

THE DISORDERS INQUIRY COMMITTEE

EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

Disorders Inquiry Committee

VOLUME

II

BOMBAY PRESIDENCY



XX.B

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Volume II

PART I

Minutes of Evidence, Ahmedabad.

At Ahmedabad, Monday, the 5th January 1920.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.F., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B.,
K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., *Secretary*.

Mr. G. E. CHATFIELD, I.C.S., District Magistrate, Ahmedabad.

the President—

Q. Mr. Chatfield, you are District Magistrate at Ahmedabad?

A. I am, Sir.

Q. How long have you been in that position?

A. I came here in May 1917.

Q. And, as I understand, Viramgam is included in your district?

A. It is.

Q. And is Kaira?

A. No, that is another district.

Q. When did the *Satyagraha* movement start in Ahmedabad?A. The *Satyagraha Sabha* or the movement?A. The *Satyagraha* movement.

Q. The movement first came to my notice in the spring of 1918.

Q. You mean by that Mr. Gandhi's *Ashram*?

A. Yes.

Q. In connection with the passive resistance to the Rowlatt legislation, as I understand it started in February 1919?

A. Quite so, Sir.

Q. And at that time there was a meeting held over which Mr. Patel presided?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Then again on the 24th of February was there another meeting at Mr. Gandhi's *Ashram* attended by Mr. Gandhi and Messrs. Horniman, Jamnadas Bhabhabhai and some others?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And at that meeting was a decision come to to start a passive resistance campaign unless the Rowlatt Bills were dropped?

A. So it was reported to me.

Q. I think at that time the Rowlatt Bills were before the Legislative Council in Delhi?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were the *Satyagraha* manifesto and vow published in the *Bombay Chronicle* of the 2nd March?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And that manifesto, of which you have supplied us with a copy,* contained a form of oath to be taken by *Satyagrahis* to refuse civilly to obey those laws; that is to say, the Rowlatt Act and such laws as a Committee, hereafter to be appointed, should think fit?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. The oath had in addition a proviso that *Satyagrahis* were to refrain from violence?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did that manifesto create a considerable amount of excitement in Ahmedabad?

A. Well, it was discussed very much.

Q. Were a large number of posters issued?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think those contained quotations from Thoreau and asked the people to join in the passive resistance movement?

A. It did, Sir.

Q. We have been supplied with copies of these posters† and I need not trouble you further upon them. The posters apparently issued from the *Satyagrahi* organisation?

A. I presume so, Sir.

Q. Were large meetings of the people held about this time?

A. They were.

Q. And did the mill-hands of Ahmedabad attend in large numbers?

A. Yes.

Q. In that connection, Ahmedabad is of course a town with a large population of about 300,000 and it contains something like 78 mills, employing 30,000 to 40,000 mill-hands?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. The *Satyagraha* movement was a movement, initiated by Mr. Gandhi?

* Para 21 of the statement of the Bombay Government, page 192.

† Appendix 3 to the statement of the Bombay Government, page 507.

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Mr. G. E. CHATFIELD.

[Continued.]

A. It was, Sir.

Q. And he particularly applied it to the passive resistance movement against the Rowlatt legislation?

A. Yes.

Q. Had Mr. Gandhi acquired a very considerable influence in Ahmedabad and particularly among the mill-hands there?

A. That is so, Sir.

Q. I think, as you have explained to us, and I do not think it is necessary to go into the details, he was instrumental in effecting a settlement of a strike of mill-hands that occurred some time ago?

A. A dispute between the mill-hands and the mill owners. It was a lock-out rather than a strike.

Q. But anyhow as a result of the negotiations that took place there, Mr. Gandhi obtained great popularity among the mill-hands?

A. That is so, Sir.

Q. About February 1919 did a number of unregistered newspapers begin to appear?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And in an appendix* you have referred us to certain of those newspapers?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. As a result of this agitation was the city worked up into a state of excitement?

A. It was excited.

Q. And the *Satyagraha Sabha* was formed in Ahmedabad I think on the 20th of March?

A. That is so, Sir.

Q. *Satyagraha Sabha* is I suppose just a *Satyagraha* society?

A. That is so.

Q. The Rowlatt Bill, that is to say, as I understand, Rowlatt Bill No. 2, passed the Legislative Council upon March 18th, and received the sanction of the Governor General of India on the 21st March?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Well, we know from other enquiries that riots occurred in Delhi upon the 30th of March. On that day a *hartal* was held in Delhi. Had a *hartal* been resolved upon for Ahmedabad on the 30th of March or not?A. No; on the 6th of April there was a *hartal*.Q. In Delhi there seemed to be uncertainty as to whether the 30th of March had been fixed upon as a day for a general *hartal* or not. Do you know whether that had been fixed on?A. I only know of the general *hartal* on the 6th of April, Sir.Q. Anyhow on the 6th of April a *hartal* was held and no business was done in Ahmedabad?

A. No.

Q. Did you on the 6th of April, or was it before the 6th of April, write to Mr. Patel and ask him to see you in connection with the *hartal*?

A. I did, Sir.

Q. What day was it?

A. I think it was on April the 3rd.

Q. Did he come along with Mr. Desai and some other followers of Mr. Gandhi and see you?

A. He did, Sir.

Q. What was the result of that interview?

A. I pointed out the dangers of a recurrence of troubles such as had occurred in Delhi and I asked him whether he was sure that there was no danger of this sort that was likely to occur on the 6th, and he assured me that they felt quite confident that nothing of the sort would happen; that they had an organisation of volunteers who would direct and control the people, and in fact he could answer that there would be no untoward happenings of any kind.

Q. On receiving that assurance did you communicate with the District Superintendent of Police?

A. I consulted him, yes.

Q. And as the result of the consultation with him did you resolve that, while you made police arrange-

ments against disturbance, they should be as unobtrusive as possible?

A. That is so, Sir.

Q. And on the 6th of April a procession in connection with the *hartal* in fact took place?

A. Yes.

Q. That procession was not attended with any disorder?

A. No, it was peaceful.

Q. So far as you could judge, upon that day was the attitude of the population orderly and quiet?

A. It was quite orderly and quite quiet.

Q. And so far also as you could judge, did the *Satyagraha* organisation carry out their undertaking?

A. So far as I could judge, it did so very well indeed.

Q. We also know from our enquiry that on the 9th of April Mr. Gandhi, who had intended to visit Delhi and afterwards Lahore, was turned back at Palwal, a small station in the Punjab. Was Mr. Gandhi's turning back known very early in Ahmedabad?

A. It was known on the morning of the 10th.

Q. In what form was it known? Was there a rumour of his having been arrested?

A. There was a rumour that he had been arrested.

Q. And in consequence of that rumour was there great excitement in the town of Ahmedabad?

A. Yes, it was reported to me that there was excitement in the town.

Q. You heard about this apparently at about 9 in the morning?

A. About that.

Q. When you heard of it, what action did you take?

A. I consulted the District Superintendent of Police as to what arrangements were necessary, and the Deputy Superintendent of Police sent down bodies of armed police to the town in order to strengthen the ordinary police.

Q. At the same time Mr. Patel, I think, issued a handbill of which you have supplied us with a copy?

A. It is in Appendix 4 to the statement of the Bombay Government.

Q. I see that circular is in the following terms:-

"The day before yesterday *Mahatma* Gandhi started from Bombay for Delhi, Lahore, Amritsar, etc. On reaching Delhi yesterday night, an order under the Defence of India Act was served on him, requiring him not to go to Delhi, Punjab and other places and restricting him to Bombay. He disregarded the order; he is therefore arrested. He has expressed his desire that all residing in the *Ashram* will celebrate this day and will do their work with double zeal and faith. It is requested that the whole public will respect his desire."

In your statement here are you not inaccurate in saying Mr. Patel called for a general strike in consequence of the arrest?

A. Yes.

Q. In point of fact what he did was he asked the people to continue working?

A. I do not think that is the meaning which was attributed to this. I rather doubt if that is the meaning of "will carry forward the work with double zeal and faith." It is "carry forward" in the original.

Q. By work you mean not their ordinary employment? You think the people understood that this was not referring to their ordinary daily work but was referring to the *Satyagraha* work?A. It is addressed to all those residing in the *Ashram* and he asked them to forward the work with a double zeal and faith. The following sentence requests the whole public to respect this desire.

Q. In what way did the public respect the desire of Mr. Gandhi?

A. By attempting to repeat the *hartal* of the 6th.

Q. And about 1 o'clock as I understand a large crowd assembled in the neighbourhood of the railway station?

A. That is so, Sir.

Q. And were shops closed?

A. Yes.

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Mr. G. E. CHATFIELD.

[Continued.]

Q. Was pressure brought to bear upon shopkeepers to induce them or force them to close their shops?

A. Yes, very much so indeed, Sir.

Q. At about half past two did something occur to two Europeans, Messrs. Sagar and Steeples?

A. Yes.

Q. What was that?

A. I understand they were driving along the station road and the crowd stopped the carriage and forced them to alight, and they were driven to take refuge in the police *chowky* at the cross roads. Later on they attempted to continue their route on the Creamery lorry. The lorry was stopped and they were again forced to alight and again driven into the *chowky*.

Q. Was an attempt made to burn the building in which they were?

A. Not the *chowky*.

Q. What building was it?

A. A flour mill. Later on when an armed police guard of 8 came to the rescue they attempted to continue their way to the Camp, but they were hustled by the crowd and forced to take refuge in a flour mill. The armed police were driven into a flour mill with them.

Q. And was any injury done by the crowd to anyone about this time?

A. No injury before they entered the mill. It was after they were forced from the mill.

Q. What was the injury that was done?

A. The whole party were severely beaten when they left the mill, but the crowd, while they were in the mill, attempted to burn it.

Q. And was one of the police constables assaulted?

A. One of the police constables was killed.

Q. At this time?

A. A little later.

Q. About what time?

A. I could not say at what time, but it occurred between 4 and 5 I imagine.

Q. What happened to him, he was thrown from the balcony?

A. The whole occurrence was this. They were driven into the mill. The crowd attacked the mill. The policemen in the mill then fired over the heads of the crowd in order to intimidate them, and the owners of the mill turned out the whole party or turned out the Europeans and four of the armed constables.

Q. I suppose the exact details have been given by someone who is a witness?

A. Unfortunately the two Europeans are not here: they are in England.

(Mr. Kemp, Counsel for Bombay Government: The facts have appeared in the judgment.)

Q. You got a report at the time?

A. I did not get a report at the time. It was followed by the riots.

Q. This police constable was so severely injured that he was removed to hospital and he died the same night?

A. That is so: he died the same afternoon.

Q. Were you in your office when the Assistant Commissioner telephoned to you at about 3-30?

A. I was.

Q. Where is your office?

A. My office is about two miles from the scene of the riot, on the other side of the Camp.

Q. What was the telephone message you received?

A. Mr. Smith, the Assistant Commissioner, telephoned to me that the station master had reported that the station was being attacked by a riotous mob. I telephoned to the station master on hearing this, and the station master told me that this was so, but that the mob had moved away from the station and was somewhere on the road between the Camp and the station and that they were besieging some Europeans and police in a mill.

Q. That is the incident which you referred to just now?

A. Yes.

Q. Then what action did you take?

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A. I telephoned up to the District Superintendent of Police and told him to get his reserve ready at once and march it down the station road. I also sent my car to fetch him down to my office.

Q. I think you continued to endeavour to get more definite information as to facts?

A. I did so.

Q. Did you find that it was impossible to get through to anyone?

A. I found it very difficult.

Q. Did the District Superintendent of Police come to your office?

A. He came down to my office after a long delay.

Q. When he came, did you start with him?

A. We started out at once.

Q. What time would that be?

A. That would be shortly before 5.

Q. What force was with you?

A. There was no force with us at all. A body of 24 men had been sent down from the head-quarter lines down the road to the station. They arrived on the scene of the riot shortly before we did.

Q. You might just explain to me the route that you took.

A. May I explain with reference to the map? (Witness went up to the map and pointed out the Prem gate, the railway station and the road leading to the station.)

Q. The route that you took was towards the Delhi gate?

A. That is so.

Q. Where was the mob?

A. The mob was all round. They were all round the flour mills and the Prem gate.

Q. I think when you reached the mob you realized that it might be difficult to quieten them?

A. Certainly.

Q. And in consequence did you send a scribbled note to the Officer Commanding?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you describe the situation and ask him to send down a military force to disperse the mob?

A. I did so.

Q. Was it your opinion that the police force at your disposal was insufficient to deal with the situation?

A. I did not quite know what the situation was when I sent that note; I could only see the outskirts. I did not know what happened to the police force.

Q. The note was taken in your car?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the District Superintendent of Police pick up a few armed police from the Idgah *chowky* and push on into the crowd?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the attitude of the crowd?

A. It was hostile but they were not violent.

Q. The 24 armed sepoy were guarding some wounded sepoy?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they guarding some prisoners?

A. Yes.

Q. Were the wounded sepoy under their protection?

A. Yes.

Q. How had these sepoy been wounded?

A. The sepoy had been wounded while escaping from the mill.

Q. And among them was the constable who was taken to the hospital?

A. Yes, he died on the way.

Q. Did you see him?

A. I did.

Q. You might describe how he was wounded as you saw him?

A. The wound which drew my attention was one in his head. It was at the back of his head and his scalp seemed to be hanging loose.

Q. Did you form your opinion as to how the wound had been caused?

* Para 24 of the statement of the Bombay Government, page 193.

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Mr. G. E. CHATFIELD.

[Continued]

A. It appeared to me that it had been caused either by an axe or by a hatchet or by some such weapon.

Q. It was not a wound that would have been caused by a *lathi* or stick?

A. No, certainly not.

Q. What attitude did the crowd take up at this time?

A. They continued to be hostile and there were many shouts, but there was no violence.

Q. Was there any building on fire?

A. Not at the time when we arrived.

Q. Had a building been on fire and a fire engine had just finished extinguishing the fires?

A. That is so.

Q. I think an attempt had been made apparently to burn down the mill and the *chawls* opposite?

A. Yes.

Q. What exactly is a *chawl*?

A. It is a residential building used by the poorer classes.

Q. How long did you remain at this place near the mill?

A. We remained there from about 5 to about a quarter to seven.

Q. And at about a quarter to seven, did the military arrive?

A. Yes.

Q. During the time you were waiting for the arrival of the military, did the crowd offer you any violence?

A. They offered no violence.

Q. Were you endeavouring to get the crowd to move back?

A. Yes, the whole time we were endeavouring to get them to move back.

Q. Along with the district police?

A. Yes, and with the sub-inspectors who were present.

Q. Did they obey your instructions to go back or not?

A. We pushed them back occasionally.

Q. Were they shouting?

A. Every now and then they were shouting.

Q. What were they shouting?

A. They were shouting for Mr. Gandhi.

Q. Were there among the crowd any of the leaders of the *Satyagraha* movement?

A. There were two.

Q. Who were they?

A. I don't know their names.

Q. So far as their action was concerned, did you consider that they desired to prevent the crowd from indulging in violence?

A. They did, Sir. I would like to say here that I did not quite understand what was meant by the word 'leaders' but they were followers of Mr. Gandhi.

Q. I see you say that these gentlemen apparently encouraged the mob to shout but they desired to dissuade the mob from committing violence?

A. That is so.

Q. The crowds fluctuated in size?

A. Yes.

Q. How many would there be?

A. At its greatest there may have been about 2 or 3 thousand.

Q. Had you any discussion with the District Superintendent as to releasing the prisoners?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you do?

A. We considered that the sight of the prisoners would certainly excite the crowd and there did not seem to be any particular reason to keep them there. At the time they were not arrested for any particular heinous offence. They were actually picked up from the crowd. When the police arrived we took down their names and addresses, and the *Satyagraha* gentleman who was there said that he would be answerable for their appearance, so we released them.

Q. Were any stones thrown during the time you were there?

A. I can't say that they were. I saw stones tumbling about the road occasionally.

Q. The bulk of the mob appeared to be mill-hands?

A. Yes.

Q. You said that at about a quarter to seven when the military force arrived, they were under Colonel Frazer?

A. Yes.

Q. They consisted of about 100 men?

A. I understand after consulting Colonel Frazer they were 200 men. I have said here 100 men.

Q. Was a guard left at the Prem gate by the Beehive mill and another body of men at the Kalupur gate?

A. Yes.

Q. That is further down?

A. Yes, that is the next gate towards the station.

Q. Did the crowd disperse there before the military?

A. Yes, they dispersed.

Q. Where did you go then?

A. I went to the railway station.

Q. Did you remain at the railway station for some time?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you drive back later in the night to Shahi Bagh?

A. I did, sir.

Q. As you drove back there, were the streets deserted?

A. They were absolutely empty.

Q. In other parts of the town besides the parts you have mentioned where did the crowds collect in the afternoon?

A. Yes, on the Richey Road.

Q. Where is the Richey Road?

A. That is further south of the Kalupur Road and also of the Delhi gate.

Q. Did you know from any information that you got at the time that the crowds in that part of the town had stoned the police?

A. I heard of that at about 11 o'clock at night from the District Superintendent of Police.

Q. Had shops been forcibly shut and people forced to alight from carriages?

A. That is so.

Q. I think the Victoria Cinema buildings sustained some damages?

A. Yes.

Q. But for the riot at the Beehive mill nothing occurred but the police were unable to cope with the situation?

A. The police assisted by the *Satyagrahi* leaders were able to cope with the situation.

Q. Was a large meeting held in the river bed on the evening of the 10th?

A. Yes.

Q. Where is it?

A. Below the Ellis bridge.

Q. Did that meeting pass off quietly?

A. I understand that the proceedings were confused at the meeting. The crowd was reported to have been much quietened down after it.

Q. Did the District Superintendent of Police come to your bungalow at about 11 at night?

A. Yes.

Q. And informed you of the dispositions that he made?

A. Yes. It was at that time that he informed me of these occurrences.

Q. You state in the Appendix* the actual dispositions that were made of the police. You say the largest body of police was stationed at some place, where was it?

A. The Khas Bazar *Chowky*.

Q. That force consisted of 16 armed police?

A. Yes.

Q. And was it increased to 20 men just about 9-15 in the morning?

A. That is so, sir. But I believe that they let men go as soon as the force was increased so that it remained very much the same in size.

Q. Was there a guard of 10 men at the lock-up? And four men at the Bank of Bombay inside Bhadar?

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Mr. G. E. CHATFIELD.

[Continued.]

A. Yes.

Q. Coming to the 11th April, what was the first incident?

A. The first incident on the 11th was, when the District Superintendent of Police and I went down to the Prem gate where the riot had occurred on the previous day, we discovered the platoon which was stationed there was confronted by a crowd, and the officer in charge complained to us that his men were annoyed. They were jeered at, and it appeared to us that there was some danger and that trouble might arise on this account.

Q. Was there any additional cause of incitement between the night of the 10th and the morning of the 11th?

A. Not at that time.

Q. Was there any rumour about the arrest of Miss Anasuya?

A. I think that rumour arose only after the arrival of the Express from Bombay, I mean the mail from Bombay, which comes somewhere after 8.

Q. You motored to the Beehive mill?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there a military guard there?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you have a conversation with the native officer in command?

A. Yes.

Q. When you were there a cart drove up containing several *Satyagrahi* leaders?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you have a conversation with these gentlemen?

A. Yes.

Q. I think they were Messrs. Patel, Yajnik and Dr. Kanuga?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you make any request to them?

A. I requested them to use their influence with the crowd, to advise the crowd to go away and not to stand about round the military guard. They agreed to do so and they were fairly successful in getting the crowd to move away.

Q. What did you yourself do?

A. The Superintendent and I went on to the Kalupur gate and from there to the station and from there to the Panch Kuwa gate.

Q. And inspected a shop?

A. Yes, we inspected Fonseca's shop near the Panch Kuwa gate.

Q. How had that shop been damaged on the previous night?

A. It was slightly damaged; they had thrown stones and some glasses were broken.

Q. In the centre of the town did you find large crowds?

A. The crowds began to get thick from the Fernandez bridge.

Q. Where is the Pankor Naka?

A. It is in the centre of the town.

Q. At that point the crowd seems to have surrounded you?

A. We met the Inspector at that point or shortly after that point and he jumped off his bicycle and in a moment the crowd had run away.

Q. What did the crowd do?

A. They did not do anything in particular.

Q. What attitude did they adopt towards you?

A. Except that they closed round very rapidly they did not do anything in particular.

Q. Did they shout?

A. No.

Q. At that time did one of the *Satyagrahis* jump into your car?

A. He jumped on the foot-board of the car and proceeded to address the crowd.

Q. Did you object to that?

A. I pushed him off.

Q. What did he say?

A. He said he was protecting me.

Q. Had he been protecting you?

A. I do not know. No attack had been made on me at that time.

Q. After he left the car, what did you do?

A. We proceeded at once, and stones were being thrown heavily.

Q. Did the mood of the crowd become angry?

A. There were shouts as we moved off and showers of stones.

Q. Were the stones aimed at you?

A. A few were aimed at the car.

Q. Had the crowd anything in their hands?

A. Not that I saw.

Q. Then what course did you pursue from that point?

A. We went straight on, followed the road to the Khas Bazar *Chowk* where the police force was. We went through the three gates through the Khas Bazar *Chowk*. There we stopped.

Q. Did you proceed on after that?

A. After stopping there for a short while, we proceeded in this direction.

Q. What do you mean by 'in this direction'?

A. I mean directly west, and as we passed the mouth of this street, that is the Leeway, a very large armed mob was coming up the street in a very excited manner.

Q. What do you mean by armed mob?

A. They were armed with *lathis* that is bamboo sticks.

Q. Did they seem intent on mischief?

A. Yes.

Q. Just before you had come up, did you find that that mob had damaged a motor car?

A. That was not known to me at the time.

Q. Did you see Mr. Desai about this time?

A. I did not.

Q. How did you learn then that he had endeavoured to pacify the mob by informing them that Miss Anasuya had not been arrested?

A. I did not know it then but I learnt it subsequently.

Q. When you saw this mob issuing out of the Leeway and also its attitude what did you consider was necessary?

A. I considered it was necessary to bring the troops at once.

Q. Had you a police force sufficient to deal with such a situation as was developing?

A. No.

Q. And did you, in consequence, drive straight to the Camp?

A. Yes.

Q. And you reached the Camp at about 20 minutes past 9 and you did not see Colonel Frazer, but Colonel Preston?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he and 300 men march as soon as they got ready to the city at about 10 o'clock?

A. It was at about 10-10.

Q. In the meantime, what had the mob been doing?

A. In the meanwhile the mob had burnt down a large tent which had been erected in the Bhadar for the matriculation examination. They also burnt the Collector's office, the whole range of offices and buildings adjoining them.

The Collector's office is in a sort of open ground in the Bhadar facing north. The Sub-Registrar's office faces the east on the road which runs down through the Bhadar. The City Magistrate's offices lie behind the Sub-Registrar's office. The record-room lies on the river front to the west, and just south of the record-room is the sub-jail beyond the gate of which is the City Survey Office.

Q. All these buildings had been burnt?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they burnt to the ground?

A. Yes, eventually.

Q. How were they burnt?

A. The crowd, first of all, set fire to the *shamiana* and after that proceeded to one office after the other and with the use of kerosene oil set fire to all the buildings.

Q. Where could the kerosene oil have been got from so as to enable the crowd to be provided beforehand in order to do this destruction?

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[Continued.]

A. That I cannot say.

Q. Was there any place hard by to these buildings where kerosene could have been got, so that they could prepare themselves first before they proceeded to destroy the buildings?

A. I do not know of any building near by from where they could have got kerosene oil. They must have brought it all with them.

Q. In order to consume these different places by fire, was a considerable quantity of kerosene necessary?

A. I should say the buildings would burn easily.

Q. Are they all more or less of an inflammable character?

A. There is a great deal of wood about them and what is more, they were very old buildings.

Q. I think you found out that the armed guard at the Bank of Bombay had opened fire on the crowd with buck-shot?

A. I learnt that later.

Q. And that the fire had saved the Bank people?

A. That is so.

Q. And did the guard fire on the crowd from the windows of the sub-jail?

A. Yes.

Q. And did the fire drive them through the main entrance of the building?

A. It drove them from the sub-jail. They set fire to the main entrance.

Q. I see you mention that one prisoner escaped in the confusion, but otherwise they did not leave the jail?

A. Yes.

Q. The crowd also burnt some other buildings?

A. They burnt the building just outside the Bhadar opposite the *Lal Darwaza*.

Q. What building was that?

A. That was a private building which looked rather like a police *Chowky*.

Q. And the telegraph office?

A. That was later.

Q. Was it about this time that an attempt was made to fire the District Court buildings?

A. I cannot say that, but a crowd did approach them.

Q. And they did not in fact fire them?

A. No.

Q. Do you know whether pleaders had expostulated with the crowd?

A. I am informed that they did.

Q. Then another mob had attacked the power station which is half a mile away. In what direction is that?

A. It is due north from the Bhadar.

Q. Did they assault anyone there?

A. Yes, Mr. Brown, who was in charge; they beat him very severely.

Q. I think they did not harm the machinery?

A. No.

Q. Did they break windows by throwing stones?

A. Yes.

Q. I see you say that the family of Mr. Brown was saved by the fidelity of his servants?

A. Yes.

Q. What do you mean by that?

A. I mean that the servants stood on the stair-case and persuaded the crowd that the family had escaped.

Q. Were the crowd attempting to get at the family?

A. They were trying to come upstairs.

Q. So they came there with the intention of assaulting the family?

A. I presume that was the intention.

Q. Was an ammunition cart proceeding to the headquarters which lies towards the Khas Bazar *chowky* attacked?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that just inside the Delhi gate?

A. Yes.

Q. That crowd was driven off by the escort? Had the escort to open fire on the crowd?

A. Yes, with buck-shot.

Q. Were the police armed?

A. Yes, they were armed police.

Q. Then did the riotous mob roam up and down the Mirzapur Road, Ghee Kantha and streets and other places?

A. Yes.

Q. What happened to the unarmed police?

A. The unarmed police were swept off the streets. They were beaten, their uniforms stripped off and they disappeared.

Q. What happened to the electric light?

A. The power station had been closed as a precautionary measure by Mr. Brown before the mob arrived.

Q. The actual electric lights in the street were broken by the mob, as they passed along, and I think the Delhi gate was set on fire?

A. Yes.

Q. What happened to the building above it?

A. That was gutted.

Q. Then one of the *chowkies* that you refer to as having been burnt belonged to the *Lal Darwaza*?

A. That is the building I referred to; it looked like a *chowky*.

Q. You say that the civil hospital was threatened but spared?

A. Yes.

Q. Where about is it?

A. It is in the Ghee Kantha.

Q. In what way was it threatened?

A. I understand there were raging mobs all round and that the mobs attempted to come in and only refrained from doing so owing to the intercession of the students and doctors.

Q. I think the students protected that building. Did they?

A. Yes.

Q. But you make a comment upon their conduct in some other respects?

A. Yes.

Q. In what respects?

A. Well, later in the day, when the body of Sergeant Fraser was brought to the hospital after he had been murdered, they booed and shouted.

Q. But I see you say that they also assisted in protecting Mrs. Tuke?

A. Yes.

Q. Was she in danger?

A. In considerable danger. Her bungalow adjoins the buildings which were burnt. She had armed herself with her own revolver.

Q. Now, you have described these different events generally. Did you fix any time for their actual occurrence? Within what limit of time did they occur?

A. They had all occurred between 9 o'clock and 11 o'clock.

Q. At 11 o'clock the troops approached the Bhadar?

A. Shortly after 11 o'clock.

Q. All this time, where were you?

A. At half-past nine I was with the 1-97th men arranging with Colonel Preston explaining the situation to him. Shortly before 10 o'clock I returned to my bungalow in order to get any messages which might have come over on the telephone. The Superintendent of Police also went to his for the same purpose. It was arranged that we should return to the lines and take down Colonel Preston and catch up the troops which were on their march to the city.

Q. And did you want any additional troops after hearing on the telephone?

A. On hearing on the telephone that the buildings and tent had been set on fire and the situation had become very much more serious, we returned to the Lines and asked Colonel Preston to send down reinforcements in addition to the 300 which had already been sent.

Q. I think you took Colonel Preston and the District Superintendent of Police in your car?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you catch up the first batch of troops just inside the Delhi gate?

A. Yes.

Q. Were certain troops left to guard that gate?

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[Continued.]

A. Yes, 30.

Q. Were they of the first 300 or of the 200?

A. They were of the first 300.

Q. And the rest of the troops you divided into 2 bodies?

A. Yes.

Q. The larger marching down the Mirzapur Road and the smaller body to Ghee Kantha?

A. Yes.

Q. You, along with Colonel Preston and the District Superintendent, accompanied the larger body?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, as you proceeded, what did you see?

A. The first sign of violence we saw was when we came in sight of the *Mamladar's Kacheri* which was then in full blaze, and as we came round the corner and saw that, we saw people turning out of the Bhadar having heard the noise of the heels of the troops as they came along. Many of them were carrying burning brands.

Q. And what did they do with these?

A. They threw them down as soon as they saw troops in the distance.

Q. Colonel Preston discussed with you as to whether the crowd should be fired upon?

A. He asked me for orders as regards firing.

Q. What did you say?

A. I asked him to fire on anybody who was setting fire to any building or who attacked the troops seriously. He told me as regards the attack on troops that he had his general military orders.

Q. I think the crowd ran in front of the troops?

A. Yes, they made no stand.

Q. And was the road cleared as far as Panch Kuwa Naka?

A. We cleared the road, the crowd retreating before us.

Q. Then, was a guard drawn up across the road there?

A. It was.

Q. And, with the rest of the troops, did you return to the Khas Bazar?

A. Yes.

Q. And you marched back on Oliphant Road?

A. Yes.

Q. There are a number of Government buildings there?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you go to the municipal offices and station another guard?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you do there?

A. There we merely stationed a platoon and then marched up north towards the Pankor Naka. On the way we found the municipal fire brigade.

Q. Had it been in action during the incendiarism at this time?

A. There were no crowds in this direction at that time.

Q. But you say "it had been prevented by violence from extinguishing the main building"?

A. They had attempted to go to the Bhadar in order to extinguish the flames there, but they had been very roughly treated and so refused to come out without a guard.

Q. Then you returned to the Pankor Naka and effected a junction of the body of the troops which had marched down in the Ghee Kantha?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you then visit the Bhadar along with Colonel Preston and the District Superintendent of Police?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the fire engine employed then to endeavour to save certain buildings?

A. I sent my car with a sub-inspector to fetch it. He did so and we set it to work to save what was left at the telegraph office.

Q. Was that the only building in which there was anything left to save?

A. Yes, the rest was beyond saving.

Q. Then as you marched from the main gate from the Bhadar, did you hear shots being fired?

A. Yes.

Q. In the direction of Pankor Naka?

A. Yes.

Q. That was from a guard of 30 men under Lieutenant Larkin?

A. That is so.

Q. Then, as you and Colonel Preston returned to Pankor Naka, did a reinforcement of 200 men under Major Kirkwood arrive by the Ghee Kantha?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the road then cleared up to the foot of the rise where the Richey Road begins?

A. Yes, we cleared it.

Q. As the crowd retreated in front of the soldiers, did they do anything?

A. Yes, stones were thrown in the direction of the troops. The crowd were too far off to reach them by throwing stones, but they were shouting and booing and throwing stones as they retreated. They were also thrown from the roofs of houses.

Q. Could you see the throwers?

A. I could not see them. The stones were falling in the neighbourhood of the troops.

Q. And you passed the *Jama Masjid*? As you passed the *Masjid*, did anything occur?

A. There was a very excited group of Muhammadans standing on the steps of the entrance and declaiming. They were crying out that bullets were falling in the mosque.

Q. Was that the case or not?

A. It was impossible.

Q. Why?

A. The mosque is surrounded by a high wall and many private buildings, and it is impossible for bullets to fall in, unless they were fired straight up in the air.

Q. I think you persuaded these people to retire into the mosque?

A. The police sub-inspector persuaded them to do so.

Q. And was the main crowd driven up the mouth of the Richey Road and held up there?

A. Yes.

Q. Where did you go then?

A. I marched round the mosque with a small body of troops on the chance of seeing crowds there. There was a rumour that the mosque was full of large crowds and that an attack was going to be made from it.

Q. An attack on what?

A. On the troops.

Q. What was the situation during midday on the eleventh?

A. The situation was that the troops just held on to few main points on the main roads in the town. There was a guard at the Delhi gate, others at the mouth of the Richey Road, the mouth of the Ghee Kantha and down at the municipal office and various side streets in the neighbourhood.

Q. I think the force available for dealing with the situation consisted of 600 military men—counting the guards at the station, something like 51 armed police at various posts?

A. That is so.

Q. The unarmed police, as you have stated, were swept away from the streets?

A. They were no longer in existence.

Q. Then shortly after-noon, was it rumoured that a strong body of rioters had broken out northwards in order to attack the Shahi Bagh and the Commissioner's offices?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, what action was taken in consequence of that?

A. Colonel Preston took 80 men and marched back by the Ghee Kantha in a northward direction.

Q. Where did you go then?

A. The Superintendent of Police and I remained for a short time and then followed them in a car in order to catch them up.

Q. As you passed up Ghee Kantha, did anything occur to you?

A. Yes.

Q. What?

A. A man from the side street threw a pile of stones tied on to the end of a sling at the car.

Q. Did it strike you?

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[Continued.]

A. No, it did not strike the car. It fell behind it.
Q. When Colonel Preston arrived at the Shahi Bagh, did he place guards over the Commissioner's residence and office and did you proceed to the Camp with maps in order to assist Colonel Preston?

A. Yes.

Q. In the meantime did the mob continue to face the military force at the mouth of the Richey Road and elsewhere?

A. So I heard.

Q. Were various outrages committed in the east and south of the town?

A. Yes.

Q. I see you refer to a mob raiding a temple for arms?

A. Yes.

Q. Where is the place?

A. Swami Narayan's temple.

Q. Did they get any arms from the Swami Narayan temple?

A. Yes.

Q. What arms?

A. They got swords, and I think they got some guns.

Q. How were swords and guns kept at that temple?

A. They had licenses for them.

Q. Then they also got swords and guns from the other smaller temple?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it about 2 o'clock that Sergeant Fraser was dragged out of his hiding-place and murdered?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the shop in which he was concealed situated only 200 yards from where the military cordon was drawn?

A. Yes.

Q. Which military cordon was that? That under Major Kirkwood or whom?

A. I think Lieutenant Fitzpatrick was in command. Major Kirkwood was in general command.

Q. Had that force fired previous to Sergeant Fraser's murder?

A. I believe so.

Q. Then later in the afternoon did the mobs attack the houses of certain officials?

A. I am not certain of the time at which they did so, but certainly they did attack the houses of two officials.

Q. These were the houses of an Honorary Magistrate and the Personal Assistant to the Collector?

A. Yes.

Q. Both were Indian gentlemen?

A. Yes.

Q. What explanation do you give for their houses being attacked?

A. Rao Bahadur Bulakhidas was my personal assistant. He is a very strict magistrate, and I believe that he is unpopular. I cannot give any other reason. Khan Bahadur Hussain Khan is an Honorary Magistrate. I do not know why they attacked him.

Q. Both gentlemen managed to escape with their families?

A. Yes.

Q. Were their houses looted?

A. Their houses were entirely looted and practically destroyed.

Q. But fire was not used?

A. No.

Q. Why was that?

A. The neighbours, I believe, interceded and asked that they should not be set fire to.

Q. Was every police *chowky* in the town burnt?

A. Every police *chowky*, I believe, except certain police *chowkies* which adjoin other buildings; they did not use fire on those, but every police *chowky* that was isolated and could be burnt without danger to other buildings was burnt.

Q. How many police *chowkies* in all were burnt?

A. I could not give the number straight off.

Q. Were certain liquor shops broken open?

A. Yes.

Q. What was done with the contents of the shops?

A. A great deal of it was drunk, and what was not drunk was wasted and allowed to run into the street.

Q. Were these shops or any of them burnt?

A. Some were burnt; the one at Panch Kuwa gate was burnt.

Q. At about 4-30 P.M. did you go with Colonel Frazer on a tour of observation?

A. Yes.

Q. Where did you go? What route did you follow?

A. We went first of all to the Delhi gate and then to the power house. From the power house to the Khas Bazar. From the Khas Bazar, we went down to the platoon which was stationed at the municipal office.

Q. What was the attitude of the crowd when you made that tour?

A. Around the Delhi gate, the side streets were full of noisy crowds. Their attitude was very hostile. They were making no attack when I saw them.

Q. How long did this tour occupy?

A. I could not give the exact time, but we got back about dusk.

Q. When does dusk come on?

A. Somewhere near 7 o'clock in April.

Q. Then you went back with Colonel Frazer?

A. Yes, we visited the railway station.

Q. Did Colonel Frazer explain to you how he was placed with reference to his military affairs?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he explain that he had not sufficient men at his disposal to deal properly with the situation?

A. He did.

Q. I think he had something like 2,000 half trained recruits?

A. Some of them were half trained and some of them were fully trained.

Q. Had you men in order to relieve those who were employed on military duty?

A. We had difficulty in providing reliefs.

Q. I think you wanted some men to guard the Gujarat College and the neighbourhood?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it finally agreed that Colonel Preston should accompany you to the police headquarter lines and telephone then to Major Kirkwood to send 20 men?

A. Yes.

Q. What time was that?

A. That was fairly late; it was dark, between 8 and 9 I think.

Q. On the way did you stop at the bungalow and find some armed and unarmed excise sepoy?

A. Yes.

Q. They were put at your disposal?

A. Yes.

Q. How many were they?

A. Altogether there were about 15 or 16 men.

Q. You sent them off by the Sabarmati bridge to march down the right bank of the river and guard the College?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they do so?

A. Yes.

Q. Why were you anxious about that College?

A. It was about the only Government building left unguarded which the mob might reach.

Q. During the evening were Europeans arriving in Shahi Bagh?

A. Yes.

Q. Where were they coming from?

A. They were coming partly from the Gujarat College quarter and partly from the Sabarmati colony which lies north of the town.

Q. Where were they collected?

A. They were collected at the Commissioner's bungalow and some went to my bungalow.

Q. Did you get to bed at all that night?

A. I did very late at about 1 o'clock.

Q. After you got to bed, you were roused up at 2?

A. Yes.

Q. What roused you up?

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[Continued.]

A. The arrival of a message from the Shahi Bagh.
Q. Was that to the effect that a mob was coming up the river-bed to attack the court?

A. It was to the effect that a mob of 500 was proceeding along the river bank presumably with the intention of attacking the Shahi Bagh.

Q. There were certain refugees in your bungalow, I think?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you have to rouse them?

A. I sent them to the Shahi Bagh.

Q. I think some of the Europeans were taking refuge at the railway station?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there a strong guard there?

A. There was a strong guard at the railway station.

Q. Was a large part of the city in the hands of the rioters in spite of the military and the police precautions that had been taken?

A. The whole city was in the hands of the rioters outside the few main roads.

Q. During the night were further acts of incendiarism committed?

A. I think it was in the evening.

Q. In your statement you say that the rioters continued throughout the night to burn minor Government and municipal buildings. Does that statement require qualification?

A. I think after dark they continued to do so. There were some outrages after dark, but perhaps not throughout the night. Acts of burning did not occur, but acts of violence, I believe, did.

Q. Between 2 and 3 did Colonel Frazer come to your bungalow and communicate to you certain orders that he intended to issue to the troops the next day?

A. He did, Sir.

Q. What were those orders?

A. He told me that he intended to issue an order to the troops that all crowds of 10 or over would be fired on at sight, and also that people who did not answer a challenge and come up after dark, even single individuals, would be fired on.

Q. Did you discuss with him the expediency of issuing such orders?

A. Yes.

Q. What was your opinion?

A. I asked him for his reasons for so drastic an order. He gave me his reasons. I then considered them sufficient.

Q. What were the reasons?

A. I understood from him that the situation could not continue, and that he could not rely on the troops that he had at his disposal to go on doing the work which he was exacting from them then without due relief and even what they were doing was very little and that the state of affairs in the main part of the town was quite unknown to us.

Q. When you assented to the issuing of these orders, was any arrangement made as to when they were to come into operation?

A. He wished that they should come into operation the next morning, but I asked him for a longer time, in order that I might warn people.

Q. What time did you ask?

A. We agreed that it could come into operation from 4 o'clock.

Q. In the afternoon?

A. Yes.

Q. Were notices printed?

A. Notices were cyclostyled that night.

Q. In what way were the notices promulgated to the people?

A. The next morning I took them down in the car and I gave them to various platoons and guards which were stationed in the city, and they were to be pasted up or dropped about by the patrols. I also gave some to the police at Kalupur *chowky* to give to the passers-by.

Q. Was the night of the 11th April one of frequent alarm?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the situation a critical and delicate one?

A. The situation was a very anxious one indeed.

Q. Was it one that you could deal with without the assistance of the military?

A. Perfectly impossible.

Q. Except that these orders were issued by the military with your approval, was anything further done in the way of proclaiming Martial Law?

A. Nothing.

Q. Or were any orders issued under Martial Law except these notices?

A. No other orders were issued.

Q. Then on the 12th, were things quieter than they had been on the 11th?

A. They were quieter than on the 11th certainly.

Q. Were reinforcements for the soldiers already in Ahmedabad anxiously awaited?

A. Yes.

Q. Where were they to come from?

A. We were specially expecting reinforcements of British troops from Bombay.

Q. In the morning was there cause of uneasiness by a rumour as to the mob attacking the cantonments?

A. Yes, there was such a rumour.

Q. What was the special cause of uneasiness there?

A. There were hardly any troops left in cantonments; they were almost empty and what troops were left there were practically untrained.

Q. I think the electric lights had been cut off?

A. Everything was in darkness.

Q. The municipal water-works was continuing to supply water but the drainage pumping station at Jamalpur had ceased to work?

A. Yes.

Q. The municipal conservancy staff disappeared?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that an alarming situation?

A. That was, Sir.

Q. During this time did you receive assistance from the municipal authorities in the town?

A. No.

Q. Are there many municipal authorities here?

A. There are many municipal councillors in the town.

Q. What was their attitude?

A. I saw nothing of them.

Q. Did you receive any assistance from many of the leading citizens of Ahmedabad?

A. Only from Mr. Ambalal Sarabhai on the afternoon of the 12th, and also from Mr. Laher at the beginning of the riots.

Q. How do you account for that?

A. I suppose they consulted their own safety.

Q. Were telegraph wires cut?

A. On the night of the 11th, telegraph wires to the south of Ahmedabad city were cut and communication was stopped between Ahmedabad and Bombay.

Q. Was the troop train derailed?

A. Yes.

Q. Where did the derailment take place?

A. I am afraid I cannot say. It was not in this district.

Q. Was it the troop train conveying troops from Bombay to Ahmedabad?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that in answer to the appeal made by the authorities here for outside help?

A. Yes.

Q. You communicated to the Government of Bombay the circumstances, I think?

A. I wired on the evening of the 11th.

Q. Were you able to wire direct or had you to send the wire through a circuitous route?

A. At that time I wired direct.

Q. Now coming to the 12th April, did the Commissioner for the Northern Division and the Inspector-General of Police arrive at about 1-30 on the 12th?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was then Commissioner of the Northern Division?

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[Continued.]

A. Mr. Pratt.

Q. Where had he been on the 11th?

A. I believe he was on the 11th at Bombay or Poona.

Q. Did he come in the same train with 300 British troops, the same force whose special had been derailed at Nadiad?

A. I cannot say if it was the same train, but they arrived at about the same time.

Q. What was done with these troops?

A. They were marched to the Bhadar; part of them went to the Bhadar and part went up to the Camp.

Q. Did they take over the defence of the Bhadar area and patrolling of the Richey Road?

A. Yes.

Q. By this time was the riot over?

A. The actual fighting was nearly over, but we still continued to have occasional friction with the mobs.

Q. Do you know what firing was done, if any, by the British troops after their arrival?

A. Thirty-two rounds were fired from rifles, and 32 rounds from a machine gun.

Q. Was it on Sunday?

A. Yes.

Q. Where did that firing take place?

A. I could not say the exact locality; I have not seen it.

Q. Did the Commissioner on his arrival drive to your bungalow?

A. Yes.

Q. When he was with you, did you receive information as to the outbreak at Viramgam?

A. Yes.

Q. And the murder of the *Awal Karkun* Mr. Madhavlal and the burning of the station and municipal buildings there?

A. Yes.

Q. About this time Mr. Ambalal Sarabhai arrived from Bombay and he offered his services?

A. Yes.

Q. On receiving news from Viramgam, was arrangement made with Colonel Frazer for 200 men to be sent by a special train to quell the riot there?

A. Yes.

Q. I think a round of inspection was also made in Ahmedabad itself?

A. Yes.

Q. The inspection was made by Colonel Frazer and the officials?

A. Colonel Frazer did not come.

Q. Who made the inspection?

A. The Commissioner, the Inspector-General and I went in a car. We were accompanied by some of the British troops in another car with a Lewis gun, and a body of troops on foot.

Q. Continuing the events that occurred at Ahmedabad, did the last fire occur on Sunday?

A. Yes.

Q. In what connection did it occur?

A. The last firing was by the British troops. I cannot give the details of what happened.

Q. About this time Mr. Gandhi offered his services in the restoration of order?

A. Mr. Gandhi arrived on Sunday morning and immediately offered his services.

Q. I think he held a large meeting?

A. On the 14th.

Q. Were his efforts successful in quieting the people?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 14th, the special orders issued by the military in consultation with you as to firing were withdrawn?

A. Yes.

Q. From the 14th, did the civil authorities resume their full power?

A. On the evening of the 14th, the police took over the control of the city. The troops were still left in the city.

Q. So that the control of the city had been in the

A. From the morning of the 11th, when they came down.

Q. The special orders that were issued were only issued at about 4 o'clock, as I understand, on the 12th?

A. Yes.

Q. They were withdrawn again on the morning of the 14th?

A. Yes. The control of the city had been in the hands of the military for less than two days.

Q. I do not want to ask you about what occurred at Viramgam, because we can get that from people who saw. As regards the question of loss of life, casualties and damage due to the riots at Ahmedabad, the fatal casualties that occurred, so far as the police and military were concerned, were Sergeant Fraser and the armed constable?

A. Yes.

Q. At Viramgam, the only fatal casualty was the murder of the *Awal Karkun*?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the meaning of *Awal Karkun*?A. He is under the *Mamladar*, who is the head of the *taluka*.

Q. As regards the firing at Ahmedabad, did the police fire 41 rounds of buckshot on April 10th and on April 11th 73 rounds of buckshot and 6 of ball?

A. Yes.

Q. The troops fired altogether 609 rounds of ball, on the 11th, 12th and 13th?

A. Yes.

Q. So the total number of rounds fired was 729?

A. Yes.

Q. May I take it that this is an accurate statement of the rounds that were fired?

A. That is the statement I have received from the military authorities. It is accurate as far as the police are concerned, except for the fact—I am not quite certain—that of those rounds said to have been fired by the police some may have been seized by the mob.

Q. Does it include a certain number of rounds stolen by the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. What were the total casualties on the side of the mob?

A. So far as I know, there were 28 fatal casualties, and the total number of casualties treated was 151.

Q. Out of this, 120 were buckshot and only 21 were bullet wounds?

A. Yes.

Q. How do you account for that?

A. It is very hard to account for it.

Q. But there is the possibility that some of the casualties which occurred after the morning of 11th were not brought to the hospital? You have given that estimate, but the actual estimate of the casualties may be considerably larger?

A. It is possible.

Q. Were any endeavours made by the authorities to discover the actual number?

A. Yes, but it was not discovered what happened to the people.

Q. In Viramgam, did you find that the number of rounds fired by the armed guard was roughly speaking 150?

A. Yes.

Q. That includes both buckshot and ball?

A. Yes.

Q. And then, by Mr. Caldecott's party, 36?

A. Yes.

Q. The military, I think, did not fire at them?

A. No.

Q. The number of casualties there was 24 of which 6 were killed.

A. Yes.

Q. As regards the damage which was done to property, both in Ahmedabad and in Viramgam

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[Continued.]

Q. You took it under different heads, Imperial, Provincial and then municipal property, and lastly private property?

A. Yes.

Q. Dealing with these matters at Ahmedabad, the total value of Imperial Government property was nearly Rs. 90,000?

A. Yes.

Q. Provincial Government property was over 5 lakhs?

A. Yes.

Q. Municipal property was 1,35,000?

A. Yes.

Q. And private property, 2,26,000?

A. Yes.

Q. You have given a total of Rs. 9,54,000?

A. Yes.

Q. Then in Viramgam, the amounts under these different heads were about Rs. 6,000, 59,000, 24,000 and 1,25,000, making a total of over 2 lakhs, and the grand total reaching the figure of over 11 lakhs of rupees?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. As regards the attitude of the west of the district, outside Ahmedabad and Viramgam, what have you to say about it?

A. The west of the district on the whole was very quiet. The only place I was anxious about was Dholka.

Q. Where is that?

A. Dholka is 30 miles south-west of Ahmedabad.

Q. What were you anxious for?

A. There is a large Muhammadan population there and the reports which I received from Dholka seemed to show that there was some danger of disturbance there, but it came to nothing.

Q. The situation, I think, was tided over?

A. The *Mamladar* behaved well, and the Assistant Collector went down there and everything was quiet by the time the troops arrived.

Q. A body of troops was posted there, from April 14th to July 10th?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that to prevent any disturbance?

A. Yes. It was purely precautionary.

Q. Did the mob attempt violence at the place?

A. Yes; that is so.

Q. About Berejdi, where is it?

A. It is about 14 miles from Ahmedabad to the south, on the borders of the Kaira district.

Q. What occurred there?

A. There is a certain mill population there. They started out to break up the line but they did not do that. They contented themselves with cutting the wires.

Q. Now, you say something about the attitude of the citizens of Ahmedabad. Did you have indications that the mob in their action were receiving support from the people who were not really sharing in their violence?

A. That is my opinion.

Q. What information did you have?

A. The student class were represented in the mob and they belonged to respectable classes. I have also got the statement of Mr. Gandhi that the educated men were behind this trouble.

Q. Mr. Gandhi does not necessarily mean those who were receiving University education?

A. No; but I think it must mean people who are more or less respectable.

Q. What indications of assistance to the mob or sympathy with the mob were given?

A. The mob received food and money, I understand, from the citizens of Ahmedabad.

Q. You are not speaking there of your own personal knowledge?

A. No; but people told me so.

Q. After the disturbances passed over, say on the 14th, did the people resume their normal attitude?

A. They did so very quickly.

Q. How do you account for that?

A. I account for it by the fact that the motive of the

and I think as soon as they found he was safe, the motive of rioting disappeared.

Q. During the period of administration by the military, had you any complaints made to you of the conduct of the troops—of the British troops in particular?

A. No.

Q. I see you refer to having up an editor of a paper before you in connection with an article that appeared in his paper?

A. Yes. An article appeared in the *Gujarati Punch* complaining of the behaviour of the British troops, that they fired unnecessarily and that there was a great deal of unnecessary bloodshed caused by the British troops. I called the editor and I asked him what reason he had for issuing this and he said that he was not responsible for the statement, but his sub-editor in his absence put it in. I therefore asked him to withdraw it and to apologise for it. He very readily agreed to do so.

Q. As regards firing upon groups of 10 people collected together, did you get any information either then or subsequently, of any indiscreet firing?

A. Mr. Gandhi wrote to me and told me that he had received such complaints and I asked him to send me the persons who made the complaint; they never came.

Q. People never came?

A. No; he did not actually see that order was complied with, but he said that he heard that. I got no further complaints.

Q. In consequence of the riots and acts of incendiarism, there were a large number of criminal prosecutions?

A. Yes.

Q. In the first place, the Government set up a special tribunal of three Judges which began to sit on the 2nd June?

A. Yes.

Q. And as the amount of work was too great, a second tribunal was set up on the 22nd July?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. That second tribunal tried only the cases from the Kaira district?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. These tribunals were set up under the Defence of India Act?

A. Yes.

Q. Under the Act of 1915?

A. Yes.

Q. They were not set up under the Bengal Regulation of 1804?

A. No.

Q. How many in all were tried by these tribunals?

A. I have not got the figures.

Q. As regards the other punitive and semi-punitive measures, after the riots had been quelled, did you issue a notice, as District Magistrate, under section 25-A of the District Police Act calling for submission of claims for compensation for damage?

A. I did so.

Q. Where a disturbance of this sort occurs and private property is damaged, is it in accordance with the Indian law that the local community is made liable for the damage?

A. Yes.

Q. And a provision is made for that matter in the Police Act?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What action did you take on it? How did you deal with the matter?

A. I called for submission of the claims from all victims of the riots within one month, and when these were sent in, I tabulated them and I enquired into them through the revenue establishment; and according to the reports which I received, I kept them down, allowed them or disallowed them.

Q. I see that you mention here that the claims submitted within one month were 13 lakhs and odd for Ahmedabad and over 2 lakhs for Viramgam?

A. Yes.

Q. These figures are largely in excess of the figures which you gave previously?

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[Continued.]

A. Because I cut them down.
 Q. Do I understand that the 13 lakhs is confined to damages committed to private property?
 A. No; it includes Imperial, Provincial and municipal.
 Q. So, the 13 lakhs corresponds to the figure of 9 lakhs you have given previously?
 A. Nine lakhs; yes.
 Q. When you cut down the figure, in what way was the recovery of the money dealt with?
 A. It was recovered in three different ways—by levy from income tax payees, by levy from the payees of the general municipal water rate in Ahmedabad and also by confiscation of the caution money of the mill-hands. The mill-hands always deposited one week's caution money with the employers. That week's caution money was confiscated.
 Q. Was there anything unusual in the matter of dealing with compensation?
 A. The situation has never arisen, so far as I know.
 Q. Had you to deal with the question of putting on additional police in certain areas?
 A. In the neighbourhood of Barejdi and Nandej.
 Q. Putting on an additional police means increasing your assessments in the area?
 A. It does so.
 Q. Were there complaints about that?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you in any way increase the police force in order to maintain peace and order?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you increase the force beyond what in your opinion was necessary in order to maintain peace and order?
 A. No, Sir.
 Q. Were the additional police forces that were put on at Barejdi and some other villages reduced afterwards?
 A. They are still there.
 Q. Your opinion is that the forces are not more than what is necessary to maintain order in this district?
 A. No.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. As regards the making of the arrests, when these riots were over, was that done by the police under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, in the ordinary way?
 A. Yes.
 Q. No exceptional measures were taken, as regards persons to be arrested, or mode or manner of arresting them?
 A. Not, so far as I know.
 Q. When did the police begin to make arrests, apart from any arrests made during the riots?
 A. I have not got any close knowledge of it. It was entirely under Mr. Guider.
 Q. Had you any reason to suppose that the bringing of the persons arrested before the magistrate immediately after arrest was not practicable? Were any other special measures adopted?
 A. No.
 Q. I think it appears in your statement that the tribunals under the Defence of India Act dealt with the punishments of all persons who were implicated in the rioting. Was that only as regards graver cases or as regards all cases?
 A. All cases which were actually concerned in the riots.
 Q. So that the ordinary criminal courts in the district did not have to deal with the rioting question at all? Is that so?
 A. That is so.
 Q. Now, taking Ahmedabad, generally, there is a good deal of wooden houses and shops?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Is there a part of the Ahmedabad city, for example, where the property, generally speaking, is not inflammable?
 A. Not that I know of.
 Q. It is all more or less of that kind?

A. Yes.
 Q. I think, on the 10th was the first attempt of the mob to do violence. There were a great many independent acts on the 10th and 11th, taking them together. Is it not so?
 A. Yes.
 Q. In your opinion, if some such measures, as in Colonel Frazer's order,* had not been adopted, do you think that the riots would have been put down as soon as they cropped up?
 A. I do not think so.
 Q. Is it not the case that the extent of damage by setting on fire houses might have been very much increased if the riots had not been put down?
 A. I do not feel certain about that. I do not think there was much to burn of Government buildings.
 Q. Did they burn all they wanted to burn?
 A. They burnt all they had at hand.
 Q. I understand, throughout, there had been little or no burning of private property in the way of houses, etc. Is that so?
 A. There is no such case.
 Q. Besides Government buildings, I think there were other cases of houses which were looted?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Having regard to the 2 Europeans who were attacked on the 10th—the case of Mr. Brown, of Sergeant Fraser and of other people—in your opinion, was the motive of the mob anti-European?
 A. Certainly, Sir.
 Q. And as the burning of the Government property seemed to indicate, it was strictly anti-Government?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Was it that the mob desired to demonstrate against the Rowlatt Bill, or were out against the supposed ill-treatment or arrest of Mr. Gandhi?
 A. That is so.
 Q. I do not gather that Rowlatt Bill itself had very much to do with the actual incidents of the 10th and 11th?
 A. I think it was partly due to that. The people were already very much exasperated by the meetings, and the agitation against the Rowlatt Bill.
 Q. I think it was suggested that there might be some difficulty in getting the direct evidence of some one who actually saw the police constable being thrown down from the balcony?
 A. Yes.
 Q. As I understand, there was one Circle Inspector in the house that was attacked by the mob?
 A. Yes.
 Q. I suppose you would have no difficulty in getting evidence as regards the attack on the house though not as regards the actual treatment of the constable?
 A. I think that is available.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. How many years have you been in the Northern Division?
 A. I have been since May 1917.
 Q. Before that where were you?
 A. I was five months in the Sholapur district and before that I have done my whole service in Sindh.
 Q. You were never in the Northern Division before 1917?
 A. No, Sir.
 Q. In the Northern Division, were you posted at Ahmedabad?
 A. Yes.
 Q. You have been in Ahmedabad ever since 1917?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Now in your experience, did you find that the people were ordinarily quiet people?
 A. I found them very quiet indeed.
 Q. And law-abiding?
 A. Yes.

* Appendix 5 to the statement of the Bombay Government, page 208.

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[Continued.]

Q. People who were not ordinarily against the authorities?
 A. Not ordinarily.
 Q. Coming to the events of April 1919, did you observe among the people any anti-British feeling, before the riots?
 A. I have not observed.
 Q. Nor anti-Government feeling?
 A. No.
 Q. Now, the Home Rule agitation came somewhere in 1917 or 1918?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Then came the Rowlatt agitation?
 A. Yes.
 Q. The Government case was (vide paragraph 72) "The actual rioters, the rabble of the city and the mills, were not much interested in the Rowlatt Bills. They were however dragged into the vortex of agitation against these Bills, by designing agitators who played upon their ignorance and apathy by fantastic misrepresentations." Are those misrepresentations as regards the provisions of the Rowlatt Act? What misrepresentations were made?
 A. I only knew this by hearsay. I heard, for instance, that some people said that the Rowlatt Act meant that the police might take 4 annas from any passerby.
 Q. Did you hear this from any responsible person?
 A. No; I have not heard from any responsible person, but I have heard it.
 Q. You have been the officer in charge of the district and you have not had placed before you any evidence regarding these misrepresentations?
 A. Only reports.
 Q. No tangible evidence?
 A. There was no evidence at all on record.
 Q. I do not think it is suggested that any of the educated people or those whom you call leaders were in any manner responsible for this misrepresentation?
 A. That I cannot say.
 Q. Has it ever been suggested that any of these misrepresentations emanated from or were propagated by any of the leaders in Ahmedabad?
 A. I never heard of any such report.
 Q. Mr. Gandhi or his followers, I gather from your statement, did not at any time incite violence?
 A. That is so.
 Q. And they did their best, so I gather from your statement, to induce the mob to abstain from violence?
 A. Certainly; the immediate followers of Gandhi did so.
 Q. On the 10th, they did, to a certain extent, succeed in controlling the mob?
 A. Yes.
 Q. You say after that they had no power over the mob. "From all that I saw of these leaders during the riots they honestly attempted to induce the mob to abstain from violence; but they appeared to have no power of controlling them when their passions were aroused." That is to say, when the riots really became serious?
 A. Yes. From the morning of the 11th.
 Q. The people that took part in the worst aspects of the disturbances were the mill-hands?
 A. Partly mill-hands; chiefly mill hands.
 Q. And your view is that their acts were dictated more by personal motives than by political considerations?
 A. That is so.
 Q. They had great regard and esteem for Mr. Gandhi, whom they considered really as a deity from their point of view?
 A. That is so.
 Q. And it was because they heard of his arrest that they got out of hand in the manner they did?
 A. Yes.
 Q. So far as the mill-hands were concerned, they really were, as I understand, the main part of the mobs that did these violent acts?
 A. They really carried out the violent acts.

Q. Now I understand the Government view is that there was no organisation controlling this movement that no evidence has been obtained that the outbreak of April was planned and directed by a central organisation which controlled the movement. That is stated in paragraph 118 of the statement of the Bombay Government. Is that correct?
 A. Yes, in my opinion.
 Q. Now you will find in paragraph 58 of the statement of the Bombay Government that Mr. Gandhi is reported to have said "It appears to me that the acts that have been committed in Ahmedabad appear to have been organised. They appear to have been arranged." I take it then that you and Government do not agree with this statement that they were organised in that sense and that they were previously arranged?
 A. My own opinion is that they were arranged on the night of the 10th.
 Q. Have you any evidence of that?
 A. Mr. Gandhi has told me so himself.
 Q. All the evidence you have for your suggestion that they were arranged on the night of the 10th is Mr. Gandhi's statement?
 A. That is so, his statement to me.
 Q. As I read to you from paragraph 118, the Government case is that there was no organisation controlling what happened?
 A. No central organisation.
 Q. Mr. Gandhi says the acts that have been committed at Ahmedabad appear to have been organised?
 A. Yes.
 Q. So there is a conflict between the view of Mr. Gandhi and the official view of this matter?
 A. I do not think those two statements are incompatible. When you say a central organisation, it means an organisation which had promoted every one of these outrages, whereas my view is that the outrages which occurred in Ahmedabad on the 11th were organised on the night of the 10th.
 Q. You have no evidence in support of that statement that they were organised on the 10th?
 A. I have got the best of evidence, I consider.
 Q. Your suggestion was based on what Mr. Gandhi told you?
 A. That I consider to be very good evidence.
 Q. Let us be clear about the situation. You have no evidence in support of that suggestion beyond the statement of Mr. Gandhi?
 A. I have got circumstances which appear to point to the same conclusion.
 Q. Are they placed officially anywhere on record?
 A. Well, I think they can be gathered from the reports.
 Q. We have not got them before us?
 A. The nature of the outbreak; the sudden and widespread nature of the outbreak.
 Q. The suddenness you yourself explain by saying that the motive of these mill-hands who took a large part in this business was personal, and it came suddenly because of the arrest of Mr. Gandhi?
 A. But that would not prevent them organising the attack on the night of the 10th.
 Q. It may be, but it is all surmise. It is possible there may have been some organisation or some arrangement on the night of the 10th, but what I want to get at is that there is no tangible proof of it?
 A. I should like to say exactly what Mr. Gandhi told me. Mr. Gandhi told me in private conversation that he knew that this was organised on the night of the 10th, and I understood from Mr. Gandhi that he knew who organised it.
 Q. He told you this?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Mr. Gandhi was not in Ahmedabad on the 10th?
 A. He was not in Ahmedabad on the 10th.
 Q. So he could have had no personal knowledge of what occurred on the 10th, it is obvious?
 A. He could have had the very best knowledge.
 Q. No personal knowledge?
 A. No personal knowledge.

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[Continued.]

Q. When Mr. Gandhi told you that this was organised on the 10th and that he knew the people who organised it, did you make any enquiries to verify whether that statement of Mr. Gandhi was correct or not?

A. He would give me no clue.

Q. He would not, but you had your official machinery for that purpose; you were put on the track by what Mr. Gandhi said. He asserted that it was arranged and he knew the people who had arranged it. With that knowledge before you what steps did you take through your official machinery to find out whether that was true or not?

A. No steps were possible which had not already been taken. I admit that no information has been received through that machinery.

Q. You took such steps as were possible to be taken and the result was negative. You have not been able to find any evidence which would prove the truth of the statement made by Mr. Gandhi?

A. That is so.

Q. Mr. Gandhi goes on to say (para. 58 of the statement of Bombay Government), "I firmly believe that some man or men with education and knowledge have a hand in them." What you said just now applies to that statement also, that you were not able to arrive at any tangible proof by such enquiries as you were able to make by your official machinery?

A. Yes.

Q. I understand Mr. Guider was asked to enquire into these riots?

A. Yes.

Q. And I suppose in the course of that enquiry he must have made enquiries to find out the causes of them?

A. Yes.

Q. I suppose you must have placed before him this statement of Mr. Gandhi? He must have been made aware of that?

A. Yes.

Q. And he must have made such investigation as he could possibly do?

A. Yes.

Q. Did Mr. Guider make a report of his investigation?

A. There was no investigation possible that I can see.

Q. Mr. Guider was put here to investigate these riots?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Gandhi's statement was put before him, and he must have in the ordinary course made a report?

A. I made a report to Government. I reported my conversation with Mr. Gandhi to the Commissioner and he reported it to Government. I have not discussed this matter with Mr. Guider.

Q. Mr. Guider was specially put on this enquiry. In the ordinary course I take it such an important fact as this statement of Mr. Gandhi which you considered sufficiently important to communicate specially to Government, must have been placed before him?

A. I suppose so.

Q. Then after he concluded his investigation, he must have made some report of that investigation?

A. I have no information about this; Mr. Guider can say.

Q. I take it that in the ordinary course if he did make such a report he must have dealt with this statement of Mr. Gandhi?

A. I cannot say.

Q. Where is that report of Mr. Guider if he made it? I do not find it in the papers.

Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay:—I do not think there is any report dealing with that particular point.

Q. Was any report made by Mr. Guider? If so, I should like to have it. He was asked to investigate these riots; he must have made some report.

A. (Mr. Kemp):—No. He made no report.

Q. (To witness): You have already told us that Mr. Gandhi acquired great influence with the mill-

hands by the way he befriended them in obtaining higher wages and other matters?

A. Yes.

Q. And they actually worshipped him as a saint?

A. Yes.

Q. Now in the ordinary course, the reported arrest of such a person is eminently likely to lead to disturbance?

A. Yes.

Q. Now when did you officially first hear of the reported arrest of Mr. Gandhi?

A. I heard there was a rumour of his arrest at about 9 o'clock on the morning of the 10th.

Q. Did the Bombay Government convey to you any official intimation of these occurrences?

A. No.

Q. Never at any time?

A. No.

Q. And you heard of this on the morning of the 10th?

A. Yes.

Q. And how did you hear it, did it appear in the papers?

A. It was telephoned up to me from the Khas Bazar.

Q. Who did that?

A. A Sub-Inspector; I think it was Mr. Kothawala.

Q. Where did he get the information from?

A. He informed me that this rumour was spreading in the bazar.

Q. This was on the morning of the 10th?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see any information with regard to that in the Bombay papers that came that morning?

A. I did not.

Q. There was nothing in the Bombay papers at all?

A. No.

Q. So when you got this information telephoned to you, you did not know that the actual facts were that Mr. Gandhi was not really arrested but was merely turned back to go to Bombay? Of that fact you were not aware?

A. I was not aware of that.

Q. When did you first become aware of that correct fact?

A. After the riots, I think.

Q. After the 10th or later during the day on the 10th?

A. It was not on the 10th nor the 11th.

Q. When did you learn first that the correct thing was that Mr. Gandhi was not arrested but that he was merely turned back and asked to go to Bombay?

A. I cannot say when I heard that first.

Q. The Bombay Government officially never informed you of this?

A. No, I had no information.

Q. Did you see the information about Mr. Gandhi in the papers that arrived here on the 11th, because the information was published, I think, in Bombay on the 10th?

A. I do not think any papers arrived on the 11th; I do not think any post arrived.

Q. How did the information first get into Ahmedabad, of his arrest, that is what I want to know?

A. How the rumour of his arrest arrived? I am afraid I cannot tell you.

Q. When you heard of it on the 10th, or subsequently on the 11th, did you take any steps to communicate with the Bombay Government to learn what the real facts were?

A. I did not.

Q. You will grant that it was really very important, looking to the position Mr. Gandhi occupied with this lower population in Ahmedabad, if he was really not arrested, to apprise the public of the real facts as early as possible to prevent further mischief?

A. It would have been beneficial certainly.

Q. But no steps were taken at any time officially either by the local administration here or by the higher authority to make that known?

A. That is so.

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[Continued.]

Q. Now the disturbances on the 10th were certainly of a serious character?

A. Yes.

Q. And you actually on the 10th called in the military to aid the civil power?

A. I did so.

Q. In the evening you told the military they were not wanted any further?

A. On the contrary I retained two strong guards at the two gates of the city where the riot had taken place.

Q. Did you not think it advisable to have the military in various parts of the city to stand by for the next day to meet any eventualities that might occur?

A. I discussed that matter with the Colonel and also the Superintendent of Police at the railway station, but on the whole we considered it was not advisable.

Q. As events turned out, you will grant that if the other course had been adopted, it would have been much better?

A. I will grant that had that course been adopted, we could have saved the buildings, but I do not agree that the riots would not have occurred, or that there would not have been the same loss of life.

Q. But you will grant that the destruction of property would in any event have been avoided?

A. Would have been less, not avoided.

Q. Test it in this way, the buildings opposite the Bank of Bombay were burned?

A. Yes.

Q. And the Bank of Bombay had about two or three armed men?

A. Four.

Q. That building was saved because that guard of four was there?

A. Yes.

Q. If you had had near by in the same quarter a military picket of 10 or 15 or 25 standing by, surely you will grant that these buildings would certainly have been saved?

A. If a sufficiently strong military force had been stationed by the buildings undoubtedly, as I say, they could have been saved.

Q. When you say stationed by the buildings, you do not mean that they need be at each building. You know the Bhadar quarter; these buildings were near by. If the military were available and could walk up to them in five or 10 minutes, that would have saved the buildings?

A. If it had been sufficiently strong.

Q. What number do you think?

A. I should say nothing under a hundred.

Q. If that precaution had been taken you could have saved the buildings?

A. I have admitted that.

Q. And if the military had been kept like that standing by in different parts of the town in sufficient number the riot could have been prevented?

A. No. I do not admit that.

Q. When I say prevented I mean that people would have rushed in crowds, but seeing the military in force they would certainly have dispersed?

A. No, they would have attacked them I think.

Q. As it happened, when the military did come they were dispersed in a very short time?

A. But they regathered and they attacked the military.

Q. But after the military arrived and took charge there was nothing very serious done?

A. I cannot admit that, I am afraid.

Q. The military arrived on the 11th after these excesses were committed?

A. After the buildings had been burnt.

Q. After that was anything serious done, after the military were in force in the city?

A. After that the houses of the Honorary Magistrate and my Personal Assistant were sacked, the temples were raided, the gates of the city were burned, the police *chowkies* were burned, liquor shops were burned.

Q. In any event that could not have been prevented? A. I could not have guarded every place.

Q. But if the military had been in force in the city from the morning of the 11th or the night of the 10th and these buildings had thereby been saved, would not that have prevented the occurring of fresh riots? Was not the mob emboldened by their success in burning those buildings?

A. It is possible they were emboldened.

Q. If these buildings had been saved from being fired that would have very much cooled down the ardour of the mob very likely?

A. It is a possibility.

Q. The police in the city were all unarmed police?

A. Not all unarmed police. There were armed police at the Khas Bazar *chowky* and the Idgah *chowky*.

Q. Of what strength?

A. At the Khas Bazar *chowky* the strength varied at different times. At the time the riot broke out, I think, there were 16 armed policemen there.

Q. And in all in the city how many armed police had you?

A. I had a small body at the power station, I think 5, at the Idgah *chowky* 7, at the sub-jail 10, and at the Bank 4, at the Khas Bazar *chowky* 16.

Q. The four at the Bank rendered a good account of themselves so far as one can see?

A. Yes they did so.

Q. What did the others do?

A. At the sub-jail they managed to defend the sub-jail, but did not prevent the main gateway being set on fire, and the police at the Khas Bazar *chowky* were attacked both from the direction of the Bhadar and also from the direction of the *Tin Darwazas*, and I understand from the accounts of the police that it was for that reason that they were unable to come to the aid of the burning buildings; to come and prevent the buildings being burnt. That force at the Khas Bazar *chowky* was meant to proceed to any point at which there was a riot, and, in view of the serious outbreak which took place on the morning of the 11th, that force was not large enough. It was immobilized by being attacked on both sides. The other body of armed police at the Idgah *chowky* consisted of 7. It was rushed by the mob, disarmed, and the *chowky* burnt.

Q. That shows that the armed force available in the city was much too small to deal with the situation?

A. Yes, it also shows the great danger of putting small bodies of men to guard points.

Q. In view of that fact that you realised then I take it, that the armed force of police in the city was not sufficient to deal with any large disturbance of that character and in view of what had happened on the 10th, would it not have been advisable to get the military into the city overnight on the 10th, or certainly early on the 11th?

A. Judging after the event, yes, but judging on the facts which were before me, I should do the same as I did then.

Q. Would it not have been better, as a matter of precaution, to err on the other side and keep the military in the city on the night of the 10th in view of what did happen on that day?

A. Well I do not know. If the military had been brought in I quite agree that it would have been better. I think the riots were inevitable in any case. That being the case it is better the military should be there to deal with them. But on the night of the 10th in my opinion I did not consider that the riots were inevitable. I considered I had every reason for believing that the followers of Mr. Gandhi were doing their best to quiet the mob, and I saw no reason why they should not succeed. I knew from the events of the 6th that they had a very great influence over the mob, and I had also witnessed that after the riot at the Prem gate. If I introduced the military at that point, it might very well have been that I should have undone the work which I believed them to be doing, and my information which I received at 11 o'clock that night was that they

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[Continued.]

had succeeded in drawing away the crowd from the armed police in the Richey Road to the river bed, and that as a result of their meeting the situation in the town had been very much improved. I did not consider that I was justified in introducing military at that moment without seeing my way a little more clearly. The best of my belief was that it was within the power of the *Satyagrahi* leaders to keep the mob quiet, and the chances were that if I introduced the military at the very moment when they were doing that, I might undo their work and cause a riot instead of preventing it.

Q. As events turned out you relied too much on the *Satyagrahi* people?

A. That is so.

Q. You say that they became powerless to control the mob; you did not realise that on the 10th I take it?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Your view was that they were able to control the crowds and they were exercising their wholesome influence on them?

A. That was my view on the 10th.

Q. And having that view on the 10th, you thought you might unnecessarily complicate the situation by introducing the military?

A. I thought so. I preferred to wait and see next morning exactly where I stood before taking that step.

Q. Could you not have put the military in the town on the 10th, not obtrusively in public places, but could you not have kept them out of sight of the populace so as not to inflame them, but so that they might still be available for any emergency, as was done in the city of Bombay?

A. Yes. Had I any particular reason to believe that the crowds would attack the Government buildings, perhaps I might have done something of the sort, but my fears at the time were concentrated on the area just round the Prem gate where the riot occurred on the 10th. That is the point which the Superintendent and I visited first the next morning. It is also the point, I understand, that the *Satyagraha* leaders visited first on the next morning, and I had not any great fears about the Bhadar and the Government buildings. I thought that if any disturbance occurred on the next day the force of armed police which was stationed in the Khas Bazar on the 10th and had taken action on the 10th, would be sufficient to deal with it on the 11th also.

Q. Mr. Chatfield, please see paragraph 71 of the Government case. It is stated there that some of the *Satyagrahis* were sent into the city to try and keep order, but there is nothing to show that their presence had any beneficial effect. When the Collector's and other offices were set on fire, some of these *Satyagrahis* were present and helped to remove to hospital those wounded at the attack on the Bank. Who were these *Satyagrahis*?

A. This information is not derived from me. I cannot answer it.

Q. Who is responsible for this statement?

A. It is not contained in my statement.

Q. Where did Government get that statement from?

Mr. Kemp:—Mr. Guider gave it.

Q. So you won't be able to say anything about the further statements in that paragraph that they refused to identify any of the offenders and that Mr. Gandhi also refused to assist you?

A. I can answer for Mr. Gandhi.

Q. With regard to the other people who are spoken of as being present at these disturbances, but showed their unwillingness to testify to facts or to identify the offenders have you any knowledge?

A. I have no personal knowledge.

Q. Then you said that Mr. Gandhi expressed his reluctance to communicate the facts which might come to his knowledge, relating to the disturbances and useful for the purposes of investigation unless the persons, communicating such facts, consented? You are aware of this, and you have personal knowledge of this?

A. Yes, I have personal knowledge of this.

Q. When did this occur?

A. I cannot say when it first occurred, but towards the end of May Mr. Guider complained to me that Mr. Gandhi had adopted this attitude and he—Mr. Gandhi—would not communicate any information against any person which would assist in obtaining conviction, and that he had his own reasons for doing so. So I arranged an interview about the end of May with Mr. Gandhi and discussed the matter at full length with him. Afterwards I took Mr. Gandhi to the Commissioner and discussed it there, and Mr. Gandhi persisted in this attitude.

Q. When you interviewed Mr. Gandhi, did Mr. Gandhi say that he had information which would assist the investigation or result in bringing the offenders to justice?

A. He said that.

Q. Positively?

A. Yes.

Q. He said that he would not give that information or assist the authorities in that matter?

A. Not anything which would obtain a conviction unless the person who gave him that information consented.

Q. He positively refused to give the information he said he had in his possession. He said he had information of a character which would be helpful for the investigation of cases?

A. Which would be helpful in obtaining conviction.

Q. But he refused to give that information to the authorities unless the persons from whom he had obtained that information consented to his doing so?

A. That is so.

Q. And neither you nor the Commissioner could dislodge Mr. Gandhi from the attitude he had adopted?

A. No, certainly not.

Q. Now martial law was never proclaimed in the sense in which it was proclaimed in the Punjab, I mean there was no formal proclamation of martial law at all?

A. There was none.

Q. Do I take it that the military were brought into the town merely in aid of the civil power?

A. That is so.

Q. All through it was merely in aid of the civil power?

A. That is so.

Q. The civil authorities never abandoned the control to them at all?

A. That is so.

Q. Then these orders* that were issued about firing on more than 10 people or on anybody who ventured out after sunset or did not answer the challenge, these orders were issued by whose authority?

A. They were actually issued by Colonel Frazer. They were issued with my consent.

Q. I take it, looking to the position which you have told us, that the civil power was still in authority and the military was only brought in aid of the civil power?

A. Yes.

Q. I take it that this order was issued by you?

A. I am responsible for that order.

Q. The military thought that this order was necessary in order to preserve peace and order and you agreed to accept their advice and issued that order, and you accept responsibility for that order.

A. Yes, I accept responsibility for that order.

Q. Under this order were any people actually fired on. Take first the order about firing on 10 or more than 10 people. Were anybody fired on under that order?

A. I understand they were.

Q. How many?

A. I am afraid I cannot tell you that.

Q. People were fired on because they contravened this particular order?

A. I have no information on that subject.

* Appendix 5 to the statement of the Bombay Government, page 208.

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[Continued.]

Q. You have no official record anywhere?

A. I don't say that none exists, but I have no information.

Q. Possibly there may be. Who will be able to give us that information?

Mr. Kemp, Counsel to Bombay Government:—I don't think there is any record.

Sir C. H. Setalvad:—The same applies to the other order?

A. Yes.

Q. About these two officers whose properties were attacked—Bulakhidas and Hussain Khan—they were very unpopular officers?

A. I cannot say they were unpopular officers.

Q. I understood you to suggest that they were unpopular officers?

A. I understood that was the case, but I can't answer that it is the case.

Q. You cannot account for it on any other basis?

A. I cannot account for it, but they were magistrates with whom the mill-hands and the population generally were in the habit of coming in conflict; these mill-hands were often brought before the courts of these two magistrates.

Q. There are other magistrates also in the city and they were not the only magistrates who were dealing with cases of that character. There are several honorary magistrates in this city?

A. The other magistrate is Rao Bahadur Dulabrai. He had not been trying cases for some months due to sickness.

Q. There were also the regular stipendiary magistrates and those two were not the only magistrates working?

A. There were the city magistrate and the Huzur Deputy Collector.

Q. Had they rightly or wrongly a reputation as unpopular officers for a long time?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. Bulakhidas was formerly in the Kaira district?

A. I don't know his past history.

Q. Their property was wholly looted?

A. Yes.

Q. Was any part of it recovered?

A. A portion of it was recovered.

Q. With regard to Hussain Khan, did he claim any particular jewellery or ornaments as his own?

Mr. Kemp, Counsel to Bombay Government:—I think you mean Bulakhidas.

Sir C. H. Setalvad:—I want to know if there is any truth in the suggestion that he identified certain jewellery or ornaments found with some person as his own, the result of which would be that that man would be implicated in the ordinary course, and it turned out in the investigation that that jewellery had really been pawned with that man by Hussain Khan and a document was actually produced to that effect?

A. I have no knowledge of that.

Q. As far as you are aware, that is true?

A. I know nothing about it.

Q. You said that the municipal authorities including the President rendered no assistance at all?

A. May I see the paragraph?

Q. I think it is in the concluding portion of paragraph 5 of your statement. You say that not a single citizen of Ahmedabad, title holder or others render any aid except Mr. Ambalal. You say the same thing in paragraph 10. You say that the actual leaders were Mr. Patel, Mr. Yajnik and Dr. Kanuga, all of whom retired to their houses when the riot became serious. This course was followed by all the influential citizens including all the members of the municipality from the President downwards?

A. Yes.

Q. And you suggest that they were so inactive, they did not render any help because they were themselves afraid?

A. I may have suggested that, but I have no way of knowing what their reasons were.

Q. I understood you to suggest that they were afraid of their own safety?

A. I said perhaps they were consulting their own safety. I cannot say any more than that.

Q. If they were really consulting their own safety, then it cannot be that they were behind the mob or controlling them in any manner?

A. I never suggested that any of these gentlemen or any of the members of the municipality or the immediate followers of Mr. Gandhi were inciting the mob or organising the mob.

Q. You do not suggest that any of these gentlemen had done it?

A. Oh, no, certainly not.

Q. Now about the various arrests that were made, it is true that a considerable number of people were arrested but were not proceeded against?

A. It is perfectly true, but I have no personal knowledge of these arrests. It has not been in my hands. I really cannot say very much.

Q. Who will be able to give us that information?

A. Mr. Guider.

Q. You can give us a statement* showing the number of people arrested, how they were dealt with and who were not brought to trial?

A. I presume so. I have no personal knowledge about this.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow:—

Q. How was the trouble brought to an end, was it the effect of Colonel Frazer's order or the introduction of the troops or actually the firing and the number of casualties inflicted that brought the trouble to an end?

A. I think partly it was the effect of the order which was passed by Colonel Frazer which brought the trouble to an end. It had a very great effect. The arrival of the British troops, I believe, had a great moral effect, so really it is a combination of both these things which brought the troubles to an end.

Q. Do you think that in the light of subsequent facts and what you just said it would have been a good thing to have Colonel Frazer's order out sooner?

A. I don't think that was possible.

Q. Why not possible?

A. Because some time was required in order to give notice.

Q. Do you mean to say you had to have a certain amount of time in which to circulate the information?

A. I had no organisation by means of which to warn the population. I had no police. I had nothing but the patrols. That was my difficulty, but it had a great effect.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan:—

Q. Viramgam and Nadiad are also two industrial towns?

A. I know nothing about Nadiad.

Q. There is a population of about 20,000 at Viramgam?

A. Yes.

Q. It contains two cotton mills?

A. Yes.

Q. Now is it not a fact that so far as Viramgam is concerned, it takes its lead from Ahmedabad in all these matters, and that it is considered as a suburb of Ahmedabad?

A. That is so.

Q. May I take it that all that happened at Viramgam was practically in sympathy with what had happened at Ahmedabad?

A. That is so.

Q. What I mean to say is that from these simultaneous happenings, both at Viramgam and at Ahmedabad, you are not prepared to say that there was some organisation behind them?

A. I have already said what I thought about Ahmedabad. I think that was organised on the night of the 10th.

* Appendix 12 to the statement of the Bombay Government, page 213.

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[Continued.]

Q. You had no evidence after the 10th that any people went from Ahmedabad to Viramgam and organised that *hartal* there?

A. I have no proof to that effect.

Q. And so far as the mill-hands are concerned, I think it is a fact that Miss Anasuya is as much a favourite of theirs as Mr. Gandhi?

A. Yes.

Q. And when you thought that on the evening of the 10th everything had gone down were you not aware that the situation would be complicated on the morning of the 11th by the false rumour that Miss Anasuya had been arrested?

A. I had never dreamed of it.

Q. Now this rumour as soon as it was received complicated matters to a certain extent, and so far as the mill-hands were concerned, to a greater extent. Is not that so?

A. Yes.

Q. Now so far as the trials of these cases were concerned, was any educated man convicted?

A. I think there was a man convicted over the murder of Sergeant Fraser. I presume he was an educated man, but he was a *Satyagrahi*.

Q. That is one instance. Any other instances?

A. I think over the Barejdi case.

Q. Was any one belonging to the *Ashram* of Gandhi ever convicted?

A. There was a man tried in the riot case of Prem gate and he was acquitted.

Q. Were any office-holders of the *Satyagraha* movement *challaned* and convicted?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. Out of the people who were convicted in these trials, do you know whether there was any one who had taken the vow?

A. So far as I know, none.

Q. Did you not even ascertain as to whether those men that were fired upon under those Martial Law orders were not rioters or could not possibly have been rioters, and if you had found out, could you give me the names, their occupations and so forth? You see, my point is that under the Martial Law orders any congregation of persons which was more than ten was fired upon. As a result some of them were killed or wounded. They may have been innocent persons, who were quite ordinary men, sitting on their shops or who could not possibly have taken part in any of the riots. Therefore was any attempt made to find out who the persons were, to what class they belonged and what their professions were?

A. I attempted to find out who the casualties were, but I failed to do so.

Q. During the firing of these two days, were any children and women wounded?

A. I have given the statistics in my statement.

Q. Will you please name them?

A. One woman wounded on the 11th. Children four.

Q. How were they wounded? I mean, did it occur inside their houses or in their shops, or did they actually form part of the crowd?

A. I remember that a girl was wounded inside a house by a stray bullet, but I cannot answer where exactly these other cases occurred.

Q. As to the burning that took place on the 10th, is it not a fact that all these buildings were burnt after the crowd was fired upon on the 10th or 11th?

A. I think it was before.

Q. Now take the burning of the *mandap* for the matriculation examination. Why was it burnt? Have you been able to ascertain as to why it was burnt?

A. Well, I cannot give the motives of the mob. It was a tempting thing to burn and they burnt it.

Q. Was it through sheer mischief?

A. I cannot say.

Q. Were they trying to enforce the *hartal* by so doing?

A. I cannot say; I have no personal knowledge.

Q. Were you informed that the crowd were rioting and doing all this mischief because they wanted the release of Miss Anasuya and Mr. Gandhi?

A. I was not present.

Q. But still you had that information? Were you not informed of that?

A. Never.

Q. Kindly see the Government case, paragraph 38. It is said that Mr. Tyabji, an Executive Engineer, remonstrated with an English-speaking Indian youth who appeared to be directing the operations and told him that Gandhi would die of grief when he heard what they had done. The youth replied that they would burn everything until Gandhi and Anasuya were released and asked Mr. Tyabji to leave him alone?

A. Yes.

Q. Was any European lady actually assaulted during these 2 or 3 days?

A. I believe that Mrs. Tudball, who is the matron of the hospital, was assaulted by one of her own staff.

Q. Any one else?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. So far as Mrs. Tuke was concerned, is it not a fact that there was no real intention or demonstration to assault her, but that when she was seen armed with a revolver and was asked not to make use of it, because they did not wish to assault her, nothing was done to her?

A. I cannot say what the motives of the crowd were.

Q. Again I refer you to the same passage about the engineer. The passage runs:—"His person was searched to see if he had any weapon concealed and he was allowed to enter Colonel Tuke's compound only on condition that he promised to prevent Mrs. Tuke using a revolver which they had seen with her." Probably you were in possession of this information?

A. I never remember being informed of this.

Q. Then you agree with me the reason was that the rioters had not got the *hartal* on the 6th?

A. That is suggested.

Q. Now take the case of these two Europeans. They were first driving in a carriage?

A. So it is reported.

Q. And they were asked to come down from the carriage?

A. I believe they were pulled out of it.

Q. Practically up to that time no European had been assaulted?

A. No Europeans, so far as I know, had been assaulted.

Q. And at least before all this intensive form of burning and rioting commenced you were surrounded by that crowd for about two hours, and except for the booing or hooting they did nothing?

A. No.

Q. Then why do you say that those two Europeans were assaulted because they were Europeans? I do not want you to understand that I am in any way justifying the conduct of the crowd. But I just want to find out whether it could not have been because of the misbehaviour of some sort of those Europeans that the crowd took objection to and committed those deeds?

A. I have never seen that suggested anywhere.

Q. But still you say, at first they were driven in a carriage, then they went back to Kalupur *Chowky* and then after that they wanted to drive back again in the lorry and that they were again made to alight. Then again they went to the *Chowky* and then from that place they went to certain houses and from there tried to escape?

A. No, they went into the *Dharamsala* and after that they tried to leave.

Q. Do you know there is a very popular missionary here in Ahmedabad?

A. Yes, Mr. Gillespie.

Q. Did he not pass through the crowds several times that day?

A. I cannot say.

Q. Was he in any way assaulted?

A. I have never heard of it.

Q. Then the mere fact that these two Europeans were assaulted in your opinion justifies you to come to the conclusion that they were assaulted because they were Europeans?

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[Continued.]

A. I say it is quite possible.

Q. Then did not something happen that induced the crowd to follow them and kill them? I mean in the way of their misbehaviour.

A. Well, I do not see any reason except the fact that they were Europeans which led to the mob's deeds.

Q. Then if that is your conclusion, why did the mob refrain from burning the bungalow of Mrs. Tuke and assaulting her? How do you account for that?

A. That is accounted for partly by the fact that people came and interceded and partly because Mrs. Tuke had a revolver.

Q. Therefore according to your statement this crowd, of which you were so afraid, could be cowed down by only the possession of a single revolver?

A. I have made no statement about this crowd at all.

Q. So you do not describe this crowd as a very dangerous one?

A. I had never seen this crowd, so cannot describe it at all.

Q. Is it not a fact that on the 10th there was nowhere more than 3 or 4 police and wherever they showed grit and stood up nothing was done? Take for instance the crowd on the 10th. Was it not dissuaded wherever the police stood and showed fight?

A. The guard on the 10th at the Beehive flour mills fired on the crowd but that did not prevent them from being overpowered and forced to fly and hide or escape.

Q. At the Bank of Bombay?

A. I account for that by the fact that the crowds will naturally turn to places that are not guarded.

Q. Well, I cannot understand why a crowd receded because of the presence of only four constables who were guarding the place?

A. Well, they preferred turning to buildings that were not guarded.

Q. Are there any other places where constables prevented damage?

A. In no other place did the crowd retreat by the mere presence of constables, so far as I know.

Q. Have you been able to find out what happened at Ahmedabad and what happened in the Punjab? What connection it has had?

A. I have not been in charge of the enquiry.

Q. But as the District Magistrate, surely you know something about it?

A. So far as I know, there is no connection.

Q. At one or two places the wires were cut and a train was derailed. Is it not a fact that the sole object of that wire-cutting and derailment was to prevent troops reaching Ahmedabad, that they had been in sympathy (probably a wrong sympathy) with the rioters of Ahmedabad so as to prevent troops from reaching earlier? Was this due to some connection with Afghanistan or the Punjab unrest or any ill-feeling towards Government?

A. No, I cannot see any reason.

Q. You mentioned in answer to General Barrow that three factors combined to put down all the trouble at Ahmedabad? That is, the presence of the British troops, the promulgation of the Martial Law order and a third factor?

A. The crowd was quite tired of their misdeeds.

Q. As a matter of fact, is it not true that the report of Mr. Gandhi had a very great effect in pacifying the people?

A. I should say that was the day after of course.

Q. Is it not a fact that Mr. Gandhi was not allowed to address a crowd on the 13th on account of Martial Law and that is why it was postponed and after permission was obtained a meeting was held on the 14th?

A. Mr. Gandhi preferred to hold it on the 14th, but there is no reason why he should not have held it on the 13th if he had wanted to. I was making arrangements; in fact, I actually drew up a rule by which people should go to his meeting.

Q. Have you heard that on his way to Ahmedabad he had to pass through Nadiad?

A. I do not know anything as to what happened on his way.

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Q. But still he passed through?

A. I suppose so.

Q. Do you know from the Government case that he addressed the people at the station and his having done so prevented anything untoward happening at Nadiad?

A. I have not studied all that happened at Nadiad. It is a different district.

Q. About this compensation affair under the Police Act, have you allowed people an opportunity to object under the Police Act? Have you allowed any time to the people by giving notice to come forward and object to any distribution of these compensations?

A. No.

Q. Did you not think that that was contemplated by the Act?

A. It is not laid down in the Act that I should allow them.

Q. Have you made any exemptions?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. On what basis?

A. Besides the general exemptions which are contained in the order, I have exempted all Europeans and Government servants and certain of the Bank of Bombay and the railway. Those are the general exemptions. I have exempted other people on certain grounds.

Q. That is, you have exempted those people as to whose loyalty you were satisfied, and as a matter of fact whom you knew were not in sympathy with the rioters?

A. That is not the reason why I exempted Europeans and Government servants, but as victims of the mob. It seemed to me unreasonable to make Europeans and Government servants to pay the damages done by a mob which was bent on persecuting them.

Q. Having regard to the population of Ahmedabad, which is a very large number, the majority of them had nothing to do with this riot?

A. No doubt there had been a great deal of people.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Were Parsees exempted?

A. No, they were not.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. As regards the mob being *anti-European*, on what do you base that statement?

A. Partly on the cries of the mob and partly on what was written up on the walls. The main thing of course is the attack on Europeans.

Q. Did they not also attack Indians?

A. They did attack Government servants.

Q. Did they make any attempt to destroy the property of Europeans?

A. Not that I know of, though it was possible for them to do so if they wished it. Certain houses in the city belong to Europeans.

Q. Several European officers including yourself went through the crowd without being molested?

A. I was molested. I was heavily stoned. My car was filled with stones.

Q. On several occasions you did go on foot and some other European officers also did go on foot through the town?

A. That was on the evening of the 10th. I was not molested then.

Q. Why was it an *anti-European* attack?

A. Because I suppose the European element was associated with Government.

Q. And the Indians who are associated with Government they were also assaulted?

A. Yes.

Q. Why was it *anti-Government*?

A. It was *anti-Government*, because it was shown by the action of the crowd. Partly the educated people were angry about the Rowlatt Act and the mill-hands angry for the arrest of Gandhi. There were different reasons why the crowd were enraged against Government.

Q. Do I understand you correctly to say that there was a spread of some sort of organisation on the 10th?

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Mr. G. E. CHATFIELD.

[Continued.]

A. No, I do not say that an organisation was spread into being, but I had thought that the organisation was used on the night of the 10th.

Q. It existed before that?

A. I presume so.

Q. What kind of organisation was it?

A. One organisation I feel sure must have been used among the mill-hands. They were more or less organised and used in co-operation. I have got no proof of any other organisations being used. At some time the organisation through the country-side perhaps, the Home Rule organisation may have been used.

Q. And the object of that was to commit excesses?

A. It was the cause of the rioting on the succeeding days.

Q. As a protest against the arrest of Gandhi?

A. Presumably so.

Q. Any other possible reason in your opinion?

A. I really cannot say what the motives of the people were, not knowing who organised it. But malevolence against Government was I suppose a possible reason.

Q. Because Mr. Gandhi was arrested?

A. Not necessarily, so far as the malevolence was concerned; other people were malevolent against Government.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—

Q. With regard to the members of the Satyagraha Ashram you said that you think one was convicted before the tribunal?

A. No, tried but acquitted.

Q. As a matter of fact was he a member of the Ashram?

A. I cannot say for certain.

Q. I think as a matter of fact he was not. He was a Satyagrahi and not a member. You were asked about the question whether the armed police parties on the 11th had the effect of preventing the crowd from doing damage, and I think you went through most of them, but left out the electric power house party. Did they prevent damage there?

A. No.

Q. There is one other question. It was suggested that if military pickets were scattered about the town or put in important places it would perhaps quell the mob. When you came down on the morning of the 11th, you went to Prem gate?

A. Yes.

Q. That was one of the places where a military picket had been left?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you find the attitude of the people quieted?

A. I did not; I found the military picket was exciting them.

Q. The presence of the military picket was exciting them?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you at any time on the 10th or 11th any talk with any of the Satyagraha leaders with reference to the question whether military pickets or police pickets should remain in the streets?

A. The actual Satyagrahi leader, a man who was controlling the crowd during the riot of the 10th at Prem gate, was very insistent that we should withdraw the armed police. He said "If you withdraw the armed police, I will be answerable that the crowd will be withdrawn too." He was very insistent that it was the presence of the police that was exciting the crowd.

Q. On that same day there was slight trouble. That was reported to you?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the same thing raised there or not?

A. I think Mr. Jivanlal Desai actually went to my personal assistant to beg him to go to Richey Road and remove the armed police from Richey Road in order that he might be able to control the mob.

Q. There is just one other question. You said before the time of these riots, before April, the people of Gujarat were quiet and you always found them quiet and law-abiding?

A. Yes.

Q. Had they at all become excitable before the 10th April?

A. Do you mean the days immediately preceding the 10th?

Q. Before the rumour of Mr. Gandhi's arrest arrived had they in any way become excited or excitable?

A. There was a feeling of unrest in the town.

Q. Can you offer any suggestion as to why they changed from the position of quiet and law-abiding citizens to the position of people who got excited or were excited?

A. No explanation, except the agitation about the Rowlatt Act.

Q. I take it that you mean the meetings and the speeches?

A. Meetings in the river-bed.

Q. There is no other reason why they should become excited as far as you know?

A. Perhaps famine, high prices and so forth might have acted on them.

Q. I take it they were excited on the 10th and 11th. I understood you to say that on the 10th the Satyagrahi leaders had a certain amount of control over the various mobs?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 11th after 9-30 or 10, had they any control over them?

A. So far as I know they had none.

Q. On the question of European property, you say, that if willing, the mob could have on the 11th destroyed European property in the city?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know how many Europeans own house property in the city of Ahmedabad?

A. I do not know.

Q. Do you know whether any Europeans own house property in Ahmedabad?

A. I only know of mission people.

Q. I take it that Europeans who are living in Ahmedabad do not live in houses owned by themselves?

A. As a rule, they do not.

Q. Do you know of any instances where a mob has refrained from burning houses, because it was pointed out that the houses belonged to other people?

A. I cannot say.

Q. With regard to the organisation which you said might have been used on the night of the 10th, you referred to the mill-hands?

A. Yes.

Q. What was their organisation? I just want you to explain what you mean by organisation already existing.

A. The organisation which I referred to was that which was created in 1918 during the struggle.

Q. To fight the mill-owners?

A. Yes.

Q. That of course was created not with any anti-Government motive, but it was created?

A. Yes.

Q. And it was in existence?

A. Yes.

Q. I just want you to clear one point. Was Sergeant Fraser murdered before or after the military pickets were placed throughout the city?

A. It was afterwards.

By Mr. Desai, Counsel for the Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad—

Q. Mr. Chatfield, you went to Prem gate at about 6 o'clock on the 10th?

A. I went at about 5 o'clock on the 10th.

Q. Before you went there, did you hear of any firing by the police on the mob?

A. I heard of firing by the police on the mob while I got close to Idgah Chowky.

Q. Before you went there, there was firing by the police?

A. There was.

Q. Did you ascertain the number of casualties on that occasion?

A. I was told there were 10 casualties.

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Mr. G. E. CHATFIELD.

[Continued.]

Q. Out of these 10, six were taken to the civil hospital?

A. Ten were taken to the civil hospital.

Q. All the 10?

A. I have it down here.

Q. Of those people who were taken to the civil hospital, how many were mere boys of 10 or 12 years of age?

A. Absolutely none were boys.

Q. Is it that your report does not say that or were they none? Have you got the information from the hospital?

A. All the figures come from the various hospitals.

Q. Have they given the ages of the patients?

A. They have not.

Q. So you cannot say whether there were any boys under 16 who went to the civil hospital?

A. I cannot say at present.

Q. Did you ascertain whether any orders to fire were given by any magistrate or any responsible officer?

A. I understand they were given by the sub-inspector of police.

Q. Did the police assist in removing these people to the hospital at all?

A. It was not in their power to do so.

Q. The Satyagrahi people who were there assisted in the removal of all the persons injured at the Prem gate including the police constable?

A. I know they assisted in removing the police constable.

Q. The Satyagrahi people who were present there tried to quell the mob absolutely?

A. I think they honestly tried.

Q. On the night of the 10th, the two Satyagrahi men who were assisting in quelling the mob there were prosecuted on the evidence of the two police sub-inspectors there who ordered firing on the mob?

A. That I cannot say.

Q. Did you have any report of any organisation, be it Satyagraha organisation, Home Rule organisation or the labour organisation, on the night of the 10th?

A. No.

Q. You got no information from any police officer even?

A. No.

Q. Then what is your basis of saying that there was some organisation on the night of the 10th?

A. I understood that from Mr. Gandhi.

Q. Mr. Gandhi was not here on the 10th?

A. He must have known all when he arrived.

Q. Your authority is only Mr. Gandhi's statement?

A. Yes, that is all I have got.

Q. The Home Rule League in the city or in the district had nothing to do whatsoever with the organisation?

A. I have no evidence about that.

Q. Then after the occurrence at Prem gate did you make any report to the Commissioner about the incidents, about the behaviour of Mr. Sagar and Mr. Steeples or about the behaviour of the police? Did you make any report to the Commissioner or to Government?

A. I had no time to do so.

Q. Not even a verbal communication?

A. The Commissioner was in Poona.

Q. You did not even wire to the Government about it?

A. No. I intended to wire the next morning.

Q. Have you come to know during your enquiry that Messrs. Steeples and Sagar insulted Mr. Gandhi in the presence of the mill-hands?

A. I have not heard that.

Q. I put it to you with all respect to the Commissioners that Messrs. Sagar and Steeples or either of them when they inquired about the incidents there, said that it was due to Mr. Gandhi and "Damn Gandhi." Did you come to know of that expression?

A. No.

Q. And that excited the mob?

A. I know nothing of it.

Q. Did you have any conversation with Mr. Steeples or Mr. Sagar that day?

A. I never saw them.

Q. Or after that day?

A. I never saw them.

Q. Do you know where Mr. Steeples lived?

A. I am not certain. I know one of them lived at the cross roads in Camp.

Q. And the other lived in the mill compound?

A. I do not know.

Q. No member of the crowd went to attack Mr. Steeples or Mr. Sagar in their bungalows or loot their property?

A. So far as I know nobody attempted that.

Q. Then I put it to you that they must have given some insult to a revered leader like Mr. Gandhi in the presence of the mill-hands and that excited the crowd and led to the attack on these two people?

A. I do not see the necessity.

Q. On the 11th morning, did you know that mill-hands had collected near the Sarangpur gate and towards Jamalpur?

A. I did not know.

Q. Have you up to the present ascertained whether they had gone that way?

A. I know there was movement of mill-hands outside the town.

Q. They entered the city through the Jamalpur gate?

A. I know the crowd did.

Q. The distance from Sarangpur gate to Jamalpur gate is about two miles or more?

A. Yes.

Q. And during that time if the police had been alert they could have stopped the movement of the crowd at Jamalpur gate?

A. That may be so, I cannot say.

Q. Have you ascertained that there was no police constable at Jamalpur gate that morning?

A. I do not know.

Q. Or even anywhere in the city that morning?

A. I never heard. It is astonishing if that was so. I cannot say.

Q. Have you come to know that some of us met these people near the Jamalpur gate and tried to dissuade them?

A. I know that you addressed the crowd.

Q. Near the Jamalpur gate?

A. I do not know exactly where you addressed, but I know you did.

Q. Subsequently some of the lawyers of Ahmedabad collected and stopped the crowd near the Queen's gardens at about 9 o'clock before you were assaulted in the Jama Masjid?

A. I never heard of that.

Q. All the mill-hands were made to sit down there and they were made to give up their sticks at the Queen's gardens?

A. I have not heard that.

Q. Have you or have you not heard that some of us went to the different places to extinguish the fire at the Mandir? Some of us were the first persons?

A. Before the arrival of the troops?

Q. Yes, before the arrival of the troops?

A. That I have not heard.

Q. Have you heard that Mr. Tyabji was trying to save certain property there?

A. Yes.

Q. He was assisted by some of us in saving property?

A. I think I have read that in the statement.

Q. Then as regards other property too, when the mob came to the District Court, pleaders and other people stopped the mob coming into the District Court?

A. I have mentioned that in my report.

Q. You have also heard that some of the pleaders stopped the whole time in the courts that day?

A. Yes.

Q. With the idea of protecting them in case of necessity?

A. I do not know what their idea was. I know they did.

Q. With what object could they have remained there? You know Mr. Muzumdar, Barrister, and the Hon'ble

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Mr. G. E. CHATFIELD—concluded—Colonel G. S. FRAZER.

Mr. Desai, stayed all the time in the court-house. Did you hear that these gentlemen were in the court-house?

A. Certain people stayed in the court-house.

Q. What led you to think that we were hiding ourselves to save our skins that day?

A. Have I said that?

Q. Practically you have said that. They were, you said, looking to their own safety and did not go out. Did you make any enquiries? Some of us were actually moving in the town in the afternoon to see what things were done, how people were hurt, and so on.

A. I saw none of them; none of them came to me as far as I know.

Q. You were not in the city that day?

A. I was in the city the whole of that day with the exception of about 3 hours.

Q. Your office was burnt. Where could we see you that day?

A. I was to be seen where the chief confusion and collision with the crowd was occurring.

Q. In the morning?

A. Yes. In the evening also I came down to the city and Mr. Ambalal had no difficulty whatsoever in coming to my bungalow.

Q. But later on there were people who could have done something to assist specially in quieting the situation without seeing you. It was just possible?

A. I can only say what I know.

Q. You have not seen any; but they could have done so. They could have stopped the mob?

A. Could have stopped? I do not quite understand the question.

Q. I might go into the streets and try to persuade the people without being seen by you. It is just possible?

A. Yes.

Q. Merely because you have not seen any of us try to quell the mob, you cannot say that we have not attempted to quell the mob?

A. No; it is possible in parts of the town I did not see.

Q. Do I understand you correctly, that Martial Law was not proclaimed in the city of Ahmedabad?

A. Martial Law was not proclaimed.

Q. Then what is it that Mr. Pratt withdrew after his arrival from Bombay?

A. The order of Colonel Frazer.

Q. Actually Martial Law was withdrawn. How can you withdraw it without its having been proclaimed. What is it that Mr. Pratt withdrew?

A. I would like to explain it. It was a fact that the population knew this order by the name of Martial Law, and when Mr. Pratt and I went round the town, the request of everyone was that Martial Law might be

withdrawn. Our object was to make it understood readily to the people and we therefore used this phrase.

Q. When orders for firing were issued, did you have any ambulance arrangement? You knew that some people were sure to be hurt. You knew that a crowd of 10 persons who were standing near a shop would be hurt?

A. There was St. John Ambulance.

Q. Was it in requisition?

A. It was actually working throughout the 11th.

Q. On the 12th?

A. I cannot say what happened in the city after the morning of the 12th.

Q. I put it to you that when shooting took place, there was no ambulance available; then we had to improvise an ambulance and Mr. Kothari took these people to the hospital.

A. I know there were volunteers working.

Q. Ambulance was not available?

A. St. John Ambulance was working on the 10th.

Q. That was later on?

A. I cannot really answer when they came, but I know they were working on the 10th. They were present at the Prem gate, and my recollection is that they were present in the centre of the city during the trouble on the morning of the 11th. That is my recollection.

Q. Mr. Ambalal was supplied with a pass when he wanted to go from place to place after his arrival from Bombay?

A. He asked for a pass and he was given one.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Before the 10th, people were excited and you gave certain reasons and among them was high prices and so on?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it true that before the 10th some of the mill-hands were on strike?

A. Some of the mill-hands are nearly always on strike. It is true that there were some on strike. My recollection is that there were some on strike.

Q. Was it a large number?

A. I remember a small party of armed police being given to two mills because they were expecting trouble on account of the strike.

Q. That was before the 10th?

A. Yes.

Q. Before the 10th, owing to the wages trouble or anything else, the mill-hands were excited?

A. Yes, but that is a very common occurrence. Generally there is trouble in one mill or another out of the 79.

Q. There was no special strike on a large scale on the 10th?

A. Not to my recollection.

Colonel G. S. FRAZER, C.M.G., I. A. (retired).

By the President—

Q. Were you in command of Ahmedabad area from 25th May 1918 to 6th May 1919?

A. Yes.

Q. Previous to that you had been in Gujarat for about 32 years?

A. That is correct.

Q. On 10th April 1919 were you communicated with by Mr. Chatfield, Collector of Ahmedabad, wanting military assistance?

A. I got a note from Mr. Chatfield by motor which arrived in my bungalow on the afternoon asking for military assistance saying that there was a riot and people were burning a mill.

Q. What action did you take on that communication?

A. I sent down 240 men from the 1-97th Infantry and went in advance of it myself.

Q. I think they left the barracks at about 5-45 and got near the Prem gate after 6?

A. I think I made a mistake there. They got to Prem gate a little later than that. 6-10 was, I confess, the time of my arrival, and not that of the troops.

Q. When they arrived, as Mr. Chatfield told us, it was about a quarter to 7?

A. About that.

Q. When you arrived at Prem gate, what did you find as regards the mob?

A. When I was actually at the gate, there was a large mob there all round and Mr. Chatfield was there. They were not doing any harm, but there was loud talking, shouting, and as I came down, I cleared the street.

Q. You proceeded farther than Prem gate?

A. Beyond Prem gate, down towards the station.

Q. Did you post a platoon under an Indian officer at the gate?

A. Yes, at Prem gate.

Q. That was near the Beehive mill?

A. Yes, quite close to it.

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Colonel G. S. FRAZER.

[Continued.]

Q. Is that where the disturbances had taken place and a constable had been seriously injured?

A. So I understand.

Q. You did not see him?

A. No.

Q. Did the rest of the troops return to cantonments?

A. All except two platoons.

Q. Where did the other platoons go?

A. The others went to Kalupur gate.

Q. So far as the military was concerned, was there any firing?

A. No.

Q. On the 11th April about 9 on your return from inspection did you learn anything of the occurrences in the city?

A. I came back at about 10 o'clock and I learnt that a large crowd had been up to cantonments and Colonel Preston sent down troops to aid the civil power.

Q. Three hundred rifles were sent?

A. Three hundred rifles were sent and some more were sent afterwards of course.

Q. How many more were sent afterwards?

A. Altogether I think up to the end of the night something between 600 and 800 troops were sent down there.

Q. Did you see Mr. Chatfield himself about this time?

A. In the early afternoon.

Q. Did you go with him into the city?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you see the damage caused by the mobs?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see some of these mobs yourself?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the attitude of the mob when you advanced with troops?

A. There was a certain amount of shouting and they went away as soon as troops advanced. They disappeared in the main streets and some went to the side streets.

Q. What conclusion did you form as to the possibility of allowing that sort of thing to go on in the interest of order?

A. Matters were certainly getting worse. The longer the mobs collected like that, the more excited were they in behaviour, and if it spread we could have little hold over the mobs.

Q. Did you consult Mr. Chatfield about issuing certain orders as regards people assembling in numbers of ten being fired at or people not answering the challenge being fired at?

A. On the following morning I went to see Mr. Chatfield and pointed out to him the difficulties of the situation and that the only way, absolutely necessary way, in my opinion to get order in the city was to at once do something to prevent the mobs collecting.

Q. Very early in the morning? I understand between 2 and 3 in the morning?

A. That is it.

Q. How did you come to go to Mr. Chatfield so early as that?

A. I went to him as soon as I decided that that particular action was necessary.

Q. Had you been engaged continuously in the work of restoring order?

A. I was busy at that time receiving reports and making arrangements for carrying rations to the troops and all that were required to be done.

Q. This proclamation which you issued was to the following effect:—(1) Any gathering of over 10 individuals collected in one spot can be fired at; (2) Any single individual seen outside any house who does not stop and come up when challenged between the hours of 7 P.M. and 6 A.M. will be shot. When was that proclamation issued?

A. That was issued on that day with orders to have effect from 4 P.M.

Q. Were orders issued to the troops as well as to the public?

A. Yes.

Q. By the officer in command?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the effect of issuing that proclamation?

A. From the reports that I received, it had a very decided effect; the crowds began to get less and less truculent and less hostile.

Q. As regards the troops you had at your disposal in Ahmedabad at this time, how were they composed?

A. All Indian troops.

Q. How many were they in number?

A. Roughly 2,000. 1,943 is the exact number.

Q. Was the work of patrolling the city difficult for such troops to undertake?

A. I shall say No. It depends on circumstances, the attitude of the people I had to encounter.

Q. Looking at the attitude of the people on the 11th, as you saw it, was it a difficult thing for you to deal with the situation?

A. Decidedly difficult; without some drastic order such as I issued, impossible.

Q. On the afternoon of the 12th, did some British troops arrive?

A. Yes, Sir. 200 British Infantry.

Q. Did they come from Bombay?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Where were they posted?

A. Half in the city, up the Richey Road and half came up to the camp in the fort.

Q. In connection with the proclamation, that is, to shoot at groups of ten were there many cases where shooting took place?

A. There were some cases. I could not tell you exactly how many.

Q. I understand the proclamation only came into force at 4 o'clock on the 12th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Then, was the last firing by troops in the city about mid-day on Sunday the 13th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. By that time, was the city restored to a state of order?

A. It had on the whole quieted down.

Q. The proclamation that you had issued on the 12th was cancelled on the 14th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you continue to keep military patrols in the city after the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they gradually reduced?

A. Gradually reduced in strength.

Q. Did order come to be gradually restored?

A. Yes; eventually.

Q. I think stone-throwing, telephone and telegraph wire-cutting continued?

A. It did.

Q. Even after the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. How were these cases dealt with? By the military or the police?

A. Wire-cutting was never discovered; we could not find out who did it. Stone-throwing was not taken much notice of; and no arrests were made.

Q. Then how long did your special patrols continue to exist in the city?

A. I am not sure. I forgot.

Q. Had you any civil officers available for permanent duty with the troops?

A. None.

Q. Did you meet the situation by appointing a military officer to work with the civil authorities?

A. Yes.

Q. Had that officer worked for long as Deputy Commissioner of Police in the office of the Commissioner?

A. As a matter of fact, he worked more in the Collector's house.

Q. Did he work with the civil officer?

A. They both worked together.

Q. Did you supply the officers with copies of regulations and of instructions for the employment of military force in aid of civil power?

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Colonel G. S. FRAZER.

[Continued.]

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you send detachments of infantry to certain places in the neighbourhood?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you also sent cavalry patrols of reconnaissance for three to six days in the surrounding country?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Except so far as Virangam is concerned, had the troops so sent into the neighbourhood to deal with any disturbances at all?

A. No, Sir.

Q. I think the Flying Corps flew over the city and the surrounding country?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was their action confined to dropping leaflets?

A. Yes, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. About the proclamation as it was being called, was it the intention that pickets in the streets should fire upon groups of men, more than ten in number?

A. That was my intention.

Q. Those pickets who fired, they were under the command of a non-commissioned officer?

A. Yes; at least a non-commissioned officer.

Q. As regards that part of the proclamation, that a person who did not answer when challenged would be fired upon, can you tell me or had you any reason to suppose that anybody was in fact fired upon for that reason alone?

A. I had no report.

Q. You do not know one way or the other?

A. No.

Q. As regards the shooting of parties of ten, I think there were some cases?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know that the shooting took place only when the parties were doing some sort of mischief?

A. I could not tell you. I know that in some cases my orders were translated very leniently; that is to say, before carrying out the firing, people were warned; crowds were warned by them. That was not the strict interpretation of my order.

Q. Now, at the end of the day would the non-commissioned officer have to make reports to anybody as to what took place under this order?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there any accounts given by the non-commissioned officer as to what he did under the order?

A. I could not say.

Q. I mean the reports would come to you through the Company officer?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. At some time or other you must have looked over these reports?

A. Yes.

Q. I suppose you looked over them in order to see whether the proclamation has been sensibly acted upon or not?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember forming an opinion one way or the other as to whether your orders have been carried out with sense and discretion?

A. I think that I did form that opinion. It is a long time ago.

Q. The materials which were before you would no doubt be available somewhere though not in your office. Are they not?

A. Probably. There were a great number of scraps of paper coming; I am rather doubtful of getting hold of them now.

Q. Would the Company officer utilise the scraps of paper to make his reports?

A. I rather doubt whether they will be in existence at all at this length of time.

Q. Can you tell me from the documents, I think it is on the 13th, there were 32 rounds fired from the Lewis gun, can you throw some light as to the occasion for

that firing, whether that was a case under the proclamation or what case was that?

A. I could not tell you.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You were at Bhadar on the 10th of April in the evening. When you went there you learnt what happened?

A. Yes.

Q. And what had happened on the 10th was of a serious character?

A. Yes, I thought so.

Q. Two Europeans had been chased, one was threatened, and the police had actually to fire on the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. After that, in the evening, about 8-30, you were asked to withdraw your troops?

A. Yes.

Q. Did it not then strike you as somewhat strange that that should be done in that manner and that it would be prudent to keep the troops in view of what had happened on the 10th?

A. No; the situation had been discussed.

Q. With whom did you discuss?

A. With Mr. Chatfield.

Q. What was your own view?

A. I was not in a position to form any opinion.

Q. Then the next day, when did you ask for assistance?

A. 10 o'clock next morning or thereabouts.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. Colonel Frazer, how many did you employ in the city at one time, approximately?

A. The greatest number I had at one time was 100 British and 289 Indians.

Q. That constituted the force at your disposal?

A. Not then. That was after I received reinforcements.

Q. How many did you get from the garrison when you first heard of the disturbance?

A. 1,943 Indians when the disturbances began.

Q. How many were sent to picket the town?

A. That was the number—1,943.

Q. This formed the whole troops at your disposal?

A. Yes. During the 10th and 11th.

Q. It would be very hard to keep these men continually on duty?

A. Precisely. They were bivouacking in the streets.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Is it not a fact that only 48 British soldiers were employed for the purpose of picketing and the remaining 52 were kept as reserve?

A. I am not aware of that.

Q. You must have been informed by your subordinates?

A. I was not informed. Will you repeat that question again?

Q. When the troops arrived from Nadiad, 100 of them were sent for the purpose of picketing. I ask whether only 48 were employed and 52 were in reserve?

A. These hundred men were posted in the city. When you say picketing do you mean it in the sense of duty?

Q. There was one picket west of the Bank of Bombay. There was one at Khas Bazar police station consisting of 12 non-commissioned officers and men and the 3rd the Female Training College. The remainder were kept at the Sessions Court. That was the disposition. many patrols sent up. What I wanted to know is whether there were only 4 pickets of British soldiers in the city.

A. I could not say that. I do not think it is correct.

Q. I am reading it from the war diary,* from the report.

General Officer Commanding the Southern Command's report.

A. I do not know; I cannot vouch for it. That may be correct.

* Not reproduced.

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Colonel G. S. FRAZER.

[Concluded.]

Q. Up to 11 o'clock on Sunday you had not issued any orders as to under what conditions the soldiers should fire on the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. Your orders were that the firing should take place when there were more than 10 men and nothing else?

A. Mobs of more than 10 men should be fired on.

Q. Supposing there were more than 10 men in a balcony, did you order that firing should take place?

A. I did not contemplate that.

Q. Were you informed of this report, of the report of Corporal Baldwin? He says: "About five minutes later after he had gone a crowd gathered in the road about 250 yards from my post and were very hostile in their behaviour. A crowd had also collected on a balcony near by openly showing their sympathy with the crowd in the road. I considered that both crowds were equally hostile and felt justified in opening fire. In order to avoid greater casualties I fired three rounds into the small crowd, and this had the effect of dispersing the crowds. There was no further trouble." Were you informed of this?

A. Not at the time. Some time later.

Q. Then you thought that the Corporal was justified in firing upon the crowd in the balcony?

A. I could not blame him for it.

Q. I think that a war diary was kept in Ahmedabad?

A. No. Not in my time.

Q. Naturally when all these officers were in charge of these pickets they must have reported if there was any occasion for firing or not?

A. We had not a staff of clerks.

Q. They would have informed you how many rounds were actually used by them? There would be a record of them?

A. Yes. That was called for. They were asked how many rounds were expended.

Q. I think therefore the information would be available as to how many rounds were fired by the officers in charge of the pickets, by each individual officer?

A. Yes.

Q. If there was any occasion to fire on a crowd which committed a breach there must be a report somewhere.

A. Yes.

Q. Even on the 12th and 13th, you were able to send a large number of soldiers to other places. You knew there was some trouble outside Ahmedabad. Therefore so far as the number of soldiers at Ahmedabad was concerned they were sufficient to restore peace and order?

A. No reinforcements.

Q. How many were there on the 11th?

A. Only those of the 200 British Infantry.

Q. Only 100 British soldiers there were, who came through Nadiad and Bombay?

A. Those were they. They came through Nadiad.

Q. Is there any record as to whether more than 48 were ever employed in picketing duty?

A. All this 100 in the city were being employed.

Q. But not more than 100 in a day?

A. No. Only 100.

Q. Of this half of them were in reserve?

A. No. Those whom you understand as being in reserve were not in reserve really. They were supplying patrols.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—We think the court is under the impression that 32 rounds were fired in one group. Is that possible?

A. It is not possible under the orders issued. From the reports I received I am satisfied that it was not.

Q. Can you tell us what the orders were with regard to the filling of bullets in magazines or in drums of Lewis guns?

A. Every fourth round a bullet is taken out so that the firing must cease automatically after 3 rounds are fired. Then it is to be reloaded again for another 3 rounds.

By Mr. Jivanlal Desai, Counsel for the Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad—Colonel Frazer, on the 11th, the Indian troops opened fire at certain places?

A. They did fire on the 11th.

Q. What was the nature of the ammunition given to them? Was it buckshot or ball?

A. Ball.

Q. It could pierce through galvanised iron sheets?

A. I do not know.

Q. What was the nature of that shot which pierced through 5 or 6 galvanised sheets?

A. You ask me what sort of shot would pierce 5 or 6 galvanised iron sheets? I cannot tell you.

Q. Was such shot used on the 10th or 11th?

A. I cannot tell you.

Q. You will not be surprised to hear that such a shot was actually used at Panch Kuwa gate which pierced through 6 sheets?

A. I do not know. I have really forgotten all these things.

Q. The British troops that came on the 12th were stationed in the Ahmedabad city. For how long, can you tell us? In the Ahmedabad city itself?

A. They were stationed at the Gujarat Club.

Q. There were British troops in the city till May 6th?

A. No. Not till I gave up command.

Q. They were stationed in Ahmedabad city that day?

A. Yes.

Q. And after that also?

A. The day after I left certainly.

Q. Did you resume command of Ahmedabad troops after that?

A. No.

Q. Do you know that on two other occasions only British troops were stationed in Ahmedabad city?

A. I heard of it.

Q. Once when Mr. Gandhi was going to resume his Satyagraha movement?

A. I do not know.

Q. Do you know the reason why they were stationed in Ahmedabad city?

A. No.

By the President—

Q. Was the ammunition used by the troops the ammunition with which they were ordinarily supplied?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you ever supply them with any particular form of ammunition?

A. No.

Q. Would it be proper to do so?

A. No.

Q. You went through the city I think on the 11th along with Colonel Preston and Mr. Chatfield?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was any member of the force that had been sent out roughly handled by the crowd?

A. I heard Lieutenant Larkin had been wounded and also another officer Lieutenant Macdonald.

Q. Did you not pick up a post orderly who had been roughly handled?

A. That was on the 10th, Sir.

Q. Where had he been wounded?

A. He had been wounded somewhere between the station and the Prem gate.

Q. I see you took him to hospital; had he been seriously wounded?

A. No, he was knocked about a bit, but he could walk.

Q. What had he been knocked about with?

A. I rather gather a stick.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Was that ammunition which was described as ball the ordinary .303 Mark VI or Mark VII?

A. I think it was Mark VI, but I am not quite sure; we had a good deal of change about that period.

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Lieutenant-Colonel W. J. PRESTON—Major W. C. KIRKWOOD.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. J. PRESTON, Commanding, 1-97th Infantry.

By the President—

Q. You are in command of certain infantry at Ahmedabad?

A. The 1-97th Infantry.

Q. We heard, I think from Colonel Frazer and Mr. Chatfield, what occurred on the 10th so far as you can refer to the matter. Coming then to the 11th of April at about 10 A.M. were you communicated with, as Colonel Frazer was not available, as regards sending troops to the city?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you informed that incendiarism, rioting and looting had been taking place and was still taking place?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you at once order 300 men under Major Kirkwood to proceed to the city?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think he took 150 with him and the remainder followed shortly after under a British officer?

A. As a matter of fact, Sir, that is not quite correct; the first party of 150 men went under Captain Johnson and Major Kirkwood came subsequently with the other 150.

Q. Did you yourself motor to the city along with Mr. Chatfield and the Deputy Superintendent of Police?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And I think you went to the Delhi gate?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you get out there and accompany the troops through and round the Bhadar?

A. I did, Sir.

Q. What was happening at the time you arrived?

A. Well, there were great crowds about and apparently when they saw the troops they began running away. A lot of them had torches in their hands and there was a lot of burning going on. Several buildings were on fire. That is what was happening then.

Q. Were there large crowds of people?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What attitude did they adopt when they saw the troops?

A. Well, in the first place, as I said just now, when they saw the troops they began bolting away down side allies and getting clear of the troops.

Q. Had you to make rapid dispositions of the troops you had available to deal with the situation?

A. Yes, Sir, very rapid.

Q. And did you order pickets to be put at various points and particularly at some of the gates I think?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. There was no actual firing I think at this time between 12 and 1 o'clock?

A. Not in my presence, Sir; I did not see any myself.

Q. Were the crowds noisy?

A. Yes, Sir, they were booing and shouting a good deal when I saw them; certainly noisy, yes.

Q. Did you fear that they might break back into the Shahi Bagh?

A. Yes, Sir, I certainly thought there was a grave danger of that happening.

Q. What action did you take to prevent it?

A. I told Captain Johnson to get there as fast as he could and make dispositions and I would come round and see him later. He went off at once.

Q. And you subsequently returned to the cantonments about 4?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Well, now as regards the other incidents that occurred on that day and particularly as regards certain firing that took place, you do not know about that from your personal knowledge?

A. No, Sir, I did not see any.

Q. Then on the 12th of April did you visit certain posts in the city and also the Shahi Bagh?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On the 14th of April, as we know, the order as regards firing on crowds was cancelled in the morning?

A. Yes, Sir.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—

Q. Did you take any steps to satisfy yourself that all officers who came on duty in the riots were conversant with these orders?

A. Every step possible, yes.

Q. Can you tell us any particular step you took?

A. Yes, one was about five loose rounds in the pouch magazines never to be loaded, nor a bullet to remain in the chamber, always to warn crowds before firing on them, explain the effect of what a bullet would do to a man.

Q. I do not mean that, I mean the steps you took to satisfy yourself that everybody knew this?

A. Well, to begin with any important orders were dictated by me personally and by the Adjutant to all officers before they went out, and when any important orders had to go to the pickets a special messenger in the shape of a British officer was sent out by motor, and those orders were explained to the Indian officers and men under that British officer's command.

Q. Was there any one at Delhi gate?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there any instructions there with regard to these orders being made known?

A. Yes, all the posts got all orders as far as I know. I made fairly certain of that.

Major W. C. KIRKWOOD, 1-97th Infantry.

By the President—

Q. You are in the 97th Infantry?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you on the 11th April receive orders from the Officer Commanding the 1-97th Infantry to take 300 men and proceed to the Bhadar in the city of Ahmedabad?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you arrive at a quarter past 10?

A. I left regimental lines at 10.15.

Q. You took a number of men with you?

A. I took about 150. The others were not quite ready and they were to follow afterwards.

Q. Did you go with the second detachment?

A. Another party that I had not known about at the time had gone along under Captain Johnson.

Q. There were altogether three parties?

A. Yes, Sir. My party came in the centre.

Q. How many did your party consist of?

A. About 150.

Q. And the other party?

A. I do not know what the rear party consisted of; I heard afterwards it was about 150 or so.

Q. I think that when you got about half way down you were overtaken by Captain Pearson, the Staff Officer of the Officer Commanding, Ahmedabad Area?

A. Yes, Sir; I was overtaken and he gave me certain orders.

Q. What were those orders you received at the time?

A. It was a memorandum from the Officer Commanding, Area—"The Officer Commanding, Area, directs that if rioters approach in a threatening manner to within about 25 yards of troops after warning the crowd to keep back, controlled fire will be opened as per orders communicated."

Q. In the case of people actually engaged in incendiarism what were you to do?

A. I was to fire at them at once.

Q. Did you explain those orders to your officers?

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Major W. C. KIRKWOOD.

[Continued.]

A. I at once called up all the officers I had under my command and explained the orders to them. We had a halt for a few minutes on the road.

Q. What orders did you give as regards your men having ammunition?

A. The ordinary order issued by the Officer Commanding, Area, that no chargers were to be put into the magazines of the rifles and five loose rounds were to be kept in the pouch.

Q. At about 11 did you arrive at the Delhi gate?

A. I arrived after 11.

Q. What had occurred there?

A. The Delhi gate itself was on fire and there was a large crowd all down that road called the Ghi Kantha; there was a dense crowd there.

Q. When you approached what did the crowd do?

A. The crowd dispersed into the small side streets along there.

Q. Had the people composing the crowds anything in their hands?

A. I saw a number of sticks and that sort of thing.

Q. As you passed the Delhi gate did you leave a picket there?

A. Yes, one British officer and 30 men were left behind and also an Indian officer.

Q. Did you continue your advance into the city?

A. I advanced then straight down the Ghi Kantha till I came to the Richey Road which is the main street of the city.

Q. When you arrived at the Richey Road what did you do?

A. I found on arrival at the Richey Road that a rioter had been killed at the corner of the Richey Road and the Ghi Kantha, and I found Lieutenant Larkin wounded. He had apparently been charged by a party of swordsmen and wounded in the hand.

Q. And the dead man, where was he lying?

A. At the corner of the road.

Q. That is to say where the Delhi gate road joins the other?

A. Where the Ghi Kantha and Richey roads intersect.

Q. Were there many people in the road?

A. There were very dense crowds half way up to the Pankor Naka on one side and there was a very large crowd down towards the road that goes down towards the Astodia gate.

Q. The road by which you had entered the city?

A. Yes; it again became densely crowded with people.

Q. What was the attitude of these crowds?

A. Most hostile, extremely hostile.

Q. In what way did they show their hostility?

A. They were throwing stones and making obscene gestures towards the troops and flourishing big sticks.

Q. And I think you advanced towards the crowd towards the Pankor Naka?

A. Yes.

Q. How many men had you?

A. About 60 or 70 men.

Q. What happened then?

A. I advanced as far as the Pankor Naka and I warned the crowd and I got my Subedar Major, Kanhaya, to warn them. They threw stones and I was hit on the head by a rock, and I saw the situation was becoming more involved and I thought it was time to fire. I ordered three men to fire and they fired at the crowd. I think two men were hit. Then I ordered the Subedar Major to go by the lower road which leads down from the lower side of the Pankor Naka, and he drove the crowd back, and I think he fired one or two shots also.

Q. Before you fired at all had you yourself been hit?

A. I had been hit.

Q. Where?

A. On the top of the *topi*.

Q. With what?

A. A big stone.

Q. Was it a stone that might have seriously wounded you if you had not had your *topi* on?

A. Possibly it would have.

Q. Did you hear any cries?

A. Yes, there was one *Sadhu* there asking for 'white men's blood.' The Subedar Major translated this to me.

Q. That had all occurred before you gave the order to fire?

A. Before I gave the order to fire.

Q. Had you also explained to the crowd what would be the effect of giving the order?

A. It was very carefully explained by the Subedar Major as well as by myself.

Q. Did you leave that part of the city yourself?

A. After I had fired and the crowd had gone back to a respectful distance, I went to see what was happening in the Bhadar, where the Training College and ladies' schools, etc., were situated, and I visited the patrols that were posted at the gates entering the Bhadar and I found a large heap of stones in the Clock Tower which had evidently been collected for the purpose of throwing at the troops or other people.

Q. Where is that?

A. The Clock Tower is near what they call the *Tin Darwaza*.

Q. And when you say a large number of stones, how many do you mean?

A. About a cartload of bricks.

Q. And had they been deliberately placed there?

A. They appear to have been deliberately placed there.

Q. With a view to being used?

A. With a view to being used, I thought.

Q. At the time you ordered fire there was no magistrate or civil authority accompanying you?

A. No, Sir, nobody at all.

Q. But you did see Mr. Chatfield?

A. Oh, yes; Mr. Chatfield passed through; he was there with Colonel Preston, but they had gone away.

Q. You went back to the Bhadar?

A. Yes, Sir. I then went back to the police Naka near the *Tin Darwaza* and tried to get the telephone there to get my communications through, and while I was there I received a letter from Mr. Brown.

Q. Who is he?

A. The engineer of the electric lights. I have got his letter here if you would like to hear it read:

"To—Any British Officer. Sir, I should be obliged if you would kindly send up about two dozen armed men. I have my wife and children on the premises and we have had a most trying time. Fortunately they have not been injured. I was unfortunate to stop a few bricks with my head, and a couple of stout sticks. As there is evidence of the mob commencing their rowdyism, kindly do the needful, as I am anxious to take the family away to the Camp."

Q. Then did you send an Indian officer and a party?

A. Yes, I sent a party to bring him in and when he came in he was very badly beaten about the head, in fact I thought he would die.

Q. And did you take him to hospital?

A. No, I could not get him to hospital; I took him over to the Salvation Army and the ladies of the Salvation Army attended to him, I think.

Q. What did you do then?

A. I tried to establish my headquarters in the police Naka just inside the *Tin Darwaza*, and I got another letter while I was there from the College:—

"Dear Sir, I write to ask you to send either police or sepoy to guard this College from the Ladies' Club opposite—they could also be accommodated in the Practising School at the back of this compound." This letter is signed by Miss Chubb. It goes on to say—"There is a rumour that this Training College, the Men's Training College and the municipal offices and Mr. Gillespie's bungalow are to be burnt down to-night."

Q. What happened after that?

A. It says also that there were 300 archers coming from Nadiad. After that I got into communication with the police headquarters, the police reserve near the cross roads, and I went round again to see

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Major W. C. KIRKWOOD.

[Continued.]

Lieutenant Fitzpatrick who was commanding at the Pankor Naka, and when I got there I received a report that Sergeant Fraser had been killed in a house up the road about 200 yards ahead of where my troops were drawn across.

Q. During that day had you to give any other order to fire than the one you refer to?

A. Yes, Sir; I fired again at about 5 o'clock.

Q. Where was that?

A. Up near the Pankor Naka. I had a couple of shots fired at the crowd as they were becoming very offensive.

Q. Were they warned before you fired on that occasion?

A. They were warned on every occasion.

Q. Was that the last occasion on that date when you fired?

A. No, Sir; later in the day I heard that the Astodia gate had been set on fire and I went out and found a large mob there and I fired at them.

Q. In consequence of all this firing what casualties occurred in the mobs?

A. I think about 4 or 5 men were hit in the crowd.

Q. In all the three occasions?

A. I think throughout the day the casualties were not more than about 6 or 7 in that particular place.

Q. How many rounds altogether were fired?

A. I think there were about 20 or 25 rounds fired in my area.

Q. Were you out again on the 12th?

A. I was in the city all night and on the 12th I handed over command of the Bhadar area to the British troops who came in.

Q. That is to those troops who came from Bombay?

A. Yes.

Q. And were you to continue?

A. No, I came out of the city. I collected all my own troops and I marched out of the city.

Q. Then you had nothing further to do with it?

A. Nothing further.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. These three parties that were fired upon because they were contravening the orders about the collection of 10 or more people, where was this?

A. That was in the neighbourhood of the Pankor Naka.

Q. On what date?

A. On the 12th about 4 p.m.

Q. This must have been after 4 o'clock on the 12th?

A. The orders were issued at 4 o'clock.

Q. This must have been after that?

A. Yes.

Q. Were these three parties in the same place?

A. No, one party was at Pankor Naka, and the other was down at Ghi Kantha road, that is the road leading down from the Delhi gate.

Q. As you were moving in that direction, you came across these parties?

A. I went round to make a commencement under the orders of the commanding officer. The orders were that these people were to be fired at if they were more than 10.

Q. When you started, where did you first find more than 10 people collected?

A. At Pankor Naka I saw more than 10.

Q. You gave them warning to disperse?

A. I gave them warning.

Q. They did not pay heed to your warning?

A. No.

Q. In what manner were they warned?

A. They were told to disperse by me.

Q. Who told them that?

A. I had an Indian officer.

Q. In what language did he tell them?

A. He spoke in Urdu. They were given every opportunity to disperse.

Q. What were the casualties?

A. There were no casualties.

Q. In the second party?

A. The second party was further away. I at first saw whether the crowd would disperse, and I found that they had actually dispersed when they saw that we were bent on shooting them.

Q. Did they disperse?

A. They did disperse, and the streets became absolutely clear.

Q. They dispersed after the firing or before?

A. After the firing.

Q. Were they also warned?

A. Yes, all the three parties were warned.

Q. How did you come to know of the collection of bricks that you say you saw at the three gates?

A. I was told by someone who lived at the gates that they were put by the crowd.

Q. Did you see the collection yourself?

A. Yes.

Q. Where were the bricks stored?

A. You know the archway that goes through under the Clock Tower?

Q. Do you mean the Bhadar gate? They were stored where? In some corner?

A. There was a sort of *chabutra* on the side of the road, and they were stored upon that.

Q. And you said about somebody shouting for white man's flesh, where was this?

A. It was on the Pan'or Naka. There was a *sadhu* there.

Q. On the 12th?

A. On the 11th.

Q. Did you hear that yourself or somebody reported that to you?

A. My Subedar-Major and I heard it. We both heard it.

Q. Who was this man?

A. He was a *sadhu* in the crowd. He was wearing yellow clothes.

Q. Was he arrested?

A. No.

Q. What language was he speaking?

A. He was speaking Urdu.

Q. Was he a Muhammadan?

A. I do not know what he was quite. He might have been a Muhammadan. I could not quite say. I did not take much notice of him.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Did you send in any report after the occurrence?

A. To whom?

Q. To your superior authorities?

A. I told my Commanding Officer of what had occurred. I sent no report.

Q. We find in the military report * exhibit A, you say that the first shot fired by the troops was at about 11 o'clock.?

A. I had sent in a lot of wires, and I may probably have sent this report.

Q. You did send this report?

A. I think so.

Q. One difference which I wish to point out to you is this. In your statement you say there have been many deaths, but in the report you say there have been many casualties?

A. On what occasions do you mean?

Q. On the three firings?

The President to the witness.—I understood you to say there were six casualties.

Witness.—I fired on the 11th and also on the 12th.

The Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan.—I am referring to the casualties that occurred on your firing under that proclamation?

A. I know of no casualties.

Q. According to this report which says that 'without inflicting many deaths' while in your statement you say 'without inflicting any casualties.' It may be a mistake. I don't know what it is.

A. I admit that casualties occurred on the 11th, but I do not know of any casualties on the 12th.

* Not reproduced.

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Major W. C. KIRKWOOD.

[Concluded.]

Q. I will read that portion. "At 3-30 p.m. I went out with the Officer Commanding the British troops who had just arrived and in order to enforce the proclamation I fired at three parties without inflicting any casualties."

A. I think it is a mistake. There were no casualties on the 12th.

Q. With regard to this *sadhu* who said that he wanted British flesh, or white man's flesh, there is no mention of this fact in your report. May I know why it has been omitted?

A. It was such a small thing that I did not think it is necessary.

Q. Do you call it a small thing?

A. I considered so at the time.

Q. There is no mention of it in this report?

A. No.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—

Q. With regard to this white man's flesh, Major, was there any report sent in on that day or the day after with reference to this particular *sadhu*?

A. I sent in no report. I did not take any notice at the time and I took it to be such a small thing as not worthy of mention.

Q. If Lieutenant Fitzpatrick who was there at the time had sent in any report it would go through you, I take it?

A. Yes, I remember forwarding that report.

Q. That would be handed to the Commanding Officer?

A. Yes, I remember forwarding the report.

Q. There is only one question that I want to ask you. When you fired at the people, you saw them setting the gate on fire?

A. Yes, Sir.

6 January 1920.]

Mr. D. D. KOTHAWALA.

At Ahmedabad, Tuesday, the 6th January 1920.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B.,
K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

MR. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., Secretary.

Sub-Inspector of Police D. D. KOTHAWALA, of Ahmedabad City Police.

By the President—

Q. You are a sub-inspector of the Ahmedabad City Police?

A. Of the City A Division, Sir.

Q. You have been serving in Ahmedabad City for the last 9 years?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was there a good deal of agitation in Ahmedabad in connection with the Rowlatt Bills?

A. There was.

Q. Certain proscribed books were published and there were a number of meetings I think held from time to time?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Then on the 6th of April, was a *hartal* held and that was treated as a day of mourning?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there a large procession on that day in the river-bed?

A. Yes, there was a very huge procession.

Q. Did those participating in the procession wear any distinctive badges?

A. Yes, with various inscriptions written upon them.

Q. Were those badges black which was indicative of mourning?

A. Yes, black banners were also carried.

Q. Did the crowd consist of a large number?

A. Not less than 40 to 50 thousands.

Q. Did it consist principally of mill-hands?

A. It consisted of all sorts of people.]

Q. On the morning of the 9th, was there another mass meeting held in the river-bed?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And in the evening a meeting of several thousands was held in Manilal's Mansions to protest against the Rowlatt Act?

A. Yes.

Q. How far was the Rowlatt Act known by the public?

A. The public had a very vague idea about the Rowlatt Act.

Q. Did they give it a particular name?

A. Yes, *Kala Kaida*.

Q. What is that?

A. It means "Black laws."

Q. But I think books against the Rowlatt Act were circulated?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they in a state of considerable excitement and discontent over the Rowlatt Act?

A. They were.

Q. On the 10th April as we know did news reach Ahmedabad that Mr. Gandhi had been arrested on his way to Delhi and turned back?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What effect had that?

A. Soon after this information was received, shops were being closed and work came to a standstill. Sugar

was distributed in the bazars and business was at a standstill. There was a sort of general *hartal*.

Q. I think certain circulars were issued?

A. Yes.

Q. Did these circulars intimate that Mr. Gandhi had been arrested for breaking the order of Government?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. That the news should be received by the *Ashram* people with great rejoicings and that the day should be observed as a holiday?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were the people also urged to carry on their work with redoubled zeal and agitation?

A. They were, Sir.

Q. By that work was meant the *Satyagraha* work?

A. Yes.

Q. As regards the people, in what state were they? Were they in a state of great excitement on the 10th?

A. Yes, they were.

Q. When you noticed how general the *hartal* had become, what did you do?

A. I informed the Deputy Superintendent of Police.

Q. Did you go to Shahi Bagh?

A. Yes.]

Q. Was that about half-past eleven?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the District Superintendent Mr. Boyd?

A. Yes.

Q. When you were speaking to Mr. Boyd, did you get a telephonic message to the effect that a gentleman had been assaulted on the Richey Road?

A. Yes, Mr. Arisu Dalal.

Q. Were you also informed that a huge mob was getting unruly?

A. Yes.

Q. Did Mr. Boyd order three armed parties to be sent from headquarters to three different parts of the city?

A. Yes.

Q. What parts were they?

A. One was Khas Bazar, the second was Richey Road and the third Kalupur.

Q. What did you do?

A. I at once went to Richey Road where there was a

tumult.

Q. When you reached there, what did you discover?

A. When I reached Richey Road I saw huge crowds of people quite boisterous and riotous, molesting people driving in *shigrams* or *tongas*.

Q. Were they throwing anything?

A. Yes, stones at those people that were clad in European costume.

Q. Of whom did the mob consist?

A. It consisted mostly of Hindus at that time.

Q. And were they subsequently joined by Muhammadans?

A. Yes, Muhammadans and Hindus of the mill locality.

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[Continued.]

Q. Were large numbers of the mill employees among them?

A. They came afterwards.

Q. Had the mob done any destruction to property before you arrived at Richey Road?

A. They had broken the electric bulbs at the Gaiety Cinema and burnt the posters.

Q. Why were they against that Cinema?

A. Because the proprietor of the Cinema had not observed the "black Sunday" and had kept his show open.

Q. Did you make any effort to get the crowd to break up?

A. I tried my best.

Q. Were you successful?

A. No.

Q. How was that?

A. Because they were most unruly.

Q. Were they shouting?

A. They were shouting out "*Mahatma Gandhi ki jai, Bande Mataram*."

Q. Was there a proscribed book also being sold there?

A. Yes, "*Hind Swaraj*."

Q. Did you in consequence go to Dr. Kanuga's dispensary?

A. Yes.

Q. I think Dr. Kanuga was a prominent *Satyagrahi*?

A. He was.

Q. Is his dispensary close to the Richey Road?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you find him there along with Mr. Patel?

A. Yes, I found him and Mr. Patel also.

Q. Did you have a conversation with him?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ask them to do anything?

A. Yes, I asked them to persuade the crowd to go away.

Q. And to get the crowd to desist from harassing people?

A. Yes.

Q. What attitude did they take up?

A. They told me that they had tried but failed. However, they readily came along with me.

Q. Did they endeavour to get the people to disperse?

A. They did.

Q. Were they successful?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Why?

A. Because the mob was boisterous and did not even listen to their advice. They were quite out of control.

Q. Did you go along with Dr. Kanuga towards Ratanpol Naka?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you meet the mob there?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that headed by Bhogia Bhagat?

A. Yes.

Q. Who is he?

A. He owns some lands, but he was a gambler.

Q. Was he a *Satyagrahi*?

A. He professed to be one.

Q. Had he himself done anything in the morning as regards forcing the shops to shut?

A. Yes.

Q. What did he do?

A. He had forced one Babu Borar to get his shop closed in Manik Chowk.

Q. Did Dr. Kanuga want Bhagat to go away?

A. Yes he told him to.

Q. Would he do so?

A. No, but was crying out loudly about the injustice of Government.

Q. I think Dr. Kanuga made a further effort to stop him from speaking any further?

A. Yes.

Q. Then leaflets were, at this time, being distributed among the people?

A. Yes.

Q. What leaflets were these?

A. There was one signed by Vallabhai Patel, Mr. Krishnalal Desai and Mr. Indulal Jainik and it was to the effect, calling a meeting at 7 in the evening in the river-bed to show what effect was produced upon *Satyagraha* by Mahatma Gandhi's arrest. The second was signed by Vallabhai Javerbhai Patel in which it was stated that "*Mahatma Gandhi was arrested on his way to Lahore, Amritsar and other places when he was served with an order under the Defence of India Act. He disobeyed the order whereupon he has been arrested. Such information has been received in the Ashram this morning and all the Ashram people have been asked to observe the day as a day of rejoicing and that they should carry on the work with redoubled zeal and faith. It is requested that the public will respect this wish.*" These leaflets were under circulation.

Q. Were you at this place for some time?

A. Yes.

Q. How long altogether?

A. Till evening.

Q. At about 2 o'clock did an armed party of 10 men arrive from headquarters?

A. Yes.

Q. Along with it I think were the City Police Inspector, Mr. Acton, and 2 sub-inspectors?

A. Yes.

Q. Did Bhagat make any request to you as regards this armed force?

A. He demanded that the armed police should be withdrawn. He made no request.

Q. Did you accede to his demand?

A. It was undesirable to do so.

Q. Why was it undesirable?

A. Because it was stated that they wanted to set the Cinema theatre on fire.

Q. Did you apprehend serious destruction to property, perhaps to life, if there were no force on the spot to keep the mob in check?

A. Yes.

Q. Were stones being thrown by the mob at this time?

A. Yes, when we did not withdraw the armed police, stones were thrown from houses, at the police and especially at me and Mr. Acton.

Q. Were you struck?

A. Stones fell on my hat. Our hats were damaged.

Q. Now, did you retaliate?

A. We did not.

Q. Was the mob getting more and more out of hand?

A. They were.

Q. Did certain gentlemen try to quiet them?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they pay any attention to this?

A. Not in the least.

Q. Did the crowds increase in number?

A. Yes, as time went on.

Q. Then at about 3 or half-past 3 did information reach you that there were disturbances at the flour mill outside the Prem gate?

A. Yes.

Q. I think 2 Europeans had taken refuge there?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you informed that the mob had to be fired upon and that a policeman had been killed?

A. Yes.

Q. Did a wounded man come in sight at this time?

A. Yes, he was being taken to the civil hospital.

Q. What effect did the sight of this man have upon the crowd?

A. It excited the crowd so much so that they almost went mad.

Q. Were you assaulted in any way?

A. They threw huge stones and brick-bats at us.

Q. Was your task becoming more and more difficult?

A. Very difficult.

Q. Did Messrs. Kanuga, Patel, Desai and Imam Sahib of the *Ashram* and some other gentlemen do their best to pacify the crowd?

A. They did their best.

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[Continued.]

Q. And without success ?
 A. All at once there was no effect upon them.
 Q. As you explained to us, a large meeting had been called for the evening in the river bed ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you, on that occasion, have to fire on the mob ?
 A. No, Sir.
 Q. When did you leave the place at which the mob had collected ?
 A. After the people had gone into the river-bed and it had become dark.
 Q. The meeting in the river-bed was very largely attended ?
 A. It was.
 Q. How many people would you estimate it at ?
 A. I think not less than 30,000.
 Q. Was that meeting attended by some prominent *Satyagrahis* ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. So far as you were able to judge, had the meeting a good or a bad effect on the people ?
 A. A good effect.
 Q. And after the meeting, did the people appear to be more orderly than before ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. I think you made a report in the evening to Mr. Boyd after the meeting had dispersed ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Were military detachments kept near the flour mills and certain other parts of the city ?
 A. Outside the city.
 Q. Was there an armed party detained at the Khas Bazar ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Early on the morning of the 11th, did you go out to see what was occurring ?
 A. Yes, in my own division.
 Q. What was the state of affairs as you discovered it on the 11th ?
 A. Business was not resumed. Some were trying to open their shops, while others were persuading them to keep them closed.
 Q. At what time in the morning did you make your round of inspection ?
 A. I started before 7 o'clock.
 Q. Then after you had made your inspection, did you give a report to Mr. Boyd ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And did you find him with Mr. Chatfield outside the Prem gate ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you inform them of the attitude of the public ?
 A. I did.
 Q. Were some prominent *Satyagrahis* with Mr. Chatfield ?
 A. Yes, Dr. Kanuga, Mr. Yajnik and Mr. Vallabhai Patel.
 Q. Did you get orders as regards the closing of liquor shops ?
 A. I got them from the District Magistrate.
 Q. Did some men become drunk from consuming liquor in the shops ?
 A. Yes, on the previous day, and the police got the shops closed.
 Q. At this time, were there some strange rumours in circulation ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What were they about ?
 A. About the arrest of Miss Anasuya.
 Q. And any other rumours ?
 A. Rumours were also afloat that they wanted to take out in procession the dead bodies of those who were killed on the previous day, that there would be a mass meeting of Hindus and Muhammadans at the *Jama Masjid* after the Friday prayer.
 Q. Did the rumour about the arrest cause considerable excitement ?
 A. It did.

Q. Numbers of the mill hands I think were not working at the time ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And some mills that had started work in the morning began to close ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Do you know whether force was used by those who did not work to compel others to remain idle along with themselves ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Were the crowd shouting ?
 A. Yes, they were shouting out '*Mahatma Gandhi ki jai*' '*Bande Mataram*' and '*Anasuya ki jai*.'
 Q. Were these crowds in large numbers ?
 A. They were very large.
 Q. Did the District Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate go in a motor car to the city ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And did you stop at Sherkotda ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Where is that ?
 A. It is outside Panch Kuwa Road.
 Q. And I think you stopped there for a little while, sent a telephonic message about closing of liquor shops and then proceeded right down Richey Road ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Were you on a bicycle ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What attitude did the people adopt towards you ?
 A. They were shouting out.
 Q. What ?
 A. These cries of "*Bande Mataram*" and "*Mahatma Gandhi ki jai*" and "*Anasuya ki jai*." As I proceeded along (the Deputy Superintendent of Police was with me) we were stoned.
 Q. Did you notice whether the crowd had armed themselves with anything ?
 A. Yes, they were armed with bamboos and heavy sticks. As I was approaching Pankor Naka I noticed this.
 Q. Did you get any information as to assaults having been committed on officials ?
 A. I was told that the District Magistrate and the Superintendent were assaulted near Pankor Naka and that they had gone on ahead.
 Q. Did you hurry on to that place ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. When you reached that place did you find that these gentlemen had passed on in a car ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you also learn that the District Superintendent of Police had ordered some ball ammunition from headquarters and had gone to fetch it ?
 A. When I reached Khas Bazar Chowky.
 Q. After a while, did a huge crowd enter the three gates ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Where are the gates ?
 A. Opposite the Bhadar.
 Q. Were they doing destruction to property ?
 A. They were breaking up the electric globes of the street lights and smashing up some of the boards of the shops.
 Q. In the crowd were there a number of young men ?
 A. They looked like school boys or college boys.
 Q. Were they in front of the mob ?
 A. They were taking the lead, Sir.
 Q. Did another mob enter the Bhadar from Raykhad side ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What side is that ?
 A. It is on the south side.
 Q. At about 9-30 did you see smoke issuing from the matriculation *mandap* side ?
 A. The first smoke rising from the Matriculation *mandap* side was noticed.
 Q. Did you telephone then to Mr. Boyd about the gravity of the situation ?
 A. Yes.

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[Continued.]

Q. Did you also indicate that you should have to open fire ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What did he say in reply to that ?
 A. He told me to use discretion.
 Q. I think you had some ammunition being conveyed in a *shigram* ?
 A. Yes, from headquarters.
 Q. What happened to it ?
 A. It was assaulted on the way and attempts were made to set fire to it.
 Q. I think it managed to reach the Khas Bazar *chowky* in safety ?
 A. Through the pluck of the armed escort.
 Q. Did they have to fire on the crowd ?
 A. They had to.
 Q. Were other buildings now set on fire ?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Did you notice them blazing ?
 A. I noticed them.
 Q. How were the people who were with you armed ? Were they armed with buckshot or ball ?
 A. At first they were armed with buckshot, then ball ammunition arrived from headquarters.
 Q. Was buckshot an effective form of ammunition to use against a crowd ?
 A. No.
 Q. Why was that ?
 A. Because the range is very small, it is only 60 yards.
 Q. Your force was a small one ?
 A. It was very small, Sir.
 Q. How many were there ?
 A. Only 15.
 Q. In view of the numbers in front of you, was it advisable to split up the force ?
 A. It was dangerous.
 Q. So you had to keep your post ?
 A. Yes, at the Khas Bazar.
 Q. Did a military force arrive ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. When did it arrive ?
 A. It was about 11 or 11-30, Sir.
 Q. Mr. Chatfield and Mr. Boyd arrived with them ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. After their arrival was the telegraph office set on fire or was it set on fire before ?
 A. It was set on fire before their arrival. It was ablaze when they came.
 Q. Were efforts made to extinguish these different fires ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Were you able to employ the fire brigade ?
 A. The fire brigade had come there, but they were badly beaten, and the hose lines were cut up.
 Q. Had they then to retreat ?
 A. They had to retreat.
 Q. Could you give us any idea of the number of rioters that collected at this part of the city ?
 A. They must be about 2,000 to 3,000, Sir.
 Q. After they had set ablaze the different buildings that were burnt there, what did they do ?
 A. They went into the other portions of the city on the arrival of the military.
 Q. Military pickets were posted to guard the different points ?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. I see you mention the circumstance that some of these rioters went to the *Jama Masjid* and the feelings of the people were absolutely excited on this particular day ?
 A. Yes, it was a Friday and there was *Juma* prayer.
 Q. In point of fact were the people so far as they were engaged in praying interfered with ?
 A. Not at all, Sir.
 Q. Then you were successful this time in saving a part of the telegraph building ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. How did you manage to do that ?

A. I went in the motor car of Mr. Chatfield and brought a fire engine under an escort.
 Q. Did you yourself witness an incident where Lieutenant Larkin was struck ?
 A. At the Pankor Naka.
 Q. About what time did that occur ?
 A. That was at about 12 or 12-30.
 Q. It was a good deal earlier in the day ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What was he struck with ?
 A. He was struck with a sword, he said.
 Q. Where ?
 A. He was lying near the stand post.
 Q. Who was the man that struck him ?
 A. As he was being lifted up, I asked who struck him. I was told by one of them that he was a school-master, an assistant teacher in the Proprietary High School, C.K. Shah.
 Q. What happened to him ?
 A. He was bleeding from the chest.
 Q. And subsequently died in the hospital ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. I think you got the broken piece of sword with which Lieutenant Larkin was injured ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Were the injured rioters moved to the city hospital and private dispensaries to have their wounds treated ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. I think in connection with the removal of the wounded, the students and collegians rendered a considerable amount of assistance ?
 A. They rendered valuable assistance.
 Q. The Ambulance Brigade of St. John was also there ?
 A. They were doing admirable work.
 Q. What was the attitude of the public generally towards the rioters ?
 A. It was sympathetic.
 Q. In what way was the sympathy shown ?
 A. Because they were fed with eatables, they were given drinking water, etc.
 Q. Did you see cases of their being fed ?
 A. I saw actually food being taken in big trays.
 Q. I see you refer to the incident of your taking the Commissioner round to the house of one who was supposed to have assisted the rioters ?
 A. Yes, I took Mr. Pratt to the house of one Virchand Bhagat.
 Q. That is a different man from the one that was at the head of the crowd you referred to earlier ?
 A. He is his father, Sir.
 Q. You refer to him also, I see, as being a notorious gambler ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What attitude did he take up when you indicated that he had given assistance to the rioters ?
 A. He was very impertinent and impudent to the Commissioner, and he told him "who had a heart had done it."
 Q. On the 11th April at about 2 o'clock you got information as to the murder of a European in a shop in Richey Road ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you and Inspector Acton go and find the dead body of Sergeant Fraser ?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Where did you find it ?
 A. It was lying thrown on the main Richey Road.
 Q. In what state was it ?
 A. The face was badly cut up and there were blows and cuts on the hands and foot and the wrist was torn asunder from the body.
 Q. I think you and Lieutenant Fitzpatrick handed over the dead body to Inspector Acton to be removed to the hospital ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Then did you proceed to Panch Kuwa ?
 A. Yes.

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[Continued.]

Q. When you reached there, did you find the insurgents were doing mischief?

A. Yes. Actually they were setting fire to the place. The fire brigade engine was caught and burnt; it was a molten mass of metal.

Q. What was being used to set fire to these different places? What material was used?

A. I was told that they used kerosine oil and petrol.

Q. In connection with the different fires that were created throughout the city, was much kerosine oil or little kerosine oil required?

A. Not much was required.

Q. Was it easy for the crowd to get kerosine oil?

A. Yes, quite easy.

Q. Where would they get it?

A. From their own mills probably.

Q. In order to set fire to these different places, they had to provide themselves with this kerosine oil?

A. They had brought it with them.

Q. Did you notice a number of inscriptions written in Gujarati about this time near the body of Sergeant Fraser?

A. On the Fernandez bridge *chowky*.

Q. What was the general effect of these inscriptions?

A. It was all hatred towards the British rule; it was written that the British *raj* was gone; the King of England is defeated, *Swaraj* is established; kill all Europeans, murder them wherever they are found. I have got those photographs.*

Q. Were they produced in the court of the first special tribunal that had to try some of the cases?

A. They were produced.

Q. From what you saw what was your opinion as to whether the movement was a movement against the British or not?

A. It was against the British, the British Government and the Government officials.

Q. Did you notice anything in connection with the destruction of buildings as to whether the buildings that were selected for destruction were Government buildings or not?

A. Yes. The rioters always took the greatest care about it. Wherever there was a *chowky* standing apart from public houses, it was set fire to.

Q. *Chowkies* standing apart from private houses were set on fire?

A. Yes. Those which adjoined private houses were first wrecked and the wrecks were set fire to on the road so as to protect the private houses.

Q. I see you say that no Indian was harmed except a police constable Imamkhan who had been murdered in protecting two Europeans at Prem gate?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that in accordance with what you saw?

A. Yes.

Q. As regards the unarmed police, what happened to them?

A. They were stripped of their Government kit and they had to retreat.

Q. After they had been stripped of their kit, were they allowed to go unharmed?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that because they were Indians?

A. Yes, because they were Indians.

Q. We have had information about two Indian gentlemen who were ill-treated, Rao Bahadur Bulakhidas and Khan Bahadur Hussain Khan. What do you say as regards their being maltreated?

A. They were robbed of their property and they had to run away for their lives.

Q. How were they selected for maltreatment by the mob?

A. Both were magistrates, Sir.

Q. You were instrumental in rescuing one of these gentlemen?

A. I rescued Rao Bahadur Bulakhidas on the early morning of the 13th.

Q. Where did you rescue him from?

A. I rescued him from a temple near Jamalpur.

Q. You indicate that among the instigators of the mob were some people of better education than the mill-hands?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you give us any illustrations of such people?

A. Yes.

Q. What are they?

A. There was a Jain at the head of the mob which committed the first and the most heinous offence, the murder of Sergeant Fraser. The first assault that was made on Sergeant Fraser was by Hindus. He was the person who brought the second mob to kill him.

Q. I see you also suggest that the looting of the temple to secure fire-arms was suggested by educated people?

A. Yes.

Q. Why do you say that?

A. Because the uneducated and the labour party could not know that there would be arms in these temples. Again, there were writings on the walls inside the city where people were wrongly given to understand that the water was poisoned.

Q. The author of the writings must have had some education?

A. Exactly.

Q. We have had information about the cutting of telegraph wires the next day?

A. Yes.

Q. Then British troops arrived on the 12th afternoon?

A. Yes.

Q. Then afterwards Mr. Gandhi arrived?

A. On the morning of the 13th.

Q. On the evening of the day on which he arrived, Mr. Gandhi held a large meeting of the general public?

A. The next evening, on the 14th.

Q. What was the result of that meeting?

A. It had a very good result.

Q. After that did affairs begin to settle down?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Looking back upon it now, do you still hold the opinion that the situation was a serious and difficult one to be dealt with during the two or three days when these occurrences took place?

A. It was absolutely difficult.

Q. Was it a situation that could be dealt with by the police without the assistance of the military?

A. No, Sir.

Q. A very substantial military assistance was essential for the restoration of law and order?

A. Yes, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Were you going about the streets after 4 o'clock on the 12th and throughout the 13th of April?

A. Yes, Sir, I was moving about.

Q. Did you see any instances where Colonel Fraser's order was acted upon (what people call Martial Law proclamation—firing on any crowd if it exceeded 10)?

A. I did not notice any firing.

Q. You did not notice any case of single individuals being challenged and being fired upon because they did not come up?

A. I did not notice.

Q. So far as the armed police were concerned, when they were under you, did they always act boldly and promptly and obey orders?

A. Yes.

Q. You have no complaint?

A. No.

Q. As to their loyalty?

A. No.

Q. After the 14th, did you take part in arresting people in connection with the riots that had taken place?

A. Yes.

Q. When did you begin to make your arrests?

A. More arrests were made about the 28th April. Before that few arrests were actually made.

Q. Was that after Mr. Guider had come upon the scene?

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[Continued.]

A. Yes.

Q. And when affairs were in his charge?

A. Yes, there was only one arrest on the day of the riot.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. How many years have you been in Ahmedabad?

A. The whole of my service, about 9 years.

Q. In the city of Ahmedabad?

A. Practically.

Q. So I take it that you must have known the people very intimately?

A. Yes.

Q. Before we come to April 1919, did you ever notice among the people any anti-British feeling?

A. None at all.

Q. Or any anti-Government feeling?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. So the events that happened on the 10th and 11th April came upon you quite as a surprise?

A. They did to some extent.

Q. You do not suggest that there was behind these occurrences any organisation for this purpose?

A. I cannot say definitely, Sir.

Q. You have no materials to suggest that?

A. I have no materials except inferences that could be drawn.

Q. But you must have as a police officer when these occurrences occurred looked about and made enquiries such as you could; were the results negative?

A. We could not get evidence about that.

Q. On which you could positively base the inference that there was any organisation behind these happenings?

A. Except presumptions and inferences.

Q. There is no tangible evidence?

A. No.

Q. And similarly you do not suggest that there was any conspiracy which brought about the events of the 10th and 11th? There is no evidence that you could find?

A. In the investigations of these cases that I had to deal with, I have got no evidence.

Q. Mr. Gandhi was a very popular figure in Ahmedabad?

A. He was.

Q. And especially with the mill-hands?

A. Yes.

Q. They considered him, as you say in your statement, their God?

A. Yes.

Q. And Anasuya Bai occupied very nearly the same position?

A. She was actually worshipped.

Q. Then I take it that the outburst of the 10th and 11th was really the outcome of the news about the arrest of Mr. Gandhi. That turned the heads of the mill-hands?

A. That is my humble opinion.

Q. Once they lost their heads over that, they resorted to all sorts of violence and destruction of property?

A. They did.

Q. You do not suggest that before they started the riot, on hearing the news of the arrest of Mr. Gandhi, any of those people had designed an attack on Government buildings or anything of that sort? It was the frenzy of the moment?

A. The feeling of the public was so much excited against Government that the least cause gave them the fury.

Q. The immediate cause, I take it was Mr. Gandhi's arrest?

A. Yes.

Q. Supposing the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest had not come here on the 10th, you do not suggest that the events of the 10th could have happened?

A. Perhaps not.

Q. Similarly if on the 11th, the report about Anasuya Bai's arrest had not arrived, the events on that day might not have happened in all probability?

A. It is difficult to say, but the direct cause of trouble on the 11th was the rumour about the arrest of Anasuya Bai.

Q. Now in all the cases that were tried before the tribunals, I want to know if you can tell me whether there was any evidence given at all of any organisation or conspiracy behind these events of the 10th or 11th. Individuals were prosecuted and convicted or acquitted, but there was never any suggestion that there was any conspiracy or organisation behind these things?

A. Not in those cases that I have investigated.

Q. In the further cases also, so far as you know?

A. I cannot say that definitely.

Q. You never heard of it yourself?

A. Not of any conspiracy.

Q. And some of the ostensible leaders that you have named, Dr. Kanungo, Mr. Patel, Mr. Desai, etc., they all throughout did their best, I take it, to assist the authorities?

A. They did.

Q. They could not succeed because the mob would not obey or follow their suggestion. Is that not so?

A. The mobs were simply mad with fury.

Q. They were so mad with fury that they did not listen?

A. Yes.

Q. But so far as the leaders were concerned, they honestly strove throughout to assist the authorities?

A. They tried their best.

Q. And you do not suggest that any prominent or leading person or any person of importance in the city did anything to the contrary, leaving alone the notorious gamblers? I mean the respectable people in the city and persons of importance or in leading position?

A. I think they indirectly helped the rioters by feeding them.

Q. Do you mean these prominent people fed them?

A. Yes. There were some respectable persons occupying some important position in the city.

Q. Did they assist in any manner?

A. I think they contributed something to the funds to provide food to the rioters or to support the injured.

Q. You suggest these people, people of standing like Mr. Patel, contributed to provide food to the rioters and to support the injured?

A. I have no data to go upon.

Q. You have no evidence?

A. I have been told that respectable persons have contributed to the funds.

Q. You were told of many things. Did you find any evidence in support of that? Did you investigate it?

A. Not supporting the rioters, but supporting the injured.

Q. Did you investigate, did you find any truth in it?

A. Yes, Sir. There were some respectable persons.

Q. Who were they?

A. They were the *Banias* and some of the leading shroffs.

Q. Did you find any subscription list opened or any thing in evidence?

A. I had a case put up against them. That was afterwards withdrawn.

Q. On the information that you got, you prosecuted some people?

A. No. I have not actually prosecuted.

Q. You suggested prosecution of some people for having contributed to support the rioters, and the case was not proceeded with at all?

A. Not proceeded with.

Q. Then it comes to this: that you have really no reliable or tangible evidence for the statement that you made?

A. There is no tangible evidence at all.

Q. Then when you say that the educated men had instigated the rioting. I take it you mean the literate people, not the educated people in the sense of the better educated people?

A. One who knows how to read and write.

* Not reproduced.

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[Continued.]

Q. What you suggest is that those who took part in the riots and who might have instigated them were the same class of people but the latter knew how to read and write?

A. The labour class.
Q. You do not suggest that educated people took part in the rioting?

A. I have no evidence.
Q. When you talk of people who can read and write taking part or helping in the riots, you mean the millhands?

A. They do not know much.
Q. For instance, there are large numbers of people among the millhands who are earning comparatively high wages; they are all people who can read and write?

A. Not of that sort.
Q. There are a considerable number of millhands who know how to read and write?

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. The writings you speak of at the Chowky and other places might have been written by any one of them?

A. The words that were used in the writing could not be their work. They could not write a poem.

Q. Why? There are a large number of them earning Rs. 100 and more who are much better off than clerks on Rs. 30 or 40. Why were they not capable of writing it?

A. No; they are not very much literate.
Q. Then your suggestion that people knowing how to read and write other than millhands must have had a hand in the rioting is based on the writings that you saw on some of the walls?

A. Not only that; but soon after the riots, there appeared also poems circulated printed in the name of Mahatma Gandhi and sold in Bazaars. and they did contain poisonous language against Government.

Q. Was anybody arrested with regard to that?
A. Yes, Sir. On the 17th, 2 men were arrested.

Q. Were they prosecuted?
A. They were prosecuted under section 108, Criminal Procedure Code.

Q. And convicted?
A. Yes, Sir. And Mahatma Gandhi himself has refuted the contents of these.

Q. Who were these people?
A. Lal Shakar, Har Jeevandas.
Q. What was their station in life?
A. They used to write such poems.

Q. Surely you do not conclude that because you find one or two individuals were doing that that the educated men or literate people as a class had a hand in this riot?

A. I give my reason. My inference is based on facts. I have stated my reasons.

Q. By "educated" you mean people who know how to read and write; you did not mean thereby the better educated classes?

A. How can I say so?
Q. You said so?

A. I said so because I have no evidence.

Q. If you have no evidence to support your suggestion, you must recognise that you are not entitled to make it?

A. I have got one evidence only; the attitude of the medical students who were educated much above the normal standard were very hostile against the Sister of the hospital; they treated her with contempt. When Sergeant Fraser was brought into the hospital they actually hooted.

Q. That was on the 11th?
A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What hospital is that?
A. Civil hospital. And they have got university degree, L.P.C.

Q. That is not a University degree?
A. I do not know.

Q. Trained there for the medical profession?
A. Exactly so.

Q. Were you there when this occurred?

A. No; I was told afterwards.
Q. You did not know exactly what occurred?
A. I was not personally there.

Q. Then you speak of arms being taken from the temple? From that you conclude that people who know how to read and write must be in it. Why do you say that?

A. Because they know who possesses fire-arms.
Q. The fact that Gossainji's temple possesses a license may be known to any person who knows how to read and write?

A. Not to the labour class.
Q. If some people frequent these temples they certainly would know that arms are hung up there?

A. We have got instances. Bhagat has got no status; he took these men.

Q. The man who was on the 1st day near Kanuga's hospital?

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Was that man prosecuted and convicted?

A. He was prosecuted and convicted.
Q. What for?

A. He was prosecuted under sections 121, 129, etc., Indian Penal Code.

Q. He led these people to the temple?
A. Yes, Sir.

Q. To get the arms?
A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You call him a notorious gambler?
A. He was.

Q. You do not put him forward as representing the educated classes?

A. Educated persons may be gamblers.
Q. They may be anything. You found a notorious gambler doing something; you do not say that the educated classes are guilty of this, because a person who knows how to read and write is a notorious gambler?

A. I have stated about Kesavlal Dayabhai, photographer.

Q. Because a notorious gambler led the millhands to get firearms, is that sufficient to call the educated classes as dangerous? Each one of these people is of that character? You have several insufficient reasons, and they put together can make no good reason.

A. I should think so.

Q. I put it to you, each reason by itself does not appear to me to be sufficient reason. You suggest that because you have 5 insufficient reasons, therefore all the 5 put together will make some good reason for your conclusion?

A. These are not insufficient, but sufficient.
Q. You said insufficient?

A. I consider them as sufficient reasons.
Q. Now Hussain Khan and Bulakhidas, as I understood from Mr. Chatfield, were people who are magistrates and as such ordinarily dealt with matters connected with millhands and people of that type.

A. Hussain Khan does not deal with mill cases.
Q. Taking Bulakhidas, he deals with cases in which this class of population is concerned. If this is a fact they would certainly know him.

A. They would not know his house.
Q. They would certainly know him; he was a magistrate and dealt with matters in which they were concerned.

A. Yes.
Q. If for some reason or other, he was unpopular with them, they would like to get at him. That is also probable?

A. It is probable.
Q. Now if he was unpopular and they wanted to get at him, where is the difficulty in the way of the millhands finding his house in some manner? That does not require any literary equipment.

A. The millhands could not possibly know where they reside.
Q. Could not possibly know his house?

A. No.
Q. Any millhand can find that out?

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[Continued.]

A. The millhands cannot find out unless they are helped by some people in that locality; they cannot know it by themselves.

Q. They do not require an educated person to point out the house. If you want to find out the house somebody can show it.

A. That does not necessarily follow.
Q. Do you agree that that is not a sufficient reason in any event?

A. Bulakhidas did not deal with the millhands at the time he was attacked.

Q. I learnt that from Mr. Chatfield that he was dealing with cases in which they were interested. Were Bulakhidas and Hussain Khan very unpopular officers in the city?

A. I cannot say.
Q. You have been 9 years a police officer and many things must have come to your notice.

A. Perhaps it was their misfortune that they were attacked by the rioters.

Q. You never heard that they were very unpopular officers?

A. They had gone over to another officer also, the City Magistrate Mr. Jaganlal.

Q. That is not answering the question. My question is, in your knowledge of the city (I take it you are a resident of Ahmedabad and your family have been residing for a long time in the city), surely you can tell me from what you have heard whether these officers were very unpopular or not?

A. I would not like to answer that question.
Q. I do not force you to if you do not want to. If they were unpopular officers, the attack on them would be explicable in some manner?

A. It is evident.
Q. You spoke about the attack on Mr. Larkin?

A. Yes, Sir. When I went there, he was bleeding.
Q. Did Mr. Larkin tell you who attacked him?

A. I asked him how he got the injury. He pointed to the man who was groaning there lying with his face downwards. He said he was sorry he was to be shot and when he was being picked up, I learnt his name.

Q. Was there a big crowd at the time?
A. There was a crowd standing opposite the platoon.

Q. Not at that spot?
A. Except the stretcher bearers I did not see anybody else.

Q. At that place, where Mr. Larkin received his injury, how many men were there?
A. I think about 25 or 30. I cannot say the exact number.

Q. You spoke of the rioters being supplied with food and water and other things by the people. Might not have that been through fear of them?

A. There is no instance known that the rioters demanded this from the public.

Q. It is not a question of demanding. If the rioters rush into a particular locality the people might have to supply them with food and water in order that they might not commit violence.

A. It was not necessary, because they could have plundered many shops.

Q. Exactly. In order to prevent the plundering, people would rather give them these things and stop plundering their houses or shops?

A. They could have asked from the shopkeepers if they wanted it without plundering.

Q. How do you know that they never asked?
A. Because there were no incidents.

Q. What do you mean by "no incidents"?
A. I have not clear evidence about it. I have been moving in the public and no one has so far told me that rioters wanted to be fed by them. If they were not fed, in my honest belief, they would have gone away. This was direct encouragement to them.

Q. In what locality was this?
A. I noticed it in Richey Road, in Khadia and other places.

Q. You saw it yourself?

A. I saw food being taken and distributed.
Q. You saw food being brought and distributed?

A. Yes, Sir; I have seen it.
Q. You were present when the food was brought in by people?

A. Not that. When I was walking up through the different military detachments I saw that food was being given to them and on the appearance of the military they were disappearing.

Q. Who were giving food when you arrived? What did you see?

A. I saw some respectable, good-looking fellows.
Q. Where did you see that?

A. First, on the Richey Road.
Q. What part of Richey Road?

A. Near Pankor post on the main road.
Q. Where were the rioters at that time?

A. The rioters had disappeared in the bye-lanes.
Q. There were no rioters in the lanes?

A. There were; we had seen them at a distance; when we arrived they scattered.

Q. When you arrived they distributed the food to them in the bye-lanes?

A. I actually saw men running with food in their hands or caps.

Q. What did you exactly see? When you came you saw rioters on the road at a distance. When you arrived near them they dispersed in the bye-lanes. What did you observe about food being distributed?

A. There was nothing to be seen. I saw from a distance food being given to them.

Q. At what distance?
A. It may be about 200 or 300 yards.

Q. Was there a large crowd of rioters at the time?
A. About 100 to 150.

Q. How many people were distributing food?
A. There were two or three.

Q. Why do you conclude that these 2 or 3 people were residents of that locality. They might have been people who were with the rioters?

A. They looked like respectable persons. I did not say that they belonged to the locality.

Q. You do not suggest that they belonged to the locality? They might have come with the rioters themselves. They might be among the rioters?

A. They may be, Sir.

Q. What other locality did you see in which food was being distributed in this way?

A. At Shahpur.
Q. Was that immediately after?

A. No, Sir.
Q. You have seen this personally in Shahpur?

A. I personally saw some food being distributed on the Richey Road, Khadia Chowky.

Q. At that junction?
A. Midway between the two roads.

Q. It is a very narrow road.
A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When did you arrive?
A. About 3-30.

Q. On the 11th?
A. Yes.

Q. And where were the rioters at that time?
A. On the Khadia Road.

Q. It must have been blocked by the rioters?
A. They were in one place.

Q. Wherever they were, they must be in numbers and they would have blocked the road. You were at the junction?

A. I was passing the Panch Kuwa gate.
Q. You saw them from the junction?

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. You did not turn but went straight on?

A. I was anxious to reach the Pankor Road.
Q. At what distance did you see them?

A. About 150 to 200 yards.
Q. You know the width of the road is very small?

A. About 25 feet.
Q. Were you on horseback?

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[Continued.]

A. I was on foot.

Q. You were hurrying to Panch Kuwa gate; you could not have noticed anything in particular that was happening at about 150 yards in that bye-lane, when you were passing up the main road hurrying on to Panch Kuwa gate, the width of the road being very small.

A. I could not notice them actually giving food, but I saw a Hindu gentleman.

Q. Did you yourself see anyone giving food?

A. No, Sir. I was told so.

Q. Where were you told so?

A. It was at the junction of these roads.

Q. When you were passing?

A. Yes. Somebody said that food was being given.

Q. You did not see it yourself?

A. No.

Q. This is the second incident. Where else did you see the food given?

A. From the Ratanpol I saw trays of food being taken.

Q. After these two incidents or before?

A. After.

Q. What time was it?

A. I cannot possibly say the time.

Q. Morning or evening or noon?

A. It must be late in the evening on the 11th?

Q. Where were you coming from?

A. I must be moving up the road.

Q. Patrolling the road?

A. Yes.

Q. You saw what?

A. Some trays.

Q. With food?

A. I did not see it. I think it was that some sweets were brought in them.

Q. Were there any rioters at the time?

A. No.

Q. Why do you suppose that these trays of sweetmeats were brought for rioters when there were no rioters at all?

A. Because there were none else to take food to.

Q. There were no rioters at that time. The simple fact that trays were taken by somebody to somebody else leads you to conclude that they were taken to the rioters. You do not know where they were sent and what was their destination?

A. No, Sir. Subsequently I found out from one man in Ratanpol.

Q. When was this?

A. Very probably on the 13th when I took the Commissioner and the Inspector General of Police.

Q. To that man Virchand Bhagat, on that day?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What did you find?

A. That there were huge iron trays and piles of fuel there. I went in to the Ratanpol and the Machipol and found big iron trays there.

Q. Were they lying on the ground?

A. No, they were in the street.

Q. On the roadway of the street?

A. Not on the roadway.

Q. It was not in any house?

A. No, it was a *chowk* of the surrounding houses.

Q. And trays were lying there?

A. Yes.

Q. This was on the 13th?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 13th there were no riots?

A. No.

Q. There were no rioters about that place?

A. No.

Q. You saw empty trays lying there?

A. Yes.

Q. How many did you find?

A. 12 to 13, and I questioned the men there.

Q. Whom?

A. The man I questioned was also a gambler. I forget his name.

Q. You seem to have come across many gamblers?

A. The feeding was done by Virchand Bhagat who was the leader of gamblers.

Q. You questioned some other gambler?

A. Yes, and I asked him what these were for, and he said, "These are for feeding the rioters and you can go and question Virchand who has done all this."

Q. This gambler who gave you that information, was he a person living in that locality or some other locality?

A. In that locality.

Q. And he said this was for feeding the rioters and Virchand had done it?

A. Yes, so I took all these officers to Virchand.

Q. And you questioned him about it?

A. No, I brought him direct to Mr. Pratt.

Q. And Mr. Pratt questioned him?

A. Mr. Pratt told him it was very shameful to have fed the rioters in that manner. He said not only he but any person having a heart would do so.

Q. So it comes to this, as to this suggestion about food that it was Mr. Virchand, a notorious gambler, who did it?

A. In one locality.

Q. You have no information about any other locality?

A. Yes, Sir, about Sarangpur.

Q. Were you there?

A. No, during my investigation I found it out.

Q. You did not see it yourself?

A. No.

Q. And what did you find out, that sweetmeats were distributed?

A. No, Sir, in Sarangpur they had purchased *Sev Mumra* to the extent of several maunds.

Q. Who had done that?

A. Some respectable persons.

Q. Did you find out their names?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you prosecute them?

A. No, Sir.

Q. You felt there was not sufficient evidence to bring them before a court of law?

A. This matter was under contemplation whether they should be prosecuted for feeding the rioters or not.

Q. Ultimately you did not?

A. I did not under orders of the Inspector General.

Q. Virchand was prosecuted?

A. Virchand was prosecuted for another offence.

Q. He was not prosecuted for this?

A. Not for feeding the rioters to my knowledge.

Q. What was he prosecuted for?

A. For taking part in the riots.

Q. Was he convicted?

A. No, Sir, the case was withdrawn. It was not my case.

Q. It was withdrawn because there was not sufficient evidence of his complicity in the riot?

A. I cannot give the reasons, Sir.

Q. He was never brought before a court at all?

A. It was withdrawn by the order of the first tribunal.

Q. Was he put up before the first tribunal?

A. I do not know whether he was actually put up or not.

Q. He was not charged with having fed the rioters and thereby abetted the riots?

A. I do not think so.

Q. You had that information available to you when he was put up?

A. That was not my case, and I do not know the full facts.

Q. But you had, and through you the police had, this information that you have told us about to-day?

Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Bombay Government—

Mr. Guider can tell all about this I think; it is rather out of this witness's scope.

Q. You found out this fact about his having fed the rioters; did you communicate that to your superior officers?

A. Yes.

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[Continued.]

Q. So that information was available to the police about Virchand having taken this part in feeding the rioters?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. As to burning these buildings you say they must have carried kerosine oil; did you see any person carrying kerosine oil?

A. No personally I did not.

Q. You merely conclude that somebody must have brought kerosine oil in order to set fire to the building?

A. No, that is from the evidence we had during the investigation.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You know as a matter of fact that there are anarchists and seditionists in different big cities of India?

A. Yes Sir, there are.

Q. And you are also aware of the fact as a police officer that from time to time pamphlets and poems are issued both under a fictitious name and sometimes over real names, and they are distributed?

A. They are, Sir.

Q. Then further you are aware that these seditionists and anarchists take advantage of such occasions to inculcate their own doctrines and they try to incite people whenever any occasion arises?

A. They do, Sir.

Q. Therefore if you found these writings written on that bridge do you claim that in the city of Ahmedabad, which contains more than 300,000 inhabitants, there are no seditionists or anarchists?

A. There may be.

Q. Therefore it is more than probable that this writing on the wall of that bridge was the action of some seditionist or anarchist?

A. He may not be a seditionist or anarchist.

Q. Or he may be?

A. Yes, he may be.

Q. Therefore why do you say that this writing on the bridge was the action of the educated community of Ahmedabad?

A. Because we had no information otherwise.

Q. Because you have no information otherwise therefore you are prepared to make a suggestion against the whole educated community of Ahmedabad?

A. Not against the whole.

Q. That is my point. If the result of your evidence is that this was the action of some particular crazy individual, I have no quarrel with that; but when you go a step further and suggest that the educated classes were behind that, I want to cross-examine you on that. Therefore may I take it that your evidence goes so far that it was the action of some individual person?

