

THE DISORDERS INQUIRY COMMITTEE

EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

Disorders Inquiry Committee

VOLUME


III

AMRITSAR



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VOLUME III

AMRITSAR.

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Volume III

PART I

Minutes of Evidence, Amritsar

At Lahore, Thursday, the 13th November 1919.

P R E S E N T :

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B.,
K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Rai Bahadur G. K. Roy, Superintendent (*Acting for Secretary*).

Mr. MILES IRVING, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar.

the President—

Q. Are you Deputy Commissioner at Amritsar?

A. I was, Sir, during the period of the disturbances.

Q. Previous to that had you any official connection with the Punjab?

A. I have been in the Punjab for about 18 years and have completed 20 years' service.

Q. As regards the occurrences at Amritsar, were there, in your opinion, any pre-disposing causes?

A. Yes, Sir, a considerable number. There were causes arising directly out of the war, the general feeling of weariness and war-nerves, a great feeling of disappointment that the end of the war had not produced any relaxation of the stringency. There was discontent in Amritsar on account of the prevailing high prices of necessaries; these were all material causes.

Q. I think Amritsar is a piece-goods centre and much affected by the economic conditions that were prevailing?

A. Yes, I think the piece-goods trade was hit too and the piece-goods merchants, I think, were discontented at having to pay high war taxes.

Q. Were there any religious troubles?

A. There was the prevailing feeling of unhappiness among Musalmans in respect to the fate of Turkey. That was, I think, the only religious cause.

Q. There was no religious cause so far as the Hindus were concerned?

A. No, I can think of none.

Q. Were there any special local causes of unrest, and, if so, what were they?

A. The city had been placed, before I came, rather in a turmoil over the municipal elections. My predecessor will tell you more about that. Sir, but they had given, as I was aware, a good deal of trouble. Rival claimants had organized gangs of, I should say, bad characters, to support their claims in the streets and that had been a distinctly local pre-disposing cause.

Q. Was there also some agitation about the platform at the Station?

A. That seems a minor matter; it was a small matter of the railway administration. The railway administration had, on account of the cramped space on the Amritsar platforms, closed the issue of platform tickets. The matter was finally decided to the satisfaction of the public, but in the meantime it had been the ground of a very severe agitation. I remember on one occasion Dr. Satyapal said Indians were not being treated like human beings in this respect and the outcome of the matter was that, whereas it was granted as a matter of administration by the railway, it was represented as having been the direct result of agitation.

Q. What do you consider, in chronological order, were some of the expressions of dissatisfaction or grievance on the part of the people? At the beginning of the year was a meeting held?

A. There was a succession of meetings held, some before my time and some after. Records have been kept of them. I have noted a meeting on January the 31st on the subject of the future of Constantinople, on February the 6th about the Rowlatt Bill and so forth—you have that before you.

Q. As regards the Rowlatt Bill, was that meeting the subject of agitation in Amritsar itself?

A. Very much so; there was a succession of meetings about it in which very strong language was used.

Q. When was the first meeting held?

A. The first meeting I have got a note of was on February the 6th, and subsequent meetings took place upon the Rowlatt Bill.

Q. Was there a meeting of Muhammadans on the 13th of February?

A. Yes, Sir, addressed by Doctor Kitchlew, and another meeting on the 21st, on the 26th there was not a political meeting, but a meeting about the opening of cheap grain

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Mr. MILES IRVING.

[Continued.]

shops for the poor, but an opportunity was taken of that to blame the Government for the export of grain.

Q. What was the object of holding a meeting on the 21st of February?

A. That was a Muhammadan meeting about the fate of the Muhammadan holy places.

Q. Was it addressed by any one else than a Muhammadan?

A. Yes, Dr. Satyapal spoke at it; he is a Hindu.

Q. On the 28th of February was there another meeting of protest against the Rowlatt Bill?

Q. Yes there was, and there were other meetings. There was one on the 1st of March.

Q. Can you say generally what the tone of the speeches was that were delivered at those meetings?

A. They were of an extremely provocative nature as reported. Occasionally the actual words amounted to a provocation to violence. I have it reported that at the meeting on the 1st of March Dr. Kitchlew said that if the Bill passed, they would not be responsible for their acts and in place of protest would have to use their hands. But generally speaking the tone was of general excitement, poems were read in flaming terms, the whole tendency being to excite the people and make them believe they were the subject of gross injustice and oppression.

Q. Now as regards the Rowlatt Bill, what sort of statements were made as to its object and scope?

A. Among the ignorant people the wildest rumours were prevalent; such rumours for example that more than four people would not be allowed to assemble together; that there would be a tax levied on every marriage, that Government would collect its revenue in kind by taking half the produce, and other very wild rumours of that kind, but these were not specifically made at the meetings. On the contrary at the meetings it was never said what the Rowlatt Bill actually was. On one occasion, to the best of my recollection, some one asked what the Rowlatt Bill was and was told from the platform that it was not opportune to give the information. There was complete ignorance on the part of the people as regards the actual provisions of the Act.

Q. Do you know who were responsible for the rumours as regards the scope and effect of the Rowlatt Act?

A. No, it is impossible to say. Rumours spread very rapidly in India, and they seem to have been sent broadcast all over the Province by some agency which I am not aware of.

Q. Was there an all-India Congress down to be held in Amritsar?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When was that to come off?

A. It was to come off about now, in October or November.

Q. And did that circumstance bring into prominence the Local Congress Committee?

A. Yes, Sir, it did. They were naturally busily engaged in the organization and it also was a circumstance uniting Muhammadans and Hindus in politics.

Q. As regards the local Congress Committee, had it an Executive Committee?

A. Yes, Sir, an Executive Committee of six.

Q. And of those six have any been tried?

A. Two were put on their trial.

Q. Who were these two?

A. I am afraid I cannot remember now.

Q. Now as regards the immediate causes of the outbreak, did the Rowlatt Bill become law in March 1919?

A. Yes.

Q. After it became law was there comparative quiet for some time?

A. Nothing particularly happened till the 23rd and then we got the first intimation of the passive resistance movement.

Q. Was a meeting held?

A. A meeting was held on the 23rd.

Q. What was the object of that?

A. It was to support the passive resistance movement, but although I enquired, I could not find out what form passive resistance was likely to take.

Q. The passive resistance movement is the movement that was inaugurated by Mr. Gandhi?

A. Yes, it took the form practically of a vow to obey orders from headquarters.

Q. On the 29th of March was there another meeting?

A. Yes, a meeting at which it was decided to have a *hartal* on the following day.

Q. Had you known, before the 29th of March, that there was any proposal to hold a *hartal*?

A. No, I had not. I had heard it talked about, but not definitely as regards Amritsar.

Q. On the 29th March was any action taken?

A. Yes, orders under the Defence of India Act were served on Dr. Satyapal preventing him from speaking in public.

Q. Why was that order issued?

A. The orders were issued by Government. I was not given the actual reasons; I understood it to be in connection with his part in the agitation.

Q. Was the order served under your immediate instructions?

A. Yes, it was served by me personally.

Q. Was the *hartal* on the 30th a complete closure of shops?

A. Yes, a complete closure of shops and business.

Q. But so far as the peace of the city was concerned there was no disturbance then?

A. No, no disturbance at all.

Q. On the day after, that is to say, on the 31st?

A. The news reached Amritsar of the occurrences at Delhi.

Q. What effect did that have on the community at Amritsar?

A. The effect, as it appeared to me, was manifested in a meeting on April the 2nd in which one Swami Satyadeo came down and advised against violence for the present. He seemed, as the report reached me, to hold out a prospect in future when, as he said, people would go to jail by thousands, foreshadowing, as I understand, some form of concerted action under orders to paralyse Government. But his immediate advice to the people was to abstain from all acts of violence till that time.

Q. On the 4th of April?

A. Orders were served on Dr. Kitchlew and one Pandit Kotu Mal.

Q. Were these served by you?

A. Yes.

Q. That was in consequence of orders from the Punjab Government?

A. Under orders from the Punjab Government.

Q. Did you know of the proposed *hartal* on the 6th of April?

A. Yes, Sir. As the news came that the *hartal* was wrongly observed on the 30th of March and that the real date was the 6th of April the question raised was whether there would be another *hartal* on the 6th April. The Local Congress Committee, in view of the events at Delhi, declared against it and at a meeting of the leading citizens held at my house on the 5th of April to take their advice whether there would be another *hartal* on the 6th, they gave as their opinion that no *hartal* would be held on that day.

Q. Was a *hartal* held?

A. As a matter of fact one was held. At about 5 P.M. at a private meeting which was attended by Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal it was decided that a *hartal* should be held.

Q. Was that a complete success?

A. Yes. It was like the former one, all business suspended throughout the city.

Q. Were any special precautions taken to deal with any disturbance should it arise?

A. I warned the Officer Commanding the Station and he stood in readiness to carry out the Internal Defence Scheme. He had some mounted troops in readiness and we had guards of police in the city which were increased in number.

Q. Was any action found necessary?

A. No action was found necessary. The police behaved with a great deal of forbearance in some ways.

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[Continued.]

No attack was made against them but they avoided going out of their way to come in conflict with the crowd. Everything passed off peacefully.

Q. Do you know anything about any poster having appeared on the Clock Tower?

A. I heard of the posters. I have heard since. I do not remember if it was brought to my knowledge then. There were so many posters and papers.

Q. After the 6th how did the situation in the city strike you?

A. They were working up for some kind of mischief for some future time which I could not foresee. It struck me that the leaders of the movement were disciplining the mob with a view to some concerted form of passive disobedience to authority which would paralyse Government.

Q. But so far as any immediate act of violence is concerned did you see anything that was being encouraged?

A. My idea was that they intended to avoid any collision with authority which would justify armed intervention and to train the mob to do what they were told.

Q. On the evening of the 9th April was the *Ram Naumi* festival held?

A. Yes, it was held. It was a Hindu festival representing characters of the Hindus, and Hindu demonstrations took place.

Q. In what form did those demonstrations take place?

A. Cars were dragged in procession and as the procession passed shouts in honour of the Hindu deities were raised and shouts of a political nature "*Mahatma Gandhi ki Jai*," "*Hindu-Muslim ki Jai*" were also raised.

Q. Did you witness these processions?

A. I was in the verandah of the Allahabad Bank. I was caught in the crowd and witnessed the procession there.

Q. So far as loyalty to the British Government is concerned was there anything to indicate this?

A. As a rule they were very civil, every car in the procession stopped in front of me and the band played "God save the King." A note of disloyalty which struck me was that a party of Muhammadan students dressed to represent the Turkish Army raised a rude demonstration by clapping their hands which is a sign of rudeness up here. That is all.

Q. On your return from witnessing that procession did you receive any orders from Government regarding Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal?

A. I received orders that they should be removed quietly to Dharamsala?

Q. How far is that from Amritsar?

A. Over 100 miles.

Q. Is it out of the Punjab?

A. It is in the Punjab, but out of my district.

Q. Did you discuss the situation with anyone?

A. I discussed it with the Officer Commanding the Station, Captain Massey, the Superintendent of Police, Mr. Rehill, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mr. Plomer, and also with the Civil Surgeon, Colonel Smith.

Q. Did you form any design as to how you should carry out those orders?

A. The best way was to arrest these persons without any fuss. The orders I gave were to send for them to my house next morning at 10 and remove them in motors.

Q. And did you make preparations accordingly?

A. My preparations roughly were based on the idea that a disorderly crowd of their supporters might come to the civil station and try to overawe me into their return, or at any rate, make a noisy demonstration which would lead to worse.

Q. Did you also fear that an attempt will be made to rescue the deportees?

A. I also feared that and guarded against it by asking the Superintendent of Police, Mr. Rehill, who knew the way and was able to drive a car, to take charge of the party and also provided an escort of British troops

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in plain clothes. The chief aim against rescue was the secrecy of our operations. I decided that they would be 30 miles on their way to Dharamsala before any one knew about it.

Q. Was there any regulation about the congregating of the crowd?

A. I gave written orders that whereas I had reason to fear the crowd would attempt to assemble in the Civil Station with the object of overawing the Deputy Commissioner by show of criminal force, no such crowd will be allowed to pass the Railway line and I gave written orders to three European Magistrates to that effect and I pointed out to them the crossings and in case of the crowd attempting to cross the line they were to carry these orders into effect.

Q. Did you give any instructions how a crowd at that point was to be dealt with?

A. I told them to keep the crowd back peacefully, if possible. But they were to be kept back at any cost, and they were to get the Military power to aid if necessary.

Q. What were the preliminary dispositions of the Military?

A. In consultation with the Officer Commanding the Station I gave him my appreciation of the situation and he told me of the Military dispositions he proposed to make which would be ready at a moment's notice, and I acquainted him with what we could do as our share with the police.

Q. Briefly, what dispositions did you make?

A. The Officer Commanding the Station agreed to have mounted pickets on the Rego Bridge, the Hall Gate Bridge and the Hospital Level Crossing and to have the British Infantry kept in reserve in the Ram-bagh Gardens. The Military reserve was in the Cantonments and 75 armed police were sent to the Kotwali and the remainder of the Police were protecting the level crossing, called the Police Lines Crossing.

Q. Where is the Kotwali?

A. The Kotwali is the chief police station in the city and is about half-a-mile in the city near the Town Hall.

Q. Was any arrangement made as regards the Motor Ambulance?

A. Colonel Smith, who had a Motor Ambulance, was asked in case of any trouble arising, which would require the evacuation of European women and children, to go round in this ambulance which would hold a very large number and to carry it out.

Q. Did, on the morning of the 10th, Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal arrive at your house?

A. They did at 10 A.M.

Q. Did they leave shortly after?

A. In about half-an-hour.

Q. After their departure did crowds begin to collect?

A. I think about half-an-hour after. I kept those persons who had come with the deportees for about an hour at my house so as to give the escort a start. I then heard that crowds had begun to collect in the Aitchison Park.

Q. Where is that Park?

A. That is on the City side of the Railway between the city and the Fort.

Q. Did you yourself proceed to Hall Gate?

A. It was arranged that until circumstances required it, otherwise I should be found at office at the end of the telephone; so I went to the office and the Officer Commanding the Station to his troops.

Q. How long did you remain there?

A. I did not remain more than half-an-hour in office when Mr. Plomer came to me riding with news that the crowds were collecting and intended to cross the line to my house.

Q. Where were the crowds collected?

A. In the city and Aitchison Park.

Q. In consequence of that information what did you do?

A. I sent Mr. Plomer to the Officer Commanding the Station. I went to the telephone to ring up Colonel

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[Continued.]

Smith to tell him to stand by, but the telephone was out of order; I then proceeded to Hall Gate bridge.

Q. What did you find at the foot of the Hall Gate bridge?

A. I found a small picket, I think, of two Indian and three British ranks, with the Assistant Commissioner, Mr. Beckett. The angry crowd had begun to stone the picket. They were trying to face the crowd but the horses would not do it.

Q. How were the picket armed?

A. I could not see at the time. I saw that two of the Indian ranks had got some kind of lance and I think one or two had a rifle, because I looked round to try and see if any of them were armed, but I could not see in the confusion.

Q. Did it appear to you that they were in a serious position?

A. They were totally unable to hold back the crowd. They were being driven back. I endeavoured to rally them and get them to charge. But the horses would not face it.

Q. When you saw the picket in this position what action did you take?

A. I withdrew them about 100 yards to get clear and rally them, also to see if any of them were armed. They were in the middle of the crowd.

Q. Did you go to the Officer Commanding Troops?

A. At that time, the Officer Commanding Troops passed me and the picket misunderstanding orders followed him. I thought the best course was to go after him and explain the situation and ask him to take such action as might be necessary. I thought that at that time he might bring troops down to the spot.

Q. While you were absent, did anything occur?

A. While I was absent, in fact I was just going, the crowd was temporarily held up by the mounted reserve, a small picket not much larger than the one which had scattered. The Magistrate whom I had sent out in the direction of the city finding them driven back called upon the military to use their arms.

Q. Did the firing take place?

A. Yes. By a couple of British ranks.

Q. Where were they situated?

A. They were near Madan's shop.

Q. Were they on foot?

A. They dismounted and fired.

Q. From what point did they fire?

A. From the side of the road by a culvert—a culvert of the road in the direction of Madan's shop.

Q. How long were you absent altogether?

A. I think half-an-hour. The Officer Commanding the Station decided to fall back on a line from my bungalow to the Kacheri and I decided to accompany him. I got back to the Kacheri and turned out the treasury guard, tried to get Colonel Smith to see if he was carrying out the plan for evacuation, asked the Assistant Commissioner to go and warn the people and found that all was working well. I went back to the scene of disturbance.

Q. When you got back to the scene of disturbance where was the crowd?

A. The crowd then had been pushed back over the Railway line. They were being held up by one small picket—British picket—on the Foot Bridge and another small picket on the Hall Gate Bridge with a small picket in reserve.

Q. Did you see some men that had been shot and some that were wounded by the fire?

A. People who were killed had been removed. But I may say smoke was coming up at this time from the National Bank in the city.

Q. Were Military then in charge of the Hall Gate Bridge and the Foot Bridge?

A. Yes.

Q. As the crowd was driven back what action did you take just about the time when the smoke was coming?

A. First of all I was called to the Foot Bridge, because the crowd was making hostile demonstration against it.

Q. After they were driven back what did the crowd do?

A. They threatened to reach the bridge but they were finally induced to withdraw by being told that they would be fired on. I then went back to the foot of the bridge. I was then called by the Magistrate from Hall Gate Bridge who said that the crowd threatened to rush the picket. I went taking with me some mounted men and I found as he said a very threatening crowd facing this small picket. We rode out from the ranks to the crowd and as far as we could tried to make our voices heard in the noise and told them to disperse. The crowd began to close in and we went back into the ranks. And once more Mr. Plomer went out of his own accord and told them that fire was going to be opened. I was rather reluctant to fire; because at that time two Indian gentlemen were endeavouring to persuade the crowd to go back. I was afraid of shooting them. So I pointed them out to the picket. I suggested to the non-commissioned officer that he might pick out a ring-leader but he could not. I was trying to pick out the ring-leader when the crowd made a rush and began to put over stones on the picket. I called on the non-commissioned officer commanding the picket to take action. He opened fire.

Q. How many shots were fired?

A. I am unable to say on this occasion. I am informed that only about 70 shots were fired by the Military on that day.

Q. Was the firing on this occasion entirely by the Military?

A. Yes.

Q. At what time did that firing take place?

A. At about 2 P.M.

Q. In the meantime, had a considerable amount of destruction been done?

A. Yes. By that time the whole damage in the city had been done. Damage to the National Bank had been done.

Q. Take these different events; in the first place the destruction at the Telegraph Office. What was that destruction?

A. The crowd rushed into the Telegraph Office and smashed up the instruments. They were on the point of killing the Telegraph Master, but he was saved by the picket which had been left to protect the Railway station.

Q. Then another part of the crowd did damage to the goods yard?

A. Yes. They stormed into the goods yard, set it on fire and killed the guard there, Mr. Robinson.

Q. Did they chase the station Superintendent?

A. He was injured greatly, and was in great danger of losing his life.

Q. Was the Railway station itself in danger?

A. The Railway station is a large building. The actual platform was sufficiently protected by the picket that was left there.

Q. Did a number of soldiers arrive at this time?

A. On the way through, a party of Gurkhas arrived and the Station Superintendent and I detained them and commandeered them for the purpose of defence to protect the station. They did not have rifles but they were armed later on.

Q. At about what time did the damage to the Telephone Exchange and to the Goods Yard and the murder of Mr. Robinson take place?

A. I think it all happened in the short time in which I was away, because we have heard in evidence of a conversation going on over the telephone at about 1 P.M. and all was over very shortly after that. That is as near as I can date it in time.

Q. You said a minute ago that you saw smoke coming from the National Bank?

A. Yes.

Q. Had a part of the crowd gone into the city?

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[Continued.]

A. I think the crowd had scattered in all directions to do violence—some to the telephone, some to the station, some to the railway line and others in various directions.

Q. At the National Bank what damage was done?

A. The bank itself was completely gutted and burnt and the Manager and assistant were murdered and also a great deal of property in the form of piece-goods was stolen from the bank's godown.

Q. The godown itself is situated at the back of the bank and so far as that part of the building is concerned was it wrecked or fired?

A. No, but the rioters went in and helped themselves to the goods.

Q. Was there a large quantity of goods looted from the bank and the station?

A. To the best of my recollection the value is estimated at about 12 lakhs.

Q. Mr. Stuart and Mr. Scott were murdered in the front room?

A. Yes.

Q. They had attempted to make their way out by a passage and were driven back?

A. That was from the evidence of the employees who were there.

Q. After they had been murdered what did the crowd do with the bodies?

A. They heaped wood and furniture on them and after putting kerosene oil they set the pile on fire.

Q. That pile was fired in the building?

A. It was fired within the building.

Q. And the main building itself was completely gutted?

A. Yes.

Q. In the destructions what was used by the crowd?

A. Kerosene oil. They must have got some from the municipal office. There were some tins of kerosene oil lying there and also from the shops in the town. I had been informed that they used squirts for pumping the oil.

Q. At about the same time was the Alliance Bank attacked?

A. The Alliance Bank was attacked about the same time and the crowd entered and killed the Manager and threw his body into the street.

Q. Could you form any opinion as to whether the Alliance Bank or the National Bank was first attacked?

A. I was not able to find that out, but I think the National Bank. I have heard various stories about that.

Q. Were these acts done by different parts of the crowd?

A. Probably.

Q. Was the Chartered Bank also attacked?

A. Yes. That was absolutely next door to the police station and the manager and his assistant were able to make their escape. A good deal of damage to property was done.

Q. Was damage done to the Religious Book Society?

A. That was burnt.

Q. What happened to the people?

A. They escaped by a ladder from the burning house.

Q. As regards the Town Hall was any thing done?

A. The Town Hall was also burnt by the rioters in the same way. Kerosene oil was used.

Q. It is completely wrecked?

A. Yes, it is completely wrecked.

Q. Were sub-post offices also burnt?

A. There were several sub-post offices burnt. The sub-post office at the Town Hall and the sub-post-offices at the Golden Temple, Majith Mandi and Dhab Basti Ram.

Q. What happened to them?

A. They were looted: any portable property found there was taken.

Q. In connection with the Town Hall did much looting occur there?

A. The records were destroyed.

Q. What happened to the Zenana Hospital?

A. That was attacked and an attempt was made to find and murder Mrs. Easdon, the lady doctor. She escaped by being concealed in a small closet.

Q. Do you know whether more than one attempt was made?

A. I remember hearing that the crowd were told by a courageous servant that she was not in—they went away and came back a second time, but she escaped detection.

Q. Did anything occur to a missionary lady Miss Sherwood?

A. Miss Sherwood was cycling round the city on her business and she was set on by a crowd and beaten down with sticks and she got up again and was dragged by the hair of her head and beaten and left for dead.

Q. Did anything occur to the Indian Christian Church?

A. That was completely burnt and destroyed.

Q. Was an attempt made to fire the school?

A. There was a middle school managed by the Church Missionary Society. The crowd entered it and attempted to burn it down but they were driven off by the police picket from the police lines crossing.

Q. Was there an electrician who was murdered?

A. Sergeant Rowlands was in the crowd near the Aitchison Park and he was beaten to death on the outskirts of Aitchison Park.

Q. What had he been doing at the time when he was struck by the mob?

A. I am not quite sure. He had been out on duty from the fort. I think he was going for some purpose between the fort and the station.

Q. Was there an organized attempt to cut communications?

A. The attempt to cut communications was certainly organized. Directly after I got down I naturally tried to communicate with Lahore, but found communications down and I learnt that the wires had been cut with a hammer and a cold chisel. The Railway Station leading in the direction of Tarn Taran was burnt and an attempt was made on the lines on the Lahore side—the main line.

Q. Was that attempt successful?

A. There was a guard on the mail who drove them off.

Q. When had that guard been stationed there?

A. I do not know for how long the trains had been carrying guards.

Q. You have already referred to the cases where you instructed the fire to take place—did these incidents, which you have referred to, occur prior to your giving your fire?

A. I think so. I saw smoke from the National Bank going up.

Q. Was the matter, in your opinion, so serious that action had to be taken for the safety of civilians generally?

A. Yes, from the moment in which the temper of the crowd was made known and we saw that they were trying to force their way into the civil lines.

Q. What provision did you make with reference to their safety and protection?

A. Well, it had already been arranged that Colonel Smith, either on news from me or if the worst came on the sound of firing, should evacuate the civilians in his motor ambulance, beginning from the most distant and I also on my way to the Officer Commanding the Station warned some of the men in the mission station. I sent Mr. Beckett to warn people down the Mall, but the station is so small that the noise and tumult got to everyone sooner than any warning, and as I got back to the treasury I found the people coming in.

Q. Then with regard to evacuating the civil population did you collect them at any time?

A. The arrangement was that there should be collecting stations; in the canal bungalow occupied by Mr. Jeffries for one—near the court house and the Alexandria School for the mission people; and people collected there except those out of the way in Cantonments.

Q. At about what time was the collection of civilians made at these places?

A. They began coming in at about one o'clock, and of course some in Cantonment or in the direction of Cantonments did not come in so soon.

Q. How many altogether were collected?

A. I have no recollection of the number.

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Q. What happened to them?

A. They remained there until the Officer Commanding the Station had made all arrangements for picketing the road to the Fort and for their safe conduct and the Officer in charge of Supply and Transport had produced necessary vehicles for those who wanted them. They went on, I believe, between 5 and 6.

Q. Did you endeavour to get further Military assistance from any place?

A. Yes. As communications were cut I got a light engine from the station and sent a Military officer to go up the line as far as he could till he got in touch with the telegraphic wire again and he got through a telegram to the General Officer Commanding 16th Indian Division at Lahore. Shortly after that communication was restored on the railway telephone line and I was able to speak to a railway official at the Lahore station and sent a message to His Honour.

Q. When did the Commissioner and the Deputy Inspector-General of Police arrive?

A. They arrived at about 5 o'clock.

Q. Later on did you get reinforcements?

A. Reinforcements came in that night from Jullundur—about 400 rifles.

Q. Did the mob take any further action with regard to the destruction of property?

A. No. They were marching about the city in fours all night I was told. But we entered the city at midnight and occupied the Kotwali releasing the Europeans who had taken refuge there.

Q. Was any attempt made on any railway station during the night?

A. The railway station at Chheharta was fired.

Q. How far is it?

A. I think about 6 miles in the Lahore direction.

Q. What was the nature of the attempt made upon that place?

A. They smashed the windows of the station and looted the goods train standing there.

Q. Was there much loot taken from that goods train?

A. I do not think very much. It was grain and sugar.

Q. As regards the next day how were you occupied?

A. We were occupying the Kotwali and we had a line of pickets not too strong protecting the civil station. We were considering the attitude of the inhabitants of the city, who, as I understood, proposed to come out in a very large demonstration to bury the dead.

In agreement with the Officer Commanding Troops, I decided that no such demonstration could possibly be permitted and they were informed that they could only carry out their demonstration in small parties. There was a good deal of argument going to and fro. These orders were finally carried out.

Q. In connection with the fire that took place on the 10th, how many rioters or members of the crowd lost their lives?

A. The number in the Health Officer's return was 8. The number that I heard that night as having been laid out for burial was from 9 to 11. I should think the figure was somewhere about those figures, 8 or 9 or 10.

Q. Do you know how many people were wounded?

A. A case was brought against the rioters who had made the attack on the Hall bridge. I think the number was 12. It was a pretty complete list. They were tried and convicted for riot.

Q. Did you on the 11th go into the city with troops?

A. I went as far as the Kotwali.

Q. How many troops had you?

A. I think we had about 100. They picketed the side streets all the way up to the Kotwali, and had only 20 left in the latter end. About 100 rifles started.

Q. Did you make any provision as regards the peace of the town?

A. We made provision to preserve the peace of the district, specially Tarn Taran, which is the headquarters of the Sikhs. Any rising there would have been most serious, more serious even than at Amritsar. I sent a Magistrate out there to do his best. We could not spare

troops and he had to get local levies and do what he could.

Q. Were similar instructions issued to other magistrates?

A. The other Tahsil is Ajnala. I sent instructions to the Tahsildar there to get local levies to protect the treasury and I understood he was assisted by Sardar Raghbir Singh.

Q. On the evening of the 11th April General Dyer arrived?

A. Yes, he arrived and took charge of the operations.

Q. Was he in command of the Jullundur Brigade?

A. Yes.

Q. What orders were given as regards the protection of the Railway lines?

A. I issued orders through the headmen of the village that villagers were responsible for keeping watch and ward along the length of Railway line in their limits, and this was organized later on into a regular system during the troubles.

Q. On the 11th, was any business going on in Amritsar?

A. The place was quite shut up and business was suspended.

Q. On the morning of the 12th, was a Military force sent round the city?

A. A small column went round the Circular Road, round the city, because we heard that a demonstration was going to be made at the shrines and a considerable crowd had come out of the city. They went back in a peaceful manner and nothing happened.

Q. Were some people arrested on that day?

A. After the people had been dispersed, the troops turned back through the city to the Kotwali. Small parties were sent out to make arrests of the persons supposed to be chiefly concerned in the murders and riots. Several important arrests were then made.

Q. In the meantime did you send out a small force to Tarn Taran?

A. Yes, it was sent out, as we were able to spare it then, on an armoured train. The intention of the officer in sending the force was that it should remain for the protection of Tarn Taran, but there was some misunderstanding and it came back that night. Then a large crowd of villagers assembled with the object of looting the Tahsil. In the night the Police turned out and showed a bold front and they dispersed.

Q. Was a permanent force sent the next morning?

A. It was; the next day, finding that the force had returned, I asked the Officer Commanding Troops to send one out.

Q. On the 12th, was business again suspended in the city?

A. Yes, nothing was doing.

Q. In whose possession was the city during these two days?

A. We had the Kotwali in possession of the Military picket. We had all the Police posts round the walls. But outside those limits the mob was in possession. It was freely said that it might be the Raj of the Sarkar outside, but inside it was *Hindu-Muslims in hakumat*. It means that the Government might be governing outside, the local soviet were ruling within.

Q. At 12 o'clock on the morning of the 13th April, was any further damage done to the Railway line?

A. The line was cut between Chheharta and Khassa, nearer to Amritsar than to Chheharta and a goods train derailed.

Q. How was that cutting of rails done?

A. It was generally done with gangmen's tools. The gangmen were in with them and they produced the implements they use. In one case, a piece of rail was removed bodily.

Q. That is not an easy thing to do?

A. It could not be done with ordinary sticks.

Q. Then on the 13th, the situation continued critical?

A. It continued very critical. We were able to hold the outskirts of the city. We made no impression in the city. The city was still impenitently hostile and that was not the worst, because the great danger was

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from the outside. If the villagers of the Majha had turned loose, we should have had a situation not paralleled since the Mutiny. We know them to be hot-headed men, who, if they thought that the Government was failing, would step in for anything they could get.

Q. Can you say yourself whether any rumours were afloat as regards general looting?

A. I was informed that the rumour in the villages was that there was any amount of loot in Amritsar. Government was failing in the control of the situation and the sooner people came in to get their share, the better. It was brought out in evidence that in certain villages people went off to get their share.

Q. Did you form any opinion whether there was any foundation for these rumours?

A. I thought them very probable. I received a circumstantial story of a large party of villagers on the 12th and 13th about three miles from Amritsar and I thought it extremely likely that we should have looting.

Q. Was a horse fair *Baisakhi* held on the 13th?

A. Yes, it was going on; it takes several days.

Q. How long had it been going on?

A. It began just about the 10th and it was going on. I went out on the 9th to see the arrangements for it.

Q. What had happened to it during the 11th and 12th?

A. Some of its booths were burnt and the holders, as far as I could gather, had scattered with a considerable loss, they said, of cattle.

Q. As regards the people who came in at this time, did they all seem to be genuinely desirous of attending this fair or had they other objects?

A. There were two things, a religious fair and the Amritsar cattle fair. The 13th actually was a religious festival held at the Amritsar Golden Temple and that is an occasion on which people come in for it. It is also believed that a great number of those who came in were inspired with a desire to get what was going in the way of loot.

Q. What was the attitude of the mob towards the authorities? Defiance?

A. It was sulky and defiant.

Q. Did you go through the streets with General Dyer in the forenoon of the 13th?

A. As a matter of fact I do not think we started before 12. We were going through from about noon till about 3-30 in the afternoon through the streets making a proclamation that no meeting would be permitted and that if the meeting did take place, it would, if necessary, be dispersed by Military force.

Q. Where did you make this proclamation?

A. It was made in 18 districts places within the city. The whole column went along the streets and whenever it came to an important centre or cross roads, it stopped and had drums beat for people collecting. Then first of all we had the official town crier who read out the proclamation in the Official Urdu language. Then we had a second town crier who explained the purport of the proclamation in the Punjabi language to the common people. When this was done, it went to the next place, beat drum and so on.

Q. Did you as responsible for the good order of the city come to any conclusion with reference to the advisability of allowing meetings?

A. I certainly was against having any meetings; in the then temper of the people it would have been madness to have allowed them while things were hanging as they were.

Q. Was your injunction against the holding of meetings obeyed?

A. I might make one explanation. As a matter of fact it was General Dyer's proclamation. It was sent after he had taken charge. I was acting as his adviser. General Dyer sent it and his proclamation was not obeyed. A large meeting assembled.

Q. Did you agree with his view?

A. As General Dyer's adviser, I thoroughly agreed that no meeting should be held.

Q. As regards obedience to that what happened?

A. Taking it chronologically, we got back at about 3-30. We heard certain rumours that a meeting would take place, but did not attach any great importance to that. I asked General Dyer if he could spare me as I wanted to go to the Fort. I had hardly gone (at about 4) when General Dyer received news that a crowd was actually collecting in Jallianwala Bagh. He proceeded there with a small party of 50 Indian ranks, 25 of the Baluchi Regiment and 25 Gurkhas and one or two armoured cars. He went into the Bagh through a narrow opening and found a large crowd collected and being addressed by a speaker.

Q. Do you know who that speaker was?

A. I cannot tell you.

Q. You do not know whether his name was Hansraj?

A. I believe he was Hansraj, but I am speaking by hearsay.

Q. Who is he?

A. Hansraj is one of the people who had been fairly prominent in political activities in the past few weeks.

Q. Did you see the crowd in the Jallianwala Bagh?

A. No.

Q. So you do not know what size it was?

A. No, various estimates have been made, but I cannot give an estimate myself; it was a very large crowd.

Q. They were fired upon by General Dyer's orders?

A. Yes.

Q. And in consequence there were a large number of casualties?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you got any official estimate of the casualties?

A. I have not got the latest official estimate. I made an estimate based on the returns made to the Health Officer of about 300, but I believe this figure has gone up somewhat and the last official estimate I have heard of is somewhere between 400 and 500 killed, but there will be other evidence as regards that.

Q. What was the result of this firing on that mob?

A. The whole rebellion collapsed. Not only the mob that was fired upon naturally dispersed and all trouble ceased in the city of Amritsar, but it was felt throughout the district. One of the reasons why there had been a danger was that the people out in the district thought for some reason or other that the arm of Government was paralysed. The inaction of the police when the National Bank was burned lent some colour to that belief and there was an idea that Government could do nothing, and this came as a disillusionment.

Q. On the 14th did anything occur?

A. There was the beginning of a *hartal* in Tarn Taran, or something in sympathy with the rioters in Amritsar, but it came to nothing. There was also a small attack by villagers on a neighbouring village, which has not very much to do with the rebellion except as an instance of the fact that when the arm of Government is relaxed people begin to fight each other.

Q. Did you form any opinion as to what the intention of the mob was with reference to Government?

A. The mob in the Jallianwala Bagh?

Q. Generally speaking, the mob in Amritsar, from the 10th to the 13th of April?

A. I believe it seriously thought it had a chance of beating the Government. One of the ringleaders, when he was talked to, said 'well, let us have the fight out.' That was somewhere between the 10th and the 13th, when he was being talked to by a friendly Indian gentleman; that is what he said, I believe.

Q. Do you understand that to mean a fight out between the populace on the one hand and organized authority on the other?

A. Yes.

Q. After this date was there any serious rising?

A. No, nothing of any importance at all as far as Amritsar was concerned.

Q. Perhaps you might indicate generally the measures that were taken to restore confidence?

A. They were measures taken through the local notables. Our great difficulty was the prevalence still

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of wild rumours, especially the prevalence of false rumours of outrage, such as for example that the Golden Temple had been bombed, that Sikh girls had been insulted, and so forth, and practically every day we got a new one; and leaflets had to be struck and people had to be written to to counteract these, and we worked this through the local squires, the gentlemen of influence in the district who patrolled their villages and contradicted rumours and kept the people quiet generally.

Q. Were certain local darbars held?

A. Yes, I went out to Tarn Taran on the 16th and talked to them and received their assurances of loyalty and that they would do everything they could, and we had a similar one for the Amritsar Tahsil at Amritsar and for the Ajnala Tahsil at Ajnala, which I was not able to attend.

Q. Did a moveable column under General Dyer visit some places?

A. Yes, one went out to places known as Rajasansi and Atari and also, I may mention, a moveable column from Ferozepore later on passed up through the district and went back to Ferozepore.

Q. In connection with the contradiction of false rumours did you receive local assistance?

A. I received a great deal of local help from Sardar Singh Majithia and his organisation, the Chief Khalsa Diwan, a prominent Sikh religious institution, helped me especially as regards the Sikhs who compose a greater part of the population, and I received a great deal of assistance in other ways from other people.

Q. Now as regards Martial Law, on what date was Martial Law proclaimed?

A. On the 15th. There is a slip in my note; it was not the 13th but the 15th.

Q. Had you applied for it before?

A. I did not apply for it. We were carrying on; there was in effect Martial Law under what we may call the common law quite apart from Martial Law under the Bengal Regulation of 1904.

Q. Martial Law was proclaimed by the local authority with the authority of the Supreme Government?

A. It was proclaimed under the Bengal Regulation.

Q. That is of 1804?

A. Yes.

Q. What was your opinion as to the necessity for Martial Law being proclaimed?

A. I think it was quite necessary. As a matter of fact Martial Law *ipso facto* existed from the time that the Commissioner told the Officer Commanding the troops to take charge of the situation. It simply legalised it in a particular form; it was there.

Q. At the time Martial Law was declared was anything said as to when it was to date from?

A. As regards the tribunals, it was operative from the 30th.

Q. After the Proclamation of Martial Law on the 19th of April was a proclamation issued by the General Officer Commanding?

A. Yes, he issued a proclamation creating a small penal code under Martial Law, making certain acts punishable.

Q. Who was that officer?

A. General Beynon.

Q. Was that proclamation issued to all the districts within your area?

A. Yes, that was for the whole divisional area. It was supplemented by local orders.

Q. Did they contain an enumeration of acts that were punishable in addition to ordinary offences?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you familiar with the different acts that were declared to be illegal under that proclamation?

A. Yes, some of them.

Q. Perhaps you might suggest what the more important of them were?

A. I may say that this was a sort of substantive law and executive orders were issued to the people which if they disobeyed they brought themselves under one of the provisions of the substantive law. It was like rules

so that if a person disobeyed a proclamation of the local General, he committed an act prejudicial to good discipline and order. The actual orders, which you may call the rules in the local Act, were as follows, the most important of them. There was the curfew.

Q. When did the curfew operate?

A. It was originally from 10 P.M. to 5 A.M. Subsequently from May the 16th people were allowed to stay out till 11-30 P.M. and the morning limit was brought down to 4 A.M., and when it was pointed out that people suffered and wanted doctors in the night, it was arranged and it was modified in their favour.

Q. Was any modification made on any special occasions?

A. On the 23rd it was removed out of consideration for the Muhammadans who have to fast all during the day in the Ramazan and are put to great inconvenience if they have to keep to their houses during the night.

Q. Were any serious complaints made as regards inconvenience arising from the order issued under Martial Law?

A. No serious complaints other than those which were attended to. People came and asked for the hours to be extended and this was done, and the Muhammadans asked for a relaxation during the Ramazan and it was given. But there was no serious inconvenience, I consider.

Q. During what period did this curfew order remain in force?

A. I think the first proclamation was on the 13th; that was an informal order of the General. It went on from then till May the 23rd, when it was removed on account of the Ramazan and not reimposed.

Q. Was there any restriction on the holding of meetings?

A. An order was passed making it an offence for more than 10 people to assemble together. It was found out that this was really unworkable in practice and there was a hasty explanation issued to say it did not mean to prevent people going about their ordinary business. As a matter of fact the kind of meetings to be prevented were perfectly well understood and I think nobody was punished for infringing it.

Q. Did that order cause a certain amount of alarm among the people?

A. Yes; the opportunity was at once taken to tell the village people 'here you are, you have been told that not more than 4 people are going to be allowed to assemble, and this is what is being done.' As a matter of fact the order did not apply to the villages, but very special measures were taken to allay their alarms.

Q. The measures taken were proclamations?

A. Yes, and messages through local notables.

Q. Was it made clear that it did not apply to marriages or funerals?

A. Yes.

Q. Or to gatherings in the market for trade or commerce?

A. Yes.

Q. Then as regards travelling what regulations were made?

A. We received orders that no one was to be allowed to travel without a permit and a good deal of time was taken in issuing permits. It was a military regulation based very largely on traffic considerations I believe.

Q. How long did that regulation last?

A. I cannot recollect the date. It did not go on very long. Of course travelling to certain places remained restricted for a long time on account of the Afghan War. I cannot remember the actual date of the removal of the restriction as regards the neighbourhood of Amritsar.

Q. Was any order issued as regards the prices of foods?

A. Yes, food was controlled. An order was issued forbidding any one to sell produce at more than a rate which had been based on the rates before the riot, and those prices were revised once a week. We found, contrary to our expectation, that prices did not fall. This is the time of the harvest and prices generally fall at harvest, but for some cause or other prices continued

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to rise, and we found that our food control was keeping food from coming in, so we raised and raised the prices till finally it was found expedient to discontinue the control altogether.

Q. Did other causes operate so as to keep up prices besides merely the fixing of prices? I suppose the general insecurity did?

A. The general insecurity, and people were afraid of their carts being commandeered. The villager has a strong objection, when he comes in with his grain cart, to find it taken by the Supply and Transport.

Q. Anyhow it was found that this regulation was not beneficial?

A. I think it was beneficial in the first instance, or we would have had famine, and we would have had riots with some show of justification, but after a week or two, as things began to steady down, it became to be not of very much use.

Q. I think, in addition to those restrictions, there were others commandeering motors, tongas, bicycles?

A. Yes, all motors, tongas and bicycles were commandeered by the military for military purposes.

Q. Were these gradually released?

A. Yes, when they were no longer required they were returned gradually.

Q. When was Martial Law revoked?

A. I think on June the 9th; I have not a note of it.

Q. Before the revocation of Martial Law had most of the special regulations creating particular offences been recalled?

A. Yes, there was really very little in practice to revoke left.

Q. Certain special commissions were appointed to deal with offences?

A. There were commissions appointed at Lahore to deal with serious offences.

Q. How many commissions were appointed in the Punjab?

A. I think 4.

Q. Where were they appointed?

A. At Lahore.

Q. All at Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. All these commissions appointed to deal with serious offences sat in Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. They were appointed by the Government of India itself?

A. No, not by the Government of India; they were appointed, I think, under the orders of the Local Government, acting with the Military Commander, but I am rather out of my sphere.

Q. What was the effect in your opinion of Martial Law on the situation generally?

A. To begin with, it enabled the peace to be preserved. Its object is to have a swift and ready means not only of bringing offenders to justice, but providing for order and the prevention of crime.

Q. Under Martial Law what was your position as Deputy Commissioner?

A. Well, I regarded it very much as that of Political Officer with a column. I should regard myself as the adviser of the Military Commander, but I was, of course, carrying out a good number of duties of which he had no cognisance, and I was also reporting to my own official superiors. But I could do nothing against his orders and could not do very much without them.

Q. You think it might have been better if you had had more power?

A. I would not ask for power to be divided. One or the other must be in charge, but I think it would have been a good arrangement if I had had a more official position as his staff officer because if I had been a political officer with the column, or if I had been a Military Governor, I should have actually carried out all the staff work, whereas, although the General consulted me and showed the greatest courtesy on every occasion, I was not absolutely sure of knowing what was going on.

Q. Give us your view from what came to your knowledge in your personal capacity and from what you saw as to who were really responsible for these disturbances.

A. Starting from the top downwards, the people in Amritsar who were responsible were the people who raised the feelings of the mob to the pitch in which they overflowed in these disturbances.

Q. Are you using responsibility there in the sense of moral responsibility, or legal responsibility?

A. I was using it in the sense of moral responsibility; I would not presume to decide the legal question.

Q. And in that sense you mean people might be responsible although it was no part of their intention that acts of violence, riot and rebellion would follow?

A. Yes. I told Dr. Kitchlew some time before that he was playing with fire and was setting in motion forces he could not control. I do not think any of these people at the time intended immediate violence. I think they were intending action designed to fetter and cripple Government which really could not be carried out without leading inevitably in the end to violence.

Q. Did the Arya Samaj take any prominent part in connection with the occurrences in Amritsar?

A. Not a prominent part. One at any rate of the arrested people was a prominent Arya Samajist, but it did not come prominently to my notice in Amritsar during the few weeks I was there. I heard of it being somewhat sulky in a few towns, but as an organisation it did not come prominently to my notice.

Q. Did the Pan-Islamic agitation cause unsettlement?

A. Undoubtedly. It is always and especially at present a very difficult subject, and there was a concerted attempt to use the difficulties about Turkey in order to capture the Musalman organisations.

Q. But as regards the actual rioters, those who went in for looting and bloodshed and arson, who were directly responsible for that?

A. They were of the lower classes of the city, very largely organised gangs. There is a great tendency for what I may call the hooligan class to be organised under led captains, and they were very much to the fore. They were of all classes. A great number were Kashmiri Muhammadans, of whom there are numbers in Amritsar, and others were Hindus, such as *Khatris* and *Aroras* of the poorer classes.

Q. Then you would regard these men as actually the leaders in the actual rebellion?

A. I think the leaders in the actual rebellion were these led leaders of the hooligans. Whatever view the politicians took of the outcome of the agitation, I strongly suspect that these led captains took quite a different one and that their view prevailed.

Q. As regards the villagers, did many of them come in?

A. A certain number flocked in for loot.

Q. During the rebellion were there any signs of special hatred towards Europeans shown by the crowd?

A. Yes. It took that point from the time the crowd was turned back. It took the form of revenge upon Europeans and on their property. If it was found that a certain property belonged to an Indian they would spare it. For example, the Alliance Bank was going to be burnt but when it was found that it was Indian property they spared it; so also with St. Catherine's Hospital which they approached. An attempt was made to murder every European they could find.

Q. As regards the dislike of the mob was it shown in the way of special designs upon persons and also property belonging to Europeans?

A. Yes.

Q. Was any hostility shown to Government servants as such?

A. No, not even to the police.

Q. As regards the method adopted by the mob in their working what have you to say about that?

A. They first had large stones. I do not think they had sticks. But when they were fired on, and dispersed they turned up with dangerous looking sticks—some of them bits of timber—some iron pointed sticks. I

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remember practically every man in the crowd had a stick.

Q. Were you able to find out from where they armed themselves with these weapons?

A. Some were picked up from a big wood pile. We have heard stories that an unusually large number of heavy sticks were brought into Amritsar during the preceding days. They have never been confirmed but people had spoken that they had seen these sticks coming in in large numbers.

Q. I think you have already said that kerosene oil was used and various implements for cutting railway communications?

A. Yes. As regards the telegraph wire one case came before my notice where they used a hammer and cold chisel.

Q. Was that for the telegraph?

A. Yes.

Q. Under the Martial Law proclamation on April 20th the General Officer Commanding nominated certain civil officers in the Amritsar District to dispose summarily of offences against that proclamation?

A. Yes, I was one.

Q. Was it originally intended that offences committed before April 19th should be dealt with by the tribunals constituted under the Act?

A. Yes, under the regulations—finally these officers were given power to try minor offences committed between the 30th March and 19th April as well as their powers to try offences committed after the 19th April. The following is a list of names of the officers:—

Myself.

Mr. G. D. Rudkin, I.C.S.

Mr. F. H. Puckle, I.C.S.

Mr. R. B. Beckett, I.C.S.

Mr. F. A. Connor, Extra Assistant Commissioner.

Q. How many cases altogether were heard?

A. Twenty-two cases by these officers, involving 143 persons, of whom 102 belonged to a single case, that of the attempt to attack Tarn Taran.

Q. Did these courts pronounce any sentence of whipping?

A. No, Sir.

Q. What sentences were they entitled to inflict?

A. Two years' rigorous imprisonment, fine and whipping.

Q. But in fact you never did any whipping?

A. No.

Q. Who brought the cases before you?

A. The cases were generally brought by the police. As a rule, the military Provost Marshal took his cases to the military officer and the police took their cases to us. Occasionally it happened the other way round.

Q. In addition as regards the civil officers who were constituted as special courts there were also military officers; and you are referring actually to civil officers?

A. I am speaking only of civil officers.

Q. What were the kind of offences which you dealt with?

A. Civil officers dealt more with offences that fell under the Indian Penal Code. They were offences which were considered not important enough to go before the tribunals at Lahore.

Q. Now can you tell us the number of cases that were brought by the military officers who were appointed?

A. I have not got figures for the total cases for the military officers.

Q. Have you a list of the cases where sentences of whipping were passed?

A. I have got a list of cases where sentences of whipping were carried out. There were 26 cases.

Q. Under what offences did the 26 cases come?

A. Breach of Fort discipline	6
Beating drum to instigate disobedience to orders	2
Threatening witnesses	3
Drunk and disorderly	4
Grazing cattle in grass farm	2

Attempt to open railway gate	1
Out during prohibited hours	2
Refusing to give transport	2
Disseminating false news	1
Assault on constable	1
Abuse	1
Refusing to halt when challenged	1

Q. Was any of the whipping conducted in public?

A. There were three at General Headquarters, two at the Kotwali and the others private and six in the bazar.

Q. Where in the bazar?

A. In the place where Miss Sherwood was assaulted.

Q. Were any respectable persons flogged?

A. No. There were no respectable persons flogged.

Q. Were fines imposed?

A. There were some very small fines, I think they were imposed on the employees of the canal workshops. It came to about Rs. 36-9-0.

Q. Were a number of women and children removed to the hills during the disturbances?

A. Yes. As soon as it was possible the military arranged their evacuation and paid their expenses. The military authorities took very great care and paid their way to and from the hills and expenses for three months.

Q. How much expenditure was involved?

A. About Rs. 30,000.

Q. Was that levied against any of the communities where the rioting took place?

A. No, Sir. Government has accepted the charge. The Municipal Committee lent the money, but I have no doubt that they have been repaid by this time.

Q. Did you establish watch and ward along the railway lines and were the villages responsible?

A. The villages through which the railway line passed. They were obliged to keep one man on duty constantly.

Q. Did you enrol any special constables?

A. The Military Commander enrolled members of the Bar as special constables—all the members of the Bar except those who were given special exemption.

Q. Was that service popular?

A. They did not like it at first. I think later on they got rather to like it. At any rate, after Martial Law was declared the General changed their designation and called them ward officers and asked for volunteers to come and we had as many as we wanted. The arrangement finally was that these gentlemen were responsible for giving early information about what was going on in the various quarters of the City.

Q. Did they do good work?

A. Yes, they gave a great deal of assistance.

Q. About these special tribunals that were appointed, can you tell me what cases were tried before them?

A. These cases were investigated by a special officer of the Criminal Investigation Department relating to each district and he having got the case together laid it before the Legal Remembrancer who decided if there was a case to go before the tribunal.

Q. These tribunals took the place of Chief or High Courts?

A. Yes.

Q. On termination of Martial Law on the 9th of June did the work of the Commissions end?

A. I think that they went on, but final work was done under the Defence of India Act. As far as I was concerned we finished all work by the 9th of June and I was told not to leave cases pending. As far as my district was concerned any cases not finished by the 9th of June were disposed of under the ordinary law.

Q. Do you think it was necessary to have Martial Law to be continued up to the 9th of June?

A. Well, it is not a self-contained problem as regards a district. The necessity arose in the Military situation as a whole. What we wanted to preserve peace was the presence of the military. After the first few weeks Martial Law was very little felt. It was as regards a district in itself not of high importance as soon as things had settled down.

Q. Did you hear any complaints about people being arrested and kept in custody without trial?

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[Continued.]

A. I did not have any complaints. I know at the end of Martial Law there was a jail delivery and anyone who was not found with a definite charge against him was released.

Witness.—May I make a couple of matters which I mentioned this morning clearer?

The President.—Yes.

Witness.—You asked about prisoners remaining in custody without trial. What happened then was that, about the beginning of June, there were a certain number of prisoners against whom the police had not time to work up the cases. As far as the Civil Courts were concerned, there was a complete jail delivery on the 9th June. The other point was, there were 135 women and children who had arrived in the Fort on the 10th.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. I think you said that up to the time on the 10th April when the crowd was checked from getting into the Civil Lines, there was no evidence or design to attack Europeans?

A. No, we had no such idea.

Q. As I understand, both during the two days of *hartal* with reference to the meetings and with reference to the time on the 10th when the crowds came up as far as the station, in neither case had they any desire to attack Europeans?

A. My Head Clerk told me that he went to see the *hartal* and was not molested. I was in the city on the Ram Naumi Day, and even on the 10th when they were pouring out in an angry mob to come to me, Mr. Jarman, the Municipal Engineer, passed them by, and they took no notice of him.

Q. Up to that time, say from the middle of March, there had been considerable agitation regarding the Rowlatt Act and other matters?

A. Yes.

Q. I understood from your evidence that there was room for complaint from time to time about violent language but nothing to suggest that there was incitement to riot?

A. There were remote suggestions when Dr. Kitchlew spoke of using their hands, but people often speak rather more violently than they mean, and it was not our opinion that there was immediate fear of violence.

Q. You said that you thought the leaders were training the mob to do what they were told in the future but were against violence at the moment?

A. Yes, that was my idea.

Q. In referring to the part of the *Satyagraha* programme, were the people to civilly disobey such laws as a committee should dictate?

A. To my mind, it took the form of some very large plan of passive disobedience to some law which would paralyse the Executive Government.

Q. It was not any other form of lawlessness or violence in the future that you were thinking of except what was announced?

A. It had not taken definite shape.

Q. So far as the *Satyagraha* leaders themselves were concerned in the city, they deprecated violence from time to time?

A. Yes, from time to time they deprecated violence.

Q. Who were the chief *Satyagrahis*, if that is the correct expression, in Amritsar?

A. I should think Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal, but it is not distinguishable from the general agitation.

Q. And I suppose you know that the principles of that particular movement as professed are in theory, at all events, contrary to violence rather than in favour of them?

A. Yes, contrary to open violence. My feeling is any form of passive resistance must eventually culminate in violence.

Q. But as professed, was the leading notion of these people, that they were merely to disobey the law and take the consequences?

A. Yes, that was possibly the notion of people like Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal. They did not open their minds to me; I should think very likely people like Bugga and Ratto had got some other ideas in their minds.

Q. Were either of these two people you mentioned last *Satyagrahis*?

A. I don't think there is a definite class of people called *Satyagrahis* in Amritsar. I never distinguished them. I never got a list of people who had taken the *Satyagraha* vow. I think things were too new to them then.

Q. Do I understand correctly if I say that you did not expect to find evidence of any plot prior to the 6th April to engage in mob law and violence? Till a later date you did not expect to find any evidence of a deliberate plot in the beginning of April?

A. It is very difficult to say, because these things take place in different strata. I don't know what the people in charge of the hooligans thought; they might have thought quite differently from the people above, and those again from well known leaders like Mr. Gandhi. We did find by experience that there was sufficient organization down in the lowest stratum to go and spread with wonderful rapidity to do various acts of violence.

Q. You told us that until the crowds were turned back at the station, even that crowd had not harmed Europeans on its way to the station?

A. No.

Q. And you said that there were no signs of animosity towards Europeans during the *hartal*?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you point me to any fact to suggest that in the beginning of April there was any plot on the part of any stratum of society in Amritsar to encourage violence against Europeans or to upset the Local Government by violence?

A. I cannot point to any fact existing before the 10th April. The only thing is the extraordinary speed in which the various acts of violence were committed within an hour as evidencing the work of some form of organization.

Q. Can you tell me which were the acts of violence that were committed so soon as to suggest that there was previous organization?

A. Three: banks were burnt fairly close together. A Church and school were attacked in another direction. The Telegraph office was attacked the first thing of all, which rather marks an intelligence. It is the argument from design.

Q. I think that is an argument which has been rather blown upon and which would not always please all people. But apart from the design to cut communications, how do you think there was a previous organization?

A. I don't say of any individual cases. I am not myself saying that it inevitably follows that there was previous organization. I am putting before you these facts which were compatible with some kind of organization, however low. It does not follow of course that an organization need be an organization *ad hoc*. An organization had to a certain extent existed already; we know it existed in the municipal elections.

Q. Would it be consistent with the facts as you know them, to regard the outbreak of the 10th of April as the case of protest against the deportation of Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal which spontaneously developed into mob violence, marked by murder and incendiarism?

A. I think that is a very good account. It spontaneously developed. It flared up in a moment. I don't think people went out with that design.

Q. Now on the 29th April I think the first order on Dr. Satyapal was served prohibiting him from addressing any more meetings and on the 4th April there was another order against Dr. Kitchlew?

A. Yes.

Q. Had they immediately before that time been in the habit of addressing meetings?

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[Continued.]

A. Yes, constantly. I think probably they were addressing every one of the meetings that took place during the year from January.

Q. And were these meetings in furtherance of Mr. Gandhi's *Satyagraha* principles?

A. *Satyagraha* really came in on the 23rd. We had not heard very much about it before that.

Q. Was it for their speeches in favour of the propaganda of Mr. Gandhi that the orders were made against them or was it for anything else?

A. The orders came from above, and I was not given any reasons.

Q. Were you not at the time the Deputy Commissioner?

A. Yes.

Q. And these two people were living and speaking in Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. I understand those orders were not initiated at your request?

A. I had only been there for a short time. At one time I thought I could get Dr. Kitchlew to behave reasonably without the orders, in fact I rather deprecated them for a time, then I found I made a mistake, but as a matter of historical fact I did not make any recommendation. I was reporting the facts as they were.

Q. You made no recommendations one way or the other as regards those orders?

A. I had, as a matter of fact, quite early asked to suspend action against Dr. Kitchlew so that I might see if I could bring him round without the order.

Q. When did you in fact begin the duties of Deputy Commissioner at Amritsar?

A. On the 23rd of February.

Q. On the 9th, apart from the Muhammadan boys being rude, were you not struck by the civility shown to you by the mobs?

A. Yes, they were civil to me.

Q. I understand they were civil to you as you were the Deputy Commissioner?

A. Yes.

Q. When did you get in Amritsar the news that Mr. Gandhi had been turned back on his way from Bombay to Delhi, was that on the 9th or 10th?

A. I can't say exactly, because we were concerned with our own affairs.

Q. You do not know when it became public property in Amritsar?

A. I cannot say, but probably after the outbreak.

Q. As regards those orders for the removal of Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal, had you made any recommendations?

A. No, I daresay I should have, but I really did not feel my feet sufficiently.

Q. Do you remember whether you knew of anything about these orders being in contemplation before you received them?

A. No, I did not. But I knew that their conduct was under the consideration of Government and that Government was devoting their earnest attention to the movements of these gentlemen, but I had no knowledge of any specific action which Government intended to take.

Q. Having got those orders, you carried them out as quickly and efficiently as you could, as we know, on the 10th April. On the evening of the 9th, I gather from the precautions which you had detailed that you recognised the possibility that there would be some disturbance in Amritsar but you did not think it possible that anything like what happened would occur?

A. I reckoned up the possibility and provided for about three times as much, but ten times would not have been enough.

Q. To take one illustration, in the first disturbance which you actually saw when a small picket was being forced on the slope from the main bridge, of how many troops did that picket consist?

A. I think about two Indians and three Europeans.

Q. And two Indians were not armed with any arms or revolvers?

A. No.

Q. Of the two Europeans one of them appears to have been armed with a revolver?

A. I could not see in the confusion if any of them had.

Q. These five men, only one or two of whom were armed, were posted in the expectation of a possible disturbance?

A. Yes. I think they did not want to put the infantry there. The only thing infantry can do is to fire whereas the ordinary crowds can be very easily turned back by heavy ammunition column houses. Therefore, as I understand, the officer placed his picket on the road and kept his infantry out of sight quietly in the Ram Bagh.

Q. I take it that the number of that picket was determined by the Officer Commanding Station and not by you?

A. Yes.

Q. I take it that the pickets were small pickets and the reserve of infantry in the gardens?

A. The military reserve was in the Cantonments. I might take this opportunity of mentioning that there were about 2,000 followers. The Officer Commanding the station had them in his mind.

Q. You had on the previous night warned the Officer Commanding Station to put the internal defence scheme into force?

A. Yes, that is practically the way to put it.

Q. The main Police reserve was in the Kotwali?

A. We put 75 rifles in the Kotwali.

Q. The Kotwali was fired on the 10th?

A. Not the Kotwali, but the town hall opposite the Kotwali.

Q. Was that, as far as you could tell, sometime before 2 o'clock?

A. I think so.

Q. Or was it later?

A. No, I think before 2. It is very difficult to pick up these times. I had a great deal of conflicting statements. My impression was that these things happened before 2.

Q. Did you ever discover what the main police reserve of 75 men were doing when the town hall next door was being pillaged?

A. It was not doing anything. It simply failed in its duty.

Q. I do not want to trouble you with any questions about the details of the fire, at either of the two bridges. But when you come to Miss Sherwood's incident, I want to know at the latest when there was an order issued under which that road was guarded at each end and no one was allowed to pass along it except by crawling on the hands and knee?

A. That order was issued.

Q. That was an order, I understand, issued by the Military after Martial Law was declared on the 15th?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me how long that order lasted?

A. I believe five days.

Q. Beginning on what date?

A. I am shaky in dates. I should guess that to be the 20th. It was issued on a Sunday, because the General told me he issued the order to the troops after parade and his warning against making any reprisals.

Q. At that time, I understand, although not technically so, you were in fact acting as the Civil or Political adviser to the Administrator of Martial Law?

A. That is my position.

Q. Was that order made on your advice or representation?

A. As a matter of fact, it was made before I heard of it. The General told me of it after parade. I was not there at the time. He said he issued it and asked whether it was all right. I asked him to make sure that no woman was involved and I said that I supposed it was

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[Continued.]

all right. I understood then that it would block a single place. The next morning, after consideration, I advised him to modify it slightly.

Q. In what direction?

A. I said it would probably be just as good and better in many ways if people were told to remove their shoes while passing the place.

Q. Do you know whether actual copies of that order are in existence?

A. So far as I am aware, I do not think it was issued in writing, but you must ask the Military for that.

Q. What were you asked to advise upon? I take it it was a draft in writing.

A. He told me that he had issued it verbally at the time of the parade.

Q. In the case of persons who want to pass along or inhabiting this place, what steps were taken to bring this order to their notice? Was it left to the picket whom they had to pass to explain it to them?

A. I am not sure. I thought it was a single place that was affected.

Q. If it be the case that this order came into force on the 19th there had been no actual act of violence committed in the town of Amritsar itself since the incident of the 13th at the latest?

A. No.

Q. Prior to the 13th, there had been no actual acts of violence until the ebullition of the 10th? None on the 11th or 12th?

A. Not actually in Amritsar.

Q. You have told us that 3 or it may be 6 of the whippings that were inflicted under the Martial Law were carried out at this place?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me the date on which they were carried out?

A. The whippings were ordered by the Military Officer trying cases.

Q. By the person who is called the Area Officer under the proclamation?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me even roughly how long after the 13th April it was that this was carried out?

A. It was something like the 21st or 22nd, because it was shortly before the Officer Commanding, 16th Division, came there. I think it was carried out before that, because I fancy General Dyer mentioned it to him.

Q. Can you tell me how many were the persons who were whipped in that place?

A. That can be got from the Military returns.

Q. Can you tell me whether those 6 persons or any of them were sentenced in respect of the attack upon Miss Sherwood?

A. I believe they were people who were sentenced in respect of the attack on Miss Sherwood.

Q. In respect of that very incident?

A. They were whipped not for that incident but for some breach of Fort discipline.

Q. For breach of Fort discipline which had nothing to do with their being part of the crowd that had attacked Miss Sherwood? Breach of discipline which had nothing to do with murders and the Sherwood incident?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever discover then why those persons in particular should be sentenced to be whipped at that particular spot?

A. It did not come within my province really. I did not go into the question, because it was purely a Military one. I think, as a matter of fact, I had discussed about their being tried by a local tribunal for the attack on Miss Sherwood and deprecated it, because the punishments that could be given were not severe enough.

Q. I think the Commissioner of the Division arrived on the 10th?

A. Yes.

Q. You had an enforcement of 400 rifles on that night?

A. Yes.

Q. When the Commissioner arrived, was that the occasion upon which the Military were told that the civil armed police will not preserve order?

A. Yes, sometime on the night of the 10th to the morning of the 11th. I think it was on the arrival of the reinforcements.

Q. To which Military Officer was that stated?

A. I think it was to the Major whose name I cannot remember, who arrived with the reinforcements.

Q. Was he given a letter to that effect in writing, or was it simply a verbal statement made?

A. It was verbal.

Q. In your opinion the best means had to be taken to restore Civil Order, because Civil Order had ceased?

A. It had ceased in the city and there was every chance of its ceasing elsewhere.

Q. Then, as you told us, General Dyer arrived on the 11th and on the morning of the 13th, a Military party went round proclaiming to the people by beat of drums that meetings would not be allowed.

A. They had been told that before, but not formally. On the morning of the 11th, notice was drafted and sent to the city to be proclaimed as best as could be done.

Q. Can you tell me what are the actual words of that notice and whether it is in existence and available for the committee?

A. I believe it is in existence.

Q. Where can it be found?

A. I think one place where it can be found is the Military records, because it is a Military order. I also translated it into the vernacular and I have retained a copy.

Q. When you gave your evidence in chief, you referred to the contents of that in this way, that no meetings would be allowed, and if necessary, they would be dispersed by Military force.

A. Yes.

Q. You yourself were not personally present at any stage?

A. No.

Q. I see there is a proclamation under date the 13th April 1919?

A. That is a different document.

Q. Was the proclamation, which was made by beat of drum, drafted by you or by the Military?

A. The Military drew it up, and I had it translated.

Q. Can you tell me if this is the document proclaimed by beat of drum? (Here the document* was shown to the witness.)

A. I think that was the one. It was translated into the vernacular. There were two notices issued about the same time.

Q. You translated that into Punjabi?

A. Into Urdu.

Q. The Punjabi translation was the one which the crowd as a whole followed?

A. The Punjabi translation was not a written translation at all. A man simply explained it.

Q. There was an exposition?

A. Yes.

Q. What sort of man was interpreting or expounding in Punjabi? Was he a skilled interpreter?

A. Yes, he was a sort of unofficial public orator who is in great demand on ceremonial occasions. He was referred to me as a man who had got a natural charm of oratory.

Q. Had he a natural tendency to accuracy as well as to oratory?

A. I think he was accurate enough. I had to check him once or twice at first, then he gave the substance right enough.

Q. You heard it yourself?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think that the ordinary member of the public, who had to rely upon Punjabi, would gather quite clearly that a meeting would be dispersed by force

* Vide Annexure A, page 34.

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[Continued.]

of arms, not only if it could not be otherwise dispersed, but straightaway? Would you gather that?

A. I should think so, the criticisms that people apparently heard was "It is all nonsense, they would not use arms." I remember the actual expressions in Urdu—"Tilhar bilhar ho jaega."

Q. Was it made quite clear that no meeting of any kind would be allowed not only in streets or public places, but anywhere?

A. That was the meaning. Everyone understood that meetings were not allowed and people in the street said that it was an order not to be obeyed. They had it quite clearly in their minds that the order was not to be obeyed.

Q. I want to come next to the administration of Martial Law. The Area Officer might, according to the rules, be any field officer?

A. Yes.

Q. In fact in Lahore can you tell me the names of some of the officers who did the work of the Area Officers?

A. The names have gone from my mind, but they were Majors.

Q. What sort of Majors were they? Were they I.M.S., R.A.M.C., Supply and Transport or what?

A. As a matter of fact, I think they were regular officers of the combatant branch of the service.

Q. Apart from the fact that your court, i.e., the court constituted under Martial Law but consisting of civil officers like yourself could alone try cases prior to the declaration of Martial Law, apart from that fact, there were, I understand, two concurrent courts, and putting aside cases of such seriousness as had to go before the Special Tribunal, I gather from you that the court to which any particular case went was determined largely by the question whether the accused had been arrested by the Police or by the Military?

A. Yes. As a matter of fact, we did nothing in the way of offences against Military discipline against these orders, because there were only 5 or 6 cases in which we dealt with offences against the proclamation and they really were rather of a technical character; for instance, I punished a Police constable for taking money, as an offence against good discipline and order, for the simple reason that there was a certain technical doubt in my mind as to the applicability of the section of the Indian Penal Code.

Q. May I take it in the same way that of the people who went to the Area Officers, some of them had committed offences which, in ordinary times, could be brought under the Penal Code, but in these days were more directly brought under the proclamation?

A. Yes, some of the offences were wrong things in themselves.

Q. In your court, you did not sentence a single person to whipping?

A. We did not; our cases, as a matter of fact, were too serious for whipping; they were cases which, in my opinion, might very well have gone to the Tribunal, but that was overworked.

Q. On the other hand, the Military Courts, according to your statement, seem to have sentenced 26 men in Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me whether it was regarded in Amritsar as a normal and most convenient form of sentence for minor offences that the offender should be sentenced to whipping?

A. Minor offences of a certain kind; the Military were very busy and had to get through their work as quickly as possible.

Q. It is not a question of the Military being busy. Was whipping regarded as the normal punishment which Area Officers would mete out to persons who are convicted by them?

A. I do not think so, because I have not got the figures. There was a good number of sentences of imprisonment too. If I get complete figures, you could see the percentage.

Q. I take it that the Military officers in Amritsar would get to know from time to time of the public events in Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. I see from the report that the following appears to have been issued for the guidance of officers in the Lahore Civil Area:—"The punishment of whipping in particular, whilst probably the most efficacious and convenient method to summarily deal with most minor breaches of Martial Law Regulations, requires tact and common sense in its infliction. Under no circumstances should old or infirm men be sentenced and the social status of the offender also needs consideration." I was asking you whether whipping sentenced by the Area Officers in Amritsar was regarded as the most efficacious and convenient method to summarily deal with the most minor breaches of the Martial Law Regulations?

A. I do not know what was in the Administrator's mind and I can only judge by figures. I did not come in contact with his work in any way.

Q. Will you be good enough to look to page 8, the details and statement with regard to Area Officers? These persons are said to have made a breach of fort discipline. Can you give me any indication of the exact nature of the offences?

A. No, I heard that they made some kind of row in the fort.

Q. I see that four persons were whipped for being drunk and disorderly, and two for grazing cattle in grass farm. You cannot tell me whether in Amritsar the punishment of whipping was regarded as the normal punishment inflicted by the Area Officers for minor offences?

A. I cannot say; I think the figures will probably show.

Q. At all events, civil officers who were exercising concurrent jurisdiction never had recourse to that punishment in a single case?

A. Our cases were very different; they were of a serious kind and would have gone to the tribunals, but for the tribunals being too busy.

Q. The court to which they went was sometimes determined by accident, viz., by the circumstance whether the Military or Civil people arrested them?

A. Most of our cases were against the ordinary law. The cases of breaches of Military law that were sent up to us were about 5 or 6 in number; nearly all were of a special nature. One I remember, as I told you, was the case of a Police constable taking bribe. The Police, as a matter of fact, did not arrest very much for these petty breaches. If a policeman found an offender against the Military regulations, he would hand him over to the nearest Military authority and would be glad to get rid of him.

Q. As regards Area Officers, did you have any experience of the method of trial adopted by these?

A. I had no personal experience. They had the same forms which were served out to us, printed forms recording the main details of the case.

Q. That was brought into existence under Martial Law specially?

A. It was a special form.

Q. Was it ordinary?

A. It was a special form.

Q. The necessity for continuing the Martial Law for a long time depended so far as you can say from the facts outside particular districts of Amritsar?

A. Yes. It was the business of the Military to fix the period.

Q. Speaking of Amritsar by itself the period may be, in your opinion, a fortnight after the 13th April. So long as you had sufficient force of Military in the town, do you think, looking at the needs of Amritsar alone, a date further than that to be necessary?

A. I think I put it longer than a fortnight. Further, the administration was ceasing to be intensive.

Q. In your opinion, Martial Law at Amritsar was necessary for a month after 13th April?

A. Of course, I was thinking of what might happen outside. We were thinking of what might be happen-

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[Continued.]

ing on the frontier I think for about three weeks. So long as the Military authorities were satisfied, I was prepared to go on.

Q. Will you tell me would the number of soldiers required have been greater, if the usual civil administration had been resumed?

A. If there had not been Martial Law, considerable number of troops would have been required.

Q. Did you ever consider the question whether time had come for resuming ordinary civil administration?

A. Information was given, I think, verbally, that the situation as a whole no longer required to carry on Martial Law. I cannot tell when that was.

Q. Did you ever before apply to have it determined?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever discover how many more men it would be necessary to put in Amritsar if Martial Law were withdrawn?

A. No.

Q. Under Martial Law a great many soldiers and officers who were doing duty would have been released. Is that not so?

A. You could have reduced an Area Officer and an Assistant Provost Martial. Not very much more. It is a military question.

Q. You think that you as a Civil officer would have been content to cease Martial Law?

A. I would within a fortnight before it ceased, that is about it.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You came to Lahore in February last?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you in Punjab before that?

A. I was in Punjab from 1899 to early in 1917.

Q. Up to 1917 you were in Punjab?

A. I was in the Secretariat from the outbreak of war.

Q. You have no knowledge of recruiting in Amritsar District?

A. No.

Q. Dr. Kitchlew and Satyapal were the popular leaders in Amritsar?

A. They were beginning to make themselves so.

Q. They had risen in popular esteem.

A. They had certain popularity.

Q. Do you suggest that these people were not popular leaders in Amritsar?

A. I say they had acquired great popularity for some time. They only came to the front recently.

Q. When you arrived in Amritsar were they holding that position of popular leaders?

A. I did not realise it at first. It grew very rapidly as the agitation grew.

Q. When you came to Amritsar you must have realised who the leading people were, particularly Kitchlew and Satyapal?

A. Yes.

Q. They were holding considerable influence?

A. Yes.

Q. I want to know if you thought that when these two people would be arrested it would cause considerable resentment in the public mind.

A. It might or might not. When they arrested Lala Lajpat Rai at Lahore, the agitation absolutely collapsed.

Q. That may have been so in 1907. But on the 10th April 1919 this was not so?

A. Quite so. I was prepared for that. I was taking all possible precautions against it.

Q. Do I take it to be your view that the crowd that came up on the first occasion that morning over the bridge were coming to your place?

A. They were coming to my house.

Q. In order to protest, I suppose, against the deportation of these people?

A. They were not going to make an ordinary protest. When people come to an official's house, they come properly clad. These people had thrown off their shoes

and pagris and were coming with all the tokens of violence.

Q. Was it not possibly sign of mourning?

A. If it was mourning it was very violent mourning.

Q. Are you aware that Indian people when in mourning come without turbans and also do not wear shoes. Is it not certainly a sign of Hindu mourning?

A. Yes, but at the same time it did not make this an ordinary deputation.

Q. But its primary object was to come to you in connection with this deportation?

A. It certainly was in connection with that.

Q. On that date in the afternoon you were present at two firings?

A. Only one, I was present at the second, not the first.

Q. I understand you to say that you were reluctant to order fire when there were friendly people trying to persuade the mob to retire?

A. Yes.

Q. How many such friendly people were there?

A. I recognized two.

Q. They were pleaders who had come down from the Court?

A. Yes. When I went to the Court I met them and they offered to come and persuade the people.

Q. Did they come and what did they do?

A. They did come and they did their best to persuade the crowd. They failed.

Q. One of these pleaders was one Gurdayal?

A. Yes.

Q. You knew him for some time?

A. I met him in Court.

Q. You didn't know him before?

A. I only knew him officially as a counsel.

Q. This gentleman was arrested on the 23rd May?

A. He was.

Q. He was kept in custody for a month and-a-half; he was brought down to Lahore and was taken to various places?

A. I do not know. Investigation was not in my hands.

Q. You know he was brought to Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. He was put up for trial?

A. Yes.

Q. In that trial you gave evidence?

A. Yes, as to the facts I had observed.

Q. That man was committed for creating disturbance?

A. I do not think he was committed for that.

Q. And that man was acquitted?

A. Yes.

Q. And this arrest of a person who so bravely at personal risk tried to assist the authorities aroused considerable resentment in Amritsar?

A. I don't think it did. I think people rather laughed at him. What he said to me afterwards was, "they are all laughing at me because I have done my best for you and all I have got is to be arrested."

Q. Then General Dyer arrived on the 11th?

A. Yes, on the evening of the 11th.

Q. When he came, the Commissioner practically made over the administration to him?

A. Yes, the Commissioner had really done so before.

Q. We want to understand this—the Commissioner was the individual, who, in view of the serious nature of the disorder, told the Officer Commanding Troops that he should consider himself in charge of the military situation and take whatever steps he thought necessary to re-establish civil control. Was this said to the Officer Commanding or to General Dyer?

A. It was said to both: to the Major who came down with reinforcements and to General Dyer.

Q. At that time martial law had not been proclaimed?

A. No, but it existed.

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[Continued.]

Q. I do not understand what the Commissioner meant by putting the General in charge of the whole Administration?

A. It was an announcement of the fact that civil administration was unequal to the task of preserving peace.

Q. For that they need not have handed over the administration to the military?

A. As far as was necessary for the preservation of civil order. The statement is a confession of the inadequacy of the civil authorities to maintain the King's peace any longer.

Q. This looks as if civil authorities did not exercise any control at all and left everything to the military?

A. The Military Officers were directed to preserve peace. It was not a case of the civil authorities taking help of the Military. You cannot, for example, ask soldiers to shoot. You can tell the soldiers that you are unable to carry on and they should at their discretion take whatever measures they think fit.

Q. The effect of this was to proclaim martial law from that date?

A. It was so practically. It announced the existence of martial law under the old common law by which every citizen is bound to help.

Q. The Seditious Meetings Act was extended to Amritsar on the 13th I understand?

A. Yes, actually on the 13th morning.

Q. Was the proclamation prohibiting meetings made under that Act?

A. Under the common Military Law and not under the Seditious Meetings Act.

Q. 13th was a day of Baisakhi festival, and this is a great religious day?

A. Yes.

Q. Many people from outside come to Amritsar for the festival?

A. I think that on that particular day people did not come to a very large extent because civil pickets stopped villagers and advised them not to come.

Q. You have seen the place of the meeting that was held in Bagh Jallianwala?

A. Yes. It was pointed out to me.

Q. It is a somewhat low-lying place surrounded by buildings with three or four small entrances?

A. There are three or four entrances; most of them are small, one fairly large.

Q. The actual place of the meeting was in one corner at the southern extremity?

A. I believe so.

Q. The place where the military came and stood was to the north?

A. Yes.

Q. Where the military stood was a raised place?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was a place at a considerable distance from where the meeting was?

A. It is a considerable distance from the place where the meeting was held.

Q. It has not been suggested that the meeting either threatened the military or did anything of that sort?

A. I do not know whether the military will suggest that or not.

Q. In the official papers, so far as you have been able to see, no such suggestion has been made?

A. I have not seen all the papers.

Q. It has been admitted that the crowd was not ordered to disperse before they were fired on?

A. Again I must tell you, I have not seen all the papers.

Q. The statement in the official report is this—"He did not order the crowd to disperse but proceeded to take action to disperse it at once by fire."

A. I will take it from you. I have not seen the papers.

Q. According to your information, about 400 to 500 were killed?

A. Yes. I have seen this report. More might have been wounded.

Q. I understood you to say that the object of doing this was really to strike terror into the hearts of the people?

A. I never said so.

Q. I think that you conveyed that idea when you said that after this firing "the whole rebellion collapsed?"

A. No, I was speaking of what actually happened. I was not attempting to read the situation, but I told you as a fact that the rebellion did collapse.

Q. You did not suggest that there was anything in the circumstances existing on the spot which necessitated firing, except that there was a prohibited meeting?

A. I do not know what there was. There was a very small body of troops in the heart of the city. General Dyer will tell you what he apprehended.

Q. So far as you know it has not been suggested that when General Dyer came there circumstances on the spot were such as to necessitate fire. It has never been suggested to your knowledge?

A. It was talked about a good deal. He might have had a very great difficulty in getting away back with that very small force.

Q. Has it been suggested to you, as Deputy Commissioner, that circumstances were of such a character as required firing?

A. I have not had any correspondence at all on the subject.

Q. I understand you to say that there was the idea that Government could do nothing?

A. These are facts.

Q. And in order to disabuse the public mind of this idea you thought it was necessary to resort to ruthless firing?

A. I do not know. I have told you of what happened as a matter of historical fact.

Q. It was the belief that the arm of Government was paralysed. You put that forward as a justification for this firing?

A. It is not my business to justify. I put it forth as a statement of actual facts.

Q. When it was the belief that the arm of Government was paralysed and that Government could do nothing, it was thought necessary in order to make people realize that Government was powerful enough to kill 500 people at a stroke?

A. I do not know what was in the mind of the Military Officer who carried out this action. I am simply stating the facts that I know.

Q. Perhaps General Dyer will explain?

A. He would be the right person.

Q. You have told us that what has been described as the crawling order was issued somewhere about the 20th?

A. Yes.

Q. You have seen the street?

A. Yes.

Q. In the street, there are houses on both sides?

A. Yes.

Q. In a considerable number?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you any information as to what happened to those persons who lived in those houses?

A. I suppose they stayed at home.

Q. If they wanted to go out, they had to conform to this order?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. Is it not a fact that certain persons who were under arrest and were taken through this street, had to crawl through?

A. Yes. I understand that is what happened. I do not know who those people were. I was told it was an accident and not intentional.

Q. Can you tell me who they were?

A. I think the military might be able to tell you. They were in military custody.

Q. You have told us there was flogging in the street.

A. Yes.

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Q. Is it true that a regular flogging platform was put up in the street?

A. I suppose there was. Where there is flogging there must be a regular flogging platform so as not to cause injury.

Q. Now was there an order requiring people who passed Europeans to salaam them?

A. No; there was an order to salaam the General when he passed; there was no order as regards Europeans as such.

Q. That suggestion is not correct?

A. I never heard any order about Europeans. I do not know whether it was the General alone or all officers in uniform. The General brought to my notice the fact that people were not salaaming him when he went out, and asked me to make it known that he should be salaamed, but to the best of my recollection the order was as regards the General.

Q. And as regards officers in uniform?

A. I am not quite sure about officers in uniform; I am quite distinct about the General.

Q. And were people punished for disobeying this order or not complying with it?

A. I think some people were punished by the military authorities and given a short period of confinement. I think they were given what is known as confinement to barracks.

Q. Were any flogged for not complying with this order?

A. These returns furnished to me show no such. I think some people were given 10 days' confinement to barracks for it. It was generally, I believe, given for an impertinent appearance, but as I say it was a military question, and I was not cognisant of it.

Q. You say that on the 11th and 12th the mob was in possession of the city?

A. Yes.

Q. Why do you say that?

A. Because they were. We covered no more of the city than what we could march into.

Q. You said that people said "Hindu-Musalman ka raj—" Did you hear those words?

A. No, that was being said in the city.

Q. Were you in the city?

A. No, not without a very large body of troops.

Q. You say that there was an organised attempt against the persons and property of Europeans?

A. Yes.

Q. They destroyed the Town Hall?

A. Yes.

Q. That was Municipal property?

A. It was almost the only instance I know of property badly destroyed that was not European, and as a matter of fact they desisted from going on to destroy the Octroi Office when they were informed that they were destroying Indian property.

Q. With regard to the tribunals, I understand that certain tribunals were constituted by the military authorities to try offences committed prior to the declaration of martial law. May I know if you can tell me under what authority that was done?

A. I believe it purported to be under the Bengal Regulation of 1804.

Q. The military authorities in constituting tribunals for the trial of offences prior to martial law, you say, acted under a Regulation of 1804?

A. I am afraid I cannot tell you under what authority that was; there was a good deal of discussion about it.

Q. What I mean is the summary courts that were set up by the military authorities; the use of the word tribunals may be confusing.

A. Yes.

Q. Have you, so far as Amritsar District is concerned, any statement of people arrested and never brought to trial?

A. They were all brought in a sense to trial, but as regards certain persons they were brought up before me for discharge. One class of people who were brought in very largely were a number of wandering Sadhus

whom we suspected. A lot of them were brought up for examination, and having been examined, they were turned away.

There was a certain number of people against whom suspicion existed and the police worked them off as fast as they could, and finally they were all worked off by June the 9th.

Q. With regard to Tarn Taran there was a conspiracy case?

A. No, it was not a conspiracy; it was waging war if I remember rightly. It was an attack on the tehsil building and people were charged for waging war.

Q. A very large number, over a hundred?

A. Yes, 102.

Q. And how many were acquitted out of them?

A. I am sorry I have not got the figures. I could get them for you.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. What was the total number of troops in the garrison of Amritsar before the reinforcement from Lahore?

A. It was a weak half company of Garrison Artillery and a weak company of British Infantry, I believe 145 strong, and there were some details ammunition column and central labour depot, that is all to the best of my recollection.

Q. There was not any military display in the streets at any time before the crowds became turbulent or riotous?

A. No. Nothing to excite the people in any way by marching troops. The troops were kept very much in the background.

Q. You do not know the size of the pickets at the crossings? Of one you told us?

A. You mean after they had pushed the rioters back. I should say there were about 6 at the bigger picket, probably about 6 in each case.

Q. So that we may assume it was the minimum number possible of troops which were used to hold back these rioters?

A. The Officer Commanding had to keep a certain reserve in cantonments; there were far too few.

Q. And the crowd was kept back in one instance near Madan's shop by two men?

A. Yes.

Q. As to the attitude of the crowd, the crowd which was coming by to your residence, which you describe as coming with their turbans off and their shoes off, were they a noisy crowd or a silent crowd?

A. They were very noisy, a furious crowd, you could hear the roar of them half way up the long road, they were an absolutely mad crowd, spitting with rage and swearing.

Q. Nothing to resemble a mourning procession?

A. Nothing in the least; they were also throwing stones.

Q. Coming back once more for a minute to the order which was given by the General Officer Commanding to the troops to use such measures as he thought necessary, is it not a fact that either civil or military are obliged to obey the orders of the authorities when called upon to do so?

A. Yes it is, from the civil point of view it is common law.

Q. Therefore the General Officer Commanding the troops would have incurred a grave responsibility if he refused to act in accordance with those orders?

A. Certainly.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Your statement which has been supplied to us consists of various sub-heads, causes, immediate cause of outbreak, and so on and so forth. May I know whether this statement was prepared for this Committee or whether it was your report for the Government?

A. It was my report for the Government; it is an abridgement of a report.

Q. It was in reply to a circular letter issued by the Lieutenant-Governor?

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A. Yes, asking for reports under various headings.
Q. And these sub-headings were given in that circular letter?

A. Yes.
Q. Have you any objection to placing that letter of the Lieutenant-Governor before this Committee?

A. I have no objection, but I am sorry I have not got it. I daresay the Local Government would supply it. I have been transferred and it does not exist in my district. I think you could get it better from the Local Government.

Q. Here you have given a survey of predisposing causes. Did you or did you not take the fact into consideration as to whether recruiting or the contribution to war loans had anything to do with these predisposing causes?

A. I considered recruiting and decided against it as a practical contributing cause for the reason that the trouble was mainly, in fact entirely, confined to city folk who had not been recruited. I mentioned that it was a new thing and of course like other new things was disposed to alarm people, but I said that neither had the people who revolted been recruited, nor had I received any indication from the district that recruiting was the cause of the troubles.

Q. In your reply to certain questions you have taken into consideration the whole situation of the Province and not of your district alone?

A. I am considering my own district only.
Q. Then it appears to me that, although you were not present in Amritsar when the recruiting was taking place, the same instructions that were issued about recruiting and collection of the war loan applied to the whole Province, not to any special district?

A. I am not in a position to say; probably they varied according to the class of troops you wanted to recruit.
Q. Then you did take that fact into consideration and rejected it?

A. Yes, I said it was not a serious contributing cause and that the people who rose had not been recruited at all and the people who had been recruited neither rose nor complained.

Q. Then about Amritsar, during the last year was the income-tax assessment raised very highly?

A. Yes.
Q. And under the Act there was a very considerable rise in assessment and was failure to contribute to the war loan a ground of enhancement?

A. No, certainly not.
Q. Is it not a fact that every village and every city under the rules had to furnish a certain quota of men?

A. I do not think any quota was asked from Amritsar City. They asked for a district quota. The district officer split it up between villages and the people were expected to find these men.

Q. And if there was any deficiency or the village officer failed to supply the requisite quota?

A. I think he very often was suspended and a better man put in. I had to deal with a lot of suspension cases when I came.

Q. Now, one of the things which you mentioned was the platform ticket agitation—how was this agitation carried on?

A. I said it was really before my time. The trouble was that the railway administration said that the platform of Amritsar was too small and they could not issue platform tickets. This was made a grievance and I only came into it later.

Q. The grievance was that exceptions were made in favour of Europeans, and that was one of the grievances. Was not this matter brought before the authorities before the agitation started?

A. It was all before my time. Mr. Burton could tell you more about it.

Q. In your opinion was there anything objectionable in the manner this agitation was carried on?

A. Yes, a good deal. It was stated that Indians were not being treated like human beings and this raised a very excited agitation.

Q. I take it that this statement, "Indians were not treated like human beings," is the worst you can say about the agitation.

A. I only mentioned it as an instance. The worst I could say was that it was an agitation, but really the worst was that the people were trying to show that the Government was acting in a manner regardless of interest and treating them without proper consideration.

Q. You think that that complaint was wrong?

A. Yes. It was a small administrative matter which the railway people could have settled departmentally.
Q. But you know that all over India where platform tickets are issued the Indians are obliged to purchase platform tickets and everywhere Europeans are excepted. Do you call this a small matter?

A. I think very little notice to the proper authorities would have put the matter right.

Q. Now, from the 30th March to the 6th April have you got anywhere the report of the speeches that were delivered by any of those so-called leaders or the real leaders?

A. No, not in my personal custody. They can be had.
Q. Was there any anti-Government or anti-European feeling shown between the 30th and 6th?

A. There was a good deal—I cannot say anti-European—there was certainly a great deal of anti-Government, but you can have access to those speeches and see for yourself.

Q. That is my difficulty—where can I get them?

A. In the Amritsar Conspiracy case.
Q. May I take it that this was the feeling of the crowd—anti-Government?

A. As far as I interpret their feeling from their action.

Q. Will you kindly give me two or three sentences from those speeches. I am only confining my question to this period.

A. I have not come prepared with extracts. You will get them from Mr. Hailey's report. For instance, the sentence "the British bite like scorpions" or the famous remark about prisons being mosques and temples and fetters bracelets.

Q. Do you think that would be the natural consequence of what Mr. Gandhi said, that we should give ourselves up and go to jail?

A. I quite agree that he is largely responsible for the whole thing.

Q. Supposing A dislikes a certain action of Government or a certain act passed by Government and if he wants to get it repealed, he agitates for it and naturally if he makes a speech or he writes about it that this action of Government is wrong—would you call this agitation anti-British or anti-Government?

A. You can see from the extracts from the papers that were put before you. You should see the cartoon in the "Waqt" where a large black snake is produced as a representation; this is the reward to India for its loyal services in the war; this monster is brought to devour its liberties.

Q. Do you think that these sentiments are confined to Amritsar—that this is the reward after our sacrifices and after what we have done for the Empire. Were not these sentiments expressed throughout India during the month of April; and you think we should draw the inference that the people of Amritsar were anti-Government. I take it that this expression of sentiment was universal and not confined to Amritsar?

A. The agitation against the Rowlatt Act was certainly universal but it nowhere took such a violent form as at Amritsar.

Q. I think from the 30th to the 6th nobody was molested by the crowd and there were large meetings and large crowds?

A. Yes.
Q. There was no recrudescence either of looting or dacoity?

A. No.
Q. Then, on April 9th were not the proceedings of the Ram Naumi day quite orderly in spite of the number of police being so very few in the city?

A. It went off very well.

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[Continued.]

Q. And this was the occasion when Hindus and Muhammadans fraternized between themselves?

A. Yes.
Q. Were you afraid of this? From a Government point of view, from a political point of view?

A. I saw that they were using religious organizations to serve political ends which always in the long run means mischief.

Q. Are you or are you not in favour of Hindu and Muslim unity?

A. It depends for what object they join. If for a good purpose I am all in favour of it.

Q. They give up their religious animosities and be friends? You are not against it?

A. No, certainly not.
Q. Has it not always been said by the authorities that there should be no quarrels between Hindus and Muhammadans on certain festival days?

A. Yes.
Q. Therefore, when you find that Hindus were drinking water which was touched by Muhammadans and that they were joining in the religious procession, was it not a matter of entire satisfaction to you?

A. It would give entire satisfaction if one did not fear that the motives underlying had a sinister purpose.

Q. You do not dislike their joint political action? You do not look with disfavour on Hindus and Muhammadans leaving their religious quarrels and taking up a common attitude and stand?

A. I have no objection. I was disquieted not by their unity but the fact that they imported their unity into religious ceremony.

Q. Would not that be the best evidence of sincerity?

A. Yes.
Q. I do not think you believe in the principle of 'divide and rule'?

A. No.
Q. I think you are aware of the fact that since the time of the publication of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reform Scheme, it has all along been alleged that one of the defects why Indians are not fit for responsible self-government is because of their religious differences and because Hindus and Muhammadans, the two important communities, do not see eye to eye with one another?

A. Certainly, that objection has been raised.

Q. And therefore I think you will agree with me it is natural, in order to prove their fitness, for political purposes, to show that they can eschew their differences if the two communities try to accommodate one another and fraternize?

A. Yes, certainly.
Q. That would certainly be a political movement?

A. Yes, we cannot help that.

Q. Then nothing untoward happened on the 9th?

A. Except the remarkable thing that the Hindu ceremony had been converted into a political demonstration. There was no conflict with the police.

Q. You have already informed the Committee that you did not suggest or recommend the deportation of Drs. Satyapal and Kitchlew?

A. It was not my suggestion.

Q. Had they done anything in contravention of the order that was issued against them on the 29th?

A. Not at any public appearance.

Q. Can you refer, between the 29th March and 4th April, to any of their speeches to which you, as District Magistrate, took serious objections; if so, at which meeting and at what place?

A. I am afraid I cannot really say. I see the speeches after they are sent up to me.

Q. I want to know what was the immediate cause of their being deported. Was it due to anything said or done by them between the 29th March and 4th April? If you can give me any information on the point, I shall be obliged.

A. I am not in possession of any. I did not make any recommendation as regards the deportation, but I said that Dr. Kitchlew had a strong hold upon the people and

that he could get the people to close their shops at 8 hours' notice.

Q. From the point of view of an officer no doubt that would be objectionable. But the question is whether, as a matter of fact, you are prepared to maintain that because a political leader has got that hold upon the people, because if he asked them to close their shops, all of them would do so, it is a serious thing against any man? Therefore the only thing that you can suggest for the deportation of these two people is that you suggested to the Government that Drs. Satyapal and Kitchlew have become so very popular that they can manage *hartal* in 8 hours. Am I right in assuming so?

A. I can't say how far their popularity was the cause of their deportation, but I will say that what was against them between those dates as a matter of fact was, that in spite of being prevented from public speaking, they were taking part in private meetings and in propaganda work designing to make Government impossible.

Q. You have no direct knowledge of the fact as to what was the design?

A. Dr. Kitchlew told me himself that his intention was to change the form of Government. He said he wished to do it by constitutional agitation.

Q. You do not object to that?

A. I pointed out that opinions as to what is constitutional might differ very much.

Q. Did he want to sever the connection of India from the British Crown?

A. He did not tell me so.

Q. And you have no information that that was his intention?

A. He did not look very far ahead really.

Q. He wanted to have self-government as in the Colonies and in England?

A. I cannot say what idea he had.

Q. I just want to know, so far as your knowledge goes, if you can inform this committee as to whether anything specially objectionable was said or done between the 29th March and 10th April by Dr. Kitchlew to justify the order of deportation?

A. He practically ordered the *hartal* of the 6th. That is one thing.

Q. And anything else?

A. I cannot think of anything else.

Q. And you are quite certain that so far as the orders go, he did not intend to contravene them?

A. I had no case for taking action against him in any way.

Q. Now, so far, that is, up to the date that Drs. Satyapal and Kitchlew were sent for by you, were arrested and deported, up to that time, certainly, there was nothing tangible and definite within your knowledge from which you could draw an inference that the crowd was prepared to resort to violence. If you had any such knowledge, will you kindly explain to the committee? What I want to know is, up to the time that Drs. Satyapal and Kitchlew were deported, you were not in possession of any facts or any written official reports from which you could draw an inference that the crowds were bent upon violence, that they were going to burn houses or to assault Europeans?

A. No, I had no evidence of any such intention.

Q. Has it not ever been your experience—I do not know if this happens in the Punjab or not—that the masses on many occasions, whenever any municipal or other order is passed on which they feel aggrieved, they go in crowd to the District Magistrate to protest and to place their grievance before him, he being their *ma bap* or head of the district?

A. They go in a respectful manner.

Q. On the night of the 9th, you were not aware of their demeanour?

A. I had no knowledge of the future.

Q. Therefore my question is, when you had no knowledge of the future, why did you conclude that on the second day, on the 10th, if the crowd came to you, it would assume a violent attitude?

A. I thought I was going to take no chances.

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Mr. MILES IRVING.

[Continued.]

Q. Can you give this committee any facts of anything done by the crowd up to the 10th, from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that they should be bound down?

A. Well, they were very rude to the police on the *hatal* day. They clapped their hands as they passed the Kotwali; they were sulky. They practically prevented the cricket match being held on the 6th, and from my recollection of what has happened in the Punjab, as elsewhere, I thought it quite likely, and knowing the bad-mashes of Amritsar, I thought it likely there would be an attempt to come and overawe me.

Q. But from the way in which they behaved towards you, it should have led you to a contrary conclusion?

A. I was taking no chances. The mob is always uncertain in these respects, but after all the events justified my belief.

Q. Under what law were you justified in declaring any mob unlawful?

A. Criminal Procedure Code, section 188. I think so. Q. Then may I take it that you passed this order on the ground that any body consisting of more than five persons becomes an unlawful assembly?

A. I am afraid I have given a wrong section. I gave a written order and I can produce my written order.

Q. Is there any report in existence from which this committee may be able to find that any constable or soldier picketed was injured or stoned by the crowd on the 10th? Is there any police paper or any other paper in existence from which we could find that the crowd which was going to pay respects to you and remonstrate with you, began throwing stones? Is there any report, dated the 10th, from which this committee may be able to find that any one of those two Indians, I mean the two pickets, either Indian or European, was injured or wounded by the mob?

A. I don't think on the first occasion.

Q. My point is, is there any paper or report to show that either of the two pickets out of the five stationed was injured by the mob on the 10th near the bridge?

A. If there was a report it would be a military report.

Q. What was the number of the crowd on the first occasion?

A. It was impossible to estimate.

Q. Give me the lowest number of the crowd?

A. They spread outside the bridge. I know some people said two or three thousand. I really cannot say. A very large crowd came in a very hostile manner.

Q. And you were not up to this time struck by the fact that this large crowd of 2,000 persons was actually stopped by the picket of 4 or 5 persons, of whom only one had a rifle, that they were only about a 100 yards from the mob; that a mob of 2,000 persons which, according to you, was bent upon mischief was a violent mob and was going to loot the whole of the Civil Station, that such a violent mob could not rush on a picket of 4 or 5 persons, of whom one only had a rifle?

A. They were fired on. They did go back.

Q. How many were wounded?

A. I think there were about three killed.

Q. In a mob of 2,000 persons who were bent on mischief and violence only three were injured, and still because they were fired on they went back as three of them were injured?

A. I did not pin myself down to 2,000. I really don't remember the number. I did not see the crowd myself.

Q. Out of the 2,000 three were killed or wounded?

A. I was told 3 were killed. I never found out.

Q. Is it not true that up to the time that this crowd was fired upon, no violence to persons or property had taken place?

A. I believe there was no violence so far as I can find out.

Q. This very crowd had to pass along the National Bank and other banks. These banks were on their way?

A. Yes.

Q. It was this crowd that went back and looted them?

A. That was one reason why they did not come on.

Q. So far as stone throwing was concerned, I think you do not say that they deliberately brought stones. They were practically taking them up from the street?

A. I think so; I do not know where they got the stones from.

Q. I put it to you that if you had seen this mob, spoken to them kindly and said "Well, these are the orders of Government; I had no hand in them, but if you make that application to me, I will just inform the Government that the people want the arrested leaders to be released," nothing untoward would have happened?

A. I did so; the mob threw stones at me.

Q. You mean at the bridge?

A. Yes. If they had come to my house, what would have probably happened is this: they would have come in increasing numbers; more and more people would have swarmed in; all the bad characters of the town would have swarmed in; people in the outskirts would commit acts of violence. They would have had to be turned out of the station at the point of the bayonet.

Q. I am trying to find out as to what were the doings of the mob. What was in the previous behaviour of the crowd that led you to that conclusion of the 10th April? So far as the second fire is concerned, is it not true that the two pleaders who were requesting and persuading the mob to go away told you, "Please do not allow them to be fired upon." Did they or did they not make that request?

A. That was when I had not fired.

Q. Before you fired?

A. That was on the foot-bridge. I was holding fire until it got so eminently dangerous that I could not wait for a moment longer.

Q. Is it not true that these two pleaders were persuading the crowd to go away and certain shots were fired from the side of the telegraph office? Is it not true that when these two pleaders were endeavouring to pacify this mob, one or two shots were fired from the side of the telegraph office and that upset the whole arrangement?

A. I did hear some shots. There was a very small guard round the telegraph office and they found themselves in danger.

Q. You heard these shots?

A. I heard one or two shots; they were in danger there—very serious danger.

Q. I think you admit up to the time that this crowd was fired upon they had no sticks; the majority of them were bareheaded and they were wearing no shoes?

A. So far as sticks are concerned, I do not think they had sticks. I did not notice sticks.

Q. I think you have learnt from the statement of two or three Europeans that it was subsequently after they were driven by the first volley that they divided into two or three groups and went to the station, one to the National Bank, etc. Then they thought of having sticks as they had been fired upon.

A. Yes. That is the same crowd that you suggested was peaceful.

Q. They did not go on because they were fired on?

A. They did not go on because they had better business in hand.

Q. Do not think for a moment that I in any way justify what was done by the crowd to murder Mr. Stewart or anybody else, or burning banks. I want to know the fact, i.e., before Mr. Thompson was killed, whether or not 5 or 6 persons were shot down?

A. I believe that to be untrue.

Q. I am asking because I do not know. That is the allegation made.

A. I believe that is totally untrue. We could not get that in evidence in the trials.

Q. Why do you say it is untrue? Do you rely upon the reports that were submitted to you by the Police?

A. I can only give you my recollection. I have never heard any reasonable story in favour of this idea. Mr. Thompson, I believe, did fire one shot.

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[Continued.]

Q. Were not these two pleaders persuading the crowd to retire from the goods shed?

A. They did; they got them back, but they went to the other place. One of them told me afterwards they were on the point of coming to ask me to fly; we could not hold them any longer.

Q. There were no excesses on the 10th after 4-30 P.M.?

A. I am not quite sure. There was an attack at the Railway Station.

Q. I am talking of Amritsar City. Is it true that there were no excesses after 4-30 or 5?

A. There was nothing left to do.

Q. After 4-30 P.M. on the 10th, has there been any attack on any person or property or any looting in the city of Amritsar till the 15th?

A. Some Indian gentlemen will tell you that their houses were considered to be in great danger.

Q. I am not talking of those ultra loyalists. I am asking you whether you are in possession of any facts which you can give to the Committee as to any person or property injured after 4-30 P.M. on the 10th up to the 15th when you proclaimed Martial Law?

A. I did not proclaim Martial Law.

Q. Did any injury to property or person happen?

A. The Police organisation should find that out; they could not find out; we did not know what was going on in the city.

Q. From the 30th March up to the 15th April can you say that any property or person was looted or his house looted or anything of that sort?

A. The ordinary crimes were going on in Amritsar; the Police diaries would give the information.

Q. Was there any recrudescence of crime on account of political agitation? From what I could gather your evidence was that the villagers were about to loot the city. What I want to know is, from the 30th March up to the 15th April, can you refer me to any acts of looting which could be traced to the surrounding villages?

A. A good deal of the villagers got away with the National Bank loot.

Q. On the 10th?

A. Yes.

Q. Apart from what happened on the 10th, between the 30th March and the 15th April, the date of declaration of Martial Law, I want to know whether you could trace any crime of looting or burglary by the surrounding villagers?

A. I do not see that the events prior to the 10th are relevant.

Q. It may be irrelevant. But can you give that information for the Committee? Or say between the 10th and the 15th?

A. Looting from the National Bank was going on. My impression is that it was going on.

Q. Have you got any tangible evidence to place before this Committee (I am not talking of National Bank) that any other person or property in Amritsar City was looted between the 10th and the 15th, which could be traced to the inhabitants of the surrounding villages?

A. I cannot myself. Possibly local officers may. I have not got any tangible evidence to offer you.

Q. Therefore when you made that statement before the Committee that there was a critical situation, because there was a serious danger of Amritsar City being looted, on what facts did you base your opinion?

A. Reports were coming that people were trying to organise themselves.

Q. Is it not true that, when you say that people themselves organised in order to protect themselves, this was exactly like what happened in Delhi. For 2 or 3 days all the police constables were withdrawn from the city; they were taken to the Civil Lines; therefore in order to keep watch and ward in the night time and in order to show to the authorities that no lawlessness had taken place or would take place, they organised themselves in order to protect themselves in the night time. You must have known also that this happened in Delhi?

A. As a matter of fact, I do not know, but I take it from you.

Q. What I want to know is this: Was it due to the fact that the whole Police Force was withdrawn from the City and therefore the inhabitants of Amritsar organised themselves in order to keep watch and ward in the night time; it was not because there was an apprehension that villagers were coming to loot the city?

A. My impression is that it was due to the apprehension that the city was to be looted.

Q. Your opinion is based on what?

A. Upon repeated reports. People came in one after another with various reports.

Q. May I know whether there are any written reports which can be produced before the Committee?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. It appears to me that your opinion was based upon people saying and placing before you all sorts of hearsay rumours?

A. I cannot remember; I think it was probably more than hearsay. That was my opinion at the time.

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Mr. MILES IRVING.

[Continued.]

At Lahore, Friday, the 14th November 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B.,
K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Rai Bahadur G. K. ROY, Superintendent (Acting for Secretary).

Mr. MILES IRVING—continued.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Will you kindly go through your statement.* Take paragraph 1 "Excitement over municipal elections." Is that in any way objectionable?

A. It depends on the nature of the excitement. On this particular occasion I was not present at the time, but certain candidates were unable to put their faces out of doors. I call that objectionable.

Q. There was nothing special so far as riots were concerned. You don't connect them in any special way with what happened at Amritsar?

A. To a certain extent. Some of the candidates to aid their candidature provided themselves with bands, I must call them hooligans, and those bands were a ready organization which was used, it appears, during the riots.

Q. I take it that you have no objection to political activity?

A. I have no objection to any political activity as such.

Q. Then kindly see paragraph 3. At the bottom of it you say "We find Hindus attending Muhammadan meetings and Muhammadans given the places of prominence in the general meetings, the chief link between the two being always found in the person of Dr. Saif-ud-din Kitchlew." Was it disliked by the authorities?

A. I had no objection to it. I stated it as a fact.

Q. Was it looked upon with disfavour?

A. It was not objected to in any way.

Q. Had it anything to do with his deportation?

A. Certainly not.

Q. Now take paragraph 4. You say "the fact that the next meeting of the All-India Congress was to be held in Amritsar was undoubtedly a contributory cause." Do you suggest that during the last 14 years the All-India Congress has excited people to acts of violence or open rebellion against Government?

A. No.

Q. Take paragraph 6. Are you not of opinion that the organizers refrained from any overt act of intimidation which could justify intervention by the police or the military?

A. Yes.

Q. Paragraph 7, I read out the whole of it to you. First of all, let us know who were those brains? You meant Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal?

A. I did not know them when I wrote that and I do not know now.

Q. You don't know to whom you referred, as the brains of the movement?

A. At the time when I wrote this it seemed to me that there was some directing mind behind that movement, but I did not know who it was.

Q. You are still of opinion that their object was to direct the movement in a direction opposite to immediate

violence. What do you mean by "threatening aspect" and what were the facts upon which you came to this conclusion?

A. Because any such collective form of passive disobedience which would paralyse Government leads to violence.

Q. Why was it threatening?

A. Because I consider that such was the likely result.

Q. The only thing which resulted was that there was a general hartal?

A. I do not mean a general hartal. People proceeded to misrepresent Government in the grossest terms and the ignorant people were becoming more and more excited against Government.

Q. Was not that going on for the last two months?

A. It was getting worse and worse, and showed no signs of stopping.

Q. During these days was there some special misrepresentation?

A. Certainly, you will have evidence before you. There was grossest misrepresentation against Government.

Q. Then, in your opinion, is all sort of passive resistance to be deprecated?

A. Yes, any collective sort of it.

Q. In a similar way you would be against strikes?

A. It depends on whether it is a matter of collective bargaining between master and man or whether it is a strike intended to paralyse Government. The recent Railway strike would be a case in point.

Q. Even up to the time that you wrote this report you were not certain or you had no evidence before you that any plans of violence were being contemplated behind this movement?

A. As a matter of fact the matter was *sub judice*. I was really thinking of the conspiracy trials then going on.

Q. You were still doubtful and you had not come to the conclusion that any violence was being contemplated by the brains behind the movement?

A. There is a difference between not coming to a conclusion and being doubtful. I refrained from a conclusion as the matter was coming before a Court.

Q. That was your reason. You said, so far as you were concerned, it was doubtful?

A. I said it is still doubtful. Certainly I had not got all the evidence and therefore I had not made up my mind.

Q. From your evidence it appears that there was a sort of meeting on the evening of the 9th between you and some other officers, namely, the Officer Commanding the station (Captain Massey), Mr. Rehill, the Superintendent of Police, Mr. Plomer, Deputy Superintendent of Police, and Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, I.M.S., Civil Surgeon.

A. Yes.

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Mr. MILES IRVING.

[Continued.]

Q. After that date up to the 15th did you hold any such meetings in consultation?

A. We were living at the Railway Station or at the Club together; we were constantly consulting each other. I was living with the Military authorities but we had no formal meetings.

Q. Were any drastic measures suggested at these conferences?

A. We were simply consulting with regard to protection. No drastic measures were suggested. There were no conferences except for consultation.

Q. Was there any feeling of revenge at what had unfortunately happened?

A. Not of revenge but of deep indignation. From the 10th the matters were in the hands of the Military authorities. There was no formal council?

Q. Was the order of deportation received by post or by hand?

A. By a police officer.

Q. Did any of these persons whom you consulted (Mr. Rehill, Mr. Plomer, Colonel Smith, etc.), leave for Lahore on the evening of the 9th?

A. Colonel Smith had been in Lahore before the meeting.

Q. Did he leave on the evening of the 9th?

A. He came back from Lahore on the 9th afternoon. Certainly none of these gentlemen went to Lahore after the meeting.

Q. During these dates, i.e., between the 9th and the 15th were any communications received from Lahore by you or by any body else?

A. The Commissioner came down.

Q. I mean communications from the Punjab Government between the 9th and the 15th?

A. I don't remember whether any written orders were received.

Q. Did you receive any advice?

A. The Commissioner was there to give me advice.

Q. The Commissioner came from Lahore.

Q. The Commissioner is not a written advice?

A. I received no instructions from Government.

Q. Did you consult the Government officers in these days?

A. I consulted the Commissioner and nobody else.

Q. Did you consult him by letter or when he went to Amritsar?

A. I consulted him when he came down to Amritsar.

Q. Paragraph 10. Is it true that up to the morning of 10th there had been no signs of enmity to Europeans as such?

A. I had not seen any at the time, but I heard of a minor case afterwards.

Q. Certain orders to which reference was made yesterday—can these orders be produced?

A. Yes, I have them.

Q. And these orders according to your statement were sent by you to the three Magistrates?

A. Yes, I gave them personally.

Q. They were not promulgated amongst the people?

A. There was no time.

Q. Being a District Magistrate of experience, do you think that compliance with the provision of the order does not require promulgation?

A. They were promulgated as well as the circumstances permitted. They were promulgated by the Magistrate who met the crowd as far as he could. He could not make himself heard as the crowd would not listen to him. It would have been asking for trouble to have it promulgated before the crowds came.

Q. You thought that 17 hours beforehand you could declare an assembly "an unlawful assembly" under the Criminal Procedure Code, which was trying to cross the line?

A. That is hardly the legal way of putting it. I issued orders under section 144 Criminal Procedure Code, and any body of persons who breaks that order becomes an unlawful assembly. I had no time to look up the rulings.

Q. You think that section 144 applies to this?

A. I have not suggested it. I have not heard it argued before me.

Q. Read section 144. Now, according to you, there was no sufficient time to promulgate. If the crowd had listened to you this order would have been promulgated?

A. Yes.

Q. Coming to the affairs of the two bridges, when you arrived there, was the picket stoned in your presence?

A. Yes, I also was stoned.

Q. Did you go inside the crowd or not?

A. I tried to do so but the horses would not face the crowd. I did not go inside the ranks of the crowd. They were round me on my right and on my left and rather behind me.

Q. You were surrounded by the crowd?

A. I was partially surrounded.

Q. In your statement, except on one occasion, there is no other mention of any stone throwing by the crowd?

A. At the time when fire was opened, there was stoning.

Q. And that was when you arrived at the scene?

A. These are the facts.

Q. There was no stone throwing a second time?

A. Certainly on the bridge stones were thrown, and a man was struck.

Q. Why was it not mentioned?

A. This statement is a brief statement. I put down the facts as concisely as I could.

Q. When you ordered fire on the crowd at about 2 P.M. was it not an important fact for you to mention as to why there was reason to fire, reason to order fire and as to the fact that certain persons were injured in your presence?

A. I was writing the report under great pressure. Of course, I thought it would be supplemented.

Q. The attack on the Zenana Hospital that is mentioned in paragraph 14. You know Dr. Kedar Nath. His house is close to the Zenana Hospital?

A. I believe so.

Q. Do you know that a majority of the wounded were taken to the place on that date?

A. They were taken; but I can't say positively. I do not commit myself, you will find it in the evidence.

Q. Is there any truth in the allegation that Mrs. Easdon was present when the wounded had arrived, and said "the Police have served you right. You deserved it"?

A. No, I have never heard it before.

Q. According to your statement the number of the killed was about 20 to 30?

A. I said casualties: killed and wounded. I think that was fairly right.

Q. Paragraph 19. Was it not a very big procession which carried the dead bodies?

A. It was not a big procession. The bodies were disposed of quietly according to our orders.

Q. It was on the 11th that the Police commenced their investigation?

A. Yes, I went through the city. I went as far as Kotwali.

Q. On the 12th important leaders were arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any disturbance when they were arrested?

A. There was no disturbance. They were arrested by the military force.

Q. According to your statement, the people who obeyed the orders about burying of the dead bodies were not reluctant?

A. They obeyed but with reluctance. There was a good deal of coming and going about it.

Q. Police commenced their investigation on the 11th?

A. I don't know to what extent.

Q. On the 12th you actually went into the city, arrested the leaders and there was no trouble and no demonstration?

A. No.

Q. What are your reasons for saying that Civil Authority had no control over the city?

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[Continued.]

A. Control extended practically as far as a rifle could go, as far as the troops could see. Officials could not come into the city without an armed force.

Q. Did you go to serve any summons, any orders or to order any taxes that were not paid in these days?

A. No, the ordinary administration was not working.

Q. Why do you say the city was not under civil control on the 11th and 12th? What was it that prevented you from going inside the city and doing your ordinary duty?

A. My idea was that I should have been murdered as the Bank Manager was murdered.

Q. And being afraid of being murdered you and other persons in authority did not want to go into the city?

A. You may put it like that. We could not go into the city without a proper guard. Military authorities themselves would not allow it.

Q. I want an explanation?

A. If I wished to go into the city my proper course was to ask the Military Commander for a guard.

Q. What prevented you from going inside with the aid of troops and from exercising your authority?

A. We could not always be going with troops.

Q. Can you say if you had gone into the city without troops your authority would have been opposed?

A. I cannot say, I had to obey military authorities.

Q. What do you mean by saying that you had to obey military authorities? Is it not a fact that every authority given to you as a District Magistrate has been conferred by an Act of Indian Legislature?

A. I take it from you.

Q. May I know that when you say that you asked the military authorities to take the control of the situation do you refer to sections 129—131 of the Criminal Procedure Code? I want to know whether you are not suspending your own power.

A. It is the common law of England. I am speaking as a layman.

Q. Leave aside the common law of England. Where is the provision in Criminal Procedure Code to hand over civil administration of any city to the military authorities?

A. I do not think it is in the Criminal Procedure Code.

Q. You cannot suggest any section under which you or the Commissioner were authorised to hand over the administration?

A. It is rather difficult to point out legal authority, but where the civil authorities are unable to control the situation and guarantee peace and order, it is their duty to ask the military authorities to take such steps as are necessary to preserve peace.

Q. I quite agree with you but that is not the meaning of sections 129 to 131. It does not say that you should hand over the administration to the civil authorities.

A. There was no handing over of the administration except what is directed—preservation of peace and order. We did not hand over the civil administration except where it was necessary to preserve peace and order.

Q. The section in all cases confers upon you the power of invoking the aid of military and nothing more. And so far as the exercise of powers is concerned they are given discretion to arrest people who put the public safety in danger when their aid is requisitioned as mentioned in sections 130 and 131 of the Criminal Procedure Code. As a District Magistrate of 20 years' experience, you knew that you were responsible for the peace and administration of the city. Under what authority did you allow the military to do all these things?

A. What things other than the maintenance of order and peace?

Q. Many things—issuing proclamations and notices, etc. A. It is under the Common Law of England.

Q. My point is whether the Military Commander is justified for taking all measures for preserving peace and order such as dispersing the crowd and arresting the people.

A. I am not arguing a case, but my opinion is that the Military Commander was justified in taking all mea-

sures necessary to maintain public peace and order such as arresting people and dispersing a crowd. If he issued any proclamation for what he considered the preservation of order, that was not an extraordinary exercise of authority, but rather making it sure that his exercise of authority would not be sudden and oppressive.

Q. Can you just refer me to any act or any order of the Government of India or the order of the Local Government which would authorise the military to exercise these powers that were exercised from the 10th by the military authorities in Amritsar?

A. They were only directed to exercise authority for the preservation of peace and order. This was necessary in my opinion.

Q. But you did certain things. What was your justification?

A. We were threatened with the greatest calamity since the mutiny. Frankly, I did not at the time get out my law books and look at the precedents of the High Court.

Q. The justification was the greatest danger since 1857. We have to decide this in the same way. Suppose there are dacoities in a district and you impose martial law for a fortnight and send 200 persons to jail without trial, that will put a stop to dacoities, but will that be your justification? [Here the President interfered and the question was not pressed.]

Q. How many persons were there with the Inspector when the attempted loot of Tarn Taran was going on?

A. A small party.

Q. Can you say how small?

A. I can't say. You will find it in the judgment of the Magistrate. I do not remember. They ran away. It was a dark night.

Q. Can you tell us what was the duration of the trial? Was it not one day?

A. It is not possible.

Q. How many persons were arrested?

A. About 102 persons.

Q. Was not sufficient time given to make good defence?

A. I really don't know any details about it. I should think they were given every reasonable opportunity.

Q. You know that 82 of them were convicted?

A. I take it from you.

Q. May I know whether they were convicted for attempting to loot, or whether they were convicted for waging war against the King-Emperor?

A. I believe it was for waging war. I do not remember.

Q. Is it not a fact that if you had tried them for dacoity they could not have been tried by the Court Martial Law?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Is it not true that unless they attempted to loot or wage war against the King-Emperor you would have no jurisdiction to try by Court Martial?

A. I do not think so. We were empowered to try offences committed before the 19th.

Q. Can you give me on what date it was decided?

A. You will find it in the judgment. In the 3rd week of April. Roughly speaking about April or May.

Q. You have said about having heard in the city said by somebody "*Hindu Musalman ki Jai*." What is the source of your information, please?

A. Several people told me. I was in constant touch with the people. I was getting information as best as I could.

Q. You can't remember the names of the persons?

A. No.

Q. Who gave this information?

A. It was said by the general report.

Q. Is it a fact that on the 11th and 12th a large number of citizens came and visited you?

A. It was not a large number; but a considerable number of respectable persons.

Q. Although you had lost control of the city on the 11th and 12th, still a large number of citizens came to visit you?

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[Continued.]

A. A large number of people who lived in civil lines and people who went in and out of the city. There were not very many.

Q. I hope they were loyal?

A. Yes, I don't suppose there were very many as early as that. I was constantly seeing people later on. I had got a few good friends.

Q. Will you kindly see paragraph 22 of your written statement, April the 14th—"The history of the rising henceforward is merely the record of progress in bringing offenders to justice."

A. "And, it may be added, in dispelling the wild rumours that were in constant circulation and in quieting the minds of the people."

Q. The history of the rising henceforward is merely the record of progress in bringing offenders to justice?

A. Yes, in Amritsar District.

Q. Now coming to martial law orders, is it not true that when you went on the 13th to the city and had that proclamation made, was it not proclaimed that from that day the curfew hour would be 8 P.M.?

A. Yes, I think it was that day.

Q. And you still maintain that this order would, according to your statement, cause no inconvenience to the public? That you have stated already in your oral deposition?

A. No serious inconvenience was caused, not generally speaking.

Q. On what date were proclamations issued explaining the meaning of the order which made it unlawful for more than 10 persons to assemble?

A. I could not tell you the date. On one occasion I know it was on the 23rd when I heard there was some alarm about this, but I cannot tell you the dates; I was constantly issuing notices. As soon as I heard there was any disquiet about any order I got out a notice.

Q. Do you know how many days this order remained in force about 10 men meeting?

A. I do not think it was withdrawn formally until martial law was taken off.

Q. Before any proclamation was issued how many days did it remain in force?

A. The order dates from April the 19th (that was in Lahore, the local order about it was a little bit later) and I remember that on April the 23rd when I was going out with the General to Rajasansi I heard about this misunderstanding and I got some of the local people to spread it about as quickly as I could and I got a notice out as soon as I could.

Q. Was an order in the following words promulgated:—"From and after the promulgation of this order, it shall be unlawful for more than two persons to walk abreast on any constructed or clearly defined pavement or sidewalk and disobedience of this order will be punished by all such special powers as are conferred on me by martial law?"

A. I do not remember that as an Amritsar order.

Q. That is not an Amritsar order, it is quite possible I am wrong and you are not?

A. I do not remember it as such; it was not in the collection of General Dyer's orders I had. I never heard of it.

Q. Was the electric light and the water-supply cut off from the city?

A. Yes, they were cut off in the city.

Q. What was the justification for that, a spirit of revenge?

A. As regards the water, partly because the people had been smashing the hydrants and partly because they had spread a rumour that the water was poisoned. We did not use the water ourselves for some time because we thought there might be some basis for the rumour. The electric light was cut off because we did not wish the people to be parading the streets at night.

Q. Was the water-supply at any time cut off from the civil station?

A. It was not cut off, but for a short time it was not used.

Q. I suppose you were not concerned about this order; no legal advice was taken from you?

A. I was not the legal adviser.

Q. By courtesy all along you were consulted in these matters. In this matter you were not consulted?

A. No, not before this order was issued.

Q. Therefore your reason is that the electric supply was cut off because you prevented the people in the night from committing offences and parading about?

A. It did not prevent them from parading about; also we did not know what they were going to do with the electric standards. When a town is out of hand electric power is not a good thing to have loose about.

Q. My question is how the cutting off of the electric current would prevent the people in the city damaging the electric plant or electric appliances?

A. It would at any rate prevent a fire arising from that. I do not press the particular motive at the time because I simply cannot remember it. I know we thought it a good thing that the electric light should be cut off.

Q. Was not that order passed in respect of revenge?

A. Revenge is hardly the correct word. As a punishment it might have entered among other considerations, but I cannot remember the particular motives that actuated one.

Q. Don't you think it was the punishment of the old Nawabi days that when one member of a family committed an offence all the members of the family were to be punished? Because some people committed an offence no doubt it was a grievous offence, therefore the whole city was punished. At that time the curfew order was in force?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore the reason suggested by you ceases to exist, because the curfew order being in existence there was no one out.

A. There was no one to see if they disobeyed it.

Q. If the electric lights were out it would prevent you seeing if they disobeyed it?

A. One did not take a lantern out to see that sort of thing.

Q. If there had been electric lights there would have been better opportunities of finding out whether people were obeying the curfew order?

A. No attempt was being made to patrol the city at that time and not for a long time till the lights were restored.

Q. Would you not be depriving these people who had house connections and who depended on this electric light for every day conveniences?

A. It was very sad for them to go to bed in the dark, but we were all suffering a good deal from this state of civil turmoil.

Q. I want to know how the cutting off of the water-supply or the electric light would in the least help you in maintaining peace and order. I want that explanation.

A. It would partly; as I say I cannot remember in the exact order what motives influenced the military authorities. After all it was their decision. But I think in regard to the water partly there was a real engineering reason as the hydrants were smashed and the water was pouring out of them, and also there was this rumour that they were poisoned. And as regards the electric lights we did not want the streets lit up at night. Also when you have a city in a state of rebellion, in a state of what is judicially found to be a state of warfare—

Q. It was not found; we are talking of what happened on the 11th, 12th and 13th.

A. What has since been found and what we considered by the facts to be a state of war, and if the military authorities thought this inconvenience would bring the city to a more sane frame of mind (as a matter of fact I cannot say whether it did or not, but it might have brought them round), I think it would be a means of bringing pressure to bear on these people with whom we were at war, and at the same time against whom we did not wish to use the utmost rigours of war.

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[Continued.]

Q. Is there any record of how many hydrants there were?

A. The Municipal people might have it.

Q. Has this allegation that the water-supply was cut off because water was flowing from smashed hydrants ever been put forward before this date?

A. I think the Engineer told me the hydrants were smashed; certainly he did.

Q. Has this reason up to this time been put forward on behalf of the Government that the supply was cut off because the water was being wasted on account of the hydrants being smashed?

A. I have not put it forward, but I do remember now that the people had been smashing the hydrants because of the rumour that the water had been poisoned.

Q. Now about travelling, I want an explanation as to why you think that if the Amritsar people were not allowed to leave Amritsar, that would help in the maintenance of peace and order. You may take my opinion that if this rowdy element had left Amritsar the peace would have been kept. Why do you think this restriction that was placed on travelling would in any way help you in the maintenance of peace and order?

A. It would prevent the emissaries of revolt going to other districts and stirring up revolt there. And there are military reasons of course connected with transport available.

Q. This was an order to prevent the emissaries of revolt from leaving the city of Amritsar?

A. It was not my order, but I take it to be one of the obvious reasons.

Q. And probably you wanted the restriction to prevent the revolt from spreading so far as the adjoining regions were concerned. I gather that from your evidence. Your anxiety was that it should not spread to the surrounding villages of Amritsar District?

A. That would hardly affect travelling by rail.

Q. Therefore you could not possibly have prevented the emissaries from going to different villages and the danger points of villages occupied by Sikhs?

A. You practically could not; you could keep them from going to distant parts of the Punjab, and there were patrols on the Grand Trunk Road to look for suspicious characters.

Q. You are still of opinion that the interning of motors and cycles caused no inconvenience?

A. I would not say it caused no inconvenience. No one likes his carriage taken away, but not serious inconvenience for a state of war.

Q. What was the need of it after the 20th?

A. You should really ask the officer in charge of civil transport. There was a great deal of transport wanted.

Q. Now about the Tarn Taran affair. Was any agreement taken from the people there that they would not take any part in political activity for the next three years, and if they did so they would pay a fine of Rs. 5,000 to the Government?

A. Yes, the people there did make some kind of agreement; it was not under my orders.

Q. But still your subordinates were there?

A. It was an act more or less of contrition.

Q. Can that agreement be produced?

A. I expect it can.

Q. The agreement was, for the next three years they undertook to have nothing to do with politics, and in case they did take any part in politics they were to pay Rs. 5,000 as fine to the Government?

A. I do not remember the terms of the agreement.

Q. I hope we shall be able to get that agreement.

A. I think it is quite possible.

Q. You have mentioned in paragraph 42 cases of flogging; can we get the record of these cases?

A. I cannot give them to you.

Q. Are there any records in existence of these cases decided by the tribunals?

A. There ought to be. A form was given out, and if they carried out their orders they filled up that form and sent it to the Administrator, Lahore area.

Q. You mention breach of Fort discipline as one of the offences?

A. It was not tried before me or under my orders. I asked what it was all about, and they said they kicked up a row in the Fort.

Q. And these were the 6 men who were transported for life for assaulting Miss Sherwood?

A. I believe the same men.

Q. There were no other men flogged for breach of discipline?

A. I believe so; I have only got these figures as figures; I have no direct evidence of this.

Q. Take the second case, 'Beating drum to instigate disobedience to orders.' Now before taking you through all these orders, I will refer to a point which was raised by Justice Rankin. I think you are aware, so far as your 20 years' experience goes, that (I am talking of the Penal Code) except for theft and unnatural offences, nobody is ever flogged under the Indian Penal Code?

A. Under the Indian Penal Code do you include the Whipping Act?

Q. Under the Indian Penal Code, am I right in saying that throughout India except for offences against property, and unnatural offences, nobody is ever awarded on conviction a sentence of whipping?

A. Can you not take judicial notice of the contents of the Penal Code? I cannot remember the sections of it, and I never use the Code without looking it up.

Q. I am not asking you what is put down in the Code, I am asking you about the normal state of affairs. Is it or is not the fact that whipping is only accorded for the offences I have named and only to juveniles?

A. No, not juvenile offenders only, that is not the case at all.

Q. A man found drunk and disorderly, he is never whipped under the Indian Penal Code?

A. No.

Q. Assault of a constable, it is a very serious offence, section 332, and it is triable by the Court of Sessions, and it is not ever punished by whipping?

A. No.

Q. Take the second item, 'Beating drum to instigate disobedience to orders,' was it not the fact that these were the two boys who were employed by Hansraj to proclaim by beat of drum the meeting which was going to be held at Jallianwala Bagh?

A. I did not know any boys were employed by Hansraj.

Q. Were these the two boys who were proclaiming with a tin that a meeting would be held at Jallianwala Bagh?

A. They may be, but I cannot say for certain till I have seen the record.

Q. Were you informed that a meeting of the citizens of Amritsar was held on the 12th of April, and at that meeting it was announced by Hansraj that a meeting of the people of the city of Amritsar would be held at Jallianwala the next day?

A. I did not know it took that form. I heard rumours of a meeting to be held next day, but I had not heard it in that complete form, and I did not hear Hansraj's name. I did not hear his name until he became an approver.

Q. And he was the man who was addressing the crowd at the Jallianwala Bagh?

A. You put his name in my mouth yesterday, but I believe he was not; I believe it was another man who was addressing them at the time who was shot, but I say I have no definite recollection. I was not there myself so I cannot tell you.

Q. Coming to the 13th, after the incident of the Jallianwala Bagh, did any of the persons in authority visit the Jallianwala Bagh that day?

A. No, not that I know of.

Q. To the best of your belief, for the rest of the week none of the persons in authority visited that Bagh?

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[Continued.]

A. I do not know whether they visited it or not, I did not.

Q. Was any ambulance provided on the 13th?

A. I believe no ambulance went out with that column.

Q. Was any help given by the authorities that night to remove the dead and the dying to the hospital?

A. No, I believe the column went straight back out of the city.

Q. No help was given?

A. No, they left them to their friends.

Q. Was any help given to the wounded after the firing on the 10th at 2 P.M. that was ordered by you?

A. Yes, some people went out with stretchers.

Q. Government people?

A. There was a hospital close by and the Civil Surgeon sent out some people from the hospital.

Q. After this firing did you consider it reasonable to remove your curfew order which was passed at 12 o'clock that day, in order that the relatives of the dead and the dying would be able to remove those people and give them any help? Did it strike you that it was absolutely necessary and more humane?

A. I do not know whether the point was thought of. I think it was assumed that the people would take away their dead, as they were given an opportunity, but we were in rather a state of excitement.

Q. You are not aware that any person as a matter of fact did disobey that curfew order that night?

A. There was nobody in the city to say.

Q. So far as your knowledge goes, there is no report that any person disobeyed that curfew order that night of the 13th?

A. Nobody was in the city; the troops went right back and left the city to itself.

Q. Did it never strike any person in authority that about four or five hundred persons having been killed, and a large number wounded, it was absolutely necessary that some first aid should be given to them?

A. I do not know whether the General thought it safe in the night to send out a party.

Q. The reason was that it would have been unsafe for a party of soldiers to go there?

A. I do not know. I remember it was night. Evening had shut down by the time I got back, and I found the military making various arrangements for the safety of the civil station in case of a further attack. They were conducting it as in a state of warfare in the face of an enemy, and it was not proposed at that time to send out search parties in the city.

Q. And would you not render that help even to enemies?

A. I think it would have been a good thing to do if the situation permitted it.

Q. At least for an hour and a half there was sufficient light and there could be no danger from 5 to 7. Why was not any help rendered then?

A. You should really ask the officer who brought the troops straight back from the city. I would not like to anticipate his appreciation of the situation. It was probably too late after he had got back; if he wanted, he should have held on then and done it.

Q. You have informed Justice Rankin that none of these people who were flogged belonged to the respectable class. Will you kindly give us the names and professions of these men?

A. I am afraid I cannot. I enquired generally speaking, and I think I should have heard if any person markedly respectable had been flogged.

Q. That answer was based on your hearsay knowledge and you had not enquired into this matter?

A. Most of my answers have been based on hearsay knowledge. I did not send for each individual and estimate his social status; I got my figures and information from the police officers who kept a record of all the military punishments, and I asked a police officer whether any respectable person had been flogged and he said no.

Q. I think there are records. It would be very easy to get the names of those persons who had been flogged and ascertain whether they were respectable?

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A. The police kept a note as far as I remember of all the military punishments.

Q. Have you any objection to placing before this committee that information that was prepared by the police, the record of the orders and punishments awarded?

A. I think it was given to me on a slip of paper and I transferred it to my report. I do not know that I kept that actual report.

Q. It is not in existence?

A. I do not know. I daresay the police could reconstruct it for you.

Q. I do not think any police papers are destroyed within the space of one year?

A. When I ask for a special report from the police, I do not hold myself bound to keep it. If I have finished with it, I can tear it up. If it was on paper or somebody brought me a slip I probably did. If the return formed part of their official records, it was kept.

Q. It might have been some oral information given to you by somebody?

A. I am not sure.

Q. You are very vague about the source of this information that they were not respectable?

A. I asked the police if there was any one of that kind, and they said no. I did not go into any details.

Q. Coming to the special constables: there were 100 pleaders who were made special constables?

A. I should think pretty well.

Q. Practically the whole lot at Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. If the district authorities be allowed to deport all the local practitioners from the various districts, don't you agree that political agitation will cease at once or at any rate to a very great extent?

A. I am not sure. I am not prepared to say. I think it might increase.

Q. Are legal practitioners liked by the district authorities?

A. Yes; I am on very good terms with the local bar.

Q. I take it that these special constables were appointed under the Police Act?

A. They were appointed by the Military authorities, and I do not think they knew very much about the Police Act. I daresay the Police Act would be applicable.

Q. I take it that the military authorities appointed these pleaders as special constables?

A. Yes.

Q. Had they power to do so? Except the Police Act, is there any enactment under which anybody can be made a police constable?

A. There is the general common law of England.

Q. I am an Indian—I know nothing of the law of England.

A. It was done after martial law was in force.

Q. Martial law is altogether different. What were the duties they had to perform?

A. The city was parcelled out between them and they were supposed to keep an eye on what was going on and report to the Provost-Marshal the state of their respective charges.

Q. How many miles had they to travel every day?

A. The city is only half a mile from General Headquarters and apart from that they had their own Mohallas in which their homes are situated.

Q. Were any written directions prescribed?

A. The Provost-Marshal may have issued them. I have not got them.

Q. Don't you think that such a thing is greatly disliked by every Indian—to be made a special constable?

A. I do not know why it should be disliked. Towards the end they rather liked it.

Q. That is your general assumption that towards the end they rather liked it—at any rate they volunteered to continue the work. These pleaders were first called special constables and then their name was changed to ward officers. Under which Act were they made ward officers?

A. Under martial law.

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[Continued.]

Q. Therefore they would not be subject to any rules or regulation framed under the Police Act?

A. I should think not.

Q. In your opinion there is no difference between a special constable under the Police Act and any person made ward officer under the martial law. There is no difference between the two?

