. But just as my appeal was going round another notice appeared under the signature of Colonel Beadon saying that he had commenced inquest proceedings and calling upon people not to be led away by outsiders and to come and make their statements before him.

On the morning of the 13th, Principal Rudra received a wire from Mahatma Gandhi in which he sent a message telling people to end the *hartal*. On learning this I, with the local leaders, went about the city and we had induced some persons to open their shops when, a fate would have it, Lt. Colonel Beadon came on horseback with a strong guard and on seeing him all the shops closed again. A meeting was, however, held in the evening of April 13th, 1919, when I exhorted about thirty-five thousand people (assembled in the evening) to obey Mahatma Gandhi and to restore normal conditions the next day. A single resolution was passed that day, a copy of which was wired to the Private Secretary to the Viceroy at Simla.

"Citizens of Delhi passed following resolution at mass meeting held this evening. This mass meeting of citizens of Delhi protests against investigation instituted by Delhi executive of incidents of March 30th on ground that being party to destruction of lives of harmless people and wounding of innocent citizens they cannot by any principle of justice and equity be allowed to sit as judges on their own actions. Meeting, however, invites Imperial Government to depute few officials from outside Delhi Province in order to co-operate with non-official commission appointed by people of Delhi for investigation of causes that led to tragedy."

While we were assembled in meeting news spread like wild-fire that the Delhi leaders were about to be arrested, that they had been called by the Deputy Commissioner ostensibly for holding consultation but in reality for being spirited away to some unknown destination. When I entered the motor car with Dr. Ansari and Lala Peare Lal, people rushed and stopped the car and began to shout:—"Please do not go to Colonel Beadon. You will be arrested. If you go, allow us all to accompany you." I knew nothing about any such meeting having been called and I assured them that I was not going. On my giving repeated assurances they left us and the motor car flew towards Kashmiri gate. In the way Dr. Ansari and Lala Peare Lal informed me that they had been really called by Colonel Beadon and that there was no time to lose. I compelled them to drop me at my lodging before they proceeded to Colonel Beadon's place.

Lathis began to appear.

From the very morning of 14th April 1919, *lathis* began to appear. At noon, the Chief Commissioner called a meeting of local leaders and they all went to the Town Hall. I heard that men with *lathis* were going to the Town Hall. Between 3 and 4 in the after-

Continued.]

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noon one man on a tonga and another on foot went running towards the sadar bazaar crying that Swamiji (meaning me) had been taken to the railway station and a special train was waiting to take him to an unknown destination. Some hundreds of the sadar people armed themselves with lathis and were running towards the railway station when they learnt that I was at home. Then thousands came running and boarded my humble lodging and I had to show myself to all by going downstairs before they could trust that all was right.

In the meanwhile Hakim Ajmal Khan and other leaders had returned from the Town Hall and after seeing them safe at Hakim Sahib's place the people went and held a meeting in the Edward Park where a C. I. D. inspector and a head constable were assaulted.

At 6 P.M. in the night on that very date I received a letter from the Chief Commissioner asking me to join the conference at the Town Hall in the morning.

The Hon'ble Mr. Barron's strength of mind saves the situation.

On the 15th of April I and Hakim Sahib made a tour of the city and after trying to induce the butchers to open shops we reached the Town Hall after 10 and saw all the other leaders there. The Chief Commissioner with Deputy Commissioner and police and military were also there. As I went in shouts of *Gandhiji ki jai Hindu Musalman ki jai* were raised outside on the Chandni Chowk Road. I was asked by the authorities to go and calm the people. I went out and asked them to be quiet and they at once became silent. But there was again a stir and the reason was plain.

I looked behind and saw Col. Beadon coming out. I exhorted the people to keep quiet and took Col. Beadon in. I noticed at that time that lathis were becoming more prominent in the crowd. After an hour's consultation it was resolved that the *chaudhris* and other prominent men from the city should also be called for final decision at 4 P.M. that day.

I and Hakim Ajmal Khan induced the butchers to commence business about 4 P.M. and when we reached the Town Hall we saw about fifty citizens in consultation with the Chief Commissioner and other officials. On the road in front of Queen Victoria's statue some 15 to 20 thousand people were standing, out of whom more than one half had lathis in their hands. On the railway road side also about 3 to 4 thousand were assembled. The people were telling me plainly that they were there to guard their leaders and if any thing went wrong they would lay down their lives to defend them (the leaders). I tried to calm them and told them that they were mistaken. They told me in reply that I was mistaken and not they, but promised to obey me in keeping quiet.

I found the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Scott of the police, and the military officers all very nervous. But the reason of the excitement of the people was plain. One room of the Town-Hall was full of armed British soldiers, more than a dozen military officers, armed cap-a-pie with revolvers in hand, were sitting in the conference, one machine-gun was mounted on the highest roof of the Hall, and to crown all an aeroplane was flying over the city. It was rumoured that the aeroplane would suddenly alight over the Town-Hall roof and would take away the leaders so at an unknown destination. Therefore as in the morning so at the evening of April 15th the people shouted *Gandhi ki jai, Hindu Musalman ki jai* every time that the aeroplane came over their heads.

Every official appeared to be excited but there was one calm figure and that was the Hon'ble Mr. Barron, Chief Commissioner of Delhi. No sooner he learnt, from the people's representatives, that the *hartal* on April 10th commenced in order to show grief at the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi and that it was continued because the people feared that their leaders would be harmed, he at once rose equal to the occasion and wrote out his memorable proclamation,* ten thousand copies of the Hindustani translation of which were distributed the next morning. It was a memorable occasion. If the head

of the province had lost his head at that time the result would have been disastrous. There is no exaggeration, then, in saying that Mr. Barron alone saved the situation that day. I hold in my possession the draft of the translation signed by Mr. Barron which, together with a printed copy of the same I produce, D.

It was growing dark and the crowd outside was becoming impatient when Mr. Barron put the draft proclamation in my hand. I at once went out and, without waiting for the door of the Queen's Garden to be opened, jumped over the railing and was at once encircled by a surging crowd of more than twenty thousands. At that time every man appeared to be carrying lathi. I told them to follow me to Dr. Ansari's compound (far away on the farthest corner of the city) and left on foot. The people were so much excited that they began to beat with their lathis the wired drums for holding sweepings of the bazar and electric globes. I at once stopped and said, in a loud voice "I will not go with you. Allow me to leave back. You promised non-violence to person and property and to fight with spiritual weapons alone and here you are breaking your vow." The vast crowd became silent for a moment and then all lathis came down and a shout went forth "We admit our fault. We will not use carnal weapons, we will not; it is the spiritual force alone which we will use" and then they walked more than half a mile, to the place of meeting, without any further mischief. There was a gathering of some fifty thousand people and I read out and explained the proclamation. Dr. Ansari spoke it through gramophone so that every word of it was heard by that huge audience. Then we dispersed.

Colonel Beadon again spoils matters.

On the morning of 16th April all the leaders became busy in getting the shops at the Chandni Chowk opened. The work had hardly proceeded through half the Chandni Chowk when suddenly Colonel Beadon, with Mr. Scott of the police, and a strong guard again came riding from the Clock-Tower to the Fatehpuri side. That was the signal for all the shops to close again. We tried best to persuade people to end the *hartal*, but the people said, "The man who calls us *badmashes* will not compel us to do so." After trying till noon, we gave up the attempt for that day and met in consultation at Hakim Ajmal Khan's house.

At about 3 P.M. intelligence reached us that all the additional police piquets were being withdrawn from the city and that even half of the ordinary police was being sent away. The people rose equal to the occasion and hundreds of volunteers came forward to guard the city and to keep night-watch. There was not a single report of an offence that night. In fact during the days of the *hartal* crimes were conspicuous by their absence; even gambling dens and drinking shops remained almost empty.

During half the night of April 16th the people's representatives sat in consultation because response had to be made to Mr. Barron's sympathetic attitude. I did not join the night meeting as full 18 days' abnormal pressure had told on my health. After 12 in the night Hakim Ajmal Khan, R. B. Sultan Singh and Dr. Ansari came to my lodging and woke me up. They told me that the Deputy Commissioner (Colonel Beadon) had phoned offering us the help of the police for the next morning and asked my advice about it. I told them in reply that if the police interfered I would have nothing to do with the opening of the *hartal* and would not join in their work on April 17th. They promised to phone to Colonel Beadon my opinion and promised that they would send a conveyance for me only if police help was not to be taken.

The next day, in spite of opposition from some misguided people, we succeeded in having all business places opened by noon. But in flat contradiction of his promise, at 11 A.M., the Deputy Commissioner sent dozens of parties of policemen with big bludgeons who began parading the streets. We telephoned the district magistrate and the police superintendent to call away

SWAMI SHRADDHANAND—concluded—Rai Bahadur SULTAN SINGH.

the police and to keep them back for two hours but all to no purpose. However, having got the last shops opened we were returning back when we saw great commotion near the Clock-Tower. As we approached people shouted :—

"You have ruined us. You are getting the shops opened while our men are being dragged by the police to the Town-Hall bleeding from bayonet wounds."

On enquiry we found that a youth of twenty was taken in custody because he was asking the people to close their shops. I drove to Hakim Ajmal Khan's and tried three times to speak to the Town-Hall by telephone, but nobody replied. Then the sound of firing was heard and I again left for the Town-Hall. I had not proceeded more than fifty paces when the wounded were seen being brought by people on their shoulders. I returned back and began receiving wounded bodies. Dr. Hari Shanker was phoned and he came at once and after dressing the wounds took them away.

While I came to Hakim Sahib's he himself went with Dr. Ansari to the Town-Hall. He asked Col. Beadon to show the arrested young man (Gauri Shankar, aged about 20 years) to them. They said that there were no wounds on his body and asked Colonel Beadon to allow them to take away the boy and by showing the people that he was not wounded to calm them. Hakim Sahib told me that as Colonel Beadon thought that the prestige of the *pirkar* would suffer, he did not allow it and they were at once startled on hearing the sound of firing.

I at once wired the whole situation that day to the Viceroy, but again no notice was taken of it.

On April 18th there was again *hartal* because one of the wounded died and about 50 thousand people followed his heir to the cremation ground. There I exhorted the people to resume business the next morning and they did so, and on the morning of April 19th normal conditions were restored.

My conclusions are :—

I. There was no need for firing at the railway station on March 30th, 1919. If the authorities had sent a car for me, I would have reached the railway station within 2 minutes and the crowd would have at once dispersed. I live very near the railway station.

II. There was absolutely no justification for firing at the Town Hall gate.

Rai Bahadur SULTAN SINGH, Banker, Delhi.

In response to the call of the Mahatma Gandhi, *hartal* was observed in Delhi on 30th March 1919, as a protest against the passing of the Rowlatt Act. I came to know at midday while at my house that a crowd, that had collected at the railway station, on hearing of the arrest of two persons, owing to a squabble between them and a sweet-meat seller there, was fired at with some casualties. I was also informed that the crowd refused to leave the railway station till the arrested men were released. After this the city police and military were called, who drove the crowd from the railway premises and pushed it towards the Queens Gardens. In the excitement of the moment some brickbats are said to have been thrown by some unruly spirits, the crowd being roughly handled by the police. This crowd was not armed even with sticks, and quietly dispersed after the firing. The news of this incident attracted a large number of men near the Clock Tower, who were fired at again, it is alleged, on their assuming a threatening attitude and throwing some missiles at the soldiers who had taken their stand inside the Queens Gardens after closing its gates.

Assuming these facts to be correct, there was no justification or necessity for firing on both occasions, at a crowd which had no means of offering any serious resistance and had no preconceived plan. That was the general impression and belief. The crowd could have been

III. The magistrate and the police erred in taking the dead bodies and the wounded to the police hospital on the evening of March 30th, where there was no sufficient material for dressing the wounded properly. It was only after a deputation of the leaders had waited on the Chief Commissioner and he had gone with them to the police hospital that the dead and the wounded were (about 27 hours after being fired at) taken to the civil hospital and dead bodies delivered to their relations and the wounded properly dressed. The English nurses refused to attend on the serious cases. When asked to do so they are reported to have said, "They have been well served. They are rebels and we won't attend them" or words to that effect.

IV. Colonel Beadon was primarily responsible for the prolongation of the *hartal* and it was only Mr. Barron's statesmanship and good heartedness which saved the situation.

V. The people's case at Delhi could only be proved if Mr. Marshall then senior police superintendent, Mr. J. L. Orde, the C. I. D. superintendent, Colonel Beadon and the military officers could be cross-examined. But they have all gone and were not detained by the authorities although it was known that a Committee of Enquiry was to sit.

VI. Some Indian officials could give very useful evidence, but they can do so only if summoned by the Honourable the members of the Committee of Enquiry.

And lastly I have to lay one request before the Committee of Enquiry. It has been urged by Anglo-Indian papers and has been repeated by partisans of the Government of India in the Legislative Council of India that all mischief in the Punjab emanated from Delhi and that emissaries from Delhi were sent to the Punjab to brew disturbances. I deny flatly that there has been any conspiracy at Delhi and that any emissaries have gone out from this place for brewing mischief; and if any such evidence is placed before the committee, in the Punjab, the Delhi representatives of the people should get ample notice of it and should be allowed to produce evidence contradicting the same.

dispersed by less drastic measures, such as found sufficient in similar circumstances in other parts of the world. The attitude of the populace can also be judged by their peaceful behaviour at the open-air meeting held in the Pipal Park on the evening of the same day, without any untoward consequences. The Hon'ble Mr. Barron, Chief Commissioner, acted with great tact in allowing this meeting to continue. This had a soothing effect on the crowd, which passed through the Chandni Chowk without making any demonstration, in spite of the excitement and deep anguish over the casualties of the day, and a foolish threat of violence by a soldier to Swami Shraddhanand, who was leading them.

On the 31st March the situation was eased to some extent by the Chief Commissioner's sympathetic attitude and allowing the dead bodies of those killed to be made over to their friends and relations. The burial and cremation of these kept the people occupied throughout that day and business was resumed on the 1st April.

There was another *hartal* on the 6th April in spite of the efforts on the *satyagraha sabha* and some prominent citizens to induce the people not to resort to it again, as it had been already observed by them on the previous Sunday. Mr. Gandhi had advised against the second *hartal* and a notice to that effect was issued by several citizens including myself. This *hartal*, together with a big meeting in the evening, passed off without any hitch.

Rai Bahadur SULTAN SINGH—concluded—Mr. S. K. RUDRA.