A. Or more, because the hand-writing was not in one hand.

Q. Now many hand-writings were there? How many photographs have you got?

A. Three photographs.*

Q. Therefore it was the hand-writing of three men?

A. More than three.

Q. Half a dozen?

A. At least four or five.

Q. Do you say it was done at one and the same time?

A. I should think so, Sir.

Q. And it is a very frequented place?

A. It was on the day of the 11th when the whole business was at a standstill.

Q. The place where you found this was it a well frequented place?

A. It is on the main road.

Q. People pass that place frequently?

A. Yes, Sir, ordinarily.

Q. Therefore taking it to be the hand-writing of about four persons, it is quite possible that in a city where there are 300,000 inhabitants there might be more than two dozen anarchists and seditionists?

A. I cannot say.

* Not reproduced.

Q. Therefore I want to know what is your reason for saying that was the action of the educated inhabitants of Ahmedabad, or that they were at the back of those persons?

A. All the facts taken together have led me to form that opinion, not one data alone.

Q. You will admit that so far as the supplying of sweetmeats, etc., was concerned, a number of these persons were inhabitants of these *mohallas*?

A. Yes.

Q. They must have had their fathers, and brothers and mothers here?

A. Yes.

Q. And when from the early morning till 6 o'clock in the evening the people were going about from place to place committing all this arson and damage they would be supplied with food by their own relations?

A. Food was supplied to the labouring class.

Q. But you did not see any labouring class; you have already stated that you only saw food being taken?

A. I have found out in my investigations.

Q. That the food was supplied to the labouring class?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And that no food was taken by any other person?

A. It must have been.

Q. By others too?

A. By others too.

Q. Therefore supposing I have an idea of burning a certain building—and I quite agree with you that there would be some leaders—and I am followed by 100 people, and I move about with a party of 100, if I am so disposed, certainly I will arrange for my own food and food for those following me. Is there anything strange in that?

A. You as the leader of the mob would arrange it?

Q. Yes, as the leader of the rioters.

A. It was not done so here.

Q. But according to your investigation you do not know?

A. We have not found it from the investigation.

Q. Therefore, if any friends or relations of these people who were moving about from place to place, admitting that your information is correct, did in two or three instances supply a certain number of the crowd with food and eatables, why do you conclude that the whole city of Ahmedabad was in sympathy with the rioters?

A. I do not mean the whole city. I only say that both educated and uneducated have taken part in this riot.

Q. If you make that statement there is no quarrel about it.

A. That is the only statement I have made.

Q. You say in this riot both educated and uneducated were concerned? That is all, you do not mean to say anything else?

A. No.

Q. You did state that the educated class, the citizens, were in sympathy with the rioters?

A. Not the citizens, Sir, the educated people. I did not mean the whole educated public of Ahmedabad.

Q. And that would be a very infinitesimal portion of the inhabitants of Ahmedabad?

A. Well I have not judged; it won't go to a majority of the population.

Q. Therefore I come to that point again. You have based your inference upon three instances that have come to your notice and from those three instances why do you say a large number of people were in sympathy with these rioters?

A. Not large; only educated people had a hand in it.

Q. And I say a few individuals.

A. Not many.

Q. So far as your investigation went, not more than a dozen?

A. No, it would go to some hundred or a couple of hundred.

Q. From your investigation you find about a hundred people were supplying eatables to these rioters?

A. Yes.

Q. You have given us only three instances?

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[Continued.]

A. But I found there were some purchasers of these eatables, some who had supplied them, some who had cooked them.

Q. In that manner you are applying section 107 of the Indian Penal Code?

A. Not in that way.

Q. Like the receivers of stolen property, the man who commits the theft and the man who disposes of the property?

A. About 100 men might have taken part in the feeding of the rioters.

Q. And also you include those who cooked the food?

A. Possibly.

Q. And also those who drew water from wells? You say so?

A. Yes.

Q. So, including the whole lot, it does not go beyond a hundred?

A. I do not think so.

Q. You have said that this gambler professed to be a Satyagrahi?

A. Yes.

Q. Was he one of those who had taken the vow?

A. I do not know.

Q. Why do you say he was a Satyagrahi?

A. He was telling me in person—"I am a Satyagrahi now, we will do what we like," and he was taking the part of a Satyagraha member.

Q. Have you been able to ascertain as a matter of fact whether he was a member?

A. I have found out that he was not a member of the Satyagraha.

Q. He was only saying so?

A. He was only professing and styling himself as such.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. You have described a procession that took place, and you say there were some banners carried with inscriptions on them?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What were the inscriptions?

A. I have supplied them; I have got the English translations of them.

Q. You say here the posters of the Gaiety Theatre were burnt by the mob, who had "pulled down the wood-framed posters exhibited outside and set them on fire." Why was that done?

A. To cause damage to the Cinematograph because they had not observed the Sunday previous, considered as a black Sunday.

Q. And did they also burn the Cinema?

A. That was talked of.

Q. You have mentioned a meeting of 30,000 people; who addressed that meeting? Who were the people who organised that meeting?

A. On the evening of the 10th?

Q. Yes. You say "As was notified in the circulars issued that day a very large mass meeting was held in the river-bed attended by about 30,000 people. It lasted for about an hour and was over at 8 p.m." That was called by the Satyagraha Sabha and it was addressed by the leaders of the Satyagraha movement?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the burden of the speeches?

A. I did not attend the meeting.

Q. Did you have any report about it?

A. I had no report about it. The Intelligence Branch was different from the Executive. I was in the Executive Branch at the time.

Q. You do not know what was said?

A. I do not know the proceedings of the meeting.

Q. But the general effect was very good?

A. Very good.

Q. Do these gentlemen you have mentioned, Dr. Kanuga, Mr. Yajnik and Mr. Patel, belong to the Satyagraha movement?

A. They do.

Q. You said rumours were also afloat that the Hindus and Muhammadans together would take out in procession

from the civil hospital the corpses of the men who had died from the injuries received in the disturbance of the previous day, and would hold a joint prayer meeting at the Jama Masjid. Do you mean the Hindus and Muhammadans would pray jointly?

A. That was the rumour spread at that time.

Q. But how could they pray jointly, the Hindu and Muhammadan prayers are not alike? Was it merely a meeting to be held or were there to be prayers jointly?

A. The rumour was that they would hold a prayer meeting there.

Q. With what object, prayer for whom?

A. For the dead that were injured on the previous day, or for the repealing of the Rowlatt Act.

Q. That is what you think?

A. Yes.

Q. But you did not hear what they were going to pray for?

A. No.

Q. You have said that you were told by Mr. Boyd to be discreet in opening fire on the mob?

A. Yes, Sir, to use discretion.

Q. He told you to use discretion, what was meant by that?

A. That unless it was absolutely necessary, there should not be loss of life.

Q. And you carried that out?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Then again you say as it was Friday there was a mob in the Jama Masjid and the feelings of the Muhammadans "were rather excited at seeing military pickets near the mosque, but with the exercise of a little tact they were appeased and they went inside" the mosque to pray. I want to be a little clearer as to what you mean by a little tact.

A. I told these people that if they did not like the sepoys stationed near the doors of the Jama Masjid, I would withdraw them to some distance. They said there were bullets coming inside. I said no bullets could go inside the mosque and they need not be afraid; they could offer their prayers and go home. And with this talk to them they were satisfied; they went inside.

Q. Do I understand you correctly that there were military near the mosque and the Muhammadans who had come there to pray had come out and complained of the nearness of the military to the mosque?

A. They resented it.

Q. And you told them they need not be afraid of it and no bullets would go into the mosque, and the military would be withdrawn from the gate of the mosque?

A. Not actually withdrawn, but they would be stationed at a little distance away, not quite close to the doors.

Q. And that satisfied them and they went inside?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You say that the ambulance work which was done by volunteers was of a character which would induce the inference that it was pre-arranged, but you say as a matter of fact it was not so. How do you say that?

A. Before we as police officers had an idea of firing actually on the rioters we could see that the dead were picked up and the injured were picked up very speedily, and they had even good stretchers.

Q. You attribute that to their organisation rather than to any anticipated need for this purpose?

A. It was only their promptness, not that it was pre-arranged. It would give one that idea, but not that it was really so.

Q. It was due to good organisation and promptitude?

A. Yes.

Q. About these inscriptions, is it not possible that the four different characters were inscribed by one man?

A. They were scribbled off in charcoal.

Q. You found different characters from which you concluded that there were four or five persons. Is it not possible that one person could write in four or five different hands?

A. It may be so. It need not necessarily be.

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Mr. D. D. KOTHAWALA.

[Continued.]

Q. You have mentioned about martial law being proclaimed, I think you refer to the military order?

A. Yes, I refer to the military order, there was no martial law proclaimed here.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay.

Q. You have emphasised the fact that this photographer Kesavlal was a Jain. You might just explain for the benefit of the Committee why you emphasise the fact that he is a Jain?

A. Jains are a class of Hindus, who are most religious, and who would not take the life of even the smallest creature.

The Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan:—There may be a black sheep?

Witness.—Kesavlal Popatlal was another Jain in the same case.

Sir C. H. Setalvad:—Was this photographer convicted?

A. Yes, Sir. I think Bhogia and Virchand are also Jains.

Mr. Kemp:—You said that you had the liquor shops closed on the morning of the 11th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. There is no question, I take it, of anything that happened on the 11th being due to drunkenness?

A. No, Sir.

Q. It could not possibly be due to drunkenness?

A. Drunkenness was only seen in the latter part, in the afternoon when they broke open the liquor shops.

Q. You got the impression that this mob were anti-European and anti-Government?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I want you to tell me what made you to conclude or what gave you the impression that they were anti-European?

A. Everybody who was clad in European costume was stoned. Mr. Dalal was assaulted in the motor car because he was clad in European costume. The Parsis had to change their head wear and they used to put on skull caps instead of hats.

Q. You were also stoned when riding on your bicycle?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did any one suggest that you should not be stoned or did any one try to protect you?

A. Yes, Sir. When I and the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mr. Shirgaonkar, were passing, shouts were heard from the crowds, 'let them go, they are deshies.'

Q. What is the meaning of deshies?

A. Indians.

Q. It was more anti-European even than anti-Government?

A. It was so.

Q. You were questioned with regard to the magistrates who were attacked, but you were mentioning something about the City Magistrate, he is not here and there is no case about him. What about him?

A. The rioters had actually gone to the place of the City Magistrate, Mr. Chhaganlal Mehta, and he had to run for his life, and there was a sort of dispensary opened in his own house.

Q. As far as you know, he was a particularly unpopular magistrate?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Now you have been questioned at considerable length on your reasons for saying that some better class of people were either sympathising with or involved in the riots. You were questioned as a police officer of your experiences and investigations. The answers you gave were based on your experiences in and during the investigation and the riots?

A. Exactly, Sir.

Q. Whatever answers you gave, the facts were thoroughly believed by you?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you in charge of the Astodia case?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Do you remember in that case whether any man was originally charged or arrested for supplying sweetmeats to the rioters?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was there any evidence on oath in the court that there had been well dressed respectable citizens supplying sweetmeats to the rioters?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I take it that you did not yourself know why some of these men were not eventually tried?

A. Under orders from the Deputy Inspector General.

Q. When you were first stoned at Richey Road, you say that stones came down from up above and the houses were occupied by millhands or lower classes?

A. There were very respectable shopkeepers and business men's residential quarters also.

Q. It is suggested by a member of the court that possibly the inscriptions on Fernandez bridge might have been done by some anarchist from some other place. It is possible, but is it reasonable to suppose that all these shopkeepers' windows were inhabited by up-country anarchists?

A. None, Sir. All are Gujaratis there.

Q. You were quite satisfied that that was done by Ahmedabad people who lived there?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. These inscriptions are, I believe, before the court?

A. The photographs of these inscriptions are before the court, the inscriptions are in Gujarati.

Q. On the night of the 10th were the mobs armed on Richey Road?

A. No, Sir.

Q. On the morning of the 11th were they armed?

A. I went up to Panch Kuwa gate; I saw nobody was armed.

Q. When did you see them armed?

A. When coming back at about 8 I saw for the first time that they were armed with sticks or lathis.

Q. Do you know or did you enquire as to where these sticks came from?

A. I was told that these sticks were taken from the shops near the three gates and a cart was coming for the Friday fair from which they had plundered these heavy sticks.

Q. Were there any sticks looted on the night before the 10th on the Prem gate side?

A. I don't know that. It is outside my division.

Q. You have mentioned that the sight of the wounded further excited the people when they saw them taken to the hospital. Where was that?

A. On the Richey Road.

Q. That was on the afternoon of the 10th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Is that the nearest way to take the wounded from the Prem gate to the civil hospital?

A. No, Sir.

Q. It was a round-about way to go?

A. It is a long way. The nearest road would be from Prem gate and Delhi Chakla street to the civil hospital.

Q. You have not suggested why they were taken to the hospital by that route?

A. I think it was to make an exhibition of the wounded.

By Mr. Jivanlal Desai, Counsel to the Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad—

Q. From Prem gate these wounded persons were taken to the dispensary?

A. So I learnt afterwards.

Q. To be treated?

A. Perhaps to render first-aid.

Q. There is a dispensary near the Panch Kuwa gate which is nearer to Prem gate than to the civil hospital?

A. It is not kept open always.

Q. It is nearer?

A. Yes.

Q. Between Prem gate and the hospital there is the Anklesaria dispensary which is nearer?

A. Yes.

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[Continued.]

Q. So far as medical aid was concerned, these people could have been taken to Anklesaria's dispensary or to Dr. Gandhi in preference to the civil hospital?

A. Yes.

Q. Your suggestion that they were taken there for exhibition is only gratuitous?

A. No, because when they were injured by bullets, they could not possibly be treated in a dispensary and their removal to the hospital was evidently necessary to any man of common sense.

Q. Do you mean to say that Dr. Kanuga, or Dr. Anklesaria or Dr. Gandhi could not have treated these people?

A. They could not have treated these people. The bullets had to be removed and operations had to be performed, which could only be done in the hospital and not in a dispensary.

Q. I take it, Mr. Kothawala, that they were actually treated at Dr. Kanuga's dispensary?

A. They were simply dressed, superficially.

Q. You mean their wounds were washed?

A. Their wounds were washed and they were immediately sent to the hospital.

Q. You know that for some time the masses of Ahmedabad are taking interest in political matters?

A. They are.

Q. Keen interest?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 30th March there was some incident at Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was well known here?

A. Through the papers.

Q. The attack on Swami Shradhdhanand and the attack on the station, all these incidents had excited some people here?

The President:—We did not have evidence of any attack on Swami Shradhdhanand.

Mr. Desai:—That was reported in the papers.

Q. That there was an attack on Swami Shradhdhanand in Chandni Chowk that about 12 bayonets were aimed at him?

A. It was reported in the papers that an attack was made on him on the 30th March.

Q. On the 30th March a *hartal* was contemplated at certain places?

A. A *hartal* was arranged at Ahmedabad also, it was put off till the 6th.

Q. On the 30th March it was observed at certain places and Delhi was one of them?

A. Yes.

Q. As the result of that there was some disturbance at Delhi, and the news that came to Ahmedabad excited some people?

A. I do not know.

Q. On the 6th there was a big procession and a *hartal*?

A. Yes.

Q. The organisers had taken proper precautions for complete quiet?

A. But they were nervous.

Q. That may be another thing; but they had taken proper precautions?

A. But they were nervous at the last moment.

Q. They had their own volunteers and they had taken proper precautions?

A. Yes, but they were nervous.

Q. It was carried out without police assistance?

A. Perhaps police assistance would have been a cause of some trouble.

Q. It was an orderly procession?

A. Not very orderly: It caused some nervousness to the organisers.

Q. And to the police also?

A. Yes.

Q. How did you know that the organisers were nervous?

A. Mr. Bachubhai himself told me that they had got all means of controlling them, that they were nervous till they reached the river-bed and that it would be better

that the police should not make any show. I assured him that the police were neither going to interfere nor giving any trouble to the procession and Mr. Bachubhai said that the masses were getting excited.

Q. He was nervous of police interference?

A. There was some sort of excitement then.

Q. He wanted the police to be out of the field?

A. That is one thing, and he himself felt nervous.

Q. It is all right, let him be nervous. But was there any other party nervous? The Cinema man, was he nervous particularly?

A. He had at least said that he was nervous, whether there was danger or not.

Q. He had applied for an armed police force?

A. I don't know that. It is not in my division. He is in B Division.

Q. B Division is just opposite to A Division?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you anywhere round the fountain head at Richey Road on the 6th?

A. I was.

Q. Did you notice an armed police party stationed there at about 4, 5, 6 or 7 o'clock?

A. No, I did not notice it.

Q. Have you yet ascertained that there was an armed police party stationed there on the 6th at the request of the proprietor?

A. I have not ascertained whether there was a party stationed there or not.

Q. You did not notice it?

A. No, none.

Q. On the 6th you had taken some precautions only at the Khas Bazar gate?

A. No, I had taken precautions all along from Panch Kuwa up to three gates which is in my charge.

Q. The procession did not pass beyond the corner on the Richey Road. It went into Khadia.

The whole of the Richey Road was left open for traffic up to the fountain?

A. That portion only.

Q. And the procession left through Khadia, Manik Chowk and came along Ranchod fountain, and special precautions were taken only at Khas Bazar Road?

A. The divisional sub-inspector had a party there. The C Division Inspector had a party and I had nothing to do with it.

Q. I talk of the police, and not of A or B Division. I talk of the police department and they had taken special precautions?

A. You said I had taken special precautions.

Q. I said the police had taken special precautions, you had an escort there and some officer and Mr. Shirgaonkar were waiting there and at no other place?

A. At no other place.

Q. Now all along the route everybody was quiet. There was no grumbling going on in the crowd?

A. Excepting a shouting.

Q. Yes, somebody's *Jai* and nothing more than that?

A. No.

Q. At the meeting also you were not present?

A. No.

Q. You did not get any report?

A. No.

Q. It was a very orderly meeting?

A. That was so.

Q. There was no disturbance.....?

A. I beg your pardon. I had seen the meeting from the bridge on the 6th. I saw the meeting on the 6th, it was orderly.

Q. You were accompanied by certain other police officers?

A. I was accompanied by Mr. Acton, Mr. Shirgaonkar and several others.

Q. The crowds were orderly and they dispersed?

A. Except that they threw something at the police officers standing on the bridge.

Q. Did they throw anything from the bridge?

A. I was told that some dust was thrown on them not on the police officers but some dust fell on them.

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[Continued.]

Q. Accidentally, from the heavens?

A. I enquired and I was told that some carriages were passing by and accidentally some dust fell down.

Q. In spite of all that the large crowd of 50,000 dispersed very quietly and there was no uneasiness in the mind of anybody left on that night or the day after that?

A. They went away very quietly.

Q. On the morning of the 9th there was a big meeting organised by the Home Rule League at Ahmedabad in *Swadeshism*?

A. Yes.

Q. And were you present there on the river-bed?

A. I was not personally present.

Q. Nothing untoward happened there?

A. Nothing.

Q. There was a meeting on the 9th evening also at Manila's Mansions, that also passed off quietly?

A. Yes.

Q. People were asked to keep quiet in spite of the passing of the Rowlatt legislation?

A. That was one of the clauses laid down.

Q. Did you attend any meeting in connection with the Rowlatt legislation?

A. None.

Q. So you cannot tell the Commissioners what was the attitude of the people at those meetings?

A. No. I can't tell the attitude of the people at those meetings.

Q. Have you had any reports that the people were disorderly at any of these meetings and that they were very excited?

A. Well, not particularly at those meetings, but the opinion of the people was very much against the makers of the laws.

Q. Have you heard any report at any of the meetings in connection with the Rowlatt legislation that there was any misrepresentation made by any of the speakers?

A. There was no misrepresentation, but I should be allowed to say that there was no right representation.

Q. There was no misrepresentation?

A. No.

Q. What is the right interpretation that you wanted?

A. I will quote one incident, Sir, from the *Praja Bandhu*, dated the 11th March, in which one of the leaders Chimanlal Jiwanlal Chinoy, a Home Ruler, *Satyagrahi* member, to my knowledge, wrote to the editor asking Mr. Gandhi to explain to the public what the Rowlatt Act really was because he said that the people had very vague ideas about it. He said that the public did not know what the Rowlatt Act was and everybody said that it was bad and that it ought not to exist. A big *marwari* merchant asked me (the writer continues). 'If the Government ask for Rs. 6,000 from me and if I do not give it, will the Government put me in jail?' He further says that 'we are so far not well educated and we must remember that and therefore I earnestly urge that we must explain to the public what is in reality the Rowlatt Act and we must bring forth the thing which is lying behind the curtain and it is hoped that Mr. Gandhi will pay attention to it.'

Q. What is the date of it?

A. It is dated the 11th March.

Q. That is a request to Mr. Gandhi and his followers to explain the Bill to the public?

A. And remove these wrong notions.

Q. There is no misrepresentation of the Act at any meeting, but this gentleman calls upon Mr. Gandhi to explain the provisions of the Act to the public?

A. Exactly.

Q. And at the meetings the Act or the Bill was properly explained?

A. I cannot say that because I did not attend.

Q. On the morning of the 10th about what time did you hear of the arrest of Mr. Gandhi?

A. At about 8 o'clock or perhaps a little earlier.

Q. Did you find that a telegram had been received from Mr. Gandhi at his *Ashram*?

A. I was told so and people ascertained about it.

Q. That telegram mentioned the fact of Mr. Gandhi's arrest?

A. So they said, that Mr. Gandhi had been arrested.

Q. And Mr. Patel issued a circular* wherein he said that Mr. Gandhi had been arrested, you have already referred to that circular. You might look at the vernacular if you like.

The President:—That is the circular Mr. Chatfield referred to yesterday.

Mr. Desai:—He also mentioned that a telegraphic message was received from him on the morning of the 10th?

A. Yes.

Q. And that day was to be observed as a day of rejoicing?

A. Yes, it was to be observed as a holiday.

Q. There was also a message of Mr. Gandhi read out that evening. I mean the translation of a message?

A. I do not know anything about that.

Q. It was published broadcast and also read out at the meeting on the 10th. I have got the vernacular.

A. I remember now that such leaflets were circulated.

Q. "Gandhiji on way to Delhi served with order not enter Punjab Delhi and restrict himself to Bombay disobeyed arrested received order arrest with greatest joy desired all participate his joy please call public meetings immediately and declare his message which shortly reads thus. I have got what I sought my arrest makes me free your duty is to seek like freedom by fulfilling *Satyagraha* pledge which is *kamadhenu* all who love can best serve me by doing what I have done they shall not resent my arrest departure from truth by a hair's breadth or violence committed against anybody whether Englishman or Indian will surely damn the great cause *Satyagrahis* are handling *Satyagrahis* or non-*Satyagrahis* Hindus Muhammadans Sikhs Parsis Christians and Jews can all take the *Swadeshi* vow and the vow of Hindu-Muhammadan unity as proposed by me. Women also doing no less than men. Salvation lies in country's adopting soul force the only and sure weapon to fight wrongs through sufferings alone we shall reach goal not by reforms dropping on us from England however unstinted." At the meeting of the 10th this message was explained?

A. I am not in a position to say that, I did not attend the meeting.

Q. The leaflets were circulated and you came across the leaflets?

A. Yes. After you read the message, I remember that such leaflets were read out.

Q. Circulated broadcast?

A. I should think so.

Q. Several thousands?

A. Must be.

Q. Have you not yet heard that at the great meeting on the evening of the 10th on the sands this message was fully explained by Messrs. Patel, Yajnik and others?

A. I was told that these three persons and Mrs. Gandhi explained the wishes of Mr. Gandhi to refrain from all sorts of violence.

Q. And also asked the people to go to work the next morning?

A. Yes.

Q. Not to observe any *hartal*?

A. They were told so.

Q. Now we come to the 11th morning. When did you start off from your house?

A. It was about a quarter to seven.

Q. You live near the Bhadar?

A. Yes.

Q. Just where you were stationed on the 10th, you saw a big placard there, saying "so long as Mr. Gandhi is in jail we shall not go to work." That placard was taken out in the night of the 10th?

A. Yes.

* Appendix 4 to the statement of the Bombay Government, page 206.

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[Continued.]

Q. On the morning of the 11th as you were going from the station side, did you notice any gentleman asking people to open their shops?

A. Personally I did not see anything, but I saw one gentleman forcing the cyclewala Kama to shut his shop and there was a bit of a quarrel.

Q. What time was it?

A. It was before 8, about a quarter to eight.

Q. After you had seen the District Magistrate?

A. Before that.

Sir C. H. Setalvad:—To open the shop or to shut it?

A. He was using bad language and was asking him to shut the shop. I advised that man that it was better to close his shop.

Mr. Desai:—Who was the man who was forcing the shopkeeper to close his shop?

A. Shall I name him?

Q. Yes, certainly.

A. I think it was Mr. Chimanlal Thakore.

Q. Some relation of Chimanlal Thakore, not the barrister?

A. No.

Q. Not he, he is dead? Some other gentleman having his surname as Thakore was abusing him?

A. Yes.

Q. Was he a young man?

A. He was an elderly person.

Q. Of what age was he?

A. About 30.

Q. And what caste?

A. That I cannot say, he might be a Brahma-Kshatriya.

Q. Have you tried to ascertain the whereabouts of that man?

A. No.

Q. Did you get him up before any officer?

A. No.

Q. Did you bring him up for trial?

A. No. This was of very common occurrence on that day. I even saw a gentleman pay a *gariwalla* Rs. 10 on that morning. He said, where am I to feed my horses? He threw out Rs. 10 in front of me and the *gariwalla* walked away.

Q. Who paid that 10 rupees?

A. The same gentleman.

Q. What gentleman was he?

A. A Hindu gentleman.

Q. Have you ascertained his name?

A. No, as I told you it was a thing of common occurrence.

Q. Perhaps you will be surprised to hear that later on other gentlemen tried to have the shops opened on the morning of the 11th?

A. Well, I should not be surprised.

Q. You say some shops were open on that morning?

A. Very few. They were being opened.

Q. So you saw some people persuading the shopkeepers to close their shops?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, I put it to you that there were others who persuaded the shopkeepers to open their shops?

A. Well, I have not seen this being done personally, but I have heard it said.

Q. On the way to the station you left your house about 6-15 and came to Kama's shop at 7-30, i.e., roughly about an hour, and while on your way did you receive information that a telegram was received in Ahmedabad about the arrest of Miss Anasuya?

A. No. I heard that Miss Anasuya was expected by the mail train.

Q. So you did not hear that a private telegram was received on that day about the arrest of Miss Anasuya?

A. No.

Q. So then this is the first time you hear of it?

A. Yes.

Q. On the morning of the 11th what was the first time that you saw any crowd, and where?

A. It was at Ratanpol at about 9 o'clock.

Q. It was when you and the District Magistrate were following them on cycles that you saw the mob for the first time?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know that the crowd was out before 8 and they were going towards Sarangpur?

A. No, during my investigations I learnt that the crowd started from Sarangpur and went to Jamalpur.

Q. At what time?

A. After the information of Miss Anasuya's arrest.

Q. Let us have the time.

A. That I learnt only in my investigation, I do not know exactly.

Q. Did they start between 7 or 8?

A. It must have been after 8.

Q. And the crowd consisted of mill-hands only; there were no so-called educated people among them?

A. I cannot say as I did not see the crowd.

Q. Then have you ascertained what the crowd consisted of?

A. No.

Q. And that the crowd from Sarangpur went to Jamalpur to Miss Anasuya's house?

A. That I heard. I was not supposed to go into the matter as that was no part of my investigation. It was outside my ward.

Q. Raigarh is in your charge?

A. Yes.

Q. Jamalpur?

A. It is inside.

Q. Let us see what time this crowd entered Jamalpur gate.

A. Well, that must have been about a quarter to nine.

Q. Are you sure?

A. I think so.

Q. And it consisted wholly of mill-hands?

A. So they say. They say that there were some Hindus also, and these belonged to the educated class.

Q. Were there no police there?

A. There was only one constable at the Jamalpur gate on point duty.

Q. And he disappeared at the sight of this crowd?

A. Well, according to his statement, the man said that he stuck to his post till the gate was destroyed.

Q. Then going on in that direction there is a small municipal school on the road?

A. Yes, there is a municipal school.

Q. Well, I put it to you that you did not ascertain whether there were any educated men amongst the crowd and as to who they were?

A. Well, I could not find out.

Q. Where did the crowd come up to?

A. From Jamalpur to Raigarh mill.

Q. And they got it closed?

A. Yes.

Q. And that crowd went by Mr. Gillespie's house?

A. Yes.

Q. And Mr. Gillespie's house was saved?

A. Before they went I have information to the effect that they were addressed by a thick-set young gentleman to commit all sorts of mischief.

Q. Where?

A. They were addressed just near Raigarh only.

Q. By whom?

A. By a Hindu gentleman.

Q. Now, did you try to ascertain who that Hindu gentleman was who told them to commit these excesses?

A. I tried to, but could not succeed.

Q. Then it is only a surmise of yours?

A. It is the mere statement of an accused person.

Q. You could not verify this statement?

A. Unfortunately not, as the attitude of the crowd did not permit of any detailed investigation being carried to a satisfactory conclusion.

Q. What is the name of the accused who is said to have been convicted?

Witness, addressing the President:—Am I supposed to give his name, your Lordship? The statement was one made before a police officer.

Q. Did you see any crowd near the Oriental Life office?

A. No, I personally did not see it.

Q. Very well. Did you go by the *pandal* when it was burning?

A. No, not then. I did not leave the Khas Bazar post.

Q. So then you do not know what part the so-called educated people of Ahmedabad, who were the brunt of it all, played in the rescuing of property even?

A. I do not know whether they were the brunt or not. All I know is that from what I personally saw of them they did render assistance on the 10th and were doing their best on the morning of the 11th within my own view.

Q. Did you see any crowd near the Oriental Life office?

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Q. So then you do not know what part the so-called educated people of Ahmedabad, who were the brunt of it all, played in the rescuing of property even?

A. I do not know whether they were the brunt or not. All I know is that from what I personally saw of them they did render assistance on the 10th and were doing their best on the morning of the 11th within my own view.

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Mr. D. D. KOTHAWALA—concluded—Lieutenant H. S. LARKIN.

President to Mr. Desai:—I do not quite see how this is in any way useful or relevant to the case.

Mr. Desai:—I just want to show your Lordship that the educated people had nothing whatever to do with this affair.

President to witness:—Well then I do not think there is any harm in giving the name as the man has been convicted.

Witness:—The accused was Dhana Mathu, a mill-hand.

Q. Then he told you that a thick-set Hindu gentleman advised him and you could not pursue that investigation any further?

A. Yes, unsupported by any other defence.

Q. Now we come to Mr. Gillespie's house. You know that the mob had gone to the house?

A. I do not know.

Q. In your investigation did you not come to hear of it?

A. No.

Q. Would you be surprised to hear that Mr. Gillespie's house was saved by some pleaders?

A. I certainly do admit that many pleaders rendered very valuable assistance.

Q. Remember it was a European and a Britisher's house. Now you said it was anti-British and anti-European. Was not Mr. Gillespie's house saved at the intervention of the pleaders of Ahmedabad?

A. I do not know.

Q. Then who saved it?

A. I do not know.

Q. Do you know that there were certain other Europeans threatened on that morning, and some missionaries, if I mistake not, were among them, Dr. Taylor and some from the Salvation Army? And they were also saved by some pleaders, and pleaders are educated people?

A. Yes.]

Lieutenant H. S. LARKIN, 1-87th Infantry.

By the President—

Q. On the 11th April about 11-30 were you stationed at some cross roads on the Richey Road?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. That was near the *Tin Darwaza*. What instructions had you?

A. I was ordered to block the road.

Q. How many men had you under your charge?

A. I had 50 men in all, and I divided them into 3 parties.

Q. Was any attack made on any of those parties?

A. Yes, about 50 men armed with *lathis* and swords attacked one of those parties.

Q. When the attack was made, what did you do?

A. I ordered three men to fire.

Q. And did they fire?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the result?

A. There was no result the first time.

Q. What effect had this firing upon the mob?

A. The mob ran past us and disappeared into a side-street, and they again appeared and attacked us.

Q. What occurred then?

A. Again I ordered every man in my squad to fire this time.

Q. Did they fire?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the effect then?

A. I mentioned in my evidence that one man was killed. The man I refer to was the man lying on the ground. He was not killed outright, but died in hospital afterwards.

Q. Did you yourself receive a wound?

A. Yes, from a sword in the arm.

Q. Was that by one of the men of the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you deal with that man?

Q. Did you see any crowd near the Oriental Life office?

A. No, I personally did not see it.

Q. Very well. Did you go by the *pandal* when it was burning?

A. No, not then. I did not leave the Khas Bazar post.

Q. So then you do not know what part the so-called educated people of Ahmedabad, who were the brunt of it all, played in the rescuing of property even?

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6 January 1920.] Lieutenant H. S. LARKIN—concluded—Mr. G. F. WESTON—Mr. R. R. BOYD.

A. I cannot say that, but I had a lance-corporal in my squad and he said that that man hit me. I do not know myself who hit me.

Q. And whether the man hit by your revolver was the man or not?

A. No, I cannot say that also.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—

Q. How far was the man from you when you fired into the crowd?

A. Well, it was a matter of 10 or 11 yards I think.

Mr. G. F. WESTON, Engineer, Drainage Pumping Station, Ahmedabad.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Weston, did you on the 11th April, hold the post of Chief Fire Superintendent, Ahmedabad Municipality?

A. Yes.

Q. At about 9-15, on that day did you get a call to a fire?

A. We discerned the fire, but there was no telephonic call.

Q. And did you proceed with the engines to the Lal Darwaza?

A. Yes.

Q. You then discovered that the examination mandap was on fire?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there a number of people about?

A. I should say about 2,000.

Q. Had you come for the express purpose of extinguishing the fire?

A. Yes.

Q. What attitude did the mob take towards you?

A. Before my arrival the hose of the engine was burnt and the men were threatened on my arrival. I passed through the crowd pulling the engine up. They allowed me to go to the mandap and then they started stoning me.

Q. Did you escape stoning?

A. I walked back to the engine amidst stones and escaped on the steam motor fire engine.

Q. And reached your quarters?

A. Yes.

Q. Where were you living?

A. Oliphant Road.

Q. Is that some distance away?

A. Yes, near the municipal office.

Q. What distance would that be? These places are not familiar to me.

A. It is nearly a mile away.

Q. Did you stay in your quarters till the next morning?

A. Yes.

Q. The next day you were asked to do some work in connection with driving a motor car for the military?

A. On the 12th, I was sent by the Municipal Commissioner to the Collector with a letter under an armed escort, and I came to the railway station from the Camp after delivering the letter; and on the following day, Sunday evening, I went back to the Camp and drove a motor for the military.

Q. You have no other information as regards the riots in Ahmedabad?

A. Nothing further.

Mr. R. R. BOYD, I. P., late District Superintendent of Police, Ahmedabad.

By the President—

Q. Were you, Mr. Boyd, formerly District Superintendent of Police, Ahmedabad?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Early in 1919, did the agitation against the Rowlatt Bills become intensive?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In particular were a number of meetings held by political leaders in Ahmedabad?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did the people adopt a hostile attitude towards the Government in consequence of the proposed passing of the Rowlatt legislation?

A. The attitude of the people became more hostile than it had been before.

Q. After one of the Rowlatt Bills was passed, I think Mr. Gandhi started his passive resistance movement?

A. Yes.

Q. *Hartal* was held on the 6th April in Ahmedabad?

A. Yes.

Q. We have heard that there was a large procession in the afternoon of that day?

A. Yes.

Q. It was not necessary, I think, for the police to take any action in consequence of the actions of the mob or of the people on that day?

A. Not on that day.

Q. Early on the 10th April, news reached Ahmedabad that Mr. Gandhi had been stopped on his way to Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. The news of that incident spread rapidly?

A. Yes.

Q. What effect had the spreading of that rumour upon the people?

A. It caused considerable commotion among the general public and the stoppage of work.

Q. I think the circumstance of Mr. Gandhi's stoppage was widely circulated among the people by handbill?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And in that handbill, was cessation from work advocated?

A. That was the way in which the wording of the handbill would be naturally interpreted.

Q. What were the terms? Did it exhort the people to rejoice with Mr. Gandhi in consequence of his arrest and to continue their work adhering to the *Satyagraha* movement?

A. Yes.

Q. In fact shops were closed on that day?

A. Yes.

Q. Was vehicular traffic stopped?

A. Yes, from mid-day onwards.

Q. And I think people were forced to get out of carriages and walk on foot?

A. Yes.

Q. Did large crowds collect?

A. It was reported to me that large crowds had collected. I was not personally in the city till the afternoon.

Q. Was it also reported to you that the millhands in general were not returning to work after the midday-recess?

A. Yes.

Q. When you heard of the turn which events were taking, what did you do?

A. I sent special parties of armed police to Kalupur, to Richey Road and to the Khas Bazar *chowky*.

Q. Did you think it advisable to have a force at these points to keep the mobs under control?

A. Yes.

Q. Was not the first violence committed by the crowd at the Victor Cinema in Richey Road?

A. That was reported to me at night, Sir.

Q. I see that you also had a report as to the damage that was done there?

A. Yes.

Q. Didn't you see it yourself?

A. No.

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Mr. R. R. BOYD.

[Continued.]

Q. In the afternoon, as we have heard, two Europeans were forced to take refuge in a mill?

A. Yes.

Q. In your statement here, you say that you had no personal knowledge of it?

A. Not till a later stage.

Q. At what time did you arrive upon the scene yourself?

A. At about 5-30 in the evening.

Q. At that time where did you go?

A. To the Prem gate.

Q. Were you accompanied by Mr. Chatfield?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you arrived there, what did you find was the state of affairs?

A. We found that a large crowd had collected facing the party and round the police which I had sent round on receipt of information that the crowd had tried to set fire to the mill. The crowd would not withdraw and demanded as a precondition of doing so that certain persons who had been arrested and were under the guard of the armed police party should be released and that the armed police should be withdrawn.

Q. Was that a feasible proposal?

A. Not at all. As a matter of fact prisoners were released, but the police were not withdrawn. The prisoners were released after their names were taken and an undertaking being given by the *Satyagrahi* leader of the crowd that he would be responsible for their production if they were wanted afterwards.

Q. I think before you arrived at this place at half past five, you had despatched from headquarters all the available armed police you had?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And that you also communicated with the military as to getting a force of soldiers to assist in maintaining order?

A. That was done by the District Magistrate on our way down to the scene of the disturbances.

Q. You waited, I think, at this place till the arrival of military assistance?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. During the period of your waiting for the military what attitude did the mob take towards you?

A. They were noisy and hostile, but only on one occasion were any stones thrown at us.

Q. At whom were the stones thrown?

A. The District Magistrate and I had gone about a hundred yards from the Prem gate to see the mill which the crowd had tried to set fire to and as we turned to come back, to where the armed police party were collected, some stones were thrown from behind.

Q. Was your police force sufficient to keep the mob in check?

A. No, Sir. It was not sufficient at that time. If the mob had become actively hostile, the force would not have been sufficient.

Q. From the temper of the mob was it apparent that they might become actively hostile at any moment?

A. Yes.

Q. The military arrived, I think, at about a quarter to seven?

A. Yes.

Q. When they arrived, did they clear the road to some extent of the crowd?

A. They completely cleared that road by lining across it and sweeping as they marched forward.

Q. Were military pickets posted at the Prem gate outside the Kalupur gate and at the station?

A. Yes. I am not certain about the station picket, but I knew of the other two.

Q. I think as far as your knowledge goes, there were no further disturbances that night?

A. None except that some stones were thrown at the military picket outside the Prem gate.

Q. When did you leave the scene and go home?

A. About 9 P.M.

Q. As you were going home, you were met by the City Police Inspector and sub-inspector Kothawala?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did they inform you of what had occurred at Richey Road that afternoon?

A. Yes, Sir, during the afternoon.

Q. You had armed police with you, I think, on this occasion?

A. Yes, at the Prem gate.

Q. Did any firing take place?

A. Not while I was present. There had been firing before I arrived.

Q. At the Prem gate?

A. At the flour mill which is within a hundred yards of it.

Q. Then about 11, I think you reported what you had learnt to the District Magistrate?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you agree to adhere to your previous arrangements as regards precautionary measures?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you also arrange to go round the city together on the following morning?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you in fact do so?

A. Yes, Sir, we started about 8 in the morning.

Q. Did you go by way of the scene of the previous evening's riots?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What did you discover in the course of the route?

A. At the place outside the Prem gate, where the first military picket was posted, there was a considerable crowd collected, which although it offered no violence to the military picket refused to withdraw.

Q. As you proceeded, were you met with any demonstrations?

A. We were hooted at first and later on about half way down the main thoroughfare of the city near the *Jama Masjid*, we stopped to talk to the City Police Inspector whom we met. Immediately our cars stopped, we were surrounded by a mob of excited crowd, one of whom jumped on the step of the car and began to gesticulate. Mr. Chatfield pushed him down, and we decided as the crowd was collecting round us to push on. As we drove away, we received a shower of stones from behind.

Q. Did these stones strike you?

A. Several of them struck us.

Q. What did you do in consequence?

A. We stopped, as we intended, at the Khas Bazar *chowky* about 200 or 300 yards further on to talk to the police officers there about the general situation.

Q. Did you resolve to ask for further military assistance?

A. By that time we had both agreed that military assistance was necessary.

Q. Had the mob assumed a threatening attitude?

A. Except for the incident of stones being thrown at us where we stopped at that moment, there was nothing very threatening in the attitude of the crowd, but later on when we left the Khas Bazar *chowky* on our way to camp, we just passed clear of a distinctly dangerous looking crowd coming up a side street.

Q. What was that crowd doing?

A. They all were armed with long sticks of bamboo, and they were shouting in a threatening way. We passed about 20 yards clear of them.

Q. What time did you arrive back in Camp?

A. About 9-20. I should think when we first reached Camp.

Q. Did you make arrangements with the Officer Commanding for a body of troops to be sent to the city?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were they to go by the Delhi gate?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You met them at the gate?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you accompany the troops in the city?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. About this time did you learn by telephone that the mob had broken out into violence and incendiarism?

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Mr. R. R. Boyd.

[Continued.]

A. After having been to Camp on the first occasion, the District Magistrate and I returned to our bungalows so as to be in telephonic communication with the city and then we learnt what was happening there. We understood that the examination *mandap* had first been set on fire and that Government offices were also threatened.

Q. When you went back to the Bhadar with the military force, did you arrive there about half past eleven?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What did you find had occurred at that time?

A. The main buildings in the Bhadar were all blazing as far as the telegraph office.

Q. Did you find that the fire engines which tried to extinguish the fire had been disabled?

A. I did not notice any fire engine actually, but there was fire engine hose cut lying across the road near the *kacheri*.

Q. I think you went to ascertain at the time the full extent of damage?

A. No, Sir. We did not enter the Bhadar. We went on to place military pickets and it was not until afterwards that we came back into the Bhadar where most of the burning had occurred.

Q. On your arrival near the Bhadar, what did the mob do?

A. A considerable number of people were issuing from the Bhadar by the various ways out, some by the Lal *Darwaza* and others by the main archway under the clock tower, several of them carrying burning torches in their hands. The main crowd and these people disappeared in front of the troops in the side streets.

Q. Did they disappear only to assemble again?

A. They did not assemble again in the exact locality.

Q. Then you made the necessary dispositions, I suppose, for safe-guarding the remaining buildings?

A. Yes, Sir, that was done by the military.

Q. Were the military engaged throughout the day in clearing the main thoroughfares?

A. I believe so.

Q. I think they were also endeavouring [to prevent further acts of incendiarism?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it possible totally to prevent these acts?

A. No, Sir, quite impossible. The military could not enter the narrow streets where many of the Government buildings afterwards burnt were situated and were unable to prevent them being destroyed.

Q. Did the mob split up into small parties?

A. That is the assumption; it must have happened.

Q. Is it the case that there was a good deal of incendiarism throughout the city generally?

A. Yes, Sir. Throughout that afternoon and evening, in all 38 police *chowkies* were destroyed in different parts of the city and the eastern suburbs.

Q. Were the destroyed *chowkies* isolated buildings?

A. Some were isolated, some were adjoining private houses. Those which were isolated were burnt and those adjoining other private buildings were wrecked and demolished and the remnants burnt in the road in front.

Q. Can you give any explanation of that discrimination between detached buildings and those that were connected with private houses?

A. I think the mob took every precaution to avoid firing the whole city; they only fired detached buildings.

Q. Were the detached buildings Government property or municipal property?

A. The police *chowkies* are, I believe, Government property.

Q. You were not yourself present during the military operations in the city during the afternoon of that day?

A. No.

Q. Had you left with the District Magistrate at about 1 o'clock?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you receive some rumour that a crowd was intending to go to Shahi Bagh?

A. Yes, Sir. While we were at the Pankor Naka, we received a rumour that a part of the crowd had broken

off and were making for the head-quarter police lines and the Government offices and European bungalows in Shahi Bagh and Cantonment.

Q. At the police head-quarter lines was there a store of arms and ammunition?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you afraid [of that falling into the hands of the mob?

A. Yes, Sir. The headquarters had been stripped almost of all its armed men by the parties which were sent into the city.

Q. I think that rumour turned out afterwards to be unfounded and no attack was made?

A. No, Sir.

Q. You considered it proper to make preparations and dispositions to meet a possible contingency?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When did you return to the city?

A. Between 5 and 6 in the evening.

Q. And you enquired as to what had occurred?

A. Yes.

Q. I think you learnt then about Sergeant Fraser's murder?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you find that the mob at Richey Road had closed in again after the military had left?

A. Yes, I was informed that the road had once been cleared up as far as the Panch Kuwa gate but when I arrived in the city in the evening, a crowd was again thickly collected on the Richey Road from the Fernandez bridge towards the Panch Kuwa gate.

Q. What was the crowd doing?

A. It was hurling stones and flourishing sticks and shouting and abusing the military pickets who were holding them back.

Q. Did you yourself see the military pickets being stoned in this way?

A. Yes, Sir. In fact I and Lieutenant Fitzpatrick advanced with a few men beyond the military picket up the street and we were stoned.

Q. But this occurred at more than one point in the city?

A. That was the point at which I was personally a witness; but I saw enough; and the same thing was happening wherever the military pickets were stationed.

Q. The military had complete patrol over the city?

A. Mainly in the western portion of the city.

Q. So far as the rest of the city was concerned in what state was it?

A. We had no definite information of what was happening.

Q. In the morning of the 12th, did you visit the station side of the city?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What was occurring on the 12th when you made your visit?

A. I did not personally witness any violent rioting. The hostile crowds were collected and the military had control only of the comparatively small portion of the city.

Q. In the parts where there was control, was the crowd quiet or violent?

A. It was noisy and distinctly hostile. The indiscriminate stone-throwing had ceased by that time, I think.

Q. You refer to some rumour as to an attack on the south side of the city by a mob? How did it arise?

A. I do not know the origin of the rumours; but it reached us during the 12th. The mob from the city were supposed to have broken off and gone towards a meeting and people coming from the Kaira district joined them and they made a combined attack on the city from the south side.

Q. That of course did not materialise?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Did you on this day attempt to restore the ordinary police arrangements?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What had happened to the unarmed police?

A. They had been completely swept off the streets. They were seized by crowds, their uniforms were torn off

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Mr. R. R. Boyd.

[Continued.]

their backs and burnt before them and they were told to go about their business.

Q. At this time, I think, you could not learn definitely as regards what was happening in parts of the city as you already explained?

A. No, Sir. Not on the 12th.

Q. Was it an anxious time for the authorities?

A. It was still very anxious.

Q. In the afternoon of that day, did the British troops arrive by train?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On the 13th, did the situation improve?

A. The situation was well in hand on the 13th.

Q. What was the spirit of the city?

A. The spirit, I should think, was just as hostile as it had been before but owing to the measures taken in the previous days their activities were considerably curbed.

Q. I think that afternoon Mr. Gandhi arrived?

A. In the morning on the 13th.

Q. Did you have any interview with the Commissioner?

A. With the Commissioner, the Inspector General of Police and the District Magistrate.

Q. Were you deputed to accompany Mr. Gandhi and Miss Anasuya to Mr. Gandhi's *Ashram*?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you do so?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On your way you stopped at certain houses?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Whose houses?

A. Mr. Ambalal's bungalow, Mr. Vallabhai Patel's house.

Q. From the latter house, did Mr. Patel and Mr. Yajnik accompany you to the *Ashram*?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were arrangements made to summon a meeting of mill-hands to be addressed by Mr. Gandhi in the afternoon. That was to take place near the *Ashram*.

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. The original proposal was that it should be held on the 13th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Mr. Gandhi considered that the time was insufficient to get notice of the meeting printed and distributed; so he suggested that it should be postponed to the following day?

A. Yes.

Q. I think you yourself made arrangements as regards the printing of notices?

A. I accompanied Mr. Yajnik to various places in the city with the draft notice.

Q. I think you returned to the Shahi Bagh and reported what had been done?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 14th, in the morning, did you receive a report of any disturbance?

A. We received information that the Sarkhej police post about 6 miles to the south-west of the city had been rushed and burnt by a mob at about 1 A.M.

Q. So far as you know, it was the last act of incendiarism that was reported?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think a party of troops was sent to Ahmedabad to deal with it?

A. Yes, Sir. They never found the mob that had done it.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Did you yourself see any instance of the order enforced either as regards the 10 people collected together or single people, who did not stop and come up when challenged?

A. I was not present at any firing.

Q. At the end of the disturbances, do I understand that it was not until Mr. Guider came that the investigation really commenced and arrests began to be made? Is it so?

A. That is so.

Q. When was that investigation begun?

A. About the end of April. I think Mr. Guider began his investigations from about the 18th of April.

Q. Can you tell me whether people who were arrested were detained for some time before being sent up for trial?

A. I do not know anything about it. The investigations were entirely in the hands of Mr. Guider.

Q. You had nothing to do with any questions of applications for bail?

A. No, Sir.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Did you see the procession that went through the city on the 6th?

A. I was not present then.

Q. You were in Ahmedabad.

A. Yes, but I did not go down to the city.

Q. You were not in the city that day?

A. I was in the city in the afternoon at the time of the procession?

Q. Where were you then?

A. At Shahi Bagh.

Q. You know of the procession?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it a very big procession?

A. Yes.

Q. I expected that you would have gone to see what had happened?

A. I did not consider it necessary to be present in person.

Q. You mean the information that you had at your disposal did not make it necessary in your opinion for you to be present here?

A. It made it necessary for me to be in Ahmedabad. I returned especially from Bombay where I had been on a few days' leave. I returned on the 6th. I did not consider it necessary to be present at the procession.

Q. That procession passed off very peacefully?

A. Yes.

Q. Nothing untoward happened in connection with that?

A. No.

Q. Then there was a meeting at the evening. Was that a big meeting?

A. The procession ended in the river-bed and broke into several separate meetings.

Q. Several meetings?

A. Yes.

Q. These meetings were also orderly?

A. I believe so.

Q. Coming to the 10th of April, you had no indication of the trouble that actually came on the 10th?

A. None.

Q. You were quite surprised at the actual events that took place on the 10th and 11th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What happened really on the 10th might be due to the news of the arrest of Mr. Gandhi? The sudden outburst on the 10th was mainly due to the arrest of Mr. Gandhi?

A. I think it would be due to that.

Q. And the events of the 11th were due largely to the further report that came that day about the arrest of Anasuya?

A. I only heard of that after the events had taken a serious turn.

Q. But the news had come early in the morning?

A. She was expected to arrive by the Gujarat mail which was due at 8-20 in the morning. It was after the train had arrived and it was found that she did not come that the rumour began to spread that she was arrested.

Q. And these events of the 11th happened after that?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 10th you were with Mr. Chatfield?

A. Yes.

Q. All the time you and he went together in the midst of the crowd?

A. For about an hour and a quarter before the military arrived.

Q. For an hour?

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Mr. R. R. BOYD—concluded—Mr. R. R. SHIRGAONKAR.

A. Yes.
 Q. And the mob did not molest you in any manner at all?
 A. Only on one occasion some stones were thrown from behind us.
 Q. Except that nothing happened? You were in the midst of the crowd and if they wanted to attack you they would have done it?
 A. We had in front of us an armed police party.
 Q. What was the strength of that?
 A. In all 21 or 22 men.
 Q. What was the number of people in the crowd?
 A. It was impossible to estimate. It runs into several thousands.
 Q. And if they were minded to attack you they could have easily rushed you?
 A. Yes, they could.
 By Mr. Jivanlal Desai, Counsel to the Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad—
 Q. On the 10th you received some information from sub-inspector Kothawala?
 A. I received a telephone message at about 3 o'clock; I did not know from whom.
 Q. The sub-inspector asked for help?
 A. Yes.
 Q. You sent an armed party?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What was the strength of that?
 A. I believe the advance party consisted of 8 men.
 Q. Before you got to Prem gate that party had fired?
 A. Either that party or another party which had been previously posted at Khadia Chowk.
 Q. What was the strength of the armed party that reached the Prem gate?
 A. Originally I believe I sent four first and they were followed afterwards by a further 18. About 30 altogether.
 Q. How many rounds roughly were fired by that party?
 A. I do not know.
 Q. You have not inquired?
 A. No. I cannot remember the figure.
 Q. Can you tell His Lordship the casualties on that occasion, before you got to Prem gate?
 A. I was informed on arrival that five or six people had been hit and that one of them subsequently died.
 Q. And they were taken to the civil hospital?
 A. I do not know where they were taken to.
 Q. Any members of the mob taken to the civil hospital that afternoon?
 A. I do not know.
 Q. You have not inquired?
 A. I did not inquire where they were taken to.
 Q. Now, did any members of the mob die on that occasion as a result of that firing?
 A. I was told that one of the Indian people had subsequently died.
 Q. At the spot?
 A. I believe after being taken away.
 Q. Where did he die?
 A. I do not know.
 Q. Up to now you are not in a position to give the number of casualties?
 A. No.
 Q. Your subordinates have made no report about them?
 A. I do not think that the subordinates were in a position to know how many were wounded or died.
 Q. Did you see Mr. Sagar and Mr. Steeples that afternoon?

Mr. R. R. SHIRGAONKAR, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Ahmedabad.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Shirgaonkar, you were the Deputy Superintendent of Police at Ahmedabad?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. On the 10th of April last, on the forenoon you learnt about the arrest of Mr. Gandhi?
 A. Yes, Sir.

A. They had left before we arrived.
 Q. On the next day or the day after?
 A. No; I do not remember seeing them.
 Q. Did you make any enquiries about the cause of the firing of the police? Why did they fire?
 A. I was informed that they fired because the crowd was setting fire to the mill in which they had taken refuge.
 Q. Where were the persons that were arrested?
 A. People had been arrested in the crowd which murdered the constable, after Steeples and Sagar and the police party had left the flour mill. The constable was thrown down by one of the crowd; he was first of all stoned till he was insensible, and as he lay on the ground the crowd broke his head; and it was from that crowd that they were arrested.
 Q. Were they kept in Chowk?
 A. In the police court.
 Q. Did you inquire into the reasons of the firing of the flour mill?
 A. Of the mill being set on fire?
 Q. Yes.
 A. I did not inquire; I took it for granted.
 Q. Did you inquire whether any of the mob had been taken into the flour mill by the police?
 A. No.
 Q. Were you told by anybody that an attempt was made to get them released from the flour mill?
 A. Members of the crowd?
 Q. Yes.
 A. No; I received no such report.
 Q. You do not know how many rounds were fired?
 A. No.
 Q. Now, do you know Mr. Blackburn, weaving master of one of the mills in that locality?
 A. I do not think I know him.
 Q. Do you know (I may be correct or incorrect) that either Blackburn, Sagar or Steeples fired a revolver at the crowd?
 A. I heard nothing of the kind.
 Q. Did you make any report to Government about the incidents of the 10th?
 A. Not until sometime afterwards.
 Q. When was that?
 A. I made a report to the Inspector-General, and I mentioned this in the general report regarding the riots which I submitted in June.
 Q. You have not made any report in April?
 A. No.
 Q. Nor any verbal communication to your superiors?
 A. Yes; all the facts were communicated. The first report was made to the District Magistrate.
 Q. Why did you not make any enquiries at the time about the firing? You were not too much excited at that time?
 A. I do not think I was excited. It is not one which could be made immediately; it would be made afterwards.
 Q. You are not in a position to give the number of the persons wounded or killed at the Prem gate?
 A. It was reported to me when we arrived that it was about 5 or 6.
 Q. You have made no further investigation?
 A. No.
 Q. You have not got any official communication from your subordinates about the casualties on that occasion?
 A. No.

Q. About 4 in the afternoon was a telephone communication sent to you that a crowd was assaulting two Europeans near the railway overbridge?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. And you were asked by the District Magistrate to make arrangements for sending up a police force?
 A. Yes, Sir.

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Mr. R. R. SHIRGAONKAR.

[Continued.]

Q. You did so, I think?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Did you yourself accompany the police force?
 A. I sent the police force from the headquarters.
 Q. Later in the day, did you get information about the constable Imam Khan having been seriously attacked?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. I think you sent unarmed men in mufti to remove him to the hospital?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you wait at the headquarters till about 8 and then return to the city?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. I think you went to the river-bed on hearing of a meeting there?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. It was collected by the time you got there?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Did the situation appear to be quiet?
 A. It was reported to be quiet.
 Q. Did you expect that business would be resumed the next day?
 A. Yes.
 Q. I think Mr. Patel who was a speaker himself said that business should begin next day?
 A. It was reported like that.
 Q. I think business was resumed early in the morning?
 A. It was resumed partially. Some shops were opened on the Richey Road.
 Q. You heard about the rumour as regards Miss Anasuya's arrest?
 A. Yes.
 Q. I think you went to the Khas Bazar about 7-15?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Had you a force with you?
 A. I went with my orderly.
 Q. There was a police force at that post?
 A. Yes; armed police.
 Q. What were they doing?
 A. They were doing nothing at that time.
 Q. I think at that time as you went along you noticed some shops open?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. On Richey Road did you see any forcing of the people to close the shop?
 A. One shop particularly.
 Q. Who was trying to force the people to close the shops?
 A. I saw one or two gentlemen. I found that a man wanted to close his shop. When I asked the man he said that the shop-keeper was abusing him. That was what he told me; but the other people said that he was wanted to close the shop.
 Q. Were people collected in groups about this time?
 A. In small groups, not in large groups.
 Q. And some of the Satyagraha leaders endeavoured to get the people to resume their business?
 A. I saw that at one place.
 Q. Was it a successful endeavour?
 A. I do not know, because immediately after I saw an altercation in one of the shops.
 Q. After that where did you proceed?
 A. After that I went to Prem gate after learning that the District Superintendent of Police had gone there.
 Q. You gave information I think to Mr. Boyd as to what you had seen?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Did he instruct you to send word to the sub-inspector to keep all available men ready at the headquarters?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. You were also asked to proceed to the civil hospital?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Did you do so?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. What did you do at the civil hospital?

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A. I saw the Civil Surgeon and the Assistant Surgeon and asked them to allow the body of the deceased constable to be removed after noting down his injuries.
 Q. After visiting the hospital where did you go?
 A. Then I went to Khas Bazar Chowky.
 Q. On your way did you notice anything about the crowds?
 A. Yes, crowds were collected on the main roads.
 Q. What attitude did the crowds adopt towards you?
 A. While I was passing I noticed nothing.
 Q. Did you hear at one point that the District Magistrate and the District Superintendent of Police, Mr. Chatfield and Mr. Boyd, had been assaulted?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. I think you made enquiries?
 A. I stopped there to make enquiries.
 Q. And as you were making enquiries you found these gentlemen had been able to proceed on in their car?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Was any assault attempted on you?
 A. I was pelted with stones.
 Q. Did any one call out anything when you were pelted with stones?
 A. Some words we heard, "they are Indians let them go."
 Q. I think you were accompanied by sub-inspector Kothawala?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Did you receive word from Khas Bazar from one of the sub-inspectors that a mob of rioters was moving along the road smashing municipal lamps?
 A. Yes, Sir, while I was in the civil hospital I heard so.
 Q. And you communicated with Mr. Chatfield?
 A. No, I told him to communicate because that was on another line of telephone.
 Q. How long were you at the civil hospital?
 A. About half an hour.
 Q. From what time?
 A. Between 9 and half past 9.
 Q. You went there, I think, for an escort?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. What escort?
 A. I wanted some of the armed police to accompany me to Khas Bazar as I was told that crowds had gathered on the road there.
 Q. I think the escort did come and you left at about 9-30 to go there?
 A. It was about 9-30 when I reached there.
 Q. Did you find a police force there anxiously awaiting your arrival?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Why was that?
 A. Because they were being attacked by the mob with stones and brickbats.
 Q. Before your arrival I think another small force had arrived?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And I think you learnt from that force that a head constable had been attacked by a mob near Delhi gate?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Was he in charge of ammunition?
 A. Yes, Sir, he was bringing ammunition from headquarters.
 Q. I think you saw yourself the burnt curtains of his conveyance in which ammunition was being taken?
 A. Yes.
 Q. That party opened fire on the mob?
 A. I was told so by the head constable.
 Q. When you reached the Khas Bazar Chowky was there a big crowd collected near the Tin Darwaza? What were they doing?
 A. They were jeering at the police and throwing stones from there.
 Q. Was there some reserve ammunition stored near there?
 A. The escort that had come from headquarters had brought ammunition in the cart.
 Q. And the situation appeared to you serious?

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Mr. R. R. SHIRGAONKAR.

[Continued.]

A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. And did you keep a guard of a head constable and three constables to protect the ammunition?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. What did you do with the rest of the men?
 A. I formed them into two lines, one facing towards the Bhadar and another facing towards the *Tin Darwaza* and then I marched with one line.
 Q. Did you request the crowd to fall back?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Was the crowd thick at this part? Were many people in the crowd?
 A. Between 500 and 1,000.
 Q. Did they comply with your request?
 A. No.
 Q. What did they do?
 A. They continued showering stones.
 Q. Did you give orders to your men as to fixing bayonets?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. And did they fix bayonets?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. What did they do there?
 A. They fixed bayonets and we marched towards the crowd.
 Q. What did the crowd do?
 A. They fell back.
 Q. And you got as far as *Tin Darwaza*?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Did the crowd at that point increase in size?
 A. At that point towards the Pankor Naka side.
 Q. What did they do?
 A. They began to throw stones again from there.
 Q. Did you again ask the crowd to disperse?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Did you give them any warning?
 A. Yes, I told them I would begin firing on them if they did not disperse.
 Q. What attitude did they take up on that warning?
 A. They began to jeer at us and continued throwing stones.
 Q. What did you do then?
 A. I ordered a volley to be fired.
 Q. How were your men armed?
 A. They were given buckshot and ball ammunition had just then come.
 Q. The ball ammunition had just come? When they fired, did they fire with buckshot?
 A. First they fired with buckshot.
 Q. How many rounds did they fire with buckshot?
 A. One round each.
 Q. What was the effect of that?
 A. No effect on the crowd.
 Q. Why?
 A. I believe because the shots did not reach them.
 Q. And when the shots were fired and did not reach the crowd, what did the crowd do?
 A. They threw stones at us.
 Q. Did the shower of stones continue to be thrown at you?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Did you give any orders then?
 A. I gave orders to use ball ammunition.
 Q. Was ball ammunition then used?
 A. Yes, it was used then.
 Q. How many rounds were fired with ball?
 A. One round.
 Q. What was the effect of that?
 A. Then the crowd fell back towards Pankor Naka.
 Q. Did you post two men under each of the three arches?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. And also two men at the entrance of the side lanes near *Tin Darwaza*?
 A. One man at each lane.
 Q. During these operations I think some of the cartridges jammed?
 A. Yes, I noticed that cartridges jammed in the muskets.
 Q. You refer to the firing of one round twice, you mean that each man fired one?
 A. Yes.
 Q. How many men had you?
 A. Six men.
 Q. That would be what we have been really describing as six rounds?
 A. Six rounds.
 Q. There was just the one volley fired?
 A. One volley.
 Q. You said two cartridges jammed in the muskets and that resulted in two men not being able to fire?
 A. Two men could not fire the second round.
 Q. Was that a serious handicap to you?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. After protecting the *Tin Darwaza*, did you return to the Khas Bazar *Chowky* and were you then joined by the City Police Inspector?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Shortly after you went to this *Chowky* did another big mob come howling from the Bhadar side?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. That was the side where the Government buildings had been set on fire?
 A. As it came from that side, I guessed that it came after destroying the Government buildings because the Government buildings were at that time already set on fire.
 Q. And did you go forward to face this mob?
 A. Yes, Sir, with the other line that was waiting there.
 Q. How many men had you there?
 A. Four were there previously and again some came afterwards.
 Q. Were you obliged to fire again?
 A. One volley was fired.
 Q. Before you fired were you stoned?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. And did you warn the crowd that they should disperse, before you fired?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Had your warning any effect?
 A. No.
 Q. On this occasion when you fired, did you fire with ball?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. On the firing taking place did the crowd disperse?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And did it run in various directions?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. What casualties were caused by the firing in this case?
 A. About six casualties in both firings.
 Q. What were the casualties caused in the previous firing?
 A. About three at that time and two or three this time.
 Q. Six altogether?
 A. Six altogether.
 Q. Then did you post men under cover of trees and corners at the entrance to the lanes behind Khas Bazar *Chowky*?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. And did you remain anxiously waiting for the arrival of the military?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Had you a sufficient force to deal with the crowd?
 A. No, not a sufficient force.
 Q. Was it essential for the maintenance of order that you should be supported by military?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. I think while you were stationed there the head constable in charge of the Bank guard sent for assistance and you were unable to send him assistance, but telephoned to headquarters for more men?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. And did a party of two head constables and 10 men arrive immediately after the arrival of the military?
 A. Yes, Sir.

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[Continued.]

Q. And were these men utilised in carrying ball ammunition to the various guards and escorting prisoners from the lock-up which had been partially burnt and in other incidental duties?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. I think Mr. Chatfield and Mr. Boyd arrived at Khas Bazar with the military and the military parties were posted as has been told?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Were there many boys among the crowd?
 A. Yes, I noticed boys.
 Q. Many boys?
 A. Yes, Sir, there were a good many boys; I cannot say how many. In front there were boys and behind them were elderly persons.
 Q. You got word about Sergeant Fraser being murdered?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Did you proceed to the place?
 A. I did not proceed there.
 Q. Was the attitude of the crowd anti-Government?
 A. It was anti-Government.
 Q. Distinctly so?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Was it also anti-European or anti-British?
 A. I cannot say.
 Q. Among the crowd and those responsible for the acts of incendiarism were there any people you would describe as belonging to the educated class of Ahmedabad?
 A. Among the crowds I could not distinguish any.
 Q. So far as you could judge?
 A. They were all mill-hands; they were badly clad.
 Q. On the 12th, did you get a report as to looting and destruction of Government and municipal property from Shahpur and other localities?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Where is Shahpur?
 (Mr. Kemp:—In the north-west part of the city.)
 Q. That is just south of the Shahi Bagh?
 (Mr. Kemp:—Well south of it.)
 (To witness) Q. I think the mill-hands had not then gone back to work and shops were closed and business was at a stand-still?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Were you still in a state of great anxiety as to what would occur?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. I think you knew about a notice being issued that day as to assemblies of ten or more being fired upon?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Did you receive certain copies of that?
 A. Yes, some copies were given to me for circulation.
 Q. What did you do with them?
 A. I got a *gari* and sent those notices with a head constable and three men in a *gari* in order that they might circulate them immediately.
 Q. What happened to the party?
 A. After half an hour the party came back saying they were attacked near Khadia.
 Q. By whom?
 A. By some persons who appeared to be of the respectable class.
 Q. What was done to them?
 A. They were pelted with stones; and the rubber tyres of the wheels of the carriage were removed.
 Q. Did you report the matter at once to the Commanding Officer?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. I think a strong body of military was sent?
 A. The Commanding Officer sent them.
 Q. And in the evening did a British regiment come to the city and relieve the Indian troops?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. After that night was the city comparatively quiet?
 A. It was quiet after that.
 Q. In your view on the 12th, when the order was issued as regards firing upon crowds, was it essential

that some drastic steps should be taken to prevent further riots and incendiarism in the city?

A. I think so because it was not known when the crowd would resume the disturbances again.

Q. And before the arrival of the British troops was it a difficult thing to keep the crowd in hand?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you know that as soon as the crowd had been dispersed at one point they gathered at another point?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Some of the streets of Ahmedabad, I understand, are very narrow and it is difficult to follow the crowds there?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Did you yourself ever see a military patrol or party fire at a crowd without warning?

A. No, I did not.

Q. What sort of rifles were issued to the police at this time?

A. The old Martini Henry.

Q. I see there is one case where two rifles jammed when they were fired with ball, is that because of mis-handling of the rifles or because the cartridge did not fit the rifle, or what was the reason of it?

A. The rifles are not good; they are not rifles, they are smooth bores.

Q. That has been investigated and you have got to the bottom of that trouble? You have investigated and found the cause of this?

A. It is a long-standing complaint; they always jam.

Q. Have you got any better rifles now?

A. No, the same.

Q. Still using the same ones?

A. Yes.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. How long have you been in Ahmedabad as Deputy Superintendent of Police?

A. At that time about six months.

Q. Were you here before?

A. No.

Q. You were only six months in Ahmedabad altogether?

A. Up to the time of the riots I was only here for six months; I came in July 1918.

Q. Before that what district were you in?

A. In Broach, for a short time only.

Q. During the six months that you were here, before the riots, did you observe any anti-Government feeling among the people?

A. No.

Q. Or any anti-British feeling?

A. No.

Q. The events of the 10th and 11th came upon you as a surprise?

A. Yes.

Q. When you say that the action of the mob on the 10th and the 11th was anti-Government do I understand you to mean that that was dictated by resentment at the Government that had arrested Mr. Gandhi?

A. That might be.

Q. That is what you think it was?

A. Yes, the arrest of Mr. Gandhi and the agitation in connection with the Rowlatt Bill.

Q. On the 10th the arrest of Mr. Gandhi became known in Ahmedabad?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And this outburst on the 10th was mainly due to that information?

A. That was the immediate cause.

Q. Then when you say the action of the mob on the 10th was anti-Government?

A. I said on the 11th.

Q. Take the 10th first. You say the action of the mob on the 10th started on the information that Mr. Gandhi was arrested. When you say it was anti-Government is this what you mean, that it was dictated by

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resentment towards the Government that had arrested Mr. Gandhi?

A. I had not seen it on the 10th.

Q. You did not see on the 10th that there was any anti-Government exhibition of feeling?

A. So far as I know, none.

Q. Then on the 11th you had already the information about the arrest of Mr. Gandhi?

A. Yes.

Q. On the top of that came the rumour about the arrest of Anasuya?

A. Yes.

Q. And the outburst on the 11th was mainly due to that information?

A. The immediate cause.

Q. When you said that the action of the crowd on the 11th was anti-Government, what you meant was that that action was dictated by resentment towards the Government who they believed had wrongly arrested Mr. Gandhi and Miss Anasuya?

A. Yes, but that was not the only cause. That was the immediate cause no doubt.

Q. I want to understand what you mean by anti-Government feeling and your saying the action of the mob on the 11th was anti-Government?

A. Yes.

Q. What do you mean by it? Do you mean thereby that the action of the mob on the 11th was dictated by resentment towards Government because they had arrested Mr. Gandhi and Miss Anasuya?

A. Yes, that was the cause.

Q. The rumour about the arrest of Miss Anasuya spread like wild-fire in the city?

A. Yes.

Lieutenant S. H. MACDONALD, Assistant Controller of Contracts.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Macdonald, on the 11th of April did you leave Camp for your depot in the city?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What duties had you to perform in the city at that time?

A. I was Assistant Controller of Contracts under the Munitions Board.

Q. You are a Lieutenant?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you driven to the Delhi gate by a gentleman?

A. Yes, Sir, by a mill-owner.

Q. Were you dropped inside the Delhi gate and you proceeded to the depot?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Near the High School did a Parsee gentleman meet you?

A. Yes, Sir, Mr. Laher.

Q. And he asked you to go back?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What reasons did he give you for that request?

A. He said that a mob was coming up the street and that it had been destroying Government property, buildings, etc., and that they would kill me if I went on.

Q. What did you do?

A. I went with him to the police chowky to get into communication with the Collector on the telephone.

Q. Before you had got into communication with the District Magistrate did the mob arrive at the gate?

A. Yes, the mob arrived at the gate.

Q. What did they do?

A. They proceeded to wreck the police shelter just inside Delhi gate. They set fire to a building near the Delhi gate which I believe was the sub-post office. They also assaulted a Parsee gentleman when he was riding on a bicycle.

Q. Did a tonga pass by with some policemen?

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Were the educated classes of Ahmedabad and well-to-do persons of Ahmedabad in some sympathy with the rioters, or were they afraid of the rioters?

A. They were afraid of the rioters.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—

Q. The resentment which the mob you say felt against Government, was that dictated solely by the fact that Government had arrested Mr. Gandhi, or were there any other reasons why you think the mob were excited against Government?

A. There were other reasons also.

Q. What were the other reasons you suggest that actuated the mob?

A. The agitation against the Rowlatt Act had excited the minds of that people.

Q. Whom was the agitation fostered by?

A. By the lectures that were given to the men.

By Mr. Jivanlal V. Desai, Counsel to the Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad—

Q. On the 12th April you got that proclamation?

A. Yes.

Q. What time was it, 9 o'clock in the morning?

A. Between 9 and 11.

Q. And you circulated it at once?

A. Yes.

Q. There was no mention made that it was to come into force at 4 P.M.?

A. No.

Q. And about the trouble to your men distributing it in Khadia, did you take any steps against the persons who disturbed your men?

A. No, we could not take any steps.

A. Yes, there was a tonga with some policemen inside. They assaulted the tongawala, and the policemen inside fired three or four shots at them.

Q. Did these shots have any effect?

A. Absolutely none, but the tonga got through.

Q. Did Mr. Laher volunteer to take a message for you to Camp?

A. I asked Mr. Laher to take a message as he said he thought that he would get through as he was dressed in a black cap and a black coat, and he said that he did not think they would attack him. I gave him the message and he left. I heard subsequently that he had delivered it.

Q. What sort of a mob was it?

A. It was a mixed mob chiefly of mill-hands.

Q. Were they armed in any way?

A. Yes, they were armed with bamboos, the ordinary building bamboos. They were also armed with dharias, lathis and sticks of various kinds.

Q. Were there any respectably dressed people who seemed to be going with the mob?

A. There was one man, but he was in the middle of the street. There were other respectably dressed people who kept more on the side of the streets and did not take any active part in what was going on.

Q. Did the mob proceed to attack the police chowky where you were?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What led them to do that?

A. There were some 5 or 6 respectably dressed people, when I say respectably dressed people, I mean they were dressed in black caps and black coats and with their usual white dhoties. I think the intention of the mob was to go towards the Prem gate. These five men were standing at the turn-off to the Prem gate. They called out and pointed to the chowky where I was standing. Then the mob came round the chowky.

6 January 1920.]

Lieutenant S. H. MACDONALD.

[Continued.]

Q. Was it your view at the time that these men who were standing in front were inciting the mob to attack the chowky?

A. That is so. I should infer that those people seemed to wield too much influence over the mob.

Q. You were unarmed, I think?

A. Yes.

Q. And there was a policeman in the chowky with you?

A. There were two police sergeants and a constable.

Q. Were they armed?

A. No, Sir, there were no arms in the chowky.

Q. What happened to you then in the chowky?

A. The mob came round and started abusing and throwing in brickbats. They also came to the stairs down below, but they did not ascend.

Q. If they had ascended they would have attacked you?

A. There is a stair-case leading up to the chowky but it is a narrow one.

Q. Were you struck on that occasion?

A. I was struck by a bit of a soda water bottle on the right hand.

Q. Did it give a cut?

A. I nearly lost the little finger of my right hand.

Q. Was the situation a serious one?

A. It was, Sir. The mob was very much infuriated.

Q. Did they indicate to you clearly what they intended to do with you?

A. I was told in English and also in Urdu that the intended to kill me, that they had already killed one European and that there would not be any European left alive by the morning.

Q. How long did you remain in this situation?

A. For nearly two hours.

Q. What relieved the situation?

A. The arrival of the troops.

Q. Just as the troops arrived, was the mob attempting anything?

A. There were cries then of burning me. This was also translated to me by one of the sergeants, and they were going for kerosine oil. When all of a sudden they started dispersing, I caught sight of the troops.

Q. When you caught sight of the troops what did you do?

A. I came down.

Q. And joined them?

A. Yes.

Q. And you accompanied them to the depot?

A. I took a guard from the officer in charge.

Q. You stayed at the depot?

A. Yes.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You noticed the crowd first coming. You said there was one person accompanying them?

A. No, that was when the crowd were near the chowky.

Q. You were inside?

A. I was upstairs. Underneath is the fire engine shed. Then there is a staircase leading up to the store room.

Q. Were you at the window?

A. I was at the window for some time. I moved away from there.

Q. When the crowd was on the road, were you at the window?

A. Yes, I was standing near the window.

Q. And you observed him talking to them?

A. Yes, this man kept haranguing to them.

Q. One man?

A. One man in particular was very active with the crowd.

Q. When you say in your statement that there were numbers of fairly well dressed men, that is not quite accurate, because here you say there was only one man who was haranguing to them?

A. The others were on the side of the road.

Q. They were merely standing?

A. This man was with them, in the middle of the road.

Q. Were the other people haranguing also or were they merely standing there?

A. They took part in this outburst also.

Q. Could you hear what they were saying?

A. They kept there shouting *Gandhi ki jai*.

Q. You could not hear what they were saying?

A. No, there was much noise.

Q. They attempted to come up the stairs?

A. They came to the foot of the stairs.

Q. They entered the chowky?

A. They entered the fire engines shed underneath.

Q. Then you heard them saying that they intended killing you?

A. Yes.

Q. Who said that?

A. Members of the mob.

Q. While they were in the street?

A. Those down in the street below me and from the steps in the chowky.

Q. In what language were they saying that?

A. It was said to me in English and in Urdu.

Q. How many people said so, was the whole crowd shouting like that or only one or two people?

A. Chiefly from the steps. What one heard from outside was not very distinct, but when it was shouted out to me from the foot-steps it could be heard very distinctly inside.

Q. The staircase was a narrow one?

A. Yes, I don't think it was more than 2 feet wide at the outside.

Q. So when you heard of their intention to kill you it must have been said by one or two men who were at the foot of the stairs?

A. There was a crowd inside. Only one man could be at the stairs, but several men could come inside.

Q. They were talking in English or in Urdu?

A. They distinctly called out to me once in English and several times in Urdu.

By Sahibzada Sardar Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. Did they attempt so set fire to the chowky?

A. They did not go as far as that.

Q. Who is this Mr. Laher, is he a European?

A. He is a Parsee.

Q. Do you live in Ahmedabad?

A. I live in Camp, my depot is in Ahmedabad.

Q. What do you mean by Camp?

A. I mean the cantonment.

Q. Was any attempt made to loot or in any way annoy Europeans in their houses in Ahmedabad city or outside the city?

A. I do not know that there are any European houses. I have no personal knowledge of these things.

Q. Have you been long in Ahmedabad?

A. For 11 months.

Q. What do you attribute this anti-European feeling to?

A. That is a matter outside my scope. I do not know. I have no concern with the town in any manner.

Q. Have you any ideas about it, have you formed any views about it from what you have seen?

A. I think there was some trouble about the Rowlatt Act. They wanted a repeal of the Act, and there seemed to be a pretty strong political agitation in the place.

I think there was the *Satyagraha* movement also which brought about this trouble. This is all outside my scope, and I can only go by what I was told. As far as the outbreak went, I was told it was due to the reported arrest of Mr. Gandhi and Miss Anasuya.

Q. Why should it in some manner wear an anti-European aspect?

A. I really do not know. I suppose because the Government is European, and more or less every European official is associated with the Government in some way.

By Mr. Jivanlal Desai, Counsel to the Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad—

Q. At what time did you come to the Delhi gate?

6 January 1920.] Lieutenant S. H. MACDONALD—concluded—Lt. F. MORRIS—Lieutenant A. ST. J. MACDONALD.

A. I left Camp just after 9, between a quarter and a half-past nine.
Q. By half-past nine you were at the Delhi gate?
A. I won't be exact about it.
Q. 10 o'clock shall I say?

A. It was before ten.
Q. Between 9 and 10 you were at Delhi gate and you were told that a European was murdered that morning?
A. Yes.

Lieutenant F. MORRIS, 1-97th Infantry.

By the President—

Q. You were a Lieutenant in the 1/97th Infantry in April last?

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. And were you ordered at about a half-past five by Captain Lambert, 1/97th Infantry, to proceed to Delhi gate from the cross-roads with a party of 50 men?

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Did you do so?

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. On arrival at Temple post did you meet Major Cochran with a small party of 8 men?

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Were they guarding a gap which was crowded by a considerable number of people?

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. How many people were there, roughly?

A. About 400 or 500.
Q. What were these people doing?

A. They had all weapons in their hands, lathis, sticks and things of that sort. They were a very excited crowd.

Q. What sort of excitement did they show?

A. They were shouting and jumping about and beating their drums.
Q. Were you ordered by Major Cochran to strengthen that post by 12 men?

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. And did he leave the post in your charge?

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. I think he then returned?

A. He went back to the cross roads.
Q. Did Major Cochran give you any special instructions?

A. No, I had to use my own discretion.
Q. At the time that Major Cochran left in what state was the crowd?

A. It was very excited and they were pelting us with stones.
Q. Did you endeavour to persuade the crowd to retire?

A. I did my best to persuade them in Hindustani.
Q. Did they pay any attention to your request?

A. Apparently not.
Q. What did they do in answer to your request?

A. I was only jeered and hooted at.
Q. Did you give an order to fire?

A. I did, Sir.
Q. How many rounds were fired?

Lieutenant A. ST. J. MACDONALD, 2-10th Jats.

By the President—

Q. Are you attached to the 2/10th Jats?

A. I am now, Sir.
Q. On the 11th April last, were you attached to the 1-99th Infantry?

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Were you ordered by Major Hinde, Commanding Depot, 1/99th Infantry, to take over and protect the Indian Defence Force Armoury and the city railway station?

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Were you relieved of your command the same evening by Major Hinde?

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Had you to fire on that occasion?

A. No, not on that day.

A. Altogether five.
Q. In the first instance you fired on the mob or just in front of them?

A. First of all thinking that these people did not understand what I had told them in Hindustani, I fired one shot with my own hand, but I did not fire to kill anybody, it was only a warning shot.

Q. Had this method of dealing with the crowd any effect?

A. It had no effect.
Q. It is not usual to fire except, if you have to fire at all, to hit some one?

A. That is so.
Q. You thought on this occasion that your warning shot would have a good effect?

A. I thought it would.
Q. When the first firing did not have any effect, did you indicate to the mob that the next time you fired you would fire effectively?

A. I did, Sir.
Q. Had that warning any effect on the mob?

A. It had no effect. Still they were pelting stones.
Q. I think you indicated to them that they should not advance beyond a certain point?

A. I gave them a certain point, and explained the position to them as best I could.
Q. When some men advanced beyond the point you had prescribed, did you give an order to fire?

A. I detailed four sepoy to load one round each and to fire.
Q. What was the result of firing?

A. Personally I saw three men fall. Whether they were wounded or killed, I do not know. They were carted away by people.

Q. What opinion did you form as to the intention of the crowd as it advanced towards you?

A. As they did not pay any heed to the warning shot, I thought their intention was to attack us, really.

Q. As the result of the firing what casualties were there?

A. Just these three.
Q. I think there was no civil officer at the moment and you had to act on your own discretion?

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. After that firing, I think there was no further trouble until you were relieved by Captain Todd on the 14th April 1919?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Then on the following day the Martial Law proclamation as you describe it was distributed as regards firing upon crowds if they did not answer a challenge?

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Had you anything to do with the distribution of the proclamation?

A. I distributed the proclamation round the station under orders from Major Hinde.
Q. I think the proclamations were distributed in the area between 8-30 and 10-30 in the morning?

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. At about 11 A.M. did a picket report that a large mob out of control was moving towards the station from the south?

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Did you receive any orders?

6 January 1920.] Lieutenant A. ST. J. MACDONALD—concluded—Lieutenant J. FITZPATRICK.

A. Yes, I was told to move out with a picket of about 20 men and disperse the mob.
Q. When you arrived there what did you find?

A. I found it was a much bigger thing than what was reported to us.
Q. Where did you find the mobs?

A. I do not know the names of the places.
Q. Somewhere near the station?

A. There was a large square and some five or six roads were converging on to it.
Q. Were there several parties in the mob?

A. Yes, there were about four or five parties.
Q. Was the crowd there a large one?

A. Two were big crowds and there were two small parties.
Q. By the big crowd what do you mean?

A. A couple of thousand, I should say. There were some hundreds in the other.
Q. Had these people anything in their hands?

A. They were all armed. The crowd of two thousand people had sticks and lathis in their hands, bill hooks and things of that sort.
Q. What is a bill hook?

A. It is a broad sharp knife tied on to bamboos.
Q. Bill hooks were carried during the disturbances?

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Is it a very effective weapon?

A. It is very sharp.
Q. Did you take up a position in the square?

A. Yes, I did.
Q. Did you think that the appearance of the troops might have the effect of dispersing the mob?

A. I thought so, Sir.
Q. Were you right in thinking so?

A. I was, Sir, but it did not have any effect at all.
Q. On the contrary did the mob get more excited?

A. I would not say any more excited, but they generally seemed not to pay much attention.
Q. What did they do?

A. They moved and were coming along nearer every moment.
Q. I think some small parties were moving towards the other side?

A. Yes, they were nearer to the other party.
Q. I think you reported to Major Hinde the situation?

A. Yes, I did.
Q. In what way?

A. I think I sent a message telling him that there were a hundred men between my position and a picket

we had on the railway line. I think I also mentioned to him the desirability of reinforcing the picket at the railway lines.

Q. Did you give any orders to your men as to the loading that was done?

A. Yes.
Q. What orders?

A. When I saw that these people had not dissipated on the appearance of the troops, I gave orders to this little picket of mine to 'single load.'

Q. You loaded in the presence of the crowd?

A. Yes. I loaded in the squares.
Q. Did that have any effect in keeping the crowd back?

A. No. They still came on.
Q. Were you in danger of being overwhelmed by the crowd?

A. Yes, I was.
Q. What did you do there?

A. I armed one of the men (Mr. Knight, an N. C. O.) who fired straightway and it had no effect. I ordered three shots to be fired.

Q. I think your orders were to the effect that four men should get ready to fire?

A. Yes.
Q. What was the effect of the firing of the three men?

A. These three fired into the big mob. The result was that this turned them away and the other mob, seeing these people fall back, also fell back themselves.

Q. Did you withdraw to the station?

A. Yes.
Q. As you were withdrawing to the station what did the mob do?

A. They collected again and came on with cries.
Q. Did they interfere with you?

A. They would have.
Q. What did you do?

A. I ordered I think shots to be fired 3 times at the mob and they fell back altogether.
Q. In consequence of the firing that took place under your orders how many casualties were there?

A. I only saw 2 men were carried away immediately.
Q. Were those two men killed or simply wounded?

A. I could not say.
Q. Except for these 2 men you do not know of any further casualties either killed or wounded?

A. No.
Q. Altogether how many shots had been fired?

A. 14.

Lieutenant J. FITZPATRICK, Cantonment Magistrate, Ahmedabad.

By the President—

Q. Were you Cantonment Magistrate at Ahmedabad?

A. I am still.
Q. On the 10th April did you first witness the riots as a spectator?

A. Yes.
Q. Where?

A. At the Prem gate.
Q. What did you see?

A. I came there when Colonel Preston, Mr. Chatfield, Colonel Frazer and Mr. Boyd marched up towards the railway station crossing and left the Prem gate in charge of Lieutenant Larkin with about 30 or 40 men and Lieutenant Larkin was holding back close on about a thousand people from advancing behind the troops that had gone on, and I was standing behind Lieutenant Larkin with another friend.

Q. What sort of crowd was it?

A. A very unruly crowd.
Q. Were there any better class of people among them—any educated people?

A. There were a number of black-coated people, Sir, and there was one man pointed out to me—a very poisonous little man—doing a lot of harm to the crowd. He was said to be a Satyagrahi wearing white clothes and a

pagree that was told to me then to be a distinctive mark of the Satyagrahi.

Q. You say he was doing a lot of harm?

A. Yes.
Q. What sort of harm was he doing?

A. Instead of persuading the mob to get back of keeping them in order, he was inciting them to whistle, shout, yell, abuse, throw stones and to do all sorts of funny things round about, and the abuse was something filthy. I know the language perfectly well and I told him that if he were any good, why could he not send the men back. But he would not listen. On one occasion when they advanced near us to the railway line, one of them pushed one of our men and there was almost a row. All this was incited by this little fellow.

Q. Did you see any soldiers being struck by a stone?

A. Yes, stones were flying about.
Q. How long did you remain there?

A. From about 5-30 to close on sun-down.
Q. Did the mob leave at that time?

A. They had thinned down, they subsequently went away into the Prem gate and into the city.

Q. On the 11th April, did you go to Pankor Naka in command of a detachment of the 1-97th?

6 January 1920.]

Lieutenant J. FITZPATRICK.

[Continued.]

A. I went to Major Kirkwood and he posted me to the Pankor Naka.

Q. At what time were you posted there?

A. About 11-30, as far as I can remember.

Q. How long did you remain there?

A. I remained there about the same time as on the morning of the 12th.

Q. What was the state of affairs during that period of your duty?

A. Well, the whole road right away from where I was on duty—I might say to the railway station, until such time as a picket came down on the line, the head road was fully packed with rioters and on all the side-streets leading to the right or left of it. I compute from the Pankor Naka to the Panch Kuwa gate there were fully 45,000 people.

Q. What were these rioters doing?

A. Abusing filthily, throwing stones, behaving indelicately in derision, and in every way they were out for the worst.

Q. You were under Major Kirkwood, I think. Did you see any mob aiming stones at him or anything of the sort?

A. Major Kirkwood and I were standing side by side turning to the right of the fountain. The party had gone right before our force, and our force had gone right ahead, and we were about then middle, when a stone was thrown clear over the force and on to us and struck Major Kirkwood on the head. It was a huge brick.

Q. You had twice attempted to go along the Richey Road with a patrol?

A. I went from this place when I got information about Sergeant Fraser being killed and I asked permission to leave the post to go up with some men and bring his body in, which request was granted me and I went and got the body.

Q. Did anything happen to you when you had proceeded thither?

A. I was stoned freely.

Q. Was the post you were stationed at a difficult one to retain with the force under you?

A. It was.

Q. How was that?

A. Because there were so many side-roads leading under a bridge that if the mob had come over the bridge and gone down the side-streets, we should have had quite a force to contend with. My force was drawn right across 2 little gates on the road side and they had come by these gates, they could have easily rushed me through one of the gates on the flank. I considered this point and therefore went forward and told them that if they advanced a certain distance, i.e., the usual 25 yards, the point at which I considered danger would accrue to me, I told them that if they advanced ahead of that point, I would fire, and I did fire every time they advanced.

Q. Did you give them a warning in the vernacular?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any difficulty in your being understood?

A. None whatever, on the contrary I was jeered at and stoned every time I did it.

Q. In consequence of the attitude of the mob, did you fire?

A. Yes, I fired right throughout the day.

Q. Several times?

A. Yes.

Q. How frequently altogether?

A. Well, I fired at 2 or 3 men on the right and on the left. I could not tell you. But I think from 50 to 80 rounds must have been expended by my party.

Q. And you yourself were unarmed?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Do you know the number of casualties caused by your party?

A. At the end of the day I totalled up 11 or 12.

Q. I think you saw the burning that was taking place?

A. Yes, I saw them burning down the Panch Kuwa gate and also the firing.

Q. How did they do it?

A. There was a crowd of about 2 or 3 hundred. They had kerosene tins carried with them, and squirts with which they squirted kerosene, and flambeaux were ablaze and they were busy on this work when I fired into them.

Q. Did you order the firing upon the men engaged?

A. Yes, it was then that I ordered them to be fired at.

Q. What were the casualties?

A. Two and perhaps a third further up the road.

Q. Did you effect any arrest?

A. One man.

Q. Where?

A. Just at this gate. He had burnt down a liquor shop on the left and perhaps he had got a little under the influence of liquor. I cannot understand his action in any other way. He was one of the leaders of this mob who placed the man that was killed on the right on a *charpoy*, which was carried through the gate and this little wretched fellow followed it, little thinking that I would identify him, and I caught him.

Q. In your report you indicate that elaborate preparations had been made by the crowd to stone the police and the military?

A. Very elaborate.

Q. What was the nature of these preparations?

A. Well, there were bricks in every store of the fruit vendors' market just outside the gate where I was stationed. Pebbles, bricks, stones and all sorts of things were put in there.

Q. I see you also refer to the leaders of the mob. Who did you consider the leaders of the mob to be as far as you remember?

A. It is only a question of identification of uniforms and clothes. There was one *Satyagrahi* again there. There were a number of black-coated people who were supposed to be wearing blackcoats for mourning. There were about 6 or 8 *Sanyasis*, mendicants or so-called priests.

Q. What were they doing?

A. They were exciting the mob the whole livelong day.

Q. Then you also refer to having seen the mob supplied with food or sweets?

A. Yes. I saw close on 60 or 80 trays of sweets being taken out by very respectably dressed Hindus and thrown into the mob, and they were cheered by these people. Every time they shouted the "jai" there was a roar of "jai" going up. I have not mentioned another point. There were so-called stretcher-bearers who made their stretchers the means of communication from mob to mob. Evidently they used to slip down the streets and get in amongst the crowd, and they would raise their hands and then went the "chalo," "maro," and all these sort of things.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. I understand you did ultimately arrest the poisonous little man?

A. I did not.

Q. Who was the man arrested on the 2nd when he was following a *charpoy*?

A. A little Muhammadan mill boy. The other had a goaty-beard.

Q. You never got a chance to identify your other friend?

A. I never did unfortunately.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. This little fellow you spoke of and whom you describe as having a goaty-beard, had he no cap but a *pagree*?

A. He had no cap but a *pagree*.

Q. You say he was a *Satyagrahi*?

A. I say he was pointed out to me as a *Satyagrahi* wearing the *Satyagrahi* uniform?

Q. Were you told that the *pagree* was a distinctive feature of the *Satyagrahi* uniform?

A. Yes.

6 January 1920.]

Lieutenant J. FITZPATRICK.

[Continued.]

Q. Are you sure?

A. Yes.

Q. A *pagree* is a common head-dress for Hindus?

A. And also for Muhammadans.

Q. Why do you say that the *pagree* was a distinctive mark?

A. Because of the way it was tied. It was a round about thing.

Q. What is called a *Pheta*?

A. That would be almost like a Marwari.

Q. The man told you that the *pagree* tied like that is a distinctive feature of a *Satyagrahi*?

A. Yes, I heard it.

Q. Who told you that?

A. One of the Indians knocking about there.

Q. Did he tell you that the turban that man was wearing was a distinctive feature of the *Satyagrahi*?

A. Therefore I say that he was pointed out to me as being such.

Q. You will be surprised to learn that the turban is not a distinctive mark of the *Satyagrahi*?

A. It may be or it may not be. I was simply told it.

Q. Then you say he was a Hindu?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you aware that Hindus do not wear beards?

A. Oh no, I could point out thousands of Hindus with beards. What about the Punjab?

Q. There you have Sikhs who wear beards. Will you be surprised to hear that Hindus in Ahmedabad do not wear beards?

A. This much I can tell you that I can swear to that man being bearded and being a Hindu.

Q. You can swear to his having a beard, but you cannot swear to his being a Hindu?

A. Because he was a *Satyagrahi* and there were no Muhammadan *Satyagrahis*.

Q. You say he was a Hindu because he was a *Satyagrahi*, and according to you a *Satyagrahi* must be a Hindu?

A. Naturally.

Q. You were not able to arrest these persons?

A. No.

Q. So the man arrested the next day was a Muhammadan?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you say that the rioters were led entirely by a black-coated Hindu?

A. Yes.

Q. "Black-coated" I understood you to say that a black coat was again a distinctive sign of the *Satyagrahi*?

A. No, of people who had put on the dress of mourning for the arrest of Gandhi.

Q. Black coats are worn by many people ordinarily?

A. I see you have got one on now, and you are not mourning.

Q. But many people in Ahmedabad wear black coats without being *Satyagrahis*?

A. But on that occasion it was worn as a sign of mourning for the arrest of Gandhi.

Q. Why do you conclude that they were *Satyagrahis*?

A. I only assume that they were *Satyagrahis* in mourning.

Q. Simply because you saw them wearing black coats?

A. Quite so.

Q. About the food of rioters, you said you saw people bringing trays of *laddoos*?

A. Yes, *jalebies* too and *Gulab-jamans* also.

Q. Where did you see this?

A. I saw them coming out of an alley at Pankor Naka. There is a gateway there. From the gateway I could see long streaks of people coming out with trays to feed the mob.

Q. Who were these people?

A. Men who were dressed in white with gold *pagrees* and they were perfectly jubilant at the idea. They were respectably dressed people of the Ahmedabad society according to what I saw from their apparel.

Q. Now, where were they bringing the sweetmeats from?

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A. From a lane on the left which is supposed to contain all the sweetmeat shops in Ahmedabad.

Q. Now these arrangements have been made by the rioters themselves. They must have been going up and down from the shops to the scene with these sweets?

A. I do not think so. If that was the case there should have been rioters escorting the people who were bringing the sweets.

Q. If the mob started with a desire to commit all these excesses surely they must have provided themselves beforehand with some food?

A. Not at all. As I have already told you if they had gone to bring these sweets some of the rioters should have been escorting them. If they were not being got through by others, then why were the sweets being dished out in handfuls and thrown out to the mob?

Q. Perhaps the only way to distribute would be to throw the *laddoos* in the mob.

A. Then it only points to paying the piper and calling the tune. A man dumped down 4 or 5 hundred *laddoos* to feed the mob. The fact remains that these sweets were taken out in trays by respectably dressed Hindu gentlemen.

Q. How many trays were there?

A. About 50.

Q. There must have been a large quantity of *laddoos*?

A. Quite, to feed 5,000 people.

Q. You say stones were collected in fruit-sellers' shops. In how many shops were these stones collected?

A. Quite half a dozen.

Q. Where?

A. Why, right through this gate at the Pankor.

Q. So instead of fruit you had seen stones collected in the shops?

A. Yes, and with white cloths over the top to prevent one from looking in to see.

Q. Did you remove the cloth?

A. Yes.

Q. Were the shop-keepers there?

A. No.

Q. Where had they gone to?

A. I do not know. The shops were quite deserted.

Q. The baskets were full of stones and nobody was in charge of them?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Was the crowd that committed the burning a moving crowd or a stationary crowd?

A. It was a crowd burning and moving along.

Q. Were the majority drunk or sober?

A. I could not tell you.

Q. Did you make a report after the occurrence, to any of your superior officers?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you, in that report, make any statement that the crowd was drunk?

A. I do not think so.

Q. I will read out to you the report. You say they were very violent and threatening and many of them were drunk?

A. Not the whole crowd was drunk.

Q. I never used the word "whole." But I used the word "many."

A. The majority of them were drunk; some of them were.

Q. You said you never made any report at all?

A. I did say I made a report.

Q. To the effect they were drunk?

A. I never said the whole crowd was drunk.

Q. I was mistaken then.

A. I beg your pardon, that is all.

Q. Therefore many of the crowd were drunk?

A. Yes, one man in particular.

Q. Was the crowd to whom sweetmeats were distributed a stationary crowd or a moving crowd?

A. Sweetmeats were taken to a crowd which I had prevented from coming further.

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Lieutenant J. FITZPATRICK.

[Continued.]

Q. How long was that crowd before you? For how many hours?

A. From 11-30 in the morning till about 6-30 in the evening. Practically the whole day.

Q. Practically there was this stationary crowd before you from 11-30 to 6; and your soldiers were on the other side. They were all along from 11-30 to 6 stationary?

A. Yes.

Q. And they never moved?

A. I told you they were going backwards and forwards.

Q. Within a space of about 100 yards?

A. 25 or 30 yards.

Q. It was the same crowd?

A. Yes.

Q. What was that crowd doing from 11-30 to 6?

A. Generally abusing, throwing stones.

Q. Therefore, may I take it that this crowd which was the same crowd there from 11-30 to 6 was there for the purpose of abusing soldiers?

A. For assaulting, and out for anything that came in their way. It was that crowd that had murdered Sergeant Fraser.

Q. May I take it that they were waiting for an opportunity to rush in and assault you?

A. Perhaps.

Q. That was the idea, otherwise how do you account for their attitude?

A. That is the only way I can account for it.

Q. They were waiting for an opportunity to be given by you with a view to rush the picket?

A. Yes.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—
Q. Did you hand over this man you arrested to the police?

A. Yes.

By Mr. Jivankal V. Desai, Counsel to the Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad—

Q. How long have you been Cantonment Magistrate?

A. Two and a half years.

Q. How long have you been in the Army?

A. About two and a half years.

Q. Before that you were in the police?

A. I was.

Q. What was your line in the police?

A. Deputy Superintendent of Police.

Q. In what presidency?

A. In the United Provinces.

Q. You do not understand the language of this district?

A. A good bit of it now.

Q. Gujarati?

A. I can understand a little.

Q. Very little?

A. Yes, but they can understand me.

Q. I want your knowledge, not their knowledge.

A. My language is Urdu; everyone can well understand it.

Q. What took you to Prem gate on the 10th of April?

A. Just to see what was on.

Q. Curiosity?

A. Absolutely.

Q. You did not go with the armed force then?

A. No.

Q. You accompanied Mr. Peebles?

A. Yes, Mr. Peebles of the Bank of Bombay.

Q. What was the strength of your party?

A. Mr. Peebles and I.

Q. Only two?

A. Yes.

Q. You stayed all along at Prem gate?

A. Yes.

Q. Without being molested by anybody belonging to the crowd?

A. We were guarded by Lieutenant Larkin with 35 men.

Q. What was the strength of the mob?

A. About 5,000.

Q. The attitude of the mob was not anti-European then?

A. I will not say that.

Q. You stayed at Prem gate for about two hours?

A. Yes.

Q. Then went to the Cantonment?

A. Yes.

Q. The next morning when did you start out?

A. I arrived in the city at about 11-30.

Q. With the troops?

A. Yes.

Q. And you came straight to Pankor Naka?

A. Yes.

Q. There was the disposition of the police force?

A. Yes.

Q. What was your beat?

A. My beat was Pankor Naka.

Q. You stopped at Pankor Naka?

A. Yes.

Q. You walked as far as the railway station?

A. When occasion arose, I went to the railway station up to the Panch Kuwa gate.

Q. Beyond that too?

A. About a 100 yards up from there.

Q. Do you know Dr. Kanuga's dispensary?

A. I have no particular knowledge of anything. If you will tell me the distance from Panch Kuwa gate, I will be able to answer.

Q. That is not in your line?

A. Quite so.

Q. Beyond Panch Kuwa gate how far did you go straight? Turned to the railway station?

A. No.

Q. Near the Bombay shop (which is the turning)?

A. Yes. I went on patrol once up to that point.

Q. From Pankor Naka to the Bombay shop?

A. Yes.

Q. A distance of about a mile?

A. I do not know.

Q. As a military officer, Cantonment Magistrate and police officer of long standing?

A. Does he know by intuition distances?

Q. Roughly was it half a mile?

A. It was more than half a mile. Call it a mile.

Q. How often did you have to walk that mile that day?

A. Once up and once down.

Q. And how long did you remain stationary at your post?

A. All the rest of the time.

Q. Your post was Pankor Naka?

A. Yes.

Q. You remained stationary at Pankor Naka?

A. Yes.

Q. You went only once to the Bombay shop and back?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you halt anywhere?

A. What for?

Q. For any purpose?

A. Not to my knowledge.]

Q. Did you make a halt at Panch Kuwa gate?

A. What for?

Q. I do not know. Did you make a halt or not?

A. To fire.

Q. You made a halt?

A. Yes.

Q. What time?

A. I could not tell you.

Q. Was it about 3 o'clock?

A. About that time I should say. Between 2 and 3 o'clock.

Q. How many shots did you fire there?

A. About 12 or 15.

Q. Now will you tell His Lordship what the casualties were on that occasion?

A. Three.

Q. Only three?

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[Continued.]

A. Yes.

Q. You are quite sure?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Any person killed?

A. Two killed.

Q. Any wounded?

A. Only one.

Q. Are you quite sure?

A. Absolutely.

Q. What did you do with the wounded man?

A. He was carried away by his own people.

Q. Where?

A. I do not know.

Q. Was he a Hindu dressed in black? A *Satyagrahi*?

A. He was one of the men.

Q. Not a *Satyagrahi*?

A. Of course not; I wish he was.

Q. You want *Satyagrahis* to be killed?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you tell us what was the nature of the shots?

Were they blank cartridges, ball cartridges? I am not a military man and I am not expected to know it.

A. 303.

Q. Was it possible for a shot like that to pierce through a number of sheets?

A. What sheets?

Q. Iron sheets.

A. How thick?

Q. Ordinary corrugated iron sheets.

A. I could not tell you.

Q. Will you be surprised to hear that one of your shots has pierced through 6 sheets?

A. I would not be surprised.

Q. I am prepared to show you that place.

A. What of it?

Q. What was that shot which pierced through six iron sheets?

A. 303 perhaps.

Q. It could go through six sheets?

A. Perhaps.

Q. It was according to your military regulations to use that shot?

A. Yes, by orders.

Q. Did you have any ambulance arrangement there?

A. No. People had already arranged that.

Q. I am talking of the military; yourself, the officer in charge of that squadron?

A. No arrangement was made; not to my knowledge.

Q. You were to leave the dead and wounded to their lot or to the care of their friends. When you went out to shoot people, did you make any arrangement to save the wounded?

A. I beg Your Lordship's intervention here. I did not go out to shoot people.

Q. You went out to preserve order. You did shoot some people?

A. I did not go to shoot them.

Q. You went out to preserve or restore order?

A. Yes.

Q. While restoring order, there was a chance of shooting some people?

A. I had to.

Q. You had absolutely no arrangement for any ambulance?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. How long did you stop at Panch Kuwa gate?

A. About 5 minutes.

Q. Where did you see the baskets of stones? Outside the Panch Kuwa gate or inside?

A. Panch Kuwa gate is about a mile away from where the stones were.

Q. You said Panch Kuwa gate?

A. I said the gate leading to Pankor Naka.

Q. You were assaulted at Pankor Naka. You saw some five or six stalls with baskets of stones?

A. Yes.

Q. Not at Panch Kuwa gate?

A. No.

Q. And you saw this huge crowd of 5,000 or 6,000 at Pankor Naka. Was it a stationary crowd?

A. From Fernandez bridge right up.

Q. Was it possible to walk along that street at about 4 o'clock that afternoon?

A. With 10 men it was.

Q. For a single individual to pass through that road?

A. Who is the single individual?

Q. I ask you this question. Was it possible? Please answer me.

A. There is no single individual. I have already told you that I was with a party of 10 men.

Q. I do not want to know how many were with you. Was the road free for traffic or not at about 4 o'clock that afternoon?

A. No.

Q. From Pankor Naka to Panch Kuwa gate?

A. Yes.

Q. People could not have passed?

A. No.

Q. Will you be surprised to hear that people passed through all the Richey Road right up to Ratanpol?

A. It was not possible for a European to move unless he was guarded anywhere on the Fernandez bridge. It was quite full of rioters between Pankor Naka and Fernandez bridge right up to Panch Kuwa gate.

Q. From Fernandez bridge to Panch Kuwa gate, the road was blocked up to 6-30 in the evening?

A. About that.

Q. I dare say you will be surprised to hear that people could walk freely between Panch Kuwa gate and Fernandez bridge up to 4 o'clock?

A. It would surprise me certainly.

Q. You remained stationary at Pankor Naka?

A. Yes.

Q. And your force remained stationary there?

A. Quite so.

Q. Whereas we could walk there through Panch Kuwa gate right up to Ratanpol?

A. But you were one of those people.

Q. A *Satyagrahi* rioter?

A. I do not say that, but you were one of the people.

Q. Indians could pass that way?

A. Perhaps.

Q. Now you know between Pankor Naka and Fernandez bridge there are places where sweetmeats are prepared?

A. I have not taken such particular notice.

Q. There are shops there?

A. There may be.

Q. Sweetmeats are sold in half the Richey Road?

A. I am told. I do not know it to my own knowledge.

Q. By whom were these trays carried?

A. By Gujarati people in gold *pagre*s.

Q. On their heads?

A. They were taking trays.

Q. How many persons carried trays?

A. I told you about 50.

Q. Were they ordinary coolies or what?

A. They may have been relatives, friends, sisters, cousins, and aunts; I do not know.

Q. Where did you see the sweets being thrown?

A. Taken right up to the mob at Fernandez bridge and beyond it, and thrown amongst them.

Q. You actually saw that with your own eyes?

A. Yes.

Q. You seem to have very strong and piercing eyes?

A. Quite so.

Q. Did you fire any shots near the place where Sergeant Fraser was murdered?

A. When I recovered his body neither I nor my party fired.

Q. How many people went to fetch the dead body?

A. There was myself, Kothawala, a Sergeant and there was a police officer.

Q. Only four?

A. And ten of my men.

Q. And that place was absolutely deserted when you went there?

A. Yes.

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[Concluded.]

- Q. Absolutely deserted ?
A. Quite so.
Q. As far as you could see towards the Panch Kuwa gate, the road was quite free ?
A. Not at all.
Q. How far could you see distinctly ?
A. The crowd had gone back 150 to 200 yards from that place; that is all; but there was no crowd there.
Q. Do you know at what time you recovered Sergeant Fraser's body ?
A. About two.
Q. Your report was that he was killed just before that time, 2 o'clock ?
A. I should say some time before 2 o'clock.
Q. You recovered the body at 2 o'clock and he was killed just before 2 o'clock ?
A. I did not say just before, but some time before.
Q. When did you pass that place before ?
A. Not once.
Q. That was the only time when you came up to that place ?
A. And went beyond and then came back.
Q. After recovering Sergeant Fraser's body ?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you attend the tribunal to identify that wretched fellow who was hiding at Prem gate ? He was tried. Two *Satyagrahis* were tried by the first tribunal.
A. Really ?
Q. They were tried,
A. I do not know anything about it.
Q. You did not offer to go and identify ?
A. No.
- Q. You took a very prominent part in the prosecution of a *Sadhu* before the first tribunal ?
A. Yes.
Q. You identified him ?
A. Yes.
Q. And the crime of that *Sadhu* was that he was instigating Subadar-Major Kanhayalal and dissuading the troops ?
A. No.
Q. What was the charge against that *Sadhu* ?
A. He was one of the leaders of the mob.
Q. What did he do ?
A. Many things.
Q. He dissuaded your troops ?
A. I was not there. I know nothing about it.
Q. You identified some *Sadhu* ?
A. Yes, as being one of the leaders of the mob and not as dissuading troops.
Q. That *Sadhu* was shot by you ?
A. No.
Q. Had he any injury ?
A. It was for that reason he got off.
Q. You had shot a *Sadhu* there ?
A. I thought I had.
Q. You identified a wrong man there ?
A. I did not see the escaped *Sadhu*.
Q. You took part in the prosecution of only one individual ?
A. That is all.
Q. This *Sadhu* has been acquitted ?
A. He was.
Q. In spite of your identification ?
A. Yes.

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Mr. J. A. GUIDER.

At Ahmedabad, Wednesday, the 7th January 1920.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B.,
K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.F., I.P., Secretary.

Mr. J. A. GUIDER, C.I.E., I.P., Deputy Inspector-General of Police, C. I. D., Bombay Presidency.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Guider, you are Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Bombay Presidency ?

A. I am.

Q. On the 14th April last you received telegraphic orders from the Inspector-General of Police at Ahmedabad to come here and take charge of the investigation of cases arising out of the riots ?

A. I did.

Q. I think you arrived in Ahmedabad on the following morning ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you immediately start your investigation ?

A. I did.

Q. I think you organised a staff in order to assist you ?

A. I did.

Q. Did you find it an easy matter to get information from the people ?

A. No. People were unwilling to come forward. They were merely afraid, I think. Besides that, there is a natural reluctance on the part of Indian witnesses to come forward and give evidence in any case.

Q. So that I suppose it is not easy enough to get evidence of these occurrences from the people ?

A. Yes; that is so.

Q. Did you gradually overcome the difficulties in your investigation ?

A. I did.

Q. On what principle did you make arrests of people ?

A. As soon as *prima facie* evidence was forthcoming to prove their complicity, arrests were ordered.

Q. The first arrests produced a startling effect upon the people ?

A. They did. The mill-hands absconded.

Q. That affected the working of the mills ?

A. To a certain extent.

Q. What arrangements did you make there ?

A. I arranged to meet the members of the Millowners' Association and explain to them that no wholesale arrests of the mill-hands were contemplated and that only those against whom evidence was forthcoming would be dealt with.

Q. I think you published a gist of the proceedings of this meeting ?

A. The Millowners' Association published a sort of notice,* reassuring notices.

Q. That had a beneficial effect ?

A. It had.

Q. As regards the number of cases you investigated in Ahmedabad you investigated them under different divisions, A, B and C ?

A. Yes; 41 cases.

Q. These are divisions of the city ?

A. Yes.

Q. You have A division 13, B division 11 and C division 17. Does that mean that people against whom charges were made were residents of that division ?

A. No. Different places were damaged. Each building which has been burnt has been treated as a separate case.

Q. Then in Kalupur division, you had 12 ?

A. Yes. Mahdopura division 3, Sarkhej division 1, Barejadi 1 and Virangam 2 cases.

Q. How many people altogether did you arrest ?

A. 357.

Q. Of these, there were a number who were released without being tried ?

A. Yes. 140.

Q. Why were they released ?

A. Because the evidence was considered insufficient to warrant their being placed on trial.

Q. Of these, how many were convicted ?

A. 106 were convicted and 111 were discharged.

Q. Were they discharged by the first tribunal or the second ?

A. This relates to Ahmedabad entirely. That is the first tribunal.

Q. The first tribunal dealt with the Ahmedabad cases ?

A. Yes.

Q. And the second ?

A. With Kaira cases.

Q. As regards the sentences pronounced in these cases, there is one death sentence commuted by Government to transportation for life. Under transportation for life, there are 22. They include the 2 sentenced to transportation in constable Imam Khan's murder case ?

A. Yes.

Q. When was the constable murdered ?

A. On the evening of the 10th April.

Q. Then you refer to sentences under forfeiture of property ?

A. Yes. 20.

Q. One transportation for 14 years ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then rigorous imprisonment for various periods ?

A. From 14 years to 1½ months.

Q. And in one case, there was a fine ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then coming to the Kaira district: you divided that into Nadiad and Anand ?

A. Yes. The cases were investigated by the local officers; I simply supervised them. The total arrests were 123.

Q. Of these, 41 were released without being tried because the evidence was not considered sufficient to warrant their being placed on trial ?

A. That is so.

Q. Eighty-two were sent up for trial, of whom 17 were convicted and 65 were discharged ?

A. Yes.

* Annexure to Mr. Guider's written statement, page 239.

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Mr. J. A. GUIDER.

[Continued.]

Q. As regards the sentences pronounced in the 17 cases, there are 2 for transportation for life and the other sentences for rigorous imprisonment varying from 10 years to 1½ months?

A. That is so.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. As regards the sentences passed by the first tribunal apart from anything that was done under the recent proclamation, were these sentences of the court reduced by the Government?

A. No. None of them have been reduced.

Q. Apart from anything that has been done under His Majesty's Proclamation, these sentences have been effective sentences, i.e., have been allowed to stand?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me what were the crimes charged against the persons who went up before the first tribunal?

A. They were waging war, conspiracy to wage war, mischief by fire, house-breaking and house-breaking with intent to commit theft, house trespass, causing hurt, murder, rioting and rioting armed with deadly weapons.

Q. In how many cases that were put up for waging war, were the accused convicted for that offence?

A. There is a statement prepared by the court clerk of the first tribunal. Twenty cases in which convictions were under sections 121 and 121-A for waging war.

Q. How many cases came under section 124 (sedition)?

A. None before the first tribunal.

Q. No case under conspiracy?

A. No.

Q. As regards the 140 who were released without being tried can you tell me, broadly speaking, how long these 140 were kept under arrest before being released?

A. Some were released in very short periods; some remained weeks and months.

Q. What is the longest period which a man was kept without being sent up for trial?

A. So far as those that were put up for trial are concerned they were all committed by the beginning of June.

Q. And the arrests were made towards the end of April?

A. They commenced the arrests about the 17th or 18th April.

Q. These are cases where the men were ultimately released?

A. Yes.

Q. They would have been released without any charge being framed against them and without their being sent up to the first tribunal?

A. Yes. As the investigation progressed, we got information. Sometimes when a man was concerned in these riots he was arrested and we tried to work up the information, and if we found that the investigation did not confirm the first suspicions against him, he was discharged.

Q. What was the longest time a man was kept under arrest before it was decided not to send him up to the tribunal?

A. I should say not longer than a fortnight or three weeks.

Q. All these 140 were kept under arrest for more than three weeks?

A. I do not think so.

Q. In addition to the 140, there were some cases where people were put up before the first tribunal but the case against them was abandoned?

A. Yes.

Q. How many such cases do you suppose there were?

A. There were 13 such cases.

Q. You can give figures a little later. I take it that in these cases, at any rate, some of the accused persons would have been arrested for considerably more than three weeks?

A. Yes.

Q. I rather think that only comparatively late in the year some cases were being commenced, and some were being abandoned.

A. It is so.

In such cases, be they few or be they many, the persons who have been arrested for some months have been kept on till decisions were given?

A. These decisions could not be arrived at at the beginning of a case. We found that at a later stage. When such trials were proceeding and we went over the evidence again, we found the witnesses were changing their statements and some of the witnesses disappeared.

Q. I think that, broadly speaking, all the cases arising out of the disturbances, be they grave charges or not, were dealt with by the tribunal and not by the ordinary court? Is that so?

A. Except one case. That is Imam Khan's murder case. There were two other cases which were tried by the tribunal but it was discovered that the sanction which was required under the Defence of India Act had not been obtained before the actual trial commenced.

Q. Therefore the ordinary courts dealt with them later?

A. In that case, the accused were convicted in the Sessions Court and sentenced to transportation for life.

Q. Did that come to the High Court?

A. It has not gone on appeal. It was disposed of only in the early part of December.

Q. During the time, the persons not yet charged before the first tribunal were being kept under arrest?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any provision for their being brought before a magistrate and for remands being taken from time to time?

A. Once the tribunal sat, they were under the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Until the tribunal sat, they were remanded by the magistrate and kept in jail.

Q. Were there any cases of bail being granted?

A. Applications were made for bail, but I do not think before a tribunal sat any bail was granted.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You arrived in Ahmedabad on the 15th?

A. Yes.

Q. You took up the investigation the same day?

A. Yes.

Q. In the course of this investigation, did you try to ascertain whether there was any organization behind these occurrences on the 11th and 12th?

A. I did.

Q. What was the result of your investigation?

A. I was unable to find any evidence as to any organization or conspiracy existing.

Q. Were you aware of any statement of Mr. Gandhi that this was prearranged and the educated people were the people who had arranged it?

A. That was put before me.

Q. Did you try to ascertain whether there was any substratum of truth in that suggestion?

A. I interviewed Mr. Gandhi on the subject and he told me that certain things had been known to him but he was not disposed to disclose them without the permission of the persons who had communicated them to him.

Q. He had information. He knew the names of the persons who had done what?

A. Organised the disturbances on the 10th and 11th.

Q. But he would not give the names of those persons?

A. No.

Q. Mr. Gandhi did not help you in that manner. Did you yourself make an investigation to find out whether there was any truth in that suggestion?

A. I did.

Q. With what result?

A. I was not able to find any evidence to substantiate that suggestion.

Q. Did you after the investigation make a report to Government or any higher authorities?

A. No.

Q. You made no report at all?

A. No.

Q. Neither to the Inspector-General of Police, nor to the Collector nor to the Commissioner nor to the Government?

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Mr. J. A. GUIDER.

[Continued.]

A. On the general result of my investigation?

Q. Yes.

A. No.

Q. Did you make any report as to any part of your investigation?

A. I made a report to Government on the result of my interview with Mr. Gandhi.

Q. Where is that report?

A. I have got it here; I shall read it out:—

“OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT, BOMBAY PRESIDENCY, POONA.

Poona, 17th April 1919.

DEAR CREERAR,

In accordance with the instructions contained in S. D. cipher telegram No. 336, dated the 16th April 1919, I interviewed Gandhi to-day and invited his assistance to discover the identity of the educated leaders alluded to in his speech, and others who took part in or instigated the riots, etc., that occurred in Ahmedabad on the 10th and 11th instant.

He said that certain names had been mentioned to him, but he felt that he could not divulge them to the authorities without the permission of the persons who had communicated them to him. He could not say that the names given to him were those of the leaders or instigators of the riots. All he could say at present was that they were present amongst the rioters during the disturbance. The persons who furnished the names did not bind him to secrecy, nor did he ask any of them whether they had any objection to the names being disclosed to the authorities. He thought, nevertheless, it would be a breach of confidence on his part if he communicated the names.

He was endeavouring to find out who the organisers of the disturbance were and was hopeful he would succeed. He had no intention of denouncing them, hoped to bring home to them by other means in accordance with his principles, the heinousness of their conduct and thought that if they were repentant and contributed towards the support of the relatives of those who had been killed and the maintenance of the wounded and maimed it would be a sufficient punishment. The Government should let bygones be bygones and refrain from penal action as the latter would not have any deterrent effect, but on the contrary would be aggravating. The bad character element in the city took advantage of the situation created by a few misguided spirits and continued to terrify respectable people by spreading rumours that there would be a revival of rowdiness in a day or two, compelling people to pay them money and supply them with grain. In reply to the query why the people submitted to this extortion and did not appeal to the police for protection, he said the people did not think the police could protect them and therefore preferred to submit to the extortion rather than complain. When I pointed out that it was absurd for the people to say, at any rate at present, that they could not rely on the police for protection as in addition to the ordinary strength, additional police had been drafted from other districts and were much in evidence all over the city and that besides these there were military guards and patrol constantly on the move who could be appealed to and were capable of dealing effectively with any rowdy characters who were inclined to be troublesome, he first questioned the presence of the military and when reassured on the point, concluded by saying the people preferred not to complain. I explained that it was this lack of co-operation on the part of the public which encouraged lawlessness and enhanced the difficulties which the authorities had to encounter in dealing with the situation and that unless the public realised their own responsibilities and acted up to them, the blame must remain at their own door. It was for Gandhi to impress on his followers the importance of co-operation to bring to justice persons who had acted in his name and yet violated all the principles which he preached, by committing murders,

destroying property and creating a state of anarchical chaos, which paralysed business and caused indescribable misery and suffering to thousands of innocent persons including women and children whose lives were placed in jeopardy while the disturbances lasted. He said he was doing his best to bring home to those who misbehaved themselves his disapproval of their conduct by having a summary of his speech printed and deputed his followers to visit the quarters where the turbulently disposed persons resided, to read out what he had said. He purposely restricted the advice to the printed summary, to avoid the risk of any discourser, saying something which might not agree with Gandhi's own views. He said that in response to his suggestion that those who had stolen arms to use in the riots, should surrender them, some had offered to do so to him, but he refused to accept them without the approval of the authorities and had addressed the District Magistrate on the subject. He advised the arm thieves to surrender them at the police station and to confess their guilt. He was hopeful that some would do so, but I said I was not so sanguine. The impression he gave me was that though he was prepared to denounce the rioters for his own benefit, that is to say, to swell the ranks of his followers, he has no intention to denounce them to the authorities.”

Q. Were these hopes of Mr. Gandhi that the guilty people would surrender to the authorities in any way fulfilled?

A. No.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—

Q. Mr. Guider, you I take it have kept in touch with the conditions prevailing in Ahmedabad district prior to the riots?

A. I have.

Q. You have received authentic reports in regard to them?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell us in what sort of state public feeling was at the end of March and beginning of April 1919?

A. Very much excited I should say.

Q. From your reports can you tell us how the people of Ahmedabad came to be excited?

(The President.—We have had that I think.)

(Mr. Kemp.—I was asking that in case there was any doubt of that being in evidence already.) Now I will take another point. With regard to the murder case of Imam Khan, were you attending the tribunal before which that case was tried?

A. I was.

Q. Were you there every day?

A. I was.

Q. You heard all the evidence that was given on oath?

A. I did.

Q. Was there any suggestion from the defence or from anywhere else that there was any provocation given by Messrs. Sagar and Steeples, or by either of them?

A. Except that in cross-examination Messrs. Sagar and Steeples were asked whether one or other of them had not used a revolver.

Q. Was there any question put to them or suggested that any abuse of Mr. Gandhi was indulged in?

A. No.

By the President—

Q. About the use of a revolver, was there any evidence that they used a revolver?

A. No.

By Mr. Kemp—

Q. Was that denied?

A. It was denied.

Q. Was there any evidence?

A. No evidence at all.

Q. Who was defending, was Mr. V. Patel?

A. No.

Q. Mr. Desai?

A. No.

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[Continued.]

Q. Any prominent Counsel?

A. No, I do not think so.

Q. Do you know where Mr. Sagar and Mr. Steeples are now?

A. In England, I believe.

Q. Did you in the course of your investigation after the riots endeavour to get any information from other people than Mr. Gandhi connected with the *Satyagraha* movement?

A. I did.

Q. Can you give me any of the names of the people you questioned with regard to this?

A. I questioned Mr. Yajnik, Dr. Kanuga and several inmates of Mr. Gandhi's *Ashram*.

Q. Mr. Kalidas Javeri?

A. And Mr. Kalidas Javeri.

Q. Would it be correct from what those gentlemen told you to say that on the afternoon of the 11th they remained inside their houses?

A. Yes; not in their own houses but they were in Mr. Vallubhai Patel's house which is just next to the Bank of Bombay.

Q. You might just turn to the statement* made by Mr. Kalidas Javeri. You might read what he said in regard to that, will you?

Witness reads:—"He went to Vallubhai's house and found him at home. Vallubhai asked him when he had returned from Bombay and what the news about Anasuya was. He replied he had arrived by the mail and that Anasuya was free. He remained in Vallubhai's house and learnt that the buildings in the compound of the Collector's office were burning and could see the smoke. He remained at Vallubhai's house for half an hour as he deemed it unsafe to go home. He heard shots being fired and saw one or two injured persons who had been shot, come running towards Vallubhai's house and fall on the road. Kalidas and Vallubhai were too terrified to go out of the house. Kalidas says they had not the courage and were perplexed. Asked why he did not go out to try and control and pacify the mob when he found they were burning the Collector's office, he replies that he had not the courage. After half an hour he walked home reaching there at 11 o'clock, and remained there till about 2 P.M., and then went to Krishnadas's house at Khadia. Cannot say whether he went again that day to Vallubhai's house or anywhere else up to 6-30 P.M. when he returned home. Adds, he now remembers he did go to Vallubhai's house at about 3 or 3-30 P.M. with Krishnadas on foot. Found Vallubhai at home and remained there till 6 or 6-30 when he went home, whether alone or with Krishnadas he does not remember. Did not venture out of his house till the next morning. He most probably, he says, went to Krishnadas's house that day but nowhere else."

Q. And was that the attitude taken up, so far as you know, by those whom you questioned?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you get any statement from Mr. Vallubhai?

A. Not with regard to these disturbances.

Q. You have already said you could get no assistance from Mr. Gandhi with regard to the carrying out of this investigation?

A. No.

Q. Did you attempt to get any assistance from any member of his *Ashram*?

A. I did.

Q. Did they give you any assistance?

A. They gave assistance so far that they admitted their presence when the riots were on and to having witnessed scenes of disorder, but when it came to a question of identifying anybody they said they refused to do so because it was against their principles.

Q. They also refused?

A. They made a reference to Mr. Gandhi who was in Bombay and he wired to me on the subject himself. The telegram reads as follows:—

"Inmates of *Ashram* have referred for my advice question of their having to identify those whom they were trying prevent incendiarism. I hope you will not press them for identification; they cannot consistently with *Ashram* principles give evidence against people. Our business is promote good-will between rulers and ruled and prevent violence wherever we may find it. It will be breach of privilege for us give evidence against prisoners whom we were preventing from committing crimes. I would plead with you not to draw public attention to our principle by forcing matters for I do not desire that our example should be copied by those who may not follow whole of our plan of life and who might simply make of it a convenience to screen offenders."

Q. I would like to give one example of the way in which assistance was refused to you. Another *Ashram* member Mr. Venayak Nurhar Barve, whom you asked to help you, and who was also present, said:

"I may be able to identify some of the persons whom I saw attacking the police. I do not however intend to identify anyone. In short I refuse to identify because it is against my conscience and against the *Ashram* rules to support physical force, I mean the punishment provided by law for persons found guilty of breaking the law. Another reason for refusing to identify the persons is that by doing so I would be looked upon as a Government spy."

Q. You have told us some of the reasons for which some of these tribunal cases had to be withdrawn against the accused at the last moment. Once the decision was arrived at that the case would have to be withdrawn against an accused person were steps taken as soon as possible to have the case withdrawn, to move the tribunal to drop it?

A. To move the tribunal to discharge the accused.

Q. Sometimes the reasons were that witnesses were doubtful at the last moment. Did you in any case in which you were doubtful have the witnesses up before you again and question them?

A. Yes, several cases.

Q. Do you know whether Mr. Gandhi asked for police assistance for a disturbance in Shahpur on the 16th of April?

A. I heard of it.

Q. Who did you hear that from?

A. From the District Magistrate Mr. Chatfield.

Q. It was suggested in the course of the examination of another witness, as showing that the feeling of the mob was not necessarily anti-European, that among other people Mr. Gillespie passed unmolested through the crowds, have you anything to say to that?

A. I think it was suggested that Mr. Gillespie passed unmolested. But I have a letter from Mr. Gillespie in which he says he was driving with Mrs. Taylor and Miss Macfaren and going towards the station and when they got into Richey Road they could not make any headway because the crowds were so dense, and the crowd commenced to stone them. They were able to turn round, and while they were retreating both Mrs. Taylor and Miss Macfaren were injured by stones. It was thought Miss Macfaren was seriously injured but it was later seen that the injury was not serious. Mrs. Taylor lives on the other side of the Ellis bridge. They thought it was not prudent to continue their journey home and so they sought refuge in Mr. Gillespie's bungalow which was close by.

Q. On what day?

A. On the 11th.

Q. What time?

A. Early in the morning, I think, because they were going to catch a train.

By Mr. Jivanlal V. Desai, Counsel to the Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad—

Q. You said you arrested 357 people. Who brought these people before you, the local police constables?

A. Some the local police and some my own staff.

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[Continued.]

Q. Surely there were more than 357 actually brought before you by the police?

A. They may have been brought before me but they were not arrested; produced before me.

Q. How many can you say?

A. I suppose four or five hundred.

Q. Beside these?

A. Possibly.

Q. They were brought before you? And surely there must have been cases that were not brought before you, that were arrested by the police and let off?

A. No, nobody would be let off without being brought before me.

Q. You have full confidence in the subordinate police constables?

A. Yes.

Q. You have had no complaint that the police constables of Ahmedabad made a good business out of this?

A. I did have a complaint from a mill-hand which was investigated and found to be untrue.

Q. What was the complaint?

A. Two mill employees said while they were proceeding from the mill to the bungalow of one of the engineers to do some private work, they were stopped on the road by two policemen and taken aside and money demanded from them. As they had no money, one who had a gold earring went and pledged it and raised four or five rupees, and until he brought that money his companion was detained, and after he brought it they were both released. The matter was investigated and found to be absolutely untrue. The earring was recovered. These two men were prosecuted and punished.

Q. Has there been any case in which a constable has been prosecuted for taking money under these circumstances?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. Was that the only complaint brought to you or was there more than one complaint?

A. Several complaints were brought up: they were investigated and found to be merely—

Q. There were several cases of police constables trying to make money?

A. No. There was another complaint about a man who was a witness in one of the cases, that he had gone about and extorted money from people of his own caste, *marwaris*, by saying that if they did not pay up, he would mention their names to the police as being implicated in the riot and have them arrested. As soon as that came to our knowledge we investigated the matter and had this man prosecuted and sent to jail. And there was another case which I might mention. There was a *bania* who went about amongst the poorer classes and said that the *mahajans* had subscribed a lot of money to secure counsel to defend all the rioters and if they had any relations who were in custody and were going to be charged in connection with these offences, they should make a statement; he would write out an application for them, but there were two or three rupees required as stamp fees, and he recovered this from them and cheated several people in this way. We ran him to earth also and got him convicted. He was not a policeman, he was a private individual. All these were private individuals.

Q. There was no case in which any police constable was convicted?

A. No.

Q. Did you make any enquiry as to the movements of certain *Satyagraha* leaders on the 11th?

A. I did.

Q. You know there was firing at the Bank of Bombay on the morning of the 11th?

A. Yes.

Q. And there were some casualties?

A. Yes.

Q. Who removed those wounded persons from the Bank?

A. Members of the *Satyagraha Ashram*.

Q. And certain pleaders also?

A. I never heard of any pleaders assisting.

Q. Did you hear that Mr. Kothari took part in the removal of those people?

A. No.

Q. Were these people first brought to Mr. Vallubhai's house?

A. No; I understood they dropped in front of his house.

Q. Mr. Vallubhai and other inmates of the house arranged an ambulance there to remove these people to the hospital?

A. These *Ashram* members were downstairs and they attended to them, but I understood Mr. Vallubhai and the others were upstairs and did not come downstairs at all.

Q. That is from Mr. Kalidas's statement*?

A. Mr. Yajnik's* and Kalidas's also.

Q. They remained upstairs and did not come down?

A. That was what I was told.

Q. You did not ask Mr. Vallubhai about them?

A. No, because I asked the other three.

Q. On the afternoon of the 11th did Mr. Vallubhai, Dr. Kanuga and others go to the civil hospital to enquire about the wounded men?

A. They did.

Q. They also walked to the city to find out about the wounded?

A. That I do not know.

Q. Do you know that Rao Sahib Harilal and Vallubhai walked through the city on that day?

A. No, I do not know.

Q. Vallubhai and Harilal are members of the municipality?

A. I believe so.

Q. Did these people take any part in trying to allay the panic on the 11th?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. Did you receive any assistance during the course of your enquiry from any Municipal Commissioners?

A. No.

Q. In any shape whatsoever?

A. No.

Q. Not even about arranging for the motor cars for the military?

A. I had no concern with that.

Q. Do you know Mr. Jehangir Rao?

A. Yes.

Q. And Mr. Pentonshaw Vakil?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they render you any assistance?

A. Mr. Pentonshaw is connected with the Millowners' Association and he was instrumental, I believe, in bringing about a meeting between me and the millowners.

Q. And he also assisted you in getting some men produced before you?

A. I asked him to send me any man who had complained against the police, that is all the assistance so far as I know. You mentioned Mr. Rao. I had him up and questioned him. He said that he witnessed the crowd going towards the *mandap* and witnessed several acts of rowdyism, and he was in the crowd, in fact marched with them 200 yards, but he said he was unable to identify a single individual. He is a resident of and has been all his life in Ahmedabad.

Q. That is another matter; one might live and die here and not be able to identify people in a crowd.

A. Possibly.

Q. Now coming to the Viramgam incidents, will you tell us the day on which the first arrest was made there?

A. The first arrest was on about the 14th or 15th April.

Q. Can you let us have the characters of the persons who were arrested, were they municipal corporators?

A. One was Vice-President of the municipality.

Q. Another a municipal corporator?

A. There were two pleaders, one Vice-President of the municipality, a medical practitioner, and there were some *mahajans*.

Q. Very rich people?

* Not reproduced.

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A. Yes, I believe so.
 Q. And they were arrested under the orders of Mr. Kissan?
 A. By orders of Mr. Kissan, the Sub-divisional Magistrate.
 Q. And applications for bailing them out on any security were made?
 A. I believe so.
 Q. And they were refused?
 A. By Mr. Kissan, I believe so.
 Q. And applications were renewed to offer any security to get them released on bail?
 A. Eventually they were discharged.
 Q. They were later on?
 A. When the investigation was completed.
 Q. How long did these people have to remain under arrest?
 A. About a couple of months I think.
 Q. More than that perhaps?
 A. Possibly.
 Q. Can you tell us when they were released, was it September?
 A. I think it was before September.
 Q. About August?
 A. I think it was about July. I am not sure. Mr. Vallubhai know.
 Q. He got Kachra Gandhi released?
 A. That was about the same time, but I had nothing to do with their arrest.
 Q. But they had to remain in custody for over two months?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And they were in the central jail at Ahmedabad?
 A. At Sabarmati.
 Q. And eventually the cases against all these persons arrested on that day were withdrawn?
 A. In fact they were not sent up for trial.
 Q. They were on the charge sheet?
 A. I do not think so.
 Q. You have been connected with this district for a number of years, not a very active connection, but as a distinguished police officer?
 A. I have had a lot to do with Ahmedabad.
 Q. You know that there was some trouble about the war loan in Viramgam taluka and there was a complaint in the *Bombay Chronicle* about it?
 A. I have read it.
 Q. And about the *zulm* of the revenue officers?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And there was some investigation made about the war loan contribution in Viramgam taluka?
 A. Not by me, personally I know nothing about the investigation.
 Q. Do you know the loans were ordered to be refunded?
 A. No, I did not know that.
 Q. You know that the *Awal Karkun* who was burnt there, had some part in connection with the raising of the war loan there?
 A. No, I did not know that.
 Q. Did you have any complaints about the methods employed by the underlings of the recruiting department in Ahmedabad and Viramgam? They may have been unfounded, but did you have any complaints made about the methods of these people?
 A. No, I received no complaint. At Ahmedabad there was one case.
 Q. There were some cases? A man from the Katra district came to Ahmedabad and said he had to go to Bombay and make all sorts of efforts to get his ward released?
 A. Yes.
 Q. The man came to you with the complaint?
 A. Yes, I believe he came to me.
 Q. And there were other similar complaints in Viramgam and other places?
 A. I have no personal knowledge of them.
 Q. Do you know the subordinate officers of this recruiting department?
 A. Those who were assisting in the recruiting?
 Q. And they carried away people from their legitimate employment?
 A. I cannot say that.
 Q. Do you know there was trouble in the Viramgam mills about this recruiting business?
 A. No.
 Q. You know the supply of grain has been controlled for some time?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Who were the controlling officers?
 A. The Collector.
 Q. The Collector of Ahmedabad?
 A. Of each district.
 Q. Mr. Bulakhidas had control in the Ahmedabad district?
 A. He is Personal Assistant to the Collector and in his official capacity he may have had some hand in it.
 Q. Was it a very successful operation?
 A. If you judge by the number of complaints in the papers I should say it was not a successful operation.
 Q. People could not get the grain they wanted?
 A. A lot of us could not get what we wanted.
 Q. That may be luxuries of life; these people could not get the necessities of life, not even kerosine oil?
 A. Well, I suffered from that myself.
 Q. The lower people?
 A. If people in better circumstances suffered from it, it follows that people in poorer circumstances must have suffered more acutely.
 Q. This lasted for some time in this district?
 A. Not only in this district; all over the presidency.
 Q. I am not concerned with any other parts.
 A. But the situation was the same here as in other parts.
 Q. It was an acute situation?
 A. Yes.

Subedar-Major KANHAYALAL BAHADUR, I.D.S.M., 1-97th Infantry.

By the President—
 Q. You are Subedar Major in the 1-97th Infantry?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Did you, along with two other Indian officers and 150 men, receive orders from Major Kirkwood about 9-30 on the 11th April to proceed to the city of Ahmedabad?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. You left the lines a little after 10?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you get any instructions as to the circumstances under which you were to fire upon the mob?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What were those instructions?
 A. We were told to fire if we saw any man attacking the troops or setting fire to any building.
 Q. Were your men provided with ammunition?

A. We had ammunition.
 Q. What was the ammunition?
 A. Ball ammunition.
 Q. The men had five rounds in their pouches?
 A. Each man had in all 100 rounds, but he kept 5 rounds in his pouch.
 Q. You arrived at the Delhi gate at about 11 o'clock?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. What did you find occurring there?
 A. When I approached the Delhi gate I saw it burning and about two thousand men collected there, and some of the men had *lathis* in their hands, some had stones.
 Q. Did you leave a force at the Delhi gate?
 A. Yes, Sir, 30 men with one Indian officer and one British officer.
 Q. Did you then proceed to Richey Road?
 A. Yes, Sir.

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Subedar-Major KANHAYALAL BAHADUR.

[Continued]

Q. Major Kirkwood and Lieutenant Fitzpatrick were leading?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What attitude did the mob adopt towards your force?
 A. When I reached the Richey Road, the mob dispersed in the side lanes, but when we proceeded further they began to throw stones at us, and when we told them not to do so they did not pay any heed to us.
 Q. When you arrived at Richey Road did you find that anything had occurred to Lieutenant Larkin?
 A. I saw two wounds on Lieutenant Larkin.
 Q. They were wounds inflicted by a sword?
 A. Yes, I saw also a broken piece of sword and I also saw a man lying near the point where the Delhi gate and Richey Road joins. He was dead.
 Q. Was there a large crowd at the fountain near the Pankor Naka?
 A. There was a big crowd near the fountain.
 Q. Had large collections of stones been made?
 A. Stones were collected in the baskets of vegetable-sellers, shops and in the *galis* or side lanes.
 Q. Were the stones being thrown from those collections?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Had the collections been made according to your view with the object of being used against the soldiers or the police?
 A. Yes, Sir, they were throwing stones at us and it seemed that they had specially collected the stones there.
 Q. I think you advanced towards the gate at Pankor Naka?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. How close did you get to them?
 A. When we had advanced about 20 yards from Pankor Naka towards the Richey Road, I saw a big crowd collected near a mosque. I put a picket near the mosque.
 Q. Did you receive any instructions from Major Kirkwood as to saying anything to the mob?
 A. Major Kirkwood asked me to explain to them well in Hindustani that the mob should disperse or else they would be fired upon, but they did not pay any heed to it.
 Q. You gave the explanation in Hindustani to the mob?
 A. Yes. I did give instructions, but they did not pay any heed. When I gave instructions the mob shouted out saying "*Mahatma Gandhi ki jai*" and began to throw stones at us.
 Q. Did you hear anything said by a *sadhu* as regards what was going to be done?
 A. There was a *sadhu* who had a curved stick in his hand, and he said "I want white flesh."
 Q. Were stones being thrown at the soldiers?
 A. On their heads.
 Q. Did Major Kirkwood explain to the crowd what the effect of this firing on them would be?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Did the crowd pay any attention to his warning?
 A. No.
 Q. Did Major Kirkwood then give certain instructions as regards firing?
 A. He told me to tell off three men to fire.
 Q. Did you do so?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And did they fire?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What was the effect of the firing on the crowd?
 A. There were four casualties.
 Q. Were you able then to drive the crowd back to some extent?
 A. The mob retreated at once.
 Q. Did you go in a different direction from Major Kirkwood?
 A. Major Kirkwood proceeded by the upper road and I went by the lower road.
 Q. Did Major Kirkwood give you any further instructions then as to further shooting?

A. Yes. He told me that as we were going by the lower road, if any people attacked us or if we were afraid for our lives, to fire on them.
 Q. As you proceeded along the lower road, did the crowd shout anything at you?
 A. A *sadhu*, I mean the same *sadhu* who had asked for white man's flesh, with some other gentlemen with him told me that we were not *Kshatriyas* and to lay down our arms and join them. He then waved his stick and a number of stones fell on us. I then asked three men to fire and they did so.
 Q. Were any casualties caused by this firing?
 A. Three men were wounded.
 Q. Did you go with a patrol to the Bhadar where Lieutenant Roberts had been sent by Major Kirkwood?
 A. I made arrangements in the said lanes and then went with a patrol to the Bhadar.
 Q. Thereafter you sent pickets to look after the safety of Europeans in different parts?
 A. Major Kirkwood ordered me to send pickets in various parts of the city to look after the safety of the Europeans.
 Q. Did you return again to the Pankor Naka?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Was there again a crowd there?
 A. A crowd was there, but when I explained to them the effect of firing, they dispersed.
 Q. What time was that?
 A. This was at about 2 or 2-30.
 Q. Were you asked about this time to give a party to Lieutenant Fitzpatrick to recover the dead body of Sergeant Fraser?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Did you see the dead body of Sergeant Fraser?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Was it seriously mutilated?
 A. It was brutally cut.
 Q. I think you received a reinforcement at about 7 and sent out patrols during the night?
 A. Yes.
 Q. On the morning of the 12th did you receive orders as to firing upon mobs if they were collected in larger number than 10 men?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. What were the orders you received?
 A. I received orders that fire should be opened wherever I saw a crowd of more than 10 persons. After that there were some printed notices to be distributed by the police. The policeman went in a *tonga*, but as the rubber tyres were cut he could not distribute them and returned them to me. I took a patrol of 10 men with me and went personally to distribute the notices in the city. Wherever I saw people collected I distributed notices to them and at cross-roads and side-lanes I pasted the notices on the walls of the houses. It was mentioned in the notice that if after 3-30 more than 10 persons gathered together, they would be liable to be fired at.
 Q. Did you on the afternoon of that day fire upon certain crowds?
 A. I fired at three groups of more than 10 men but there were no casualties.
 Q. Why were there no casualties if you fired on three different occasions?
 A. Not even wounded.
 Q. How did it occur? Was it bad shooting?
 A. I had raw recruits with me, and they had not received proper training.
 Q. Did they fire on the ground or in the air?
 A. Over the heads of the mobs.
 Q. Before you fired on any of these occasions, did you first give the mob intimation that they should disperse or did you fire without any intimation?
 A. I used to give a warning on every occasion and explained to them twice and thrice. When they did not care, I fired on them.
 Q. On every occasion you gave a warning?
 A. Yes.
 Q. At 8-30 were you relieved by British troops and did you return to the cantonment?

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A. Yes.
 By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—
 Q. You told us of a *sadhu* near the Pankor Naka who was making a lot of trouble?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Shouting about wanting white man's flesh?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. You had to fire on the crowd first of all at Pankor Naka, and then again when you were moving away from there?
 A. I fired between the mosque and the fountain.
 Q. And on both these occasions when there was firing the *sadhu* was there?
 A. Yes. He was first near the fountain and when Major Kirkwood went by the lower road the *sadhu* was there and he was again on the Pankor Naka and he asked for white man's flesh.
 Q. Why did you not order a man to pick out the *sadhu* and drop him then and there on either of these occasions?
 A. When the three men fired near the Pankor Naka, I had given orders to fire at the *sadhu*, but the *sadhu* was not injured, but three other men got injured.
 Q. On the second occasion how did he escape?
 A. The men who were standing by his side got injured when I gave orders to fire.
 By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay:—
 Q. Who was the non-commissioned officer you ordered to fire especially on this *sadhu*?
 A. Naik Parbhu.
 Q. When the bullet went high, what did you say to him?
 A. I took him to task for firing in the air. He said he made a mistake.
 Q. Have you already sworn on oath that evidence before?
 A. Yes.
 By Mr. Jivanlal V. Desai, Counsel to the Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad.
 Q. That *sadhu* has been tried and acquitted?
 A. Yes.
 Q. You identified that *sadhu* as the one who demanded white man's flesh, on oath?
 A. Yes, I did, it is true.
 Q. Was any *sadhu* hit in the arm?
 A. No.
 Q. Did you go to Bombay to identify any *sadhu*?
 A. I did not go to Bombay, but I identified him here.

Q. Did anyone go to Bombay to identify any *sadhu*?
 A. I do not know who went to Bombay, but I did not go.
 Q. Was this *sadhu* brought from Bombay for identification?
 A. I don't know that. I was then in England. I identified this *sadhu* in the police lines.
 Q. Where was he arrested?
 A. I don't know where he was arrested, but I heard that he was arrested in Bombay.
 Q. Did you hear that for the purpose of identification people went to Bombay?
 A. I do not know, I was not there.
 Q. You had orders to fire only when there were 10 persons collected, and not otherwise?
 A. I received orders on the 12th.
 Q. On the 11th what were your orders about firing?
 A. On the 11th I had received orders to fire at any man who tried to attack us or set fire to any Government buildings. For the night of the 11th I had received orders that if I saw one or two men I should ask them where they were going to, and if they did not give any answer, then I should fire.
 Q. In the afternoon of the 11th, your sepoy have fired, even though there were no crowds, no attacks on the military, and no houses burnt?
 A. Who says so?
 Q. I say so.
 A. If you tell a lie what can I say?
 Q. Did you keep a party at Ratanpol, Pankor Naka?
 A. I kept a patrol at Pankor Naka where the four roads cross each other.
 Q. How many?
 A. 15 men.
 Q. And are you sure they did not fire promiscuously without being attacked?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Who were the officers in charge?
 A. Lieutenant Fitzpatrick on the 11th and at the Pankor Naka myself.
 Q. Who was at the head of the Ratanpol one?
 A. I was.
 Q. Were you stationary there all the time?
 A. I used to remain there, but if I had occasion to go elsewhere, I gave orders as to how they should act and the sepoy obeyed my orders.

Rao Bahadur BULAKHIDAS BAPUJI TRIVEDI, Personal Assistant to the Collector of Ahmedabad.

By the President—
 Q. Are you Personal Assistant to the District Magistrate?
 A. I was till 7th November last.
 Q. In the evening of the 10th April last, did some *Satyagrahis* come to your room?
 A. Yes, they did.
 Q. Who were these gentlemen?
 A. Mr. Jivanlal, Barrister, who was accompanied by two or three other *Satyagrahis*.
 Q. Did they give you some information as to the doing of the crowd in Richey Road?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Were you requested to go to the scene of the occurrences?
 A. Yes, he did ask me.
 Q. And did you in fact go?
 A. No, because the District Magistrate was there.
 Q. I think Mr. Jivanlal left you and there was a mass meeting that night?
 A. Yes.
 Q. On the morning of the 11th, did you hear of certain occurrences in the city?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Was that about 11 in the morning?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What was it you had heard?

A. I had heard that many rioters had collected and burnt offices, the *Mandap*, the Collector's office, the City Magistrate's office, the Stamp office, the Enquiry office, the record room, the Registrar's office and some police offices.
 Q. Were you told that the mob had no friendly feelings towards you and were likely to do you harm if they could get at you?
 A. The mob was saying "let us go to Bulakhi's house and kill him." This was the first information which I received at my house just about the time I was preparing to go to office.
 Q. I think you left your house in charge of a servant and you asked your family to go to your brother's house?
 A. Yes.
 Q. As you went along the street, what did you find was the state of affairs?
 A. I saw people rambling in all directions in great numbers.
 Q. Was the city in a very disturbed condition?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And were you able to go straight to your office, or had you to take a roundabout route?
 A. I had to take a roundabout route.
 Q. On account of the crowds?
 A. On account of the information I received that these rioters were bent upon killing me.

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Rao Bahadur BULAKHIDAS BAPUJI TRIVEDI.

[Continued.]

Q. And on your way you got some information, I think, from Mr. Kavi?

A. Yes. He was at his house when I went to see him. He asked me where I was going to and said that there was no way for me to go to office because there were a lot of rioters collected on the way, and that I should stop there for some time. In the meantime the Swami Narayan's temple people had come in numbers.

Q. In consequence of this information, did you alter your plans?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you do?

A. I had to hide myself in the house of Seth Hirallal.

Q. Was he a friend of yours?

A. Yes.

Q. Had the house you entered two main *darwazas*?

A. Yes.

Q. Your host was a considerably aged gentleman?

A. Yes.

Q. And did he desire you to stay with him?

A. Yes. Of course when I went to his house and some time after the Swami Narayan's temple row was taking place, he asked me to hide myself in my brother's house just adjacent as he said it would be much safer there.

Q. Did anything occur to your house at this time?

A. Yes. A *shigram* was burnt and a cot in the *darya* was burnt, and a short time later, I heard that the whole house was ransacked.

Q. Did they do anything to your orderly and servants?

A. Yes, they were beaten.

Q. Anything taken out of your house?

A. Everything.

Q. What was done with the furniture?

A. Some was burnt, some smashed to pieces, and some taken away. All the ornaments, clothes and other things were taken away and my two iron safes were broken and thrown from the upper storey into the *chowky*.

Q. Now, how did you manage to get all this information?

A. Through the *Gumashita* of Seth.

Q. How was he able to get that information?

A. Because he was always attending on me and I sent him every now and then to see what was happening at my house.

Q. Did the crowd move to where you were?

A. Yes.

Q. What happened?

A. Nandlal was asked and he said Bulakhidas was not there. He asked them to search the house and if I was found, to take me away. Of course, they did not dare to go into his house and search for me because the Seth was a very respectable man and commands great influence in the city of Ahmedabad. They said they would come again in the evening at 8 o'clock. The Seth then became nervous and asked me to go and hide myself in some other place. So I went to Tajpur and had to take shelter in the house of one of the Sunnis there I stayed there for the day. The next morning I heard that the rioters were burning the *Astodia chowky* so I could not move from my hiding place. In the night I thought I should go to Gackwar's *Haveli* so I managed to go there telling Mr. Kothawala to ask for the necessary permission of the police guard to escort me there.

Q. Was it in order to protect you from the rioters? Your brother had circulated a rumour?

A. Yes, it was in the evening, to the effect that I was killed.

Q. Was that in the hope that the rioters would cease their search for you?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Had the mob any particular reason to entertain ill-feelings towards you?

A. I was the Personal Assistant to the Collector. I did my duties.

Q. Except that you were an official, was there any other reason?

A. I do not know if they had any ill-feeling.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You were told by the Collector that the crowd was shouting "Let us go to Bulakhi's house and kill him." Is that so?

A. No, I said my revenue *Naik* came and told me this. Q. The passage in your statement runs thus:—"The Collector and the District Superintendent of Police came in the motor and escaped with great tact, though stones were thrown. He told me that there was a crowd of thousands of people who were saying "Let us go to Bulakhi's house and kill him." Who is "he" there? Does it not refer either to the Collector or the District Superintendent of Police?

A. No, I mean the revenue *Naik*.

Q. Well, then that is very badly worded, and is confusing. So the *Naik* came and told you that the crowd was shouting to that effect?

A. Yes.

Q. What crowd was this? Was it the crowd that burnt the *mandap* or some other crowd?

A. I do not know which crowd it was. All I know is that the *Naik* told me that the crowd was coming to my house to kill me.

Q. You say "the crowds in the city were bent upon killing me?"

A. Some of them.

Q. Then what crowd was it? Was it the crowd which wrecked the Bhadar?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And that crowd persisted in following you and trying to get at you for two days?

A. I cannot say that.

Q. Did this crowd consist mostly of mill-hands?

A. They were backed up by some educated people.

Q. Now I want to know whether this crowd consisted mainly of mill-hands?

A. Yes.

Q. Then why was this crowd of mill-hands so inimical to you that they persisted for two days in trying to find you and to kill you?

A. Because they must have been instigated by some people. There were wire-pullers working behind the screen.

Q. You say that they were set up by some wire-pullers working behind the screen. Have you any evidence about this?

A. I have no tangible evidence with me. I can only give you some instances.

Q. What instances are they?

A. Instances to infer that this must have been done by some intelligent educated persons.

Q. When you say that this must have been done by some intelligent persons, do you refer to the attack on yourself or the attack generally?

A. All these acts include myself also.

Q. I am dealing now with the particular attack on you. You said with regard to the particular attack on yourself that there were people engineering from behind?

A. But how am I to know this? I do not know who were at the bottom and how it was all managed.

Q. The question I am putting is very simple to answer. You are simply confusing yourself. Now listen to me and answer my question to the point. I want to know whether you suggest that there were wire-pullers behind who set the crowd on to murder you?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Then who were these wire-pullers?

A. I do not know. It is my inference. I do not know their names. It is my inference that these mill-hands alone cannot perpetrate all these atrocities in the city.

Q. You are mixing up everything. Take first the personal attack on yourself. You have told me that you do suggest that there were wire-pullers behind the crowds?

A. Yes.

Q. That the personal attack on yourself was engineered by somebody who instigated the mill-hands to do it?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you sure about this?

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[Continued.]

A. I said I was.
Q. Now I want to know who do you think were the men that engineered this attack on you?

A. I cannot say. I have no tangible evidence on that point.

Q. Have you any evidence to justify you in making that suggestion?

A. Yes, one instance. A golden medal for Rao Bahadur was granted to me by the Government. During the ransacking of my goods and chattels, this golden medal was burgled, by some unknown person or persons along with other things during the loot on the 11th. Somebody seems to have addressed and posted it to the Dead Letter Office of the Bombay Post Office. From there it was sent to the Collector's office here and ultimately came back to me with defaced marks on it. So I conclude that the very fact of this deed having been done, goes to show that it could not have been committed by any illiterate person, but by educated people, people who knew how to read and write, and not by mill-hands.

Q. Is that the only reason for your conclusion that there were wire-pullers?

A. I have some official information that on the evening of the 10th mass meetings were held at the Ellis bridge and there some inflammatory speeches were made.

Q. Was anything said about you?

A. No, they were bitter speeches.

Q. Now, you see this is a very serious allegation that you bring forward. If there were educated wire-pullers engineering this attack on yourself, what other reasons have you besides this medal incident which you have stated for what it is worth?

A. I always keep aloof from the people from the official point of view.

Q. So then is that your second reason why you make this suggestion?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you any more reasons?

A. No.

Q. Now, these mill-hands who were striving to find you out for two days with the intention of killing you, could not have elected to do so without some reason. Why were they so inimical towards you?

A. I suppose they and their instigators must know the reason.

Q. So you cannot answer this question?

A. No.

Q. Is it true that you were a very unpopular officer?

A. I cannot say. It is for my superior officers to judge.

Q. I want a direct answer. I want your own personal view?

A. I believe I am popular, because I discharge my duties loyally and conscientiously.

Q. Surely it does not follow that because you are discharging your duties loyally that you are popular.

A. Well, I consider myself popular.

Q. Very popular?

A. I cannot say that. But I am popular.

Q. If you are really popular, how do you account for this bitterness against yourself inasmuch as these people wanted to kill you?

A. I said there may be some other persons at the bottom. The reason must be best known to these people I suppose. I cannot give you any reason.

Q. Were you in charge of the control of food supplies?

A. The Collector was in charge and I was under the direct control of that officer.

Q. In the administration of that department, did you become unpopular?

A. I do not think so at all.

Q. Were you all throughout your career a popular man?

A. How am I to judge, Sir? It is for my superiors to say.

Q. The attack on you seems to me very strange and inexplicable.

A. My assailants ought to know the reason.

Q. I want to know whether you can give any reason for it?

A. No, I cannot.

Q. Then, speaking on the general situation of the atrocities committed in Ahmedabad, I understood you to suggest that there were wire-pullers behind engineering the movement?

A. That is my inference.

Q. Do you suggest that?

A. Yes.

Q. What are your reasons for that suggestion?

A. Owing to the widespread agitation going on now-a-days. Ahmedabad was very quiet before, and you and I both know this fact because we belong to Ahmedabad.

Q. Have you any specific reasons for making that suggestion?

A. No.

Q. Your loss, I see, was a very heavy one—about 20,000 rupees.

A. Over that even.

Q. What did it consist of—cash?

A. Cash, ornaments, jewellery, furniture, cooking utensils, clothes. In fact everything was taken away.

Q. Was anything traced ultimately?

A. Yes, some was traced, and the accused taken up and dealt by the tribunal.

Q. They were convicted, I suppose.

A. Yes, about 8 out of 11.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You say that you discharged your work honestly?

A. No, I did not say honestly but loyally and conscientiously.

Q. At the same time you said that so far as you were concerned, you did not mix with people and you gave no opportunity to favour one party or groups of parties.

A. I gave no opportunity.

Q. May I understand that these are the qualities which the educated classes dislike and they made you unpopular?

A. Some of them might have.

Q. From the evidence that has been placed before us, I gather that notwithstanding what has happened in Ahmedabad and notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Chatfield had to maintain peace and order and had to do all these things, up to this time he is very popular. How is it that the mere fact of your being Personal Assistant to Mr. Chatfield makes you unpopular?

A. I was City Magistrate before that in Ahmedabad.

Q. One of the reasons given by you in answer to the President was that because you were Personal Assistant, therefore this attack was made. From the evidence placed before us from both sides, the Government and the people, it appears to me that notwithstanding what has happened at Ahmedabad, Mr. Chatfield is a very popular officer and he is considered to be a very sympathetic officer. How is it that simply because you are Personal Assistant to Mr. Chatfield, the attack was made on you?

A. I cannot tell. How can I check the opinion formed by others?

Q. Did you give any other reason?

A. I did my duty.

Q. Therefore the reason was not the mere fact of your being Personal Assistant to Mr. Chatfield?

A. You may take any view you like, but my own idea is I cannot say whether I became unpopular or otherwise. It is for the people to think. As a magistrate I had lots of cases to decide.

Q. Therefore it may be due to something done by you as a magistrate in deciding cases?

A. I was City Magistrate in Ahmedabad for a year or so.

Q. As City Magistrate you were unpopular?

A. I cannot say I was unpopular. People may think as they like. I did not consider myself unpopular.

Q. You were a witness in the looting case with regard to the looting of your house?

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[Continued.]

A. I was.

Q. An allegation is made that you wrongly identified certain property and that was demonstrated not to belong to you?

A. No; there was nothing of the sort.

Q. There is no truth in the allegation?

A. No; I did not identify any property. In Hindu families ornaments are of a similar nature. I did not identify. Females can identify. I cannot identify property, ornaments especially.

By Mr. Jivanlal V. Desai, Counsel to the Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad—

Q. You were City Magistrate of Ahmedabad for a year before your present appointment as Personal Assistant?

A. Yes.

Q. When did you cease to be Personal Assistant?

A. I think in November 1918.

Q. Till November 1917, you were City Magistrate of Ahmedabad?

A. I was for a year, I know.

Q. Before that you were magistrate at Kaira?

A. Yes.

Q. For a very long time?

A. Yes.

Q. You were a very popular magistrate there?

A. I cannot say whether I was popular.

Q. Were you unpopular?

A. I do not consider that I was unpopular.

Q. Were you considered to be a very strict magistrate?

A. I was a strict magistrate.

Q. Not a polite magistrate?

A. I am polite.

Q. We know you are polite. Were you considered not to be polite by the people?

A. I do not know whether the people considered me not to be polite.

Q. Whether you were a popular or unpopular officer, polite or otherwise, you do not know?

A. I was a strict officer as I said.

Q. Very strict officer all your life?

A. I cannot say very strict.

Q. Very harsh in punishing offenders?

A. I am not harsh in punishing offenders.

Q. You may not be harsh, but people considered you to be harsh?

A. Concerned party may think any way they like.

Q. You do not know what the public estimate of you was?

A. No.

Q. Had you the reputation of being a very blunt man in your official capacity?

A. I do not think. My superiors did not consider so.

Q. Not your superiors, but the public?

A. The public may consider anything they like.

Q. Parties who had to deal with you considered you to be very blunt?

A. I cannot know what opinion they hold.

Q. I daresay, Rao Bahadur, you were in the habit of abusing some of the criminals and witnesses in court?

A. Never.

Q. Never in your life?

A. Never in my life.

Q. You had not that reputation of abusing people in the court?

A. No.

Q. So from all accounts, your public career as a magistrate, as a Deputy Collector, and Personal Assistant, ought to lead to popularity?

A. It is for the people to say. I cannot say.

Q. Will it lead to popularity or otherwise?

A. It may or may not.

Q. Certain acts of yours might lead to unpopularity?

A. I cannot say. Persons generally judge according to their own standards.

Q. On the 10th April last year, you were Personal Assistant?

A. Yes.

Q. And you have referred in your statement to an interview which I had the honour of having with you. You have reported that interview?

A. I referred to that.

Q. Can you tell me who besides me were in your chamber with me? You said there were two other persons?

A. I do not know their names.

Q. You were attended by the City Magistrate and Chitnis?

A. Chitnis came there to obtain orders.

Q. Before I came there, the City Magistrate was in the chamber?

A. No.

Q. Are you sure of that?

A. That is what I think. You came all of a sudden.

Q. I remained standing for a quarter of an hour. You had not the courtesy to offer a chair. Did you give one?

A. I did.

Q. Still I remained standing. That is very good. I am used to standing in courts, and before you very often I have stood. It does not matter in the least. Do you mean to say that when I was talking to you, there were more than four persons in your room? You three officers, myself and two others. You are quite sure of that?

A. Two others came after you.

Q. They were in the verandah?

A. Outside.

Q. In the office room?

A. In the office premises.

Q. Was the attitude taken by me an attitude of suppliance or an awe-inspiring and terrorising one? What was the attitude?

A. You came and simply informed me what was going on.

Q. Was I in a suppliant mood or in a harsh mood?

A. Not in a harsh mood.

Q. I begged of you to go to Richey Road?

A. You did not beg. You requested me.

Q. As a man would talk to another man, and not as talking to an officer. I requested you several times to go with me to intercede on behalf of the public with the police?

A. You asked me that the police should not interfere and must be withdrawn. You requested me that I should arrange for that.

Q. I requested you to go with me; then you said that you were frightened, because the officials may take a wrong view of the situation that you were won over and perhaps the people might be afraid that you came to read the Riot Act?

A. I did not take any notice of that.

Q. What view did you take?

A. The view was that the District Magistrate was there on the spot and so I cannot give orders.

Q. Did you or did you not tell me that the attitude that you may take up might be misconstrued by the official world?

A. No.

Q. You did not tell me that?

A. Never.

Q. You did not tell me that it would be misconstrued by the people that you came there to order firing?

A. No. I did not say that.

Q. Perhaps your memory is short?

A. My memory would never be short.

Q. Did you make any report, confidential or otherwise, about this interview to your superiors?

A. I did.

Q. What did you say in the report? Kindly read it out. Let us have a copy of it.

A. This is the information that I have put in the statement.

Q. What report did you make?

A. That you had come there.

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Q. Did you make a report that we had come there for a malicious or nefarious purpose to your superiors, that Jivanlal came there to decoy you to that place?

A. I did tell that you came to my place.

Q. To decoy you?

A. I did not say that you came to decoy me. I do not think you meant to decoy. You told me that I or the City Magistrate would not be molested or hurt by the people, and that you were taking the responsibility. You said these words.

Q. Then you have not made any report to your official superiors to the effect that you were to be decoyed to Ratnapol to be murdered or assaulted?

A. Never.

Q. Are you quite sure of that?

A. Of course, I did not.

Q. Do you know that immediately after I left you, the police were withdrawn from Ratnapol?

A. I do not know that.

Q. And the crowd which collected dispersed that evening soon after I left?

A. The crowd had gone to the mass meeting.

Q. Soon after I left you they dispersed in the ordinary fashion?

A. That I do not know.

Q. You have not heard that?

A. No.

Q. Which way did you go home that night? Through Richey Road?

A. I went by the hospital side to my house.

Q. You walked home?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know that the crowd had gone to the City Magistrate's house on the 11th?

A. Yes.

Q. Simultaneously that the crowd came to your house?

A. Yes.

Q. That house was not looted?

A. No.

Q. There were many other Indian officials in Ahmedabad besides yourself. There were many Indian subordinate judges, and there are two Assistant Judges, who are also Indians, Vasudev and Mehta?

A. Yes.

Q. In your Department also there are so many Indians?

A. Yes.

Q. Mamladars?

Mr. A. H. RAIKES, Deputy Superintendent of Telegraphs, Ahmedabad.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Raikes, were you Superintendent in charge of the central telegraph office, Ahmedabad?

A. Yes.

Q. On the afternoon of the 10th April, did you get information of serious rioting in the vicinity of Kalupur?

A. Yes.

Q. Where is your office?

A. In the Bhadar.

Q. Was there any injury done to your office on the 10th?

A. None.

Q. At Kalupur was injury done to the telegraph office there?

A. Very minor injury.

Q. Then on the 11th, you might explain what occurred to your office?

A. The mob passed the office about 9 o'clock in the morning carrying sticks and bamboos and all manner of weapons. Then they passed on to the examination pandal which they set fire to about an hour afterwards. Then they went on to the Collector's office and some of the police courts, and they came back to the office about 11 o'clock and set it on fire.

Q. They set fire in a systematic sort of way?

A. Yes.

Q. Two Deputy Collectors?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Kothawala? They are all Indians?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you assign any person whatsoever why you were singled out of the Indian officials here?

A. I cannot assign any reason for it.

Q. Mr. Bulakhidas, in the case before the 1st tribunal, the case re looting your own house, there was a Bania arrested? Do you remember there was a Bania accused?

A. I do not know.

Q. A Bania from whose house ornaments worth about Rs. 2,000 or 3,000 were taken?

A. He was one of the accused.

Q. Who has been acquitted?

A. Yes.

Q. Those ornaments were identified to be yours?

A. I did not identify them to be mine.

Q. You may not have identified them. Mrs. Bulakhidas may have.

A. Yes.

Q. Certain ornaments were identified to be yours?

A. Yes.

Q. And they were finally proved not to be yours?

A. Because the evidence was not sufficient. That is what the tribunal said.

Q. The accused proved to the hilt that the ornaments were his?

A. The tribunal said that there was overwhelming evidence on the other side and our evidence was not strong enough. That is what I understand from the judgment.

Q. The accused proved that they were his?

A. They did not say they were not mine.

Q. The accused proved that the ornaments were his and were not yours?

A. Among Hindu families ornaments are of the same kind.

Q. You say your loss has been very heavy. We all deplore it. What was the cash kept in your house? You say Rs. 70,000 worth of ornaments and cash.

A. I think about Rs. 15,000 or Rs. 16,000.

Q. In gold, silver, or currency notes?

A. In cash.

Q. In silver?

A. Yes.

A. I will just read to you what I have got here. The trouble started on the 11th morning when it was reported that Mr. Gandhi was arrested.

Q. We need not go into it. I want to know exactly what occurred at your office. We have heard about Mr. Gandhi being arrested. What damage was done to the telegraph office?

A. The whole place was burnt down except for two rooms.

Q. What method did the mob adopt in connection with the burning of your office?

A. They collected all the furniture and set fire to it by using kerosine oil or petrol.

Q. They set fire to different places?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the mob go to the upper floor and start setting fire there?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the crowd below prevent people trying to save the buildings?

A. Yes.

Q. Then your godowns were set on fire?

A. Yes.

Q. Where are the godowns? Are they in the office?

A. One set is about 12 feet from the office, and the other one about 30 feet.

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Mr. A. H. RAIKES—concluded—Mr. DUNCAN E. BROWN.

Q. I see you say that they attempted to attack the bachelors' quarters?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they desist?

A. Yes.

Q. Why?

A. I cannot say; it may be for the reason that an Indian was occupying that bungalow.

Q. Did you send for the fire brigade?

A. Yes.

Q. I think it did not come for a considerable time?

A. Yes.

Q. And you found out afterwards that some of the fire engines had been destroyed?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you able to save anything?

A. We saved nothing.

Q. I think there was a strong breeze and the flames were fanned that day?

A. Yes.

Q. The whole building, I think, was burnt down with the exception of two rooms in the Deputy Superintendent's quarters?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the staff make their exit through the back verandah when the mob rushed the building?

A. Yes.

Q. You were at one end of the office?

A. Yes.

Q. Later on you were joined by a clerk?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you stay in the office hoping that something might be done to save the building?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you able to get into communication with Bombay?

A. Yes.

Q. What was your object?

A. To ask for assistance.

Q. And were you able to effect communication?

A. We got in communication with Bombay at about 2 in the afternoon.

Q. Did you get into communication direct?

A. Yes.

Q. And later on you got into communication with Agra?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you sent the following message to the Postmaster-General: "Office burnt down. Nothing saved. Mob rushed building breaking windows, doors, chairs, staircases, piled and set fire using petrol or kerosine. Whole building with surrounding outhouses gutted half dozen places simultaneously. Mob stood by till fire at height threatening any interference. Instrument tables chairs piled in heaps and set on fire. No possibility save anything. Fear cash drafts records everything lost."

Mr. DUNCAN E. BROWN of the Electric Power House, Ahmedabad.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Brown, were you connected with the electric power house, Ahmedabad?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 11th April 1919, when you were having breakfast, were you summoned by the office cable jointer?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the reason for your getting a summons?

A. This jointer ran into the dining room in a very nervous state and asked me to run away to the Camp and take my family away to the Camp as soon as possible, as there was a riotous crowd in the city burning and destroying all Government property and killing all Europeans.

Q. Where were you at that time?

A. In the premises of the electric power house.

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No opportunity enter burning building up to now fire engines at work. Stores Bombay to issue by to-night's mail forms stationery according previous indents." I do not follow the last sentence. What is it?

A. The last portion is to repeat the last indent.

Q. You addressed other telegrams to other places asking for stores?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you remain in communication all night with Bombay?

A. Yes.

Q. Did a break occur in the morning?

A. Yes.

Q. How did it occur?

A. I do not know. It may be attributed to the destruction of town lines.

Q. Cutting of the line?

A. Yes.

Q. For a while were you unable to communicate with anyone outside?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that in consequence of other lines being destroyed?

A. In consequence of the town lines being destroyed.

Q. Did you get information as to a number of posts being destroyed?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know anything about it?

A. Not beyond hearing that so many posts had been pulled to pieces. It is a matter of the Engineering Department, not of the Traffic.

Q. A certain amount of cash was stolen from the office that day?

A. It was not stolen, but was lost, burnt.

Q. You refer in your report* dated 31st October to a considerable amount of other cash that you could not recover then. Was it recovered later?

A. It was all recovered.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Throughout the day on the 10th you were in communication with Bombay?

A. Yes.

Q. Wires were cut on the morning of the 11th?

A. Wires were not cut.

Q. Communication was cut?

A. Communication was cut when the building was burnt down.

Q. Because the building was burnt down, that is why communication ceased?

A. Yes.

Q. Practically no wires were cut?

A. No.

* Written statement of Mr. A. H. Raikes.

Q. Your family was also residing there?

A. Yes.

Q. Where are these premises situated?

A. In Shahpur Road. About 200 yards away from the telephone office.

Q. I think you had known about some trouble the day before?

A. I had heard.

Q. Did you consider it advisable to telephone to the Engineer and Manager?

A. I did.

Q. What did you do then?

A. While in the act of telephoning to the Engineer and Manager on the morning of the 11th, the crowd arrived. I had to leave the telephone. I explained to the Engineer that the crowd had come and asked him to send help if necessary. I ran outside and went to one of the gates to ask the crowd what they wanted.

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Mr. DUNCAN E. BROWN.

[Continued.]

The crowd was very noisy. They were stoning and brandishing sticks. Several young men in black coats and black caps were scaling the gates and tried to hit me through the doors. I got at a reasonable distance and asked them what they wanted. They demanded that the plant must be shut down. This I immediately did. I walked to the power station door and ordered the driver to shut down the plant.

Q. What happened?

A. The stoning became all the worse and I was obliged to shut the front gate to prevent the machinery from being damaged. After this was done I looked round the office verandah where there was an armed guard. There should have been 3 constables and a *havildar*, but the 3 constables were practically hiding themselves on the steps leading to my residence. The *havildar* was in a fairly exposed position and being stoned mercilessly. I noticed that he was in a position ready for firing, and I thought it would be advisable to get him out of the way. As I was walking towards him, I saw 3 or 4 figures either push open the gates or climb, I am not sure which, and approach the constable; and I heard him fire a shot. At the time the shot was fired they must have been about 20 paces away from him. I immediately rushed up to him and noticed that something had happened to his rifle as if the empty cartridge had jammed. He was not able to load quick enough. I told him to go with me upstairs. I tried to push him upstairs, but he was rather keen on staying there and firing but he was not able to do it. I did not know why, and I walked away upstairs calling out to him again. He followed. Four policemen remained on the front verandah. All this time the crowd was shouting "*Sahib mardalo*" ("Kill the Sahib"). Realising that it would be inadvisable to have my family there I thought it best to run downstairs again which I did.

Q. I think you had other attendants who were guarding the premises downstairs?

A. They were not exactly guarding; they were trying their best to see what they could do.

Q. To keep the crowd away?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you remain downstairs?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you do there?

A. I at first attempted to enter the office from the back door but this had been locked. On my turning round I was struck over the right eye with a large stone. The stone was evidently thrown by a lad. I then attempted to approach the crowd, and I knew it was hopeless. I fully expected a hammering and I approached the crowd and got another blow over the nose from a brick.

Q. Blood was flowing from your nose?

A. Yes; eyes and nose. I approached the crowd holding up my hand and asked them not to throw stones. But they rushed forward, evidently to finish their job. They were frustrated to a certain extent by a young Muhammadan who partially protected me, by his own body. I was then surrounded and I received one blow from a *lathi* across the back of my head.

Q. You were conscious?

A. Not unconscious. It was practically a knock-out but it was temporary. I dropped on my knees and while there I received 3 or 4 blows on the back. I immediately got up and fled into the power house from the back door.

Q. I think you found your staff in the power house?

A. Yes.

Q. And they did what they could?

A. Yes.

Q. Why did you go into the Cooler room? To wash your face?

A. Yes. When I got into the power house, the majority of the staff rushed out closing the door behind them.

Q. You were asked to go away from there?

A. Yes.

Q. Why?

A. The station fitter and one of the turners rushed into the power house and asked me to hide myself and get away into the stores as the rioters had decided to search the power house, as they wanted to kill me.

Q. So far as you were concerned, was there any ground for your being unpopular with the mob?

A. Absolutely none.

Q. What possible ground of objection could the mob have towards you?

A. I have no idea.

Q. Then did you hear the mob shout out?

A. Yes.

Q. What were they shouting?

A. "*Sahib mardalo*: *Topivala mardalo*" ("Kill the Sahib; kill the man with a hat.")

Q. I think so far as your family was concerned they were not molested?

A. No.

Q. How was that?

A. I can only give you a reason. From what I have heard, this cable jointer was a workman. He was dressed in workman's clothing. He was with several of these rioters who attempted to run upstairs by the back steps. He ran up to them and told them to come down again as he had been through the house and there was nobody there. These rioters believed him and came down.

Q. Then I think you were attended to by the St. John Ambulance Association?

A. Yes.

Q. And later on a detachment of native infantry arrived and escorted you and your family to the "three gates." And from there where did you go?

A. From there I went to the Alliance Mission headquarters at Khanpur.

Q. By that time was the city quiet?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Have you any reason to suppose that the rioters were anti-European?

A. Yes, certainly.

Q. A good deal of reason?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you shut down the plant immediately you were asked to do?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you tell the crowd that you were shutting down the plant?

A. I told them myself. My men told them. There was no necessity to tell them, because they heard the machinery and they saw the machinery.

By Major General Sir George Barrow—

Q. You say that the crowd was anti-European. Is it simply because you were a white man that they attacked you?

A. The natives really think that the Europeans are associated with the Government.

Q. Exactly.

A. That might be a reason.

Q. None of your Indian employers were assaulted at the same time as you were?

A. They were not with me when I was assaulted. I was alone at the time I was assaulted.

Q. They did not enter the power house when you entered?

A. They did not.

By the Hon'ble Mr. T. Smith—

Q. Is your company a limited liability company?

A. Yes.

Q. Who are the owners—shareholders?

A. A number of the inhabitants of Ahmedabad are shareholders in this.

Q. A number of Indians are shareholders?

A. Yes. The agents of the company are Messrs. Killick Nixon. There is a feeling that the Killick Nixons are Government people.

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Mr. DUNCAN E. BROWN—concluded—Mr. D. A. LAHER.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay.—

Q. Have you any reason to suggest why actually the electric machinery was not damaged?

A. Yes. I can give you a reason. We were supplying power to the Jubilee mill and if the machinery had been damaged we should not be able to supply power.

Q. Any other reason?

A. I was told that some of the staff intervened and told the rioters not to destroy the property as it was not Government property.

Mr. D. A. LAHER, student of the Gujarat College, Ahmedabad.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Laher, you are a student of the Gujarat College, Ahmedabad?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You came to know of the disturbances on the afternoon of the 10th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Had you to proceed along the Richey road?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. As you were going along the Richey road were there crowds of people collected?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were they doing anything?

A. They were shouting *jais*, and when they saw our uniform they took up an hostile attitude.

Q. How did they show it?

A. Stones were thrown at us and we heard some abusive language.

Q. Why were you singled out for abuse?

A. The feeling of the public was not very good towards the Government and the Government they identified with Europeans; and as we had *khaki* uniforms they thought that we belonged to Government.

Q. When you got to the Prem gate did you find a police squad there?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was there a large crowd of people there?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What was occurring there?

A. They looked to be quiet, but a few stones were occasionally flung here and there.

Q. What exactly was it that you were doing on that occasion?

A. We went out to treat persons who might get wounded and remove them to the hospital.

Q. Did you have to remove some people in the night?

A. Before we went nearly all of them were removed. We treated one or two who were wounded there.

Q. After treating them you returned at about 7-30?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On your way some people requested you to take off your uniform?

A. Not a request. We were demanded to take off our uniform.

Q. Did you refuse to take it off?

A. I tried to reason with them, but I could not succeed.

Q. You did not take off your uniform?

A. Certainly not, Sir.

Q. You managed to keep it and proceeded along without being actually forced to do so?

A. No, Sir. They thought that we would yield very easily; as we did not, they let us go, but they flung a few pieces of tiles at us.

Q. Next morning, were crowds of excited people collected in different parts of the town?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was carriage traffic stopped?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On that day did you go to the ambulance headquarters?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Where are they situated?

A. At a distance of 500 yards from my place.

Q. Where is your place?

A. At Delhi gate, Sir.

Q. When you were at the head-quarters, did you see smoke rising from the town?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You put on your uniform?

A. I thought of going home and putting on my uniform.

Q. You did proceed home to do that?

A. I tried.

Q. As you proceeded, did you come upon a number of crowds of people?

A. I did not come across them. I saw they were going in other directions. At the cross-road, there is the ambulance head-quarters. We have to go out a few yards and there is the high road of Mirzapur. To go to my house I have to go in one direction, and the mob was going in another direction. The Grand Hotel is 50 paces from there. The mob came there. Their attitude seemed to be very furious. They went to the hotel and demanded of the proprietors if there were any Europeans there. The proprietor of the hotel came out and assured them that there had been no Europeans there since the evening of the previous day.

Q. Why did they want the Europeans?

A. They were saying that if they got them they would kill them.

Q. Did they rush then to the electric power house?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you continued in the direction of your own house?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see at this time Lieutenant Macdonald going on foot?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you saw him, what did you say to him?

A. I thought that it was not very safe for him to proceed in the direction of the mob. I thought of telling him to go to a place of safety.

Q. You did persuade him to accompany you to take shelter at the Delhi Chakla Chowky?

A. Yes.

Q. When you had got to this chowky, what occurred?

A. The mob immediately came and began throwing stones at the gate. The situation appeared to be very grave and we wanted some help immediately; because the mob was a big one and there were only a few policemen upon whom we could not rely much. So I tried to call the District Magistrate. He was out at the time. So I called the District Superintendent of Police on the phone but he too was out. Shortly afterwards the District Magistrate came to his bungalow and inquired on the phone why we wanted him. Lieutenant Macdonald told him that he was in bad need of immediate help. We were assured by the District Magistrate that the military would be coming.

Q. Did you decide to go out yourself and try to get help?

A. First I did not think of going myself. I thought of remaining by the side of Lieutenant Macdonald; but nobody would go there and immediate help was required; and I thought it better to go there.

Q. Did you cycle to the Camp?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You explained the situation to the District Magistrate?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You got troops despatched in motor lorries to the scene?

A. I saw them despatched.

Q. Did you go back to the chowky yourself?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you got back, what did the mob do?

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Mr. D. A. LAHER—concluded—Mr. J. B. TYABJI.

A. I was at a short distance away from the troops. As soon as they saw the troops they ran away.
 Q. But for that help by the troops, what would have been Lieutenant Macdonald's fate in your opinion?
 A. I think they might have done him some serious harm.
 Q. Did you then go to the Khas Bazar to get some help for Mr. Brown?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. In your way, did you notice a board at the Grand Hotel?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. What did it intimate?
 A. The words were written there "*Bande Mataram*—the hotel is closed to-day" in vernacular.
 Q. Were military cordons thrown out near the hotel?
 A. Not near the hotel, but in the bazar.
 Q. Was the mob in the bazar in an excited state?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. What was it doing?
 A. They were throwing stones and shouting aloud.
 Q. There were some Indian soldiers there?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. You went to Mr. Brown under their escort?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. You went home at about 12.30. As you were going home, did you find a big crowd near the Delhi gate Chowky?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. That is at the Delhi gate?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. What was the crowd doing there at the time?
 A. They were burning and destroying the *chowky*. They took out the things from the *chowky* and were burning the woodwork outside together with the fire brigade lorry, lines, etc., and all those things that could be burnt.
 Q. Later in the afternoon, did you again go to the Khas Bazar?
 A. Yes.
 Q. That is about 5?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Was firing going on then?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Were certain people wounded there?
 A. Yes.
 Q. You attended to them?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. How many did you attend to?
 A. I think I treated three patients there.
 Q. What attitude did the mob take towards you?
 A. They did not like our presence there and they insulted us and I thought it was wise to leave that place.
 Q. I think your officer had been informed that you really went on assisting the wounded?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Is it due to the circumstance that you were wearing uniform you got into difficulty?
 A. Yes, Sir.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You are a student of the Gujarat College? What class?