A. There is no difference in the functions.

Q. Nor was there a difference in the punishments to which they were liable?

A. I do not know.

Q. Is not a special constable punishable for the same offence for which an ordinary constable is punishable?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any order passed by which these 100 pleaders would not be under any Inspector or Thanadar?

A. I do not think any order was passed. They were to be straight under the order of the Provost-Marshal. There was no question of their ever being put under the police.

Q. What were the duties of these Ward Officers?

A. To patrol their respective divisions from time to time and to report to the Provost-Marshal any circumstances arising.

Q. Is that all?

A. Yes.

Q. They were ordered to report themselves three times every day at the outset?

A. Yes.

Q. At 10 A.M., at 1 P.M. and at 5 P.M.?

A. You have the orders before you. I do not remember the exact hours.

Q. And do you consider that these duties were liked by these professional pleaders, who were carrying on their business duty?

A. I did not say liked. They were a good deal reconciled to them later on. I will say this that these orders were relaxed. After that relaxation the military experienced no difficulty in getting volunteers after the special constables, as such, were disbanded.

Q. Can you give me the names of these volunteers?

A. I think there were about 20. I cannot give you the names.

Q. What was the number of the police when these special constables were appointed?

A. I could not say. You must ask the Superintendent of Police.

Q. You must give me a general idea. What was the number inside the city and the civil station?

A. Reinforcements came in. Two or three hundred possibly.

Q. What was the total number of soldiers available?

A. The strength of the troops was constantly varying.

Q. Give me an approximate idea?

A. Approximate on what date?

Q. I am talking of the day when these special constables were appointed.

A. Probably not less than 500 at any time.

Q. You said you had 1,500 camp followers available all along. Were there any available for military duty?

A. They were purely followers.

Q. Where was the need of appointing these pleaders as special constables?

A. You must ask the military authorities. I should say that they gave very valuable assistance because, not being police, they could influence the people, and they could let us have first hand information and as a matter of fact they on several occasions did very good service.

Q. I assume that these pleaders and legal practitioners could influence the public and they are leaders of the public?

A. They can influence the public and some of them are looked on as leaders of the public.

Q. I will put it to you, were any of these men made special constables because the authorities wanted to punish these local agitators?

A. The idea did not originate with me and I cannot speak for the motives of another officer.

Q. A large number of the C. I. D. were imported during these days into the city of Amritsar?

A. I did not say a large number. The investigation was carried on by the C. I. D. There was a gazetted officer, an Inspector and his subordinates.

Q. It was the C. I. D. who decided as to which cases will go to the special tribunal and which cases will go to the civil court and they used to send cases to the Legal Remembrancer over your head. Is it not so?

A. Yes. They sent cases direct to the Legal Remembrancer and to us.

Q. Now a question was put to you by General Barrow as to whether this crowd was a noisy crowd or not?

A. Yes.

Q. I think you must have witnessed *Molurum* processions at some time?

A. Yes.

Q. Are not they funeral processions? a procession which follows a *tazia*?

A. Not in my definition.

Q. Have you ever seen any Indian funeral procession which makes no noise?

A. It depends on what you call noise. They play music and there is lamentation.

Q. Did they not hawl out at the top of their voices "*Ram Ram sal*"?

A. They uttered cries.

Q. They are not those funeral processions where nobody makes a noise. Is it not the funeral procession of the ordinary Indian?

A. They do make those cries.

Q. Then in reply to Mr. Justice Rankin, you said that Kitchlew said "we will use our hands." May I know what is the source of your information?

A. The report of the special reporter of the Government.

Q. Is that in existence?

A. Yes.

Q. Can that be made available?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you say what was the occasion according to your notes and in what connection?

A. I cannot remember. I have seen so many of those. I have given those extracts.

Q. Do you know whether all those persons who took part in the riots took the *Satyagraha* vow?

A. I do not think so. I do not know how many of them.

Q. You had no idea as to whether there was two or three?

A. No.

Q. You wanted to make out some difference between the civil arrest and military arrest. I want to make that point clear. Some people were arrested by the civil police?

A. Yes.

Q. I do not think any people were arrested by the military?

A. They may have been arrested under the orders of the military authorities, but they were arrested by the police.

Q. I think very often they had arrested people. For example, all those people who were brought to trial except those who were flogged for breach of fort discipline—all those people were actually tried and sentenced. Were they not all arrested by the civil police?

A. No. For instance, in my presence on the 12th the police went out as a guide to the military and they returned in my presence. Armed parties went out under the guidance of the police and they brought them back to the Kotwali.

Q. Do you wish to suggest any difference in the treatment on account of these different arrests? Were the people who were arrested by the military treated differently from those who were arrested by the civil?

A. I think the tendency was to make people who were guilty of any offences against military law over to the

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[Continued.]

military authorities and those under the ordinary law to the civil police. Things were not entirely in water-tight compartments. I know one case of bribery against a policeman was dealt with by the Provost-Marshal.

Q. Are you aware of the fact that respectable people who were arrested were handcuffed in couples and marched through the city and for hours made to sit and stand in the sun?

A. I cannot say how far they were respectable people. I was not present at any instances you mention. The people were handcuffed in the ordinary way and they were taken to the civil jail or taken to the fort.

Q. Up to this time are you not aware that even after they were arrested and taken to jail they were kept handcuffed inside the jail?

A. Do you mean in the jail or in the fort?

Q. The fort.

A. I am pretty sure they were not handcuffed in jail unless they were kept out in the compound. In the fort a temporary place was made for them.

Q. I am only asking about being handcuffed?

A. I do not know whether they were kept handcuffed.

Q. Was any arrangement made for the ordinary convenience of those respectable people who were arrested?

A. Everyone was suffering for the want of ordinary convenience in the fort—both European women and children. I have no doubt that arrangements were made as quickly as possible.

Q. Were they kept in condemned cells in the fort?

A. There are no condemned cells in the fort.

Q. I do not want to call them cages but small rooms with bars—like cages either in the jail or in the fort?

A. There is the ordinary bar kind of cell. A condemned cell is rather more roomy than other cells.

Q. At what time were the authorities made aware that a meeting would be held at the Jallianwala Bagh at 4 P.M.?

A. We were made aware of this fact at about 12. I first heard it in the form of a rumour to which I paid no attention.

Q. From your statement it appears that this information was received by the authorities at about 4 P.M. It appears that the authorities were aware of this fact at 12 noon—that a meeting had been announced but the information that the crowd were actually collecting was at about 4 P.M. What was the number of police inside the Kotwali on the 13th?

A. I do not know.

Q. How far is the Kotwali from the Bagh?

A. It is very hard to say—half a mile or three-quarters.

Q. How many people were there? The newspaper estimate was about 20 to 25 thousand people. What is your estimate?

A. I did not see.

Q. What did you learn?

A. I heard about 10,000, but I do not trust the estimate of the crowd.

Q. You will agree with me that this crowd would not be able to assemble there even in a few minutes before the time the meeting was announced, say, 4 P.M. This crowd would begin to assemble at that place at about 2 or 3 P.M. I want to know what steps were taken by the authorities or by the police to warn all these people who commenced to assemble at Jallianwala Bagh and to tell them that this meeting was illegal and that they should leave the place.

A. The authorities were warning them. About 4 P.M. the news of the actual collecting of the crowd got to General Dyer upon which he marched out.

Q. If the authorities were specially cognizant of the fact that a meeting was to be held at 4 P.M. where was the difficulty in posting two or three soldiers at Jallianwala Bagh to scare away all the people?

A. I do not think that the General thought it would be safe. I do not think half a dozen soldiers would be sufficient.

Q. I take it that this was not done because half a dozen soldiers would not be sufficient?

A. Yes.

Q. Why were not the police constables at the Kotwali ordered to go and prevent the people from assembling at Jallianwala Bagh?

A. It was not safe for a party to go out into the city during those days.

Q. But they were in the Kotwali?

A. Yes, they were safe in the Kotwali.

Q. You do not know how many rounds were fired?

A. 1,650 I have been told.

Q. Is it true that the fire went on for at least 15 minutes?

A. General Dyer will tell you. I think that it went on for ten.

Q. Were you informed that the majority of the dead bodies found there were in the exit?

A. I was not informed that they were nearly all in the exit, but they were at the back.

Q. Was not the chief exit occupied by the military?

A. No, certainly not.

Q. Do you know whether a boy of 7 years was shot?

A. Not to my knowledge. He was not in our returns.

Q. So long as you were there you never took any steps to see how many persons were killed or wounded?

A. Yes, I tried. I got the returns in from the Health Officer.

Q. You never ordered an enquiry so long as you were there?

A. I did not order any enquiry.

Q. Between the 11th and 12th, did you suggest any meeting to be held in the city for the purpose of terminating the *hartal*?

A. On one occasion a meeting was held at the Town Hall and the General came down to it.

Q. You were also with him?

A. I went down to the meeting. It was between the 10th and the 15th.

Q. You had a meeting on the 15th?

A. I think it is in General Dyer's report.

Q. Were all the shops opened on the morning of the 13th?

A. Not all.

Q. Was there any *hartal* on the morning of the 13th?

A. I don't know the exact number of shops that had opened. A great number of shops, I believe, were still closed.

Q. Then may I understand that 75 per cent. were opened and 25 per cent. closed?

A. We could not go round the city. I think probably some shops were opened. They had to get their own supplies.

Q. Now where was that meeting held, and was any speech made by you or by the General?

A. Yes.

Q. Can we get a copy of that speech?

A. I made no copy of it. I made it *ex tempore*.

Q. Was it a threatening speech?

A. No, I don't think so.

Q. Was it not to the effect that if the shops were not opened at once all sorts of measures would be taken against the shop-keepers and so on?

A. I don't think so. So far as I remember, I spoke in bitter reproach of what has been done under the people's noses. It was not a threatening speech at all.

Q. What was the attitude of the Civil Surgeon and the nurses with regard to the wounded?

A. The ordinary attitude of any doctor or nurse to any sick person.

Q. Then it is wrongly alleged that they refused to treat them?

A. I would say that was an under-statement. I would call it an infamous calumny.

Q. There was an aeroplane also on the 13th hovering above?

A. I believe there was one. I was hoping for one. I did not see any myself. That was on the 10th.

Q. Was there not an aeroplane between 4 and 5 P.M. when the meeting at Jallianwala Bagh was being held?

A. I don't remember. There were aeroplanes carrying messages nearly every day after the 10th. An aeroplane may very well have come down in the Fort on that day.

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Mr. MILES IRVING.

[Continued.]

Q. Was not the meeting on the 14th held in the Kotwali?

A. It was held not exactly in the Kotwali, but in one of the municipal rooms, one of the few rooms of the Municipality that escaped the wreck.

Q. When did the Lieutenant-Governor visit Amritsar?

A. I cannot give the date. It was very soon after the occurrences.

Q. On the 20th?

A. I can't say exactly. I don't think he came then; it was, I think, a little later.

Q. You can't give the date?

A. I am afraid I cannot.

Q. Did any person from the Government of India visit your place during the month of April, either Lord Chelmsford or any other person belonging to the Government of India?

A. Mr. Hailey came down one day.

Q. Which month?

A. May or June. I could not say which month.

Q. Now about rebellion, will you kindly give the Committee all the facts within your knowledge upon which you are prepared to make any statement that there was open rebellion in Amritsar between the 10th and 15th April excepting what happened on the 10th. The 10th I am leaving aside for the present, but excepting that, I want to know what are the facts upon which you are prepared to make a statement that there was open rebellion in Amritsar between the 10th and 15th April?

The President to Pandit Jagat Narayan:—I think you might put the question in another way and ask him, in addition to the circumstances which he has already stated, are there any additional facts which he desires to call our attention to?

Q. So far as I remember, as far as the city of Amritsar is concerned, the only fact which was stated before this Committee was about the general state of the province. Except that, I want to know if you can place before this Committee any other facts upon which you base the conclusion that between the 10th and the 15th April the city of Amritsar was in a state of open rebellion. You have mentioned one fact, having regard to the general state of the province. Excepting that one fact, I want to know if there are any other specific facts upon which you base that conclusion?

A. The temper of the people was actually defiant; they were organizing themselves in a hostile manner; they were openly making it known that they regarded themselves as being in control of the city and independent of the British Crown, and it was believed that the leaders desired, according to the best information we could get, to fight it out and see who is the master. All these things came to one inevitably by hearsay. We were unable to enter the city alone without the Military protection, and the opinions were arrived at from the general aspect of affairs in the city.

Q. I shall repeat the facts (1) The people were organizing themselves, (2) They had assumed a defiant attitude, (3) They said they had the control of the city, (4) The leaders desired to fight it out and (5) The general aspect of the city itself. Anything else?

A. That is all I can think of for the moment.

Q. I am sorry to take some time over these. I will take these one by one. What do you mean when you say that the people were organizing themselves between the 10th and the 15th?

A. I said they were organizing themselves, I do not know whether they wanted the watch and ward of the city, but they were busy in making their own arrangements of a semi-police or a semi-military nature. They were setting up as it were a rival organization.

Q. To fine people, to decide cases, and so forth?

A. It was all very crude and very inchoate.

Q. And what is the basis of that information?

A. Reports from the city.

Q. What do you mean by "defiant attitude"?

A. You could see the people's look when you passed through.

Q. You said they had the control of the city, and you yourself admitted that for two days none of the authorities cared to go inside the city?

A. Neither cared, nor were they allowed by the Military authorities. None of us were such fools as to put our heads into a hornet's nest.

Q. The Military were in charge of it?

A. Yes, certainly.

Q. Will you kindly give me the sources of this information "We will fight it out"?

A. I think you will find it in one of the reports of the trials.

Q. Therefore, may I take it that you are prepared as an experienced District Magistrate to take a single word or a single expression from the speech of a platform speaker, who was opposing the Rowlatt Act or any other thing, and saying that if our request is not granted we will fight it out, that amounts to open rebellion?

A. I think the occasion was later on. A number of facts were being given to me throughout the day. One was not taking notes but forming the best opinions that one could under the circumstances. There was no reasoned judgment about it.

Q. Will you take the general aspect and say if I am wrong or if I am correct? There was no looting on the 13th?

A. I am not sure.

Q. To the best of your knowledge?

A. No, I am not sure to the best of my knowledge. I did hear reports that some people in the city had been looted. They were all rumours. The ordinary administration had broken down.

Q. What I mean to say is, there are no written reports recorded in the *thana*, there are no complaints that anybody was looted between the 13th and the 15th?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. There were no written reports that somebody was assaulted and so on between the 10th and the 15th?

A. The ordinary administration had broken down, and there were no means of knowing anything definitely.

Q. But so far as your personal knowledge is concerned, there was no assault?

A. I am giving here hearsay reports and rumours.

Q. Can you give us the names of such persons who brought to you the news that somebody was assaulted?

A. People were constantly visiting me. It was a long time ago. I was forming the best opinion I could under the circumstances.

Q. There was no disorder or trouble between the 10th and the 15th except that on the 13th between the people and the authorities?

A. On the 12th the crowds went out of the city in a way against the orders and they collected in considerable numbers and they had to be told to disperse.

Q. They did disperse?

A. They dispersed but very reluctantly. I went and asked them to disperse.

Q. I am very thankful for that information that they did disperse and that you went and told them to disperse. They did not assault the authorities, there was no stone-throwing?

A. No, there was nothing of the sort. The crowds were outside and they went away. They did not come near the column except a few of them.

Q. Between the 10th and the 15th, there were a few breaches of Martial Law and certain people were whipped, certain people were fined and there were one or two other incidents; have you got a record of those cases?

A. I have got no record of offences other than what is on record.

Q. And you admit that on the 11th you went inside the city?

A. Yes.

Q. And police investigation commenced on that day?

A. Yes.

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Mr. MILES IRVING.

[Continued.]

Q. You admit that on the 12th you went inside the city and you admit that the principal men were arrested and no disturbance took place?

A. Yes.

Q. You further admit that the dead bodies of the people were taken away for burial on the 11th and there was no disturbance and they obeyed your orders?

A. After a great deal of difficulty they did.

Q. And from the 13th to the 15th, to the best of your knowledge, the orders that were passed by the Military authorities were obeyed, except in cases where you have given us an indication of the punishment that was awarded to those who disobeyed the orders?

A. I have no knowledge. I forget when the city came to be patrolled.

Q. And your not paying frequent visits to the city was due to the fact that you believed or that you thought that you would be assaulted or murdered? Because in one place you said "we did not go inside the city because I thought that I would be murdered"?

A. To the belief of the military commander it was not safe.

Q. Having regard to all these facts, do you still maintain that the Amritsar city was in a state of open rebellion?

A. Yes.

Q. You have described that although the crawling order was passed you did not consider it very important and therefore you did not mention it in your statement. You have mentioned all the Martial Law orders?

A. Mentioned the orders of a general nature.

Q. Is it or is it not true that what you had described as crawling on hands and feet was practically crawling on the belly like worms?

A. I don't know.

Q. Would you be prepared to swear that the allegation that is made by the public or by the press that the real order was that the people had to crawl on their belly and that anyone disobeying it met with strong punishment is false?

A. It never came to my knowledge. I do not think such a thing was carried out.

Q. You did not see actually, but the people might have been ordered to crawl on their bellies?

A. It was not the order, the General told me, that he had passed.

Q. But the way in which the order was carried out?

A. It was not brought to my notice.

Q. Will you be prepared to state before this Committee that there are 50 or 60 back-doors?

A. No. I don't think so. I don't think all the houses have back-doors.

Q. For how many days did this order remain in force?

A. I am told it was in force for four or five days.

Q. Was any arrangement made for scavenging?

A. I don't know. I do not suppose I had this particular order very much in mind.

Q. You state that it did not cause much inconvenience by this order?

A. I did not say that.

Q. How do you think they should make their purchases?

A. As a matter of fact, the reason why I did not get any complaints (interrupted by the next question).

Q. Would they be able to go to the bazar without going through the street?

A. They got over the roofs from down behind.

Q. To the best of your knowledge there were many people who were very happy in going through the process of crawling on their bellies?

A. I don't think so, I never said so.

Q. It was suggested somewhere that at the time that you ordered the firing there was a pleader and he was going to advise you to order the firing and the firing took place; what is the name of that pleader?

A. I don't think that was suggested.

Q. It was not true?

A. What he told me was, he was going to tell me to fly (interrupted by the subsequent question).

Q. Yes, what is the name of that pleader?

A. His name is Makbul Mahmud.

Q. There was civil authority present at the Jallianwala Bagh?

A. No magistrate. There were two police officers.

Q. The magistrates were there?

A. None close at hand, but one could have been sent for.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith—

Q. I am not quite clear as to the attitude of the authorities on the 9th. What did you contemplate would follow on the arrest of Drs. Satyapal and Kitchlew?

A. What I contemplated was that the probable result would be that a rather disorderly crowd would come to my house or the court-house and make a disturbance. I thought if that happened the crowds would be swarming in numbers from the city, and we would have about 10,000 people adrift in the civil lines whom we could not control, and people from the outskirts also would start making mischief. Therefore I considered it imperative that no crowds should be allowed to enter the civil station.

Q. At the same time you were contemplating the removal of Europeans?

A. What I actually did was, I took the estimated probability, multiplied it by at least two or three, and provided for that. We were really providing for an extreme contingency and I rather thought it would be very good practice to see if evacuation would work. I did not think it was necessary.

Q. Had you contemplated more serious consequences, would it have been competent to you to delay the arrest of Dr. Kitchlew until you could deal with it effectively?

A. Government wanted me to do it quietly. If I had thought that the situation was out of hand and I could not do it without disorder, that consideration would have been paramount and I would have said, "no; it cannot be done without reinforcements." But in the meantime news would have got about, and there would probably be a strong agitation to prevent Dr. Kitchlew being taken away, and by delaying I should have rather given away the Government's case.

Q. Were there pickets on the Banks, for instance, on the 10th?

A. No. We thought of keeping the peace of the city and my idea was that if we split up the force into small parties under a non-commissioned officer they would not face their responsibility and would be liable to be overwhelmed and I thought that in the event of any trouble there should be a compact body under a gazetted officer who could direct the men in any direction. The banks are so close to the Kotwali and we had 75 men there.

Q. Were the Banks, as a matter of fact, picketed on the 6th?

A. I heard afterwards they had asked for pickets.

Q. Were they picketed on the *hawal* of the 30th?

A. I believe they were on the 6th.

Q. Did it not occur to you that it was most essential to have pickets on the banks on this important occasion when you expected a disturbance?

A. What we thought was, the banks were so close to the Kotwali that any disturbance could easily be dealt with better by one solid overwhelming force as we thought it would be.

Q. Were the Indian Defence Force called out for service?

A. No.

Q. Why was that?

A. Of course it was for the military Commander to say.

Q. Is it in the jurisdiction of the magistrate to call out the necessary forces or is it for the military authorities?

A. Strictly speaking, only the General Officer Commanding the Division can call them out, but that would not stand in the way if they were really required.

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[Continued.]

Q. Do you know that the three murdered officers were members of the Indian Defence Force?

A. Yes.

Q. It has been suggested that if these men had been armed, they might have been alive to-day. Is that so?

A. If they had been somewhere else, if they had not been in the banks, they might have been alive.

Q. It was not your duty to call them out?

A. No, nor would one call them out exactly with that idea.

Q. What was the strength of the Indian Defence Force in Amritsar?

A. I do not remember. It was something very small. Three of the Light Horse and I think a weak half platoon.

Q. Do you know if the Officer Commanding that force left Amritsar for Lahore that morning?

A. I heard that he did. I do not think he reported his intention to the Officer Commanding the Station, but the Officer Commanding the Station would know.

Q. Did Colonel Smith's ambulance convey many people to the Fort?

A. It did convey them first of all to the Alexander School collecting station. As a matter of fact, Colonel Smith's ambulance made one trip and made another to the Mission School and found it could not get there because the mob was there and then the Police Officer dispersed them. Then he began to go round the station and found that people had gone, the warning had gone round. Then he went back to his hospital. Afterwards as regards conveyance from the collecting stations to the Fort, that was arranged by the Military people—Supply and Transport.

Q. Is it the duty of the Military to convey such cases?

A. From the collecting stations to the Fort. Yes, the Military Supply and Transport arrange it.

Q. From the collecting station?

A. Yes. We should supply any transport we could get.

Q. Were the arrangements effective for the conveyance of women and children to the Fort?

A. Yes, from the collecting station. Some of the cars and tongas broke, but they all got there safe and sound.

Q. Is it the case that isolated women had to find their way to the Fort?

A. Well I cannot think how it could have been so, unless they were people from cantonments, right at the back who had not come to the collecting stations. I understand the arrangement for conveyance from collecting stations to the Fort was that the Military picked the road, transport was provided and they moved off as soon as they could. There was no great danger because there was a picket in front.

Q. The arrangements in the Fort for their reception were in the hands of the Military?

A. Yes.

Q. You had nothing to do with it?

A. No. I had nothing. I helped the Military to provide milk and vegetables afterwards.

Q. Did you visit the Fort that day by any chance?

A. Not on the 10th. I could not get to the Fort for some time.

Q. Did you see the Officer Commanding the Fort that day?

A. No, not that day. The whole time I was at the station or sleeping in my boots.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Rice—

Q. You had some Police in the civil lines on the 10th of April? I do not want the number. Had you?

A. They were in the Police lines at the level crossing.

Q. Was Mr. Plomer in charge of the arrangements?

A. He was generally in charge of the Police in the civil lines.

Q. The District Superintendent had gone to Dharmasala?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you know of any other European gazetted officer of Police on that morning in Amritsar?

A. There was Mr. Marshall, Inspector, who was posted at the level crossing.

Q. He was engaged at the level crossing?

A. Yes.

Q. An Indian Deputy Superintendent was at the Kotwali with 75 men?

A. There were three reserves of 25 each.

Q. Armed with muskets, All these 75?

A. Yes.

Q. In addition to the ordinary constables employed in the town?

A. Yes.

Q. If it was suggested to you—a mere suggestion—that a force of 75 armed Police under an energetic officer at the Kotwali would have been fully competent, if they did their duty, to protect the banks and the town hall from the attacks of the mob, would you agree to that?

A. I would; that is what we had in mind.

Q. They would have been quite competent?

A. Yes.

Q. An Indian Police Officer (I say it from my own experience) who has risen to the rank of Deputy Superintendent would ordinarily be an experienced and trusted officer; was that the case on this occasion?

A. I had no personal knowledge of him. But as a matter of fact I asked if he was all right. The reply was that he was a good man.

Q. They thought he was a good man?

A. Yes.

Q. You had no reason to suppose that he would fail or allow his men to fail in emergencies?

A. No, indeed.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. You had notice of the meeting at the Jallianwala Bagh on the 13th April?

A. Yes, a notice came; it was said that this meeting was going to be held.

Q. A very serious view of this meeting was evidently taken by the authorities?

A. Yes.

Q. They had got about 50 men in all, Gurkhas and others and about 2 or 3 armoured cars?

A. Yes.

Q. Could not this force be detailed to prevent the meeting being held?

A. The General was going round that morning. It was only after he came back that he heard that the meeting was actually being held.

Q. But this was the meeting that was announced. If the object was to prevent the meeting being held, it certainly was the centre where the military should have been concentrated?

A. He might have gone there, but could not have done that himself personally and also gone round.

Q. I understood from what you said that the city was in a very serious state and it was difficult for officers to go into the city?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think that 50 Policemen were sufficient to maintain order in those days?

A. At what time?

Q. On the 10th.

A. I never said it was difficult for officers to go into the city before the 10th; up till the 10th there was no difficulty. I went to the Ram Naumi entirely alone and unescorted. I did not even take the trouble of taking my revolver. There was also no Police constable with me.

Q. You did not know what was really simmering in the city?

A. No; I did not.

Q. Had you no means of information about the state of affairs going on in the city?

A. One constantly tries one's best to know. I think you will see that most citizens will say that they never entertained any such thing.

Q. You joined Amritsar District from military duty?

A. Yes.

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Mr. MILES IRVING.

[Continued.]

Q. And before that you were in the Secretariat?

A. Before that I was in the Financial Commissioner's office. I was there for three years and I went on military duty for two years.

Q. Were any booths in the horse fair burnt?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they European property?

A. I do not think they were. I am not sure whether they belonged to the horse fair people or were Municipal booths.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Dr. Satyapal had offered himself for Military service in the year 1915 when the war broke out?

A. I am not sure; he may have.

Q. And he was actually doing war service at Aden as Lieutenant for a considerable time?

A. I have not heard it. I will take it from you.

Q. When these two people were arrested on the 10th, were they taken first to Dharmasala?

A. Yes.

Q. And from there to a place called Pathankot?

A. Pathankot is on the way to Dharmasala.

Q. They were then brought to Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. When they were first brought to Lahore, are you in a position to tell me whether they were brought handcuffed?

A. I cannot tell you; it is beyond my jurisdiction.

Q. Are you in a position to tell me after they were brought to Lahore, whether they were put in solitary cells and if so, for how long?

A. I cannot, I am afraid.

Q. It is said that special instructions were issued to do that? Are you aware of that?

A. My jurisdiction does not extend to Lahore.

Q. I want to put one question with regard to what you said about the revolt in Amritsar City and its being in a state of warfare with the authorities. How long, in your view, did this state of warfare continue? All the time that Martial Law was in force?

A. The control of the city was resumed after the 13th.

Q. You thought that this state of warfare, as you describe, continued from the 10th to the 13th?

A. Yes.

Q. I take it that the measures that were taken during that period were on the footing that Amritsar was in a state of warfare against the Crown?

A. I think that is very near the situation. There was the feeling that we were near to another '57.

Q. Were these measures dictated by the view that you regarded Amritsar as in a state of warfare against the Crown?

A. I should think it was very near to that. I do not draw fine distinctions between warfare and rebellion.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. I propose to ask you a few questions. First about Jallianwala Bagh. Can you tell us during the time you were Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar, if Jallianwala Bagh was ever used for meetings other than political?

A. I do not think so. I was there for a short time. I do not remember it.

Q. During the period of 6 weeks I think it was entirely used for political meetings?

A. Yes.

Q. Before the firing took place on the 13th had news come through to Amritsar of the happenings at Lahore on the 10th?

A. Yes.

Q. Also of the murders at Kasur, the burning of Kasur, attacks on a train at Kasur, all these things?

A. Yes; it had come throughout the Province.

Q. One question was asked by one of the members and you indicated that having regard to the happenings on the 10th at Amritsar itself you saw that they were consistent with a sudden rising without premeditation, but that your own impression was that there were indications of organisation and leadership? Is that so?

A. Yes.

Q. Were Drs. Satyapal and Kitchlew leaders, among others in Amritsar?

A. Yes, certainly.

Q. Were they tried by the Commission at Lahore presided over by a Judge of the High Court?

A. Yes.

Q. Did that Commission specifically find as a fact that there was an organised conspiracy?

(At this stage Pandit Jagat Narayan objected to this question being put, as the findings of the Commission could be seen by the Committee.)

Mr. Ganpat Rai (interrupting) asked, before another question was put to the witness by the Government Advocate, whether the Committee could in fairness allow the Government Advocate to cross-examine the witness in the absence of there being another party representing the public.

The President:—Anyone who desires to examine may make an application intimating to us previously in whose behalf and for the elucidation of what points he wants to appear. But it is quite impossible during the course of the examination of a particular witness for anyone to step in and interfere.

Mr. Herbert continuing:—

Q. Could you tell me, Mr. Irving, whether as a fact, the Commission found that Drs. Satyapal and Kitchlew were the main leaders?

(At this stage again Sir C. H. Setalvad objected to the question.)

Mr. Herbert continuing said: I was simply referring to that question to arrive at the decision of the Commission: "they further found that . . . also the occurrences of the 10th were due to the sayings and doings of the leaders at Amritsar."

The President ruled that the witness could not be asked about the findings of the Commission.

Mr. Herbert continuing:—

Q. Another question that was put by one of the members of the Committee was that with regard to the deportation of Kitchlew and Satyapal; you said that that was done by the Government of the Punjab itself and that you had no recollection of having recommended it. Are there other sources of information available to the Government which were not available to the district officer even in respect of particular persons living within the officer's jurisdiction?

A. Yes; for example the C. I. D. sends in reports of any meetings, before I know about them.

Q. I put it to you in another way. Are you aware of the fact, for instance, that in the case of Dr. Kitchlew, he was ordered not to speak at any meetings in Amritsar District and that he went outside the Amritsar District and addressed meetings?

A. I remember that.

Q. There are other sources of information in that way?

A. Yes.

Q. In regard to the order that was proclaimed by General Dyer by beat of drum on the 13th before the firing, you told us you were personally present when it was translated to the crowd. The concluding words were "Any such procession or gathering of 4 men will be looked upon and treated as an unlawful assembly and dispersed by force of arms." Can you say that when translated the words were "Goli se hataya jayega"? Do you have any recollection?

A. I think it was something like that. I recollect the words "thithar bihar hoga."

Q. Before this proclamation was issued, had you yourself issued some similar proclamation on the 11th?

A. I issued an order on the 11th that no meetings of any kind would be allowed. I issued that early on the 11th. I did not know how far it was proclaimed. It was done as well as could be.

Q. That troops would restore order in Amritsar and use force, if necessary. No gathering of persons or procession of any sort will be allowed. All gatherings would be fired on. Any persons leaving the city in

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Mr. MILES IRVING—concluded—Mr. R. PLOMER.

groups of more than 4 will be fired on. Respectable persons should keep indoors. Is that it?

A. Yes.

Q. Your attention was directed to the fact that the military authorities inflicted punishment of whipping on 6 particular individuals within the lane where Miss Sherwood was assaulted and you were asked whether that punishment was inflicted in respect of anything connected with the assault on Miss Sherwood herself. You said 'No.' Is it not a fact that these individuals who were so punished by whipping in that particular lane were in the fort under arrest for the assault on Miss Sherwood?

A. Yes.

[Mr. Herbert then invited attention to the witness being questioned during the opening of the examination in regard to a poster put up at the Town Hall and handed over the original poster* bearing the signature of Mr. Justice Broadway to the President.]

The witness then withdrew.

ANNEXURE A.

A situation has arisen in which there is reason to believe that a mob from the city will attempt to approach the District Court House with the intention of overawing by force or show of criminal force the constituted authorities.

Mr. R. PLOMER, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Amritsar.

By the President—

Q. I believe you are the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Amritsar?

A. Yes, Sir, I am.

Q. On the evening of the 9th April did you get any instructions as regards the disposition of the police forces on the following days?

A. Yes, I did at the Deputy Commissioner's house. The instructions I got were to have an Armed Reserve under Inspector Marshall to hold the Police Lines Level Crossing and the mounted police to remain in the Lines. In the city there were to be three Armed Reserves of 25 men each under Deputy Superintendent of Police Khan Sahib Ahmad Jan and the City Inspector Muhammad Ashraf Khan. I had to take my orders from the Deputy Commissioner and also to have information conveyed to the Officer Commanding the Station as regards the movements of any mobs in the city.

Q. In consequence of the instructions that you received on the 9th what did you do on the 10th of April?

A. Early on the 10th of April I telephoned my orders to the Lines Officer about the first Reserve and the mounted police on the Level Crossing, and also told him what he was to do at the Kotwali where we had three Armed Reserves, City and Divisional Police. I also intimated to him to go to Deputy Superintendent of Police Khan Sahib Ahmad Jan, who would be the Senior Officer in command.

Q. About what time did you give those instructions?

A. I suppose about 7 or 8 in the morning.

Q. After you had given those instructions what did you yourself do?

A. I rode out later on to the Mall, and I waited there until Mr. Rehill passed up in the motor car. Two motors went with the deportees, Mr. Rehill being in charge. After that passed I rode into the Deputy Commissioner's compound, and I told him that I was now going to telephone to the city police and the line police to stand to.

Q. Did you do that?

A. I did that from my house, and I then myself waited for a telephonic message from the City Inspector. I received the first message at about 11 or 11-30 to say

* Annexure B.

And I consider that action to prevent this is necessary to prevent a riot.

I therefore under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code, direct that no body of persons exceeding five in number, and no individual members of a body of persons whose demeanour appears subversive of the public tranquillity, shall cross any of the railway bridges and crossings leading from the City to Civil Lines or Cantonments until further orders.

And I direct all magistrates and other persons responsible for the maintenance of public order to treat any persons contravening this order as an unlawful assembly and to disperse them.

MILES IRVING,*

District Magistrate.

AMRITSAR,
10th April 1919.

ANNEXURE B.

A Request.

As long as the name of the Rowlatt Bill does not disappear from India, Hindus and Muhammadans should have no rest. Be ready to die and to kill. It is nothing. Hundreds of such laws they will have to withdraw.

An humble person of the community.

that there were mobs on the move, and that they were going to the Aitchison Park. I then telephoned up to the Deputy Commissioner that I had come away to the kutchery, and I rode up to the kutchery and informed him.

Q. Did you receive any further message?

A. The Deputy Commissioner and myself walked into the Telephone Room in the Police Office. As we got there we received a second message from the City Inspector to the effect that the mobs were going out of the city and assembling in the Aitchison Park under the leadership of Bugga and Ratto with the idea to demand the release of the deportees.

Q. Who are these two men, Bugga and Ratto, to whom you refer?

A. Bugga and Ratto are two men who were convicted afterwards in the National Bank murder cases. They were really Kitchlew's lieutenants.

Q. What were they by profession?

A. I believe both used to carry on some sort of brokerage in the sale of houses in the city, but Bugga had a gambling den at one time. He was also a head of a gang of hooligans and had a lot of riff-raffs under him.

Q. Were they men of influence over the mob?

A. They were men of influence over the mob.

Q. What steps did you take then?

A. I informed the Deputy Commissioner immediately of the other message, and I told him that I was galloping to inform the Officer Commanding the troops. As arranged I at once galloped to the Ram Bagh to inform the Officer Commanding the troops, who was out posting mounted pickets at the points he was to hold, and eventually I found him at the Railway Station. I informed him at the Railway Station, galloped back with him to the Ram Bagh and left him there with his infantry. From there I went on to the Police Lines where I had an Armed Reserve of 25 men under a Sub-Inspector and a few mounted police with whom I hurried to the Railway Foot Bridge and intercepted the mob.

Q. Had you any other police?

A. Yes, I had also 6 or 7 Sowars with me.

Q. Your force consisted of these?

A. 24 foot police and 7 mounted police.

Q. When you reached the Railway Foot Bridge, how did you find the state of the mob?

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[Continued.]

A. I went from the Church direction and not from the Civil Lines because I knew that the mob had collected near the Foot Bridge. Ammunition Column Pickets consisted of four men, two Europeans and two Indians. They were stoned by the mob, and had fallen back to the cross roads beyond Madan's shop. The two Europeans were dismounted and the two Indians were holding the horses.

Q. What arms had these Europeans?

A. One had a revolver and the other a rifle. There were two or three bodies in front of Madan's shop. The crowd had extended right away to the Hall Gate and the Aitchison Park. I advanced and the crowd fell back to the Foot Bridge.

Q. At what time would this be?

A. I did not look at the time, but it was about 1 o'clock.

Q. Could you arrive by the time firing had taken place?

A. In front of this column picket two or three bodies were lying.

Q. Did you hear firing?

A. I did not hear the shots.

Q. What action did you take at this point near Madan's shop?

A. I advanced towards the crowd and brought up my men and within 40 yards of the crowd, with guns loaded with buckshot at the ready position, when Sardar Gurdial Singh Salihria, Bar-at-Law, and two or three other members of the local Bar rushed forward and asked me not to fire, and said that they would take the mob back to the city. I agreed to this. The mob was induced to retire by these gentlemen, and eventually they went down towards the Telegraph Office leaving the Foot Bridge and the Railway Line which were practically clear by the time the Military Pickets, Somersets under Brown, arrived. The Foot and Railway Over-Bridges were immediately taken over by the Military, and a police picket of 24 men were to hold the Railway Level Crossing.

Q. Was Mr. Irving present during this time?

A. I saw Mr. Irving before the infantry arrived, and I think he rode down towards the kutchery side after that.

Q. Did you see him afterwards?

A. Yes, I saw him afterwards when the Over-Bridge was attacked.

Q. You say the mob retired in consequence of the intervention of the gentlemen you referred to. How far did they fall back?

A. They fell back to the other side towards the Telegraph Office. In fact after the firing the mob began dwindling away from the rear. I cannot tell exactly the number, but it did very strongly.

Q. Was it about this time when the Railway Goods Yard was attacked?

A. Yes, it was about that time. There is one point to remember, Sir. The mob that came out of the city were coming out from three gates, Hall Gate, Hathi Gate and the Lohgarh Gate. Those coming from the Lohgarh Gate came clean across.

Q. In what number? Can you give an idea?

A. I cannot tell you in what number they were collecting. When I arrived at the Foot Bridge it was just like a huge crowd from Madan's shop to the Hall Gate and to the Aitchison Park.

Q. That crowd must have consisted of many thousands?

A. Yes, many thousands; I should say 30,000.

Q. Did you know about the attack on the Railway Goods Yard?

A. That I heard about afterwards. I did not know at the time about Guard Robinson being murdered.

Q. Was the Telegraph Office attacked and the property destroyed there?

A. Yes, the Telegraph Office was attacked from two sides, and I saw the mob rushing into the Telegraph Office from the Aitchison Park side and smashing the Telephone switchboard to bits, and one of the Indian

Sepoys belonging to the 54th Sikhs fired one or two shots against the crowd towards the Aitchison Park side.

Q. What was the temper of the crowd which was dispersing in these directions?

A. The temper was a violent mood. Some were armed with lathis and some were armed with railings that they had pulled up and were brandishing these about. When I got there I heard that abusive language was being used towards us.

Q. Did you actually see people attacking Mr. Pinto and Sergeant Rowlands?

A. Sergeant Rowlands was attacked far off near the Rego Bridge. Mr. Pinto, as far as I know, was attacked in his room. I did not see it.

Q. Had any attempt about this time been made by the crowd to enter the Civil Lines?

A. After they retired from the Foot Bridge side a huge crowd was seen coming over to the Over-Bridge and they began stoning the Infantry Picket holding it. That mob was fired on by order of the Deputy Commissioner. I followed him after he tried to persuade the crowd to go back to the city.

Q. Did you hear Mr. Irving endeavouring to get the crowd dispersed, and did you see stones thrown at him?

A. Yes, I saw him. But he was not hit.

Q. Did you see that second firing taking place after the destruction of the property of the Telegraph Office and the Station?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Did you see any indication of the blazing from certain fires of the city itself?

A. From the Over-Bridge after that firing. I could see the smoke rising inside the city close to Hall Gate, especially from the Preaching Hall and then from the buildings inside the city.

Q. Did you see the mob had done destruction? Was it the same mob or a different mob that was fired on by Mr. Irving's orders?

A. That I cannot say. There were hundreds of people.

Q. Did these burnings occur simultaneously or some time after?

A. Simultaneously. I could not tell you exactly when the Banks were burnt or the Town Hall. When the Banks were burnt I was inside.

Q. Did you go to the city immediately after?

A. I went into the city at 12 o'clock that night with the Military Column.

Q. Did men under your fire in obedience to Mr. Irving's orders?

A. Those men were not under me, but they were under the Military Pickets.

Q. I think at about 2 p.m. a number of Gurkhas arrived?

A. Yes, they arrived at the Railway Station at about 2 p.m. When that Troops Special came in from the Jullundur side they were detained at the station and marched into the Fort, and then they came on to duty at the Bridges.

Q. Later on in the evening did other troops arrive?

A. A detachment from Lahore Cantonment and Jullundur arrived later on.

Q. You went off into the city about midnight.

A. We were escorted by a strong force. I went simply as a guide up to the Kotwali.

Q. In what state was the city?

A. When we went into the city the streets were all deserted.

Q. Did you get the charred remains of Messrs. Stewart and Scott of the National Bank?

A. Yes. I got the remains of Messrs. Stewart and Scott of the National Bank, and I got Messrs. Thompson and Ross of the Chartered Bank, Jarman, Municipal Engineer, and Sergeant Parsonage—all of whom had taken refuge at the Kotwali.

Q. Were you in the city on the 11th April?

A. I went at night.

Q. With whom did you go?

A. With the military force under the Officer Commanding.

Q. Who was he?

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[Continued.]

A. I don't know who he was.
 Q. On the 11th was any business being done in the city?
 A. The shops were all closed.
 Q. Did something occur on the 12th?
 A. They began to open their shops on the 15th.
 Q. On the second day were a number of ringleaders of the mob arrested?
 A. Yes, on the 12th. Bugga and Dina Nath and some others were arrested?
 Q. Who else were present?
 A. General Dyer and Mr. Donald. The General went from the other end. Bugga was arrested where I was and Dina Nath was arrested where General Dyer was.
 Q. They were protected by military force?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Was there any meeting held that evening in the city by the public?
 A. On the 12th there was a public meeting held in the Hindu Sabha High School demanding the release of the deportees.
 Q. Did you know when it took place?
 A. No. That was reported by the City Inspector. I do not know whether it was reported on the following morning.
 Q. When was the order issued against holding meetings?
 A. You mean General Dyer's. The proclamation was issued on the 13th. The General went round himself in person.
 Q. Were you in the city?
 A. I was with him.
 Q. Will you indicate the way in which his proclamation was made known to the public?
 A. The proclamation was read by the Naib Tahsildar. He read this out in Urdu. He explained to the people in Punjabi.
 Q. At how many different places?
 A. From about 18 to 20 places.
 Q. What was the gist of the explanation, that was given to the people in Punjabi?
 A. That no public meeting would be permitted, that if any meetings were held in contravention of the proclamation they would be dispersed by military force.
 Q. Were you in the city in the afternoon?
 A. I was with General Dyer.
 Q. Were you at Jallianwala Bagh when firing took place?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What time did that occur?
 A. I suppose at 4 or 5 in the afternoon. I cannot tell the exact time.
 Q. When did you come to know that the meeting was being held in Jallianwala Bagh?
 A. The City Inspector sent out a report that a meeting at Jallianwala Bagh was being held.
 Q. Will you explain what occurred in Jallianwala Bagh in your own language?
 A. General Dyer with 25 Gurkhas and 25 Baluchis armed entered the Bagh by that narrow lane on the raised ground, Gurkhas on the left and Baluchis on the right, and with all people in front. There was a meeting taking place in front. The crowd was seated down on the ground. Somebody was addressing the meeting when firing took place.
 Q. How far was the meeting from the Bagh?
 A. When I entered the Bagh the meeting was at about 150 yards distance.
 Q. Did you form any opinion as to the crowd?
 A. When firing commenced the crowd was rushing in opposite direction.
 Q. You did not see what occurred prior to the firing?
 A. No.
 Q. Had you been with General Dyer?
 A. I was coming in.
 Q. Were you much behind him?
 A. General Dyer was in front of us; an armed car was ahead of us. The armed car was left in the street.
 Q. How long after you got into the Bagh did the firing continue?
 A. I suppose about 10 minutes.

Q. During the time the firing continued what was the crowd doing?
 A. Trying to escape as far as they could.
 Q. Did you know how that crowd had been called together?
 A. After the General Officer Commanding's proclamation about 3 persons with an empty kerosene tin went round announcing that the meeting would be held. It must be when the General left the city. No one followed.
 Q. Did you hear any one announcing the meeting?
 A. No.
 Q. After the firing took place at the Bagh what did you do?
 A. Troops marched back to the Kotwali. The General and I came along with them.
 Q. In what state was the city then?
 A. We only passed through the Bazar. People were coming and going. Some people put on a sullen mood. Shops were all closed. People were hanging about.
 Q. Shops remained closed on the 14th April?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And on the 15th a meeting was held and was addressed by the General Officer Commanding?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Were you present at the meeting?
 A. I was present and the Superintendent of Police.
 Q. What announcement was made in your presence?
 A. The General impressed on the people that it was their duty to open their shops, and if they do so he was ready to assist them. They all consented to it and the shops were opened.
 Q. The meeting was between the General and the leading citizens of Amritsar?
 A. Yes. It was attended by pleaders and leading citizens.
 Q. The meeting was to get the business resumed. Had that the desired result?
 A. Shops began opening by that evening. All shops were practically opened.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. On the 13th when the Officer Commanding went with the party were you so close behind as to be able to hear, before you got through the lane, the first shot of firing?
 A. I could not exactly. There were buildings between.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. On the 10th when you saw the crowd first, they were coming to the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow?
 A. They were coming to the Foot Bridge from the city.
 Q. You did not learn anything as to where they were going?
 A. No.
 Q. What was their intention in going to the Deputy Commissioner if they were going to him?
 A. In connection with the arrest of Satyapal and Kitchlew.
 Q. Before it came to the Foot Bridge that crowd had come through the city?
 A. It must have.
 Q. And on its way it passed the Town Hall and the Banks?
 A. As I saw the crowd came up through the gates. Some portion must have passed the Town Hall and the Banks.
 Q. And on that occasion, they did not do anything to the Banks or to the Town Hall?
 A. They did not do anything to the buildings.
 Q. You were not present at the first firing?
 A. No.
 Q. When you came you found the picket driven back?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Then you saw Gurdayal Singh and three others when you arrived?
 A. Yes.
 Q. These people were inducing the crowd to go back, and there were people who were going over the Railway Line by the Foot Bridge?

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[Continued.]

A. Yes.
 Q. The crowd had already been fired on once?
 A. Yes.
 Q. These two people were able to induce them to clear the Foot Bridge and the Railway Line as you have mentioned?
 A. Yes.
 Q. When the second firing took place, were you present at the time?
 A. I was.
 Q. Mr. Irving stated that at that time Gurdayal Singh and another were making efforts to induce the crowd to disperse. Did they make two attempts? Did they succeed in each of them or was there one attempt?
 A. There may be two attempts because they were still making that attempt.
 Q. Mr. Irving said that he was reluctant to fire because they might be hurt. Did you hear that?
 A. Mr. Irving must have said that.
 Q. When Mr. Gurdayal Singh was making efforts to induce the crowd to disperse, did any firing take place at that time from the Telegraph Office?
 A. I do not know. There were many firings.
 Q. When was the firing from the Telegraph Offices?
 A. It was before the second firing ordered by Mr. Irving?
 A. That was long before the second firing.
 Q. That was in the opposite direction?
 A. Towards the Aitchison Park side.
 Q. That was not directed towards the railway line?
 A. No.
 Q. In the city after the 10th there was no act of violence?
 A. There were no acts of violence.
 Q. On the 11th orders issued in connection with the funeral procession were obeyed?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Do you know what these orders were?
 A. No.
 Q. Was there any trouble?
 A. No.
 Q. And on the 12th you made arrests of the people that you have mentioned?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And on the 13th the order was promulgated by the General against holding meetings?
 A. Yes.
 Q. 13th is also a Baisakhi day festival?
 A. Yes.
 Q. That day is of importance?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Many people come to Amritsar from outlying villages?
 A. They do.
 Q. So they had on that occasion?
 A. Well, much less in number than usual.
 Q. There was also another fair?
 A. Yes. There was also a horse and cattle fair.
 Q. You say that the order was proclaimed at 18 to 20 places about prohibiting the meetings. Were you present at all?
 A. I went round with the General.
 Q. When you were going about promulgating these orders were the streets deserted as they were on the previous day?
 A. People were collecting wherever they liked. People in the immediate vicinity and adjacent street were coming together.
 Q. Did you go first to the Jallianwala Bagh or did you and the General go to the place together?
 A. I went separately.
 Q. When did you hear first of the meeting being held?
 A. We had a report from the City Inspector.
 Q. Where were you at the time?
 A. I was at the Rambagh Gate, the Military Headquarters.
 Q. General Dyer was also there?
 A. Yes. His force was also there.
 Q. He took Gurkhas and Baluchis himself. Were they at the Military Headquarters?

A. Yes, at the Military Headquarters.
 Q. Did you start together or how?
 A. He was in his own motor car. I was with the Superintendent of Police.
 Q. General Dyer was in his own motor car, you and the Superintendent in another car. Was it at a distance?
 A. It was following the General's car.
 Q. At what distance?
 A. Not very far behind.
 Q. Was the car in sight?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Were the pickets taken up on the way?
 A. I think the picket met him at Kotwali.
 Q. He must have stopped there a little to give instructions?
 A. Yes.
 Q. You must have come up by that time?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Your car had the first car in sight?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Gurkhas and Baluchis were going on foot? Were they keeping abreast with the General or were they all ahead of the General's car or immediately behind?
 A. Gurkhas were ahead or behind his car.
 Q. And the Baluchis were in front?
 A. Yes.
 Q. The car could not be going at a very high speed?
 A. No.
 Q. Your car must be immediately behind?
 A. We were behind the armoured car.
 Q. You had the General's car in front, then the armoured car and then your car?
 A. That was the order.
 Q. One car must be immediately following the other?
 A. Yes.
 Q. When you reached the small lane leading up to the Bagh you must have arrived there almost immediately.
 A. I suppose a minute or two after.
 Q. When you arrived into the lane you saw Gurkhas and Baluchis actually in the act of firing?
 A. Yes.
 Q. When you saw the people they were running away?
 A. Yes.
 Q. You did not see people sitting down at the lecture?
 A. No.
 Q. When you arrived the firing was going on?
 A. Yes.
 Q. The crowd was running in every direction?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And after you arrived firing continued for 10 minutes?
 A. About 10 minutes.
 Q. All the time the crowd attempted to run away?
 A. Yes.
 Q. How long did you stop there?
 A. Immediately after the firing was over I marched back and followed the General.
 Q. When the General went away were there any people still there?
 A. There were people still pouring out.
 Q. You went with the General back to the Military Headquarters?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you take any measures with regard to the killed and wounded in the Bagh?
 A. No.
 Q. You never thought of doing so?
 A. I received no orders to take action.
 Q. Nor did it suggest itself to any one that it should be done?
 A. It is not my business.
 Q. That night did you do anything in connection with the Jallianwala Bagh?
 A. No.
 Q. You said that people on the 13th and 14th were in a sullen mood? On both days?
 A. Yes. I found the city in a sullen mood.
 Q. After the firing that happened at 4 and 5 o'clock did you find that the streets were deserted?

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[Continued.]

A. There were people coming through the Bazar.
 Q. You found the streets as usual, not at work?
 A. Shops were not opened.
 Q. Do you mean to say they were not keeping indoors?
 A. I do not think they could have heard what had happened.
 Q. You spoke of the meeting of the 15th between the General and the leading citizens; by citizens, whom do you mean?
 A. Magistrates, Ward members, members of the local bar and wealthy people.
 Q. Was Mr. Irving present?
 A. Yes.

By Major General Sir George Barrow—

Q. In the fourth paragraph of your statement what do you mean by 'in the meanwhile,' do you mean between the two firings, or after the last firing, or before the first firing? Have you any idea at what period that happened?
 A. It was certainly before the second firing. I could not tell you the exact time that Guard Robinson was murdered. It was certainly before the firing on the Over-Bridge.
 Q. The time between the two firings was how much approximately?
 A. About an hour or an hour and-a-half I should say.
 Q. Now, coming for a moment to the Jallianwala Bagh, you say that the firing continued for about 10 minutes, after you got in?
 A. Roughly, I could not say exactly.
 Q. Was it continuous all that time? Was the firing going on the whole of that period from the time you entered till the time the final shot was fired?
 A. It was independent firing.
 Q. That is to say it was not volley firing, still it was going on?
 A. Yes.
 Q. When you say it was independent firing, was it directed in any way; that is to say, were there any orders directing it?
 A. They were firing on the crowd.
 Q. Was it rapid firing?
 A. I should say ordinary independent.
 Q. But independent firing can be rapid too?
 A. I don't think it was rapid.
 Q. Each man was loading and firing?
 A. I could not say whether they were using their magazines or whether the magazines were cut off.
 Q. Not very rapid do you think?
 A. I do not think it was rapid fire.
 Q. And there were no orders given from the commencement fire to the cease fire?
 A. I heard none.
 Q. There were no orders given directing the fire on to certain portions of the crowd so far as you heard?
 A. No.
 Q. When the firing ceased had it continued practically till most of the crowd were out of the Bagh?
 A. No, all the crowd had not got away when the firing ceased.
 Q. Half of them, two thirds of them, or a great number of them?
 A. There were a great number still up against the wall.
 Q. But all trying to get away?
 A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—
 Q. There was a meeting at the Deputy Commissioner's house on the night of the 9th, and you were present at that meeting?
 A. Yes.
 Q. The result of that meeting you have put down in these words:—'It was expected that the arrest of Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal would cause a certain amount of excitement.' Do you wish to modify your statement in any way?
 A. No.

Q. Were there any charges of corruption and bribery made against your subordinates and against the police in general at Amritsar?
 A. I believe there have been.
 Q. I believe you are certain that no houses were burned and no person was killed before the firing?
 A. No, I cannot say that any one was murdered before that first firing, or houses burned. I won't say about Guard Robinson and Sergeant Rowlands; I know nothing about them.
 Q. When you arrived you had not seen the first stone throwing at all with your own eyes?
 A. No; I saw the road littered with stones.
 Q. When you arrived what was the distance between the four men standing behind some culvert and the first troops; how many yards?
 A. About 100 to 150 yards.
 Q. At that time, the first time, did they make any attempt in your presence to rush the picket?
 A. No, I passed through that picket and came up in front of the mob.
 Q. The first time when they were a hundred yards apart, did they in your presence make any attempt to rush the picket and try to decrease the distance between the picket and themselves?
 A. No, they were standing in front of Madan's shop.
 Q. There was no attempt, so far as you are aware, to rush the picket?
 A. No.
 Q. And I think that the mob, which was standing near Madan's building, was more than a thousand?
 A. The mob extended from Madan's right away to Hall Gate.
 Q. May I take it that they were about one thousand?
 A. Down below the Foot Bridge? There must have been a couple of thousands there, and they were on the Foot Bridge.
 Q. After the first firing did you remain all along there or did you leave the place?
 A. I remained there till about 12 o'clock at night at that Foot Bridge.
 Q. Mr. Irving arrived about an hour and a half after you did at that spot?
 A. I saw him very shortly after I arrived there.
 Q. Were any injuries reported by the police on that day as having been caused by the throwing of stones?
 A. None that I know of.
 Q. Was anybody treated for injury or wounds?
 A. A non-commissioned officer in charge of the picket on the overbridge had his wounds dressed at the Station Hospital.
 Q. Any one else?
 A. No, not that I know of.
 Q. From your statement I understand that the two pleaders were able to persuade the crowd to clear the railway line before the arrival of the infantry, is not that so?
 A. There were more than two. I said Gurdayal Singh had two or three with him.
 Q. That was before the arrival of the infantry?
 A. Yes.
 Q. It was not the fear of the infantry that induced them to clear the line?
 A. No, the pleaders induced them to go back.
 Q. Did you make any attempt to go to the city on the 11th and 12th?
 A. I did not go to the city on the 11th in the day; I went at night.
 Q. There was communication between you and the Kotwali? Messengers used to come?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Were these messengers molested?
 A. They used to come from the back of the city.
 Q. Was there any complaint of messengers coming to you from the Kotwali being molested by the mob?
 A. There was a bicycle orderly of mine who was molested.
 Q. How was he molested?
 A. He was pulled off his bike.

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[Continued.]

Q. Why? Was it because, there being a *hartal*, he was asked not to ride on his bike?
 A. No, simply because he was a policeman I suppose.
 Q. Was any attempt made to burn the Kotwali or incite the people against it?
 A. I do not know of any attempt being made on the Kotwali.
 Q. Were any reports made to you to that effect?
 A. No.
 Q. Will you kindly describe the route by which you went for the purpose of making that proclamation?
 One Deputy Sahib was in a bamboo cart?
 A. No, a Naib-Tahsildar.
 Q. And that bamboo cart was followed by General Dyer's motor?
 A. Yes, General Dyer's motor and other motors—of the Superintendent of Police and others.
 Q. From the time you entered the city till the time you got out of the city did the General get out of the motor?
 A. I do not know, I do not think so.
 Q. In Amritsar you cannot go in a motor in every lane and every street?
 A. No, not everywhere.
 Q. Therefore I would like to know at what place the bamboo cart entered the city; describe the route?
 A. We started from the Town Hall, round by the Octroi Office into Hall street, down Hall street, by Hall Gate to Hathi Gate to Lohgarh Gate, from Lohgarh Gate to Bhab Sant Singh, Bhairon ka Astan, Bazar Chitta Katra, Chowk Chitta Katra, Bazar Killa Bhangian, Bazar Katra Karam Singh, Chowk Katra Karam Singh, Chowk Nimak Mandi, Chowk Killa Bhangian, Bazar Gandawala, Bazar Bagh Jhanda Singh, Chowk Mulla Singh, Majith Mandi, Loha Mandi, Talab Tunda, Chowk Phulanwala, Chowk K. Dulo, Chowk Lohgarh and out by Lohgarh Gate.
 Q. And you finished this by 3 o'clock?
 A. It must have taken quite two hours.
 Q. I think, being a police officer, you can understand Punjabi and Urdu?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Will you kindly give me the exact words, either Urdu or Punjabi, of how the Proclamation was translated?
 A. I cannot give you the exact words but it was to the effect...
 Q. I want, if you can give it, the translation.
 A. I cannot give you the exact words.
 Q. Just see your statement, you said no public meeting would be permitted, and, if held, would be dispersed by the military?
 A. Yes, by rifle fire.
 Q. Why do you say this, that there will be a use of fire? Why do you not mention it in your statement? That is why, I say you have modified it to-day?
 A. I did not think of it at the time I wrote that statement.
 Q. How was this translated in Punjabi?
 A. It was translated in Punjabi by the Naib-Tahsildar. It was read out in Urdu.
 Q. Will you kindly give me the words?
 A. As I say, I cannot give you the exact words; the Naib-Tahsildar will be able to tell you that exactly.
 Q. Were there any words in the Proclamation corresponding to "by fire"?
 A. I do not know.
 Q. You did not hear people saying *goli mar dega*?
 A. I heard the Naib-Tahsildar saying *goli se chitr phitr ho jaega* (laughter).
 President.—There should be no demonstration of any description by any member of the audience. It is only on those conditions that this enquiry is to be conducted in public.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—
 Q. Were you present on the 12th in the city or outside the city where there was a crowd of people assembled?

A. Yes, I was with the General.
 Q. And the Deputy Commissioner?
 A. The Deputy Commissioner and the Deputy Superintendent of Police.
 Q. At what place was this crowd?
 A. Sultan Wing Gate.
 Q. And they dispersed on the orders of the Deputy Commissioner?
 A. Yes, they all fell back to the other end of the street; you could see the crowds at the other end of the street. But they did not come in the way of the troops when they marched down to the Kotwali.
 Q. Was there any special meeting of the crowd anywhere which was dispersed by the orders of the Deputy Commissioner?
 A. Those are the only crowds that I know of.
 Q. From the evening of the 10th up to the evening of the 15th was there any recrudescence of crimes? Any more crimes committed?
 A. Do you mean ordinary crimes?
 Q. Yes.
 A. No, I think, during martial law we had very little crime.
 Q. In the city I suppose on the 11th, 12th and 13th you had no control and therefore there was no martial law in the city?
 A. There was martial law, but there was very little crime reported.
 Q. Was not the whole police force removed from the city in these days?
 A. No.
 Q. The ordinary police were there?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And they were doing their ordinary duty of night watch?
 A. No, the night beat duty had been removed, the men were in the four divisions and there were a certain number in reserve in the Kotwali.
 Q. And during these days who kept the watch and ward during the night time?
 A. There were night patrols sent out, but I do not think there were any sent out for the 10th, 11th and 12th.
 Q. Is it not true that during some of these dates the arrangement was made by the people themselves to watch the streets and the lanes in the night time?
 A. So I heard.
 Q. Was it as an act of defiance against the authorities, or was it due to the fact that the police were removed and they tried to maintain proper order in the night time?
 A. I could not tell you.
 Q. From after what had happened on the 10th to the morning of the 15th can you tell me any specific thing which happened at Amritsar from which it could be inferred that the people were openly defying the authority of the Government?
 A. Well, there was an attempt on the Tarn Taran, are you alluding to the city only?
 Q. Yes.
 A. Beyond the looting of provisions that were being sent to the Fort for the ladies and children there, I do not know of any other act of violence.
 Q. Was any inhabitant of the city convicted for looting those provisions?
 A. I do not know.
 Q. And on what date did this take place?
 A. That I could not say either, it happened on more than one occasion I believe.
 Q. You cannot say whether it was between the 10th and 15th or after the 15th?
 A. I am not sure of the day or the date.
 Q. Was there a third firing on the 10th?
 A. No, only two firings, beyond the odd shots I said I heard towards the Telegraph Office.
 Q. What was the time when the last firing took place?
 A. It would be hard to say; I could not tell you the exact time.

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Mr. R. PLOMER.

[Continued.]

Q. Now when you were going on translating that Proclamation of General Dyer, had you any conversation with the crowds in the streets, or did you just stand up and translate the thing?

A. I was not with the Naib-Tahsildar, I was far behind with the Superintendent of Police, in his motor car.

Q. Had you any conversation with any of the citizens or any of the crowd?

A. No.

Q. And when you were coming back after the firing on the 13th you passed through Hall Bazaar, you did not go into any portion of the city?

A. No.

Q. Where is the *Baisakhi* fair held?

A. You mean the bathing fair; at the Golden Temple tank.

Q. Did you go to the Golden Temple to proclaim this?

A. No.

Q. Were you not informed by the police that there was a meeting held on the 12th and that it was decided there to hold a meeting on the 13th?

A. I was informed of the meeting of the 12th in the Hindu Sabha High School, but I do not remember being informed that a meeting was also to be held at Jallianwala Bagh next day.

Q. Have you got any reasons for believing that if, instead of firing at once, a display of military force had been made, it would have been sufficient to disperse that crowd at Jallianwala Bagh?

A. I cannot say.

Q. It might have?

A. Everything is possible.

Q. Is it not a fact that as soon as they saw soldiers coming on that raised platform they began to rush away from the Bagh?

A. I did not get in with the soldiers, but I was told afterwards that when the firing started the man on the chair called out that it was blank ammunition that was being used and not to run away.

Q. I do not want that hearsay statement, that is not my question.

A. Well, I did not come in with the soldiers.

Q. Had you anything to do with the arrest of different persons on subsequent days? On the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, onwards?

A. Only on the 12th personally.

Q. And you know nothing about the arrest of different people in Amritsar City?

A. I used to be present in the Kotwali and the arrests used to be made by the subordinate police and the C. I. D.

Q. Is it a fact that respectable people were handcuffed in couples and marched through the city?

A. When the prisoners were sent out from the Kotwali, that is, when the lock-ups were overcrowded, prisoners had to be sent out to the sub-jail and the cage in the Rambagh, and they were handcuffed and sent out.

Q. Were the majority of these arrested persons kept for hours in exposed places in the sun during the next week of their arrest?

A. No, I know nothing of that.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith—

Q. In that long list of names you gave describing the route the General took when his Proclamation was made, is that the route which would ordinarily be taken if Proclamations are being made, and would it embrace the points at which Proclamations might be made ordinarily?

A. Well, most of that route would come in.

Q. Were there many parts of Amritsar left out?

A. The part towards the Golden Temple was left out.

Q. Why was that omitted?

A. Well, the General wanted to get back, it was getting hot for the troops.

Q. What time was this?

A. It must have been about 1 o'clock in the day when we got back.

Q. You say Sergeant Rowlands was on his way on foot to the Municipal Power House from the Fort?

A. So I heard; I did not see him.

Q. How far is Rego Bridge from the Fort?

A. I suppose about 200 or 300 yards.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. About this Proclamation of the General on the 13th, which was the first point where it was first promulgated?

A. Just where the Town Hall Post Office used to be.

Q. At about what time?

A. About 11 or so.

Q. Were there many people there at that time or were they collected?

A. They were collected by beat of drum.

Q. Where was the drummer?

A. The drummer was with the Naib-Tahsildar.

Q. Where was the Naib-Tahsildar?

A. At the head of the procession in a bamboo cart.

Q. You first stopped near the Post Office and there people were collected by the beat of drum?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the drum beaten standing there or was it sent round?

A. It was beaten at the spot where the drummer was standing.

Q. Did he cry out anything or did he simply beat the drum?

A. I cannot say whether he cried out anything. The people were beckoned to the spot by the Naib-Tahsildar and their attention was directed by the drum.

Q. How many people collected?

A. I could not tell you. At almost every place we had a crowd of about 400 or 500.

Q. How long did that proceeding take place?

A. I cannot say.

Q. Half an hour or two or three minutes?

A. I really do not know how long we spent at each place.

Q. You have no idea of time at all. There were 20 places on the journey, how long would that take going from point to point?

A. I could not say.

Q. Altogether according to you about eight or ten thousand people were informed of this proclamation by 3 o'clock.

A. Well, that would be right. I cannot swear to the crowd at every point. They got together as many as they possibly could. Probably the man who was proclaiming this would give you better information on that point. I have no idea.

Q. What is the population of Amritsar?

A. I believe it was a lakh and fifty thousand according to the last census.

Q. You thought that was sufficient notice for a town like Amritsar to give of an important proclamation?

A. I did not think anything. When it was too hot to walk in the city I took the nearest route out.

Q. You did not suggest to the General that a longer time might be given?

A. No. When we got to the Majid Mandar the General remarked that it was getting too hot for the troops, so I took the route to Lohgarh gate.

Q. And then this proclamation was stopped?

A. Yes.

Q. When you entered Jallianwala Bagh may I take it that you saw the crowd running because the fire had already started?

A. Yes.

Q. And the fire went on for ten minutes after that?

A. Well roughly it must have been going on for about ten minutes.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Can you tell me, Mr. Plomer, the composition of the crowd that was fired on at Jallianwala Bagh? Were

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Mr. R. PLOMER—concluded—Mr. J. F. REHILL.

they mostly townspeople or villagers? Have you any idea?

A. My impression was that they were mostly townspeople.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You thought that they were mostly townspeople in the crowd. When you arrived the crowd was running. Is not that so? If so, they had their backs to you?

A. Yes.

Q. And you were at a considerable distance?

A. Yes.

Q. It would be almost impossible at that distance and with their backs turned towards you to make out whether they were townspeople or villagers?

A. If the majority of the crowd had been villagers I should certainly have been able to say if they were villagers.

Q. What do you mean by villagers?

A. Actual cultivators. The Jats are more like townspeople than cultivators. I think it is mostly the Jats that come in for the bathing fair.

Mr. J. F. REHILL, Superintendent of Police, Amritsar.

By the President—

Q. You are Superintendent of Police at Amritsar?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You have heard from the previous witness the statement as to police arrangements that were made for the 10th. Was any police protection afforded to the banks of the Telegraph Office on that day?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Can you explain why?

A. Because on the 6th when we had the *hartal* we had sent a police guard to the various banks and there did not seem any occasion for it, and we really expected an ordinary sort of demonstration.

Q. Your disposition of the Police was with a view to dealing with the situation if it became disorderly?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. As regards the conduct of the Police force during this time from the 10th to the 15th of April what is your opinion of it? Was the discipline good? Were there any instances of unsatisfactory conduct which came to your notice?

A. Only one came to my notice about a head constable who had been offered a bribe.

Q. About what date did that occur?

A. It was some days after the disturbances when the investigation was going on. I forget the exact date.

Q. What happened in that case?

A. We had the head-constable prosecuted and he was convicted and sentenced to two years' imprisonment.

Q. Was that the only case of bribery that was dealt with?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were there any complaints made of the conduct of the police?

A. No, Sir.

Q. In anonymous petitions?

A. Yes. Anonymous petitions were received.

Q. Did you investigate the charges made in those petitions?

A. Well, I had enquiries made but they were such absurd allegations that we did not register any cases.

Q. Did any instances come before your notice of attempts made to seduce the people?

A. No, Sir.

Q. In connection with some of the outbreaks did you make investigations in the neighbourhood and villages?

A. Yes, Sir. In particular there were some villages on the Lahore Grand Trunk Road—about four villages—concerned in attacking the railway station and cutting the telegraph wire and there were also some villages towards Tarn Taran.

Q. Did you find it easy to get information about the occurrences?

A. The villagers towards the Lahore Grand Trunk Road were not easy to get and they placed obstacles in the way of the police.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. These attempts that were made on the railway line, were they made mostly with a view to loot?

A. Yes.

Q. By cutting the railway line a goods train may be derailed and the people can then come and loot?

A. Exactly.

Q. Was that the main idea with regard to various other railway derailments?

A. There was only one case of railway derailment in my district.

Q. How many cases of cutting the railway line came to your notice?

A. I only had one in my district—the one near Khalsa Station.

Q. That is on the Tarn Taran line?

A. That is on the main line.

Q. There was some attempt on the Tarn Taran line?

A. I think there was. That was also of the same character.

Q. That attack on the Tarn Taran line; is that within your district?

A. Yes.

Q. That attack was made by whom?

A. That attack was made by the Sikhs, chiefly by the Jat Sikhs.

Q. And was that made with the object of looting the treasury there?

A. Yes.

Q. They did not succeed in doing so?

A. No.

Q. The main object was loot?

A. At Tarn Taran the main object was loot.

Q. You have no personal knowledge of what happened at Jallianwala Bagh. You were not there on duty?

A. I was on duty at Jallianwala Bagh on the 13th.

Q. As soon as the military entered the passage and occupied the ground what did the crowd do?

A. I was just at the back and just as I was going into the street the fire began, so personally I saw nothing.

Q. It is your opinion that the work of prosecution and securing conviction was greatly simplified by the lower standard of evidence that was required by the military courts?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. How many police constables were with Inspector Azizuddin who foiled the attempt of the villagers to attack Tarn Taran?

A. He must have had about 8 or 10 constables.

Q. And what was the number of the crowd out of which the 102 were challaned?

A. The crowd must have been about 200.

Q. Was it a dark night?

A. I forget now.

Q. Were the 102 all identified by the 8 constables?

A. Well, not only by the 8 constables. There were the headmen of the villages also there.

Q. Supposing there had been no martial law, under which section would you have challaned these men?

A. For unlawful assembly and attempt to commit dacoity.

Q. Not for waging war against the King?

A. No.

Q. Were there any complaints of bribery against the police during the time the investigation was carried on?

A. Only by anonymous letters. No one ever came forward and made a specific complaint.

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Mr. J. F. REHILL—continued—Mr. R. B. BECKETT.

Q. Do you think it is an easy thing to come forward and make a complaint against the police?

A. In normal times, yes. They always did it.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. Do you know who rescued Miss Sherwood?

A. I forget the name of the men but I think it was some of the townspeople.

Q. You say in your written statement that an attempt to hold a meeting at Jallianwala Bagh on the 13th was dispersed. Was it merely an attempt?

A. They had started a meeting.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. On the 13th when the General went round proclaiming that order against the crowds were you with him? That order was not announced in all parts of the town?

A. No.

Q. Were those parts where it was announced then more or less thickly populated than other parts?

A. It was announced in the thick part of the town. The witness withdrew.

Mr. R. B. BECKETT, I.C.S., Assistant Commissioner, Amritsar.

By the President—

Q. Were you Assistant Commissioner at Amritsar?

A. I was then, Sir.

Q. You were at Amritsar I think on the 10th of April?

A. I was.

Q. Where did you first come in contact with the crowd?

A. Well, I had just come back from making a round. I arrived back at the *kutchery* when Mr. Irving came and said he had been told that a crowd was reported to be approaching the Deputy Commissioner's house via the Hall Bridge and he asked me to go down at once and be Magistrate on duty there.

Q. Were you Magistrate on duty there at Hall Bridge?

A. Yes.

Q. When did you arrive there?

A. I was told afterwards that it was about 1 o'clock.

Q. When you arrived there was there a crowd assembled?

A. Well, I can best describe it by what I saw. When I turned the corner I heard a noise like the noise of the sea and I stuck my heels into my horse and I galloped as hard as I could and found the crowd there with four mounted soldiers. On the iron work on the top of the over bridge were four soldiers and the crowd was a short distance away, about eight or ten yards. That was as near as they could get.

Q. Were the four soldiers all Europeans?

A. Yes. Three or four, I do not remember now how many.

Q. What instructions had you with reference to the crowd?

A. In the morning I had received that typewritten copy of instructions which you see handed up and in this particular case it said that I was the Magistrate on duty.

Q. Did you give any intimation to the crowd as to how they were to conduct themselves?

A. I did my best. I could not make myself heard but the crowd was stretched as far as I could see and they were continually increasing. There were three men who were in front of the crowd running about. I could not make out why. The crowd were all shouting and behaving in a most fanatical manner, making faces, waving their hands. The first thing that I did was to go with the four men of the picket to the crowd and try and make myself heard, but I found that was impossible, so I shouted out to them to go back and relied on my gestures to show that they were not to come forward.

Q. Did you make it clear by your gestures that the crowd was not to advance further in the direction that they were given?

A. Simply that the crowd was not to be allowed to cross the bridge and I did my best to prevent this.

Q. Who were the three men who were trying to hold the crowd back?

A. I do not know.

Q. When you gave these indications to the crowd of what you desired them to do, did they comply with your request?

A. No. They simply shouted and made a demonstration.

Q. Did they continue to advance?

A. At short intervals they remained stationary during which I had time to say a few words to the four soldiers.

Q. What did you say to the soldiers?

A. I asked who was the senior N. C. O. in charge. There was no officer. I said: "We have got to keep this crowd from crossing this bridge and you have got to do all in your power to prevent them from doing so."

Q. Did you continue your endeavours to get the crowd to go back?

A. I continued until they drove us to the bottom of the bridge.

Q. They drove you over the bridge?

A. At first slowly until they got out on the slope. The difficulty was they were hitting our horses and the horses were absolutely frantic. I could hold my horse as my hands were free and I kept her nose to the crowd. The other four horses were absolutely out of control.

Q. What was being thrown at the horses?

A. Nothing was being thrown. One man had got hold of a small cane and he hit my pony on the nose and they continued to press forward like that until they got to the slope and the soldiers who had been holding in their horses went a bit further back and I had to turn and follow them.

Q. How far back was it?

A. When they got nearly to the foot of the bridge, there was a heap of half bricks and stones lying and they started throwing these, and the crowds on both sides opposite to Madan's joined in, and they stoned us from the sides. I heard that there were people already there who had started throwing stones.

Q. You mean crowds had already assembled near Madan's?

A. Yes.

Q. Now was it at this time that an order to fire was given?

A. No order was given. But I had an impression at the time (I think I have written it in my report which I have sent in, I have not actually seen it) that one of those two men had pulled out his rifle and tried to fire in the air, but it had no effect.

Q. Were you present when the first firing took place?

A. No. But I had a talk with Mr. Irving and asked him if I could go and call for troops because I had no information what steps had been taken with regard to troops. I was told there was a picket there and these four men were not enough. I had not known if any one had gone to fetch troops. But when I got there the crowds were already moving and had moved.

Q. Did you come upon the troops?

A. Yes, in the Ram Bagh.

Q. What did you do there?

A. I found some had already left. I rode back along the other road to the Mall to the point near the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow and I met Mr. Irving again there, and I said 'Shall I go along and warn people?' because as far as I knew the crowd was driven back, but they were still advancing.

Q. Did you return to the neighbourhood of Madan's shop?

A. Not for some time afterwards. I had other work to do.

Q. At the time you returned there, there was firing?

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Mr. R. B. BECKETT—concluded—Mr. F. A. CONNOR.

A. Yes. I should explain, Sir, I was placed on duty on the Hall Bridge in the morning. Three of us had been given particular places on the Hall Bridge, and I was not there the whole time. Mr. Seymour is the permanent Magistrate.

Q. Had you any further duties connected with the rioting that day?

A. I was riding about doing one thing or another all day. The particular thing I remember was when I got back into *kutchery* I heard that telephone wires were cut and we could not get any communication. Within half an hour the crowd had assembled, and it was necessary to warn Mr. Smith that there was a crowd coming.

Q. What was the demeanour of the crowd on those occasions so far as you saw it?

A. Well, it was bent on mischief, I should say. It was intensely excited. I was able to speak to one man only in the crowd. He came forward and I had to lean from my horse so as to make myself heard, and he shouted out to me "what we want to know is where is Satypal." I told him "I cannot tell you; will you help to get the crowd back." Then I went on pressing the crowd back.

Q. They appeared to be amenable to reason or persuasion?

A. No. Not at all. One could not make oneself heard for one thing.

Q. Do you know whether it was at the same time as the firing that the destruction in the town took place?

A. No, I don't know anything about that.

Q. As regards the destruction of the telegraph, when did this take place?

A. I was behind the lines at that time. I did not hear anything until I returned from the Khalsa College.

Q. Apparently the destruction took place on this side at different points separated from each other by considerable distances in the city?

A. Yes, I do not know the city very well. I had only been there a short time and my work was within court, so I cannot speak to that.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. At what place the telephone wires were cut?

A. At the *kutchery*.

Q. The telephone wires between Amritsar and Lahore?

A. In Amritsar itself to Col. Smith's residence.

Q. At what points were they cut?

A. I could not tell. At several places the telephone was not already working.

Q. When did you hear this?

A. That was almost immediately after I had ridden across the Ram Bagh out on to the Mall and warned the people about six houses up the Mall and then arrived in *kutchery*, so it could not have been very long.

Q. Do you say the demeanour of the crowd was excited or was it bent on mischief?

A. I should say it was bent on mischief.

Q. You saw they were in excitement?

A. Yes.

Q. The people were excited over the arrests of Dr. Satyapal and Kitchlew and they were enquiring when they were?

A. I only heard that from one man. It was simply a howl.

Q. What were they shouting? Did you catch what they were shouting?

A. No, I could not.

Mr. F. A. CONNOR, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Amritsar.

By the President—

Q. You are an Extra Assistant Commissioner?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you go to the Circuit House on the morning of the 10th, or in the afternoon?

A. I came straight away from court to the scene of the occurrence.

Q. About what time did you arrive at the scene of the occurrence?

A. Somewhere near 1 o'clock, either before or after.

Q. What do you mean by the scene of the occurrence? What place do you refer to?

A. Just this side of Madan's shop on Queen's Road.

Q. Had you any duties assigned to you?

A. I was told to proceed to the Kotwali in the city.

Q. Did you do so?

A. I could not get beyond Queen's Road.

Q. How was that?

A. I came upon a military picket, a mounted picket trotting back at a very fast pace, and they were being very badly stoned by a large mob, a very dense crowd.

Q. What sort of stones were they?

A. They were real stones, I mean stone ballast. I think they were from a collection of stones for road metalling as I discovered it afterwards.

Q. How did they get them?

A. I think there were some stacks on the other side of the railway lines. I saw them afterwards.

Q. Were there many of them?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they being thrown at this military picket?

A. Yes.

Q. I don't think you indicated how the picket was composed?

A. About three British mounted men of the Ammunition Column and three Indian sowars.

Q. Were the British soldiers armed?

A. Two of them I know were armed.

Q. What were they armed with?

A. One with a pistol and the other with a carbine.

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Q. Were the sowars armed?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Who was their commander?

A. Lieutenant Dickie.

Q. Did he make any statement to you?

A. Yes, he said "Oh, for God's sake send reinforcements" as he was being stoned at the time.

Q. Did he seem to be in a position of peril?

A. Yes, he was in very serious peril.

Q. Then as you came up did the troops halt the horses?

A. Yes, they did. I had to make them turn the horses round; they were inclined to come into the ci lines.

Q. And did you say anything as to the crowd being where it ought not to have been.

A. Yes, I told Lieutenant Dickie in reply to his statement that it was up to him to have fired on the mob.

Q. Did you give instructions to fire?

A. I practically implied that they should fire and the men were very glad to have even an order of that kind and they opened fire.

Q. What do you mean by using the expression "very glad to have"?

A. They were in such distress that they were practically bolting into civil lines.

Q. You mean that they looked upon it as the order?

A. The whole thing was one-sided; they were bolt into civil lines.

Q. What firing took place?

A. Two men dismounted and took cover behind the culverts there and I think they must have fired at three or four shots.

Q. These culverts are near Madan's shop and situated at a distance of about 50 or 100 yards?

A. In the civil lines there are two culverts on the side of the new court road.

Q. There is no great distance, I suppose?

A. About 100 yards I should say.

Q. How many shots did they fire?

A. I think about five or six.

G.

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Mr. F. A. CONNOR.

[Concluded.]

Q. Did you notice what the effect was upon the crowd?
 A. It brought them to a dead standstill.
 Q. Did you notice any people drop from among the crowd?

A. No, I did not notice any men drop.
 Q. Were some people wounded?
 A. Afterwards when the mob had retired I went up to one man and I told some people (there were two men more), and I think they took him to the hospital.

Q. At this time were any missiles thrown at you?
 A. Yes, from the roof of Madan's building.

Q. Were shouts shouted at you?
 A. It was really a murderous yell, the noise they were making, not shouting with the usual cries which they did on the 6th and other days.

Q. Did you distinguish any of the shouts?
 A. No, it was just a murderous yell.
 Q. Did you hear anywhere that they wanted these two people Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal back?

A. Yes, I heard a few of the mob left behind and they were shouting at the Indian sowars. They came afterwards. When I was talking to the men who had assembled round this wounded man they demanded the immediate release of these two men Drs. Satyapal and Kitchlew. I even told them that the men would be released, but one man from the mob struck his chest and said they should have back these two men now or they were ready to die.

Q. Was there a wounded man there?
 A. Yes. There were others also.
 Q. Were any shouts as regards self-government shouted to you?

A. Yes, one man did say that we had promised them self-government and we were giving them bullets.
 Q. Was he speaking in English?
 A. He spoke in the vernacular; he was a low class man.

Q. What did you say to it?
 A. I said they would be fired on sooner or later.
 Q. Why did you say so?
 A. Because they were forcibly pushing a British armed force.

Q. These shouts that you refer to came after the crowd had been fired upon?

A. No, I could hear the yell, it was a continuous yell.
 Q. What I mean is, these expressions of shouting came after the mob had been driven back?

A. Yes, only about five or six men were left on that road.

Q. These men made those remarks?
 A. Yes.

Q. What did you do after the firing was over and the crowd had retired?

A. The crowd did not retire into the city. They took up a position along the railway lines and the bridges. Then Mr. Plomer came out with some policemen and Mr. Brown, I think, also came out with about two tonga loads of men of the Somerset Regiment and then these soldiers lined themselves and they held the position till another lot of men of the Somersets came up.

Q. Did you remain there all this time?
 A. Yes, I was there practically the whole time.

Q. Were you there when the second firing took place?
 A. Yes, I was at the foot of the bridge.

Q. Did you see anything taking place?
 A. I merely heard the shouts.

Q. Did you notice the flames from the buildings that were being burnt in the city?

A. Yes, we even got the information that Mr. Stewart was dying.

Q. About what time?

A. Very shortly after.

Q. Was that shortly after the firing?

A. Yes, it was after the firing.

Q. Could you say how long after the firing?

A. I don't know, perhaps after 15 minutes or so.

Q. Do you mean you actually saw the flames?

A. We saw a dense smoke. I first thought the city was on fire until we got the correct information.

Q. About what time was it?

A. I won't be certain, it may be anything within an hour.

Q. The crowd broke up and did destruction in different directions?

A. The crowd remained where they were, but a number of them afterwards came to the railway station side.

Q. While the crowd remained near the position where you were, other people formed themselves into other crowds and did the work of destruction which was carried out in different parts of the city?

A. It was one sea of human heads that one could see, and of course the whole city was full of a mob. I was told by an Indian himself that he reckoned the number of men who had risen that day to be nearly 30,000.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You remained at the place where the firing took place and you were talking to those 5 or 6 people?

A. No, I waited for about 2 or 3 minutes. After the firing they came to a dead standstill, and they started retiring gradually when they saw that one or two men of the pickets had taken a strong position. Then I advanced and went up.

Q. They recrossed the bridge?

A. They went to the other side of the line across the fencing.

Q. They had come over the bridge up to Madan's shop at the foot of the bridge?

A. They must have gone across the line.

Q. Did they go back to the city?

A. I did not notice. I know they went back to the other side of the line.

Q. They recrossed the railway lines?

A. They went back.

Q. You remained on this side?

A. Yes.

Q. So you could not notice from there whether any part of that crowd went back to the town or not?
 A. I don't think those men could have got there through that dense crowd.

Q. That may be, but that part of the mob which was at the other end could get away?

A. With some difficulty some of the crowds at the end might have gone.

Q. I am talking of people standing on the other side of the railway line. Surely those who were at the end of that crowd could get away and do anything they liked?

A. Yes, I suppose they could.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Brickbats were thrown at you from the top of Harbhagavan Building?

A. Yes.

Q. And you immediately saw whence they came?

A. Yes.

Q. And you saw that there were only three Indian girls on the balcony?

A. They looked like Bengalis, I don't know who they were. The doors were open. If any one did it from there he could have got away inside.

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Captain J. W. MASSEY.

At Lahore, Saturday, the 15th November 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B.,
K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Rai Bahadur G. K. ROY, Superintendent (Acting for Secretary).

Captain J. W. MASSEY, Officer Commanding, Amritsar.

By the President—

Q. Captain Massey, were you in April Officer Commanding, Amritsar?

A. I was.

Q. On the 9th April, you received a telephone communication to visit the Deputy Commissioner?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you visit him accordingly?

A. I did.

Q. At your visit did you learn that Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal were to be deported the next day?

A. I did.

Q. You consulted as to the arrangements that were to be made in connection with the deportation?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that particularly with a view to prevent any disturbances or any attempt against their being arrested?

A. It was.

Q. What provision was accordingly made to secure these objects?

A. It was arranged by the Deputy Commissioner that these men should be invited to his house at 10 o'clock the following morning and they would then be arrested and conducted by the Superintendent of Police to Dharm-sala; they were to have gone in one car simply with the Superintendent of Police and an orderly. I suggested that I did not think it was an adequate escort for them. I suggested that they should have two cars and a British escort of 4 men. I also suggested that these men should be in mufti as though they were going out for a shooting party.

Q. Were arrangements accordingly made?

A. They were.

Q. Did you suggest anything further as precautionary measures?

A. I suggested that I should have my men handy in case there should be any trouble.

Q. How many men was it arranged that you should have handy?

A. About 90.

Q. How were they to be disposed?

A. 50 mounted men, and 40 Somerset Light Infantry.

Q. As regards the mounted men, were they from No. 12 Ammunition Column?

A. Yes.

Q. How were they armed?

A. They were armed with lances, swords and rifles.

Q. The 40 men were from the Somerset Light Infantry?

A. Yes.

Q. Where did you propose to place these forces?

A. I decided to have them at the Ram Bagh. Then I arranged with the Deputy Commissioner to post these men as pickets after the arrest had taken place.

Q. What route would the Somerset Light Infantry take?

A. Down the new Court right up the station into the Ram Bagh.

Q. In the course of that route, would they pass the Deputy Commissioner's house?

A. No. I arranged that after the halt at the Deputy Commissioner's house, just about the time the arrest was to take place, I would march up the Mall. So if the people of Amritsar attempted to rescue these two men, I should be on the spot and be able to render help.

Q. On the morning of the 10th, did you make arrangements about this with Captain Botting in command of the 12th Ammunition Column?

A. I did.

Q. What arrangements were made?

A. I took him round the various posts that we decided to have in case of trouble, as he was to be in command. I showed him the place where pickets were to be placed. From there we went round.

Q. What were the places where you proposed to place pickets?

A. They were in three parties, Ram Bagh crossing, the overhead bridge and the Rego bridge. The Police were holding the Police crossing.

Q. Where is the Rego bridge?

A. The Rego bridge is that which leads to the Fort.

Q. In what direction is that?

A. That is on the Grand Trunk Road going to Lahore between the station and Lahore.

Q. Were arrangements accordingly made?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you proceed to the Fort?

A. Yes; I went to the Fort.

Q. Did you see the Officer Commanding?

A. I saw him and warned him of what was going to take place and that he was to be ready in case of emergency.

Q. What was the emergency that you anticipated?

A. I thought in case there was serious trouble, it would mean that I would have to evacuate the women and children to the Fort. I told him that if he saw any trouble and the mob turned to get to the Fort or Railway Station, he must take the necessary precautions.

Q. Did you give him any instructions as regards placing any guns?

A. I told him to have his guns in position and also to have a machine gun covering in case the women and children had to be covered.

Q. Did you give him any instructions as regards firing or not?

A. Yes, Sir; I told him that if the mob was making for the Fort or was going to destroy the Railway Station or the bridge, he was not to hesitate but to open fire.

Q. Then later at 9-45, did you leave the cantonment and go down the Mall to the garden?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you proceeding alone?

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Captain J. W. MASSEY.

[Continued.]

A. Yes, I was alone.
 Q. Did you meet the party of Somerset Light Infantry?
 A. I did.
 Q. On your route, did you pass through the Deputy Commissioner's house?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Were there any people about there?
 A. There were only two *garis*.
 Q. When you arrived at the Ram Bagh gardens, did you meet the Somerset Light Infantry?
 A. Yes, I met them.
 Q. At which place? Was it at the arranged place?
 A. Yes, at the pre-arranged place.
 Q. What did you do there?
 A. I then brought them along the Mall towards the Deputy Commissioner's house.
 Q. Where did you station them?
 A. By the Sessions Court House. I then went to the Deputy Commissioner's house and found everything quiet; Doctors Kitchlew and Satyapal had been arrested.
 Q. They had not been despatched, I think, to Dharm-sala at that time?
 A. They were waiting to be despatched.
 Q. They were afterwards despatched?
 A. Yes.
 Q. At what time did the party leave for Dharm-sala?
 A. 11 o'clock.
 Q. Did you leave the Deputy Commissioner's house before?
 A. I went back. I was with my troops when the cars passed.
 Q. After the cars passed you, what did you do?
 A. I returned to the Ram Bagh where I waited for the mounted men of the Ammunition Column to turn up.
 Q. Ram Bagh was to be your headquarters?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you see the mounted men of No. 12 Ammunition Column?
 A. As I was returning to Ram Bagh I saw them at the head of the Mall.
 Q. When you arrived at the rendezvous, did you come to any decision as to placing the mounted men?
 A. I decided to leave the Infantry to rest, as they had been marching all the morning, and I took off the mounted men to place them as pickets.
 Q. You placed the pickets in the places already arranged?
 A. Yes.
 Q. After that did you go to the station?
 A. Yes.
 Q. At the station did you see an Indian Officer?
 A. Yes. I instructed him to place these men at the foot bridge overlooking the Telegraph office with instructions that if the Telegraph office was to be attacked, they were to guard it and prevent it from being molested.
 Q. After that did you go to the Station Superintendent?
 A. Yes.
 Q. When you were there, did Mr. Plomer, Deputy Superintendent of Police, arrive?
 A. He did.
 Q. Did you get information from him?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What information?
 A. He told me that the mob was breaking out of the city by thousands and he heard that they were making for the Deputy Commissioner's house or the *kutchery*. I immediately went out of the office and went to the Indian officer.
 Q. What did you see?
 A. I told him to hurry his men to the Telegraph office and with the remainder of the men he was to guard the station.
 Q. You left the station yourself?
 A. Yes.
 Q. At this time did you see the picket at the over-bridge?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What was happening to it?
 A. I saw a roaring crowd surging out of the city and coming out of Aitchison Park and from that direction. I saw the picket being driven back. Mr. Beckett was there trying to wave the crowd back. They were being rushed over the bridge.
 Q. How many men were in that picket?
 A. There were 7: 6 men and 1 N. C. O. in charge.
 Q. Were they mounted?
 A. There were mounted men, armed with 2 lances and 2 rifles. The N. C. O. had a sword and a revolver.
 Q. What was the attitude of the crowd as you saw it?
 A. It was very threatening.
 Q. Did you take any action yourself?
 A. I found that I was being cut off. I could not get through Cooper Road; so I had to go in a parallel road to Ram Bagh. Seeing the attitude of the crowd, I wanted to bring my infantry into position.
 Q. Did you accordingly proceed to join your forces?
 A. I did.
 Q. Which route did you take?
 A. I had to go to the Circuit House, across the Golf Course into the Ram Bagh.
 Q. Was that a direct route?
 A. I could not get through the direct route; the mob was going to stop and cut me off.
 Q. When you arrived at the Ram Bagh, did you find that a part of your reserve had been taken charge of by Lieutenant Dickie?
 A. Part of the mounted men were taken charge of by him and they went off towards the station.
 Q. Did they go in support of the overbridge picket?
 A. Yes.
 Q. On that occasion, in your opinion, had they any effect in keeping back the crowd?
 A. Undoubtedly.
 Q. What effect?
 A. They simply cut the crowd off and they checked it at any rate till the infantry were able to come up.
 Q. Lieutenant Dickie left Ram Bagh before you arrived?
 A. Yes; he came down Cooper Road.
 Q. When you got to Ram Bagh, did you put him in charge?
 A. I left Lieutenant Brown in charge of the infantry.
 Q. What instructions did you give him?
 A. He was marching towards the station. I immediately stopped him and took him along the Mall.
 Q. Why did you adopt that course?
 A. Because I had heard from Mr. Plomer that the mob was making for the Deputy Commissioner's house or *kutchery*; that was my direct route and if they had come, they would have broken over the Golf Course and I should not have been able to stop them there.
 Q. What route did you take?
 A. I went straight up the Mall past the Deputy Commissioner's house; I saw nothing of the crowd. I left a party with my men at the Deputy Commissioner's house and went on to the *kutchery*. There was no sign of the crowd. I gave orders to Lieutenant Brown to proceed as fast as possible to the station and get conveyances, such as tongas, etc., and to get down to the station at all costs. He was to keep the crowd on the other side of the bridge and not allow them to come to the Railway line and drive them back.
 Q. What was your object in commandeering vehicles?
 A. Simply to get the men as quickly as possible.
 Q. Did you consider that essential?
 A. I thought it was, because it was a question of getting men as soon as possible to check the crowd.
 Q. Did you proceed then to your station at the Quarter Guard of the British Infantry?
 A. Yes.
 Q. On your way there did you see in what condition were the lines of the central depot Ammunition Column No. 2?
 A. They were all quiet and orderly; there was no excitement there at all.
 Q. When you arrived at the garden, what did you do?

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Captain J. W. MASSEY.

[Continued.]

A. I telephoned to the Fort and I asked how things were there. The Officer Commanding Fort said that everything was quiet.
 Q. Could you tell me approximately what time this was?
 A. That would be about 1 or 1-30.
 Q. Previous to your proceeding there, had you seen any one?
 A. I sent a man to warn and turn the infantry out.
 Q. Where?
 A. I sent him to the British Infantry Camp Barracks.
 Q. Where is that?
 A. That is in the Cantonment.
 Q. How far is that?
 A. About 2 miles from the station.
 Q. When you were at the Quarter Guard, did you receive a message from Mr. Bennett?
 A. I did.
 Q. Did he come on a motor cycle?
 A. It was Mr. Bennett's son.
 Q. Did you find that there were a number of Gurkhas on arriving at the station?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you give any orders?
 A. I gave orders to detain them immediately. I wrote a chit to the Officer Commanding Gurkhas ordering him to take the hundred men to the Fort and to have them armed. At the same time I telephoned to the Fort to the Officer Commanding who was to arm the hundred men who were coming there.
 Q. At the Amritsar Fort?
 A. Yes. Fort Govindgarh.
 Q. After that where did you go?
 A. After that I went back again to the station.
 Q. Did you meet Lieutenant Brown there?
 A. I did.
 Q. He was the Officer in Command?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you learn from him that the mob had been fired on?
 A. Yes, Sir. He told me when he got there, that the mob was on this side of the Railway line along the road leading to the overbridge and he decided that the only thing he could do was to drive them over the bridge. He received instructions. He told, I think, Mr. Connor and pressed the crowd. The crowd would not go, but started throwing stones and so on. There was only one thing to do and they were fired upon and driven across and over the Railway line.
 Q. Did you take any further precaution at this time?
 A. Yes; the Gurkhas came down and I strengthened all my pickets.
 Q. Did you then return to the place where the women and children were being collected?
 A. I did.
 Q. Who issued instructions as to the collection of women and children?
 A. That was done by the Deputy Commissioner.
 Q. Where did they collect?
 A. They first of all went to the *kutchery* and then to Mr. Jefferies' bungalow. It was the pre-arranged place.
 Q. What time was this?
 A. Soon after the crowd came over the line. Warning had been given and on my way down on the second time, I saw women and children going to the *kutchery*.
 Q. Did you see the firing of buildings?
 A. When I came down to the station, I did.
 Q. What time was that?
 A. They were burning the second time I came down. It would be somewhere about 2-30.
 Q. Did you in the afternoon of the day carry women and children to the Fort?
 A. I did, Sir.
 Q. Why did you come to that resolution?
 A. Because on both of my flanks there was a crowd of about 40,000 people. It was 20,000 to 30,000 on each side; 30,000 on the Cattle Fair side and 20,000 on the Horse Fair side. I did not know what was exactly going to happen. In my opinion the only safe course was to send the women and children into the Fort.
 Q. When you arrived had they collected?
 A. They had not.
 Q. Did you find whether any arrangements had been made for transport?
 A. A certain amount but they were not sufficient.
 Q. Did you do anything?
 A. I arranged for Army Transport carts.
 Q. What sort of carts were they?
 A. They were Army Transport carts, small carts, mule drawn.
 Q. Were these carts sent?
 A. They were.
 Q. Did you then proceed to the Quarter Guard of the Infantry?
 A. I then telephoned to the Officer Commanding the Fort that women and children had left for the Fort and that he was to receive them there.
 Q. Was that in case an attempt had been made to molest them on the way?
 A. Yes.
 Q. When you had given these instructions did you inform the people at Mr. Jeffries' bungalow that they were to proceed to the Fort?
 A. I did, Sir.
 Q. Did they proceed under Military escort?
 A. The roads were being patrolled by the Indian Defence Force. There was no necessity of an escort.
 Q. Were they armed in any way?
 A. Some of them might have been armed. They were privately armed.
 Q. Did you personally escort any party?
 A. No, Sir. I went down so far as the first lot had arrived in the Fort.
 Q. When you had sent the first lot where did you go?
 A. I returned to the station and then visited my pickets.
 Q. Were you looking out for further reinforcements?
 A. I was, Sir.
 Q. Did you consider further reinforcements necessary?
 A. Absolutely.
 Q. I think Mr. Kitchin, the Commissioner of Lahore, arrived by this time?
 A. He did, Sir.
 Q. Did you see him?
 A. I did, Sir.
 Q. I think you had informed him of what had occurred at the different Banks?
 A. I told him that Mr. Scott and Mr. Stewart of the National Bank had been murdered and also others of the other Banks.
 Q. When did you receive information of these murders?
 A. The second time I came to the station.
 Q. I think it was about 2-30?
 A. It was about 3 o'clock after I returned from the Garden.
 Q. I think some other gentleman from the Chartered Bank who was in the Kotwali did give that information too?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. What information did you give as regards your forces to deal with the situation?
 A. You mean to the Commissioner. I told him that I was strong enough to enter the city and at the same time to protect the Civil Lines and the Telegraph Office.
 Q. Did you tell him that you were expecting reinforcements?
 A. I told him that I was expecting them and that I was waiting for their arrival.
 Q. Did reinforcements arrive from Lahore?
 A. Yes, from Lahore.
 Q. And did the next morning further reinforcements come in?
 A. Yes, Sir, from Jallandhar.
 Q. Did Major McDonnell of the Baluchis take over command from you on the morning of the 11th?
 A. Yes, Sir, he did.

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Captain J. W. MASSEY—concluded—Lieut.-Col. HENRY SMITH.

Q. Besides the ordinary precautions what other necessity was there?

A. In case there came such a mob as on the 10th.

Q. Until it was fired upon what harm had it done?

A. That I cannot say. I saw an ordinary peaceful crowd and also a hostile crowd.

Q. Was there hostility of the crowd apart from the fact that they were prevented from going to the Deputy Commissioner?

A. Undoubtedly.

Q. When you discussed the situation on the night of the 9th, was the civil administration handed over to you at the time?

A. No.

Q. When you gave orders to the Commandant at the Fort and other officers of the Army, you might have done so at your responsibility?

A. I did it in the event of a hostile crowd coming.

Q. Did you give those orders on your own initiative?

A. Undoubtedly.

Q. You thought you had that authority?

A. Certainly. Yes, I had.

Q. You said in your statement that the waving of hands by Mr. Beckett kept the crowd back?

A. He was telling the crowd to stop and they stopped. They were pushing them back and the horses were backing. They were being driven to the bridge.

Q. Both horses and men?

A. Yes.

Q. And Mr. Beckett was trying to get the crowd back?

A. He waved his hand to keep back the naughty boys, but they did not.

Q. What kind of demonstration was anticipated by the Deputy Commissioner?

A. We did not know what kind of demonstration it would be. It might have been a peaceful one or a hostile one.

Q. Were they given any chance of making any demonstration?

A. Had a peaceful deputation come they would certainly have been allowed to see the Deputy Commissioner.

Q. Were they told that if a peaceful deputation had come you would have allowed them to see the Deputy Commissioner?

A. They might have been told by the police. It had nothing to do with me.

Lieut.-Col. HENRY SMITH, C.I.E., I.M.S., Civil Surgeon, Amritsar.

By the President—

Q. Are you Civil Surgeon in Amritsar?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Have you been long in Amritsar?

A. Just about ten years.

Q. Are you familiar with the life of the people there?

A. Pretty familiar, Sir.

Q. In the beginning of this year did you notice any change coming over the temper and disposition of the people?

A. In the month of January, there was nothing noticeable. Of course, there was some political agitation going on. But it did not seem to affect the temper of the people in January. It commenced to affect their temper when the Rowlatt Bill was being discussed in the Legislative Council.

Q. Was there any strong feeling about the Rowlatt Bill?

A. Strong feeling.

Q. Do you know what statements were made about it? Or what rumours were in circulation as to its effects?

A. For example, that funerals could not be conducted without police supervision, that marriages could not be celebrated without police supervision, and no end of detailed interference or supervision by the police.

Q. Were there any false rumours exaggerating the powers that were proposed to be conferred by that legislation upon the police?

A. That the police could arrest anybody they liked and put him into jail without a trial.

Q. Had these rumours in your judgment a very unsettling effect upon the population?

A. Distinctly so.

Q. Could you see indications of that in the attitude and demeanour of the people?

A. Their attitude and demeanour to myself in the early stages was not noticeable. I happened to be, you might say, a Government philanthropist in the medical line. It was only when the second *hartal* came on that I could notice their attitude to myself very distinctly.

Q. That is, on the 6th of April you are referring to?

A. Yes.

Q. I was rather asking you to go a little further back and indicate to us, if you are in a position to do so, the general effect of the circulation of these false rumours upon the people as indicated in their demeanour and attitude if you noticed it.

A. I think the people believed the rumours to be true, and naturally believing them to be true would be in a

very angry state of mind over them. I discussed these matters with some men of advanced political views with whom I was in close touch, and I asked some of them if they had actually read the Rowlatt Bill and held these wild views concerning it. And the reply was that they had not.

Q. Did they express to you what the ground of their antipathy to the Bill was?

A. A general objection to it.

Q. Now, were there other unsettling things besides the Rowlatt Bill?

A. There was some little fuss about people getting on to the Railway platform. The Railway platform is very small and does not admit everybody.

Q. Were there also religious questions which had an unsettling effect upon the minds of the people—Hindu or Muhammadan questions?

A. Turkish affairs; educated Muslims were naturally anxious about the destiny of Turkey.

Q. When had the Municipal elections in fact taken place?

A. Last winter.

Q. Were there any indications of disturbance then?

A. The chiefs of the rowdies of the city organized gangs and interfered with the men who were candidates for the election. There was one gentleman who was not allowed to leave his own building for the whole time.

Q. On account of the action of an organized band?

A. An organized band of hooligans.

Q. Was the hooligan element a strong element in Amritsar?

A. Fairly strong.

Q. At this time you say they became organized?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they in fact do much harm at that time?

A. I do not think they did any harm at the election time.

Q. Did you see in the fact that they were organizing the possibilities of future harm?

A. I did not consider the possibilities at that time.

Q. In your view organized bands of hooligans have a very considerable power of destruction?

A. Very much so. I believe the practice in Amritsar is that a wealthy man pays one of these chiefs a monthly pay in the form of blackmail, and after that he need not keep a watchman.

Q. I asked you formerly about religious questions. Did you see anything in connection with the fraternization between the Hindus and Muhammadans?

A. Yes.

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Lieut.-Colonel HENRY SMITH.

[Continued.]

Q. What opinion did you form as to the fraternization when you saw it taking place?

A. Knowing the Hindu and Muhammadan religions pretty well, and their sentiments too in general, I regarded that as distinctly a sign of the times.

Q. Did you form any opinion as to whether this was indicative?

A. Indicative of combined organization?

Q. Did you look upon it as an indication of greater tolerance on the part of one religion to the other or rather as an indication of political organization behind?

A. Political, not religious; no change in my opinion in the question of tolerance.

Q. Did that seem to you to be a dangerous and unsettling element, when you are dealing with a great mass of uneducated people?

A. Very distinctly.

Q. You were in the city during the disturbance?

A. Yes.

Q. You saw the events of 10th April?

A. Yes.

Q. Personally did you see the firing of any of the buildings in the city?

A. I will make a brief statement. I brought the hospital ambulance which accommodated about 25 soldiers with me to the hospital to have it ready in case of need. I was doing a cataract on the operating table, a thing that does not take more than a minute, and my Assistant told me "they are firing, Sir." These were the first shots, the hospital being quite close to the position.

I walked across the room to the telephone and rang up the Deputy Commissioner, but the telephone wires were out at that time.

Q. Were they cut as soon as you heard the first firing?

A. Immediately after. They might have been cut before the first firing, but they were cut immediately after the first shots.

Q. Did you form any opinion as to whether the cutting was in consequence of the firing, or whether it must have been an act of the mob independent of the fire?

A. My opinion is that the whole violence went off practically at once in the different parts. I got on the ambulance immediately and went off into the city across the police lines to bring out the three European Missionary Ladies and Indian Christians. I got back with them and returned for the middle school which is across the Police Lines crossing and close to it, but sheltered by a garden. I walked into the walled enclosure and saw a party there smashing everything and the under-storey of the main building on fire. The moment they saw me they made a dash for myself. I was armed with a walking stick. I got on the ambulance and got off. The driver happened to go by a circuitous route and came round to the police lines; and by the time I got there the police had gone there to the relief.

Q. What time did that take place?

A. That was early, between 1 and 2 probably. When I was going for the missionaries, I could see smoke in the city. When I got the length of the Missionary hospital, I could see from there that flames were coming out of the buildings, so that the whole business seemed to me to have been one. They were stopped coming across the Railway and they proceeded, shots or no shots, to violence. That this plan was organized is to me clear.

Q. Why do you say that?

A. The class of men whom I saw at work on that building were not the middle class of the city. They were hooligans. They were the class of men whom I would expect to be looting shops in the neighbourhood of the National Bank, and so on, under normal circumstances, as distinct from burning schools.

Q. Was it manifestly a crowd that was entirely out of hand and doing irresponsible acts of violence wholly regardless of the officers who had to maintain peace and order?

A. I do not think they had any respect for law and order, that is for Government. They had distinctly

respect for anything Indian as they had not injured any Indian or his property throughout the proceedings.

Q. There was a statement, I think, made that some of the booths at the fair were injured, and that was the property belonging to Indians?

A. That I don't know. The class of men who appear at horse fairs contains a considerable number of frontier men who are ready to loot anybody or anything if circumstances are favourable.

Q. Did you consider that the lives of Europeans were safe in the city that day?

A. When I saw the Church on fire, considering that it is as much a sacrilege to a Hindu or a Musalman to interfere with a Church as to interfere with a mosque or temple, I came to the conclusion that this show meant the white man root and branch.

Q. Then you know that arrangements were made to evacuate women and children?

A. Yes. The arrangements I knew of that were made, were to evacuate the missionaries myself. Other details I don't know of.

Q. But did you consider, looking to the temper and attitude of the mob, that it was essential, in the interests of the safety of the missionaries, that they should be evacuated?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you form a similar opinion as regards the general evacuation of the women and children in the city?

A. In regard to the women and children north of the Civil Lines it was not so urgent. So long as the Railway line was held they were reasonably safe.

Q. But I was talking of the evacuation of those in the city proper, I mean in the lines. You know they were evacuated and sent to the Fort?

A. Yes. Except the lady doctor and the missionaries, there were no European ladies in the city.

Q. I should have said in a certain part of the civil lines. Was that a measure, in your opinion, essential to their safety?

A. Ultimately; not so very urgent for an hour or half-an-hour.

Q. What was the temper of the mob on the succeeding days after the 10th?

A. Supremely sulky.

Q. Did you see a risk of a further outbreak in their attitude?

A. My opinion at the time was and still is that if the force was not sufficient to prevent them, the outbreak might occur at any moment afterwards.

Q. Of course at this time and the subsequent date, I think no European visited the city unless under protection?

A. No, I don't think they did.

Q. In your judgment was it not essential?

A. I don't think it would have been safe for many days afterwards for a European to go through the city without a guard; in fact I refused myself to go to see a patient in the city and asked them to bring him to the hospital as I objected to using a guard.

Q. From the point of view of the maintenance of law and order did you form any opinion as to the necessity of martial law being put in force?

A. My opinion is that if martial law had not been instituted, the whole of the Punjab villagers would have gone into revolution, not revolution against Government, but they would have assumed that law and order was out of time and it would be loot who can.

By the Honble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. I want you to help me to understand this question about organization a little more. First of all I gather from what you have told us that from the beginning of the year there had been a great deal more political activity throughout Amritsar, just as in other places, than usual. And there was opposition to the Rowlatt Act which heightened the effect of that?

A. Yes.

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[Continued.]

Q. And, as I understand, there were two *harkals* on the 30th March and 6th April which heightened the effect still further?

A. Yes.

Q. So that at the time of the second *harkal*, people at Amritsar and apparently elsewhere were in an extremely excited condition from the political point of view?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, with regard to these mobs of hooligans, am I right in understanding that mobs of hooligans had existed from before the municipal election of the last cold weather? They had existed before then, but for the first time they were used extensively in the election?

A. They were organized.

Q. I want to know whether you consider that before the Municipal election there were leaders of bands of hooligans?

A. Yes.

Q. The people did levy this form of blackmail?

A. Yes.

Q. But in the municipal election they were used for canvassing purposes?

A. Canvassing or intimidation.

Q. What I suggest to you is, is this not inconsistent with the facts that you know that after the mob had broken out on the 10th April these more or less organized bands of hooligans would no doubt start to do designed mischief straight away?

A. In my opinion they could do the class of mischief that hooligans do. That is go looting, not injuring anybody in particular, but loot where loot is easiest.

Q. Do you attribute, for example, the immediate attack upon the Telegraph office to planning by leaders of such hooligans or do you think that is improbable?

A. My opinion is that the mobs had received their orders; that gangs were organized for contingencies, not necessarily on the 10th April, probably a little later and that these mobs had received their orders.

Q. Do you mean prior to the 10th?

A. Yes. My information from one of the most respectable men in Amritsar, who is not a politician himself, is that these gangs were organized on the night of 9th and that there was a butcher attached to each gang.

Q. Can you tell us the name of your informant?

A. I have not got his permission and I do not think it would be judicious to give his name further than to say that he commands my respect.

Q. Apart from this information that this gentleman whose name we must not know has given to you, I was asking rather your own opinion from your own experience.

A. My observation of the facts in regard to the attack on the Telegraph office, Banks, Church, Town Hall, school, a gang arriving to dispose of the ladies in the hospital, all acting simultaneously in different places, makes me say that did not occur without organization. And these were all aimed at one class, not interfering with any Indian or with his property.

Q. May I put this to you: Supposing this was done: by the sort of men you saw looting in the mission school, people you say who would go out for loot anywhere, would you not expect that sort of persons to loot anybody else's property whether he was a European or an Indian?

A. Yes, quite indiscriminately, wherever he got loot easiest.

Q. May I put it to you this way: this theory about hooligans rather breaks down if you find that in point of fact the mob did not loot wherever possible, but attacked particular classes chosen apparently for political reasons?

A. My view is that these bands were acting under orders.

Q. Have you any idea of the persons who gave the orders?

A. I don't know the organization. I don't know the heads of the organization.

Q. Did you attribute it to orders given by some unknown person? In your evidence you said as I understand you that whether there was shooting or no shooting,

the moment the mob was stopped all this mischief broke out at once?

A. My opinion is that the whole thing went simultaneously on the stopping of the mob.

Q. Does not the sudden way in which these things occurred suggest to you that it was not organized from beforehand but was a spontaneous ebullition of high excitement?

A. If it was a spontaneous ebullition without organization, I cannot understand native shops not being looted and not being interfered with. The class of men who were at work were I presume some of them burglars; the class of men whom I saw at that school were the class of men whom you could expect to see burgling shops, not politicians.

Q. Have you got a considerable experience as regards Punjab villagers as distinct from citizens of Amritsar?

A. Yes, I know the Punjab villagers very well.

Q. Is it in the course of your ordinary duty to visit villages for any purposes round about Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. What are your reasons for saying that you think that the villagers got the information that law was out of time, and that it was time for every one to loot? What is your reason for saying that villagers had got that notion?

A. As far as I know villagers of the Central Punjab were ready for that occasion.

Q. Is this something you know of your own knowledge that the villagers of the Punjab were ready for that occasion?

A. My information is that the villagers were to loot Amritsar.

Q. Did you see yourself, have brought to your own notice at the time, any facts which pointed that way?

A. I noticed no facts that pointed that way. I did notice that I was visited by a lot of fine stalwart Sikh villagers apparently to persuade me to give one of my friends a medical certificate who was a soldier and I noticed the attitude of these men. Their attitude to me was respectful, but they looked like a lot of gentlemen who were ready to go anywhere.

Q. Your friend whose name we must not know, who knew about this organization on the 9th, when did he first tell you about this?

A. About a month ago.

Q. That was a bit late to be very useful to you?

A. Well, I had a talk with the man. We talked over many things, that being one of them. He was not giving me information for the police as I have no connection with the police.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. How many years have you been in the Punjab?

A. I came to Punjab on the 15th September 1895 in Civil employ.

Q. All these years you have been in the Punjab?

A. I spent 10 years of that in Amritsar and the balance in the neighbouring district of Jullundur.

Q. Can you speak the language of the people and understand it?

A. Fairly well.

Q. You cannot speak sufficiently well to converse intimately with people?

A. I cannot speak sufficiently well to do a philosophic disquisition.

Q. I didn't ask you that.

A. I can speak sufficiently well for them to understand me and for me to understand them on plain matters.

Q. And in all these years' experience of the Punjab you found the people loyal generally?

A. I found the people kind-hearted and amiable.

Q. But my question was about their being loyal.

A. Yes.

Q. And you did not see any sign of unrest or disloyalty in the Punjab till you came to January 1919?

A. Not exactly. There was a little in 1907 which I think was somewhat connected with the Land Alienation Bill.

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[Continued.]

Q. But leaving that aside, after that till January 1919 you did not observe any general sign of unrest or disloyalty?

A. Not any general sign. There were the returned emigrants in November and December 1914 and the first month of 1915. That was an isolated matter, and did not affect the general population.

Q. In Amritsar you say that in the beginning of 1919 there was political agitation going on. You thought that was a disquieting sign?

A. No.

Q. You are not against political agitation in the Punjab?

A. By no means, I am a democrat.

Q. And you did not object to people in the Punjab or anywhere else in this country having political agitation?

A. Not so long as they did not interfere with the rights of the citizens.

Q. Now about the Rowlatt Bill. Did you yourself study the Rowlatt Bill critically?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you follow the proceedings in the Legislative Council about the Bill?

A. Carefully.

Q. Were you struck by the unanimity with which the Indian representatives in the Legislative Council opposed the measure?

A. Yes.

Q. Indian gentlemen of all shades of political opinion opposed the Bill. Were you struck by that fact?

A. Yes.

Q. And you yourself saw nothing objectionable in the Rowlatt Bill?

A. Nothing. It does not interfere with anybody.

Q. You thought there was nothing objectionable in the Rowlatt Bill at all?

A. I think so.

Q. All these Indian representatives who were opposing it in the Council were misguided people in your opinion?

A. No. I do not consider they were misguided people. If I may be permitted to answer your question, I do not consider they are misguided people; I consider that a system of irresponsibility implies opposition and nothing but opposition and that is history.

Q. You attribute their opposition to the present system of Government under which no responsibility is given to the representatives of the people? Is that what you mean?

A. The man who is responsible to the people for his attitude and for the result of his attitude is different.

Q. Am I right in taking it to be your view that the attitude of the Indian representatives in the Council was really the result of the present system of administration under which people have no responsibility put upon them?

A. The present system in which these gentlemen have no responsibility for any action. If they were saddled with responsibility they would be much more careful.

Q. What you mean to say is if the present system of administration was changed so as to give responsibility to the people then this frame of mind would disappear?

A. I hope so.

Q. Now you saw nothing objectionable in the Rowlatt Bill; did you not observe that the main reason for the unanimous opposition in the country towards the Bill was the fact of its clothing the executive and the police with power to interfere with the personal liberty of the people uncontrolled by the judiciary? Was not that the main reason of the opposition?

A. I am not a lawyer to discuss issues of law.

Q. I am not asking you to discuss that, Doctor. From what you read, and you say you carefully read the proceedings and the agitation that followed on the Bill, was not the main opposition based on this ground that the Bill purported to clothe the executive with power to interfere with the personal liberty of the people uncontrolled by the judiciary?

A. I forget the details of the Bill by this time, the whole details of it, but I read it at the time and I read the discussion in the Council carefully and my conclusion was that the Bill did not interfere with the ordinary citizen.

Q. You spoke of the various rumours that were started about the Rowlatt Act, about its provisions being misrepresented in various ways. Who do you think were responsible for these misrepresentations?

A. I should think an organization. In my opinion the same misrepresentations were everywhere throughout the Province.

Q. Did you yourself hear of those misrepresentations being made anywhere?

A. No, I did not hear them.

Q. Did you yourself hear anyone making these representations to any class of people?

A. Not further than to hear it talked over with myself.

Q. I do not want to know what somebody else told you; did you yourself hear any body of persons making these misrepresentations to any people?

A. I did not.

Q. Then you say the zenanas were also invaded by the propaganda about the Rowlatt Bill?

A. Such is my information.

Q. You have again no personal knowledge about it?

A. No, how could I?

Q. Then you seem to think that the high prices of foodstuffs had nothing to do with the dissatisfaction that culminated in these disturbances?

A. I do not think so, we had high prices of foodstuffs long before it.

Q. True, but when these high prices continue for a very very long time, they have their effect?

A. They will. The class of people who were operating in this affair in Amritsar were not a political class.

Q. That is true, the people affected by the high prices may not be of the political class, but surely high prices continued for a long time will make those classes very much dissatisfied and they will be ready to join in any outburst that comes along?

A. I do not think that would make them join in; they are an exceedingly placid people in matters of that kind. They take it as the order of destiny.

Q. But you still adhere to the view that the dissatisfaction following on high prices must be eliminated altogether from the causes?

A. No.

Q. It was then one of the causes?

A. I do not eliminate it altogether, my statement does not mean that.

Q. You will take that also as one of the causes?

A. Partially.

Q. Then you seem disinclined to accept the unrest following on Turkish affairs as having any potent influence in what followed?

A. It was a cause distinctly. It is one party taking advantage of the other party's grievance or mental state, so to speak.

Q. Then you suggest in your statement that some parties were in the pay of the Russo-German Bolshevik organization?

A. I did not say they were in their pay.

Q. You say "What influenced both Hindu and Moslem was more allied to a wave of Bolshevism, if some of the parties were not even in the pay of the Russo-German Bolshevik organization." You do there make the suggestion that possibly some people were in the pay of the Russo-German Bolshevik organization. Have you any evidence in support of that suggestion?

A. I have not.

Q. You have talked of the unity between Hindus and Muhammadans, you think that is not a good thing at all?

A. I do not in the least object to it.

Q. You say that the fraternization between Hindus and Muhammadans was a sign of the times?

A. If it is real. I do not believe it is real.

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[Continued.]

Q. What do you mean by "it is a sign of the times"? What does it indicate according to you?

A. A joint organization for political purposes.

Q. And you think that it is wrong or objectionable for Hindus and Muhammadans to join in that manner for political purposes?

A. Not in the least.

Q. Then why do you consider that as a disquieting sign?

A. I do not believe that Hindu-Muslim unity is genuine; I do not believe that.

Q. What are your grounds for that?

A. Hindu-Muslim unity I take to mean unity on religious matters, tolerance on religious matters. I do not believe that the Hindu who drinks out of the same cup with the Muslim, and the Muslim who gets the Hindu *tika* put on his forehead is really sincere. I do not believe that that is real.

Q. Is not each one, by doing so, paying respect to the other?

A. It may look like that, but I do not believe the thing is real, that there is that tolerance existing between the two sets.

Q. Is that your intuitive belief? Why do you say it does not exist?

A. I have spent a good deal of time in this country and I have seen the affairs at Katarpur in the United Provinces and several other instances, and I do not believe that the lion and the lamb all of a sudden have laid down together.

Q. Your view is that, looking to the past history?

A. To the very recent past history.

Q. It seems inconceivable that they could come together in the manner they did, is that your suggestion?

A. Yes, my statement is that I do not believe that this Hindu-Muslim unity is genuine, and I say that it is merely a political manoeuvre.

Q. Of one party to catch the other to unite for a definite purpose?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you aware that this attempt to bring Hindus and Muhammadans together and make them unite has been going on for some years in this country?

A. Yes.

Q. It is not that it came all of a sudden in January 1919?

A. Yes, but I would take it that what has gone on hardly deserves the name of eye-wash.

Q. You seem to think that all these attempts which have been going on for some years are not genuine at all?

A. It is a huge issue. There are something like 70 million Muhammadans in this country and the balance of Hindus, and to make a statement that because a small section do this thing, that therefore it means Hindu-Muslim unity, I do not agree with that.

Q. It may be that this view of Hindu-Muslim unity may not yet have permeated to all the Hindus and Muhammadans; that may be, but you seem to suggest that whatever section of the Hindu and Muhammadan communities are making this attempt at unity and trying to bring it about, these attempts are not genuine?

A. I am not accusing your leaders, I am giving you my opinion on the statement of the case.

Q. Now speaking of the *hartals* of the 30th of March and the 6th of April, you say that they were a masterpiece of organization?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you aware that these *hartals*, certainly the one of the 6th of April, were very general throughout the country?

A. Yes.

Q. And you suggest that there was a huge organization throughout the country directed from one place?

A. I cannot understand it on any other grounds, that the arrangements should be exactly the same throughout the country on the same date.

Q. Does not the carrying out of such a *hartal* on that scale throughout the country indicate to you that the

people in every place, for some reason or other, were prepared for it, otherwise no organization would succeed in having it done on such a large scale?

A. They were prepared by the agitation.

Q. They were prepared to receive such a suggestion and work it out?

[No reply.]

Q. Can you suggest that the *hartals* were designed and organized by Mr. Gandhi or by a revolutionary organization behind him for the purpose of developing a little discipline and a revolutionary spirit? You suggest that there is a revolutionary organization behind Mr. Gandhi, that evidently is your suggestion?

A. My opinion is what is stated in that paper.

Q. But I want to know definitely whether, in making that statement you suggest that you believe there is a revolutionary organization behind Mr. Gandhi?

A. I believe. I have no facts to go on except this universality of the *hartal* on the same day and its uniform organization.

Q. From the fact of the *hartal* being universal and uniform you come to the conclusion that there is a revolutionary organization behind Mr. Gandhi?

A. May be, may not be.

Q. You have no evidence in support of that suggestion?

A. No evidence further than the evidence stated.

Q. Now about misrepresentations in regard to the Rowlatt Bills, how long were these misrepresentations going on?

A. Throughout March.

Q. From January or February?

A. No, my information is not as detailed as that of the police, my information would imply March and after.

Q. The Bills were introduced somewhere in February if I remember right?

A. I think so.

Q. All that time did Government do anything by means of publicity to tell the people what the real provisions were?

A. Government issued a huge edition of the Rowlatt Bill in the vernacular in the first days of April and issued it broadcast free.

Q. Was that done in Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you spoke of the existence of hooligans and their leaders in Amritsar, how long have these organized hooligans and their leaders existed in Amritsar?

A. On a small scale I should think indefinitely.

Q. For many years?

A. Quite, there have been hooligans in Amritsar since it was Amritsar, I presume.

Q. Organized bands of hooligans and their leaders?

A. Yes, that applies to 10th of April.

Q. But I mean were these bands of hooligans existing in Amritsar for some time before the *hartal*? Were they existing from before the municipal election?

A. They were evident before the municipal election.

Q. Were they before that?

A. Yes, I have heard of them before that.

Q. For how long?

A. For some years.

Q. What steps did the police take to deal with these hooligans and their leaders who had existed for many years?

A. That I do not know; that is police business of which I know nothing.

Q. About the mobs having received their orders on the 10th, you have no personal knowledge about that?

A. No personal knowledge.

Q. You said that the violence on the 10th seemed to be aimed at one class?

A. Yes.

Q. The Town Hall was burned on the 10th?

A. Yes.

Q. That was not property belonging to Europeans?

A. The issue there would be who burned the Town Hall, was it somebody interested in the destruction of the records?

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[Continued.]

Q. You suggest that the Town Hall was burned by somebody interested in the destruction of the records?

A. No, I say it is an open question.

Q. Has that ever been suggested by anyone till now, that the Town Hall was burned, not by the rioters but by some one else?

A. I do not think they found out who burned the Town Hall.

Q. It must have been some of the people in the crowd that broke into violence, burned the National Bank and committed murders at the Alliance Bank?

A. Committed murders at the Alliance Bank but did not burn the Bank.

Q. You are aware that the same set of people were charged for all these acts, the murders, the burning of the National Bank and the Town Hall?

A. I do not know the details of the police or court work.

Q. Do you suggest that those who burned the Town Hall were a different band of people from those who burned the other buildings and committed those murders?

A. I do not know.

Q. Then why do you suggest that the burning of the Town Hall was by some people who wanted the destruction of the records, on what evidence do you suggest that?

A. I have no evidence on the matter.

Q. Has anybody till now suggested that?

A. I do not know.

Q. You have never heard of it before?

A. I am not aware that I did not hear it.

Q. You heard of it?

A. I may have.

Q. Surely you ought to know whether you did hear or did not hear of it?

A. I have a very bad memory except for important facts.

Q. So far as you can remember, you did not hear it?

A. So far as I remember I may have heard it. I may not have heard it.

Q. Did you hear anything?

A. I cannot say that I did hear.

Q. You said that the whole of the Punjab villages would have gone into revolution. I understood you to say, not revolution against Government but for the purpose of looting?

A. My view is that if Amritsar city had been left in the possession of the leaders of this organization Amritsar would have been looted on the following days.

Q. That on the days following martial law the hooligans from the neighbouring villages....?

A. I would not call these hooligans but war-like villagers.

Q. I understood you to say, Colonel, that your reason for this suggestion is that some Sikhs....?

A. No, this is not my reason at all. My reason is my general knowledge of these people.

Q. That the Punjab villager is always ready to take advantage of such situation and go out for loot?

A. If I had gone out to one of the villagers on the 10th of April and brought a quantity of rum with me and offered it to a lot of stalwart Sikh villagers and told them "come along with me to loot Amritsar," I could have looted Amritsar.

Q. They are always ready for a loot?

A. They like a fight and they like a loot.

Q. I want to understand what you meant to suggest about the Sikhs that you saw?

A. I suggested nothing except that their general facial expression was that of a man who was ready for any romantic adventure.

Q. You judge of them from the facial expression not from anything what they said?

A. I can judge more closely from his facial expression than from what he says.

Q. Their attitude towards you you say was very respectful?

A. Quite.

Q. Well from their facial expression you came to the conclusion that they were *badmashes*?

A. They were not *badmashes*.

Q. Then who were they?

A. They were a lot of fine stalwart Sikh villagers.

Q. What was there in their facial expression that showed they were out for loot?

A. Mischief was in it.

Q. On the 10th when the first firing took place you were in your operating room. Is it in the city proper?

A. That is on the north side of the railway close up to the over-head bridge between the cart bridge and the next level crossing.

Q. When you heard the shots fired you telephoned to the fort?

A. Yes.

Q. Then did you go out into the city?

A. Yes, I went straight out into the city.

Q. At that time large crowds had already assembled on the railway bridge?

A. Large crowds had assembled on the day of these occurrences.

Q. You were not afraid of going into the city?

A. Fear when it comes to be a matter of duty and it is a question of whether these women should be slaughtered? should I funk?

Q. You did not anticipate any violence to yourself when you went?

A. I had my job to do and it had got to be done.

Q. I quite appreciate that you were prepared to face any danger to relieve those people but what I want to know is, did you anticipate that there would be any violence done to you?

A. Distinctly. I called at the first picket and asked for a few bayonets, but I could not get any. They had received their orders.

Q. Were you molested?

A. Some kind of stuff was thrown at us, but going at the rate of thirty miles we were fairly safe.

Q. When you reached the city what did you find?

A. When I reached the hospital.....

Q. Is that in the town?

A. Just in it. When I reached the hospital my car stopped, the driver held his seat and he was instructed to keep his engines going. I walked into the Mission house and ordered these people out.

Q. They were still there?

A. Yes.

Q. They thought they would not be molested?

A. I told them that I had not come there to discuss matters. My orders were that they were to get into the ambulance in the minimum of time and that I could not wait until the crowds could gather?

Q. And you sent them away?

A. I put them into the ambulance—three Europeans and about thirty or forty Indian Christian women.

Q. And after doing that did you return to your consulting room?

A. I brought them on to the north side of the neighbourhood of the railway station and I went back straight for the middle school, and when I got there I found that the gentlemen were operating in the lower storey of it.

Q. You found these people were burning the lower storey of the school?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you do next?

A. I went as far as I could to the police line picket to turn them on to the school; by the time I got there the police had gone and they had gone to its relief.

Q. Did they succeed in doing that?

A. Yes.

Q. Now after the 10th were any acts of violence committed in the city?

A. I do not think so. The major acts of violence on the people themselves usually gravitated into hospital.

Q. Up to the 15th when Martial Law was declared the state of the city was quiet?

A. I would not say quiet.

Q. What did you observe as unusual still?

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[Continued.]

A. Well, my information is that the writ of Government did not run throughout the city.

Q. Have you any personal knowledge about that?

A. I have no personal knowledge. I have knowledge that my own police orderly could not get anything to eat in the city unless he discarded his uniform and pugri.

Q. Were you aware that on the 12th the police and the military arrested various people in the town?

A. Yes.

Q. And on the 11th you had a funeral procession of the people who were dead and without any untoward results?

A. Yes.

By Major General Sir George Barrow—

Q. You have in the course of your profession been brought into close touch with the people?

A. Yes.

Q. And your conclusions are the same as mine that the people are amiable, good-hearted and loyal?

A. Quite.

Q. And they did not bear any malice or ill-feeling to any of their class or party or colour or creed?

A. There was no ill-feeling.

Q. And therefore they are not a class of people who would rise to acts of violence against any class or creed or party or race unless they were moved to it by some form of misrepresentation?

A. Yes.

Q. Your statement about the villagers being ready to loot, your experience coincides with mine also that it does not take very much for a civilized man to take to loot when he gets an opportunity?

A. Not very much.

Q. In fact it is the very sign for more disorder when occasion is given?

A. Yes; extreme disorder.

Q. And as a rule these people would do no violence to Europeans or people of other classes or creeds or to property unless something was put before them by pleaders or speakers or orators?

A. Take the case of Miss Sherwood and Mrs. Easdon. I do not think the people of Amritsar city—certainly the villagers would never interfere with women. I do not think the people of Amritsar city would interfere with their missionary ladies unless there was some definite plan behind it.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You told the Committee that you were a democrat. Are you a democrat in your own country or in India?

A. I am a democrat in my own country and I am a democrat in India. I believe that one man is as good as another.

Q. You have informed the Committee that you have read the Rowlatt Bills very carefully?

A. I read them carefully at the time.

Q. May I know what this Rowlatt Bill No. I was about?

A. I have forgotten all about it.

Q. Do you know whether it gave the police any extensive powers which they did not enjoy before?

A. I do not remember.

Q. Do you know what the Rowlatt Bill was about?

A. It is roughly the enactment of the Defence of India Bill as a war measure. I do not know the details of it.

Q. Have you read the Defence of India Bill?

A. I have.

Q. Do you remember it?

A. I do not remember it.

Q. When did you read the Defence of India Bill?

A. I forget the time.

(The President here intervened and disallowed questions in connection with the Rowlatt Bill.)

Q. You are a democrat. Supposing you had enjoyed the right of trial by jury for a generation and supposing that right had been taken away, would you resent it or not?

A. I would resent it.

Q. You have said that the villagers of the Punjab were ready to loot Amritsar and that they would have done so.

Am I right in saying that the villagers of the Punjab were ready to loot Amritsar between the 11th and 15th of April and that the organization which was in existence was not in touch with these villagers?

A. Quite, except in so far as a few men were concerned.

Q. Therefore the organization in Amritsar had practically no influence over those Punjab villagers who were ready to loot?

A. I do not think they were taken into their confidence.

Q. About the municipal elections, you have stated that the masses were not in intimate touch with each other. The organization has no scruples about employing headmen. I think you approve of the present system of municipal elections or do you approve of the past?

A. I am not criticising the system at all.

Q. Do you think that as this did not exist in past years, it is a healthy sign that such a thing has been brought about in recent years?

A. I would call it the exuberance of a healthy sign in municipal elections for people to go about and canvass.

Q. I want to know whether this canvassing is regarded as a healthy sign?

A. Distinctly healthy.

Q. Now as regards Hindu and Muhammadan unity, you say it is all superficial, eye-wash—it is not real at all?

A. Quite.

Q. Do you know what forces have been acting during the last four or five years since the commencement of the war?

A. Well, I have read the papers.

Q. And you think that these forces are acting here in India too?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know that for the last two years there have been discussions about the Montagu-Chelmsford report?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know the two things that had been urged against any claim of self-government—the two things which have been principally urged against Indians asking for self-government?

A. I know many things.

Q. Was it not urged, first of all, that there is no proper electorate to elect representatives. Do you know that?

A. I do not see that that is any objection at all.

Q. I think you will agree with me that the Muhammadan community have their political aspirations?

A. Certainly.

Q. They have the same disabilities as the Hindus?

A. The same.

Q. Therefore would there be anything strange if the two communities, in order to gain their object, tried to join one another politically?

A. There would be no objection.

Q. Therefore why do you not consider it to be genuine?

A. I do not believe that it is genuine for a Hindu to drink water out of the same cup, neither do I believe it is so for the Muslim to put the Hindu *tika* on his forehead.

Q. Do you know that the Hindu who drinks from the cup of a Muhammadan is damned for ever?

A. That is the genuine Hindu.

Q. Are not the *Muharram*, the *Bakrid*, the *Ram Lila* and seats for municipal boards and the Legislative Council the principal causes of differences between the Muhammadan and Hindu community?

A. That is a very big question.

Q. And if the Hindus and Muhammadans have decided their disputes about the number of seats on Municipal Committees and Legislative Councils, if the Hindus and Muhammadans have decided their quarrel about the *Bakrid*, if the Muhammadans have agreed to refrain from making any cow sacrifices, and lastly if the Hindus and Muhammadans have joined in the *Ram Lila* affair, even then you will say that there is no genuine effort made for bringing about a union between the two communities?

A. I never said a genuine effort is not made to bring about a union, but such a union would certainly be desirable.

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[Continued.]

Q. May I understand you to suggest that this unity can be brought about between the Hindus and Muhammadans, the latter of whom number about 700 lakhs, all of a sudden, all in one day?

