

REPORT

OF THE

ARMY IN INDIA COMMITTEE,

1919-1920.

TERMS OF REFERENCE.

1. To enquire into and report, with special reference to *post-bellum* conditions, upon the administration and, where necessary, the organization of the Army in India, including its relations with the War Office and the India Office, and the relations of the two Offices to one another.
2. To consider the position of the Commander-in-Chief in his dual capacity as head of the Army and Member of the Executive Council, and to make recommendations.
3. To consider and to report upon any other matters which they may decide are relevant to the enquiry.

[Price one anna.]

REPORT

OF THE

ARMY IN INDIA COMMITTEE, 1919-1920.

TO THE RIGHT HON. E. S. MONTAGU, M. P.

SIR,


In forwarding you the first part of our Report we desire to point out a difficulty with which we are confronted at the outset of our enquiry. We cannot consider the administration of the Army in India otherwise than as part of the total armed forces of the Empire; yet we have no indication of the form of organization which may be set up in the future for the control of other parts of those forces, or of the whole.

We have, it is true, been told that proposals for the higher direction of our Imperial forces are under consideration, and we are aware of the circumstances under which an Imperial Cabinet was formed during the late war. But the bases of permanent Imperial control over the organized forces of the Empire are as yet unalaid, and we have therefore been obliged to take existing statutes and usage as the foundation of the proposals we have made in accordance with the terms of our reference. The remedies which we shall venture to suggest for such defects in the Army in India as may be disclosed in the course of our enquiry will, therefore, be made subject to the limitations we have indicated.

Novel political machinery created by the Peace Treaty has enhanced the importance of the Army of India relatively to the military forces in other parts of the Empire, and more particularly to those of the British Isles. We feel bound to assume that Western Europe will no longer be an armed camp containing national armies in a high state of preparation for war, and we note that conflicts fraught with the gravest consequences to the belligerent nations cannot in future take place within a few days or weeks of an order to mobilize. We realize, and the evidence of Lord Allenby confirms our belief, that the war has left Eastern Europe, and what is commonly known as the near and Middle East, in a condition of grave unrest, with consequences to India, especially as regards her military and financial resources, that we are unable to ignore.

We are aware that, during the war, the necessary co-ordination of the fighting strength of the whole Empire brought into existence what has been called an Imperial Cabinet, performing real functions of Imperial Government, and accepted apparently without demur by the united peoples. The evolution of this novel constitutional instrument is for the moment arrested. If the principle of an Imperial Cabinet composed of the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and the Dominions becomes rooted in our institutions, other changes connected with Imperial defence seem likely to follow.

An Imperial General Staff, an Imperial Naval and an Imperial Air Staff, possibly an Imperial Foreign Office, may become segregated under the leadership of the British Prime Minister of the day, but controlled by a body that from the nature of the case cannot be wholly responsible to the Parliament at Westminster. If India were again to be represented directly in a permanent Imperial Council or Cabinet, such as that summoned *ad hoc* during the war, the position of her Commander-in-Chief might assume a special aspect different from that which we have had to consider. Desirable and perhaps vital as such an evolution of our institutions may be, the



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chances of its accomplishment are not immediate. We have, therefore, accepted for the purpose of our Report the relations of India to Great Britain and to the Empire as they stand to-day.

We desire also to mention that we have been requested, in considering our recommendations, to avoid, if possible, framing them in such a manner as may hereafter prove inconsistent with the gradual approach of India towards a Dominion status; and we observe that the Indian Constitutional Reforms recently proposed have in view the relaxation of the control of the Secretary of State, as well as of Parliament, over the Government of India.

We are at the same time confronted with evidence of the continued reluctance of the India Office to relinquish into the hands of the Government of India greater freedom in the administration of the Army, even in cases where this could be done without compromising the administration of the Army at home or contravening the sound principle of uniformity in military policy. We are strongly of opinion that greater latitude should be allowed to the Governor-General in Council and to the Commander-in-Chief in India in matters affecting internal military administration, in order to secure greater efficiency, and especially the greater contentment of the Army in India.

At the same time, we lay stress upon the importance of maintaining constant and intimate touch between the Commander-in-Chief in India and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London and between their General Staff officers.

Taking, then, existing institutions and the present conditions in India as the basis on which to work, we consider that we shall be laying the foundations of a sound Imperial military system, if the plans we propose are consistent—

- (1) with the control by the Government of India of Indian military affairs;
- (2) with giving to the Government of India a voice in questions of Imperial defence, and
- (3) with allowing the Imperial General Staff through its Chief to exercise a considered influence on the military policy of the Government of India.

Keeping these principles in mind, we propose to submit our Report to you in several parts, and to report on each separately. Part I is forwarded herewith, and deals with matters upon which a great mass of evidence already exists in documents laid before us. We have therefore not thought it necessary to travel once more over ground investigated by numerous committees and commissions, and by eminent Viceroys and Commanders-in-Chief in past years.

We have limited our enquiry upon these matters to obtaining the views of distinguished soldiers of recent war experience, and we have found that their conclusions are in general agreement with the recorded opinions of Lord Lytton and Lord Kitchener.

At the outset of our inquiry it was necessary to decide whether formal evidence should be taken. After consideration, we determined that it was undesirable to add to the mass of documentary evidence already available. We consequently decided to take counsel with high officers, military and civil, and certain independent persons whose views and experience could simplify our task, but not to record their evidence formally. We have thus obtained expressions of opinion given with complete freedom, and, coupled with the experience of the members of the Committee, they have been of great value to us in forming our conclusions.

We desire to remind you that the subsequent parts of our Report, dealing as they are bound to do with matters of administrative detail, would be largely influenced by the decision at which you may arrive to accept or reject the proposals we have made in Part I. So convinced are we of the desirability of obtaining a decision of His Majesty's Government on the principles laid down in Part I before proceeding to the laborious examination

of the numerous questions covered by our reference, that we have thought it imperative to place Part I of our Report in your hands before the Committee proceeds to India. It would facilitate the work of the Committee, and would render their complete report of greater value to His Majesty's Government and to the Government of India, if we could obtain from you at an early date an indication of the advice you are likely to tender to His Majesty's Government upon the principal questions covered by Part I of our Report.

We are,

Sir,

Your obedient Servants,

ESHER.

M. F. O'DWYER.

H. V. COX, LIEUT-GENL.

CLAUD W. JACOB, LIEUT-GENL.

J. P. DUCANE, LIEUT-GENL.

G. FELL.

WEBB GILLMAN, MAJ-GENL.

C. M. WAGSTAFF, BRIG.-GENL.,

Secretary.

The 3rd November 1919.

PART I.

SECTION I.

The India Office.

1. The relations between the India Office and the Government of India are presumably based upon the importance of keeping the control of Parliament as far as possible intact over Indian expenditure. The theory, sound in itself in view of the bureaucratic form of Government in India, has proved to be illusory in practice. The business of Parliament is too great and too complex to enable any effective control to be exercised by the House of Commons over Indian expenditure. In practice, therefore, the control of the India Office has been merely the control of one bureaucracy over another.

The working of this system undoubtedly causes delay in dealing with military questions that frequently require rapid settlement, both in the interests of efficiency and of the contentment of the Army in India. We, therefore, recommend that greater latitude should be allowed to the Governor-General in Council in deciding questions of a military character, provided they do not influence by reflex action the administration of the British Army at home.

2. From 1909, and particularly during the war, the rule was relaxed under which all communications of a military nature between the Commander-in-Chief and the War Office passed through the India Office. During the war the Commander-in-Chief in India communicated direct with the War Office. We consider that this freedom of communication should now be established as a permanent right on a regular official basis; but should be limited to communications between the Commander-in-Chief and the Imperial General Staff. The Secretary of State for India should be kept fully informed of such communications.

3. In order to facilitate what we consider of primary importance, namely the free and intimate relation between the Commander-in-Chief in India and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and in order that the Secretary of State for India should also be fully informed upon all questions of military policy affecting India, we recommend that the Secretary in the Military Department of the India Office should always be an officer with Indian experience, of high military rank, appointed on the recommendation of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff by the Secretary of State for India. It would be convenient and desirable that this officer should be a Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff in order that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff may have the benefit of experienced advice on Indian matters. Furthermore, he should have the right of attending the meetings of the Army Council when questions affecting India are discussed. Although we strongly advocate that questions of administration regarding the Army in India should be mainly settled in India itself, and should only be referred to the India Office under the circumstances which we have previously noted, we are of opinion that the Secretary in the Military Department of the India Office should have attached to his Department two officers specially conversant with "A" and "Q" questions, in so far as they affect India.

4. We are unable to see any advantage, from the point of view of India, in retaining upon the India Council in London the services of an officer of high military rank. It is undesirable that the Secretary of State for India should be left in any doubt as to the quarter from which military advice should be offered him. The principle upon which we think it important to insist is that the sole responsible military adviser of the Secretary of State should be the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. This advice could be tendered either through his Deputy Chief established in the India Office, or directly by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff himself, who should be authorized to attend any meeting of the Council of India at which military questions of first importance are to be discussed.

5. We recommend in Section III that the Commander-in-Chief in India shall be appointed with the concurrence of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and that the Commander-in-Chief shall be the sole military adviser of the

Government of India. If this system can be established, the chain of military responsibility for questions of an Imperial character will be complete. On the one hand, the Commander-in-Chief will look to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff for supreme direction in all questions of Imperial military policy in which India is concerned; and, on the other hand, the Governor-General will look to the Commander-in-Chief for military advice upon questions in which India only is concerned, and also upon questions of a wider military character with confidence that the Commander-in-Chief will be in a position to express upon the latter the considered views of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

6. We believe that, under the plan thus proposed, the Government of India will retain its statutory control over the Army in India, that the Governor-General will be assured of undivided counsel upon military questions, and that uniformity of military policy will at last be established between Great Britain and India.

SECTION II.

Defence Committee.

7. Our attention has been called to the Committee of Defence set up in India by the Governor-General during the war. Its composition and functions follow those of the Committee of Imperial Defence in this country as they were understood to be after it was reconstituted on a new basis in 1902 and before the establishment of its permanent Secretariat in 1905.

That Committee was consultative and not executive. It had no administrative functions. It could not prescribe a policy or give directions. Its duty was to advise. It interfered with no existing authority. It possessed no fixed constitution, and the persons composing it were selected by the Prime Minister from among his colleagues and their technical assistants, with the addition of any person whose advice he might desire to obtain upon the matters about to be discussed. The Committee, in short, contained no *ex-officio* member except the Prime Minister himself, and this flexibility, as Mr. Balfour pointed out at the time, gave it an advantage of first-rate importance in dealing with the manifold subjects that gather round the problem of national defence.

8. Such, we understand, was the body upon which the Governor-General modelled the Defence Committee in India, and we are firmly convinced that, taken in conjunction with the existence of the War Book, which had been prepared in 1914, it contributed valuable assistance towards bringing India into line with Great Britain during the war, and that it should not be allowed to disappear.

We recommend that its Secretary should be a member of the Governor-General's Private Secretariat, and that he should have charge of the records and be responsible for the preparation and upkeep of the War Book.

9. The War Book, designed by Sir Maurice Hankey some years before 1914, was planned with a view to the instant mobilization of all government departments at home on the outbreak of war. For the first time in this country the attention of all Departments of Government was drawn to the fact that war was not the sole business of the Admiralty and the War Office, but that it was the concern of practically every Department of State. The Defence Committee, by its composition and its methods of working, first suggested this somewhat novel conception of modern war, but the War Book stereotyped it and fixed it indelibly in the minds of the whole Civil Service.

The War Book prepared in India in 1914 has been laid before us. It is a work of such value that we strongly recommend that it should be constantly revised and kept up-to-date by the officer we have designated, who will, at the same time, be the Secretary of the Defence Committee.

We would suggest that the Secretary of the Indian Defence Committee should be placed in direct touch with the Secretary of the Imperial Defence Committee in London, so that as far as possible the measures concerted by the latter should be applied by the Governor-General in India, so far as they are appropriate, to local conditions.

SECTION III.

The High Command.

10. The definition of the High Command in India in future requires a few preliminary words of explanation. We have before observed that our attention has been drawn to the importance of keeping in view in any proposals we may make, the gradual approach of the Government of India to a Dominion status. We have also kept before our minds the possibility that, in the near future, Imperial control over the military policy of the Empire may take a form other than that which obtains at the present time, leading to the establishment of a real Imperial General Staff deriving its authority not from the War Office and the British Parliament, but from an Imperial Council such as that contemplated in 1907, which materialized in the course of the late war, in what has been called an Imperial Cabinet.

We have, however, felt ourselves obliged to base the recommendations we are about to make upon existing facts. We are unable to admit any close resemblance between the principles which are applied to army administration in this country, governed as it is under democratic Parliamentary institutions, and the conditions that obtain in India, where the government remains of a bureaucratic character with such Parliamentary checks as are found to be possible. No analogy exists between the Government of India and that of any European country. It appears to us, therefore, that Army administration in India must conform to the principles laid down by the statutes upon which that Government is based, which place the control of the Army in India in the hands of the Governor-General in Council.

11. We have endeavoured to superimpose upon the existing fabric of Indian army administration the general staff idea. In other words, while leaving the control of the Army in India to the Governor-General in Council, we have tried to knit closer the relations between the High Command in India and the High Command as it now exists at the centre of the Empire. We have considered and rejected the proposal to establish in India a Civilian Member of the Executive Council responsible for the Army, and an Army Council with collective responsibilities, as unsuited to Indian requirements at the present time. Among the numerous recommendations that have been made in former years for the reconstitution of the War Department, we have adopted that of Lord Lytton, that the Commander-in-Chief should be himself the only military member of the Viceroy's Council, and we have not thought it conducive to good administration that, upon the Executive Council, the Commander-in-Chief should have any military colleague or competitor entitled to deal with the administration of army affairs.

12. We recommend that in future the Army Department and the Headquarters Staff should be consolidated under one head, and with a single Secretariat, which is not at present the case, and that the Commander-in-Chief should be in that capacity considered to be the administrative, as well as the executive head of the Army, subject only to the Governor-General in Council, in whom the supreme control of the Army is vested by statute. Every trace of the duality of functions resulting from the same officer being Commander-in-Chief and Member-in-Charge of the Army Department should be swept away.

13. We are of opinion that the financial responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief should not be divorced from his executive responsibilities, and that while his purely military status should be in no way affected, it should be recognized that he possesses a personal and professional interest in and responsibility for the economical administration of Army funds. We are in agreement with the view that the Commander-in-Chief should be looked upon by all His Majesty's Indian subjects and feudatories in India as the depository and representative of a personal authority, second only to that of the Viceroy, and we are strongly of opinion that any change in the position of the Commander-in-Chief which would have the effect of weakening that authority, is inadvisable.

14. We propose that a Military Council should be established, composed of high staff officers and others to assist the Commander-in-Chief in the performance of his administrative functions. This body would have no collective responsibility. Its members, however, would be individually responsible for the branches they would be called upon to administer.

15. We hold the position of the Secretary to Government in the Army Department, as it is generally understood, to be inconvenient and undesirable, as rendering possible an interference with the sole right of the Commander-in-Chief to offer military advice to the Governor-General in Council.

16. We propose to deal in Part II of our Report with the personnel of the Military Council and their respective functions, responsibilities and powers.

17. We are in agreement with the General Staff view that the Commander-in-Chief in India should be more directly in touch with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, with a view to obtaining increased efficiency as regards the organization, equipment and training of the Army in India, so as to develop the military resources of India in a manner suited to Imperial necessities. We have already stated that, in our view, the Commander-in-Chief in India should have the established right to communicate in peace with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London with regard to strategical plans, war organization, training and the selection for commands and senior staff appointments. But we are not prepared to dogmatise as to whether the Government of India or the Imperial Government at Whitehall is to be responsible for the military safety of India. It is obvious that, if the gradual approach of India to a Dominion status is to be taken as an axiom, this question can be resolved only by the exercise of judgment, tact, and the principle of "give and take." We, however, are strongly of opinion that while unity of administration is for the present out of the question, unity of conception on broad lines of military policy, such as those for which an Imperial General Staff should be responsible, is essential in the interests of India herself and of the Empire as a whole. For this reason we suggest that the Commander-in-Chief in India should be appointed by His Majesty's Government on the recommendation of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and that the same procedure should be observed in the appointment of the Chief of the General Staff in India. Should this recommendation be approved, given a close co-operation and correspondence between the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief in India, we believe that as much will have been done towards securing unity of military purpose as can be profitably accomplished at the present time.

18. We have said that, in our opinion, the Commander-in-Chief should be the sole military adviser of the Government of India. So important a function carries with it a necessity that the Commander-in-Chief shall be in the closest relation to the Governor-General in Council during the progress of hostilities and at all moments in peace when military questions of the first importance come under discussion. At the same time, we cannot disregard the importance of personal inspection from time to time of the larger army formations by the Commander-in-Chief himself. During his absence from headquarters under peace conditions, we therefore recommend that he should delegate to his Chief of the General Staff such functions as he thinks may be properly exercised by that officer during his absence. We do not contemplate that under any circumstances the Commander-in-Chief should himself take the field in war. In our view the command of military operations, whether on a large or small scale, should always be entrusted to an officer specially selected for that purpose. We are too well aware of the inconvenience and danger created in 1914 by stripping the War Office of its most experienced advisers and administrators, to desire to see a repetition in India of so unfortunate an incident. To the personal influence of the recognized head of the Army of India, especially over Indian troops, we have already alluded, and while we are anxious that it should not be supposed that we depreciate the value of his making himself thoroughly acquainted with the sentiments and requirements of officers and troops in all parts of India, we desire to make

clear that, during moments of tension, it would not be consistent with the efficient discharge of his highest duties to absent himself from the Council table of the Governor-General.

19. We are convinced that the Commander-in-Chief, as being an "extraordinary" Member of Council, could be relieved of considerable technical responsibility. There appears to us no sound and valid reason why his signature should be obtained to despatches from the Government of India upon questions which have no military significance or importance, or that he should be required to study and record his opinion on cases which relate exclusively to the civil administration. We are sure that a liberal interpretation of the necessities of Indian administration would lead to an appreciable reduction of his duties. We, therefore, recommend that he should be excused attendance at the Executive and Legislative Councils except when the business under discussion affects military interests.

20. We have refrained from exploring in detail the functions which, in our view, should in future be imposed upon the Military Council which we have recommended. We believe that this can best be done after the visit of the Committee to India.

21. The recommendations we have made in Part I of our Report are based upon general principles to which the whole Committee have given their adherence, upon a mass of documentary evidence that has been at their disposal and upon the conferences between the members of the Committee and officers and others with profound experience of the working of army administration in India, previous to the war, during the war and since the armistice.

We offer these recommendations to the Secretary of State for India in the hope that he will obtain for them the early sanction of His Majesty's Government, in order that the labours of this Committee may not, like those of so many others, be thrown away.

ESHER.

M. F. O'DWYER.

H. V. COX, LIEUT.-GENL.

CLAUD W. JACOB, LIEUT.-GENL.

J. P. DUCANE, LIEUT.-GENL.

G. FELL.

WEBB GILLMAN, MAJ.-GENL.

C. M. WAGSTAFF, BRIG.-GENL.,
Secretary.

The 3rd November 1919.

REPORT

OF THE

ARMY IN INDIA COMMITTEE,

1919-1920.

Part II.

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REPORT
OF THE
ARMY IN INDIA COMMITTEE, 1919-1920,

Part II.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE E. S. MONTAGU, M.P.

SIR,

Throughout this Report, we have been guided by the consideration that the army in India, as in all civilised States, furnishes the ultimate sanction for the security of the people against external aggression and for the maintenance of internal tranquillity. We are impressed by the necessity of maintaining this instrument, placed as it always must and should be in the hands of the civil power, in the highest state of efficiency. Whatever form the future Government of India may take, however it may be democratised, and whatever advance may be made on the part of the various sections of the Indian community towards national and imperial unity, the army cannot fail to remain a vital attribute of government in the hands of the dominant authority.

The proposals made by us in Part I having been in the main approved by you, we have in Part II attempted to deal with the difficult question of Supply, to explain in detail the functions which, in our view, should be imposed upon the Military Council, the constitution of which we recommended in Part I, and to make certain proposals regarding Military Finance.

We propose that a Military Council should be constituted for the purpose of assisting the Commander-in-Chief, with a view to relieving him, not of his responsibility, but of manifold duties which, without impairing that responsibility, he can, and should, delegate to his staff officers at Army Headquarters. We desire to impress upon the Commander-in-Chief and upon the officers in question the absolute necessity of carrying out loyally and to the full this principle of delegation. All sound administration is based upon it. No administrator, however able and however conscientious, can interpret responsibility in the sense of giving personal attention and sanction to every act of administration, if the accomplishment of his task is to stand the test of efficiency.

In the constitution of the Military Council, in the functions we have allotted to its various members, and in the handling of this difficult question of military supply, we have all been guided by the supreme consideration of the efficiency of the army in war, coupled with a due regard to the best interests of the Indian tax-payer. We aim at establishing a system which, while it will work simply and economically in time of peace, will be adaptable, without undue friction and disturbance, to the conditions even of such a war as that in which the Empire has recently been engaged.

We lay stress upon the importance, as it appears to us, of organising in India a system of military administration which will establish a chain of responsibility from the Commander-in-Chief himself through his Military Council to the military commands, and so down to divisional units, in order that the test of war, whenever it is applied, shall find ready to hand a body of men expert in administration as well as in command, ready to meet its exigencies. While we are anxious to see officers from their youth up trained in administration as well as in general staff duties, we are conscious that, under a voluntary system such as ours, it is impossible to rely wholly for the administration of the army upon the soldier. There are certain spheres of administration into which a civilian element must not only be introduced, but should be cordially welcomed. This axiom especially applies to the region of provision and production of material, which is essential to the military needs of an army in peace time and in the field. The provisioning of an army with all that it requires, which is ordinarily covered by the term "supply," has been considered carefully by us

in consultation with the most experienced authorities, both in India and at home. There has been much conflict of opinion and we have been furnished with advice in divers forms. Powerful arguments, supported by experience in war and by knowledge of Indian conditions, have been used in the course of our discussions in favour of various solutions of what is admitted to be a complicated problem.

The recommendations which we have made in Part II have been signed by us, but we regret that in regard to section I a divergence of views has occurred.

While detracting from the constructive value of our report this divergence of opinion will not, we venture to hope, prove a serious obstacle in attempting to arrive at a decision upon the functions to be vested in the Commander-in-Chief.

We are all agreed in our recommendations regarding the composition and functions of the Military Council, except to the extent that the minority desire to see added to it a member, with the title of Surveyor-General of Supply, to whom they would entrust those functions of production and provision which the majority advocate placing under a separate Member of the Executive Council.

We are,

SIR,

Your obedient Servants,

ESHER.

M. F. O'DWYER.

H. V. COX, *Lieut.-Genl.*

J. P. DUCANE, *Lieut.-Genl.*

CLAUD W. JACOB, *Lieut.-Genl.*

H. HUDSON, *Lieut.-Genl.*

G. FELL.

WEBB GILLMAN, *Major-Genl.*

UMAR HAYAT.

K. G. GUPTA.

C. M. WAGSTAFF, *Colonel, Secretary.*

19th May 1920.

PART II.

SECTION I.

Production and Provision.

The responsibility for provision and production is a question to which we have given the most earnest consideration, and regarding which we have taken a great deal of evidence, both in England and in India. We do not intend to enter into the arguments adduced in support of the various systems proposed for the home army, since in the first place such matters are outside the scope of our enquiry, and in the second place the problem of the most efficient method of supplying the army in India, as it presents itself to us, is different from that at home.

2. The main factors which distinguish the two problems are these. In the first place there is an essential difference between the systems under which the two armies are administered. In the United Kingdom there is a civilian Secretary of State for War, responsible to Parliament, who presides over the Army Council, a body possessing collective responsibility for the administration of the army. In India, under the proposals put forward by us in Part I of this Report, the sole responsibility to the Governor-General in Council for command and administration will remain with the Commander-in-Chief, assisted by a small military council possessing, as such, merely advisory powers. In view of the very heavy burden of work which this arrangement will still leave upon the Commander-in-Chief, who will also remain an extraordinary Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, we consider it desirable to relieve him of duties which can be performed by others.