Mr. J. B. TYABJI, Executive Engineer, Ahmedabad.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Tyabji, you are an Executive Engineer in Ahmedabad?

A. Yes.

Q. You were in Ahmedabad on the 11th of April last?

A. Yes.

Q. On that day I think you had occasion to motor through the town?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What route did you take?

A. Inter Arts.

Q. In these disturbances, when you were moving about, did you observe any college student taking part in the rioting?

A. None, Sir.

Q. No student at all?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Were they taking part in anything?

A. I did see some of them going about.

Q. You said that a carriage was coming from the Camp side with curtains drawn but that female *sarees* and ornaments were seen outside. Then it was the inmates of the carriage that fired upon the mob?

A. I came to know of the firing afterwards. There was no ammunition in the bazars, so they wanted some ammunition from the police head-quarters, so they thought it best to put on female dress so that the rioters might believe that there were some females in the carriage and they might go away. But they did not do so.

Q. Who were these people?

A. I do not know; some armed police.

Q. They put on female dress and also some ornaments?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And when the mob were going to attack them, they greeted them with firing?

A. The mob first attacked, and hence they opened fire.

Q. When you saw these crowds in the disturbances, while you were attending to your work, what were they saying? They wanted to see Mr. Gandhi?

A. What time, Sir?

Q. You refer to that at the end of your statement.

A. That relates to the 13th not 12th.

Q. You say "Near the railway station I saw Rao Bahadur Ramanbhai persuading some shopkeepers to open their shops." That was on the 13th?

A. Yes, Sir.

By Mr. Jivanlal V. Desai, Counsel to the Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad—

Q. Mr. Laher, on the 10th April you went to Prem gate?

A. Yes.

Q. What time did you get to the Prem gate?

A. We reached at about 6.15.

Q. Where did you get your litter from?

A. From the ambulance head-quarters.

Q. You had a report of some casualties at the Prem gate?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What time did you get it?

A. At about 5.30 or 6.

Q. You had a telephonic message?

A. No, Sir. A person from Kanuga's dispensary came to inform us. He said that firing had taken place at Richey Road.

Q. There was firing and there were some casualties?

A. Yes.

Q. That man came from Kanuga's dispensary saying that your help was wanted?

A. Yes.

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Mr. J. B. TYABJI.

[Continued.]

Q. Did that necessitate your going through part of the city again?
 A. Through the same part.
 Q. Did you notice anything on that occasion?
 A. Well, I met a similar crowd.
 Q. Were you with any one or were you alone?
 A. The second time I went alone.
 Q. On that second occasion you noticed the burning of the buildings I think?
 A. On my return.
 Q. Were you joined by any one when returning?
 A. At home.
 Q. Was that by Mr. Ali?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What did you do then?
 A. I tried to put out the fire in the *mandap*.
 Q. Were you successful?
 A. No, Sir.
 Q. How was that?
 A. I was too late and it was too sudden.
 Q. I think you found that the hose of the fire-engine had been destroyed?
 A. So I learnt.
 Q. Did the crowd see that you were endeavouring to put out the fire?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. What attitude did they take up?
 A. They threw stones at us.
 Q. Where did you go when they threw stones?
 A. Just outside the compound and even inside when I sent men up to my outhouses which were on fire.
 Q. Were you accompanied by your wife?
 A. She was near there.
 Q. I think in consequence of the attitude of the crowd you thought it well to stop at home to put out the fire?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Were you anxious about the safety of Mrs. Tuke at this time?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. What enquiries did you make about her?
 A. I sent a man to her place first and then went there myself.
 Q. As you were going there did you come across a crowd?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. And did you notice a man who was leading the crowd?
 A. Well, I did not meet any dense crowd, and I noticed one man who looked as if he might have influence with the people.
 Q. Did you speak to him?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. What conversation did you have with him?
 A. I just asked him what he was doing and told him that if Mr. Gandhi heard of it it would be a great grief to him.
 Q. What did he say to that?
 A. He asked me to mind my own business.
 Q. Did he say anything about what he would do as regards burning buildings?
 A. Yes, he said they would burn everything down until Mr. Gandhi and Miss Anasuya were set free.
 Q. I think you found yourself stopped at the gate. Which gate do you refer to?
 A. That is the eastern gate of Colonel Tuke's bungalow.
 Q. What stopped you there?
 A. The gate was burnt from inside.
 Q. I think a number of people were collected near the gate?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Were they asking you whose house it was?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you say anything to that?
 A. I said it was Lady Chinubai's, and—
 Q. Why did you say that?
 A. Well, it was true.
 Q. I see, it was her house. Then did the people crowd round you?
 A. Yes.

Q. And did they search you?

A. Yes.

Q. What were they searching you for?

A. For arms.

Q. Who were the people who composed this crowd near Mrs. Tuke's bungalow?

A. They looked to me like mill-hands. There were some boys among them.

Q. There were none of the better class people?

A. Not that I could make out.

Q. Was anything done to you beside your being searched for weapons?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Was your coat not torn?

A. That was in the search.

Q. And did anything happen to your purse?

A. Yes, my purse was picked.

Q. Were you afraid yourself that you might be severely handled by the crowd?

A. No, Sir.

Q. They did not attempt any violence?

A. When I was being searched I did not feel at all comfortable.

Q. But in fact they let you go without subjecting you to violence?

A. Yes.

Q. How long would you be near the bungalow at this time?

A. A few minutes, I think.

Q. Was anything said to you as to what was to happen to the bungalow itself?

A. Not by the men in the crowd, but the man who accompanied us I think said that it would be burnt down.

Q. Who was the man that accompanied you?

A. I could not tell; he looked like a jobber in a mill.

Q. He had been a member of the mob himself?

A. No, he did not come out of the mob; he was standing about.

Q. Had he influence with the mob?

A. I could not tell.

Q. Why was he accompanying them?

A. I suppose he had some influence.

Q. At the time did you not think he was anxious that you should leave in order that the mob might have a free hand?

A. I suspected so.

Q. Had the people at the bungalow not seen a revolver in the possession of Mrs. Tuke?

A. I do not know if they saw it but they knew of it.

Q. What was said about the revolver?

A. They said there was a lady inside with a revolver and they wanted to be assured that it would not be used against them.

Q. You stopped sometime near the outhouses of the Assistant Collector's bungalow?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Where are they?

A. Behind the bungalow. I think I would call it at the front of the bungalow because the gate is really behind.

Q. Were you visited there by one of the students?

A. Not there, after we came back in the house.

Q. Did you go into the Tukes' bungalow?

A. Into the verandah.

Q. Did you send then for help?

A. Yes, Sir, to the hospital.

Q. How long did you remain at the Tukes' bungalow?

A. I should think about an hour or a little more.

Q. Did you then leave?

A. Yes.

Q. At that time did you consider Mrs. Tuke was in safety?

A. Yes.

A. Yes.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. When you were proceeding in the morning towards Shah Alam you passed a crowd of people?

A. Yes.

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Mr. J. B. TYABJI—concluded—Mr. AMBALAL SARABHAI.

Q. And you say they were being addressed by somebody. Who was addressing them?
 A. I have no recollection of the gentlemen now, but I think they belonged to the Home Rule League, pleaders.
 Q. What were they telling the people?
 A. Persuading them to go away.
 Q. What effect was that persuasion having on the crowd?
 A. Some individuals I saw addressed did turn back.
 Q. Then later on when you went to enquire about Miss Chubb?
 A. It was the second time, I noticed this; the first time I passed through I saw the gentleman addressing them but did not stop.
 Q. The second time you stopped?
 A. The second time I passed on foot.
 Q. And you stopped and heard what he was saying?
 A. Yes, a little.
 Q. And he was asking the crowd to disperse?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And it had some effect on some part of the crowd?
 A. Yes.
 Q. You speak of Mr. Muzumdar, Barrister, addressing them?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Was that at another place?
 A. No, just there.
 Q. Where the other man was also addressing them?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And what was he telling them?
 A. Asking the men to go home quietly.
 Q. And was that having any effect?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Then you went to the place, where you were told that the mob were pulling down the *mandap*?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And you say that you asked your informer to go and tell the gentlemen who were harranguing the men a short distance off?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Who were these men?
 A. The same men whom I have just mentioned.
 Q. The people of the Home Rule League you mentioned and Mr. Muzumdar?
 A. Yes.
 Q. They were still in the same place, or had they shifted somewhere else?
 A. In the same place.
 Q. You had heard them persuading the crowd to disperse therefore you referred this man to them?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Then you say that shortly after that you noticed Mr. Jivanlal Desai coming to the spot?
 A. Yes that is in the *maidan*.
 Q. How long after you heard that the *mandap* was being smashed?
 A. Soon after.
 Q. And where did Mr. Desai come from?
 A. He must have been in the neighbourhood.
 Q. And you spoke to him, or he spoke to you?

Mr. AMBALAL SARABHAI, Millowner, Ahmedabad.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Ambalal Sarabhai, you have large commercial interest in Ahmedabad?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. You are owner of a number of mills here?
 A. Two mills are under my management.
 Q. You were not in Ahmedabad during the series of riots on the 11th?
 A. No, Sir.
 Q. You were some distance away?
 A. I was at Matheran.
 Q. And you returned to Ahmedabad on the afternoon of the 12th?
 A. Yes.

Q. Did you return in the same train as a number of British troops from Bombay?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. The troops that had been in a train that was derailed?
 A. I was in the train that followed.
 Q. And your train brought along a number of British troops?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Did you learn that a train had been derailed?
 A. We were told about it at a roadside station.
 Q. I think you also learnt that Mr. Gandhi had been arrested?
 A. Yes, Sir.

A. I think it was he who asked if there was a telephone in the house.
 Q. You say "Shortly after I noticed Mr. Jivanlal Desai, Pleader, come up to help us."
 A. Yes in putting out the flames on the *mandap*.
 Q. What was he doing?
 A. He was removing the furniture from the *mandap* and that sort of thing.
 Q. When he was doing that what was the crowd doing?
 A. First there was very little crowd in evidence. I think they must have gone off to the Collector's *Kacheri*.
 Q. And Mr. Jivanlal Desai was trying to extinguish the flames and save the furniture?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Was he alone or was he helped by other people?
 A. There were several other gentlemen.
 Q. Who were they?
 A. I do not recollect any of them.
 Q. There were several gentlemen with him? How many?
 A. May be half a dozen.
 Q. And they were also doing the same?
 A. Yes.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—
 Q. Mr. Tyabji, this time when you were going through the crowd had you a hat on?
 A. Yes, Sir, in the morning.
 Q. Did you continue to keep your hat on?
 A. No, later I removed it.
 Q. Will you tell us for what reason?
 A. I thought it was safer.

Q. You were going to say a moment ago,—you told us you told the mob this house was Lady Chinubai's because it was true and then you stopped what you were going to say?
 A. I thought it was better for the crowd not to know that there was an English lady in it.
 Q. There is usually a name-board outside with the name Colonel Tuke on it, is there not?
 A. There is now.
 Q. Had the servants taken that in? Was there one at the time?
 A. I do not recollect.
 Q. You do not know whether the servants had taken it in?
 A. No, I do not.

By Mr. Jivanlal V. Desai, Counsel to the Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad—
 Q. Mr. Tyabji, when you were trying to extinguish the fire you could not get water from the municipal main. Was there any water available there?
 A. I do not recollect.

Q. Some time long after I came the fire-engine came up if you remember, and even then water was not available?
 A. I don't recollect.

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Mr. AMBALAL SARABHAI.

[Continued.]

Q. And had you a communication from the secretary of one of your mills that the mill-hands had gone out on strike?
 A. Yes, I had a wire from Mr. Patel informing me about Mr. Gandhi's arrest, and the next day, I think, I had a wire from my secretary informing me of the strike in the mills.
 Q. I suppose you were anxious to return to Ahmedabad and see what could be done to bring the strike to an end?
 A. According to my original programme I was due here on the 12th.
 Q. I suppose you would be all the more anxious to get back in consequence of this?
 A. I started earlier from Matheran because I wanted to know what had happened.
 Q. You are a brother of Anasuya Ben?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Where was she on the day of the riot?
 A. I met her on Friday in Bombay.
 Q. Did you inform her of the strike?
 A. I showed her the telegram I had received.
 Q. I see she had great influence with the mill-hands in Ahmedabad?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And you asked her to give you a note to them?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Asking them to resume work?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did the Commissioner, Northern Division, travel in the same train as you?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. The Commissioner desired you, I think, to take certain action?
 A. He asked me to send a telegram.
 Q. To Mr. V. J. Patel?
 A. Yes, I did so.
 Q. Mr. Patel was well known to the mill-hands?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Did you at the different stations notice any signs of excitement among the people?
 A. I saw it, but whether at Anand or Nadiad, I am not sure.
 Q. You did not see any serious disturbance?
 A. I saw telegraphic wires were cut and some poles were bent.
 Q. As the train steamed into Ahmedabad railway station did you hear some shots fired?
 A. Yes.
 Q. I think you did not know anything about the circumstances under which they were fired?
 A. I knew that there was disturbance.
 Q. Did you see some European mill officers with fire-arms on your arrival at the station?
 A. Yes, Sir, in a mill bungalow.
 Q. As far as the station was concerned, everything was quiet?
 A. There were not many persons on the platform.
 Q. There was a strong military picket at the time?
 A. Yes.
 Q. You were, I think, in ignorance of the proclamation that had been issued on that morning as regards people not collecting in numbers?
 A. I had not known about it.
 Q. Were you anxious as to your sister not being arrested?
 A. I had seen Mr. Gandhi in Bombay on Friday and also my sister. Till I arrived here I did not know that there was a rumour that they were arrested, and I was anxious that Mr. Gandhi should be set at liberty.
 Q. I think you went to the house of Mr. Desai?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. With a view to ascertaining the best way of communicating with people?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you take every opportunity of informing all the people you came across that neither Mr. Gandhi nor your sister had been arrested?

A. At the station they asked me and also just outside the platform, whether my sister was set at liberty, and I told them that both of them had not been arrested.
 Q. Then I suppose that news was received with welcome everywhere?
 A. Yes, it was.
 Q. Did you stop your car somewhere near the Panch Kuwa gate?
 A. Yes, I did.
 Q. I think there were a number of people scattered about in the verandahs of houses there?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did these people collect round your car and you gave them the news?
 A. Yes.
 Q. I think at that time you were not aware of the existence of Martial Law and that collections of people might have been fired at?
 A. No, I was not aware of it.
 Q. Nothing untoward occurred?
 A. No.
 Q. Did you go to the bungalow of Mr. Chatfield?
 A. Yes, later on.
 Q. What time was it?
 A. Between 2 and 3, I am not quite sure about the time.
 Q. Did you wish for permission to wire to Mr. Gandhi?
 A. Yes.
 Q. At that time it was not possible for any private individual to send a wire?
 A. There was no telegraph office.
 Q. What was your intention in communicating with Mr. Gandhi?
 A. On the previous evening I was told in Bombay that he was intending to proceed to Delhi very soon, and after coming to my house when I heard of the bloodshed and rioting, I thought that if Mr. Gandhi again went to Delhi and got himself arrested, there might be a repetition of the troubles, so I wanted to wire him and tell him not to court arrest.
 Q. When did you hear about the order that had been issued that more than 10 people should not collect at one place?
 A. At Mr. Desai's house.
 Q. Did you have a conversation with Mr. Chatfield about that?
 A. Yes.
 Q. To what effect?
 A. First I went to Mr. Chatfield's bungalow and told him that it was very difficult to communicate with the people because people were not allowed to collect in the city. I told him that unless the people collected it would be very difficult to get the information known. There I was told that the people had gone outside the city walls at Kankaria, and I wanted permission to go there.
 Q. Mr. Chatfield gave you that permission?
 A. Yes.
 Q. I think he suggested that he should accompany you?
 A. I mean the permission was given, but he told me that the officer commanding could give me the permission.
 Q. The original idea, I think, was that he should accompany you to the town?
 A. I think it was suggested by the Commissioner, Northern Division, and the Inspector General that I should go with them.
 Q. You thought it would be better that you should be in different company?
 A. At that time at any rate.
 Q. You suggested that Mr. Patel and Mr. Desai should accompany you?
 A. Yes.
 Q. These two gentlemen have considerable influence with the mill-hands?
 A. Yes.
 Q. I think Mr. Chatfield assented to your going with these gentlemen?

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[Continued.]

A. Yes.

Q. You had some difficulty in getting through the Delhi gate on the first occasion because you had not a pass and you went back and got a pass?

A. Colonel Frazer told me that cars would be allowed to pass, but the officer there told me that I would not be allowed to pass through without a pass. So I went back and got a pass.

Q. At the Delhi gate did you see a small crowd of people?

A. Yes, just opposite the Delhi gate near the *chowky*.
Q. Were they making any disturbance or were they quiet when you saw them?

A. I was there just for a few minutes. At that time they were very quiet.

Q. It was not a crowd that had collected in defiance of the order against collection of crowds so far as you could judge?

A. I suppose they knew about the orders, but out of curiosity they might have collected there.

Q. There was no firing so far as you saw upon that crowd?

A. They told me that if the crowd became big they would fire, but I had then gone back to the Officer Commanding to get a pass.

Q. You saw a man lying on the street near the Delhi gate, he was either dead or wounded?

A. I did.

Q. You found out from the military officer that the wounded were allowed to be removed when the firing ceased?

A. Both the wounded and the dead.

Q. I think you were told also that the firing which had taken place had been of a very brief character?

A. Yes, I was told so.

Q. When you arrived at Mr. Patel's house you found Dr. Kanuga there?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you learn there that there were ample facilities for treating the wounded at the civil hospital and at private dispensaries?

A. I did.

Q. Did these gentlemen assent to accompany you to pacify the mob?

A. They did.

Q. Now where did you go to with these gentlemen?

A. I went to Mr. Desai's house.

Q. What did you do after that?

A. We got out by the Raipur gate and went towards Kankaria. We were told that the crowd was on the other side of Kankaria. There Mr. Ardesir Wadia stopped us on the way.

Q. You heard from Mr. Wadia that the crowd had visited his house?

A. He stopped us.

Q. Who is Mr. Wadia?

A. He is a Parsee gentleman. He is an Engineer.

Q. Had his family been very much alarmed?

A. They were very alarmed.

Q. Had they made any demand of Mr. Wadia?

A. They wanted his gun.

Q. I think they went through his house searching for it?

A. That is what Mr. Wadia told us.

Q. Were you advised not to proceed further than that?

A. Mr. Wadia told us so.

Q. He wanted you to arrange for the removal of his family?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you do then? Did you make any arrangements?

A. I wanted to inform the Collector about it. I went to his bungalow: he was out. I thought he was at the Commissioner's place, so I went to Shahi Bagh, there also he was not seen. So I saw the Officer Commanding and told him about it. He said he could not do anything and that I must tell the Collector. So I again went to the Collector's bungalow. He was not there. At last

I saw Mr. Broomfield who was the Assistant Judge and he promised to inform the Collector.

Q. As you proceeded along, were missiles thrown at your car at all?

A. One big stone was thrown.

Q. Thrown by a crowd or by a single individual?

A. It was near the Raipur gate, and I think it was thrown from one of the bye-lanes.

Q. Did you proceed along Richey Road that day?

A. Yes, while going to Mr. Desai's house.

Q. Did you notice any writing on the walls?

A. Yes, I saw written on the walls in charcoal that Europeans should be murdered.

Q. I think you saw that Government buildings and city gates had been burnt and some of the gates were still smouldering?

A. Yes, by Government buildings, I mean police *chowkies*.

Q. At the time did you form any impression as to what sort of feelings the mob had been actuated by in indulging in these acts of violence?

A. At the time I did not. I was absolutely shocked at what I saw.

Q. But thinking over it afterwards did you form any opinion as to what had caused this action on the part of the mob?

A. I thought that the arrest of Mr. Gandhi had upset the people and they got very much excited and they were out for mischief.

Q. And that they had given away to active anti-Government feeling?

A. Yes.

Q. On the next morning, on the 13th, did Mr. Gandhi and your sister come?

A. Yes, they did.

Q. You went to the station to meet them?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you asked by the authorities to arrange for motor cars?

A. Yes.

Q. And I think you did what you could to assist them?

A. Yes.

Q. When Mr. Gandhi arrived you went with him to some of the officials' houses?

A. I got down at my house and then he went to the Commissioner's bungalow.

Q. And I think a meeting was arranged which Mr. Gandhi was to have addressed?

A. Yes, he told me about it on his return from the Commissioner's bungalow.

Q. On Sunday night were you sent for by the Commissioner and the Inspector-General and asked if you could arrange for the mills being started the next morning?

A. I was sent for by the Commissioner, and I met the Inspector-General there.

Q. Did you learn then that the proclamation against meetings of persons in greater number than ten was to be withdrawn the next morning?

A. Yes, I understood him to say so.

Q. In view of the acts of lawlessness that you had seen, did you consider that precautions were still necessary?

A. In the previous evening while going to Kankaria, I was told that repeated attempts were made at burning a mill. Before the riots a dozen mills were on strike on that side and the dispute was not settled. I was afraid that they would attempt to burn the mills and I therefore thought that precautions should be taken, I mean, they should be in preparedness.

Q. You had some questions as to what was to be done with reference to paying the mill-hands during the time they were idle. What was that?

A. The mills were not working from Thursday, from 5 o'clock, I think, so on Friday, Saturday and Monday morning, and I wanted to know, if the work people refused to resume work unless they were promised the wages of these four days, I wanted to know from the Commis-

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Mr. AMBALAL SARABHAI.

[Continued.]

sioner whether the mills should pay the wages for these days or not.

Q. I think your own idea had been that in the interests of discipline they ought not to be paid?

A. I thought at the time that it would amount to paying for rioting.

Q. But what was the Commissioner's view?

A. He shared my view, but looking to the condition of the city and the necessity of starting the mills early, I felt and he also agreed, that we should not hold out on that point.

Q. Was it arranged that a notice should be issued by the Millowners' Association informing the people that the mills should begin work as usual from Tuesday morning?

A. Yes.

Q. And I think these notices were distributed broadcast in the city and also at Mr. Gandhi's meeting?

A. Yes, they were.

Q. There was a rumour at that time that the first mill that would start work would be burnt down?

A. Yes.

Q. How did that rumour set about?

A. I don't know. I heard it.

Q. In point of fact, no attempt was made to burn down the first mill working?

A. No, not on Tuesday.

Q. You did have a meeting of the Ahmedabad Millowners' Association?

A. Yes.

Q. On what day, Sunday or Monday?

A. It was on Monday, I am not sure.

Q. I think it was attended by the Collector and the Inspector-General?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And arrangements were made for the protection of the mills if necessary?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you a meeting with Mr. Gandhi on Sunday or Monday?

A. Yes, I think. I saw him on the day he arrived on Sunday, and on Monday morning I was asked by the Commissioner to take him to the District Court. So I saw him on Monday morning as well.

Q. Did the Commissioner show you a notice that unless people resorted to violence they would not be fired upon?

A. Yes, Sir, that is my recollection.

Q. You were asked to arrange for the distribution of these notices at Mr. Gandhi's meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you attend Mr. Gandhi's meeting?

A. I did.

Q. That was held on Monday, the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was the meeting held?

A. Just opposite to his *Ashram*.

Q. It was a large meeting?

A. Yes, quite a large one.

Q. Did most of the prominent mill agents also attend?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. At the meeting, I think, Mr. Gandhi condemned the atrocities that had been committed by the people in very strong language and advised those who had been guilty to confess their misdeeds and deliver their arms to the police?

A. He did.

Q. Did he intimate that he was going to fast for a short time himself?

A. Yes, for 3 days.

Q. And he advised other people also to fast?

A. Yes.

Q. Did his speech seem to have a good effect upon the mob?

A. I think so.

Q. I think there was only one European, the Rev. Gillespie, who attended that meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. And he motored back with you?

A. Yes.

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Q. On your return was any sign of hostility shown to you by the mob?

A. Not at the meeting, on the way back.

Q. Did you accordingly make arrangements for your mills to start on Tuesday?

A. Yes.

Q. I see you refer to having passed Jamalpur. What part of the city is that?

A. It is south of the Richey Road. Most of the weavers of my Calico mills live there.

Q. You went there after Mr. Gandhi's meeting?

A. Directly from there. The telephones were not working.

Q. Were large numbers of people collected in the streets?

A. Not many.

Q. Did you stop your car from time to time?

A. At one place, and I called the people and told them that the mills would be started the next morning.

Q. And you advised all the people to return to work and to go to their respective mills?

A. Yes.

Q. In fact your mills were open the next day without any disturbance?

A. There was no trouble.

Q. Was there a good return of the men after the opening?

A. Fairly good, I think.

Q. Was there a strong rumour some time afterwards that Mr. Gandhi, your sister and some other leaders might be arrested?

A. Yes, there was a rumour to that effect.

Q. Did that cause any excitement?

A. People seemed to believe it.

Q. I think you saw the Collector and the Commissioner in consequence of hearing that rumour?

A. I went to see the Collector and the Commissioner happened to be there.

Q. Did you discuss the situation with them?

A. I did.

Q. What advice did you give them?

A. I did not offer any advice. I simply told them.

Q. Your opinion was asked and did you give it?

A. They told me that it was not their intention to arrest those who were not actually responsible for the commission of offences.

Q. I think you knew of the *Satyagraha* movement, of course?

A. Yes.

Q. After what occurred, were you hopeful that it might come to an end?

A. Yes.

Q. You refer in your statement to some meeting after the riots, held by the Commissioner, where advice was given on the duties of citizenship?

A. Yes.

Q. According to you that meeting did not do much good?

A. I think it did harm, for it gave offence to many. The class of people invited did not know the duties of citizenship.

Q. They did not appreciate the advice that was given?

A. They only said what they knew.

Q. Now as regards the causes of this serious outbreak, have you any views of your own which you would like to put before us?

A. I have given them most fully in my statement.

Q. May I take it that there was a strong feeling in Ahmedabad in connection with the Rowlatt legislation?

A. Yes.

Q. And that the arrest of Mr. Gandhi or rather the turning back of Mr. Gandhi from his journey to Delhi and the rumoured arrest of your sister, had a serious effect upon the people?

Q. People did not know that he was turned back but heard that he was arrested and that excited them a good deal. I think if they had known that Mr. Gandhi was being brought back to Bombay it would not have excited them.

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Mr. AMBALAL SARABHAI.

[Continued.]

Q. Apparently the people are very apt to believe false rumours in Ahmedabad?

A. I think it is the same case everywhere.

Q. Perhaps they are a little more liable here than elsewhere. They very readily believed the rumour of your sister's arrest and of course we know there was no foundation for that at all?

A. There was such a great excitement that all sorts of rumours were believed.

Q. Now, about the measures taken by the authorities in connection with the riots, you know that the investigations were being conducted by Mr. Guider?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he act considerably or inconsiderately?

A. Very satisfactorily.

Q. I think the mill-hands made some suggestion to him and they received his attention?

A. Yes.

Q. So far as you can see, did he endeavour to avoid any unnecessary harshness in the measures that were adopted?

A. I think he did. He took every precaution to avoid it.

Q. Now, after an outburst such as had occurred here, the excitement consequent upon it, and the measures taken which were to get restoration of order and to round up offenders, perhaps some innocent people have had to suffer?

A. Yes, that is my own opinion.

Q. You are quite prepared to admit that this is necessarily an accident?

A. Yes, it was unavoidable. Some people had to suffer accidentally.

Q. But Mr. Guider, as I understand, did not cause any one to be arrested nor a charge to be preferred against any one, unless he had some substantial evidence?

A. Yes, and unless he was himself convinced of the charge.

Q. Now we have heard something about it, I do not know whether we have to deal with it ourselves or not, but in connection with the damage that was occasioned, certain levies had to be made upon the community so as to compensate people who had suffered?

A. Yes, the Honourable Mr. Desai had asked a question in the Bombay Council and I was under the impression that this did not fall under the scope of the Committee, but the Bombay Government gave a reply to the effect that this Committee would investigate the matter. So I sent in an additional statement.

Q. Of course you may turn out to be right in your first opinion and the Bombay Government wrong. But I assume that that is not so. Perhaps can you give us a word or two explaining your view?

A. I have given it in my written statement in full.

Q. Is that an additional statement?

A. Yes, I sent it on the 2nd of January.

Q. The only thing is if it is an open matter, I should not desire to foreclose discussion amongst ourselves, but *prima facie* I should be disposed to agree with that, but that is a view contrary to the answer. My own view is that it seems to me to be a kind of question that hardly falls within the scope of our enquiry, because there may be purely legal questions involving the consideration of a matter of this sort, as well as questions of policy or mixed questions of policy and law, and I do not think that it is suitable or expedient to deal with such a point. Of course there could be no harm in our being put in possession of the bare facts.

Mr. Kemp.—Mr. Chatfield has given the bare facts.

President.—Yes, but we have not got this gentleman's views upon the matter.

Mr. Kemp.—Not Mr. Chatfield's?

President.—But we have not got this gentleman's contention.

To witness.—In a word, you object to the method of compensation that was adopted?

A. I do not object to compensation being levied from those who were guilty, but I think many innocent people will be paying compensation.

Q. Now let me assume that the guilty people were all people who possessed no means at all. How are you going to get compensation from them?

A. That is just what I say; they escape.

Q. If you get no compensation, then are you going to let the people who lost their property go without any damage? You see, this loss is usually a loss I think which is assessed on a community in consequence of rioting or disturbances. Some individuals suffer damages and the community generally are to recompense that loss, because theoretically it is in consequence of an inadequate police provision having been made, but the loss has been occasioned to individuals.

A. It may be perfectly legal, but I do not think it has been equitable.

Q. But I do not see what equitable principle you are going to adopt instead?

A. Would it be right for those who have been innocent to pay?

Q. The point is that some have suffered accidentally? A. Women and children were fined in the mills. I do not think any of them were arrested. Then many working class people—the mill-hands—have been convicted, but not fined.

Q. You see if people who suffered are to be compensated they must be compensated out of some fund and you cannot collect a fund from people who have got nothing to contribute to it?

A. Then my submission is if money is to be taken out of the city, it should be taken from those who can best afford to pay it and the poor people should be left out and the well-to-do fined. But I do not think it would be fair, because Government is rich enough and they could pay it.

Q. Then that is just the people paying in a different way. That means you make innocent people pay by other ways?

A. I can quite realise that. Perhaps it could not, have been otherwise. I do not for a moment suggest that it is not legal. It may be perfectly legal.

Q. A method of compensation has been adopted by Government. Do you suggest an alternative or a more preferable method of compensation for the people who have suffered? You see you can perhaps criticise a scheme, but it is never sufficient merely to criticise the measure unless you are prepared to put forward an alternative that is fair.

A. May I read out one sentence from my statement?

Q. Yes. A. "While fully realizing that public funds should not be spent in compensating for damage done by few miscreants still the levy cannot be justified because it has been collected from more innocent than guilty." It could however have been collected except for the fact that women and children in the factories should have been exempted.

Q. I understand that apart from the levy on the mill-hands, that so far as the mill-hands were concerned, it meant a levy upon women and children in addition to the levy upon men?

A. All the workmen were fined including women and children.

Q. So that you point to that as an outstanding element of unfairness?

A. I believe so. They should have been exempted. Then with regard to railway employees being exempted, I take objection to that, because some of them were suspected of crimes and arrested, whereas I do not think we were any less loyal than they.

Q. It looks as though you think that there should not be any exemption at all?

A. I object to the principle of levy, unless you can take it from people who have actually done mischief simply to compensate those who have suffered damages. To take it from those who have not done any mischief is not right.

Q. Then you will levy from those who have suffered a loss without any recourse at all, and is not that unfair? Accidentally some person may have lost his own fortune

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[Continued.]

in consequence of a riotous outbreak by another section of the community. So if you do not levy and put it on the community at large, that individual suffers. Is not that a worse course to take?

A. I fully realise the difficulty, but I have given my views in the note.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Do I understand you to mean that you can improve upon the Government measure firstly by exempting the women and children of the mill class, and secondly by refusing to make a special exception for the railway employees?

A. No, I do not say that. I mean women and children particularly.

Q. Do you think it improves the scheme if the exemption of railway employees is not given?

A. There should be no exemption at all.

Q. Now there is another class of exemption. I understand that the Europeans have been exempted. Do you take the same exemption to that exemption as in the case of the railway employees?

A. Yes.

Q. Now you see the method by which some suffer is not in one way but three different ways. People liable to income-tax, there is also a levy upon the rate-payers and on the mill-hands. Now do you appreciate that it is not an attempt to collect the whole damage from one class only and that it is an attempt in three different ways, the joint effect of which make each part bear their proper share.

A. In the first case it is taken from the mill-hands, income-tax payers and house-owners. If it is taken for compensating those who have suffered damage due to riots and not with a view to fining the whole city, then the best way would be to put some terminal tax on food grains on the whole city and every one would have to pay.

Q. Of course if you did that you would immediately put a much heavier burden on the poor people with large families to support than upon rich people?

A. It would spread wholly. There is a terminal tax here. They could have doubled it in order to get these 9 lakhs of rupees.

Q. Do you think that the terminal tax would have had in itself an incidence fairly proportionate to ability to pay?

A. I think so. I object to exemptions. No one should be exempted.

Q. May I put this to you quite bluntly? Do you consider that the method adopted with regard to the mill-hands is objectionable because it is not levied merely for the purposes of compensation but because it is a punitive measure?

A. As such I approve of it. Then first of all it would be ascertained who are guilty, and when this is ascertained, I would not mind those guilty being punished. But there were others besides mill-hands who were convicted I understand and those have not been fined, whereas mill-hands have been.

Q. This measure proceeded by deducting something from their caution money?

A. One week's caution money was attached.

Q. What is "caution money"?

A. We hold eight days' wages, and if they left us, this was forfeited.

Q. The mill-hands as at what date?

A. It was in October.

Q. People who had been fined may have been mill-hands during the time of the riots and there may be people who became mill-hands afterwards and they also had to contribute?

A. Yes, that is what I said. Those who joined after have been fined and those who went away have been punished.

Q. I rather gather as regards the causes of the sudden excitement at Ahmedabad that you thought it was because the people were under the impression that Mr. Gandhi had been arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think they understood that Mr. Gandhi had been arrested because he was opposing measures of Government, or do you think they understood that he was "arrested" simply in the sense that he was prevented from going to Delhi?

A. No, "arrested" in actuality.

Q. For what reason?

A. For going to Delhi.

Q. There was no information abroad in the public mind that he had been arrested simply because he opposed the Rowlatt Bills?

A. No.

Q. As a matter of fact news about his arrest came in a wire which is just before us, to the Ashram?

A. I was not here. But I think the people understood that he was arrested because of his activities in connection with his passive resistance movement.

Q. That is just what I want to know. Do they think that Government put him in jail because he was a political opponent of Government or did they think that he was put into jail because he was wanting to go to Delhi and was prevented from going?

A. I do not know. I presume they thought that he was arrested because of his passive resistance movement, consulting newspapers and going to Delhi. I mean it was all part of one programme.

Q. Now tell me do you know the educated community of Ahmedabad pretty well?

A. I do.

Q. Are there more people here who follow Gandhi than in any other places? I mean people imbued with *Satyagraha* principles.

A. I cannot say, perhaps in Bombay he has a greater following.

Q. You do not know if he has a big following among the educated community of Ahmedabad?

A. He has a following, but to what extent I do not know. But I should like to understand what you mean by "following."

Q. I suppose people following him do so in every way?

A. I do not agree on that point. I have a great regard and respect for Mr. Gandhi myself. I do not believe in passive resistance.

Q. Can you tell me this? It has been suggested on the one hand that the educated classes did not assist the police after the disturbances but on the other hand that during these disturbances various educated gentlemen went about among the mobs doing their best to dissuade them. Now as regards doing their best to dissuade the mobs, nobody supposed that the followers of Mr. Gandhi, who understand his principles, would desire to do anything else than dissuade the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, do you think it is true from your own knowledge of Ahmedabad that apart from that, when the question came of giving information to the police, the latter had been unable to get any substantial assistance from educated people who knew, because they were imbued with *Satyagraha* principles? Can you tell me whether the educated people of Ahmedabad are of such views that they would not be likely to assist the police even to trace out persons whom they knew were concerned in these crimes?

A. I do not think they would have refrained from giving the information if they had it.

Q. Information which would lead to the conviction of the miscreants?

A. Yes.

Q. At the time of the outbreak of these disturbances, apart from political causes of unrest, so far as economic causes were concerned, first of all, was there any particular disturbance or trouble going on as regards the mills at Ahmedabad?

A. Well, some mills were on strike.

Q. Were a large number of people affected or a small number?

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[Continued.]

A. Some 12 mills were on strike and there must have been some 5,000 strikers, and 3,000 men out of employment, remaining idle on account of the strike.

Q. So that as many as 8,000 people were affected?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think that added to the seriousness of the disturbances or to the likelihood of its taking place?

A. I think so.

Q. Do you think that that ought to be taken account of as being in part the cause of this disturbance?

A. Yes, I have given it as such in my statement.

Q. And in the same way the people of Ahmedabad were affected by the pressure of high prices?

A. Yes.

Q. What do you suggest, apart from political reasons, for this state of excitement? Do you think that they were desperate in consequence of these high prices and indulged in excesses?

A. I do not think so. They earned very good wages. Q. Does it come to this that the high prices were not an immediate cause?

A. There was a shortage of supplies like kerosine but it was not sufficiently important to cause an outbreak, a riot or anything like that.

Q. But as regards the people being on strike, you attribute it more to that?

A. Yes.

Q. It was a sort of *hartal* I suppose, as regards the 8th?

A. It was a strike for wages and they were out doing nothing so they joined in the *hartal*.

Q. So I suppose mischief comes to idle hands whatever the causes of the idleness?

A. Yes.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Were high prices then in existence for a considerable time in Ahmedabad and other places and were the lower classes hard hit by them?

A. Yes.

Q. And though that would be no reason to indulge in riots, still it had thrown them into a state of dissatisfaction?

A. Not against Government, I think.

Q. A general state of dissatisfaction?

A. Well, there had been a proportionate rise in wages in the case of the working classes.

Q. You cannot say that the rise in wages was proportionate to the rise in foodstuffs?

A. I believe so, in the case of the mill-hands it was.

Q. Now with reference to the mill-hands what has been the proportionate rise in wages?

A. About 50 per cent. over July 1917.

Q. How much over the pre-war wages?

A. Well, about 70 per cent. of the pre-war rates.

Q. Now the prices of various necessary articles have gone up 200 and 300 per cent.?

A. The average is 65 per cent.

Q. Take the ordinary things such as rice, wheat, *ghee*. Prices have gone up 200, 300 per cent. and more?

A. I was only going through the notification of the Director.

Q. I am concerned with the labouring population. Their wants are ordinarily wheat, *dal*, *ghee*, rice. The prices of these commodities have certainly gone up 300 per cent.?

A. I do not think so. I have gone through that and I do not agree with that view.

Q. Take the price of *ghee*. It is now Rs. 60 a maund in Ahmedabad. It was Rs. 15 before?

A. If that was so, then all the wages that they get would be spent in buying necessary things; most of it goes to drinking.

Q. That may be?

A. They do not feel it. They are not short of food.

Q. Is it not a fact that the prices of these necessary articles of food have gone up 200 per cent.?

A. At the most to 100 per cent.

Q. Take *ghee* for instance. What was the price of *ghee* before the war?

A. They do not take *ghee* as a rule, the labouring classes.

Q. They surely take some little *ghee*?

A. Very little.

Q. Take the price of *dal*. It has gone up over 300 per cent. And it is the same thing with regard to rice. You take the actual price ruling to-day and the price before the war of these necessary articles. You will find it is 300 per cent. and more?

A. I cannot understand how they can afford to spend more than what they used to do before.

Q. That is another thing. Take rice?

A. They can perhaps afford to pay the increased prices.

Q. I am only trying to test your statement that the rise in wages is proportionate or equal to the rise in prices. I am pointing out that is not so. The rise in wages is about 70 per cent., and the rise in price of commodities is 300 to 400 per cent.?

A. The Government information is 65 per cent. The statistics issued by the Director of Statistics is to that effect.

Q. You know the prices at which articles of food are sold?

A. I tell you that it is not more than 100 per cent.

Q. What was the price of *ghee* before the war?

A. I suppose my wife knows it.

Q. What is it now?

A. I do not know.

Q. Take rice, take *dal*, what is the increase?

A. Burma rice is about Rs. 4 or so, not even Rs. 4.

Q. Rs. 4 a maund?

A. Yes, or less than Rs. 4 a maund. I was doing some famine relief work, we were selling at 13 lbs. a rupee, i.e., Rs. 3 per maund.

Q. It may be so in special famine shops?

A. That was our cost price. Wheat was sold at 12 or 13 lbs. a rupee.

Q. What is the price of wheat in Ahmedabad?

A. The quality that poor people eat can be had for about Rs. 5 a maund. Or 9 to 10 lbs. per rupee, i.e., about Rs. 4 a maund. It was never less than Rs. 2 before the war. So it has increased by 100 per cent.

Q. The mill-hands in Ahmedabad have been more or less for some years in a state of chronic unrest?

A. I should not say so.

Q. Did they not have strikers on very large scale sometime ago?

A. It is the same thing all over the world. There is labour unrest all over the world.

Q. In 1918 there was a very big strike?

A. Yes.

Q. Ever since then they are more or less in a dissatisfied condition. I do not say that they are justified in their demand. But that has been the state of their mind?

A. They want higher wages from time to time and they get it. I do not think they are dissatisfied. They are dissatisfied only when they want an increase, and they strike and get it.

Q. Probably their minds have been unsettled. Every time they want an increase, they strike and get higher wages?

A. When they want an increase, they are unsettled for a time.

Q. I take it, Mr. Ambalal, that you are not a *Satyagrahi*?

A. No, I am not.

Q. Nor have you taken that vow?

A. No.

Q. You are not a member of the *Satyagraha Sabha*?

A. No.

Q. You think that the *Satyagraha* doctrine, and its off-shoot, what is called civil disobedience of laws, is too subtle for the ordinary mind to understand and too difficult to follow in practice.

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[Continued.]

A. Are you asking my opinion about *Satyagraha*, passive resistance or the expediency of it in this case?

Q. The doctrine of *Satyagraha* itself and of civil disobedience as preached by Mr. Gandhi, in your view is too subtle for the ordinary man in the street to comprehend and for him to follow in the right spirit in which Mr. Gandhi wants him to follow?

A. As a mass movement, I think it can never be followed.

Q. For the masses, the ideal put forward of civil disobedience as preached by Mr. Gandhi was too subtle for them to understand and too difficult for them to follow in the right direction?

A. That is my humble opinion.

Q. And therefore I take it that your view is that if that is preached to the masses in that manner, it must inevitably result in violence. If you ask large masses to follow civil disobedience as preached the ordinary mind not being able to grasp the high ideal underlying it, it must surely result in violence?

A. It may or may not; I cannot say.

Q. What is more probable in your view?

A. I never thought about it.

Q. If you put an ideal of this character which it is too subtle for the ordinary man to understand or follow and practise it, it is sure sooner or later to result in violence?

A. The chances are that it would, or it may not.

Q. And therefore I take it that your view will be, Mr. Ambalal, that as a political weapon, it is a dangerous weapon to use?

A. Yes, but may I qualify it by saying that in the past there was no attempt at mass movement so far in the agitation in India, and so Government said that the agitation was confined only to the educated classes and they said that the masses are not behind the educated people.

Q. I am not objecting to any person trying to educate the masses and bringing them to realise the political situation. What I am putting to you is that this method of educating the masses or getting them into a line with the educated classes and asking them to follow what is called civil disobedience is a dangerous weapon to put in their hands?

A. The main agitation is also dangerous, though not to the same extent.

Q. There may be various other matters. Now I am on this particular matter. I do not object to educating the masses. I advocate it myself that you must bring the masses to realise what the real position is, but this particular method of asking them to follow what is called civil disobedience is really dangerous?

A. That is why I did not join it.

Q. That is your view?

A. Yes.

Q. About the compensation, when was it levied?

A. I have not got the exact date.

Q. Take the men that you know. An appreciable number of the mill-hands on whom the levy was made in October came to Ahmedabad and joined your mills after April?

A. No, most of them were here in April.

Q. Then who had the grievance?

A. It unjustly affected only a very small number. The men in my mill are very steady.

Q. But there may be other mills in which you have a fluctuating labour population and where the levy is made on a very appreciable number of people who came after April?

A. I believe perhaps 15 to 20 per cent. were affected. That is my opinion. I have not got figures.

Q. You spoke of the meeting that was presided over by the Commissioner, where he addressed the people. Who were called at that meeting? Were you present?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. Who else were there?

A. Members of the municipality, Millowners' Association and Local Board men.

Q. What did the Commissioner say?

A. I do not remember exactly what he said.

Q. He said something which gave offence?

A. Yes.

Q. He said that the educated people were behind the atrocities of 10th and 11th April?

A. Yes the name of Ahmedabad, Gujarat, was blackened and all that.

Q. He said that the educated classes were behind the atrocities of the 10th and 11th April?

A. Yes.

Q. That was resented, I suppose, by the people?

A. It was not so much what he said, but the stuck-up manner.

Q. He treated them not in the right way?

A. That is what I think. He looked very cross. That is what I think.

Q. Did he particularly say anything offensive to the legal fraternity?

A. To me he behaved badly.

Q. What did he do?

A. He did not allow me to speak. He said one member of each association should speak. I was the President of the Millowners' Association. When I asked him, he said 'No.' The next day when I asked him why he refused to let me speak, he replied that I should have spoken without asking him.

Q. Who said 'No.'?

A. The Commissioner.

Q. You wanted to speak?

A. I had to speak on behalf of my association. I sent a chit, on which I said "Mr. Mangaldas has already spoken and I would like to speak." This is why I asked: one mill-owner had already spoken. The attitude of the mill-owners may be misunderstood if I did not speak on behalf of the Millowners' Association; they may think that we did not want to help Government. So I had been to see him. I asked him why I was not allowed to speak. Then he said that Mr. Mangaldas had spoken. I told him that when I wanted as President of the association to speak on behalf of the association, he should have allowed me. He replied that I should never have asked him. I should have had more courage and spoken there, and it was my mistake. I asked him if he thought that I should have spoken, why he stopped me. He said it was my own mistake.

Q. You should not have minded his 'No' and got up and made your speech. Did he say anything particularly about lawyers?

A. He did: I do not remember exactly what he said.

Q. Did he suggest that they were behind these disturbances?

A. I do not remember it. I know that people who went there told me that they were very dissatisfied. Not all of them. There may be some who might have been pleased.

Q. Some were pleased?

A. Some were satisfied and some dissatisfied.

Q. If I remember rightly, Mr. Ambalal, my reading of the report of that meeting (my recollection may be wrong, I want to verify it), the Commissioner made some such charges against the legal profession, and if I remember rightly, the Government pleader got up and in his speech, he repudiated them on behalf of the members of the bar. Is that correct?

A. That is my recollection.

Q. Was it particularly offensive to the lawyers?

A. I could not say at this length of time.

By Major General Sir George Barrow—
Q. About the prices you said that they had gone up generally by about 57 per cent.

A. Sixty-five per cent. The general rise in prices has been by 65 per cent. and wages 50 per cent.

Q. Different things are in different states. For instance garlic has gone up 500 per cent.

A. I do not know.

Q. Do you know the price of *ghee* at present? I think it is Rs. 1-8-0 per lb.

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[Continued.]

A. I do not know.

Q. But the prices of other commodities which people eat, do you maintain that they have gone by 100 per cent.?

A. That is the maximum.

Q. But not more?

A. That is why the maximum is entered.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. When you informed Miss Anasuya Ben at Bombay about the doings of people at Ahmedabad, what was her attitude? Was she very indignant and did she completely disapprove of the action of the people at Ahmedabad?

A. That is what I said.

Q. Then when you were passing through this station, you saw a crowd. Was that crowd mostly of boys and youths?

A. Yes.

Q. Did their attitude look to you to be very threatening?

A. Not threatening.

Q. When you saw a crowd near the Delhi gate, you saw them collected in large numbers, i.e., exceeding 10. May I understand that that was done in defiance of the order or did they appear to you to be dazed and not able to understand the risk they were running unconsciously?

A. People had gone mad. I do not think they realised what they were doing.

Q. They appeared to you to be dazed at that time?

A. Yes.

Q. Then when Mr. Wadia informed you about the fact that certain men were asking him to deliver his gun and they went inside his house, did he also inform you that these men were drunk?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. When you informed the Commandant or the man in military command, in what position Mr. Wadia and his family were, he said he could not help him in any way.

A. He referred me to the Collector and the Commissioner; he could not do anything.

Q. The answer given to you was that so far as he was concerned, nothing could be done?

A. I should see them.

Q. What did he say? He could not do anything in the matter?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you say that the feeling was anti-Government at the time?

A. Yes.

Q. Similarly in Ahmedabad when the mill-hands were agitating against the mill-owners and there was the campaign carried on by your sister and Mahatma Gandhi against the mill-owners?

A. Not to the same extent; something like it.

Q. You suggested that the preparations should not be relaxed?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you expect any outburst again?

A. I did not.

Q. There was nothing in the manner of the crowd that you saw from which you expected a further outburst?

A. I said on the previous evening they were trying to burn a mill.

Q. Therefore may I understand that you expected some trouble?

A. Not expected, I wanted to be on the safe side.

Q. You wanted that to be taken as a precautionary measure?

A. Yes.

Q. So far as the Collector of your district was concerned, do not think that anybody ever whispered anything against him. He was a very popular and sympathetic officer?

A. He is.

Q. So far how did he manage the situation? There is no complaint in Ahmedabad?

A. He managed it admirably.

Q. So far as your Commissioner is concerned, was he unpopular and unsympathetic?

A. The then Commissioner is not here now.

Q. Not this Commissioner. The Commissioner who was here then.

A. I cannot say the same about him? I am sorry I cannot.

Q. Then was there any complaint in Ahmedabad as to the duration of the arrests, that people were arrested and were kept for a long time without trial? Was there any such complaint?

A. I am talking about Ahmedabad itself.

Q. I am asking you about Ahmedabad.

A. No; I have not heard such complaints.

Q. And there was no complaint that innocent persons were run in deliberately?

A. Not at all.

Q. With regard to the two Martial Law orders, did you hear any complaints about innocent people being shot under those two Martial Law orders?

A. There were rumours, but they were never substantiated.

Q. Have you ever been able to know how many persons were shot under the Martial Law orders?

A. About 30 were killed.

Q. Under these two Martial Law orders that if more than 10 persons assemble at one place, they will be shot at, and if any person is challenged and he does not give a reply, he would be shot. In enforcing these Martial Law orders, were any persons wounded or killed?

A. I think so.

Q. Do you know from your own personal knowledge as to whether those persons were innocent persons or whether really they were members of a riotous crowd or anything of that sort?

A. It is very difficult to realise.

Q. Can you give me the names of any of these persons?

A. I do not know any one.

Q. Were any women and children shot in that way?

A. I do not know. I know one of my weavers was wounded, but he was the man who murdered.....

Q. I am talking of what happened subsequent to the 12th, not the 10th and 11th?

A. I do not know.

Q. Were the powers under these two Martial Law orders not properly exercised?

A. I did not say so. There were all sorts of rumours; I did not believe these then, and after enquiries, I do not believe them now.

Q. Then you say that the Satyagraha movement should be given up because those who went in for it were liable to be arrested after the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi?

A. I am afraid I have not put it very happily there. It would excite the work-people if Mahatma Gandhi was arrested, that is why I felt they should not court arrest again.

Q. Coming to the causes and the Rowlatt Act, I think it was your opinion that it was not so much the provisions of the Rowlatt Act but the fact that it was passed by the Government of India in the teeth of unanimous opposition by all the non-official members. The people resented that. You state "The passing of the Rowlatt Act in the teeth of unanimous opposition of Indian members of the Legislative Council disillusioned the minds of the people and they began to realise that the executive would continue as unmindful of the popular opinion as in the past." That is your opinion?

A. And having regard to the ending of the war and the different statements that were made by statesmen of the repute, the expectation of the people was that their condition would be bettered?

A. Yes.

Q. And they would be given greater voice in the management of their affairs. That was your opinion?

A. Yes.

Q. Do I understand you correctly that the mere fact of Mr. Gandhi's arrest, apart from any reason for which he might have been arrested, the mere fact that people came to believe that Mr. Gandhi had been arrested by the authorities, rightly or wrongly, was the cause of the disturbance? Is that your view?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. Now with regard to the people who composed these crowds, were weavers also with them, or were they merely the mill-hands?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. Now with regard to the people who composed these crowds, were weavers also with them, or were they merely the mill-hands?

A. Yes, I think so.

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[Continued.]

A. Yes. May I just say it was because of the provisions of the legislations not being judiciously used?

Q. I am coming to the second point. It was not so much the provisions of the Rowlatt Bill perhaps. It was a repressive measure and people would have been quite content to give this new weapon into the hands of the Government, but the way in which the previous repressive legislations were acted upon and the powers exercised, did not create confidence in their minds?

A. Yes.

Q. In your opinion "People thought that previous enactments had unfortunately not been judiciously applied and strongly objected to strengthening the hands of Government with a fresh measure of repressive legislation?"

A. Yes.

Q. Further on, the impression in the minds of the people was, having regard to the past of Mahatma Gandhi and his career and the fact that no doubt could be thrown on his loyalty, you thought and people thought when Mahatma Gandhi was arrested, there was no Indian who was safe?

A. I think so. No one was safe under the Defence of India Act. That is what I said.

Q. So far as the question of giving evidence is concerned, I think you will agree with me that the trait of Indian character is that respectable people are averse to volunteer to give their evidence. I do not approve of it. But they dislike coming forward and mixing themselves up as witnesses in criminal cases. No respectable person, so long as he can avoid it, would care to appear as a witness in criminal cases. Is it not a fact that they do not like to appear as witnesses? You may call it weakness. They would try their best to avoid appearing as witnesses?

A. I do not know.

Q. You think that they are always ready and willing?

A. If they have the information they would give it. Q. They would volunteer?

A. They will not volunteer.

Q. Supposing they are put in the witness-box, will they volunteer information?

A. If they have any information they would give it on being asked, I suppose.

Q. Is there no reluctance in the minds of Indian gentlemen to volunteer evidence in criminal cases?

A. I do not think so.

Q. You do not think there is this weakness of the Indian character throughout the length and breadth of India?

A. I do not know much of other presidencies.

Q. Don't you know that there has been general complaint both by the Government and the people everywhere of the opposition to the police and it has been urged that when investigations are made, owing to this weakness of the Indian character, they do not come forward to help the police and they never volunteer their evidence. You have never heard of that?

A. I do not believe it.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. About these disturbances on the 10th were they spontaneous outburst on the part of the mill people or were they induced by some other people?

A. I was not here on the 10th and my information is only collected from others, who say it was spontaneous. I have no personal knowledge. I was told it was spontaneous.

Q. Do I understand you correctly that the mere fact of Mr. Gandhi's arrest, apart from any reason for which he might have been arrested, the mere fact that people came to believe that Mr. Gandhi had been arrested by the authorities, rightly or wrongly, was the cause of the disturbance? Is that your view?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. Now with regard to the people who composed these crowds, were weavers also with them, or were they merely the mill-hands?

A. Yes, I think so.

A. I never saw the crowd. They might have joined them, because one of the weavers was convicted.

Q. Now I understand you to say that it was due to the fact that Mr. Chatfield dealt with the situation tactfully that further serious developments were averted?

A. That is my firm opinion.

Q. And also Mr. Guider in his investigations not only acted justly and considerably but took care to keep his subordinate officers under proper control?

A. I thought so.

Q. You say something about Government complaining that the agitation was led by the educated people and that the masses were drawn into it?

A. Sir Chimanlal Setalvad was asking me about mass agitation and passive resistance movement and I said that up to now agitation has been confined to educated classes only and Mr. Gandhi believes in mass agitation; and Government say that the educated classes are asking for it and that the masses do not ask for it. Gandhi began the mass agitation.

Q. For that reason?

A. No, no. It is coincidence. I do not say it was on account of that. But Mr. Gandhi always believed in mass agitation.

Q. That happens to coincide.

A. Yes, with the result that the masses took part in the agitation and of course they were excited.

Q. Did the common people in Ahmedabad take very much interest in the proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council?

A. What sort of people?

Q. The masses?

A. You mean the mill-hands?

Q. The mill-hands and others?

A. I do not think so. They knew all about the Rowlatt agitation.

Q. How did they come to know?

A. News was distributed to them.

Q. By whom?

A. I cannot say. They had a summary of the provisions of the legislation given to them.

Q. When was that done?

A. In February or March.

Q. Before the passing of the Act?

A. I cannot say. I know they were carrying small books.

Q. Can they read and write?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. A large number?

A. Not a very big percentage, but quite a fair number. They could go and get the book read to them by others.

Q. Did you see any books?

A. I do not remember now.

Q. You have no recollection as to what was said with regard to the legislation?

A. I do not think so.

Q. You can tell us who were the people who distributed the copies?

A. I think there was one book published by Mr. Gandhi. I do not remember now. It was by Thoreau or some American author.

Q. It was published by Mr. Gandhi?

A. It was all in Gujarati. I do not remember now. I had a copy of it then.

Q. Do you know Gujarati?

A. Yes. It was something about what he felt there. He felt he would be more happy in prison than outside. It was sold or distributed. But they had copies, I know.

Q. Of which organization was that?

A. I do not know. I think it was Mr. Gandhi's. He translated the book. That is my recollection.

Q. From English into Gujarati?

A. That I do not know.

Q. Who translated it?

A. He translated it. From what language, I do not know.

Q. You do not know in what language the original is?

A. I do not know.

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[Continued.]

A. No.

Q. And that in your opinion caused a great deal of uneasiness and unrest in the minds of the people?

A. I do not think so.

Q. They took it all very calmly and quietly?

A. Yes. They went through it, they read it as so many others read it.

Q. What was the object of distributing it?

A. I could not say what Mr. Gandhi's object was.

Q. Did not the book mention the object with which all these doctrines were propagated?

A. I did not go through it carefully. I was told that they were distributed to the mill-hands; they were carrying or purchasing them.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—

Q. I just want you to say shortly, Mr. Ambalal, —I take it, from what you saw yourself you were in Ahmedabad at the time—whatever the military orders were with regard to the firing, they were extraordinarily leniently carried out?

A. Yes.

Q. The remark, when Mr. Pratt interviewed him, Mr. Gandhi made about the educated people was not that the educated classes of Ahmedabad were behind the agitation but that some of the educated people were behind it?

A. May be. I do not remember.

Q. Now, whatever the rise of prices has been, I think you stated the mill-hands had been resorting to liquor shops less frequently than they used to do before?

A. Yes. The prices of liquor might have gone up also.

Q. It has gone down?

A. I do not know.

Q. Now, this caution money was in the hands of the owners or managers of the mills, and in case the mill-hands left without notice, it would be forfeited?

A. It was for making out a wage. Some time has to be spent in making out a wage. I mean, if the wages were to be paid last Saturday, it would be paid this Saturday and during the week this wage would be counted.

Q. As a matter of fact they all did leave?

A. When?

Q. 11th April. And their moneys were to be forfeited?

A. They stated that the mills were not started.

Q. Otherwise they would have been prepared to receive them?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, did you hear that there were young children throwing stones in the riots?

A. Have you heard that—I do not myself know of the disturbances—that was done by young boys and children?

(President.—I do not think so; it must be a presumption.)

Q. What percentage of the ordinary mill-hands is able to read and write?

A. I think, in the weaving classes about 40 or 50 per cent. can read and write.

Q. How many of the others, spinners and others?

A. About 5 to 10 per cent.

Q. The weavers are a minority and the others are in the majority?

A. On an average 12 per cent. are able to read and write among the mill operatives in Ahmedabad or less than that. May be about 10 per cent.

Q. These pamphlets or books that were translated were about the man who felt happier in prison than out of it?

A. Yes.

Q. That would not do harm to the ordinary mill operatives when they read it?

A. I do not know.

Q. Would these pamphlets be understood by the ordinary mill operatives?

A. I do not know if they understood much of it.

By Mr. Jivanlal V Desai, Counsel to the Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad—

Q. You arrived from Bombay on the 12th?

A. Yes, at about 1 o'clock.

Q. You motored through the city later on?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the condition of the city? Did you find any crowds in the streets?

A. No excepting the one I saw near the Delhi gate chowky.

Q. That came up after you motored there?

A. No, while I was going through the city I saw a few persons near the Delhi gate chowky.

Q. Numbering about?

A. About 30.

Q. Except that, you did not notice any crowd?

A. No.

Q. You went to the different parts of the city?

A. In the afternoon I went.

Q. In the evening did you see any crowds?

A. No.

Q. This crowd that you saw at the Delhi gate was an ordinary crowd?

A. They were not doing mischief. I was there for a couple of minutes. Their attitude was not threatening.

Q. Wherever you went and whenever you talked to the people, they appeared to be quite satisfied about the safety of Mr. Gandhi?

A. I think so.

Q. So it was possible for them to go to work next day?

A. They would not go to work unless they saw my sister.

Q. I suppose the military were removed on the 12th after your arrival and after you had given them full assurance that they would be allowed to work next day?

A. Not quite sure.

Q. Would there have been any disturbances without it?

A. I cannot say.

Q. Now, you went to Mr. Wadia's house?

A. On Saturday, the 12th.

Q. What time?

A. Between 5 and 6.

Q. You did not see any crowd there?

A. No.

Q. As far as you went, neither in the city nor outside on the 12th did you see any big crowd?

A. No.

Q. That day Mr. Gandhi came?

A. He came at about 9.

Q. About 9 on the 13th?

A. I cannot say.

Q. By the mail train of the 13th?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know the district court-house?

A. Yes.

Q. The Commissioner was there?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Gandhi?

A. Yes.

Q. The District Judge?

A. Yes.

Q. And it was after that conference that the proclamation* withdrawing the martial law was issued? Do you know that?

A. I was there; it was shown to me.

Q. In the district court compound?

A. In the staircase room.

Q. Was it printed or in manuscript?

A. I do not remember.

Q. Was it to this effect: "Everything is quiet; there is no reason for any fear; martial law has been withdrawn; and no bullets would be fired. All people have full liberty to go on the roads. Business must be resumed and shops opened. People are to go to business next day.—Pratt, Commissioner." Was it an English translation or was it in Gujarati?

* Appendix 8 to the statement of the Government of Bombay, page 208.

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[Concluded.]

A. I do not remember now.

Q. On the 14th, in the district court?

A. I do not remember. They showed me some proclamation when Mr. Gandhi saw the Commissioner, that unless people resorted to violence they would not be fired at.

Q. That is on the 13th?

A. On Monday morning at the district court I had a message. I was also asked to accompany Mr. Gandhi and the Commissioner showed me a draft notice saying that unless people resorted to violence they would not be fired at.

Q. That was before the violence or after?

A. I do not remember.

Q. You know this handbill was issued that day?

A. I do not know.

Q. You arrived on the 12th. So to the best of your recollection was there martial law on the 13th?

A. I do not remember.

Q. On the 12th you came here and on the 13th and 14th morning?

A. 12th and 13th I know. I do not know about the 14th.

Q. Have you made any inquiries about the persons killed or wounded by the military or the police?

A. I know a number of persons were wounded. I was not told what the number was.

Q. You have not made any personal inquiries as to how they came by their injuries?

A. I know they received shots.

Q. Under what circumstances? You do not know?

A. No.

Q. That would be known to the Gujarat Sabha?

A. I do not know who should know about it.

Q. You have not had any official intimation from the Gujarat Sabha about the casualties?

A. I have read from the papers. I do not remember now.

Q. Your knowledge is only from the papers. You have not made any personal inquiries?

A. I have made personal inquiries from friends.

Q. From the relations-of the dead?

A. No.

Q. Coming to the investigation, were you favoured with any interviews by the police officers during the investigation?

A. About what?

Q. During the investigation, I daresay the police officers would be about making all sorts of inquiries?

A. I saw Mr. Guider.

Q. At your house or headquarters?

A. He called at my house.

Q. In what connection did he come to your house?

A. He wanted some information.

Q. Did he have any conversation about the different famine committees?

A. He asked me what I was doing on the committee.

Q. What did he say about the famine committee? That they were district agencies of sedition?

A. To me?

Q. Yes. Did he mention the famine committees?

A. He asked me about the different organisations; but there was no such suggestion.

Q. You were a prominent member of the committee at Ahmedabad?

A. He wanted to know what sort of work I was doing on the famine committee.

Q. He suspected it?

A. I could not say.

Q. He suspected these famine committees? He had heard about it and he wanted to know some particulars?

A. No.

Q. About the genuine work done by the committees, from seditious work down to famine relief work?

(President.—Why do you want to know about Mr. Guider's work?)

Q. You have told the President that there one of the mills was threatened with fire. Was that on the 13th?

A. On the 12th.

Q. Where?

A. Lakshmi cotton mill.

Q. So if any precautions are necessary, would they be outside the city or inside?

A. I only gave information that the mill was threatened.

Q. You say that there were some necessary precautions to be taken. Were they to be taken outside the city or inside the city?

A. I did not say precautions. They should be prepared to meet any contingency.

Q. Outside or inside?

A. Both outside and inside. There were some mills outside.

Q. Only for the protection of the mills?

A. Both for the protection of the mills and other things as well. I only suggested that precautions would be necessary.

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Mr. JIVANLAL VARAJRAI DESAI.

At Ahmedabad, Thursday, the 8th January 1920.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., Secretary.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. JIVANLAL VARAJRAI DESAI, B.A., Bar.-at-Law, Secretary, Home Rule League, Ahmedabad.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Desai, you are a Barrister-at-Law practising in Ahmedabad courts for a number of years?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you have been taking a prominent part in public movements?

A. I have.

Q. Have the citizens of Ahmedabad lately taken a keener interest in political matters than they had been doing previously?

A. They have.

Q. I suppose there are a number of special causes for that, such as the Home Rule League, etc.?

A. We had a political conference, we have the Home Rule Leagues, the advent of Mrs. Besant; Mr. Tilak came down here; Mr. Gandhi has made this his home; and then we also had something in that direction to educate the people.

Q. We have already heard about the strike and the interest of Mr. Gandhi and his consequent influence with the mill-hands.

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I suppose you quite agree with the statement generally made on that?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. After the armistice, was there a certain amount of disappointment on the failure of the town to return to its normal condition?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And in particular there was a good deal of discontent about the passing of the Rowlatt legislation?

A. There was.

Q. In connection with the opposition to that legislation, Mr. Gandhi started the *satyagraha* movement?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. I do not know if you yourself joined the *satyagraha sabha*?

A. I did; I am a member of that society.

Q. Do you not disapprove of a movement asking people to pledge themselves to disobey measures of Government according to the dictation of a committee?

A. We did not ask the masses, but we explained this fully to a select few, who wished to take the vow. It was a restricted movement.

Q. So far as the select few are concerned, is it not a dangerous policy?

A. That is not my opinion, Sir.

Q. Do you think it is quite a proper thing that you should obey a committee in preference to Government?

A. That committee was appointed by ourselves. We selected certain laws which had to be disobeyed.

Q. Then you make the committee the arbitrator whether you should obey or disobey laws?

A. It was left even to us to disobey the committee if the committee decided that certain moral laws should be disobeyed.

Q. It strikes me that it is extraordinary and dangerous.

A. It may be. Even now we do not think it is dangerous at all.

Q. If the general public is taught the principles even in the form of passive resistance, it is very apt to lead to active opposition?

A. We did not preach in that fashion at all.

Q. However you may preach it, the preaching is very likely to result in a practical form of active resistance to law?

A. I do not think so.

Q. In fact, it did all over India?

A. There may be other things besides. *Satyagrahis* have always assisted in the preservation of order wherever they were.

Q. But if you assist in the preservation of order but denounce the Government and say that measures of Government are not to be obeyed, you are unconsciously apt to lead to disorder?

A. There were only certain measures of Government which were to be disobeyed and we denounced certain legislation only, not all.

Q. The selection of the legislation was to be left to the committee?

A. Yes.

Q. The *hartal* was an off-shoot of that?A. As a mark of humiliation and penance we had organised a *hartal* on the 6th April, our voice was not heard, our representatives were denounced, and therefore we thought it was a mark of great humiliation which we ought to observe.Q. As regards the *hartal*, that is general cessation of work?

A. That is so.

Q. Is not that very apt to lead to riot and disorder? A. No; there was absolute quiet in the city of Ahmedabad and wherever we went.

Q. You know that in many places it led to riot. For instance in Delhi, in consequence of the *hartal*, there was riot?

A. I do not know what has transpired before Your Lordship's Committee. But some people went to request certain refreshment sellers at the station to stop selling, and there was disturbance. Here there was nothing of the kind.

Q. You are referring to what occurred on the 6th? A. No; on the 30th at Delhi.

Q. There was no general *hartal* here on the 30th March?A. We understood that we were to observe that Sunday as a day of penance. We had made arrangements for that day. In the meanwhile we learnt from Mr. Gandhi that the 6th April was to be observed, and we observed the 6th as the *hartal*.

Q. The 6th passed off, you had certain processions, and as I understand, there was no conflict?

A. No.

Q. Would you take this view that by continuing indefinitely for a long period of time mourning and

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Mr. JIVANLAL VARAJRAI DESAI.

[Continued.]

cessation from work, you will soon get violence amongst the crowd?

A. We decided to have it for one day. That was the only day of penance. We did not want to observe any other day.

Q. Of course if people have to observe *harts*, they are very apt to commit violence?

A. We had the mill-hands strike for days and days together. There was no disturbance whatsoever. They were meeting day after day, there were no disturbances at all.

Q. Of course we know that very serious disturbances took place on the 10th?

A. In some parts they may have.

Q. How do you account for that? Do you mean to say that it was caused by Mr. Gandhi's arrest? But on Mr. Gandhi's arrest, as I understand, the people of their own accord resolved to hold *hartal*?

A. They did.

Q. In the course of their holding *hartal*, they indulged in these acts of violence?A. I was not a particular witness, but then I know at about half-past two o'clock on the 10th, I heard a little row. I went up from my office and within two minutes, I dispersed the whole crowd. That was on the 10th. They were at a particular Cinematograph show. The proprietor of that had not observed the *hartal*. On the 6th, when the procession was moving, he stopped the show, put up a placard saying that there will be no show; in the evening he started again. It may have annoyed the people.

Q. Do you approve of a man being obstructed from doing his business?

A. I do not. I scolded the people that had collected there and sent them about their business in a minute.

Q. You admit then that the action of the mob in interfering with this man was improper?

A. It was improper.

Q. You do not know I think about the incidents that led to shooting?

A. I heard about that immediately.

Q. I want to know this from you. You admit that if a public authority cannot maintain law and order and prevent the destruction of property or preserve life without shooting, it becomes necessary to shoot?

A. I do.

Q. Whether such a situation had arisen on the 10th or not, you are not in a position to say?

A. The information that was communicated to me at about 6-30 on the evening of that day led me to believe that the excesses were due to the high-handed act of certain people, not of the mob.

Q. What was the high-handed act? Can you suggest?

A. I suggested in the course of cross-examination that the high-handed acts were the abuse showered upon Mr. Gandhi and the police firing upon the mob before Mr. Chatfield arrived there.

Q. Have you any definite information, or is that rumour?

A. I was told by a person who was standing just near the Beehive flour mill. He was held up. He was taking some carts of coal from the goods-shed of the Ahmedabad railway station. His carts were held up; he was also there for some time. He gave me this information. That man may still be available.

Q. Now you know that on that day two Europeans had to take refuge from the mob?

A. That was subsequent to the insult given to Mr. Gandhi.

Q. Do you say that either of these gentlemen did in fact insult Mr. Gandhi in the presence of the mob?

A. That was the information communicated to me.

Q. What was the form of insult?

A. It was reported to me that when these two individuals were coming from the station, they were balanced. They were mill-hands. Their mills had stopped; they had gone to the railway refreshment room and had some thing to drink. When they came back, they asked what the mob was collected for. They said that Mr.

Gandhi was arrested and as a mark of protest against that measure, they were observing *hartal* and they would not let people to pass. Then it was reported to me that one of those Europeans said "Damn Gandhi."

Q. Why was the mob preventing people from passing? If they prevented people, they were starting the first act of lawlessness.

A. They may not like people to go about in carriages.

Q. Do you consider they were right in doing so?

A. I do not, Sir.

Q. Are not the authorities justified in seeing that the people who wish to drive in carriages are allowed to do so?

A. The firing on the 10th was not due to that. If the two gentlemen wanted to pass quietly, perhaps they would not have been molested.

Q. If the mob was preventing these two gentlemen from passing and they were told that the reason was that Mr. Gandhi had been arrested and the people were holding *hartal* and they said "Damn Gandhi," do you consider that a reason for the mob to molest them?

A. It would excite the mob.

Q. Do you think it to be a reason for taking their lives away?

A. It would not be proper.

Q. Therefore if the mob attempted to take their lives away and they had to seek places for hiding, the police authorities would be quite right to interfere?

A. If their lives were in danger, the police would have protected by firing.

Q. If the mob could not be kept off, firing would be necessary?

A. If the mob will not be removed otherwise.

Q. Now there was a meeting I think that night, as we have heard?

A. There was.

Q. I do not know whether you were present?

A. I was.

Q. That passed off quietly?

A. Very quietly.

Q. Did you disapprove of what had occurred early in the day?

A. Everyone of us reprimanded as strongly as we could.

Q. What is your view about the incidents of the next day, i.e., the 11th?

A. I was in the district court library at about 7-30. We had morning courts. A friend of mine came up to me at about 7-45 and told me that the mob had gone to a private school under my management and had got it closed, and that mob was moving towards Mr. Ambalal's mill. It was about two miles off from my school. They wanted the shops to be closed and they might turn violent. I was asked to go and meet them. So I gave up the papers of my cases and ran up in a hackney carriage standing there to meet this crowd that was coming from Jamalpur, and I met them half way between Jamalpur gate and the police *chowky*. I stopped the crowd there. The crowd was about 200 to 300 strong. I asked them what they were doing and told them that Mahatma Gandhi's message was that everybody should resume work and it was foolish of them to do other business. Then immediately thereafter another crowd came up. That was about 500 strong. I brought the whole crowd back about 700 or 800 people. I explained Gandhi's message and asked them to go about their business. They told me that they wanted to stop business as a mark of regret as they also heard (I also had heard before I left court) of Miss Anasuyabai's arrest. I was told that there was a private message got in Ahmedabad announcing the arrest. It may be absolutely incorrect. As a mark of resentment against the arrest of Miss Anasuyabai and Mr. Gandhi, the mill-hands were out of work that day. I tried to reason with them. They went away assuring me that they would not do any mischief whatsoever. I was at that time in European dress. I had a *topce* on. The crowd went to another mill and got that mill closed and were proceeding in some other direction. Then I went to the

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[Continued.]

bar room of the court and took some of my friends and then we met them somewhere near the gardens. They were 500 or 600 strong at that time. I mounted a platform and pacified them and made them give up their sticks or other missiles they had in their hands. Just at that time somebody rushed in and said that the mill-hands were arrested and we were to go and try to get them released. We promised to help them and we were just moving. Then a cry was raised about fire and the first information was that the telegraph office was on fire. I rushed off immediately. I saw that the telegraph office was already on fire. I went inside the Bhadar. There was a lot of fodder stacked. Cattle were there. I saw them burn; they belonged to a friend of mine; apart from that friendship, I went there because it was a public building being burnt. I saw Mr. Tyabji. I assisted him in saving as much property as we could. I had a horse whip in my hand. The only reason for the occurrence would be the resentment against the alleged arrest of Miss Anasuyabai.

Q. It strikes me as an ordinary thing that because the mob hears of the arrest of someone in an entirely different city, they should at once set about to burn down all the Government buildings. Does that not strike you as very extraordinary too?

A. Anasuya was not an ordinary individual. She is almost a mother to these mill-hands.

Q. However much they might hold her in respect, it is an extraordinary thing that the rumour about her arrest should produce the burning down of Government buildings?

A. It may not have been the very first idea. The Matriculation mandap was most inflammable. It was of wooden beams and cloth. Anybody passing might have taken it into his head to throw a lighted match. It could have been burnt in no time. There was a lot of furniture, chairs, tables and lot of paper there. Out of frenzy somebody might have thrown a lighted match or something there. That may have been done and somebody else might have thought of burning some houses which were all in one compound. They saved the office of the Executive Engineer, that was close by.

Q. But as we have been told, there was a considerable number of buildings burnt that day very much about the same time?

A. Some of them were very old.

Q. Was it not the case that the crowd used not only wood in order to set these buildings on fire, but also oil?

A. It was reported to me afterwards.

Q. Have you any doubt that that was true?

A. I cannot say one way or the other. That must be true.

Q. On that assumption doesn't it look as though the mob might not have done these things either on the 10th or 11th suddenly, but that they had formed a design to destroy the buildings of the Government.

A. No, Sir.

Q. Then what else?

A. After we left them on the 10th, they were all quiet. Until we went to the court in the morning of the 11th, there was absolutely no sign of any disturbance. If there was any we would have some scent. In the morning some of my friends went out into the streets to see about the shops being opened.

Q. In the course of the cross-examination of different witnesses that have been examined, you have heard the statement made by such gentlemen as Lieutenant Fitzpatrick, Lieutenant Macdonald, Lieutenant Larkin and a number of other gentlemen, who had to fire upon them?

A. Yes.

Q. In particular you had reference to the shouts of the crowd about killing Europeans and so on. What do you say to that?

A. That might have been later on. After the first fire, there was a mad frenzy. It was not anything like an organisation.

Q. But they may have a different kind of organisation not in the sense of a carefully designed plot that had

been hatched many days previously; but on the day in question, that looked like an organisation in the sense that people were going to all the different places they could in order to rout out Europeans and to destroy Government property?

A. Messrs. Kennedy and Broomfield, two European members of the Indian Civil Service, the District Judge and Joint Judge, went up to the mandap and they returned quite unmolested. They left the court at about 12 o'clock and they had to go from the district court near the Bhadar to the Camp and their carriage was allowed to pass. I am told everybody salaamed them on their way.

Q. You also heard the opinions of these gentlemen that they considered it was consistent with their duty and imperative to order certain of the soldiers to fire upon the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you offer any criticism on it?

A. Between 4 and 4-30 I left my house by myself to go to my club. I passed by Richey Road. When I was near the Manik Chowk post office I saw—I cannot say that my vision is very perfect—three sepoys aiming their guns. There were not 10 people in the street. Myself and another friend who joined me on the road were two. There might have been stray passers-by. There was no crowd there whatsoever. When I was there, I was beckoned by the sepoys not to proceed further. I turned into a bye-lane. I went with about 10 or 15 boys. I heard a gun shot simultaneously.

Q. Is that on the 11th?

A. On the 11th. The shooting was absolutely unjustifiable. There was no crowd. Everybody could pass through absolutely.

Q. Who were those that were fired at on that occasion?

A. I think they fired in the air.

Q. Then no injury was done?

A. I did not hear of any injury. But it was not necessary to fire then.

Q. You do not know what was the immediate cause of the fire?

A. So far as I could see, there was no crowd there.

Q. But then you suggest that your sight is a little imperfect and you may have failed to see what actually occurred?

A. I could see that there was no crowd there. I am quite certain.

Q. You do not even know whether the sepoys were asked to fire or whether they fired accidentally?

A. Their guns were lifted when I went there and they were aiming.

Q. Aiming at whom?

A. Not at any particular individual.

Q. Aiming up in the air?

A. Just to frighten the people.

Q. I want to know whether any one of these orders given for firing and complied with was rash or reckless?

A. I noticed another firing. I cannot say it was rash or reckless. I noticed firing at a quarter past three on the 11th. At that time there were 3 or 4 municipal houses burning and there was a crowd of people who were making an attack on a liquor shop; the firing then was justifiable, but I do not know what the bullet used was. Because one bullet pierced through 5 sheets of galvanized iron in a bungalow.

Q. That is a point in reference to which you cross-examined a witness. Of course bullets will go through.

A. I am not a military man and I do not know anything about bullet or gun.

Q. It had not done any harm?

A. There was no harm because there was no occupant in that room.

Q. Do you know from what direction it came?

A. It came from the north-west. That is, Panch Kuwa gate. That was what Lieutenant Fitzpatrick deposed to.

Q. Looking to what occurred on the 11th, was it not essential that the police should be supported by military force, in your opinion?

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[Continued.]

A. They could have taken precautions. By the evening of the 11th everything was quiet in the city. They could have kept some military in readiness. Martial Law was proclaimed on the 12th. What we understand by Martial Law proclamation might not be the same thing. These instructions given to the soldiers in the city were not justifiable. By the evening of the 11th everything was quiet.

Q. Do you think that people in authority, after what had occurred on the 10th and the 11th, were unduly apprehensive of the situation?

A. They could have taken precautions. They could have kept pickets in different places; that was quite sufficient. It was not necessary to issue the order as regards firing on crowds of 10 persons or on any individuals going in the night. That was not necessary.

Q. If crowds are bent upon setting fire to buildings, it might have been necessary to fire upon them?

A. Their zeal or enthusiasm or frenzy had all cooled down by the evening of the 11th.

Q. I think there were certain indications of disorder on the 12th?

A. That was what I was surprised to hear from the military authorities. So far as I know they had not come to my knowledge.

Q. Do you speak to the accuracy of it?

A. I do not.

Q. So far as Martial Law is concerned, with reference to these special rules, there are just two of them, as regards crowds of over ten liable to be fired on and as regards persons not answering a challenge being liable to be shot. They existed only for a matter of 2 days.

A. We thought it came into force on the morning of the 12th. Nobody knew that it would come into force at 4 o'clock. We were not told that it would be applied. I take the 12th and 14th morning till about 10 o'clock when it was removed after a conference at the District Magistrate's house.

Q. In connection with these two orders, I suppose circumstances might justify such orders?

A. There may be justifying circumstances, but the use made of them was hardly justifiable.

Q. As regards the use, I want to know whether there was any occasion during these two days?

A. The Secretary of the Gujarat Sabha had gone making certain inquiries and it was found that certain women had been hurt, that certain men going about on a peaceful occupation, to buy vegetables or something like that, had been hurt. I asked Mr. Chatfield and others whether they made enquiries about these incidents and they said they made no enquiries but they left it to be proved by the Secretary of the Sabha to give the names of these witnesses.

Q. You have not so far put in any witnesses on behalf of the Sabha who could present the case to us.

A. We have made a general statement that innocent persons have been injured.

Q. An innocent person may be injured by justifiable firing. If you are making a case of unjustifiable firing, do not you think it is only fair that you should give specific notice of it? Have you done so?

A. We have not done so.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. I take it you are the senior member of the bar?

A. I am not the senior member.

Q. You are one of the senior members at least. You are entitled to be called so?

A. I think I have finished my task.

Q. Now just tell me, is it the case that among Indians the pleader class is practically the same in Ahmedabad as what may be called the educated classes. In the sense of the university educated classes, it is practically the same in Ahmedabad as in any other part of India?

A. Yes.

Q. And is it a fact that a great deal of the Rowlatt Bill agitation, to use the phrase in a neutral sense, comes from the members of the bar, not because of any particular connection between the pleaders and the law but

because the bar is bound to be an educated politically minded people?

A. We have got some doctors who took interest in these things, medical practitioners; some merchants also took interest in these matters.

Q. As regards the *satyagraha sabha*, do I take it that the leaders of the society are largely composed of lawyers?

A. No, Sir.

Q. The lawyers in Ahmedabad are not identified with it?

A. No.

Q. And it is only by way of accident that one or two of them were identified?

A. That is so.

Q. I do not want to discuss with you at present anything about the limits of civil disobedience.

A. It is left to Mr. Gandhi.

Q. Would you mind telling me as you understood it, when you took upon yourself to disobey the Rowlatt Act or any other law selected by the committee or that the committee specified, how is it to be afterwards determined?

A. To be determined by the members.

Q. Do I understand it to be a committee of members of your own society or of all India?

A. There may be some of the Ahmedabad members and a joint committee of others also.

Q. As a matter of fact when you took the vow the general principles upon which the committee itself was to be constituted were not actually made clear? Were they?

A. We knew how it was to be constituted, that Mr. Gandhi was to be the President and 3 or 4 members from Ahmedabad and some from Bombay were to form the committee.

Q. Do you know that the committee that was to decide about these laws would not have members except from Ahmedabad or Bombay?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was it not the intention that the committee ultimately to decide would consist of members to be taken from the different provinces and parts of India?

A. Yes.

Q. The *satyagraha* movement as you know was a thing which spread all over India. At all events, it was preached all over India?

A. It was taken to Madras, the Punjab and Calcutta.

Q. And Delhi?

A. Delhi also.

Q. We have not been able to understand whether each of these places was invited to have a committee of its own?

A. There are sub-committees at different centres.

Q. There were to be sub-committees?

A. There were *sabhas* at different centres, such as Ahmedabad, Delhi, Madras—different *sabhas*. Each *sabha* will have an executive and there will be a representative of the different *sabhas* on the central body.

Q. As regards the committee which was to decide which laws should be disobeyed by the gentlemen who lived in the Punjab, was that committee a different committee from Ahmedabad or Bombay?

A. Mr. Gandhi's committee would decide that, then refer it to the Punjab sub-committee.

Q. You mean that Ahmedabad and Bombay should treat this as a central committee. That was the idea?

A. They would communicate with the executive committee in the Punjab and they would decide whether they were to follow their lead or not. That was my impression.

Q. This scheme was a complicated scheme. Was it put on paper in a practical form?

A. We have the organisation of the *sabha* on paper. From what I have seen it will be a most important document.

Q. Would that contain what I may call a carefully drafted constitution explaining the points I have been asking you about?

A. It would contain most of it.

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[Continued]

Q. The nature of the committee that was to be at the different parts of India and how it was to be allied to the central committee?

A. We have not got all that chalked out.

Q. In the end, when people were taking a vow to disobey the Rowlatt Bill, that is Rowlatt Bill No. II, were other acts determined by the Ahmedabad or Bombay Committee, or any committee, or singled out for the exercise of this?

A. The Press Act and the Newspaper Registration Act, these were the two selected at first. It was suggested that proscribed literature should be published and unregistered newspapers should be distributed.

Q. Just tell me, at Bombay did the central committee, in the presence of Mr. Gandhi, have a meeting and formally decide this?

A. They did, at Bombay.

Q. In fact, that ruling, I understand, would be binding upon the persons who have taken the vow in Ahmedabad?

A. Yes.

Q. In point of fact, except for the publication of certain proscribed literature, I think Mr. Gandhi did not intentionally do any violation of law. That was the only method?

A. That was the only method.

Q. If any follower of Mr. Gandhi has got into conflict with the police or did not do what he was told to do, that was in the ordinary way and not as a member of the *sabha*?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me, from your knowledge of Mr. Gandhi's attempt to put the *satyagraha* principle into force in this way, was a *satyagrahi* required to go to a given place and try to get into conflict with the authorities by disobeying some order and getting himself arrested?

A. No, Sir.

Q. It was only for Mr. Gandhi himself to do that?

A. He wanted to go to the Punjab.

Q. Do I understand you to say that Mr. Gandhi went to Delhi or the Punjab to get himself arrested?

A. No. He wanted to go to pacify the people after the disturbances of the 30th March.

Q. You spoke of the first time when he was turned back?

A. He was actually arrested. He was sent back under custody to Bombay. I am informed he was arrested at Palwal.

Q. You know that after that arrest there was some talk that he wanted to go there for the purpose of getting himself re-arrested?

A. He wanted to go back.

Q. I want to ask you as regards the *hartal*. The notion of the *hartal* is the notion of humiliation and penance.

A. That is our notion. When it is applied to people, *hartal* is for humiliation and penance for the sins of the people. We were so very sinful that our prayers were not heard by the Government.

Q. Have *hartals* been resorted to on occasions when pressure by Government or anybody else has to be demonstrated against? Have you done that before?

A. Yes.

Q. In this particular case, do you not think that the *satyagraha* movement as a political agitation against the Rowlatt Act and the *hartal*, made a rather heady mixture for the poor and uneducated people of Ahmedabad?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Do you think that a mixture of the political and religious is intoxicating at any time?

A. I am not religious-minded. I cannot say that.

Q. Mr. Gandhi you described as an essentially religious man and not a mere politician?

A. Yes.

Q. You have told us, as we have been told in other places, that the intention of the *satyagrahis* was not to invite anybody of the street to take the vow, their ideal was something which required a great deal of preparation and all that?

A. Yes.

Q. At the same time, so far as Ahmedabad is concerned, during this time, is it not the case, that by meetings and speeches, the members of the society endeavour to train and educate the people so they might feel themselves entitled to take the vow?

A. We showed them what *satyagraha* is. We tried to explain to them the principles so that by careful training they might in course of time be able to follow this movement.

Q. It was not intended to be something which you are to keep to yourself, but you intended that it should spread among the masses?

A. In course of time.

Q. And it would have been much better as a political demonstration?

A. There was a question among ourselves whether in a country like India with a population of 300 millions and over it was possible to spread this.

Q. Apart from any question of disobeying the Rowlatt Act or any other law that might be decided by the committee, do you not think that all this talk about *satyagraha*, about resisting law, spread all over India last April tremendously fast and along with it was associated the idea of lawlessness?

A. I won't go so far.

Q. If it be true, that may account possibly for a great deal in the conduct of the mob not only here but throughout India?

A. Their instruction was that an immoral law was not to be obeyed, the law that was opposed to the natural rights of citizens was not to be obeyed.

Q. That was the principle? The principle was that no bad law was to be obeyed and you are to disobey certain other laws as a protest against that? So it was not the disobeying of the law which violated your own conscience? That never was the *satyagraha* principle?

A. Yes.

Q. The principle was that the Rowlatt Act violated your conscience; in protest against that you disobey that law and any other laws which the committee may determine?

A. The committee won't include such laws as don't go against the natural rights of individuals. No individual was to be going about breaking any law. The committee was to be a sort of check or brake.

Q. At the meeting held on the 10th, you told us, you and everybody else who addressed that meeting, denounced the violence. You tried your best to bring the people to their right sense of duty. Would you mind telling me, did you at the same time say anything to persuade them to give up the *hartal* and open their shops and carry on business as usual?

A. We did so.

Q. When you were cross-examining one witness you said that a telegram had been actually received in Ahmedabad purporting that Anasuyabai had been arrested. Have you seen that telegram?

A. I have not.

Q. Do you know who saw it?

A. A friend of mine came and told me when I was going from court to meet the mob near Jamalpur gate. Q. Do you know who first received it? The name of the person?

A. I was told that some *bania* in the market received it.

Q. Do you know from whom it was supposed to have come?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Whoever may have got the opportunity to get to the bottom of that matter, he could have ascertained who was responsible for spreading the report of the telegram?

A. It was possible. I tried to get it but I could not.

Q. You never traced it. Did you ask your friend to help you?

A. I asked him.

Q. Did he give you any help?

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[Continued.]

A. I understand he was called by the police also.

Q. You rather made it a matter of complaint in the notice, in the Martial Law proclamation, that it was not said that it was only to be acted upon after 4 o'clock?

A. Yes.

Q. Now about that Martial Law order, I understand you to say that on the evening of the 11th things seemed to have settled down?

A. Yes.

Q. You do not think that the authorities should have done more than take precautions by having stronger pickets throughout the city and then see whether any further trouble arose or not?

A. Yes.

Q. In your view you go so far as to say that it was because that order was proclaimed that people did in fact insist upon collecting in crowds in Ahmedabad?

A. They did not collect. After the evening of the 11th, they had not collected.

Q. Unless they collected in crowds of more than 10 would the order for firing be given?

A. Your Lordship will see, in Ahmedabad there are so many shops, vegetable shops and other shops, about 200 or so, and at each shop there will be an assembly and crowd of more than 10. That prevented people from doing their business.

Q. Was there not a *hartal* on the 12th when the Martial Law order came into existence?

A. No *hartal* on the 12th.

Q. Were the shops open or shut?

A. Shut.

Q. As they were shut, could people carry on their ordinary business?

A. They could have gone there.

Q. I am talking about this order of firing upon people in groups of ten if necessary, without warning. Do you not think, the military doing duty all day on the 10th and 11th, the wisest thing was to give notice that crowds causing trouble will not be spared?

A. These crowds had spent themselves out.

Q. There is no harm in that notice. People were told, after the frenzy was over, they would be fired upon if they assembled in tens?

A. On the 12th; we had to go to the courts. The courts were working.

Q. Nobody supposed that a barrister would be fired upon. No trouble about that?

A. We were stopped on the road.

Q. That would be a pleasure?

A. I do not know.

Q. Can you tell me whether as a matter of fact there was a single instance of the Martial Law order being brought into force, that is to say, of people without warning being fired upon with the intention to hit them merely because they were ten or more than ten. Was there a single case in which that was ever done on the 12th or 13th?

A. I have heard of a case; I was not a witness.

Q. And in that case, was anybody killed?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. How many?

A. One. I am told one solitary individual was going to his work and he was hit.

Q. Can you identify the occasion?

A. I know something. He was living in Khadia. He was working in a cinematograph show. I think it was on the morning of the 12th when he was going to his shop.

Q. Is it the morning of the 12th? It was under this proclamation?

A. I think after the arrival of the British troops. At about 12-30.

Q. At what spot?

A. Near the Fernandez bridge, on the Richey Road.

Q. You think on that occasion the people were more than ten?

A. My information is that this man was passing along and he was hit.

Q. That somebody fired at him, without cause, without warning?

A. That was what I was told.

Q. With the intention to hit him? It was not a stray bullet?

A. It was not.

Q. You cannot say for certain that there was a case in which the so-called Martial Law order as such was carried out?

A. This information was communicated to me.

Q. You stated in your evidence that you and other gentlemen did try to induce the mob to cease their violence?

A. Yes.

Q. I want to ask you whether, after it was all over, the educated classes in Ahmedabad assisted the police to get convictions. I am only asking you because you are a member of the *satyagraha sabha* and it would be true to the principles of *satyagraha* to see that information is given out to the police to get convictions?

A. I do not believe in that at all.

Q. And therefore you do not necessarily bind yourself to everything Mr. Guider said to Mr. Gandhi?

A. No, that is about the *Ashram* only, not about the *satyagraha*, that is what I understood from Mr. Guider.

Q. As far as you and the members of your *sabha* are concerned you do not think it would be in any respect wrong to refuse to give the police assistance?

A. I would give every possible assistance to them.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You had various meetings about the Rowlatt legislation?

A. Yes, Sir, we had.

Q. At these meetings were the provisions of the legislation explained?

A. Fully explained.

Q. How many meetings had you of that character? A. I think we had no less than a dozen meetings at different places in Ahmedabad.

Q. Where the provisions were fully explained?

A. Fully explained by competent men.

Q. Were the actual provisions of the Bill put in print? A. Yes, Sir. A copy was given to Mr. Guider yesterday.

Q. Both in English and the vernacular?

A. Yes, because we wanted it to go to the vernacular-knowing masses.

Q. And those having a copy of the actual provisions of the Bill were they actually distributed among the people?

A. Yes, Sir, freely.

Q. Largely? How many copies?

A. More than 5,000.

Q. Giving the full provisions of the Bill?

A. Yes, Sir. This pamphlet (witness refers to pamphlet in his hand) contains the whole Bill and explanations also. Mr. Gandhi published an explanation of it. Q. Mr. Gandhi published another pamphlet?

A. Yes.

Q. And this one you hold in your hand was published by whom?

A. By the *satyagraha sabha*.

Q. And Mr. Gandhi published one of his own?

A. Yes, Sir, it is in the vernacular.

Q. What was printed in English?

A. As we appealed to the masses, we printed all these in the vernacular. We printed a translation of the speech of the Hon'ble Mr. Patel in the Imperial Council.

Q. Will you give me a copy of that?

A. We have given copies with our case; all these are put in marked A to H.

Q. These meetings, when were they held, in February and March?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You heard of the misrepresentations with regard to the Rowlatt Act? Did they come to your notice?

* Not reproduced.

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[Continued.]

A. They exist only in the imagination of the Criminal Investigation Department people; there were no misrepresentations whatever by anybody. I was present at most of the meetings, Mr. Patel was present.

Q. I am not asking you what happened at the meetings. Whatever the origin of it may be, the fact is that there were in the minds of the public certain misapprehensions about the Rowlatt Act which were not justified by the provisions?

A. We came to know of these misapprehensions when we read in the papers about some misrepresentations in the Punjab, that people were to be carried away, and marriages were to be stopped and so on. There was no misrepresentation in this part of the country.

Q. That five people could not stand together?

A. There was no such misrepresentation here.

Q. You mean to say that there never was current any misrepresentation about the Rowlatt Act in Ahmedabad or other parts?

A. I am prepared to say so so far as Ahmedabad was concerned.

Q. There never was at any time any currency given to misrepresentations of that character?

A. There might be some people who may not have read the Bill or heard about it; they may be absolutely ignorant, but so far as Ahmedabad was concerned, there was no misrepresentation.

Q. Did not some of the ordinary people believe that under this Act anything could be done to anybody?

A. You cannot judge about the feelings and beliefs of certain individuals.

Q. Did that come to your knowledge that there was some such belief in the minds of the people?

A. No.

Q. You never heard of that?

A. No.

Q. At any of these meetings, held either by the *satyagraha sabha* or any other public body in the city were any misrepresentations made about the provisions of the Rowlatt Act?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Is there any truth in the suggestion that behind the occurrences of the 10th and the 11th of April in Ahmedabad there was a pre-arranged scheme and that the educated classes were in it?

A. It is absolutely unfounded.

Q. You have heard of Mr. Gandhi's statement that these things were pre-arranged and that they were pre-arranged by educated persons?

A. By Shikela, he means some literate persons.

Q. He says it was pre-arranged, do you accept that?

A. I do not, Sir.

Q. You do not think that is true?

A. To my knowledge it is not true.

Q. Now when he says it was pre-arranged by educated persons, do you accept that?

A. No Sir, I do not. I had absolutely a tussle with Mr. Gandhi about that statement. I quarrelled with Mr. Gandhi about it.

Q. You quarrelled with Mr. Gandhi about it?

A. He won't budge and I won't budge.

Q. He won't be persuaded to your view?

A. And I won't accept his.

Q. Did you ask him on what materials he based that statement?

A. I asked him.

Q. Did he tell you what those materials were?

A. He did not.

Q. Did he say he had materials?

A. I understood him to say he had some materials.

Q. But he was unwilling to give them?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. It has been said that you and other leading people in Ahmedabad, Municipal Commissioners, President included, shut yourselves up in your houses to save yourselves, was this true?

A. That may be the knowledge of Mr. Chatfield, it is not my knowledge.

Q. Is that true?

A. No, it is not.

Q. Did you yourself go about during those two days?

A. I did. Mr. Vallabhai Patel is a councillor, Mr. Javeri is a councillor, they all went about.

Q. Did they take part in any manner in assisting the authorities?

A. I do not know, but they went about to the different hospitals, Ramanbhai is President of the municipality, Mr. Rao is a councillor. Several others assisted them. What assistance was wanted of us we do not know; there was an atmosphere of distrust at that time.

Q. You did not know how your offer of help might be received?

A. Quite so.

Q. Did you do all that you could?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Gandhi is very much worshipped in Ahmedabad?

A. He is.

Q. And in other parts also?

A. Yes.

Q. Very much in Ahmedabad?

A. Yes.

Q. The strict injunction of Mr. Gandhi's *Satyagraha* creed is no violence?

A. Quite so, adherence to truth and no violence.

Q. I understand the theory is you must invite suffering on yourself and inflict no suffering on other people?

A. Quite so.

Q. The mill hands, the masses, are very much devoted to Mr. Gandhi? They look upon him as their senior?

A. As their saviour, that is so.

Q. And that devotion of theirs did not prevent them from committing these acts of violence and did not make them follow his injunction of no violence?

A. They are not *Satyagrahis*.

Q. They need not be, but Mr. Gandhi is like God to them?

A. They thought their God was being persecuted.

Q. Mr. Gandhi is like God to them; Mr. Gandhi's great creed is no violence at all, you must suffer yourself?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In spite of their devotion to him these people were not able to follow that creed of his of no violence?

A. That is so.

Q. Does not that show that his creed is of such a character that it is very difficult for the ordinary man and the ordinary people to rise to the necessary level to follow it?

A. Of course it is a very difficult creed.

Q. You were asked about the *Satyagraha* movement and you say the idea was to disobey the Rowlatt Act and also to disobey other laws which are against your conscience or which violate natural justice?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Who is to determine that a particular law violates natural justice or is against your conscience? Is each individual to do so for himself?

A. Each individual might do it, but there was to be a sort of a check over the individual's opinion by the opinion of a committee.

Q. You say the Press Registration Act was one of the laws selected for disobedience?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. That Act enacts that no newspaper is to be printed or published without registration?

A. Yes.

Q. What is there in that legislation which is against your conscience?

A. No it was a protest against the Press Act.

Q. Is there anything in that Act which requires a newspaper to be registered before it is published, against natural justice, or against your conscience to obey?

A. Not the Act of 1857, but the subsequent Press Act.

Q. But we are not dealing with the Press Act. What you decided to disobey was the Newspaper Registration Act, and in order to disobey that, what was done was that an unregistered newspaper was decided to be issued

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[Continued.]

and was attempted to be issued. What was there in that law which was against your conscience?

A. Forfeiture of presses.

Q. That is not merely registration?

A. No, it is part of that.

Q. What you decided to disobey was merely the registration provision; that is what you decided to disobey?

A. It would necessarily entail upon the proprietors of the press forfeiture.

Q. What you decided to disobey was the provision as to registration, that you would not register a newspaper. What was there against your conscience in registering a newspaper?

A. As I suggest there was the Press Act also.

Q. Then the idea was this, I take it, that by disobeying the provision as to registration you would invite on yourself certain consequences of forfeiture and others?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. By inviting those consequences on yourself of having your property forfeited, or being sent to jail what did you mean to effect?

A. We wanted to show the enormity of the press legislation.

Q. You were inviting suffering by forfeiture and in that manner you wanted to show what?

A. The enormity of the press legislation, the oppression upon newspaper proprietors.

Q. The original idea was that by having hundreds and thousands of people going to prison to compel Government to repeal the Rowlatt Act, was that the idea?

A. I do not think there was scope for hundreds to go to jail.

Q. You did not get so many to go to jail, but the idea was to get a large number to break laws, thereby getting many people to suffer and thereby compelling Government ultimately to accede to your view about the Rowlatt Act?

A. It might appear to the British public that as so many people were prepared to go to jail a great enormity was being practised here.

Q. In order to invite attention by large numbers going to jail?

A. The British sense of justice was to be invoked.

Q. And was not the idea this to a certain extent that by breaking laws in that manner you might so embarrass Government that they would be compelled to accede to your wishes?

A. No embarrassment of Government was intended. Nothing was further from our minds.

Q. But would it not result in that?

A. It may or may not.

Q. It may not be intended but if you have disobedience of laws and the will of individual people or the will of any committee, would it not inevitably lead to the embarrassment of ordered Government?

A. I should not go so far, Sir.

Q. It is obvious. You are a lawyer, if you have laws which have been in operation all these years, which you have never thought of disobeying before and if you start a campaign of this character, where you say you will disobey various laws, as each individual thinks or as a certain committee thinks, would it not inevitably result in embarrassing ordered Government?

A. I have told you that is not my opinion; it would not go so far.

Q. You think if the people would take it into their heads to go on disobeying laws, you could carry on ordered Government?

A. Yes, there are various laws, the Civil Procedure Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, all these are obeyed.

Q. What laws are you to disobey? Your committee may determine one or two one day and they may determine a dozen the next year?

A. It is already decided in the vows.

Q. Such laws as your committee may determine?

A. We are not to do any violence.

Q. You need not cause any violence at all in order to embarrass Government in that way, by disobeying

laws without committing violence. Even peacefully in that manner you do create considerable embarrassment in carrying on ordered Government?

A. It may result in that, but it was never intended to.

Q. You say it was not intended to?

A. Yes.

Q. It was immensely likely to result in that if done on a large scale? Assuming the conditions I gave you done on a large scale, it must result?

A. I do not know, other things are carried on like that in other parts of the world.

Q. Leave alone other parts of the world, if this is done on a large scale it must have that result?

A. I am not in a position to agree with you there, Sir.

Q. You do not think it would result?

A. No.

By Major General Sir George Barrow—

Q. In regard to the memorandum of the committee appointed by the *Satyagraha Sabha*, Ahmedabad, with reference to that notice about firing on 10 or more people had that notice led to innocent persons going on peaceful avocations being killed?

A. Yes, Sir. The Secretary of the *Sabha* has made a rough list and he has pointed out to me about 7 persons who have been killed like that.

Q. Have you got their names?

A. Yes, Sir. On that point the Secretary of the *Sabha*, who has made personal investigations into this matter, will be in a better position to enlighten you.

Q. Did you sign your name to this document?

A. No, that is signed by the Secretary, that is another Desai.

Q. It is signed by Harilal Desai, Jivanlal Desai and Mr. Krishnalal?

A. Yes, Sir, I am Jivanlal Desai.

Q. You signed this document, and anyhow you say innocent persons going on peaceful avocations were killed?

A. Yes, Sir. I have told you we have got three Secretaries of the *Sabha*, and they have made certain enquiries and they have been able to ascertain that 7 persons were killed as mentioned here.

Q. You told the President there were only some wounded, except one man who was killed?

A. I mentioned one man.

Q. Which you say was not by a stray bullet; how do you know it was not a stray bullet?

A. That is my information.

Q. Did you speak to the person who did see the shot fired?

A. No, Sir, the information was brought to me not by one who saw it.

Q. Your statement is merely hearsay?

A. Quite so.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Is it a fact that, after his return from Delhi, Mahatma Gandhi made a statement that now he considered that he was the only man who was safe for passive resistance?

A. Yes.

Q. Don't you think that is a complete confession of the failure of the movement?

A. I should think so.

Q. Now so far as the *Satyagraha* movement is concerned, I think you will agree with me that, in whatever high respect Mahatma Gandhi may be held by educated classes, and he is held, I do not dispute it—I am not talking of Ahmedabad or Bombay—in places like Calcutta and in the United Provinces people like *ekka*-drivers, Government servants, hackney carriage drivers and others have not such respect for Mahatma Gandhi that as soon as they hear that he has said the 6th of April should be observed as a *hartal*, they will voluntarily observe a *hartal*?

A. My personal experience is that he is so much revered that I heard of old women at Amritsar giving up their *purdah* to come and worship him.

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[Continued.]

Q. I was talking of the 6th of April ?
 A. I should think the work he has done will last for many years, in Champaran for instance and in Kaira it has endeared him to every one there, even *ekka*-drivers.
 Q. The whole lot of them ? There may be some that I can understand. Have you not heard that at different places tram-cars were interfered with, hackney carriages were interfered with, motor cars were interfered with ?
 A. I have heard so.
 Q. That is they were not voluntarily observing the *hartal* and some people on behalf of the *Satyagrahis* were obliging them to observe the *hartal* ?
 A. Not obliging them, they might be explaining.
 Q. Was that explaining, by means of smashing motor cars ?
 A. That might be later on.
 Q. So far as the 6th of April is concerned, except at Delhi nothing had happened anywhere else ?
 A. Quite so.
 Q. Except what had happened on the 30th of March at Delhi, on the 6th of April nothing had happened anywhere else ?
 A. That is so.
 Q. I do not think you deny the fact that tram-cars were stopped at places, that *ekka*-drivers were interfered with, that motor cars were interfered with on the 6th of April ?
 A. Not in Ahmedabad.
 Q. I am not talking of Ahmedabad. Take for instance Bombay. Is it not a fact that tram-cars were stopped on the 6th or subsequently ?
 A. I have heard that on the 10th and 11th tram traffic was interfered with.
 Q. And at Delhi on the 30th March *ekkawalas* were stopped ?
 A. Yes, I have read so in the papers.
 Q. My point is, the *Satyagrahis* are a handful ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Now if they want *Satyagraha* principles to be observed and the majority of the people are not of their way of thinking, it is natural that wherever they are they will try to get the people to follow them ?
 A. No.
 Q. When you wish the *hartal* to be observed is it not a fact that the zealous members of the Association, or zealous followers of Mr. Gandhi would approach people and ask them to observe the *hartal*, persuade them in the first instance and say Gandhi had declared that a *hartal* should be observed and he is a great man, and we hope you will make it a success and cease to work on that day ?
 A. I will tell you what we did in Ahmedabad. We called together a meeting and explained to them what was the meaning of *hartal*, what was to be done, and that everything was to be done peacefully.
 Q. Your statement refers to the general question of *hartal*. The question is whether or not, taking a practical point of view of this *hartal*, it would probably lead to violence ?
 A. Everything is probable.
 Q. More than probable, because what do you find ? Have you not heard that everywhere where this *hartal* was observed there was interference with motor cars and *ekkawalas* ?
 A. I have read of some instances somewhere.
 Q. And according to you there will be black sheep in every place ?
 A. I daresay.
 Q. And there will be many not ready to follow Mr. Gandhi ? They will be so very fond of making money that they will open their shops ?
 A. So far as Ahmedabad was concerned.
 Q. I am not talking of Ahmedabad ; generally speaking, having regard to human nature, there will be hundreds and thousands ?
 A. Yes, there would be.
 Q. And therefore an attempt would be made by the Home Rulers to enforce the *hartal* ?
 A. There was no attempt made to enforce the *hartal*.

Q. Not in Ahmedabad or anywhere else ?
 A. So far as my knowledge goes, not in Ahmedabad or anywhere else.
 Q. You heard what happened at Delhi ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And what happened at Bombay ?
 A. On the 10th and 11th I have read about that.
 Q. You have heard of what happened at Lahore ?
 A. No.
 Q. You know what happened at Kasur ?
 A. That was after the 13th.
 Q. You know what happened at Gujranwala ?
 A. That *hartal* was not in pursuance of what Mr. Gandhi said. It depends on the nature of the *hartal*.
 Q. The nature of *hartal* means that you cease to work ?
 A. Cease to work under what circumstances ?
 Q. Would you like this Committee honestly to believe that under the orders of Mr. Gandhi on the 6th of April, when the *hartal* was held, except for a few handfuls of men, there was anybody who was really mourning or who had gone to the riverside to bathe or who was sitting in his house and praying ? That was not my experience because I was travelling on that day and I had experience of three different cities. And do you wish us to believe that *hartal* meant that everybody was concerned for the purification of his soul and was thinking of God ?
 A. I cannot say.
 Q. *Hartal* means people should not do their work ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Take for instance the case of Government servants. You know that an attempt was made to prevent Government servants and railway servants from doing their legitimate work on the 6th and on some of these days ?
 A. No, Sir.
 Q. On the 10th ?
 A. No, Sir.
 Q. On the 11th, 12th and 13th ?
 A. I don't know about that. It might be in the Punjab, but so far as my knowledge goes there was nothing on this side.
 Q. Your knowledge extends to Bombay, and at Bombay was there anything ?
 A. I don't think so.
 Q. The tram service was dislocated ?
 A. It was held up. There were large crowds in the city and the cars were held up. Of course there were rude people and stones were thrown.
 Q. That is my point. Why were these stones thrown ?
 A. That is as a mark of resentment against the authorities in arresting Mr. Gandhi.
 Q. Therefore you will agree with me that stones were thrown with a view that the tram cars should not ply and to make the tram and motor company observe *hartal* ?
 A. It might be the motor company or the motor owners.
 Q. Therefore stones were thrown at them to compel them to observe *hartal* ?
 A. There are *hartaals* and *hartaals*. A *hartal* might be held as a mark of resentment and it might be held as a mark of penance. Now the *hartal* that was held on the 10th and the 11th was a mark of resentment, and the *hartal* on the 6th was as a mark of penance.
 Q. At least there will be another philosophical discussion as to what sort of *hartal* the masses should observe ?
 A. I daresay there would be one, certainly.
 Q. Like the one on the 6th or on the 10th ?
 A. I say there would be one.
 Q. I will leave that *hartal* to *Satyagrahis*. You know the *hartaals* that followed the 10th April, and they were likely to lead to rowdysim and fighting ?
 A. They were not organised *hartaals*.
 Q. Even that will be in your favour. Even assuming that those *hartaals* were spontaneous ones and that pressure was not brought to bear on anybody still you found that even on those occasions there were a large number of people who were not inclined to observe *hartaals* and they were interfered with. Therefore do you still adhere to

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[Continued.]

your view that generally speaking so far as *hartaals* are concerned, there is no likelihood of their leading to a breach of the peace ?
 A. They would.
 Q. You will admit that there is only one *Mahatma* Gandhi. Whatever he may do, we have to act with our own organisations, and it is very difficult for you to control the volunteers, to control people who overdo things in persuading business people to close their shops or there may be some persons who may be under your obligation and you go and ask them to close their shops but they may not be believing in soul force . . . ?
 A. There might be some disturbance.
 Q. Therefore you will agree with me that so far as the enforcement of *hartal* is concerned, it is more than likely to lead to rowdysim and a breach of the peace ?
 A. Just as I told Sir Chimanlal, I would say that I would agree to differ from you.
 Q. What is your explanation about the attack on Mr. Fraser ? I want to ask you that on behalf of the Gujarat Sabha ?
 A. It was a very brutal attack. I have no explanation. It was absolutely an uncalled for attack. He was a very quiet young fellow. He was a very good fellow, and those who did it did a very dastardly act.
 Q. How do you account for it ?
 A. I cannot account for it.
 Q. The explanation is given by the witness because he was a European. What reason have you to differ from that point of view ?
 A. Because Messrs. Kennedy and Broomfield were in the midst of the crowd near the *mandap* and they were allowed to . . .
 Q. They were surrounded by *Satyagrahi* pleaders like yourself ?
 A. It was not in the court-house.
 Q. At what time it was ?
 A. About 10 o'clock.
 Q. This was subsequent to 10 o'clock ?
 A. Yes. It might be the frenzy of the mob and not simply because he was a European.
 Q. I don't say that, it is not my own view, but I want you to explain the thing. Here are the facts. You admit that Mr. Fraser was a good fellow. There was that mob. You have heard how he was attacked. You also have heard from the evidence that they said 'here is a European, kill him.' The cries of the mob also showed that their intention was to kill a European. There are witnesses who came and told us that Mr. Fraser was assaulted because he was a European. Now what have you to say to that ? Why should you reject that explanation ?
 A. That is for you to say.
 Q. You cannot give any explanation ?
 A. No, besides Mr. Fraser there were other Europeans who moved about and there were also many people in European clothes. I myself had a *topi* on for the whole time.
 Q. What explanation have you to give to the contemplated assault on Mrs. Tuke ?
 A. That was mob frenzy.
 Q. You admit practically that the frenzy of the mob adopted this attitude that they were ready to kill every European that they saw ?
 A. They would have then killed anybody. They would have killed even an Indian if he had interfered with them.
 Q. I want to make that point clear. Here the case has been put forward that the mob was out for killing Europeans and the circumstances also point to that. But from your cross-examination on behalf of the Sabha we are not satisfied with the explanation put forward by the Sabha. The reason given to us is that the mob was out for killing Europeans and that they were anti-European and anti-Government. What have you to say to that ?
 A. I can only say as to what happened up to half-past nine.

Q. After half-past nine you don't take the responsibility or you cannot say anything happened after that ?
 A. I was with the mob till half-past nine. I tried to quieten them.
 Q. You appeared 10th as a signatory to the statement of the Sabha and as a counsel. You also have heard their evidence. You are also a resident of Ahmedabad. Can you suggest any other explanation ?
 A. The only explanation is mob frenzy, and not anti-European or anti-Government feeling.
 Q. The frenzy was to kill Europeans, that was their madness ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. At that time and on that day the mob was anti-European and anti-Government ?
 A. Yes, they did some damage to Government property.
 Q. Therefore, having regard to all these facts you cannot suggest any other explanation except the one that the mob was anti-European and anti-Government on that day ?
 A. Yes, that is the only explanation.
 Q. You will be the best man to give us an explanation about the notice that was issued by the *Satyagraha Sabha*. Great exception has been taken by the other side to the wording of that. Will you be able to give us an explanation or I should keep these questions for the secretary of your Sabha ?
 A. We have the secretary of the Sabha coming forward who will be the best man to give an explanation.
 Q. Now I don't think the object of the *Satyagrahis* is the disobedience of all laws, but civil disobedience ?
 A. Yes, civil disobedience.
 Q. You do not mean to go about and preach to the people to commit breaches of the Penal Code, to commit offences and to get themselves arrested ?
 A. We advocate only civil disobedience.
 Q. But how could you possibly civilly disobey Rowlatt Bill No. 2 ? Was it understood that you would go and commit sedition and become an anarchist ? How was it possible for any one to disobey the Rowlatt Act unless and until he was prepared either to become an anarchist or to preach sedition or do something which would bring him under the purview of that Act ?
 A. That will take us into the discussion of all the sections, and I do not know that we have sufficient time at our disposal just now to go through every section and see how it can be disobeyed civilly.
 Q. You will agree with me that it is only the penal portion to which you can take exception. It has nothing to do with the procedure. I will only ask you to let me know how could you possibly commit a breach of the Rowlatt Act. Unless and until you commit an offence you will not have an opportunity to obey or disobey the procedure provided by that. Therefore you cannot say that your intention was to disobey the procedure ?
 A. As the law is worded, you need not be an anarchist or a seditionist to come within the clutches of that law.
 Q. He has to do that act ?
 A. No. You have only to come under the displeasure of the Criminal Investigation Department.
 Q. That is a different matter. But supposing you deliberately want to disobey the Rowlatt Act, I want to know how the *Satyagrahis* were prepared to disobey the orders ? It was decided that you should civilly disobey the civil laws until and unless the Rowlatt Act was repealed. That was the reason why the necessity was enforced upon you to civilly disobey the laws ?
 A. That was the principal reason.
 Q. Therefore when you decided to civilly disobey other laws . . . ?
 A. We wanted a repeal of the Act.
 Q. Under the doctrines preached by *Mahatma* Gandhi it was decided to disobey civilly other laws in order to show your resentment against the Rowlatt Act ?
 A. That would be so.
 Q. With regard to the *Satyagrahis*, embarrassing, so far as Government is concerned, every agitation, whether it is constitutional or otherwise, industrial or social, is likely to embarrass the Government. Therefore the

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only difference is whether the intention of the agitation was to embarrass the Government or not, and your case is, that so far as *Satyagrahis* are concerned, your intention was not to embarrass the Government. It may be a consequence that the Government may be embarrassed?

A. We are not responsible for it. It is not our intention.

Q. You have heard the evidence of that man who was not prepared to admit whether he was a popular man or not, I mean Mr. Bulakhidas. Can you give me any explanation why his house was burnt?

A. His cross-examination by me would have led to something. He was a very blunt magistrate. He was given to abusing people in his court, and these mill-hands had very much to do with him. His policy was obnoxious.

Q. So far as the Collector of your district is concerned?

A. He is a very popular man. I don't think we have had many like him here.

Q. Now about these sweetmeats. It is very unfortunate that you did not put that question, but if that is true, am I right in supposing that the lane from which those trays of sweetmeats are supplied, that is, the place where at least 50 sweetmeat sellers have their shops, is the place from where the sweetmeats are distributed throughout the city?

A. I did not press that question, because I knew that Mr. Fitzpatrick would not give a proper answer. He mixed up Pankor Naka and Panch Kuva Naka. At Ratanpol there are houses of these confectioners. They manufacture sweets there and then take the sweets from their houses to their shops across the road. They had to pass through that road.

Q. Can this be seen every day?

A. If you go that side every morning you can see sweets carried by that road.

Q. An allegation has been made that you were ready with your ambulance of the *Satyagraha* society and that the volunteers were very speedily on the spot and this shows that there was an organisation behind?

A. That is only the alertness of the volunteers. There was no pre-arranged thing of any kind. When the news spread that people were fired on on the morning of the 11th, they rushed off to the spot. If there is any insinuation it is absolutely unfounded. We had to improvise Mr. Kothari. He was in Bhadar. He carried the men there. We have many eminent doctors like Dr. Kanuga and the others, who were on the spot, necessarily rendered help. Besides, in that locality many young men are readily available, because all the school and college boys live in that locality. Immediately on hearing this news, they considered it as part of their duty to do this kind of social service.

Q. Although I will agree with you in regard to the question of embarrassment, still I want to ask you one question. You admit that hardly 5 to 10 per cent. of Indians are literate, not to talk of their being educated. If you preach this doctrine of not obeying the laws of

Government, don't you think it would be very dangerous either for the *Satyagrahis* or for the Home Rulers or for a foreign Government which won't be able to carry on the administration even for a month?

A. Do you ask my individual opinion? Then I would say, I won't mind that, I want my own Government.

Q. Supposing under the reform scheme you are entrusted with certain departments, and they are demanding that more subjects should be transferred. Do you mean to say that you would be able to carry on the administration of any province even for a month if anybody and everybody was prepared to disobey any law which he liked?

A. I would take upon myself the task of educating the people properly to the sense of their duty and responsibility.

Q. You will agree that even with the best of intentions and with all the facilities that are available or that may be given to you, you will not be able to educate even 25 per cent. of the population in the next 15 or 20 years. Therefore supposing from 1921 you are in charge of the administration of law and peace and order, what will happen if this doctrine is preached to the masses and if they are trained to the disobedience of laws and to the putting a stop to the civil administration?

A. I would try and preach a contrary doctrine if I am in charge of the administration.

By the President—

Q. When you will be a Government you will very much object to the *Satyagraha* movement?

A. I may have to say so.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. I do not differ from you so far as the educated classes are concerned who can understand what soul-force means and what are the principles underlying the *Satyagraha* movement. But I want to be enlightened as to your position as *Satyagrahis*. Do they honestly believe that if this doctrine is preached to the masses and if the masses respond to the *Satyagrahis*, it will be possible for anybody, whether it is a foreign Government or a *swadeshi* Government, to carry on the administration even for a month?

A. It would be difficult to approach the masses.

Q. Therefore you agree with me that so far as the *Satyagraha* movement is concerned, it should be strictly confined to the educated classes?

A. Yes.

Q. While going through the city I find that the roofs of every one of these gates has been burnt. How do you account for it?

A. Mob frenzy.

Q. There must be some reason for it?

A. Nothing whatsoever, they got drunk.

Q. Why should the roofs of these old gates be burnt?

A. They are police *chowkies*.

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[Continued.]

At Ahmedabad, Friday, the 9th January 1920.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, KT.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., Secretary.

Mr. JIVANLAL V. DESAI, Barrister-at-Law—continued.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—

Q. I do not want to ask you anything this morning in view of your answers given yesterday with reference to your connection with the *Satyagraha* movement, i.e., as to pledging yourself under its control. But I just want to ask you a few things you mention in your statement here. I suppose we could take it that your statement made here, i.e., both written and verbal, was very seriously considered by you?

A. Yes.

Q. And you believe what you say?

A. Yes.

Q. And you wish the Committee to believe it?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, now I just want to draw your attention to some of the things that you have said. You believe, of course, that there were abuses made against Mr. Gandhi by either Mr. Sagar or Mr. Steeples on the afternoon of the 10th?

A. I have been informed so.

Q. You believe it?

A. Yes, and I have no reason to doubt the veracity of that information.

Q. Have you heard, on oath, the statements made by Messrs. Sagar and Steeples about its denial here?

A. No.

Q. Have you not heard that put to them as witnesses here?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think that there is no reason to disbelieve it?

A. No.

Q. Have you discussed the matter at all with those who defended any of the accused in that case?

A. No.

Q. Why?

A. Because I had no time to do that.

Q. But still you do not consider any reason to disbelieve what we heard here?

A. I had information from a man who was there and saw it.

Q. Can you find who the man is?

A. Yes, he can be found.

Q. But you have not found him up to now?

A. Not since then.

Q. I suppose you must have spoken to the gentleman?

A. Yes.

Q. Very well, that is one of the statements and the sort of evidence on which you base your information, and that is one of the statements which you would have the Committee believe?

A. Yes.

Q. And that, I take it, is the example of the sort of statements you ask your audience at meetings to believe?

A. No.

Q. You consider your statements very more seriously than that?

A. Decidedly, we do not make any statements which are unwarranted by facts.

Q. I will take you to another point which you want the Committee to believe. Have you got your statement there?

A. Yes.

Q. You see the passage of your statement beginning with "I remained at home". You say "I remained at home up to about 4 p.m. I saw a party of the military going along the Reid Road. The party went into the city and returned after about half an hour. I saw the party drawn up near the Panch Kuwa gate and they opened fire in different directions. I had seen a man wounded near the house of the late Mr. Deoshanker near the gate. Some time after I was informed that a bullet had passed through my compound". Now, what do you mean to imply by that?

A. I reported that incident to Lieutenant Fitzpatrick.

Q. What is the point of making that statement? That there were no crowds attacking the military then and there were some people standing when the bullets came into the main compound. Therefore the point is that the firing was unnecessary?

A. That was my point of view.

Q. The next paragraph is to the same point: "After 4 p.m., I left my house and I went towards the bazar by the Richey Road. There were few people going along but when I reached the Fernandez bridge, I saw a military picket at the mouth of the Ratanpol. When I was a few yards from the Ratanpol I saw the picket preparing to fire and being beckoned I turned into a lane".

A. I asked the Havildar Kanhayalal about that.

Q. The point is that the military fired indiscriminately and unnecessarily?

A. Yes.

Q. And you signed the *Sabha* statement?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you please turn to paragraph 14 of that statement: "We (that includes yourself) have no remarks to offer on the shots that were fired on the 11th in the different parts in the city as we are not in possession of all the facts connected with them. It would however appear that the action of the police was dictated by the necessities of the situation."

A. That refers to the firing near the Bhadar and those places.

Q. And different parts of the city?

A. More particularly in the Bhadar. The firing I refer to is that made by the military and not by the police.

Q. Shots fired on the 11th does not make the point clear. It says further down "The firing on the 11th where it took place would appear to have been dictated by necessity". Do you follow that now?

A. Yes.

Q. And in spite of it you signed the statement?

A. It particularly refers to the firing in the Bhadar.

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[Continued.]

Q. Has any further information come to your knowledge since you signed that statement?

A. I made no further enquiries.

Q. That is also another illustration of the sort of statements you made at the river-bed?

A. No, this was quite seriously considered.

Q. You have no other evidence to base it on?

A. Well, I have got the Secretary of the Sabha for it.

Q. No further evidence about this indiscriminate firing of the 11th?

A. We were practically handicapped in making any investigations during those four or five days and if we had had an occasion we should certainly have got the best possible evidence from the different parts of the city to find out who were fired at, how they were fired at, and whether they were fired at in the interests of the Martial Law orders.

Q. I am just coming to the Martial Law order. What is your statement, will you just say it clearly? The firing by the military was wanton and unnecessary on the 12th after the Martial Law order?

A. On the 12th it was not at all necessary to place Ahmedabad under Martial Law.

Q. Please answer my question. Do you want the Committee to believe, no matter what the order was, that the firing on the 12th was wanton and unnecessary?

A. As far as our information goes, some of it at any rate was absolutely unnecessary.

Q. I am asking you whether you wish the Committee to believe that it was unnecessary?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. The evidence on which you base that (we will call it evidence for the moment) is I suppose that in the last paragraph of your statement where you refer to a man in hospital. You say "I have no data, but I saw a man in a private hospital who was wounded on the morning of the 12th by the party distributing hand-bills regarding the introduction of Martial Law and he tells me that he was not in the crowd but by himself"?

A. Yes.

Q. He is dead, I suppose?

A. No.

Q. Well, I suppose he could come and give evidence?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you found any trace of him, or do you know who he is?

A. He is a mill-hand.

Q. There are 40,000 mill-hands.

A. I have some data as to the particular individual and I will find out.

Q. Surely before you made these statements you must have attempted to find out.

A. I had an interview with the man and I asked him what was the matter and I was quite satisfied with his statement. The neighbours living in the locality told me what the incident was, and there were some respectable people there.

Q. Did you go to his locality?

A. He was hiding there and was subsequently taken to the hospital. I enquired of some people as to what the incident was about, I mean people that are living there.

Q. It was the British troops you suggest who were responsible for it?

A. No, that was not the case.

Q. There is another incident in which you talk about the British troops?

A. They came on the 12th.

Q. You suggested to one member of the meeting that the man told you that he had been wounded by the British troops?

A. No, that is about the other incident on the Richey Road.

Q. Where did you see him?

A. I never saw him, but was told about it.

Q. On that third-hand evidence and on this second-hand evidence you wish the Committee to believe that the firing was wanton and unnecessary?

A. I call it first-hand information.

Q. Now in paragraph 15 of the statement signed by yourself and other members of the Sabha. You might just look at that portion: "Secondly nowhere in the city did the crowd offer resistance to the military". Do you wish to modify that? Do you want the committee to believe that or not?

A. That is my information.

Q. Do you wish the Committee to believe it or not? Otherwise I am sure you would not say so?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you heard Lieutenant Larkin's evidence?

A. Yes.

Q. What have you got to say to that?

A. Well, that might be correct.

Q. If you say that his statement is correct, surely you do not want the Committee to believe that nowhere in the city were the military resisted?

A. There may have been a general *melee*, and acts of resistance to the military according to the information that was brought to us.

Q. That is negative information?

A. Yes.

Q. And this is positive information?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you wish to modify your statement to some extent?

A. Yes, in the light of Lieutenant Larkin's case.

Q. There may be other instances like that?

A. None has come so far under our notice. That is the only solitary instance.

Q. Now, do you consider that there was no resistance by the crowd in the face of the mobs retiring before the military and throwing stones at a distance of 25 yards?

A. Well, the stones may be in retaliation for bullets.

Q. But bullets had not been fired?

A. I do not know. Bullets were fired at some places on the morning of the 11th and later in the day.

Q. Very well, I shall not go so far. Now would you wish the Committee to also believe (perhaps you have withdrawn this by now) that the riots were nowhere *anti-European*? Do you wish to modify that?

A. I cannot say *anti-European*.

Q. Now, do you wish the Committee to believe that it was not *anti-European*?

A. It is an inference to be drawn by the Committee itself.

Q. Let me put before you all that the Committee has heard. It has heard of the attack on Messrs. Sagar and Steeles. The Committee have heard of the attack on Sergeant Fraser—the brutal, wanton, dastardly, despicable (and you might use every sort of adjective in condemnation of this crime).—The Committee have heard of the attack on Mr. Brown, and the Committee have heard of the attack on Lieutenant Macdonald. The Committee have also heard of the attack on Mr. Laher as the crowd went to the Grand Hotel and wanted to know whether there were any Europeans there.

A. I have told what I had known of Messrs. Kennedy and Broomfield. If it were *anti-European* they could have easily gone to them. These two were absolutely undefended.

Q. What I want to know is whether in view of that one fact, you want the Committee to believe that the riots were not *anti-European*?

A. That is an inference to be drawn by the Committee. I cannot say one way or the other.

Q. Very well, as regards Messrs. Kennedy and Broomfield. They went out from the court with some *pattidars* immediately the *mandap* was set on fire?

A. No, some time after fire was set.

Q. There were no other buildings on fire then. They went near the scene and returned?

A. They got there after I left.

Q. How do you know that they had got there?

A. I was told so immediately they got there.

Q. You are getting into second-hand evidence again I am afraid, Mr. Desai. Then later on the people did not jeer at them and interfere with them in any way?

A. The feeling was not *anti-European*.

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[Continued.]

Q. Then you base your statement on that?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know that the military were in charge of the roads when they went away and there were no rioters?

A. To a certain extent the military were in charge of the road. But there were people walking about.

Q. Very well, of course there were. These were all the statements that you wanted the Committee to believe and the sort of evidence and information on which you base them?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, have you heard it suggested very strongly on the evening of the 10th at least that there was some organization for a riot on the next day?

A. I have heard so.

Q. Do you know on what that was based, viz., the alleged statement by Mr. Gandhi alluded to by Mr. Chatfield? Have you heard Mr. Chatfield say that definitely in the evening there was a plan on the night of the 10th?

A. I will ask you to refer to the report made by Mr. Guider which absolutely gives contrary information.

Q. Did you ask Mr. Chatfield whether the report sent by Mr. Gandhi was before or after the interview in which he said there was no organisation on the 10th?

A. No.

Q. Would you be surprised to know that later when Mr. Gandhi only suspected at first and thought some educated men were behind it all, later on he discredited that there were some people planning on the night of the 10th?

A. Mr. Gandhi is here to explain the point.

Q. He will no doubt explain what is true, there is no doubt about it, but in view of that allegation, could you say that there could have been no organisation on the 10th?

A. So far as my information goes there was absolutely no organisation on the 10th.

Q. How is it that you knew this?

A. Well, I attended the meeting of the Sabha on the 10th about nine o'clock and it was there that I had heard of it.

Q. I did not understand Mr. Chatfield to allege that Mr. Gandhi's *Satyagraha Sabha* was also assisting this?

A. No, it was the people who took an interest in these matters here. We dispersed and then next morning we met again, and if there were any such information it would have been brought to notice. In the morning I was there till about 9-30 and the mill-hands were also there and they were quite prepared to listen to me.

Q. They were armed with sticks?

A. Yes, because it was a fair day, i.e., the usual Friday fair. These people always take sticks to the fair to be sold.

Q. Did they go with sticks to the fair?

A. Sticks are sold at the fair and they might have picked them from the Friday fair.

Q. Now I just want to remind you of the sort of statement that you have made on the river-bed. Are they not different to your evidence here?

A. I would like you to mention any particular statement made in the river-bed.

Q. I just want you to say whether you seriously considered the statements that you made on the river-bed?

A. Decidedly.

Q. I will not go into very many details. You dealt with the Rowlett Act I suppose in the river-bed?

A. Yes.

Q. You explained thoroughly to the people the reasons why Government passed the Rowlett Act?

A. Yes.

Q. You read to them the Rowlett Commission's Report?

A. Just little extracts here and there, and also criticised the report.

Q. What extracts did you read out?

A. I do not remember.

Q. Did you suggest to other people and to the Committee in your evidence that the crimes committed were

few and far between and that the whole thing was exaggerated?

A. I said on one occasion that it is possible for the Criminal Investigation Department to get out any statements against an individual, but unless it was sifted by any judicial tribunal it was not correct at all.

Q. Did you not suggest to the people that the Report of the Rowlett Committee was not true?

A. It was faulty I said. That is my opinion still.

Q. You told people that the Rowlett Commission's report was not a true report.

President.—I think we need not go into details. Generally speaking Mr. Desai did present his views against the Rowlett Bill.

Mr. Kemp to witness—

Q. I just want to ask you one more question. You were aware that there were violent misrepresentations going about with reference to the Rowlett Act?

A. Not in this part of the country.

Q. But you have been reading the papers at times?

A. I saw some extracts from the *Pioneer*.

Q. Have you been reading the *Bombay Chronicle*?

A. I am a constant reader of it.

Q. Did you not find some misrepresentations mentioned in it?

A. Misrepresentations as reproduced from these papers.

Q. Well, now you knew that they were going about?

A. In other parts of the country.

Q. But those papers were read here?

A. Not very widely.

Q. But they were being read by people here?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you take any steps to refute these misrepresentations?

A. No, we did not.

Q. Did you not know that these misrepresentations were exciting the people?

A. When we correctly represented the statute we thought it was quite sufficient.

Q. Now I will come very briefly to the events of the 10th and 11th. On the 10th evening you were on the Richey Road?

A. Yes.

Q. You went from there to Rai Behadur Bulakhidas's house?

A. I wanted to see the City Magistrate Mr. Chaggenlal first and then went there afterwards.

Q. Anyhow you went to Bulakhidas's house?

A. Yes.

Q. And you went there definitely to ask him to withdraw the police?

A. Yes.

Q. Because the City Police excited the people?

A. No, I found there was a large crowd of people there, and tried to disperse the crowd, and a sub-inspector joined me. The crowd was a bit excited on the sight of bayonets. I tried to impress on Mr. Acton, the Inspector, the advisability of moving away and I had some little conversation with him and then I thought I had better go to the City Magistrate and ask him to withdraw the police because they were exciting the mob.

Q. About these hand-bills, I think you were one of those who distributed some of these hand-bills?

A. Yes.

Q. On the morning of the 11th you had gone out early perhaps for a walk?

A. I went to the court that morning.

Q. But you were out in the streets, were you not?

A. After that I was returning.

Q. And it was your information then, and you gave it to sub-inspector Kothawala, that there would not be any trouble during the day?

A. I did not see Mr. Kothawala.

Q. But you remember to have seen Dr. Kanuga and others?

A. Yes.

Q. On that day you went to court early?

A. At about half-past seven.

Q. And you were there at the time the fire broke out?

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[Continued.]

A. I was out in the streets.
 Q. When did you first get wind of the fire?
 A. I was trying to pacify a crowd of mill-hands, in fact 7 of us, and we thought that we had succeeded in pacifying them.
 Q. When you were in the Bhedar what did you do?
 A. I did my best to extinguish the fire.
 Q. I know that, and I have admitted that point, but after that what did you do?

A. I went back to my house. I was having a drink at the time when I was told that there was a crowd rushing towards the court. I then went to the court compound and managed to keep back the crowd. Then I remained in the court house for some time. I was told that the District Registrar's office was on fire. I ran off again and saw the flames there. I again heard shots near the Bank of Bombay.

Q. Just after this you had no control at all over the crowd. Had you?

A. I had no control.
 Q. You went into Mr. Vallabhai's house?
 A. I was near the staircase on the road.
 Q. You never went into the house?
 A. Never.
 Q. Mr. Vallabhai and others were there?

A. Yes. Mr. Vallabhai was there and there were some others who were arranging to remove the wounded from there. After that I again went to the court and I stayed with the first Additional Judge Mr. Vasudev till about 11-30.

Q. There is one more question. You did not recognise anyone in this crowd? You did not recognise any of the rioters at all?

A. There were mill-hands. I did not come into contact with the mill-hands. I could have recognised if I was asked a day or two after that. But subsequently I would not be able to recognise them. There were some fat people and some peculiar looking chaps who could have been recognised.

Q. You did not inform the police?
 A. Nobody asked me.
 Q. You know you ought to inform them?
 A. It was not possible.
 Q. You know the Criminal Procedure Code?

A. Yes.
 Q. You know Section 44?
 A. Yes.

Q. What does that say?
 A. If you will give me the section, I will read the section to you.

Q. It runs thus: "Every person, whether within or without the presidency towns, aware of the commission of, or of the intention of any other person to commit, any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code. . . . shall, in the absence of reasonable excuse, the burden of proving which shall lie upon the person so aware, forthwith give information to the nearest magistrate or police-officer of such commission or intention."

A. About the commission of offences, everybody knew what the offences were.

Q. Can you say whether any member of the Home Rule League or *Satyagraha Sabha* or any *Satyagrahi* at all gave evidence on behalf of the prosecution in any case?

A. I do not know who gave evidence.
 Q. You do not know?
 A. I do not know who the witnesses were. I know certain people were called by the police.
 Q. We have heard that?
 A. I know that.

By Mr. V. J. Patel, Counsel to the Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad—

Q. You know that in Bhogilal Bhagat's case, Dr. Kanuga gave evidence on behalf of the prosecution?
 A. I know Bhagat's case; I cannot say whether Dr. Kanuga was a witness or not. I took no interest. I was not consulted by anybody.

Q. You say that the Rowlatt Act is to be disobeyed according to the conditions of the pledge?

A. Yes.
 Q. Is it not possible for you to explain how it would be possible for a *Satyagrahi* to respectfully disobey the provisions?

A. Part II is quite clear. The Governor-General has to be satisfied of the reports of some officers, and we know very well, in the *mofussil* at any rate, how that information is communicated to the Governor-General. We know how the Criminal Investigation Department and the village officers manufacture evidence against these people.

(The President.—I do not think that is the answer to the question. The question was how was it possible to civilly disobey laws.)

A. Your Lordship will see Part II of the Rowlatt Act is similar to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code with regard to being bound down to report your presence at certain places and then to be interned or interned at a particular place. We can civilly disobey an order passed against us for reporting ourselves at particular places and thereby incurring the penalty under the Act, if we believe that the Act was wrongly applied to a particular place.)

Q. On the morning of the 10th, when the information about Mr. Gandhi's arrest was received, were you sent for?

A. I was working in the bar library. I was sent for by Mr. Patel. We had a conference whether that news was to be given to the public or whether it was to be kept back, and eventually we decided that the people would come to know of it one way or the other. While discussing, we got a number of people who came to enquire about its correctness. So we thought it was better to give the correct version of the situation.

Q. Was the leaflet that has been produced in this court on behalf of Government ever understood by anybody in Ahmedabad as a general invitation for *hartal*?

A. No.
 Q. Did you ever understand it in that sense?

A. No.
 Q. Did anybody understand it like that till it was produced in court?

A. The general public took it as a matter of rejoicing and sugar was distributed by some people.

Q. And that was the object of publishing that leaflet?

A. Yes, quite so.
 Q. It was put to you as if the *hartal* was the forerunner of the disturbances. You know that there was another *hartal* in December last on the *Khilafat* day in Ahmedabad?

A. Yes.
 Q. Was there any disturbance?

A. No.
 Q. Was there any forcing of *hartal* on anybody?

A. No.
 Q. On the question of the justifiability or otherwise of what is known as Martial Law proclamations, did you then know or did anybody in the city know that the civil authorities were in power when the military were introduced in the city and the proclamation was issued?

A. I remember to have read a notice on the notice-board of the district court that the 11th and 12th were to be considered as *dies non*, that there was to be no work going on and the courts might re-open after some time.

Q. I put it to you that till you heard the Government case in this Committee, were you ever under the impression that the military authorities were called in aid of the civil authorities?

A. That was not the impression created on the minds of people in Ahmedabad.

Q. And the subsequent withdrawal of Martial Law by the leaflet* signed by Mr. Pratt, Commissioner, made the position quite clear?

A. Yes, distinct.

* Appendix 6 to the statement of the Bombay Government, page 209.

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Q. If there was shooting in the city during that period without an order from a magistrate, do you know of any law under which shooting could be done?

A. My legal knowledge is very poor; I think it was under Martial Law.

Q. Unless it was under Martial Law, the military could not be justified in firing upon the mob or crowds of 10 if they were going about their peaceful avocations without an order from a magistrate?

A. It is only under Martial Law.
 (The President.—The way in which you put the question is not proper. Is it under these circumstances that firing was justified? If it is a peaceful crowd of 10 or more there would be no firing at all. There was some prospect of committing acts of violence.)

Mr. Patel.—That is certainly the case.)

Q. You say that Mr. Chatfield was a very popular officer?

A. Yes.
 Q. Will you be able to speak in the same way about the Commissioner?

A. No.
 Q. Why?

A. Whenever we met him in public, we have noticed his stuck-up manner and he has been giving us grandmotherly or grandfatherly advice as if we were school-boys.

Q. What would you call his attitude?
 A. Most offensive. Any gentleman with any iota of self-respect would have resented that, and particularly the tone of Mr. Pratt.

Q. Do you know whether the chief witness, the chief man who tried to protect the life of Sergeant Fraser, Avandlal, was a member of the Home Rule League?

A. There are so many members of the Home Rule League. I cannot say that as I am quite sure of that.

Q. Do you know if Mr. Chatfield and Mr. Boyd and other officials who were moving about in the thick of the fight identified anybody till now?

Mr. M. K. GANDHI, Bar-at-Law, Ahmedabad.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Gandhi, we have been informed that you are the author of the *Satyagraha* movement?

A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. I would like you to give us an explanation of what that movement is?

A. It was a movement intended to replace methods of violence. It is a movement based entirely on truth. It is, as I have conceived it, an extension of the domestic law on the political field, and my own experience has led me to the conclusion that that movement and that movement alone can rid India of the possibilities of violence spreading throughout the length and breadth of the land for the redress of grievances, supposed or real.

Q. So far as it has any bearing upon our enquiry, you adopted it in connection with the opposition to the Rowlatt Bill?

A. Yes.
 Q. And in connection with it you asked people to pledge themselves by what is known as the *Satyagraha* vow?

A. I did.
 Q. Am I correct in holding that the *Satyagraha* vow is this? Starting with the narrative as to the objectionable paragraphs of the Rowlatt legislation, *Satyagrahis* pledge themselves to civilly disobey the Rowlatt Act and such other acts as the committee to be appointed may determine. Was it your intention to enlist as many *Satyagrahis* as possible?

A. Yes, consistently with the carrying on of the movement in a proper way, that is to say, if I found a million men who were capable of understanding the truth and adhering by it and never using violence, I would certainly be glad to have the million men.

A. No; not to my knowledge.

Q. Or any of these officials, Deputy Collectors, Assistant Collectors, *Mamladars*?

A. Not to my knowledge.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. I want to ask you one or two questions about the conspiracy or the organisation on the evening of the 10th. You know that it is for those who assert a positive proposition to prove that fact?

A. Yes.
 Q. And it is not for those who assert a negative proposition to prove that?
 A. It is self-evident.

Q. Now you have heard the whole evidence in this case; except the bare assertion of Mr. Chatfield, no fact have been proved before this Committee.

(The President.—You cannot ask a witness to give the Committee advice.)

Q. Has any evidence been placed before this Committee in your hearing that there was conspiracy up to now?

A. No.
 Q. In cross-examination the statement of Mr. Chatfield was referred to you?

A. Yes.
 Q. You were asked whether you adhere to that statement?

A. Yes.
 Q. Except referring to the statement of Mr. Gandhi, did Mr. Chatfield refer to any other evidence?

A. No.
 Q. With regard to giving evidence, whether they were *Satyagrahis* or not, were people summoned as witnesses in any cases?

A. They were called by the police.
 Q. Were they summoned to give evidence in any case?
 A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. You will get as many *Satyagrahis* as possible if you are satisfied that they understand the nature of the movement?

A. Yes.
 Q. Is not your movement a movement essentially antagonistic to Government? Don't you substitute the determination of this committee for the will of Government?

A. Not in my opinion. That is not the spirit in which the movement has been conceived, and that is not the spirit in which the movement wherever I have led it has been understood by the people.

Q. Look at it from the point of view of Government, Mr. Gandhi. If you are the Government yourself, what would you say to a movement that was started by someone to the effect that none of your laws were to be obeyed and instead the will of some committee was to be obeyed?

A. That would not be stating the whole of the case for *Satyagrahis*. I would put it this way. If I was in charge of the Government of a country and I found myself face to face with a body of men who were determined to find out the truth, who were determined to seek redress in connection with unjust laws without inflicting violence, without rioting, without arson, I would welcome the body of men and I would consider that they were the best constitutionalists, as Governor, I could get by my side, because they would keep me in the right track.

Q. I suppose it is the case in India as elsewhere that people differ as to the justice or injustice of particular laws?

A. Yes; and that is the reason, the main reason, why violence is eliminated here. The *Satyagrahi* gives his opponent the same right of independence and feeling of truth that he reserves to himself, seeing that he wants

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[Continued.]

to fight for truth he will do so by inviting injury upon his own person.

Q. Before you come to the question of violence, I was looking at it from the point of view of the continuing of Government. Would it be possible to continue Government if a body of men stood up against Government who were to accept not the Government's view of what was right or what was wrong, but the view of an independent committee?

A. I think that it would be quite possible, and I have found within my experience of 8 years of continuous struggle in South Africa that it was so. I found General Smuts who went through the whole of that campaign, said in the end, that if all conducted themselves as the *Satyagrahis* had done, he should have nothing to say.

Q. That was in connection with a particular campaign. There was nothing objectionable, but, so far as I recollect—I may be wrong—there was no such pledge as was given here?

A. Certainly. Every *Satyagrahi* was bound to resist all those laws which he considered to be unjust and all those laws which were not of a criminal character in order to bend Government to the will of the people.

Q. You see in your present pledge, you have gone a step further. It is not what laws the *Satyagrahi* considers unjust but it is what the committee considers unjust that he has got to disobey?

A. I was only this morning discussing about it. That pledge or part of the pledge is really a restraint. If you will re-read it, you will find that that pledge or that part of the pledge is designed to be a restraint upon individual liberty so far as the breach of laws was concerned; and as I intended to make it a mass movement, I felt that some such step was necessary that no man should become the lord of the masses, so far as the *Satyagrahis* were concerned. Therefore I conceived this plan that the committee should be able to say what laws may be broken *en masse*.

Q. We know the saying that doctors differ, and I understand from Mr. Desai that even *Satyagrahis* differ occasionally?

A. I have not the slightest doubt and I have found it to my cost.

Q. I put this case to you. Supposing a *Satyagrahi* was satisfied in his own mind that a particular law was a just law and ought to be obeyed but the committee of *Satyagrahis* said 'disobey this law', what was the *Satyagrahi* who signed such a pledge to do?

A. He is not bound to disobey that law which he does not consider to be unjust and we had such *Satyagrahis* in abundance.

Q. According to the terms of the pledge, as I understand he would be bound to disobey that?

A. Not as I have conceived the pledge and not as I have interpreted it. If the committee will say that my interpretation of the pledge is faulty, all I can say is I should mend the error the next time I start a *Satyagraha* campaign.

Q. I do not wish to give you advice Mr. Gandhi, I know that you would not take it, if I did. But this *Satyagraha* is a rather dangerous campaign?

A. I wish I could disabuse the committee really of this attitude that it is a dangerous campaign. If you will conceive the campaign as designed in order to rid the country of the school of violence, then you will share the same concern that I have that at any cost a movement of this character should remain in the country and purify it certainly.

Q. In connection with the Rowlatt legislation, I know we have been told that there was a very general widespread Indian opposition to the Rowlatt legislation. Look at that legislation from an independent standard, apart altogether from the Indian or European standpoint. Would you indicate briefly to me what the essence of your objection to the legislation is?

A. As I read the Rowlatt Committee's report and came to the end of it, and I saw the legislation that was fore-shadowed, I felt that it was not warranted by the facts that were produced by the committee. As I read

the legislation itself, I felt that it was so restrictive of human liberty, that no self-respecting person or no self-respecting nation could allow such legislation to appear on its regular statute book. When I saw the debates in the Legislative Council, I felt that the opposition against it was universal and when I found that opposition against it was universal and when I found that opposition against it was universal and when I found that opposition against it was universal, there was no course left open but to resist that law to the utmost.

Q. So far as the objects of that legislation are concerned, have you any doubt that the objects were to put down revolutionary and anarchical crimes?

A. I have no doubt that the object was laudable.

Q. Those are quite laudable objects?

A. Quite so.

Q. Your complaint then must be as regards the methods adopted?

A. Entirely that.

Q. If I have understood it rightly, what you complain of is that greater power has been given to the executive than they enjoyed before?

A. That is so.

Q. I understand that the executive had these powers during the period of the European war under the Defence of India Act?

A. That is true. The Defence of India Act was an emergency legislation. The Defence of India Act was designed to secure the co-operation of everybody in order to put down any violence that might be offered by any school at the moment; and it was with the greatest reluctance that the people really accepted the Defence of India Act, but the Rowlatt legislation was of a different character altogether as I apprehended; then the people had the additional advantage of having the experience of the working of the Defence of India Act.

Q. Suppose now, Mr. Gandhi, that the Rowlatt legislation was to be put into operation; in the first instance the Local Government should be satisfied that there was a state of anarchy existing, and in the second place, the Government of India had to take that attitude. Would you see any serious objection to it?

A. I would see most serious objection. I would not as legislator leave that power in the hands of an executive which I had repeatedly found wanting. I have known the executive Government in India to have run mad. I would certainly not arm a Government of that character with any such arbitrary powers.

Q. Then your objection really comes back to this, that you think that the Government of India in the prosecution of a laudable object adopted a wrong measure. Is not the proper method of dealing with that from a constitutional point of view to endeavour to get the legislation remedied by satisfying the Government of the inexpediency of the measure?

A. I tried to get that done. On bended knee I pleaded before Lord Chelmsford and before other English officers I had the pleasure of meeting and placed my view-point before him also. I am glad to say that some of them accepted the view that I placed before them, but they said that the Rowlatt Committee made these recommendations and they were helpless. I think we exhausted all the resources open to us.

Q. If an honest opponent differs from your view, you cannot expect to satisfy him of the rightness of your cause all of a sudden. You must do so by degrees?

A. Yes.

Q. Is not refusing to obey that or any other law you choose to select a rather drastic way of attempting to do that?

A. I respectfully differ. When I find that even my father has imposed upon me a law which is repugnant to my conscience, I think it is the least drastic course that I adopt by respectfully telling him "Father, I cannot obey this." I do nothing but justice to my father when I do that. If I may say so without any disrespect to the committee, I have simply followed that in my own domestic circle, and I found I had done so with the

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[Continued.]

greatest advantage. I have placed that before Indians and everybody for acceptance. Rather than feel angry with my father, I would respectfully tell him "I cannot obey this law." I see nothing wrong in that. If it is not wrong for me to say so to my father, there is nothing wrong for me to say so to a friend or to a Government.

Q. Now in the prosecution of your *Satyagraha* movement against the Rowlatt legislation you resolved to open a *hartal* throughout India?

A. Yes.

Q. When the *hartal* was on, no business was to be done, thereby to show disapproval of Government's action?

A. Yes.

Q. *Hartal* means then general cessation of business throughout the whole country?

A. Yes.

Q. If you have a general cessation of business for a brief time nothing harmful might result. But if the cessation is for a lengthened period will it not be productive of great harm to the people?

A. Very great.

Q. As regards your *hartal*, it was originally to be held on the 30th March?

A. I had simply said the second Sunday after the publication.

Q. The second Sunday was the 6th April. Some people seemed to have made a miscalculation?

A. No miscalculation. Those who came to know of the Viceregal assent immediately after it was given, for them the calculation would be 30th March. That was brought to the notice of the people in Madras. I immediately sent a telegram fixing the 6th April, but at the end of the day telegrams had gone all over India when this letter* was published fixing the second Sunday after the Viceregal assent was given in Delhi. Unfortunately, the *hartal* came prematurely.

Q. When the *hartal* came in Delhi, unfortunately serious riots took place?

A. Yes.

Q. As regards the *hartal* is it your view that the abstention from business should be entirely passive?

A. Entirely.

Q. Then anything like what I may call active persuasion on the part of those who observed any *hartal*, to get others to follow their example, would be disapproved?

A. Entirely; if that active persuasion was exerted on the day of the *hartal*. In any case that would be disapproved. It will not be disapproved if in preparing the people for the *hartal* leaflets were distributed and people were told from platforms, in their different houses also, that it was a proper thing for them to do.

Q. We know as a fact that there were a great number of meetings held in connection with your movement when gentlemen in sympathy with your views endeavoured to persuade the people generally as to the propriety of adopting the course you advocated; and in consequence of that general agitation there was a very general campaign throughout the country to observe the *hartal* conforming to your views?

A. Yes.

Q. But now if I follow you aright, you disapproved of any people observing the *hartal* endeavouring to make people to get down on the day of the *hartal* from their *tongas* or motor cars in which they happened to be driving?

A. I felt very much grieved when I heard that.

Q. That would be fully against your doctrine?

A. Very fully.

Q. And if anything of that sort occurred, inevitably violence or riot would ensue?

A. Yes, that would.

Q. May I take it, that you won't disapprove of the action of the police or civil authority in interfering with those who were observing the *hartal* and also endeavouring to force others to adopt a similar course, so long as the police acted with sufficient restraint and forbearance?

A. I saw no recourse was open to the police but to do that.

Q. And if that is your view, from what happened *a fortiori* I take it as your view that it was improper on the part of any people to go to the shop-keepers and tell them to close their shops?

A. On the day it was highly improper.

Q. It would be still more highly improper to jostle the unfortunate shop-keepers who have not been willing to close their shops, from the *Satyagraha* stand-point?

A. I will hold it to be criminal.

Q. In connection with the *hartal* on the 6th, there was no violence, but we had a considerable amount of evidence on all these times of persuasion being brought to bear upon people to make them observe the *hartal*?

A. There was that.

Q. Those were indications of improper action?

A. Certainly.

Q. Your lieutenant in Delhi is *Swami Shradhdhanand*.....?

A. I would hardly call him my lieutenant. I would like to call him my esteemed co-worker.

Q. He wrote to you a letter upon the subject of *hartal*. He indicated to you that after what occurred in Delhi and, I think also in the Punjab, it was manifest that you could not have a general *hartal* without violence inevitably ensuing?

A. I do not think he said that in so many words. I cannot recall the contents of that letter.*

Q. It was very much to that effect?

A. I think what he said was—he went much further—that it was not possible; he was not referring to the *hartal*, but the law-breaking campaign; he suggested that the *Satyagraha* campaign could not be carried on with impunity among the masses of people but there was really a difference between him and me. When I suspended civil disobedience he thought that I ought not to suspend civil disobedience, but when I found it necessary to suspend civil disobedience because I had not obtained sufficient control over the people in order to prevent violence then he said: "If this is the position you take up the moral for me to draw is that *Satyagraha* can never be put into action as mass movement." I think that is the drift of his letter. I had to discuss it with him also.

Q. Did he agree with you?

A. I do not know whether he is still holding that view to-day. Facts might have converted him. I feel that suspension of civil disobedience is as much a necessity as prosecuting civil disobedience.

Q. You see if you have complete abstention from work and simultaneously you have the application of such a doctrine as civil disobedience of law among the masses of idle people, there will be great difficulty in distinguishing between passive and active resistance, Mr. Gandhi?

A. I will like your lordship to draw a sharp distinction between *hartal* and *Satyagraha* proper. *Hartal* may sometimes be *satyagrahic* or may not be. Here civil disobedience as such had absolutely nothing to do with *hartal*. *Hartal* had a twofold purpose; one to strike the imagination of the people as also to strike the imagination of the Government; but the second was a discipline for those who have to offer disobedience. I had no method of understanding the mind of India except by some such striking thing. If I had simply satisfied myself with fasting I would not have known how many fasted, or with prayer, I would not have known how many prayed. The *hartal* is a proper index to show how far I could carry my principle.

Q. I quite follow the difference between the two things. But if you have the *hartal* in the same time as *Satyagraha* doctrine is being preached? It was being preached at public meetings?

A. Certainly, on that very day.

Q. Do you not create a condition of very great danger to peace and order?

* Annexure to Mr. Gandhi's written statement, page 252.]

* Not traceable by Mr. Gandhi or elsewhere.

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[Continued.]

A. On the contrary, I promote peace. And I have done it myself on the 6th of April, because I was there in Bombay, and there was some fear of people themselves offering violence. And I am here to tell you that no violence, no real violence was offered by the people, because people were being told the true nature of *Satyagraha*. It was an amazing sight for me to see thousands of people behaving in a perfectly peaceful manner. That would not have been the case if the *Satyagraha* doctrine had not been preached in the right key. It all depends on the doctrine of *Satyagraha* or the doctrine of hate in the form *Satyagraha*. But to enforce *Satyagraha* and call upon those who are engaged in *hartal* to break the law is a different application and it is that which I am trying to distinguish.

Q. Coming to the occurrences in which you yourself were implicated, you intended to proceed to Delhi and to the Punjab and you were met at Palwal and escorted back to Bombay?

A. Yes.

Q. As I understand, were you formally arrested?

A. I was absolutely in form and substance arrested and I was surprised to find it so often said that it was not so. The train pulled up between Muttra and Palwal and the order was served on me when we reached the border and the police officer exceedingly courteously reasoned with me saying how bad it would be for them to arrest me at a way-side station and how it would not be possible to have a magistrate and that he did not know what proceedings would be adopted. We reached Palwal. At that station, I saw not only the Superintendent of Police, I think it was the Delhi Superintendent of Police, but also a party of officers. I suppose they were police constables, I cannot say exactly who they were and the officer placing his hands on my shoulders said "Mr. Gandhi, I arrest you." He served two orders on me, then he asked me quickly to remove my luggage, not myself personally, but he had the luggage removed and I was called upon to point out the things that had to be removed. He asked whether there was any man who wanted to be with me. Then there was a friend who came with me. There was a police guard. I intended to go to the platform to clear my throat and the police challenged me. They were right. There were all the simple ingredients of proper arrest.

Q. We heard of far-reaching ingredients.

A. I do not say it was anything bad. The police performed, as they themselves said, the painful duty, as gently and as courteously as any gentleman could possibly do.

Q. Do not you understand that all that was required of you was, in consequence of the order of Government, you were not to proceed to Delhi or the Punjab but you should go back to Bombay?

A. Yes; that was what the police said at the place where the train was held up. By the time I was arrested I had actually committed an offence. Therefore I was arrested. The officer arresting me did not know how I was to be dealt with. When I came to Muttra I received further orders.

Q. And the nature of the further orders was that you were asked to go back to Bombay?

A. Not at all. I was taken under escort. There were two changes at Muttra. There was this police officer. He did not know what was to be done. He said I would have to be taken straight to the Secretary and therefore I would have to await orders as to what would be done to me. Then he exchanged some words with Mr. Bowring at Siwai Madhopur where the Peshawar train joined the Bombay train. I was taken to the Commissioner who had certain orders and it was he who produced the order when I was taken to Bombay. But Mr. Bowring himself was unaware of what was to happen to me when I was to be taken to Bombay. He was met, I believe, at Surat by an officer who came there from Bombay. He had a chat with me. It was daybreak. Mr. Bowring had a conversation with this officer, then he told me that I would be free in Bombay.

Q. It amounts to this, that in consequence of an order of Government it was made clear to you that you would not be allowed to proceed to Delhi or the Punjab, but if you remained at Bombay you will be allowed perfect freedom?

A. Certainly in the Bombay Presidency.

Q. Of course that is a little different from the idea that you have been taken and forcibly thrown into jail?

A. I do not know if anybody charged Government with forcibly throwing me into jail. Everybody asked what is the truth, when I was arrested. I do not think that anybody has made it a matter of complaint against Government, except that Government had no business to turn me away from a mission of peace which Government knew I was bent on.

Q. There may be a difference of opinion, quite an honest difference of opinion, between you and the Government?

A. I have accepted that position.

Q. Rightly or wrongly, if they had thought that if you were allowed to proceed to Delhi in order to propagate the doctrine, riot might ensue, they would be justified in taking that action?

A. From their own view. From that standpoint I have absolutely nothing to say.

Q. Subsequently to your arrest, very unfortunately serious incidents occurred in Delhi and the Punjab and also in Ahmedabad here? The only matter we have got to deal with here is as regards Ahmedabad itself. In Ahmedabad as we have been told, you enjoyed great popularity among the mill workers on account of the fact that you intervened successfully in one of their disputes and your arrest seems to have created a great resentment on their part, and very unfortunately again, on the part of the mob, on the 11th and 12th at Ahmedabad and Viramgam. So far as these incidents are concerned, you have no personal knowledge?

A. I have no personal knowledge.

Q. I do not know whether there is any matter in connection with them on which you would like to present your views which would be useful in enabling us to form our opinion?

A. I would venture to present this thing in connection with these riots. I consider that the action of this mob whether in Ahmedabad or in Viramgam was totally unjustified and I have thought that it was a very sad thing that they lost self-control. I do not wish to offer the slightest defence for the acts of the mob, but at the same time I would like to say that the people amongst whom, rightly or wrongly, I was popular were put to such severe stress by Government who should have known better. I think the Government committed an unpardonable error of judgment and the mob committed a similar unpardonable error, but more unpardonable on the part of the mob than on the part of the Government. I wish to say that also as a *Satyagrahi*, I cannot find a single thing done by the mob which I can defend or justify. No amount of provocation, however great, could justify people from doing as they have done. It has been suggested to me that all those who did it were not *Satyagrahis*. That is true. But they chose to take part in the *Satyagraha* movement and came under the *Satyagraha* discipline. These were the terms in which I have spoken to the people; and it gives me the greatest pleasure and also pain to declare my settled conviction before this Committee also. I have said this elsewhere. I would proceed further with what I have come to know.

Q. Very well.

A. As soon as I came here I endeavoured to do what I was capable of doing in order to repair the mischief and the error, as I sensed at the time. I placed it before the people and at the disposal of the authorities also, and I had a very long interview with Mr. Pratt and with other officers. I was to have held a meeting by their consent. I think Mr. Robertson also was present at the time, on the 13th; but I thought that it would not be possible for me to hold the meeting that day. Whether it was martial law or whatever it was, that was not the deciding factor; my co-workers were not able to reach the people; they sent volunteers to send notices. I

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[Continued.]

conferred with Mr. Pratt and he said 'yes, you could hold the meeting on the 14th.' So the meeting took place on the 14th. There I adumbrated what I felt. It happened that there I used the words 'organisation' and 'education' both of which terms have been so much quoted against me and against the people. If against me, it is no matter; but if against the people, it matters very materially. The speech itself was in Gujarati. If you will read it—of course, you won't, but Sir Chimanlal will.

He will be able to guide the Committee there and he will correct me if I am misunderstanding or misinterpreting the meaning of the terms. I have translated a Gujarati word which simply means those who know how to read and write, *Shikhalas*, and I chose the word *Bhanelas* as I sensed the thing before me at the time. I had no time to keep together all the evidence that could have come before me. I used the word *Bhanelas* in the sense of 'leader' 'a man who can read and write.' I have spoken not of 'organisation' but I might have said this thing 'done in an organised manner.' I do not wish to withdraw a single word from that. But I want the Committee to understand if I could make the Committee understand that I referred only to the events in Ahmedabad. I had then no knowledge even of what had happened in Viramgam; but at Ahmedabad, looking at the whole picture and talking to the people, because I had talked to a large number of people who were before me, not merely at the meeting but also before the meeting, I felt that this thing was organised and I hold on to that even now. I had no hesitation in saying it to Mr. Guider. I had no hesitation in saying it to Mr. Chatfield. I am here to repeat that statement. In my opinion, the thing was organised, but there it stands. There was no question whether it was a deep-laid conspiracy through the length and breadth of India or a deep-rooted organisation of which this was a part. The organisation was hastily constructed; the organisation was not in the sense in which we understand the word organisation. There is my expression "This thing has been done in an organised manner." I certainly felt strengthened in my supposition as I marched along with the facts I was getting. I wish also to place my position before the Committee. When I was addressing many people, I was not concerned with what steps the Government will take and it was necessary for me to diagnose the situation before the people. I was not concerned with giving any information to the police and when Mr. Guider came to me I said 'it was none of my business. I was simply a reformer, and if I could wean the people from the error of their ways,' my position was justified and my task was finished; if he thought that he could get a single name from me he was mistaken. I said I was taking a serious responsibility as a citizen and also I understood that responsibility. So you would put a proper valuation on my work. It is an improper valuation on that word to hitch it on to any organisation, real or fancied. If I confined that word to Ahmedabad alone, to masses of absolutely unlettered men, who would be able to make no fine distinctions—then you have got the idea of what that organisation is. This exactly is my opinion as given to him, and I have no hesitation in giving that opinion to the Committee. There were those poor deluded labourers whose one business was to see me released and see Anasuyabai released. That it was a wicked rumour deliberately started by some body I have not the slightest doubt. As soon as these things happened the people thought there should be something behind it. Then there were the half educated raw youths. This is the work of these, I am grieved to have to say. These youths possessed themselves with false ideas gathered from shows, such as the Cinematograph shows that they have been, gathered from silly novels and from the political literature of Europe. I know that school. I have mixed with these men and I have endeavoured to wean them. I may however tell the Committee that there are to-day, I won't be able to say 100, but I will not be surprised if I count it by the 20, men who have ceased to belong to the school of violence because of this. But it was an organisation of this

character. I think I have now given the full meaning of what I have said. I want deliberately to except those who go by the name of university men or degree men. I do not for one moment wish the Committee to understand that the degree men and the university men are incapable of doing that. On the contrary, the university men have also often implicated themselves in these things but not in Ahmedabad, not for this purpose. I am not aware of a single university man having instigated these things.

Q. As regards the organisation, you think it started on the 10th?

A. Mr. Chatfield has said that. I have not really taxed my mind on it, but it was an organisation or attempt made before the rioting took place.

Q. I am not going to ask you to name any people in connection with this matter. Your view in so expressing yourself was apparently that there was a common purpose among the people who were affected on the 10th and 11th?

A. I would not say there was a common purpose, I think I would be then exaggerating it on the other side. Not a common purpose that fired the whole mob, but I think your Lordship will agree with me that a common purpose may be restricted to two or three men and they are able to affect a whole mass of people, but once they have affected the people with their ideas, although originally they are the responsible people, the whole people are affected.

Q. On this particular occasion on the 10th, 11th and 12th the affection took the form of the obliteration of all trace of Government; was not that so?

A. I think it was certainly *anti*-Government and I had not yet been able to make up my mind whether it was *anti*-European also. I am not really able to assist the Committee on that point. I would like to believe that it was not *anti*-European. There were certainly silver lines to this cloud. But I should certainly feel exceedingly hurt if I made the discovery, but I would place it before the Committee if I found that.

Q. I am not sure whether you desire to answer this question or not. According to *Satyagrahi* doctrines, is it right that people who have committed crimes should be punished by the civil authorities?

A. I am not prepared to say that it is wrong but there is a better method. It is really a difficult question to answer, because you do not anticipate any pressure from outside. But on the whole I think that it would be the proper thing to say that a *Satyagrahi* cannot possibly quarrel with any punishment that might be meted out to offenders and therefore he cannot be *anti*-Government in that sense.

Q. But apparently it is against the doctrines of the *Satyagraha* to give assistance to Government by way of placing information that would lead to the conviction of offenders?

A. According to the *Satyagraha* you say it is inconsistent.

Q. It is inconsistent?

A. That would be inconsistent.

Q. Why?

A. For the simple reason that a *Satyagrahi's* business is not to assist the police by that particular method which is open to the police or which the police adopts but he helps the authorities and the police by making the people more law-abiding and more respectful to authority. But when he sees lapses it is no part of his duty to combine his reform work with police work. The two are contradictory and inconsistent. I know Mr. Guider has challenged that.

Q. You gave an answer to Mr. Guider and it was really on that answer that I was asking this question?

A. And he has not been able to dislodge me from that position. And I am fully aware that I have not dislodged him from his position.

Q. Supposing a *Satyagrahi* had seen one of the more serious crimes committed in the course of these riots, actually committed in his own presence, would there be no obligation upon him to inform the police?

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A. Of course I have answered that before Mr. Guider and I think I must answer that here also. I do not want to misguide the youth of the country, but my answer is that even then he cannot go and give evidence against his brother, and when I say against his brother there is no distinction here of country or anything of that kind at all.

Q. As I understand your *Satyagrahi* vow, it is wholly independent of Indian or European nationality?

A. Certainly. And what I would suggest is that it is inherent in the thing. He cannot do the two things. I have now mixed with criminals of the deadliest type for a number of years and I know that I have been instrumental, however poorly, but still I have been instrumental in weaning them over. I should forfeit their confidence if I disclosed the name of a single man. My business ends there. I should pay with my life if I have the courage, in weaning the man who is about to do a criminal act, but if I have done that or after I have found myself unable to do it, the other duty does not devolve upon me, viz., of going and straightaway lodging the information before the police.

Q. Of course you see there is a distinction, Mr. Gandhi, between divulging a communication that has been made to you in confidence and making a statement as regards a crime that has been committed in your presence? And you say it is not the duty of a *Satyagrahi* to assist the police?

A. I would say that it is the straightest conduct of a *Satyagrahi* not to do so and not to give evidence in a court of law even in connection with a crime which has been committed under his own nose and which he has assisted in preventing, but I do not want to carry that doctrine to that dangerous limit. I think it is open only in the rarest cases possible but it would be a prostitution of the doctrine if a *Satyagrahi* having signed a pledge absolved himself from bringing criminals to justice; nor does that follow from the *Satyagrahi* pledge. But if a man modelled his life according to the principles of *Satyagraha* as I venture to think I have conceived them, I think there is no room for him to do so. But in order that I may not be misunderstood I am not able to say to-day that I will not give information against a man whom I have seen in the act of committing a crime because I do not claim to be a perfected *Satyagrahi*. I am aiming at becoming it and when I have become that, probably God will never put such temptations in my way, but if they were there, I would certainly not give evidence. But to-day I am unable to say of myself that I would not do so.

Q. Now there is one other point on which you may desire to express your views. As regards the measures which were taken by the Government to repress the riot, what have you to say about them?

A. In Ahmedabad I think that whether there was technically Martial Law or whether there was not, the impression left on my mind by Mr. Pratt and the other gentlemen who were there was clearly that there was Martial Law. I feel that Martial Law was not necessary but I am not really competent to judge that. I think that the Government acted with the greatest restraint and with forbearance under provocation of a serious character. In the case of a troop train coming to suppress disorders being in danger of being derailed and escaping derailment, I can understand troops of that character dealing destruction in a fit of fury. It would be mad but I would find it in my heart to excuse an act of that fury. I think therefore there was self-restraint on the part of Government and on the part of those who were actually conducting the business. I think at the same time that the terms in which the military notice was couched were open to very serious objections. I think they were totally unwarranted by the situation as it faced the military, and I do believe that as a result of that several offensive lives were lost. If the military rule or semi-military rule had been carried on for any length of time, do not know what would have happened.

Q. Do you know of any case where groups of people were fired on without first having been asked to disperse?

A. If I am to believe the statements that were made before me I think that that has happened, and I should certainly not be surprised if that has happened. I saw the troops that were posted. Some of them were mere lads. Mr. Pratt brought that danger face to face with me. It is one thing he said, to issue these orders; it is another thing to have these orders carried in the spirit in which they have been issued, and he himself did anticipate the danger of these young lads simply playing with the people and playing with fire and I do feel that some such thing has happened.

Q. You think something of the sort may have occurred?

A. I do not say 'may have,' I think something of that kind has occurred. I think the people who came to me did not exaggerate and I cross-examined them very severely and they said 'No we have not received warnings.' It does not matter if you have got a group of 9 people, that is not a crime; a 10th man comes without wanting to be the 10th and the military fire, and what is the value even of a warning being given to men who do not know the thing?

Q. Of course the object of that order was to prevent groups of people going and indulging in acts of violence?

A. I think there was a much better way of doing that.

Q. What better way?

A. A better way would be not to fire. To give these directions to irresponsible lads was the height of folly.

Q. If a complaint is to be made that any irresponsible lad has acted contrary to the way in which he had instructions to act, we should know what that incident was and also the facts?

A. I quite agree with your Lordship. I can only give you my impression. I am unable to prove the thing and I understand the responsibility rests on my shoulders; but if you ask me to give my impression, it is that such things must have happened. What I feel is that any civilian should have realised that as inevitable in the nature of things.

Q. Is there any other matter in this connection?

A. I have said in my statement, and I should like to repeat it, that I do not know that the people were not sufficiently punished, though I would again make the admission, and make it with the greatest pleasure, that the work of the troops here was done consistently with the laws of civilised justice. There was nothing to be said against that. I have urged already that the sections under which the prosecutions were undertaken ought not to have been brought into use. There was nothing to warrant that, and certainly nothing to warrant that when the trial took place.

Q. You mean the sections as regards waging war; of course that is after all a legal question?

A. It is, but I place it before this Committee in order that they may have a proper bearing in so far as I can enable the Committee to have that, as to the measures taken by the Government. And as I have said, and I think a deserved, tribute to the Government for their forbearance, I do not want myself to be misunderstood as endorsing all that has been done, and so I am as gently as possible urging upon the Committee these defects, even in this admirable handling by the administration.

Q. But that looks very like as though you were making a complaint against the Government Advocate that he did not understand the proper charge?

A. I think it was more than that, it was not the Government Advocate who merely chose, though technically it was. But that is not how the thing happened. That is within my experience and quite rightly. No Advocate would take upon his shoulders the entire responsibility of choosing the section, but he would be naturally guided by the administrative bent at the time and the Government might have instructed the Advocate, the Government Counsel, not to do that; but I do ask myself whether it was necessary for them to impose that heavy contribution upon Ahmedabad. But the sorest point with me is that they should have imposed that very severe contribution upon the labourers and in the manner they did.

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[Continued.]

The manner in which it was executed in my opinion was unforgivable.

Q. We had a statement from Mr. Ambalal Sarabhai.

A. And I ventured to differ from him in spite of my regard for him and his fairness. I think he erred, and erred grievously, against his own people, the labourers.

Q. I am not sure that you are not going a bit beyond the scope of our enquiry?

A. You have put before me a sore point.

Q. There may be difficulties of course between employers and employees, but we have nothing to do with that.

A. I fully understood that and no man can more fully appreciate Mr. Ambalal's difficulty than I can. And I wish to finish this part of my statement by saying that I think that the action of the Government in connection with the Nadiad and Barejadi case was totally unjustified, and I would ask the Committee to read the correspondence* between Government and the Collector of Nadiad and you will find there arguments urged for inflicting that fine totally irrelevant to the scope.

Q. It is a question really of the laws of India, but is it not in accordance with those laws that, if an additional police force has to be got for any particular district, that district has to pay for it?

A. Surely, Sir, it is not obligatory upon the Government to do that. It is open to the Government to make the people pay; it is open to the Government to single out a class of people for that treatment, but it is nowhere, according to my reading of that law, giving such wide discretion to the Government, obligatory upon the Government to take that expense from the people.

Q. How are they to recoup themselves?

A. Recoup from the general revenue. If they consider a particular district is insufficiently policed, surely they do that. They get it from the general revenue. And I certainly hold very strong opinions, knowing as I do the people of Nadiad and the people of Barejadi that there was no occasion whatsoever for posting a single additional policeman. The people of Nadiad under the most difficult circumstances acted with the greatest self-restraint, and I have investigated that matter as fully as I was capable of doing in conjunction with Mr. Ker, the Collector, and I am here to tell the Committee that it is my deliberate opinion that the people of Nadiad were not in league with those who went there to derail, but that they exercised all the powers that were at their disposal in order to restrain them, and they got a handsome tribute from the Collector and a compliment for their assistance. And I would say the same thing for the people of Barejadi.

Q. That I think deals with the points you wish to bring before our notice?

A. I think so, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Mr. Gandhi, you have given us your views about civil disobedience and I do not want in the least to make you argue the point over again with me. But I want to get some facts and dates roughly from you if I can. I think the *Satyagraha* vow was settled somewhere about the third week in February?

A. I think that is very nearly right.

Q. I think what has been called your *hukm* was dated somewhere about the 23rd of February?

A. Yes.

Q. At that time the Rowlatt Bill No. 2 had not yet been passed, it was passed later on in March?

A. Possibly.

Q. The vow† as printed which is before us shows that it was known that the Bill would be passed, but it had not yet been passed?

A. Yes.

Q. And for some time before the 23rd of February I think the press in India, not that it was any part of my duty to know this at that time, but from the papers

put before us, the press in India, seems to have been ringing with proposals about the way in which to protest against those Acts if they were passed. And I daresay you had to consider a great many suggestions before you made up your mind about the form of your protest, and among the suggestions you had to consider was there a suggestion, widely spread throughout India, that it would be a good method of protest if people were to refuse to pay their land-revenue and taxes? I think you had a good many forms of protest suggested to you by irresponsible people, and the *Satyagraha* vow which you settled in the third week of February was what you thought the best method of protest at that time?

A. Yes.

Q. Now did you have to consider—I ask you this because of a speech of yours which I think I have read—were you asked to consider whether it should be laid down that orders passed by local magistrates under the Criminal Procedure Code should be disobeyed?

A. Of course that was placed before me.

Q. You never committed yourself to that? You thought it might be inadvisable?

A. Not only never committed myself, but I opposed it strenuously.

Q. Had you expressed, by the 8th of April let us say, a view on that subject one way or the other?

A. By the 8th of April I had sufficiently expressed that view, because it was urged upon me by friends that we should commit a breach of the laws governing processions and so on, and I had suggested that we could not possibly do that, we ought not to do it. I had even issued instructions that all police orders should be scrupulously obeyed and carried out.

Q. Can you give me the date of any instructions that were issued publicly, either by yourself or the Bombay Sabha on that point?

A. I can only say it was between the 6th and the actual civil disobedience. I can only offer to the Committee to send all the papers that I can trace.

Q. I do not want to put you to any undue trouble, but speaking for myself, if you can give me some document which shows that you have repudiated the notion that there was to be any disobedience against local magistrates, I shall be very glad.

A. I shall, if it is there, do that.*

Q. I am rather anxious, Mr. Gandhi, to find out from you exactly what made you start upon your journey to Delhi, which was interrupted. Will you tell me shortly in your own way the facts that led up to that act and what exactly you intended to do when you got to Delhi?

A. I think it was about the 1st of April, or even a little before, I had received a letter from Dr. Satyapal from Amritsar saying he had been trying to follow the *Satyagraha* movement, that he appreciated the thing and he liked it immensely, but that he himself did not fully understand it, nor did the people. Would I not go over to Amritsar, be his guest, and deliver a few speeches explaining the doctrine of *Satyagraha*, as they were, on a superficial observation of it, enamoured of the thing? As I happened to know from information given to me by the police officers that this letter was intercepted, copied by them and then given to me, I told Dr. Satyapal that I should do so at the very first opportunity that I had. Meanwhile I received a letter from *Swami* Shradhdhanand saying that I should go to Delhi. The people of Delhi were becoming unamenable to the control of the leaders. Really all these people never responded in Delhi, least of all the big cities of India, that is my impression and that is the information they have given me. He said if you only come here, even if it is for a day, I should be pleased, and he sent not only one telegram but he sent two or three, at least two I know.

Q. About what date? Was it after the events of the 30th in Delhi?

A. Yes, after the events of the 30th of March and before the *kartal*† of the 6th, and so I think I sent a telegram to him saying I would do so, but I would come

* Not printed.

† Para. 21 of the statement of the Government of Bombay, page 192.

* Vide Annexure at page 132.

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immediately after the *hartal*. I was most anxious for the thing to pass off nicely in Bombay and so it did. I was most anxious we should start our civil disobedience while the whole thing was arranged, so we did that for one day, and on the 8th I took the train. But I got his first wire between the 30th of March and the 6th of April.

Q. Again I do not want to put you to any trouble about it, but do you happen to have these wires or copies of them?

A. If I have them I shall certainly let you have them. My general routine is to destroy all these documents, simply because I do not want to burden myself. But it is likely that I may have those telegrams. If I have them, I will furnish them.*

Q. As I gather, the attitude the *Swami* adopted in writing to you was that, in order that the *Satyagraha* movement might have the benefit of a further extension of influence through your going to Delhi, he wished you to go there?

A. Certainly.

Q. He was not inviting you to go to Delhi for the express purpose of pacifying the crowds that had got riotous and out of hand, but in the ordinary course of the *Satyagraha* propaganda?

A. Not in the same manner that it was arranged for me to be in Amritsar. He definitely mentioned that "we may not be able to restrain the crowd." He said "I have tried my utmost up to now, but I may fail and so I would like you to come up; your presence will have a pacifying influence." If I can get those letters I shall be pleased to give them to you.

Q. Am I right in supposing that, so far as you are concerned, it was no part of your intention in going to Delhi for the first time in order to have a collision with the authorities in the interests of the *Satyagraha* movement?

A. None at all.

Q. You knew, I think, at that time, that the *Swamiji* was having difficulty in getting the crowds in Delhi to do what he wanted and that the police authorities were having an anxious time of it?

A. Yes.

Q. You say you had no intention of proceeding to Delhi to make the position worse but to make it better?

A. I was proceeding to Delhi to help the authorities.

Q. There are just one or two things that I would like to ask you about. I do not believe in quoting speeches, Mr. Gandhi. I have some reports before me and I cannot read through the whole, but I will read a few lines from your speeches at Ahmedabad on the 13th April.

A. On the 13th or 14th?

Q. On the 14th. You were speaking in Gujarati and it is a speech which you began by saying that what had happened in Ahmedabad during the past 4 or 5 days had disgraced the city. What you appeared to have said according to this report is, "he told them that these disturbances had done no good to Ahmedabad, that they had done considerable harm to the passive resistance. If after his arrest people had preserved peace, the Rowlatt Bill would have been cancelled or on the verge of being cancelled. It would not be a matter of wonder now if there was a delay in the cancellation of the Bill. When he got free on Friday, he intended to start again for Delhi on Sunday to try and get himself re-arrested as the cause of passive resistance would have been greatly strengthened. Now instead of going to Delhi he had to carry on passive resistance against themselves." Was that simply a passing thought in your mind or had you in a cooler moment formed the determination really to go back to get yourself re-arrested?