Things assumed their normal condition the next day and the people were expecting the arrival of Mr. Gandhi on the evening of the 9th April, when the news of his being prevented from coming to Delhi caused a great deal of disappointment and commotion, leading to the complete and spontaneous closing of the bazar next morning, that is, on the 10th April.

This state of things continued till the 16th April, as some people thought that by doing so the authorities may be induced to cancel their order against Mr. Gandhi. During this interval several meetings were held in the Town Hall at which the people were kindly allowed, by the Chief Commissioner, to lay their grievances before him and it was a real stroke of statesmanship on his part to issue a proclamation assuring the public that their grievances will be brought to the notice of the higher authorities and that no harm will come to their leaders. The police were also kept under proper control for the time being. This action was very much appreciated and it restored the confidence of the people in the head of the local administration. The situation was thus saved and the people listening to the advice of the leaders opened their shops on the morning of the 17th April.

Unfortunately the police by their tactless interference arrested a lad who was foolishly asking some shopkeepers to continue the closing of their shops. This incident was exaggerated by some men who gave out that the boy had been bayoneted after he was dragged inside the garden, and this gave rise to great excitement on account of which the bazar was closed again and a large crowd collected in Chandni Chowk in an angry mood. Haziq-ul-Mulk Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr. Ansari went to the local officers in the Town Hall to find

out the true facts. I had been going round the bazars with Swami Shradhdhanand to see the shops opened and when we passed through the crowd in a motor car near the Clock Tower, the crowd surrounded us, showered abuses and remonstrated that while we were asking the people to open their shops, the police had caught hold of a lad who had met with a dog's death, for which we were considered to be responsible. It was with difficulty that I was able to get away and walked to Hakim Ajmal Khan's house in Ballimaran. A few minutes after my arrival there, sound of firing was heard and a crowd brought some wounded men saying that the police picket in the corner of Ballimaran had fired and caused some casualties. As I was the subject of their wrath, I did not face the crowd, and after some time when the wounded had been attended and taken away, I returned to my house. Subsequent enquiry disclosed that this firing was not ordered by any responsible officer, and was due to a fracas between the picket and the mob, which was coming from Chandni Chowk after the bazar had been closed in consequence of the fresh excitement produced by the rumour of a boy being done to death, which afterwards was found to be incorrect.

After this incident the attitude of the local officers became stiff, and several men, including myself, were enrolled as special constables on the 18th. The Chief Commissioner, Mr. Barron, again came to the rescue and got this order, which was very humiliating to those who tried to help the authorities, cancelled after two or three days. The police were also warned not to harass the people. Great credit is due to Mr. Barron for his patient and tactful attitude which has saved Delhi from a most critical situation and horrors perpetrated in the Punjab.

Mr. S. K. RUDRA, Principal, St. Stephen's College, Delhi (23rd October 1919).

1. Events of which witness was an eye-witness:—

(a) April 1st.—Funeral procession of certain persons killed in the firing on March 30th. Great emotion of the crowd. But crowd quite orderly and deeply impressed by the solemnity of the occasion. Hindus carrying Muhammadan dead and Muhammadans carrying Hindus, a thing which witness had never seen before. Consolation offered at the Ghat to the families of the dead (*Mar nahin gaye—zinda hain*). Crowd at Ghat 8,000 to 10,000 persons. Addresses by several speakers. Witness heard Swami Shradhdhanand's address. Address all that could be desired, exercised a great restraining influence on the crowd. Followed by prayer by the swami.

(b) April 6th.—Walked through city. Complete hartal, but no disorder. Went on to meeting near Edward Park—proceedings quite orderly—heard part of a speech by L. Shankar Lal.

(c) Date.—? Went to meeting in Dr. Ansari's compound. Meeting nearly over when witness arrived. Huge crowds, orderly.

(d) Date.—? Walked through city on the night the police were withdrawn. All quiet save for the shouts of the volunteer watchmen.

(e) Date.—? Went through city with telegram from Mr. Gandhi, announcing his safety and freedom. People pleased to hear news but doubtful of its accuracy, having suspicions as to whether telegram had really been sent by Mr. Gandhi.

2. State of feeling.—Points on which witness can give first-hand evidence:—

(a) Effect of Colonel Beadon's notice to the city—great annoyance caused by his use of the word *badmash* and other expressions.

(b) Great excitement over the appointment of leading *raias* as special constables and over the conditions of service. Great relief and easing of tension when the special constables were disbanded.

(c) Students—general behaviour satisfactory—willing to listen to the directions of witness—College work carried on almost without interruption—no evidence of any participation in disorderly proceedings—feeling of shame for the excesses of the mob.

(d) The principal leaders and *raias* of the city—ashamed of the excesses of the mob—indignant at the shooting on March 30th but anxious for the stoppage of the hartal and wishing to do their best to assist the authorities to restore normal conditions.

3. General effect of Chief Commissioner's dealing with the situation.—Situation extremely critical—martial law would probably have been inevitable but for Chief Commissioner's tactful and statesmanlike policy, especially in the following points:—

(a) the withdrawal of the troops from the city,

(b) no arrests of any of the principal leaders,

(c) conferences with the leaders to attempt to restore normal conditions, desire for their help and willingness to listen to their suggestions.

Gratitude of the citizens of Delhi to the Chief Commissioner.

4. Behaviour of the troops and the Police.—As far as the witness's observations went, the troops and police were not much in evidence during the disturbed period, except for pickets stationed at certain points. Witness observed no improper behaviour on their part.

N.B.—Witness was not present at any of the events of March 30th and can give no evidence with regard to that day.

Mr. ISLAMULLAH KHAN—Mr. K. A. DESAI.

Mr. ISLAMULLAH KHAN, Municipal Commissioner and Hony. Magistrate, Delhi (30th March 1919).

I went off to Gurgaon on Sunday, 30th March 1919, the day of mourning and strike of *Satyagrahis* from here to see my counsel there in connection with my village case. As I could not find him there I came back to Delhi by the first train and got here at about 1-30 P.M. When I got down at the platform I found the station simply packed with men. On enquiry it was found that it was mob of *Satyagrahis* who came up at the railway station to get the shop there shut up. The shop-keepers, they said, refused to do so on which *Satyagrahis* used force, hence a squabble between the shop-keepers and *Satyagrahis* and consequent interference of police, one or two arrest of *Satyagrahis* by police just to restore order. I saw the mob within the railway station making lot of fuss and there was great confusion. It was told that the mob broke and smashed glass panes of windows of the station and thrashed the station-master jolly well. The mob came out of the station in great rush shouting "*Gandhi ji jai*," and we would have the men arrested by the police released.

I met Mr. Currie, additional district magistrate, at the entrance of the station and he asked me if I saw Mr. Barron, the Chief Commissioner; I replied in negative and said that I was just coming from Gurgaon. Mr. Currie asked me to stay there and I stayed there for about an hour or so. The mob was continuously throwing brick-bats and struck over the officials there which fell about three persons and was persistent to get the men arrested released. Every effort was made to appease the anger of the mob and it was said that the men arrested were

released but all in vain, and it rather served to augment their anger instead and the situation was getting serious. The mob, most of them armed with *lathis*, seemed to attack the Government men every moment. I was simply trembling considering the consequences. Under the circumstances it was found necessary to send for mounted guard, infantry and a machine gun to frighten away the mob. I left the station before the gun was fired as messengers after messengers were sent by my people to come home at once as disturbances in our neighbouring streets taking place and that the mob then had alighted some Europeans from their car forcibly. I therefore hastened and found no tramway or carriage to convey me home. On my way home I saw at different parts of the streets groups of men standing talking to get Rowlatt Bill annulled at any cost, never to pay taxes, never to obey Government orders. In short there was a state of chaos, disorder and lawlessness prevailing over the city.

After my arrival home I heard firing and I was not surprised to hear it considering the situation of Government men at railway station, as they were surrounded by a mob provocative in extreme and their all efforts failed to appease them.

I think the authorities were justified in ordering to fire simply to frighten away the mob. If they had not done so as a primary precautionary step, the situation would have become from worse to worst and most dangerously serious.

Mr. K. A. DESAI, Manager of the Birla Mills (2nd November 1919).

The following statement by me has already appeared in the papers and I repeat it here.

I am manager of the Hanuman Mahadeo Mills. I have taken the passive resistance vow. I have taken an active part in the passive resistance movement there, and have also attended all the meetings in this connection. The speeches at all the meetings were delivered with a view to exhort the sympathies of the public to join the passive resistance movement, and special stress was laid by all the speakers not to resort to any sort of violence or opposition or bitterness but to take to humiliation and prayers.

Passive resistance was advocated as a soul force and all the communities were appealed to join and sympathise. By a resolution 30th March was fixed as humiliation day. Due precautions were taken by the *satyagrahis*, and volunteers were sent round in every locality to see that no violent measures were resorted to, and the drawbacks, if any, were due to the unprecedented and unexpected response from the general public to the command of Mahatma Gandhi.

On the 30th I started at 7 A.M. and went round Sabzi-mandi Sadar, Kharibawdi and Chandni Chowk. Nearly every shop was closed and perfect peace and order were maintained. I spent about two hours at Fatehpuri and nothing unusual happened there. From there I returned to the Home Rule League office and spent about one hour there. After eleven o'clock on being informed that near Fatehpuri large crowds have assembled, I started with Mr. Shankar Lal to go there in order to disperse them. On coming near the Clock Tower, I was informed that at the railway station two boys, while requesting the station shop-keepers to close their shops, were beaten by the station master severely and kept in custody.

At the station superintendent's office.

I went there and found a few men standing near the platform entrance gate, demanding the two men back. On the other side of the gate there about half a dozen soldiers abusing and trying to beat them with canes,

etc., through the gate holes. The crowd began to increase in numbers, as the information went round the city. Some men from the crowd entered the platform and went near the station superintendent's office as, I believe, they were informed that the two men were kept in custody in his room. As soon as they went there he got angry and began to abuse and beat them. I tried to stop the people from entering and wanted to have an interview with him, but to no purpose. He, with some others in the room, began thrashing the crowd. I sought the assistance of a policeman in civil dress and got an entrance into the room, but, before I could talk, the city inspector forced open the back door of the office and came in with about a dozen constables abusing and thrashing the people with whip and sticks. I at once retired and came back on the platform and began to talk to several authorities, but they were so excited that the only reply I got from them was that the Chief Commissioner and the military had been sent for. I also inquired as to the necessity of this measure and whether anybody was hurt, but these people were creating a row and breaking glasses.

I approached to the district traffic superintendent, as well as the station superintendent, and said that the whole station will be cleared if the two men were returned. They only said, "Let the Chief Commissioner and military come." I came out and had a conversation with the city inspector, who was all in excitement and abusing both the people and passive resisters. I told him that the rough handling of the people was far from desirable and we *satyagrahis* were ready to present our backs instead to the police to get their sticks if that would satisfy them. I then said that I would try to persuade the crowd to retire if the two men were released. I also offered to give bail, to which the *kotwal* replied that he had no man in his custody there. Owing to the delay in the return of men and the harsh rough treatment, the crowd was provoked to a great extent and every minute the matter grew worse. I tried my best along with other *satyagrahis* to induce the people to retire, but they were only bent on one thing and they had lost all faith in the assurances of the inspector and

[continued.]

Mr. K. A. DESAI.

railway authorities as they had beaten them very severely. As neither the police nor the crowd were inclined to yield, I thought of going and calling some leaders, but in the meanwhile a contingent of armed police arrived, and as I proceeded a little further I saw a machine-gun coming. Thinking this will further provoke the people and it was now beyond my power to persuade, I returned to the office of the Home Rule League in sorrow and despair. On returning there a member of the Criminal Investigation Department came and told Lala Shankar Lal and me that we were called by the police inspector to persuade the crowd. I told Mr. Shankar Lal that the people were provoked to the highest pitch and our going would not serve the purpose. Let us therefore take some leaders with us. But on coming near the Clock Tower we were met by an *ekka* with two wounded. I said that the worst had happened, it is useless to go and we sat on a verandah opposite the garden. Another carriage followed with three more wounded. Great crowds were gathering there and, with a view to disperse them, we said to them that a meeting is being held at the Congress grounds and people began to go in that direction. On reaching there, a meeting was at once started. But after some time news arrived of the second fire on the crowds near the Clock Tower. This provoked the people again and during the meeting 50 Lancers with 2 European officers came on the spot and began to surround the crowd. A machine-gun was also seen at a distance. One of them talked to Mahatma Munshi Ram and, on inquiry by me as to what he wanted, he said that he wanted an assurance that this crowd would be peaceful and that no stones would be thrown at Europeans, and I said "Provided you retire and do not provoke the people the meeting would be peaceful." He told me to announce that to the meeting, and I did so. They retired then.

Most peaceful meetings.

At the second meeting the Chief Commissioner of Delhi arrived and called the Chairman, Mahatma Munshi Ram, and after a short interview with him retired and promised that the crowd would not be molested any more if they retired quietly after the meeting. The meeting, although attended by about 25 thousand men, was the most peaceful one I have ever seen. On Monday I also kept going round the city throughout the day and, though the crowds were large in number than the preceding day, there being no provocation from the police and the authorities, the whole day passed peacefully.

From what I have seen and known I am confident that this catastrophe would have been averted if the two boys were released at that time and if the harsh treatment were not accorded to the crowd. A little tact and yielding on the part of the city inspector and the station authorities to the people's wishes would have undoubtedly saved so many lives.

In addition to the above I beg to state as follows.

I saw no *lathis* in the hands of the people, nor did I see stone being thrown at the station throughout the time I was there. I passed near the garden the next day and did not see any railing or bars or pillars broken. There were several interviews of the leaders with the authorities during the days of *hartal* wherein I was present, the accounts of which will be found in Haziq-ul-Mulk, Hakim Ajmal Khan's and others' statements.

I worked with other leaders throughout the days of *hartal* and tried to see that no violence was resorted to. In fact there was no damage done to public property in the city except the few glasses broken by the police at the station and a few lanterns broken here and there by some playful boys. There was no spirit of mischief or any *anti-Government* feeling, for all the meetings held during these days, in spite of large audience to the extent of a lakh of people, were completely peaceful and orderly. The people were quiet all throughout. There were heaps of bricks and stones lying in the Congress *pandal* grounds and not a single stone was thrown in

spite of the great military array displayed twice during the meetings attended by more than 25 thousand people.

The boycott of tramcars also was not due to any *anti-British* feelings as will be seen from the letter of the acting manager of the Tramcars Company (original submitted herewith).

There were several actions such as the issue of notices by Colonel Beadon, the appointment of special constables, the picketting of police and the military in the city and the display of machine guns and aeroplane; all these things instead of pacifying the excited public went a great way to add fuel to the fire.