Secondly, there can be no comparison between the industrial conditions of the United Kingdom and of India. At home, provision and production are comparatively easy, since there are numbers of highly organised and efficient firms with whom orders can be placed to meet the army's requirements. In India, industrial development is in its infancy, and reliance has to be placed on a number of specialised Government factories, the administration of which presents considerable difficulties and calls for the exercise of business capacity.

Thirdly, the demands of the army in India for munitions of all sorts closely affect industrial development, which it is now the policy of Government to stimulate. This factor does not exist in the United Kingdom, where army requirements in normal times represent only a fraction of the country's productive power.

While, therefore, we are in favour of assimilating, so far as practicable, the system of administration at Army Headquarters in India to that in force at the War Office, we are satisfied that the conditions in India differ so widely from those in the United Kingdom that the organisation for production and provision demands an independent examination, free from those considerations which have determined the issue at home.

3. Turning now to the Indian problem, we think it desirable to sketch briefly the past history of the arrangements for supply. Prior to 1906 there were two Members of the Executive Council, the Commander-in-Chief, who was responsible for command and executive work, and who had under him three principal staff officers—the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, and the Principal Medical Officer—and the Military Member, also a soldier, who was responsible for the administrative work of the army, and who had under him the Director-General of Ordnance, the Director-General of Supply and Transport, and the Director-General of Military Works. This Member, therefore, combined the functions of administration and supply, besides being the authority to whom the Commander-in-Chief had to refer for sanction all such proposals as required the orders of Government. Under this arrangement the Government of India had two military advisers. This system was abandoned in 1906 in favour of an arrangement under which a department of Military Supply was created and placed in charge of another soldier, with the rank of major-general, who also had a seat on the Executive Council.

We do not think it necessary to enter into the merits of the controversy which resulted in this decision. In 1909 this department was abolished and the present system was introduced, under which all the work connected with the administration of the army, the formulation and execution of the military policy of the Government of India, the responsibility for maintaining every branch of the army, combatant and non-combatant, in a state of efficiency, and the supreme direction of any military operations based upon India, are centred in one authority, the Commander-in-Chief and Army Member.

4. We have already recommended, in Part I of this Report, that the Commander-in-Chief should have the sole right to offer military advice to the Governor-General in Council, and that he should have no military colleague upon the Executive Council. We consider, however, that recent experience and the changing conditions of India render it one of the first essentials of a sound organisation to relieve the Commander-in-Chief, as far as is consistent with his office, of the heavy burden which at present devolves upon him. As already stated, he now has the sole responsibility for the efficiency of the army in all its branches. He exercises command over a very large force in India, and he has, in addition, considerable administrative responsibilities for the large portion of the Indian Army now employed overseas. He is the sole adviser of the Governor-General in Council on all questions of military policy, and is in supreme direction of all operations based on India. As a Member of the Executive Council, he shares with his colleagues the responsibility for all the decisions of Government, whether on civil or military matters. We believe that certain proposals put forward in this part of our Report and in Part I will, if accepted, go some way towards affording the Commander-in-Chief relief, and we now proceed to consider how it is possible further to reduce his work and so set him free to devote his time to his various duties as Commander-in-Chief, as a Member of the Government, and as sole military adviser to the Governor-General in Council.

5. It is at this point that we regret to find a divergence of opinion among the members of the Committee. The majority, consisting of Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Cox, Lieutenant-General Sir Claud Jacob, Sir Godfrey Fell, Major-General Sir Webb Gillman, and Sir Krishna Gupta, for the reasons given in paragraphs 6-16, strongly incline to the view that production and provision and the administration of the Royal Indian Marine should be entrusted to a civilian Member of the Executive Council. The minority, composed of Lord Esler, Lieutenant-General Sir John Du Cane, Lieutenant-General Sir Havelock Hudson and Major Sir Umar Hayat Khan, favour a solution, for the reasons given in paragraphs 17-23, which places production and provision under a civilian member of the Commander-in-Chief's Military Council, and the Royal Indian Marine directly under the Commander-in-Chief.

Opinion of
the majority
of the
Committee.

6. The majority hold that the necessary relief could not be afforded to the Commander-in-Chief by entrusting production and provision to a special civilian officer working directly under him as a member of the Military Council. It is claimed for this arrangement that, while relieving the Quartermaster-General of work which, having regard to his already heavy duties, he cannot conveniently perform, it would leave unimpaired the sole responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief for the efficiency of the army. They do not, however, recommend the adoption of this organisation, for the following reasons:—

In the first place, they do not consider that such an arrangement would afford the Commander-in-Chief sufficient relief to enable him to discharge the many functions entrusted to him. So long as the ultimate responsibility for production and provision remains with him he cannot divest himself of all the work connected therewith, although he may delegate the administrative details to the special supply officer on his staff. There is a limit, too, to the extent to which, under any system of government, large administrative questions can be left to the disposal of a subordinate officer. Consequently all questions which, owing to their financial importance, their contentious nature, their intrinsic difficulty, or their bearing on other departments of Government, would be

beyond the capacity of the supply officer to decide, would have to be referred for the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, thereby adding considerably to his labours. Moreover, many questions relating to factory administration and supply are of such importance as to require discussion in the Executive Council; and it is, they consider, very desirable to relieve the Commander-in-Chief of the obligation to study and present to the Council cases which, by reason of their technical nature and their unfamiliarity, he can only master with considerable effort and at an expenditure of time which he can ill afford. The indications are that these questions will be more numerous and more difficult in the near future. Labour questions in India, as elsewhere, are daily becoming more complex and more insistent, as evidenced by the increased frequency of industrial strikes, and will closely affect the working of the Government factories, and, indeed, all sources of production. The growth of trade unionism in India will also present difficult problems for solution. They desire to relieve the Commander-in-Chief of the task of handling these and many other related subjects.

Secondly, under the organisation which they propose, the Commander-in-Chief will still have the sole responsibility for the specifications and issue of all stores, lethal and non-lethal, required by the army, for satisfying himself that the army's requirements are fully and promptly met, for fixing scales of reserves, and for holding all stores and reserves. They do not consider that the transfer to another authority of the functions of production and provision contravenes the doctrine that the responsibility for the maintenance, training, and administration of the army should be concentrated under a single head. For example, under the existing system, the Commander-in-Chief, though responsible for the efficiency of the army, can have no responsibility for the production or provision of the large quantities of stores which have now to be procured from the United Kingdom. They can see, therefore, no objection in principle to his being dependent upon an outside agency for supply in India, just as he is now dependent upon an outside agency for supply from the United Kingdom. His position in relation to the supply agency in India will, in fact, be analogous to that of the War Office in relation to the great armament firms.

Their view is that while the Commander-in-Chief should remain solely responsible for demanding what is required for the efficiency of the army, and for seeing that his demands are met, to the extent that they may have received the sanction of Government, it is essential that he should be relieved of the administrative work involved in the production and provision of supplies. They go further, and consider it undesirable that he should be in a position to concern himself with the details of this work, at the expense of his purely military duties and of his duties as a Member of the Governor-General's Council, which, even with the limitations that have been proposed, are fully sufficient to occupy his whole energies. The arrangement which they advocate will, in their opinion, ensure this result; and they hold strongly that the alternative arrangement, under which production and provision would be entrusted to a member of the Military Council, would fail to afford the necessary relief to the Commander-in-Chief.

It has been suggested that if provision and production were placed under a civilian Member of the Military Council, subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief, this organisation could, on the outbreak of a war of any magnitude, be formed into a separate and independent department of Government under a Member of the Executive Council. They do not consider that this would be a sound arrangement in India, which is peculiarly liable to be plunged without warning into hostilities, and where, in consequence, the bulk of the army has to be constantly maintained in a state of readiness for war. Frontier operations now involve the employment of larger forces and of greater quantities of material than used to be the case. They therefore hold that it would be wise to maintain in peace time an organisation for production and provision, capable of rapid expansion without the dislocation entailed by the creation, on the outbreak of war, of a separate department of Government and the transfer to it of these functions.

7. Other considerations which, they hold, tell in favour of entrusting supply to an agency outside Army Headquarters and under a civilian head, are that, as was recognised by His Majesty's Government in 1906, the duties connected with supply are essentially civil in character, and are, therefore, in their opinion, more likely to be efficiently and economically performed by a department under a civilian. This consideration applies also to the administration of army factories, the personnel of which it is generally agreed should be almost entirely civilian. Again, the creation of an agency outside Army Headquarters would relieve a number of soldiers of work which is not military in character; and would enable expansion to be carried out, on the outbreak of war, without the imposition of extra work and responsibility upon the Commander-in-Chief and his staff at a time of great stress.

8. Holding, then, that it is a matter of primary importance to relieve the Commander-in-Chief of production and provision and entrust them to an agency outside Army Headquarters, they turn to the question of the nature of this outside agency.

9. Under the Indian system of government, every department of Government must be placed under a Member of the Executive Council. The head of the supply agency must, therefore, be either the Member in charge of one of the existing departments of Government or a Member specially appointed for this purpose. The evidence which has been taken on this subject in India shows that it would be impracticable to hand over the responsibility for production and provision for the army to any of the existing departments of Government, or to any of the departments as they may be reconstituted as a result of the Reforms Scheme. It follows that the supply department must be administered by a separate Member of the Executive Council appointed for this purpose.

10. It may be argued that the experience of 1906-09 showed that there would not be enough work to occupy a full time Member of Council. Whatever may have been the case in 1906-09 it can hardly be contended, in the light of the experience gained during the war, and of the increasing volume and complexity of the work of production and provision, that the task of supplying and equipping a large army, and of dealing with the administration of the many departments connected therewith, would not give sufficient occupation to a Member of Council. New standards have been created. Recent experience has shown the paramount necessity of rendering India more nearly self-supporting in the matter of munitions of all kinds, lethal and non-lethal, thus minimising the risks attendant upon dependence for essential stores upon the mother country, with which its sea communications may at any time be interrupted or severed. Men's eyes have been opened to the vastness of the requirements of modern warfare, to the necessity of organising the Empire's resources in peace time in such a way as to be capable, on the outbreak of war, of expansion with a rapidity and to an extent never contemplated before 1914. The need for stimulating local manufactures, and for placing the control of large purchasing operations, *e.g.*, for textiles, foodstuffs, etc., under expert management, has been emphasized. It was the recognition, at the instance of the present Commander-in-Chief in India, of the supreme importance of these matters that led to the creation of the Indian Munitions Board, that is, in effect, to the partial adoption, as a temporary war measure, of the separation of functions which they now recommend as a permanent measure. It would, they think, be a retrograde measure to replace permanently under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief the multifarious activities which have, during the war, occupied the energies of the Indian Munitions Board and its large staff. These activities impinge at many points on the civil administration of the country, and can therefore be more appropriately discharged by a civil department of Government.

The situation has been altered greatly by the recent grant of free rations to the Indian Army, and the consequent necessity for making large wholesale purchases of foodstuffs and for arranging for distribution to the depôts under the control of the Quartermaster-General, and by the supply to the Indian

Army of clothing in kind, in lieu of the previous system under which regiments made their own arrangements for clothing their men. In short, the problems of supply have become far larger and more important, from both the administrative and the financial standpoints, than they were in pre-war days.

11. The majority next turn to a wholly different consideration. One of the matters which were referred for the advice of the Committee is the administration and organisation of the Royal Indian Marine. It is proposed to deal with this question in greater detail in a later Part of this Report. For the present the issue concerns the position of this service in the scheme of Indian Government and the arrangements for its administrative control.

The Royal Indian Marine is at present administered by the Commander-in-Chief through the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Army Department, an official who, under the proposals put forward in this part of this Report, will disappear. There has been ample evidence to show that this arrangement, as can readily be understood, is distasteful to the service, and also, it is understood, to the Admiralty, who are interested in its efficiency. For this reason, as well as on grounds of principle, they think it desirable to relieve the Commander-in-Chief and Army Headquarters of all responsibility for the administration of the marine service. They anticipate that the administrative work connected therewith is not likely to decrease in volume. There are many directions in which progress and development are needed in the interests of efficiency, and indeed are demanded by Indian public opinion. There is no existing department of Government to which the administration of the marine service could suitably be transferred; but they consider that it might appropriately be handed over to the proposed new department. Much of the work relates to the administration of the dockyards, which are large workshops for construction and repairs, and execute refitting work needed by the Royal Navy in Indian waters, in addition to their work for the Indian Government. The administration of the dockyards presents problems similar in character to those involved in the administration of the ordnance and other factories. They recommend, therefore, that the administration of the Royal Indian Marine should also form part of the duties of the proposed Member of Council.

12. Again, in view of the predominating importance of the army in India, to which reference has been made in paragraph 37 of this Part, they consider it desirable that it should have more than one representative in the Viceroy's Executive Council. The administration of the army will be one of the chief responsibilities, if not the most important, which will remain to the Government of India under the Reforms Scheme, and its cost at present absorbs nearly half the revenues reserved for imperial, as opposed to provincial, purposes. In other words the responsibility for the expenditure of nearly half of the total revenues of the Government of India now rests upon the shoulders of one man, namely, the Commander-in-Chief. The amount required for the upkeep of the army has already aroused considerable criticism in the Legislative Council. It is not possible to indicate the exact share of the funds provided in the army budget which will under these proposals, be administered by the new department; but the amount will certainly be considerably in excess of that administered by any of the other great spending departments of the Government of India, and covers precisely those heads of army expenditure which afford the widest scope for economy. They consider that the creation of a separate department of Government responsible for production and provision would undoubtedly result in increased efficiency and consequent economy, thus tending to minimise criticism, and that the Indian tax-payer would welcome this scheme, as affording the best guarantee that his interests are safeguarded. With these considerations in view, they think it desirable that the Commander-in-Chief, as head of the largest spending department in India, should have the assistance of a civil colleague, who would share with him, in a clearly defined sphere, the interest in and responsibility for the welfare and efficiency of the army and the expenditure connected therewith,

and assist him in demonstrating the necessity of such expenditure to the Council and the outside public.

13. In arriving at their conclusions, they have not overlooked various disadvantages which may be urged against the scheme which they advocate. It has been suggested that the proposed organisation would deprive the Commander-in-Chief of the power, on his own initiative, to speed up production to suit the requirements of the moment. They consider, however, that production is more likely to be speeded up, at a time of strain, if it is under the administration of a department whose special function it will be to meet the requirements of the army, than under the present system, which throws upon the Commander-in-Chief the whole responsibility for organising the means of increasing production, at a time when his purely military duties should claim all his time and energies. It has also been suggested that, having regard to the necessary limitation of funds available for the army, there might be a risk of the civil Member pressing upon the collective Council the needs of his own department for more funds; and that his demands, if accepted, would reduce the sum available for other military measures, which the Commander in Chief might perhaps regard as more urgent or important. To this they would reply that they consider it necessary that the control of the military budget should remain in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, who would allot to the new department such portion of the funds at his disposal as will enable it, on the basis of the ascertained cost of manufacture or purchase, to meet the needs of the army as estimated by him. They do not contemplate the possibility of the Government of India allocating to this department money which the Commander-in-Chief might need for other purposes in connection with the army.

14. Lastly, apprehension may be felt that the Commander-in-Chief might find himself hampered at times in the execution of his office by differences of opinion between himself and his civil colleague. They do not think, however, that there is any real danger of this occurring. Under the Indian constitution, no one Member of Council can overrule another in matters which are within the latter's purview. Where differences of opinion occur between two Members of Council in matters which concern both their departments, the procedure for adjusting these differences is clearly laid down, and secure to the Commander-in-Chief the opportunity of laying his case fully and personally before the Council as a whole. It works, it is believed, quite smoothly in practice in the case of other departments of Government, the Members in charge of which must naturally at times view problems from different and possibly irreconcilable standpoints. In the case of the two Members who would be chiefly concerned, under the proposed organisation, with military matters, it is reasonable to assume that their community of interest in and responsibility for the efficiency of the army, and the clear definition of their respective functions, would tend to minimise, if not to remove altogether, opportunities for friction and disagreement. Should such unfortunately occur, they would be settled, as in the case of similar differences of opinion between other Members, by the decision of the Viceroy and his collective Council.

15. They therefore recommend the creation of a new department of Government to deal with the supply of the army, and they consider it essential that the Member in charge should be a civilian, in order that there may be no danger of a second military opinion on the Executive Council. This provision meets, in their opinion, the principal objection which was taken to the organisation for military supply which was set up in 1906. They feel confident that the creation of the proposed department will result in increased efficiency and economy in the administration of the army and marine services.

It is difficult to find a title which accurately defines the functions of the new department. They suggest that it be called "the Department of Munitions and Marine."

16. Under the organisation which they recommend, the new department under a civilian Member of Council, would be responsible for meeting the demands of the Commander-in-Chief for supplies, including foodstuffs and

forage, for stores of all kinds in bulk, and for the administration of the ordnance and clothing factories, as well as of the Royal Indian Marine. The Quartermaster General would remain responsible, under the Commander-in-Chief, for the holding and issuing of all military stores; for specifications and issue of all armaments, ammunition, provisions, forage, fuel, clothing, equipment, general stores and material; for fixing scales of reserves of the above to be held in depôts, garrisons, mobilisation stores and war reserve; and for local purchases of such supplies as are not provided in bulk by the new department. A table is attached outlining the organisation which they consider would be suitable for the proposed new department, though this may require amendment in the light of experience.

17. The minority of the Committee, composed of Lord Escher, Lieut-Generals Sir H. Hudson and Sir J. Du Cane, and Major Sir Umar Hayat Khan, desire to record their disagreement with the arguments, and their dissent from the conclusions, contained in the foregoing paragraphs. Opinion of the Minority of the Committee.

They feel obliged to challenge these conclusions and arguments on the ground that the proposal based on them, namely, the setting up of a separate department for production and provision under a Member of the Executive Council, is irreconcilable with the fundamental principle of concentrating the command and administration of the army in India under the Governor-General in Council in the hands of a single responsible authority.

They hold that the proposed creation of a separate Member of the Executive Council for the production and provision of military supply leads directly to that system of dual control which was abandoned in 1909. They are convinced that sooner or later friction between the Commander-in-Chief and the Member of Council for production would be certain to arise, that economical use of the financial resources of the army would not be secured, and that the principle of sole responsibility for the welfare and efficiency of the army would be violated.

They are unable to assent to a proposal which disregards the first principles of sound financial administration and places a Member of Council in charge of a department of State in the anomalous position of being held responsible for the expenditure of funds forming a portion of the military budget, the estimates for which were not prepared and administered under his sole authority and control.

18. They hold that, while there are strong reasons why certain aspects of production and provision of military supply, namely, factory administration and contracts, should be under civilian control, especially under the conditions prevailing in India at the present time, this result can best be achieved by placing them under a civilian member of the Military Council of the Commander-in-Chief. They recommend that a civilian, who would be called the Surveyor-General of Supply, should be added to the Military Council as the head of a branch which will be provided with the technical officers required by military necessities. The Surveyor-General of Supply, as a member of the Military Council, would be in constant touch with his military colleagues, and would have ample opportunity of acquainting himself both with the requirements and the administration of the army. He would have no interests divergent from those of his colleagues, and, without circumlocution or undue delay, he would be in a position to associate himself with them in the economical use of army funds.

19. While they are anxious to relieve the Commander-in-Chief as far as possible from the burden that has evidently been imposed upon him of recent years, primarily owing to the special conditions that arose during the war, they are not convinced that the plan proposed by the majority is necessary to attain that result. They consider that the other means which have been recommended elsewhere in this Report should suffice to achieve this object. These other means are: the abolition of the "duality of functions resulting from the same officer being the Commander-in-Chief and Member in charge of

the Army Department,"* the delegation of responsibility to the heads of branches who are members of the Military Council, the co-ordinating functions of the Secretary, and the considerable measure of relief it is proposed to afford to the Commander-in-Chief from attending the Executive and Legislative Councils.

As regards the last-named they considered that further relief could be afforded if the Secretary, Army Headquarters, or one of the members of the Military Council, were authorised to attend the meetings of the Executive Council, and were empowered, when the Commander-in-Chief is absent, or whenever summoned by the Governor-General, to explain questions of military administration which are under discussion. They also recommend that the Secretary, Army Headquarters, should be a Member of the Legislative Council where, following the analogy of a Parliamentary Under Secretary in this country, he could represent the Commander-in-Chief, give explanations and take part in discussion.

20. They do not agree that the system proposed by the majority is necessary in order to ensure rapid expansion of the organisation for production on the outbreak of war. They hold that any peace system which is not extravagant in establishment must necessarily be profoundly modified for a great emergency such as the recent war. The primary duty of a War Department in peace is to organise and prepare for war, and in war to conduct war. In peace the War Department should be responsible for its own supply and for the accumulation of reserves. The mobilisation of industry and the concentration of national effort in a great emergency are outside its scope. The peace system should be adequate for the ordinary purposes for which the army in India is maintained and the normal contingencies that it may be expected to meet.

They further hold that under the system that they advocate, the function of production in a great emergency should be separated from Army Headquarters, and that this could be done without dislocation. The branch under the suggested Surveyor-General of Supply, *plus* the necessary technical services, should be detached and expanded. A plan for this should form an important part of the mobilisation arrangements, and should be the special study of the Surveyor-General of Supply.

21. They also desire to draw attention to the fact that it has recently been decided not to establish a Ministry of Supply at home, mainly on the ground that the unnecessary duplication of Government departments inevitably leads to uneconomical administration, and is therefore unjustifiable.

Without wishing to labour the point, and while fully recognising that conditions in India and at home are in many respects dissimilar, they wish to emphasise the desirability, where possible, of assimilating the organisation in India and at home, for the following reasons:—

- (a) The centre of gravity of probable military operations has shifted from West to East. In the future we must contemplate the possibility of our armies operating in the Middle East, based partially on India and partially on home. It is essential that the general headquarters of a field army should be able to work smoothly and without confusion with both the Indian and home military authorities.
- (b) Differences in system make it difficult for officers to pick up their work quickly when interchanged, and the importance of such interchange of officers between home and India has been frequently emphasised.

The differences between the constitutional positions of the Secretary of State for War and the Commander-in-Chief in India do not affect this question.

* *Vide* Part I, Section III, paragraph 12.

What is desirable is that in each case the subordinate branches should deal with similar subjects, so that staff officers will know with whom they have to deal.

22. They do not propose to reply at further length to the arguments used by their colleagues in support of the suggestion to place production and provision for the army under a separate Member of the Executive Council, because they consider the whole field of objection to be covered by the comments upon the principle involved in that suggestion which they have made in the preceding paragraphs. They are convinced that in the present circumstances of India, and having in mind the complicated changes of government upon which India is now entering, their proposal to place supply under the Commander-in-Chief will conduce to the highest efficiency of the army as an instrument in the hands of the civil power, by simplifying military administration, and by securing unity of control. They are of opinion that the Department for Military Production and Provision, which the majority of their colleagues propose to place under a separate Member of the Executive Council, can without essential alteration form a branch under the Commander-in-Chief, in charge of a civilian member of his Military Council. This is the course (stated in paragraph 18) which they strongly recommend should be followed. The organisation proposed is shown on the attached table.

23. As regards the administration of the Royal Indian Marine, they see no reason why the arrangements proposed in Section II, paragraph 41, for the Royal Air Force should not apply equally in the case of this service, nor should they in any way conflict with the recommendations for the organisation of the Royal Indian Marine, which are made later in Part VII of this Report.

SECTION II.

Composition and Functions of the Military Council.

24. In paragraph 14 of Part I of our Report we recommended the establishment of a Military Council composed of high staff officers and others, to assist the Commander-in-Chief in the performance of his administrative functions. In making this recommendation we were influenced by the desire to lessen the burden of work which at present devolves upon him. We now proceed to discuss the constitution of the Military Council and to define its functions.

25. The Commander-in-Chief will be President, and the Chief of the General Staff, Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General and Financial Adviser will in any case be members. In the absence of the Commander-in-Chief the Chief of the General Staff will preside. The remaining heads of branches, whose claims for membership of the Military Council are now for consideration, are the Director-General of Ordnance, Director-General of Military Works and Director of Medical Services.

26. Our attention has been called to the fact that in the recent war general officers commanding armies in the field had attached to their staffs senior officers of high military and technical qualifications, such as the General Officer Commanding, Royal Artillery, the Engineer-in-Chief, &c., who advised them on all questions in connection with the efficiency of their arm for war.

27. We consider that Army Headquarters, India, would benefit by an analogous organization, and we recommend that senior officers of certain services should be affiliated to the General Staff, and that their functions should be to advise on all questions relating to their arm in war and on the training of their arm in peace and war.