A. I had done that. I had told Mr. Griffith, the Commissioner of Police, that it was my intention to do so unless I found something serious.

Q. Do you mean Mr. Jeffries?

A. Mr. Griffith, the Commissioner of Police in Bombay. I mentioned that fact to Mr. Pratt also.

* Not traceable by Mr. Gandhi or elsewhere.

Q. I have not heard of him yet. He is new to us. Now let us take it that you had been unjustly turned back from Delhi, but what was the object of going back to get yourself re-arrested?

A. As a *Satyagrahi* having once been arrested and set free, it is our duty to seek re-arrest and seek imprisonment again and again. That was the object and nothing else.

Q. I do not know,—of course you know better than I do,—it is not the object of a *Satyagrahi* to go and get himself imprisoned always, is it?

A. No, it is not always.

Q. What is the particular reason from your point of view to get yourself re-arrested?

A. To invite self-suffering. If I embark upon a campaign of civil breach that is the only way by which I can make good that campaign.

Q. Was it your idea that if you went back to Delhi and you were arrested, that that would inflame the country or parts of it and have a greater effect in stopping the Rowlatt Bill?

A. Not at all. If that was so, I would have proceeded straight, without the slightest hesitation or consideration. Here I just want to supplement my information by saying that at that time I had no idea of what had occurred in Amritsar or elsewhere.

Q. The events at Amritsar occurred on the 10th which was when you were travelling back in the train. At what time did you actually arrive back in Bombay?

A. On the 11th.

Q. At that time I take it that there were urgent messages for you to come to Ahmedabad?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they meet you immediately on your arrival at home?

A. No. I was not met by any friend so far as I am aware.

Q. Did you get a message to come to Ahmedabad the moment you arrived in Bombay?

A. I got the message the next day. I arrived on the 11th. I got the message on the 12th.

Q. Your facilities for keeping abreast of what was happening all over the country during those days were very bad, and you were not fully posted up with what was happening?

A. No.

Q. That point about going back to Delhi I put it to you again, because it was only a few days after you had been arrested and turned back. What I understood you to say was for the first time when you went to Delhi it was no part of your object to get into collision with the police but you went there to make the position better?

A. Yes.

Q. I don't think I have before me in an authoritative form the facts as to the action you took to bring to an end the practice of what is called civil disobedience. I think you did feel yourself compelled to advise the temporary suspension of civil disobedience, and according to the documents before me, that was done about the 18th April?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was done after you got back from Ahmedabad, and you addressed a letter to the Secretaries of the *Sabha* in which you said that "it is not without sorrow that I feel compelled to advise the temporary suspension of civil disobedience. I give this advice not because I have less faith now in its efficacy, but because, I have, if possible, greater faith than before. It is my perception of the law of *Satyagraha* movement that impels me to suggest suspension. I am sorry that when I embarked upon a mass movement, I underrated the forces of evil, and I must now pause and consider how best to meet the situation." Now you seem to have stated there very frankly that when on the 23rd of February you embarked upon *Satyagraha* and civil disobedience as a mass movement, you had underrated the forces of evil, and I suppose that the experiences through which India had passed during the intervening period

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led you to think that it was doing more harm than good in that form?

A. Yes.

Q. After that date, the 18th April, I think from time to time you were requested for instructions whether it was going to be restarted again; was it ever in fact restarted again?

A. No.

Q. You have kept it in suspension since that date?

A. And then a notice was issued that it will be started, I think, on the 1st of August or the 1st of July, I forget now the exact month, when I saw there was a fair control over the situation, but yielding to the better knowledge and the better information of the Government of India, it was Lord Chelmsford's desire conveyed to me through His Excellency the Governor of Bombay and supplemented by the advice of the Governor of Bombay also, I felt that in order to make good my claim as a *Satyagrahi* I should yield and I yielded.

Q. I think there is a letter over your signature in which you put the matter thus:—"As long as we practice truth and ask others to do so, *Satyagraha* can never be said to have ceased. And if all practise truth, and refrain from violence to person and property, we would immediately get what we want. But when all are not prepared to do so, when *Satyagrahis* are only a handful, then we have to devise other methods deducible from *Satyagraha*. One such method is *civil disobedience*. I have already explained the reason why this civil disobedience has been for the time being suspended. As long as we know that there is every likelihood, bordering on certainty, of rioting and violence following civil disobedience, so long disobedience of laws cannot be regarded as civil disobedience, but it is disobedience that is thoughtless, unevils and devoid of truth". And for those reasons you suspended it after experience had shown you that the line between civil disobedience and other disobedience was more difficult to draw for other people than you had thought?

A. Yes.

Q. I want to ask you, Mr. Gandhi. You have been taking an interest in politics all over India, and I want you to speak, so far as you can, for the whole of India as regards this point. Looking back upon what happened in the Punjab and Delhi and other places, do you think that by a misinterpretation of the principles of *Satyagraha*, there has been a tendency all over India in April and May of last year to have an undue sympathy with lawlessness and an inadequate perception of the necessity of obedience to law?

A. So far as I have been able to gauge the public feeling, I do not think that would be a correct statement.

Q. Do you feel guilty yourself of having done anything to damage the law-abiding instinct of the Indian people by the *Satyagraha* movement?

A. I feel guilty of having temporarily damaged that instinct in some people. I do feel that. But I do not feel for one moment that there has been a spirit of lawlessness amongst the people as a whole.

Q. Of course in some parts of India there was greater reason than in others for being in a state of excitement. The Punjab is an instance, and there are other instances which I need not mention, but as I understand it or rather put it that where people got more excited there, they were more liable to misinterpret what you wanted?

A. I think where the people did not understand the doctrine there they were liable to misinterpret it. I found to my most agreeable surprise that for the first time people from the Punjab came to me voluntarily and said "Oh, if only we had understood the doctrine, how differently we would have acted."

Q. And it is the case, is it not, that before you started this particular movement in the third week of February a campaign had been going on for a substantial time in which the disobedience of law had played a prominent part in the papers all over India?

A. Oh, yes, certainly.

Q. Your view was to appoint a committee which should decide what laws to disobey....?

A. That is so, and we often discussed it at our meetings, and I made it as plain as it was possible for me to do so.

Q. Your intention was to have a committee in Bombay both for Bombay and Ahmedabad?

A. That is all.

Q. And of course your intention was that this civil disobedience should be practised in parts of India where they would have such *Sabhas*. Did you intend that each place should have its own *Sabhas* to prescribe particular laws to be disobeyed?

A. That was done, but I think it was only nominally done, because the *Sabhas* in each place where it was actually done, appointed me as the President, because they felt, and very naturally too, they felt in that respect they should be guided by me. There was a local committee formed in Madras and they made me President, and I rather liked the idea, and that was the same thing in the United Provinces, so that we should have the same policy all over.

Q. Did you contemplate that different laws should be prescribed for different areas for the purposes of being broken?

A. I contemplated that if the necessity arose, but not otherwise.

Q. I see in your speeches that your movement is referred to sometimes by the phrase "civil disobedience" which comes apparently from Thoreau, and sometimes by the phrase, which is more familiar to an Englishman, "passive resistance." Now if an order comes to a man from Government or from anybody else, and if his conscience says that it is not right, it may be up to him simply to do nothing if not to obey, but civil disobedience goes further than that. Does it not?

A. Certainly.

Q. First of all, civil disobedience as a propaganda, was a means, as you put it speaking of South Africa, of bending the Government to the will of the people?

A. Certainly.

Q. Secondly, the disobedience may be active as well as passive, but still be civil according to your *Satyagraha* doctrines?

A. Yes.

Q. And thirdly, the Committee may fail to prescribe the law to be broken which is against one's conscience or prescribe a law which is not against one's conscience to be broken?

A. Certainly.

Q. Those differences as I understood you to say you perceived from your former propaganda and this is your way of putting the passive resistance doctrine into force?

A. That is why I have not called it a passive doctrine, because there is nothing passive about this thing. It is active, but not in the physical sense.

Q. For instance, if there is a law which says that you must not publish a newspaper unless you register it, and you publish it, it is not passive resistance?

A. It is active and intensely active.

Q. In the same way you go and get yourself arrested when you are told not to go to Delhi and that would be active resistance?

A. Certainly.

Q. What I want to know is whether you appreciate the fact, as it appears to me is the case, that civil disobedience as understood by you and what is called passive resistance are really two very different things?

A. I accept that. There is a fundamental distinction.

Q. You said it was an extension of the domestic law on the political field, that what is repugnant to one's conscience he has a right to refuse?

A. That is true.

-By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You were asked about the Rowlatt Bills and you were told that the Rowlatt Act that was passed really re-enacted the provisions of the Defence of India Act to a certain extent. The Defence of India Act provisions were submitted to merely as an emergency measure for the period of the war, but that would not justify keeping

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all those provisions after the war was over. That was one of the objections to the Bill?

A. Yes.

Q. Then it was pointed out that the extension of the Rowlett Act as passed to any particular province or locality could only be if the Government of India extended it. Have you not found that similar extensions under other Acts that were made were based on what the people considered to be very insufficient grounds?

A. Yes.

Q. And the main objection to the Rowlett Bills was not this, but that it attempted to place a considerable power in the hands of the executive uncontrolled by the judiciary?

A. Yes.

Q. And also the manner in which the Act was passed in the Legislative Council in the teeth of all combined non-official opposition and that too on the eve of a substantial measure of self-Government being granted created the greatest resentment throughout the country?

A. Yes.

Q. With regard to your *Satyagraha* doctrine, as far as I am able to understand it, it involves a pursuit of truth?

A. Yes.

Q. And in the pursuit of truth to invite suffering on oneself and not to cause violence to anybody else?

A. Yes.

Q. That I understand is the main principle underlying?

A. That is so.

Q. Now in that doctrine, who is to determine the truth? That individual himself?

A. Yes, that individual himself.

Q. So each one that adopts this doctrine has to determine for himself what is the truth that he will pursue?

A. Most decidedly.

Q. And in doing that different individuals will take very different views as to what is the truth to be pursued?

A. Certainly.

Q. It might on that footing cause considerable confusion?

A. I won't accept that. It need not lead to any confusion if you accept the proposition that a man is honestly in search after truth and that he will never inflict violence upon him who holds to truth. Then there is no possibility of confusion.

Q. A man may honestly strive after truth, but however honestly a man may strive his notions of truth will be quite different from the notions of truth of some other people or his intellectual equipment may be of such a character that his conclusion as regards truth may be entirely opposite to the conclusion of somebody else?

A. That was precisely the reason why in answer to Lord Hunter I suggested that non-violence was the necessary corollary to the acceptance of *Satyagraha* doctrine.

Q. I quite see that non-violence is a common factor to all but what truth a particular person should pursue, on that there will be immense difference of opinion?

A. Certainly.

Q. You recognise, I suppose, Mr. Gandhi, that in order properly to follow in the right spirit in which you conceive the doctrine of *Satyagraha*, pursuit after truth, in the manner you describe, the person must be equipped with high moral and intellectual equipment?

A. Certainly, a man who wants to pursue truth independently has to be equipped with high moral and intellectual equipment.

Q. Now do you expect that standard of moral and intellectual equipment in the ordinary man?

A. It is not necessary for me to have that standard from all who accept the thing. If, for instance, A has evolved a conception of truth which B, C and 50 others accepted implicitly from him then I need not expect from them that high standard which I would expect from A, but the others will follow that. They will know that they are not to inflict any violence, and you create a large body.

Q. It comes to this, that the person or persons with high moral and intellectual equipment that I have spoken

of would come to a particular conclusion. Then a large number of other people have to blindly follow him?

A. Not blindly. I would not say blindly, but I would not expect the same standard of intellectual or moral equipment from them as I would expect from A.

Q. I thought you agreed with me that in order to practise in the right spirit your doctrine of *Satyagraha* a person should be fitted with high moral and intellectual equipment, but you say it is not necessary to exact that standard from all people because all that they need do is to follow what a person of that high intellectual and moral equipment has decided?

A. You may put it that way if you wish to. But all I wish to urge is that each individual, unless he wants to carry on his pursuit independently, does not need to do so. I simply say that if one man conceives a plan of life, it is not necessary for all the others, before they can follow that, to have the same intellectual and moral equipment. If you have appreciated that from what I have said, I have nothing more to say.

Q. I take it that your scheme, as you conceive it, involves the determination of what is the right path and the true path by people who are capable of high intellectual and moral equipment and a large number of other people following them without themselves being able to arrive at similar conclusions by reason of their lower moral and intellectual equipment?

A. I cannot subscribe to that, because I have not said that. I do not say that they are not to exercise their judgment but I simply say that in order that they may exercise their judgment the same mental and moral equipment is not necessary.

Q. Because they are to accept the judgment of people who are capable of exercising better judgment and equipped with better moral and intellectual standards?

A. Naturally, but I think that is in human nature, but I exact nothing more than I would exact from an ordinary human being.

Q. I will put it in another way. The success of your propaganda must depend upon a large number of people accepting the conclusions of people in whom they have faith and who are fortunate enough to have that high moral and intellectual equipment. If everybody without out for himself what is the right path, you will end in confusion. So the success of your scheme implies and with that high moral and intellectual equipment will pursue the truth and determine what it is, then a larger number not so endowed will accept their conclusions and follow them?

A. I do not accept that as a natural conclusion, that the success of the movement depends upon that. In the existence of one full *Satyagrahi*. One *Satyagrahi* can achieve success in the manner and in the sense that in the plan of violence numbers of people cannot do.

Q. The first part of it, I understood, Mr. Gandhi, is that it is a doctrine of pursuit of truth in the sense that out by a person fitted with high moral and intellectual equipment which the ordinary masses do not possess?

A. Of making an independent search, that is how I would like to put it.

Q. Therefore so far as they are concerned, they have to accept the conclusions of people who are capable of doing it?

A. Not without sufficiently exercising their judgment.

Q. They can only exercise such judgment as they have?

A. Certainly.

Q. And as you have said, the real pursuit of truth in the manner you have described requires such high moral and intellectual equipment that it is beyond the ordinary individual?

A. That is true with reference to any original thing.

Q. I am not pointing this as a reproach against the movement. I am only understanding the position.

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A. Perhaps I am reading actually more in your words than I am entitled to.

Q. You need not view my questions with undue suspicion?

A. It is not suspicion, Sir Chimanlal, but I simply do not want the Committee or you for that matter to misunderstand my position. That is all.

Q. I understand you to say, Mr. Gandhi, you do not consider yourself a perfect *Satyagrahi* yet?

A. No.

Q. If that is so, Mr. Gandhi, it is almost impossible for ordinary people to ever hope to be that?

A. I do not by any means consider myself to be an extraordinary man.

Q. You may not consider yourself, but looking to your life and your habits the people know that you are an extraordinary man and can pursue a doctrine such as the *Satyagraha* perfectly. But are there not many people for whom it is almost impossible to hope to pursue it correctly?

A. They perhaps in that case would not have understood the scope of *Satyagraha* at all. It would mean that they had felt quite disgusted. Now take for instance the 40,000 Indians in South Africa who are totally uncultured and illiterate, and these people never came to that conclusion.

Q. I may be wrong. But when you speak of the 40,000 in South Africa, I think they simply followed your lead?

A. Yes, followed my lead after having examined the position. If I take you through the streets of South Africa, and should you have the time to do it, you will find that your countrymen were capable of doing it because they did not follow me blindly.

Q. True, but there in South Africa you had a broad simple issue?

A. Yes.

Q. And it was an issue with regard to which the sympathy of the civilised world was with the people who were following *Satyagraha* and that very much differentiates the situation from the situation that you have here?

A. Not on the concrete instance of *Satyagrahi* control. I have had to consolidate more information here on my side than I had in South Africa. They were divided in two forces of hostile camps there.

Q. That may be, but still you had a clean-cut issue?

A. So also here.

Q. Here you say you had on this particular occasion the Rowlett Bill agitation, but once you start this doctrine of *Satyagraha* and introduce it into political campaigns and activities in a country like India, situated as we are, it is not one clean-cut issue that we arrive at. There would be varied and complicated situations to which you would have to apply this doctrine?

A. I do not apply this doctrine to every situation in life. I simply present *Satyagraha* as an instrument of infinitely greater power and infinitely purer than violence.

Q. Then, I take it, you will agree that it is not a doctrine that you would apply to every grievance or every situation that may arise?

A. Most certainly not. Not if only because of the automatic limits of the doctrine imposed, because everyone is not ready to suffer. Everyone is ready to strike a blow if he would receive one in return.

Q. You say that an ordinary man is quite ready to strike a blow, so your doctrine involves eschewing that altogether and on the contrary the suffering ones go on suffering. Now does not that require very extraordinary control over ordinary human passions?

A. Not to my experience. It does not really require that extraordinary control for sufferings that you imagine. Every mother suffers and she is not exceptionally gifted with any great virtues.

Q. Now take a case in ordinary life. If you get a blow and you determine to suffer it according to your doctrine, surely that does require extraordinary control over ordinary human passions?

A. Then, your countrymen have got that extraordinary control.

Q. Do you think they have exercised it or exhibited it in all these places?

A. Yes, they have exhibited that in a very large measure.

Q. Take Ahmedabad. Do you think they exhibited that control over their passions when on hearing of your arrest they burst forth and committed all these atrocities which you clearly denounced. Do you think they exhibited this self-control and self-restraint?

A. All I say is that throughout India where you find these isolated instances, you find innumerable instances where the people exercise the most exemplary self-restraint and hence we have earned the title of the "mild Hindu."

Q. I daresay many people did not take part in these disturbances and in that sense it is self-restraint. But you see the point is how, on hearing of your arrest, which was the first provocation to them, they burst into ebullitions, and these atrocities in Ahmedabad followed almost at once.

A. To me it just shows that even we have not gone far enough. I moved 7 lakhs of people in Kaira, they are high-spirited people, and yet they acted with the greatest self-restraint in the face of very grave provocation at the time of the Kaira trouble which was not for one day but continued for six months.

Q. So you consider these many manifestations of violence in different parts as merely an accidental or a passing phase which is not likely to recur?

A. I do not say so, but it will certainly be rare and rarer still from a clear conception that the country has now got of *Satyagraha*. I have no doubt in my mind about it.

Q. Do you think that the country has now realised the high ideals that you have placed before them?

A. Not in its full sense, but the country has sufficiently realised the high ideal to enable a man like myself to try it again and I would not hesitate to try it again if a situation warranting such control faced me, but as I have said it is not every day that you want to break laws.

Q. Do you feel sure that if you started it again similar disturbances would not result in any place?

A. It is very difficult to say beforehand when such a situation faces me, but I do feel sure that the country is all the purer and better for having gone through the fire of *Satyagraha*.

Q. Now, as I understand you from your statement, the *Satyagraha* doctrine is used in the political sphere to oppose unjust laws?

A. Yes.

Q. And that is to be done by inviting penalties under that law, by breaking that law. And you say your doctrine inculcates this with regard to such laws in connection with which the rendering of obedience would be a dishonour, and you go so far as to say that in order to register your protest against any such law one would be entitled to withdraw co-operation altogether from the State?

A. I have not said that there, i.e., "to withdraw co-operation." But I would accept that proposition also when a situation may be reached in which case it would be a proper thing to withdraw complete co-operation from the State.

Q. Now ordinarily I take it that your doctrine is co-operation with Government?

A. Yes.

Q. I mean to say in the very interests of the country, for its ordered development, for which there ought to be co-operation?

A. Yes.

Q. And there ought to be an elimination as far as possible of any race hatred or race feeling or bitterness of that kind?

A. Yes.

Q. Tested in this way, when your doctrine says with regard to any particular law or laws to invite suffering

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and go to jail by breaking them you hope thereby ultimately to excite the sympathy of the people in authority and to make them see the correct view of it?

A. I should eliminate the hope. That hope is not a necessary ingredient.

Q. If I remember I think in your statement you mention it?

A. When I place the doctrine before the people I place that also before them, but it is not an essential part of the doctrine. The essential part is not to accept and obey a law to obey which is a dishonour, therefore it becomes a necessity of the situation for us to do that but that by itself is the register of a protest by honest action, which brings about the sympathy of the world and the repeal of that legislation. It is one of the conditions of that act. A man may say "no, the whole world will rise against me," but he must still make good his protest.

Q. It is true the result may also be that though it may not be the strict ideal of *Satyagraha*. According to you one should not do it for achieving that result but the hope may be that if you can get a number of people going to jail and suffering then the authorities may be moved by sympathy and may realise the correct point of view as you consider it. Now if that is done on any particular occasion and if several people went to jail in this way and suffered, will it not also create to a certain extent a feeling of hatred against the Government in the minds of people who would naturally feel that they were so helpless before this Government that the only thing they could do was to go to jail. Would it not naturally create in these circumstances, although you may restrain yourself and not proceed to violence, in your mind, a certain feeling against the authority with regard to whom you have to take this action of inviting suffering on yourself.

A. It is totally contrary to my 30 years' experience. I myself, and all those who have been associated with me, have not by reason of suffering been filled, at least, with any greater ill-will than is professed to be, but I know of scores of instances in which they have got rid of the ill-will, because this is a doctrine in which you get rid of that kind of passion and ill-will in the quickest manner possible. See what is happening to-day in South Africa after the close of such a bitter struggle causing the suffering of innocent men. The Governors and the Indians have gone on the best of terms and even when they were labouring under very serious disabilities at the time of the war, the Indians offered their services absolutely voluntarily and there you had no recruitment or anything of that kind. It was all optional, and those who cared to go did so and they served under the very gentlemen who, in their opinion, had subjected them to the greatest hardship; and General Smuts, when he returned, was the recipient of an address from the people who voluntarily voted that address to him, and whom he had, in their estimation, oppressed during the passive resistance struggle.

Q. Then when the Rowlatt Bills were passed, you decided to present the *Satyagraha* doctrine to the country?

A. Yes.

Q. And you wanted the masses to be *Satyagrahis* in that sense?

A. To take part in the movement without pledging themselves to the *Satyagraha* vow.

Q. True, they may or may not take the vow, but you wanted them to be *Satyagrahis* in spirit, to follow the doctrines of the *Satyagraha* movement?

A. That part of the movement not devoted to civil disobedience, that is to say, I would warn them and invite them to take part in meetings to be organized, but I would not invite them to take part in the civil breach of the laws, and I would not make them to force others who do not wish to take part.

Q. You never intended that the masses should take part in the civil disobedience part of the movement?

A. Unless they definitely took the pledge. I would then take the masses also with me.

Q. But you did want them to follow the *Satyagraha* doctrine?

A. Certainly. You may perhaps recall I framed another statement of pledge to be signed by all after this violence which omitted mention of civil resistance but simply mentioned the following of truth at all costs and asking others also to do that. I omitted from that even the taking of self-suffering.

Q. By whom was this statement to be signed?

A. It was a pledge to be signed by a large number of people who are not in my circle and who are not civil resisters.

Q. Your idea is this that the masses or a large number of people should not be asked to subscribe to civil disobedience?

A. I do not say that. I simply say that in opposition of the violent movement I issued another pledge which was intended to be signed by everybody who cared to do so which simply bound him to observe the truth in all his dealings and not to inflict violence, i.e., to omit civil disobedience and therefore the inviting of suffering.

Q. Because you considered civil disobedience in consequence of the suffering following on that, to be not quite suited to the ordinary masses?

A. No. I had suspended the movement at the time and yet I wanted to place something before the country. Naturally a leader would sometimes emphasize one part of his propaganda and sometimes another. At this time when I saw that the civil disobedience part was misunderstood by the people, I suspended that, but I wanted to emphasize the principle—a part of it—the non-violence part of it, and so I eliminated civil disobedience, not because it was unsuited to the masses, but because it was unsuited to the season, in other words, it was not in season to preach it.

Q. Because of your experience of the occurrences that took place in April, you came to the conclusion that civil disobedience propaganda was unsuited to the occasion?

A. For that season, I have not come to any such conclusion as you postulate.

Q. I do not suggest that but you came to the conclusion that looking to the circumstances then existing *Satyagraha* was unsuited?

A. Yes.

Q. And therefore you suspended it?

A. Yes.

Q. And you came to that conclusion because the events showed you that the people had not really understood what you meant by civil obedience?

A. Yes.

Q. And they had thereby misled themselves?

A. Yes.

Q. When you first decided about civil disobedience I suppose it was in connection with the Rowlatt Act?

A. No, when the pledge was first signed, the whole thing was contemplated at the very first sitting in Ahmedabad at the *Ashram*.

Q. The disobedience of the Rowlatt Act as well as other laws?

A. Yes.

Q. You see I just want to correct my impression.

A. Yes, many have really thought that the other laws came in after. That is not so.

Q. If I remember aright, Mrs. Besant first took the vow?

A. Well, there are 2 versions to it. She took the vow and she did not. I was told that she had really taken the vow in toto less the committee clause. She did not want to be dominated by a committee. As you have now seen it was a question of limitation, but she misunderstood that.

Q. Was it not like this, viz., that she pointed out that it was not possible to disobey the Rowlatt Act, unless you became a seditionist or an anarchist?

A. I remember to have read it in the papers, but that was previous to the telegram and conversation of hers, so far as I recollect.

Q. She did point that out?

A. Of course there she misread the law, but she did say that.

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[Continued.]

Q. What I want to be clear about is whether it was on her pointing out what I have stated that the determination was arrived at to disobey other laws?

A. Not at all. It was some days at least after the pledge was published that Mrs. Besant wrote what you have stated. Mrs. Besant knew nothing of the pledge then at the time it was signed at Ahmedabad.

Q. I simply want to know whether my recollection is correct. She pointed out that the very nature of the Act did not lend itself to such disobedience, but as regards disobedience of any other laws, she refused to join that because she said that it would lead to chaos?

A. Yes I know she advanced that argument and she refuted the movement so far as it related to the disobedience of other laws, but I do not know on what grounds ultimately she refused to join the movement.

Q. The ground was put forward by her in her paper?

A. Certainly, she wrote an article to that effect in her *New India*.

Q. That is, that disobedience of laws in that manner must inevitably lead to chaos?

A. Yes.

Q. Now with regard to civil disobedience of various laws, was the idea underlying it this to a certain extent that, if you disobeyed various laws the result would be to embarrass the Government or to make ordered Government impossible, that Government would be obliged to yield to the demand of the people with regard to the Rowlatt Bill and, thus would be effected what you yourself described as bending the Government to the will of the people? Was that the idea underlying it?

A. It is not embarrassment of the Government, but the idea is the exercise of your right to withdraw your co-operation from Government that has forfeited all confidence and esteem, and it will all depend upon the measure of forfeiture of confidence.

Q. Take this particular case we are dealing with—the Rowlatt Act. By the passing of the Rowlatt Act, did you and your co-workers come to the conclusion that in doing that the Government had so acted that they had forfeited their confidence and therefore all claim for co-operation?

A. Oh, no. Not at all.

Q. I want to be clear.

A. The determining consideration was that the Rowlatt Act itself would not lend itself to active disobedience from moment to moment and therefore if we want to impress ourselves upon the Government we must stick to some other channel and we did so by actively breaking other laws which did not involve moral turpitude.

Q. Now, if you actually break other laws, would you grant that it would make, in a certain measure, ordered Government impossible?

A. I would not say that. Ordered Government would not be impossible in the case of totally inoffensive people. Naturally we have to assume that condition to be in existence with the people.

Q. The laws that you determined to be disobeyed were laws that were obeyed by you and other people all these years?

A. Yes.

Q. When they were enacted, they were not considered by you to be so outrageous that you should not obey them. Then, determining now to disobey the laws which you had all these years obeyed, would it not look as if meant to make Government impossible?

A. It would; if it covered a wide area. I would make Government impossible if I found that Government had taken leave of its senses entirely.

Q. On the 10th April, Mr. Gandhi, you were not in Ahmedabad?

A. No.

Q. You were on your way to Bombay?

A. On my way back to Bombay.

Q. When did you arrive in Bombay?

A. On the 11th.

Q. On the 9th you were arrested at Palwal and you sent a message?

A. Before I was arrested I had dictated the message.*

Q. Are you aware that on the 10th in Ahmedabad a meeting was held where your message was read?

A. Yes.

Q. In that message you had exhorted the people not to commit violence?

A. Yes.

Q. And that message was, I understand, explained to the meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. That was a very big meeting in Ahmedabad?

A. So I have heard.

Q. In spite of that exhortation of yours, which was communicated to the people not to commit violence the mob burst into violence on the 11th?

A. Yes.

Q. Doesn't it show, Mr. Gandhi, that it is very difficult to make the ordinary masses, as they are, grasp this theory of no violence and suffering on oneself?

A. I admit the difficulty of it certainly.

Q. It is very difficult for them to practise that, i.e., no violence and suffering on oneself?

A. After having been used to methods of violence, one does find it difficult to exercise self-restraint.

Q. In the circumstances, as they are at present it is very difficult to practise abstention from violence in that manner?

A. Certainly.

Q. The other part is easy for them to grasp, viz., that they are to oppose certain legislation or to oppose Government in enforcing that legislation. That is a thing which the ordinary mind very easily grasps?

A. I think you are right; but I do not think that I have found it easy to explain to the people and make them understand that it was very difficult to oppose unjust laws. On the contrary, it has cost me considerable energy and industry before I have been able to drive the truth home.

Q. What I mean is if you tell the people that the Rowlatt Act is an unjust Act, or some other Act is an unjust Act, and we must oppose that, that is a suggestion which the ordinary mind will easily grasp and follow?

A. Certainly.

Q. Coupled with that, if you tell them that they should oppose that but abstain from violence, that part is very difficult, as they are constituted at present to grasp and follow?

A. Certainly.

Q. Then you arrived in Ahmedabad on the 12th?

A. On the 13th.

Q. You explained to the President what you meant by the statement you are reported to have made that this was organised by educated people. You have told us that you meant by that that there was no general conspiracy, but it was organised on the 10th, and that the people who organised it were people who could read and write. You do not mean the better educated classes had any hand in it?

A. No.

Q. When you say that this was organised by some one, have you any evidence in support of that statement?

A. Yes; I have evidence in support of that statement.

Q. I think you are not prepared to place that either before the authorities or before this Committee?

A. I am not prepared to give the names of the informants.

Q. I do not want the names of the informants. But the informants must have given you certain facts or certain materials which led you to conclude that this was organised on the 10th. Have you any objection to place those materials before the Committee?

A. I do not know what you mean by material, but I have no objection to describing the nature of the things that were done on the 10th or whenever the thing was suggested to the crowds as to how they should act in the matter. There were some people who suggested to

* Annexure to Mr. Gandhi's written statement, page 254.

them the burning of the chowkies and some people suggested how to do it.

Q. Let us go step by step. As regards such information as you are prepared to give about the organisation of the 10th, was there any meeting held on the 10th where they were told to do this?

A. I have no evidence of any meeting held in any house or anything of that kind, but I have evidence of people who were themselves told what to do.

Q. Was that on the 10th?

A. I am not able to tax my memory to that extent, but if I said to Mr. Chatfield it was on the 10th, it is the 10th.

Q. I want to be quite clear about this. We have been told that on the 11th people on the spot were told to do various things. That is different from their being told deliberately on the night previous to do certain things?

A. Yes. I understand the distinction. As to the 11th, it is also equally true.

Q. Let us first take the evening of the 10th. Have you got any information in proof of your statement?

A. I have.

Q. On the 10th some people, whoever they were, went about telling people to work out a programme which they had thought out. Is that so?

A. Perhaps I would not put it so strongly. I would put it this way, because this is what was impressed upon my mind at the time. I was told that during that night there were people who said "You are fools, this is what you should do and this is how you should do the thing." What the whole conversation was, I am unable to reproduce to-day, because I took no notes. On the whole the conversation which was described to me came to this that it was suggested to those who were about them that this is what they should do.

Q. Did individuals go about on the night of the 10th for this purpose?

A. I would not even put it so strongly as that, because I have no evidence, but they seized the opportunity which offered itself to them.

Q. The opportunity was on the 10th?

A. Supposing I was in my shop for instance and I saw people gathering round me, naturally on a day like that there would be a discussion and there would be crowds of people discussing as to how these things should be done or what was to be done. Somebody would say "Don't you know what should be done? This is how things have been done and you ought to do this." I want to say also that there was no destruction of life suggested by anybody so far as I know, but there was certainly destruction of property suggested.

Q. Then this must have been done during the day on the 10th and the night of the 10th?

A. I do not know about the day on the 10th. I do know about the evening of the 10th but I have more abundant and clear proof about the 11th.

Q. We are coming to the 11th presently. Let us confine attention to the 10th now. On the evening of the 10th, you say it happened in this way, that people congregated somewhere near shops or in some other place and somebody told them "Now, this is how you ought to proceed." That would be only when people by accident came there and when a man got an opportunity. Such an accident in that manner would not occur ordinarily in the evening or the night. It may happen during the day?

A. I do not know.

Q. If it happened in the evening or on the night, it must be more organised in that people deliberately went about telling people what to do?

A. I would not be surprised if that were also true that some people might have deliberately gone about from place to place. I can certainly imagine the possibility of such a thing, but I have not got evidence to the effect that some people actually went about from place to place, but I have with me unimpeachable testimony that some people actually incited the people to this kind of violence.

Q. On the 10th?

A. Yes.

Q. You are the best judge of what you call unimpeachable evidence. Is it any evidence on which ordinary human beings in ordinary life can base their conclusions?

A. I think so. I have not employed any extraordinary method of reasoning before I accepted it. On the contrary I think that I would act with the greatest caution before I would accept any such testimony.

Q. Were the people who gave you the information people who actually heard that or saw that done or did they hear it from somebody?

A. I have the testimony of those deluded people who were told this thing, and I have the testimony of some who did know also.

Q. People who heard this being said?

A. Who were told themselves to do the thing, and I have the testimony of some who themselves did it also.

Q. Was this on a large scale or in an isolated manner?

A. It is difficult to say whether it was on a large scale. In a way I am prepared to say that it was on a large scale. Certainly there were isolated cases. These men did not busy themselves to that extent, that they made it a point to go about from end to end, but they certainly seized the opportunity of the temper of the people and put this idea into their minds. That is the real meaning of what I am saying.

Q. What you say is really that the people burst out on your arrest on the 10th?

A. Yes.

Q. They had no plan before that at all?

A. They had no plan before that.

Q. Some persons saw that the crowds were excited in that manner and they took hold of that opportunity and misled them or diverted them into these actions?

A. I have not the shadow of a doubt about that.

Q. And for that you say you have got direct evidence?

A. I have direct evidence.

Q. Of people who saw that being done or who themselves had done it?

A. Yes.

Q. I take it that your principles forbid you from giving that information to the authorities or to the Committee?

A. I could not give the names of the people who have done so, just as if I was acting as counsel for these people. My principles and law also would forbid that, and I occupy with them a position unfortunately more sacred than that of a counsel. I had people coming to me who wanted to surrender the swords that they had got from the Swami Narayan temple, but unfortunately they had not the courage and the pluck to do so.

Q. You have evidence before you that on the 11th some people led the mobs or suggested to them what to do?

A. I have no evidence as to people leading the mobs, but I have evidence again equally strong, perhaps stronger than the evidence with reference to the 10th, that youngsters and youths rebuked those who were idle and who would not go and assist in the work of destruction.

Q. You have also definite information as to who those people were?

A. I cannot say that I have definite information, but I have had the names. I do not know them; I may have seen them, but I would not be able to identify them, that is to say, the people who said so. I do not know that at this distance of time I could even identify my informants.

Q. You cannot identify your informants?

A. I cannot. One man was not saying this to me. For instance, a party from a village came to me and I said "Hullo, this is what you have done and that is how you have understood my mission." They begged pardon of me. This is what happened on the morning of the 14th. They said they were exceedingly sorry but I would not find them doing the same thing again. I asked them to describe how they did it; then they described. If you ask me to identify them, I would not be able to do so, because I do not know them by names; I have not seen them either for any length of time, whereas I can identify some of my informants certainly.

Q. The informants with regard to the 10th, you can identify?

A. With regard to the 11th, more clearly, but I think I can identify some with reference to the 10th also.

Q. You say that some villagers came to you?

A. Quite a number.

Q. And you rebuked them for having acted in that manner?

A. I simply took them to task. I asked them "Why didn't you interfere? Why did you allow these things to happen under your very nose?"

Q. Then they said that they were instigated or were asked by others?

A. No. They said "Prem." That was the exact word. They said "our love for you made us do this thing." Then I asked them to describe how they did it; then they described.

Q. So far as you have described, it only comes to this, that they said they had done it and nobody asked them to do it?

A. I have given you three illustrations. One, of those men who knew the thing, but who were not themselves told to do the thing, another party who saw these things being done, the inciting and the act, whilst they themselves were mere spectators, and the third class of people who themselves were actors but not the inciters. I have not got any testimony or any confession from the instigators themselves.

Q. There may not be confession by the instigators. But if you rebuked certain people for having done certain things, they would naturally shoulder responsibility on somebody else by saying "True, I did it, but somebody else asked me to do it."

A. They may do that, but I think I should be able to discriminate between that and a true thing.

Q. You formed your own conclusions?

A. That is all I can say.

Q. You still adhere to them?

A. I do and as I am gaining experience day after day, it confirms me in that conclusion.

Q. I understood that with regard to the Kaira disturbances and the derailments, there also you had certain information?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that in your view an organised movement?

A. It was not organised, and it was done certainly by a definite party of people some of whom were really drunkards. They went to the station. Whether they went to the station with that intention or not, I have no clear evidence but having reached the station they said "let us do this thing."

Q. It was not organised in the sense that the people of the town were behind it?

A. No; on the contrary, it is my conviction that if the people in the town had come to know of any such thing, they would have gone and turned these men away. I may be mistaken, but that is my view and my view is based on the testimony of those for whom I entertain a very high regard. I do not think they will willingly deceive me.

Q. About those people who were reported to you as having taken part in the derailment, they have never been prosecuted?

A. Whether they have been prosecuted or some others I do not know, because I do not know the names.

Q. Then when these disturbances occurred, Mr. Gandhi, you suspended your *Satyagraha* propaganda, so far as civil disobedience was concerned. That was on the 18th April?

A. Yes.

Q. When you issued that notice, you realised, I think, that civil disobedience as a mass movement under the existing circumstances was not advisable?

A. Under those circumstances, it was not opportune at the time. I could not restrain the violence of the mob.

Q. In the circumstances then existing you realised that it was not advisable that this movement should proceed as a mass movement?

A. Yes.

Q. Then at that stage you merely suspended and you notified, if I remember correctly, that you proposed to resume it sometime in July?

A. On the 1st of July.

Q. Have you got the notice that you issued on that occasion?

A. I have, but I do not have it in my possession just now. But Mr. Justice Rankin had it.

Q. Then you thought in two months people will come up to the standard and Government military arrangements would be complete?

A. I said that. That is the letter.

Q. Then you suspended it till July in the hope that before that time, the masses would be educated as regards the correct principles of *Satyagraha* and there would be no danger then to resume civil disobedience movement?

A. That is correct as a partial statement. What I felt was that if I suspended the thing for two months, I shall be able to overtake the misinterpretation and misunderstanding about it, and I shall be able to make the position much more clear than I had done or had been able to do before the people and Government.

Q. I will come to the Government in a minute. I want to understand first this. When you suspended it you believed that the people had not fully understood your propaganda or creed and that they were not yet fit to exercise *Satyagraha*, and certainly its off-shoot of civil disobedience, in the real manner in which you desired and you believed that they would be fit to do so within two months?

A. I did not believe they would be fit to do so within two months.

Q. I want the actual expression used.

A. (Reads) "I am sorry that when I embarked upon a mass movement, I under-rated the forces of evil and I must now pass and consider how best to meet the situation. But whilst doing so, I wish to say that from a careful examination of the tragedy at Ahmedabad and Viramgam, I am convinced that *Satyagraha* had nothing to do with the violence of the mob, and that many swarmed round the banner of mischief largely because of their affection for Anasuyabai and myself. Had the Government, in an unwise manner, not prevented me from entering Delhi and so compelled me to disobey their orders I feel certain that Ahmedabad and Viramgam would have remained free from the horrors of the last week. In other words, *Satyagraha* has neither been the cause nor the occasion of the upheaval. If anything, the presence of *Satyagrahis* has acted as a check, ever so light, upon the previously existing lawless elements. As regards the events in the Punjab, it is admitted that they are unconnected with the *Satyagraha* movement."

In the course of the *Satyagraha* struggle in South Africa, several thousands of indentured Indians had struck work. This was a *Satyagraha* strike and, therefore, entirely peaceful and voluntary. Whilst the strike was going on, the strike of the European miners and railway employees, etc., was declared."

Q. Take that portion, where you refer to the reason for suspending it for two months.

A. I am coming to that.

Overtures were made to me to make common cause with the European strikers. As a *Satyagrahi*, I did not require a moment's consideration to decline to do so. I went further, and for fear of our strike being classed with the strike of the Europeans, in which methods of violence and the use of arms found a prominent place, ours was suspended and *Satyagraha* from that moment came to be recognised by the Europeans of South Africa as an honourable and honest movement and in the words of General Smutt's 'a constitutional movement.' I can do no less at the present critical moment. I would be untrue to *Satyagraha* if I allowed it, by any action of mine, to be used as an occasion for feeding violence, for embittering the relations between the English and the Indians. Our *Satyagraha* must, therefore, now consist in ceaselessly helping the authorities in all the

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[Continued.]

ways available to us as *Satyagrahis* to restore order and to curb lawlessness. We can turn the tragedies going on before us to good account, if we could but succeed in gaining the adherence of the masses to the fundamental principles of *Satyagraha*.

Satyagraha is like a banian-tree with innumerable branches. Civil disobedience is one such branch. *Satya* (truth) and *Ahimsa* (non-violence) together make the parent trunk from which all the innumerable branches shoot out. We have found by bitter experience that, whilst in an atmosphere of lawlessness, civil disobedience found ready acceptance. *Satya* (truth) and *Ahimsa* (non-violence), from which alone civil disobedience can worthily spring, have commended little or no respect. Ours then is a Herculean task, but we may not shirk it. We must fearlessly spread the doctrine of *Satya* and *Ahimsa*, and then and not till then shall we be able to undertake mass-*Satyagraha*. My attitude towards the Rowlatt legislation remains unchanged. Indeed I do feel that the Rowlatt legislation is one of the many causes of the present unrest. But in a surcharged atmosphere, I must refrain from examining these causes. The main and only purpose of this letter is to advise all *Satyagrahis* to temporarily suspend civil disobedience, to give the Government effective co-operation in restoring order, and by preaching and practice to gain adherence to the fundamental principles mentioned above.

"When is *Satyagraha* going to be resumed: is the question many have asked me. There are two answers. One is that *Satyagraha* has not at all ceased as long as we practise truth and ask others to do so, so long *Satyagraha* can never be said to have ceased. And if all practise truth and refrain from violence to person and property, we would get all we want. When all are not prepared to do so, we have to devise other methods. One such method is civil disobedience. I have already explained the reason why this civil disobedience has been for the time being suspended. As long as we know that there is every likelihood bordering on certainty to rioting and violence following civil disobedience, so long disobedience of laws cannot be regarded as civil disobedience but is disobedience that is thoughtless, uncivil and devoid of truth. *Satyagrahis* may never commit such disobedience. My confidence in *Satyagrahis* has led me to say that we shall be fitted to resume civil disobedience in about 2 months if the Rowlatt legislation is not withdrawn in the meantime. We may resume by the beginning of July next. In provisionally fixing this period, I am guided by the following considerations: One of them is that we shall have by that time spread our message throughout the country namely, that during the tenure of civil disobedience no one under the cover of *Satyagraha*, under a pretence to help it, should resort to violence, and it may be hoped that the people, convinced that the true interests of the country will be served by acting in accordance with the message of peace, will materially contribute towards India's progress, but it is possible that India may not understand *Satyagraha* to this extent. In that case, there is one more way to help the non-recurrence of violence. Though the conditions upon which it is based is humiliating, it is open to a *Satyagrahi* to avail himself of this advantage. Now it becomes their duty to resume *Satyagraha* under such conditions. The military dispositions that are now going on will ensure non-recurrence of violence. The recent outbreaks were so sudden that the Government were not prepared to cope with them; but the Government arrangements are likely to be effected in 2 months and breach of public peace will be well nigh impossible, and therefore conscious or unconscious of the past, the *Satyagrahi*, under that state of things, may without fear of any disturbance commit civil disobedience and thereby demonstrate that not violence but *Satyagraha* alone can help us to secure justice."

Q. Then you hoped that within 2 months' time people would be fitted for the proper civil disobedience campaign. Has that hope been fulfilled?

A. Personally I consider that the hope would have been fulfilled if I had resumed *Satyagraha* at the moment. I made that altogether bold experiment on the 17th October. In fact, it has not been fulfilled. If all people become quite fitted to practise *Satyagraha* doctrines—pardon me, I have not said that in my letter. What I have said is that we shall have the passive help of the people; they will not egg others to violence and will not do violence themselves.

Q. If I heard you correctly, you used the words 'fitted' in 2 months, they would practise *Satyagraha*?

A. I have described here the sense in which 'fitted' is used. Fitted, because the people will have received the message, and they will be passive sympathisers with the movement along with the movement to go forward.

Q. In the first part, you explained that people did not realise the real inwardness of your creed and therefore civil disobedience got associated with violence, and therefore you came to the conclusion that it was imperative in the interests of the country, of law and order, that it should be suspended?

Questions have been asked when it is going to be resumed. Then you say you would be able to resume it on the 1st July. In giving the reasons, you say "within that time people would become fitted."

A. By receiving the message of *Satyagraha*.

Q. You mean by that time people would realise the real inwardness of *Satyagraha* and would be able to practise civil disobedience.

A. I won't expect the people to realise the inwardness of *Satyagraha* but I would expect the people to realise that it is better for them to join the movement again, at least to refrain from disturbing the movement.

Q. That is far different from saying 'that I expect the people to be fitted, etc.'

A. That is the meaning conveyed by the word 'fitted.' I would ask you to accept my interpretation of it. I think you will find it here; if not that is the interpretation.

Q. Then you go on to express the apprehension that people may not get so fitted in the manner you have explained now, in which event also there will be no harm in restarting civil disobedience because the military dispositions by that time would have been so completely organised that any violence would be effectively dealt with; and therefore you advocate it, the re-starting of civil disobedience, even if people did not quite get fitted in the sense you mean?

A. Certainly.

Q. Just see what that means. The military dispositions should be kept in all parts of the country or certainly in some parts of the country in order that some people may have the pleasure of breaking certain laws and violence may not result? Does it not involve that?

A. Not the interpretation warranted by this letter. I have not meant that. I simply say that I see the dispositions going on and I have every right to seize the opportunity.

Q. If you will kindly read it again. You give two reasons, two circumstances on which you hope to start the movement again on the 1st of July. One is your hope that people would get fitted and therefore the chance of violence would be avoided. Secondly even if they were not so fit and even if they were as before prone to go to violence, still the military dispositions now taking place in the country would be so complete within the two months that even if people not fitted in that manner resorted in the old way to violence there would be no great harm done to law and order because the military dispositions were there?

A. That is totally different from my wishing the military dispositions in order.

Q. That is the meaning of what you say. I did not say you wished?

A. Then you are correct.

Q. Whether you wish it or not, you say in fact, the military dispositions would be so completed in 2 months that you can then, even though the people were not

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[Continued.]

quite fitted, without apprehension of disorder, restart civil disobedience because no great harm or violence will be done as the military is there to cope with it.

A. Certainly I meant that.

Q. I ask you to follow me, and to see what that means. That involves that assuming that the people have not got so fitted within the 2 months, Government must maintain these military dispositions in various parts of the country in order that some people who have taken the vow—only some people—could have the pleasure of breaking some laws. Going further, it involves that in order that these few people who have taken this vow might be able to break the laws, certain laws, without any serious consequence to society, these military dispositions must be maintained at a considerable cost which must be paid for by the large masses of innocent people who have nothing to do with that. It must result in that?

A. That will be the result if the man who pretended to be a *Satyagrahi* had really said good-bye to his senses. It could not otherwise result.

Q. You yourself apprehended that it is possible that within 2 months men cannot be got so fitted as to avoid violence. Even then passive civil disobedience will be started, or ought to be started, on the 1st July because even though people may be minded to do violence they will be prevented from doing so because of the effective military dispositions?

A. Quite right. I am taking advantage there of a circumstance that is happening before me irrespective of what I may do. But I think it will obviate the necessity of asking questions on this score if I am making the position clear. As a *Satyagrahi* I would never say I would not be guilty of doing any such thing, that in order that I may go with a handful of men breaking laws, the Government may impose a military force on the country. Then I would understand that the atmosphere had not been prepared for the reception of the doctrine and I must not do so.

Q. I take it so far then you modified what you said?

A. I did so. I did not start the campaign as I had expected to on the 1st July, much to the disappointment of my co-workers who were with me in this letter of the 2nd May, only because the Governor-General and the Governor of Bombay felt that I had not sufficient data before me and this was how it was put to me: "Do you want India to be an armed camp?" I said "No." "Then if you do not want India to be an armed camp won't you suspend the *Satyagraha*?" On this I suspended.

Q. That shows that you on the representations that were made to you modified the position you took up in this manifesto?

A. Certainly. I postponed the time.

Q. You would start civil disobedience only when you are satisfied that the people have got so fitted that it would not result in violence?

A. Or otherwise some other circumstance presents itself to me which has fulfilled the propagation of that doctrine.

Q. But that you would not start if the people do not become fitted, and if violence could only be prevented by military organisation?

A. Military organisation got for the purpose.

Q. You say with regard to the events in Ahmedabad on the 10th and 11th, that the action of the mob was no doubt unjustifiable and indefensible but you speak of an unpardonable error of judgment on the part of the Government. Would you specify the acts of Government you characterise in that way?

A. I said that it was an unpardonable error of judgment on the part of the Government in having arrested me. That is what I am referring to. I am not thinking of any errors committed here. I have heard about cause being given to the mob by those two gentlemen—I forgot their names—I did not consider that in any way justified the mob in taking the law into their own hands.

Q. You do not attribute any error of judgment to the actual measures taken in Ahmedabad?

A. I won't go so far as to say that. I am not prepared to say that there was an error of judgment. I have not troubled myself to find out what was true. Having made up my mind to consider that not even any excess by the people is pardonable it was no part of my duty to put the thing in the scales. I am not prepared to say whether there was an error or no error.

Q. I understand you to complain of the method of compensation, of recoveries made for the destruction of property?

A. From the labourers.

Q. Do I understand you to say that the levy was made about the time of the *Moharram*, somewhere in September or October?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it a fact that the labourers then on work whose eight days' wages were confiscated, a good number of them, were people who had not been in Ahmedabad in April at that time?

A. Absolutely new men who had come from the villages later and who did not belong to the city of Ahmedabad and who were not in the city of Ahmedabad when these events occurred, and who newly joined the mills, come from other places outside Ahmedabad.

Q. And you consider that very wrong—that these wages should be confiscated for events which occurred at that time?

A. Not only that, I want to add to the fact, which I can prove even to-day, that a large number of men, when this kind of campaign went on, simply went out of Ahmedabad, taking no part. They are also made to pay.

Q. With regard to this it can be said that the residents of Ahmedabad, those who belonged to the mill population, are responsible for the excesses though individually they might not be, but with regard to those who came afterwards there was no semblance of excuse of that kind. That is your complaint? What is the other complaint with regard to the mill labourers?

A. The other complaint is that the manner of collection was so wholly bad, as also the amount. I think it was the distribution *per capita*. The mill labourers could ill afford to pay a week's wage. That was how it was calculated. I saw no calculation.

Q. I do not follow you.

A. That it was a week's wages in each case. It was first of all not fixing the amount—I am speaking under correction. It was *per capita* of the whole city of Ahmedabad. That was bad, that a labourer should pay individually precisely the same as the mill-owner himself. Have I made myself understood?

Q. If I understand you aright, it is the incidence of the amount that you talk of, that the labourers as the richer classes had to pay the same amount? Is that really so? In addition to this, the income tax people have been made to pay?

A. Yes; I am speaking under correction, but my impression as it was then left on mind was that. I am quite prepared to study the thing and submit my reason on that score. But all I wanted to submit before the Committee was that the fine imposed on the labourer was excessive and as you have pointed out was exacted from many of those here who were not here at the time and the time chosen for exacting the fine was most inopportune. And there I wish to say that the authorities are not to blame for selecting that time. They did not select that time, because it was *Moharram* time; it accidentally happened to be so. It was too late for them to make any alteration but whatever it was it was difficult for the labourers to understand that it was not deliberately chosen. So the time was inopportune and to take away a week's wage from the labourers was not a proper thing.

Q. It was very heavy?

A. I did feel it.

Q. Do you object to the exemptions as they were given?

A. I won't say anything about exemptions. I am not prepared to dispute the discretion vested in the authorities with reference to that. I am not prepared to say I have not seen any such glaring injustice in the

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It would perhaps not be quite fair if I do not put my testimony to the handsomest manner in which the present Collector of Ahmedabad has dealt with anything that has gone before him and wherever he has committed errors of judgment that have appeared to me to be errors they have been partly explained, and so it goes against my course to complain even of this tax upon the labourers, but as it so happened unfortunately, it was their misfortune; but he in the most gentlemanly manner possible took the whole of the blame, if it was blameworthy, on his shoulders. This was what he said: "It is my act; I must take the sole responsibility." But I, as a citizen, am here to say that having definite information from the responsible men he thought that that was the only manner in which he can make the collection from the labourers and that would be the proper sum to exact from.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You have been asked certain questions about the Rowlett legislation. Will you permit me to ask one or two more? You have said that you had no objection to the Government putting down anarchical crime. It is the duty of the Government to do so. Then you were asked what were your objections to the Rowlett Bill and you have given certain reasons. I would like to know whether Rowlett Bill No. II did not create a new crime at all or was only a procedure?

A. The Rowlett Bill No. I did create a new crime. No. II concerns itself with the trial of anarchical crimes. That is how I heard it put. As a matter of fact, these anarchical crimes could have been punished by the ordinary law of the land and they were so punished. It was only during the 3 years of the war that by special legislation that the Defence of India Act was passed...

Q. And you thought that during the time of the war, though the whole nation showed its loyalty, it had been passed. When after the war was finished this procedure might be adopted for normal times. So practically your objection was not to the punishment of anarchical crimes but it was that the fundamental principles of justice as administered in every civilised country were departed from in this legislation.

With regard to the second point, you have mentioned to the Committee, and I have also gathered from your speeches, that during the last 8 or 10 years they had also similar safeguards.

Then as regards Bill No. II. What is your position?

A. I have certainly regarded the safeguards provided in this Rowlett Bill to be not merely illusory but as dangerous traps. That is my impression of the safeguards provided for in the Rowlett Act. Really I feel that it makes the executive still more responsible because it deludes itself into the belief that they are safeguarding the subjects whereas there are really no safeguards. That is my opinion.

Q. As you are the fountain head of the *Satyagraha* movement I will ask you one or two more questions. I will deal only with the political aspect of the *Satyagraha* movement. You will agree with me that every political movement for its success depends upon the number of its followers?

A. Every political movement.

Q. I am only dealing here with the political aspect of the *Satyagraha* movement.

A. Depends for its success on the number of its followers, yes.

Q. Therefore that portion of the *Satyagraha* movement which dealt with political matters, the natural idea would be to get as many followers as possible?

A. Yes.

Q. And the underlying idea of having a large number of followers is that if a certain thing be done not by one person or two persons but be done by a large number of persons the Government will be attracted?

A. I won't agree with you there.

Q. I will take the example of a strike. Do I understand you as saying that, supposing only one or two persons strike, will that have any effect? Or for the purpose of having an effective result is it not necessary for a large number of people to strike?

A. I do not subscribe to that doctrine. When you are engaged in a political movement which is based on the strictest principles of morality, any single isolated good act has its consequence, no matter whether it is done by the humblest or the highest; that is my deliberate conviction.

Q. I do not dispute that. You have stated here that your idea was to accomplish everything by spiritual force, or soul force; that was the underlying idea. But in order to achieve any political object it is necessary to have the force of numbers?

A. That is to say if you will ask me to say yes to a non-moral political movement, yes, but not to a movement which is emphatically moral and goes on to the political platform because it must.

Q. So far as the moral aspect of it is concerned, I understand that follows the truth. Assuming this, you would depend for the success of your movement on a very large following? If the soul force of one man accomplishes a thing in two months, probably the soul force of 10,000 persons would accomplish it in 10 days?

A. You cannot have an arithmetical calculation for a force like that. It is not like the question of an ordinary soldier, that if one man can shoot 10, then 10 men will be able to shoot 100.

Q. Anyhow 100 men, if they are of the same quality, will be able to shoot more than 10.

A. Imagine that 10 *Satyagrahis* with the same power behind them are working, then certainly they will be able to produce better results than one.

Q. Having regard to the constitution of our Government here or in England, I think you will agree with me that there is no use fighting shy of the word "embarrassment" because the word has been used and you said so?

A. Not at all.

Q. You will agree with me that any agitation, the most loyal and constitutional agitation, if it is against something done by authority, is bound to embarrass the authorities. Therefore in your *Satyagraha* agitation, it may be that you are fighting with soul force, but one consequence is that you do embarrass the Government and you do not fight shy of that?

A. It is no question of fighting shy; when I was trying to dispute the use of the word embarrassment I meant that that was not the intention. I think the intention is a definite ingredient in determining the value of the embarrassment.

Q. You do not say that any political agitation should not embarrass the Government?

A. No, I do not say that for one moment.

Q. But it must be conducted, according to you, with truth and no violence?

A. But I would like to emphasize the distinction that ordinary political agitation starts with the definite intention of embarrassing the Government. The *Satyagraha* agitation never starts with the intention of embarrassing anybody, but if embarrassment is the result, it faces it.

Q. Therefore the embarrassment would be the result either of soul force or the result of numbers, is it not so?

A. What I say is a *Satyagrahi* would not shirk that issue, but would never want to embarrass.

Q. But taking that example of a strike. I have not much experience of strikes, but I have a little. Do you think any strike has ever succeeded in which one or two persons who are against mill-owners say they will not work? Has that ever succeeded?

A. Oh yes, I can show you scores of instances, and I think any mill-owner will come here and say that if the head-man who controls a department strikes, it is quite enough to bend the mill-owner.

Q. There again there is that force of numbers behind his back. I quite understand that if a Gandhi strikes and goes to jail, it may cause a stir in the whole country, but supposing a common man, even a man who is not going to have recourse to violence, a man who is going to follow truth, a common man, says he will not pay taxes, a poor man, and he goes to jail, do you mean

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to say the Viceroy, the Governor-General or the King-Emperor would hear of what had happened?

A. I can certainly lay my hands on many a Viceroy of India who, if he found that there was a man whom he would value purely for his strictest morality, honesty and truth, would not sacrifice that man, and if that man struck he would consider that he would rather have a million men strike than that one man.

Q. You will agree with me that hardly one in a million will be such a man as will come to the notice of the Viceroy or the King-Emperor?

A. I do not know that. I think a man who is strictly moral and who is working on a field which is touched by a Viceroy, would certainly make his impression, as did, I think, Keshub Chunder Sen when Lord William Bentinck was Viceroy.

Q. You are again talking of the highest men India has produced?

A. I cannot help that. It must be the desire of every citizen that India should multiply top men.

Sir C. H. Setalvad.—Panditji forgets that Mr. Gandhi by fasting for three days brought the mill-owners to their knees.

Witness.—I am sorry, I am humiliated by the fact of my having brought the mill-owners down by my fast.

Q. A man who is loved like you or a person like Anasuya Ben, supposing they are arrested again, do you mean to say that during the last four or five months you have so much prepared the people of Ahmedabad and Bombay that if they hear of your arrest there will be no unrest?

A. There will be unrest enough. I think both Anasuya Ben and I would be seriously disappointed if there was no unrest, but that unrest would take a different shape altogether.

Q. That is your opinion, that that unrest would take the form of mourning and fasting and would not take the form of violence?

A. I am not able to say that with confidence, but I really do expect that we have very nearly reached that stage.

Q. And certainly I think you will agree with me that, having regard to the percentage of education so far as India is concerned, it is very difficult to expect that illiterate men who love you will be able to control their passions and look upon things in that philosophic light?

A. Not at all, it is not that class of education which you have in mind which I need for the propagation of *Satyagraha*.

Q. In course of time you may prepare them for that; I am talking of the present time.

A. I would not say the propagation of the *Satyagrahi* doctrine is more difficult here because of our illiteracy. Illiteracy I hold to be deplorable in common with all our countrymen, but I do not consider that illiteracy is a bar to the propagation of *Satyagraha*. If I fear any danger, I fear that danger from the half-lettered men.

Q. I will give up the word illiterate. Do you say it is very easy to control a city which contains more than 300,000 inhabitants and Bombay city which contains more than 1,200,000 inhabitants? Supposing all these people were to revere and love you and respect you, will they stand and look upon your arrest from a philosophical point of view?

A. I have admitted the difficulty of the task, but I dispute the impossibility of it, nor do I consider it is so difficult that it is well-nigh impossible. I consider that it is difficult but it is not at all insurmountable.

Q. Then I take it that *hartal* is not an essential part of the *Satyagraha* movement at all?

A. It is no integral part of it.

Q. And, therefore, so far as *hartal* is concerned it is not necessary for the propagation of the *Satyagraha* movement to order a *hartal* every second day or every month?

A. Not at all.

Q. And having regard to the experience that we have had it is probable that the *Satyagraha* movement will continue without a *hartal*?

A. If it is necessary. I have contemplated a *hartal* and in order that I might try it in connection with Mr.

Horniman I ordered it and in connection with the *Khilafat* movement, and on both occasions we were wholly successful, although there was a *hartal* on an extensive scale and of its type absolutely complete in so many places in India.

Q. I may be wrong in my facts, but am I right in supposing that the success of your movement in Africa depended on large bodies of persons going to jail?

A. Yes, or rather because they did not use any violence.

Q. And at the same time very large numbers of them went to jail?

A. Certainly.

Q. You did not get what you wanted because a handful of them went to jail?

A. Well, when we had got what we wanted there were not that large number of men in jail as you imagine. I do not dispute the point that the largeness of the number of people going to jail had its due effect. Of course the South African statesmen can speak with better authority, but my own impression is that it was the correctness of the movement which really gained adherents in the highest ranks of society in South Africa. We were after all a handful who would have been blotted out of existence if we had deviated by a hair's-breadth from the correct path.

Q. I do not know if you agree with me that the largeness of the number was a great factor in the success?

A. I would say it had its due weight.

Q. Now with regard to one other matter you have touched upon, I want to make it clear, because I find you have mentioned that fact in one of your Madras speeches. One of your objects in starting the *Satyagraha* movement was that you found in India there was an extremist class, a certain class bent upon violence and anarchy, and your object was to give this class of person a better platform to work on, a more spiritual and more moral platform?

A. Certainly.

Q. A question was put to you by Sir C. H. Setalvad, and as I don't agree with him, I want to have your opinion. Supposing individuals be prepared to disobey any law according to their own lights, I do not understand how that can possibly cause any embarrassment to anybody. Supposing I live in a municipality and I find a tax that has been imposed is not a good tax and if in the following of that truth I am required to go to jail, I do not think I require any moral training. If a man is required to go to jail according to the dictates of his conscience, he does not require any moral training. I think he is the best possible man for being a citizen. Do you agree with me that the mere fact of different individuals breaking different laws in different parts and going to jail cannot possibly embarrass Government unless and until it is a mass movement?

A. That is so.

Q. It would not create any hopeless position at all?

A. No, certainly, but I won't say that it would create a hopeless situation if there was a mass movement.

Q. What I mean to say is that I do not see any difficulty; I think that is the highest principle that can be inculcated and I think, if I have judged your speeches aright, that one of the underlying ideas of the *Satyagraha* movement was that you found that one of the besetting sins of the present-day Indians is that, owing to their long slavery, they cannot stand up for the right, and they servilely do things which are against their own conscience and I have seen it stated you wanted them to become more straightforward and more moral. You make a difference between a straightforward man and a man who only for the pleasure of breaking laws breaks them?

A. I think that is obvious.

Q. I think that is your principle?

A. I would draw a sharp distinction between lawlessness and assertiveness.

Q. You have been accused of inconsistency and I will put that before you and I want your explanation. It appears that you made a statement to the officials that you did not want to drag the mill-hands into this movement?

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A. Yes.

Q. And at the same time in one of your speeches you have said the mill hands should come to your meetings, but they should first obtain the permission of the mill-owners, and from this the inference is drawn that here is Mr. Gandhi who in one breath says he does not want to drag the mill hands into this movement and in the next breath he incites them to come to his meetings and become *Satyagrahis*?

A. I should like to see the passages. I can recall two occasions. There was an occasion when I said I did not want the mill hands to join this movement at all.

Q. And on the second occasion you said they should not come to the meetings until they got permission?

A. True, and as a matter of fact between these two positions I see no inconsistency whatsoever, because I was anxious that the mill-hands should not come to us *holus bolus*; I said no mill hand. The instructions given to the Secretaries of the *Satyagraha Sabha* were that they were not to take in a single mill hand on the *Satyagraha* pledge unless he was seen by me or better still by Anasuya Ben because she would know, she would guarantee that that man understood the position, and he would be able to do so.

Q. Then there is another matter about your helping the authorities with evidence. Your objection is to disclose the names?

A. That is so.

Q. And you had no other objection in helping the authorities for the procuring of evidence. I find here as a matter of fact that you went to certain people who were in jail?

A. I did.

Q. And you exhorted them to confess their guilt?

A. Not only that, I very nearly succeeded but for two mishaps. I would have completely succeeded in getting every one of the wire-cutters to make a confession. But I saw them together with Mr. Ker. It was nearly 11 o'clock at night, and his assistant was also present, and the men said if they were sent under escort or somehow among the people, they would get the real men, and if some of them themselves had done the thing they would say so.

Q. And therefore you did propose that they should make a clean breast of it and help the authorities?

A. I went much further than that in trying to do that. I wanted to go to Nadiad to finish the work, but an equally important matter in connection with helping the authorities engaged me and kept me in Bombay. Meanwhile some proceedings were taken here, and a third attempt was made when I really did not succeed because of the sections under which they were tried. The men were so frightened that they would not listen to me when I suggested that they should make a confession. Of course I did not see them directly then, but Mr. Vallabhai Patel, a co-worker of mine, tried. He took the message from me, he saw the men in person but he did not succeed.

Q. I think you will agree with me that if respect for law is diminished in the mass mind that would be a hopeless position, however good, bad or indifferent the laws may be?

A. I won't say that respect for law and order means respect for such law and order that promotes the well being of a nation; but that presupposes discrimination on the part of the people. People will become lawless; they have become lawless for ages past. In that question what I had to address myself to was whether they should continue to become lawless in the manner in which they have been, that is, either surreptitiously breaking a law and if arrested putting up any kind of defence, or resorting to secret violence or open violence, none of which things can possibly promote the well being of a community.

Q. My point is, having regard to the circumstances, a sort of sanctity attaches to the laws of the Government of the time being?

A. Not in my estimation.

Q. I do not mean that philosophers look upon things in this way?

A. I look upon it as a practical man.

Q. That is not the best check on the masses?

A. Not a blind adherence to laws, no check whatsoever. It is because either they blindly adhere or they blindly commit violence. Either event is undesirable.

Q. So long as every individual is not fit to judge for himself he would have to follow somebody?

A. Certainly, he would have to follow somebody. The masses will have to choose their leaders most decidedly.

Q. Supposing your own ministers pass any law, would it be open to anybody and everybody to break them?

A. Will it be open to the masses? I think it will be more open to the masses when India has her own ministers, because whilst English ministers have at least the benefit of ignorance on their side, unintentionally, our own ministers will have absolutely no such excuse.

Q. Is not the remedy to turn those ministers out and not to break the laws?

A. I have known in most democratic countries ministers who have made themselves irremovable somehow or other. In that event what is a poor respectable minority to do? That minority will certainly bring down the tallest minister by offering stubborn civil resistance, and such a position I do anticipate happening in India also.

Q. I am troubling you but I do not understand. Supposing your own minister, your own representative Government, passes a law, that is a guarantee that it is a good law, and do you mean to say that under your *Satyagraha* principles it is open to any body of men to preach the breaking of those laws and to break those laws? The remedy is to turn out those ministers?

A. A *Satyagrahi* would exhaust all means possible, but I simply gave you a concrete instance of a minister under a democracy having made himself practically irremovable because he would not listen to those who have got the voice of conscience in them. What are those people who have got that voice within them then to do, although it is their own domestic affair of their Government, even so it would be not only open, but it would be the duty of a body of *Satyagrahis* to offer civil disobedience, but when they can turn out the minister, naturally let them do so. If I could have turned out Lord Chelmsford, I would have said, "Lord Chelmsford, you go if you do not remove the Rowlatt Act," and I would have got some other Viceroy from England.

Q. I hope you are not going to give evidence in Bombay?

A. The Committee has two functions here, I do not know. I have no evidence to give in Bombay.

Q. I wanted to ask you one thing about Bombay which you witnessed yourself.

A. Certainly everything about Bombay, or if the Committee wishes to travel outside Bombay, I am at the Committee's disposal.

Q. I know as a matter of fact you are not keeping very good health?

A. I am not keeping very good health just now.

Q. During the last two or three years?

A. During the last two years.

Q. And at different times you were in so indifferent health that you were not able to read even your address?

A. Yes.

Q. And you asked other people to read your address?

A. Yes.

Q. And you were not shamming?

A. I hope so.

Q. You were at Bombay when some of these things were going on at Bombay?

A. Yes, I was there.

Q. And you wanted to address a meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. On what date?

A. On the 6th I addressed several meetings.

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Q. Any subsequent to that?

A. I addressed a meeting on the 11th on my return from Delhi.

Q. And you got the sanction of the authorities there?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. But the military or the police were in possession of the streets and you could not pass without a permit being obtained?

A. No, I do not think the military or the police were in possession of the streets.

Q. The streets through which you had to pass?

A. No, the crowd gathered at Chowpati.

Q. I am talking of Pydhownie.

A. Oh, yes, they were there.

Q. And when your motor passed that street you had the sanction of the authorities to pass?

A. No, I did not receive any sanction. I simply went there as there was danger of violence breaking out.

Messages came to me immediately I reached my house and I sent some friends informing the crowd that I was free and that did not answer, and I think Mr. Hansraj came and asked me to go there, otherwise the crowd would not be pacified.

Q. Did you succeed in pacifying the crowd?

A. I think the crowd was pacified enough.

Q. If it be said the attempt was futile?

A. I do not think it would be correct to say my attempt to control the crowd was futile. The crowd was insistent on passing the street; their passage was prevented by the military or the police whoever these officials were, and I was in front in the car with Anasuya Ben, and I was reasoning with the people who were within the reach of my voice asking them to go by the lane that the officials had pointed out, and they were turning. Meanwhile the police had ceased resisting and a portion of the crowd was making way in that direction also because the police had ceased to resist, but I do not mean to imply therefore that the police had ceased to resist because they wanted to, but I think they felt the pressure of the crowd so much that they ceased to resist, when suddenly there was a dash from the cavalry or the horsemen.

Q. Here it is said that Mr. Gandhi was held up, the crowd was extremely angry, and the police officer seeing the cavalry in possession, used his discretion and allowed him to pass?

A. Allowed me to pass? I do not know what they did, I certainly passed. The motor did not stop for a single minute.

Q. And when the cavalry saw the excited crowd they charged on the crowd?

A. They charged upon the crowd but they charged at the point I have mentioned.

Q. Did you complain of this charge to anybody?

A. Yes.

Q. In your opinion was that charge justifiable?

A. My own opinion as an on-looker is, they could have avoided the charge. It was not necessary for them to make the charge because the crowd was turning in the other direction.

Q. Even your life was in danger and you had to leave your motor car?

A. No.

Q. Here it is said: "It is interesting to note that while Gandhi has regularly adopted the pose of the interesting invalid when addressing meetings, the officer in command of the armed police reports that he showed wonderful agility and nimbleness in escaping from his car when the cavalry were charging."

A. Anyhow that is untrue.

Q. You have deposed to the evidence of which you were in possession about this organisation on the evening of the 10th, and also about the firing that took place under the Martial Law orders, and you said that in your opinion certain innocent persons were wounded or shot down. May I take it that according to you both these facts are equally reliable?

A. I think so.

Q. You also believe that evidence in the same way as you believe the evidence with regard to the conspiracy and organisation?

A. I do believe so.

Q. You make no difference between the two sets of circumstances?

A. No.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. I want to ask you a few questions, Mr. Gandhi. Now going back for a moment to the Rowlatt legislation, you are no doubt aware that before the war there were a great many anarchical crimes in India?

A. I would not subscribe to the statement that there were a great many anarchical crimes in India.

Q. There were at any rate dacoities and murders in Bengal by people who were not afraid of Government. There was a bomb thrown on the Viceroy at Delhi?

A. Certainly.

Q. There were a great many trials held in Bengal?

A. Certainly.

Q. And it was due to these occurrences and to keep law and order a Commission was appointed consisting of three eminent judges presided over by Mr. Justice Rowlatt?

A. Yes.

Q. They went into the question very carefully and after a very careful investigation of the whole case, they submitted a report to the Government, and in that report I understand they made certain recommendations for a certain kind of legislation. I heard you to say that you did not agree with the conclusions of that report?

A. I said that.

Q. What are your grounds for not agreeing with that legislation?

A. Because the facts that have been marshalled in the Rowlatt Committee's report did not irresistibly lead me to the conclusion that any such legislation was at all necessary. On the contrary upon those facts I would have written a report totally contrary to the Rowlatt report. That was the impression left on my mind.

Q. But you do not deny that so far as the information in the hands of the Government was concerned, it is a fact that serious crime was happening in the country?

A. No more serious than in any other country, and certainly there is no serious crime in India. This anarchy proper has been confined to Bengal. You have had an outburst here and there, but after all Bengal is not India.

Q. Anarchy and crime prevailed very largely in Bengal?

A. I would not under-rate the significance of it. It was there and serious enough to warrant strong Government measures. I do not deny that at all. But at the time the Rowlatt Committee framed its report and took evidence, I venture to submit that the material before that committee did not warrant the conclusions. I may be totally wrong in that, but the Rowlatt Committee's report is tainted with one very serious defect, in that it is evidence which was taken practically in secret and it was all official evidence.

Q. Assuming for argument's sake that the facts as marshalled by the Rowlatt Committee did not warrant the report which they made, you say that the conditions in Bengal were such as made the adoption of such strong measures necessary, and you admit, independent of the report, such strong measures were necessary?

A. I admit that.

Q. What measures would you suggest that Government should have adopted to meet the situation?

A. But the Government have actually adopted measures which I do not approve of entirely. I simply say that the Government would be entitled, and it would be its duty, to adopt strong measures to root out crime of that nature. In answer to the question what measures should be adopted by the Government, I can only say, not the Rowlatt Act—of course it is not for me to suggest what measures Government should adopt,—but if I were to point out what measures Government should adopt, then all the measures that I would be capable of suggesting would be of a reformatory character and

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[Continued.]

not of a repressive character, whereas the Government measures were all of a repressive character.

Q. You will surely agree that in the existing state of human nature Government who are responsible for keeping law and order are compelled, however much it may be against their wishes, to adopt repressive legislation?

A. Certainly. Therefore I can only say, constituted as I am, that I am prepared to examine any measures that the Government may submit and criticise. But it is not possible for me to say what measures Government should adopt because my mind would immediately work at reforming the criminal and not at punishing the criminal. If I had to frame a legislative measure, it would be of that character, but I would not deny the right of a Government to adopt repressive measures also.

Q. When you admit the right of Government to adopt strong measures and you criticise the particular measures that Government have adopted, surely I am entitled to ask what repressive legislation in your opinion Government should have undertaken to meet the circumstances?

A. It is very difficult for me to answer that. I can only give a negative answer, certainly not the Rowlatt Act, and I would give my reasons for it. The Viceroy has got sufficient powers independently of the Rowlatt legislation not to warrant his disfiguring the statute book with an enactment of such nature. Anybody reading such a law, if he had never lived in India and had opened the statute book and read the Rowlatt legislation, the irresistible conclusion that would be left on his mind would be that India must be a country simply infested with anarchy. I do not for one moment believe that India is a country which is infested with anarchy. Therefore, I believe that the powers the Viceroy has got are absolutely ample in order to stamp out anarchy, and if the Viceroy does not use those powers and takes other powers, I think he is wrong. He has got powers of emergency legislation, and I think that that is the proper thing to do.

Q. By Ordinances you mean?

A. Yes, and I think he would be justified in doing so, and I shall give my reasons for it, because I have discussed it thoroughly and given many an anxious night to the thing as to why it was that a man with the cool head of Lord Chelmsford had run into the trap. He has got this emergency legislation power; he could use those powers and he could use those powers without the slightest hesitation and need not go to the legislature. He takes a responsible step and he should justify his step subsequently to the legislature or to the country or to the public opinion such as it is to-day in the country and not anticipate events and put a law on the ordinary statute book of the country. I think that there the executive went much further than was warranted by the facts.

Q. I have not had the benefit of reading the Rowlatt Act, but I suppose it is merely an enabling statute, i.e., by passing it the Government of India have not necessarily brought it into operation. It can only be brought into operation if the Governor-General in Council thinks it necessary?

A. Except that part of it.

Q. The Governor-General certifies that the law has to be extended to a certain area, but don't you think that it is a sufficient safeguard?

A. I do not think for one moment that it is so, knowing so well as I do the manner in which these sanctions are given. The origin of the sanction makes it really a tainted sanction. The origin would be through a humble police officer, or not even an officer, but a humble policeman. He goes and tells his superior, 'Oh, such and such things are happening here.' Now the police officer may or may not go into the thing deeply and even if he goes into the thing deeply, he would examine the things through the spectacles of the policeman who gave him the information. Then after that the original taint in it travels upward till at last it goes to the Viceroy. With all this ceremonial sanctity of an investigation which is so tainted, I say it is wrong, and therefore the

Viceroy should not have taken the power ordinarily to declare those things. If he wants to make himself responsible, then let him be the author of the legislation, and not the legislature.

Q. Do I understand you correctly that in such important matters, because a thing has originated from a policeman, that will be taken up by all the officials above him right through to the Viceroy without they themselves minutely scrutinising the thing based on the light of their own experience and knowledge whether the representation is worth giving attention to or not?

A. I do not say that it is not possible to manage things in any other manner. In a Government constituted as ours is, that is the only possible step to take, but knowing that, I would not arm the executive with powers so deadly in connection with a crime which is not endemic in India. If anarchy had become endemic throughout the length and breadth of India, I would not probably have said much against the Rowlatt legislation; then I would condescend to examine the details. To-day I would not condescend to examine the legislation and even to talk of it because I consider that the principle itself is at bottom unsound. In ordinary affairs I can understand it, but not when it is a matter of simply dealing with a whole community because that is what the powers mean; anybody may be commanded and called upon to lodge security.

Q. You know that during the war under the Defence of India Act there were a great many people who were interned as a necessary measure of safety and that after signing the peace, I suppose *ipso facto*, after a lapse of six months those people must come out. Then the question would certainly arise as to how the Government should deal with people of a dangerous character. Would you not approve of the Government having a certain weapon in their hands to deal with the situation that might be created any moment?

A. I respectfully contend that the Government have such a weapon. They have it already in the powers granted to the Viceroy to pass ordinances. The Defence of India Act cannot really be used in my humble opinion as a stepping stone to legislation of the Rowlatt Act type in times of peace. It was pre-eminently a war measure, and what you would allow in war time you would certainly not allow in times of peace.

Q. But the legislation is merely an enabling measure and it is also limited to three years?

A. I understand that, but I cannot contemplate with equanimity a whole people being condemned even for three years.

Q. Now I want to know what was the object of starting the Satyagraha movement? Was it started with a view to bring about a better political condition or as a means to oppose the immoral legislation which is not approved of by the country? What was the necessity for it?

A. The necessity lay in the intense desire to have that legislation repealed. If you fail to get redress through the ordinary channels of petition and so on, you must examine whether there are other ways open to you extraordinary, still not unconstitutional, and I found that this was the only way to combat the mischief and the evil.

Q. Could you not do it by constitutional means?

A. I fail to discover any other less effective constitutional means. It has been suggested to me by a very great friend that I should have at least promoted a petition and awaited an answer to the petition to the House of Commons before embarking upon it. I beg to differ from him, and I still hold that while it was open to me to do it constitutionally, it would have been totally ineffective. I could not have secured a repeal of the Rowlatt Act by those means.

Q. Why?

A. Because of my political experience. A petition after its having gone through all the stages in India, I have not known to have succeeded.

Q. Therefore you think that the only means open to you was the Satyagraha movement?

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A. The only other honourable means open to me was that. Certainly.

Q. If I heard you correctly you said you feared half literacy more than illiteracy. Did I hear you correctly?

A. That was quite right.

Q. I would like to know the reasons for holding that view?

A. Because I have noticed travelling throughout India that youths with ill-digested education are far more irresponsible and thoughtless than the illiterate masses. I think that the illiterate masses are much better balanced than the half-educated youths of the country, and I believe that if the latter could be reclaimed from the error into which they have to-day fallen the problem before India could become infinitely simpler than it is to-day.

Q. Whom would you call half-educated men?

A. Take a boy who has passed to the High School and has a little knowledge of English, still less a knowledge of English history. He reads newspapers which he only half understands and feeds on his own predilections instead of checking them. Such a man is far more dangerous to the peace and well being of India than the totally illiterate masses.

Q. How would you meet the situation?

A. I have been trying to meet that situation, and I flatter myself with the belief that I have attained success which I had not anticipated in that direction.

Q. In what way?

A. Because even such men, when you appeal to them, tax your patience more than illiterate people, but if you are patient enough with them, they are certainly amenable to reason and control also.

Q. Do I understand you correctly to say that those people who go through High Schools are patient enough to receive further teaching but that they tax your patience when you try to put them on the right path?

A. I think the very foundation of the educational system to-day in India is so unsound that it does not tend to make a man balanced after he has even finished his education. As a matter of fact, we have not so many highly educated Indians as to be able to form universal conclusions, and so I do not dread to lay down any definite conclusions about that, because I have got sufficient data, a large number of men to work with and work upon, and so I have come to the conclusion that our educational system is rotten to the core and requires overhauling.

Q. I want to know the big defects of that educational system.

A. The one defect is, that there is no real moral or religious education in the schools. The second defect is that, seeing that the medium of instruction is English which places such a strain upon the intellectual resources of the youths who are receiving the education, they really do not assimilate the noblest ideas that are imparted to them through the schools. They have got nothing but parrot's training, the very best of them.

Q. What would you substitute? In your view the medium of instruction should be the vernacular and religious teaching should be introduced?

A. I think these two defects must be remedied and then there is the personal element; the personal touch on the part of the teachers is also lacking. A better class of teachers with much better traditions than are in vogue to-day are required. These three things will certainly bring about the needed change.

Q. Do I understand it correctly that the Satyagraha movement is concerned principally or mainly with the inculcation of truth and high morality without regard to the number of people who will follow it?

A. Certainly, that is the idea.

Q. The essence of the thing is in itself, apart from the number?

A. It does not matter whether there are two members or one member.

Q. Has this movement also spread to the Punjab?

A. I think it has spread to the Punjab as a leaven. I cannot lay my hands upon any who has signed the Satyagraha pledge, but I have come to the conclusion

that the Punjab is just as capable of receiving and responding to the doctrine as any other part of India, if not perhaps more so; but there I may be mistaken, but certainly the Punjab is just as receptive as any other part of India.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—

Q. I am not trying your patience, Mr. Gandhi, by asking many questions about the Satyagraha movement. I do not mean by that I am convinced at all by what you have said. Now I am afraid that on the view you take of the Rowlatt Committee's recommendations, we do not see eye to eye. There are two points which I must ask you to explain. One is this: you say that the Martial Law order of the 12th was absolutely unjustifiable. With regard to that, do you know the circumstances under which it was brought about?

A. I was not here on the 12th, but I heard about it.

Q. Yes, you were not here on the 12th, but you came here on the 13th. On night of the 12th, you may take it from me, this is what happened. The person who was in charge of the military command decided, taking all things into consideration, that things could not go on very well. The mobs could not be held in hand, anywhere else riots might break out, and he and his men then available would not be able to cope with them properly. He therefore passed orders which in the result were successful. What have you to say first with regard to that?

A. I would not like to say anything, because as I said, when I spoke about it as an outsider it did not appeal to me, the necessity of it did not appeal to me, and certainly not the terms of the orders that were issued.

Q. As an outsider, you mean?

A. As an outsider, as a non-military man; naturally I would concede a great deal to the authorities who have got to deal with the situation.

Q. Supposing you and I were there on the spot in charge of the military, would you consider that order justifiable?

A. I consider it fair enough giving my opinion for what it is worth, always with the caution that I concede that the military would be the better judges of the situation, but if I may be permitted to give my judgment after examining the circumstances and the facts, I say these facts do not warrant the orders that were issued.

Q. By these facts, do you mean the facts that you have elicited from information as against the facts which were present in the military commander's mind?

A. I do not say that against the facts, but from what I have now heard and also from what little I have read, it leads me to the conclusion that certainly on those facts if I had any military training I would not issue those orders.

Q. I see we do not see eye to eye there also?

A. I am afraid not there.

Q. There is only one other point, Mr. Gandhi, with regard to the instances of indiscriminate and wanton firing on the 12th under this order.

A. I have not used all those adjectives, but I simply said.....

Q. I think what you said was that a number of innocent people were fired upon?

A. That I said.

Q. You base that on what?

A. On the evidence of those people who came to me hot from the thing.

Q. Who were wounded?

A. I saw wounded people also. I went over to the hostel, and I saw every one of the wounded people.

Q. Just consider what impulse would there be at the back of these peoples' minds to make them tell you the truth as regards how their wounds were received. What was there to make these people tell you the absolute truth when you saw them wounded?

A. When he is speaking to me I would certainly consider that the most natural thing for him would be to tell me the unvarnished truth.

Q. He could gain nothing by saying that he was in the right and he could gain something by saying he was not?

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[Continued.]

A. I know there is that point to be considered, but I have not gone in forming my conclusion upon the testimony of those who told me. I had the testimony of those who witnessed the firing, and I think I have a hazy recollection that I brought to the notice of Mr. Pratt one instance.

Q. Do you remember that on the 14th of April you wrote to Mr. Chatfield and said that you had heard that one or two women were killed by the military and some men also? Will you please give me the pure facts, as I am myself anxious to know under what circumstances it had happened, or whether it did happen at all? Mr. Chatfield wrote back asking for any data and if possible for the people to come and tell him all about it.

A. Yes. I remember it.

Q. Well now, Mr. Chatfield is still in the dark about this.

A. It was simply because we had not collected sufficient material to place before him and the orders were withdrawn by that time and I did not wish to prosecute it any further.

Q. Could you have given any names of persons who were wounded?

A. Yes, if I had been so reminded then I could have done that.

Q. But Mr. Chatfield asked you, did he not?

A. Yes, but when I saw that these orders were withdrawn I did not want to prosecute the thing any further, because I knew that in a matter of that character there must have been a certain amount of accidents to look to and I did not want to go any further into the matter. Nor did I stay in Ahmedabad for any length of time after that.

Q. On this point of your information, I just want to say to you that the suggestion that you made in various other evidences with regard to such organisations as there were on the 10th, was meant to correspond exactly with what you have told us. But I just like also to point out that the evidence on which you base that is rather different to the evidence on which you base these instances of being wounded without a just cause. For this reason that people who came and told you that they had organised little bits of riots would gain nothing but opprobrium from you. And people who came to you and said they had been wounded under that cause, could not run the risk of any opprobrium from you?

A. No.

Q. So there is that distinction between the two classes of evidence. I think you based that statement.....

A. It is not for me to value both classes of evidence differently. I mean to say a man would not come to me straight and appreciate a thing and describe the incident differently from what he had actually seen it.

Q. I am afraid we cannot take it any further?

A. No, but I would really ask you and ask the Committee also not to feel the least of it that I wish to labour this point. I do not really suggest that it is there placed by way of any complaint, but as I am bound to give my view I have simply given it.

Q. There is this other point that you did not hear anything from the military side. If you knew the circumstances on the military side, then would you be able to find out whether they fired at anybody. A stray bullet might ricochet and go off at right angles and a man standing at right angles may be wounded. But the suggestion that that was the fault of the military is not quite fair, is it?

A. Not in the manner you put it.

Q. Well, I think that is the manner it has got to be put.

A. The case I have brought to the notice of the Committee and on which I have based my conclusion that these orders were obeyed, is that some of these young men actually shot into a party of men, whether 10 or 11 or even under 10, without any notice that would enable the people to understand what they were asked to do.

Q. Well, as I say, you cannot give any instance that has really occurred?

A. Because I have no desire to labour that point. Otherwise I would come prepared and I have no desire to make a big thing out of a little thing in a large movement in which the Government have covered themselves

with nothing but credit. I did not want to magnify that incident nor did I wish to trouble Mr. Chatfield any further about it.

To President.—There is only one point further with regard to this Bombay case. At present there is nobody actually appearing for this case as it was not known whether this was going to be taken and the result is that no one has been instructed to ask Mr. Gandhi questions on it.

President.—Mr. Gandhi's evidence so far as it has been given does not amount to a great deal.

Mr. Kemp.—The only point he contended was that particular charge of cavalry was not justified.

President.—I did not hear whether there were any casualties in that case?

Witness.—There is no suggestion of casualties in that case. In the course of the demonstrations one or two men were trampled and that is natural if there was a charge of that character. I do not think there were any deaths and the injuries sustained even by the men who were trampled were by no means serious so far as I understood it. After the whole event had finished, I went to Mr. Griffiths to protest against the cavalry being sent. And he really demurred to my using the word "cavalry," but not being a military man I did not know what it was.

By Mr. Jivanlal V. Desai, Counsel to the Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad—

Q. Mahatma Gandhiji, you left Bombay on the 8th of April?

A. Yes, in the evening.

Q. When was the order served on you?

A. In the evening at 9 between Falwal and Muttra. That was the first order.

Q. Not to enter the province of Punjab or Delhi, I think?

A. I forget which it was, I think it was Delhi.

Q. Subsequent to that a second order was served upon you at the next station?

A. Two more orders at the next station.

Q. At about what time?

A. Probably at half-past seven or 8 or even 9. It was between that time.

Q. Then you dictated a message?

A. Yes, before reaching Falwal, after the first order was served and after knowing that I was to be arrested at Falwal.

Q. And the gentleman who took down this message is a graduate in Arts and Law?

A. Yes.

Q. There was no mistake in the message taken by him?

A. No, because I had read the message.

Q. You simply exhorted your Ashram people to hold that day as a day of rejoicing?

A. Not only they but everybody.

Q. You did not want the Ashram people or passengers to observe the *hartal*? It seems that the words "with redoubled zeal" had been mentioned therein and had been interpreted in a different way?

A. There is nothing in my statement with regard to the *hartal*. But if you want to examine my mental condition I did not want to say at that time that I wanted the *hartal* or not.

Q. Could your message be construed in the light that people were to observe the *hartal* and to go about the streets creating mischief?

A. Most decidedly not.

Q. Do you know that that message was never construed by the Ashram people or by the *Satyagraha Sabha* as such?

A. So I was told. Mr. Vallabhai Patel told me emphatically that he told the people that they were not to have the *hartal*.

Q. Now you were brought back to Bombay on the 11th?

A. Yes.

Q. The train was stopped at Marine Lines station?

A. It was accidentally stopped and then I suggested to Mr. Bowring that I should get down at Marine Lines station in order to avoid any demonstration at Colaba.

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[Continued.]

Q. And nobody in Bombay knew that you were going by that train?

A. No.

Q. When you reached Marine Lines station were there no people to meet you there?

A. Naturally none.

Q. And casually you got into a passing victoria?

A. No. A friend was passing by and he saw me and gave me a lift.

Q. And you wanted to avoid all demonstration in Bombay as far as you could?

A. Yes.

Q. And when you traced the disturbances you went to pacify the people?

A. Certainly.

Q. When did you hear of the incidents at Ahmedabad, on the morning of the 12th?

A. I think for the first time in the morning of the 12th. A friend came and said that something had happened there. No, if I now recollect, I heard something from Mr. Griffiths himself because he was discussing the situation with me and he said "do you know what is happening in the country?" I said "No." He said something had happened in Ahmedabad but he could not give me the details because the wires were cut. But he did let me have an inkling that there was something amiss in Ahmedabad.

Q. As soon as you heard that you were wanted here you came down?

A. Yes, by the first available train.

Q. Were there any citizens to meet you at the station?

A. I do not think there were any friends. Mr. Boyd was there and some other officer whose name I do not know.

Q. Then from the station you went to Mr. Ambalal's house?

A. To the Commissioner straight.

Q. And you stopped with him for about two hours, I suppose?

A. Probably.

Q. And from Mr. Pratt you went to Ambalal's?

A. Yes, I think I went to him for a few minutes.

Q. Were you accompanied by any military officers when you were coming back from there?

A. Yes, purely for my protection.

Q. Because of the existence of Martial Law?

A. Because of the pickets that might challenge me.

Q. You found everything quiet on the 13th?

A. Yes.

Q. You wanted to hold a meeting on that day?

A. Yes.

Q. And you had instructed Mr. Vallabhai Patel and others to organise a meeting, if possible?

A. Yes.

Q. But it could not be organised because of the existence of Martial Law?

A. Not purely. There were difficulties. It was suggested that there were such difficulties that we might not get a large gathering and without a large gathering I could not deliver my message.

Q. So you directed them to arrange the meeting for the next day?

A. Yes.

Q. And you did not know then that Martial Law would be withdrawn?

A. Certainly, I did not know.

Q. On the 13th you gave instructions to Messrs. Vallabhai Patel and others to show to the people a particular path of going to the Ashram to avoid the military pickets and to come by side-streets?

A. Yes.

Q. At what time did you go to the Ashram on that day?

A. I think I must have reached there at 2 o'clock on the 13th.

Q. Then among other non-official people you met Messrs. Vallabhai Patel and others?

A. Yes.

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Q. When you joined the meeting did any other people see you till you saw Mr. Vallabhai Patel?

A. No.

Q. When did you deliver your speech?

A. Some time during the night.

Q. Did you have many callers from the time you went to the Ashram?

A. Not on the 13th.

Q. I think the statement that you made in your speech on the 13th is more or less an impression created upon your mind?

A. I think the speech puts it like that.

Q. From the fact that certain particular wires were cut, and buildings burnt, it was the impression in your mind that there was some sort of organised attempt?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there any particular statements made to you by any of the rioters?

A. I would not say they were made to me by any of the rioters on the 13th, but some endorsement of the view that I suggested was certainly forthcoming at that time. I said to myself "this is what appears to have happened," and I discussed with those friends who called there and instead of disputing the proposition, they said "Yes."

Q. Was that an impression or was it knowledge?

A. I did not cross-examine them so as to know whether they were speaking out of their impression or knowledge. I would not be able to say that, but they certainly endorsed the views I expressed.

Q. That may have been merely an impression also?

A. Yes.

Q. You had a sort of conference on the morning of the 14th at the district court house with Mr. Pratt and Mr. Chatfield and the Officer Commanding. And it was resolved that what was known as Martial Law was to be withdrawn?

A. I was told that it would be.

Q. And as a result of that only, the meeting in the Ashram in the afternoon was so well attended?

A. No, not because the orders were withdrawn.

Q. Now you noticed that on the 6th the crowds that were going to your Ashram were very orderly?

A. I think absolutely orderly, and I think I saw the Rev. Mr. Gillespie there?

Q. Yes. And your speech was read out by Mr. Vallabhai Patel because you were not in a fit condition of health?

A. My voice could not reach the audience at that time.

Q. When did you have an interview with Mr. Chatfield? Was it before or after the meeting?

A. Before that on the 13th and on the 14th in the morning at about 9 o'clock.

Q. When did you have an interview with Mr. Guider? A. He honoured me with a visit some day after the meeting.

Q. Your conversation at that honourable interview was all *bona fide*. There was no shamming on your part?

A. Certainly none on my part nor any on his part.

Q. Mr. Guider says in his report of what happened at that interview that "the impression he gave me was that though he was prepared to denounce the rioters for his own benefit, that is to say, to swell the ranks of his followers, he had no intention of denouncing them to the authorities?"

A. Well, I can only say that Mr. Guider has done (though unintentionally perhaps) violence to me.

The President.—That is, to your *Satyagraha* doctrine?

A. Yes.

Mr. Desai.—You told him that there were certain persons in the crowd inviting them actually to take part?

A. Doing what?

Q. Certain men among the leaders who were the instigators of the riots or present among them.

A. But I have a distinct recollection that I told Mr. Guider that the leaders were there trying to restrain the mob. That is my impression.

Q. After this meeting of the 14th you addressed several other meetings through your *Desai* in the streets?

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[Continued.]

A. Yes.

Q. And you wrote out your speeches and got them read by several of the audience in the city and that had a pacifying effect on the minds of the people?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was from the 11th till again the meetings were prohibited?

A. Yes.

Q. And what we might call the so-called educated people of Ahmedabad, did they take any active part in the propaganda work?

A. Some of them.

Q. Now you have been for a fairly long time in Ahmedabad, for 5 years. What is your estimate about the educated people of Ahmedabad? Do they take part in such riotous movements, burning buildings and cutting wires at Ahmedabad?

A. I have not found them to be doing that.

Q. Of course, they might be intent upon menacing Government by making speeches and criticising the Rowlatt Bill and such legislations. Apart from that you found them to be a quiet sort of people?

A. Yes.

Q. Now you know there was some trouble between the mill-hands and mill-owners in 1918?

A. I suppose it was in 1918.

Q. And large crowds of these mill-hands used to assemble day after day and you used to preach to them sermons, and Anasuya Bai and others did likewise.

A. Yes.

Q. During all these days thousands of mill-hands met and they were very orderly even till the very last when the question of wages was a disquieting factor. They took part in large processions through the city and the crowds were always very orderly, and the mill-hands were well behaved and orderly?

A. Certainly. I found them so.

Q. Now did you tell Mr. Chatfield or give him any reason to think that you told him that the Home Rule League either in Ahmedabad or up country had made any organisations for these troubles on the 11th?

A. I do not think that I did say so. I should be very much surprised indeed if he did say so.

Q. You have come into contact with the Home Rule League agitation in the provinces?

A. Yes.

Q. There is also a constant agitation among the people?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know that the Satyagraha movement against the Rowlatt Act had a rather pacifying effect on the people?

A. It is my deliberate conviction, that but for Satyagraha, India would have witnessed scenes perhaps more terrible than it has passed through.

Copy of letter dated January 11th, 1920, from M. K. Gandhi, Esq., to Disorders Inquiry Committee.

Here are the extracts I promised regarding my declarations in connection with civil disobedience. I regret to say that I have not been able to trace Swami Shradhdhanandji's telegrams or his letters received just after the 30th March. If you consider them to be very material evidence in connection with any point, I suppose you could get copies of the telegrams through the Telegraph Department and possibly a copy of Dr. Satyapal's letter through the C. I. D. in the Punjab. Superintendent Bowring, who took me to Bombay from Siwai Madhopur, told me that he had seen Dr. Satyapal's letter to me.

ENCLOSURE No. 1.

Extract from a speech delivered by Mr. Gandhi at Madras on the 30th March 1919.

"I would venture further to state that every precaution that is humanly possible is being, and will be, taken to avert any such danger (Bolshevism). It is for that reason that our pledge commits the signatories to the

breach of those laws that may be selected for the purpose by a committee of Satyagrahis; and I am glad that our Sind friends have understood the pledge and obeyed the prohibition of the Hyderabad Commissioner of Police to note their inoffensive procession for it is no part of the present movement to break all the laws of the land the breach of which is not inconsistent with the pledge. A Satyagrahi is nothing if not law-abiding."

The following are mentioned as some of the considerations by which the committee deciding upon the first civil breach was guided, in a statement issued by the Bombay Satyagraha Sabha on or about the 4th April 1919:—

- (1) To cause as little disturbance as possible among the governors and the governed;
- (2) Until Satyagrahis have become seasoned, disciplined and capable of handling delicately organised movements, to select such laws only as can be disobeyed individually;
- (3) To select as a first step, laws that have evoked popular disapproval and that from the Satyagraha standpoint, are the most open to attack;
- (4) To select laws whose civil breach would constitute an education for the people, showing them a clear way out of the difficulties that lie in the path of honest men desiring to do public work.

ENCLOSURE No. 2.

Extract from a speech delivered by Mr. Gandhi on the 4th of April 1919, in Bombay.

"The conduct described in allegation (5),—namely that the crowd in Delhi declined to disperse when the magistrate gave the order to do so,—can be consistent with the pledge. But if the allegation is true, the conduct was premature because the committee contemplated in the pledge has not decided upon the disobedience of orders that might be issued by magistrates under the Riot Act. I am anxious to make it as clear as I can that in this movement no pressure can be put up on the people who do not wish to accept our suggestions or advice. The movement being essentially one to secure the greatest freedom for all Satyagrahis, we cannot forcibly demand the release of those who might be arrested whether justly or unjustly. The essence of the pledge is to invite imprisonment and until the committee decides upon a breach of the Riot Act it is the duty of Satyagrahis to obey magisterial orders to disperse, etc., without making the slightest ado and thus to demonstrate their law-abiding nature."

ENCLOSURE No. 3.

Extract from a speech delivered at Chowpati, Bombay, on the 6th of April 1919.

"From the pure Satyagraha standard our case in Delhi is weak in one respect. The crowd undoubtedly demanded the release of the men who were arrested at the instance of the station authorities and declined to disperse until they were given up. Both those acts were wrong. It was wrong to demand the release of the arrested men. It is arrest and imprisonment that we seek by civil disobedience. It therefore ill becomes us to resent either and it was wrong not to disperse. In this movement it is open to Satyagrahis to disobey only those laws which are selected for the purpose by the committee contemplated in the pledge. When we have acquired habits of discipline, self-control, qualities of leadership and obedience, we shall be better able to offer civil disobedience even by large crowds. But until we have developed these qualities I have advised that we should select for civil disobedience only such laws as may be disobeyed by individuals. It is therefore necessary for us till we are sufficiently disciplined and till the spirit of Satyagraha has permeated large bodies of men and women to obey all regulations regarding processions and gatherings."

10 January 1920.]

Miss ANASUYA SARABHAI.—Rao Bahadur R. M. NILKANTH.

At Ahmedabad, Saturday, the 10th January 1920.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., I.A.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., Secretary.

Miss ANASUYA SARABHAI of Ahmedabad.

By the President—

Q. You have taken a great interest in the welfare of the mill workers in Ahmedabad?

A. Yes.

Q. And I think in consequence you have great influence with them?

A. Yes.

Q. You were not in Ahmedabad actually when the rioting took place?

A. I was in Bombay.

Q. I think you arrived with Mr. Gandhi?

A. Yes.

Q. You were present here yesterday and heard Mr. Gandhi's statement?

A. I have nothing more to add to it.

Q. I think that is quite fair. I think the Committee will accept you as agreeing with Mr. Gandhi. If you desire to add anything, we shall be pleased to hear you?

A. I have nothing to add.

Rao Bahadur RAMANBHAI M. NILKANTH, B.A., LL.B., President, Ahmedabad Municipality.

By the President—

Q. You are the President of the Ahmedabad municipality?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think, so far as the occurrences on the 10th were concerned, you have no observations to make?

A. No.

Q. Then on the 11th, did you go to the civil courts in the morning?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you hear rumours about the arrest of Anasuya Sarabhai?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you then remain at the court for some time?

A. Till about 11 or 11-30.

Q. I think you were in the compound when a large number of people passed there?

A. I was there.

Q. You noticed numbers of these people were carrying sticks?

A. Yes.

Q. A little later was news received that the Rev. Gillespie has been surrounded by the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. I think a pleader in your court asked the court to stop his case and allow him to render assistance?

A. Yes.

Q. Then came the news a little later of the burning of the Matriculation mandap?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you hear some time after any firing?

A. Yes, from the side of the Bank of Bombay.

Q. And you don't know the circumstances under which that took place?

A. Except that there was a mob.

Q. Was there a big mob?

A. Yes.

Q. Then a little later news came of the Government buildings being burnt?

A. Yes.

Q. When did you leave the court?

A. At 11 or 11-30.

Q. In what direction did you walk?

A. Towards the west. I went to my residence across the bridge.

Q. When you went over the Ellis bridge you did not meet any people there?

A. It was all deserted.

Q. About 2 o'clock in the afternoon, did the Hon'ble Mr. Desai, who was a neighbour of yours come?

A. We both came back to the town.

Q. When you came to the Bhadar did you find buildings on fire?

A. Yes.

Q. At this time was the locality deserted?

A. We did not find anybody near the buildings.

Q. Where did you go then?

A. We passed through the bazar; we saw the Mamlatdar's kacheri burning, then we came back near the telegraph office where the municipal fire engine was working.

Q. What did you find there?

A. The Municipal councillor, Mr. Ferozshah, was there. Some attempts were made to keep the fire under control. There were many men. Then we walked further and went towards the Three Gates and the Khas Bazar.

Q. How long did you remain there?

A. For about 2 hours, I should think. Then we went to the municipal office; there we were informed that the water of the water-works had been poisoned. The rumour was false. We met the Municipal Commissioner there. He said that there was some danger to the Queen's statue, and he was asking for the Collector's help, but the military authorities would not allow his note to be carried, and the note came back.

Q. You were in the city. On this occasion you saw very few people?

A. We were not allowed to proceed further beyond the Khas Bazar. We did not see any mob at that time.

Q. There must have been number of mobs doing destruction in different parts of the city?

A. Further towards the east, we were not allowed to proceed.

Q. Who did not allow you?

A. The military pickets at the Khas Bazar.

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Rao Bahadur R. M. NILKANTH.

[Continued.]

Q. Then on the morning of the 12th, did you go back to the civil court?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. On that day did you see a noisy crowd take any part?

A. When I came to my house in the city, I did see a noisy crowd.

Q. Was that crowd dispersed by firing?

A. Yes, it was.

Q. There was a party of Indian troops under British officers?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the result of the firing?

A. One man was killed. I saw one dead body.

Q. Have you any comment to make upon the firing that took place there on that occasion?

A. I was rather far from the crowd. I do not know whether the crowd had been first asked to disperse or not.

Q. If they were asked to disperse, there would be no ground for criticism?

A. No.

Q. Then you returned again to the city?

A. I did.

Q. Did you hear the proclamations that were made against the assembling of people in numbers and against any one failing to answer a challenge?

A. Yes.

Q. I think you also heard that the Commissioner desired to see you?

A. He called at my house, and left word that he might be seen either that night or the following morning. It was not possible to see him at Shahi Bagh at night.

Q. Was the city in a disturbed state?

A. I believe the military pickets did not allow the people to pass in the streets that night. So I could not go.

Q. You did go next morning?

A. Yes.

Q. When you went there, you learnt that Mr. Gandhi was coming by the Gujarat mail?

A. I learnt that he had come.

Q. You met Mr. Pratt there?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he make any request to you?

A. He asked me to go round the city in company with some citizens to persuade the shopkeepers to open the shops. I told him it was not possible or safe to do so till the order for firing was stopped. I heard that some people going to the shops were fired at. He said that the firing order was not for such people. I consulted Mr. Boyd. The Inspector General of Police was in company with Mr. Desai. I went outside the railway compound and talked to some shopkeepers. They would not open till the firing was stopped. One man said till he actually saw Mr. Gandhi he would not open his shop.

Q. Some people objected to open shops because there was this order and other people because they wanted to see Mr. Gandhi first?

A. Everybody said that he would not open his shop till the firing order was stopped.

Q. So far as the firing order was concerned, did Mr. Pratt make clear to you that it did not affect the people going to the shops?

A. It was not so in practice. It said that if the crowds collected, they would shoot at them. They had no orders to distinguish purchasers or customers from other people.

Q. Do you suggest that you saw yourself anything that indicated that people who were in the ordinary course purchasing at shops were fired at?

A. I did not see firing at customers.

Q. The order against assembling in numbers of about 10 was withdrawn on the morning of the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. The shops then opened again?

A. Gradually, of course.

Q. And, as I understand, things pretty rapidly resumed a normal aspect?

A. They did.

Q. In connection with the withdrawal of the order, I think the Commissioner saw you and you gave him assistance in connection with the translation and printing?

A. On the previous day, he asked me to see him next morning. He issued an order that martial law was withdrawn. He asked me to translate it into the vernacular and print and circulate. I did so.

Q. You saw then that it was properly printed and issued?

A. I did that myself.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You have lived in Ahmedabad all your life?

A. Yes.

Q. Your father was living here before?

A. Yes.

Q. You found the people of Ahmedabad very quiet and law-abiding?

A. Very.

Q. As regards the events of the 10th and 11th, did they come upon you as a surprise?

A. Yes.

Q. How do you account for them?

A. Of course the Rowlatt law agitated the minds of the people. There were economic causes, dearth of food and clothing; the mill-hands particularly, had been in a sore state of mind. There had been a strike the previous year. And the Satyagraha propaganda had brought Mr. Gandhi into great prominence. The immediate cause was the arrest of Mr. Gandhi, and subsequently of course, the rumoured arrest of Anasuya Bai.

Q. The mill-hands have been in a chronic state of discontent?

A. Yes. Often they have been going on strikes.

Q. Ever since 1917?

A. I should think so.

Q. Now, about the Satyagraha propaganda; that started somewhere in 1918?

A. I should think so.

Q. When the Rowlatt Bills were on?

A. I should think so.

Q. Did you join the Satyagraha Sabha yourself?

A. I did not.

Q. You are not a Satyagrahi?

A. I am not.

Q. You have not taken the vow?

A. I do not agree with the propaganda.

Q. The Satyagraha movement, particularly that part of it, relating to the civil disobedience of the laws, I take it you disapproved?

A. It weakens respect for the law and is a source of danger.

Q. The theory of it as propounded by Mr. Gandhi, is not readily grasped by the ordinary mind?

A. It is not. Besides, I should think there is no question of absolute truth or untruth; no moral problem is involved in opposing the Rowlatt Act or any other Act. It is not proper to call it Satyagraha.

Q. Whether a particular measure is not good or is not for the benefit of the society and should therefore be opposed is according to you a matter of political opinion?

A. There is no question of absolute truth or untruth involved in the consideration of such a thing. If the law should say that people should speak untruth, that would be a different question.

Q. Whether a particular measure is justified is a question of circumstances?

A. These are changing truths; circumstances differ. There is no question of violation or enforcement of absolute truth. No one has to submit to untruth.

Q. You know that the principle of Satyagraha is to invite suffering on one's self and not to do violence to anybody else. Is that a theory which the ordinary mind can appreciate and practically follow?

A. It cannot. It is playing with fire.

Q. If you put such a programme for the ordinary people it is almost inevitable that it must lead to confusion?

A. Yes.

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Rao Bahadur R. M. NILKANTH.

[Continued.]

Q. Similarly, if you put the civil disobedience programme before the general public, most of them would understand that it is right generally to break laws?

A. Yes. They would think there is nothing wrong in breaking the laws.

Q. They would grasp the broad fact that it is permissible or honourable or patriotic to go about breaking laws, and they would not distinguish between a particular law and any other law. Is that your view?

A. People would learn to defy authority. It might produce general disrespect for authority and for law, which is very dangerous to the welfare of the society. That is my view.

Q. Mr. Ramanbhai, may I take it that the other educated people also share your view?

A. Very few.

Q. Taking yourself, holding that view, what steps you took yourself to combat this?

A. Any attempt would be hopeless. The current of public opinion was so strong in favour of Satyagraha that we had to lie low and wait till better sense prevailed.

Q. You in fact took no steps to make your view known to the people?

A. I did not take any steps.

Q. Were these views openly declared so that the public might know that Mr. Ramanbhai held these views?

A. I never attended any meetings held by the Satyagraha Sabha so far.

Q. Holding the view you do you were bound to abstain from these meetings. But did you do anything to let people know what your views were actually? Did you take any steps to make your views known to the public?

A. Except conversations and discussing the thing with friends I took no other steps. When I met my brother pleaders I talked to them about these things.

Q. You are the President of the municipality and a leader in Ahmedabad, and if you held these views—you say you did hold these views—one should have thought, whether you succeed or not, it was up to you to let people know that it was your view, so that any people disposed to agree with you might follow?

A. I was waiting for a lead from the Bombay leaders.

Q. You are aware that leaders in Madras, in Bombay and in Calcutta and in other parts of the country who took this view, did issue a manifesto expressly condemning civil disobedience. You are aware of that?

A. Yes.

Q. Your statement that you were waiting for a lead from Bombay is not correct?

A. That was not sufficient for Ahmedabad.

Q. You said that your reason for not expressing your view was that you waited for a lead?

A. I understood I should myself have taken some active measures.

Q. What I ask you is, did you do anything to make known to the public in Ahmedabad that this was your view?

A. I did not.

Q. You said you were waiting for a lead from Bombay. You will see, from what I have stated, that leaders in Bombay and other places did openly declare themselves against civil disobedience?

A. It is only a particular act.

Q. I am only dealing with what you said. So far as the expression of view is concerned, you had prominent leaders in Bombay, as I have said, in Delhi, in Calcutta, issuing a manifesto under their signature emphatically saying that they disapproved of the civil disobedience movement and pointing out that it must lead to very undesirable results. You are aware of that? Did you take any similar measures to issue any such statement in Ahmedabad?

A. I did not. I did not think that expression of view was quite enough. So far as the expression of disapproval was concerned, it was general in the whole country. So far as the city of Ahmedabad was concerned, which is the home, one may say, of the Satyagraha movement and of civil disobedience that did not

make any difference. I do not think that any expression of my views would count for much.

Q. Possibly you thought that the atmosphere was such that your attempting to do it would have brought no appreciable result and might possibly have created trouble?

A. I did not think of trouble.

Q. In the sense that it might possibly increase the strength of the opposition?

A. Possibly. Still it would have been futile.

Q. You could have issued a printed statement?

A. Certainly.

Q. About the Rowlatt Act, I understand you are opposed to it?

A. I presided over two meetings to protest against that.

Q. At those meetings were any misrepresentations ever made about the provisions of the Rowlatt Act?

A. As a matter of fact, the whole provisions of the Act were explained.

Q. At those meetings?

A. Yes.

Q. So far as you are aware, were any attempts made by any of the educated people in Ahmedabad to misrepresent the provisions of the Act?

A. I have not come to know of such an attempt.

Q. Did it come to your knowledge that there were in the minds of the people wrong beliefs about the provisions of the Rowlatt Act? Were there many people, who did not exactly know what the Act provided for?

A. Not the details.

Q. When it is said that it gives more powers to the police or executive, so far there is no misrepresentation. Was there any misrepresentation of this kind, namely, that any number of people, say 5 or 6, collecting at a place would be liable to be arrested?

A. No. There was no such impression.

Q. Or that any marriage ceremony or marriage rites would be interfered with?

A. No.

Q. Misrepresentations of that kind were said to exist in other parts of the country?

A. They have not come to my notice in this part.

Q. You say you attended two meetings about the Rowlatt Act? Were there many other meetings after that?

A. In the interval between these two meetings?

A. Yes.

Q. Some meetings might have been held.

Q. Which you did not attend?

A. I did not.

Q. After that, any other meeting?

A. The last meeting was on the 30th of March, so far as I remember. After that we had no meeting.

Q. Then you had a general hartal on the 6th?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you take part in that?

A. I joined in the procession, which went from the city to the river.

Q. Mr. Gandhi had asked that day to be observed as a day of mourning and humiliation?

A. I did not fast; I did not go to the river.

Q. You know the fact that the hartal on the 6th of April came about because of the injunctions of Mr. Gandhi?

A. Yes, I know.

Q. In many places in the country?

A. Yes.

Q. And a fast was to be observed? I understand you did not fast, nor did you go to the river to bathe?

A. No.

Q. But you joined in the procession?

A. As a demonstration against the Act, I thought, I should join.

Q. In so far as you were in opposition to the Act you thought your joining in the procession would be an expression of disapproval against the Act. Was that procession an orderly procession?

A. There was no violence.

Q. There was no exhibition of violence?

A. No shout, excitement or anything of the kind.

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[Rao Bahadur R. M. NILKANTH

[Continued.]

Q. That *hartal* was general?

A. It was.

Q. Did you yourself approve of having an extensive *hartal* in that manner?

A. I did not approve.

Q. If continued for a long time, it is eminently likely to result in breach of peace; so you disapproved of it?

A. Yes.

Q. In your view, I take it that the immediate cause of the outburst on the 10th was the news of the arrest of Mr. Gandhi?

A. Yes.

Q. That outburst took the form of destruction of Government buildings?

A. It was thought that Government were to blame for the arrest of Gandhi and the wrath of the public was directed against the Government.

Q. It was an expression of the resentment of the people against Government, who arrested Mr. Gandhi?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you account for its taking partly an anti-European form in the sense that Sergeant Fraser was murdered?

A. In attacks of that character. Europeans were identified with Government in a greater degree than Indians.

Q. That was because in your view they identified Europeans with Government and gave expression to their resentment in that manner?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. In your statement there are two allegations; I will read them. In one place you say "instances had occurred of customers standing at shops being fired at, and that till the order to fire was withdrawn, it would be neither possible to prevail upon people to open shops nor safe for them to do so." In another place, "we requested him to withdraw the order to fire as it was no more necessary and as innocent persons were being shot." On what basis did you make these statements?

A. On what I have heard and what some shop-keepers have told us.

Q. You have no personal knowledge?

A. No.

Q. Did you see those shop-keepers?

A. I did.

Q. When you made that statement to the authorities, did they dispute the truth of these statements?

A. No.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. You have told the Committee what you think of the *Satyagraha* movement?

A. Yes.

Q. And in your view the results of that movement are not for the peace of the country?

A. Yes.

Q. And you hold very strongly to that view?

A. Yes.

Q. Also you hold the important position of the President of the municipality of Ahmedabad?

A. Yes.

Q. I do not quite understand that you did not feel it to be your duty to warn the people of Ahmedabad against the dangers of the *Satyagraha* movement.

A. We are a drop in the ocean, I do not know what we could do. People of my views are not likely to get any hearing.

Q. It does not matter if you are alone in your view; the matter was of such a serious character, did you not feel impelled to give expression to your views?

A. No, I think the general knowledge that those who held moderate views were opposed to the *Satyagraha* movement was quite enough so far as the expression of views was concerned. The views of myself did not matter much, the views of a party had been expressed and that was quite enough.

Q. In Ahmedabad?

A. No, in Bombay.

Q. I am talking of Ahmedabad where you are President of the municipality?

A. As President of the municipality I have nothing to do with politics.

Q. Do you not exercise some influence on the town on that account?

A. Well partly of course; not such an influence that people would be inclined to change their views on my going harranguing them, or showing them my views.

Q. Did you not express your views as a matter of fact, whether they would change their views or not?

A. No, I did not.

Q. What was the view of the municipal councillors as regards the *Satyagraha* movement?A. In the municipal council we have some members of the *Satyagraha Sabha*; there are some who do not interest themselves at all in these questions, and there are some of my views.

Q. There are divided opinions with regard to this?

A. Yes.

Q. You have told us that you joined the procession on the 6th of April?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you not think that your joining that procession, a procession which was organised I presume by *Satyagraha* people in Ahmedabad, would lead people to think you were a sympathiser with that movement?

A. No my views were well known; there was no likelihood of any mistake.

Q. But you never gave expression to them?

A. I may say that even at meetings where I presided, that view was expressed, that I belong to the moderate party and I do not share those views. That was very well known to people taking part in public affairs.

Q. You say it was very well known in Ahmedabad that you belonged to the moderate party. The moderate party is an organisation opposed to the extremist party?

A. Still the moderate party did not approve of the *Satyagraha* movement.

Q. Did you ever say so?

A. I did not say so, but the leaders of the party said so.

Q. How could people know in Ahmedabad that the moderate party were against the *Satyagraha* movement?

A. People who read the newspapers know that.

Q. Did you read that in the newspapers?

A. No, I did not. I am talking of the manifesto of Sir C. Setalvad and others.

Q. I am talking about Ahmedabad?

A. In Ahmedabad I did not issue any manifesto.

Q. Because you took part in a procession on the 6th of April organised by the *Satyagraha* people I suggested your doing so would make people believe you sympathised with that movement.

A. Till now nobody has told me so and I have no reason to believe any one thought so.

Q. On one side you have your views as regards the *Satyagraha* and by taking part in that procession you have shown that you were a participator in some movement organised by them?

A. In Ahmedabad there is no likelihood of any mistake on this ground.

Q. They know your views also?

A. They know my views very well.

Q. You also did not believe in a *hartal*?A. No, of course occasional *hartals*, but the institution of organising *hartals* for the expression of public opinion I do not believe in that.Q. You did not approve of the *hartal* suggested for the 6th of April?

A. Yes, I did not.

Q. And yet many of the people who took part in the procession of which you were a member must have been people who observed the *hartal*?

A. They must have been.

Q. And you were joining those?

A. I did not consider them as untouchables; there was no harm in joining them.

Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—

Q. Did you give as much assistance as you possibly could to the authorities on the 11th and 12th?

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[Continued.]

A. I could not get in touch with the authorities. I could not get any protection. I asked a military officer who was passing to take some steps to protect the Queen's statue.

Q. A military officer?

A. A military officer passing with a picket.

Q. What time was this?

A. On the evening of the 11th; I told him I was informed that there was some danger.

Q. What time?

A. About 4 or 4-30.

Q. Where were you going?

A. Back to my residence.

Q. After having seen the crowd near the Astodia Chakla?

A. Yes.

Q. You say you were told the crowd were preparing to burn the Astodia Chakla *chowky*?

A. Yes, I was told so.

Q. And there was a picket there?

A. Yes.

Q. How far?

A. About 300 paces away.

Q. And there was no one to walk up the street and tell them?

A. No.

Q. Were you not there yourself?

A. They would not allow me to.

Q. Why could you not tell the picket the crowd were going to burn the *chowky*?

A. The crowd could be seen by the picket.

Q. Let me read from your statement. You say :—"I saw a crowd near the Astodia Chakla and I was told that the crowd was burning the police *chowky* at that place. There was a military picket very near at the junction of the Oliphant Road and the Dana Pith Road near the municipal office, but apparently there was no one to ask the picket to march up to the police *chowky* and disperse the crowd." Did you consider yourself incompetent to ask the picket to walk up the road and disperse the crowd?

A. I did not think any civilians could give any orders to the military.

Q. Who did you mean should go and ask the picket?

A. What I meant was this that no police officers or any other Government officers were moving about the city.

Q. Could you not go up to this picket and say, over there is a police *chowky* being burnt? You complained of the fact that no one was there to ask the picket.

A. The picket could see it.

Q. Why do you say there was no one there?

A. What I mean is there was no organisation of officers moving about the city?

Q. Did you point it out to the picket?

A. No, I thought I could not give them any instructions.

Q. Did you point out to the picket that there was damage being done?

A. No, I did not think it was my duty to do so because I could not possibly influence the picket.

Q. You suggested the picket could see it? I hear it suggested the picket could have seen it themselves, that is not correct?

A. It is correct.

Q. Where was the picket?

A. Just near the municipal office where the road branches towards Dana Pith.

Q. 300 yards away?

A. Yes, and the picket was here, and the police station was in a straight line.

Q. And the crowd you say were preparing to burn it?

A. I saw a crowd preparing to burn it or burning it.

Q. Be quite frank, Mr. Ramanbhai, could you not have gone to the picket and said, "the crowd are preparing to burn the *chowky*?"

A. I could have gone.

Q. I take it there were other British officers you could have communicated with throughout the days of the 11th and 12th?

A. Except military officers, there were only one or two whom I saw.

Q. Did you attempt to go up and ask how you could help the authorities?

A. No, I did not ask how I could help them.

Q. You were at Khas Bazar on the 11th?

A. Yes. There was no military officer there.

Q. You will be surprised to hear that the Khas Bazar was the headquarters of the force?

A. Yes.

Q. You knew that?

A. Yes.

Q. And yet you did not offer yourself?

A. There was nothing to be done in the Khas Bazar; it was all empty.

Q. Another thing; you say you got rumours of the water being poisoned, what exactly do you mean by this: "We could find no means of reaching any authorities to request them to inform the public that the rumour was unfounded?"

A. So far as we were concerned, we could not move about the city owing to the military pickets. A Municipal Commissioner told me he had sent an urgent chit which could not be delivered. He could not reach the picket.

Q. You think a notice sent out that this was an unfounded rumour would have been quite sufficient?

A. It would have had some effect.

Q. Would it, on these mobs?

A. Not on the mobs, on the citizens.

Q. You think that the citizens who were ridiculous enough to believe that the British Government would poison the water, would be sensible enough to believe a notice issued afterwards that the water was not poisoned?

A. These things are not measured arithmetically.

Q. It was a ridiculous statement?

A. It was a ridiculous statement.

Q. I mean the statement you are making. The statement you are making is this; you were complaining that you could not ask the authorities to contradict this rumour. You will agree that the contradiction of this rumour by the authorities would have been of no use at all?

A. I do not agree, it would have been useful, a proclamation by the Collector.

Q. How would this proclamation be distributed?

A. By beat of drum.

Q. Do you think people would have collected round the drum?

A. People had been drawing water from wells and *takas* because they thought the water had been poisoned. Of course there was resentment against the Government owing to the fact that they thought they had poisoned the water; it was necessary to contradict that.

Q. You say you got your information about these orders, as to whether they were likely to be carried out against any party of 10, from a military sepoy?

A. Yes.

Q. You did not attempt to ask any higher authority?

A. I went up to Colonel Frazer and told him what was happening and he said "these things must happen."

Q. What things?

A. Innocent people being fired at.

Q. Did you ask him whether his officers would make any distinction?

A. I asked him and he said "our orders are general."

Q. When did you ask him this?

A. At about 2 or 2-30 on the 13th.

Q. What did he say?

A. He said these things must happen; it was not possible to issue fresh orders that day and he would go to the city in the evening with the Commissioner and decide what was to be done.

Q. You say you presided at two meetings with regard to this Rowlatt Act?

A. Yes.

Q. Was either of them on the 25th or 26th of March?

A. I think so.

Q. Did Mrs. Naidu speak at that meeting?

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A. No, I did not attend that meeting.
Q. You did not hear her speak?
A. Not on that occasion.
Q. You did not see the speech reported that she made?
A. No, I have no recollection.
Q. You were interested in it?
A. I purposely avoided going to hear Mrs. Naidu, because I did not agree with her in some of her views.
Q. I suppose you must have read the speech?
A. Perhaps I did, I have no recollection of it at present.
Q. Who were the speakers at the meeting at which you presided?
A. At the first meeting myself and Mr. Harilal Desai, at the second meeting myself and the Honourable Mr. Patel, member of the Imperial Council.

By Mr. Jivanlal V. Desai, Counsel to the Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad—
Q. The Honourable Mr. Patel keenly opposed this Bill in the Viceroy's Council?
A. He did.
Q. He was conversant with all the details of the Bill?
A. Yes.
Q. And he explained all the details fully?
A. Yes, and the proceedings of the Council also.
Q. At the other meeting both yourself and Mr. Harilal Desai explained the details fully?
A. Yes, almost the whole of the two Bills.
Q. Were fully discussed?
A. Yes.
Q. Is there any justification for saying that you were hiding yourself in concern for your safety?
A. Certainly, if I had been hiding, I would not have been in the town on the day of the disturbance.
Q. It is suggested that the President of the municipality and the councillors also consulted their safety; do you know any other municipal councillors who were moving about in those days?
A. Those members, who were members of the *Satyagraha Sabha*, Mr. Patel, and others went about to pacify the mob, but of course they did not succeed. One councillor was trying to help the fire brigade and Mr. Pestonshaw was working on behalf of the Mill-owners' Association. Whatever co-operation was called for from us we gave. We made the conservancy arrangements for the military troops. We arranged for the lighting as some of the Minifer lamps had been broken. I printed the proclamation about the withdrawal of Martial Law and advising the people to open their shops, and had it distributed. Wherever it was possible to do anything we did it.
Q. The Honourable Mr. Harilal Desai is also a member of the Corporation?

The Hon'ble Rao Sahib HARILAL DESAIBHAI DESAI, B.A., LL.B., Vice-President, District Local Board, Ahmedabad.

By the President—
Q. Mr. Desai, you are a member of the District Local Board?
A. I am Vice-President of it.
Q. You are also a member of the Council?
A. Of the Legislative Council, Bombay, and a member of the municipal corporation also.
Q. You were in the city of Ahmedabad during the period of the disturbances about which we are inquiring?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you been present during the course of our proceedings?
A. No, I was here only yesterday.
Q. So far as the 10th was concerned, I do not think there is anything you wish particularly to draw our attention to?
A. No.
Q. Now coming to the 11th, when did you first know of the disturbances?

A. Yes.
Q. He went about with you also?
A. Yes.
Q. It is said you did not go to the officers; did any of the officers directly call for your assistance?
A. None, it was not possible to find any officers in the town. We could not move freely about the city. I only went on the 13th, because the Commissioner gave me a pass.
Q. There is a dispute about martial law here. Do you remember a meeting called by the Commissioner, Mr. Pratt, at the Prembhai Hall?
A. Yes, on the 23rd of April.
Q. Do you know he delivered a speech there?
A. He did. He said in that speech that the civil authorities had withdrawn and there was Martial Law in the city for three days or so.
Q. "Owing to this insurrection the courts remained closed and civil authority was suspended for three days and during that interval the military authorities were responsible and Martial Law prevailed." That is what he said?
A. Yes.
Q. It was on the 24th of April?
A. I think that report says "yesterday," 23rd.
Q. And Mr. Pratt also said:—"It is generally admitted that the insurrection was organised, and there is good authority for the belief that it was organised by intelligent and educated leaders." Is there any justification for this remark?
A. I have not come to know any reasons.
Q. He further said:—"Who were those men? I say to you gentlemen that there must be hundreds of men in Ahmedabad city, who know who those leaders were or who could help us in finding out those leaders. Punishment of coolies will be useless if the leaders escape?"
A. I spoke at that meeting and said the citizens of Ahmedabad would be very happy to co-operate if we were told in what way our help could be given in finding out the real culprits.
Q. And the other leaders of Ahmedabad also offered their co-operation? Mr. Mangal Das and others?
A. Yes.
Q. Mr. Ambalal Sarabhai also was offering his co-operation and he was stopped?
A. Yes, there was some misunderstanding, he could not speak.
Q. You remember that, owing to the existence of this military order, some dead bodies could not be taken to the cremation ground and had to be burnt in the city?
A. People would not go to carry the dead bodies because they were afraid of being shot, so for the first time two dead bodies were burnt in the city.
Q. Within the city walls?
A. Within the city walls.

A. I was in the court conducting an appeal before the joint judge and I heard some shouting of a mob passing by the court house and on enquiry it was found that the mob was out for mischief.
Q. A little after I think you heard about the burning of the *mandap*?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you afterwards hear about the firing near the Bank of Bombay?
A. Yes.
Q. About this time did people in the courts begin to disappear?
A. Yes.
Q. I suppose people were getting naturally alarmed as to what might occur in consequence?
A. Yes, on account of the alarm created they melted away.
Q. I think you waited yourself for some time?
A. Yes, I waited in order to see that there was no mishap to the court house and that the Judge, Mr.

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Kennedy, went unmolested. I therefore waited till he went.
Q. Mr. Kennedy was sitting at the time?
A. Mr. Kennedy had ceased work in the court and I sent word to him that, as he had no carriage and my carriage was waiting, he could use my carriage when he wanted to go.
Q. I think you found he made arrangements for another carriage? He did not require your carriage?
A. Yes, he called me and he sat talking for about 45 minutes in his chamber and during that he said he had arranged for another carriage and did not want mine.
Q. And at about 11-30 you went out in company with another gentleman?
A. Yes, I went out near the Hemabhai Institute to see what the matter was.
Q. At this time did you notice anything in particular?
A. When I was just opposite the telegraph office it was burning fiercely, and from that point I saw the *Mamladar's kacheri* also on fire, and there were two or three gentlemen opposite the telegraph office.
Q. You returned to your house after that?
A. I returned to court and then I returned to my riverside residence.
Q. In the afternoon, as we have heard from the last witness, you came to the city with him?
A. With him in order to see what the mischief was.
Q. Did you find the streets deserted?
A. They were all deserted.
Q. I think the buildings in the compound of the Collector's office were burning?
A. They were burning and there was no one there to quench the fire, or save the property or anything of that sort.
Q. Did you see some military pickets about?
A. Yes, at the *Lal Darwaza* near the *Mamladar's kacheri* I saw a military picket and further on near Khas Bazar, opposite the three gates, we also saw a military picket. But from there we were not allowed to proceed further in the direction of the three gates, but we could see from there that as far as the *Ranchodlal fountain* the road was quite clear and there was no crowd or any sign of a crowd.
Q. And did you see anything of the municipal fire brigade?
A. Yes, it was at the telegraph office working.
Q. Did you know that some damage had been done to the hose of the fire engine?
A. Yes, I heard in the morning the hose was damaged just near the *Matriculation mandap*.
Q. Of course if mobs were putting buildings on fire with the intention of burning them down, it is quite likely that they would prevent the fires being extinguished?
A. Certainly.
Q. I think you went to the municipal offices to see if things were safe there?
A. Yes, I went with the President.
Q. And then you returned to your own residence?
A. Yes, I first went to my town residence and then I returned to my riverside residence.
Q. On the morning of the 12th you drove from your town residence I think?
A. No, from my riverside residence I drove to the south-west portion of the city in Dariapur, in order to see a hostel which is in my charge, to see how it was and whether things were safe there.
Q. Did you find everything all right?
A. Yes, it was all right. There was nothing wrong.
Q. You returned to your residence and again visited the city in the afternoon?
A. In the afternoon again I visited the city.
Q. When you were in the city you heard about the proclamation which had been issued about crowds collecting?
A. Yes, I heard that martial law was declared and the instructions were as have been deposed to by witnesses here.
Q. All you heard about martial law was, I suppose, that these two regulations had been issued against crowds collecting and about being out at night?

A. Yes, and I may say further that on the morning of the 13th a notice was pasted on the Acharatnal Hostel which I again visited on that day, and it was handed over to me by the Manager who said that it was pasted there by a police officer, and he gave it to me and it is with me.
Q. Was that a notice giving effect to these two regulations?
A. Yes, it was headed "Instructions to soldiers," and then there are two heads, first that if 10 men are seen collected, they will be fired at, and secondly, if any one was found at night and on being challenged did not stop, he would be fired at.
Q. Coming to the morning of the 13th, I think you went with the last witness again and endeavoured to get shopkeepers to open?
A. Yes, I was passing by the station from Prem gate and I met Mr. Ramanbhai there and I and he thought that we might request the shopkeepers to open and we made a request, and, as stated by Mr. Ramanbhai just now, some of the people said they would open after Mr. Gandhi returned, after they saw him, and several others said that until martial law was withdrawn it was not possible for them to open their shops because it would be keeping shops open without any customers.
Q. These orders as regards people not assembling and the liability of persons failing to answer a challenge being fired at were withdrawn on the 14th?
A. Yes.
Q. And business was resumed then?
A. Yes.
Q. I do not know whether I have dealt fully with all the events that occurred so far as they came to your knowledge?
A. Nothing particular has been left out.
Q. So far as the case of the actual firing was concerned, did anything specially come under your notice?
A. Yes, Sir. On the 12th, 13th and 14th I came to know of several instances of men moving about and not in a collection of 10 who were reported to have been shot at various places.
Q. Did you see anything yourself?
A. I did not see myself, but on enquiries I found that that statement was not incorrect. I say that there was one man who had gone to the vegetable market, his name was Chimanlal Harilal, to buy vegetables, and he got shot there. Then there was an application to the district court for guardianship of his minor widow and in that case there were affidavits put in showing that he was shot at whilst he was in the vegetable market to purchase vegetables.
Q. When he was alone?
A. Whether he was alone there or there were some other people along with him, I cannot say, but he was in a peaceful pursuit.
Q. On what day was it?
A. On the 12th?
Q. In the morning or in the afternoon?
A. In the afternoon.
Q. Do you know on whose orders the firing had taken place?
A. There were general instructions issued to the soldiers who were posted at various points, and they used their own discretion, if I may say so.
Q. Of course, as you know in these matters if firing has to be resorted to you may fire at people at one point and you may injure some one who is a bit away and the person injured may be innocent?
A. I quite concede that point. But what I believe is that there was neither the civil authority nor the military authority. If it is the military authority, certainly they generally issue instructions to soldiers to carry out certain instructions, and in performing their duties there must certainly be some mishaps. But if there is no martial law, then certainly under the law as it stands it must be done according to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, Chapter IX: under that crowd has first to be asked to disperse, then the civil force has to be used, afterwards the force of military should be used. These are the provisions.
Q. Would you not accept this view that where there has been deliberate burning of a large number of Gov.

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ernment buildings in various parts of the city, it is not unreasonable that the restoration of order should be left in the hands of the military at all events for a limited period of time?

A. Of course, if I accept the premises that Your Lordship has put in, then certainly the conclusion follows. But my point is that inside the city walls all the mischief was over by the evening of the 11th and there was no special necessity to issue any such general instructions to the military or for the declaration of martial law on the 12th.

Q. Now put yourself in the position of some responsibility. Supposing it came to your knowledge that a great number of buildings had been deliberately set fire to on the 11th, and you could not say whether that was an end of the disturbances and you were afraid of further outbreaks, don't you think it would be a reasonable thing that you should leave things in the hands of the military even for a limited period?

A. If that was the impression in the official's mind then certainly on that ground it would be justified.

Q. Now about the cause of the outbreak, I do not know whether you wish to add anything to what has been said?

A. I would like to put it this way, that even after the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest reached here, there was only a *hartal*, and I believe if there had been no provocation to the peaceful crowd, which was demonstrating outside the Kalupur gate, then there would have been no mishap on that day, and if this rumour about Miss Anasuya Ben had not come about, very likely there would have been nothing in Ahmedabad.

Q. Now you are familiar with the incidents that occurred on the 10th?

A. I have heard only.

Q. You do not suggest that the crowd on the 10th were justified in pursuing the two unfortunate Europeans in the manner they did?

A. I may be allowed to say this; ordinarily when there is a *hartal* or a peaceful demonstration, generally it happens in the case of a *hartal* that those people who go about in carriages are requested to get down. Of course several gentlemen whether Indian or otherwise just smile and get down. But those who insisted upon proceeding certainly came in collision, and my impression is that the two European mill operatives who were dealt with by the crowd used insulting language with reference to Mr. Gandhi which certainly put the crowds back up. And if that had not happened, very likely there would have been no disturbance near the Prem gate.

Q. These two gentlemen are in Europe and we cannot hear them, but we know that they denied on oath having given any provocation before the tribunals.

A. I have noticed that they were examined before one of the tribunals here, and I am also under the impression that one of the witnesses before those tribunals stated that they used insulting words to Mr. Gandhi whereupon these things occurred, and it is my belief that in Ahmedabad the crowd is generally so law-abiding that unless grave provocation is offered the Ahmedabad crowd is not likely to do anything of the sort that happened.

Q. But Mr. Desai you do not consider it as a sign of peacefulness on the part of the crowd that they insisted upon people who were going about in carriages to get down?

A. It is not lawful, it is true, but generally even in other countries when a crowd is on strike such things do occur, and these lapses are considered as innocent.

Q. But then the police are there to prevent the troubles, and they do so even in India?

A. Yes.

Q. I suppose you know that it is part of the duty of the police to see that citizens, whether Europeans or Indians, have the right of passing along the roads?

A. If the police manage these matters with tact, which generally they do not, then certainly no collision would occur.

Q. The tact you suggest is that they should have allowed the mob to take their own way?

A. They should have taken matters smilingly.

Q. If the police had smiled at the mob, then nothing would have happened?

A. I know that several highly respectable mill-agents were asked to get down from their motors, and they smilingly did so. I believe one or two European gentlemen passing by the Richey Road were also asked to get down, and they smilingly did so, and there was no trouble at all.

Q. That was probably a very good policy from your own point of view?

A. It would be a good policy not to come in collision with a crowd.

Q. I suppose it was a little indiscreet on the part of the two European gentlemen not to have assented to the wishes of the crowd? But is it not a little hard upon them that they should be asked to alight?

A. It was hard upon them to be asked to alight. Of course it was for them to take it coolly.

Q. It was a wonderful transition from the peace and quiet on the part of the crowd to indulge in such violence as the wanton wreck of human life as well as destruction of buildings?

A. Certainly it is very reprehensible.

Q. Do you agree with Mr. Gandhi—I do not mean to implicate the educated people of Ahmedabad or anything of that sort—do you agree with him that in connection with the different occurrences, there must have been some organisation behind all these occurrences?

A. I believe that there was no organisation so far as my impression goes, and it may possibly be that the relations, friends and comrades of those people who got injured at the firing near Prem gate may have brooded over the matter, but I believe that nothing would have come about if the rumour about the arrest of Miss Anasuya had not been circulated.

Q. Whom do you blame for the rumour?

A. Some wag, who wanted mischief, or I can't say how it came about.

Q. We have had it suggested to us more than once that these rumours are the work of the police. Do you make any such suggestion?

A. I do not.

Q. Don't you think that it is a little absurd to say that the police who have after all the disagreeable duty of keeping peace and order start these rumours?

A. I don't think they would start rumours.

Q. It would be extremely bad policy from their point of view?

A. Because they had no object to serve.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. I do not at all understand your view about these two Europeans. As I understand the facts from what we have been told, these two gentlemen were stopped in their carriage by a crowd which was being addressed by a speaker, that they turned back towards the Kalupur Chowky, dismissed their carriage and attempted to proceed in the Creamery lorry which was on its way up to the Camp; then the lorry was again stopped at the same place and they were forced to alight, they were stoned back to the Kalupur Chowky where they took refuge, and then you have the history of the attack upon the police, and when they were endeavouring to escape one of the constables was thrown from the wall and so on. Do I understand you to say that when there is a *hartal* in Ahmedabad called by Mr. Gandhi, it is the duty of a person when he is interrupted in the course of his endeavour to do his work, to use such tact and obey the crowd to such an extent that if he does not obey them it is some reasonable justification for these results happening?

A. I believe that every one, small or great, on every occasion is bound to use his tact, and if he does not use it, then he has no right to blame others for the consequences. But in this case I believe that at one point or another, whether at the time they were driving in their own carriage or in the Creamery van or in the interval between the two, they must have spoken some words insulting to Mr. Gandhi whom the crowd revered and for whom they had gone out for *hartal*, which they resented. But I believe that the whole thing came

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about, as my impression is, after there was some firing at the flour mill.

Q. We can reconstruct any story, but what I am asking you is, on the facts which are before us do you or do you not represent to this committee that there was some serious provocation worth talking about to be said for the crowd?

A. I believe there must have been some provocation before they started on this mischief.

Q. Assuming that they did not exercise tact, they wanted to go on, it was not till the crowd were threatening them that they turned back, assuming that it was their duty to exercise tact, and assuming that they did not exercise what you call tact, do you consider it is a justification for the action of the crowd on them?

A. I do not take it as a justification for the conduct of the crowd.

Q. Is it any sort of mitigation?

A. I would only put it as a provocation. I would not even call it mitigation.

Q. Now these two Europeans were going to attend to their duty and they had never taken part or any particular interest in the details of Indian politics. They were going in a carriage and they were stopped by a crowd. Supposing they said that they would not get down, that they do not sympathise with Gandhi, do you suggest that is a mitigation of the conduct of the crowd?

A. That is a provocative conduct, and I would disapprove of it in as strong terms as I possibly can.

Q. You really say that it is provocative conduct and you say you will disapprove of it in as strong terms as you possibly can. What epithets have you got left regarding the conduct of the crowd for you to express your disapproval?

A. It is something like lighting a match to a gunpowder magazine. At such times what is required is tact, and if any person does not use it, he does it at his own risk.

Q. If that was so, you think that Sagar and Steeples deserved all they got?

A. I don't say that. But my impression is, the events followed afterwards, but they were instrumental in firing on the crowd and they got utterly out of hand.

Q. If gentlemen of your position did not take these views of what is legitimate and what is some vindication of the conduct of the crowd, the crowds would not be so apt to commit these brutal acts?

A. I should think that when we are considering the whole question coolly, we must consider both the sides, and while I do not approve of the conduct of the crowds all along, I do say that there was provocation and some mitigation of the enormity of the events that followed.

Q. You understand that it seems to be agreed that these two gentlemen when they were stopped did turn back.

A. I take your account to be correct.

Q. I take the account which is put before us and which I never saw until two days ago. Now these two people had not insisted upon any rights at all but were simply endeavouring to get away owing to the events that occurred for their lives? You understand that?

A. That is a one-sided account. But the account I have got is that in any case they offered some provocation of the kind that I explained, and but for the firing the crowd would not have gone out of hand and would not have done the reprehensible acts that they did.

Q. Now another point about firing. Under the Criminal Procedure Code there are certain provisions which are all addressed to the dispersing by force if necessary of particular unlawful assemblies, and so far as the Codes of India are concerned the only provision for dealing with matters of this sort is the section which provides that every unlawful assembly should be dispersed. Now you know that on the 10th April in Ahmedabad there had been these serious occurrences, there was firing at the Beehive mills and firing on other occasions . . . ?

A. I think there was firing on the 10th at the Beehive mill and near the Prem gate.

Q. There had been serious riots on the 10th April?

A. Only there and following upon what I have stated before.

Q. And you know that on the evening of the 10th, riots appeared to have come to an end?

A. That was my impression.

Q. You know that Mr. Chatfield and the authorities are now being criticised because on the evening of the 10th they thought that matters had come to an end in so far as they did not place the military instead of the police by the morning of the 11th? On the evening of the 11th, matters had come to an end?

A. Inside the city walls.

Q. Now, having taken the view the day before that matters had come to an end and when an extraordinarily serious outbreak occurred the next morning, do you think it was a reasonable view to take that the riots had come to an end and that they might not take place again the next morning?

A. I should think there was nothing unreasonable in that position in believing that everything was at an end on the 10th and that nothing might occur on the 11th. I believe also, as I stated above, but for the report of the arrest of Anasuya Ben nothing would have occurred on the 11th.

Q. What I am putting to you is that there was a pernicious liar on the 11th to spread a rumour which put the people in this frame of mind, but there is no reason against there being another riot on the morning of the 12th?

A. The point is practically that all the Government offices, except the civil court, had been burnt down by 12 o'clock. The military picket was placed about 12 noon and after that whatever took place was all on the fringe of the town and not inside, and therefore I believe there was no reason in the afternoon of the 12th to give Martial Law instructions to the picket that was placed here.

Q. After the experiences of the 11th, it was impossible for the authorities to say with confidence that things might not be as bad on the morning of the 12th as on the 11th morning?

A. My reply again is this, that Government officers believe that the riots were *anti-Government* and *anti-European*. That is the position they have maintained all along. Now all the Government property inside the city except the civil court has been burnt. The police *chowkies* had also by the evening of the 11th. They had withdrawn practically every European inside the city walls to Shahi Bagh or to the cantonment, consequently there was nothing likely to happen inside the town on the 12th.

Q. There were still Europeans who might be called upon to exercise tact. There were still European ladies who had not yet been hunted down, the Collector was still in the land of the living and there were various possibilities of trouble?

A. Then the military pickets would have sufficed and martial law instructions were not necessary.

Q. Supposing on the morning of the 12th, there was a danger that the riots would be as bad as they were on the morning of the 11th, do you think it was a right thing to allow crowds to assemble and then after they had assembled to disperse them under the Criminal Procedure Code? Do you think it was a wrong thing to take measures to prevent crowds assembling at all on the principle that prevention is better than cure?

A. Any sensible man could make a distinction between a crowd following peaceful pursuits and a crowd disposed to create a disturbance of the peace, and therefore if after putting the military pickets care had been taken by officers to discriminate between a peaceful crowd and a crowd intent upon disturbance, then it was not necessary to give martial law instructions indiscriminately to fire upon 10 persons whether going on peaceful pursuits or in making demonstrations. That was an improper order to give.

Q. What I ask you is, do you think it was unreasonable for them to try to take measures to prevent crowds assembling at all as distinct from dispersing them after they had assembled? What do you say to that question?

A. Even to that question, I say that allowing people in the street to move about to follow their peaceful pursuits would not conflict with a desire to allow crowds

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[Continued.]

to collect, because generally when people go about the streets for following their peaceful avocations they do not collect in crowds. It is only in the bazars or some such places that they collect in crowds.

Q. Exactly, therefore, for the purpose of going about to pursue their ordinary avocations, they need not go about in groups of 10 and they would be interfered with by this martial law order?

A. They were in fact interfered with, and the shooting of these 17 people which had been reported on the 12th, as my enquiries showed, indicates that they were not shot because they were in groups of more than ten, but the picket stationed at the Naka simply turned on fire when they saw two or three men passing by and that is how people got injured.

Q. But really you know you are talking about something else. I am talking about the order or proclamation which you were criticising. I put it to you, as you said yourself, for going about your ordinary business you need not go about in crowds of more than 10. So was there anything wrong in issuing the order that people were not to collect in crowds of more than 10?

A. There was nothing wrong in issuing that order if it was accompanied by proper instructions to the soldiers who were to administer it, that they were to discriminate between a crowd which might disturb the peace and people going about to pursue their peaceful avocations.

Q. You agree with me that apart from discriminating between a peaceful crowd going about to pursue their usual avocations and those who were out for mischief, there is nothing in the order itself?

A. There is nothing in the order itself, but I only object to the operation of it.

Q. You object to the way in which it was carried out under the martial law proclamation?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know for certain that there ever was a single case of a crowd of 10 persons being dispersed by firing without first being asked to disperse when they had not done anything of a riotous character?

A. So far as I know, I know of no case in which the officer in charge of any picket in any centre went up to what he thought to be a crowd and asked them to disperse before opening fire, and all the cases that I have known are of a character that the soldiers fired on the people from where they were without asking them to disperse.

Q. That is not the point. What I want to know is, do you know yourself for certain whether there was a case of a crowd being fired upon under that order without the crowd being asked to disperse first and without their having done anything of a riotous character?

A. I have no personal knowledge.

Q. You have no personal knowledge? But will you now tell me if you have got any particulars and details even second hand of any such case which I could enquire into and get particulars of from you?

A. As I said, I have no personal knowledge. No instance of the type that you mention came within my enquiries. I may add further that I do not think that even the officer in charge knows of any such instance because I from my place in the council asked certain questions with reference to the way in which the martial law was worked, and Government on the 10th December gave a reply that as Your Lordship Hunter's Committee was going to enquire into the matter it was not necessary to anticipate the results. If they had given the information perhaps we would have been able to test it in the interval.

Q. There might be all sorts of cases which we are required to enquire into. The assumption is we are to enquire into the facts which can be credibly put before us. It really comes to this, first of all you say you do not object to the proclamation but only to the way in which it is carried out. Secondly you could give me no proofs on the latter point whatever?

A. On the first point I have no knowledge—personal knowledge. As to the second I say that some enquiries were made and in 4 or 5 particular cases they were not

in a crowd of 10 and yet were shot at, and these were engaged in personal pursuits. That is all I can say.

Q. As regards the case of the man who was going to buy vegetables that was only collected from affidavits made in connection with that case and your enquiries. The documents and affidavits are available and the record is on the file and if the Gujarat Sabha had wanted to pursue the point on that particular case I do not think there is any difficulty in the least in getting the case. They can be produced from the court?

A. Yes.

Q. And of course I cannot tell without looking at the affidavits whether they were not all second-hand evidence.

A. It was made by the father-in-law of the widow.

Q. Was he with the man when he died?

A. I cannot say.

Q. It is quite possible that this man may have been shot by a stray bullet?

A. Possibly.

Q. About this position generally. You are the Vice-President of the District Local Board and you are a Pleader?

A. I am.

Q. Now, would you mind telling me whether these sorts of incidents will recur in Ahmedabad?

A. No.

Q. What has been the change then, since April?

A. Well, I believe that the Government would not commit the mistakes that they did commit in the arrest of Mr. Gandhi and thereby outraging public feeling and I think even with reference to Miss Anasuya's reported arrest. But there was no likelihood of Miss Anasuya Bai being arrested because she is simply working in a peaceful mission for the uplift of the mill people.

Q. Government did not arrest Miss Anasuya?

A. No, but it was rumoured to that effect.

Q. Now I just want to ask you whether assuming that the Government were wrong in turning back Mr. Gandhi, the crowds or mobs were thrust into their mood by provocation and that is how they committed all this violence? Do you put it as an extreme provocation?

A. It was a provocation because Mr. Gandhi was on a peaceful mission and was known to have been on a peaceful mission. If Mr. Gandhi was arrested under other circumstances, the effect may not have been regarded as a provocation, but if he was on a peaceful mission and Government not understanding the purpose of his mission and perhaps intending to show the might of their authority, arrested him then certainly it may act upon them as a provocation and even extreme provocation.

Q. The result is that you do not quite know whether or not it should be regarded as extreme or not?

A. I do not know.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. In the last answer you gave to Justice Rankin you seem to make some distinction between Gandhi being arrested while going on a peaceful mission and his being arrested under some other circumstances. And you seem to suggest that inasmuch as Mr. Gandhi was arrested on this occasion while he was going on a peaceful mission that may afford some provocation.

A. It may create a feeling in the public mind that Government were putting themselves in a wrong position and also an unreasonable position.

Q. Do you suggest that the mill-hands and the ignorant crowds went about saying that Mr. Gandhi was arrested while he was going on a peaceful mission. In the last answer to Mr. Justice Rankin you raised this distinction that Mr. Gandhi on this particular occasion was arrested while he was going to Delhi on a peaceful mission, and therefore the public resentment was much greater. When you make this distinction do you suggest that the mill population, the labouring population in Ahmedabad had present in their minds this distinction that Mr. Gandhi was arrested on a peaceful mission, and therefore went off their heads and committed these deeds?

A. I would restrict it to the intelligent portion—the public outside the mill-hands.

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Q. Now, did the intelligent portion of the people of Ahmedabad take part in these riots?

A. Not so far as I am aware.

Q. Then all we are concerned with is the mill population. Certainly you agree that they could not, in their minds, have made this distinction that you are drawing?

A. Yes.

Q. Then, to them it was perfectly immaterial on what mission Mr. Gandhi proceeded and was arrested. It was simply sufficient to them that he was arrested. It does not matter under what circumstances?

A. Yes.

Q. And that turned their heads?

A. Yes.

Q. So far as they were concerned the circumstances under which Mr. Gandhi was arrested did not make any difference at all?

A. Not with the mill-hands.

Q. You say that on the 10th the crowd was making a peaceful demonstration outside the Kalupur gate?

A. I said "it is stated" because I was not a personal witness.

Q. When you say that the crowd was making a peaceful demonstration, what do you mean by that?

A. That is simply collecting together and saying *Mahatma Gandhi ki jai*, that is all.

Q. They were roaming about in the streets in large numbers obstructing the traffic, were they not?

A. Well, when people roam about without any intention to cause any obstruction, simply because of their numbers which in that sense obstructs the passage of vehicles, etc., I do not think that is called violent obstruction. I would call it peaceful obstruction, or rather peaceful demonstration to quote my own words from the statement.

Q. Then you said that because these Europeans used disrespectful language towards Mr. Gandhi that the burst occurred?

A. Thereafter the temper of the crowd changed.

Q. Now, have you any evidence in support of that statement that they (the Europeans) did use that language?

A. That is a statement made by one of the witnesses before the tribunal.

Q. I do not know what statement was made before the tribunal. But are you calling evidence before this committee in support of that statement?

A. I do not know if any evidence is to be called.

Q. You are representing the Gujarat Sabha, and you I see have signed a statement as such.

A. Because the Gujarat Sabha appointed a sub-committee to draw up a statement which was to be submitted to the committee, and I was simply a member on that committee.

Q. Now, in that statement you officially represent the Gujarat Sabha, so you ought to be in a position to answer my question. Are you calling any evidence in support of this statement?

A. Very likely not.

Q. If you are not calling any evidence in support of this allegation, do you think it is right, that you, as a lawyer, should put forward this statement in your evidence before this Committee?

A. That is just why I have put it like this, namely, that "it is stated."

Q. Well, in the evidence here you have repeated that allegation, and you persist in repeating that but for that incident these untoward events at Kalupur gate would not have happened. Do you think you were justified in repeating your allegation in that form in your evidence, though you had known that the Gujarat Sabha whom you represent officially for this purpose, were not calling any evidence to support this allegation?

A. Well, I felt myself justified in this way that if the Committee thought that some particular evidence on this point were necessary we might ask the Sabha to get it. Sir, may I refer you to paragraph 7 of our case. "Disturbance took place at Prem

Darwaza, where an excited crowd came into collision with the police when they fired on it and one police constable was killed. Members of the committee have no personal knowledge of this disturbance nor are they in a position to trace the immediate causes of the same."

Q. It is perfectly clear from this that the Sabha did not propose to call any evidence. Now with the certain knowledge of that do you think it was right for you to have persisted in making that allegation in your evidence when you were not going to call any evidence in support of it?

A. I have put in a separate statement along with that, under the head "Causes." This is a ground I based on what information I had got. Now in that case the witnesses were not asked to give evidence in support of their statement when they put it up as hearsay. Of course you may accept it for whatever it is worth. I mentioned it in my separate statement as a thing which was stated and which I have believed, and for that reason I put in a separate statement.

Q. When you put forward that allegation in your statement, I take it you put it forward for the Committee to accept it in some form or other. Do you expect the Committee to accept such statements when you do not prove them by calling witnesses in support of it?

A. The Committee is to come to a conclusion after enquiring from both sides—the Government side as well as the other side. The facts are put before the Committee as personal knowledge or as hearsay and it is for the Committee to call for such further information as is desired from one side or the other.

Q. So you want the Committee to act on hearsay information in support of which no evidence is called before them?

A. No. When such a statement is put in the Committee might see for themselves whether there is any truth or not by calling on the Government side to go into it. Therefore I made it clear by saying that it has been stated by one of the witnesses before the tribunal.

Q. Do you believe that statement?

A. Yes.

Q. And the evidence which makes you believe that is the affidavit made in that case?

A. The statement made in the course of the evidence.

Q. In a statement made by a witness before the tribunal?

A. Yes, in cross-examination.

Q. There was no affirmative evidence before the tribunal called in support of this statement, but it was a suggestion made in cross-examination to a witness for the prosecution and it was denied?

A. It was put so far as I know to the witness in cross-examination.

Q. Did that witness admit it or deny it?

A. My impression is that he admitted it, and that case went up twice.

Q. When these 2 Europeans had used bad language who was present?

A. I do not remember the name?

Q. Can you refer us to that admission of his before the tribunal. The proceedings are available, I suppose?

A. As I told you just now, that case was tried twice. There are records available. If they are accessible to me I may show you.

Q. I do not think there will be any difficulty as the Government Advocate can let you see the records. We would like to see it.

A. If Mr. Kemp would just get me from the Government Pleader the Prem *Darwaza* record case before the tribunal (No. 1), as well as the case before Mr. Kennedy, I would show you.

[See page 147, at the close of Mr. Patel's evidence.]

Q. Similarly regarding the statement that you make to the effect that several peaceful citizens engaged in peaceful pursuits are reported to be unnecessarily and wantonly wounded by soldiers, are

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the Gujarat Sabha calling any evidence in support of that statement?

A. I do not think, except for giving the names of the people who were wounded or who died.

Q. They have got the names of the people who were so wantonly wounded?

A. Yes.

Q. Are those people so wounded going to be called?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Then how is that statement going to be substantiated if they are available and you are not going to call them? How many were wounded in all?

A. 17 on the 12th and about 2 on the 13th, out of which 7 are dead and 12 are living.

Q. Are you going to call any of these 12?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Then is it not strange that 12 of those who you say were wounded are still living in the city, who you say are available, and still they are not called to give evidence before this Committee?

A. They should have been called.

Q. Certainly, if the allegation is true.

A. I reminded the Secretary of the Sabha to arrange to put them up if he could get these people.

Q. That is not the point. You are making this statement and if you want the Committee to act upon that statement or take any notice of it, surely you must produce evidence in support of it. You make this statement without producing any evidence, and how can any responsible committee take any notice of that allegation if it is not backed by evidence? You are lawyers of standing and ought to know this very well?

(Mr. V. J. Patel, Counsel to the Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad:—We never knew that the Government case was that after the proclamation was issued warning was going to be given to the crowd. We took it for granted that any crowd of 10 was to be shot at without any notice. This is the first time we came to learn that they first gave notice to the crowd to disperse and then they shot at them.)

(Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay:—May I suggest that Mr. Vallabhai is going to give evidence.)

(Sir C. H. Setalvad to Mr. Patel:—I did not quite understand you Mr. Patel.)

(Mr. Patel:—My point, Sir, is this, that this proclamation contained no words to the effect that the soldiers were to fire after warning was given to a crowd of 10 or more people. Till we came to this Committee and heard Mr. Chatfield's evidence, we did not know that there were any orders to the soldiers that they were to give notice to the crowd first to disperse. So we took it for granted as we had information that several people had been shot without any previous notice, and therefore it was not necessary for us to go into this question of bringing witnesses to this committee.)

Q. To Mr. Patel:—You knew what the Government case was some days back when Mr. Chatfield gave evidence?

A. Yes, only then.

Q. After that, did you make up your minds to call any of the witnesses?

A. We had very little time, because we had to come to court at 10.

Q. So that you do not propose to call in any witnesses?

A. No.

Q. To Witness:—Mr. Harilal, you heard Mr. Ramanbhai giving evidence?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you agree or disagree with him about the Satyagraha propaganda and civil disobedience propaganda?

A. I think you had better ask me distinct questions on the point, because I will not exactly say that I agree or disagree.

Q. You partly agree and partly disagree?

A. That would not quite define my position.

Q. You think that the civil disobedience propaganda in the present circumstances of the masses

is not a suitable thing to resort to for political purposes?

A. I generally sympathise with the movement, but I thought with the masses, it may get into lapses.

Q. A propaganda of that character is not likely to be grasped in its real aspects by the masses and is evidently likely to lead to violence.

A. Likely to lead to disturbances and violence.

Q. Your view is the same as Mr. Ramanbhai's i.e., it is undesirable to have civil disobedience propaganda among the masses

A. Generally I would say that I agree with that in this way. While I was in sympathy with it, I did not join the Satyagraha movement for the reason that if it took a very wide area of propaganda, it will not be worked in the true spirit of the originator.

Q. You grant that taking the ordinary masses, it is very difficult for them to grasp it really as Mr. Gandhi conceives it to be?

A. Certainly.

Q. Therefore it will be a thing unsuited for the masses?

A. Of course Satyagraha in the sense of practising civil disobedience within the limits of law is a thing which could be practised by only highly educated people.

Q. That is only very few people could follow it?

A. That is what I think.

Q. If inculcated on any large scale it is really calculated to unsettle the ordinary mind?

A. It might lead to wrong consequences.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Now if I understand you aright, I want to clear your position, whether I agree with you or not. You say, according to you, under the Criminal Procedure Code, no crowd can be shot without notice to disperse?

A. Yes.

Q. So far as the people of Ahmedabad were aware, from what was said by the authorities and what was done by the authorities, you thought that for at least three days, martial law was enforced in Ahmedabad?

A. It was.

Q. So far as you are concerned, you do not think that sections of the Criminal Procedure Code would apply?

A. No.

Q. Therefore for the first time when it was stated before this committee that there was no martial law, the question arose whether notice to disperse was given or not?

A. Yes.

Q. Then with regard to another point, I want to have it quite clear, whether I agree with you or not. Your case is this. You have put forward, if that fact were true, that abusive language was used by those two unfortunate men not as a justification?

A. I do not.

Q. You do not put forward the justification that those persons who were concerned should not deserve the highest penalty of the law?

A. No.

Q. You were only putting that forward to show that at that time there was no open rebellion and that the crowd did not intend to murder Europeans as such, but that was the reason why the crowd took that turn rightly or wrongly and began to kill Europeans. For that reason you are putting that forward?

A. I generally accept what you say, but I just wish to modify it in this way, that but for that the disturbances and the ebullition would never have occurred and, on account of the disturbances, the firing that came about rather changed their temper.

Q. You have put forward a second proposition, which is not quite clear. We have got the Moharram processions and the Dasehra processions. Moharram processions go on for a number of days. Hindus and others are not allowed to exercise their rights and they are not allowed to do certain things

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when those processions pass in the street out of respect for the feelings of the Muhammadan crowds?

A. There are limitations.

Q. They cannot enforce their rights which they have under the civil authority?

A. There are considerable limitations.

Q. Your point was that when about 2 or 3,000 people who were revering Mahatma Gandhi and were out on account of his arrest, if they were there, then it would be the height of folly for anybody to condemn Mahatma Gandhi. You do not put that forward as a justification?

A. Not at all.

Q. You only put that forward that because this thing happened, therefore the crowd lost its temper?

A. It was tactless.

Q. I am not putting the word tactless. I am not going so far. You put that forward as showing what led the crowd to assault and not as a justification?

A. No.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—

Q. Mr. Desai, you did not see any mobs on the 10th or 11th?

A. No.

Q. You did not see any single mob?

A. Except one.

Q. The whole of your movements on those two days were confined to the areas protected by the troops?

A. Ellis bridge area was not protected.

Q. You were in the court from 8 to 11-30?

A. From 7-30 to 12.

Q. You never looked out of the court to see the riots and destruction of property?

A. I saw it from the terrace.

Q. You never went out?

A. I did not.

Q. The roads were fully protected and incidentally no one attacked the court house?

A. There was a crowd once or twice very near the gates, but the gates were locked and there was guard near the Sessions court.

Q. What guard?

A. Police guard.

Q. How many?

A. 6 or 7.

Q. Armed?

A. Yes.

Q. You are sure they were armed?

A. Yes, the police in charge of prisoners are always armed.

Mr. M. C. PATEL, B.A., LL.B., Bar-at-Law, Ahmedabad.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Patel, you are a barrister, I believe?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you present in Ahmedabad during the period of the riots?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What can you tell us about the riots yourself?

A. On the 10th, I was present at the meeting in the Sabarmati sands. Although I was not in the front ranks of the Satyagrahis, I was just standing aside and some of the crowd came rushing towards me. Of course I thought it was my duty then just to speak to them to keep quiet. I rather formed a meeting then and there and exhorted them to stick very literally to the advice which Mr. Gandhi gave to all the persons. I said it was in the interest of the country and it was also due to their love of Mr. Gandhi to keep perfect peace.

Q. Was that meeting on the night of the 10th?

A. At about 7.

Q. You saw nothing of what occurred in the day?

A. No.

Q. Then on the 11th and 12th, what did you see?

A. On the 11th, at about 8 o'clock in the morning, I was going to court and somebody came running after my carriage and gave me the news that Anasuya was arrested. I went to court from there,

Q. Do you say that this armed police that were there kept away the crowd?

A. The gates were locked and three guards were placed one on each of the three gates.

Q. After being locked up behind the courts, after 12, you went out. Did you go further than the military picket?

A. There was no military picket there.

Q. Did you go to Khas bazar?

A. I went up to Hemabhai Institute.

Q. Was there a military picket there?

A. No.

Q. Did you go out of the lines of the military picket?

A. There were neither lines of military picket, nor a single soul. It must have arrived after 10-30.

(The President, interrupting:—We have to confine ourselves to three things, the disturbances, the causes and the measures taken.)

(Mr. Kemp:—I just wanted to show that this witness is entirely incompetent to show what the position in the city was. He has given this information that on the morning of the 12th, there was no military picket. I just wanted to give a reason for going on, but I am not pressing it.)

Q. With regard to the information you got about innocent persons being killed, there was a working committee formed of the Gujarat Sabha to enquire into this?

A. No.

Q. Do you say "No" or you do not know?

A. So far as I know, no working committee was formed to enquire into this.

Q. Do you make any distinction? You might be frank. Was there a working committee formed for any purpose?

A. I am quite frank. I have furnished the information in my statement. Beyond that I do not know. If there was any formed, I did not attend, and I do not know of the proceedings which happened behind my back.

Q. What are the names of the two European gentlemen who smilingly got out of their carriages?

A. I cannot give the names.

Q. Have you ever heard their names?

A. No.

Q. Who did you hear the story from?

A. I cannot give you exactly the name, but it was from those who were trying to pacify the crowd, some of the members of the Gujarat Sabha. I cannot give you the names.

At about a quarter to 9 my friend Mr. Desai came running in the bar room. I was sitting there and he asked me to go out just to appease the crowd that was coming with lathis. I at once ran out with him and came near Karanj gardens. I believe there was a sub-inspector standing there. The crowd was just near the Mission High School. I asked the sub-inspector to follow me. He could not leave the post. I ran towards them, went near them and stretched out my arms in the road and the crowd began to sit down. I addressed the crowd from a verandah for about 15 minutes. I requested them to put down their lathis and was just on the point of going to collect them in a bundle. In the meantime, my friend Mr. Majumdar came and asked me to allow him an opportunity for addressing. I of course stepped aside. In a minute or two after that, some incident occurred and the crowd at once got out of hand, took up lathis which they had put down and ran towards the Bhadar.

Q. What was the incident?

A. I could not exactly remember what it was. Then something happened.

Q. Then did you see what occurred at the Bhadar or elsewhere where there was incendiarism or violence on that day?

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[Continued.]

A. Immediately after that, I went to court and from court I went to the burning *mandap* and when I was just near the *kacheri*, my friend Mr. Desai came from that direction telling me that the *mandap* was already burnt and the crowd was unmanageable. So, of course, I had to return to the club and I waited there up to 11-30, and after that I wanted to go home. So I took the road towards Astodia Road, because the main roads through the three gates were in possession of the military and it was not possible to pass through them. While I was going home, I saw a crowd near the *Prarthna Samaj Mandir*. It was quite excited. They told us that shooting was going on and when I was going home, I saw some of the volunteers coming with wounded boys on stretchers. I went home.

Q. You were in the town for a considerable period during the day. Did you see yourself any cases of shooting?

A. No.

Q. Or on any day during the period?

A. Yes.

Q. On which day?

A. On the 12th. After martial law was proclaimed after 1 o'clock, I went outside the city walls and just near the Sarangpur gate I saw a party of Indian soldiers. They were about 10. There were some villagers sitting there. They did not shoot at them. But then they went round there and found there were no crowds. They simply fired two shots in the air. Then I was going towards Raipur gate. A party of soldiers followed me at a distance of about 10 feet behind me. After going some distance I saw that there was a crowd of mill-hands just near the Mahipatram Anath Ashram. Because martial law was proclaimed, I thought the soldiers would fire. So I got aside on a side road. The soldiers halted. As soon as the soldiers were seen all the crowd disappeared.

Q. There was no firing?

A. No. The soldiers returned. I proceeded a little further. Some two or three persons were deeply drunk and it was smelling all over. They rushed out and I at once began to stop them. I thought they would be shot down at once. Of course I could not control them. They ran towards the soldiers and in a minute shots were fired upon us. About 10 or 12 bullets fell and I was saved by a screen of rafters intervening. Of course there was no casualty there. After that I went into the city.

Q. Who had fired? These soldiers behind you?

A. Certainly.

Q. Do you suggest that they fired actually with a view to hit?

A. No.

Q. They must be very bad shots if they missed you?

A. I think they never meant to kill.

Q. So that as far as this incident was concerned, it was not a case of firing on people with a view to do injury?

A. No.

Q. Did you see on that day any firing with a view to hit people?

A. No, not myself.

Q. I have read over your statement, Mr. Patel. Of course we are all entitled to our own political views and you express here in considerable detail your political views; but after all we are not very materially interested in those views, except in so far as they have any direct bearing upon the question of the causes of the disturbances. You have heard what has already been said by several gentlemen representing your point of view. Do you think you can usefully add anything?

A. Nothing further so far as the causes are concerned. I can add nothing.

Q. So far as the measures that were adopted by the authorities to deal with the situation and as regards the shooting, can you tell us what you know about the occurrences?

A. Yes.

Q. Is there anything else that you want to say?

A. I have to add to what I have already said in my statement what I heard about the indiscreet shooting after the European soldiers were put in charge of the city. Reports were very thick that the shooting was rather indiscreet. That is all that I have heard.

Q. There are very different views about that, I suppose?

A. Yes.

Q. Even Mr. Gandhi himself yesterday said after the British troops had arrived, and when they were in charge, he thought that there must have been a considerable amount of restraint as greater casualties had not occurred. Do you agree with that view?

A. Opinions differ on that point. So far as I understand, public opinion was almost unanimous on that point that there was indiscreet shooting resorted to.

Q. When it was not likely, without shooting at all, to avoid the possibility of the mobs getting out of hand, you cannot restore order without it?

A. I quite agree.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You heard Mr. Gandhi's statement yesterday?

A. Yes.

Q. He said what happened on the 11th was pre-arranged. Do you agree with that?

A. Certainly not. I would say that that statement was not correct.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagan Narayan—

Q. According to your statement, soon after the *mandap* affair, you had a talk with Mr. Desai and he informed you that the crowd was out of hand and out of control even at that very early stage?

A. That is what I believe.

Q. Then you have made several allegations in your statement about indiscriminate shooting, but so far as I understand, that is the only one instance of which you have personal knowledge and that was not meant for killing?

A. That is exactly what I said. So far as I know, Indian soldiers are sympathetic.

Q. Have you personal knowledge of any other instances?

A. No.

Q. You say in two places that there was indiscriminate shooting, and all along there was shooting throughout the city. With regard to this statement, except that one instance, have you got personal knowledge of any other shooting?

A. No personal knowledge, but I was defending one of the accused in Fraser's murder trial, and there it was said by the principal witness—

Q. I do not want to hear that unless you have personal knowledge.

A. I have got no personal knowledge.

Q. Then so far as the proclamation of martial law is concerned practically from your statement it appears that except some sentimental objection you have no real objection to the proclamation of martial law on those two days?

A. I believe there was indiscreet shooting.

Q. Is that fact proved?

A. I believe it to be true.

Q. Then you have some objection to the European soldiers, because they were of too tender an age.

A. I rather found fault with the temper.

Q. Don't you see that by implication in your statement you mean to say that the Indian soldiers deliberately were not obeying orders?

A. I beg your pardon. They were carrying out the orders in the spirit in which they were given.

Q. They were not shooting to kill. If a soldier is ordered to shoot, he should shoot with a view to kill?

A. That is not what I mean. What I mean to say is this, that they knew the purpose for which they were kept there and Government could not have meant that we were to be shot down.

Q. Certainly when the order was given? Your idea is supposing that there had been Indian sol-

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Mr. M. C. PATEL—concluded—Mr. K. N. DESAI.

diers and there was an officer in command and an order was given to shoot, they would shoot in a way that there would be no casualties?

A. They would do so with a view to have the least casualties. The way to have the least casualties is to shoot in the air. I saw that two shots were fired when there were no crowds there.

Q. You think that the soldiers should have been more careful?

A. Yes.

Q. The second part of your evidence is about conspiracy, and your contention is that there was no conspiracy in Ahmedabad?

A. No.

Q. You have every praise for the sympathy and coolness of head of the District Magistrate of Ahmedabad?

A. Yes.

Q. You have no complaint about police enquiry, and you think that every police enquiry was properly done?

A. Yes.

Q. Then so far as the disturbances out of Ahmedabad but belonging to this very district are concerned your opinion is that with regard to the disturbances in Barjadi, Nadiad and Vadod, they should not have been convicted for waging war. You say that is the mistake committed. You think they should have been convicted under the Railway Act or for some other minor offences. That is your complaint?

A. Yes.

Mr. KRISHNALAL N. DESAI, M.A., LL.B., Secretary, Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad.

By the President—

Q. You are the Secretary of the Gujarat Sabha?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You heard what has already been said and I do not know if you want to add anything?

A. About the *Satyagraha Sabha*?

Q. Yes.

A. Not after what Mr. Gandhi has said.

Q. As regards the events themselves on the 10th of April did you see anything of the occurrences near the Prem gate?

A. No, Sir. Not personally.

Q. You were at the meeting held that evening?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On the 11th, when did you first hear of the disturbances?

A. At about 9-15.

Q. What had occurred?

A. That the Matriculation *mandap* was on fire.

Q. Did you go there?

A. I did go.

Q. Did you see it?

A. I saw it.

Q. Did you see crowds that day?

A. The first crowd I saw on that day was at about 8-15 on the Richey Road.

Q. Afterwards when you saw the *mandap* ablaze, you saw the crowd?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were the crowds very unruly?

A. Certainly, they were.

Q. Then in the afternoon you heard further that the mill-hands had struck work?

A. Yes, Sir. On the afternoon of the 10th.

Q. We have had a great deal of evidence already and I do not wish to duplicate the evidence. Is there any event of which you can speak from personal knowledge?

A. On the 11th?

Q. Yes.

A. I do not think I have anything to add.

Q. You have no personal knowledge as regards any of the shootings?

A. I have personal knowledge of about two incidents.

Q. Which were these?

A. One occurred on the afternoon of the 12th, at about 1 P.M., just about 10 or 15 paces from my own house.

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Q. Then so far as the Governor and the Local Government of Bombay are concerned, you think they have dealt with this critical situation in a very wise and sympathetic way and you have no cause of complaint?

A. What I had to say, I have said; I have nothing further than that.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—

Q. One of the points that you have mentioned is that the soldiers fired in the air. I see you yourself thought that they would fire, because there were some drunken men on the road?

A. Of course they were.

Q. You thought they were going to fire because you saw drunken people issuing?

A. Yes.

Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay (on resumption of sitting):—I made enquiries about the second trial in Imam Khan's murder case in the Sessions court and I find that one witness who had been examined before the tribunal and to whom no questions had been put on the point did in the Sessions court in cross-examination say that the *Sahibs* had abused Mr. Gandhi.

(President:—What expression did he use?)

(Advocate:—“Damn Gandhi.” That was what he had answered in cross-examination to a leading question.)

Q. Where is that exactly?

A. Just on the Khadia Road.

Q. What occurred there?

A. A group of about 10 to 12 females were standing where about 5 armed sepoys came with *shikar* arms and one of these *shikar* arms was fired.

Q. What occurred?

A. There was no casualty.

Q. What is the other incident?

A. The other is on the 13th, at about 12-30 P.M. One Motilal Harbol from my street was going to a shop on the Richey Road. Within 15 minutes of his going, information was received by me that he was killed, and on enquiry I found that he was going along to his shop when he was shot.

Q. You did not see actually what occurred?

A. I heard a shot.

Q. How was he hit? By a stray bullet or shot aimed at him by some soldier?

A. I cannot say.

Q. I ask you generally is there any point you would like to emphasise which has not been fully discussed?

A. No.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You heard Mr. Gandhi's evidence?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. He said that the happenings of the 11th were pre-arranged on the night of the 10th? Do you agree with that?

A. I have no evidence to support that.

Q. What is your own view?

A. I do not agree with that view.

Q. Speaking of the 10th, you say that Mr. Patel, Mr. Kanungo, Mr. Kothari were there, and on your way you remonstrated with a few mill-hands and tried to explain to them Mr. Gandhi's mission about non-violence. Did it have any effect?

A. At that time, they agreed that they would not cause violence.

Q. This was on the 10th? At what time?

A. At about 2 P.M.

Q. For the moment they agreed; but the effect of it was not lasting; they committed still greater excesses on the 11th?

A. Yes, Sir.

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[Continued.]

Q. You grant that this propaganda about inviting suffering on one's self and not committing violence is a thing which the ordinary mill-hand is unable to imbibe?

A. Certainly difficult.

Q. Very difficult, because it involves such control over ordinary human passions that it is only very few people that can rise to the level?

A. If properly explained, some of these, most of these, mill-hands would rise to the occasion.

Q. You explained this theory for many months in Ahmedabad?

A. The mill-hands were not invited, they were never present at most of these meetings.

Q. They were not members of the Satyagraha movement officially in that sense; still they were invited to follow the Satyagraha principles?

A. The mill-hands as a class were never invited.

Q. You invited all people in Ahmedabad to join the movement?

A. To the procession they were invited.

Q. Taking that procession of the 6th of April you say you invited all the mill-hands? What they understood was that it was some procession, some demonstration in opposition to the Rowlatt Bill. That was all they understood?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And they understood that Mr. Gandhi was leading the opposition?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. They could not, as you said, grasp this theory of Mr. Gandhi, of inviting suffering on one's self and committing no violence?

A. I would like to differentiate between the two. The theory of not doing violence, that would be grasped, but not that of inviting suffering.

Q. When passions are aroused, to abstain from committing violence, is that a thing, ordinary people with ordinary passions can practise?

A. It was not the arousing of passions for them. Mr. Gandhi was arrested. That only aroused their passions; that made them indignant.

Q. When passions are aroused in that manner in the ordinary man, is it not very difficult for him to exercise that control over his passions, and put in practice the theory of non-violence?

A. I think they can do.

Q. That it is very easy?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 10th and 11th, they failed to do that?

A. That was simply because I think there was not sufficient attempt to explain the details of the whole principle.

Q. On the 10th and 11th, they failed to do that because they did not grasp this principle of non-violence. Till they had not done that, was it not very dangerous to have taken all these mill-hands in this agitation?

A. That is exactly what I say. They were never taken.

Q. There was a manifestation against the Rowlatt Bill and they were asked to join in that manifestation. Is not it?

A. Yes, they were.

Q. You say they had not been trained sufficiently in the theory of non-violence which according to Mr. Gandhi was essential to the true carrying on of the agitation successfully from his point of view?

A. Yes.

Q. You further admit that they were not trained in that sufficiently as is evident from their doings of the 10th and 11th?

A. They were not sufficiently trained in all the principles of Satyagraha.

Q. But they were not trained in the essential thing, which is abstention from violence, which is the crux of the thing, and without which the whole will be a failure. They were not trained in that fundamental principle. Was it not then rather a dangerous thing to have asked the mill-hands to join in this agitation against the Rowlatt Bill?

A. So far as the 6th is concerned nobody knew that the arrest of Mr. Gandhi was coming so suddenly.

Q. Leave alone the arrest. You brought the mill-hands on the 6th in that agitation?

A. Manifestation.

Q. You can only take part in the agitation by taking part in the manifestation or procession. You admit that they had not been sufficiently trained in one of the fundamental principles underlying the peaceful and successful carrying out of such an agitation, according to Mr. Gandhi? With these two facts, was it not then dangerous, till they had been sufficiently trained, to have drawn them into the agitation?

A. But for the two supervening causes of Gandhi's arrest and Anasuya's rumoured arrest, I am sure they would not have broken out as they did.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Do you support the statement made by the Sabha so far as Prem gate is concerned?

A. I certainly support that statement. I also went to the Prem gate. I heard that rumour.

Q. You do not go beyond what we have heard from other witnesses, I do not want you to repeat it. Do you believe in that rumour?

A. The rumour about firing was false.

Q. About the abuse?

A. I heard several persons talking to me.

Q. Therefore why do you in one breath praise the authorities and in the other breath accuse them of not properly handling the situation?

A. I beg your pardon.

Q. You say that the authorities practically did not handle the situation tactfully at the Prem gate and had they handled it carefully nothing would have happened. You were not personally there; you have not placed the facts before us; then why do you say, had the authorities, etc., etc.?

A. From my personal inquiries I gathered that had the Collector immediately gone there, the situation would have been controlled.

Q. That is a different matter. Then it comes to this: that had he arrived on the scene and addressed them, then the crowd would have listened to him and not done anything?

A. Certainly.

Q. Surely you cannot expect your Collector to be at every place without being informed?

A. It was the first occurrence of a very serious character.

Q. It must take some time for the news to reach the Collector?

A. He received the news at 2-30.

Q. As soon as the news reached him surely you would expect him to make arrangements. He could not run to the spot. He would have to inform the District Superintendent of Police, collect the police and then come to the spot; it will take some time?

A. 2 to 2½ hours is too long a period when the circumstance was so serious.

Q. Had you any reason to suppose that for these two hours and a half he was not aware of what was going on?

A. Certainly. Had he come early, the situation would have been different. I did not blame him.

Q. Therefore you say careful handling. If by chance the Collector had arrived earlier, the situation would have eased?

A. Yes.

Q. It appears that after 2 P.M. on the 10th and after your experience on the 11th, you admit that in your statement, the crowd was out of control and though they might be prepared to listen to you they were not prepared to follow your advice?

A. On the 11th.

Q. Both on the 11th and the 10th. At what time you saw certain wounded persons brought to Kanuga dispensary?

A. At about 5 P.M.

Q. But some things were done by the crowd before that time, before 5 P.M.

A. Near the Prem gate?

Q. Anywhere? Did anything happen after 5 P.M., any mischief occur that day?

A. Nothing.

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[Concluded.]

Q. Therefore when you say that the sight of these wounded persons excited the mob then it must have led them to commit mischief. Any murder that was committed was before this?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore this would not be the exciting cause, seeing the dead body?