The only feeling that existed was that of resentment against the Rowlatt Legislation. It is also not true that any attempt was made by leaders at public meetings to misrepresent the scope of Rowlatt legislation. On the contrary I have been able to gather from several informal interviews I had with certain authorities here that they were supplied with exaggerated reports from some quarters.

I am also of opinion that the Criminal Investigation Department have not acted fairly or conveyed the facts in true light to their superiors, and I know at one or two places when we were trying to persuade the people to open shops there were a few men of the Criminal Investigation Department, whom I can recognise if shown to me, who spoke out from the crowd certain sentences, such as "Why do you open shops, our dead are not returned as yet;" "the leaders have been brought up by Government" and such other sentences. The belief that the Criminal Investigation Department people were abused at every meeting in speeches is far from true. In fact nobody took notice of them and allowed them to carry on their work unhindered.

The attitude of some of the European residents was far from being conciliatory. Instead of pacifying measures, they believed in a strong policy, except the Chief Commissioner, Hon'ble Mr. Barron, an instance would suffice. Certain European member of the Punjab Chamber of Commerce on 17th April called a meeting by telephone at the bungalow of a member and there wanted to decide to request the authorities to resort to measures like martial law immediately, and had it not been for the tact of an Indian member who was fortunate enough to have a telephone (I was not informed of the meeting though a member and therefore was able to attend the meeting), the resolution would not have been worded as it is (copy appended herewith).

In conclusion, I am firmly of opinion, as I have said above, that the whole catastrophe of the 30th would have been averted had the police and the authorities acted with a little patience, tact, and wisdom, instead of according a harsh and severe treatment to the public and resorting to final measures unnecessarily and thereby provoking them to the highest pitch. The timely release of the two boys would have saved so many innocent lives without in any way lessening the prestige of the Government.

Letter No. C.-80-1036, dated Delhi, the 7th April 1919, from L. O. Fuller, Esq., Acting Manager, Delhi Electric Tramways and Lighting Company, Limited, to the Editor, "Vijaya," Delhi.

Boycott of tramcars.—It has been reported to me by friends that the present boycott of tram cars is due to the fact that our tram cars were not suspended on Sunday, 30th March, in spite of the request made by the leaders of the passive resistance.

In respect of this, we should thank you if you would kindly state in the columns of your paper that the Manager of the Tramways Company was never approached on the subject, by any one of the public, but irrespective of this no tram car was in the street after about 9-30 A.M., either on Sunday, 30th March, or Sunday, April 6th.

Mr. K. A. DESAI—concluded—Mr. SHANKAR LAL.

Letter No. 731, dated Delhi, the 19th September 1919, from Mr. P. Mukerjee, Honorary Secretary, Punjab Chamber of Commerce, to K. A. Desai, Esq., Sabzimandi, Delhi.

With reference to your letter of the 18th instant, I beg to enclose herewith a copy of the minutes of an emergency meeting of the Delhi members of the Punjab Chamber, held on Thursday, the 17th April 1919, at 5 P.M., in the office of the Delhi Flour Mills Company, Limited, Delhi, containing all the required information. Also I beg to inform you that the resolution was forwarded to the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, on the same day and no reply has been received as yet from him.

(Confidential.)

For the information of Delhi members only.

THE PUNJAB CHAMBER OF COMMERCE.

Minutes of an emergency meeting of the Delhi members of the Punjab Chamber of Commerce held on Thursday, the 17th April 1919, at 5 P.M., in the office of the Delhi Flour Mills Company, Limited, No. 2 Kashmir Gate, Delhi.

PRESENT:

Names.	Representing.
Mr. R. E. Grant Govan	Delhi Flour Mills Co., Ltd. (in the chair).
Mr. H. H. Yule	East India Railway Co., Ltd.
Mr. C. R. Goodwin	Ganesh Flour Mills Co., Ltd.
Mr. H. A. Whyte	Allahabad Bank, Ltd.
Mr. R. L. Baylis	King, King & Co.
Mr. W. J. Tarleton	Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China.
Mr. J. Carnegie	National Bank of India, Ltd.
Mr. R. Fernie	Mercantile Bank of India, Ltd.
Mr. C. R. Blomfield	Civil and Sanitary Engineering and General Construction Co., Ltd.
Mr. E. J. Sheriff	R. J. Wood & Co.
Mr. H. M. Rodden	J. B. Norton & Sons.
Mr. J. N. Hutchinson	Alliance Bank of Simla, Ltd.
Mr. D. N. Bhanja	Kerr Tarruck & Co.
Mr. P. Mukerjee	P. Mukerjee & Co.
Lala Sri Ram	Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co., Ltd.
Mr. Abdul Sattar	Mr. S. M. Fazl Elahi.

1. Proposed by Mr. Yule and seconded by Mr. Hutchinson that Mr. Grant Govan take the chair.
Carried unanimously.

Mr. SHANKAR LAL, Delhi.

I took the vow of *satyagraha* on 7th March 1919, that is the very day when the *sabha* was established in Delhi by a resolution of a public meeting held in the Pipal Park under the presidentship of Doctor Ansari in the presence of Mahatma Gandhi. I was a member of the executive committee of the *sabha* and was appointed its treasurer and as such I attended all the meetings of the *sabha*, private or public, and addressed nearly all the meetings that were held under the auspices of the *sabha*.

Under the auspices of the *sabha* the first public meeting was held on the 24th March 1919 to explain to the people the true meaning of *satyagraha* vow.

Another meeting was held on 27th March under the presidentship of Swami Shradhdhanand when the following resolution was passed on my motion:—

(1) This public meeting of the citizens of Delhi places on record its emphatic protest against the enactment of Rowlatt Act and in order to express its protest proposes to adopt the following means:—

(a) To fast from the night of the 29th up to the evening of the 30th March.

The Secretary read the notice convening the meeting.

The Chairman briefly addressed the meeting pointing out to those present the serious local conditions prevailing in Delhi owing to the *hartal* and the riots. He emphasized the fact that the position, instead of improving, was, if anything, growing worse and it was therefore the duty of the Chamber to address the Local Government immediately with a view to strong action being taken to restore order in the city at once. He proposed therefore the adoption of the following resolution:—

"That this meeting having carefully reviewed the progress of events in Delhi from the 30th March, the date when the disturbances in the city commenced, has convincing evidence in the threatening and riotous attitude of the mob that the measures so far taken by the authorities to restore order to the city, confidence to its inhabitants, and protection to its trade and industry, have proved ineffective.

The meeting, therefore, would urge upon Government the necessity which now exists for dealing with the situation, not only promptly, but sternly, and would suggest the adoption of measures calculated to restore the normal conditions of trade and industry."

Seconded by Mr. Yule.
The resolution was unanimously adopted.

It was resolved also that a copy of the resolution accompanied by the following letter should be forwarded to the Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner, Delhi:—

"Sir,—I have the honour to attach herewith, for your information and such action as you may deem necessary, copy of a resolution unanimously passed this afternoon at a representative meeting of the Delhi members of the Punjab Chamber of Commerce.

I am also directed to suggest as a practical measure that a proclamation should be issued to-morrow calling upon all shop-keepers and butchers to open their shops and resume normal business on Saturday morning, a guarantee of protection being given to them. This protection to be secured by the picketting of the *entire* city by military troops and police."

A vote of thanks to the chair terminated the meeting.

J. RENTON DENNING, Secretary.
R. E. GRANT GOVAN, Chairman.
The 17th April 1919.

(b) To close all shops and suspend all business on the 30th March with the exception of such businesses as related to public utility, e.g., chemists, vendors of foodstuffs.

(c) To hold a monster meeting on the evening of the 30th March to record our protest.

(2) That this public meeting expresses its full confidence in Mahatma Gandhi and requests the people of the whole of India to take *satyagraha* vow in order to get the Rowlatt Act repealed.

I was and even still am of opinion that *hartal* is a constitutional way of expressing our protest of mourning and grief. Even before the 30th March *hartal* has been observed by the Indians on many occasions. In 1917 when the license for Ramlika procession was not granted Delhi people observed a *hartal*. Besides this many a time people suspended their business even on the order of the Government itself, for example, at the time of the death of Queen Victoria and King Edward; and as the Government had seen it fit to pass the Rowlatt Act against the unanimous opinion of the whole of India,

Continued.]

Mr. SHANKAR LAL.

hartal was absolutely a constitutional way of expressing our grief and protest.

So according to the instructions issued by Mahatma Gandhi and the resolution passed at the public meeting I and my following friends took it upon ourselves as *satyagraha* to approach every shop-keeper and request him to close his shop on 30th March :—Mr. Arif, Professor Indar of "Vijay," Mr. Taj Uddin, M. Abdulla, Merchant, and Pandit Shiv Narain Haksar.

We approached practically each and every shop-keeper in the big bazars of the city and requested them humbly to close their shops on the 30th but the people were already prepared to suspend their business, so that it did not take us more than ten hours (some four hours on the 28th and some six hours on 29th) to go round the whole of the city of Delhi.

We explained to the people the instructions of Mahatma Gandhi, for example, not to use any force or pressure on any unwilling brother nor should close the shops which sold drugs and foodstuffs.

In the evening of 29th March another public meeting was held to instruct the people as to the way of observing *hartal*. They were told not to roam about idly in the city, not to force any shop-keeper to close his shop against his wish. Mr. Abbas Husain Qari, Maulvi Ahmad Said and myself spoke in this meeting.

At the end of the meeting I, as Secretary, Home Rule Volunteer Corps, asked all the volunteers to present themselves early in the morning on 30th in uniform.

The volunteers and some leading members of *satyagraha sabha* were present early in the morning on 30th at the Home Rule League office. The volunteers were detailed off to various parts of the city and they were ordered to see that there collected no crowds anywhere in the streets and nobody was forced either to close his shop or open his shop against his will.

I with some volunteers remained in the office, and other members of the *sabha* went personally to the city to make a round whenever any news arrived of any crowd having gathered anywhere I despatched the volunteers from the office to disperse the crowd.

Up to 10 A.M. the news I received was that all shops were closed in the city and everywhere there was quiet. The police force was visible in the city in great numbers and from the early morning their treatment was rather harsh, mounted police was riding in the city hither and thither. Members of the *sabha* returned at about noon.

At that time I desired to make a round myself to satisfy myself that the reports of the volunteers were true. So Professor Indar, Mr. Desai, myself and a few volunteers started from the Home Rule office towards Fatehpuri. In Chandni Chowk people were collected before the shops but they were conversing with each other in an ordinary manner, our volunteers would not allow them to block the road.

We were thinking of making a round of the whole of the city, but when we reached the Clock Tower we heard that two volunteers were arrested by the railway authorities, and there was a big crowd at the railway station. The people's mind was rather disturbed by this news and I became anxious about my volunteers.

We all started towards the railway station and stationed some volunteers at the gate of Queen's Garden to see that the people did not go towards the station. When we reached the station there was a crowd of some three or four hundred on the road and in the garden. On seeing us people flocked to us and informed us that two men had been arrested, the police had beaten them. On hearing this, I ascended the paling of the station yard and told the people that they were *satyagrahis*, they should not shout but go home; we would file a proper complaint in the court and try our best to get the men released. But the people said that the railway authorities had arrested the men without any reason, the shop-keepers had willingly closed their shops when the police interfered, kicked, abused and beaten the people and arrested two of them. If there was any ault of these two men, they were ready to go bail for

them. Hearing this I asked Mr. Desai to go to the station authorities and stand surety for these two men. Mr. Desai went inside and we waited outside. When we came, the door of the station was guarded by the police, but shortly afterwards the city police inspector came, and these guards were withdrawn, and people entered the station yard. Mr. Desai came back and said that the authorities would not listen to him.

During all this time the police was threatening the people and was beating them without any reason. We were requesting the people to go away and were imploring the police not to be so harsh. Mr. Desai told me that it was useless to stay there, the police were obstinate. He said "let us go and inform the leaders." We went to the Home Rule League office, near Kauria Bridge, we saw a machine-gun going towards the station. Shortly afterwards, we heard that the people were fired, upon at the railway station. Swami Shradhdhanand brought with him a huge crowd to the Pipal Park. Although the advertised time of the meeting was 4 P.M. yet in order to divert the people from going to Chandni Chowk, we began the meeting early.

On the 4th the Executive Committee of the *satyagraha sabha* passed resolutions unanimously that there should be no *hartal* on 6th April, but on 5th, Lieutenant-Colonel Beadon, the then Deputy Commissioner, issued a notice in which he called those who had observed *hartal* as "badmashes." People were irritated at this, and they again closed their shops on the 6th. In the morning all of us met at Dr. Ansari's office, Fatehpuri, when I suggested that in order to avoid any *fracas* of the police, the people should not be allowed to roam idly in the bazar, and one way to keep them busy was to hold three or four public meetings. All present approved of this suggestion and Mr. Rauf Ali was sent to the Deputy Commissioner to get permission to hold meetings in public places. Three meetings were held that day, attended by thousands, one in the morning at Fatehpuri Mosque, another at noon in Edward Park and third in the evening at Dr. Ansari's bungalow at Daryaganj, and the day passed off peacefully and calmly. People opening their shops on the 7th.

On the 9th, Mahatma Gandhi was arrested and *satyagraha sabha* again requested the people to observe *hartal*, and this continued up to 17th. People did not open their shop as they demanded that the order of the Delhi Government against the entry of Mahatma Gandhi must be cancelled. There was no disturbance up to 17th, although the police hirelings were spreading all sorts of rumours (to mention only a particular case, a meeting was held in Pataodi House, after the end of the meeting a man was saying, that a *sahib*, meaning thereby a European officer of his firm, was saying that all leaders of the people would be arrested and the police had not arrested them as they were guarded by the people; but whenever they were found alone, they would be at once arrested, and further that if the people did not open their shops, they would be bombed from aeroplanes. I, Professor Indar and some other friends were present. I told him either to reveal the name of his *sahib*, or I would take him to the police station. He told me that he would tell it to me privately, I took him aside and he named the manager of Dunlop Company. On this I said that either he must announce these statements from the steps of Jama Mosque or I would take him to the police station, and we took him to Jama Mosque, when we reached Edward Park the man said that it was all wrong and requested to be allowed to go. But Professor Indar and I did not believe him and he suddenly decamped).

During these days various efforts were made by Hakim Sahib, Dr. Ansari and others to have the shops opened; and a notice was issued signed by many people including myself to finish the *hartal*.

On the evening of the 16th the authorities withdrew the police from the city and people patrolled the streets and did watchman's duty themselves. Home Rule Volunteer Corps, Indraprasth Sewak Mandli and other volunteers helped the people.