Four of these officers, who should hold the rank either of major-general or of colonel on the staff, should be allotted to the following branches respectively:—cavalry, artillery, engineers and pioneers, and infantry. Suitable officers of lesser rank should, in addition to their other duties, advise the General Staff on questions concerning signals, machine-guns, tanks, gas and other armaments or equipments.

28. These officers should be the means by which the training of their arm is co-ordinated throughout the army in India, and should be the responsible advisers to subordinate commanders for this purpose. They should be the eyes and ears of the General Staff, and should be assisted by officers, possessing the necessary technical experience, to enable them to give advice, from the point of view of the military user, on the armament and equipment suitable for their branch of the service.

Though we propose that for the sake of convenience these officers should be designated Inspectors we recommend that powers of independent inspection should not be given to them, and that any inspection of troops which they desire to carry out should only be done by arrangement with subordinate commanders.

29. Prior to the war, the functions of the Director-General of Ordnance included the provision and maintenance of approved scales of reserves of all arms, of all kinds of ammunition, of vehicles (other than transport) and of technical equipment of artillery and engineer units: provision of guns, machine guns, small arms ammunition, technical and ordnance stores and vehicles: and inspection of the same.

He was assisted in the performance of these functions by the Directors of Artillery, of Ordnance Stores and of Ordnance Inspection, and by the Director of Ordnance Factories, who was located at Calcutta.

During the war these functions were curtailed by the appointment, under the Quartermaster-General, of a Director of Equipment and Ordnance Stores, a Major-General, who is responsible for the maintenance and issue of stores; and by the transfer to the Indian Munitions Board of the administrative control of the Ordnance factories.

Though in 1920 the Ordnance factories were handed back temporarily to the Director-General of Ordnance, we have recommended in Section I of Part II that they should, in common with all army factories, be placed under a civilian head, who would be either a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council or a member of the Commander-in-Chief's Military Council, and who would be responsible for the production and provision of army munitions and for administering army contracts.

We also consider that the maintenance of approved scales of reserves of armaments, ammunition and equipment, and their issue should devolve on the Quartermaster-General, who should also be responsible for seeing that the articles are of suitable quality.

30. If our proposals are accepted, the pre-war functions of the Director-General of Ordnance will be so curtailed that we consider the appointment in India of an officer of this status is no longer required.

The remaining functions are mainly technical, and we recommend that they should be performed by a Director of Armaments in the branch of the Quartermaster-General. This director would be responsible for inspection from the point of view of the purchaser, and would place his subordinate inspectors in the factories and contractors' works to watch the processes of manufacture on behalf of the purchasing department. He would also approve the finished article.

This inspection would, of course, be independent of any tests which the manufacturer may consider necessary from his point of view.

The inclusion of the Director-General of Ordnance in the Military Council consequently becomes no longer necessary.

31. The Director-General of Military Works is responsible for—

- (1) The construction and upkeep of barracks and other military works in cantonments.
- (2) Communications, including telephones, and defences.

(3) Mechanical plant for works purposes.

(4) Provision of accommodation other than as in (1).

His duties with reference to military engineering in connection with war have been negligible in the past.

For this officer we propose to substitute—

- (a) An Inspector of Engineers and Pioneers, who should advise on all engineer operations in connection with war, the training of engineer and pioneer services both in peace and war, and their technical equipment.
- (b) A Director of Military Works.

In considering this latter officer's duties we are of opinion that, though he should be responsible for plans, specifications, inspection, and the financial questions involved in the construction and upkeep of barracks and other military works in cantonments, including roads, ranges, &c., the actual work of construction and upkeep could in many cases be carried out by a civilian agency, as is suggested in our remarks on Engineer Services in Section IV of Part IV.

As, moreover, the work in connection with telephones should devolve on the Inspector of Signals, whose appointment is suggested elsewhere in this Report, we consider that those duties of the Director of Military Works which cannot be performed by a civilian agency should be limited to:—

- (1) Specification of plans and scrutiny of estimates for accommodation; and inspection of buildings, etc.
- (2) Construction and repair of works of an important military character, such as defences, and of those roads near the frontier the upkeep of which is necessitated mainly by military considerations.
- (3) The holding and distribution of engineering stores, including electrical and mechanical plant.

We consider that the Quartermaster-General should be able to undertake the control of this directorate without being unduly overburdened, since we recommend that he should be relieved of all responsibility for production and provision.

Under the organisation now suggested, the Director-General of Military Works disappears, and no question therefore arises as to his inclusion in the Military Council.

32. With regard to the Director of Medical Services, there are two alternatives:—(a) to make him a full member of the Military Council; (b) to place him under one of the principal staff officers, who, following the practice in force hitherto at home, would be the Adjutant General.

We recommend that the Director of Medical Services should not be a member of the Military Council, and that he should be placed under the Adjutant General. Our principal reasons for this conclusion are that it is difficult to ensure the proper co-ordination of work at Army Headquarters unless every branch of it is placed under one or other of the principal staff officers. The number of such officers through whom the Commander-in-Chief has to work should be as few as possible.

It is very desirable to put an end to the present system which permits of the Director of Medical Services, in that capacity, issuing orders in the name of the Commander-in-Chief without the knowledge or concurrence of the staff at Army Headquarters.

We wish to add that the Adjutant General should make a point of having the Director of Medical Services with him at his periodical conferences with the Commander-in-Chief, whenever the question for discussion is of a technical, medical or sanitary character; and the Commander-in-Chief will no doubt for his part send for and consult the Director of Medical Services whenever he wishes to ascertain his views on such matters first hand.

33. We have now to consider the arrangements for the performance of the secretarial duties of the Military Council and of Army Headquarters, and the status of the officer responsible for them.

Under the existing organization, there has been a high military officer holding the post of Secretary to the Government of India in the Army Department. He is responsible to the Viceroy for the proper working of the Army Department. All proposals requiring the orders of the Government of India have to be referred to him for that purpose, and he is required to examine them from the administrative standpoint and with special reference to their bearing on the general civil administration. It is his duty to see that the Rules of Business of the Government of India are observed. He has the statutory right of access to the Viceroy, whom he sees as a rule every week, and to whom he takes army cases requiring His Excellency's orders. He has the statutory right also to submit cases at any stage to the Governor-General. His position is exactly analogous to that of the civil Secretaries to Government in other departments; but he has certain additional functions. For example, he is Secretary to the Government of India in the Marine Department and in this capacity administers, on behalf of the Government of India and under the direction of the Army Member, the Royal Indian Marine, the executive head of which is located at Bombay. He deals with questions relating to chaplains of all denominations in the field, and with questions affecting the pay and allowances of Roman Catholic and Wesleyan chaplains and other chaplains not on the establishment. He also controls a small section dealing with medals. He corresponds weekly with the Secretary, Military Department at the India Office. He is also a Member of the Legislative Council. Finally, he is a member of the Commander-in-Chief's Advisory Council.

34. In paragraph 15 of Part I of our Report we have stated that we hold the position of the Secretary to Government in the Army Department, as it is generally understood, to be inconvenient and undesirable, as rendering possible an interference with the sole right of the Commander-in-Chief to offer military advice to the Governor-General in Council. We now recommend that this appointment should be abolished, not only on the above ground, but also because its existence conflicts with our recommendation (paragraph 14 of Part I of our Report) that the members of the Military Council should be individually responsible for the branches which they are called upon to administer. We consider that this object would be secured by providing that the Commander-in-Chief should delegate to them such executive powers as he may decide; and that each member of the Military Council should, in respect of the subjects pertaining to his particular branch, exercise the power of disposing of cases on behalf of the Government of India analogous to that possessed by the civil Secretaries to the Government of India, to the extent to which the Commander-in-Chief, by special or general order, may delegate such powers, and subject to the observance of financial rules. They should have the power of making unofficial references to other departments of the Government of India. They should not, however, be Secretaries or Joint Secretaries to the Government of India; orders in the name of the Government of India should not issue over their signature; nor should they have the statutory right of access to the Viceroy which is conferred on Secretaries by rules 5 and 6 of the Rules of Business of the Government of India. But we consider that, if the Viceroy desires detailed information regarding any particular case, the Commander-in-Chief should depute the head of the branch concerned to take the papers and explain them to His Excellency.

35. At the same time, it is clearly necessary to provide for the maintenance of close liaison between Army Headquarters on the one hand and with the civil departments of the Government of India and with Local Governments on the other hand, and to ensure that the Rules of Business of the Government of India are observed. We also think it desirable to afford Army Headquarters assistance in connection with cases involving legislation, and in the preparation of despatches to the Secretary of State.

36. For the performance of all these duties we propose that there should be a Secretary, Army Headquarters, whose functions should be:—

- (1) To sign and issue letters, conveying the orders of the Government of India, which have been prepared by heads of branches. The case dealing with the subject matter must be sent to the Secretary, Army Headquarters, at the same time as the draft letter or orders.
- (2) To issue Army Orders, Army Instructions (India), and Gazette Notifications.
- (3) To maintain liaison with the civil administration; to satisfy himself that the Rules of Business of the Government of India are observed, especially with reference to the necessity for consulting such other departments of Government as may be concerned with the measures under discussion; and to call the attention of the head of the branch to any departure from these rules.

Note.—In connection with the issue of letters, or orders, the branch concerned should be responsible for the policy and wording, but it should be open to the Secretary, Army Headquarters to suggest, to the head of the branch responsible for the subject matter, any points in which the wording might be more fully or clearly expressed.

- (4) To arrange for and control the secretarial work of the Military Council.
- (5) To control the entire clerical and subordinate establishments of Army Headquarters.
- (6) To render assistance in the preparation of despatches to the Secretary of State.

All communications intended for Army Headquarters will be addressed to the Secretary, Army Headquarters, who will distribute them to the appropriate branch or branches.

37. In view of the predominating importance of the part which the army in India plays in the administration of the country, of the large share which it absorbs of the public revenue, and of the numerous ways in which its welfare, contentment and efficiency react upon the whole body politic, we consider that the Secretary, Army Headquarters should be an official of high status and wide administrative experience. We also recommend that he should be a civilian. It would not, in our opinion, meet the administrative requirements of the case to make him merely the Secretary to the Military Council, and as such subordinate, in a sense, to the high staff officers who constitute that Council. We therefore propose that he should be a member of the Military Council, and that his full designation should be "Civil Member and Secretary, Army Headquarters." He should be appointed by the Viceroy in consultation with the Commander-in-Chief. He should not have the statutory right of access to the Viceroy, but we anticipate that the Viceroy will desire to see him at regular intervals in order that he may keep His Excellency in touch with those aspects of army Administration which affect the general civil administration, and the relations between the army and the various Local Governments. We consider that this procedure has many advantages, and that it is open to none of the objections of principle which can be urged against the present system, under which the Secretary in the Army Department, himself a soldier of high rank, has the statutory right to take army cases to the Viceroy, and to tender advice on them which may not be in consonance with the views of the Army Member.

38. Our recommendations regarding the future administration of the Royal Indian Marine will be found in Part VII of this Report. The other non-secretarial duties hitherto performed by the Secretary in the Army Department should, we consider, be reallocated by the Commander-in-Chief among the Army Headquarters Staff.

39. We have thus arrived at the following as the composition of the Military Council :—

President	...	...	...	The Commander-in-Chief.
Members	...	...	...	{ The Chief of the General Staff. The Adjutant-General. The Quartermaster-General. The Financial Adviser. The Civil Member and Secretary, Army Headquarters.

If the proposal made in paragraphs 17 to 23 of this Part is accepted, it will of course involve the inclusion of a Surveyor-General of Supply in the Military Council.

40 *Functions of the Military Council.*—The Council can have no collective responsibility. We consider that, with reference to the duty of assisting the Commander-in-Chief in the performance of his administrative functions, the following classes of cases should be referred for discussion by the Military Council :—

- (i) All important cases which require the sanction or orders of the Secretary of State, except cases which only require such sanction or orders under financial rules.
- (ii) All cases which, by reason of their intrinsic importance or their bearing on the general administration of the country, or likely to necessitate consideration eventually by the Governor-General in Council.
- (iii) All cases which the Commander-in-Chief may decide should be brought before the Military Council.

In addition, it should be one of the principal duties of the Military Council to watch the progress of military expenditure, with a view to securing the economical use of army funds: to prepare, and maintain up to date, a comprehensive programme of schemes for the welfare and improvement of the army; and to advise regarding the order in which these schemes should be financed, with reference to the funds available.

The functions of the present Advisory Council will be merged in those of the Military Council as now outlined.

41. We have not hitherto dealt with the position at Army Headquarters of the Military Secretary and of the Air Officer Commanding the Royal Air Force in India. We consider that the Military Secretary should not in future be a personal staff officer of the Commander-in-Chief, who should, however, have an Assistant Military Secretary in lieu of one of his existing A. D. C.'s. We recommend that the Military Secretary should be the head of a separate branch, should work directly under the Commander-in-Chief and should not be a Member of the Military Council. We note that he is now *ex-officio* secretary to the recently instituted Selection Board, and we consider that this should always be one of his functions. He should also maintain the list and records of officers qualified for staff appointments.

We recommend that the Air Officer Commanding the Royal Air Force should have direct relations with the Commander-in-Chief, to whom he should be responsible, as he is now, for the efficiency of the Air Force in India. He should administer the budget of the Air Force, subject to the general control of the Commander-in-Chief. He should be permitted to correspond direct with the Royal Air Force authorities in England on technical subjects, including the supply of technical stores for which provision has been made in his budget or for which special sanction has been obtained.

If hereafter the strength of the Royal Air Force in India increases to a degree which is likely to render this arrangement unsuitable, the position of the Air Force and its commander will require reconsideration.

As regards the Royal Indian Marine, it will be seen that the minority recommend that it should be administered directly under the Commander-in-Chief. If, on the other hand the view of the majority prevails, the Royal Indian Marine will be placed under the proposed new Member of Council.

SECTION III.

Military Finance.

42. *Financial Advice and Control at Army Headquarters.*—We have examined the system now obtaining in India, under which financial advice is given and control is exercised by an officer of the Finance Department, situated at Army Headquarters, and acting in the dual capacity of representative of the Finance Member and of Financial Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief. We have also compared it with the system in force at the War Office, under which responsibility for the compilation of accounts, for audit (other than Treasury audit), and for financial control, is centred in the Assistant Financial Secretary, who is an officer of the War Office and not of the Treasury. The evidence which we have received indicates that the system in force in India, which was adopted on the recommendation of Lord Kitchener, is well suited to the conditions of Indian army administration. We agree, and recommend its continuance.

We do so the more readily because we understand, firstly, that the Financial Adviser considers himself, and is regarded by the military heads of branches, as a colleague and not as a hostile critic; secondly, that he abstains from offering advice on the purely military aspects of matters with which he has to deal; and, thirdly, that in cases where the Financial Adviser finds himself unable, on financial grounds, to advise the acceptance of a proposal put forward by the military authorities, the Commander-in-Chief has the final opportunity of considering the grounds of the Financial Adviser's objection, and of stating his own views, before the case is submitted to the Finance Member. Subject to this second condition, we consider that the more closely he is kept in touch with the daily work of Army Headquarters and the policy of the Commander-in-Chief the greater will be his usefulness.

If our proposals for the creation of a Military Council are accepted, we recommend that the Financial Adviser should be a member of that Council.

43. *Financial assistance to branches at Army Headquarters.*—During the war financial officers were posted to certain branches at Army Headquarters with the object of assisting the military authorities in the financial side of their work. This arrangement was not altogether satisfactory, since it was not obligatory on the military authorities to consult their attached financial officers. The financial officers, too, had no definite powers or responsibility and were merely required to offer advice in cases which were referred to them for that purpose.

44. We recommend that there should be, in each of the principal spending branches at Army Headquarters, a financial officer who should have definite functions and responsibilities assigned to him. These officers should be subordinate to the Financial Adviser and work in close co-operation with him and the Military Accountant-General. They should have the title of Deputy Financial Adviser. There should be one such officer, with a suitable staff, in the Adjutant-General's branch, and two in the Quartermaster General's branch, of whom one should deal solely with Military Works. This latter appointment will entail the abolition of the special appointment of Examiner, Military Works Accounts, and a complete reorganization, which we think very desirable, of the expenditure and accounts procedure of the Military Works Services.

It will be the duty of these Deputy Financial Advisers to help the executive in the administration of the grants placed under their control (regarding which we make certain recommendations later), and for this purpose they will have to maintain the necessary statistics. For example, the Deputy Financial Adviser in the Adjutant-General's branch will require prompt information regarding

the progress of expenditure on the pay and allowances of regimental units and other formations and regarding variations in the strength of troops in India. Every month he should place before the Adjutant-General a statement showing whether, apart from any new measures for which provision was not made in the budget, the progress of expenditure and the strength of troops actually on duty in India indicate the probability of an excess over the budget grant or a saving in it. If there is an excess, it will be his duty to bring it promptly to notice, with a view to an additional grant being obtained from Government, if it cannot be met by reappropriation. In the event of a saving, the money will be available for reallocation on fresh expenditure according as the Commander-in-Chief, with the advice of the Military Council, may decide. For example, it may be utilised to meet excesses under other grant heads, or to finance new schemes which have been approved and for which no provision exists in the budget.

The Deputy Financial Adviser in the Quartermaster-General's branch will require efficient assistants, termed Assistant Financial Advisers, to watch the expenditure of the various Directors under the Quartermaster-General. These assistants should also be in charge of the expenditure on grass farms and dairy farms, and on mechanical transport workshops, and will be responsible for seeing that cost accounts are properly maintained. In the same way there should be a Deputy Financial Adviser attached to the Royal Air Force who should also be responsible for seeing that cost accounts are maintained in its manufacturing establishments. Each of these Deputy Financial Advisers will also be responsible for assisting the head of the branch in framing his budget estimate.

45. *Financial arrangements in connection with Production and Provision.*—It will be seen from Section I of this Part that alternative arrangements have been suggested for the administrative control of the army factories, of contracts for purchases of supplies of all kinds in bulk, and of the Royal Indian Marine. Whichever of the two systems be adopted, we recommend that there should be a separate Controller at the headquarters of Government, who will maintain the accounts of ordnance factory expenditure, and will also function as a Deputy Financial Adviser, and will render assistance to the executive in the financial administration of the factories. He should pay special attention to the proper maintenance of cost accounts. A second Controller, with similar duties, may be required in connection with the clothing factories, though it may be found possible for one Controller to exercise his functions in respect of both groups of factories.

A system was introduced, with effect from the 1st April, 1919, under which separate finance and accounting offices were established in each of the ordnance factories, with a central office attached to the headquarters of the Director of Ordnance Factories. The function of these offices was to maintain cost accounts, to furnish statistics connected with these accounts to the factory superintendents and to the Director of Ordnance Factories in such a manner as would be of the greatest assistance to the administration, and to help the administration in the preparation of estimates and with all financial work generally. We consider that these arrangements are satisfactory and should be extended to the clothing factories as soon as possible.

With regard to the contracts for the purchase of stores and supplies of all kinds, we recommend that the accounts and audit should be concentrated under a Controller at headquarters, whose financial advice should be at the disposal of the authority responsible for making the contracts.

As regards the Royal Indian Marine, under whatever Member of Council the supreme control may be placed, the greater part of the administrative work will be in the hands of the Director, whose headquarters will be at Bombay. He will require financial assistance, and we recommend that he should have attached to his office a Controller, who should not only maintain the marine accounts, including those relating to the dockyards, but should also discharge the duties of a Deputy Financial Adviser.

46. *Financial advice in Commands and Divisions.*—At present financial advice in Commands and Divisions is given by the Deputy Military Auditors-General, who are located at the headquarters of the Commands, and by the Divisional Controllers of Military Accounts respectively. If it be found possible hereafter to delegate to the commanders of these formations wider administrative powers, it may be found necessary to appoint whole-time financial advisers to assist them in the exercise of these powers. For the present, however, we do not consider this necessary, since there would not be sufficient work to occupy fully officers who had no other duties to perform. We recognise that it is possibly open to objection to combine the functions of accounts and audit with those of financial advice, and that officers of the Military Accounts Department have hitherto had no opportunities for obtaining higher financial training, and for this reason cannot be altogether satisfactory in their capacity as Financial Advisers. We consider, however, that the arrangements which we have mentioned for attaching Deputy Financial Advisers and Assistant Financial Advisers to the several branches of Army Headquarters will afford the necessary training to a considerable number of officers of the Military Accounts Department, who will thus be well equipped in the future to render financial assistance to commands and divisions.

47. *The Military Accountant-General.*—We do not propose any change in the present arrangements under which the Military Accountant-General works under the Financial Adviser at Army Headquarters and in the closest co-operation with him. The Military Accountant-General's main function, apart from administering the department of which he is the head, should be to see that the estimates are prepared, and the accounts maintained, in such a form as will be of the greatest help to the military authorities and to the Finance Department of the Government of India.

We have carefully considered whether the Military Accountant-General and his department should not come directly under the control of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, who would thus have the same administrative relations with this department as he now has with the Indian Finance Department. We think, however, that the balance of advantage lies in retaining the present system, which ensures that the Financial Adviser is kept closely in touch with, and exercises, under the Finance Member, a certain measure of control over, the department which deals with the pay and audit arrangements of the army in India. This system enables the Commander-in-Chief to obtain information without delay regarding defects in these arrangements which react unfavourably on the contentment and efficiency of the army, and to ensure that action is taken to remedy such defects. This would prove more difficult if the responsibility for the work of the Military Accounts Department were removed from the Financial Adviser, and placed under the Comptroller and Auditor-General, who is not so easily accessible, and in fact does not accompany the Government of India and Army Headquarters to Simla during the summer months.

Moreover, to divorce the Financial Adviser from all responsibility for the work of the Military Accounts Department would result in a weakening of his control over military expenditure. The evils of such an arrangement have been apparent during the last few years in respect to Military Works expenditure, which has been brought to account by an officer directly subordinate to the Comptroller and Auditor-General, and not subordinate to the Financial Adviser.

We are, however, impressed by the desirability of securing that the Comptroller and Auditor-General shall exercise more definite authority over the audit staff of the Military Accounts Department. At present he has no direct relations with the personnel of the Military Accounts Department, even those employed on purely audit duties. We understand that the question of the method by which the Comptroller and Auditor-General should exercise his responsibility for the audit of all public expenditure in India is at present under consideration by the Government, and we have no desire to anticipate or prejudge the conclusions at which they may arrive. But, even though no fundamental changes may result from this examination of the matter, we consider that the Comptroller and Auditor-General should at least have a voice

in the selection and posting of the Military Deputy Auditors-General, and should have under his direct administrative control a sufficient number of senior audit officers whether military or civil, to enable him to satisfy himself by test audits regarding the correctness and completeness of the audit of military expenditure.

48. *Preparation of the military budget.*—The rules which govern the preparation of the budget estimates are contained in paragraphs 28 to 36 of Army Regulations, India, Volume III. We consider that the present procedure is not satisfactory. The chief defect in the system is that the bulk of the work of preparing the estimates devolves either upon the Controllers of Military Accounts in divisions, *e.g.*, in respect to pay charges, ecclesiastical charges, miscellaneous services, conveyance by road, river, sea and rail, rewards for military services, pensions and receipt grants; or upon the departmental officers at divisional headquarters, *e.g.*, upon the Assistant Directors of Supply and Transport of Divisions in respect to supplies of food and forage, transport and compensation for dearness of food, and upon the Deputy Directors of Medical Services of Divisions in respect of medical services. The heads of branches at Army Headquarters are only responsible for preparing so much of the budget estimates as refer to the personnel of their own branches, and, in the case of the Quartermaster-General, the cantonment budget. Certain Directors prepare their own estimates; but though several of them work directly under the Quartermaster-General, he is not responsible for scrutinizing the consolidated budget of the departments and services which he administers.

49. Another defect is that, although in the budget the grants are shown as at the disposal of various military authorities, in practice the latter do not really administer the grants thus allotted to them. For example, the grant for the pay charges of troops is shown in the budget as under the control of general officers commanding divisions and independent brigades. In practice these officers have no power to administer this grant nor to utilize savings in pay charges to meet other expenditure. The budget is to this extent misleading and fails to represent the facts correctly.

A third defect is that estimates are not prepared with sufficient accuracy, and frequently fail to take into account consequential expenditure in other directions. For instance, it sometimes happens that a scheme for administrative reorganization, placed before Government by the branch concerned, ignores the expenditure which will result from the provision of the necessary buildings.