A. The unity of drinking out of the same cup and all is indicated by that. That is the unity I mean.

Q. Do you know as to whether or not they have settled their differences about Municipal seats, whether or not they have settled their differences about seats on the Legislative Councils, whether or not very large classes of Muhammadans have abstained from cow-sacrifices, and whether or not on the last *Muharram* and *Ram Lila* occasions they fraternised with one another?

A. Fraternising is one thing.

Q. Are not the Roman Catholics and Protestants for political purposes one and the same?

A. In some places they are not.

Q. Well, in the majority of cases? I suppose you quite understand my question. If you want to go on like this, you may go on for four or five hours. I don't mind. I am not talking of exceptions.

A. They are distinctly not one and the same in some places.

Q. I am talking of the majority of places?

A. I am talking of Ireland.

Q. I never referred to Ireland.

A. They are distinctly not there one and the same, and I am not aware that there is not an organization there too. If you want to become the Mayor of a certain city, say in the United States, you have to appeal to the organization.

Q. I want to know whether for the last 70 to 75 years the Protestants and Roman Catholics have not been one and the same for political purpose?

A. Not entirely. In some divisions of Liverpool you find very many Irish people. In other places you find Mr. Parnell, when he was at his best, could commandeer the Catholics of England to vote for the party he wanted.

Q. Now, after the 10th when did you go inside the city? After the 15th I mean?

A. I forget the number of days. I only went into the city when I was called there professionally.

Q. My question is, between the 10th and the 15th, did you go inside the city?

A. No, I did not.

Q. And on the 10th you stopped for a few minutes when you went to take those nurses or ladies?

A. Yes.

Q. How many minutes did you stop?

A. I did not look at the watch. Probably not more than 10 minutes.

Q. How many minutes did you stop before the school?

A. Before the school, not one.

Q. Therefore, may I take it that beyond your dash inside the city at the rate of 30 miles an hour on the evening of the 10th, you had no occasion to watch the demeanour of the crowd from the 10th to the 15th?

A. I had occasion to watch the demeanour of those whom I met with. I had no occasion to watch the demeanour of the people at large. It was not part of my duty in any sense to go on parading the city.

Q. My whole point is, you have stated before that his Committee that the demeanour of the crowd from the 10th to the 15th was very sulky. Therefore I say that as, between the 10th and the 15th, you did not go to the city, that as you stopped for only 10 minutes between the 10th and the 15th, you had no occasion to watch the demeanour of the crowd inside the city.

A. My work is close to the city, and the crowd is coming in and going out. I meet the same people that I would meet if I once went through the city.

Q. May I understand the crowds were coming to where you were?

A. They were going to the railway station on business and some of them were coming into my hospital.

Q. And the evidence you gave was judging from their eyes or faces?

A. General demeanour.

Q. And that crowd whom you met at the railway station paid visits at the hospital?

A. I met them all over the place.

Q. Those whom you met all over the place were the crowd of the city of Amritsar?

A. They were the people of Amritsar.

Q. What is the distance between the National Bank and the Town Hall and the Kotwali?

A. The Town Hall is up against the Kotwali.

Q. And the National Bank?

A. I should say about five minutes' walk.

Q. Were they burnt one after the other or at the same time?

A. I should think the whole of these buildings were burnt pretty well at the same time, but I don't know definitely.

Q. What records you suggest are kept in the Town Hall?

A. Municipal records.

Q. Do you think some people will be interested in burning those records?

A. Possibly.

Q. Are there any records deciding questions of title, etc.?

A. I do not know what records are kept there.

Q. Excepting building applications and the accounts, are there any other records kept in the Town Hall?

A. Accounts would be a very important class of records. Records of accounts, I know, were destroyed.

Q. In answer to Sir (Himantlal Setalvad, you asked him to come with you to a certain village and so on, have you ever tried that experiment yourself?

A. No.

Q. In answer to General Barrow you said that these villagers throughout the Punjab were very loyal, amiable and good-hearted and that they never fight or quarrel?

A. I did not say so. They do both.

Q. At the same time you said that so long as the leaders and speakers and orators do not influence them they do nothing. These are the very words?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore may I understand that the masses in the Punjab are under the influence of leaders and speakers and orators?

A. Masses? I don't think so.

Q. Therefore these leaders and speakers and orators will have no influence over them?

A. That is to come on trial. It may harm or may not harm.

Q. Now you have expressed your opinion about Bolshevism and you have been questioned. May I know as to whether this opinion of yours was shared by the authorities in Amritsar or not?

A. I do not know.

Q. Between the 9th up to the 15th you were present at several of the conferences and meetings that were held by the authorities?

A. No. By accident I was present at one, and that was by accident and not by design.

Q. You were absent from Amritsar on the 9th. Is it not so?

A. Yes.

Q. At what time did you leave Amritsar?

A. I think by the Bombay Mail in the morning.

Q. And you came back by the evening train?

A. Yes, I came back by the evening train.

Q. Had you any conversation with the authorities at Lahore about Amritsar affairs on the 9th?

A. Yes.

Q. The order of deportation for Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal came by the same train with you?

A. That I don't know. I know nothing about that order.

Q. Is it not a fact that you at least came to know that very night that an order had arrived?

A. I came to know about it that night when I called on the Deputy Commissioner after dinner.

Q. Had you any conversation about Amritsar affairs at Lahore with the authorities?

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[Continued.]

A. Yes.
 Q. You expressed your view about the situation in Amritsar?
 A. Yes.
 Q. The position of the leaders was the subject of conversation?
 A. Practically not. The leaders were known to everybody.
 Q. Did you consent to the order of deportation being passed against Dr. Satyapal and Dr. Kitchlew, or did you approve of it?
 A. I neither suggested it nor approved nor disapproved of it. I had not within my official province to do anything with this order.
 Q. I think you were aware of the fact that a number of soldiers were going to the Jallianwala Bagh with General Dyer?
 A. I was not aware of it. I did not become aware of it until about 7 or 8 o'clock in the evening after the events.
 Q. Can you give this Committee any idea as to how many wounded persons were admitted in your hospital between the 13th and the 25th April?
 A. Do you mean gun shot injuries? About 24.
 Q. Between the 13th and the 25th April?
 A. Between the 13th and the 1st July. About 24.
 Q. Do you know one Bodh Singh of Amritsar?
 A. I probably do. I know many people whose names I do not remember.
 Q. Do you remember if during this period after the 13th any person was brought to you by Bodh Singh for treatment as he was dangerously wounded and it was a case of amputation of the leg or arm?
 A. I don't remember. Probably he did.
 Q. Did you perform the operation upon him?
 A. All the cases that came into my hospital I attended to.
 Q. I am not talking of hospital cases.
 A. I am including him. All the cases that were brought into the hospital were operated on as far as possible by me. I did not leave them to my Assistant. I treated these cases in the same way as I would treat the same cases at any other time.
 Q. An allegation has been made, and I want to put it to you if there is any truth in it, that in some cases when people in the city brought wounded persons to you, the first reply you gave them was to go to Gandhi and Kitchlew?
 A. It is an absolute falsehood. I told no patient anything of the kind.
 Q. I do not suggest it. I wanted you to deny it.
 A. I am very pleased that you asked me that question.
 Q. Now is this allegation true, that this Bodh Singh brought his relation to you for the amputation of leg or arm and you refused to perform the amputation without being paid Rs. 1,500?
 A. It is untrue.
 Q. When he was taken to the Mission Hospital, there the operation was performed for Rs. 50?
 A. I remember one case was brought to me and he was suffering from tetanus and I refused to operate on him because the man would die of tetanus, whether operated on or not; he had only a very short time to live. That is possibly the case that has been construed up in this way.
 Q. Did you make any special arrangements for the wounded on the night of the 13th or on the morning of the 14th?
 A. As soon as the fires broke out, as soon as the wires were cut, I ordered a lot of medicines as I expected a lot of these cases in order to treat them.
 Q. When was this done, on what date?
 A. I did not keep dates of these. It was the earliest time after the 10th after the wire was opened.
 Q. Apart from this ordering of medicines from Lahore, may I know as to whether any special arrangements were

made at the hospital on the night of the 13th and the morning of the 14th?
 A. No special arrangements were required. Everything was ready. It is always ready.
 Q. Now you are quite sure that except on the 9th April you were not present at any other meeting?
 A. I am quite sure. I have never been consulted on matters of what is called local defence. The Doctor never is.
 Q. I don't ask whether you have.
 A. To be present at the meeting I would simply have to be consulted.
 Q. Did you ever suggest that any drastic measures should be taken against Amritsar, such as bombardment or something like that?
 A. I suggested on the 10th April that such force should be used as would re-establish law and order.
 Q. Have you ever suggested that Amritsar should be bombarded?
 A. My answer is the answer I gave, that such force as is necessary which would re-establish law and order should be used.
 Q. Did you ever suggest to the authorities that Amritsar should be bombarded?
 A. I suggested what I state.
 Q. Therefore you did not suggest this? You can deny it if you like.
 A. I suggested what I state. It may imply bombardment, it may imply anything.
 Q. I am right in thinking that between the 10th and 15th or 16th even when you were asked to go to the city you refused to go?
 A. I was asked to go and see one case, and I advised the party to bring the patient up to the hospital to a comfortable room in the hospital and that I would see him there, but I objected to going with a police guard.
 Q. Now about these rumours, were these rumours confined to the Punjab or were they current all over the country?
 A. That I do not know.
 Q. I put it to you that, supposing similar rumours were current all over the country in every district and in every province, in the United Provinces, Madras, Calcutta and Bombay, then what would you suggest as to why there should be any such extraordinary excitement here? If I put it to you that the rumours which you say were current were so throughout the country in the months of February and March, then can you give any special reasons why these results followed in the Punjab?
 A. I cannot.
 Q. I suggest that similar rumours were current everywhere throughout the country. You have suggested that these rumours were current and the majority of the masses believed these rumours and were ready for mischief. Therefore what I want to know is, supposing what I suggest is correct, whether the people of the Punjab alone were ready for mischief on account of these rumours?
 A. Well, I could not easily answer you that question. If you take a mere opinion for an answer, my opinion would be that the Punjab is a warlike province of India, that your influencing the province from which the Indian army was recruited would be a very important thing. I do not see any special reason why the Punjab was selected more than other provinces.
 Q. You said that orders were given by some unknown person. Where do you locate this unknown person, do you think he is in the Amritsar city?
 A. No, I do not know where he is.
 Q. You do not suggest that Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal were responsible for these and other orders or were they?
 A. I know Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal very well. But I do not regard them as organizers. I regard them as much smaller men than organizers.
 Q. Then you have stated that for what was done by the crowd on the 10th, according to your belief, orders were previously issued?
 A. No. My opinion is that the organization was for an ulterior date and that the affairs at Amritsar on the

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[Continued.]

10th were regrettable to the organization as the show had gone out of hand.
 Q. And you believed that at some future date a red flag would be unfurled and that there would be a revolution?
 A. Yes, that was the intention.
 Q. You do not make Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal responsible for these orders? Before the 10th certain orders were given by certain persons to do a certain thing. According to you, those persons were waiting and biding their time, but they prematurely did certain things which they were not authorized to do that day. Therefore the men who were responsible for these orders were Drs. Satyapal and Kitchlew?
 A. The show had gone out of hand.
 Q. I am sorry. To my mind the answer is not quite clear. I want to know whether Drs. Satyapal and Kitchlew were responsible for these orders which were passed before the 10th and which were disobeyed and whether something was done which was premature? Were these two people responsible for these orders?
 A. That I do not know.
 Q. Now I do not think so far as the villages are concerned you have to pay many professional visits to these villages?
 A. I have to go to the district and inspect a lot of dispensaries.
 Q. My first question is whether you are called to the villages professionally?
 A. Not professionally, but I have to inspect vaccination and so on.
 Q. Then your connection with the different villages is in your official capacity of supervising the work of the vaccinators and the work of vital statistics?
 A. Vital statistics work does not give me any trouble.
 Q. Once in six months you go and visit the Tahsil dispensaries, is it not so?
 A. I have to see the district dispensaries once in a quarter.
 Q. That is all. That is so far as your connection with the tahsils is concerned, you have to supervise the vaccination work, and inspect district dispensaries once in three months?
 A. Supervising vaccination work means stopping an hour or two in a village.
 Q. How many times have you to supervise the vaccination work in one month?
 A. A fortnight every cold weather.
 Q. And there are vaccination depôts in every village?
 A. No.
 Q. As you have stated that so far as this supervision work is concerned, you have to stop in those villages for two or three hours?
 A. I have to go round and inspect. My interest in these villages is great. In going across the villages I generally have a talk with the people over general sanitary matters, their crops, their cattle, their children and so on.
 Q. Beyond your visit once in 15 days in the cold weather and once in a quarter to supervise the district dispensaries, you have no other connection with the village affairs?
 A. I have a great connection with village affairs. I have probably the largest one man hospital in the world. I see the relatives of the patients and so on.
 Q. First of all, you were talking of visiting villages leaving your headquarters only for 15 days for supervising vaccination work and once in a quarter to see the dispensaries which are in the villages?
 A. Yes, to supervise these things as also to attend to a few other things.
 Q. How far is the place where you were when you first heard the firing from the National Bank?
 A. From the National Bank? I was in the hospital and I think the distance is about half-a-mile. If you go round the circuitous road it is between a quarter and half a mile.
 Q. What was the time when you heard the firing?
 A. I did not look at my watch.
 Q. Is it not necessary for the purpose of canvassing to have a large number of canvassers?

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A. Yes.
 Q. I do not understand what you mean by saying that at the time of election certain persons were organized. If I understand it right, it is like this. Here was a candidate A fighting against candidate B. A had a large number of persons employed, either honorary or paid workers, in order to secure votes for him. There was B who was opposing him; he had a large number of persons, either paid or honorary, to secure votes for him. That is what did take place in Amritsar?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And this is what you say they were organized for on this occasion?
 A. That is what I call legitimate.
 Q. I am talking about organization. That is the organization you were speaking of. The organization according to you means that A was fighting against B. A employed a number of honorary or paid men as canvassers, and B also employed a number of honorary or paid men as canvassers for 10 or 15 days during the time of election they worked for him?
 A. Yes.
 Q. After that the whole thing is abandoned. Those people would have nothing to do with the successful candidate?
 A. Of course not.
 Q. Therefore that is what you meant by saying that at the time of election people were organized?
 A. Yes.
 Q. May I understand that you claim that by seeing the face of a man, you could say whether that man would commit theft or burglary or not?
 A. I did not say anything of the kind. I will make a very broad guess indeed as to what he is.
 Q. You have stated before this Committee that by seeing those men, who were at the school, you could say that they were not the men who would commit theft or looting. The only possible inference for me to draw is that, by seeing their faces or by seeing their dress, you came to the conclusion that they were not the men who usually commit theft or burglary or looting?
 A. No; nothing of the kind. They are the class of men who do that.
 Q. By seeing the face you concluded that they were the class of men who usually commit looting or burglary?
 A. Yes; they were the type.
 Q. You know Bugga and Ratto?
 A. I did a hernia operation for one of them at one time. I did not know his name then, and I do not know it now, but I know the man.
 Q. You knew the man previously, i.e., before you operated?
 A. I would know if I were to see him.
 Q. Was he a badmash?
 A. Such is my information. I never saw him do anything.
 Q. From his face, is he the man who will commit loot?
 A. I do not know.
 Q. Have you seen Ratto?
 A. I may have seen him; probably I have seen him.
 Q. Then you do not know who were the leaders of the hooligans before this occurrence? Were you or were you not aware as to who were the leaders of these so-called hooligans in Amritsar?
 A. I was not aware.
 Q. Did it or did it not come to your knowledge? Is it not your experience that in the majority of the Indian towns, so far as the different professions are concerned, there are chowdhris or panchayats for every class; take, for instance, butchers or kumhars; have not all these communities got a chowdhri?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Is it not a fact that if a chowdhri asks anything to be done, the whole brotherhood, it may be 5,000, or 10,000 or 15,000, will obey his order?
 A. Yes. It may or may not obey orders. There is generally a chowdhri in an organization.]

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Lieut.-Colonel HENRY SMITH—concluded—Mr. F. H. BURTON.

Q. Therefore these organizations do exist in every town. Do they or do they not?

A. Organizations exist. Organization for a definite purpose is another story.

Q. For the purpose of securing vote; supposing I enlist the sympathy of a *chowdhri* of butchers in my favour and

he orders the whole *Panchayat* to vote in my favour, would you then begin to call him a hooligan, a man who intimidates?

A. Certainly not; so long as he does not interfere with the rights of any citizen, I would not call him a hooligan.

Mr. F. H. BURTON, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar.

By the President—

Q. Were you Deputy Commissioner of the Amritsar District from October 1917 to February 1919?

A. Yes.

Q. During that time had you the opportunity of forming conclusions as to subjects that were affecting the public mind?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you during that period see indications of unrest?

A. No; I should not say I saw any indication of unrest.

Q. Were there any causes of unsettlement in the public mind?

A. Yes, causes that might give rise to discontent.

Q. What were these causes?

A. The principal one would be the high prices.

Q. That is the economic cause?

A. Yes; and then there was the agitation over the platform tickets just as I left the district.

Q. We have heard about that already. Were there any political causes of any unsettlement in the public mind?

A. There was the Turkish peace terms. I think there was one meeting about the Turkish peace terms and one about the Rowlatt Bill before I left the district.

Q. Were there any other political topics that engaged attention?

A. No political matters besides that.

Q. I think there was a District Congress Committee formed in 1917?

A. Yes.

Q. In connection with that there was a good deal of political agitation?

A. Yes, quite so.

Q. Among local causes, there was the question of the Municipal elections?

A. Municipal elections caused a good deal of excitement owing to the introduction of the new ward system and also to the allotment of three separate seats to Sikhs.

Q. As regards the questions of recruiting and war loans, how did Amritsar stand?

A. The second war loan was raised in my time. There were some 10,000 recruits altogether.

Q. That is from the district?

A. Yes.

Q. What are the figures for the city?

A. The city furnished practically no recruits for six months of 1918, for which we have figures. Only 51 recruits altogether from the city came forward.

Q. As regards contribution to the war loan?

A. The city of Amritsar, as far as my recollection goes, contributed about 16 lakhs or possibly 17 lakhs.

Q. So far as the city of Amritsar was concerned, was it materially affected either by recruiting or by contributions to the war loans?

A. No, not at all. I considered the contribution very low. Amritsar is a city of great wealth; and they could easily have given 50 lakhs in my opinion.

Q. As regards those who were prominent in connection with politics, was Dr. Kitchlew a leading politician?

A. Dr. Kitchlew was a leading politician certainly. He was a pronounced Home Ruler, and he is a man we always regarded as a source of trouble in the city.

Q. By trouble what do you mean?

A. We thought that his speeches and actions might cause breaches of peace. The idea was that his activities might tend to cause some breach of the peace.

Q. Were complaints made about his activities?

A. Yes; I heard from various people that his influence was not for the good of the people, and one man did, I

remember, actually complain in August that his son was being led astray by Dr. Kitchlew.

Q. Do you know personally about the nature and character of any of the speeches made by him?

A. I was not present at any meeting addressed by him. I have seen reports of meetings at which he made speeches. During my time he did not make any speech to which one could make any great objection.

Q. During that time speeches of a political character, such as might be delivered by a politician of advanced views, were made?

A. Yes.

Q. What about Dr. Satyapal?

A. Dr. Satyapal did not come to my notice at all. He was prominent during the platform ticket agitation. But that was just as I was leaving the district.

Q. What do you know about the man referred to under the name of Ratto?

A. What I know from our record is that he was a member of a seditious club that existed in 1907 known as the Shining Club. He took a leading part in organizing volunteers and inducing the people to join in the Provincial Conference of 1918. He was helping Congress matters. That is all I know about him.

Q. Was there any prominent member of the Congress by the name of Kotu Mal?

A. Yes. He was a prominent member of the Congress.

Q. Do you know whether he was active in connection with the agitation over the Rowlatt Bill?

A. Yes, at the meeting of the 9th February he made rather a strong speech on that occasion and gave as a reason against the Bill that it was intended to bar soldiers from getting free rations and clothing after return from field service.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. You said about Dr. Kitchlew that his speeches and activities were such as might cause breach of the peace. Were his activities distinct from speeches?

A. I have already stated that his views were very anti-Government. He was always liable to try and stir up trouble.

Q. That is practically covered by political speaking?

A. Not only that. Apart from public meetings there were private meetings at which incitements were made and conventions were held and so on.

Q. Was anything brought to your notice officially in the way of acts done by Dr. Kitchlew of which you were entitled to complain beyond having taken part in the meetings and what was said thereat?

A. No acts came to my notice.

Q. When you say the influence of his speeches was anti-Government you mean that he spoke as a Home-Ruler and criticised the administration?

A. One thought more than that because as I say he might do his best on every occasion to stir up trouble. But people in the city told me his influence was not good. And one incident which I quoted was that a merchant complained to me that his son was being led astray by Kitchlew and that he would like his son interned.

Q. Apart from your information as an officer of the district was there anything in his speeches that was not covered by the Home Rule Agitation and the opinion which he was entitled to hold about the Reforms Scheme?

A. Not in his public speeches in my time.

Q. Did his private speeches not come under your notice?

A. No.

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Mr. F. H. BURTON.

[Continued.]

Q. With regard to this club Ratto was a member thereof so far as you know. That club was in existence when you left the district?

A. That club ceased to exist long ago.

Q. You say it was a seditious club?

A. That club came in conflict with the police and had connection with the notorious political agitator Ajit Singh. He was one of its members before he was arrested.

Q. How many years ago did this club go out of existence?

A. It was in existence in 1907 and ceased to exist long ago.

Q. Beyond frequent visits to the club by these persons was there anything else to say that it could be proved that it was a seditious club?

A. I can only go by the brief record that exists in my office about the club.

Q. Was that information supplied through the police or the Criminal Investigation Department?

A. I cannot say. There is a file that exists about this club in my office. Owing to its connection with Ajit Singh it was called a seditious club.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. What was the arrangement in the district of Amritsar about recruiting, whether the District Officers were told off to get recruits or whether committees were appointed?

A. For 1918 we were told that we were expected to supply so many recruits.

Q. Before 1918 was the same system followed?

A. No.

Q. If a particular locality did not supply that number were they visited with some punishment?

A. No.

Q. How was the requisite number supplied? Must it be supplied?

A. Not must be, but they were expected to do their best to supply that number.

Q. If they did not do that, what happened?

A. Nothing.

Q. Then about Dr. Kitchlew, you say he was anti-Government. What do you mean by that? Was he against British Government or against the present form of Government?

A. So far as I know, he was a Home Ruler. By anti-Government I mean he was against British Government.

Q. Are you familiar with the Home Rule programme?

A. I am afraid I am not.

Q. Why do you assume that the person who is a Home Ruler is against Government?

A. I do not. I think Dr. Kitchlew was. I do not say so because he was a Home Ruler. He had pronounced anti-Government views.

Q. What do you mean by saying anti-Government views? Was he against the present system of Government or was he against British authority altogether?

A. He was against British authority altogether.

Q. What are your reasons?

A. His speeches.

Q. Can you produce any of his speeches?

A. I think so. You mean speeches he made in my time or some of the speeches he made later on.

Q. First of all we ask you about his speeches he made in your time. Did he make any speech in which he said that the British Government should be turned out of this country?

A. There was one speech he made in which he went to that extent. When I say so I go by his later speeches.

Q. During the time you were there did he say any such thing in any speech?

A. Not in any public speech that was reported to me.

Q. You suggest that his subsequent speeches were of such a nature?

A. Some of his subsequent speeches were of that character.

Q. Would you be able to supply us with the reports of those speeches?

A. Yes. We have copies of them—

Here Mr. Herbert pointed out that the speeches in question were on the records of the martial law trial cases.

Q. Then about Dr. Satyapal. Are you aware that Dr. Satyapal was during the war working as Lieutenant in the I.M.S.?

A. No.

Q. Did you never hear that he was doing service during the war and that he was posted at Aden?

A. I don't know that.

Q. About this man Ratto, the reason that you gave is that he was holding Congress organizations?

A. I did not give reasons. I was describing the man.

Q. You don't object to the man helping the Congress?

A. Not at all.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. About recruiting you say that no undue pressure was brought to bear upon people to get recruits?

A. Not at all.

Q. But efforts were constantly made to get the recruits and the people had common sense to realize that the recruits were required for the Government?

A. Yes.

Q. I suppose they wished to win the war and the present Government to have a general rule?

A. Yes.

Q. Then it was reasonable on the part of the police authorities to make every reasonable effort to get recruits?

A. Yes.

Q. There is one other point. You say in your statement as regards Amritsar City proper, the regiments did not like city men and that they preferred zamindar classes as a rule. Do you know why they did?

A. I don't know. I think they regarded villagers as the best soldiers. I really do not know whether I discussed the question.

Q. There is another question. I am not clear as to the agitation about platform tickets. Do you know that, and if you don't I tell you that, during the war the British public with their wives, their children and their old mothers went to the Railway Station and were not admitted to the platform or to have platform tickets?

A. No.

Q. Our wives, our children, our friends were not allowed on the platform to meet us when we came back from the front. If that was done with good reasons and there was no agitation, no single word of protest against it, why should the Amritsar public object to it and why did they object?

A. I think I could explain that. These restrictions of platform tickets applied only to the Mail trains and not to the ordinary Passenger trains, and the leaders in the agitation thought that this restriction was placed in the interests of Europeans. It gave them a great deal of trouble when their relatives wanted to travel by the Mail trains from the city.

Q. Was it in your opinion a reasonable order?

A. To a certain extent it was reasonable, but steps were immediately taken to get it removed. The station is so small that it is very difficult for passengers to move along at the Amritsar platform.

Q. They thought that it was a sufficient reason to make this agitation?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. I take up this question of platform agitation. Europeans were excluded from this disability. Was it not so?

A. I do not think it applied to Europeans.

Q. Is it not a fact that not only in the G. I. P. Administration but all over the country where Indians are not allowed, Europeans are not excluded?

A. I cannot say.

Q. Supposing if it were so, was it not a legitimate complaint and grievance?

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[Continued.]

A. Yes, if it only applies to the Mail trains and the people should ordinarily travel by those trains.

Q. With regard to recruiting, may I understand that your statement before this Committee is that throughout the province of the Punjab no pressure was brought to bear on the people for the purposes of war loan and for the purposes of recruiting?

A. My statement applies to the Amritsar District.

Q. Supposing this village was asked to furnish so many recruits and that village so many, and those villages failed to procure the number required, the villagers had to purchase recruits from outside and to pay for them to avoid the displeasure of the Deputy Commissioner. Did it come to your notice?

A. That did not apply to the Amritsar District.

Q. But has it come to your knowledge that this thing was going on in other districts?

A. This was going on in some places.

Q. So far as subscriptions to the War Fund are concerned, did it not require a great deal of exertion and were people not compelled to subscribe to it?

A. We all had to exert for this, and both officials and non-officials mixed in raising subscriptions, and care was taken that no compulsion was used.

Q. Was it not a fact that pressure was brought to bear upon the litigants and pleaders by the Judicial Officers to subscribe to this?

A. There was no case that came to my notice.

Q. Was this system previously in force in the Punjab?

A. Yes, it must be.

Q. Is it not a fact that all such persons as wished to renew their licenses but failed to supply their quota were not given their licenses?

A. That was not in the Amritsar District.

Q. Do you know if it was done in other districts?

A. I cannot say.

Q. Was there not a large number of deserters in 1918 so far as recruits were concerned?

A. I cannot say.

Q. Can you give me the number of deserters in the Amritsar District?

A. It was not high.

Q. Where can I get them?

A. From the Recruiting Officer. The number of deserters in the Amritsar District was about 800 out of 22,000.

Q. Was there a general proclamation for these deserters to come back again?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the new income-tax assessment made in your time?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it, at the time of income-tax assessment, under consideration that from certain merchants or traders who had not given reasonable subscriptions should be levied a higher tax? Supposing, here is A who was expected to subscribe Rs. 1,000 but subscribed Rs. 500 only, and at the time of assessment he was made to pay Rs. 350 instead of Rs. 300.

A. No.

Q. Just briefly, there was an election contest between Lachhmi Narain and Ram Narain. Lachhmi Narain had the Piece-Goods Association behind his back. There were two other parties, Jagat Ram's party and Harnam Singh's party. Is it not so?

A. Yes.

Q. These parties had bands of hooligans to intimidate voters. See your written statement, paragraph Elections, section "c." Was it so?

A. There were complaints which were brought to me.

Q. Were there any complaints against Jagat Ram and Harnam Singh?

A. Those were the principal parties.

Q. Was some action taken against these two parties?

A. I told the police to stop it either by threatening or actually taking security proceedings against them.

Q. Were Bugga and Ratto the two men who were dealt with at this time?

A. No.

Q. The Sikhs were not taking part in any of the agitations. As far as elections are concerned three separate seats were allotted to Sikhs and there was a great deal of agitation over it?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. Practically there was no recruiting from the Amritsar City itself?

A. Practically none.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. We are told that during the war even in England people were not allowed to see their relations at the Railway Stations. Did it apply to everybody without any distinction?

A. Yes.

Q. But at Amritsar discrimination was made between Europeans and Indians. Europeans were allowed on the platform even without platform tickets while Indians were totally prohibited. They could not go even with a platform ticket?

A. Yes.

Q. On the Mail trains there are no third class passengers except servants of the First and Second Class Passengers, and only the better class people travel by such trains and usually the number of Europeans is larger than Indians. Is not that so?

A. Yes. That, I understand, is the position.

Q. But in this case Indians were prohibited from visiting their relations or from sending them off and Europeans were not. Did you not think that was unreasonable and improper?

A. Yes. We got it removed.

Q. That was made unthinkingly without knowing the feeling it would arouse and the inconvenience it would cause?

A. That was done by the Railway Department.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Did you make inquiries as to the casualties in the Jallianwala Bagh?

A. Yes.

Q. When did you make those inquiries?

A. After our list had been made out by Dr. Rozdon, the Health Officer. The non-official agency, the Seva Samiti, gave me a copy of their unchecked list and I had it checked, but unfortunately the checking was not complete.

Q. How many were indicated as the total number in that unofficial list?

A. Four hundred and eighty, and those were by names.

Q. Have you had that checked as far as possible?

A. Yes. It was given to me on the 22nd of October.

Q. Had it been asked for previously?

A. Yes, we had asked Mr. Tivary, the Secretary, to let us have it from September onwards, but we only got it on the 22nd of October.

Q. So far as your check of that list goes, can you give us the details as to how far it is correct?

A. Mr. Tivary gave it to me. Unfortunately, so far I have not had the final results, but the intermediate results were that out of 482 names 15 names were shown twice, 13 who were shown as killed were found living, and we could not trace 30 of them in the city. Then in the villages also, we could not check some of the names. The Tahsildars could not check them. I have not got the final results.

Q. Might I hand this paper, which purports to be the final result, which has just been received, to you. (Here Mr. Herbert handed the list to the witness.) According to this latest checked list, what number would you make out as the total casualties at Jallianwala Bagh?

A. In all we had 44 unidentified corpses entered. If this were added on to 482, that would make 530 roughly. On checking the number of casualties in the villages, the Tahsildars now report that of the villagers who were reported killed, some of the bodies were buried by the Seva Samiti—some of those 44. I have not had the

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final figures. A great many of the 44 were villagers. I should put the total number, so far, at something over roughly 400 or a little more than 400.

Q. About how much? Four hundred and—

A. About 415 possibly, but I have not got these final figures.

Q. Could you indicate out of the 415, how many of them were Hindus, how many Muhammadans, how many Sikhs, and how many villagers? What is the percentage?

A. If the total of 482 were taken, about 73 villagers, 26 belonging to outside districts—or rather 77 belonging to the villages of the district and 26 to districts other than Amritsar.

Q. That is one-fourth or less than that?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the percentage? What percentage of Hindus were there?

A. I have not got the figures, but I think it was 60 per cent. Hindus.

Q. What percentage of Muhammadans?

A. Thirty-three per cent. or something like that.

Q. Are you sure of that?

A. I am not sure. I have not got the figures.

(The President interrupting Mr. Herbert:—"I do not myself quite see what the point of this analysis is.")

(Mr. Herbert:—"At any rate a suggestion, my Lord, has been made that most of these people were villagers who came for the Baisakhi fair.")

Q. You say that the villagers were 25 per cent.?

A. According to the unchecked list about 25 per cent., or about 20 per cent.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. There was a discussion about the numbers of men killed in the Legislative Council?

A. Yes.

Q. When did you first prepare your list? I am not talking to you about the list supplied to you by Seva Samiti.

A. It was ready by about the beginning of September.

Q. When did you commence enquiry? When did you pass orders?

A. A proclamation was issued on the 7th of August, asking people to send in the names of any of their relatives who had been killed in Jallianwala Bagh by the 21st.

Q. What was the number originally given out by the Amritsar authority as the total number of casualties?

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By the President—

Q. Are you an inhabitant of Amritsar?

A. I am a resident of Amritsar.

Q. Were you in Amritsar during the period of the riots?

A. I was in Amritsar up to the morning of the 11th.

Q. Up to the morning of the 11th April?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you just tell us generally what were the occurrences so far as you have observed previous to that?

A. What I beg to say is that I can give information only with regard to *hatalas*, because on the 9th I was attending a meeting at Government House with regard to the Red Cross Meeting: so I was not at Amritsar on the 9th. I was in Amritsar on the 30th March. I was at my house on the 30th March. About noon-time some people sat in front of my house and shouted 'shame,' 'shame.'

Q. What were they referring to?

A. What I inferred was that possibly they thought that I am a rather pro-official, and I do not take part at all in the political meetings. Then it was rumoured that for a second time there would be a *hatal* on the 6th. I enquired from several respectable gentlemen, and they at least assured me that there would be no

A. First of all the number entered in the Health Officer's register was 200, and after this proclamation, it was increased to 300.

Q. Has the Seva Samiti informed you that their list is complete?

A. They informed me that the list was unchecked.

Q. Was it complete? Did it refer to all the villages? Could they go to all the villages?

A. I cannot say; it is very difficult.

Q. Does this include the wounded at all?

A. No; it does not.

Q. The Baisakhi fair was a Hindu fair?

A. Yes.

Q. So far as the villages are concerned, naturally the enquiry would be defective. You could make your enquiry, but there will be difficulties for the Seva Samiti to make enquiries in the outlying villages?

A. They enquired in the outlying villages. Our proclamation was issued to every village.

Q. Don't you think that anybody and everybody who was wounded or the relatives of killed persons in that fair would be funky to come forward and say that he was one of the rioters?

A. Yes.

Q. Anybody who was wounded will not be willing to come and say that he was wounded?

A. Not likely.

Q. Your enquiry depended upon the reports made by patwaris; the so-called enquiry depended upon the reports made by them?

A. People were invited to give information.

Q. Was not the official agency employed by you to collect material, patwaris of the different villages?

A. I cannot say; I was not here when the first list was prepared. I took charge on the 6th September, and it was complete before then.

Q. You ordered no enquiry by any responsible officer?

A. It was my predecessor who ordered that enquiry.

Q. You are not aware that this was done by the patwaris?

A. I am not.

Q. Can you tell me what was the agency employed for making this enquiry as to the number of villagers killed and wounded?

A. There was a proclamation issued.

Q. Through the Tahsildars, I suppose. May I understand that the Tahsildars themselves made enquiries or were they made by the patwaris?

A. I cannot say.

hatal. I sent for them and they said that there would be no *hatal*, because a *hatal* had already taken place once.

Then on the 5th, as a precautionary measure, there was a meeting at the house of the Deputy Commissioner. I am also a member of the Municipal Committee; it was arranged with Honorary Magistrates and Members of the Municipal Committee, if there was a *hatal* on the morning of the 6th, then I was asked to draw up a scheme telling different Magistrates and Members of the Municipal Committee to go to certain wards and see that something untoward might not happen. It was so arranged that we should first meet at the Town Hall. If there was a *hatal*, then in accordance with that scheme, the Honorary Magistrates and the Members who were charged to go to certain wards had to go on the morning of the 6th. At least to my surprise and to the surprise of others there was a *hatal*. So we had to meet at the Town Hall and the different Honorary Magistrates and the Members had to go to different wards. I had to go to Division No. 1. About noon we had to go to the house of the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Miles Irving, and told him that nothing violent was going to happen at all, and then we asked his permission to return to our houses. At least I was asked at the time what really were the

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[Continued.]

causes. As far as I remember, I said that there were many causes. The one was the high prices; the other was that the people were complaining with regard to the taxes—I should say filling up of forms, not taxes, and the Muhammadans specially with regard to the Turkey matter, and the Rowlatt Bill was also one of the causes. Then the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Miles Irving, told us that we could go because there was no violence and nothing untoward to happen. So we went away. Then on the 7th and 8th as usual, I had to attend Court. On the 9th I had to come to Lahore, because I had to attend that meeting. In the evening I returned home. On the 10th at about 11 or 11-30, I left my house and went to the *Kutcheri* (court). Hardly had I reached the door of the room, than all at once a postal peon handed me a letter, and I opened it in the presence of the lawyers because I did not know it was a bearing (unstamped) letter and that I could not open it. In it I was profusely abused. It was a threatening letter. It stated that I might possibly be blown up. I did not mind it because I had confidence in the people that I would not be blown up. Then while I was talking a pleader came running to say that there was firing going on. As I live generally in the Civil Lines, I moved from the District Court Bar room to my bungalow in the Civil Lines and I stayed there. At about 4 o'clock my daughter, who is a student of the Alexandra High School, came to me, and I was quite surprised to find she had come at that time. She said she could not go to her house because the bazaars were full of crowds, and she was brought to my house in the Civil Lines. Then a boy, who is a friend of my son, and a graduate came running and said my house had been attacked and was going to be burned, and it was only through the intervention of a neighbour that it was not, and he told me that one of the outer doors of the house was broken and the glasses were smashed.

Q. Had the glasses been smashed?

A. Yes, the glasses of the windows.

Q. They were broken?

A. Yes, and they are still in that condition. In my house was my son about 20 years of age and the female members of the family and small children, and as the house was going to be put on fire, they had to jump to the adjoining house, and I was told that they remained hidden in one room of the neighbouring house. Then, at about 9-30 all the members of the family came to me, and the ladies were quite nervous and they did not like to stop there for a minute. I was pressed to send them to Lahore, and I tried to get a ticket but I could not. And we had to pass the whole night there without food, and then in the morning I was again advised that they should be brought to Lahore. But being one of the leading members of the Hindu community as well as Vice-President of the Municipal Committee, I did not like to leave the station because I should be there whatever happened. But I enquired whether there were other people in the bungalows or not and I found there were none and I was pressed to escort them to Lahore because they thought that possibly on the way they might be attacked and it would bring a bad name to the family if the elder member of the family did not accompany them. When I reached Bhagwanpur I was stopped.

Q. Who stopped you?

A. A Police Inspector. That Police Inspector was a son of a friend of mine who is a Barrister at Amritsar. I asked him what to do. He said what he could do for me was that I could go to the thana and stop there with the members of his family. So for four miles, sometimes walking and sometimes in carriages, we had to go there, and passed the night at the thana, and we reached Lahore and then I wanted to go back. But I was told that permission should be taken from Colonel Frank Johnson. I tried to obtain it and I can say that for 4 days I was absolutely unable to get permission, but the next day I wrote a letter to Mr. Miles Irving explaining the circumstances in which I had come to Lahore and that I was not willing to stop there. And through my son I sent a letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Bayley and he

very kindly got me permission to return on about the 17th or 18th.

Q. Was it your opinion, when you took your family from Amritsar, that there was serious danger?

A. Yes, at least to my life there was. When I came to know that my house was broken the only inference I could draw was that possibly there might be an attack on me.

Q. Did you see the crowds on the 10th yourself?

A. No.

Q. But for some time previously had you noticed anything about the attitude or demeanour of the crowd, for a few days prior to the 10th?

A. I used to go about my business as usual; as a matter of fact I never attended the political meetings, though I came to know that from day to day the number of the audience was growing larger and larger to such an extent as 40,000 and 50,000; that was the talk in the bar room.

Q. Do you know what Dr. Kitchlew's influence was with the crowd?

A. He was from day to day coming into prominence.

Q. In connection with what?

A. I did not hear what the subjects discussed at the meetings were, but at least he was the prominent man at those meetings and on that account he was becoming popular.

Q. Did you know anything about the character of the speeches that were being delivered to the audiences?

A. I never read them and none came to my notice. The purport of those speeches were not published in English papers and I read only English papers and am never in the habit of subscribing to any Urdu paper. I do not know whether the purport of those speeches was in those papers or not, but I did not read them.

Q. Can you say anything as to whether the crowd previous to the 10th had shown any disposition to be anti-Government or anti-British?

A. That could only, my Lord, be shown at the meeting; it could only be observed by one who had attended the meetings. When I had to leave the city for my own professional work they were doing the work.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. What is your profession?

A. I am an advocate.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. How many years have you been practising at Amritsar?

A. I began practice in 1880.

Q. You are Vice-President of what body?

A. Of the Municipality, and the President of the Bar Association.

Q. You say you never took part in any political activity?

A. At least I did not attend such meetings; I have never attended such meetings.

Q. You have never taken part in any political meeting?

A. To my knowledge I have not. I may say that the last time there was a Congress, I was a delegate, but I was a mute delegate.

Q. You believe then in being a mute delegate and not in taking an active part?

A. It is not a question of mute delegate; many sit still and many stand up and speak.

Q. You are not concerned in political matters?

A. I am concerned in political matters, but I do not attend the meetings, for what reason that may be I cannot say.

Q. You say you did not take any part in the deliberations but you still attended the Congress meeting as a delegate?

A. Yes.

Q. But you could do the same thing with regard to other meetings though you might not speak?

A. That is only a question of will and discretion.

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[Continued.]

Q. What I wish to know is, your reason for not attending any political meetings. For not taking part in political activity in Amritsar.

A. Special reasons I cannot assign at all; I do not go there that is all.

Q. All these years? You have been 20 years in Amritsar and there have been many occasions on which there has been political activity in Amritsar?

A. As far again as my knowledge goes, there was a semi-political meeting, the Hindu Conference there, and I was President of the Reception Committee.

Q. That is quite a different thing; what I want to get at is why you kept aloof, as you say you did, from all political activity in Amritsar?

A. No special reason.

Q. I put it to you straight. You abstained from any participation in political movements in Amritsar because you thought that if you did that you would be incurring the displeasure of the authorities?

A. No, not on account of that; that displeasure could not be incurred unless there was something of a violent character which I dislike. Unless there was something very serious I do not consider that a man will incur displeasure simply by going to a meeting.

Q. Supposing the political activity is with regard to bringing about a change in the present system of administration, you would participate in that?

A. I was the first man to write with regard to the reforms. In many ways my views were quite consistent with the Congress men.

Q. Your Vice-Presidency of the Municipal Committee, is that a Government nomination?

A. No, I am elected by the members. The Deputy Commissioner is the President; the Vice-President is elected by the members.

Q. Among the members have you an official majority?

A. No, the majority is with the elected members.

Q. Your abstaining from political activity in Amritsar, did that make you unpopular with the people?

A. I think it would be rather a vanity on my part, and I am the last person to entertain that idea, but as regards the question of popularity, my firm belief is that many in important cities would envy my position. There is no unpopularity at all.

Q. Your abstention from political activity, did that bring upon you the displeasure of your colleagues at the bar and other educated people at Amritsar?

A. No displeasure.

Q. They approved of your abstention?

A. Yes. I am also Secretary of the Hindu Sabha.

If my abstention was to have any effect of unpopularity I would not have remained Secretary of the Hindu Sabha for a minute.

Q. Do you know the Rowlatt Bills?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you a supporter of those Bills or were you one of those who opposed them?

A. Absolute indifference.

Q. Did you apply your mind to that and come to any conclusion about them?

A. Not in a definite way, but in many points I agreed with those who had to speak in the Council against the Rowlatt Bill. But I am one of those who, once the law is passed, think we should submit to it and not go against it.

Q. I am referring to the agitation against the Rowlatt Bill before it became an Act. You were of the same view as the people who opposed it to a large extent?

A. Yes.

Q. And there were meetings in Amritsar to oppose the measure?

A. Yes.

Q. You approved of them?

A. I neither approved nor disapproved; there is such a thing as indifference.

Q. What do you mean by saying that you neither approved nor disapproved of them?

A. I did not say whether I should go or not go, take part or not take part; I said I would read the result of the meeting in the papers.

Q. Did you approve of those meetings?

A. If I had been to the meetings and seen how they were conducted, then the question of approval would have arisen.

Q. But you could not come to that stage if you did not go to the meeting?

A. But I did not go to the meetings, therefore I cannot say whether I approved or not.

Q. You spoke of this threatening letter that you got, you received that on the 10th of April?

A. I got two letters, one was before the 30th March and the other was exactly on the 10th April.

Q. Was it an anonymous letter?

A. Yes.

Q. You do not know who wrote it?

A. No.

Q. You did not hand it over to the police?

A. No. I consigned it to the waste paper basket.

Q. You did not take it seriously.

A. No. It was said I might possibly be killed but I perfectly knew that I would not be killed.

Q. Up to the 10th of April did you notice anything anti-British or anti-Government?

A. No.

Q. On the 10th when the outrages were committed they came upon you as a surprise?

A. Yes.

Q. Now Kitchlew and Satyapal had acquired considerable influence by this time. How long were they wielding that influence in Amritsar?

A. Possibly sometime before the Provincial Conference and the Provincial Conference occurred in 1918.

Q. They were really very popular?

A. Yes.

Q. If these two people were arrested and deported as they were on the 10th—that would be a very exciting cause in Amritsar?

A. It was.

Q. Do you attribute what happened to that arrest and deportation in a considerable measure?

A. That was one of the chief causes of what happened.

Q. When you speak of your house being attacked what really happened?

A. One of the doors of my house was broken and some glass panes.

Q. Were not other glass panes in the city broken?

A. I do not know. The door of my house was broken with a long bamboo which belonged to an acrobat and possibly this was forcibly taken away from him.

Q. Was the attack particularly directed against you or was it a part of the general violence?

A. It was directed against me for the reason that I was considered to be a pro-official.

Q. Had you the reputation in Amritsar of being a pro-official?

A. I did have that reputation and also that I was a supporter of Government.

Q. Are you on that account disliked by the people?

A. I have already submitted that I am not disliked.

If I was disliked I would not have enjoyed the position which I now enjoy.

Q. You came to Lahore.

A. I left Amritsar on the morning of the 11th and reached here about half past 12 or 1.

Q. And you did not succeed in getting a permit to go back till the 17th or 18th in spite of your being a pro-official?

A. My reason for returning was that I might possibly be of some help to Government.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. That letter probably was an empty threat.

A. I am not able to read the mind of the sender. I did not pay any attention to it on account of my close relation with the people.

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LALA GOPAL DAS BHANDARI—concluded—MALIK FATEH KHAN.

Q. Have you any enemies in Amritsar?
 A. As far as I know I have none but possibly there might be one.
 Q. I take it that you are very popular with the masses?
 A. That is my belief.
 Q. And you have heard that the crowd which committed all these offences—was the crowd principally composed of Amritsar people on the 10th?
 A. At least to my knowledge.
 Q. Therefore the attack on your house would not be led by any large section of the people?
 A. My own impression is that I am not a leader of the associates and not in close association with the riff-raff, therefore that must be an act of the riff-raff.
 Q. You say that the mob did not enter your house; what was the reason that was given for not burning your house?
 A. There were two reasons. First it is a very big house and if they had burnt it, half the city would also have been burnt, and the second was an intervention. As far as my information goes they were trying to obtain kerosine oil but were unsuccessful.
 Q. As a matter of fact the rioters did not enter your house?
 A. They did not enter it.
 Q. You are a wealthy man?
 A. That is a difficult question to answer. I have got moderate means to live upon.
 Q. The looting of your house would have been considerable?
 A. Undoubtedly.
 Q. It might have been a matter of thousands and the killing of your family?
 A. I beg to say that the two things are mixed up together.
 Q. You know one Hans Raj?
 A. Yes.
 Q. He is a close relation of yours?
 A. No.
 Q. He is in no way related to you?
 A. He is.
 Q. He is the man who was an approver in the conspiracy case?
 A. That is a fact.
 Q. What relation is Hans Raj to you?
 A. He is my wife's cousin's son. I have no connection whatever with that boy. I am not even on speaking terms with him.
 Q. Was this Hans Raj one of those people who were attending meetings and who was organizing those political meetings?
 A. That is only hearsay knowledge.
 Q. He had no enmity with you?
 A. Neither enmity nor friendship.
 Q. He had some influence upon the crowd?
 A. How can I say? He is an irresponsible boy. I do not know what he was doing.
 Q. You had something to say about Satyapal?
 A. He is a man of education and is known to me. Many times he attended my house in his professional

capacity but I cannot compare this Hans Raj with Satyapal.
 Q. He is more related to you than Satyapal?
 A. Satyapal is also related to me in one way.
 Q. May I take it that nearly all the men who wielded influence over the crowd were men of influence and position?
 A. Some may have been wielding influence on account of religious enthusiasm.
 Q. With regard to the breaking in of your house I would like to know whether or not in your opinion that was an act of some of your enemies?
 A. I have no enemies.
 Q. Then to whom do you ascribe this attack on your house?
 A. It was an act of violence done by the people.
 Q. Did you hear that the houses of others had been attacked also?
 A. Yes.
 Q. You returned on the 17th. Well, from the 18th up to the 25th or up to the 30th of April in what condition did you find the people of Amritsar?
 A. In a very good condition.
 Q. On your return Amritsar was in a normal condition so far as the people were concerned?
 A. When I returned I did not go to my house. I remained in the civil lines.
 Q. There was nothing abnormal so far as the people of Amritsar were concerned from the 18th to the 30th of April?
 A. No.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. You have told the Committee that you are a popular man in Amritsar, that your relations with the people are cordial and yet on the 10th of April the mob attempted to burn your house?

A. My relations are cordial as far as the good citizens are concerned, the population of Amritsar is one lakh fifty-two thousand and there is bound to be a certain number of riff-raff—possibly to the extent of ten thousand. This is my own impression. The good people never did it. I have already submitted that it was an act of violence. In excited times a crowd simply requires a leader and they simply follow him in everything he does.

Q. Then you are not popular with the other eight or ten thousand?

A. One cannot be popular with every man living in the city.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. From what you observed in Amritsar and your intimate knowledge of the people you do not think that what happened on the 10th was in any way pre-arranged or organized?

A. No. I looked upon the people of Amritsar as the loyalist people. As far as my knowledge goes the attack was never organized.

MALIK FATEH KHAN, Naib-Tahsildar, Amritsar.

By the President—

Q. Are you a resident in Amritsar?
 A. I am the Naib-Tahsildar of that place.
 Q. Were you in the city between the 10th and 13th of April?
 A. Yes, I was there.
 Q. In what state was the city?
 A. It was in a bad condition, and the people were saying that the city belonged to the Hindus and Muhammadans.
 A. Anything else?
 A. They refused to supply any provisions to Europeans. On the 10th when I was going to the District Court there was a *hartal* in the city. On the way when I reached

the Mission School I found two boys of 12 years of age standing there. I was asked to take off my turban before proceeding further. Some people were saying that the water in the pipe had been poisoned and that it should not be drunk.

Q. During the days between the 11th and 13th was it safe for an European to go into the city without a guard?

A. No, it was not safe.

Q. On the 13th of April did you go with the troops and read out a proclamation at different parts and points of the city?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. What was the proclamation you read?

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MALIK FATEH KHAN.

[Continued.]

A. It was the proclamation made by General Dyer. The proclamation was to the effect that if any property was damaged in Amritsar or at any place outside, they would be held responsible for that, and that if they came together at any time they would be dispersed by means of weapons and arms.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad to the interpreter—

Q. Did he say no meetings, no processions were to be held? You had better translate the whole thing.

A. No meetings, no processions were to be held.

By the President—

Q. In what language did you make the proclamation?
 A. I read it out in Urdu twice and thrice. I repeated every word of it and afterwards I explained it in Punjabi again twice and thrice.

Q. At how many different places did you make the proclamation and make the explanation to the people as to its effect?

A. I began to promulgate at the Government Gardens. We set out at about 10 or 11 o'clock. We proclaimed at the following places:—

Rambagh Gate.
 Kotwali.
 Queen's Statue.
 Hall Bazar Chowk.
 Hall Gate.
 Hathi Gate.
 Lohgarh Gate.
 Katra of Dulab.
 Dhab of Khatiks.
 Katra Safed.
 Bazar Dhab.
 Chowk Karam Singh.
 Nimak Mandi.
 Kila Bhangian.
 Bazar Gandanwalla.
 Bagh Jhanda Singh.
 Majith Mandi.
 Loha Mandi.
 Tunda Talab.

Q. Is that a full list of the places at which you made the proclamation?

A. These are all the places.

Q. How much time was occupied in going through the city and making this proclamation?

A. From 11 to 3-30 p.m. We made this proclamation in the presence of a crowd of 500 or 1,000 people, and we explained to them that we would fire upon them if they did not pay any heed to what we explained. They jeered at us.

Q. In what way did they jeer at you?

A. They said that they were being simply threatened and that they would not be fired upon.

Q. When the reading of the proclamation was finished, what did you do?

A. We even distributed this proclamation among the people. I handed copies of this proclamation to them personally.

Q. Did you hand written proclamation to them?

A. Printed. They were in Urdu.

Q. How many such proclamations were handed by you to people that day?

A. I cannot say, they were in a bundle.

Q. At 3-30 p.m. when you had finished reading the proclamation what did you do?

A. I went to the Company Bagh or Government Gardens.

Q. Were you at the Jallianwala Bagh when the firing took place?

A. I was not there. I was in the Government Gardens.

Q. Did you hear anything about such a meeting being held as was in fact held at the Jallianwala Bagh? Did you hear any intimation that a meeting was to be held at the Jallianwala Bagh that afternoon?

A. When I was distributing these proclamations one Obaidullah, who appeared to be Sub-Inspector of Police,

told those people that if they held any meeting at that Bagh they would be fired on.

Q. Did you say they replied to the announcement you made that they were going to hold a meeting and that General Dyer might fire on the mob?

A. There was an order by General Dyer that the people would be dispersed by force of arms.

Q. What did the people say? (To the translator:—Get his answer bit by bit.)

A. The people addressed Obaidullah and said, "we will hold a meeting; let us be fired on."

Q. Did they say where the meeting was to be held?
 A. I did not hear where the meeting was to be held.

Q. Were there several meetings to be held according to the statements made by the crowd?

A. No. They said they would hold a meeting to-day at 4.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Was this statement made while the witness was going round with General Dyer?

A. This was said when I was in company with General Dyer, but he was coming behind. I was in front. There was a file of soldiers.

Q. Did you see the Sub-Inspector tell General Dyer this or did General Dyer hear it himself?

A. The Sub-Inspector and I heard this, but General Dyer did not hear it because he was coming behind.

Q. Was the place of the meeting mentioned by name?

A. No. They simply said one meeting would be held. I simply heard, I have not seen, but I heard that some people were saying that there would be one meeting.

Q. Did you or did you not hear any member of the crowd say to this Sub-Inspector of Police that there would be a meeting at 4 o'clock?

A. I did not recognise any one. People spoke when they came together at the place.

Q. Did the witness himself hear anybody tell the Sub-Inspector that there would be a meeting at 4 o'clock or is this what has been told by some body else?

A. I simply heard, I heard it myself.

Q. Did you hear what the Sub-Inspector said to them after they told him that?

A. The sub-Inspector said "you are allowed to do what you like, you are allowed to do what you choose to do."

Q. Was it getting hot when you stopped this procession?

A. It was getting hot.

Q. Did you cut short your march because of the heat?

A. The proclamation was made at different places. I was a new man at the time.

Q. Just tell me. The proclamation in Urdu was simply read from the written document or printed document?

A. Yes.

Q. And as regards it what was said in Punjabi was an explanation?

A. Yes, it was an explanation.

Q. But beyond the written document in Urdu, there was no explanation in Urdu?

A. The proclamation in Urdu was read out and then it was explained in Punjabi.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. I understood you to say that you were new to Amritsar?

A. Yes, I was new. I went there in the middle of January.

Q. And you were not familiar on the 13th April with all parts of the city?

A. No, I was not familiar.

Q. Then who decided the places where this proclamation was to be read or proclaimed?

A. Mr. Plomer and Inspector Muhammad Ashraf.

Q. You were not in a position to judge whether proclaiming this notification at places where you proclaimed

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MALIK FATEH KHAN.

[Continued.]

it was sufficient to give proper information to the whole city?

A. To my knowledge the people fully became aware of the proclamation.

Q. You told me that you were new to Amritsar and therefore you had no intimate knowledge of the city. You are not therefore in a position to say that what you did was sufficient to give information to the whole city?

A. I was under the impression that all the people of Amritsar would become aware of the proclamation, because people came together there and there was a beat of drum and the bell was being rung.

Q. No doubt at places where you did proclaim some people assembled. But what I am putting to you is that you were not in a position to judge whether proclaiming the notification at the places mentioned was sufficient notification to the whole city of Amritsar?

A. The shops were closed and there was *hartal*, and people were bent upon hearing what they were told.

Q. Now, you did not determine the places where this notification was to be proclaimed?

A. No.

Q. Do you know the Golden Temple at Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. It is a very thickly populated locality?

A. Not in the Temple itself.

Q. But is there a large population round about? When you go to the Temple you pass through narrow streets all lined by big houses?

A. Yes, there are narrow streets.

Q. That part where the Temple is situated is a thickly populated part of the city?

A. One side is thickly populated.

Q. You did not go to proclaim this notification in that Temple quarter?

A. We went as far as the Queen's Statue.

Q. How far is that from the Golden Temple?

A. To my knowledge it is a distance of 200 or 300 *karams* [paces].

Q. You know the quarter where the Jallianwala Bagh is situated?

A. I do not know. I have not even seen the Jallianwala Bagh or that quarter where it is situated.

Q. You did not go to that quarter to proclaim the notification?

A. I did not go there. I have not even seen the Bagh. Even up to this time I have not seen it.

Q. Now who led this party? Who was in front?

A. Inspector Muhammad Ashraf Khan. We were being led by Inspector Muhammad Ashraf Khan, and I and Obaidullah were following.

Q. On horse back?

A. Yes.

Q. Who followed you?

A. Troops, British soldiers.

Q. How many?

A. I do not know the number.

Q. And then followed the General?

A. So far as I know, the Deputy Commissioner. There was a motor car in which were the Deputy Commissioner and the General *Sahib*.

Q. Do you mean Mr. Irving?

A. Yes, the Superintendent of Police and General Dyer.

Q. Mr. Rehill, Mr. Plomer, were all of them in one motor car?

A. There were two motor cars.

Q. Did you proceed at a quick pace or did you go slowly?

A. At a slow pace, and we were beating drums.

Q. Who was beating drums, somebody in front of you?

A. One man was beating a drum and he was sitting with me in the bamboo cart.

Q. When you went to the first place did you or the other man beat the drum?

A. When we started from the Government Gardens we began to beat the drum.

Q. You kept beating the drum all through?

A. All through, continuously all the time.

Q. When you went to the first place, what happened? People came on seeing you or what happened?

A. When we reached the first place we beat the drum continuously for two or three minutes to call people.

Q. How many people assembled round you?

A. I cannot say exactly, but sometimes 500, sometimes 100.

Q. You cannot tell me how many assembled in the first place?

A. I don't remember.

Q. It may be 100?

A. More than 100.

Q. The same number or about the same number assembled at other places?

A. Much more than 100 assembled at other places.

Q. You said that the crowds jeered at you. Did they jeer at every place?

A. Generally at every place.

Q. About their holding a meeting at 4 P.M., was that said at every place? You have deposed that when the notification was translated to them, they said "we will hold a meeting at 4 P.M. and let us be fired upon." Was that said at all these places?

A. It was said at one or two places by one or two people.

Q. What were these places where this was said?

A. I do not remember at what places these were said.

Q. You have spoken of the written proclamation in Urdu. Were the copies that you had written or printed?

A. Printed.

Q. Was that the Curfew notification that was distributed among the people or the other one or both?

A. Both.

Q. Both were read out?

A. Yes, both.

Q. One after the other?

A. Yes, one after the other.

Q. Which was the first one? The Curfew or the other?

A. The first was the warning to the people against destroying property or life. That was read first.

Q. Was that notification printed?

A. The printed one was read out, and then the Curfew notice.

Q. Which was printed?

A. The printed one was as follows:—"The people of Amritsar are hereby warned that if there is any damage to property or life in the city of Amritsar or at any places outlying it."

Q. Was that the notification that was printed?

A. Yes. This was printed.

Q. The one about meetings was not printed?

A. It was part of this.

Q. The other about going out at night after 8 P.M. was it printed or not?

A. That was not printed.

Q. Who distributed these copies?

A. I distributed; people got them from me.

Q. You have spoken about the city being in a bad condition from the 10th to the 13th?

A. Yes.

Q. It was said that people were saying that the city belonged to the Hindus and Muhammadans?

A. Yes; generally they were saying so.

Q. Who told you this?

A. On the morning of the 11th I went into the city and heard when I got near the Mosque known as Khairdin Masjid. There I saw dead bodies of natives which had been shot. I enquired from Sardar Nihal Singh, Barrister, how many had been killed. There was a crowd of people at this time at the place. I enquired how many natives had been shot and how many Europeans. In reply he said that probably 12 natives had been shot.

Q. Who told you about the town belonging to the Hindus and Muhammadans?

A. This was proclaimed by beat of drum. Chaprasis brought the news to me.

Q. You did not hear the news yourself?

A. I personally did not hear.

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MALIK FATEH KHAN.

[Continued.]

Q. Then you spoke about the supplies to the Fort. You were not allowed to do that? In fact, you did send supplies?

A. I did, taking the same from villages outside.

Q. Did you get the supplies from Amritsar?

A. I got them only once.

Q. On what date?

A. On the 11th.

Q. On the 11th you got supplies from Amritsar city itself?

A. Yes, I got potatoes and greens.

Q. The supply that you wanted to send on the 11th to the Fort, you got it from Amritsar city?

A. I got it only once; then people got round the man from whom I had purchased.

Q. Was that on the same day or the succeeding day, i.e., 12th?

A. On the 12th, when I asked the man for supplies, the man said that the people would burn his house. Then I sent a man to Majithi, a village at some distance within Municipal limits, and there also people refused to give supplies.

Q. On the 10th when you were passing through the streets, were you asked to take off your shoes or your *pagri*?

A. *Pagri* (turban).

Q. Why did they ask you to do that?

A. They said that I would be allowed only after I took off my *pagri*.

Q. What was the reason for people asking you to take off your *pagri*?

A. I do not know.

Q. You spoke about the water being poisoned. Did you hear that yourself or did somebody tell you?

A. I heard it myself; 4 or 5 men were saying so; I heard it with my own ears.

Q. On what date?

A. On the 10th.

Q. During these days, 10th to 13th, where were you living?

A. I always live within tahsil premises.

Q. Is that within the city?

A. A little outside the city.

Q. In the Civil Lines?

A. Not in the Civil Lines.

Q. Between the 10th and 12th, did you go into the city?

A. I went on the 11th and 12th.

Q. You were not molested on those days.

A. On the 11th they did. They wanted to say something more.

Q. Were you molested or were you not on the 11th and 12th?

A. On the 11th they molested me.

Q. On the 12th, they did not?

A. No; not on the 12th.

Q. Did they molest you after the 12th and subsequent days?

A. On the 13th there was firing, and on the 14th people got frightened.

Q. After the 13th, the city was completely quiet?

A. Yes; there was quiet. Mischief ceased and people were quiet from the 14th.

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MALIK FATEH KHAN.

[Continued.]

At Lahore, Monday, the 17th November 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B.,
K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Rai Bahadur G. K. ROY, Superintendent (Acting for Secretary).

MALIK FATEH KHAN, Naib Tahsildar, Amritsar—continued.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Were you examined as a witness in any of the Amritsar cases that were prosecuted on behalf of Government?

A. No.

Q. When did you give your statement for the first time in connection with this inquiry?

A. Before Mr. Puckle.

Q. When?

A. Some ten or fifteen days ago.

Q. Was it a written statement?

A. No. It was oral.

Q. Do you know that when for the first time the military forces came inside the city of Amritsar on the 11th April they arrested certain persons?

A. I was not with them at that time.

Q. Were you not aware of this fact?

A. So far as I know there were no arrests on the 11th.

Q. Do you know that military forces came to the city on the 12th?

A. Not in my presence.

Q. Do you know whether these forces had come or not?

A. The forces had arrived in the city, but I don't know whether they entered the city on the 11th or not.

Q. Are you not aware that they entered the city on the 12th and arrested people?

A. I heard that they entered on the 12th, but I was not with them.

Q. If a military force entered the city of Amritsar on the 11th April and people were arrested, and if again a military force entered the city of Amritsar on the 12th April and people were arrested, how do you account for the fact that on the 13th when they entered people had collected in hundreds to hear the Proclamation?

A. The people seeing the situation on the 11th and 12th were not afraid and they were making agitation.

Q. Were they not afraid of being arrested on the 13th?

A. No.

Q. Do you know in how many divisions and wards the city of Amritsar is divided?

A. I have heard that there are 12 divisions or wards.

Q. Are you familiar with the other Mohallas and parts of the city except those you mentioned in your statement?

A. No. I don't know.

Q. Can you say, when you went inside the city with that Proclamation and you were distributing the notices in how many wards you entered?

A. That I cannot tell.

Q. Will you be able to give me important places if I point out to you certain routes for going to the city?

A. No. I cannot because I go to the city very seldom.

Q. Who supplied you with the list of places you have mentioned in your statement?

A. I took it down.

Q. Do I understand that as you were going distributing the notices you were jotting down the names of places in a book or on a paper?

A. Yes, I was keeping them by way of a memo.

Q. You have described on the last occasion certain conversation that passed between two and three men and one Obaidullah about the meeting to be held at the Jallianwala Garden?

A. Not about Jallianwala Garden.

Q. Did you then and there inform General Dyer or Mr. Rehill of what the people were saying?

A. No, I did not. There was no necessity for me to do so.

Q. Why not?

A. I felt no necessity because they were following me.

Q. Were they able to hear that conversation?

A. No, they could not.

Q. Then why was there no necessity?

A. Thousands of such topics were going on and I could not tell each and every thing.

Q. When you were definitely informed that notwithstanding the Proclamation by General Dyer the people were determined to hold the meeting, why did you not inform him of this? Was it not an important thing?

A. I did not feel any necessity therefor.

Q. Are there any shops inside the city where firearms are sold?

A. I had never been to that shop.

Q. Do you know how many firearms are possessed by the citizens of Amritsar under licences?

A. I cannot tell the number.

Q. From the 6th up to the 15th did it ever come to your knowledge that any firearms were used by any of the rioters?

A. No.

Q. Now you have stated on the last occasion about your translating and proclaiming two notices. It is not clear to me which was printed and which was not printed. Therefore I would like to know which was printed and which was not? I read out to you the notice "The inhabitants of Amritsar are hereby warned that if they cause damage to any property, or will commit any acts of violence, in the environs of Amritsar, it will be taken for granted that such acts are due to the incitement in Amritsar City. All offenders will be martial punished according to law." Is that the notice?

A. That was a printed one.

Q. Do you know when and where it was printed?

A. That I don't know. That was given to me to read it out to the public.

Q. Was the notice in which it was proclaimed that "no person residing in Amritsar City is permitted to leave the city or his house" printed or not?

A. That was not printed.

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MALIK FATEH KHAN.

[Continued.]

Q. How did you translate in Urdu the words "will be punished according to martial law" and "will be dispersed by force of arms" to the public?

A. I don't know English. Let me have the Urdu and I will tell you how I did translate that.

Q. How did you explain to the public about the dispersing of the meeting?

A. Agar koi majma khilaf-i-qanun hoga to bazar aslah muntashir kia javega. Ya aisa hoga to goli chalai javegi.

(Translation.—If there is any unlawful assembly, it will be dispersed by force of arms. Or if there is such (an assembly) it will be fired on.)

Q. How did you explain the last portion of the first notice to the public in the Punjabi or Urdu from your memory?

A. Koi jalsa na karne parga. Koi julus nahin nikalga. Agar koi aisa karega to Fauji canun se uske sath saluk kia javega.

(Translation.—No meeting will be allowed. No procession may come out. If any such take place, it will be dealt with by military law.)

Q. At what place did you hear the conversation about poisoning the water works?

A. When I was going from the Mission Girls' School to the Kutchery.

Q. How many people made that statement?

A. Five or six men who said: "Brothers, do not drink water from the water works. It has been poisoned." They were speaking this in loud tones.

Q. Did you mention this fact in your statement which you gave to Mr. Puckle 15 days ago?

A. That I don't remember. Mr. Puckle told me that from the 10th to the 15th I should give my direct evidence.

Q. Did he prohibit you from making any statement? Did you hear him with your own ears telling you not to make any statement?

A. He did not prohibit me but told me to state events from the 10th to the 15th.

Q. You have stated that a certain person or persons were saying that houses would be burnt?

A. I simply said that a vegetable seller was threatened that if he sold vegetables his house would be burnt.

Q. Did you report this matter to any of your officers?

A. Hundreds of such things were being spoken on that day. I could not tell about them all.

Q. Why did you cause Majithia, who made a similar statement, to be prosecuted and why did you not have this man prosecuted?

A. The vegetable seller was simply telling this to some person and did not make mention of it by way of agitation.

Q. Did you ask the name of that man?

A. I did not because such things were told all over the city.

Q. Were the shops opened on the evening of the 14th?

A. After Mr. Kitchin, the Commissioner, and General Dyer had made the leaders to understand the situation some shops were opened on the 14th and all on the 15th.

Q. Are you aware that General Dyer came to the city on the night of the 13th after the Jallianwala affair?

A. I do not know.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. When were you first called by General Dyer on the 13th?

A. I was called by Mr. Miles Irving; he asked me to bring a drum-beater.

Q. At what time were you called by Mr. Irving?

A. I went to him at about 9 o'clock with a drum-beater.

Q. To what place?

A. In the Government garden.

Q. Is that the Rambagh?

A. Yes.

Q. Was General Dyer there?

A. Yes.

Q. And Mr. Irving asked you to get a drum-beater?

A. He sent me a process through the Revenue Assistant asking me to bring a drum-beater.

Q. What time did you get the process?

A. At night on the 12th.

Q. When you went at 9 o'clock to Mr. Irving did you take the drum-beater with you?

A. Yes.

Q. Was a procession formed then or afterwards?

A. At 11 o'clock.

Q. You saw Mr. Irving at 9 o'clock and had taken the drum-beater with you at the time, then what did you do, did you remain there or go back?

A. I remained standing there.

Q. Did you remain there till 11 o'clock?

A. Yes.

Q. You are sure it was 11 o'clock?

A. Yes, I am sure of it.

Q. How was the procession formed? General Dyer and Mr. Irving, were they also there in the Ram Bagh?

A. Yes.

Q. And how was the procession formed?

A. Some British soldiers had come there.

Q. How many?

A. I do not know the number.

Q. Approximately?

A. Probably 50 or 60, I cannot tell the exact number.

Q. English soldiers?

A. Yes.

Q. And any Indian soldiers?

A. Yes.

Q. How many?

A. Probably 50 or 60.

Q. Any police?

A. The police constables were not with the procession, but they were in the city; I saw them only now and then.

Q. Was this Proclamation handed over to you?

A. Yes.

Q. Who gave it to you?

A. So far as I remember, it was handed to me by

Mr. Irving.

Q. One copy given to you or several copies?

A. The printed notices were given to me in a bundle.

Q. How many?

A. I do not know.

Q. One hundred or two hundred?

A. I cannot give the number.

Q. About 11 o'clock they started from the Ram Bagh?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the first point at which you arrived?

A. After leaving the Ram Bagh we arrived at Ram

Gate.

Q. How far is that from the Ram Bagh?

A. A very short distance.

Q. You arrived there in 4 or 5 minutes?

A. Probably.

Q. Then you halted there?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you do, beat the drum for 4 or 5 minutes?

A. Yes, the drum was beaten and also a bell was

rung to attract people.

Q. For 4 or 5 minutes?

A. Probably, but I do not remember it exactly.

Q. Then about 500 people collected there?

A. Probably there were more than 500.

Q. Did it take some time for them to collect or did they all come at once?

A. They came at once running to hear the Proclamation, because it being a *hartal*, they were wandering about.

Q. Wandering about the streets and they came running?

A. Yes, I saw them for three days together.

Q. Then you read out the Proclamation?

A. Yes.

Q. How long did you take to do that?

A. I do not remember.

Q. 4 or 5 minutes at least?

A. Two or three minutes or four minutes.

Q. You explained that in Punjabi? First in Hindustani and then in Punjabi?

A. Yes.

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MALIK FATEH KHAN.

[Concluded.]

Q. That must also have taken 4 or 5 minutes to explain to such a large number?

A. I was simply reading it out.

Q. The Urdu took about 5 minutes and the Punjabi took about 5 minutes?

A. When I was explaining in Punjabi it took me a very short time.

Q. How much?

A. Half the time—2 or 3 minutes.

Q. Did most of the people understand Urdu or Punjabi?

A. All sorts of people were there.

Q. Who were the majority?

A. Most of them were educated men, because the number of educated people is greater. There were a good number of people who could understand Urdu.

Q. Then what was the necessity of a hurried explanation in Punjabi if the people understood Urdu?

A. There were some poor men of the lower class who could not understand Urdu.

Q. Would it not take same time to explain it to those few people in Punjabi as to explain it to others in Hindustani?

A. I could explain in the Punjabi sooner than the Urdu.

Q. You were sure they understood it?

A. I am certain of it.

Q. Then you went to the next point?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the distance between these two points?

A. I do not remember.

Q. Now you know it?

A. I did not take notice of it, because I go very seldom to the city.

Q. Was it about half-a-mile long?

A. Not half-a-mile.

Q. Quarter of a mile? You must have some idea.

A. Less than quarter of a mile in my estimation.

Q. It is more than one furlong and nearly two furlongs?

A. Yes: less than 2 furlongs or about 2 furlongs.

Q. How long did it take you to walk to that place from this first point?

A. I cannot tell. I did not take notice of it.

Q. About ten minutes?

A. Less than ten minutes.

Q. About 7 minutes?

A. I cannot say.

Q. Were you going very fast or at an ordinary pace?

A. At an ordinary pace.

Q. Then you repeated the same process there as you did at the first point?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the next point the Kotwali?

A. Yes.

Q. There you took a longer time?

A. Yes: because General Dyer and the Deputy Commissioner had all got down there in order that the people might come together in large numbers.

Q. I am supposing that Mr. Irving and General Dyer were following you all the time: was not that so?

A. They all came down from their motors at the Kotwali.

Q. Were you there?

A. I was with the drum-beater in the bamboo cart. We did not get down.

Q. Then what did Mr. Irving and General Dyer do when they got out of their motor-car?

A. They asked me to wait till a large number of people came together.

Q. How long did you wait there?

A. 7 or 8 minutes, and we were beating the drum all the time.

Q. Then you took about ten minutes to explain to the people, or did you take a longer time?

A. It took me five minutes there.

Q. Five minutes in Hindustani and five minutes in Punjabi?

A. Both took me five or six minutes together, because the notice was not a long one.

Q. After that how did the procession start again?

A. In the same way.

Q. General Dyer and Mr. Irving all coming with you?

A. Yes, they got into their motors, and there were British soldiers between me and the motors.

Q. They were following in succession?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the next point you got to?

A. I have already given all the points one by one.

Q. The next point you have given here is Chowk Ghaswala after the Kotwali?

A. The 3rd point was the Queen's statue.

Q. Is there a Ghaswala Chowk at the Queen's statue?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the distance between the Kotwali and the Chowk?

A. I again would say with great respect that I do not remember it.

Q. Are you still Naib Tahsildar of Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. And you do not know the city?

A. No, I do not know it because I live outside in the Tahsil premises.

Q. At Chowk Ghaswala also you stopped?

A. Yes.

Q. And beat the drum in the same way as before?

A. Yes.

Q. After that, you proceeded to Chowk Hall Bazar?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you say the distance between these two points?

A. I do not remember.

Q. Can you say how long it took you to get there?

A. I again say most respectfully that I do not remember it.

Q. There also was the same proceeding, 5 or 6 minutes, beating the drum and reading out the Proclamation?

A. Yes.

Q. The next point was Chowk Khansama?

A. After that there comes the Hall Gate.

Q. Here it is given Chowk Khansama before Hall Gate.

A. I do not remember.

Q. You do not know the distances?

A. No, I am not acquainted with the city.

Q. Everywhere you repeated the same process?

A. Yes.

Q. Then at the last point, after that you thought you had done enough?

A. Yes.

Q. And for that reason you returned?

A. Yes.

By Mr. Abdul Qadir, Assistant Govt. Advocate—

Q. Yesterday you referred to yourself being molested on the 11th in the city?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell us what was the form of that molestation?

A. When I got near the mosque of Khairdin a number of persons had collected there. One of them was Sardar Nihal Singh. Then I enquired from him how many natives had been killed and wounded and how many British. He said about 12 or 14 natives had been killed, and that he did not know anything about the English. One or two of the crowd told me that one or two English had been killed. One of the crowd said to me "What does it matter if any bastard English have been killed" (literally sons of menstruation). When I enquired from some one I was told that the man who told me that was named Bugga.

Q. What was this story about your own molestation?

A. Then I told them that there were military as well as guns at each and every gate and they were still indulging in such talk. I said people of their kind had ruined us and done all harm to us. Then all the crowd surrounded me, but Sardar Nihal Singh said "he is one of us, he is an Indian." Then I went away.

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LALA JIWAN LAL.

LALA JIWAN LAL, Inspector of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab.

By the President—

Q. You belong to the Criminal Investigation Branch?

A. I am an Inspector of the Criminal Investigation Department, Political Branch.

Q. Had you to make investigations in connection with the agitation against the Rowlatt Bills?

A. I was deputed in connection with the Amritsar activities against the Rowlatt Bill, and I went there to attend the meetings.

Q. When was the first meeting held which you attended?

A. It was on the 28th of February in the Bande Mataram Hall.

Q. What sort of statements were made at that meeting about the Rowlatt Bill?

A. They are entered in my report about that day's meeting and that was presented to the Court as an Exhibit* and it has been printed. (Report handed to President.)

Q. When did you attend another meeting?

A. On the 23rd March in the same Bande Mataram Hall.

Q. Did many attend that meeting?

A. The Bande Mataram Hall was packed to its utmost capacity.

Q. What was the state of the feeling among the audience at that meeting?

A. People were very much excited and after they had been dispersed it was palpable from their attitude that they were very excited.

Q. Who presided over that meeting?

A. It is entered in my report.

Q. At that meeting were any statements made that had special effect in exciting the audience?

A. The statements made there showed that the law was very injurious to the people and the people were being subjected to a great tyranny.

Q. This report of yours contains an accurate statement of what you heard?

A. I have reported what I heard in detail.

Q. At the close of the meeting did you hear any remarks made by the audience as to the Government?

A. The people abused and said that they were treated very cruelly, their rights had been snatched away by the Government, and their money was also being robbed.

Q. After the passing of the Rowlatt Bill in the Legislative Council, was there a meeting held in connection with Mr. Gandhi's propaganda for passive resistance?

A. There was a meeting on the 29th in Jallianwala Bagh in which it was resolved that the 30th of March should be observed as a fasting day according to the message of Mahatma Gandhi.

Q. On the 30th of March, did you know whether there was a complete hartal in Amritsar?

A. There was a complete hartal on the 30th of March at Amritsar.

Q. Was there a large public meeting held that night?

A. There was a big mass meeting in Jallianwala Bagh that evening.

Q. Were you present at that meeting?

A. I was present at the meeting.

Q. Is there a record of what you heard at that meeting?

A. That report which I had prepared with the help of Asaf Ali has been submitted to the Court.

Q. What was the attitude of the audience at that meeting with reference to Government?

A. They were spreading all sorts of contemptuous remarks about Government.

Q. Who were the chief speakers at that meeting?

A. Dr. Kitchlew and Dina Nath, the editor of the paper "Waght" and others.

Q. There was another hartal held on the 6th; were you present in Amritsar on the 6th April?

A. I was not present on the 6th at Amritsar.

Q. You were in Lahore for some time and then returned to Amritsar on the 9th April?

A. I returned to Amritsar on the 9th April.

Q. On that day was the Ram Naumi procession being celebrated?

A. There was a procession of Ram Naumi that evening.

Q. Did you submit a report about that?

A. I submitted a detailed report about that which has been submitted to the Court as an exhibit.

Q. At that procession did you hear any statements made by the crowd derogatory of the Government?

A. They were abusing people whom they thought were helping Government and they said "Dust be on the heads of those who flatter Government."

Q. On the 10th April did you hear of the news of the deportation of Dr. Kitchlew and Satyapal?

A. On the 10th April at 11-30 A.M. I heard people saying that Dr. Kitchlew and Satyapal had been arrested and deported.

Q. Where were you at this time?

A. I was in the Hall Bazar.

Q. Whereabouts is that?

A. I was at a place confronting the shop of Dr. Satyapal which is situated in the Hall Bazar and the Hall Bazar is situated at first gate of the city after the bridge.

Q. Were the shops closed?

A. They began to close just after hearing the news and they were closed abruptly.

Q. Was the crowd that collected a large crowd?

A. First of all, the crowd was divided into different parts and then they gathered; they came from different sides and they gathered at one place and the total number was about 1,500 to 2,000.

Q. What was the demeanour of the crowd?

A. They were very excited and just looked like mad men.

Q. Were they uttering any cries?

A. They said: "They have taken away our leaders Satyapal and Kitchlew." "Where is the Deputy Commissioner?" "We will butcher him to pieces."

Q. Were they uttering cries "we will butcher him to pieces" at this time?

A. These words were uttered when they were going over the bridge.

Q. That was before they had been turned back?

A. It was before that.

Q. Did you see a picket posted at the Road Bridge?

A. I saw some two or three mounted guards on the bridge, two or three of them were Europeans, while two or three of them were Indians.

Q. Did the crowd make efforts to go into the Civil Lines?

A. The crowd was making towards Civil Lines and some of them said they were going to the Deputy Commissioner.

Q. Were you in front or behind the crowd?

A. I was at the back of the crowd.

Q. Did you hear firing?

A. When the people started throwing stones and brickbats then the picket began to turn round and after some time I heard firing.

Q. When you heard firing what did you do?

A. The Telegraph office is situated nearby and I directly went to the telegraph office and telephoned to the Criminal Investigation Department Officer in Lahore saying that the condition at Amritsar was very bad.

Q. In your opinion was there a danger of acts of violence and destruction to property taking place?

A. In my opinion, had the crowd been allowed to move on to the Civil Lines and approach the Deputy Commissioner's house there was a danger of life and property.

Q. Did the crowd go to the Telegraph office when you were there?

A. When I was in the Telegraph office, people from the crowd came to the Telegraph office with clubs and pieces of wood in their hands and they broke the doors by breaking the glass panes.

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[Continued.]

Q. When you first saw the crowd earlier in the morning had they been armed with these sticks that they now had?

A. When I saw this crowd near the bridge they had had no sticks in their hands.

Q. At the Telegraph office did you hear any shouts from the crowd?

A. The crowd was saying "They killed our brethren and we shall kill them."

Q. Was anything said about destroying any buildings?

A. Some of them did say "let us go to the Kotwali and destroy it."

Q. Did you see any destruction that was done at any of the public buildings that were in Amritsar on that date?

A. At about 5 o'clock I saw the British Church Mission room and the National Bank of India destroyed.

Q. What happened to you when you saw the crowd at the Telegraph Office?

A. It was very dangerous for me to stay there when the people were imbued with the idea of destruction to property and violence and therefore I left the place and came back to my home.

Q. Did you return to the scene at about 5 o'clock?

A. When I came back at about 5 o'clock I saw all the buildings which I have enumerated before and also witnessed the looting at the National Bank godown.

Q. Was the building still blazing when you came back?

A. The Church had already been burnt and I saw the National Bank and Town Hall ablaze.

Q. Were there large crowds about?

A. There were thousands of them with sticks in their hands crying loudly and showing signs that there was no regular Government and that everything that was there was their own. They were shouting "*Candhi ki jai, Satyapal ki jai*, and woe be to the Government" which means as a matter of fact "the fleet of the Government may be drowned" and the people were saying that some Europeans had been killed.

Q. What attitude was the crowd taking up as regards Europeans?

A. In the mosque of Khair-din, where dead bodies were lying, I heard a Sikh and a Muhammadan addressing the crowd that had gathered there "Murder the Europeans, this is the time that we should rise."

Q. Were the rioters parading the city in bands?

A. They were moving about the city with sticks in their hands.

Q. Would it have been safe for any European to appear in the crowd unprotected by a military force?

A. It would have been utterly impossible for a European to have gone there. He would have been cut to pieces.

Q. Was there complete disorder in the city?

A. There was a big agitation in the city and there was management about things.

Q. Did you leave the city to go to Lahore that night?

A. In the evening I met my Deputy Superintendent who had gone to Amritsar in a motor car, having heard all these things from me. He took me with him in his motor car.

Q. Were you in Lahore during the subsequent period of the disturbance?

A. I remained in Lahore. I never went to Amritsar afterwards.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You reported on the various meetings that you spoke of?

A. Yes, I reported.

Q. At the meeting of the 28th February Kitchlew spoke?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In your report these words were said by Dr. Kitchlew "that we Indians were loyal to the King and to the British nation but we are against the system of Government adopted by the representatives of the King in India and against them we should do all possible agitation in a constitutional way"?

A. These words were uttered by Kitchlew.

Q. Did you take any exception to those sentiments?

A. I went only to report him. I never went there to make an objection.

Q. Do you suggest that these meetings were meetings that propagated sedition?

A. I did not say that the meeting was convened for that purpose, but it did have the effect of exciting the people.

Q. Did it have the effect of exciting the people against the Rowlatt Act or against the British Government?

A. It was against the British Government because they wanted to pass the Rowlatt Bill.

Q. They objected to the action of Government in passing the Rowlatt Bill?

A. Besides mentioning about the Rowlatt Bill they also narrated the old stories about past cruelties and one of them will be found in Dina Nath's speech about starvation.

Q. So far as Kitchlew was concerned, can you point me to any passage in which he spoke against the authority of the British Government or suggested that that authority be done away with at this meeting of the 28th?

A. He also added "that we Indians were loyal to the King and to the British nation, but we are against their system of Government adopted by the representatives of the King, and against them we should do all possible agitation in a constitutional way." When this passage was delivered, it was delivered in such an attitude that his demeanour showed that he made a jest of the whole thing.

Q. Do you suggest that though Dr. Kitchlew expressly used words of loyalty to the King and the British nation, still the manner of his delivering the speech was such as to suggest the contrary? Do you suggest that?

A. His manner was such as if he was using this passage as a shield to protect him against any charge of disloyalty.

Q. Do you mean to suggest that in all those speeches, whenever assertions were made of loyalty, people were asked to be loyal to the British nation and the King, that was not genuine at all?

A. I have said these things only about the speech made by Dr. Kitchlew.

Q. Do you mean to say whenever he said we should be loyal to the King-Emperor and British nation, that was not seriously meant by him?

A. It depends upon the speaker.

Q. Do you suggest the same thing with regard to the other speakers?

A. I will just say after consulting their speeches.

Q. Whenever any of these speakers asserted their steadfast loyalty to the British nation and the King, do you suggest that they never meant that to be genuine or serious?

A. I can say about Dr. Kitchlew that whenever he talked about loyalty he did so with a smile and treated it as a jest.

Q. When he spoke about loyalty he accompanied that with a smile which showed that he did not mean it?

A. The people interpreted it like that.

Q. Did you interpret it like that?

A. I took it in that light.

Q. Now with regard to the meeting of the 29th March about which you made a report, Dr. Satyapal in his speech again spoke about bureaucracy and not against the King-Emperor or the authorities?

A. He did say so.

Q. The suggestion throughout is that the bureaucracy are not carrying out the real principles of the British Government?

A. They only used the word bureaucracy as far as I remember.

Q. Whenever they expressly used the word bureaucracy, and said that the bureaucracy were not carrying out the real principles of the British Government you say they meant to attack the British Government itself?

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[Continued.]

A. They meant only those Europeans. I said that they meant only those Europeans who governed India and who carried out the orders of Government in India.

Q. You did not understand them to mean that they went to throw off the British rule?

A. They wanted to impress on the audience whenever they spoke that Government was practising tyranny and whatever they did was improper and illegal.

Q. With regard to the Rowlatt Bills, there was unanimous opposition throughout the districts you knew?

A. People did oppose the Rowlatt Bill but they could not say what it was. They said they did not know anything about the Rowlatt Bill, but they believed in whatever was said by the leaders.

Q. Do you know the Rowlatt Bill yourself?

A. I had only a cursory glance at the Rowlatt Bill, but I have not committed it to memory.

Q. You do not know what it contains?

A. It deals with measures suppressing anarchical crimes.

Q. On the 30th March, in Amritsar, there was a general hartal?

A. There was a complete hartal on the 30th March in Amritsar.

Q. And there were large crowds, I suppose, moving about in the streets?

A. I saw masses of crowds in the crossings and chowks.

Q. On that occasion, there was no violence?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. And were there no attacks on Europeans or on their property?

A. I do not know anything about it. It did not occur.

Q. On the 6th April, you had again a general hartal?

A. If the question deals with Amritsar, I was not in Amritsar on that day.

Q. Were you in Amritsar on the 9th?

A. I was there.

Q. On the night was there a big procession of the Ram Naumi festival?

A. It was the procession of Ram Naumi. It is a big Hindu holiday.

Q. Now the procession that day was an orderly procession?

A. It was neither in the usual course of things nor was it according to the customs of the Hindus. Muhammadans had also joined the Hindus, and people had dressed themselves in Turkish costumes. I have given details of it in my report.

Q. My question was whether those processions were orderly?

A. They were shouting the 'jai' cries of different men and they were moving about.

Q. Were the crowds orderly?

A. According to the Hindu significance I do not call it an orderly procession because they were jumping and shouting out cries and there were Muhammadans in it.

Q. Do you say the crowds were disorderly because the Muhammadans had joined the Hindus?

A. It was not a proper procession according to the Hindu regulations.

Q. I will come to that in a minute. What I am asking you at present is that these crowds did not commit any violence; they were orderly?

A. There was no violence committed by these people.

Q. You said that the Hindus and Muhammadans had joined these processions?

A. Yes.

Q. You consider that to be wrong?

A. It was not proper for Muhammadans to have taken part in it according to the Hindu notion.

Q. Is there anything wrong that Hindus and Muhammadans joined in their respective festivals?

A. I do not say that it is improper, but they were drinking water out of the same glass which according to the Hindu notions is not right.

Q. Then the objection is to their drinking water together and you do not object to their joining in the festivals?

A. As an ordinary thing, it is quite sufficient to say *Raja Ram Chandar ki jai*. On such occasions it was

not at all necessary for them to have uttered the cries of *jai* for Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal.

Q. You say that they acted wrongly in shouting the *jai* cries for Kitchlew and Satyapal?

A. According to the Hindu usage it was not right.

Q. On the Ram Naumi day, were you present with the Deputy Commissioner amid the processions?

A. I was not at that place where the Deputy Commissioner was, but I heard afterwards that the Deputy Commissioner had come.

Q. Are you aware that the crowds on that day paid special respect to the Deputy Commissioner?

A. I had not heard.

Q. On the 9th, the crowds exhibited no anti-European or anti-Government feeling. Do you mean to say up to the 9th April or only on the day of the Ram Naumi?

A. Up to the 9th April in all these gatherings, the people said that Government is practising tyrannies and has been robbing money that belonged to us and things of that sort.

Q. Who said that the Government was robbing money, the leaders?

A. Common people who met each other in the bazaars.

Q. How many people did you hear say so?

A. After the meetings came to an end, there was open talk about it in the bazaars.

Q. Now the crowds gathered on the 10th April. Was that mainly due to the arrest of Satyapal and Kitchlew?

A. In my opinion, it was due to their arrest.

Q. You said that somebody said: "Where is the Deputy Commissioner? we will cut him to pieces." Where did you hear this? at what place?

A. Just on the first slope of the road bridge.

Q. And who were saying this?

A. The members of the crowds who were mixed together.

Q. You say that you were at the back of the crowd?

A. I was in the back portion of the crowd.

Q. Were you mixed up in the crowd?

A. I was mixed up in the back portion of the crowd.

Q. Were people around you saying this?

A. Yes, certainly.

Q. You spoke of people having thrown stones, of pickets turned back and so on. You did not observe all that yourself?

A. I saw people raising their hands in the manner when people do in throwing brick-bats and I did see people throwing brick-bats.

Q. And you were at the foot of the bridge on the city side?

A. I was at that spot on the slope when people crowded about the Deputy Commissioner; but as the crowd moved onwards, I also moved along with it and at the point when they threw the brick-bats, I was on the level ground and I could see them throwing stones.

Q. You were on the top of the bridge?

A. Just near the top of the bridge.

Q. Where did the crowd get the stones?

A. The bridge is over the railway line and there was a heap of stones on the railway line and heaps alongside the road which had been collected by the Municipal Committee for repairing roads.

Q. When did you go home?

A. When they demolished the Telegraph Office. After that I went home.

Q. And you remained at home till 5 in the evening?

A. I was at my place till 5.

Q. And you remained at home all that time?

A. Had I intended to die I would have gone outside.

Q. You remained at home because you were afraid?

A. I could not stand against so many thousands. I was afraid certainly.

Q. You spoke of the gathering in the mosque where the dead bodies were lying; was it not on the next day?

A. It was the same evening of the 10th.

Q. And you spoke of a Sikh and Muhammadan telling the crowd to murder the Europeans?

A. I did hear it.

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[Continued.]

Q. Who was the Sikh and who was the Muhammadan : do you know their names ?

A. I do not know their names.

Q. You were present there. Did you not ascertain their names ?

A. I could not ascertain the names of any of them because I was a C. I. D. Officer and as such I could not approach them.

Q. Is it not the business of the C. I. D. Officer to find out ?

A. The people were so much excited that as a C. I. D. Officer I could not venture to ask them who they were.

Q. Neither from them nor from any other man ?

A. No, I could not.

Q. Did you note this in your diary on that day ?

A. The same evening I mentioned all these things to my Deputy Superintendent who had come from Lahore on the same evening. I mentioned it to the Deputy Inspector-General at Lahore.

Q. Did you send any report ?

A. I have not submitted any written report about it.

Q. You keep a diary of what happens day after day and what you do ?

A. There is no system of daily diaries for the C. I. D. It is only a popular thought that the C. I. D. people have daily diaries.

Q. They rely upon their memory ?

A. They only write down and record those things which are worth writing.

Q. You did not consider this an important matter to record ? A Sikh or Muhammadan preaching the murder of Europeans ?

A. It was a very important thing and I did mention it to the Deputy Inspector-General at Lahore and the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Amritsar, the same evening. Beyond that I did not think anything further was necessary.

Q. It was so important. Why was it not recorded ?

A. The officers to whom I mentioned this story are very responsible and very reliable.

Q. That is all you did ?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. At the meetings which you attended and about which you have submitted reports, you and Ashraf Ali were given a seat near the dais and every facility was given to make reports. Is that not so ?

A. No request was made about the meeting of the 28th, nor was any seat provided. Ashraf Ali did not take any notes regarding the meeting of the 28th.

Q. Your assistant was given one seat near the dais where he sat and took notes on the 23rd of March ?

A. The conveners of the meeting of the 29th March did say that reporters were allowed to sit near the dais. Ashraf Ali did sit there ; in the same way on the 30th March.

Q. Ashraf Ali was your subordinate and you had to check his reports and then submit them ?

A. I did check them.

Q. Some of the reports which you have submitted are not originals ; they have been prepared from Urdu notes which you have destroyed ?

A. It is true.

Q. Therefore I conclude that you were known to the people in Amritsar as a C.I.D. man ?

A. I never sat on the dais. It was Ashraf Ali who sat there ; people did not know me.

Q. You were taking notes at meeting. Did you or did you not at any of these meetings (about half a dozen) take notes ?

A. I did.

Q. And the people were not able to see that you were taking notes of the speeches ?

A. They could not, because there were other correspondents and some were taking notes for a joke. There were several others who took these notes to please themselves as a hobby.

Q. I will come to these meetings subsequently. Apart from these meetings, did you or did you not go to Dr. Kitchlew and offer yourself as a *Satyagrahi* candidate ?

A. Yes, I did go to him.

Q. This is the way in which you have described this is your diary. I will read it out. You can say whether it is so or not. "I personally called on Dr. Kitchlew as the follower of his views. I am not known to him in any capacity. It was necessary to sign a form regarding passive resistance and the manner in which it was to be resorted to would be according to the instructions of Mr. Gandhi to be received later on. He gave me a form which I attach herewith. It is printed by the George Press, Amritsar. He advised that no violence or force should be used." Is that correct ?

A. It is quite correct.

Q. It was genuine ; it was a private talk ; you went before him as a *Satyagrahi*. He advised you that no violence or force should be used ?

A. He told me clearly that there should be no violence.

Q. Therefore it was not meant ironically at that time ?

A. It was not ironical at that time.

Q. Is it or is it not a fact that in your diaries you have been in the habit of mentioning, after reporting the speeches, what you heard or your impressions about the meeting were ? You have done it in several diaries. Is it or is it not so ?

A. I have been writing a note about that, after concluding the daily report ; i.e., as regards what I had heard from people.

Q. Can you refer this committee to any diary of yours from which we could find the 4 or 5 statements which you have made ? The 1st is that the Deputy Commissioner should be torn to pieces ; the 2nd is that your impression was that the Amritsar crowd were saying that Europeans should be murdered ; the 3rd is that the crowd were saying "come along, let us burn every building ;" the 4th was in front of the mass meeting there were two men who were saying "these barristers should be killed" and all that. Can you refer this committee to any diary of yours where mention is made about these 4 or 5 statements ? You might have informed your superiors ; is there any record ?

A. There is no written record ; I have already said that.

Q. Please see your report of the most important meeting, which was held on the 23rd or 25th, at which *Satyagraha* was preached. There you have said "in asking the audience to take to passive resistance, he asked them to call out *Gandhi ki jai*, which was done. He referred to certain questions from Gandhi's speeches dealing with passive resistance without violence." You remember that the speakers there clearly said that there should be passive resistance, but there should be no violence ?

A. Yes.

Q. He said not to use any force on anybody, and if they were to be faced with death, they should face it. This is at a meeting held on the 23rd of March at the Bande Mataram Hall. And further he added that if things were to result in iron fetters, why should they fear ?

A. I think this was on the 30th of March.

Q. It was at the mass meeting of the citizens of Amritsar held on the 23rd. The date does not matter, so long as you say that is your report.

Again take page 44. It is said "They should not take to revolutionary measures nor attain their freedom by shedding their blood. The only way of their salvation lay in passive resistance. They were quite prepared to meet any hardship in their way, be it internment or any other punishment." Is that correct ?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you want to qualify the meaning of this sentence by saying that it was said with a smile, sneer ?

A. There was no smile.

Q. As a matter of fact, in none of the meetings in which you were present, resistance of any civil law was really advocated. It was always said that that would be the question which would be decided subsequently

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[Continued.]

by Mr. Gandhi. As a matter of fact, so far as Amritsar is concerned, none of the audience were ever required to disobey any law. It was always said that this question as to what laws should be civilly disobeyed would be subsequently decided by Mr. Gandhi. Is that so ?

A. It is right.

Q. There is a report of Ashraf Ali and it is an exhibit in the conspiracy case. It is dated the 29th of March ?

A. Yes.

Q. I refer then to the speech of Dr. Satyapal and Lala Diwan Chaud. He says : "The first question which has just arisen in my mind is whether all of us are ready to have fast. The crowd said 'yes' 'all, all, all.' As for myself I have declared this and will not open my shop. Our object will be that we should not injure any one. We do not want to do any violent action and if any stupid fellow does such action, then the Government will be responsible for that." This was said by Diwan Chaud ?

A. Yes.

Q. In the end (it is about 4 lines from the end), Dr. Satyapal said "I will further request that all of you may now go without doing anything unlawful or injurious to any officer or policeman."

A. He said so.

Q. Further on at the bottom of page 33 he said "not to do any act against the Government, not to cause any bodily injury or violence in carrying out your mission."

A. Yes, I have got it.

Q. He says "Therefore all of you should try to spread these two objects (viz., not to cause any bodily injury and not to do any act against Government) of Mahatma Gandhi throughout the length and breadth of the country with great enthusiasm."

A. Yes.

Q. Further on Dr. Kitchlew says "Englishmen are ruling over India since 150 years and they used to make pledges that in their reign there would be no distinction of caste, creed or colour. These were the real thoughts of our Government, but I see that bureaucracy is not representing Government really." Is that so ?

A. It is so.

Q. At the end of Dr. Satyapal's speech, there is the following :—"We were encouraged by the Government and our hopes aspired. We used to think that we will be given self-government and that both Hindus and Muhammadans will be reigning the country. We used to think that we will make progress in the world like other nations of the world and we used to think that our children will receive such education as we wish and

that they will be ready with everything for their nation and country. But it is with great regret that all our hopes have been turned into dust. But now as the war has ended, instead of self-government, such violent Acts are imposed upon us. Where have gone their pledges ?"

A. Yes.

Q. After this line, there is this : "We do not want to injure the Police and other such officers as they are Europeans ; we understand that it is a moral degradation. We only want to do as Gandhi says, 'do not injure anyone, but be ready to be injured by, while at the same time such things are against the laws of humanity ?"

A. Yes ; I have got it.

Q. You will find the following in the speech of Dr. Satyapal. It is a big passage but I will read the whole of it to you because it relates the objects about the Rowlatt Act.

It was said "If these Acts were temporary measures then I do not think there can be any necessity of putting them forward. Some Englishmen even do not like this and do not wish to put this Act on their book as a matter of shame. I want to ask you that when the Act will be imposed and will be in force Government will no longer be caring for these things, they say that this Act will only be applied for the anarchists. The bureaucracy is ready to trample down the rights of the Indians and consequently has passed this Act under any risks. If the bureaucracy is not at present ready to have some regard of our rights, then what care will they take of us when the Act will be in force. It cannot be expected from the police and magistracy that they will use this Act in a somewhat mild manner and so the passing of such an Act is a kind of shame for the Indians."

Then further on he said "Mahatma Gandhi has confessed that that nation cannot progress in this world by means of revolutionary crimes. He who shall do such things will have to reap similar ones. By means of dacoities and other mischiefs India cannot make progress. Men who have done so or are doing such things have learnt those things from Europe and not from India."

There is one sentence more. He said "Men who believe that Gandhi is spreading revolution in the country really they have not understood the sense of Mahatma Gandhi's message ; he who tries to spread any kind of revolution in the country, in the real sense, he is not the real follower of Mahatma Gandhi." That is all ?

A. Yes.

Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate :—I think reference has been made to particular passages.

ANNEXURE A.

I attended the meeting held at Amritsar on 28th February 1919 under the chairmanship of L. Kanhaya Lal, Pleader, to protest against the Rowlatt Bill in the Bande Mataram Hall at 3-30 p.m. The opening speech was delivered by Dr. Satyapal who expressed about the condition of Indians going from bad to worse and told that these Bills are a hitch to our success. He also impressed upon the audience about the Congress having been invited in Amritsar this year and asked their help in each and every way for its success but he did not make any proposals. He also impressed that all Hindus, Muhammadans and Sikhs should totally unite to help the cause of the motherland.

After this Dr. Saif-ud-Din Kitchlew, Bar-at-Law, followed him and seconded him. Moreover, he declared that on one side the Government is trying to help us with the Reform Scheme and on the other it is putting up permanent obstacles in our way by passing such Bills. He also said that we Indians were loyal to the King and to the British Nation but we are against the system of Government adopted by the representatives of the King in India and against them we should do all possible agitation in a constitutional way. He also added that if a revolution happens to take place in India, in that case these gentlemen (representatives of the King in India) will be totally responsible for this and not the Indians.

Then Mr. Badr-ul-Islam, Bar-at-Law, came on the stage and moved the first resolution which went that the citizens of Amritsar are totally against the Rowlatt Bills being passed. He also told that if these were passed then agitation should be done against these Bills and if sacrifices will be required, he will be the first man to go to the jail. He also repeated a conversation which he had with his European friends some time back in England during his stay there while under training for the Bar. He said, it was about the treatment of the British towards Indians in India. He said, his friends disbelieved him and told him that the British could not treat the Indians so badly in India. On further enquiry from him they learnt that only two lakhs of the British were controlling more than thirty crores of Indians in India, they simply laughed at it and remarked that the Indians could turn such a small number of British out of India by giving them only two slaps each. The above gentleman also said that the Indians are loyal to the King and the British Nation. He also preached passive resistance.

The resolution moved by Mr. Badr-ul-Islam was supported by L. Narain Das Khanna, who also said, that if these Bills were passed they shall have to do what Bengalis did at the time of Partition of Bengal and shall oblige the Government to cancel these Bills.

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After this Muhammad Abdullah Minhas, Editor of the *Vakil*, moved the second resolution that they should thank the non-official members of the Council who have already opposed the Bills. The resolution was supported by Dr. Muhammad Abdullah Fauk. Then L. Kotu Mall stood up and moved the third resolution, that the copy of the above resolution may be sent to the local authorities, he was supported by S. Buhle Shah, Rais.

Mr. C. G. FARQUHAR, Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Central Range.

By the President—

Q. Are you Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Central Range?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You were not in Amritsar on the 10th of April?

A. No.

Q. You made yourself familiar with the police dispositions there?

A. I went down to Amritsar on the 6th June and made an inquiry.

Q. You were told what these were? I want your opinion as to the sufficiency of the arrangements that were made?

A. I think the police arrangements were entirely sufficient if they were carried out properly.

Q. On the 10th is it the case with the Kotwali that there was an Indian Officer in charge and no European?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you told what happened on the 6th?

A. I was told, Sir.

Q. What do you say as to the change?

A. The change was one of necessity rather than that of choice.

Q. How far have you been able to ascertain that orders were not received properly by the officer who was at the Kotwali?

A. I took exception to the fact that the senior officer did not receive his orders direct from his superiors but through his subordinate.

Q. Who was his subordinate?

A. His subordinate was Inspector Muhammad Ashraf Khan.

Q. Are there any regulations in detail in the Kotwali for the action that police should take in the event of a riot?

A. Yes, that refers to what would be called an internal riot, quite different from outside matters, just like riots over kine-killing or riots like that.

Q. On the morning of the 10th there were in the Kotwali 100 armed men. Were there another 100 outside the Kotwali?

A. Yes, 100 men unarmed.

Q. Did they make use at all of these 100 unarmed men during the day?

A. No.

Q. Would it not have been possible for them to make use of them?

A. Being unarmed and being separate detachments of police in every locality it was not easy for them to have done anything.

Q. With reference to the action taken by the police who were concentrated at the Kotwali, I believe the Kotwali is not far from the National Bank?

A. It is about 50 yards.

Q. Was any help sent from the Kotwali?

A. The help was eventually sent after a very long delay.

Q. Was it sent after the murders of the gentlemen in the National Bank had taken place?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you give us four reasons why police assistance should not have been sent earlier?

A. I have given various reasons in my report. Partly it was due to the fact that there was no unity between the senior police officer at the Kotwali and the officer-in-charge and partly because they were afraid that the

In the end L. Kanhaya Lal, the President, made a very short speech in Punjabi opposing the Rowlatt Bills. All the other speeches were delivered in Urdu. The Bande Mataram Hall was totally packed up consisting chiefly of lawyers and men of commercial class. During the speeches when any speaker uttered the words: "If Rowlatt Bills were passed" the whole crowd shouted the word of *shame*.

crowd would assault them and partly it is due to want of definite orders as to the action which was to be taken.

Q. The Town Hall itself is quite close to the Kotwali?

A. At a distance of 2 or 3 yards. It is practically in the same building.

Q. Where were the police located?

A. On this side of the Kotwali.

Q. Did they do anything?

A. They made a half-hearted demonstration, threatening to fire but actually they never did.

Q. In your opinion threatening to fire would have better effects than actually firing?

A. Not unless you showed a determination that you were to actually fire at the end.

Q. What explanation do you offer for this inaction?

A. It was a great responsibility thrown on officers neither of whom was young. It was really up to them to fire as the circumstances were such and they did not care to take that responsibility.

Q. At the time of the destruction of the Town Hall the police did not like to fire perhaps because the lives of some of the mob who were close were not safe?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you any criticisms to make as regards the detective force at Amritsar?

A. My idea was that the detective force such as they were in Amritsar, just men from the force, were not organized in any way to deal with political information to any great extent. They were well known to the people of the town and in this particular instance their utility was practically destroyed by the fact that they were very well recognized or could be well recognized.

Q. Do you offer certain criticism on the defence scheme?

A. Yes.

Q. What are your criticisms?

A. My view is that at the headquarters of every district the police arrangement should be cut and dry and should be apart entirely from any military arrangement and both might co-operate with each other. The burden of any disturbance in the first instance is on the police.

Q. Was any provision made, so far as you can judge, for the protection of Europeans that might be in the city when these disturbances occurred?

A. No. I don't think anything was done. I know that intimation was given to Mr. Stuart that there might be trouble on the following day but he did not take it seriously.

Q. On whom rests the responsibility of this?

A. On the Superintendent of Police and the Deputy Commissioner, of course.

Q. I think finally Colonel Smith had to do the collection of the Europeans in a motor van?

A. He had a motor van with which he collected some ladies from the Mission Hospital and the Girls' School.

Q. That was fairly late in the day?

A. Yes.

Q. By that time ladies in the city and other Europeans had been exposed to a considerable extent?

A. So I understand.

Q. So far as the police in Amritsar themselves are individually concerned was there anything in their action which you saw to complain about?

A. Nothing.

Q. It was a question of bad leadership?

A. Entirely.

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Mr. C. G. FARQUHAR—concluded—Khan Bahadur FAZAL DAD KHAN.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. As regards the armed men at Amritsar were they all competent and trained in the use of arms?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they provided with buckshot or with rifle ammunition?

A. With smooth bore ball ammunition and I understand with buckshot too.

Q. Had you mounted police in any number at Amritsar at this time?

A. No.

Q. I take it that leading officers were mounted for the purposes of command?

A. Yes.

Q. You had no available force of mounted police. Therefore any question that arises is as to the keeping back of the crowd by the foot police, whether or not they had other duties to perform and whether or not they had a considerable number of troops at their backs?

A. You mean inside the city or outside it?

Q. Anywhere. To deal with a large number of people preventing them from going if you don't want them to go?

A. I understand that proved a failure on one occasion in Lahore.

Q. I am suggesting that.

A. It will not lead me to accept the theory that a few mounted police could keep back a very hostile crowd.

Q. You could keep back a crowd of very many armed men with dismounted men?

A. I should rather have the footmen.

Q. You don't regard the lack of mounted police as a defect in the establishment of Amritsar?

A. No.

Q. There is a note signed by "A. C. Stewart" to the effect "The police deserve no credit for saving the lives of Messrs. Thompson and Ross, whose lives were saved by the inability of the crowd to discover where they were hidden. When the police arrived at the Bank the crowd had actually left the building with the exception of perhaps half a dozen men." Is that a note on your statement or is it a note with your agreement?

A. That is Mr. Stewart's note on my statement. Reports had been given otherwise. The police arrived at the Bank after the first attack on it.

Q. When you say that they went to the Bank and were miraculously in time to do any good, you say so because they were so late?

A. Yes.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. As regards the defence scheme you say it had not been worked out?

A. There was a mixed defence scheme between the military and the civil. My idea is that we should have a separate police defence scheme from the military in Amritsar. In Amritsar the Cantonments are close to the police but in many stations military Cantonments are at a distance and they have separate police defence schemes to hold up any rioting until the assistance of the military is received. We have got a part of one scheme.

Q. Had there been a defence scheme in Amritsar?

A. There had been. The police details had not been worked out.

Q. Would that reflect on somebody?

A. That is my own idea. I don't know whether my predecessors had it. I have done it in all the districts in my range.

Khan Bahadur FAZAL DAD KHAN, Risaldar Major, Indian Army.

By the President—

Q. You are a Risaldar Major in the Indian Army?

A. In the 12th Cavalry.

Q. On 10th April last were you near Amritsar?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. In the course of your inquiry did it come to your knowledge that the Clerks of the Chartered Bank, who could be seen from the Kotwali, asked the police from the Kotwali to come and help them?

A. Yes.

Q. And they did not send any help and did not listen to them?

A. Not for a long time.

Q. Not because they did not know that a certain Bank was being damaged and that the clerks were shouting from the roof of the Bank to the Kotwali for assistance; they were practically asking for help and no help was sent?

A. Yes.

Q. The defence which was put forward by Muhammad Ashraf Khan for not taking action. You don't believe that defence?

A. I don't believe it. It is a false defence put forward by him.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith—

Q. You say in your statement that for the regulation of police action in the event of a riot in Amritsar there are standing orders in detail in the Kotwali. Would these standing orders provide for pickets at the banks?

A. Probably not. I imagine they do refer to an internal riot in the city of Amritsar.

Q. It has been urged with considerable force that if there had been pickets at the banks on the 10th they might have been safe. That might be right or wrong, what do you think?

A. I think it would be folly to put small detached pickets at these buildings.

Q. Did you put pickets on the 6th when *hartal* took place?

A. Small detached pickets which could not possibly keep back a big crowd.

Q. There are pickets there now?

A. They go to the banks during office hours each day.

Q. There was a European officer of the Kotwali in charge of the *hartal* of the 6th; why was there none on the 10th when matters were more serious?

A. I could not say. The idea perhaps was that men should remain concentrated at one place. In my opinion it was a very good idea indeed.

Q. You mentioned that the National Bank is 50 yards from the Kotwali, but we understand from Mr. Stewart, Inspector-General, that it is about 238 yards. Is it not an error?

A. Yes. I referred to the Chartered Bank when I said it was at a distance of 50 yards. There are two banks. One is quite close, say 100 or 150 yards distant. That is the Chartered Bank. The National Bank is farther on. From both these banks they had a call for assistance.

Q. In Delhi we had a great deal of evidence to the effect that the people disliked the police. Were they disliked in Amritsar? Do you know anything about it?

A. I have seen no evidence of it. Practically none.

Q. It has been brought to our notice in Delhi that had the police not interfered and had matters been left to the leaders everything would have been all right. Here in Amritsar the police stayed out of the way with disastrous results.

A. Quite so.

Q. In what part of Amritsar were you?

A. In the Amritsar Horse Fair.

Q. Was your tent near the road?

A. Yes, by the side of the road.

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Khan Bahadur FAZAL DAD KHAN.

[Continued.]

Q. Did you notice whether the shopkeepers were keeping their shops open or was anything happening to them?

A. Five or six men came at 12 o'clock and informed the shopkeepers that Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal had been arrested by the Government and deported somewhere, and they were asked to close their shops on an oath.

Q. Was anything said as to what would be done to them if they did not close their shops?

A. That they would be looted.

Q. Were the shops actually closed?

A. Yes, all closed.

Q. At about 12 did you hear the noise of a large crowd?

A. It was at about 1 o'clock.

Q. Where were the crowd?

A. They were coming out of the Hathli Gate.

Q. Did you go towards the Hathli Gate?

A. When they had just come out, I reached the Hathli Gate. The last tent of the horse fair was pitched alongside.

Q. How many people were there?

A. There were several parties coming out of the Hathli Gate. Some moved on the Aitchison Park and some to the Telegraph Office and to Hall Gate. I do not know the exact number, but the total might have been near 20,000.

Q. Did you about then notice an outburst of smoke?

A. When I had returned to my tent after 1, I noticed between 1 and 2 p.m. a good deal of smoke.

Q. Were there a number of merchants and zemindars about where you were stationed?

A. There were horse dealers from different parts of the country and also some zemindars.

Q. What did they do when these flames burst out?

A. When this crowd came out at about 1 there was a general unrest among the people and they came rushing towards me asking what they should do. I said there was no unrest, but those people who had one or two horses with them just managed to go back home-wards, and people who could not manage to take their horses back owing to their numbers stayed there.

Q. A short time after this did you get news that a European who was going to the Fort from the goods shed had been killed?

A. Yes, I heard that one was killed. I went there and saw him.

Q. Whereabout did you find this man?

A. At the southern slope of the road between the new and the old railway godowns.

Q. After the clearance of people from the fair, were others arriving, were people coming into the fair at this time?

A. No, nobody could come.

Q. Were the people who remained in a state of fear?

A. They were very much perturbed. We had 8 parties of cavalry there; had we left, it was their opinion that they would have been looted.

Q. Did you continue to remain there with any object in view?

A. My reason was firstly that we wanted to offer our services to any civil or military British Officer who chanced to come there.

Q. Did any one come there?

A. Up to 6 no one came. The other reasons were that if I went away from there the shopkeepers would necessarily have been looted; also, owing to the disturbances we could not get any waggon for conveying our horses, of which we had 5 to 7 each.

Q. Did you remove the corpse of the European that you had seen dead?

A. At about 6 in the evening a riding squad came and carried the corpse away to the Fort.

Q. Did you go to the Fort with that squad?

A. No. After 6 o'clock there were ladies and children going in motors and a bamboo cart and other conveyances to the Fort. In the evening, having seen that no officer had turned up, I moved to the Fort in order

to inform any officer if I were to find one there, of our number and of our proposed help.

Q. Did you consider the situation serious?

A. Very serious.

Q. When you got to the Fort did you see the Commanding Officer?

A. When I went to the Fort I found at the Fort Gate two European gentlemen, one of them being Mr. Jefferies whom I knew and who had been at Lyallpur as Executive Engineer. I informed him of my proposed support and also of my number and that I was ready to serve the Government as a picket or in any other capacity if I was provided with suitable horses and arms. Then he took me inside the Fort to the Commanding Officer and informed him of my purpose. The Officer Commanding asked me as to the number of men that were available. I offered the services of 6 officers out of 8 and 14 cavalry men, and the rest I wanted to keep in the Fair to guard my horses. The Officer Commanding asked me to come to the Fort at 9 o'clock in the evening and gave me the countersign. I reached there in the evening and the Commanding Officer gave one rifle and 50 rounds to each man and asked us to guard the turrets of the Fort.

Q. Was it considered that there was a risk of the Fort being invaded or an assault made on it?

A. The Officer Commanding informed me that because there were only a few men in the Fort they wanted our help because they had been hearing the news that the city people would attack and assault the Fort.

Q. What was the size of your company.

A. Twenty in all.

Q. And did you remain at the Fort that night?

A. Yes, till 7 in the morning. The men guarding the Fort were so few that there were none to relieve them; there was no change of guards.

Q. Did you remain up the whole night?

A. Yes.

Q. In the morning were you relieved?

A. In the morning the Officer Commanding informed me that reinforcements had arrived during the night and so there was no necessity for my stopping there any further.

Q. Then did you go back to your tent in the market?

A. Yes.

Q. How long did you remain there?

A. I returned to Lahore the same day by the 2 o'clock train as the fair had closed.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. When you and your party were at the fair you had no arms?

A. No, we had only gone to purchase horses.

Q. Did the crowds come to the fair where you were?

A. Nobody came there.

Q. Did you try to keep them away?

A. The eight men of my party were there at my tent and we were ready to oppose any people assaulting us.

Q. Was there any loot in the fair?

A. There was no loot.

Q. You said that 5 or 6 men came and told the shopkeepers that they should close the shops? Who were these shopkeepers?

A. I could not tell you.

Q. Nor can you tell us who these men were?

A. I don't know these people.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. What is your regiment?

A. 12th Cavalry.

Q. How long were you at the fair, before this outbreak occurred?

A. I reached the fair at 9 o'clock on the 9th.

Q. Had you any reason to anticipate this outbreak before it occurred?

A. On the 9th towards the evening I saw one of those lemonade bottle dealers who go about in cars and he was shouting out to the people that Hindu and Muham-

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Khan Bahadur FAZAL DAD KHAN—concluded—MUHAMMAD ASHRAF KHAN.

madans had now joined, there was no difference and they should come and drink the water.

Q. What did you infer from that?

A. I thought there was something at the bottom of it.

Q. Did you think there was something unusual?

A. This has never been done and therefore I considered it unusual.

Q. You do not belong to this part of the country?

A. No, Sir. I do not belong to Amritsar.

Q. What is your district?

A. Originally I belonged to Jullundur. I was in Lyallpur for 16 years in the cavalry and now I live in Montgomery.

Q. These Indian Officers whom you mentioned and the sowars, how many of these were pensioners and how many were on the active list?

A. There were two only on pension; the others were all on the active lists.

Q. Did they offer service out of a sense of loyalty and duty to the Government?

A. Certainly.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Out of your party I understand that only 6 officers and 14 men were given arms?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any attack made upon them or on the fair?

A. No.

MUHAMMAD ASHRAF KHAN, Inspector of Police, Amritsar City.

By the President—

Q. Were you Inspector in charge of the City Police at Amritsar from the 1st September 1918 to the end of July 1919?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Then on the 10th April had you certain instructions as to the duties you were to perform on that day?

A. At 8 a.m. on the 10th Mr. Plomer, the Superintendent of Police, sent for me by telephone and informed me secretly that Messrs. Kitchlew and Satyapal were going to be deported and that I should be on the look-out and make certain special arrangements.

Q. Where were you stationed that day?

A. I was in the Kotwali at that time; but after that I was in his bungalow.

Q. When did you leave the Kotwali?

A. Just at the moment when I received a message at about 8 a.m.

Q. At the time when the Banks were being burnt where were you?

A. I was in the Kotwali.

Q. How many men had you under you?

A. There were about 75 men under me and Khan Sahib Ahmed Jan was in charge.

Q. Did you see the burning of the Town Hall?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did the Police take any action to prevent the burning?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What action?

A. The fire brigade was sent for at once. Police also helped in quenching the fire.

Q. Did the police take any action to prevent the crowd burning the Town Hall?

A. When they saw fire and the Town Hall ablaze they could not find any mob there.

Q. Did you not see the mob burning Town Hall?

A. Not at all. If we had seen anybody doing that, they would have been arrested if not shot.

Q. Did you notice that the mob were burning the banks?

A. Not in my presence.

Q. Was a messenger not sent asking for police assistance to prevent the destruction of Bank property?

A. I despatched men directly under the instructions of Khan Sahib Ahmed Jan as he received the message.

Q. Was that after the National and Alliance Banks had been destroyed by fire?

A. The Alliance Bank was not set on fire. It was the National Bank that was on fire.

Q. Did you despatch any men to the National Bank?

A. I despatched one Sub-Inspector and 25 constables under instructions of the Khan Sahib.

Q. Was that before or after the Bank was destroyed?

A. I did not know at that time whether it was before the thing or after. But afterwards at the inquiry it was found out that when our men reached, the thing had been done and the Europeans had been murdered,

And in the inquiry we found out that the first thing done by the mob was to murder these Europeans.

Q. In what state was the city from the 10th to the 13th April?

A. It was dangerous.

Q. Were people in safety to go about the streets during that time?

A. There was danger.

Q. What did the danger arise from?

A. There was fire and Europeans had been murdered and people were afraid of their own deaths.

Q. During this time from the 10th to the 13th were the police accompanied by military force when they went into the city?

A. Yes, along with the military.

Q. Was the police force in your opinion insufficient to maintain order during that period?

A. As the mob numbered about 75 to 80 thousand men the police force then available was not sufficient to cope with the mob. There were few people in the reserve, because several of the force had already been to the National Bank. They were despatched to all three places: one Sub-Inspector each at the National Bank, Chartered Bank and the Alliance Bank and some men were busy in helping the fire brigade and some were guarding the Police Station because arms and ammunition were stored there.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. What time on the 10th April did you get to the Kotwali?

A. It was about 9 a.m. that I reached the Kotwali after having done with Mr. Plomer.

Q. And did you stay at the Kotwali throughout the main portion of that afternoon and morning?

A. I was in the Kotwali.

Q. Until when were you in the Kotwali?

A. I was there from the 9th to the 13th and slept even there.

Q. Was Khan Sahib Ahmed Jan, Deputy Superintendent of Police, your superior officer?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you got to the Kotwali on the morning of the 10th was he there too?

A. When I returned I did not find him there. I then despatched a message in writing asking him to come at once, but when I found that he did not come I went to him because he lives with me and I brought him along with me.

Q. What time of the day was that?

A. At about half-past 9 or 10.

Q. In the morning?

A. Yes.

Q. From the time that you brought him there was he in the Kotwali during the rest of that day?

A. He was there for the main part of day. He only left the Kotwali for about 15 minutes when he went to the Chartered Bank which is situated near by.

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[Continued.]

Q. At what time of the day would that be?
 A. It was about 2.
 Q. When he left for the Chartered Bank had the mob begun to attack the Town Hall or not?
 A. Nobody assaulted the Town Hall. There was only fire which had been done before.
 Q. Had they by that time set fire to the Town Hall?
 A. It was ablaze.
 Q. What time was it that they first began to approach the Town Hall for the purpose of setting fire to it?
 A. I cannot tell you exactly the time they came to set it on fire, but I noticed the fire there.
 Q. What time was it when you first noticed the fire in the Town Hall?
 A. At about 2 P.M.
 Q. And it was after that that Khan Sahib Ahmed Jan left for the Chartered Bank?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Was that before or after the party had left to the Chartered Bank?
 A. They received the information later and so they were despatched later.
 Q. Did the party go to the Alliance Bank?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Was that before or after the party went to the Chartered Bank?
 A. After.
 Q. Now you got to the Kotwali at about half-past 9 in the morning—how many had you at the Kotwali at that time?
 A. Three Sub-Inspectors and 25 men of the Reserve Force.
 Q. What further men had you got at the Kotwali in the course of that morning?
 A. 50 men in all.
 Q. At what time of the day had you 75 men?
 A. It was about 10-30.
 Q. From 10-30 in the morning of the 10th April you had 3 Sub-Inspectors and 75 men. Will you please tell me what you did with these 75 men in the morning of the 10th April?
 A. They were despatched to the different Banks, as I have told you before.
 Q. You told me before you had not despatched any till after 2 o'clock in the afternoon. I want to know what you were doing in the morning?
 A. We were guarding the Kotwali (Police Station) and also helping the Fire Brigade at the Town Hall.
 Q. At what time of the day? You say you noticed the fire brigade at 2 o'clock. Is that so?
 A. It was about 2 o'clock.
 Q. Before you noticed the fire in the Town Hall what did you notice all these men were doing?
 A. They were in reserve as extra men.
 Q. Were they or were they not inside the Kotwali, or were they outside?
 A. They were inside the compound of the Kotwali.
 Q. Were they armed with rifles?
 A. They were armed.
 Q. They were in the compound of the Kotwali. Why didn't they stand in front of the Kotwali so that they could see the Kotwali and command the road?
 A. The compound is situated between the Town Hall and the Police Station, and they were there.
 Q. So they were all standing between the Kotwali on the one side of the road and the Town Hall on the other. Were they standing in line?
 A. They were standing in line.
 Q. With their arms?
 A. Yes.
 Q. They had their buck-shot or ball?
 A. They were supplied with it.
 Q. They could all see anything happening to the Town Hall?
 A. They could notice anything in the front part but not the back side.
 Q. What happened during the morning in the front part?

A. Small parties of about 100 to 200 men each were moving about to Aitchison Park from various directions and some from the side of the Town Hall.
 Q. They were passing by the Kotwali and the Town Hall, and going through the gate?
 A. One party had gone that way and later we did not allow anybody to pass.
 Q. Did you put your men across the gate so as to prevent any traffic through the gate?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What time of day was it when you stopped the gate?
 A. About 12 o'clock.
 Q. Now from that time, did anybody come in front of the gateway between the Town Hall and the Kotwali?
 A. Not after the men had been placed there.
 Q. Were there any crowds coming up to the gates in front of the Kotwali and rear of the Kotwali and the Town Hall?
 A. The first party had come and they enquired about Satyapal and Kitchlew. Nobody after them had gone that way.
 Q. Do I understand that after 12 o'clock, the road of the compound between the Kotwali and the Town Hall was cleared?
 A. It was all cleared.
 Q. When did you first know that anything was wrong with the Town Hall?
 A. It was between a quarter to 2 and 2.
 Q. What did you notice from within?
 A. That it was on fire at the back.
 Q. You knew that it was on fire at the back. Did that come as a surprise to you?
 A. Yes. I was surprised.
 Q. At what time did the mob break into the Town Hall?
 A. I did not notice. I think they must have entered from the back.
 Q. Is it only a question of thinking or do you know it as a fact?
 A. It is my opinion that the fire must have been started there because I noticed the fire there for the first time.
 Q. Will you undertake to say as a matter of your own knowledge that no person had got into the Town Hall after 12 o'clock from the front.
 A. Nobody entered from the front.
 Q. Is it the case that at any time during that morning and before 2 o'clock the police lined up before the Kotwali threatening to fire?
 A. They did threaten once.
 Q. Where were they actually standing when they threatened to fire?
 A. They were in the compound then.
 Q. Near the gate or the Kotwali?
 A. In front of the Kotwali.
 Q. It must have been they that threatened to fire from the Town Hall. Is it not so?
 A. These men posted there could see people at the back of the Town Hall from the open gates.
 Q. At whom did they threaten to fire?
 A. The people at the back of the Town Hall.
 Q. How far away were the people at the back of the Town Hall from the police when they threatened?
 A. It was about a distance of 30 paces.
 Q. At that time, was the Town Hall on fire or not?
 A. No.
 Q. Why did they threatened to fire on the crowd?
 A. Mr. Jarman the Municipal Engineer was there; with some men we wanted to bring him and so we did.
 Q. Why did you threaten to fire upon the crowd at the time?
 A. Only to save Mr. Jarman, and we did bring him to the Kotwali.
 Q. What was the crowd, when you threatened, trying to do?
 A. They were not doing anything. We only saw them passing.

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[Continued.]

Q. Do I understand that you threatened the passing crowd at the back of the Town Hall?
 A. Yes.
 Q. At the time you threatened the crowd were the crowd not attempting to do some damage?
 A. No.
 Q. What was the object of threatening to fire upon the crowd when it did not do anything?
 A. They had heard cries from Mr. Jarman. He was crying for help, so they went to his rescue apprehending danger.
 Q. Was Mr. Jarman crying for rescue without any cause?
 A. I cannot tell that. He did cry.
 Q. How big was the crowd that you threatened to fire on?
 A. About 70 or 60 men; they looked as if they were only passing by the back of the Town Hall.
 Q. Then you could see, could you not, the crowd so passing the Town Hall?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you take any of the men and go to the back of the Town Hall and see what was happening?
 A. I did go to that part of the building and brought myself the cash books of Mr. Jarman.
 Q. So you did go out by the back of the Town Hall?
 A. I went there myself to save all the papers and other property in his room.
 Q. This was after the fire had broken out?
 A. The fire had not yet broken out.
 Q. Why did you have to save the property from his room in the Town Hall?
 A. I went before the fire broke out; I went only to lock the things. After the fire, I went there to save him.
 Q. Do I understand after the fire broke out you yourself went and saved something from his office?
 A. I had taken them in my custody before the fire broke out.
 Q. Why did you think it necessary to take the things into your own possession out of this gentleman's office before the fire broke out?
 A. As there were many people round about the buildings, there was the danger of the property being lost or robbed in any way by those people or the servants of the gentleman himself.
 Q. Why did you not with your reserve police move from the back of the Town Hall?
 A. They were only passing. They did not gather here; and they were passing from a great distance.
 Q. If you apprehended danger to the Town Hall or the property in it from the rear why did not you take some steps to keep the rear of the Town Hall under proper observation?
 A. The Police were stationed there.
 Q. Then how did people manage to set fire to the Town Hall from behind?
 A. I thought they had set fire long before this.
 Q. Long before what?
 A. Before I went to take possession of these things.
 Q. Had you yourself and your superior officer Khan Sahib Ahmad Jan no sort of quarrel that morning at the Kotwali?
 A. There was no quarrel.
 Q. Did you at any time refuse to take orders from him on that morning?
 A. Not at all. Had there been he would have reported.
 Q. Apart from the question of any quarrel, was there any difference of opinion between you that morning?
 A. In my opinion there was nothing of the sort.
 Q. Did you receive any orders as regards what you should do on that morning?
 A. Mr. Plomer had only instructed that 75 men of the reserve should be placed there and kept in reserve till he came himself.
 Q. Did you receive any other orders besides this?
 A. None besides this. As the time at his disposal was very short, he could not give me any other instructions.

Q. Did you at any time receive instructions from Mr. Plomer that you yourself were not to leave the Kotwali that morning?
 A. No instructions.
 Q. Do I understand from you that the first party left the Bank after the fire in the Town Hall had become known to you?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Now when the fire at the Town Hall became known to you, what did you do on that?
 A. We sent message to the Fire Brigade and sent all the men that were at my disposal to help the Fire Brigade.
 Q. At that time before you sent out the parties to the Bank, the men at your disposal were 75 men?
 A. Yes: 75 men.
 Q. Do I understand you sent the whole 75 men to the Town Hall to see what they could do?
 A. I sent one guard to help the Fire Brigade and two guards were stationed there to protect the Kotwali because there were ammunition and arms in it.
 Q. What did you mean by guard? How many men?
 A. Twenty-five men.
 Q. Did you send one guard to the Town Hall?
 A. One guard.
 Q. Did you yourself go to the Town Hall across the road?
 A. I went there myself and was helping in quenching the fire.
 Q. Did you go there from the front or from the rear?
 A. I went from the front side and also saw the back portion of it.
 Q. When you went in from the front side, what did you see?
 A. I saw violent flames; there was a wind blowing.
 Q. At the time you noticed the building on fire?
 A. Yes.
 Q. At the time you came to the Town Hall the crowd had cleared and you noticed nothing?
 A. The crowd had cleared after 12; nobody had come there because they were all gathering in Aitchison Park.
 Q. Was there any kerosine in the Park to assist the flames when you entered from the front?
 A. There were about 20 to 25 canisters of oil which we took possession of afterwards.
 Q. Where did they come from?
 A. They belonged to somebody and probably were waiting for delivery.
 Q. Where did they come from to the town?
 A. They belonged to the Municipal Committee.
 Q. Were they kept in the Town Hall?
 A. Yes.
 Q. They had not brought them in from outside?
 A. They said that they belonged to the Committee. I do not think that they were brought in.
 Q. You had 25 men at the Town Hall to assist the Fire Brigade, had you?
 A. All this force of 25 men was with me till I heard news from the Chartered Bank and other Banks and after that there were only 8 to 10 men with me.
 Q. From which Bank did you get news of the cry for help?
 A. We received news from the Chartered Bank, which was 50 yards from the Kotwali.
 Q. The distance is so much?
 A. About that.
 Q. Who brought the news of the Chartered Bank?
 A. I do not remember now, but I do remember that we received the news.
 Q. What did you do upon receiving the news?
 A. We despatched 25 constables under a Sub-Inspector after having consulted Khan Ahmed Jan Sahib.
 Q. How long did it take you to consult?
 A. Instantly.
 Q. You did not go with that party?
 A. As I was busy with the Fire Brigade in the Town Hall and as I had also in my mind the protection of the Kotwali, therefore I did not go with them.
 Q. Who did go in charge of that party?
 A. Labbu Ram.

[Continued.]

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MUHAMMAD ASHRAF KHAN.

[Continued.]