Mr. SHANKAR LAL—concluded—RAM BHAROS—Haziq ul Mulk, HAKIM MUHAMMAD AJMAL KHAN.

On the night of 16th the leaders approached the authority and requested them that if they did not interfere, and the police and military were withdrawn from the garden all the shops would be opened.

On 17th through the efforts of Hakim Sahib, Dr. Ansari and others the shops began to open, and practically all shops in Sadar Bazar, Chandni Chowk, Khari Baoli, Dariba, and Chawri Bazar were opened. The most important fact is that there was no police throughout

the night of the 16th and the morning of the 17th up to 10 A.M. When suddenly the city inspector Khan Sahib Hamiduddin who could not be seen in the city for nearly a week was seen riding in Chandni Chowk. Several police pickets began to patrol the bazars and seeing this people became excited. When suddenly the news spread like wild fire that a young fellow named Gauri Shankar was arrested and all the bazars were again closed.

Translation of statement of RAM BHAROS.

I am at present employed by Messrs. G. R. Beri and Co. On 30th of March I went to Mr. Sakeb of Enquiry Office at about 11 A.M. for demanding money. While on my way I saw a crowd in the "Ganges line" waiting hall appealing the shopkeepers to close their shops. When I reached the waiting hall a Christian officer who did not look to be European ordered the police constables to arrest the people who were kicking up a row. I was one of the crowd. I was with two other persons arrested. The policemen took me to the police *chauki* through the platform and made me to sit there in a railway police

office where two or three men were working. There I requested them to let me know the reasons of my arrest on which they began to beat me and strangled my throat. About 15 minutes after this some of the police people came to the police *chauki* and on my mentioning to them that I have got a demand bill and on my showing it to the police authorities at their instance I was released. I at once went home since I was not in senses on account of the thrashing of police and I do not know what happened afterwards.

Haziq-ul-Mulk HAKIM MUHAMMAD AJMAL KHAN, Delhi.

I belong to a family which has been resident in Delhi for the last three centuries. My elders have always held a position of trust among the citizens and have been in touch with the public of Delhi.

Ever since the year 1857 A.D., this city has been in the constant enjoyment of peace and order. Never in my memory have the people of Delhi shown an inclination of breaking the King's peace in political matters. To my mind the foundation of the political awakening of Delhi dates from the year 1911 A.D. when it was selected by His Imperial Majesty the King Emperor as the Capital of India. From this time onward the growth of political thoughts has been going on strictly on constitutional lines, not only because the people of Delhi were instinctively law-abiding but because their leaders kept them assiduously to the course of law and order.

It was also in the fitness of things that Delhi being the Capital of the Indian Empire should prepare to keep itself abreast of the new thoughts which was galvanizing almost every nation on the surface of the globe. The ideals for which the war has been waged and did not leave the citizens of Delhi unaffected by their infectious originality and vigour. Hence the formation of a branch of the Home Rule League, and the sessions of the Indian National Congress and such other public activity were only different manifestation of the political awakening of the citizens of Delhi.

The advent of the constitutional reforms and the visit of the Secretary of State to India had their effect on the people's mind in due course. The hopes raised by the prospect of the reforms scheme had yet to fructify when the whole country was plunged into a state of agitation the citizens of Delhi perhaps felt the keenness of the situation more painfully than the rest of India. This regard of public opinion by the Government led Mr. Gandhi to embark on his *satyagraha* propaganda. A *satyagraha* committee was formed in Delhi on the 5th March 1919. The 6th of April was fixed by Mr. Gandhi as a day of humiliation, fasting and prayer. On account of some misunderstanding the Delhi people fixed the 30th March for fasting, prayer, etc. Hence Delhi witnessed a complete suspension of business on the 30th March 1919. It is said that some men went to the railway station in the forenoon to persuade a few station sweet-sellers to close their shops. They had not long been there when the station superintendent caused three of them to be

arrested by the police. The people demanded their release and some of them got inside the station compound but were driven out. To the best of my information the situation was that on the one side, were ranged the police, the military and some responsible officers, and on the other, towards the Garden Gate, were an assemblage of people, some of whom are alleged to have thrown brickbats. This state of affair has been described as threatening, leading to firing on a very large crowd.

So far as I have been able to ascertain, no attempt was made by the responsible officers on the spot to disperse the crowd by resorting to expedients. If at that time the Hindu and Muslim leaders had been sent for and their services availed of, to persuade the crowd to go away, I am sure so many valuable lives of the Delhi citizens would have been saved and the sufferings on account of the wounds inflicted on the crowd avoided.

As the question before this Committee is to give a finding whether firing on this occasion was necessary, it would not be out of place to mention here that it is justified by the officials on the allegation that the crowd had become unruly and noisy and one of the men was so near the British troops that he tried to snatch away the bayonet of a British soldier and was bayoneted by him. Even if this allegation turns out to be true I do not believe that this one instance could justify firing on an unarmed crowd mostly consisting of by standers.

The next event after the firing at the station, is the gathering of the people near the Clock Tower in Chandni Chowk. Here also, it is said, some brickbats were thrown by the boys in the crowd and one even struck a British officer, which led to a further order of firing. I believe at this point also more humane methods would have met the situation. It is said that the people who gathered at the Clock Tower wanted to go to the Queen's Road for the purpose of fetching the wounded and the killed. They were not allowed by the troops to proceed in that direction with the consequence already stated.

In the afternoon of the same day a huge meeting was held in the Pipal Park where a resolution protesting against the Rowlatt Act was passed. The authorities apprehending disorder went down to the meeting ground; and Mr. Barron, the Chief Commissioner, accompanied by a detachment of cavalry came to the meeting place and desired Swami Shradhdhanand to adjourn the meeting, but on Swami's assurance about the peaceful nature of the meeting, he allowed it to proceed.

I may here remark that this was a very wise act on part of the Chief Commissioner; for if he had insisted

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upon immediately dispersing the meeting which was peaceful in its nature, the probability was that it would have been very difficult to avoid unpleasant incident.

On the 31st of March, the *hartal* continued on account of the events of the previous day. Swamiji, Rai Bahadur Lala Sultan Singh, Rai Sahib Lala Pyare Lal, Dr. M. A. Ansari, myself and others went through the Chandni Chowk. We saw at the end of the Ballimaran Street a concourse of the people outside the mosque known as the Masjid Imli Wali. There was a corpse of a young man from Hasanpur who had been killed the day before. As the sight of this corpse was likely to excite the people we thought it better to bury the corpse at the earliest opportunity. Thousands of Hindus and Muslims followed this corpse to its final resting place. In the burial ground Swamiji and myself delivered speeches exhorting the people to open their shops and resume business; and so far as I could see the result of these speeches was markedly favourable. When we came back to the city, we were asked by the public to request the authorities to hand over the corpses and their wounded to them, and to get the military removed from the Town Hall front. In order to place this matter before the authorities Rai Bahadur Lala Sultan Singh, Rai Sahib Lala Pyare Lal, Mr. Abdul Rahman, Pleader, Mr. Pearey Lal, Motor Merchant, and myself went to Mr. Barron, who gave us a very patient and sympathetic hearing and took us to the police hospital. Here we were told that there were no corpses in that hospital. The Chief Commissioner then led us to the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow, where he first interviewed Colonel Beadon and then went away advising us to see him. Colonel Beadon acceded to our request and the corpses were handed over to the public, and also the military were removed from the Town Hall front. With the exception of those who needed urgent medical attendance other wounded were, at our request, discharged from the hospital.

I may frankly confess that it was all due to the wise and conciliatory attitude of the Chief Commissioner.

From the 1st April 1919, shops began to open and gradually business was resumed. From the 1st to the 5th of April 1919 nothing worthy of mention happened excepting that non-official commission began their sittings. On the 6th another spontaneous *hartal* took place, but on the 7th business was normal and continued so till the 9th. On the 9th the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest created great sensation in the city and the gravity of the situation brought about yet another spontaneous *hartal* which continued till the 16th April. On the 14th an unfortunate event took place in the Edward Memorial Park, where some Criminal Investigation Department officers were roughly handled by the crowd. On the 17th the

efforts of the leaders to terminate the *hartal* bore their fruit, but the police arrested a person who was alleged to have induced a shopkeeper to shut up his shop again. Just after this happening, Dr. Ansari and myself passing in the Chandni Chowk witnessed signs of the distress of the people who surrounded us and told us that the police had arrested a man and bayoneted him and thrown him over the garden railing, towards the Town Hall. They also said that because this was the result of their ending the *hartal* they would at once resume it and closed their shops. Hearing all this we went to the Deputy Commissioner in the Town Hall, and detailing before him what we had heard, requested him twice to release the person arrested. To this he replied that were that to be done the people would be emboldened to make similar demand on every occasion. Next we asked him to be allowed to have a look at that man. This was granted and we saw that the said person had received no serious injuries. While this conversation was in progress the shops began to be closed and crowd started towards Fatehpuri. Shortly after this we heard two distinct reports of firing and soon after we saw a police *havidar* who was seriously injured, being borne to the Town Hall. A few moments later we came to know that a large crowd collected in front of the Ballimaran piequet, and a *fracas* is alleged to have ensued. The casualties here were reported to amount to some 16 or 17 wounded, 2 of whom died afterwards.

Regarding the incidents of this day I believe that nothing untoward would have happened, had the police not arrested that person or had the Deputy Commissioner released him when we had requested him so to do.

From this date onward the behaviour of the police and the attitude of the Deputy Commissioner became extremely objectionable. The police caused extensive arrests and the Deputy Commissioner appointed 14 of the respectable citizens special constables. This was regarded both by those who were thus appointed and by the public as humiliating and insulting. Both these matters were represented to the Chief Commissioner who promised redress. That very day the orders of appointment of special constables were withdrawn, though the arrests by the police abated only a few days later.

The wise and sympathetic actions of the Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner went quite a long way towards allaying the irritation of the people (caused by not altogether unexceptional attitude of some other authorities) and inspiring them with confidence. The public feeling with respect to the Chief Commissioner, later on, found expression in a resolution (passed at a public meeting of the citizens of Delhi) of gratitude to the Chief Commissioner.

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There was a meeting on the night of the 29th March 1919 in the Pipal Park generally known as Congress Pandal and an appeal was made to the people to act as volunteers. Those who offered their services were asked to attend the Home Rule League office at 9 A.M. Accordingly I went there on the morning of 30th March and saw there Professor Indra and Mr. Abdulla, glass merchant. On inquiry they informed me that volunteers had already been posted and now the circle inspectors were wanted and I may act as such and may not allow the crowd to gather at any place in the city and try to the utmost to preserve peace. I accompanied to disperse them. Professor Indra and Mr. Abdulla went to Sadar Bazar *via* Lalkua. After a short interval I also went to take round in the city and returned to Fatehpuri again *via* Lalkua, Hauzqazi, Chawri Bazar, Juma Masjid and Dariba and seeing no crowd there and the people were passing hither or thither peacefully and there was no apprehension of any untoward accident I went home at about 10 A.M.

At about 12-45 P.M. when I was sitting at Lachhu Missar Vaid's chamber, I was informed that a few volun-

teers have been arrested at the station and whoever *satyagrahi* or Home Rule League volunteer goes there is arrested and they are being beaten and given very harsh treatment by the police. Thinking that the matter may not grow worse, I reached the station where a machine-gun had already arrived and was standing near the octroi office and Messrs. Marshall, Currie, Knollys and with another European gentleman who afterwards I knew was Mr. Jeffreys, Sardar Chait Singh, Sheopershad sub-inspector, Kotwal Hamiduddin Khan and police constables were standing near the machine gun. The police was on the road and was surrounded by the public who were shouting *Jai Karao* and demanding the release of arrested people. The authorities committed the mistake to arrest the people in the presence of public and released them, without the knowledge of anybody. Had they been released in the presence of some people the matter would not have taken such a turn. I met one of my volunteers and inquired of him what was the matter. I was informed that the deputy superintendent, railway, has treated the people very harshly and had they not been exhorted to stick to

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their *satyagraha* pledge, serious consequences would have ensued by this time. The people were showing great patience and there was not excitement of any kind, but they were determined to have the arrested men released. I at once saw Hamiduddin Khan and requested him to release the arrested men. He assured me of their release which I announced to the public but they will not believe and were saying that they are all standing and had they been released they would have been brought before them. I searched hither and thither of the station which was well guarded at that time, but I could not find any body and the people, but on account of the harsh treatment which they were given they never believed me. On this I requested K. S. Hamiduddin to give me in writing that the two persons arrested have been released. In the beginning he hesitated to do it, but on second thought he did accede to my request which I read out to the public. On this the people started and returned to the garden but in the meantime the garden gate was blocked by the British soldiers and one man who was left on the road and who entered the garden was fired at and wounded with the bayonet and on whose crying the people began to return. At that time nobody tried to settle the matter amicably and allow the people to return of their own accord, but were immediately fired at. I took up Debi Sahai (this is the name of the wounded) and complained to Hamiduddin who asked me to send him to hospital and requested me to tell the people to retire. I again began to push them back while the firing was going on and the people retired of their own accord and when 3 or 4 people were left only there the firing was stopped. Taking advantage of this I picked up a few of the wounded; I turned towards Chandni Chowk leaving the rest to their fate because I was not allowed to go to them again. The people had already dispersed and there were only about 100 persons left who were desiring to bring the wounded brethren when Swami Shradhdhanand came and told the people to go to the Pipal Park, where a meeting was being arranged. Many people followed him, but I stayed there to persuade the people to go on that direction. Several times I came pushing the people up till Moti Bazar, Billimaran, and Maliwara streets and went on doing this until half an hour. In the meanwhile the British soldiers reached on the road between the Town Hall and the Queen Victoria Statue and closed the garden gates. Immediately afterwards a military officer came out whom I told that this was not the time of any harsh treatment but of..... If they will show little kindness and allow the people to remove the wounded they will disperse of their own accord, but he refused to do so and told me to ap-

proach Mr. Marshall who was in the garden at that time. I requested him to allow me to go to him, but the soldiers posted at the gate stopped me. In the meanwhile the people had again gathered on the other side and when I went that side to push them back, but before I had approached the people, a volley was fired. The road was quite clear at that time, there being not a single stone or *lan'ar* since it is swept twice or thrice a day. I never saw anybody throwing stone, etc. I immediately returned and the firing had stopped at that time. A wounded man was lying on the road and a few soldiers came out to remove and two or three of them took him to the garden dragging him like a dog. The people could not bear this and appealed for mercy on which the soldiers thinking that they were trying to come near them again fired with double force. This time the shots went up to the ten shops on the other side of the road and wounded the people on the other side of the road who were mere spectators and were standing on the shops. The people had run away and also started with their wounded. The butchery and the dragging on which was going on at this time, was pitiable and is beyond any description. I went to the Pipal Park to report this incident where I found the Chief Commissioner, Mr. Currie and Hamiduddin escorted by a company of Sikh regiment engaged in conversation with Swami Shradhdhanand. The interview terminated as soon as I arrived and the officials, etc., retired towards the wall road. The meeting commenced and finished very peacefully and I was going with Swami Shradhdhanand followed by the people quietly and calmly and all of a sudden a Gurkha sepoy fired near the Katra Nawab Sahib or the old Tahsil. At that time half of the crowd had already passed in front of him. Swamiji returned and was inquiring of him of the reasons to fire, that all of a sudden a dozen Gurkhas turned their rifles with fixed bayonets upon him and told him and the people that they will pierce them. This very sentence was repeated 3 or 4 times, but the only reply Swamiji gave was that you can do so, but please give reasons of your doing so to which they replied the same and said nothing else. In the meanwhile Mr. Orde arrived on horseback. They lowered their rifles and when Swamiji complained to him he replied that an enquiry will be made. On this Swamiji again started, but a Gurkha sepoy who was standing in the centre of the road where the people were going continued the display of his dagger and after repeated requests of Swamiji he retired with great difficulty. In the meanwhile the machine gun kept lagging behind us. On reaching Fatehpuri Swamiji asked people to go home, who obeyed, I also followed.