50. The present form, too, of the military accounts renders it impossible to ascertain readily what is the cost of a particular arm of the service or of a particular formation. For instance, it is not possible to say what is the total cost to Government of the mechanical transport service, since all charges on account of stores and equipment and food, etc., are lumped together under the prescribed grant heads of the supplying departments (Supply and Transport, Clothing, Ordnance, etc.), and these grant heads do not indicate how much of the provision refers to the supply of stores and equipment to the mechanical transport.

51. We recommend that the heads of the principal departments of the army should prepare their own budgets for all the services and departments which they administer, receiving for this purpose assistance from the Deputy Financial Advisers who we have proposed should be attached to their branches.

52. Not only do we wish to impose upon the heads of branches the responsibility for the preparation of their budget estimates, but we also desire to make them directly responsible, under the Commander-in-Chief, for the administration of the grants allotted to them. The budget grants should be definitely allotted to the authorities responsible for the various services. Portions of the grants should be reallocated, under the general control of the head of the branch, to the various Directors. For example, the grant for mechanical transport should be administered, under the Quartermaster-General, by the Director of Mechanical Transport, the grant for the purchase of animals by the Director of

Remounts, etc. The budget should be so framed as to show clearly the amount of grant at the disposal of each officer.

53. The military budget ordinarily offers little scope for reappropriation of funds. During the war, a large sum of money was provided annually as a reserve to meet unforeseen expenditure, other than that entailed by active operations. We do not recommend the continuance of this system, which weakens the control of the Commander-in-Chief over military expenditure and affords less incentive to the spending authorities to keep their expenditure within their grants. We consider that greater elasticity will result if our proposal is adopted to make the heads of branches responsible for administering their own grants. It will be their duty to watch the progress of expenditure of these grants, with a view to effecting savings, which can then be utilised, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, to meet excesses under other grant heads or to finance new schemes. In order that full advantage may result from this system, it is essential that the accounts shall be maintained in such a form as will afford prompt and regular information regarding the progress of expenditure. At present the military accounts system is defective in this respect, but we understand that steps are being taken to improve it.

54. We also consider it very desirable that information should be promptly and readily afforded to the Government of India regarding the progress of expenditure at home in connection with indents for stores, etc. Great inconvenience is caused by the fact that such information is not furnished until towards the close of the financial year, and then only in such a condensed form as to afford little assistance.

55. We also recommend that there should be a "block vote" for each arm of the service, fighting and ancillary. For example, in the case of regimental units, there should be a "block vote" for their pay, food and forage, clothing and equipment. Similarly, in the case of the Royal Air Force or of the mechanical transport, there should be a "block vote" for pay, food, clothing, equipment and stores. After these "block votes" have been settled, the sums should be distributed among the prescribed budget heads, *e.g.*, the various sums allotted for food and forage should be brought together under the appropriate grant head, *viz.*, "Grant 4—Supply and Transport," and all the sums allotted for clothing should be brought together under "Grant 6—Clothing." There should, however, be an appendix to the budget, showing under one head the total sum of money allotted for each arm of the service under the various heads.

56. With regard to purely manufacturing concerns, such as the ordnance and army clothing factories, the procedure to be adopted in allotting budget grants should, we consider, be as follows. Each administrative authority at Army Headquarters who requires stores from the factories, *e.g.*, the Quartermaster-General in respect of clothing and equipment, and the Air Officer Commanding in respect of the service under his control, will allot an appropriate portion of his "block vote" to the authority which supplies the articles required. The aggregate of these allotments will, in the budget, be placed at the disposal of that authority, who will arrange his programme of manufacture accordingly and will reallocate the necessary sums to the various factories. Any additional indent on a factory, or the cancellation of any indent already passed on to it, will be accounted for by a simultaneous addition to, or reduction in, the funds placed at the disposal of the factory.

57. We suggest that it might afford a direct incentive to the economic administration of the factories if savings (within certain defined limits) effected in the "on-costs" during the course of the financial year (but not savings due to unforeseen reductions in the cost of raw materials, etc.) should be available for expenditure, during that year or within a reasonable period after its close, on the improvement of their working and efficiency. We attach great importance to this recommendation, and we consider that, if it is adopted and if cost accounting is efficient, it will result in considerable economies in manufacturing costs. It will also benefit the army, as the lower "on-costs" of manufacture of an article effected in any year will reduce the price charged to the army for that article in the following year. If at any time a factory is unable to use the

savings resulting from economical management, the money will be available for reallocation. The rate of "on-costs" to be provided in the budget in respect of all articles manufactured in ordnance or army clothing factories should contain a reasonable allowance, on a percentage basis, for depreciation of machinery and plant; and this sum should be at the disposal of the factory authorities to expend at their discretion on repairs and replacements.

We think that a similar system, under which savings in "on-costs" should be available for expenditure on improvements, should also be applied to grass and dairy farms.

We understand that many of the proposals outlined in the preceding paragraphs have already received the approval of the Government of India, and we think that they should be introduced at an early date.

58. If it be decided to adopt the proposal to entrust production and provision, and the administration of the Royal Indian Marine, to a separate Member of Council, we recommend that the spheres of financial responsibility of this Member and of the Commander-in-Chief respectively should be defined as follows. When the military estimates for the following year are being prepared, the Commander-in-Chief will furnish his colleague with an estimate of the quantity of munitions, stores, clothing, foodstuffs and forage which the army will require, indicating where possible the approximate dates at which delivery should be made. The Member in charge of the Department of Munitions and Marine will then inform the Commander-in-Chief of the estimated cost of these various supplies. He will base his estimates on the ascertained cost of manufacture during the current year, modified if necessary with reference to such factors as probable alterations in the cost of raw materials, etc., and in the case of purchased articles by the anticipated trend of market prices. These estimates will be incorporated under the appropriate grant heads in the military budget estimates. When the budget estimates are finally accepted and passed, the Commander-in-Chief will transfer to the Member for Munitions and Marine the whole sum included in the budget for production and provision, and this amount will be administered by that Member, subject to the usual control of the Finance Department.

If in the course of the financial year it is found that savings (other than those referred to in paragraph 57) can be effected—for example, through an unforeseen fall in prices of foodstuffs or a reduction in the quantities of food or other articles required by the army—these savings will be replaced at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief for expenditure on other objects. If, on the other hand, an unforeseen rise in the price of purchased articles or of raw materials, such as textiles, appears likely to cause an excess over the sum allotted to the Member for Munitions and Marine for the purpose of supplying the army's requirements, the latter will report the circumstance to the Commander-in-Chief, who, unless he is prepared to meet the deficiency from savings under other grants, will, with the assistance of his colleague, approach the Government of India for an additional grant. If the Commander-in-Chief in the course of the year finds that he requires larger quantities of supplies than he originally estimated, it will be necessary for him to obtain, either by reappropriation or by an additional grant from Government, the requisite funds and to place them at his colleague's disposal.

59. If the administration of the Royal Indian Marine is transferred to the proposed Department of Munitions and Marine, we recommend that the Marine budget should be entirely separated from the Military budget, and be solely administered by the Member in charge of that department.

60. We recommend that the Financial Adviser at Army Headquarters should also be the Financial Adviser to the proposed Department of Munitions and Marine, in which he will be represented by a competent Deputy Financial Adviser. This arrangement, which we have ascertained will be practicable, will secure the closest liaison in matters of finance between Army Headquarters and the new Department, and will enable the Financial Adviser to exercise general control over the whole military and marine expenditure, and to ensure

that the necessary adjustments, to which reference has been made, are carried out without friction or delay.

61. *Pay arrangements.*—We have received evidence showing that great dissatisfaction at present exists with regard to the arrangements for disbursement of pay to officers and men of the army in India. We recognise that many of the complaints are due to a partial breakdown of the system under the abnormal strain of war conditions, the shortage of accounts establishments and the employment of a large body of untrained officers and clerks. But the inevitable delays incidental to the war do not wholly account for the universal feeling of dissatisfaction which prevails at present. We consider that the main defect of the present system is that the accounts of officers and men are prepared, as a rule, at a great distance from the station at which they are serving. This inevitably causes delay and gives rise to misunderstandings which could be promptly and easily removed if there were closer relations between the individuals concerned and the disbursing authorities. We have learnt with satisfaction that the Government of India propose to make a radical change in the system under which accounts are prepared. In future there will, we understand, be trained military accounts clerks attached to each unit and formation. These clerks will prepare the pay accounts of the officers and men, which will thereafter be sent to a disbursing centre for the issue of a cheque. This cheque will be issued without waiting for audit of the claims, the audit being taken up after payment, and any overpayments or short payments adjusted in the next bill. The clerks of the Military Accounts Department will also assist the regimental authorities in the maintenance of proper accounts of regimental stores and equipment. The proposed arrangements appear to us to be a great improvement on the existing system, and will have the further advantage of relieving regimental officers of much office work and correspondence, which now take up time which should be spent in training the men. We consider that staff officers should prepare their own salary bills, which, after payment by the disbursing office, should be subjected to audit in the ordinary course.

We understand that the arrangements sketched above for the disbursement of pay will not affect the system under which pay is drawn in the field in the form of advances, and the accounts are maintained at the base; and we hope that, in so far as may be practicable, efforts will be made to ensure that any divergence between the peace and the war systems will not involve the risk of dislocation and breakdown on the outbreak of war.

62. *Audit of pay and allowances.*—We have also received numerous complaints regarding the minuteness and rigidity of audit, and we consider that there is considerable justification for these complaints. It must, however, be remembered that the primary duty of an auditor is to apply the strict letter of the regulations to all claims with which he has to deal; and although it must be admitted that the audit by the Military Accounts Department has, especially prior to the war, been unduly narrow, and has perhaps sometimes exceeded its proper functions, we consider that the principal reason why so many disputes occur between the audit authorities and the individuals whose claims come under their review is that the Army Regulations, India, dealing with pay, allowances, leave, pensions, etc., are hopelessly complex, bristle with anomalies, and are often obscure, if not positively contradictory. We hope that certain recommendations, contained in other parts of this Report, will render possible a considerable simplification of these regulations; and we recommend that, if our proposals are accepted, the task of revising them be taken up without delay.

63. *Revision of Regulations.*—We go further, and recommend that the revised regulations should be framed on different lines and in a different spirit. In our opinion, one of the main defects of the existing regulations on these subjects is that they attempt to provide by rule for every contingency which may occur. We consider that the method to be followed in revising them should be that the regulations should, in addition to showing clearly the rates of pay, etc., and the conditions of service, lay down broad principles and leave their application to exceptional cases to be decided, on the merits by competent financial authority. We recognise that it is impossible to make the Army Regulations, India, as brief and simple as the corresponding regulations at home.

The causes which lead to the volume and complexity of the regulations in India are that there are both British and Indian troops serving under different conditions as regards pay, promotion, etc.; that there are various services which are manned partly by officers belonging to Home establishments and partly by officers belonging to Indian departments; and that Indian service, unlike service at home, renders long periods of furlough necessary, and these in turn necessitate elaborate rules governing furlough allowances and the acting arrangements in place of officers absent on leave.

With regard to the spirit in which the regulations should be conceived, we consider that the fault of the present system is that, generally speaking, the regulations appear to be framed on the assumption that every individual will endeavour to take advantage, whenever possible, of the Government which he serves, and that the regulations must therefore be so rigidly worded and must contain so many safeguards as to defeat this object. This spirit of distrust on the part of the Government has, perhaps inevitably, led to a regrettable tendency on the part of officers to put forward claims and demands in excess of their dues, in the hope that they will be passed. Thus the relations between the Government and a large body of its servants are, in this respect, most unsatisfactory. We consider that serious disciplinary notice should be taken of any attempt to evade the rules or to take unfair advantage of them. But we believe that far better results will be obtained if the regulations are framed in a spirit of trust, and on the assumption that the individuals whose pay and allowances and privileges are governed by them are honourable men who will not attempt to obtain more than is their just due.

64. *Summary of recommendations.*—It will be convenient to summarise the recommendations put forward on the subject of military finance. They are:—

(a) That the system under which financial control is exercised at Army Headquarters should be continued.

(b) That the Financial Adviser should be a Member of the Military Council.

(c) That there should be a Deputy Financial Adviser in each of the principal spending branches of Army Headquarters and in the Royal Air Force, with functions as described.

(d) That, whatever arrangement is made for production and provision, there should be at headquarters a Controller of Ordnance Factory Accounts, who would also act as Deputy Financial Adviser to the authority responsible for administration. This Controller's functions might extend to the clothing factories; but, if this is not found practicable, there should be a separate Controller for the latter.

(e) That the system under which separate finance and accounting offices are attached to the ordnance factories should be extended to the clothing factories.

(f) That the accounts and audit relating to contracts should be concentrated under a Controller at headquarters, who should also act as Deputy Financial Adviser to the administrative authority.

(g) That a Controller should be attached to the office of the Director, Royal Indian Marine, at Bombay, to maintain the marine accounts and to act as Deputy Financial Adviser to the Director.

(h) That for the present no change should be made in the arrangements under which financial assistance and advice are given in commands and divisions.

(i) That no change should be made in the status and duties of the Military Accountant-General.

(j) That the Comptroller and Auditor-General should exercise more definite authority over the audit staff of the Military Accounts Department.

(k) That the responsibility for preparing their estimates and administering their grants should be definitely placed on the heads of branches at Army Headquarters and on the officer commanding the Royal Air Force.

(l) That the military accounts should be maintained in such a form as will enable the heads of branches to watch the progress of expenditure, with a view to savings being made available for other objects.

(m) That prompt information should be afforded to the Government of India regarding the progress of expenditure at home on stores, etc.

(n) That there should be a block vote for each arm of the service and for the Royal Air Force.

(o) That savings effected in the "on-costs" of factories should be available for expenditure on the improvement of the factories.

(p) That the spheres of financial responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief and the Member for Munitions and Marine (if this department is formed) should be defined on the lines indicated.

(q) That the Financial Adviser at Army Headquarters should also be the Financial Adviser to the proposed Department of Munitions and Marine.

(r) That a radical change, on the lines proposed by the Government of India, should be made in the system under which pay is disbursed.

(s) That the regulations dealing with pay, allowances, leave, pensions, etc., should be revised.

ESHER.

M. F. O'DWYER.

H. V. COX, *Lieut.-Gen.*

CLAUD W. JACOB, *Lieut.-Gen.*

H. HUDSON, *Lieut.-Gen.*

G. FELL.

WEBB GILLMAN, *Major-Gen.*

UMAR HAYAT.

K. G. GUPTA.

I agree with my colleagues except that I consider that the Financial Adviser should be an official of Army Headquarters, and not of the Finance Department, and that, if a separate Department is set up for Supply, the same official should not act as Financial Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief and the Supply Member.


J. P. Du CANE, *Lieut.-Gen.*

C. M. WAGSTAFF, *Colonel, Secretary.*

19th May 1920.

DISTRIBUTION OF DUTIES AT ARMY HEADQUARTERS

Commander-in-Chief.



AIR OFFICER COMMANDING ROYAL AIR FORCE.

Administration of the Royal Air Force and of the grants for it.

MILITARY SECRETARY.

Appointments, promotions and retirements of officers.

Confidential Reports.


Compilation of the staff list, and custody of records of staff officers.

Honours, rewards, decorations, and patronage.

Secretary to Selection Board.


DISTRIBUTION OF DUTIES OF MEMBER FOR MUNITIONS AND MARINE.

Member of Council.



DISTRIBUTION OF DUTIES IN THE CASE OF THE APPOINTMENT OF A SURVEYOR-GENERAL OF SUPPLY UNDER THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

Commander-in-Chief.



The duties of the Surveyor-General of Supply would be the same as those of the Member for Munitions and Marine, with the exception of the administration of the Royal Indian Marine.

*Member of the Military Council.

REPORT
OF THE
ARMY IN INDIA COMMITTEE.
1919—1920.

Parts III to IX and Appendix.

COVERING LETTER.

PART III.—Decentralisation and Liaison.

PART IV.—Closer Relations between the British and Indian Armies.

SECTION I.—Regimental Officers.

SECTION II.—Departments.

SECTION III.—The Medical Services.

SECTION IV.—Engineer Services.

SECTION V.—Training and Military Education.

SECTION VI.—Appointments.

PART V.—Conditions of Service in the Army in India.

SECTION I.—British Officers.

SECTION II.—Pay and Allowances.

SECTION III.—British Troops.

SECTION IV.—Indian Officers.

SECTION V.—Indian Other Ranks.

PART VI.—The Territorial Force.

PART VII.—The Royal Indian Marine.

PART VIII.—Miscellaneous.

SECTION I.—The Indian Army Reserve of Officers.

SECTION II.—Conditions of Service of "Followers".

SECTION III.—Military Staff Clerks.

SECTION IV.—Chaplains.

SECTION V.—Class Composition of Units.

SECTION VI.—The Burma and Assam Military Police.

PART IX.—Conclusion.

APPENDIX.

TO THE RIGHT HON'BLE E. S. MONTAGU, P.C.

SIR,

We beg now to forward to you the further and concluding Parts (III—IX) of our Report. The enquiry upon which these portions of our Report are based was mainly conducted in India, although our recommendations have been fully discussed and finally settled after the return of the Committee to this country.

These portions of our Report deal mainly with questions of administration, and with certain specific questions of organisation with which we have been asked to deal. Although our terms of reference include the words "where necessary the organisation of the Army in India", we have not conceived it to be part of our duty to enquire into or to submit recommendations regarding the numbers and composition of the Army in India, nor the specific purposes for which that army is required in view of the greater responsibilities assumed by the British Empire in consequence of the Treaties of Peace recently concluded. We have made recommendations, at your request, in regard to the formation of a Territorial Force in India, but we were not invited to express an opinion upon the ratio of British to Indian troops.

Parts III to IX cover a wide field. They deal with matters of administration vitally affecting the contentment of the Army in India. We hope and believe that the suggestions which we have made will contribute to the well-being of the British and Indian soldiers under the control of the Government of India.

In the concluding Part of the Report we have drawn attention to the effects upon Indian finance of the recommendations which we have made. It is impossible for us to form even an approximate estimate of the cost to the Indian tax-payer, but we are convinced of the necessity of raising the standard of living for British and Indian soldiers of all ranks, if the spirit of both is to be maintained at the high level which the interests of the Indian Empire demand.

One of our Indian colleagues, Sir Krishna Gupta, has reminded us, in a note appended to this Report, of the momentous declaration of policy made in August 1917, with a view of placing India on the road to the attainment of a Dominion status. That we had not overlooked this Proclamation was made clear in the letter which we addressed to you in connection with Part I of our Report. A Dominion status implies responsibilities as well as privileges, and this obvious reflection has been borne in mind by us throughout the whole of our enquiry and the recommendations which we have based upon it.

Another of our colleagues, Sir Umar Hayat Khan, holds strong opinions on the subject of the conditions of enlistment in the Indian Army, and views with grave apprehension any suggestion to convert it into a short-service army on the lines of some continental armies. We understand that, though there is no intention of proceeding so far as this, still in order to secure an effective reserve to cover wastage in the field it may be necessary to shorten the period of service with the colours. We hope that any change in this direction will be introduced with caution, since we hold that every unit of a voluntary army should contain a considerable proportion of well-trained and seasoned men.

We have endeavoured not to trench, more than was absolutely necessary, upon matters which clearly lie within the sphere of the General Staff. Where we have done so, it has been at the request of Army Headquarters.

Our recommendations have been made with the view of enabling the Government of India and yourself to form practical conclusions upon a series of problems that have given rise to some controversy in the past, and to place them in a light which may minimise controversy in the future and lead to their easy solution.

We desire gratefully to acknowledge the assistance which you have rendered us, which has been afforded to us by the officials of the India Office under your control, by the Viceroy, the Commander-in-Chief and officers of every rank and degree, in

India, as well as the valuable services which have been rendered to us by our secretaries, Colonel C. M. Wagstaff and Major T. W. Lloyd.

Our colleague, Lieut.-General Sir John DuCane, Master-General of the Ordnance, has asked to be excused from signing Parts III—IX, on the grounds that he was prevented from going to India with the Committee, and that owing to his heavy official duties he has been unable to attend regularly the meetings that have taken place since the Committee returned. We appreciate the reasons which have actuated him.

It is a matter of deep regret that we have not had the advantage of the presence, during the later stages of our discussions, of our colleague, Lieut.-General Sir Claud Jacob, who was unavoidably detained in India, but our conclusions have been submitted to him, and it is a matter of satisfaction to us to feel that they meet with his general approval.

We are,

SIR,

Your obedient Servants,

ESHER.

M. F. O'DWYER.

H. V. COX, *Lt.-Gen.*

H. HUDSON, *Lt.-Gen.*

G. FELL.

WEBB, GILLMAN, *Maj.-Gen.*

UMAR, HAYAT.

K. G. GUPTA.

C. M. WAGSTAFF, *Colonel,*

Secretary.

22nd June 1920.

PART III.

Decentralisation and Liaison.

PART III.

Decentralisation and Liaison.

In Part II of this Report we have shown that it is necessary to relieve the Commander-in-Chief and promote the more rapid conduct of business. One method of effecting this is to secure decentralisation at Army Headquarters from the Commander-in-Chief to his principal staff officers, and from them to their directors or assistants. We consider further that the same principles of devolution and decentralisation should be extended so as to include the whole of the army organisation in India.

Before making any definite suggestions on these points, it will be convenient to review the evolution of the present systems of command and staff in India.

The System of Command in India.

2. The "Command" system in India was first introduced in 1895, on the abolition of the old Bengal, Bombay and Madras armies. Four Commands were formed in that year, *viz.*, Punjab, Bengal, Madras and Bombay, each under a lieutenant-general, who was responsible for the administration as well as for the training of troops in his command.

3. In 1904, as a consequence of Lord Kitchner's redistribution and reorganisation, the Madras Command was abolished, and the army was divided into three Commands—Northern, Eastern and Western, corresponding to the Punjab, Bengal and Bombay Commands.

4. In 1907, on the delegation of administrative powers to divisional commanders, Lord Kitchner considered that the retention of similar powers by the lieutenant-generals of Commands merely led to delay in the despatch of business. The Command system was therefore abolished, and India was divided into two armies—Northern and Southern—each under a general officer, who was charged with command, inspection and training, but was not accorded any administrative responsibility.

5. It appears that Lord Kitchner, in drawing up his reorganisation and redistribution scheme in 1903, intended that the army should be organised in divisional areas, each to include one or more definite war formations, together with the garrison troops necessary for the internal security of the area in war; in other words, each divisional area was to be self-contained and self-administered.

This system was based on the assumption that the necessary concentration of troops would actually be carried into effect and that divisional commanders would be able to exercise close control. This concentration, which was dependent on the entire re-adjustment of accommodation, involved a large and very expensive building scheme, and was never completed. Thus, in practice, it was the exception rather than the rule for the whole of the troops of war formations to be located in peace within their own divisional areas under their divisional commanders; while internal security troops, when required, had in many cases to be brought into these areas from outside. The tendency was, therefore, towards an increased dispersion rather than concentration.

Further, for purpose of internal security, India was divided into a number of smaller areas within the divisional spheres. It was intended in 1904 that brigade commanders should be provided for such areas, and also, in order to secure continuity of command and administration, that the general officers, with their staffs, should continue to perform their normal duties on and after the mobilization of the field army. These brigade commands were never created. With the abolition of the three Commands in 1907, the means for securing in time of war continuity of command and administration disappeared. In practice, therefore, the command of an internal security area fell, on the mobilization of the field army, to the senior regimental commanding officer in that area. The result was that, when the divisional commander and his staff went on service, an improvised staff had to assume responsibility for administration and internal security.

6. This system proved unsatisfactory both in peace and on mobilization for war. We have been told that in peace divisional commanders were overwhelmed by the large administrative responsibilities imposed on them, and that their staffs were insufficient to meet the immediate requirements of administration or to provide for continuity on mobilization. Also, owing to the dispersal of troops in their areas, commanders were unable to exercise any degree of close control or to devote sufficient attention to their primary duty, *viz.*, the training of troops for war.

At the same time, the elimination of administrative responsibilities from the higher command of armies entailed an additional burden on Army Headquarters, where the administrative machine was clogged by a mass of minor detail. Floating in the background, in a somewhat nebulous atmosphere, were the two army commanders, whose duties were confined to questions of training, discipline and efficiency of units, and, to a limited extent to the appointment and promotion of officers, but who were without any responsibility whatever for administration.