A. It did not result in any positive mischief.

Q. Therefore you do not say that this would be the exciting cause for what the mob did on that day?

A. Certainly not.

Q. The mob were so much excited on the 11th that they even tried to break down the motor car of Miss Anasuya Bai?

A. Yes.

Q. You and some other Satyagrahis were there?

A. Yes.

Q. The whole of your statement, to sum up, is that so far as you and others are concerned, that you were doing your best to appease the crowd, that though in the early part of the 10th you did succeed in certain places, after 2 P.M., you did not succeed in pacifying the crowd, on the 10th or the 11th?

A. On the night of the 10th?

Q. Not on the night. And your whole statement is to the effect that you were charged with this and that you did nothing. You were taking shelter behind the parapet wall. That is the meaning of your statement; you did not help us with any other facts. Your statement is that you, as a matter of fact, with some other officers of the Satyagraha Sabha were doing your best to pacify them?

A. Yes.

Q. With regard to the other facts, your facts are not based on personal knowledge but are based on rumour.

By Mr. Jivanlal V. Desai, Counsel to the Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad—

Q. You brought some wounded persons to the Kanuga dispensary?

A. Yes.

Q. Who brought them?

A. I do not know exactly.

Q. Were they brought by the police?

A. Certainly not.

Q. St. John's Ambulance men?

A. No.

Q. By some volunteers?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they treated there?

A. They were dressed.

Q. And then sent on to the civil hospital?

A. Yes.

Q. After that, you went to the Prem gate?

A. Went to the Bhadar, and then Prem gate.

Q. Now everything was quiet on the 10th?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 11th, after the burning of the mandap, where did you go?

A. Immediately after?

Q. Just about that time. Did you go to Mr. Patel's house?

A. Yes.

Q. What time?

A. About 9-45.

Q. Was Mr. Patel there?

A. He was not there.

Q. Any other members of the Gujarat Sabha or Satyagraha Sabha?

A. I found none there.

Q. When did they come up?

A. I found them there when I came again at 10-15.

Q. How many had been there?

A. We were about 6 or 7.

Q. And what were you doing?

A. Just considering what we were to do.

Q. Consulting your safety or assisting the wounded?

A. Some of us were assisting the wounded; others were considering what steps should be taken to prevent mischief.

Q. How long did you remain there?

A. For about quarter of an hour. Only when I heard that the telegraph office was set on fire, I went with Mr. Kalidas.

Q. To assist the firing or take away the mob?

A. Certainly to quell the mob.

Q. When did you go home?

A. About 12.

Q. Till that time, you were just about this locality?

A. Certainly.

Q. Did you confine yourself to your house that day or did you set out afterwards?

A. I went out at about 1-30.

Q. Where did you go?

A. To Mr. Patel's house.

Q. What for?

A. Just to see what to do.

Q. To do what?

A. To quell the mob.

Q. Did you find many of your friends there?

A. Yes.

Q. How many?

A. About 10 or 12.

Q. Any municipal councillors?

A. Yes; Mr. Patel and Mr. Kalidas.

Q. Any pleaders there?

A. Mr. Kothari was there.

Q. Any other pleaders?

A. Mr. Fulshanker came there.

Q. All assembled there?

A. Just to consider what they should do for the wounded.

Q. Now on the 11th, did any of you go to the civil hospital to inquire about the wounded?

A. Mr. Patel did.

Q. Who else?

A. Mr. Kanuga.

Q. What time did they come?

A. Went at 12-30 and returned at 5-30.

Q. You have mentioned to the President about an incident occurring near your house. Unfortunately one got killed?

A. Yes.

Q. As a responsible officer of the Gujarat Sabha, did you make any inquiries of any casualties?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Not as an officer of the Gujarat Sabha?

A. No.

Q. Then in your personal capacity?

A. At the request of Mr. Gandhi.

Q. At the request of Mr. Gandhi you made certain inquiries into certain casualties?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you personally tell us also how many were killed and how many were wounded on the 12th?

A. On the 12th, 16 wounded and 6 killed.

Q. Out of these 16 or over and above?

A. Over and above.

Q. On the 13th?

A. One wounded and one killed.

Q. How many women killed or wounded?

A. Three women.

Q. Did you make any inquiries into the relative causes of the incidents to these unfortunate individuals?

(President:—You cannot ask for the result of enquiries made by a private individual.)

(Mr. Jivanlal Desai:—That is what the police officer would do.)

(President:—If an official enquiry was made, that is all right. It is not for a private individual to make investigations.)

(Mr. Jivanlal Desai:—I was asking of any enquiries of the relations of the wounded. If it is not wanted, I shall stop.)

To witness.—You told us about the volunteer Ambulance Corps rendering assistance on the 10th and 11th. Was it spontaneously got up?

A. Spontaneously got up.

Q. Private hospitals?

A. Spontaneously got up in private buildings.

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Mr. V. J. PATEL.

Mr. V. J. PATEL, Bar-at-Law, Secretary, *Satyagraha Sabha*, Ahmedabad.

By the President—

Q. You have of course been present and acted on behalf of the *Satyagraha Sabha*?

A. Yes.

Q. You heard the evidence that has been given? I just leave it to yourself to supplement anything which has been said. A good deal of your statement is already covered by other evidence, with which you agree I think?

A. Yes.

Q. Are there any additional points?

A. One thing I want to explain to you is about the leaflet* which has been construed as a general invitation for *hartal* on behalf of the *Satyagraha Sabha*. I may say that the leaflet was issued long after the *hartal*, in order to prevent any misrepresentation regarding the points of Mr. Gandhi. Both the telegrams I received were translated, published and circulated.

So far as the 10th is concerned, I have nothing more to say except that we were all engaged on the Richey Road, most of us, and none of us got any information of the occurrences at the Prem gate till the incident was over. And the crowds were so great on the Richey Road that practically all of us were engaged on the Richey Road till about 5 o'clock, when we got information about the shooting incident, and when the wounded came from Dr. Kanuga's hospital we found it better to remove the whole crowd from the city by holding a meeting a little earlier, so we removed the whole crowd one hour earlier to the river-bed, and the effect of the meeting was good and at night till about 11 o'clock we patrolled in the city, and the only point that I can suggest is that we found no trace of any recurrence of trouble in the morning, and we found nobody who was likely to create any trouble next morning by way of organisation. Next morning we went round from very early in the morning and things appeared to assume a normal aspect, but there appeared to be a danger-point near the Prem gate, where there was a large crowd in front of the military, and we were trying to disperse them when Mr. Chatfield and Mr. Boyd came. I had a long talk with Mr. Chatfield and there I told him that in the city things appeared to have assumed a normal aspect, but I was rather apprehensive about the mill-hands because none of us had any particular control over them. Only Anasuya Ben or Gandhi could control them. I had wired to her the previous evening and she was expected and we induced the crowd to move from that place under the pretext that she was expected at her place. Of course it was a fact, but subsequently it was found that she did not come.

Q. Had she any intention of coming there?

A. Yes. We wired to her to come. She was not expected but for our wire, but our wire was received by her late, after the mail, so she could not come. But we thought she would come because we had wired.

Q. What time did you wire, was that on the 10th or the 11th?

A. 10th, between 5 and 6. As soon as we heard about the incident at the Prem gate we sent an urgent message. Then while we were persuading these crowds at the Prem gate, some accompanied us to her bungalow. In the compound we learnt there was a rumour in the city that she was arrested and there were large crowds moving about in the city with sticks which they had looted from the vegetable market, so we went there.

Q. Can you give me any suggestion as to the rumour about her arrest?

A. I am afraid I cannot. I have not been able to trace it; I have tried my best. And therefore we have no means for saying there was any organisation, but I am not prepared to disagree with Mr. Gandhi, and I would go so far as Mr. Chatfield, that there were some people, say a very few, who, it may not be on the night of the 10th, but on the morning of the 11th, certainly must have misled these people, because otherwise the conditions appeared to be quite normal and we were able

* Appendix 4 to the statement of Bombay Government, page 208.

to control these people but for the rumour which altogether upset them suddenly. And then things went beyond our control. Of course when I reached my house I saw flames coming out of various buildings which are very near my house, and immediately after I heard shots fired and two persons wounded fell in front of my house. I borrowed some cots from neighbours and got them removed through members of the *Satyagraha Ashram* who had come. I had called about 12 men and they came and informed me that they also were unable to say anything. So they removed the wounded, and some pleaders assisted me. Then of course we distributed large numbers of leaflets saying that Anasuya Ben was not arrested, she was free. Then it was impossible to circulate these leaflets because there was a sort of chaos. There was shooting and crowds were moving. At about 4 o'clock on the 11th when we went to the hospital it was overfull with wounded. Many of them were lying on the verandah because it was too full. There were about 70 people wounded in the hospital at about 4 o'clock, and by the evening of the 11th the situation was, as far as we could see, entirely under control. In my opinion there was no necessity for any such proclamation as was issued on the morning of the 12th at 9 o'clock, and I still maintain that in spite of the evidence that I have heard, the shooting on the 12th and the 13th was not justified by the facts.

Q. Did you yourself personally see any shooting that took place?

A. No, Sir, the difficulty was that our presence on those days gathered a large crowd around us, so we had practically to avoid appearing in public places on the 12th and the 13th in order to avoid shooting. As soon as we went on any public street people gathered from all sides to get information either about Mr. Gandhi or Anasuya Ben and various other things, and so there was a danger of unnecessary shooting.

Q. Then on the 12th did you see any incidents?

A. No, there was no disturbance on the 12th.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. On the morning of the 11th you found a crowd on the Richey Road and it was not doing any harm?

A. I did not see any crowd in the Richey Road on the morning of the 11th, it was at the Prem gate.

Q. On the morning of the 11th, and that was the crowd you tried to induce to disperse, so you took them to Miss Anasuya's bungalow?

A. Yes.

Q. And you told them that she was coming by mail?

A. That was before we removed them. We took them telling them she was expected.

Q. And while the crowd was there at her bungalow expecting her, her car came back from the train with the announcement that she had not arrived?

A. That there was a rumour in the city that she was arrested and large numbers of mill-hands were moving about with sticks.

Q. Up to the time that it was known that she had not come by that mail, there was no rumour that she was arrested?

A. None that I heard.

Q. What I mean to say is that, don't you think one thing that gave rise to the rumour that she was arrested was this, your having brought the crowd to her bungalow telling them she was coming and then her not coming? Did not that start the rumour?

A. No, the rumour started long before we left the bungalow, because we got information from the chauffeur himself that in the city there was a rumour and that the car was attacked and crowds had looted sticks and were bent upon mischief.

Q. Do you suggest there was a rumour before the mail train had arrived?

A. No.

Q. The time between the arrival of the train and the chauffeur getting to her bungalow was very short?

A. No, Mr. Desai, who came in the motor, went about in search of me in the motor for more than an hour, and eventually he came along.

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[Continued.]

Q. How long did the motor take to get to her bungalow after the train arrived?

A. The mail arrives at about 8-10.

Q. It was over an hour before the chauffeur turned up at the bungalow with the news that she had not come?

A. Yes.

Q. And in the meantime the rumour had got abroad?

A. And in the meantime the matriculation *mandap* was already on fire.

Q. I see from your statement that you were so nervous about the condition of the crowd that you actually took your own daughters away from the Training College?

A. Yes.

Q. And I take it at that time Indians as well as Europeans were nervous of the crowd as to what might happen?

A. Yes.

Q. You have given us particulars in your statement, but on the 10th you did address and did successfully disperse crowds at various places?

A. Yes.

Q. At the Richey Road at 2 o'clock, and at another place in the Richey Road at 3, and you told us what you were trying to do at 5 o'clock?

A. Yes.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. On the 10th by the evening you thought the situation was in hand?

A. On the 10th at about 11 o'clock we thought we were safe for the night.

Q. You were not sure for the next day?

A. No. Therefore twelve volunteers were sent for from Mr. Gandhi's *Ashram* on the 11th.

Q. I understand by the evening of the 10th you thought the situation was of such a character that there was no likelihood of any disturbance on the 11th?

A. Yes, but as there was that shooting incident, we thought it better to take precautions.

Q. So far as you were able to judge, by the evening of the 10th, after you addressed the crowds to disperse and so on, you were of the view that nothing untoward was going to happen on the 11th, that was your view?

A. Yes.

Q. But still you were not quite sure?

A. No.

Q. As a matter of precaution you did make arrangements to deal with the situation if it did arise?

A. As far as I could.

Q. On the 11th these disturbances occurred?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any organisation or arrangement on the night of the 10th?

A. I could see no trace.

Q. You saw that statement made by Mr. Gandhi that there was some arrangement made on the 10th by some people and you accept that?

A. No, Mr. Gandhi has never said so. I understood him to say that on the night of the 10th there might have been some people exciting the crowds.

Q. He was much more emphatic than that, he said in his view there was some pre-arrangement made on 10th by some people to bring about the events of the 11th?

A. I understood him to say there were some people who excited these people saying that they ought to do things like this.

Q. They told the crowd, or instigated them, or pointed out to them what acts of violence they should do?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was, according to him, done on the 10th?

A. On the night of the 10th.

Q. You seem to agree with that view?

A. What I say is this, that it may have been on the morning of the 11th or on the night of the 10th.

Q. Let us know exactly in what and how far you agree with Mr. Gandhi; do you agree with him in the suggestion that on the night of the 10th some designing

persons had pre-arranged and indicated to the mob the acts of violence that they were expected to commit the next day?

A. Not in the sense that they may have organised the thing, but they may have suggested it because I could see traces.

Q. What do you mean by organisation, if you bring together people and suggest certain things to them?

A. No, if a crowd is passing by a shop, some one sitting in the shop might say, "why are you moving about idly, you should do things in this manner."

Q. It was merely a casual suggestion?

A. Yes.

Q. That could not be during the night of the 10th. During the night you do not have shops open and crowds in the streets?

A. Many shops are open to 12 o'clock and crowds pass till mid-night, especially on the Richey Road.

Q. On the 10th were large crowds moving in the streets?

A. Till 11 o'clock there were large crowds on the Richey Road.

Q. On the 10th?

A. We were all busy on the night of the 10th on the Richey Road.

Q. Till what time?

A. Till 11 o'clock.

Q. You were moving about on the Richey Road?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you yourself hear or notice any instigation of that character?

A. No. But I could see traces of our attempts of trying to keep the peace being foiled by some people. This rumour of Anasuya Ben's arrest is one of the instances of somebody having started a rumour in order to foil our attempts.

Q. Your idea is that the rumour about Miss Anasuya was deliberately started as a part of the pre-arrangement?

A. Not as a part of the pre-arrangement; it may have been on the morning of the 11th.

Q. Why do you say that, what is the evidence in support of it?

A. There was no justification for such a rumour. A deliberately false rumour was started at a time when even the originator of the rumour must have thought that it was likely to create a considerable amount of mischief.

Q. I quite see that the rumour was started at a time and in a manner which shows that whoever started it, did it in a wicked manner, but is not that different? A man may take it into his head to do a thing of that character, that is quite different from saying that by pre-arrangement certain things were done?

A. I did not say by pre-arrangement, I say on the morning of the 11th that rumour was started by some one intending to create a disturbance or intending that the mill-hands might get out of control and create a disturbance.

Q. That is perfectly true; some one must have started the rumour, otherwise it would not have got currency?

A. That is so.

Q. You do not mean on the 10th a dozen people or half a dozen people met together and made up their minds in what direction they would mislead the crowd into violence, and carried out that plan?

A. Nor do I mean to suggest that Mr. Gandhi's information can be anything but true because he sifts his evidence so thoroughly from my experience.

Q. From your confidence in Mr. Gandhi you are prepared to accept that statement, but your own view is that on the night of the 10th or the morning of the 11th they did not sit down together and concoct what in their view should be done and they then carried out the campaign?

A. No, I do not suggest that.

Q. Then what you suggest is that when the crowds came on the streets some people took advantage of their presence there and suggested to them various acts of violence?

A. Yes, that is what I suggest.

10 January 1920.]

Mr. V. J. PATEL.

[concluded.]

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—

Q. I think you said, Mr. Patel, that before that leaflet* was issued to the public *hartal* was general?

A. Yes.

Q. You considered very carefully, I take it, the wording you put on the leaflet?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you consider now (I am not suggesting at the time you intended the *hartal* to go on), do you consider now that the wording of that was happy, having regard to the fact that there was a *hartal* going on?A. I can tell you this much, that this leaflet has not been considered to my knowledge by anybody as a general invitation for a *hartal* till for the first time I heard in the tribunal that the President of the tribunal considered it in that way; and I still consider it to be a correct translation of Mr. Gandhi's message.Q. It is only your addition that I am speaking of now. This is the translation I have of it:—"He has expressed his desire that all residing in the *Ashram* will celebrate this day and will do their work with double zeal and faith. It is requested that the whole public will respect his desire." Having regard to the fact that what the whole public were doing then was keeping this *hartal*, do you consider that that was calculated to make them stop this *hartal*?A. In the first place I do not grant your premises that the general public were keeping the *hartal*. The general public were never keeping *hartals*.

Q. You said, before the leaflet was issued, something was going on?

A. Before the leaflet was issued, as soon as the information was received from the telegraph office by me, the information went round the city like wild-fire and there was a spontaneous *hartal*.Q. There was a spontaneous *hartal* going on when your leaflet was issued at about 2?

A. Yes.

Q. Having regard to that, do you think the terms of your leaflet calculated to make them stop this general *hartal*?A. No, it was not possible by means of any leaflet to stop the *hartal* that day, but this leaflet had the effect of removing any misrepresentation about his arrest, and had the effect on the mind of some to consider that arrest as a matter for rejoicing, not as a matter for resentment.

Q. That would have been all right if you had stopped at the end of his telegram, I am talking only of your remarks at the bottom.

A. I do not consider that remark applies to the people for the zeal of going with the *hartal*, but it applies only to their considering it as a matter of rejoicing, the general public should regard this as a matter for rejoicing.

Q. And celebrate the day?

A. The celebration does not mean *hartal*.

Q. What other day had they celebrated before this?

A. No days.

Q. Was not the 6th of April so celebrated?

A. I beg your pardon, it was a mourning day, not a celebrating day. It is quite the reverse.

Q. Celebrating does not necessarily mean celebrating with joy?

A. Celebration necessarily means joy.

* Appendix 4 to Statement of Bombay Government, page 203.

Q. You probably know more about it than I do, we will take your own words in the vernacular, what were they? Have you got a copy of the leaflet?

A. I have got it by heart.

Q. Perhaps you can tell me what words you used for celebrating the day?

A. *Utsav*.

Q. What does that imply?

A. Celebration, rejoicing.

Q. Necessarily rejoicing?

A. *Utsav* cannot mean mourning.

Q. Had it been shown to the people how they should celebrate with joy?

A. Not by being angry, but by distributing sugar. Many people opened their shops and began to distribute sugar, but they found it too hard to withstand the opposition of the general mass.

Q. Why could you not make that clear in the notice?

A. This was not the only leaflet issued, all were issued together.

Q. Did you issue any leaflet in which you recommended the people to stop the *hartal*?A. No, it was impossible by a leaflet to stop the *hartal*.

Q. What was the object of issuing this?

A. To prevent any misrepresentation about his arrest.

Q. Did your words define what was the object?

A. The object was that they should not regard this as a matter of resentment against Government but should take it as a matter of rejoicing.

Mr. Kemp to President.—I do not know whether it is worth while going into the question of misrepresentations about the Rowlatt Act and whether the Committee wish to hear anything about that?

The Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan.—If he has any personal knowledge.

President.—Misrepresentation about the Rowlatt Act is a very general point. You have not suggested in your case that this witness made any particular statement about it.

Witness.—We heard about misrepresentations for the first time after the Martial Law Commissions began work.

President.—You have not made any statements about it. I don't see any use of a general examination of people in regard to what they may have heard about an enactment which may have been perfectly understood by the speakers and totally misunderstood by the whole audience.

Q. In that case there is of course no necessity for me to take it up at all. There is just one other question, Mr. Patel. Was there any working committee, or any other name you would like to give it, going about collecting evidence about innocent people being killed on the 12th and 13th?

A. Not innocent people, of people wounded and killed. The information was collected by me and my co-workers, not for the purpose of finding out who were innocent and who were guilty, but for the purpose of distributing relief to the wounded and the killed.

Q. Was no attempt made to find out who were killed quite innocently or wounded quite innocently?

A. No, no such enquiry was made.

Minutes of Evidence, Viramgam.

At Ahmedabad, Thursday, the 8th January 1920.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B.,
K.C.M.G., I.A.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., Secretary.

Mr. F. H. CALDECOTT, Assistant Collector of Salt and Excise, Kharaghoda Sub-division.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Caldecott, you are Assistant Collector of Salt and Excise in the Kharaghoda Sub-division.

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Where are you resident?

A. At Kharaghoda.

Q. How far is that from Viramgam?

A. 23 miles.

Q. Did you on the 12th of April last receive a message from Mr. Prescott?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. To what effect was it?

A. That the railway Traffic Inspector had been brought in on a light engine badly hit about the head, and he asked me to send the doctor down.

Q. And did you do that?

A. I did.

Q. Did you also ride down to Mr. Prescott's bungalow and see the Traffic Inspector?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was that?

A. Mr. MacIlvride.

Q. And did you learn from him what had been going on in Viramgam?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you make preparations then to go to Viramgam yourself?

A. Yes.

Q. You went back in the light engine that had brought Mr. MacIlvride?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you accompanied by any one?

A. I had 56 sepoy and Mr. Prescott.

Q. When did you arrive at Viramgam?

A. After sunset.

Q. When you were a little way out of Viramgam did you get any information?

A. The permanent-way gangsmen informed me the line had been torn up a bit and the train could not go on, and so I took the men out of the wagons and we marched into Viramgam yard. One thing I did not include in my report. There was a big crowd close to the spot where we detrained marching into Viramgam. Directly they saw us they ran away.

Q. When you arrived at the station of Viramgam what did you notice?

A. The whole yard was being looted. There is a big yard there for broad-gauge and metre-gauge wagons.

Q. Who was doing the looting?

A. Mostly people from the surrounding villages and railway-hands and mill-hands.

Q. Were many people engaged in it?

A. Yes, the yard was pretty well crowded.

Q. Did you clear the yard?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you then go to the Station Master's bungalow?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you find him in rather a perturbed state of mind?

A. He was.

Q. Did you give him a guard to look after his bungalow?

A. I gave him two sepoy.

Q. And you went across to Mr. Thornley's mill?

A. Yes.

Q. He, I think, had left?

A. He had left for Kharaghoda across country.

Q. Did you then go to the missionaries' bungalow?

A. Yes.

Q. And you left two sepoy to act as a guard there?

A. Two sepoy I left.

Q. From there did you proceed to the Government treasury?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you find damage had been done there?

A. Yes, the sub-inspector's office had been burnt, the outlying police lines had been burnt and also the top of the gate leading into the compound. There were also a lot of kerosine tins ready opened on the verandah of the treasury.

Q. Did you take certain steps in order to save the treasury?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What steps did you take?

A. I rushed up. There were a lot of people there and they ran away to the back of the treasury. I had a rough idea where the treasury was, so I went and stood in the doorway and after two or three people ran out I shouted out if any more people ran away I would shoot.

Q. Did you in fact shoot then?

A. I shot not to kill but to frighten, Sir.

Q. Did you fire in the air?

A. No. They had to rush down a passage and get behind a wall. Directly they got behind the wall I fired at them.

Q. How much firing took place?

A. I should think about four rounds altogether.

Q. Were any casualties caused by it?

A. There was one man outside whom I cannot claim to have killed. I think he was killed during the riots by the state of his body next morning. There was one killed outside. There were two wounded in front of the treasury, one was shot by a policeman who rushed in with a musket and let loose from his hip, and the other wounded man I do not know where he came from.

Q. Did you arrest any people?

A. Two in the treasury.

Q. Were these men engaged in looting at the time?

A. I presume so.

Q. Did you find the police guard had an easy time?

A. No, they had a very rough time.

Q. And did you collect some armed policemen?

A. Yes.

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Mr. F. H. CALDECOTT.

[Continued.]

Q. I think you gave them a jemadar and 10 of your sepoys?

A. Yes.

Q. That left a guard of about 20 people for the treasury?

A. And after that Major Cochran sent up, I think, 10 of his sepoys.

Q. I think before leaving the treasury you got a corrugated iron barricade pulled down?

A. Yes.

Q. Had that been wrecked before you got it pulled down?

A. No, it was standing; the dead man was behind that barricade.

Q. I see in the statement you have presented here you say: "before leaving the treasury I had pulled down a corrugated iron barricade which the mob had wrecked in front of the treasury?"

A. Had erected.

Q. This printing is very bad. So it had been erected by the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. For what purpose had it been erected?

A. They said they had been firing into the treasury from behind it.

Q. The mob had?

A. Yes, that was the intimation I received.

Q. Did you patrol the surrounding area?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And did you satisfy yourself that things were right?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you then go back to the station?

A. I went back to the station and met the regiment which had just arrived.

Q. Did you report yourself to the Major?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did he then go to the treasury with some sepoys to see things for himself?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you left behind to help Lieutenant Eales to choose suitable spots for posting guards on roads leading to the town of Viramgam?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. After this did you return to the station and place guards in the station yard?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What time was this now?

A. I really could not tell you because I never looked at my watch from the time we left Kharaghoda till midnight. I presume it must have been about 9 o'clock.

Q. And did you wait some time then at the station?

A. I waited till 12 o'clock.

Q. Then you left and stayed at Mr. Thornley's bungalow?

A. Yes.

Q. Next morning did you do anything?

A. The Major asked me to call up the leading Sethias of the place which I did.

Q. Did you interview them?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the interview about?

A. The Major told them that if they did not induce the people to open their shops by a certain hour in the afternoon, he would introduce martial law, and he explained what the steps of martial law would be.

Q. What steps did he explain?

A. That if groups of more than 10 were seen they would be shot at sight by the military.

Q. And what was the result of this interview?

A. All the shops were opened and things were quite normal by 5 o'clock.

Q. The rioting had lasted from 11 in the morning till about 10?

A. No, Sir, that is wrong, it ought to have been about 8 I think. Very soon after 8 we got to the treasury.

Q. During that time had the station, the post office and the municipal office been burnt down and part of the treasury damaged by fire?

A. Yes.

Q. I think the 3rd class magistrate who had ordered the armed police guard to fire on the mob at the treasury was captured by the rioters?

A. Yes, so I heard.

Q. You also heard that kerosine oil had been poured over him and he had been burnt alive?

A. Yes.

Q. Were the sepoys you had with you trained men?

A. Some of them were not; some of them were recruits.

Q. I think you gave them the option of falling out?

A. Yes, but they did not.

Q. Did they discharge their duties satisfactorily?

A. Pretty well, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Mr. Caldecott, I did not quite follow what you found at the treasury. First of all when you went to the treasury as I understand the mob had been firing on the police from behind a corrugated iron barrier?

A. Also from a chabutra in front of the upper storey flats.

Q. When you got to the treasury, did you find any policemen there?

A. I found them after I got into the treasury room.

Q. Where were the police?

A. In the treasury room.

Q. Now the firing that you did was done from what spot?

A. From right at the end of the verandah.

Q. Was that before you got into the treasury room?

A. Yes, before. It was after the firing that three hands were put out of the door and they said "We are police, stop shooting." So I stopped shooting and went up to the treasury.

Q. The people who had been firing from behind the corrugated iron, did they run away?

A. They had disappeared.

Q. And really you had to deal with the people who were inside the treasury?

A. They were inside the treasury exactly.

Q. The police who were inside the treasury, were they armed?

A. I cannot remember that.

Q. Had they been firing back?

A. Oh, it was dark then. There were only three men.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You say "To save what remained of the treasury and to rescue the police armed guards I had to take some stern steps?"

A. I meant the shooting to frighten.

Q. You did not shoot into the crowd?

A. No, I was firing as they came out of the treasury. It was a very dark passage.

Q. That is all you mean by stern steps?

A. That is all I mean, that is compared to the steps we had taken at the station yard.

Q. The mob was firing at the police from behind the corrugated iron barricade?

A. Yes.

Q. Where did they get their arms from?

A. I do not know. I heard that the crowd had gone to some well-to-do people who had got arms and threatened them, but I do not know whether they got their arms from them.

Q. Did you see what sort of arms they were?

A. No, we only found three sepoys' muskets in the compound.

Q. You found them after they dispersed?

A. Yes.

Q. They left the arms there?

A. They left the arms there till next morning. It was next morning I found those guns there.

Q. You did not see the people fire?

A. No, I did not see them.

Q. All that happened before you arrived?

A. Before I arrived.

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Mr. F. H. CALDECOTT.

[Continued.]

Q. And that night or next morning you found the guns lying there?

A. Yes, I went back with Major Cochran.

Q. And when you arrived you were told the mob from behind the barricade had fired at the police?

A. Yes.

Q. And these guns you took possession of?

A. I handed them over to the police havildar at the treasury.

Q. And you do not know what the investigation showed as to whom they belonged to?

A. No. I may also mention that we found a bag of rupees outside the treasury. One of the sepoys happened to kick a white cloth and he heard the sound of money and he picked up a bag of rupees which we took back to the treasury. I gave it over to the police havildar.

Q. Was that lying on the ground?

A. Lying on the ground.

Q. Evidently left by one of the rioters?

A. I presume so.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Did you submit a report after the event?

A. I did.

Q. How many persons were there in the crowd when you reached the place?

A. There might have been 30 or 40, roughly; it was hard to tell.

Q. And where were these three policemen, were they forming part of the crowd engaged in looting the treasury?

A. I cannot say that.

Q. Were they in the crowd?

A. They were in the treasury room from which these men had been running away.

Q. They were not in the crowd?

A. No.

Q. Did you threaten those men who were there that if they ran away they would be shot?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you find any marks on this barricade?

A. No, none at all.

Q. I will read out to you an extract from the Government statement which bears a different interpretation from yours. It says:—"Mr. Caldecott found only a score or so of men in the kacheri and threatened to shoot any who ran away. The others had apparently fled on hearing of his approach. About three men in the crowd asked him not to shoot as they were policemen."

A. I have not seen that report.

Q. It goes on:—"Some of the looters attempted to escape and five rounds were fired." Did you make that sort of report?

A. No, I never made that report.

Q. Did you consider yourself justified in shooting the men who were running away?

A. I was shooting not to kill but just to frighten them.

Q. Anyhow two were killed and one was wounded?

A. I cannot claim one and I do not know if I can claim the others.

Q. If five shots were fired by 50 soldiers, how many casualties would you expect? How many soldiers were with you?

A. The sepoys were not firing; I was firing with the subedar.

Q. Those who were with you did not fire and the looters escaped?

A. No, I fired at them when they had got round the corner.

Q. Can I have the original of the statement upon which this Government report is based, that "Mr. Caldecott found only a score of men," etc.?

Mr. Kemp.—I think it must be the letter* from the Assistant Collector of Viramgam. That is a more detailed report by Mr. Kissan.

Q. Did you make any report in the month of May or any statement to any of your superior officers?

A. I gave one to the special police officer.

Q. That is the only statement you gave?

A. I think one to Mr. Kissan.

Q. Therefore there will be three statements, one given to the police officer who came to investigate the case and the other to Mr. Kissan and the third one is the one from which you are examined?

A. I did really send in one report and I made notes of another. This statement is made from that.

Q. There will be two original reports, one given to the police officer who came to investigate the case and the other to Mr. Kissan?

A. Yes.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. These reports that you gave to the police officer and to your superior officers are identical with the statement you have made to the Committee now?

A. The report made to my superior officer is identical with what I have stated to-day.

Q. And practically you made a similar report to the police officer?

A. Yes.

Q. When you got into the treasury, how many policemen did you see?

A. I did not see the police until firing was stopped. The police were in the treasury room, I did not see them.

Q. How many of them?

A. Two or three sepoys if I remember rightly.

Q. Were they armed?

A. I cannot remember that.

Q. You state here they were armed police with rifles?

A. There were armed police, they were an armed guard.

Q. What sort of arms?

A. Three or four muskets and I found some inside the box in a room adjoining the treasury.

Q. They were lying about?

A. Yes, there were also cartridges.

Q. What kind of rifles were they?

A. Two-bore.

Q. Did you know how many policemen were guarding the treasury?

A. No.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—

Q. I take it, Mr. Caldecott, that after this threat of more stringent orders about firing, nothing at all was done?

A. There was an end to everything; there were no riots.

Q. Were there any bullet marks actually inside the treasury?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Did you see any bullet marks anywhere?

A. No, not even on the corrugated sheets.

Q. On the walls?

A. No, I never looked at them.

By Mr. Jivanlal V. Desai, Counsel to Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad—

Q. When you went to the treasury you saw a crowd of 20 people?

A. 30 or 40.

Q. How many of these were policemen?

A. There were no policemen among them.

Q. In the treasury room you saw three policemen?

A. When I went up.

Q. Were there any men besides these men?

A. There were two men.

Q. They were not connected with the police or revenue department?

A. No.

Q. Did you see any revenue pattewalas there?

A. No.

Q. Did you find out whether any policemen or revenue pattewala had any hand in the looting of the treasury?

A. No.

Q. How long have you been in this sub-division, Viramgam?

A. For 28 years at Kharaghoda.

Q. In 1917 there was brisk recruiting going on in Viramgam?

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Mr. F. H. CALDECOTT—concluded—Mr. M. A. MUNSHI

A. I was in Kharaghoda.
 Q. You had occasion to come to Viramgam?
 A. Very seldom.
 Q. You know that certain mill-agents had taken certain precautions to protect their mill-hands?
 A. No, I know nothing about it.
 Q. I give an instance of Naginlal. Do you know he had employed Pathans to protect his men?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you hear that he had to make special arrangements to supply the men with the necessities of life?
 A. I have not heard of that.
 Q. Did you hear of some war loan troubles in the Viramgam Taluka?
 A. No.
 Q. You know Rampura village? It is a talukdari village?
 A. Yes.

Q. There was correspondence going on about war loan?
 A. Yes, I remember it now.
 Q. And the amount collected was ordered to be refunded by the Government of Bombay?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Because the men in charge of the war loan had done something which ought not to have been done?
 A. Yes.
 Q. For how long have you known the *Awal Karkun* in Viramgam Taluka?
 A. I knew the circle Inspector for four or five years.
 Q. He had to do a lot with the villages there?
 A. I know nothing about it.
 Q. Had he any hand in the war loan?
 A. I cannot say.
 Q. Had he any hand in getting recruits?
 A. I cannot say.

Mr. M. A. MUNSHI, Station Master, Viramgam.

By the President—

Q. Are you Station Master at Viramgam?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. On the 12th April 1919 at about 9 o'clock did you see an unusual number of people standing in the third class passengers' waiting shed?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Were they passengers?
 A. They were not passengers.
 Q. What were they doing?
 A. They were waiting for something, looking for something.
 Q. I think you went afterwards to attend to your work?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Was your Traffic Inspector, Mr. MacIlvrde sitting in the waiting room?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Did you return at about 10 o'clock?
 A. Yes, Sir, from the yards.
 Q. Did you learn that when you were away the crowd had been dispersed by the police *Jamedar*?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. And that Mr. MacIlvrde had been advised to sit in the luggage office?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Why had he been so advised?
 A. As the waiting room was not a safe place for him to sit.
 Q. I think you had some work to attend to and you went to the yard to order some carriages to be attached to a train?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. When you returned at about 11, did you receive any information as to any occurrence?
 A. Yes.
 Q. What was that?
 A. That a crowd had jumped from the fencing in the garden and that they were repulsed and that Mr. MacIlvrde had been taken to or rather occupied the officers' rest-house.
 Q. Where is that officers' rest-house situated?
 A. On the top of the station buildings.
 Q. Did you go to see Mr. MacIlvrde as to whether he should remain there or go away by the Bhavnagar train?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. I think Mr. MacIlvrde wanted to wait and go back to Ahmedabad for his work?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. You agreed to that course?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Did you leave any one to protect Mr. MacIlvrde?
 A. Yes, a head watchman and a policeman.
 Q. I think Mr. MacIlvrde was served with his breakfast there?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Had you gone back to take some refreshments yourself?
 A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You were informed then that a big crowd of rioters had surrounded the station buildings?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. They had rushed into the telegraph office and broken all the communications?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Did you go and see for yourself if that had occurred?
 A. I came back to the station.
 Q. What did you find there?
 A. A large number of rioters were running up and down, backwards and forwards, and a young man was running about with a stick in his hand. He appeared to be the head of the rioters. I caught hold of that man and asked him the reason of his disorderly behaviour and as to why they had attacked the station. He replied to me that one Mr. Thornley was in the officers' rest-house upstairs. I told him that Mr. Thornley was not there but one Mr. MacIlvrde, my Traffic Inspector, was there. Still he insisted on it and said that Mr. Thornley was there. After that I took an oath and suggested that if he told his men not to throw stones and to disperse, I would take him alone with me on the top to assure him that Mr. Thornley was not there. That man lifted his hand and shouted out and tried to stop all the rioters, but of course they were very much excited and did not care for his order.
 Q. Why did the rioters wish to get hold of Mr. Thornley?
 A. I do not know that.
 Q. Did you take the young man you refer to to the gallery of the rest-house to show him that Mr. Thornley was not there?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. What were the people doing?
 A. They were breaking the windows and glasses with sticks and the people who were standing outside were throwing stones at random.
 Q. Did any of the stones strike you or any one of you?
 A. One or two stones struck me.
 Q. Where were these stones thrown?
 A. In the gallery of the rest-house.
 Q. You were told that Mr. MacIlvrde had been seriously injured?
 A. Yes, I was informed.
 Q. Where was he?
 A. He had come out of the rest-house in the gallery for the staircase.
 Q. Were the station buildings set on fire this time?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Did you send an urgent telegram to inform the Railway and Government Officers of what had happened and ask for assistance?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Were you able to send these communications by telegraph or telephone?
 A. No, Sir, none from Viramgam.
 Q. Why was that?

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Mr. M. A. MUNSHI.

[Continued.]

A. All communications were destroyed.
 Q. And you sent your message with your assistant and two signallers on an engine to Jakhwada station?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Where is that station?
 A. Seven miles away from Viramgam; to the south.
 Q. In the meantime Mr. MacIlvrde was sent by your staff on an engine to Kharaghoda?
 A. Yes.
 Q. I think he had been seriously injured?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Did you endeavour, as far as possible, to save the station buildings?
 A. Yes, Sir. Hose pipes were brought in.
 Q. What attitude did the mob take towards your saving the station buildings?
 A. They shouted from a distance and said that if I attempted to put out the fire I would be burnt alive.
 Q. About 3 o'clock did some of the rioters run towards the Kharaghoda line and take some rails off?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Were there many engaged in that work of removing the rail?
 A. I do not know how many there were, but from what I saw from the platform, I saw there was a gang of about 100 rioters on that side.
 Q. Were means taken to stop a train that had to pass over that line?
 A. I sent a memo to the Permanent-way Inspector to take measures to prevent any train from Kharaghoda side.
 Q. After the rioters had taken off the rails, did they return to the station?
 A. Yes, they returned to the station, near a signal box.
 Q. What did they do to the signal box?
 A. They set fire to it and to the transhipping staff office.
 Q. Did the crowd increase in numbers?
 A. Afterwards it increased in numbers.
 Q. Did they engage themselves in looting?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. What did they loot?
 A. The goods contained in the metre gauge and broad gauge wagons which were standing in the yard.
 Q. What did they get from these wagons?
 A. All sorts of sundries, grain, *jaggery*, *ghee*, cloth, etc.
 Q. I think Mr. MacIlvrde returned from Kharaghoda with Messrs. Caldecott and Prescott with Kharaghoda armed police at about 7-30?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Were there some grass wagons at the station?
 A. Yes, Sir. The train was standing there.
 Q. Did you manage to save some of them?
 A. All except two.
 Q. What happened to the two that were not saved?
 A. The contents were burnt to ashes.
 Q. Did a detachment of the 1/97th arrive from Ahmedabad by 9 at night and did they start patrolling the city?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Had people from the surrounding villages collected there?
 A. Yes, I was told by my staff that *badmashes* from the surrounding villages had collected there.
 Q. With what object?
 A. For causing more disturbances in the city.
 Q. And was that prevented by the arrival of the military?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. So far as you could judge, who constituted the rioters at Viramgam?
 A. The labouring class and the mill-hands.
 Q. Excepting the labouring class and mill-hands, was there any one else?
 A. I did not notice any others.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. You did not have any reason to suppose that the railway staff were taking part in the riots?

A. No, Sir.
 Q. So far as you know they attempted to defend the station and Mr. MacIlvrde as best as they could and to assist you?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. You say that the spirit amongst the rioters of Viramgam was very much increased after the arrival of the down Gujarat mail. Did that train bring country people or people from Ahmedabad into Viramgam?
 A. That was the train from Bombay, the Gujarat mail, that was a through-train from Bombay.
 Q. If the rioters were increased by people who came by that train, the suggestion is that they came from Ahmedabad?
 A. That is the idea behind.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. I do not quite understand what you mean when you say in your statement, "I did not take special notice of the passengers who arrived by down Gujarat mail train, but it is a well-known fact that the spirit amongst the rioters of Viramgam was very much increased after the arrival of that train." What do you mean by that? What date are you speaking of here?
 A. I am speaking of the 12th April. When I saw the people who were waiting in the waiting-shed before the arrival of the train, it did not appear that they were bent on mischief. They were waiting for something or looking for something, but I did not find any spirit in them at that time.
 Q. What do you mean by spirit?
 A. Any intention to cause trouble or disturbance.
 Q. They were doing nothing?
 A. They had collected.
 Q. Collected in the third class waiting room? They were not doing any destruction of property or shouting?
 A. No.
 Q. That was in the morning?
 A. At about 9 o'clock in the morning.
 Q. When did the Gujarat mail arrive?
 A. At about 10-15.
 Q. The destruction of the station and of the goods wagons occurred in the afternoon?
 A. After 12 o'clock.
 Q. Do you suggest that that was instigated by some passengers who had come by the Gujarat mail train?
 A. I cannot say that.
 Q. The young man that you saw leading the crowd in the afternoon, was he arrested?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. And tried?
 A. Yes, and convicted by the special tribunal.
 Q. Who was he?
 A. He was a Muhammadan belonging to the labouring class.
 Q. Was he a mill-hand?
 A. He was not a mill-hand. He was a private servant. I don't know whether he was a mill-hand or not.
 Q. In the crowds that you saw both in the morning and in the afternoon, you did not see any respectable people of the town?
 A. No, Sir.
 Q. These rioters at the station destroyed private property?
 A. Yes.
 Q. For instance the property lying in the wagons?
 A. In the wagons, in the luggage office yard as well, all of which belonged to private individuals or it may be called public property.
 Q. And they burnt the grass and fodder wagons?
 A. They set fire but only two wagons were burnt.
 Q. They attempted to destroy fodder wagons? Had that fodder come from some place or was it being despatched?
 A. It was transhipped. It was to go to Kathiawar. It had to be transhipped into metre gauge wagons at Viramgam.
 Q. Was it in large quantity?
 A. One wagon was set fire to, but there was a whole load of 42 vehicles.

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Q. And the crowd intended to destroy the whole of that?
A. They set fire at one end, but we separated all the wagons.

Q. Did you go into the town on the 12th?
A. No, Sir.

Q. You did not know what happened in the town?
A. Absolutely nothing.

Q. How many years have you been in Viramgam?
A. Three years.

Q. What is the number of the mill population in Viramgam?

A. About two thousand.

Q. In all how many mills are there?

A. Two mills.

Q. The whole labouring population is only 2,000?

A. No. The population is 20,000. The mill-hands number only 2,000.

Q. Are they Muhammadans or Hindus?

A. Muhammadans and Hindus as well.

Q. The Hindus live in Viramgam or come from outside Kathiawar and other places?

A. Specially the weavers and spinners stop at Viramgam.

Q. Are they residents of Viramgam or come from other places?

A. I could not tell you that.

Q. Were there any disturbances of this nature at any time before in Viramgam?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Did you anticipate any trouble of this character on the 12th?

A. No, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Had Mr. Thornley anything to do with the mills there?

A. Yes, he was the mill manager.

Q. Do any Europeans or European ladies live inside the town of Viramgam?

A. Not inside the town, none except one in the mill, Mr. Boileau.

Q. Any missionary?

A. Yes, there is a missionary lady.

Q. Mr. Calvert—Has he got ladies with him?

A. He is living with his family there.

Q. Was his family in any way assaulted?

A. I do not know.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. About this train, did it come from Bombay or Ahmedabad?

A. It was the Gujarat mail from Bombay and it came through Ahmedabad to Viramgam.

Q. What was the material that was used for setting these buildings on fire at the railway station?

A. Grass and kerosene oil.

Q. Did they come provided with those materials beforehand or did they take it from the station yard?

A. I could not tell you. In the beginning they must have brought from outside. Of course I had kerosene oil in the godown in one of the rooms in the station buildings. I had 60 wagons of kerosene oil and they may have taken out of that also. I cannot say definitely.

Q. You had plenty of grass?

A. Yes, there was a lot of fodder.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—

Q. Was this grass Government grass?

Mr. SAKERLAL BALVANTRAI THAKORE, Railway Police Sub-Inspector, Viramgam.

By the President—

Q. You are the railway Police Sub-Inspector at Viramgam?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did the rumour of Mr. Gandhi's arrest spread through the town very rapidly?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What was the effect of that?

A. Yes, these two wagons consisted of Government grass going up to Kathiawar and Rajkot in connection with famine operations.

Q. Was there a great scarcity of fodder up at Kathiawar?

A. Yes.

Q. How many trains were there on the 11th, i.e., the day before, from Ahmedabad to Viramgam?

A. There were three passenger trains.

Q. Does it not take about an hour from Ahmedabad to Viramgam?

A. Yes.

By Mr. Desai, Counsel to the Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad—

Q. Do you know that grass was sent by the Famine Commissioner to Kathiawar from other parts of Gujarat?

A. Yes, it was coming from Bulsar, Surat, Ujjain and Agra even.

Q. It was not Government property?

A. There was Government property also.

Q. Now, do you know that somewhere about the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918, there was recruiting going on briskly in Viramgam?

A. As a matter of fact, I do not take notice of outside work, as I have much to do myself.

Q. But surely you must have met certain gentlemen at the station now and then?

A. Well, I might have.

Q. Do you know that just about that time the merchants of Viramgam had employed special men to guard their men from being carried away by recruiting people?

A. I do not know that.

Q. Were you so busy with your own work?

A. Always.

Q. I suppose you know nothing about war loans either?

A. No.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Do you say that these 42 wagons belonged to Government?

A. I have not taken an inventory, but the wagons that were actually burnt to ashes, belonged to Government.

Q. And of these two happened to be Government property?

A. Yes.

Q. Both these two were not separate from the rest?

A. One was a metre gauge wagon, and the other wagon burnt was not unloaded.

Q. Now I want to understand you correctly. You said there were about 42 wagons?

A. Yes.

Q. Out of these 42, one was a metre gauge wagon?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they all together?

A. Yes.

Q. And there was nothing to indicate on the wagons whether any particular one belonged to Government or to private owners?

A. No.

Q. And the rioters attempted to set fire to the whole lot, and in the ordinary course, what happened to be burnt among other things was the property of Government?

A. Yes, the wagon which was burnt happened to be Government property.

A. On the 11th people closed their shops in the town as well as on the railway.

Q. Even the railway licensed vendors ceased work on the 11th?

A. Yes.

Q. And the mill-hands having stopped work, loitered about in crowds, I suppose?

A. Yes.

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Mr. SAKERLAL BALVANTRAI THAKORE.

[Continued.]

Q. Did you consider it advisable to take some precautionary measures and to give advice to your men?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you do?

A. I kept my men in the station yard with a view to prevent any disturbances occurring there.

Q. Did you ask them to convey to you information of any disorder that would accrue?

A. Yes.

Q. Did a number of people ramble about near your office on the morning of the 11th?

A. Yes, about 100 people.

Q. Did you manage to persuade them to go away?

A. Yes.

Q. But did the crowd re-appear at any other time?

A. Yes.

Q. Then coming on to the 12th, was there a considerable crowd coming into the railway compound?

A. Yes.

Q. How many people?

A. About 1,000.

Q. Did they appear to be looking for some one?

A. Yes, Mr. MacIlvride, the Traffic Inspector.

Q. What grievance had they against him?

A. I had learnt that the mob were out to assault any European officer and this Mr. MacIlvride is a European officer, so I sent a wire to my superior officer and informed Mr. MacIlvride to go away to Saoli or Khara-ghoda.

Q. What did Mr. MacIlvride do then?

A. He told me that he would go to Ahmedabad by the 10 up train.

Q. Did you think that the crowd intended seriously to attack him?

A. I do not know, but they were saying that they were going to injure any European officer.

Q. Did it appear to you that they were going to injure officers because they were representatives of the Government?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the situation an alarming one?

A. At that time it was serious.

Q. Did you endeavour to get the crowd to desist from their acts of lawlessness?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you succeed?

A. No.

Q. What did they do?

A. I persuaded them to desist, but subsequently another party came from the rear and seriously injured Mr. MacIlvride. I was near by at the time, and when I saw him bleeding, I watched over him, so the mob kept away from us.

Q. Did you see them set fire to the railway premises?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you endeavour to prevent that?

A. Yes.

Q. What were the properties set on fire?

A. They set fire to the telegraph office first, then came the luggage office, the rest house, the station master's office, the godown and the waiting-room.

Q. In setting fire to these buildings, did the crowd use any inflammable material?

A. That I do not know.

Q. Did they destroy telephone wires?

A. Yes. The Government telegraph wires just close to the compound were destroyed.

Q. We have been told that a third class Magistrate was very cruelly murdered. Where and when did this occur?

A. He was murdered just near the temple of the Goddess Desaphalia about 150 paces from the Kacheri.

Q. How far is it from the railway station?

A. More than half a mile.

Q. Did the news of this produce a serious effect in the minds of your men?

A. Yes, because when I sent one of my men to fetch the fire engine from the Municipality, he was told that if any police officers were seen they would be killed.

Q. Why? I suppose because he was a representative of Government?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the report reach your men as to the way in which the magistrate was murdered?

A. Yes.

Q. Were your men aware of the methods adopted by the crowd in doing to death the unfortunate men?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the report that it should have played such an excited effect on your men?

A. One of my men heard during the course of the burning that if anybody interfered and prevented them from doing this mischief, he would be thrown into the fire.

Q. Who brought you the information about the murder of the magistrate and how it was done?

A. When he was murdered some railway servants came from the town and reported to me that the rioters had followed him and brutally murdered him, by burning him alive.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Did you ever discover what the meaning or object or cause of all these riots at Viramgam was? What was it all about?

A. As soon as they heard of the disturbances at Ahmedabad at mail time on the 12th, they commenced all this mischief.

Q. Did you hear the crowd at the platform muttering any cries?

A. Yes, of Mahatma Gandhi ki jai.

Q. Any other?

A. No.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. On the evening of the 10th, news arrived of the arrest of Gandhi and did you see that the shops were closed?

A. Not on the evening of the 10th.

Q. What happened on the 10th when the news arrived at Viramgam? You say that at about 7 p.m. on the 10th rumours spread like wild-fire in the town, and that business was also closed down from the early morning of the 11th?

A. On the 10th the news came, and on the 11th shops closed.

Q. Did anything untoward happen on the 11th?

A. No.

Q. On that day shops remained closed, business was suspended, mills were not working and crowds were roaming about in the town?

A. Yes.

Q. But there were no disturbances?

A. There was no attack on the 11th on either the railway station or the mills, nor on Europeans.

Q. Did you see crowds roving about?

A. Yes, on the railway platform.

Q. They did no mischief on that day anywhere in the town so far as you know?

A. No.

Q. There was no attack on person or property on the 11th anywhere?

A. No.

Q. How do you account for their attacking person and property on the 12th?

A. After the arrival of the mail on the 12th, some men might have come from Ahmedabad and instigated them.

Q. Have you any evidence in support of that suggestion?

A. That was the rumour.

Q. Was any one from Ahmedabad arrested at Viramgam?

A. No.

Q. People from Ahmedabad came on the 12th and instigated the committal of these riots at Viramgam?

A. No.

Q. Now on the morning of the 12th news must have arrived of what had happened in Ahmedabad on the 10th and 11th?

A. Yes.

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Mr. SAKERLAL BALVANTRAI THAKORE.

[Continued.]

Q. Then do you not think that that really affected the minds of Viramgam people and they lost their heads over it?

A. There was a meeting in the town on the 11th.

Q. At what time?

A. At four o'clock.

Q. At that time had news of the happenings at Ahmedabad on the 11th arrived or not?

A. Some information was received. There were 2 trains before that.

Q. Now the burning of the public buildings in Ahmedabad happened between nine and eleven o'clock. Now at what time does the train arrive from Ahmedabad?

A. Well, it leaves Ahmedabad at 11 o'clock and it takes one hour to arrive at Viramgam.

Q. So that it is unlikely that by that train any news would have arrived of the happenings at Ahmedabad. There is no train after that. The meeting was held at 4 o'clock on the 11th, and the news of what actually happened at Ahmedabad could not have been actually available?

A. They may have got some information.

Q. Now the public buildings at Ahmedabad were burnt at about 11, and the train left Ahmedabad station at 11, so that it is very unlikely that news of the happenings at Ahmedabad could have been received by that train. Now have you positive information that before the meeting that was held at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the 11th, news had arrived in Viramgam of the attacks at Ahmedabad?

A. Yes, the guard and some passengers were talking about this.

Q. Were you at the station?

A. Yes, my duty was to attend all the trains.

Q. When that train arrived, what did you hear?

A. The driver and the guard spoke to me and told me that some buildings had been burnt at Ahmedabad.

Q. Did you attend this meeting which was held at 4 o'clock?

A. No.

Q. Is there any official report of what happened at that meeting?

A. I have nothing to do with it, as the town sub-inspector is required to submit the report.

Q. Did you hear anything about this meeting on the following day?

A. Yes, there was some agitation at the meeting to the effect that the people should follow the footsteps of Ahmedabad.

Q. There must be some official report of what happened I suppose?

A. The city police must know that.

Q. Then on the 12th when the crowd went to the waiting-room you say you succeeded in dispersing them by the help of a weaving master?

A. Yes.

Q. Was this weaving master one of the crowd or did he happen to be on the platform at the time for some business of his own?

A. Yes.

Q. He came there for some business of his own?

A. Yes.

Q. You took his help in dispersing the crowd?

A. Yes. I got information to advise Mr. MacIlvride to go away. At that time I was going upstairs.

Q. Where was the weaving master?

A. He was standing on the platform.

Q. You asked him to speak to the crowd?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the number of this crowd?

A. At that time it was 500 to 700.

Q. Consisting of mill hands and labourers?

A. Mill hands, labourers, etc.

Q. Were they armed?

A. At that time they were not armed.

Q. Were they in a very excited state?

A. Not very much.

Q. Then this weaving master was able to persuade them to disperse?

A. He tried to disperse them and then I told my jamadar to persuade them; then he succeeded.

Q. Between you and him, you succeeded in dispersing the crowd?

A. Yes.

Q. Then they came again later?

A. When I went home to take a meal, they came.

Q. You say that part of that crowd was armed with deadly weapons, swords, *dharias*, and country guns. Is that so?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Do you know where they got these guns and swords from?

A. From licensees in the town.

Q. Did they loot their houses and get the arms, or how did they get them?

A. They did not loot. They threatened the licensees and got them.

Q. When they came so armed, you say that you approached the leader and asked him the reason why they were creating this disturbance. Who was this leader?

A. One Muhammadan.

Q. Was he arrested ever afterwards?

A. He was arrested.

Q. Was he tried and convicted?

A. He was convicted—transportation for life.

Q. At the time when you spoke to him, he insisted on the *sahib* saying *Mahatma Gandhi ki jai*. That was his demand, that Mr. MacIlvride should say *Gandhi Mahatma ki jai*?

A. Yes.

Q. Did not the crowd want to attack Mr. MacIlvride?

A. They wanted him to shout *Gandhi Mahatma ki jai*.

Q. That was all that they wanted to be done?

A. I talked to only that leader.

Q. The leader wanted that the *sahib* should say this?

A. Mr. MacIlvride did not say this.

Q. I will come to that later. His demand was that the *sahib* should say this?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it put to Mr. MacIlvride that he should say this? Did he refuse to say so?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was Mr. MacIlvride at this time when this leader made this demand?

A. He was in the balcony with me.

Q. He heard that?

A. Yes.

Q. Then what happened? Did he say anything?

Did you tell him anything? Did he answer the leader?

A. He said I have nothing to do with Mr. Gandhi.

Q. What was his answer?

A. He said "I am a railway servant, I have nothing to do with Mr. Gandhi."

Q. And therefore he would not say that?

A. Yes.

Q. When he said that, did the leader and the crowd follow him and get more excited?

A. I was afterwards persuading them to disperse.

Q. I will come to the dispersion of the crowd in a minute. When Mr. MacIlvride refused to accede to the demand about shouting *Gandhi Mahatma ki jai*, did it excite the crowd at that moment? Did they shout or do anything to show in any manner their resentment?

A. They might have thought.

Q. You were there when this demand was made?

A. Yes.

Q. He refused to accede to the demand. What effect had that on the crowd? That is what I want to know. When he refused to accede to the demand made by the leader, what effect did it have on him and the crowd? You observed and you were standing there?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you see?

A. Mr. MacIlvride did not stop for a minute or a second, but went away to the rest house above the station.

Q. He refused to accede to this demand?

A. Yes.

Q. What effect did that refusal have on the crowd? A. That might have excited the rioters.

Q. What did you see?

A. I saw they were excited.

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Q. When Mr. MacIlvride refused to say that, they were excited?

A. Yes.

Q. At that moment Mr. MacIlvride went away?

A. Yes.

Q. Then what did the crowd do? You say they were excited. Did they do anything further then at the station?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they follow Mr. MacIlvride or try to follow him?

A. They went inside and injured him.

Q. Then they went into the rest house and injured him?

A. Yes. They were all standing in the balcony.

Q. Did you know the unfortunate magistrate Madhavlal who was burnt?

A. I knew him.

Q. For how many years have you been in Viramgam?

A. From September 1916.

Q. Madhavlal was there all the time that you were there?

A. Yes.

Q. Was he in any manner an unpopular officer?

A. No.

Q. How do you account for the crowd so brutally murdering him on this occasion. What do you think was the reason?

A. There is a rumour that he ordered firing.

Q. You think because earlier in the day he had ordered fire to be opened on the crowd he was so treated. Is that your explanation?

A. Yes.

Q. That is how you account for it?

A. Yes.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. What is the distance between the railway station and the town of Viramgam?

A. Nearly half a mile. The town begins from the Kacheri. It is about a quarter to half a mile.

Q. Quite close?

A. Yes.

Q. You said people were armed with some deadly weapons like swords and country guns?

A. Yes.

Q. About how many of the crowd were so armed?

A. About 4 or 5.

Q. How many had swords and how many guns approximately?

A. Four or five altogether. Two or three had swords and two or three guns.

Q. What is *dharia*?

A. It is an agricultural implement for cutting trees.

Q. Is it made of steel?

A. Yes.

Q. How many people had *dharias* in their hands?

A. About 50 or so. I cannot say exactly.

Q. You say that in your belief these swords and guns had been handed over to the mob by the license holders of their own accord?

A. Because they were threatened they had to yield. It was understood after investigation.

Q. Then were the wires at Viramgam cut in all directions?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see them cut?

A. Government wire is close to the railway compound. I saw it cut.

Q. What instruments did they employ for cutting wires?

A. Ordinary hatchets.

Q. How did they cut the wires? Did they climb up?

A. They brought a staircase and men jumped.

Q. Who brought the staircase?

A. Somebody.

Q. Someone of the rioters?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they bring it or loot it from the station?

A. They brought it from the neighbouring houses.

By Mr. Jivanlal V. Desai, Counsel to the Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad—

Q. Mr. Balvantrai, you know that there was some recruiting going on in Viramgam in 1918?

A. I was on the railway. It went on in the town.

Q. But you are a police officer and you ought to know what was going on there. Have you never heard of that?

A. My duty was separate.

Q. Have you heard of it or not?

A. Yes, recruiting was going on.

Q. Do you know that the mill agents had to employ special guards to protect their men from being carried away by recruiters?

A. No.

Q. You have never heard of that?

A. I do not know.

Mr. G. MACILVRIDE, Station Master, Ahmedabad (late Traffic Inspector).

By the President—

Q. Are you Traffic Superintendent, Mr. MacIlvride?

A. Station Master, Sir.

Q. You were Traffic Inspector?

A. Yes.

Q. Now you are Station Master?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 11th April did you leave Ahmedabad for Viramgam by 1 Down Mail?

A. Yes.

Q. What time was that?

A. 8-45.

Q. When did you reach Viramgam?

A. 10-10.

Q. When you reached Viramgam, was there anything occurring in the station?

A. Everything was normal.

Q. There had been some incidents the day before, but the station was quiet then?

A. Yes.

Q. You completed the work you had to do and left for Kharaghoda during the evening?

A. Yes.

Q. Up to that time, had nothing occurred?

A. Nothing.

Q. When you arrived at Kharaghoda, you received a message from the station master, Nadiad, that the troop train had been derailed?

A. Yes.

Q. You returned to Viramgam the next morning?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you notice anything about the station?

A. Nothing, Sir.

Q. Then I think you were told that the station master thought that you should go to the luggage office?

A. Yes.

Q. So far as you could judge, did you see any reason for that?

A. No.

Q. When you took up your position there, did anything occur to you?

A. Nothing.

Q. I think the sub-inspector of police came along and informed you that the situation was taking a turn for the worse?

A. Yes.

Q. What time would that be?

A. Just before the mail came in, 10-10.

Q. Did he say anything, whether you could walk on the platform?

A. He said I should not walk along on the platform.

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Mr. G. MACILVRIDE—concluded—Mr. J. A. GUIDER.

Q. I think after you had a talk with the sub-inspector, the mail came in and you went to the north end of the platform?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. To the island platform?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you go to find out what had occurred at Ahmedabad?

A. Yes.

Q. You heard rumours of the occurrences?

A. On account of receiving this message from Nadiad.

Q. When you were there, did you notice a crowd?

A. Yes.

Q. What were they doing?

A. They jumped over the railway fence.

Q. In what direction were they going?

A. Towards the city.

Q. Was that away or towards the railway station?

A. Away from the station.

Q. At that time did you leave for the officers' rest-house above the station?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the crowd dispersed then?

A. Yes.

Q. At about 12 o'clock, did the crowd come from the south approach of the station?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What did they do?

A. Before I knew where I was, they surrounded the station and I heard the breaking of lamps.

Q. How many people were in that crowd?

A. I cannot say.

Q. Then did stones come in through the windows and glass doors of the rest-house?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they flung at any one?

A. I suppose they were being thrown at me because I was there.

Q. Why were you singled out for attack?

A. That I cannot say, Sir.

Q. Had the crowd any cause of complaint against you?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. You only go occasionally to Viramgam?

A. Yes.

Q. Where is your station?

A. My headquarters is Ahmedabad.

Q. Did the rioters come to you and have a talk with you?

A. Yes.

Q. What did they say?

A. They asked me to say *Mahatma Gandhi ki jai*, to which I replied I had nothing to do with Mr. Gandhi, and my work was railway work pure and simple.

Q. What did they say?

A. Accused No. 1 tried to save me.

Q. Never mind about accused No. 1.

A. One of the crowd tried to save me, but a man from the rear hit me across the head with a stick.

Q. Were you hit more than once?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you become unconscious?

A. Yes.

Q. You were taken from the room?

A. Yes.

Q. You do not know what happened then?

A. No.

Q. When you came to your senses, where did you find yourself?

A. On a light engine proceeding to Kharaghoda.

Q. I think you had been taken to Mr. Prescott's bungalow?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Prescott attended to your wounds?

A. Yes.

Q. He wrote to the hospital compounder to come and attend?

A. Yes.

Q. I think the Assistant Collector also came across and attended to you?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you go back to Viramgam with the special?

A. Yes.

Q. As you proceeded, you were careful to see that the rails were not lifted?

A. Yes.

Q. The troops alighted about a mile away from Viramgam?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you find the outer signal damaged?

A. Yes.

Q. They attempted to burn a culvert?

A. Yes.

Q. On proceeding further, did you find a cabin damaged?

A. Yes.

Q. When you arrived at the station, were the mob doing anything?

A. From the cabin looking towards the station, we could see that the mobs were looting both broad gauge and metre gauge wagons.

Q. You left a picket at the station?

A. Yes.

Q. Troops came from Ahmedabad at about 9-30?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you leave about 11 o'clock at night for further medical treatment?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you receive such medical treatment?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you been rather seriously injured?

A. Yes.

Q. At the time did it appear to you that the intention of the crowd was to take your life or seriously injure you. What was it?

A. I never had time to think of it.

Q. You were unconscious and you do not know?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. You said that some of the mob had sticks or lathis?

A. Lathis.

Q. Did you see anybody with any fire-arms?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Before this day, Mr. MacIlvrde, were you personally known to a considerable number of mill-hands at Viramgam?

A. I do not know any of them.

Q. The bulk of the people did not know you?

A. Only the station staff know me.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. How far is Kharaghoda from Viramgam?

A. It is about 22 miles.

Q. You say you saw a crowd moving towards the city. You were at the island platform?

A. I saw the crowd moving from the island platform.

Q. Where was the crowd?

A. On the north approach of the station moving towards the city.

Q. Near the railway station?

A. Within the station gates.

Q. At that time you noticed the crowd for the first time?

A. Yes.

Mr. J. A. GUIDER, C.I.E., Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Bombay Presidency.

By the President—

Q. About the murder of the magistrate, I understand that you had to investigate?

A. I supervised the investigation.

Q. Did you make as full an investigation as you could have done?

A. I did.

Q. As a result of the investigation, did it appear that this gentleman had been murdered by being burnt?

8 January 1920.]

Mr. J. A. GUIDER.

[Concluded.]

A. He had been seriously assaulted before he was actually burnt. He was dragged out of the house, maltreated and brought to the street practically half dead. Kerosene oil was poured over him and he was burnt alive.

Q. Where did this occur?

A. In Viramgam town in the public street about 150 yards behind the *Kacheri*.

Q. At the time when it occurred, were there many people about?

A. Yes, it was 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

Q. Did that appear clearly in evidence?

A. Yes, and also before the tribunal.

Q. Although this had occurred at this public place, was any evidence got so as to convict anyone concerned in the murder?

A. Eight or nine witnesses were produced who actually witnessed it.

Q. What was the result of the trial?

A. There was a dissenting judgment. The President was for convicting several of them and the other two members disagreed.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Nobody was convicted of this murder, not because nobody who had seen it would come forward as a witness, but because the Court held that the identification was not strong enough?

A. The identification evidently was not strong enough in the opinion of two Commissioners.

Q. As regards the facts, can you tell me whether it was thought in the course of the trial that the man was done to death in the way you describe?

A. There was no dispute about the facts at all.

Q. Apart from the question of who did it, can you explain to me why there is any difficulty in producing some witnesses before us who could say that they saw that man being burnt to death and whether they could identify the persons concerned?

A. There is no difficulty in producing the witnesses, but we did not think it necessary as we have the judgments in the case.

Q. It is not the case that it was done and nobody is willing to come and say what he saw?

A. It is not so.

10 January 1920.]

Mr. MANILAL NAGARLAL.

At Ahmedabad, Saturday, the 10th January 1920.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B.,
K.C.M.G., I.A.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., Secretary.

Mr. MANILAL NAGARLAL, Clerk, Talukdari Settlement Office, Ahmedabad.

By the President—

Q. Were you a clerk in the Talukdari Settlement Office, Ahmedabad?

A. Yes, I am at present.

Q. In April 1919, were you a Karkun in the Mamlatdar's Kacheri?

A. Yes.

Q. That is at Viramgam?

A. Yes.

Q. On 12th April did you attend office?

A. Yes.

Q. At what time did the Ahal Karkun arrive?

A. At 11-15.

Q. About 12 or 12-30 did a considerable number of people arrive at the office?

A. Yes.

Q. What did they do?

A. They were shouting "Victory to Mahatma Gandhi," "beat" and throwing stones.

Q. Was there a police guard at the office?

A. Yes.

Q. What did it consist of?

A. Three sepoys and one havildar.

Q. Were shots fired?

A. Yes.

Q. How did they come to be fired?

A. When they threw stones on the police and the police guard and the main guard of the Kacheri, the police fired on them.

Q. Were any of the crowd wounded in consequence of the firing?

A. Three men were injured.

Q. Had the Ahal Karkun given orders to fire?

A. No.

Q. Had he given any orders at all about firing?

A. He had given orders to fire blank shots so that no one might be injured.

Q. He had given orders to fire blank shots and instead of that the shots that had been fired had not been blank. Is that so?

A. The firing which the police made before the order was given was not blank.

Q. Just explain in your own words what occurred then?

A. The Ahal Karkun and the Karkuns walked over the roofs of the houses behind the Kacheri and escaped.

Q. Escaped from the crowd?

A. The crowd was on the other side of the Kacheri in front of it whereas we jumped over the compound wall at the back near the police lines.

Q. Why did you jump?

A. Through fear of being injured or being beaten.

Q. At this time were the crowd threatening you?

A. They were shouting "Beat" "Beat" and were throwing stones.

Q. Were you afraid that they were going to attack you and perhaps take your lives?

A. Yes.

Q. Continuing the narrative you have to give us, what occurred afterwards?

A. We then put Mahdovlal in a warehouse. Then I went home. My house is near the house of Mahdovlal. I told Mahdovlal's wife to escape from the house. I removed my family from my house and then I started again to see the movements of the crowd.

Q. What did you see then?

A. In the meantime I saw the crowd going towards the house of Mahdovlal.

Q. Is that the Ahal Karkun?

A. Yes. Most of the men entered the house of Mahdovlal, threw down his property, looted most of it and burnt the rest.

Q. What did they do then?

A. Then they went back in search of Mahdovlal. I followed them to see.

Q. How far behind the crowd were you?

A. I went after about 10 or 12 minutes.

Q. Did you see Mahdovlal, Ahal Karkun?

A. I saw Mahdovlal from the lane opposite to Ambaji Matha Temple.

Q. At this time was he alive?

A. Yes.

Q. What was done to him?

A. Kerosene oil was poured on him and he was burnt.

Q. Did you see that yourself actually being done?

A. Yes.

Q. At the time when kerosene was poured on him, was he still alive?

A. Yes.

Q. When the kerosene was poured on him, then what was done to him?

A. Mahdovlal entreated that he should not be burnt. But still the people poured kerosene oil on him and burnt him.

Q. Did you yourself see certain of the people who were engaged in the actual murder?

A. I noticed these men and identified them before the tribunal.

Q. But I think there was other evidence as well given and the result was no one was actually convicted?

A. Two or three of those accused have been convicted.

Q. Was anyone convicted of the actual murder?

A. I do not know that.

Q. Apart altogether from whether the Ahal Karkun ordered firing or not, had any of the mob actually been killed by firing at this place before the attack was made upon the Ahal Karkun?

A. Three men were injured on account of the firing by the police guard when stones were thrown at them.

Q. Do I understand that no one was killed, although three men had been injured by the firing?

A. I do not know that.

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Mr. MANILAL NAGARLAL.

[Continued.]

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Before the police fired at all, what had happened?

A. The office of the sub-inspector was burnt.

Q. That was before the police fired at all?

A. Yes, and the mob had come there after burning the railway station and the post office.

Q. But at the Kacheri had anything else been done besides the burning of the sub-inspector's office?

A. A notice was pasted near the front gate.

Q. By whom?

A. I do not know who had pasted it.

Q. But what sort of notice was that?

A. If the Rowlett Act was not cancelled, the Raj would be lost and there would be disturbances and bloodshed.

Q. Before the police had fired, had there been any stones thrown?

A. Stones were thrown before the police fired.

Q. Where did the police fire from? From inside the Kacheri?

A. From near the treasury room where there is a police guard.

Q. But is the place where the police fired from inside the house or outside the house?

A. From the verandah of the Kacheri.

Q. Were you with the police all the time until they fired?

A. I could see the firing from the Kacheri door.

Q. How far away from the police?

A. Ten paces.

Q. Where was the Ahal Karkun all the time? Was he with you?

A. He was on the seat opposite.

Q. Quite near you?

A. Yes.

Q. When you saw this magistrate being burnt, you stayed and looked the whole time that he was being burnt?

A. I went away after a match was applied to him.

Q. When burning began and when he was still alive?

A. After he was dead. I went away after kerosene was poured on him and he was set fire to and the records of the Talukdari office were brought and heaped on him.

Q. Did they leave his ashes or his body at that spot where he was burnt?

A. Yes.

Q. You were not there?

A. No.

Q. Did you take any part in recovering his body afterwards?

A. No.

Q. After you left, you did not see any more with reference to this man?

A. No.

Q. When the mob came first, you say they were shouting *Maro, maro*, and *Mahatma Gandhi ki jai*?

A. Yes.

Q. That was before anybody had fired at all?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you able to gather from what you saw as to who it was that they wanted to beat, whether it was the policemen, or anybody who happened to be there or this Magistrate in particular?

A. They were shouting out generally *Maro, maro*, i.e., beat.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. When the mob arrived the Ahal Karkun and you were in the Kacheri?

A. Yes.

Q. And the police were in the adjoining verandah?

A. On the verandah.

Q. The police were in the verandah and you were inside the room?

A. Yes.

Q. When the mob came, did the police fire as soon as they came or when?

A. After they had thrown stones.

Q. The mob could not then know who ordered the firing?

A. Not at all.

Q. They may have believed that Mahdovlal ordered the firing?

A. They must have suspected him because he was the Magistrate.

Q. After that firing the mob rushed into that building?

A. I do not know that.

Q. After the first firing, you were inside with Mahdovlal and the police were on the verandah. What happened after the first firing when three men were injured?

A. As the rioters tried to rush into the place, within two or three minutes after the first firing we went away.

Q. You said Mahdovlal ordered blank firing. When was that?

A. At the time of leaving the Kacheri.

Q. As soon as the mob came in and you were leaving, he gave orders to fire blank when he was leaving?

A. Yes.

Q. How many years have you been in Viramgam?

A. Since a year and a quarter.

Q. Can you assign any particular reason why the mob murdered Mahdovlal in this manner? Is there any particular reason that you can think of?

A. Because they suspected that Mahdovlal had given the order to fire and when we were in the godown, I heard the people shouting that Mahdovlal had rushed away after giving the orders to fire.

Q. They were shouting that Mahdovlal had given orders to fire and had then rushed away?

A. Yes.

Q. Otherwise Mahdovlal was not generally an unpopular officer?

A. No.

Q. There was nothing beyond what happened that day that excited the crowd against him?

A. No.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—

Q. How far is the sub-inspector's office which was burnt before the police began to fire from the verandah where the police were?

A. About 25 paces.

By Mr. Jivanlal V. Desai, Counsel to the Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad—

Q. You have told us about some notice being pasted up at the gate?

A. Yes.

Q. When did you read it?

A. At 11 a.m. on the 12th April.

Q. Before you went to the Kacheri?

A. While I was in the Kacheri.

Q. Did you make any report about this notice to your superiors?

A. At 11-15, while I was reading the notice, Mahdovlal came there and I pointed out the notice to him.

Q. Were there any Karkuns in the Kacheri when you went there?

A. All were standing outside.

Q. They were all reading the notice?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was the Mamlatdar?

A. He was in the district.

Q. Did you tell the Mamlatdar about the notice when he arrived?

A. The Mamlatdar returned after two or three days.

Q. When he arrived, did you tell him?

A. I myself was outside Ahmedabad when he returned.

(Mr. Kemp:—I might just say this for the information of Mr. Desai. His direct superior Mr. Mahdovlal reported about this notice in a letter on that same date. He reported about this notice to the Mamlatdar who was on tour.)

10 January 1920.]

Mr. MANILAL NAGARLAL.

[Concluded.]

Q. When did you leave Viramgam?
 A. On the morning of the 13th.
 Q. You were in Viramgam the whole night of the 12th?
 A. Yes.
 Q. In the house?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Where was your house? Near the Matha?
 A. My house was opposite to Mahdovlal's house at a considerable distance from the Matha.
 Q. You gave no information to Mrs. Mahdovlal?
 A. Mrs. Mahdovlal hid herself and I did not see her afterwards.
 Q. She hid herself before Mahdovlal was burnt?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Even though you knew that Mahdovlal was being burnt, you did not care to see Mrs. Mahdovlal?
 A. Because I did not know where Mrs. Mahdovlal had hid herself.
 Q. You tried to find her?
 A. Yes.
 Q. I am told you left Viramgam immediately after these occurrences on the 12th. Is that correct?
 A. On the morning of the 13th.
 Q. You are a family man I suppose?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Where did they live on the 12th?
 A. In my house in Viramgam.
 Q. You are the son of Mr. Nagarlal, who was in the Ahmedabad police force?
 A. Yes.

Q. You are a friend of Mr. Mothichandra, sub-inspector of police, Viramgam?
 A. I am not his friend, but I call all the sub-inspectors my uncles, as my father was a sub-inspector.
 Q. You had to make your statement to the police a number of times?
 A. Only once before Mr. Lakia.
 Q. Who is Mr. Lakia?
 A. Police Inspector.
 Q. Where is he?
 A. In Viramgam.
 Q. Were you not taken to Khan Sahib Rashid Khan?
 A. He was also there.
 Q. How often?
 A. Only once.
 Q. You were a witness before the tribunal?
 A. Yes.
 Q. As regards the actual murder of Mahdovlal, you have not been believed by the tribunal?
 The President.—That does not follow, as you know in criminal cases the question is whether there has been sufficient proof to establish guilt.
 Q. There was some difficulty in Viramgam about recruiting. Did you know about it while you were there?
 A. At that time I was in the Collector's office.
 Q. Do you know that there was some difficulty in recruiting at Viramgam?
 A. How am I to know that?

Minutes of Evidence, Kaira District.

At Ahmedabad, Thursday, the 8th January 1920.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.
 The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.
 Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B.,
 K.C.M.G., I.A.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.
 The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.
 Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.
 Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., Secretary.

Rao Sahib N. V. TRIVEDI, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Kaira District.

By the President—
 Q. Are you the Deputy Superintendent of Police in Kaira district?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Is it a big or small district?
 A. It is a big district.
 Q. Are there many big towns in it?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. What are the largest towns?
 A. Nadiad and Anand.
 Q. What was the population of the two towns?
 A. Nadiad, 35 to 40 thousand. Anand about 20,000.
 Q. Was there much political activity in that district?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Is that of recent growth?
 A. Of course, of recent growth.
 Q. Is there any branch of the Home Rule League?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Were there causes for agitation there among the people, in political matters?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. What are those causes?
 A. With regard to what?
 Q. In regard generally to the agitation and unrest.
 A. First the Home Rule League; then came the Passive Resistance movement against payment of land revenue. Then the Rowlatt Bill agitation.
 Q. I think, as regards the period with which we are concerned, the Rowlatt Bill agitation may be considered as the principal cause?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. In that district, as at Ahmedabad, is Mr. Gandhi an influential personality?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Did the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest reach the district on the evening of the 10th?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did it come through a wire received by the Nadiad Home Rule League?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. What was the effect of the news spreading upon the people?
 A. There was excitement, and hartals at once commenced in all the big towns.
 Q. Was that started as a protest against the action of the Government?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Was any circular issued at this time either by any members of the Home Rule League or by the Satyagraha Sabha about Gandhi's arrest?
 A. I do not know.
 Q. We heard of a circular being issued and I wanted to question you about it. At Nadiad, after the shops had been closed and the mills struck work, did the labourers of the mills come out in bazars, in procession?
 A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were they in large numbers?
 A. About 3,000.
 Q. Were they lectured to by any one?
 A. They were lectured to by one Janardhan Sharma.
 Q. Who is he?
 A. He is a member of the Home Rule League and Satyagraha preacher.
 Q. You refer to him as the most irresponsible of Mr. Gandhi's followers. What do you mean by that?
 A. In his speeches he was very exciting.
 Q. Was another meeting held the same day, in the evening?
 A. At 8-30 p.m. Swadeshi was preached and Janardhan Sharma burnt his clothes saying that these were all of British manufacture.
 Q. Who preached this?
 A. Janardhan Sharma.
 Q. You say he referred to the British as foreign rulers? Did he refer to them in any other way?
 A. I was not present there at the meeting.
 Q. Was it the result of these meetings that the feelings of the people were roused against Government?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. On the 11th, were there further meetings?
 A. Yes, Sir. Throughout the district.
 Q. There is a Government High School at Nadiad?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did the mob go to it?
 A. They went in the morning and forced the headmaster to close the school.
 Q. Why was he asked to close the school?
 A. They said there was hartal and they should as a mark of respect to Mr. Gandhi; close the school.
 Q. Who was at the head of that crowd?
 A. Janardhan Sharma was at the head.
 Q. In the afternoon did he go to Anand?
 A. Yes, Sir. There he delivered a speech and sang inflammatory songs.
 Q. You were at Anand?
 A. I was not, but I came to know about it from the reports.
 Q. About what occurred at the time?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. At night time, was a lecture given to a large audience?
 A. Yes, Sir. Mr. Maulvi Sheikh Imam, a follower of Mr. Gandhi had gone from Ahmedabad and he lectured there. And Janardhan Sharma spoke.
 Q. By this time did news come of what had occurred at Ahmedabad?
 A. Yes, Sir.
 Q. Had that a very serious effect on the people?
 A. Yes. A very serious effect it had.
 Q. So far as Mr. Maulvi was concerned, he advised the audience to remain quiet and peaceful?
 A. Yes. He advised like that; but said 'my heart is bleeding' and all that and people naturally get excited.

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[Continued.]

Q. So you think his design was to speak of exciting things before the people and at the same time temper them with advice to remain quiet?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. They seemed to be seized with a sort of frenzy?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And against whom?

A. Against Government.

Q. I think there were reports as to firing on the people at Ahmedabad?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. That increased the feeling against the Government?

A. Considerably, Sir.

Q. In what state was the station staff at Nadiad?

A. The station staff had sympathy with the people. They had received news that a troops special was coming from Bombay to Ahmedabad. They received that news in the afternoon and that news was circulated in the whole town.

Q. Did the mob discuss what should be done as regards the troops that were to come to Ahmedabad?

A. A talk was going round the town as to how this troops special should be stopped.

Q. Then what was resolved on?

A. A rail was removed at night and the troops special was derailed. Fortunately, nobody was injured.

Q. Derailling might have led to very serious injury?

A. Nobody was injured.

Q. Did you find out who had effected the derailment?

A. Yes, Sir. There was a case sent up from Nadiad. They were young men.

Q. A case was sent up?

A. Before the 2nd Tribunal.

Q. Who were involved in that derailment?

A. The land holding class and *pattedars* mostly.

Q. Who are *pattedars*?

A. They are the influential land holding class of the district.

Q. Was there any particular grievance against Government?

A. They wanted to help the rioters at Ahmedabad. It was due to the resentment at the supposed arrest of Mr. Gandhi.

Q. Are these the only two causes you can suggest for their taking this action?

A. Their feeling were excited by the agitation against the Rowlatt Act.

Q. In connection with the agitation against the Rowlatt Act, were many rumours circulated in this district as well as in other places?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What were the rumours that were circulated?

A. That anybody could be arrested without any warrant or anything if the police thought fit; that was the idea prevailing amongst all the villagers in the district.

Q. So they looked upon the Rowlatt Act as a Black Act to destroy individual freedom?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was there any rumour connected with the Rowlatt Act as regards Government interfering with the freedom of marriage or freedom of holding property or anything of that sort?

A. No such rumours in my district.

Q. Now, on the 12th, did the news of the derailment of the troops special spread through the district?

A. Yes, Sir. Throughout.

Q. How was the news received?

A. It was considered as a sort of meritorious act.

Q. How do you account for that feeling among the people?

A. They thought that the rioters at Ahmedabad had risen against the Government. So this was in their favour.

Q. Were speeches made about this?

A. Yes. That Janardhan Sharma made a speech at Chaklashi.

Q. In praise of the derailment of the train?

A. Yes, Sir, that it was a patriotic act that these people had done in removing the rail.

Q. Was anything done to this man? Was he charged with any offence?

A. He was charged under Rule 25 of the Defence of India Act and sentenced to 18 months' rigorous imprisonment.

Q. Did news of what had occurred in the Punjab reach here?

A. By the 12th.

Q. What effect had it?

A. That also had a very exciting effect.

Q. What was generally reported or rumoured in the district as to what had occurred in the Punjab?

A. That wholesale shooting was being done in the Punjab as well as in Ahmedabad.

Q. Were acts of violence committed in other towns in the district?

A. At Anand also.

Q. What was done there?

A. They wanted to burn the Government dairy and the European dairy had to be closed down and they forced the licensed vendors at the railway station to observe the *hartal* and afterwards they burnt the house of one of the licensed vendors.

Q. They burnt the house?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Who was that vendor?

A. One Rogilal.

Q. What was the reason for his house being burnt?

A. Because he refused to observe the *hartal* and he was selling sweets at the station.

Q. Did the mob threaten to do more damage at Anand?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Then how were they prevented?

A. The police had taken action in guarding the places of the houses of the missionaries, dairies and Government properties.

Q. Were special measures taken to protect Government buildings?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Dairies and houses of Europeans?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were people leaving Anand in consequence of the hostile attitude of the people?

A. Yes. There was an European station master. His house was burnt and after that the house of Rogilal. He thought the situation was bad and removed his family to Baroda.

Q. On the afternoon of the 12th, news of the destruction of the telegraph offices at Ahmedabad and the cutting of telegraph wires at different places were quite known in large town and villages, on the railway line?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did the villagers follow the example that had been set?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. At what places?

A. Narsanda, Anand and Vadod.

Q. Was a culvert on the railway near the station set on fire?

A. Yes. That was extinguished on the police arriving in time. We had arranged with the railway men between the districts to put on patrols. There were rumours that more damage might be done to the railway line.

Q. You refer to Anand. Did anything occur in Nadiad?

A. At Nadiad this derailment and closing of the Government school took place and they wanted to do damage to the European dairy there.

Q. On the morning of the 13th, Mr. Gandhi passed through the Nadiad station?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did he give the people any advice to avoid violence?

A. He advised them to remain quiet.

Q. In the evening was his message read out at a public meeting?

A. Yes, Sir.

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[Continued.]

Q. Was that advising the *hartal* to be brought to an end next day?

A. The *hartal* was not brought to an end the next day, because the mill-hands would not allow that to be done.

Q. How long did the *hartal* last?

A. It lasted on the 14th and opened on the 15th.

Q. On the 17th, this Janardhan Sharma who excited the people was arrested?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On his being searched, were certain documents found on him?

A. It was a very anarchical poem. It was signed "Anarchist" and advocated murder of all officials, police, breaking telegraph wires and removing rails, for the sake of getting home rule. He said by *Satyagraha* alone they would not get it.

Q. I understand that a detachment of troops arrived in the district on the 13th, but the District Magistrate requisitioned further military help?

A. Because the feeling of the people was excited and very sullen and nobody knew when they might break out again.

Q. The District Magistrate was Mr. Ker. Is he still acting as District Magistrate?

A. No, Sir. He is on leave.

Q. Was he camping in the area from the 12th April to the beginning of June?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were there, so far as you know, any complaints made about the way in which he dealt with the situation?

A. No, Sir. On the contrary all liked the way in which the situation was managed in Kaira. That was in a great degree due to Mr. Ker who was very popular.

Q. Had you anything to do with the investigation of the offences committed during the time?

A. Yes, Sir. I supervised them.

Q. How many cases altogether were sent up?

A. Altogether 6 cases were sent up. One under the Defence of India Act.

Q. The case you already referred to?

A. Yes, Sir. Others were for offences under the Penal Code and the Telegraph Act.

Q. I think all these cases would be dealt with now?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were there convictions in all cases?

A. The last case, Anand Navli case, was withdrawn, and the Narsanda case ended in acquittal.

Q. In connection with the prosecution of these cases, was it an easy matter to get convictions?

A. It was a very difficult matter.

Q. How was that?

A. Because there was a strong public opposition and there was an unprecedented "*Khatpat*" to break down prosecutions, and witnesses perjured like anything. They gave evidence and on the strength of that the case was sent up. Later on they perjured in Court.

Q. That is to say, they made a different statement in the Court from the statement they made before the Magistrates?

A. Yes, Sir.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You spoke of misrepresentations in connection with the Rowlatt Act. People believed that under that Act the police could arrest anybody?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When did these misrepresentations of the Rowlatt Act come to your notice?

A. Since the time the Rowlatt Bill was introduced into the Council, and from the time the agitation started.

Q. Somewhere in February?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And was this understanding of the Rowlatt Act general in your district?

A. General.

Q. In places in Anand and Nadiad?

A. Everywhere, Sir.

Q. That anybody can be arrested under the Rowlatt Act by the police? Was that the only misrepresentation you are aware of?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You say that this misrepresentation was made at the meetings of the 11th?

A. At the meetings as well as in the literature which was being circulated on the subject.

Q. Do you mean to say that in the literature that was circulated about the Rowlatt Act it was said that, irrespective of anything, any person can be arrested by the police?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Can you produce any copies of that literature?

A. I think Mr. Vallabhai issued a summary of the Rowlatt Act and according to those provisions Government could arrest anybody.

Q. That pamphlet summarized or stated what the actual provisions of the Rowlatt Act were?

A. Yes, some of them.

Q. And then it stated what the writer thought was the effect of it?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that what you mean when you say that misrepresentation was made by publishing pamphlets?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you speak of misrepresentations at meetings, were you present at any of these meetings?

A. No, I was not present but said that from the reports which I have seen.

Q. Have you got those reports of those meetings?

A. I have not got them here.

Q. Can you produce them?

A. I will see.

Q. If you will kindly do so have them sent up.

A. Very well.

Q. When these misrepresentations came to your knowledge or to the knowledge of the authorities were any steps taken by the authorities to explain to the people the real provisions and to disabuse their minds of these misrepresentations?

A. I know about myself; I tried to do it.

Q. What did you do?

A. I said it was not like that, and that it was only in political cases that people could be arrested like that.

Q. You are a busy officer, you could only have spoken to such people as you came across. Was any systematic effort made when these misrepresentations came to the notice of the authorities to correct the misrepresentations? Were any steps taken?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. The misrepresentation was allowed currency all the time?

A. I suppose so.

Q. Mr. Gandhi was a very popular figure in Kaira and also in Ahmedabad and other parts of the country?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When the news of his arrest came it naturally very much excited the populace?

A. Yes.

Q. You attribute, I take it, the disturbances that actually occurred mainly to that cause?

A. Mainly.

Q. You say further excitement was caused by news about the Punjab.

A. The Punjab and Ahmedabad, both.

Q. What was the news about the Punjab, that there had been indiscriminate shooting in the Punjab?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. That was what people believed?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. That the Punjab people had been indiscriminately shot at by the authorities?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Who spread that?

A. We cannot say who spread it, but that was the general impression.

Q. When did that report come to your notice?

A. By the 12th.

Q. In the Punjab nothing happened till the 10th and the first incidents we have were at Amritsar and at Lahore on the 10th, and the Jallianwala

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[Continued.]

Bagh shooting did not take place till the 13th. So on the 12th or before that you could not have had reports about indiscriminate shooting in the Punjab?

A. We had in the papers.

Q. How could you have in the papers on the 12th what happened on the 13th?

A. If you will refer to the vernacular papers of the 11th, received on the 12th, you will find that.

Q. Find what?

A. That shootings were going on in the Punjab.

Q. Versions of shooting on the 10th at Lahore and Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. And that further excited the crowds?

A. Yes. But the greater effect was caused by the rumours about Ahmedabad; that was the immediate thing.

Q. Then came the news of the happenings at Ahmedabad on the 10th and 11th?

A. Yes.

Q. And the people in your district believed there had been indiscriminate shooting at Ahmedabad?

A. Yes, and they heard that Government offices were burnt and murders were committed. We were hearing all sorts of rumours.

Q. What was the sort of belief that excited the populace? Were they told there had been indiscriminate shooting in Ahmedabad?

A. That many people were shot down and that Government offices were burnt and there was nothing like Government; that was the impression.

Q. What excited the crowd, the news that the people from among the public were shot, did that excite them?

A. These things excited them, but the news that the people had done these things in Ahmedabad caused a great frenzy in their minds.

Q. And they lost their heads?

A. Yes, they lost their heads.

Q. This derailment of the troop train, was that in your opinion actuated by the motive to prevent the troops from going to Ahmedabad and having more shooting?

A. Yes.

Q. At what distance from Nadiad did the derailment take place?

A. It was about a mile and a half from Nadiad.

Q. It was during the night?

A. Between half past 12 and 2 A.M.

Q. Was that after the ordinary mail had passed?

A. The ordinary mail and the other trains had passed.

Q. Then it must have been later?

A. The ordinary mail passes at 11.

Q. You are speaking of the up mail, I am speaking of the down mail?

A. The down mail came after the troop special.

Q. After the Bombay mail from Ahmedabad had passed?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you said some other train?

A. Yes, there is a passenger train.

Q. So the line was safe till then?

A. Yes.

Q. And it must have been done some time after that?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And the troop train arrived at 2 A.M.?

A. Yes.

Q. For what distance was the line taken up?

A. One rail was lifted off. The bolts were taken off and the rail was thrown down the embankment, which was very high there. If the train had gone a little to a side, there would have been a very bad accident because it would have gone down.

Q. This taking out of the rail could have been done without special implements?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. If anybody had got spanners they could have done it; they did not require any special railway implements for that purpose?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Anybody could do that?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. People were arrested for this and prosecuted?

A. Yes.

Q. They were all acquitted?

A. Except one.

Q. In the derailment case?

A. Yes. They were not acquitted: they were discharged because the witnesses turned round, and they are being prosecuted for perjury.

Q. One or other of their statements must be false, the one made before the Magistrate or the one made before the Tribunal, it is difficult to say which one was false?

A. The one they made here, that was false.

Q. How can you say that? The other may be false and this may be true?

A. There are certain other circumstances that lead us to find that the statements made here were false, because one man went and told Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Gandhi gave him a three days' fast for taking part in this.

Q. One of the accused, according to you, went and confessed to Mr. Gandhi; where did you get that from, were you present?

A. No, I got it from the accused himself, and that is corroborated by my other information.

Q. Did that accused confess before the Tribunal?

A. That accused made a statement before the District Magistrate, but later on he turned round and denied it.

Q. He made a statement before the District Magistrate that he had confessed to Mr. Gandhi?

A. He told that to me.

Q. You said he made some statement to the District Magistrate?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did he in that statement to the District Magistrate say he had confessed his guilt to Mr. Gandhi?

A. No.

Q. Nor did he say that before the Tribunal?

A. No, he said that somebody had put it into his mind to say that.

Q. He did not say before the Tribunal that he had confessed to Mr. Gandhi?

A. No.

Q. Did he say that to you?

A. Yes, he said that to me.

Q. In the course of your investigation?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you take steps to verify that?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you go to Mr. Gandhi and ask him?

A. I asked Mr. Ker, the District Magistrate; he had a talk with Mr. Gandhi on this and certain other steps.

Q. This statement was made to you; did you take any steps to verify it?

A. I reported the matter to the District Magistrate.

Q. And did he take any steps to verify it?

A. I think he verified it.

Q. And was that result reported to you?

A. Yes, I wanted to put Mr. Gandhi in the witness box.

Q. We are coming to the trial, but first what steps were taken to verify the statement that he had confessed to Mr. Gandhi? What steps did you or Mr. Ker take to verify from Mr. Gandhi whether this was true?

A. Mr. Ker asked Mr. Gandhi as far as I believe.

Q. Did Mr. Ker tell you he had asked Mr. Gandhi?

A. He said he had had a talk with Mr. Gandhi.

Q. Did Mr. Ker tell you this was true, that he had asked Mr. Gandhi whether this particular person had confessed his guilt to him?

A. I do not know.

Q. Mr. Ker did not tell you anything about it?

A. Not particularly.

Q. After your report to Mr. Ker he did not tell you he had taken steps to verify that by asking Mr. Gandhi about it?

A. He told me he had asked Mr. Gandhi in connection with these cases.

Q. He may have asked Mr. Gandhi many things in connection with these cases, but did he tell you

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[Continued.]

he had asked Mr. Gandhi this particular question whether this particular person had confessed to him?

A. He did not tell me anything particularly like that.

Q. You say you wished to call Mr. Gandhi as a witness?

A. Mr. Ker said Mr. Gandhi perhaps would not give evidence because he thought Mr. Gandhi had taken up the attitude as if he were a father confessor.

Q. He thought Mr. Gandhi would take up the attitude that this statement was made to him in confidence and he would not disclose it?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he disclose it to Mr. Ker?

A. I think so.

Q. He disclosed it to Mr. Ker?

A. I think so.

Q. If he had disclosed it to Mr. Ker he would have had no objection to disclose it to the Court?

A. I had a talk with Mr. Ker, and Mr. Gandhi had told him certain things on condition that he did not make use of them officially.

Q. Mr. Ker received certain information from Mr. Gandhi on an assurance of keeping confidence?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. So Mr. Ker was not in a position to make use of it?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In Nadiad and Anand there was no violence or destruction of property except in connection with that sweetmeat seller you spoke of?

A. No, the police had taken precautions from the first.

Q. But the fact is that there was no actual disturbance either in Nadiad or Anand, or any destruction of property or taking of life?

A. Not the taking of life, but the telegraph wires were cut.

Q. Wire is not life? There was no destruction of property of the sort you had in Ahmedabad?

A. No.

Q. No attack on individuals?

A. No, Sir.

Q. There was no particular attack on Europeans in your district?

A. There was no attack in particular. The people went to the dairy and it would have developed into an attack if proper precautions had not been taken at the dairy at Anand.

Q. Anything might have developed, but as the facts stand, there was no organised attack on Europeans as such?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Now with regard to the cutting of the railway line, you have spoken of one case where a troop train was derailed. Was there any further cutting of the railway line after that?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Was there any further cutting of the railway line?

A. That attempt at Uttarsanda to burn the culvert, that is, one of them.

Q. On what day was that?

A. On the night of the 12th; this was on the early morning of the 12th and that was in the night.

Q. The derailment was at 2 A.M.?

A. Between 12 and 2.

Q. And this Uttarsanda incident?

A. Prior to 11.

Q. Where is this spot?

A. That comes first between Anand and Nadiad.

Q. It may be really part of the same plan to stop the troop train?

A. No, Sir, the troop train had already passed and many hours had elapsed.

Q. Is there any other cutting of the railway line?

A. Between Boriavi and Uttarsanda.

Q. What night?

A. The same night, the night of the 12th. All these railway cuttings happened on the morning of the 12th and the night of the 12th.

Q. And all within what distance?

A. All between Anand and Nadiad.

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Q. How many miles' run is that?

A. About 20 miles.

Q. There was no railway cutting subsequent to that?

A. A troop special was run on the railway lines as far as the limits of the Kaira district, a daily troop patrol train.

Q. Kindly first answer my question. There was no cutting of the railway line after that day?

A. No, Sir.

Q. You say that was so because proper precautions had been taken to prevent that?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. The cutting of telegraph wires, when did that first occur in your district?

A. That was on the night of the 12th.

Q. The same night as this?

A. The same night.

Q. Was that at several places?

A. Several places.

Q. Again between Nadiad and Anand?

A. Between Vasad and Nadiad, beyond Anand.

Q. Just on this side of the Mahi river?

A. Yes.

Q. At how many places were the wires cut?

A. Three places.

Q. That was also on the 12th?

A. Yes.

Q. No cuttings after that?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. In your district in the agitation which was carried on against the Rowlatt Act, I believe Mr. Kalidas Javeri was the most active mover?

A. He was.

Q. Were certain pamphlets about the Rowlatt Act and how to meet it published on behalf of Mr. Gandhi in Nadiad?

A. Yes.

Q. Were any pamphlets that were either translated or written by Mr. Gandhi circulated in Nadiad?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any misrepresentation in those pamphlets?

A. I am not aware of it.

Q. You have not read those pamphlets? You have not seen them?

A. I have seen them.

Q. You are not aware of any misrepresentation?

A. No.

Q. Do you know that an effigy of the Rowlatt Act was burnt in Nadiad?

A. Yes.

Q. And people were calling out *Ram bolo Ram*?

A. Yes.

Q. And is it a fact that you prosecuted these men as members of an unlawful assembly and they were acquitted?

A. I did not prosecute them; my subordinates did it and it was at my suggestion that Mr. Ker did what he did.

Q. These people were prosecuted as members of an unlawful assembly?

A. No, there was a proclamation issued that these things should not be done on account of the *Holi* holidays and it was in contravention of the proclamation of the District Magistrate that these men had gone in that procession.

Q. What was the proclamation, that during the *Holi* holidays no dead body should be taken out?

A. No.

Q. Was it contemplated that no effigies would be burned?

A. No, in the *Holi* holidays people did take out these things.

Q. The meeting of the 6th of April was a very important meeting and there were about 10,000 persons present?

A. Yes.

Q. And that meeting was presided over by Mr. Gokaldas?

A. Yes, Sir.

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[Continued.]

Q. Do you know what resolutions were passed at that meeting?

A. Protesting against the Rowlatt Bill.

Q. Was it that they should approach Mr. Montagu to repeal the Rowlatt Act and if Mr. Montagu did not hear they should approach the King-Emperor and if they were disappointed by the King-Emperor, they should adopt *Satyagraha*?

A. I do not know because I was out of the district on that day.

Q. You have been deposing to all sorts of things as the head of the police department because you received reports, but because this day you were out of the city I take it you received no report?

A. I received a report.

Q. I am giving you that from the Government report. It says their object was to send a protest to Mr. Montagu against the Rowlatt Bill, and if justice could not be had from that quarter the message was to be sent to the King-Emperor, and if that failed, *Satyagraha* (passive resistance) was to be adopted?

A. Yes. But I can tell you one thing, that before that signatures to the *Satyagrahi* pledge were being obtained in the district.

Q. Then on the 11th of April what was the time of the meeting that was held?

A. Meetings were held throughout the district.

Q. You say one Abdul Qazi Bawa came to Nadiad and a big meeting was held on the 11th?

A. Yes, it was about 8-30 p.m.

Q. And he is a follower of Mr. Gandhi?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And was not the object of his coming to pacify the people and say what had happened at Ahmedabad and that they should not follow the example of Ahmedabad?

A. Of course he said things like that.

Q. He did say things like that, that the people should not follow the example of Ahmedabad?

A. Of course.

Q. Then you say that the place where this engine was derailed was not flat ground, it was high raised ground, and if there had been an accident, it would have been very serious? Are you quite sure?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you seen the place?

A. Yes.

Q. It is not flat ground?

A. No, Sir.

Q. I will read out to you what the Government report* says. It says:—"The ground at this point was flat and the train ran along for a considerable distance." That is the reason given by the Government why there was no serious loss of life.

A. It was like this, the engine jumped up—Q. It jumped up, it remounted the rails beyond the breach. The question of the engine jumping up does not arise. Was the ground flat or was it a high embankment?

A. It is a high embankment.

Q. Do you agree with this statement that Mr. Gandhi's followers in Nadiad tried their best to persuade the people to remain quiet, and Mr. Gandhi himself, as he passed through on the morning of the 13th, very strongly exhorted the crowd at the station to keep the peace? The strike ceased on the 14th and the mills resumed working on the morning of the 15th?

A. I agree with a portion of it.

Q. That Mr. Gandhi's followers tried their best to persuade the people to remain quiet?

A. Some of them did; some of them on the contrary excited the people.

Q. One of them is that man?

A. He was the leader.

Q. Any other follower of Mr. Gandhi you can name, who excited the people?

A. There were some cases where offences were committed.

Q. They were all followers of Mr. Gandhi?

A. Most of them.

* Para. 105 of the statement of the Bombay Government, page 205.

Q. These persons who have been convicted in these four cases, they were some of them members of the *Satyagraha Sabha* and some of them members of the League, that is your information?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Are you quite sure about that?

A. Of course.

Q. You say about this Government dairy at Anand that it would have been burnt down if no measures had been taken?

A. Perhaps.

Q. Is that true, are you quite sure of it?

A. Perhaps.

Q. Is it not a fact that there was no danger to the dairy? The Manager was asked to close it down and the Manager did close it down and the mob went away. I will read out to you what the Government report* says:—"They (the crowd) also tried to stop the Government dairy from working and the Manager eventually consented to stop work for half an hour, whereupon the crowd went away."?

A. That was in the afternoon, I spoke of the evening.

Q. Were there two attempts?

A. In the afternoon there was that attempt. These Government dairies and these European dairies are close to the house of this Rogilal which was burnt down.

Q. The second time when the Manager was asked to close the dairy, the dairy was closed for half an hour and the crowd went away? The crowd was persuaded to go, there was no necessity for precautions?

A. There was necessity for precautions.

Q. You have stated that without these precautions the whole thing would have been burnt down?

A. That was later on. In the evening the situation had become worse.

Q. Do I understand there were three cases?

A. The third time the mob did not go actually to the dairies, but it was so near that if the police had not arrived on the scene, they might have gone there and perhaps done damage. The police had placed a guard there.

Q. In addition to the 6 cases that have been referred to by you there were 41 other persons who were arrested for having taken part in the disorders?

A. Not in addition to.

Q. They are included in the 6 cases? One of these cases was the case of these 41 persons?

A. Yes.

Q. For how many weeks were these 41 persons kept under arrest?

A. They were arrested about the end of April and May.

Q. When did they finish the cases?

A. About the end of October.

Q. They were not let out on bail?

A. No, Sir.

Q. And the majority of the 41 persons were respectable people of Nadiad? I am referring to one case only.

A. All these 41 were from different cases.

Q. These 41 were taken in one case?

A. They were of the six cases.

Q. Still 41 persons had been arrested for having taken part in the disorders; the general charge against them was that they had taken part in the disorders on the 11th and the 12th?

A. They had cut wires. There was no case sent up and nobody was arrested for general disorders.

Q. The tribunal discharged them because the evidence was not sufficient and therefore their case was not proceeded with?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Out of these 6 cases, am I right in supposing that there were 82 persons who were under arrest?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Out of these 82 persons up to the 26th November only 14 were convicted and 36 were discharged?

A. 17 were convicted and 36 discharged.

Q. May I know of these 17 persons who were convicted, how many were *Banias* and how many were *Pattidars*?

* Para. 110 of the statement of the Bombay Government, page 250.

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Rao Sahib N. V. TRIVEDI.

[Continued.]

A. There were about 8 to 10 *Banias*.

Q. Out of these 17 convicted persons?

A. Not convicted persons.

Q. I am talking of these convicted persons, how many of them were *Banias* and how many *Pattidars*. Am I right in supposing that there was not one?

A. One was a *Bania*.

Q. And how many *Pattidars*?

A. Others were *Pattidars*.

Q. You are quite sure of that?

A. Yes.

Q. You know that about Rs. 15,000 have been levied on this village of Nadiad for the cost of extra police? The cost of the additional police would come to that.

A. It has not been levied yet.

Q. And this is levied only on two classes, i.e., *Banias* and *Pattidars* and on no one else?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were all these convicted persons residents of the town of Nadiad?

A. Excuse me, sir, you are mixing up all the cases with Nadiad town.

Q. I want to know out of the 17 convicted persons were there any *Banias* or *Pattidars*?

A. There was only one case of Nadiad town and that case was discharged because of the perjury of certain witnesses.

Q. How many *Banias* or *Pattidars* of the town of Nadiad have been convicted?

A. One.

Q. So far as your Kaira district is concerned, do you agree with the Government opinion that there were no signs of a regular organisation of these disturbances beforehand?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Do you also agree that all these disturbances appear to have been hurriedly organised and carried out and disclose no clear sign of a regular organisation or that they were planned or thought out before the 10th April for the commission of such offences?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Do you further agree that no evidence has been obtained by you that the outbreak of April was planned and directed by a central organisation which controlled the movement?

A. Yes, Sir.

By Sahibzada Sardar Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. How long have you been in Kaira?

A. I came there in May 1918.

Q. Had you any previous acquaintance with the district?

A. Yes.

Q. You were there before. When?

A. In 1914.

Q. For how long?

A. For 8 months.

Q. As far as your knowledge of the district goes, according to you there was no political movement or sign of political movement in Kaira before the middle of 1918?

A. There was no sign, Sir.

Q. You attribute these political activities to the arrest of Mrs. Besant in 1917?

A. That started the Home Rule Leagues.

Q. Were there a large number of followers in the district?

A. In the Gujarat district there is a large number of followers who revere Mrs. Besant.

Q. As theosophists or what?

A. Semi-religious persons.

Q. What do you mean by semi-religious?

A. As a theosophist she has been taking interest in Hinduism.

Q. And therefore this agitation was caused?

A. That caused a flutter and that brought about the establishment of Home Rule Leagues and their branches in the Kaira district.

Q. So according to you if she had not been arrested, these things would not have come into existence?

A. I cannot say that, but that hastened it.

Q. Were there signs of its coming on without it?

A. Signs were there, because the first Gujarat political conference was held in 1917.

Q. About what time in 1917? In the beginning?

A. It was after that. After the arrest of Mrs. Besant.

Q. You said it hastened it. It hastened what? The political movement?

A. Yes.

Q. What were the signs of political movement before the arrest of Mrs. Besant?

A. Before that the people of the district did not take any particular interest in political agitation.

Q. It did not hasten anything?

A. It would have come later on, but then as a resentment against the internment orders against Mrs. Besant, they started meetings and at these meetings the idea of starting Home Rule Leagues was first broached.

Q. You think there was some sort of political feeling but it was brought to the surface and intensified on account of it?

A. Yes.

Q. Now this conference that was held at Godhra in 1917, that was a political conference?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did it advocate Home Rule agitation or some other movement?

A. It was for Home Rule League agitation. It was under the auspices of the Home Rule League. Mr. Gandhi started that idea.

Q. Was Mr. Gandhi at this conference?

A. Yes, he presided.

Q. Then you refer to the disturbances by Dharamdas? Who are these?

A. They form the majority of the population of the Kaira district. They are neither Rajputs nor Bhils. They are a class between the two.

Q. Are they a turbulent class generally?

A. Yes.

Q. Are they at all educated in any way?

A. They are not educated.

Q. Now you say, "The introduction of the Rowlatt Bills in the Imperial Legislative Council, however, served as a shower of rain on the withering weeds of discontent, which in consequence grew strongly and spread throughout the district." Do you refer merely to the fact of the introduction of the Bills or the agitation consequent upon their introduction?

A. The agitation in consequence of the introduction of the Rowlatt Bills.

Q. Who were the principal people who took part in this agitation?

A. The Home Rule Leagues.

Q. Did they hold meetings and make speeches?

A. Yes. They did so throughout the Kaira district.

Q. Then you say that it was an error of judgment on the part of the Punjab Government to exclude Mr. Gandhi from the Punjab?

A. People believed that if he had not been arrested no troubles would have been caused.

Q. Is that your belief also?

A. I think also like that. I believed also like that.

Q. On what do you base that view?

A. The people had a sort of reverence for Mr. Gandhi.

Q. Then you refer to some meeting of 10,000 people. What was that meeting about?

A. That was about preaching *Satyagraha*.

Q. Was a *Maulana* present at that meeting?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was he a *Satyagrahi*?

A. He was with Mr. Gandhi in South Africa. He lives in Ahmedabad but came down from Kaira for this meeting.

Q. When was that meeting held?

A. On the 11th.

Q. What did he tell the people at the meeting?

A. He advised that everybody should remain quiet.

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Rao Sahib N. V. TRIVEDI.

[Continued.]

Q. Now you mentioned about the news of the troubles in the Punjab reaching the Kaira district through newspapers. I believe you said that the first news arrived on the 12th April and that caused resentment against the Government. Did you hear any further news from the Punjab later on at all?

A. Later on of course through the papers.

Q. That is on the 12th?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you hear any news after the 12th from the Punjab?

A. After that many rumours were being circulated.

Q. About what time?

A. Till about the end of April.

Q. When did they begin to get into circulation?

A. By the 12th.

Q. Some rumours went on till the end of April?

A. Yes.

Q. Nothing new after that?

A. One rumour reached me that the Viceroy was murdered.

Q. I am talking of the Punjab. The Viceroy is not in the Punjab?

A. Nothing beyond what appeared in the papers. Simla is in the Punjab.

Q. And because people had been hearing of what was happening in the Punjab and also at Ahmedabad, they got annoyed, and it excited an anti-Government feeling?

A. Very much.

Q. You mentioned about a case of some local sub-inspector. Who was that?

A. He is a Muhammadan, by name Abdul Rahman.

Q. What did he do?

A. He persuaded the crowds at Anand.

Q. What means did he adopt to persuade them?

A. He took the leaders with him to the dairy.

Q. Is there a dairy at Anand?

A. There is a Government dairy as well as a private dairy. When he heard that the mob had gone there he called some of the people and persuaded them not to create disturbance. Then he kept bandobast by keeping armed men at Government buildings, and then the whole thing quieted down.

Q. You say here you did not start any investigation into the various disturbances in Kaira immediately. You give it as a reason that if you had done so, it would have led to further disturbances, so I may take it from you that it was your opinion that in Kaira you were not in favour of what are called strong measures, and you attribute the early restoration of Government to the sympathetic procedure. Is that so?

A. We thought that we must be careful first of all, because the situation was so bad that it might get worse any moment.

Q. So according to you the way in which the authorities proceeded was to help to restore confidence?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Because they were careful and cautious?

A. Yes.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—

Q. Did the Nadiad branch of the Home Rule League establish roughly about 86 sub-branches in the district?

A. Yes.

Q. And did they all have their own organisations?

A. Yes.

Q. Were all those small organisations active in the agitation against the Rowlett Act?

A. Yes.

By Mr. V. J. Patel, Counsel to the Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad—

Q. How many villages are there in the Kaira district?

A. I am sorry I do not know the exact number, but I think there are about 7 talukas, each taluka comprising perhaps 100 villages.

Q. And the hartal on the 11th was mostly done in the district?

A. Yes.

Q. And the only cause of arson that was committed in the whole district was at Anand in connection with Rogilal's house?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was due to Rogilal having used very foul abuse against the Home Rulers?

A. No.

Q. Did he not admit this in his deposition?

A. I might explain. First of all these people went to the Home Rulers who forced him to observe the hartal and when he declined, these people abused him and he retaliated and on that, these people getting excited, went and burnt down his house. Another reason was that he was giving information to the Sahibs of the Deva dairy.

Q. There were two dairies in Anand and one of them was called "Indian dairy."

A. Yes.

Q. And the other was the Government dairy. So the mob did not go at all to the Government dairy. They went to the Indian dairy?

A. Well, the crowd had no opportunity to go to the Government dairy.

Q. Well they did not go at all, and this was due to the clever precautions that you took?

A. Yes.

Q. Now so far as the Indian dairy is concerned, when the crowd went there in the morning, they requested the Manager to close down? and they appeared to be very quiet?

A. Yes, at that time.

Q. On the second occasion as soon as an assurance was given that he would close for half an hour out of respect to these people, they went away?

A. Yes, but some stones were thrown.

Q. And they never appeared before the dairy again?

A. No.

Q. Now there are several missionaries in Kaira district, they live in out-of-way places. None of them were attacked, and perhaps you took very good precautions, precautions better than those taken at Ahmedabad, and no one was molested?

A. No.

Q. So far as Nadiad is concerned you put up a case against some youngsters?

A. No, they were not youngsters, they were more than 20 years of age.

Q. But they were all young men?

A. Yes.

Q. There were three approvers in the case?

A. Yes.

Q. And two of them were thorough scoundrels?

A. Certainly not.

Q. One of them was a drunkard and was living on the earnings of a prostitute?

A. No.

Q. It is not the finding of the Tribunal that they were very low men?

A. I do not know whether I am competent to divulge any information on the findings of the Tribunal.

Q. Did not one of the approvers admit that when in the act of committing derailment he was so drunk that he slept there all night?

A. He did not say that he was so drunk and as a matter of fact he was not drunk.

Q. But was he not drunk at the time?

A. No, he had taken some alcohol and that does not mean that he was drunk.

Q. Now these two approvers did not change that story in the Tribunal, but stuck to their original story?

A. One of them made some improvement in his version.

Q. They did not go back upon their statements but merely improved their stories so as to make them more consistent with the other position?

A. The first statement made by him before the District Magistrate was a brief statement and he gave fuller details.

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[Continued.]

Q. In any event he did not change his statement to favour the defence?

A. No.

Q. In spite of the evidence of these two approvers, all the accused were acquitted?

A. They were discharged.

Q. Excepting one who had made an optional statement?

A. Yes.

Q. That one who had made an optional statement had nothing to do with Mr. Gandhi or the Home Rule League?

A. No.

Q. He was a nephew of a Mamlatdar?

A. Yes.

Q. Now coming to your statement that no immediate action was taken by way of investigation, you received information about the offence of wire-cutting at Narsanda on the morning of the 13th and that very night, the sub-inspector went and stayed there?

A. But the investigation was not started.

Q. Will you please confine yourself to the question. He went there for the purpose of making preliminary enquiries the very night and on the 18th several leaders of the village were arrested?

A. Not on the 18th. It was on the 23rd.

Q. Now the statements of the principal witnesses were taken about the 18th?

A. Yes.

Q. And you went there on the 23rd?

A. Yes.

Q. Dirasali went there on the 21st?

A. Yes.

Q. So the enquiry was very prompt in that case? A. It commenced on the 21st when the situation became better.

Q. There were 5 approvers in that case?

A. Yes.

Q. And you got them pardoned?

A. That was necessary.

Q. And out of these five approvers one of them was bound over for good behaviour and was convicted for illicit distillation of liquor?

A. Yes, but I might explain the whole thing.....

Q. These five approvers stuck to their story, and that case against the 20 accused was withdrawn by the police. The accused remained in jail for over five months, they were respectable people and the rest of the accused were acquitted in December by a dissenting judgment. The judgment was that of Khan Bahadur Kadri with regard to three leaders only. All of them were prosecuted for waging war against the King?

A. No, for conspiracy.

Q. In the Anand wire-cutting case you had an approver?

A. No.

Q. Very well. When was that case withdrawn?

A. In November.

Q. It was investigated by a sub-inspector who, you certified, had given very good assistance in Anand in those days?

A. Yes.

Q. It was revised by the Criminal Investigation Department (by Mr. Guider) in November and he advised the withdrawal of that case?

A. Yes.

Q. And in this case also the leaders, the Chairman of the municipality and a member of the District Board, were the principal accused?

A. No, the latter was a member of the District Local Board some years back.

Q. How many accused were there in that case?

A. Fifteen.

Q. And the Chairman was in the arson case also?

A. He was in that case only.

Q. The other man was in both the cases?

A. Yes.

Q. And both the cases were withdrawn against him?

A. Yes.

Q. These people remained in jail for more than five months?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, in the Rogilal's case, how many persons were arrested?

A. Nine.

Q. Out of these the case against 3 was withdrawn in December?

A. Yes.

Q. And eventually they were convicted?

A. Yes.

Q. And all these 3 had nothing to do with either the Home Rule League or with Mr. Gandhi?

A. Yes, they had. The leader Dowrabai.

Q. Was he a member of the Home Rule League?

A. Yes, as far as I know.

Q. Have you made any enquiry about it?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you bring the fact out in the case?

A. It was not necessary.

Q. What evidence have you got to show that he was a member of the Home Rule League?

A. His name was in the list as one of the members.

Q. Have you seen that for yourself?

A. It was said to be.

Q. What has he to do with Mr. Gandhi?

A. He himself acknowledged in his statement that he was a follower of Gandhi.

Q. He did not say so in court?

A. Yes.

Q. Coming to your statement that there was one Bania and one Brahmin convicted and the rest were Pattidars. Was there any Muhammadan convicted in the Vadod case—a Gosai?

A. Yes.

Q. Then why did you not make mention about this?

A. Because I was asked only about Banias and Pattidars.

Q. Very well, you arrested about 36 leaders of Vadod in the wire-cutting case of Viramgam?

A. Some only were leaders, not all.

Q. How many of them were acquitted?

A. Twelve were convicted and some were discharged and some acquitted.

Q. And in the Anand Rogilal's case there was an approver?

A. Yes.

Q. In the Boriad case there was also an approver?

A. Yes.

Q. You did not put up an approver in any other case?

A. No.

Q. All the witnesses examined in the Kaira case were bound down under section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code?

A. Well, the precautions were necessary. It was in the interests of the accused so that there might be no improvements made in the statements.

Q. As soon as the witness was found improving or explaining his statement you thought he was per-juring?

A. Not altogether.

Q. Now, coming to Nadiad, you say the station staff was involved in it?

A. Yes.

Q. What authority have you for this statement?

A. I had made enquiries.

Q. What evidence have you in support of that statement?

A. The statement of one of the station staff.

Q. And who is he?

A. Chandu Lal, a signaller.

Q. Chandu Lal, a signaller, made the statement to the police, but subsequently did he not make a statement before the District Magistrate that he was threatened and beaten, and this was as soon as he turned his back on you?

A. Yes, but I wish to explain (interrupted).

Q. And from that evidence you say the station staff was involved?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you put up any of the station staff before a court of law?

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[Concluded.]

A. Well there may be other reasons which would convince the man who was on the spot and enquired into the thing.

Q. As for Janardhan Sharma, you say he was making very violent speeches?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you haul him up for having made these seditious speeches, before any magistrate?

A. No. Violent speeches come under certain sections of the law, but they could only have been excited speeches, that is all.

Q. His prosecution was made under rule 25 of the Defence of India Act because of a leaflet that was found in his pocket?

A. Yes.

Q. That leaflet was found in his pocket on the 17th of April and it was received in Nadiad by that day's post?

A. So it is said.

Q. It was posted from Dakor?

A. I do not know.

Q. Did you make any enquiries in that connection?

A. I did.

Q. Was there any evidence to show that Janardhan had anything to do with this leaflet except that it was received from the post office on that day?

A. Well the fact that he had it in his possession would not prove that he had it with a malicious intention.

Q. And that was a proof because he got the school closed on the 12th?

A. When he got it on the morning he was told that it was a violent piece of paper and in spite of that he kept it.

Q. He said that he got it at 10 o'clock when the post was received and it was found on his person at about 11 o'clock on the same day?

A. Yes.

Q. And he said that he kept it to see out of curiosity and so it remained in his pocket?

A. He was told expressly by the person from whom he got it that it was a violent and anarchical leaflet and that it was fit to be destroyed, and still he kept it with him.

Q. And you thought that he would spread it to the public or read it to other persons?

A. Yes.

Q. And it is for that reason that he was convicted and sentenced to 18 months?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know that Mr. Ker wrote a letter to the municipality thanking the people of Nadiad through their representative members of the municipality, for the general law-abiding behaviour during the troubled times in April?

A. I had heard of it, but I have not seen the letter.

Q. It was printed in the papers and in the press?

A. I have not seen it.

Q. Do you stick to the opinion of Mr. Ker or have you any reasons to differ?

A. Without seeing the letter how can I say?

Q. Well, I put it to you that Mr. Ker wrote to the municipality of Nadiad to that effect. This is the substance of the letter. Do you accept it or do you differ?

A. The general public behaved all right. They did not commit any excesses as at Ahmedabad.

Q. Now in the Nadiad derailment case the story of the 3 approvers was that except for the 14 people who were put up before the Tribunal, nobody had anything to do with the derailment?

A. The approvers did speak in the court.

Q. The story of the approvers was that nobody knew of their own conspiracy?

A. No.

Q. And it was committed during the night at a distance of a mile and a half?

A. Yes.

Q. And you say that prominent members of the Home Rule League assisted you?

A. No. As regards myself, Mr. Madholal Trivedi helped me.

Q. Did Mr. Fulchand at the request of the police send Janardhan to the school?

A. Certainly not.

Q. Did the sub-inspector at the station send somebody to the High School?

A. No.

Q. Did any police officer make the request?

A. It is usually the duty of police officers to request the public to help.

Q. Did he actually ask?

A. Yes.

Q. And Janardhan was sent to the school by Fulchand?

A. No.

Q. But Fulchand said so in his evidence?

A. He may have said so.

Q. Janardhan said in his statement that he was charged for having got the school closed and was convicted for that?

A. Yes, because early in the morning he had forced the masters and told them that if they did not close the school he would resign.

Q. You have a general aversion to political activities?

A. No.

Q. Is there not a lot of agitation since this Home Rule League has come into existence?

A. I agree.

Q. And it is generally disliked by police officers because they are the first ones to be affected?

A. Certainly not.

Q. Do you not find it very inconvenient and uncomfortable in travelling and getting the usual comforts when proceeding to districts?

A. When one pays for comforts one naturally gets them.

Q. In your district generally the disturbances were confined to the railway line?

A. Yes.

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Mr. GOKALDAS D. TALATI.

At Ahmedabad, Saturday, the 10th January 1920.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B.,

K.C.M.G., I.A.

The Hon'ble PANDIT JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., Secretary.

Mr. GOKALDAS D. TALATI of Nadiad.

By the President—

Q. You are an inhabitant of Nadiad?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. So far as Nadiad is concerned, during the disturbances I think nothing serious occurred in the city itself?

A. Yes.

Q. But there was a derailment of a train some distance away?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. How far?

A. One mile and a half.

Q. And in connection with that there were a number of people prosecuted?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were there several convictions there?

A. No, only one man was convicted.

Q. There must have been more than one man guilty of the act, that is pretty clear, is it not?

A. There must have been more men engaged in the work.

Q. Had you any theory as to how the act was committed?

A. At first for some days we did not know how it was committed, but afterwards we had this theory that the offence was committed by some people in Nadiad.

Q. So that the offenders, although they were never brought to justice, belonged to the town of Nadiad?

A. Must be.

Q. Derailment is a very serious thing, of course, if you have got to move troops about?

A. Yes.

Q. And you would not blame the authorities for taking elaborate precautions against the recurrence of such an event as that?

A. No, if the authorities felt there would be a recurrence of it in Nadiad.

Q. You think they were wrong?

A. We think so.

Q. And is it because you think they were wrong that you complain about their having imposed additional police on the district?

A. No, the additional police was imposed, not for a recurrence really, but for the preservation of law and order.

Q. But then of course if derailments were taking place in the neighbourhood of Nadiad and were committed by people emerging from Nadiad, that is quite contrary to the maintenance of law and order, is it not?

A. We could not of course gauge the motives of the persons who committed it.

Q. As I understand it, your main complaint against the measures that were taken is in connection with the imposition of the extra police?

A. Yes. Nadiad as a whole throughout preserved law and order and still the additional police force has been forced upon us which we think is totally against section 25-A of the District Police Act.

Q. I am not quite sure whether your complaint comes within the scope of our enquiry or not. You seem to

have a complaint that the procedure was not correct, that a levy was made on Nadiad in order to meet the expense of the extra police force?

A. Additional police has been posted.

Q. Your real complaint is, I suppose, that a certain expense has been imposed upon the inhabitants of Nadiad in consequence of the extra police and you think that is unfair?

A. We think so.

Q. Is it unfair because you think the local authorities or the Government had no right to impose that levy or because you have an inequitable method of raising the money?

A. It is unfair in two ways. In fact Nadiad people as a whole used precautions to keep peace during these disturbed days. That is one of our grounds and we say that the Nadiad people should not be taxed. The other ground is there may be a case of derailment there, but the work of a few ruffians should not bring a slur on the people of Nadiad as a whole.

Q. But the presence of extra police does not necessarily mean a slur upon the inhabitants?

A. It is, Sir.

Q. How is it? It just gives the inhabitants extra protection, does it not?

A. We had it before, we had it then, and we have it even now. Extra protection we never required and nobody ever said that we required extra protection.

Q. How much does it amount to altogether?

A. It may be anything, Sir, but it is a slur. On any other occasion this may be quoted as a precedent, and the levy is imposed only on two classes, the *Banias* and the *Pattidars*.

Q. Assuming that it was a proper provision to have extra police, how do you think the expense should have been met?

A. If Government requires the police for protecting people or a certain thing, then Government has to pay for the police and not a particular section or community in a town. If it was through the fault of a particular community or a particular town, then it may be another thing, otherwise Government has to meet the extra cost because they required the police at Nadiad.

Q. I follow you now. You have no complaint to make about any measure that was adopted by the authorities with a view to suppressing the riots at the time?

A. There were no riots.

Q. I mean either in suppressing the riots or in the trial of any one from Nadiad?

A. What we expected was, that as peace was preserved throughout the Kaira district, there was no necessity of the application of the Defence of India Act to that district at all. Ordinary courts would have sufficed, and therefore we complain of this also that the Defence Act was applied in Kaira on the 22nd April, ten days after, when everything was quiet and there was no trouble there of any kind.

Q. Do you mean the cases should not have been tried by a special tribunal?

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[Continued.]

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. There was only one case from Nadiad that they tried?

A. Yes.

Q. If there was only one case it was a very serious one. That was the one relating to the derailment?

A. It could have been tried by the ordinary court.

Q. How much better would it be for the people of Nadiad if these 14 people, of whom one was convicted, had been tried by the High Court instead of by the tribunal?

A. It is a kind of curtailing the liberties of the people themselves. They had their remedies in their hands, and they could have taken advantage of them. Simply this was a way of cutting away their rights that they were tried by a tribunal.

Q. What right was cut away? only one person was convicted; probably if the High Court had tried the cases there would have been more convictions?

A. We are not to look to the results. We have to look to the step itself which curtailed the rights of the subjects by taking away their right of appeal.

Q. So far as the setting up of these tribunals was concerned, they were set up with reference to Ahmedabad and Nadiad comes, I think, under the Kaira district, so that it was dealt with by the second of the special tribunals?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. We had not much complaint about them in Ahmedabad?

A. It is only our formal complaint that there was no necessity for the special tribunal.

Q. Is there any other matter you think you could bring before this committee?

A. We have placed the whole facts here. What we allege is, considered from every point of view, the imposition of the additional police was simply prejudged. We have the telegram of the 12th April, and there it is said "Government expresses the desire that if practicable strong forces of additional police should be posted." This was done on the 12th. The events happened on the morning of the 12th, and when everything was settled and everything was quiet, it was in the month of August that this order for imposing additional police was issued. We beg to state that there was no necessity whatsoever for that. There were no offences in Nadiad worth mentioning before this and this was done only on account of one case. We have the authority of the Inspector General of Police to the effect that they placed additional police for the safety of the people living in the district. I think there was no ground whatsoever for that as such circumstances did not arise, and therefore this imposition was not proper.

Q. Ordinarily speaking I suppose the town of Nadiad has to pay for the expenses of the police?

A. That is along with the whole Police Department. Nadiad by itself has not to pay.

Q. I wanted to know whether your complaint is because it was a special method of assessment,—after all I am not familiar with the method in which people are assessed in India and in the districts.

A. When the District Police Act was amended people thought that it was a repressive legislation because it gave certain powers to the executive to put additional police in places where they liked against which there was no remedy. We say that the application of that Act has been wrongly made use of in this case.

Q. So that your complaint is the wrong application of this special Act though there was no necessity for it?

A. Though we preserved peace throughout, and even our Collector was of that opinion and said that we had preserved perfect peace last year, still this additional police has been forced on us.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Could you tell me if the Sessions Judge tries cases with the aid of a jury or with the aid of assessors?

A. So far as Kaira district is concerned, with the aid of assessors.

Q. Now if these people had been tried not by the special tribunal but by the Sessions Judge in the first instance, they would not have been tried by a jury, they

would have been tried by the Sessions Judge and assessors, and then they would have had the right of appeal to the High Court or revision if there had been any point of law?

A. Yes.

Q. But I suppose the Bombay High Court does not undertake to re-hear all facts? Does it?

A. The Bombay High Court undertakes to re-hear cases on facts even.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Your complaint seems to be this. The order about the imposition of the additional police was passed in August?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you say that after the events of April till August nothing had happened to show that there was any necessity for the maintenance of law and order by the imposition of additional police?

A. At any time even in April.

Q. It was only imposed in August?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What you say, I take it, is that in August the additional police was imposed, but from April to August there was no serious crime of any kind to justify the imposition of additional police in August?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. There was perfect peace and order between April and August, and therefore in August there was no necessity, whatever necessity there might have been in April for it, for imposing additional police in August?

A. There was none.

Q. You say that with regard to the events in April, the District Magistrate had written to the municipality praising the conduct of the inhabitants of Nadiad during these trying times?

A. Yes, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Can you give us the exact wording of the grounds upon which the additional police was imposed? Here the Government says (I am reading from paragraph 4 of your statement) "The correspondence reveals that the diffusion of a spirit of lawlessness by Mr. Gandhi, the propaganda of opposition to Government and the persistent agitation against Government are mentioned as grounds for the imposition of the additional police."

A. They are correct.

Q. Your contention is that in the first place so far as the inhabitants of Nadiad itself were concerned, there was no danger to life and property of the inhabitants or to any portion of the inhabitants?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Your further contention is that so far as the result of the trial is concerned no Pattidar or no Bania has been convicted?

A. It is on that ground we take our stand. No bania has ever been even accused nor has he ever been accused of taking part in the derailment.

Q. And perhaps your further ground is that so far as the evidence in that trial was concerned, it was made clear that this derailment was the act of a handful of persons who on the spur of the moment conspired to do it and that they were not supported by any portion of the Nadiad public?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Your contention is that having regard to the facts there is no evidence upon which this magistrate could have held that the inhabitants of Nadiad caused or contributed to the holding of any unlawful assembly?

A. Not only that, but the District Magistrate wrote quite to the contrary. He was satisfied with our conduct and the reasons shown are totally indirect.

Q. Further on, as soon as this derailment occurred near your village, you people assembled together and passed a resolution at the station offering a reward of Rs. 500 to find out those who were concerned in the affair?

A. Yes, Sir.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—

Q. From April to August, I think troops were posted at Nadiad?

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Mr. GOKALDAS D. TALATI.

[Concluded.]

A. No, Sir.

Q. No troops were posted?

A. Some troops came from Ahmedabad to Nadiad and went back. Troops never permanently stayed there.

Q. Between April and August were not always some troops in Nadiad?

A. I don't think so.

Q. But can't you say yes or no?

A. I say, there were no troops.

Q. You said that the people of Nadiad behaved extraordinarily well and there was no disturbance of any kind, but do you know that one Janardhan Sharma headed by a thousand people went to the High School?

A. It was no disturbance at all.

Q. Did Janardhan Sharma go there with some people?

A. He was sent there to pacify some boys who wanted to have the school closed.

Q. He did not go there with a mob?

A. He was sent there to pacify some of the boys.

Q. Was he ever tried for going there?

A. Yes.

Q. Was he convicted?

A. Convicted and fined.

Q. I think also he was bound over to keep the peace?

A. I don't remember.

By Mr. V. J. Patel, Counsel to the Gujarat Sabha, Ahmedabad—

Q. You said that there was one case under the Defence of India Act. You know that this Janardhan Sharma was also tried under rule 25 of the Defence of India Act?

A. Yes. The President.—Was he an inhabitant of Nadiad or of some other part?

A. He was a resident of Chaklashi.

Mr. Patel.—Who sent Janardhan Sharma to the High School?

A. At the request of the sub-inspector of police at Nadiad, he was sent to the school to pacify some boys who wanted to have the school closed for the day.

Q. It is suggested that some troops were kept between April and August, was there any necessity for the troops being kept there?

A. No. A. After this derailment case, has there been any increase of offences in Nadiad?

A. No.

Q. Even up to now?

A. No.

Q. There is this additional police still?

A. Yes, there is this additional police.

Minutes of Evidence, Bombay.

At Bombay, Thursday, the 15th January 1920.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.

The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.O.M.G., I.A.

The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.

The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.

Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.

Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., Secretary.

Mr. F. E. Sharp, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bombay.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Sharp, are you Deputy Commissioner of Police at Bombay?

A. Yes, I am.

Q. About midnight on the 10th April 1919, did you receive a wire about the Punjab disturbances at Amritsar and Lahore?

A. I personally did not receive it, but was informed of it.

Q. And you were told to proceed at once to the head police office and you there met Mr. Griffiths?

A. Yes.

Q. All Superintendents, I think, were immediately warned and told to be ready for any emergency?

A. Yes, every police station was informed that there had been disturbances in the Punjab and that they had better be prepared for any eventualities.

Q. Was a company of armed police turned out and did it stand ready till 3 in the morning?

A. Yes.

Q. Up to that time was there any sign of disturbances in the city?

A. I heard the following morning that there had been a little disturbance over-night in the region of Bhuleswar. Large crowds were collecting there and a few stones were thrown at tram-cars, but the crowds were easily dispersed by the police.

Q. That is to say, by the local police?

A. Yes, no support was sent out that night.

Q. And as you had no disturbances to tackle yourself, I think you turned in about 3 o'clock.

A. Yes.

Q. And did you return to the head office early next morning?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you then receive a telephone message as to signs of disorder in certain regions?

A. Yes, we got a telephone message from Pydhownie reporting that two or three attempts were made to commit disturbances, that crowds were collecting there and were threatening a disturbance and finally that they had begun to throw stones which was an obvious sign of disorder.

Q. Was there disorder in any other region besides this?

A. None, at that time.

Q. At half-past eleven were you ordered by the Commissioner to proceed with a force of armed police?

A. It was about half-past ten or eleven; I cannot say exactly what time but it was about that time when I was told by the Commissioner to take down a force of armed police to Pydhownie.

Q. Did you arrive there about 11 o'clock?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you in a motor-lorry and accompanied by armed police?

A. Yes.

Q. What force had you?

A. 25 armed police and 1 European officer.

Q. Just before reaching Pydhownie did anything occur?

A. The whole of the north Abdul Rahman Street was densely crowded with people who were collected there and were obviously rowdy and shouting and jeering at us just before Pydhownie police station. An attempt was made to overthrow the lorry by throwing a beam under it. This brought the lorry to a standstill.

Q. So that the attempt was not successful?

A. No, and we could not proceed any further as the crowds were too dense and the lorry was obviously stopped by the beam. I then ordered the men to alight from the lorry.

Q. Did you clear the way for the lorry?

A. No, it was left where it was and I took the men on foot. It was only about a 100 yards away. I first attempted to arrest the man who threw the beam, but he disappeared in the crowd and was lost sight of. Subsequently he was arrested two hours later by a sepoy who recognised him.

Q. As you proceeded, what did you discover to be the state of affairs?

A. There were very large crowds. I should think in the region of Pydhownie station, Abdul Rahman Street, Nagdevi and all these streets there may have been about 5,000 people assembled. It may be many more; I am unable to estimate the numbers.

Q. What were the crowds doing at that time?

A. They seemed to have no particular object. They were obviously disorderly and just after I arrived there they first threw stones at us and continued stoning us intermittently for a space of some 3 or 4 hours.

Q. Did any stones strike you?

A. All the police there were frequently hit by stones.

Q. Were any serious wounds received by any of the police?

A. Four of our men received grievous injuries and had to go to hospital, and I suppose 30 or 40 must have been hit in the course of this disorder. But only four were grievously hurt.

Q. Were you the senior police officer present and therefore responsible for the measures taken to cope with the situation?

A. Yes.

Q. How long did you remain at this place?

A. I was in the area of Pydhownie, Abdul Rahman Street and Nagdevi, from about 11 A.M. to 2-30 P.M. approximately.

Q. And during all that time did the crowd continue riotous?

A. I was in the area of Pydhownie, Abdul Rahman Street. This particular area is very thickly populated, and evidently all the people turned out.

Q. In addition to throwing stones, did the crowd do anything in the way of destroying property?

A. They attacked tram-cars. They held up the trams and people were forced to alight. They continued to attack the trams and inflicted great damage to them.

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[Continued.]

Q. What sort of damage?

A. They smashed windows with huge stones, but I myself examined no cars.

Q. Were the military called in to assist the police?

A. Yes, at 12 o'clock, I think, I telephoned to the Commissioner of Police saying that things were getting rather out-of-hand and the situation was serious. He then asked the Brigade Officer to reinforce me. This force was sent up from Government House and from Parel, where they were stationed.

Q. Was the situation such, in your opinion, as to necessitate military assistance?

A. Certainly.

Q. Were you unable, with the police at your disposal, to cope with the situation?

A. I had with me about 70 or 100 men of all ranks at the time. I was afraid that I might be overpowered or in the last extreme I might have to call upon the armed police to fire. I therefore asked the Commissioner to send out troops, and, if possible, to come himself, and also to send magistrates.

Q. Did the military force arrive while you were still on the scene?

A. They came from Parel which is to the north of the Island, having had orders to go to Crawford Market and they rode to the scene of the disturbance. I attempted to stop them but I could not do so as they were given express orders to stop nowhere but to go straight to Crawford Market.

Q. You are referring to the cavalry which rode through?

A. Yes.

Q. As the cavalry rode forward did the crowd retreat in front of them?

A. Yes, into the side-streets.

Q. When the cavalry passed what happened to the crowd?

A. It came back at once and again commenced to stone the police and became disorderly.

Q. Did the cavalry finally come back?

A. They were finally ordered back at 3 P.M. The first orders I received at about 1-30 or 2 P.M. when the Commissioner himself arrived and brought up two platoons of Indian infantry.

Q. Later on you say further troops arrived?

A. The cavalry finally came out about 3 P.M. The Commissioner sent me to the head office to get them out.

Q. Then was it in front of this Indian infantry that the crowd dispersed in all directions?

A. No, it was the cavalry who had been called down from Parel.

Q. When did they arrive?

A. They actually arrived at 12-30, but did not stop there as they had orders to proceed to the police head office.

Q. As they passed you on that occasion did you not request assistance from the officer in charge?

A. I should have, but as they came along very suddenly and had gone past equally suddenly, I could not stop them, and the crowd was very disorderly at the time.

Q. When did you say the infantry arrived?

A. About 2 P.M. They arrived with the Commissioner himself.

Q. And after that you were sent by the Commissioner to get the assistance of the cavalry?

A. That was about one hour later. He told me to go to the head office and ask the officer there to send out the cavalry to assist him.

Q. And of the occurrences subsequent to that, you have no personal knowledge?

A. Not after 3 P.M.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Were the crowd uttering any cries from time to time?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you distinguish any cries in the crowd?

A. Yes.

Q. What cries?

A. Cries of *Hindu Mussalman ki jai, Mahatma Gandhi ki jai*; these were specially uttered.

Q. Any others that you remember?

A. No, I cannot say I heard any others.

Q. Then from the time you arrived till the time you left them, the troops and the police were engaged I think in charging the crowd?

A. That went on intermittently for 3 hours. The police and mounted infantry made I think about 20 charges during the course of 2 or 3 hours.

Q. Was it for the purpose of thrusting back the rioters or was it for the purpose of clearing the way for traffic?

A. Both.

Q. Did you keep the road open for traffic at all?

A. We tried our best to do so, but no sooner had we driven the crowd from one street than they emerged from another.

Q. Then was the whole force of troops and police entirely surrounded by crowds?

A. Yes. They were continually surrounded. Some of the crowd even got into the ranks of the armed police and asked them not to obey their officer's commands.

Q. Did you actually see them do so?

A. No, there was a European officer with them and he told me.

Q. What is his name?

A. Inspector Carter.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. When did the news or the report about the arrest of Mr. Gandhi arrive in Bombay?

A. On the 10th; the day before.

Q. Was it in the evening of the 10th?

A. I think it was on the afternoon. The *Bombay Chronicle* published a special edition that evening announcing the arrest.

Q. And was that the main reason for the unrest in the city of Bombay?

A. I should think so; to a very great extent it was. Mr. Gandhi is a very popular man in Bombay.

Q. And it was his arrest that brought on this demonstration?

A. To some extent.

Q. I understood you to say to a very great extent?

A. Yes.

Q. But nothing happened on the 10th?

A. There was an attempt to hold up tram-cars in the evening, but nothing serious had happened.

Q. The attempt to hold up tram-cars was, I suppose, a part of the demonstration of the *hartal* for the arrest of Gandhi?

A. Undoubtedly, that is the usual course of procedure adopted in the observance of the *hartal*.

Q. Then what happened on the 11th was also a continuation of the same demonstration?

A. Yes, generally the *hartal* was proclaimed that morning.

Q. In consequence of the arrest of Mr. Gandhi?

A. Yes, from early in the morning some people went round attempting to close down the shops and they succeeded.

Q. And the stopping of tram-cars was also a part of the same programme, i.e., that the trams should not ply because of the *hartal*?

A. Yes.

Q. And people were also asked to alight from their carriages and motor cars which was also a part of the general *hartal*?

A. I think so.

Q. Now, with regard to the damage done to tram-cars, by what part of the crowds was that being done?

A. Well, crowds had assembled there; they were composed both of Hindus and Muhammadans, perhaps more of Hindus.

Q. What class of people were they?

A. They were certainly people of some education and position, such as shop-keepers, clerks and tradesmen.

Q. The people that actually took part in destroying the tram-cars were they of the rowdy element or people of education?

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Mr. F. E. SHARP.

[Continued.]

A. They were all rowdy, but I should call them people of education, they were not of the mill-hand type at all.

Q. Did you observe the leaders among them? I mean did you see any person or persons of known position and respectability in Bombay among the crowds?

A. Do you mean leading the rioters? No.

Q. Did any person known in that way in Bombay come on the scene at any time?

A. Yes, they did at about 3 o'clock.

Q. Who were they?

A. Mr. Umar Sobhani. At that juncture I had myself left. I left him at Crawford Market as I was going to get the cavalry sent out.

Q. Had you any conversation with him?

A. I was there present at the conversation he had had with the Deputy Commissioner.

Q. What was his object in coming?

A. He did not tell us.

Q. Then why did he come there at all?

A. I cannot answer that question because he did not tell us anything to that effect. But he was speaking to the Deputy Commissioner.

Q. What was he saying?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. Whom else did you see?

A. No one else.

Q. And there was no attempt at destroying any other property, i.e., public buildings, etc.?

A. I formed the impression that destruction of property seemed to be directed against Government. They attacked tram-cars which they considered to be Government property.

Q. Why do you say that they regarded the tramway company as a Government institution?

A. Well, I think a great majority of them did think so.

Q. You are not giving sufficient credit to the intelligent people in Bombay. They surely know that the tramway company is a private concern, in which many Indians own shares.

A. Of course the intelligentsia know that, but the masses do not.

Q. You speak of the shop-keepers. They know that the tramway company is a private concern and not a Government concern.

A. I rather doubt myself if all the shop-keepers think that it is purely a private concern.

Q. But some of them hold shares in the company and would naturally think otherwise.

A. I doubt if these people that took part hold any shares in the tramway company.

Q. Do you know that in connection with the tramway company, huge business is done in the share market and it is well-known that it is a private concern?

A. Well, people who do hold shares in the market would certainly appreciate that the tramway is purely a private concern.

Q. The tramway has existed in Bombay for many years. It was first started by an American company and there is no illusion about it in the minds of the people of Bombay that the tramway company has not always been a private concern. Then why do you suggest that simply because the tram-cars were attacked and damaged they were against Government?

A. Well, the whole demonstration struck me as being essentially against Government.

Q. About the demonstration you told us that it was all due to the news of the arrest of Mr. Gandhi?

A. That is not a part of the demonstration against Government. I can conceive no reason why they should attack private property connected with tramways.

Q. There is nothing like this when you have large crowds moving in this manner. There is always some wanton destruction to property. The unruly element always get out of hand and for a moment do anything?

A. There was no attack on Indian property, but that was an attack against Government.

Q. Was there any attempt at damaging any Government buildings or offices?

A. No, they wanted to attack the police station but could not do so.

Q. There was no attempt made to attack any public building, or any Government property in this sense, nor was there any attempt made on Government officials?

A. Very much on Government officials. They stoned the police.

Q. Except for stone throwing no studied attempt on Government officials or Europeans as such was made? And no distinction was made between Indian officials and European officials?

A. No, I think they stoned the European police and Indian police quite impartially.

Q. So there was no distinction in that way?

A. No, it struck me they were just as much inclined to attack the European as the Indian police.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. You say that the rioting was very intense?

A. Yes.

Q. Where did they get the stones from?

A. Unfortunately the road in that area was under repair and the side road was covered with road metal. It was most unfortunate.

Q. Did the stone-throwing do any injury to people?

A. We had four badly hurt and I should think that at least 50 were struck.

Q. They were minor injuries?

A. Yes, the cavalry were also struck.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Did the trams stop at the request of the crowd?

A. Yes, they were entirely held up.

Q. Was that done voluntarily?

A. No; they were stopped by force.

Q. That would be the reason why the trams were stoned and damaged?

A. That took place in the first case. Long afterwards trams were held up, and there was no possibility of their being got moving again. The crowd still continued to attack these trams and damage them.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. You speak about stone-throwing. At whom were they aimed?

A. The crowd started stone-throwing just after I arrived. The first stone thrown was perhaps 5 minutes after my arrival. The stones were thrown at myself and the men who were with me.

Q. There was no stone-throwing when you arrived?

A. I did not see any myself. Just after I arrived the first stone-throwing commenced against me and my men.

Q. Did the crowd have any kind of arms? Were they armed with lathis?

A. Subsequently very many of them got lathis. I do not know where they got the lathis from. I noticed at about 2 o'clock for the first time that many of them had lathis.

Q. Were they using lathis?

A. I saw several big lathis. The police were also armed with lathis. Frequently the police attacked the crowd and lathis were being used freely on both sides.

Q. There was a regular scuffle between the police and the crowd?

A. Yes, on many occasions.

Q. The crowd was of several thousands?

A. Yes.

Q. Were the police overpowered?

A. There was great danger of it. Of course we had armed police with us the whole time in case of eventualities.

Q. You had 70 police. Had you anything more?

A. They were all from that division. I do not think there were more than 70.

Q. How many more men did you get?

A. The Commissioner brought out two platoons.

Q. How much would that be?

A. The infantry came about 100 strong.

Q. And cavalry?

A. That I cannot say.

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Mr. F. E. SHARP—concluded—Mr. A. H. S. ASTON.

Q. Will it be 50?

A. I was not there; I went back. I do not know how many went there. I think it was one squadron.

Q. And they were able to control the situation without firing?

A. They controlled the situation to some extent.

Q. What do you mean by some extent?

A. The troops and the police charged the crowd repeatedly and drove them back for the time being. We cannot say they restored order, because this disorder went on for three or four hours.

Q. After four hours, order was restored?

A. I should put it this way that the crowd melted away. It did disperse to Chowpatti sands.

Mr. A. H. S. ASTON, Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Aston, are you the Chief Presidency Magistrate of Bombay?

A. I am.

Q. On the 11th April did you accompany the Commissioner of Police in a motor-lorry containing a number of Indian troops?

A. Yes.

Q. What time did you arrive at Pydhownie?

A. I should say it was before 2. I was sitting at about 11-30 in the police court and soon after that, I got a message that I was wanted. I left the court and went to the head police office. There we waited till the military arrived and then went straight to Pydhownie.

Q. How many troops were there?

A. There were two motor-lorries full of Indian infantry.

Q. You do not know the exact number?

A. I do not know the exact number.

Q. What situation did you find?

A. There were large crowds at Pydhownie, and as I was given to understand that there was trouble in Abdul Rahman Street, we walked along Abdul Rahman Street. I saw crowds of people standing about there. They appeared to be sullen. I went with my Court Interpreter. I went up to these people. We began to talk to people in the streets. I told them that they should disperse. I reminded them that in big crowds there are nearly always people of a disorderly character and they tend to get other law-abiding people into trouble. I warned and told them that they should go. Very often they said "Yes, I am going." They moved a little away and then collected again further back. Every now and then from some side street stones would come. I do not know who threw them.

Q. Did the situation appear to be a serious one?

A. Not really serious.

Q. Not at that time?

A. No.

Q. But such a situation as might develop into a serious one?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the Commissioner ask Mr. Sharp to go and get some cavalry to assist in the dispersing of the crowd?

A. My impression is that the Commissioner at the head police office expected the arrival of cavalry. I understand the cavalry were on their way sometime previous to the time we arrived at Pydhownie.

Q. Did the crowd throw anything at you?

A. They threw stones in my direction. Whether they were aimed at me I cannot say. There was a stone now and then.

Q. The trams were stopped along Abdul Rahman Street?

A. Yes.

Q. What occurred to the traffic?

A. Great boulders and stones were placed in front of these trams, and they were at a standstill.

Q. Were any of the cars destroyed or partially destroyed so far as you know?

A. Stones were thrown at the trams. But I may mention that the violence in my presence was furtive, not open. We had the stones and boulders removed.

Q. What do you mean by that?

A. It seemed to take its normal course and the crowd went away because they heard that Mr. Gandhi was going to address a meeting there in the evening.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—

Q. The cavalry, I believe, were encamped on the race-course?

A. I think it was at Government House in the north of the city.

Q. It came down to the place?

A. Yes.

I looked in another direction and when I looked back again, there would be a large stone placed on the line.

Q. Meantime were the police engaged in clearing the road?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they able to do so successfully?

A. Yes, but they met with a certain amount of opposition. I noticed a man strike several policemen with a lathi. He tried to escape, but he was afterwards arrested.

Q. There were other arrests made?

A. Other arrests were also made.

Q. Were you there when the cavalry arrived?

A. No. I was then opposite the Crawford Market at the other end.

Q. You were proceeding towards Crawford Market from Pydhownie?

A. Yes.

Q. As you were proceeding, did you hear news as to Mr. Gandhi having arrived at Bombay?

A. Yes.

Q. Did that news seem to spread among the crowds?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that received with satisfaction?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it received with shouts?

A. Soon afterwards I heard shouts of "Chowpatti," let us go to Chowpatti.

Q. How far is Chowpatti from that place?

A. It will take about a quarter of an hour in a carriage.

Q. You waited for some time near Crawford Market and returned to Pydhownie?

A. Yes.

Q. On your return did you find the trams in the same position as before?

A. Yes, and considerably damaged.

Q. Was the framework damaged, as well as the glass?

A. Yes. In the distance I saw some juveniles and some adults rushing and hitting the trams. I saw men hit the trams with sticks and boulders. I saw stones being thrown. Then they bolted down the side street. I sent a message; at that time I was accompanied by my interpreter and Inspector of Police, Mr. Dyer. I sent a message for troops to come. Before they came these people stopped. Honorary Magistrate Mr. Haig-Brown came with troops.

Q. On your return on this occasion to Pydhownie, were you yourself assaulted in any way by stones?

A. Stones were thrown in our direction.

Q. Were endeavours made to get the stone-throwers to desist?

A. When we came back again from Pydhownie towards the Crawford Market, people in the crowd held up their hands in the direction from which stones came, shouting "don't throw stones."

Q. Were these efforts successful?

A. Stone-throwing stopped.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Did you observe what class of people composed this crowd?

A. Hindus mostly, fewer Muhammadans and a certain number of juveniles.

Q. What class of people were they?

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Mr. A. H. S. ASTON—concluded.—Mr. J. WALKER.

A. I should say *banias*.
Q. Did they consist of the unruly elements, *bad-mashes* and that class of people?

A. I think there were three classes really. There were these *banias*, who seemed to be sullen, then there were the juveniles, street Arabs who were out for mischief and fun, and then there were the hooligans who were out for damage.

Q. It was the hooligan element that did the damage?
A. That I cannot say. I do not know who threw stones. I saw the hooligan element and the juveniles doing damage to the cars.

Q. In your view these crowds assembled and made these demonstrations, because of the news of the arrest of Mr. Gandhi?

A. I should say that was probably so.
Q. That was the primary cause?

A. Yes.
Q. When Mr. Gandhi arrived in Bombay on the 11th did he come to Pydhownie?

A. I did not see him. I heard so. I was at the Crawford Market end of Abdul Rahman Street.

Q. You heard people shouting 'Chowpatti.' Did the crowd disperse after that?

A. I did not notice. When we went on with the prisoners towards the head police office, some moved away.

Q. Towards Chowpatti?
A. Yes.

Q. But the rest of the crowd still remained?

A. There were small crowds here and there and the police were clearing the road.

Q. Did they still continue to do damage to the trams after that or did they stop?

A. It was on my return that I saw from a distance these trams being damaged.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. When you were returning, stones were thrown towards you. Was there a large number of stones or were there only one or two stones?

A. Very few. I cannot say from where the stones came.

Q. The people who raised their hands and prevented the crowds from stone-throwing were Indians?
A. Yes.

Q. Then when Umar Sobhani came to you, did he ask your permission to announce to the people the arrival of Mr. Gandhi?

A. He did not ask my permission.

Q. He had some conversation with Mr. Griffith and you were there?

A. Mr. Griffith and the Deputy Commissioner were there.

Q. Did he announce to the crowd that they should go to Chowpatti, where they would be addressed by Mr. Gandhi?

Mr. J. WALKER, Superintendent of the Bombay City Police.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Walker, are you a Superintendent of the Bombay City Police force?

A. Yes, my Lord.

Q. Are you in charge of B Division?

A. I am.

Q. About 10-30 on the night of the 10th April last, did you receive information that tram cars were being stopped at Pydhownie and at another point?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the name of the other point?

A. Bhuleswar. Kalbadevi Road.

Q. Were you also informed that passengers were being forced to alight by the crowd?

A. Yes.

Q. On getting this information, did you immediately proceed to the scene?

A. I did.

Q. Did you find that it was the case that cars were being held up?

A. I did not hear that, but I certainly heard shouts of Chowpatti.

Q. Before that, during the course of these riots, i.e., for 3 or 4 hours, the police were able to make several arrests?

A. The police were making arrests while I was there.

Q. As regards the throwing of stones, you do not ask this committee to believe that there was any deliberate attack upon you or any Europeans?

A. Stones were thrown in our direction, I did not look down the street. I was telling people near me to disperse. There were stones from behind the crowds coming in my direction, or else a stone would come possibly from a window, as I was going down Abdul Rahman Street.

Q. Are you prepared to say that it was an anti-European demonstration? I am not asking whether it was anti-Government demonstration, apart from the connection between Europeans and Government. I want to know whether any Europeans as such were assaulted or did you come to the conclusion that this demonstration was an anti-European demonstration?

A. I believe the Commissioner of Police received injuries, but I was not present at that time, and I heard other officers received injuries.

Q. Surely in the city of Bombay there are hundreds and thousands of Europeans and there must have been hundreds of isolated instances where the crowd could have got hold of European pedestrians and could have assaulted them and throughout the whole of that day you did not receive any news that any large number of Europeans were assaulted by the crowd?

A. No. I think I heard that one lady was molested. I do not know how much reliance can be placed on that. She was in the tram.

Q. Therefore I take it that except that you heard that one lady was molested in the tram, in the whole city of Bombay there was no other lady molested?

A. No.

Q. As soon as arrests were made, was not the stone-throwing stopped?

A. Stone-throwing was desultory.

Q. It was not continuous.

A. Not continuous.

Q. Do you know anything as to when Mr. Gandhi arrived and what happened?

A. No.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—

Q. Did you, Mr. Aston, as a matter of fact, see any Europeans other than officers or magistrates?

A. I think I saw Europeans connected with the tramway company in Abdul Rahman Street.

Q. Did you see Europeans other than those connected with the tramway, military or police?

A. I do not recollect seeing any.

A. I did.

Q. And passengers were being forced to alight?
A. Yes.

Q. Who were doing this?

A. The majority of persons were Hindus.

Q. Was there a large crowd?

A. I should say from 1,500 to 2,000.

Q. Did you say anything to the crowd?

A. Yes, we warned them to desist and not to interfere with the trams.

Q. Did you ask them to disperse?

A. I did.

Q. Did you succeed?

A. Eventually they dispersed.

Q. I think you made no arrests that evening?

A. No.

Q. Then on the morning of the next day, crowds again collected at the same points?

A. Yes.

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Mr. J. WALKER.

[Continued.]

Q. Were tram cars again held up and passengers forced to alight?

A. Yes.

Q. Was this being done to a very great extent?

A. To such an extent that the Police were overpowered, my Lord.

Q. I think the military arrived at Pydhownie about 11-30 or 12?

A. About then.

Q. What military force was that?

A. Cavalry.

Q. Did they stay?

A. They marched through.

Q. I think crowds were in Abdul Rahman Street and the bye-lanes?

A. Yes.

Q. Were these crowds in large numbers?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the tram traffic completely dislocated?

A. Yes.

Q. Were the crowds doing anything?

A. The crowds put sleepers on the rails and dislocated the tramway traffic.

Q. Were they throwing stones?

A. Yes, they were.

Q. Did the police make several charges?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you there yourself?

A. Yes.

Q. You saw the charges made?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the police charge frequently?

A. Every 10 minutes.

Q. Did the military assist in charging?

A. Not when I was there.

Q. At about three o'clock did Mr. Gandhi arrive?

A. Yes, my Lord.

Q. Were you there when he arrived?

A. Yes.

Q. Were the military there at the time?

A. There was a company of military stationed facing Pydhownie station.

Q. When he arrived did anything occur?

A. The crowd jeered and shouted. I think there was Mr. Gandhi and some of his followers. I think three cars arrived at about 3 o'clock and endeavours were made to make the crowd move to Chowpatti. But they did not appear to have any effect for the time. Eventually the crowd went away.

Q. At the time that Mr. Gandhi was there, did the police or the military charge the crowd there at all?

A. At that time what I saw from a distance was that there was a squad of armed police across Abdul Rahman Street; this appeared to be overpowered and the cavalry made a charge there.

Q. As a result of the cavalry charge, were any casualties caused?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. If any occurred there, it was of such a character that no report was made?

A. Yes.

Q. When did the crowd finally disperse?

A. Say at about 5 or 5-30.

Q. Did they then go to Chowpatti?

A. I think the majority went there.

Q. Was the situation a serious one to tackle?

A. It was serious, my Lord.

Q. At any time, there might have been very serious rioting and bloodshed?

A. Yes.

Q. You have yourself had experience of a number of riots that have occurred in Bombay?

A. Yes.

Q. On some of those occasions, has firing been resorted to in order to restore order?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you think that on this occasion that firing might have to be resorted to?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the situation seem to be as serious as on the previous occasions?

A. It did, my Lord.

Q. At about three o'clock I think you along with two European officers tried to go to Abdul Rahman Street from Sheikh Memon Street. What distance is that?

A. There is a side lane called Nagdevi Lane between the two streets, one of the said streets being Abdul Rahman Street.

Q. You were trying to proceed to this connecting street between these two practically parallel streets?

A. Yes.

Q. As you were proceeding, did anything happen to you?

A. We were stoned so much so that we had to give up the idea of going there.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Can you tell me how many convictions were obtained arising out of these disturbances in this city?

A. As far as my division is concerned, I think it would be about 25.

Q. You do not know how many were convicted on the whole?

A. No.

Q. Did you understand when you were there that the crowd were creating trouble because of the arrest of Mr. Gandhi or was there any other reason?

A. I think that had something to do with the disturbances.

Q. That was the largest cause?

A. I think so.

Q. Did you know at any time that Mr. Gandhi was in Bombay or that he was expected in Bombay?

A. We heard he was expected in Bombay. We did not know of his arrival until he came down there.

Q. I take it that the police and military put up with these things as much as they possibly could in the expectation that before long Mr. Gandhi's arrival would be known to the people and things would return to a normal state?

A. Quite so.

Q. That policy was successful in the end?

A. It was, in the end.

Q. About the demeanour of the crowd, you say that several times you found it very difficult not to resort to extreme measures?

A. Yes, it was very difficult indeed.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You say that Mr. Gandhi arrived with his followers. Who were his followers? Who arrived with Mr. Gandhi?

A. I could not tell you. I saw three cars and there were persons in them. I could not tell you who they were.

Q. Were the people known to you or were they strangers?

A. They were not known to me. I think there was Umar Sobhani there.

Q. Jannadas Dwarkadas?

A. I did not notice him. He may have been.

Q. When they arrived, what did they do? Did they address the crowd?

A. They spoke to the crowd and asked them to go to Chowpatti where a meeting was to be held.

Q. The crowd, I suppose, many of them, had not seen Mr. Gandhi before?

A. Very likely not.

Q. They were not sure, I suppose, that Mr. Gandhi was after all free?

A. That may be so.

Q. Might not that account for their continuance there in spite of the announcement that he would shortly go to Chowpatti and address them?

A. Very likely.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You know that on the 10th the "Bombay Chronicle" published a special supplement announcing Mr. Gandhi's arrest?

A. I did not see that.

Q. Had you heard of that?

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Mr. J. WALKER.

[Concluded.]

A. I had.

Q. And after this announcement, attempts were made to persuade the people to observe the *hartal*?

A. Yes.

Q. Then could you give any other reason? Why do you say that the arrest of Mr. Gandhi was largely responsible for this? What other reasons could you give for this demonstration? Is it not a fact that the arrest of Mr. Gandhi was the sole cause?

A. I cannot answer that.

Q. Could you give any other reason?

A. No.

Q. You said that you were at a distance and you believed that the police cordon was overpowered. Now this cordon was placed there for some time to prevent people from passing through. Do you remember that Mr. Gandhi obtained special permission to pass through that cordon and he was allowed to do so?

A. Yes.

Q. And when the cavalry saw that Mr. Gandhi was passing through that cordon, they thought that the cordon was overpowered, and they attacked the crowd?

A. Not so. The other way about.

Q. Do I understand that the cordon was assaulted by the crowd?

A. They were being overpowered by the crowd as Mr. Gandhi's car was passing in that direction.

Q. That is, a large number of people followed the car?

A. People coming from the north.

Q. They were coming from the direction towards which the car was going?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it with a view to see Mr. Gandhi?

A. It was before Mr. Gandhi's car arrived there. There was a cordon of police and the crowd rushed the police.

Q. With a view to overpower the police or to reach the car?

A. With a view to overpower the police.

Q. Was the car of Mr. Gandhi held up at that place by the police first before this happened?

A. No. The car was not held up when Mr. Gandhi arrived. He was allowed to stop at Pydhownie as long as he wished. I do not think his car was stopped in any way. It turned down Abdul Rahman Street to a side street.

Q. Here it is said "when Gandhi was held up, the crowd were extremely angry and the police officer in charge of the armed police, seeing the road clear and the cavalry in possession, used his discretion and allowed him to pass."

A. I do not know.

Q. Further it is said "when the cavalry saw the excited crowd coming down they assumed that the police had been overwhelmed and charged the crowd."

A. I cannot remember.

Q. I am reading it to you from the statement of the Government case, and it is said "when the cavalry saw the excited crowd coming down, they assumed that the police had been over-whelmed and charged the crowd."

A. That is not my point.

Q. Here, as a matter of fact, the cordon of police was not overpowered. Seeing the crowd excited, they assumed that the police had been overwhelmed and charged the crowd. That is the difference between your statement and this case. What is your answer? You don't agree?

A. I am giving you what I thought was correct about the charge.

Q. After Mr. Gandhi left his car, did he take shelter in any house?

A. That I do not know. I cannot tell you that.

Q. Here it is said that when the cavalry charged the crowd, Gandhi escaped from his motor car and took shelter in a neighbouring house?

A. I do not know that.

By Mr. Kemp, Counsel to the Government of Bombay—

Q. When Mr. Gandhi was allowed through the cordon, did he go alone or with some other people?

A. Three cars went in the same direction.

Q. What about the crowd?

A. The crowd was kept back by the police. They moved, but they were not allowed to follow Mr. Gandhi.

Q. They were stopped?

A. Not the crowd in Pydhownie. The crowds had all been in the side streets.

Q. You saw the cavalry?

A. Yes.

Q. Between the cavalry and the cordon of police, I take it, there were some people?

A. A crowd of people.

Q. It was from that crowd that Mr. Gandhi's car came?

A. Yes.

Q. What I want to make clear is, when you saw that Mr. Gandhi came in his car through the cordon of police, whether there was anything from which you could imply that the only person that was passing was Mr. Gandhi?

A. Passing the cordon of police?

Q. You say Mr. Gandhi came through the cordon. You thought that the police cordon was being overpowered when Mr. Gandhi came through. Did any one else go there or why do you say that the cordon was overpowered?

A. There were three cars passing that way and the crowds collected there.

Q. My point is with regard to the cavalry. Who was in charge of the cordon?

A. Mr. Carter.

Q. Where is he?

A. He is laid up with pneumonia.

Q. Is there any other police officer who saw the incidents happen?

A. I do not know.

Q. This incident where you say "You tried to go from Sheikh Memon Street to Abdul Rahman Street," that was about 3 P.M. Could you say whether that was after or before Mr. Gandhi arrived?

A. Before Mr. Gandhi arrived.

PART II

Written Statements

Accepted by the Committee without oral evidence.

AHMEDABAD AND KAIRA.

Mr. P. N. MALLICK, Superintendent, Telegraph Engineering, Ajmer Division.

Damage done to telegraph lines by the rioters in or near Ahmedabad in April 1919.

As regards the damages to the telegraph lines they are given below:—

(1) Wires were cut at 8 places in Ahmedabad.

Ahmedabad-Bombay route.

(2) Wires were cut at 2 places between Barejadi and Kanij.

(3) Wires were cut at 1 place between Vatva and Barejadi.

(4) Wires were cut at 1 place between Uttarsanda and Boriavi.

(5) Wires were cut at 1 place between Navli and Vasad.

Ahmedabad-Kathiawar route.

(6) Wires were cut at Viramgam station.

(7) Wires were cut at 1 place between Viramgam and Bhankoda.

(8) Wires were cut at 1 place between Lakhtar and Bala Road.

Ahmedabad-Dholka route.

(9) Wires were cut at 1 place between Sabarmati and Ellis bridge.

Ahmedabad-Prantij route.

(10) Wires were cut at 2 places between Ahmedabad and Assarwa.

(11) Wires were cut at 2 places between Assarwa and Naroda.
(12) Wires were cut at 1 place between Dabhoda and Nandol Dehgam.
(13) Wires were cut at several places on the telephone lines in Ahmedabad.

The cost of the damages is given below:—

	Rs.
Instruments, batteries, etc.	28,486
Line stores	536
Cost of repairs	1,200
TOTAL	30,222

Nothing could be done for repairing the lines on 11th April in Ahmedabad itself as the place was full of rioters; from 12th, repairs to lines outside the town were commenced but nothing could be done in Ahmedabad till the 14th. A temporary office was opened just outside the Ahmedabad railway station on the 13th and receipt and transmission of telegrams were carried out to a certain extent by the temporary office: this was possible as no damage was done to our telegraph wires between Ahmedabad railway station and Palanpur along the main railway line. After the lines were temporarily repaired and instruments were fitted up in a building adjoining the old telegraph office and in the same compound and which was used as quarters for bachelor telegraphists, normal working was resumed from the 16th April 1919.

Mr. F. SIEVWRIGHT, Acting Traffic Superintendent, Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway, Bombay.

At the time of the disturbances in Gujarat last April I was District Traffic Superintendent of the Ahmedabad broad-gauge district of the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway, with headquarters at Ahmedabad. The district extends from Surat to Kharaghoda including certain branch lines.

On the 11th April I was at Surat. At about midday I received a telegram from the Station Master, Ahmedabad, stating that the electric power station in the town had been burnt down, and asking me to make arrangements to have him supplied with oil for lamps. As there was nothing indicating otherwise, I presumed that there had been an accidental fire.

At about 1 P.M. I received another telegram from the Staff Sergeant Instructor of the detachment of the 1/17th Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway Battalion, Indian Defence Force, Ahmedabad, asking for orders, as there were continual disturbances in the city. He telegraphed to me as I was the senior Indian Defence Force officer in Ahmedabad and commanding this detachment.

I then proceeded to Ahmedabad by the fast passenger train leaving Surat at 2 P.M. I could get no further news as communication with Ahmedabad appeared to have been cut.

At Anand I received a telegram from the Station Master, Kankaria, which is a suburb of Ahmedabad, to the effect that rioters had burnt all Government

buildings and had disconnected rails in his station yard, cut and broken all his signal connections, and that all telegraph and telephone wires had been cut; that the military were firing on the rioters and the riot appeared to be subsiding.

At Nadiad there was an exceptionally large concourse of people on the station platforms. My saloon was attached to the rear of the train and as it left the station, and the crowd saw me in it there was some hooting.

On arrival at Ahmedabad at about 9-30 P.M. I found the station occupied by a strong detachment of Indian Infantry and that pickets had been put out at all important points. The rioters had burnt the gates of one of the level-crossings crossing the Ahmedabad yard, and had tried to set fire to the sleepers over the culvert running across the yard.

That evening everything was quiet at Ahmedabad. The District Locomotive Superintendent and my Assistant and I remained at the station that night. I arranged for a patrol train to run between the Sabarmati bridge and Kankaria cabin.

At about 4-30 A.M. on the 12th of April I received a telegram from the Station Master, Nadiad, reporting the derailment of a troop train. Arrangements were made to run out a relief train to Kankaria where the break-down train was picked up, and the whole lot then proceeded to Nadiad. The Officer Commanding

Concluded.]

Mr. F. SIEVWRIGHT.

at Ahmedabad station gave me, at my request, one Indian officer and twenty men in case protection was needed for the working party. At first the break-down gang were unwilling to go out with the break-down train as they were afraid they might be assaulted when working at Nadiad. But when I showed them the escort provided they came willingly enough.

On the way it was noticed that the telegraph wires and posts had been cut and pulled down in several places between Kankaria and Kanij.

This damage must have been done just after the telegrams reporting the derailment of the troops special, between Uttarsanda and Nadiad had come through. On arrival at the site of accident at about 8 A.M. the work of transshipment and clearing the line was taken in hand. At Nadiad station the platforms were found occupied by a dense crowd of people who hampered everything, and were inclined to be noisy. They, however, left the station premises when the escort with the train alighted on the station platform.

During the time taken in clearing the line, which was eventually cleared about 6 P.M., crowds of people gathered on each side of the railway line, but showed no open hostility. This may have been due to the presence of the escort.

Shortly before the line was restored, I received a telegram reporting that the station at Viramgam had

been burnt down by rioters, and that my Traffic Inspector, Mr. MacIlvride, had been seriously injured.

I proceeded then to Viramgam. At Nadiad I was informed by one of the Deputy Station Masters that, as he was moving about among the people on the platform, he had heard conversation to the effect that rails would be removed from the railway near Barejadi station between Nadiad and Ahmedabad. At Ahmedabad I found that a military force had been despatched there by special train and asked for a patrol train to run out to Nadiad in view of the information given me there. At Jakhwada station, which is the next station before Ahmedabad, the Station Master informed me that rioters had been at his station an hour previously and had smashed his north end point indicators and signal lamps, and he stated that they had proceeded along the railway towards Viramgam. I ordered the train to proceed cautiously, but nothing was seen of the rioters.

At Viramgam, where I arrived at about midnight, I found the station building entirely demolished and troops guarding the station premises. In the morning I had to reorganise the work of the station and had difficulty at first in collecting the station staff together, as they had evidently been very much frightened by the occurrences of the previous day. In the afternoon as everything was quiet at Viramgam, I returned to my headquarters at Ahmedabad.

Written Statements

Accepted by the Committee without oral evidence.

CITY OF BOMBAY.

Major G. S. GORDON, 35th Scinde Horse.

Copy of a letter, dated 12th April 1919, from the Officer Commanding Cavalry, to the General Staff Officer, Bombay Brigade.

REPORT ON YESTERDAY'S RIOTING IN ABDUL RAHMAN STREET.

Arrived at 13-00 hours at Crawford Market with one squadron.

Ordered by the Deputy Commissioner of Police at 14-15 hours to patrol Abdul Rahman Street as far as Pydhownie and to keep the street open. The formation adopted was column of sections at 50 yards interval. The tramway line was up in places and blocked with stones and poles, etc.

The first time the column went down the street no stones were thrown; on the return journey the officer in rear reported that stones had been thrown and that he himself had been struck. I ordered sections about, and stones were thrown from a point about half way up the street. One sowar of the 7th Lancers (Shand Khan) was badly hit in the head and I took him back to the Police Headquarters and reported the stone throwing to the Deputy Commissioner of Police. I then returned and recommenced the patrolling—more stones were thrown and a large mob advanced and endeavoured to force the horses of the leading section back. I, therefore, formed troops and dispersed this mob who scattered and then stoned the rear of the column.

At Pydhownie heavy showers of stones fell and the police drawn up across the road made ready to fire. I

told the European policeman in charge that I would charge the street first which I did, and dispersed this mob. I reformed at Crawford Market, and at about 15-30 hours, went back again to Pydhownie in sections at a walk; stones were again thrown at intervals but not very heavily. I relieved this half squadron at 16-00 hours who patrolled till 17-00 hours. The officer in charge reported slight stone-throwing and bonfires lit in the street which were scattered:—

Casualties—		
British Officers	2	slightly hurt.
7th H. Lancers	4	men in hospital.
Do.	5	slightly hurt.
35th Scinde Horse	5	do.
Total	16	

Horses—		
7th Haryana Lancers	6	slightly hurt.
35th Scinde Horse	5	do.
Total	11	

G. S. GORDON, Major,
35th Scinde Horse,
O. C. Cavalry.

Statement given by Major GORDON on 7th November 1919.

On the 11th April 1919 I was in command of one squadron 7th Haryana Lancers and one squadron 35th Scinde Horse at the race-course, Bombay.

At about 12-30 hours I received an urgent summons from the Civil authorities for one squadron to proceed immediately to Crawford Market.

I took two troops 7th Haryana Lancers (H. M.) and two troops 35th Scinde Horse (Derajat Mussulmans), arriving at Crawford Market about 13-00 hours. The streets were open, but there were crowds on the pavements, who raised ironical cheers as the squadron passed; the route was littered with "bullies" and paving stones. On arrival at Crawford Market I reported to the Deputy Commissioner and District Superintendent of Police.

At about 14-15 hours the Deputy Commissioner told me that the crowd in Abdul Rahman Street required "moving on" and ordered me to patrol Abdul Rahman Street as far as Pydhownie with half my cavalry (two troops), leaving the other half inside the Kotwali. I was particularly told not to clear the street, but to keep the crowd moving and suggested that sections at intervals of fifty yards would best suit the purpose. I led the column myself and met with no opposition. I arrived at Pydhownie where there was a large crowd and I circled the square and then returned the way I had come. The tramway line was up in places and the street was strewn with large paving stones and "bullies" or poles. About half-way the officer in rear of the column reported to me that stones were being thrown at the rear of the column and that he himself had been struck. I ordered sections about and went back to the rear of the column and stones were thrown from a point about half-way up the street.

As soon as we came up, the stone-throwing ceased, and I ordered sections about again. By this time the

column had closed up and we were in column of sections. More stones were thrown and one man was badly hit on the head. I returned to Crawford Market and reported the stone-throwing and showed the man who had been hit to the Deputy Commissioner. I then returned in column of sections and was met by a large mob, advancing and shouting from the direction of Pydhownie, and who endeavoured to force the leading section back. I thereupon formed troops and drove back the mob, who scattered. I continued up the street to Pydhownie and stones were thrown up at the rear of column. I found the police drawn up at Pydhownie and as heavy showers of stones were falling, the police made ready to fire. The mob consisted of young men and little boys. The little boys were always in front and were evidently being egged on by the older ones. There were no sticks or lathis, nor did the mob fire any shots. I was of the opinion that the mob were endeavouring to engage the troops. Under these circumstances I told the European Sergeant in charge that I would charge the street first. He said to me that I had better go some way down as the police were going to fire. At this time, the showers of stones were very heavy. I charged down the street and the mob scattered. I am of the opinion that this charge had a most salutary effect. I formed up at Crawford Market, and reported to the magistrate there that I had charged and he appeared very satisfied. About 15-30 hours the magistrate asked me to go up the street again, which I did at a walk in column of sections. Stones were thrown at intervals, but not heavily. I endeavoured to trace where the stones came from, but it was impossible to make any arrests. I relieved the half squadron at 16-00 hours and the other half squadron patrolled till 17-00 hours. A few stones were thrown and bonfires were lit in the streets. These were scattered.

PART III

Written Statements.

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Statement of the GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY concerning the disturbances in Ahmedabad and Kaira districts in April 1919.

CHAPTER I.

Introductory.

In order to convey a correct idea of the origin and contributory causes which led to the disturbances and disorders that occurred in the month of April 1919 at Ahmedabad, Viramgam, Nadiad and at other places on the line of railway between Viramgam and Anand, it is necessary to refer to the political atmosphere of Gujarat during the preceding three years.

2. Ahmedabad and Kaira are the only two districts of the province of Gujarat seriously affected by the disturbances. Prior to 1916, these two districts, although not absolutely free from politics, may be said to have shown moderate activity in political matters. Such activity as did exist was confined to a section of the press and to a few members of the legal profession. The general body of the people evinced little or no interest in the attempts made by a few to arouse them to a display of energy in asserting their civic existence and clamouring for greater privileges as citizens of the Empire.

3. Ahmedabad city with its population of 300,000 (according to the last census, but probably since increased by 25 per cent.) is the capital of Gujarat and, in the presidency, stands next to Bombay in point of wealth, industry and commerce. It possesses no less than 78 mills, which employ nearly 50,000 hands. Its trade, both export and import, is very large. The noteworthy characteristic of its industrial and commercial enterprises is that they are essentially and wholly Indian owned and worked, except for one or two Europeans employed in some of the mills. The income tax return for the last financial year amounted to fifteen lakhs and ninety-five thousands of rupees. These figures denote undeniable prosperity and speak for themselves.

4. Viramgam town is situated at a distance of 40 miles to the west from Ahmedabad and within easy access by railway. It is the headquarters of a taluka of the district, and is also an industrial centre of some importance. The population numbers 20,000. It contains two large cotton mills and seven spinning factories which afford employment to about 3,000 hands. It may be described as a sort of suburb of Ahmedabad; the main industry being identical, there is a close connection between the two places, Viramgam taking its lead from Ahmedabad in most matters.

5. Nadiad town is on the railway line 29 miles south from Ahmedabad and, besides being the most important town of the Kaira district, is also a large commercial centre. It has a population of 27,000 and last year paid Rs. 26,000 in income tax. It possesses two cotton mills employing nearly 2,000 hands. Owing to its proximity and accessibility to Ahmedabad, it may also be considered a suburb of the Gujarat capital and is in close touch with it. Being the largest town in its district, it gives the lead to the countryside generally and practically sets the policy to be followed by them.

6. These fortuitous conditions of contiguity and mutual association of interests are factors that naturally tend to weld the people together and to create the probability of an unhesitating adoption by all of any cause which the people of one or the other area may take up. When, however, in addition to these natural and economic promoting elements, we see the people closely associated by an infusion of political activities, it is not surprising to find that the people of Nadiad and Viramgam emulated

the disorderly demonstrations which started in Ahmedabad on the 10th April 1919, immediately it was made known that Gandhi had been arrested and prevented from going to Delhi.

CHAPTER II.

Political history.

7. The methods by which the political union was brought about were clever in inception, persistent in character, gradual in adoption and effective in result. They may be described as originating in the establishment of a branch of the Bombay Home Rule League at Ahmedabad, in October 1916, by Messrs. Maganbhai Chaturbhai Patel and Jivanlal Virajrai Desai, both Barristers-at-Law and residents of Ahmedabad. On the 20th of the same month a meeting was held under the presidency of M. K. Gandhi to induce people to become members. P. Kashinath Telang, a prominent member from Bombay, delivered an address. The attendance numbered about 1,000 and consisted chiefly of students and members of the legal profession.

8. Since 1915 Mohanlal Karamchand Gandhi, Barrister-at-Law, who had gained notoriety in South Africa by the very prominent part he took in the passive resistance movement adopted by the Indians in that colony, had established himself in an educational institution which he names the *Satyagraha Ashram*, on the bank of the Sabarmati river at Ahmedabad. His presence in Ahmedabad was bound to exercise an influence on the Home Rule League and was not long in doing so. His advice was sought on the questions of the day and went far to mould the views of the members of the league all over Gujarat. He took an active interest in the league and frequently presided at its meetings.

9. The Ahmedabad branch extended its activities to other parts of Gujarat. In April 1917 the Secretary, Maganbhai Chaturbhai Patel, visited the Panch Mahals district, delivered two speeches at Godhra in the interests of the league and established a branch later.

10. The order of internment passed by the Madras Government against Mrs. Besant in June 1917 afforded a stimulus for recruitment to the league. On 22nd June a deputation consisting of Mr. Horniman, the editor of the *Bombay Chronicle* newspaper, Jamnadas Dwarkadas and others from Bombay came to Ahmedabad and delivered public speeches at a meeting of the league held in the Anand Bhavan theatre. This assistance from Bombay infused fresh vitality in the local branch. On the 1st July Maganbhai Patel, the Ahmedabad branch secretary, visited Nadiad in the Kaira district and opened a branch of the League there. Thakordas Nathubhai Desai and Nandlal Nannalal, B.A., two pleaders, were appointed secretaries. About 100 members were enrolled. Among them were several pleaders and Gokaldas Dwarkadas Talati, a prominent resident. The League took such a strong hold on the Kaira people that within a short time 86 branches were started in the district, each of which became a very active centre for the dissemination of home rule propaganda and literature. On the 12th August 1917 the Ahmedabad branch held a

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AHMEDABAD AND KAIRA.

meeting on which they issued special invitations to the trading classes. About 500 attended, chiefly Marwaris and their agents. Home rule, passive resistance and boycott of foreign goods were the subjects of the speeches delivered. About 50 traders enrolled themselves as members, much to the satisfaction of the secretary, Maganbhai Patel, who remarked that these enrolments contradicted the taunt that the League was composed only of pleaders and literary men.