Q. Were any persons whipped inside the Kotwali ?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Who were these men ?
 A. Those who made an attack on Miss Sherwood. This was done by the military authorities and they have the record of such cases.
 Q. You don't know why were they flogged in the Kotwali ?
 A. I cannot say. Perhaps for infringement of military orders.
 Q. Nor can you name those persons ?
 A. No, Sir.
 Q. The shops were opened on the 14th ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. There was a meeting held before that ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Are you aware that at some of the floggings that took place inside the city the pleaders were made to attend ?
 A. Some of the pleaders were present. I cannot say whether they had been called to attend or had come there of their own accord.
 Q. What was the number of those pleaders ?
 A. They were mixed with other people and I therefore cannot tell the exact number.
 Q. Approximately ?
 A. I noticed about 8 or 10.
 Q. Had they any business inside the Kotwali at that time ?
 A. I don't remember. They might have come on business because they used to attend the Kotwali on investigation purposes.
 Q. Did a large number of shop-keepers come to you and requested you to intercede with the authorities that they might be allowed to open their shops ?
 A. S. Harnam Singh, Municipal Commissioner, and other influential persons came and asked me.
 Q. Or that they were unwilling and were persuaded by the police to open their shops ?
 A. They informed me that they were ready to open their shops.
 Q. That was before the shops were opened ?
 A. Yes, before the shops were opened.
 Q. Is it not a fact that the meeting at which the Deputy Commissioner and General Dyer were present was held for the purposes of persuading them to open their shops ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. So far as the authorities were concerned there was no obstruction. Are you aware that the permission of the authorities was necessary to open the shops ?
 A. As after the firing incident nobody stirred, a meeting was held to tell the people to open their shops.
 Q. After the meeting no one approached you to ask permission to open the shops ?
 A. None. On the evening of the 14th all had opened their shops.
 Q. Where was your house then ?
 A. My house was then situated near the Hall Gate.
 Q. On the 10th did you not for the first time see Deputy Superintendent of Police Ahmad Jan when he visited your house on that morning ?
 A. I went to his house.
 Q. If the Deputy Superintendent of Police says that he went to your house, would not that statement be incorrect ?
 A. Both my house and his house were situated near by.
 Q. That doesn't matter.
 A. I went to him first and he told me he would wear uniform and I said I also would wear uniform and I then took him in my trap.
 Q. The Deputy Superintendent of Police says that this happened at about 12-15. Is that a correct statement or a false statement ?
 A. This is incorrect.
 Q. The Deputy Superintendent of Police says that it was at that time you informed him that Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal had been arrested and despatched to some unknown destination and that there was apprehension

of some demonstration and that was why he had been called ?
 A. I did say so. I had also a knowledge of it.
 Q. Both of you went to the Kotwali ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What was the strength of the detective staff on that day in the Kotwali ?
 A. About 10 or 12.
 Q. And the whole lot of them were sent with the crowd ?
 A. They had their own duties to perform and they had been asked to inform the police.
 Q. Were they or were they not present in the Kotwali when you and the Deputy Superintendent of Police arrived ?
 A. They were not all there. There were only a few there.
 Q. The Deputy Superintendent of Police says that the detective staff was present. This is incorrect ?
 A. There were a few present.
 Q. When you went from your house to the Kotwali did you not see any evidence of unrest or disturbance ?
 A. I did not notice any.
 Q. Is it true that the people had begun going to the Hall Bazar ?
 A. We had reached the Kotwali before that.
 Q. Was it about 12-30 ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. News that some people had been fired upon at the Railway Station was received by you when you both had reached the Kotwali or before ?
 A. Afterwards.
 Q. That was the first news that you received ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And some time after this news, you received the news of the damage that had been done by the crowd ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Before the news of firing no news was received by you of any damage having been done by the crowd ?
 A. The place where firing took place is situated at a distance from the Kotwali.
 Q. That is not the point. Did you receive news of the mob being killed first or of the damage done ?
 A. I received first the news about firing.
 Q. Now before receipt of this news you had already informed Mr. Plomer that the crowd which was in the Aitchison Park intended to visit the Deputy Commissioner ?
 A. I had informed him by telephone.
 Q. Did you inform him that it was a murderous crowd and that they had *lathis* ?
 A. No, Sir. I did not tell him this.
 Q. According to the Deputy Superintendent of Police the first news that you received was about the attack on the Chartered Bank and that was about 1-30.
 A. Yes, it is correct.
 Q. The Deputy Superintendent of Police says that upon this he directed the City Inspector to take a reserve and go there but you said you had orders not to leave the Kotwali. He therefore taking an armed reserve went there.
 A. It is not correct. He went afterwards.
 Q. Did the Deputy Superintendent of Police go to the Chartered Bank ?
 A. He did go afterwards and I did not go.
 Q. According to the Deputy Superintendent of Police the Town Hall was set fire to after he had gone to the Chartered Bank ?
 A. He was present at the Kotwali when the fire at the Town Hall broke out.
 Q. Is this an incorrect statement ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Were you and your subordinates and other persons who were connected with these affairs accused of taking bribes and of corruption ?
 A. A Head Constable was accused and he was chalaned.
 Q. Was there any general allegation of corruption or of bribery in the presence of General Dyer or the Deputy Commissioner ?
 A. I do not know of any other incident.

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[Continued.]

Q. There is no question of any incident. I want to know whether there was any general complaint against the police ?
 A. So long as I was in the Kotwali I did not hear of any such thing. There might have been something after I had left on leave.
 Q. Were you ordered to patrol certain surrounding villages on the 13th and 14th ?
 A. Yes, I was ordered to patrol round the city with my police.
 Q. There was no military force with you ?
 A. No.
 Q. And that was to save the city from any gangs of dacoits ?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Did you go to the station on the night of the 11th ?
 A. Yes, at night.
 Q. Did you see General Dyer ?
 A. Yes, I did see him at the Railway Station.
 Q. Did you give him certain names ?
 A. Which names ?
 Q. Names of certain persons, i.e., of agitators or of bad characters or of men concerned in the riots ?
 A. I did not give him any names.
 Q. Nor did you give him any names on the 12th and 13th ?
 A. He saw secret diaries.
 Q. I don't want secret diaries. I want to know whether you gave him any names ?
 A. I did tell him about the rioters.
 Q. What were those names ? Can you give me as complete a list as possible ?
 A. I don't remember all. It was Ratto and Bugga about whom I told him.
 Q. I want only the names.
 A. I remember only Ratto and Bugga and Ghulam Hassan.
 Q. Is not Bugga a *chaudhri* of Amritsar ?
 A. He is not a *chaudhri*.
 Q. Was his influence exercised in the direction of restraining young men from going to extremes or exciting them to go to extremes ?
 A. The report said that he excited them.
 Q. You see that report which you submitted on the 12th of April, there you have clearly said that about 4,000 young men were accompanying this procession which dispersed at about 2-30 P.M. at the church outside Rambagh Gate at the intercession of *Chaudhri* Bugga, who did not accompany the procession, but went at the end to get them dispersed, as the mob had made up their minds to go to the railway station. You say that it was Bugga who came and interceded and prevented them from going to the railway station, is that true ?
 A. It is a fact.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith—

Q. You have 26 years' service in the police ?
 A. 27 years' service.
 Q. Have you ever had to deal with a riot before ?
 A. Never.
 Q. Have you ever had to open fire upon a crowd ?
 A. I have opened fire on dacoits, not on rioters.
 Q. Were any shots fired by the men on duty at the Kotwali that day ?
 A. No, not on that day.
 Q. When buildings were burned and people murdered and banks looted under your nose ?
 A. No, Sir, I did not think it necessary.

By Mr. Abdul Qadir, Assistant Government Advocate—

With your Lordship's permission, I must first ask the witness to produce a confidential report which I understand he made on the 11th and 12th about rumours of leading people coming from villages in the Amritsar District.

President.—When was that report made ?

Mr. Abdul Qadir.—I understand one on the 11th April and another on the 12th.

President.—Whom were they made to ?

Mr. Abdul Qadir.—His superior officer.

President.—Why were these reports not sent to us before ?

Mr. Abdul Qadir.—We have just traced them.

The reports in question were then handed in by witness.*

President.—To whom were these reports made, who was the witness's superior officer ?

Witness.—To the Superintendent of Police.

President.—In whose hand-writing are these reports ?

A. My own.

Mr. Abdul Qadir.—I might explain, my Lord, that this occurred to us in connection with the examination of Mr. Miles Irving. This question was put to him and we enquired whether there were any reports made at the time.

President.—It would have been much better that we should have seen them before because there are one or two points upon which questions might have been asked.

Mr. Abdul Qadir.—They just came in this morning. To witness—Are the whole of these written by you, or simply signed by you ?

A. That of the 12th was written by me, the others have been written by the Sub-Inspector of the detective staff and signed by me.

Q. Your attention has just been drawn to the police diary reports by one of the Hon'ble Members of the Committee. I want to ask you whether in this printed book from page 1 to 23 all the police diary reports are signed by you ?

A. Yes.

Q. There is a note on page 5 about that man Said Gurdit Shah who supported or moved a resolution as to how his speech was taken by the audience at the time; will you read that, "from the people's point of view they did not consider him to be a genuine speaker ?"

A. Yes.

Q. Now I pass on to another point, you mentioned that you took possession of certain kerosene oil tins. When you took possession of them, were the tins containing kerosene oil, or had the contents been used or burnt up ?

A. They contained oil.

Q. At what time did you take possession of them ?

A. At about 2 or 3 o'clock in the evening of the 10th.

Q. Was it after the burning of the Town Hall ?

A. Yes.

Q. Those tins were in a room which had not been burnt ?

A. Yes.

Q. You have mentioned that you sent, though at a late hour, these guards of 25 men to each of the three banks. Were any of your guards in time to do any good at any of the banks ?

A. At the Chartered Bank the life of the Manager was saved and the burning of the Bank prevented.

By the President—

Q. I want to ask a question as regards that report of the 12th. You refer to a meeting said to have been held at 9-30 A.M. and certain resolutions said to have been passed at that meeting, among them a resolution against opening shops and a resolution against providing food for Europeans. I want to know from you how you know a meeting was held at that time and how you know those resolutions you refer to in your report were actually passed at the meeting ?

A. The Sub-Inspector of the detective staff informed me.

Q. Who was it who gave you that information about that ?

A. Obaidullah.

Mr. Abdul Qadir.—We are taking steps to get that man.

By the President—

Q. You yourself have no actual knowledge about the matter upon which you made your report on the 12th ?

A. No, Sir.

* Vide Annexure A—next page.

17 November 1919.]

MUHAMMAD ASHRAF KHAN,

[Concluded.]

ANNEXURE A.

Confidential, dated the 11th April 1919.

Information has been received that a number of Jats of the surrounding villages have collected at canal outside Chatiwind Gate and their probable intention is said to loot the market. Detective Staff has been directed to verify it. The excited mobs are also preparing to guard themselves against these Jats, under the circumstances what should be done?

MUHAMMAD ASHRAF KHAN,

*City Inspector.**Deputy Superintendent of Police.*

and collect at one place from where they will start committing mischief.

For information.

MUHAMMAD ASHRAF KHAN,

*City Inspector.**Deputy Superintendent of Police.*

(Seal.) CITY KOTWALI, AMRITSAR.

The 12th April 1919, 8-30 a.m.

A big meeting of the citizens is said to be held at *Dhab Khatikan*, at about 9-30 A.M. to-day to discuss the following points:—

- (1) To carry the dead body of a Sikh of Peshawar in procession who was shot on 10th April 1919 and died last night in *Katra Ahluwalian*.
- (2) To depute volunteers to check and, if possible, to stop food stuffs, etc., taken from the City to the Fort for Europeans.
- (3) To arrange to have a *hartal* in horse and cattle fair.
- (4) To collect subscriptions in order to feed the poor Indians.
- (5) To open the shops from 7 P.M. to 9 P.M. to-day to sell food stuffs.
- (6) To make private arrangements to guard the city from the villagers who intend to plunder the city.

For information.

MUHAMMAD ASHRAF KHAN.

Deputy Superintendent of Police.

IMMEDIATE.

(Seal.) CITY KOTWALI AMRITSAR.

Confidential, dated the 11th April 1919, 11-50 a.m.

Foot Constable 79 Sher Muhammad of the Detective Staff who was deputed to collect information, came at 11-50 A.M. and reported that he was standing in *Chauk Nimak Mandi*, where he saw 7 Jat Sikhs and a Muhammadan who were armed with *dangs*. Few citizens in *Nimak Mandi* asked them for food but they denied saying "*Sada intijam hunda hai*." Then citizens enquired what was going in villages, upon which they replied that in villages there was a general union and villagers in small numbers would come and enter the city by different ways

18 November 1919.]

Major E. C. BARNES.

At Lahore, Tuesday, the 18th November 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Rai Bahadur G. K. ROY, Superintendent (*Acting for Secretary*).

Major E. C. BARNES, I.A., Divisional Recruiting Officer, Lahore.

By the President—

Q. You are a Divisional Recruiting Officer at Lahore?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In connection with the recruiting can you explain what was the method adopted?

A. I can explain the method adopted in Recruiting Offices. Recruits are brought up either by recruiters from regiments or by special recruiters, civilians, to whom we have given certificates allowing them to recruit. These recruits are sent by the Assistant Recruiting Officers, and if passed by them and by the Medical Officers they are enrolled.

Q. Are there certain specific questions asked before a man is recruited?

A. Yes, Sir. May I hand in the enrolment form?

Q. Among the questions is one as to whether the applicant is willing to be enrolled in..... and then a blank?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Have you impressed upon your Assistant Officers the importance of that question?

A. Yes, Sir. I was so certain that my orders were being carried out that I never issued any definite order about it until I received a letter which was written by the Adjutant-General and sent to the Punjab Government. On receipt of that, although I did not consider it necessary, I did issue a circular to all my Assistant Recruiting Officers.

Q. "In view of the suspicion regarding forcible enlistment which appears to be prevalent in certain areas, it is suggested for your consideration that it might be advisable to publish in districts a notice to the effect that recruits are not to be enlisted unless they express to a Recruiting Officer their willingness to serve and unless they sign the Enrolment Form, and that up to the time of enrolment it is open to them to withdraw even though they may have signified to a recruiter their willingness to join." That is the communication?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Have you taken means to satisfy yourself that your Assistants carried out these instructions?

A. I am continually visiting my Assistant Recruiting Officers and seeing their methods.

Q. The circular that was sent out after that communication had been forwarded to you was to the effect that all Assistant Recruiting Officers are held personally responsible that only recruits who expressed their willingness to enlist should be enrolled?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Had you in your circular letter to your Assistant Recruiting Officers also had notices to this effect displayed on recruiting offices?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you reluctant to have unwilling men in the service?

A. Yes, Sir; because they do not make good soldiers. They probably desert.

Q. As far as you are aware, were endeavours ever made to swell the number by taking either unwilling or unfit men?

A. No, Sir. Never in recruiting offices.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. May I know what was the system followed in getting recruits in the various districts in this province?

A. Well, we first started work with recruiters belonging to regiments. These were men who were already in the army. Eventually we found we were not getting sufficient. It would have been necessary either to take on a very much larger recruiting staff or to employ civil organization, i.e., Tahsildars and Lambardars, and by means of these men we made it known in the district that recruits were required, and the conditions of the service in the army.

Q. Was the civil administration, i.e., Tahsildars and Lambardars employed for recruiting purposes?

A. Yes.

Q. And was not a scheme laid down under which a particular number was to be provided by a certain area?

A. It may have been laid down by a certain Deputy Commissioner that a certain area should, if possible, supply a certain number.

Q. Who laid that scheme down?

A. I am afraid I don't know.

Q. Have you any papers showing that scheme as to what was the number that was allotted to each district?

A. I have not got these here.

Q. And were the Tahsildars of the areas made responsible for getting that fixed number?

A. He was responsible that the conditions of joining the service should be made known.

Q. Was he also made responsible for getting a required number of recruits?

A. No. It could not be done.

Q. Is it a fact that the Tahsildars or other village officers who were not able to get the necessary number of recruits incurred the displeasure of the officials and were punished?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Have you ever heard that in some of the villages, because they were unable to get people in sufficient number voluntarily they had to buy recruits from other localities?

A. Well, the only instance I know of would be where an official or private person was anxious to obtain some reward from Government. Being unable to get recruits from his own area, he would then buy recruits from other districts, and say that they belonged to his area. All these persons were out for getting rewards.

Q. You mean by this that this was only resorted to by individuals and not by people residing in a particular area?

A. I have never heard of any instances of that.

18 November 1919.]

Major E. C. BARNES.

[Continued.]

Q. Have you heard that in some districts of this Province there was considerable dissatisfaction with regard to the methods of recruiting?

A. No. I have heard rumours to that effect, but never believed it.

Q. If I remember rightly, did not Sir Michael O'Dwyer in one of his speeches make reference to undesirable methods of recruiting resorted to by some officials?

A. I don't know of the reference.

Q. He referred to some of the subordinate officials having adopted methods which were not desirable?

A. Yes, but that was bound to occur in a big area like this in certain instances.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. The subordinate officials just the same as private persons are out for rewards?

A. A subordinate official who is also out for rewards will try to get rewards by illegal methods.

Q. I want to know whether that actually happened?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. With regard to desertions, is there any reason to believe that undue pressure was being brought to bear on men to join the service?

A. Well, I do not think that could possibly be the case, because at recruiting offices they get too many chances of saying that they are not willing to join.

Q. They get every opportunity? It is not only once?

A. Yes, Sir, when they first came they could say that.

Q. Then as to pressure being brought to bear on certain districts to provide a certain number of recruits, you know the territorial system at Home introduced by Mr. Haldane. You know that that was based on different areas, districts, and towns and that they were expected to produce a certain number of men?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. That is the only way you could place the recruiting system to fix in their minds that a certain district has to produce a certain number?

A. It does not necessarily mean that any undue pressure was being brought to bear. It merely means that those figures are what they are to work up to.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Were you ever a member of the Punjab Recruiting Board and Punjab Soldiers' Board?

A. Yes.

Q. Were the minutes of the proceedings of these committees recorded?

A. Yes. They were recorded.

Q. Is there any objection to producing the minutes?

A. No objection.

Q. Was the normal recruiting of Punjab 7,500 before the war?

A. I am afraid I don't remember the figures.

Q. Do you know that desertions in 1917 amounted to 2,700 roughly?

A. Yes, about that.

Q. And the desertions in Gujranwala District amounted to 50 per cent. of the number recruited?

A. I think that is wrong. But I again say that I have not got figures.

Q. Is it a fact that in some of the frontier districts young men crossed over to the frontier in 1917 to save themselves from being recruited?

A. No.

Q. Has it ever come to your notice either as a Recruiting Officer or as a member of the Recruiting Board and Punjab Soldiers' Board?

A. No. I have never heard of that.

Q. Was this system ever described to you by Government Officers as compulsory-voluntary?

A. No.

Q. It never came to your knowledge?

A. No.

Q. Is it not a fact that in June 1918, a committee was appointed by the Government and by the Punjab Recruiting Board to draft a compulsory Bill and that it was dropped because the war was over?

A. I have never heard of that subject.

Q. You never heard that any undesirable methods were adopted for the purpose of inducing people to subscribe to the War Loan?

A. No.

Q. I am referring to four cases—did you or did you not know at the time of the assessment whether a man had to subscribe to the war loan or not?

A. May I point out that I had nothing whatever to do with the war loan?

Q. As a member of the Punjab Recruiting Board it never came to your notice that cases were published in papers showing that undue influence was being exercised for the purpose of securing subscriptions to the war loan?

A. I did not read any vernacular papers but I did hear rumours.

Q. I refer to the "Tribune" of February, 1918?

A. I did not read that.

Q. Was a Darbar held in August, 1917, by Sir Michael O'Dwyer at Kasur?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it there stated by His Honour that if the recruitment was not up to the mark the Government might think of shifting the capital from Lahore to Amritsar?

A. I did not hear the statement.

Q. Was any policy adopted at Kasur that the police should send up young Jats of Madar under section 107 and that option be given to them either of enlisting or furnishing security—you never heard complaints either on the Board or as Recruiting Officer that any such policy was adopted by any officer?

A. No.

Q. Did you read Mr. Montagu's budget speech, dated the 22nd June, 1919?

A. No, I have not read it.

Q. Have you heard that he said in his speech that recruiting for the army had gone on, and, in parts particularly affected by these disturbances, that there was reason to believe that many a family was left without its bread winner?

A. No.

Q. Are you aware that Panchayats were formed in villages for the purpose of recruiting?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you hear of any complaints that when these Panchayats were unable to procure the necessary number of recruits they used to adopt a system of *dhurna*?

A. No, I have not heard of that.

Q. Did you hear of the Bala Larka murder case—did you hear of any complaints that people were made to stand naked before their families?

A. I heard that rumour but it was not in my area.

Q. Did you hear of the fact that people were confined in thorn bushes and made to stand for hours?

A. I heard that rumour too.

By the President—

Q. Do you know whether there was any truth in these rumours?

A. I spoke to a police officer in a neighbouring district who told me he had heard that, and that he was positive there was no truth in it.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Did you hear of the case of Parmanand versus The Crown—the Karnal case?

A. No.

Q. That these people were chalaned because they did not supply recruits?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever hear that fire-arms were used and that people wanted to rescue these men who were unwilling to go—it was in Multan?

A. I heard that.

Q. Did it come to your notice that some officials said that press-gang methods were used by recruiters?

A. In the Multan District I heard that.

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Major E. C. BARNES—concluded—The Hon'ble KHAWAJA YUSUF SHAH.

Q. Now, as a member of the board, are you aware that the rules under the Land Act were amended so as to include recruiting?

A. No, I do not know that.

Q. As a member of the committee, were you aware that these lambardars and others who were being supplied water from the canal were told that if they did not help in recruiting they would have no right to water?

A. No.

Q. Is it a fact that this board impressed every Superintendent of Police, every Tahsildar, every Munsif, every Honorary Magistrate—in fact everybody who is anybody in a district, to do his best to help recruiting?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any shortage of camp followers and sweepers for the army?

A. There must have been a shortage because the civil authorities were asked to help.

Q. And was it ever suggested that the people in the Gujranwala District who were convicted of rioting should be made camp followers?

A. No.

Q. Was it ever discussed by your board that the system followed in some of the districts was likely to lead to trouble?

A. No.

Q. With regard to the forms you have placed before this committee, are you aware that similar forms have been in use for many many years so far as the recruitment which is called the *Bharti* is concerned, that is, people go for labour to Jamaica, Fiji and other places?

A. What forms?

Q. Exactly the same forms, a man is taken before an officer, there is a form which the man has to sign whether he is a voluntary recruit or not. Are you aware whether all these formalities have been in use throughout India for the last 20 or 25 years so far as recruiting to Fiji and other islands is concerned?

A. I have only recruited for the Indian army.

Q. Do you know that there have been cases where such proceedings have been alleged to be bogus proceedings?

A. No.

The Hon'ble KHAWAJA YUSUF SHAH, Khan Bahadur, Municipal Commissioner and Honorary Magistrate, Amritsar.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Yusuf Shah, what position do you hold in Amritsar?

A. I am a Municipal Commissioner and an Honorary Magistrate.

Q. You are familiar with the city and the affairs of the city?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Have you noticed recently some little time prior to April this year whether there was a growing feeling of discontent and unrest?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What did you attribute that to?

A. This was partly due to high prices and the Muhammadans of the city of Amritsar were unhappy over the Turkish affairs, and unfortunately the Rowlatt Act was introduced at that time and people went and tried to put false and malicious rumours into circulation in connection with that Rowlatt Act. For instance, they said that Government was going to take half of the produce of the land, that not more than 4 persons could talk together, and things of that sort. These people were already discontented on account of high prices and also on account of Turkish affairs, but these rumours simply stimulated the whole thing, and this was mainly done by the ringleaders who were simply exciting people and trying to bring hatred against Government.

Q. Whom do you refer to as the ringleaders?

A. Partly I say Dr. Kitchlew, and also Dr. Satyapal, but the latter a little later on became a ringleader.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Rice—

Q. Major Barnes, doubtless you would have thought it very wrong if while the war was on every officer in authority did not do his best for the Army?

A. Yes, undoubtedly.

Q. While there may have been excess of zeal and possibly wrong practices in certain cases, you are not aware that the methods adopted by the authorities were the cause of general dissatisfaction among the people?

A. In the case of certain individuals, as I explained, those individuals were out for rewards.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. Had you ever any talk with the officers of the Indian troops in the field as to recruits received?

A. I cannot remember doing so. I have been myself in the field with the Indian Army.

Q. Of course you came in contact there with all the recruits who were coming out?

A. Yes, Sir, I was in the field early in 1914-15, and not since then.

Q. You, who like myself, have been in the field, came in contact with the officers of these recruits?

A. I must have done so. But I cannot remember particular instances.

Q. You cannot remember whether any recruit ever made any complaint that pressure was brought to bear on him?

A. I have never had any such statement made to me by any officer. They never made such a statement.

Q. You may take it from me as one who spoke to thousands of recruits that in some instances there were complaints that pressure was brought to bear on them, and some went even so far as to say that they were never well fed or well clothed or complaints of that sort?

A. We heard that.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Whenever any complaints were made in regard to the methods of recruitment, do you know whether any enquiries were held into those allegations?

A. I have not heard of any.

Q. Do you attribute all this to either of these gentlemen?

A. They were the prime movers. Of course, there were others too, but they were the chief organizers of these meetings and they used to take an active part in the meetings that were held from the early part of the year till April.

Q. Do you attribute to them or to any of them any of the misstatements about the effect of the Rowlatt legislation?

A. It was simply because these things were said at the meetings in which they took an active part or over which they presided. As I was not present at the meetings, I could not say whether these things were said by one gentleman or the other, but such things were said there.

Q. Now you were not in the city between the 10th and the 13th April?

A. I was living outside the city. I used to get all sorts of information. I was living in the Civil Lines. My relations were in the city, and they used to give me all sorts of information, because I was interested in them.

Q. In what state was the city between the 10th and 13th April?

A. Between the 10th and the 13th, in my opinion, from the reports that were brought to me it seemed there was no British *Raj* existing in those days there. The mob had full control of the city, I mean the hostile mob had full control of the city.

18 November 1919.]

The Hon'ble KHAWAJA YUSUF SHAH.

[Continued.]

Q. During these days was it safe to go from the Civil Lines into the city particularly if you were a European?

A. In my opinion it was dangerous for Europeans; after the incident of the 10th it was quite dangerous for Europeans to go because the hostility was so much against the European population that they could not go there unless they were strongly guarded by police or military force.

Q. What opinion did you form as to whether it was advisable to have martial law declared?

A. In my opinion, Sir, the police failed utterly to do their duty; because the police were quite inactive when the Town Hall was being burnt. In my opinion the police had lost all control over the mob and the mob was cocksure about the police that they would not interfere. The people said that the police were their own kith and kin, and they would not disturb them (the people), and such things did happen. The police kept quiet, and so from that it appeared the people were correct in their statements. The people said "don't care for the police, they are our own 'bhrathri.' They are our own brethren."

Q. Then in your opinion it was essential for the maintenance of law and order that martial law should be declared?

A. Yes, Sir. In such cases of course martial law was justified.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. You never went to any meeting at which Dr. Kitchlew and Dr. Satyapal presided?

A. No, Sir. I never went.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. The causes of unsettled state of things you mentioned were high prices, [the dissatisfaction among the Muhammadans over the Turkish affairs. Then you said, unfortunately at the same time came the Rowlatt Acts. Is it your view that it was unfortunate that the Rowlatt Acts were introduced at the same time?

A. By unfortunate I meant that the people put wrong interpretations. They tried to impress upon those people who were of anti-English idea all against the Rowlatt Act.

Q. What you call "unfortunate" are the misrepresentations about the Rowlatt Acts, and not its introduction?

A. It was the misrepresentations.

Q. What you call unfortunate are the misrepresentations that were made with regard to the Rowlatt Acts and not its introduction at that time?

A. It was on account of the misrepresentations that were made with regard to the Rowlatt Acts.

Q. You did not consider the introduction of the Rowlatt Act in any manner unfortunate?

A. No, Sir. Certainly not.

Q. You thought it to be a very good thing.

A. As it was based on the Rowlatt Commission, I think some stringent measures were necessary.

Q. You thought that the Rowlatt Acts were quite justified at that time?

A. It was only on account of misrepresentations that were added to it.

Q. Have you studied the Rowlatt Act yourself?

A. Well, I think, I had a glance at it.

Q. You are a member of the Legislative Council?

A. Yes, Sir, of the Provincial Legislative Council.

Q. For how many years have you been a member?

A. From 1910. I am one of the seniormost members on this Council.

Q. You were always nominated by Government?

A. First time I was elected, and at the second and third time I was nominated.

Q. You did not stand for election after the first election?

A. I was nominated by Government, I did not stand for election.

Q. Did you yourself personally hear the misrepresentations that you spoke of about the Rowlatt Act?

A. Yes, Sir. People used to come and say "what is this, is it the reward for the war services which we

have rendered, that they would not allow even a wife and husband to live together, that no marriages can be celebrated without the permission of Government, and things of that sort."

Q. People came and told you all these things?

A. Yes.

Q. How many people came and told you that?

A. Lots of people, people belonging to the ignorant classes. I told them that it was all wrong. They said that they heard so, and that those things were said at the meetings.

Q. They came and told you that these things were said at the meetings?

A. Yes.

Q. Who came and told you that?

A. Lots of people.

Q. You cannot say how many people?

A. May be 50 or 70, not in one day, but of course they used to come to me.

Q. Every day?

A. I used to go to the town. Of course I did not go to the town between the 10th and the 13th.

Q. For how many days did people come and tell you this continuously?

A. At least for a fortnight.

Q. When was that, in what month?

A. In the month of March, in the beginning of March, in the latter portion of February.

Q. They all said that these things were represented at the meetings?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you care to enquire as to whether in fact it was so said at the meetings or not?

A. Well, Sir, I did not care to enquire, but at the same time I knew that in order to excite the feelings of the people such things were said. I believed it.

Q. Then you did not care to enquire?

A. I knew as a matter of fact that lots of things were said simply to excite the feelings of the people.

Q. You did not care to enquire whether what you were told about what was being said at the meetings was true or not but you believed it?

A. I did not make enquiries. But I was told that such things were said there.

Q. You just now told me that you did not care to enquire?

A. In the first place whatever they said I took to be correct, and afterwards I did make enquiries and found that such things were said.

Q. You first took what was told you as correct?

A. What was told by people to me I found to be correct.

Q. From whom did you make enquiries?

A. From different people.

Q. Did you see the reports?

A. I did not see the C. I. D. reports, nor any newspaper reports.

Q. Then what enquiries did you make to find out whether what was said at the meetings was correct?

A. I made enquiries from people who brought me the information.

Q. I want to know in what manner you made enquiries as to what was said at the meetings was correct?

A. I asked other people. Those who came to me said that such was the case.

Q. You said that misrepresentations were being made by the ringleaders like Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal who wanted to excite hatred against the Government?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you ever hear Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal at any time or at any place making those misrepresentations?

A. Of course he had a talk with me on other political matters.

Q. You spoke of misrepresentations that were being made at these meetings by Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal, did you ever hear any such misrepresentations being made?

A. I never went to the meetings.

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The Hon'ble KHAWAJA YUSUF SHAH.

[Continued.]

Q. Will you be surprised to learn that if you look at the C. I. D. reports of what Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal are supposed to have said in various meetings that instead of preaching hatred against Government they always preached obedience to Government and constituted authority, will you be surprised to learn that?

A. I have no knowledge of it, Sir.

Q. Then from the 10th to the 13th, you did not go into the city?

A. No, I did not go between the 10th and the 13th.

Q. Now before the 10th, there was no exhibition of any anti-English feeling in the town so far as you observed it?

A. Of course, before the 10th, there was the Ram Naumi affair. On that day I found an extraordinary unity between the Hindus and Muhammadans which I had never noticed before.

Q. On the 9th, on the Ram Naumi day, you observed an extraordinary unity between Hindus and Muhammadans. Do you call that a manifestation of anti-European feeling?

A. Well, it is not anti-European feeling. To a certain extent it was an extraordinary unity by which I thought they simply wanted to unite together to get something out of Europeans or to paralyse the Government. It was simply to paralyse Government.

Q. Your impression was that unity between the Hindus and Muhammadans was for the purpose of getting something out of Europeans or paralyzing Government?

A. Yes.

Q. Now quite irrespective of that, up to the 10th, did you observe any manifestation of anti-European feeling in Amritsar?

A. No, Sir, I did not.

Q. This unity between the Hindus and Muhammadans, you liked or disliked it?

A. It was a sham unity, therefore I disliked it, because on that Ram Naumi day they drank water from one and the same cup, but the next day of course there was the same "shoshat" again. It was a sham thing to my mind.

Q. Do you think the Hindus and Muhammadans who fraternized together that day did not mean fraternization at all?

A. Certainly not, there was no actual unity. They simply wanted to show Government that there was unity.

Q. If there was no actual or genuine unity, how would they succeed in paralyzing the Government, if the unity was really not genuine or was never meant to be genuine?

A. They simply wanted to show Government that they were so much united that they drank water from one and the same cup. They simply wanted to impress upon Government their unity and thereby paralyse Government.

Q. They thought Government would be deceived merely by this outward show of drinking from the same glass, although they never meant to unite?

A. No, they never meant to unite.

Q. They meant to be as hostile as ever?

A. They were holding as different views as ever.

Q. They were never united in their views.

A. No.

Q. They were never united in their aspirations?

A. No.

Q. And they never meant to be?

A. Certainly not to my belief.

Q. They merely hoped Government would be deceived by their drinking out of one glass?

A. They merely wanted to show Government they had united whereas they had not actually united.

Q. After the 13th there was no further violence in the city?

A. After the 13th there was no violence, but people looked sulky.

Q. But there was no violence and nothing happened after the 13th?

A. Nothing as far as I remember.

Q. After that there was no exhibition of any feeling against Europeans?

A. I do not think there was any exhibition.

Q. You were aware that martial law was introduced on the 15th?

A. There was some sort of martial law introduced on the 13th, the martial law was confirmed on the 15th. The Military had certain orders issued to them and they were acting upon them.

Q. There was in fact martial law between the 10th and 13th and it was proclaimed on the 15th. I want to know, in your view, was it necessary on the 15th to further confirm the martial law?

A. Certainly; it was highly desirable. In fact, I wrote to Colonel North who was then the officer-in-charge, and I thought it would have been much better to keep it for some time longer.

Q. When the martial law was removed in June, you wrote that the martial law should not be removed; it should be continued longer?

A. I said so.

Q. Why did you say that?

A. Because in my opinion I thought people were still looking sulky.

Q. What were they doing when you say they were sulky?

A. They were talking all sorts of things. They were still discontented because they thought they had not had justice.

Q. Discontented because justice was not done to them? In what particular?

A. Because their men were arrested.

Q. And because they felt that justice was not done to them by reason of their men being arrested you thought that it was necessary to continue the martial law?

A. Yes; because I thought there might be another rising.

Q. You generally, I take it, approve of martial law administration always in preference to civil administration?

A. No; certainly not. I only approve of martial law in urgent cases. Such was the case in Amritsar. The Civil Government had lost all control because the police had failed to do their duty.

Q. Yes; that was on the 13th April. You thought in April, May and June, and further, it was necessary to have martial law?

A. Yes, in my opinion, because it was in the interests of good administration.

Q. You think it is in the interests of good administration to have martial law.

A. Yes.

Q. You think the emergency did not cease even in June?

A. Yes, according to my own idea. I thought that it would be better if it is kept longer.

Q. You thought Government were wrong when they removed martial law?

A. I did not say that. I thought if it be kept longer it would be still better.

Q. The reason for martial law was that the police had utterly failed to do their duty on the 10th?

A. Certainly, and the population was under no control.

Q. You referred to the police allowing the Town Hall to be burnt. If that particular force had failed to do their duty, surely the proper remedy would be to replace it by another force. Would that not be the obvious course to take instead of having martial law?

A. The police having failed to do its duty, and as the mob got out of control, some stringent measure was desirable to bring about order, and I thought that nothing was better than the introduction of martial law.

Q. In your statement you give it as your opinion that what General Dyer did on the 13th at Jallianwala Bagh was a very good thing?

A. In my opinion, we had to quell the disturbance, and this quelled the disturbance. If we had not done

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[Continued.]

so, sooner or later Government would have taken such drastic measures to quell the disturbance.

Q. Do you think that drastic measure was necessary to strike terror?

A. No, it was not for terror but to quell the disturbance, and it did quell the disturbance.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. On the 9th, were you at Amritsar or Lahore?

A. I was in Amritsar.

Q. You were not at Lahore on the 9th?

A. To the best of my knowledge I was at Amritsar.

Q. You have got a residential house in Civil Lines?

A. I am with my friends there.

Q. Before that where did you live?

A. I was living outside for a very long time.

Q. And you also have a house inside the city, and you have got your relations there?

A. Yes.

Q. If I understand you aright, you say that your opinion of what was happening in the city between the 10th and the 13th was based upon the report that you received from your relations?

A. And other friends too.

Q. Therefore on the 10th, 11th, 12th and 13th, your relations and other people from the city used to come and visit you and give you information?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the number of people who came to visit you between the 10th and the 13th?

A. About 10 or 15. They did not come together.

Q. Who were those relations of yours? May I know their names?

A. I have 2 nephews.

Q. Were they assaulted or maltreated in any way?

A. They did not tell me so.

Q. What was your constituency from which you were elected the first time?

A. I was elected on the Council?

Q. What is your constituency, Muhammadan group, zamindar group or what?

A. The members of the municipalities in certain groups.

Q. That is, delegates were elected from municipalities and those delegates elected you?

A. The municipal members of certain groups were the voters.

Q. Did you yourself see the Ram Naumi procession?

A. No; I did not go into town.

Q. You never heard about it?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you make any difference between martial law and military aid?

A. I do not think I can make any difference; I do not know the details of the difference between the two.

Q. I think you also approved of the crawling order that was passed by General Dyer?

A. No, I do not approve of that. I do not know if the order was carried out or not.

Q. Supposing you had been living in that street, would you have been happy?

A. Certainly not.

Q. You would be sulky over it?

A. Certainly I would have been very sorry over it.

Q. And you would be discontented?

A. Yes, if that order was actually brought into force.

Q. Now the order of the cutting of water supply and electric light, do you approve of it?

A. I blame the citizens to a great extent for that.

Q. I only asked whether you approved of that?

A. No.

Q. Supposing you had been living in the city and your electric lighting and water supply were cut off, you would have been sulky and discontented?

A. Certainly.

Q. Supposing you had not been allowed to leave your house after 8 o'clock every night, would you have been happy over it?

A. I do not think that was necessary because it was a reasonable order considering the circumstances.

Q. Supposing you had been living in the city and you were not allowed to leave the house after 8 P.M.?

A. Under the circumstances I would have accepted that order.

Q. Everybody had to accept it, the question is whether you would have liked it or not?

A. Nobody would have liked that others should interfere with his liberty, but certain laws are to be obeyed.

Q. But you say that some time after the 13th the people were sulky, do you mean to say there was any occasion for them to be happy and not discontented after 400 or 500 were killed and these orders had been passed?

A. It is not a question of that because those people that were killed were killed simply because....

Q. I am not asking you why they were killed, I am asking you of the general state of affairs in Amritsar city. After what had happened on the 13th do you think the people of Amritsar city would feel happy over it?

A. Certainly, naturally I would say they were sulky over it.

Q. That would be a natural feeling?

A. Yes.

Q. And you had no grounds for believing that those from whose faces you inferred that they were sulky were actually the men who did take part in the riots?

A. I cannot say whether they did take part in the riots or not.

Q. During these dates after the 13th, were not large numbers of people arrested in Amritsar?

A. Of course arrests were going on.

Q. Would that make the people very happy?

A. Some of the people who were guilty of course wanted to escape from the police.

Q. Would that make those people very happy or their relations very happy?

A. Certainly not, nobody would like their relations arrested whether guilty or not guilty.

Q. In the month of April when did you go to Lahore?

A. I think it was on the 6th or 7th. I do not exactly remember.

Q. Possibly you might have gone on the 9th or are you prepared to swear you never went to Lahore on the 9th?

A. As far as I remember, I was in Amritsar on the 9th of April.

Q. Were any shops looted or people assaulted during these days?

A. Only the National Bank was looted.

Q. Leaving aside what happened on the 10th, from the 24th March to the 10th of April was anybody looted?

A. No, not to my knowledge.

Q. About this unity, was not the Hindu-Muhammadan feeling very strong in Amritsar city for some time?

A. I do not follow you.

Q. In the years 1917 and 1918 were not the feelings of the Hindus and Muhammadans very much against each other? Their feelings were very bitter?

A. No, they were not very bitter, but they were not so very friendly as it appeared now.

Q. In Amritsar city there are two clubs, the Muhammadan Club and the Hindu Sabha, and is it not a fact that every year certain games are held in Amritsar city which are a very important affair and thousands of persons go to see them?

A. Cricket matches are held.

Q. Have not murders been committed so far as these matches are concerned between Hindus and Muhammadans?

A. There was one case when there was a riot between Hindus and Muhammadans and one or two men were killed.

Q. One or two Hindus were killed?

A. One, I think.

Q. Is it not a fact that two or three months before this Ram Naumi festival Dr. Kitchlew and Dr. Satyapal

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[Continued.]

tried their best and brought about a union of the two parties?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Is it not a fact that the Hindus subscribed to Muhammadan institutions and the Muhammadans made presents to the Hindus on account of Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal's endeavours?

A. I know nothing about this.

Q. Is there any rivalry now between the two Clubs, the Muhammadan Club and the Hindu Sabha Club?

A. Rivalry there is no doubt.

Q. Bitter feeling?

A. No, the feelings become bitter at the time of matches, because they are the two important cricket clubs there and of course there is rivalry between them.

Q. Then you are not prepared to admit that during the last 5 or 6 months, or 8 or 9 months, attempts were made and the two parties were reconciled, and a purse was given by the Muhammadans to the Hindus and a subscription was made by the Hindus?

A. I know nothing about this.

Q. You say you never entered the city from the 10th to the 13th?

A. No, I went on the 14th.

Q. And you have stated to this Committee that after the 10th it was the same again, Hindus drinking water from Mussalmans, that the relations were exactly the same as they were before?

A. On the 11th or 12th, I cannot remember exactly, a man came to me and said "that was only a sham thing. To-day I went to a shop-keeper and wanted to buy some sweetmeats and he said, 'don't touch them.'"

Q. Your opinion is based upon that?

A. Yes.

Q. Then do you mean to say that all the Hindu inhabitants of Amritsar drank water out of the cups of Muhammadans?

A. Those that were in the assembly there.

Q. The whole 60,000?

A. The whole procession that was going on, because they had those drinking places.

Q. Then it is from hearsay that you say that every one of the 60,000 Hindus were drinking water out of the cups of Muhammadans?

A. I myself told you I was not present: I heard this.

Q. Every one of them?

A. Those that were in the procession.

Q. What was their number?

Q. It may be between 20 and 25,000.

Q. Do you know the penalties attaching to a Hindu for drinking out of the cup of a Muhammadan?

A. Well, I think, he will be outcasted.

Q. A Hindu, if he drinks out of the cup of a Muhammadan, if he has marriageable daughters, will those daughters be married or not?

A. That I cannot say; very likely not.

Q. Further a Hindu who drinks water from out of the cup of a Muhammadan, will the priest perform his funeral and other ceremonies?

A. I cannot say that either.

Q. But it is likely he would not? What is your opinion?

A. That he would not.

Q. Therefore may I understand that all these Hindus ran the risk of being outcasted, of their funeral and other ceremonies not being performed, of their daughters not being married, simply for the sake of making a show before the authorities?

A. They did drink water from the cups of Muhammadans, there is no denying the fact. What will be the consequences of that I do not know.

Q. Are you not aware that a large number of educated Hindus now do not observe these caste scruples?

A. This educated class, if you compare it with the whole Hindus population, it can be counted on your fingers.

Q. Therefore having regard to the whole mass of Hindus in the Punjab, the 10,000 or 15,000 who were there can be counted on the fingers?

A. Yes, you asked me about the educated class who do not observe caste, I know that some of them do not observe caste. There are others who privately do things and openly go against them.

Q. Will you kindly inform this Committee, leaving aside military aid and the presence of the military and the picketing, what was there in martial law which saved the situation and which was absolutely necessary?

A. In my opinion it was a hostile mob in the city and we wanted martial law to be introduced in order to keep these people in check, and after the incident of the Jallianwala Bagh, I think the disturbances were quelled and martial law just did what was desirable under the circumstances.

Q. You have not answered my question, but I will not press it.

A. What is your question?

Q. I said, leaving aside the fact that the presence of the military was necessary in the city, and that there should be picketing, and that the military should go through the city and keep watch and ward, can you tell me what there was in martial law which saved the situation or which you considered to be absolutely necessary? Supposing martial law had not been proclaimed and 500 British soldiers had been drafted into the city and pickets were kept, and there was the aeroplane and the machine gun and patrolling of the city for 8 or 10 days, and finding the people quiet they might have left it or made any other necessary arrangements?

A. It was desirable to maintain discipline and order, and martial law was necessary to maintain order as the mob was not under control.

Q. If 75 Indian Police failed to do their duty and did not save the Town Hall from being burnt, do you think 500 British soldiers would have failed in doing their duty and would not have maintained order?

A. The order was maintained there by martial law; that I have already said. The police having failed, martial law and pickets were introduced, which maintained order there.

Q. What do you mean by martial law? Have you had any other experience of martial law? Have you read in history or anywhere the accounts about the introduction of martial law and what happened? Do you know anything about it?

A. I do not know. Martial law was desirable under the circumstances. I have told it often and often.

Q. I wanted to test that opinion; that is all; it is quite possible. I do not say that you were not right. I want to test the grounds upon which you have based your opinion.

A. I have already said that the police having failed to do their duty, martial law was highly desirable to maintain order, and without it, of course, there would have been worse results.

Q. Supposing a meeting is prohibited and that order is disobeyed by the public, do you think it desirable that they should be fired upon and 400 men should be killed?

A. There were special circumstances; the city had gone out of the hands of the authorities and it was defying that order. Further on when General Dyer gave that injunction, on the one hand he was proclaiming the order, and, on the other hand, people were saying "Oh, no; we do not care for this order; you better go to the Jallianwala Garden and be present there." They had concluded to defy this order.

Q. I quite understand what you mean. Therefore for this disobedience or defiance, you thought it was absolutely necessary to fire upon the crowd of 25,000 people, which was not doing any violence, but disobeying a certain order. Therefore in your opinion it was necessary that they should be dispersed by being fired upon?

A. I only say that General Dyer was justified in taking that action. I was not present there. He may have told them to disperse and they would not have obeyed the order.

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[Concluded.]

By the Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith—

Q. You were asked about the electric lighting and water being cut off and you said you approved of it?

A. No, I said I did not approve of it.

Q. You said to Sir Chimanlal that before the 10th, you were not aware of any anti-European feeling in Amritsar?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. As a matter of fact, the three Bank Managers who were so brutally murdered were popular men?

A. They were very, very popular men.

Q. Mr. Stewart in particular had done a very great deal for the trade and industry of Amritsar?

A. Yes, the present state of the city is greatly due to Mr. Stewart, the Manager of the National Bank.

Q. He carried business through very difficult times?

A. Very difficult times, he always helped tradesmen.

Q. The respectable trading firms, which were the backbone of the community, held him in very high esteem?

A. Yes, in very high esteem. I had the honour of knowing him too, because he was a member of the Municipal Committee.

Q. Can you account for the attack that was made on them on the 10th? Why were they singled out?

A. I have said in my statement that there was anti-English feeling there.

Q. Can you account for the attack that was made on the 10th?

A. When it was brought to their notice that Satyapal and Kitchlew had been deported, they got up, and instead of looting the houses of Hindus and Muhammadans, they went straight to European Banks.

Q. Do you think it was an organised mob?

A. I think it looks like it. Because the mob started from different parts of the city and came straight to the Town Hall and from there to the National Bank.

Q. There are other banks in Amritsar?

A. The Alliance Bank is very close to my residential house in the city, although I do not live in the house now. There is also the Chartered Bank behind the walls of the Kotwali. They went and attacked these places. And there is another thing which I want to bring to the notice of the Committee, i.e., that they would not burn the Alliance Bank and Chartered Bank, because the houses belong to Indians.

Q. And there was the Indian Agent of the Allahabad Bank?

A. They attacked the National Bank. As regards the Town Hall the masses draw very little difference between Municipal Government and Government. They thought it was also Sarkari or Government. They burnt the Town Hall and they burnt the adjoining Post Office there.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmed Khan—

Q. You said that on Ram Naumi day Hindus drank from the same glass from which the Muhammadans drank. It was only for one day. The next day it was as it existed before?

A. Yes, on that day. Afterwards the same line of demarcation was observed.

Q. When they drank from the same glass on Ram Naumi day, it was with the object of paralysing Government?

A. I think so.

Q. You think that by this action on one day, they could paralyse the Government?

A. I do not know what else they could have done further on. They started with that; they might have done something more.

Q. Did anybody tell you that they were doing that with the object of paralysing the Government?

A. Of course I did not hear.

Q. Is that your inference from the fact that they did so?

A. I may have heard it; I could not mention the name.

Q. You now remember that you heard it. From whom did you hear it?

A. I heard it from different people; their action showed it. They simply wanted to show that Ram Naumi

show was a different show, and that the Turkish Army had nothing to do with Ram Naumi. There were some Turkish soldiers brought there in uniform. That had nothing to do with them. Instead of saying *Ramchandar ki jai* they were saying *Satyapal ki jai* and *Kitchlew ki jai*. They were given out at that Ram Naumi.

Q. You inferred from the fact that they drank in the same glass, their object was to paralyse Government?

A. Certainly; they would have done something more. They wanted to show to Government that Hindus and Muhammadans are united.

Q. By doing it for only one day?

A. I say that God knows what their further action would have been. They started with that.

Q. They did it for only one day. The next day they started having the old relations again?

A. The same line of demarcation was observed.

Q. In your opinion by doing that for one day only, they thought they would succeed in paralysing the Government?

A. This was their propaganda beginning to paralyse Government. They would have done something afterwards.

Q. Something else was not done?

A. That was not done.

Q. Your inference was based upon this one thing alone?

A. Yes; nothing was done because on the 10th these two men were deported.

Q. Now you say that these things, the burning of the Town Hall and other buildings and the murders that were committed were done by an organised mob?

A. They were done by an organised mob.

Q. Do you know who organised the mob?

A. I cannot say. It is very difficult to say. These people must have been instigated by the speeches that were made previous to the 10th April.

Q. I am not talking about instigation; I am asking about organisation. There is a difference between incitement and organisation. Who organised the mob?

A. It is not within my knowledge. From the deeds, it appeared that they were organised.

Q. Only from what they did?

A. Yes; I cannot say who organised them; very likely they were organised of course.

Q. If anybody had organised the mob, being an old resident of Amritsar, you would probably have known him?

A. Certainly.

By Mr. Abdul Qadir, Assistant Government Advocate—

Q. There is another Bank which has not been referred to. I want to know if you can give any explanation for that?

A. It is an Indian concern.

Q. Has that Bank a European Manager or an Indian Manager?

A. As far as I know, there is an Indian Manager.

Q. Do you know any of the reasons for the stopping of the water and the electric supply, which you disapproved of?

A. As regards water pipe, I said of course these people do not take water from those

been poisoned." On the 14th

e and he had some consultation

request that was made by the

tee leaders was they asked him

ld be allowed to go on.

ou to explain what is meant by

ing a Hindu drinks water, of

not be touched by a Muhammadan.

Q. In this state of things in the town of Amritsar, is there anything remaining now out of that profession

of unity; they were professing to give up this "touch

me not" on that Ram Naumi day. You have told the

committee that a very large number of people gave up

up *chhut-chhut*. Do you find any of that left in the town?

A. No; certainly not.

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SARDAR BIKRAM SINGH.

SARDAR BIKRAM SINGH, Honorary Magistrate, Amritsar.

By the President—

Q. Where do you reside, Mr. Bikram Singh?

A. I live in the Civil Lines.

Q. In Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you occupy any official position?

A. Yes, Sir. I have first class powers both criminal and civil in the whole of the district.

Q. Under the Commissioner? Are you an Honorary Magistrate?

A. Yes, I am an Honorary Magistrate having both civil and criminal powers.

Q. Do you know what the state of feeling was in the villages near Amritsar about the 10th to the 15th April?

A. The majority of people thought that there was no British *Raj* existing in Amritsar and that they should now go to Amritsar to loot it.

Q. Did you yourself see indications of unrest?

A. On several occasions I noted people going with *lathis* in hand towards the city.

Q. Were they going on any errand?

A. They had no particular business.

Q. Was there danger in the feeling as to the British *Raj* not having power in Amritsar and the villagers entering the city and looting?

A. Certainly.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Do you know anything about any particular villages that were likely to send people to loot Amritsar?

A. The villages are situated near my *kothi*. People of the villages of Gumtala, Mirankot, Rodala, etc., passed by my *kothi*. They mentioned that they were going to loot the city.

Q. On what date was that?

A. On the 11th and 12th of April.

Q. On the 11th and 12th April were you living in the Civil Lines or were you somewhere else?

A. I was living in the Civil Lines.

Q. These were villagers passing your bungalow in the Civil Lines?

A. It is a public road passing near by, by which they passed.

Q. Did you talk to these people as they passed?

A. They conversed among themselves and I overheard them.

Q. What were they saying when you overheard them?

A. There is a baker's shop near by. I found some of them sitting there and talking to each other, saying, "let us go and loot the city, especially the property belonging to the National Bank."

Q. How many people, do you remember, were sitting round the baker's shop?

A. Between 5 and 6 men.

Q. Apart from people sitting round the baker's shop, did you overhear any other people that you could recollect?

A. It is a difficult thing to remember, because they passed at various times.

Q. Are you quite sure that you heard the talk about looting, except from the people round the baker's shop?

A. People informed me that there was a talk about that in the villages.

Q. That would be some time afterwards?

A. Exactly between the 11th and 12th.

Q. The talk was between the 11th and 12th. When did your tenants tell you?

A. My tenants go to their villages in the evening to sleep there at their homes. When they came back in the morning they informed me.

Q. Do you recollect any particular tenant who made this report to you at the time?

A. I do not recollect.

Q. When did you hear the talk in the baker's shop? Was it on the 11th or 12th.

A. On the noon of the 12th.

Q. Apart from the looting that took place on the 10th were you in the city yourself and did you or did you not see any looting after the 10th?

A. I never went to the city after that.

Q. When did you next go to the city?

A. On the 14th April.

Q. On the 11th did you see any signs of people proceeding from the city passing your house to outlying villages with any signs of spoil? Anything to show that they had done looting?

A. My men who belong to the Gumtala village informed me that the spoils had reached Gumtala.

Q. I ask you this: did you yourself on the 11th see any person passing your house in Civil Lines with any signs that they had been engaged in looting on the 11th?

A. I did not see any.

Q. Did you see anything yourself that showed you that looting had been done by the villagers on the 12th?

A. I did not see anybody.

Q. Nor on the 13th?

A. No.

Q. Did you have any friends or relations living in the city during those days, i.e., 10th to 13th?

A. Several.

Q. Did you see them or hold communication with them or other people living in the city during those days?

A. Several of them came to me to see me.

Q. Had any of them been molested or had any difficulty with the mob?

A. None, Sir.

Q. Did you not get to know from your friends and relations the state of the city during those days at the time?

A. Yes, Sir. I did.

Q. According to these reports that reached you at the time, what was the state of the city?

A. People said that the subjects are ruling the city.

Q. Did these friends and relations of yours come and tell you at the time?

A. They came to see me on the 12th.

Q. Did they tell you that on the 12th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did they tell you any particulars that might be investigated or ascertained of the happenings in the city on the 11th and 12th?

A. They informed me that the property belonging to the National Bank had been looted and carried away by people.

Q. Anything else?

A. Nothing particular.

Q. Did they tell you, for instance, of any people being hurt or engaged in fight in any particular part of the city on the 11th and 12th?

A. Nothing.

Q. Did they tell you whether or not any meetings were being held on the 11th and 12th within the city?

A. They said that there was a meeting in the Hindu Sabha.

Q. Did they tell you of any particular shops or business being interfered with?

A. All shops were closed and there was no business going on.

By Sir C. H. Setahvad—

Q. Are you an Honorary Magistrate and Honorary Munsif?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You write your proceedings in English?

A. Yes.

Q. And surely you can understand English and answer my questions in English because you will thus save a great deal of time?

A. I don't mind if you press me for that.

Q. Sardar Sahib, you have made a statement that majority of people in the villages thought that there was no British *Raj* in Amritsar, that they would go to

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SARDAR BIKRAM SINGH.

[Continued.]

Amritsar and lost the city. That statement of yours is based on what you overheard at the baker's shop near your bungalow and what your tenants also told you?

A. Yes.

Q. This *lathi* of yours is a ground floor building or has it got an upper floor?

A. No; it is an ordinary ground floor *lathi*.

Q. Where were you in your house when you say you overheard these people?

A. May I give you a sketch of the position of my house?

Q. No, you can tell me whether you were in your bed-room, or in your verandah or were in your drawing room or so on?

A. There are several shops outside my house on the road. My house is situated on the Ajnala Road.

Q. Is your house just on the road or has it a compound?

A. Yes, it has a compound.

Q. Where is this baker's shop? Is it on the road or opposite your house?

A. Just close to my house. Just across the road.

Q. Is there a road between your house and the baker's shop?

A. There is no road at all. This is the gate of my house (pointing out on the table) and there are four sides of my house.

Q. I am speaking with reference to the road on which your house abuts and I want to know whether this baker's shop is on the same side as your house or on the opposite side?

A. It is on the right side of the gate of my house and abutting right on the road.

Q. What is the width of the compound of your house?

A. I am very sorry I have never measured it.

Q. Never mind, you can roughly say 20 yards, 30 yards or 100 yards?

A. About 100 yards.

Q. Your actual building is 100 yards removed from the road?

A. Yes, from the road it is 100 yards.

Q. I am speaking with reference to the road on which your house abuts. It does not abut right on to the road. The gate is on the road?

A. Yes.

Q. Your house is inside and the baker's shop abuts right on to the road?

A. Yes.

Q. From your gate to your building what is the distance?

A. About 50 yards.

Q. Were you in your house?

A. I was not in my house.

Q. When you overheard this you were not in your house?

A. I was walking on the Ajnala Road.

Q. What time was it, about?

A. 12 o'clock noon.

Q. Why were you walking at 12 noon?

A. There was a great excitement in the city and I was walking with a view to ascertaining what was going on in the city from the people who were coming from the city.

Q. That was on the 12th?

A. On the 12th at noon.

Q. And you say you were there on the road because there was excitement in the city?

A. Yes.

Q. What were you doing there in regard to the excitement?

A. I was getting information and asking people who were coming from the city as to what was happening there.

Q. Did you ask any people?

A. No, they were talking amongst themselves.

Q. From whom did you get that information?

A. From the people who were coming from the city and not from people who were coming from villages.

Q. Can you tell us the names of those people?

A. I cannot tell you the names.

Q. Were these people in large numbers?

A. No, people very seldom came from the city.

Q. You were on the road when people were giving you the information?

A. Yes, there were many soldiers there and I also asked them.

Q. You went to the soldiers?

A. You are not following me, Sir.

Q. You have stated that you went outside your house at 12 noon to inquire from people coming from the city what was happening there and that it was very seldom that people came from the city and that you went to the soldiers on the road to get information from them as to what was happening in the city?

A. Yes. I was standing on the road, and found soldiers there. There is a District Court just close to my house and people were also coming from there and they were also talking about it.

Q. You were making an inquiry from the soldiers?

A. Not from the soldiers alone but from anybody that might happen to come from the city as to what was going on there.

Q. The villagers whom you overheard arrived soon after you came on the road or when did they arrive?

A. When I arrived there they were already taking their meals inside the baker's shop.

Q. At the baker's shop do the people sit down and take their meals?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it a sort of a hotel?

A. A *bhaur* (oven).

Q. How many people were sitting there?

A. About 5 or 6.

Q. This baker's shop, you have told us, abuts on to the road?

A. Yes.

Q. Has he a big stall on the road?

A. Very small.

Q. Where were these people sitting for taking their meals?

A. In the verandah of the shop.

Q. Was it on the road or inside the shop?

A. They were sitting in the verandah of the shop.

Q. Was the place on the road or inside the shop?

A. Very near the road and not inside the shop. The verandah is always outside the building.

Q. People could see them sitting easily?

A. Very easily.

Q. How many were they?

A. 5 or 6.

Q. You had never seen them before?

A. Never.

Q. From where did you see them?

A. From the road.

Q. Did you see them as soon as you came out of your house or afterwards?

A. When I was pacing the road.

Q. You noticed them taking their meals?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the distance between the place they were sitting down and taking their meals and the place you were standing?

A. Just as it is between you and myself (about twenty feet).

Q. Did you stand where you were in order to overhear them?

A. I was just pacing along the road.

Q. And you heard them talking?

A. Yes.

Q. What did they say?

A. They said that they would go and loot the National Bank.

Q. What did you hear and from whom?

A. From those people who were at the baker's shop and I heard them saying "Let us go and loot the goods of the National Bank." One of them was saying so.

They were talking amongst themselves.

Q. What did you overhear?

A. What I have already stated.

Q. Did you go up to them and speak to them?

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SARDAR BIKRAM SINGH.

[Continued.]

A. No, I did not go to them nor had I any talk with them.

Q. You have stated that their intention was to go to the city and loot the National Bank?

A. Yes.

Q. On that did you give information to the police?

A. The National Bank had already been looted most probably by the 12th and the looting must have been stopped by that time. I had a talk with the Deputy Commissioner about it.

Q. Sardar Bikram Singh, you are not answering my question. You say that people were going to the city to loot some property of the National Bank and you were there yourself and that the soldiers were standing on the road and you were an Honorary Magistrate. Did you take any steps to inform the police or any authority at the moment or did you take any steps to prevent those people from going and looting the Bank?

A. I had a talk with the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Miles Irving.

Q. That is not an answer to my question. You say people were preparing to go to the city to loot the National Bank property and that you overheard them saying so. Did you immediately take any steps at the moment to inform the police or anybody in authority or to have those people arrested?

A. I informed the Deputy Commissioner about it.

Q. No, I don't want that answer. I want to know whether you took any steps immediately to apprise the authorities that these people had declared their intention to loot the National Bank?

A. With utmost respect to your good self, I did inform the Deputy Commissioner.

Q. Sardar Bikram Singh, you are an Honorary Magistrate and an Honorary Civil Judge and you certainly understand my question. Did you, at the moment you heard these men talking that they would go to the city to loot the National Bank, take any steps to inform the authorities immediately?

A. I thought it proper to inform about the attitude of the people.

Q. You are determined not to answer my question. I want to know whether you informed the authorities at the moment or not?

A. I only informed the proper authority.

Q. My point is that at that moment did you take any steps to inform the authorities?

A. I did inform the Deputy Commissioner.

By the President—

Q. How long after did you inform the Deputy Commissioner?

A. About six hours after.

Q. This was the first time you informed the Deputy Commissioner of what you had heard?

A. I had several talks before that, about this particular matter.

By Sir C. H. Seelrad—

Q. I would still like to have an answer to my question. Did you at that moment inform the authorities that these people were going to the city to loot the National Bank?

A. I informed the Deputy Commissioner.

Q. You informed the Deputy Commissioner at 6 o'clock in the evening?

A. You may draw your inference, Sir.

Q. If you informed the Deputy Commissioner at 6 p.m., that was not at the moment. It was at 12 noon when you heard them talking?

A. You can draw the inference.

Q. Did you at that moment inform the authorities? If you did not, why don't you tell us that you did not inform him at that moment?

A. I did inform the Deputy Commissioner in the evening.

Q. That was on the 12th at 12 noon, and that was the only occasion you heard villagers declaring that they would go to the city to loot the National Bank?

A. I have already stated it. That was the only occasion.

Q. About your tenants, where do these tenants live?

A. In Guntala.

Q. They are all of Guntala?

A. Yes.

Q. I understood you to say that they were coming from and going to Guntala. Where do they actually reside?

A. They pass their nights in Guntala, come in the morning and go back to Guntala in the evening.

Q. How far is Guntala from Amritsar?

A. It is only two miles distant.

Q. Is it two miles from your house?

A. Yes. I have some 1,000 bighas of land near my house. They used to come in the morning and go back in the evening after cultivating this land. I have several wells attached to this land.

Q. These tenants told you that in the village people were talking about looting the National Bank?

A. Yes.

Q. On how many occasions did they tell you?

A. On the morning of the 11th, on the 12th and on the 13th.

Q. They said the same thing every day?

A. Yes.

Q. They repeated the same thing every day?

A. Yes.

Q. After the 13th they did not?

A. At least I got no reports after that date.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You were living in the Civil Lines?

A. I was and am still living there.

Q. Were you consulted by the Deputy Commissioner before martial law was introduced on the 15th or were you consulted about the utility of the martial law or measures taken?

A. I was not, Sir.

Q. Was any other Indian resident of the Civil Lines consulted to your knowledge?

A. I don't know.

Q. Had you any knowledge as to what measures they were going to take against Amritsar?

A. No, I had no personal knowledge.

Q. During those days had you any information that Amritsar was going to be bombarded or were the people coming from the city between the 10th and the 13th talking about it?

A. Yes, people were talking about it. They were also saying that the Darbar Sahib had been bombarded and there was a talk amongst the citizens about Amritsar being bombarded.

Q. This you heard from the people coming out of the city and going to their villages or from the city people?

A. From the city people.

Q. I suppose therefore that in those days after the 10th all the gates were picketed by the military?

A. Yes.

Q. No large number of people from the villages could go inside the city?

A. People were allowed to go inside the city, but they were not allowed to come out of it. But there were several secret paths and people used to come by those ways.

Q. The pickets were in a position that they allowed people to go inside the city, but did not allow them to come out?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore you say that during those three days no body was allowed to come out from inside the city. Then how were the relations and friends of the people living in the Civil Lines allowed to come and see them?

A. Almost all of them had *khansamas*, *cheprasis* and sweepers for whom they had got permits and they were allowed to come inside the city and go out, and it was these men that the relatives used to come and see.

Q. I want to know whether the relations and friends were allowed to come and see them?

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SARDAR BIKRAM SINGH.

[Continued.]

A. My servants used to go inside the city and bring my relations from there.

Q. Sardar Bikram Singh, I cannot force you to answer my question. I want to know whether people were not allowed to come outside the city to see their relations in the Civil Lines. What do you mean by *khansamas* and *chaprasis*?

A. I give you the source of my information.

Q. You state that no people were allowed by these pickets to enter the Civil Lines and therefore friends and relations who were living inside the city were not consequently allowed to come to the Civil Lines to see their relations there?

A. I have already stated that the *khansamas* and *chaprasis* had permits and they used to come to the city.

Q. Are the *khansamas* and *chaprasis* relations of the people?

A. My relations used to come with them.

Q. The *chaprasis* had permits and therefore they were allowed to bring people from inside the city?

A. They had permits.

Q. Had not these servants had permits, nobody else would have been allowed to come out of the city?

A. Yes.

Q. Unless there was somebody with the citizens they would not have been allowed to come out of the city?

A. In spite of these pickets and precautions by them people used to come out by the secret paths and ways.

Q. Even respectable people?

A. No. Not respectable people such as Municipal Commissioners and Honorary Magistrates or big shopkeepers and merchants.

Q. Take for instance the Hon'ble Khwaja Yusuf Shah?

A. They had all their chits and permits.

Q. His relations in the city would get the permits and then they would be allowed to come out of the city?

A. Yes.

Q. According to you about 25 or 30 other residents or citizens, not being his relations, would not have been allowed to come and visit him?

A. If they had allowed them.

Q. Therefore you now modify your previous statement that the people were allowed to come?

A. Had you seen the position you would have very well understood the point.

Q. I want to know whether the people were allowed to come outside the city or not?

A. The position was very critical.

Q. Therefore nobody was allowed to come without a chit?

A. As I have already stated there were many secret paths from which people could easily come outside the city. God knows from what other paths they used to come out.

Q. I want to know therefore that on the 12th at 12 noon in the month of April you were enjoying yourself on that road in the hope that certain people would come and give you the information what was going on in the city?

A. Not only at that time but the whole day.

Q. You have stated that you were walking before your house on that road about 12 noon in the hope that some people would come and give you some news; and you have also stated that there were soldiers standing close to you. Therefore you would not ask the people whether they had come by some secret paths, because the soldiers were standing there and they could not come without chits?

A. If once a man was outside the city, no soldiers could question him except in the night.

Q. I don't want that. Please tell me yes or no?

A. The picket outside my house was not on duty during the day time but during the night.

Q. Then according to you there was another picket.

A. Yes, on the main gates round the city.

Q. Would the people be coming from those pickets or from some secret paths?

A. I have explained my position.

Q. You wanted that information from some people who had come out of the city by some secret path?

A. I cannot definitely say, Sir, by which way they had come.

Q. Had you heard anything about the conduct of the police between the 11th and the 19th?

A. Yes, I had heard.

Q. What was the information given to you?

A. That is not my knowledge, but only hearsay.

Q. It was the information which the people from the city gave you between the 11th and the 19th?

A. It was based on rumours. The information that I got was that the police were taking bribes. It was only hearsay.

Q. Why do you hesitate in giving your deposition? You did go inside the city on the 14th and there was a meeting on that day?

A. Yes. It was I who got that meeting convened. It was my proposal.

Q. And the shops were opened on that day as a consequence of that meeting?

A. We influenced the shopkeepers to open their shops, but they were afraid and asked who would be responsible for opening their shops.

Q. Was there a large crowd of about 2 or 3 thousand people outside the place where the meeting was held?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they want to make any representation to General Dyer?

A. Yes. I went outside and heard them.

Q. Do you know what arrangements were made for the people that were wounded on the 13th?

A. No. I do not know anything because I did not go into the city.

Q. Was any complaint made about the treatment of the wounded?

A. After the 13th the people were so terrified that they did not even talk to each other.

Q. And you have got no information as to what was happening in the city after the 13th?

A. Practically nothing was happening because the people were so terrified.

Q. Are you aware that on the 11th people were being arrested inside the city?

A. I cannot say positively. I have no direct knowledge.

Q. With regard to the conversation at that baker's shop about looting, is there any reason why they were talking so loudly, is there any reason why they gave out their secret that they were going to loot the National Bank?

A. You may draw any conclusions you like. Perhaps you have no experience of the people of this Province whenever they sit in a baker's shop taking their meals. They usually talk on all sorts of things. It is in their nature to do this.

Q. It acts like a glass of wine. Usually after a glass of wine people become talkative?

A. I cannot say. The looting of the National Bank was not a secret at all. The people were openly talking about that place.

Q. I want to know what was happening on the 11th and 12th. Did you get any information on the 11th and 12th that except the National Bank anybody else was going to be looted?

A. The villagers had broken the railway line and from that I gathered that they were all bent upon looting Amritsar City.

Q. Do you believe that it was possible for a number of villagers to come and loot Amritsar City on the 11th and 12th?

A. It was quite possible and the *Baisakhi* festival was on the 13th, and on such occasions people come to Amritsar.

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SARDAR BIKRAM SINGH—concluded—LALA TEK CHAND JAINI—Mr. C. DONALD.

Q. After the 13th was it possible for any number of outside villagers to come and loot Amritsar City when, as a matter of fact, on the 11th, 12th and 13th more than 400 military could have gone inside the city and made arrangements there?

A. I do not know whether it was possible.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. When you heard those people talking at the baker's shop about looting, did you consider their statement of a very serious nature?

A. No. It was not serious. I treated the matter in a casual way.

LALA TEK CHAND JAINI of Jandiala.

By the President—

Q. Where do you reside?

A. In Jullanda Grou.

Q. How far outside the city is that?

A. About 10 or 11 miles away from the city.

Q. Were there any disturbances in your district?

A. In the city only.

Q. Were there any rumours as to the occurrences in Amritsar?

A. The news had spread.

Q. What was the state of unrest? Describe it in your own way?

A. The people were dissatisfied previously.

Q. What caused discontent in your district?

A. The poor people were complaining of the high prices.

Q. What was causing discontent to the people other than the poor?

A. The merchants and traders were angry owing to the new Income-Tax Act.

Q. Were there also rumours in your district as to the effect of the Rowlatt legislation?

A. Yes.

Q. What sort of rumours were circulated in your district as regards the Rowlatt Act?

A. There were two kinds of discontent about the Rowlatt Act in that district, the people who knew nothing about it owing to their lack of knowledge and the others who were in the know of things. They were discontented, because they thought that the Act was passed at a time when it was not opportune.

Q. What signs of discontent were exhibited in your district?

A. The people said that the Government ought not to have passed this Act at such a time when the people have served their Government without any purpose or selfish end.

Q. What action was taken by the people to indicate their discontent?

A. The people in my village wanted to have a *hartal* on the same day as there was a *hartal* in other places—on the 6th of April.

Q. Was there a *hartal* on the 6th of April?

A. No, Sir. Some people came to me in the evening of the 5th and they told me that they wanted to have a *hartal* on the 6th in this village, but because I knew that there were among those certain people who could not control themselves if any disturbance was to take place, I told them that it was not advisable, and if anybody would come forward to take the responsibility they may be allowed to have it, but as nobody would be responsible, there was no *hartal*. After this the people went away.

Mr. C. DONALD, Director of Fisheries, Dharamsala, Punjab.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Donald, you are the Director of Fisheries in the Punjab?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Are you familiar with a number of villages in or near Amritsar?

A. No, I am not familiar with the villages near Amritsar, but I am familiar with the way down. I am constantly going up and down that part.

Q. In the course of your journeys to and from Amritsar, have you had occasion to see and converse with people generally?

A. Are you referring, Sir, to the Amritsar district?

Q. Not to any particular district?

A. I am frequently going to it.

Q. Do you know about the rumours about the Rowlatt Act that were circulated?

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Q. At the time martial law was declared were the people in a very unsettled state?

A. It was previous to martial law—after the 10th.

Q. Was martial law in your opinion necessary?

A. The display of a military force was necessary.

Q. Why do you say so?

A. I was sitting at my place on the evening of the 10th when I noticed a crowd of people passing by my house. They were shouting. I sent my man to call one of the crowd. One of the members of the crowd came to me and I enquired from him as to what was the object of the crowd. He replied that people were going to Amritsar, because they had heard there was loot to be had at Amritsar.

Q. On any subsequent date after the 10th did you see any crowd of men going from your district with the object of looting?

A. I took two or three men with me and stopped their going to the city about the same time.

Q. What is the other incident of the 12th?

A. I received information at 9 in the evening on the 12th that there were certain people outside the city with axes in their hands.

Q. Did you see these men?

A. I sent for the head constable in charge of my village instantly.

Q. Had you reason to fear that this crowd was going to do damage?

A. I sent for him in order to go with him in his company to the place to see whether there was any truth in these things.

Q. Did you go with him?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What did you find when you arrived?

A. When I arrived there I did not see anybody there, and I enquired from the temple which is situated at that place. The members of the temple informed me that they had noticed two men sharpening their axes in the evening, and on enquiry I was told that they had left for Amritsar, so from this I concluded that there might have been danger.

Q. What did you discover at the time?

A. This is all that I had seen.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You have said that a crowd of people were shouting and going to Amritsar. How many people were there?

A. About 70 or 80 men.

Q. You were able to persuade them not to go?

A. Certainly. Only by persuasion and by saying that these things which they were about to do were very dangerous for themselves.

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Mr. C. DONALD.

[Continued.]

A. On the particular day in question, that is the 11th April, when I came down I asked the people what the trouble was, because I had heard nothing about it till I got down to Gurdaspur. There I was told that there was trouble in Amritsar, and I questioned anybody that I saw as to what the trouble was, and there I heard certain misrepresentations.

Q. What information did you get as to the cause of the trouble?

A. It was varied, but it was more or less on the same lines. I heard rumours to the effect that any two or three people collected together can be arrested by the police, that nobody can get married without paying a tax of Rs. 5 to the Government, that if a man died, before his relatives could bury him they would have to pay Rs. 5 to Government and finally that people must realise that the crops belong to Government, as also the land, and that Government could commandeer any part of the whole crops. There are variations but this was the general trend.

Q. Did people believe these representations were the result of the Rowlatt legislation?

A. They did, Sir.

Q. In consequence of their belief in these statements, were they agitated?

A. They were very agitated on that day.

Q. Did they seem to be indignant or angry about this legislation in consequence of its having these different effects?

A. They were extremely angry.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. On what day did you come through these villages?

A. I came through on the 11th April.

Q. In what villages did you have this conversation?

A. On the canal bank. I did not stop at any of the villages. I stopped on the canal bank where there are villages adjoining all round. I do not know what the villages are. On the canal bank there are villages going up and down.

Q. Was this at one place or at several places?

A. I stopped at three or four different places, I am not quite sure.

Q. You stopped at three or four different places on the canal bank?

A. Yes.

Q. In all how many people did you talk to?

A. I could not tell you. I mean my questions were aimed at whoever happened to be there, probably 20 or 30.

Q. At the first stop, how many people did you talk to?

A. About three or four.

Q. Who were they, Hindus or Muhammadans?

A. There was one Sikh. I did not know what the others were. I did not notice them particularly.

Q. Can you talk their language?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you talk to them in their language?

A. Yes.

Q. And did they tell you that the Rowlatt Act provided for these things?

A. As I said, with small reservations or modifications here and there, that is what I heard throughout on the whole of my journey down.

Q. You began asking them what the trouble was about?

A. I asked them what the trouble was about in Amritsar.

Q. There was no trouble in their own villages?

A. I did not even know of the trouble in Amritsar.

Q. They did not tell you about the trouble in their own villages, and when you asked them what the trouble was in Amritsar, what did they say?

A. As I said just now, they said the trouble was in the Rowlatt Act, *naya qanun* (new law).

Q. Did they give any reasons for the trouble?

A. I got no other reasons that I can remember.

Q. They did not refer to any other event in Amritsar except the *naya qanun*?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they say that the new *qanun* contained the provisions mentioned by you?

A. Yes, as mentioned by me just now.

Q. Did they tell you about this or did you ask them as to what they believed the *qanun* to be?

A. I asked them what the trouble was about. They said the *naya qanun*. Now I am giving you a general idea of the whole thing. I don't remember any particular conversation. I asked them what this trouble in Amritsar was about. They replied that there had been trouble in Amritsar. I asked them what it was all due to, and they said it was the new *qanun*. I asked them what this new *qanun* was, and then they told me all that I told you now.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You started at 12 o'clock from Gurdaspur?

A. About 12 o'clock.

Q. And you reached Lahore about 5 or 6 P.M.?

A. Probably later than that, I don't quite remember, but I think it was later than that. It was fairly dark.

Q. And you went *via* Aliwal and Wagha?

A. Yes.

Q. And it would be a distance of about 85 miles?

A. No, between Aliwal and Wagha it would be about 80 miles I think. I am not quite sure, it is about 85 miles by the other way.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. How far are these places Aliwal and Wagha from Amritsar?

A. Well, a canal runs down like this; Amritsar is over here. I have never gone across the country. Aliwal is a good long way. I have never been across the country.

Q. What class of people were these, were they villagers?

A. All villagers.

Q. Were they going on a journey?

A. A good many of them seemed to be coming from Amritsar itself?

Q. You asked them that?

A. Some of them were coming from Amritsar, and others were just wandering about.

Q. Did you stop your car to make these inquiries?

A. I happened to stop my car to water and oil and things of that sort. Whenever I stopped my car, I did make it a point to find out for my own edification as to what was going on.

Q. They did not describe to you what happened in Amritsar, but they simply began to tell you what the causes were?

A. They did tell me that they heard that Europeans had been killed and people had been shot.

Q. They were not eye-witnesses themselves?

A. I could not tell you that. They may have been, but they would not have told me that if they were.

Q. They said that all this trouble was due to the new *qanun*?

A. One man went as far as to say "*sade gale jal de*." The new *qanun* is burning in my throat. May I tell you a little part of what I actually spoke to them about? When I heard these versions of the new *qanun*, I said to the fellows: "Look here, do you believe in the representations of the Rowlatt Act that you have heard?—I know nothing about that because I am not a lawyer, but do you believe these representations of the Rowlatt Act to be genuine?" Their reply was, "When the whole country is speaking of it, it must be true." I said: "Never mind of the whole country speaking of it," but I asked them if from their knowledge of the British in India all these years, individually or collectively, they thought that the British Government were capable of doing the things that were misrepresented to them. They said no. Then I replied,—"I am not saying my exact words,—but this was a general trend of my argu-

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Mr. C. DONALD—concluded—LALA VAISHNO DAS.

ment—I said that if this was intended to be brought in, would it not have been brought in after the mutiny; was there any necessity to bring in a rule like this when hundreds of their people were fighting side by side with ourselves. Yet they said "*sade gale jal de*." That is, burning in my throat.

Q. Did they tell you who told them those things?

A. No, I asked them first of all who started those rumours. One old fellow turned round to me and said "you ought to know." I said if I knew I would not have asked him. Then I asked who started this thing, and they said it was all over the country. I asked them, can you give me an idea who started it? They said "no." So I said: "Look here, there are three people in India who are concerned with law. The ordinary person knows absolutely nothing about it, and these three persons are (1) Judges, (2) Policemen, (3) Pleaders." I said, "Is it possible—I know nothing about it,—but is it possible that one of these have started it? It is not to the interest of the policemen or magistrates to start these rumours, but there may be some discontented pleaders without a brief who may have started it." Thereupon one man said "*ghatal vakil hua*." I said

again: "There are three people that know the law." May it be one of these? I wanted to get some information.

Q. Did you ask them as to the pleader who started these rumours? Who was the pleader?

A. I was only asking him for information.

Q. Did you ask him that pleaders have probably started the rumours and who those pleaders were?

A. No.

Q. Were there any rumours round about Dharamsala about the Rowlatt Act?

A. I did not hear them from the people. I heard them when I went back from my servants that those rumours were there. I had been on tour. I had just gone back, and I had not done any touring in Dharamsala itself.

Q. These rumours about which you have given details here were the same sort of rumours round about Dharamsala as well?

A. More or less.

Q. You heard them from people?

A. I had not heard them before. I only heard from my servants that such rumours were going about.

LALA VAISHNO DAS, of Majitha.

By the President—

Q. Where do you reside Mr. Vaishno Das?

A. In Majitha, District Amritsar.

Q. Can you speak English or not?

A. No, Sir.

Q. How far is Majitha from Amritsar city?

A. Eleven miles.

Q. Was your district in a disturbed state during the period from the 10th to the 15th April?

A. It was in a state of disturbance.

Q. Have you got some property in your village?

A. There is some property.

Q. What sort of property is it?

A. Some cash, some ornaments and some grain.

Q. Now during the period of the disturbance, were you afraid that your property might be looted?

A. There was a danger.

Q. Did you take any special precautions to protect your property?

A. I employed 20 men.

Q. How long did you employ these twenty men?

A. For 8 days.

Q. During the whole of that time did you consider it necessary to have special protection of your property?

A. Yes.

Q. Is your property in different *mohallas*, in different towns?

A. Some of it was in the street and some in another lane.

Q. On the night of the 13th, did you hear any rumour that caused you special anxiety?

A. In the evening I had not yet gone to take my meal when people from the village informed me that there was an intention to commit dacoity on the village (Majitha).

Q. In consequence of that rumour, did you take any further precaution?

A. We sat together, joined our heads together and planned that every Brahman and Kshatri should send their young men to protect the village.

Q. Were you in a state of consternation as to what would happen?

A. As two respectable persons had informed me of it, and as there was no other arrangement for guarding the village, therefore we decided that we should have Kshatri and Brahmans, 10 of them at each corner and crossing to guard the village. Then we began to note down the names of those people whom the Kshatri and Brahman families were to send for the protection of the village and we made no distinction between a rich person and a poor person. All of them were to send

their young men. At about 11, while we were still considering the plans, two men who were drunk, came driving in an *ekka* (a conveyance driven with one horse) and they caught my feet and informed me that they had hardly escaped that evening and there was no hope of their being alive. They informed me that they constituted a party of ten and they were in the vicinity of the garden of the Jallianwala Bagh and 8 of them had returned and there was no news about the remaining two. It was quite clear that they had been frightened by the firing and they could not talk properly because they were so frightened.

They were drunk and they could not talk properly, but it was quite clear that they were very much frightened and they also said that Majitha has escaped the ruin.

Q. What did they mean by Majitha having escaped ruin?

A. That Majitha had escaped looting.

Q. Why do you assume that Majitha had escaped looting?

A. The people who had come there were all suspicious characters.

Q. What saved Majitha from being looted?

A. Firing.

Q. Then is it your opinion that by firing they prevented the village from being looted?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the attitude of the village people near you as to sending supplies to Amritsar about this time?

A. A man came to me from the Tahsildar on the morning of the 13th who informed me on behalf of the Tahsildar that there was no supply for the military forces of vegetables and potatoes; therefore I sent to him daily a supply of these things. After having received this message I sent for Chaudhri Ali Gauhar who lived at the back of my house, and who is also a member of the Municipal Committee. Directly, with the Chaudhri Ali Gauhar and the chaprassi from the Tahsildar, I went to one Ghulam Muhammad, a shopkeeper, who had recently bought 200 maunds of potatoes, in order to get some supplies from him cheap. He had scarcely begun weighing the potatoes when people rushed like lightning and gathered there. The people told me "we have already ruined the house of Lala Gopal Das; if you send supplies to Amritsar, we will do the same with your house." I told them that I required this supply of potatoes to send them to the city, but they did not let me do so.

Chaudhri Ali Gauhar advised me to leave that place because there was in his opinion the danger of a dis-

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LALA VAISHNO DAS—continued—SARDAR SADHU SINGH.

turbance there. We left that shop, but the chaprassi was there. He informed me later on that he was threatened by the people that he would be killed if he insisted on taking potatoes. The chaprassi, when he returned from the shop, was quaking with fear. The idea struck me of reporting the matter to the Tahsildar. As a matter of fact, I did write the report but considering that all these people belonged to the village I abstained from the idea. Then I despatched my servant telling him to procure these potatoes and vegetables somehow or other as I wanted to send them the same day.

Q. What was the objection to your sending the potatoes into the city?

A. They said that they would not let the vegetables go for Europeans. Then I collected some vegetables and despatched them through Fazil-ud-din and asked him to reach Rambag Gate. This Fazil-ud-din reports that when he was going to the city he was met by 2 crowds who threatened that he would be subjected to severe loss if he insisted in taking those vegetables to the city. Fazil-ud-din made a pretext that he was taking the vegetables for my son who was a pleader at Amritsar, and as those people knew me as well as my son they let him go. In the same way by different routes I used to send these vegetables every day for 3 or 4 days.

Q. Was the feeling at that time very strong against Europeans?

A. The feeling against Europeans was bad.

Q. For how long did that bad feeling continue?

A. For about 4 or 5 days.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. The information that you received in your village was that Majitha was going to be looted. You say in your statement that it was threatened to be done by some zamindars. Is that true or was it to be done only by hooligans?

A. There might have been some zamindars in that group.

Q. Then it is not correct to say that 300 zamindars were conspiring to loot Majitha?

A. There was no mention of zamindars. The report came that three or four hundred men had gathered together, and the majority of these people are always zamindars.

Q. You said hooligans?

A. Yes, people who belonged to the criminal tribe.

Q. Why do you not call them badmashes instead of zamindars?

A. There are hooligans in zamindars also as there are in Kshatris and other people.

Q. These badmashes that you were expecting to attack Majitha were to come from the surrounding villages?

A. I cannot say exactly, but they must naturally come from the neighbouring villages.

Q. Not from the city of Amritsar?

A. I cannot say about any people whom I have not seen.

Q. What did you believe? People were coming from various villages to attack Majitha? You did not understand that people were coming from Amritsar to attack the village?

A. The information that I received was that a group of 300 or 400 zamindars was coming to loot Majitha.

SARDAR SADHU SINGH, of village Khokaran, Amritsar District.

By the President—

Q. Where do you reside?

A. I live in a village named Khokaran.

Q. How far is it from Amritsar?

A. Twenty miles.

Q. In what state was the Khokaran village from the 10th to 15th April?

Q. What did you understand: the 300 zamindars were coming from the Amritsar city or from other villages?

A. How can I say about it?

Q. From your knowledge of the surrounding country.

What did you believe: were the 300 people Amritsar citizens coming to attack Majitha or villagers?

(Mr. Herbert.—If there is a zamindar, he could not possibly be in the city.)

Q. Then it is not the city people that you expected?

A. Just possible. I cannot tell exactly whether they belonged to the city or not.

Q. Zamindars cannot be in Amritsar. Is it correct or not?

A. Zamindars generally live in villages. There is a small number of them in the city.

Q. Who were these ten people that you spoke of and who you were told, had gone to the Jallianwala Bagh. Did they belong to your village?

A. They belonged to Majitha.

Q. And they had gone to Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. Had they gone to the Baisakhi festival?

A. In my opinion they went also for looting purpose.

Q. Do not people go from your village to Amritsar for festivals?

A. They do go.

Q. Did they go this year?

A. The two men whom I met were Muhammadans.

Q. I am not asking that. People from villages go to Amritsar for this festival; did they go this year?

A. I think they went.

Q. Did you learn from those 8 people as to what happened to their two friends who were with them? Where were the other 6?

A. They did not come to see me; they were passing by that road.

Q. Is it your son that was a pleader at Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. Did those 2 people speak to you about the firing at the Jallianwala Bagh?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you get anxious about your son who was at Amritsar?

A. No.

Q. Did you take any steps to get news about your son on that day or the next day?

A. I despatched a man the next morning.

Q. Was he able to get to Amritsar and bring news?

A. The man who went with the vegetables first of all brought the news.

Q. Every day regularly your man goes to Amritsar with vegetables. Is it so?

A. I used to send every day in those days a man in a bamboo cart.

Q. What do you mean by "those days"? Did you send on the 10th, 11th, 12th and 13th?

A. From the 13th it began and I used to send him for about 4 or 5 days.

Q. You went to the shop to get those vegetables because you wanted them cheap?

A. Yes.

Q. He refused to give you because you wanted them cheap.

A. The rate was not yet settled and as the man was my own tenant I am not in a position to say anything about it.

A. The people of that village and also of the villages near by had bad feelings towards the Government owing to the Rowlatt legislation and also owing to the new income-tax, and incorrect rumours which were afloat.

Q. Did you see signs of excitement among the people?

A. There was a general talk about the Rowlatt Act to the effect that under that Act they could not marry

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SARDAR SADHU SINGH.

[Continued.]

and there were all sorts of restrictions laid upon their liberty.

Q. About the 10th or the 13th April, did the people mass together, or did they become threatening in their attitude?

A. I did not notice any crowd or any threatening. I only noticed 2 or 3 individuals talking to each other at different places when I was going round my village and other places. And about income-tax, they used to say that Government were going to take half the produce from all the zamindars and half the income of other people.

Q. About the time from the 10th to 15th April, did you hear any threats from the people as to looting in any place?

A. On the 11th, it was generally known that on the 10th, Amritsar Banks had been looted, Kotwalis had been burnt, stations had been burnt and several Europeans had been killed.

Q. What opinion did that information have upon the villagers in the villages?

A. The news had a very bad effect on the people of my village and the adjoining villages, and there was a general impression that they ought to have gone there and also taken part in the looting.

Q. In your opinion was the situation in your village dangerous during this period?

A. It was dangerous.

Q. Had people come to disregard law and order?

A. They were dissatisfied with the Government that Government had passed such a law.

Q. I was referring particularly to the time between the 10th and the 15th?

A. On the 14th, I noticed that people had heard about firing and martial law.

Q. After they heard of martial law and firing did quiet prevail in the village?

A. The feelings and ideas that they had in their minds of going and looting were removed.

Q. Was there a considerable amount of unrest for some time after this in the village?

A. For about 4, 5 or 6 days there was unrest, but afterwards all was quiet.

Q. In your opinion was martial law necessary to bring the people to a sense of order?

A. At that moment it was necessary.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You spoke about the various rumours regarding the Rowlatt Act. Were these representations made by anyone in your village?

A. There was a general talk about it which I heard. I did not hear from any particular person.

Q. Did you not see or know anyone making these representations to the people about the Rowlatt Act?

A. I do not recollect the names, several people did it.

Q. Were there any meetings in your village?

A. No meeting was held either in the village or in its vicinity.

Q. At no time was there disorder in your village?

A. Neither in my village nor in the adjoining villages there was any disorder. Only these ideas were there.

Q. The whole time they were quiet?

A. Yes.

Q. Only after they heard of the looting at Amritsar some of them had the idea that they should share in the loot?

A. The news about the burning of these Banks and looting at Amritsar had affected their minds and therefore there was a change.

Q. It was after the news from Amritsar that there was any idea of looting.

A. Yes, they entertained ideas about the Rowlatt Act before that.

Q. That we have learnt. So far as the looting disorder was concerned, any idea about that came only after the news from Amritsar?

A. They heard that everything was to be got there, currency notes, cloth, etc., and so they ought to have gone there.

Q. They thought they ought to have gone and shared it?

A. Yes.

Q. This feeling disappeared after a few days?

A. Yes.

Q. You never went out of your village to Amritsar or any other place during this time?

A. I went to Amritsar on the 18th or 19th.

Q. Between the 10th and 18th, you did not stir out of your village?

A. I used to go about my village and the other adjoining villages.

Q. You did not observe anything unusual?

A. Nothing was manifest; they were only talking.

Q. In your view martial law was necessary. You thought it was necessary to disabuse the people in your village of those ideas about looting?

A. It was necessary in my opinion for suppressing ideas of looting both in the district and the villages. Had it not been promulgated, there were chances of greater dangers.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You are the owner of village Khokaran?

A. I am a resident of that village. I am also the owner of that village and some others.

Q. All the inhabitants of Khokaran and surrounding villages are your tenants?

A. I do not own a very large amount of land.

Q. Did you hear anyone preaching either in your village or in the surrounding villages, or informing people what the Rowlatt Act meant?

A. I did not hear anybody speaking.

Q. You did not hear anybody explaining or interpreting the meaning of the Rowlatt Act to the inhabitants of your village or surrounding villages?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Did you make any enquiries as to from what source these rumours came to your village and were spread?

A. People who came from the city brought these news and it was known that they brought the news.

Q. Did you hear it from somebody or did you hear yourself that the city men were detailing these news? Your villagers informed you that they heard this news from some person who had come from the city and visited the village?

A. I could not get hold of any particular person who was responsible for the news, but people said that they heard it in the city; when I asked them from whom they had heard, they related the name of some other person.

Q. For the first time did you really hear any of your tenants or inhabitants of your village say that they were ready or that they were willing to go to Amritsar for the purpose of looting, or was this news brought to you by somebody?

A. I do not remember any particular name, but there was general talk about it.

Q. I want to know whether you were present when anybody said: "It is a pity that I was not there, and I am willing to go and loot." Did you hear anybody giving expression to that view?

A. There was a talk about it, but I do not recollect the name.

Q. Did you not hear yourself? Nobody expressed the views in your presence?

A. None.

(The witness at this stage volunteered to say something regarding recruiting, if required.)

By the President—

Q. What do you know about recruiting?

A. Recruits from my district were not recruited by force. They went voluntarily; that is all.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Anything else?

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SARDAR SADHU SINGH—concluded—Dr. MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH FAUQ.

A. Nothing.
 Q. Do you make any difference between the introduction of martial law and calling in of military aid?
 A. I do not comprehend the difference. If I am made to understand, I will understand.
 Q. Did people intend going to Amritsar or where?
 A. My village is situated midway between Lahore and Amritsar. Therefore people wanted to go both to Lahore and Amritsar as well as the stations for looting and obtaining money.
 Q. Between the 10th and the 15th, did you see with your own eyes a crowd of 100 or 200 people bent upon looting?
 A. I did not see any crowd of that sort.
 Q. Did you see a crowd of 40 or 50 persons?
 A. None.
 Q. A crowd of 30 persons?
 A. None.
 Q. A crowd of 15 persons collected together for the purpose of looting?
 A. None.
 Q. Did you see a crowd of 10 persons?
 A. No.
 Q. When is *rabi* gathered in your village?
 A. In the month of *Baisakh*, and it takes some days in *Jeth*.
 Q. Were you in the habit of going every day to the outlying villages and leaving Khokaran?
 A. I used to go for about 10 or 15 days.
 Q. Especially in the month of April?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What was the need of that?
 A. As I am the Honorary Secretary of the Sikh Sardars' Committee in Amritsar District for the supervision of emigrants, Honorary Secretary of Zamindars' Committee, and Honorary Assistant Collector, first grade, and Sub-Registrar, I considered it to be my duty to go there and correct the wrong information which was prevailing there.
 Q. I think you had sufficient influence to prevent people from believing those rumours after you became aware of the rumours and the intentions of the inhabitants of Khokaran?
 A. In the ordinary course of things I could check, but I could not if it went beyond the ordinary.
 Q. I want to know whether you generally exercise influence over the inhabitants of Khokaran?
 A. Ordinarily I could, but in exceptional cases as at that particular juncture, it was impossible. It was a very critical time and it was very hard for us.
 Q. Are there a large number of badmashes in the Khokaran village?

Dr. MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH FAUQ, Private Practitioner, Amritsar.

By the President—

Q. Are you in practice in Amritsar?
 A. I am a private practitioner there.
 Q. Were you there on the 10th?
 A. Yes, I was present at Amritsar.
 Q. Where were you at the time firing took place?
 A. I was on the bridge.
 Q. Would you tell us exactly what you saw?
 A. I saw that a mob was present there and they were saying that they must see the Deputy Commissioner and ask him where Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal were and would ask for their release and if the Deputy Commissioner would not release them he should take them also where they were. They were talking matters like that. In the square where there is an electric post there were some soldiers and some Europeans on horseback and the mob did not agree to return and insisted upon visiting the Deputy Commissioner. After 5 or 6 minutes the officers went back to the bridge and they then took their positions just near the foot bridge. The mob then advanced and went down the railway line and took some stones from there and began to throw them on those officers. Upon

A. A few.
 Q. According to you what will be the number of badmashes?
 A. About 5 or 6.
 Q. These people, who according to you were bent upon looting, they were not badmashes, but respectable men?
 A. This is not the work of gentlemen, there were those badmashes and also some low class people.
 Q. Did you hold any meetings to disabuse the minds of these people?
 A. I used to go alone. I did not hold meetings, but people used to gather when I used to make them understand about these things.
 Q. When did you give your statement for this committee?
 A. I did not give any written statement. I only mentioned it to Mr. Puckle 9 or 10 days ago.
 Q. For the first time you mentioned these facts to Mr. Puckle only 9 or 10 days ago?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Before that you had not mentioned it?
 A. I mentioned to the Deputy Commissioner previous to mentioning to Mr. Puckle, on the 19th and 20th of April.
 Q. Was your statement recorded anywhere?
 A. No, Sir.
 Q. Who was the Deputy Commissioner to whom you mentioned it?
 A. I mentioned this to Mr. Miles Irving and at that time he only told us that we should be going ahead doing the same thing and they were also making other arrangements. The other Sardars also had been working in their own areas.
 Q. At what time did the news of the looting of Amritsar reach Khokaran?
 A. I do not remember the time, but it was on the 11th April.
 Q. The excitement subsided after the 13th?
 A. After hearing on the 14th that martial law had been proclaimed, this excitement subsided, and it took about 4 or 5 days.
 Q. Was this information given to you when you went out of your house early in the morning on the 11th?
 A. People who came there were giving information.
 Q. Again on the 13th you went out and somebody came and informed you that people were ready to loot. Is that so? Was that news given to you every morning? Can you give the names of persons who gave you this information on the 11th, 12th and 13th?
 A. I do not remember the names of people.

this the officers fired on the mob and I then came to the Telegraph Office and the mob went behind.
 Q. Were you at the Telegraph Office when the mob came?
 A. When that firing took place, say, after about 20 minutes, I again went there and the mob was just destroying the Telegraph office and seeing this I at once came back.
 Q. Were they destroying the Telegraph office?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What was the state of the feeling of the mob?
 A. I cannot tell that. They wanted to see the Deputy Commissioner. As they threw stones on the officers I can say they were hostile towards Government.
 Q. Did they seem to have lost their temper?
 A. Yes, at the time when they were refused permission to see the Deputy Commissioner.
 Q. Did you see them doing destruction to the building in the town and the city?
 A. Yes, I saw them.
 Q. Did you actually see them?
 A. Yes, I saw them personally.

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Dr. MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH FAUQ.

[Continued.]

Q. At what time?
 A. Between 2 and 3. I saw the National Bank burning and thereafter I saw it being looted.
 Q. Did you actually see the person who set fire?
 A. When I came to the Bank it had already been burnt. They did not set fire in my presence.
 Q. Had you gone immediately from the Telegraph office to the National Bank?
 A. After the first firing when I came I went to Dr. Bashir's place with the wounded persons. When I returned from there I saw that the National Bank was burning.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. How did you come to be with the crowd?
 A. They passed just near my house and I went with them to see what was going on.
 Q. Where is your house?
 A. In Chauk Farid.
 Q. Is that near the National Bank?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And the crowds passed through that street in the morning?
 A. Yes.
 Q. That was after you heard of the arrest of Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal?
 A. Yes.
 Q. You also joined the mob with the idea of going with them to the Deputy Commissioner?
 A. No. I went with them to see what they were doing.
 Q. Were you attending to your work when that crowd passed by your dispensary?
 A. That was no time of my work.
 Q. You merely went with the crowd as a matter of curiosity?
 A. I went with them to see what they were doing because never before had such a mob collected in Amritsar. I was really surprised to see such a big mob and I wanted to see whether they were allowed to interview the Deputy Commissioner.
 Q. Before the 10th were you in touch with what was happening in the city?
 A. Yes. I was in the city and I used to go to the meetings.
 Q. Did you know Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal?
 A. Yes, they were personal friends of mine.
 Q. You attended meetings which they addressed?
 A. Yes.
 Q. How long have you been practising in Amritsar?
 A. In Amritsar for about nine years.
 Q. You know the Rowlatt Bill agitation meetings?
 A. I attended all those meetings and used to be there.
 Q. At those meetings did Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal incite violence?
 A. No. They never said anything to the people to incite violence.
 Q. Did they at those meetings misrepresent the Rowlatt Act?
 A. Dr. Kitchlew never misrepresented the Bill but as the masses of people were illiterate they took it as misrepresenting.
 Q. What he said was misrepresentation or the people took it as misrepresentation?
 A. Yes, the people took it as misrepresentation.
 Q. Did they tell the mob that under the provisions of the Bill they could not marry or take out their funerals and like that?
 A. Dr. Kitchlew never said it like that.
 Q. People misunderstood what he said?
 A. Yes, I mean to say that the people were unable to understand these political points.
 Q. I want to know, Doctor, whether the real provisions of the Rowlatt Bill were not understood by the people?
 A. The illiterate people could not understand what they were and some agitators misrepresented them.
 Q. Who started these misrepresentations?
 A. I don't know the exact names as I had no business to search after them.

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Q. With your knowledge of the city and your acquaintance of the people with whom you were mixing, did you come to know who misrepresented them?
 A. No. I had no work of that kind.
 Q. Did you find as a fact these misrepresentations about the provisions of the Rowlatt Act in the minds of the people?
 A. I heard men saying that they would not be allowed to marry and to take out their funerals, etc.
 Q. You say people in Amritsar believed that those were the provisions of the Rowlatt Act?
 A. Yes, they believed so. I cannot say how they came to believe that.
 Q. But in fact they did believe that?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Was that a large section?
 A. Yes, a large section. As they were illiterate they believed whatever they were told by some men but the educated classes did not believe them.
 Q. Did the educated classes do anything wrong?
 A. I cannot say that.
 Q. Did they do anything to misrepresent the Rowlatt Act?
 A. I did not see.
 Q. "No one would be allowed to marry," etc., you know that is not a provision of the Rowlatt Act?
 A. That I told them several times but they would not believe it.
 Q. When people spoke to you what you understood to be the wrong impression did you tell them that their impression was wrong?
 A. I told them that their impression was absolutely wrong. I told them that it was wrong that you won't be allowed to marry. This I did many times.
 Q. Did Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal tell the people that their notion about this was wrong?
 A. No, I never heard them.
 Q. At the meetings were the provisions of the Rowlatt Act discussed?
 A. The provisions were not discussed but they strongly protested against the Rowlatt Act.
 Q. Were the people in a state of excitement owing to what they believed to be the provisions of the Rowlatt Act?
 A. I cannot say.
 Q. Before the 10th was there excitement amongst the people of Amritsar about the provisions?
 A. There was no such excitement before the 10th as appeared on the 10th.
 Q. They did not do what they did on the 10th but was there excitement?
 A. Yes, there was excitement about the Rowlatt Bill.
 Q. Was there excitement in the public mind over any other matter beside the Rowlatt Act?
 A. I cannot say.
 Q. On the 10th the people, as you have told us, were going to the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow and you joined with them and you reached the overbridge outside the Hall Gate?
 A. Yes.
 Q. You stopped there?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Now till that time when they passed through the city was there any disorder?
 A. No. They were saying that both of their leaders had been caught. Either they should also be kept there or their leaders should be released.
 Q. There was no disorder?
 A. No.
 Q. From what you saw in the city was there any feeling against the British?
 A. I never heard of or saw any such feeling against Europeans. But some time I saw that people had some hatred in their minds about the Europeans and this I saw from their violent speeches. Yes, people had hatred against Europeans.
 Q. When did you find those feelings of hatred?
 A. When these provisions of the Act were being discussed. They raised shouts of "shame, shame."

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Dr. MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH FAUQ.

[Continued.]

Q. Shouts of shame are quite different from hatred ?
A. While discussing the provisions of the Act when the name of Sir William Vincent was taken people raised cries of "shame, shame."

Q. People believed that the author of the Bill was to blame for this ?

A. I cannot say.

Q. Was there any definite feeling against Sir William Vincent ?

A. I cannot say that there was any definite feeling against Sir William Vincent.

Q. From what you observed were they against people individually or against a body of European officials or against all the British ? Were they against Europeans as Europeans or they were against the British Government ?

A. They were against the British Government.

Q. Before the 10th what was the state of the minds of the people against the British Government itself ?

A. The people protested against certain acts of the Government.

Q. There is a great difference between the acts of the Government and the British Government itself. Did they say that they did not want British Government ? Was there any such feeling against the British Government itself before the 10th ?

A. No, there was none.

Q. Did you see any manifestation of such feeling before the 10th ?

A. No.

Q. I would like to know, if you can tell me, when there was nothing before the 10th, how do you explain the sudden outburst against the Europeans on the 10th ?

A. As the leaders were caught the people had become excited.

Q. Why were they against Europeans ?

A. I cannot say why they did so.

Q. Before the 10th there was no anti-Government feeling. I am asking you, Doctor, because you are a citizen of Amritsar. Do you assign any reason why on the 10th suddenly this manifestation against Europeans took place ?

A. I cannot say why they did like that.

Q. On the bridge the crowd was prevented from going further ?

A. Yes.

Q. Supposing they had been allowed to cross the bridge, what do you think would have happened ?

A. They might have done something wrong or they may not have done anything. I cannot say.

Q. What is your opinion after you had seen the state of the crowd ?

A. In 1907 when Ajit Singh and Amba Pershad were arrested a similar crowd collected and broke into the Post Office. Before they had done anything we could not imagine that they would do something wrong.

Q. Don't take us to 1907. We want to know of what you saw of the crowd with whom you were in the morning. Supposing that they had been allowed to cross to the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow what would have happened ?

A. When they began to throw stones I became certain that they would do mischief.

Q. The stones were not thrown before they were prevented. Were not the stones thrown after they were prevented ?

A. They wanted to go up to the bridge and from there to the Deputy Commissioner's house and they were not allowed to do so, and it was then that they began to throw stones.

Q. If they had not been prevented what do you think would have happened ?

A. I cannot understand. At the very moment they were prevented they began to throw stones.

Q. If they had not been prevented it was just possible that they would not have thrown stones ?

A. It was just possible.

Q. In your opinion if they had been allowed to go, they might have begun to throw stones ?

A. It was possible.

Q. Do I understand you to say that the crowd was in such an excited state of mind that the least provocation would have resulted in an outburst ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then the firing took place ?

A. Yes.

Q. When did the firing take place ?

A. When I came back with the crowd.

Q. They returned from that place ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you still continue to remain with them ?

A. I came with them and I again returned.

Q. That crowd went to the other side of the Bridge ?

A. A part of that and not all of them. A part of them went to the railway station. We came to the city.

Q. When you came to the city the crowd was with you ?

A. A part of that crowd.

Q. How many were they ?

A. I cannot say. They might be 1,000.

Q. When you came back to the city to what place did those 1,000 people go ?

A. They went to Katra Kanahyan and then to Dr. Bashir's house to treat the patients at his house.

Q. There were two wounded persons with you ?

A. We all went to Dr. Bashir's house and there the two wounded persons were treated.

Q. Were you there when the wounded persons were treated ?

A. I was still there when the wounded persons were treated. Men from different parts were passing through the Hall Bazar and persons in large number were passing.

Q. You mean other crowds were also passing and going to the Hall Bazar ?

A. They were at that time excited at seeing their wounded persons and were saying "Now bring the Deputy Commissioner, we will tear him into pieces, and like that."

Q. When they saw the wounded they got more excited ?

A. Yes, they were saying that innocent men had been killed and that they now must go to the Deputy Commissioner and the Europeans and do this and that.

Q. This was said by the crowd that was passing through the streets ?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the state of the people that were with you ?

A. They were also very much excited.

Q. Were they saying the same thing ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you not tell them anything or did you make an attempt to pacify them ?

A. No.

Q. Were you excited ?

A. No.

Q. You ought to have pacified them ?

A. I was not in a position to pacify them. They would not listen to anybody.

Q. Did they then disperse ?

A. Yes, they dispersed.

Q. Where were you then ?

A. I was at Dr. Bashir's house.

Q. Where did they go ?

A. To different directions.

Q. How did they disperse ?

A. I don't know.

Q. From Dr. Bashir's house where did you go ?

A. From there I went again to the Hall Bazar.

Q. Did you go past the National Bank and other Banks ?

A. Yes, I saw the National Bank.

Q. Was it burning when you reached the National Bank ?

A. It was already on fire and some people were standing.

Q. Had the murders of the Manager and the Accountant already taken place ?

A. Yes.

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Q. Was there a large crowd ?

A. There was no large crowd. People had gone away.

Q. What did you see next after that ?

A. I kept standing there. A few people were there.

Q. How long ?

A. Say for about half an hour.

Q. What was then happening ?

A. Those few people also went away.

Q. Who ?

A. Those who were standing. All the bazar was clear.

Q. In what time ?

A. There was nobody in half an hour.

Q. Was there any police or military ?

A. There was no police, nor military.

Q. The National Bank was burning ?

A. Yes.

Q. People had gone away ?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you see after half an hour ? Did any people attempt to put out the fire ?

A. No.

Q. Were people looting the godown of the National Bank ?

A. When all the bazar was clear and a mob was standing in the next chawk, at that time that mob came into the Bank and began looting it.

Q. The mob which looted the Bank, was it the same mob or was it a different mob ?

A. I cannot say, it may be the same mob.

Q. Did you see the Town Hall on fire ?

A. Yes.

Q. That was after the looting of the Bank had taken place ?

A. I went to the Bank first and when I was returning some minutes after I saw that flames were coming out from the Town Hall. I first saw the National Bank and a short time after I saw the looting of it and thereafter I saw the Town Hall burning.

Q. Did you make any attempt to prevent people doing that sort of things ?

A. No.

Q. From there you went home ?

A. I went home at about 5.

Q. What were you doing all that time at the National Bank ?

A. I kept standing there in the bazar.

Q. What was your object in standing there ?

A. Only to see what the people were doing.

Q. Then you went home ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you stir out again that night ?

A. Yes, I came out again.

Q. What did you see ?

A. I saw people saying that their innocent people had been killed. This would bring about bad results and the Government would be ruined. Ordinary people were saying that.

Q. They were in groups in the streets ?

A. Yes, they were talking like that.

Q. Do you know what happened on the 11th ?

A. Yes, I was with the funeral processions on that day. They went from Khair-din's mosque to Sultanwind.

Q. Were there large gatherings ?

A. Very large.

Q. Many thousands ?

A. Yes, many thousands.

Q. There were both Hindus and Muhammadans ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you join them ?

A. Yes.

Q. In those processions what were the crowds saying ?

A. They were not saying anything in particular. They were saying "Hindu-Musalman ki jai." They were saying Kalimah and they were saying Ram Ram.

Q. Were they saying anything about Government or Europeans ?

A. With the processions they were not saying anything at all. But when the processions started they were saying they had killed our men.

Q. From where did they start ?

A. From Khair-din's Mosque where the dead bodies were lying.

Q. What did they say ?

A. They did not say anything but before the processions started some gentlemen, for instance Khwaja Ghulam Yasin, Syed Budhe Shah, Lala Duni Chand, Lala Kesho Ram and two or three more came and said that Mr. Miles Irving, the Deputy Commissioner, had ordered that the funerals be taken out at an interval of 15 minutes each and that not more than 8 men should accompany a funeral. The mob said that they won't agree to this in any case. The Government might do whatever they liked. They might fire them to death and we will all go to our funerals, i.e., the martyrs of our nation. At the same time they were saying that at Lahore an Indian army had occupied the Fort and the Anarkali. And at the same time some people were talking and saying that at Lahore an Indian army had occupied the Fort and at Anarkali the European army had been defeated by the Indians and they had soda water bottles which they used as bombs.

Q. Who said this ?

A. Common people in the mob there.

Q. Not any one you named ?

A. No.

Q. The gentlemen you named were persuading the people to obey the orders of the Deputy Commissioner ?

A. Yes, but nobody was obeying them, and attempts were made to assault them and they ran away.

Q. The crowd would not take their advice and turned on them ?

A. Yes, and they ran away.

Q. Then the processions were not guided by any of these leading men ?

A. No ; Pandit Kashi Ram was with them.

Q. What happened ultimately, were the orders of the Deputy Commissioner obeyed or not ?

A. At that time they were not.

Q. When were they obeyed ?

A. Up to the 13th there was no sign of the Government in Amritsar city.

Q. Then you know that the water supply and the electric light were cut off, when was that ?

A. Yes, I came to know it on the 11th.

Q. Your own lights must have been cut off ?

A. I have no connection in my house.

Q. And your water supply ?

A. I have a well in my house.

Q. You came to know that the water supply was cut off on the 11th ?

A. Yes, on the 11th morning.

Q. On the 11th and 12th there was no sign of any authority ?

A. Yes.

Q. There was no police ?

A. No police.

Q. No military ?

A. No military.

Q. On the 11th and 12th did not the police and military come into the town ?

A. No, I don't think they did.

Q. On the 12th various people were arrested in the city ?

A. Yes.

Q. For that purpose the military and the police must have come into the city ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then I do not follow you when you say on the 11th and 12th there was no police or military.

A. They only came in and arrested them and took them away.

Q. On the 11th and 12th how was order maintained ?

A. There was no order on the 11th ; a meeting was held and some three or four hundred long sticks of bamboo were purchased and the people were wandering about

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the bazar saying "Be careful and take care of your house."

Q. On the 11th a meeting was held at which volunteers were appointed?

A. Yes, members of the *Satragraha* were asked to keep order.

Q. And you said they moved about the city saying what?

A. They were saying "You should take care of your houses and you should be careful."

Q. They shouted in the same way as the *pahrawalas* do?

A. Yes.

Q. And did they maintain order in that manner?

A. Yes, there was order, but there was a danger from those who were guarding the city. I could not see the rest of the town, but in my mohalla I saw that these guards were all badmashes, and I think in all the town it was like that, and in that case there was a danger that they might loot the inhabitants and the houses. The chawk of Farid is a bad part of the town and the men of that part are badmashes and they had sticks in their hands and were shouting in the bazar that you should be careful, and I may say that up to midnight I could not sleep.

Q. There must be a certain number of badmashes about the town in that state of things, but do you suggest that the *Satyagraha* volunteers were badmashes?

A. I do not think these badmashes were *Satyagraha* volunteers. I do not think the members of the *Satyagraha* would be like these badmashes who had no interest in any movement, social or political.

Q. About these *Satyagraha* volunteers, they were people regularly on the roll of the *Satyagraha* organization?

A. I did not see the roll of the *Satyagrahis* and their list.

Q. Were you present at this meeting on the 11th?

A. Yes.

Q. Who convened this meeting?

A. As far as I came to know from the proceedings, that meeting was not convened by anybody, but Dholan Das and Sheikh Sadik Hussain and some other men came to Dr. Bashir, who was Secretary of the *Satyagrahis*, to say the *hartal* should be terminated in the morning and the shops should be opened.

As the people had no other work to do except to walk in the bazars, more than 20,000 people assembled there.

Q. At the meeting?

A. No, just in front of Dr. Bashir's house. Some 500 men were allowed in and then the main gate was shut.

Q. At this meeting was a resolution passed?

A. No.

Q. Or was any determination come to that the *hartal* should be ended?

A. Yes, it was stated by Dr. Bashir and Bugga and somebody else that if Government gave a guarantee that it would not take any steps in regard to what had happened they should early in the morning open the shops. But Dholan Das said, "We cannot give you this assurance," and so they did not agree to the proposal and these people went away.

Q. Then do you know the events that happened on the 13th?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 13th you know that a proclamation was issued prohibiting meetings?

A. Yes.

Q. You know that a meeting was held at Jallianwala Bagh?

A. Yes.

Q. You were not present there?

A. No.

Q. After the 13th was the city perfectly quiet?

A. I left Amritsar on the 14th.

Q. And how long were you absent?

A. I came back on the 22nd April.

Q. When you returned you found the city quiet?

A. Yes, at that time it was quiet.

Q. Was order perfectly restored?

A. Yes, at that time people were much terrified.

Q. Terrified by what?

A. I cannot say by what. They were not doing what they were doing on the 11th, 12th and 13th.

Q. To all purposes the people looked about normal?

A. Yes, they were all doing their daily business.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. You said that Dr. Kitchlew, when he addressed the meetings at Amritsar, did not explain the Rowlatt Bill to the people, but protested against it. What reasons did he give for protesting against it?

A. He quoted certain sections and said that if these Bills were passed a man who was arrested would not be allowed to produce a pleader and would not be allowed to plead against the orders of the Court, and the rights of the people would be lost. Dr. Kitchlew never said, I at least never heard him saying, that people would not be allowed to marry and would not be allowed to take their funerals in the graveyard without an escort.

Q. He quoted certain sections?

A. Yes.

Q. You said you joined the crowd that was going up to the Deputy Commissioner's house in the first instance and they were saying: "We will set our leaders free." Did they say how they proposed to set them free?

A. That I cannot say; they said: "We will ask the Deputy Commissioner to set our leaders free, or to take us with them."

Q. They did not make any threats as to what would happen?

A. No, at that time they did not make any threats, but soon after they began to throw stones.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. On the first morning were they bare-headed and bare-footed with *lathis* in their hands?

A. Bare-footed but not bare-headed.

Q. And no *lathis*?

A. No *lathis*.

Q. Up to the time of stone-throwing you did not hear any member of the crowd saying that they would tear the Deputy Commissioner to pieces? It was subsequent to the firing taking place?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you a leader of Amritsar city like Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever incite people to have recourse to violence? Did you ever incite the mob to kill or damage any property?

A. Never.

Q. Did you ever spread any false rumours?

A. No.

Q. You were a friend of Dr. Bashir?

A. Yes.

Q. And you knew intimately Dr. Kitchlew and Dr. Satyapal?

A. Yes.

Q. And you helped the two wounded that were shot at the first bridge?

A. Yes, I chloroformed them.

Q. Was an attempt made by the police to get you implicated?

A. Yes, I was called when I returned from the out station.

Q. My only question is, was an attempt made by the police to implicate you in this riot?

A. I do not know, but I was called to the police station and asked something of this; after that I was never called.

Q. On the 11th the dead bodies were at Khair-din's Mosque?

A. Yes.

Q. Those dead bodies were ultimately buried outside the Sultanwind Gate?

A. Yes.

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Q. That was the order of the Deputy Commissioner that they should be buried outside the city beyond the Sultanwind Gate?

A. Yes, I heard that, I have no personal knowledge.

Q. People came and informed you that that was the order of the Deputy Commissioner?

A. Yes.

Q. You were present when the dead bodies were burned?

A. No, I was just standing some hundred yards away.

Q. You are the only Dr. Fauq in Amritsar, or is there any one else?

A. No, I am the only one.

Q. Was any effort made by Dr. Bashir and Dr. Kitchlew and Dr. Satyapal many months previous to the 10th of April to bring about Hindu-Muhammadan unity?

A. In some meetings such speeches were delivered.

Q. But you do not know whether any genuine effort was made by them?

A. I do not know of any particular effort, but generally in these meetings speeches were made to that effect.

Q. Are you a *Satyagrahi*?

A. No.

Q. Is it not a fact that you were the principal person who was accused by the police for circulating false rumours which you now put into the mouths of the mob?

A. No.

Q. I will read out to you a statement made by Hansraj, who was the approver in the Conspiracy case, see if it is correct?

A. Yes, I know Hansraj well.

Q. He stated "The bodies were taken up and we went towards Sultanwind. Chaudhri Bugga, Narain Das Khanna, Rattan Chand Mahasha—he is a witness in this case?"

A. I know what kind of witness he is.

Q. "And Nasir Muhammad, Hakim of Khotawali Galli, Katra Kanhaiya, Dr. Fauq, and Dr. Bashir, Ghulam Muhammad, poet, and myself were making arrangements and taking the crowd along." Is that true?

A. No, I was not making arrangements.

Q. "When we reached the graveyard the Hindus and Muhammadans said their prayers at one place. The Muhammadans brought wood to burn the Hindus on being instructed by Dr. Fauq and Dr. Bashir." Is that true?

A. No.

Q. "While passing Katra Kanhaiya, Dr. Fauq said that he had received good news of the Lahorewala Lal being killed and that the Lahore Fort was in the hands of Indians. The people on hearing this got very excited and began to cry out aloud the *jaïs* for Dr. Kitchlew, Dr. Bashir and Gandhi, and Dr. Satyapal?"

A. That is false, I never passed Katra Kanhaiya at the time.

Q. I only read out to you the statement of the approver Hansraj and I want you to state whether that statement is true or false, that you were implicated by Hansraj as having done these things?

A. No, I did not do what he says.

Q. Are you aware that Dholan Das is considered to be a Government man?

A. I do not know.

Q. You do not know whether he was considered by the mob of Amritsar to be a Government man?

A. The mob said he was, but I have no personal knowledge.

Q. You were present at that meeting and said (or is it not true), that it was Dholan Das that suggested that volunteers should be called and arrangements should be made to keep watch and ward that night?

A. I do not remember that Dholan Das said this.

Q. And that a sub-committee was appointed for this purpose consisting of Lala Dholan Das, Todar Mal, Duni Chand, Dr. Bashir, Kesho Ram, Vakil, Chaudhri Bugga and Ratan Chand; is that true or not?

A. For what?

Q. That no crimes should be committed in the night time. You said you were present and *Satyagrahis* were appointed; was this committee appointed?

A. This sub-committee was proposed, but not approved.

Q. Is it not a fact that it was Lala Dholan Das who suggested that this arrangement should be made?

A. I do not remember that he moved it.

Q. I would like to know whether this statement is correct according to your memory. The approver has said that Lala Dholan Das said a large number of Jats were inside the city, and that volunteers should be sent out in the night for *intizam*?

A. I do not remember.

Q. Was there any speech made by Dina Nath on the 11th at the mosque?

A. Yes.

Q. Was not the purport of the speech that work should be done with soul force as they had no arms? That if bullets were fired at them they should receive them on their breasts?

A. I did not hear these words.

Q. You heard something different?

A. No, he was far away and his voice could not come to me.

Q. About the Ram Naumi affair, was not the union brought about by Drs. Kitchlew, Bashir and Satyapal?

A. There was much union, but I do not know how it was brought about.

Q. Do you think it was genuine or false?

A. It was not genuine.

Q. Why do you say so?

A. Four or five days after there were no signs of that union; so I say it was not genuine.

Q. How did you find that out, there were no signs?

A. That day Hindus and Muhammadans were both drinking water together and eating sweetmeats. On the 12th and the morning of the 13th they were doing that before the proclamation of martial law. I have got certain Hindu friends and they were doing the same thing on the Ram Naumi day.

Q. And on the 13th you offered them food and drink and they refused?

A. Yes.

Q. Then at these meetings that were held at different times was ever, according to you, sedition preached?

A. No; I cannot say that sedition was preached, but those speeches and poems and all that were going on were violently exciting.

Q. Is it not a fact that on account of some very strong recommendations you were saved from being arrested after Hansraj had deposed that you were one of the leaders and taking a prominent part?

A. It is absolutely wrong, I never went to anybody for my recommendations.

Q. Were not people arrested on the 11th?

A. I don't know.

Q. Were you given any notices of martial law on the 13th? Did you see them?

A. No, I was at that time standing in Hall Bazaar, and I heard what was preached. As I went early in the morning on the 14th out of the station, how could I get those notices?

Q. I am talking of the 13th?

A. On the 13th I got a notice and they were distributed among the people.

Q. Were you present?

A. Yes, I was present at the time the notices were distributed.

Q. Is it not a fact that on the 12th a meeting was announced to take place on the 13th?

A. On the 12th at 4, a meeting was already held at Top Katika and in the evening I came to know that on the 13th a meeting would be held in Jallianwala Bagh.

Q. Were you present at that meeting of the 12th at 4 P.M.?

A. Yes, I was there.

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Q. At any rate, this Hansraj said a meeting would be held in Jallianwala Bagh at 4 P.M. the next day?

A. He said a meeting would be held when a letter from Dr. Kitchlew would be read by his wife.

Q. Was it falsely given out by this Hansraj that either on the 12th or 13th Messrs. Kitchlew and Satyapal would address the crowd?

A. Yes, it was falsely given out.

Q. There was a *hartal* on two days. Was it in your opinion spontaneous? Nobody was coerced or threatened, the shop-keepers were asked to close their shops?

A. Yes. They closed their shops; but some of them wanted to open their shops. But they were not allowed by some of the *badmashes* to open their shops.

Q. How many?

A. A fruit-seller with a basket had begun to sell his fruit in the *chauk*, when some 5 or 6 persons came and threw away all his fruits, and after giving him two or three slaps told him that as all the shops in the city were closed, why did he sell his things?

Q. On what date was this?

A. It was on the 12th.

Q. I am talking of the 30th March and 6th April. Did you see any such thing going on on the 30th and 6th?

A. Yes. At that time the *tongawalas* were forced not to hire out their tum-tums. I was going to the railway station and I took a tonga from Hall Bazar and on the way some 20 men came and caught the horses and asked the *tongawalas* to go back. I was then forced to come down and had to go on foot.

Q. Was there *hartal* on the 6th?

A. Yes. There was a general *hartal*.

Q. Did you see any such force used on the 6th?

A. No, I did not.

Q. You are an assistant of Dr. Bashir who had been sentenced in the conspiracy case. How many years did he get?

A. Perhaps 6 years.

Q. He was first sentenced to death?

A. Yes.

Q. Then notwithstanding that you are a friend of Dr. Kitchlew, you still ask the Committee to believe that on the *hartal* day you were forcibly made to alight from the tonga?

A. Yes.

Q. How is it, that if you are not one of the leaders of the crowd, you were present at every important meeting?

A. I have got interest to see these things.

Q. As a philosopher?

A. That is my taste.

Q. Were you not afraid of being molested by the crowd?

A. I had not done anything wrong, why should I be afraid? I was not telling the crowd to do that.

Q. According to you if anybody interfered with the crowd there was no chance of his being molested, leaving aside Europeans?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whether any military came inside the town on the night of the 13th?

A. No. I do not remember.

Q. Do you remember at what press these notices were printed?

A. No.

Q. The Electric Press is inside the city; it is not in the Civil Lines?

A. Yes.

Q. There was nothing to prevent the Electric Press printing these notices on the 11th?

A. If the electric supply was cut off how could the Press print these notices?

Q. Therefore the notices that were circulated and published were not printed at the Electric Press?

A. It might have been so.

Q. Are there any other presses?

A. Yes. There are many presses in the city.

Q. In the Civil Lines?

A. There are none.

Q. Therefore any notices that were printed were printed inside the city?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know that a large number of people were arrested—how many, can you give me an idea?

A. I never went to the Police to find out these things.

Q. Do you know if any bribery and corruption was prevalent during these days?

A. No. I don't know. I simply heard.

Q. What did you hear?

A. That the police took bribes, but I have got no personal knowledge. And I heard that a great amount had been collected in bribes.

Q. Do you know that a large number of traders from Katra were brought to the Kotwali and made to remain there for the whole day?

A. I heard so. I did not see them.

Q. Do you know how many persons were made to crawl? As you are very fond of seeing what was happening you must know?

A. No. I don't know.

Q. When you came back on the 22nd April were you afraid of the part that was ascribed to you by Hansraj? Why did you leave this city?

A. I was never made afraid by such false things. I left the city because there was a marriage ceremony of my sister at Batala.

Q. On the 12th you say there was no visible authority. What did you do? You did not see any police inside the city?

A. On the electric post there were some posters affixed. Upon these posters were some words of an exciting nature. For instance, on one poster the following was written: "Oh people, if Dr. Satyapal and Dr. Kitchlew had been killed, we will get four times as large than those who had been killed. Come and help us. Our leaders have been killed."

I saw such like posters on different electric posts beginning from Hall Bazar and passing through Katra.

Q. On the 12th you went round the city in the morning and saw these posters. You know the wording of these posters very well. How many times did you read them?

A. I have brains to remember these things.

Q. Did you see anything else?

A. I heard people talking that Lahore Fort had been taken.

Q. Except these seditious posters there was nothing unusual?

A. That was unusual—people wandering in the bazar without any work.

Q. Was it not *hartal* day?

A. I think a *hartal* unusual.

Q. On the 12th?

A. Yes, there was a *hartal*.

Q. There was a *hartal* and people were wandering about and you saw nothing else beyond those posters, and on these two grounds you say that there was no authority in Amritsar city?

A. I have already said that the people were saying that the Lahore Fort had been taken.

Q. You were inciting the people?

A. No, I was not; I was only seeing the people.

Q. Then was this the first time you heard this and similar misrepresentations in the city? Or did you hear these things previously too?

A. That was the first time.

Q. How many months before did you hear these rumours?

A. These rumours were spread on the 10th and 11th.

Q. Not before that? How many months previous to the 10th of April?

A. I first began to hear them about the middle of February.

Q. You were not able to find out who was responsible for these rumours?

A. No. There was no particular man.

Q. Were you able to find out whether these rumours were only confined to Amritsar or were they spread all over the country?

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Dr. MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH FAUQ.

[Concluded.]

A. When I went to Batala in March I heard these rumours too.

Q. From the middle of February?

A. Yes.

Q. Before the stones were thrown by the mob and before they were fired upon, you did not hear the mob saying anything from which you could infer that they would go and molest the Deputy Commissioner?

A. No; I did not hear any remark, but when these officers retreated from the bridge the mob gave cheers and shouted "*Daur gaya, daur gaya*." [He has run away.]

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. When General Dyer's proclamation was being read out on the 13th prohibiting meetings being held was there any counter-proclamation announced?

A. At that time people said they may do whatever they like, but we must hold a meeting at Jallianwala Bagh.

Q. When?

A. Before the meeting on the 13th.

Q. You took two of the wounded to Dr. Bashir's house. Is that anywhere in the vicinity of the Municipal Zenana Hospital?

A. No. That is another side.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You say that when the proclamation prohibiting the meeting was read out the people said: "Let them do what they will, we will hold a meeting." At what place did you hear this?

A. I heard the proclamation near the Kotwali, and when the procession proceeded forward some young gentlemen spoke these words.

Q. You heard this at the Kotwali?

A. Near the Kotwali.

Q. You were present only when the proclamation was read out near the Kotwali?

A. Yes.

Q. And after the party had proceeded to some distance one gentleman told you this?

Q. Not one. There were some twenty or twenty-five men who made this remark. It was a general remark made by them all.

19 November 1919.]

Brigdr.-Genl. R. E. H. DYER.

At Lahore, Thursday, the 19th November 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Rai Bahadur G. K. Roy, Superintendent (Acting for Secretary).

Brigadier General R. E. H. DYER, C.B., Commanding 45th Brigade.

By the President—

General Dyer, were you in April in command of the 45th Brigade?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you in Jullundur when you heard of the disturbances in Amritsar?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you ascertain that a military force had been sent from Jullundur to Amritsar?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When was that force sent?

A. On the night of the 10th and 11th. It was 1 o'clock in the morning of the 11th April.

Q. But prior to that a small force had been sent?

A. Yes, a small force had been sent prior to that.

Q. Then on the 10th, did you receive a telegram from Lahore saying that trouble had arisen in Amritsar?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In consequence of that trouble, was a force sent?

A. A force was sent.

Q. That force consisted of 100 British and 200 Indians?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was that not somewhat in excess of what you had been asked to send?

A. As far as I remember, it was in excess of what they had asked me to send; I sent more Indian troops.

Q. Why did you send the troops in excess?

A. From what I heard it seemed the position was very dangerous. I had a very large force at Jullundur which could have been easily spared, but I thought no harm would be done if I sent some more troops than had been asked for in view of the situation. Amritsar was also in my command then.

Q. A little after 5, did you get a further telegram explaining the situation at Amritsar and informing you of the murder of certain Europeans?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. After that, I think the troops left by 1 in the morning of the 11th?

A. Yes, 1 o'clock, I think it was, 1 o'clock in the morning as far as I remember.

Q. That was after both the telegrams were received?

A. Yes, after both the telegrams were received.

Q. At the time the troops left, in what state was the communication between Amritsar and Jullundur?

A. We had to wire in a roundabout way as far as I can remember because the ordinary telegraph had been cut. We had to go to the railway station and we got through in a roundabout way.

Q. Then on the 11th, about 2 P.M., did you receive a telegram asking you to proceed personally to Amritsar?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. With what object?

A. It was under my command, and the Divisional Commander perhaps thought that I ought to be there.

Q. Did you see the Commissioner at Jullundur, and after seeing him come to the conclusion that you ought to proceed to Amritsar?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you go by motor car?

A. Yes, I went by motor car.

Q. When did you arrive at Amritsar?

A. I could not say exactly. I think it was about 9 or 9-30, it was night time anyway.

Q. At that time the headquarters of the Amritsar garrison was at the Amritsar railway station?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you see Mr. Miles Irving, the Deputy Commissioner, and Mr. Plomer?

A. They were both at the Railway Station.

Q. Did you have a conference with them in the railway camp?

A. Yes.

Q. What information did you receive from Mr. Miles Irving?

A. He said he could not deal with the situation any longer, that it was beyond all civil control, and that I could take matters in hand.

Q. I would like you to explain to me what you understood your position to be in consequence of Mr. Miles Irving's request to you?

A. Roughly speaking, I understood the position to be that civil law was at an end and that military law would have to take its place for the time being.

Q. Is there any provision for such a situation on the assumption that martial law was not to be proclaimed?

A. A situation may arise like that. It was necessary for me to act without the actual declaration of war or martial law.

Q. But as long as the civil authority exists in a town, are you not in the position of giving them assistance rather than of superseding them?

A. In ordinary cases, yes; but in the extraordinary case it was handed to me, the power was placed in my hands.

Q. Was it your opinion that that relieved you of any necessity of consulting Mr. Miles Irving as the civil authority in the district?

A. I think it relieved me of that. At the same time I did consult him as far as I remember on all questions.

Q. Now, did you on the 11th proceed into the city?

A. Yes, I went at night. It may have been the 11th by that time or the 12th; it was on that night.

Q. You proceeded then to the Kotwali and saw Mr. Ashraf Khan?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. After you saw Mr. Ashraf Khan, did you return to the station?

A. Yes, Sir. I brought him back.

Q. Was there a further conference then held?

A. Yes, Sir.

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[Continued.]

Q. Then did you during the night proceed to re-organize your troops?

A. I re-organized my troops.

Q. On what lines?

A. I thought the pickets were too strong, and I wanted a larger striking force in case of necessity, so I did what I thought was right from a military point of view as regards re-organizing the troops. I did not think the railway station was a good place for headquarters. I thought Ram Bagh would be better.

Q. Had you personally gone to the Kotwali that night?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you see any sign of the mob?

A. There was no mob, but I think, as far as I can recollect, I saw the fires smouldering there still.

Q. Then did you after the second conference resolve to remove your headquarters to Ram Bagh?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Is that in the city itself?

A. No, Sir. It is near the city, not very far from the city.

Q. Then later, on the morning of the 12th, did you proceed through the city with a column of all the available troops?

A. We went round the city towards Sultanwind Gate and then I proceeded through the city from there.

Q. What military force had you? Did it consist of 125 British and 310 Indians and two armoured cars?

A. Yes, Sir. That is about right.

Q. Did you proceed through the city to the places where you got reports as to mobs collecting?

A. There was a mob at the Sultanwind Gate. We had a little difficulty in dispersing them. They would not go away. So I considered the advisability of opening fire on them. I thought it would not be quite right and that perhaps I had better issue a proclamation personally before I took that drastic measure.

Q. Were you in touch with any aeroplane at this time?

A. No, Sir. There was an aeroplane reporting now and then, but it was not actually under my command. It usually came from Lahore.

Q. That aeroplane which had come from Lahore gave you reports as to the situation of the crowds in the town and the city?

A. Yes, Sir, they gave me all the information about what was going on.

Q. On the occasion of this march through the city, in what condition did you find it as regards the crowds and so on?

A. I found them very insolent, Sir.

Q. In what respect did they show their insolence?

A. They were shouting the cry of *Hindu-Musliman ki jai*. I asked them to go away, but they would not move off, and a certain number of people spat on the ground as we passed along on various occasions which was noticed by my Brigade-Major.

Q. Did you see any act of violence committed on that occasion?

A. No, Sir.

Q. During that day, were certain arrests made by the police?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were they made under military protection?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You referred to a proclamation.* I think you had a proclamation prepared which appears in the Appendix to the report which you sent to the General Staff on the 25th August?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Referring to that proclamation, I see it is in the following terms:—"The inhabitants of Amritsar are hereby warned that if they will cause damage to any property or will commit any acts of violence in the environments of Amritsar, it will be taken for granted that such acts have been committed in the Amritsar City itself and the offenders will be punished according to military law. All meetings and gatherings are

* Vide Appendix No. II, Proclamation No. 1, notice page 212.

hereby prohibited and will be dispersed at once under military law." Who prepared that proclamation?

A. I should think that was done by my Brigade-Major and read to me or I may have dictated it to him and he wrote it.

Q. That was prepared on the evening of the 12th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. How was it issued?

A. Through the police, I believe.

Q. Do you know whether any measures were taken to ensure its publication to the citizens?

A. No, I can't say. Most likely I was informed that it had been proclaimed but I cannot say for certain.

Q. Would you explain to me what is meant by dispersing a crowd under military law?

A. You have to send them away, and they have to clear out.

Q. According to military law, if you require to disperse a crowd must you or must you not give them intimation that they are required to disperse before you resort to the measure of firing?

A. You should warn them that if they do collect they will be dispersed.

Q. According to military law, would it or would it not be right to fire upon a crowd without giving proper intimation to the crowd as to the necessity of this course?