7. Such was the system at the outbreak of the great war.

Early in the war both army commanders took the field, and in 1916 a successor was appointed to command the Northern Army, and in 1917 a successor to the Southern Army Commander was appointed, but the Quetta, Lucknow and Burma Divisions remained directly under the Commander-in-Chief. The duties of these army commanders remained as before, but a major-general in charge of administration with a small staff was added, to enable them more effectively to undertake the inspection of administrative units and services. They still remained, however, without actual administrative responsibilities.

8. In 1918 financial powers were given to these army commanders, and they were also authorised to deal with all administrative questions, except those involving matters of policy or of new principle, or those relating to the war. To assist them their staffs were again increased.

The Staff System in India.

9. The essential difference between the staff system :—

- (a) as laid down in King's Regulations,
- (b) as laid down in Field Service Regulations, and
- (c) as now practised in India,

lies in the degree of division between the functions of command and administration.

10. Under the staff system as laid down in King's Regulations, each general officer commanding-in-chief has on his staff a general officer in charge of administration, to whom he delegates powers to deal with all administrative matters not involving questions of policy or principle. He is thus relieved of all responsibility in such matters.

The general officer in charge of administration :—

- (i) Corresponds direct with the War Office.
- (ii) Exercises the financial powers of a general officer commanding-in-chief.
- (iii) Has the power to delegate his financial authority, within certain limits.
- (iv) Is responsible to the Army Council for the proper expenditure of money.
- (v) Deals direct with local heads of services and departments.

The result is that all administrative responsibility rests on him ; he issues orders to the heads of services and departments, who in their turn give their order to their subordinate representatives, leaving subordinate commanders to formulate their requirements, but relieving them of the responsibility for meeting such requirements.

11. Under the staff system as laid down in Field Service Regulations, there is no general officer in charge of administration. The responsibility for providing the requirements of the forces in the field rests with the various directors or heads of administrative services and departments, subject to the general control and supervision of the three principal staff officers. The latter are responsible for the issue of all orders of the commander to the various services. These in their turn are responsible for the provision of administrative requirements.

12. Under the staff system as now practised in India, the responsibility for administration rests on army and subordinate commanders, who have representatives of the administrative services to advise and assist them. These representatives carry out the orders transmitted to them by the commander through his staff.

13. In the Commands and in some divisions in India, general officers in charge of administration were appointed during the war, but were not given the same powers or responsibilities as a general officer in charge of administration in the United Kingdom. In India they co-ordinate the work of the adjutant-general's and quartermaster-general's branches, and are responsible to their commanders, but not directly to Army Headquarters, the channel of correspondence, except on technical matters peculiar to a particular service, being through the command or division. They are, in fact, senior staff officers who co-ordinate administrative work and who in virtue of their position and experience relieved the general officer commanding of all detail, though not of responsibility.

14. The staff system now obtaining in India appears to us well suited to local conditions.

Proposals for organisation of Commands.

15. The military conditions and requirements in India are not analogous to those either of the United Kingdom or of an expeditionary force. In India the areas of commands and districts are infinitely greater and communications are less rapid. External conditions demand a state of readiness for war, while internal unrest may at any time require immediate action. It is therefore essential to have a wide distribution of subordinate commands, with commanders fully acquainted with local conditions, ready to grapple with any situation, and armed with adequate powers. We consider that this can best be effected not merely by increasing the responsibilities of a few high staff officers at Army Headquarters, but also by widening the powers of subordinate officers ; in other words, by large and real decentralisation.

16. In establishing a system of command in India, regard must be had to the following considerations :—

- (a) The distance to be covered and the paucity of communications, which limit the size of an area that can be controlled from one centre.
- (b) The desirability of making the boundaries of military districts coincide with those of civil administrations.
- (c) The necessity of limiting the numbers of subordinate commanders to be dealt with by superior authority.
- (d) The limitations imposed by consideration of accommodation, and by the necessity for providing internal security garrisons. Financial stringency is an obstacle to the provision of new accommodation, so long as barracks or lines remain unoccupied. Consequently, the distribution of troops must be governed rather by existing accommodation than by existing military requirements. These factors necessitate a large measure of dispersion in peace.

17. We have examined a paper, prepared by the General Staff, in which it is proposed that India should be divided into fourteen separate areas, to be called "districts".

It is evident that if Army Headquarters is to exercise effective control, and is not to be overloaded with work, some link must be introduced between Army Headquarters and Districts, in order to avoid a return to the state of affairs which existed before the war. The General Staff consider that for this purpose four Commands should be formed, each under an Army Commander, graded as a general officer commanding-in-chief, with an adequate staff. These Commands, will comprise districts, each containing a certain number of brigade commands. Burma should form an independent district. Districts should be classified as first or second class, according to their importance.

18. If this plan is adopted, the army and district commanders should be responsible for the command and administration of the troops in their areas, as well as for internal security. The boundaries of each command and district should,

usually, coincide with those of civil administrations. In those districts in which war formations are located, the general officer commanding the district should also command the war formation. But in order to ensure continuity of administration on the war formations proceeding on service, the staffs in peace should be so constituted that a proportion, including the general officer in charge of administration, would remain behind to administer the district.

19. Some further decentralisation will be effected by the system of grouping Indian units which it is proposed to introduce.

20. These proposals appear to us generally suitable, and likely to promote the policy of decentralisation which we have in view.

Internal Security and Liaison between the Military and Civil Authorities.

21. The functions of the army are to repel external aggression and to maintain internal security. For the proper discharge of the latter duty, it must keep close and constant touch with the civil authorities, who share the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. They should therefore be kept regularly informed of such military matters as :—

- (a) An unhealthy spirit among the troops.
- (b) Attempts from without or within to tamper with the troops, to excite disaffection, or to spread political propaganda.
- (c) Ill-feeling between the troops and the local civil population.

22. It appears that, at present, there is no regular system of communicating information on such points between the army and the civil authorities.

It is true that, since the outbreak of the war, the civil administration of each province prepares and forwards for the information of the Government of India a fortnightly report on the general political situation in its area, and copies of these reports are furnished to Army Headquarters, to the Commands, to divisions, and in some cases to brigades. In addition, a weekly summary of the political situation in India as a whole is drawn up by the Director of Central Intelligence and circulated to heads of provinces and certain military authorities. On the other hand, the army furnishes no corresponding information to the civil authorities. Cases have been mentioned to us in which the civil Government was seriously embarrassed by the absence of information as to seditious influences at work in particular units, as to the results of enquiries into cases of mutiny and sedition within the army, and as to the return to civil life of men discharged from the army on suspicion of seditious tendencies or of communicating with the enemy.

23. We understand that the General Staff are now considering measures for remedying these defects, and establishing close and regular liaison with provincial Governments. The point has been kept in view in the new scheme of Commands, each of which will comprise and deal with one or more complete civil administrations in matters of internal security, hitherto centralised at Army Headquarters.

24. But it is not enough to establish a system of liaison between the superior military and civil authorities. To be really effective, the system must be extended to the local civil and military officers, on whom arrangements for internal security must ultimately devolve.

With this object we make the following general suggestions :—

- (a) Periodical summaries of military external and internal intelligence, likely to have a bearing on the internal situation, should be furnished by Army Headquarters to provincial Governments, which should be responsible for communicating such items as they consider necessary to the local officers concerned.
- (b) Periodical conferences should be held between the local civil and military officers for the discussion of matters of common interest.
- (c) There should be closer relations and more regular correspondence between different provinces on matters which are likely to affect the internal security of more than one province.

(d) As a large portion of the Indian Army is now employed overseas in Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Persia, etc., where movements and influences hostile to the British Government in India may be at work, it is desirable that these areas also should be brought within the sphere of the Indian military and civil intelligence agencies, so that information bearing on the Indian Army, or on political movements likely to affect India, may be made promptly available in India.

(e) As in recent years many seditious and revolutionary movements in India have been initiated and organised in Europe, America, Africa, and the Far East, and one object common to all of them is to tamper with the loyalty of the Indian Army, information from those areas should also be obtained by the Government of India and promptly transmitted, as far as necessary, to the civil and military authorities concerned.

(f) The intelligence collected under the above heads should be collated and disseminated by one responsible authority in India.

Propaganda.

25. In the foregoing paragraphs we have endeavoured to outline the steps that should be taken to ensure co-operation between civil and military authorities in obtaining indications of local feeling, and the earliest information of attempts to spread disaffection. We think, however, that these in themselves will be inadequate unless suitable measures are taken to bring before the army and the classes from which it is drawn, in clear and simple language, correct information as to the progress of events and the policy of Government. We consider that there should be a central bureau at the headquarters of the Government of India, in close touch with local Governments and with the authority referred to in paragraph 24 (f), and that this agency should be responsible for the collection and timely dissemination of such information.

We are also led to believe that there have been in some cases friction and misunderstanding between the press and Army Headquarters, owing to the fact that information upon matters affecting the army has not been freely communicated to the press. The value of the press in India as a medium for information appears to us to have been neglected in the past. We earnestly commend to the notice of the Government of India the importance of keeping the army and the public adequately informed of the trend of current events, through the press and other channels.

PART IV.

Closer Relations between the British and Indian Armies.

SECTION I.—Regimental Officers.

SECTION II.—Departments.

SECTION III.—The Medical Services.

SECTION IV.—Engineer Services.

SECTION V.—Training and Military Education.

SECTION VI.—Appointments.

PART IV.

Closer Relations between the British and Indian Armies.

1. A question to which we have devoted much attention is the possibility of establishing closer relations between the British and Indian Armies. The subject is a wide one, and we propose to divide it into appropriate sections.

The first Section relates to the British officers of the cavalry and infantry. We then proceed to examine, in Section II, the question of the administrative services, namely, the Supply and Transport Corps, and the Ordnance, Veterinary and Signal Services.

Next, we devote separate sections to the Medical and Engineer Services. The last two sections relate to closer co-operation in training and military education, and to the distribution of certain high appointments in India between the British service and the Indian Army.

SECTION I.

REGIMENTAL OFFICERS.

2. At the request of the Committee, Army Headquarters circulated to units of the Indian Army the following scheme for producing closer relations between British officers of the British and Indian Armies.

In the covering letter, in which remarks were invited, it was explained that the scheme was purely tentative, and that it did not commit the military authorities or the Government of India in any way.

Scheme for producing closer relations between British officers of the British and Indian Armies.

1. It is not necessary to labour the point that something in the direction of fusion of the British officers' cadre of the Indian Army with that of the British Army is much to be desired.

2. It may be noted, however, that any system of fusion must provide that Indian regiments shall always have in their senior ranks officers with a thorough knowledge of Indian soldiers and Indian conditions.

3. The advantages claimed for fusion, as a principle, are :—

- (i) That it would go far to prevent the deterioration, mental and physical, which sometimes sets in when officers have served continuously in India.
- (ii) It would prevent the final decision as to prolonged service in India having to be made by officers when still very junior.
- (iii) It would produce officers well fitted by experience to serve either with British or Indian troops.
- (iv) Officers who have done a tour of service with Indian troops might be earmarked as a first reserve in case of necessity for the officers' cadre of the Indian Army. This would go far to solve an existing difficulty.
- (v) Fusion in any degree must tend towards the removal of a feeling of inequality between the services.
- (vi) Uniformity of discipline, training and ideals would be produced.

4. It would appear, at first sight, that the more complete the fusion the better ; but further consideration shows that the condition mentioned in paragraph 2 militates against the adoption of one cadre, throughout, and that, while the two services continue to be regulated on systems so different as regimental promotion in one case and promotion by a time-scale in the other case, the limitations to the application of the one cadre principle become considerable.

It is impossible to say, especially at present, what chance there is of either service changing its system of promotion.

Examination of the matter seems to show that while it would not be wise at the present time to put forward proposals which could not be carried out without the subversion of one or the other systems, a great step towards fusion is possible without disturbing existing conditions.

5. The scheme given below ensures fusion by putting all the British officers of the two greater parts of the Imperial Army (*i.e.*, the British and Indian Armies) on to one list up to 12 years' service, and again after command of an Indian unit (or 26 years' service if not in command), while the condition mentioned in paragraph 2 is satisfied by the retention of the Indian cadre for what may be termed the "central period" of an officers' service.

6. The following are the proposals in detail:—

- (a) Before leaving Sandhurst, all cadets will be given the option of electing for a term of service with Indian troops. Vacancies on the Indian establishment will be allotted according to place on the Sandhurst exit list (except to King's India Cadets). If accepted, the young officers will be posted to a British regiment which has a battalion in India, and to that battalion. Urdu should be taught to all cadets at Sandhurst.

After one year, if well reported on, he will be seconded in his British regiment, and posted to an Indian regiment, with which he will remain for four years, the first year being on probation. During the first year he will have to pass the necessary language test. At five years' service he will be reposted to the home battalion of his British regiment. Should there be no battalion of his regiment at home he will be attached as supernumerary to another battalion.

- (b) On completing six years' service he will be given the option of either remaining with his British regiment or of volunteering for a second term of four years with Indian troops (if possible with the same Indian group as before). If he so volunteers, and is accepted by the Government of India, he will be again seconded in his British regiment.

It will also be permissible for an officer of the British service of six years' service, who has never served with Indian troops, to volunteer for a tour of four years' service with them, and on its completion to come under the condition of sub-paragraph (c) below.

- (c) On completion of ten years' service he will return for two years' service with his British regiment at home, or with some other regiment as provided in paragraph 6(a). On the expiry of this period he must elect either to remain with his British regiment or to join the "Indian cadre" for further service with Indian troops.

In the latter case, and if accepted by the Government of India, he will remain with Indian troops, until he either completes command of his Indian unit or is reported unfit for it. On completion of command he will either be placed on the list of those selected for promotion to substantive colonel or will be retired. If unfit he will, unless the War Office or the Government of India wish to retain his services, be retired. These principles will be applied *mutatis mutandis* to officers in departmental and staff employ.

- (d) On completion of command of his Indian regiment and promotion to colonel, or, if not in command, on attainment of 26 years' service, an officer's name will be brought on to the general list of officers of the British service, and he will be eligible for staff or other employment equally with others, whether in India or elsewhere.

- (e) During his third term of service with Indian troops the officer will return home for service with his British regiment (his former one, if possible), to which he will be attached as supernumerary for one year. This year should commence not less than a year before, as far as can be foreseen, he comes up for consideration for second-in-command of his regiment.

- (f) An officer who at 12 years' service elects, and is accepted for, a third term of service with Indian troops will cease to have any claim to return to his British regiment, except under paragraph 6 (c).

- (g) All officers of the British service who have done a tour of service with Indian troops, and who have not elected to join the Indian cadre under sub-paragraph (c), but who are reported on as fit for employment with Indian troops, and who have qualified in Urdu, should be noted in records and shown in the British and Indian army lists as qualified for employment with the Indian Army in case of need.

7. It will be seen that, when this scheme is in full working, promotion by a time-scale will only be necessary after an officer has 12 years' service. So long as promotion to captain is by time-scale, it will be necessary to make temporary adjustments between the two services by the grant of local rank in India. The following arrangement is proposed:—

So long as an officer is borne on the cadre of his British regiment, his promotion will, in the ordinary course, be governed by vacancies in that regiment, but when, under the time-scale

in force, for the time being in the Indian Army, he would be eligible for promotion before it falls due in his British regiment, he will be given local rank while serving with Indian troops. But, on returning to his British regiment, he will take the rank to which his place on the cadre of that regiment entitles him, even though this may mean reversion to a lower rank than he has held under the time-scale with Indian troops. On electing, after 12 years' service, for a further and final term of Indian service on the cadre of an Indian unit, an officer will come again on to the Indian time-scale and will remain subject to it until his term on the Indian list is complete.

Further fusion than that outlined above, although probably desirable, is only possible if both armies adopt one system of promotion.

8. The above scheme appears to be applicable to the cavalry branch of the Indian Army with slight modification. It will sometimes be necessary in the cavalry to attach the officer during the periods of duty at home as supernumerary to a regiment which is not the one on whose rolls his name is borne, *vide* paragraph 6 (a). His rank would be regulated by his place in the latter.

9. The scheme does not appear to present any difficulties as regards the filling of staff appointments. The matter can be considered separately, but the claims of officers on the Indian cadre to their fair share of staff appointments should be secured.

10. *Pay.*—A comparison has been made of the emoluments drawn by—

- (a) Officers of the British Army serving at home.
- (b) Officers of the British Army serving with British troops in India.
- (c) British officers serving with the Indian Army.

In all cases the rates are subject to revision in the future. But it seems clear that Government, both at home and in India, is committed to the present ratio between the three scales and that ratio must, therefore, be taken as the basis on which to formulate the scheme. It can be seen that the pay and staff pay of the British officers serving with the Indian Army are in every case considerably higher than the pay of the British officer serving at home or with British troops in India.

This should render it easy to secure a constant flow of officers to the Indian Army who are suitable for service with Indian troops; on the other hand, the officer reverting to his British regiment for a period after a tour of Indian service will suffer a marked drop in his emoluments. It must be remembered, however, that these periodic terms of service with British troops at home will largely take the place of the old expensive spells of furlough out of India. In the past these furloughs have frequently absorbed the whole of an officer's savings, and have even left him in debt.

As all the above transfers are on duty, officers and their families would receive free passage and transport to and fro.

It is not considered that any absence from India, other than as above laid down, is necessary during the first twelve years of service, except on accumulated privilege leave, the rules for which might stand as at present. Sick leave is of course excepted. It is thought that, during the first ten years, any sick leave from India exceeding nine months, except as the result of wounds or illness contracted on service, should involve return to the officer's British regiment at home. This return would not debar an officer from volunteering for a second tour of service with the Indian Army when qualified for it. English pay should be drawn on sick leave.

During what has been called the "central period" of an officers' service, *viz.*, when he is serving on the Indian cadre, the period of attachment spent at home will not prejudice his eligibility for furlough under the rules for the time being in force. During such furlough an officer should draw the pay and allowances of a British service officer of corresponding rank at home, in lieu of the existing furlough pay of the Indian Army.

11. *Pensions.*—It is not considered that the first two tours of service in India should entitle an officer to any participation in the possible benefits of Indian pension, but any subsequent service with the Indian Army should entitle an officer to the benefits of an Indian pension, such benefits in this case to be calculated for the present on his whole service.

12. *Safeguarding rights of officers already substantive in the Indian Army.*—It is impossible to deprive these officers of the right to continue on their existing terms of service. They should, however, be permitted, and encouraged, to proceed home on duty for a year's attachment to British troops after five years' service, for two years after ten years' service, and for one year before promotion to second-in-command.

Officers who have accepted the scheme, and who proceed home for a period or periods of attachment to a British regiment, should draw during such periods the British pay and allowances of their rank. They will also be permitted to draw British pay and allowances during any subsequent furlough at home.

Officers who do not accept the scheme will draw, while on furlough, the furlough pay in force for the time being for the officers of the Indian Army. Exchanges should be permitted between the services, under suitable safeguards.

3. The replies from units, which reached the Committee a short time before they left India for England, show that the objects of the scheme are generally approved, but that important questions, requiring prolonged consideration, have arisen as to how they can best be attained.

4. The most important suggestion that has emerged from the enquiries relates to the affiliation of British with Indian regiments. It is evident that it is only in conference with the War Office that this suggestion can be properly examined, and we have already had some informal discussions on the subject with its representatives.

5. It is equally evident that, with the best will on both sides, affiliation of units alone may not furnish a complete solution of the whole problem. We therefore mention the following suggested modifications of the original scheme, which, in our opinion, go a long way towards establishing closer relationship between units and officers of both services, and cannot fail to be of benefit to the officers of the Indian Army:—

Cadets whilst at Sandhurst would elect, as at present, for appointment on probation to the Indian Army, would be sent out to India on the Unattached List, and would be posted to a British unit serving in India. After a year's service with that unit they would be posted for a probationary term to an Indian unit and, after 4 years in the Indian Army, would have to elect for either the British service or the Indian Army. If admitted to the Indian Army, an officer would be required to spend one more year in the rank of lieutenant, and one year in each of the ranks of captain and major, with a British battalion (or unit of a group), allied for the purpose to his Indian Army unit. These periods of attachment should be at home,* and during them the officer would be either on the establishment or supernumerary as may be decided. Under this proposal, an officer would throughout the whole of his service in the Indian Army keep up his connection with the British unit to which his Indian unit is allied. If it can be arranged that officers of the British service be permitted to take the place of officers of the Indian Army so attached, we consider that both services would benefit.

An example may make the scheme clearer. It is assumed that the 6th Jats is allied to the Border Regiment. A gentleman cadet elects, at Sandhurst, for the Indian Army. He is placed on the Unattached List on leaving the College, and subsequently joins the 2/Worcestershire Regiment in India as an attached officer. He serves for a year with this battalion, and is then transferred to the 6th Jats. At the end of 5 years' total service he elects and is accepted for the Indian Army. After, say, 6 years' service his turn comes for a tour of duty with British troops at home; he then goes, not to his original British battalion, the Worcesters, but to the battalion to which the 6th Jats (his Indian Army unit) is allied, i.e., the Border Regiment. Similarly, during his service in the ranks of captain and major he spends his tours of duty with British troops at home with the Border Regiment.

6. To investigate thoroughly the whole matter would take a considerable time. We do not consider our Committee to be well suited for the detailed examination of such a matter; and we cannot delay the presentation of our Report in order to undertake prolonged enquiry into it. We therefore recommend that the matter should be further examined, in the light of these remarks by a combined committee of War Office and India Office representatives, to whom, we hope, the information we have collected and tabulated may be useful.

* Note.—Such tours of duty would, of course, include free passage for the officer and his family both ways.

SECTION II.

CLOSER RELATIONS BETWEEN DEPARTMENTS.

7. In our view, the war has shown the necessity for assimilating, so far as practicable, the organisation and system of administration of those services which are concerned with the feeding of the Army, with its transport, with the holding and issue of stores, with the care of the sick, including animals, and with signalling. We show later why, in our opinion, the problem of medical administration in India presents peculiar difficulties. For this reason, we omit the medical services from consideration in the present connection, and confine ourselves to examining the question of the extent to which it is practicable and desirable to amalgamate, or at least to establish closer relations between, the following services, namely, the Royal Army Service Corps and the Supply and Transport Corps; the Royal Army Veterinary Corps and the Army Veterinary Service in India; the Royal Army Ordnance Corps and the Stores Section of the Indian Ordnance Department; and the Signal Corps at home and in India.

8. India has now been admitted into partnership with the Empire, and the Indian Army has fought, alongside troops from other parts of the Empire, in every theatre of war. Its responsibilities have thus been greatly widened, and it can no longer be regarded as a local force, whose sphere of activity is limited to India and the surrounding frontier territories. It must rather be treated as a part of an Imperial army, ready to serve in any part of the world. It follows that the organization of its auxiliary services should, if confusion is to be avoided, conform closely to that of the rest of the forces of the Empire.

9. Apart from the advantages of uniformity in administrative methods, we consider that nothing but good can result from establishing close relations between the superior personnel, which will afford officers opportunities for the interchange of ideas, for studying the local conditions prevailing in different parts of the Empire, and for widening their administrative experience. There is reason to believe that certain Indian services have suffered in efficiency owing to the necessarily restricted character of their activities. They have tended to become narrow in outlook, and to adhere to practices which have been abandoned elsewhere in favour of more up-to-date methods. These divergences of system led to inconvenience during the war, when Indian services were serving alongside the corresponding British services in the same theatre.

10. We have endeavoured, in framing our detailed recommendations, to apply certain general principles which, in our opinion, should govern the reorganization of the personnel of these services. These may be stated as follows:—

- (1) To secure the presence in the Indian services of a sufficient number of British officers and subordinate personnel possessing an adequate knowledge of the country, its customs and languages.
- (2) To assimilate administrative methods, so far as practicable, in the home and Indian services.
- (3) To adopt a common basis for determining, throughout these services the pay of British officers serving on tours of duty in India, in order to remove existing anomalies and secure uniformity of system and simplification of accounts.
- (4) To ensure the regular interchange of British personnel between home and India.

11. We consider that the services in India should, generally speaking, consist of—

- (a) British personnel, maintained by the War Office and sent out to India for tours of duty; and
- (b) Indian personnel, enlisted in India for service with Indian formations, and employed to replace British personnel, as far as is compatible with efficiency.

The whole, while in India, must be administered by the Government of India.