11. Four days later another meeting was held in Ahmedabad at which a ladies' branch was formed. Miss Anasuya Sarabhai, sister of Mr. Ambalal Sarabhai, a millionaire millowner, and Mrs. Sumant Butukram Mehta were appointed secretaries.

12. In November the Ahmedabad branch displayed great activity, its members visiting all the *taluka* towns and the larger villages in the districts collecting signatures on the home rule petition to be forwarded to the Secretary of State.

CHAPTER III.

Intervening industrial developments.

13. Miss Anasuya turned her attention to the mill-hands and started an organisation to improve their condition and protect their interests. In December the weavers employed in all the mills demanded a 50 per cent. increase of pay. The mill agents declined to give more than 20 per cent. Mr. Gandhi then intervened and offered to act as an arbitrator. The millowners declined the offer and, anticipating a strike, resolved in the middle of February 1918 on a general lockout of all the weavers. The weavers rallied round Mr. Gandhi and Miss Anasuya who organised daily meetings in the river-bed which were well attended by all the weavers, at which Gandhi and Anasuya harangued them to stand fast in their demand for the 50 per cent. increase. The interest taken by these two leaders resulted in their becoming very popular with the mill-hands. Gandhi's efforts to induce the millowners to accede to the increase not meeting with any success up to the middle of March, he declared he would eat nothing until the demands of the mill-hands were conceded. The millowners believing that he would carry out his declaration and fearing that if he were to starve himself to death, the mill-hands would become exasperated and wreak vengeance on the mills, consented to a compromise by which the mill-hands were to receive the 50 per cent. for one day and for one day to accept the 20 per cent. increase first offered by the mill agents, thereafter to receive a rise of 35 per cent. The strike thus ended was considered a victory for the operatives for which they were indebted to Gandhi and Anasuya. To show their appreciation the two benefactors were driven in a victoria, bedecked with flowers, through the city heading a triumphal procession of thousands of mill-hands. Thus Mr. Gandhi and Miss Anasuya had a strong labour organisation absolutely devoted to them and controlling the whole of the 40,000 operatives in Ahmedabad; and the mill population of Viramgam was sure to imitate whatever action was taken there. It may be noted that the Collector and the District Magistrate, though in close communication with both parties during the lockout, maintained a neutral attitude except for the measures taken to preserve the peace.

CHAPTER IV.

Political history—continued.

14. In March 1918 Mrs. Besant visited Ahmedabad, where, seated in the same carriage with M. K. Gandhi, she drove in a large procession through the principal parts of the city and delivered an address on the benefits of home rule.

15. In June 1918 the branch started delivering speeches in the public streets and thoroughfares.

16. In July 1918 Kalidas Jaskaran Javeri, a pleader of Ahmedabad and a prominent home ruler, visited Dohad in the Panch Mahals district and delivered a spirited exhortation in favour of home rule.

17. In August 1918 Mr. M. K. Gandhi presided at one of the open air home rule meetings in Ahmedabad. Apparently the members were disappointed at the poor attendance of their street meetings and sought to improve matters by getting Gandhi to take part. The result was partially successful as the attendance was large.

18. Prominent workers in the cause of the League in addition to those previously named were Vallubhai Patel, Barrister-at-Law, and Indulal Kanayalal Yajnik, B.A., LL.B.

19. The Branch spared no effort to propagate the views of the League and to cultivate an interest in politics amongst all classes. The reform scheme that followed the visit to India of Mr. Montagu, Secretary of State, furnished a fruitful theme for discussion and was not neglected as a means to bring the League into prominence by their adverse criticisms on the attitude of the European community and Government officials towards the measures.

20. The legislation in the Imperial Council, regarding the Rowlatt Bills in the beginning of 1919, afforded a congenial subject for the League to take up, encouraged by the oratory indulged in, and the attitude adopted by, the unofficial members of the Council in the strenuous opposition that they presented against the passing of the Bills, while articles that appeared in the *Bombay Chronicle* and some of the vernacular newspapers of the presidency added to the excitement.

21. The Ahmedabad branch held a meeting on the 23rd February presided over by Mr. Vallubhai Patel to protest against the Bills. The meeting was attended by about 500 persons and may be said to have originated what became known later as the *Satyagraha* movement. The following day another meeting was held in Mr. Gandhi's *Ashram* attended by Messrs. Gandhi, Hormiman, Jamnadas Dwarkadas and Umar Sobhani from Bombay, and Mrs. Sarojini Naidu. It was decided to start a passive resistance movement campaign unless the Rowlatt Bills were abandoned. A manifesto was drawn up and approved. It contained a form of oath to be taken by the members of the *Satyagraha Sabha* to refuse to obey the Rowlatt Bills, if passed, and such other laws as a committee to be appointed later, were to decide. It was published in the *Bombay Chronicle* of the 2nd March and ran as follows:—

Being conscientiously of opinion that the Bills known as the Indian Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill No. I of 1919 and the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill No. II of 1919 are unjust, subversive of the principles of liberty and justice, and destructive of the elementary rights of individuals on which the safety of the community as a whole, and the State itself, is based, we solemnly affirm that, in the event of these Bills becoming law and until they are withdrawn, we shall refuse civilly to obey these laws and such other laws as a committee to be hereafter appointed may think fit, and we further affirm that in this struggle we will faithfully follow truth and refrain from violence to life, person or property.

Mr. Gandhi was the first signatory and among others from Ahmedabad were (1) Vallubhai Javerbhai Patel, Bar.-at-Law, (2) Anasuya Sarabhai, (3) Indulal Kanayalal Yajnik, whose names have already been mentioned in connection with the Home Rule League. The branches of the Home Rule League all over Gujarat threw themselves heart and soul into the work of spreading the doctrines of the *Satyagraha Sabha* and by holding meetings at which exciting speeches were delivered, assisted in popularising the movement in mofussil towns and villages. The publication in the newspapers was followed by the appearance of a large number of posters containing quotations from Thoreau and incitements to the people

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Continued.]

to adopt disobedience of the law. The following is an English translation of the posters:—

I.

Duty of the servants of the country.

The abodes of just and good men are jails in the kingdom in which men are unjustly imprisoned.

It is shameful to obey the tyrannical rule. To oppose it is easy and good.

Thoreau.

II.

Whom will you respect?

Rowlatt Bill or the truth?

I see no necessity of teaching the virtue of respecting the law. It is always necessary to respect the truth.

Thoreau.

III.

How can the atrocities of the Rowlatt Bill be stopped?

There is no atrocity if a thousand men refuse to pay taxes; but to pay taxes to a Government which commits atrocities is to support such rule and thus encourage atrocities.

Thoreau.

IV.

How will the bonds of the Rowlatt Bill be broken?

The breaking of the bonds of slavery will commence the very day a single patriot is sent to prison for having opposed slavery and decline to pay taxes.

Thoreau.

Fight against the bonds of the Rowlatt Bill. Advice of Great Thoreau.

A man is privileged to oppose the rule of tyranny when the tyranny becomes oppressive. Nine hundred and ninety-nine out of a thousand persons talk of truthfulness but only one practises it. The value of this one is however very great.

22. All through the month of March the agitation was vigorously kept up particularly in the Ahmedabad and Kaira districts. The Broach, Surat and the Panch Mahals districts also participated in the movement but less actively than the former two.

23. As part of the passive resistance civil disobedience policy, literature that had been proscribed by Government was reprinted and publicly sold. An unregistered newspaper called the *Satyagraha* edited by Mr. Gandhi was published, the readers of which were requested to prepare copies and distribute them.

24. The following is an English translation of one of the issues:—

Read this paper, prepare copies and distribute them among your friends and tell them to prepare copies and circulate them freely.

One pice per copy.

Satyagrahi.

(Editor Mohanlal Karamchand Gandhi.)

(This paper will be published every Monday at 10 in the morning.)

(Bombay Gamdevi—Belangi Road, Chaitra Sud and Sanvat 1975.)

Notice to subscribers.

This paper is not registered according to law. It cannot therefore have an annual subscription. It cannot also be guaranteed that the subscriber will always get the paper because Government can at any time arrest the editor. It is impossible to give any assurance of its continuance until and unless someone is ready to take up the editorship as soon as Government sends the present editor to jail. We shall spare no pains to produce a permanent supply of such editors. It is not our intention to infringe the provisions of the Press Act; but this paper will be published until the Rowlatt Act is cancelled.

Who are we?

The answer to a question as to what the *Satyagrahi* will do, solves:—"Who are we?" The object of *Satyagraha* is to get the Rowlatt Bill cancelled, that is to say, the object of *Satyagrahi* is to point out to the people in pursuance of the principles of *Satyagraha*, the means to get it repealed. According to the *Satyagraha* vow, the *Satyagrahis* are to disregard certain laws and to go on to jail—pilgrimage. The best example therefore that can be shown is that the publication of this paper itself violates the law. Amongst other associations it is not imperative that the preceptor should follow the doctrine he teaches. I do not on this account find fault with these associations. They follow a certain principle. The principle of *Satyagraha* is quite different. Herein the precept given is example and hence the doctrines advocated in this paper will have to be well tried. And as the value of known remedies is far more than that of a new one, we hope that the remedies proved by experience will be regarded valuable by the readers of this paper and will be adopted by them courageously.

Many interesting events happened yesterday but the most interesting was that when the millowners refused leave to their mill-hands, the latter celebrated the day after finishing their work in the mills.

25. Mrs. Sarojini Naidu toured the districts of Gujarat holding large meetings, denouncing the Bills, recommending passive resistance and urging all to sign the pledge. At one of these meetings alluding to the reform scheme and the Rowlatt Bills, she described Government as holding in one hand a glass of nectar and in the other a cup of poison. At another she urged that Government had no right to tyrannise over the whole country for the sake of a few revolutionaries. The Bills did not intend to give the people justice, and if any one criticised the behaviour of a Government servant, he would be accused of anarchy and be brought within the clutches of the law. Government and justice depended on the will of the people, and if they were not treated justly, they should disobey the authorities.

26. Mahatma Munshiram alias Swami Shradhdhanandji, political agitator from Lahore, also visited Ahmedabad and Nadiad where he addressed huge meetings, speaking in favour of passive resistance and denouncing the Rowlatt Bills. The meeting which he addressed at Ahmedabad took place on the 20th March and coincided with the celebration of the anniversary of the settlement of the strike of mill-hands. About 10,000 mill-hands were present at the meeting. The *Swami* in his speech endeavoured to invest the passive resistance movement with a religious significance.

27. Jamnadas Dwarkadas, a Bombay Bhatia and enthusiastic home ruler and theosophist, at one of the meetings compared India to a lion, which, when irritated, killed his irritators. He deprecated fighting with offensive weapons and advised the use of the powerful weapon of passive resistance. He urged his hearers not to be afraid of being sent to prison, as it was better to go to prison than to allow a scourge to fall upon their motherland.

28. The movement became very popular in Ahmedabad and Nadiad. The Home Rule League became practically merged in the *Satyagraha Sabha*, the office-bearers and members of the former being the leaders of the latter.

29. The Rowlatt Bills became law on the 21st March 1919. This provoked the *Satyagrahis* to further activities all over Gujarat. Riots occurred at Delhi on the 30th March and added to the excitement in Ahmedabad and Kaira.

30. Mr. Gandhi as the President of the *Satyagraha Sabha* fixed the 6th April as a day of general mourning on account of the passing of the Rowlatt Bills and called for a *hartal* or general stoppage of all business on that day.

31. In Ahmedabad preparations were made to observe the day as suggested by Mr. Gandhi and to organise monster processions and meetings.

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AHMEDABAD AND KAIRA.

32. On the 3rd of April the District Magistrate, Ahmedabad, pointed out to Messrs. Vallubhai Patel and Jivanlal Desai, the secretaries of the *Sabha*, the risk incurred by holding the proposed demonstrations reminding them of the riots in Delhi and the need of avoiding a repetition in Ahmedabad. Messrs. Patel and Desai assured the District Magistrate that violence was far from their wishes, and that none would be resorted to, and they gave an assurance that the procession would be orderly and that no shopkeeper would be forced to close his shop against his will. Accepting these assurances, the District Magistrate ordered that the police arrangements should be unobtrusive and the crowd left to itself. The strike was observed and although the promise that no pressure would be brought to bear to compel shopkeepers to close their shops, was not strictly adhered to, on the whole the procession, which was a very large one, estimated at 50,000, passed off quietly. Numerous black banners and flags, bearing inscriptions in harmony with the demonstration and similar to those that appeared in the posters alluded to above were carried aloft during the procession, which made its way to the bed of the river Sabarmati below the Ellis bridge, where inflammatory and exciting speeches were delivered as a *finale* of the proceedings by Vallubhai Patel, Barrister-at-Law, Indulal Jainik, B.A., LL.B., Kalidas Jaskaran, Pleader. The last-named in the course of his speech said that warrants for the arrest of seven of the leaders had been issued, but they would not be deterred. He hoped that when they were arrested, others would be ready to take their places and continue the agitation. The statement about the warrants was untrue. Though the speakers may have intended and advised the assembly to resist the Bills until they were revoked by adopting the attitude of passive resistance against Government, and civil disobedience of the law, the uneducated among the audience unable to differentiate between active and passive resistance or between defiant and "civil" disobedience, probably interpreted the harangues according to their own intellectual standard as exhortations to aggressive resistance and disobedience and went home imbued with the idea that it was their bounden duty to forcibly coerce Government into a withdrawal of the objectionable laws by all means in their power whenever their leaders called upon them to do so.

CHAPTER V.

Outbreak of violence on 10th April.

33. The events of the 9th, 10th and 11th April are thus described in the judgment of the learned president of the first special tribunal:—

"On April 9th there was another meeting of *Satyagrahis* in the river-bed, in which reference was made to the Rowlatt Bills in connection with *Swadeshi*. In this same month a paper known as *Hind Swarajya* written by Mr. Gandhi and proscribed by Government in 1914 was sold in Ahmedabad, apparently for the express purpose of setting an example of how to disobey the law. Unregistered newspapers were published apparently with the same intent. By these two movements, the mill association movement and the *Satyagraha* movement Mr. Gandhi and M^{rs} Anasuya had attained a position of great influence in Ahmedabad both among the mill-hands and among other classes. The enormous attendance at the meeting shows the extent to which popular interest was aroused. No evidence has been adduced to show that there was at any time any direct incitement to violence given either by Mr. Gandhi or by his immediate lieutenants, but it is obvious that such a doctrine as that of 'refusing respectfully to obey the laws' was at least likely to be made use of by seditious persons to promote deeds of violence. Nor was it likely that the illiterate crowds to whom these doctrines were offered would be likely to appreciate the difference between active and passive resistance. Once the duty of loyal obedience was removed, violence was bound to issue on sufficient cause arising. The proximate cause

of the Ahmedabad disturbances consisted of two rumours of which one was wholly and the other partially false. The first rumour was that Mr. Gandhi had been arrested. This rumour reached Ahmedabad early on the morning of the 10th April. It resulted in the outbreak with which the present trial is chiefly concerned. The second rumour was that Miss Anasuya had been arrested. This rumour reached Ahmedabad early in the morning of the 11th April. This rumour served greatly to accentuate the existing excitement and was followed by a second mob outbreak in the course of which Sergeant Fraser was killed, the Collector and District Superintendent of Police were assaulted and almost all the Government offices including both the big offices and the numerous police *chowkies* were wrecked and burnt by a wildly infuriated mob. The disturbances were only suppressed on both days by calling in the aid of the military. They were the immediate result of the rumours already noted acting upon minds already excited and prepared by the propaganda above described. Mr. V. J. Patel who defended accused Nos. 2 and 3 and is himself described as the secretary of the *Satyagraha* cross-examined Sub-Inspector Kothawala with a view to showing that the leading *Satyagrahis* were at least innocent of intending to promote violence. Mr. Kothawala admitted that certain of these leaders did assist him in pacifying the crowd on the morning of the 11th April and that after the riot of the 10th, the public meeting already called for that evening to consider the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest was expedited. To the handbill convening the meeting was attached a notice purporting to be signed by Mr. V. J. Patel in which as Secretary of the *Satyagraha Sabha* and in Mr. Gandhi's name he expressly called for a general strike (holiday) in celebration of the arrest and requested that the work should be carried 'further with double zeal and faith.' To address such ambiguous words to illiterate mill-hands was at the best extreme foolishness. They were no doubt given a definite interpretation in favour of direct and violent action by seditious agitators."

The news of the arrest created universal excitement particularly amongst the mill employees by whom Gandhi was held in high esteem. Their feelings were in a very excitable condition, which had been produced among them by the inflammatory discourses denouncing Government and urging defiance of the law and resistance to authority, that had been delivered at the several meetings held during the preceding few days. The news of Gandhi's arrest produced the spark necessary to ignite the combustible material that had thus accumulated. The workmen in most of the mills immediately "downed tools," the shops were closed, some voluntarily, some forcibly, others through fear, and a general strike was observed. People were forcibly compelled to alight from conveyances and proceed on foot. Those who refused or tried to drive away were stoned. From 1 p.m. large crowds assembled on the roads in the vicinity of the railway station and moved about compelling shopkeepers to close their shops, behaving in a rowdy manner and shouting out "*Mahatma Gandhi ki jai*." At about 2-30 p.m. two European weaving masters, Messrs. Sagar and Steeples, who were driving home, were stopped and made to turn back towards the Kalupur *Chowky*, where they dismissed their carriage and made an attempt to get to their home by getting on the motor lorry belonging to the Government dairy which was proceeding to the Camp. The lorry was stopped, Sagar and Steeples compelled to alight and stoned back to the Kalupur Police *Chowky* where they took refuge. The police at the *chowky* persuaded the crowd to withdraw and telephoned to headquarters for an armed party. Sagar and Steeples made another attempt to escape but were again attacked and stoned by the crowd and forced to seek shelter in a *dharmasala*, from where they sallied forth once more with the hope of escaping the mob. They were again attacked and forced to take shelter in the Beehive flour mill, where they were joined by a party of eight armed police under two sub-inspectors. The crowd attacked the mill,

AHMEDABAD AND KAIRA.

[Continued.]

forced the entrance, destroyed the telephone, wrecked the office and set fire to the mill records. They demanded the surrender of the two Europeans and called upon the police to depart. The Europeans and police had taken refuge on the upper floor of the mill. The mob then started setting fire to the base of the mill. The police fired over their heads but this did not deter the crowd beyond sending them back a few paces. The mill people fearing the destruction of their premises, insisted on the Europeans and police vacating and practically forced them out. The two Europeans came out accompanied by one sub-inspector and four armed policemen and tried to force a passage through the crowd in order to escape. They were set upon, stoned and assaulted with sticks. In self-defence the police fired. One of the Europeans, Sagar, managed to escape, but Steeples with the four policemen had to rush to the upper floor of a *chawl* on the opposite side of the road. The upper floor is flanked by a narrow open verandah balcony facing the street. There are six rooms in the block opening into the balcony. All the doors were locked or bolted from the inside, the inmates having made their escape by the back as soon as the mob approached. As soon as they reached the balcony, the fugitives were exposed to the mob, who pelted them with stones and tried to rush the staircase that led up to the balcony. Two of the policemen tried to guard the approach but were unable to do so. Meanwhile Steeples and three of the policemen forced open one of the doors and escaped from the building through an opening that had been made in the back wall of the room. One policeman was seized by the mob and thrown from the balcony into the road where he was brutally assaulted and died in a short time. At 3-30 p.m. the District Magistrate, who was in his office at the Bhadar which is on the opposite side of the city at a distance of about two miles, received a telephone message that the railway station was being attacked by a mob. He rang up the station master who reported that the mob had moved away from the station, but were still in the neighbourhood and had besieged two Europeans and some policemen in a mill. The District Magistrate rang up the District Superintendent of Police and directed him to get together as many men as he could from the headquarter lines and send them down to the railway station. He also informed the District Superintendent of Police that he was sending his motor car to fetch him to the District Magistrate's office from where both of them would proceed to the scene of the disturbance. The Superintendent of Police ordered an armed party of twenty-four men to proceed towards the station from the headquarters lines which are situated about 2½ miles from the railway station. He arrived at the District Magistrate's office at 5 p.m. Both proceeded towards the scene of the disturbance and when they arrived within view of the crowd, they found it to be so dense that the possibility of getting out of it once they entered was very remote, so the District Magistrate scribbled a note to the Officer Commanding the troops at Ahmedabad informing him of the situation and requesting the despatch of a military force to deal with the mob. The note was sent by the District Magistrate's motor. The District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police taking a few armed policemen from the Idgha *Chowky* proceeded on foot, pushing their way through the crowd, which though sullen and hostile, offered no opposition to their progress. On arrival at the *chawl*, where the policeman was lying injured, they found twenty-four policemen guarding five persons who had been arrested, and three or four wounded policemen, including the one who had been thrown from the balcony, who among other injuries had a ghastly wound on the back of his head over which the scalp was hanging loose. The District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police had the injured policemen removed to hospital. The condition of affairs that existed is thus described by the District Magistrate:—"I am not certain of the time when we arrived but think that it was shortly after 5 p.m. We remained on the spot until the arrival of the troops at dusk 6-30 p.m.

or somewhat later. The crowd attempted nothing against us but occasionally pressed forward upon the armed police. The Superintendent of Police and I kept walking up and down ordering them back and were assisted in so doing by two men in *Satyagrahi* costume who appeared to be the leaders. Every now and then these men called for a cheer for Mr. Gandhi whereupon the crowd shouted '*Gandhi Mahatma ki jai*' and were obviously excited by their own cries. I am of opinion that the *Satyagrahis* honestly desired to avoid violence though their encouragement of these cries was distinctly dangerous. The crowd fluctuated in size, sometimes increasing and pressing forward, sometimes thinning away. There were two or three thousands of them when the numbers were greatest. The Superintendent of Police asked me whether the prisoners should not be released as the sight of them was rendering the mob dangerous. I agreed with him that it was neither prudent nor necessary to retain them as the force was not a large one and was completely surrounded. Accordingly their names were taken and they were allowed to depart. One of the *Satyagrahis* undertook to produce them when called upon. This man who was subsequently tried and acquitted by the tribunal acted as if he were the leader of the mob, voicing their demands for the release of the prisoners and the withdrawal of the police. As he appeared to have authority with the crowd he was requested to use his influence and induce them to allow the removal of the dying man to the civil hospital. He did so successfully and the constable was carried off upon a *charpoy* but expired before he arrived.

"The demeanour of the crowd was hostile but on the whole they did not behave badly for the hour and a half during which we were awaiting the military. A few stones were thrown without aim or effect. There was a large number of boys and youngsters present. The bulk of the mob appeared to be mill-hands. At 6-30 or 6-45 p.m. Colonel Fraser arrived with a force of about 100 men who spread out across the road and cleared it as they advanced. A guard of 30 men was left at the Prem gate by the Beehive mill and another body at the Kalupur gate about 500 yards further south. The rest of the men were left at the station. The crowd dispersed before them without any show of resistance. I remained at the station until about 9-45 or 10 p.m. and on driving back to Shahi Bagh found all the streets in the neighbourhood deserted. Apparently all excitement had subsided."

Six persons were tried for the murder of the constable. Four were convicted and two acquitted. The following extract from the judgment of the tribunal that disposed of the case is instructive:—

"The effect of the agitation against the Rowlatt Act described as the *Kala Kaida* (Black Act) and of the *Satyagraha* movement on the minds of the mill-hands of Ahmedabad of whom there is an enormous number in the city can clearly be traced in the events of the 10th and 11th April last. The *Satyagraha* vow was being circulated for signatures by *Satyagrahi* agents like accused No. 2. Whatever its real meaning and import may be to the educated, it was likely to be entirely misconstrued or misunderstood by labourers and mill-hands. To them it would rather mean a license for violating the laws of the land with impunity. The natural effect of selling proscribed literature like the *Hind Swarajya* in open defiance of the law on the minds of the illiterate would be that the *Sarkar* had become powerless and that they could impose their will on the Government by defying the law. These facts have a pertinent and immediate bearing on the question of the intention of the mob which had collected in the vicinity of the Prem *Darwaza* on the 10th April.

"Turning now to the occurrence of the 9th April we find that a meeting was held near the Ellis bridge at which references were made to the Rowlatt Act and *Swadeshi* and another meeting attended by about 4,000 persons including merchants and mill-hands was held at the Manilal Mansions the same evening.

"On a careful consideration of these facts I have come to the conclusion that though the proximate cause or the *causa causans* of the riot on the 10th April was the spreading of the rumour that Mr. Gandhi had been arrested, the persistent agitation against the Rowlatt Act and the *Satyagraha* propaganda were contributory causes. The leaders of the *Satyagraha* movements must have realised this as they advertised a meeting below the Ellis bridge for the evening of the 10th to give instructions about the Rowlatt Bills and the riots which had taken place that day."

34. In other parts of the town and especially in the thoroughfares leading from the railway station large crowds were on the move behaving in a disorderly manner, forcing shopkeepers to close their shops, stoning the police and compelling people to get out of their carriages. The Victoria Cinema building was considerably damaged because it had not closed the previous Sunday, the 6th April, the day ordained by Gandhi to be observed as one of mourning on account of the passing of the Rowlatt Bills.

35. In the evening a mass meeting was held below the Ellis bridge at which Vallubhai Patel, Mrs. Gandhi, wife of M. K. Gandhi, and Indulal Yajnik spoke. Unfortunately no authentic report of the speeches is available, as the proceedings are said to have been very confused and noisy. The crowd however dispersed without committing any more serious mischief that night.

36. Military pickets were posted during the night at the railway station and at the Prem Darwaza, the gateway in the city wall leading from the railway station into the city. On the night of the 10th and early morning of the 11th April armed police guards were posted at the following places:—

	Head Constables.	Constables.
(1) Khas Bazar Chowky	3	13
(2) Idgah Chowky	1	6
(3) Electric Power Station	1	3
(4) Bank of Bombay Guard	1	3
(5) Lockup Guard	1	9
(6) Rajnagar Mills	1	4
(7) Aryodaya Mills	1	4

The available men at headquarters were kept in readiness. The night passed without anything untoward occurring in the city.

CHAPTER VI.

The events of 11th April.

37. The morning of the 11th April saw all the mills closed down, crowds of mill-hands assembled outside the Prem Darwaza and mixed crowds moving along all the streets and thoroughfares of the city. Most of the shops were unopened. The arrest of Gandhi was the prevailing topic coupled with exaggerated accounts of the number of persons shot by the police on the previous evening. To add to the excitement, a mischievous rumour got abroad that Miss Anasuya had also been arrested. This increased the excitement among the mill-hands who soon manifested a turbulent disposition and proceeded to indulge in hooliganism. They moved about in bands, armed with sticks which they looted from shops where stocks are kept for sale, and seizing anything that could be used as a weapon, proceeded to different mills and factories which they suspected were surreptitiously working, and behaved boisterously until they were satisfied that no work was going on. They rushed through the streets shouting and brandishing their sticks compelling shops and business places to close, and stoning the police. The District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police visited the vicinity of the previous evening's disturbance and passed up the Richey Road about 8-30 A.M. They stopped at one point midway between the Prem Darwaza and the Khas Bazar Chowky to speak to the city inspector of police who was cycling. Their car was surrounded by a mob. As they drove off

they were pelted with stones. Further on in the vicinity of the Victoria gardens, they saw an infuriated mob of about 200 mill-hands rushing towards them from the direction of the Ellis bridge. They escaped molestation by swerving to the right and realising the seriousness of the situation proceeded to the Camp where they arranged for the military to be sent into the city to deal with the rioters. Meanwhile a crowd proceeded to the Bhadar near the Lal Darwaza and set fire to the *mandap* erected for holding the matriculation examination, destroying the whole structure as well as all the desks and chairs that it contained. The municipal fire engines were summoned to extinguish the fire. When they arrived the firemen were threatened and the hose pipes cut so as to render them useless. The residence of the Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, adjoins the site where the examination *mandap* stood. There were a number of surplus wooden posts lying below the outhouses of the Engineer's bungalow. These were set on fire. Mr. Tyabjee, the Executive Engineer, in order to save his premises from catching fire, made an attempt to extinguish the burning posts, but was forced to desist by being stoned and threatened that his bungalow would be set fire to, if he persisted trying to save the posts from destruction.

38. After burning the *mandap* the mob proceeded to the group of buildings comprising the Collector's office, the record room, the Sub-Registrar's office, the City Survey office and the City Magistrate's office and set fire to them. While the work of devastation was in progress, Mr. Tyabjee, the Executive Engineer, with Mrs. Tyabjee, passed on their way to the residence of Colonel Tuke, the Civil Surgeon, with the object of enquiring about the safety of Mrs. Tuke who was alone in her bungalow which is situated within 50 yards from the Collector's office. Mr. Tyabjee remonstrated with an English-speaking Indian youth who appeared to be directing the operations and told him that Gandhi would die of grief when he heard what they had done. The youth replied that they would burn everything until Gandhi and Anasuya were released and asked Mr. Tyabjee to leave him alone. A crowd closed round Mr. and Mrs. Tyabjee. His person was searched to see if he had any weapon concealed and he was allowed to enter Colonel Tuke's compound only on condition that he promised to prevent Mrs. Tuke using a revolver which they had seen with her. While Mr. Tyabjee was being searched for arms, his pocket was picked of a purse containing a small amount of money.

39. When the Collector's office was set fire to, Mrs. Tuke's compound was picketed outside by the crowd. Mrs. Tuke was alone in the bungalow and realising that the situation was critical armed herself with her husband's revolver and awaited developments. The crowd surrounding the compound tried to dissuade the Tyabjees from entering saying it would not be safe as they intended to burn the bungalow. One of them accompanied them in to prevent their being molested by the mob some of whom may not have approved of the permission to enter. Mr. Nowrojee Vakil and a member of the Salvation Army followed the Tyabjees to enquire after Mrs. Tuke, followed later by medical students sent from the civil hospital. The mob dispersed without doing any damage to Colonel Tuke's bungalow.

40. After setting fire to the Collector's offices, the crowd made for the Bank of Bombay which is situated about 100 yards away and on the opposite of the road from the Government office, but were held up by the police guard of one head constable and three constables who fired and wounded a few and thereby saved the bank. The same mob attacked the subsidiary jail in which there were fifty prisoners confined. They set fire to the gateway to force an entrance, but were driven off by the police guard who fired and wounded a few. Two prisoners escaped during the attack but were subsequently re-arrested.

41. Mr. Vallubhai Patel, the Secretary of the *Satyagraha Sabha*, and the signatory to the notice promulgated the previous day about the arrest of Gandhi, calling

for a general strike and inviting the attendance at the meeting to be held on the evening of the 10th April, lives quite close to the Bombay Bank and the group of offices that were burnt. At the time of the burning of these offices and of the attack on the Bombay Bank and subsidiary jail he was in his house along with Dr. Kanuga, Indulal Yajnik, Krishnalal Desai and Kalidas Jaskaran Javeri, all prominent members of the *Satyagraha Sabha*. None of these gentlemen made any attempt to approach the mob to dissuade them from the work of destruction that they were engaged in. Not only did they refrain from interfering but they also did not venture downstairs to attend to the wounded, a couple of whom were lying in front of their door. Certain inmates of the *Satyagraha Ashram*, who were present by order at Mr. Vallubhai Patel's house, helped to remove the wounded to hospital. When Dr. Kanuga was questioned about his behaviour in that, being a medical man, he did not attempt to render any aid to the wounded lying at his door, he replied "call it fear or anything you like, but I did not feel equal to leaving the room." Indulal Yajnik's explanation on this point is instructive. He said "I saw the *pandal*, the Collector's and the Magistrate's offices, the office of the North Daskroi and the Magistrate's offices, the office of the North Daskroi and the Magistrate's offices burning away as I was drafting a message to be sent to the Associated Press. I and my friends assembled at Mr. Patel's house did not go out to dissuade the mob from committing acts of violence for two reasons. Firstly when we saw the building on fire we never thought another would be set on fire immediately afterwards. The whole proceedings took us unawares and caused us a series of painful surprises. Secondly we thought that no useful purpose would be served by appealing to a mob which has embarked on a course of violence and was altogether out of control. I saw the guard firing from the Bank of Bombay building and two wounded persons lying near our house, who were removed to the civil hospital."

42. Mr. Kalidas Jaskaran, when he was asked why he did not make any attempt to prevent the offices being burned, replied: "you deny us the right to carry arms and you expect us to go and face an infuriated mob." When he was asked whether even if he had possessed arms on this occasion he would have ventured to face the mob and use the arms, he said that being a Jain he would never hurt or kill anyone.

43. These are the gentlemen who delivered speeches to illiterate crowds urging them to set aside fear, to commit deeds of valour, to suffer hardships, and to go to prison, rather than submit to obedience to objectionable laws. It is true that on the morning of the 11th they were about the streets endeavouring to calm the crowds and at the suggestion of the District Magistrate they persuaded a crowd, which had assembled near the Prem Darwaza, to follow them to Mirzapur to meet Anasuya at her house, but found on arrival that only a small number had done so, the remainder having dropped out on the way. When, however, the mob later resorted to incendiarism and violence, these leaders did not make any effort to restrain the fury of the mob or to save any property. It is not as if by doing so incurred any risk of personal injury. The rioters never attacked any private Indian individual and seemed resolved only on assaulting Europeans, whether official or non-official, and a few selected unpopular Indian officials such as Rao Bahadur Bulakhidas and Khan Bahadur Hussain Khan Dhanekhan who had become unpopular owing to their activity as magistrates.

44. From the Collector's office the crowd passed on to the electric power house in the Shahpur quarter of the town which they attacked and compelled to close down. Not content with stopping the work, they attacked the premises to which some damage was done. The European manager, Mr. Brown, was severely assaulted and would most probably have been killed but for the fidelity of some of his Indian staff, who concealed him and induced the mob to believe he had left the premises. The power house would probably have been destroyed but for the presence of the police guard of one head

constable and three constables who fired three rounds of buckshot after they were assaulted by showers of stones. By 10 A.M. the streets were overrun by rioters mobs who attacked police *chowkies* and every building they thought or were instructed to be Government property. *Chowkies* that were isolated were set fire to, and the contents burned inclusive of the uniform and private kit of the policemen stationed there. Those that were not isolated were wrecked, all the woodwork removed and burnt along with the men's kit in front of the *chowkies*. The latter *chowkies* were not burned because of the risk of setting fire to the adjoining privately owned buildings.

45. The Daskroi *Mamladar's* office on the Mirzapur Road with all the records, etc., was completely destroyed by fire. The Government telegraph office was similarly completely burned after the mob had first destroyed and smashed all the instruments and furniture.

46. Lieutenant Macdonald of the Army Clothing Department, who was proceeding as usual from his residence to office in the city, was forced to take refuge in the upper storey of the Delhi Chakla police *chowky* where he was besieged by a mob and pelted with stones and empty bottles one of which cut his hand. It seems probable he would have fared much worse but for the opportune arrival of the military at about 11 A.M.

47. The Delhi gate of the city, the post office and police *chowky* adjoining it were set fire to and destroyed along with their contents.

48. A private building at Lal Darwaza which resembled a police *chowky* was also set fire to and destroyed.

49. Meanwhile a body of three hundred Indian infantry started from the Camp at 10-10 A.M. under the orders of Lieut.-Colonel Preston, Commanding the 1/97th Infantry, who in the absence of Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer, the Officer Commanding the Station, despatched them at the request of the District Magistrate. After arranging for the despatch of the military the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police returned to their quarters where they received telephone messages about the burning of the Government offices and the attack on Lieutenant Macdonald. They returned to the military lines and arranged for the despatch of another body of 200 infantry under Major Kirkwood, to reinforce the first. The District Magistrate took Colonel Preston and the Superintendent of Police in his car and proceeded to the city, overtaking the first military detachment just inside the Delhi gate. At the request of the District Magistrate Lieutenant-Colonel Preston posted a guard of 30 men over the Delhi gate. The remainder were divided into two bodies one of which marched to the Ghee Kanta road towards the Panch Kuwa Naka and the other proceeded *via* the Mirzapur road towards the Bhadar where the Government offices were burning. Both parties were to meet at the Pankor Naka which is the centre of the city. The District Magistrate, Lieutenant-Colonel Preston and the Superintendent of Police accompanied the Bhadar party. As they approached the Lal Darwaza they saw the Daskroi *Mamladar's* office in full blaze, the roof having already fallen in. At the approach of the military the rioters, in the vicinity of the burning offices in the Bhadar ran away. Lieutenant-Colonel Preston asked the District Magistrate for orders about firing and was told he could open fire on any one engaged in incendiarism, or who attack the troops. The military cleared the road without firing a shot, and stopped at the Pankor Naka. A line of troops was drawn across the road and left to guard the spot. The remainder were marched back to the Khas Bazar outside the Three Gates, thence *via* Oliphant road to the municipal office where another military guard was posted. The remainder returned to the Pankor Naka where they were joined by the other half of the force. At about 11-30 A.M. a mob of about fifty rioters, some armed with swords and the rest with other weapons, attacked the military guard under Lieutenant Larkin posted at the Panch Kuwa Naka. Lieutenant Larkin was wounded on the arm. The military then fired on the mob and one of them said to be the leader was severely wounded

and died after removal shortly after in the civil hospital. The military reinforcement of two hundred men under Major Kirkwood arrived immediately after. They were employed in clearing the street as far as the rise where Richey Road begins. The crowd retreated before the troops, booing, shouting and throwing stones. Stones were also thrown from the windows and roofs of the houses in the street. The situation at noon was as follows: The Delhi, Prem, Kalupur and Astodia gates of the city and the western entrance to the Richey Road were strongly held by the military. Practically the whole of the city north-west of a line drawn from the Ellis bridge to the municipal office and from the latter to the Delhi gate was similarly protected. The military force in and near the city numbered six hundred. In addition there were fifty-one armed policemen at various posts. The unarmed police were swept away by the overwhelmingly hostile crowds before the arrival of the military. Information was received that the rioters were marching towards the Shahi Bagh to attack the liquor warehouse, the municipal workshops, the police headquarters lines with its reserve of arms and ammunition, the railway bridge over the Sabarmati, and the water pumping station. A military force of 80 men under Colonel Preston marched to Shahi Bagh via the Ghee Kanta and Delhi gate and posted guards. No attack was however made.

50. Meantime the mob in the different parts of the city, undeterred by the presence of the military, continued to give trouble and committed various outrages in the east and south of the town. At noon they raided the Swami Narayan and Gosaiji Maharaj temples and looted several guns and swords with which they armed themselves and continued their depredations. About 2 p.m. an European sergeant of police, named Fraser, who had concealed himself in a bicycle shop on the Richey Road was barbarously murdered and his mutilated body thrown into the road. This shop is situated within 200 yards of the Pantar Naka where the military had been posted since 11 a.m. but was screened from view by a mass of people facing the military party and by a rising bend on the road. Four persons were sent up for this murder, one was acquitted and three were convicted, one receiving a death sentence which Government altered to transportation for life. Later in the afternoon the rioters attacked, looted and wrecked the houses of Rao Bahadur Bulakhidas, Deputy Collector and Personal Assistant to the Collector of Ahmedabad, and of Khan Bahadur Hussinkhan, a retired Police Inspector and Honorary Magistrate. Both these gentlemen with their families had to flee for their lives and succeeded in escaping. Their houses were completely looted and everything that could be destroyed without fire was destroyed beyond repair. The houses would have been burned also but for the owners of the adjoining houses who naturally interfered in their own interests. Three liquor shops were broken open, the liquor which the rioters could not consume was emptied into the drains, and the furniture was smashed. One shop was completely burnt down, its isolated situation in respect to neighbouring buildings favouring this mode of destruction.

51. Lieutenant Fitzpatrick who was on duty with the troops on the Richey Road describes the attitude of the crowd as keeping at a distance of about 20 paces, throwing and slinging stones with great boldness. Both he and Major Kirkwood were several times hit with stones. The leader of the mob in that locality was a *Sanyasi* who kept inciting the mob to commit fresh deeds of violence, shouting out that he was eager to consume "white flesh." He even attempted to seduce the Indian troops by saying they were brothers and therefore the military should not fire on them. Among the crowd Lieutenant Fitzpatrick says were many black-coated white-turbaned men, whom he understood to be *Satyagrahis*. Trays of sweetmeats were constantly being brought by respectably dressed men from side streets and distributed to the mob. While patrolling down the road with a party the Lieutenant came upon a

mob burning the city gate. Many of them were drunk, probably from the effects of the liquor looted from a neighbouring shop that had been burned. They threw stones at the troops, abused them, made indecent gestures at them, and dispersed only when they were fired upon. Major Kirkwood with another party had to fire on a mob engaged in burning the Astodia gate. The municipal pumping station outside the Jamalpur gate was attacked by the mob and badly damaged. They thought that the Engineer in charge was a European and demanded his surrender. The Engineer who is an Indian deemed it prudent to decamp. It was only after the mob were satisfied that there was no European on the premises and that the place was not owned by Government that they abandoned the attack.

52. Throughout the evening the mobs continued to move about the streets making hostile demonstrations and while avoiding coming to close quarters with the military, they showed no sign of being in the least afraid of the troops. Wherever they could they cut the telephone wires and smashed the electric lamps. All the police *chowkies* were wrecked. The walls of the *chowky* near the Fernandez bridge on Richey Road were disfigured by obscene seditious and inciting writings, as for example:—

"The British Raj is gone." "The King of England is defeated and *Swaraj* is established."

"Kill all Europeans." "Murder them wherever they be found."

"The British Empire will soon pass away and will also pass away here" (India).

"Victory; Victory; Victory to *Mahatma* Gandhi."

"This stable has been cleaned and is now a urinal."

"This is a brothel."

"Secure *Swaraj*."

The obscene ones are unfit to be quoted here but have been made available for perusal by members of the committee.

53. Fugitive Europeans and Anglo-Indians from the mill area, the Sabarmati station and the across-river suburb made their way to Shahi Bagh, where they were accommodated in either the Commissioner's or Collector's bungalows. Most of the Europeans from the mills in the neighbourhood of main railway station took refuge at the latter place where there was a strong military guard.

54. Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser, the Officer Commanding the Station, decided to issue an order to the troops in the city (*vide* Appendix 5), which was to come into force at 4 p.m. on the 12th April, that they were to fire at sight on any group of ten persons and after dark on any person who did not answer and come up when challenged. Cylindrical notices to the above effect were distributed and posted up throughout the city between 9 a.m. and noon. The order came into force as arranged and was interpreted by the people as placing the city under martial law. The military strength at Ahmedabad was 2,000. Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser utilized these to the best advantage considering they were mostly untrained. He considered the force insufficient to deal with the situation and applied to Bombay for reinforcements on the 11th April. The major portion of the force were on duty in the city, leaving 200 to act as a reserve in the Camp. It was necessary to arrange some system of relief, as the men in the city had been continuously on duty for long hours and required rest. Rumours of contemplated attacks by armed insurgents from outside Ahmedabad necessitated extra precautions which the limited strength was unable to meet. The arrival therefore of aid from Bombay was anxiously awaited. Owing to the stoppage of the electric power house and the damage to the service wires and lamps, the city was unlit. The municipal drainage pumping station of Jamalpur had ceased to work and the municipal staff had disappeared. The sanitary condition of the city threatened to become perilous in the absence of conservancy arrangements and the accumulation of sewage in the sewers. Fortunately the municipal water works continued to supply water.

55. The telegraph wires were cut during the night of the 11th April and prevented communication with other places. A mob of rioters burned the railway level-crossing gates at Sarangpur Road outside the Ahmedabad station yard limits and tried to set fire to the wooden sleepers of a culvert, besides removing the keys of the rails. They were dispersed by the military. No arrests were made. The same night a plot was hatched at Barejdi railway station, which is 11 miles from Ahmedabad, to remove a rail over a bridge with the object of bad, to derail the troop train that was derailed in fact the same night further south at Nadiad. The plot failed for want of co-operation that was relied upon from the next station. To make up for the failure the same conspirators cut the telegraph wires on both sides of the station on the following morning. In this connection nine persons were sent up for trial before the first trial. Seven were convicted and two acquitted. A rail was removed on the railway near Nadiad and derailed a troop train conveying 200 British troops sent as reinforcements from Bombay to Ahmedabad. Their arrival was consequently delayed by several hours. The Commissioner, Northern Division, and the Inspector-General of Police arrived along with the British troops during the afternoon of the 12th April. The arrival of these reinforcements and the proclamation about firing on groups of 10 had a wholesome effect in bringing the people to their senses, the effect of which soon became apparent.

56. Sporadic outbursts of disorder on the outskirts of the city continued till the 13th morning, but were of a mild character. The so-called martial law order was cancelled on the morning of the 14th (*vide* Appendix 6) and the fact made known by the distribution broadcast of printed handbills. The military continued to remain in the city, but only as guards at fixed centres.

The regular police at Ahmedabad were rapidly reinforced by detachments from other districts, amounting in all to 3 Sub-Inspectors, 151 foot constabulary and 46 mounted policemen, and the military pickets were gradually withdrawn. The last acts of violence were the burning on the night of the 13th April 1919 of the police post at Sarkhej situated six miles from Ahmedabad and an attempt on the night of the 17th April to tamper with the railway line between mileage 335 and 336 at Chharodi which lies midway between Ahmedabad and Viramgam. The driver of a goods train reported he had seen a gang of about 50 men on the line and that his engine was heavily jerked. Immediate attention was discovered a tie bar and some broken pot sleepers on the line evidently placed there after the goods train had passed and another tie bar further on which apparently had caused the jerk reported by the driver. No clue was obtained of the offenders.

56-A. Besides Ahmedabad itself and Viramgam, the only other place in the district where military was posted as a precautionary measure was Dholka, where on the 14th April one officer and 90 rank and file were sent. Of these, half the number were withdrawn on the 22nd April and the remainder on the 28th July.

57. On the 14th April the shops commenced to be re-opened and were all opened by the 15th April.

58. On the 13th Gandhi arrived at Ahmedabad and was immediately called for an interview with the Commissioner, the Inspector-General of Police and the District Magistrate. He offered his services to assist in restoring order. He then proceeded to his *Ashram* and issued a notice calling a meeting for the 13th, subsequently postponed to the 14th. At the meeting Gandhi spoke strongly upbraiding the people for their acts of violence and concluded by saying:—

"It appears to me that the acts that have been committed in Ahmedabad appear to have been organized. They appear to have been arranged. I firmly believe that some man or men with education and knowledge have a hand in them. I can make bold to say that they may be educated but not practical men. They have misled us in committing wicked acts. I advise you that you should not hereafter be misled in this way. I request

such men also that they should reflect over and over again. I will advise them and you all to read my *Hind Swarajya* on this subject. I have now received information that we could print *Hind Swarajya* and in doing so do not break the law in the least."

"Of the mill-hands the spinners have struck work for some time. I will advise them to resume their work at once. After resuming work they can make whatever demands they wish to make and obtain whatever increase they could justly get. If you try to obtain more by oppressing the millowners it would be like striking the axe on your own feet. It is my special advice to all millhands that it is their duty to remain aloof from mischief. I beg to remind them that they have given a promise to worthy Anasuya Ben and to me to do so."

"I pray to all that you will all stick to your work. The labourers will begin to work in the mills."

59. As far as it has been possible to ascertain, the number of casualties arising out of the disturbances in Ahmedabad from the 10th to the 13th April was twenty-eight killed and one hundred and twenty-three wounded. It is probable that there were more, but they have not been traced.

60. The police in the suppression of the riots in Ahmedabad expended ammunition as follows:—

	Buckshot.	Ball.	TOTAL.
10th April	38	Nil.	38
11th April	55	46	101
TOTAL	93	46	139

The military expended 609 rounds during the whole period.

61. The only two fatal casualties among the representatives of law and order were the armed Indian Constable Imamkhan who was killed on the 10th April and European Sergeant Fraser who was killed on the 11th April.

62. The reported casualties among the rioters bears a somewhat small proportion to the ammunition expended, but this is doubtless in large measure due to the fact that it was not necessary to resort to concentrated and continuous fire. The majority of the cases treated were for buckshot wounds. The following statement gives the details:—

	Number treated.	Buck-shot wounds.	Bullet wounds.	Fatal cases.	REMARKS.
Civil Hospital.					
10th April	10	10	Nil.	4	
11th April	63	63	Nil.	10	
12th April	17	17*	Nil.	7	* This includes a few bullet wounds but the number is not available.
13th April	4	Nil.	4	3	
Private Practitioners.					
10th April	26†	23	1	3	† No details forthcoming of two men.
11th April	28	25	3‡	1	‡ Includes one for contused wound caused by rifle butt.
12th April	3	1	2	Nil.	
TOTAL	151	139	10	28	

Only one woman and four children were injured by the firing. The woman was inside her house and was struck by a stray bullet.

63. The extent of the damage done by the rioters to property in Ahmedabad is estimated as under:—

	Rs.
Government	5,93,692
Municipal	1,35,031
Private	2,26,046
TOTAL	9,54,769

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[Continued.]

CHAPTER VII.

Subsequent Measures.

64. After the riots in Ahmedabad had been quelled, the District Magistrate issued on the 17th April a notice under section 25-A of the District Police Act calling for submission of claims for compensation for damage from all victims of the riots in Ahmedabad and Viramgam.

65. The claims submitted within one month amounted to Rs. 13,21,769 for Ahmedabad and Rs. 2,34,240 for Viramgam. After careful consideration it was decided that the amount claimed in Ahmedabad should be recovered by a forfeiture of one week's wages upon the mill-hands and by the imposition of a cess upon all payers of income-tax proportionate to the amount at which they were last assessed and of a cess upon all house-holders. A copy of the order of Collector in the matter is appended (*vide* Appendices Nos. 9-10). The recoveries to be made approximate to the amount of the claims. The same principles were applied to Viramgam, except that in consideration of the fact that a full recovery of the amount claimed was beyond the resources of the town the amount to be recovered was fixed at Rs. 42,000. Accordingly the District Magistrate passed an order under section 25-A of the District Police Act IV of 1890 as amended by Act III of 1915 for the recovery of the amount. A copy of this order is given in Appendix No. 10.

Additional police.

66. An additional force of 18 men at an annual cost of Rs. 6,028 was located at the villages of Barejdi, Nandej and neighbouring villages in order to prevent further outrages, such as the telegraph wire-cutting and attempt to remove rails which the villagers had perpetrated. A reference to these crimes has already been made in this statement.

CHAPTER VIII.

Criminal prosecutions.

67. As soon as order was restored in Ahmedabad, the police commenced the investigation of the criminal offences that had been committed during the riots and some arrests were made within a few days. A scare ensued particularly among the mill-hands, many of whom absconded and caused some inconvenience to the working of the mills. The scare however was very shortlived. The police investigations were much hampered by the reluctance of members of the public to come forward to give evidence. In order to expedite the disposal of the cases arising out of the riots Government appointed a special tribunal of three Commissioners under the Defence of India Act. The Commission commenced work on the 2nd June. The amount of work to be got through by the tribunal was found more than the tribunal could deal with expeditiously, so a second tribunal was appointed. The latter commenced work on the 22nd July and since then, up to the end of November, had been solely occupied with the cases from the Kaira district. It is expected that both the tribunals will complete their work by the end of the year.

68. The total number of persons placed on trial was :—

Ahmedabad	167
Viramgam	50
TOTAL	217

Of these the disposal has been as under :—

	Convicted.	Discharged.
Ahmedabad	79	88
Viramgam	27	23
TOTAL	106	111

69. In addition to these 140 persons were arrested on *prima facie* evidence that they had been concerned in the disorderly events or had abetted them. They were subsequently released on application to the tribunal.

The charges against them were withdrawn before the cases came on for trial as soon as it was discovered that the available evidence against them was not likely to be considered sufficient to establish their guilt. In several of such cases the witnesses resiled, leaving no alternative but to withdraw the charges.

CHAPTER IX.

Demeanour of the citizens of Ahmedabad.

70. It has already been shown how the *Satyagrahi* leaders created and fanned the excitement connected with the Rowlatt Bills and how the excited feelings of the people culminated in an outbreak of violent disorder as soon as the news of Gandhi's arrest was announced. It has also been shown how these leaders retired to their houses as soon as the mob began to destroy property and made no attempt either to appeal to the better instincts of the misguided and infuriated pupils of their teachings or to restrain them in their career of open rebellion or to bring them to a more sober frame of mind. As stated by the learned president of the first special tribunal—

No evidence has been adduced to show that there was at any time any direct incitement to violence given either by Mr. Gandhi or by his immediate lieutenants, but it is obvious that such a doctrine as that of 'refusing respectfully to obey the laws' was at least likely to be made use of by seditious persons to promote deeds of violence. Nor was it likely that the illiterate crowds to whom these doctrines were offered would be likely to appreciate the difference between active and passive resistance. Once the duty of loyal obedience was removed violence was bound to issue on sufficient cause arising. The proximate cause of the Ahmedabad disturbances consisted of two rumours of which one was wholly and the other partially false.

71. Several *Satyagrahi* inmates of Gandhi's *Ashram* under instructions from Mr. Vallubhai Patel, the secretary of the *Sabha*, were called to the latter's residence on the 11th and 12th April. They were sent into the city to try and keep order, but there is nothing to show that their presence had any beneficial effect. When the Collector's and other offices were set on fire, some of these *Satyagrahis* were present and helped to remove to hospital those wounded at the attack on the Bank. They have admitted their presence at various parts of the city and have stated that they witnessed the disorderly behaviour of the rioters. They were willing to testify to these facts, but when it came to the question of identifying any of the offenders, they declined pointblank and their refusal was prompted by the advice of Mr. Gandhi (*vide* Appendix 8), who, although he was in Bombay, was consulted through Mr. Vallubhai Patel and approved of the refusal. Mr. Gandhi himself was asked to assist in securing evidence to prosecute the cases, but expressed his reluctance to communicate the facts which might come to his knowledge relating to the disturbances and useful for the purposes of the investigation, unless the persons communicating such facts consented. It should be emphasised that no communication from Mr. Gandhi was received that would have facilitated the investigations into the offences.

The example thus set was followed by all the rich and influential citizens, including the members of the Municipality from the President downwards. The Indian magistracy and higher municipal executive officers likewise gave no real assistance in this respect. Not one came forward to offer his services to help in restoring order, even after the troops were in possession of the streets and the riotous mob had ceased from destruction. All the upper floor windows and balconies of houses in the respectable quarters were crowded with curious spectators watching the progress of the riots when they were at their height. Everywhere could be seen the

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[Continued.]

distribution of sweetmeats and drinking water to the rioters by the well-to-do classes. Some may have furnished these supplies through fear, but from the generous and copious manner in which the assistance was rendered, it was evident that the contributors were in sympathy with the rioters and that this feeling was the underlying motive. Young men of the student class were also conspicuous among the mobs encouraging and inciting them. They rendered useful service to the rioters by rushing here and there on their bicycles carrying messages regarding the disposition or approach of the troops and suggesting places to be attacked. It is a significant fact that the judicial courts both at Ahmedabad and Viramgam were undamaged.

Mr. Ambalal Sarabhai, brother of Miss Anasuya, was not in Ahmedabad when the riots occurred. He returned on the afternoon of 12th April and immediately placed himself at the disposal of the Commissioner and District Magistrate and rendered very useful help in protecting public confidence. Another example of what could be done if there had been any inclination to help, is the case of Mr. Dara Aspandiarji Laher, a Parsee student of the Gujarat College, who, under critical conditions, displayed loyalty as well as physical and moral courage. He was instrumental in saving Lieutenant Macdonald from falling into the hands of the mob. Aware of the approach of a crowd of rioters from the direction of Mirzapur, he warned Lieutenant Macdonald, who was on his way from the Camp to his office situated at Mirza, of the danger and advised him to take refuge in the Delhi Chakla police Chowky. He had just entered the Chowky when the mob arrived and surrounded it. The unarmed policemen were driven away and attempts made to get at Lieutenant Macdonald, who was on the upper floor at the head of the stairs defending himself as best he could. Lieutenant Macdonald and Mr. Laher telephoned from the Chowky to the Collector explaining the situation and asking for help. The mob seeing this destroyed the telephone wire outside. Mr. Laher made his way through the crowd at considerable personal risk, and securing a cycle rode to the Collector's bungalow and further on to the Camp and hurried on the military whose ultimate opportune arrival was without doubt the means of saving the life of Lieutenant Macdonald.

CHAPTER X.

Other circumstances.

72. The suddenness with which the violent outbreak began was equalled by the abruptness with which it ended, leaving behind scarcely any trace of smouldering embers of the conflagration. The actual rioters, the rabble of the city and the mills, were not much interested in the Rowlatt Bills. They were however dragged into the vortex of the agitation against these Bills, by designing agitators who played upon their ignorance and apathy by fantastic misrepresentations. Unfortunately the millhands believed themselves under obligations to Mr. Gandhi, for having supported the year before their demand for increased wages which they secured. They were roused to action by the false announcements of the arrest of Mr. Gandhi and Miss Anasuya both of whom they held in high esteem, and were moved to behave as they did from personal more than political motives. They were mere tools used to create a demonstration against Government and are the wretched victims of their own folly inasmuch as the punishment following their deeds falls heaviest on themselves. They realised too late that they had been duped.

CHAPTER XI.

Disturbances at Viramgam.

73. During the evening of the 12th April while the Commissioner, Northern Division, the Inspector General of Police and the District Magistrate were conferring in

the Collector's bungalow in Ahmedabad a telephone message was received from the railway station that serious disturbances had taken place at Viramgam, where the railway station, the municipal office and other buildings had been burnt and where the *Awal Karim* had been murdered. The three officers above named immediately proceeded to the Camp and arranged with the Officer Commanding for the speedy despatch of 100 men to Viramgam to deal with the situation. The troops left at 8 P.M. by a special train.

74. On the 6th April 1919 there was a meeting in the Kashinath Vishwanath temple from 4 to 7 P.M. to protest against the Rowlatt Bill. The audience numbered from two to three thousand. Among the speakers were :—

1. Chhotalal Trikamal Parekh, Pleader and Vice-President, Municipality.
2. Vadilal Dajibhai Maniar, Pleader.
3. Lalshankar Jayanand, Private Medical Practitioner.

75. On the 9th idem another meeting was held to protest against the Rowlatt Bill and to spread the *Satyagraha* movement.

76. On the 10th April there was a third meeting when very inflammable speeches were said to have been made by Chhotalal Parekh and Vadilal, Pleaders.

77. On the 11th April the public of Viramgam went on a general strike, all shops were closed and business suspended. The licensed stall-keepers at the railway station followed the general example. Large crowds of people, numbering about 500 collected in the railway compound, shouting "*Mahatma Gandhi ki jai*." They were persuaded to disperse by the railway police. The demonstration at the railway station continued from 10 to 11 A.M. There was no breach of the peace either at the railway station or in the town.

78. On the 12th April 1919 at about 10 A.M. the strikers in large crowds numbering over a thousand, assembled in the railway station compound to await the arrival of the down mail. From their attitude and the rumours then afloat, it was manifest that the mob would unless controlled commit a breach of the peace and their behaviour showed that they contemplated an assault on Europeans.

79. Mr. MacIlvride, European Railway Traffic Inspector, Ahmedabad, was putting up in the rest house on the upper floor of the railway station. He had come from Kharaghoda to Viramgam in connection with a criminal case against one of the coaching clerks. He was advised by the railway Sub-Inspector of Police to depart from Viramgam in view of the hostile tendency of the mob. He arranged to leave for Ahmedabad by the 3 P.M. train. The Sub-Inspector detailed a police constable and a railway watchman to guard the rest house until Mr. MacIlvride left.

80. At 11-15 A.M. the railway Sub-Inspector telegraphed to his Superintendent to send an armed party of 25 men from Bombay stating that people were assembling at the railway station in large numbers intending to assault Europeans, and in the interim that the Sub-Inspector, Mehsana, be ordered to send all the men he could spare to Viramgam by the first available train. At the same time the Sub-Inspector sent a note to the magistrate and the town Sub-Inspector, Viramgam, asking for assistance.

81. In the meanwhile the mob dispersed for a short time. They reappeared at the railway station at midday armed with sticks and other offensive weapons. Their number, which was over a thousand, continued to increase as time went on. No persuasion by the police or Station Master was of any avail. The mob began a general assault by throwing stones at the rest house, where Mr. MacIlvride was lodged, and the railway building. Some of the rioters forced their way into the rest house from the staircase facing the platform. The Sub-Inspector and the Station Master intervened. The mob consented to spare Mr. MacIlvride if he would cheer *Gandhi Maharaj* three times. Mr. MacIlvride said he had nothing to do with Mr. Gandhi, but some witnesses

say that he complied. However as the Station Master was dissuading the crowd from assaulting the Traffic Inspector, another batch of rioters crept up into the rest house by the back staircase and brutally assaulted Mr. MacIlvrde with sticks. Mr. MacIlvrde was rescued with great difficulty. His assailants were persuaded to retire downstairs on to the platform where they joined the mob who were busy damaging and destroying the railway station. Mr. MacIlvrde was subsequently removed to a brake-van and thence to a goods train engine which took him to Kharaghoda 20 miles to the west at 1-30 P. M. The rioters took possession of all the tins of kerosine oil which were stored near the Station Master's office. They set the telegraph office on fire. The fire spread to the whole station building. When the work of destruction had proceeded so far, the ringleader Malik led the mob to the post office. At the railway gate Malik himself cut the telegraph wires. As the railway station telegraph office was completely destroyed the Station Master and the Sub-Inspector telegraphed the occurrence to their respective superiors from the next station Jakhvada 10 miles to the east. A party consisting of two signallers one Deputy Station Master, Sub-Inspector's writer, Head Constable, and one Carriage Inspector, were despatched on a light engine to Jakhvada to despatch messages to the railway officials concerned. This occurred at about 2-10 P. M.

82. On their way into the town the rioters called a short halt at the Sub-Judge's court. A party entered the premises and compelled the court to be closed. Amongst those present in the court at the time besides the Sub-Judge was Chhotalal Parekh, Pleader, the Vice-President of the Municipality and one of the prominent speakers at the meetings of the preceding days. The Sub-Judge and Chhotalal proceeded to their homes. Chhotalal, when subsequently asked why he did not make an effort to dissuade the mob from their career of violence, said he was too terrified to think of anything of the sort, and that when they were compelled to leave the Sub-Judge's court their progress homewards was very painful to him. A man from the mob with a drawn sword marched in front of them in a threatening attitude. He, Chhotalal, could only repeat the name of God. When he reached his house he locked himself in and did not attempt to open a single door or window till the next day. From the court, the mob passed to the Bharwadi, looting on their way half a dozen bottles of whisky from the shop of a licensed vendor Jaishankar. This happened at about 1-45 P. M. Passing by the Bharwadi gate they set it and the adjacent police *Chowky* on fire. They then proceeded to the post and telegraph office, where the staff was ejected by force and kerosine oil being poured on the records and furniture, the building was ignited and all Government property including insured parcels, cash, postage stamps, telegraph instruments, furniture, etc., and the private property of the Post Master was destroyed by fire. Three adjacent houses belonging to (1) Gangaram Rama, (2) Jetha Amtha, and (3) Chika Ramji also caught fire and were burnt. The mob then proceeded to the *Mamlatdar's kacheri*. At this stage it would appear the whole town was in the hands of the rioters. Their number had swelled to over two thousand divided in several groups working in the pursuance of a common design. The main body took up their position in front of the *kacheri*. One detachment proceeded towards Golvadi *Chowky*, broke open the door and windows of the buildings, took out the police kit and burnt it carrying away a sword belonging to one of the constables. Next they visited the Sub-Inspector's house and the unarmed police lines. The owner of the Sub-Inspector's house and one Manilal entreated the mob not to damage the house as it belonged to a private citizen and pointed out that if the lines were set on fire the adjoining houses of citizens would also suffer. These appeals prevailed on the mob who after making a futile search for the Sub-Inspector departed. The whole town appeared to be in sympathy with the rioters. The *Mahajans*, while not actually joining the mob, encouraged and helped them by providing refreshments such as sweet-

meats and drinking water. Notices were posted up at different places threatening Government. The following translation of one is a specimen:—

- (1) If the Rowlett Bill is passed, the Government will disappear.
- (2) Oh! Government! No good will come to you from the enactment of the "Black Act."

Those who are your dogs and who always support your good or bad deeds and those who are sons of pigs will obey the law. But those who are true sons of Hindus and Muhammadans or who are true Indians will never respect or obey your Black Act.

* * * * *

- (3) Right conquers and wrong fails.

83. The main body who were arrayed against the *Mamlatdar's Kacheri* opened the attack by throwing brickbats and stones at the building and the police guard. They set fire to the Sub-Inspector's office which was situated in the north-east corner of the compound and also set fire to the main gate of the *kacheri* compound. They then set fire to the municipal office which is on the west of the *kacheri*, kerosine oil being freely used to aid the conflagration. The rioters were in possession of a considerable quantity of kerosine oil procured partly from the railway station, partly from the municipal stores and partly from a licensed vendor Chhotalal Mohanlal whose premises were broken into for the purpose. Seeing the Sub-Inspector's office on fire, the *Awal Karkun*, Mr. Madhavlal Hargovindas, ordered the armed police, constituting the guard over the *Mamlatdar's* treasury to fire on the mob. The police guard at this time consisted of three head constables and nine constables. They resisted the attack and commenced to fire at about 1 or 1-30 P. M. Mr. Madhavlal and all the clerks, *talati* and peons belonging to the *kacheri* escaped by climbing over the back wall of the compound. In order to defeat the police and divert the firing, the mob had recourse to various devices. The police lines in the west of the *kacheri* compound are adjacent to the Police Inspector's quarters. The party of the rioters raided the Inspector's residence and set fire to the outhouses, intending that the fire should extend to the police lines. The Inspector was absent on duty in the district and in not setting fire to the house in which he lived the rioters were probably influenced by a regard for private property. The attempt was partially successful, as the lines caught fire, but the police did not change their position or relax their resistance. Another band set fire to Head Constable Keshavlal's quarters. This was a Government building detached from the main *kacheri* building. Similarly they set fire to a house on the north-east of the *kacheri* next to the police lines, which was tenanted by Ladha Mahmed Ganchi. But none of these devices were effective inasmuch as the fire did not spread to the main *kacheri* building. The police guard maintained a steady fire and kept the mob at bay. At about this stage in the events, some of the rioters were heard to exclaim that it was Madhavlal who ordered the police to fire on them and that therefore he should be got hold of. Accordingly some of the party went to his house but not finding him there, they looted the premises, smashed his furniture, burnt his carriage and valuables, took away some property and destroyed the rest. His wife had received timely warning from a neighbour and concealed herself in the house of a friend. One of the rioters got information of Madhavlal's whereabouts and shouted out that Madhavlal was hiding in the house of Bhailal Karkun, whereupon the mob proceeded to the latter place, broke into it, dragged Madhavlal to the main road near Ambaji temple and amid general acclamation burned him to death after saturating his clothes with kerosine oil. To consummate his cremation records of the *Talukdari* settlement village from the office of the Deputy Manager, Amritlal Virji, were used as fuel. This happened between 3 and 4 P. M.

As stated above the rioters were working in several strong parties. The main detachment had besieged the *kacheri* on all sides. Some of the rioters, who were in possession of guns and ammunition, had taken up their position on the upper floor of a house which faces the *kacheri*, from where they fired at the police guard. The rioters left no stone unturned to procure arms and ammunition. Two mounted messengers were sent to a village named Chor Wadodra, eight miles from Virangam, to bring in men and arms. In the town, every attempt was made to obtain arms from the licensed holders. Several *Mahajans* provided refreshments for the rioters. As the buildings surrounding the *kacheri* were all ablaze the rioters expected it would spread to the *kacheri* and compel the police to abandon the latter. The discovery of Madhavlal's hiding-place drew the mob away from the *kacheri* about 2 P. M. After disposing of Madhavlal as described above some of the rioters proceeded back to the railway station. They entered the locomotive workshop shed, broke open a tool chest, took possession of the tools and reinforced by more rioters from the town proceeded along the line that runs to Kharaghoda. They added to their stock of tools at the railway boring well where they broke the metre-gauge and water cock. At the home signal post they removed several lengths of rail from the line, broke the signals, damaged the facing points and indicators and set fire to the wooden sleepers that supported the rails over a culvert. They destroyed telegraph posts and wires. They set fire to the Wadhwan line signallers' cabin and interlocking mechanism. They next proceeded to the transshipping platform in the Virangam goods yards, broke open the sealed loaded waggons and looted the contents which consisted of grain, piece-goods, clothing, groceries, sugar, furniture and all sorts of miscellaneous goods. They set fire to several waggons loads of grass which was in transit to famine areas and waggons that were in use as offices by the railway clerks. The villagers from the adjoining villages assisted in the looting. While this was in progress a force consisting of armed men of the Salt Department under Mr. Caldecott, Assistant Collector, arrived from Kharaghoda. Information of what was occurring at Virangam reached Kharaghoda through Mr. MacIlvrde whose departure on a light engine after he was assaulted has been mentioned. Mr. Caldecott collected 56 of his armed men and came into Virangam in an improvised railway train as fast as was possible. Owing to the damage done to the line outside Virangam station, his train was held up about a mile and a half from the station. He detained his party and advanced into the station and opened fire on the mob, engaged in destroying and looting, which immediately dispersed. Mr. Caldecott pushed on with his men to the town and arrived at the *kacheri* about 8 P. M. to find it being looted by the rioters. He opened fire. The rioters fled leaving two of their number dead and two others wounded. One axe and two swords belonging to the rioters were found inside the *kacheri*. In addition to these casualties twenty wounded persons were admitted into the dispensary between 2-30 and 8 P. M. the same day. Of these four died subsequently making six deaths in all among the rioters.

84. When the mob attacking the *kacheri* withdrew on receipt of news that the whereabouts of Madhavlal had been discovered, they remained committing depredations in other parts of the town and did not return to the *kacheri* till sunset. The police up to 6 P. M. behaved well in defending the *kacheri* considering the odds that opposed them and the absence of any officer of higher rank than the Head Constable in charge of the guard to lead or encourage them. The Sub-Inspector lived quite close to the *kacheri* but remained concealed and never made any attempt to show himself or rally his men. The unarmed police also disappeared from the beginning. When the attack on the *kacheri* was resumed at sunset the police guard also disappeared probably dismayed at the fate of the *Awal Karkun* and the increasing intensity of the violent mob, enveloped as they were by the smoke of smouldering buildings. Before their departure the

Head Constable removed twenty-five under-trial prisoners who were confined in the lock-up, from their cells to the open yard at the back of the *kacheri* building, to save them from being burned to death in case the rioters set fire to the building in which the lock-up existed. They were found there when the rioters entered and were set free. Some of them were taken to a neighbouring house where a *Brahmin* widow was providing food to the rioters and were fed with the rioters.

85. Shortly after Mr. Caldecott's party restored order at the *kacheri*, he left a guard of his men to protect the place and returned with the rest of his party to the railway station. At 10-30 P. M. the military detachment sent from Ahmedabad arrived and took charge of the town. No further outbreaks of violence occurred. The shops reopened on the 13th but the mills did not resume proper working till the 18th April.

86. Owing to the destruction of all the records in the Sub-Inspector's office, it is not possible to say definitely what amount of ammunition the police had on hand when the riots broke out. When the balance was checked on the 15th April it was found to be 332 ball, 138 buckshot and 250 blank. Two muskets and four bayonets were also found missing. Of these one musket was subsequently recovered intact from a well and the other was found in a drain broken beyond repair. Two bayonets were also subsequently found in different parts of the town and the remaining two are still missing. The damage done to property is estimated as under:—

	Rs.	A.	P.
Government.	66,447	12	1
Municipal	24,420	0	0
Private	1,24,861	10	0
TOTAL	2,16,729	6	1

87. Fifty men were tried for offences connected with these occurrences by the first special tribunal. Twenty-seven were convicted and the rest were acquitted.

CHAPTER XII.

Disturbances in the Kaira district of April 11th and 12th, 1919.

Preliminary sketch of the origin and general causes of the disturbances.

88. Political activities in Nadiad (the centre and chief town of the district) are of fairly long standing, but it was not till the establishment of the Home Rule League (following the internment of Mrs. Annie Besant) that they became prominent. The first seeds of political disturbance in the Kaira district were undoubtedly sown by the activities of the Home Rulers in 1918 when they took up what is known as the "Passive resistance" movement against the payment of land revenue. Some damage had been done by excessive rains in the district to the crops of the revenue year 1917-18. Under the Bombay land revenue rules the crops in such cases are carefully inspected and valued in annas, suspension or remission of revenue following as a rule automatically when the crop is below certain specified valuations. The Home Rulers took up the line that the Government valuations were unfair and excessive, commenced an agitation against them and induced Mr. M. K. Gandhi to associate himself with them in this agitation. Mr. Gandhi took the view that it was under the circumstances the duty of all to refuse to pay the land revenue willingly. Naturally the Home Rule League acquired great popularity by this movement and were able to open branches all over the district and Mr. Gandhi's local popularity increased. What followed has been described by Mr. Ker, the then District Magistrate, as follows:—

"The mainstay of the movement was the *pratinaya** or sacred vow, which all were invited to take, whether able to pay or not, that they would not pay the revenue, and many copies of this were circulated in the villages and signatures obtained. Every method of obstruction

* Appendix I.

was adopted even the boycott of those who paid was advocated and enforced in several villages, and Government servants engaged in the work of collection were subjected to all kinds of petty annoyance and sometimes even insult; not only were the usual services and courtesies withheld, but the purchase of supplies were frequently prevented and in some cases Mamlatdars themselves had difficulty in procuring water from the village well. A movement of this kind was naturally likely to degenerate from passive to active resistance, and there were a few cases of forcible obstruction to distraint, but this was no part of Mr. Gandhi's policy and his influence was always strongly exercised on the side of peaceful methods."

89. This 'passive resistance' movement ceased in June 1918, the result being hailed as a victory for Mr. Gandhi by the Home Rulers, although in fact most of the land revenue was actually collected. Whatever may have been Mr. Gandhi's policy and his advocacy of peaceful methods, it is clear that a campaign like this was calculated to, and in fact did, undermine Government prestige and the influence of Government throughout the district. A manifestation of the spirit that was abroad in the land occurred in August of the same year, when what is known as the 'Dharala outbreak' occurred. The Dharalas form the mass of the population of the district, and a large number have criminal propensities. Partly no doubt to the inferiority of the season but mainly, as is quite certain, to the general impression (created by the passive resistance movement) that Government was weakened and its officers without real power the Dharalas over a large part of the district committed a series of dacoities, robberies, etc., that put the whole district into a turmoil for a time. Vigorous measures were taken to cope with this outbreak of crime which was soon suppressed, and there is no doubt that by the vigorous action taken on this occasion Government prestige and influence in the district was largely re-established. The very liberal policy adopted by Government in dealing with the famine of 1918 conducted still more to this improvement. Towards the beginning of 1919 the general political situation in the district was much improved, when unfortunately the agitation against the Rowlatt Bills and the *Satyagraha* campaign set on foot by Mr. Gandhi gave local agitators another opportunity.

90. Throughout March and April 1919 strong agitation was carried on throughout the district against the Bill. Mr. Gandhi of course acquired considerable local popularity and influence by the attitude adopted, and the news of his supposed arrest (10th April) naturally caused much excitement. It is doubtful, however, if this in itself would have caused any serious local disturbances, had not the serious riots of the mill-hands in Ahmedabad broken out. In fact it seems to have been the news that troops were being despatched from Bombay to put down the disturbances there that led to the commission of the offences of the derailment of the troop train and the cutting of telegraph wires. These crimes seem to have been clearly aimed at preventing assistance from reaching Ahmedabad. Other local disturbances were not serious, though there were frequent rumours and no doubt a great deal of likelihood of such disturbances occurring at any moment.

CHAPTER XIII.

Course of the Anti-Rowlatt Bill agitation and the 'Satyagraha' campaign of March to April 1919.

91. A meeting of the Home Rulers was held in Narsanda on the 9th March 1919 under the presidency of Mr. Fulchand of Nadiad. The main object was to adopt passive resistance and *Satyagraha* against the Bill.

92. On 15th March 1919 a largely attended meeting consisting of about 500 persons was held in Nadiad town

under the presidency of Mr. Gokaldas D. Talati, to protest against and condemn the Bill. Lectures were delivered by various persons including Mr. Jamnadas Dwarkadas of Bombay who had come from Bombay to attend the meeting. The object of the meeting was to follow *Satyagraha*.

93. A similar meeting was called at Kathlal on the 6th March.

94. Similar meetings were held in many villages of the district.

95. Pamphlets entitled "How to break the handcuffs in the form of Rowlatt Bill" written by Mr. M. K. Gandhi were freely distributed in villages and many persons had signed the *Satyagraha* vow of Mr. M. K. Gandhi.

96. On the *Holi* and *Dhuleti* days (16th and 17th March) the Nadiad people had processions at night in connection with the Rowlatt Bill. An effigy was made and people moved from place to place saying *Ram Bolo Bhai Ram** thus showing their anger and resentment against the Bill.

97. The Police Sub-Inspector, Nadiad, had committed five persons of Nadiad in the court of the second class Magistrate, Nadiad, for offences under sections 68 (a) and (e) of the District Police Act, in connection with the above unlawful assembly. The case was not an important one, but with a view to stop further agitation in Nadiad in connection with this case, Mr. Ker (then District Magistrate) withdrew it from the court of the second class Magistrate and disposed of it himself acquitting all the accused for want of evidence under section 245, Criminal Procedure Code, on the 4th April 1919.

98. The 6th April 1919 (Sunday) was fixed by the Home Rulers as *Satyagraha* day. It was very generally observed as a holiday in towns and villages of the district. Some of the people observed fast. Crowded processions were held on that day in Nadiad and everywhere there was talk of strike and fast. People hoisted black flags in the processions. In the same evening a monster meeting consisting of about 10,000 people was held at Nadiad under the presidency of Mr. Gokaldas D. Talati. Their object was to send a protest to Mr. Montagu against the Rowlatt Bill; if justice could not be had from that quarter then His Majesty the King-Emperor was to be approached and if that failed, then *Satyagraha* 'passive resistance' was to be adopted.

99. The Home Rule League office had commenced by this time to distribute and sell proscribed literature including the pamphlet called *Hind Swarajya* by Mr. M. K. Gandhi in pursuance of *Satyagraha* vow to disobey the law.

CHAPTER XIV.

Account of the disturbances in the district, following on the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest.

100. The news about the internment of Mr. M. K. Gandhi was received in Nadiad by wire on the 10th April. In consequence all shops in the bazar were closed, mobs collected in the bazars and a black flag was hoisted first in the Ahmedabad bazar. The mob proceeded to the mills; the labourers struck work and came in procession from the mills to the bazar. About 3,000 men had collected there, and Janardhan Sharma and Jamnadas Bhawar delivered lectures and sang songs advocating the observance of *Satyagraha*.

101. Another meeting was held at about 8-30 P.M. consisting of about 5,000 men. The observance of true *Satyagraha* was again insisted upon. On the 11th April also the strike continued. The schools were all required to be closed. A crowd of about 40 school boys had gone to the dairy to have it closed, but none dare to do any mischief there. Numerous rumours about the disturbances in Ahmedabad arrived in Nadiad with each train.

102. In the morning of the 11th April one Janardhan Sharma of Chaklasi, Taluka Nadiad, a *Satyagrahi*,

* *Ram Bolo Bhai Ram* are the words chanted or recited by Hindu mourners when following a corpse to the burning ground. The implication was that the Bill was dead and about to be burnt.

marched at the head of a crowd consisting mostly of boys, with a few men, to the Government English High School with the object of making the Head Master close it. In this connection a case was brought before the District Magistrate against Janardhan Sharma for offences under sections 143 and 547, Indian Penal Code. This case was summarily tried by Mr. Ker and the accused was convicted under section 143, Indian Penal Code, only. As no damage was in fact done to persons or property, the punishment was limited to a fine of Rs. 300 or six weeks' imprisonment; the accused was also bound over in Rs. 500 with two sureties in the like amount to keep the peace for one year under section 106, Criminal Procedure Code.

103. When arrested on 17th April for the above offences Janardhan Sharma was found to have in his possession one copy of a very inflammatory leaflet entitled *Din Din Jagao Har Har Mahadev*. He has been prosecuted and tried for this by the second special tribunal, Ahmedabad, under section 25 (a) of the Defence of India Rules, and convicted and sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment on the 24th July 1919. The poem read as follows:—

Din Din Jagao (Muhammadian war cry.)*

Har Har Mahadev (Hindu war cry.)

Dohra.

The English people are very tyrannical, they are perfidious and treacherous;
They have disgraced India by enacting Black Acts.
In the war, blood was freely shed (by Indians) and food, money and valuable lives were given;
And as a reward thereof Black Acts and two stones of a grinding mill were given.
Punjabi, Bengali, Deccani and Gujarati;
Why have you been asleep, you also rulers of the Native States.
Post offices, railways and telegraph offices must be destroyed first;
Police must also be destroyed to ensure a positive success.
Collectors, Commissioners and Governors in particular. Massacre them, then only your (Indians) prestige will be saved.
To slaughter the white people take up swords;
Brave men make haste and do not delay.
If you will spare them, they will assume the tiger's form;
And will crush all, even the Indian ruling chiefs.
Form plots and have courage, but do not have at heart the slightest mercy;
Then only will success be achieved, understand, oh, India.
Arjun too was given the same advice emphatically by Krishna;
You all too therefore act in the same way and victory in every way will be attained.
Nothing will be achieved by taking to *Satyagraha*, but by taking up arms victory will be had;
The English will fly and your object will be served.
Anarchist.

104. On the 11th Mr. Abdul Kazi Bawa Imam Hussain Moulvi, one of Gandhi's followers, came from Ahmedabad. Some ten thousand men attended his lectures which aimed at pacifying the people and dissuading them from acts of violence such as the Ahmedabad people had committed. On the 10th and 11th April there was a *hartal* in most of the villages and towns of the district. This gentleman delivered two speeches in Nadiad at the Ahmedabad gate. It is supposed that it was on the outskirts of this

* *Din Din, Jagao* literally "The faith, the faith, awake," is the Muhammadian war cry, and *Har Har Mahadev*—an invocation to God—is the Mahatma (Hindu) war cry. The combination of the two meant that the leaflet was addressed to the warriors of both communities.
† *Hartal*.—This word practically means 'a strike', but specially denotes a general closing of shops and cessation of work in any particular locality, as a protest against some unpopular Government action or measure.

meeting that the conspiracy was hatched to derail the special troop train going with 200 British troops to Ahmedabad, to put down the riots there.

105. On the night of the 11th April a rail was removed from the railway line at mile 279 between Uttarsanda and Nadiad railway stations. A troop train carrying 200 British troops to Ahmedabad was consequently derailed. Fortunately there were no casualties. The engine remounted the rails beyond the breach and the carriage remained upright. The ground at this point was flat and the train ran along for a considerable distance breaking the iron sleepers, scattering the ballast and tearing up the ground. The damage was repaired in the course of the day and the traffic was resumed after being blocked for 16 hours.

106. In connection with this offence the police subsequently sent up 14 accused for trial before the special tribunal at Ahmedabad for offences under sections 120-B and 121-A, 143, 149, 109, 114, Indian Penal Code, and sections 126-B and 128 of the Railway Act. The second special tribunal disposed of the case on the 20th August 1919 convicting only one and discharging all the other accused. The trial was remarkable for the unabashed perjury of the witnesses. Motilal Hiralal, one of the approvers who had been granted a pardon by the District Magistrate, swore that the confession he made before that officer was made whilst he was intoxicated. The tribunal was so satisfied about the perjury of this and six other witnesses who were relied upon by the prosecution and who changed their statements in court, that it has ordered their prosecution for perjury.

107. Additional police consisting of one Sub-Inspector, four armed Head Constables and forty armed Constables have been stationed at Nadiad under Government Resolution, Judicial Department, No. 6136 of 28th July 1919 at a cost of Rs. 15,556 to be defrayed by the *Panias* and *Pattidar* residents of the town.

108. Another disturbance was caused by cutting telegraph wires and removing the rail keys, between Boriavi and Uttarsanda at mile No. 275 on the evening of the 12th April 1919. Four telegraph posts were pulled down and insulators smashed. An attempt was also made to burn the wooden sleepers of a small culvert. The fire was noticed by the permanent-way inspector in time and extinguished before much damage was done. Twenty-six persons in the case are under trial at present by the special tribunal. The case is known as the Narsanda wire cutting case.

109. Mr. Ker, the District Magistrate, moved his camp to Nadiad in the evening of the 12th April and stayed there till the beginning of June. It was said that a mob intended to destroy the district bungalow where he was putting up as well as to attack the dairy and the mission bungalows. The rumour about attacking the dairy was a strong one. No disturbance, however, actually took place. Mr. Gandhi's followers in Nadiad tried their best to persuade people to remain quiet and Mr. Gandhi himself as he passed through on the morning of the 13th very strongly exhorted a crowd at the station to keep the peace. The strike ceased on the 14th and the mills resumed working in the morning of the 15th.

110. At Anand there was a disturbance at the railway station on the evening of the 13th. A large crowd tried to force a sweatmeat seller Bogilal to stop his business and as he refused to do so they went to his house and, after scattering kerosine oil about, burnt it down. A case against the perpetrators of the crime is pending before the special tribunal. They also tried to stop the Government dairy from working and the Manager eventually consented to stop work for half an hour whereupon the crowd went away.

111. Two more disturbances had taken place, namely, cutting of telegraph wires (1) near Vadod, and (2) Anand between Navli and Anand during the night of the 11th. In the Vadod case 36 persons were sent up for trial out of whom 12 were convicted by the special tribunal. The Anand case has been withdrawn as the evidence was found to be insufficient and fresh evidence was not procurable.

AHMEDABAD AND KAIRA.

[Continued.]

CHAPTER XV:

Other precautionary measures.

112. To protect the treasury and sub-treasuries the following detachments of the 99th Deccan Infantry were despatched to this district on the 17th April:—

- 50 to Kaira.
- 200 to Nadiad.
- 25 to Thasra.
- 25 to Kapadvanj.
- 25 to Borsad.

There was also a detachment of the same regiment at Anand.

113. There were no further disturbances and the agitation calmed down in course of time.

114. The total number of persons placed on trial was 82, of whom 17 were convicted and 65 discharged or acquitted.

115. In addition to these 41 persons were arrested on *prima facie* evidence that they had been concerned in the disorderly events or had abetted them. They were subsequently released on application to the tribunal. The charges against them were withdrawn before the cases came on for trial as soon as it was discovered that the available evidence against them was not likely to be considered sufficient to establish their guilt. In several of such cases, the witnesses resiled, leaving no alternative but to withdraw the charges.

CHAPTER XVI.

General conclusion—Kaira district.

116. So far as Kaira district is concerned there are no signs of regular organisation of these disturbances beforehand. Undoubtedly the passive resistance agitation of 1918 and still more the Rowlatt Bill agitation of this year prepared the way for trouble, but the actual disturbances which all occurred in two or three days were due to the sudden news of the Ahmedabad riots and a desire to prevent Government from sending troops to put them down. Each particular offence, whether rail-lifting or wire cutting, appears to have been hurriedly organised and carried out, and discloses no clear sign of any regular organisation, planned and thought out before the 10th April for the commission of such offences, though no doubt the ground was well prepared for troubles and for the sudden outbreak of serious disturbances by the 'passive resistance' and *Satyagraha* agitations engineered from Ahmedabad. In fact such agitations were certain to lead to active violence when a suitable opportunity occurred as the mass of the people were not sufficiently educated to understand exactly what was the idea underlying Mr. Gandhi's propaganda.

117. It should be added that the disturbances appear to have been due to the action of only comparatively small sections of the inhabitants of the district, almost exclusively the *Pattidar* and *Bania* communities. The mass of the people, as for instance *Dharalas*, held conspicuously aloof from the whole business.

CHAPTER XVII.

Concluding remarks.

118. No evidence has been obtained that the outbreak of April was planned and directed by a central organiza-

tion which controlled the movement. At each place where violent deeds were perpetrated, there were found persons who had been taught by the agitations of the previous months that violent action was necessary to attain the ends which the leaders had described to them. We have documentary proof of the spirit that was abroad in the land in the writing on the police *Chowky* at Ahmedabad which is quoted in paragraph 52 above; in the leaflet that was found in the possession of Janardhan Sharma when he was arrested at Nadiad which is referred to in paragraph 104 and in the poster which was found at Viramgam which is quoted in paragraph 83. While the leaders themselves may have used expressions in their speeches which may read as dissuasions from violence, the meaning which was attached to their utterances is shewn clearly by these documents. The danger of a doctrine which preaches resistance to law is illustrated by the action of Gandhi's most devoted followers, the mill-hands at Ahmedabad, and he himself has admitted that the mobs there were led and instructed by educated persons. The general tendency of his teachings had been well summed up in the words of the learned President of the first tribunal which are already quoted in paragraph 33 above referred to, and are repeated here.

"No evidence has been adduced to show that there was at any time any direct incitement to violence given either by Mr. Gandhi or by his immediate lieutenants but it is obvious that such a doctrine as that of 'refusing respectfully to obey the laws' was at least likely to be made use of by seditious persons to promote deeds of violence. Nor was it likely that the illiterate crowds to whom these doctrines were offered would be likely to appreciate the difference between active and passive resistance. Once the duty of loyal obedience was removed, violence was bound to issue on sufficient cause arising."

119. Turning to the course of the riots, it is noteworthy that even after the outbreak of the 10th April the local authorities did not apprehend any further scenes of violence at Ahmedabad. When the District Magistrate returned to his residence at about 9-30 P.M. on the night of the 10th, he found the city perfectly quiet, and during the night no reports of any unusual occurrence reached him. It was for this reason that apart from the military pickets at the station and the Prem gate, which lie to the south of the town, no other military posts were established either on the night of the 10th or on the early morning of the 11th. Armed police parties in the city were stationed at the Khas Bazar *Chowky*, Kalupur *Chowky* and Idgah *Chowky* while the usual guards were mounted over the Bank of Bombay and the subsidiary jail. Apart from the Idgah *Chowky* which was destroyed owing to the defection of the guard and from the electric power station, where however the damage done was comparatively slight, all places where armed parties were posted were saved from damage during the riots owing to the resolute behaviour of the police who used their fire arms to keep the mob back. Again at Viramgam the treasury guard saved the treasury for several hours although fiercely assailed.

The behaviour of the military during the period that they were stationed in the city was exemplary. Only one complaint was publicly made against their conduct which, on investigation, was found to be absolutely baseless and the editor of the newspaper which published it withdrew it and apologised.

AHMEDABAD AND KAIRA.

[Continued.]

APPENDIX 1.

Pratignaya pledge circulated in the Kaira district during the passive resistance movement and admonishing the people not to pay up land revenue even if they were able to.

As we know that the outturn of crops in our village is less than 4 annas we applied to Government to postpone the collection of land revenue till the next year, nevertheless the collection has not been postponed. We, the undersigned, therefore take a vow that we shall not pay the current year's land revenue—the whole of it or any part of it which is still in arrears. But we shall allow Government to take such legal steps as they deem fit for recovering that land revenue and shall undergo all consequent hardships. We shall even allow our lands to be forfeited, but by making payments with our own hands we shall not belie ourselves and lose our self-respect. If Government postpone the recovery of the second instalment wherever it is not still recovered, then those of us who are able to pay will pay up the whole or part of the land revenue still due from us. Those of us having means to pay are withholding for the reason that if these paid up those who cannot afford to pay might get confused and sell their things indiscriminately or borrow money and pay and be miserable. We believe that it is the duty of the well-to-do to protect the poor in such circumstances.

Serial No.	How many <i>bighas</i> of land.	Date.	Signature.

APPENDIX 2.

Copy of Mr. Gandhi's manifesto, published in the Bombay Chronicle, dated 1st March 1919.

SIR,

I enclose herewith the *Satyagraha* pledge regarding the Rowlatt Bills. The step taken is probably the most momentous in the history of India. I give my assurance that it has not been hastily taken. Personally I have passed many a sleepless night over it. I have endeavoured duly to appreciate Government's position but I have been unable to find any justification for the extraordinary Bills. I have read the Rowlatt Committee's report. I have gone through its narrative with admiration. Its reading has driven me to conclusions just the opposite of the Committee's. I should conclude from the reports that secret violence is confined to isolated and very small parts of India, and to a microscopic body of people. The existence of such men is truly a danger to society. But the passing of the Bills, designed to affect the whole of India and its people and arming the Government with powers out of all proportion to the situation sought to be dealt with, is a greater danger. The Committee utterly ignores the historical fact that the millions in India are by nature the gentlest on earth.

Now look at the setting of the Bills. Their introduction is accompanied by certain assurances given by the Viceroy, regarding the civil service and the British commercial interests. Many of us are filled with the greatest misgivings about the Viceregal utterance. I frankly confess I do not understand its full scope and intention. If it means that the civil service and the British commercial interests are to be held superior to those of India and its political and commercial requirements, no Indian can accept the doctrine. It can but end in a fratricidal struggle within the Empire. Reforms may or may not come. The need of the moment is a proper and just understanding upon the vital issue. No tinkering with it will produce real satisfaction. Let the great civil

service corporation understand that it can remain in India only as its trustee and servant not in name but in deed, and let the British commercial houses understand that they can remain in India only to supplement her requirements and not to destroy indigenous art, trade and manufacture; and you have two measures to replace the Rowlatt Bills. They, I promise, will successfully deal with any conspiracy against the State.

Sir George Lowndes simply added fuel to the fire when he flouted public opinion. He has forgotten his Indian History or he would have known that the Government he represents has, before now, surrendered its own considered opinion to the force of public opinion.

It will be now easy to see why I consider the Bills to be an unmistakable symptom of a deep-seated disease in the governing body. It needs therefore to be drastically treated. Subterranean violence will be the remedy applied by impetuous, hot-headed youths who will have grown impatient of the spirit underlying the Bills and the circumstances attending their introduction. The Bills must intensify the hatred and ill-will against the State, of which the deeds of violence are undoubtedly an evidence. *The Indian Covenanters* by their determination to undergo every form of suffering make an irresistible appeal to the Government towards which they bear no ill-will and provide to the believers in the efficiency of violence, as a means of securing redress of grievances, with an infallible remedy, and withal a remedy that blesses those that use it and also those against whom it is used. If the covenanters know the use of this remedy, I fear no ill from it, I have no business to doubt their ability. They must ascertain whether the disease is sufficiently great to justify the strong remedy and whether all milder ones have been tried. They have convinced themselves that the disease is serious enough, and that milder measures have utterly failed. The rest lies in the lap of the gods.—I am yours, etc.,

M. K. GANDHI.

APPENDIX 3.

English versions of quotations from Thoreau which appeared in Gujarati posters posted up in the Ahmedabad and Kaira districts.

Duty of the servants of the country.

I.

The abodes of just and good men are jails in the kingdom in which men are unjustly imprisoned.

It is shameful to obey the tyrannical rule. To oppose it is easy and good.

Thoreau.

II.

Whom will you respect?

Rowlatt Bill or the truth?

I see no necessity of teaching the virtue of respecting the law. It is always necessary to respect the truth.

Thoreau.

III.

How can the atrocities of the Rowlatt Bill be stopped?

There is no atrocity if a thousand men refuse to pay taxes. But to pay taxes to the kingdom which does atrocities, is to support such rule and thus atrocities lie in paying taxes.

Thoreau.

IV.

How will the bonds of the Rowlatt Bill be broken?

There will be the commencement of the breaking of the bonds of slavery the very day on which only one hero, having opposed slavery and having not paid the taxes, will go to jail.

Thoreau.

V.

Fight against the bonds of the Rowlatt Bill. Advice of Great Thoreau.

A man is privileged to oppose the tyrannical rule when there is much tyranny. Nine hundred and ninety-nine out of a thousand persons talk of truthfulness, but only one puts it into action. The value of this one is, however, very great.

Thoreau.

AHMEDABAD AND KAIRA.

[Continued.]

APPENDIX 4.

English version of hand-bill signed by Mr. V. J. Patel, Secretary of the Satyagraha Sabha, intimating receipt of the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest.

(The first part is a notice convening a meeting for 7 P.M. on the night of 10th April.)

The following news has been received by wire in the Ashrama this morning:—

"The day before yesterday 'Mahatma Gandhi' started from Bombay for Delhi, Lahore, Amritsar, etc. On reaching Delhi yesterday night, an order under the Defence of India Act was served on him, requiring him not to go to Delhi, Punjab and other places and restricting him to Bombay. He disregarded the order; he is therefore arrested." He has expressed his desire that all residing in the Ashrama will celebrate this day and will do their work with double zeal and faith. It is requested that the whole public will respect his desire.

VALLUBHAI JAVERBHAI PATEL,

Secretary, Satyagraha Sabha.

AHMEDABAD,

Dated 10th April 1919.

APPENDIX 5.

English version of Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser's military order issued in Ahmedabad city regarding the firing on an assembly of ten persons and on those who did not stop when challenged.

Order to the military forces stationed in the city.

1. The military will fire if more than ten persons assemble in one place.

2. If any person is seen outside his house during the time between 7 in the evening and 6 in the morning and does not stop and come up when challenged, he will be shot dead.

G. S. FRAZER,

Officer Commanding Ahmedabad Brigade.

AHMEDABAD,

Dated 12th April 1919.

APPENDIX 6.

English version of Commissioner, Northern Division's proclamation cancelling the military order about firing on groups of ten persons.

NOTICE.

1. Now there is peace everywhere. There is no reason to fear.

2. Martial law (military law) has been withdrawn. Now no shots will be fired.

3. All men are now at liberty to move about on the roads.

Resume business and open shops now.

4. Millhands should go to work to-morrow.

F. PRATT,

Commissioner, Northern Division.

Dated 14th April 1919.

APPENDIX 7.

Statement of rounds fired during the riots in Ahmedabad by the police and the military.

(1) On April 10th.

The police fired 41 rounds of buckshot in the fracas by the Beehive flour mill. This however included 10 rounds with the constable who was killed. It is improbable that he fired them all as his musket jammed. The balance must have been taken from him by the mob.

(2) On April 11th.

The police fired 73 rounds of buckshot and 6 rounds of ball. The firing was distributed thus:—

A.—By the main body of armed police at the Khas Bazar Chowky 37 rounds buckshot and 6 of ball.

B.—By the escort of an ammunition cart which the mob attacked on Mirzapur road between 9 and 10 A.M.—10 rounds buckshot.

C.—By the Bank guard—10 rounds buckshot.

D.—By the sub-jail guard—13 rounds buckshot.

E.—By the guard at power station—3 rounds buckshot.

(3) The number of rounds fired in Ahmedabad by the troops were as under:—

British Detachment	30 rounds from rifles.
"	32 " " machine guns.
1-97 Infantry	397 " " rifles.
1-99 Infantry	150 " " "

TOTAL 609 rounds.

(4) The grand total thus comes to 729 rounds fired by troops and police, of which 83 were buckshot and the rest ball.

G. E. CHATFIELD,

District Magistrate, Ahmedabad.

APPENDIX 8.

Copy of telegram, dated 12th May, 1919, from Mr. M. K. Gandhi, to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, C. I. D.

To

J. A. GULDER, Esq.,

Ahmedabad.

Inmates of Ashram have referred for my advice question of their having to identify those whom they were trying prevent incendiarism. I hope you will not press them for identification they cannot consistently with Ashram principles give evidence against people. Our business is promote good will between rulers and ruled and prevent violence wherever we may find it. It will be breach of privilege for us give evidence against prisoners whom we were preventing from committing crimes. I would plead with you not to draw public attention to our principle by forcing matters for I do not desire that our example should be copied by those who may not follow whole of our plan of life and who might simply make of it a convenience to screen offenders.

GANDHI.

APPENDIX 9.

Copy of order by the District Magistrate, Ahmedabad, under Section 25A of the District Police Act as regards Ahmedabad for the payment of compensation for destruction of property during the riots.

With the previous sanction of the Commissioner, Northern Division, and in exercise of the powers conferred by section 25A of the Bombay District Police Act, IV of 1890, as amended by Act III of 1915, the District Magistrate of Ahmedabad—

(1) declares that the inhabitants of Ahmedabad, i.e., those residing or habitually employed within the municipal area of Ahmedabad, have by their conduct caused, or helped to cause the holding of the unlawful assemblies which on April 10th, 11th and 12th caused loss and damage to property, death and grievous hurt to persons in Ahmedabad; and

(2) requires the Collector of Ahmedabad and the municipality of Ahmedabad to recover out of the total sum of Rs. 9,54,771-6-1 determined by the District Magistrate, Ahmedabad, under section 25A (1) (a) (i) the sum of Rs. 8,86,600 be paid in compensation for such loss, damage, death and grievous hurt, from the inhabitants of Ahmedabad as defined above, in the following ways:—

(A) A rate to be levied by the Municipality of Ahmedabad equal to 3 times the general compulsory municipal water tax so as to realize about Rs. 4,80,000.

AHMEDABAD AND KAIRA.

[Continued.]

(B) The recovery, by the Collector of an amount equal to one week's wages from all mill-hands employed during September 1919 within the municipal limits, including Jobbers and Head Jobbers but excluding the clerical staff so as to realize about 1,76,000

(C) A rate to be levied by the Collector on all payers of income-tax, equal to one-third of the annual income-tax demand during the year 1918-19, so as to realize 2,30,000

TOTAL 8,86,000

(3) requires the Collector to apportion all moneys so recovered, whether by himself or by the municipality, amongst the persons shown in the lists which have been approved of by the Commissioner, Northern Division. The following persons have been exempted by the Commissioner, Northern Division, from payment of the aforesaid rates and levies:—

(a) Government servants, (b) railway employees, (c) employees of the Bank of Bombay, (d) Europeans, (e) persons whom the District Magistrate shall exempt on the grounds that their cases are hard and exceptional.

G. E. CHATFIELD,
Collector.

APPENDIX 10.

Copy of order by the District Magistrate, Ahmedabad, under section 25A of the District Police Act as regards Viramgam.

With the previous sanction of the Commissioner, Northern Division, and in the exercise of the powers conferred by section 25A of the Bombay District Police Act, IV of 1890, as amended by Act III of 1915, the District Magistrate of Ahmedabad—

(1) declares that the inhabitants of Viramgam, that is to say, those residing in or regularly employed within the municipal limits of Viramgam, have by their conduct caused or contributed towards the holding of unlawful

assemblies, which on April 12th, 1919, caused loss and damage to property and death and grievous hurt to persons at Viramgam, and

(2) requires the Collector of Ahmedabad and the municipality of Viramgam to recover the amount of Rs. 42,000 being a portion of the sum of Rs. 2,16,729-6-1 determined by the District Magistrate on account of the loss and damage aforesaid, from the inhabitants of Viramgam (i.e., those residing or regularly employed within Viramgam municipal limits) in the following manner:—

(a) A local cess to be imposed by the Viramgam municipality in the form of a house-tax so as to realize about 24,312

(b) The recovery by the Collector of an amount equal to one week's wages from all mill-hands so as to realize about 5,000

(c) The imposition by the Collector of a rate equal to 50 per cent. of the income-tax demand for 1918-19 on all payers of income-tax in Viramgam so as to realize an amount of about 12,688

TOTAL 42,000

(3) requires the Collector to apportion all moneys so recovered, whether by him or the municipality, amongst the persons shown in the lists approved of by the Commissioner, Northern Division.

The following persons have been exempted by the Commissioner, Northern Division, from the payment of the aforesaid rates and levies:—

(a) Government servants.
(b) Railway employees.
(c) Employees of the Bank of Bombay.
(d) Europeans.
(e) Persons whom the District Magistrate shall exempt on the grounds that their cases are hard and exceptional.

G. E. CHATFIELD,
District Magistrate, Ahmedabad.

AHMEDABAD,

25th September 1919.

APPENDIX 11.

Statement showing the number of persons arrested in the Kaira district in connection with the disturbances of April 1919 against whom proceedings were withdrawn before or during the trials.

Serial No.	Name of case and name of accused.	No. of accused against whom case was withdrawn.	Date of arrest of each.	Section of law under which sent up or arrested.	Date of final discharge.	Caste, occupation and bail application given or not.	REMARKS.
1	Nadiad derailment case. Rupsing Mokansing	1	13th May 1919.	120B, 121, 121A, 143, 149, 109, 114, I. P. C. 126(B) and 128 of the Railway Act.	24th July 1919.	Girasia, trader in betel leaves. No bail application.	
2	Moti Naran	1	21st May 1919.	Do.	8th August 1919.	Pattidar, trade. No bail application.	Prosecution withdrawn during trial.

AHMEDABAD AND KAIRA.

[Continued.]

Statement showing the number of persons arrested in the Kaira district in connection with the disturbances of April 1919 against whom proceedings were withdrawn before or during the trials—contd.

Serial No.	Name of case and name of accused.	No. of accused against whom case was withdrawn.	Date of arrest of each.	Section of law under which sent up or arrested.	Date of final discharge.	Caste, occupation and bail application given or not.	REMARKS.
3	Vadod wire cutting case. Khoda Garbad .	1	5th May 1919.	143, 147, 148, 149, 121, 121A, I. P. C. 25 of Act XIII of 1885.	14th August 1919.	Dharala, agriculture, bail application made, refused by II tribunal on ground of sufficient <i>prima facie</i> case.	
4	Manilal Jethalal .	1	26th April 1919.	Do.	1st September 1919.	Brahmin, merchant, bail application refused by II tribunal on grounds of <i>prima facie</i> case.	Prosecution withdrawn during trial.
5	Mondas Natha .	1	26th April 1919.	Do.	1st September 1919.	Pattidar, agriculture, bail application refused by II tribunal on grounds of <i>prima facie</i> case.	
6	Natha Trikam .	1	29th April 1919.	Do.	Do.	Do.	
7	Narsanda wire cutting case. Dhari Jiji .	1	23rd April 1919.	121, 121A, 143, 147, 148, 149, I. P. C. 25 (c) of Act XIII of 1885 and 126 (b) of Rail way Act of 1890.	16th October 1919.	Pattidar, agriculture. No application for bail.	
8	Dhari Dharamdas .	1	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	
9	Waghji Mathur .	1	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	
10	Shankar Gokal .	1	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	
11	Mathur Laxmidas .	1	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	
12	Kalidas Naran .	1	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	
13	Zaver Sakhdas .	1	10th May 1919.	121A, 121, 143, 147, 148, 149, I. P. C. and 25 (c) of Act XIII of 1885 and 126 (b) of Act IX of 1890.	Do.	Pattidar, Agriculture. No bail application.	
14	Chota Jiva .	1	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	
15	Moti Iswar .	1	12th May 1919	Do.	Do.	Do.	
16	Fula Veri .	1	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	
17	Mathur Bapu .	1	Do.	Do.	Do.	Kumbhar, Potter. No bail application.	
18	Bhaiji Mongal .	1	30th May 1919.	Do.	Do.	Pattidar, trade. No bail application.	
19	Manilal Bhaichand .	1	31st May 1919.	Do.	Do.	Bania, merchant. No bail application.	
20	Shiva Hirji .	1	Do.	Do.	Do.	Pattidar, agriculture. No bail application.	
21	Fula Govind .	1	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	
22	Moti Bakar .	1	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	

AHMEDABAD AND KAIRA.

[Continued.]

Statement showing the number of persons arrested in the Kaira district in connection with the disturbances of April 1919 against whom proceedings were withdrawn before or during the trials—contd.

Serial No.	Name of case and name of accused.	No. of accused against whom case was withdrawn.	Date of arrest of each.	Section of law under which sent up or arrested.	Date of final discharge.	Caste, occupation and bail application given or not.	REMARKS.
23	Narsanda wire cutting case—contd. Gokal Nagar .	1	31st May 1919.	121A, 121, 143, 147, 148, 149, I. P. C. and 25 (c) of Act XIII of 1885 and 126 (b) of Act IX of 1890.	16th October 1919.	Pattidar, agriculture. No bail application.	
24	Punam Talshi .	1	1st June 1919.	Do.	Do.	Do.	
25	Shankar Kishor .	1	Do.	Do.	Do.	Pattidar, trade. No bail application.	
26	Chota Makan .	1	7th June 1919.	Do.	Do.	Pattidar, agriculture. No bail application.	
27	Laloo Naran .	1	8th June 1919.	Do.	Do.	Pattidar, trade. No bail application.	
28	Anand arson case. Karsandas Kesavlal .	1	20th May 1919.	147, 149, 436, I. P. C.	11th November 1919.	Pattidar, landowner, bail application made but refused by II tribunal on ground that there case <i>prima facie</i> was against accused.	Also arrested vide No. 31 in Anand Navli wire cutting case.
29	Gordhandas Keshavlal .	1	19th May 1919.	Do.	Do.	Pattidar, landowner, bail application made but refused by II tribunal on ground that there case <i>prima facie</i> was against accused.	
30	Bhailal Narsi .	1	16th June 1919.	Do.	Do.	Pattidar, agriculture, no bail application.	Was accused in Anand Navli wire cutting case.
31	Anand Navli wire cutting case. Karsandas Kesavlal .	1	20th May 1919.	120B, 121, 121A, 147, 148, 149, 379, 109, 114, I. P. C. and 25 (c) of Act XIII of 1885.	Do.	Pattidar, landowner, bail application made in June, rejected by II tribunal on ground of sufficient <i>prima facie</i> evidence.	
32	Ranchod Naran Bin Baber .	1	17th May 1919.	Do.	Do.	Pattidar, agriculture. No bail application.	
33	Kashi Zaver .	1	Do.	Do.	Do.	Pattidar, merchant. No bail application.	
34	Tulshibhai Naran .	1	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	
35	Manorbhai Naran .	1	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	
36	Parbhudas Talshi .	1	Do.	Do.	Do.	Dharala, labour. No bail application.	
37	Shankar Jala .	1	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	

Continued.]

AHMEDABAD AND KAIRA.

Statement showing the number of persons arrested in the Kaira District in connection with the disturbances of April 1919 against whom proceedings were withdrawn before or during the trials—concl'd.

Serial No.	Name of case and name of accused.	No. of accused against whom case was withdrawn.	Date of arrest of each.	Section of law under which sent up or arrested.	Date of final discharge.	Caste, occupation and bail application given or not.	REMARKS.
38	Anand Navi's wire cutting case—concl'd. Dhula Lakha . . .	1	17th May 1919.	120B, 121, 121A, 147, 148, 149, 379, 109, 114, I. P. C. and 25 (c) of Act XIII of 1885.	11th Novem-ber 1919.	Dharala, private service. No bail application.	
39	Soma Ghema . . .	1	16th May 1919.	Do.	Do.	Dharala, agricul-ture, no bail application.	
40	Chunilal Jiwa . . .	1	20th May 1919.	Do.	Do.	Kachia, mason. No bail application.	
41	Natha Hargowan . . .	1	17th April 1919.	Do.	Do.	Brahmin, business. No bail applica-tion.	Was accused in Anand arson case.
42	Iswar Kashi . . .	1	13th June 1919.	Do.	Do.	Pattidar, agricul-ture. No bail application.	
43	Chatur Bhulji . . .	1	9th June 1919.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Was accused in Anand arson case and convicted to 3 years' rigorous imprisonment.
44	Bhailal Narsi . . .	1	16th June 1919.	Do.	Do.	Pattidar, trade. No bail application.	
45	Chatur Talshi . . .	1	13th June 1919.	Do.	Do.	Pattidar, agricul-ture. No bail application.	

AHMEDABAD AND KAIRA.

[Continued.]

Statement showing the dates of release on bail or discharge of the persons against whom cases were withdrawn.

APPENDIX 12.

AHMEDABAD.

Serial No.	Name of case.	Name of accused against whom case was withdrawn.	Caste.	Occupation.	Date of arrest.	Section of Indian Penal Code under which charged.	Date of release on bail.	Date of withdrawal.	Date of final discharge.
1		Baldeo Kalidas . . .	Bania	Shroff . . .	28th April 1919	121, 121A, 147, 148, 436, 440, 452, with 109.	20th June 1919	16th September 1919.	16th September 1919.
2		Mohan Chimanlal . . .	Hindu	(Business) dealer in gold.	Do.	Do.	26th June 1919	Do.	Do.
3	C. R. No. 42 Astodia . . .	Chandulal Chunilal . . .	Bania	Cloth merchant	Do.	Do.	20th June 1919	Do.	Do.
4	Chakia and gate Chowky arson.	Dhanji Ambaram . . .	Ghanohi . . .	Milk seller	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
5		Haribhai Ambaram . . .	Do.	Private clerk	Do.	Do.	26th June 1919	Do.	Do.
6		Balubhai Harikama . . .	Bania	Money lender	Do.	Do.	20th June 1919	Do.	Do.
7		Jivan Kuber . . .	Bhaugar . . .	Hotel keeper	Do.	Do.	26th June 1919	Do.	Do.
8		Ahmedji Rehmanji . . .	Chhipra . . .	Dyer	Do.	Do.	6th August 1919	Do.	Do.
9	G. R. No. 43 Jamalpur gate Chowky arson case.	Nanoo alias Gulabshaw Gambhirshaw . . .	Mussalman Fakir	Mill-hand	17th May 1919	121, 121A, 148, 436, 149.	..	13th October 1919.	13th October 1919.
10		Chimen Nansa . . .	Chanchi . . .	Milk seller	28th April 1919	121, 121A, 148, 440, 436, 395, 149.	..	14th October 1919.	14th October 1919.
11	C. R. No. 45 Raipur Chakla and gate Chowky arson case.	Moti Bulakhi . . .	Kumbhar	Potter	Do.	Do.	..	Do.	Do.
12		Punja Shanker . . .	Ravat . . .	Carriage driver	Do.	Do.	..	Do.	Do.
13		Mulchand Gordhan . . .	Bania	Municipal clerk	12th May 1919	Do.	..	Do.	Do.
14	C. R. No. 47 Fernandez Chowky.	Manilal Maganlal Modi . . .	Bania	Speculator	28th April 1919	121, 121A, 148, 440, 452, 149.	..	Do.	Do.
15	Arson . . .	Chiman Govind . . .	Ghanohi . . .	Sweetmeat sel-ler.	Do.	Do.	..	Do.	Do.
16	C. R. No. 51 Khadia Chowky arson case.	Jetha Girdhar . . .	Khatri . . .	Mill-hand	2nd May 1919	121, 121A, 148, 149, 440, 452.	..	19th May 1919	19th May 1919
17	C. R. No. 24 Swaminarain's Mandir arms loot case.	Virchand Gokal . . .	Omal Bania . . .	Cotton broker .	5th May 1919	121, 121A, 122, 148, 440, 452, 395, 149.	..	16th August 1919.	16th August 1919.
18	C. R. No. 25 Gosaji Maharsaj Mandir arms loot case.	Virchand Gokal . . .	Do.	Do.	Do.	121, 121A, 122, 148, 395, 149.	..	Do.	Do.

Continued.]

AHMEDABAD AND KAIRA.

Statement showing the dates of release on bail or discharge of the persons against whom cases were withdrawn—contd.

AHMEDABAD—contd.

Serial No.	Name of case	Name of accused against whom case was withdrawn.	Caste.	Occupation.	Date of arrest.	Section of Indian Penal Code under which charged.	Date of release on bail.	Date of withdrawal.	Date of final discharge.
19	C. R. No. 26 Rao Bahadur Balakrishna house loot case.	Fakira Moti	Darji	Tailor.	21st April 1919	121, 121A, 307, 436, 511, 454, 395, 440, 148, 149, 412.	27th May 1919	23rd August 1919.	15th September 1919.
20		Rehman Nurbhai	Mussalman	Pan-bidi seller.	17th April 1919	Do.	24th May 1919.	Do.	Do.
21	C. R. No. 27 Khan Bahadur Hussain Khan's house loot case.	Bai Sankli daughter of Dalji Rama.	Thakarda	Labourer	18th April 1919	121, 121A, 148, 149, 395, 436, 511, 440, 412.	19th April 1919	8th September 1919.	15th September 1919.
22	C. R. No. 28 destruction of Dhukwa Chowky case.	Moti Dhuleji*	Do.	Do.	1st May 1919	121, 121A, 148, 440, 452, 149.	...	11th September 1919.	11th September 1919.
23	C. R. No. 29 destruction and arson of Kalapur Chakla Chowky case.	Bulakhi Jethalal†	Bania	Mill service	30th April 1919	121, 121A, 148, 436, 452, 149.	...	Do.	Do.
24	C. R. No. 36 Daryapur liquor shop loot case.	Shekhan Eader Khan.	Mussalman	Mill labourer	2nd June 1919	121, 121A, 148, 149, 436, 440, 395, 412.	...	31st October 1919.	31st October 1919.
25	"	Muhammad Dosu	Mussalman barber.	Barber	3rd May 1919	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
26	"	Dhula Dina]	Rajput	Mill labourer	21st April 1919	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
27	"	Naran Mangal]	Lodha	Do.	20th May 1919	121, 121A, 148, 149, 436, 440, 395, 412.	...	Do.	Do.
28	"	Vireji Kaluji]	Thakarda	Do.	11th May 1919.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
29		Amba Pans]	Marwadi car-penter.	Carpenter	30th April 1919	121, 121A, 147, 148, 436, 149.	...	3rd November 1919.	3rd November 1919.
30		Madho Bhimji	Girasia	Private service	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
31		Sada Gogji]	Do.	Millhand	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.

AHMEDABAD AND KAIRA.

[Continued.]

Serial No.	Name of case	Name of accused against whom case was withdrawn.	Caste.	Occupation.	Date of arrest.	Section of Indian Penal Code under which charged.	Date of release on bail.	Date of withdrawal.	Date of final discharge.
32	C. R. No. 32 Gheekanta Chowky.	Rana Kala	Marwadi car-penter.	Cart driving	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
33		Hothi Jena	Do.	Labour coolie	10th May 1919	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
34		Madho Madarup	Do.	Do.	Absconded	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
35		Champada Abas	Muhammadan	Hire carriage driving.	30th April 1919	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
36		Karim Muhammad	Do.	Wood seller	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
37		Madarup Ghuma	Carpenter	Carpenter	9th September 1919.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
38		Mavji Kana	Chamar	Mill-hand	30th April 1919	121, 121A, 147, 436, 149.	...	13th November 1919.	13th November 1919.
39		Pasa Pitambar	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
40		Bala Uka	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
41		Hira Uka	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
42		Chiman Trakam	Girasia	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
43		Kuber Manor	Mochi	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
44		Liladhar Champashi	Bania	Private service	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
45		Mohan Laloo	Vaghri	Mill-hand	Do.	Do.	...	7th November 1919.	7th November 1919.
46	C. R. No. 34 Shahpur Chowky	Manekram Vastaram	Bania	Trade	Do.	121, 121A, 147, 436, 149, 440, and 452.	3rd October 1919.	Do.	Do.
47		Liladhar Champashi	Do.	Private service	Do.	121, 121A, 147, 436, 149.	18th October 1919.	Do.	Do.
48		Chatur Mala	Vaghri	Mill hand	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
49	C. R. No. 36 Huzar Deputy Collector's office	Hira Lakha	Dhed	Do.	24th April 1919	436, 440, 149, 352, 148, 121, 121A.	...	10th September 1919.	10th September 1919.
50	C. R. No. 39 North Deskroi office.	Dhana Mathur	Thakarda	Do.	30th April 1919	148, 436, 440, 147, 149, 352, 121, 121A.	...	15th May 1919	15th May 1919
51	C. R. No. 49 Sub-Registrar's office.	Ratana Gala	Do.	Do.	6th May 1919	148, 440, 436, 149, 121, 121A.	15th July 1919	23rd September 1919.	23rd September 1919.
52	C. R. No. 47 Matro Mandap	Dhana Mathur	Do.	Do.	30th April 1919	148, 436, 149, 121, 121A.	...	15th May 1919	15th May 1919
53		Jetha Mougha	Dhed	Labourer	21st April 1919	121, 121A, 148, 436, 440, 149.	...	12th December 1919.	12th December 1919.
54		Paswa Kandas	Kunbi	Mill-hand	27th April 1919	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
55		Sakra Anaru	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
56		Partap Bhupata	Thakarda	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
57		Khoda Bhajji	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
58	C. R. No. 63 Saraspur Chowky case.	Bechar Jiwa	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	12th December 1919.	12th December 1919.
59		Dipa Nager	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
60		Mohan iswar	Kunbi	Trade	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
61		Abu Ranjan	Muhammadan	Mill-hand	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
62	C. R. No. 67 Saraspur liquor shop case.	Jetha Mougha	Dhed	Labour	21st April 1919	121, 121A, 148, 436, 440, 396, 149.	...	Do.	Do.

* (This accused was convicted in C. R. No. 24 so this case was withdrawn).

† (This accused was convicted in C. R. No. 24 so this case was withdrawn).

Continued.]

AHMEDABAD AND KAIRA.

Statement showing the dates of release on bail or discharge of the persons against whom cases were withdrawn—contd.

AHMEDABAD—contd.

Serial No.	Name of case.	Name of accused against whom case was withdrawn.	Caste.	Occupation.	Date of arrest.	Section of Indian Penal Code under which charged.	Date of release on bail.	Date of withdrawal.	Date of final discharge.
63	C. R. No. 67 Saraspur liquor shop case—contd.	Paswa Sama	Dhed	Labour	22nd April 1919	121, 121A, 148, 438, 440, 396, 149.	...	12th November 1919.	12th November 1919.
64		Galuji Baluji	Thakarda	Mill-hand	27th April 1919	Do.	19th August 1919.	Died on 10th October 1919.	12th December 1919.
65		Abu Ramjan	Muhammadian	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
66		Dipa Nager	Thakarda	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
67		Partap Bhupata	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
68	C. R. No. 68 Panch Kuwa liquor shop case.	Sakra Amra	Kunbi	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
69		Paswa Kandas	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
70		Atiya Galuji	Thakarda	Do.	28th July 1919	Do.	19th August 1919.	12th November 1919.	12th November 1919.
71	C. R. No. 68 Panch Kuwa liquor shop case.	Nur Muhammad Soju	Muhammadian	Do.	20th April 1919	Do.	...	28th November 1919.	28th November 1919.
72	C. R. No. 71 Idgah Chowky case.	Chhagan Bhalu	Thakarda	Do.	9th May 1919	Do.	...	13th November 1919.	13th November 1919.
73		Chhagan Daji	Do.	Do.	19th May 1919.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
74		Rawaji Ohaji	Do.	Do.	20th May 1919.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
75	C. R. No. 40 Jehangirpura Tolbar case	AHMEDABAD CITY—Madhavpura Division.				121, 121A, 147, 148, 436, 149.	...	15th November 1919.	15th November 1919.
76		Kana Vana	Marwadi Bhil	Mill-hand	5th May 1919	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
77		Petha Ralha	Do.	Labourer	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
78		Hajia Chitra	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
79		Dana Karsan	Do.	Mill-hand	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
80		Bhaga Lakha	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
81		Madhoo Lakha	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
82	C. R. No. 19 Sarkhej thana arson case.	Mala Bechar	Thakarda	Cultivation	24th April 1919	147, 148, 149, 434, 440, 396, 121, 121A.	...	14th October 1919.	14th October 1919.
83		Dala Parsing	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
84		Magan Vira	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
85		Magan Lakha	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.

AHMEDABAD AND KAIRA.

[Continued.]

86	C. R. No. 19 Sarkhej thana arson case.	Hathi Hathi	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
87		Chatur Gaga	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
88		Joita Hani	Pattidar	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
89		Chatur Vagha	Thakarda	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
90		Moti Jalam	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
91		Jije Kala	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
92		Gaja Hathi	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
93		Dhola Bhupat	Do.	Do.	25th April 1919	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
94		Bechar Vagha	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
95		Dhula Vana	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
96		Desal Vasta	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
97		Rana Daji	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
98		Kan Segal	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
99	C. R. No. 40 Virangam	Kaji Ragha	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
100		Bava Nara	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
101		Punja Bhaji	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.
102		Jesing Partap	Do.	Do.	24th April 1919	Do.	28th May 1919	Do.	Do.
103		Baji Gobar	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
104		VIRANGAM TOWN.				121, 121A, 122, 148, 152, 201, 302, 307, 342, 398, 431, 436, 452, 454, 390, 412 and Telegraph Act, 25(c).	31st May 1919	14th June 1919	4th August 1919
105		Tribhovan Harivalav	Kadva Kunbi	Landlord and merchant.	16th April 1919	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
106		Fulsing Tribhovan	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
107		Ranchhod Harivalav	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
108		Chhotalal Trikamlal	Shravak Bania	Pleaser	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
109		Vadilal Dajibhai	Modh Bania	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
110		Lalsankar Jayanand	Brahmin	Private medical practitioner.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
111		Dungar Bagha	Koli	Private service	13th April 1919.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
112		Ishwarlal Kalidas	Kadva Kunbi	Assistant teacher in municipal school.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
113	C. R. No. 40 Virangam	Badar Jita	Mussalman	Mill labourer	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
114		Popat Naran	Chancha	Watch repairer	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
115		Keshav Sherbhai	Mussalman	Weigher	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
116		Rama Ratna	Dhed	Mill labourer	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
117		Popat Haribhai	Khatri	Dyer	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
118		Vrijlal Deyehi	Modh Bania	Gumasta	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
119		Moti Amra	Rajpat Marwadi	Mill labourer	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
120		Jiva Jora	Modh Bania	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
121		Ratilal Jethalal	Modh Bania	Gram merchant	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
122		Dhanji Chhagan	Shravak Bania	Shroff	16th April 1919	Do.	15th June 1919	Do.	Do.
123		Kachara Kastur	Do.	Landlord and merchant.	24th April 1919	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
124		Janu Usman	Mussalman	Bigi seller	19th May 1919	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
125		Jehebekhan Sultankhan	Do.	Private service	17th April 1919	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
126		Nanu Nurabhai	Do.	Fuel seller	16th April 1919	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
127		Ghulam Hussein Abdul	Do.	Petty merchant	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
128		Janu Jamal	Do.	Mill labourer	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
129		Gatur Vaghaji	Do.	Railway coolie	7th May 1919	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
130		Ibrahim Jeeva	Do.	Mill labourer	13th April 1919	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
131		Moti Nathu	Thakarda	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.

Concluded.]

AHMEDABAD AND KAIRA.

Statement showing the dates of release on bail or discharge of the persons against whom cases were withdrawn—concl'd.

Serial No.	Name of case.	Name of accused whom case was withdrawn.	Caste.	Occupation.	Date of arrest.	Section of Indian Penal Code under which charged.	Date of release on bail.	Date of withdrawal.	Date of final discharge.
131	C. R. No. 40 Virangam—concl'd.	Valabh Hira Chand	Modh Bania	VIRANGAM TOWN—concl'd. Gumasta	13th April 1919	121, 121A, 122, 148, 152, 201, 302, 307, 342, 395, 431, 436, 452, 454, 380, 412 and Telegraph Act, 25(c).	...	14th June 1919	14th August 1919
132		Rama Bhaga	Koli	Mill labourer	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	Do.

Summary of caste and occupation.

Caste.	No.	Occupation.	No.
Thakardas	39	Mill-hands	51
Patidars	1	Labourers	9
Banias	18	Tailors	1
Musalmans	17	Barbers	1
Darjis	1	Mill labourers	1
Lodhas	1	Traders	13
Rajputs	1	Private service	9
Bhavsars	2	Dyers	2
Chhipas	1	Carriage drivers	3
Fakirs	1	Potters	1
Kumbhars	1	Carpenters	2
Ravats	1	Wood sellers	1
Khatris	1	Cultivators	22
Ghanchis	2	Pleaders	2
Carpenters	4	Medical practitioners	1
Girastars	5	Landlord and merchants	8
Chamars	3	Shroffs (bankers)	1
Vagris	5	Teachers	1
Dheds	2	Weavers	1
Kumbis	9	Railway coolies	1
Marwadi Bhis	8	Watch repairer	1
Kolis	3		
Ghancha	1		
Brahmins	1		
	TOTAL		132

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Written Statements of Witnesses, Ahmedabad.

Mr. G. E. CHATFIELD, I.C.S., District Magistrate, Ahmedabad.

Report on the April riots.

(1) *Preliminary.*—Before giving an account of the riots it is necessary to consider the peculiar conditions at Ahmedabad and Virangam and to explain the extraordinary influence of Mr. Gandhi in these cities. Both towns are industrial. Ahmedabad has a population of nearly 300,000 and contains 78 mills which employ 30,000 to 40,000 mill-hands. Virangam with a population of 20,000 contains two large mills and seven ginning factories, employing 2,000 to 3,000. The latter town is a sort of industrial suburb of Ahmedabad; the mill-agent of the Virangam mills is a member of the Ahmedabad Mill-owners' Association, and the mill hands are in close touch with their fellows in Ahmedabad. Any movement of the mill hands in the latter city is sure to be imitated by those of Virangam. Ahmedabad is the headquarters of Mr. M. K. Gandhi who has established an Ashram on the bank of the Sabarmati river outside the city.

Mr. Gandhi obtained great influence over the mill-hands of Ahmedabad in the beginning of 1918. Miss Anasuya Sarabhai a disciple of his turned her attention to the betterment of this class in 1917 and began to organize it in order to obtain better wages from the mill-agents. In December 1917, the warpers, a small but important and highly skilled branch of the mill labourers, struck for higher wages. The mill-agents under the guidance of their President Mr. Ambalal Sarabhai, brother of Miss Anasuya, proceeded to organize in turn and oppose the new union. Matters came to a head in February 1918 when the weavers, a more numerous branch of the skilled labourers (there are about 10,000 of them) demanded a 50 per cent. increase of pay. The mill agents refused to grant more than 20 per cent. increase. Mr. Gandhi intervened at this point and offered to arbitrate; but the agents refused to accept his arbitration, partly because they considered that it would be detrimental to discipline in future, partly because they distrusted his power to induce the weavers to accept his decision. As the weavers had a recourse to strike in two mills at a time, probably with a view to break up the union of the agents, the latter resolved on a general lock-out of the weavers which continued from the middle of February to the middle of March. Grave disturbances were feared and the agents appealed to the District Magistrate for protection of the mills; but a very slight show of force, the stationing of a few armed police at the city gates and the patrolling of the main roads by armed police in motor cars proved sufficient to maintain order. While the lock-out continued the weavers met daily in the river-bed near the Shahpur gate and were harangued by Mr. Gandhi. The result was twofold. The new organization was immensely strengthened and the weavers grew accustomed to look to Mr. Gandhi as their leader and benefactor, and also in an almost equal degree to Miss Anasuya Sarabhai who attended and addressed their meetings. In spite of all their enthusiasm, however, the agents were in fair way to win a complete victory when on March 15th Mr. Gandhi took a vow to eat nothing until the mill-hands received their demands. This brought matters to a crisis. The mill agents were terrified at the idea that he might actually starve himself and that the infuriated mob would wreak vengeance upon them as the authors of his death. A compromise was immediately arrived at. The mill agents conceded the demands of the weavers for one day and for one day the latter accepted the 20 per cent. rise which had been offered them previously. Thereafter a rise of 35 per cent. was agreed upon. This was regarded a great triumph for the weavers, Mr. Gandhi and Miss Anasuya were the heroes of the day and were driven through the city in a Victoria heading a triumphal procession. The mill-hands thenceforward had a warm personal affection for both of them and regarded them as friends and benefactors. Another

result of the struggle was that the weavers became well-organised, used to meetings, to common counsels, to concerted action and to obey him obeying the orders of the subordinate leaders, who were for the most part the Jobbers and mill foremen. The spinners number about 30,000 individuals, many of whom are women and children; they were not engaged in this struggle. They are a much lower class than the weavers, inferior in skill and intelligence. They would naturally follow the lead of the weavers in any time of great and general excitement. Thus Mr. Gandhi and Miss Anasuya had a strong labour organization absolutely devoted to them and controlling the whole of the 40,000 operatives in Ahmedabad; and the mill population of Virangam was sure to imitate whatever action was taken there. It may be noted that the Collector and the District Magistrate though in close communication with both parties during the lock-out maintained a neutral attitude except for the measures taken to preserve the peace.

(2) *Anti-Government campaign in Kaira.*—After the settlement of the labour dispute in 1918, Mr. Gandhi turned his attention to the Kaira agitation, with which I have no concern except as regards its effects. It was one of a series of campaign against Government led by Mr. Gandhi. The *Bombay Chronicle* preached his cause and the whole press of India followed suit. The result was greatly to strengthen the influence of Mr. Gandhi in the countryside and especially among the Patidars. The Kaira district was most affected and those portions of the Ahmedabad district, such as Daskroi which adjoin Kaira. The *Gujarat Sabha* of which Mr. Gandhi was the practical leader also strengthened its influence throughout the whole of the district by the excellent relief work which it did during the famine and influenza outbreak in the end of 1918.

(3) *Home Rule League and Satyagraha League.*—The Ahmedabad branch of the Home Rule League was started on October 6th, 1916, by Mr. M. C. Patel and Mr. J. V. Desai, Barristers-at-Law, with the assistance of the *Swadeshi Mitra Mandal* and the Gokhale Society. The bulk of the members were *Prachina Kshatriyas*. Mr. M. K. Gandhi presided at some of the earliest meetings. The League held meetings and delivered lectures between October 1916 and June 1917 with little effect. On June 22nd 1917, a deputation consisting of Messrs. Horniman, J. Dwarkadas, Banker, Pandya and the Honourable Mr. Jamal came to Ahmedabad and spoke at the *Anand Bhavan* theatre at a meeting of the League. This gave the League much more vitality. In August 1917 Miss Anasuya Sarabhai joined it and formed a ladies branch of which she and Mrs. S. B. Mehta were secretaries. Mr. Gandhi from time to time presided at the more important meetings. In September 1917, the League began sending out agents into the district to collect funds and spread propaganda. In March 1918, Mrs. Besant visited Ahmedabad and addressed the League. In June 1918, open air street lectures were begun and continued till the riots. In February 1919, the movement gave way to the *Satyagraha* movement.

The *Satyagraha* movement may be said to have begun in Ahmedabad on February 23rd of 1919 when Mr. V. J. Patel presided over a meeting of about 500 persons in the *Dhoramsala* of Sheth Manilal Rarchhodlal near the station to protest against the Rowlatt Bills. On the 24th idem there was a meeting at Mr. Gandhi's Ashram attended by Mr. Gandhi, Messrs. Horniman, Jamnadas Dwarkadas, Umar Sobhani and Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, at which it was decided to start a passive resistance campaign unless the Rowlatt Bills were dropped. The *Satyagraha* manifesto and vow were published in the *Bombay Chronicle* of March 2nd. This manifesto contained a form of oath to be taken by the *Satyagrahis*—to refuse civilly to obey those laws (i.e. the

* Vide para. 21 of the statement of the Bombay Government.

Continued.]

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Rowlatt Act) and such laws as a Committee hereafter to be appointed should think fit'. The oath contained a proviso about refraining from violence. This manifesto created great excitement throughout India, and in Ahmedabad as in elsewhere. A large number of posters* began to appear, mostly containing quotations from Thoreau and inciting the people to passive disobedience. These obviously emanated from the *Satyagrahi* organization. Enormous meetings were held in the river-bed and elsewhere. The mill-hands attended in large numbers. The speeches were highly inflammatory and did excite the whole population of the city to indignation against Government though there was neither any attempt to incite, nor any tendency to proceed, to violence. Unregistered newspapers† began to appear prosecution of the campaign of civil disobedience. In fact the whole city was worked up an uncommon pitch of excitement between March 20th, when the *Satyagraha Sabha* was formed, and April 10th on which rioting commenced. The Rowlatt Bill was passed on March 18th and received the Governor-General's sanction on March 21st.

The Delhi riots occurred on 30th March when Mr. Gandhi fixed April 6th as a day of general mourning and called for a *hartal* or closure of all business. I wrote to his principal lieutenant Mr. Vallubhai Patel, and asked him to come and see me. He came with Mr. Jivanlal Desai and some other followers of Mr. Gandhi about April 3rd and I asked their intentions regarding the great procession and *hartal* fixed for the 6th. I mentioned the Delhi riots and the need of avoiding any such thing here. They assured me that violence was far from their wishes and they could answer for it that none would be used. They promised that the procession should be orderly and that no shops should be forcibly closed. The *Ma'ajana*‡ also assured me that they were closing shops voluntarily. Satisfied that the organizers of the demonstration had no intention of breaking the peace but that on the contrary they had made elaborate arrangements to preserve order, I arranged with the District Superintendent of Police that the police arrangements should be unobstructive and the crowd so far as possible left to itself. The procession was a very orderly one in spite of its huge size. No act of violence was committed. In fact the general temper of the people seemed to me to be lawabiding and pacific and nothing seemed less probable than that the city was on the verge of dangerous riots. The *Satyagrahi* organization seemed also to be good and their hold of the people a firm one.

(4) *The riot of April 10th.*—Early in the morning of April 10th, a rumour reached Ahmedabad that Mr. Gandhi had been arrested—an exaggeration of the fact that he had been stopped at Delhi and forced to return to Bombay instead of proceeding to the Punjab. The rumour caused great excitement. I heard of it at about 9 A.M. when the Police Sub-Inspector, Khas Bazar, informed me on the telephone. I saw the District Superintendent of Police and arranged with him to have the forces of police at the main stations in the city strengthened from his armed guard. Mr. V. J. Patel issued a handbill § as Secretary of the *Satyagraha Sabha* calling for a general strike in celebration of the arrest and requesting all to carry on the work with double zeal and faith. In obedience to this handbill a large crowd assembled at about 1 P.M. in the neighbourhood of the railway station and closed the shops forcibly. Those who did not close at once were roughly treated. At about 2-30 P.M. two Europeans (Messrs. Sagar and Steeples) were stopped in a carriage by a crowd which was being addressed by a speaker on a bullock cart. They turned back towards the Kalapur *chowky* dismissed their carriage and attempted to proceed on the Creamery lorry which was on its way up to Camp. The lorry was stopped again at the same place and they were forced to alight and stoned back to the

* Appendix 3 to the statement of the Bombay Government.
† Vide para. 24 of the statement of the Government of Bombay.
‡ i.e. The heads of various commercial classes dealers shopkeepers, etc.
§ Appendix 4 to the statement of the Bombay Government.

Kalapur *Chawky* where they took refuge. The police induced the crowd to withdraw and telephoned for an armed guard of 8 men which arrived shortly after. The two Europeans again attempted to proceed but were immediately stoned and driven into a *Dharamsala*. They again made the attempt but were very severely stoned and driven for shelter into the Beehive flour mill. Here they were joined by 2 Sub-Inspectors and the 8 armed police. The crowd attacked the mill, forced the entrance, destroyed the office, wrecked the telephone and burnt the mill records. They next proceeded to set fire to the window frames, calling on the police to depart and surrender the two Europeans. The police then fired in the air and the mob recoiled. The police then fired in order to save themselves insisted on the departure of the latter from their premises and they accordingly went with one police Sub-Inspector, 4 armed police constables (the remainder of the force remained hidden in the mill). They were immediately mobbed by the crowd, which seems to have been encouraged by the firing in the air, and driven into building with a balcony after firing on their assailants and wounding 12 of them. Some of the crowd attempted to burn the building and some forced the stair-case leading to the balcony. The latter succeeded in catching one of the armed police constables, but the rest of the party broke through a back wall and escaped. The man who was caught was thrown head foremost from the balcony and so injured by the crowd below that he died the same evening while he was being removed to hospital.

I was in my office in the Bhadar when the Assistant Commissioner telephoned down to me at 3-30 P.M. that the Station Master had rung him up and informed him that a mob was attacking the station. I rung up the Station Master who told me that the crowd had moved away from the station but was still in the neighbourhood and reported to have rounded up two Europeans and a party of police in a mill. I then rang up the District Superintendent of Police, informed him of what I had heard and told him to get together what force he could at Headquarter Lines and send it down the road to the station. (He had only 24 men available). In the meantime I sent my car to fetch him and asked him to come and pick me up at my office in order that we might proceed to the scene of the riot. I continued to try and get more definite information as to the facts by telephone, but found this impossible; the District Superintendent of Police took longer to arrive than I expected and it was nearly 5 P.M. by the time we started out *via* the Delhi gate and Camp crossing. The 24 armed police had already marched down the road by which we approached the scene of the riot. When we came in view of the mob and saw its size and also noted that the police had disappeared in its midst and that it would be extremely difficult to send back any message after we had once entered it I scribbled a note to the Officer Commanding, Ahmedabad, telling him the situation and asking him to send down a military force to disperse the mob. This was sent by my motor car. The District Superintendent of Police and I picked up a few armed police from the Idgah *Chowky* and pushed on into the crowd which was sullen and hostile but offered no opposition. We found the 24 armed police guarding five prisoners in a space near the Beehive mill which they had cleared. Three or 4 wounded sepoys were under their protection, one of whom was the man thrown from the balcony and mortally wounded. He had a horrible wound at the back of the head over which the scalp was hanging loose. The crowd stood around watching and a fire engine had just finished extinguishing the fires which had been lit by the mob in their attempt to burn down the mill and the *chawls* opposite. I am not certain of the time we arrived but think that it was shortly after 5 P.M. We remained on the spot until the arrival of the troops at dusk (6-30 or somewhat later). The crowd attempted nothing against us but occasionally pressed forward upon the armed police. The District Superintendent of Police and I kept walking up and down ordering them back and were assisted in so doing by two men in *Satyagrahi* costume

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[Continued.]

who appeared to be the leaders. Every now and then these men called for a cheer for Mr. Gandhi whereupon the crowd shouted "*Gandhi Mahatma li jai*" and were obviously excited by their own cries. I am of opinion that the *Satyagrahis* honestly desired to avoid violence though their encouragement of these cries was distinctly dangerous. The crowd fluctuated in size, sometimes increasing and pressing forward, sometimes thinning away. There were two or three thousands of them when the numbers were greatest. The District Superintendent of Police asked me whether the prisoners should not be released as the sight of them was rendering the mob dangerous. I agreed with him that it was neither prudent nor necessary to retain them as the force was not a large one and was completely surrounded. Accordingly their names were taken and they were allowed to depart. One of the *Satyagrahis* undertook to produce them when called upon. This man who was subsequently tried and acquitted by the tribunal acted as if he were the leader of the mob, voicing their demands for the release of the prisoners and the withdrawal of the police. As he appeared to have authority with the crowd he was requested to use his influence and induce them to allow the removal of the dying man to the civil hospital. He did so successfully and the constable was carried off upon a *charpoy* but expired before he arrived.

The demeanour of the crowd was hostile but on the whole they did not behave badly for the hour and a half during which we were awaiting the military. A few stones were thrown without aim or effect. There was a large number of boys and youngsters present. The bulk of the mob appeared to be mill-hands. At 6-30 or 6-45 P.M. Colonel Frazer arrived with a force of about 100 men who spread out across the road and cleared it as they advanced. A guard of 30 men was left at the Prem gate by the Beehive mill and another body at the Kalapur gate about 500 yards further south. The rest of the men were left at the station. The crowd dispersed before them without any show of resistance. I remained at the station until about 9-45 or 10 P.M. and on driving back to the Shahi Bagh found all the streets and in the neighbourhood deserted. Apparently all excitement had subsided.

In other parts of the town, and especially in the Richey Road, there were large crowds on the afternoon of the 10th crying for Gandhi. Some stones were thrown at the police, some shops were forcibly closed and people forced to alight from their carriages. The Victor Cinema sustained some damage, apparently because it had not observed *hartal* on April 6th. But there was no trouble with which the police were unable to deal, excepting the riot at the Beehive mill. A big meeting was held in the river-bed on the evening of the 10th at which the *Satyagrahi* leaders addressed the crowd, to what effect is not precisely known as the proceedings seem to have been confused and noisy. The District Superintendent of Police came to my bungalow at 11 P.M. and told me his dispositions for the night of which I approved.* The largest body of armed police was stationed at the Khas Bazar *Chowky* protecting the approach to the Bhadar. This consisted of 16 armed police. It was increased to 20 men at 9-15 A.M. on the following morning just before the riots broke out. Besides this force there was a guard of ten men at the lockup and 4 at the Bank of Bombay inside the Bhadar.

(5) *The riot of April 11th.*—Early on the morning of April 11th, a rumour reached Ahmedabad that Miss Anasuya had been arrested. This was absolutely without foundation but caused almost as much excitement as the reported arrest of Mr. Gandhi had done previously. I had agreed with Colonel Frazer on the morning of the 11th as regards the state of affairs in the city. At 8 A.M. therefore I took the District Superintendent of Police with me and motored down to the Beehive mill where a small crowd was gathered round the military guard. While I was talking with the native officer in command

* Vide para. 36 of statement of the Bombay Government.

a car drove up containing Messrs. Vallubhai Patel, Indulal Yajnik and Dr. Kanuga, the well-known *Satyagrahis*. I requested them to induce the people to disperse. They did so and disappeared with them on foot through the Prem gate. We proceeded to Kalapur and the station where all was quiet, inspected Fonseca's shop which had been damaged on the previous day and struck up the Richey Road through the Panch Kuwa gate. In the centre of the city we struck large crowds and were much hooted and booed at. Near the Pankor Naka we became surrounded by a large and hostile crowd, while stopping to speak with Inspector Acton. A *Satyagrahi* jumped on the step of the car and addressed the crowd with up-lifted arm. I pushed him down and asked him what he meant by his action, whereupon he retorted that he was protecting us from the people. His "protection" however did not save us from a smart stoning as soon as the car moved forward again. Both the District Superintendent of Police and I were hit. We paused at the Khas Bazar *Chowky* for news and learnt that the crowd was getting intractable. As we proceeded on our course an excited mob armed with *lathis* came tearing up 'Lee way' to the left and nearly cut us off. This same mob had immediately before damaged the motor car belonging to Miss Anasuya herself. Mr. Krishnalal Desai the well-known *Satyagrahi* was driving about in it and attempting to reassure the mob that the news of her arrest was false and that he had just received a telegram from her contradicting it! After seeing this mob I saw that not a moment was to be lost in calling for military assistance and drove straight to the Camp which we reached at 9-20 A.M. Colonel Frazer was not to be found but at 9-30 A.M. I found Colonel Preston Commanding 1-97th Infantry who ordered 300 men to march as soon as they could be got ready. They marched at 10-10 A.M.

Meanwhile the mob in the city had proceeded to commit acts of violence and arson. One large body collected inside the Bhadar enclosure where an immense *Mandap* had been erected for matriculation examination. This they burnt. They then proceeded to burn the entire row of buildings known as the Collector's office, the record rooms, the Sub-Registrar's office, the City Magistrate's office and the City Survey office over the gate of the sub-jail. The armed guard at the Bank of Bombay opened fire on them with buckshot and saved the Bank buildings. The guard fired on them from the windows of the sub-jail and drove them off though the main entrance of the building was burnt down. Only one prisoner escaped in the confusion: the rest made no attempt to do so. The crowd also burnt the *Mamlattar's Kacheri* and the telegraph office and threatened the district courts, from which they were induced to retire by the expostulation of the Pleaders (so it is reported). The District Judge and Additional Sessions Judge were in court at the time and had a fortunate escape.

Another mob attacked the power station half a mile away and severely beat Mr. Brown who was there in charge. They did no harm to the machinery however and contented themselves with breaking windows and throwing stones into the power-house. The family of Mr. Brown were saved by the fidelity of his servants who put the mob on a false scent.

An ammunition cart which was proceeding from Headquarter Lines to the Khas Bazar *Chowky* with ammunition for the 20 armed police there stationed was attacked by a mob inside the Delhi gate, but driven off by the escort who opened fire on them with buckshot. The same mob surrounded the Delhi gate *Chowky* in which Lieutenant Macdonald of the Army Clothing Department had taken refuge. He held the narrow stair with cudgel for more than an hour and escaped with a cut on the hand from a broken bottle. Some of unarmed police in the *Chowky* took off their uniforms at the command of the mob and were allowed to descend and escape.

Riotous mobs roamed up and down the Mirzapur Road, Ghi Kantha and the streets connecting them. The unarmed police throughout the whole city was swept away, their uniforms torn from their backs and burnt, the men beaten, insulted and cowed. The mob broke all the

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electric lights as they went. The Delhi gate was set fire to and the building above it gutted. The Lal Darwaza Chowky was burnt at this time. The civil hospital was threatened but spared, possibly because 12 of the rioters of the preceding day were lying there. The conduct of the medical students was of a mixed character. They sympathised with the rioters and later in the day cheered when the dead body of Sergeant Frazer was brought in. But they appear to have been loyal to the Civil Surgeon and to have helped in preserving the hospital from attack. Some of them proceeded to his house to the Bhadar and helped to protect Mrs. Tuke who was in considerable danger there and probably owed her safety to the fact that she showed herself in the verandah with a revolver in hand.

The exact time at which all these events happened is not easy to ascertain. But by 11 A.M. when the troops were approaching the Bhadar the Government buildings were completely gutted I returned to my bungalow at about 10 A.M. for any messages which might have come through on the telephone, and heard from Sheth Mangaldas of the burning of the *mandap* and Government offices; and the danger to the Judges and the District courts. I heard also from Mr. Laverenault a student of the Gujarat College, of the plight of Lieutenant Macdonald. I then returned to the Camp Lines with the District Superintendent of Police who had received corroborative messages and asked Colonel Preston to send reinforcements after the 300 men who were then en route for the city. From the Lines the smoke of the burning offices was visible above the city. He arranged to send down another 200 men under Major Kirkwood. I then took Colonel Preston and the District Superintendent of Police in my motor car and caught up the first body of troops just inside the Delhi gate.

At my request Colonel Preston left 30 men to guard this gate and divided the rest into two bodies, the larger to march down the Mirzapur Road, the smaller (about 100 men) down the Ghi Kantha. The two were to effect a junction at the Pankor Naka which is the centre of the city. Colonel Preston, the District Superintendent of Police and I accompanied the larger body which approached the burning offices by way of the Mirzapur Road. On the way Professor Charlier who had been hiding in the High School joined us. As we approached the Lal Darwaza, we saw the North Daskroi *Kacheri* in full blaze, the roof having already fallen in. The mob in the Bhadar had already taken alarm and the pouring out, some by the Lal Darwaza, some by way of the blazing telegraph office, some by the main Bhadar entrance. Many were carrying blazing rafters which they threw down on seeing the troops. Colonel Preston asked me for orders about firing and I requested him to fire on any crowd engaged in incendiarism or which made an attack upon the troops. As regards the latter he said he had his general military orders. The crowd ran as the troop advanced leaving the Bhadar and the large space before it clear. The troops cleared the road to the Pankor Naka where a guard was drawn up across the road. With the rest we returned to the Khas Bazar and marched round by the Oliphant Road in which many Government buildings are situated to the municipal office where another guard was stationed. We then marched north, set free the municipal fire brigade which had been prevented by violence from extinguishing the flames of the burning building, and returning to the Pankor Naka affected our junction with the body which had marched down the Ghi Kantha. Colonel Preston, the District Superintendent of Police and I then visited the Bhadar and assured ourselves of the safety of Mrs. Tuke. The municipal engine was set to work on portion of the telegraph office—the only building of which anything was left worth saving. As we emerged from the main gate of the Bhadar, we heard first a shot or two and then a crackle of firing from the direction of the Pankor Naka. The guard of 30 men stationed there under Lieutenant Larkin was attacked by a party of 50 men armed with swords. He first ordered three men to fire on them: then when the swordsmen charged,

his whole force fired. Lieutenant Larkin was slightly wounded on the arm with a sword. This was first firing by the troops and occurred at about 11-30 A.M.—half an hour after their arrival at the Bhadar. As Colonel Preston and I returned to the Pankor Naka the reinforcement of 200 men arrived under Major Kirkwood via the Ghi Kantha. The road was then cleared up to the foot of the rise where the Richey Road begins. The crowd treated before the troops booing and shouting and throwing stones ineffectively. Several tiles were thrown from the roofs and stones from the windows though I did not see the throwers. As we passed the entrance of the *Jama Masjid* a group of Muhammadans upon the steps declaimed excitedly against us, saying that the Friday prayers were being held in the mosque and that bullets were falling amongst the worshippers (this was impossible as the mosque is completely surrounded by buildings). The objectors were persuaded by the Police Sub-Inspectors to retire into the mosque. The main crowd was driven up the mouth of the Richey Road and held there. I accompanied a smaller body which marched down the Manekchowk and round the mosque, but there were few people there. The mosque was reported to be full at the time and a rumour was mentioned by the police that an attack would be made from it at 1 P.M.

The situation at noon was this: The following posts were strongly held by the military—the Prem, Delhi, and Kalupur gates, the mouth of the Richey Road by the *Jama Masjid* the Astodia Road at the municipal office. The Mirzapur Road and Ghi Kantha Road were freed of the mob. Roughly speaking the whole of the city north-west of a line drawn from Ellis bridge to the municipal office and from the latter to the Delhi gate was denied to the main body of rioters and the Delhi, Prem and Kalupur gates closed to them. The military force in and near the city consisted of 600 men counting the guard at the station. There was a force of 51 armed police at various posts. The unarmed police had been swept from the street.

Shortly after noon it was rumoured that a strong body of rioters had broken out northwards in order to attack the Shahi Bagh and Commissioner's offices. As the Darapur and Shahpur gates were not guarded and much, besides the Shahi Bagh lay open to an attack by the rioters (e.g., the distillery and liquor warehouse, the municipal water works the police head-quarter lines with reserve arms and ammunition, the bridge across the Sabarmati the pumping engine and pipe line upon which the main railway station and Kankaria goods station depend for their water-supply). Colonel Preston marched straight for the Shahi Bagh via the Ghi Kantha and the Delhi gate with a force of 80 men. As the District Superintendent of Police and I were motoring after them up the Ghi Kantha a pole with a sickle tied on to the end was tossed at us from a side alley but missed us. On arriving at the Shahi Bagh which had not been attacked, Colonel Preston placed guards over the Commissioner's residence and office and I proceeded to camp with maps in order to assist Colonel Frazer.

Meantime the mob continued to face the military forces at the mouth of the Richey Road and elsewhere and to commit various outrages in the east and south of the town. At noon the mob raided the Swami Narayan's temple for arms and carried away 10 guns and 15 swords. About 1 hour later they raided Gosaiji temple and secured a sword and 3 poniards. At 2 P.M. they dragged Sergeant Frazer out of his hiding place in a bicycle shop in the Richey Road and barbarously murdered him. This shop was only 200 yards from the military cordon and the crowd was infuriated at their losses from the firing of the latter. Later in the afternoon mobs attacked the houses of Khan Bahadur Hussain Khan Dhane Khan, an Honorary Magistrate, and of Rao Bahadur Bulakhidas, Personal Assistant to the Collector. Both these gentlemen escaped safely with their families, but their houses were completely looted and everything destroyed which could be destroyed without the use of fire—against which the neighbours not unnaturally protested. Every police *chowky* was burnt and so also were the gates of the

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city. Three liquor shops were broken open and the contents drunk or allowed to flow into the gutters. One was completely burnt. Of the attitude of the mob in the face of the troops the Cantonment Magistrate, Mr. Fitzpatrick, gives the following account. He was in command of the troops in Richey Road throughout the afternoon. The crowd kept about 20 paces away and was very dangerous, throwing and slinging stones at them with the utmost boldness. Both he and Major Kirkwood were hit. The leader in that locality was a *Sanyasi* and more than one *Sanyasi* was engaged in inciting the people to violence. A Subedar-Major in the Manekchowk reported that one of them was raising the cry "we want white meat." There were in the crowd many black-coated men and men with white *Pagries* whom Lieutenant Fitzpatrick understood to be *Satyagrahis*. He frequently saw trays of sweetmeats being carried out of a street or alley opening into the Richey Road (apparently the Ratan Pole by men in clean white clothes wearing gold *pagries*; these sweetmeats were distributed amongst the mob. Later in the afternoon he was ordered to take a body of men and march down to the Panch Kuwa gate, in order to clear the whole of the Richey Road. He did so and found a mob engaged in burning the gate, many of them drunk. They indulged in abuse and indecent gesture and also stoned the troops; whereupon he opened fire upon them and dispersed them. The Richey Road was cleared by 6-30 or 7 P.M. Similarly Major Kirkwood marched down the Oliphant Road and fired on a mob which was burning the Astodia gate. There were dangerous mobs in the neighbourhood of the Delhi gate both inside and outside the walls. Lieutenant Morris was obliged to fire on a crowd which issued from the temple known as Hathisingh's Wadi whence constant efforts were also made by small parties to cut the telephone wires.

At about 4-30 P.M. I went with Colonel Frazer on a tour of observation through the city. We motored straight to the Khas Bazar and from thence proceeded on foot with 30 men to the picket stationed at the municipal Office and blocking the Oliphant Road. A large and hostile crowd stood about 150 yards down the road towards Astodia and the lanes to the south of the Oliphant Road were full of men. We marched down towards the main crowd which retired before us or took the side streets and when we reached the place where they had been standing a crowd had formed up behind us at the municipal office. We therefore returned. The crowds booed and shouted but were not otherwise offensive and kept a respectful distance. The impression left on me was that the mob had no intention of coming to close quarters but was not in the least frightened. We then returned to the Delhi gate. The maze of streets in that neighbourhood was full of dangerous-looking set of men. We learnt from Major Cochrane who was then in command that they were continually giving trouble and that the neighbourhood of Hathisingh's Wadi outside the gate was also occupied by a dangerous mob which had several times attempted to cut the telephone. From the noise it appeared to us that the temple was full of excited men.

It was now dusk and I returned to Camp with Colonel Frazer. Colonel Frazer informed me that he could do no more than he had done already with the 2,000 half-trained recruits at his disposal and that the dispositions already made must remain unaltered until he received the reinforcements for which he was applying. I asked him whether he could spare some men to guard the Gujarat College and neighbourhood and it was finally agreed that Colonel Preston should accompany me to the police headquarter lines and telephone thence to Major Kirkwood to send 20 men there. On the way I stopped at my bungalow and found some armed and unarmed excise sepoys—about 15 in all—who had been sent by the Assistant Collector of Salt and Excise and put at my disposal. I sent them off via the Sabarmati bridge to march down the right bank of the river and guard the College. This they did the same night. We then went to the police headquarters and telephoned to Major Kirkwood.

In the course of the evening up till 11 P.M. fugitive Europeans and Eurasians continued to arrive at the Shahi

Bagh, some from the mill area, some from the Ellis bridge suburb, some from Sabarmati. They were put up in the Commissioner's and Collector's bungalows. But at 2 A.M. I received a note from the Staff Captain saying that a mob was coming up the river-bed to attack the Shahi Bagh quarter. I packed off the refugees in my bungalow to that of the Commissioner where there was a guard. Most of the Europeans from the mill quarter had taken refuge at the railway station which was a convenient centre for them and where they were under a strong guard. It must be remembered that the greater part of the city and almost the whole of the suburbs to the south and south-east of it were entirely in the hands of the rioters, who continued throughout the night to burn minor Government and municipal buildings.

Between 2 and 3 A.M. Colonel Frazer came over to my bungalow and told me that he intended issuing orders to the troops in the city next day to fire at sight on any group of ten and after dark to fire on anybody who did not answer and come up when challenged. He agreed not to bring this order into force until 4 P.M., to enable me to get notices printed and the population warned. I proceeded at about 3-30 A.M. to the bungalow of Mr. Smith, the Assistant Commissioner, and arranged with him to get a number of copies cyclostyled. These copies were ready by about 9 A.M. next morning and I took them down with me in my car and gave them to the military patrols to scatter broadcast or stick them up in conspicuous places. At Kalupur Chowky I gave a number of copies to the Police Sub-Inspector for distribution to the passers-by. For on the station road there was still a certain number of people passing to and fro. In the city the military cordon stopped all communication between one part of the town and another.

The night of April 11th was one of frequent alarms and rumours. Incendiarism and violence was still continuing to some slight extent in those portions of the city where the troops had not yet been seen, e.g., in the Jamalpur and Shahpur quarter. On the morning of the 12th things were more or less quiet though a few shots were fired from time to time in the city. The arrival of reinforcements was anxiously expected. Out of 2,000 half-trained recruits all but a couple of hundred were engaged in the city or in guarding various posts outside it. As Colonel Frazer pointed out to me this state of affairs could not continue long as even fully-trained troops required relief and these were not fully-trained troops. The force left in Camp was dangerously small and a report on the morning of the 12th that a mob intended to attack the cantonments from Naroda while all the troops were in the city caused some uneasiness. So far as the city was concerned the military held the main roads from Ellis bridge to the station from Delhi gate to the municipal office by the Ghi Kantha and by the Mirzapur Road. Little or nothing was known about what was happening in two-thirds of Ahmedabad, in the crowded streets and 'Pols' to the east and south. The power station was closed. The city and railway stations were unlit. The municipal water-works was continuing to supply water but the drainage pumping engine at Jamalpur had ceased to work and the municipal conservancy staff had disappeared. The state of the city threatened to become perilous in the absence of all conservancy and while all sewers were checked with sewage. During the 11th, 12th and 13th not a single citizen of Ahmedabad, title-holder, municipal councillor or mill-owner approached any civil or military authority with any offer of help, except Mr. Ambalal Sarabhai, President of the Millowners' Association, who arrived from Bombay on the afternoon of the 12th. The unarmed police had been entirely swept from the streets. All Indian officials other than police officers were in hiding or at least failed to put in any appearance. But I must add that the military cordon was drawn so tight that there was considerable difficulty in moving about: and there was doubtless a double danger in doing so, from the rioters and from the military themselves. The European suburban population were for the most part fugitives and living either at the Shahi Bagh or at the railway station. The telegraph wires

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to the south of Ahmedabad were cut near Barejdi and elsewhere on the night of the 11th and a troop train conveying British troops from Bombay was derailed in the Kaira district on the morning of April 12th, which prolonged the period of danger and anxiety for many hours. I sent wires to Government giving an account of the occurrences of the 10th and 11th. They were sent circuitously *via* Ajmere and I am unaware whether they were ever received.

(6) *Occurrences at Ahmedabad on April 12th.*—The Commissioner, Northern Division, and the Inspector General of Police arrived at about 1-30 p.m. on the 12th, simultaneously with a force of 300 British troops—the same force whose special train had been derailed near Nadiad. These were marched to the Bhadar where they occupied a portion of the court buildings. They took over the defence of the Bhadar area and the patrolling of the Richey Road. The riots were by this time nearly over and though the troops continued to meet with opposition in certain localities it was no longer so dangerous. The British troops fired 32 rounds only with their rifles and an equal number on Sunday from a Lewis gun. But the news of their arrival and the proclamation of the Officer Commanding that groups of 10 would be fired upon spread terror through the population and brought the disturbances to a speedy close inside the city itself.

The Commissioner, Northern Division, and the Inspector-General of Police on arrival drove up to the District Magistrate's bungalow in order to obtain information as to the events of the past two days. While they were hearing the account a message was received from the railway station by telephone concerning a riot which had broken out in Viramgam, the murder of the *Awal Karkun* and the burning of the station and Municipal buildings. Mr. Ambalal Sarabhai, President of the Mill-owners' Association, arrived at the District Magistrate's bungalow from Bombay at this instant and offered his services in the restoration of order. These could not be utilized at the moment: but on the following day his assistance was of great value in producing motor cars and drivers for the use of the military. Mr. Ambalal was the only leading citizen of Ahmedabad who bestirred himself to help the authorities and in my opinion he deserves great credit for doing so. On receiving the news about Viramgam, the Commissioner, the Inspector-General and the District Magistrate proceeded to Camp and arranged with Colonel Frazer for the despatch of 200 men by a special to quell the riots. They then motored to the station and arranged for the Special. After this they went on a round of inspection and exploration along the main roads—i.e., Richey Road, Oliphant Road, Astodia gate and the road to Kankaria tank. They proceeded under escort, and were followed by a body of troops under Lieutenant Mullany. Nothing was seen of any mob outside of the walls but the family of Mr. Ardesir Wadia seized the opportunity afforded them by the arrival of troops to vacate the Kankaria bungalow and return with them to the city. They stated that a mob of several hundred men had threatened them and demanded firearms that very morning. The escort was met with hostile demonstrations from side streets near the Astodia gate. The Commissioner, Inspector-General of Police and the District Magistrate returned to Camp and arranged with the Officer Commanding for obtaining reinforcement from Mhow.

To continue and conclude the narrative of events at Ahmedabad I may add the following facts. The last firing in the city was on Sunday morning. On the same morning Mr. Gandhi and Miss Anasuya arrived from Bombay and drove up to the Shahi Bagh where they interviewed the Commissioner, Inspector-General of Police and District Magistrate. Mr. Gandhi offered his services in the restoration of order and confidence. He then proceeded by motor to the *Ashram* which lies across the river and sent out notices by his agents for a meeting at the *Ashram* to be held on the following evening (it was subsequently postponed to April 14th on account of the difficulty caused by the military proclamation which forbade any gathering of 10 men). On Sunday afternoon,

the Commissioner and Collector toured through a large part of the city which lay beyond the military patrols. First they were accompanied by an escort; but it was soon found that the population was thoroughly cowed and that the escort prevented them from getting into touch with the people; so it was left behind. This tour was continued on Sunday morning. It was announced that 'Martial Law' (the popular name given to Colonel Frazer's proclamation) was at an end. With the assistance of Rao Bahadur Ramanbhai a number of hand-bills were printed to the same effect and distributed amongst the people. In the course of Monday and Tuesday people were induced to open their shops and began to work again. The last act of open violence by the mob was committed at Sarkhej on the night on Sunday the 13th when they rushed and burnt the police post, striped and beat the police. This news reached the authorities at Ahmedabad on Monday morning.

(7) *Events at Viramgam.*—I have already described the town of Viramgam as a sort of industrial suburb of Ahmedabad with two mills and about 200 mill-hands. The city itself is walled up and the railway station lies about $\frac{1}{2}$ of a mile from the Bharwadi gate. The mills lie on the further side of the railway line. On April 6th there was a *hartal* in Viramgam as elsewhere and a procession of about 1,000 persons headed by the local pleaders marched through the town from the Bharwadi gate to the Munsar Tank. On its return it made a diversion past the *Kacheri* and cheered Gandhi, Tilak and Jinnah. On April 9th there was a meeting of 3,000 or 4,000 men in Kashi Vishvanatha's *Dharamsala* to protest against the Rowlett Act. On the 11th (the day of the chief riot in Ahmedabad) there was again a *hartal* and the mills were closed. On the morning of the 11th there were ominous crowds in the neighbourhood of the station. A meeting was held in the evening at which the local pleaders urged all to imitate what was done in Ahmedabad. As in Ahmedabad there was an organization of volunteers. On the morning of the 12th, it was known that there were very serious riots in Ahmedabad. At 11 a.m. the station was again threatened by crowds and the railway Sub-Inspector wired to his Superintendent asking for a guard of 25 armed men to protect the station and the Europeans there. The *Mamladar* was absent at Sitapur 23 miles away. The *Awal Karkun* had written to him on the 10th and 11th mentioning what was going on in the way of meetings but not expressing any apprehension of a violent outbreak. But at noon of April 12th, he wrote a letter urging the *Mamladar* to return as the news from Ahmedabad was exceedingly serious and that Viramgam was likely to imitate Ahmedabad. He wrote "Crowds of mill-hands move for the whole day with sticks: and it is likely that they may perhaps get excited on hearing the news of Ahmedabad. Therefore you will kindly return here immediately because there is danger every moment. Letters and Government work are at present at a standstill. Merely to preserve peace is a great task."—This extract from a letter written before the event renders more eloquently than any subsequent description can the atmosphere of Viramgam on the morning of the 12th. The same letter mentions the ominous looting of the shops outside the Golwadi gate where sticks were sold. It is quite clear that the main inspiration of the riot which followed was the example of Ahmedabad to which all classes at Viramgam are accustomed to look for guidance.

The riot broke out at the railway station where, as already stated, threatening crowds had assembled from time to time throughout the morning. The District Traffic Inspector Mr. MacIlvride was in the station and the crowd had seen him there. When the Sub-Inspector wired for a guard Mr. MacIlvride was persuaded to retire to the upper storey "rest-room" and keep out of public view. At about noon a large mob attacked the station and forced its way up the stairs demanding that he should repeat the formula '*Gandhi Maharaj ki jai*'. The evidence differs as to whether he complied or not. The crowd momentarily retreated, but shortly returned by both stair-cases and beat him severely with sticks led by one

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Malik Kutab, a Muhammadan. This man who has been since sentenced to penal servitude for life was wearing some sort of helmet resembling a fireman's. Mr. MacIlvride was stunned by the blows which he received: but some of the railway porters, who deserved great credit for their action, threw porters' clothes upon him and managed to smuggle him out and put him on an engine which carried him to Kharaghoda. In the meanwhile the rioters set fire to the station-buildings and completely gutted them. They made use of kerosine which they found on the premises. Before the buildings were burnt many busied themselves in the needless task of destroying the telegraph apparatus which they contained. At 1 p.m. the crowd finished with the station and started for the town still under the leadership of Malik Kutab. The latter climbed a telegraph post and destroyed the wires between the station and the town. Before I proceed to the doings of the mob in the town itself I may mention certain acts of violence which were committed in the station neighbourhood at later hours in the day. At about 3 p.m. some of the rioters returned, seized tools from the loco-shed and destroyed a portion of the line in the direction of Kharaghoda by removing the rails and burning the sleepers. Again at 4 to 5 p.m. rioters looted the goods wagons in the sidings and set fire to the grass bales in other wagons. They also burnt the signal cabin on the Kharaghoda line and destroyed the signals.

The rioters meanwhile marched from the station to the *Kacheri* at about 1 p.m. *En route* they compelled the closure of the civil court and passed on to the Bharwadi gate. (It is to be noted that neither in Ahmedabad nor in Viramgam was any damage done to the civil courts: the only explanation to my mind is that the influence of the pleaders, whose interests would be injured by their destruction was successfully exerted for their preservation.) The Bharwadi gate was fired by the mob, the police *Chowki* damaged, the toll office wrecked and the books destroyed. The mob then plundered and burnt the post office. Between 1 and 2 p.m. they reached the *Mamladar's Kacheri*. As previously stated the *Mamladar* was encamped at Sitapur 23 miles away and the *Awal Karkun* Mr. Madhavlal was in charge, with an armed guard of 9 constables and 2 *havildars*. The main gates were closed. The Sub-Inspector's Office and the main gateway were set fire to by the mob. The *Awal Karkun* then ordered the guard to fire upon them and they did so. It appears that the *Awal Karkun* then lost heart and escaped from the premises over a back wall followed by all his *karkuns* and peons. The police guard took up positions in the verandah of the *Kacheri* and continued to defend it, firing when necessary, until 7-30 p.m. The rioters attempted to overcome the defence by setting fire to various buildings adjoining *Kacheri*, such as the *Mamladar's* office, some rooms of Sukleshwar Mahadev, the Sukleshwar Mahadev, the police lines and a Ghanchi's house. They had seized or obtained three guns from license-holders and fired uneffectively on the guard from a building opposite the *Kacheri*. They are stated to have finally overcome the defence by placing 2 tanks of kerosine east and west of the *Kacheri* at dusk and setting these on fire. The police then broke and made their escape in different directions. The mob then fled into the treasury and looted it until at about 8 p.m. Mr. Caldecott arrived with an armed guard from Kharaghoda as will presently be narrated. This defence of the *Kacheri* by the armed guard was not discreditable to the men who were left to their own devices: but by no means creditable to the Sub-Inspector who was in charge but not present, and whose explanations for his failure to be present were quite unconvincing. He has since been degraded.

The *Awal Karkun* Mr. Madhavlal after escaping from the *Kacheri* hid first in a neighbouring godown, then in the house of one Bhailal. The mob searched diligently for him until they discovered and seized him at about 3 p.m. In the course of this search they looted his house, took out and burnt his belongings and attempted to seize his wife who fortunately made her escape. Madhavlal himself was dragged to an open space, his clothes were soaked

in kerosine; and he was actually burnt alive with terrible torments in the open street.

While these scenes of violence were being enacted at Viramgam the engine upon which Mr. MacIlvride had left the station arrived at Kharaghoda. The Assistant Collector, Salt Revenue, Mr. Caldecott, on hearing the news, acted with great spirit and promptitude. He gathered a party of 56 rank and file of the sepoys under his command, put them into 3 waggons, had the mail which had left at 4-50 p.m. held up at an intermediate station and ran his party to within $\frac{1}{2}$ miles of Viramgam. Near the village of Bhojwa he discovered a mob engaged in looting the station yard, whom he dispersed by firing a volley in the air. On arriving at the station, he learned of the attack on the *Kacheri* whither he next proceeded, accompanied by Mr. MacIlvride in spite of his wounds. At about 8 p.m. he and his party reached the *Kacheri* and found the remains of the mob still engaged in looting. Some ran out of the treasury. He warned them that if any more attempted to escape he would fire: and fired when they disregarded his warning. He found two wounded men in the compound, several Government rifles lying about and a bag of rupees on the road outside the compound. A sum of Rs. 4,663 was still in the treasury but an amount of Rs. 58,499 was missing. (Notes to the value of Rs. 13,865 were afterwards discovered in a box in one of the burnt houses.) At the corner of the *Mahajan's Chabutra* opposite the *Kacheri* he found screens of corrugated iron erected as a barricade: evidently with the object of obtaining some protection from the fire of the police guard. They bore no shot marks. The 29 under trial prisoners who had been confined in the sub-jail had been released by the police for fear of fire and had made their escape during the assault on the *Kacheri*. Amongst the persons whom Mr. Caldecott found in the treasury were a police *Havildar* and 2 constables in uniform. He returned from the *Kacheri* to the railway station where he learnt that Major Cochran and Lieutenant Eales had arrived with 100 men from Ahmedabad in the special train of which I have made mention above. The military force had already proceeded into the town. Major Cochran placed guards where necessary in the city and made his headquarters one of the sheds at the railway station. Next day, on the 13th, Mr. Caldecott had up some of the leading men of the town and urged them to get people to open their shops. Major Cochran let it be known that unless they did so he would issue an order similar to that issued by Colonel Frazer in Ahmedabad regarding groups of 10. The threat had the desired effect. Shops were opened, mills began to work and the ordinary life of the town was restored to this usual condition. On the morning of the 14th, the Assistant Collector (who was in a remote village on famine duty and only heard on the evening of the 13th of the events at Ahmedabad and Viramgam) arrived and found the town quiet and business going on as usual. No other disturbances occurred subsequently. The only subsequent malefactions which probably were connected with the riots were the placing of obstacles on the line to Ahmedabad on the 14th and 18th. No harm was done by them.

(8) *Loss of life, casualties and damage due to the riots.*

At Ahmedabad the only fatal casualties on the side of law and order were the armed constable killed opposite the Beehive flour mill on April 10th and Sergeant Frazer who was murdered in the Richey Road on April 11th. At Viramgam, the only fatal casualty was the murdered *Awal Karkun* Mr. Madhavlal.

At Ahmedabad the police fired 41 rounds of buckshot on April 10th and on April 11th 73 rounds of buckshot and 6 of ball. The troops fired 609 rounds of ball, on the 11th, 12th and 13th. Thus the total number of rounds fired was 729. The known casualties are very low for such expenditure of ammunition at close quarters and the list is probably incomplete especially as the cases are mostly buckshot wounds and were brought to hospital either on the 10th or early on the 11th. The total number of casualties treated by practitioners was 151 of which 120 were buckshot and only 21 bullet wounds. Twenty-

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eight cases were fatal. Only 1 woman and four children were hit. It is probable that after the troops occupied the city and the matters came to something like a downright battle the rioters were afraid to bring their wounded for treatment. As to the dead it was reported that many were burnt in the streets; others no doubt were taken out of the city to the south and burnt there.

In Viramgam the number of rounds fired by the armed guard was roughly speaking 150 including buck and black shots, by Mr. Caldecott's party. 36. The military did not fire. The number of casualties was 24 of which 6 were fatal.

The list* of claims for compensation is appended and shows the amount of damage to property both in Ahmedabad and in Viramgam. The figures may be summarized as follows:—

	Ahmedabad.		Viramgam.		TOTAL.	
	Rs.	A. P.	Rs.	A. P.	Rs.	A. P.
Imperial Government	89,872	8 0	6,741	9 0	96,614	1 0
Provincial "	5,03,820	12 0	59,708	3 1	5,63,528	15 1
Municipal "	1,35,031	13 4	24,420	0 0	1,59,451	13 4
Private "	2,26,046	4 9	1,23,861	10 0	3,51,907	14 9
TOTAL	9,54,771	6 1	2,16,729	6 1	11,71,500	12 2

(9) *Attitude of the rest of the district.*—Outside Ahmedabad and Viramgam, there was very little active sympathy shown for the rioters. On the night of the 11th a mob at Barejdi, where there are mills, turned out with the intention of cutting the line in order to wreck the troop train (which was actually derailed in the Kaira district). In Dholka where there is a fairly large and rather ill-conditioned Muhammadan population and where some of the most influential men are of bad reputation, there was some danger of a riot. The tact and firmness of the *Mamladar* in the first instance and subsequently the presence of the Assistant Collector tided over the dangers of the situation and there never was any act of open violence though much excitement. It was considered necessary to post a body of troops here from April 14th, to July 10th. Elsewhere in the district there was not much risk of danger. The out-of-the-way place had no interest in or comprehension of the agitation which caused the riots. The larger town which sympathized with the agitation possessed no large body of men as inflammable as the mill-hand population of Ahmedabad and Viramgam.

(10) *Demeanour of the citizens of Ahmedabad and Viramgam.*—I have already described how the *Satyagrahi* leaders fanned the excitement over the Rowlatt Bill until the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest caused an outbreak amongst the mill-hands and the rabble of the city. From all that I saw of these leaders during the riots they honestly attempted to induce the mob to abstain from violence; but they appeared to have no power of controlling them when their passions were aroused. The actual leaders like Messrs. V. J. Patel, Indulal Jainik, Dr. Kanuga, Jivanlal Desai, retired to their houses and shut themselves in as soon as the riot became serious on April 11th. In this course they were imitated by all the rich and influential citizens, including all the members of the municipality from the President downwards. The magistracy and the higher municipal officers were no better. Every man took thought for his own safety. None came forward to offer his services in restoring order, even when the troops occupied their quarter and it would have been safe to do so. All the upper storey windows and balconies of houses were crowded with curious spectators while the riots were in full career. The rioters received everywhere help in the shape of money, food and clothing. No doubt many rendered them this assistance from fear but the manner in which it was rendered in too many instances indicates sympathy as the true motive. The distribution of tray-loads of sweetmeats amongst the rioters on the Richey Road on April 11th, (vouched for by Mr. Fitz-

Not reproduced.

patrick) is a good instance of this. The persons who distributed them were men dressed in clean white garments and wearing gold *pagris*—that is to say persons of some respectability. Further my own observation and that of other witnesses convinces me that young men of the student class were a very considerable and dangerous element of the rioters. Lieutenant Macdonald when hiding in the Delhi gate *Chowky* on the morning of the 11th saw, so he informed me, respectable youths of this description gathering the lower elements together and pointing out to them his hiding place. They also did much to aid the rioters in the way of carrying bicycle messages from one point to another. My general impression of the situation is that amongst the educated classes to which such lads belong there was a great deal of active malevolence against Government, which older men were too cautious to shew, but which was shewn openly by the younger. The mass of the respectable people of the town wavered between sympathy with them and fear of the consequences. This view is borne out by the fact that since the riots nobody respectable has given any information which could incriminate any individual rioter though many admit that the acts of violence took place under their eyes. The pleader class which had been haranguing crowds for the past two months was by no means without influence with the mob: as is shewn by the ease with which they saved both at Ahmedabad and Viramgam the courts upon which their livelihood depends. But this influence was otherwise unused by them. Neither during the riots nor afterwards when the restoration of public confidence was the need of the moment did a single pleader offer his services throughout the district. Mr. Ambalal Sarabhai has already been mentioned by me as the solitary exception to this indifference shewn by the influential classes. I should like also to mention Mr. Dara Aspandiarji Laher, a student of the Gujarat College, who showed both loyalty and physical and moral courage. He was active in saving Mr. Macdonald at the Delhi *Chowky* and not only apprized me by the telephone but bicycled up to Camp in order to do so. This action at a time when the rioters had the whole city practically in their hands showed not only physical courage but still more remarkable moral courage in a mere youth at College.

(11) *After the riots.*—As already narrated it was proclaimed on Monday morning April 14th that 'Martial Law' was over. (As a matter of fact it had never been proclaimed. But the measures announced and taken by the military had received this title amongst the people of Ahmedabad.) With the aid of Mr. Ambalal the mills were got working on Tuesday. The shops began to open on Monday after the Commissioner's proclamation and were all open on Tuesday. The police took over from the military the responsibility for preserving order on Monday the 14th; but large bodies of troops were kept in reserve as a precaution and only withdrawn cautiously and gradually. During the week which followed men's nerves were much shaken and there were two false alarms which necessitated the turning out of troops at night. The outrage at Sarkhej raised a fear that some of the more desperate rioters having been driven from the city and suburbs, might be planning riots in the neighbouring town of Sanand, Dholka and Bavla. A squadron of Central India Horse arrived opportunely after the riots and was sent out on patrol duty to Kaira, Dholka, Bavla and Viramgam and Sanand as well as to the neighbouring villages of Ahmedabad. This was continued till the end of April. But it soon became evident that the spirit which had inspired the riots was utterly broken and the feelings of the countryside towards the patrols were chiefly friendliness and curiosity. The same may be said of the aeroplane which was employed. To this disappearance of rancour the attitude of Mr. Gandhi contributed not a little. He held a meeting at the *Ashram* on April 14th and expressed to immense crowds his abhorrence of the acts of violence which they had committed. His very appearance in their midst made them realize the folly of their actions. Troops were

Mr. G. E. CHATFIELD—concluded—Colonel G. S. FRAZER.

kept stationed in Ahmedabad, at Viramgam and Dholka for a considerable period after peace was restored. Their behaviour towards the people was excellent and I received no serious complaint of misbehaviour. There was some grumbling at Viramgam in the end of April about the scrutiny of railway passengers by the military; and this was immediately discontinued on the grounds that it was vexatious and no longer necessary. Here perhaps I should mention a captious complaint against the conduct of the British troops during the Ahmedabad riots which appeared in the *Gujarati Punch** on April 13th. I had up the editor and on ascertaining that he had no real information to justify his complaint gave him the true facts and called upon him to publish an apology which he did in the following numbers of his paper.

In short from the firing of the last shot on the morning of Sunday the 13th April the relations of the troops to the population have been excellent. No collision of any sort has occurred.

(12) *Punishment of the offenders.*—In order to deal with large number of criminal prosecutions which arose out of the riots at Ahmedabad and Viramgam Government appointed a special tribunal of 3 Judges which began to sit on June 2nd. The amount of work, however, proved too great for this tribunal and Government therefore appointed a second one which commenced its sitting upon July 22nd. The second tribunal tries only the cases from the Kaira district. Appendix G† shows the number of persons tried, convicted and acquitted by the first tribunal up to date and the nature of their sentences.

(13) *Other punitive and semi-punitive measures.*—Directly the riots had been quelled I issued a notice* as District Magistrate under Section 25-A of the District Police Act calling for submission of claims for compensation for damage from all victims of the riots in both towns. The claims submitted within one month amounted to Rs. 13,21,789-5-1 for Ahmedabad and Rs. 2,34,240-4-10 for Viramgam. The question how these sums should be recovered received long and careful consideration from Government which finally decided that the Viramgam bill was entirely beyond the resources of the town and that a sum of Rs. 42,000 only should be recovered from it. In the case of Ahmedabad the amount fixed for recovery was nearer to the whole bill and it is possible that the recoveries may be greater than estimated and cover the total amount. Appendix X† shows the final order of the District Magistrate under Section 25-A of the District Police Act. In both cities the same principle has been adopted with regard to the recovery. A fine of one week's wages has been laid upon the mill-hands

* Not reproduced.

† *Vide* para 68 of the statement of the Bombay Government.

‡ Appendices 9 and 10 to the statement of the Bombay Government.

Colonel G. S. FRAZER, C.M.G., Indian Army (retd.).

I was in command of Ahmedabad Area from 25th May 1918 to 6th May 1919 and previous to this period I had not been in Gujarat for the past 32 years.

1. The first actual disturbances broke out in Ahmedabad on the 10th April 1919. At about 5-15 P.M. on the 10th April 1919 a letter was brought to me in my bungalow in cantonments by motor from Mr. Chatfield, the Collector of Ahmedabad, saying there was a mob of several thousands near the Prem gate on the station road burning a mill, and the Collector required military assistance. I at once turned out 200 men of the 1-97th Infantry. These left their barracks at 5-45 P.M. and arrived near the Prem gate at 6-10 P.M. In the meantime I went on in advance till I saw the crowd at the Prem gate about 300 yards from me, and I informed the Collector of my presence and the early arrival of the

who were the chief rioters in both towns; a cess is levied from all payers of income-tax, proportionate to the amount of the latter which they pay; and the municipalities are ordered to levy a general cess from all householders in their respective towns.