A. If they have already had orders to clear out, it would be right.

Q. About this time did you get any information as to the collection of certain people outside the city?

A. I had information that evening that the crowds were likely to collect and loot the city, I was told the *Manja* Sikhs would collect.Q. Who are these *Manja* Sikhs and Jats?A. They are villagers. The *Manja* Sikhs are largely recruited in regiments and so on.

Q. Your view was there was serious danger of their engaging themselves in looting in the city?

A. Yes, Sir. Very much so.

Q. On that evening about 10 o'clock, was a party of British troops sent to Asrafa Mission Hospital?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was that with a view to rescue certain Missionary ladies who were calling for help?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you also receive messages from other places indicative of great unrest in the neighbourhood?

A. Verbal messages and others. I could not write them all down because I had to write my reports many months later. I had a great deal of work to do. I did not note down all the messages that were constantly coming in, but I know I was constantly hearing rumours and messages all throughout the 12th and the morning of the 13th that the situation was growing more serious every moment.

Q. Among the places from which you had messages were Dhariwal, Gurdaspur, Tarn Taran, Lahore and Kasur?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In consequence of these messages, were troops sent from Amritsar?

A. As far as I remember, I believe I did send troops.

Q. Then on the morning of the 13th, you formed a resolution as to yourself making a proclamation in the city.

A. I went through personally.

Q. At what time did you start to make your proclamation?

A. It was morning, Sir. I do not exactly remember what time it was. It may have been 9-30, or it may have been a little later.

Q. How long did you occupy in making the proclamation?

A. It was a long time. I may have been there two or three hours perhaps.

Q. Had you completed your proclamation before lunch time?

A. As far as I was concerned, I came away. It may have gone on after I left.

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[Continued.]

Q. The proclamation, I think, was in fact made by a witness who has already given testimony to us?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did he in his evidence indicate all the different parts of the city at which the proclamation was read, or were there other places where it was in fact read?

A. I believe it was properly read. I did not hear it every time. I believe it was thoroughly explained. It took a fairly long time every time.

Q. What I want to know is this. Are you aware of any other places than the places mentioned by him where the proclamation was in fact read and explained to the people who were brought together, as I understand, by the beating of the drum?

A. A drum was beaten. I did not quite understand them, Sir. I was only with him.

Q. Perhaps you did not get yourself acquainted with the names of the places?

A. No, Sir.

Q. You did not go through the whole city?

A. I went to a good many places. I did not know Amritsar city well, so I could not say whether I went to any other quarter.

Q. In this connection it might be well, I think, that a map should be put in with a red line showing the route which you took in issuing the proclamation.

(At this stage the Government Advocate handed up a map to the President.)

(The President.—Here is a map handed to me which indicates the routes that you took and the different places where the proclamation was read. Now if you look at the map, is it not evident that in many parts of the city the proclamation was not read at all.)

(Here the General went up to the President and examined the map.)

A. Yes, it would look like that.

Q. The Proclamation* that was in fact read on this occasion was as mentioned in what appears in Appendix III to your Report, and that is in these terms:—"It is hereby proclaimed to all whom it may concern that no person residing in the city is permitted or allowed to leave the city in his own or hired conveyance or on foot without a pass from one of the following." Then it proceeds—"No person residing in the Amritsar city is permitted to leave his house after 8. Any persons found in the streets after 8 are liable to be shot. No procession of any kind is permitted to parade the streets in the city or any part of the city or outside of it at any time. Any such processions or any gatherings of four men would be looked upon and treated as an unlawful assembly and dispersed by force of arms if necessary." What is the significance of the qualification "if necessary"?

A. Well, I thought it necessary, it may not always be necessary.

Q. Does that mean or does it not mean that if you come upon a large meeting of people, you would first ask them to disperse and would then only fire if you found that they refused to disperse after your personally requesting them to do so?

A. It all depends on the circumstances. If I had told them to disperse and they had refused to do so, I should think that I would be quite justified in dispersing them by force of arms, because they had defied my authority, and it would not be necessary in my opinion to say to them any more.

Q. During the time when the Proclamation was being issued, did you hear any ejaculations made by the crowd with reference to your Proclamation?

A. I heard a good deal of noise going on in front and a little behind. I could not always hear what they said.

Q. Can you personally testify to any distinct utterance made by the crowd during the period of your issuing the Proclamation?

A. I could see that they were laughing and that they were not behaving very well evidently. I was told that they were saying "this is all bluff, he won't fire," "not to be afraid" and words to that effect.

* Vide Appendix No. III, Proclamation No. 2, page 212.

Q. When did you get information that a meeting will assemble at the Jallianwala Bagh?

A. I was in the city at the time; I cannot quite say what time it was; it may have been from 1-30 to 2 o'clock.

Q. I see in the report you say that "At 12-40 P.M. whilst yet in the city, on my way to the Rambagh, I was informed that in spite of my stern Proclamation a big meeting would be held at the Jallianwala Bagh at 4-30 P.M. that afternoon."

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. On the assumption that that is correct I want you to explain why you did not take measures for preventing the crowd from assembling at all at the Bagh?

A. I went there as soon as I could. I had to think the matter out. I had to organize my forces and make up my mind as to where I might put my pickets. I thought I had done enough to make the crowd not meet, if they were going to meet. I had to consider the military situation and make up my mind as to what to do, which took me a certain amount of time. I had warned them all day, that is, up to the time I went to Rambagh.

Q. When did you first receive definite information that a meeting was being held at Jallianwala Bagh?

A. About 4 o'clock.

Q. From Mr. Rehill?

A. Yes.

Q. When you received that information, what action did you take?

A. I marched off through the city.

Q. Had you with you picketing parties?

A. I had the picketing parties for marching off, and all marched off together.

Q. And your special party consisted of 25 Rifles of the Gurkhas and 25 Rifles of the Sikhs?

A. There were 40 other rifles of Gurkhas.

Q. And you also had two armoured cars?

A. Yes.

Q. Were these all the troops you had available for big reserves?

A. Every available man, after providing for other things.

Q. As I understand, you proceeded to the Jallianwala Bagh at a usual pace?

A. At an ordinary walking pace.

Q. You did not consider any necessity for proceeding with any extra expedition?

A. No, Sir.

Q. As you marched, the parties that were with you all dropped out?

A. They all dropped out, as they marched along. Some had to go in one direction and some in another. As we marched they took the most convenient road and they left us.

Q. As nearly as you can recollect, at what time did you reach the Jallianwala Bagh?

A. I shall think about 5 or 5-15, perhaps; I could not say; I do not know the time.

Q. When you arrived at the Jallianwala Bagh, what did you do?

A. I deployed my troops right and left of the entrance.

Q. Afterwards you entered by the narrow entrance that leads into the Jallianwala Bagh. I think you left your motor cars behind?

A. I left the motor cars behind.

Q. Did you have the Gurkhas, who were armed, with you?

A. They all came in and went to the Bagh.

Q. You had 40 Gurkhas and 2 columns of 25 men each, these fifty men being armed with rifles? That is, on the high ground, that is on the north side, that rectangular space that goes by the name of Jallianwala Bagh?

A. Yes.

Q. That is a very wide piece of ground, and has very few exits?

A. I think three or four exits. There is one wide exit.

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[Continued.]

Q. When you got into the Jallianwala Bagh what did you do?

A. I opened fire.

Q. At once?

A. Immediately I had thought about the matter, and it did not take me more than 30 seconds to make up my mind as to what my duty was.

Q. As regards the crowd, what was it doing at the time?

A. Holding a meeting. There was a man in the centre of the place standing on something raised. You could see him above the crowd. His arms were moving about; he was evidently addressing a meeting.

Q. How far was the nearest man in the crowd from you?

A. When I entered first, about 8 or 9 yards off the wall; he ran away to the right, and there were a good many others who ran away and climbed over the wall there.

Q. As I understand the Jallianwala Bagh, at a distance of something like 100 yards from the raised ground? Do I understand where you stationed armed soldiers there is a small ridge? Where was the man who was addressing the crowd standing?

A. He was absolutely in the centre of the section, as far as one could judge; may be within 50 or 60 yards from me. He seemed to be surrounded by them; but most of them were on the further side.

Q. So far as you know, was there any crying except this man's addressing the crowd?

A. No; I cannot say there was anything beyond that he was addressing the crowd.

Q. How many people were there in the crowd?

A. I then estimated it at 5,000. I heard there were many more.

Q. On the assumption that there was a crowd of something like 5,000 and more, have you any doubt that many of these people must have been unaware of your Proclamation?

A. It was being well issued and news spread very rapidly in places like that under prevailing conditions. At the same time, there may have been a good many who had not heard the Proclamation.

Q. On the assumption that there was that risk of people being in the crowd who were not aware of the Proclamation, did it not occur to you that it was a proper measure to ask the crowd to disperse before you took to actually firing upon them?

A. No, at the time it did not occur to me. I merely felt that my orders had not been obeyed, that martial law was flouted, and that it was my duty to immediately disperse it by rifle fire.

Q. Before you dispersed the crowd, had the crowd taken any action at all?

A. No, Sir. They ran away, a few of them. When I began to fire in the centre they began to run to the road.

Q. Martial law had not been proclaimed before you took that step, which was a serious step. Did you consider about the propriety of consulting the Deputy Commissioner who was the civil authority responsible for law and order?

A. There was no Deputy Commissioner there to consult at the time. I did not think it wise to ask anybody further. I had to make up my mind immediately as to what my action should be. I considered it from a military view that I should fire immediately, that if I did not do so, I should fail in my duty.

Q. When you left the Rambagh did it occur to you that you were going to fire if you found an assembly there?

A. I considered well the nature of my duty.

Q. Did not you think it proper to have a Civil Representative with you before you took that action?

A. I had a police officer with me.

Q. Who was that?

A. Mr. Rehill; Mr. Plomer.

Q. As I understand, Mr. Rehill and Mr. Plomer came on the scene after you actually fired?

A. I think Mr. Rehill was there actually while the firing was going on.

Q. During the whole time?

A. I do not know whether he was there the whole time. He was looking after the troops; but I saw him there. I did not wait long after the firing.

Q. Before firing, did you ask Mr. Rehill whether in his judgment it was necessary to fire?

A. No, Sir. My mind was made up as I came along in my motor car—if my orders were not obeyed, I would fire immediately.

Q. In firing was your object to disperse the crowd?

A. Yes.

Q. Any other object?

A. No, Sir. I was going to fire until they dispersed.

Q. Did the crowd at once start to disperse as soon as you fired?

A. Immediately.

Q. Did you continue firing?

A. Yes.

Q. If the crowd was going to disperse, why did you not stop firing?

A. I thought it my duty to go on firing until it dispersed. If I fired a little, the effect would not be sufficient. If I had fired a little I should be wrong in firing at all.

Q. How long did the firing go on?

A. It may be 10 minutes; it may be less, calculating from the number of rounds that we fired.

Q. Could you say whether there were any sticks with the people?

A. I cannot say that. I assume numbers had sticks. I knew they were going to be armed with sticks.

Q. Have you ever, in your military experience, used a similar method of dispersing an assembly?

A. Never, Sir. It was an exceptional case.

Q. What reason had you to suppose that if you had ordered the assembly to leave the Bagh they would not have done so without the necessity of your firing, continued firing for a length of time?

A. Yes; I think it quite possible that I could have dispersed them perhaps even without firing.

Q. Why did you not adopt that course?

A. I could not disperse them for some time; then they would all come back and laugh at me, and I considered I would be making myself a fool.

Q. In your view the situation was a very serious one?

A. Very serious indeed, Sir.

Q. Had you had any communications from other places than Amritsar indicating serious rioting?

A. Yes.

Q. As far as I see, in Appendix V,* the first 8 messages were received previous to the 13th of April. You will see on page 13 the first message is dated—By Aeroplane 12th April, informing "Telegraph line reported cut this morning between Cantonment East and Harbanspura. Lahore quiet. Kasur reports at 06-10. Armour train visited Khem Karan during night and found Station wrecked but no casualties. Rioters in small numbers apparently organised for destruction left in direction of Sulej. Train patrolled two stations beyond and all quiet, so returned to Kasur." On the same day you had a telegraph from the Telegraph Master stating—

"Regret to report all telegraph wires between Lahore and Amritsar are cut from 11-15 P.M. last night, and the line party sent at 1-20 A.M. this morning are still at the Railway Station with the Armoured Train which was supposed to proceed to Attari this morning, where the wires are probably cut. When communication restored your wire will be despatched."

Then another telegram indicating that there is sudden disconnection on all lines in Amritsar and Lahore. Again, you have a communication that rioters had attacked the Station at Kasur at 9-58 and the two European representatives in the train had been badly injured. Then a further wire. Then you had a communication on the 18th from Mr. Miles Irving that

* Vide page 212.

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[Continued.]

secret meetings had taken place in certain plantations near the Rambagh; and on the 13th further information from the armoured car as regards the situation, and also from the Traffic Superintendent. What decision did these different communications lead you to as regards the general state of the district?

A. I thought they were trying to isolate me and my forces. Every thing pointed to the fact that there was a widespread movement, and that it was not confined to Amritsar alone. I looked upon these men as rebels who were trying to isolate my forces and cut me off from other supplies. Therefore I considered it my duty to fire on them and to fire well.

Q. Was there any other circumstance that weighed with you when you took your decision to fire?

A. No; I looked upon it as my duty, a very horrible duty.

Q. After the firing had taken place I think you returned with your troops to the Rambagh?

A. Yes.

Q. And on examining the ammunition, you discovered that 1,650 rounds had been fired?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know the casualties imposed by the firing?

A. No; I formed a rough estimate from the number of rounds. I calculated that number to be 800. There would be more than that of casualties.

Q. You know that the casualties were something between 400 and 500?

A. Yes; I have seen it in the papers. I divided all my rounds by 5—I am in doubt whether by 5 or 6—to arrive at the number.

Q. I understood that the shooting that took place was individual shooting, and it was not volley shooting?

A. No; there was no volley shooting.

Q. The crowd was very dense?

A. It was very dense.

Q. It was unlikely that a man shooting into the crowd will miss?

A. No, according to the circumstances of the case. They were running, and I noticed only a certain number of men were hit. In the centre of the section, the crowd was very dense and therefore if a man directed his fire well he should not miss.

Q. So that it is not impossible that the number of deaths may have been 400 or 500 from the number of rounds that were fired?

A. Quite possible.

Q. As regards the removal of the wounded, were your force in a position to render any aid in that way?

A. No, Sir. I could render aid, but I had to consider the situation. It was a medical question afterwards.

Q. Next day I think you issued a Proclamation with reference to the burning of the dead?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. After the firing what was the state of the city?

A. On the same night you mean, Sir?

Q. On the 14th?

A. I went throughout the city at night to see if my orders had been carried out. I visited the pickets to see that all was secure.

Q. Martial law, I think, was actually proclaimed on the 15th at Amritsar?

A. I believe on the 15th. May be later perhaps; I cannot remember.

Q. Under martial law a number of orders were issued?

A. Yes.

Q. Both before and after the proclamation of the martial law?

A. Yes, Sir. As far as I remember, there must be an order every day.

Q. Who would be responsible for the actual shooting and the orders?

A. I am responsible for the orders; they may be issued by my Brigade Major, but I am responsible.

Q. In the action of restoring order I think you had drafted the pleaders of the city as special constables? What was your object in taking that action?

A. Well; they knew the law, they knew the city as well as other men. They were lawyers. Therefore I

looked upon them as quite useful men to bring up men who were not obeying the law to justice.

Q. Did the special constables report anything to you?

A. They were to report three times a day to me.

Q. The regulations you issued with reference to the special constables are contained in one of your appendices. Appendix VII defines the different duties imposed upon the special constables. Was any complaint made to you by the special constables as to their being enrolled or as to the nature of the duties that you imposed upon them?

A. I do not think they complained; I do not remember their complaining. They did very good work and liked it better and better as I understood.

Q. Then I think you placed a picket of Gurkhas at the Kotwali for helping the police in carrying out their duties?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that a necessary measure?

A. I thought they might want help.

Q. By the ordinary duties of the people, what do you mean? Was it arresting people?

A. It was the daily duties, and any other duties that might be given.

Q. To protect them from the crowd?

A. If called upon.

Q. I think you also invited those who knew of acts of bribery or corruption to report to you personally?

A. Because I thought I had better hear what they had to say; I heard there was a good deal of bribery and corruption going on, and I thought it good to make them come to me personally and let me know what was going on.

Q. Bribery and corruption among whom?

A. The police.

Q. Did you have complaints made to you of bribery and corruption?

A. No, Sir; they did not come forward.

Q. I see in your report you say that the city very quickly assumed normal conditions, and there was law and order?

A. Yes, Sir; there was no crime absolutely.

Q. If that was so, was it necessary that martial law should be proclaimed on the 15th?

A. Martial law was proclaimed, but I think they were getting better, and I relaxed the conditions of martial law as they improved.

Q. Your view of course was that martial law had *de facto* been in existence from your arrival?

A. Absolutely it had the same effect.

Q. Did you on the morning of the 14th receive information that another meeting was to be held?

A. Yes, Sir. In the Golden Temple.

Q. What significance did you attach to that?

A. I thought that I might have to fire again to send the mob out, and that if I did so, we should have all the Sikhs complaining that I had destroyed the Golden Temple. Without any firing, rumours were going round that I had destroyed the Golden Temple. Therefore if I fired on it, there would be proof that I had destroyed the Golden Temple according to that.

Q. There was, of course, no truth that the Golden Temple had in any way been touched?

A. No, never; it was not touched in the least. I sent for Arur Singh Majithia and Sundar Singh Majithia, because one was the Manager of the Golden Temple and the other, I understand was a very influential Sikh. I asked them not to allow these rumours, and if they wanted help, I should be glad to help them.

Q. What was the attitude of the Sikhs throughout these disturbances?

A. I should think they wanted law, but I was afraid that unless we did something in the way of going round, they might join in anything.

Q. After your interview with these representative Sikhs, what position did the Sikhs take up?

A. I think they were all out to help me. All the Indian Officers that I saw—I saw Arur Singh Majithia, and also the Mahant—came round and offered to help me. I asked them whether they thought it would be a good thing to go round and have a talk with the vil-

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[Continued.]

lagers, and they thought that it would be an excellent thing.

Q. When you referred to the Sikhs being out for loot, you had meant that there were Sikh elements that might have resorted to loot. You did not refer to the Sikh population generally?

A. I am not certain that they were not in it as regards destroying the Railway line and that kind of thing. But I think the main idea of the majority of them was, probably, to loot.

Q. You mean the villagers then who were near?

A. I think the villagers were out for loot and also to do other destruction if the British Raj had really failed.

Q. Is it the villagers that you mentioned as regards the Sikhs being out for loot?

A. All the villagers are not Sikhs, Sir. The majority of them are Sikhs.

Q. The attitude of the Sikh officers and the Sikh soldiers, I understand, was unexceptionable?

A. They were all out to help me.

Q. Had some nasty rumours been set afloat as regards your action or the conduct of your troops with reference to Sikhs?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you take means to dispel these rumours?

A. I had to dispel them, so I went round.

Q. You were satisfied that there was no truth in any of them?

A. Absolutely no truth.

Q. I think it was on the same day, i.e., the 14th, that you had a meeting in connection with the opening of shops?

A. Yes, Sir. I remember.

Q. The shops were in fact open?

A. I think they opened on the 14th after the meeting.

Q. There was a Proclamation which was issued in that connection, which we find referred to in Appendix IX?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On the 21st, you proceeded with a movable column, I think, to a certain place in the vicinity of Gurdaspur?

A. Yes.

Q. When did you first start a movable column?

A. I think it was on the 21st.

Q. What were the duties to be performed by the column?

A. I wanted to show that I had a good force in hand, that the Sarkar was not helpless, and that they were not to listen to lies.

Q. I see your report about the movable column in Appendix XI,* where you say that a movable column under Captain Drake proceeded to Gurdaspur, they were met by the Deputy Commissioner, and so on. A list of pleaders who had taken active part was obtained.

The duties then, as I understand, of the column were practically to show that there was military force available to maintain law and order, if necessary?

A. Yes, Sir. Also there were great numbers of lies being circulated. They had to try to prove to them that those were lies.

Q. Part of their duty consisted in propaganda work?

A. More or less in that way.

Q. How was the propaganda work performed by the movable column?

A. I simply held a Durbar and I told them what I thought. Then usually after that either the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Miles Irving, or the Mahant made a speech and explained. He usually explained about false rumours, and after that we went away.

Q. I think you held a large Durbar at various places?

A. Yes.

Q. You sent out a second column on the 24th April?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You went with it yourself?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. The column visited a number of places and in Appendix XII,† there is a diary of the column showing the work that was done by it?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On the 28th April, I think, you proceeded with the assistance of the Commissioner to Sursingh where the movable column had arrived? Was that a particularly disaffected village?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you address the heads of the village?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In addressing the heads of the village, you might indicate what sort of language you used. What did you indicate to them?

A. That a lot of lies were afloat and that they were not to believe these lies, that the British Raj was not over, that I had not destroyed the Golden Temple and that I had not allowed other wicked actions to take place, and so on.

Q. In your opinion what was the effect of the Movable Columns?

A. I was told it was very good indeed wherever I went.

Q. Did you form any opinion from the demeanour of the inhabitants in the villages as to whether they were likely to be engaged in looting if you had not made indication that force was available to prevent it? When you visited these villages, did you form any opinion as to whether the inhabitants might have looted Amritsar or the district if you had not made an exhibition of force?

A. On the columns, I did not see any exhibition, because everybody was now loyal all that time; but there were men at Attari, I believe, who had looted actually in their houses. Whether they took it themselves, or whether they bought it, I do not know.

Q. In connection with the work performed by those columns, were you largely assisted by Indian officers?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On the 29th April was there a meeting of Brigadiers held at the Divisional Commander's house at Lahore at which the danger of agitators getting at the Indian Army was discussed?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were any cases of attempts made to undermine the loyalty of the troops brought to your notice?

A. There were a good many rumours, and I was informed that the citizens of Amritsar had been giving my sepoy sweets and so on with a view to getting at them. Beyond that I did not see anything among the troops. When they were ordered to fire, they fired; I could not see anything among the troops beyond that.

Q. At this meeting, I think you also discussed the question of resorting to the Internal Security Scheme?

A. Yes, Sir. We had to be prepared for all emergencies, we discussed.

Q. On the 30th, did you proceed to Jullundur? There was a conference of Officers Commanding the Units and Indian officers?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. At that meeting what information did you get as to the attitude of the Indian troops generally?

A. They said that they were absolutely loyal and that they did not approve of what was going on.

Q. I think when the trouble arose in Afghanistan, you had an offer of 10,000 men from the Sikhs?

A. Yes; they said they would give 10,000 Sikhs.

Q. At what time do you say Amritsar became normal after the 13th of April?

A. Very shortly after. The good efforts of the bar-risters and the pleaders and the police all brought it right.

Q. I think martial law was continued for a considerable time?

A. It was.

Q. Was it continued until the 6th of June?

A. I went away; I believe it was up to 6th June.

Q. When did you go away?

A. Sometime in May. I had also been round the districts a good deal; so I was not very much at Amritsar after that.

Q. I think you first heard of the trouble in Afghanistan about the 4th of May?

A. I think it was about that time.

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Q. In connection with the Military situation, would it have been a serious matter if the communications of the Punjab, the Railways and Telegraph had been seriously interfered with.

A. Most extraordinarily inconvenient, almost a disaster you might call it.

Q. When you left, who took over command?

A. I handed over to Colonel Hynes of the 1/25th London Regiment.

Q. You got a letter that you refer to in page 7 of this report,* as regards paragraph (iii) A of the above quoted letter. That is the letter from the General Staff?

A. That was a letter, I think, from the Adjutant-General through the Divisional Commander. The reference to it is at the head. I have not got that letter with me.

Q. I think that refers to the question of flogging. There were a number of floggings?

A. Yes; there were, I think, 25 in all, so far as I remember.

Q. As regards flogging, that is a form of punishment that is recognised in the Army?

A. Yes, after martial law specially.

Q. What do you think about public flogging as contrasted with flogging in private?

A. As a soldier, when we lash a man, he is lashed in public. The whole regiment parades there. The victim is lashed in public with a view to making an impression on other wrong-doers or would-be wrong-doers.

Q. Is it for the maintenance of discipline in the Army?

A. Quite so.

Q. You had the same reason for flogging civilians under martial law?

A. Yes, I looked upon it as the same. It would make a good impression under martial law.

Q. Of course according to the old civil law, these things used to occur in public. But for many years, they have not taken place.

A. I do not think I have whipped anyone in public. It was not due to me that I did not, but I was ordered not to. So I took down what I looked upon as a platform for public lashings. I never lashed anybody on it.

Q. Then these people were whipped in the street where Miss Sherwood was attacked?

A. Both ends of the street were closed. I did not look upon it as a public thoroughfare.

Q. I suppose people could come from the ends of the street for seeing?

A. If they liked to come there, they would have seen.

Q. And the people who were living in the street could see?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Would it not have been better if these whippings had taken place in private?

A. I cannot see it, Sir.

Q. So far as the inhabitants of the street were concerned, why should they in fact see the flogging? Why should the floggings have taken place in their neighbourhood?

A. I think the population of Amritsar is about 70,000, as far as I know.

Q. It is a good deal more than that. I think about 1,60,000.

A. All the crowds who were present both at the firing and in other places—it looked as if the majority of these men were in it, I would not say the majority, but a very great number—were rebellious.

Q. Surely, General, you must admit that in a large population like 1,60,000, there must have been many citizens who would not disperse, but who were quite willing to obey a lawful order?

A. They were not allowed to by some of the men.

Q. Therefore there was an unruly minority that you had to get the mastery of?

* See page 205.

A. Unfortunately for them, owing to the wicked acts of others, they came under martial law; and if they had to look at things like that, it may have been unfortunate, but under martial law, it could not be helped.

Q. In administering martial law, must you not as far as possible see that you do not permanently alienate the people or put them out of sympathy with the administration?

A. Quite so. I think we have to make examples; these men were doing wrong in spite of everything.

Q. In making examples, mustn't you, as far as possible, see that you do not condemn the innocent at the same time that you are punishing the guilty?

A. I do not see that I was condemning the innocent.

Q. Take your order as regards crawling in that street. What was your object in passing that?

A. I have explained that in my statement. I felt a woman had been beaten. We look upon women as sacred or ought to. I was searching my brain for a suitable punishment to meet this awful case. I did not know how to meet it in a suitable manner. There was a little bit of accident in that. When I posted the pickets I went down and I ordered a triangle to be erected. I felt the street ought to be looked upon as sacred. Therefore I posted a couple of pickets and I told them that no Indians were to pass along there.

I then also said that if they had to pass, they must go on all fours. It never entered my brain that any sensible or sane man under those conditions would intentionally go through that street.

Q. You promulgated that order, I understand on the 19th or 20th April and the assault was committed on the 10th of April. Your object was to punish those who were guilty of this assault and so far as possible to avoid punishing those who might be innocent?

A. Yes.

Q. This street where you issued this proclamation was a street where there are many houses abutting. Is it not so?

A. A good many houses on both sides of it.

Q. As I understand, there are many houses that have no back entrances at all?

A. I was not aware of that at the time.

Q. If it be the case that many of the houses have no back entrances what justification is there for pronouncing an order that necessitated the inhabitants lawfully residing in these houses to crawl on all fours when they had to leave their homes?

A. They could leave at other times. My picket was only there from 6 A.M. to 8 P.M. I do not think it a very great inconvenience for them if they had to suffer a little for all that Amritsar had done. I thought it would do no harm under martial law. They could easily get the necessities of life by other means. It would not have taken much ingenuity to improvise other means of getting necessary things. They might have to suffer a little amount of inconvenience.

Q. How were they to get food if most of the houses had no back entrances?

A. Those who had not back entrances, if they had to get the necessities of life, might have gone on the roof and improvised means. If not, they could wait until 8 o'clock in the night and then go out and get the things.

Q. All this thing might have a very different effect from the effect you wished. Instead of being a just punishment on those who were intended to be punished, it might cause a great deal of ill-feeling among those who resented treatment of this sort and who were not responsible for the acts that were done?

A. Amritsar had behaved very badly and I think most of the inhabitants of Amritsar either gave assistance or were only waiting to see what was going to happen apparently. At any rate, they did not offer any help until after the firing; and if they suffered a little under martial law.

Q. Do you admit that during a period of turmoil when the mob was having the upper hand, it is difficult for the peaceful citizen to give assistance in quelling the disturbances and it is just on that account that the extreme act of firing upon a mob is justified?

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A. Yes, they were obstructing law abiding citizens, I presume, but I think that on that occasion we only thought of punishing the wicked; and men who had beaten Miss Sherwood who had to go through that street were punished. It was not my intention to punish anybody else.

Q. This was not a street that was necessarily frequented by those who had beaten Miss Sherwood.

A. No, I had erected a platform in the middle of the street and when I got those men who had beaten Miss Sherwood, I wanted to lash them there. I also wanted to keep the street what I call sacred. Therefore I did not want anybody to pass through it. It was an accident that these men had to crawl there.

Q. In point of fact, there were a number of prisoners and they were made to crawl?

A. I did not hear of that. If they took anybody deliberately, even those were not sent there deliberately. It was a pure accident that they got there. My orders were published and therefore when the Sergeant saw them, he made them do what I had ordered; but I never imagined that any sane man would go there voluntarily.

Q. If the effect of this was to prevent people from frequenting the street at all, it was meaningless?

A. It was only with a view to make it what I call sacred. I was going to lash people there presently. That was the whole object. It might be that I could have done something else. But I was searching my brain for some suitable punishment at the time.

Q. You continued enforcing the order from the 19th or 20th to the 25th of April?

A. Yes; I think that is all right. I went away on the 21st and the order was kept in force up to the 25th.

Q. What led to its being superseded?

A. I received an order to that effect.

Q. If you had not received that order, what was your intention with reference to that?

A. After I returned, I presume I would have taken the pickets off. I had a great deal to think of and after the men were lashed, there was no object in keeping the pickets on.

Q. It was only one case of lashing. There were six men. On what date did that take place?

A. I think it may have been about the 20th; I do not know. It is in the report.

Q. If it was on the 20th and there was no object in keeping the pickets, why were they not removed then?

A. I may have overlooked the matter. I had a great deal to think of. I had men with me all day long, night and day. I may have overlooked it but there was certainly no object in keeping it on after these men had been lashed.

Q. As regards the men who were lashed, I think all of them were men who had assaulted Miss Sherwood. Were they?

A. Yes; they were the men who had assaulted Miss Sherwood.

Q. They were not lashed in consequence of the assault on Miss Sherwood, but for some other offence?

A. They were lashed for some other offence.

Q. They were tried by the Provost-Marshal?

A. If those men beat Miss Sherwood, they must be lashed in that street.

Q. Where they lashed in that street before they had been tried for the offence of assaulting Miss Sherwood?

A. No, Sir. But I knew they had beaten Miss Sherwood. It was the place I appointed. I did not wait till the lashing was done. It was done by the Provost-Marshal.

Q. Lashing was not given in respect of the assault on Miss Sherwood. Therefore I do not see that the punishment that was meted out in consequence of that could have had any effect as a lesson to others. Were the punishments meted out in respect of some breach of discipline or order?

A. It was a coincidence, I suppose, when I found that those were the men who had beaten Miss Sherwood. That was the place to lash them.

Q. I can understand that if they had been lashed at the time. But in consequence of their having beaten Miss Sherwood, they were not lashed. Except for a different offence, I do not quite see how you achieve anything by having them lashed in the street.

A. Everybody knew that they had beaten Miss Sherwood and, therefore, it appeared to me to be the proper place to lash them. They deserved a bigger punishment than lashing. I simply lashed them.

Q. Complaints were being made that under martial law, a number of respectable citizens of Amritsar, occupying positions of responsibility in the city, were arrested and kept in custody for a long time and then released without any charge being framed against them. Do you know anything about that?

A. I do not remember anything about that. I believe there were a certain number of men in the Bagh and there were a certain number of persons in the Fort. We were trying to get them tried as fast as we could, and my orders were that they should be tried as fast as ever they could manage it. There was a great deal of doubt as to who should try them, whether by Provost-Marshal, or whether it should be done through the Civil authorities at first, or whether they should be sent up to a Tribunal for trial. It may have been owing to that that there was a little delay.

Q. But in connection with these people do you know when they were sent through the streets they used to be subjected to the indignity of being fettered?

A. I think they were probably handcuffed.

Q. That was the ordinary method of dealing with men who had committed offences under martial law before they were tried?

A. I think that was the correct course if they had been handcuffed.

Q. As regards the trial of all these cases there were two sets of Tribunals, one set up by you as Summary Courts and the other set up by Government of India as Special Tribunals under the Bengal Act?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Had you anything to do with the Regulations that governed the trials of the cases in the Special Courts?

A. No, Sir, all the laws are laid down and the offenders were tried by the Provost-Marshal.

Q. What are the laws that governed the proceedings? Are there any special Army Regulations or special Martial Regulations that governed them?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Can you supply me with a copy of those Regulations?

A. No, Sir, I have not got a copy here.

Q. I suppose you will get us a copy?*

A. Yes.

Q. With reference to Special Commissions, i.e., the Special Tribunals I think you had nothing to do with them?

A. No, Sir.

Q. That was with the Courts that had been constituted?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. We also have a complaint as regards the cutting of the water connection on the 11th of April. What have you to say with regard to that?

A. I don't think any order was issued by me. I set the water going on again. It had either been stopped by the mob or the pipes had been broken because there was a rumour that the water has been poisoned. Whether it be false or true I remember the water was cut off either by the mob or by some special orders.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. You arrived in Amritsar about 9 o'clock on the evening of the 11th and took over charge?

A. It may be that.

Q. You had already known of various striking symptoms of unrest throughout the Punjab?

A. Yes, before I got to Amritsar.

Q. When you got there you were told what had happened on the 10th?

* Printed as annexure A to Mr. Miles Irving's statement page 193.

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[Continued.]

A. Yes.

Q. That murders were committed and that property was looted and that the Civil authorities were not in possession of the city at all?

A. Yes, I was told that the city was in complete lawlessness.

Q. If I follow you, you state that you thought the position to be that you had the city in rebellion and not simply an unlawful assembly that could have been stopped with the assistance of military?

A. I regret it was in open rebellion.

Q. As I understand the civil authorities invited you to assume control?

A. Yes.

Q. And in point of fact from that time the Deputy Commissioner and the other civil authorities assisted you on the footing that you were in control?

A. Yes.

Q. Whether that is the correct law or not, you had to act at the spur of the moment?

A. The law was handed over to me at the time.

Q. Taking it on that footing, as I understand, on the 13th when you took the measures about these proclamations you took them on the basis that martial law was in fact being enforced, as, on any other footing, you as a soldier would not necessarily have been concerned?

A. No.

Q. That being so, as I understand you, the first thing you did was that you wanted to give a warning against meetings being held at all and you spent the morning of the 13th in giving that warning?

A. Yes, warning not to hold meetings.

Q. I think at that time you had drafted an order and put it in the form of a proclamation in English.

A. Yes, there was a proclamation.

Q. Apart from the proclamation in English there was one in Urdu?

A. There was a proclamation in Urdu.

Q. I take it that the proclamation in Urdu was the same as in English?

A. It ought to have been the same. There was a little difference in the translation. I don't think it was quite an absolute translation.

Q. And you also had to see that the matter was explained in Punjabi, as I understand?

A. It was in their own language. But I cannot say whether it was in pure Punjabi or in Hindustani.

Q. You attached great importance to meetings not being allowed and you had made up your mind that you would stop the meetings straightaway?

A. Yes, I had made up my mind to stop them straightaway.

Q. Did it occur to you, General Dyer, although you might be quite right in treating Amritsar in rebellion and in complete lawlessness and that the enforcing of martial law was very necessary, to explain something to the people that they must take their orders from you? They would want to know why they must take their own orders from you?

A. According to my orders it was explained that they must obey my orders and if they obeyed them I was quite prepared to do everything for them. I had very little time for these things and was engaged in organizing my forces. Up to the time I came that was one transaction.

Q. I don't think I made myself clear. The proclamation was to prohibit people from using conveyances or leaving the city without permits. The question which I am putting to you is that at this time the population of Amritsar presumably did not know much about martial law and they were entitled to some sort of definite warning from you to that effect as there has been no proclamation of martial law before. Did you ever give any such warning to that effect?

A. I issued a proclamation but I don't know I said anything. Everybody knew that martial law had taken place, that I was a military officer and that martial law was in force and not civil law.

Q. Did you think it necessary to go round the city with your troops to bring that home to them as far as possible?

A. A number of people knew that I had taken over charge and that the control of the city had been handed over to me by the civil authorities and that the military law was now in force.

Q. When you were proclaiming under Martial Law a series of proclamations which were under your signature dated the 25th April, you also sent out a long notice with special prohibitions. I notice you say in No. 3* that during the period of martial law no processions or gatherings "of more than ten persons will be held without my written authority, except marriages, funerals and religious ceremonies, and any such meetings," etc., "will be broken up by force without warning" but unfortunately your proclamation of the 15th says, that any such processions or gatherings will be dispersed by force of arms, if necessary. So you had in the meantime learnt by experience to endeavour to be more explicit?

A. I would have been more explicit but I had very little time to realise the situation. We had to look sharp with these things.

Q. I quite appreciate that. You did learn about the middle of the day that a meeting was going to be held?

A. Yes, about the middle of the day. At 1-30.

Q. You have been asked by the President about the feasibility in the circumstances of preventing people from collecting in the Bagh.

A. I had told them up to the time I was in the city not to collect.

Q. How many men would it have taken to prevent the meeting from being held in the Bagh?

A. It would have depended on the crowd and on the temper of the crowd.

Q. Assuming that there was a big crowd?

A. The Bagh had two or three entrances. 20 men at each entrance would have been sufficient.

Q. Supposing, seeing pickets at the entrances of that particular place they had decided to hold a meeting somewhere else, would you have been able to follow them with the same pickets elsewhere?

A. If they were going to disobey my orders I would have followed them to anywhere they might have assembled.

Q. I want you to tell us whether you think it would have been feasible on the afternoon of the 13th by means of these pickets to prevent a meeting from assembling altogether?

A. No, I had not enough troops. I could only take them to the Jallianwala Bagh.

Q. I gather you thought what you had done on the morning of the 13th would be effective?

A. I thought so. It would have had effect.

Q. You did not intend to do anything to provoke them to hold a meeting?

A. No. If they were going to obey my order I was quite prepared to help them. If they were not going to obey my orders I was going to make them obey.

Q. You waited at the Rambagh or at the Kotwali before proceeding to Jallianwala Bagh?

A. I went to the Rambagh first. I did not wait at the Kotwali.

Q. Your own car went in front or behind the Infantry?

A. I had some troops in front.

Q. I think you had Messrs. Rehill and Plomer with you in a car behind?

A. I cannot say.

Q. How long did it take you from the Rambagh to get to the Bagh?

A. If the Infantry marches—the Rambagh may be a mile and a half—I cannot tell you. We marched three miles an hour owing to the narrowness of the streets.

Q. I think you had an opportunity to make up your mind while you were marching to decide what was the right course. You came to the conclusion that if there really was a meeting, the right thing for you would be to fire upon them straightaway?

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[Continued.]

A. I had made up my mind. I was only wondering whether I should do it or whether I should not.

Q. No question of having your forces attacked entered into your consideration at all?

A. No. The situation was very very serious. I had made up my mind that I would do all men to death if they were going to continue the meeting.

Q. As I understand that decision of yours was based upon two things; firstly, that you thought that it was a sign of rebellion in their refusal to obey your orders; and, secondly, you thought the Amritsar position must be looked in the light of the position in the Punjab as a whole?

A. Yes. From a military point of view I must not allow myself to be surrounded.

Q. You must not allow Amritsar City to be surrounded?

A. My troops, i.e., the whole of my forces, in the city.

Q. Was the Amritsar situation apart from the Punjab situation or was it the same situation?

A. I looked at it from a wider point of view. It was the same situation.

Q. Does it or does it not come to this, you thought that some striking act would be desirable to make people not only in Amritsar but elsewhere consider their position more correctly?

A. Yes. I had to do something very strong.

Q. Of course you agree with me that it was rather at the cost of individuals in particular?

A. I had heard that a certain number of them had been induced to come to the Bagh by a promise that their taxes and land revenues would be abolished as the British Raj was at an end. Evidently those who came there for that reason appeared to me that they were not innocent when they did those things.

Q. Excuse my putting it in that way, General, but was it not a resort to what has been called "frightfulness" for the benefit of the Punjab Districts as a whole?

A. No. I don't think so. I think it was a horrible duty for me to perform. It was a merciful act that I had given them chance to disperse. The responsibility was very great. I had made up my mind that if I fired I must fire well and strong so that it would have a full effect. I had decided if I fired one round I must shoot a lot of rounds or I must not shoot at all. My logical conclusion was that I must disperse the crowd which had defied the arm of law. I fired and continued to fire until the crowd dispersed.

Q. Had you any armoured cars?

A. Yes, 2.

Q. Did you make use of them?

A. The armoured cars remained outside the square and never came into action as the lane was too narrow to admit them.

Q. You commenced firing the moment you had got your men in position?

A. Yes.

Q. The crowd had begun to go away when you continued firing?

A. Yes.

Q. The crowd were making an effort to go away by some of the entrances at the further end of the Bagh?

A. Yes.

Q. You put your pickets one to the right and one to the left of the entrance. Towards some places the crowd was getting thicker than other places?

A. They did.

Q. From time to time you changed your firing and directed it to places where the crowds were thickest?

A. That is so.

Q. Is that so?

A. Yes.

Q. And for the reasons you have explained to us, you had made up your mind to open fire at the crowd for having assembled at all?

A. Quite right.

Q. I want to ask about the crawling order. Was that order about crawling in that street, in which Miss Sherwood was so savagely attacked, in writing?

A. I shall have to ask the Brigade-Major. I thought about the point. I think my impression is that it was in writing.

Q. That was not made known amongst the public under the martial law?

A. No.

Q. Was it promulgated at any of the parades? Was it a civil order or a military order?

A. I held very few parades. I think I had to write to Mr. Miles Irving.

Q. Can you remember the language of it?

A. More or less. As far as I remember I gave orders that this street must be blocked at both ends and that no Indians be allowed to go through it and that if they wanted to pass they must go through on all fours. On all fours was interpreted as crawling. I cannot explain. My order said "all fours."

Q. At this time it would be about the 19th April and Miss Sherwood had been assaulted on the 10th. When did you give orders for a triangle to be erected there?

A. I cannot remember the exact date. I think a few days afterwards.

Q. Was it before or after you made the order about going on hands and feet?

A. I went and saw the spot and I then gave orders for a triangle to be erected there.

Q. If you wanted to punish them in this way why did you not simply refuse admission to anybody?

A. That is what I meant that no Indian should go through the lane.

Q. Why did you then give order to crawl or to go through on all fours?

A. It may have come in that way. I may have said that they must go through on all fours; I cannot say. My brain at that time had a lot to do. I was closing the street to punish them.

Q. Was it a punishment for those who were found guilty of taking part in this assault?

A. For any body who had committed a gross crime. It would be a good thing to have him punished there. Especially I wanted to punish the men who had beaten Miss Sherwood.

Q. Did it not occur to you that in India in these times things having special applicability to Indians which had a touch of humiliation, were very ill-advised?

A. It was Indians who had rebelled there. Therefore it could only apply to Indians who had rebelled in Amritsar.

Q. At the time you ordered the triangle to be put up you had no particular person in your mind whom you wanted to punish?

A. No.

Q. Did you want to punish those only who had committed crimes in that street?

A. Yes, who had beaten Miss Sherwood.

Q. To beat them for the offences which they had committed?

A. Well, it was rather at all events that, and they deserved very severe punishment. If they committed any offence of any kind against martial law orders, they were lashed in that street.

Q. There were six people who were afterwards convicted of complicity in Miss Sherwood's assault? These six persons in the meantime and before trial were under detention in the Fort?

A. They were under detention before trial.

Q. They were sentenced by Provost-Marshal to punishment of whipping for breach of Fort discipline?

A. Yes.

Q. According to the Provost-Marshal's Report the breach of discipline is gross insubordination and offering violence while in military custody on a date subsequent to 19th April and for that they were sentenced to be whipped. When you had given orders for a triangle to be put up in this lane, who would know that this would not be the punishment for any other offence for which they were convicted? You had not made it known.

A. No, Sir. I may not have.

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[Continued.]

Q. Are you satisfied in your own mind that these 6 persons really committed any tangible offence against Fort discipline, or did you think that they were certain to be sentenced to whipping sooner or later?

A. If they committed a fault, I think it was pretty certain that they would be sentenced to whipping, because most of the offences under martial law, whatever they were, were then being whipped.

Q. Anyhow these persons who had not yet been tried for any offence against Miss Sherwood, were rather marked out to be whipped on that spot?

A. Yes, if they had committed the offence against Miss Sherwood, they were marked out to be lashed in that street.

Q. They were afterwards convicted, all those six?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember what punishment was meted out to them?

A. As far as I remember, 30 lashes.

Q. For the offence against Miss Sherwood?

A. No, whatever offence they were tried for, they were awarded 30 lashes for that.

Q. Do you remember what they got for the offence against Miss Sherwood?

A. No, I never saw it, I missed it, it came out later, I think.

Q. You said everybody knew they were guilty of this offence against Miss Sherwood, how did that come about, how did everybody know?

A. I did not mean to convey that these particular men had really committed that offence.

Q. What certainty had you at the time you ordered them to be whipped at this spot that they would be found guilty of this offence against Miss Sherwood?

A. I did not know they would be found guilty; when they were not found guilty, I lashed them.

Q. When they were lashed for a breach of Fort discipline they were not yet found guilty of the crimes against Miss Sherwood, these particular men?

A. The chances were from what I had heard and been told that these were the particular men. If they were not the particular men and another man was beaten, still it did not matter very much whether he was beaten there or somewhere else, if he was convicted. I did not wish to run the risk, if he had committed the offence against Miss Sherwood, of his being beaten somewhere else; therefore when I heard that these were the men, I had them beaten in the same street.

Q. Were you not rather doing that from the point of view of striking the popular imagination?

A. No, I had only that end in view that these men had in a dastardly manner beaten a woman and knocked her down six times in the street, and that nothing was too bad for them either from a British man or a Hindu or a Sikh or any other man.

Q. Insubordination in the Army is a very bad offence?

A. Very bad.

Q. And it all depends on the circumstances whether it amounts to very grave crime or very small crime?

A. Yes.

Q. The smallest tendency to cheek a superior Non-commissioned Officer is insubordination? And on the other hand insubordination may cover some of the gravest crimes a soldier can do?

A. Yes, there is no limit to the amount of insubordination.

Q. Insubordination is a very elastic term?

A. Yes.

Q. And offering violence, a man might conceivably be convicted of that for doing very little?

A. Yes, if he was under martial law.

Q. Even small offences under martial law are severely dealt with; these men seem to have got 30 lashes each?

A. Yes.

Q. Talking about lashes, is it the case that floggings under martial law were all administered with the cane, except one case in Kasur?

A. I do not know how they did it in Kasur, but I think, as far as I remember, there were lashings with the cane, and I think one was done with a lash.

Q. These six, were they lashed with a cane, do you remember?

A. I was not there, but I believe they were lashed with a cane.

Q. As sentences of whipping go, was 30 lashes a large sentence?

A. In the old days it used to be many hundreds of lashes. Now-a-days I look upon it as not a very severe sentence.

Q. How did it compare with other whipping sentences in Amritsar at this time, there were, I think, 25 or 26 of them?

A. I think they mostly got from 15 to 30 lashes.

Q. Did any get more than 30 lashes?

A. No, 30 lashes was the limit. I have not got the record of the lashings; I think they went up to the Punjab Government.

Q. You were saying to me that whipping was an ordinary punishment under martial law?

A. Yes, under martial law.

Q. I gather that it seems to have been adopted both in Amritsar and elsewhere, do you mind telling me where that comes from, what is the authority for saying that, because martial law has been instituted in a city, the ordinary punishment for criminal offences is a sentence of whipping?

A. It is the custom I suppose every time there is martial law; I have not known martial law very often. That is all I can say.

Q. As I understand in the Indian Army whipping still continues as a recognised punishment?

A. Hardly, there are very few.

Q. It has practically disappeared?

A. Practically. Of course in martial law you want a speedy punishment, and that is the most speedy punishment one knows of and that is why whipping comes in more in martial law than under ordinary law.

Q. Except for that merit that it is a speedy punishment for a civilian who has broken a martial law proclamation, or committed a criminal offence under martial law, what else can be said for the punishment of whipping? What advantage is there in resorting to it?

A. I should think that is of the greatest advantage; it is a speedy punishment, you get it over and have done with it. You have not got to have a large number of officers there to hold Courts Martial or Summary Courts. A Provost-Marshal is appointed and he gives the order, and all is over.

Q. On the other hand you agree with me that as a punishment it has the disadvantage of being humiliating?

A. It is humiliating.

Q. And as I understand you, you say in your report that you do not believe it was inflicted in fact upon people of the respectable classes, is that so?

A. Have I said that?

Q. It may be your Provost-Marshal who said it. As far as you are concerned, I take it your view is that there should be no discrimination and that people who have been guilty of offences should be punished?

A. If they are guilty of offences under martial law, they ought to be punished.

Q. Of course under martial law with a great many proclamations, a new proclamation every other day, it might easily be that a respectable person would commit an offence against a proclamation?

A. Yes; they should not come under martial law. They should not do things that bring them under martial law, because we cannot teach them then all about martial law.

Q. Does not that make it rather objectionable and unjust that the ordinary punishment under martial law should be the punishment of whipping?

A. Martial law was found necessary, and those who laid down that there should be martial law, laid down that there should be whipping under martial law.

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Q. As I understand, as far as you were concerned, you were at the head of this martial law administration, but the punishments were meted out by the Area Officers, Provost-Marshals and other Officers subordinate to you? They were the people who tried prisoners?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you yourself hold courts at all?

A. No, not a single one.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You told us that on the 11th, when you arrived, the civil authorities handed over charge to you of the city?

A. They said civil law could no longer operate and I should take command. There was complete lawlessness in the city, they said.

Q. Was charge formally handed over to you?

A. In writing, there is a copy of it.

Q. It is Appendix I to your report. Can you tell me under what authority this writing to the effect "handed over to the General Officer Commanding" and signed by the Deputy Commissioner midnight 11th-12th April, was passed?

A. It was done under some civil law. I do not know what law.

Q. Had you any orders from superior authority to take over charge in that manner?

A. I was Commanding Officer of the District and therefore, if the civil law ceases to operate, it became my duty to take matters in hand, and civil law had ceased to operate.

Q. You thought you were competent yourself to take over charge when Mr. Miles Irving handed over charge to you?

A. Oh yes, rather.

Q. When you arrived you heard of the events of the 10th at Amritsar?

A. I arrived there on the 11th.

Q. You heard of the events that had taken place on the 10th, you were told of them?

A. Yes.

Q. Did it strike you then that the armed force at Amritsar at the disposal of the Civil authorities was not sufficient to cope with the situation that had arisen on the 10th?

A. It had apparently proved itself not sufficient. If the civil authorities had sufficient military aid supplied to them could they have carried on?

A. It remains to be seen, you would have had to try the thing.

Q. That expedient was not tried?

A. I think the very best expedient in the circumstances was that they should hand the authority over to me as Commanding Officer of the district considering the situation all round.

Q. But neither you nor Mr. Irving considered the feasibility of the alternative of the Civil authority carrying on with sufficient military aid from you?

A. No, I thought it had gone beyond that, that I should come in aid of civil power.

Q. You did not consider that alternative at all?

A. I did not try it.

Q. You did not consider it?

A. I did not consider it was right. I thought what had been done was right. The situation was very serious, it was beyond the civil control, therefore I was the man to deal with it rightly and properly.

Q. Did you and Mr. Irving sit down and consider, you may then have rejected the feasibility of the alternative I have suggested, or you did not consider it at all?

A. I may have considered it.

Q. You had a consultation with Mr. Irving that night?

A. Yes.

Q. And with some other people too—the police and some other gentlemen?

A. As far as I remember, there may have been Mr. Rehill, Mr. Plomer and myself and Major Briggs.

Q. Was Colonel Smith the Civil Surgeon there?

A. He was wandering about the station; I don't quite remember whether he was at the conference. I do not think he was.

Q. At that conference did you consider the alternative that I suggested?

A. I have not quite got your meaning, but what had happened appeared to me correct; that is, authority was handed over to me and that is what I thought was right. I did not see any reason for considering anything else.

Q. You did not see the necessity of considering the alternative I have suggested?

A. I do not suppose I ever considered it; I may have thought of it or not. Either the military take charge or they give assistance as aid for civil power. The time for giving aid to civil power had gone. I don't know of any medium course between those two.

Q. As soon as you arrived Mr. Irving told you he was prepared to hand over. All that I want to know is, when that proposal was made to you, did you and Mr. Irving consider the alternative of the civil power carrying on with sufficient aid from you?

A. No, I did not think it advisable. I thought what had happened was right; there was no reason to consider anything else. When you have got the right thing you do not consider anything else.

Q. There was no discussion between you and Mr. Irving on the subject?

A. No.

Q. On the 12th were various arrests made in the city?

A. Yes.

Q. Who made the arrests?

A. The police with the aid of the military. I was there to give help, if necessary.

Q. But the police arrested them?

A. Yes.

Q. Were any warrants issued by the civil authority?

A. There were no warrants as far as I know. We could arrest those people under martial law. But they might have had their warrants with them; you would have to find that out from them.

Q. Did you give any warrants?

A. I gave no warrants, if they had committed a crime they were to be arrested.

Q. Was there any prior investigation into the allegations made against those people?

A. No, I thought the police knew their job, they would arrest them and have them tried in the ordinary way.

Q. Then the arresting of these people was still left to the ordinary civil authority?

A. When they came and said this man has murdered so and so or done so and so, I said "Arrest him."

Q. Were the persons so arrested on the 12th handcuffed and marched through the city?

A. I do not know; they were probably handcuffed.

Q. And taken through the city?

A. I cannot say. They probably had to go through the city because they had to come out of it.

Q. Was any suggestion made at your consultation to take some drastic military measures against the city on the 12th?

A. I was going to enforce my orders, if that is what you mean.

Q. No other special measures?

A. If you mention any special measure I will tell you whether I did it or not.

Q. A complaint has been made that it was at one time contemplated to bombard the city?

A. I know nothing of that. I never thought it necessary to bombard the city. It may have been necessary later on; it depends on the behaviour of the crowd.

Q. There is no truth in the suggestion that you considered that on the 11th?

A. No, absolutely none, I had no idea of bombarding anything.

Q. On the 12th you issued the proclamation No. 1 and on the 13th you promulgated proclamation No. 2

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[Continued.]

which was proclaimed in the streets in the manner you have described?

A. No. 2 I would swear was proclaimed, as regards No. 1. was not there for it.

Q. If you look at that proclamation, this is what it says, the last two paragraphs:—"No procession of any kind is permitted to parade the streets in the city or any part of the city or outside of it at any time. Any such processions or gatherings of 4 men will be looked upon and treated as an unlawfully assembly and dispersed by force of arms, if necessary." Does not that refer to processions parading the streets?

A. Yes, it would refer to people in the streets.

Q. Does not that confine itself to people parading the streets?

A. They might be just outside the streets, it would refer to them too.

Q. Would it apply to an assembly meeting, not in a street, but in a place like the Jallianwala Bagh?

A. Oh yes, it applied to the Jallianwala Bagh or any other place as far as I was concerned in Amritsar.

Q. If you will kindly look at it, is not the language open to that construction?

A. What construction?

Q. The prohibition is that no person should parade any part of the city or streets of the city. The prohibition is against parading of processions?

A. Yes.

Q. Then follows the penalty. The penalty is with regard to such processions or gatherings of four men that is processions or gatherings parading the streets or any part of the city. You do not think it is open to that construction?

A. That it was only in the streets they were not to meet? Certainly not.

Q. You have seen the Golden Temple in Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. And you have seen that quarter?

A. Yes, I do not know it very well, I have been there once or twice.

Q. Your proclamation was not read out in that quarter?

A. I cannot tell, I do not know Amritsar very well. It was read out in a great number of places; it must have come near the Golden Temple I take it.

Q. You will be surprised to learn that it was not promulgated in that quarter.

A. I see.

Q. Then you heard at about 12-40 that the Jallianwala meeting was to be held?

A. Yes.

Q. When you heard that you did not take any steps to warn the people against going to that place?

A. I had been warning them all the morning.

Q. You did not do so after you heard of it?

A. No, I began to organize my troops and think about it.

Q. You did not think it would be desirable, for instance, to put up posters at that place warning people?

A. I did not think there was any time to put up posters and write posters, I had to organize my troops and look sharp, for if they were going to disobey my orders, the situation was really serious, and it was a much more serious situation than it appears now looking back at it. I had to get my troops ready.

Q. When you heard of the contemplated meeting at 12-40 you made up your mind that if the meeting was going to be held you would go and fire?

A. When I heard that they were coming and collecting I did not at first believe that they were coming, but if they were coming to defy my authority, and really to meet after all I had done that morning, I had made up my mind that I would fire immediately in order to save the military situation. The time had come now when we should delay no longer. If I had delayed any longer I was liable for court-martial.

Q. You took two armoured cars with you?

A. Yes.

Q. Those cars had machine-guns?

A. Yes.

Q. And when you took them you meant to use the machine-guns against the crowd, did you?

A. If necessary. If the necessity arose, and I was attacked or anything else like that, I presume I would have used them.

Q. When you arrived there you were not able to take the armoured cars in because the passage was too narrow?

A. Yes.

Q. Supposing the passage was sufficient to allow the armoured cars to go in would you have opened fire with the machine-guns?

A. I think probably yes.

Q. In that case the casualties would have been very much higher?

A. Yes.

Q. And you did not open fire with the machine-guns simply by the accident of the armoured cars not being able to get in?

A. I have answered you. I have said if they had been there the probability is that I would have opened fire with them.

Q. With the machine-guns straight?

A. With the machine-guns.

Q. I gather generally from what you put in your report that your idea in taking this action was really to strike terror? That is what you say. "It was no longer a question of merely dispersing the crowd, but one of producing a sufficient moral effect."

A. If they disobeyed my orders it showed that there was complete defiance of law, that there was something much more serious behind it than I imagined, that therefore these were rebels, and I must not treat them with gloves on. They had come out to fight if they defied me, and I was going to give them a lesson.

Q. I take it that your idea in taking that action was to strike terror?

A. Call it what you like. I was going to punish them. My idea from the military point of view was to make a wide impression.

Q. To strike terror not only in the city of Amritsar but throughout the Punjab?

A. Yes, throughout the Punjab. I wanted to reduce their moral, the moral of the rebels.

Q. You thought that by striking terror in that manner you would save the British Raj? You thought that the British Raj was in danger.

A. No, the British Raj is a mighty thing. It would not be in great danger but it might bring about more bloodshed, more looting, more lives lost.

Q. You did not think your act was instituted in order to save the British Raj?

A. No, never, I took action to save life and property and to prevent anybody who thought they could manage to mutiny from mutinying. It was a merciful act but at the same time it was a horrible act and it took a lot of doing.

Q. Did it ever occur to you that by adopting this method of "frightfulness"—excuse the term—you were really doing a great disservice to the British Raj by driving discontent deep?

A. No, it only struck me that at the time it was my duty to do this and that it was a horrible duty. I did not like the idea of doing it but I also realized that it was the only means of saving life and that any reasonable man with justice in his mind would realize that I had done the right thing; and it was a merciful act though a horrible act and they ought to be thankful to me for doing it.

Q. Did this aspect of the matter strike you that by doing an act of that character you were doing a great disservice to the British Raj?

A. I thought it would be doing a jolly lot of good and they would realize that they were not to be wicked.

Q. When you entered the Bagh and gave orders for firing did the men fire standing?

A. They were kneeling. By the laws of musketry these men were kneeling.

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[Continued.]

Q. Did you observe that after the firing was opened there were a number of people who lay on the ground in order to save themselves?

A. Yes.

Q. And your men continued to fire on these people who were lying on the ground?

A. I cannot say that. I think that some were running at the time and I directed them to fire, and sometimes I stopped firing and redirected the firing on other targets. The firing was controlled.

Q. Did you direct the firing on people who were lying down in order to save themselves?

A. I probably selected another target. There might have been firing on the people who were still lying down though I think there were better targets than that.

Q. After the firing had taken place did you take any measures for the relief of the wounded?

A. No, certainly not. It was not my job. But the hospitals were open and the medical officers were there. The wounded only had to apply for help. But they did not do this because they themselves would be taken in custody for being in the assembly. I was ready to help them if they applied.

Q. Were any measures taken immediately for dealing with the dead?

A. They asked that they might bury their dead.

Q. That was much later?

A. My recollection is that when I got back they came and asked me and I said certainly. It never entered my head that the hospitals were not sufficient for that number of wounded if they had liked to come forward.

Q. This action of yours in shooting the people at Jallianwala Bagh which resulted in the death of 500 people and considerable number being wounded was approved by the Punjab Government?

A. I believe so. There is a wire to that effect.

Q. You wired the information to the Lieutenant-Governor?

A. I did not wire the information. If it was wired, my Brigade Major wired it.

Q. In your statement you appended a telegram saying your action was approved by the Lieutenant-Governor?

A. I received it.

Q. And he referred to your action at Jallianwala Bagh?

A. I presume so.

Q. Were any orders promulgated to the effect that people should salaam the Military officers and if they did not do so they would be punished?

A. Under martial law every man under the General Officer Commanding salutes him whether it be by salaaming in the ordinary manner or by taking off his hat. Every man is bound to salute.

Q. Were any orders promulgated?

A. I don't know and I cannot remember. That is the ordinary course that they must all salute; if they do not salute they are not showing respect. And every Indian knows that he ought to salaam.

Q. Take a city like Amritsar where there is a large number of people who are absolutely uneducated and can have no conception as to martial law.

A. They all know salaaming is a custom of India. They salaam their Rajas, they salaam their senior officers and under martial law they ought to salaam in the same way.

Q. What I mean to suggest is that a large number of people in the town like Amritsar would not realize that it was a part of martial law that they should salaam British officers?

A. That may be so. They know that I am in command and therefore they ought to respect me. If I see my senior officers I salute them. The Indians know the custom of salaaming. They know that they ought to salaam.

Q. Should they salaam all officers?

A. Certainly. I think they ought to take their hats off if necessary.

Q. Should they salute every British officer?

A. I should think so. But there may be some Indian officers who are more senior in rank than

British officers and I would not expect them to salute.

Q. Would you conceive it to be the duty of every Indian to salute you?

A. If martial law is declared every citizen of Amritsar is bound to salute me.

Q. Is it your view that it is obligatory on the citizens of Amritsar also to salaam all other military officers under you?

A. I think there was a rebellion and a great deal of trouble and in that case it would have been just as well.

Q. With regard to other officers what was your view at that time?

A. I think that under martial law they ought to salaam their superior officers.

Q. Were people actually arrested for not salaaming?

A. I think most of them were arrested for being impertinent and they were promptly arrested for being impertinent.

Q. They were not arrested for failing to salaam?

A. They were arrested more for impertinence. When they were asked why they did not salaam, they used to be impertinent and were arrested because I knew they could salaam and that under martial law they ought to be civil.

Q. Were some of these people in connection with the salaaming kept in custody for ten days? That is what we have been told?

A. No, I do not think that is right. I think these men were not kept under arrest. I do not believe they got any punishment except having to crawl through the street.

Q. Were people who refused to salaam or were impertinent in that connection—were they made to crawl in the street?

A. There were some arrested by accident where the police were posted. I had pickets at the near end and my orders were that they should crawl.

Q. There were some men then who were not connected with the Sherwood assault but were arrested for impertinence and marched to this street and made to crawl?

A. They had nothing to do with the Sherwood case but they were men who were impertinent to me as I went through. These men were made to crawl not necessarily because they had beaten Miss Sherwood.

Q. There were six people who were connected with the Sherwood incident. Over and above these six were there other people who were made to crawl?

A. I do not know. These six were made to crawl.

Q. I take it that people who were not connected with the Sherwood incident—but who committed a breach of fort discipline—were marched into that street and made to crawl?

A. By accident. I gave orders to take them back to the police—the police were opposite me. I did not know the police were at the far end of the street.

They were marched back to the police and the Sergeant said my orders were to make them crawl. My intention was not to make these particular men crawl. Why they went there after the 19th I do not know. Possibly they voluntarily wanted to crawl.

Q. You say in your report that after the 13th the city was a pattern of law and order—that applies to the period subsequent to the 13th and 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell us, what was the need for continuing martial law for the period it was continued?

A. No harm would be done. Martial law was being very justly administered. It was not my job to discontinue martial law. I received my orders from higher authorities.

Q. I take it from you that martial law was continued because no harm was done and it was justly administered, but there was no particular necessity of continuing it?

A. As far as I could see law and order had come and I suppose there was an interval when martial law was not necessary but it may have continued to go on for a bit longer.

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[Continued.]

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. General Dyer, there are one or two points which I am not quite clear about. You received orders or directions or instructions when you arrived at Amritsar that you should take such measures that might be found necessary to restore order?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And although martial law had not been proclaimed you considered that the situation was such that it was necessary to carry out the instructions that you had received just in the same way as if martial law had been proclaimed?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In other words, you considered that war was being waged against the Crown and that you had a right to anticipate the proclamation of martial law?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Now coming on to the Jallianwala Bagh incident for a minute, you perhaps know as well as I do, that an unlawful assembly may be dispersed even by force, if necessary, even though it has not actually resorted to acts of violence?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Now, with regard to the use of force against the crowd in the Jallianwala Bagh, do I take it from what you said this morning that you had taken a wider view of the whole situation, that you had looked at it not merely as an officer who was assisting the military, but you were acting in accordance with the directions given to you? In other words, I will read out to you the actual words to refresh your memory. "Where a proclamation of martial law has been issued, any soldier who takes, in accordance with the official instructions laid down for the guidance of those administering martial law, such measures as honestly seem to be necessary for carrying such issue and the operation of restoring peace and preserving authority" You, therefore, I understand, were acting under those words conveyed in the Proclamation, that is, you honestly thought that it was necessary to use force for the successful issue of the operation of restoring peace and authority in the Punjab. Am I right?

A. Absolutely, Sir.

Q. And that you were convinced honestly in your mind that when you fired on this crowd it was to prevent further trouble and bloodshed which might follow later on?

A. Absolutely, Sir.

Q. As to the question which was put to you by the President about picketing, I understood from your explanation, first of all there was no time, next that you did not want to split up your forces, that if you split up your forces into small bodies they will more likely be attacked and overwhelmed, and that it would also lead to bloodshed?

A. Absolutely clear. I did not want to split up my force.

Q. You issued the Proclamation about people not assembling, and I think the map which was handed up this morning shows the route through which you went, but it shows that you did not go very far into the city?

A. I thought I had gone a long way. We went to many places. I do not know Amritsar very well. We did a great deal in the way of reading out the Proclamation, and I understood that, after I had finished, perhaps a little more was going to be done in that way. I thought I had done quite enough. I confess I do not know how far we had penetrated into the city. I do not know the city very well. I think I knew it since I have been there in April. I once saw the Golden Temple, and I think that was about the limit of my knowledge of Amritsar.

Q. You were satisfied in your mind that the Proclamation had been sufficiently widely made known?

A. I certainly felt that I had done more than I was called upon to do.

Q. We all know that news circulate very rapidly in the bazaars?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Then you referred once to the seriousness of the situation and said that unless one is faced with a situation of that sort, it is difficult to realise what it means?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. That is, the necessity for prompt action was so essential that there was no time for further reflection?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you yourself were so much occupied with the various questions which were brought before you that you had no time to sit down and consider from every point of view what the possible consequences of your action might be?

A. That is true.

Q. And also perhaps you will agree with me that when one is faced with such a situation, it creates quite a different impression on one's mind to what it will when you are simply reading about it?

A. Quite true, Sir.

Q. There is only one other point I want to ask you about. I think you referred in your statement that expressions of special satisfaction were conveyed to you by a good many people, Indians, on your prompt action?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Raises, respectable citizens and others?

A. I mean all kinds of men expressed their satisfaction. They all said that I had saved the situation; I had saved the Punjab, and all kinds of praise were showered on me which I dare not mention.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You arrived at Amritsar at about 9 or 10 P.M. on the 11th?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, were you informed that on the 11th the civil authorities were able to make arrests in the city?

A. On what date?

Q. On the 11th?

A. They had made arrests on the 11th. I was not informed of that fact. I understood that. I see it is in that report that there were arrests made.

Q. You were not informed of this?

A. Not then and there.

Q. Were you informed of this fact on the 12th?

A. On the 12th, as far as I can remember, no.

Q. Were you informed of the fact that on the 11th, the people of Amritsar City approached the civil authorities for the purpose of burying their dead, that certain orders were passed by the Deputy Commissioner, and that these orders were obeyed?

A. I did hear that they had asked to bury their dead, and certain orders were issued about the matter. Yes, I did hear that.

Q. Were you informed of any acts of lawlessness or violence that were committed by the mob on the 11th?

A. No.

Q. Were you informed of any acts of lawlessness and violence that were committed by the mob on the 12th?

A. I should think not, as far as I can remember.

Q. Therefore, may I take it that up to the 13th the only information which you had about the behaviour of the mob inside the city was as to what they did on the 10th?

A. Outside the city a good deal happened.

Q. I am only asking you about Amritsar City.

A. So far as the Amritsar City was concerned, there was no further lawlessness.

Q. And the only information that was supplied to you was as to what they had done on the 10th?

A. Yes, I think that is right.

Q. You have repeatedly been describing the citizens of Amritsar as rebels. Therefore may I take it that your conclusion was based upon that information which was supplied to you?

A. I say it was based partly on that.

Q. Was your conclusion based on the facts that were supplied to you on the night of the 11th as to what had happened on the 10th?

A. Not only in Amritsar City, but outside Amritsar. My mind was not made up on what had happened in Amritsar only.

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[Continued.]

Q. On the 11th or on the morning of the 12th at the railway station a number of names were given to you of the agitators by Ashraf Khan?

A. On the night of the 11th, it would be practically the morning of the 12th.

Q. May I know where that paper is, can I get all these names that were taken down by you?

A. I am afraid you cannot have them. I have not got them now.

Q. Or the names that were taken down by Major Briggs that night?

A. It is a long time. We have been moving about a lot on the frontier.

Q. Am I to understand that paper will not be in existence now?

A. I cannot say. He may have it. He is a very good Brigade-Major. He may possibly have it.

Q. Is it not a fact that all those persons that were named that night by Ashraf Khan were arrested under your orders?

A. I cannot say they were arrested under my orders. Certain men were arrested, I cannot remember the names. I don't remember if they were all arrested, but there were certain names mentioned, and I was told that they had done certain things, and I undoubtedly said, "Arrest him."

Q. You were given this information by Ashraf Khan and the Superintendent?

A. Yes.

Q. And nobody else gave you this information?

A. Mr. Miles Irving may have said something.

Q. Then may I take it that all the information about individual acts was given to you by Mr. Miles Irving or by the Superintendent or by Ashraf Khan?

A. No, there were lots of other people there, there were lots of other officials. They may have given me the information, I could not tell you exactly.

Q. There may be other officials who gave you that information?

A. Yes, there may be.

Q. Therefore, if it be a fact that neither the police nor the officials were aware of the fact as to who were the persons responsible for the assault on Miss Sherwood, as to who were the persons who burnt down the National Bank, as to who were the persons who were responsible for the murder of Mr. Stewart, they could have given you no information on these points?

A. Why should you assume that they did not know?

Q. Are you aware whether up to the end of 23rd April any reliable information was given to any person in authority as to who were the persons concerned in all these occurrences?

A. I don't understand that. There were lots of people arrested. They may have given it.

Q. I am coming to that. For the first time the approver Hansraj gave the information to the police authorities on the 23rd April as to who were the persons who were concerned in the different occurrences, and up to that time there was no other evidence in the possession of the police?

A. Hansraj was not the only man. The police may have heard it from somebody else.

Q. Can you tell me as to whether there was any other information in your possession except what the officials informed you as to who were the persons concerned in the different occurrences?

A. No, certainly not, because I went there as a military man. I knew nothing about the matter until the civilians and the officials in Amritsar told me.

Q. Supposing the authorities were themselves unaware?

A. If they have done something wrong, they will be answerable for that.

Q. Supposing the authorities were not aware of the individuals who committed the various acts of violence?

A. They could not give me the information.

Q. Now, therefore, is it not a very extraordinary coincidence? You take it from me that the approver Hansraj for the first time gave his statement on the 23rd April. Don't you think it to be a very extraordinary coincidence that if on the 23rd April the authorities came to know for the first time, who were the persons

responsible for the assault on Miss Sherwood, how was it possible for you or for any British officer to understand or think that the six persons that were arrested were concerned in the assault on Miss Sherwood? These people were flogged before the 23rd April in that lane, and therefore my point is, if this fact as to who were the persons concerned in the assault on Miss Sherwood was not known to the authorities till the 23rd April, how could you come to the conclusion that these people were actually concerned in the assault on Miss Sherwood?

A. How am I to assume that the authorities never knew who were the persons concerned in the assault on Miss Sherwood, because before the 23rd Hansraj had not spoken? There were lots of other people who could give information.

Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate.—May I point out that Hansraj never mentioned about the assault on Miss Sherwood? They got the information from other sources.

Q. Who informed you that these six persons who were flogged for the breach of martial law rules were concerned in the assault on Miss Sherwood?

A. The man who arrested them. They told me that. I cannot remember at this date, I presume so, or one of the officials, Mr. Rehill, or whosever's duty it was to arrest, probably came and informed me, and if they were arrested wrongly, they would be answerable for their wrongdoing some day.

Q. Is it not a fact that except these six persons no one else was ever accused of having committed certain breaches of the regulations inside the Fort, and no other person has been mentioned as having committed a similar breach of the rules?

A. They may have been particularly wicked people.

Q. Is it not a very extraordinary coincidence that except these six persons who were supposed by you to have taken part in the assault on Miss Sherwood, nobody else inside the Fort committed any breach of the rules and these six persons were therefore flogged?

A. They may have been arrested early. There may not have been many men under arrest at the time. I could not tell you.

Q. What was the number of persons who were arrested and kept inside the Fort?

A. I could not tell you.

Q. More than 100?

A. Not at that time. There were some in the Fort, some in the Rambagh, but I really cannot tell you how many there were. But if those men were tried by a Court and condemned, then I presume the whole thing ends there, and that shows they must have committed an offence.

Q. Can we get any detailed information as to what was the offence committed by these six men?

A. I should think so. The police would know perhaps why these people were arrested. I presume the police would have something, but as far as I know they were tried under martial law by the Provost-Marshal, I take it.

Q. Would there be any written record of the trial of these men?

A. I doubt it, I should not think so. Under martial law it is not necessary to keep any records.

Q. I want to know if any records have been kept?

A. You may be able to get them from the police or whoever arrested them would no doubt be able to give you that information.

Q. What have you to say to this suggestion, that because rightly or wrongly these six persons were supposed by you or by the authorities to have taken part in the assault on Miss Sherwood, therefore on the pretext of breach of certain laws inside the Fort, as a matter of revenge, they were flogged. What have you to say to that?

A. I think it is a wrong suggestion.

Q. Don't you think it wrong to inflict any punishment on under-trial prisoners for what they had done in connection with the assault on Miss Sherwood, so long as their offence was not tried?

A. No, I cannot say. If they committed an offence under martial law, they must suffer for it. If they

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[Continued.]

committed another offence they must get another punishment.

Q. Why were they not flogged inside the Fort?

A. I wanted them to be flogged where Miss Sherwood fell.

Q. Similarly with regard to the crawling order, that order was promulgated by you outside the Fort, was it not?

A. No, I could not say that. I was asked that question before.

Q. It appears so from your statement. It was not clearly stated, but I can infer that?

A. That is why I felt a little doubt myself.

Q. I infer, as a matter of fact, that this crawling order was passed by you when you were inside the city. It is only my inference?

A. Yes.

Q. You say here, I will just refer to your statement*—you say "I then posted two British pickets, one in each end of the street, with orders to allow no Indians to pass, that if they had to pass they must go through on all fours." I think this order was passed when you were posting the pickets?

A. Very likely.

Q. You have already informed Sir Chimanlal that you never imagined that any sane man would voluntarily go through the street under those conditions?

A. That is absolutely so.

Q. When you passed the order, so far as you were concerned, you thought that this order might remain a dead letter?

A. I was thinking of another punishment.

Q. You considered at that time that probably this order would remain a dead letter, because there would be no person who would go inside and out of the street, obeying this order?

A. Quite so.

Q. Is it not an extraordinary coincidence then that when all of a sudden you moved about and felt the necessity of arresting 12 persons for no definite offence these are the very persons who were made to obey the order?

A. I do not see the funny coincidence. I went through the city after posting the pickets. There was a certain number of inhabitants who were called up and handed to the police.

Q. I think it an extraordinary coincidence?

A. You are quite at liberty to think what you like. I must keep to the truth.

Q. Will there be any record of these persons?

A. I should think so. If we search it out, I think we can get at the names.

Q. Any other punishment they may have been subjected to?

A. I think that is very possible, if you call that punishment.

Q. May I know whether there is any record?

A. There is a record of all the punishments under the Provost-Marshal and of all the punishments he gave.

Q. You have no recollection as to whether they were guilty of any offence?

A. The Provost-Marshal may know; I have nothing to do with it.

Q. You have no recollection whether any such thing happened or not, so far as these twelve men were concerned?

A. I have no recollection at all.

Q. Taking your first Proclamation, it appears to me that this was dictated by you or written after 10 P.M.? Am I right?

A. I cannot say. I have to look it up. It is Proclamation No. 1.

Q. No. 1?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it not somewhere in the evening that this order was dictated by you? At what time was this order dictated?

A. I have absolutely no recollection.

Q. This order was dictated by you on the 12th, sometime in the evening?

A. May be in the evening. I cannot say the time.

* See page 205.

Q. You went out with a number of soldiers on the 12th inside the city?

A. Quite right.

Q. At what time did you do that?

A. About 12; I am not certain; I tell you what I think.

Q. May I take it that this order was dictated by you after you had returned from the city?

A. I have already said I cannot tell you; I do not recollect.

Q. Major Briggs says that this order was dictated after you had come from the city?

A. Whatever Major Briggs says may be right.

Q. Therefore it would be after 12?

A. If he says so, most certainly yes.

Q. Therefore I take it that this order was dictated after 12?

A. It may be so if Major Briggs said so.

Q. And it was handed over by you to the Deputy Commissioner for the purpose of translation?

A. You have to ask Major Briggs; he will be able to tell you what he did.

Q. Do you know anything as to where this order was printed?

A. Absolutely nothing. I cannot remember who printed it.

Q. So you have no personal knowledge as to whether it was on the 12th or on some other date it was promulgated?

A. I cannot recollect at the present moment.

Q. If this order of yours was printed at all on the 12th, it must have been printed inside the city (Amritsar)?

A. Why?

Q. Are there any printing presses outside Amritsar?

A. There are other presses outside.

Q. Anyhow on the 12th, after you returned from the city no civil authority had asked you to give them any escort for the purpose of going inside the city and promulgating this notice?

A. Had this been so, this would have been mentioned in the diary.

Q. I think the police would have been quite able to do that without the aid of your men?

A. I do not know.

Q. It was printed inside the city; is it not right?

A. I do not know where it was printed or the name of the printing press.

Q. Only I want to know as to whether or not any help of the military was invoked by the civil authority for the purpose of promulgating this notice on the 12th?

A. I should think not. I really can't tell you.

Q. In your opinion, the police were quite competent to do the duty?

A. I did not say that. I assume they may have been.

Q. On the 13th, when you left Rambagh, is it not a fact that you practically on all three sides surrounded the Jallianwala Bagh with your pickets? You left a picket at the Sultanwind Gate?

A. I do not think that a picket was left at the Sultanwind Gate. I remember a picket at the Lahore Gate.

Q. You will be able to give information as to where, at what places, these pickets were left, when you were advancing to the Jallianwala Bagh?

A. I will tell you: Lahore Gate, Hall Gate and another; I do not see how it matters. I will concede if you like that there was a picket at the Sultanwind Gate. My information is that it was not.

Q. If a woman was found wounded at the Sultanwind Gate, could you give us any explanation as to how the woman was wounded?

A. Would you give me the date?

Q. Either on the 12th or 13th.

A. I do not know there was.

Q. Supposing there was, how would you explain it?

A. On the 12th, it would be difficult to explain. If it was on the 13th, it was quite possible that a ricochet from the Jallianwala Bagh might have hit the woman outside. I do not know the direction. If it was at the Sultanwind Gate, she might have been hit during the firing. Beyond that, I cannot give any explanation.

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[Continued.]

If a bullet is not correctly aimed, it may take any direction; also sideways.

Q. Even persons found wounded on the 2nd or 3rd storey of the buildings?

A. Yes, may be.

Q. If there be marks of bullets on the 2nd and 3rd storey, would it not show that you ordered firing overhead?

A. Certainly not. I never gave any such order. I know what orders I gave. I directed the fire personally. I can tell you if you want what orders I gave. I never gave any order for overhead firing. Absolutely none.

Q. With regard to the looting on the 11th and 12th, you mentioned in answer to the questions put by the President that you heard that the *Manjha* Sikhs were about to loot and therefore you considered that it was a serious and dangerous position. You have made that statement?

A. That was one of the items; it is a small item of the general rebellion.

Q. Was it not that this information was given to you by the Commissioner of Lahore, and that he never believed that it would be a fact?

A. "A message was received from the Commissioner, Lahore, saying 200 armed *Manjha* Sikhs were about to raid the City. The Commissioner, however, did not put much reliance on this report."

Q. This is from the statement of Captain Briggs?

A. Yes, true.

Q. Therefore when you replied to the question put by the President whether 200 *Manjha* Sikhs were about to raid the city, you were referring to this information?

A. Did I ever say there were 200 *Manjha* Sikhs? I had more information than that; that *Manjha* Sikhs were going to loot the City and I depended well on that information. The Commissioner was not the man on the spot. My information came from a much nearer source.

Q. Who gave that information?

A. The police.

Q. And you mean Ashraf Khan. Was that information given to you on the 12th or 13th?

A. Must be on the 12th.

Q. At what time and place?

A. I can't remember at this distant date. I have been through a good deal of scenes and I have forgotten at what time different things happened. I have no objection to find out and let you know at what time it happened.

Q. I think Ashraf Khan might have come to you very well on the 12th if he liked?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore on the night of the 12th, it was not necessary to have a large body of British soldiers in order to bring Ashraf Khan from the Kotwali to the railway station?

A. I do not know if he was in the Kotwali. He was wandering about all day. He could come to me any time he liked.

Q. From your statement I gather that on the night of the 11th you reached there?

A. On the night of the 11th I went to the city to bring him out with an escort if it were necessary. I had just arrived and I was not well up in the situation and I thought from all I had heard that it was necessary to take in an escort.

Q. You must have received the information from the civil authorities on the subject, that it was impossible for Ashraf Khan to come to the station and therefore you thought it necessary to go with an escort and bring him back to the station?

A. Probably they said that to take an escort would be wise.

Q. On the 12th did he come to you with any escort?

A. I do not know.

Q. You cannot even approximately fix the time?

A. It was probably evening. I should think it might be. I have no recollection of the exact spot. There were many important things I had to consider at that time.

Q. This is one thing: Suppose, for instance, your 2nd Proclamation had not been issued, i.e., you had not

issued any proclamation prohibiting gathering of persons and supposing you were informed that about 10,000 or 15,000 persons were assembled at the Jallianwala Bagh and were holding a meeting, and supposing you had done what you really did on the 13th, would not the results have been the same?

A. I cannot understand.

Q. You say that firing was absolutely necessary as regards what happened in the Punjab and that the firing had a good effect. I say that supposing that the meeting which you wanted to disperse was held there without your issuing any proclamation and you had adopted the same methods, would the results have been the same?

A. I am only going into what I actually did. I cannot go into suppositions.

Q. Of course that meeting was prohibited by you and you went in person; supposing this meeting was held and it was not prohibited by you, if you had gone, you would have prohibited it?

A. Because I had issued this proclamation and it had shown people that I had tried to prevent them from meeting, therefore when they had disobeyed law and order, I shot. Surely the effect would be much better than if I had done it without the proclamation.

Q. Inside the City?

A. Anywhere.

Q. Therefore I take it that on the morning of the 14th all the surrounding villages were aware of this fact, that a proclamation was issued by you, and that any disobedience of the proclamation would make the soldiers open fire because it was not a legal meeting.

A. Yes.

Q. You do not contend that when all those villagers to whom no oral proclamation was issued by means of tom-tom assembled there in disobedience of that order, this would be considered to be an unlawful assembly and therefore the meeting would have to be dispersed?

A. Would you put the question again?

Q. Here was a prohibited meeting; you felt justified in going there and dispersing it and in the course of dispersing that meeting you thought that having regard to what was happening all around Amritsar it was absolutely necessary to take drastic steps. Therefore I say that supposing this meeting had not been prohibited and you were informed that a seditious meeting was being held and you had gone there and taken steps and the news got abroad that a seditious meeting was held and people were shot, would not the effect be the same?

A. I cannot say. I would rather have it as I did it. I do not know the effect of what it would have been if it had been something else. I am not going to pass an opinion as to what would have been if I had done something else.

Q. The salutary effect was the effect of the drastic measure or the salutary effect was the effect caused by the meeting being prohibited by you?

A. It is difficult to say. I want to punish the naughty boy; it would be difficult to say what would be the effect of punishment on a boy who is not naughty.

Q. I say the effect of what happened on the 13th was the salutary effect of the news travelling abroad that certain people had been fired upon by the military or was the salutary effect due to the fact that it was a prohibited meeting?

A. I think it had a better effect when it was a prohibited meeting.

Q. And you contend that the effect was to spread the news?

A. I do not contend it. It was spreading and news spreads rapidly.

Q. Would you justify your action, supposing the meeting had not been prohibited merely because it would have a greater effect on the surrounding villages?

A. I think if a man had gone on firing without doing what I did he would not be justified.

Q. Having regard to the situation this had a very salutary effect.

My second point is, you yourself admit that there were a large number of villagers in that meeting?

A. There were villagers and city people; that was my opinion.

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[Continued.]

Q. Whatever may be your opinion about the city people, you cannot say that those villagers were also informed of the fact that the meeting was prohibited.

A. It all depends upon how far that written proclamation was issued. It may have been sent to the villages. You must ask the police about it.

Q. How could it have been sent to the villagers? Because it would not have been ready by the night of the 12th?

A. Because it was in print.

Q. There was no evidence of any civil officer to that effect?

A. I believe it was in print that night.

Q. Do you suggest that it was seen?

A. I suggest it.

Q. Do you suggest it was sent to the outside villages?

A. I said 'may be.'

Q. Assuming that there were a large number of villagers who were not residents of Amritsar and assuming that this notice dated 12th April was not sent to their villages in order to produce that effect outside would you consider yourself justified in ordering shooting?

A. I think that the men who came to the Jallianwala Bagh had hostile feelings towards the British Raj and they came with that intention and I do not believe they were honest people.

Q. From the 11th to 15th, have you ever been informed by anybody that any person inside the city of Amritsar was seen with a firearm in his possession or used any firearm?

A. This is against law.

Q. Or any of them used any firearm?

A. I do not know that any used any firearm.

Q. Therefore you had no information that even a single individual of the mob had a firearm.

A. No. They were going to do it with *lathis*. I know there were thousands of *lathis* which I saw with my own eyes in the railway station and these were going to be their arms. I have got one in my own possession. My Brigade-Major saw them. I have got a return of how many were seen.

Q. Is it a fact that the first information that you got about these *lathis* was on the 29th April and that they arrived at the station and were not inside the city and that you had prevented them from going inside the city?

A. I will tell you. It was on the 29th April. I can get you the exact date.

In March 1919, there were 455 bundles of canes received at Amritsar, each bundle containing over 200 of these canes. They were malacca canes. I had a sample which I have brought away with me. In the month of April there were 601 bundles of canes. Therefore that covers March and April and the question you raised.

Q. Is it not that this information was given to you on the 25th April and these *lathis* never went out of the city?

A. I do not know where the *lathis* went.

There is Major Briggs' statement—

"On or about April 29th, the Station Master, Amritsar, called me up on the telephone and said a very exceptionally large amount of sticks (*lathis*) were arriving and he asked for orders as to their disposal. I told him not to deliver them to the consignees, but wait for orders. The General Officer Commanding and myself went down to the station that day to see them. One large store-house was full up to the roof with them and there were many more in trucks."

Q. That is true?

A. That is true, and the date is 29th.

Q. I therefore take it that on the 10th, 11th and 12th these *lathis*, which you have included in your figures, were not inside the city. You have based your argument upon railway figures?

A. Absolutely. I had gone and seen them.

Q. So far as the civil authorities were concerned, they have informed this committee—and up to this time no other evidence has been produced before this committee—they have not been able to trace any citizens of Amritsar going outside Amritsar to distant villages and in-

citing people to rebellion. They have not actually been able to fix this responsibility upon any individual resident of Amritsar City.

And my question is, on the 11th and 12th did you receive any wire or any official information—if that be so it will be found here—did you receive any official information on the 11th or 12th that any citizens of Amritsar had gone outside Amritsar and were inciting people to rebellion or to loot?

A. I cannot remember having received such a thing.

Q. You say on the 12th—

"The inhabitants of Amritsar are hereby warned that if they will cause damage to any property or will commit any acts of violence in the environs of Amritsar, it will be taken for granted that such acts are due to the incitements in Amritsar City, and offenders will be punished according to military law."

You consider it fair that for whatever happened outside Amritsar, you would punish Amritsar?

A. Would you read it again?

Q. If it means anything, it means that you will assume that these citizens of Amritsar have offended against the law and that they will be punished.

A. Those offenders who do the offence. Read it according to my words and not according to your words.

Q. Have not some of the orders promulgated by you a family likeness to similar orders promulgated in Belgium? For instance, the order about *salaaming* and the Curfew order?

A. In my mind it had nothing to do with Belgium whatever.

Q. Is it not a fact that such and similar orders were resented by all the civilised press?

A. I am not aware of it.

Q. In your opinion every resident of the city of Amritsar would be aware of the fact that because martial law has been declared, therefore it was his duty to *salaam* the British Officers?

A. They brought themselves under martial law.

Q. Supposing they bring themselves under martial law, my point is, do you assume or do you think that everyone of them would also know what liabilities there are?

A. I do not think he would not; I think he would soon get to know.

Q. You do not say that they would know?

A. Not absolutely. I do not suppose it is spread to every man, but they know about it as soon as possible.

Q. That would be if martial law is declared?

A. Yes.

Q. Was martial law declared on the 12th or on the 15th?

A. I do not remember the date, I think, it was on the 15th.

Q. Why were those people arrested on the 12th, for being insolent or for not *salaaming*?

A. There was something going on equal to martial law. I explained that before. When I took over, the law was equivalent to martial law.

Q. Your first entry into the city was on the 12th?

A. Very early on the 12th, the night of the 11th.

Q. That was your first entry into the city, i.e., on the 12th?

A. I forget what time it was.

Q. I am not referring to time. I am only referring to the date. It was on the 12th that you entered into the city for the first time?

A. I cannot say the exact time. It may be so near the 12th and so near the 11th. The same night that I got to Amritsar, I went to the City Kotwali to bring men.

Q. At that time you saw a lot of people?

A. Everything was quiet.

Q. There were no people going about and walking about. Was it dead midnight?

A. We will assume it was midnight.

Q. Nobody witnessed your entry?

A. I have said it was quiet.

Q. There may be quiet, but 5,000 or 10,000 people might have been assembled?

A. I cannot go on wandering about these things. In fact, it might have been happening in the City.

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[Continued.]

Q. Was there always quiet?

A. I say yes.

Q. So far as you went, did you find any crowd in the street or any people walking in the street?

A. No.

Q. Therefore the first time that people would have been aware of your entry was when you entered into the City with a body of soldiers on the 12th?

A. It is not necessary to see me to know that I have arrived.

Q. Then you said that they would know on the 12th that martial law was in force on account of what was going on. But there was nothing going on. The first thing you did to make people know that there was a sort of martial law was marching through the city with a body of British soldiers?

A. We went through the city on the 12th.

Q. Therefore that was the first thing that would give an indication that something was going on. Previous to that there was nothing?

A. There was a great deal going on previous to that. There were murders and all kinds of things taking place. You must mention the date if you want to know exactly. "Before" is a very wide term.

Q. Your marching through the city with a body of British soldiers was the first thing which would convince the people or show them that martial law had been introduced or is going to be introduced. Previous to that nothing had been done in Amritsar. Is it from that that people would infer that martial law has been introduced or was going to be introduced? Is that so or not?

A. They may have known that I was there before. As regards martial law being introduced when I came there, I suppose all the news spread wonderfully. I took over charge from Mr. Miles Irving on the night of the 11th. That may have spread round as fast as you like.

Q. My point is this. I will make it as clear as possible. Certain persons were arrested when you were marching through the city on the 12th. I asked you that question and you said that certain persons were arrested. My second question was whether they were arrested for not *salaaming* and you said yes.

A. Did I say "Yes"? I want to settle that point. I may have arrested, but did I say so? You said I arrested. I did not arrest.

Q. Were a number of people arrested on the 12th?

A. There were a number of people arrested on the 12th most certainly.

Q. For not *salaaming* you?

A. I cannot say whether they were arrested for not *salaaming* me.

Q. Supposing some were arrested?

A. Supposing they were; I say they were not. But we will assume for the moment.

Q. If you say "not," I will stop.

A. I neither say "yes" nor "no," because I do not remember.

By the President—

Q. Did the police arrest for not *salaaming*?

A. No.

Q. Were any arrests made on the 12th except by the police?

A. There were lots of arrests made on the 12th.

Q. In addition to those made by the police?

A. Not that I remember. It is a long time ago. I do not think anybody was arrested for not *salaaming* on the 12th.

By the Hon. the Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Similarly those 12 men were also arrested by the police under your orders?

A. Which 12 men?

Q. Those who passed through that lane?

A. I think I said eleven.

Q. Those 11 men were arrested by the police?

A. They were brought to me and they were impertinent and they were arrested.

Q. By the police?

A. Probably by the police.

Q. They were arrested because they did not *salaam* you?

A. For impertinence of a different kind. There were not arrested for not *salaaming*. Actually when I called them up to me, they were impertinent and they were arrested for that; whether it was for not *salaaming* or not.

Q. This question has been asked by every Member, and although passing over the same ground, I want to put it to you again more clearly. Was there any proclamation made in the city at any time that from that hour or from that date, martial law had been introduced or would be introduced before the 15th?

A. I do not believe any such proclamation was expressly issued. It may have been.

Q. So far as you are aware, did you ask anybody to make a proclamation?

A. No, not up to the 15th.

Q. In reply to several questions, you have said it was done under martial law. May I now whether there are any written rules to which you are referring?

A. Yes; certain rules are framed and passed.

Q. Give me that reference; I know nothing about it.

A. I refer you to the Manual of military law; you can get it all there.

Q. Under the authority of this book, you say that people who were arrested should have been handcuffed in couples?

A. I did not say it. I did not say they were.

Q. When the President put that question as to why and under what authority this was done, your reply was that it was done under martial law. May I know whether that is provided for in this book?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it not a fact that when you say that certain things were done under martial law you mean that you thought these things were proper and, therefore, they were done?

A. I think I was fairly just in any action that I took and I thought I was right.

Q. I am not questioning your justice or honesty. When you state that certain things were done under martial law, by that may I understand that they were done because it was your pleasure to do them, because you considered it right to do so? There was no written authority for doing these things.

A. I did what I thought right.

Q. Therefore, when you said that these persons were handcuffed in pairs—

A. I never said they were handcuffed in pairs.

Q. Suppose certain persons were handcuffed in pairs. In answer to the question put by the President, you said you considered it right and it was your pleasure?

A. Not about handcuffing. As to whether they were handcuffed, I cannot tell you. They were arrested; I did not see them.

Q. Supposing handcuffs were put on, this was under your orders?

A. I suppose I become responsible for it, but it was not by my orders. For anything that was done there, I take it that I was responsible.

Q. I want to know, as a matter of fact, whether you were directly or indirectly responsible as the head of the military department?

A. I say I was responsible.

Q. I am not asking the question of responsibility. I want to know whether it was done under your direct orders and whether you were the person who issued those orders?

A. I ordered the arrest of those 11 people.

Q. I am asking about handcuffs.

A. I did not order anybody to put on handcuffs.

Q. Were not a large number of arrested persons kept in an open racket court throughout the day and the night for 6 or 7 days inside the Fort?

A. In the night we had a little cover over the racket court. There were tarpaulins spread over; we did the best we could; there was no room there.

Q. Therefore this allegation that they were kept in an open racket court during the day and the night the whole time is wrong?

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[Continued.]

A. A racket court is usually open.
 Q. Without any shade for their heads? That is the allegation.
 A. My impression is that there was a shed over it.
 Q. May I know what was the number of persons that were kept so in the racket court?
 A. No, I cannot tell you.
 Q. Can I get any record from which I may be able to get that information?
 A. I think when you see Major Briggs, he will be able to give you information on that point probably. I could not positively say, because we have been a long time away.
 Q. After a few days they were removed to cells?
 A. After a few days I left Amritsar and I do not know what happened.
 Q. So long as you were there?
 A. I think they were in the racket court so long as I was there; also in the Ram Bagh.
 Q. In your opinion would there be any justification for keeping couples handcuffed in the night time?
 A. It all depends on what they have done.
 Q. Up to that time it was not investigated. They were under-trial prisoners. What I want to know is, do you think that it was justified, under the circumstances, that these men should be handcuffed in pairs, and that they should be kept in cells in the night time so handcuffed? Do you think it was proper?
 A. If a sentry lets a prisoner go, it is a very serious offence; therefore it may be necessary.
 Q. What is your opinion? Was it justifiable? Was that a proper thing to do?
 A. It was justifiable.
 Q. You went on the night of the 13th inside the city to see that your Curfew orders were obeyed?
 A. That is so.
 Q. And you found that your orders were obeyed?
 A. That is quite true.
 Q. And you intended that that order of yours should be obeyed on the night of the 13th? You intended that the Curfew order should be obeyed?
 A. If I gave an order, I intended it to be obeyed.
 Q. You never gave a moment's thought as to what would happen to the 400 or 500 persons that were killed inside the Jallianwala Bagh, as to how they would be attended to, as to how their relations would come and take them away, as to how any water would be administered to them, as to how any medicine would be administered to them. It never occurred to you as to how it would be possible after 8 o'clock to remove the dead bodies?
 A. They asked if they might remove them, and I allowed them to remove them; they could bring them what they liked.
 Q. May I understand that if those people had gone and disobeyed the Curfew order, you would never have punished them?
 A. I gave my permission that they might go and remove the dead bodies. Therefore I presume they could go.
 Q. Your permission was to remove the dead bodies. Did you in any way modify your Curfew order? Did you make any proclamation that "to-day I modify my Curfew order and allow people to remain outside till 12 o'clock to remove dead bodies?"
 A. I allowed them to go and remove the dead. Therefore they could go.
 Q. Did you in any way modify your Curfew order on the 13th?
 A. It was probably modified.
 Q. From this it appears that it was not modified?
 A. A good deal happened. If I said 'yes,' they might go. The order must have been modified.
 Q. Did you issue any proclamation? Is there any written order saying that the order that was passed by you on the morning of the 12th was modified, and that people were allowed to remain outside their houses up to 12 o'clock or 1 o'clock?
 A. I think they must have remained all the night. I saw all the dead bodies going by the next morning.
 Q. You do not answer my point.

A. I must answer it according to my light.
 Q. Did you pass any written order and is there any written order in existence that the Curfew order had been modified?
 A. I allowed them to go. That is quite enough.
 Q. That is not the answer to my question.
 A. I cannot tell you; I gave them permission to remove and bury their dead. Therefore orders must have been given not to interfere with them.
 Q. If your Curfew order was modified, how was it that at 9 p.m. you went inside the city to see whether your order was obeyed or not?
 A. I do not know that I went at 9 p.m.
 Q. Supposing it was between 9 and 10 p.m.
 A. I do not think it was between 9 and 10 p.m. I think it was later.
 Q. It is clear that you came back to Ram Bagh at 10-30.
 A. It was at 10 o'clock that I went round.
 Q. Therefore I am right in saying that at 10 o'clock you went round? The order or permission to remove the dead bodies was issued by you on the 14th. You see Appendix VI* signed by you at the top of page 16?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Is this military diary a correct diary or do you say it is incorrect?
 A. As far as I know it is correct.
 Q. It is not prepared like the general diary in the thanas?
 A. I do not know of the general diary in the thanas.
 Q. It is written as soon as events happen? It gives a correct idea. It is not merely an imaginary diary?
 A. It ought to be correct. The Brigade Major may forget to make an entry. There may be mistakes in it.
 Q. May I know whether this diary is complete, or only portions of it have been selected for this committee?
 A. I believe what the Brigade Major wrote is there. I can say this much. I do not say whether he has left this or that out. It is what the Brigade Major issued.
 Q. Therefore I think this is a complete diary?
 A. I would not guarantee that as complete. Everything that is mentioned there happened.
 Q. Something might have been omitted.
 A. Quite so; I have been hunting for many a thing which I did, but I could not find them.
 Q. Would he put in everything or are many things omitted?
 A. Certain things may have been omitted. They are hard-worked generally. As an instance, I cannot find that I went through the city on that night in the diary.
 Q. The subsequent proclamations that you issued, did they help you in the maintenance of peace and order?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Supposing those martial law orders had not been issued how would peace and order have been disturbed?
 A. I fail to understand your question, I am sorry. You must repeat it.
 Q. Certain martial law orders had been issued and proclaimed after the 13th or say after the 15th. My point is whether they were necessary for the purposes of maintaining peace and order?
 A. I should think they were. We had to regulate the affairs.
 Q. Take, for instance, on the 25th of April an order was issued that it would be unlawful for more than two people to walk abreast on any constructed or clearly defined pavement?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Do you think it was necessary for the purposes of maintaining peace and order in Amritsar?
 A. I think it must have appeared necessary to the man who was there. I think I was away on the 25th.
 Q. See order No. 8† of the 25th April 1919. And it was continued for 24 days?
 A. It may; I cannot tell. I went away myself.
 Q. Because it was discontinued on the 19th May, i.e., it remained in force for about 23 or 24 days?
 A. I had gone before that. The man on the spot must have thought it necessary for some reason.

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 † Page 184.

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[Continued.]

Q. You are not responsible for this order?
 A. If I was not there. If I handed over the charge on . . . I forget the date on which I handed over charge. I have mentioned in the statement the date on which I handed over charge. I think I had already handed over charge.
 Q. I suggest to you one thing. I want your approval of it or denial. Is it not true that martial law was continued after the 15th in the Amritsar City with the object of clearing up the lock-ups, jail, and other places of custody in which there were hundreds of prisoners?
 A. No. I have never heard of such things. Absolutely not.
 Q. Did you order any flogging inside the Kotwali?
 A. I did not order them to be flogged in that place. It was all done by the Provost-Marshal. It may be, I may have said so. There were three cases. Everything was my order. The Provost-Marshal's order was my order.
 Q. It is a fact that the pleaders, whom you had made special constables, were made to attend and witness two or three flogging cases?
 A. No. They were there in the Ram Bagh. When I was having a meeting with them the flogging was going on. I was present there.
 Q. There were about one hundred pleaders whom you made special constables?
 A. Yes, about that.
 Q. Amongst these were men between the age of 60 and 70?
 A. Yes, there were old men; Mr. Miles Irving asked me and I let them go. If there were any old men they were removed. We wanted young men and we did not want old men. As soon as Mr. Miles Irving told me I let them go.
 Q. Is it not true that after the 13th people were arrested without any evidence and without any information, but their cases were investigated long after?
 A. I accept that there was a considerable amount of delay. I do not know. My orders were that they were to be tried as soon as possible. Orders were received through the Provost-Marshal, and if there was any delay, I don't know about that.
 Q. My point is this. I want to know whether the people were arrested first and the evidence was obtained afterwards or whether the evidence was obtained first and the people were arrested afterwards?
 A. I think the evidence was obtained first that they had committed some offence and then they were tried. All were sent up to higher Tribunals according to orders.
 Q. May I ask you if this evidence which was obtained was oral and was obtained previous to the arrest of these men?
 A. They were tried by Summary Court under martial law and the only man who will tell you about this is Major Shirley as to what he did.
 Q. Were their depositions recorded or heard?
 A. That was not my job to look at this.
 Q. The moving columns were surrounding different villages as you have said. Were not people arrested by these moving columns under your orders?
 A. Yes, under my orders, but after consultation with the Civil authorities, some were arrested.
 Q. Did your party make any searches without any authority or under what authority they were made?
 A. I think that a search was made. I don't remember the name of the village; it was somewhere near Attari where it was said that a lot of railway material was lying and the people came and took it away. That is all.
 Q. Except that, no other searches were made by the moving column?
 A. Good gracious! No.
 Q. You addressed the people at a meeting at Amritsar on the 14th and that address was in the language of the people?
 A. That was after the day of shooting. I partly spoke in the language of the people and partly in English.
 Q. Did you inform the people that if their shops will not be opened, they would be shot down—*goli se mar diye jawenge*?

A. No. Certainly not. They were only too ready to open their shops.
 Q. Did you say anything about people educated in Germany or people from Bengal or people from England, etc.?
 A. I should not think so. It is very difficult to remember now. I should not think so.
 Q. There is no doubt in your mind?
 A. There is a doubt, that is why I am hesitating. I had so much to do. It is not quite fair to ask me what happened so long ago. I cannot answer you straight. I don't remember.
 Q. So long as you remained in Amritsar was there any evidence, apart from inference, placed before you showing that there was an organized conspiracy?
 A. There were acts which were taking place all along the line at the same time.
 Q. I have already said that I don't want you to draw any inferences. Was there any evidence so far as Amritsar is concerned for you to draw an inference from what happened there?
 A. From what happened at Amritsar and elsewhere I formed an opinion that there was a widespread conspiracy.
 Q. Apart from the inference was there any tangible evidence produced before you that what happened in Amritsar was the result of an organized conspiracy?
 A. Lots of murders had been committed and all sorts of things were taking place. There must have been some organized conspiracy right along the line, as far as I can judge.
 Q. Now when you reached the Jallianwala Bagh there was no apprehension of your being attacked as the soldiers were there, or was there a possibility?
 A. There was certainly a possibility.
 Q. Did you take also a large number of police with you whom you left close by at the Jallianwala Bagh?
 A. There was Mr. Rehill and Mr. Plomer with me. I don't know how many police they had with them.
 Q. I refer you to your Appendix No. XIII.* When you arrived in Amritsar on the night of the 11th, there were 475 British soldiers and 710 Indian soldiers. Is it true?
 A. Must be.
 Q. And then up to the 20th April there were about 533 British soldiers and 650 Indian soldiers?
 A. Quite right.
 Q. Your source of information except what you saw with your own eyes of what was happening on the 12th, may I take it, was Muhammad Ashraf Khan?
 A. A lot of other people, citizens and officers who had been appointed for the purpose.
 Q. Except the officers, were there any who gave you information on the 12th and the 13th?
 A. Lots of people living inside the city visited me on the 12th and the 13th and gave me the information.
 Q. Supposing between 400 and 500 were killed what would be the proportion of the wounded?
 A. It was very close firing, you understand. I should say multiplied by 3. It may be more I should think.
 Q. Is it not a fact that it being close firing one bullet could kill 2 or 3 at a time?
 A. That is true. Quite possible.
 Q. You had already made up your mind at the Ram Bagh that you had a very unpleasant duty to perform and that you had to do it?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you make any Ambulance arrangements?
 A. I had no time for that.
 Q. Was it brought to your notice that the dead bodies were mutilated in the night time?
 A. I never heard of it. My men were accused; it was said that the sepoys had gone in. That is not true.
 Q. Before putting other questions, I want to make it clear to you that the assault on Miss Sherwood was a very cowardly one, but the question is this whether you had or had not heard up to this time that both British and Indian women had been shamelessly assaulted by somebody in Railway carriages on station platforms and other places?

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[Continued.]

A. There were rumours. I had heard that some Sikh ladies were interfered with.

Q. I am talking generally and not particularly of these Sikh ladies. They may be from Calcutta, from Madras, or from Bombay. It had happened previously. I had heard it probably. In your opinion, just imagine, was it not a more dastardly assault than the one committed on Miss Sherwood, or do you think the assault on Miss Sherwood was more desperate?

A. I could not say unless I had seen the two assaults, which of the two was more dastardly.

Q. Were you informed of the fact that a meeting was held on the 12th inside the city?

A. I think I was.

Q. Were any person hogged when the movable columns went outside Amritsar City to different villages?

A. No.

Q. Not a single man?

A. Not a single man.

Q. When you were answering a certain question put by Sir Chimanlal you said you did not know about this crawling but you were informed that other men came there apparently voluntarily subsequent to the crawling done by these men?

A. It looked like that at one time; one man actually crawled through three times and had to be stopped by Sergeant Nicholls.

Q. This one man of the 49 men that had to crawl, did it voluntarily?

A. No; that is not good reason. I think that nobody was brought up to the Sergeant by any officials. Therefore it looks as if they came of themselves.

Q. When you passed that order did you make any inquiries whether there were backdoors and exits to these houses?

A. I did not. I thought men would be able to get on to the roofs of their houses and the pickets were on duty from 6 A.M. to 8 P.M. and the people could go out from 8 to 10 P.M. without inconvenience and could get necessary things.

Q. On the 13th was, as far as you are aware, only one of your orders proclaimed?

A. On the 13th, I assume only one order was proclaimed, but it is quite possible that I might have proclaimed other orders. This first and the second orders were both proclaimed. You had better ask Mr. Rehill and the Tahsildar what they were actually proclaiming.

Q. In your opinion, in the orders that you passed in relation to the pleaders who were enrolled as special constables, did you give them sufficient opportunity to carry on their ordinary work?

A. What do you call the ordinary work?

Q. Their ordinary work as pleaders.

A. They could not have carried on their work as special constables. As such they had to report themselves to me three times a day and had to patrol and make arrests.

Q. They could not do their work?

A. I don't think they would have got time.

Q. Now about sweetmeats. How many soldiers came to you and said that they were given sweetmeats?

A. None came to me and said so. They could not come direct to me. They had to come through a lot of other channels.

Q. So no sweetmeats were given to these soldiers?

A. That is only my hearsay knowledge.

Q. And may I know when did it happen and on what date?

A. No, I can't tell that.

Q. Are you or are you not aware that so far as India is concerned martial law can only be proclaimed or introduced by certain individuals. Are you aware of that?

A. Yes.

Q. Can in any fixed area any officer proclaim martial law and appoint officers for that purpose?

A. If there is a rebellion you can assume charge and it will have the effect of martial law. Here is the man on the spot (pointing to Sir George Barrow).

Q. Could you not get orders by wire from the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab?

A. I suppose I could have.

Q. Could you not have obtained these orders from His Excellency the Governor-General or from His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor if there was any need for the introduction of martial law?

A. Absolutely not, I think. The situation was developing very fast by leaps and bounds.

Q. You could not have wired to the Lieutenant-Governor at 10 P.M. on the 11th that the situation was such that you wanted that martial law should be proclaimed?

A. If it had been necessary, I think the Lieutenant-Governor knew as much as I did.

Q. Therefore you did not think it necessary?

A. He was probably meditating. He was coming down from Simla on the 14th.

Q. Can you tell me why it was not possible for you to have wired and asked the permission of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, informing him that the situation was so serious that you could not control the city, to have martial law declared, and why this was not done?

A. You say possible. I say he could have wired.

Q. At the time charge was handed over to you, did you ask your predecessor why he did not ask the permission of superior authority?

A. No, I thought I could manage.

Q. Do you know whether there are any written rules and regulations to which you can refer me by which all the civil courts of the province or of the area under your control can be suspended at the mere request of the Deputy Commissioner?

A. When the situation was what it was, I could take charge.

Q. On the mere request of the Deputy Commissioner to suspend the functions of all the civil courts and police?

A. I cannot remember any law that will say exactly those words.

Q. But are there any rules?

A. There are a number of precedents which have been created.

Q. Am I asking you about precedents? I am asking you about rules and regulations on the subject.

A. It all depends on the circumstances.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. We have just been discussing the question of your assumptions of authority in Amritsar on the 11th of April. There is one point not quite clear to me, and that is whether you assumed that authority on the ground that you felt the situation demanded it, or because the Deputy Commissioner had given you the written document, which is here as one of the appendices to your report?

A. I was the Officer Commanding, Amritsar, as well as Jullundur. If the civil law failed or ceased to operate it was my duty to take things in hand until I got further orders on the subject, so I took the situation in hand. Also civil authority was handed over to me.

Q. Do I understand that, independently of any civil authority handing over to you the supreme authority in Amritsar, you could from your own position as Commanding Officer take it over?

A. As an extreme case I could; if the situation suddenly developed which demanded my acting on assumed responsibility, it is my duty to assume responsibility.

Q. May I know the conditions which would constitute an extreme case to justify you to assume that command? What are the conditions laid down?

A. Well, in case of a rebellion, which I honestly thought was rebellion, I would chance it and take the responsibility. I do not mean to say I would be right in every case, but it would be my duty to take the responsibility, and if I was wrong I would suffer.

Q. You have certain general orders to that effect?

A. No, there are no orders, but it is more or less the Officers Commanding are encouraged to take responsibility, especially in the field.

Q. There are no orders?

A. The orders are that we are to take responsibility.

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[Continued.]

Q. There must be some orders?

A. I do not know of any orders which exactly suit what happened, that would meet a case like mine at Amritsar.

Q. What would in your opinion constitute rebellion? You have said it is your duty to assume supreme authority within the area under your command if there is rebellion?

A. Yes.

Q. And especially if civil law has ceased?

A. Civil law has ceased.

Q. Do you make a distinction between the two, rebellion and civil law ceasing?

A. If the civil law had ceased it helps one what.

Q. Do you consider them one and the same thing, civil law ceasing and rebellion?

A. I should think if civil law has ceased then a rebellion is on.

Q. The two things are the same?

A. Yes.

Q. The ceasing of civil law would mean the existence of rebellion?

A. I should think that would constitute rebellion, that is my opinion.

Q. In appreciating a situation which would enable you to take such drastic powers of life and death over a large number of His Majesty's subjects you have to exercise your judgment whether a certain state of things exists which you can call rebellion, therefore I presume you have very clear notions as to what rebellion means?

A. I should think so; if a case arose I should be able to make up my mind. This is also a case where I ought to assume responsibility, and would run the risks. We have got to do that.

Q. In your opinion the ceasing of civil law is the same thing as the existence of rebellion?

A. I should say very near it. If civil law has ceased there is something serious going on.

Q. That civil law has ceased and therefore there is a state of rebellion?

A. I am not a lawyer.

Q. You certainly understand what rebellion means?

A. I think I can understand what rebellion means, but we all make errors in our judgments.

Q. There may be errors in judgment, but certainly you cannot have any doubt in your mind as to what constitutes rebellion?

A. In my own mind I might say "this is rebellion," another man might prove to me that this is not rebellion.

Q. And when you came to Amritsar and from your experience here for several days you did not find anything from which you could apprehend any danger to the British Raj?

A. Not to the British Raj. I apprehended the danger of mutiny, loss of life, riot, bloodshed and all that sort of thing, but I never imagined that that would end the British Raj.

Q. Nor was there anything aimed at the British Raj?

A. No, I did not say that, because the act of rebellion is aimed at the British Raj.

Q. Do you not think that rebellion implies a certain organization the object of which is to subvert constituted authority?

A. I should think that would be so.

Q. And civil disorder may mean simply loot?

A. May mean merely a riot which has nothing to do with rebellion.

Q. The two things are very distinct?

A. Yes. When you arrived in Amritsar on the 11th of April you found that civil order had ceased.

A. That was one thing.

Q. Nothing more?

A. I also knew from what happened that there must be something else.

Q. But you have no evidence of that, it is merely your guess?

A. No, messages were arriving. I know what had happened in Amritsar itself; other things were happening outside Amritsar all over the place. I had to put

all that together in my mind and say this is a rebellion. Q. Could not disorders and looting occur at the same time in 20 or 30 places?

A. This was not loot, it was derailing of trains, cutting of telegraph wires, etc. Those were acts not of loot but of murder.

Q. Of disorder?

A. It is more than disorder; it is almost amounting to murder if you derail a train.

Q. Because it happened at various places at the same time, from that you inferred that there was rebellion?

A. Not only in Amritsar.

Q. There was rebellion in Amritsar as well as elsewhere?

A. Yes, what was happening in Amritsar was part of the rebellion.

Q. Which was happening elsewhere?

A. As part of the organized movement.

Q. Did you have any information in your possession to lead you to that inference, apart from the occurrences themselves, that there was such an organization behind this movement?

A. I do not think there was any outside information beyond what was actually occurring and what I had heard.

Q. Had you not heard of the general all-India movement for observing the hartal on account of the passing of the Rowlatt Act?

A. I believe there was.

Q. And these hartals and these disorders happened on the dates on which these hartals were observed?

A. I have no knowledge of that. I did not know when it was going to be.

Q. But you knew disorders were happening in various places?

A. In Delhi I knew they were.

Q. They were on those dates fixed for the hartals?

A. No, I did not know what dates the hartals were on. They had a hartal about the 6th in one place and on another day in another place.

Q. 30th March and 6th April. There were two dates and for the whole of India they were the same dates. Could you not account for these disorders as due to this?

A. No, I did not combine them because I did not know much about the hartal.

Q. Do you not think it was necessary for you to know about these hartals in order to know whether it was rebellion, an organised attempt or not?

A. I had done all I could in learning them, but perhaps I have not grasped your question.

Q. My question is this. You said that because at the same time disorders took place in various parts of India, from that you inferred there was rebellion in Amritsar and elsewhere also?

A. Yes, it looked like it.

Q. My suggestion is that these disorders took place on account of the general proclamation of a hartal on certain dates throughout India on account of the passing of the Rowlatt Act. You say you do not know that?

A. I did not think it had to do with the hartals. The hartals were merely the closing of shops as a protest, that would not constitute rebellion.

Q. When you came to Amritsar on the night of the 11th I presume you discussed the situation with the Deputy Commissioner and other officers on the spot?

A. Yes.

Q. He did not inform you that there was a general idea of holding a hartal throughout India on particular days on account of the Rowlatt Act?

A. He may have, I have no recollection.

Q. But if he had told you that then you would modify your opinion that because these disorders took place simultaneously in various parts of India they were not due to any organised rebellion?

A. I should say the acts that were now committed—that is, the uprooting of railway lines, cutting of telegraph wires, murdering of citizens, etc., was more than hartal, and the two had nothing to do with each other.

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[Continued.]

Q. But is the murdering of citizens obviously an act of rebellion against the British Government or the constituted authority?

A. Not single acts, but if they take to it wholesale, and uproot trains and cut telegraph wires and try to cut off the troops, that becomes rebellion.

Q. Was there any cutting of wires or uprooting of railway lines in Amritsar?

A. All round Amritsar there was cutting of telegraph wires.

Q. By the night of the 11th?

A. Rather, I could not get through a wire on the 10th to Amritsar. I had considerable difficulty. I have got it down in my report that we had to send it by a round-about way on the 10th.

Q. I assume that you thought there was some big organization behind the whole India movement, but there must have been some branches at these places where these disorders took place?

A. It looked like an organized movement: I have no proof. It may have been a coincidence all of these things happening, but it certainly looked like an organized rebellion.

Q. What made you think so? If it was an all-India movement and there was some big organization behind the all-India movement, would not that organization have branches at the points where these disorders took place?

A. I should think they would have.

Q. It follows naturally; otherwise it could not be carried out?

A. Yes.

Q. Then it presupposes the existence of a branch in Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the Deputy Commissioner tell you on the 11th that there was a certain branch of this big organization here stirring up this trouble in Amritsar?

A. I fail there. I do not remember what the Deputy Commissioner said, he may have told me, but I have not the vaguest recollection of his telling me.

Q. Don't you think it was a very important fact for you to determine whether there was really a rebellion or not in Amritsar?

A. If he had thought that had anything to do with the matter, he would have probably told me, but as I have no recollection of his having told me, he probably did not tell me.

Q. Then assuming that you had properly appreciated the position and that you thought it necessary in the interests of law and order to assume supreme authority, was it not necessary for you, or is it not necessary according to law, that you should make a proclamation to the effect that you had assumed supreme authority, and that in future Amritsar would be under martial law?

A. I should think it would be a good thing. If I had thought a little faster and had a little more time, I think I would have issued such a proclamation. This is the first rebellion I have had to deal with, and hereafter, though I hope I will not have to deal with another, I may deal with it differently.

Q. May I take it that in certain conditions it is not necessary to proclaim martial law but to act upon it?

A. Yes, to assume authority. I cannot of course snatch it out of the hands of the civil authorities. The civil authorities gave it to me. If the civil authorities give it over I take it over, but if things get very bad and shooting begins and fighting begins, then I assume complete charge. When I arrived at Amritsar it was voluntarily handed over to me, but occasions may arise when the situation is such that I must assume command.

Q. I thought you assumed command because the situation demanded it, now you say that it was because the civil authorities handed it over to you?

A. It was both as a matter of fact; the civil authority handed it over to me and—

Q. But you took it because the civil authorities handed it over to you?

A. Yes, and the situation demanded it too. You must combine the two,

A. And in that case was it not necessary that you should proclaim it?

A. I do not think so, it would have been better to.

Q. Were you not bound to do so?

A. No, I was not bound to, but I think it would have been better to. I ought to have had some sort of order to tell them.

Q. And that for the reason that the civil authorities had handed over to you? By civil authority you mean the Deputy Commissioner?

A. Yes.

Q. You said the people were going to carry out their intentions, and this rebellion, whatever it was, by means of canes?

A. They were going to be armed probably with these canes.

Q. And we have just been pursuing the question that, probably, according to you, there was some organisation behind the movement, so I take it there must have been some intelligent people who understood the situation, who were directing all this. Do you think any man in his senses would imagine that he could subvert constituted authority by means of canes?

A. That is, if the army was numerous enough, that you could overcome a smaller army by means of men armed with canes, it is quite possible.

Q. Do you think this organised mob, no matter how large in number, could successfully, under any conditions, be opposed to organised forces of the Crown?

A. Not for long. In a place like Amritsar and various small places where the garrison is small they might.

Q. You come again to Amritsar?

A. I say, if the force is large enough they might suddenly be able to disarm a portion of the organized forces, and then, having a little success, they might even get them over to their side, we may say.

Q. It would not last for long?

A. No, but a great deal of damage might be done in the meanwhile.

Q. Were you not told at the time on the 11th of April that it was only a very small proportion of the inhabitants of Amritsar who were causing these disorders, and that there was a very large number of citizens who were peaceful, law-abiding and loyal?

A. I may have been told, I cannot remember that. But there was a very large crowd where the rioters were in the early days, therefore it looked as if a great many of the citizens of Amritsar were in the movement.

Q. The respectable ones?

A. A great many people who did not want to join it were probably forced to do so because law and order was out of hand. If there had been law and order, I believe there would have been lots of men who, if they had been guarded, would have been loyal. It was the want of that that drove them to it.

Q. You have told us about that Proclamation on the morning of the 13th, that you did not know the city of Amritsar very well?

A. I do not know the city of Amritsar very well even now.

Q. Don't you think it was necessary for you, when you assumed supreme authority, to know the city fairly well through maps or other information?

A. I have been working at it; I was working at it and looking it up; it takes me a little longer to learn geography than it once did.

Q. You assume such enormous powers over a certain area and yet you were not familiar with the main features of that area at all?

A. I had the civil authorities with me; the Deputy Commissioner with me and the police. I assumed that they would proclaim the Proclamation wherever it was necessary in all the important places, and those were my directions.

Q. You had them with you and did not think it necessary?

A. I had them there; I assumed they knew Amritsar and would do what was necessary.

Q. You have told us about the crawling order, that it was given not with the object either of punishment or revenge, but because you thought the street to be sacred?

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[Concluded.]

A. The making of the street sacred was that no one was to go through and if they did go through, they should go on all fours. I probably said that and I may have put it down in writing, but I did not mean to send any one back to crawl, nor did I believe in my mind anybody would go back voluntarily to crawl. Therefore I thought nobody would crawl. It was an accident that they were made to crawl. I am responsible for it, but it was a pure and simple accident.

Q. Because the street, according to you, was sacred?

A. That was the idea. I was searching in my brain for some suitable punishment to meet the case. That was not the punishment I intended to give. I intended to make nobody crawl through that street.

Q. Nobody should go through and if they did they should crawl?

A. That was it, if they did, they must go through on all fours?

Q. Is it necessary to go to sacred places on all fours?

A. Not necessary. That was a portion of the order. I have explained that I never intended anybody to crawl. I made it sacred by closing the street, not by making anybody go through on all fours.

Q. And you said you erected the whipping post there because the place was sacred?

A. Not because it was sacred; I erected it there because I intended to punish people there.

Q. It was a sacred street?

A. A sacred street and I was going to make examples of the men who had beaten that woman. I did not at that time imagine that I was going to beat other people there too.

Q. Did you have any evidence whatsoever that any of the people who lived in that street were involved in any way in the brutal assault on Miss Sherwood?

A. No. But they might have helped to save the woman I think. They helped afterwards; they might have helped before while the thing was going on. They might have come out and tried to save her. I do not look upon their behaviour as what it should have been in not coming out.

Q. Some people rescued Miss Sherwood?

A. That was later.

Q. Are you sure that some people were standing outside and looking on?

A. I can tell you what happened. There was an open door and Miss Sherwood after being knocked down tried to gain admittance at this open door and the door was slammed in her face.

Q. In that street?

A. Yes; in that street.

Q. By one person?

A. That is all I can tell you.

Q. And then she was taken to some people's house for protection?

A. Some man helped her. This man did a lot to help her and when I saw her in hospital she said this man had saved her.

Q. You have no evidence that any man living in the street abstained from helping her?

A. They ought to have been more ready to help her.

Q. Did you not think that because the city was in disorder peaceful citizens would remain in their houses and naturally not venture out?

A. There was a woman being beaten in the street and they ought to have ventured out.

Q. In answer to a question you said that the pickets were removed from that street after 8 o'clock at night?

A. That is right.

Q. Then if people wanted to get out they could do so? Were not Curfew orders also in force at the time?

A. At the beginning it was 8 o'clock—afterwards 10 o'clock. They could go out between 8 and 10 and before 6 o'clock in the morning.

Q. And after the pickets were removed was it not disobedience of orders to go through that street without going on all fours?

A. They were all allowed to pass by the picket. Up to that time they were allowed to go in the morning and evening and they used to collect outside and when the picket moved the crowd used to rush through.

Q. Still the orders applied every night?

A. I meant them to apply for every hour but actually the picket was only remaining up to 8 o'clock.

Q. If they had been caught disobeying these orders at night they were liable to be punished?

A. Yes, after 10. I do not think they would have been run in.

Q. But the liability was there still?

A. Yes—probably.

Q. What was the necessity for proclaiming Martial Law on the 15th when Martial Law had been in operation from the night of the 11th?

A. This was by order. Up to that there was no actual orders.

Q. You have told us that on the 13th the city was a model of law and order?

A. It was all quiet when I went round. After the shooting it soon became a model of law and order.

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Khan Sahib AHMAD JAN.

At Lahore, Thursday, the 20th November 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B.,
K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Rai Bahadur G. K. Roy, Superintendent (Acting for Secretary).

Khan Sahib AHMAD JAN, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Amritsar.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Ahmad Jan, you are a Deputy Superintendent of Police?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You have been for about 23 months in Amritsar and you were made Deputy Superintendent in May 1918?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You were at the headquarters on the 30th March and also on the 6th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On the latter date, I think you were on duty at the Kotwali?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On the 10th April when the serious disturbances took place in Amritsar, were you at the police office at 10.30?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Where is that office?

A. In the Kutchery, in the District Court.

Q. Did you get a note from the City Inspector to the effect that you were to go to the Kotwali?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Is the City Inspector or are you the senior in position?

A. I am supposed to be higher, I am a Deputy Superintendent.

Q. Had the orders come through Mr. Plomer, the Deputy Superintendent of Police?

A. No, Sir.

Q. From whom did you get them?

A. The City Inspector wrote a note saying that Mr. Plomer wanted me at the Kotwali.

Q. If you were supposed to be higher in rank than the City Inspector, he could not give you any instructions except as the mouthpiece of some one else?

A. Yes, he said in his note that it was Mr. Plomer's orders that I should go to the Kotwali.

Q. I think you went to the Inspector's house?

A. I went to my house, and I met him just near my house.

Q. Is that some 400 yards from the Kotwali?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And just after the Hall Gate Bazar?

A. Near the Hall Gate Bazar.

Q. Did you learn of the arrest of Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal?

A. Yes, Sir, from the City Inspector.

Q. After that where did you go?

A. We both went to the Kotwali.

Q. Did you receive any further orders from any other officer?

A. No, Sir.

Q. What were the orders that you had received prior to your arrival at the Kotwali?

A. No orders.

Q. What had you to do at the Kotwali?

A. I was told to be present there as I was on the 6th.

Q. I suppose you had to maintain order with the police force at your command?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you arrived at the Kotwali, what force did you find there?

A. Three reserves, about 75 men.

Q. Were these men armed?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. With rifles?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In addition were there any detectives?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. How many?

A. I don't remember the exact number, about 15 or 16.

Q. On your way to the Kotwali I think you had seen no indication of unrest?

A. No, Sir.

Q. About 12.30, however, did the people begin to pass towards the Hall Bazar in crowds?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were the people that passed in an excited state?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What were they doing?

A. They were calling out *Satyapal ki jai, Kitchlew ki jai, Hindu aur Musalman ki jai*.

Q. Then you heard of the crowd collecting in Aitchison Park?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You continued to remain at the Kotwali?

A. I was then at the Kotwali, and the City Inspector told me that he had informed Mr. Plomer.

Q. Was there any police force looking after the crowds as they went towards Aitchison Park?

A. I was told there was a reserve, just near the bridge at that place.

Q. Did you hear later that there had been firing at the railway crossing and that some men had been killed?

A. Yes, Sir, at the time when the door of the Kotwali was being broken, I heard the noise. I went up there. That was the time I heard that firing was resorted to, they said *goli chal gai*.

Q. Was there any disturbance at this time in front of the Kotwali?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Was there not an attempt to break into the Kotwali?

A. No, Sir, only a door.

Q. What happened to the door?

A. The glasses of the door in the gateway were smashed.

Q. Who had smashed the glasses?

A. I could not see anybody there. When I went there, nobody was breaking the glasses at the time. I could not see anybody there.

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[Continued.]

Q. When you went out after the glasses of the door had been broken were there many people about?

A. Yes, by that road people were passing.

Q. The people who were passing were in a state of excitement?

A. After that I think I saw them more excited.

Q. Did you give any orders to your force?

A. On this I got all the force lined in front of the Kotwali.

Q. You put a force in front of the Kotwali?

A. Because I thought it was a dangerous time.

Q. What was your object in putting that force there?

A. May I add something more here, Sir?

The President.—Yes, certainly.

A. On the 6th, there were three Magistrates in the Kotwali. The Superintendent of Police and the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mr. Plomer, directed us that people who were in uniform and going here and there in front of the Kotwali should remain at the rear of the Kotwali because their appearance would make the mob more excited. Therefore all the reserves on that day were kept behind the Kotwali. Similarly on the 10th they were put behind the Kotwali. I called them from behind the Kotwali.

Q. On the 10th, as I understand, there was no Magistrate near the Kotwali?

A. No, Sir. The police were lined in front of the Kotwali.

Q. When was the Town Hall burnt?

A. At this time a man came and said that the Chartered Bank was attacked and the lives of two Sahibs were in great danger. Then I went to that place, the Chartered Bank.

Q. Did you go to the Chartered Bank or did you give instructions to the City Inspector to go?

A. First I told him to go with a reserve, but he said that he was ordered not to leave the Kotwali.

Q. Did you go yourself?

A. Yes, I went myself with a reserve.

Q. Had the Town Hall been burnt when you went to the Chartered Bank or was it still intact when you went there?

A. After I went to the Chartered Bank the Town Hall was burnt. I was at the front door of the Bank when a constable said *ag lag gaya* (it has caught fire). Then I went out and saw the Town Hall was burning.

Q. How many men did you take with you to the Chartered Bank?

A. 25 men.

Q. How many did you leave at the Kotwali?

A. The rest, about 50.

Q. Were those 50 men armed?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was there a large crowd in front of the Chartered Bank?

A. I estimated roughly that there were about 2,000 men.

Q. Did you see what they were doing?

A. Some of them, I should say, were inside the Bank, and there were a lot of others outside; when I reached there I made a rush and cried out *pakaro, pakaro*, that is to say, seize them, seize them, and the people ran away, and I found a lot of papers burning outside the Bank and all the Bank glasses and other property were smashed.

Q. At this time, did you know whether the National Bank was burnt or not?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Had it not been burnt?

A. I had no information at all.

Q. The National Bank is not far from the Chartered Bank, could you not see when you were at the Chartered Bank whether the National Bank was burning or not?

A. No, Sir, I could not see.

Q. If it was actually burning, there would be smoke rising to the heavens and you could see that?

A. I did not see it.

Q. Did you look in the opposite direction?

A. No, Sir, I was in the Bank, sometimes inside and sometimes at the door.

Q. What did you do at the Chartered Bank?

A. When I went there the people had run away. I put my men outside on the road and I put some men inside the Bank. Then I searched all the rooms in the Chartered Bank. I found none outside. Then I saw two gentlemen on the balcony.

Q. Now is it not the case that by the time you actually got into this Bank the crowds were running away?

A. Yes, Sir, they were running.

Q. What caused them to run away?

A. I rushed upon them and we cried out *pakaro, pakaro*, i.e., seize them, seize them, and the crowds ran away.

Q. Did you seize any one of the crowd?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Why not?

A. I was only trying to see if the Sahibs were alive and what had happened to them. I was very anxious about those two gentlemen.

Q. How long were you at this Bank?

A. I personally was there up to 5 p.m.

Q. When you had gone there, what time was it?

A. I could not say the exact time, I think it was about half-past one when I went there.

Q. So from half-past one till 5 you were at the Chartered Bank, and during that time did you either see the National Bank burning or did you hear that it had been burnt?

A. I did not hear anything. No report came to me. I did not see anything myself.

Q. After you saw that the Sahibs were in safety, what duties were you performing at the Bank?

A. I was thinking perhaps the mob might come and attack again, therefore I had posted my men inside and outside.

Q. You posted men outside the Bank which by this time was deserted?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you not see from the excitement in the streets that something grave was happening in other parts of the town?

A. I was at a place where I had no opportunity to think of other matters, because there were two European gentlemen there and I expected another assault on them.

Q. Before you left the Kotwali, had you given any instructions to the City Inspector as to what he was to do in the event of the crowd resorting to violence or destruction?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Why not?

A. The City Inspector is a senior man. He is actually senior to me. I was junior to him. I was made a temporary Deputy Superintendent after that. Of course he knew very well everything because he had seen Mr. Plomer but I could not see him, and Mr. Plomer and the City Inspector were directly in charge of the city. I had no connection with the city at all.

Q. You got back, as I understand, to the Kotwali about 5 o'clock?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you learn then that serious destruction had been done in the city?

A. About the National Bank, and the Alliance Bank, I was told that guards had been sent there.

Q. Did you find that a number of Europeans had taken refuge in the Kotwali?

A. Two men.

By the Hon'ble Justice Rankin—

Q. You got to the City Inspector's house at about 12.15?

A. I reached the Kotwali at about 12.15.

Q. You got to the Kotwali at 12.15 with the Inspector?

A. Yes, with the Inspector.

Q. And there were 75 armed men, is that so?

A. Yes, Sir.

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[Continued.]

Q. Were there any other men there when you got to the Kotwali?

A. Yes, Sir, as I just stated, there were some detectives and some other men belonging to the Kotwali itself.

Q. The detective staff you said numbered about 10 to 15, is that right?

A. 15 or 16.

Q. And how many were the men belonging to the Kotwali itself?

A. I could not tell, because they were all busy. There were some clerks and others.

Q. Never mind about clerks, I am talking to you about the police force. Were there any other policemen apart from the detectives and 75 armed men?

A. There may have been, Sir.

Q. Did you not enquire what force you had at the Kotwali?

A. I had three reserves. That was the force.

Q. Three reserves means 75 men, but apart from these how many policemen had you at the Kotwali?

A. I did not enquire. I was told that these reserves were put there on duty.

Q. You understood that the 75 armed men was the police reserve for the whole city?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You understood that they were not there simply to guard the Kotwali, but to be of use wherever necessary throughout the city?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I understood you to say that you did what had been done on the 6th and you put your men out of sight at Kotwali?

A. They were there already. They were behind the Kotwali.

Q. At about 12-30 I understand the crowds began to pass towards Hall Bazar. Does that mean they began to pass between the Town Hall and the Kotwali and went through the gate?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. At the rear of the Town Hall, on the other side of the Town Hall, is there a road?

A. Yes, there is a road, and people can pass through it.

Q. Is it a wide road?

A. An ordinary road.

Q. When you got there, the crowds were not going by that road, as I understand, but they were coming in between the Town Hall and going through the gate to the Hall Bazar?