Dr. M. A. ANSARI, Delhi. (3rd November 1919).

India's share in the war had largely contributed to the entertainment of high aspirations by Indians, which, however, turned out to be extravagant in view of the later development of Government's policy. The introduction of the Rowlatt legislation led to unprecedented agitation throughout India. But Government enacted the objectionable measure in the teeth of universal opposition, causing profound disappointment and resentment. This naturally led to the adoption of passive resistance in the form of *satyagraha*, i.e., insistence on truth and negation of all violence.

At such a time Mahatma Gandhi gave a message of hope to the people of India. *satyagraha* or passive resistance against the Rowlatt Bills was inaugurated at a meeting held at the Ashram of Mahatma Gandhi at Ahmedabad on Friday, the 24th February 1919. He advocated the only remaining and the most effective constitutional method of agitation against the unjust measures, by practising *satyagraha* or civil resistance. The Mahatma had given to the matter his serious consideration and it was with the sense of full responsibility

that he started the *satyagraha* campaign. His own words show the amount of concern and care with which he took this step:—

"I enclose herewith the *satyagraha* pledge regarding the Rowlatt Bills. The step taken is probably the most momentous in the history of India. I give my assurance that it has not been hastily taken. Personally I have passed many a sleepless night over it. I have endeavoured duly to appreciate Government's position, but I have been unable to find any justification for the extraordinary bills. I have read the Rowlett Committee's report. I have gone through its narrative with admiration. Its reading has driven me to conclusions just the opposite of the Committee's....."

The Satyagraha Vow.

"Being conscientiously of opinion that the Bills known as the Indian Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill No. 1 of 1919 and the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill No. 2 of 1919, are unjust

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subversive of the principles of liberty and justice, and destructive of the elementary rights of individuals on which the safety of the community as a whole, and the state itself is based, we solemnly affirm that, in the event of these Bills becoming Law and until they are withdrawn, we shall refuse civilly to obey these laws and such other laws as a Committee to be hereafter appointed may think fit, and we further affirm that in this struggle we will faithfully follow truth and refrain from violence to life, person or property." (Reported in the *Bombay Chronicle* of 1st March 1919.)

It has been alleged in certain quarters that *satyagraha* was the cause of all disorders during March and April last. This is an absolutely baseless assertion, as can be proved by facts. The principles advocated by *satyagraha*, as described above, had been strictly observed by all *satyagrahis*. Not a single *satyagrahi* has been convicted of any violence. On the contrary, *satyagraha sabha* and *satyagrahis* have always scrupulously observed non-violence and have helped the authorities in restoring order. In Delhi, Ahmedabad, Bombay, concrete instances can be shown to prove this assertion.

Hartal.

Hartal or the suspension of all business is not a new thing in this country. From olden times it has been practised at various special occasions to express the general sorrow or trouble. In Delhi as in many other towns all business was suspended and shops were closed on receiving the news of the death of Queen Victoria, and King Edward the VII, in recent years. Only last year the Hindu community marked their general dissatisfaction with the orders of the authorities regarding the *Ramila* procession by suspending all business and closing their shops for several days. There is nothing, therefore, new or ominous and threatening in *hartal*, as has been stated recently by some persons, in England, as showing the disposition of the people to disorder. In connection with the *satyagraha* observance the *hartal* was enjoined as a sign of general mourning on the passage of the Rowlatt Act.

Owing to my absence from Delhi from 26th March last to April 2nd (last), I am unable to speak to any facts from direct observations.

On April 6th, it became clear early in the morning that *hartal* had taken place and an informal consultation of the leading citizens of Delhi took place in my consulting rooms at Fatehpuri, to devise means to divert the people from collecting in the Chandni Chowk and the central places of the town. Some two hundred volunteers were sent out to help the preservation of order in the town. A large crowd of people were taken to Fatehpuri Mosque to attend the *Fateha* of those who had died of wounds. Permission was obtained from the Deputy Commissioner to hold a public meeting soon after the *Fateha* was over in Edward Park in order to divert the crowd from the Chandni Chowk and with the same purpose another mass meeting was held at Daryaganj, right away in the outskirts of the town. The day passed off quietly and on the next day, the 7th April, and the following two days, 8th and 9th, business was resumed all over the town and everything was normal.

In the afternoon of the 9th April, news was received in Delhi of the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi at Palwal, causing some excitement, and on the 10th of April there was a spontaneous *hartal* all over the town. It is clear that this *hartal* was to express the people's indignation and protest against the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi and the orders passed by the Government of India and other local Governments against him. This *hartal* continued up to the evening of the 16th April, and in spite of the continued efforts of the leaders to put an end to *hartal* it did not end. Various factors worked to keep the *hartal* going. The most important was the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi. Then the news of Amritsar leaders

and the firing on the masses there and at Lahore, also contributed towards the same end. Gujranwalli, Ahmedabad, the occurrences at other places had all their due share in this. A large mass meeting was addressed by Swami Shradhdhanand on the banks of the Jumna on the morning of the 10th. He exhorted the people to finish the *hartal* on the next day. Another meeting was held at Daryaganj, where the public determination to continue the *hartal* until Mahatma Gandhi, was allowed to visit them, was clearly shown, but the chairman and all the speakers appealed to the audience to open their shops the next day. The day passed off peacefully.

On the 11th of April notices were posted about the official enquiry regarding the incidents of the 30th March, *hartal* continued, but the day passed off quietly and peacefully.

On the 12th and 13th April the official enquiry was conducted in the Town Hall with a strong escort of the military and the police. The enquiry surrounded by such a show of armed forces was adversely criticised and attracted no witnesses from the public. On the evening of the 13th, the Deputy Commissioner and the senior superintendent asked a few leading persons in the city to discuss with them the existing situation. On the evening of the 13th, the officials and the leaders agreed that the *hartal* was not doing any good to the people and that it should cease as early as possible. The officials said that things could not be allowed to go on much longer and that steps should be taken by the authorities to get the shops opened. The leaders who were making every effort to end the *hartal* expressed the view that some more time should be allowed them and that in the existing state of people's feelings intervention by the authorities might lead to misunderstanding and friction. The *hartal* still continued but the day passed off peacefully.

On the 14th of April the senior superintendent of police telephoned to Haziq-ul-Mulk Hakim Ajmal Khan Sahib, asking him to meet the Chief Commissioner and other officials in the Town Hall with some of the leading citizens of Delhi. At this meeting the Chief Commissioner and other officials assembled, and discussed with the leaders the critical situation arising from the continuance of the *hartal*. The Chief Commissioner invited their co-operation to put an end to that situation. He proposed to issue a proclamation under section 188, Indian Penal Code, and to patrol the city with police and troops in order to reassure the law-abiding citizens of the Government's support. The leaders explained why their efforts had hitherto failed and they asked for one more opportunity before the police and military were brought out. To meet their wishes the Chief Commissioner adjourned the meeting till the next morning. It was hoped that by agreement between the shop-keepers and butchers most of the shops would be opened that evening and the local slaughter house would resume work early next morning. While the crowds gathered outside the Town Hall large demonstrations shouting for the release of the leaders. After the termination of the meeting while the leaders were getting out of the Town Hall, they received a great ovation, the crowds shouting their *jai*. The presence of a large number of military force around the Town Hall, of armoured cars and machine guns, and aeroplanes flying over the city had caused great apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the safety of their leaders. In the afternoon a conference of the leading citizens of Delhi together with representation of the various trades and crafts took place at the house of Haziq-ul-Mulk Hakim Ajmal Khan Sahib, where ways and means for stopping the *hartal* were discussed, the butchers promising to open the slaughter house next morning and the city people agreed to follow their example.

While this conference was going on I received a telephonic message from my residence that a crowd of people had gone there (after an assault on two members of the

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C. I. D. force) with a revolver. I instructed to send the revolver to the Deputy Commissioner which was promptly done. Swami Shradhdhanand and myself proceeded at once to the Edward Park, but found that the meeting had dispersed, we then visited the house of the C. I. D. inspector, who was wounded and finding that he had been removed to the civil hospital, we went and saw him there. The *hartal* still continued.

At the morning meeting of the 15th April in the Town Hall the Chief Commissioner read the last *communiqué* issued by the Government of India. It was suggested by the leaders that leading men of all trades should be invited to the meeting to persuade them to resume their business. And further an effort might be made to induce the butchers to open the slaughter house during the day. The meeting was adjourned till 3 P.M. Haziq-ul-Mulk Hakim Ajmal Khan Sahib in the meantime succeeded in his efforts to induce the butchers.

At the afternoon meeting a large number of tradesmen and the leading citizens of Delhi met the authorities. Their arrival at the Town Hall was signal for crowds to collect in larger number. At this meeting it was stated that the reason for the *hartal* was the order against Mahatma Gandhi, and one of the reasons for its continuance for these five days was the suspicion in the minds of the public generally that their leaders were going to be arrested. On the Chief Commissioner assuring the meeting that there was no such intention on the part of the Government, it was suggested that in order to allay these apprehensions, handbills should be issued over the signature of the Chief Commissioner containing the statement that the Government did not intend to arrest the leaders and also announcing that Mahatma Gandhi was in Ahmedabad, absolutely free and in good health, and the Chief Commissioner would communicate to the Government of India that the *hartal* was due to the orders against Mahatma Gandhi. The fact that the slaughter house had resumed work was also announced in the meeting. The Chief Commissioner underfoot to issue a handbill in the manner suggested and the draft prepared by Haziq-ul-mulk, and myself was approved by the meeting. It was hoped that business would be resumed in the evening if only for a short time. The crowd outside was permitted to go to Daryaganj by Swami Shradhdhanand who informed them about the decision at the meeting and advised them to act upon it.

On the 16th morning an organised effort was made by the leaders and the shops in Sadar Bazar, Khari Bawli, and eastern half of the Chandni Chowk were opened, but they soon closed. On the 15th night it was observed that night watchmen did not perform their duty. How this happened is not known, but it caused an apprehension among the people of Delhi. On the night of 16th, five hundred young men of the Congress, the Home Rule League and the Muslim League Volunteer corps were deputed to do the duty of night watchmen. On the afternoon of the 16th a meeting of the representative business and the leading citizens of Delhi was held at the Mercantile Association, where a definite undertaking was signed by these to end the *hartal*. The same day another representative gathering of the leading citizens met at Haziq-ul-mulk Hakim Ajmal Khan Sahib's house and came to a unanimous decision to end the *hartal*. The same night the senior superintendent of police telephoned to Hakim Sahib that the Deputy Commissioner wished to consult a few of the leaders and accordingly Hakim Sahib, Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh, and myself went to the Deputy Commissioner's residence. After our conversation at the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow, followed by a consultation by Swami Shradhdhanand, we arrived at the final conclusion that any assistance from the police would be undesirable in the prevailing conditions and this information was telephoned to the officials late that night.

Early in the morning of the 17th batches of local leaders commenced work simultaneously in different

parts of the town, with the result that the shops began to open one after another until at last all the shops in Sadar Bazar, Khari Bawli, Chandni Chowk, and Dargah had opened and Chowri Bazar also began to open its shops. By the middle of the day the city had assumed its normal aspect and the ordinary course of business was resumed. No idle crowd were seen loitering about the city. The Deputy Commissioner telephoned to Haziq-ul-mulk and myself and expressed his pleasure at the successful termination of our labours and the resumption of the normal life in the town. Soon after this as we were motoring through the Chandni Chowk, we saw the shops closing up again and the crowds running towards the Clock Tower. A number of excited men came up and told us that the police had arrested a young man and that he was wounded by a bayonet and dragged into the Town Hall. We tried to pacify them and in order to ascertain the true facts of the case, we drove to the Town Hall where the statement about the arrest was confirmed. On being told that the arrested person was not wounded at all, we requested Colonel Beadon to permit us to see him so that we might inform the public of the correct facts and thus allay the excitement. Colonel Beadon acceded to our request. There was no wound whatsoever on the body of the youth. With a view to allay the excitement caused by the arrest we repeatedly requested the Deputy Commissioner to release him, but he did not grant our request and said that by doing so people would be encouraged to disturb the public peace and would be emboldened to do as they liked. After this as we were thinking of returning we heard report of firing and saw people running from Fatehpuri towards the Clock Tower. The posse of policemen stationed at the Town Hall fired over the heads of the approaching crowd which dispersed. We also saw a head constable brought in a *doli* with blood stains on his head and forehead. On our way home to Ballimaran, we passed two stretchers and one *charpai* with wounded persons being carried to the hospital. We were informed that the total number of casualties known was seventeen, out of which two had died.

The Chief Commissioner's attitude.

During all this crisis I can say from my personal knowledge that the Chief Commissioner always acted with great care, tact and sympathy. He showed no bias, was invariably fair and endeavoured to view things in their true light. Every reasonable and fair suggestion met with his acceptance. His wise handling of the situation saved Delhi from the horrors of martial law. His restraining influence on his over-zealous subordinates often secured for the people many of their redresses which would not have been obtained otherwise. On the 31st of March he gave permission to the people about seeing the wounded, allowed the dead bodies to be given to their relatives and removed the troops from the city into the Queen's Garden. During the meetings in the Town Hall he changed his intention regarding the proclamation and the military parade in the town, when the objections against it were duly explained to him. Again the request of the people regarding the handbills issued under his signatures was readily granted.