No additional police have been imposed upon the cities of Ahmedabad and Viramgam. An additional police station however of 18 men has been imposed upon the villages of Barejdi, Nandej and other villages of the neighbourhood on account of the wire cutting and attempts to damage the railway line in which the villagers indulged on the night of April 11th.

(14) *Final remarks.*—The suddenness with which this violent outbreak began is equalled by the abruptness with which it came to an end. There were hardly any smouldering embers left by the conflagration. I account for this in the following way. The class which nurses rancour against Government and which had become embittered to the highest degree by the Rowlatt agitation is an educated class—Nagar Brahmins, Brahma Kahatriyas in the towns, Pattidars in the country villages. These men are not the stuff of which rioters are made; they have not the physical courage to carry through an outbreak of the kind. The actual rioters, the rabble of the city and the mills, were not much touched by the Rowlatt agitation except in so far as agitators may have abused their ignorance and played upon their fears by fantastic lies and misrepresentation. They were aroused by the news that Mr. Gandhi and Miss Anasuya were arrested: their concern was personal not political. They were the mere implements of the educated class which used them and then left them to their fate. It is on their wretched instruments that the punishment falls most heavily. This class awoke from their folly to find that they had been gulled; that their benefactors were unhurt and bitterly upbraiding them for their violence. Hence the sudden cessation of violent action. To sum up the parties involved in the disturbances were three. Mr. Gandhi and a party of enthusiasts were mainly responsible for the exceedingly exasperated state of public opinion. They were aided and abetted by a much larger class who did not share their high ideals and were perfectly ready to employ violence if the opportunity arose. This opportunity did arise when Mr. Gandhi was reported to have been arrested and the mill-hands whose favourite he was, became excited. They fostered this excitement especially by spreading false rumours and aided the rioters by distribution of money, food and clothes. The young men of this class were amongst the rioters on foot or on bicycles some carrying messages, some suggesting objects for the violence of the mob, some actually aiding in the work of arson by squirting kerosene through hand-pumps or actually joining in the fray. The vast body of the rioters were ignorant mill-hands who felt bound in gratitude to strike a blow for Gandhi.

troops. At 6-10 P.M. I formed a line of troops across the road and having given the necessary instructions as to future action, I advanced and cleared the road, the crowd dispersing without any firing. I then posted a platoon under an Indian officer at the Prem gate near the Beehive mill, and a platoon under an Indian officer at the cross roads outside the Kalupur gate, and at the request of the Collector the rest of the troops returned to cantonments.

2. On the 11th April at about 10 A.M. on my return from an instructional parade of the officers of the Depot 2-97th Infantry, I learnt that the Collector had driven up to cantonments in a motor to obtain military aid, and Lieutenant-Colonel Preston, 1-97th Infantry, the next senior officer, had despatched 300 rifles to proceed to the city, and gone with the Collector to the city.

Colonel G. S. FRAZER—concluded—Lieut. Col. W. J. PRESTON.

I sent reinforcements to the city and on the return of the Collector, after consultation with him, I went with him to the city, and saw the damages which the mobs had caused, and issued orders posting troops at various places in and around the city, including the railway station, and sending frequent patrols through and around the city, for the purpose of protecting buildings and property, and dispersing mobs and preventing mobs collecting.

3. I saw mobs of one or two thousand persons in each. On each occasion when I advanced with troops, the mobs retired, and dispersed into the numerous small side-streets, and collected again behind the troops, and again dispersed when the troops turned about. No firing occurred in my presence.

4. For this reason I saw at once that in this way the troops would be kept continually on the go and harassed beyond endurance and it would have been impossible to prevent the mobs from continually reforming and damaging property.

5. Therefore on the following morning, 12th April, I issued the following proclamation, after I had informed the Collector of my intention, by means of leaflets distributed by patrols about the city, cyclostyled in Gujarati, stating:—

- (1) "Any gathering of over 10 individuals collected in one spot will be fired on at once by troops.
- (2) Any single individual seen outside any house who does not stop and come up when challenged between the hours of 7 P.M. and 6 A.M. will be shot."

6. These orders were also issued to the troops and had an immediate effect. The city at once began to quiet down.

7. On the afternoon of the 12th April some British troops arrived of which 100 were at once posted in the city, with the remainder in reserve at the fort and cantonments.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. J. PRESTON, Commanding, 1-97th Infantry.

I.—April 10th, 1919.

The first news of actual trouble in the city of Ahmedabad was told me by Captain Pearson, Staff Officer to Colonel G. S. Frazer, Commanding the Ahmedabad Area. Captain Pearson came to see me at my house at about 3 P.M. on 10th April 1919, and told me there was serious rioting and looting in the city owing to the arrest of Gandhi. Later on in the afternoon I went to see Colonel Frazer to ascertain if there were any further news. Whilst I was at Colonel Frazer's house, a letter came from Mr. Chatfield, the Collector, to Colonel Frazer asking him to send troops at once to the city. Colonel Frazer told me to send a company at once, and I sent one under Captain T. F. J. Eales, who left with 200 men about 6 P.M.

I accompanied Colonel Frazer and Mr. Chatfield in a motor car to the city meeting Captain Eales' men by the Prem gate. We got out of the car, and accompanied the troops as they moved slowly down the road towards the railway station. The crowd about 2,000 retired as the troops advanced. There was some booing and shouting but no stone-throwing. Colonel Frazer, I and Mr. Chatfield then went on to the railway station—here there was a dense crowd of about 3,000. They boxed and shouted but nothing else.

I was now ordered to leave one platoon under an Indian officer at the cross-roads outside the Kalapur gate, and one platoon under an Indian officer by the

8. The last firing by troops in the city took place about midday on Sunday, 13th April, and order being more or less restored in the city, on the 14th April I cancelled the orders to the troops regarding firing in my proclamation of the 12th April.

9. Patrols were by degrees reduced as the city gradually settled down, and order was restored, with the exception of cases of stone throwing, telephone and telegraph wires being cut, etc., etc., and after a time the police resumed their duties and the military patrols were discontinued and some of the military posts reduced.

10. The Commissioner, Northern Division, and the Inspector-General of Police arrived in Ahmedabad on 12th April and I had daily and frequent consultations with both these officers and also the Collector and Deputy Inspector General of Police.

11. I established a separate headquarters control for the disturbances operations and connected the same by wire and visual signalling with all the posts in the city and the residences of the Commissioner and Collector.

12. No civil officers were available for permanent duty with troops, but I appointed an officer of the rank of Captain as liaison officer with the civil authorities, and this officer worked with the Deputy Inspector General of Police in the Commissioner's office.

13. Printed copies of the regulations giving instructions for employment of troops in aid of the civil power were given to every officer.

14. As regards the district beyond the vicinity of Ahmedabad city on the request of the civil authorities I sent detachments of Infantry to the following places, viz.:—Nadiad, Anand, Kaira, Borsad, Thasra, Kapadvanj, Vasad Bridge, Sanand, Viramgam and Dholka, and also cavalry patrols on reconnaissance of three to six days into the surrounding country. But with the exception of Viramgam where the troops arrived at the end of the disturbances, the troops had no disturbances to contend with at any of these places. The Royal Flying Corps also flew over the city and the surrounding country and dropped leaflets explaining the Rowlatt Act.

Prem gate near the "Beehive" mills. These platoons stayed the night at their posts. The remainder of the company went back to cantonments. Colonel Frazer, I and Mr. Chatfield left the city between 7 P.M. and 7-30 P.M. for cantonment. On the way we picked up a post-orderly of the 1-97th who had been roughly handled, and took him to hospital. He was minus his bayonet.

No firing took place on the 10th April.

II.—April 11th, 1919.

At about 10 A.M. when I was working in my office in our lines Mr. Chatfield motored up told me he could not find Colonel Frazer and asked me to send troops at once to the city (to the Bhadar) where incendiarism—rioting and looting—had been, and were still, taking place. I at once ordered out 300 men under Major W. C. Kirkwood, who took 150 with him. The remainder followed shortly after under a British officer.

I myself with Captain Lambert (Adjutant), Mr. Chatfield and the District Superintendent of Police motored to the city to the Delhi gate. Here we got out and accompanied the troops through and round the Bhadar. The place was then burning in many places, the Collector's office being entirely burnt, and the telegraph office partially so. The heat of the burning and the sun were intense. I saw numbers of men with lighted torches running here and there and bolting when they

Lieut.-Col. W. J. PRESTON—concluded—MAJOR W. C. KIRKWOOD.

saw the troops. There were dense crowds too—of several thousands, who however disappeared down alleys and side streets as soon as they saw the troops. Whilst I was with the troops, neither these men nor the men with torches were fired on. Near Major Kirkwood's headquarters in the Bhadar, there was a huge crowd of several thousands. As I moved through the Bhadar, hurried dispositions had to be made, and I ordered pickets to be put at various important points and at gates. There was no actual firing at this time (between 12 and 1 P.M.) but the crowds were most noisy and hostile—and shouted a great deal. I now thought the crowd or part of it might break back into the Shahi Bagh to do damage there, and therefore sent some 50 men under Captain Johnson to go there as quickly as possible and make necessary dispositions for defence. Later about 3 P.M. Mr. Chatfield and I visited the Shahi Bagh and found Captain Johnson's dispositions quite satisfactory. I arrived back in cantonment about 4 P.M.

III.—April 12th, 1919.

There was some rioting—but this stopped when the city got to know of the special orders issued by Colonel Frazer.

I visited all posts in the city and Shahi Bagh by motor.

Major W. C. KIRKWOOD—97th Infantry.

On the morning of 11th April about 9-30 A.M. I received orders from the Officer Commanding 1-97th Infantry to take 300 men and proceed to the Bhadar in the city of Ahmedabad, where rioting was taking place: so at about 10-15 A.M. I left the regimental lines with about 150 men. The remainder were to follow later. When I had gone about half way to the city I was overtaken by Captain Hugh Pearson, Staff Officer of the Officer Commanding Ahmedabad Area, who showed me orders which laid down that if the crowd was caught in acts of incendiarisms or made an attack on the troops they were to be fired on. I at once explained these orders to my officers and ordered the men to have five rounds in their pouches and none in the magazine.

At about 11 A.M. I arrived at the Delhi gate which had been set on fire; here I saw a very large crowd (about 2,000) which, however, dispersed in the side streets as I approached; many of the men in the crowd were armed with lathis. On passing the Delhi gate I left a party consisting of one British officer, one Indian officer and about thirty men with orders to allow nobody through the gate. I then continued my advance into the city with the object of establishing myself at the Bhadar and the Pankor Naka which were at the ends of the Richey Road which is said to be the principal thoroughfare in the city. On arrival at Richey Road I found that Lieutenant Larkin had been wounded by a charge of swordsmen and there was a dead man at the corner where the Delhi gate road joins the Richey Road. On entering the Richey Road I found a large crowd at the fountain near the Pankor Naka at the point where the road bifurcates, another big crowd had assembled in the road which led out towards the Astodia gate, and the road by which I had entered the city had again become densely crowded.

The attitude of these crowds was extremely hostile and a large number of them were carrying sticks and stones.

I advanced towards the crowd at the Pankor Naka with about 60 men and got within about twenty yards of them. I ordered them to disperse and said I would fire if they did not do so; this only tended to increase the stone throwing, and one *Sadhu* shouted out that he wanted white men's flesh and a stone was thrown hitting me on the side of the head.

I now considered the time had come to open fire, as I was in a very dangerous position, having so few men

IV.—April 14th, 1919.

Firing ceased by order from 6 A.M. From this date the various events are fully recorded in the Brigade Major, Ahmedabad Force's narrative, dated 28th August 1919.

V.—Conclusion.

(1) I personally ascertained that all officers knew the paragraphs in an Army Regulations, India, Volume II, relating to "Duties in aid of the civil power." Previous to the actual rioting, I had heard rumours of impending trouble in the city—for instance on the 6th April the company was ordered to "Stand-to" in the lines ready for emergency—but nothing happened. Thus I was forewarned.

(2) Any special orders regarding firing, etc., were at once made known to officers in command of pickets and posts, and I satisfied myself by visiting these, at various times that orders were fully understood.

(3) There was always an "Emergency company" under a British officer ready in the lines to turn out at a moment's notice by day or night.

(4) Every available British officer was used for riots duty; at one time even the Adjutant was in command of a party.

(5) I was not present when firing actually took place at any particular point.

with me and large crowds on all sides, and was in danger of being rushed. I therefore warned and explained the effect of fire. I then named three men to fire which drove the crowd back.

Subedar-Major Kanhayalal drove the crowd by the lower road and I heard several shots fired by his party and found that he had shot one or two men.

As the crowd had returned I left Lieutenant Fitzpatrick, 1-99th Infantry, in charge of the Pankor Naka.

I would like to mention here that during the whole time I was in the city no magistrate or civil authority accompanied my force, nor was there anybody with magisterial powers attached to my head-quarters; however, I saw the Collector, who arrived with Colonel Preston, but did not remain.

I now went to the Bhadar where I had sent Lieutenant Roberts with a party; here everything was quiet, but I found that several public buildings were on fire, including the Collector's and telegraph offices.

Several letters asking for assistance were now brought to me from Europeans in the surrounding district and Mr. Brown of the Electric Light Company sent a man to inform me that his house had been surrounded and asked for assistance. I sent an Indian officer and a party to bring him to my headquarters and found on his arrival that he had been seriously damaged about the head. I then took a guard and visited the Civil Surgeon, Salvation Army headquarters, Miss Chubb's School and the Training College, which places I arranged to guard and was thus occupied until 3 P.M. when I returned to the Pankor Naka where I found that the crowd had again collected and were throwing stones and there appeared to be a danger of the troops being rushed, as my main body had been considerably reduced owing to my having to place guards at various places for the protection of European ladies and Government schools. I again warned the crowd of the effect of fire and named three men to fire which dispersed the crowd for a time and made them keep at a respectable distance. About this time information had been received by the police that Sergeant Fraser of their Corps had been killed and was lying in a house some little way up the Richey Road so I sent out a party under Lieutenant Fitzpatrick to bring his remains which when recovered were found to be dreadfully mutilated.

Major W. C. KIRKWOOD—concluded—Mr. D. D. KOTHAWALA.

At about 4 p. m. I heard that the mob had set fire to the Astodia gate so I at once took a party and went there and on arrival I saw a party of about 400 men who were engaged in burning the gates. I therefore ordered one or two shots to be fired which dispersed the crowd. I then returned to my headquarter which I had established in a police Naka near the *Tin Darwaza*. At about 7 p.m. I was reinforced by a party of the—99th Infantry under Lieutenant Mullaly and during the night I sent out patrols towards the Delhi gate, railway station and along the road outside the Bhadar. On the morning of the 12th I sent Lieutenant Mullaly out with a patrol. This patrol was attacked by a mob and was compelled to open fire. Later in the morning I received orders which laid down that mobs over ten

in number were to be fired at if they did not disperse when ordered to do so, with these orders I also received a large number of pamphlets explaining these orders, for distribution to the crowd.

In order to distribute the pamphlets I sent out a number of patrols and at 3-30 p.m. the time laid down for the orders to come into operation, I went out with the Officer Commanding British troops (who had just arrived) and in order to enforce the proclamation I fired at three parties of over ten who did not disperse when ordered, without inflicting any casualties, these parties all fled and the streets now became deserted.

At 8-30 I was relieved and returned to cantonments, my post having been taken over by British troops.

Sub-Inspector of Police D. D. KOTHAWALA, of Ahmedabad City Police.

I have been serving in Ahmedabad city for more than nine years. There was much agitation going on in Ahmedabad regarding the Rowlatt Bills, and when they were passed (21st March 1919) the *Satyagraha* movement was started by Mr. M. K. Gandhi. In order to commit a civil disobedience of the law a proscribed book "*Hind Swaraj*" written by Mr. Gandhi and proscribed by Government in 1914, was sold in Ahmedabad, and unregistered newspapers, *Satyagrahi* and *Satyagraha Akhbar*, were published. The object was to show how the public resented the new legislation, and to secure its repeal. To demonstrate the grief of the whole country it was resolved by the *Satyagrahis* headed and directed by Mr. M. K. Gandhi to observe the Sunday falling on the 6th of April 1919 as the day of mourning. It was decided that there should be a general cessation of business and that day should be observed as "Black Sunday." Accordingly there was a general *hartal* in Ahmedabad and a monster procession took place through the city to the river-bed. Those participating in the procession wore symbols of mourning such as black bands tied round their arms, or black rosettes on their coats or black caps on their heads. Black banners with various inscriptions were carried, and about fifty to sixty thousand people took part in response to the exhortations of Mr. Gandhi who had before this attained a position of great influence in Ahmedabad, both amongst the mill-hands and the other classes, who joined him readily in his attempt to get the Act repealed. On the morning of the 9th April there was a mass meeting in the river-bed on *Swadeshim*, and in the evening there was large meeting attended by about 4,000 people held in Manilal Mansion to protest against the Rowlatt Act which by now was known to the public in general including the illiterate labour class as "*Kala Kaida*" (the black laws) and books such as *Rowlatt Kaida ni samjuti* (the duty to disobey the law) published by Barrister Vallubhai J. Patel were in great circulation. The people had been worked up to a high pitch of discontent over the Rowlatt Acts when the information of Mr. Gandhi's arrest reached Ahmedabad on the morning of the 10th idem. Soon after the receipt of this information, circulars were distributed broadcast amongst the public to make the event known to all, and it was declared therein that a mass meeting would be held in the evening in the river-bed when Mr. Gandhi's message would be explained. The other leaflets were to the effect that Mr. Gandhi has been arrested for breaking the order of Government, that the news should be received by the *Ashram* people with great rejoicings and that the day should be observed as a holiday. They were urged to carry on their work with redoubled zeal and devotion and the public were requested to respect his wishes. The circulars bore the signatures of Vallubhai J. Patel. No sooner had the information reached here than the bazars and shops began to close, some voluntarily and others by force direct or indirect, and as a mark of rejoicing sugar was distributed at different places. The people were however very excited and the feelings of the illiterate masses

got the upper hand, as there was nobody to guide or direct them rightly. The business in and outside the city practically came to a standstill, and the people began to move about in numbers from one place to another. Seeing such an abrupt and unexpected change of affairs, I immediately proceeded to Shahi Bagh to inform my District Superintendent of Police of what was happening. It was about 11-30 A.M. and as we were talking I got a telephone message that Mr. Dalal was assaulted on the Richey Road when going in his motor car and that there was a huge mob getting turbulent. District Superintendent of Police Mr. Boyd, ordered three armed parties to be sent out from head-quarters to Khas Bazar, Ratanpol and Kalupur outside respectively each consisting of ten men. I immediately rode down on my bicycle and on coming to Richey Road I saw huge crowd of people which were not only boisterous but riotous, and would not allow anybody to pass in a carriage or in a bicycle. They were throwing stones at people and hooting them, if they were clad in European costumes. The mob consisted mainly of high class Hindus, but were subsequently joined by Muhammadans who looked like mill employes. Before I came up the mob had smashed the electric light bulbs and shades at the Gaiety Theatre of the Victor Cinema and had pulled down the wood framed posters exhibited outside and set them on fire, the only reason being that the proprietor of the Cinema had not observed the Black Sunday but had kept his show open. I tried my best to persuade the people to disperse, but they listened to nobody in their ear breaking shouts of *Mahatma Gandhi ki jai* and *Vande Mataram*. They were getting more and more turbulent. Some people were inciting them while some were trying to quieten them. Some were at the same time selling the proscribed book "*Hind Swaraj*" with great enthusiasm. I therefore went to Dr. Kanuga's dispensary which was close by and finding the doctor and Vallubhai Patel there I asked them to persuade the crowd to go home and not harass people walking or driving on road. They told me that they had tried before I came up, but it was all in vain. However, they readily came along to ask the people to disperse and go home, but they would not do so. The feelings of the mob were so excited that they paid no heed whatsoever to what was said to them by their own leaders of the *Satyagraha* movement. When Dr. Kanuga and I went towards Ratanpol Naka we met a mob headed by one Bhogia of Baboo Borar closed in Manek Chowk. The doctor told Bhogia to go away and let the people disperse, but Bhogia at the top of his voice began to address the people, saying "What can I do? The heads of the people are turned. Now the injustice of this rule can no longer be tolerated," and was speaking further when the doctor stopped him saying he wanted to hear so. Nor would any of the people collected there pay the least heed to what was said to them. The leaders whose speeches and lectures had given them their knowledge of politics and passive resistance had no control

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[Continued.]

over them. At the same time leaflets were distributed broadcast urging the people to carry on passive resistance with greater vigour, and as an example, the proscribed books and leaflets were being sold on the spot which was like adding fuel to the fire. About that time, i.e., 2 p.m., an armed party of 10 men arrived from head-quarters and with it came the City Police Inspector, Mr. Acton, and Sub-Inspectors Baig and Karanjawala. The armed party was standing on one side, when the abovementioned Bhogia Bhagat demanded that the armed men should be withdrawn. This was neither possible nor desirable as it was apprehended that the mob intended to set the Cinema theatre on fire. As the armed men were not withdrawn as suggested by Bhogia we, the police, were pelted with stones. We did not retaliate but kept ourselves cool and collected. Some gentlemen did try to quieten the mob and requested them to go home and meet in the river-bed at the appointed time for the purpose stated in the circulars. But they did not move and the crowds began to increase in numbers. At about 3 or 3-30 p.m. information reached us that there was a disturbance at the flour mill outside the Prem gate where the rioters were demanding that the two Europeans who had taken the refuge in the mill should be handed over, and that the mob had to be fired on, and a policeman had been killed. When a wounded man who was being carried to the hospital came in sight of the mob on the Richey Road, they lost their heads and pelted us with huge stones, bricks and pieces of masonry from the roofs and windows of houses on both sides and Mr. Acton and I should have been seriously hurt but for our thick sun helmets. The work became harder than ever for us now to prevent the excited people from going to Prem gateside. Messrs. Kanuga, Vallubhai Patel, Jivanlal Desai, Imam Sahib of the *Ashram*, and several other gentlemen did try their best to get the mob to be calm and quiet and to go home or to the river-bed where they said the principles of passive resistance would be taught to them and Gandhi's message explained. We all reasoned with them for a long time and with great perseverance before they could be persuaded to walk towards the river a little before the time appointed for the meeting. The Hindus and the Muhammadans seemed combined in most mysterious manner which made me think that there were some people working on the people's feelings behind the scene. The news of Gandhi's supposed arrest was the cause of all the trouble that infuriated the public, more specially the mill-hands who had put a blind faith in Gandhi as their God.

As was notified in the circulars issued that day a very large mass meeting was held in the river-bed attended by about 30,000 people. It lasted for about an hour and was over at 8 p.m. After the meeting there was a decidedly marked change in the public for the better and they did not even hiss at the police when going home from the river. After the meeting had dispersed many of the shops remained closed. At about 8-30 that evening the City Police Inspector and I went outside the Prem gate and reported to Mr. Boyd, the District Superintendent of Police, all that had happened on the Richey Road. Military detachments were kept near the flour mill, Kalupur, and the railway station, and the District Superintendent of Police ordered the armed party to be detained at Khas Bazar till the next morning, i.e., the 11th. I went out early to see how matters were in my division and finding the same grave aspect, business at a standstill, and some people forcing the others to close their shops, I went to report about it to my District Superintendent of Police whom I found with the District Magistrate outside Prem gate. It was then about 7-30 A.M. I informed them that the attitude of the people was almost the same and the condition of business unaltered. But Dr. Kanuga, Mr. Yajnik and Mr. V. J. Patel, who were also present there, assured these officers that *Satyagraha* volunteers were sent out and that they themselves were going round through the city to see the business was resumed, and that there was no cause for any anxiety. However the District Magistrate ordered me to get all the liquor shops closed as some men had got drunk

and created disturbance when the police on their own initiative had these closed on the day previous. Rumours were also afloat that the Hindus and Muhammadans together would take out in procession from the civil hospital the corpses of the men who died from the injuries received in the disturbance of the previous day, and would hold a joint prayer meeting at the *Jama Masjid*. About this time, i.e., a quarter past or half past eight, after the arrival of the Gujrat mail as Miss Anasuya did not arrive from Bombay as was expected by her people, a fresh and persistent rumour spread like lightning that she too had been arrested. As she also was almost worshipped by the mill-hands, matters began suddenly to grow worse. Many of the mills were not working and those that started work that morning began to close, and force was used by the labourers not working against those that kept working. Shouts of *Anasuya Mata ki jai* were added to shouts of *Mahatma Gandhi ki jai* and *Bande Mataram*. All the shops were closed, and thousands of people, young and old, educated and uneducated, began to move about. The District Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate went in a motor car into the city. I stopped at Sherkotda with the Deputy Superintendent of Police to send telephone messages for the closing of the liquor shops and soon after while riding down Richey Road on our bicycles, we were pelted with stones. But some people in the crowd shouted out "they are *deshis*," "let them go." We saw that the crowds were now armed with bamboos and sticks and we were informed by a Muhammadan that the District Magistrate and the District Superintendent of Police were assaulted on the road near Pankor Naka. So we hurried on, and found that the car had safely passed on to Khas Bazar *Chowky* where I met the Divisional Sub-Inspector Baig and Sub-Inspector Karanjawala and I was informed that the District Superintendent of Police had ordered ball ammunition from head-quarters and had gone to fetch the military. After a while a huge crowd entered the three gates smashing up electric lights and sign-boards. The mob was armed with sticks and bamboos and there were seen amongst them a fairly large number of high class Hindu boys who looked like students, either school boys or collegians, and they were taking the lead. Another mob entered the Bhadar from Raykhad side and at about 9-30 A.M. we all of a sudden saw smoke issuing from the matric *Mandap* side. I telephoned to Mr. Boyd that the situation was very grave and that we should have to open fire on the approaching mob of rioters entering the three gates now. He told me to use discretion in opening fire. The *Shigram* in which the ammunition was being conveyed, was attacked and attempts were made to set it on fire, but it reached Khas Bazar *Chowky* safely through the pluck of the armed police escort who fired on the rioters. About this time the Deputy Superintendent of Police came up from the civil hospital the mobs numbering thousands tried to rush in through the three gates. Seeing the offices of the Collector, the City Magistrate, the Registrars and the Magisterial lock-up were now ablaze the handful of police opened fire on the approaching rioters. The buck shot was found to be absolutely useless the range being short, and the rioters were using the slings to throw stones at the police, and ball ammunition had to be used to save the *Chowky* which was stored with ammunition. The party being very small, not more than 15, it was not advisable to split them up in the face of thousands of approaching rioters and therefore the armed squad could not leave the post. They stayed there till the military arrived. I telephoned repeatedly to the District Superintendent of Police to bring the military early, but it took a long time for them to walk all that distance from the Camp. It was about 11 or 11-30 A.M. that the District Magistrate and the District Superintendent of Police arrived near the Bhadar with military forces, and then the telegraph office was ablaze and the fire brigade had retreated on account of the beating they got at the hands of the rioters, and their hose lines were cut up into pieces. The rioters having carried out their work of destruction on the Bhadar and *Lal Darwaza* sides

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scattered in different directions. Military pickets were posted to guard the Ellis bridge, the training colleges, the city police lines and the municipal buildings, and the remainder of the force took up posts on Richey Road, Manek Chowk, Pankor, etc. As it was Friday there was *Namaz* in the *Jama Masjid* and the feelings of the Muhammadans were rather excited seeing the military pickets near the mosque, but with the exercise of a little tact they were appeased and they went inside to pray. One portion of the telegraph building was still safe, but the fire brigade men would not bring out their engine as they had a bitter experience. The District Magistrate ordered me to bring the engine somehow or other so I escorted them with the aid of the military and they saved that portion of the building.

I saw Lieutenant Larkin of the 97th Regiment struck in the hand by a sword-cut which was dealt on him by a school master named C. K. Shah who got his due and died in hospital. I have got in my possession the broken piece of the sword with which the Lieutenant was hurt. The injured insurgents were removed to the civil hospital or the private dispensaries to have the wounds treated, and the work of removing the dead and injured was very speedily carried out by the students and the collegians who had taken a good deal of interest in the riots. The Ambulance Brigade of St. John's section here did admirable work, but the work done by the Hindu volunteers, mostly students, was most enthusiastic and they within a very short space of time secured a good number of stretchers and stretcher bearers and this humane work was carried out so effectively and speedily that it would lead one to think that these preparations were all pre-arranged, which as a matter of fact may not be the case. There is no doubt that the public in general sympathised with the rioters in treating them with eatables either voluntarily or through fear when they were engaged in their nefarious work and water drawn from the wells was supplied them when there was a rumour that the water in the tanks was poisoned. But with regard to the treating of rioters with food I may quote an incident that when the Commissioner, Northern Division, asked me two days later to take him round the places of destruction and to show him the persons who are said to have fed the rioters, I took him to a leading man named Virchand Bhagat, a notorious gambler, who, on being told by Mr. Pratt, the Commissioner, that it was very shameful on his part to have encouraged the rioters by feeding them, had the courage and the audacity to reply that it was not only he or anybody else, but whoever has a heart had done. Mr. Robertson, the Inspector-General of Police, and the District Magistrate were with us in the same motor car at the time.

On the 11th about 2 P.M. when I was at the Khas Bazar *Chowky* with other officers of the police and the military, Lieutenant Fitzpatrick brought us the information that a European, probably of the police department, was murdered in a shop on the Richey Road. So Inspector Acton, Sergeant Stewart and I went up with him and a military squad, and we found the dead body of Sergeant Fraser lying across the road, cut up very badly about the hands and the feet, and his face was unrecognisable. I and Lieutenant Fitzpatrick handed over the dead body to Inspector Acton and Sergeant Stewart to be removed to the hospital, and we proceeded up the Panch Kuwa gate where we were told the insurgents were creating trouble and mischief. On going up there, we saw the fire brigade station, the police *Chowky*, and the Panch Kuwa gate gutted, and the fire engine was like a molten mass on the road. Lieutenant Fitzpatrick got hold of a boy, "Dhana Mathur", who was actually seen by us spreading the fire on to the gates, and he was taken into my custody, when he was following a corpse

of a man who had fallen a victim to the firing of our men. When we were proceeding to pick up the dead body of Sergeant Fraser I noticed inscriptions written in Gujarati, written in charcoal on the inside and outside walls of the wrecked Fernandez bridge *Chowky* in a very large hand just a few spaces from the scene of that brutal murder. The inscriptions were the most filthy and foul abuses of Europeans and above them was written victory to *Mahatma Gandhi*. There was also written "The British *Raj* is gone, the King of England is defeated and *Swaraj* is established, kill all Europeans. Murder them wherever they be found, etc., etc." I got these inscriptions photographed which were produced in the court of the 1st special tribunal. It was apparent from what I had seen that the whole feeling of the rebellious people was turned against the Europeans, and Government, including Government servants. The Government buildings more specially police *Chowkies* which were destroyed stood apart from other buildings of private persons and were set on fire. While in the case of others which were in close proximity to private property, the wooden structures were removed outside and set fire to on the roads, so as to protect the private houses. No Indian was harmed except police constable Imamkhan who was murdered on the 10th when protecting the lives of two Europeans, at the Prem gate flour mill, and although the police were stripped of their Government clothing, they were let off unhurt because they were natives. Excepting Rao Bahadur Bulakhidas and Khan Bahadur Hussain Khan the insurgents had not ill-treated any Indian. All these facts seem to me to indicate that educated men had a hand in the rioting. The labouring classes, who are generally illiterate, could scarcely be credited with the good sense to protect private property destroying the Government buildings nor could they have possibly known who were Rao Bahadur Bulakhidas or Hussain Khan and what they were and where they lived. I rescued Rao Bahadur Bulakhidas in the early morning of the 13th idem from the Ramjee's temple in Jamalpur where he was hiding himself but was not safe being followed by the rioters. Again there was the instance of an educated man, a Jain moreover, Kesav Lal Dayabhai, Photographer, who was at the bottom of the murder of the poor defenceless innocent European and it was he who first betrayed the Sergeant Fraser while he was taking refuge in Anandlal's shop and brought the second mob to kill him so brutally. The looting of Swaminarayan's and Gosaiji's temples in order to secure fire-arms must have been suggested by some educated men. In Rayapore and Khadia localities it was written on the street walls with charcoal not to drink tap water as poison was put into the tanks of the water works, and the rioters were well fed with *laddoes* and *jilebis* without a single instance being known that it was asked for by the rioters or that the rioters used any sort of force to extract them. All these facts convinced me that there were educated men behind the rioters.

Conditions did not improve, though there were military forces posted in and outside the city, and so Martial Law was proclaimed on the 12th April. In the morning the news of the British troops train being derailed reached Ahmedabad. The telegraph wires were cut on the railway lines. The British troops arrived inside the city at about 3 P.M. and thereafter the situation became well in hand. Mr. Gandhi and Miss Anasuya arrived here on the morning of the 13th instant. In the evening of the next day Mr. Gandhi called a mass meeting of the general public, including the labour classes, which was attended by thousands of people and he remonstrated with them for the wicked deeds they had done here and at other places and told every body to resume work as before. Martial Law was withdrawn on the 14th. As affairs got settled, the investigation into different offences was taken up by the police.

Lieutenant H. S. LARKIN, 1-97th Infantry.

On the 11th April about 11-30 A.M. I was stationed at some cross-roads at Richey Road, Ahmedabad, near

the *Tin Darwaza* and was ordered to block the roads. There were fifty men in all under my charge, who were

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divided into three parties. About fifty men armed with *lathis* and swords suddenly attacked one of these parties. There was not even time to warn the mob before firing on them. This party consisted of about fifteen men. Only three men were ordered to fire this time. The mob then rushed past us into a side street and again appeared and attacked us. Again there was no time to warn the mob before firing on them. This time all the men in the party fired a single round. I myself received a cut from a sword on the arm. Not a single shot was fired before the mob attacked.

I had to fire my revolver in self-defence. One of the mob was killed.

Major Kirkwood with a party then arrived.

No magistrate or civil officer accompanied me. All the men of my party had five rounds per man freed from the charger in accordance with orders received.

Captain Johnson and a party arrived and I proceeded with him to the Shahi Bagh.

Mr. G. F. WESTON, Engineer, Drainage Pumping Station, Ahmedabad.

On the 11th April 1919, I held the post of Chief Fire Superintendent, Ahmedabad municipality. At about 9-15 A.M. a call to a fire was received, the engines turned out and proceeded to the *Lal Darwaza* where it was discovered that the (Examination) *Mandap* was on fire, the fire having been started by the rioters. I was stoned by the mob, but managed to escape on the steam motor fire engine, and reached my quarters safely. I stayed in

my quarters till 10 A.M. on the 12th, when I was sent by the Municipal Commissioner to the Collector with a letter, under military escort. I went to the railway station (on return) and stayed there till Sunday evening, when my services were required by the military to drive a motor car. I was there up till the 20th April, and then proceeded on leave, that is all I know.

Mr. R. R. BOYD, late District Superintendent of Police, Ahmedabad.

Events antecedent to the riots.

Since the beginning of the year 1918 there had been considerable industrial unrest in Ahmedabad and frequent strikes (sometimes of a partial and sometimes of a more or less general character) occurred among the mill-hands. In these struggles with their employers the cause of the mill-hands was espoused by Mr. M. K. Gandhi and Miss Anasuya Sarabhai who held frequent meetings of the operatives, formed a Mill-hands Union and gave the hands unstinted support and encouragement in their demand for better terms and conditions of employment. In this work the two principals were ably seconded by Mr. Gandhi's various local lieutenants. Largely owing to this influential championship of their cause the hands eventually gained almost all their demands from their employers. As a result Mr. Gandhi (who had always been a much respected figure) and Miss Anasuya Sarabhai became the idols of the populace and the other local political leaders who had worked with them gained a popularity and an influence over the mill-hands which they had not before enjoyed. Political activity increased and flourished; the frequent meetings addressed by the political leaders were more largely attended and a widening circle became interested in their propaganda. Such was the general state of affairs when, early in 1919, the intensive agitation against the Rowlatt Bills was set on foot by Mr. Gandhi which soon developed into his *Satyagraha* or passive resistance movement to prevent the passage of the Bill. The cause being Mr. Gandhi's invested it with an exceptional interest for the people of Ahmedabad. Meeting after meeting was held by the political leaders at which inequity of the Bills and of the Government which intended to pass them was expounded in unmeasured terms to crowded audiences who were given to understand that the passage of the Bills into law would reduce them to a state of virtual slavery and that it was their duty at whatever risk to their persons and liberties to resist them. After the final passage of the first Rowlatt Act the 6th of April was appointed by Mr. Gandhi to be observed as a day of general *hartal* and mourning. All shops and mills in Ahmedabad were closed and all vehicular traffic in the streets was stopped at an early hour in the day. Only in a few cases, apparently, had the persuasion to be resorted to effect this, so general was the feeling that Mr. Gandhi's behest should be obeyed. In the afternoon a monster procession, about 50,000 strong, starting from the vicinity of the station, marched through the city to the river-bed where it split up into several groups which were separately addressed by some of the local political leaders and afterwards quietly

dispersed. In the procession were carried several black banners bearing inscriptions denouncing the Rowlatt Act, but on the whole the conduct of the demonstration was quite orderly and the city police who accompanied it did not have to interfere and were not molested. Other special police parties which were posted at certain points in the city did not have to be called upon. During the succeeding three days, agitation against the Rowlatt Act continued and further meetings were held. The hands of some mills also remained out on strike and I had to supply police guards to two mills where the operatives threatened violence to the mill premises.

The events of April 10th.

In the morning on the 10th April news was received in Ahmedabad that Mr. Gandhi had been arrested on his way to Delhi. The news spread rapidly and caused general commotion and partial stoppage of work. A handbill announcing it and calling for a general strike and cessation of work in celebration of the event was issued and distributed about noon by Mr. V. J. Patel as Secretary of the *Satyagraha Sabha* and a meeting was also called for the evening in the river-bed. Shops were closed and vehicles were stopped and the passengers made to alight and proceed on foot, crowds began to collect and the mill-hands in general after the midday recess did not return to work. On hearing of the new turn which events had taken I sent three further special parties of armed police, each of 10 men, to different points in the city to assist in the preservation of order if necessary. The first violence committed by the crowd was at the Victor Cinema in Richey Road where lamps and windows were smashed, apparently because the Cinema had failed to close down during the general stoppage on the 6th. In the afternoon at about 2-30 two European mill employees were stopped by a crowd on the railway over-bridge near the station and made to get down from their carriage. The crowd became aggressive and the Europeans were forced to take refuge in the Kalupur police *Chowky* where there was a police guard. After sometime the crowd withdrew sufficiently to enable them to proceed on their way under the protection of a police escort but they were soon hemmed in again and driven into the shelter of a *dharamsala* close by. After a time the crowd again withdrew from here and they were encouraged once more to proceed but were soon again driven with their escort to seek refuge in a flour mill near the Prem gate. The crowd followed them into the entrance of the mill and wrecked the mill office and telephone box before they were ejected and excluded by the shutting of the entrance gate. They

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then endeavoured to set fire to the mill. At this the armed police escort fired on the crowd and a few persons were wounded of whom one was afterwards reported to have died. On this the crowd withdrew somewhat and the two Europeans with three or four armed police issued from the mill and again tried to get home. They were again forced by the crowd attacking them to take refuge in a *Chawl* at the opposite side of the road where they were bombarded with stones till they finally effected their escape through the back of the *Chawl* into a mill compound. One of them had been severely and the other slightly injured by the various assaults of the crowd with sticks and stones. One of the armed constables who got left behind in the verandah of the *Chawl* when the rest of the party escaped was thrown down by one of the crowd who mounted to the verandah and was then severely beaten about the head by the crowd as he lay helpless. He died later in the evening while being taken down to the hospital.

On learning of these further events by telephone about 4 P.M. I despatched from headquarters to the scene all the remaining available armed police and myself went in response to a call from the District Magistrate to his office and accompanied him to the scene of the disturbance. On the way we stopped at the Rajnagar mill to send a requisition to camp for military assistance and reached the spot at about 5.30. At this time though the crowd had ceased committing violence since the arrival on the scene of the final armed police party they were in a sullen and intractable humour and would not disperse. On one occasion when our backs were turned some stones were thrown at the District Magistrate and myself. It was only when the military arrived in force about 6.45 that the mob was driven off the main road and made partially to disperse. Military pickets were then posted at the Prem gate, outside Kalupur gate and the station and no further disturbance occurred that night though some stones were thrown at the troops after dark. On my way home at about 9 P.M. from the scene of this disturbance I was met by the city police Inspector and Sub-Inspector Kothawala who informed me of what had occurred during the afternoon on the Richey Road where the crowd had been very turbulent and threatening but had not committed actual violence beyond the throwing of stones at the police who were trying to preserve order and induce them to disperse. This crowd, like the one outside the Prem gate when the District Magistrate and I were present had refused to disperse unless the police were first withdrawn and appeared to be enraged at the very presence of the police. However, they were eventually led away by the *Satyagrahi* leaders to the pre-arranged meeting in the river-bed after which the temper of the crowd on their return appeared to have considerably cooled down. The Inspector and Sub-Inspector appeared to be of opinion that the crisis was passed and that no further trouble need be apprehended that night. I went at about 11 P.M. and reported these facts to the District Magistrate and we agreed to adhere to our previous arrangement to let the existing precautionary measures continue and to go round the city together in the morning and see how matters stood.

Next morning, the 11th, the District Magistrate and I drove through the city, going by way of the scene of the previous evening's riot. Here the military picket was faced by a moderate crowd which would not move off though it threatened no violence. Further on as we proceeded we met with many demonstrations of hostility but no active violence till we had reached a point on the Richey Road about opposite the entrance to the *Jama Masjid*. Here we stopped our car to speak to Inspector Acton who was bicycling up the road in the opposite direction. It may be mentioned here that all the shops and bazars were closed and groups of people were standing about the streets. Immediately when we stopped our car was surrounded by a small crowd. We decided to push on and told the Inspector to turn back and follow us to the Khas Bazar *Chowky*. As we started the crowd opened out and let us pass but we

were greeted from behind as we drew off by a sharp shower of stones several of which hit us. We stopped for a while at the Khas Bazar *Chowky* to speak to the police officers collected there and then proceeded on our way to Camp to call in further military assistance in dealing with the situation which had assumed decidedly threatening aspect. At one point not far from the *Chowky* we just passed clear of a yelling mob of about 200 which was coming up a side street brandishing long sticks and bamboos and which was evidently bent on mischief.

On arrival in Camp we arranged with the Officer Commanding for a body of troops to proceed to the city *via* the Delhi gate as soon as possible. We were to meet them at the gate after picking up the Officer Commanding and accompany them into the city. Meanwhile we returned to our bungalows and learned by telephone that the mob had broken out into violence and incendiarism and had already set fire to the examination *pandal* in the Bhadar. Soon after information came that the Government offices in the Bhadar were being set on fire. We proceeded again to Camp to pick up the Officer Commanding and ask for further troops to be sent and eventually reached the Bhadar with the advance military force about 11.30. The buildings were then past saving and the mob had disabled fire engines which were trying to extinguish the fires. The full extent of the damage was only ascertained later. Meanwhile on our arrival the mob issuing from the Bhadar moved away in front of the advancing troops or vanished up side streets. After making the necessary dispositions for safeguarding the remaining Government buildings and for holding certain strategic points the military with the assistance of reinforcements which arrived later were engaged throughout the day in clearing the main thoroughfares and endeavouring to prevent further acts of incendiarism. These latter, however, it was impossible totally to prevent as the incendiaries in the mob split up into the small parties which visited practically every part of the city and the eastern suburbs and destroyed nearly all isolated police buildings and liquor shops. Detached buildings were burnt, and those which adjoined other houses were partially or totally wrecked and demolished.

I was not present during the military operations in the city during the afternoon as at about 1 P.M. I left with the District Magistrate and a detachment of troops for the Shahi Bagh and cantonment areas on receipt of a rumour that a portion of the mob had broken off and was making for the police headquarters lines where there was a reserve of arms and ammunition, and for the Government offices and bungalows in those areas. This rumour appeared afterwards to be unfounded as no attack was made on those parts though preparations and dispositions had to be made to meet the possibility. I returned to the city between 5 and 6 P.M. and inquired into events there and visited some of the military pickets. I was informed of Sergeant Fraser's murder and the recovery of his body on the Richey Road. The mob on the Richey Road had again closed in after the return of the military patrol which had once cleared the road and was collected thickly on the road from the Fernandez bridge towards the station yelling the wildly gesticulating and brandishing weapons and hurling stones and abuse at the military picket west of the bridge from a distance of 60 or 70 yards. At other points which I saw the military pickets were also faced at fairly close quarters by mobs making hostile demonstrations. Up to this time the military control only extended to the main thoroughfares in the western portion of the city and the road leading from the Shahi Bagh to the station and the remainder of the city still remained completely in the hands of the mob.

On the 12th I visited the station side of the city in the morning and the other controlled parts later. Detached rioting still continued though the extreme violence of the mob had been curbed both by fatigue and by the measures taken on the previous day. Rumours were prevalent of a projected attack from the south side of the city by a mob reinforced by people from the Kaira

Mr. R. R. BOYD—concluded—Mr. R. R. SHIRGAONKAR.

district. I endeavoured so far as possible to restore the ordinary police arrangements in the controlled parts of the city. During the rioting of the previous day the unarmed city and suburban police had been completely swept off the streets. They could offer no effective resistance to the overpowering force of the rioters. They appear to have stood their ground as long as possible, but they were seized by overwhelming crowds and stripped of their uniforms which were then burned before their eyes in the streets. Persistent rumours were still afloat as to the intentions and next objectives of the mob and little or nothing definite could be learned of what was happening in the parts of the city still in their possession. British troops, whose train had been derailed in the morning in the Kaira district, arrived in the afternoon and were posted by evening.

On the 13th the situation was well in hand though the spirit of the general populace was still markedly hostile and the atmosphere far from normal and little was still known of the true state of affairs in the parts of the city which the military patrols had not yet penetrated. Mr. Gandhi and Miss Anasuya Sarabhai arrived by the Gujarat rail and were taken to the Commissioner's bungalow at Shahi Bagh. After a conference with the chief civil officials I was deputed to accompany Mr. Gandhi and Miss Anasuya to Mr. Gandhi's *Ashram*

across the river. We stopped at Mr. Ambalal Sarabhai's and Mr. V. J. Patel's houses on the way there. From the latter place Mr. V. J. Patel and Mr. Indulal K. Yajnik accompanied us to the *Ashram* where details were arranged of summoning a meeting of mill-hands, etc., to be addressed by Mr. Gandhi next afternoon near the *Ashram*. The meeting had first been proposed for the afternoon of the 13th when agreed upon at the conference at the Commissioner's bungalow, but owing to the shortness of the time for making the arrangements and getting notices printed, it was decided at the *Ashram* to convene it for the following evening instead. After details had been arranged and a notice drafted I accompanied Mr. Indulal K. Yajnik to various presses in the city to arrange for the printing of the notices. I afterwards returned to the Shahi Bagh and reported the arrangements and the alteration of the date to the Commissioner and the District Magistrate.

On the 14th in the morning news was received that the Sarkhej police outpost building, about six miles outside city to the south-west, had been rushed and burned by a mob at about 1 A.M. that morning. This, I believe, was the last act of incendiarism reported. A party of troops sent out from Ahmedabad to deal with the mob which committed it failed to trace to them.

Mr. R. R. SHIRGAONKAR, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Ahmedabad.

On the 10th of April at about 12.30 P.M. I learnt about the arrest of Mr. M. K. Gandhi on his way to Delhi. On my way to office I saw that all the shops in the city were closed, the vehicular traffic was stopped as passing carriages and drivers were stoned, and all business was at a standstill. At about 1.30 P.M. news came to office that a crowd which had collected on the Richey Road had become turbulent, had smashed the glass wind screen of a motor car, assaulted the occupants and stopped the car from proceeding further. Sub-Inspector Kothawala, who was then engaged with the District Superintendent of Police, Mr. Boyd, was ordered by him to go to Richey Road immediately and see that no further disturbance was created. He was told that parties of armed police would be sent to Richey Road and Khas Bazar *Chowky* to assist him. The District Superintendent of Police then instructed me to telephone to the Sub-Inspector, headquarters, to send out three parties—2 head constables and 10 constables to Kalupur police station, 1 head constable and 4 constables to Richey Road and 2 head constables and 10 constables to Khas Bazar *Chowky*. The first party was instructed to place itself under the orders of Sub-Inspector, Kalupur Division, and the other two parties were instructed to place themselves under the orders of the city police Inspector, Ahmedabad city, and Sub-Inspector "A" division. The Sub-Inspector was ordered to issue ten rounds of buckshot ammunition per man to the parties.

At about 3 P.M. Sub-Inspector Kothawala telephoned that the crowd on Richey Road had smashed the electric light bulbs at the Gaiety Theatre, because the proprietor of the Victor Cinema had kept his show open on the 6th of April 1919 and had not joined the others in observing *hartal* on that day; and that the crowd on the Richey Road had been pacified by him with the assistance of Dr. Kanuga and Mr. Vallubhai J. Patel. He reported that everything was quiet on Richey Road although people were moving about in crowds. I then telephoned to Sub-Inspector, Kalupur Division, and asked him whether the party sent there had arrived. He replied in the negative. I told him that an armed party of 2 head constables and 10 constables was sent to his assistance. On enquiring about the situation in his division, he informed me that the people had collected in numbers but there was no disturbance.

At about 4 P.M. the District Magistrate telephoned that two Europeans had been assaulted by a crowd near the railway overbridge and that he was sending his

motor car for Mr. Boyd to accompany him to the scene. The District Superintendent of Police then asked me to enquire from the Sub-Inspector's headquarters, how many men he could spare. The Sub-Inspector replied that as many parties had been sent out and he could spare only about half a dozen men. The District Superintendent of Police then asked me to go to headquarters personally and send to Kalupur police station as many men as I could get under the headquarters *Jamadar* and await orders. I then proceeded to the headquarters immediately, sounded an alarm and 16 head constables and constables having answered the call, I sent them to Kalupur at the double, under the command of the head-quarters *Jamadar*, to assist the first party. I told the *Jamadar* that the District Magistrate and the District Superintendent of Police were following him. After this party had left I collected the stragglers and about a dozen men were kept ready at headquarters in case they were wanted anywhere. At about 5.30 P.M. I got information that constable Imamkhan has been severely beaten by the mob and that assistance was required to remove him to hospital. I sent about half a dozen unarmed men in mufti to remove the wounded constable to the hospital. I waited at the headquarters till 8 P.M. and then returned to the city. On the way, learning that a big meeting was being held in the river-bed, I proceeded there but by the time I got there the meeting was over, and the people were returning home. At night the situation appeared to be quiet in the city and it was thought that after the advice given at the meeting by Mr. V. J. Patel business would be resumed next day.

On the 11th morning I started early to see the situation in the city and whether business was resumed or not. I reached Khas Bazar at 7.15 A.M. *via* Mirzapur, 2 head constables and 10 constables armed were present there and 1 head constable and 4 constables had returned to headquarters for meals. The city police Inspector, Ahmedabad, was not present nor any of the Sub-Inspectors. I proceeded along Richey Road and met Sub-Inspector Kothawala near the Fernandez bridge. I saw that some shops near Khas Bazar and on Richey Road were open. The vegetable market too was open. On Richey Road I saw some persons forcing those who had kept their shops open to close them. People had collected here and there in groups and some *Satyagrahi* men in white caps were observed advising the people to resume business. We then proceeded to the

Continued.]

Mr. R. R. SHIRGAONKAR.

railway station *via* Panch Kuwa gate. At the Kalupur police station we learnt that the District Superintendent of Police was going to the civil hospital. We therefore proceeded towards Prem Darwaza and met the District Magistrate and the District Superintendent of Police outside the gate. They were talking with Dr. Kanuga and Messrs. V. J. Patel and Yajnik. I informed the District Superintendent of Police what I had seen on Richey Road. The District Superintendent of Police instructed me to send word to the Sub-Inspector, headquarters, to keep all his available men ready at the headquarters and then to proceed to the civil hospital to request the Civil Surgeon to allow the body of the deceased constable Imamkhan to be removed after noting down the injuries. Sub-Inspector Kothawala was asked by the District Magistrate to order all the liquor shops to be closed. The District Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate proceeded towards Richey Road and we stopped at the Kalupur police station to send the messages. On our way back to Richey Road we learnt that Miss Anasuya who was expected by the mail had not arrived and there was a persistent rumour that she was arrested. Matters now took a serious turn unexpectedly. It was about a quarter to nine. Richey Road which was comparatively deserted when we passed along it in the morning was now densely crowded. The crowds appeared to be disturbed and turbulent. When we reached Fernandez bridge we heard that the District Magistrate and the District Superintendent of Police were assaulted. We got down from our bicycles to make enquiries, just then we saw a mob consisting mostly of mill-hands passing towards Manek Chowk by the side of the slope of Fernandez bridge. While we were making enquiries we were pelted with stones, some of which hit us. We then learnt that the motor car of the District Magistrate and District Superintendent of Police had gone on to Khas Bazar. Here some one said (alluding to us) in Gujarati "They are 'Deshis', let them go." We then went on. I went to the civil hospital from the Pankor Naka and Sub-Inspector Kothawala went to Khas Bazar. In the civil hospital I saw the Assistant and the Civil Surgeon and requested them to note down the injuries on the body of the deceased constable Imamkhan and allow it to be removed by the party from the headquarters which had been sent there for the purpose. When I was thus engaged, I received a telephone message from Khas Bazar from Sub-Inspector Karanjawala that a mob of rioters armed with big bamboo sticks was moving along Khas Bazar road smashing the municipal lamps. I told him to telephone to the District Magistrate, who I anticipated would have reached his bungalow by that time, for military assistance and asked him to send me an escort to accompany me to Khas Bazar. While I was waiting at the civil hospital for the escort I saw big clouds of smoke issuing from the Bhadar and some one brought news a few minutes later that the Matriculation *Mandap* was set on fire by the rioters and that they were going to set the other Government buildings also on fire. A noise of thousands of people collected together was heard at the hospital. An escort of three constables was sent to me by side lanes and I reached Khas Bazar at about 9.30 A.M. The city police, Inspector, Ahmedabad, was not there but Sub-Inspectors Kothawala, Karanjawala and Baig were there. They were anxiously awaiting my arrival. A party of 1 head constable and 3 constables had just arrived from the headquarters with reserve ammunition. The head constable in charge of the party told me that on his way to Khas Bazar he was attacked by a mob near the Delhi gate which tried to set fire to the carriage when they learnt that it was carrying ammunition. He showed me the burnt curtains. The party had opened fire on the mob and the driver having driven the carriage at full gallop with great pluck they escaped without any injury. I learnt at Khas Bazar on my arrival that almost all the Government buildings in Bhadar were set on fire. When I reached Khas Bazar *Chowky* a big crowd had collected near *Tin Darwaza* and was pelting the police with

stones and brickbats. They intended to attack Khas Bazar *Chowky* where the reserve ammunition was stored. The situation appeared to me very serious. I kept a guard of 1 head constable and 3 constables to protect the ammunition and with the rest of the men at the *Chowky* (three head constables, one head constable who had gone to headquarters for meals had returned by this time) and ten constables—formed two skirmishing lines facing outwards. One was kept behind Khas Bazar *Chowky* facing Bhadar and the other faced towards the crowd. I asked the crowd to fall back and clear the road between *Tin Darwaza* and Khas Bazar. They would not do so and answered me with a shower of stones and brickbats some of which hit the constables. I asked my men to fix bayonets and the line facing *Tin Darwaza* was ordered to move forward. This was led by Sub-Inspector Kothawala and myself. The other two Sub-Inspectors remained with the other line. As soon as we moved, the rioters fell back and we reached *Tin Darwaza*. Here the crowd was joined by more men and they began to pelt us with stones. I asked the crowd again to disperse and warned them that if they continued to throw stones on the police, I should open fire on them. The crowd jeered at us and continued pelting us with stones. I ordered a volley to be fired on the mob. The buckshot with which the cartridges were loaded would not carry more than 60 yards and the stones thrown by the rioters with slings reached us. As the shower of stones still continued I gave orders to use ball ammunition and this had the desired effect on the crowd. They fell back towards Pankor Naka and remained at a safe distance. I posted two men under cover under each of the three arches and posted two men at the entrance to the two side lanes near *Tin Darwaza*. Unfortunately during these operations the cartridges jammed in two muskets and as the men had no rods with them they had to fall back on the *Chowky*. This was a serious drawback. The cartridges in these old muskets jammed often and as the rods had been withdrawn for the use of the military in the middle of 1918 the men were helpless.

Having protected the *Tin Darwaza* side I returned to Khas Bazar *Chowky* and was now joined by the city police Inspector, Ahmedabad city. About 15 minutes after this another big mob came howling from Bhadar side having set all the Government buildings on fire. In the meantime the four constables who had gone to headquarters for meals had returned and I was able to move towards Bhadar to face this new mob. Having experience of the last firing, this time when we received a shower of stones, I warned the mob to disperse but when it would not move away and insisted on attacking us it was received with ball ammunition from rifles. This had immediate effect and the mob dispersed and ran in various directions. I posted men under cover of trees and corners at the entrance to the lanes behind Khas Bazar *Chowky* and remained anxiously waiting for the arrival of the military which came at about 11.30 A.M. While we were so situated the Head Constable in charge of the Bank guard sent for assistance. I was not in a position to send him aid and so I telephoned to headquarters for more men. A party of 2 head constables and 10 men arrived immediately after the arrival of the military. These men were then utilized in carrying ball ammunition to various guards in escorting undertrial prisoners from the lock-up which was partially burnt, to Gaekwar's *Haveli*, in driving away the mob which was preventing the fire engine from being used for extinguishing the fire at the telegraph office and for various other minor escorts.

The District Magistrate and the District Superintendent of Police arrived at Khas Bazar with the military and military parties were posted at important centres and strong patrolling parties moved about through all parts of the city. The mob noticed that day consisted mostly of boys who were sent to the forefront while the elderly persons remained behind. *Satyagrahi* volunteers and students from the medical school were engaged in the work of removing the dead and wounded and this

Mr. R. R. SHIRGAONKAR—concluded—Lieut. S. H. MACDONALD—Lieut. F. MORRIS.

work was done by them speedily. The Ambulance Brigade of St. John section being in *khaki* uniform were afraid to move about freely and wanted police escorts when I requested them to remove the Ramoshi who lay wounded in the opium office to the hospital. The mobs appeared to be very infuriated and reckless as even after the arrival of the military they tried several times to pass the military cordon at Pankor Naka, and firing had to be resorted to. The work of destroying police *chowkies* and the houses of Rao Bahadur Bulakhidas and Khan Bahadur Hussainkhan was done after the military had taken charge of the city. They ran away when the patrolling party approached them and carried on the work of destruction as soon as their backs were turned. Looting and destruction work was continued by the mob till evening.

At about 2 P.M. on the 11th Lieutenant Fitzpatrick brought information that a European, probably a police Sergeant, was murdered in a shop on Richey Road and that his body was lying on the road. Inspector Acton, Sergeant Stewart and Sub-Inspector Kothawala went to the place with Lieutenant Fitzpatrick and a squad of military men. They found the dead body of Sergeant Fraser lying across the road cut up very badly. All the police officers had collected at Khas Bazar except Sergeant Fraser and we had been enquiring where he had gone. His body was removed to the hospital. Sub-Inspector Kothawala brought a boy Dhana Mathur with him, who he said was caught red-handed spreading fire on the Panch Kuwa *Darwaza* gate. I noticed that the feeling of the public was against the Government and Government officers and I had to supply escorts to officers of the police, telegraph, postal and other

departments who were molested by the public in the performance of their duties and came to me for help. The educated classes and well-to-do persons were afraid of the rioters, as they thought that their next step would be to loot the houses of private persons. At night time the city was quiet.

On the 12th morning looting and destruction of Government and municipal property was reported from Shahpur and other localities. The mill-hands had not gone to work. The shops were closed and all business was at a standstill. No one could tell as to when and where the disturbance would start again and so the Officer Commanding the Ahmedabad Brigade issued notices to the effect that any assembly of 10 or more persons at a time would be fired upon without previous notice and that people found on the road after 7 P.M. and not answering the challenge would be shot immediately. This order came into force after 3 P.M. The British officer in charge of the military gave me a few copies for quick distribution and I sent a party of 1 head constable and 3 constables in a carriage with instructions to fire on the mob in case they were molested, to distribute the notices. The party returned after about half an hour and reported that the carriage was attached by some persons of the respectable class near Khadia; the rubber tyers of the wheels were partly removed and they had to fire on their assailants some of whom were wounded. I reported the fact immediately to the Commanding Officer and sent a strong patrol of military under the Subedar-Major in that locality to distribute the notices. In the evening a European regiment came to the city and relieved the Indian troops. Stray shots and volleys were heard at Khas Bazar from time to time. At night the city was quiet again.

Lieutenant S. H. MACDONALD, Assistant Controller of Contracts.

On 11th April I left Camp for my depôt in the city soon after 9 A.M. and was driven down to the Delhi gate in a *gharry* by a young man who I believe owned a mill in Ahmedabad. He dropped me inside the Delhi gate and I proceeded to walk on to the depôt. When at the High School a Parsee gentleman Mr. Laher accosted me and implored me to go back saying that a big mob was coming up the road from the Bhadar and that they would kill me. I returned to the police *Chowky* and rang up the Collector on the phone to let him know the state of affairs. Before I got into communication with him the mob arrived at the Delhi gate and proceeded to wreck the small police shelter just inside the gate and also the sub-post office. They also assaulted various people. A tonga with three or four policemen came in by the Delhi gate and was set on by the mob. One policeman fired 3 or 4 shots into the crowd but as far as I could see without effect. Mr. Laher then volunteered to take a message up to camp for me and left saying he thought he could get through alright. This he succeeded in doing as I subsequently heard. The mob consisted of a very mixed crowd armed with bamboo *lathis* of various sorts, *dharias*, and some few had swords. They were harangued at intervals by fairly well dressed men and kept shouting *Gandhi Maharaj ki jai*. Various well dressed men also joined in the exhortations and it

was just after I got into communication with the Collector and had been informed by him that the troops had been ordered out and to stay where I was, that some of these black-coated gentry, whom I could see through the window spoke to the crowd and pointed to the police *Chowky* which the mob then proceeded to assault. I was unarmed and the three policemen in the *Chowky* were also unarmed. Broken mineral water bottles and brickbats were thrown and I received a severe cut on the right hand. The mob came to the stairway leading up to the *Chowky* from the room below but were afraid to venture up as it meant coming in single file. The situation was a serious one and very unpleasant as the mob was bent on mischief and I was informed by several of its members in both English and Urdu that they intended killing me and every European in the place and that they had already killed one European and would finish them all off by the morning. Near 11 o'clock and after I had been in this situation for over an hour the troops appeared up the road and they were just in time as the mob were then setting about firing the *Chowky*. As soon as the troops appeared the crowd bolted and I went down and met the troops. I accompanied them as far as my depôt where the officer in charge gave me a guard and the troops then went on towards the Bhadar, I staying at the depôt.

Lieutenant F. MORRIS, 1-97th Infantry.

On the afternoon of the 11th April 1919 about 5.30 P.M. I was ordered by Captain Lambert, 1-97th Infantry, to proceed to Delhi gate from cross-roads with a party of 50 men.

On arrival at temple post I met Major Cochran with a small party of eight men who were guarding a gap which was crowded by a mob of 400 to 500 in number and were armed with swords, *lathis* and various other weapons.

Major Cochran ordered me to strengthen this post by 12 men and left the post in my entire charge without issuing any further orders and he returned to cross-roads. The mob at this time were extremely excited and were pelting us with stones and their attitude was very threatening.

I did my best to get the crowd to retire, but I was only jeered and hooted at and rewarded with stones, fortunately none hit me. Seeing no signs of the crowd

Lieut. F. MORRIS—concluded—Lieut. A. ST. J. MACDONALD—Lieut. J. FITZPATRICK.

retiring and noticing them come closer to us I fired one round at the ground in front of the mob to frighten them instead of which they pelted all the more stones at us. I then explained to them that if this didn't cease and if they advanced a yard beyond a certain point I would open fire on them. I gave them to understand the fire would be extremely effective. This warning had no effect on the mob and after about ten minutes the whole mob advanced and about 15 men came beyond the given point with the mob behind them waving their weapons above their heads and shouting.

I was certain they intended to attack us with a rush we being so small a party compared with their strength and I detailed four sepoy to load one round

each in their rifles and ordered them to fire. I saw three men fall in the mob but cannot say whether they were killed or wounded as the mob carried them away as they retired.

There was no civil officer present at the moment and as the situation was extremely grave time did not permit of my requisitioning for one, then again none of my men knew where any of the civil officers resided and on the other hand all telephonic communications had been destroyed.

There was no more trouble at this post up to the time I was relieved by Captain Todd, 1-97th Infantry, on the 14th April 1919.

Lieutenant A. St. J. MACDONALD, I.A.R.O., attached 2-10th Jats.

I was ordered on the morning of the 11th April at Ahmedabad by Major Hinde, Commanding Depot 1-99th Infantry, to take over and protect the Indian Defence Force Armoury and the city railway station. I was relieved of the command the same evening by Major Hinde.

The following day a Martial Law Proclamation was distributed through the city and posted on all the important gates and cross-roads. This was on the morning of the 12th. The proclamations were distributed in the station area from about 8-30 to 10-30 A.M.

At about 11 A.M. a picket reported a large mob out of control moving towards the station from the south. Major Hinde ordered me to move out with 20 men and disperse the mob. On arrival I found the situation a much graver one than reported.

There was a large square with five or six roads converging on to it. There were parties of 50 and 60 approximately on two of the roads down which I could see and two roads had mobs of a much larger number. One was a crowd of some two thousand and the other some hundreds. Both these were armed with sticks and a kind of bill hook which was carried largely during these disturbances. I took up a position in the centre of the square, thinking that the appearance of troops would have

dispersed the mobs and also I sought a commanding position. It had no effect but instead excited the large mobs who raised shouts and cries and waved their sticks and weapons in the air, and still moved forward towards the square. The small parties stopped on seeing troops. I at once reported to Major Hinde the situation. On seeing the stubbornness of the large mobs I ordered the men to "single load."

When the mob had advanced to within close distance and I had my flanks threatened, I personally ordered four men to get ready to fire. And ordered one man to fire hoping it would have the result of turning and dispersing the mobs. It did not. And I ordered the remaining three men to fire. This turned the mobs who separated and fell back. On my attempt to withdraw the troops from the square to the station the mobs collected again and moved with shouts towards the station. Seeing the stubbornness of these presumable leaders I further directed ten shots at the mobs. This had the desired effect and there was no further trouble from that quarter.

I have nothing further to report of my duties at Ahmedabad.

Lieutenant J. FITZPATRICK, Cantonment Magistrate, Ahmedabad.

April 10th 1919.

At about 5-30 P.M. I first witnessed the riots as a spectator. I was on the main road to the station near the Prem gate. A cordon was drawn across the road, under the command of Lieutenant Larkin. I was behind this cordon. I saw a crowd 2,000 to 3,000 strong headed by a short, thin Hindu with a goatee beard. He was clothed in white with a small squat *pagri*. I can identify him. This crowd was prevented by Lieutenant Larkin from getting south of the Prem gate. Another crowd much bigger than the one mentioned was driven by troops under Colonel Preston towards the Kalupur circles and in this crowd I saw many Hindus dressed as *Satyagrahis*.

The man who headed the crowd hemmed in by Lieutenant Larkin did nothing to quiet the mob, which hooted, abused and threw stones at the military. I saw one sepoy struck in the mouth by a stone. There were constant cries of "*Mahatma Gandhi ki jai*" and when the sepoy pushed the mob back the *Satyagrahi* described above was most offensive in his expostulations.

April 11th, 1919.

I went to the Pankor Naka in command of a detachment of the 1-97th Infantry. I took up my post at about 11-30 hours and stayed until about 11-30 hours on the 12th April 1919. I was under the orders of Major Kirkwood. The whole city was out against the Government and the white man. I saw Major Kirkwood singled out by the mob and hit on the topee with a full-sized brick thrown from an upper storey. This was at 12 hours.

I twice went with patrols along the Richey Road and each time I was singled out for attack with stones. My post was such that had the mob got down the steps leading under the Fernandez bridge, they could have taken me on both flanks and Subedar Major Kanhayalal's party in the rear. This party was stationed in the Maneek Chowk.

I repeatedly warned the mob that if they advanced to the Fernandez bridge I should have to fire. With my command of the vernacular there was no mistaking my orders. The crowd which extended practically from Fernandez bridge to the railway station and also filled all the side streets became so threatening, and disobedient that I was forced at various times to fire a total of 80 to 100 rounds. I think that about 12 persons were either killed or wounded. I myself was quite unarmed.

At about 14-00 hours I heard that Sergeant Fraser had been killed up the Richey Road. I went with a patrol of ten rifles to recover the body, which I handed over to the police. I then proceeded towards the Panch Kuva gate which I saw burning, and I there saw about 100 incendiaries in the act of burning the gate and the fire engine station. Here my men killed two of the incendiaries and wounded a third, and it was here at about 15-00 hours that the only arrest during the riots was made by me.

In conclusion I would add that every preparation had been made in the city to stone the police and military. Fruit vendors' stalls were filled with stones, bricks and brickbats. The mob was jeering, hooting, abusing filthily

Lieut. J. FITZPATRICK—concluded—Mr. J. A. GUIDER.

and wagging their private parts at me and my men. We were being constantly stoned by hand and by slings.

Though in the mob were Mussalman mill-hands by the hundred, the rioters were led entirely by black-coated

Hindus, one being a *Satyagrahi* garbed as described in what I saw on the 10th April, and about 6 or 8 *Sanyasis*.

During the riots on the 11th April, I saw gold *pagri*d respectfully dressed citizen frequently taking out large trays of sweetmeats to feed the mob.

Mr. J. A. GUIDER, C.I.E., Deputy Inspector-General of Police, C. I. D., Bombay Presidency.

Kaira.

The number of cases investigated is given below:—

Nadiad	3
Anand	3

The total number of persons arrested was 123. Of these 41 were released without being tried owing to the evidence being considered insufficient to warrant their being placed on trial. Eighty-two were sent up for trial of whom 17 were convicted and 65 were discharged or acquitted.

The sentences awarded were as shown below:—

Transportation for life	2
Rigorous imprisonment for 10 years	4
" " 7 "	1
" " 5 "	4
" " 4 "	1
" " 3 "	4
" " 1½ "	1
	17

ANNEXURE TO MR. GUIDER'S STATEMENT.

Public Notice.

By arrangement Mr. Guider, Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, attended a meeting of the Millowners' Association to-day to discuss the police investigation going on in the city. After consultation with him, the following is published for the information of all the workmen:—

1. Mr. Guider explained that it is not the object of Government to harass the innocent through the police, but in order to find out the real culprits it is necessary for the police in the discharge of their duty to call men and question them. No one therefore should be alarmed if called by the police and when they attend they should state truly what they know.

2. It was stated that the work people ran away on hearing rumours of police harassment. There is no reason for this. Mr. Guider says that if any complaints of harassment by the police is brought to notice by any millowner or the association full enquiry will be made and if found to be true the matter will be suitably dealt with.

3. It is alleged that a large number of mill labourers took part in the riots. Their names must be known to their companions who, though they took no part in the disturbances, saw what was going on. In the interest of the latter to avoid being suspected and to protect the innocent they should inform the police what they know and disclose the names of the guilty parties. Such a step will be beneficial to all and many will be saved from inconvenience and anxiety, will be able to attend to their work regularly and thereby benefit themselves and their employers, the millowners.

G. J. PATEL,

P. N. VAKIL,

Joint Honorary Secretaries,

Millowners' Association, Ahmedabad.

2nd May 1919.

† (Commuted by Government to transportation for life.)
‡ (Including 2 sentenced to transportation in constable Imamkhan's murder case by the Sessions court.)
(a) Includes one who was also sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment for another offence.
(b) This number includes 3 persons, one of whom was convicted on two different charges and sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment for each charge; and two persons sentenced on different charges to two years' rigorous imprisonment each.
(c) This number includes 2 persons, one of whom has been convicted on a different offence for which he has been sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment and another similarly was sentenced to six months' rigorous imprisonment.

On the 14th April 1919 I received telegraphic orders from the Inspector-General of Police who was at Ahmedabad to come to Ahmedabad and take charge of the investigation of cases arising out of the riots. I left Poona the same afternoon and arrived at Ahmedabad at 8-30 the following morning. Immediately after arrival I accompanied the Inspector-General of Police into the city and viewed the different places that had been destroyed or damaged. I organised the investigating staff and commenced the investigation. I found that no one was willing to come forward to give information or in any way to assist the investigation. People were willing enough to admit knowledge of disturbances, but when it came to the question of furnishing the names of or identifying the offenders, they pleaded inability.

These difficulties were gradually overcome. As soon as sufficient *prima facie* evidence to establish the guilt of persons was forthcoming arrests were ordered. The first few arrests created a scare among the population, chiefly among the mill-hands, several of whom left Ahmedabad. Their departure affected the working of the mills to some extent and gave rise to complaints from the millowners. I arranged to meet the members of the Millowners' Association and explained to them that no wholesale arrests of the mill-hands was contemplated. Only those individuals against whom evidence of participation in the riots was forthcoming would be arrested and the rest would not be interfered with. The gist of the proceedings at this meeting was published in the local newspapers and printed on leaflets* by the Millowners' Association. Copies of these leaflets were posted up and distributed in the different mills. Their publication had a beneficial effect in checking the exodus and restoring confidence.

The number of cases investigated is given below:—

Ahmedabad.

"A" Division	13
"B" Division	11
"C" Division	17
Kalupur Division	12
Mahadapura Division	3
Sarkhej Division	1
Barejadi	1
Virangam	2

The total number of persons arrested was 357. Of these 140 were released without being tried owing to the evidence being considered insufficient to warrant their being placed on trial. Two hundred and seventeen were sent up for trial, 106 were convicted and 111 were discharged or acquitted by the first tribunal appointed to try the cases.

The sentences awarded were as shown below:—

Death	1 †
Transportation for life	22 ‡
Forfeiture of property	20
Transportation for 14 years	1
Rigorous imprisonment for 14 years	1
" " 10 "	2
" " 7 "	15 (a)
" " 5 "	41 (b)
" " 4 "	2
" " 3 "	14
" " 2½ "	2
" " 2 "	2 (c)
" " 1½ "	2
Fine of Rs. 500	1
	106 (sic)

* Copy attached.

Subedar-Major KANHAYALAL BAHADUR—Rao Bahadur BULAKHIDAS BAPUJI TRIVEDI.

Subedar-Major KANHAYALAL BAHADUR, I.D.S.M., 1-97th Infantry.

I and two other Indian Officers (Subedar Muhammad Akbar Hussain and Jamadar Jodha) with 150 men received orders from Major W. C. Kirkwood at about 9-30 A.M. to proceed to the city where rioting was taking place. We left the lines at about 10-15 A.M. When we had gone about half way to the city we met Captain H. Pearson, Staff Officer to the Officer Commanding, Ahmedabad Area, who showed some orders to Major Kirkwood who explained to us that if the crowd was caught in acts of incendiarisms or made an attack on the troops they were to be fired on and ordered the men to have five loose rounds of ammunition in their pouches. We arrived at about 11 A.M. at the Delhi gate and saw that it had been set on fire and there were about 2,000 men who dispersed into side streets when we approached; many of the men in the crowd were armed with *lathies* and stones. On passing the Delhi gate we left a party consisting of 1 British Officer and 1 Indian Officer and 30 men with orders to allow nobody through the Gate. We then advanced to Richey Road. Major W. C. Kirkwood, 1-97th Infantry, and Lieutenant Fitzpatrick, 1-99th Infantry, leading. On the way the mob were throwing stones, they were told not to throw stones but the prohibition was of no use. On arrival at Richey Road we found that Lieutenant H. S. Larkin had been wounded by a charge of swordsmen and there was a dead man near a water pump at the corner where the Delhi gate road joins the Richey Road. On entering the Richey Road we found a large crowd at the fountain near the Pankor Naka; all the streets and shops of vegetable vendors were filled with stone and bricks. They were throwing stones by hands and slings towards the troops and especially towards British Officers. Another big crowd had assembled on a road which led out towards the Astodia gate and the road by which we had entered the city had again become densely crowded.

The attitude of these crowds was extremely hostile and large numbers of the men were carrying sticks and stones.

We advanced towards the crowd at the Pankor Naka with 60 men and got within about 20 yards of them. There was also a large crowd at the Masjid where we kept a picket.

We received orders from Major Kirkwood to inform the mob on Pankor Naka that if they did not disperse they would be fired on. They gave no attention to this and shouted "*Gandhi Mahatma ki jai*" and one *Sadhu* and his party shouted out that they wanted white men's

flesh, and stones were thrown hitting many sepoys and the head of Major Kirkwood. Major Kirkwood explained to the crowd the effect of fire and ordered me to name three men to fire which drove the crowd back. Major Kirkwood drove the crowd by upper road and I drove the crowd by the lower road near the fountain. I was ordered by Major Kirkwood to shoot if I was in danger and many gentlemen (whom I cannot make out because I had just returned from field service) were shouting "*Jai Gandhiji ki jai*" and that we were not *Kshatriyas* asking us to lay down arms and join with them so that we may eat white men's flesh and if you do not lay down arms we will eat you also, and began to throw stones like showers of rain, hitting many sepoys and men and rushed on us saying why do you not lay down arms. On this I named three men to fire which drove the crowd back, three men being wounded. During the whole time we were in the city no magistrate or civil authority accompanied our force. I went with a patrol to the Bhadar where Major Kirkwood had sent Lieutenant Roberts with a party; here everything was quiet but several public buildings including the Commissioner's and telegraph offices were on fire. The Bank was not set on fire.

I received orders from Major Kirkwood to send pickets for the safety of Europeans.

I returned again to Pankor Naka with patrol and found that the crowd had again collected and were throwing stones. I again warned the crowd of the effect of fire which made them keep at a respectable distance.

I was ordered by Major Kirkwood to give a party to Lieutenant Fitzpatrick as Sergeant Fraser of the police corps had been killed; when the remains of Sergeant Fraser whom I saw were brought in they were dreadfully mutilated. We received a reinforcement of 1-99th Infantry at 7 P.M. we sent out patrols during the night. On the morning of 12th we received orders that mobs of over 10 in number were to be fired at if they did not disperse when ordered. I also received a large number of pamphlets explaining these orders which were distributed by patrols to the crowd and posted at cross roads. At 3-30 P.M. the time laid down for the orders to come into operation and in order to enforce the proclamation three parties of over 10 men who did not disperse when ordered were fired at without inflicting any casualties; these parties all fled.

We were relieved at 8-30 P.M. by British troops and returned to cantonments.

Rao Bahadur BULAKHIDAS BAPUJI TRIVEDI, Personal Assistant to the Collector of Ahmedabad.

I am the Personal Assistant to the Collector of Ahmedabad.

It so happened that on the 10th April 1919 the Collector was informed of the disturbance taking place in the afternoon and after making the necessary arrangements with Mr. Boyd who was brought in the Collector's car, they both left for Prem gate at about 5 P.M. At about 6-30 P.M. or so the same day, Mr. Jivanlal, Barrister, accompanied by two or three *Satyagrahis* came to my room when the Collector's *chitnis*. Mr. Shelat, was obtaining my orders on certain matters. Mr. Jivanlal represented to me that there was a great crowd of men on the Richey Road who were stopped by the police from going to the Ellis bridge and the people have become obstinate. So I should go with him as the District Magistrate was not there. In the meantime Mr. Chhaganlal, the then acting City Magistrate, came to inquire and to consult the District Magistrate, on the subject. I asked Mr. Jivanlal to approach the District Magistrate who had left a little before. He further said that it was nearly the time of the mass meeting that was fixed to be held near the Ellis bridge; if I or the City Magistrate would accompany him he would see that none of us was hurt.

After hearing some news about the events that happened near the Prem gate we thought it better to refer Mr. Jivanlal and his associates to the District Magistrate and the District Superintendent of Police. Mr. Jivanlal then left and the mass meeting was held at night on the 10th April 1919.

2. As regards the 11th I was preparing to go to the office at about 11 A.M. when the Revenue *Naiik* Ahmed came to my house and told me that Government offices, viz., the Collector's, City Magistrate's, Huzur Deputy Collector's, Enquiry Office, record room, Registration office, the *Mandap* erected for the matriculation examination, etc., were burnt, and there were rioters on all the main roads. The Collector and the District Superintendent of Police came in the motor and escaped with great tact, though stones were thrown. He told me that there was a crowd of thousands of people who were saying "Let us go to the Bulakhi's house and kill him." The Revenue *Naiik* had a gloomy face. At this time one Brahmin named Balashankar came. He said the same thing and then a *Mukhtyar* Mohanlal who was so much terrified that he told openly that the rioters were bent upon taking my life. I left the house leaving

Rao Bahadur BULAKHIDAS BAPUJI TRIVEDI—concluded—Mr. A. H. RAIKES.

it in charge of my servants and asking my family members to go to my brother's house. People in the streets were running like anything and the whole of Ahmedabad city was in a very disturbed state. As there was no road passable without the rioters I thought it possible that by the Swaminarayan *Bari* I could go to Bhadar, so I went there. On the way I happened to see Mr. Kavi who told me that I could not be able to go to the office. At this time we heard a row taking place at the Swaminarayan's temple. He asked me to go somewhere else otherwise he said we would both be killed. I then went to Seth Hiralal Girdharlal Bechar Mankiwala. His brother, Mr. Nanbhai alias Ranchodlal, was my school companion. I had known this family since long. Again the family of Seth Bechar Mankiwala is one of the oldest and its members being *saukars* of known respectability and loyal as I know. I went to Seth Hiralal's house which has two main doorways, one leading in Dhanasutar's Gundi's Pol and another in Kharakuwa's Pol. Seth Hiralal, who is an old man of about 70 years, thought to keep me in his brother's house when he heard that the rioters had proceeded towards my house and had burnt my *Shigram* and looting the house. They were at every moment abusing my mother and sister. My orderly and servants were beaten. The rioters first burnt my *Shigram* and the harness and other kit. Then they climbed over the house by means of a ladder. In short they sacked and looted my house and destroyed all furniture, valuable clothes and took away all ornaments, cash and valuable documents. I got every moment information through Seth's *Cumasta*. When the mob was looting my house some of the rioters gave out that Bulakhi is at Bechar Manki's house and they should go there. A number of persons came there through Dhanasutar's Pol at about 2 P.M. and went into the house where I was before. Here Mr. Nandlal Hiralal Seth told the ring-leaders that Rao Bahadur was not there and allowed them to enquire into the house and he would have no objection to go and search his house and find out Bulakhi. Some of them said that they would come at night if I be not found out by that time. The rioters tried their utmost in search of me. It was at about

5 P.M. that they could make a space and break open my two iron safes by throwing them down from my second floor and then only they could get hold of all my jewellery, cash, currency notes, etc. The rioters went to my relatives' houses at various localities but to no purpose. In the evening my brother who had hidden in a house at some distance from my house arranged through his friends to circulate a rumour that Bulakhidas' hands and feet were mutilated and he was killed outside Daria-pur gate. During the time my house was being looted some of the rioters went to Khan Bahadur Hussain Khan's house. A little before the evening Seth Ranchodlal who was gathering information from various sources learnt that the rioters were again to go to his house at about 8 P.M. that day in my search. He became a bit nervous and asked me to arrange to take shelter somewhere else. I arranged with my wife's relations and my brother-in-law and *Karkun* Maganlal Mansukhrum to leave the house in disguise after sunset. I did so. I took rest in a house near Swaminarayan's temple and after 11 P.M. went to Tajpur. Here I had to stay for 24 hours because in the morning of the 12th, the rioters burnt the Astodia *Chowky*. So I decided to go to Gaekwar's *Haveli*. For this I started at about 2 A.M. at night and went to a temple under the management of one of my caste men named Mohanlal Hathi. I stayed here for about an hour and a half and then through my *Sheristedar*, Mr. Shivashankar Chhaganlal, I managed to send message to Mr. Kothawala asking him to come with the police and military aid, as I intended to go to the Gaekwar's *Haveli*. The city was in a disturbed state and I had to manage very carefully to get myself removed from the place. He obtained the permission of the District Superintendent of Police and the authorities and came with four British troops and some military. I was thus taken to the Gaekwar's *Haveli*. Here I informed the District Magistrate, G. E. Chatfield, Esquire, by a phone. He kindly arranged to take me to a house near Shahi Bagh. I have been ever since living in the locality till now. My loss was more than seventy thousand rupees.

Mr. A. H. RAIKES, Superintendent in charge central Telegraph Office, Ahmedabad.

On the afternoon of the 10th April 1919 there was rioting in the vicinity of Kalapur. The telegraph office there was reported to be slightly damaged. The mob then moved on towards the flour mills and some trouble occurred between the rioters and some Europeans employed there; after which there was a lull for the night, but started afresh next morning the 11th when it was reported that Gandhi was arrested. The Superintendent of Police was phoned for and subsequently written to asking for a guard, but could not be found. The Officer Commanding station was also wired to asking for help as trouble was anticipated. The mob armed with clubs, bamboos and all manner of weapons passed the office shortly after nine hours. After burning the Matriculation examination *pandal* and some Government buildings they proceeded towards the office, rushed the gates which had previously been tied down with wire and entered the compound. They started throwing stones at the glasses, breaking doors and windows. Several of them rushed into the building, piled furniture, boxes, in fact woodwork of every description, and set the lot on fire, using petrol or kerosine oil for the purpose. Five fires were kindled on the ground floor. One in each of the following occupants' quarters: the Technical Supervisor Mr. Daruvala's and Telegraph Master Mr. Moses, the club-room and the Public Counter; and one at the foot of the flight of stairs leading to the office. Some of them rushed to the upper floor where the office is situated, and two more fires were lighted, while the rest remained below and prevented any interference. Before leaving they set on fire the godowns with the engine room on the east, and also the godowns

and kitchens attached to the quarters on the west side. Telegraphist Rose, a recent arrival from Bombay, who was unable to obtain accommodation outside, had stacked his goods in one of the outhouses, while he occupied a small room in the bachelors' quarters. The bachelors' quarters were also attacked, but finding the occupant to be an Indian they left the place alone. Meanwhile the fire blazed furiously. The fire brigade was sent for, but did not turn up till near 14 hours. It was subsequently reported that two of the fire engines were completely destroyed and the firemen stoned and beaten. There was no chance of saving anything, and it would appear nature helped destruction. A strong breeze sprung up and fanned the flames all day, making it impossible to approach within several yards of the fire. The whole building was completely burnt down, except two rooms in the Deputy Superintendent's quarters which are believed to be unsafe for occupation.

When the mob rushed the building, the staff made their exit through the back verandah. I was alone at one end of the office and was joined a few minutes later by clerk Oza. We stayed in the office in the hope that something might be done to save the situation after the mob had gone, but the heat was intense and smoke blinding when we were obliged to quit, and remained in the bachelors' quarters endeavouring to get communication with Bombay. Communication was established with Bombay about 14 hours on the 11th, and with Agra later on. The other lines appeared right, but instruments were not available to open communication. Some telegrams were exchanged between the Deputy Superintendent, Ahmedabad, and Postmaster-General, Bombay. Tele-

Mr. A. H. RAIKES—concluded—Mr. DUNCAN E. BROWN.

graphs, Bombay, and other office heads. The following wire was sent to Postmaster-General, Bombay, on the 11th:—

Class XT
Code Time Nil

Person to : P M G By, O S By, Stores By, Tels By, S A J
Text:—

Office burnt down. Nothing saved. Mob rushed building breaking windows doors chairs staircases, piled and set fire using petrol or kerosine. Whole building with surrounding outhouses gutted half dozen places simultaneously. Mob stood by till fire at height threatening any interference. Instrument tables chairs piled in heaps and set on fire. No possibility save anything. Fear cash drafts records everything lost. No opportunity enter burning building up to now fire engines at work. Stores Bombay to issue by tonight's mail forms stationery according previous indents. (Addsd. P. M. G., Bombay, Copy O. S. Bombay, Stores Bombay, Tels. Bombay and S. Ajmere informed.)

Other telegrams were addressed to Stores, Calcutta, and Stores, Bombay, asking for stores, stationery, forms, etc.

We remained in communication with Bombay all night of the 11th, but observed a break early next morning. It would appear, the mob got wind of the fact that we were in communication with Bombay and their doings would be made known, and consequently wrecked the town lines. At about 10 hours we were in communication with Agra, but lost Bombay completely, the line being frequently earthed or insulated. All other lines were completely cut off. After about 16 hours of the 12th there was no communication with anyone till about midday the 13th. Deputy Superintendents, Engineering, Mr. Harvey and Mr. Netto, with a party together with Mr.

O'Brien, Deputy Superintendent, Engineering, Ahmedabad, opened a camp office out at the railway station, as it was found the town lines were in a hopeless state of confusion. Communication was established with Bombay through Ajmere and Agra on line 42-26, all Bombay wires being interrupted. This was the only workable line at Ahmedabad Camp office, but the office had to be well staffed as it was expected some of the other lines may be righting. Later it was reported that 50 posts were down, and the wires on both sides cut in several places. All hope of getting the stations beyond was abandoned. At 20 hours we lost Bombay till 10 hours on 14th by substituting 47 for 42 and remained in communication till closing down of Camp at midday on 16th.

The central office was again in communication with Bombay on 41 on the 14th and, except for occasional stoppages, remained in communication. Only clear line and State telegrams were accepted at the Camp office. About half a dozen lines were brought into the main office on the 15th, and, although the leads were brought in, the instruments could not be fitted till the following morning; and by midday the 16th we were in communication with all stations.

All records were completely destroyed. The public counter cash amounting to Rs. 250 was lost when the mob rushed in and burnt the place.

Rs. 1,250 in cash and stamps and the cash imprest (amount unknown) is still in the safe on the upper flat embedded in the wall but not accessible, as the Public Works Department are of opinion that the walls may fall at any moment. It is possible the amount of cash is safe either in coin or silver. The loss to private property is also great.

Mr. DUNCAN E. BROWN, of the Electric Power House, Ahmedabad.

At about 9-30 o'clock, while having breakfast, I was hastily summoned by the Company's Cable Jointer Ali Hussain who appeared to be in a very nervous state. He entreated me to shut down the plant at the generating station and to take my family away to the Camp immediately as there was a riot in the city, and the rioters had decided to kill all the *Sahibs*. I was aware of the fact that there had been a little trouble the evening before, and so thought it advisable to telephone to the Engineer and Manager and explain the situation to him with a view to shutting down the plant if the rioters demanded it.

It took about ten to fifteen minutes before my conversation with the Chief concluded, and just as I put the telephone receiver on to its bracket, I heard the shouting and whistling at the gates which had been closed previously. I ran outside and approached the east gate of the front wall with a view to try and pacify the mob who were throwing stones and brandishing sticks, etc., and calling out to the power station workmen to stop the machinery. Thinking that the machines would in all probability be damaged if the demands of the ruffians were not acceded to, I immediately shut down the plant. The police guard furnished for the protection of the plant, which consisted of a *Havildar* and three armed constables were trying to take shelter behind the pillars of the office verandah and the front staircase leading to my residence. Seeing the *Havildar* in a precarious position and being stoned unmercifully, I hastened towards him; before I reached him, he was struck in the chest by a heavy brick which made him reel; on recovering himself, I saw him fire one round and then struggle with his rifle as if the empty cartridge had jammed. I pushed him and the other men upstairs to get them out of sight of the crowd. All this time the mob had been stoning the buildings from all sides. On reaching my front verandah, the *Havildar* told me that he would remain at the top of the staircase and prevent anybody from coming upstairs that way.

Hearing shouts of "*Sahib mardalo*" and "*sopee-wala mardalo*", and having my wife and children in the house I thought it advisable to leave my bungalow before the crowd attempted to come upstairs. I accordingly ran down the back steps, which was guarded by my private servant and oilman who entreated me to remain upstairs. My first thought was to telephone to Mr. Preston who was at Shahi Bagh with a view to letting him know how we were situated, but on arriving at the office door, I found it had been closed with a lock on it, I immediately turned about and in doing so received the first blow over the right eye from a large stone. Realising that there was no means of escape, and surrounded as I was by the mob, I thought it advisable to remonstrate with them with the hope that the sight of the blood from the wound on my face would save me further injury; this however did not prove to be the case for I soon got a half brick in the face which damaged my nose and made the blood flow all the faster. I was then set about with sticks and *lathis*, and had it not been for a sympathetic Muhammadan who protected me by trying to shield me with his body, I should have been killed. One very severe blow across the back of the skull sent me on my knees and while in a dazed condition I was struck several times on the body. On recovering my senses, I turned and ran as fast as I possibly could under the circumstances, into the power house by the rear entrance to the same. It was then I found my staff all present in the power house, and when they saw my condition, they rushed out to do their best on my behalf. I went into the Cooler room to wash the blood from my face and head, and while doing so was hastily called away by the station fitter Framji and driver Chhotalal and hidden in the stores, as the mob had decided to search the power house and kill me. They entreated me to hide, promising to protect my family from every danger and so I entered the stores. From my position in the stores I could hear the breaking of the window glasses and wood work, etc., and the shouts of "*Sahib lao, Sahib mar-*

Mr. DUNCAN E. BROWN—concluded—Mr. D. A. LAHER.

dalo." One of the oilmen, who lived on the premises, brought his wife and made her remain in the verandah of the stores with a view to making the rioters believe it was her quarters, this seemingly had the desired effect for I was not found. I am thankful to state that my family was not molested in any way chiefly due to the presence of mind of Ali Hussain who was able to make the mob believe that the family had left for the Camp.

Mr. D. A. LAHER, student of the Gujarat College, Ahmedabad.

At 5 P.M. on the 10th April I was called out on an emergency duty from the Ambulance headquarters. There I came to know that some disturbances had occurred near Prem gate, and a few persons were wounded. A party of four, of which I was one, soon started out. On our way at Richey Road, excited crowds of people shouted aloud, "*Maro, Maro*," and pelted us with stones, abusing and calling us flatterers of the Government. Mr. Kothawala, who was then our officer, succeeded in a measure to pacify the people by explaining that we were out to help their own cause. We proceeded and reached Prem gate after having come across several parties of people shouting "*Mahatma Gandhi ki jai*." Nearly all of these showed a little or more hostility towards our uniform.

There, at Prem gate, I saw about 800 people. In the midst of them was a small police squad. The District Magistrate and the District Superintendent of Police were calmly persuading the mob to disperse. Stones were occasionally thrown here and there, and it was only when the military arrived on the scene that the mob were pushed back and some terrified policemen who had taken refuge in the flour mill near by, to save themselves from the violence of the murderous mob, were taken out.

Military were posted here and there and all was quiet. On our way back at about 7-30 P.M. near Dariapur, a small excited group of men demanded of us to put off our uniform and helmet. I tried to reason with them but in vain. It was only when I took a bolder attitude and gave them to understand emphatically that under no circumstances we were going to yield, they gave way, but not without flinging a few pieces of tiles.

Early next morning a few excited groups of men were stopping the carriage traffic and calling upon shopkeepers as had opened their shops to close them, and were often shouting their chorus of the day—"*Mahatma Gandhi ki jai*." At about 9 A.M. two crowds of rather decent looking people, with which were some known persons of the city, were seen by me going towards Mirzapur from the direction of Prem gate. They appeared sad and morose and little inclined to do any harm.

I then went to the Ambulance headquarters to inquire how things were going on, as being second in command of the Division at the time. It was from here that immense masses of smoke were seen rising up to the sky in the direction of Lal Darwaza, and immediately came to know that the University *pandal* was set to fire, and actual riots had taken place.

I set out to put on my uniform. On my way home I saw a mob—a very large one—excited and infuriated, with a black banner, *dharias vasis*, big *lathis*, kerosine oil tin and bottles, evidently out on a work of violence and destruction. At the Grand Hotel, they halted, intending to do some mischief to Europeans if they were any. Here they were shouting, "There must be some Europeans, kill them" (in vernacular). The hotel people assured them that the hotel was closed since the day before, and that there were no Europeans there. They then rushed towards the electric power house, and I went in the direction of my place, when I saw Lieutenant Macdonald making his way on foot towards the mob. I persuaded him to refrain from the intention, for they would surely have done serious harm to his life, as was seen from the disposition of the mob, and requested him to accompany me to take shelter at the Delhi Chakla *Chowky*. He did so. Immediately then the wild mob came up and began throwing stones at the *Chowky*. It was a very grave situation and we badly required some

I was attended to at about 12 noon by the St. John Ambulance Association. At 3 o'clock P.M. a detachment of Native Infantry arrived and escorted my family and myself to the three gates, and from there the officer in charge of the troops in the city, viz., Major Kirkwood, escorted us to the Alliance Mission headquarters at Khanpur, as that part of the city was quiet at the time and controlled by a strong guard.

I tried to call the District Magistrate and the District Superintendent on the phone but they were out. Shortly after, the District Magistrate enquired on the phone and Lieutenant Macdonald told him how he was practically a prisoner at the *Chowky* in need of urgent help. He was assured that the military would shortly come. At this time a carriage came from the Camp side. The curtains were drawn, but there could be seen ornaments and *sarees* of females. The mob rushed at it. Evidently their intention was most harmful, and they shouted "*Bhagi nakho, bhagi nakho*." But to their extreme disappointment these seeming women opened fire on them from within. The mob was struck dumb, but the carriage running a few yards from them they furiously ran after it. The situation was growing worse for the Lieutenant as time went on, and immediate help was badly necessary.

Then I hurriedly cycled away to the Camp in about 8 minutes and explained the situation to the District Magistrate who was there with some military officers; and troops were immediately despatched in motor lorries. The mob at once took flight at the sight of the troops and not a shot was fired. By this timely help the Lieutenant was saved, but not before one of his fingers was injured by a soda-water bottle which was flung at him.

I now went to Khas Bazar with Mr. Kothawala to get some help for Mr. Brown of electric power house, who had been roughly handled and injured by the mob. On our way there we saw on the Grand Hotel a board—that was ingenuously put up with the words "*Vande Mataram*—the hotel is closed to-day" (in vernacular). At this time military cordons were being thrown there. The mob there, also, was no less excited and was throwing stones, singing their chorus. Some armed sepoys were already sent and we were escorted there by four more, to Mr. Brown whom we gave the necessary treatment. On our way we saw that the telegraph office, all the Courts, and Government offices were set on fire. At about 12-30 noon, I returned home to find a big mob coming to the Delhi Chakla *Chowky* after burning the Delhi gate *Chowky* and the post office. Some *badmashes* went up, began breaking it and burnt the woodwork outside together with the fire brigade lorry, lines, etc. After this they went to Dariapur. I again went to Khas Bazar at about 5 P.M. and found firing going on. I treated two or three wounded. The mob seeing my uniform treated me roughly with some insult and I left the place. Next day morning I again went out with my officer and treated two wounded on our way. Here also we met with the similar treatment. After taking a round in the bazar we returned home. Again in the noon about four of us started out. There had just been a few shots fired at this time, and we intended to attend the wounded. In spite of warning from a military officer against the fury of the mob we went on to find a wholesome welcome of sticks and stones, abuse and insult and found our position perfectly unbearable. Thanks to the tact of our the then officer who explained to them our humanitarian mission and persuaded the mob not to think of our fateful uniform, and persuaded the mob not to think of our fateful uniform, We then were able to leave the place quite safe, with an intention not to be out to help them any more as we had got sufficient of them. But on account of the martial law things seemed to have taken a better turn and the next day morning I just went out to see how things were. Near the railway station I saw Rao Bahadur Ramanbhai persuading some shopkeepers to open their shops but they were not disposed to do it till Martial Law had been removed and till they had seen Mr. Gandhi.

Mr. J. B. TYABJI—Mr. AMBALAL SARABHAI.

Mr. J. B. TYABJI, Executive Engineer, Ahmedabad.

The following is an account of my experiences with the mob on Friday the 11th April.

I started in my motor with a party of friends to see Shah Alam about 9 o'clock. Passing by Premabai Hall I passed a crowd of people being addressed by the Home Rulers who were asking the men to disperse quietly. As I drove on towards the Training College I noticed a large crowd coming from the right, the Victoria Gardens, with long bamboos in their hands, shouting. We were a good distance off, but we judged from the noise they made that they were in an ugly mood and we decided to turn back, and not go on when so much rowdiness was about. So I turned to the right from the corner of the Training College. Just there I met several Bora gentlemen who spoke to us and told us not to go about but to return home as it was not safe to be moving out. We passed on to the gardens and by the Gujarat Club, home. Near the gardens a large number of people came running out of the place next to the gardens where there is a store of wood. They had long poles in their hands. They ran in front of the car and shouted to me stop. I slowed down and practically stopped, but apparently the sight of my venerable companion (Mr. Abdul Hussain) who is 70 years old and has a long grey beard and of my 2 children in the car made the men relent and we were permitted to go on unmolested. I did not speak to the men. I passed Dr. Taylor in the gate at Ahmed Shah's mosque.

After returning home I walked up to Miss Chubb's to enquire if she was alright. I again noticed a crowd collected opposite the Premabai Hall. This time the crowd had sticks. I saw also Mr. Muzumdar, Barrister, talking to some men and persuading them to go home quietly. Mr. Nissar Hussain also met me and desired me not to stir out unnecessarily. There was a crowd of women collected beyond the *Prarthna Samaj* apparently trying to persuade their male relations, perhaps boys, to come back. There was no crowd outside the Women's Training College. The relations of the girls attending the Training College had come in to take the girls away as they apprehended trouble. On returning from the College just beyond the Premabai Hall I met some servant of the contractor who had put up the examination *mandap*. He said the mob were pulling down the *mandap*. I asked him to go and tell the gentlemen, who were haranguing the men a short distance off, about it. Passing out of the Bhadar gate I noticed volumes of smoke going up near my bungalow. I ran up and saw that the examination *mandap* was in flames. My friend Mr. Jabir Ali and I and some servants ran out over the compound wall and pulled down the tents nearest to the compound to prevent the flames setting my outhouses on fire. Shortly after I noticed Mr. Jivanlal Desai, Pleader, come up to help us. He or some other pleader enquired if there was a telephone in the house and some one said that the fire engine had been sent for—and then it turned out that the engine was coming but that the hose had been cut and the engine destroyed on the way. Before the flames of the *mandap* had gone down we noticed large volumes of smoke coming out of the Collector's offices. About this time there were comparatively few people in the open space round the *mandap*. There was a crowd beyond the railings near the Collector's office. Some of the men now came up over the railings, and began to make a bonfire of the chairs and tables which had been rescued by us from the *mandap*. These men belonged apparently to the mill-hand class. I think they were mostly Hindus. My wife thinks she noticed a good many Muhammadans among them. As we were afraid that a heap of bullies lying against my outhouses would be set fire to and would endanger my outhouses we attempted to have them

moved away. But the men sent for this work were stoned and had to desist. Soon the bullies were lighted. I then sent a man up the roof of the outhouses and ordered him to throw down the tiles from the roof over the burning bullies. When the crowd noticed this they began throwing brickbats at us in the compound. One of these hit Mr. Ali. We ran up to the wall, including my wife, and on seeing us come up the men stopped throwing stones, but we understood that we would not be allowed to put out the flames and thought it wise to stop doing so. I may mention that I had thrown away my hat and was going about bare-headed.

We had sent a man to obtain news of Mrs. Tuke and had been informed that she was alright, that the mob had been turned back from her bungalow by being told that the house belonged to Anasuyabai. We now set out to see for ourselves that she felt alright, my friend Mr. Abdul Hussain, my wife and myself—I with my black Persian cap on. We noticed large numbers of men apparently returning from the Collector's office, along the road in front of Mrs. Tuke's bungalow. I stopped to talk to a young fellow—about 25—who seemed to be directing operations. He had a *dhoti* on and a white (fairly clean) coat and a small black cap. I asked him what he was doing and told him that when Gandhi heard of this he could die of grief. He said they would burn down everything till Gandhi and Anasuyabai were set free and asked me to leave him alone. On going on to meet the others I found we were stopped at the gate. The gate was barred inside and we had to wait whilst the servants came up to open it. In this interval a little group collected round us and wanted to know whose house it was. I said it was Lady Chinubai's. The men crowded round us and searched us for weapons. The men appeared to be of the lowest class mill hands. I had my coat torn open and my purse picked in the process. The men were very unwilling even then to let us get in. One or two of them apparently wished to dissuade us because they said the house would be unsafe. The compound wall is low and several of the men were sitting on it, so that the gate was not much of a hindrance for them. We must have been standing at the gate for several minutes and were very much dishevelled when we got in. One man came in with us as a sort of protector. He kept telling us that it wasn't safe for us to remain in the place and that it would be burnt down. I however much suspected that he wanted us to leave so as to have a free hand. The men at the gate said they knew there was a lady with a revolver in the house and that she was going to shoot them and they wanted us to promise that we would not shoot them. I gave the promise. It appears that they then left the house. Mrs. Tuke was in the front of the house—in the compound. We stopped some time near the outhouses of the Assistant Collector's bungalow and then sat in the verandah. One of Colonel Tuke's medical students came in soon after we did and we sent him to the hospital to ask Colonel Tuke to send some sort of help. Mr. Nowroji Vakil and an officer of the Salvation Army also came in to make enquiries. A number of students then came in Colonel Tuke's car and kept guard in the bungalow. We also heard that the military were coming to see what was happening here and returned after half an hour or so. After devising various plans of escape we thought it wisest for Mrs. Tuke to stay indoors and returned home a little before noon. We met groups of men on the way. We found on our return that the *Mamlatdar's kacheri* and the telegraph office were in full blaze. I think that it was after my return that I saw among the men passing in front of my house towards the *kacheri*, contractor Mr. Vaghjibhai Parshotum going with 2 or 3 others.

Mr. AMBALAL SARABHAI, Millowner, Ahmedabad.

I have been asked by the Collector of Ahmedabad to give evidence before the Commission appointed to enquire into the April disturbances, and to submit

in writing an account of my experiences during the riots, or any information which I may possess regarding them.

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[Continued.]

Of the happenings and atrocities committed by the mob prior to Saturday, the 12th April 1919, I have no personal knowledge and therefore I am unable to say much. The 6th of April was observed as a day of mourning but I was not present. I was away from Ahmedabad from the end of March to Saturday, the 12th April 1919. I arrived here on Saturday afternoon by the Gujarat mail. Prior to my leaving Matheran for Ahmedabad, I had information about Mahatma Gandhi's arrest. The Secretary of one of my mills had wired me that the mill-hands had left work. I learnt at the Colaba station of serious disturbances in Ahmedabad. Some British troops were travelling by the same train. I felt that mill-hands should resume work immediately. I told my sister Anasuyabai about the strike in Ahmedabad and she was very indignant about it. She had great influence with the labour on account of the work she had done for their benefit. I requested her to give me a note calling upon the mill-hands to resume work, which she gladly did. The Commissioner, Northern Division, and the Inspector-General were travelling by the same train. The Commissioner, Northern Division, desired me on Saturday morning at a road side station to send a telegram to Ahmedabad intimating Mahatma Gandhi's release. I accordingly sent telegrams to Mr. V. J. Patel, Bar-at-law, and Mr. K. N. Desai, M.A., LL.B., who were well known to mill-hands having taken leading part at the time of the great strike of mill-hands and in relieving distress at the time of influenza and famine. The troop train which preceded the mail from Colaba had been derailed near Nadiad on account of a few rails being removed. Passengers had to be transhipped from one train to another as the derailed train was blocking the line. Telegraph wires had been cut and the poles bent. I saw a small crowd mostly composed of youths either near Nadiad or Anand railway stations. They seemed excited. Their attitude did not look threatening but the boys were calling "*Jai*" of Mahatma Gandhi and Mrs. Besant. As the train steamed into the Ahmedabad railway station yard I heard a few shots. In a bungalow by the railway line occupied by a mill officer I saw a few European mill officers with fire-arms. They cheered presumably at seeing the British troops in the train. On the platform at the station everything looked deserted and quiet. The railway station had a strong military picket to guard it.

I did not know that Martial Law was in existence. I was anxious to get the real news known and to see the people return to their peaceful daily work. I therefore went to the house of Mr. K. M. Desai with a view to ascertain the best method of communicating with the people for the purpose of persuading them to return to work. There were a few men near the station steps and I informed them that Mahatma Gandhi was freed in Bombay. I was asked if Anasuyabai was also free and I told them that she was with me the previous evening and she had never been arrested. While driving to Mr. Desai's house wherever I saw a crowd of persons on the verandahs of houses I gave them the news. The news was received with cheers everywhere. I stopped my car somewhere near Panch Kuwa gate where I found a good many persons sitting scattered in verandahs of houses. They collected round my car and I gave them the news. I allowed the people to collect because I did not know of the existence of Martial Law and evidently they did not know what risk they were running and it was lucky that the crowd and myself were not fired at. At Mr. Desai's house I learnt about Martial Law. As I had just returned from Bombay people were anxious to get news about Mahatma Gandhi and Anasuyabai and began to collect, but they were told not to collect and to disperse.

I saw the Collector at his bungalow. As telegrams were not accepted I had to take his permission for wires to Mahatma Gandhi informing him (Mahatma Gandhi) of what happened in Ahmedabad and requesting him not to court arrest. I was informed in Bombay of Mahatma Gandhi's intention to proceed to Delhi again before long, in spite of the Government order. I felt that after what had happened in Ahmedabad he should return to Ahmeda-

bad and not court arrest himself or allow Anasuyabai to do so. A large portion of Ahmedabad population is composed of mill-hands and their dependents. Mahatma Gandhi and Anasuyabai are worshipped by the labour population of the city, and their arrest would have excited them again.

I told the Collector that on account of Martial Law it was not possible to collect people and to make known to them the real facts, and without real facts being made known it was not possible to persuade the people to return to work. The Commissioner, Northern Division, and the Inspector-General happened to be there and they asked if I would go with them to the city. Martial Law was applicable within the city area only and there was no Martial Law outside. It was rumoured that a mob had collected outside the Martial Law area and I volunteered to go to the mob to give it the true facts and to try to pacify it. I explained that though personally I had no objection to go with them it would not have the desired effect because people might think that I was giving them a wrong version under their (officers') direction. In order that my persuasions may be effective, I suggested that Mr. V. J. Patel and Mr. K. N. Desai should go with me. I gave them (Government officers) assurance that the persons whom I wanted with me would not excite the mob in any way, and if they did so, I would see that they did not get a chance. I was asked to go to the Mess where the Officer Commanding was holding his office. I followed the Commissioner, Northern Division, the Collector and the Inspector-General who preceded me. I was called in and told that I could go wherever I liked and if I was challenged by the military on the way I should tell them that I had permission of the Officer Commanding. But I was stopped from proceeding further by an officer at the Delhi gate. I therefore went back to the Officer Commanding and he gave me a pass. I returned with the pass and was allowed to proceed. The military officers at the Delhi gate and other places were civil and obliging. I saw a small crowd opposite the picket at Delhi gate in spite of instructions which were to the effect that people should not collect. When they assumed a fairly big number they would be liable to be fired at, but still this did not prevent the people from collecting. I passed one of such crowds on the way. The men appeared dazed. I thought then and still believe that they had lost their sense and without any reason they were collecting, and evidently did not understand what risk they were running. I saw a man lying on the street near Delhi gate dead or wounded. I was told by a military officer that people wounded or killed as a result of firing were allowed to be removed when firing ceased. Such firing, I was told, did not last more than a minute or so. Dr. Kanuga was also at Dr. Patel's house. I was informed there, which report was confirmed afterwards, that there were ample facilities for the treatment of the wounded—civil hospital and private dispensaries. They were very indignant at the atrocities of the mob and they gladly assented to accompany me to pacify the mob near Kankaria or wherever it may be. We took Mr. Desai from his house on our way and proceeded towards Kankaria. We were stopped on the way by Mr. A. D. Wadia who informed us of the mob being somewhere near Kankaria. The mob had visited his house and the ladies and children were terror-stricken. The mob had demanded the surrender of his gun. Mr. Wadia denied having a gun in the place and they went through his house and searched it. According to his report the men were drunk and were armed with *dharias* and sticks. There was a rumour that some men had bows and arrows and that these men had come from Kaira side. We were advised not to proceed further as it would be difficult to find the mob. In case we succeeded in getting near it we were in great danger of being attacked. Mr. Wadia requested me to arrange for the removal of his family and valuables to a place of safety as the mob had promised to call for the gun again in the evening. A big stone was hurled at my car but we had a narrow escape. I was informed by the Officer Commanding to return home before 7 P.M. as according to

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orders anyone out after 7 P.M. was liable to be shot at. It was nearly 5 o'clock and after leaving these gentlemen I went to the Collector and the Commissioner, Northern Division, who were both out. I then went to the Officer Commanding and told him what I had seen. I informed him of Mr. Wadia and his family but he said that he could not do anything in the matter. I again called on the Commissioner, Northern Division, and the Collector, but as they were out I left a message about Mr. Wadia with Mr. Broomfield, the Additional Sessions Judge, and told him what I had seen. I further explained why it was not possible for me to get to the mob.

On the Richey Road it was written on the wall in coal that Europeans should be murdered. I saw Government buildings and city gates burnt down. Some of the gates were still smouldering. Buildings seemed to be hopelessly damaged by fire. My own impression was and is that there was anti-Government feelings for the time being on account of the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi and rumoured arrest of Anasuyabai. I found similar feelings amongst the mill-hands against mill agents when Mahatma Gandhi took his famous oath during the great strike of 1918. This feeling took as short a time to subside as it took to excite.

On Sunday morning I thought that Mahatma Gandhi and Anasuyabai would arrive in Ahmedabad in response to my wire. I therefore went to meet them at the station. All prominent local civil officers were there. I was asked to arrange for motor cars which were required by the military. The train was late and I made all the arrangements I could to secure the cars. I was also asked if I had any intimation about the arrival of Mahatma Gandhi and Anasuyabai. I told them that in all probability they would be in Ahmedabad that morning. The Deputy Inspector-General asked me to introduce him to Mahatma Gandhi and we drove away in the same car. Mahatma Gandhi was asked to see the Commissioner, Northern Division. He, Anasuyabai and the Deputy Inspector-General went to the Commissioner's bungalow. Mahatma Gandhi informed me of his intention to call a mass meeting and he told me how shocked he was at what the people had done. The meeting was arranged to take place on Monday.

On Sunday night at about 10 P.M. I was sent for by the Commissioner, Northern Division, and he and the Inspector-General asked me if I could arrange for mills to be started the next morning. I was informed by them that it was their intention to withdraw the Martial Law. In view of the atrocities committed only two days back, I was of opinion that there should be no relaxation in their preparedness to meet all eventualities though I did not expect any. I agreed to do all I could but after some conversation it was felt it would be better to arrange to work the mills after Mahatma Gandhi's meeting. I enquired that in case the work people demanded a promise for payment of wages for the days the mills were not working due to riots and its after-effects, and if they refuse to resume work, what should the mill agents do. In the interest of discipline I explained that the men should not be paid. The Commissioner, Northern Division, and I felt that the mills should agree to payment of wages as it was essential that they resume work without delay. It was arranged that a notice should be issued by the Millowners' Association informing the work people that the mills would begin work as usual from Tuesday morning and that these notices should be distributed broadcast in the city and at the meeting of Mahatma Gandhi.

There was a strong rumour that the mill which blew the whistle first for starting work would be burnt down. There were labour troubles at the time of the riots, spinners of most of the mills on Raipur side being on strike. It was rumoured that persistent attacks were made by a mob to burn a mill, the men of which were on strike at the time of the riots.

A meeting of the Ahmedabad Millowners' Association was called which was attended by the Collector and the Inspector-General.

Arrangements were devised for the protection of mills in case of any trouble. The draft of the notice to be issued by the Millowners' Association was approved by members, the Collector and the Inspector-General.

I had a message early Monday morning from the Commissioner, Northern Division, asking me to arrange for Mahatma Gandhi to see him at the District Court, the same morning. I was also asked to accompany him. Mahatma Gandhi saw the Commissioner and the Commissioner showed me a draft of a notice to be issued by Government, which I recollect was to the effect that unless the people resorted to violence they would not be fired at. I was asked to arrange for the distribution of notices at Mahatma Gandhi's meeting which I did.

Mahatma Gandhi's meeting was a huge meeting. Most of the prominent mill agents were also present. In the meeting Mahatma Gandhi condemned very strongly the atrocities committed by people. He advised those guilty to confess their misdeeds, to deliver to police arms, if any, to follow his example, and to fast for three days and to subscribe to a fund for the benefit of those who had suffered during the riots. His speech seemed to have a very good effect. Reverend Mr. Gillespie was the only European who attended the meeting. He motored back with me and the people did not show any hostile attitude towards him at the meeting nor on the way. He moved freely in the crowd.

I had to arrange for my mills to be started on Tuesday morning. I passed Jamalpur, where most of my weavers live. There were people on verandahs and in the streets. I stopped my car and they collected and I asked them to return to work on Tuesday. They looked very quiet and promised to do so and to inform other work people to go to their respective mills. The mills were started on Tuesday morning, without any trouble or hitch. The return of the men in most of the mills was fair. As some of the work people who were from villages round about had run away during the riots there was a shortage felt for a considerable time. The investigations scared some and the shortage continued for a few weeks. There was a very strong rumour to the effect nearly a week after the riots that Mahatma Gandhi, Anasuyabai and other leaders would be arrested. The city had just begun to assume its normal condition and such a step, in my opinion, would have excited the people and done incalculable harm by estranging the sympathy of the people. I therefore saw the Collector and the Commissioner, Northern Division, and told them that the arrest of the people who were not responsible for the riots, but, who in their opinion may have been responsible for the agitation against the Rowlatt Act, would be a mistake. I also felt that Satyagraha movement should be given up because those who went in for it were liable to be arrested. After seeing what had happened, I believed that there would be great bloodshed if Mahatma Gandhi and other leaders were to court arrest and were arrested. I was assured by the Collector and the Commissioner that they had no intention of arresting persons who had not taken part in the riots. I then went to see Mahatma Gandhi in Bombay to dissuade him from starting the campaign afresh but the previous evening he had decided to suspend it.

A meeting was called about ten days after the riots by the Commissioner, Northern Division, to explain to the people duties of citizenship, but, unfortunately it did good to no one and he gave offence to some.

By referring to the terms of reference I find that the Committee has been appointed to investigate the recent disturbances, their causes and the measures taken to cope with them.

Causes.—The war and its aims as given out and the speeches of the British and allied Ministers raised the hopes of the people of India who believe that on cessation of hostilities the Government of this country would be carried out in accordance with the wishes of the people. The passing of the Rowlatt Act in the teeth of unanimous opposition of Indian members of the Legislative Council disillusioned the minds of the people and they began to

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realise that the executive would continue as unmindful of the popular opinion as in the past. The people were, however, told by the Government that the opposition to the Rowlatt Act was not genuine and as it did not affect in the least other than anarchists, the agitation was without any real grievance and due mainly to misconception about the scope of the proposed legislation. When the wave of unrest and Bolshevism was passing all over the world in the abstract, I, for one, do believe that Government should have unlimited powers to deal with Bolshevism and unhealthy unrest. The people would not grudge strengthening the hands of Government with such limited powers, provided they were certain that such powers would not be injudiciously used by the Government and its agents, and, if abused, it would be in the people's power to set matters right. People thought that previous enactment had unfortunately not been judiciously applied and strongly objected to strengthening the hands of Government with a fresh measure of repressive legislation. It is well known that Mahatma Gandhi is worshipped by masses and held in high respect and esteem by every Indian, even though many may differ with his views and methods. When the report, as published, wrongly informing public of his arrest, under the Defence of India Act, while in fact he was simply being brought back to Bombay was received, the people got greatly excited and naturally believed that if a person like Mahatma Gandhi had been arrested no Indian who differed from Government was secure from arrest. I am of opinion that this arrest of Mahatma Gandhi played on their minds and the masses resorted to violence and a policeman was murdered. When next day they heard of the false rumour of the arrest of Anasuyabai they gave vent further to their excitement by burning Government property and murdering an European Sergeant.

Measures.—Soon after the disturbances investigations were taken in hand by the Criminal Investigation Department with Mr. Guider at the head. Many mill-hands and others were required by the authorities for information

Supplementary written statement of Mr. AMBALAL SARABHAI, Millowner, Ahmedabad.

In the written statement already submitted I had mentioned that as it was not quite clear to me whether or not the subject of compensation for damages done during the most lamentable riots in April last fell within the scope of enquiry of the Committee I did not offer any remarks on the subject. From a reply to a question* on the subject of an Hon'ble Member of the Bombay Legislative Council, I understand, that the Committee is to investigate the subject of compensation. I therefore submit this supplementary statement.

Compensation has been levied as under:—

(1) One week's wages of all workmen employed in factories and mills, heads of departments, their assistants, clerks and those whose caution money is not held by employers have been exempted. Women and children have not been exempted. Caution money held by employers on a particular day equivalent to one week's wages were attached and employers were asked to pay them into the Government treasury before a date fixed by the Collector. The order of attachment was served on the employers, most of whom are the members of the Ahmedabad Millowners' Association. Employers recovered caution money attached by Government from the first pay that fell due after the payment of amounts attached. Men employed in small flour mills, mechanic shops and other manual workers, skilled and unskilled, not employed in factories and mills have not been subjected to this levy. Women were very distressed and it was not an uncommon sight to see them bitterly weeping

* A series of questions relating to the disturbances was put by the Hon'ble Raj Sahib H. D. Dholakia, Esq., M.L.A., and answer given was the "matters referred to will form the subject of investigation by the Disorders Inquiry Committee which is expected shortly to visit the presidency. Government do not consider it desirable to anticipate the results of the enquiry."

and statements and it created a little scare. Mr. Guider took every care not to unnecessarily scare the people and the suggestions made by the Millowners' Association received his prompt attention. He took precautions to avoid unnecessary harshness. People who were suspected were cross-examined by him. At a time of such grave crisis some innocent men are sure to suffer, still I am of opinion that the investigations were carried out in a most satisfactory manner. Unless Mr. Guider was convinced of the guilt of any party, no action was taken, and, enquiry of this nature could not have been carried out better and Mr. Guider performed his unpleasant task without a bias and in a God-fearing manner. He kept his subordinate staff under proper control and they were not allowed to get overzealous which is unfortunately the case so often even when the head of department is a good man.

As a result of the damage done during the riots compensation is being collected, but, as it is not quite clear to me whether or not it falls under the terms of reference, I prefer not to offer any remarks about it.

I had occasions during these grave crisis of coming in close contact with the Collector. I found him perfectly composed and sympathetic. He listened carefully to the various proposals and they received his very best attention. He did not in the least seem to be in a fright or bent on taking revenge or unnecessary harsh measures. I feel certain that the situation was saved mainly due to his cool-headedness and the sympathy he always feels for the people. I did not come into contact with other officers to the same extent, but from what I saw of them I wish it was possible for me to speak in the same terms about them though the attitude of all the officers was on the whole very satisfactory. One appreciates it all the more after hearing of the official attitude in the other provinces at the time of riots. In my humble opinion, if the Collector had taken any measures beyond which he took, the trouble would have been considerably more and the harm in every respect incalculable.

in their places of employment. Those who took up employment for the first time after the riots, or who were not in Ahmedabad during the riots, have not been exempted. As far as I know, no woman or child employed in any mill or factory was either arrested or convicted. The men subjected to this levy said at the time of attachment that they would take considerably more than the amount of fine by the way of permanent increase in rates of wages. By the way of fine they lost about 2 per cent. of the annual total wage. They have successfully extorted from employers a further rise in wages to the extent of 12 per cent. I cannot say that the rise secured by them was not mainly due to the rise in the cost of living, but if they had not been fined it might not perhaps have come on so soon. The Collector and the Commissioner, Northern Division, did consult a few non-officials with a view to ascertain the best method of fining the mill-hands and the opinion of non-officials did receive due consideration.

(2) One-third income-tax assessments have been levied by the income-tax office from income-tax payers. Mill Companies and factories have been exempted but firms and partnerships have been subjected to the levy. Women tax-payers and those who were not in Ahmedabad at the time of riots so also those who gave assistance to Government at the time of riots, but who did not apply for exemption have not been exempted. Persons who lent their cars and whose houses were taken over for the occupation of the military, did not make them over with an eye to receiving compensation from Government. Most of the cars lent were returned in very bad condition, but I am not aware of any one having claimed compensation from Government for damage to cars, or rents for houses for the military. The Officer Commanding did thank

Mr. AMBALAL SARABHAI—concluded—Mr. JIVANLAL VARAJRAI DESAI.

those who lent their cars. Government did not exempt even such persons, but I do not think any one applied for exemption on the ground of loan of motor cars, or on account of their houses being taken over for the military. In respect of applications for exemption from payment of compensation, my information may not be true, but what is mentioned above is correct to the best of my information. Very few or no payers of income-tax have been convicted.

(3) Three times the water tax has been ordered to be levied from house owners through the municipality. As mill companies have been exempted from payment of compensation and dividends are declared income-tax free, an investor in mill shares would not pay any compensation, while an estate owner would be subjected to the fine. Employees of the Bank of Bombay, the Ahmedabad Electricity Company, the railway companies, Government servants (not pensioners) and Europeans have been totally exempted from payment of any compensation. I believe that some employees of the railway company were arrested for having taken part in cutting of telegraph wires, etc. The employees of the municipality have not been exempted though the Board has passed a resolution requesting the Government to do so. Those who desired to be exempted from payment of compensation were asked to apply to the Collector. Self-respect must have prevented many from so doing.

From the arrest made and persons put up for trial the policy of Government appears to have been to punish only those who were responsible for the commission of the offences. Those who took part in the agitation over the Rowlatt Act and the passive resistance movement have not been touched.

The following seem to me to be the object underlying the levy of compensation:—

- To fine those who rioted or were responsible for the damages, but, who escaped arrest and conviction as all the miscreants could not be arrested and convicted.
- To fine those who had sympathy with the rioters and those who took part more or less in the agitation over the Rowlatt Act or in the passive resistance movement prior to the riots.
- To collect the amount of damage from the city in order that public funds may not be used for damage done in Ahmedabad.

Mr. JIVANLAL VARAJRAI DESAI, B.A., Bar-at-Law, Secretary, Home Rule League, Ahmedabad.

I am a Barrister-at-Law, practising in the Ahmedabad courts for nearly 24 years. I take some part in the public movements in the country and try to educate public opinion on current important matters.

The citizens of Ahmedabad began to take greater interest in political questions since the year 1915, the year of the Bombay Congress under the presidency of Lord Sinha. In the year 1916 we had organized the Bombay Provincial Conference and the Gujarat Educational Conference.

The Political Conference was attended by both the sections of the nationalists—moderate and advanced—and Mr. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, leader of the advanced party, had come here with a fairly large number of Deccani delegates. This aroused the Ahmedabad public.

The next year the whole country was roused up by the Home Rule movement in pursuance of the resolution of the Lucknow Congress. The city was visited by Mrs. Besant and the internment order passed against her and Messrs. Wadia and Arundale created a greater stir throughout the country and Ahmedabad too had its share in the agitation to secure their release.

In August 1917 the Right Hon'ble the Secretary of State made his pronouncement regarding the grant of responsible government, and we took an humble part in explaining to the people here as well as in the different talukas the demand of the country and how far the Government were meeting it.

- (d) To hold the whole population responsible for the damage done by a few by inflicting exemplary punishment.

If the motive was as given in (a), then, as a number of persons arrested and convicted have been other than mill-hands as well, practically no income-tax payers and very few house owners, the object has not been fulfilled. Moreover, persons like women and children have been fined. Firms as such could not have taken part in riots, have also been subjected to the levy. Innocent persons have been penalized and those guilty have escaped punishment.

If the (b), then a large number of those who were mainly responsible for the agitation and the passive resistance movement have completely escaped. Mahatma Gandhi, I believe, will not be paying any compensation as he is neither a mill-hand, nor a payer of income-tax nor a house owner.

If the (c), then it should have been collected irrespective of the responsibility of guilt. In which case, it should have been levied from those who were in the best position to pay it.

If the (d), then the amount levied per payee is so small that it will not have any exemplary effect if even infliction of punishment however severe on those who are not guilty serves as a deterrent. In my humble opinion the levy should not have been made if it was impossible to do it equitably. While fully realising that public funds should not be spent in compensating for damage done by few miscreants, still the levy cannot be justified because it has been collected from more innocent than guilty. The method of levy though inequitable and unjustifiable has been in my opinion the least provocative.

Re tribunals.—Since the subject of compensation falls within the scope of the enquiry of the Committee, I take it that the subject of the method adopted for the trial of the guilty falls within the scope of enquiry as well.

Ahmedabad began to assume its normal aspect from Tuesday the 15th April 1919. It would have been better if the trials had taken place in the ordinary way and tribunals had not been set up. The work of the tribunals has been considered just and satisfactory on the whole. The personnel of the first tribunal inspired more confidence than that of the second tribunal.

The labour movement was also organized by Bahen Anasuya and her co-workers.

Mahatma Gandhi had adopted this city as his home and his simplicity of life and self-less work attracted the attention of the citizens.

In the beginning of 1918 there were strikes in local mills and the strikers met in the river-bed day after day and the large meetings of mill-hands were well managed and orderly. These regular meetings of mill-hands instilled into their minds deep reverence for Mr. Gandhi. The strike was brought to a close by the intervention of Mr. Gandhi and his sacrifice in the cause of labour endeared him the more.

After the armistice last year the people had expected that the promised reforms would be soon coming and the restrictions imposed on account of war would be relaxed. But the control on the movement of grains was continued.

The monsoon of 1918 had failed and the prices of all necessary articles—foodstuffs and wearing apparel—had gone up very high. The cost of living even in the case of middle class people had gone up very high. The poor man's oil and cereals were controlled and large quantities of wheat and ghee were exported. This state of things greatly perturbed the minds of the poor house-holders.

The thinking people had expected that as a result of the termination of the hostilities the political prisoners and internees would be released and the administration of the country would be carried on more on democratic

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[Continued.]

lines instead of on bureaucratic lines. They know that India had contributed largely in men and money and Indian soldiers had saved the situation in France in 1915. They did not want any reward for this sacrifice, but they expected just and kindlier treatment, but instead of that the Government offered to them the Rowlatt legislation.

This legislation had aroused great opposition in the country. Members of Council had opposed it with all their might. Publicists of all shades of opinion had criticized it in unequivocal terms and the public mind was much agitated. There was such opposition against this legislation that Mr. Gandhi suggested *Satyagraha* against it. Men like Swami Shradhdhanandji who had given up worldly concerns and adopted *sanyas* came out of their retirement and all over the country meetings were held to protest against this legislation.

Ahmedabad also had its due share in this protest and as a humble worker in the national cause I took part at some of these meetings and explained the proposed legislation and how it affected the liberties of the subjects.

When Mr. Gandhi started the *Satyagraha Sabha* I joined it and was present at some of the meetings organized by this Sabha. At every meeting organized by this Sabha persons who had carefully studied the Bills explained them and exhorted people to keep up their protest against them.

In spite of the opposition to the Bills, the Government passed one of them into Act and as a mark of penance Mr. Gandhi desired that the second Sunday after the passing of the Act be observed as a day of humiliation and people were to fast and go in orderly procession to some sacred place and offer prayers to secure divine intervention.

There was some misunderstanding about the day. At first we thought 30th March 1919 was to be observed but we got timely intimation that Sunday the 6th April 1919 was to be observed and not the 30th March, but people in Delhi, not getting the information in time, observed Sunday the 30th March as the day of humiliation and something untoward happened there. The news was flashed on the wires to Bombay and we soon learnt about the incidents.

We decided to observe the 6th April as the day of humiliation and we had organized a procession from Manilal Mansions to the river.

Swami Shradhdhanandji and Mrs. Sarojini Naidu had come down to Ahmedabad on this mission and they had addressed large audiences about the Rowlatt Acts. It was therefore anticipated that the procession would be very largely attended.

The District Magistrate of Ahmedabad called up Mr. V. J. Patel, Secretary of the *Satyagraha Sabha*, with some of the local leaders on 4th April, and I accompanied Mr. Patel and Mr. Krishnalal Desai to him. We assured him that nothing untoward need be feared, because everyone understood the solemnity of the occasion. The District Magistrate told us that he did not wish to come in our way, but only wanted to be assured that nothing like what had happened at Delhi would occur here.

On the 6th April there was a complete cessation of work in Ahmedabad, most places of public resort and amusement were closed, and fast was observed by a large number of people. A procession was arranged to start at 3 P.M. but long before the appointed hour large crowds of people had collected on the road and the procession consisting of more than 50,000 people went to the sands. No more orderly or quieter procession had passed through the streets of Ahmedabad within living memory and one may rightly describe it as a sight for the gods. The rich as well as the poor, brains and hands, professional gentlemen and mechanics, merchants and labourers, had joined the procession and there was a sprinkling of women also in it.

At the river platforms were arranged, the measure was briefly explained and divine intervention was sought for the repeal of the measure.

On the 9th April there was the *Ramnavami* holiday and we had organized a mass meeting in the sands to preach *swadeshi* and to take *swadeshi* vow. In deference to the opinion of Mr. Gandhi, the taking of the vow was deferred but the audience was exhorted to use *swadeshi* articles. It was announced at that meeting that Mr. Gandhi was on his way to Delhi to make personal inquiries in connection with the Delhi incidents and try to settle the differences between the officials and the people. But before he reached the frontier of the Punjab, internment order was served upon him and on his disobeying it and going into the Punjab he was arrested, and the news of his arrest was sent to the *Satyagraha Ashram* by his Secretary Mr. Mahadeo Desai by telegram. This telegram was sent by the Ashram people to Mr. Patel on the morning of the 10th.

As the courts were working in the morning I had gone to the court and was in the district court library at about 7-45 A.M. when the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest was brought to me. The messenger asked me to go to Mr. Patel's. At Mr. Patel's we arranged to publish a translation of Mr. Mahadeo Desai's telegram, so that the people may not be excited by the bare news of the arrest. But before the translation could be printed and published the news of the arrest had reached the markets and mills, and people stopped business and collected in groups on the roads.

I was in court till about 10-30. At about 2 P.M. my son brought me the information that on his way to the post office he saw the shops were closed and soon after my clerk returned from the Bank of Bombay and he gave me the information of a large crowd being collected near Ranchhodlal fountain on the Richey Road. About half an hour later when I was at work in my office I heard the noise of a crowd and I inferred that the crowd on the Richey Road was coming towards the station: so I rushed off to meet them. I saw a small crowd near the English Cinema near the Panch Kuwa gate, throwing stones at the building. I remonstrated with them and within two minutes the crowd dispersed and all was quiet. I saw a man in the building throwing stones at the crowd.

In my opinion the crowd must have proceeded from the Richey Road fountain to see that the shops were closed on account of Mr. Gandhi's arrest and collected at this place because on the 6th April the manager had at first not notified that the theatre would be closed that day, but had only just before the starting of the procession had put up a board announcing that there would be no performance that evening but subsequently the management changed their mind and gave a performance. When I was returning from the river-side I saw the theatre illuminated as usual and ordinary preparations were seen as on performance nights.

After dispersing the crowd at this place I returned to my bungalow and after tea I left with a friend of mine to go to my club. When I was near the Manekchowk post office on the Richey Road I noticed a large crowd of people collected near the Laxmi Vilas Hotel and beyond and I hurried up and inquired what the matter was. I saw there the city police Inspector, several Sub-inspectors of police, one or two Sergeants of police and a party of armed sepoy, all in their full uniform. I went up to the police Inspector Mr. Acton and asked him the reason of the presence of the police force there. He pointed out to me a brickbat and told me: "Mr. Desai, this brickbat will mean bullets." I told him that it could not mean that and that I would see if the crowd disperses. I talked with some people who were standing in the front and explained to them that the police were trying to preserve order and the crowd should not continue longer there. Someone said that the police had taken up a threatening attitude and they could not tolerate it. I interceded with them further and Sub-Inspector Baig joined us in our conversation and we succeeded in persuading some people to move on, but their places were filled up by others at the back. Mr. Indulal Yajnik, Mr. Achratlal Seth and others were trying their utmost to ask the people to preserve strict order and not to relieve

[Continued.]

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the congestion at the place and go to the river-side. I stopped at this place for about a quarter of an hour and then proceeded towards the Bhadar.

Proceeding a few yards I came near the fountain where I saw some damage to the electric lamps of the Gaiety Theatre and learnt on inquiry that that was the place where the crowd had first collected. In my opinion the damage to this theatre was due to the fact that on the 6th April the management of the theatre had kept it open and that an armed police party was stationed there that afternoon. On that day no special precautions were necessary to be taken by the police throughout the city except that they had kept a small party at the Khas Bazar *chowky* near Three Gates under the Deputy Superintendent of Police. I was told that the management had specially requisitioned a party of armed police for the safety of the theatre that day. On my return from the river-side I had noticed the police party still sitting at the entrance of the theatre. To my knowledge the only damage done by the crowd on that day till about 5 P.M. was to the two theatres.

I proceeded from this place towards the Bhadar and was joined on my way by Mr. P. V. Medh, M.A., B.Sc., and Mr. N. M. Desai B.A., LL.B., and when we had gone a few yards further I met Head Constable Jethelal Vithaldas belonging to the Criminal Intelligence Branch of police on his cycle. I requested him to run up to the City Magistrate and request him in my name to arrange for the withdrawal of the police force on the Richey Road, so that the crowd there might be dispersed. He told me that instead of his carrying my message my personal interview will have some effect: so we all walked up to the court of the City Magistrate and I was there informed that he was with Mr. Bulakhidas, the Personal Assistant to the Collector. I went up to the latter's office and found the City Magistrate, the Personal Assistant to the Collector and the *Chitnis*. I remained standing before them and implored them to withdraw the police force so that the crowd might disperse. I told them that if, after the police withdrew, there was any mishap, they may hold me personally responsible for any mischief, and I will submit to the penalties of law. My prayer was unheeded. I remained with the City Magistrate and the Personal Assistant to the Collector for about a quarter of an hour. When I saw that my entreaties were of no avail I left the office and was returning to the Richey Road to again persuade the crowd to disperse, but when I went near the Karanj, I noticed several people going towards the river, and met a friend who was persuading the crowd to disperse. He told me that the police having withdrawn themselves the crowd dispersed. He further informed me that some injured persons were taken to the civil hospital. I was told that they were injured somewhere outside Kalupur gate.

I went to the civil hospital to inquire what the matter was and learnt that six injured persons were taken there, and while I was there a seventh person was brought there. This man I learnt, was a police constable and he expired soon after he was brought.

A crowd had collected in the compound of the civil hospital and I dispersed it. I had hoped to make some inquiries about this incident next day and had asked a man, who was present in the compound and who said he was present at Prem *Darwaza* before and at the time of the incident, to see me the next day. This man's name was Mr. Vyas. He told me he was a coal merchant and had his place of business at Gheekanta in Maganbhai's Wadi.

We held a mass meeting in the river-bed on the 10th evening and explained the message of Mr. Gandhi and exhorted the people to preserve perfect peace and order and go about their business the next day.

We had arranged that a party of our workers should go out into the markets to see that the shops were opened. I had inquired at about 7-30 A.M. at the house of Mr. Patel to find that he was in the bazar. Shortly after that I was in the District Law Library, when I was informed by a friend of mine that a crowd of mill-hands

had gone to my school—the Native Institution—outside Sarangpur gate, and had got it closed, and that they were proceeding towards Astodia and Jamalpur to get the mills and the institutions closed and that I should meet them and try to dissuade them from their purpose. As I was leaving the court little before 8 A.M. I learnt that a report was current in the city that a telegram was received in Ahmedabad informing of the arrest of *Srimati* Anasuya at Bombay. I took a hackney *chigram* and proceeded towards the Jamalpur gate. When I was half way between the Khamasa police station and Jamalpur gate, I saw a large crowd of mill-hands coming towards the Khamasa *chowky* from the Jamalpur gate. I stood in the middle of the road and got the crowd to stop and talked with some members thereof. I reasoned with them that the message of Mr. Gandhi enjoined them to go to work but they replied that Mr. Gandhi being under arrest they could not go to work and they would go home. Some members of the crowd had bamboo sticks and such other things. The crowd was about 1,000 strong. They stopped about ten minutes and promising not to create any mischief they went on. They went towards the Becharadas mill. I took my carriage to the Gaekwar's *Haveli* (police head-quarter) and had to stop it after going some distance from the *Haveli* as the crowd were still passing. I did not see any policeman all the way. I got out of the carriage in the court compound and got some friends then waiting in the Bar room to go with me to again intercept the crowd and some half a dozen of us went near the office of the Oriental Insurance Company near the Karanj and got the whole crowd then numbering about 5,000 strong to sit down, and we talked to them for about half an hour. They put down their sticks, etc., and they were practically calmed and we thought they would quietly disperse, but someone came rushing from Khanupur side and shouted out that some of mill-hands were arrested in Shahpur and we should go with them to see about that and as we were preparing to go with them when the crowd rose up and left in a *melée*. When I was descending the steps I noticed smoke clouds and was told that the telegraph office was fired. I rushed in that direction and seeing that the telegraph office was safe went into the Bhadar and saw that *Matric pandal* was burning.

Mr. Tyabji, Executive Engineer, was trying to save some tents, etc., and I assisted him. I tried to pour water on the burning things but there was no water in the pipe. I kept the crowd away and saved some articles and left after the fire engine arrived. I was at this place for about half an hour. From this place I went to my club to rest a while and I was hardly there about ten minutes when I saw people rushing out of the court compound and I heard that the crowd had gone towards the courts. I rushed into the court compound, when I learnt that the crowd was kept out of the court compound. I was on the court verandah when I heard of the fire at the Sub-Registrar's office and ran up to the place, but when I turned the corner near the Bank of Bombay I heard the firing there which kept the mob away. Some people were injured by the shots and they were taken to the hospital by an improvised ambulance under Mr. Manilal Kothari, a pleader.

After this fire I returned to the court and remained there till about 11-30. The Daskroi *Mamladar's Kacheri* and the Government telegraph office were also then burnt. I heard gun-shots firing near the Bhadar and the Khas Bazar gate. It was not possible to return from the court by the Karanj and Three Gates: so I returned by the Oliphant road. On my way home I saw solitary police constables in some police stations, some of whom were not in uniform.

I remained at home up to about 4 P.M. I saw a party of the military going along the Reid Road. The party went into the city and returned after about half an hour. I saw the party drawn up near the Panch *Kuwa* gate and they opened fire in different directions. I had seen a man wounded near the house of the late Mr. Deoshanker near the gate. Some time after I was informed that a bullet had passed through my compound and on inspection

Mr. JIVANLAL VARAJRAI DESAI—concluded—Mr. M. K. GANDHI.

tion I found that one bullet had passed through the corrugated sheet wall of a hut and another through the corrugated sheet roof of another hut.

After 4 P.M. I left my house and I went towards the bazar by the Richey Road. There were few people going along, but when I reached the Fernandez bridge, I saw a military picket at the mouth of the Ratanpol. When I was a few yards from the Ratanpol, I saw the picket preparing to fire and being beckoned I turned into a lane and by bye-lanes I went to Lal *Darwaza* to Mr. Mungaldas. After being with him for about an hour I went to Mr. Patel's who, I heard, had gone to the civil hospital. While I was there some friends came up and we returned home. A military picket was stationed near the municipal office, and we avoided the picket by bye-lanes. We did not notice any groups of mill-hands or rioters; so far as I could notice the crowds had all dispersed by the evening of the 11th. On the 12th I was going to the court at about 7-30 A.M. and on the road I saw some citizens. I was told that the passage along the Richey Road was closed. I proceeded as far as the Bala Hanuman on the Richey Road, where I saw some pleaders returning. I also returned.

Some time after I learnt that martial law was proclaimed in the city. As far as I could see all was quiet in the city.

British troops arrived in the afternoon of the 12th.

Martial law was continued on the 13th and was withdrawn in the morning of the 14th April soon after the conference in the District Court.

Mr. M. K. GANDHI, Bar-at-Law, Ahmedabad.

Satyagraha.

For the past thirty years I have been preaching and practising *Satyagraha*. The principles of *Satyagraha* as I know it to-day constitute a gradual evolution.

Satyagraha differs from "passive resistance" as north pole from south. The latter has been conceived a weapon of the weak and does not exclude the use of physical force or violence for the purpose of gaining one's end. Whereas the former has been conceived as a weapon of the strongest and excludes the use of violence in any shape or form.

The term *Satyagraha* was coined by me in South Africa to express the force that the Indians there used for full eight years. And it was coined in order to distinguish the movements then going on in the United Kingdom and South Africa under the name of "passive resistance."

Its root-meaning is holding on to truth, hence truth-force. I have also called it love-force or soul-force. In the application of *Satyagraha*, I discovered in the earliest stages that pursuit of truth did not admit of violence being inflicted on one's opponent, but that he must be weaned from error by patience and sympathy. For what appears to be truth to the one, may appear to be error to the other. And patience means self-suffering. So the doctrine came to mean vindication of truth, not by infliction of suffering on the opponent, but on oneself.

But in the political field the struggle on behalf of the people mostly consists in opposing error in the shape of unjust laws. When you have failed to bring the error home to the law-giver by way of petitions and the like, the only remedy open to you, if you do not wish to submit to error, is to compel him by physical force to yield to you or by suffering in your own person by inviting the penalty for the primary breach of the law. Hence *Satyagraha* largely appears to the public as civil disobedience or civil resistance. It is civil in the sense that it is not criminal or rude. Generally the law-breaker breaks the law surreptitiously and tries to avoid the penalty. Not so the civil resister. He ever obeys the laws of the State to which he belongs not out of fear of the sanctions, but because he considers them to be good for the welfare of society. But there come occasions,

On the 13th April there was absolute quiet in the city.

In my opinion the disturbances were due to the arrest of Mr. Gandhi at a time when the people were agitated on account of the utter disregard of Indian opinion by the Government of India in the matter of the Rowlatt legislation, the prevalence of famine and excessive prices and insufficiency of grain supplies when large quantities were being exported, administration of control in reference to which all sorts of reports were current in the city and the district regarding the corruption of the railway and the Government employees. As regards the imposition of the martial law in Ahmedabad I am of the opinion that after the evening of the 11th April the situation in Ahmedabad, could have been controlled by the ordinary police with the aid of police and military pickets, and there was no necessity of the introduction of martial law. Regarding the working of the martial law I have no data, but I saw a man in a private hospital who was wounded on the morning of the 12th by the party who were distributing handbills regarding the introduction of the martial law, and he told me that he was not in a crowd by himself when the shot was fired at him. In consequence of the martial law no shops in the bazar could be opened, because ten men would soon be collected and firing would be resorted to. The stopping of the business on the 13th must be attributed to the existence of martial law in Ahmedabad. If it was not established I believe that shops would have been opened on the 13th April.

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generally rare, when he considers certain laws to be so unjust as to render obedience to them a dishonour. He then openly and civilly breaks them and quietly suffers the penalty for their breach. And in order to register his protests against the action of the law-givers it is open to him to withdraw his co-operation from the State by disobeying such other laws whose breach does not involve moral turpitude.

In my opinion the beauty and the efficacy of *Satyagraha* are so great and the doctrine so simple that it can be preached even to children. It was preached by me to thousands of men, women and boys, commonly called "indentured Indians," with excellent results.

Rowlatt Bills.

When the Rowlatt Bills were published, I felt that they were so restrictive of human liberty that they must be resisted to the utmost. I observe, too, that the opposition to them was universal among Indians. I submit that no State, however despotic, has the right to enact laws which are repugnant to the whole body of the people, much less a Government guided by constitutional usage and precedents such as the Indian Government. So I felt, too, that the on-coming agitation needed a definite direction, if it was neither to collapse nor to run into violent channels.

The 6th of April.

I ventured, therefore, to present *Satyagraha* to the country, emphasising its civil-resistance aspect. And as it is purely an inward and purifying force, I suggested the observance of fast, prayer and suspension of all work for one day, the 6th of April. There was a magnificent response throughout the length and breadth of India, even in little villages, although there was no organisation and no great previous preparation. The idea was given to the public as soon as it was conceived. On the 6th April there was no violence used by the people, no collision with the police worth naming. The *hartal* was purely voluntary and spontaneous. I attach hereto text of the letter* in which the idea was announced.

* Annexure A, page 252.

[Continued.]

Mr. M. K. GANDHI.

My arrest.

The observance of the 6th April was to be followed by civil disobedience only by those who had signed the *Satyagraha* covenant. For the purpose, the committee of the *Satyagraha Sabha* had selected certain non-criminal and political laws for disobedience, and we commenced the distribution of prohibited literature of a perfectly healthy type, e.g., a pamphlet written by me on Home Rule, a free translation of Ruskin's "Unto this last" and of the "Defence and death of Socrates," etc.

Disorders.

But there is no doubt that the 6th of April found India vitalised as never before. The people who were fearstricken ceased to fear authority.

Moreover, hitherto the masses had lain inert. The leaders had not really acted upon them. They were undisciplined. They had found a new force. But they did not know what it was or how to use it.

At Delhi the leaders found it difficult to restrain the very large number of people who had remained unmoved before. At Amritsar Dr. Satyapal was anxious that I should go there and show to the people the peaceful nature of *Satyagraha*. Swami Shri Shradhdhanandji from Delhi and Dr. Satyapal from Amritsar wrote to me asking me to go to their respective places, to Delhi for pacifying the people and to Amritsar for explaining the true nature of *Satyagraha*. I had never been to Amritsar or for that matter to the Punjab before. The two messages were seen by the authorities and they knew that I was invited to both the places for peaceful purposes. I left Bombay for Delhi and the Punjab on the 8th April and had telegraphed to Dr. Satyapal, whom I had never met before, to meet me at Delhi. But after passing Muttra I was served with an order prohibiting me from entering the province of Delhi. I felt that I was bound to disregard this order and I proceeded on my journey. At Palwal I was served with an order prohibiting me from entering the Punjab and confining me to the Bombay Presidency. And I was arrested by a party of police and taken off the train at that station. The Superintendent of Police who arrested me acted with every courtesy. I was taken to Muttra by the first available train and thence by goods train early in the morning to Siwai Madhopur where I joined the Bombay mail from Peshawar and was taken charge of by Superintendent Bowring. I was discharged at Bombay on the 10th April.

But the people at Ahmedabad and Viramgam and in Gujarat generally had heard of my arrest. They became furious. Shops were closed, crowds gathered and murder, arson, pillage, wire-cutting and attempt at derailing followed.

Causes.

I had worked in the midst of the Kaira ryots just before and had mixed among thousands of men and women. I had worked at the instance of, and with Miss Anasuya Sarabhai among the mill-hands of Ahmedabad. The mill-hands appreciated her philanthropic work and adored her. The fury of the labourers in Ahmedabad reached whiteheat when a false rumour was started that she too was arrested. Both of us had visited, and interceded for the millhands of Viramgam when they were in trouble. And it is my firm belief that the excesses were due to the great resentment of the mob over my arrest and the rumoured arrest of Miss Anasuya Sarabhai.

I have mixed with the masses in practically the whole of India and talked to them freely. I do not believe that there was any revolutionary movement behind the excesses. They could hardly be dignified by the term "rebellion."

Measures.

And in my opinion the Government erred in prosecuting the offenders for waging war. This hasty view has caused unmerited or disproportionate suffering. The fine imposed on Ahmedabad was heavy and the manner of collecting it from the labourers was unnece-

sarily harsh and irritating. I doubt the justice of inflicting on the labourers a fine so large as Rs. 1,76,000. The imposition of an additional police on Nadiad and Barejadi and the collection of the cost from the farmers of Barejadi and from the Baniyas and Patidars of Nadiad was totally unjustified and even vindictive. I think that the introduction of Martial Law in Ahmedabad was also unjustified and its thoughtless administration resulted in the loss of several innocent lives.

At the same time, and subject to the reservations by me, I have no doubt that in the Bombay presidency the authorities acted with considerable restraint at a time when the atmosphere was surcharged with mutual suspicion and the attempt at wrecking the train which was bringing the troops to restore order had naturally angered the authorities.

ANNEXURE A.

DAY OF HUMILIATION AND PRAYER.

FASTING PENANCE TO BE OBSERVED NEXT SUNDAY.

Mr. Gandhi's call to "Satyagrahis."

(Associated Press.)

Madras, March 24.

Mr. Gandhi has sent the following letter to the press:—*Satyagraha*, as I have endeavoured to explain at several meetings, is essentially a religious movement. It is a process of purification and penance. It seeks to secure reforms or redress of grievances by self-suffering. I therefore venture to suggest that the second Sunday after the publication of the Viceregal assent to Bill No. 2 of 1919 may be observed as the day of humiliation and prayer. As there must be effective public demonstration in keeping with the character of the observance, I beg to advise as follows:—A twenty four hours' fast, counting from the last meal on the preceding night should be observed by all adults unless prevented from so doing by consideration of religion or health. The fast is not to be regarded in any shape or form in the nature of a hunger strike or designed to put any pressure upon Government. It is to be regarded for *Satyagrahis* as a necessary discipline to fit them for the civil disobedience contemplated in their pledge and for all others, as some slight token of the intensity of their wounded feelings.

All work except such as may be necessary in the public interest should be suspended for the day. Markets and other business places should be closed. Employees who are required to work even on Sundays may only suspend work after obtaining previous leave. I do not hesitate to recommend these two suggestions for adoption by public servants for, though it is an unquestionably right thing for them not to take part in political discussions and gatherings, in my opinion they have the undoubted right to express upon vital matters their feelings in the very limited manner herein suggested. Public meetings should be held on that day in all parts of India not excluding villages at which a resolution praying for the withdrawal of the measures should be passed. If my advice is deemed worthy of acceptance the responsibility will lie in the first instance on various *Satyagraha* associations for undertaking the necessary work of organisation, but all other associations will, I hope, join hands in making this demonstration a success.

ANNEXURE B.

"RESOLVE TO REFRAIN FROM ALL VIOLENCE."

CALL TO "*Satyagrahis*."*Mr. Gandhi's speech at Ahmedabad.*

The following is the full text of the speech of Mr. Gandhi delivered at a meeting of the citizens of Ahmedabad held at his *Ashram*, Sabarmati, on Monday last.

Mr. M. K. GANDHI.

[Continued.]

BROTHERS,

I mean to address myself mainly to you. Brothers, the events that have happened in course of the last few days have been most disgraceful to Ahmedabad, and as all these things have happened in my name, I am ashamed of them, and those who have been responsible for them have thereby not honoured me but disgraced me. A rapier run through my body could hardly have pained me more. I have said times without number that *Satyagraha* admits of no violence, no pillage, no incendiarism; and still in the name of *Satyagraha* we burnt down buildings, forcibly captured weapons, extorted money, stopped trains, cut off telegraph wires, killed innocent people and plundered shops and private houses. If deeds such as these could save me from the prison house or the scaffold, I should not like to be so saved. I do wish to say in all earnestness that violence has not secured my discharge. A most brutal rumour was set afloat that Anasuya Ben was arrested. The crowds were infuriated all the more, and disturbance increased. You have thereby disgraced Anasuya Ben and under the cloak of her arrest heinous deeds have been done. These deeds have not benefited the people in any way. They have done nothing but harm.

The buildings burnt down were public property and they will naturally be rebuilt at our expense. The loss due to the shops remaining closed is also our loss. The terrorism prevailing in the city due to Martial Law is also the result of this violence. It has been said that many innocent lives have been lost as a result of the operation of Martial Law. If this is a fact then for that too the deeds described above are responsible. It will thus be seen that the events that have happened have done nothing but harm to us. Moreover they have most seriously damaged the *Satyagraha* movement. Had an entirely peaceful agitation followed my arrest, the Rowlatt Act would have been out or on the point of being out of the Statute Book to-day. It should not be a matter for surprise if the withdrawal of the Act is now delayed. When I was released on Friday my plan was to start for Delhi again on Saturday to seek re-arrest, and that would have been an accession of strength to the movement. Now instead of going to Delhi, it remains to me to offer *Satyagraha* against our own people, and as it is my determination to offer *Satyagraha* even unto death for securing the withdrawal of the Rowlatt legislation, I think the occasion has arrived when I should offer *Satyagraha* against ourselves for the violence that has occurred. And I shall do so at the sacrifice of my body, so long as we do not keep perfect peace and cease from violence to person and property. How can I seek imprisonment unless I have absolute confidence that we shall no longer be guilty of such errors? Those desirous of joining the *Satyagraha* movement or of helping it must entirely abstain from violence. They may not resort to violence even on my being re-arrested or on some such events happening. English men and women have been compelled to leave their homes and confine themselves to places of protection in Shahi Bagh, because their trust in our harmlessness has received a rude shock. A little thinking should convince us that this is a matter of humiliation for us all. The sooner this state of things stops the better for us. They are our brethren and it is our duty to inspire them with the belief that their persons are as sacred to us as our own, and this is what we call *Abhaydan*, the first requisite of true religion. *Satyagraha* without this is *Duragraha*.

Two duties before us.

There are two distinct duties now before us. One is that we should firmly resolve upon refraining from all violence, and the other is that we should repent and do penance for our sins. So long as we don't repent and do not realise our errors and make an open confession of them we shall not truly change our course. The first step is that those of us who have captured weapons should surrender them. To show that we are really penitent we will contribute each of us not less than eight

annas towards helping the families of those who have been killed by our acts. Though no amount of money contribution can altogether undo the results of the furious deeds of the past few days, our contribution will be a slight token of our repentance. I hope and pray that no one will evade this contribution on the plea that he has had no part in these wicked acts. For if such as those who were no party to these deeds had all courageously and bravely gone forward to put down the lawlessness, the mob would have been checked in their career and would have immediately realised the wickedness of their doings. I venture to say that if instead of giving money to the mob out of fear we had rushed out to protect buildings and to save the innocent without fear of death we could have succeeded in so doing. Unless we have this sort of courage, mischief-makers will always try to intimidate us into participating in their misdeeds. Fear of death makes us devoid both of valour and of religion. For want of valour is want of religious faith. And having done little to stop the violence we have been all participants in the sins that have been committed. And we ought, therefore, to contribute our mite as a mark of our repentance. Each group can collect its own contributions and send them on to me through its collectors. I would also advise, if it is possible for you, to observe a twenty-four hours' fast in slight expiation of these sins. This fast should be observed in private and there is no need for crowds to go to the bathing ghats.

I have thus far drawn attention to what appears to be your duty. I must now consider my own. My responsibility is a million times greater than yours. I have placed *Satyagraha* before people for their acceptance, and I have lived in your midst for four years. I have also given some contribution to the special service of Ahmedabad. Its citizens are not quite unfamiliar with my views.

An allegation.

It is alleged that I have without proper consideration persuaded thousands to join the movement. That allegation is, I admit, true to a certain extent, but to a certain extent only. It is open to anybody to say that but for the *Satyagraha* campaign, there would not have been this violence. For this I have already done a penance, to my mind an unendurable one, namely, that I have had to postpone my visit to Delhi to seek re-arrest and I have also been obliged to suggest a temporary restriction of *Satyagraha* to a limited field. This has been more painful to me than a wound. But this penance is not enough, and I have therefore decided to fast for three days, i.e., 72 hours. I hope my fast will pain no one. I believe a seventy-two hours' fast is easier for me than a twenty-four hours' fast for you. And I have imposed on me a discipline which I can bear. If you really feel pity for the suffering that will be caused to me, I request that that pity should always restrain you from ever again being party to the criminal acts of which I have complained. Take it from me that we are not going to win *Swarajya* or benefit our country in the least by violence and terrorism. I am of opinion that if we have to wade through violence to obtain *Swarajya*, and if a redress of grievances were to be only possible by means of ill-will for and slaughter of Englishmen, I, for one, would do without that *Swarajya* and without a redress of those grievances. For me life would not be worth living if Ahmedabad continues to countenance violence in the name of truth. The poet has called Gujarat the "Garvi" (great and glorious) Gujarat. Ahmedabad, its capital, is the residence of many religious Hindus and Muhammadans. Deeds of public violence in a city like this is like an ocean being on fire. Who can quench that fire? I can only offer myself as a sacrifice to be burnt in that fire, and I, therefore, ask you all to help in the attainment of results that I desire out of my fast. May the love that lured you into unworthy acts awaken you to a sense of the reality, and if that love does continue to animate you beware that I may not have to fast myself to death.

concluded.]

Mr. M. K. GANDHI.

Organised deeds.

It seems that the deeds I have complained of have been done in an organised manner. There seems to be a definite design about them, and I am sure that there must be some educated and clever man or men behind them. They may be educated, but their education has not enlightened them. You have been misled into doing these deeds by such people. I advise you never to be so misguided and I would ask them seriously to reconsider their views. To them and you I commend my book "*Hind Swarajya*" which is, I understand, may be printed and published without infringing the law thereby.

Among the mill-hands the spinners have been on strike for some days. I advise them to resume work immediately and to ask for increase if they want any only after resuming work, and in a reasonable manner. To resort to the use of force to get any increase is suicidal. I would specially advise all mill-hands to altogether eschew violence. It is their interest to do so and I remind them of the promises made to Anasuya Ben and me that they would ever refrain from violence. I hope that all will now resume work.

ANNEXURE C.

MR. GANDHI ARRESTED.

ORDER NOT TO ENTER THE PUNJAB OR DELHI.

TAKEN TO UNKNOWN DESTINATION.

His message to his countrymen.

(From our Correspondent.)

[Muttra, April 10.]

Mahatma Gandhiji on way to Delhi was arrested at Palwal and brought back at night to Muttra where he was detained till the morning. He was taken away by a special train by the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway route. The destination is not known.

Mahatma Gandhiji is in a very weak state of health and is reported to be suffering from pain in the chest.

[Later.]

We have received the following message from the Private Secretary to *Mahatma* Gandhi:—

[Delhi, April 10.]

Mahatma Gandhi on his way to Delhi at Kosi was served with an order not to enter the Punjab, not to enter Delhi and restrict himself to Bombay.

The officer serving the order treated him most politely assuring him it would be his most painful duty to arrest him, if he elected to disobey, but that there would be no ill-will between them.

Mr. Gandhi smilingly said he must elect to disobey, as it was his duty and that the officer ought also to do what was his duty.

In the few minutes that were left to us, he dictated the following message, laying special emphasis in his oral message to me as in the written message that none shall resent his arrest or do anything tainted with untruth or violence which were sure to damn the sacred cause.

The Message.

The message reads as follows:—

TO MY COUNTRYMEN,

It is a matter of the highest concern to me, as I hope to you, that I have received an order from the Punjab Government not to enter that province and another from the Delhi Government not to enter Delhi, while an order of the Government of India which was served on me immediately after, restricts me to Bombay. I had no hesitation in saying to the officer, who served the order on me, that I was bound in virtue of the pledge to disregard it, which I have done and I shall presently find myself a free man, my body being taken by them in their custody.

It was galling to me to remain free whilst the Rowlatt legislation disfigured the Statute Book. My arrest

makes me free. It now remains for you to do your duty which is clearly stated in the *Satyagraha* pledge. Follow it and you will find it will be your *Kamadhenu*. I hope there will be no resentment about my arrest. I have received what I was seeking, either the withdrawal of the Rowlatt legislation or imprisonment. A departure from the truth by a hair's breadth or violence committed against anybody whether Englishman or Indian will surely damn the great Cause, the *Satyagraha* is handling.

I hope the Hindu-Moslem unity, which seems now to have taken a firm hold of the people, will become a reality and I feel convinced that it will only be a reality if the suggestions I have ventured to make in my communication to the press are carried out. The responsibility of the Hindus in this matter is greater than that of the Muhammadans, they being in a minority, and I hope they will discharge their responsibility in a manner worthy of their country.

I have also made certain suggestions regarding the proposed *Swadeshi* vow. I commend them to your serious attention and you will find that as your ideas of *Satyagraha* become matured the Hindu-Moslem unity are but parts of *Satyagraha*. Finally it is my firm belief that we shall obtain salvation only through suffering and not by reforms dropping on us from England, no matter how unstintingly they might be granted. The English are a great nation, but the weaker also go to the wall, if they come in contact with them. When they are themselves courageous they have borne untold sufferings and they only respond to courage and sufferings and the partnership with them is only possible after we have developed indomitable courage and the faculty for unlimited suffering. There is a fundamental difference between their civilization and ours. They believe in the doctrine of violence or brute force as the final arbiter. My reading of our civilization is that we are expected to believe in soul-force or moral force as the final arbiter and this is *Satyagraha*.

We are groaning under sufferings which we would avoid if we could, because we have swerved from the path laid down for us by the ancient civilization.

I hope that Hindus, Muhammadans, Sikhs, Parsis, Christians, Jews, and all who are born in India or who made India their land of adoption will fully participate in these national observances and I hope too that women will take therein as full a share as men."

Further details.

Later information shows that *Mahatma* Gandhiji's enforced departure from Muttra took place under extraordinary and mysterious circumstances. The B. B. and C. I. Passenger, which leaves for Bombay at 6-30 A.M., started from the station platform without a brake and it was after one mile's travelling that the *Mahatma's* carriage and the brake were attached to the train.

Further enquiry shows that the police read over the Punjab Government's order that he was forbidden to enter the Punjab at Kosi, but the *Mahatma* refused to obey it.

The *Mahatma* was stopped at Palwal, his carriage was detached and he was brought back under escort to Muttra. It is said that he was neither arrested nor deported, but taken back home under escort.

Latest.

(Associated Press.)

[Simla, April 10.]

It is understood that Mr. Gandhi is being escorted back to the Bombay Presidency.

ANNEXURE D.

Translation of speech delivered in Ahmedabad by Mr. M. K. Gandhi on April 13, 1919.

(Not reproduced here as speech is printed in Appendices to statement of Government of the Punjab.)

Miss ANASUYA SARABHAI.—Rao Bahadur RAMANBHAI M. NILKANTH.

Miss ANASUYA SARABHAI of Ahmedabad.

I have been in touch with the mill-hands of Ahmedabad for the last five years and have endeavoured to serve them to the best of my ability. I believe that their attachment towards me is very great. In the year 1918 there was a big strike of the weavers numbering over 10,000. It lasted twenty-three days. Whilst the trouble was brewing I invited Mr. Gandhi to assist me as I knew he was versed in such matters. He came from Champaran for the purpose as also for the Kaira ryots. The strike ended to the satisfaction of both the owners and the employees. There was no violence committed by the mill-hands during that critical period and it is admitted that they acted with great restraint.

When Mr. Gandhi started his *Satyagraha* movement I was among the first signatories to the *Satyagraha* pledge. I was in Ahmedabad when the fasting prayer and *hartal* were observed on the 6th day of April last. I was with the procession the like of which I had not seen before. Whilst there was the greatest enthusiasm and earnestness, there was neither violence nor defiance in that vast crowd of people. I can say from personal experience that the *hartal* was absolutely voluntary.

I went back to Bombay on the 7th April and took part in the distribution of prohibited literature. Mr. Gandhi having heard from Delhi and Amritsar left for Delhi on the 8th April. We heard the news of his arrest at Palwal in Bombay on the 10th April, and there was the greatest excitement in Bombay. Beyond Mr. Gandhi's message which was telegraphed by his Secre-

tary we knew nothing of what happened. On the 11th Mr. Gandhi was brought to Bombay and discharged there. It was not without the greatest difficulty that serious collision with the police was averted in Bombay. I had a wire from friends in Ahmedabad that there was fear of violence being committed there and that I should go there at once. I tried to leave the same evening, but as there was no certainty of complete communication with Ahmedabad I refrained. On the 12th Mr. Gandhi received wires pressing him to go to Ahmedabad and we both proceeded there and arrived on the 13th April. On reaching Ahmedabad Mr. Gandhi received a message from the Commissioner to see him and he and I went to the Commissioner. I was present at the interview. Mr. Gandhi expressed his regret for the sad occurrences and said that he would like to address the people if the Commissioner permitted it. The latter consenting Mr. Gandhi addressed a big meeting on the 14th April, advising complete avoidance of violence.

In my opinion, but for Mr. Gandhi's arrest the mob would not have committed the excesses. I deeply deplore the part that the mill-hands played in them. I am sure that neither for the sake of me nor for Mr. Gandhi was any violence justified.

I believe that the mill-hands have suffered much for their folly. The fine imposed upon them was too heavy and the manner of collecting it unjust and needlessly oppressive.

Rao Bahadur RAMANBHAI M. NILKANTH, B.A., LL.B., President, Ahmedabad Municipality.

Statement of facts.

I have no particular observations to make with regard to the occurrences of the 10th April. I heard of the disturbance outside the Prem Darwaza when I went to the municipal office in the evening.

When I came to the civil courts on the morning of the 11th (the courts were sitting in the morning) I heard of the rumour that Bai Anasuya Sarabhai had been arrested at Bombay. I was in the compound of the civil court at about 8 A.M. when the mob passed from the lee-way to Karanj-square. I saw that several persons in the crowd were carrying sticks raised in their arms. A little later when I was in the court of the Assistant Judge some one brought the news that Reverend Mr. Gillespie was surrounded by the mob. Mr. Fulshanker, pleader, was in the court and he asked the court to stop his case and allow him to go to rescue Mr. Gillespie. After about an hour the news came that the Matriculation *mandap* had been set fire to by the mob. A little later firing was heard. It was, at the Bank of Bombay. News of Government buildings in the Bhadar being set fire to came later. I left the court at about 11-30 A.M. and walked to my residence across the river, my groom having not brought my carriage owing to the rumour that the mob did not allow carriages to pass. I met very few people on the Ellis bridge and on the road beyond. I passed two police *chowkies* but there were no policemen there.

At about 2 P.M. the Hon'ble Rao Sahib Harilal Desai (who is my neighbour) and I came in my carriage from across the river to the Bhadar. We sent back our carriage from near the Gujarat Club and walked up to Mr. Vallubhai's house in the Bhadar. We inquired if there was any news, but nothing particular was known. In company with some other friends the Hon'ble Rao Sahib Harilal and myself went further into the Bhadar and passed by the offices of the Sub-Registrar and the Collector. The buildings were burning fiercely and we were surprised to find that the whole locality was deserted. There were no officials, clerks or even peons at the site to attempt rescue of the records or furniture, though the mob had gone away some hours ago. From the Lal Darwaza we came out of the Bhadar and came to the front of the telegraph office, where a

Municipal fire engine was working. There were military pickets on the Lal Darwaza road and though there was some traffic everything was quiet. We went on to the Khas Bazar. When we came to the Khas Bazar police *chowky* the military picket there stopped us from proceeding towards the Three Gates. We therefore turned towards the Hope Market and from thence went to the municipal office. At the municipal office we were told that a false rumour had been circulating to the effect that the water at the Dudheshwar water works had been poisoned. We could find no means of reaching any authorities to request them to inform the public that the rumour was unfounded. From the municipal office I went to my city residence at Astodia. From thence I saw a crowd near Astodia Chakla and I was told that the crowd was burning the police *chowky* at the place. There was a military picket very near at the junction of the Oliphant Road and the Dana Pith Road near the municipal office, but apparently there was no one to ask the picket to march up to the police *chowky* and disperse the crowd. I returned to my residence across the river in the afternoon. I came back to the city at about 7 P.M. and came as far as entrance to the Bhadar opposite the Victoria Gardens. I saw a party of European ladies going into the Bhadar under the protection of armed Indian sepoy. There was no sign of the mob in that locality. No news could be obtained, except wild rumours, and I returned to my residence across the river.

On the morning of the 12th I went to the civil courts and thence to my residence in the city at Astodia. I saw a noisy crowd entering the Mandvi Pol. After some time I saw a party of Indian sepoy under an European officer going up to the Astodia Chakla. The party fired and dispersed the crowd and returned. One man was killed. The party either did not know that a crowd had entered Mandvi Pol or had no instructions to go into Pols. I returned to my residence across the river.

When I returned to the city in the evening I learnt of the martial law proclamation. I was further informed that the Honourable Mr. Pratt, Commissioner, Northern Division, had called at my residence in the city and left word that I should go and see him at the Shahi Bagh

Rao Bahadur RAMANBHAI M. NILKANTH—concluded.—The Hon'ble Rao Sahib HARILAL DESAIBHAI DESAI.

either that night or next morning. While going to the Shahi Bagh next morning, i.e., on the 13th, I learnt that Mr. Pratt had gone to the railway station to meet Mr. Gandhi who was coming by the Gujarat mail. I went to the railway station and met Mr. Pratt there. He asked me to go round the city in company of some citizens and persuade people to open their shops. I told him that owing to the martial law order that any collection of ten persons would be fired at; instances had occurred of customers standing at shops being fired at, and that till the order to fire was withdrawn, it would be neither possible to prevail upon people to open shops, nor safe for them to do so. Mr. Pratt said that the order of firing was not meant for such people. He furnished me with a note to permit me to move about the town. I then took with me some friends who were at the station and went to some shops, called out the shop-keepers and asked them to open their shops. But everyone said that till the firing was stopped it was not safe to open shops. One man said in addition that he would wait till Mr. Gandhi actually arrived. We asked a military sepoy at the Sherkotda police *chowky* whether people making purchases at shops are likely to be fired at. He said that their orders were to fire at a collection of ten or more persons, and they had no instructions to treat people making purchases at shops differently. We talked to some police officers on the subject, but they said that the matter was in the hands of the military authorities. I and my friends walked from the station to the Bhadar to show to the people that it was safe to move about. At about 2 P.M. some friends and I went to the Camp and saw Colonel Frazer, the Commanding Officer. We

requested him to withdraw the order to fire as it was no more necessary and as innocent persons were being shot. He said that unfortunately it must happen that those who do mischief escape and innocent persons suffer. I told him that the Commissioner, Northern Division, asked me to persuade people to re-open shops but that people would not do so till the firing was stopped. Colonel Frazer said that it was not possible for him to send orders to different parties all over the town that day, that he prepared to go to town in the evening in company with the Commissioner, Northern Division, and he would then decide upon the course of action to be taken. We then went to the Shahi Bagh, saw the Hon'ble Mr. Pratt, and spoke to him about the result of our attempts to get shops re-opened and of our interview with Colonel Frazer. We requested him to get the order of firing withdrawn. He said he would go to the town with Colonel Frazer and tell me next morning at the District Court what could be done.

Next morning, i.e., on the 14th, I saw the Hon'ble Mr. Pratt at the District Court. Mr. Chatfield, the Collector, was also there. Mr. Pratt told me that what I wanted was allowed and that martial law was withdrawn. He then drew up a notification about the withdrawal of martial law, informing people that they could safely move about, advising them to open shops and suggesting that mill-hands should go on work next day. As desired by him I translated the notification into Gujarati and got a large number of copies printed at the nearest printing press. The Collector and I arranged to distribute the notification over the city.

The Hon'ble Rao Sahib HARILAL DESAIBHAI DESAI, B.A., LL.B., Vice-President, District Local Board, Ahmedabad.

I, Harilal Desai, High Court Pleader, Ahmedabad, have to state as follows before the Disorders Inquiry Committee:—

1. On the 10th of April 1919 the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest spread in the city at about 9 or 10 A.M. and there was a *hartal*. In the evening there was a large meeting of thousands of people on the sands in the river-bed, and people were being exhorted and admonished to remain quiet, to refrain from violence to person or property and to resume work.

2. On the morning of the 11th at about 8-30 A.M. I heard a loud noise of a mob passing by the court-house near Bhadar where I was conducting an appeal before the Joint Judge, Mr. Broomfield. On inquiry it was stated that a mob was out in large numbers. After finishing the work there I went to the court of the Assistant Judge in the same compound for another appeal. Soon after some one came in and stated that the *Mandap* for the matriculation examination in the Bhadar was set on fire, and that the Judge Mr. Kennedy and the Joint Judge Mr. Broomfield had gone out towards the *Mandap*. Sometime after the Judges' return to the compound I heard some firing of shots near the Bank of Bombay. About this time people in the courts began to melt away. As the Judges did not leave the court premises I thought it better to wait there. Later on news came that the offices in the compound of the Collector, the Daskroi *Mamlatdar's kacheri* and the telegraph office were set on fire. I went up to Mr. Kennedy and offered him my carriage and even to accompany him. He said he had arranged for a carriage and was not going to leave the premises until the guard he had asked for for the court-house arrived. At about 11-30 A.M. I went out as far as the Hemabhai Institute in company with one of the Judges to see the state of affairs outside. I found the square near the Bhadar and the roads deserted. The telegraph office and the *Mamlatdar's kacheri* were fiercely under fire. Dr. Taylor was near the Hemabhai Institute and one or two Indian gentlemen. After returning to the court premises I left for my riverside residence in company with a Judge and a Sub-Judge. The roads and the Ellis bridge were almost deserted.

3. At about 2 P.M. I went into the city with Rao Bahadur Ramanbhai M. Nilkanth, President, Ahmedabad Municipality, to look up the damage to property in the Bhadar and the surroundings. The roads were found deserted. The buildings in the compound of the Collector's office were burning fiercely and there was no one there. At the *Laldarwaza* we found a military picket, and further on the municipal fire brigade at the telegraph office. There was also a military picket at the Khás Bazar police *Chowky*, but the roads throughout were deserted. We could see through the Three Gates as far as the Ranchhodlal fountain and found the roads deserted. We were asked by the military picket at the Khás Bazar not to proceed towards the Three Gates but to go by the Parsi *Agiari* road. We went to the municipal offices to see if things were safe there. Thence I went to my city house and returned to my riverside residence in the evening. I did not notice any mob on the road.

4. On the morning of 12th April I drove from my riverside residence to Dariapur to look up the Acharatlal Hostel at about 8-30 A.M. There was very little traffic on the roads and everything seemed quiet. I again went to the city on that day at about 4 P.M. I learnt that martial law was declared in the city and that I must reach my riverside residence before it was dark. At the municipal offices a flower pot on the parapet of the northern landing in front of the Municipal Commissioner's office was pointed out to me as having been broken by a shot which came from the direction of the Pankor *Naka* where soldiers administering martial law were posted.

5. At the railway station on the morning of the 13th when Rao Bahadur Ramanbhai and myself asked some of the shopkeepers there to open their shops they said that they would do so after Mr. Gandhi's return to Ahmedabad. This was before the arrival of the Gujarat mail.

6. The immediate cause of the *hartal* on the 10th of April was the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest. It has been stated that the crowd was making peaceful demonstrations outside the Kalupur gate when two European mill opera-

The Hon'ble Rao Sahib HARILAL DESAIBHAI DESAI—concluded.—Mr. MAGANBHAI CHATURBHAI PATEL.

tives spoke insultingly of Mr. Gandhi, whereupon the crowd got unruly, resulting in a disturbance near the Prem gate. There was firing on the crowd and some people were wounded. It is stated that this incident caused great resentment among the friends and relations of the injured and their comrades. The rumour of the arrest of Bai Anasuya in Bombay which spread after the arrival of the Gujarat mail on the morning of 11th April seems to have put the mob out of temper as she is held in great esteem by the millhands on account of her efforts for their uplift. The famine, the high prices of the necessities of life required for human beings and cattle, the administration of control, the export of foodstuffs and fodder when the stock in the country was itself insufficient and lastly a feeling of despondent helplessness caused by the way in which the Rowlatt legislation was carried through the legislature in the teeth of public opposition had already put the patience of the people to a severe test.

Mr. MAGANBHAI CHATURBHAI PATEL, B.A., LL.B., Bar-at-Law, Ahmedabad.

The causes of disturbances in Gujarat were two-fold. 1. General discontent prevailing amongst the people and 2. Mr. Gandhi's arrest. The first was the effective cause and the second was the immediate cause.

Discontent.

General discontent was due to various reasons and it was slowly growing for a number of years. The conviction that had grown upon the minds of the educated people in India was slowly dawning upon the masses that the intense poverty that was devastating thousands every year was curable and that proper remedies were not applied because of the system of Government in which the Indian bureaucracy being irresponsible to the people of India could hardly be brought under check by the British Parliament who for want of time and accurate information could not make its authority felt to stop the evil methods of administering millions committed to their charge. In Gujarat the land assessment was heavy enough and the cruelty with which it was made to increase in every settlement stopped altogether the growth of population and reduced it to an appreciably large extent. Sympathy shown by the bureaucracy in this miserable condition of the people became transparent to the masses when they found that those who began to expound their cause were suppressed under one pretext or another and repressive measures were adopted to kill all legitimate political agitation. The minor officers' treatment more or less encouraged by the indifference of their superiors indignant towards the growing consciousness of self-respect amongst the masses made the system still more disgusting. Every effort made by British Statesmen to liberalize the system was opposed tooth and nail and even strong persons like Lord Morley were baffled in their attempts by clever devices of the trained bureaucracy. The masses began to see with clearness which they never had before that the foreign trade interests backed up by clever bureaucracy would never allow the Indian voice to be raised enough to be heard in the British Parliament. In utter helplessness they were driven to brood over the ways of Englishmen governing India when compared with those followed in England. They began keenly to feel now that people who have no authoritative voice in their own Government at home would naturally be treated abroad with indifference and insult even within the British Empire and saw that the only way out of the wretchedness of life in India was to be politically free. Their faith, however, in the British nation and her liberal institutions in England was great and to a man they cheerfully bore the burden of the war with sanguine expectations that as the world atmosphere was clearing up and self-determination was going to become the rule in politics of all civilized nations, India who shed her blood and treasure for high ideals would be made a

7. I believe that if military pickets had been posted at important centres inside the city from the early morning of the 11th of April the mob mischief to property would have been saved. I also believe that the raids on the houses of Rao Bahadur Bulakhidas and Khan Bahadur Hussainkhan were due to their personal unpopularity. It has been stated in the evidence led before one of the special tribunals that the raiders of Khan Bahadur Hussainkhan's house held a mock court there to mimic his magisterial shortcomings as an Honorary Magistrate.

8. I think that there was no necessity to declare martial law in Ahmedabad about the noon of the 12th of April. Inside the city walls the mischief was over by the evening of the 11th. I believe that military pickets would have sufficed. During the operation of the martial law on the 12th and the 13th of April several peaceful citizens engaged in peaceful pursuits are reported to have been unnecessarily and wantonly wounded by the soldiers.

free partner in the Empire. In these high expectations they enormously suffered under the unprecedented high prices of foodstuffs and clothings and every article of necessity and they also suffered cutting insults of officials in collections of warloans and pangs of separation from their kith and kin in the not unusual evil practice of recruitment in war. But when they found that even the small expectations raised by Mr. Montagu's visit to India were to be frustrated by a systematic organisation of the Indian Bureaucracy both here and in England the public indignation began terribly to rise. At such an unfortunate moment the Rowlatt legislation was introduced in the Council which served one more weapon liable to be grossly abused in the hands of the bureaucracy and the corrupt police and the peoples' confidence in the good motives of Government was lost. They then began to shake their heads in pitious helplessness saying even a strong ministry could not relieve India of this pest of bureaucracy. They saw their leaders who had sacrificed their life and wealth in their country's service were insulted and treated by bureaucrats highly placed in office in a manner which none would dare show to even a workman in England and they saw measures carried in the teeth of unanimous opposition of public opinion. All these various situations brought about by the system of Government established by the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy had worked up the mind of the public to a pitch which could have created disturbances at any time an illfated opportunity occurred.

My opinion on this point is based on knowledge derived from my close acquaintance of the village life in which I have been brought up. In my practice I had also to roam about the district and had come in close touch with the actual conditions of people in various villages. My experience was fully borne out by my studies of the settlement records and the census reports and other Government publications.

Immediate cause of disturbance.

Immediate cause of disturbance was Mr. Gandhi's arrest. I do not believe that people in general liked the *Satyagraha* but indeed they revered Mr. M. K. Gandhi whose purity and simplicity of life had created a deep impression on them and as is natural with an Indian when a *Sanyasi* of his type suffers in a political cause that suffering was too strong a provocation not to inflame the materials so well prepared by the bureaucracy beforehand. The public indignation against the bureaucratic methods of administration here was aroused and those whom Mr. Gandhi helped in the mill strikes some months ago were first to show it by striking work in the mills. The sufferings of the mill-hand population caused by the extremely high prices of food-stuffs had created a general feeling in their favour and when they

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came out on a strike in protest against their benefactor. Mr. Gandhi, public sympathy was at once aroused and there was a spontaneous general strike showing strong dislike and even disgust for bureaucratic high handedness in the action they took against Mr. Gandhi. The immediate cause of the general *hartal* on the 10th was thus Mr. Gandhi's arrest but the real cause to back up this demonstration was the general discontent that was prevalent amongst the people for the various causes enumerated above. That such was the beginning of the Ahmedabad troubles I could say of my personal knowledge. I was not present where this disturbance resulted in a riot and a loss of life in the afternoon of the 10th at Prem Darwaza.