A. Yes, I saw that.

Q. They kept on going by one way?

A. I saw them go towards the Hall Bazar.

Q. About what time did you bring your men out and put them in front of the Kotwali?

A. At 1-30.

Q. After that time the crowd had been allowed to go between the Kotwali and Town Hall as they liked?

A. They passed that way.

Q. You allowed them to go to the Hall Bazar through the Gate at 1-30 without interfering with them between the Town Hall and Kotwali?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Up to what time did you receive any information at all of the turbulent crowds at the Railway crossing? 12-30?

A. That was the time when the firing took place. That was the time I got information of the Chartered Bank.

Q. You got information that the Chartered Bank was fired and of the fire at the Railway crossing at the same time?

A. Yes.

Q. When you got your men in front of the Kotwali, where did you place them, in front or across the roads, so as to bar the gate?

A. I got information about the Chartered Bank and left with them.

Q. What were you doing? Simply standing in front?

A. No, I was doing what was necessary and advisable.

Q. You mean you did not make up your mind to do anything particular with your men?

A. I had not decided yet.

Q. Previous to that you had noticed, had you, that the door had been broken?

A. It was at the same time that I noticed that.

Q. Was it seeing the door that made you take the men to the front of the Kotwali?

A. Yes.

Q. You saw the door broken, you heard the firing at the station and you heard the message from the Chartered Bank, all at the same time?

A. I think so.

Q. I want you to be quite clear as to whether you heard the firing or not?

A. I heard it.

Q. Where exactly was this door?

A. In the gateway.

Q. Inside the archway?

A. Yes.

Q. All this time had you any men at all posted at the far end of the gateway?

A. No.

Q. Had you any men keeping any sort of guard up the street from the gateway?

A. No.

Q. Had you any men keeping a look-out towards the direction in which the Alliance Bank is?

A. No.

Q. The road that runs down to the Alliance Bank is commanded as regards the one end of it, is it not, from the Kotwali?

A. There are other roads leading to the Alliance Bank which were not visible from the Kotwali.

Q. Had you taken any steps at all from the Kotwali to see what was happening in your immediate front?

A. A detective staff was posted to bring the information.

Q. Were they sent out into the streets to walk about?

A. They were ordered to go everywhere.

Q. They were sent out quite early in the morning away from the Kotwali?

A. Not in the morning.

Q. At what time.

A. I do not know exactly.

Q. Then the detective staff were going to and fro?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they reporting to you?

A. To the City Inspector.

Q. While you were in charge there, did you see any report from the detective staff?

A. The detective staff reported to the City Inspector that people were gathering in the Aitchison Park and the City Inspector told me so.

Q. Did they report to you what was the condition of the road leading from your own gate to the Hall Gate?

A. Mobs were passing on.

Q. Did you send any of these detectives in any particular direction to bring reports to you?

A. They should go everywhere and bring information.

Q. About 1-30, how many reports did you receive from the outside by means of detectives?

A. I can't say how many. They were received by the City Inspector. I received that much information, i.e., the shops were closed and people were going to Aitchison Park, and they were going again to the Deputy Commissioner's house.

Q. So you do not know what reports or how many were received?

A. I do not know.

Q. Did you regard yourself as in charge of the Kotwali or did you regard it enough if as senior officer you supervised and left the charge to the City Inspector?

A. I was posted on duty that day.

Q. The City Inspector was in charge of the Kotwali and you were in charge of all?

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[Continued.]

A. I was sent for only to remain there and see what was going on.

Q. It is no good seeing anything unless you do something? You were supposed to be in charge for the purpose of taking action?

A. I considered myself to be in charge.

Q. Of what?

A. If I heard that there was to be another demonstration I considered myself to be in charge for that.

Q. Which did you consider to be in charge of the 75 armed men?

A. I considered myself to be in charge.

Q. I suppose you can be said to be in charge of the arrangements for getting information to enable you to use the 75 men?

A. Yes.

Q. I just ask you once again, you never received a single report from the detectives direct yourself?

A. Up to that time I received no other report.

Q. Did you receive any report yourself from the detectives?

A. No.

Q. You went out with your 25 men to the Chartered Bank. You had to go through the gate a certain distance through a sort of garden in front of your gate, before you got to the side street which leads to the Chartered Bank?

A. Not through the garden, but through the Hall Bazar, the main street.

Q. You had to proceed a distance up the Hall Bazar before you got to the side road that takes you to the Chartered Bank?

A. Yes.

Q. When you proceeded did you notice whether in part of the same street in front of you there was a mob?

A. Crowds were passing.

Q. They were still being allowed to go between the Town Hall and Kotwali and pass along the road?

A. Yes.

Q. And when your 25 men passed, there was a crowd behind and a crowd in front of them?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you at that time had any message from the National Bank?

A. No, Sir.

Q. When you got up to the crowd round the Chartered Bank, crowds scattered in front of you?

A. That was so.

Q. Then you got into the Bank and found the Sahibs there. Why did you not take them to the Kotwali straight away?

A. Crowds were passing the road.

Q. Although the crowd which attacked the Bank ran away you thought that the crowd would come along and attack again?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you get any message from the remainder of the force at Kotwali? Did you send any message to the effect that the crowd was dangerous and that they would block the gate?

A. I sent no message.

Q. When did you first see signs of the Town Hall being put on fire?

A. Some time after I was there. A little time after.

Q. On seeing those signs did you not think it right either to communicate to the Kotwali or take your force and the Sahibs straight away?

A. I said just now that the people were passing. I did not think it proper to take the Sahibs at the time unprotected. I tried my best to save their lives.

Q. You had one-third of the whole Police Reserve, 25 armed men, and the distance between you and the Kotwali was about 50 yards only?

A. I cannot say whether 50 yards or 100 yards.

Q. Did you make any attempt with your 25 men to clear the bit of road from the main street to the Chartered Bank?

A. No, Sir.

Q. What was the danger in taking the Sahibs through? You only had a little bit of the whole Bazar Road to keep clear?

A. I did not think of it.

Q. The only bit of road to be cleared is the bit in front of the Hall Bazar?

A. Exactly.

Q. Did you know there were 60 policemen barring the gate?

A. No.

Q. At any rate you knew that there may be as many as 50 more armed men a few yards inside the gate. You knew that?

A. Yes.

Q. You could have called to them from the end of the Chartered Bank road in Hall Bazar, could you not?

A. I did not call them. I saw a guard coming towards the Hall Bazar.

Q. They managed to go through that bit of road all right. Why could you not?

A. I could not leave the Bank.

Q. Why not?

A. There were 2 European gentlemen inside. I feared the Bank would be attacked again.

Q. I put it to you again; you could have blocked the Hall Bazar at the junction of the side road which leads to the Chartered Bank and your forces could have blocked up the gate. Why did not you do either? Or give orders for taking either action?

A. I did not think.

Q. Did you ever discover whether the Town Hall had been fired by people entering from the back or from the front?

A. No.

Q. Had you and Inspector Ashraf Khan had any difference of opinion while you were at the Kotwali that morning?

A. None at all.

Q. No quarrel?

A. No.

Q. No question as to who was to take orders from the other?

A. No.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. What do you mean by saying you had no connection with the city?

A. I was in charge of the rural stations; I was not in charge of the city station.

Q. On the 10th you were put in charge of the city or you considered yourself as being in charge of the city?

A. I considered myself as being in charge.

Q. And that was because trouble was anticipated over the arrest of Kitchlew and Satyapal?

A. I was told they would again make a *hartal*.

Q. Because trouble was anticipated that day you were called in and you considered yourself to be in charge of the city. Is it so?

A. Yes. In charge of the work, you mean.

Q. For maintaining order in the city that day and for seeing that there were no disturbances?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. For that purpose, the Police Inspector was under your orders?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Now if that was so, I want to know why after you went to the Chartered Bank, i.e., from 1-30 p.m., right up to 5 p.m. (witness—it is not exact time, may be about that) that you took no steps to discharge that duty that was cast upon you, i.e., to see that order was maintained in the city? You took no steps at all to control the whole thing?

A. I could not leave the bank.

Q. When you went to the Chartered Bank you thought that your whole duty consisted in guarding those two gentlemen and the rest of your duty of keeping order in the city had not to be attended to?

A. I was close by the Kotwali. They could easily ask for my help and advice. I was not asked at all.

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[Continued.]

Q. You did not do anything because nobody took instructions from you. Is that your explanation? You were inactive because nobody came to you and asked for instructions. Is that what you mean?

A. I was not inactive.

Q. What was your activity during that period, 1-30 to 5 P.M.? You were at the Chartered Bank guarding those European gentlemen. What other activity did you exhibit during that time?

A. I thought that was the most important thing.

Q. You thought you discharged your duty of keeping order in the city by guarding only those 2 European gentlemen at the Chartered Bank. Was that your idea?

A. I had no information about the city. Had I heard about the National Bank, I think I should have taken some more risk.

Q. Just follow me. When you found that 2 European gentlemen in the Chartered Bank were attacked by the mob, that the Bank was attacked, surely that must have given you the idea that something very unusual and unruly was happening in the city. Is not that so? It must give you an idea that the city was out of hand?

A. I could not think that.

Q. You thought everything else was quiet in the city. What was the idea that you formed when the 2 gentlemen in the Bank were attacked? Did not that give you an idea that something very unusual was happening in the city?

A. No, Sir.

Q. You considered that there was nothing unusual in the city?

A. I cannot say that.

Q. As a Police officer and as a man of common sense, when you found the mob attacking 2 European gentlemen and a Bank did not that give you some idea as to the conduct of the mob?

A. I did not think so. I had to guard those gentlemen.

Q. That was the only thing you were bound to attend to and nothing else? If you had come to know of some other thing you would have attended to it. Is that so?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it not your duty to find out what else was happening?

A. I was at the Bank.

Q. Was it or was it not your duty to find out what else was happening?

A. I had posted detectives for that purpose.

Q. Did it occur to you that when the Chartered Bank was attacked and those 2 Europeans were attacked similar incidents may be happening round about you?

A. It did not strike me.

Q. Never struck you that similar events may have been happening in the city?

A. No, Sir.

Q. With all your experience?

A. I have never such an experience in my whole life.

Q. Were you unnerved because it was such an unusual occurrence?

A. Had I been unnerved I could never have gone to the Bank and saved the Europeans.

Q. Then you had your wits about you?

A. Yes.

Q. When you found that these banks and European gentlemen were attacked you never considered it your duty to look about and see what was happening about you in other places?

A. It never occurred to me.

Q. You thought you discharged your duty by staying at the Chartered Bank?

A. I thought it was a more important one.

Q. You discharged your duty as Deputy Superintendent of Police in Amritsar by being 4 hours at this Bank merely guarding the Bank and 2 European gentlemen and that when the crowd had run away. You thought you did your duty by merely guarding the bank?

A. The only information about any incident was about these 2 European gentlemen; so I thought it my duty to save the lives of these 2 European gentlemen.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. At 3 o'clock you had already sent those two Europeans to the Kotwali?

A. I think it was 3 o'clock.

Q. What were you doing from 3 o'clock to 5 o'clock at the Bank?

A. I stayed at the Bank in order to give the people an impression that those two Europeans were still at the Bank and they had not been removed to the Kotwali, so that people may not assault the Kotwali as they had previously assaulted the Bank.

Q. You sent those two European gentlemen through that piece of garden?

A. Yes.

Q. That piece of garden on the road where the crowds were passing?

A. It is so.

Q. You did not consider it unsafe to send those two European gentlemen with an escort of a few constables?

A. The rush at that time had decreased and I with 5 or 6 men went along that road, so that people's attention might be directed towards me.

Q. That is not my point. When the two European gentlemen were going from the bank to the Kotwali, they would be visible to the crowd?

A. The head dresses were changed so that people might not be able to know them.

Q. Your purpose would have been effected by leaving about 10 or 15 men at the bank and by your going towards the city or other banks and finding out what was happening. What was there to prevent your leaving, say, about 10 constables at the bank from 3 to 5 o'clock, to enable you to go and see what was happening in other places?

A. I thought of stationing the guard as it was.

Q. Now, you reached the Kotwali at 3 o'clock. Even when you reached the Kotwali, you did not enquire as to what was happening in the city in other places, whether any places had been looted or burnt or not?

A. I did not reach at 3 o'clock.

Q. At 3-15? You say "As there were lots of people about, I waited till about 3 o'clock before taking them to the Kotwali. I sent them in charge of Labhu Ram and a Head Constable to the Kotwali. I went round the road up to the front entrance of the Kotwali to divert the attention of the people." Then you went up to the gateway?

A. Up to the gateway at 3 o'clock.

Q. Then you did not enquire as to why a guard of 25 had been sent out of the Kotwali towards the city?

A. I did not go to the Kotwali.

Q. How many yards were you away from the Kotwali?

A. I never went up that side.

Q. You went at 3 o'clock to the gate of the Kotwali. How far was the gate from the place you were standing?

A. The same gateway, the arch.

Q. How far were you from the arch?

A. I think about 30 or 40 yards.

Q. You were about 30 or 40 yards from the gate of the Kotwali?

A. From the Kotwali itself.

Q. You were about 30 or 40 yards away?

A. Yes, at the arch.

Q. You had already seen a guard of 25 men going towards another direction. It never struck you to make enquiries?

A. Not at that time.

Q. You were at the Chartered Bank?

A. Yes, at that time.

Q. Therefore you had already seen a guard of 25 men leaving the Kotwali?

A. Yes.

Q. At 3 o'clock you went to the Kotwali in the sense that you were 30 or 40 yards away. It never

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Khan Sahib AHMAD JAN—concluded—Sardar Bahadur SARDAR SUKHA SINGH.

struck you to make any enquiries as to why a guard had been sent and what was happening?

A. I returned soon. I did not go to the Kotwali itself.

Q. Even after seeing that a guard of 25 men had been sent to some other place, even then it did not strike you that something unusual was happening?

A. I cannot say whether it was 25 men.

Q. You saw a body of policemen going towards another direction. Even then it did not strike you that something unusual was happening in the city somewhere else?

A. I cannot say now, Sir.

Q. At the time when you came from your house to the Kotwali at about 12-15 or 12-30, did you see any signs of unrest?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. Khan Sahib, how many years have you served in the Punjab Police?

A. Thirty-one years.

Q. You were at one time City Inspector of Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. So you have some experience of Town Police work?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it the duty of every police officer to protect life and property?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it the duty of Town Police Officers when the town is in the possession of a mob, to clear the streets and disperse the mob?

A. It is.

Q. Why didn't you do that?

A. Up to the time I was in the Kotwali, I should say that I protected two lives. I got the information and I protected two lives.

Q. Why didn't you take your police out and clear the streets of the city of the mob which had taken possession of it?

A. I had no information properly speaking. I got information about the Chartered Bank and I went there.

Sardar Bahadur SARDAR SUKHA SINGH, Deputy Superintendent of Police, C. I. D., Punjab.

By the President—

Q. Are you Deputy Superintendent of Police of the Criminal Investigation Department in the Punjab?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think you were not at Amritsar during the disturbances, but you had to make certain investigations in connection with cases?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I want really to get from you a statement as to how cases were investigated. Who made investigations into cases?

A. The actual investigations were made by the Inspector and Sub-Inspectors.

Q. Under whose supervision were these?

A. Under the supervision of different officers.

Q. Who were these different officers?

A. For the city, the Assistant to the Superintendent of Police, Amritsar, Mr. Plomer, was with me.

Q. Who was your head? Mr. Howell?

A. Yes; and for the Railway cases, there was the Deputy Superintendent of Railway Police, Sardar Bishan Singh, and for the suburbs of Amritsar, there was this gentleman, Ahmad Jan, who was just examined.

Q. What were your duties?

A. My duty was as Personal Assistant to Mr. Howell, to hear reports from the investigating staff, to see that no unreasonable arrest was taking place, and to submit *challans*, to see if the evidence was correct and to supervise the whole work.

Q. During what period of time did you act in that capacity?

Q. Were your men armed?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were they armed with firearms?

A. Yes.

Q. For what purpose do they carry firearms?

A. For purposes of firing.

Q. Do you think now that you would have done your duty if you had taken your men into the streets on this occasion and tried to make the mob disperse, and if they refused, to have fired at them?

A. If I had been in the Kotwali, I should have done so, but I was in the Bank.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. Is the Kotwali the only police station in Amritsar or are there other stations?

A. There is only one police station.

Q. There are no *thanas*?

A. No other *thanas*.

Q. Did you think that a guard of 75 men was sufficient in the present state of the town?

A. If there had been no disturbance it would have been sufficient, but at such disturbances I think it was not.

Q. When you went to the Chartered Bank did it not occur to you that there were several other banks quite close and they might be similarly attacked as the Chartered Bank?

A. I was very busy; I thought it was only that bank which had been attacked.

Q. You were busy in looking after the Chartered Bank. As the senior officer in charge of the Police in the city of Amritsar to protect the life and property of the inhabitants, it did not occur to you that the mob which attacked the Chartered Bank might attack also the other banks which were not very far away, viz., the National Bank and the Alliance Bank?

A. It did not strike me.

Q. Did it not also strike you to enquire as to what was happening at the National Bank which is only at a stone's throw from the Chartered Bank?

A. I did not hear anything about the National Bank and made no enquiry.

A. From 19th April up to 7th June.

Q. That is practically during the whole period of martial law?

A. Yes. Martial law was still in force when I came back to Lahore to assist in the prosecutions of the big cases.

Q. Is that the prosecutions of the conspiracy cases?

A. Yes.

Q. You have told us generally what your duties were. I would like you to give me the details of the actual procedure that you followed?

A. When I went there, I took a list of people who were under arrest at that time.

Q. Who provided you with that list of the arrested people?

A. The Kotwali staff.

Q. When you got that list what did you do?

A. Officers were sent for from outside stations and were gathered from the district also who were to make the investigations, and I divided the work.

Q. You got these officers to make investigations?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they in turn make reports to you?

A. They were investigating cases and writing their case diaries. They were coming to me to say what the result of the enquiries were almost daily.

Q. When you got the result of the inquiries, did you act on your own initiative or did you consult with Mr. Howell?

A. Mr. Howell was sitting in the same room and Mr. Plomer also sat in the room. It was a big hall

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Sardar Bahadur SARDAR SUKHA SINGH.

[Continued.]

like this, where a clerk and our staff and all these officers were sitting. Mr. Howell used to come there daily twice.

Q. Was it Mr. Howell who determined what people were to be prosecuted?

A. Yes. We have to go through the evidence and see whether the evidence is sufficient for sending the case up for trial.

Q. How many cases altogether had you to deal with?

A. 108 cases.

Q. Is it that 108 cases were sent up to the courts?

A. Yes.

Q. You would have had a number more to consider whether they should be brought before the courts or not?

A. Yes; not very much.

Q. How many more?

A. The thing is this, during the investigations the greatest care was taken that only those should be arrested who could be sent up for trial. I will explain to you, Sir, that there were only 7 or 8 persons who were arrested by the investigating staff and not sent up for trial. They reported for release about 7 or 8 out of 533.

Q. Was there not a much larger number of people who were arrested and kept in custody for some time?

A. I am explaining that point also. Besides this there were about 12 persons who were arrested under orders and they could not be sent up for trial.

Q. What do you mean by arrested under orders?

A. I will explain. On the 19th when I went there, Mr. Connor, the Additional District Magistrate, had recorded the statement of Mrs. Easdon and that statement was produced before the District Magistrate; and that statement on which the order of the District Magistrate was recorded came to the police station for compliance to arrest the persons who were named by Mrs. Easdon, and there were two persons among them who could not be sent up for trial later on. Those were Dr. Kidar Nath and his compounder. These are the two persons.

(At this stage Mr. Herbert handed over the order to the President, after showing it to the witness who identified the same.)

Q. You say that these two gentlemen, Dr. Kidar Nath and another, could not afterwards be prosecuted. What do you mean by that?

A. Because the evidence was not sufficient against them.

Q. How long had these people been kept in custody?

A. Until investigation was completed and the case was sent up for trial.

Q. How long was that?

A. I could not give you the exact date, but it was in May some time.

Q. Do I understand from you that the whole number of people who were actually arrested and not afterwards tried amounts to 20?

A. I have given details of two persons now. Then I will give you another batch. There was another batch which was arrested under the orders of the General Officer Commanding, on 28th April. When Hans Raj's statement was recorded on the 23rd or 24th, Mr. Rehill, the Superintendent of Police, had written a note to the General Officer Commanding giving certain names of persons suspected to be concerned in these disturbances. That was about the 30th or so. I cannot give you the exact date; on the arrest of those two persons. This order was brought to the Kotwali by Mr. Plomer and complied with. We have not been able to send up 10 or 11 people from this batch.

Q. There were eleven of that batch that could not be sent up for trial?

A. Yes.

Q. Because after investigation the evidence against them was not sufficient?

* Vide Annexure A, page 150.

A. Yes.

Q. Were there any others who were arrested and could not be sent up for trial?

A. Besides this about 6 or 7 persons or more who were arrested by the investigating staff could not be sent up. There were three persons who were arrested in connection with the bank murder cases, and when the bank murder cases were sent up, there was not sufficient evidence against them and we had to discharge those three persons.

Q. Are there any further cases?

A. When firing took place at the bridge, all who were injured were arrested. As in Lahore, a trial similar to that did take place and we were asked to follow suit. There was one man whose leg was cut off and it was not proper that he should be sent up. His discharge was applied for.

Q. Does that complete the list?

A. No; there was another man who was arrested; this was Dr. Kitchlew's father's servant or something like that. He was arrested by a Sub-Inspector, as he was suspected for the murder of a European. Later on, he thought that he was not the correct man and the original man was arrested and that man was also discharged.

Q. Any further cases?

A. Besides these, there were certain arrests for which the investigating officers were not responsible, and those were when we were having the list of those who were arrested by the pleaders prepared; and they were 11 persons. They were included in our list to show that they had also been arrested, but we had nothing to do with the investigation. A Sub-Inspector was sent to head-quarters to those special constables, and there was no proof against them, and they were discharged there and then when our application was sent and we have no knowledge of it. The reason was that the main charge against them brought forward by those special constables (pleaders) was that they were seen carrying certain goods belonging to the National Bank. Those goods were not forthcoming and the identification of those goods was impossible. So that the Sub-Inspector went to them and produced those men before the Court Sub-Inspector and they were discharged then and there. We had absolutely nothing to do with them.

Q. Can you tell us anything more about Dr. Kidar Nath's arrest?

A. I have produced before you the order of his arrest. Hussain Bakhsh went to him and asked for help for the protection of Mrs. Easdon and that help was refused. That was the impression at first. Later on there was some change in the statement. I myself and Mr. Plomer went to the spot and besides the investigation which was made by the Sub-Inspector, I personally looked into the matter. The Sub-Inspector told me that there was some confusion in the statement of Mrs. Easdon and I understand it was confused even before the Court when the case was tried. So Hussain Bakhsh changed his statement and said that he went to ask Dr. Kidar Nath for help, but he told him to go out and he did not come. He did not explain that Mrs. Easdon was in danger and that he should help. So far as I can see, this was a retraction in the statement of Hussain Bakhsh.

Q. So that after fuller inquiries it was discovered that Dr. Kidar Nath was under arrest?

A. The thing is this that several arrests were not made at once. In that case there were subsequent informations and other arrests were made later, on and for several persons who were absconding the inquiry was not complete. There might be other evidence regarding Dr. Kidar Nath or not. When this case was complete and was to be sent up, on the very day Dr. Kidar Nath was discharged.

Q. Was any one detained longer than was necessary in order to complete investigation with reference to his case?

A. Certain men were absconding and I should say the investigation was not complete and could not be complete before that.

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Sardar Bahadur SARDAR SUKHA SINGH.

[Continued.]

Q. You said you were concerned in 108 cases altogether?

A. Yes.

Q. What Courts tried these cases?

A. Some were locally tried by the Summary Courts and some were sent up here, to the Tribunals.

Q. Some at Amritsar?

A. The thing is this that there was a printed order and the Superintendent of Police (not our Superintendent but the Superintendent of Police of the District) was the chief officer to decide if these cases should go to the Tribunals at Lahore or should be tried locally. In the first instance the cases were to be sent to the D. I. G. specially appointed here for this purpose and through him to the Legal Remembrancer to the Punjab Government who used to go through the evidence to see if they were such cases as should be produced before the Tribunals, and some of the cases which in his opinion were not proper to be tried by these Tribunals were returned for trial locally.

Q. After that procedure had been gone through how many cases were tried by the Special Tribunals and how many by the Summary Courts?

A. There is a printed list in the Government Office I believe.

[Mr. Herbert pointed out that there was a list prepared by and put in by the Legal Remembrancer, Mr. Ellis.]

Q. In connection with the statements by the witnesses, I suppose these statements, which you had taken, were recorded by the Tribunals on oath?

A. Yes. The Tribunals, in my opinion, were proper Courts.

Q. During the period you have referred to, i.e., from the 19th of April to the 7th of June, were there several Magistrates sitting daily at the Kotwali?

A. One, two or three, or sometimes four.

Q. Were they investigating cases of minor importance?

A. No, Sir. Only one Magistrate was holding Court there. Others were sent to record the statements of the witnesses under section 164, Criminal Procedure Code.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin--

Q. As I understand one Magistrate was actually trying the prisoners at the Kotwali?

A. He was doing his work. That was, his office work.

Q. This one man was actually trying and sentencing prisoners?

A. Not prisoners in these cases but in other cases.

Q. He was actually busy with ordinary work?

A. Yes, when he was not working with us.

Q. You said one Magistrate was holding his Court at the Kotwali?

A. He was recording statements under section 164 whenever needed.

Q. He was recording confessions or statements by persons under arrest?

A. Yes.

Q. Now I just want you to make sure that you don't count anybody twice with the figures you have already given. First of all 12 persons were arrested under orders?

A. Yes.

Q. I understand that of those 12 persons only two, Dr. Kidar Nath and the other gentleman with him, were not sent up for trial.

A. Ten others were not sent up.

Q. You gave us 12 as a figure?

A. There is some mistake. I gave 12 as the total number of arrests under orders. I then divided it. Two were those who were arrested under this order which I have seen and ten under the orders of the Officer Commanding.

Q. The two were not sent up for trial at all?

A. These two were not sent and the ten were also not sent.

Q. Twelve persons were arrested under orders and the twelve were not sent up for trial?

A. Yes.

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Q. But more than twelve persons were arrested under orders and 12 were not sent up for trial?

A. Yes.

Q. The two were Dr. Kidar Nath and his friend. Twelve persons were those who were not sent up for trial although their arrests were ordered by the General?

A. Yes.

Q. In addition to those, six or seven persons were arrested by the Investigation Department against whom a case was not found fit to be tried?

A. Not the Investigation Department but all the Investigating Officers.

Q. That was apart from Mr. Connor's orders and General's orders. Those six persons represent the only people for whom the Investigating Officers were responsible?

A. Yes.

Q. And the three men who were concerned, were they included in those six?

A. Yes.

Q. The man who was let off whose leg had been cut off was included in these six?

A. Yes.

Q. Was Dr. Satyapal's father included in these six and seven?

A. Yes.

Q. Fourteen persons were arrested by the pleaders. They were not kept under arrest for any time at all?

A. Not with us.

Q. Were they arrested and detained for more than a few minutes?

A. For 2 days or 3 days.

Q. They may have been detained and arrested for three or four days and their case was investigated by the Sub-Inspector but as evidence against them could not be found he got them let off?

A. Through the Court Inspector and the Superintendent of Police.

Q. You don't know yourself the date on which those persons were arrested or released?

A. No.

Q. Just tell me please. Did you ever inquire into this question of the persons who were actually sent up for trial before the local Courts and the percentage that was acquitted?

A. This I cannot say.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad--

Q. You came to Amritsar on the 19th April?

A. Yes.

Q. And you have told us that you were then given a list of persons who had been arrested. Where is that list?

A. I had taken notes from their list. I said they had the list and I took notes from that list.

Q. They had a list and that must be somewhere on the record?

A. Yes, it must be with the police still.

Q. Can you get that list?

A. You may ask them, Sir. It is not with me. But if you want I can give the names of all these persons.

Q. Can we have the original list? Have you a copy of it?

A. No. The names are with me.

Q. You copied the names from that list?

A. Yes.

Q. How many did they contain?

A. May be about 100.

Q. Were you connected with Amritsar before or was it the first time you were sent there?

A. Some years ago I was attached for two years.

Q. You were not in the Amritsar city?

A. No.

Q. On the 20th were Dr. Kidar Nath and his Assistant brought to you?

A. Yes, they were brought to me.

Q. When they were brought to you what did you ask them?

A. I took down his statement, and he said that he was innocent and that he had done nothing.

Q. Did you ask him why he did not give the list of the wounded persons treated by him on the 10th?

U

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Sardar Bahadur SARDAR SUKHA SINGH.

[Continued.]

20 November 1919.

Sardar Bahadur SARDAR SUKHA SINGH.

[Continued.]

A. The thing is this that we made inquiries about the wounded from all the persons. I deputed a Sub-Inspector to make such inquiries.

Q. But I want to know that when Dr. Kidar Nath was brought to you did you ask him why he refused to give the list of the wounded persons treated by him on the 10th?

A. I cannot remember definitely. He was arrested on the statement of Mrs. Easdon. I did not arrest him for the purpose that he refused to give me a list of the wounded treated by him on the 10th.

Q. I did not say that you arrested him. What I am putting to you is that he was brought to you on the 20th by the C. I. D. Inspector, Jawahar Lal, and you recorded his statement. When they were so brought to you did you ask him why he refused to give the list of the wounded persons treated by him on the 10th of April?

A. This I cannot remember. That was of no importance to me.

Q. Did he reply that he had never so refused?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. Did you ask him whether he could then trace any of the cases that were wounded on the 10th?

A. I can't remember these things.

Q. Do you remember whether he said, Yes, he could trace them?

A. Perhaps he may have told me.

Q. Do you remember you sent him with a Sub-Inspector to trace the wounded people?

A. Perhaps it may be correct. I had deputed a Sub-Inspector to make inquiries from all the Doctors.

Q. What I am asking you is, did you send Dr. Kidar Nath with the Sub-Inspector to find out the wounded persons?

A. I don't remember. I might have done this.

Q. Was he brought back to you that very day?

A. I don't remember sending him with the Sub-Inspector. My impression is that he was in the lock-up at the Kotwali.

Q. I want you to tax up your memory a little and let me know whether at any time on that day you asked Dr. Kidar Nath to name any one of the assailants of Mrs. Easdon?

A. I must have made inquiries. I recorded this statement on the 20th.

Q. On the 20th did you ask him to name the persons who made an attack on Mrs. Easdon?

A. I must have asked him.

Q. Did he tell you that he could not tell that he had seen the attack on Mrs. Easdon?

A. Yes.

Q. And when he said that, you, Mr. Plomer and Mr. Marshall told him that if he would not name anybody he would also be arrested?

A. Orders of his arrest are with you. He was under arrest when he was brought to me. How could I have arrested him twice?

Q. Do you know that Dr. Kidar Nath did say that he was in his house and he did not know who her assailants were?

A. He did at that time.

Q. On that day did you tell him that he was not helping the Government and therefore he would be arrested?

A. I did not tell him. He was already under arrest.

Q. Then you say "No." You did not say that?

A. No.

Q. You mean to say that Dr. Kidar Nath before he was brought to you on the 20th for the first time had already been arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it true that Dr. Kidar Nath asked you to show him the orders under which he was going to be arrested and the offences of which he was accused. Is that true? You did not give him that information?

A. I gave him the information that he was arrested on the statement of Mrs. Easdon.

Q. You told him that he was arrested on the statement of Mrs. Easdon?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me in what part of Mrs. Easdon's statement this passage occurs?

A. There is her statement.

Q. Will you kindly look at it and point out the passage on which Dr. Kidar Nath was arrested?

A. I made over this order to Jawahar Lal who is a good English-speaking man.

Q. You say that Dr. Kidar Nath was arrested on the statement of Mrs. Easdon. I want you to point out to me the passage on which he was arrested.

A. I made over this order to Jawahar Lal, Inspector, to comply with this order and in compliance with that order he was arrested. I cannot say what is the sense.

Q. You can't point out the passage?

A. No, Sir, this is the order which was properly understood or might have been misunderstood.

(Mr. Herbert.—What she says in her statement is that her servant Hussain Bakhsh told her that he had asked Dr. Kidar Nath for help for the protection of Mrs. Easdon, but that help was refused. Her servant informed her that Dr. Kidar Nath was concerned.)

Q. Now, Dr. Kidar Nath, after you arrested him on the 20th was kept in the lock-up from the 20th to the 27th?

A. This I don't remember. This was the arrangement of the District Police.

Q. Are you aware of it?

A. Yes, he was in the lock-up for some days.

Q. Is it true that on the 27th he was marched handcuffed with other persons to the jail?

A. I don't know.

Q. And that he was so kept in jail till the 12th May?

A. I think it is correct.

Q. And you sent him to the jail. Are you aware that he was locked up in a cell?

A. I don't know.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You were sent from Lahore to investigate these cases at Amritsar?

A. Yes. I was sent down to Amritsar to investigate those cases along with the local police.

Q. Is it true or not that you were practically in charge of all the cases and that you and Jawahar Lal investigated all the cases in Amritsar?

A. No. Jawahar Lal had only investigated the principal case, i.e., leaders' case.

Q. Were any special instructions given to you by the Punjab Government when you were sent to Amritsar?

A. The Punjab Government gave me no instructions when I was sent.

Q. What was the number of the persons whose list was given to you on your arrival?

A. I have already said about 100.

Q. You have stated in answer to the President that these subordinates submitted their diaries to you and you then submitted an abstract of them to Mr. Howell. Is that true?

A. To the Superintendent of Police, yes.

Q. Therefore I take it that diaries were prepared for the investigation of these cases by these Sub-Inspectors?

A. By Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors.

Q. Those diaries are in existence?

A. Yes.

Q. When the list of 100 names was given to you, were you shown any diaries about the investigation of these 100 cases?

A. In different cases. I submit that no case was registered up to this time, and therefore no diary was forthcoming.

Q. That is, practically the police had not investigated those cases up to that time?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you and your subordinates the powers you were exercising?

A. Yes.

Q. Were the powers conferred upon you under the Criminal Procedure Code?

A. Yes.

Q. No extraordinary powers were given to you?

A. About martial law?

Q. I am asking about investigation.

A. No.

Q. Therefore when all the persons were arrested by the police there were warrants of arrest issued for these men?

A. No. We can arrest without a warrant.

Q. All the persons that were called before you had *safinas* in the police diaries regarding them?

A. No. Not at all. If you go through the whole of the Punjab you won't get *safinas* and you won't find them in the cases of persons who were sent up by the police if you go through the case diaries.

Q. Did that list contain for what offences those 100 persons were arrested?

A. No. I only counted that so many persons were in the lock-up.

Q. Subsequently you investigated these cases?

A. Not only these. I did others also.

Q. But surely there could be no investigation until there was a record of evidence and of the offences for which they were arrested?

A. I don't understand the question.

Q. Was there any written record before you commenced the investigation as to what was the charge brought against them or what was the information given to you?

A. No, there was no record.

Q. The offences that were committed by them were the result of the subsequent investigation?

A. There was a rough idea. There were several persons whose cases were to be investigated.

Q. You were a stranger; you came there on the 19th: I don't mind, there must be some rough idea. But let me know who gave you that rough idea?

A. I made inquiries from the person who was at the Kotwali.

Q. Therefore there must be some record?

A. There was no record.

Q. Why were they arrested?

A. They were arrested under the impression that they had committed offences.

Q. You belong to the C. I. D.?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it not a fact that the whole investigation was in the hands of C. I. D.?

A. No, the main case was investigated by Jawahar Lal.

Q. Is it not a fact that almost all the important cases were investigated by the C. I. D. men?

A. No, that is not a correct idea.

Q. How many cases were investigated by the C. I. D.?

A. About 6 or 7 important cases might have been investigated.

Q. And unimportant cases?

A. Very few.

Q. Therefore practically all these cases about which evidence is being produced before this Committee, the National Bank case, the Chartered Bank case, the Sherwood case?

A. The Chartered Bank case was not investigated by the C. I. D.

Q. Mrs. Easdon's case, Bugga's case?

A. Those and the National Bank case were not investigated by the C. I. D.

Q. The burning of the Town Hall?

A. Not by the C. I. D.; the district officer investigated it.

Q. The general conspiracy case?

A. That was investigated by Pandit Jawahar Lal of the C. I. D.

Q. How many Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors were sent to Amritsar?

A. Two Inspectors and two Sub-Inspectors.

Q. Is it or is it not true that it was practically within your power to decide as to which cases would be tried by which tribunal and by whom?

A. No, not in my power.

Q. Was there any record as usual kept of the time a person was arrested and the date?

A. Not with regard to those persons who were already arrested, about 100.

Q. But after that?

A. Certainly.

Q. Was there a general complaint against your department of extortion and corruption and bribery?

A. No, only against one man.

Q. One man was convicted, all these charges were false; I want to know whether there was a general complaint?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Is it or is it not true that you and your subordinate Jawahar Lal brought from time to time a large number of persons from the city, and kept them in the Kotwali and they had to come to the police station not without any charge and they had to go?

A. To the best of my belief this is absolutely false.

Q. Is it your experience that people are made to come before the police for days and days and their actual arrest is reported subsequently?

A. There is a general practice in the Police Department throughout the Province and I should say perhaps throughout India, people come to the police station not for arrest only but for making enquiries, and they are not supposed to be arrested.

Q. Was any complaint made by any of the witnesses in these cases that they made their statements because they were threatened by the police?

A. Certain witnesses have reacted their statements before the tribunal.

Q. And therefore they falsely made that allegation?

A. Yes, they made false allegations.

Q. Have you ever seen any statement of Mrs. Easdon's chaprasi dated 20th April?

A. I may have seen it.

Q. Did you yourself record the statement of Hussain Bakhsh?

A. No, not this statement.

Q. Did you, before Dr. Kidar Nath was brought before you, record the statement of Mrs. Easdon's chaprasi?

A. No.

Q. Were you in possession of this chaprasi's statement before the 20th of April?

A. No.

Q. Subsequently you recorded his statement?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore, so far as you know, Mr. Rehill ordered the arrest of Dr. Kidar Nath simply because Mrs. Easdon said that she had received information from her chaprasi that Kidar Nath refused to save her?

A. This is all I heard, nothing else. This was all said to me, I was there on the very day.

Q. Now, certainly you had no right to arrest Dr. Kidar Nath for not supplying you with a list of wounded persons?

A. No, certainly not.

Q. Do you know that in Bugga's case Muhammad Hussain was the principal witness?

A. Yes.

Q. And in the conspiracy case Hans Raj was the principal witness?

A. Yes.

Q. Were these people known to you before?

A. No.

Q. What is Muhammad Hussain now?

A. I do not know.

Q. Is he an Assistant Traffic Superintendent?

A. No.

Q. When you produced him as a witness, were you aware that he was a dismissed Government servant?

A. No, I want to say that he did not make a statement to me. His statement was before the Superintendent of Police long before I arrived there.

Q. Before the 19th?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you give me the names of the witnesses that were produced in Miss Sherwood's case?

A. No, that case was investigated by the local Inspector and not by us.

Q. Were Manik Chand, Muni Lal, Hassan and Baba Bambawala witnesses in Miss Sherwood's case?

A. I do not know.

Q. Do you know that these names, as being those of men concerned in the assault on Miss Sherwood, were given to the police or to the Magistrate on the 25th of

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Sardar Bahadur SARDAR SUKHA SINGH.

[Concluded.]

April by Hans Raj? Do you know it was Jawahar Lal who produced Hans Raj before the Magistrate for his confession to be recorded?

A. Yes.

Q. And Jawahar Lal made notes of his statement?

A. He may have made notes, but I have not seen them.

Q. He never submitted his diary to you?

A. He submitted it.

Q. In the diary you did not find any statement of Hans Raj?

A. No, the statement was one he had already made before Mr. Seymour.

Q. Are you or are you not aware that on the 23rd of April Hans Raj made a statement that Manik Chand, Muni Lal, Hassan and Baba Bambawala could give details of the assault on Miss Sherwood—"they told me of assault on her?"

A. No, I do not know.

Q. Were any people kept in the Kotwali haveli?

A. Yes.

Q. How many?

A. I cannot say, but such room as was available was utilised.

Q. There must be some record to show how many people were kept.

A. You can find it out from the daily police diaries of the station in which the arrest occurred.

Q. Were people, to your knowledge, handcuffed in pairs and marched through the city, arrested persons?

A. I do not know.

Q. Is it true that you ordered the arrest of a large number of piecegoods traders in Amritsar?

A. No, I will explain to you exactly what happened. That is not true and up to this time I have heard no such allegation. With regard to the Alliance Bank murder case the Additional Magistrate, Mr. Connor, when we were sitting in the office, came and said these gentlemen have been murdered and he showed us the position. There was a bazar on one side and a *katra* on the other side. When the crowd went to the Bank that gentleman tried to run away from the upper side towards the *katra*, and as the people there threw stones at him he was compelled to go back again when he was murdered. The assaulters were really not those men of the surrounding place but it was done in broad daylight and these people must have seen it, and they ought to give some information on that point. And he told me that "if your brother had been killed, you police would have taken much more interest than you are doing in this investigation," and he told us that all these people should be brought for the purpose of making enquiries.

He is Additional District Magistrate. He told me to go and see about this. I went there and found the position he had described was quite correct, and it may be considered under his direction, it may be considered his suggestion, I asked the investigating officers to send for them.

Q. They were brought to the Kotwali?

A. Those people who were sitting there were asked to come to the Kotwali for the purpose of enquiry.

Q. How many days?

A. To the best of my knowledge only one day.

Q. How many people?

A. I cannot say.

Q. From what time to what time did they remain at the Kotwali?

A. I cannot say.

Q. Were any prisoners kept in the open racket ground inside the Fort?

A. I have not been there. Nearly every lock-up was full, the jail, Fort, Kotwali and every police station lock-up was full.

Q. You have no knowledge, you never went to the Fort during these days?

A. No.

Q. You know some prisoners in the night time were handcuffed and kept in cells in pairs?

A. Where?

Q. Either in the Kotwali or jail?

A. Not in the Kotwali; I do not know about the jail.

Q. Were the clerks of the National Bank ill-treated in any way?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Were any prisoners kept inside the National Bank?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. You had previously investigated two or three other conspiracy cases? You were responsible for the Delhi Conspiracy case?

A. Yes, I have taken part in nearly every conspiracy case.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Did you find the people of Amritsar, during the course of your investigation, you and your staff, very ready and willing to come forward and give evidence, or did you experience any difficulty?

A. These *katra* people were not the offenders and nobody expected that people in that position would come and attack in this way. They were seeing things before their eyes and they did not come forward to give any evidence or any idea.

Q. Apart from this incident generally?

A. Generally they were not helpful.

ANNEXURE A.

Mrs. Isabel Mary Eason, Lady Doctor, I. C. Municipal Female Hospital on oath.

I work in the Municipal Female Hospital, which is in Chauk Farid, some 100 yards from Satiya Pal's dispensary. On day of occurrence, I was in the hospital when the *Dhai's* son who is a student in the Baij Nath High School, came running and told his mother to go quickly and the mob collecting. This was at about 12-45 in the day. Almost immediately after a large mob appeared shouting and passed along in direction of Hall Gate. Shortly after we heard a European had been murdered and we at once locked the gates of the hospitals. Later, I heard shots being fired and a Hindu with a wound in his foot was brought in to Kidar Nath's dispensary just opposite our hospital. I had by then run upstairs and could see from there. Kidar Nath and his compounder attended the wounded man. A young very fair Mohammanan man appeared with an Aluminium bicycle and was inciting the mob. Some one in the mob shouted for me to be thrown down. At the time I recognized in the mob Mohammad Amin Pleader, the latter's brother and son Akbar and the fair Mohammanan youth already referred to. They were

all inciting the mob. My Chaprassi Hussain Bux told me that he asked Kidar Nath to save me and that he refused. My Chaprassi told me to hide, and I threw my hat to the *dhai* Basainki and went across to Mrs. Benjamin's quarters. When going across I saw Mohammad Amin's son Akbar at the head of the mob that had come round the corner from direction of Kidar Nath's dispensary. Akbar had apparently gone round the corner to meet this mob. Meanwhile a Mohammanan with a bad bullet wound in the calf of his leg, had been brought to the Choki. From my hiding place in Mrs. Benjamin's quarters I saw dense clouds of smoke. My Chaprassi has since told me that same day and the following day Akbar, the son of Mohamman Amin Pleader questioned him about me and was angry to think I had been able to escape.

Methra, a Hindu woman, and compounder of the hospital opened the heavy doors and admitted the mob. There is abundant evidence on this. I think she is seditious. The mob I understand searched all over for me. I heard that shouts *bari mem kidhar hai*.

20 November 1919.]

LALA JOWAHAR LAL.

Mrs. Benjamin went down on her knees and swore I was not with her. They came within a yard or two of my hiding place in the closet.

The worst of the lot among those mentioned by me was the very fair youth.

A mob of quite 500 searched for me all over the hospital. My Chaprassi Hussain Bux, the latter's father and the sweepers Thakari and Mrs. Benjamin should be able to identify some of the mob. Thakari says Gama Tonga Man was determined to get at me and was shouting a lot. When the mob went down stairs breaking open the go-down and rooms my Chaprassi, went to a Constable's house and got me a burka and pajama and I escaped.

Mohammad Amin Pleader's house is near the hospital.

(Sd.) F. A. CONNOR,
R. A. O. C.,

20th April 1919.

The 8 men referred to should be arrested and brought to General Head Quarters.

(Sd.) J. REHILL,
S. P.,

20th April 1919.

LALA JOWAHAR LAL, Inspector of Police, C.I.D., Punjab.

By the President—

Q. You are an Inspector of Police of the Criminal Investigation Department at Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. I need not trouble you about Lahore just now. On 10th April did you go to Amritsar from Lahore?

A. Yes, by the Calcutta Mail.

Q. And you got there about 4-50?

A. Yes.

Q. You had gone in connection with what?

A. I had gone to see the Public Prosecutor in connection with the sovereign melting case.

Q. When you arrived at Amritsar did you find there had been a serious riot?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was it your intention to go to the city on your arrival?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And did you carry out that intention?

A. I was advised not to do it.

Q. Why?

A. They said somebody may attack you, because the city is in a disturbed condition.

Q. Later on did you go to the city?

A. I went after 7.

Q. You went in plain clothes?

A. Yes.

Q. When you got to the city did you see the serious destruction done to the town?

A. Yes.

Q. And in particular I think you noticed the clock broken and the Baptist Mission Church being fired and the National Bank burning?

A. Yes.

Q. When you went to the city did you see groups of people?

A. Yes, I saw groups as I was passing through the city.

Q. What were they doing?

A. They were standing together abusing the Government and Europeans.

Q. Had they anything in their hands?

A. A few had *lathis*.

Q. Were these city people?

A. They were city people.

Q. You say they were abusing the Government and Europeans, can you recollect any of the expressions that were used by the crowds?

A. Generally they were saying that their leaders, Satyapal and Kitchlew had been arrested and unless they were let off they would not rest, and that they would do some mischief unless they were released.

Q. Did you hear anything else of what they said?

A. They were saying a lot of things. I cannot recollect the exact words. They were very excited and openly abusive and slang was used.

Q. At that time had the police any control over the city?

A. No.

Q. Was it completely out of hand?

A. Completely out of hand.

Q. What part of the city did you visit that night?

A. I went up to the Hall Gate, through Hall Bazaar, then I went up to the Clock Tower and then came back to Kamaduri side and back.

Q. The next day did you go to the city?

A. Yes, early in the morning I went to the city.

Q. What did you find was the state of affairs in the morning?

A. The same condition.

Q. Were people gathering?

A. They were gathering at the Khairdin Mosque and they were bringing the dead bodies in to be taken in procession from that place to outside the city.

Q. On the 11th did you see the people burying some of those who had been killed the day before?

A. I went to the Khairdin Mosque and they were bringing in the bodies. I was there and somebody said "there is a C. I. D. dog," and I slipped away and I came back to the station. I did not go along with the procession.

Q. Did you see any people there whom you knew by sight?

A. Yes, I saw Dr. Bashir on horseback and I saw Dina Nath.

Q. Who were these two?

A. These were the accused in the main conspiracy case.

Q. And they were sentenced?

A. Yes, both of them have been sentenced.

Q. As regards the latter of these two, where was he when you saw him?

A. Dina Nath was standing in Hall Bazaar near the stairs of the mosque and he was addressing the people. I could not hear what he was saying because I was at a distance.

Q. Was any remark made when you were there?

A. Somebody shouted "there is a C. I. D. dog," and I had to bolt away from that place.

Q. Were you afraid?

A. I was afraid of my life.

Q. On that day were the people in any order or discipline?

A. No discipline.

Q. Was any business being transacted in the city?

A. All the shops were closed.

Q. You went back, I think, to Lahore that night?

A. I arrived here about 2 o'clock.

Q. Then on the night of the 12th did you again visit Amritsar?

A. Yes, I again went to Amritsar.

Q. When you arrived on the 12th did you visit the city?

A. On that night I did not go into the city.

Q. Did you see what was happening in the city?

A. On that night I arrived at about 10 o'clock by the Bombay Mail.

Q. And where did you go?

A. I slept at the station.

Q. Did you make a visit to the city next day?

A. The next morning early.

Q. What did you find occurring in the city?

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[Continued.]

A. On the 13th the people were still walking in groups and all the shops were closed.

Q. Did you notice whether the people were carrying anything in their hands?

A. Yes, they had lathis.

Q. Were the crowds large that you saw on the 13th?

A. The people were in groups wandering through the Bazar, some going this side and some that, but they were not collected specially at any place.

Q. Did the crowds appear to you to be out of control on the 13th?

A. Yes, of course they were unruly.

Q. Did you see General Dyer or the military in the city on that day?

A. Yes, I saw them.

Q. Were you in the city when the Proclamation was read?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you hear this Proclamation read?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you follow it round from place to place?

A. No. The first time that I heard it was before the Kotwali and then near the Clock Tower.

Q. Were there a large number of people collected?

A. There were a number of people.

Q. Did you hear any remarks made by the crowd as to the Proclamation?

A. At the Kotwali I was at a distance, but at the Clock Tower the people were laughing. I did not hear the exact words.

Q. Were you in the city in the afternoon as well as in the morning?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. At about what time did you go to Jallianwala Bagh?

A. I went to Jallianwala Bagh at about 4 o'clock.

Q. Did you go to the Bagh itself?

A. I tried to go in, but there was a large crowd of people. I could not hear anything. Moreover, it was risky for me to go there, so I came back.

Q. How many people would be collected in Jallianwala Bagh?

A. About twenty thousand.

Q. And were they collected in dense numbers on the south side?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you hear anything that was said by members of the crowd?

A. At that time I could not hear anything, but when I was walking away they said "What do they care for military orders—what can the military do?"

Q. What was the attitude of the crowd—was it a defiant attitude?

A. They were very restless.

Q. You say you were too far away to hear what was said?

A. Yes, too far.

Q. Did you hear shouts from the crowd?

A. They were shouting Doctors Satyapal and Kitchlew ki jai—ki jai.

Q. Was anything being shouted derogatory of Government?

A. I did not hear.

Q. You were also in Amritsar from the 13th to the 18th?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. During that time what state was the city in?

A. After the 14th they commenced to open their shops in the evening and business was resumed. On the 15th all the shops were open.

Q. On the days when you were in Amritsar on the 10th, 11th and 13th would it have been safe for an European to go into the city unaccompanied by an armed military force?

A. It was not safe.

Q. Did you see any indication on the part of the crowd that they were still hostile to the Europeans?

A. They were openly abusing the Europeans.

Q. Were Europeans able to move about the city at all between the 13th and 18th?

A. They were going into the city, but they were accompanied by an armed escort.

Q. Without an escort they could not have entered the city at all?

A. No.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. From what you saw of the city on the 11th and 12th did you gather that the people were thrown into all this turmoil by the arrest of Doctors Satyapal and Kitchlew?

A. Yes, that was the cause.

Q. You spoke of having heard the Proclamation by General Dyer being made known to the public. At how many places did you hear that yourself?

A. Well I heard it twice. Once at the Kotwali and the second time near the Clock Tower.

Q. Was the Kotwali the first place?

A. Yes.

Q. And the Clock Tower was the next?

A. Yes.

Q. At the Kotwali how many people were there?

A. It is very difficult to say. There were more than a hundred.

Q. And at the Clock Tower?

A. About two or three hundred.

Q. And where were you standing when this was done, in the crowd or near General Dyer?

A. I was standing with the crowd.

Q. And from where you were standing in the crowd could you hear what was said?

A. The man was standing on the tum-tum. I heard a few words.

Q. How far were you from him?

A. I was at a distance of about ten or fifteen yards from him.

Q. And was a crowd behind you?

A. Yes, there was.

Q. You think they could all hear?

A. Yes.

Q. When you went to Jallianwala Bagh in the afternoon. By what entrance did you go through?

A. By the entrance by which the military subsequently went.

Q. And did you stop after you went into the entrance?

A. I stopped there and the crowd was at the southern end.

Q. About 150 yards from where you were standing and from that distance you could not hear what was being said at the meeting?

A. On the raised ground also there were people standing.

Q. Near you?

A. Yes.

Q. How many people were standing where you were?

A. There was a large crowd. The meeting was on the southern side, but people were also standing on the raised ground.

Q. They did not form part of the meeting?

A. They were looking on.

Q. How many minutes did you remain there?

A. I suppose about two or three minutes and I then left.

Q. Did you then go to Amritsar again—somewhere about the 19th for further investigation?

A. I was there on the 19th.

Q. With Sardar Sukha Singh?

A. I went a day after him.

Q. Were you placed under him for the purpose of this investigation?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember Dr. Kidar Nath—you went to him on the 19th?

A. Yes, I do remember.

Q. When you went there you asked him and his assistant to go with you to the Kotwali?

A. I took them to the Kotwali.

Q. Did you take them under arrest or merely ask them to go?

A. It was practically speaking an arrest. I was ordered to arrest them, but I suppose I asked them at that time to go to the Kotwali.

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[Continued.]

Q. When they came to the Kotwali was not Kidar Nath asked why he had not given a list of the wounded persons?

A. I cannot remember, because I handed them over and I was busy doing other work. I arrested them and handed them over to the Sub-Inspector.

Q. You do not know what happened?

A. No.

Q. Were you present when Kidar Nath was told that as he was not helping the Government he would also be arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you aware that Dr. Kidar Nath was kept in the lock-up from the 20th to the 27th?

A. Yes, he remained there some time.

Q. On the 27th he was taken handcuffed to the jail?

A. I had nothing to do with that. He must have gone handcuffed along with others.

Q. And they must have marched through the city?

A. Yes, they passed through Hall Gate Bazar.

Q. Where is the lock-up?

A. The lock-up is in the Kotwali.

Q. He was taken from the lock-up through Hall Bazar and across the bridge to the civil lines and were other prisoners also taken with him?

A. Yes, I think so. I cannot say the exact number, but they were sent.

Q. They were marched through the streets in that manner?

A. Yes.

Q. In the jail was Kidar Nath kept in a cell?

A. I know nothing about it.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Are you known to the people of Amritsar?

A. To a very few.

Q. I think you must have run several cases in the Amritsar City?

A. Only once last year.

Q. You were known to the pleaders and barristers of Amritsar?

A. Many knew me.

Q. You were entrusted with the investigation of these cases on the 20th?

A. Of the main case only.

Q. What were you doing from the 13th to the 18th?

A. I was simply there to watch the condition of the town and to report on it.

Q. On the 12th you were not in Amritsar. You only arrived on the night of the 12th?

A. Yes.

Q. You went to the city after 7 P.M.?

A. Yes.

Q. You have said in a previous case that you were enquiring into all the offences connected with the disturbances?

A. I was in charge of the main case. I was general assistant. I was doing every kind of work. I was the only man and I was helping all round.

Q. May I take it then that you were not dealing with all the cases? This is incorrect?

A. Yes, it is incorrect.

Q. When you investigate a case are you required to prepare a diary?

A. Yes.

Q. As soon as you arrived at Amritsar by chance you selected Hansraj and brought him from the fort to the Kotwali. That is your statement?

A. That is true, but this requires some explanation. The position is this. Dr. Bashir and another was examined by Sardar Sukha Singh and we were considering whom we should next examine. It was then thought that as Hansraj has been made Secretary of the Satnagraha he knew all about it, and it was accordingly proposed to bring him from the fort.

Q. Were all the prisoners in the fort?

A. I cannot remember who were there, because they were arrested without my knowledge.

Q. You are not aware of the fact that all the persons who were subsequently tried for the conspiracy case were in the fort?

A. No, they were not all there. There may have been a few. They were in the Kotwali at that time.

Q. When were they arrested?

A. I cannot remember the exact date.

Q. Then if these people were in the Kotwali their names would appear in the register there?

A. Yes.

Q. You have admitted that before you produced Hansraj before Mr. Seymour you questioned him?

A. Yes.

Q. And you have said that you took notes of his statement and then you destroyed them?

A. That is a fact.

Q. Was not Hansraj the most important witness in the whole of the conspiracy case?

A. Yes, later on he became so.

Q. There was no other witness who could give details of the meetings, etc.?

A. No.

Q. May I know why his statement did not form part of your statement and why it was destroyed?

A. He was brought from the fort at about 11 o'clock, and at about 3 o'clock he was ready to make a statement. I there and then applied for a Magistrate. He was then put into the lock-up and a Magistrate came and recorded his statement.

Q. Mr. Rice says that you have answered my question, but I am not satisfied with it. I will again say that you have admitted that you recorded the statement of Hansraj. Further on you have admitted that after sometime you destroyed that statement. Why did not you keep those notes?

A. I did not record any statement of Hansraj. I was simply jotting down notes for my own use. It was not a proper statement.

Q. In order to record the statement of witnesses is there any proper form prescribed?

A. No.

Q. The notes which you took down and the statement of Hansraj, why did you not make them a part of the diary?

A. They were not complete.

Q. May I take it that this statement did not form part of your diary, because it was incomplete and therefore you destroyed it?

A. Yes.

Q. You know Dr. Fauq. Did you see Dr. Fauq at the Mosque when you went in the morning?

A. No. He may have been in the crowd, but I did not see him.

Q. You were examined in the conspiracy case in the month of June, and up to that time the case of Dr. Fauq was under consideration of the Criminal Investigation Department?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you go on the night of the 10th to the District Magistrate and inform him of what you had heard?

A. I reported to Mr. Donald, the Deputy Inspector-General of the Central Range, who was the senior police officer, at the railway station.

Q. Did you make any similar reports on the night of the 12th and 13th?

A. Well, I sent my reports in, but it was not then.

Q. Did you go to the Kotwali on the 12th or 13th?

A. On the 13th I went. Yes, on the 10th I went to the Kotwali, but I went at half-past ten.

Q. According to you certain statements were made by the crowd which you heard—do these find a place in your report?

A. Yes, I think so. About the 10th and 12th when I came here I did not submit any report, but I submitted it verbally.

Q. There is no record of the statement which you have stated to-day anywhere?

A. No.

Q. You have said that you heard the crowd saying certain things and you have given to the President certain things, but there is no written record?

A. I only made verbal reports.

Q. Were you aware that a deputation of the citizens waited on the District Magistrate on the 11th in order to get his permission to bury the dead bodies?

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[Concluded.]

A. I heard about it.
 Q. When you were afraid of your life on the first occasion may I know why did you go to the city several times? Why were you wandering all over the city?
 A. Because I was sent from this place to see the condition of things. On the 13th, of course, I was not so much afraid.
 Q. You stopped at Jallianwala Bagh for two or three minutes, and on hearing that the military would be coming, why did you run away?
 A. That meeting was held in contravention of the order of the General. I thought the military would come and fire upon the crowd, and as I was amongst them I might also be shot, so in order to save my life I went away.
 Q. May I take it that you did not hear what was said at the meeting?
 A. No. I did not hear.
 Q. May I know who was addressing the meeting?
 A. I could not see distinctly. I could not make out the man who was addressing the meeting.
 Q. May I know who was president of the meeting?
 A. I did not know.
 Q. May I know who was the president of the meeting?
 A. At that time I did not know. Do you want the knowledge derived from my investigation?
 Q. At that time?
 A. I did not know.
 Q. Did you investigate Miss Sherwood's case?
 A. No, I did not.
 Q. During the course of his statement was not Hansraj kept at the Kotwali?
 A. I left on the 22nd for Delhi, he was then at the Kotwali.

Q. And again on the 23rd he made another statement, he made statements on two days, 22nd and 23rd?
 A. His statement was being recorded by the Magistrate.
 Q. What I mean to say is that his statement was recorded on two days and he spent the night between these two days in the Kotwali?
 A. Yes, he must have.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. You state that there is no written record of what you were supposed to have heard, namely, the cries of the mob, is it not a fact that you deposed the same before the Commissioners?
 A. Yes, Sir. I did mention it.
 Q. You said that you went to arrest Dr. Kidar Nath, did you go alone?
 A. I took three or four policemen more.
 Q. When you came to the room of Sukha Ram, did you remain there?
 A. I did not remain there.
 Q. You stated that you appeared as a witness in the main Amritsar Conspiracy case. Did you produce these documents, namely extracts from the *Nusrat*, the *Pratap* and other newspapers? (The documents were handed to the witness for perusal.)
 A. Yes, I produced them.
 (Mr. Herbert.—They contain reports of speeches also reported by the Criminal Investigation Department and they are put in for the purpose of comparison.)
 (The President.—What copies have you got?)
 (Mr. Herbert.—Two were put in yesterday.)*

* Not reproduced. The C.I.D. report is contained in Annexure A to oral evidence of Lala Jivan Lal, page 77.

21 November 1919.]

Mr. B. B. HOWELL,

At Lahore, Friday, the 21st November 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Rai Bahadur G. K. Roy, Superintendent (Acting for Secretary).

Mr. B. B. HOWELL, I.P., Superintendent of Police, Crimes Branch, Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab.

By the President—

Q. You are the Superintendent of Police, Crimes Branch, of the Criminal Investigation Department?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. You were not in Amritsar when the outbreak took place?
 A. No, Sir, I went there subsequently.
 Q. I think you went there in connection with the investigation of the various cases connected with the outbreak?
 A. Yes, Sir, I did.
 Q. And as regards the conduct of investigation, what position do the officers of the Criminal Investigation Department occupy?
 A. They occupy the position of assistants to the local police, Sir.
 Q. They do not supersede the local police?
 A. In no way, Sir.
 Q. Do they continue to be responsible?
 A. They do, Sir.
 Q. Are they also responsible for the final presentation of cases to the court?
 A. Yes, they are.
 Q. Was that procedure followed in connection with the enquiries at Amritsar?
 A. It was followed throughout, Sir.
 Q. As regards the presentation of cases, I think they were not put up direct to the tribunals but a summary of evidence in each was forwarded to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police and the Legal Remembrancer?
 A. That is so, Sir.
 Q. Then what is the position exactly of the Legal Remembrancer in the Punjab Government, is he a Public Prosecutor?
 A. For the purpose of these cases, Sir, he decided whether the cases should be sent to the tribunals or whether they should be returned to the summary courts, and if they were sent to the tribunals, under which sections the accused should be charged.
 Q. Had he unfettered discretion as to whether the cases should be sent to one tribunal or the other?
 A. Yes, Sir, he had.
 Q. And he also had discretion after the summary of evidence was placed before him to decide whether a prosecution was to take place or not?
 A. He had, Sir, yes.
 Q. I think in the end 108 cases were investigated and 583 accused were implicated?
 A. That is so.
 Q. That is as regards cases both before the tribunals or the special courts and the Commissioners?
 A. Yes.
 By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—
 Q. During the administration of martial law the police, were they acting really as assistants themselves of the military authorities, were they not?

Q. While so acting, so far as you observed, were there any proceedings governed by the ordinary law, and did they take the same steps that they have been accustomed to take in normal times?

A. Yes, practically.

Q. What are the chief differences so far as you observed in the proceedings of the police due to the fact that martial law was in existence?

A. The chief difference was in the procedure as regards the presentation of cases. For instance, the regular remands were not taken during that period. I think that was the principal difference, otherwise the procedure as regards investigation was the same.

Q. When you say that regular remands were not taken, do you mean that an accused person was not brought up from time to time before a Magistrate and part of the evidence taken?

A. That is so.

Q. As I understand, when you arrived at Amritsar, the position was that the military and the police and other persons assisting them had arrested 100 or so persons who were in the various lock-ups?

A. Roughly about 100 people and odd, I think. I think it was about 100 to 125.

Q. You think the chief difference in the martial law was that the cases were thoroughly investigated, then it was decided whether they should be presented before a court at all, if so, to which court and under which section, and when that was finally done, they went for the first time before a Magistrate or a court of some sort?

A. Yes, that is roughly the position.

Q. There may be an exception in particular cases, but the broad outline of procedure was this?

A. Yes, that was the broad outline of the procedure followed.

Q. Were any steps taken to put a limit to the period of investigation before presenting the accused to a court?

A. No, Sir, there was no limit fixed.

Q. No hard and fast rule was laid down?

A. None, no hard and fast rule.

Q. Would it be your duty to keep an eye upon that sort of thing among others and see that people were not kept too long?

A. My principal duty was to see that there was no delay in presenting people before a court.

Q. As far as the cases which did not go to the special tribunals are concerned, what do you think was the longest time any man was kept from the time of his arrest to the time he was sent up before one of the minor courts?

A. I should think the longest time in an isolated instance was probably about six weeks.

Q. Then in the bulk of such cases, how long would the man be before he was sent up for trial?

A. Are you speaking of the summary cases, Sir?

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Mr. B. B. HOWELL.

[Continued.]

Q. I am speaking of cases which did not ultimately go before a special tribunal, cases which went either before the summary courts or before the officers?

A. I should think in the majority of cases, half that time, about three weeks.

Q. During this period when you were there, I understand some arrests were made by the police and some made by the military, the Provost-Marshal and his men?

A. Not during the time that I was there.

Q. But only at the very beginning?

A. At the very beginning I understand it was so, but that is not within my knowledge.

Q. Did you have anything to do as regards minor cases with the question as to whether they should be tried by an area officer or by a summary court?

A. No, Sir, I had nothing to do with that.

Q. The cases which you investigated or the investigation of which you supervised, did some of them go before area officers and some before the courts and some before the special tribunals?

A. I believe so.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Was Sukha Singh an officer under you?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. Was he put in charge of investigations under your supervision?

A. Yes, he was assisting me.

Q. Who was actually conducting the investigations, yourself or Sukha Singh?

A. Certain officers under us were conducting the investigations, officers on our staff were actually conducting the investigations.

Q. Was not Sukha Singh in charge of the investigations?

A. He was not conducting the investigations, he was assisting me in supervising the investigations.

Q. The actual investigations were being conducted by other subordinate officers?

A. By other officers, not always subordinate. Certain Deputy Superintendents were also there.

Q. How long did you remain at Amritsar attending to this matter?

A. I remained there for about 7 weeks, I think. It was on the 23rd April that I arrived permanently in Amritsar, and I left there on the 9th June.

Q. When was martial law removed?

A. I believe martial law was removed on the 9th June.

Q. Now, after you finished your work in Amritsar, did you make any report to Government or to any higher authority of your work?

A. I made a short note on the general result of my work there saying how many cases I had investigated and the number of people whom I had sent up for trial in connection with those cases.

Q. Does that report merely contain the figures of cases dealt with or does it deal with other general matters?

A. No, it merely dealt with cases I had had under investigation, that is all.

Q. It does not refer either to the general situation or to any other matters?

A. No, in no way.

Q. And all that you dealt with while at Amritsar was individual cases?

A. Quite so.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You never had occasion to record the statement of witnesses? They were recorded by the subordinate police officers, and they were presented to you, is that so?

A. Yes, that is so.

Q. You had no time and it was no part of your duty to see as to whether those statements were correctly recorded or not?

A. In certain instances witnesses and accused came before me and I heard their statements and satisfied myself that the investigating officer had correctly recorded them.

Q. How many cases were decided, approximately?

A. Possibly some 15 or 20 cases. I do not remember exactly. I made no note of it.

Q. Now, I will read out to you the opinion of Mr. Kitchin about the portion of your statement dealing with the investigations, and I will ask you as to whether you agree with it or not. Mr. Kitchin says "Magistrates ceased to be in control of police investigations. In none of the instructions for the investigation and presentation of martial law cases before the tribunals or the summary courts is there any mention of the District Magistrate or of his ultimate responsibility. District Police Officers generally continued to work with the District Magistrates in accordance with the traditions of subordinates and goodwill which invariably govern their relations, but neither the District Magistrates nor the Superintendents of Police were always in touch with the doings of the special police officers deputed by the Criminal Investigation Department. This was not necessary nor desirable." This is at page 5, do you agree with this or not? (This passage was repeated twice.)

A. I presume the question is as to whether I remained in touch with the District Magistrate.

Q. You belong to the Criminal Investigation Department. Here the question is, you said you were assisting the regular police, that the regular police were certainly responsible to the District Magistrate as the head of the police, and the District Magistrate, I presume, was responsible. But here it is said that "the District Magistrate ceased to be in control of police investigations. In none of the instructions for the investigation and presentation of martial law cases before the tribunals or the summary courts is there any mention of the District Magistrate or of his ultimate responsibility." Then he says, "because they were loyal to the traditions, therefore the District Magistrate and the police officers helped the Criminal Investigation Department" and further on he says that "neither the District Magistrates nor the Superintendents of Police were in touch with the doings of the special police officers deputed by the Criminal Investigation Department." That is, he says, that the regular police practically helped them, that the whole investigation was practically in the hands of the Criminal Investigation Department and that the District Magistrate was not considered to be responsible as head of the police, he was not touched at all?

A. As far as my position was concerned, I said I was there to assist the local police, and I kept in touch throughout the investigations with the Superintendent of Police at Amritsar.

Q. But was the District Police or the District Magistrate in any way responsible for the investigations and for the presentation of cases? Were the District Magistrate as head of the police and the District Police of Amritsar responsible for the presentation and investigation of cases?

A. That was a matter which the Superintendent of Police at Amritsar would know. It was with him that I was working and he was the link between myself and the District Magistrate.

Q. I understand that you think that the Superintendent of Police was responsible for the investigation and presentation of cases. But here it is admitted that out of goodwill and out of the traditions of the service, certainly, he was helping you and your assistants, but the question is as to whether he was responsible for the investigation and presentation of cases?

A. I know nothing about his responsibility. As regards my own responsibility, it was to get in touch with the Superintendent of Police at Amritsar which I did.

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Mr. A. J. W. KITCHIN.

Mr. A. J. W. KITCHIN, C.I.E., I.C.S., Commissioner, Lahore Division.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Kitchin, I understand you are Commissioner of Lahore Division and that Division includes Amritsar?

A. I was Commissioner at Lahore until a few weeks ago, and Amritsar is included in the Lahore Division.

Q. Well, we may have to ask you a question or two as regards the occurrences at Lahore subsequently, but meantime—

A. Would you allow me to explain my position? I am going on furlough in three or four days with permission, as a matter of fact I know nothing about Lahore.

Q. Then we would take your evidence on the whole situation?

A. Yes, Sir, if you would be so kind.

Q. I think in Lahore the first *hartal* was held on the 6th April?

A. Yes, Sir, it was held on the 6th April.

Q. Did you receive news as to a crowd collecting on the Mall and did you go to the spot?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you remain on the Mall near the Post Office for some time?

A. Yes, for an hour or so.

Q. What time was that?

A. I think about noon.

Q. Was the crowd stopped on that occasion?

A. Yes.

Q. Were both the police and military on duty?

A. Yes, they were both on duty.

Q. So far as the behaviour of the crowd was concerned on that day, how would you describe it?

A. I would describe it as fairly good tempered, but entirely defiant.

Q. In what sense defiant?

A. They would obey no orders without an actual force or show of force.

Q. What led to their leaving without any disturbance or violence?

A. I will explain what I saw with my own eyes. They were led away by one of their own leaders who came on a horse. He asked them to go away with him and they went away with him.

Q. Do you know who that leader was?

A. Mr. Gokal Chand Naurang.

Q. Did you see anything of the Ram Naumi procession on the 9th?

A. No, I did not see it.

Q. Coming to the 10th April, did you receive a telephonic call?

A. Yes.

Q. About what time?

A. About half-past one.

Q. Was it (the telephone message) from Amritsar?

A. Yes; from the Government House, telling me that crowds were coming into the city and that there would be trouble and that I was to go down at once.

Q. Did you make arrangements for it?

A. Yes. I left in a motor car with the Deputy Inspector-General of Police and the Superintendent, Telegraphs. At that time the Telegraph Office was wrecked and that was why the Superintendent went down with me.

Q. Did you reach Khalsa College, about 2 miles from Amritsar, soon after 4 o'clock?

A. Yes.

Q. At that place did you hear what had happened?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you realise that the situation was much more serious than you anticipated?

A. Yes.

Q. I might ask you: On your way from Lahore, as you motored along, did you see any indications of a disturbance?

A. No. It was then very quiet; we asked questions as we went along; a part of my duties was to collect intelligence on the road. On that day I got nothing.

Q. Where did you go from Khalsa College?

A. I went out to the Station Staff Office in Cantonments and thence to the railway station where I found the Officer Commanding, Captain Massey.

Q. Did you search for the Deputy Commissioner?

A. I brought him down with me. I found him out on the road supervising the removal of women and children to the Fort.

Q. Was it manifest to you that a very serious state of affairs existed in Amritsar?

A. Yes; very serious.

Q. You got to the railway station: did you make it your headquarters?

A. We all lived there.

Q. For dealing with the situation, what opinion did you form as to the sufficiency of police protection?

A. That it was not sufficient.

Q. At that time how many troops were about with you?

A. The figures can be got: they are on record.

Q. Was there prospect of trouble from the Labour Corps?

A. I cannot say; but that was a consideration.

Q. As regards the police guard in the Kotwali, do you know what happened to them?

A. We had no news of them; we thought they were all killed.

Q. It had not been possible for some time to communicate with the Kotwali?

A. There was no means of communication between the city and the troops.

Q. Was it rumoured that there were some Europeans still alive in the city?

A. Yes.

Q. Were all the troops required for the purpose of holding the railway station and bridges?

A. There was no striking force. Most of the Gurkhas were without arms.

Q. Was not the holding of these points, railway station and bridges, absolutely essential?

A. Absolutely vital.

Q. Meantime troops arrived with rifles?

A. Some of the Gurkhas were being armed. There were not many rifles. Many of them remained unarmed. Those to whom rifles could be spared were given rifles.

Q. Were any arrangements made to communicate with the Kotwali in the city?

A. It was determined to go in and fight our way into the Kotwali. While arrangements were going on we heard that the Europeans in the city were all saved.

Q. It was decided then to wait the arrival of troops?

A. It seemed to be very risky to hold the city of Amritsar without more troops. Troops came, but they came much later.

Q. Troops came from Lahore?

A. Yes. There were difficulties in the way.

Q. About 11 p.m. of the night a troop train came with reinforcements?

A. Yes.

Q. On Major Macdonald's arrival, what communication did you make to him?

A. I told him that the situation was beyond our control and that he must take such immediate steps as the military situation demanded.

Q. What in your view was the effect of giving those instructions to Major Macdonald? Was he given a free hand, without consultation with you, to act as he chose?

A. Of course to act in consultation with me.

Q. Was it indicated to him that the civil authority alone was powerless to deal with the situation?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you advise him to send a party to the City?

A. I asked him if possible to send a party into the city to get information and bring the survivors among the Europeans.

Q. The party was accompanied simply by guides?

A. The party was entirely a military party.

Q. Why could you not send it with a civil magistrate?

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[Continued.]

A. Because we expected that the party would have to fight their way, and the presence of a civil magistrate would embarrass the military officer. It was purely a military operation.

Q. Were the surviving Europeans brought out alive and the hotwals reinforced without any fighting?

A. Yes.

Q. You knew of course that certain members of the crowd had been fired on and killed?

A. Yes.

Q. Was any communication received on the night of the 10th as to the number of persons killed?

A. Not on the night of the 10th. On the morning of the 11th some people came in from the city to arrange processions for the burying of the dead.

Q. Who were the people that you saw about there? Were they all young lawyers?

A. I do not know that personally myself. They seemed to be representing the rioters. That was the impression they left on my mind.

Q. So far as the dead were concerned, what arrangements did you make?

A. Emissaries came in and wanted to go out with full procession. All small parties were allowed. When I saw their number and that their attitude was defiant I told them they would be allowed at 2 o'clock to take away and bury their dead provided they would not commit any excesses and would go back into the city by 4 o'clock. And the troops of course picketed the way.

Q. Were reports coming in from time to time of outrages in the outlying districts, around Amritsar?

A. Yes; telegraph lines were cut at Gurdaspur and Dhariwal and other places, some stations were being burnt. The lines between Lahore and Amritsar were unsafe; no train could move about without danger. That was why the troops were so late in coming.

Q. Were wild rumours in circulation as to the state of the troops at Lahore?

A. Yes; it was very difficult to get information from Lahore; all the telegraphic lines were down; the only means of communication was by the phonophone. The phonophone is a telephone which is worked by means of telegraph wires; it would still work if any of the wires are still uncut. We had great difficulty in making it audible, and I got a message from Lahore. I was called up by the Station Superintendent at Lahore. I asked him to let me know what was happening there. A few minutes after I got a message that Lahore was all right; but it was very hard to hear anything.

Q. You mention that there were rumours as regards the Lahore Fort being taken. Did you hear that at Amritsar on the 10th?

A. Yes; that was in the evening.

Q. Did you hear also of a rumour as regards the troops having mutinied?

A. That was the rumour; and that the Lahore Fort had fallen in consequence.

Q. And such rumours must necessarily have a disturbing effect on the population?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 11th of April, the burial of the dead took place without any special incident?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you on the 11th return to Amritsar?

A. I went back in the evening with Mr. Donald.

Q. You also saw the condition of things in Lahore itself?

A. Yes; I might add here about the nature of the proclamation in the Appendix in General Dyer's report; that was signed by Mr. Miles Irving. I remained in consultation with him; I did not take over charge from him. That proclamation was given to those emissaries who came to arrange about the burning of the dead. The Officer Commanding Troops was there. It was considered undesirable at the time to take any severe military action as the people were thoroughly overborne by the dangers of the situation which they created.

I asked the Principal of the Khalsa College who was thereabouts to send in his own students to tell the

people that we considered that a state of war had broken out and they must settle down. I understand he had sent a number of students to tell the people in the city that our patience was nearly exhausted. There was no intention of firing until the people had been adequately and sufficiently warned. I had expected some penitence after the murders and the lootings of the previous day, but there was no indication of anything of the kind.

Q. Did you report again that the city was in a state of rebellion? What was your own view at the time?

A. I hardly used the words before. The situation became more and more acute every day.

Q. Was that notice in English?

A. Yes; it was given for distribution. It was given to the gentlemen who came there and who knew English, but to the Khalsa student it was announced verbally.

Q. Did you expect these emissaries to help you?

A. Yes; that was the only means. Nobody could come between the city and cantonments unless he was an Indian non-official.

Q. Were these emissaries well qualified to explain to the people?

A. They were of course all Indians.

Q. You returned to Lahore on the 11th. Did you give certain instructions as regards the booking of passengers on the line to Amritsar?

A. I think I am correct. I had previously wired to stop all one class booking; the *Baisakhi* festival was coming on then, and we did not want to fill Amritsar with innocent people when the situation was grave.

Q. Were your instructions as regards the stopping of booking carried out?

A. I believe so.

Q. When you arrived at Lahore, I suppose you reported the situation to the Lieutenant-Governor.

A. I went direct.

Q. Did you also report to the Officer in Charge of Troops?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you next morning return from Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. You went by motor, picking up information on the road?

A. Yes.

Q. So far as the road was concerned, did you see any unrest?

A. No; the road was packed with traffic.

Q. On the road did you hear anything from the people?

A. We stopped at all police posts for information and stopped groups of people and made enquiries. That was the first day.

Q. Had those people whom you saw seemed to regard the situation as a serious one?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they indicate that it would be necessary to prevent further spread of the lawlessness that was existing in Amritsar?

A. Amritsar was in rebellion. That was the position simply we were in.

Q. When you reached Amritsar, did you find that General Dyer had arrived to take command?

A. Yes; and he had also removed his headquarters to Rambagh.

Q. At this time, was the decision made as regards the arrest of those who were supposed to be ring-leaders in the insurrectionary movement?

A. Yes; a strong force was going in to effect the arrests.

Q. Did you approve of that action—of those arrests?

A. I was not asked to approve. If I had not approved, I would have said so.

Q. In fact, a number of arrests were made?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember the exact number?

A. About a dozen, I should think. They were all important arrests.

Q. Up to this time, had anyone been able to enter Amritsar without special military protection?

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A. No; not for a long time afterwards?

Q. And was the military protection given to one or several?

A. To each party. The smallest force that could enter the city would of necessity have to be of a considerable number. For instance, the managers of the banks from Lahore had to see their banks. They were sent under a military escort. They were not allowed to go except with an escort, a strong escort too.

Q. On the 12th, did you issue further orders to the people as regards their not assembling in numbers?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember issuing any order distinct from that which you referred to in the appendix of General Dyer's report?

A. I am not clear in my mind as to whether it refers to the 11th or 12th. This was written some months ago. My recollection was probably more clear then than it is now. I do not remember having issued an order after General Dyer. It may be after Major Macdonald took charge.

Q. On the 14th, you heard of firing taking place at the Jallianwala Bagh, and you were asked to go up at once?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you go?

A. I went; in those days we had an escort.

Q. You arrived at about 8 in the morning and saw General Dyer and discussed the situation with him?

A. Yes.

Q. On the way you went to the railway station?

A. Yes.

Q. So it was at that time that you decided that Kirpan case?

A. Yes; on the spot.

Q. And you made investigation?

A. Yes; there was a rumour that certain Sikh girls had been insulted; rumours are after effects. There was no insult.

Q. You have got an explanation?

A. I have given my report; the fact is stated in a Press communiqué.

Q. That Press communiqué contains the result of the investigation made by you on the spot immediately after the incident?

A. Yes; the rumour was entirely without foundation.

Q. Is Kasur also in your division?

A. Yes; in my division.

Q. How far from Lahore?

A. 25 miles.

Q. How far from Amritsar?

A. About the same distance. I think they are something like a triangle.

Q. You returned to Lahore on the 14th after visiting Amritsar. Did you then for the first time hear of the burning of Gujranwala?

A. Yes.

Q. In Lahore was there the view that Colonel O'Brien and all the Europeans in Gujranwala had been murdered?

A. That was what the Local Government thought at the moment.

Q. That of course was unfounded?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you hear aeroplanes returning.

A. Yes, I heard. Afterwards reports came in.

Q. At this meeting with the Lieutenant-Governor, did you discuss the question as to the necessity for proclamation of martial law?

A. Yes; I thought it had gone far enough and we ought to have martial law.

Q. Did you entertain any opinion to that effect up to the 14th?

A. No; I think I raised it first on the 12th.

Q. As regards the proclamation of martial law, what procedure is necessary to be followed in Punjab?

A. Well, that is a question I can hardly answer.

Q. The proclamation of martial law is different from the existence of martial law?

A. It is beyond my sphere; correspondence began with the Government of India.

Q. You may or may not be able to confirm what is my impression. But martial law is proclaimed in the Punjab after the Lieutenant-Governor has received the approval of the Government of India to the proclamation?

A. Yes.

Q. Then I think the Punjab Government applied for authority to proclaim martial law?

A. I do not know exactly; I know they applied, but I cannot remember at the present moment the exact time when they applied. I knew when they had applied. At any rate my impression is that it was on the evening of the 12th. Afterwards martial law might be proclaimed at any moment.

Q. In your opinion as a civil authority responsible for good order in your district, did you consider martial law essential?

A. It was then essential.

Q. Subsequently I will ask one or two questions about martial law; meantime, however, I would like to have your view generally upon the question as to the causes of these disturbances which arose in so many different parts of the Punjab, almost like a mutiny as it were. What would you consider was the chief causes of unrest? I see you say in your evidence that "The Rowlatt Act was of course the occasion and not the cause of the trouble." What exactly do you mean by that?

A. The atmosphere was getting more and more electric and surcharged with trouble and trouble would have come if not about that, probably about something else and probably in those months.

Q. In consequence of your putting it in that way, you might indicate in the first instance to me what causes were there independent of the rumours with reference to the Rowlatt Act?

A. The whole country was unsettled with the war. They were tired of war. There was the economic cause, the high prices of foodstuffs, which touched the towns far more than the villages. The villages profited from high prices, because they are all agricultural people; and they have made very large profits off account of the war. But the towns, especially the poorer classes in the towns, have been very hard pressed. There are other petty causes. The Income-tax Act affected a certain class of persons and the seizure of wheat annoyed wheat traders very much indeed. Then there was the political movement that India should rule herself quickly. And of course there was the Muhammadan trouble, which was getting more and more acute. At the top of these came the Rowlatt Act.

Q. I suppose political agitation may have the effect of unsettling people in excess of what is desired by those who are agitating?

A. Undoubtedly.

Q. It may sometimes have the same effect upon seditious movement.

A. It might certainly.

Q. In connection with this political agitation, there was the Rowlatt Act. But apart from the Rowlatt Act, there have been other things?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there rumours about the Hindu marriage question?

A. They have gone very far with reference to the marriage question. It has been mentioned among them.

Q. And you have referred to, I think, the confiscation of property under the enhanced income-tax?

A. Rumour came of course. It was put down as part of the Rowlatt Act (confiscation of property). The commandeering of wheat caused much trouble. This year in Lahore I heard the income-tax appeals. This year was the first year in which the new income-tax form came into force. There were a very large number of appeals put in before me. The petition of appeal itself was printed, and it stated that the income-tax form was unintelligible and appellant respectfully did not mean to fill it and asked whether the appeal would be accepted. That is the class of appeal. Similarly with regard to wheat seizures. They used a printed form, which was common. They said that

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wheat had been seized in order to send it to English to benefit the English people to the impoverishment of India and therefore the action was wrong, which statement is undoubtedly untrue. It was also stated in a speech of Dr. Kitchlew in Amritsar. I am not suggesting anything, I only give the statement.

Q. What was stated as regards wheat?

A. It was stated that wheat was seized in order to send it to the people of England. These are what I had to deal with in my judicial capacity.

Q. Did you see any indication of unrest in consequence of the methods that have been adopted in years previous for recruiting the army?

A. No; I am new to this division. I never had anything to do with recruiting in the division, and of course, all that was over long before the agitation began.

Q. And recruiting was principally or almost entirely from the villages of the district and to a very limited extent from the cities that were most affected?

A. Almost not at all from the cities.

Q. It has been put to some of the witnesses that assessments were levied upon people in excess of what otherwise would have been levied in consequence of their having failed to subscribe for the war loan or having paid what was considered an inadequate amount?

A. I can only answer that question as regards assessment, with which I deal myself. As regards the cases which I had on appeal, in no single case was that suggested.

Q. So far as you are aware, I understand you have extensive knowledge?

A. It is a thing one does not do really.

Q. To return to these Rowlatt Act rumours, what sort of rumours were in existence as regards the effect of the Rowlatt legislation?

A. All kinds of rumours, about the confiscation of property, that a crowd of people talking would be arrested by the Police, about fees on marriages, and so on. They were rampant everywhere.

Q. Was it evident to you, (it would not be surprising to any of us) that the Rowlatt Acts were very imperfect, if at all, understood by the great majority of the people?

A. I do not think they were ever read. The Rowlatt Act is not very easy to understand.

Q. Precisely so; I was going to say I do not know whether an Indian audience is so intelligent that the reading of an Act of this sort will convey its accurate meaning to their minds?

A. It may be so intelligent; I find it very hard to understand. The references to the sections and the sub-sections are very hard to understand.

Q. Of course it is undoubtedly the case that the principle of the Rowlatt legislation was strenuously objected to by prominent Indians throughout the whole of India?

A. Yes, it was. They did not always give expression so clearly as that. They objected mostly on the specific ground that all the non-officials had objected to it in the Imperial Council and therefore it must be bad. They never explained even in the speeches what the Act meant. I doubt if many of them knew.

Q. It is not surprising that the Rowlatt legislation is not understood by the public. Well, so far as Amritsar is concerned, undoubtedly would you say that the arrest of Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal was the spark that lighted the inflammable material which was there?

A. I suppose it was. I did not know about Amritsar before. But I think about the 7th Mr. Irving wrote and asked that the garrison might be increased. He was expecting trouble, but the extra troops had not gone down before the explosion came.

Q. Was it you who authorized the deportation of Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal?

A. No; that was on the orders of Government.

Q. What are the reasons for their being deported on the 10th?

A. Government will give you them. I have nothing to do with them.

Q. There are some questions arising out of martial law and I suppose you will be able to give information

upon those points. Generally speaking, your view was that martial law was essential?

A. Yes.

Q. Why do you say so? Briefly what are the reasons?

A. Briefly there were two causes. One was we lost control and if we did not recover control very quickly, the whole country might rise. It was spreading so fast. Secondly, arrests were being made and we had to deal with these arrests quickly and effectively, and unless we dealt with these arrests quickly and effectively, we should never be able to deal with them at all. It was beyond the powers of the ordinary courts.

Q. Referring to your statement with reference to that answer, I see you say, "In no place had the civil Government, aided by military force, actually lost and failed to recover control."

A. Yes, I said so.

Q. It rather looks as though when you prepared this statement you were of that view as regards the necessity for the prevention of spreading of disorder, etc.?

A. Yes, it spread out of Amritsar; we heard that. There was no actual rioting. They got as far as Lyallpur.

Q. You mean emissaries from Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. If criminals defy arrests, your position is pretty difficult as the administrator of the law?

A. It is.

Q. Was that the situation for a time?

A. No warrant could have been served in Amritsar until perhaps the 14th.

Q. You said that the towns in the neighbourhood were also up as well as Amritsar itself?

A. Yes.

Q. From a military point of view, was it vital that the rural population should be prevented from going into the movement?

A. Yes.

Q. Are the rural population the fighting elements?

A. Yes; that is where they come from. The Jats are among the finest fighting stock in the world.

Q. As regards the Jats, you say they were collecting for loot?

A. Yes.

Q. What were your reasons for making that statement?

A. It is based on information that I could collect on the road, e.g., that such and such village is up, and so on, of course coupled with the evidence I had of the trains being attacked here, stations burnt and the railway lines cut everywhere.

Q. Am I right in supposing that that is the information which you got in the course of your duties at the time?

A. Not only that, other reports were coming in. There was no proof anywhere. It was only information we had from officers, of course.

Q. What, in your view, prevented a more serious outbreak?

A. It was what we actually did on the 13th April at Amritsar. There was no more trouble anywhere.

Q. You say that is the cause of its being ended. How would that bring any such movement, as you have indicated, to an end?

A. They realized that the situation was serious and that the British Government meant to put down anarchy with violence.

Q. Could you deal with the number of cases that had to be dealt with in consequence of the arrests under civil law?

A. No; we could not do it.

Q. In your view, is the setting up of special courts and the procedure more summary under martial law?

A. Under martial law, I think, was essential.

Q. As regards the question whether any of these tribunals ought to have tried certain cases, I suppose you would not express anything?

A. I had nothing whatever to say with that.

Q. That may raise a question of law which you are not versed in?

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A. There is only one question which I wish to answer, if I may, on this point. It was at one time suggested that the mob which attacked the Tarn Taran tahsil had been tried by a single magistrate and convicted for waging war against the King. A single magistrate who constituted a summary court had only power to try cases cognizable by a first class magistrate. Those men were charged with rioting and convicted. A more serious offence could not be tried by Summary Courts.

Q. But what I do not understand in that connection is—I may have been wrong in picking up your answer—if there was one magistrate sitting alone and he had only power to deal with what you described as minor offences, how did he deal with cases of waging war?

A. He could not; they had to go to tribunals. In fact, no cases of waging war were tried by a single Magistrate. They could not do it any more than a petty Magistrate could try a murder case.

Q. You say in that connection there was a rumour, which was an unfounded rumour?

A. The rumour, I understand, came from a suggestion made in the council.

Q. As regards the Tarn Taran case, were the men charged with the offence of waging war and tried before a Special Tribunal?

A. Not to my knowledge; they may have been.

(Mr. Abdul Kadir.—I have gone through that record, because the question was put that day, and I find that they were charged for an offence under section 144 of the Indian Penal Code. That is all, and there was no other offence. That is for unlawful assembly being armed with deadly weapons. That was an offence triable by a Magistrate of the first class or by a Summary Court. It was not an offence cognizable only by the Court of Sessions.)

Q. Who tried the case?

A. Mr. Rudkin, Summary Court and Martial Law Officer.

Q. When the Police of Amritsar made the arrests for these offences they should have had warrants?

A. The Police do not need any warrants when they are arresting for cognizable offences.

Q. Under martial law of course the courts adopt a much more summary procedure than under the ordinary administration of the law?

A. Yes; they do.

Q. In your opinion was that an advantage in the state of affairs that existed?

A. I did not actually see any of the courts at work. The procedure was summary. The Magistrates were all experienced District Magistrates, nearly all of them. There was a good deal of procedure. They would have, I think, differed a good deal from what is ordinarily considered as a summary court. They examined hundreds of witnesses, and so on. The record of the evidence was not kept, but the Judge went into detail.

Q. These courts then heard evidence in public?

A. Yes, counsel and everything.

Q. Was there any friction between civil and military authorities during the administration of martial law?

A. No.

Q. Were demands made on civil officers and officers commanding to exercise tact in their mutual relations?

A. It was not very easy always; we could restrain.

Q. I think it is your view as regards work being better done if the ultimate decision rested with the Government. I do not know if it is your own view or whether it is the generally held view?

A. It is my own personal view. I am not committing anyone else to it. After that, I find that I have made the statement "Neither the District Magistrate nor the Superintendents of Police were always in touch with the doings of the Special Police officers deputed by the Criminal Investigation Department. This was not necessary nor desirable." I am not correct in saying that the Superintendents of Police were not in touch. I should have said "There were orders to put them in charge." That part of my statement is incorrect.

Q. So far as Mr. Howell's explanation is concerned, have you anything to say?

A. Mr. Howell's explanation was correct. It is I who was wrong.

Q. What was the effect upon the people of the proclamation of martial law?

A. There was complete peace.

Q. Did the more respectable classes appear to get relief from its existence?

A. They seemed to.

Q. Were crimes stopped?

A. Stopped altogether.

Q. Did the disorderly classes actually disappear?

A. Yes.

Q. Of course martial law cannot be popular anywhere?

A. No.

Q. Have you any doubt that under martial law some of the orders that were passed would not be oppressive, but at all events were objected to as disagreeable?

A. Undoubtedly.

Q. Have you also any doubt that in the administration of martial law in different places errors had been made by individual officers?

A. Undoubtedly.

Q. I suppose during the period of martial law excessive zeal in individual cases of parties was shown?

A. It was.

Q. You satisfied yourself it was?

A. It was.

Q. Without going into the detailed examination of the cases that occurred I suppose it would be regrettable that gentlemen of position should be arrested under suspicion and kept for a considerable time under custody without a charge having been preferred against them?

A. That is a general proposition. I will admit that.

Q. Have you any view as to the propriety or impropriety of flogging taking place in public?

A. As soon as it was known it was stopped.

Q. You mean you stopped it?

A. No. I had no authority to stop it.

Q. A considerable time after martial law was proclaimed, was it noticeable that the people were not friendly disposed toward the officers?

A. Before the proclamation and not after it.

Q. As regards the duration of martial law it was continued from its proclamation on the 15th of April till the 6th of June?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it necessary or advisable in your opinion that martial law should continue even on the assumption that it was proper to declare it and it was declared?

A. It is a very wide and broad question. The local issues were very small. The trouble was on the frontier.

Q. Another question, you think, arises, considering the question of propriety, of the length of time?

A. No evidence can be given to you in public. The trouble on the frontier began on the 6th of April, the first day of martial law. You will have evidence.

Q. While the unfortunate movement lasted do you express any opinion that it was anti-European?

A. It was I think. It was more correctly anti-British. The Americans and some of the alien races did get differential treatment. Some of the Germans also got it.

Q. Were there any circumstances that can justify your drawing that conclusion of the movement being anti-English?

A. As opposed to anti-European or as opposed to anti-British?

Q. You put it rather as anti-British as compared with anti-European?

A. I think I had better correct myself and change it to anti-British from anti-European.

Q. What circumstances were there that seemed to justify drawing that conclusion?

A. I will try to put them forward.

Q. Well, as regards anti-European what were the circumstances?

A. Well, every European who came in the presence of the mob was attacked.

Q. You suggest that the Arya Samaj was involved?

A. Well, a very large percentage of the persons convicted were Hindus, I think. See my statement here. I had better correct my statement. I correct it. I don't think I can support that.

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Mr. A. J. W. KITCHIN.

[Continued.]

Q. I don't know that I am familiar with the organization of the Arya Samaj. So far as I have heard here I think it is not necessarily antagonistic to the Europeans?

A. No. I think, certainly not. There were individual members who were antagonistic. Possibly they might not and possibly they might be a majority.

Q. During the course of the agitation was there a railway strike?

A. Yes.

Q. When was the railway strike?

A. It had been maturing for some time.

Q. The railway strike was a movement independent of the passive resistance?

A. In its origin certainly. When it had joined afterwards it was purely political. In the beginning it was entirely economic.

Q. The two things coincided?

A. Yes.

Q. As regards the railway officials, i.e., the railway subordinates, what attitude did they take afterwards?

A. I ought not to have generalised it. A very great number of them were shaken.

Q. In fact the general strike did not come off?

A. No.

Q. What would have averted it?

A. Difficult to say, of course. Martial law was a thing that averted it. It could have been averted without martial law.

Q. I think this at least was a matter of public knowledge and was not confidential. I mean as regards Afghanistan?

A. Yes. I was.

Q. Did the Amir make a proclamation that appeared in public?

A. I don't know.

The Hon'ble Mr. Rice and Mr. Herbert.—Yes.

A. There is nothing secret in it now.

Q. So far as Government officers of different grades and departments are concerned, what was their attitude?

A. Absolutely loyal.

Q. Do you make any exception as regards the officials of the Railway and the Post Office?

A. I don't think I have the right. Of course as regards the Railway officials many were punished and dismissed and similarly with regard to the Post Office.

Q. You would not generalise with the exception of few instances?

A. No. I do not wish to press the generalisation. There were many cases.

Q. But in other departments, as you say in the case of the Railway and Postal Departments at the time of the strike, was any pressure brought to bear upon any of the officers to join in the movement?

A. Yes. Pressure was brought to bear upon the clerks preventing them from attending their offices and other officers also suffered, but they behaved well.

Q. But in spite of the fact that they behaved well was pressure brought to bear upon the clerks?

A. Yes. They behaved well and also the clerks in the Banks at Amritsar stood up to the last for their Managers.

Q. Had you any indication that the Tahsildars and the Extra Assistant Commissioners, with very few exceptions, all did their best?

A. They did.

Q. Let me have information as to what exactly a Tahsildar is?

A. The district is divided in 3 or 4 sub-divisions. Each of those is called a Tahsil and the Tahsildar is in charge of it. His principal functions are to collect land revenue and hold charge of the Sub-Treasury in that particular sub-division. He is the minor officer of a sub-division of a district.

Q. As regards the police force generally what was their behaviour?

A. They were good.

Q. Do you know that certain complaints were made by the public as regards blackmail?

A. Unfortunately there were complaints only, but no specific complaints against any specific persons were made.

Q. I thought there had been one or two?

A. I don't know anything about specific complaints of bribes in specific cases. There might be some, but if there had been any, they would have been surely investigated.

Q. Was it your duty to investigate such cases?

A. No, indeed. I had not to take it up at all. Had there been any I should gladly have taken it up. I don't mean I was satisfied that there had been no complaints.

Q. Satisfied regarding what?

A. There was no corruption.

Q. You mean there might have been some cases of corruption so far as general allegation was made. But so far as you were concerned no specific complaints were brought to your knowledge?

A. I was not at all satisfied that there must have been. Many other complaints were going on at that time. It was very difficult to distinguish.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Mr. Kitchin, you were in April last Commissioner of Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. That Division includes Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. So, though Mr. Miles Irving was immediately in charge of Amritsar, you were also responsible for Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. You had known in April the various causes that you have described, for instance, very high prices and difficulties of supply. You were fully aware that they had existed for some time?

A. Yes.

Q. And you say that in Lahore on the 6th the demeanour of the crowd was defiant?

A. Yes.

Q. And you knew that on the 6th April in Amritsar there was a general hartal?

A. Yes, I knew that.

Q. So you knew on the 6th that there was considerable existing excitement in Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. Then the arrest of Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal was decided upon. When did you learn that?

A. When did I hear of it first, you mean to ask?

A. Yes.

Q. I am not sure; on the evening or on the night of the 9th.

Q. So I understand you to say that though you were Commissioner in charge of the Lahore Division, which included Amritsar, you had nothing to do with the proposal for the arrest of these people?

A. No, so far as I remember, I had nothing to do with it. It would be quite usual.

Q. The Punjab Government never consulted you?

A. So far as I remember, not at all.

Q. Did not Mr. Irving tell you about it?

A. He used to write joint letters about the situation to Government and myself, sending me a copy of each of his letters.

Q. Then you knew that before the 9th it was in contemplation?

A. No. I knew it was a proposal under consideration.

Q. Likely to be decided upon?

A. Yes.

Q. You also knew that Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal were very popular in Amritsar for some time?

A. I knew something. I didn't know Amritsar at all.

Q. Even in your official capacity?

A. Of course.

Q. Then it must have been made clear to you that these men had considerable influence in Amritsar.

A. Yes.

Q. You therefore also must have known that their arrest in the existing state of excitement would certainly lead to much greater excitement?

A. I did not know it.

Q. You knew that Amritsar was in a state of excitement owing to the causes you have described and that Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal were people of influence.

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[Continued.]

If those people were arrested did not you think it would necessarily lead to very much greater excitement?

A. Not necessarily at all. My experience of the past showed that it would have the opposite effect, but still I had nothing to do with these things.

Q. Though the ultimate result of their arrest may be that the excitement might cease, but at the moment the obvious result of taking measures for their arrest would be that the existing state of excitement would become worse.

A. No. I don't think it did.

Q. Do not you think that in any event when their arrests were to be made it was necessary to take extra precautions for securing order in Amritsar?

A. No. I don't think any extra precautions were necessary.

Q. They were not called for?

A. No.

Q. You told us that Mr. Miles Irving had already on the 7th asked for extra military help?

A. I believe about the 7th.

Q. And you knew that in Amritsar you had only 75 armed police?

A. I did not know about the garrison. I could have found out about the 75 armed police.

Q. 75 armed police in the Kotwali?

A. There was information in my office.

Q. Officially you know or you could have known that by a little inquiry?

A. Yes.

Q. Don't you think under the circumstances it was desirable that proper and complete arrangements be made for securing law and order in Amritsar before proceeding to arrest those people?

A. Of course it was not the question I had to face. I don't take that view.

Q. Don't you think that if such proper arrangements had been made, for instance, if the extra garrison that had been asked for on the 7th had been allowed to come in and proper military precautions had been taken, outrages in the town that took place would have been avoided?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Do you think that if you had proper military forces in the town when the arrests were made, these things would still have taken place?

A. I think so. We had asked for 100 men.

Q. Your mean to say that 100 military armed, with the police already available, could not have coped with the situation?

A. It could not have prevented it. It might have recovered control quicker.

Q. Could not the military have prevented the burning of the National Bank and other buildings?

A. No. They could not. They could have gone into the town quicker and recovered control quicker.

Q. What I mean to say is that, if, when the arrests were effected, military had been brought in and proper dispositions had been made at the proper points, would it not have been much safer?

A. No.

Q. You don't think so?

A. No.

Q. You think that any previous arrangements or precautions could not have prevented the violence?

A. Not any such moderate arrangements that you indicate.

Q. You are aware that the Superintendent of Police, Mr. Rehill, went with Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal to take them away?

A. Yes.

Q. With the result that the head of the police was absent from Amritsar when these events happened?

A. Yes.

Q. You think this could have been avoided and somebody else could have been sent?

A. An unfortunate decision. It was difficult to find another man. Mr. Rehill drives his own car very nicely and he knew the way. It would have been difficult for any car which could have taken that party to go through except that driven by Mr. Rehill.

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Q. Does this not indicate that some extra arrangements were necessary to be made? Should it not have been thought out previously so as to avoid his leaving the police without his guidance on this juncture?

A. It took that particular form of decision. I don't know that what happened could have been anticipated.

Q. Then you went there on the 11th, Mr. Kitchin?

A. Yes.

Q. In the morning?

A. Yes.

Q. And General Dyer had already arrived?

A. No. General Dyer arrived on the night of the 11th. I had gone away on the midnight of the 11th.

Q. You were there before?

A. I had left.

Q. And you met him at the railway station?

A. I met him on the 14th as I came back to Lahore on the night of the 11th with Mr. Donald after giving over charge to Major Macdonald. I went back on the morning of the 14th.

Q. Before General Dyer arrived you had made over the administration to Major Macdonald, the Officer Commanding, there?

A. Yes.

Q. Could not the Civil Authorities have carried on with the aid of the military?

A. The question really was whether the military could carry on with the assistance of the civil.

Q. In the ordinary conditions the civil authorities were in charge. Then the extraordinary events happened. Then the first alternative would be that the civil authorities were to carry on with the aid of the military. Was it possible to do so? Could not the civil authorities have carried on with sufficient aid from the military?

A. I judge they could not. It is a purely military question as to whether they could enter the city at night, and picket the streets and so on, and how to deal with the street fighting that I anticipated, and I decided to leave it to the soldiers to run it themselves.

Q. Military force had to enter the city on the 11th. That is why you thought that the station should be made over to the military?

A. I think I had to do it. There was no time to ask the Magistrate to go and give orders for firing. They would go and do it. I expected a fight that day.

Q. Not only on that day but on subsequent days also?

A. I allowed it to be continued the next day.

Q. I understand from your statement, Mr. Kitchin, that in no place did the civil Government actually lose control with the aid of the military?

A. Yes. That is correct.

Q. And in Amritsar you say in your statement that civil authorities lost control on the 10th, but they recovered it on the 12th?

A. I have said so in my statement. It is hardly correct. Civil control was lost on the 10th. Till the 14th no arrests could have been effected or processes could have been served.

Q. You could have taken control on the 12th?

A. What I mean is that on the 12th we were able to make arrests without fighting.

Q. Then in Gujranwala you lost control on the 14th and recovered it the next day?

A. Yes.

Q. And in Lahore?

A. I was not in Lahore. I understand that for two days or so no process could be served in Lahore.

Q. If there were no other considerations, the civil authority could, soon after the 11th, that is, on the 12th, 13th or 14th, as the case may be, have taken back control and carried on with such aid as might have been necessary from the military?

A. Yes, in individual places.

Q. According to your statement, in almost all places?

A. Yes.

Q. But your view is that martial law was wanted, not for the purpose of getting control but for the purpose of what you describe as preventing the spread of infection?

A. Yes.

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Mr. A. J. W. KITCHIN.

[Continued.]

Q. And that is your only justification for martial law being declared?

A. That was the immediate reason.

Q. And also I take it the second important reason from your point of view was to provide for the speedy disposal of the persons who had already been arrested between the 10th and 13th?

A. That is a reason which weighed with me; I have no reason to suppose it weighed with any one else.

Q. In your view those were the two main reasons for the declaration of martial law,—preventing the spread of infection finding some speedy method of disposing of the cases of persons already arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. And may I take it that the second reason, namely, speedy disposal of cases, was the main reason in your view for continuing martial law, or one of the main reasons?

A. I do not think so, not in my mind.

Q. Now so far as providing for speedy disposal of cases of persons arrested, don't you think that object by itself could have been effected without martial law?

A. We could not have effected it under the ordinary criminal law.

Q. Means could have been found of providing for that without having martial law?

A. That may be so, but it is not a matter with the decision of which I had anything to do.

Q. But I am asking your view?

A. If means had been provided for the summary disposal of cases quickly that—

Q. That would in your view have removed the main reason for martial law?

A. That would in my view have removed one of the reasons.

Q. One of the chief reasons?

A. Not for proclaiming Martial Law, that was inevitable; but for continuing martial law.

Q. Are you aware that in Ahmedabad, where outrages similar to those in Amritsar took place and where also a very large number of people had been arrested, the method of speedy disposal of their cases was found in another way without continuing martial law beyond a day or two?

A. I do not know any details.

Q. Then you also are of the view that the frontier trouble was also a reason?

A. Yes. I think there are other witnesses who will speak to that; I am not concerned with that. I think you will find that emissaries had gone a long way.

Q. You say you would not use the word rebellion as to the state of things existing in Amritsar on the 11th?

A. Yes, and I think I said I would use the word rebellion as regards the condition of things on the 13th. It is all a matter of degree.

Q. Then on the 11th and 12th nothing worse had happened than what had already happened on the 10th?

A. Yes. The trouble had continued.

Q. I am dealing with the city?

A. We were dealing with Amritsar and district.

Q. Then your position is this, that so far as the city of Amritsar itself was concerned, you would not be justified in describing the state of things as rebellion, but that when you took it along with what was happening in other places, the situation was different?

A. Yes. I had no news of any places except villages round Amritsar along the line of the railway wherever we could get news to. Gurdaspur was cut off next day, and we could get no news from there for five days.

Q. This cutting of telegraph wires and railway lines, was that mainly with the idea of looting?

A. Well, I really could not tell you. I should say not looting. It was going on generally; the wires and lines were being cut in all directions.

Q. We were told by some police officer that in his view it was mainly with a view to looting?

A. You do not get much by cutting railway lines in the way of looting.

Q. The idea is that you derail the goods trains?

A. Yes, it is true the goods trains were attacked in that way.

Q. And the cutting of the railway lines was with a view to stopping the goods trains in that way and looting them?

A. It may be so. It certainly is a fact that railway goods trains were being looted all over the place.

Q. And in your view the large majority of people in Amritsar were not well disposed to the authorities?

A. It is not a position on which I could really give an answer, but at any rate I saw no indications whatever of any general good disposition among the people of Amritsar until three or four days afterwards.

Q. But you will also grant that, if there were turbulent elements which defied authority, the law-abiding people would naturally be terrorised or frightened by their turbulent attitude?

A. I hope so. I am not making any charges against the majority of the people of Amritsar. I am not saying or thinking that they were ill-disposed. All I am saying is that for three or four days none of them showed their good disposition towards us.

Q. What did they do, the majority of them?

A. I do not know whether they were about the streets or not. We could get no information, and they would give us no assistance.

Q. They were not coming to you to give information?

A. No, or any kind of assistance.

Q. Are you aware that on the evening of the night of the 11th General Dyer had taken charge?

A. I was really thinking of the morning of the 11th before anything had been done.

Q. Your complaint is that on the morning of the 11th they were not assisting you in the manner they should have?

A. Yes.

Q. Don't you think the events of the 10th were so terrible as to unnerve the people? If these events unnerved the authorities, surely the ordinary people would be unnerved?

A. I do not think the authorities were unnerved; the people might have been. I am only telling you the facts as they were; we got no assistance.

Q. After General Dyer assumed charge late on the 11th and in view of the fact of Martial Law being in existence, you do not blame people for not coming to you and so on?

A. I am afraid they came all right then; there was no trouble then.

Q. Then all their inactivity which you complain of and from which you draw an inference against them is confined to the 11th?

A. The 11th and the time I was there on the 10th itself.

Q. On the 10th you did not get there till late at night?

A. I got there at 5 o'clock.

Q. From what you saw on the evening of the 10th and the morning of the 11th?

A. Yes, on the 14th the place was buzzing like a hive.

Q. After that you had no fault to find?

A. No.

Q. About the Jallianwala Bagh incident. In your statement you say it was necessary to strike quickly and hard, in regard to the matter. Is that your view?

A. Yes.

Q. So I take your view to be that it was necessary to do something on a grand scale to strike terror into the minds of the people, was that the idea?

A. Well, with some modification of epithets, yes.

Q. Not that the necessities of the actual situation in Amritsar or on the spot required it? Something quite out of the way, something that would strike terror was needed in your opinion?

A. Now you are getting a little stronger; I cannot quite say yes to that. I said the military situation was so serious that an example was necessary.

Q. The military situation, not in Amritsar itself but in the surrounding parts?

A. In the surrounding parts and in the Punjab generally.

Q. It was necessary to do what—to make an example?

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[Continued.]

A. Strong steps were necessary.

Q. What is your idea of strong steps?

A. Well, General Dyer took a strong step.

Q. We are now dealing with your view. In your view it was necessary to take a strong step; you mean it was necessary to kill a large number of people in order to set an example?

A. No, I did not say that.

Q. What was your view of taking a strong step?

A. I had expected that, before the end was over (and it was going to get very much worse; it might have got incredibly worse than it did), there would be large casualties. I saw no alternative to that, that there must be casualties.

Q. What I want to understand is—was your frame of mind and that of the authorities connected with Amritsar this, that the situation was of such a character that it was necessary to take occasion to do something that would have a great effect?

A. No, I do not think I thought of it.

Q. After you learnt of what had happened in the Jallianwala Bagh, did you approve of what had been done?

A. No, I have never, so far as I know, expressed an opinion. I did say at the time, and I say now, it ended the troubles.

Q. We will deal with the effect of it in a minute. When you were told of what had been done, did you approve of it in your own mind?

A. I think I will leave the question unanswered.

Q. Did you express any opinion officially to any one as regards this incident?

A. The opinion I expressed at the time was that the thing was finished now.

Q. That is again on the effect of it?

A. That is the only opinion I expressed.

Q. Did you express any opinion on the incident itself?

A. No.

Q. Nor were you consulted about it at any time?

A. No, I was consulted about the effect.

Q. I will tell you why I want to know it, because we have had it in evidence that the Lieutenant-Governor wired, or some authority wired, that the Lieutenant-Governor had approved of what had been done by General Dyer at Jallianwala Bagh?

A. I do not think you can take that.

Q. We have got it?

A. I know I am not entitled to speak for Government, but I think you are putting perhaps a wrong interpretation upon the orders conveyed.

Q. I put it to General Dyer and he said that was so; I will read it out to you.

A. I have seen it, I remember it; I am not in a position to explain it.

Q. I only say this, it appears that the action of General Dyer was approved by the Lieutenant-Governor as shown by this telegram. All I want to know is whether you were asked officially your view on your opinion with regard to this incident before the Lieutenant-Governor approved of it?

A. No: well, yes, I was, the answer I gave was the answer I gave you just now.

Q. You were consulted? On what date?

A. On the morning of the 14th. No, I was not consulted as regards the action of General Dyer, I was consulted as regards the effect of the action of General Dyer?

Q. On what date, on the morning of the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that personally or in writing?

A. Personally.

Q. You were called?

A. Yes.

Q. What were you asked?

A. I was asked what the effect would be.

Q. And you said it would have a very good effect?

A. I said in my opinion the trouble was over.

Q. In your opinion what was done on the 13th would have that effect?

A. Yes.

Q. You were certain it would have that effect?

A. Yes.

Q. That is all the opinion you were asked and you gave it?

A. Yes.

Q. You were asked something on the 10th?

A. I was asked nothing on the 10th; it must have been a slip of the tongue.

Q. In your statement you deal with various causes that in your view brought about the ultimate burst. You have mentioned war weariness, that people had got quite sick of the war, and high prices and great distress owing to high prices?

A. Yes, in towns.

Q. Then you had the new income-tax forms of assessment?

A. Yes.

Q. And these new income-tax forms, were they regarded by the people as very inquisitorial?

A. I believe they were very much the same forms as are used in England.

Q. They were quite different to what they used to be in this country?

A. Yes, I think they were trying to introduce something more of the English procedure.

Q. About wheat, the complaint was, I understand, that the wheat was commandeered at particular fixed prices?

A. Yes, that was the complaint.

Q. With regard to wheat taken from the Colonies that was not so?

A. No, I think it was all commandeered. As a matter of fact I had nothing to do with the commandeering, but there was a Committee to hear objections and appeals consisting of two officers, and a non-official, and of that Committee I was the President.

Q. All these causes that you have mentioned were really very potent causes?

A. Potent causes, yes.

Q. Strong causes for considerable unrest?

A. Yes, affecting different classes.

Q. With the result that almost all classes were by one reason or another affected? And in your view, irrespective of the Rowlatt Act, the situation created by these causes had got so electric and surcharged that trouble was bound to supervene?

A. Not bound to supervene.

Q. Was eminently likely to supervene?

A. Yes.

Q. And then came the Rowlatt Acts?

A. Yes.

Q. And those Acts, as you know, had almost unanimous opposition from the Indian population?

A. I take it from you, yes.

Q. Now in dealing with the causes this is what you say under the head "Nature of the movement." "Clear proof of actual revolutionary causes being at work is given by the attitude of the Amir of Afghanistan." I want to understand that. Beyond the attitude of the Amir have you any other proof of actual revolutionary causes?

A. I think perhaps some evidence will be given you, not by me.

Q. Of which you are not aware?

A. It is not evidence which could be given in public.

Q. When you speak of the attitude of the Amir of Afghanistan, is that a matter which somebody else will deal with?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it your view (that is what you express) that there was a widespread organization?

A. Expressed in those words it is very distinctly not my view.

Q. Those are the words you used, you put it rather emphatically. "The spread of the movement to Afghanistan is absolute proof that the organization was widespread."

A. I cannot support the word "organization" quite.

Q. You cannot say that there was any organization?

A. That is another matter; I am not prepared to put it in those words that the organization was widespread.

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[Continued.]

Q. You cannot name any particular organization?

A. I am not quite so sure about that, but I am afraid I am not in a position to suggest any such organization here anyhow.

Q. I take it also that your observation about the Arya Samaj you would rather withdraw?

A. Yes, as regards the organization, yes.

Q. When were you consulted about Gujranwala, about sending the aeroplanes?

A. The aeroplanes were on their way back when I came back to Lahore. When I came back from Amritsar I went to see the Lieutenant-Governor and I was sitting talking to him on the evening of the 14th when we heard the aeroplanes going home from Gujranwala.

Q. And when were they sent?

A. I do not know but I think they had gone at 12 o'clock that very day.

Q. And were they sent after these reports had come in that O'Brien and other Europeans had been murdered?

A. No, O'Brien and the aeroplanes started at the same time.

Q. These reports came at a later date?

A. I was with the Lieutenant-Governor when the aeroplanes came home from Gujranwala. They went back to the cantonment and from there they telephoned up their report, and the report was that the whole place was in flames and no Europeans were visible, and as Colonel O'Brien had gone off on a motor-car that morning and should have arrived in Gujranwala before the aeroplanes, the only inference was that *kam tamam* (the work is complete).

Q. And the report of the Europeans being murdered was supplied by the aeroplanes?

A. No report. That inference was drawn by us who got the report that the buildings were in flames and no Europeans were visible and crowds were about. As a matter of fact we found out afterwards that they were in the Treasury and all safe. I only mentioned it because that was the atmosphere with which we were dealing.

Q. You spoke of people from Amritsar having been found at Lyallpur and on the frontier, I want to understand that. Were residents of Amritsar arrested for offences committed at Lyallpur and the frontier?

A. They had not been convicted, I think, on the frontier, but they had been convicted at Lyallpur and they were implicated in a good many of the railway smashing cases and at Chuharkana. I think I am right in saying that. As regards Lyallpur I know I am correct, but as regards the frontier there were no convictions.

Q. But there were cases of Amritsar people who had committed acts of violence in other places?

A. Yes, and at Kasur, I think, these Amritsar people were convicted there. I am speaking only of conviction.

Q. In ordinary times you find Amritsar people convicted in other districts?

A. I was speaking of people who had left Amritsar that night—the night of the 10th.

Q. About the police this is what you say—"There is also very little doubt that during the investigations which followed the police of some places extorted a good deal of blackmail?"

A. That is correct—that is my opinion.

Q. Before the events that took place did you observe any anti-Government or anti-British feeling either at Lahore or Amritsar?

A. Not at Amritsar certainly. I had no complaints in Lahore. Not in the districts ever.

Q. In the districts there was no anti-British or anti-Government feeling?

A. No, excepting the districts that came into the disturbances.

Q. Before the 10th?

A. It began about the 1st of April.

Q. Between the 1st and 10th April was there any exhibition of anti-British feeling anywhere?

A. Yes, there was. Reports began to come in.

Q. Take Amritsar first, was there any manifestation of that feeling before the 10th?

A. Yes. Mr. Irving speaks with authority on Amritsar. He said there was none, but as a matter of fact, I know there was some.

Q. With regard to Lahore was there any tangible manifestation of feeling before the 10th?

A. Yes, there was.

Q. When?

A. I am thinking of my own experience when some men were rude to me. My own experience is probably rather a general experience.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. These events occurring almost simultaneously at Amritsar, Lahore and Gujranwala and the cutting of the railways must have had a great effect on everybody's mind?

A. It did indeed.

Q. I understand from you that martial law was introduced because of these riots and to prevent the spread of the infection. Was there any doubt in anybody's mind that martial law should be introduced or it was practically universal?

A. I do not think there was any doubt about it; it was the only thing to do.

Q. You know probably that during the time of the mutiny things happened because the civil authorities on two or three occasions did not take sufficiently strong action?

A. Yes.

Q. It was put to you by Sir C. Setalvad that if troops had been despatched to Amritsar as soon as things became known and before the arrests were made it might have stopped further trouble but I will now put it the other way; in England the War Office and the civil authorities are strongly averse to the appearance of the military on the scene until an absolute necessity for their action arises because the appearance of the military very often causes excitement which it is desired to avoid?

A. That is of course true.

Q. May I take it that the Europeans considered the introduction of martial law as entirely justified?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. From your experience as a district officer would you say that in certain cases a miscarriage of justice occurs under the ordinary civil law or do such things never occur?

A. Of course they occur.

Q. Therefore if they occur under the civil law there is reason to believe that such cases can also occur under martial law?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You know that sentences which are passed by a martial law Court are not subject to appeal and there is no remedy for the correction of any sentences?

A. We can accept that.

Q. You know that all Deputy Commissioners were required to submit a report, and the Commissioners had to review those reports and to submit their own reports?

A. Yes.

Q. May I take it that this statement is practically an extract of the report which you submitted as a Commissioner?

A. Yes.

Q. You were Commissioner of Lahore and this includes Amritsar, Gujranwala, Gurdaspur and Sialkot.

A. Kasur is a sub-division of Lahore, Sheikhupura is a sub-division of Gujranwala, but from the 1st of November Sheikhupura has become a separate district.

Q. All these serious disturbances occurred in your division?

A. Yes.

Q. Questions about the Arya Samaj have already been asked, but I will cover the same ground a little, and although you have modified your opinion, it still appears to me that because a number of men who were convicted in these cases were Arya Samajis, you think

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there was some connection with these disturbances by the Arya Samaj?

A. I have said only what you have repeated that the number of Arya Samajis who were convicted in relation to others was very large.

Q. Is it not a fact that the Arya Samaj movement is anti-Christian, anti-Sikh and anti-Muhammadan?

A. I am not prepared to say that.

Q. So far as the religious movement is concerned?

A. Well, I am not prepared to say with regard to any movement.

Q. Do you know if the Arya Samaj as an organization is suspected in your division as having something to do with the disturbances; and were any drastic measures suggested by any of your subordinate officers against the Arya Samaj?

A. No drastic measures were suggested to me.

Q. It was not suspected?

A. I am not prepared to say.

Q. Although you have modified your statement there are one or two points which I wish to clear up. Take, for instance, the sentence "it would be idle to pretend that this is mere coincidence"—then again it is stated "clear proof of actual revolutionary causes being at work is given...". May I take it that you are still of opinion that there is a revolutionary movement behind these disturbances?

A. I am not clear on the subject.

Q. This is your present opinion or were you of that opinion sometime in April that there was no revolutionary propaganda or movement behind these disturbances?

A. My opinion is probably modified.

Q. Therefore at the time—in the month of April—you had an idea that, probably there was a revolutionary movement behind these disturbances?

A. At the time, yes.

Q. Therefore, I take it that your judgment will be influenced by that opinion?

A. Yes, to some extent. At such times one has to act on the information before one.

Q. You have stated that apart from the question of the introduction of martial law, the continuance of martial law for a long time was influenced by the fact of what was happening in Afghanistan?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it not a fact that throughout India, including the Punjab, both in the press and from the public platform the action of the Amir was condemned and readiness to stand by the Government was willingly expressed?

A. I am afraid I do not read the press throughout India, but I will accept it from you. On the platform, so far as I know, it was so.

Q. Is it not a fact that this threat of Afghanistan against the Turkish power was empty and that nobody believed in it?

A. I think that is quite likely.

Q. What difference would it have made if these cases instead of being tried under martial law had been tried by courts under the Defence of India Act?

A. The difficulty is that a court under the Defence of India Act requires three judges, all of whom, so far as I know, must be Sessions Judges, and there are not enough Sessions Judges to go round; and there were something like three thousand prisoners.

Q. It appears to me from your statement that the cases were tried just as they would have been tried by an ordinary civil court?

A. No. What I intended to say was that the Magistrates were doing their duty within the best of their powers and using care and discretion which they have been accustomed to use when working under the provisions of the ordinary Criminal Procedure Code.

Q. That the officers of the Summary Courts showed no undue haste or prejudice. Is that your opinion?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you aware that arrests were made by the officials at Amritsar on the 11th of April?

A. No, I am not.

Q. Were any arrests made on the 11th inside the Amritsar City?

A. I do not know of any. I think there is a misunderstanding. Arrests may have been made as Amritsar is a big place. I never heard of any arrests made inside Amritsar City.

Q. I think you are aware that so far as the burying of dead bodies is concerned, if they are not the subjects of any crime, there is no necessity to take anybody's permission?

A. Of course not.

Q. In all cases when a person cannot bury the dead body it is only because a sort of inquest is held under the Criminal Procedure Code before that body is buried?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore in this case there was no question of permission?

A. Of course not.

Q. Because these dead bodies were shot in the riots, that is why permission of the officer was necessary?

A. No. Permission was not necessary to bury the dead but permission was necessary for a crowd to follow and bury the dead.

Q. Is the burial ground outside the Sultanwind Gate?

A. It is outside the city.

Q. Is there anything to prevent the people from burying the dead bodies inside the city?

A. Presumably there are Municipal regulations.

Q. Is the burning ghat also outside the city?

A. Yes, outside.

Q. According to the evidence, it is said that a deputation waited upon the Deputy Commissioner?

A. It could hardly be called a deputation—a deputation connotes that they have been deputed. They were in fact self-constituted representatives. There were about five or six in number.

Q. And it was decided that the dead bodies should be buried before 1 or 2 o'clock?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it not a fact that these orders of the Deputy Commissioner were obeyed?

A. Yes, ultimately they were.

Q. Obeyed; but they never agreed to obey them?

A. They never agreed to obey them.

Q. Do you mean those five or six persons or the crowd inside the city?

A. So far as they were represented by the people who went to and fro.

Q. And the crowd wanted to bury these bodies in Jallianwala Bagh?

A. A crowd wanted to go out twenty or thirty thousand strong to bury the dead. There was no objection to the burying of the dead but the crowd was objected to.

Q. Therefore I assume that the crowd was afraid of the force that was at the command of the authorities?

A. It may have been so.

Q. On the 10th it has been deposed by one witness and there is other evidence that on the 10th there was one C. I. D. man who came inside the city twice?

A. Yes. Do you mean the C. I. D. man who was in the city?

Q. Yes.

A. I saw him myself.

Q. And he must have given you the information or that information must have reached you through the police that Ashraf Khan and all these people were safe and sound?

A. Yes, he did not appear until the evening.

Q. He has informed us that when he went back he informed his superior officer and therefore Mr. Donald must have informed you?

A. Yes.

Q. And according to him he went back at about 7 in the evening?

A. Yes.

Q. And he has also stated that before he left the city he had gone to the Kotwali and seen Ashraf Khan?

A. Yes.

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(Continued.)

Q. Therefore I take it that at 7 p.m. you were aware that the police were safe and sound?

A. By 7 p.m. we certainly knew it.

Q. And you arrived at Amritsar at about 5 p.m. at the railway station and the interval of uncertainty so far as you were concerned was only two hours?

A. Yes.

Q. What was there to prevent the people inside the Kotwali from communicating this to you?

A. So far as I know they could not send out messengers in plain clothes.

Q. And when they wanted, they as a matter of fact sent a letter to you?

A. Yes, they could not have appeared in uniform.

Q. You have heard Jawahar Lal's evidence and you know that according to him this rumour about the burning of the fort at Lahore was not current on the evening of the 10th but he heard this rumour on the morning of the 11th when he went to that mosque where the dead bodies were?

A. I do not remember that. I heard it myself on the evening of the 10th. I myself contradicted it.

Q. Was the source of information given by any other person than Ashraf Khan?

A. It came from Ashraf Khan.

Q. And he did not mention that there was any such rumour?

A. I do not remember his mentioning it.

Q. The Deputy Commissioner has given his statement and there is no mention of it?

A. I do not remember his having mentioned it.

Q. You say in your statement that "it was necessary to strike quickly and to strike hard in order to save the rural people and above all to save the army from infection"—is it your contention that any people from Amritsar were tampering with the loyalty of the troops or were inciting the rural population to revolt?

A. I cannot answer that question.

Q. Have you any information that any person from Amritsar was doing that?

A. Yes, we have, but details cannot be given.

Q. You have stated in your statement that "if martial law comes again for anything less than an extreme state of military and civil insurrection, then in my opinion the ultimate control of the civil administration, including martial law regulations and orders and martial law courts, should remain with the Lieutenant-Governor and the control of districts should be left with district officers." May I take it that you contemplate two sets of conditions? There may be an extreme state of martial law and there may be an ordinary state of martial law?

A. Yes, I did contemplate that when I wrote.

Q. Do you think that the recent disturbances in the Punjab could correctly be described as an extreme case which could justify the assumption by the military of civil control?

A. Martial law at present means the assumption by the military of full control. It means neither less nor more than that. It has no intermediate stage.

Q. Therefore, I think, you would describe that as an extreme case which would justify martial law?

A. I have said an extreme state of civil and military insurrection; that did not happen.

Q. Now supposing a large number of arrests had not been made in Amritsar city, then one of the main reasons for the declaration of martial law was this; supposing if on the 15th no persons had been arrested, would not one of the main reasons for which you said martial law was justified have ceased to exist?

A. As regards Amritsar city itself, one of the main reasons would have ceased to exist; Amritsar was only an isolated part.

Q. Now you have given a very large number of predisposing causes and they have all been dealt with by the President and by others. I will only deal with two points. One is recruiting. Apart from the fact whether recruiting had anything to do with these disturbances or not, I want to know whether the recruiting campaign and the war loan affair did or did not, as a matter of fact, cause discontent in the province of the Punjab?

A. I cannot speak for the province as a whole. I can speak for my own district. I was not in the Lahore Division in those days. I was in the Lyallpur District. I held charge of the Lyallpur District for 3½ years during the years of war.

Q. You have never expressed an opinion of this kind, that these things did cause discontent?

A. No, there was of course some pressure.

Q. Apart from this fact, I want to know whether or not, as a matter of fact, there was an appreciable amount of discontent on account of the method of recruiting or on account of the pressure that was brought to bear on the people for the purpose of war loan?

A. I can speak only for my own district. There was a certain amount of discontent. There was also the war. I myself was conscripted.

Q. Is it not a fact that the sympathies of the educated classes throughout the Punjab, especially in Lahore and Amritsar, were alienated to an appreciable extent by the way they were reproached by the Lieutenant-Governor from time to time and the way the thing was rubbed into them that while every other person was doing something for the country, the educated people of the Punjab were doing nothing, that they were good for nothing, that they had not helped the Government and that while others were doing something they were only talking?

A. Yes, I think it is quite likely that they were.

Q. I want to know if in your opinion it is not one of the results of the war that a desire for self-rule and self-determination has found an expression and that it is a real desire?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, is it not a fact that during these three years 1916, 1917, 1918, certain measures of the Government have caused some discontent in the masses of the people?

A. In the masses of the people, I do not know.

Q. The educated classes?

A. Among the educated classes, it is very likely.

Q. Is it not a fact that rightly or wrongly people came to believe that the Reform Scheme was going to be whittled down by the Government of India?

A. It may be so. I am really not in touch with the expressions of the political classes.

Q. Still, as Commissioner of a Division you are expected to know it?

A. I spent most of my time in agricultural districts.

Q. Don't you think that the passing of the Rowlatt Bill, which was opposed by the unanimous opinion of all members of the Legislative Council, was like the proverbial last straw that broke the camel's back?

A. I cannot express an opinion on it really. I was never quite clear in my own mind as to why they objected to it so much. I admit they did object to it, but I am never clear in my own mind as to why they did so.

Q. I will just put a few facts before you. There was first the Rowlatt Bill No. 1 and then Rowlatt Bill No. 2 had become an Act and No. 1 will probably become an Act next January?

A. Is that so? I do not know, it may be so.

Q. You have expressed an opinion that it was very difficult to understand the provisions of that Act and nobody has read them?

A. I read it through several times.

Q. Is it not a fact that the Rowlatt Bill simply deals with two matters? One is that any one in India who is in possession of any seditious poem, article or paper or other literature becomes guilty under that Bill and that the onus of proving that he was in possession of it for good reason and in good faith would be on the accused person? (This question was repeated twice.)

A. I cannot answer you. I am glad to hear it explained. It is not often one has an opportunity of having it explained.

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(Continued.)

Q. That is the only provision?

A. I don't remember that.

Q. I think you know, being the Commissioner of a Division, that under section 196-B.....

A. I understand that you have already explained, have you not? This is only extended in the case of anarchical crimes.

Q. So far as Bill No. 1 is concerned, it is not a question of anarchical crimes; it only creates a new offence by saying that any person who is in possession of seditious literature becomes guilty and that the onus of proving that he was in possession of it in good faith lies upon the accused persons. That is the only section in Bill No. 1. There is no other section. Is it very difficult to understand the meaning of that section?

A. I have plenty of leisure.

Q. Now about the powers of the police. You are aware, I think as Commissioner of a Division, that up to this time under section 196-B. of the Criminal Procedure Code, no police officer is allowed to make any investigation into a revolutionary or anarchical crime unless and until he gets a sanction from the District Magistrate or from any other constituted authority, and this Rowlatt Bill No. 1 allows the police to make investigations into those cases. Are you aware of that?

A. No, I do not know.

Q. And therefore if the people say that the powers of the police have been increased, you will not be surprised that they are telling the truth?

A. I should like to verify it by a reference to the Bill.

Q. If my premise is wrong, then everything falls to the ground?

A. I understand you want to convert me to the opposition.

Q. What I say is, it has been repeatedly said that the powers of the police have been increased, I want to know if this is a fact or not?

A. If the facts are correctly stated that the powers of the police have been increased, then of course they have been increased.

Q. I will not deal with Rowlatt Bill No. 2 in great detail. I will only ask you one or two questions about it. Does it or does it not take away the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil courts?

A. Under certain classes of crimes if certain circumstances have arisen.

Q. That is, all the crimes that were being tried under the Defence of India Act which was purely a temporary measure and which would cease to exist I think after next month, were not all those crimes taken away from the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil courts?

A. Yes, with that limitation of course; certain crimes and under certain circumstances.

Q. In places where the Act would be extended?

A. Yes.

Q. And does or does not the mere fact of the extension of that Act deprive the inhabitants of that part of the country of any right of appeal? Does it or does it not deprive the inhabitants of that part of the country, where Rowlatt Bill No. 2 has been extended, of any right of appeal?

A. As regards those particular kinds of crimes tried before those particular kinds of tribunals.

Q. Therefore the contention was that there is no need, first of all, to extend the Act during the last six months, and I think you know that there was also the contention that when in Ireland and other places where there are really anarchical crimes committed no such provision is made, why it should be made in India, are you aware of that?

A. Yes.

Q. It was contended that when the enforcement of such an Act was not necessary in Ireland, why it should be necessary for India after the war. You are aware of that?

A. Yes.

Q. And also you know that under certain circumstances when certain steps have been taken by the Lieutenant-Governor or by the Governor-General in Council any right of representation by the people or any right of being present when the evidence of a man was being recorded, is taken away under certain circumstances and in certain cases?

A. Yes, under those circumstances and for those very limited cases.

Q. And you think as a matter of principle it is only revolutionary political men who can object to these conditions and not the ordinary law-abiding citizens?

A. I never said so.

Q. Do you agree with me that this is a question of principle and that every person has a right to object to this principle?

A. I could have agreed with you even 10 minutes ago that every person has a right to object to this principle.

Q. You will not call him a revolutionary?

A. I never have. I am sorry to have given you so much trouble.

Q. Is it not a fact that all these serious disturbances which occurred in your division, except in Amritsar, all occurred after the 10th April?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you remember the date of Mahatma Gandhi's arrest?

A. I think it was on the 9th.

Q. Will you be surprised to find it suggested that one of the causes of these disturbances was the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi and not any pre-arranged conspiracy. You have in your statement expressed a surprise as to why they should occur in three or four different places at one and the same time. You have said so. Therefore I put it to you and will you be surprised if I suggest to you that the mere arrest of Mahatma Gandhi and the order that was passed by the Punjab and Delhi Governments that he should be arrested beyond the limits of Delhi caused all these disturbances simultaneously?

A. Yes, I am not surprised.

Q. Now I think you will give me some credit—having spent the whole of my time in law—I have become old, but I think you will give me some credit if I say that I know the difference between a cognisable and non-cognisable offence. But may I know for what offence Dr. Kidar Nath was arrested, was it for a cognisable or non-cognisable offence?