The attitude of other officials.

From what I have been able to ascertain from reliable persons, I feel convinced that on the 30th of March the action of the additional district magistrate and the police officers at the railway station and the Clock Tower was in excess of the occasion, and caused a considerable amount of unnecessary sufferings. It has been justly said that all possible harmless measures for dispersing the crowds were not taken. Moreover it is clear that the order for firing was too hasty and uncalled for. And lastly it has been generally asserted that treatment of the wounded was not humane. The Deputy Commissioner's treatment of the situation was far from being satisfactory. He committed indiscretions and thereby

Dr. M. A. ANSARI—concluded—MUHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN,

caused quite unnecessary resentment. For instance the handbill which the Deputy Commissioner read at the meeting in the Town Hall on the 4th April, and published, it was the cause of the great offence to the people. His speech at the meeting of the municipal commissioners was most insulting to the people of Delhi. His open hostility to the political leaders was always a potent cause of friction. The arrest of the young man on the 17th and his refusal to release him was the direct cause of closing the shops on the 17th and the incidents which

led to firing. His unwise orders appointing fourteen respectable citizens of Delhi special constables was a blunder and might have led to serious unpleasantness if the Chief Commissioner had not intervened and had the order cancelled. During the course of my statement the work of the *satyagraha* sabha and the public men in Delhi in keeping peace and order and regarding the ending of the *hartal* and their co-operation with the authorities have been amply illustrated and I need not dwell further on this point.

MUHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN, Vakil, Delhi.

I am a graduate in Arts and Law of the Punjab University. I am a vakil of the High Court of Lahore of ten years' standing. I was one of the general secretaries of the reception committee of the Indian National Congress which met here in December last.

I was in Delhi during 30th March and 22nd April 1919 and am aware of the general condition prevailing in Delhi.

After the sad occurrences of 30th March 1919, I was one of the six persons who were requested by a number of public citizens to make an enquiry into the occurrences. Along with Haziq-ul-Mulk Hakim Muhammad Ajmal Khan Sahib, Rai Sahib Lala Peare Lal, Mr. Shiv Narain, B.A., LL.B., Vakil, High Court, Rai Bahadur Lala Sultan Singh and Dr. S. P. Shroff, L.R.C.P. & S., I made enquiries from a number of persons and recorded their statements. I attach some of these statements, particularly of those who had received injuries.

I attended several public meetings as well as the Conferences held by Colonel Beadon at the Town Hall or at his house.

I laboured along with other leading citizens of Delhi in trying and asking the people to resume their business.

On the morning of the 18th April, while I was on my way to my office in Chandni Chowk, I was asked by Mr. Scott to attend at the Town Hall as I was appointed a special constable along with others by the District Magistrate. I attended the Town Hall after the receipt of the order of appointment. When I went there, I found Rai Sahib Lala Peare Lal and Hafiz Abdul Aziz, B.A., LL.B., vakil, waiting for Mr. Scott who came a little after 12 noon. The first duty which was imposed upon us by the senior superintendent of police was to serve the order of appointment as special constables on the following gentlemen within an hour and a half and present ourselves at 2 P.M. again at the Town Hall. Their names are:—

1. Mr. Shiv Narain, B.A., LL.B.,
2. Rai Bahadur Lala Sultan Singh,
3. Dr. A. Rahman, M.B., Ch. B. (Edin.),
4. Lala Har Gobind Pershad Nigam, M.A.,
5. Mr. Asaf Ali, Bar-at-Law,
6. Sheikh Fakhruddin,
7. Lala Madan Mohan, Secretary, Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co., Ltd.,
8. Lala Peare Lal, Motor Merchant,
9. Lala Jagdish Pershad,
10. Lala Ram Lal, President, Hindustani Mercantile Association,
11. Sheikh Muhammad Siddiq.

I protested against this duty being imposed upon us. I pointed out that I could only be called upon to help in restoring or maintaining order but was told by Mr. Scott to carry out the order. I told him I would do so, but I would contest the point.

Having served the order on as many gentlemen as could be found, I attended at the Town Hall at 2 P.M., when after a little discussion we were ordered to appear at 9 A.M. on the 19th April. We did so and I handed to Mr. Scott my written objections addressed to the

district magistrate against the appointment as a special constable which were:—

- (i) that under the present circumstances no citizen of Delhi could be legally appointed as one; and
- (ii) the addition of fourteen persons could not materially increase the then existing police force which amounted to about 1,500 strong.

I enquired several times if any orders had been passed on my petition but none have been conveyed to me so far. I called at the District Magistrate's house (where he used to hold his court) on the 20th for this purpose, but he refused to see me.

I might mention here that Colonel Beadon had withdrawn the order of appointment against one of these gentlemen through the intervention of (as I understand) an Honorary Magistrate.

Rai Sahib Lala Peare Lal, who is a vakil of over 35 years standing and is the president of the Bar Association, was poor in health at the time.

To return to the 19th April—the four batches were made up by Mr. Scott and the batch in which I was to work was ordered to resume duty at 6 A.M. daily and was to remain there till 10 A.M. But as this order was passed at about 10 A.M., I was ordered on that day to attend the Town Hall at 6 P.M. and was to carry out the orders which were to be given then. I reported and was told by Mr. Jeffreys to go to Sabzimandi and report myself at the Police Chowki in Saddar Bazar and subsequently at the police station. No disturbance had occurred in this locality. Nor was there any apprehension of the breach of the peace there. I returned at about 11 P.M. and was to get my orders at the Town Hall at 6 A.M. the next day. I went there on the 20th April but found no one. I telephoned to Mr. Scott, who was stopping with Colonel Beadon and was told to call again at 10 A.M.

On the 21st morning I again attended the Town Hall and found no one there. I telephoned again to Mr. Scott and was told to attend the police station at 8 A.M. When I went there at the time, I found other special constables there. At about 8-30 A.M. Colonel Beadon rode into the police station and handed over a paper to the city inspector of police and went away without taking notice of any of us. The inspector gave us an order to read and took our signatures on it. A copy of this order has been published in the "Independent" of 10th May 1919 at page 6.

There was no necessity in Delhi for any of us being appointed as special constables. All of us felt that the step had been taken by Colonel Beadon simply to humiliate us. Under the circumstances we took this order as a gross and gratuitous insult. The Delhi public regarded this as such and they passed a resolution on the evening of 18th April 1919 expressing their indignation at the indignity offered. The order was withdrawn on 21st April through the kind intervention of the Chief Commissioner. Colonel Beadon's order of 21st April will be read with interest if taken together with his remarks which he made on that evening thanking the special constables for the work they had done during the time when they were acting as such.

SHIV NARAIN—SHAM LAL.

SHIV NARAIN, B.A., LL.B., Vakil, Delhi (6th November 1919).

I am a Graduate in Arts and Law of the Punjab University and a vakil of the High Court of Judicature at Lahore. I have been practising as a pleader and vakil for about 19 years in Delhi as my ordinary place of held business.

I was one of the general secretaries of the reception committee of the thirty-third Indian National Congress at Delhi in December 1918.

I was an elected member of the municipal committee of Delhi in the years 1909-1912. I am again a member of the said municipal committee since April 1918. I have taken active part in drawing up a scheme for local self-government as a member of the special sub-committee appointed for the purpose in view of the Government of India resolution of May 1918, in that behalf. Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Beadon was *ex-officio* president of the municipal committee of Delhi up till about the end of September last when he left Delhi on furlough for six months. In drawing up the aforesaid scheme I was along with my colleague R. S. Pyare Lal, vakil, High Court, and also senior vice-president of the Delhi municipality, of opinion that the Delhi municipality should have an elected chairman.

My office is almost opposite the eastern gate of the Queen's Garden opening into Chandni Chowk. From there I witnessed the firing at the Chandni Chowk on the 30th March 1919, and taking into consideration the circumstances on the whole I am of opinion that the

said firing could and should have been avoided and that it was not only unnecessary but also unjustifiable.

I was one of those citizens of Delhi who had been invited to the Town Hall by the Deputy Commissioner and am in a position to describe what happened there at the first meeting.

I am one of those residents and citizens of Delhi who were made special constables and am in a position to make a statement that the order of appointment was not only unnecessary and uncalled for but also illegal and mischievous. I am also one of those special constables who were called to the city *kotwali* at 8 o'clock in the morning of the 21st April 1919, and were served with an order by Lieutenant-Colonel Beadon directing special constables to remain and sleep in the *thanas* assigned to them respectively and to wear batons or *pagri*s and to assist in searches. A full copy of this order appears to have been published in the issue of the "Independent" of Allahabad dated the 6th May 1919 or thereabout. I was present at the interview with Colonel Beadon at his house at 5 o'clock in the afternoon of that day.

I am one of those citizens of Delhi who constituted the committee of inquiry into the incidents which took place on the 30th March 1919 at Delhi, and as such I recorded some of the statements made by witnesses who appeared before us.

APPENDIX.

ORDERS OF DISTRICT MAGISTRATE.

Whereas a disturbance of the peace has taken place in Delhi and further disturbance may be expected and whereas the police force ordinarily employed for preserving the peace is not sufficient, under section 17 of the Police Act V of 1861, I appoint the following persons for one month Special Police Officers within the limits of Delhi municipality and notified area committees:—

- (1) Rai Sahib Lala Pearey Lal.
- (2) Rai Bahadur Lala Sultan Singh.
- (3) Lala Pearey Lal, Motor Merchant.
- (4) Lala Shiv Narain, Pleader.
- (5) Mr. Abdur Rahman, Pleader.
- (6) Dr. Abdur Rahman.
- (7) Seth Ram Lal.
- (8) Lala Madan Mohan.
- (9) Mr. Asaf Ali, Bar-at-Law.
- (10) Hafiz Abdul Aziz, Pleader.
- (11) Lala Har Gobind Pershad Nigam.
- (12) Mian Fakhruddin, Butcher.
- (13) M. Muhammad Siddiq, Sadar Bazar.
- (14) Lala Jagdish Rai, Jeweller.

This order is passed at the request of the senior superintendent of police. These men will be used specially for patrol work where there is any danger and also for arresting individuals where the disturbance of the peace is expected.

H. C. BEADON.

Senior superintendent of police—I am not at all satisfied with the manner in which the special police officers are working. They seem to be sent out by them-

selves to perform duties which they fail to perform and most of the time they are not serving the State efficiently. This is possibly because the instructions are not sufficiently explicit.

They must now be attached to the *thanas* with which they are familiar, so that they can help the *thanadars* with their local knowledge. They should be provided with proper accoutrements (*i.e.*, belt and baton) and with a police badge or *pagri* so that they may be recognised. They should reside and sleep at the *thana* doing the duties assigned to them. These duties should be to go out with at least one daylight patrol per day amidst the ordinary police. They should be sent out with head constables to arrest offenders and to obtain information about absconders and bad characters especially political suspects. In fact the *thanadars* must take proper use of them and their local knowledge for the benefit of the State.

I see, too that some of these officials are producing medical certificates. If any of them fall sick they should be taken to the police hospital, if such they will be admitted, if not they should be dealt with departmentally.

I suggest that the postings to *thanas* should be as follows:—

- Hauz Qazi—Jagdish and Nigam.
- Kotwali—Shiv Narain, Asaf Ali and Ram Lal.
- Sabzimandi—Dr. Abdur Rahman.
- Sadar Chowk—H. Abdul Aziz, Fakhruddin.
- Faiz Bazar—Abdur Rahman, Pleader, Pearey Lal, Pleader.
- Kashmere gate—Sultan Singh, Peare Lal (Motor Merchant) Madan Mohan.

Statement of SHAM LAL recorded at the "Congress" office on 5th April 1919.

Sham Lal, son of Ram Pershad, Kahar, resident of railway station, aged 12 years.

On Sunday at about 3 or 3-30 I was playing and came to the Clock Tower. Here I saw people shouting and throwing stones at the police and the military. The

military soldiers fired two blank volleys and a third volley which was loaded (by blank volley I mean that no body was hit). I was standing on the footpath outside the garden and there were other people in front of me. I was struck and I fell down and became senseless.

SHAM LAL—concluded—CHIDAMI LAL—SEVA RAM—Dr. ABDUR RAHMAN.

When I recovered my senses, I ran away to my house. I was standing near the *sabil* outside kucha *labil* Attar. Adults were throwing stones and not boys. When blank volleys were fired, people ran away but they returned and advanced when they knew that volleys were blank. There were people both inside and outside the garden. The gate of the garden was open. The soldiers and the police were standing on the road near the big red building. Nobody gave a warning to disperse otherwise fire will be opened. I cannot say how many other persons fell.

I am under the treatment of Dr. Kanshi Ram, the railway doctor of the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Company.

Note by Dr. S. P. Shroff.

There is a large sloughing wound oval in shape about 5 inches long and about 2½ to 3 inches broad and ¼ inch deep on the side of the left hip (iliac region). There is a great deal of superficial scorching.

Statement of CHIDAMI LAL recorded on 3rd April 1919 at the Civil Hospital.

Chidami Lal, son of Lala Ram of Dariba, aged 18 years, shop-keeper, bread seller.

I was going towards the Hardinge Library. I was all alone. I was struck by a bullet in the arm and the

left side. I came up to the gate of the garden near Clock Tower and fell down there. Some people put me in a tonga and sent me to the hospital. I did not see any dispute or quarrel.

Statement of SEVA RAM recorded on 3rd April 1919 at the Civil Hospital.

Seva Ram, son of Nanchmal, betel-leaf-seller of Bagh Dewar, aged 30 years. I was going to my shop after having taken my meals. I stood at the corner of the Queen's Gardens and I was hit by a bullet and became senseless. I had been standing there for about ten minutes. I was standing outside the garden on the pavement near the *sabil* of the Muhammadans. There

were many people near the gate of the garden. Some were inside the garden. A large crowd was also in the shops of the cloth sellers. I did not see any one throwing stones nor did I hear any one giving warning to the crowd to disperse or they will be fired upon. I cannot say whether the European soldiers or the Indian police fired.

Dr. ABDUR RAHMAN, Local Satyagraha Sabha, Delhi.

The *satyagraha* pledge and its meaning, e.g., insistence on truth and negation of all violence will show for themselves what *satyagrahis* have been preaching to the people.