12. In our recommendations for closer relations between these services we have made suggestions under which certain personnel of the Indian Unattached List* will be permitted to transfer to the British service. We realise that this may interfere with the prospects of those on this list who may decide not to elect for transfer. We suggest that it may be necessary in their case to substitute a time-scale of promotion.

Royal Army Service Corps and Supply and Transport Corps.

13. Before considering the possibility of amalgamation of these two corps it is necessary to compare the conditions which obtain in each.

(a) *Recruitment.*—The Royal Army Service Corps is recruited wholly from the British service, and the Supply and Transport Corps wholly from the Indian Army.

(b) *System of Promotion, etc.*—In the Royal Army Service Corps, officers are promoted to fill vacancies in the fixed establishment of the corps. In the Supply and Transport Corps, officers are promoted according to the time-scale of the Indian Army, irrespective of appointments or ranks required for units; they are also graded departmentally in six classes, partly by length of commissioned service and partly by length of departmental service; advancement up to Class 4 is by the former and thereafter by length of service in each class.

(c) *Comparison of Service.*—The following table compares the army service of officers of the Royal Army Service Corps list and that of officers of similar service and rank on the Supply and Transport Corps list. It is of interest as showing how equally the two systems of promotion in rank have worked in practice :—

					Army Service (in years).	
					R.A.S.C.	S. & T.C.
Senior Colonel	..	..	..	..	34	32
Junior Colonel	..	..	..	..	27	32
Senior Lieutenant-Colonel	..	..	..	..	27	32
17th Lieutenant-Colonel	..	..	..	..	26	31
Junior Lieutenant-Colonel	..	..	..	..	25	26
Senior Major	..	..	..	..	25	25
30th Major	..	..	..	..	19	21
50th Major	..	..	..	..	19	19
100th Major	..	..	..	..	17	18
Junior Major	..	..	..	..	15	15
Senior Captain	..	..	..	..	15	14
20th Captain	..	..	..	..	13	12
Junior Captain	..	..	..	..	5	4

The Royal Army Service Corps is likely to be blocked by peace conditions, while in the Supply and Transport Corps promotion in rank is being slowed down gradually to the pre-war scale of the Indian Army. The effect cannot be accurately foreseen, but the two services are never likely to be nearer together in this respect than now.

(d) *Comparison of Pay.*—The Supply and Transport Corps pay is much better than that of the Royal Army Service Corps. In the ranks of lieutenant-colonel, major and captain, the former is almost double the latter. In the rank of lieutenant, the Supply and Transport Corps pay is nearly 50 per cent. better than that of the Royal Army Service Corps.

14. We have considered the extent to which, having regard to the factors mentioned above, it is possible to apply the general principles advocated at the beginning of this Section.

It is not practicable to effect complete fusion of the officer cadres of the two services at the present time, owing to (a) the much higher rates of pay of the Supply and Transport Corps, and (b) the necessity of safeguarding existing rights of officers who are permanent in that corps.

* A list containing all British other ranks of departments serving continuously in India.

15. But though complete fusion is not yet practicable, we think it desirable to move in the direction of a unification of the two corps, in view of the necessity for assimilation to be as complete as possible in the services of supply and transport. With this object, we put forward the following recommendations :—

(i) *Method of unification.*—The officers' cadre of the two corps should be unified into one Indian establishment, by stopping recruitment for the Supply and Transport Corps, and appointing Royal Army Service Corps personnel to the vacancies as they occur at the bottom of the former list.

(ii) *Title of Corps.*—The designation "Supply and Transport Corps" should disappear and be replaced by "Army Service Corps, India." This corps should include those of the existing Supply and Transport Corps personnel whose names will be borne on a special Indian list.

(iii) *Maintenance and control of the Corps.*—The War Office should maintain up to strength in India the Royal Army Service Corps personnel as fixed by the Government of India, but the latter should exercise administrative and financial control over them in India.

(iv) *Entry into the Corps.*—British officers and other ranks, whether employed in India or at home, should be borne on the list of the Royal Army Service Corps, with the exception noted in sub-paragraph (vii) below; but in the future officers of the Indian Army should be permitted to enter the Royal Army Service Corps for continuous service in India. Such officers should be borne permanently on the establishment of the Army Service Corps, India, and shown in italics on the home list of the Royal Army Service Corps. Their promotion should be regulated by vacancies in the latter corps, and they should be entitled to the pensions and other benefits of the Indian Army.

Except as provided for above, British officers and other ranks should be able to join the Royal Army Service Corps from any regular unit, British or Indian, at home or abroad, on the same conditions as before the war.

(v) *Special Indian conditions of service.*—Officers should not serve more than five years in India without a period of at least one year on duty at home. All officers of the Royal Army Service Corps posted to India for the first time for a tour of service should pass an examination (to include a language test), which would entitle them to a special Indian allowance while serving in India. To qualify for command of a unit in India, an officer of the Royal Army Service Corps must have completed at least one tour of Indian service.

(vi) *Pay.*—In view of the fact that the officers of the present Supply and Transport Corps are called upon to spend the whole of their service in India, it cannot be reasonably claimed that the rates of pay for the officers of the Royal Army Service Corps under this scheme should be identical with the present rates of the Supply and Transport Corps. Their pay should be arranged on the following basis :—

(i) British pay of rank, as for the British service in India (*vide* paragraph 24 of Part V).

(ii) Corps pay at English rates, expressed in rupees.

(iii) Allowance for special qualifications [see sub-paragraph (v) above].

(vii) *Transfers of Supply and Transport Corps officers.*—On the introduction of this scheme, all officers who are permanently in the Supply and Transport Corps should be permitted, within a fixed period, to transfer to the Royal Army Service Corps under the following conditions :—

(a) They will take their place on the Royal Army Service Corps regimental list according to army service.

(b) They must unconditionally accept the regulations regarding pay, promotion, service and pensions of the Royal Army Service Corps.

Officers of the Supply and Transport Corps who transfer to the Royal Army Service Corps, and who, on transfer, have served more than five years in India (that period being the ordinary tour of foreign service for Royal Army Service Corps officers), should be permitted to reckon their time in India as a tour of foreign service for purposes of the foreign service roster.

Officers of the Supply and Transport Corps who do not transfer to the Royal Army Service Corps should be placed on a "special Indian list," and should continue to serve under the present conditions of the Supply and Transport Corps. No fresh admissions should be made to this list, which would gradually disappear.

It is important that the proposed arrangements should not penalise officers of the present cadre of the Supply and Transport Corps in their claims to succeed to the higher appointments of their own corps.

(viii) *Pensions*.—Pensions (except for officers of the Supply and Transport Corps who do not transfer) should be on the British scale.

(ix) *British Subordinate Staff, Supply and Transport Corps*.—The subordinate staff of the Supply and Transport Corps should be placed on a "special list, India," and continue to serve on as non-commissioned officers or warrant officers, Supply and Transport Corps, till the end of their service. No further admissions should be made into this part of the Corps, which will disappear in time. The duties at present carried out by the subordinate staff of the Supply and Transport Corps will be gradually taken over by personnel serving on ordinary Royal Army Service Corps engagements, and receiving a special allowance based on principles similar to that alluded to in sub-paragraph (v).

(x) The Indian establishment of the Supply and Transport Corps should continue to be a local service, forming part of the Army Service Corps, India. Indian officers with the Viceroy's commission might suitably be employed on supply duties.

(xi) It is to be noted that, as all ranks of the Royal Army Service Corps in India will be on their own list and under their own rules, promotion will be by vacancy and not by time, except in cases of lieutenants of 11 years' service.

(xii) The question of a reserve of officers for the Army Service Corps, India, is dealt with in Part VIII of this Report.

Veterinary Service.

16. Before the war, the duties of the Army Veterinary Service in India were limited to the care of animals of the British and non-silladar units. It also supervised generally the arrangements for the care and treatment of all other units. Its control was no doubt extended as the war progressed.

17. The service contained (a) a fixed establishment of officers of the Royal Army Veterinary Corps, detailed by the War Office, as in the case of the Royal Army Medical Corps, for tours of service in India; (b) a few warrant and non-commissioned officers of the unattached list, i.e., men taken, not from the Royal Army Veterinary Corps, but from mounted units in India who had elected for permanent service in India; and (c) a few Indian subordinates; making in all about 90 other ranks. The actual number required even for the limited veterinary services of the Army in peace time amounted to 1,562, and the difference was made good by detailing subordinate personnel from various regimental or corps units.

Such a scheme has the following obvious disadvantages:—

(a) Subordinate personnel, i.e., shoeing-smiths (British), syces, line orderlies and transport dressers, detailed for duty in veterinary hospitals belonged to regimental or corps establishments, and were thus counted as effective twice over. They were not permanently under the veterinary authorities for training or discipline.

(b) On mobilization, field veterinary units had to be improvised from such material as might be available. During the war it was found necessary to take men for this purpose with but few qualifications and no training.

18. We have seen a scheme, which is now under the consideration of the Government of India, for the reorganization of the veterinary services in India on the following lines:—

(a) One self-contained Army Veterinary Corps to be formed in India, responsible for the veterinary services of the army in India, including the Remount Department, but excluding horse-breeding operations.

(b) This corps to be termed the Army Veterinary Corps, India, and to include both British and Indian personnel, the whole of the latter being enlisted for service in the Army Veterinary Corps, India.

(c) This corps to form the nucleus for expansion on mobilization, and in war to undertake the whole of the veterinary services in the field.

(d) The British personnel to be found from the home establishment, and be detailed for service in India on conditions similar to those obtaining in other corps. The present continuous service "unattached list" personnel would be allowed to die out, or be absorbed into the Royal Army Veterinary Corps. As an alternative, it has been suggested that, within a fixed establishment, other ranks of the Royal Army Veterinary Corps might be allowed to elect for continuous service in India, in which case the absorption of the present unattached list men would be unnecessary.

(e) Depots for the Army Veterinary Corps, India, to be formed for the training of all personnel, excepting veterinary assistants who are graduates of veterinary colleges in India, and to perform also all duties connected with recruitment and records.

(f) The provision of all veterinary medicines, necessities and equipment to be withdrawn from the Indian Medical Service, and, with the budget provision, to be controlled by the Veterinary Service alone.

The scheme, as outlined above, seems to us to be suitable.

19. We consider that the question of the admission of a certain number of duly qualified Indians to commissions in the Veterinary Service in India should not be overlooked. The scheme to which we have referred aims at extending the present functions of the Royal Army Veterinary Corps in India so as to provide a trained veterinary service for Indian cavalry and transport corps. Such an extension, highly desirable in itself, affords an additional reason for opening the superior service in India to Indians possessing the necessary qualifications. Moreover, the opening out of fresh opportunities should stimulate interests in veterinary work, and help to attract educated Indians to a profession for which there is much scope in India.

It is understood that the charter of the Royal Army Veterinary Corps, like that of the Royal Army Medical Corps, provides that only persons of pure European descent can hold officers' commissions in the Corps. We recommend that the question of removing this restriction be considered; and that Indians, who obtain the necessary professional qualifications by passing successfully through the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, should be allowed to compete on equal terms for admission to the Royal Army Veterinary Corps. It would probably be desirable in this case to arrange that Indians, thus admitted, should be ear-marked for continuous service in India.

In any case we recommend that a certain number of appointments in the Army Veterinary Corps, India, should be reserved for Indians so qualified, under conditions similar to those obtaining for Indian officers with the King's commission serving in the army. If in any year the number of Indian applicants for employment in this Corps is in excess of vacancies, the appointments should be filled by competition *inter se*.

Ordnance Services.

20. We recommend that army ordnance duties in India should be performed by British personnel belonging to the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, assisted by locally enlisted Indian personnel. We suggest that this joint service should be designated the Army Ordnance Corps, India.

21. The British personnel, both officers and other ranks, required for duty in India should be maintained by the War Office and be sent out on tours of duty. While in India this personnel would be administered by the Government of India.

22. The officers and other ranks now belonging to the Indian Ordnance Department should be permitted to transfer to the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, but those who do not transfer should be borne on a special list for promotion.

British officers belonging to the Indian Army should, if qualified, be eligible for transfer to the Royal Army Ordnance Corps; but if so transferred they should forfeit all claim to Indian Army allowances and pensions.

We consider that the same rules as regards granting commissions from the ranks to British personnel should be in force in India and at home.

23. We recommend that pay should be arranged on the following lines :—

- (a) British pay, as for the British service in India.
- (b) Extra pay, calculated on a rupee basis, at rates similar to those laid down for corresponding appointments at home.
- (c) A special allowance to officers, warrant officers and senior non-commissioned officers who have passed an examination including a language test.

24. Pensions for British personnel, except in the case of those belonging to the Indian Ordnance Department who do not transfer, should be on the British scale.

Corps of Signals.

25. Under the existing system, the Signal Service in India is maintained by attaching to it, from both British and Indian units, such personnel as are required. These men, however, remain on the strength of their original units.

We consider that this system is unsatisfactory, and that the Corps of Signals in India should correspond as nearly as possible to the Corps of Signals at home, and that personnel should be definitely posted to the Corps.

26. We recommend that this Corps should be constituted on the following general lines :—

- (a) The Signal Service in India should form a separate Corps and be designated the Corps of Signals, India. It should be composed partly of British and partly of Indian personnel, and should be under an Inspector of Signals, who should be the technical adviser to the General Staff. The corps will require a depot organization in India.
- (b) The designation, organization, and where possible the equipment, should be the same for all signal units with both home and Indian formations.
- (c) There should be a signal training centre or centres in India for the purpose of training officers and other ranks of the Corps of Signals, India, and of assimilating British and Indian methods of training. These centres could function as depots, and could also undertake the training of instructors and assistant instructors for units other than those belonging to the Corps of Signals.
- (d) The establishment of British personnel should be maintained by the War Office.
- (e) Officers, whether belonging to the British service or the Indian Army, should be eligible for tours of duty with the Corps of Signals, India, under the same conditions as are laid down for the Corps of Signals at home. British officers, whilst serving in the corps either at home

or in India and belonging to either the British service or the Indian Army, should be allowed to interchange for periods of service. A cadre of officers for permanent service in the Corps of Signals, India, should be maintained.

- (f) British other ranks should be borne on a fixed establishment and should be sent out to India for duty in the same way as other British troops.

We suggest that promotions up to, but exclusive of, the rank of serjeant should be made within the Indian establishment.

27. The Corps in India should be diluted with Indian personnel, as far as is compatible with efficiency.

28. Appointments to units, as well as higher appointments, should be distributed proportionately amongst officers of the British service and the Indian Army.

An officer of the British service should not, however, get command of a unit unless he has served a previous tour with the Corps of Signals, India, possesses a knowledge of Indian conditions and has passed a language test.

29. Pay should be made up as under :—

- (a) British pay of rank, as for British officers and other ranks in India.
- (b) Corps pay, calculated on a rupee basis, at rates similar to those laid down for similar appointments at home.
- (c) A special allowance to British service officers, warrant officers and senior non-commissioned officers who have passed an examination, which will include a language test.
- (d) Indian Army officers should continue to draw the Indian Army allowance.

Telegraph Personnel.

30. The telegraphs in India are managed by the telegraph branch of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, assisted by 600 military telegraph operators and 100 wireless operators, who, before the war, were attached from British units in India. We recommend that in the future these operators should belong to the Corps of Signals, India, which should be augmented for this purpose.

In the war these 700 operators became available for use by the army in the field, and were under the orders of the Chief Signal Officer, a system which proved satisfactory.

31. Detailed arrangements concerning depots of stores and personnel, limits of responsibility, etc., should be worked out in peace time, so that officers, men, transport and stores may be in readiness to move as required at short notice.

In order to fulfil these requirements, we recommend that one or more suitably organized line of communication battalions should be formed, consisting of the military telegraph wireless personnel referred to, as well as of selected civilian personnel belonging to the Indian Telegraph Department.

We suggest that in peace time military operators should draw from army sources their military rates of pay and corps pay, and should receive additional pay from the Telegraph Department according to the nature of their duties.

When employed on active service, all telegraph personnel should be placed definitely under the orders of the commander in the field.

SECTION III.

THE MEDICAL SERVICES.

32. The suggested unification of the two medical organizations, *viz.*, the Royal Army Medical Corps, which now serves British troops, and the Indian Medical Service, which is not only responsible for the medical charge of Indian troops, wherever employed, but also provides the superior civil medical service of the Indian Empire, presents great difficulties.

33. If the two services were purely military, their unification could be carried out on the lines suggested for services such as the Royal Army Service Corps and the Supply and Transport Corps, or the Royal Army Ordnance Corps and the Indian Ordnance Department. But the Indian Medical Service, though primarily a military service, is also the channel of recruitment for the civil medical service. The latter contains over 60 per cent. of the total personnel of the Indian Medical Service, all of whom are liable to recall to military duty. It is this double rôle that has given rise to the serious practical difficulties which have blocked the various attempts made in the past to create a unified service.

34. In connection with the general question of a closer union between the British and Indian Armies, it has been represented to us by the Secretary of State that the question is nowhere more acute than it is in the case of the Indian Medical Service and the Royal Army Medical Corps, but that there are two very great difficulties, both of which require earnest consideration. The one is that in any Indian Medical Service there must be room for the growing number of efficient Indian doctors. The second is that a military career in India, in itself, is not sufficient to attract the best doctors, and that it is very difficult, from the medical point of view, to separate the needs of the civil official population from the needs of the army.

The first difficulty can be easily solved. The proportion of Indians in the Indian Medical Service, which was only 7 per cent. before the war, has steadily risen in recent years, and now amounts to over 10 per cent., excluding a large number of temporary appointments—some 900. At present, permanent recruitment is being carried out in the ratio of one-third Indian and two-thirds British; and there should be no difficulty in maintaining this or some similar ratio of Indians in future.

The second difficulty is, however, more serious.

35. The desirability of unification was prominently brought to notice in the recent war, when officers trained in two separate organizations had to work in the field side by side. Accordingly in January 1919, at the instance of the Secretary of State, the Government of India appointed a committee, presided over by Sir H. Verney Lovett, "to examine and report on the question of the reorganization of the medical services in India, both civil and military, from the standpoint that it is desirable that there should be unified medical service for India."

36. At this stage it is desirable to make it clear that the expression "unification of the medical services" is used in two senses:—

- (a) By the Government of India, the Verney Lovett Committee and the Secretary of State, as meaning the unification of the superior military and civil medical services.
- (b) By the military authorities and the heads of the Royal Army Medical Corps, who are concerned only with the army, as meaning the unification of the two military medical services only.

37. The Verney Lovett Committee proposed the creation of a unified service, to be known as the Indian Medical Corps, which would be responsible for all medical services in India, both civil and military, and would be composed of:—

- (a) The present Indian Medical Service, supplemented *at the start* by volunteers from the Royal Army Medical Corps.
- (b) Men selected by the Secretary of State from the present temporary officers of the Indian Medical Service and Royal Army Medical Corps.

- (c) Candidates from the medical schools in the United Kingdom, to be selected by a half-yearly competitive examination, separate from that for the Royal Army Medical Corps, in which Indian candidates with Indian qualifications would be given special facilities to compete.

This unified service was to displace the Royal Army Medical Corps; and a large portion of the cadre, as in the case of the Indian Medical Service at present, was to be employed in peace time on civil duties under Local Governments. These officers were to be divided into—

- (a) An ordinary war reserve
 - (b) A special war reserve
 - (c) All others, who would be liable to recall only in a national emergency, and then only to hold certain posts as specialists or consultants.
- } both liable to recall to military duty.

Under this scheme, the military and the civil branches of the proposed Indian Medical Corps were to be administered, under the Commander-in-Chief and certain civil departments of the Government of India respectively, by two separate Directors appointed from the Corps. Promotion was to follow the rules in force for the Royal Army Medical Corps, including selection for the post of lieutenant-colonel; and on attaining that rank an officer was to choose finally between (a) medical administration (military), (b) medical specialisation, (c) permanent civil employ.

38. The Verney Lovett Committee recognised that the proposed scheme could not be accepted unless it commended itself not only to the Government of India, but also to the War Office, which is concerned with the proposals in so far as they affect British troops in India and involve the elimination of the Royal Army Medical Corps.

39. Before we discuss the proposals of the Verney Lovett Committee, we must refer to two other schemes. The first, which is advocated by a large body of military opinion as well as by senior officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps, is that the latter should take over medical charge of the whole army in India, leaving the medical care of the civil population to a separate civil medical service.

This scheme is also favoured by a large section of Indian opinion, which desires that the civil medical service should have an entirely separate organization though it might draw a small portion of its personnel from the military service and its civil members might be made liable for military duty in case of serious emergency. This point of view has been summarized as follows:—

- (a) Steps should be taken to institute a civil medical service, which would absorb all the civil posts at present held by the Indian Medical Service, and would be recruited from the independent medical profession, the civil medical officers (other than Indian Medical Service), and the Indian Medical Service, the last being restricted to 10 per cent. of the cadre.
- (b) The Indian Medical Service, which would then be exclusively military, should be recruited by simultaneous competitive examinations, or by separate competitive examinations in India.

This summary expresses the views of those who object to the civil medical services of India being an adjunct of a military service—all the civil personnel being liable to recall in time of war, thereby disorganizing the entire civil medical organization—and who also resent the so-called monopoly of the most highly-paid civil appointments by a service which is primarily military. They see no objection to all the military medical work being taken over by the Royal Army Medical Corps, provided that a certain proportion of Indians are admitted to the latter.

40. But while a unified military and a separate civil medical service are advocated, though for different reasons, both by a large body of military opinion and by certain Indian politicians, there is, we believe, on the other hand an important section of Indian opinion which is strongly opposed to the breaking up of the present Indian Medical Service. This section advocates a third scheme, under which the Indian Medical Service would be retained on the military as well as on the civil side.

with a personnel of 40 per cent. Indians and 60 per cent. British ; officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps would be attached to the Indian Medical Service if and when they came on tours of service in India ; and the present liability of Indian Medical Service officers in civil employ to revert to military duty, for which they should keep themselves duly qualified, would be retained.

41. An important factor in the problem is the declining popularity of the Indian Medical Service, which began in 1909, and which has been more marked in recent years, and may be attributed to the following causes :—

- (a) Recent constitutional changes in India, which will place the civil medical services in the provinces under the control of Indian Ministers.
- (b) The increased cost of living in India, combined with the decrease of opportunities for private practice, owing to frequent transfers, to the increasing competition of private practitioners, and to the regulations restricting fees (which have, however, recently been relaxed).
- (c) The difficulty in obtaining leave, owing to war conditions and to the service being below strength.
- (d) The paucity of war honours and rewards to Indian Medical Service officers, as compared with the sister service. This undoubtedly has had a depressing effect on the service, and, we believe, affords a reasonable ground for complaint.
- (e) General uneasiness as regards prospects.

The cumulative result has been a steadily increasing difficulty in obtaining recruits of the right stamp from the medical schools of the United Kingdom. This was apparent even before the war, but it has been aggravated by the shortage of qualified medical men caused by the war.

The Royal Army Medical Corps has apparently been able to supply its own immediate deficiency by selecting for permanent appointment officers who had obtained temporary commissions and done well during the war. The Indian Medical Service for one reason or another, has been less successful in obtaining British recruits in this manner ; and we understand that there is, or soon will be (when those whose pension is due are allowed to retire), a shortage of nearly 200 officers in a total cadre of 775. In fact, the Indian Medical Service may now be said to be at the nadir of its reputation, as the Royal Army Medical Corps was some twenty years ago ; and just as in 1897 the War Office (paragraph 7, Verney Lovett Report) proposed that the duties of the Royal Army Medical Corps in India should be permanently taken over by the military side of the Indian Medical Service, the cadre being expanded accordingly, so we now find a strong body of opinion advocating the converse proposal, that the Royal Army Medical Corps should absorb the military side of the Indian Medical Service, thus securing a unified military service and leading up to the complete severance of the civil medical service.

42. The question of the future organization of the Indian Medical Service involves, therefore, not only military but also administrative issue of much importance, and requires close examination in both its military and civil aspects.

43. We have shown that three separate schemes have been put forward :—

- (1) That of the Verney Lovett Committee, *viz.*, the elimination of the Royal Army Medical Corps from India, and the creation of a unified Indian Medical Corps, to serve both the army and the civil population.
- (2) The proposal to entrust the medical charge of the Indian Army, as well as of the British Army, to the Royal Army Medical Corps, thus making the Indian Medical Service a purely civil medical service.
- (3) The proposal to retain both the Royal Army Medical Corps and the Indian Medical Service, but to split the latter up into two separate services, the one serving the Indian Army and the other the civil population.