A. I have no idea.

Q. Therefore if the arrest of Dr. Kidar Nath was not for any cognisable offence, you will agree with me that a warrant of arrest was necessary under the Criminal Procedure Code?

A. Undoubtedly, of course he may have been arrested under martial law, but under the Criminal Procedure Code, if it was a non-cognisable offence, a warrant was needed.

Q. You will agree with me that all persons were not convicted for cognisable offences, they were not all convicted for murder, there is at least an appreciable number of persons who were convicted for very minor offences?

A. I do not know for what they were arrested.

Q. And therefore all those persons would require for their arrest a warrant under the Criminal Procedure Code?

A. By no means. A warrant is determined by the offence for which a man is arrested.

Q. If they were not arrested for the offence of any murder or for the committing of any cognisable case, then a warrant would be required?

A. Yes.

Q. I want to know—I don't want any details—whether the revolutionary movement which may be behind these disturbances had its influence from outside or was located inside the province of the Punjab, or is all-pervading throughout the country or is confined to the Punjab alone?

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[Continued.]

A. I do not know much about it, but indications are that it is outside influence.

Q. It is not inside the province, it was outside influence?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you connect the congress movement and the Home Rule movement with this revolutionary movement?

A. No, in no way.

Q. Except a few anarchists and certain members of the other party is it not within your knowledge that there is not a single political party in India who wants self-government without the protection of the British arms or who wants to sever its connection from the British arms?

A. I believe so. I accept that.

Q. Then how is it and why is it that when the same causes which were operating inside the Punjab were also acting outside the Punjab no disturbances took place anywhere else on account of these hartals, on account of the passing of these Rowlatt Bills, on account of scarcity of rain, and on account of recruiting? How is it that while all these forces were at work throughout the country and in every province there were disturbances only in the Punjab and in no other country?

A. We are the frontier province.

Q. I suggest if it is not a fact that those provinces were better handled by their Local Governments, and therefore no disturbances took place there?

A. Do you expect me to say yes?

Q. At least you know that there was hartal in every other important city of the United Provinces as there was in the Punjab, I think you must have read about it in the papers?

A. I don't know it.

Q. There was complete hartal and there were no disturbances outside the Punjab. You must have read about it?

A. I cannot say of my personal knowledge.

Q. If you have read about it in papers you can answer it?

A. I have read in papers that there was hartal in large cities and other provinces.

Q. And you have also read that there were no disturbances?

A. I have not read that, but there were no disturbances.

Q. I am quite satisfied with that negative answer. During these months there had been railway strikes in other parts of India, mill-hand strikes, and so on?

A. Yes, there had been.

Q. And they were in no way connected with either revolutionary conspiracy, or anything of that sort?

A. I don't suppose they were.

Q. You said that in your opinion the arrest of Dr. Kitchlew and Dr. Satyapal did not cause excitement, but I think you will agree with me that the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi did cause a great deal of excitement?

A. Undoubtedly it caused excitement. The arrest of Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal also caused excitement.

Q. It is not quite clear whether for the first time the civil control of the city of Amritsar was handed over to Captain Massey or to some other officer?

A. Major MacDonald was in charge of the troops, and not Captain Massey.

Q. If the complete control was handed over to Major MacDonald on the night of the 10th, how was it that a proclamation was issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar on the morning of the 11th signed by him?

A. Yes, at that time it was looked upon as the province of the Deputy Commissioner.

Q. How was it that the burial order was given by the Deputy Commissioner?

A. The burial order, I think, was given by the Officer Commanding in consultation with the Deputy Commissioner. It was actually given by Major MacDonald. In those days we all lived together. I might make the point a little clearer. In those days not only in Amritsar but in other places too in the

first two days everybody lived in his boots in the railway station, the civil and the military lived, ate and slept together. There was no question of any conference. We were together all day long at Amritsar, Gurdaspur and at Lahore.

Q. What would be the number of soldiers required on the night of the 10th to control the situation?

A. I cannot answer the question.

Q. You have stated that the force at your command was not sufficient to control the situation. Therefore there are two points. First of all there is the civil authority. You can call the military authorities and say, "we cannot control the situation and you take it over." Therefore I want to know what was the number of military men required so that the civil authority might maintain control with the help of the military authorities?

A. I could not tell you. It is a purely military question. I have my own ideas, but I don't think I can express them in front of soldiers.

Q. One more question. Was any attempt made by anybody to go inside the city from the Civil Lines or from the railway station, and was he prevented from doing so?

A. No.

Q. Did you receive any information that any person or any body of persons wanted to go outside the city on the 10th April, and that they were prevented by the mob from doing so?

A. No. The mob were burning Bagtanwala.

Q. Was any notice issued by Mr. Miles Irving, the Deputy Commissioner at Amritsar, on the 14th and 15th about the Jallianwala affair?

A. No, not to my knowledge.

Q. I want to put a question about income-tax. Is it a fact that the joint Hindu family system does not prevail anywhere outside India?

A. It does not prevail.

Q. Is it a fact that so far as income-tax forms are concerned, people have to answer all sorts of questions put to them?

A. It is not confined to Hindus.

Q. Now about these rumours, I am not talking of this period of the months of April or May—is it not true that before that time during 1916-17-18 similar wild news were afloat, and that they were believed in?

A. That may be true.

Q. What I want to know is whether there was any design behind it?

A. Similar rumours were afloat in India and were swallowed by the people?

Q. Not only in India. Such rumours were believed even in England, about the Russian army being seen in England, and believed by a large number of people. Have you any special quarrel with the pleaders?

A. No personal quarrel so far as I know.

Q. Had you any opinion that the pleaders of your region were practically responsible for this revolutionary movement?

A. You put the words "revolutionary movement" into my mouth. That is the most important point. I have not yet said it. These gentlemen were much interested in the agitation which ended in these unhappy troubles.

Q. You cannot expect anything from these pleaders?

A. Quite naturally.

Q. Therefore there was no reason for you to suspect them as having been connected with these disturbances in any way?

A. It is quite possible.

Q. There was no reason, without any proof, for you to suspect that they are as a body responsible to a great extent for these disturbances?

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[Continued.]

A. I have not said that they were responsible. I have suggested that they were responsible for the agitation which blew off into these disturbances.

Q. Were you at Gurdaspur on 18th February?

A. I cannot remember. Very likely.

Q. And you went there with a military force?

A. I did not go with a military force.

Q. Did you hold a sort of durbar or conference in the court?

A. I summoned certain members of the bar before me.

Q. In the Court of the Sub-Judge?

A. Yes.

Q. And the Court of the Sub-Judge was surrounded by the Military?

A. Yes.

Q. I only want to know what did you say to these pleaders who came before you in Gurdaspur?

A. I said to them that I had summoned them to arrest them for crimes committed, and then I decided not to arrest them, to defer their arrest to a subsequent occasion.

Q. If any one of them turned King's evidence his case would be taken into consideration?

A. I do not say that.

Q. Did you ask any of them to give evidence on behalf of Government?

A. I cannot remember what I said. I had no intention of that kind. I might have said something to them; other pleaders were there too. This never entered into my head till this moment.

Q. Had you any reliable tangible evidence that these pleaders and barristers had committed any offences?

A. Yes; I had.

Q. On the 19th, they were arrested?

A. Not on the 19th; I will tell you if you like. It was on the 18th and they may have been arrested on the 2nd day.

Q. Were they brought handcuffed to Lahore?

A. I know nothing about that. I cannot say. It is a cognisable offence.

Q. Is it the 8th July?

A. I do not know.

Q. More than 6 weeks afterwards?

A. Yes.

Q. No charge preferred against them?

A. Yes; a definite charge.

Q. They were not brought to trial?

A. No.

Q. You know they were kept in solitary cells?

A. I know nothing about that.

Q. Mr. Abbott was the District Magistrate in Gurdaspur?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it suggested to take any steps against them before the Chief Court under the Legal Practitioners' Act?

A. That is being done; papers are now before the High Court.

Q. The civil authorities gave up the direction of affairs in Lahore, or were they exercising autocratic powers under the guise of martial law?

A. I do not understand.

Q. Had the Civil authorities really given up the direction of affairs in Lahore or were they exercising autocratic powers?

A. The question is not a fair one. The civil authorities were exercising their jurisdiction and the military officer, the Officer Commanding troops, so far as I can understand, acted in consultation with the Lieutenant-Governor. The High Court was doing its duty and the other civil courts were doing their duty and the magistrates holding their trials. There was not any supersession of the ordinary civil courts by the military courts; no complete supersession.

Q. You know the Ashrapore pleaders were arrested like the Gurdaspur pleaders by your orders?

A. Not on my orders.

Q. But you know they were arrested?

A. I think some of them were arrested.

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Q. Is it a fact that there was no proclamation of martial law at Gurdaspur?

A. Never. There was no martial law exercised in Gurdaspur.

Q. Therefore I believe that when these pleaders and barristers of Gurdaspur were arrested, there will be some warrant showing for what offence and under which section of the Indian Penal Code they were arrested?

A. They were arrested under the Defence of India Act.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. How many were arrested?

A. I do not remember; about 8.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

For what time did you see the crowd on the 6th April?

A. About an hour.

Q. It is not quite clear what you mean by "that they were not obeying orders." You said that the crowd was good natured and you also stated that they were defiant of discipline?

A. I mean that when they were told to go back they did not go back.

Q. That is when they were ordered to move back, they would not move back. What was the number of the crowd?

A. Certainly some thousands. There was some stone-throwing too; but I did not get it.

Q. From the 11th up to the 13th a number of civil officers were always available and could have been at the disposal of the military; there was no scarcity of civil officers?

A. There was great scarcity.

Q. I mean District Officers, Magistrates. A large number of Magistrates were available?

A. Yes.

Q. A question was put to you and there is some confusion. May I ask you again as to whether the prohibitory order, that is mentioned, was actually issued on the 12th and not on the 11th?

A. From the sequence of facts, the inference is inevitable; I know that it is on the 11th; I am not sure of the 12th. Of the 11th I am quite sure.

Q. You have stated to the President that what you have stated in your statement about the relations of Superintendents of Police and District Magistrates is wrong. What I want to know is whether you have changed your opinion or whether it is still your opinion?

A. I have changed my opinion after referring to the rules and instructions pertaining to the investigating officers.

Q. When you sent in your report to the Lieutenant-Governor, you were of this opinion?

A. I am of this opinion; it is quite my opinion. I should have stated "the Superintendent had powers; the District Magistrates had no specific powers."

Q. You refer in your statement to the "virile methods of the British Officers." So far as Amritsar is concerned, to whom are you referring in this sentence?

A. It would not apply to any Indian officer, because every one of them seems to have been afraid.

Q. You say "but for the British Officers and their more virile methods there would have been general anarchy." How do you say that every one of them was afraid; Mr. Miles Irving was not afraid; Mr. Plomer was not afraid; several others were by no means afraid. By Police officers you mean officers in charge of the civil administration of Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. To what methods of the Deputy Commissioner and the subordinate magistrates you are referring?

A. To the fact that they were prepared to go out of their responsibility, live where they can, speak where they can, until the things quieted down.

Q. So far as the question of civil responsibility is concerned, they gave up all civil responsibility

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, AMRITSAR.

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Mr. A. J. W. KITCHIN—concluded—Mr. OBAIDULLAH.

A. So far as direction is concerned at all, there is not much indication of direction. The attacks were made entirely on the railways.

Q. Those are the facts, we know them. I understand you say because it was a frontier province, therefore there were disturbances here, though there were common factors elsewhere operating in the same way?

A. There were common factors elsewhere operating in the same way. Of course the frontier province was the centre of the trouble. The frontier province of course was the focus of trouble. I do not pretend to explain the whole thing.

Q. You cannot explain?

A. I cannot explain the whole thing.

Q. There was reference made to the Mutiny. You do not suppose that conditions prevailed in the Punjab similar to those that prevailed before or during the Mutiny?

A. They did not.

Q. Not even a remote resemblance at all?

A. No.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. You were made to say that all the happenings in the Punjab, murders, arson and what not, from the 10th onwards, might possibly or conceivably be due to the excitement caused by the arrest of Mr. Gandhi.

A. Yes.

Q. The first happenings were in Amritsar. Were they not?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you any evidence, have you ever heard that the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest reached Amritsar before the crowds collected there?

A. No, it did not reach Amritsar.

Q. You were also made to say that Sir Michael O'Dwyer on various occasions made disparaging remarks about the educated people. Do you know personally that Sir Michael O'Dwyer ever did say such a thing?

A. I do know that he said some things which were so interpreted by the classes referred to.

Q. You have told us that so far as trials by summary courts were concerned, there was no appeal and therefore no remedy for injustice, but could not they always petition His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor and ultimately His Excellency the Viceroy if any injustice was found and the penalty could be entirely remedied?

A. Yes, of course.

Q. You said that the cutting of the railway was, in your opinion, due mainly to the fact that people were out for loot?

A. I did not say that.

(The President.—He contradicted that: that is what I understood.)

Q. How many times was that proclamation prohibiting people from meeting made in Amritsar?

A. Which proclamation?

Q. How many proclamations were there?

A. There were three. There were two within my own knowledge, which were given to the leading citizens of Amritsar who came in the early morning. Then a second one was sent to the colleges. The third that I know of was by General Dyer when he went round the town.

Mr. OBAIDULLAH, sub-inspector of police, Kotwali, Amritsar.

By the President—

Q. You are a sub-inspector, I think?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you present at the meetings held at Amritsar on the 31st January, 5th, 9th, 11th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 26th, 28th February, 22nd March, 29th March and 30th March and 2nd and 6th April?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you report the proceedings to the City Inspector?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were the reports that you made correct reports of what you heard at the meetings?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. They are in accordance with your information?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you notice and remove a hand-bill that was posted in Amritsar?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What were the words in that hand-bill?

A. "Prepare yourselves to die and kill others."

Q. Where did you find that poster?

A. At the Clock Tower.

Q. I think you produced it in the Amritsar conspiracy case?

A. Yes.

Q. You accompanied General Dyer when he made his proclamation?

A. Yes.

Q. To different places where it was proclaimed?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When the proclamation was read out, did you hear any statements made by the people as regards the proclamation?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you hear?

A. That there will be a meeting.

Q. Was that mentioned frequently? Did you hear that said often by the crowd, or was it said only once or twice?

A. Once or twice.

Q. As regards your report of the 12th, you state here "A big meeting of the citizens is said to be held

to discuss the following points." Do you mean that the meeting had been held or was it said to be held?

A. I meant that a meeting would be held.

Q. Do you know whether the meeting did take place?

A. The meeting did not take place at that time.

Q. That is not much use. It was a report of a meeting that did not take place.

A. Yes; that did not take place.

Q. A meeting took place on the evening of that day?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that reported by you?

A. It was reported by some other reporter.

Q. That is the meeting that took place?

A. Yes.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. On what day did you find that hand-bill on the Clock Tower?

A. On the 6th April.

Q. Was this the only hand-bill that you found?

A. That was the only hand-bill that I found.

Q. In the whole city?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were the meetings that you attended and the proceedings of which you reported, conducted in English?

A. No, in Urdu.

Q. All the speeches were in Urdu?

A. Yes.

Q. What were they about? About the Rowlatt Bill?

A. Meetings about Rowlatt Bills started since the 5th of February. The first meeting was held on the 5th February.

Q. About the report that you made about a meeting, you thought that it was going to be held?

A. Yes.

Q. It was never held?

A. No, never held. But the meeting was held in the evening.

Q. This particular meeting that you reported was never held?

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Mr. A. J. W. KITCHIN.

[Continued.]

instead of taking every responsibility off the military officers.

A. That also requires some responsibility.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith—

Q. This request of the Deputy Commissioner, which was made on the 7th April, for increasing the garrison I suppose was received by you?

A. I saw the letter; it was addressed on the 9th; a copy was sent direct to the Local Government; it must have reached the Local Government on the 9th. The Local Government requested the General Officer Commanding to send troops.

Q. Would the Local Government comply with the Deputy Commissioner's request for increasing the garrison, while, as a matter of fact, on the 9th they were sending out men for the arrest of Kitchlew and Satyapal?

A. I should say they passed the request at my instance.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. You say that about 11 P.M. you arrived in Amritsar on the 10th. On that very day you handed over charge. May I take it that you deprived the Deputy Commissioner of all his authority?

A. At that time I had no such intention.

Q. You could not hand over charge unless you deprived the Deputy Commissioner of his authority?

A. It grew into that. It became that ultimately.

Q. The moment you handed over the authority to Major MacDonald the Deputy Commissioner became deprived of his powers?

A. The Deputy Commissioner continued to exercise his powers.

Q. Was it not entirely given to Major MacDonald? If it was, how would the Deputy Commissioner be able to use his authority?

A. I handed over charge to Major MacDonald of the military situation. He would take such steps as were required. I said nothing about civil administration.

Q. You handed over charge to Major MacDonald of the military situation. As regards the civil administration, the Deputy Commissioner was still in charge?

A. Yes.

Q. How did you distinguish the military situation and civil administration in Amritsar?

A. The military situation meant going in and clearing up of streets and mobs. What was anticipated was street fighting of a dangerous kind.

Q. In clearing streets they could kill people and do what they liked?

A. Do everything they thought necessary.

Q. Does it not mean handing over the entire powers to them?

A. It is not intended.

Q. As a matter of fact it is implied?

A. It grew into that.

Q. Either it may mean that or it may mean nothing?

A. It became that. Of course this also has to be said that I knew by the 13th martial law was coming.

Q. I am not talking about the 13th. I am talking of the 10th after your arrival and handing your authority to Major MacDonald, and there cannot be any greater authority than to do what anybody liked, even to the extent of killing. Did you hand over the command to Major MacDonald for the purpose of restoring order?

A. Yes.

Q. For the time being your authority ceased?

A. As a matter of fact my authority did not cease, because I continued to direct the affairs.

Q. You gave him absolute discretion? The whole authority vested in you, you vested in him, retaining at the same time your own authority?

A. In fact, I could have had snatched it at any moment.

Q. He was under your orders?

A. He did not come under my orders, because I did not issue any orders.

Q. Then whatever he did in consequence, you felt yourself responsible for it. Could you divest yourself of your authority to any without orders? Have you that authority to hand over whatever authority you possess to any other officer?

A. Certainly.

Q. Is there any specific rule?

A. There is no rule about it. In a situation of that kind I thought under the ordinary rules of the Executive Government, I had such authority.

Q. Could you deprive the Deputy Commissioner of his powers of a Magistrate?

A. I did not.

Q. You knew that it would have that effect?

A. No, I didn't.

Q. By your handing over the authority to Major MacDonald, you were depriving Mr. Irving of his authority?

A. No.

Q. Since Major MacDonald was acting under your authority, you did not think it your duty to make it known that Major MacDonald was the supreme authority, and that he had your orders to restore order by any means which he thought necessary?

A. As a matter of fact, it was conveyed to them. I issued a proclamation on the morning of the 11th. The proclamation which is referred to in Appendix No. 1.*

Q. You simply said that you handed it over to some people who came to you?

A. Yes.

Q. That you think is sufficient?

A. There was not sufficient time to make it known to the people of Amritsar. It was handed over to the citizens afterwards. College students were sent for.

Q. Because you handed it over to a few citizens, 4 or 5 in number, you thought it sufficient for the whole of the town?

A. I did not think it sufficient. As a matter of fact, Major MacDonald said it was not sufficient.

Q. Don't you think that the proclamation was not sufficiently made known to the people?

A. We were trying to get the people. We had no other means of making the proclamation. Major MacDonald himself objected that the proclamation was not sufficiently known to the people, and he wished it made better known. I was not there, but I presume it was made known on the 13th of April.

Q. You said in answer to Pandit Jagat Narayan that disturbances took place in the Punjab, though there were common factors here and elsewhere, because Punjab was a frontier province?

A. I suggested that.

Q. I do not understand that, because Punjab is a frontier province, this should be a reason of the disturbances here?

A. The troops are all here; railway lines were being cut.

Q. Because there were a large number of troops stationed in the province, therefore that caused the disturbances to take place. I should have thought that it should have the contrary effect?

A. It should have, but the military value of the Punjab was so much greater than any other part.

Q. I do not understand that because Punjab has a great military value and is a frontier province, therefore there should be disturbances here and not in other provinces. Why should that be the reason for the disturbances?

A. Because political agitation in those days was much hotter in the Punjab than it was in any other province.

Q. Much hotter than anywhere?

A. Anywhere south of Delhi so far as I know.

Q. So it was not because it was a frontier province?

A. But the frontier province came into it.

Q. I want to understand because of its being a frontier province, why should it be liable to disturbances and not other provinces. Why should that fact be attributed for the disturbances?

* See page 212.

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Mr. A. J. W. KITCHIN—concluded—Mr. OBAIDULLAH.

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Q. That is the meeting that took place?

A. Yes.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. On what day did you find that hand-bill on the Clock Tower?

A. On the 6th April.

Q. Was this the only hand-bill that you found?

A. That was the only hand-bill that I found.

Q. In the whole city?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were the meetings that you attended and the proceedings of which you reported, conducted in English?

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Q. All the speeches were in Urdu?

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Q. About the report that you made about a meeting, you thought that it was going to be held?

A. Yes.

Q. It was never held?

A. No, never held. But the meeting was held in the evening.

Q. This particular meeting that you reported was never held?

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Mr. ORAIDULLAH.

[Continued.]

- A. No.
 Q. It was incorrect information?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Whom did you get that information from?
 A. It was brought to me by a detective.
 Q. You yourself did not make any enquiries about it?
 A. No. As soon as the information was brought to me, I at once wrote my report.
 Q. Some detective came and reported to you?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did he give you all the particulars and the agenda of the meeting?
 A. Yes.
 Q. You accepted that because a detective gave it?
 A. Yes.
 Q. You made no other enquiries?
 A. No.
 Q. It turned out to be incorrect?
 A. Yes.

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LALA KHUSHABI RAM.

At Lahore, Thursday, the 11th December 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.
 The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.
 Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.
 The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.
 Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.
 Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., Secretary.

LALA KHUSHABI RAM.

By the President—

- Q. You applied some time ago to give evidence before us?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. We asked you to appear some time ago, but you did not get the communication?
 A. Because on the 25th I was at Jhang and I received that letter there. Then I arrived here on the 26th. I was sitting here and some gentlemen were giving evidence, but I was not called. Then again I attended on the 29th. There was the anniversary of the Arya Samaj and I had to attend. I heard that I was not called for that day. Then I went to Jhang.
 Q. You did not get the further communication that we were going to hear you; anyhow it is all right, now that we are hearing you. At the time of these disturbances, what were you?
 A. I was at Amritsar.
 Q. What was your position?
 A. I was a parcel clerk at the Railway Station.
 Q. Were you there during the period of the riots, i.e., on the 10th April?
 A. On 10th April, I was relieved from that station at about 12 o'clock. I was transferred. I left the station at about 12 o'clock. My place was where the first shooting took place at about 12 or 12-15. I saw that occurrence.
 Q. What did you see?
 A. At about 12-10 or 12-15, I heard the noise of horses. Then I came outside and I saw from my fencing that there were about 20 Military soldiers and one officer.
 Q. Who was the officer?
 A. The Officer Commanding.
 Q. Who was he?
 A. I do not know his name.
 Q. Was there any Magistrate there?
 A. There was one civilian, I do not know his name. He had a white helmet, a Gujrati cloth and pants. He was also on a horse. Altogether there were about eight or 10 Indian sepoy and other European soldiers there. There are two bridges, one a carriage bridge and the other a foot-bridge. Between these two places, there is a plot from which the road leads to court and there are two wings of buildings.
 Q. How far is that from Madan's shop?
 A. It is the last building where there is a clock. That is the last building called Hargobind building; I was living there. All the soldiers with cavalry stopped there at a *chowk*. There are four roads, one goes to Ram Bagh, another goes to court, the third one goes to the Railway Station and the fourth to the town. They halted at that *chowk*. There were about 14 or 15 boys under 15 years of age.
 Q. Was that the whole crowd?
 A. That was the crowd. Behind those boys there were about 20 or 25 men. They were coming also from the town side.
 Q. They entered the Civil Lines?
 A. Yes, when the sowars halted there. I shouted and asked them what they were doing and where they were going. They replied that as Dr. Satyapal and Dr. Kitchlew had been arrested, they were going to the Deputy Commissioner to make a complaint.
 Q. I just want to be quite certain of one thing. Is it your evidence that the whole crowd, desirous of going to the Civil Lines to make a complaint to the Deputy Commissioner, consisted of about 25 or 30 people?
 A. Yes.
 Q. You are quite certain?
 A. Yes; I have seen and talked to the people.
 Q. They were all quiet and peaceful?
 A. Yes, they were running after those horses.
 Q. They were approaching in this way?
 A. When they approached near my house, I shouted them to stop.
 Q. Why did you do that?
 A. I only told them that this action was against Gandhi's instructions and they were disobeying his orders. And they must not go to the Deputy Commissioner or anybody else to complain regarding the arrest of Dr. Satyapal and Dr. Kitchlew.
 Q. How was that against Mr. Gandhi's instructions?
 A. Because I heard in the meetings from Drs. Kitchlew, Satyapal and others on the 29th, 30th and 6th April, that his teaching was that nobody must be against Government.
 Q. The instruction, I understand, was not to use violence?
 A. Yes.
 Q. If this small number of about 25 or 30 people were going to make a complaint to the Deputy Commissioner, what was the objection to their doing so, even according to Mr. Gandhi?
 A. They were running towards the bungalows. From that place the Civil Lines begin. I thought there might be some people behind them. Then it will be a cause of excitement.
 Q. You thought there might be people behind them?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Were you not able to see whether there were people behind them?
 A. I did not see.
 Q. Did you shut your eyes?
 A. There are some bridges, just like a hill. No one can see beyond the bridges. I could see up to Madan's hotel.
 Q. Just tell us now what happened in your sight.
 A. When I was talking with those boys and they stopped there, on the other side of that *chowk*, the Officer Commanding had a white fly-killer. All others had rifles and revolvers. But the Officer Commanding had nothing, except a *chauri* in his right hand. His shirt was folded up to the elbows and he was shouting 'Now you see

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LALA KHUSHABI RAM.

[Continued.]

if you will not allow us to shoot them, you will be held responsible.' These were his words.

Q. Saying to whom?

A. He was addressing the civilian.

Q. The Deputy Commissioner?

A. I cannot say who he was, but I could not hear the reply of the civilian officer. I only heard his words. After a while all of them went to the Ram Bagh side. I told the people that they should go now to their houses, because they were coming running after the horses. I presume they were perspiring, and there is a cool water well (Lala Gagar Mal) and there are some benches and some arrangements for the public to take rest there. They then sat down there and took some rest and I made them understand that they must go to their houses then. They were saying that Dr. Satyapal had been arrested and what should they do. Innocently they were saying such words. After two or three minutes, the whole cavalry arrived on that square spot again. Then the Officer Commanding told the civilian, "Now, you see they are still here. If you will not now allow us to shoot them, you will be responsible," and then he also uttered some words to the soldiers, "If you will not obey my orders, I will kick you out." But I could not hear the reply of the civilian officer or of the soldiers. But in the meantime a soldier came up amongst the boys and fired a blank round, and then two more; they were all blank rounds up to the third fire. There was nobody except one boy.

Q. Was there only one boy?

A. Then I said to him "Why have you come to kill yourself here? You must go out at once." Then he hid himself in a stable underneath my quarters. At that time, there was none on the road. I could not see a single man on the road.

Q. There was no one on the road at all?

A. No one on the road at that time. When he finished those four blank fires, he went to the *chowk* where the cavalry was standing. Another soldier came and took out a black revolver from his pants and shot towards Madan's hotel. I could not see anybody, but after a time, there was a boy, the parcel clerk's son, Ishwar Dar, standing.

Q. What did you see?

A. There were two wounded persons. They took them and brought them on the road from the edge of Madan's hotel.

Q. According to you, there was no crowd?

A. I could not see a single man. From my bungalow, I could not see because there is a tree there on that side. I was thinking "at whom were they shooting?" I uttered these words: "There is a great *zulum*, men are shot for no reason." My parcel clerk said "why do you say such words; they will shoot you and all of us will be in trouble." Then I saw that they then applied to the Officer Commanding for a *tonga* to take the wounded to the hospital, or to some other place. A *tongawalla* and a bamboo *cartwala* were passing that road to Ram Bagh. The Officer Commanding refused to give a *tonga*.

Q. Everything must have been quiet and orderly? So far as the people were concerned they were shouting out at that time?

A. I could not see anything except a man calling a *tongawalla*. The soldiers got hold of two persons who were accidentally passing and shot them.

Q. Is it your view that they shot down two persons who were accidentally on the street on the other side of Madan's shop?

A. There were two Indians I saw, one walking to Ram Bagh; that one was also wounded; and there were two, one shot on his buttocks and the other on his back. There was bleeding. One was a Hindu and the Muhammadan was about 40 years old.

Q. It does not matter about the age; I want to know how many people there were when you saw these two wounded people?

A. There were only five wounded persons. I saw two first of all, and two afterwards when I reached there.

Q. Did you see any people who were not wounded?

A. Yes, when I reached that spot, there were about 8 or 10 people.

Q. That is all?

A. Yes; they were taking the wounded persons. They declined to provide *tongas*; then a motor car also arrived there, and they also declined to give the military motor car. They then brought some *charpays* from the house and on those *charpays* they took the wounded persons to the town.

Q. Was anyone killed by the shooting?

A. Yes, at about 17 o'clock, I heard from Babu Nihal Singh, Barrister.

Q. 17 o'clock is a long time afterwards?

A. When those persons took the wounded on the *charpays*, they were bleeding and they could not take them.

Q. You say it was about 17 o'clock. We are talking about 12-30?

A. At that time, they were not taking them.

Q. There were five wounded people and 8 or 10 who were attending on them. Were there any people on the bridge?

A. I could not see.

Q. Is it your evidence that you could see no one at all about, except these 8 persons and the five wounded there on the spot?

A. Yes, at that time, a Hindu gentleman, who had a bit of brown paper, was taking their names. He also entered my name as a witness.

Q. Did you see anything else that occurred that day?

A. After my arrival there, I saw that there was a fire in the goods shed at about 13-30 or 14 o'clock.

Q. Did you not see fire from the banks at about 1 or 2 o'clock?

A. I did not go beyond the bridge.

Q. Did you not hear that there was great excitement in the city?

A. I heard so.

Q. When did you hear?

A. I heard from a clerk of the National Bank of India. I do not know his name. He was the son of my chief parcel clerk.

Q. Did you hear then of the murders that had taken place at the banks?

A. He also explained the whole story of Amritsar that day.

Q. I do not want what you heard; I only want to know what you know yourself? You say you saw nothing of the other happenings yourself?

A. I did not see with my own eyes.

Q. You said that the police had refused to give a motor car to carry the wounded?

A. They were officers, but not police officers.

Q. The police were not there at all?

A. There were no police at the time; there was one *chaprasi* and a Sikh; he reported when there was an attack on the telegraph office. He said that the whole cavalry went there.

Q. Now, what happened to yourself? You wanted to make a statement about that I believe?

A. I was relieved on the 10th. I could not get any train to go to Lyallpur; on the following day I went to Lyallpur. I reached there at 17-30; I remained there on the 12th, 13th and 14th. Then on the 15th, I joined my duty at Lahore Cantonment Supply Depot. Then I worked there from 15th April to 1st May. On the 29th April I received a letter from my wife saying our five sons had been arrested by the police, and that one of them, the little boy aged seven years, was released after three or four hours and the other four were still in the custody of the police.

Q. Were they arrested?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What were they charged with any offence?

A. I cannot say, Sir.

Q. Subsequently?

A. They were not taken to any Magistrate. Their only fault was that they were wearing those black badges.

Q. Where are your sons now?

11 December 1919.]

LALA KHUSHABI RAM.

[Continued.]

A. One of them is here. In those days they were all at Lyallpur.

Q. Were any of them charged before a military court?

A. They were not taken to a military court. I was arrested on the 1st May. They were arrested on the 25th April, and on the same day my house was searched, and on the 26th an internment order was issued against me at Lyallpur. The police were searching for me and asking my sons "Where is your father?" My sons replied that I was at my duties, but the police said "No, you are telling lies." Then my eldest son told them I was not telling lies and I was at my post, so they wired to my District Traffic Superintendent here to arrest me. At about 20-30 on the 1st May I was arrested here and put in the lock-up in the railway platform. I asked the Superintendent of Police why I was arrested and put in jail and he said he was still in the dark and could not say what the charges were against me, and that he would enquire from the higher authorities; I told him that for 18 months I had delivered no lecture and done nothing.

Q. No charge was brought against you?

A. No charge.

Q. Were you ultimately brought before any court?

A. No, only on the 3rd May I was taken to Lyallpur. When the police constables took me to the police station they refused to take me because there were no charges against me.

Q. Were you released then?

A. On the 3rd of May I went to the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow. He enquired my name and then ordered the police to release me and take my handcuffs off. When they released me the Deputy Commissioner called me into his office and gave me an Internment Order which I have with me. When I read that Internment Order I said to him, "I beg your pardon Sir, I am not a retired Station Master." There was written in that Internment Order "Khushabi Ram, retired Station Master." I told him that I was a parcel clerk, that since my eye-sight failed I was reverted to the clerical line, and I could not say against whom this Order was. He said the Order was issued by the military authorities and he did not know. He asked if I was Khushabi Ram and when I replied that I was, he said "then this Order is for you." I told him if this Order was for me he could call me through my officers and I could attend, and he replied that he did not know and that the military authorities issued the orders for my arrest, and now I could go home.

Q. Then you got home?

A. Yes, Sir; I live at Lyallpur.

Q. The order was that you should be interned?

A. Yes, at Lyallpur.

Q. Have you got the Order?

A. Yes, Sir. These orders were issued on the 11th May; they were released on the 9th May.

Q. These orders were for your sons?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any one having your name who was a retired Station Master at Lyallpur?

A. I cannot say.

Q. Are you the only person of the name of Khushabi Ram at Lyallpur?

A. This I can say, there is no Station Master named Khushabi Ram.

Q. What is wrong is that you are wrongly described, but apparently it was intended right enough that you should be interned?

A. I was not retired.

Q. Is your complaint that you have been wrongly described in the Internment Order?

A. The Order was issued on 29th April and I was arrested on the 1st May and the C. I. D. men who gave this information against me were quite unaware whether I was a retired Station Master or on duty.

Q. Well now, have you any other point you wish to bring to our notice?

A. Yes, Sir. On the 9th May my sons were released with great difficulty, and then I went to the Deputy Commissioner when Martial Law was over and this

Order was cancelled, and asked him to give me a chit to let to go to my duties and he declined to do so. He instructed me to write to my officers. I did so and they replied that my services were no longer required. My services were dispensed with for nothing, but as I had performed 32 years' service I was not anxious to keep my post, and I replied that I was ready to be retired but I must be paid fully, but they made me forfeit Rs. 1,250.

Q. It is a complaint you have against the railway authorities that they have not given you your pension or bonus?

A. The money which was due to me, Rs. 1,250, the pay of three months. They arrested me. I did not request them to arrest me. I was arrested innocently and from 1st May to 9th August they were bound to give me my full pay. Otherwise they should inform me that I was guilty of such and such an offence. In those days one gentleman came to see me there and he was punished with two years' jail.

Q. Two years' jail for seeing you?

A. Only for coming from Chanda to Lyallpur to see me. He arrived on the 15th, was arrested on 17th and on the 19th he was ordered two years' imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500. I saw a copy of the evidence and from a question there I presume that that poor man was arrested only for my sake, because the Magistrate asked him, "Why did you go to Lyallpur to see Khushabi Ram? What connection have you with Khushabi Ram and his sons?"

Q. You do not really wish us to suppose that any man was prosecuted simply for seeing you at Lyallpur?

A. In those days there was only the reign of the police. The Viceroy, the Lieutenant-Governor, the Deputy Commissioner could not interfere with them. The police were doing everything.

Q. The police were all-powerful?

A. They had full powers. I suffered very much trouble in getting my sons released from their clutches.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. What was the name of the man who was punished for seeing you?

A. Hakim Rai.

Q. Of what place?

A. He is in the central jail still.

Q. He was punished at Lyallpur?

A. At Chanda, District Jhang.

Q. And what are the names of your sons?

A. Vishta Karma, Jaideva, Vidya Dhar, Dev Datt, and Daram Bir.

Q. Were they ever tried for any offence and convicted?

A. No; they were kept in custody for 15 days.

Q. Probably they were present at the time the rioting was going on at Amritsar, is it not so?

A. No, my sons were saying that they were arrested only for wearing those badges.

Q. You say you saw five wounded men?

A. I saw two men from my house when they were putting them on two beds.

Q. Therefore I understand you to say that these five men were all alone and did not form part of any crowd?

A. They might be a part of a crowd.

Q. That crowd might be 2,000 or 3,000 or 6,000 strong?

A. No, only 20 or 30 persons.

Q. These five men were among the 20 men you saw; there was not a large crowd behind them?

A. There was no large crowd behind them.

By Major-General Sir George Barron—

Q. You say those soldiers who fired first of all, fired blank?

A. Yes.

Q. How do you know they fired blank?

A. Because there was only a little noise, and there was no bullet or shot.

Q. Would you have seen the bullet when it was fired?

A. No one was wounded.

Q. How do you know it was blank?

A. I was once at peace celebrations and saw blank fired.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Did you send a written statement to the Committee?

A. Not a full statement, only a brief one.

Q. You describe yourself in that as Khushabi Ram, late Station Master?

A. I was not Station Master there. At East Supply Depot I was Station Master.

Q. How long ago?

A. For 15 days.

Q. When?

A. From 15th April to 1st May.

Mr. Herbert.—The Internment Order is quite correct

PART II

Written Statements of Witnesses

Mr. MILES IRVING, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar.

I.—Survey of Predisposing Causes.

CAUSES.

- (i) Rumours.
- (ii) Religious troubles.
- (iii) Taxation and requisitioning stocks on payment.
- (iv) Rise in prices.
- (v) Reaction after armistice.
- (vi) Special local causes—
 - (a) Platform ticket agitation.
 - (b) Excitement over municipal elections.

II.—The disturbances at Amritsar

2. The penultimate stage of the agitation may be said to date from January 31st, when a meeting was held to protest about the future of Constantinople. It was followed on February 6th by a meeting on the Rowlatt Bill. On February 9th Drs. Gokal Chand and Naurang Chand came down from Lahore and the same subject was dealt with. There was a National meeting of Muhammadans on February 13th addressed by Dr. Kitchlew.

On 21st February the Muhammadans held another meeting which dealt with the holy places and the Muhammadan internees and at which the Hindu Dr. Satyapal spoke. On February 26th the opportunity of a public meeting to consider the question of the opening of cheap grain shops was taken by Dr. Kitchlew to lay the blame of the high prices on the Government, at which he said that the grain which had been seized under the Defence of India Act was being exported to Europe. Another meeting to protest against the Rowlatt Bill was held on February 28th.

3. There were other meetings but these were the most important. The speeches at these meetings were couched in a higher and higher key. No opportunity was lost of blaming Government for economic conditions and of alarming the people with the terms of the Rowlatt Bill, and there is no doubt that these inflammatory utterances began gravely to influence the minds of the masses, imbuing them with the feeling that their sufferings were the direct result of the British Raj. And what was said in these meetings, exaggerated as it was, was magnified a thousandfold in the wild rumours that passed current among the people. At the same time there may be seen throughout a quiet and persistent attempt to bring Muhammadans into line with an agitation that was in its source Hindu. We find Hindus attending Muhammadan meetings and Muhammadans given the places of prominence in the general meetings, the chief link between the two being always found in the person of Dr. Saif-ud-din Kitchlew.

4. The fact that the next meeting of the All-India Congress was to be held in Amritsar was undoubtedly a contributory cause. It brought into prominence the local Congress Committee. This was founded in October 1917 with the object of uniting Hindus and Musalmans in political action and though no action was, during the period covered by this report, taken directly under its auspices, it is significant that out of an executive committee of 6, 2 have been put on their trial for conspiracy.

II.—Immediate causes of the Outbreak

5. The Rowlatt Bill became law in March 1919 and there was a short pause, apparently to see what was being done at the headquarters of the movement. It was on March

23rd that the first meeting was held to support the passive resistance movement, but it was not disclosed what line passive resistance would take. This appeared in a second meeting on March 29th in which a *hartal* was declared for the following day. On the evening of the 29th, orders were served on Dr. Satyapal not to speak in public. The *hartal* was an unexpected triumph for the malcontents and stopped the whole business of the city, but there was no collision with the police. Next day brought the news of the riots at Delhi, and it seems to have been felt by those behind the movement that there was a danger of a premature explosion as one Swami Satya Deo, a follower of Mr. Gandhi, came down on April 2nd to lecture upon "Soul Force," who dissuaded the people from violence and from holding public meetings until the time should come when a manifesto would be issued by Mr. Gandhi calling on the people to go to jail by thousands. On April 4th orders were served on Dr. Kitchlew and Pandit Kotu Mal not to speak in public.

6. After this it was very doubtful whether there would be another *hartal* on April 6th. The local Congress Committee alarmed by the events at Delhi declared against it, and the Deputy Commissioner was assured by a meeting of the chief citizens held at his house on April 5th that there would be no *hartal*. It was not until 5 P.M. on that day that Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal and others decided at a private meeting that the *hartal* should take place. It was as great a success as that of the preceding Sunday. The Officer Commanding the Station had been warned to be ready to act on the Internal Defence Scheme, but there was no collision with the police, the organizers refraining from any overt act of intimidation which could justify intervention.

7. The situation had however begun to take a threatening aspect. It was not that any immediate violence was then apprehended. On the contrary the policy of the brains behind the movement appeared to be directed in the opposite direction. It seemed their intention to avoid any collision with authority which would justify armed intervention and to train the crowd with a view to some collective form of passive disobedience to authority which would paralyse Government by the sheer weight of offenders. Whether that was indeed all that they had in view is, while this report is being written, still doubtful. But events were soon to show either that they had raised a storm that got beyond their control or that their plans of violence were brought to a head prematurely.

8. On the evening of April 9th the festival of *Ram Naumi* was observed. An important feature of this was the fact that although it is a purely Hindu festival it was celebrated by Muhammadans and Hindus alike. Water was provided by Muhammadans and drunk from their hands by Hindus, although, it is true, in silver vessels. And as the procession passed, the cries raised were, in place of those giving honour to the Hindu deities, the political shouts of "*Hindu Musalman ki jai*" and "*Mahatma Gandhi ki jai*." At the same time there was little sign of active hostility to Government and none of hostility to Europeans as such. The Deputy Commissioner by accident was caught in the crowd and witnessed the procession unguarded from the verandah of the Allahabad Bank. Every car in the procession stopped in front of him and the accompanying band played God Save the King. Only one party of Muhammadans dressed to represent the Turkish Army made

Continued.]

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a somewhat offensive demonstration, clapping hands, and shouting "*Hindu Musalman ki jai*"

9. On his return from the procession at about 7.30 P.M. the Deputy Commissioner received the order of Government that Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal were to be escorted quietly to Dharmasala. The situation was discussed between the Deputy Commissioner, the Officer Commanding Station (Captain Massey) and the Superintendent of Police, Mr. Rehill, accompanied by Mr. Plomer, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, I.M.S., the Civil Surgeon, was by reason of his experience of the city and his knowledge of Indian opinion also asked to join in the deliberations.

10. The situation as it presented itself did not seem to argue any serious results as likely to arise from the arrests. There had been no signs of enmity to Europeans as such; during the *hartal* of the preceding Sunday Europeans had been walking about among the crowd quite unmolested. The most that there seemed reason to apprehend in Amritsar was that there might be a disorderly demonstration in front of the Deputy Commissioner's house or the District Court House to demand the return of the arrested persons. What was considered a more likely occurrence was that an attempt might be made to rescue the deportees on the way, and to meet this danger the Deputy Commissioner asked Mr. Rehill, the Superintendent of Police, the only responsible officer who knew the way, to accompany the escort.

11. As regards Amritsar it was decided that no crowd should be allowed to cross the railway line, and three European Magistrates were detailed to the three main crossings, and on the following morning received written orders to the effect that any crowd attempting to cross the line was to be dealt with as an unlawful assembly. In event of the crowd attempting to persist in their design the Officer Commanding Station was warned to be ready to take up the Internal Defence Scheme at a moment's notice, and the preliminary dispositions of the troops and police were worked out in consultation. Briefly they were that the peace of the city should be protected by 75 armed police under a Deputy Superintendent in the Kotwali, and that the Police Lines railway crossings should be protected by the police, that the Rego Bridge, Foot Bridge, Hall Gate Bridge and Hospital level crossing should be picketted by mounted troops, and that British Infantry should be kept at hand in the Kambagh Gardens. The military reserve was retained in cantonments. The railway station had for some days been under the protection of a military picket. In event of evacuation of Europeans being called for it was decided that Lieutenant-Colonel Smith should keep a motor ambulance with him and at the first intimation of disturbance evacuate civilians in it.

III.—The Disturbances.

12. April 10th.—Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal arrived at the Deputy Commissioner's house at 10 A.M. without any disturbance being created. They departed in two motor cars at 10.30 A.M. under escort. Between 11 A.M. and noon crowds began to collect in the City and Aitchison Park. Information was received by telephone at noon that the crowd intended to go to the Deputy Commissioner's house, and the Military were warned. The Deputy Commissioner proceeding to the Hall Gate Bridge found at about 12.30 that an angry crowd had poured over it driving back a small mounted picket accompanied by Mr. Beckett, Assistant Commissioner. The picket was stoned and could not hold the crowd back; but the opportune arrival of mounted supports held them temporarily. The Deputy Commissioner rode to the Officer Commanding Troops to explain the situation and while he was absent the mounted troops were again attacked and pressed back; and on being called on by Mr. Connor, 1st Class Magistrate, opened fire, wounding and killing a few rioters. This was at about 1 P.M. This and the arrival of a body of police under Mr. Plomer, Deputy Superintendent of Police, held the mob, and the forces were further augmented by a British Infantry picket. Finally, the crowd was driven back over the railway

line but not before the infantry had been obliged to fire. Up to this point casualties among the rioters were small. The military then took charge of the Hall Gate Bridge and the Foot Bridge.

13. Part of the crowd repulsed from the crossing attacked the telegraph office and destroyed the telephone exchange and were beaten off just in time to prevent further damage by a detachment of the Railway picket which had been sent forward to protect it by the Officer Commanding Station as soon as the first sign of trouble began. This must have happened about 1 P.M. as a conversation was taking place over the telephone at that time between the Municipal Engineer and the Agent, Alliance Bank, about the crowds coming back into the city. Another part of the crowd turned to the goods yard where they did considerable damage by fire and killed Mr. Robinson, a Guard. They also chased the Station Superintendent, but were turned back by the railway picket. The arrival by chance of a detachment of the 1-9th Gurkhas, about 260 strong, finally secured the railway station.

14. Within the city all Europeans and all Government property were attacked. The National Bank of India was sacked and burnt and Mr. Stewart, the Agent, and Mr. Scott, his assistant, were murdered. The Alliance Bank was attacked, and the Agent, Mr. J. M. Thomson, murdered. The Chartered Bank was attacked, but the Agent, Mr. J. W. Thomson, and his assistant, Mr. Ross, were rescued by the police from the Kotwali. The Religious Book Society's Depot and Hall were burnt down, but the inmates who were Indian Christians escaped. The Town Hall and the Sub-Post Office attached to it were fired and the Sub-Post Offices at the Golden Temple, Majith Mandi and Dhab Basti Ram were looted. The Zenana Hospital was entered and every effort made to find and kill Mrs. Easdon, the lady doctor in charge, who however escaped. Miss Sherwood, a Mission Lady, was caught cycling in the city and brutally attacked, being rescued with difficulty. The mob burnt the Indian Christian Church and attempted to fire the C. M. S. Girls' Normal School, but were driven off by police from the Police Lines. The Electrician to the Military Works, Sergeant Rowlands, was caught by the rioters near the Aitchison Park and murdered.

15. There was further an organized attempt to cut communications. Telegraph wires were cut and Bhogtanwala Railway Station on the Tarn Taran line was burnt and looted. An attempt was also made on the main line of rail towards Lahore, but was defeated by fire from the Railway Police Guard on the Down Calcutta Mail.

16. The mob also made another attempt to burst into the Civil Lines and after repeated warnings were fired on by order of the Deputy Commissioner at the Hall Gate Bridge. There were probably about 20—30 casualties caused at the time. This was at about 2 P.M.

17. In the meantime civilians had been collected at the collecting stations, the Alexandra School and one of the Canal Bungalows. The ladies of St. Catherine's Hospital in the city had according to the plan been promptly evacuated by Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, as it turned out at considerable risk. As soon as the road to the Fort was picketted, civilians were removed thither. Appeals for help had been sent to Lahore by an officer on a light engine and also by phonophone as soon as communication was re-established and at about 10 P.M. 400 reinforcements arrived from Jullundur and Lahore. The City was entered and the Kotwali occupied at midnight. The Commissioner, Mr. A. J. W. Kitchin, C.I.E., and the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Mr. D. Donald, C.I.E., arrived by motor car from Lahore at about 5 P.M.

18. The same night an attack was made by a mob of villagers on Chheharta Railway Station. The mob only broke the windows of the station itself, and proceeded to loot a goods train that was standing in the yard.

19. The morning of April 11th was taken up with precautionary measures designed to prevent any trouble over the burial of the killed rioters; it was forbidden to make any demonstration over them and these orders were

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[Continued.]

carried out. Troops again marched into the City after noon accompanied by the Deputy Commissioner and the Police set to work on their investigations. At the same time precautions were taken to prevent the trouble spreading to the villages. A 1st Class Magistrate (Lala Sant Ram) was sent out to Tarn Taran with orders to organize local levies for the protection of the tahsil. Similar instructions were given to the Tahsildar of Ajnala, and Honorary Lieutenant Sardar Raghbir Singh, O.B.E., of Rajasansi went out to his village to assist in composing the minds of the people of the tahsil. That evening Brigadier General R. E. H. Dyer, C.B., Commanding Jullundur Brigade, arrived and assumed charge of operations. Orders were issued for general watch and ward along the railway lines.

20. On the morning of April 12th a military force was sent round the city to prevent a threatened disturbance and then marched into the city when a considerable number of important arrests were made. As trouble was threatened from Tarn Taran a small force was sent out on an armoured train, but owing to a misunderstanding did not remain there. After they had gone, a body of villagers collected with the object of looting the tahsil, but were dispersed on a bold front being shown by Inspector Aziz-ud-din and a few men. A permanent force was despatched early the next morning.

21. April 13th.—About 2 A.M. this morning the line was cut between Chheharta and Khassa and a goods train derailed. The situation was still critical. In Amritsar the mob still, when out of sight of the military, boasted that it might be the Raj of the Sarkar outside, but inside it was *Hindu-Musalmanon Ki Hakumat*. At the same time villagers were pouring into the city, and the wildest rumours were prevalent that the bazars would be looted. Subsequent inquiries make it appear that there were substantial grounds for this fear, and that the influx of villagers was inspired with the idea of loot and was not merely due to the *Baisakhi*. In the district the attitude of the people was still in suspense, and it was said that Government could not or would not use force. In the forenoon the Officer Commanding Troops, Brigadier General Dyer, accompanied by the Deputy Commissioner, marched through the city at the head of a body of troops with the object of giving a clear warning that no meetings would be allowed. At every important street the column stopped while this was announced by beat of drum. Notwithstanding this warning news was received at about 4 P.M., just after the column had returned, that a meeting was being assembled in the Bagh Jallianwala. The General took a small party of 50 Indian Troops and an armoured car to the spot, being accompanied by the Superintendent of Police, and on entering the garden with the infantry found a large crowd assembled, which he considered necessary to disperse by fire. He estimated the casualties at about 200 to 300 killed, besides wounded.

22. April 14th.—The effect of this was electric. The news ended all danger of further disturbance in the district. It was taken far and wide as an assurance that the hand of Government was not, as it was thought, paralysed and all who were waiting on events hastened to declare for constituted authority. There was indeed a sympathy etc *hartal* in Tarn Taran on April 14th, but the arrival of reinforcements of British troops put an end to all danger in that quarter. An attack by the villagers of Ballarwal on the neighbouring village of Makowal was dispersed. The history of the rising henceforward is merely the record of progress in bringing offenders to justice and, it may be added, in dispelling the wild rumours that were in constant circulation and in quieting the minds of the people.

23. This opportunity may be taken for relating the measures adopted to restore confidence among the people. They consisted in the first place in a steady patrol of villages and the holding of meetings by Zaildars and other local notables under the control of District authorities. A special Darbar was held by the Deputy Commissioner at Tarn Taran on April 16th and similar Darbars presided over by Magistrates were held for the other two

tahsils. The Hon'ble Sardar Sundar Singh, Majithia, attended and addressed all three Darbars. A moveable column under General Dyer visited Rajasansi and Atari accompanied by the Deputy Commissioner and Darbars were held at both of these places. At the same time a local publicity board was organized and leaflets issued contradicting false rumours, and in this work the authorities of the Golden Temple, the Chief Khalsa Diwan and other religious bodies assisted. These steps, coupled with the knowledge that Government was determined to maintain authority, had the desired effect, and after April 14th the district outside the city very rapidly returned to normal conditions.

IV.—Martial Law.

24. Martial Law was declared in Amritsar District on April 13th. On April 19th a proclamation was issued by the General Officer Commanding 16th Indian Division making certain acts punishable under Martial Law and this proclamation, common to all districts within the Divisional Area, was the basis of all punitive measures other than those for contravention of the ordinary law. The most important, containing Nos. 1-13, was specifically applied to the city of Amritsar only, and as a matter of fact no attempt was made to enforce the others outside this area.

25. The most important of these orders* were the following:—

No. 1.—*The curfew from 10 P.M. to 5 A.M.*—These hours were changed to 11.30 P.M. to 4 A.M. on May 16th with a further modification in favour of persons requiring medical assistance. On May 23rd the curfew was removed altogether out of consideration for Muhammadans observing the fast of Ramzan. No serious public inconvenience was caused and the restriction had a beneficial and quieting effect.

26. No. 3.—*Restriction of meetings making it unlawful for more than 10 persons to assemble.*—This order taken literally was impossible of execution—apart from marriages and funerals—the ordinary business of trade and commerce could not go on if it were literally enforced. Some alarm was caused by the order especially in the villages—where as a matter of fact it did not apply—and it was represented as confirming the worst rumours of the Rowlatt Act. Proclamations were quickly issued explaining that it was not meant to prohibit marriage or funeral assemblies or gatherings in the market for trade or commerce. Indeed it is very difficult to define the kind of meeting it is intended to prohibit, but in practice it is easy enough to recognize what is meant. It is worth noting for future guidance that marriages and funerals and gatherings in the fields for harvest or in the market for commerce should always be specifically permitted.

27. No. 5.—*Restriction of travelling was imposed from above.*—It gave a great deal of trouble in issuing permits and was finally removed. It is too unwieldy for use a day longer than is absolutely necessary.

28. No. 9.—Under this order prices were fixed. These were fixed at a time when there was every reason to believe that the prices of food-grains would fall, as they generally do at harvest time. But contrary to experience the general trend of prices was to rise, and it was found that the fixed prices tended to prevent grain coming in. They were not the only cause by any means; a general feeling of insecurity and the commandeering of transport were causes that contributed very largely. Still grain did stop coming in, and it was necessary to raise prices week by week, as well as to publish re-assuring notices that carts coming in would not be seized. This had some effect, but it was finally found expedient to discontinue fixed prices altogether. As a matter of fact prices did not rise much above the last prices fixed.

For further guidance it may be said that it is probably wise to fix prices at the outset to prevent general starvation. But the effect on commercial conditions is never-

* For Martial Law orders and notices issued in the Amritsar area vide annexure A, page 183.

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calculable and it is impossible for long to keep prices at a different level from that prevailing generally in the province.

29. The above are all the restrictions of importance imposed under Martial Law besides the commandeering of motors, tongas and bicycles. They do not amount to very much, and with the gradual relaxation it cannot be said that the abolition of Martial Law made very much difference to the life of the ordinary citizen. Only 50 persons were punished for breaches of Martial Law, and some of these would have been punishable under the ordinary law. The effect of Martial Law was indeed moral rather than material, and lay in the feeling of the citizen that he was under a new and entirely strange dispensation very much swifter than anything he knew and whose action was terrible because unaccountable.

30. In circumstances like those of the Amritsar riots such a complete change of atmosphere as is involved by the swift transition to Martial Law is undoubtedly salutary. It may be suggested, however, that it would be more in conformity with the principles of Military as well as of Civil Administration if a more regular position were given to the Deputy Commissioner. He was in this case formally in a worse position than if he had been political officer on the staff of the local commander as there he would have had the right to be consulted on matters affecting his province. As a matter of fact, by the courtesy of the General Officer Commanding, he was in practice very generally consulted, but in reviewing the position for future guidance it is necessary to point out that this was purely a matter of courtesy, and that under the letter of the law he was in the anomalous position of having his authority superseded and having no right to insist on being consulted, while remaining responsible to his official superiors for the good administration of the district. If it is ever necessary again to impose Martial Law, it is worth considering whether the administration of Martial Law should not be entrusted to the Deputy Commissioner as Staff Officer of the local Commander, with the power to appeal through the Commissioner to the Divisional General if he felt that any order he received should not be carried out.

31. Of the people responsible for the disturbances not one in ten intended them. They were promoted by the politically conscious classes involved in a wild competition for popularity. As the appetite of the mob for excitement grew with what it fed on, the man who fell behind his fellows in violence of speech fell out of the race. "A leader," said one of them apologetically, "must follow." In this race all the politically minded were starters, and one can only distinguish those who were sagacious enough to see that it was a race upon a moving avalanche and withdrew in time, and those who from blindness or desperation pressed on. The pleader class, perhaps, may be said to have contained a very large proportion of the former category, and the men who continued to the end are representative of every section of the educated. One can detect a strong tendency towards pushing the Muhammadans into prominent positions in an agitation which declared itself Hindu in the very shouts of its advocates. "Jai" is pure Hindi. But generally speaking it is a mixture of pleaders, doctors and traders who emerge. College students and school boys marched round in the *hatalas*, but are not prominent either in the promotion of the disturbances or in the disturbances themselves. The Arya Samaj was not prominent as a body in Amritsar: in small towns one hears of it as adopting a passively sulky attitude. There is no complaint against any class of Government servants. Pan-Islamic agitators did undoubtedly help to work up the Muhammadan side of the agitation. The actual rioters were the bands of bad characters under their led captains. These were chiefly Kashmiri Muhammadans, but many Khatrias and Aroras of the poorer class took part. The villagers as far as they took part in the movement were inspired by pure love of loot. They thought that the British Raj was tottering to its fall and were hastening for their share in the spoil.

V.—Nature of Movement.

32. Prior to April 10th the movement showed itself as one of opposition to Government, but there were no signs of hatred to Europeans. As has been said Europeans walked unmolested among the crowds on the days of *hatala*, and even the angry crowd that poured out of the city to find the Deputy Commissioner on April 10th took no notice of unofficial Europeans that it met on the way. Only after the troops had been compelled to fire the feeling was changed to a passion for vengeance which was undoubtedly racial. It was the hated European on whom the mob sought to wreak its vengeance, and it made not the least difference that its victims were wholly unconnected with Government. On the other hand, the mob could always be persuaded to spare Indian property—even though occupied by Europeans—such as the Alliance Bank and St. Catherine's Hospital. Christians and Christian property were only attacked as connected with Europeans; the only Indian Christians who were attacked were the Reverend Jaswant Singh and his wife who were permitted to escape from their burning house, and the custodians of the Mission Church. The attacks on the Normal School and St. Catherine's Hospital were probably directed against their European inmates and the C. M. S. Church was regarded as European property.

The only Indians threatened were those who were regarded as traitors to the common cause. There was no hostility displayed to Government servants, not even to the Police, as such, and though the crowd certainly burnt the Municipal Office, it was dissuaded from burning the Octroi Office when it was pointed out that it belonged to the people. There were no acts directed against the King-Emperor, and the statue of Queen Victoria in the city only suffered the loss of a finger. As regards the villagers it may be said that they had no motive but loot. They believed that the British Government was tottering and wished to be first in with the loot and there is no reason to think that they were inspired with any hatred for Government or for Europeans.

VI.—Methods adopted.

33. The mob came out unarmed save for stones it picked up on the way, but on being fired on it dispersed and re-assembled in a suspiciously short time with iron-pointed lathis and other sticks. Kerosene oil found at the Municipal Office and elsewhere was used to burn down buildings, and the rioters who cut the telegraph wires provided themselves with cold chisels and other implements. The rioting in the city was over in a very short time, but it included attempts on communications both by wire and rail. Shops were closed in the city on the 11th and 12th and at Tarn Taran on the 14th. The attempt on the line on the night of the 12th-13th was made with gangmen's tools.

VII.—Punitive and Protective Measures.

34. Martial law was declared in the Amritsar District on April 13th. On April 19th, a proclamation was issued by the General Officer Commanding, 16th Indian Division, making certain acts punishable under Martial Law. On April 20th the General Officer Commanding, 16th Indian Division, nominated the following Civil Officers in the Amritsar District to dispose summarily of offences against that proclamation:—

Mr. Miles Irving, I.C.S.
Mr. G. D. Rudkin, I.C.S.
Mr. F. H. Puckle, I.C.S.
Mr. R. B. Beckett, I.C.S.
Mr. F. A. Connor, E.A.C.

It was originally intended that offences committed before April 19th should be dealt with by the tribunals, but the officers above mentioned were on May 5th given power to try minor offences committed between 30th March and 19th April.

In considering the classification of persons convicted in Statement F. the 82 persons convicted in the Tarn Taran attempt must be remembered.

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35. Minor offences committed before the proclamation of 19th April were all dealt with by the Civil Officers above mentioned and were for the most part those which the local representative of the Criminal Investigation Department decided were not important enough to go to the tribunals, or which were sent back from Lahore on the same grounds. They also dealt with some cases sent up direct by the local police in the district. Only 22 cases were dealt with and 102 out of the 143 persons involved belonged to a single case, that of the attempt to attack Tarn Taran. No sentences of whipping were imposed by these courts.

36. With the exception of 5 or 6 cases put up by the police, including two bribery cases and a case of seditious language (acquitted) which were dealt with by Civil Officers, offences against Martial Law were dealt with by Military Officers. These officers took cases brought before them by the Provost Marshal and his assistants. Twenty-six men were ordered to be whipped, all by Military Courts, for the following offences:—

Breach of Fort Discipline	6
Beating drum to instigate disobedience to orders	2
Threatening witnesses	3
Drunk and disorderly	4
Grazing cattle in Grass Farm	2
Attempt to open railway gate	2
Out during prohibited hours	2
Refusing to give transport	2
Disseminating false news	1
Assault on constable	1
Abuse	1
Refusing to halt when challenged	1

The six sentenced for breach of Fort Discipline were flogged in the bazar but the public was not permitted to approach. The three sentenced for threatening witnesses were flogged at General Headquarters. The only public flogging properly so called was at the Kotwali of the men who instigated disobedience to orders. All other whippings were in private. No person of the respectable classes was whipped.

ANNEXURE A.

Martial Law Orders and Notices.

AMRITSAR AREA.

WHEREAS Martial Law has been declared in the District of AMRITSAR and

WHEREAS I have been appointed to command Troops and administer Martial Law in the said district of AMRITSAR

AND WHEREAS Martial Law may be briefly described as the will of the Military Commander in enforcing law, order and public safety:

NOW THEREFORE by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law I do make and issue the following Orders:—

No. 1.

At 22-00 hours each evening and from then until 05-00 hours on the following morning no person other than a European or a person in possession of a military permit signed by me or on my behalf will be permitted to leave his or her house or compound or the building in which he or she may be at 22-00 hours. During these prohibited hours no person other than those excepted above will be permitted to use the streets or roads, and any person found disobeying this Order will be arrested, and, if any attempt is made to evade or resist arrest, that person will be liable to be shot.

No. 2.

In order to protect the lives of His Majesty's Soldiers and Police under my Command, I make known that if

37. Petty fines, aggregating Rs. 36-9-0, were levied under Military Law: no other recoveries have been made from the inhabitants of the district under Military Law. Inquiries are now proceeding under section 15 A of the Police Act with a view to recovering compensation for the damage done at Amritsar from the inhabitants of the city, and for that done by the derailment at Chheharta and other isolated acts of aggression from the villages responsible.

38. Expenditure of nearly Rs. 30,000 was incurred, under the orders of the Military authorities, in defraying the cost of the move to the hills of women and children whom it was necessary to remove from the station. The money was advanced by the Municipal Committee and proposals will be submitted for the cost being met.

39. Watch and ward was established along the length of railway lines, the adjoining villages being made responsible.

40. Under military orders the members of the local Bar were enrolled as special constables and patrolled their respective divisions of the city. This service was at first unpopular, but gradually the sense of its usefulness and dignity increased, and when it ceased to be compulsory and volunteers were called for to perform the same service under the more dignified title of Ward Officer there was no difficulty in obtaining the requisite number. These gentlemen did really good work, and the Ward Officers were presented with badges of office at the hands of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor.

41. It is suggested for consideration that the orders by which an officer of the Criminal Investigation Department decided what cases should go to Tribunals and what to local courts, and submitted cases direct to the Legal Remembrancer without reference to the District Magistrate, should not be repeated.

They were doubtless designed to save the District Magistrate's work at a time when he was very busy, but such a consideration should not weigh against the practical disadvantage of the District Magistrate being kept in ignorance of what people were sent up for trial and of the nature of the evidence against them.

any firearm is discharged or bombs thrown at them the most drastic reprisals will instantly be made against property surrounding the scene of the outrage. Therefore it behoves all loyal inhabitants to see to it that no evilly-disposed agitator is allowed on his premises.

No. 3.

During the period of Martial Law, I prohibit all processions, meetings or other gatherings of more than 10 persons without my written authority, except marriages, funerals and religious ceremonies that are not concerned with politics and any such meetings, gatherings or processions held in disobedience of this Order will be broken up by force without warning.

No. 4.

I forbid any person to offer violence or cause obstruction to any person desirous of opening his shop or conducting his business or proceeding to his work or business.

Any person contravening this Order will be arrested, tried by a Summary Court and be liable to be shot.

No. 5.

I prohibit in the area under my Command the issue of Third or Intermediate Class tickets at all Railway Stations in the Command, except only in the case of servants travelling with their European masters, or

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servants of others in the employ of the Government, or all such to whom Railway permits have been granted by me or on my behalf.

No. 6.

WHEREAS I deem it advisable to take steps to prevent any evilly-disposed persons tearing down or defacing Notices and Orders which I may cause to be exhibited for the information and good government of the people of this Area,

All Orders that I have to issue under Martial Law will be handed to such owners of property as I may select, and it will be the duty of such owners of property to exhibit and keep exhibited and undamaged in the position on their property selected by me all such orders.

The duty of protecting such Orders will therefore devolve on the owners of property, and failure to ensure the proper protection and continued exhibition of my Orders will result in severe punishment.

Similarly I hold responsible the owner of any property on which seditious or any other Notices, proclamations or writings not authorized by me, are exhibited.

No. 7.

WHEREAS I think it advisable to take such steps as I think necessary for the prevention of violence and the preservation of good order, more particularly for the prevention of injury to His Majesty's Soldiers and Police, as well as to all law-abiding citizens in the Area under my Command, I make the following Order:—

From and after the promulgation of this Order it shall be illegal for any male person to carry or be found in possession of an instrument known as a *lathi*.

All persons disobeying this Order will be arrested, tried by summary Proceedings and punished under the powers conferred on me by Martial Law.

No. 8.

WHEREAS I deem it expedient to take further steps for the prevention of violence and intimidation and for the maintenance of good order in the Area under my Command, I make the following Order:—

From and after the promulgation of this Order it shall be unlawful for more than two persons to walk abreast on any constructed or clearly defined pavement or side walk in such Area, and disobedience of this Order will be punished by all such special powers as are conferred on me by Martial Law.

No. 9.

WHEREAS practically every shop and business establishment in the Area under my Command has been closed in accordance with the *hartal* or organized closure of business directed against His Majesty's Government,

AND WHEREAS the continuance or resumption of such *hartal* is detrimental to the good order and governance of the said Area,

AND WHEREAS I deem it expedient to cause the said *hartal* to entirely cease:

Now THEREFORE by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law I make the following Order, namely:—

On and after the promulgation of this Order every shop and business establishment in the Area under my Command shall open and carry on its business, and thereafter daily shall continue to keep open and carry on its business during the usual hours, not beyond 22-00 hours, in exactly the same manner as before the creation of the said *hartal*.

AND LIKEWISE I order that every skilled or other worker will resume and continue during the usual hours his ordinary trade, work or calling.

AND I WARN all concerned that if I find this Order has been, without good and valid reason, disobeyed, the persons concerned will be arrested and tried under the

summary procedure of Martial Law, and shops so closed will be opened and kept open by force, and any resultant loss arising from such forcible openings will rest on the owners and/or occupiers concerned.

AND I FURTHER WARN all concerned that this Order must be strictly obeyed in spirit as well as in letter, that is to say, that to open a shop and then refuse to sell goods and to charge an exorbitant or prohibitive rate will be deemed a contravention of this Order. Rates will be fixed from time to time by competent authority.

No. 10.

WHEREAS it has come to my knowledge that the present state of unrest is being added to and encouraged by the spreading of false, inaccurate and exaggerated reports or rumours.

Now THEREFORE by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I give notice that ANY PERSON found guilty of publishing, spreading or repeating false, inaccurate or exaggerated reports in connection with the Military or Political situation will be arrested and summarily dealt with under Martial Law.

No. 11.

And finally I declare that loyal and law-abiding persons have nothing to fear from the exercise of Martial Law, but I warn all people that any disobedience to these or any other Orders that I may think fit to issue under Martial Law will be severely punished under the summary powers possessed or delegated by me.

No. 12.

WHEREAS it has come to my knowledge that a number of persons in the Area under my Command are in possession of firearms and ammunition, by virtue of exemption, license or otherwise,

AND WHEREAS I deem it desirable, in the interests of the safety of His Majesty's Troops and Police and for the prevention of disorder and violence, to take steps to ensure that such arms should not pass, by theft or otherwise, into the possession of those who might use them unlawfully,

Now THEREFORE by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law I do make the following Order, that is to say,

Any person in possession of any arms or ammunition, ordered by me or by any Officer, Magistrate, Soldier or Policeman acting on my behalf to surrender for safe custody such arms and ammunition shall deliver them to me at the place and by the hour mentioned in such Order.

And for the purpose of this Order, every Military or Police Officer, Magistrate, Soldier and Policeman shall be deemed to be acting on my behalf.

AND I WARN ALL CONCERNED that disobedience of this Order will be summarily dealt with by me under Martial Law.

No. 13.

AND WHEREAS by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I ORDERED THAT—

All pedal-driven cycles (save and except such as are the *bona fide* property of Government) owned or possessed by persons, other than Europeans, residing in the district hereinafter described, shall be delivered to the Officer appointed by me at the Fort between the hours of 09-00 and 16-00 hours on Monday, 28th April 1919.

AND THEREAFTER it will be a contravention of Martial Law for any such person to be in possession of a cycle unless accompanied by a Certificate of Exemption from military service signed on my behalf.

For the purposes of this Order, all cycles owned or ridden in the course of duty by Officers or servants of

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the Government shall be deemed to be the property of Government and therefore exempt from this Order.

DISTRICT AFFECTED.

That portion of the Area under my Command known as the "City."

R. E. H. DYER, C. B., BRIG.-GENL.

Commanding Amritsar Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, RAMBAGH,
AMRITSAR:

25th April 1919.

No. 14.

WHEREAS I have reason to believe that certain Dealers in the Area under my Command are holding secret stores of the under-mentioned commodities:

I THEREFORE by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law make the following Orders:—

Every trader, banker, bunnia or other person in the said Area, who owns or possesses directly or indirectly any of the undernoted commodities exceeding 5 maunds in weight shall render to me in writing (Enclosed in an envelope marked "Stocks") by 11-00 hours on Saturday, the 17th day of May 1919, a return showing the total quantity of these commodities owned or possessed by him.

And so that no person intending to evade this order may subsequently when faced with the consequences of such evasion complain that he was unaware of the procedure to be adopted by me.

I WARN ALL CONCERNED that as soon as possible after the hour named for the rendering of the said returns I shall cause them to be published and at the same time offer a substantial reward for information that will lead to the conviction of any persons failing to submit or submitting an inaccurate return.

And such reward will be paid by the person disobeying this Order in addition to such other punishment as by virtue of Martial Law I am empowered to impose.

AND I FURTHER WARN would-be informers of the consequences of giving me false information.

Commodities affected.—GUR, SHAKKER, SUGAR, MISRI, GRAM, SALT, WHEAT, ATTA.

B. M. HYNES, LIEUT.-COL.,

Commanding Amritsar Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, CIRCUIT HOUSE,
AMRITSAR:

May 11th, 1919.

No. 15.

AND WHEREAS I have reason to believe that certain dealers in the Area under my Command are holding secret stores of the undermentioned commodities:

I THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, make the following Orders:—

Every trader, banker, bunnia, or other person in the said Area, who owns or possesses directly or indirectly any of the undernoted commodities exceeding in the case of—

Cut and logwood firewood,—10 maunds;

and in the case of:—

Quaker oats, 1 case of not less than 12 tins or packets each weighing 1 lb;

shall render to me in writing (Enclosed in an envelope marked "Stocks") by 11-00 hours on Monday the 19th day of May 1919, a return showing the total of these commodities owned or possessed by him.

And so that no person intending to evade this Order may subsequently, when faced with the consequences of such evasion, complain that he was unaware of the procedure to be adopted by me.

I WARN ALL CONCERNED that as soon as possible after the hour named for the rendering of the said returns I shall cause them to be published and at the same time offer a substantial reward for information that will lead to the conviction of any persons failing to submit or submitting an inaccurate return.

And such reward will be paid by the persons or person disobeying this Order, in addition to such other punishment as, by virtue of Martial Law, I am empowered to impose.

AND I FURTHER WARN would-be informers of the consequence of giving me false information.

Commodities affected.—Quaker Oats, Firewood.

B. M. HYNES, LIEUT.-COL.,

Commanding Amritsar Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, CIRCUIT HOUSE,
AMRITSAR:

May 12th, 1919.

No. 16.

WHEREAS the Amir of Afghanistan has seen fit to take certain hostile action against the Government of His Majesty the King-Emperor,

AND WHEREAS I deem it desirable to take steps to ascertain the names and business of all subjects of the said Amir who may be in the Area under my Command,

Now THEREFORE by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I make the following Orders:—

(1) No Afghan subject shall leave the Area under my Command without my written permission.

(2) Every Afghan subject (except women and children and the old and infirm, who must be registered by their families) now in the Area under my Command shall present himself for registration at the headquarters of the Superintendent of Police between 09-00 hours on Sunday, the 18th day of May 1919, and 17-00 hours on Tuesday, the 20th day of May 1919.

(3) From and including Wednesday, the 21st day of May 1919, it shall be an offence against Martial Law for any person to harbour or assist in any way an Afghan subject not in possession of a certificate signed by me or on my behalf.

And I further declare that should any person know of the existence of any unregistered Afghan subject in the Area under my Command and fail to report such knowledge to the Superintendent of Police immediately, such person shall be deemed to have contravened Martial Law and be dealt with accordingly.

B. M. HYNES, LIEUT.-COL.,

Commanding Amritsar Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, CIRCUIT HOUSE,
AMRITSAR:

May 14th, 1919.

No. 17.

WHEREAS by Martial Law Order No. 1 of 25th April 1919, I warned the public that in the district under my Command known as Amritsar City no person other than a European or a person in possession of a Military permit signed by me or on my behalf would be permitted to leave his or her house or compound or the building in which he or she may be between 22-00 hours each evening until 05-00 hours the following morning:

Now THEREFORE by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I order that these hours be changed to 22-30 hours each evening until 04-00 hours the next morning, that is to say:—

During these prohibited hours 22-30 hours each evening until 04-00 hours the next morning no person other than those exempted above will be permitted to use the streets or roads, and any person found disobeying this

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order will be arrested, and, if any attempt is made to evade or resist arrest, that person will be liable to be shot.

B. M. HYNES, LIEUT.-COL.,
Commanding Amritsar Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, CIRCUIT HOUSE,
AMRITSAR:
May 16th, 1919.

No. 18.

WHEREAS I have reason to believe that food-stuffs are not coming into Amritsar City because the country people are afraid that their carts, ekkas, or asses are liable to be commandeered by the military:

I HEREBY make it known to all concerned that no carts, ekkas, or asses engaged in bringing food-stuffs in Amritsar City will be commandeered for Military or any other purposes.

FURTHERMORE I hereby declare that should it be my intention in the future to commandeer any of the above-mentioned carts, ekkas, or asses I will give 48 hours' clear notice of my intention to do so.

B. M. HYNES, LIEUT.-COL.,
Commanding Amritsar Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, CIRCUIT HOUSE,
AMRITSAR:
May 16th, 1919.

No. 19.

WHEREAS I have reason to believe that the people of Amritsar City are suffering inconvenience on account of not being able to go out and procure Medical Aid for the Sick between the prohibited hours of 22-30 hours each evening to 04-00 hours the next morning:

NOW THEREFORE by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I make the following Orders:—

Should Medical Aid be necessary in any house, building or compound between the prohibited hours of 22-30 and 04-00 hours, one person and one only from the said house, building or compound will proceed to the Kotwali or nearest Police picquet. On arrival at the Kotwali or Police picquet the said person will be accompanied by a Police constable to obtain Medical Aid; when this has been done the said person will proceed back to his house building or compound and remain there until 04-00 hours.

B. M. HYNES, LIEUT.-COL.,
Commanding Amritsar Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, CIRCUIT HOUSE,
AMRITSAR:
May 16th, 1919.

No. 20.

WHEREAS the behaviour of the people in the Area under my Command renders it possible to modify or annul various Martial Law Orders which from time to time I deemed necessary to issue in the interests of public safety:

NOW THEREFORE I make the following Orders:—

1. Martial Law Order No. 8 of April 24th, 1919, is cancelled from this hour.

2. Martial Law Order No. 13 of April 24th, 1919, is modified, so that all pedal-driven cycles, with the exception of those actually required by the Military and Civil Authorities, will be returned to owners on applica-

tion to the Tehsildar. Certificates of exemption are no longer necessary.

B. M. HYNES, LIEUT.-COL.,
Commanding Amritsar Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, CIRCUIT HOUSE,
AMRITSAR:
May 19th, 1919.

No. 21.

WHEREAS owing to the improved situation I no longer consider the fixing of Nirik Rates for Food-stuffs essential, I order that the said Nirik Rates be abolished with effect from 00-00 hours on Wednesday, May 21st, 1919.

Shop-keepers and merchants however, are warned that the prices of food-stuffs will be carefully watched for the protection of the poor and the benefit of trade and should this concession be taken advantage of, fixed prices will be immediately re-imposed.

It is hoped that under this Order wheat will be freely brought into the city from the surrounding district. There is no present intention of commandeering stocks of any food-stuffs.

In announcing these relaxations of Martial Law Orders I warn all concerned that these concessions must not be misinterpreted as a sign of the weakening of Martial Law which will still be applied with all swift and severity against those engaged in seditious propaganda or in attempting to aid the King's Enemies.

B. M. HYNES, LIEUT.-COL.,
Commanding Amritsar Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, CIRCUIT HOUSE,
AMRITSAR:
May 19th, 1919.

No. 22.

WHEREAS the behaviour of the people in the Area under my Command renders it possible to modify and/or annul various Martial Law Orders, and whereas in my opinion the Curfew restrictions will make it practically impossible for Mohammadans to conduct the proper observance of the Ramzan:

NOW THEREFORE I make the following Orders:—

1. Martial Law Order No. 17 of the 16th day of May 1919 is cancelled from this hour. Which is to say that the people may move in the City by night at all hour without hindrance.

2. The playing of bands and of musical instruments and drums of all and every description is absolutely forbidden between the hours of 23-30 each evening until 04-00 hours the following morning.

AND I WARN ALL CONCERNED that any disobedience of this Order will result in prompt and severe punishment under Martial Law.

Area affected.

That portion of the Area under my Command known as the City the Civil Lines and Cantonments.

W. F. NORTH, LIEUT.-COL., THE HON.,
Commanding Amritsar Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, CIRCUIT HOUSE,
AMRITSAR:
May 23rd, 1919.

No. 23.

WHEREAS by Martial Law Notice No. 21, I abolished Nirik rates for food-stuffs, with effect from 00-00 hours on Wednesday, May 21st, 1919;

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[Continued.]

AND WHEREAS by the said notice I warned shop-keepers and merchants that should this concession be taken advantage of, fixed prices would be immediately reimposed:

AND WHEREAS I now hear that high prices are being charged for Salt and Milk:

NOW THEREFORE by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I order that after 00-00 hours on Wednesday, the 28th day of May 1919, it shall be in contravention of Martial Law to charge or attempt to charge more than the prices set forth hereunder:

SALT for 14 seers, not more than 1 Rupee.

MILK (Cow per gadvi of 21 chataks) per seer, not more than annas 4.

MILK (Buffalo per gadvi of 21 chataks) per seer, not more than annas 4, pies 6.

MILK (Boiled per gadvi of 21 chataks) per seer, not more than annas 5.

AND I HEREBY give notice that such prices shall be considered to be a maximum, and it shall be no offence to sell either Milk or Salt at a cheaper rate.

AND I FURTHER ORDER that it shall be in contravention of Martial Law for any person who is a vender of Salt or Milk:—

(1) To refuse to sell Salt or Milk when in possession of such articles and requested to do so.

(2) To adulterate Milk.

W. F. NORTH, LIEUT.-COL., THE HON.,
Commanding Amritsar Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, CIRCUIT HOUSE,
AMRITSAR:
May 27th, 1919.

No. 24.

WHEREAS it has been brought to my notice that during the last few days false rumours have been spread in the City of Amritsar to the effect that:—

(1) A tax is being levied on all cattle and dogs, and
(2) That at Amritsar all grain is being confiscated and stored in the Fort, all of which is untrue and known to be untrue by the inhabitants of Amritsar:

NOW THEREFORE to mark my displeasure at these false rumours, I hereby cancel my order No. 22 of May 23rd 1919, and hereby make orders as follows:—

WHEREAS in my opinion the Curfew restrictions will make it impossible for Muhammadans to conduct the proper observance of the Fast of Ramzan:

NOW THEREFORE of my great favour I make the following concession:—

(1) Martial Law Order No. 22 of May 23rd is cancelled.
(2) Martial Law Order No. 17 of May 16th, 1919, is varied as follows:—

Which is to say that:—
From the first day of the Fast of Ramzan until the end of the Fast or until further notice the people of Amritsar may move in the City at all hours without hindrance.

(3) The playing of bands and of musical instruments of all and every description is absolutely forbidden between the hours of 22-30 hours each evening until 04-00 hours the following morning.

AND I WARN ALL CONCERNED that any disobedience of this Order will result in prompt and severe punishment under Martial Law.

W. F. NORTH, LIEUT.-COL., THE HON.,
Commanding Amritsar Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, CIRCUIT HOUSE,
AMRITSAR:
May 28th, 1919.

No. 25.

WHEREAS I find that Cloth Merchants in the Area under my Command are charging a high price for cheap cotton cloth, known as "Standard" Cloth;

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AND WHEREAS I warned all concerned, that prices would be watched for the benefit of the poor, under my Command,

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I order the Cloth Merchants named below to STOCK AND SELL Standard Cloth, from 06-00 hours on Saturday, the 7th day of June 1919, at the price of Annas Six (6) Pies Nine (9) per yard, which will leave a reasonable profit to the seller.

AND FURTHER, it shall be deemed a contravention of Martial Law if more than twelve (12) yards are sold to any one purchaser, or if any person, having purchased such Cloth from one of the Merchants referred to, re-sells it.

1. B. Darbara Singh Gurba-	Hall Bazar.
khish Singh . . .	
2. L. Mool Chand Bazaz . .	Kamani Dewari.
3. L. Jai Narain Kansh Ram	" "
4. M. Nabi Bukhsh, Tailor .	Katra Jaimal Singh.
5. L. Hem Raj Nand Lall . .	" "
6. Bhagat Ram Ba Kishen . .	Kochoa "Karmoon."
7. L. Rehu Mal Bishen Dass	Near Octroi Office.
8. L. Gulchu Mal Chaudhri .	Karmoon Deori.
9. L. Sunder Mal Narain Das	" "
10. L. Bhagat Ram Khushi	" "
Ram . . .	" "
11. L. Wasoo Mal Panna Mal	" "
12. L. Bishen Dass Ram Dass	" "
13. L. Ram Chand Ram Lall .	" "
14. L. Jawanda Mal Bishen	" "
Dass . . .	" "
15. L. Devi Dass Chopra . .	Katra Ahluwalian.
16. L. Gokal Chand Sat Pal .	Bazar Gokal Chand.
17. Fattah Chand Mangoo Mal	" "
18. L. Mehraj Mal Bari Nath .	Bazar Saboonian.
19. Nand Lal Beka Singh . .	Guru Bazar.
20. Chaudri Gobind Ram . .	" "
21. L. Dhani Ram Bazaz . .	Chauk Darbar Sahib.
22. Ganesh Dass Nand Kishore	" "
23. L. Ganga Ram Gobind	" "
Ram . . .	" "
24. L. Radha Kishen Sethi . .	Nimak Mandi.
25. B. Mota Singh . . .	" "
26. Sham Das Lal Chand . .	Kstra Sofaid.
27. M. Wali Muhammad . .	" "
28. L. Panna Lall . . .	Chauk Passian,
29. Haji Naneek Nabi Bakhsh	Katra Bagh Singh.
30. M. Inayat Khoja . . .	Sweeper Gate.

AND I warn the above Merchants, that any disobedience of these orders will be strictly dealt with under Martial Law.

W. F. NORTH, LIEUT.-COL., THE HON.,
Commanding Amritsar Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, CIRCUIT HOUSE,
AMRITSAR:
June 5th, 1919.

No. 26.

WHEREAS by Martial Law order No. 21 of 19th May 1919, I stated that Nirik Rates would be abolished, and that prices of Food-stuffs would be watched for the benefit of the Poor under my Command,

AND WHEREAS I now find that the Sugar Merchants under my Command are charging exorbitant prices for Sugar.

Now, therefore, to show my displeasure and to punish the Sugar Merchants under my Command, I, therefore, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, make the following order, that is to say:—

From 07-00 hours on Sunday, June 8th, 1919, and until further notice it shall be a contravention of Martial Law for any dealer or other person in the Area under my Command to charge or attempt to charge more than the prices shown below:—

SUGAR (Khand) 2 seers 4 chatacks for 1 Rupee.
MISRI 2 seers 2 chatacks, for 1 Rupee.

. 2 B

Mr. MILES IRVING—concluded—Mr. R. PLOMER.

AND any person found guilty of contravening this order will be severely punished.

W. F. NORTH, LIEUT.-COL., THE HON.,
Commanding Amritsar Area

HEAD-QUARTERS, CIRCUIT HOUSE,
AMRITSAR:

June 7th, 1919.
07:30 hours.

No. 27.

WHEREAS it has been brought to my notice that exorbitant prices are being charged for Ice.

AND WHEREAS this has incurred my great displeasure: Now, therefore, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I make the following orders:—

Wholesale. After 07:00 hours on Monday, June 9th, 1919, Ice shall be manufactured and sold by Ice Merchants in the Area under my Command at a price not exceeding Re. 1-8 per maund, and not less than one maund shall be sold at this price.

Retail. Ice shall be purchased and sold by retail Ice dealers in the Area under my Command at the following prices:—

It shall be purchased at the rate of Re. 1-8 per maund from the Ice Merchants, and shall be sold by the Retail Dealers at the price of Rs. 2-8 per maund to the public. That is to say, not more than 1 anna is to be charged for 1 seer of Ice.

And I warn all those concerned, that should any Merchant or dealer refuse to sell Ice at these prices, or should any retail dealers in Ice refuse to buy Ice for the purpose of reselling it to the Public then it shall be deemed a contravention of Martial Law.

And any disobedience of these orders will be strictly dealt with under Martial Law.

W. F. NORTH, LIEUT.-COL., THE HON.,

Commanding Amritsar Area.

HEAD-QUARTERS, CIRCUIT HOUSE,
AMRITSAR:

June 8th, 1919.
10:00 hours.

Mr. R. PLOMER, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Amritsar.

ORDERS were received on the evening of 9th April 1919 for the arrest and deportation of Doctors Kitchlew and Satyapal. The Deputy Commissioner sent for them on the morning of 10th April 1919, to his house, from where they left in motors for Dharamsala at about 10:30 A.M., with an escort in charge of Mr. Rehill, Superintendent of Police. By about 11 A.M., the news of the arrests became known in the city, and ardent followers of the deportees went round urging the people to close their shops and assemble in the Aitchison Park with the intention of proceeding to the Deputy Commissioner's house and demanding their release.

As it was expected that the arrest of Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal would cause a certain amount of excitement, it had been previously arranged at a meeting held at the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow the night before that the Officer Commanding the Station, would have a force of British Infantry and some mounted men from the Ammunition Column in the Rambagh, with which he was to hold the Railway Foot Bridge, the Railway Over Bridge and the Hospital Level Crossing, while the Police Lines Level Crossing was to be held by the Police, in order to prevent large mobs from entering the Civil Lines and trying to overawe the authorities. There was also an armed Police Reserve of 75 men at the City Kotwali under the orders of Khan Sahib Ahmad Jan, Deputy Superintendent of Police and the City Inspector besides the men in the four divisions.

At about 11:30 A.M., the City Inspector informed me by telephone, that crowds were proceeding to the Aitchison Park. I immediately informed the Deputy Commissioner at the Kutchery, and while there I received a second message to the effect that the mobs were being led by Ratto and Bugga, Kitchlew's Lieutenants and intended going to the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow to demand the release of Kitchlew and Satyapal.

As arranged I immediately galloped to the Rambagh to inform the Officer Commanding Troops, who was out posting mounted picquets at the points he was to hold, and eventually I found him at the Railway Station. Leaving Officer Commanding Troops with his infantry in the Rambagh, I went on to the Police Lines where I had a spare armed Reserve of 25 men and a few mounted Police with whom I hurried to the Railway Foot Bridge and intercepted the mob which at this point consisted of several thousands and was in possession of the Foot Bridge, the Railway Lines and the road near Madan's shop. The mounted picquet of the column

was stoned by the mob and had fallen back to the cross roads further down and had already fired on the mob, when I arrived. The mob fell back to the Foot Bridge with the Police facing them with bayonets fixed and at the ready position, when some members of the local Bar rushed forward and asked me not to fire and that they would take the mob back to the city. I agreed to this. The mob was induced to retire by these gentlemen and by the time the Infantry arrived, the Foot Bridge and the Railway Line were practically clear of it. The Foot and Over Bridges were immediately taken over by the Military and the Hospital Crossing by the Police picquet. In the meanwhile a mob had entered the Railway goods yard and assaulted Mr. Bennett, the Station Superintendent, who had a very narrow escape. Guard Robinson who was in the yard was less fortunate and was overtaken and beaten to death with lathis.

Another large crowd attacked the Telegraph office from two sides and smashed the telephone switch board to bits, destroyed the furniture in the Telegraph Master's quarters. Mr. Pinto, the Telegraph Master, was seized and was being dragged out of his bed room, when he was rescued by two men of the 54th Sikhs (Muhammadans) a small party of whom had been sent from the Railway Station to protect the Telegraph Office. About this time Sergeant Rowlands, Electrician, who was on his way on foot to the Municipal Power House from the Fort, was chased, overtaken and beaten to death near the Rego Bridge.

Another mob of some thousands made a determined attempt to cross into Civil Lines by the Railway Over Bridge and began stoning the Infantry picquet holding it. It was eventually fired on by order of the District Magistrate, dispersed and driven into the city. About this time columns of smoke began to rise inside the city close to Hall Gate and it became evident that the mob thwarted in its attempt to burn and pillage the Civil Lines had begun to wreak its vengeance on British Banks and Christian religious buildings inside the city and to murder every Britisher they came across.

Fortunately about 2 P.M. a train with 270 Gurkhas on board arrived from Jullundur side. The men were immediately detrained, armed and made use of to protect the Railway Station and Civil Lines from any further attack.

Later on in the evening troops arrived from Jullundur and Lahore. About midnight a strong force of Military entered the city by the Rambagh Gate and Hall Gate under my guidance and went as far as the City Kotwali

Mr. R. PLOMER—continued—Mr. J. F. REHILL.

and returned to Military Headquarters at the Railway Station, bringing back Messrs. Thompson and Ross of the Chartered Bank, Jarman, Municipal Engineer, and Sergeant Parsonage, Supply and Transport, all of whom had taken refuge at the Kotwali and also the charred remains of Messrs. Stewart and Scott of the National Bank and Thompson of the Alliance Bank.

The European women and children from the Civil Lines and the Cantonment had all been conveyed to the Fort by evening.

On 11th April 1919, there was a *hartal* in the city. The bodies of Hindus and Muhammadans, eight in number killed the day before, were taken out in procession by the Sultanwind Gate for burial and cremation.

The Military marched into the city at night.

On 12th April 1919, there was a *hartal* as usual. The Military marched into the city by Sultanwind Gate to the Kotwali. General Dyer and Mr. Donald, Deputy Inspector-General of Police, were present. Bugga and Dina Nath and some others were arrested.

In the evening a protest meeting was held in the Hindu Sabha High School demanding the release of the deportees.

On 13th April 1919, the *hartal* was continued. During the day the General Officer Commanding accompanied by an armed force had a proclamation made in important parts of the city that no public meeting would be permitted and if held would be dispersed by the Military. The same afternoon a meeting was held in Jallawalian Bagh, in spite of the proclamation and was dispersed by the General Officer Commanding by rifle fire.

The Superintendent of Police, Mr. Rehill and I were present. After the General Officer Commanding's proclamation one Guram Ditta, Bania and Balu, Halwai, went round with an empty kerosene tin announcing that the meeting in Jallawalian Bagh would be held that same evening.

On 14th April 1919, the shops still remained closed.

On 15th April 1919, the General Officer Commanding held a meeting of the leading citizens in the Town Hall Library and with their help the shops were opened the same day.

Mr. J. F. REHILL, Superintendent of Police, Amritsar.

1. Drs. Kitchlew and Satya Pal were arrested on the morning of the 10th April and removed under escort, from Amritsar, at about 10:30 A.M. At about 11 A.M. the crowds began to collect at the Aitchison Park with the expressed intention to marching to the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow. A large mob was checked at the Railway foot bridge by one reserve of Police and a mounted picquet, which was forced to fire on the crowd. Another large crowd attacked the Telegraph Office, wrecked the instruments, and assaulted the Telegraph Master, who was only saved from death by two Muhammadans of the 54th Sikhs. In the meanwhile a mob entered the Goods Yard, assaulted Mr. Bennett, the Station Superintendent, and beat Guard Robinson to death. About this time, Sergeant Rowlands, who was walking from the Fort to the Municipal Power House, was beaten to death near the Rego Bridge.

Another mob of some thousands made a determined attempt to cross into Civil Lines by the Railway over-bridge. It was eventually fired on and wrecked its revenge on Europeans and British and Christian buildings in the City. The National Bank of India was burnt and looted. Mr. Stewart and Mr. Scott, the Agent and Assistant Agent, were murdered. The Chartered Bank was also attacked and damaged. Messrs. Thomson and Ross had a narrow escape, being rescued by the City Police. The Alliance Bank was also rushed by the mob. Mr. T. M. Thomson, the Agent, was killed and his body burnt. The Religious Book Society's Depot and Hall was burnt down but the inmates escaped. The Town Hall and Sub-Post Office attached to it were fired and the Sub-Post Office at the Golden Temple, Majith Mandi, and Dhab Basti were looted. The Zenana Hospital was entered and every effort made to find and kill Mrs. Eason, the Lady Doctor in charge. She, however, escaped. Miss Sherwood, a Mission Lady, was caught cycling in the City, and brutally assaulted with shoes and sticks, being rescued with difficulty. Outside the City the mob burnt down the Indian Christian Church and attacked the Girls' Normal School, where books and clothes were burnt. The ladies inside were rescued just in time by the Police.

In addition to all this, the railway line was damaged, telegraph wires were cut, and Bhagtanwala Railway Station on the Tarn Taran line, was burnt and looted. The Water Works and the lives of the European Engineer and his family there being thus saved.

Order was restored the same evening. An attempt to hold a meeting in the Jallianwala Bagh, on April 13th, was dispersed by rifle fire from a party of 50 Indian troops under General Dyer. The mob suffered severe

casualties and the situation has since been uneventful.

2. *Police arrangements.*—To cope with any situation which might arise, it was arranged that the level crossing near the Police Lines and near the Hospital should be held by parties of armed Police, while the Railway over-bridge was to be held by the Military. In addition to this, three armed reserves were concentrated at the Kotwali to deal with any disturbance in the City. All remaining Police were kept in readiness at their usual posts.

Police protection for the Telegraph Office and Banks was not arranged for before 10th April 1919, as it was not expected that any real necessity for such protection would arise. Guards were provided for the Banks on the 6th April when the most rigorous of the *hartals* was in progress, but these guards were found to be unnecessary. Hence for the 10th when no *hartal* had been declared and in the absence of any special information warranting such very special precautions, guards on the Banks did not appear to be called for when the trouble arose, and it arose very suddenly. Police reserves from the Kotwali marched to the three Banks and in one case afforded protection to the two Europeans in the building.

3. *Attempts to tamper with Police.*—No attempts were made to seduce any member of the Police force from his allegiance.

4. *Conduct of the Police Force.*—The discipline of the constabulary was satisfactory under very trying circumstances and their attitude and general efficiency was good.

At Balarwal, the inhabitants which include a considerable number of Mehtams conspired to commit dacoities, taking advantages of the riots in Amritsar. They were, however, frustrated in their designs. The inhabitants of the 4 villages, Gumaiapur, Basarke, Khapar Khori and Wadali-Guru, took a prominent part in the offences on the Railway line which occurred on 10th April 1919, cutting the telegraph wires on the main line, derauling trains and looting goods waggons. Seventy-five persons from these 4 villages were arrested for such offences. The remainder of the inhabitants made no attempt to prevent these outrages and made no report to the Police Station. During the subsequent investigations the residents of these villages attempted to spoil the cases against accused and in fact succeeded in suppressing a considerable amount of evidence.

The villagers of Jarmastpur, Gorkha, Bhogga and Chotala, took part in the plot to attack the Tarn Taran Tahsil, almost every family providing one or two of its members for the enterprise. No report was made at the Police Station. In the investigations which followed

Mr. J. F. REHILL—continued—Mr. R. B. BECKETT—Mr. CONNOR—Captain J. W. MASSEY.

the inhabitants of these villages showed that their sympathies were not on the side of Government and greatly obstructed the collection of evidence.

5. *Police work under Martial Law.*—The co-operation of the Police with the Military during the period of Martial Law was most satisfactory. Cases were much more quickly heard and decided than under the ordinary procedure and Police work was much simplified by the lower standard of evidence necessary in military courts. No special difficulties were observed in investigating cases under the new conditions.

Only one case of bribery against a Police Officer, was *challenged* from this district, in which a Head Constable was convicted to 2 years' rigorous imprisonment for

accepting money from an accused with a view to assisting in his release. No anonymous petition amongst those on which action was taken was found to be based on fact, the whole of the accusations against the Police being false.

6. It has not been possible to state the amount of property stolen and recovered in many of the cases tried under Martial Law, owing to the peculiar circumstances under which the offences were committed.

7. *Instances of misconduct on the part of the Police.*—The case of bribery against the Head Constable has already been mentioned in paragraph 5. I have no other instances to give of Police Officers who have failed in their duty, or misconducted themselves.

Mr. R. B. BECKETT, I.C.S., Assistant Commissioner, Amritsar.

Arrived at Hall Bridge when crowd had reached the top of the ascent; there was picket of 4 mounted men, 2 with rifles and 2 with swords. Ordered crowd to go back. Told Non-Commissioned Officer to use any measures

to stop them. Driven back to New Court Road and showered with bricks. Thinks one shot was fired on the way down from the bridge. It had no effect. Will describe the demeanour of the crowd.

Mr. CONNOR, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Amritsar.

When I reached the Circuit House, which must have been at 1 p.m., I heard the roar of the mob and two shots being fired. When I reached the Hargobind Buildings at the corner of the Mission compound (where the Queen's Road from Railway Station to Ram Bagh intersects the New Court Road) I came upon a small body of mounted troops retiring at the trot being chased by a mob who were pelting them with stones. Some of these stones were formidable ones and had apparently been picked up from the railway track.

These troops consisted of a British sergeant and three British soldiers of the 12th Ammunition Column and 3 or 4 Indian sowars of the same column. The latter did not seem to have even sticks. Lieutenant Dickie of the Followers was in command and his position was desperate. He shouted to me for reinforcements. His troops stopped their horses on seeing me come up from the opposite direction and the mob continued to throw stones and advance. I called out to Lieutenant Dickie that the mob should not have been allowed to cross the railway line, and that it was left to him to fire on them if necessary. On this two British soldiers (whose names I ascertained later are Gunners Fordham and Burkins) with remarkable promptitude dismounted and opened fire with a carbine and pistol from behind culverts on the advancing mob which was at the time in front of Madan's shop and some three men fell wounded. Lieutenant Dickie and I then rode up to the wounded—Lieutenant

Dickie to a man near Madan's door and I to the foot of the road bridge near Gagar Mal's Dharmshala. Bricks were thrown at me from the top of the Hargobind Buildings and I looked up and saw three Babu girls only in the balcony. We were greeted with shouts "We want Satyapal and Kitchlew." The mounted troops followed us and I heard shouts from the mob addressed to the Indian sowars "Brothers, do not take sides against us."

The group of men I went up to demanded the immediate release of Satyapal and Kitchlew. There was a wounded man with them and I told the men to take him to the hospital. One of the group addressed me most violently saying they had given their blood and money and had been promised self-government, but were being given bullets instead. He spoke in Urdu, but used the English words self-government. The man seemed to belong to the class that had given neither money nor blood. I informed them that when they stoned armed British troops and forcibly pushed them back they must have known they would sooner or later be fired on. One man then came forward and struck his chest and defiantly said in Urdu: "If our Satyapal and Kitchlew are not returned to us immediately we are ready to die." One Khatri lad was absolutely rabid. On seeing the men becoming violent I returned to where the mounted troops were, i.e., near Madan's door.

Captain J. W. MASSEY, Officer Commanding, Amritsar.

Narrating the occurrences at the commencement of the Riots at Amritsar.

At about 8-30 p.m. on the night of the 9th April, I received a telephone message from the Deputy Commissioner (Mr. Miles Irving), asking me to call at his house at 9 p.m. On my arrival there, I found Mr. Miles Irving, Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, I.M.S., Mr. Rehill, Superintendent of Police, and Mr. Plomer, Deputy Superintendent of Police. I was then informed that orders had been issued for the arrest of Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal. It was decided that these men should be invited to the Deputy Commissioner's house, be arrested there and conveyed by the Superintendent of Police to Dharmshala. It struck me that it was not advisable that these men be taken without an adequate escort so I suggested that two motor cars should be used and a British escort should be found. To camouflage this, I suggested that the escort should be in plain clothes and proceed as though

they were a shooting party. Arrangements were made to procure the necessary motor cars, and civilian clothes found for the men. I informed the Deputy Commissioner that as a precautionary measure I would have 50 mounted men from No. 12 Ammunition Column, armed with lances, swords and rifles, and 2 officers and 40 men of the 1st G. B. Somerset Light Infantry at the Rambagh Gardens, in case a rescuing party might be sent out by the organisers of the "hartal." The Somerset Light Infantry would be ordinarily on a route march, marching from Cantonments via New Court Road towards the station, from there on to Rambagh Gardens, and would arrive along the Mall at his house at about the time when the arrest was to take place, so that at the time of the arrest, if the said Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal had brought their friends or a rescue party were at hand, that I should surround his bungalow and arrest anybody attempting a rescue.

Captain J. W. MASSEY,

[Continued.]

At 6-0 A.M. on the morning of the 10th, I had arranged with Captain Botting, Commanding No. 12 Ammunition Column, to make a tour of the positions that I considered should be held. This was carried out and we proceeded to the Fort, where I informed the Officer Commanding of the situation, and instructed him to get his guns into position, and to be prepared to receive women and children should the necessity arise. I also instructed him to place a Maxim Gun to command the road from the Rego Bridge to the Fort, with the instructions that should trouble arise he was not to hesitate to open fire if he saw large crowds of men coming from the gates of the city in a threatening attitude towards the Fort, Railway Station, or the Horse Fair Ground.

At 9-45 on the morning of the 10th, I left the Cantonments and rode down the Mall to the Rambagh Gardens to meet the party of the Somerset Light Infantry who were on the route march. On passing the Deputy Commissioner's house I noticed there were only two Gharries, and there were no other persons about. I rode on to the Rambagh Gardens, met the Somerset Light Infantry at our pre-arranged place and brought them on towards the Deputy Commissioner's house, and halted them in the shade near the Sessions Court House. I then went to the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow, where I was informed that Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal had arrived and had been arrested and they were waiting for the second motor car to turn up. This car was lent by Mr. J. P. Preston, Skin Merchant of Amritsar, which was unavoidably detained in the city procuring petrol. It eventually turned up and the party proceeded to Dharmshala at about 11-0 hours. The party passed me on the road. I immediately marched back with my men to the Rambagh Gardens which I had arranged with the Deputy Commissioner to make my Headquarters. Before entering the Rambagh I saw the mounted men of No. 12 Ammunition Column coming along the Mall as pre-arranged by me with Captain Botting. On our arrival at the *rendezvous* I decided to place the mounted men as picquets and to rest the Infantry who were finding one picquet at the Well Post on the Mall. Captain Botting and I took 25 men of the Ammunition Column and placed picquets over (1) the level crossing in front of Rambagh Gate, (2) road bridge to Hall Gate and (3) Rego Bridge. We then proceeded to the Station where I ordered the Indian officer (Jemadar Zardad Khan) belonging to the 54th Sikhs (who was sent from Jullundur to the Railway Station Guard) to take 1 Naik and 6 men to the Foot Bridge overlooking the Telegraph Office. I then went to see the Station Superintendent in his office. While I was there Mr. Plomer, Deputy Superintendent of Police, came to me and informed me that crowds of men were coming out of the city, and were going to make a demonstration at the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow or the Kutcheri. I immediately left the Station Superintendent's office and went to the Railway Guard, where I met the Indian Officer, Zardad Khan, who was in charge of them, and ordered him to turn his men out at once, and his orders were to protect the Railway Station as well as looking after the Government Telegraph Office. I then went out of the station with Captain Botting, and we mounted our horses, with the intention of riding down Cooper Road to my reserves in the Rambagh. When I had mounted I saw the picquet at the over-bridge (Hall Gate Entrance), being driven back, and what appeared to me Mr. Beckett, Assistant Deputy Commissioner, waving his hands to keep the crowd back. I could see the crowd breaking through, so I decided to ride down the parallel road, pass the Circuit House, across the Golf Course to the Rambagh to join my force. When I arrived there I found that a party from the reserve of my mounted men were taken in charge by Lieutenant Dickie, who had been informed that a crowd was breaking over the overbridge and went to the support of the overbridge and the Railway Station. This officer's initiative undoubtedly checked the mob from getting beyond the crossing of Cooper Road and the Civil Lines, as when he saw the situation he gave

orders to fire on the crowd, which undoubtedly stopped them from proceeding up the Civil Lines. On my arrival at the Rambagh I met 2nd-Lieutenant Brown in charge of a party of Somerset Light Infantry marching to the Station, as my mounted men had gone to the support of the Railway Station and overbridge picquets. I immediately countermarched them up the Mall towards the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow and Kutcheri where I anticipated a demonstration was likely to take place, from the information received from Mr. Plomer, Deputy Superintendent of Police.

On proceeding up the Mall towards the Kutcheri, I saw no crowds breaking over the Golf Course towards the Deputy Commissioner's house, or proceeding along the New Court Road towards the Kutcheri, I left a party at the Deputy Commissioner's house with instructions to guard same and the Mall down towards the Rambagh. With the remainder of my force I proceeded to the Kutcheri. On my arrival there I found that the mob had made no progress in that direction, so I ordered 2nd-Lieutenant Brown to proceed with all haste, if necessary commandeering tongas and tum-tums on the New Court Road to take his men to the support of the picquets in and near the Railway Station with orders he was to stop the mob from advancing towards the Kutcheri. I then proceeded to my station at the Quarter Guard of the British Infantry Barracks in Cantonments. On my way there I saw that the Lines of the Followers Central Depot, Ammunition Column, and No. 2 Mule Depot were quiet. On my arrival at the Guard Room I telephoned the Fort and ascertained that all was quiet there. Previous to this I had sent a galloper on, before leaving the Rambagh with the message that a native rabble was coming out of the city with the possible intention of making a demonstration at the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow or the Kutcheri, and that the men in Barracks were to turn out, and take up their positions.

While I was at the Quarter Guard I received a message by Mr. Bennett, junr., who rode upon his motor cycle, informing me that a party of 1-9th Gurkhas, 260 strong but unarmed had arrived at the Railway Station, on their way to Peshawar. I then gave orders to detain the Gurkhas and telephoned the Officer Commanding, Fort Govindgarh, that I was sending him 100 men to be armed. I then proceeded to the Railway Station where I met 2nd-Lieutenant Brown in command of the Somerset Light Infantry, who informed me that he had fired on the mob and had driven them back over the Railway Line. While I was with 2nd-Lieutenant Brown a party of 200 Gurkhas including the 100 armed from the Fort arrived with Captain Crampton in command. I immediately strengthened my picquets then returned to the house where the women and children were collected.

As the situation was now well in hand I decided to send the women and children to the Fort. On my arrival at Mr. Jeffries' house (where the women and children were) I discovered that no transport had been arranged to convey them to the Fort, so I went to Cantonments with a view to seeing Major Hext, to see if he could assist with his A. T. Carts. On my way I met Major Hext whom I spoke to on the subject, and we arranged that Transport should be supplied to those who required at Mr. Jeffries' bungalow. I then rode on to the Quarter Guard of the British Infantry, and rang up Officer Commanding, Fort, and informed him that I was about to evacuate the women and children to the Fort, that a strong Gurkha Guard was placed on the Rego Bridge and that the women and children would be coming along the Rego Bridge Fort Road, and should the natives on the Horse Fair Ground attempt to make a demonstration or in any way interfere with the party of women and children coming into the Fort, he was not to hesitate to open fire on the obstructing crowd. After I had given these instructions, I informed the people at Mr. Jeffries' bungalow that the road was quite safe and they could proceed to the Fort, and those that had not got the necessary transport, could obtain same from Major Hext. New Court Road and Fort road were being patrolled by the mounted men of the Ammunition Column. I

Captain J. W. MASSEY—concluded—Lieutenant-Colonel HENRY SMITH.

personally saw parties going over the Rego Bridge and into the Fort with perfect safety. I then went to the Railway Station and from there on, visited my picquets.

The situation was well in hand, and I was hoping for reinforcements, to arrive at any moment.

Mr. Kitchin, Commissioner and Mr. Donald, Deputy Inspector General of Police from Lahore, arrived at the Railway Station in a motor car. I informed them that I had received information that Mr. Stewart and Mr. Scott of the National Bank and Mr. Thompson of the Alliance Bank had been murdered in the city, and their banks were on fire, and that Sergeant Rowlands and a guard had been killed near the station, that Mr. Jarman, Mr. Thompson and two other Europeans were in the Kotwali. I informed them that I did not consider that I had strong enough force to make a demonstration in the city as well as guarding the Civil Lines and Cantonments, until I was reinforced: that reinforcements were telegraphed for, and that I was awaiting their arrival. At about 10-30 P.M., reinforcements arrived from Lahore and at 5-15 next morning from Jullundur, Major MacDonald of the 1-124th Baluchis from Lahore

Lieutenant-Colonel HENRY SMITH, C.I.E., I.M.S., Civil Surgeon of Amritsar.

The unrest appeared to commence in earnest when the Rowlatt Bill was being dealt with in the Viceroy's Legislative Council. The politicians so grossly misrepresented that Bill that they led the people to believe that there were almost only three functions in life—to be begotten, to be born and to die which it did not put completely under the control and supervision of the Police. This did not merely apply to the male population, the Zenanas were invaded by the same propaganda wholesale. In my opinion high prices of foodstuffs had nothing real to do with the affair. The people whom high prices of foodstuffs affect most seriously are not "politically minded." High prices were, of course, used by the politician to serve their political purpose. I doubt if even Turkish affairs influenced the city Moslem as much as on the surface it would appear. What influenced both Hindu and Moslem was more allied to a wave of Bolshevism if some of the parties were not even in the pay of the Russo-German Bolshevik organization. What facilitated the operations of the 10th of April was the fact that the present system adopted in Municipal elections necessitates that aspirants for seats in the Municipal Council shall canvas for votes. Formerly the "classes" and the "masses" were not in intimate touch with each other. The present system implies organization. The organization has no scruples about employing the headmen of the hooligans of which there are many for purposes of intimidation. Hence for April the 10th there was experience of organizing the poorer elements of the city and the hooligans, so that it was a comparatively easy matter with the funds at the disposal of the politicians to organize revolutionary mobs. If the Indian gentlemen, who give evidence be examined on this issue, I have no doubt they will support my views.

2. I observed the development of the change in the temper of the people from being reasonable to being revolutionary. After the *hartal* on the 6th of April their mental attitude was to be able only to see different shades of red, so to speak. This does not apply to all. There are many men in Amritsar who disapproved of the whole propaganda, but who I am convinced, were so terrorised that they were afraid to be seen visiting an officer's bungalow. Those who command the chiefs of the hooligans of Amritsar—this requires money—can terrorize almost any resident.

3. The *hartals* here on the 30th March and on the 6th

took over the command from me. Just before midnight, the relieving forces that arrived entered the city, and brought back the refugees from the Kotwali. The situation was now quiet. During the early morning of the 11th various leading men of the various denominations in the city called upon the Officer Commanding, Amritsar, to obtain concession for the purpose of making arrangements to bury their dead.

This was granted and the burials took place.

On the night of the 11th Brigadier-General Dyer, with the Brigade-Major, arrived at Amritsar, and took over command of the Forces. After an interview he decided to enter the city and to ascertain for himself the exact condition. He found all quiet at the Kotwali and that the fires at the National Bank and the Town Hall were still burning. Brigadier-General Dyer cross-questioned the Police and brought several of them back to his Headquarters.

On the afternoon of the 10th, the Somerset Light Infantry and Ammunition Column fired 73 (seventy-three) rounds, casualties reported were 8 or 9 dead, wounded unknown.

of April were a masterpiece of organization. I observed that the Hindus and Moslems on the 8th and 9th of April were drinking out of the same cup, and that the Moslem reciprocated by having the Hindu *tikka* painted on his forehead—Hindu-Moslem unity. I told an important official on the 9th of April that in my opinion these *hartals* had nothing to do with religion, but that they were designed and organised by Mr. Gandhi or by a revolutionary organization behind him for the purpose of developing a little discipline and a revolutionary spirit, and that I had no doubt from the great success of the *hartal* on 6th April 1919, that they intended to have another *hartal* at no distant date on which the red flag would be heaved up everywhere at the same time, but that the saving of the situation would be in the fact that they had developed the revolutionary spirit to such an extent that it was certain to get out of hand somewhere at any moment in which case the whole organization would go astray if dealt with with promptness and firmness, and that once it went out of hand I was confident that reasoning with these people would be of no avail—that prompt force would be necessary.

4. As to the affairs of 10th April 1919, they indicated a detailed organization of people who had "wind in the head." The details were local, but the affairs elsewhere in the Punjab and in the Bombay Presidency taken together with the *hartal* indicated a Central organization. I expressed at the above-mentioned interview that apart from the *Arya Samaj* element in the villages that the village communities were not in the movement and that it was essentially *Arya Samaj* and Municipal Moslem. When law and order was thought to be "out of time" the zamindar was, as he would be, at all times ready to go looting and from such information as I possess if Martial Law had not been proclaimed and force used at Amritsar on the 13th April 1919, Amritsar City would have been looted by the martial Sikh villagers next day and would probably have caused a much heavier mortality than Martial Law did.

That the Sikh villagers did not act earlier I explain by the fact that in my opinion the city people did not take them into their confidence and that they were then not in the organization, as the city people were afraid of them that they would at once go looting and display all the vices associated with looting under such circumstances.

I was present at Amritsar throughout this period and can give details if required.

Mr. F. H. BURTON.

Mr. F. H. BURTON, Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar.

I was Deputy Commissioner of the Amritsar District from October 1917 to 19th February 1919, and have knowledge of the political and other matters which affected the public mind during that period.

1. *Political*.—A District Congress Committee was formed in October 1917 in connection with the reform scheme; delegates were sent to the Provincial Conference, Lahore, in the same month and in July 1918 the Provincial Conference was held at Amritsar, Lala Duni Chand of Lahore being President. In December 1918 some 50 delegates were selected to attend the Congress meeting at Delhi, and some 100 persons of different classes proceeded from Amritsar for that purpose. At Delhi the Congress was invited to hold its next meeting at Amritsar and a reception committee was formed at Amritsar in January 1919.

On the 31st January 1919, a meeting of some 1,500 Muhammadans was held at the Bande Mataram Hall to protest against the handing over of Constantinople to Christian States. Resolutions dealing with the annexation of the Holy Places and the appointment of Khalifa were passed and copies sent to Government.

On the 5th February 1919, a meeting of some 2,000 citizens of Amritsar was held in the Bande Mataram Hall under the auspices of the District Congress Committee to protest against the Rowlatt Bill.

On the 9th February another meeting on the same subject and under the auspices of the District Congress Committee was held in the Bande Mataram Hall at which Dr. Gokal Chand Naurang and Mr. Nanak Chand, Barrister, both of Lahore, delivered lectures on the Rowlatt Bill. One speaker gave as a reason for the Bill that it was intended to bar soldiers from getting free rations and clothing, etc., as on active service when they returned from field service. Copies of the resolutions were forwarded to the authorities and to the Press.

2. *Economic*.—Towards the end of 1918, prices had risen very high, and as there was a great deal of wheat being kept back from the market in *kothas* in the city, a certain amount was compulsorily acquired by Government with a view to bringing down prices. Some of this wheat was made over to the Municipal Committee for sale in their cheap-grain shops and the rest was sent to Mesopotamia for the troops. These wheat seizures were not popular with the merchants who owned the stocks. In January and February 1919, the price of wheat was less than 6 seers the rupee compared with 10 seers in October 1917. Prices of other grains were proportionately high and price of cloth enormous. The poorer classes felt high prices severely although during March 1919 the price of wheat fell 16 per cent. The piece-goods merchants, iron-mongers and others had in many cases made fortunes out of the war, but were disappointed at finding the restrictions on railway goods traffic continuing after the armistice. The hide merchants had been rather badly hit by the prohibition on exports of skins.

3. *Special local matters*.—(a) Some 26 lakhs were contributed to the 2nd War Loan and the district supplied some 10,000 recruits to the army during the period. The city contributed some 15 lakhs which was poor in view of the wealth of its citizens. As regards recruits, only 51 came forward from the city during the 6 months of 1918, for which we have statistics. There were no complaints from the people of Amritsar City in connection with either of these matters.

(b) In January 1919, the Municipal elections were held. The introduction of the ward system and the allotment of 3 separate seats for Sikhs rendered them of particular interest and great excitement prevailed. There were several bitter fights between opposing candidates and in a number of cases young and new candidates got in ousting old members of the city who had had seats for years. The most bitter contest, however, occurred in one of the Sikh wards. Before the elections complaints were made that some of the candidates were using bands of hooligans to intimidate voters, and I had to ask the Superintendent of Police to take some action against these bands. A

number of the Hindu candidates standing for different wards belonged to one party which came out very successfully at the elections.

(c) About the end of 1918 the Railway Department restricted the issue of platform tickets for mail trains on account of the overcrowding of the station which is very small one for a large place like Amritsar. The feeling about this appears to have been very great, but was not brought into prominence until February 1919 when two public meetings were held at which there was some strong speaking. On 12th February Dr. Satyapal sent a letter to the Railway threatening agitation "the like of which you have never witnessed" unless the restrictions were removed: a copy of this was sent to the Deputy Commissioner under a covering letter of 13th February and on the 15th *idem* a copy of a telegram to the Lieutenant Governor. The Deputy Commissioner addressed the Railway authorities on 21st February and on 4th March received a reply that the question had been settled to the satisfaction of the Amritsar public.

4. *Political agitators*, (1) Dr. Saif-ud-din Kitchlew was an extremist and home-ruler of pronounced anti-Government views. During 1918 he had not much following. I worked as head of the volunteers to stir up the public connection with the Provincial Conference of July 19 and later on his activities were such that in September 1918 he was given a warning by the Local Government. There were complaints about Kitchlew's activities at the time and in August 1918 a shawl merchant complained me that his son, a boy, was being led astray by Kitchlew; he wanted his son interned or kept in custody as he was afraid he might commit a crime. Kitchlew appears to have gained considerable popularity during the election and was returned ousting one of the old members. I attended the Muhammadan meeting of 31st January, but his speech on that occasion was unobjectionable: he also attended the meeting on 5th February. He presided at the meeting of 9th February when he made a political speech and attended the meetings called in connection with the platform tickets agitation. In February 1919 appears to have started the idea of a National Library to coach the masses in politics.

(2) Dr. Satyapal, a member of the Congress party, did not come into prominence until February 1919 up to which time he appears to have been moderate. He was present at the Congress meeting of 6th February and was president of the railway grievance committee which was prepared to carry on violent agitation to gain the object.

(3) Rattan Chand or Ratto now in jail was a member of the defunct Shining Club—a seditious club existing in 1907 which had connection with the notorious political agitator Ajit Singh. He took a leading part in organizing volunteers and inducing the people to join in the Provincial Conference of July 1918. He visited Delhi in connection with the Congress meeting in December 1918.

(4) P. Kotu Mal, who was convicted in the disturbances, was a prominent member of the Congress party. At the meeting of the 9th February to protest against the Rowlatt Bill he gave as a reason for the Bill that it was intended to bar soldiers from getting free rations and clothing after return from field service.

Brief note as to the methods employed to raise—

(1) Recruits,
(2) War Loan,
in Amritsar district during the Great War.

I.—Recruits.

Amritsar District is a central Manjha portion of the Province, is well known for supplying recruits to the Indian Army. There has been a District Recruiting office at Amritsar since 1893.

In war time the progress in recruitment has been marked. The district has supplied about twenty

Continued.]

Mr. F. H. BURTON.

thousand recruits in war time. Statement A* attached herewith will show certain details of recruitment.

Recruiting is in military hands and the Deputy Commissioner and the Civil Authorities render necessary help to the Army Department.

The recruitment in this district has always been voluntary and systematic, and the rural classes take it up as their ordinary profession, and thus there is no occasion to use pressure, nor has compulsion ever been used by Civil or Military Authorities in this district.

In order to give healthy stimulus to recruiting the Deputy Commissioner appointed Recruiting Committees for each tahsil and under the Tahsil Committee there were appointed Sub-Committees for each zail, who were to help in recruitment. There were 16 Zail Sub-Committees in Tarn Taran tahsil, 15 in Amritsar tahsil, 12 in Ajnala tahsil.

The Tahsil Committee were to meet twice a month and to send its report to the Deputy Commissioner once a week as to progress of recruiting and any suggestion of improvement.

The members were mostly non-officials and rendered help to the local recruiting officers.

The Tahsil Committees were appointed in February 1918 and later on the Deputy Commissioner appointed a district recruiting committee in March 1918 in order to co-ordinate the work of Sub-Committees and generally to supervise and advise in recruiting. The District Executive Recruiting Committee consisted of some officials, but mostly of non-officials. The Deputy Commissioner was its President and Lala Ganga Ram Wadhwa was its Secretary. Members were added from time to time. The District Committee was to meet at least every month. The recruitment was encouraged and monthly lists were called regularly.

In May 1918 it was thought proper to push on recruiting by means of lecturing propaganda. There were 16 meetings held at different centres of the district in this connection and were well attended by all classes. The recruiting quota for each tahsil and zail were fixed up. These meetings were held in May and June 1918.

Fourteen thousand recruits were required from the district for the whole year from April 1918 to April 1919. The rough proportion for each tahsil was as below :—

(1) Amritsar tahsil, excluding Amritsar City	5,400
(2) Tarn Taran tahsil	5,300
(3) Ajnala tahsil	5,300
TOTAL	14,000

Thus Amritsar city was rigidly excluded from calculation as there was no chance of *bona fide* recruits coming forward from the city proper.

The recruitment from April 1918 to November 1918 was 5,126 of which 4,094 were combatants and 1,032 were non-combatants.

Very few recruits came forward from the city proper. In six months from January to June 1918 there was 51 recruits, of which combatants were 35 and the rest were non-combatants.

The fact that the system of recruitment was voluntary in this district is further illustrated by the following procedure adopted by the Recruiting Office at Amritsar :—

- (1) There was special recruiting staff consisting of 12 Army pensioners who brought in recruits.
- (2) Special recruiters consisting of leading gentlemen of the city and of district who sent recruits to be enrolled.
- (3) Recruiting parties from regiments sent out the recruits only for their own regiments.

A number of recruits came alone to be enrolled. The recruits were got mostly from the villages and terms of service were stated to them by the recruiters. All the recruits were brought before the District Recruiting Officer who made sure that they were willing to serve

* Not reproduced.

before they were sworn in. There was a war bonus of Rs. 50 paid to each combatant recruit.

As regards Amritsar City proper the regiments did not desire city men I am told. They preferred zamindar classes as a rule. There was no case of forcible enlistment in Amritsar Recruiting office. On the other hand, a notice was widely circulated in Urdu and Gurmukhi that recruitment was to be voluntary. A copy* of such notice received in War League Office is attached herewith. Both Civil and Military Officers were very particular about this point.

It may be added that there were branch depôts for recruiting at (1) Tarn Taran, (2) Ajnala, (3) Jandiala for various units. They were serving as feeders to the main office at Amritsar. The enrolment was done in Amritsar Recruiting office and all recruits were to fill up the forms at Amritsar office. There was thus no chance of instances of compulsion being undetected.

II.

As regards War Loan in this district, there was :—
First War Loan, and
Second War Loan.

The figures for the first War Loan were over 15 lakhs, while in the second War Loan we had about 26 lakhs.

The method of raising War Loan was a voluntary system of offers by those who could invest in such a safe and profitable security. Fifteen lakhs for a rich and trading place like Amritsar City and district was below the mark and thus in the second War Loan a scheme was formulated to organize sub-committees working in each sub-division of the city.

The district recruiting committee was constituted War Loan Committee also and was called District War League in June 1918.

The Deputy Commissioner was the President and Lala Ganga Ram Wadhwa was the Honorary Secretary. There were 31 members of the league and greater majority was of non-officials. The Tahsildars were asked to add some leading sahukars to the Tahsil Committees for War Loan purposes.

People were persuaded and especially sahukars to invest in the War Loan. Care was taken that no compulsion was to be used. The zamindars were not asked about War Loan, as their business was recruiting primarily. The sahukars and trading classes and only those who could afford to invest were approached.

There were ten sub-committees for Amritsar City and three for the tahsils for War Loan purposes. Lists of promises and realization were opened by each sub-committee and reports sent to District War League who supervised the details and provided necessary stimulus by the holding of meetings and distribution of posters and literature.

A number of meetings were held in the city and in the tahsils and other centres for War Loan purposes. The popularity of the War Loan in this district could be judged from the following few facts :—

- (1) There were about one thousand investors in 2nd War Loan in War Bonds, of whom 25 were for Rs. 20,000 or more.
- (2) The Ladies Department alone provided about half a lakh within a short period of a day or two.
- (3) The officials and non-officials worked in co-operation in obtaining investments.
- (4) The Postal Branch of the War Loan was equally successful.

Elections.

(a) The introduction of the ward system made the elections of particular interest. Formerly there had been no ward system in existence. The result was that there were some bitter fights between candidates and their supporters in several of the wards and several of the younger men with political tendencies got in ousting the old members who had sat in the Committee for many years, e.g., Kitchlew, Ghulam Yasin, Kesho Ram. Even in some other cases there was keen rivalry and enmity

Mr. F. H. BURTON—concluded—LALA GOPAL DAS BHANDARI—MALIK FATEH KHAN—LALA JIWAN LAL.

was created between persons who had formerly pulled on well together, e.g., Lachmi Narain with the Piece Goods Association behind him defeated Lala Ram Narain. Kitchlew and the younger men won by appealing to the religious sentiments of the Musalmans over the Turkish question and his influence which before the elections was not great enormously increased.

(b) Another matter which made the elections of particular interest was the allotment of 3 separate seats to Sikhs. There were a very large number of candidates and the excitement over the voting in one of the wards in which Sardar Harnam Singh, the so-called apostate from the Sikh Faith, stood as a candidate was great. So much so that unless Harnam Singh had withdrawn on the very morning of the voting there would almost certainly have been a row and Harnam Singh stated that if he had been elected he would have been in fear of his life.

(c) On the former committee there were two main parties, viz., the party of Jagat Ram and that of Harnam Singh. It was said that during the elections each of these parties had bands of hooligans to intimidate voters and as far as I can recollect we took action to get rid of these men either by threatening or actually taking security proceedings against them. I am not sure that we did not put some of them in the *hawalat*. I expect Kitchlew had some too. In the elections Harnam Singh's party was entirely defeated and Jagat Ram and his candidates, supported by Lala Balmokand and Lala Duni Chand, M.A., were nearly always successful.

(d) As a result of the elections a number of new members who had never before worked in the committee were elected, e.g., Kitchlew, Kesho Ram, Ghulam Yasin, Muhammad Sharif, Jagat Ram's son and Lala Bijai Sain, several of them quite young inexperienced men.

(e) As regards subsequent conditions, there was a campaign to have a non-official chairman elected and the motion was defeated by 3 or 4 votes. I think this was mainly the work of Kitchlew. Lala Gopal Das Bhandari told me that Kitchlew approached him and asked him to stand for post of President saying he would make him Raja of the city, but he refused. Apparently he afterwards

got Lala Balmokand to stand. There were some out-spoken public meetings on the subject.

Note re Agitation about Platform Tickets.

The Railway administration found it necessary to restrict the issue of platform tickets for Mail trains, the reason being that owing to the reduction of Passenger trains, Mail trains were generally over-crowded. The restriction was not applied to passenger trains.

The matter was brought to the Lieutenant-Governor's notice at an informal meeting held in the Town Hall, Amritsar, in November 1918.

Public meetings were held on 5th and 12th February at which there was some strong speaking by Satyapal and Kitchlew. On 12th February Dr. Satyapal addressed an open letter to the Station Superintendent, Amritsar, asking for the restriction to be removed owing to the inconvenience and offence it caused. This letter stated that public meetings had been held to protest strongly against the Railway administration's orders and to organize an agitation to get the order rescinded, and threatened resort to agitation "the like of which you have never witnessed." A copy of this printed letter was sent to the Deputy Commissioner by Mr. Satyapal under cover of a printed circular letter, dated 13th February 1919, and on the 15th idem copy of a telegram addressed to the Lieutenant-Governor by Dr. Satyapal, President, Railway Grievance Association, was also sent to the Deputy Commissioner.

The Deputy Commissioner addressed the Railway authorities about the matter on 21st February 1919 and received their intermediate reply on 25th February and their final reply on 4th March stating that the question had been settled to the satisfaction of the Amritsar public.

The point of this agitation is that Kitchlew and Satyapal got the credit for the removal of the restrictions. This finally consolidated their position and made the public think that agitation by public meeting was the best way of getting grievance removed.

LALA GOPAL DAS BHANDARI.

Well known as a supporter of Government. On 30th mob sat outside his house shouting "shame." Received two threatening letters, one on 10th and one before.

Took his family to Lahore and returned on 17th. Will corroborate Yusuf Shah and Ghulam Sadiq as to Kitchlew's influence. Even by 6th attitude of the city was defiant.

MALIK FATEH KHAN, Naib Tahsildar, Amritsar.

State of city from 10th to 13th. Incident with Bugga at Khair Din's mosque on 11th. Went with the troops on 13th and read out the proclamation forbidding meetings.

Names of places where proclamation forbidding meetings were announced on 13th, etc.—

- (1) Kotwali, Chauk Ghas Wala, Chauk Hall Bazar,

Chauk Khansama Wala, Hall Gate, Hathi Gate, Lohgarh Gate, Dhab Khatikan, Chauk Bhai Sant Singh, Chauk Chitta Katra, Chauk Katra Karam Singh, Chauk Nimak Mandi, Chauk Kila Bhangian, Chauk Bagh Jhanda Singh, Majith Mandi, Chauk Tunda Talab, Chauk Phullan-wala, Chauk Dulo;

LALA JIWAN LAL, Inspector, Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab.

I belong to the Political Branch of the Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab. In this province the public agitation against the Rowlatt Bills started through the local newspapers and by holding protest meetings in the beginning of February 1919. In the third week of February I was ordered by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Political Branch, to report about the activities of the Amritsar public with regard to this agitation.

I went to the meeting of February 28th at Amritsar held in Bande Mataram Hall to protest against the Rowlat Bills. I took notes of the meeting and made a report.

On 9th March 1919, I was ordered to attend the meeting held in Lahore in the Bradlaugh Hall to protest against the Rowlatt Acts. In this meeting, among others Dr. Saif-ud-Din Kitchlew of Amritsar also delivered a speech. There were other Criminal Investigation Department Officers along with me taking notes in shorthand. I also helped the report.

On March 23rd, I attended another protest meeting against the Rowlatt Acts held in Bande Mataram Hall at Amritsar. Prepared report from Urdu notes, which I made at the time and then destroyed. I noticed that there was much more excitement among the masses

Continued.]

LALA JIWAN LAL.

after the dispersal of this meeting than it was after the meeting of the 28th February held in the same hall. The result of the speeches was that some of the audience actually abused and cursed the Government, also passed remarks that the Government was simply robbing them of their wealth and every little comfort.

The second Bill was probably passed on 18th of March in the Imperial Legislative Council and on the 26th March Mr. Gandhi's messages of the 23rd March advocating fasting and suspension of business on the 30th of March. I attended this meeting with Asghar Ali, Short-hand Reporter. I took brief notes and Asghar Ali took notes in shorthand and prepared the report under my supervision.

On 30th March there was a complete *hartal* in Amritsar and a protest meeting was held in the evening at the Jallianwala Bagh. The meeting was a very enthusiastic one. Asghar Ali, shorthand writer, prepared the report of this meeting too under my supervision and I also took brief notes. These two meetings of the 29th and 30th March excited the feelings of the Public very much and their behaviour at the meetings and after their dispersals, showed that they were all full of hatred and contempt towards the Government.

The day of national humiliation was observed at Amritsar on the 30th March but its postponement to 6th April was also published the same day.

At Lahore a meeting was arranged on the 6th April and I was ordered by my Deputy Superintendent to report the proceedings of the meeting and also to report about the behaviour of the people in the city in connection with the observation of the day of national humiliation. There was a complete *hartal* in the city and there was only one shop (Delhi House) in Anarkali which was not closed and sold things. Different mobs were seen parading through the city, shouting *Gandhi ki jai*, *Shahidan Delhi ki jai*, *Duni Chand ki jai*, *Satya Pul ki jai*, etc., etc. The mob forced the passers-by to take off their caps and head dresses. Also I noticed that a motor carrying certain friends of the Hon'ble Rai Bahadur Ram Saran Dass was stopped by a mob on the Mall Road. At about 9 A.M. I saw thousands of men collected in front of the Islamia School inside Sheranwala Gate forcing the school authorities to close the school and did not disperse until the school was actually closed. At about 10-20 A.M. I saw huge disorderly crowds emerging from Mochi, Shahalmi, Lohari Gates, with a view to go to the Mall road. I reported all about these demonstrations, etc., to my Deputy Superintendent orally. At about 2 P.M. I went to the Bradlaugh Hall and found it totally packed. The proceedings started before time. Owing to a very heavy rush of people meetings were also held outside the hall. I took notes inside the Bradlaugh Hall. After the proceedings had started Messrs. Bowring and Beaver, Superintendents and Mr. Askwith, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, came to the Bradlaugh Hall. They were all in uniform and as soon as the officers entered the hall rose at them, shouted and hissed. They were taken into the hall but not given chairs to sit. Afterwards they were seated in the balcony. Cries of shame were also shouted by the audience. I and Asghar Ali took notes of the proceedings and prepared a report. After the meeting was over there was a minor hostile demonstration outside the hall when the officers left it. Hindus and Muhammadans took water in the same glasses outside the hall.

After this meeting ended a large crowd marched through the city in form of procession and disorderly scenes took place, such as burning of the Rowlett Bill copies and cursing the Municipal Commissioners, etc.

On 9th April I went to Amritsar, saw the *Ram Naumi* procession and submitted a report about it.