At the preliminary general meetings held under the auspices of the local *satyagraha sabha* before the incidents of the 30th March, I being one of the general secretaries of the local *sabha* was present at all the meetings. The speakers who were all responsible men explained the true scope of the Rowlatt Acts to the audience and also explained how after exhausting all the ordinary methods of constitutional agitation against these Acts they were forced to take recourse to the only constitutional method left to them, e.g., *satyagraha* or passive resistance. They further explained the true meaning of *satyagraha* and told the audience that as it required all the soul power of a man which he had in him he should think a hundred times over before he took the vow. The proceedings of all these meetings were sent to the Press, the reports of which would show how the Rowlatt Acts were explained to the people. The peaceful conclusion of all these meetings show for themselves that the speakers did not use any language to agitate the audience to take to violence.

The incident of the 30th March 1919.—I left my place at about 7 A.M. and went first to Fatehpuri where I saw a large crowd. I saw some men there requesting people to leave conveyance and walk on foot as it was the mourning day, but nobody used any force to get people out of their conveyance. I advised the people at Fatehpuri that it was not right of them to request others to leave their conveyance. It was their own look-out whether they observed the day of mourning or not. I am glad to mention that my request to the crowd had the desired effect and they gave up asking the people to get out of their conveyance. I visited several places and found everything quiet so I returned to my house by 12 noon. The public meeting for the day to protest against the passage of the Rowlatt Legislation was previously announced to take place at the Pipla Park at about 5 P.M. I left my place at about half past three with a view to attend the meeting. When I reached the corner of Queen's Gardens near Sarai Ahmed Pai I saw the garden gate and also the inside of the garden picketed. On enquiry I was told that the people had been shot by the police and soldiers

both at the railway station and the Clock Tower. Seeing that the soldiers would not allow people to enter either the garden or to proceed towards the railway station, I started towards the Clock Tower the only street left for me to go through. When I reached the Chandni Chowk I saw that the whole of the street was picketed with soldiers and armed police. I also saw the armoured car patrolling the Chandni Chowk Street. When I reached the Clock Tower I saw the Chief Commissioner, the additional district magistrate (Mr. Currie) and other civil officials and officers of the army collected in a conference in front of a long row of cavalry. A few minutes after my arrival they started towards the Pipla Park and I also followed them. When I reached the Pipla Park where we had convened the meeting, I saw that Swami Shradhanand and Mr. Shuaib were already in conversation with the Chief Commissioner. I also joined the group. The Chief Commissioner asked Swamiji either to dissolve the meeting or take full responsibility that nothing serious would happen to affect the peace. Swamiji said that it was a peaceful meeting and that there was no need of its being dissolved. He further said that he was prepared to take all the responsibility if the military and the police were removed from this place and that if the people were not molested on their way back to their homes. At the meeting I was told that many people were shot dead at the railway station and the Clock Tower and many got wounded. The meeting went on for about two hours and we all dispersed peacefully. Swamiji at the head of a large crowd started towards the Clock Tower and Fatehpuri with a view to conduct them to their homes peacefully. I did not follow him, as I started making enquiries about the incident of shooting. I left the Pipla Park after some time for Haziq-ul-Mulk Hakim Ajmal Khan Sahib's place and on my way examined the shop at the Clock Tower where the bullets had pierced the wooden frame work of the shop door. I did not meet Haziq-ul-Mulk at his house but was told there that the police and the military with machine gun were demanding the dead body of a Musalman, lying inside the Imli Mosque and the people were refusing to hand it over. I hurried to the scene but by the time I arrived the police had left leaving the corpse there.

Dr. ABDUR RAHMAN—concluded—GIRDHARI.

Seeing that everything was quiet I went home.

31st March.—Early next morning some people came to my house and informed me that the police had again come to the Imli Mosque to demand the body which the people had refused to deliver, and they feared that serious friction might take place. I at once started for that place. On arrival I was asked by the people to get permission either from the Deputy Commissioner or the *kotwal* to let them remove the body to the grave-yard and bury it there according to the Muslim rites. I found the *kotwal* in front of the Town Hall and explained to him the seriousness of the situation and requested him to give the permission which he gave in writing. On my way back I met Haziq-ul-Mulk; on the way we consulted and agreed to take away the idle crowd out of the city with the funeral in order to keep them occupied. On reaching the Imli Mosque I found Dr. R. C. Sen there. We both examined the dead body and found that one bullet had gone through the neck and the other had pierced his chest. After examination Haziq-ul-Mulk and myself along with the funeral started for the grave-yard and on our way hundreds and thousands of Musalmans and Hindus joined the procession. At the grave-yard after the burial ceremony was over, Haziq-ul-Mulk and Swamiji delivered long speeches in order to keep the people out of the city. In their speeches they asked the people to avoid passion and to open their shops on the following morning. On our return from the grave-yard, we were told that the people would not open their shops on the following morning unless they got all the dead bodies from the police custody in order to bury them according to their respective rites. Upon this a deputation of the leading men of Delhi waited upon the Chief Commissioner the same afternoon to make the request which was granted to them. The people removed the dead bodies from the civil hospital and they went in procession to their respective burial places. While the deputation went to the Chief Commissioner I got the opportunity of seeing some wounded patients. One was seriously hurt by bullet of which he died two or three days later. The others whom

I saw that day had gunshot wounds mostly above the belt but they were not serious.

All the shops were opened on the 1st of April and remained so till the 5th. During this interval the Deputy Commissioner issued a notice which was posted all over the city. In this he had used unseemly language against the leaders of Delhi and specially against the members of the *satyagraha sabha*. On the top of this came the official version about the incident of the 30th from the Home Department, Simla, which did not show any sympathy, with the people who had suffered, but instead they had tried to shield the action of the local authorities. The members of the executive committee of the Local *satyagraha sabha* held a meeting on the 4th and passed a resolution requesting the people of Delhi not to observe *hartal* on the 6th, as they had already done so on the 30th of March. In spite of our recommendations to the contrary the people did observe *hartal* on the 6th because of the resentment they had felt from the notice of the Deputy Commissioner and the *communiqué* of the Home Department. On the 6th we took the precautionary measures by holding public meetings and keeping the people occupied.

On the 7th the shops reopened. On the 9th Mr. Gandhi was expected to come by the evening mail. In order to avoid crowd at the station we the members of the local *sabha* did not inform the people that Mr. Gandhi was coming that evening. With the result that only fifteen or twenty of us were present at the railway station in order to receive him. The train came, but we did not find Mr. Gandhi. His private secretary told us that Mr. Gandhi was arrested and was being taken back to Bombay. This news spread throughout the town like wild fire and the following day we saw a spontaneous *hartal* which continued for several days. Two mass public meetings were held on the 10th, to keep the people occupied. In our speeches we begged the people to open their shops next morning but the resentment owing to the arrest of Mr. Gandhi and the deportation of the Punjab leaders was so great that the *hartal* continued. I left Delhi on the 13th.

Statement of GIRDHARI recorded at the Civil Hospital on 3rd April 1919.

Girdhari, son of Kallan Kahar, aged 18 years, of Barsa Dari Sher Afghan Khan, in the service of the municipal committee.

After leaving a box of oil in the godown opposite the municipal offices I wanted to go to drink water. A crowd was going to the railway station through the Queen's

Gardens. In order to drink water I went to the well which is situated near the railway station where a tomb is also situated when the crowd ran I also did the same. I was struck by buckshot in six places. I fell down on the spot.

APPENDIX I.

LIST OF APPENDICES.

- I. Col. Beadon's notice of 2 April 1920.
- II. Do. do. 14 April 1920.
- III. Telegram from Home Department 20 April 1920.
- IV. Telegram to Home Department 21 April 1920.
- V. List of Material Damage done during riots.
- VI. Report of Sergeant Kemsley.
- VII. Order appointing special police-officers.
- VIII. Instructions regarding duties of special police-officers.
- IX. Rejoinder by *Satyagraha Sabha*.
- X. Notice by *Satyagraha Sabha*.
- XI. Notice of Chief Commissioner.

APPENDIX I.

[Translation.]

Colonel Beadon's notice, dated 2nd April 1919.

NOTICE.

From the Deputy Commissioner of Delhi to the residents of Delhi.

You have all heard of the rioting which took place on Sunday, 30th March, at the Railway Station and Queen's Garden with the unfortunate result that eight persons were killed and more have been wounded. For this reason I publish the following facts for the information of the public.

On that day certain persons had determined to close their shops as a sign of protest against the Act which has been passed by the Supreme Government to prevent murderous outrages and anarchical crimes and to protect the public from such criminals. Those persons who organised this protest suppressed the fact that though the Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act had been passed by the Imperial Council, it is not actually in force and no part of it can be brought into operation unless and until the Governor-General in Council publishes a notification declaring that he is satisfied that in any part or parts of India, in which it is to come into force, anarchical or revolutionary movements are being promoted, and certain serious offences connected therewith are prevalent to such an extent that the special procedure for their repression prescribed by the Act is necessary to ensure the public safety. It should be known to you that at present the Act is not in force in any part of India, and it is the hope of Government that it will never be necessary to enforce it. The action of the Government in passing the Act is merely that of a prudent householder who keeps buckets full of water to put out fire if one takes place or a zamindar who sleeps on his threshing floor when the wheat has been reaped to prevent its being stolen. The proverb "construct your bridge before the flood" is appropriate here. The citizens of Delhi have no need to anticipate that the enforcement of the Act will be necessary here. What reason is there then for the excitement which has been aroused? In these circumstances the strike was foolish and unnecessary.

Those who had determined to close their shops took the law into their own hands and prevented other shop-keepers by threats from opening their shops. The result was that the bazar was closed and many people were idle and a crowd of *badmashes* created a disturbance at the railway station. The so-called Passive Resistance turned at once into active rioting, which the *Sirkur* cannot allow. Those who created the strike are entirely to blame for creating a situation which they could not control.

You are now warned by this notice not to be deceived by those people who wish to compel you to close your shops. The shopkeeper who closes his shop injures himself; probably he will often injure innocent persons also but the Government does not suffer. If any person compels you to close your shops you must get his name recorded in the police-station. Until you help Government in this way, Government cannot help you. Now that peace has been restored in the city neither arouse any excitement nor allow others to arouse it, nor bring more misfortune upon your relatives and fellow-citizens.

Government as you know desires on no account that there should be riots or that force should be used to suppress them. I assure you all that we, who are Government servants, are extremely sorry that any one should be killed or wounded. I therefore propose asking the *raises* of Delhi to raise a subscription for the dependents and the wounded.

APPENDICES II, III, IV.

APPENDIX II.

[Translation.]

NOTICE.

Since it has been brought to my notice that the peaceful citizens of Delhi wish to resume their daily business but many of them are prevented from doing so by some persons and pressure is also being brought to bear on them, the public are therefore informed that such prevention and pressure are illegal, and anyone doing such things is liable to punishment under section 188, Indian Penal Code.

(Sd.) H. C. BEADON,

Deputy Commissioner, Delhi.

14th April, 1919.

APPENDIX III.

Telegram No. 621, dated the 20th April 1919, from the Government of India, Home Department, Simla, to the Chief Commissioner, Delhi.

It is reported from the Punjab that emissaries from Delhi in considerable numbers are stirring up trouble in neighbouring districts. More especially Arya *samajists* amongst Jats of Rohtak and Hissar. Further that big merchants at Delhi are bringing economic pressure to bear upon smaller men in districts by refusing to honour *hundis*. Similar pressure is also being felt at Rampur and Moradabad in the United Provinces. It is also stated that strong anti-British Muhammadan influences emanating from Delhi are affecting places like Panipat, Rohtak, Karnal, Gurgaon. Civil and military authorities, Punjab, ask for martial law at Delhi on the ground that so long as Delhi is disturbed things will not quieten down in surrounding districts. Our latest information is that Delhi is quiet and it would be difficult to find justification for martial law. You have told us that you are considering this question. Meantime it is of vital importance we should know what is going on behind the scenes, who is pulling the strings and sending out emissaries, whether Muhammadan or Arya Samaj and take measures immediately to stop their campaign as well as that of merchants. For this first essential seems strong Criminal Investigation Department Staff. You should immediately take any steps you think necessary to strengthen it and will receive full support from Government of India. It has been suggested that emissaries go out in motor cars. If this is so consider whether it could not be stopped by commandeering petrol under Defence of India Rules. Other reports indicate use of railway. It is possible telegraph is used. Please report what arrangements are in force for censorship of telegrams and whether they are adequate.

APPENDIX IV.

Telegram No. 74, dated the 21st April 1919, from the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, to the Government of India, Home Department, Simla.

Referring to your telegram No. 621, dated 20th April. Present situation in Delhi which has been quiet for two days and where disorderliness has not been, since more or less fortuitous riot at railway station, characterised by any attempted attack on civil station Government buildings or looting in bazars would not justify martial law. Question was different on afternoon of 17th instant, when further resistance to civil authorities might have necessitated other methods of action. Position may at any time become different if it should be found that all-India movement is centralised in Delhi and local action insufficient to deal with the case. Scott proceeding to Simla to-day and will explain situation.

Enquiries instituted regarding emissaries. I am inclined to think that, in view of other means of communication, commandeering petrol might lose us valuable information. Orders have been issued that daily reports of all motors crossing Jumna Bridge or passing *thanas* on Karnal, Rohtak, Gurgaon-Muttra roads with description of occupants if possible shall be sent in. Enquiries already started regarding two motor cars reported to have gone in Meerut direction. Presumably cessation of *hartal* will stop economic pressure on outstations but enquiries will be made. Censorship of telegrams in force in accordance with your telegram, dated 12th April, No. 532. Deputy Superintendent, Telegraphs, assures me that all doubtful telegrams are being sent to Deputy Chief Censor, Simla. Only railway Telegraph offices can communicate with outside places except through Central Office where soldier signallers employed checking telegrams.

APPENDICES IV, V, VI.

Most important that local Criminal Investigation Department should be strengthened. Order already been detailed for enquiry into underground influences obviously working. Scott will explain further requirements.

APPENDIX V.

List of material damage done during the Delhi riots.