44. We now proceed to discuss these three schemes in their order.

We consider that the Verney Lovett report puts forward the only feasible scheme for a unified military and civil medical service ; but we feel unable to support that scheme because it would, after the first selection had been made, permanently exclude the Royal Army Medical Corps from India. Such exclusion would, we believe, adversely affect, especially at the present time, both the large body of British troops in India, whose health has hitherto been so admirably safeguarded by the Royal Army Medical Corps, and the service itself, which would be shut out from the wide field of medical experience that India affords. Moreover, even if those objections were not considered fatal to the Verney Lovett scheme, we believe that the proposed Indian Medical Corps would, certainly for some years to come, find it impossible to provide the full establishment of officers required for British as well as for Indian troops, since it cannot now attract sufficient candidates even for existing needs from the medical schools, and it is most unlikely that under present conditions it would obtain any large numbers of volunteers from the Royal Army Medical Corps.

The other proposals of the Verney Lovett Committee for assimilating the conditions of promotion, study leave, special training, &c., for the two services seem to us generally suitable, and have been adopted in our final recommendations.

45. As regards the second scheme, looking at the problem as purely a military one, there would seem to be no objection in principle, and obvious advantages in practice, in having the same medical organization for the *whole* army in India as for the rest of the Imperial Forces. Officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps would, as at present, come to India for tours of duty ; but their number in India, now only 320, would have to be increased to over 1 000. It would probably be advisable, in order to encourage the necessary knowledge of Indian languages, customs and conditions, to allow a certain proportion to elect for continuous service, or at least successive tours of service, which in the case of the British element should entitle them to higher rates of pension.

If this scheme were adopted, it would be an essential condition that the Royal Army Medical Corps should be opened to Indians and arrangements made for the admission of a reasonable proportion of Indians.

At the start, officers of the Indian Medical Service, whether civil or military, could doubtless be given the option of joining this expanded Royal Army Medical Corps and of retaining their existing rates of pay, pensions, &c.

46. We cannot, however, recommend this scheme, because, even if the War Office were prepared to allow the admission of Indians to the Royal Army Medical Corps, we see two very serious objections, (a) the complete separation of the civil from the military medical service, with the undesirable consequences referred to later, and (b) the loss of a reserve of 300 to 400 medical officers, with military training and holding the King's commission, whom the Local Governments would furnish from the civil side in an emergency.

With regard to the latter point, we do not consider that an equally well-qualified reserve could be supplied from the United Kingdom, or from the civil medical services of the provinces, or from a special reserve to be formed from the existing temporary Indian Medical Service officers. We believe that it would be unwise to count on any substantial assistance from the United Kingdom. Expert opinion, too, is doubtful as to the readiness of private practitioners, or of members of the civil medical services in India, to come forward, even if liable by the terms of their engagement ; while out of the 900 or more temporary Indian Medical Service officers employed in the war, we understand that only a small proportion have proved themselves so fit for active service as to justify selection for permanent appointments. Nor are we satisfied that under present conditions the Royal Army Medical Corps could provide the 775 British and 300 Indian medical officers estimated to be required for the peace establishment. Finally, such a solution would be unfavourably criticised, unless the present rule restricting admission to the Royal Army Medical Corps to candidates of pure European parentage were abrogated and facilities given for the admission of Indians in reasonable numbers to the Royal Army Medical Corps.

47. Military opinion, as represented to us by many witnesses of high authority and recent experience in the field, was practically unanimous in holding that the

Royal Army Medical Corps, owing to its superior organization and military training in peace time, its skilled subordinate personnel (which the Indian Medical Service still lacks), and its capacity for rapid expansion in war, had proved itself on the administrative side more efficient in the field than the Indian Medical Service. It was maintained that the officers of the latter service lacked the necessary training for work in the field, though quite as efficient professionally as the Royal Army Medical Corps in the wards, and also as specialists and consultants. This defect is attributed to their inferior military training under the antiquated regimental hospital system (now abolished), their ignorance of the principles of military administration in the field, and their lack of familiarity with the latest developments of military hygiene, of preventive medicine, and of military medical science.

48. We believe that the above criticism is generally accurate. The responsibility, however, does not rest entirely with the Indian Medical Service. On its behalf it is urged that its military side has suffered in the past from the fact that the Director of Medical Services in India has always belonged to the sister service, and has not been sufficiently alive to the medical needs of the Indian Army, or has not pressed them successfully on the Government of India.

It is admitted by some of its senior officers that the Indian Medical Service has not in the past received adequate military training, and that such defects as came to light on active service were due partly to that cause, and partly to the fact that men recalled from civil employ were often employed without reference to their aptitudes and capacity. However this may be, it is clear that, though in theory a military service, the outlook of the Indian Medical Service in the past has been mainly civil, and that the best officers have secured civil appointments as early as possible, and have lost touch with the military side of their profession. They are consequently at a disadvantage when recalled on the outbreak of war, or reverted towards the end of their service, to hold military administrative appointments. We shall endeavour to suggest later how this defect can be remedied.

49. As regards the third scheme, namely, the organization of a separate military medical service for the Indian Army (the Royal Army Medical Corps being retained for the British Army) and a separate medical service for civil requirements, we agree with the Verney Lovett Committee (para. 54) that it presents few advantages, while it has all the disadvantages consequent upon the separation of the civil medical service from the military medical service. It appears that such a division of the Indian Medical Service into two separate services was carried out twice before, but on both occasions it was found to be unworkable in practice, and the two services were speedily reunited. Though such a division might now find favour with a section of Indian opinion, we do not think that it merits serious consideration. This Corps would be working side by side with the Royal Army Medical Corps, an arrangement which would perpetuate all the disadvantages of the present system, with little corresponding gain.

50. We have referred to the undesirability of forming a separate civil medical service. Our view is based on the following considerations:—

- (1) The separation would probably entail a large increase of expenditure, because:—
 - (a) It would be necessary to maintain a larger military cadre, in the absence of a trained military reserve.
 - (b) Officers in military employ would have to be paid higher salaries, owing to the loss of opportunities on the civil side.
 - (c) Officers on the civil side would have to be paid higher salaries, owing to the loss of military rank and of the prestige and protection which it affords.
- (2) A purely civil medical service would inevitably, under the new conditions in India, tend to become provincial, and would thereby deteriorate in quality.
- (3) A purely military medical service would probably suffer in efficiency from the lack of the wide experience afforded by civil practice.

- (4) It would be increasingly difficult to obtain a reasonable proportion of well-qualified Europeans in such a service, though a strong European element is essential—
 - (a) For medical attendance on the European servants of Government and their families, who have been led to expect that they will be treated by men of their own race, and whose expectations it is particularly desirable not to disappoint at the present time.
 - (b) For the maintenance of western standards of research, efficiency and discipline in the civil medical services of Government.
- (5) It would be unwise to break up a service which has such fine traditions and has rendered such services to India as the Indian Medical Service.
- (6) As far as we are in possession of their views, both the Government of India and Local Governments are opposed to the creation of a separate civil medical service.

51. We have now completed our examination of the three schemes which have been put forward for the reorganization of the medical services in India, and have shown why, in our opinion, none of them is altogether suited to the requirements of the army on the one side and of the civil population on the other.

We have explained that the Verney Lovett scheme for a unified military and civil medical service cannot be recommended, because it involves the exclusion from India (where one-third of the British Army is usually quartered) of the Royal Army Medical Corps; and that the absorption of the military side of the Indian Medical Service by the Royal Army Medical Corps is equally undesirable, because, in addition to many practical difficulties and probable political objections, it would involve the deterioration, and eventually the disappearance, of the Indian Medical Service as an all-India service. We have also indicated grave objections to the third scheme.

52. Having started with the hope of devising a scheme for the amalgamation of the two services into one, we have been reluctantly forced to the conclusion that such amalgamation is impracticable—at least, in present conditions. In connection with the even wider question of the relations between the British and Indian Armies, while aiming at closer liaison, at assimilation of conditions, uniformity of ideals and interchange of officers, we have not thought it desirable, in view of the present and probable future status of India in the Empire, to aim at complete unification or amalgamation.

53. As long as there are separate British and Indian Armies, we see no objection to the continuance of separate medical services for the two armies; but it is essential to eliminate friction and jealousy and to secure as nearly as possible uniformity of training, of methods and of ideals.

54. We hold that in India there is ample scope both for the up-to-date technical training, wide administrative experience and close contact with the latest medical developments which the Royal Army Medical Corps is in a position to supply, and for the special knowledge of Indian epidemics and diseases and the familiarity with local conditions which the Indian Medical Service has peculiar facilities to acquire.

55. We consider that the following proposals, if accepted, will maintain the Indian Medical Service in its position as the premier civil medical service in India, will improve its efficiency as a military service, and will secure more harmonious working and closer co-operation between it and the Royal Army Medical Corps:—

- (1) There should be a joint examination, as was formerly the case for both services in medicine and surgery, the subjects common to both. Candidates for the Indian Medical Service should take in addition the extra subjects, indicated in the syllabus to the Verney Lovett report, which are considered necessary for that service.
- (2) The commissions for successful candidates should in both cases bear the same date, which might be that either of their joining, or passing out from, the Royal Army Medical Corps College, Millbank.
- (3) There should be joint preliminary training, as at present, at Millbank; but Indian Medical Service officers between five and ten years'

service should, like Royal Army Medical Corps officers, return to Millbank for subsequent courses, till such time as adequate facilities for such training are provided in India. We agree with the Verney Lovett Committee as to the need of providing such facilities.

- (4) The rules and the periods of service for promotion up to the rank of major should be similar for both services.
- (5) No Indian Medical Service officer should be eligible for civil employ till he has completed at least two years' service on the military side, and has been certified by the Director, Medical Services as fully qualified on that side.
- (6) The selection of officers for civil employ should be made by a Board, consisting of the Director-General, Indian Medical Service as President, the Director, Medical Services, and not more than two lay members to be nominated by the Government of India.
- (7) An Indian Medical Service officer should select finally between military and civil employ in his 16th year of service; and if he elects for, and is finally posted to, civil employ, he should be debarred from further military employ, except as in (9) (c) below, and from higher rank than that of lieutenant-colonel, to which he would rise automatically under the time-scale for the time being in force.
- (8) Promotion to lieutenant-colonel for Indian Medical Service officers in military employ should be subject to selection, as in the case of the Royal Army Medical Corps.
- (9) Officers in civil employ shall be classified as :—
 - (a) Ordinary war reserve—up to ten years' total service.
 - (b) Special war reserve—up to sixteen years' total service.
 - (c) All others.

Officers in category (a) would be liable to recall to military duty in an ordinary emergency, and those in (b) only in a greater emergency.

Officers in category (a) and (b) should be required to keep up their military training by periodical return to duty with troops; a period of three months every three years is suggested. Officers in class (c) should only be recalled in a very serious emergency, for work as specialists and consultants, subject to the sanction of the administrations under which they are serving and to the extent agreed upon. They should, on recall, be given suitable temporary rank, on the analogy of the private practitioners employed by the War Office during the war.
- (10) Officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps should be posted to India in the various grades for tours of duty as at present, and should be entitled to a reasonable share in the higher military administrative appointments.
- (11) In view of the fact that the Director, Medical Services is the head of both the military medical services, the post should be held by an officer of the Army Medical Service and the Indian Medical Service alternately.
- (12) Exchange of officers between the Royal Army Medical Corps and the Indian Medical Service should be allowed, as at present.
- (13) Interchange of duties between officers of both services, e.g., charge of British and Indian station hospitals, field ambulances on manoeuvres, &c., should be encouraged.
- (14) If a fixed proportion of Indians be recruited for the Indian Medical Service, that proportion should be maintained in the military and civil branches.
- (15) On the analogy of other Indian services, the pay of the Indian Medical Service should be substantially higher than that of the Royal Army Medical Corps when employed in India. This is necessary in order to attract recruits to the Indian Medical Service. Similarly, the Indian Medical Service pensions should be on a higher scale.

SECTION IV.

ENGINEER SERVICES.

A.—Functions.

56. In India the Director-General of Military Works is responsible for all duties in connection with the Military Works Services. He is also *ex-officio* inspector of engineer units, and of pioneer battalions as regards their technical training. It is doubtful, however, whether even before the war he had the time, or a sufficiently intimate knowledge of details, to perform the functions of an inspecting officer satisfactorily in addition to his other duties. During the war, in 1916, an Inspector of Engineers and Pioneers was appointed to relieve the Director-General of Military Works of his inspection duties. As his duties during the war were limited to those of inspection, the question of studying engineering in connection with operations of war still remains to be developed. To attain this object we have suggested, in Part II, the appointment of a senior officer of the Royal Engineers who shall be the means by which the training of field engineer units is co-ordinated.

57. In addition to the usual duties in the field for which engineer personnel is required, there are various technical services, required either in peace or war, whose recruitment from or affiliation with engineers must be considered. These services are :—

Transportation, Signal, Telegraph, Postal, Survey and Map Production, Printing, Searchlights, Meteorological, Forestry, Quarrying, Camouflage, and Gas.

58. We consider that many of these services should be classified as engineers, and we make the following recommendations :—

- (a) Transportation units for the construction of railways, ropeways, etc., require personnel of the engineering professions, and we are of opinion that construction units should therefore be engineers. The personnel for operating railways, ropeways, etc., are not strictly speaking engineers, but, as operation cannot be a separate organisation from construction, we consider that all transportation units employed in peace or war should be engineers.

As regards railways, there are in existence certain regular companies of Railway Sappers and Miners, which have in peace time been suitably employed under the Railway Board. For work in the more forward areas in war we recommend the employment of these companies increased by railway specialist personnel, who should be maintained on a reserve basis in peace time, so as to form one or more railway reserve battalions. We consider that in peace these railway companies should be given constant employment in railway construction, in order to maintain their efficiency. If so employed, they are comparatively cheap units to maintain, because the work done by them is assessed at contractors' rates, and is credited to the army budget.

- (b) The postal department is a branch of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs. In war, such personnel as are required are placed at the disposal of an army in the field, and should be placed definitely under the orders of the army commander. There would not appear to be any necessity to classify the postal personnel as engineers.
- (c) We consider that units of the following services should continue to be engineers :—survey and map production, printing in forward areas, and searchlight.
- (d) Meteorological personnel should be found by the Royal Air Force.
- (e) Personnel of units required in war for forestry, quarrying, camouflage and gas should be engineers.

General Employment of R. E. officers.

59. Prior to 1914 more Royal Engineer officers were employed in Military Works than in any other engineering service, almost all the high appointments

open to them being in this branch. The experience gained in the war has led to the increase in the number of field engineer units, many of which are of recent creation, and we consider that in the future more attention should be paid to the training of engineers for field duties than in the past, and that experience in these duties should be a necessary qualification for the higher engineer appointments.

We are also of opinion that, though much of the training in the Military Works Branch is beneficial to an officer in war, a considerable portion of it is of little value from a military point of view, and could adequately be performed, especially in areas of minor military importance, by some civil agency such as the Public Works Department.

In view, however, of the fact that under the Reforms Scheme certain works may be entrusted to local bodies, we are strongly of opinion that no work of imperial importance should be handed over to these bodies, and that no Royal Engineer officers should be placed under their orders.

B.—Organization.

Engineers and Pioneers.

60. In the foregoing paragraphs we have recorded our views as to the general functions of the engineer services. Before we consider how these services should be organized in order to perform adequately these functions, we desire to state our opinion on the question of the amalgamation or otherwise of engineers and pioneers in Indian divisions.

In approaching this question we have noted the recommendation made by the Committee presided over by Lord Rawlinson, which considered the amalgamation of these services at home to be desirable. In India, however, the conditions are different. Firstly, some of the pioneer battalions are of long standing, with old and cherished fighting records, and deserve to be treated differently to pioneer battalions of the home organization, which were formed only after the commencement of the recent war. There are consequently grave objections, from a sentimental point of view, to amalgamation. Secondly, at home all recruits belong to one homogeneous race; in India, in order to get enough men, it is necessary to draw from many different races and different castes men who will not intermingle, and have to be enlisted for different classes of work. Thirdly, the disposal of pioneer officers, if amalgamation is decided on, would present great difficulty; their technical training is not sufficient to admit of their commanding engineer units, and their replacement by Royal Engineer officers would cause inconvenience and expense to the State. Lastly during the recent war engineers and pioneers in Indian divisions have worked together as a whole or by companies, under the orders of the Commanding Royal Engineer of their division, to the satisfaction of all concerned. The sapper and miner companies provided the skilled, and the pioneer the semi-skilled, portion of the personnel required for the work in hand, and their combined work produced good results.

While, therefore, we realise the advisability of similarity in home and Indian organization, we are of opinion that in India it is neither necessary nor advisable to amalgamate pioneers and engineers.

We also consider that the primary rôle of pioneer units should be efficiency in pioneer work, and their secondary rôle that of infantry, and we recommend that the footnote on page 18, Field Service Regulations, 1914, Part I, be revised accordingly.

61. We recommend that the Commanding Royal Engineer of an Indian division in war should have at least the rank of colonel, that the divisional battalion of pioneers should be placed under his orders, and that his engineer field companies should consist of three companies of sappers and miners. In the pre-war organization of an Indian division only two sapper and miner companies were allotted, and the experience of the war has shown that a third company is essential. We are, further, of opinion that the total strength and composition of engineers and pioneers in a division in war should approximate to the total number of Royal Engineers decided on in the war establishments of a division at home, and that the present strength of a sapper and miner company requires an increase both in officers and men both in peace and war.

We lay stress upon the desirability of training engineer and pioneer units together in peace, though it is realized that, owing to lack of accommodation, this can be arranged in only few commands. All these units should be employed as much as possible on work that is remunerative to the State.

Army Engineer Units.

62. We consider that the question of the various engineer units to be maintained either in peace or war does not come within the terms of our reference, and that this subject should be dealt with locally. At the same time, we desire to emphasise the fact that the army in India should be provided adequately both with those engineer units whose maintenance in peace has become necessary, and also with the cadres of such other units as will be required on mobilization.

Nomenclature.

63. In view of the variety of units performing engineer work, we consider that the term "Sappers and Miners" is inapplicable to all, and we suggest a more comprehensive term such as "Indian engineers," the words "Sappers and Miners" being added in brackets after those units which belong to that branch. The following are specimens of the designations suggested:—

3rd Field Company, Indian Engineers (Sappers and Miners).

B. Railway Company, Indian Engineers.

1st Searchlight Section, Indian Engineers.

4th Base Park Company, Indian Engineers.

Depot Organization.

46. The Sappers and Miners are at present organized into three separate corps, with headquarters at Roorkee, Kirkee and Bangalore each corps having originally been formed to enlist and train suitable men in the provinces of Bengal, Bombay and Madras respectively. Their retention as separate corps is due to caste and enlistment necessities. Each corps has its own depot establishment, instructional schools and workshops. The strength of each corps has been enormously expanded to meet the requirements of war, and, in our opinion, these corps will be fully occupied in providing such field companies, field troops and bridging trains as will be required in future by the army in India. These Sapper and Miner corps will not be competent to provide in addition a depot or organization for other engineer units, and we consider that at least two more depots are required, namely:—

(a) For railway units.

(b) For special engineering services, such as electric-light personnel; electrical and mechanical units; survey units; litho-photo and printing sections; camouflage units; engineer park companies; works battalions, etc.

Organization at Army Headquarters and in Commands, etc.

65. In Part II we recommend that, in the organization at Army Headquarters, the field engineer training should be co-ordinated by a senior Royal Engineer officer affiliated to the General Staff, and that the Military Works Services should become a directorate under the Quartermaster-General. In Commands, however, we consider that it is desirable to have a chief engineer, who would be responsible for the training within his command of engineer and pioneer units, and for the execution of military works and the financial responsibility in connection therewith. For carrying out the Works duties he should be assisted by district or area engineer commanders. Where necessary, he should also have under his orders an organization for issuing engineer stores, which could on mobilization develop into an engineer base park. In lower formations, we recommend that Commanding Royal Engineers should be freed as much as possible from duties in connection with the Military Works Services, in order to enable them to pay proper attention in peace to the training of the engineer and pioneer units under their orders.

Decentralization of Responsibility.

66. Within Commands the financial responsibility for engineer works should as far as possible, be delegated to Chief Engineers, so as to admit of a greater amount of inter-departmental correspondence on technical matters, and thereby to relieve general officers commanding of much clerical work.

67. We also suggest that the system of administering the Barrack Department might be made similar to that at home.

SECTION V.

CLOSER CO-OPERATION IN TRAINING AND MILITARY EDUCATION BETWEEN THE HOME AND INDIAN ARMIES.

68. In order that the systems at home and in India may be organized on similar lines, the following conditions should be observed as far as possible :—

- (a) Similarity in the organization of the General Staff and in the distribution of its duties at the War Office and at Army Headquarters, India.
- (b) Similarity in the conduct of staff duties, in the application of the principle of war during training, and in war establishments.
- (c) Similarity of organization, syllabus, and system of training at the Camberley and Quetta Staff Colleges, and at other military educational establishments.

69. As regards 1 (a), we understand that the proposals under consideration by Army Headquarters, India, for the organization of the General Staff are so similar to what is understood to be the system of training and military education at the War Office that uniformity between these two headquarters is assured.

70. As regards 1 (b), we have been informed that Army Headquarters, India, have already accepted in principle the proposals on the subject of loans, attachments and interchanges of officers and other ranks, formulated by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff on the 15th November, 1919. We recommend that these proposals be put into effect, not only by interchange with the army at home, but also with those of the self-governing Dominions.

71. As regards 1 (c), one result of the recent war has been to assimilate the systems of training at all military educational establishments. For the future, all that appears to be required is to put into operation the scheme, which has already been accepted in principle, for interchange of instructors at the Staff Colleges and at other educational establishments.

72. To promote the close assimilation of training methods, it is essential that constant communication should take place between the War Office and Army Headquarters, India, regarding new proposals affecting organization and training.

SECTION VI.

APPOINTMENTS.

73. We have been requested to examine the arrangements under which officers of the British service and Indian Army are selected for certain high appointments to commands and staffs. The absence of any *data*, giving in a convenient form the existing rules or conventions on the subject, has caused us considerable difficulty. Appendix XXII to Army Regulations, India, Volume II, purports to supply this information in tabular form, but much of the information is out of date, and the qualifications laid down are, in our opinion, sometimes unsuitable. We therefore attach a table in which we include the alterations that we suggest.

74. We do not regard as within the scope of our deliberations the question of the actual distribution of staff appointments and commands as between the British service and the Indian Army. We feel, however, that unless a fair proportion of these high appointments is reserved for officers of the Indian Army, its advantages as a career will be appreciably diminished. Under existing practice, if the Commander-in-Chief belongs to the British service, two of his three principal staff officers (C. G. S., A. G., Q. M. G.) should belong to the Indian Army. We consider that this practice should be maintained, and that similarly, if the Commander-in-Chief belongs to the Indian Army, two of the principal staff officers should come from the British service. We note with satisfaction that the War Office agrees that a due proportion of the appointments open to major-generals in countries, other than India, where Indian troops are serving, should be allotted to officers of the Indian Army. We consider that this principle should be extended to commands above the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and to staff appointments.

A.—COMMANDS.

No.	Appointment.	PRESENT (<i>vide</i> A. R. I. VOL. II, APP. XXII.)		AS PROPOSED BY THE ARMY IN INDIA COMMITTEE.		
		Nominating and sanctioning authorities.	Qualifications.	Nominating and sanctioning authorities.	Qualifications.	REMARKS.
1	Commander-in-Chief	Nothing laid down	..	The Cabinet, on the nomination of the Secretary of State for War in consultation with the Secretary of State for India.	..	The term should be for 4 years.
2	Army Commander ..	(i) War Office, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India, in the case of an officer of the British service. (ii) Secretary of State for India, on the nomination of the Government of India, in the case of an officer of the Indian service.	*	(i) In the case of an officer of the British service, the Secretary of State for War with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India. (ii) In the case of an officer of the Indian Army, the Secretary of State for India, on the nomination of the Government of India, and with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for War.	Not below the rank of lieutenant-general.	
3	District Commanders, and all commands tenable by officers of the rank of major general.	(i) War Office, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India, in the case of an officer of the British service. (ii) Viceroy, on the nomination of the C-in-C., in the case of an officer of the Indian service.	*, (1), (2) ..	As in the case of Army Commanders.	Major-general.	
4	Brigade Commanders	(i) War Office, after consultation with the C-in-C., in the case of major-generals of the British service. (ii) Viceroy, on the nomination of the C-in-C., in the case of Indian Army officers, and of colonels of the British service (with the concurrence of the War Office when not on the Indian establishment).	*, (1), (2), (8a) (9a).	(i) In the case of officers of the British service, the War Office, with the concurrence of the C-in-C. (ii) In the case of officers of the Indian Army, the Government of India, on the nomination of the C-in-C.	Not below rank of colonel or brevet colonel, and not over 53 years of age.	