On 10th April while I was at Amritsar at about 11-30 A.M. the news of Kitchlew and Satyapal's deportation were received in the city and spread like wildfire. All the shops were closed in no time. I was in the Hall Bazaar at about 12 noon where a large mob collected and moved towards the civil station. The mob went over the foot bridge and the road bridge to cross the

railway lines. The appearance of the crowd was extremely hostile. People were saying "They have taken away our leaders." "Where is the Deputy Commissioner?" "We will tear him to pieces." I understood that the common object of the mob was to secure the immediate release of Kitchlew and Satyapal and to kill the Deputy Commissioner if they could not succeed. A Military picquet (mounted) which was posted on the road bridge stopped this furious mob from crossing the railway lines and entering the civil station. At this the crowd picked up stones from the road and railway lines and pelted the picquet very heavily with the result that the mounted picquet had to retreat. At that time I was at the tail of the mob watching these disorderly events. Soon after I heard firing and I ran to the telegraph office where I telephoned to Lahore that situation at Amritsar was very unhealthy. Crowd then came with *dandas*, etc., and smashed the Telegraph office. I went home as it was not safe to move among most disorderly mobs full of murderous elements. At the telegraph office I heard the rioters shouting, "They have killed our brothers and we will kill them." "Come on let us wreck their offices and bank." As about 5 P.M. I came out of the house and saw that British Church, Mission Room, National Bank of India, the Municipal Hall, Hall Gate Clock and the Post Office near the Municipal office were in flames. Chartered Bank was also smashed. Also heard that Europeans were murdered. People were openly abusing the Government and the Europeans. Municipal pipes, telephone wires, electric wires were also smashed. I saw the National Bank godown looting. Saw Hindu and Muhammadan corpses about 8 or 9 in number in Khair Din's mosque in the Hall Gate Bazar where a Sikh and a Muhammadan openly preached murder of Europeans and told the people that the British Raj had almost ended. From their appearance they did not look to be responsible people but were rowdies. Rioters were seen patrolling the city with *lathis* in hands. There was complete lawlessness in the city. I came out of the city and saw picquets of British soldiers and Gurkhas outside the city near the railway station. There I was met by my Deputy Superintendent Khan Sahib Abdul Aziz Khan who had come from Lahore on a motor. He heard from me the news of this outbreak and I returned to Lahore along with him in motor the same evening.

Next morning while going to the office at Lahore, I saw that all the shops were closed and *chhabils* were noticed in different bazars where Hindus and Muhammadans were served water in the same glasses. In office I was ordered to attend the Badshahi Mosque meeting. At about 1 P.M. I arrived at the Badshahi Mosque. There were many Hindus and Mussalmans. Inside the door there was a piece of draped cloth with a motto in Persian meaning "The King who practises tyranny cuts his own root underneath." At about 1-30 P.M. I saw Ram Bhaj Dutt, Mohsin Shah, Taj Din and Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din together in the mosque. There were then Muslim prayers. At 2 P.M. Shuja-ud-Din made a speech from the pulpit. He said that the Deputy Commissioner had desired speeches to be made to dissuade people from the *hartal*, but that he told the Deputy Commissioner that neither police nor military should come. Then Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din read out Gandhi's message from a newspaper. Ram Bhaj Dutt then spoke from the pulpit. He said that he himself had been present at the disturbance on the 10th and that the police had fired at the crowd after they had actually retreated and he characterised this action as perverse and tyrannical and said that the King should depend not on arms but on management. He said that Germany had fallen through internal revolution. Then he referred again to the 10th and said that the people only retired when they were fired upon. This was cowardly and what they should have done was to stand and die. People in the mosque put questions written on paper pieces to Ram Bhaj Dutt. Then he said he was tired of speaking. Mohsin Shah then got on the pulpit to read the *chits* but could not make himself heard and got down. Khalifa Shuja-ud-

LALA JIWAN LAL—concluded—Mr. C. G. FARQUHAR.

Din then read out the *chits*. The questions were, shall we open the shops or not? Shall we go to the office or not? And should we follow the instructions of Gandhi that orders contrary to conscience should be disobeyed? Ram Bhaj Dutt said that he alone could not answer these questions and that a committee should be formed for the purpose of preparing answers. He said that every one would have to abide by the decision of the committee even if it involved death for them. An aeroplane then passed over the mosque; Ram Bhaj Dutt then pointed and said "How could we fight this? God will have to decide." He said that for five days no one should go to the Mall Road, and that no students should attend the schools or colleges. He advised them to tell their parents that he (Ram Bhaj Dutt) had given them this order.

Then Allah Din, speaking from the pulpit, approved what had been done in the city, except that no single leader had been appointed. Therefore he advised the appointment of a dictator. He said that we should strive to recover the corpses of the dead. While he was speaking Balwant Singh, a Khalasi of the Railway Volunteers Corps, came in shouting about the mutiny, and saying that he had killed a number of soldiers. People shouted "we are delighted" and said "now our own armies are coming." I then went and telephoned to the Deputy Inspector-General and returned about 15 minutes after. When I returned Mota Singh of Patiala was speaking from the pulpit. Before Allah Din had had finished speaking Harkishen Lal, Dharam Das Suri, Duni Chand and Peyari Mohan Dattatriya arrived at the scene. It was after 4 P.M. They were greeted with the same shouts of *Gandhi ki jai*, etc. Mota Singh said that the people ought to have stood the shots for the sake of the country instead of running away. He said he did not believe in the Bible saying about turning the other cheek, also said that to bear tyranny was to encourage it. Duni Chand then got on the pulpit and called

upon the people to elect the committee which Ram Bhaj Dutt had proposed. The people began to shout out names of Harkishen Lal, Ram Bhaj Dutt, Duni Chand, Dharam Das Suri, Doctor Gopi Chand, Sardar Habibullah, Bar-at-Law, Moshin Shah, Pleader, Doctor Nihal Chand and Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din. The election of members of the committee was done by one man proposing a name, which was acclaimed by the audience. Then another name was proposed and acclaimed and so on. Duni Chand said that the *hartal* made it necessary to arrange for food and drink for the poor people. He also said that if those of the members who were then elected refused to serve, their names should be struck off and the committee should have power to elect new members. Harkishen Lal then announced a subscription of Rs. 10,000 towards the Committee for the *Langar Khanas*. By that time it was evening prayer time and the mob left the mosque, after arranging that there should be another meeting in the mosque at 8 A.M. next morning and that the *hartal* should continue the following day. Duni Chand announced it. There were the usual shouts "*Delhi ke Shahidon ki jai*," "*Amritsar ke Shahidon ki jai*," etc. The procession in which men armed with *lathis* and *dandas* were leading passed through the Hira Mandi to the Gumti Bazar. On the way pictures of Their Majesties the King and Queen on the house of Raghu Nath Sahai were destroyed by the mob. The mob then pulled down, kicked and defaced a sign board of one Fakir Chand, contractor, bearing pictures of Their Majesties the King and the Queen. There were then shouts "*Hai hai George Mar Gaya*." I gave my account orally to Deputy Superintendent of Police, Political, the same evening. I took no written notes at the meeting as it was not safe to do so.

I investigated the *Danda Fauj* case in which *Danda Fauj* was formed by one Chanan Din which went about the city on the 11th and 12th April carrying sticks and delivering most seditious speeches.

Mr. C. G. FARQUHAR, Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Central Range, Amritsar.

I was transferred from the Ambala Range and took over charge of the Lahore Range on the morning of the 2nd June. On the 6th June, as directed by the Inspector-General of Police, I proceeded to Amritsar, and there held a departmental enquiry into the conduct of the Police located within the city of Amritsar on the 10th of April.

On the conclusion of my enquiry I submitted a report, which is appended. From this report will be learnt the names of the witnesses I examined and the conclusions I arrived at. The main conclusion arrived at was that had the Police in the Police Kotwali made any demonstration, such as their strength and the state of affairs as disclosed by the evidence warranted being made, it is probable that there would have been but few or no outrages, but in the absence of any sort of action of the Police, the mob was permitted to do as it pleased.

Report on Police work and arrangements at Amritsar on 10th April 1919.

Below are the statements of certain persons whom I interviewed and of Police Officers whose statements I took during my stay at Amritsar from 6th to 11th June:—

Briefly these statements amount to the following:—

- (1) On receipt of orders that Kitchlew and Satyapal were to be arrested and deported, a meeting was held on the evening of the 9th April in the Deputy Commissioner's house, Amritsar, at which the Deputy Commissioner, Police Officers and Military Officers were present. It was decided at this meeting that the Police and Military should hold the perimeter of the

Railway Line from the Railway Station to the Police Lines. The Police were to hold the Police Lines, Railway Level Crossing and the Military were to hold all the other points.

- (2) The Kotwali was to be the rendezvous of 3 Police reserves of full strength.
- (3) Mr. Rehill was to escort Kitchlew and Satyapal by motor car to the destination appointed by the Punjab Government. This decision to send Mr. Rehill, was arrived at after consultation at the meeting and the order was given to Mr. Rehill by Deputy Commissioner after mature consideration and in face of the order by Inspector-General of Police that Mr. Rehill was not to leave his headquarters.

In pursuance of the above decision orders were issued to Inspector Marshall to hold the Police Lines, Railway Level Crossing with a Police reserve. Three reserves were concentrated at the Kotwali and Khan Sahib Ahmad Jan, Deputy Superintendent, was told off to be in charge and one extra reserve was to be sent to reinforce the Lines.

The above comprise the entire orders issued to the Police except that on the departure of Mr. Rehill, Mr. Plomer, Deputy Superintendent of Police, was to be in charge.

The dispositions of the Police were so far as they went sufficient, but the absence of any further orders was a grave error.

On the 6th April when a general *hartal* took place a European Officer was present all the time in the Kotwali. On the present occasion only an elderly Indian Officer was in charge. This officer, for some reason which is unexplained, received no orders of any sort direct. He

Mr. C. G. FARQUHAR—continued—Khan Bahadur FAZAL DAD KHAN.

states that he went that morning to office quite unaware of what was going on or what arrangements were *en train* and only went to the City at the request of the City Inspector to whom all such orders as affected the City had been communicated by Mr. Plomer instead of to Khan Sahib Ahmad Jan. This was entirely wrong as it resulted in Khan Sahib Ahmad Jan receiving orders second hand through his subordinate with whom I gather he is not on the best of terms.

For the regulation of Police action in the event of a riot in Amritsar there are standing orders in detail in the Kotwali. Altogether, there were in Kotwali on the morning of the 10th April 100 armed men with a full complement of officers. There were also roughly 100 constables and 16 head constables in the various divisions in the City. These men were not called into the Kotwali and were made use of in no way throughout the day.

I will now consider the action taken by the Police concentrated at the Kotwali.

It is in evidence that a clerk of the National Bank told the Police at the Kotwali that the Bank was being attacked and asking for help. No help was sent.

It is in evidence that appeals for help were made by the Clerks of the Chartered Bank to the Police and that these appeals were only complied with after considerable delay. A body of Police headed by Khan Sahib Ahmad Jan went to the Bank and were miraculously in time to save the lives of Messrs. Thompson and Ross.

It is also in evidence that when the Town Hall was burning the Kotwali Police lined up and threatened to fire but did not. This constituted the total action taken by the Kotwali Police until late in the evening when there was nothing to be gained by taking action.

There are various reasons for this inaction in my opinion as follows:—

- (1) Want of any sort of co-operation between Khan Sahib Ahmad Jan, Deputy Superintendent and Muhammad Ashraf Khan, City Inspector, the latter of whom seems to have refused to take orders from the former at the same time doing nothing himself. Ashraf Khan (so Khan Sahib Ahmad Jan states) said he had received orders not to leave the Kotwali. I do not believe this for one moment.
- (2) Fear. The crowd were large and there was no determined officer in charge. The responsibility for firing on the crowd was too great for the officers in command at the Kotwali.
- (3) Want of definite orders as to the action that was to be taken in certain circumstances. Definite orders should have been given to the City Police to bring in Europeans if matters grew serious. Directly the mob was fired on matters were serious and action to safeguard Europeans should have been taken.
- (4) The detective force was an unmitigated failure. The members are too well known and moved in fear of their lives. Apparently they do not use disguises.

There is no secret service fund in Amritsar and therefore there were no useful spies from whom information could be obtained.

As regards the Defence Scheme, I find that it had not been worked out. Mr. Burton, Deputy Commissioner, notes that it is the business of the Military. I disagree entirely. It is the business of the Police primarily to make their own scheme and work it in co-operation with the Military. The Military make their own scheme.

Khan Bahadur FAZAL DAD KHAN, Risaldar, Major, Indian Army.

On the 10th April 1919, I was sitting in my tent in the horse market. My tent was on the road. A few boys and young men came bare-headed and told the shop-keepers, who were selling fodder and eatables, that

This absence of any well defined defence scheme would not have mattered much in this case had responsible officers realized the situation. Whether it was possible to do so or not or whether the violent outbreak was impossible to foresee is difficult to say. It is, of course, very easy to see it after the event but the power shown by Kitchlew and Satyapal in being able to call a *hartal* in spite of the endeavours of the nominal leaders of the people should have given an inkling to the probabilities of a row when the people learned that these two persons had been arrested and to the possibility that the action of the mob might be directed against Europeans. This was recognised to some extent for Colonel Smith, Civil Surgeon, was told off to collect women and children from the Zenana Hospital and the Normal Girls' School. He was able to get to the former but not to the latter and the ladies at the latter were miraculously saved and eventually rescued by Inspector Marshall with only 12 men.

While arranging to safeguard people in Civil Lines, I regret to think that Europeans in the City seem to have been entirely forgotten except so far as it was arranged that Colonel Smith should collect them. This he tried to do very late in the day, far later than was advisable, when the ladies had been in danger some time and when he himself was running grave risk.

In addition to the persons whose statements are attached I had conversation with the Revd. Mr. Mackenzie, C.M.S., Colonel Smith and Mr. Miles Irving, but they had nothing to tell me that threw any light on action by the Police.

I may add that the action of Mr. Plomer, in bringing up a Police reserve when the Mounted Military picket was being driven back was of very great value.

Mr. Mackenzie told me of the brave action of a Police constable who saved his servant, and I am certain that properly led in the City the Amritsar Police would have behaved splendidly.

C. FARQUHAR,

Deputy Inspector-General of Police,
Central Range.

The 13th June 1919.

In continuation of my report, dated 13th June 1919, in my enquiry into the conduct of the Amritsar Kotwali Police on the occasion of the outbreak on the 10th April, I write to say that I have just received the papers of the enquiry held by Mr. Watson, Additional Superintendent of Police, Amritsar, under your verbal orders of 13th May. There is nothing whatever in these papers which, I think, need be quoted in addition to what I have already given in my report referred to above.

The most prominent feature in the enquiry held by Mr. Watson is the very obvious endeavour on the part of all the Police Officers examined, of and above the rank of Sub-Inspector, to magnify the part played by himself and to minimise the part played by others. Finally there is nothing in Mr. Watson's report which leads me to change, in any way, the opinion expressed in my report that the Senior Police Officers, Khan Sahib Ahmad Jan, Deputy Superintendent, and Muhammad Ashraf Khan had lamentably failed in their duty.

In face of this unqualified condemnation I would recommend that both these officers be suspended from duty pending a final departmental enquiry into their conduct.

C. FARQUHAR,

Deputy Inspector-General of Police,
Central Range.

The 16th June 1919.

Dr. Satyapal and Kitchlew had been deported by Government, and that Hindus and Muhammadans should at once close their shops, and if any person failed to close, his shop would be looted. The shops were accordingly

Khan Bahadur FAZAL DAD KHAN—continued—MUHAMMAD ASHRAF KHAN.

closed. After 12 noon, the noise of a large crowd was heard from the side of the Hathi Gate. I got nearer and saw about twenty thousand people, who were armed with clubs, going towards the Telegraph Office. I came back to the tent. After 1 p.m. there was a violent outbreak of smoke in the Amritsar City, and it was inferred that a fire had broken out somewhere. A little later smoke burst out from another place and again it was inferred that fire had broken out at another place. A number of merchants and zamindars who had brought horses and ponies for sale enquired of me what to do, seeing that there was such a disturbance in the city. Those of them who had an animal or two with them at once left for their homes. All mule dealers took their mules to their homes, to the salt market and Sir Siri Jagat Singh. Within an hour, no one was left in the horse market, except big horse-dealers and those who had come to purchase horses for the Army. A short time afterwards I heard the news that a European, who was going to the Fort from the goods-shed, had been killed by some persons from amongst the mob, who were armed with clubs. On that day a storm blew at intervals. At 2 p.m. a motor passed on its way to the Telegraph Office. It contained a few armed European soldiers. After that a party of about twenty armed European soldiers passed. They also went towards the Telegraph Office. Thereafter, the sound of a volley fire was heard. Probably twenty shots must have been fired. Whoever came into the horse-market from the Amritsar City, came panic-stricken thinking that the mob would soon come into the market and loot the people. All the Indian officers consulted me as to what they should do. I reassured them and told them to take heart. I also told them that if we left the market, the mob was sure to loot the horse-dealers, and that we should see to it that the horse-dealers were not looted. Various groups of people were roaming about the goods-shed. No Civil or Military officers came towards us, nor could we go towards them. We were thus unable to offer our services. At about 6 p.m. an escort came, and after

placing in a car the corpse of the European who had been killed when going from the goods-shed, took the corpse to the fort. All the European boys, girls and women in the civil lines began to go into the fort in motors, tongas and carriages. They were accompanied by two or three officers on horseback. As no civil or military officer came into the market, I went at about sunset to the gate of the fort in company with Risaldar Muhammad Khan of the 18th and Risaldar Karim Nawaz Khan of the 15th Lancers in the hope that some civil or military British officer will meet us and we shall tell him that in the horse-market there were a number of Indian officers and sowars of various cavalry regiments, and that if we were given horses and arms, we should do patrol and picket work wherever necessary, or we should be given guns and cartridges to enable us to work as foot soldiers. At the gate of the fort there were two British officers on horseback. I saluted them. They enquired of me my name and rank. On my giving the required information they took me to the Officer Commanding the Fort and told him all about me. The Officer Commanding the Fort said that I should come into the Fort at 9 p.m., because the number of men in the fort was inadequate, and reports were coming in that the city mob, which was armed with *lathies*, might perhaps assault the fort by putting up ladders and that it was necessary to defend the fort walls. At 9 p.m. I, Honorary Captain Muhammad Ali Beg, formerly of the 9th Lancers at present of Rampur State, Risaldar Muhammad Khan of the 18th Tiwana Lancers, Risaldar Karim Niwaz Khan of the 15th Lancers, Wardi Major Abdus Samad Khan of the 25th Cavalry, Resaidar Suraj Singh of the 2nd Lancers, together, with fourteen sowars and daffadars belonging to various cavalry regiments, reported ourselves inside the fort. We were given one gun and fifty cartridges apiece and the defence of fort walls was entrusted to us. At seven o'clock in the morning, the Officer Commanding said that adequate troops had arrived from outside, and that all of us could go to the market.

MUHAMMAD ASHRAF KHAN, Inspector of Police, Amritsar City.

I was Inspector in charge of City Police, Amritsar, from 1st September 1918 to the end of July 1919. There was a certain amount of feeling in the city connected with high prices before Amritsar got affected by the agitation consequent on the passing of the Rowlatt Bill. Public meetings were organised and strong speeches made by agitators. Before this there had been some excitement over the questions of platform tickets and occupation of Muslim holy places, etc., etc. The proceedings were published with exaggeration in a local newspaper entitled the *Waqf*, Amritsar. Meanwhile Mr. Gandhi inaugurated the passive resistance movement. The original idea was that a general *hartal* should take place on the 30th March 1919, but in Amritsar the date was changed to 6th April, but in Amritsar a general and complete *hartal* took place throughout the city on both days, i.e., the 30th March and the 6th April, and on the latter date a meeting was also held at Bagh Jallianwala, but it passed off quietly.

On the 9th April 1919, there was the *Ram Naumi* procession, and there was a big manifestation of a combination between Hindus and Muslims.

On the 10th April 1919, after the deportation of Doctor Kitchlew and Doctor Satyapal there was a general agitation and *hartal* throughout the city and the people began to proceed towards the Civil Lines. This information was at once telephoned by me to Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mr. Plomer, then in charge of the Amritsar District, at about 11-30 a.m., in consequence of which a picket of the Police and the Military was posted at the Railway overbridge. The mobs were being led by Ratto and Bugga, Kitchlew's agents. While proceeding to the Civil Lines they were checked at the railway overbridge by the Military and the police who had to fire. The mob returned to the city and began

to burn Banks and other places. The Christian Religious Book Society and the Church and other public places inside the city were set on fire. The mob began to murder every British they came across. Messrs. Stewart and Scott of the National Bank, Mr. Thomson of the Alliance Bank, Mr. Rowland, Military Sergeant and Mr. Robinson, Guard, North-Western Railway, were brutally murdered, and Miss Sherwood, a Missionary lady, was assaulted, and an attempt to murder Mrs. Easdon, a lady doctor, was also made, but it failed, because Mrs. Easdon managed to conceal herself. On information about these incidents being received at the Kotwali, I immediately, under instructions of Khan Sahib Ahmad Jan, Deputy Superintendent of Police, detailed police guards to protect Chartered Bank and Alliance Bank, etc. The Chartered Bank was completely saved, and also the lives of two Europeans, Messrs. Thomson and Ross of the Bank, but unfortunately, before the arrival of the Police guard at the Alliance Bank, Mr. Thomson, Manager, was murdered, but no damage was yet done to the property, and the arrival of the police averted further damage there.

From the 10th to the 13th April the Amritsar City was in a state of chaos and a general *hartal* was observed. It was being openly said by the city mobs that there was Hindu-Muslim *raj* in the city.

On the 12th April a protest meeting was held in the Hindu Sabha School, where the question of release of deportees was freely discussed, and the audience were instructed not to open their shops unless the deportees were released.

On the 13th April, in spite of the proclamation of Martial Law, a similar disloyal meeting was held in Bagh Jallianwala and the Military had to fire.

All the shops in the city were opened on the afternoon of the 14th April.

Major E. C. BARNES—The Hon'ble KHAWAJA YUSUF SHAH—SARDAR BIKRAM SINGH—LALA TEK CHAND JAINI.

Major E. C. BARNES, I.A., Divisional Recruiting Officer, Lahore.

All Assistant and District Assistant Recruiting Officers, when enrolling recruits, have to ask personally or have asked in their presence all the questions shown on the Enrolment form. Among these is the question "Are you willing to be enrolled in _____," the blank space being intended for the insertion of the unit for which the recruit is enrolled.

I have, when visiting my district offices, continually impressed on all assistants the importance of this question. My own experience is that recruits will often say "No" to this question because they wish to join some unit in which no vacancy exist and will later on return and reply "Yes" when they find that they cannot be taken for the unit they wanted to go to. This I think shows clearly that this particular question is understood by recruits.

I have always been entirely satisfied that my assistants have made quite certain that their recruits understood the fact that service in the Indian Army was voluntary, and I never found it necessary to issue any written orders on this subject. On the receipt, however, of Commissioner, Multan Division's endorsement No. 1409, dated 23rd July 1918, copy attached, I issued the attached circulars, although there was in my opinion no necessity to issue it.

Any Recruiting Officer who worked under my orders will corroborate the statement that in this recruiting division every endeavour was made to take into the army only those recruits who would be of service in the units to which they were sent, and that never at any time were efforts made to swell figures by taking either unwilling or unfit men.

Men who were unwilling would not have been considered likely to perform efficiently the duty for which they were enrolled.

No. 07543—I (A. G.-2), dated 26th June 1918, from the Adjutant-General in India, Simla, to the Additional Secretary to Government, Punjab.

In view of the suspicion regarding forcible enlistment which appears to be prevalent in certain areas, it is

The Hon'ble KHAWAJA YUSUF SHAH, Khan Bahadur, Municipal Commissioner and Hony. Magistrate, Amritsar.

Kitchlew at the bottom of all the trouble. His agitations aimed at gradually discrediting the moderate leaders, who wanted to work with Government, by calling them traitors. This done, the people were leaderless and were worked upon by inflammatory anti-Government and anti-British speeches—Turkey, platform tickets, Rowlatt Bill.

SARDAR BIKRAM SINGH, Hony. Magistrate, Amritsar.

Mostly same as Syed Budhe Shah. A knowledgeable witness and reliable on any matter concerning the city.

Villagers joined in rising only with ideas of loot.

LALA TEK CHAND JAINI, Jandiala.

In his *ilaga* there was no actual trouble. There was a minority who were influenced by the disturbances in Amritsar and thought there was an opportunity to loot. False rumours of all sorts and feelings against Rowlatt Act were current which had unsettled men's minds. Many people thought these Acts inopportune. It is likely that if strong measures had not been taken to restore

suggested for your consideration that it might be advisable to publish in districts a notice to the effect that recruits are not to be enlisted unless they express to a recruiting officer their willingness to serve and unless they sign the Enrolment Form, and that up to the time of enrolment it is open to them to withdraw even though they may have signified to a recruiter their willingness to join.

Should your Board consider action on the above lines desirable you will no doubt arrange with the Local Government for a notice to be published in such a manner and in such districts as you consider advisable.

Endorsement by the Punjab Government, No. 2181-S. Milty., dated 6th July 1918.

Copy forwarded to all Commissioners in the Punjab with the request that action considered suitable in view of the local circumstances may be adopted.

Endorsement by the Commissioner, Multan Division, No. 1409, dated 23rd July 1919.

Copy forwarded to all Deputy Commissioners in the Multan Division, to the Divisional Recruiting Officer, Lahore, and Assistant Recruiting Officer, Multan, for information.

Undersigned believes it is generally known throughout this division that unless they express to the recruiting officer their willingness to serve they cannot be enlisted, but if there is any doubt in the question a notice to this effect should be issued.

Circular letter No. 3179, dated 29th July 1918, from the Divisional Recruiting Officer, Lahore, to all Assistant Recruiting Officers and District Assistant Recruiting Officers.

All Assistant Recruiting Officers and District Assistant Recruiting Officers are held personally responsible that only recruits who express their willingness to enlist are enrolled.

2. Notices to this effect in Urdu and Gurmukhi should be displayed to all Recruiting Offices.

Was not actually in the city between 10th and 13th, but knows that the general attitude was defiant. Thinks that the introduction of Martial Law was justified. As regards the Jallewalian Bagh episode, if Dyer had not acted then, some such drastic measure would have had to have been taken sooner or later to bring the city under control, police being powerless.

E. g., Gumtala and Mirankot were preparing to go in and loot Amritsar and were certainly stopped by news of the firing on 13th. There is no doubt that but for this firm action looting would have taken place.

order in Amritsar, the disorderly elements among the people would have been strengthened and trouble would have ensued. Martial Law was advisable, but was continued too long and some of the measures were considered too strong, and there was sometimes a lack of tact in the administration.

Mr. C. DONALD—LALA VAISHNO DAS—SARDAR SADHU SINGH—Dr. MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH FAUQ—Brigadier-General R. E. H. DYER.

Mr. C. DONALD, Director of Fisheries, Punjab, Dharmasala.

On 10th April I left Dharmasala for Lahore and stopped the night in Nurpur.

2. On 11th morning I motored down to Gurdaspur where I had breakfast and some time about midday I left for Lahore. I went in to see Mr. Darling at Gurdaspur as I passed his bungalow and for the first time heard of the disturbances from him.

3. He advised me not to motor through Amritsar as I was on my way to see a doctor and not feeling very well.

4. I came on *via* Aliwal and Wagha and stopped my car in 3 or 4 places and interrogated people about the riots in Amritsar and the cause of them. I received more or less the same statement all along the line, viz., representations of the Rowlatt Act, as apparently spread among the people. They were:—

- (1) If 2 or 3 people are seen together the police could arrest them.
- (2) Nobody could be married without the sanction of Government and on payment of a Rs. 5 fee.
- (3) Relations may not bury a corpse without reporting to the police and paying a burial fee of Rs. 5.

LALA VAISHNO DAS of Majitha.

States that during the disturbances he had to put on some 25 special chaukidars and pay them very highly. On 13th he was told that 300 zamindars were conspiring to loot Majitha and he arranged to have bodies of men on duty that night in every mohalla. At 9 o'clock that evening some men arrived in a *tum-tum* under influence

(4) Zamindars must realize that all the land belonged to Government and the crops thereon and Government could commandeer any portion or the whole of them if desired, without payment.

5. I heard additions and modifications of the above, for instance, some had the rumour *re* marriage but said nothing about the fee, but on the whole most people I spoke to had much the same version as I have given.

6. The above had incensed the people of the district more than anything else, so far as I could make out and as one man put it, the fact that these rules should come out now, when we have fought together, "was burning in his throat."

7. I reached Lahore in the evening of the 11th and on 12th I underwent an operation and was in a nursing home.

8. I think it was on the 15th or 16th I took over the Civil Supply Depot from Mr. Macfarlane and ran that for 3 or 4 days and closed down after the shops opened.

9. I returned by motor to Dharmasala on, I think, 22nd April (it was the day Sir Michael O'Dwyer went to Amritsar).

SARDAR SADHU SINGH of village Khokaran.

Will describe the excitement among villagers from the events of 10th April. The excitement spread and the people were massing for loot and talking of marching

on Lahore. The firing of 13th April ended a dangerous situation.

Dr. MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH FAUQ, Private Practitioner, Amritsar.

Can give evidence as to the hostile attitude of the crowd before they were fired on. Was at Telegraph Office when mob came.

Brigadier-General R.E. H. DYER, C.B., Commanding 45th Brigade at Amritsar.

Dated Dalhousie, the 25th August 1919. From Brigadier-General R. E. H. Dyer, C.B., Commanding 45th Brigade, to the General Staff, 16th (Indian) Division.

With reference to the Adjutant-General's No. 026375, (A. G.-10), dated the 19th July 1919, I have the honour to state that it will be necessary for me to mention certain events which occurred prior to 11th April 1919, the date on which I reached Amritsar, in order to show why I considered it *my bounden duty to disperse by rifle fire* the unlawful assembly in the Jallianwala Bagh on the 13th April 1919.

In the summer of 1918 there was some trouble in Jullundur City between sepoys and citizens. I went to the scene of the trouble and by my personal influence put matters right. A display of armed force was not necessary on this occasion. I believe that a deputation of the elders of the city expressed a wish to thank me for my prompt and firm action.

Later in 1918 the Muhammadan Sepoys of the two Police Battalions raised at Phillour, after attacking the Sikh Sepoys of those Battalions, became most insubordinate. On hearing of the trouble at Phillour, I at once proceeded there in my car. I arrived at about 2-0 A.M. and at dawn brought the offenders to a proper sense of their iniquities without using military force.

Again in March 1919 I was informed by telegram that a number of sepoys going by train from Lahore to Singapur were behaving in a most insubordinate manner and looting sweet-vendors and others as they passed through various stations. I held up the train at Jullundur and removed the offenders to barracks. No force was used and when the offenders had been restored to a proper sense of discipline, I allowed them to proceed to their destination.

I mention the above incidents merely to show that when possible I use my best endeavour to suppress riotous crowds without use of unnecessary force. At Amritsar the case was very different.

The crowd, in complete defiance of my orders, forced my hand and it was my duty to vindicate authority. The city was in a state of complete lawlessness and from a military point of view there was every reason why I should open fire.

On or about the 30th March 1919 I passed through Delhi, in a motor car, accompanied by my wife and niece on a visit to the 'Kutub.' On going through the native quarters of the city we passed through a large and unruly crowd which roared at us and two men actually climbed on to the back of my car. That night I learned the true meaning of what we had gone through.

Continued.]

Brigadier-General R. E. H. DYER.

We proceeded from Delhi to Agra and thence back through Delhi via Ludhiana and Phillour to Jullundur which we reached on the 6th April 1919. During my tour I was thoroughly impressed with the dangerous nature of the feeling of the inhabitants. On passing through Ludhiana and Phillour our car was pelted and a large fragment of wood thrown in front of the car with a view to upsetting it. Arrived at Jullundur I found that various military precautions had been taken, both in the city and in cantonments, and that a party of one Native officer and 20 rifles of the 54th Sikhs had been sent to guard the Railway Station at Amritsar. Amritsar had been warned to take all military precautions, but nothing beyond a "hartal" had yet taken place there. There had been a large meeting of natives in Jullundur City and a "hartal" had been held. All was apparently quiet on the 7th though I was on that day informed that matters were in a very bad state indeed. On the 10th a code telegram was received at about 4-0 P.M. from Lahore saying that trouble in Amritsar was expected, ordering me to move 100 Londons and 100 Muhammadans to Amritsar. Feeling that the situation was very bad, I sent 100 British and 200 Indian troops. At about 5-15 P.M. on the 10th another telegram was received from Amritsar saying that the situation was serious and that the Manager of the National Bank had been killed, that the bank was in flames and to expedite the troops. Troops left by special train at 1-0 A.M. on the 11th and arrived at Amritsar at 5-15 A.M. on that day. All communication between Amritsar and Jullundur was interrupted at 4-0 P.M. on the 10th, but at 8-0 P.M. we got a wire through to Amritsar by the Railway telegraph, in a roundabout way, telling Amritsar that troops were coming. At about 2-0 P.M. on the 11th April I received a telegram from the 16th Division (Lahore) telling me to proceed to Amritsar and take charge of the situation if the situation at Jullundur permitted it. I at once proceeded to see the Commissioner at Jullundur and came to the conclusion that the situation at Amritsar demanded my presence there. I went by car to Amritsar soon as ever I could, arriving there at 9-0 P.M. accompanied by Captain Briggs, my Brigade-Major. I found that headquarters of the Amritsar Garrison had been established at the Railway Station. Mr. Miles Irving (Deputy Commissioner) and Mr. Plomer (a Police Officer), together with various other civil officials, were also there present. I held a conference at once in a railway carriage. Mr. Miles Irving informed me that the situation was beyond civil control and gave over charge to me (*vide Appendix No. 1*). At 12-30 A.M. on the 12th I proceeded with an escort to the Kotwali in the city to bring the City Superintendent of Police, named Ashraf Khan, to the Railway Station. Ashraf Khan, I was told, could probably give me the names of various ringleaders and perhaps valuable information as to the situation.

From the evening of the 10th till this time no European from outside had entered the city, as complete lawlessness prevailed and indeed continued to prevail till the firing took place on the evening of the 13th.

Ashraf Khan at once eagerly placed all his information at my disposal.

Another conference was held in the railway carriage. It was then clear to me that things were in a very critical state. On the arrest of Kichlew and Satyapal, two leading agitators, on the 10th April, the mob had taken the law into their own hands. A crowd had tried to force their way into the civil lines and cantonments and had been prevented from doing so only by rifle fire. Various Europeans had been killed in a most dastardly manner and a British lady had been beaten with sticks and shoes and knocked down six times in the street. Telegraphic and telephonic communications had been cut and trains could no longer proceed in safety in various directions from Amritsar. The inhabitants of the surrounding villages who had been told that the British "Raj" was at

an end, were coming into Amritsar in increasing numbers with the object of swelling the ranks of the mob. A *Danda Fauj* was to be formed so numerous that with "slaps alone," it was said, they could drive the British out of the country. Arrangements had been made to arm the "*Danda Fauj*" with sticks, and large consignments of these sticks were coming to Amritsar. A comparison of the number of bundles of sticks which came to Amritsar in the early months of 1918 with those received in April 1919 is very significant (*vide Appendix IV*).*

During the night of the 11th-12th I reorganized my troops, reduced the pickets to increase my striking force, and removed headquarters to Ram Bagh. At 10-0 A.M. on the 12th a column of all available troops, 125 British, 310 Indians and 2 Armoured Cars, marched round and through the city to locations where mobs were reported by aeroplanes to be collecting. The bearing of the inhabitants was most insolent and many spat on the ground as we passed. The mob at the Sultanwind Gate, where leaders were shouting "*Hindu aur Musalman li jai*" was dispersed with difficulty, and I considered the advisability of opening fire. I came to the conclusion that a proclamation should be issued by me personally before taking such drastic measures. The column proceeded through the Sultanwind Gate to the Kotwali and plans were carried out for the arrest of various agitators. Many arrests were ably effected including that of Chowdhury Bugga and Dr. Dina Nath owing to the excellent information given by the City Inspector of Police, Mohamed Ashraf Khan. A proclamation was issued on the evening of the 12th April (*vide Appendix II*).*

Hearing that Manjha Jats had collected outside the city to plunder the city that night, I gave orders to the City Inspector of Police to patrol and give me timely information of any such movement as I feared the intentions of these Manjhas who would certainly make common cause with the city mob on being told that the British "Raj" was at an end.

At 10-0 P.M. on the 12th, a party of British troops was sent to Ashrapore Mission Hospital near Atari to rescue certain mission ladies who were calling for help. Messages from Dhariwal, Gurdaspur, Tarn Taran, Lahore and Kasur showed signs of the greatest unrest, and 25 Indian ranks from Amritsar were sent to Dhariwal and 50 Gurkhas ordered from Bakloh to Gurdaspur.

At 9-0 A.M. on the 13th I proceeded through the city with a column of troops to issue, by beat of drums, proclamation No. 2 (*vide Appendix III*). The proclamation was duly proclaimed at all important streets and corners in the city, and inhabitants were allowed to collect in large numbers specially to hear what was ordered. As my crier proclaimed that where crowds assemble they would be fired at the mob clapped their hands and laughingly proclaimed, "this is only bluff and no firing will take place." Following hotfoot on my proclamation a counter-proclamation is said to have been issued by the enemies of the Crown, declaring that the British "Raj" was at an end and not to be afraid of being fired at. At 12-40 P.M. whilst yet in the city on my way to the Ram Bagh, I was informed that in spite of my stern proclamations a big meeting would be held at the Jallianwalla Bagh at 4-30 P.M. that afternoon when messages from Dr. Kichlew would be read out.

I returned to the Ram Bagh at about 1-30 P.M. I then determined to picket the main gates of the city, as if my direct orders were to be disobeyed, I recognized that matters must be critical and that all law, both civil and military, was set at defiance. At 4-0 P.M. I received a message from Mr. Rehill, the Superintendent of Police, Amritsar district, to say that a crowd of about 1,000 had already assembled and that more were coming. I also received a message from Mr. Lewis, Manager, Crown Cinema, who had been through the city disguised, confirming this. Shortly after 4-0 P.M. I matured my

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[Continued.]

plans and leaving a reserve for emergencies I marched with the picketting parties and a special party consisting of 25 rifles, 1-9th Gurkhas, 25 rifles, 54th Sikhs, F. F. and 59th Rifles, F. F. and 2 armoured cars. There were also 40 Gurkhas armed only with "kukris" with the special party. These were all the troops available after providing for the pickets, reserves, and duties. I proceeded through the city towards the Jallianwalla Bagh at the usual pace, dropping my picketting parties as I marched. The gathering in the Jallianwalla Bagh must have received ample warning of my coming, and I personally had ample time to consider the nature of the painful duty I might be faced with. I passed with my infantry through a narrow lane into the Jallianwalla Bagh and at once deployed them to the right and left of the entrance in the square. The armoured cars remained outside the square and never came into action as the lane was too narrow to admit them.

I was faced by a dense mass of men evidently holding a seditious meeting. In the centre of the square was a raised platform and a man on it was gesticulating and addressing the crowd. The crowd appeared to be a mixed one, consisting of city people and outsiders. I did not see a single woman or child in the assembly. Many villagers were, I understand, induced to come to the Bagh by a promise that their taxes and land revenues would be abolished as the British "Raj" was at an end. Evidently those who came believing the British "Raj" was at an end were themselves not very innocent.

I had heard a great deal about the *Danda Fauj*, I was aware of the dastardly acts of cruelty which had been committed on the 10th.

Messages written and verbal were momentarily coming in to me on the 12th and 13th April telling me of fresh acts of violence and of the growing seriousness of the situation (*vide Appendix V*).

Amritsar, from a military point of view, would soon be completely isolated if matters were allowed to continue as they were doing. Communications by rail, telephone and telegraph had already been once severed.

The "*hartal*" continued in Gujranwala, Lahore, Lyallpur and other large cities until the news of the firing and the consequent opening of the shops at Amritsar on the 14th spread and then the news (exaggerated) of the measures taken against the mob at Amritsar reduced their moral, and they did not carry out their plans of loot and murder.

My work that morning, in personally conducting the proclamation, must be looked upon as one transaction with what had now come to pass. There was no reason to further parley with the mob, evidently they were there to defy the arm of the law.

The responsibility was very great. If I fired I must fire with good effect, a small amount of firing would be a criminal act of folly.

I had the choice of carrying out a very distasteful and horrible duty or of neglecting to do my duty, of suppressing disorder or of becoming responsible for all future bloodshed.

We cannot be very brave unless we be possessed of a greater fear. I had considered the matter from every point of view. My duty and my military instincts told me to fire. My conscience was also clear on that point. What faced me was, what on the morrow would be the *Danda Fauj*.

I fired and continued to fire until the crowd dispersed and I consider this is the least amount of firing which would produce the necessary moral, and widespread effect it was my duty to produce, if I was to justify my action. If more troops had been at hand the casualties would have been greater in proportion. It was no longer a question of merely dispersing the crowd; but one of producing a sufficient moral effect, from a military point of view, not only on those who were present but more specially throughout the Punjab. There could be no question of undue severity.

Immediately after ceasing fire, the troops returned to the Ram Bagh and at once, on arrival, the men's

pouches were examined. It was noted that 1,650 rounds had been fired. The ammunition used was .303" Mark VI, the ordinary ammunition issued by arsenal and used throughout the army. Fire was directed on to the crowds and not on to individuals. No military parties visited the Bagh subsequent to the firing either that night or the following morning.

The necessity was very great indeed and the means have been justified by the end.

A reference to a proclamation by the Governor General in Council, dated 14th April will show that my estimate of the situation was correct:—

Open rebellion reigned in Amritsar and it was my duty to suppress it.

Many inhabitants subsequently thanked me and recognized that I had committed a just and merciful act. In later days I was thanked by thousands and the press on one occasion was greater than the Circuit House grounds could hold.

I then estimated the crowd to number 5,000 but now learn that there were probably from 25,000 to 30,000 collected there and every man who escaped from the Jallianwalla Bagh was a messenger to tell that law and order had been restored in Amritsar.

It may be asked whether after the shooting was over, I offered help to the wounded. I did not offer help because the military situation had to be considered throughout the incident. The crowd was so dense that if a determined rush had been made at any time, arms or no arms, my small force must instantly have been overpowered and consequently I was very careful of not giving the mob a chance of organizing. I sometimes ceased fire and redirected my fire where the crowd was collecting more thickly. By the time I had completely dispersed the crowd my ammunition was running short. I returned to the Ram Bagh without counting or inspecting the casualties. The crowd was free now to ask for medical aid, but this they avoided doing lest they themselves be proved to have attended the assembly. They asked if they might bury their dead, and to this I consented. A proclamation was issued that evening and military law and restrictions were relaxed to enable them to do this (*vide Appendix VI*).

It was now necessary to arrest the wrong-doers, and in this I was most ably and energetically assisted by Mr. Rehill, Superintendent of Police, and by one, Ashraf Khan, City Inspector of Police. I fear Ashraf Khan has made many enemies in consequence and I would here put on record my appreciation of his work.

To restore things to their normal conditions and to prevent looting and bribery, I initiated the following:—

- (1) I organized all the pleaders and barristers in the city as special constables. The city was divided off into sections and special constables, assisted by military patrols, appointed to maintain law and order. These special constables reported to me thrice daily at the Ram Bagh and they were made responsible for immediately suppressing and reporting to me the committal of unlawful acts. They did their work, with few exceptions, very well indeed (*vide Appendix VII*).*
- (2) I placed a large picket of Gurkhas at the Kotwali to help the Police in carrying out their normal duties.
- (3) I invited those who knew of acts of bribery or corruption, to report to me personally, and they were informed that I was eager to make an example of culprits.

The city very quickly assumed normal conditions and was soon a pattern of law and order.

Military patrols visited the various quarters night and day.

Blackmail may possibly have been levied but no cases of this were reported to me.

Had prompt measures not been taken on the 13th and had the Punjab Government not expressed their (*vide*

Continued.]

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Appendix VIII)* approval of this and other strong measures such as those initiated at Lahore by Colonel Frank Johnson, I am strongly of opinion that acts of violence, plunder and bloodshed would immediately have been perpetrated on a much larger scale throughout India.

In conclusion, I would also mention that on the 12th, and morning of 13th, the City Inspector of Police made every endeavour to induce the traders and shop-keepers to close the "hartal" and open the shops. But they would not hear of this and said that until the Rowlatt Act had been repealed, and their leaders Dr. Kitchlu and Satyapal released, this could not be done.

Subsequently to the firing on 13th, these leaders and shop-keepers themselves came to the City Inspector and begged that they might be allowed to open their shops. I convened a meeting of these men and all shops were opened on the morning, 14th (vide Appendix IX).*

Soon after the 13th, Honorary Magistrates, leading citizens, Municipal Commissioners, *Raises* and *Chowdhris* expressed and admiration for my firm action and said that it had saved Amritsar and other cities in the Punjab from complete plunder and bloodshed.

On the morning of the 14th April, Mr. D. Donald, Inspector-General of Police, Lahore, informed me that it was intended to hold another meeting around the Golden Temple. It was not hard to gauge the significance of this.

It was evidently thought that I should again open fire on this meeting and some of the bullets would have hit the Golden Temple, whereupon the whole Sikh community would have been up in arms as one man. This also meant that the Sikh Sepoy would in all probability be up in arms and a most serious situation be the result.

I accordingly at once despatched a message (vide Appendix X)* to Sardar Arur Singh, C.I.E., the Manager of the Golden Temple, to say that if his Golden Temple was defiled in any way all the troops at my disposal would protect it. I asked Sardar Arur Singh to come and see me at once and also Sardar Sundar Singh Majithia, the head Sikh of the Amritsar district.

Persistent malicious rumours of the bombing of the Golden Temple and raping of Sikh girls at Amritsar were afloat, and one realized then that the great object of the mutineers was to get the Sikhs on their side.

I was born in India and have served in Punjab Regiments all my service, I know the language very well and I consider I am an authority on what was going on in and around Amritsar. I know many good and trustworthy retired Sikh officers. I called these men to come and see me.

After April 13th the situation was clearer and one saw that the Sikhs were not in the mutiny to any extent and that it was my duty to keep them out of it.

Sardars Sundar Singh and Arur Singh came at once to see me and both agreed to help me and to deny the many false rumours that were prevalent. Owing to their influence the meeting was not held around the Golden Temple.

On the 16th April I thought it imperative to proceed to Lahore to see the Lieutenant-Governor about keeping the Sikhs out of the disorder and I also proposed to go round the district with small moveable columns with four objects:—

- (1) To show that the *Sarkar* was still strong and had soldiers and guns.
- (2) To assure the Sikhs that all they had heard about the bombing of the Golden Temple, raping of Sikh girls, etc., was false, and that they must not be led into disorder by those who were doing all in their power to get them into it, to use them as scapegoats.
- (3) To talk straightly and to the point to the population.
- (4) To be certain of having the Sikhs on our side in case of Muhammadan trouble arising from the Turkish Peace Terms.

* Page 214.

Daily many old Sikh officers came in to see me and assured me that all would be well.

Accordingly on the 21st April I proceeded with a moveable column of 100 British, 100 Indian, 20 Indian Cavalry and 2 armoured cars to Gurdaspur (vide Appendix XI).*

Mr. Harcourt, Deputy Commissioner, Gurdaspur district, and Mr. Glascock, Superintendent of Police, Gurdaspur district, met me at Gurdaspur and explained that since the 13th April the situation was very much more satisfactory, but that it had been very threatening at Gurdaspur, Dhariwal and Batala before that date.

I marched through Gurdaspur and spoke very plainly to the heads of the communities. I then proceeded to Dhariwal and Batala and did the same. I have reason to believe that the effect of this was very good.

On the 24th April I proceeded with another column to China Bugga-Atari, Amritsar (vide Appendix XII).†

Exceptionally large Durbars were held at Raja Sansi and Atari. I was accompanied by the Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar, Mr. Miles Irving. The effect of these two Durbars was very good indeed. On this latter column I was accompanied by the Mahant Siri Kirpa Singh of Guru Sat Sultani. This man is a most influential and powerful Sikh priest and rendered me invaluable service in keeping the Sikhs straight and denying the many malicious rumours which had been systematically disseminated amongst the villages in the whole district.

On the 28th April I proceeded with the Assistant Commissioner (Mr. Puckle) to Sursingh at which place the Ferozepore moveable column had arrived. This village was reported to be particularly disaffected. I spoke strongly to the heads of the village and to the Lambardars of the neighbouring villages with, I believe, very good effect.

I am convinced the effect of these columns was very good indeed. The villagers who are ignorant but brave people had been led to believe that the British "Raj" was at an end and most of them thoroughly believed that the malicious rumours were not merely rumours but real facts and did not realize that these rumours had been woven round the Rowlatt Bill.

These villagers were quite ready to join in disorder, and had great hopes of loot which had been promised.

With the help of the Indian officers whom they knew, and seeing their high priest with the columns, the villagers soon began to realize that they were being used or were meant to be used as tools in the hands of the enemies of the Crown.

More and more villages were being drawn into the movement.

The effect of the events on April 13th and these moveable columns snatched the villagers from the hands of the agitators and thus the latter were left alone.

On these columns I simply talk plainly, and to the point, to all. No whippings were administered.

For some time past a certain amount of anxiety had been felt as to what attitude the sepoys of the Indian Army would take up.

To my certain knowledge the agitators had been trying to tamper with the loyalty of the Indian Army, and some of my sepoys at Amritsar had been fed with sweetmeats by the inhabitants of Amritsar City.

On the 29th April, a conference of Brigadiers was held at the Divisional Commander's house at Lahore, at which the danger of the agitators "getting at" the Indian Army and the preparations for resorting to the Internal Security scheme were discussed.

On 30th April I proceeded to Jullundur and held a conference of officers Commanding Units and Indian officers, and explained these two subjects to them. They all assured me that their men were absolutely loyal and were not at all in sympathy with disorder.

As a result of my dealings with the Sikhs, my Brigade-Major and myself were made Sikhs at the Golden Temple, and shrines erected at Guru Sat Sultani, and when hosti-

† Page 215.

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[Continued.]

ilities with Afghanistan broke out, the influential Sikhs offered 10,000 men to help the *Sarkar*.

In the meantime Amritsar was practically normal again.

On the 4th May I heard that trouble was anticipated with Afghanistan and on the 6th May war was declared with Afghanistan.

I would here point out that had the situation in the Punjab not been promptly and firmly dealt with in April, telegraph and railway lines would in all probability have been damaged to a much greater extent and concentration on the Frontier against the Afghans rendered very difficult if not impossible, and the situation would have been most critical.

On May 8th I proceeded to Jullundur to my permanent headquarters as my Brigade was mobilizing for the North-West Frontier Force. Lieutenant-Colonel B. M. Hynes, 1-25th London Regiment, then took over Command of Amritsar and he was relieved on May 23rd, 1919, the day his Battalion left for the North-West Frontier, by Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon'ble W. F. North, 1st Garrison Battalion, Somerset Light Infantry.

As regards paragraph (ii) A of the above quoted letter, I would represent that from a soldier's point of view corporal punishment, if inflicted, is best inflicted in public as a warning to others. When a soldier is awarded lashes the whole regiment parades, and the victim is lashed in public. As a matter of fact in my opinion no persons were whipped in public.

Six persons were whipped in the street where Miss Sherwood fell, but as both ends of this street were closed to the public, it can hardly be looked upon as a public thoroughfare.

Three persons were whipped privately in the Ram Bagh. Four persons were whipped in the Kotwali. In all 25 were whipped in Amritsar and this after the proclamation of Martial Law. All were duly tried.

I had certainly erected a platform for public whippings between the fort and the city but this was never used, as, before it was quite ready, I received orders to dismantle it and not to inflict punishment in public. Please see Annexure B.

As regards paragraph (iii) A of the above quoted letter:—

A helpless woman had been mercilessly beaten, in a most cruel manner, by a lot of dastardly cowards. She

was beaten with sticks and shoes, and knocked down six times in the street. She tried to gain entrance at an open door, but the door was slammed in her face. To be beaten with shoes is considered by Indians to be the greatest insult. It seemed intolerable to me that some suitable punishment could not be meted out. Civil law was at an end and I searched my brain for some military punishment to meet the case.

I inspected the spot where Miss Sherwood ultimately fell, and I gave orders for a triangle to be erected there. I then posted two British picquets, one at each end of the street, with orders to allow no Indians to pass, that if they had to pass they must go through on all fours. I never imagined that any sane man would voluntarily go through under those conditions, and I was still searching for some fitting punishment when Providence stepped in. After giving my orders I proceeded further through the city, and as I passed I gave orders for eleven insolent inhabitants to be handed over to the Police, and brought to me at the Ram Bagh at 9-0 A.M. next morning. I did not know that the Police who accompanied my force had been left at the far end of the street in which the picquets were posted. Arrived at the near end of the street, the prisoners were confronted by the non-commissioned officer in command of the picquet and made to crawl, between the two picquets, a distance of about 150 yards. I presumed that there were back entrances to the houses which would enable those living in the street to obtain food and water, and it would not take much ingenuity to improvise other means of obtaining the necessities of life. My orders remained in force from the afternoon of the 19th to the 24th of April 1919. In all some fifty complied with the order to go through on all fours but I cannot understand why any went through after the 19th, especially as all the houses had back exits and the picquets were only on duty from 6-0 A.M. to 8-0 P.M. The only conclusion that I can come to is that, except the eleven I referred to above, all went through to make martyrs of themselves. Sergeant W. H. Nicholls, 1-25th Battalion, London Regiment, who was in charge of the picquets on all the days, informs me that the extra men came there apparently voluntarily, as they were not brought to him by anybody. One man actually crawled through three times and had to be stopped, by the picquet, from giving further exhibitions.

ANNEXURES AND APPENDICES.

ANNEXURES.

- A.—Account of riots on 10th and 11th April 1919 by O. C., Amritsar.
- B.—Operation of Martial Law.

APPENDICES.

- Nos.
- I.—Civil handing over Law to Military.
- II.—Proclamation No. 1.
- III.—Proclamation No. 2.
- IV.—Comparison influx of "lathis" in 1918 and 1919.
- V.—Several messages showing situation on 12th, 13th and 14th April.
- VI.—Proclamation saying inhabitants may bury their dead.
- VII.—Orders to Special Constables.
- VIII.—Approval of action.
- IX.—Report on meeting of heads of communities after the firing.
- X.—Message to Manager, Golden Temple.
- XI.—Report on Gurdaspur, Dhariwal, Batala Moveable Column.
- XII.—Report on Bhugga-Atari Moveable Column.
- XIII.—Strength of troops on my arrival, 11th April 1919 and on 20th April 1919.
- XIV.—Report sent to Division, morning 14th, reporting my action of 13th April.
- XV.—War diary kept during April.

ANNEXURE A.

NARRATING THE OCCURRENCES AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE RIOTS AT AMRITSAR.

[This was a *verbatim* reproduction of Capt. Massey's report which is printed as his written statement on pages 190 to 192.]

[Continued.]

Brigdr.-Genl. R. E. H. DYER.

ANNEXURE B.

REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF MARTIAL LAW IN AMRITSAR AREA.

Offences. Trial and execution of sentences. 1. I would refer to Annexure B(a).

As every case in connection with Amritsar riots occurred on a date previous to April 19th, 1919, no cases could be tried or otherwise disposed of, however trivial, by the Military authorities; a fact which entailed considerable delay in the disposal of cases. With regard to the last sentence of paragraph 3 of Annexure 'A' no cases occurred.

As a result very few cases came before the Military authorities at all (*viz.*, only such as were committed subsequent to April 19th, 1919).

The number of whippings inflicted was 25, which would appear an exceedingly small number when it is remembered that the city and district were full of professional roughs, many of whom had been imported by agitators for the purpose of riots or had come to Amritsar for the sake of violence and loot.

In no case was a man of advanced age sentenced to whipping, the social status of offenders was taken into account, no promiscuous or summary whipping took place; the greatest restraint was observed by all troops. Every case was legally tried, trials were conducted in exactly the same manner as at a Summary Court Martial under the Indian Army Act, accused was asked if he wished to call witnesses for the defence, their attendance was secured by the Police or, if they could not be found, judicial cognisance was taken of the fact and the accused given the benefit of such evidence as he stated they would give in his favour; in addition every accused was permitted to make any statement he wished in his own defence.

The possibility of corruption on the part of minor Police officials or of the case being instigated by a false informer for his own ends was carefully watched. Prosecution witnesses were subjected to a heavy cross-examination by the Military Magistrate and the accused was allowed to put any question to witnesses he wished. Precautions even went to the extent of reliable and independent Military officers being sent (in one case the Magistrate even went himself) to make searching enquiries to test the reliability of prosecution evidence. In not a few cases acquittals resulted.

Every whipping carried out by the Military authorities was correctly administered in every respect, the instrument was inspected, a responsible officer was present, the prisoner was medically examined as to his fitness to undergo corporal punishment and a medical officer was in attendance.

Although the normal military procedure for the infliction of corporal punishment under the Indian Army Act is for all whippings to be public, (*i.e.*, the Commander orders the attendance of all persons whom he considers it in the interests of discipline to have present) nevertheless no public whipping took place whatever.

At first three whippings were carried out at Area Headquarters in the Rambagh and four at the City Police Station and only such persons as were present at these places on business should have witnessed them and then only by pure accident.

Subsequently all prisoners sentenced to undergo corporal punishment or imprisonment were handed over to the Civil Police and the sentences carried out in accordance with the Civil Regulations on the subject.

Triangles were erected at certain public places for use in the event of a necessity arising for holding public whippings, but no such whippings were ordered. The fact that these triangles were erected undoubtedly served as a deterrent to the rough element of the city.

In only one case was a triangle other than those at Area Headquarters and at the City Police Station actually used. Six men were whipped in the street where Miss Sherwood was assaulted, but the whipping was not public, the street being closed by Military picquets and the public excluded.

The six men in question were those implicated in the assault on this lady. They were brought before me in my capacity of Provost Marshall and Military Magistrate for gross insubordination and offering violence while in Military custody on a date subsequent to April 19th, 1919, and were sentenced by me to be whipped under powers conferred on me by law.

The fact that the men in question were whipped in this street, although not publicly, undoubtedly brought home to the native imagination that the protection of women was considered of primary importance by the authorities, although it might not be universally accepted by public opinion in the East; more especially was the effect salutary in Amritsar at the time owing to the presence of a large number of roughs and vagabonds then infesting the city, and from whom no woman would have been safe.

2. A schedule is attached showing the various orders Proclamations and Martial Law restrictions. passed under Martial Law for the governance of the area; the reasons for these orders, and the approximate dates of the withdrawal of restrictions.

The guiding principles throughout were—

- (1) The prevention of further violence.
- (2) The speedy arrest of offenders.
- (3) Restoring confidence among respectable citizens.
- (4) The protection of the poor from profiteering.
- (5) The restoration of normal business as soon as possible.

Besides the Military picquets and regular Police a force of special constables was raised from barristers and other educated residents of the city, whose duty it was to explain orders to the people, to see that they were observed, to assist in the arrest of persons known to be implicated in the riot and to report any difficulty or distress.

The leaders of all religious and business communities were encouraged to visit Area Headquarters and confer with the Military authorities, and everything was done to mitigate the severity of the restrictions in the case of *bona fide* religious ceremonies and business. At the same time severe restrictions were necessary owing to the fact that the city was full of dangerous characters, that the temper of the people was at first alarmed and then sullen and that there were many conspirators and rioters still at large and in hiding in the city and district, the arrest of whom the inhabitants showed no inclination whatever to assist. As soon as the arrests had been made the restrictions were gradually withdrawn.

3. I have already stated above that since no offences committed before April 19th, 1919, could be tried by the Military Magistrate, an infinitesimal number of cases were disposed of by him; and I have also shown that every precaution was taken at the trial of these cases to guard against false evidence produced by the prosecution resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The force of special constables (drawn as they were from barristers and educated men, who from their normal employment were thoroughly conversant with the conduct of the regular Police Force) was specially qualified to find out and report, or otherwise keep a check on theft or corruption on the part of Police subordinates and their agents.

I would refer to Annexure B(a), paragraph 4. From this it will be seen that the preliminary investigation of all cases was carried out by the Local Criminal Investigation Department officer, at Amritsar, and what in Military parlance would be called the "Summary of Evidence" of each case was forwarded direct to the Deputy Inspector-General, Criminal Investigation Department, Lahore, and not to, or through, the General Officer Commanding, Amritsar Area.

It follows, therefore, that control by the Military authority at Amritsar over the personnel entrusted with the collection of evidence and the preparation of the summaries of evidence was quite impossible since this work was taken entirely out of his hands.

At the same time numerous reports and complaints were made to the Military authorities with regard to the corruption of police officials and of persons giving false information to the police with a view to the arrest of individuals for their private ends. No report was ever made to me, or any of my assistants, of actual theft by Police officials as far as I can remember.

Accusations made against police and their informers were either anonymous or else general. Specific persons and cases were not cited. In all cases in which it was possible to do so and which came under my notice the complainant was told that he would be given every assistance and support if he could produce evidence in substantiation of his complaint against any police official and informer. Respectable individuals of good position including reliable retired Indian officers, were asked to assist in bringing to light any cases of corruption.

Owing, however, to the fear which the Indian has of the police, any evidence which may have existed was unobtainable and only two actual cases came before my notice. In one, the principal witness did not appear; I remanded the case and gave orders that he must be found and produced. He could not be traced, and I was forced to dismiss the case. In the other case although General Dyer left instructions for the case to be brought before me for investigation, yet for some reason this was not done, and I believe the case was investigated by the Deputy Commissioner [see Annexure B(b)].

Whatever the grounds may be for assuming the existence or otherwise of corruption and irregular practices on the part of the police, there is no doubt that considerable feeling existed in the city and district, so much so that the Indian troops who throughout performed their duties, quietly, disinterestedly and in a soldierly and temperate manner were themselves deeply concerned and their Indian officers were quite outspoken on the subject.

As a fundamental fact it must be conceded that the past and present history of all Asiatic countries proves that the police in the East are regarded as the instruments of despotic or bureaucratic rule and rather than the protectors of the individual and the guardians of the social welfare of the community. Further, it is inherent in the Asiatic character that minor officials should be open to corruption and that everyone has his price. The attitude of the public towards the policeman re-acts on the latter, every man is his enemy, and he receives no assistance from the public; consequently the collection of evidence, the arrest of criminals and the bringing of them to justice is rendered excessively difficult. The natural result is that the temptation to resort to irregular practices is greatly enhanced.

The reluctance of the people of Amritsar City to give information which would lead to the arrest and punishments of conspirators and rioters was very noticeable indeed, and if doubtful methods were used to obtain evidence or if prosecution by the police took place, the inhabitants of Amritsar themselves are more to blame than anyone else.

They did not render the assistance which it was their bounden duty as citizens to give and their attitude only made the procuring of definite evidence as to the existence of corruption an impossibility but was in my opinion the primary cause and principal incentive to any corruption or persecution that may have taken place.

Whatever may have been the rights and wrongs of the question, there is no doubt that the inhabitants of the city and district became sullen and resentful as arrests and investigations proceeded. This point caused more feeling against the operation of Martial Law, in my opinion, than all other actions and restrictions to which they were subjected. Everything possible under the circumstances was done by Military authority to prevent and bring to justice corrupt practices; and Mr. Rehill, the Superintendent of Police at Amritsar, rendered every assistance.

Brigdr.-Genl. R. E. H. DYER.

[Continued.]

4. The ordinary civil and municipal machinery was used for the administration of Martial Law; but in addition great assistance was given by the leaders of the Sikh community and the work and practical common-sense of retired Military officers and ex-soldiers and was of very great value indeed. The fact of the district being under Military government automatically raised their status and they were not slow to exercise the influence thus conferred in re-assuring the people and quieting the district, besides which they carried out a good deal of confidential work and valuable advice.

The records of all sentences awarded by Military officers were despatched to the Martial Law officer of the Lahore Divisional Area, and forwarded to the Punjab Government. The records of sentences awarded by Civil Magistrates did not pass through my hands. Every sentence awarded by Military officers was recorded on the prescribed form at the time of trial.

S. R. SHIRLEY, Major,
Late Area Officer and Provost Marshal,
Amritsar District.

ANNEXURE B(a).
Extracts from instructions in regard to the trial of persons charged with offences in connection with the present disturbances committed before the 19th April 1919.

3. All offences connected with the disturbances which were committed before the date of the Martial Law proclamations, (*i.e.*, before April 19th in the case of districts or portions of districts within the limits of the 16th Indian Division, and the 20th April in the case of districts or portions of districts within the limits of the 2nd Rawalpindi Division) will therefore be tried by the Commissions appointed under the Martial Law Ordinance, 1919. The Courts-Martial appointed under the proclamations have no power to try any of these offences. Should any such cases have been dealt with by Courts-Martial before the issue of these orders a list of them should be prepared as it will be necessary to regularise them later on.

4. The Commissions will sit in Lahore. The officers in charge of investigations should send prisoners into Lahore. The preliminary investigation will be conducted by the Police who will make a report and submit it with a *précis* of the statements of witnesses to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Lahore. If he considers that there is a *prima facie* case, he will submit the *précis* for orders to the Legal Remembrancer. If the Legal Remembrancer considers that there is no case for trial by a Commission, he will direct the release of the accused. If he considers that there is a case for trial, he will frame a charge and convene a Commission, giving to the Commission a special direction, if he finds the case is one which should be tried according to the procedure prescribed for Summary General Court-Martial.

ANNEXURE B(b).
[Urgent and Confidential.]
Memorandum No. 111-11-P. M., dated Amritsar, 12th May 1919, from Captain J. F. Postance, P. M., Amritsar, to the Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar.

Brigadier-General Dyer, C.B., before leaving Amritsar issued an order that the case of the policeman who has been arrested here on a charge of having taken a bribe of Rs. 1,000 was to be heard by the Provost Marshal. I informed the police of this order and they state that the case is now under investigation by you.

I am directed by Lieutenant-Colonel B. M. Hynes, Commanding Amritsar, to say that the case in question should be brought up before Major Shirley, M.C., with the necessary witnesses at the Circuit House at 11-15 hours on Wednesday, 14th instant.

Continued.]

Brigdr.-Genl. R. E. H. DYER.

Martial Law orders issued at Amritsar.

No. and date.	Restriction.	Why imposed.	Date of cancellation or modification.
1 of 25th April 1919 .	No one permitted to leave house or compound between the hours of 22 hours and 05 hours without a special permit from the Military.	The public safety and to prevent seditious gatherings at night.	Modified by Order No. 17 of 16th May 1919 to 22-30 hours each evening to 04-00 hours the following morning. Cancelled by Order No. 22 of 23rd May 1919
2 of 25th April 1919 .	No firearms to be discharged or bombs thrown at His Majesty's soldiers and police. In case of this being done, drastic reprisals to be taken against property surrounding scene of outrage.	For the protection of His Majesty's soldiers and police.	
3 of 25th April 1919 .	No processions or gatherings of more than ten people, except marriage, funeral and religious ceremonies.	The public safety and to prevent seditious gatherings.	
4 of 25th April 1919 .	No person to offer violence or to cause obstruction to any person desirous of opening his shop and conducting his ordinary daily business.	For the benefit of the poor. To induce the people to return to their ordinary daily vocations and to restore the ordinary conditions of trade and business.	
5 of 25th April 1919 .	Prohibition and sale of 3rd and Intermediate Class Railway tickets unless in possession of a special permit.	To prevent a general exodus of those concerned in the riots and to enable the police to keep a better and more efficient supervision on all people travelling by rail.	
6 of 25th April 1919 .	Prohibition against tearing down notices and orders displayed by order of General Officer Commanding.	The public safety and in order that all should become acquainted with orders and notices issued.	
7 of 25th April 1919 .	No male person to carry or be found in possession of a <i>lathi</i> .	Prevention of violence and preservation of good order. Protection of His Majesty's soldiers and police, and all law-abiding citizens.	
8 of 25th April 1919 .	Unlawful for more than two people to walk abreast on any constructed or clearly defined pavement.	Prevention of violence and intimidation and preservation of good order.	Cancelled by Order No. 20 of 19th May 1919.
9 of 25th April 1919 .	Every shop and business to open and carry on its business between the usual hours and not beyond 22-00 hours in exactly the same manner as before the " <i>hartal</i> ." Rates to be fixed from time to time by competent authority.	For the public good. To restore good order and governance and the usual daily business and trade conditions.	Fixing of <i>nerrick</i> rates abolished by Order No. 21 of 19th May 1919.
10 of 25th April 1919 .	Unlawful to publish, spread or repeat false, inaccurate or exaggerated reports of the military and political situation.	The public safety and to prevent the encouragement of the state of unrest.	
1 of 25th April 1919	Loyal and law-abiding citizens have nothing to fear from the exercise of Martial Law.	To restore confidence in the loyal and law-abiding and to prevent them being intimidated by the seditious.	
2 of 25th April 1919.	All people, so ordered, to surrender for safe custody any arms and ammunition in their possession.	The public safety and the protection of His Majesty's soldiers and police.	
3 of 25th April 1919	All pedal driven cycles except those owned by Government or by Europeans to be surrendered by 16-00 hours on 27th April 1919, at the Fort, unless the owner has a certificate of exemption.	Cycles needed for the use of the Military and Civil Authorities. To prevent disaffected people leaving the Area.	Modified by Order No. 20 of 19th May 1919 as follows:—All cycles with the exception of those actually required by the Military and Civil Authorities will be returned to owners on application to the Tehsildar. Certificates of exemption no longer necessary.

Brigdr.-Genl. R. E. H. DYER.

[Continued]

Martial Law orders issued at Amritsar—contd.

No. and date.	Restriction.	Why imposed.	Date of cancellation or modification.
14 of 11th May 1919 .	Declaration of stocks from traders, bankers, <i>bunniah</i> s and all others who possess more than five maunds of <i>gur</i> , <i>shakkar</i> , sugar, <i>misri</i> , gram, salt, wheat and <i>atta</i> by 11-00 hours on Saturday 17th May 1919. Stocks to be published and reward paid to people giving information leading to conviction of anyone submitting a false return.	The good of the poor people. To enable them to know the dealers who had stocks of food-stuffs which they (the dealers) would be obliged to sell at the rates fixed by the Military and Civil Authorities. To prevent profiteers from increasing the already inflated prices of food-stuffs by withholding stocks from the public.	
15 of 11th May 1919 .	In connection with food-stuffs other than those dealt with in Order No. 14.	Ditto.	
16 of 14th May 1919 .	Afghan subjects not to leave the Area without written permission from the Military. All Afghan subjects (except women and children and the old and infirm who must be registered by their families) to present themselves to the Superintendent of Police for registration between 09-00 hours on the 17th May 1919 and 17-00 hours on 19th May 1919. From and including 19th May 1919 to assist to shelter Afghan subjects not in possession of a certificate of registration is an offence against Martial Law. Should any person know of the existence of any unregistered Afghan subject and not communicate his knowledge to the Authorities, this will also be deemed an offence against Martial Law and dealt with accordingly.	To enable the Military and Civil authorities to maintain an efficient supervision over all Afghan subjects in the Area and to prevent all local disaffected people from aiding and abetting these said subjects of the Amir in any designs they might formulate against the peace of the country.	
17 of 16th May 1919 .	Shortening the hours during which inhabitants of the city are not allowed to leave their houses or compounds from 22-00 hours and 05-00 hours to 22-30 each evening to 04-00 hours the following morning.	For the public convenience. To give traders and all business people who came into the city by day to transact business, more time to get away. To enable the various sects to proceed to their temples in the early hours of the morning to pray, which procedure is a common one in the Punjab.	
18 of 16th May 1919 .	No carts, <i>ekkas</i> or asses engaged in bringing food-stuffs into the city to be commandeered for military or other purpose. If it is found necessary to commandeer the said carts, <i>ekkas</i> or asses, 48 hours' clear notice of the intention of the authorities to do so will be given.	To restore confidence among the country people and to encourage them to bring in food-stuffs. Owing to rumours spread by the disaffected that carts and beasts of burden would be commandeered by the military, the country people had heretofore been reluctant to bring in food-stuffs. This order had a very good effect.	
19 of 16th May 1919 .	In case of medical aid being necessary in the city during the prohibited hours of 22-30 hours and 04-00 hours, one person from the house or building to proceed to the Police Station or nearest Police Picquet. A Police Constable will then accompany the said person to procure the required medical aid, after which the said person will proceed straight back to his or her place of residence.	The public convenience. It was not possible to allow anybody and everybody to frequent the streets during the prohibited hours on the pretence of procuring medical aid. Such a concession would have been taken instant advantage of by the disaffected. Order No. 19 appeared the only solution of the difficulty.	

Continued.]

Brigdr.-Genl. R. E. H. DYER.

Martial law orders issued at Amritsar—contd.

No. and date.	Restriction.	Why imposed.	Date of cancellation or modification.
20 of 19th May 1919 . .	Order No. 8 of 24th April 1919 is cancelled. Order No. 13 of 24th April 1919 is modified so that all cycles except those actually required for the use of the Military and Civil Authorities will be returned to their owners. Certificates of exemption are no longer necessary.	These restrictions were cancelled and modified on account of the improved behaviour of the inhabitants of the city and for the public convenience.	
21 of 19th May 1919 . .	<i>Nirrik</i> rates for food-stuffs are abolished from 00-00 hours on 21st May 1919. Merchants are warned that prices of food-stuffs will be carefully watched for the protection of the poor and the benefit of the trade and <i>nirrik</i> rates immediately re-imposed should it be deemed necessary to do so. These relaxations of Martial Law are not to be misinterpreted as a sign of the weakening of Martial Law which will be applied with all swiftness and severity against those engaged in seditious propaganda or in aiding the King's enemies.	To restore normal conditions particularly in regard to the retailing of food-stuffs and the carrying on of general business. To encourage farmers to bring in food-stuffs and confirm them in the belief that the Military had no intention of interfering with their means of livelihood longer than was necessary.	
22 of 23rd May 1919 . .	Order No. 17 of 16th May 1919 is cancelled which is to say that people may move in the city by night at all hours without let or hindrance. The playing of bands and of musical instruments and drums of all and every description is forbidden between the hours of 22-30 each evening and 04-00 hours the following morning.	In order to enable Muhammadans to conduct the observance of the "Ramzan." To ensure that no trouble of any kind, riots, looting, etc., take place in the city by night under cover of the noise made by bands and musical instruments and drums.	
23 of 27th May 1919 . .	Owing to the high prices charged for milk and salt, fixed rates will again be imposed to come into effect from 00-00 hours on 26th May 1919. It is a contravention of Martial Law to charge or attempt to charge more than the prices set forth hereunder. Salt for 14 seers, not more than Re. 1 (one). Milk (cow) (per <i>gadvi</i> of 21 <i>chhataks</i>) per seer not more than annas 4 (four). Milk (buffalo) (per <i>gadvi</i> of 21 <i>chhataks</i>) per seer not more than annas 4-6 (four and half annas). Milk (boiled) (per <i>gadvi</i> of 21 <i>chhataks</i>) per seer not more than annas 5 (five). These prices are to be considered a maximum. It is no offence against the law to sell at lower rates. Furthermore it is a contravention of Martial Law for vendors of salt and milk (1) to refuse to sell when in possession of stocks, (2) to adulterate milk.	Fixed prices re-imposed owing to the extortionate prices charged to the poor people for milk and salt.	
24 of 28th May 1919 . .	Confirmatory to Order No. 22 of 23rd May 1919.		

Brigdr.-Genl. R. E. H. DYER.

[Continued.]

Martial Law orders issued at Amritsar—concl.

No. and date.	Restriction.	Why imposed.	Date of cancellation or modification.
25 of 5th June 1919 . .	The price of "Standard" cloth is fixed at annas six and pies nine per yard. The list of merchants mentioned in the order are ordered to stock and sell at this price. It is a contravention of Martial Law for any of the said merchants to sell more than 12 yards to any one purchaser or for any purchaser to re-sell the cloth.	The price of "Standard" cloth fixed solely for the benefit of the poor. A fixed amount to be sold to each purchaser as supplies of this cloth are not too plentiful.	
26 of 7th June 1919 . .	Prices of sugar are fixed as hereunder from 07-00 hours on 8th June 1919 :— Sugar (<i>Khand</i>) 2 seers 4 <i>chhataks</i> , for Re. 1 (one). <i>Misri</i> 2 seers 2 <i>chhataks</i> for Re. 1 (one).	For the protection of the poor and owing to the extortionate price charged by shop-keepers for sugar.	
27 of 8th June 1919 . .	Price of ice is fixed as hereunder from 07-00 hours on 9th June 1919 :— Wholesale, Re. 1 annas 8 (Re. 1-8-0) per maund. (Not less than one maund to be sold at this price.) Retail dealers, Rs. 2-8-0 per maund. Not more than 1 anna to be charged for 1 seer of ice. It is a contravention of Martial Law for any merchant or dealer to refuse to sell at these prices, or for retail dealers to refuse to buy ice to resell to the public.	For the protection of the poor and owing to the extortionate price charged by shopkeepers for ice.	

(All Martial Law Orders, other than those referred to as cancelled or modified in this appendix automatically ceased to have effect when Martial Law was withdrawn from Amritsar on 9th June 1919.)

Continued.]

Brigdr.-Genl. R. E. H. DYER.

APPENDIX I.

GIVEN OUT MORNING ELEVENTH TO SEVERAL CITIZENS.

Handed over to the G. O. C., 45th Brigade, and signed by the Deputy Commissioner midnight 11th-12th April 1919.

The troops have orders to restore order in Amritsar and to use all force necessary.

No gathering of persons nor processions of any sort will be allowed.

All gatherings will be fired on.

Any persons leaving the city in groups of more than four will be fired on.

Respectable persons should keep indoors.

True Copy.

AMRITSAR, (Sd.) MILES IRVING,
11th April 1919. Deputy Commissioner.

APPENDIX II.

PROCLAMATION No. 1.

NOTICE.

The inhabitants of Amritsar are hereby warned that if they will cause damage to any property or will commit any acts of violence in the environs of Amritsar, it will be taken for granted that such acts are due to the incitement in Amritsar City, and offenders will be punished according to Military Law.

All meetings and gatherings are hereby prohibited and will be dispersed at once under Military Law.

Certified true Copy.

F. C. BRIGGS, Captain, Brigade-Major,
13th April 1919. for Brigadier-General, Commanding
45th Brigade.

APPENDIX III.

PROCLAMATION No. 2.

13th April 1919.

1. It is hereby proclaimed to all whom it may concern that no person residing in the city is permitted or allowed to leave the city in his own private or hired conveyance or on foot, without a pass from one of the following officers:—

The Deputy Commissioner.

The Superintendent of Police, Mr. Rehill.

The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mr. Plomer.

The Assistant Commissioner, Mr. Beckett.

Mr. Connor, Magistrate.

Mr. Seymour, Magistrate.

Agha Mohammed Hussain, Magistrate.

The Police Officer in charge of the City Kotwali.

This will be a special form and pass.

2. No person residing in the Amritsar City is permitted to leave his house after 8-0 P.M.

Any persons found in the streets after 8-0 P.M. are liable to be shot.

3. No procession of any kind is permitted to parade the streets in the city or any part of the city or outside of it at any time.

Any such processions or any gathering of 4 men will be looked upon and treated as an unlawful assembly and dispersed by force of arms, if necessary.

APPENDIX IV.

COMPARISON OF NUMBER OF BUNDLES OF *Luthis* AND STICKS RECEIVED IN MARCH AND APRIL 1918 AND MARCH AND APRIL 1919.

1918.		1919.	
March	12	March	455
April	Nil.	April	601
TOTAL	12	TOTAL	1,056

APPENDIX V.

SEVERAL MESSAGES RECEIVED SHOWING SITUATION AT AMRITSAR AND ENVIRONS ON 12TH, 13TH AND 14TH, APRIL 1919.

1. No. 132-S. from Genstaff Division (By aeroplane) 12th April 1919.

Telegraph line reported out this morning between Cantonment East and Harbanspura. Lahore quiet. Kasur reports at 06-10. Armoured train visited Khem Karan during night and found station wrecked but no casualties. Rioters in small numbers apparently organised for destruction left in direction of Sulej. Train patrolled two stations beyond and all quiet, so returned to Kasur.

Wired you last night to return Royal Sussex to Lahore to-day relieving them by Queens from Jullundur. Understand from R. T. O. here that you have already made arrangements to that effect.

Most important to get Sussex back here to-day as trouble anticipated here to-morrow. Please report your situation by bearer who is to return at once.

2. From Telegraph Master, Amritsar, 12th April 1919.

Regret to report all telegraph wires between Lahore and Amritsar are cut from 11-15 P.M., last night, and the line party sent at 1-20 A.M. this morning are still at the Railway Station with the Armoured Train which was supposed to proceed to Attari this morning, where the wires are probably cut. When communication restored your wire will be despatched.

3. From Telegraph Master, Amritsar, 12th April 1919.

There is sudden disconnection noticed on all lines between this and Lahore at 11-15 and from observation the lines are cut between Attari and this.

4. From Gandasingh Wala, S. D. O., Kasur, 12th April 1919.

Rioters attacked Station Kasur at 9-58 date, telegraph instruments as well as wires broken, station building smashed and burnt with all furniture, consumable stores, cash, and ticket books of third class Booking Office looted. Two Europeans military passengers of train No. 60 UP, badly injured, one of them died while firing on rioters, military force urgently required.

5. From Station Master, Kasur, 12th April 1919.

Rioters attacked station at about 9-58 date, telegraph instruments as well as wires broken, station building smashed and burnt with all furniture, tools and plants, consumable stores, third class booking office cash ticket records looted away. Two European officers badly injured, one of them died while firing on rioters. 61 Up and 62 Down stabled here No. 14 Down returned back to R. K. W. from District. Signals. D. T. S. Ferozepore to please issue orders for 61 Up and 62 Down and other train and P. W. I. Kasur to trolley and patrol line Military force provided station still in danger.

6. From Miles Irving to Brigade Major, 13th April 1919.

I have received information that secret meetings taken place in the Thirch plantations near the Ram Bagh at the places marked A.A. on the sketch. They might be searched by night.

7. From O. C., Armoured Train, 13th April 1919.

The Armoured Train has returned from Tarn Taran after leaving the Indian officer and 25 men of the Baluchis there. The Cavalry ordered there also arrived while we were there. The Tahsildar reported that the Treasury was attacked by a mob armed with *luthis* from the neighbouring villages last night, but that the mob was beaten off and followed up. In the pursuit three men, viz., two Jat Sikhs and one Muhammadan were captured and are now in the *Thana* at Tarn Taran. I proposed to bring these three men back to Amritsar but the Tahsildar

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[Continued.]

wished to keep them and try to get explanations out of them. As the Indian officer had no objection I left them there.

8. The Traffic Superintendent, Amritsar, No. 1-B., dated 13th April 1919.

I beg to report having sent the Armoured Train towards Butari at 1-55 A.M. as the Guard of 79 Up Goods at Maranwala wires (copy attached) that a bridge was seen on fire on the Down line. On return to Amritsar the Armoured Car will be sent to Attari as the Railway through telegraph wires and the Government telegraph wires have been cut near Attari. The driver of 58 Down, which arrived at 0-35, also reported a body of rioters with *luthis* near the line on the Lahore side of Amritsar Station, which the Armoured Car will disperse.

The Guard of 144 Down arrived here 2 hours, reports several telegraph poles seen lying on the ground between Jallo and Harbanspura.

9. From O. C. Armoured Train, 14th April 1919.

As directed Armoured Train No. 1 was taken out from Amritsar to patrol the line to Attari and pilot the Down Mail through. It left Amritsar at 22-20 hours. All was well up to Attari the reports showing that nothing unusual had occurred or was expected. On arrival at Attari the Station Master and Inspector of Police reported that nothing had so far occurred, but that they were expecting a raid by a mob of villagers and that they had reason to believe that this mob was already near the line not far above Attari between this and the next station Wagah as they had heard shouting from that direction. All being quiet at Attari the Armoured Train therefore proceeded to Wagah and on from there to Jallo the next station. Nothing unusual was seen, heard or ascertained. Consequently I wired to Lahore from Jallo about midnight to start the mail intending to patrol the line back to Attari in front of it and then to pilot it through to Amritsar one section ahead. When this wire had been sent we tried to get line clear back to Wagah but failed. I therefore got permission to proceed without line clear. Just as we were starting 17 Up passenger train entered Jallo and the driver stopped as he reported that Wagah Station had just been fired and that the mob about 250 strong had tried to rush his train but that he had slipped through. I therefore wired back to Lahore Cantonment to stop the Mail there or at Lahore and proceeded at once to Wagah, about 0-15 or thereabouts. On arrival at Wagah it was found to be burning but nothing more was seen and no one was visible even by careful use of the search-light. I one was visible even by careful use of the search-light. I therefore proceeded to Attari to see whether all was well there. Finding all was well there and as we were running short of water in the engine I decided to go back as far as Lahore Cantonment to definitely detain the Mail as it was not safe for it to proceed, take water and then return to Attari to patrol 71 Passenger then on the road and other goods trains from Attari to Jallo. Unfortunately, just before reaching Wagah the Armoured Train was derailed although proceeding with all caution due to complete rail length of permanent-way having been lifted bodily out of the track. This was between one and two hours and was the third time we had passed over this section within about an hour. The three leading vehicles, namely the mine exploding unit, the machine gun unit and 12-pounder gun were badly derailed, but no one injured. I took steps to protect the train and on examination found that a start had been made to cut the other line also, but that job had evidently been interrupted.

I tried to get communication with Lahore or Amritsar by tapping the line but failed. Between 2 and 3 hours an engine and brake-van came from Lahore with two B. Os. and 45 Indian rank and file, news of the burning of Wagah having been given by the driver of 17 Up in Lahore. I reported the facts to them. They decided to return to Lahore leaving one officer and 40 rank and file, the other officer going through to Lahore to report the facts. About 6 hours the Sub-Way Inspector arrived and restored

through running over the Up line about 6-30 hours and traffic can now be passed on Down line. About 9 hours another train arrived from Lahore with a crew breakdown staff, a section of Cooly Corps and more Native Infantry to assist in clearing the line. This work is now in progress and I hope that the line will be cleared by this evening. I propose then to proceed to Lahore with damaged vehicles to get them repaired. The repairs to these will take about a week.

Through working on the Down line should be restored this evening. The telegraph wires are also badly cut in several places between Jallo and Attari. The Sub-Way Inspector reported on his arrival that the Down line had been cut in several places about a mile and a half away from where the Armoured Train had been derailed and towards Attari. This was done after the Armoured Train had passed through and derailed. They must evidently have hid in the crops on either side of the line, as the Armoured Train passed, and then got to work as soon as it was clear, hence all done within about an hour during which the Armoured Train had passed three times over this section. Wagah is not badly burnt, the mob evidently having been interrupted by the Armoured Train. The mob was apparently trying to get the mail which was prevented, and also the burning of Attari was prevented by the arrival of the Armoured Train.

10. From Captain MacMillan, Fort, 14th April 1919.

I am informed by Canon Gifford of Tern Taran Mission that the Indian Doctor in charge of the Leper Asylum there is in difficulties, and also the rest of the Christians there.

There is also a European Lady Mission Doctor alone out at the Canal Bungalow, about 1½ miles N.W. of Valtola Station.

11. From R. B. Beckett, A. C., 14th April 1919.

Lieutenant Raghbir Singh of Raja Sansar reports that a village near Shahura in the direction of Attari is greatly disaffected. The people of the village were out last night with the intention of wrecking the Railway line, but only succeeded in cutting the telegraph.

12. From A. T. S., N.-W. R., Amritsar, 14th April 1919.

Telegraph communication with Lahore on the through wire destroyed. No down trains arriving. Armoured train which went out at 22 hours last night not returned. Wagah and Jallo Stations both reported burnt. Am sending out 2nd Armoured Train which was stabled here to discover nature of obstruction and if possible remove the same and restore communication.

13. From Miles Irving, 14th April 1919.

From Shahura to Attari on the main line of rail towards Lahore the villagers are disaffected and made attempts to cut the line but only cut wires as they had no proper implements.

14. From A. E. Giffins, 14th April 1919.

I have the honour to report that I brought the ladies in from Jundiala, reaching there at 1-30 A.M.

I am keeping them at my house for the night in view of the difficulty of getting them settled in for the night up at the Fort and the possibility of being refused entrance.

I should be very glad if the motor ambulance could be placed at their disposal to-morrow at 10 A.M. to take them and their things to the Fort.

15. From H. Harcourt, Deputy Commissioner, Gurdaspur, 15th April 1919.

On the whole the situation here is hopeful. Batala is a possible danger spot, so I have got in all Europeans and 35 Indian Christian school boys from there.

At Dharawal all is going strongly, but the Jail population there give cause for some anxiety.

There has, so far, been little open violence. Superintendent of Police and I both think the ladies can safely stay here so long as troops remain.

Continued.]

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People are sobering down. There has been (e.g., on Saturday night in the mosque with a joint Hindu and Muhammadan meeting) not a little violent talk.

16. From 2nd-Lt. I. W. Armstrong, Dhariwal, 15th April 1919.

The Gurkha picquet of 1 Indian officer and 25 men arrived safely with Mr. Bell on Sunday evening. I handed in a telegram on Monday morning reporting that all was well but this has not been forwarded owing to the wires being interrupted. I will arrange to send in a special messenger daily should the wires not be opened and railway communication remain closed.

The situation here is quiet on the surface though reports have been received through the police of contemplated attacks on the Mills and Europeans. These have not developed yet and not the slightest sign of disaffection has been visible as far as I am aware.

We have concentrated the Europeans including women and children in one bungalow fairly suitable for defence and have placed there all the arms and ammunition in our charge. The knowledge that we are prepared may be keeping malcontents quiet.

1 N. C. O. and 9 men of the R. G. A. and R. F. A. arrived here from Gurdaspur on Sunday, and remain on guard.

During the day we are working the Mills as usual and have no armed guard around the Mills, but after closing time the Gurkhas are posted and the bungalow above-mentioned is guarded by the 10 Gunners and our own contingent of the I. D. F. 11 men. In addition we have 26 of our own Gurkha guard in readiness.

The bazar is full of very wild rumours regarding the doings at Amritsar.

APPENDIX VI.

The inhabitants may burn or bury their dead as soon as they please. There must be no demonstration or disorder of any kind, the inhabitants must return to the city immediately after the ceremony.

(Sd.) R. E. DYER, Bd.-Genl.,
AMRITSAR; } Commanding 45th Infantry Brigade.
The 14th April 1919. }

APPENDIX VII.

Orders for the Special Constables organized to maintain law and order in Amritsar City and to bring to my notice the names of all citizens of Amritsar who were in any way implicated in unlawful meetings, in riots, or any other unlawful acts.

I look to these Special Constables as knowing the city and inhabitants to do all in their power in helping to bring the real culprits to justice.

Their duties are :-

- (1) Thoroughly patrol their respective Divisions as apportioned in the Scheme drawn up by Gopal Das and other members of the Committee.
- (2) Constant reports will be made as to how matters are progressing to the Provost Marshal.
- (3) Every Special Constable will report to him daily until further orders, at 10-00 hours, 13-00 hours and 17-00 hours.
- (4) All secret meetings of any kind must at once be brought to the notice of the Provost Marshal.

(Sd.) F. C. BRIGGS, Captain,
Brigade Major, 45th Brigade.

APPENDIX VIII.

Telegram (by aeroplane) No. 250-S., from General Staff Division, to General Brigade, Amritsar.

Your B-21. Your action correct and, Lieutenant-Governor approves.

APPENDIX IX.

To Headquarters, 16th Indian Division, Lahore.

Situation Report 17-30 hours.

Reference Meeting mentioned in my situation report of 16 hours. Results of the meeting were as follows :-

Shops would be opened as soon as possible beginning with Kutra Ahluwalian where piece-goods markets are situated.

Protection has been promised and so long as the behaviour of the inhabitants is good, water will be allowed them from the main. Shops to-morrow night need not close at twenty hours but remain open up to twenty-two hours.

Influential inhabitants who were present promised to obey the Sarkar.

A proclamation will be issued this evening by beat of drum to give effect to the above.

General Brigade.

(Sd.) F. C. BRIGGS, Captain,
Brigade-Major, 45th Brigade.

APPENDIX X.

To Sardar Arur Singh, C.I.E., Manager, Golden Temple.

The General Officer Commanding has heard that it is intended to hold a meeting in the Golden Temple. You are no doubt aware that such a meeting of the citizens of Amritsar would be contrary to all Sikh usages. You should therefore come and see the General immediately on receipt of this order, realising that the troops will all be used to protect your Golden Temple from any kind of indignity or harm.

(Sd.) F. C. BRIGGS, Captain,
Brigade Major,
45th Brigade.
12 Noon, }
The 14th April 1919. }

APPENDIX XI.

Report of Moveable Column, Gurdaspur, Dhariwal and Batala.

The Moveable Column ordered in my No. B-39, dated the 19th April 1919, proceeded by train to Gurdaspur 09-00 hours on the 21st instant, arriving at Gurdaspur 11-15 hours.

They were met by the Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police, Gurdaspur District, at 12-00 hours, the Column marched to the school where the heads of communities were collected and the General Officer Commanding addressed the meeting.

A list of Pleaders and Barristers who had taken an active part in the *hartal*, Gurdaspur, was obtained from the Superintendent of Police, this was forwarded to you under my No. P-2, dated the 22nd April 1919, with a request that their licenses be suspended.

The column returned to the train and the General Officer Commanding and the Brigade-Major proceeded with a suitable escort by train to Pathankot to inspect the Gurkha Detachment there, they returned 18-30 hours.

22nd April 1919.

Column proceeded by train to Dhariwal and marched through the bazaar at 09-00 hours, a meeting of heads of communities was held and the General Officer Commanding addressed the meeting. Five arrests of men, who caused shops to be shut on the evidence of Mr. Armstrong, I. D. F., were made.

Also a Government servant who acted in an insolent manner was arrested.

These men are now confined in Fort Govindgarh.

Column left by train and arrived Batala 13-00 hours. Heads of communities at Batala City were collected and addressed by the General Officer Commanding at 15-00 hours. Directly after this meeting, another meeting was

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[Continued.]

held of lambardars and villagers. The Column entrained at 16-00 hours and arrived Amritsar 17-15 hours.
(No. G-16, to Headquarters, 16th Indian Division, Lahore.)

(Sd.) F. C. BRIGGS, Captain,
for Brigadier-General, Commanding, 45th
Infantry Brigade.

APPENDIX XII.

Diary of Amritsar Moveable Column operating in the Bhugga-Atari Area from 24th April to 26th April 1919.

24th April 1919.

The Column as detailed in my No. B. E-39 of 19th April 1919 accompanied by the Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar District and the Mahunt (a big Sikh Priest, living at Guru Sat Sultani), moved out to Bhugga via Raja Sansee. Here a large Durbar was held at which all the influential men of the District attended.

The General Officer Commanding, and Mahunt addressed the meeting which passed off satisfactorily.

At 13 hours the Column resumed the march to Bhugga and arrived there 15 hours. Camped round Canal Bungalow, an ideal camp for the size of the Force.

All quiet during day and night.

25th April 1919.

Column moved to Attari at 09-00 hours.

The General Officer Commanding, with Cavalry and Armoured Car proceeded to Asrapur (near Beerowal) Mission Hospital. All was well. This hospital had been threatened on the night of the 12th instant and the two ladies, including Miss Purnell, were then sent in to Lahore on that night.

APPENDIX XIII.

Strength of troops when I arrived at Amritsar at 21-00 hours on 11th April was as follows :-

Unit.	Where from.	STRENGTH.		REMARKS.
		British.	Indian.	
1st G. B. Somerset L. I.	Original Garrison	184	...	In Fort Govindgarh, two officers and 44 men, R. G. A. and 1 officer and 15 men, I. D. F.
No. 12 Ammunition Column, R. F. A.	" "	41	...	Left for Lahore morning 13th having been recalled as trouble was expected there.
2-6th Bn., Royal Sussex	Lahore	130	...	
No. 2 Armoured Cars	"	13	...	
1-25th London Regiment	Jullundur	107	...	
54th Sikhs, F. F.	"	...	21	Left for Jullundur 18th.
59th Rifles, F. F.	"	...	101	
2-151st Infantry	"	...	130	
1-124th Baluchis	Lahore	...	181	Left for Lahore 14th.
9th Gurkhas	En route Peshawar	...	277	Left for Peshawar 19th.
TOTAL		475	710	

The re-inforcements had only arrived the morning of the 11th instant and consequently were very disorganised. Many very strong picquets were being formed with the result that the striking force was very small.

Continued.]

Brigdr.-Genl. R. E. H. DYER.

Strength of troops on 20th April.

Unit.	Where from.	STRENGTH.		REMARKS.
		British.	Indian.	
1-25th Londons	Jullundur	239	...	In Fort Govindgarh, two officers and 52 men R. G. A., one Officer and 15 men, I. D. F.
1st G. B. Somerset L. I.	Original Garrison	186	...	
1093rd Battery, R. F. A.	Jullundur	36	...	
Armoured Cars	Lahore	18	...	
No. 12 Ammunition Column, R. F. A.	Original Garrison	44	...	
40th Signal Company	Dalhousie	10	...	
Cavalry	Jullundur	...	54	
51st Sikhs, F. F.	"	...	53	
52nd Sikhs, F. F.	"	...	117	
59th Rifles, F. F.	"	...	81	
2-151st Infantry	"	...	126	
1-7th Gurkhas	Bakloh	...	105	
40th Signal Company	Dalhousie	...	24	
No. 12 Ammunition Column, R. F. A.	Original Garrison	...	80	
1093rd Battery, R. F. A.	Jullundur	...	10	
	TOTAL	533	650	

Duties, guards and picquets were very heavy as will be seen by the following statement:—

British troops were finding—

Nature.	No.
Station Picquets	37
Bridge Guard	11
Detachment, Tarn Taran	22
Armed train to Pathankote	26
Armoured train	17
Fort Govindgarh	86
Cantonments	190
TOTAL	389

which leaves a balance of 144, out of which regimental duties and guards had to be taken, and patrols were generally detailed as required.

Indian troops were finding—

Nature.	No.
Detachment, Dhariwal	26
" Tarn Taran	34
Train escort duties	80
Repairing line escort	10
Construction train	10
Blockhouse on railway from Amritsar to Atari	40
Amritsar picquet	132
Kotwali (reinforcing police)	50
TOTAL	382

which leaves a balance of 268, out of which regimental guards and duties had to be taken with reliefs, etc.

It will, therefore, be seen that it was seldom that more than 100 British and 200 Indians could be available as a striking force on 13th April. In addition to this, 5 picquets of 40 each were posted round the city, and so having left a reserve of 50 at Ram Bagh, only 50 rifles, plus 40 unarmed Gurkhas, and 2 armoured cars were available as a striking force. Forty British ranks had also been to Asrapore.

APPENDIX XIV.

Secret B. 21.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS 21-00, 11TH APRIL 1919 TO GENSTAFF DIVISION.

I arrived here on night of the 11th April, and the same night went through the city to bring the Superintendent of Police in charge of the city to hear personally what he had to say.

After consultation with the Deputy Commissioner and police officials I determined with a view to showing the

inhabitants that I had a sufficient military force to force them to law and order and also to arrest certain ring-leaders. This was carried out between 12-00 hours and 15-00 hours on 12th April.

I was aware that the inhabitants had been warned that they were not to hold meetings or followings, and that if they did so they would be fired on. To further enforce my wishes, a proclamation was proclaimed on morning of 13th by beat of drum in many of the main streets of the city, warning the inhabitants that unlawful acts would be punished by military force. On my way back from the city I was informed that the disaffected characters in the city had ordered a meeting in the Jallianwala Bagh at 16-30 hours. I did not think this meeting would take place in the face of what I had done.

At 16-00 hours I received a report from the Police that a gathering was beginning in the place mentioned above.

I immediately sent picquets to hold various gates of the city and marched with 25 rifles, 9th Gurkhas, and 25 rifles from detachments of 54th Sikhs, F. F. and 59th Rifles, F. F. making a total of 50 rifles, and also 40 Gurkhas armed with *kukris*. Two armoured cars also accompanied this party.

I entered the Jallianwala Bagh by a very narrow lane which necessitated my leaving my armoured cars behind.

On entering, I saw a dense crowd estimated at about 5,000; a man on a raised platform addressing the audience and making gesticulations with his hands.

I realised that my force was small and to hesitate might induce attack. I immediately opened fire and dispersed the crowd.

I estimate that between 200 and 300 of the crowd were killed. My party fired 1,650 rounds.

I returned to my Headquarters about 18-00 hours.

At 22-00 hours accompanied by a force, I visited all my picquets and marched through the city in order to make sure that my orders as to inhabitants not being out of their houses after 20-00, had been obeyed.

The city was absolutely quiet and not a soul to be seen.

I returned to Headquarters at midnight. The inhabitants have asked permission to bury the dead in accordance with my orders. This I am allowing.

I am,

SIR,

Your most obedient servant,

R. E. DYER,

Brig.-General, Commanding 45th Brigade.

Brigdr.-Genl. R. E. H. DYER.

Continued.

APPENDIX XV.

[Secret.]

WAR DIARY, AMRITSAR.

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of events and information.	REMARKS.	Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of events and information.	REMARKS.
AMRITSAR—contd.					
10th April 1919—					
13-00 hours	Mob collected in city and moved out towards Civil Station.			Armoured train passed a Goods train at mile 310-5 with engine and 8 vehicles derailed owing to permanent-way being torn up.	
	After warning them to disperse, the pliquet on Railway Bridge leading to Hall Gate, drove the mob away by fire—73 rounds were fired.		21-00 hours	Armoured train visited Kasur and found station wrecked, no casualties, train patrolled two stations beyond and back to Kasur.	
	At the same time another mob attacked the Telegraph Office and smashed telegraph material and Telegraph Master's quarters. A party of 8 men from a Detachment Depot, 54th Sikhs F. F. who had been sent up from Jullundur on 5th April to protect the Railway Station in case of necessity, led by Subedar Zardad Khan was sent to the Telegraph Office and by using the bayonet arrived at the Telegraph Office to find the Telegraph Master being dragged out of the building by the neck.			General Officer Commanding and Brigade-Major, 45th Brigade, arrived Amritsar.	
	Subedar Zardad Khan promptly bayoneted the man who had hold of the Telegraph Master and his party dispersed the mob—18 rounds were fired. The Subedar then returned to the Railway Station, leaving Lance-Naick Noman Shah in charge of the Telegraph Office.		12th April 1919—	Conference held with Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police and names of agitators obtained. All quiet.	
	In the meantime other mobs attacked the Alliance Bank of Simla, killed the Agent (Mr. J. M. Thompson) and committed damage to premises, and also burnt the National Bank to the ground, killing the Agent and his Assistant, Mr. Stewart and Mr. Scott, respectively.		00-30 hours	General Officer Commanding with escort proceeded to Kotwali and brought in the City Superintendent of Police. A long conference was held during which many more names were procured and arrangements for the arrests discussed.	
	A mob also assaulted and beat Miss Sherwood.		07-00 hours	Picquets along railway line were reduced to a minimum of two non-commissioned officers and nine men and remaining troops Headquarters were removed to Rambagh.	
13-45 hours	Portion of the Town Hall was burnt, also a portion of the Railway Goods Shed and Mission Church.		10-00 hours	Column marched through City to ascertain where mobs were reported collecting by aeroplanes.	
	Picquets were placed along the Railway line at all the bridges and level crossings, whilst the remainder of the troops were ordered to bivouac at Rambagh, a good camp and a central position.			All mobs met with soon dispersed. Column then marched to Kotwali and sent out parties to arrest agitators.	
18-00 hours	The body of Sergeant Rowlands (Military Works Services) was picked up near the Fort.		14-00 hours	Several important arrests were made including Ch. Bhugga and Dina Nath.	
	All quiet during the night.			Column returned to Rambagh. 50 Sabres from 11th Lancers and Guides Jullundur arrived.	
11th April 1919—				Proclamation No. 1 issued.	Appendix A.
02-00 hours	Reinforcements from 2-6th Royal Sussex Regiment and 1-124th Baluchis arrived from Lahore.		22-00 hours	Party of Londons in motor lorries sent to Asrapur Mission Hospital near Atari to rescue the Mission ladies who were calling for help.	
05-00 hours	Reinforcements from 1-25th Battalion, London Regiment (100 men, 2-151st Infantry (100) men and 59th Rifles (100) men under command of Major F. A. S. Clarke, D.S.O., London Regiment, arrived from Jullundur by special train.			Party found ladies being removed by armoured cars from Lahore, so returned.	
07-00 hours	Column marched through City and made 12 arrests, and troops received orders to restore order and use all force necessary, no gatherings or processions were allowed and all gatherings were to be fired on.			Messages from Dhariwal and Gurdaspur showed signs of unrest.	
12-00 hours	Station Master reported all lines between Amritsar and Lahore disconnected, probably near Atari.		13th April 1919—	50 Gurkhas from Bakloh ordered to Gurdaspur and 1 Indian officer and 25 Indian other ranks sent to Dhariwal from here.	
	Line party sent out to repair an armoured train ordered to Atari.		01-00 hours	All quiet up to midnight.	
	News received that Treasury at Tarn Taran twice attacked but mob repulsed. Troops sent to Tarn Taran as garrison.		12-40 hours	Column marched through City, a few arrests made, and proclamation No. 2 issued by beat of drum.	Appendix B.
			16-00 hours	On returning to Rambagh information was received that in spite of these stern proclamations, a big meeting would be held at Jallianwala Bagh at 16-30 hours, at which messages from Dr. Kitchlu would be read out.	
				Main gates of the City were picqueted and a force of 50 Indian ranks and two armoured cars proceeded to Jallianwala Bagh where they found the meeting in full swing with the lecturers on a raised platform addressing a very large crowd.	
				The crowd was dispersed by fire, 1,650 rounds were fired.	
				The armoured cars did not come into action. Casualties estimated at between 200 and 300 killed.	

Continued.]

Brigdr.-Genl. R. E. H. DYER.

WAR DIARY, AMRITSAR—continued.

Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of events and information.	REMARKS.	Hour, Date, Place.	Summary of events and information.	REMARKS.
AMRITSAR—contd.			AMRITSAR—contd.		
16-30 hours.	Party marched back, special precautions were taken during the night in case of reprisals.		12-00 hours	Column marched to School and General Officer Commanding addressed heads of communities.	
14th April 1919—	All quiet during night.		13-00 hours	Column returned to train and General Officer Commanding proceeded with escort to Pathankote to see the Garrison there. All was very quiet.	
01-00 hours	No. 1 Armoured train derailed near Wagah.		15-00 hours	General Officer Commanding returned and Column slept in train. All quiet during night.	
07-00 hours	Inhabitants requested and obtained permission to bury their dead with the strict understanding there was to be no procession or demonstration and eight men per corpse only to go out of the city. Telegraphic communication with Lahore and Jullundur again interrupted, and no Down trains arriving. Wagah and Jallo Stations both reported burnt.		22nd April 1919—	All quiet at Amritsar.	
	No. 2 Armoured train sent out to restore communications.		08-00 hours	Column proceeded to Dharawal. A meeting of heads of communities was addressed by General Officer Commanding.	
09-30 hours	More information received about the derailment of the armoured train near Wagah, one section rail and sleepers had been removed, and the armoured train had been badly damaged. Assistance was urgently asked for. The Down lines also at mile 321-10 were lifted and telegraph wires cut from miles 320 to 320-11.		12-00 hours	Column proceeded to Batala.	
			14-30 hours	Meeting of heads of communities was addressed by General Officer Commanding and after this another meeting of <i>lambardars</i> of neighbouring villages.	
17-00 hours	Column marched into City and General Officer Commanding addressed heads of communities in the Library. They promised to have the shops opened and protection was promised them. To carry this out a party of 1 British officer and 50 Gurkhas were posted at the Kotwali and patrolled the City at uncertain intervals with Police Guides. Shops were allowed to be kept open until 22-00 hours from and including 15th April 1919.		17-30 hours	Column arrived back at Amritsar. All quiet during night.	
15th April 1919—	Blockhouses with garrisons established at all small stations.		23rd April 1919	All quiet.	
10-00 hours	Dharawal and Gurdaspur cut off by wire, but special messenger reported well.		24th April 1919—		
11-00 hours	Column marched through Amritsar City. All quiet. All quiet during night.		07-00 hours	General Officer Commanding Division visited Amritsar. A Column under General Officer Commanding accompanied by Deputy Commissioner and a big Sikh priest, composed of 100 British ranks, 150 Indian ranks, 20 Cavalry, 1 Section of Royal Field Artillery moved to China Bugga and halted at Raja Sansar en route for a Durbar.	
16th April 1919	Villagers ordered to patrol railway line from Beas to Atari.		09-00 hours	The General Officer Commanding addressed the meeting which was a big and influential one.	
	Situation from 15th April 1919 well in hand.		13-00 hours	The Column resumed its march to China Bugga and arrived there 15-00 hours.	
	No crimes or damages to report Amritsar District. Party of 3 British officers and 153 Indian other ranks, 32nd Sikhs, arrived from Jullundur.		25th April 1919	All quiet during night, and at Amritsar.	
17th April 1919	All quiet. Usual patrols through City.		09-00 hours	Column moved to Atari where a large Durbar was held at 16-00 hours. Camped for night round Atari P. W. D. Rest-house.	
18th April 1919	All quiet, usual patrols through City, 1 British officer, 3 Gurkha officers and 100 ranks arrived from Bakloh. 1 Section 109th Battery and 3 British officers and 50 Indian other ranks from Jullundur.		26th April 1919—	1 British officer, 2 Gurkha officers and 101 ranks arrived from Bakloh (1-7th Gurkhas).	
19th April 1919	All quiet, usual patrols through the City.		06-00 hours	Names of 11 men from villages of Dilake, Shuhura, and Dhwana Khurd implicated in the burning of Wagah Station were obtained, also 5 men from Atari in possession of stolen bank property.	
20th April 1919	All quiet, usual patrols through the City.		08-00 hours	Column returned to Amritsar, arriving there 13-00 hours. All quiet during night.	
21st April 1919—			27th April 1919	All quiet, usual patrols in the City. Headquarters, 1-25th Battalion, London, Regiment, arrived at Amritsar.	
09-00 hours	General Officer Commanding with Movable Column consisting of 100 Londons, 100 Indian ranks and 20 Cavalry proceeded by special train to Gurdaspur.		28th April 1919	All quiet, usual patrols in the City.	
			29th April 1919	All quiet, usual patrols in the City.	
			30th April 1919	General Officer Commanding proceeded to Jullundur and held a conference of Officers Commanding Units. All quiet up to date, 350 arrests made.	

(Sd.) F. C. BRIGGS, Captain,
Brigade-Major, 45th Brigade.AMRITSAR,
Dated 1st May 1919.

Brigdr.-Genl. R. E. H. DYER—concluded—Khan Sahib AHMAD JAN.

PROCLAMATION NO. I.

NOTICE.

The inhabitants of Amritsar are hereby warned that if they cause damage to any property, or will commit any acts of violence, in the environs of Amritsar, it will be taken for granted that such acts are due to the incitement in Amritsar City. Any offenders will be punished according to Martial Law.

All meetings and gatherings are hereby prohibited and will be dispersed at once under Martial Law.

(Certified true copy.)

(Sd.) F. C. BRIGGS, Captain,
Brigade-Major, 45th Brigade.

Dated 12th April 1919.

PROCLAMATION NO. II.

1. It is hereby proclaimed to all whom it may concern that no person residing in the city is permitted or allowed to leave the city in his own private or hired conveyance or on foot without a pass from one of the following officers.

The Deputy Commissioner.

The Superintendent of Police, Mr. Rehill.

The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mr. Plomer.
The Assistant Commissioner, Mr. Beckett.

Mr. Connor, Magistrate.

Mr. Seymour, Magistrate.

Agha Mohammad Hussain, Magistrate.

The Police Officer in charge of the City Kotwali.

This will be a special form and pass.

2. No person residing in Amritsar City is permitted to leave his house after 20-00 hours.

Any persons found in the streets after 20-00 hours are liable to be shot.

3. No procession of any kind is permitted to parade the streets in the City or any part of the City or outside of it at any time.

Any such processions or gatherings of four men will be looked upon and treated as an unlawful assembly and dispersed by force of arms, if necessary.

(Certified true copy.)

(Sd.) F. C. BRIGGS, Captain,
Brigade-Major, 45th Brigade.

Dated 13th April 1919.

Khan Sahib AHMAD JAN, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Amritsar.

1. I have been in Amritsar for 23 months. I came as City Inspector. I was made Deputy Superintendent in May 1918.

I was in Headquarters on the 30th March, and on the 6th April I was on duty at the Kotwali. There was a *hartal* that day also. This *hartal* was said to have been made at the instigation of Kitchlew and Satyapal. I am not, however, in charge of the city and do not really know what influence Kitchlew and Satyapal had with the people. The *hartal* was arranged beforehand. I was on duty in the city on the 10th April. I came to office that day about 10-30, and about 11-30 I got a note from the City Inspector to the effect that I was to go to the Kotwali. The orders were from Mr. Plomer, Deputy Superintendent of Police. I put on uniform and went to the Inspector's house. This is about 400 yards from the Kotwali just off the Hall Gate Bazar, and I must have arrived at about 12-15. The Inspector told me that Satyapal and Kitchlew had been arrested and despatched to some unknown destination, and that there was apprehension of some demonstration and that was why I had been called. We both then went to the Kotwali.

I did not see Mr. Plomer that day, nor Mr. Rehill. I received no orders direct from either of these officers. I had received no prior information that Kitchlew and Satyapal were to be arrested. I received no orders in writing about my responsibilities at the Kotwali, nor any other sort of orders other than what the Inspector told me. On my arrival at the Kotwali, I found three reserves (armed) there and the detective staff and others of the Kotwali force. On the way to the Kotwali there was no sort of unrest. At about 12-30, however, people began to pass towards the Hall Bazar and later they began to pass in crowds. They were angry and were calling out *Kitchlew ki jai*, *Satyapal ki jai*, *Hindu-Muslim ki jai*. I received news that the crowd had collected in the Aitchison Park and intended going to the Deputy Commissioner's house. The City Inspector told me that he had informed Mr. Plomer about this. No Police officers other than the detectives were with the crowd. Information came in later that there had been firing at the Railway crossing, and that some men had been killed. An attempt was made by some persons to

break in the front entrance of the Kotwali. I went there and found the glasses of doors broken, but the offenders had escaped. The people seemed to be getting more excited. I therefore ordered the reserves to fall in front of the Kotwali. The men were still falling in when a man brought the news at about 1-30 that the Chartered Bank had been attacked and destroyed and two *Sahibs* were there in great danger. I directed the City Inspector to take a reserve and go there, but he said he had orders not to leave the Kotwali. I therefore taking an armed reserve went there. There were about 2,000 persons, I should say inside the Bank and outside. We rushed at them and I called "Seize them," "Seize them"; they thereupon ran away. I got to the Bank and asked the *babus* about the *Sahibs*; they said they were alive and upstairs. I posted my men and searched the premises. They came out on to the balcony. I reassured the *Sahibs*. As there were lots of people about I waited till about 3 o'clock before taking them to the Kotwali. I sent them in charge of Labhu Ram and a Head Constable to the Kotwali. I sent the *Sahibs* through the Municipal gardens and I, with a few of my men, went round the road up to the front entrance of the Kotwali to divert the attention of the people still passing through the Hall Road. Seeing the *Sahibs* had reached the Kotwali I returned to the Bank. I eventually returned to the Kotwali about 5 p.m. On my return to the Kotwali I found two more *Sahibs* there, Mr. Jarman, and a Military Sergeant, the safety of all these European gentlemen was in all respects properly looked after up to midnight when they were made over to the Military who took them to the Fort. I learnt then about the National Bank and Alliance Bank, and that guards had been sent there. No report about these Banks had come while I was in the Kotwali. The smoke and the glow from the National Bank, could not be seen from where I was at the Chartered Bank, nor could the Alliance Bank. The Town Hall was fired shortly after I reached the bank. It was quite impossible, however, for me to leave the Bank and the *Sahibs*, nor could I for the moment take them to the Kotwali. I knew also that there were sufficient people in the Kotwali. There were crowds passing continually outside the Kotwali. Their appearance was exactly what it had been on the 6th.

Sardar Bahadur SARDAR SUKHA SINGH—LALA JOWAHAR LAL—Mr. B. BROCAS HOWELL—Mr. A. J. W. KITCHIN.

Sardar Bahadur SARDAR SUKHA SINGH, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab.

I was not at Amritsar during the disturbances and, therefore, am not an eye-witness to the events. I was ordered to go to Amritsar for investigation of cases in conjunction with the local police. I reached there on 18th April 1919, and after waiting upon Mr. Rehill, Superintendent of Police, and other officers started the investigation on 19th April 1919. Up to this time, although a large number of persons were arrested who were in the lock-up at Kotwali in Jail and in Fort, but no case was registered under the impression that the Martial Law Courts will decide those cases summarily. Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors were investigating individual cases under the supervision of four Gazetted Officers of the provincial service:—

- (1) Myself.
- (2) Mr. Plomer.

LALA JOWAHAR LAL, Inspector of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab, Lahore.

I was at Lahore on 9th April and saw a good deal of the *Ram Naumi* procession and can speak about its political character.

On April 10th, I went to Amritsar from Lahore by the Calcutta Mail. I arrived there about 4.15 p.m. I went to consult the Public Prosecutor about a gold melting case. I learned at the Lahore Station that there had been a riot at Amritsar, but I heard no details. When I arrived at Amritsar I heard that the mob had set fire to the Railway Goods Shed, and I saw the corpse of Guard Robinson. I intended to go to the city, but was advised not to do so. Went there later about 7.30 p.m. in plain clothes. The clock near the Hall Gate was broken. The Baptist Church Mission room was on fire as were also the National Bank of India and the Municipal Hall. I passed through several bazars. People were passing in groups. Many had *lathis*. They were city people. People were openly abusing Government and Europeans. They said if troops entered the city, they would kill them with bricks thrown from the roofs of houses and *lathis*. Then I went back to the station. Went again to the city about 11 p.m. City police armed with *lathis* were patrolling the streets. When I had been the first time to the city, I went to Khair Din Mosque. Saw only one corpse there which had not then been identified. People said other corpses had been taken away by relatives and would be brought again next morning. On April 11th, I went to the City again in early morning. I went to the Khair Din

(3) Khan Sahib Ahmad Jan.

(4) Sardar Sahib Bishan Singh.

Mr. Howell, Superintendent of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, was our head, and I had to assist him in going through the evidence and preparing the *challans* for submission to courts and I had also to advise and help the staff.

I returned to Lahore on 7th June 1919. 108 cases were prepared and sent up before the courts. Almost all the witnesses found out by the police were to be produced before the Magistrate by whom their statements were recorded. So at a time from one to three Magistrates, 1st and 2nd Class, had to sit at the Kotwali daily, which place was the headquarters of the investigation.

Mosque between 7 and 8 a.m. People were collecting and bodies were being brought. When there was a big crowd I saw Bashir come up on horseback; I knew him before by sight. I also saw Dina Nath whom I had seen in Lahore. He was in the middle of a crowd which he was addressing. I heard nothing of what he said and as some one called out that a Criminal Investigation Department dog was about, I went off. Then I came back to Lahore by the Calcutta Mail on April 11th. Went again to Amritsar on night of April 12th. I arrived there by the Bombay Mail. People in the city were still passing in groups and abusing Government and shops were shut. They were saying that only five Europeans had been killed, while dozens of their women had become widows. This was in early morning of April 13th. Many of them had *lathis*. Went about the city all that day and went to Jallianwala Bagh about 4 p.m. Saw large crowd there, but could hear nothing. On the way had heard people saying "What can the military do." I thought the troops might come, so I only stayed there 2 or 3 minutes. Seditious Meeting Act has been applied at 11 a.m. that day, and the meeting was held in contravention of orders. There must have been over 20,000 people there. Their attitude was very hostile, and they were shouting and praising Gandhi, Kitchlew and Satyapal. From April 13th—18th I was at Amritsar, but was put on some special confidential duty. I joined the investigation in the cases on April 20th.

Mr. B. BROCAS HOWELL, Superintendent of Police, Criminal Branch, Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab.

I was not at Amritsar when the outbreak occurred there, but was subsequently deputed in order to superintend, in conjunction with the Superintendent of Police, Amritsar, the investigation of the various cases connected with the outbreak.

It is specifically laid down that officers of the Criminal Investigation Department deputed to assist in the investigation of cases shall in no way supersede the local police who shall continue to be responsible for the conduct of the case and for its final presentation in Court. This procedure was followed throughout the enquiries at Amritsar.

Cases were not put up direct to tribunals but a summary of evidence in each case was forwarded through the Deputy Inspector-General of Police to the Legal Remembrancer, who after full consideration decided to which tribunals they should be sent and the offence for which they should be tried.

In all 108 cases were investigated, comprising 533 accused.

My work at Amritsar was completed on the 9th June 1919, and I returned to Lahore the same day.

Mr. A. J. W. KITCHIN, C.I.E., I.C.S., Commissioner of Lahore.

On the morning of the 6th April, when the first *hartal* was held in Lahore, I received news that a crowd was trying to come down the Mall and I went out to the spot. I was on the Mall near the Post Office for about an hour, and saw the crowd stopped and turned back. Both Police and Cavalry were on duty. The demeanour of the crowd on the whole was

fairly good tempered, but they were entirely defiant of discipline, and were actually taken away by their own leaders, when it began to appear that in the event of further defiance a collision with the military would be inevitable.

On the 10th of April, I received a telephone call in office at about 1.30 p.m., telling me that there

Mr. A. J. W. KITCHIN.

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was trouble in Amritsar, and that I was to go down at once. The orders came direct from Government House. After making some brief enquiries and necessary preparations, I left in a motor car with Mr. Donald, Deputy Inspector-General of Police, and Mr. Coode, Superintendent, Telegraphs. We reached the Khalsa College nearly two miles from Amritsar, soon after 4 p.m., where we heard that the trouble was much worse than we had anticipated, and that the banks were burned and a number of Europeans killed. On the road as we came along all was quiet and there was no sign of disturbances. We then went to the Station Staff Office in Cantonments and thence to the Railway Station, where we found the Officer Commanding troops. We then went in search of the Deputy Commissioner and found him supervising the removal of women and children to the fort. I fetched him down to the Railway Station and established headquarters at that place. The situation then was very serious indeed, the number of troops was very small and anxiety was expressed about the possibility of holding the Railway line and also as regards the attitude of the Labour Corps, 2,000 strong, who were encamped behind us in Cantonments. Nothing was known of the Police guard in the Kotwali, and it was supposed that they had been killed. It was rumoured that there were still Europeans alive in the city, but there was no means of communication between the city and the troops holding the Railway Station and bridges. By this time a troop train of Gurkhas had been stopped at the station, and some of them were being armed with rifles when we arrived. It was decided that a party should fight their way into the city in order to get out the Europeans who were alleged to be in danger. While arrangements were being made a letter was brought out from the Police Officer in the Kotwali, saying that all the Europeans alive were inside and were in no danger. Having regard to the difficulties of street fighting, and to the absolute necessity of holding the civil station and the Treasury, I decided to await the arrival of troops which were expected from Lahore.

About 11 p.m., a troop train came in from Lahore with reinforcements, under the command of Major Macdonald. On his arrival I told him that the situation was beyond civil control, and that he, as senior military officer, was to take such steps as the military situation demanded. I also advised that a party should go into the city at once and fight their way to the Kotwali to reinforce the police and to bring away the survivors among the Europeans. A party went in at once and were accompanied only by guides, and by no civil magistrate, as I did not wish to embarrass the military officer in command with the presence of a civil officer senior to himself. Meanwhile, headquarters remained at the Railway Station. The surviving Europeans were brought out alive and the Kotwali reinforced without resistance or fighting.

Next day, some emissaries came in from the city to arrange processions for the burying of the dead. Their attitude was entirely defiant and the situation continued to be a purely military one. Reports of outrages all round Amritsar continued to come in, and it was perfectly clear that unless peace and order were to be established in Amritsar, the trouble would spread indefinitely. In fact a state of war already existed. Constant rumours were coming in of the mutiny of troops, and while we had definite news that there was trouble in Lahore, we also heard rumours that the troops in Lahore had mutinied, and that Lahore Fort had been taken. I did not believe in any of these rumours, but they were being bandied about eagerly in the city. The burial of the dead, at which I had expected fighting, took place without incident on the afternoon of the 11th April, and later on I returned to Lahore with Mr. Donald to report to the Lieutenant-Governor and to see the condition of things in Lahore. I had already asked the Agent of the North-Western Railway to stop all railway booking to Amritsar until the situation was easier. By

this time all telegraph lines were down and we could only communicate with Lahore irregularly by the phonograph which connected Station Masters at Lahore and Amritsar and which can be worked when any of the lines are still uncut.

On arrival in Lahore, I reported the situation to the Lieutenant-Governor and told him that I had made over command to the Officer-in-charge of troops. Next morning I returned to Amritsar with Mr. Donald by motor and found the road fairly quiet, though rumours were spreading fast. I was advised on the road that the trouble would go further unless Amritsar riots were stopped at once. In Amritsar, I found that General Dyer had arrived with more troops and taken over command and had removed headquarters to the Rambagh. By this time the district officers had some information of the ringleaders, and it was decided that sufficient force should go in to make arrests. A number of ringleaders were arrested, and brought out, the troops forming an escort to the police who made the arrests. Up to this time no one could enter Amritsar without the gates being picketed and the side streets guarded and without adopting proper military precautions, so that the smallest force that could enter the city would of necessity have to be of a considerable number. I issued orders prohibiting all gatherings in the streets and saying that all assemblies of more than five persons would be liable to be dispersed by fire without further warning.

In the evening, I returned to Lahore, and remained in Lahore on Sunday, the 13th April. On the 14th, at 3 a.m., I was aroused by telephone and proceeded to Government House, where I first had news of firing in the Jallianwala Bagh. I was told to go out at once, and went off with two cars and an escort. We arrived at about 8 a.m. and I saw General Dyer and discussed the situation with him. In the evening I returned again with Mr. Donald to Lahore. On the way we went to the Railway Station and I personally decided the "Kirpan" case which was afterwards so much misrepresented. I may add that on Saturday, the 12th, had happened the rioting in Kasur which place was also in the Division. I returned to Lahore on the evening of the 14th and there I heard for the first time of the burning of Gujranwala. When I reached Government House at about 6 p.m., I found that the Lieutenant-Governor was of opinion that Colonel O'Brien and all the Europeans in Gujranwala had been murdered. We heard the aeroplanes returning while I was with Sir Michael O'Dwyer. I had already on an earlier occasion, probably in the evening of 12th April, told the Lieutenant-Governor that, in my opinion, Martial Law was inevitable, and we discussed that course together. I did not go out to Gujranwala or to Chuharkana until a later date, when the rebellion was quelled and the British Government had regained control.

II.—Causes.

The Rowlatt Act was of course the occasion and not the cause of the trouble. Few of the opponents of the Act had read it, but they knew that it was passed in the face of the whole of the Indian representatives on the Imperial Council, showing that Indians had no power in their own country.

Up to a point the agitation was very successful. A campaign of lies began which was very ingenious and was successful beyond belief. The general dislike of the police, which is very deep-seated indeed, was utilised to the full by stories of enormous powers of summary arrest which were to be conferred upon them. The stories about the intended interference in marriage customs and domestic life can undoubtedly be traced to the Patel Marriage Bill, which orthodox Hinduism regards with horror. The general rumour about confiscation of property comes from annoyance at the enhanced Income Tax and Excess Profits Tax. The old commercial resentment of the Punjab Land Alienation Act can be traced in others of the rumours which were afloat is most interesting and instructive, and reveals much of the secret grievances and aspirations of the political classes. The

Continued.]

Mr. A. J. W. KITCHIN.

spread of rumours was most successful. The Rowlett Act became the Black Act, so black that it was impious even to read it. None of the lower classes and very few of the educated had ever read the Act or had the least idea of its provisions. Any attempt at instruction was resented. Copies distributed to the public were burned as unclean. The city women in their houses were more moved than I have ever known them before. It was, in short, a Hindu movement of bitter misrepresentation, and the Muhammadans were gathered in by means of the racial mistrust which is always dormant. National feeling in India is growing, but its cement is racial feeling. As education spreads, the desire for Indian rule and the dislike of foreign rule becomes stronger and stronger.

Economic causes of unrest are not wanting. High prices and difficulties of supply have caused much distress in towns, while the agricultural classes generally are prosperous. There is no feeling in India stronger than the desire to be let alone in private life. There is no desire for efficiency, but a strong desire for domestic liberty entrenched among the ramparts of customary and personal law. The trader wants to be let alone in his methods of trading and the farmer to be let alone in his farm. This is the cause of the general unpopularity of the police, who by the very nature of their occupations are compelled to interfere in domestic matters and to lift the purdah of family disputes. If the police were always discreet and always upright they would still be unpopular in India. The agricultural classes have no especial present causes of discontent. Prices are high, markets good and revenue light, while racial antipathy is not strong among them. Appeals were made to their general dislike of the police and to their love of their land. The appeals were not successful partly for lack of organisation, and partly for lack of interest. Most important of all the wheat crop was standing dead ripe in the fields in the middle of April and if all hands did not turn out to cut the crop it would be lost. The commercial classes had other grievances. Among the moneyed classes the resentment against the income tax is as real as it is interesting and unreasonable. It was looked upon as extortion and as an interference with the rights of trade. The income tax assessment was not unfair, but the new Income tax Act searches deep and the Special Income tax staff did their first year of enquiry. In the Lahore Division the following towns came under Special Income tax assessment and the increase was very large:—

Lahore.	Kasur.
Amritsar.	Patti.
Gujranwala.	Khem Karan.
Wazirabad.	Sialkot.
Hafizabad.	Chunian.
Sangla.	Pattoki.
Chuharkana.	Nankana.
Akalgah.	Sohdra.
Eminabad.	

With the exception of the last five alone, there were disturbances at every place. It would be idle to pretend that this is mere coincidence.

In November and December 1918 wheat stocks were seized under the Defence of India Act to stop speculation and to reduce the price of grain to the poor. This action of Government was grossly misrepresented and was looked up on as extortion committed for the benefit of the people of England. Among the places at which wheat stocks were seized under the Defence of India Act were:—

Amritsar,
Kasur,
Patti,
Lallpur,
Gojra,

all of which were centres of disturbances. Judicial corruption is understood in India and is not much resented. Police procedure, honest or corrupt, legal chicanery, forgery and false evidence are the products of British rule and are bitterly resented.

Moreover, the resentment is directed not at the oppressors, but at the Government.

III.—Martial Law.

The real need for Martial Law was to prevent the spread of disorders. In no place had the Civil Government, aided by military forces, actually lost and failed to recover control. We lost control at Amritsar on 10th April, and did not recover control of the city till 12th April when the first arrests were made. We lost control at Gujranwala on 14th April and recovered control next day. Sangla, Hafizabad, Chuharkana and Batala were entirely out of control until troops arrived. No Government can claim to control a locality, where criminals can defy arrest, and when the local officials dare not make arrests for fear of an outbreak. But martial law was really wanted not to recover control for this had already been done by the rifles of the troops, but to prevent the spread of the infection. The towns were in open insurrection, but the townspeople have no military value at all. It was necessary to strike quickly and to strike hard in order to save the rural people and above all to save the army from infection. In the Amritsar Tahsil at least the danger was great and imminent. The Jats were collecting for loot, encouraged by the immunity of the Amritsar Mobs. The crowd in Amritsar was scattered on 13th April and as the news spread the villages settled down. All independent opinion is united that the blow struck on 13th April in Amritsar saved the central Punjab from anarchy, loot and murder. At that time Martial Law had not been declared.

Martial Law was necessary to provide summary courts for the clearance of the lock-ups which were full of arrests. Delay was most undesirable, and it was necessary to show at once that the rising had failed. The single magistrate courts were not empowered until long after the tribunals, and one of the advantages of prompt jail clearance was partially lost.

On the whole Martial Law worked very well and the judicial officers who sat as judges in the summary courts showed no undue haste, or prejudice or relaxation of the established standards of evidence. The courts worked quickly, but they did justice as a court must do justice, which works in public, hears both sides and decides judicially.

The proclamation of Martial Law meant of necessity that the ultimate control of the civil administration passed to the military. There was actually very little friction, but the demands made on civil officers and on officers commanding to exercise tact and urbanity in their mutual dealings were very heavy. The work would have been better done if the ultimate decision of all matters had rested with the Punjab Government and if the district officers had remained in undisputed charge of their districts with the assistance of military support. Two military divisions were included in the martial law area and there were a number of independent commands. There was in fact almost no friction, but the constant effort to avoid friction was a very real strain. Not only did Deputy Commissioners cease to be in supreme charge of their districts, but as District Magistrates they ceased to be in control of police investigations. In none of the instructions for the investigation and presentation of martial law cases before the tribunals or the summary courts is there any mention of the District Magistrate or of his ultimate responsibility. District Police officers generally continued to work with the District Magistrates in accordance with the traditions of subordinates and good will which invariably govern their relations, but neither District Magistrates nor Superintendents of Police were always in touch with the doings of the special police officers deputed by the Criminal Investigation Department. This was not necessary, nor desirable. No ill-effects happened, but then here again there were great demands on the tact and forbearance of District officers. If Martial Law comes again for anything less than an extreme state of military and civil insurrection, then in my

Mr. A. J. W. KITCHIN—concluded—OBAIDULLAH—KHUSHABI RAM.

opinion the ultimate control of the civil administration, including Martial Law Regulations and Orders and Martial Law Courts, should remain with the Lieutenant-Governor and the control of districts should be left with district officers.

The effect of Martial Law on the people was immediate. From the very first there was no resistance of any kind. Many of the respectable or moneyed classes felt an instant sense of relief. Crime stopped, the feeling of insecurity ended and the criminals and disorderly classes went under the ground. No one could be expected to like Martial Law, but peace was agreeable to all respectable people and the control of prices was very popular. Not a shot was fired after Martial Law was proclaimed, nor was a single order openly disobeyed. Lahore and Amritsar remained sulky, but the villages were unaffected. The stopping of booking on the railway was very unpopular and troublesome, but that was the result of the insecurity of the railways and not of Martial Law.

IV.—Nature of the movement.

The movement was definitely racial and anti-European. The Indian Christians, though viewed with suspicion, were not attacked, while Americans and other foreigners were in equal danger from British subjects. The Arya Samaj was involved from top to bottom with all its organisation. A general strike on the railway had of course been intended, and it failed partly from lack of organisation and partly from lack of courage. Railway subordinates were generally obstructive, and sometimes actually hostile. Workshop employees were similarly affected, largely through economic discontent, and a general strike was very narrowly averted. Clear proof of actual revolutionary causes being at work is given by the attitude of the Amir of Afghanistan. His absurd proclamation to the peoples of India with its familiar travesty of the Rowlett Act might have been written by an unbalanced school boy in an

Indian bazar. The spread of the movement to Afghanistan is absolute proof that the organisation was widespread.

V.—Notice of Officers.

As a general rule Government officers of all grades and departments stood firm. Exception must be made of the Railway who were generally unsound, and of the Post Office officials who were much affected. In other departments work in the offices went just as usual, in spite of strong pressure brought to bear on the clerks, who were then suffering from special grievances in respect of their pay. On the other hand, this was due in the main to the spirit of caution which permeated the masses included in the disturbances—clerks were afraid of dismissal, students of missing examinations, and all alike of being shot. Tahsildars and Extra Assistant Commissioners, with one or two exceptions, all did their best and worked hard. With one or two exceptions none of them showed any personal courage, initiative, nor acceptance of responsibility. But for the British officers and their more virile methods there would have been general anarchy. The Police force did best of all, and though they showed on general occasions no desire to proceed to extremities or to run risks, yet several Police officers showed initiative and firmness of a high order, while with very few exceptions the whole force was loyal. In fact, the Police officers showed up a good deal better than the Magistrates. There is also very little doubt that during the investigations which followed the Police of some places extorted a good deal of blackmail. This was one substantial reason for expediting the investigation of cases, as protracted investigation and judicial delay led inevitably to blackmail. Bribes are paid to avoid arrest, and not on cases which appear before the courts. This was also a reason for stopping arrests and prosecutions, as soon as ring-leaders and active agents had been arrested and order restored.

OBAIDULLAH, Sub-Inspector of Police, Amritsar Kotwall.

I was present at meetings held in Amritsar on 31st January 1919, 5th February 1919, 9th February 1919, 11th February 1919, 21st February 1919, 22nd-23rd February 1919, 26th February 1919, 28th February 1919, 23rd March 1919, 22nd March 1919, 29th March 1919, 30th March 1919, 2nd April 1919, 6th April 1919, and reported their proceedings to the City Inspector, Muhammad Ashraf Khan. The Police Diaries reports* printed at pages 1 to 22 were made by me. The report at page 23 was made by some other reporter. I myself removed the hand bill saying *Marne marne ho* and produced it at the trial of Amritsar Conspiracy Case where it was marked as Exhibit P. 44.


KHUSHABI RAM, late Station Master, outside Jhang Bazar, Lyallpur.

As I lived at Amritsar up to 11th April 1919 as a parcel clerk and had occupied a bungalow of Hargobind buildings where the mob was fired first of all on the 10th April last in my presence and for which story, as I presume, was arrested, dismissed and about Rs. 1,200

are forfeited by the Railway innocently, I therefore want to give my evidence before the Committee during the current month because I have to go to Calcutta on the end of this month.

(2) My four sons named Vishvakarma, Jaideva, Vidyadhar and Dev Datta were also confined by the police of Lyallpur.

* Not reproduced.



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