Name of claimant.	Details of damage.	Amount.
		Rs.
Superintendent of Police, on behalf of—		
Sub-Inspector Sheo Parshad	For a gold wrist watch	165
Turab Ali and certain constables	For loss of kit, etc.	306
Inspector Mohammad Faqir	For personal damages	20,000
	On account of—	
Two police officers	Property lost or destroyed	300
Members of the Ballimaran picquet	Petty articles snatched by the mob	44
Head Constable Turab Ali	Loss of articles taken by the rioters	24
Six men of the Fatehpuri picquet	Personal damages	5,000
Secretary, Municipal Committee	Loss of miscellaneous articles	42
	Damage done to lamps, railings, dustbins, etc.	5,520
Deputy Traffic Superintendent, East Indian Railway.	Damage done to gates, windows, etc.	3,804*
Manager, Delhi Electric Tramway and Lighting Company.	Damage done to property	358
Deputy Superintendent, Telegraphs	Damage done to the telegraph wires	93
	TOTAL	35,656

* Repairs to broken gates, windows, etc.	Rs. 50
One chair	10
One uniform—Mr. Mathews	19
Attah of (difference on the purchase and sale price to railway subordinates)	3,725
	3,804

APPENDIX VI.

Report, dated the 6th April 1919, on Disturbances at Delhi, on the 30th March 1919, from Sergeant A. J. Kemsley, Fort Delhi, to the Adjutant, 1st Garrison Battalion, Bedford's, Delhi.

I have the honour to report that on Sunday, the 30th March 1919, I was on duty at the main railway station, and I received orders from Second-Lieutenant Shelford to take 12 men into Queen's Gardens to assist the police in driving back the crowd who were very hostile, using sticks, bricks and stones freely. I then received orders from Second-Lieutenant Shelford to take my orders from the senior officer present which was Mr. M. M. L. Currie who was trying to say a few words to the angry crowd who were getting very violent.

Mr. M. M. L. Currie was being attacked by bricks, stones and sticks being used very freely. Mr. Marshall then asked Mr. M. M. L. Currie if he should open fire and Mr. Currie said "Yes." Mr. Marshall then ordered the police to fire over the heads of the crowd. I then asked Mr. Currie if my men should fire, and he said "Yes." I then gave my men an order to fire one volley over their heads, then an order was given to fire into the crowd, I think, by Mr. Marshall. I then ordered my men to fire two volleys into the crowd which was done. It was rather difficult to say who some of the orders were given by, hence I have a doubt as to who gave the order to fire into the crowd, as I had not seen the police officers or the civilian authorities before.

The crowd then quietened down and withdrew towards the Town Hall and Chandni Chowk. I then waited until Second-Lieutenant Shelford came up with the remainder which was then divided into three picquets. I was then placed in charge of no. 2 picquet. Things had then quietened down and the police had then formed a line with the Town Hall. The crowd were very quiet for about 10 minutes and then the crowd got very violent again using stones and bricks freely and driving the police back. I then gave my men the order to advance to the Town Hall to help the police and reported to Mr. Jeffery, assistant superintendent of police, who gave the order to fire one volley over their heads. Mr. Marshall then came up and took matters into his own hands, and ordered two volleys to be fired into the crowd. After the first volley was fired the crowd got more daring using stones and bricks freely, and also laughing at the military and police. I then placed my men in front of the Town Hall along with the police.

APPENDICES VII, VIII.

APPENDIX VII.

ORDER.

Whereas a disturbance of the peace has taken place in Delhi and further disturbances may be expected and whereas the police force ordinarily employed for preserving the peace is not sufficient, under section 17 of the Police Act V of 1861, I appoint the following persons for one month special police officers within the limits of the Delhi municipality and notified area:—

1. R. S. Peare Lal.
2. R. B. Sultan Singh.
3. Peare Lal, Motorwala.
4. Shiv Narain, Pleader.
5. Abdur Rahman, Pleader.
6. Abdur Rahman, Doctor.
7. Seth Ram Lal.
8. Madan Mohan Lal, Delhi Cloth and General Mills.
9. Asaf Ali, Barrister.
10. Hafiz Abdul Aziz.
11. Har Gobind Parshad Nigam.
12. Fakhruddin, Butcher.
13. Mohammad Sadiq, Multani.
14. Jagdish Rai, Johri.

This order is passed at the request of the senior superintendent of police. These men will be used specially for patrol work where there is danger and also for arresting individuals where a disturbance of the peace is expected.

(Sd.) H. C. BEADON,
District Magistrate, Delhi.

Dated 17th April, 1919.

APPENDIX VIII.

Instructions issued by the senior Superintendent of Police regarding the duties of special police officers.

The undermentioned gentlemen have been appointed Special Police Officers by an order of the District Magistrate, dated the 17th April 1919, under section 17 of the Police Act V of 1861:—

1. R. S. Peare Lal.
2. R. B. Sultan Singh.
3. Peare Lal (Motorwala).
4. Shiv Narain, Pleader.
5. Abdur Rahman, Pleader.
6. Seth Ram Lal.
7. Madan Mohan Lal.
8. Asaf Ali.
9. Hafiz Abdul Aziz.
10. Har Gobind Pershad Nigam.
11. Fakhruddin, Butcher.
12. Jagdish Rai, Johri.
13. Dr. Abdur Rahman.

They will be divided into groups as in the attached statement "A" and each group will come on to duty in rotation for four hours at a time.

3. A statement "B" will be made out showing the time at which each group is to come on duty.
4. Each group will attend at the time stated in the statement, paragraph 3, at the Town Hall, and will report for orders to the senior police officer present.
5. They will ordinarily be employed on patrolling duties and in assisting the police to maintain law and order; and will further carry out any duties allotted to them by the senior police officer present at the Town Hall.
6. Before going off duty each member of a group will ascertain when he is to come on duty again. This can be done by a reference to the statement referred to in paragraph 3.

APPENDICES VIII, IX.

7. When no police officer is present at the Town Hall the groups will report to the senior superintendent of police for instructions.

STATEMENT A.

Group I.

R. S. Peare Lal.
Madan Mohan Lal.
Mr. Abdur Rahman, Pleader.
Jagdish Rai.

Group II.

R. B. Sultan Singh.
Peare Lal, Motorwala.
Shiv Narain, Pleader.
Har Gobind Pershad Nigam.

Group III.

Seth Ram Lal.
Fakhruddin, Butcher.
Asaf Ali.
Hafiz Abdul Aziz.

*APPENDIX IX.

A reply to the allegation against the *Satyagraha Sabha* contained in the notice issued in the name of Colonel H. C. Beadon, Deputy Commissioner of Delhi.

DEAR SIR,

After carefully reading the notice read out to the assembly convened by you in the Town Hall on the 4th of April 1919 and subsequently issued presumably under your orders to the public of Delhi, the Executive Committee of the *Satyagraha Sabha*, Delhi, feel constrained in the public interest to reply to certain reflections against the said *Sabha* contained in the notice referred to above in order to remove the misunderstanding that it is likely to create and to counteract the attempts that are being assiduously made in certain quarters to screen the mistakes of certain subordinate officers in connection with the recent unfortunate incidents and to point out their responsibility on unoffending public workers.

(1) The assertion contained in your notice that the persons who advised to give expression to public indignation concealed from the public the fact that the Act No. II of 1919 would be applicable in special circumstances and only after a notification by the Governor General in Council to that effect. It is submitted that the workers of the *Satyagraha Sabha* have explained to the public all the aspects of the act sought to be repealed in three meetings held before the Sunday demonstration. They had at the same time placed before the audience in the said meetings contentions and arguments advanced by the non-official members of the Imperial Legislative Council against the passing of the said Act. It appears to the Committee that the notice issued on your signature was prepared without carefully reading the speeches delivered by the non-official members of the Imperial Legislative Council and without obtaining a correct report of the speeches delivered at the meetings held under the auspices of the *Satyagraha Sabha* on the 24th, 27th, 29th March 1919. The Committee does not believe that the report of the said speeches did not reach you. All that it submits is that a very incorrect and distorted account of them was supplied to you, which led you to arrive at incorrect conclusion and hold the citizens of Delhi and their leaders especially the members of the *Satyagraha Sabha* responsible for the unfortunate incidents of Sunday, the 30th March.

(2) In your notice you also mention that the Rowlatt Act is not applicable to Delhi and it is hoped there will be no occasion to apply it to Delhi. Consequently in your opinion the closing of the shops was foolish and a silly decision. We feel it our duty to make it clear that the people of India object to the principle underlying the Act. The Act also presupposes that the whole of the country is rife with anarchical societies, necessitating the use of such stringent and harsh laws. We respectfully but firmly submit that considering the unimpeachable attitude of the country as a whole in the past, suspicions of this nature constitute an insult to its populations. It is the feeling of this insult and indignation which is sought to be expressed in meetings, speeches and demonstrations from one end of the country

APPENDIX IX.

to the other, that it may be brought home to the Government that the people cannot bear the breach of the principles of justice involved in the passages of the Rowlatt Acts. To designate the purely constitutional efforts of the people as "futile and silly" is not only an insult to the people of this country but it is an insult offered to the fundamental principles on which rests the entire structure of the British Empire and of which our rulers are justly proud.

(3) The third misstatement which we feel our duty to contradict is that threats were used to force people to close their shops. It is impossible to conceive that a handful of men however influential would have succeeded in organising such a large demonstration if the people themselves had not willingly co-operated with them in the task. You must be aware of the failure that attended the efforts made by the leading citizens of Delhi and the members of the *Satyagraha Sabha* to prevent people from closing their shops on the 31st March 1919. It is not intended to deny that some people might have expressed over-enthusiasm in efforts to induce people to close their shops which in a case or two might have resulted in slight unpleasantness. But it is absolutely unjustifiable and incorrect to represent it as forcing people to close their shops. In this connection we may be permitted to point out that it is against the fundamental principles of the *Satyagraha Sabha* and that the *Sabha* cannot possibly violate its basic principles.

(4) The fourth statement in your notice is that the people who assembled at the station and were finally without any cause fired at were ordinary *badmashes* and rioters. You also assert that no boys were killed (or wounded)? near the station or Clock Tower. We may be permitted to say that it is incorrect and against facts. We feel confident that if the Government appoints an impartial Committee to investigate and inquire into the whole unfortunate affair it shall bear out our statement and it would become evident how many boys were killed or wounded by the firing of the police and military.

(5) The fifth incorrect statement in your notice is that the persons who suggested the closing of the shops are responsible for all these developments. We do not know on what arguments and facts the Government relies for this statement but we beg to draw your attention to the fact that while the Government (according to its own statement) failed to restore order even after the free-use of the rifles and the bayonets at the railway station where not more than five thousand are said to have been present, a few members of the *Satyagraha Sabha* succeeded in controlling and peacefully dispersing an audience estimated at 20,000 to 50,000 people on the 30th of March in the Pipla Park in spite of the provocation which a display of bare swords and bayonets, rifles and machine guns naturally caused. Can any man after seeing this attitude of the *Satyagrahis* rightly hold them responsible for the bloodshed on the 30th of March? Without the least intention of delivering a hasty judgment we respectfully submit that the responsibility of all this affair lies on the Government officials who, even if it be conceded that a few mischievous urchins flung a few stones at the Police, replied to the stones of boys by the rifles, bullets, and the bayonets of the police and the military. Officials who were panic stricken by the ordinary noise and clamour natural on such occasions and irresponsibly made innocent people the target of rifles we thought it necessary to contradict by facts and arguments the allegations made against us, but if the Government considers that no blame attaches to it in this matter it should establish its innocence in order to remove the possibility of all future misunderstanding.

(6) As regards your advice to the people not to close their shops and to report the name of persons who might compel them to close shops to the nearest police station, we beg to point out that the Executive Committee of the *Satyagraha Sabha* has already decided that in view of the fact that they have already done so on the 30th March that no demonstration should be held on the 6th of April. Even Mahatma Gandhi has sent a notice to that effect which is binding on every *Satyagrahi*. But, if your advice implies that it is illegal to persuade or induce any shopkeeper to close his shop we must emphatically beg to protest against this unjust interference with the legitimate rights of the people. After all this rebuking and expressions of displeasure you have been pleased to announce your intention of requesting the leading citizens of Delhi to raise funds for the help of the wounded and for the families of the killed. It is very kind of you to express such care and solicitude for the welfare of the people and we thank you for the humanitarian motives which prompted that decision. Need not we point out that citizens of Delhi have already started a fund for the relief of the wounded and the sufferers and memorial of those killed and it is hoped that the citizens shall give practical proof of the sympathy and sacrifice. It is therefore superfluous to appeal to the *raies* of Delhi when general public has already taken up the work as a duty they owed to God.

In conclusion we may be permitted to say that our conscience is clear, our convictions are unshaken, and we stand firm on the path of truth. Whatever we are doing we consider it our duty and in future whatever we shall do we shall be guided by the best interests of our people and our country. We are neither conspirators nor disturbers of peace. We are neither conspirators nor rebels. Our crime, if crime it can be called, is that we do not permit any interference with our legitimate rights and consider it the duty of every self-respecting man to be prepared for every kind of sacrifice for the defence of right and justice. In the end we pray to God that He may grant wisdom to our rulers and help us in our righteous cause.

(This notice was signed by the President and the Secretary).

APPENDIX X.

APPENDIX X.

Translation of a notice issued by the *Satyagraha Sabha*, Delhi.

IMPORTANT NOTICE.

The Managing Committee of the Delhi *Satyagraha Sabha* have passed on the 2nd April the following resolution, which is being published for the information of the general public:—

Resolution.

Resolved that the following notice be published in local newspapers for the information of the general public.

Satyagraha has been celebrated in Delhi on 30th March instead of 6th April on which date it will be celebrated throughout India. The Managing Committee of the Delhi *Satyagraha Sabha* have decided that only a public meeting be held on Sunday, the 6th April, and they do not recommend a *hartal*. The meeting will be held at

at 5 P.M.

(Sd.) (Dr.) ABDUR RAHMAN,
and
(Professor) INDRA,
Secretaries of the Satyagraha Sabha, Delhi.

APPENDIX XI.

[Translation.]

NOTICE.

To the residents of Delhi.


In the meeting of 15th April 1919, at which were present the Deputy Commissioner, myself, other officers, selected tradesmen of the city and other representatives, I was requested to inform the Government of India that the reason for the last *hartal* were the orders passed against Mahatma Gandhi. Though the Government of India are aware of it, yet I promise to inform them of it once again.

It was mentioned at this meeting that one of the reasons for the continuance of the *hartal* which has lasted for the last five days, is that the people suspect that the authorities intend to harm in one way or other those leaders of the people whom they (the authorities) have been consulting for the last so many days. It is needless to mention that this view is quite unfounded and I hope that people will believe it.

It is notified that that the slaughter house has been opened from this evening and meat is being sold in the Sadar Bazar. The city people should also open their shops now as promised.

A telegram has been received from Mahatma Gandhi that he is at liberty and enjoys good health at Ahmedabad, his home.

(Sd.) C. A. BARRON,
Chief Commissioner, Delhi.



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