First stages of the disturbance.

All educated people and *Satyagrahis* were trying their level best to restore order ever since the disturbances broke out on the 10th. I was present at a large meeting in the Sabarmati sands on the 10th evening at about 7 P.M. when the *Satyagrahis* were addressing the people and exhorting them to keep perfect peace and order. Some of the audience came running towards me in a very excited state of mind at Mr. Gandhi's arrest and I had to address them and persuaded them to literally follow Mr. Gandhi's advice to keep peace which was best for all who sincerely loved him and the country. The meeting was perfectly calm, and Mrs. Gandhi was also present in it.

When at about 8 P.M. I was returning home some of the *Satyagrahis* asked me to persuade the shopkeepers to open up their shops from the morning of the 11th. A big crowd was standing apparently in an excited mood on the Richey Road and I addressed it from a verandah for about half an hour. The temper of the crowd cooled down and I believed they resolved to open up their shops in the next morning. Nothing to my knowledge happened in the night.

In the morning of the 11th April at about 8 I was going to court and I found that some of the shops on the road were being opened up and some people, I think, were still in an indecisive mood. Some body running after my carriage told me that Anasuya was also arrested. That rumour was afterwards found out to be false. At about quarter to 9 when I was sitting in the bar room my friend, Mr. Desai, came in asking me to go out to appease a big crowd with *lathis* which was just near the court. I at once threw off my papers and ran out with him to see if we can possibly persuade them to a peaceful conduct. Near the Karanj gardens, I think, a police Inspector, pointed me out the crowd coming from the river-side and near the Mission High School and I asked him to approach them with me just to stop them there. He however could not leave the post. I rushed towards them and stood in their way stretching out my arms. The crowd began to sit down on the road. Apparently they were excited and with *lathis* in their hands I addressed them for about 15 minutes and requested them to put down their sticks. I prevailed upon them to give up their *lathis* and the sticks were going to be collected in a bundle. My friend Mr. Majmudar then turned up and asked me to allow him to speak a few words of advice to them. Within a minute or two some incident happened and the crowd picked up the sticks they had put down and the gathering broke up. When I was addressing them some of them told me that their friends had been arrested by the police in the *Chowky*. We told them that we would procure their release and asked a friend of mine just to see the police and to request them not to add to the fury of the excited mob.

While the crowd dispersed and ran towards the Bhadar I stopped one of them looking like one having some influence over the mill hands and I inquired of him the purpose they had bent upon. I was then assured that they meant no mischief whatsoever. They only meant to get the mills stop working that day.

Burning of the Mandap.

From there I at once went towards the court and I thought of going towards the *Kacheri* where the crowd had gone with a view if possible to make another attempt at bringing them under control. When I was passing by the Gujarat Club I found the *Mandap* was set on fire and when I was going towards the burning *Mandap* I saw my friend Mr. Desai coming from that direction who told me that the crowd was uncontrollable. We returned and waited in the club. We then began to hear shots and see columns of smoke coming out of the public buildings set on fire by the rioters. It seems by that time at the Khas Bazar *Chowky* orders were given to fire for during some time we stayed at the club we heard more than about a dozen gun-shots. In the club we read in the "Times of India" that Mr. Gandhi was on his way back to Bombay.

Subsequent events.

While returning home between 11 and 11-30 *via* Astodia road as the main roads through the three gates were in possession of the police and the military I saw that mill-hands and lower classes were in a disorderly array near the Mission High School and *Prathna Samaj Mandir* and we were told firing was going on. There I heard some one of the crowd being disgusted with the life they were made to lead under the ever-rising prices of food-stuffs and clothing remarked that death would be preferable to the wretchedness of the life they were living in. On my way home, I saw many volunteers carrying the wounded on stretchers to some private dispensary for dressing. The people seemed to be in a heavily disturbed state of mind and they were, I believe, under a confusion created by fear of looting and sympathy for the poor and the ignorant shot down in the scuffle.

Since I reached home reports were coming to me that there was a regular scuffle going on between the three gates and the western end of the Richey Road. The main roads were held by the military although no martial law was proclaimed and shooting was going on all along the road. In the Fraser murder case in which I was conducting the defence of the fourth accused before the first special tribunal the principal witness whose shop was attacked and where Sergeant Fraser was ruthlessly murdered, as I remember, stated that the crowd had attacked the sergeant in his shop, was saying that they could not bear the sight of their men being shot down by the military on the public roads. I believe the fury of the mill-hands was roused to a very high pitch because of the indiscreet shooting all along. I heard when some of the rioters robbed the Swaminarayan temple of their arms the fight grew in intensity.

At about half past two or three a small crowd came near my house to set fire to a municipal *Chowky* and the neighbours came running to me just to try to save their houses being set on fire. On hearing this, I ran down and one who was going in front I stopped by taking him in my arms. He was in excitement. I asked him to cool down and pointed him out how he was inviting incalculable miseries by such mischievous conduct. From his answers I found that certain rumours such as poisoning the water of the city had excited him. On his telling me some of the rioters died on the spot on drinking water from a tap I told him that it could not be due to poisoning of the water as it was incredible but because of their extreme excitement under the effects of drink endangering life. The man was persuaded to leave the *chowky* and I asked him just to persuade other men to retire home. He pleaded that he was helpless for men were uncontrollable. All the police had been withdrawn from the *Chowkies* in the city after I think 12 or 1 o'clock that day.

Martial Law proclaimed.

About the 11th evening people were quieting down and order was restored in the city. The military were still in possession of the main roads, and next day there

Mr. MAGANBHAI CHATURBHAI PATEL—concluded—Mr. KRISHNALAL N. DESAI.

was no disturbance. There were rumours that Europeans were coming from Bombay.

At about the noon of 12th April Martial Law was proclaimed and people were prohibited from moving about in groups of 10 and more. It was also ordered that none should stir out after sunset and before sunrise and that any person violating those orders may be fired upon by the military. The shops were not opened on the 12th, very likely because the city was held by the military and the Martial Law was proclaimed. People had never dreamt of such things before and that filled them with terror. Once at about 1 P.M. after the proclamation of the Martial Law I went out round the city walls from Panch Kuwa gate to Raipur and I was followed by a small party of Indian soldiers from the Sarangpur gate on the road leading to Raipur gate. On seeing a crowd of mill-hands near Mahipatram Anath Ashram I halted and so did the soldiers following me. I thought the soldiers might fire, and so removed myself from their range and stood aside. The crowd disappeared and the soldiers returned. I proceeded further up and some of the crowd smelling drunk issued out on the road. I tried to stop and disperse them fearing they would at once be fired upon by the military but I failed and in a minute a round was fired on us. I slipped behind a screen of rafters and bullets fell on it. Happily the bullets injured none. From there I entered the city walls and returned home.

European soldiers.

European soldiers from Bombay came in the afternoon of the 12th and they took charge of the city. Martial law continued for about 4 or 5 days though in my opinion quite unnecessary after 12th at the most. During the period European soldiers held the city there were very strong reports that although there was quiet everywhere indiscreet shooting was resorted to; public opinion on this point was almost unanimous that the European soldiers did not show to the people that sympathy and discreet which were manifest in the Indian soldiers who thoroughly understood their business, i.e., the purpose of the authorities in putting them there. European soldiers, they said, were treating the citizens as if they were enemies of the king whereas Indian soldiers looked upon the excited crowds as citizens who were to be kept in order for the time being.

No conspiracy.

There was not even the slightest reason to suspect any conspiracy in the ordinary course of the time. The disturbances broke out all of a sudden in the morning of the 11th. The riot assumed a serious form later because of the shooting all along the road and fury of the uncultured mill-hands was excited. There was no ulterior purpose. *Chowkies* were burnt because of the rioters' belief that when European soldiers would come they would be shot down from behind the shelter of the closed *chowkies* and the gates would be closed and every one of them within may be killed. This impression they had got from the Khas Bazar *Chowky* in the morning. Damage done to the public buildings was by way of showing their disgust of the bureaucratic methods of Government and their wrath so suddenly excited could not see whether the examination *pandal* was private or public property. Government servants as such were not attacked. Only very unpopular magistrates known to the people as unjustly harassing the poor were molested. Even European officers who were

known to be just and sympathetic were helped by the mob and escorted safe to their residence.

There was absolutely no hand of the educated classes in these disturbances. They were all for putting them down and keeping perfect peace and this I say notwithstanding Mr. Gandhi's statement to the contrary. In all the Ahmedabad inquiries by the tribunals for over six months not even a suggestion has been made to that effect from any quarter and not the slightest evidence is brought on record to create even a suspicion.

District Magistrate of Ahmedabad.

I have not a word to say against the District Magistrate of Ahmedabad Mr. Chatfield who admirably kept his head cool all this time. Had he allowed himself to be ruffled a little the conditions here would be much worse. But what I could say of him I could not say of Mr. Pratt the Commissioner, Northern Division.

Police inquiry.

So far as the police inquiry conducted here in Ahmedabad and under the immediate supervision of Mr. Guider people have not to complain. On the contrary they have to thank him for much restraint for their usual practices. Lower officers, however, seem to have created much terror in the minds of the people for it was easy for any one to manipulate the names of persons to be brought up for trial. I heard of such complaints while conducting the defence in many important cases before the tribunals.

Disturbances outside Ahmedabad.

My information about the disturbances in Viramgam is derived from the trials before the tribunal under Defence of India Act and from what I heard people talking to me during the course of such inquiries. They were created by the mill-hands of Viramgam in sympathy with those of Ahmedabad and the attitude of the rest of the public was just the same as it was in Ahmedabad.

Disturbances at Barejdi, Nadiad and Vadod were offences committed by a few misguided hands purely under the Indian Railways Act. To put them down as serious offences of waging of war against the Crown or conspiracy seemed to me to be stepping beyond the limits of all reasonable proportions. There was no intention anywhere in Gujarat to subvert the Government and to wage war against the Crown and until the appointment of special tribunals under the Defence of India Act authorities investigating these offences took the same sensible view of the matter. The only intention alleged against the offenders was out of sympathy to the sufferers to save lives of many mill hands in Ahmedabad by delaying the special train of European soldiers. The cases of Barejdi and Vadod seemed to me to be very hard. I believe it was unfortunate that no appeal was allowed on the decisions of the tribunals.

Governor of Bombay.

I could not close my statement without expressing a debt of gratitude to Sir George Lloyd, the Governor of Bombay, whose strong liberal principles of Government must have lent great support to the Collectors of Ahmedabad and Kaira in their cool and considerate judgment in dealing with the situation although perhaps they might have had to yield to the official etiquette in submitting to some of the wishes of their immediate superior.

Mr. KRISHNALAL N. DESAI, M.A., LL.B., Secretary, Gujarat Sabha; Member, All-India Congress Committee.

In Ahmedabad the disturbances occurred only on the 10th and the 11th April last.

In some quarters it is said that the disturbances were a result of the agitation of the *Satyagrahis* against the Rowlatt Act.

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bad attended these meetings and every one was interested to see that nothing that was inconsistent with the tenets of *Satyagraha* was preached. I was myself present at almost all these meetings and I can safely assert that the speeches delivered were always moderate in tone. In fact the essentials of *Satyagraha*—*Satya* and *Ahimsa* (truth and non-violence) coupled with the determination to suffer rather than to injure—were the main points of the various speeches. The Rowlatt Act was also explained in all its details by competent speakers and there was no misrepresentation about that Act. On 4th April Mr. Chatfield, the District Magistrate, sent for us, and Mr. Patel, Mr. Jivanlal and myself interviewed him that evening and assured him that we will see that the 6th April will pass away peacefully. Instructions were issued, that after the evening of the 5th nobody should be asked to suspend his business. 6th April was announced as a day of fast and a general suspension of all work. The day was observed as such in Ahmedabad also. A huge procession consisting of a motley group of persons of all castes and creeds started at 3 p.m. from outside the Panch Kuwa. The crowd now and then might have numbered a hundred thousand persons. This huge procession went to the river side and there *Mahatma* Gandhi's message was read from three platforms and speeches delivered to about 70,000 persons. The celebration was peaceful. The mill-hands had joined. The crowd even during the dreary April days went on so peacefully that any impartial observer could see that it had no desire to make or cause mischief.

On the morning of the 10th while I was going to court I was asked by some one to go to the house of Mr. V. J. Patel who had just received a telegram about Mr. Gandhi's arrest. I went there immediately. We were discussing the way in which we should calm down the public feeling which was likely to be exasperated at this ill news. But before we had hardly come to a definite conclusion the news had spread like wild fire. About 10 to 15 minutes after I reached Mr. Patel's house I received information that several shopkeepers had closed their shops and there was going to be a general strike. I immediately went to the Bazar, conversed with several shopkeepers but found that public feeling was very strong on the point and it was impossible to persuade the ever-increasing crowd to resume work. When I saw that it was all a question of feeling suddenly roused on hearing the news I thought time would be a powerful element in toning down these feelings and so I simply requested and entreated the people to go home, if they had no desire to resume work, and not to assemble in crowds. I also went home at about 12 noon. At about 2 p.m. I heard that several mill-hands had struck work after 12 noon. I also learnt that a crowd was causing damage to the Cinema just opposite Ranchhodlal's fountain. I went there; Mr. Patel, Mr. Kanuga and Mr. Kothari were there. On my way I remonstrated with a few mill-hands I met, that Mr. Gandhi was arrested because he sought arrest and that it was the first essential of the fight he was conducting that people should behave peaceably and as if nothing had happened. From Ranchhodlal's fountain I went to the Gujarat Sabha office where I received a telephonic message that a crowd was collecting near the railway station. I immediately left for that place. On my way near Mahavir's temple I met Mr. Kothari and he told me that though the mob was excited it was not unruly. I saw there Mr. Chimanlal J. Chinai, a *Satyagrahi*. He was trying to disperse the crowd. The crowd was asked to disperse and go to the river-side where a public meeting was arranged to explain *Mahatma* Gandhi's message of peace and love. While on Richey Road I saw four wounded persons brought to Dr. Kanuga's dispensary. On inquiry I found that these were the victims of Prem Darwaza firing. The sight of these wounded greatly excited the mob on the Richey Road. With a view to avoid any catastrophe there, we arranged to lead the crowd to the river-bed where a meeting was arranged. On my way to the meeting place I went to Mr. Patel and thinking that as the mill-hands had struck work the presence of

Shrimati Anasuya Ben may enable us to persuade them to resume work, Mr. Patel, Mr. Indulal and myself sent a joint message to her at Bombay asking her to come immediately. After reaching the meeting place I conferred with Mr. Patel and then left the meeting to go to Prem Darwaza. I reached there at about 6-30 or 6-45 p.m. On my way near the Panch Kuwa gate I was told that a rumour was in the air that a peaceful crowd was fired upon by one European gentleman and some violent words were also said to have been spoken by two Europeans disparaging Mr. Gandhi. This exasperated the crowd. Definite inquiries on the spot were out of question. The crowd had begun to grow disorderly since about 2-30 p.m. The District Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate arrived there at about 5 p.m. A careful handling of the situation in time near the Prem gate would have changed the whole aspect and I am sure the District Magistrate who is very popular if early at the scene would have been able to ease public feeling and thus avoid any further catastrophe. Even after the arrival of the armed police I think firing was unnecessarily resorted to.

The night of the 10th passed off quietly. In the morning I went at about 7-45 a.m. to the railway station thinking that Anasuya Ben might come. On my way to the station I found two or three small groups of men only. I also met two police Sub-Inspectors who told me that things were assuming a normal aspect. I reached the station at about 8 a.m. There I received Anasuya Ben's message that our telegram was received late and so she could not come but authorised me to issue any handbill, I liked, over her signature. The mail arrived at about 8-30 a.m. and I immediately went away with Mr. Kalidas J. Jhaveri who arrived from Bombay by the Gujarat mail to Mr. Patel's house in Anasuya Ben's motor. On our way there we learnt that a false rumour about Anasuya Ben's arrest was already in the air exasperating public feeling. With a view to counteract the evil effects of this false rumour I immediately got issued a leaflet over Anasuya Ben's signature stating that she was free in Bombay. The leaflet is attached.* On our way to Mr. Patel's we encountered some two or three groups of men and to all these we showed Anasuya Ben's telegram I had just received and explained to them that she was free in Bombay. When we reached Mr. Patel's house I was told that he was out since early morning. As I wanted to issue a handbill over Anasuya Ben's signature we went again in search of Mr. Patel and Mr. Yajnik. When the motor we were occupying had come near the gate just opposite to the Victoria Gardens we were stopped by a crowd of *Dheda* and *Vagharies* coming out of Becharadas mills. These were almost all armed with bamboo sticks. Mr. Kalidas and myself asked them to return and told them that it was Anasuya Ben's special desire that they should resume work. They would not hear us. The crowd simply asked us to produce Anasuya Ben. We tried to quiet them down but all of a sudden some one from behind flung a stone or two at the motor. This was immediately followed by two or three blows of sticks against the motor. The hood was slightly damaged. The crowd went away towards the Gujarat Club side without heeding us. We were informed that a crowd had assembled near the Oriental Insurance Company's office and we went there. The motor was sent away and we walked the distance. Near that office I saw Mr. Maganbhai Chaturbhai Patel and Mr. Majmudar, Barrister, and others persuading the crowd. It was here that I got separated from Mr. Kalidas. As Mr. Patel was not there and as I was told that Mr. Patel had gone to river-side I ran over to the river-side picking up Mr. Kothari on my way but did not find Mr. Patel. I again returned and went towards Pankor Naka but by this time it was sufficiently certain that though the crowds listened to us they were in no mood to heed us. I saw a crowd near the Proprietary High School. After once more remonstrating with the crowd I ran over to Anasuya

* Annexure A, page 261.

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[Concluded.]

Ben's residence at Mirzapur on learning that Mr. Patel and Dr. Kanuga were seen there last. I found there a few mill-hands. I explained to them the necessity of keeping peace and dispersing. From thence I again went to Mr. Patel's and thence to the District Court. Here I saw clouds of smoke coming from the side of Lal Darwaza. I hastened there. The Matriculation Mandap was on fire. I went in the compound and tried to help the contractor's men as best I could. I was suddenly asked by some one there to phone to the water works Engineer for water. I ran over towards K. B. Rustamji's bungalow but was told on my way that there were only 3 or 4 feet of water in the cistern. I again returned and went to Mr. Patel who had returned. There I drafted in consultation with Mr. Indulal and Mr. Patel the notice to be issued over Anasuya Ben's signature. This is annexed.* This was sent to the Press and issued at about 12 noon and freely distributed. After sending the draft to the press I thought it advisable to send another telegram to Anasuya Ben asking her to come down. I sent it at about 11 p.m. but as the telegraph office had by this time been raided by the mob the telegram was despatched through the railway office. Unfortunately even this telegram did not reach Anasuya Ben in time. The crowd had by 10-15 a.m. gone beyond control. At 10-45 while I was at Mr. Patel's some one came running saying that the crowd was coming towards the telegraph office. I hastened to the office with Mr. Fulshankar, pleader, and Mr. Kalidas Jhaveri with a view to save these lines of communication. When we reached the place the office was already in possession of the mob and I noticed flames coming out. I returned to Mr. Patel's and went home at about 12 noon. Before leaving for the telegraph office I heard firing opposite to the Bank of Bombay at about 10-30 a.m. By the time I returned home at 12 the armed police had taken possession of almost all the important public buildings. At about 2 p.m. I again went to Mr. Patel's house. During the interval it was impossible to find out where the mob was. It had melted away in small gangs causing mischief to the various police *chowkies*, etc. From 2 p.m. to about 6 I was at Mr. Patel's. By that time owing to the posting of military at several centres the situation to the posting of military under control. On the morning of the 12th I again went to Mr. Patel's at about 9. Martial Law was declared at about 10 a.m. on the 12th. In the view of the altered situation after the arrival of the military I think this was unnecessary. The main road was closed to all pedestrian traffic. At about 11-15 a State telegram despatched from Anand by Seth Ambalal Sarabhai was received at my place stating that *Mahatma* Gandhi and Anasuya Ben were free at Bombay and that the latter desired me to request the mill-hands to resume work. I immediately got it published. I annex the notice.† At about 3 p.m. Seth Ambalal Sarabhai came to me directly from the railway station. I explained to him the whole situation. He went home and returned at about 5-30 p.m. with Mr. Patel and Dr. Kanuga. We all went in his motor towards the Kankaria side to see if we could meet any rioters. But we found none and returned. From this narration it will be clear that the authorities on the morning of the 11th did not suspect any further mischief. They thought that things would assume a normal aspect. I think the experience of the evening of the 10th ought to have been a sufficient lesson and the authorities ought to have been more alert and armed police should have been kept ready at several centres on the evening of the 10th. Had this been done the 11th would have passed away quietly. Unfortunately even on the 11th the armed police appeared on the scene after about 10-30 a.m. The question naturally arises as to who were the persons constituting this mysterious mob. I encountered several groups and I can safely say that these consisted mostly of *Vagharies*, *Dheds* and *Marwaris* with a sprink-

ling of a few middle class men. There were mill-hands also but the spinners were more in evidence than the weavers. In this connection it will be pertinent to note that the spinners of about a dozen mills constituting the Raipur group were on strike during the fortnight preceding the 11th April. Moreover the whole was a spontaneous act of feelings roused by the arrest of Mr. Gandhi. The false rumour of Anasuya Ben's arrest on the morning of 11th accentuated the whole situation. The great respect in which these two are held by the masses in general and the mill-hands in particular was the chief cause of this spontaneous outburst of popular feeling at the ill-advised action of the Government of India in arresting Mr. Gandhi who was on a peaceful mission. There was absolutely no organisation behind it. As a protest against the ill-considered action of the authorities in arresting Mr. Gandhi this feeling manifested itself mainly against the authorities. People had already begun to consider bureaucracy as likely to do any ill-conceived action flouting public opinion. The internment orders against Mrs. Besant and others, the passing of the Rowlatt Bills in the teeth of the unanimous opposition from the public and the numerous arrests in the Punjab had made the public too ready to hear of any such further action of the bureaucracy. Thus even the false news of Anasuya Ben's arrest was believed in spite of our assertions to the contrary. The feeling was not against the British *Raj*. It was only against the bureaucratic system.

ANNEXURE A.

Public Notice.

The rumour that has spread to-day in Ahmedabad, that I have been arrested, is not true; up to now I have not been arrested. My request is that no mill-hands should make any disturbance.

ANASUYA SARABHAI

BOMBAY;

Dated 11th April 1919.

ANNEXURE B.

Warning to mill-hands.

I have heard that the labouring class of Ahmedabad is excited on account of the news of *Mahatma* Gandhi being arrested. It is a matter for great regret that an order was issued restricting *Mahatma* Gandhi, and we must sit quiet in order to show our regret. Our purpose will not be served by making a disturbance or by doing injury to the life and property of any one. On the contrary, by doing so, we spoil the fight of *Mahatma* Gandhi.

Therefore, it is my special suggestion to the mill labouring class of Ahmedabad that on this extremely painful occasion they should make no disturbance or mischief of any kind and should do their work quietly. Those who do not go to their work should sit at home and pray to God.

It is my particular advice that all should on this occasion observe perfect peace for the sake of your love and respect for *Mahatma* Gandhi and for me, for the sake of the work begun by him and for the sake of the honour of Ahmedabad city.

This our fight is just for bearing pain. And if we remain firm with patience and peace, then the victory will be ours in the end.

ANASUYA SARABHAI.

Dated 11th April 1919.

* Annexure B, (opposite).
† Annexure C, page 262.

Mr. KRISHNALAL N. DESAI—concluded—Mr. VALLABHBHAI JHAVERBHAI PATEL.

ANNEXURE C.

Public Notice.

In the telegram just received by me at 11-30 the news has arrived that *Mahatma* Gandhiji and *Shri* Anasuya Ben are at large in Bombay and are quite well. They are not under restraint of any kind.

It is the special request of *Shri* Anasuya Ben to the labourer class that they should return to work and do

their work peacefully without making disturbance of any kind.

Written by the servant,

KRISHNALAL NARSILAL DESAI.

Alias BACHUBHAI.

AHMEDABAD ;

12th April 1919.

Mr. VALLABHBHAI JHAVERBHAI PATEL, Bar-at-Law, Secretary, *Satyagraha Sabha*, Ahmedabad

The Government of India committed a grave error in passing the Rowlatt Act in the month of March in the teeth of the united opposition of the country with undue haste and at a very inopportune time. This exasperated the people whose political consciousness had been awakened by the inception of the Home Rule propaganda. In order to direct the violent agitation against the Rowlatt Act into peaceful and law-abiding channel and to offer an effective opposition to the high-handed action of the authorities in flouting public opinion Mr. Gandhi started the *Satyagraha* movement during the last week of February. I am one of the Secretaries of the local *Satyagraha Sabha* of which Mr. Gandhi is the President. During the month of March four public meetings were held to explain to the public the Rowlatt Act. Speeches were made explaining to the people the obnoxious clauses of the Rowlatt Act and true spirit of *Satyagraha*. I was present at almost all these meetings. Speeches were moderate in tone.

On the 3rd April I received a note from Mr. Chatfield in connection with the *hartal* on the 6th.

Messrs. Jivanlal V. Desai, Krishnalal N. Desai and myself saw him in the evening as desired by him. Special leaflets were issued that after the evening of the 5th no attempt should be made by anybody to ask anyone to close his shop or to strike work.

In the morning of the 6th volunteers were called and instructed how to keep order in the procession. People collected in large numbers before time and so the procession was started from the appointed place (Manilal Mansion) at about 3 P.M. Large number of people also joined on the way. Ladies also joined. The procession was quite orderly and peaceful.

At about 5 P.M. some 50,000 people assembled in the river-bed. The meeting was divided in 3 parts. Mr. Gandhi's message was read and explained. Messrs. Jivanlal, Indulal and Chinoy were amongst the principal speakers. The meeting dispersed quietly. In the morning of the 10th a telegram addressed to the *Ashram* was received by me between 8 and 9 A.M. I sent a copy of it to the *Ashram*. An hour after another telegram addressed to me was received with a full message from Mr. Gandhi. Members of the committee were sent for and the translation of the message was sent to the Press. I felt that the Government of India had committed a very serious mistake in thus arresting Mr. Gandhi who was on a mission of peace to Punjab. The news of the arrest, coming at a time when the whole political atmosphere was surcharged with indignation, unsettled the public mind. While we were discussing as to what steps should be adopted to ease public feeling the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest spread in the city like wild-fire and people closed down their shops. Attempts were made to persuade people to open their shops but to no purpose. At about 2 P.M. I was called to pacify a crowd creating disturbance near the Cinematograph on the Richey Road. I addressed them from the window of the adjoining house and they dispersed. Again at about 3 P.M. I was called at another place on the Richey Road. Messrs. Acton and Kothawala were then trying to disperse the crowd and I addressed them from an Otta and dispersed them. At about 5 P.M. I got information about the firing near Prem Darwaza and so I started to go there. While on the Richey Road I was informed that things were quiet there. Unfortunately at this time some

three or four wounded persons came to Dr. Kanuga's dispensary from Prem Darwaza. After treating them Dr. Kanuga directed them to be taken to the civil hospital. The crowd at the Richey Road began to be uncontrollable at the sight of these victims of Prem Darwaza firing. I thought the safest course was to take the crowd away to the river-bed where a meeting was arranged. I sent word to the members of my committee to induce the crowd to go to the river bed. I myself went there with some 500 people. Thousands of people began to follow. Within a very short time 30 to 40 thousand people assembled and the meeting was held about an hour earlier than previously announced. The meeting was divided into three parts. Mr. Gandhi's message was read over and explained. Mrs. Gandhi, who was specially requested to attend, appealed to the people to resume work next morning. The meeting dispersed at about 9 P.M. Many of us patrolled in the city till 11 P.M. exhorting the people to open their shops next morning and resume work. The night passed off quietly.

In the early morning of the 11th about a dozen volunteers from Mr. Gandhi's *Ashrama* whom I had specially sent for came to me and I instructed them to move about in the city and see that everything was quiet and people were returning to their work. I went to the civil hospital with Dr. Kanuga and Mr. Indulal to see the wounded but were asked to come at 4 P.M. Then we passed by the Richey Road. Some people had opened their shops. We advised others to do so. Mr. Kothawala met us at *Char Rasia*. He told us that things were getting normal and there was no cause for anxiety. Then we went to the Prem Darwaza. Some troops were there and there was a large crowd of mill-hands standing near the place. We advised them to disperse, but they did not. Then we went to Mr. Amritlal Mulchand Mehta. He was not at home. We returned to Prem Darwaza and just at that time Mr. Chatfield and Mr. Boyd came there. I had a talk with Mr. Chatfield. I told him that there was no appearance of any trouble on the Richey Road side but the mill hands that had assembled there did not disperse and we were trying to disperse them. I also told him that none of us had much influence with the mill hands and I expected Anasuya Ben whom I had wired the previous evening to return by Gujarat mail. We induced the mob to follow us to her bungalow and informed them that she was coming by mail. Dr. Kanuga and myself walked in front and Mr. Yajnik was following the crowd. About a couple of hundred came with us to the bungalow and there we exhorted them to go on work and to behave peacefully and that they should influence others to do so. Mr. Amritlal Mehta who had come there also assisted us in advising them. While we were advising them Anasuya Ben's car came and we were informed that she had not arrived by mail as was expected. Rumours were afloat that Anasuya Ben was arrested and therefore the mill hands who were excited began to go out of our control. We went from there to the Shakhbazar, but there was nobody there. Then we passed by the Female Training College and near the Raikhad mill saw a large crowd coming with sticks. We succeeded in persuading some of them to give up their sticks to us but all did not accept our suggestion. As soon as we entered the Bhadar gate near the Gujarat Club we saw the Univer-

Mr. VALLABHBHAI JHAVERBHAI PATEL—concluded—GUJARAT SABHA.

sity *mandap* on flames. Mr. Indulal was sent to fetch my daughter and the daughters of Dr. Sumant from the Female Training College. He returned with them and after my daughter was brought to my house Mr. Indulal went to Dr. Sumant with his daughters. In the meanwhile the group of offices in Bhadar were set on fire. The Bombay Bank Guard fired and 2 wounded men fell in front of my house. Some of the *Ashram* people came and informed at that time that the mob was absolutely uncontrollable.

I asked them and some other people standing there to remove the wounded people to the hospital. I had received a telegram from the Associated Press for detailed information by wire. We drafted the wire. Meanwhile Mr. Krishnalal N. Desai came to my place with Anasuya Ben's message to him that she could not come but authorised him to issue any handbills we liked over her signature. A leaflet was drafted and issued. Another message was sent by Mr. Krishnalal to Anasuya Ben asking her to come over immediately. The telegraph office was on fire at the time. Messages were not received in that office and they were sent to the station. The Press message was returned but the other one was accepted but unfortunately did not reach Anasuya Ben in time.

Between 12 and 1 P.M. somebody came and told me that many people were wounded and were being removed to Dr. Solomon of civil hospital for stretchers. By 12 noon the military pickets were posted at several important centres and the crowd had consequently

melted away into small groups causing mischief to the various police *chowkies*.

Mr. Rao came at about 3 P.M. at my place and then we went to the hospital, as we heard that some European gentleman was seriously wounded. We saw a large number of wounded people there and heard that a sergeant was killed on the Richey Road. We returned at about 5 P.M. No disturbance occurred in the city after 6 P.M. and the posting of military pickets had brought the situation well under control.

In the morning of the 12th we went to the station to receive Anasuya Ben but we were told that the mail was late by some hours. We returned and on our way back we stopped for some time at Mr. Krishnalal Desai's. On my return home I learnt that martial law was proclaimed in the city at about 10 A.M. At about 12 I got a message from Seth Ambalal from Anand to the effect that he had personally seen Mr. Gandhi at Bombay and that he and Anasuya Ben were free there. I circulated the news in the city, and sent a message to Mr. Gandhi to come to Ahmedabad at once. In the afternoon Seth Ambalal came to my place and Dr. Kanuga Mr. Desai and myself went with him on the Kankaria side. Mr. Gandhi and Anasuya Ben came by mail on the 13th and went straight to Shahi Pagh. They came to my place with Mr. Boyd at about 11 A.M. and we all went to the *Ashram* and arranged to call a meeting the next day.

The martial law was withdrawn on the morning of the 14th.

Memorandum of the committee appointed by the GUJARAT SABHA, Ahmedabad.

The committee of the Gujrat Sabha submits the following statement regarding the causes of the disturbances that took place in April last and the measures taken to cope with them:—

1. The remote causes of the disturbances are to be found in the economic conditions resulting from the war. Shortage of foodstuffs and cloth and the consequent rise in their prices increased the stress of life while the wages and earnings of the large mass of people did not increase proportionately. Administration of the system of control and other measures taken by Government to relieve the economic stress hit many traders hard and was not understood by the large masses of people who vaguely felt that the Government was responsible for the situation. The complete failure of monsoon last year deeply accentuated the economic hardships of the middle and the poor classes.

2. The altered political situation had made the people very sensitive to political events. Dissatisfaction with the present status of disqualification and inferiority and aspirations for greater rights and liberty with limited prospects of their validation, existed before the war. But desire for self-government and self-determination was considerably heightened by the happenings of the war and the declarations of liberal principles by American and European statesmen. The attempts made by the Anglo-Indian Press in India and the Indo-British Association in England to thwart the Montagu-Chelmsford Reform Scheme caused deep resentment which was also directed against British officials in India, the large majority of whom were believed to be firmly opposed to the reform scheme. The feelings expressed in the Press and platform permeated large sections of the masses including petty traders, artisans and labourers.

3. In this atmosphere of strained hopes and sensitive discontent was passed the Rowlatt Act towards the end of March last. It was generally felt that the Act constituted a gross violation of the principles of liberty and justice and was resented as a mark of insult and humiliation. It roused a volume of political feeling and agitation the like of which has never been witnessed before. The *Satyagraha* movement inaugurated by Mr. Gandhi on 24th February 1919 awakened profound enthusiasm and enhanced the popular determination to oppose the measure at any cost.

4. In response to Mr. Gandhi's appeal to observe the 6th April as a day of humiliation and prayer a perfect *hartal* was observed in the city on 6th April. A huge procession of about 75,000 persons or more including some of the leading citizens passed by the main streets of the city to river-bed. The large mass of people was broken up into three sections to which Mr. Gandhi's message was read from three platforms. The procession and meeting, while they were undoubtedly unparalleled in the annals of the public life of the city, were carried out as was expected peacefully and quietly and even when some persons were asked at some places to get down from vehicles force was neither threatened nor used.

5. The leading members of the local *Satyagraha Sabha* began the *Satyagraha* campaign on 7th April by selling copies of *Hind Swarajya* written by Mr. Gandhi. The sale continued on 8th and 9th April, and though it evoked enthusiasm where it took place, it did not cause any undue excitement. A public meeting was held on 9th April under the auspices of the *Satyagraha Sabha* to explain the commencement of the *Satyagraha* movement, and it passed off quietly. The minds of the people were undoubtedly excited by the passing of the Rowlatt Act.

6. In this surcharged atmosphere came the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest. The news spread like wild-fire throughout the city and was most deeply resented. It should be noted that Mr. Gandhi has honoured Ahmedabad by making it his head-quarters while he is loved and respected as a spiritual and political leader in the whole of India; the feelings of love and reverence cherished for him in this city are extraordinary. On hearing the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest the people, following the recent example of 6th April, began to shut their shops and proclaim a *hartal*. The labourers also left the mills at about 12 noon to join their fellow citizens who had struck work.

7. Disturbance took place at Prem Darwaza where an excited crowd came into collision with the police when they fired on it and one police constable was killed. Members of the committee have no personal knowledge of this disturbance nor are they in a position to trace the immediate causes of the same.

8. Crowds had also collected at Richey Road and it was due to the efforts of local leaders of *Satyagraha* movement that a collision was averted between a party

GUJARAT SABHA.

15. Before offering our remarks on the introduction of the martial law on the morning of the 12th, we would pause to summarise a few facts bearing on the matter. Firstly, the military pickets which were stationed at Bhadar and at the Government buildings near by at about 12 A.M. succeeded in clearing the whole

Note.—All the signatories except Mr. Yajnik were subsequently examined as witnesses.

4. Rioting had lasted from 11 A.M. of the 12th to, say, about 10 P.M. of the same date after which nothing happened. During this time the station, post office and municipal office had been burnt down and part of the treasury had been damaged by fire. The third class Magistrate, who gave the order to armed police guard at the treasury to fire at the mob, was eventually captured by the rioters, who poured kerosine oil over him and burnt him alive. The sepoys on leaving Kharaghoda, I must say, were in rather a shaky condition, a good many of them being only recruits and not knowing what was in front of them. I gave every man who did not wish to accompany me the option of falling out, but I am glad to say they all refused to do so. After we had once started operations at Viramgam the sepoys and *amaldars* settled down, did their work like men and I felt proud of them. Mr. Prescott gave me most valuable assistance and thoroughly helped to keep up the prestige of the department. The acting Subedar—an old soldier—also accompanied me and his presence helped to put confidence into our men. I sent the sepoys back the next day by the midday train after finding that their services were no longer required. The Major asked me to convey a message from him to them to the effect that they had done "damned well" which message was duly conveyed to them. This message bucked the men up immensely and I saw that they knew that their services had been appreciated.

Mr. M. A. MUNSHI—Mr. SAKERLAL BALVANTRAI THAKORE.

Mr. M. A. MUNSHI, Station Master, Viramgam, Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway.

On the 12th April 1919 at about 9 A.M. I saw an unusual number of people standing in the third class passengers' waiting shed. They were not the passengers but appeared to me as if they were waiting or looking for something. I took no notice of these people, but went away in the yard to attend to my work. At this time my Traffic Inspector Mr. MacIlvrde who had come from Kharaghoda by 8 A.M. train was sitting in the waiting room.

At about 10 o'clock, when I returned from the yard, I was informed by the police *Jamadar* that he had dispersed the crowd from the waiting shed and had advised Mr. MacIlvrde to sit in the luggage office as he considered that the waiting room was not the safe place to sit in.

On arrival of the mail from Bombay, I attended to the transhipment and on seeing the metre gauge train for Bhavnagar side overcrowded, I went in the yard to order some more carriages to be attached to the train. From the yard I returned with the carriages at about 11 o'clock when I was informed by the Sub-Inspector of police that a crowd of rioters had jumped over the fencing in the station garden but they were repulsed and that Mr. MacIlvrde had occupied the officer's rest house (situated on the top of the station buildings). Myself and the Sub-Inspector went to consult Mr. MacIlvrde as to whether he should remain here or go away by the Bhavnagar train. He said he had to attend the work at Ahmedabad and therefore he would rather prefer to go to Ahmedabad by the 3 P.M. train No. 10 Up. As he was quite safe in the officer's rest house, I also agreed that he should return to Ahmedabad. Having kept one head watchman and one police constable on the alert, myself and the Sub-Inspector of police went home for the breakfast. Mr. MacIlvrde was served with the breakfast in the officer's rest house and I was taking my *khana* at home. I was informed that a big crowd of rioters has surrounded the station buildings and that they have rushed inside the telegraph office and broken down all the communication and throwing stones at the officer's rest house. I left my *khana* and appeared on the station where I saw a crowd of about one thousand people armed with sticks running up and down and throwing stones at the station buildings; the crowd consisted of the labour class of people, young men and boys, Hindus and Muhammadans. Amidst this crowd I saw one young man playing with his stick furiously as if he was the head of the rioters. I caught him and asked him to explain to me the reasons of their disorderly behaviour and as to why they have attacked the railway station. He replied to me that Thornley *Sahib* (the Manager of the Alfred Mills) has been concealed in the rest house on top of this station buildings. I said that the rest house has been occupied by the railway Traffic Inspector and requested him to go away from the railway station. He said there is Thornley *Sahib*. I took an oath and suggested that if you tell these men not to throw the stones and disperse the crowd, I will take you alone with me on the top to assure you that the person you suspect was not there. He agreed and lifted his hand to stop quiet, but the crowd was in great excitement and did not care for his order. At this time I saw number of people going up on the ladder and in the

gallery of the rest house. I and the said young man went up in the gallery where I saw number of people breaking the window glasses of the rest house with the sticks. I saw Mr. MacIlvrde had come out of the rest house and standing near the ladder with clerk Nanalal. The people standing on the platform and in the garden, were throwing the stones at random. When two or three stones struck me, my staff and the rioters dragged me down the ladder and dragged me to my bungalow opposite the platform; within ten minutes I came out from the bungalow as the doctor informed me that the Traffic Inspector has seriously been injured by the rioters. In the meanwhile the station buildings was set on fire by the rioters.

Immediately I issued a very urgent telegram to inform the railway and Government officers of what had happened and to send me all sorts of assistance. As the telegraph and telephone communications were destroyed by the rioters I had to send my message with my Assistant and two signallers on an engine to Jakhwada station, to be despatched from there to Ahmedabad. In the meanwhile Mr. MacIlvrde, who was seriously injured, was sent away by my staff on an engine to Kharaghoda.

Hose pipes were brought to play water on the roof of island platform to save from the flames of station buildings but the rioters shouted from a distance that who-so-ever makes an effort to extinguish the fire, will be burnt alive.

At about 3 P.M. a gang of about 100 rioters ran towards Kharaghoda line and took off two rails of the Kharaghoda line. The permanent way inspector on being informed by me had taken measures to stop any train coming from Kharaghoda a long way off the disturbed road. The rioters after taking off the two rails returned towards the station and set fire to the signalling cabin and to the office of the transhipping staff. In the meanwhile a big crowd again appeared in the yard where number of metre and broad gauge waggons loaded with public goods were standing: they opened all the waggons and started looting the public goods. At 7-30 P.M. MacIlvrde returned from Kharaghoda with Messrs. Caldecott and Prescott with Kharaghoda armed police. At this time the rioters were looting the goods set fire to waggons loaded with the famine grass fodder and disappeared. All the grass waggons were saved by separating them from the fire, except the two waggons, the contents of which were burnt to ashes. The rioters had broken the main connection of the water pipe from the boring.

A detachment of 97th arrived from Ahmedabad at 9 P.M. and started patrolling in the city. The *badmashes* of the surrounding villages had been collected to set the city on fire and loot the city but on arrival of the troops in time they disappeared. Accused Nos. 1, 2 and 5 were identified by me, all of whom were convicted and were sentenced by the tribunal court for transportation.

I did not take special notice of the passengers arrived by down Gujarat mail train, but it is a well-known fact that the spirit amongst the rioters of Viramgam was very much increased after the arrival of that train.

The rioters of Viramgam were consisted of the mill-hands and the labour class of people.

Mr. SAKERLAL BALVANTRAI THAKORE, Railway Police Sub-Inspector, Viramgam.

At about 7 P.M. on the 10th of April 1919 the rumour of the arrest of Mr. M. K. Gandhi spread like a wildfire in the town. The business was altogether suspended throughout every nook and corner of the whole town from the early morning of the 11th. The shops were closed. The mill-hands went on strike; consequently both the mills could not work. Even the railway licensed dealers in tea and confectionery sought no exclusion therefrom but they preferred to pursue the same line. The mill-hands having no work loitered here and there at random. The occurrences at Ahmedabad

attracted my attention and I thought it advisable to take some precautionary measures and to give a piece of advice to my men. I gathered together all of them and gave them a word of warning to be alert and vigilant, to refrain from entering into any sort of debate with the outsiders that would likely tend to cause any disturbance and to convey me whatever information they could pick up from their conversation or whatever inferences they were able to draw from their acts and attitude; then they were all sent to their respective duties.

Mr. SAKERLAL BALVANTRAI THAKORE—concluded—Mr. G. MACILVRDE.

At about 10 A.M. on the 11th a crowd numbering about 100 or more rushing into the railway limits neared my office shouting repeatedly "*Gandhi Mahatma ki jai*," i.e., Hail to Gandhi *Mahatma*. I persuaded them to leave the limits undisturbed and they accordingly did without any further disturbance. The crowd reappeared the night —I cannot precisely and definitely say whether the crowd was the same—its number was very small. I endeavoured to trace out the reason of their appearance but it was to no purpose, but their acts suggested inferences that they went to the station to know what happened at Ahmedabad because of turning their faces to the town with the passengers.

At about 9-30 A.M. the next day a crowd of 1,000 chiefly made up of the mill-hands rushed into the railway pound. They seemed to be eagerly searching somebody, but when they could find none some of them entered the railway premises. I thought that they were likely going to do some injury to the Europeans and Mr. MacIlvrde, the Traffic Inspector, had a little ere come up by the Kharaghoda train. Upon him was cast an evil eye by the strikers while he was walking along the platform. I requested the Superintendent of Police by wires after this wires to send me the assistance of the armed men at this critical juncture, but owing to the devastation of the means of the communications the messages could not reach the destination in time and the timely aid could not be had. I told the Traffic Inspector that it was advisable for him to leave the place for Sabli as his life seemed to me in danger but he ignored this and showed his inclination to go to Ahmedabad by 10-Up train.

To allow his person to be seen by others any longer was to bring calamity on him. I took him to the waiting room and thence to the rest house. I could succeed this time in the effort of dispersing them by the help of one weaving master. The crowd was then wholly dispersed and no one was seen within the railway limits. I then repaired to the town for my meals; half the way I saw my constable Becharsing running to me in a bewildered state. We both hastened to the station and to my utter surprise I saw a huge crowd. The situation seemed to be very alarming and the mob irresistible; the most of it was mob was armed with sticks and cudgels; a part of it was with deadly weapons such as swords, *dharias* and country guns. I gathered my courage and approached the so-called leader in person and asked him the reason for this. He insisted on having the *Sahib* utter "*Gandhi Mahatma ki jai*" (hail to Gandhi *Mahatma*) and unless this has been done there was the plain refusal to disperse. With these words he ran to the rest house and the others followed him in train. They all forcibly made their way

to the staircase. The events at Ahmedabad highly excited them. To check the trend was nothing but to pour oil on troubled waters, to add fuel to the fire, they unloosened their temperament, lost control over their senses and were bent upon doing the heinous acts. I and the Station Master Mr. Munshi tried our utmost to persuade them but every effort proved futile. The rioters ran to the balcony where the Traffic Inspector was standing and injured him seriously. I ran to his help and meanwhile an unknown personage rushed forward and gave me two blows on my shoulder. I took the Traffic Inspector in the inner room, and the crowd went downstairs. The Traffic Inspector was clad in the porter's dress and after giving him the requisite medical aid by Mr. Ghoda he was sent to Kharaghoda in a brake van. The others were not silent by this time, they raided the luggage office and looted the contents of the parcels. They aimed at the glass windows with the stones and unripe mangoes and damaged a great deal of the railway premises and the property. Then they set the telegraph office on fire in order to shut the communication with outside. At about 3 P.M. some 25 men forcibly took the implements from the Locomotive sheds and were seen running wildly towards the K. O. D. line to deconstruct it with a view to deter the help coming from that side. They cut also the wires and all sort of communication was stopped. The wires to the Superintendent of Police were sent from Jakhwada. The news of the cruel and torturing death of Mr. Madhavlal, the *Sahib Karkun*, produced the greatest alarm in the minds of my men, their mental agony knew no bounds. They trembled with fear when the rumour came to their ears that they were going to massacre every policeman and the members of the family if he stood a barrier to their progress. They ran home to take them to a place of safety. What deplorable state was of ours at that time!

At about 4 P.M. the rioters rushed into the goods shed and fell upon the contents of the wagons like grass hoppers. They seized with whatever came to their hands and fled. They destroyed grass in the wagons by fire. The looting lasted till the first discharge of the volley by Messrs. Caldecott and Prescott dashed against the ears of the rioters; they then ran with their lives. No sooner did the Traffic Inspector Mr. MacIlvrde reach Kharaghoda and inform the aforesaid of the riot than they started with the armed men. At about 9 P.M. the special train brought the military. I laid the matter before the Commanding Officer and patrolled with him within the railway limits and the town. Everything was silenced since the arrival of Messrs. Caldecott and Prescott and no further agitation was noticed.

Mr. G. MACILVRDE, Traffic Inspector, Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway, Viramgam, now Station Master, Ahmedabad.

I left for Viramgam on the 11th April by 1-Down mail when the situation at Ahmedabad seemed quiet, although the rioters had stoned the station at about 3 P.M. on the 10th April for about five or six minutes, and then moved northward. On arrival at Viramgam on 11th morning, the situation there was normal and work was being carried out at the station. After completing my work during the day I left for Kharaghoda during the evening, and up till then, there was no sign of dissatisfaction; while at Kharaghoda I received a message from the Station Master, Nadiad, that a troop train had been derailed between Nadiad and Uttarsanda.

On return to Viramgam next morning it never gave me the impression that there was to be a serious riot and the first impression I received was, while walking on the platform the Head Constable of police informed that I was requested by the Station Master to go to the luggage office; while sitting there, and sometime afterwards, the Sub-Inspector of police came and informed that the situation had taken a decided change for the worse, and that it was not safe for me to walk

on the platform alone. After talking for a while with the Sub-Inspector, the mail came in and we went to the north end of the island platform to inquire from the driver what like the situation was at Ahmedabad. It was from here that we noticed a crowd moving towards the city, and when they noticed us standing on the platform, some jumped over the railway fencing. I then moved into the officers' rest house above the station, either on the advice of Assistant Medical Officer or Sub-Inspector of Police. This crowd was dispersed. At about 12 noon a crowd was heard coming from the south approach of the station and before I knew where I was, I found the station was surrounded and lamps being broken on the platform. Within a few minutes the stones came in through the windows and the glass doors of the rest house, which lasted for about half an hour, when the front staircase from the platform was rushed by the rioters. Finding that I had no weapon for defence, I put on a bold front and went to the verandah, and asked what was wrong; when I was asked to say "*Mahatma Gandhi ki jai*" to which I "replied I have nothing to do with Mr. Gandhi, my work is railway." The

Mr. G. MacILVRIDE—concluded.—MANILAL NAGARLAL.

accused No. 1 tried to save me, but somebody from the crowd hit me across the head with a *lathi*. The crowd then seemed to disperse, only to return a few minutes later by the side and bathroom steps and belaboured me across the head and back until I was unconscious.

How I was taken out of the room I do not know (I had subsequently learnt this fact). When I came to my senses again I found myself lying on the light engine going to Kharaghoda, and being taken to the Salt Superintendent's bungalow. Here I was dressed as far as possible by Mr. Prescott who wrote for the hospital compounder to come and to attend my wounds. After Mr. Prescott had ascertained the fact of what was wrong at Viramgam, he wrote to the Assistant Collector, who came across and ascertained the real facts for himself, and decided he must leave at once with as many sepoys as he could for Viramgam. These sepoys accompanied with the Salt Collector left for Viramgam by a special train. I also accompanied this train. *En route* the thought struck me that, as they derailed the troop train between Nadiad and Uttarsanda, the rioters may attempt it here as well, so I told the Deputy Collector

after leaving Jhund to be careful, as the rails may be uprooted, and the driver was informed accordingly. About a mile from Viramgam the train stopped and the troops alighted, and while walking along the track to Viramgam station it was found that the outer signal had been damaged, and an attempt made to burn a culvert, and the line was found uprooted. On proceeding further, we found the cabin damaged. From this point of view, looking towards the station, all the wagons in metre-gauge and broad-gauge yard were being looted by the rioters. A volley was fired into the air. This had the desired effect and the whole of the rioters were dispersed. I saw nobody injured. Consignments of grain, etc., were found lying all over the yard, and I noticed some wagons of hay on fire. The station building was burnt to the ground. After leaving a picket on the station, the Collector with the sepoys left for the Government treasury. The troops from Ahmedabad arrived at Viramgam at about 9.30 P.M. I left for further medical treatment by rail at about 11 P.M. on the 12th April 1919.

MANILAL NAGARLAL, Clerk in the Talukdari Settlement Office, Ahmedabad.

In April 1919 I was a *karkun* in the *Mamlatdar's Kacheri*. On the 12th April 1919 I attended the office. The *Awal Karkun* and 3rd Class Magistrate Madhavlal Hargovind came to the office about a quarter of an hour. About 12 or 12.30 a mob of about five or six hundred Hindus and Muhammadans chiefly mill hands and labourers, with about 100 respectively dressed Hindus, merchants, *gumastas*, etc., came to the front of the *Kacheri*. They were armed with swords and sticks, 2 or 3 swords. They were shouting "*Maro, Maro*" and "*Mahatma Gandhi ki jai*." They commenced to throw stones into the *Kacheri*. The police guard consisting of *Havildar* Budrising and 3 constables were armed with guns. They fired on the mob without orders from Madhavlal or any one else. They fired 4 or 5 shots. Some of the crowd got wounded. Madhavlal told the police to fire blank. I do not know whether the police fired blank or not. Before the police fired the mob had set fire to the Sub-Inspector's office which is in the compound of the *Kacheri*. Madhavlal myself and other *karkuns* ran away from the back of the premises and took refuge in a godown. Hussain Mevo, Treasury Clerk, was also with us. We remained there for about five minutes when I left Madhavlal there and went home. I removed my family to another house and went out to see what was

going on. I heard the rioters were in search of Madhavlal and saw them enter his house, loot and destroy the contents. Not finding him in his house, the rioters went in search of him. I followed them at a distance and saw them dragging Madhavlal towards the Ambajee Matha temple. He was alive. At the corner of the street they poured kerosine oil over him and with papers looted from the *Talukdari* office which adjoins they set fire to him. There were about five or six hundred persons engaged in the killing of Madhavlal. I recognized five or six persons among the murderers and identified them later before the police and later before the 1st tribunal. The names of the five or six are—

1. Malik.
2. Rasul, barber.
3. Jiwa Meva, municipal peon.
4. Baloo Master, school teacher.
5. Kesoojee, labourer.
6. Goverdhan, bangle shop-keeper.

Rasul sprinkled the kerosine oil, and Goverdhan lighted the flame. Malik had a gun pointing at Madhavlal. Baloo Master suggested to hang the body of the tale-tattler. The others were all assisting.

Rao Sahib N. V. TRIVEDI.

Written statements of Witnesses, Kaira District.

Rao Sahib N. V. TRIVEDI, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Kaira.

The internment orders passed by the Madras Government against Mrs. Annie Besant caused a considerable flutter in the district as in the whole of Gujarat and led to the establishment in the district of the Home Rule League branches to which may fairly be attached the responsibility for the political unrest prevalent in the district from the middle of 1917. Before the establishment of the Home Rule League branch in Nadiad in July 1917, the district was fairly free from any active political agitation and people appeared to remain content with the reports of political activities in other parts of the country.

However Mrs. Besant's semi-religious personality like that of Mr. Gandhi appealed very much to the religiously inclined people of Gujarat including those of Kaira and the Home Rule agitation which, though already strong at the time in the Deccan, had not been able to make such headway in the Gujarat, took firm root and grew so strong that within a short time Kaira began to give a lead to the other parts of the country.

The first Gujarat Conference held at Godhra in 1917 also gave an impetus to the young aspirants to political fame in the district.

The Nadiad branch organised Home Rule lectures on a large scale and by the end of the year established no less than 86 sub-branches in the district. It also organised in villages small reading libraries attached to the sub-branches of the League and arranged to get papers like the *Hindustan* subscribed to generally in the district. It also distributed to the sub-branches Home Rule League literature received from the head office at Bombay and when signatures were being obtained for Mr. Gandhi's monster petition to Mr. Montagu, the Nadiad branch through the agency of its numerous sub-branches carried on a very active propaganda in obtaining signatures to it. Till then though Government and their officials were derided in lectures the agitation was carried on within reasonable bounds and no ill-feeling was created between the officials and those carrying it on.

August 1917, however, saw the beginning of the agitation against the payment of the land assessment as owing to heavy rains the crops in the district were injured. The Home Rule Leagues were in the thick of it and were the instruments through which the Bombay and Ahmedabad Home Rulers carried on the non-payment agitation. Meetings and lectures were organised in most of the big villages of the district and people advised not to pay the assessment. In an organised campaign of such magnitude it was not always possible for sober leaders to be present everywhere and the work had to be entrusted to quite raw men who in their anxiety to be popular with their audiences which consisted mostly of illiterate and ignorant persons, carried themselves beyond reasonable bounds and attacked the administration and Government officials wholesale. Mr. Gandhi had issued strict injunctions to his followers to be civil and courteous to the officials and to carry on the agitation quite peaceably. But his irresponsible followers, however, did not quite respect his injunctions and the result was that officials were obstructed in the proper performance of their duties and not only the usual courtesies denied to them, but in some cases violence was practised. At Vadod stones were thrown at the *Mamlatdar's* camp in the Chora, at Navli nettles were thrown on the bed of the *Awal Karkun* and at Gana fracas actually took place. Obstructions were put in the way of the officials buying their supplies in villages while on tour, and even carts could not be had for moving a camp from one place to the other. The feeling of respect for Government and its officials which was a marked feature of the district before the advent of the Home Rule League in the district, gave place to one of general disrespect. One who

could denounce the official class with greater vehemence and could show greater disrespect than others passed as a great patriot. The whole atmosphere was so changed that even Mr. Gandhi was shown actual disrespect when he advocated the paying up of the assessment at the end of May.

In consequence as was quite natural Government's prestige was greatly undermined. An impression appeared to have been left on the minds of the people that Government was carrying on the administration practically on sufferance. The result was soon observed in what is known as the Dharala rising on the finish of the passive resistance movement. The Dharalas form a majority of the population of this district, and partly owing to the economic stress created by the bad season and war and partly through certainly through the impression that Government's authority had weakened, committed a series of dacoities, robberies, etc., so much so that the whole district was practically in a turmoil for some time. Large gangs of Dharalas numbering 100 to 200 armed with *dharias*, swords and guns raided villages and committed serious offences. One noticeable feature of these raids was that while committing offences they always declared that the British *Raj* had ceased to exist and that their own rule had taken its place. Rigorous measures were however taken to cope with the outbreak of crime and it was soon suppressed. There is no doubt that owing to these measures Government prestige and influence were re-established. The liberal policy adopted by Government regarding grant of grass and *tagavi* in the famine of 1918 conduced still more to this improvement and by the beginning of 1919 the general situation of the district was quiet and normal. The introduction of the Rowlatt Bills in the Imperial Legislative Council, however, served as a shower of rain on the withering weeds of discontent, which in consequence grew strongly and spread throughout the district. The ground had already been prepared by the political agitation carried on in the district in 1917 and 1918 and no great outside impetus was needed. However if wanting it was supplied by the Home Rule League in the form of posters and literature calculated to excite the public opinion against the Bills and against Government. It was suggested that for all its war services India instead of being rewarded was being fettered and that Government had not only broken faith with the people but were deliberately following a policy of repression against the advancement of the nation. The people, even ignorant villagers, became greatly resentful. This feeling of resentfulness was greatly fanned when Mr. Gandhi launched his passive resistance against the Bills. Meetings protesting against the Rowlatt Bills were held in numerous places in the district and the 6th of April was generally observed as a day of mourning throughout the district and black flags were exhibited in prominent places in villages and towns. The Rowlatt Bills strained the public feelings to such a tension that even those acknowledged as most loyal became restive and entertained grave doubts about the good intentions of Government and certainly began to think very low of the present Government of India. While the public feeling was so high pitched another error in judgment caused by the Government of a sister province set loose the tempest which soon enveloped the whole country. The error of judgment committed by the Madras Government in passing internment orders against Mrs. Besant spread the Home Rule doctrines and Home Rule Leagues throughout the country at a terrific speed, the supposed arrest and externment orders of the Punjab Government against Mr. Gandhi the other outstanding figure in the country revered more for asceticism than anything else like Mrs. Besant threw the country in a turmoil the like of which had not been seen since the days of the mutiny.

Rai Sahib N. V. TRIVEDI.

[Concluded.]

The news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest reached the district on the evening of the 10th through a wire received by the Nadiad Home Rule League. Mr. Gandhi had already become a popular hero and no sooner the news of his arrest reached large towns *hartal* started in full swing as a protest against the action of Government.

At Nadiad after the shops were closed and the mills struck work the labourers of the two mills came out to the bazar in a procession. There to an audience of about 3,000 persons, Janardhan Sharma, the most irresponsible of Mr. Gandhi's followers in the districts, lectured advocating passive resistance against the Rowlatt Acts. A meeting with a similar purpose was also held in the evening at about 8-30 P.M. the same day. At the big town of Anand and several villages on the railway line also on receipt of the news *hartals* immediately commenced.

On the 11th the news spread throughout the district and *hartals* and meetings protesting against the action of Government were the order of the day. In the morning Janardhan Sharma went with a mob to the Government High School and forced the Head Master to close the school early. In the afternoon he went to Anand and there he delivered an exciting harangue and sang inflammatory songs. At night he again lectured at Moulvi Shaikh Imam's lecture to an audience of about 10,000 persons. By this time the news about the murders and riots in Ahmedabad on the 10th and 11th, due to the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest, had been received in the district and at Nadiad the nerve centre of the district the people were in a highly excited state of mind. No doubt Mr. Moulvi requested his audience to be quiet and peaceful but the highly exciting news of the happenings in Ahmedabad which reached the district in a greatly exaggerated form were not conducive to peace and order. A sort of mad frenzy seized the people and the feelings of resentment against the Government was uppermost in the mind of everyone. Reports about the firing on the people in Ahmedabad made the resentment stronger and everyone feeling a sort of sympathy with the rioters began to think how he could best serve them against Government. The station staff at Nadiad being no exception to the frenzy reigning all round, divulged the news about the passing of the troops special to Ahmedabad. The question of the moment was how to prevent the troops from reaching Ahmedabad. Some young men carried away by frenzy made a conspiracy to derail the troops special and eventually with the assistance of the information about the timing of the expected arrival of the train, gleaned from the station staff, did remove a rail, causing the derailment of the troops special. Providentially, however, no one in the train was injured though a delay of several hours occurred to the troops in reaching Ahmedabad. The next morning, i.e., on the 12th, the news of the derailment spread through the district and the act was generally looked upon as a meritorious act. Janardhan Sharma even made a speech to the effect at Chaklashi. News of the happenings in the Punjab also reached the district through newspapers by this time and the Punjab and Ahmedabad events coupled with the serious local offence against the State, brought the Government prestige at its lowest and the frenzy of the people increased in an inverse ratio. In Anand the mob enforcing the *hartal* on those who were unwilling even committed violence and set fire to the house of a sweetmeat seller named Rogilal who refused to observe the *hartal*. But for the tact and personality of the local Sub-Inspector the mob would have attacked the Government and European dairies at Anand. The attitude of the mob was so dangerous that special measures had to be adopted to protect Government buildings, dairies and houses of Europeans. After the mob had attacked the licensed vendors on the station platform the European Station Master at Anand believed the atmosphere so very hostile to Europeans that he left for Baroda with his family. By the afternoon of the 12th the news of the destruction

of the telegraph office at Ahmedabad and the cutting of the telegraph wires between Barejdi and Kanij were quite known in large towns and villages on the railway line and by midnight telegraph wires were cut by the villagers of the large villages of Narsanda, Anand and Vadod where sub-branches of the Home Rule League existed and where Home Rule, passive resistance and anti-Rowlatt agitation had previously been carried on very vigorously. At Uttarsanda, a very active Home Rule League village, a culvert on the railway near the station was set on fire but the police arriving on the scene in time no damage was done.

On the morning of the 13th Mr. Gandhi while passing to Ahmedabad advised the people assembled on the platform of the Nadiad station to welcome him, to observe peace and order and in the evening his message was read out in a big public meeting where it was resolved that the *hartal* should be opened the next day. The public feeling was however very sullen and resentful and the exaggerated news of the happenings in Ahmedabad and the Punjab calculated to excite the feeling against Government were circulating all round. In consequence for some time the efforts of the local authorities were directed chiefly towards the prevention of disorders like those in the Punjab and in Ahmedabad as there was a great deal of likelihood of such disorders breaking out in the district at any moment.

On the 17th during the search of Janardhan Sharma's person on his arrest for a prosecution against him under sections 143, 457, Indian Penal Code, on the complaint of the Head Master of the Government High School, a highly anarchist poem entitled "*Din, Din, Jagao*" advocating murder and violence for obtaining Home Rule was found in the pocket of his coat and it was feared that most of the people shared the sentiments of the poem in a more or less degree. Though a detachment of the troops had arrived in the district on the 13th looking to the general atmosphere prevailing at the time, the District Magistrate requisitioned further military help which arrived in the district on the 19th.

The District Magistrate, Mr. Ker, camped in Nadiad from the 12th April to the beginning of June and it was simply owing to his strong personality and sympathetic handling of the situation that the situation did not become worse in the district.

As the situation improved and the people began to feel that the authority of Government had re-established itself, the investigation of the offences committed on the 11th and 12th was taken up in hand as it was acknowledged on all hands that immediate investigation would precipitate further disorders.

Six cases (1) Janardhan Sharma's case, (2) Nadiad derailment case, (3) Vadod wire cutting case, (4) Narsanda wire cutting case, (5) Anand arson case, (6) Anand Navli wire-cutting case, were sent up for trial to the second special tribunal appointed by Government under the Defence of India Rules. Out of these the first three have been decided, the fourth is being heard while Nos. 5 and 6 are pending trial.

A very noteworthy feature of the conduct of these cases is the strong opposition evinced by the public against the prosecution and the consequent unprecedented "*khapari*" to get the accused who are looked upon as patriots acquitted. Kaira district is notorious for the perjury committed by witnesses belonging to it, but in these cases even that notoriety has been surpassed so as to make it proverbial. A reference to the judgments of the learned President of the second special tribunal will show how an organised attempt has been made to frustrate the ends of justice by wholesale unabashed perjury in the derailment and Vadod cases.

Mr. GOKALDAS D. TALATI.

Mr. GOKALDAS D. TALATI, Nadiad.

1. Nadiad is the chief town of the Kaira district. Having a central situation therein and the highest percentage of literates in the presidency, it has activities in various directions. To its credit are to be found during the last score of years:—

- The founding of a mill and a co-operative store, the best of their kind in Gujarat (economically).
- Starting an orphanage that can vie with any in the presidency (socially).
- Establishing a Home Rule branch, fairly active in the presidency (politically).

These activities soon drew the attention of Government and the repressive laws and orders began to be applied. The following are some of the instances:—

- Security of Rs. 3,000 was demanded from Mr. F. B. Shah for his press.
- He was prosecuted for keeping in possession his press two days.
- A book of orphanage songs though registered by the Government, was confiscated by the same Government and two books of the Gujarati Press were proscribed.
- The Native General Library—the place for holding public meetings—was forced to be registered by a threat through the municipality.
- The Social Club was made to lose its ground and buildings.

Thus ended the pre-Home Rule days.

2. Nadiad Home Rule branch started work in the district around. The total number of branches is 105 and of membership above three thousand. During its existence of less than three years, it has to its credit the following work:—

- An application on reforms to the Secretary of State with 35 thousand signatures was prepared and despatched.
- Literature on self-government about 13,000 copies were distributed in the district.
- In the scarcity year of 1918 a petition signed by 14,000 persons was despatched to Government for postponement of revenue.
- Plague solution—about 100 bottles were distributed during the epidemic.
- Helped Mahatma Gandhi in his efforts at recruiting.
- During influenza epidemic we distributed medicine in 300 villages.
- Distribution of 800 garments during famine and working with the Famine Committee.

Such benevolent public work of Home Rulers coincided with the scarcity year of 1918 and the famine year of 1919. The villagers therefore much appreciated it. On the other hand the laws and orders of Government, which created for them miseries, were resented.

We quote instances:—

- The lately passed Mahura Act deprived them of Mahura flowers during scarcity and thus affected the quantity of food both for men and cattle when they most needed it.
- The non-postponement of Government dues when they knew they can justly claim it, as also the Commissioner's autocratic reply that people have no remedy against a revenue officer's order for exaction, Mr. Gandhi's passive resistance notwithstanding, created a feeling of helplessness.
- During 1919 famine because of control no corn can be had for love or money. Some took to dacoity. But instead of the speedy and cheapest supply of corn or the arrest of the culprits, the Government sent villagers whole-

sale to jail under security-orders. This made them insecure.

- The death or sale of cattle for want of grass in that famine year had a depressing effect.

3. There was thus much misery and irritation in the district yet people were biding their time and trying to overcome the dire effects of the seasons when to their utter amazement the Rowlatt Bill became law against the unanimous wish of the country. That made the bureaucratic nature of the Government too patent. The inherent law-abiding nature and the passive resistance movement of Mahatma Gandhi directed their energies to peaceful channels and in all 700 from the district took the passive resistance vows against the Act. But then followed the Government blunder of trifling with Mr. Gandhi's liberties. The news were conveyed by Mr. Gandhi's Secretary from Delhi to our local Home Rule office. Government cared not to contradict the news about arrest. Though thus the irritation was heightened, yet people kept calm, and simply, but spontaneously, struck work both on the 10th and 11th April. The leaders too organized meetings on both these nights advising people to be passive. Thousands attended and every thing went off quietly. On the latter night some unknown persons removed a rail a mile and a half away which derailed a troop train. For this crime of a few guilty people the innocent many of the town are ordered to pay an additional police tax, and the Defence of India Act was applied.

4. The employment of additional police is unjust and unjustifiable, as it punishes the innocent for the crime of the guilty. But even the law, as it stands, has an unjust application in Nadiad as will be seen from the following:—

- The police law allows Government when the conduct of any particular section renders it expedient to impose additional police. In our case the expediency was prejudged, as will be seen from Government telegram No. 282 S. D. of 12th April (the very day of derailment) which "desired" "if practicable" to post "strong additional police."
- On 21st April the Collector of the district conveyed his "appreciation of very general respect for the law and order which they (Nadiad people) maintained during the period of strain and excitement." The same Collector in his letter of 26th May cites as a main ground for imposing additional police "the disturbances of 11th," the same officer proposing both thanks and punishment for the behaviour of the same people during the same period.

Nay more, the Government in their reply to the Hon'ble Mr. Harilal say they posted this police to "maintain law and order." The ground for thanking us becomes a cause for our punishment.

- Another main ground is thus stated:—"If for example in any particular case the ringleaders are convicted and adequately punished, it may be a question whether it is necessary or desirable to impose any additional police." But presumably as no leaders of Nadiad were charged, "the principle that an additional force should be imposed has been accepted" in our case, meaning that the leaders should have gone to jail to save their town from the imposition of additional police. This is an argument that only an Indian autocrat can offer.
- The correspondence reveals that the diffusion of a "spirit of lawlessness by Mr. Gandhi, the propaganda of opposition to Government," and "persistent agitation against Govern-

MR. GOKALDAS D. TALATI.

[Concluded.]

ment" are mentioned as grounds for the additional police. These misrepresentations of our law-abiding political activities, they thought, justified the expediency that the law required. But according to the principle enunciated by Mr. Robertson in the Legislative Council, additional police is to be imposed only when the present strength of police is not able to preserve law and order, and is imposed with a view to give safety to law-abiding citizens. It is never punitive, but additional.

- (e) In all 14 persons were prosecuted for derailment; excepting one accused, who wished to be an approver, all got their discharge; amongst the 14, there were no Banias, and but one Pattidar accused who meant to be an approver got conviction; yet, long before the case was taken to the tribunal, the Collector wrote "Banias and Pattidar class perpetrated the derailment."—a reckless statement, since no Bania was ever seen suspected of the guilt and no Pattidar is proved guilty by independent evidence.

Thus then, the imposition of additional police and the consequent taxing of the people is an injustice done to the progressive inhabitants of Nadiad, done with some ulterior object

6. During the trial it was admitted on all sides that the object of derailment was to retard the train from reaching the Martial Law Area of Ahmedabad and thus save human lives. Those who lately studied what Martial Law and military combined was capable of, can take the object as one for clemency by the court. But instead of an ordinary court trial, the culprits got trials through a special tribunal under the Defence of India Act which curtailed their ordinary judicial rights.

The whole history as laid above will convince the committee that Nadiad has been a victim to the policy of autocracy that ever tried to perpetuate itself, through acts like the Rowlatt Act which is a lawless law, or through their application against saintly souls like Mahatma Gandhi. When avenues of redress get closed, there is natural reaction which the autocracy resented, blinding itself to the fact that it was of its own creation.

Nadiad tried its best to help the investigation of that single crime by a resolution, detested it and offered a reward of Rs. 500. The leaders too tried for confessions and but for the ferocious sentences in the Punjab, they think they would have succeeded.

We lay this short memorandum before the Disorders Committee. We wish to appear as witnesses before it, with the object of exposing the Government measures, so that the police tax may go, and the illegal trials may be quashed.

* This statement was sent as a joint production of Mr. Talati and Mr. B. G. Mehta; the latter was not examined by the Committee.

Written Statements, Bombay.

Statement of the Government of Bombay concerning the City of Bombay.

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Statement of the GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY relating to the disturbances in the city of Bombay in April 1919.

CHAPTER I.

Introductory.

The sequence of events in the city of Bombay during the early weeks of April 1919, which will form the substantive matter for the investigation of the Committee and to the causes and circumstances of which the enquiry will be mainly directed, will be narrated in their due order in the course of the present statement. It will suffice at this preliminary stage to remark briefly on their general and superficial characteristics. Apart from the occurrences of the 11th April, in which there were several critical moments from which the gravest consequences might have ensued, a casual observer might have regarded them as demonstrations rather than disorders. They were attended by no fatal casualties or extensive destruction of public or private property. There was no suspension of the normal course of administration or of civil control over law and order. Offences committed in the course of the disturbances were dealt with by the permanent magisterial courts. There was no serious dislocation for any considerable period of the normal life of the city. The circumstances which distinguish these events, apart from the unprecedented dimensions of the crowds of demonstrators and rioters, was that they synchronized with others of a more disastrous character elsewhere; that their proximate causes were not purely local or occasional; and that their connexion with preceding events, all presenting certain significant elements of unity and cohesion, is clear and unmistakable. Certain factors from which perhaps no social organism in the world was exempt were present in full operation. The acute economical situation, the general neurotic reaction from the strain of the war, the slow, but spasmodic and violent, progress towards a social and political settlement in all relations, international, imperial or local, a general sense of abnormality and *malaise*, all contributed to form an atmosphere which a spark might explode. Another element was necessary to give concentration, impulse and direction to these formidable but latent and diffused forces. That element was supplied by the policy, methods and expedients of an extremist group, whose design was to turn to their own purposes all these predisposing factors of unrest and the adoption, as an immediate objective, of the agitation against the Rowlatt legislation.

2. A complete investigation of the causes, proximate and remote, of any specific incident in the period under discussion would extend to an examination of the political history of India for at least the last twenty years. It is impossible within the limits of the present statement to embark on so extensive an enquiry and all that can be attempted is a brief summary of the salient incidents immediately preceding this period.

3. A convenient 'point de depart' is the formation of the Indian Home Rule League, of which details will be found in Appendix I.*

The declared policy of the league was sufficiently elastic to render possible or at least plausible the inclusion in its membership of the advocates of constitutional progress with those of the most extreme nationalist programme. As usually happens in the case of organizations which seek to unite the most diverse elements on the basis of a comprehensive formula, especially in a society where an inherited political tradition does not as yet exist, power and control rapidly passed into the hands of the extremist section. It would be reasonable to infer from their action and speeches that the deliberate policy of the leaders of this group was directed not so much to obtain by constitutional methods the public acceptance of any particular political doctrine as to coerce government by an attack upon its administration in all directions and to encourage or create movements calculated to impede or embarrass all administrative activities of whatever nature. The Home Rule press

* Not reproduced.

and platform were at an early stage directed towards these ends, and it is a matter for profound regret that the energy, ability and versatility, which were diverted into these channels, were not more usefully and directly applied to a practical solution of the problems confronting the Government and peoples of India. Though platform oratory of every description was extensively and effectively employed, the instrument chiefly relied upon was the Press. Almost every vernacular or Anglo-vernacular organ with real influence and large circulation became enlisted, and pamphlets and leaflets were disseminated broadcast. A list of some of the more remarkable references to current political topics appearing in the press and of pamphlets and similar published matter will be found in appendices II* and II-A.* Particular attention may perhaps be invited to the article "Let your indignation flame" appearing in the *Chronicle's* issue of February 6th, 1919, and to the matter enclosed in heavy mourning bands contained in the issues from April 1st to 7th.

4. The expedients of this group varied remarkably but there was unity and consistency in the general aim of discrediting Government in the public estimation. Its policy and actions were misrepresented. Its officers were attacked corporately and individually. Racial antipathy was invoked. Appeals were made to religious animosities and apprehensions. Attempts on the discipline and loyalty of the army and on the impressionable minds of school-boys and students were not neglected. Finally, the abnormal economic conditions created by the war, and aggravated at various times by natural causes such as famine and epidemics, rendered the condition of the labouring classes a favourable field for exploitation, and every advantage was taken of these circumstances. In the beginning of the year 1919, the preparatory work was fairly complete, and the immediate occasion for the explosion was a matter of chance or indifference. It happened to be the Rowlatt Act. But if it had not been the Rowlatt Act, it would merely have been something else.

CHAPTER II.

The Dadar incident—The Mulji Jetha market scare—The G. I. P. railway workshop strike—The postal strike—The Kaira agitation—Appearance of passive resistance—The Willingdon memorial.

5. The first incident of considerable importance in this campaign was the agitation over the so-called "Reign of terror in Dadar," which, like all the similar instances subsequently to be narrated, was largely engineered by means of articles and letters in the *Bombay Chronicle*. The editor of this paper was Mr. B. G. Horniman. It is a somewhat remarkable, though by no means unprecedented, fact that the protagonist of the extremist group of an ostensibly nationalist propaganda should have been an Englishman. It is nevertheless the case that he completely dominated the group and his career as a journalist and politician, terminating in his deportation under the Defence of India Act on 26th April 1919, coincides with the ascending and descending arcs of the wave of intensive agitation and its most violent manifestations in Bombay. A more detailed account of this interesting but dangerous and unscrupulous personality would anticipate much of the present narrative and may conveniently be relegated to an appendix.† His principal and most active associates were Mr. Omar Sobhani, Mr. Jamnadas Dwarakadas, Mr. S. G. Banker, Mr. Lakhmidas Tairsey and Dr. Sathye. He was prepared to co-operate with Mrs. Besant and Mr. Gandhi so far as the policies they advocated conduced to his own schemes. In the same system Mr. Jinnah was a cautious and subsidiary satellite. Other subordinate members of the group will be incidentally noticed in connection

* Not reproduced.
† Appendix III.

with the parts they took in this and subsequent proceedings.

6. During June and July 1917 a military labour camp had been opened at Dadar in the north of the Island, which is thickly populated by mill-hands and the labouring classes, and the military recruiting officers found these localities the best recruiting ground in Bombay for the Mahratta regiments. Articles appeared in the *Chronicle* under the most startling head lines. Letters addressed to the editor in the wildest terms were published in a prominent manner. These contained harrowing accounts of outrages alleged to have been committed by military sepoy on the women of these neighbourhoods. In addition to these published accounts, stories were apparently deliberately spread among the people by the agents of the Home Rulers. Among those who took part in an attempt at bolstering up complaints which enquiry proved to be false or exaggerated beyond recognition were Jamnadas Dwarakadas and S. G. Banker. Another newspaper, the *Message*, published by Achut Balwant Kolhatkar, also took part in creating the atmosphere of panic which ensued. The Government of Bombay found it necessary to pass an order under the Defence of India Act prohibiting any further reference to the subject.

7. Another development in July 1917 was the scare among the merchants of the Mulji Jetha market, which has always been very subject to the influence of the Home Rule League. On this occasion stories were spread of the abduction of women by British soldiers. Enquiries proved in every instance in which a name was mentioned that the allegation was unfounded. Throughout this period only one authentic instance of an indecent assault upon a woman, by an Indian follower (at Dadar), came to the notice of the authorities. In this case the police lodged a prosecution which resulted in the conviction of the accused.

8. In the middle of July 1917, a strike occurred in the G. I. P. railway workshops at Matunga and Perel. This strike was economic and non-political in origin. It resulted from grievances which at least appeared real to the strikers at a time when there was considerable general economic unrest. The Bombay Home Rulers were not slow to seize the opportunity to interfere. On the 20th of July the *Chronicle* published a suggestion that the Servants of India Society and the Kamgar that the *Hitavardhak Sabha* should interest themselves in the strike. On the 21st and 22nd July, Messrs. Rustomji and Ginwala, solicitors, and the Hon'ble Mr. Jinnah and Ginwala, solicitors, and the Hon'ble Mr. Jinnah approached the Agent of the railway, both by letter and on the telephone. The Agent however refused to deal with his men through legal intermediaries. There were signs that Mr. Jinnah continued to maintain touch with the strikers during the following week and he made more than one attempt to obtain recognition by the railway authorities. At the same time unrest spread in the cloth market and at Dana Bunder where Jamnadas Dwarakadas, Omar Sobhani and Naraindas Purshotumdas were noticed addressing the workers. The line they took was to advise that nothing hasty or rash should be done, while encouraging a spirit of discontent by suggesting that they were prepared to formulate demands on behalf of the labourers. This intervention by the Home Rulers was resented by Indians who did not share their political opinions. Early in August control of the strike by the Home Rule party became more pronounced and more open. A grain shop was opened. On the 10th of August the *Chronicle* announced that a subscription list would be opened for the Strikers' Family Relief Fund. Dr. D. D. Sathye was noticed as being energetically interested in the matter. On the 13th Dr. Desai and his followers were seen urging the people to attend the grain shop. It was clear, however, that there was a considerable body of opinion among the strikers which was averse from receiving charity from the Home Rulers. The preliminary meeting of the Strikers' Relief Association was attended by Horniman, and its executive consisted of rabid Home Rulers. Their plans were however to some extent frustrated by the attitude of the more sober

Home Rulers who controlled the purse strings. These latter showed that they were unwilling to proceed to extremes.

9. Throughout this strike one Govind Purshuram, a Panchkalsi by caste, belonging to the Matunga workshops, took a prominent part. He was observed to be in close touch with Dr. D. D. Sathye. On the 31st of August Jivraj J. Nensey, well known to the police as a firebrand and a Home Ruler, was visited by a number of the men's leader apparently in his capacity as Treasurer of the Relief Fund Committee. On the 4th of September a foreman in the railway workshops named Fairweather was attacked by a number of strikers. When isolated and in danger of being overwhelmed he made use of a revolver in self-defence. In doing so he wounded one man. From the 14th July to the 25th of September the *Chronicle* contained almost daily articles and letters on the strike, the general effect of which undoubtedly was to suggest that Government was adopting an unreasonable and unfair attitude towards the strikers. The intention to create ill-feeling towards Government and to enable the Home Rulers to come forward as champions of popular grievances is clearly discernable when the cumulative effect of this propaganda is taken into consideration. A typical instance is the series of leaderettes in the *Chronicle's* issue of the 19th August 1917.*

10. The railway strike had hardly died away when the Home Rulers began to evince interest in the postmen's grievances. At a meeting of postmen held on the 9th of September 1917, Mr. Ginwala, Solicitor, was authorised by the men to draw up a petition asking for redress of their grievances as regards pay, pension and leave rules. The *Chronicle* took up the matter in its customary manner. An article published in that paper on the 18th of September* was reported to have had a very considerable effect on the temper of the postmen and to have caused many waverers to throw in their lot with those who were anxious to strike. On the 19th of September practically all the 800 postmen employed in Bombay went out on strike as a result of the decision arrived at at a meeting held the day before. On the 21st idem Luckmidas Tairsey, a prominent Home Ruler, took part in opening a campaign in the Mulji Jetha Market with the object of raising funds to assist the strikers. Members of the Home Rule League were noticed fraternising with the strikers. On the 30th of September a number of postmen drew small sums varying from Rs. 5 to 15 from the fund which had been established by Lakhmidas Tairsey, one W. T. Halai and other members of the Home Rule League.

11. The *Bombay Chronicle* not only espoused the cause of the strikers, but also flooded its columns with letters to the editor complaining against the attitude of Government and enlarging on the disorganisation of public business which had resulted from the strike. The obvious intention was to influence public opinion and to persuade various public bodies and associations to regard the inconvenience caused to them as due to the obstinate attitude of the authorities. On the 27th of September the *Chronicle's* special correspondent stated that telegrams had been despatched by Mr. W. T. Halai on behalf of the Indian mercantile community to Sir Dinshaw Wacha, Sir Ebrahim Rahimtulla, Sir Fazulbhoj Currimbhoy and Mr. Jinnah complaining that the postal strike had entirely dislocated the business of Indian merchants and that, while European firms were being served, the Indian community was almost entirely neglected, that a strong protest had been raised at the Chamber's general meeting of that date, and praying that the matter might be brought to the notice of the Viceroy for immediate redress. The actual facts were that no discussion had taken place at the meeting, no resolutions had been passed and the telegrams were not sent in pursuance of any motion passed at the meeting, but that after the meeting had concluded there had been some discussion and Mr. Halai, a person of no importance in the Indian mercantile community,

* Not reproduced.

who was present had sent the telegrams without any proper authority. This may be regarded as a typical instance of the methods employed by the Home Rulers. From time to time during the following year the *Chronicle* published paragraphs calculated to keep alive the agitation among the postmen.

12. Early in 1918 the distress in the Kaira district, which has been more fully described in Chapter XII of the statement relating to disturbances in the Ahmedabad and Kaira Districts, received particular attention from the Home Rule League and the National Union of Bombay which were working in close connection with the Gujarat Sabha of Ahmedabad. Mr. M. K. Gandhi who was closely connected with the Gujarat Sabha, came to Bombay and addressed a meeting of the merchants of the Mulji Jetha cloth market in connection with the position in Kaira. He dilated on the failure of Government to remove the hardships of the peasants and characterised the attitude of the local authorities as unjust and likely to cause unnecessary hardships. He advocated passive resistance as a weapon to be used against Government in this connection. Horniman addressed this meeting in response to persistent calls from the audience. He stated that he would blindly subscribe to anything which Gandhi had advocated.

13. The Home Rule League of Bombay opened a number of shops in the Kaira district to alleviate the sufferings of the poor. Arrangements were made through a Home Ruler, Mavjee Govindjee, to procure grain from the Central Provinces. Lokhmidas Tairsey and S. G. Banker undertook the collection of funds to defray expenses in this connection. On the 7th of February a meeting of Kaira Patidars was held at the Hirabag in Bombay at which the Government Press Note was condemned as incorrect and based on false and one-sided reports from local officials.

14. The *Bombay Chronicle* espoused the cause of the passive resisters of Kaira by publishing in its columns detailed accounts of events connected with this agitation. It indulged in bold headlines and gave prominence to Gandhi's speeches and writings on "Soul force," as well as in attacks on Government officials and on the general policy of Government in connection with the land assessment. Prominence was given to the work of the Home Rule League on behalf of the people of Kaira. The issues of the 1st April, 16th May, 28th May and 5th and 8th June are specially noteworthy.*

15. In November 1918 Horniman and his associates of the Bombay Home Rule League engineered what was in some respects the most remarkable and most unscrupulous of all these political moves. His Excellency Lord Willingdon was about to leave the Bombay Presidency for England on the expiry of his tenure of office which, as was generally recognized in all but extremist quarters, had been conspicuously signalized by a policy of conciliation and of encouragement to political and social reform. At the instance of a number of leading citizens the Sheriff of Bombay had proposed to call a public meeting to consider the question of voting a memorial to His Excellency. Violent opposition to this meeting was organised in the *Bombay Chronicle*, *Young India* and the *Hindusthan*. Signatures for the anti-Willingdon protest were obtained from an audience which had been summoned by the Bombay Home Rule League on the 22nd of November to celebrate the armistice. This function was a political demonstration rather than a celebration of victory. Home Rule flags surrounded the standards of Britain, France and Belgium while the Home Rule volunteers carried placards inscribed "Democracy Triumphant," "Down with Prussianism everywhere," "We will suffer till India wins Home Rule," and similar devices.

16. The leaders in the anti-Willingdon agitation were Horniman, Jamnadas Dwarkadas, Omer Sobhani and M. A. Jinnah. They, with others, delivered a series of speeches deliberately calculated to bring into hatred and contempt the acts of His Excellency's Government

*Not reproduced.

and to impugn its benefits. The main attack was delivered against His Excellency himself but the effect on the mill-hands and workmen, to whom some of these lectures were addressed, could only be expected to cause them to believe that Government had lost all capacity to deal with the Home Rulers or to meet their attacks. Omer Sobhani made a noticeable attempt to discredit His Excellency by circulating broadcast a leaflet in Urdu in which he detailed a number of the administrative acts of His Excellency's Government and endeavoured to deduce that His Excellency had been no friend of the Moslems. Among the speakers who addressed the meetings of Home Rulers, mill-hands and workmen (and thus availed themselves of the soil already prepared by their machinations during the railway strikes and fertilised for further activities) besides the Home Rulers already mentioned, were Messrs K. P. Khadilkar, Manu Subedar, Mavji Govindji, C. V. Vaidya, Dr. Sawarkar, S. M. Paranjpe, M. K. Azad and Sayad Hussain. At these meetings Horniman was singled out for special attention by the audiences which evidently regarded him as a popular champion.

17. On 11th of December the Sheriff's meeting took place at the Town Hall. The Home Rulers organised a procession to the Town Hall with the object of opposing the resolution in favour of a memorial to His Excellency. A large number of Home Rulers, the majority of whom were students and Gujarati servants belonging to the cloth markets, took up a position along the pavement round the Elphinstone Gardens facing the Town Hall at daybreak, many hours before the meeting was timed to begin. The leaders of the requisitionists of the meeting—high officers of Government, High Court Judges and leading citizens of Bombay—as they arrived were greeted by the rabble collected outside the hall with shouts of derision and cries of "shame." Home Rulers within the Town Hall created an uproar and were forcibly ejected by the stewards. When at length the resolution proposing that a memorial should be raised to His Excellency had been put to the vote and declared carried, and after the Sheriff had formally dissolved the meeting, the opposition attempted to obtain possession of the platform. The disorder at this stage passed all bounds and the police were called in and asked to clear the hall. Educated Home Rulers adopted a very contumacious attitude throughout the day, refusing to obey the orders of the police, and thereby compelling them to execute their orders by force.

CHAPTER III.

The great mill strike.

18. In January 1919 there broke out the largest general strike of mill-hands ever experienced in Bombay. In its initial stages there are grounds for believing that Home Rulers were concerned in the organisation of this as of previous strikes which have been discussed above. A mass meeting was called when the strike had been in progress two days at which certain "popular leaders" were advertised as speakers. Jamnadas Dwarkadas addressed the meeting, but he was hooted and could not control his audience. The meeting broke up with the clearly expressed intention of attacking a group of mills which were still at work. When a posse of unarmed policemen attempted to frustrate this move, the strikers attacked them with unbridled violence, killing one policeman, seriously injuring 5 and less seriously injuring 20 others. The timely arrival of reinforcements saved the police from further casualties, but this incident led to the calling out of the military and to a clear "declaration of war" between the strikers and the forces of law and order.

There is no doubt that this episode brought home to the Home Rulers the fact that they were unloosing forces which they were unable to control and from that point onwards they did not take a prominent part in the organisation of the strike. The transition from violent words to violent deeds, though the logical and

CHAPTER IV.

The Satyagraha campaign.

21. With this brief sketch of the preliminary skirmishes in Bombay, we arrive at the opening of the *Satyagraha* campaign which culminated in the disturbances of April. In February the so-called Rowlatt Bill had been introduced in the Imperial Council, and ultimately, notwithstanding opposition, both within and without the Council, became law as the Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act. When it was clear that Government was determined in its attitude, warnings and threats of agitation such as had not been paralleled in India were indulged in by extremist politicians. On the 24th of February Messrs. Horniman, Jamnadas Dwarkadas, Omer Sobhani, Mrs. Naidu and some others went from Bombay to Ahmedabad and met Gandhi. As a result of their deliberations, Gandhi sent a strongly worded telegram to His Excellency the Viceroy stating that if Government proceeded with the Rowlatt Bills it was their intention to resort to passive resistance. On the 26th of February the *Chronicle* published a message from its correspondent in Delhi, dated the 25th February, which was worded as follows:—

"In reply to an enquiry as to when Mr. Gandhi would start for England as a member of the Congress deputation, he had wired to the Hon'ble Pandit Malaviya as follows:—
'I have no confidence in deputation Rowlatt Bills block all progress.'"

22. On the 28th of February a large public meeting was organised by the Home Rule League in the mill districts of Bombay. Messrs. Horniman, Jamnadas, Omer Sobhani and other prominent Home Rulers went in procession to the meeting. This procession was clearly intended to attract the notice of the millhands, but in this respect it largely failed in its purpose. At the meeting every speaker endeavoured to persuade the audience that the Rowlatt Bills were intended to rob them of their personal liberty and freedom and to enable the bureaucracy to govern despotically. It was announced that Mahatma Gandhi was about to preach passive resistance, and the audience was urged to be prepared to protest at any cost, if they were not willing to be enslaved.† On the 1st of March the *Chronicle* announced the inauguration of passive resistance against what it termed the "Black Bills" and published Mr. Gandhi's *Satyagraha* vow.‡ Throughout the following weeks the *Chronicle* was devoted, day after day, to a campaign of extraordinary vehemence in favour of passive resistance. On the 1st of March Mr. Gandhi arrived in Bombay where he was continuously visited by Messrs. Horniman, Jamnadas Dwarkadas, S. G. Banker, Dr. D. D. Sathye, Dr. M. B. Velkar, Mrs. Naidu, Miss Anasuyabai of Ahmedabad, Mavji Govindji and other Home Rulers. The employees of the Mulji Jetha cloth market were invited to join the movement and to sign the vow at S. G. Banker's residence. The *Satyagraha Sabha* was organised with Mr. Gandhi as President, Mr. Horniman as Vice-President, and the leading Home Rulers on the Committee. A full list is given as an appendix.§

23. The inauguration of the passive resistance movement called forth a manifesto from the leaders of the Indian moderate party who had joined with the extremists in their opposition to the Rowlatt legislation. In this manifesto they made it clear that they were not prepared to follow the extremists in this movement. The members of the Home Rule League, now merged in the *Satyagraha Sabha*, met this manifesto with ridicule, and the cleavage between the two Indian political schools of thought which had temporarily combined thus manifested itself again. It may be noted that Mr. Srinivas Sastri, President of the Servants of India Society, was among those who regarded passive resistance against other laws as ridiculous and dangerous. On the 8th of March rumours were circulated in Bombay that Government intended to apply the Rowlatt Bills to Muhammadan agitators in connection with the Turkish question.

inevitable consequence of their proceedings, was too formidable a reality and wiser or more cautious counsels prevailed. Nevertheless Horniman, Jamnadas Dwarkadas and H. P. Mandavie among others kept in very close touch with the situation and visited the mill area with regularity. A lady known as Miss Anasuyabai, a sister of Mr. Ambalal Sarabhai of Ahmedabad and a friend of Mr. Gandhi, as well as of the Bombay Home Rulers, also made herself prominent by visiting the mill-hands, especially those who had been wounded in encounters with the police or the military.

The *Chronicle* maintained its traditional policy of attacking the authorities and seizing every opportunity to misrepresent their acts and to twist facts in such a way as to inspire popular imagination with hostility to the officers of Government. It is difficult to assess the full effect of this campaign, but there is every justification for assuming that it was in no small measure responsible for the fact that at one period in the strike racial feeling was clearly manifest, attacks being made on isolated Europeans in the streets.

The following issues of the *Chronicle* contain typical instances illustrative of the general policy of the paper.—10th, 12th, 14th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 25th, 26th, and 27th January 1919.* The paper *Young India* adopted the same policy.

19. Among the intrigues preliminary to the *Satyagraha* which burst in April 1919, an attempt made by publishing correspondence in the columns of the *Chronicle* on the subject of demobilisation to subvert the discipline of British troops in India is specially remarkable. It is significant that this correspondence commenced on the 1st of January and ceased on the 23rd of April. It consisted of a series of letters to the editor purporting to have emanated from British soldiers on the subject of demobilisation grievances. The majority of these letters were dated from Poona, Kirkee, Ahmednagar and Bombay. In every instance they were either anonymous or pseudonymous. They were full of complaints and criticisms against the military authorities in India and in England. Many were calculated to create a feeling of ill-will between British troops and the European civilian population in India, the latter being represented as cowards who had evaded their responsibilities in connection with the war and remained behind to grow fat at the expense of their more patriotic fellow-citizens. Others aimed at stirring up insubordination between British soldiers and their officers. Others again clearly aimed at creating a bond between the British soldier and his Indian fellow-soldier as well as Indians generally as brothers in distress under the tyranny of a bureaucratic government. In this correspondence* there are repeated references to Bolshevism in the British Army, to a volcano of discontent among the troops ready to burst into flame; there are queries whether civilian soldiers in India should be content to wait for demobilisation and there is a very definite suggestion that a date should be fixed, and that if they were not to be taken home by that fixed date they should express their attitude in the only way left open to them, viz., to go out on strike on the 11th of May.

It is also a very significant fact that these letters suggesting that there was a spirit of gross insubordination among British troops were exclusively confined to the pages of the *Bombay Chronicle*. Enquiries indicated that the other English papers in Bombay received a very small number of such letters which they did not publish.

20. It was evident that something more than the discontent over the delay in demobilisation, which undoubtedly existed, was represented by these letters. The situation as regards demobilisation was in no way less acute after the 23rd of April when the publication of these letters ceased, but it was on 26th of April that Mr. Horniman was deported. By that time it was clear that the *Satyagraha* movement had ceased to be an active political movement.

*Not reproduced.

† Appendix IX.

‡ Appendix X.

§ Appendix XI.

From the 10th onwards numerous strongly worded leaflets and pamphlets urging the people to join the passive resistance movement were widely circulated. At the same time a very vigorous campaign of speech-making was conducted—Mr. Horniman, Mrs. Naidu, Mr. Jamnadas and other prominent members of the Home Rule League being as usual the chief speakers. On the 14th of March *Swami Shradhdhanand*, otherwise known as *Mahatma Munshi Ram* of the Gurukul at Kangri near Haridwar, made a noteworthy speech. His wording was often obscure, his meaning being apparently helped out by his gestures. This speech was fanatical in tone, and the general effect was one of hostility to Government and its officers. It contained the following quotation from Krishna's words to Arjun:—

"You cannot control the result, you can only control your action, do your work and leave the result to look after itself. Whether the Government will give in or not under pressure of the *Satyagraha* agitation is not our lookout. It is their affair. Our concern is in starting the campaign."

It is not without significance that the account of this speech published in the *Chronicle* of the 16th was edited in such a manner as to minimise its effect.

24. On the 19th of March came the news of the passing of the "Rowlatt" Act. On receipt of this information some 50 merchants of the Mulji Jetha cloth market sent in a written request to the Secretary of the Native Piece-goods Merchants Association of Bombay to convene a meeting to consider the question of closing the market as a protest. In response to this request the Secretary called a meeting for the 20th. It was held in the market hall in the afternoon, and it was then decided to close the market on the 21st for one day. As a result the Mulji Jetha market closed on the 21st. The Lakhmidas Khimji and Morarji Goculdas markets followed suit. There was no excitement in this connection. This incident is interesting as furnishing an instance of a spontaneous *hartal* very different in its effects from those organised by the political leaders.

25. The news of the passing of the Act was followed by a stream of excited articles and leaders in the *Chronicle* which now struck a note of despair coupled with determination to suffer. On the 25th of March Mr. Gandhi announced in the *Chronicle* that Sunday the 30th of March would be a day of fast and prayer. Shortly afterwards he announced without any explanation of the change that his intention was to fix the 6th of April as the day of penance. The reason for this change has never come to light, but it is remarkable that the new date was adopted nearly everywhere in India, except in Delhi and a few other places.

26. The following is the text of Mr. Gandhi's letter to the Press announcing his ideas as to the way in which the day of humiliation and prayer should be observed. It is dated March the 24th from Madras, which place he visited in connection with the campaign:—

"*Satyagraha*, as I have endeavoured to explain at several meetings, is essentially a religious movement. It is a process of purification and penance. It seeks to secure reforms or redress of grievances by self-suffering. I therefore venture to suggest that the second Sunday after the publication of the Viceregal assent to Bill No. 2 of 1919 may be observed as the day of humiliation and prayer. As there must be effective public demonstration in keeping with the character of the observance, I beg to advise as follows:—

"A twenty-four hours fast counting from the last meal on the preceding night should be observed by all adults unless prevented from so doing by consideration of religion or health. The fast is not to be regarded in any shape or form in the nature of a hunger-strike or designed to put any pressure upon Government. It is to be regarded for *Satyagrahis* as a necessary discipline to fit them for the civil disobedience contemplated in their pledge and for others as some slight token of the intensity of their wounded feelings.

"All work except such as may be necessary in the public interest should be suspended for the day. Markets and other business places should be closed. Employees who are required to work even on Sunday may only suspend work after obtaining previous leave. I do not hesitate to recommend these two suggestions for adoption by public servants for, though it is an unquestionably right thing for them not to take part in political discussions and gatherings, in my opinion they have the undoubted right to express upon vital matters their feelings in the very limited manner herein suggested. Public meetings should be held on that day in all parts of India not excluding villages at which a resolution passed. If my advice is deemed worthy of acceptance the responsibility will lie in the first instance on various *Satyagraha* Associations for undertaking the necessary work of organisation, but all other associations will, I hope, join hands in making this demonstration a success."

27. In a special evening edition on the 1st of April, the *Chronicle* first published in Bombay the news of the rioting in Delhi and the use of fire-arms by the troops.

CHAPTER V.

April 6th.

28. The main facts in connection with the observance of "Black Sunday" (April 6th) in Bombay can be briefly summarized, but a complete diary maintained by the police authorities is attached.* The *Satyagraha* movement which had been advertised in the *Bombay Chronicle* during the preceding weeks culminated in the design of announcing this day as a day of "national mourning" to protest against the Rowlatt Act.

29. On the Friday preceding Black Sunday a meeting of millhands was held near the Elphinstone mill at which Mr. Gandhi, Mrs. Naidu, Mr. Horniman and Dr. Savarkar were the chief speakers. The meeting was designed to spread the movement among the millhands, and though they had sometimes been, and though Mr. Gandhi told the millhands not to come out on Sunday unless they could obtain leave from their masters, yet the general tenor of his speech made it clear that he desired them to stop work on Sunday, and that he hoped that the result of Sunday would be to secure strength to break the law.

30. Mrs. Naidu and Dr. Savarkar also spoke but in plainer terms, Mrs. Naidu informing the millhands that the Rowlatt Act attacked their honour (*izzat*), trampled their right of independence under foot, and that by passing it Government made them slaves.

31. On Saturday the 5th, Mr. Gandhi spoke at a meeting of the residents of Dana Bunder at Baroda Street. He explained the new principle of *Satyagraha* which aimed, he said, at reaching the goal, though he did not make it clear what the goal was. He then announced that the demonstrations planned for the following day were to constitute a preparation for breaking laws—"any laws we like in such manner as we think fit." No disorder must take place. At Delhi the mistake of using force was made. However, Delhi acquitted herself well and would be immortalised in history. Munshi Ram and Ajmal Khan displayed "*bahaduri*."

32. From an early hour on Black Sunday it became apparent that the leaders of the movement designed to paralyse the life of the city in three important respects by—

- (1) Causing all shops to remain shut throughout the day.
- (2) Stopping all taxis, trams and other public conveyances.
- (3) Causing all theatres and cinemas to close.

33. The closing of the shops, extending to about 80 per cent. of the shops in the city, was effected with little trouble, the great majority closing voluntarily owing

* Appendix XII. (Not reproduced.)

to fear engendered by the unrest now manifest among the mass of the population. Intimidation, culminating in two cases in the smashing of victorias, secured the second object of the agitators, and the same means effected the closing of the native theatres, though the cinemas, protected by armed police guards, remained opened and enjoyed full houses.

34. The stoppage of these public activities was however intended only as the setting for the principal work of the day, a display of spectacular demonstrations of protest against the Rowlatt Act. These demonstrations took three forms.

35. In the morning a large crowd estimated by the police at between 10,000 and 20,000 persons assembled at Chowpatti to take part in the "sea bath," an act of mourning arranged beforehand and elaborately advertised by the *Bombay Chronicle* during the days immediately preceding Black Sunday. The "sea bath" was accompanied by speeches, the most important being that of Mr. Gandhi who announced that he would not take the *Swadeshi* vow that day. He attacked the authorities for the rioting at Delhi, and he concluded by saying that no laws must be broken that Sunday as the people were not trained sufficiently. It is presumed that he postponed taking the *Swadeshi* vow through fear that it would lead to an outbreak of racial feeling. Such an outbreak would have been prejudicial to his purpose, which was to secure an effect by interfering with the public life to the greatest possible extent without causing disorder which would lead to action by the authorities before the movement had time to grow. It was no doubt for similar reasons that a Sunday had been chosen, as it was the day for the maximum of effect with the minimum risk of friction.

36. In the afternoon was held a meeting of not less spectacular and of a more serious character. It was supposed to be an impromptu, but it was evident that it had been carefully stage-managed. A Muhammadan *anti-Satyagraha* meeting had been announced, which gradually developed into an imitation of the incident at Delhi where Hindus and Muhammadans had fraternised. Mr. Gandhi and Mrs. Naidu spoke from the *Minar* of the *Sonapur Masjid*, the place whence the *azan* is called by the *Bangi*. Mrs. Naidu's speech was extremely emotional and it was said that her reference to the martyrdom of Imam Hussain brought tears to the eyes of some among the audience, particularly as it came from the lips of a woman and a Hindu. There was no direct incitement to violence or outspoken encouragement of definite action. On the other hand the usual precautions not to use violence were not given.

37. Mrs. Naidu was followed by various Hindus and Muhammadans whose speeches were more distinctly inciting. References were made to recent affairs in Egypt, and it was suggested that the British Empire must fall like spray from a fountain. The atmosphere for this meeting was deliberately created by the circulation shortly beforehand of hand-bills describing events in Delhi and *Swami Shradhdhanand's* preaching in the *Jama Masjid*, as well as by the circulation of the theory that the real object of the Rowlatt Bills was to enable Government to deal with a Muhammadan rising if a *jihad* was proclaimed over the dismemberment of Turkey.

38. In the evening there was another meeting at French bridge at which Mr. Jinnah, Sir Dinshaw Petit, Mr. Natrajan and Mr. Baptista spoke. This meeting was more in the nature of constitutional politics. Mr. Jinnah declared that if Bolshevism came to India, the bureaucracy would be responsible for it. Lord Chelmsford who was responsible for the passing of the Rowlatt Bills should be informed of the real feeling of the people against those Bills. The Sinn Feiners in Ireland had openly declared their severance from England, and so had the people of South Africa, but no such Act as the Rowlatt Bill had been passed to deal with them. Mr. Baptista remarked that Mr. Jinnah had cursed the Rowlatt Bill, but he would praise it because it had effected the reconciliation of Hindus and Muhammadans and of moderates and extremists.

39. The next move of the *Satyagraha Sabha* was characterised by remarkable ingenuity. On Tuesday the 8th February there was published in the *Bombay Chronicle* a statement purporting to have been issued by the *Satyagraha Sabha* and to have been signed by Mr. M. K. Gandhi as President and by Messrs. D. D. Sathye, Omer Sobhani and Shankerlal Ghelabhai (referred to above as S. G. Banker), as Secretaries. According to the statement the committee contemplated by the *Satyagraha* pledge had "advised that for the time being laws regarding prohibited literature and registration of newspapers" might "be civilly disobeyed." *Satyagrahis* were invited to "commit civil disobedience" by disseminating four named "Prohibited works" and by publishing a written newspaper without registering it. The objects aimed at were undoubtedly to bring Government into contempt and to infuse a spirit of disobedience by openly counselling and by causing others to act equally openly in ways which the public were led to believe constituted breaches of the law. Two virulent articles in the same issue of the *Bombay Chronicle* were published with the like objects. The statement and articles are contained in appendix XII-A.* In reality to disseminate so-called "prohibited literature" was *per se* no offence and it was no offence to publish a written unregistered newspaper: indeed a written newspaper could not be registered.

The signatories to this statement and the *Bombay Chronicle* thus set out to bring Government into contempt and infuse a spirit of disobedience without risk to those who followed the course advised. Reprints of pamphlets and a written newspaper of which Mr. Gandhi was stated to be the editor were sold in the streets of Bombay. The newspaper emphasised the point that the very act of publishing it amounted to civil disobedience and that Mr. Gandhi as editor was liable at any moment to be arrested by the Government. The opinion spread rapidly that Mr. Gandhi and his followers were openly breaking the law and that Government was powerless to deal with them. Moderate and loyal Indians began to show signs of general alarm. More than one implored the authorities to take action.

40. Meanwhile, on February the 8th, Mr. Gandhi left Bombay for Delhi, and on the following day issued a message in connection with the *Swadeshi* vow in the *Hindustan* newspaper. He drew a distinction between *Swadeshi* and "Boycott." The former was a religious aspiration and the natural duty of every individual, while the latter was a sort of punishment and a malicious aspiration which would bring harm to the public. The *Satyagrahis* should not take part in such a movement. According to him, the limited *Swadeshi* vow could be properly taken as under:—

"In the name of God, from this day I will make use of cloth made of cotton, silk or wool of India for my purpose. I will abstain from using foreign cloth and I take a vow that I will burn to ashes all the foreign clothes that I have."

It is to be noted that this vow was not published or mentioned in the *Chronicle*.

CHAPTER VI.

April 11th.

41. On the 10th of April the *Chronicle* published a special supplement announcing Mr. Gandhi's arrest. *Satyagrahis* immediately went through the streets calling upon the people to shut their shops. Muhammadans took part in the movement, and the cloth merchants of the Mulji Jetha market met to arrange in closing shops. The Colaba Cotton Bazar closed, and it was proposed to close also the Share Bazar for 8 days and to collect subscriptions for the employees during the period. About 10 P.M. crowds collected at Pydhonie and commenced to interfere with the tram cars, but the police managed to disperse them without difficulty.

42. On Friday morning the 11th April, the closed shops gave presage of trouble brewing, and by 10 A.M. reports had been received that trams were being stoned and passengers forced to alight on Kalbadevi Road and at Bhuleshwar, and that shops which were kept open were being stoned at Maharbourie. The local police were able to deal with the situation until 11-30 A.M., when matters became critical. A reinforcement of 25 armed police and a posse of mounted police were ordered out to Pydhownie, and the General Officer Commanding was asked to establish a military reserve at head-quarters and to order a squadron of cavalry to come down Parel Road and Frere Road from their camp at the race course. Meanwhile reports had come in to the effect that trams were being stoned and labour carts overturned on Frere Road. Twenty-five armed police were despatched to that area under a European officer who were able, without much difficulty, to restore order.

43. Reports, however, came from Pydhownie that the temper of the crowds in that locality was extremely bad and that they were getting out of hand. The mounted police were compelled to charge on four or five occasions but the effect of this manoeuvre was very transitory and the crowds returned to the charge with redoubled fury. On receipt of this information the Commissioner of Police proceeded to Pydhownie with two platoons of Indian Infantry while two platoons marched up Abdul Rahman Street to the same point. The focus of the disturbance gradually moved from Pydhownie down Abdul Rahman Street and finally remained at the junction of the Abdul Rahman Street and Nagdevi Street. At this point the mob was extremely violent. Large boulders were repeatedly placed on the tram lines and the cars were heavily stoned. An attempt had previously been made to overturn the lorry, in which the armed police reinforcements were proceeding to Pydhownie, by flinging a heavy wooden sleeper in front of the lorry, and this manoeuvre was over and over again repeated with a view to derailing tram cars. The mob steadfastly refused to obey the orders of the magistrates to disperse, and contented themselves with retreating to a safe distance whence they could stone the police with impunity. The mounted police made a few more charges, but without any permanent result. Matters culminated at about 3 P.M. when the stoning became very violent. Vigorous baton charges by the unarmed police, who effected a number of arrests, afforded some temporary relief, but it was clear that the mob was growing in number and becoming more violent. Cavalry patrols were therefore sent out in the hope that the crowds would be forced into movement.

44. There had already been ample grounds to justify the use of firearms on many occasions. The authorities, however, were anxious to delay taking this extreme step to the utmost limit in the hope that the news of Mr. Gandhi's return to Bombay and of his release from custody would have a calming effect. This news was being bandied about from 2 P.M., but at first it was not credited.

45. At about 2-30 P.M. Mr. Omar Sobhani appeared in Abdul Rahman Street in his motor. His arrival was the signal for a great demonstration. He asked permission of the Commissioner of Police to announce to the crowds that Mr. Gandhi was in Bombay, a free man, and that he would address a public meeting at Chowpatti that evening. Permission for the proposed meeting having been given Mr. Omar Sobhani announced the fact from the running board of his car. There was at once a general cry "to Chowpatti," but few moved. At this juncture the cavalry patrol arrived. Their appearance was a signal for a fresh outburst of stone-throwing and a number of troopers were hit. The cavalry continued to patrol the streets for some two hours and were on occasion compelled to charge the mob, particularly when they were belabouring a British officer and two troopers who had been unhorsed. Shortly after this incident, Mr. Gandhi himself appeared at Pydhownie in a motor car. His attempt to control the crowd was futile and his appearance had little or no effect on their

rowdism. He announced that he was shortly to address a gathering at Chowpatti and left Pydhownie for Abdul Rahman Street. A cordon of armed police had, earlier in the day, been drawn up across the road at this point with orders to permit no one to enter Abdul Rahman Street. When Mr. Gandhi was held up, the crowds were extremely angry, and the police officer in charge of the armed police, seeing the road clear and the cavalry in possession, used his discretion and allowed him to pass. When the cavalry saw the excited crowd coming down they assumed that the police had been overwhelmed and charged the crowd. Mr. Gandhi escaped from his motor into a neighbouring house and the crowds dispersed in all directions. Reports show that the crowd at this moment was in a state of frenzy. They were dancing along with Mr. Gandhi's car, waving their arms and shouting with all the appearance of fanatics. From this point the disturbance gradually lessened in intensity until about 5 P.M. when conditions became more or less normal in this locality.

46. At 5-15 P.M. reports were received that the crowd was attacking tram cars on Girgaum and Charni Roads. Police reinforcements were despatched from the local reserve and order was quickly restored, four arrests being made. After this episode the tramway company withdrew their cars to the sheds where military guards were posted.

47. Meanwhile reports showed that a crowd of enormous proportions was assembling on Chowpatti sands and was eagerly awaiting Mr. Gandhi's arrival. Adequate military arrangements were made in the locality to deal with any development that might arise, but there was no display of force beyond the customary police arrangements for regulating heavy traffic of such a nature. The meeting passed off without incident, Mr. Gandhi being the only speaker. The crowd was on the whole very orderly. A large proportion were mere sight-seers, hundreds of whom streamed away to the city after seeing Mr. Gandhi's arrival without waiting for the actual meeting.

48. An outstanding feature of the rioting was the combination of Hindus and Muhammadans in attacking the police and the troops with showers of stones. The Muhammadans were deliberately incited by the Hindus who spread the report that the Rowlatt Bills were intended to enable Government to coerce the Muhammadans and prevent them from giving trouble so as to facilitate the dismemberment of Turkey. The shouts of "*Hindu-Musulman ki jai*" repeatedly raised by the crowd had this significance.

49. Forty-two rioters were arrested, and, on conviction, received sentences varying from a fine of Rs. 2 to six months' rigorous imprisonment. In connection with the damage done to the property of the Bombay Electric Supply and Tramways Company on the 10th and 11th April, proceedings were taken by the Chief Presidency Magistrate under section 45 of Act IV of 1902, who directed compensation to the amount of Rs. 4,552-8-0 to be recovered. A summary of the proceedings is contained in Appendix XIII.*

50. Three police constables were seriously injured and taken to hospital. Many were slightly injured by stones. The squadron of cavalry suffered 16 casualties of whom 4 were severely injured and taken to hospital.

51. A more detailed account of these events is contained in a contemporary report by the Commissioner of Police which is attached (Appendix XIV).†

CHAPTER VII.

Conclusion.

52. The events subsequent to the disturbances of the 10th April in Bombay may be dismissed with a brief summary. News of the disastrous occurrences in the Punjab and at Ahmedabad and Viramgam in this Presidency were received with bewilderment and consternation, and had a powerful effect in restraining the sections of the populace inclined to disorder. The general body of the public capable of receiving any distinct impressions

*Not reproduced.

† Page 287.

of the situation realised that the extremist agitators had unchained forces which they could not control if they would; that the reckless campaign of invective and incitement to violence had at last reached its logical and disastrous conclusion in acts of rebellion; and that out of a confusion of inflammatory harangues and journalistic rhetoric, which they had come to regard as the normal and natural accompaniment of advanced politics, a sudden and imminent danger to the social order had arisen. There was a movement of resentment against the extremist leaders, who themselves contemplated their handiwork in its actual manifestation with terrified surprise. Even the *Bombay Chronicle* adopted for a brief interval a note of suspended judgment and detachment.

53. Meanwhile Mr. Gandhi had gone to Ahmedabad. On April 17th he disseminated handbills counselling moderation and obedience to authority. On the 18th he returned to Bombay and after an interview with Mr. Horniman, he announced in the Press the suspension of the *Satyagraha* movement.

54. The part played by the *Bombay Chronicle* and its Editor in the campaign leading up to the disturbances has already been described. The Government of Bombay were of opinion and were legally advised that in respect of matter published in this paper in connection with the Rowlatt Act and the *Satyagraha* movement a prosecution could have been successfully instituted under section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code. It is unnecessary to emphasise further the effect of these incitements to disorder in preparing the way for and finally in precipitating the grave crisis which had arisen or the necessity of taking measures against the prime mover in these persistent and malignant attacks on Government. The recent events at Delhi, in the Punjab and in Gujarat

had inevitably had a profoundly disturbing effect on the Bombay populace, which Mr. Horniman had made every effort to attract to his side. The fact that the rioting in Bombay on the 11th April did not terminate in bloodshed on an extensive scale was not due to the temper of the mob, which was truculent and aggressive, nor to the efforts of the extremist leaders, who were either ill-disposed or impotent. It was due entirely to the impressive display of military force and the efficient dispositions made by the General Officer Commanding the Bombay Brigade and the Commissioner of Police and to the admirable tact, resolution and judgment displayed by all ranks of the military and police forces on that day. The tension, however, remained acute, and there was every reason to apprehend that during the inevitable delay entailed by a criminal prosecution there would be a recrudescence of disturbances on a wide scale attended by great loss of life and property. Government accordingly decided to deport Mr. Horniman by an order under Rule 3 of the Defence of India (Consolidation) Rules. Mr. Horniman had recently undergone an operation and Government desired to have before them medical opinion that his removal would be unattended by danger. This opinion, which included that of Mr. Horniman's private attendant, was obtained, and the order was carried out on April 26th. Simultaneously orders were passed under the Press Act forfeiting the security deposited by the *Bombay Chronicle* Press and under Rule 3 of the Defence of India Rules imposing pre-censorship on the Press (Appendices XV,* XVI,† XVII†).

Mr. Horniman was deported, the *Bombay Chronicle* suspended publication and the period of acute crisis came to an end.

* Page 291.

† Not reproduced.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX III.

Note on Mr. Horniman.

Within a short period of his arrival in Bombay as Editor of the *Bombay Chronicle* Mr. Horniman rapidly established himself as a prominent member of the extremist section, and his career as a dangerous agitator and organiser of political movements hostile to Government must be regarded concurrently with his editorial activities. The *Bombay Chronicle* became the recognised organ of extremist politics. It was conspicuous for consistent misrepresentation of the policy and intentions of Government, for personal attacks on individual officers of Government, and for the prominence given to all incidents and reports likely to arouse racial animosity. For the present purpose it will suffice to confine attention to a brief notice of Mr. Horniman's proceedings in the years 1917, 1918 and 1919.

2. As a prominent member of the Home Rule League in 1917, Mr. Horniman took a leading part in the agitation against the order passed by the Government of Madras on Mrs. Besant, and addressed or presided at various protest meetings, notably at Madras in June, at Surat on July 21st and Bombay on July 30th. During July the *Chronicle* published statements of an alarmist and inflammatory character alleging outrages on women by men of the Labour Corps then quartered in Dadar Camp. These led to great uneasiness and some violence on the part of the mill-hall population, and the Government of Bombay found it necessary to pass an order under the Defence of India Act prohibiting any reference to the subject. On August 12th, 1917, Mr. Horniman gave notice of a motion in the Bombay Provincial Congress Committee advocating passive resistance, which he followed up by a speech in the same sense on September 2nd. This is to be noted as indicating that the movement which culminated so disastrously in the month of April had long been contemplated by him and his followers as a political weapon. During this year Mr. Horniman prosecuted vigorously, both personally and

by his paper, propaganda in two significant directions. The first was to encourage youths and students to take part in political movements and subject them to the virus of extremist agitation. As instances of this may be mentioned his election as Vice-President of the Young India Society in September 1917, and an address delivered by him on October 4th, 1917, to the Bombay Presidency Students' Federation. The second line of propaganda above referred to was the fomenting of labour and industrial disputes and the attempt to play upon the credulous and excitable temperament of the labouring classes as instanced in the Dadar incident above referred to.

On September 16th, he made a bitter attack on Government in a lecture on the Mesopotamian campaign.

In October 1917 he became Secretary to the Home Rule League.

About October 20th, by a *coup d'état* in the Directorate of the *Bombay Chronicle* Press, Mr. Horniman obtained complete control of the paper, the tone and policy of which became progressively more and more virulent and hostile to Government.

3. On February 20th, 1918, the maximum security of Rs. 2,000 was taken from Mr. Horniman as keeper of the *Bombay Chronicle* press under section 3 of Act I of 1910. In April of this year Mr. Horniman took an active part in the agitation engineered in regard to the refusal of passports to Tilak and his party for their proposed journey to England. This was followed by a campaign of a virulent and seditious character extending from the 22nd April 1918 till the end of July, in connection with the Imperial, and, later, the Bombay Provincial War Conferences. This in turn was succeeded by a campaign initiated about the middle of November in connection with a proposed memorial to His Excellency Lord Willingdon.

4. During 1919 the *Bombay Chronicle* pursued a course of the most reckless license. This was initiated about the middle of January by a series of articles, leaders and letters from correspondents on the Rowlatt Bills

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[Continued.]

which developed into the passive resistance (*vide* leading article in its issue of the 1st March 1919) and *Satyagraha* movement (ditto of 8th March 1919). Mr. Horniman was one of the signatories of the *Satyagraha* vow, and there can be no question that he joined the movement deliberately in full recognition of the disastrous consequences which would necessarily ensue. Such consequences did actually ensue and of the connection between them and the propaganda of the *Bombay Chronicle* there can be no reasonable doubt. Attention is also invited to the publicity given during March and April to letters purporting to be written by British soldiers, the transparent purpose of which is to inflame discontent and prejudice discipline.

5. In the order forfeiting the security of the *Bombay Chronicle* press, a selection has been made of typical passages of a seditious and inflammatory character.

6. It is not however possible by considering individual and isolated passages to estimate the profoundly and comprehensively mischievous effect on the political situation and the public of the insidious and malevolent course consistently pursued by the *Bombay Chronicle* and its editor over an extended period. Great cunning has been exercised for the most part in avoiding any extreme and palpable infringement of the law in single utterances; but the collected and cumulative effect of the whole is beyond question. A dossier of articles and correspondence appearing in the *Bombay Chronicle* will be found in Appendix II.*

These should be carefully examined as a whole if a just appreciation is to be arrived at of the policy and intentions which inspired them.

APPENDIX IX.

Report of the meeting held on 28th February 1919 behind the Elphinstone mills to protest against the Rowlatt Bills.

Under the joint auspices of the Home Rule League and the Bombay National Union, a public meeting was held on Friday, the 28th February 1919, on the open space behind the Elphinstone mills. The processions of Home Rulers arrived at the meeting place at about 7.15 p.m. where there was already a large attendance of mill-hands. Mr. Annasaheb Nene presided. On the platform were seated most of the leaders of the Home Rule League.

Mr. Nene in opening the proceedings of the meeting said in Marathi:—Gentlemen, this is the second occasion on which I am presiding over a meeting at this place. We have met here to-day to condemn the Rowlatt Bills which are rightly styled the Black Bills. We are all British citizens and we have as such every right to conduct a constitutional agitation against this measure for the purpose of protecting our liberties and rights. Our late reverend leader Dadabhai Naoroji (loud cheers) has told us that unless we got Home Rule (*Swarajya*) it was no use fighting for small things. And when the *Swarajya* movement was commenced many years ago, some of our leaders had to go to jail and suffer for their patriotism. But afterwards our beloved King George found out that it was only through sympathy that they could rule over us. Then, when the great war came, which had only recently come to a happy termination, we were told that it was our duty to help England and the Allies to the best of our ability and so the whole of India did its duty in sending men and money for England's help. We poured our blood on the fields of battle and spent our treasures freely and we have got our reward for all that in the shape of these horrible Bills. These Bills are going to be fastened on us and it is our duty to protest against them and oppose them by every constitutional means. Some of the speakers are going to explain to you the text of those bills and after hearing them you can make up your minds as to whether you are ready to wear this *kanthi* (necklace) which Government is presenting to you.

I will now call upon Mr. Jamnadas Dwarkadas to address you.

* Not reproduced.

Mr. Jamnadas Dwarkadas who addressed the meeting in Gujarati said:—Gentlemen, I had given you an assurance on the occasion of the meeting which was called to consider the question of a memorial to Lord Willingdon that next time I would address you in Marathi, but I never expected that that 'next time' would come so soon. It is really shameful that although I can speak in English I am unable to address you in Marathi. Well, I can assure you that I am at present learning Marathi and will soon venture to address you in that tongue. You will not fail to understand me even if I were to speak to you in Gujarati as the same thoughts are occupying the minds of us all (Cheers). Dear brothers, we are already accustomed to take part in such a movement. You are more or less experienced in the mode of carrying on such a struggle. At least the citizens of Bombay need not learn from anyone how to fight for one's birth-right. That was, however, only a small opportunity. When we want to build a house we prepare a plan. We proceed with the building of the house according to this plan. The Willingdon memorial movement was a sort of a plan for the large structure. At that time we built a small house but now we are called upon to rear a huge edifice. We are to erect this building on the strength of the experience gained at that time. I hope people will give us the same help now as they did on that occasion. The voice of popular opinion must ring continuously.

The question before us now is being discussed throughout the country in the press and on the platform. This movement is gaining support everywhere. This must have given you an idea of the importance attached to this question. The present is not the time to keep quiet but to agitate. To keep quiet is to invite slavery.

This time I am going to speak only on one or two points in the Bills. A case is always tried in an open court of law. Due weight was attached to popular opinion. The judge could not flout popular opinion. The case against Lokamanya Tilak was also tried in an open court, but when these Bills are passed into law this right will be wrested from us. The judge will inflict any punishment he likes on the man whom he considers to be guilty (Shame). Government will trample upon popular opinion on the strength of power (Shame). We had faith in British justice up to this time, but when these bills are passed into law British justice will exist only in name (Cheers). No one will suppose that there is any such thing as British justice. These Bills will reduce that justice to ashes (Cheers).

Suppose two men are speaking. A detective sees them. He reports on suspicion. Done. He will be held to be guilty and put into jail for any length of time Government may decide (Shame). If in the eyes of Government I am a dangerous person, they will remove anyone who associates with me whether it be my brother, my *mehra* or my wife (Shame). They need not necessarily take part in any political movements. Suppose a political document is found with me of which I was ignorant; whatever evidence I may adduce I shall be held to be guilty. A similar document is found with Mr. Horniman. Whatever he may say to prove his good faith, even if he urges that he had that document to study some particular question, he will not fail to be transported (Shame). The authorities already press us too heavily owing to the powers with which they are already armed. Is it necessary to recapitulate how they abused the provisions of the Defence of India Act? Although that war measure was meant to fight the designs of Germany it was put into operation against our popular leaders like Lokamanya Tilak and Mrs. Besant. It is not necessary to dwell upon the consequences when the present bills are passed to supplement such laws. You can judge for yourselves the extent of their powers in that case.

When these bills are passed into law we shall cease to have any political existence. There will be absolutely no trace of our political rights (Shame). Will there be any hope of regeneration of the country when politicians are gagged, meetings are prohibited and the newspapers are suspended (No, No). What harm is there if

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[Continued.]

the people of this country are killed outright instead of ending the political existence of this country, depriving the people of the freedom of thought and arresting the mighty flow of public opinion (Cheers).

When these laws are enacted the condition of the people of this country will be worse than that of slaves. Meetings are being held everywhere. More might be held. We must all make Government realise that the population of this country is not as helpless as they think to be. It will never allow the passage of laws that deprive it of freedom.

If these Bills are passed into law not only you but also your children will be condemned into slavery. Do you want their curses? We are all Hindus. We have to perform the *Shradha* ceremony as enjoined by our religion with a view to paying off the debt of our forebears. The principal item in that ceremony is the control of will-power. You can only achieve the contentment of your forebears if you act according to the dictates of this will-power. Their contentment is our happiness. But is your will-power in your keeping? In such circumstances you have no right to discharge the debt of your forebears. The nation which is unable to discharge the debt of its forebears is on the road to progressive decline. In this way the Bills will conflict with religious faith. We do not want to be under (the shadow of) fear. These Bills will do away with the reign of freedom from fear. You must never allow this law to be passed which will enchain your soul and body. We are not helpless. The time is come to show that we possess what is called strength.

Sir George Lowndes (Shame) declared in the Council that Government would pass the Bills in spite of the united opposition of the non-official members (Shame). The Bills will be passed even if the whole country is united and there is strong opposition against them (Shame). Apparently the administration is to be carried on according to their pleasure? Popular opinion does not count. Those who respect public opinion are alone able to rule (Cheers). The test of an administration is not to be found in the officials but in public opinion. It is no rule which knows no check and is based on popular sonal will. The real rule is that which is based on popular will (Cheers). Sir George Lowndes says that even if the thirty-three crores of people were to strenuously oppose these Bills, we (Government) will not fail to enslave them (Shame). Sir George Lowndes may not know the people as I know them. I have full faith in the people here. The task is not as easy as they think it to be. The population of India is not as effeminate as they think it to be. These people will never allow them to make good their professions (Cheers). These people will not allow the passage of these Bills even if they have to walk over sword-blades (Cheers).

Hindus know that this body has taken birth several times and is also dead as many times (Cheers). Hindus know perfectly well that the real value of life lies in giving it up in the service of others. They do not at all care for their lives (bodies) (Cheers). Therefore, gird your loins and come forward to defend your rights and to ensure the happiness of others. If necessary sacrifice your lives willingly for this cause. What is the worth of this body? Even if you die consider that only one worm has become the less from amongst these diseased and worn-out worms (Cheers). What harm is there if one diseased worm dies to make our country healthy? Get rid of individuality at this time. The body of India must become healthy. We must be prepared to do anything to accomplish that object. Our desires will be satisfied if we are prepared to act like this. Do not give room in your minds to temptation of any kind. Let the divine spirit that is in you come forth. That power is invincible. No one can stand that power (Cheers).

This day is most sacred. It is *Mahashivratri* and is dedicated to (the worship of) *Mahadeo*. The deity *Mahadeo* represents strength. By doing penance, Arjun obtained the invincible bow from this very deity. With the help of the same power he punished the wicked.

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Like Arjun let us pray to *Mahadeo* and ask from him for power which will enable us to face this situation.

In conclusion I have only to tell you to be prepared to fight until success is obtained even if you have to sacrifice (yourselves) (Cheers).

Mr. Goswami who next addressed the audience said in Marathi:—Gentlemen, many of us are likely to be quite in the dark as to the nature of the Rowlatt Bills. So I am going to explain to you their nature in short. Laws are made after consulting the people. Then how is it that a number of Bills are introduced when our people are saying we don't want them. We were sitting eagerly expecting Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, but now the time of being subjected to repression has arrived. Though we pass a number of resolutions, send wires, of what use will they be? Now the time has come when some action must be commenced whether it be within or outside lawful limits. It is said this is an emergency Bill. But what emergency is there at present. As if murder after murder is being committed every day. Youths in a corner of Bengal got their heads turned? What is the remedy for it? It is such Bills? How an outrage is committed had to be found out. For that a committee was appointed. Mr. Rowlatt (was appointed). Two persons from among ourselves (Shame) who were like the handle of an axe which brings about the ruin of its kith and kin were to work with him. They brought out these two Bills. This was like making a present to a man out of his own gift?

Formerly in *Moglai* the way of giving punishments consisted in either being trodden under the foot of an elephant or being impaled. At present the punishment is the same but is it punishment of the civilized age? Punishment is to be given by using the language such as, under such and such section, under such and such a sub-rule. The judge may write anything he likes on a slip of paper, pronounce sentence. There lies no appeal. We are not permitted to talk even with that *Lokamanya* who suffered for our sake and who for our sake is suffering so much hardship? (Shame.) Therefore be resolute. This day is the day of *Shiva*. Resolve upon something to-day. Remember *Shiva's* vow once observed cannot be given up. Let Lowndes, Lovett say anything they like. Do not mind them (Loud cheers).

Dr. Savarkar who then addressed the meeting said in Marathi:—Mr. President and gentlemen, this day is *Mahashivratri* day. According to our old religious notions we should to-day hear *puranas*, *kirtans*. Instead of listening to how God punished the wicked, how he made the true cause victorious you have gathered here. With the change of time the old order is also changed. Now we must hear different kinds of *puranas*. Formerly there used to be one *Shivaratra* at the most in a year but in its stead 360 *Mahashivratri*s are after us in a year.* In these changed times what *puranas* are to be read and what *kirtans* to be performed? There is no food in the belly, no power in the hand. Under these circumstances what *puranas* other than those of the injustice done to us are to be heard? The present *puranas* of us, slave people, are to be of this kind alone? To-day's *puran* is not a *puran* performed to the accompaniment of (a sort of tabor) (cymbal), to-day's *kirtan* is the *kirtan* of the doings of bureaucracy. When is a man inclined to perform *kirtans* and *puranas*? When the soul is joyful and peaceful. But the soul is hungry, it is over-powered with hunger. It is hungering for Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. Under these circumstances is it not a misfortune that the live coals of Rowlatt's Bills should fall on the body? Time has arrived for our houses being burnt by the flames of these live coals.

You might have heard the story of Bhasmasura demon in the *Puranas*. In order to please the guileless Shankar he first showed meekness and with flattery he won him over. He got a boon that he on whose head he would place his hand should be reduced to ashes. The poor

* This means that people have to fast 360 days a year, i.e., to remain hungry.

Continued.]

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Shankar residing in the Himalayas was, guileless indeed! Bhasmasura intoxicated on account of the boon went about placing his hand on any person whatsoever. Men, demons, gods, all these of course fell victims, but he prepared himself to place his hand even on the holy matted hair of Shankar and on the holy Ganges.

The same is the condition of the Rowlatt Bills or of other Acts. Before the Press Act and the Defence of India and Arms Act were to be passed by Government they indulged in flattery. We consented. For what do the bureaucrats receiving thousands of rupees as pay come here? To reduce to ashes the thirty-three crores of *Mahadevas* here (Shame). The Rowlatt Bills are very like Bhasmasura. The hand of this Bhasmasura demon is to fall on all. He will reduce to ashes all our rights. Then though Montagu-Chelmsford reforms or something else comes what is their use? Though thousands of doctors are brought for a patient after he is dead what can they do? This Bhasmasura (says) I will put my hand on you lightly. I put it lightly like a rose flower. I put it for three years only (Laughter) but we tell him no, do not at all place your hand, do not put it even for a moment. You will reduce us to ashes in a moment. Then who will tell what you will do in three years? It is after all a machine gun? Even its one shot will burn (a thing) and reduce (it) to ashes, then there is no need at all of firing more shots. Narsinh* latent in the wood up to the present is now roused. He will not mind flattery. Though Sir George Lowndes might put forth any number of attempts to trap this lion in the net this lion will not be taken in. Though a piece of meat be held in his front this kind of trick cannot now do. The Indian people are now awake. Who does not sleep? Has not England gone to sleep? Was not England asleep when William the Conqueror invaded it? We had been asleep but not for being dead. We had gone to sleep to wake up again (Cheers). We went to sleep in 1818 in order only to see the dawn of 1919. Though our sleep was for 100 years it was not a permanent one. While the sun of *Swarajya* is rising in the sky and while your own people are singing loudly merry songs for it do you expect that we would be sleeping yet? Though you put forth any number of attempts to hide the crow it is not possible that it will remain hidden.† It is crowing. Getting up with it we too are awake. How the whole population is awake you come to this place and see then you will know. Two years ago these Parel people did not know even the word "Political." But who will not feel wonder seeing the present awakening? These twentieth century Bhasmasuras must be properly reformed. We want bureaucracy. Not that we don't want them, because who else will serve us? (Laughter.) We do not mean to destroy these Bhasmasuras, only this much they should be what we will ask them to do. As for us we will not do what they will ask us to do. (Cheers.) We tell the bureaucracy, you remain here. We have no objection. But we will not allow you to exercise the right of reducing us to ashes, of setting fire to our houses. You stay here, but stay to do what we will ask you to do. We will never allow public opinion to be trampled under foot. We will not allow you to dance as you like. We will not give you power to trample under foot our rights, our leaders in any way you like. (Cheers.) The time of passing these Bills is extended to the 1st of March, extend it further. Nay postpone these Bills for good. (Cheers.)

You are our servants and so we love you. Servant should be loved when he discharges his duties properly. (Cheers.) We love you. We give you bonus. You remain at Simla if you like, but with all this we will not give you ownership of our mill.‡ Because we have given you bonus, shall we give you the mill? When we were young ignorant we gave the mill in your possession for the time, so will you usurp it for ever? (Cheers.)

* Popular opinion is here compared to Narsinh (King of beasts).
† Here the speaker is addressing the bureaucracy.
‡ meaning the power of administering our land.

We have become wise now. Old days are gone. There can be no land as holy as our land of the Aryans. You remain as servants of this our holy land of the Aryans which even people like Mr. Horniman (Cheers) born in foreign countries love very deeply, in which are born jewels like the *Lokamanya* Tilak (Cheers) which has for its bulwark a mountain like the Himalayas, through parts which is flowing a holy river like the Ganges, but we will not give its ownership to you.

You will come to know what the nature of these Bills is if you will read the *Kesari* dated the 28th. You should make it a point to read them. Unless we understand the Bills, how can we fight? Specially read them out to those who cannot read. (Loud and continued cheers.)

Mr. B. G. Horniman who next addressed the meeting said:—Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen,—I hope it will not be thought that I am going unnecessarily over old ground when I remind you that only a few months have passed since there came the close of the great war that was waged triumphantly to assert the principles of liberty and justice throughout the world. I am again stating facts which it is not necessary to tell you for your information but which I am only stating as the basis for what I am going to state presently when I say that the war and the victory could not have been triumphantly won if it had not been for the part which India played on the side of Great Britain and the Allies. I was just now when sitting in this chair thinking of what might have happened if in 1914 India had not sent the aid which she did to the battlefields in Flanders and enabled the Allies to stem the onrush of the great German hordes which aimed at Paris and London. I am thinking what might have happened if instead of being stemmed by the arrival at the psychological moment of troops from India the Germans had reached Paris and Calais and possibly crossed the channel and laid siege to London and made themselves masters of the capital of England. If that had happened, as fortunately it did not happen, if the Germans had established themselves in the country and had been still triumphant there, I was thinking that in that case the British public might have been holding meetings at this moment to protest against the introduction of some German equivalent of the Rowlatt Bills (applause and laughter). It is a most terrible irony that after India had given her blood and poured out her treasure and made the great sacrifices that she has made in this great cause of liberty, she should be refused her share of justice and liberty, and that instead of being free from the trammels under which she has already laboured she should have fresh chains placed on her. We know that President Wilson has said in a famous phrase that the war was being waged to make the world safe for democracy. (Cheers.) But we find that India has played her part in the war in order that India may be made safe for the democracy. (Cries of shame.) I was very much struck the other day on seeing a telegram which came from New York in which the expression used by a member of the Senate of the United States in regard to what was going on at the Peace Conference. This gentleman complained that the United States were being drawn into undesirable association with what he complained, I think, as European Powers and Asiatic despots. Well, ladies and gentlemen, I have been searching the map of Asia to find out who are these Asiatic despots. I cannot find them anywhere but in one important country in the map of Asia. There is certainly no despotism in Japan, there is no despotism to-day in China. There is no despotism in unfortunate Persia because the Shah of Persia is under the tutelage at the present moment of the Allied Government. Despotism no longer rules in Turkey. Then who are these Asiatic despots? Ladies and gentlemen, it is a shameful thing to say that the only despotism at the present moment in Asia, the only despots at the present moment are ruling in India, the despots who are trying to fetter the people of this country with stronger chains in order that they might strengthen their despotic powers. (Cries of shame, shame.) Yes, it is shame but the lesson at the present moment for the people of

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[Continued.]

India in regard to that is that they should not cry shame upon the despots or abuse them. We could leave them alone for the present. Let them realise that there could not be despots unless people were willing to be slaves. (Loud applause.) And it rests with the people of this country at this moment to decide for themselves whether they are going to allow despots and despotism to reign in India or not. It lies upon the people themselves to decide that they would not be slaves and that they would not have the badge of slavery put on them by these iniquitous measures. You have got to make up your minds whether at this moment when slaves are being freed in every part of the world from despotic Governments, India alone among all the countries of the world is going to bear that badge of slavery which is indicated by the terrible provisions of the proposed Bills, because no people could claim to be a self-respecting nation if these Bills appear on their Statute Book. It is not necessary, ladies and gentlemen, to enlarge upon this matter. It is sufficient to say that the provisions of the Bills are such as exist on the Statute Book of no civilized country in the world, and are you going to allow it to be said that you are content to sit down with folded hands when measures of such a character are placed on the Statute Book? (Cries of no, no.) Measures which would not be tolerated in any civilized country in the world the people of which are supposed to enjoy any sort of rights or freedom. Ladies and gentlemen, I have no desire to say much more than this that if you are content that there should be despotism in India, that despotism should continue to reign, then when these Bills are passed all that you have to do is to accept them and sit quiet and think that your agitation is over and that there is nothing more to be done. (Cries of no, no, we don't want them.) Well, if you do not want them then you must not let your protests cease with the passing of the Bills but you must continue your protests and make your protests successful. And we could, if we would, make our protests successful in the fully felt (applause), because there is no despotism in the world which could stand against the spiritual determination of three hundred millions of people (loud cheers). People in whom you have placed your confidence are sitting to devise means by which your protests could be made felt. There is the Committee appointed by the two Home Rule Leagues to organise continuous agitation. What I want to tell you is that those of us who are trying to find means by which our agitation could be brought to bear on the Government, and make our protests successful, cannot hope to have success unless the mass of the people are prepared to follow us and support us in every way possible (loud applause). I know it is a superfluous and also an impertinent question to put to you, but I want your answer whether you are going to support us in what we propose should be done. (Cries of yes, yes and applause.) There are many ways which might have to be pursued but I am not going to enter into details at this moment beyond saying that *Mahatma* Gandhi (loud cheers) is coming to Bombay to-morrow and is going to lead the movement of passive resistance (loud cheers) not only against these Bills but against other laws as long as the Bills remain. *Mahatma* Gandhi is taking counsel with other leaders in order to devise such a campaign as might be successfully carried through against these Bills. I need hardly ask you whether to a man like *Mahatma* Gandhi (loud cheers) whose great record of self-sacrifice and leadership both in South Africa and in this country is a shining example to every patriot as to what he should do at such a time, whether you are not prepared to give all the support that you might be able to give to *Mahatma* Gandhi when he would sound the call, and whether you would not follow him? (Applause and cries of Yes, we are prepared to follow him.) That at the present moment is the problem which you have to consider. You have to make your protest against the Bills in such a way and with such strength and determination that our protests might be effective, so that these Bills even if they are passed into law should be ultimately repealed by the

Government on the demand of the people (cheers) and that this badge of slavery should be removed from the people of India. (Loud and continued cheers.)

Mr. Annasaheb Nene (Chairman) in his concluding speech addressed the audience in Marathi and said:—

Gentlemen, up to now you have heard important speeches. And great spirit appears to have inspired you. But I am doubtful whether you have really understood the gravity of the situation because I heard you laughing many times. But let me tell you that this is not a thing to be laughed at. Dr. Savarkar has told you to read the Bills carefully from the *Kesari* and I hope all of you who have not understood what they are will make an attempt to understand them either by reading them yourself or by getting them read to you by others. You have all heard that notwithstanding the strong opposition of the people's representatives in the Imperial Council Sir George Lowndes has said on behalf of Government that Government is determined to carry these Bills through. But I would only remind Government of the risk that they are going to run by disregarding in this way popular opinion. Let the British people think how they lost America. The people of the United States that time wanted self-Government and the British people would not give them self-Government. Then there was the war of American independence and England lost America. Let the British people be aware that the same thing does not happen with regard to India at present. Government know how our people have fought for the allies and have rendered help both in men and money and it is wise that they should not estrange such people from them by passing these iniquitous measures.

Then notwithstanding all this agitation and this opposition if Government allows these Bills to be passed into law, as Mr. Horniman has asked you, I want to ask you whether you are prepared to follow the passive resistance movement which *Mahatma* Gandhi is going to commence. (Cries of Yes, we are prepared.) It is no use saying yes, without considering well. You must remember that it is not an easy thing. Some of you shall have to go to jail and you must be prepared to suffer hardships. Are you prepared for all this? (Cries of Yes, we are.) Well if you are prepared for all this, then I am sure you shall succeed. And if as you say you are prepared to suffer for the preservation of your rights and liberty, then you should follow *Mahatma* Gandhi in the passive resistance movement (loud cheers and continued applause).

Mr. Jamnadas Mehta in proposing a vote of thanks to the Chairman assured him that they were all ready to follow *Mahatma* Gandhi in the passive resistance movement.

The vote was carried amidst cries of "passive resistance," "passive resistance" and *bande mataram* and *Mahatma Gandhi ki Jai* and *Horniman Sahib ki Jai* and *Jamnadas ki Jai*.

The meeting was then dissolved.

APPENDIX X.

Cutting from the "Bombay Chronicle," 1st March 1919.

THE SATYAGRAHA VOW.

Being conscientiously of opinion that the Bills known as the Indian Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill No. I of 1919 and the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill No. II of 1919, are unjust, subversive of the principles of liberty and justice, and destructive of the elementary rights of individuals on which the safety of the community, as a whole, and the State itself is based, we solemnly affirm that, in the event of these Bills becoming law and until they are withdrawn, we shall refuse civilly to obey these laws and such other laws as a Committee to be hereafter appointed may think fit, and we further affirm that in this struggle we will faithfully follow truth and refrain from violence to life, person or property.

[Continued.]

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APPENDIX XI.

Cutting from the "Bombay Chronicle," 3rd March 1919.

SATYAGRAHA SABHA.

At a meeting of the signatories to the *Satyagraha* pledge held on Saturday, the following Executive Committee was appointed:—

President:—*Mahatma* Gandhi.
Vice-President:—Mr. B. G. Horniman.

Members of the Committee:—

1. Mr. Jamnadas Dwarkadas.
2. Mrs. Sarojini Naidu.
3. Dr. Erulker.
4. Mr. Subedar.
5. Mr. L. R. Tairsey.
6. Mr. Azad.
7. Dr. Welker.
8. Mr. Jamnadas M. Mehta.
9. Mr. L. G. Khare.
10. Mr. V. A. Desai.
11. Mrs. Awantikabai Gokhale.
12. Mr. Chunilal Ujamsi.
13. Mr. R. N. Mandlik.
14. Mr. Jethmal Narandas.
15. Mr. Hansraj P. Thakersey.
16. Mr. Vitthaladas V. Jerajani.

with power to add.

Secretaries:—
Dr. Sathye.
Mr. Shankerlal Banker.
Mr. Umar Sobhani.

APPENDIX XII-A.

Cutting from the "Bombay Chronicle," dated the 8th April 1919, regarding *Satyagraha*.

SATYAGRAHA STRUGGLE COMMENCES.

Laws for civil disobedience.

The following statement has been issued by the *Satyagraha Sabha*.

The Committee contemplated by the *Satyagraha* pledge has advised that for the time being laws regarding prohibited literature and registration of newspapers may be civilly disobeyed.

With reference to prohibited literature, the Committee has selected the following prohibited works for dissemination:—

- Hind Swarajya*, by M. K. Gandhi.
Sarvodaya or 'Universal Dawn', by M. K. Gandhi (being a paraphrase of "Unto This Last").
"The Story of a *Satyagrahi*," by M. K. Gandhi (being a paraphrase of the "Defence and Death of Socrates" by Plato).
"The life and address of Mustafa Kamil Pasha" (printed at the International Printing Press).

In making this selection, the Committee has been guided by the following considerations:—

- (1) To cause as little disturbance as possible between the governors and the governed;
- (2) Until *Satyagrahis* have become seasoned, disciplined and capable of handling delicately organised movements, to select such laws only as can be disobeyed individually;
- (3) To select, as a first step, laws that have evoked popular disapproval and that from the *Satyagraha* standpoint, are the most open to attack;
- (4) To select laws whose civil breach would constitute an education for the people, showing them a clear way out of the difficulties that lie in the path of honest men desiring to do public work;

- (5) Regarding prohibited literature, to select such books and pamphlets as are not inconsistent with *Satyagraha* and which are, therefore, of a clean type and which do not, either directly or indirectly, approve of or encourage violence.

How to commit civil disobedience.

Satyagrahis should receive copies of prohibited literature for distribution. A limited number of copies can be had from the Secretaries of the *Satyagraha Sabha*. *Satyagrahis* should, so far as possible, write their names and address as sellers, so that they may be traced easily when wanted by Government for prosecution. Naturally there can be no question of secret sale of this literature. At the same time there should be no forwardness, either, in distributing it.

It is open to *Satyagrahis* to form small groups of men and women to whom they may read this class of literature. The object in selected prohibited literature is not merely to commit a civil breach of the law regarding it but it is also to supply people with clean literature of high moral value. It is expected that the Government will confiscate such literature. *Satyagraha* is and has to be as independent of finance as possible. When, therefore, copies are confiscated, *Satyagrahis* are required to make copies of prohibited literature themselves or by securing the assistance of willing friends and to make use of it until it is confiscated by giving readings to the people from it. It is stated that such readings would amount to dissemination of prohibited literature. When whole copies are exhausted by dissemination or confiscation *Satyagrahis* may continue civil disobedience by writing out and distributing extracts from accessible books.

Regarding civil breach of the law governing the publication of newspapers, the idea is to publish in every *Satyagraha* centre a written newspaper without registering it. It need not occupy more than one side of half a foolscap. When such a newspaper is edited, it will be found how difficult it is to fill up half a sheet. It is a well-known fact that a vast majority of newspapers contain much padding. Further it can not be denied that newspaper articles written under the terror of the strict newspaper law have a double meaning. A *Satyagrahi* for whom punishments provided by law have lost all terror, can give only in an unregistered newspaper his thoughts and opinions unhampered by any other consideration than that of his own conscience. His newspaper, therefore, if otherwise well edited, can become a most powerful vehicle for transmitting pure ideas in a concise manner, and there need be no fear of inability to circulate a handwritten newspaper; for it will be the duty of those who may receive the first copies to recopy till at last the process of multiplication is made to cover, if necessary, the whole of the masses of India. And it must not be forgotten that we have in India the tradition of imparting instruction by oral teaching.

M. K. GANDHI,
President, *Satyagraha Sabha*.
D. D. SATHYE,
UMAR SOBhani,
SHANKERLAL GHELABHAI,
Secretaries.

Notes of the day.

The beginning of the struggle.—The *Satyagraha Sabha* has announced that, for the time being, laws regarding prohibited literature and registration of newspapers may be civilly disobeyed. Those who realise the purpose of the movement will easily see that the first acts of disobedience relate to laws and orders which have been regarded as unjust and discreditable by the entire community. The four pamphlets selected happen to be under official interdict but those who know the works will have no doubt as to their moral value and their title to free dissemination. The breach of orders touching them

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[Continued.]

is deliberately to be executed by *Satyagrahis* who believe the orders to be, in the words of Mr. Gandhi, in violation of the national conscience. The books deserve to be in free circulation, and therefore the prohibition is wrong and has no business to exist. The statement issued by the *Sabha* contains the most lucid instructions for individual conduct and they are in absolute adherence to the vow on which it is based.

Education for the people.—Regarding the second series of disobedience, they relate to Press Act which is admittedly a dangerous engine of oppression in the public life of this country. The country has been absolutely unanimous in the condemnation of the Act and its pernicious influence, and there has been strong and legitimate resentment against the authority of the executive to strangle publications at pleasure. Now it is going to be challenged. *Satyagrahis* who court the penalties of the laws welcome them and are prepared to endure them without private grievances. Apart from the main object of removing tyrannous laws, the breach of laws by the *Satyagrahis* is so directed as to constitute an education for the people, "showing them a clear way out of the difficulties that lie in the path of honest men desiring to do public work."

APPENDIX XIV.

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE'S REPORT ON RIOTS OF APRIL 11TH.

No. 02198/P.—528, Bombay, 19th April 1919, from F. C. Griffith, Esq., Acting Commissioner of Police, Bombay, to the Secretary to Government, Special Department, Bombay.

SIR,

I have the honour to report on the rioting in Bombay on Friday 11th April.

1. I enclose the head office diary and the C. I. D. diaries connected with the events of Friday 11th April giving the detailed reports of passing events as they were received on the telephone.

2. I add the following remarks on the salient features of the rioting, the events which immediately preceded it.

3. I shall not here discuss the general aspects of the violent agitation which has been going on for some years in the press and on the platform in

innumerable articles and speeches designed to bring Government into hatred and contempt. They have been reported to Government from week to week. It is necessary however to refer to the gradual approach to the present point of culmination in the *Satyagraha* movement, in which the *Bombay Chronicle* as an organ and its editor Horniman as an individual have played leading parts. After the spectacular success of the demonstration

Sunday, April 6th.

tion of Black Sunday (April 6th) reported last week the leaders of the movement decided as Gandhi's speeches had foretold, they had shown their power sufficiently, and that their *Satyagraha* had penetrated the masses sufficiently for them to proceed to the next step, the open violation of laws. To understand the real nature of this movement, of which

The *Satyagraha* movement and its leaders.

head, it is necessary to study in detail the characters and speeches of the men who have come to the surface in connection with it, as well as the large political movements which have preceded it both in Bombay and elsewhere in India. Speaking generally it may be said, that Gandhi, Jamnadas Dwarkadas, Umar Sobhani, Horniman and the rest of the *Satyagraha* leaders are either agitators pure and simple or men of no weight. There is no one with any pretensions to statesmanship among them.

4. I enclose reports on recent speeches at meetings held in Bombay on the 4th, 5th and 6th at which Gandhi was present.

On the 4th was a meeting of mill-hands near the Elphinstone mill (mentioned in the meeting on the 4th last week's letter, paragraph XV April).

(4) at which Raut, a jobber, Gandhi, Mrs. Naidu, Horniman and Dr. Savarkar were the speakers. The meeting was clearly designed to spread the movement among the mill-hands; and, though the speakers were more guarded in their remarks than they have sometimes been and though Gandhi told the mill-hands not to come out on Sunday unless they could obtain leave from their masters, there is nothing to refute that (Gandhi told me at an interview on the 11th that he had no intention of bringing the mill-hands into the movement "probably for many a long day"). In his speech on this occasion Gandhi made it clear that he desired the mill-hands to stop work on Sunday the 6th and that he hoped that the result of Sunday would be to secure strength to break the laws.

5. The keynote of Mrs. Naidu's speech is "We are all poor people earning a few annas a day. We do not understand politics. We understand what we mean by our honour. In fighting the Rowlatt Bills we are fighting for our honour (izzat)." She told the mill-hands that the Rowlatt Act trampled under foot their right of independence, and that by passing it Government made them slaves.

6. Savarkar's speech is distinctly inciting.

7. On the 5th Gandhi spoke at a meeting of the residents of Dana Bunder at Baroda Street, Wari Bunder, Bombay. He said that *Satyagraha*, a new principle in politics aims at reaching the goal and admits of no acceptance of anything less. (He did not make it clear what the goal was but he said "we have resolved to fight for our goal on the strength of truth even until we are overpowered by death. We shall die but we shall fight for our goal.")

8. He remarked on discussions which had up to then prevailed and said that from the next day (Sunday) a new policy would be adopted. He evidently referred to the plan for the Hindu-Muslim fraternalism in the Sonapur Masjid. He said that Sunday was a preparation for breaking laws—"any laws we like and in such manner as we think fit," and "The Rowlatt Act is a wrong one..... we propose to break it." No disorder must take place. At Delhi the mistake of using force was made. However Delhi acquitted herself well and would be immortalised in history. Munshi Ram and Ajmal Khan displayed *bahaduri*.

N.B.—It is important to note that this speech was not reported in the *Chronicle*.

9. On the 6th at the morning meeting at Chowpatti, Gandhi was the only speaker.

The following three points are important:—

- (1) He gives reason for not taking *Swadeshi* vow on that day in that place as being that it is not advisable to have two irons in the fire.
- (2) He attacks the authorities over the rioting at Delhi and says "the more heartless the authorities the more welcome as *Satyagrahis* have resolved to die for truth."
- (3) He says no laws to be broken that Sunday as the people were not trained sufficiently.

10. The question is what reasons induced Gandhi to postpone the *Swadeshi* vow. It would undoubtedly have been dangerous to his purpose as being likely to lead to an outbreak of racial feeling. His main purpose was to secure an effect by interfering with public life to the greatest possible extent on that without causing disorder which would lead to action by the authorities before the movement had had time to grow. It is for a similar reason that a Sunday was chosen; it was the day for the maximum of effect with the minimum risk of friction.

[Continued.]

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11. There are reasons for supposing that bringing of the *Swadeshi* phase of the movement into prominence has been forced on Gandhi and the leaders by the extreme element before they are prepared to do so (compare the report on Khaparde's interview in my weekly letter dated 24th March 1919 and the fact that the *Swadeshi* vow has been published in the *Hindusthan* and not in the *Chronicle* till a much later date).

12. The next meeting of importance was that at the Sonapur Masjid which was followed by rowdiness and the holding up of tram cars as mentioned last week (paragraph XV 5 (2)). The real facts of this meeting have not been fully ascertained yet. But it is beyond dispute that the speeches, particularly that of Mrs. Naidu, were very exciting. It is said that her reference to the martyrdom especially of Imam Hussain brought tears to the eyes of some among her audience, and this from the lips of a woman and a Hindu. There was no direct incitement to violence no outspoken directions to take definite action. On the other hand the usual cautions not to use violence were not given. This fact is more than significant.

13. At the meeting at French bridge on the evening of the 6th Jinnah, Sir Dinshaw Petit, Natrajan and Baptista were the speakers.

Their speeches were more in the nature of constitutional politics than those of any other meeting of this campaign.

Mr. John Scurr, who was present, is mentioned by Baptista as a "Stalwart of the Labour Party." He is an official of the British Auxiliary of the Home Rule for India League.

14. Sunday's success was immediately followed by the publication of "proscribed" literature and the publication of an unregistered newspaper.

The next step: The breaking of laws. Gandhi sent me a copy of the paper and Umar Sobhani and Mrs. Naidu called at my bungalow in my absence with copies of *Hind Swaraj*. Unfortunately neither of these moves brought their authors within the four corners of the law, and no action has therefore been taken by the police. Reprints of the four pamphlets have been sold during the week on the streets of Bombay. The opinion spread rapidly that Gandhi was openly breaking the law and that Government was powerless to deal with him. The *Bombay Chronicle*, the "*Satyagraha* organ," made it clear that the breaking of the Press Act was only a preliminary to serve as training for breaking other laws. It was clear to everyone that eventually if the movement progressed as it had commenced the *Satyagrahis* hoped to increase their following as they widened the circle of laws which it was their pleasure to break, until they were in a position to paralyse the whole administration. Moderate and loyal Indians began to show signs of general alarm. More than one implored the authorities to take action.

15. Gandhi left Bombay for Delhi on the 8th (Tuesday).

16. On the 9th April he issued a message in connection with the vow of "*Swadeshi*" in the *Hindusthan* newspaper to the following effect:—

Although the people were very eager to take the *Swadeshi* vow, he felt that they had not fully grasped the difficulties that lay in the way of the observance of that vow. To take the vow in respect of all articles was an impossibility. He was of opinion that the *Swadeshi* vow could safely be taken in respect of cotton, silk and woollen clothes of daily wear. To observe successfully this vow to this limited extent would entail various hardships. The people had committed a grave sin by encouraging the use of foreign clothes. There would be hardly any difficulty about the supply of cloth made in the country. Honesty and abstinence were essential qualities for the observance of the vow. It was also necessary to burn all foreign cloths and to observe the *Swadeshi* vow suggested by him, to purify

the people from the grave sin committed by them in using foreign cloth. They should also understand the difference between "*Swadeshi*" and "*Boycott*." The former was a religious aspiration and the natural duty of every individual while the latter was a sort of punishment and a malicious aspiration. "*Boycott*" would bring harm to the public. The *Satyagrahis* should not take part in the movement. According to him the limited *Swadeshi* vow could be properly taken as under:—

"In the name of God, from this day I will make use of cloth made of cotton, silk or wool of India for my purpose. I will abstain from using foreign cloth and I take a vow that I will burn to ashes all the foreign clothes that I have."

He hoped that many men and women would try to keep this vow. There should be no haste in taking it. His earnest desire was to see the foundation of *Swadeshi* deeply rooted. He was of opinion that such movements could easily be pushed when the *Satyagraha* movement was in full swing.

It is to be noted that this vow was not published or mentioned in the *Chronicle*.

17. On the 10th the *Bombay Chronicle* published a special supplement announcing Gandhi's arrest: The effect of the news. *Satyagrahis* immediately went through the streets calling upon people to shut their shops. Muhammadans were seen taking part in this movement. The cloth merchants of the Mulji Jetha market met to arrange for the closing of shops. The Colaba Cotton bazar closed. It was proposed to close the Share Bazar for 8 days and to raise subscriptions for the employees during that period. The value of certain shares such as the Simplex mill fell immediately.

18. About 10 p.m. crowds collected near Pydhownie and commenced to interfere with tram cars. They were dispersed by the police without any difficulty.

19. On Friday morning there were unmistakable signs of trouble brewing. Shops were closed and crowds were seen loitering about in the neighbourhood of Pydhownie, Bhuleshwar and Abdul Rahman Street.

20. By 10 a.m. reports had been received that trams were being stoned and passengers forced to alight on Kalbadevi Road and at Bhuleshwar Road and that shops which were kept open were being stoned at Maharbourie. The local police were able to deal with the situation until 11-30 a.m., when things became critical. I sent Mr. Sharp out to reinforce the police at Pydhownie with 25 armed police, and ordered out a posse of the mounted police. I also asked the General Officer Commanding to establish a military reserve at headquarters and to order a squadron of cavalry to come down Parel Road and Frere Road from their camps at the race-course. Meanwhile reports had come in to the effect that trams were being stoned and labour carts overturned on Frere Road. I despatched 25 armed police to that area under a European officer who were able, without much difficulty, to restore order.

21. Mr. Sharp, however, reported from Pydhownie that the temper of the crowds in that locality was extremely bad and that they were getting out of hand. The mounted police were compelled to charge on four or five occasions, but the effect of this manoeuvre was very transitory and the crowds returned to the charge with redoubled fury. On receipt of this information I proceeded to Pydhownie with two platoons of Indian infantry while two platoons marched up Abdul Rahman Street to the same point. The focus of the disturbance gradually moved from Pydhownie down Abdul Rahman Street and finally remained at the junction of Abdul Rahman Street and Nagdevi Street.

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[Continued.]

At this point the mob was extremely rowdy. Large boulders were repeatedly placed on the tram lines and the cars were heavily stoned. An attempt had previously been made to overturn the lorry in which the armed police reinforcements were proceeding to Pydhownie by flinging a heavy wooden sleeper in front of the lorry, and this manoeuvre was over and over again repeated with a view to derailing tram cars. The mob steadfastly refused to obey the orders of the magistrates to disperse, but contented themselves with retreating to a safe distance whence they could stone the police with impunity. The mounted police made a few more charges, but the result was very evanescent. Matters culminated at about 3 p.m. when the stoning became very violent. Vigorous baton charges by the unarmed police, who effected a number of arrests, afforded some temporary relief, but it was clear that the mob was growing in numbers and becoming more violent. I therefore asked that cavalry patrols should be sent out in the hope that the crowds would be forced into movement.

22. There had been ample grounds to justify the use of firearms at many stages during the riot, but I was anxious to delay taking this extreme step to the utmost limit in the hope that news of Gandhi's return to Bombay and of his release from custody would have a calming effect. This news was being bandied about from 2 p.m. but at first it was not credited.

23. At about 2-30 p.m. Umar Sobhani appeared in Abdul Rahman Street in his motor. His arrival was the signal for a great demonstration. He asked my permission to announce to the crowds that Gandhi was in Bombay, a free man, and that he would address a public meeting at Chowpatti that evening. I gave permission for the proposed meeting and Umar Sobhani announced the fact from the running board of his car. There was at once a general cry "to Chowpatti," but few moved. At this juncture the cavalry patrol arrived. Their appearance was a signal for a fresh outburst of stone-throwing and a number of troopers were hit. The cavalry continued to patrol the streets for some two hours and were on occasions compelled to charge the mob particularly when they were belabouring a British officer and two troopers who had been unhorsed. Shortly after this incident Gandhi himself appeared at Pydhownie in a motor car. His attempt to control the crowd was futile and his appearance had little or no effect on their rowdiness. He announced that he was shortly to address a gathering at Chowpatti and left Pydhownie for Abdul Rahman Street. A cordon of armed police had, earlier in the day, been drawn up across the road at this point with orders to permit no one to enter Abdul Rahman Street. When Gandhi was held up, the crowd were extremely angry and the police officer in charge of the armed police, seeing the road clear and the cavalry in possession, used his discretion and allowed him to pass. When the cavalry saw the excited crowd coming down they assumed that the police had been overwhelmed and charged the crowd. Gandhi escaped from his motor into a neighbouring house and the crowd was at this moment in a state of frenzy. They were dancing along with Gandhi's car, waving their arms and shouting with all the appearance of fanatics. From this point, the disturbance gradually lessened in intensity until about 5 p.m. when conditions became more or less normal in this locality.

24. At 5-15 p.m. reports were received that the crowd was attacking tram cars on Girgaum and Charni Roads. Police reinforcements were despatched from the local reserve and order was quickly restored, 4 arrests being made. After this episode the tramway company withdrew their cars to the sheds, where military guards were posted.

25. Meanwhile reports showed that a crowd of enormous proportions was assembling on Chowpatti sands and was eagerly awaiting Gandhi's arrival. Adequate military arrangements were made in the locality to deal with any development that might arise, but there was no display of force beyond the customary police arrangements for regulating heavy traffic of such a nature. The meeting passed off without incident, Gandhi being the only speaker. The crowd was on the whole very orderly. A large proportion were mere sight-seers, hundreds of whom streamed away to the city after seeing Gandhi's arrival without waiting for the actual meeting.

26. After the cavalry charged the mob at Pydhownie Gandhi came to see me at my headquarters and complained that the charge was unprovoked and had embittered the situation. The facts were, as I explained to him, that the cavalry had been very heavily stoned, had shown great forbearance and had finally charged when they might have used firearms. Gandhi then proceeded to discuss the general situation with me. He would not admit that he had been convinced that his *Satyagraha* "experiment" was a failure in view of the behaviour of the crowds in Bombay. I then told him of what had happened at Amritsar and he was genuinely upset when I convinced him that his movement had degenerated into a bitter racial feud accompanied by arson and murder. Jamnadas, who was with him, was also visibly perturbed at the news. I extracted from Gandhi a promise that he would not, in view of the serious consequences of his propaganda, do anything to induce the mill-hands to join and, further, a promise that he would see that his agents did not make any attempt to stir up unrest in that quarter. Gandhi said that he would have to reconsider his position in view of what he had seen and heard and announced his intention of proceeding to Ahmedabad in order to see whether he could be of any assistance in restoring order.

It is interesting to note that while Gandhi has regularly adopted the pose of the interesting invalid when addressing meetings, the officer in command of the armed police reports that he showed wonderful agility and nimbleness in escaping from his car when the cavalry were charging.

27. One outstanding feature of the rioting is that Hindus and Muhammadans combined to attack the police and the troops with showers of stones. There is no doubt that the Muhammadans were deliberately incited by the Hindus who, I am convinced from information obtained from various sources, spread the report that the Rowlett Bills were intended to enable Government to coerce the Muhammadans and prevent them from giving trouble so as to facilitate the dismemberment of Turkey. That shouts of *Hindu Musalman ki jai* were repeatedly raised by the crowd, is not without special significance.

The total number of rioters arrested was 40, of whom 28 were Hindus, 11 Muhammadans and 1 Christian. Three police constables were severely injured and went to hospital. Many were slightly hurt by stones.

The squadron of cavalry suffered 16 casualties, of whom 4 were severely injured and went to hospital. It is greatly to their credit that they contented themselves with charging the mob instead of firing on them.

An appreciable amount of damage was done to a number of tram cars.

I would bring to the favourable notice of Government the conduct of the police of all ranks at Pydhownie. Both Officers and men had an extremely trying day and their tact, patience and forbearance is deserving of all praise. The unarmed police displayed courage in a marked degree and repeatedly attacked with the baton angry crowds who outnumbered them many times over. The mounted police were, as usual, invaluable, while the armed police displayed an excellent sense of discipline in the forbearance they exercised while being heavily

[Continued.]

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stoned. The burden of responsibility fell mainly upon Mr. Sharp and I cannot speak too highly of the manner in which he acquitted himself. From all accounts Mr. Sharp had ample justification for firing on the crowd on repeated occasions before my arrival at Pydhownie and the fact that he succeeded in dealing with the situation without taking this extreme step redounds greatly to his credit.

Annexure to Commissioner of Police's report on the riots of April 11th.

C. I. D. DIARY.

11th April 1919.

11-40 a.m.—Reports that a disturbance took place at Pydhownie a short time back. Informed that Superintendent and Deputy Commissioner of Police are not in office.

11-50 a.m.—Reports that all is well at Khetwadi, Chota Sonapur and Play House.

11-55 a.m.—Reports that at Mandvi and Princes Dock people have gathered and are trying to compel other people to close their shops, etc.

12 noon.—Reports that all shops in Bhendi Bazar are closed. The people are trying their utmost to compel the men from tram cars to get down.

12 noon.—Reports that at Carnac Road and Frere Road the crowd is enormous and they are stopping every cart. They stop the carts and untie the bullocks. They are also throwing out of the cart its contents.

12-10 p.m.—Reports that at Grant Road-side all shops are closed.

12-20 p.m.—Reports that at Nagpada, Madanpura and Play House all shops are closed.

1 p.m.—Reports that at 12-45 Sub-Inspector Ratyarkhan saw the Nazir Mr. Khatkate of the *Jama Masjid* and asked him whether any meeting was to be held in the *Masjid* to-day or any other day, when Mr. Khatkate informed him that he does not know of any meeting and said that he will inform the people who attend the *Juma* prayers if requested by anybody about holding any meeting that the question will be considered when Gandhi returns to Bombay.

1-10 p.m.—Reports that at Dongri and Bhat Bazar some Bania boys are obstructing all the *khataras* passing by that way and they throw the contents of the *khataras* on the road.

1-30 p.m.—Reports that leaflets containing Gujarati verses on the Hindu and Muhammadan unity and the Rowlatt Bills are sold and distributed. Notices of this evening meetings at French bridge and Shantaram's *Chawl* are freely circulated. A part of '*Hind Swaraj*' by Mahatma Gandhi in English are being sold. Various reports coming to the effect that stones were thrown at Pydhownie on tram cars, bullock carts, motor cars and public conveyances. Information also comes in of the assault on Mr. Sharp, K. B. M. H. produces a leaflet in Urdu under the signature of Umar Sobhani, giving the news of the arrest of Gandhi and his message strengthening the unity between the Hindus and Muhammadans.

1-50 p.m.—Reports that all the mills in "E" Division are working after recess hours, except the two, viz., Bombay Cotton and Western India mills, which are not working from morning.

1-50 p.m.—Reports that all is well.

1-50 p.m.—Reports that the mill-hands have returned to their work after recess hour.

1-50 p.m.—Reports that everything is quiet. The mill-hands have returned to work after tiffin.

2 p.m.—Reports that the *Jama Masjid* prayers went off alright. Several Hindus came there to enquire whether there was any meeting in the mosque. They were told that there was no meeting except prayers. So the Hindus went away. A motor car with a European in it was stopped by the crowd at Rangari *Mohalla*. The

European took out his revolver and pointed at the crowd. The crowd got excited and began throwing stones. The motor car went away. The European is said to have been injured by stones. The number of the car could not be taken.

2-15 p.m.—Reports that the examination *pandal* at Ahmedabad has been burnt down.

2-30 p.m.—Reports that Narsoo, otherwise called Kaisar-i-Hind mill, closed at 12-30.

2-50 p.m.—Reports that majority of shops at Holi Chakla and Bazar Gate are closed. It is rumoured that Gandhi is arriving at the Colaba station shortly, hence the police arrangement. It is also rumoured in Bazar Gate that there has been a collusion between the police and the crowd at the market.

3 p.m.—Reports that Mr. Gandhi has left the place in a motor car No. 2873 followed by six other motor cars for a round in the city, in order to show the people that he has come down to Bombay and that they should not be anxious about him.

3-20 p.m.—Reports that lot of stone-throwing is going on in Abdul Rahman Street and I am hurt on the left leg.

3-20 p.m.—Gandhi, accompanied by Jamnadas, arrived in head office at about 3-15 p.m. and left at about 4-30 towards the Fort side.

4-50 p.m.—Reports that at Arthur Bundar near cotton bales, there is a hand-written placard asking the men not to come to work.

5 p.m.—Reports that the mass meeting which was to be held at French bridge, will be held now on the Chowpatti sand, and people are directed to go to Chowpatti instead of at French bridge.

5-10 p.m.—Reports that near Play House there is some disturbance and people are dragging out passengers from tram cars.

5-45 p.m.—Reports that at about 2-30 p.m. some tram cars were coming along the Abdul Rahman Street. They were held up by the crowd and the crowd began to throw stones on the cars. Some glasses were broken and some pieces are lying on the road. These tram cars were removed with the assistance of the military. This line is closed and some people (*navalis*) are gathered and are trying to stop every car that is passing by that road.

6 p.m.—Reports that at Pydhownie, Gandhi tried to pacify the people. Jamnadas was with him. But the crowd was not disposed to hear him. In spite of his admonition not to throw stones or to create disturbance, the stone-throwing is still continuing. The stones are also coming from the houses situated on the Abdul Rahman Street. On the whole, the spirit of the people is bitter and the crowd is extremely out of hand. They hear nobody and indiscriminately throw stones. Europeans passing in motor cars are specially selected for stones. At about 4 p.m. a Hindu with broken leg was brought to the Pydhownie police station. Little after his admission at the police station, Banker and Umar Sobhani came to the station and wanted to see him. They could not see him because he was removed to the J. J. Hospital. Troopers as well as lancers were also stoned. Those who fell from the horses were badly beaten by the crowd. Two such injured persons were brought to the Pydhownie police station and sent to the hospital. Mrs. Naidu came at the Pydhownie junction and was enquiring whether everything was quiet. Special edition of the *Bombay Chronicle* and other Gujarati daily papers were issued at 3-30 p.m. announcing Gandhi's release. It should be noted that the stoning increased after Gandhi was released and after he left Pydhownie junction to proceed to market through Abdul Rahman Street. At about 5 p.m. I left Pydhownie with K.B.H.M., Barodia, K.S.O. and Schiff and went through Bhendi Bazar, Null Bazar, Grant Road, Lamington Road, Queen's Road and came to market. At Grant Road we saw a crowd obstructing tram cars and passing motor cars. Our car was stoned. Another thing to be noted is that Muhammadan and Bhori boys formed the large number of crowd and took a mischievous part.

CITY OF BOMBAY.

[Continued.]

6-10 p.m.—Reports that the Muhammadans and Hindus of the Khatao Makanji mill left the mill at 12-30 and 1-30 respectively. Consequently the mill is closed.

7-25 p.m.—Reports that the mill-hands are going home. Everything is quiet.

7-45 p.m.—Reports that small shops in the locality of Mandvi, Masjid Bandar, Dongri and Bhat Bazar are now open. Everything is quiet.

9-10 p.m.—Reports that at about 9 p.m. some people came from Masjid Bunder side shouting "*Hindu Musalman ki jai*" and went towards Mandvi.

10-10 p.m.—Reports that some 200 men came from the Mandvi side, with one board written in Gujarati (inscription not known) and went towards the Chinch Bunder side, shouting "*Gandhi Maharaj ki jai*" and "*Hindu-Musalman ki jai*."

APPENDIX XV.

ORDER DEPORTING MR. HORNIMAN.

Order.

To

MR. BENJAMIN GUY, HORNIMAN,

Residing at Worli, Bombay.

WHEREAS in the opinion of Governor of Bombay in Council there are reasonable grounds for believing that you have acted, are acting and are about to act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety;

AND WHEREAS the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council has been obtained to the order firstly herein contained;

NOW THEREFORE the Governor of Bombay in Council in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by Rule 3 of the Defence of India (Consolidation) Rules, 1915, by this order directs—

1. That you shall remove yourself from British India by the steamer *Takada* or by such other steamer bound for England as may hereafter be designated to you by the Governor of Bombay in Council.

2. That pending your removing yourself from British India you shall not receive visits from or directly or indirectly communicate with or receive any communication from any person or persons who may not at the time this order is served upon you be residing in the bungalow in which you now reside or the outhouses attached thereto save upon the following terms and conditions, viz. :—

That you shall be permitted to despatch or receive written communications subject to prior censorship by the Commissioner of Police, Bombay.

3. That should it appear to Lieutenant-Colonel Ashton Street and Lieutenant-Colonel Ernest Frederick Gordon-Tucker that it would be dangerous to your health for you to undertake a voyage forthwith you shall, until such time as you can without such danger undertake the same, reside and remain in the station hospital, Colaba.

4. That pending such time as you may be in the station hospital, Colaba, you shall not receive visits from or

directly or indirectly communicate with or receive any communication from any person or persons save upon the following terms and conditions, viz. :—

(a) That you shall be permitted to despatch or receive written communications subject to prior censorship by the Officer Commanding that said hospital; and

(b) That you shall be permitted to receive visits from and communicate verbally with your medical advisers, provided such visits and communications take place in the presence of the Officer Commanding the said hospital or such other medical officer as he may depute.

5. That should it appear to Lieutenant-Colonel Ashton Street and Lieutenant-Colonel Ernest Frederick Gordon-Tucker that it would be dangerous to your health for you to leave the said bungalow you shall, until such time as you can without such danger either undertake a voyage or proceed to the said hospital, reside and remain in the same bungalow.

6. That pending such time as you may be in the said bungalow you shall not receive visits from or directly or indirectly communicate with or receive any communication from any person or persons who may not at the time this order is served upon you be residing in the same bungalow or the outhouses attached thereto, save upon the following terms and conditions, viz. :—

(a) That you shall be permitted to despatch or receive written communications subject to prior censorship by the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, and

(b) That you shall be permitted to receive visits from and communicate verbally with your medical advisers provided that such visits and communications take place in the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel Ashton Street and Lieutenant-Colonel Ernest Frederick Gordon-Tucker or either of them.

Dated this 26th day of April 1919.

By Order of His Excellency the Honourable the Governor of Bombay in Council

J. CRERAR,

Secretary to the Government of Bombay,
Judicial Department.

Triplicate copy endorsed.

Endorsed by authority of the Governor of Bombay in Council to Mr. Francis Charles Griffith, Commissioner of Police, Bombay, under the provisions of Rule 4 (a) of the Defence of India (Consolidation) Rules, 1915, to enforce compliance with the same.

J. CRERAR,

Secretary to the Government of Bombay,
Judicial Department.

Bombay, dated this 26th day of April 1919.

Mr. F. E. SHARP.—Mr. J. WALKER.—Mr. A. H. S. ASTON.

Written statements of Witnesses, Bombay City.

Mr. F. E. Sharp, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bombay.

I received verbal information at about midnight on the 10th of April of the Punjab disturbances at Amritsar and Lahore and I was told to proceed at once to the head police office. There I met the Commissioner of Police. All Superintendents too were immediately warned of the Punjab disturbances and told to be ready for any emergency. A company of armed police was turned out and stood till 3 A.M. There being then no signs of any disturbance in the city we turned in for the night. I returned to head office early the following morning and at 10 A.M. messages were received by telephone that there were signs of disorder in the Pydhownie and Bhuleshwar regions. At 10-30 A.M. I was ordered by the Commissioner to proceed with a force of armed police of Pydhownie in answer to a call of assistance from that police station. I arrived there at about 11 A.M. in a motor lorry with the armed police. Just before reaching Pydhownie an attempt was made to overturn

the lorry by throwing a beam under the front wheels; the lorry however was not overturned but was brought to a standstill. Huge crowds were collected in this area and stone-throwing was rife. Being the senior police officer present I was responsible for the measures taken to check this rioting. These measures consisted mainly of charges by the foot and mounted police and effecting as many arrests as possible. Rioting continued intermittently from 11 A.M. to 3 P.M. and considerable damage was done to property—especially to the trams of the Bombay Electric Supply and Tramways Company, Limited. The military were called out at about 2 P.M. to assist the civil police. I had previously telephoned to the Commissioner that the situation was getting out of hand and that it would be advisable for him to come in person to the scene of rioting and bring a military force with him. He did so and met me near Pydhownie at about 2 P.M. when we assumed charge of the situation.

Mr. J. WALKER, Superintendent of the Bombay City Police Force.

10th April 1919.

I am a Superintendent of the Bombay City Police Force and in charge of the "B" Division.

At about 10-30 P.M. on the 10th April last, I received information that tram cars were being stopped on the Kalbadevi Road and also at Pydhownie, and that passengers were being forced to alight by a crowd of townspeople. I immediately proceeded to the scene and found that tram cars were being held up and passengers forced to alight by a crowd of people consisting mostly of Hindus. The crowds were ordered to desist from obstructing the tram cars and to disperse, which they eventually did. Endeavours were made to keep the crowds on the move. No arrests were made.

11th April 1919.

At about 10 A.M. on the 11th April last, crowds again collected on Kalbadevi Road and Pydhownie where tram cars were being held up and passengers forced to alight. This was carried out to such an extent that the police were unable to cope with the situation and military arrived at Pydhownie at about 11-30 A.M. By this time crowds had collected on Abdul Rahman Street and the

bye-lanes. Here the tram traffic was completely dislocated, as the crowds placed wooden sleepers across the tram lines. This was followed up by stone-throwing. Several charges were made by the police and arrests were made. At about 3 P.M. Mr. Gandhi arrived with some of his followers in motor cars and tried to persuade the crowds to go to Chowpatti, where a meeting was to be held. This appeal, however, did not appear to meet with approval by the crowds, who remained where they were for a considerable time after Gandhi had gone. I have had experience of four serious riots in Bombay when it was necessary to call in military aid. In each of these riots the troops or police or both fired and lives were lost.

In the riots in 1919 the demeanour of the crowds struck me as being as bad as it had been in the previous occasions in my experience and I thought on more than one occasion that firing was inevitable. At about 3 P.M., accompanied by two European officers, I tried to go from Shaikh Memon Street to Abdul Rahman Street and thence south to Nagdevi Street, but we were so heavily stoned that we were unable to proceed.

The rioting ceased at about 4 P.M. but it was some time before the crowds dispersed.

Mr. A. H. S. ASTON, Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay.

On April 11th I accompanied the Commissioner of Police to Pydhownie in a motor lorry containing Indian troops. There were crowds at Pydhownie.

We proceeded on foot down Abdul Rahman Street. Abdul Rahman Street has Nagdevi Street on one side of it and Shaikh Memon Street on the other more or less parallel to it and these roads are intersected by three or more streets at right angles.

I saw groups loitering about and told them through my Court Interpreter to disperse. Once or twice a stone was thrown in our direction from a side street.

Half way down Abdul Rahman Street two or three trams had been brought to a standstill, huge stones had been placed in front of them on the railway lines. These were removed but as soon as our attention was diverted a stone would be furtively replaced on the line.

The police were clearing the road. I saw a man strike

a sepoy with a heavy lathi. He endeavoured to escape but was arrested. Other arrests were also made.

As we were proceeding towards the head police office it was reported that Mr. Gandhi had arrived in Bombay. The news appeared to give great satisfaction to some Hindus on the road. I heard them saying "let us go to Chowpatti."

After waiting for some time near Crawford Market I returned to Pydhownie accompanied by my Court Interpreter and Inspector Dyer.

The trams were in the same position. When we were at a distance, I noticed juveniles and one or two adults throwing stones at them and ringing their bells.

On our return to Pydhownie one or two stones were thrown at us either from the windows of houses or from side streets.

Some pedestrians who accompanied us held up their hands telling the stone throwers to desist.