B.—STAFF APPOINTMENTS.

No.	Appointment.	PRESENT (<i>vide</i> A.R.I., VOL. II, APP. XXII.)		AS PROPOSED BY THE ARMY-IN-INDIA COMMITTEE.		
		Nominating and sanctioning authorities.	Qualifications.	Nominating and sanctioning authorities.	Qualifications.	REMARKS.
5	Chief of the General Staff.	Secretary of State for India (with the concurrence of the War Office in the case of an officer of the British service) on the nomination of the Government of India.	*(1)	As for the C-in-C.	Two of these three should not belong to the same service as the C-in-C. and their rank should ordinarily not be lower than lieutenant-general.	The C. G. S. should receive the same pay and allowances as an Army Commander. If major-generals are appointed, they should be given the temporary rank of lieutenant-general. To be held alternately by an officer of the R. A. M. C. and I.M.S.
6	Adjutant-General in India.		*, (1), (2), (9), or (12), (25)	As in the case of Army Commanders.		
7	Quartermaster-General in India		*, (1), (2), (9), or (12), (25).			
8	Director of Medical Services in India.	(i) War Office with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India, in the case of an officer of the British service. (ii) Government of India, in the case of an officer of the Indian service. N. B.—Before any officer is nominated on the occurrence of a vacancy, the Government of India will report the vacancy to the Secretary of State for India with their opinion whether it should be filled from the British or Indian service, and the Secretary of State for India will decide this question in consultation with the Army Council.	(23), (y)	As in the case of Army Commanders.	Rank not below major-general.	
9	Secretary, Military Department, India Office.	Not included	None laid down.	Secretary of State for India, on the recommendation of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.	Officer of the Indian Army not below rank of major-general.	
10	Major-general in charge of administration. (Commands.)	Not included	None laid down.	As in the case of Army Commanders.	Major-general.	
11	Military Secretary ..	Commander-in-Chief ..	*, (2), (d)	Government of India, on the nomination of the Commander-in-Chief.	Officer of the Indian Army not below the rank of colonel or brevet-colonel.	Same tenure as for other staff officers. Title to be Military Secretary, Army Headquarters.
2	Bdr-General, Gen. Staff.	Viceroy (with the concurrence of the War Office in the case of an officer of the British service not on the Indian establishment) on the nomination of the Commander-in-Chief.	(1), (2), (8), (26)	As in the case of Army Commanders.	To follow the practice obtaining at home.	
3	Bdr-General in charge of administration.	None laid down ..	None laid down.			
4	Directors at A.H.Q.— (a) Director of Supplies and Transport.	Viceroy (with the concurrence of the War Office in the case of an officer of the British Service) on the nomination of the Commander-in-Chief.	(2), (15)	As in the case of Brigade Commanders.	Ditto.	
	(b) Dir.-Gen. Ordnance.	Viceroy, on the nomination of the Commander-in-Chief.	(2), (14), (d)			
	Dir.-Gen. Mily. Works.		(2)			
	Dir.-Gen. Army Remount Dept.		(15)			
	Dir. Army Clothing.		(3), (15), (a)			

No.	Appointments.	PRESENT (<i>vide</i> A.R.I., VOL. II, APP. XXII.)		AS PROPOSED BY THE ARMY-IN-INDIA COMMITTEE.		
		Nominating and sanctioning authorities.	Qualifications.	Nominating and sanctioning authorities.	Qualifications.	REMARKS.
15	(c) Dir. Mly. Operations. Dir. Staff Duties Dir. Mily. Training. Dep. Adj.-Gen. Dep. Qr.-Mr.-Gen.	{ C.-in-C. (with the approval of the War Office in the case of an officer of the British service not on the Indian establishment).	{ *, (1), (2) (8) (24)	{ As in the case of Brigade Commanders.	{ To follow the practice obtaining at home.	
	(d) Dir. of Farms. Dir. of Ord. Inspection. Dir. of Ord. Stores.					
	Other Directors not shown.	{ C.-in-C.	{ (2), (8), (15) (e) (2), (14), (d), (e) (2), (14), (d), (e)			
	(a) G. S. O. 1 .. A. A. G. A. Q. M. G.	{ C.-in-C. (with the concurrence of the War Office in the case of an officer of the British service not on the Indian establishment).	{ (2), (8), (24)	{ As for Brigade Commanders.	{ Ditto.	
	(b) D. D. M. S. .. A. D. M. S. at A. H. Q. D. D. E. & O. S. D. D. G. M. W.	{ C.-in-C.	{ (30) (31) Nothing laid down. (2), (e)	{ Ditto ..	{ Ditto	

QUALIFICATIONS UNDER APPENDIX XXII, A. R. I., VOL. II.

*Open to officers of the British service on the Imperial establishment.

- (1) Not tenable by an officer on the cadre of a corps.
- (2) Rank not below colonel.
- (3) Rank not below major.
- (8) Not over 54 years of age.
- (8a) Not over 54 years of age; but major-generals of the British service may be appointed up to the age of 55, and such officers will vacate at the age of 58 or on completion of four years' tenure, whichever is earlier.
- (9) Five years' service in India.
- (9a) Five years' service in India; but, for the purpose of this rule, one year's service in India in the rank of field officer counts as two years' service in a lower rank.
- (12) Three years' service in India as a regimental field officer who has during a campaign in India —
 - (a) commanded a regiment of cavalry, a battery of artillery or a battalion of infantry; or
 - (b) served on the staff as a field officer provided that a medal was granted for such campaign or that the officer was honourably mentioned in despatches.
- (14) British service officer.
- (15) Officer of the Indian Army.
- (23) Ordinarily from the British service, but the Government of India may nominate an officer of the Indian Medical Service.
- (24) Higher Standard Hindustani.
- (25) Lower Standard Hindustani.
- (26) Higher Standard Hindustani; but when the G. O. C. Army is an officer of the Indian service, the Lower Standard only in Hindustani is required.
- (30) Indian-Medical Service officer.
- (31) One each from Royal Army Medical Corps and Indian Medical Service.
 - (a) Appointments to the Clothing Department will be for three years in the first instance. Tenure not limited.
 - (d) Five years' tenure.
 - (e) May be held by a lieutenant-colonel.
 - (y) The tenure of this appointment by a surgeon-general of the British service is unlimited, while that of I. M. S. officers is limited five years (counting from the date from which the full consolidated salary has been continuously drawn unless reappointed for a second tour of duty), subject in all cases to vacation at the prescribed age limit.

PART V.

Conditions of Service in the Army in India.

SECTION I.—British Officers (including Indian Officers with King's Commissions).

SECTION II.—Applicability to India of a Uniform Scale of Pay for British Officers.

SECTION III.—British Troops.

SECTION IV.—Indian Officers.

SECTION V.—Indian Other Ranks.

PART V.

Conditions of Service in the Army in India.

SECTION I.

BRITISH OFFICERS (INCLUDING INDIAN OFFICERS WITH KING'S COMMISSIONS).

One of the subjects to which we were enjoined to devote particular attention is the amelioration of the general conditions of service in the Indian Army, as regards both British and other ranks. We had not proceeded far in our investigations before we found it necessary to include in our enquiry the conditions obtaining in the British service in India.

We have given considerable attention to this subject, and we have become aware that a spirit of unrest and dissatisfaction is noticeable in both armies. This spirit is no doubt in great part due to the war and its aftermath, such as frequent transfers, the prevalence of high prices, and the fluctuations in the exchange value of the rupee, and also to changes in the political organisation in India. Close investigation has, however, shown that there are other causes, many of long standing, which we think can and should be removed at once.

Before we proceed to make our recommendations, we will endeavour to indicate briefly what, in our opinion, are the principal causes underlying the undoubted feeling of discontent which prevails throughout the army in India.

2. Taking first the case of the British officers, we note that the pay in both services has recently been increased. There are still, however, certain anomalies in the pay of British officers of the Indian Army which require to be removed, and we deal separately with these in a later Section.

3. The delays experienced by officers in obtaining what they believe to be their just dues are a fruitful source of dissatisfaction. These delays, as we have shown in Part II, Section III, are not altogether the fault of the Military Accounts Department, which in India is responsible for pay, accounts and audit. Apart from temporary causes, such as congestion of work arising out of the war and the recent fluctuations in the sterling value of the rupee, they are largely due to the complexity of the regulations governing pay, leave, travelling allowances, etc. Until these regulations have been revised and simplified, there will continue to be friction between military officers and those responsible for dealing with their personal claims; and in the Section dealing with Military Finance we have emphasised the necessity for a complete revision of the regulations.

4. A serious ground for discontent is the difficulty experienced by officers in obtaining suitable accommodation for themselves and their families. Even before the war there was room for considerable improvement. With the increase in the number of officers serving in India, the lack of accommodation assumed very serious proportions; and though a certain amount has been done by Government in the direction of building temporary quarters in some stations, specially in northern India, the supply has by no means overtaken the demand, with the result that officers, and married officers in particular are put to the greatest inconvenience and discomfort. We recognise that it would have been difficult for Government to provide quarters in adequate numbers and sufficiently promptly to meet the ever-increasing demands of an expanding army. To the extent that the present shortage is due to the large number of officers in excess of the authorised establishment, this particular ground for discontent will disappear gradually, as conditions revert to the normal. But, apart from the inadequacy of the quarters available, there can be no doubt that the standard of accommodation before the war was far below what is suitable, and, as we shall show later, the same remark applies with even greater force to the accommodation provided in the barracks and married lines of British troops, in Indian lines and in hospitals. In the matter of improving accommodation, little was possible during the war, when the Government of India were straining every nerve and devoting all their resources to the raising, training, and equipping of a new army. Nevertheless, we note with satisfaction that some progress has been made, even under war conditions, with

the supply of electric light and fans in barracks and hospitals, and with improvements of the latter. The progress made in these directions during the next few years will be the measure of the contentment, and to a great extent of the efficiency of the army in India; and we urge that considerations of finance should not be allowed to postpone work of so urgent a character. Had the necessary measures been taken in the years before the war to improve the conditions under which officers and men had to live, both in health and in sickness, there would be less legitimate discontent than now exists, and the ultimate cost to Government would have been far less.

5. In the preceding paragraphs we have mentioned two of the main factors which operate to cause dissatisfaction and resentment in the minds of British officers serving in the army in India. But no examination of the matter would be complete which failed to take into account a certain feeling of despondency which prevails among many of the British officers of the Indian Army at the present time. To understand this feeling it is necessary to bear in mind that the army to which they belong, and of which they were proud, was shown in the early stages of the war to be inferior to the British Army in training and equipment and consequently in efficiency. In spite of these drawbacks, the Indian Army rendered great service to the Empire at a time of dire peril, and played a gallant part in stemming the German onslaught in the west in the winter of 1914-15. Then came the decision to transfer the bulk of the Indian troops from France to Mesopotamia. The history of the Mesopotamian campaign is known to all. Such defects as existed in the organisation and administration of the Indian Army came prominently to notice. The later phases of the campaign more than atoned for previous failures; but the credit which the Indian Army gained for the ultimate victory of our arms, both in Mesopotamia and in Palestine, could not wholly wipe out from the minds of numbers of keen and devoted officers the stigma which, through no fault of theirs, had by that time attached to Indian army administration. They were also taught, by criticisms in the press and elsewhere to attribute to the Government which they served a disregard of their interests; and the want of close liaison between Army Headquarters and the troops contributed to strengthen the belief that the Government of India and Army Headquarters were indifferent to the welfare of the Indian Army. Later, too, many Indian Army officers who had begun to earn high reputations and to fill staff appointments and commands of considerable importance on the western front found themselves recalled to India, and in many cases on their arrival were assigned posts of less importance than those which they had held in the field, while they lost the opportunities for earning distinction and gaining promotion which were in their grasp in other theatres of war.

6. This general feeling of soreness, accentuated no doubt by war strain and the inability to obtain leave which resulted from the Afghan war and the Waziristan operations following closely after the armistice, the British officers have not yet lost, nor will they lose it until they feel sure that their own Government is doing its best to uphold their interests and to redress their grievances. We may mention that our attention has been called to what is considered to be an attitude of undue reticence, adopted by the military authorities in India, as to their policy and intentions regarding matters which affect officers of the Indian Army and the conditions of their service. The fact that any important proposals have to be referred by the Government of India for the sanction of the Secretary of State in Council is responsible for this reticence, and it is a matter for regret that the position is not better understood in the Indian Army. At the same time, we think that there are many matters in respect of which Government and the military authorities in India might, and should, take officers into their confidence, while maintaining a proper reserve in regard to questions the decision of which does not rest in their hands.

7. Recent changes and reforms have no doubt proved another unsettling factor in the minds of British officers of the Indian Army; but this feeling, it is to be hoped, will pass away in time. For the present it contributes to the unpopularity of service in India, and we therefore feel bound to notice it.

8. All these circumstances have combined to produce a condition of affairs which calls for immediate remedy. It is impossible to ignore the signs of the times, or

to shut our eyes to the fact that, whereas the Indian Army formerly attracted the pick of the Sandhurst cadets, there is a reluctance at present on the part of cadets and their parents to elect for that army. This reluctance is particularly noticeable in the case of those families which have a long and honourable connection with the Indian Army. To some extent this may be attributed to the fact that the rates of pay of officers in the British Army, as recently revised, now afford a living wage; and that consequently a young officer who has no private means is no longer obliged to seek a career in the Indian Army. It is true that the latter still offers pecuniary advantages somewhat in excess of the British service, but it is equally true that these advantages are far smaller than they used to be, and are no longer, in our opinion, sufficient to turn the scale of an Indian career.

9. The problem before us, then, is to render service in the Indian Army sufficiently attractive to secure a constant flow of the best of the Sandhurst cadets, and to ensure that officers who have selected for that army, and British service officers while stationed in India, remain contented throughout their service.

House Accommodation.

10. We have already indicated two directions in which reforms are urgently needed, *firstly*, the simplification of the regulations dealing with pay and allowances, and *secondly* the provisions of suitable accommodation for all officers. We realise that the latter problem is one of no small difficulty, but we are strongly of opinion that the Government should recognise definitely its obligation to provide accommodation for all its military officers, as well as for messes of units. The grant of lodging allowance, as in England, will not meet the case, for the necessary accommodation does not exist. The decision as to the best methods of relief is a matter for the Government of India, and these methods will no doubt vary in different parts of the country. The alternatives appear to be (a) to build; (b) to buy; (c) to hire. The first would be very expensive, and a combination of (b) and (c), according to local circumstances, would probably be preferable.

The following suggestions are put forward as practical solutions of the difficulty:—

- (i) In addition to providing a sufficient number of bungalows to accommodate officers remaining in the plains during the hot weather, huts might be erected for use in the cold weather only; and such officers as remain in the plains during the summer should be permitted to share quarters in the bungalows, the occupants paying rent on the scale laid down in clause (ii) below, the total not to exceed the assessed rent of the bungalow. Thus rent would be paid for the huts only during the winter.

An arrangement of this kind would also tend to prevent heavy expenditure on building in a cantonment which it may be advisable to abandon later.

- (ii) The rent of Government quarters should be assessed in the usual way; but the total should not exceed 5 per cent. per annum of pay of rank for unmarried officers' quarters, and 10 per cent. for married quarters.
- (iii) Bachelors' quarters, to hold four to six officers, might be built, by Government or private enterprise, near messes, thus releasing bungalows for married officers.
- (iv) The legal machinery for obliging landlords to keep their houses in proper repair should also be rendered more speedy, effective and easy of application.
- (v) If officers (married or single) are obliged to live in camp, because no house accommodation is available, tents should be supplied free by Government on an adequate scale.

We are also of opinion that, following the home arrangements, the necessary furniture should be supplied and kept up in all Government quarters, and hire be charged for its use. The rate of hire might be that adopted by the Public Works Department, *viz.* 10 per cent. on original value.

Before leaving the subject of officers' quarters, we wish to draw attention to the importance of installing electric fans and light in all cantonments in the plains as soon as possible. Officers will, we feel sure, be willing to pay reasonable rates for these comforts in their houses, and the effect upon their health and spirits cannot fail to be beneficial.

Pay and Pensions.

11. As regards pay, we consider that certain recommendations which we have made in Section II of this Part will, if adopted, go far towards maintaining throughout all the regimental ranks the relative advantage of service in the Indian Army over service with the British Army. We consider it essential that this advantage in favour of the Indian Army should be maintained also in regard to pensions, since we are aware that the prospect of a higher pension plays a great part in the selection of an Indian military career.

Concessions in Kind.

12. Apart, however, from pay, there are certain concessions in kind which are enjoyed by officers of the British service in the United Kingdom, but are denied to them and to British officers of the Indian Army while serving in India. In considering to what extent similar concessions, or allowances in lieu, should be given in India, we have not overlooked the fact that the higher pay given in India is intended *inter alia* to compensate for the loss of these concessions or allowances. Nevertheless, there are certain matters in respect to which we consider that a more liberal policy should be adopted, for we feel convinced that if British officers are to serve contentedly in India additional attractions are necessary, and these, we think, should take the form of concessions in kind.

13. In the British service in India, officers who are required to maintain chargers receive an additional allowance of Rs. 30 a month for each charger. In the Indian Army, all officers are required to maintain chargers, in varying numbers, according to their rank and to the arm of the service to which they belong; and their pay in theory includes an allowance of Rs. 30 a month for each charger which they have to maintain. The cost of keeping a charger has risen greatly since his rate was fixed, and evidence points to the conclusion that it is now at least Rs. 60 a month in most stations. It is obvious that the Indian Army officer who draws in the lower ranks only Rs. 100 a month, higher pay than a British service officer of corresponding rank, and has to spend Rs. 60 a month out of that Rs. 100 to maintain a charger, is only Rs. 40 a month better off than an officer of the British service. This advantage is too small to compensate for the disadvantages of continuous service in India with Indian troops. Moreover, the horse allowance of Rs. 30 a month included in the Indian Army Officers' pay was intended to cover in part the cost of purchase. Its inadequacy for this purpose is patent; and the result is that the young Army Officer has to start his career by providing himself with a charger, and is then continuously out of pocket by the difference between the cost of its upkeep and the sum included in his pay for that purpose.

In the United Kingdom, mounted officers are provided with chargers by Government, which also pays for their upkeep. We recommend the adoption of a similar arrangement in India. But we see no reason why all officers in the Indian Army, other than cavalry officers, should be mounted, and we consider that in infantry regiments and similar units only the following officers should be mounted and should have one charger each:—the commanding officer, second-in-command, company commanders, adjutant and quartermaster, a total of eight. In cavalry regiments we recommend that all officers, including the commanding officer, should have two chargers each.

14. Subject to these limitations, we strongly recommend, for both the British service and the Indian Army:—

- (1) That Government should provide each mounted officer free of charge with the authorised number of chargers.
- (2) That Government should provide forage free of charge for the upkeep of such chargers.

- (3) That Government should provide an Indian groom for each horse; such grooms to be enlisted soldiers, paid, rationed and clothed by Government.
- (4) That, in the case of officers of the British service, the horse allowance now given in addition to pay should be withdrawn.
- (5) That no reduction should be made in the pay of officers of the Indian Army in consideration of Government relieving them of the cost of providing and maintaining chargers. The reason for this recommendation will, we believe, be made clear by a study of the Section dealing with the adoption of a uniform scale of pay for officers of the two services.
- (6) That saddlery and horse-kit should be issued free by Government, and be borne on regimental charge.

It is for consideration, however, whether under modern conditions there is the same necessity to provide all staff officers with chargers. In many theatres of war a pool of horses was formed to enable officers of the staff and departments of divisions and higher formations to carry out such mounted duties as were necessary. A pool of motor cars was also formed to enable them to perform those duties for which horses were not needed. A somewhat similar system might be adopted in India, both in peace and in the field.

15. Other concessions which we recommend for all British officers are the following:—

- (1) Officers should have the right to purchase from Government rations, fuel, oil and other articles stocked by Government departments, for themselves and their families.
- (2) Tents should be provided free by Government and be kept in unit or arsenal charge. They should be issued for use on manœuvres and field training, as well as on active service, and transport for them should be provided free by Government. No deduction should be made from the pay of officers of the Indian Army in return for the free provision of tents, notwithstanding the fact that this pay theoretically includes a sum on account of tentage.

This tentage allowance has been for so long merged into pay that it is not easy to ascertain exactly what it was given for, and thus it has had for years past little or no relation to its original object.

- (3) Officers of the British service should be allowed a soldier servant from the ranks, as in the United Kingdom. Officers of the Indian Army should be allowed an Indian soldier servant from the ranks, special enlistments being made for the purpose, if necessary.

Travelling and Detention Allowances.

16. The present arrangements under which British officers draw travelling and detention allowances are complicated, unpopular and uneven in operation.

When travelling by rail, officers pay their own fares and draw a certain sum in cash, as laid down in Army Regulations, India, Volume X, paragraph 29(a). This sum is expressed in terms of fares, and varies according to factors such as the railway line over which the journey is performed, the rank of the officer travelling, and the nature of the duty on which the travels, whether permanent transfer or temporary or inspection duty. There is also a scale of allowances for an officer's wife and family.

Officers also draw detention allowance at Rs. 5 a day, under the conditions specified in Army Regulations, India, Volume I, paragraphs 254 and 254-A. Ordinarily, however, an officer is not entitled to any detention allowance for the day on which he commences or terminates a journey, nor if he returns to headquarters on the same day.

In lieu of the present arrangements, we recommend the adoption of a system under which warrants, to cover the officer, his servants and baggage according to an

authorised scale, and, where admissible, his family, should be issued for all journeys on duty; and the officer should draw in addition an allowance at the rate of Rs. 5 for a single day or part of a day on which he travels, and Rs. 10 for a night away from his headquarters, but not both.

We also recommend the grant of a free passage home, for an officer of the Indian Army and his family, once at the end of his service, either on retirement or on unemployment.

Medical Attendance.

17. Another matter which has been brought prominently to our notice relates to the insufficiency of European medical officers. In the past there has been an implied understanding that the British officer, while serving in India, has the right to expect that his wife and family will be treated, when sick, by men of their own race. We find that considerable anxiety is felt by married officers of the Indian Army and their wives in regard to medical attendance in the future. It is recognised by these officers that the Indian Medical Service is being recruited more and more from Indians, and that in consequence there is increasing probability of their wives and daughters being stationed in places where European medical aid is not procurable without much delay and great expense. This risk they are most anxious to minimize; and they consider that it is the duty of Government to take measures to assist them. We entirely agree. We strongly urge that hospital accommodation for the wives and families of British officers should be provided in places where European doctors are available, either in station hospitals for British troops or in civil hospitals. We recommend that, until such arrangements are complete, a British Medical Officer should be placed in visiting medical charge of outlying places where officers' wives and families are stationed.

We also consider that the establishment of maternity homes at suitable centres is deserving of every encouragement, that convalescent homes for officers in good climates are urgently needed, and that the matter of their provision should be taken up as soon as possible.

Transfer to Half-pay List.

18. Our attention has been called to the regulation (A.R.I., Vol. I, para. 723) under which an officer whose transfer to the half-pay list has been caused by medical unfitness resulting from military duty is, on restoration to full pay, only allowed to reckon up to one year of the time spent on half-pay for promotion and pension. This regulation appears to us to bear very hardly on officers who have spent more than one year on the half-pay list as a consequence of wounds received or illness contracted on active service; and we recommend that the limit of time should be abolished, with retrospective effect from the beginning of the war.

Family Pensions Funds.

19. In the course of our investigations in India we became aware that there is considerable dissatisfaction with the present methods of management of the two military provident funds, which consist of the subscriptions and donations of officers, viz., the Indian Military Service Family Pension Fund now closed to new entrants and its successor, the Indian Military Widow's and Orphans' Fund.

The complaints are briefly as follows:—

- (a) That the 4 per cent. interest given by the Secretary of State on balances is too low, having regard to rates of interest now obtainable.
- (b) That no accounts, beyond a statement after the quinquennial actuarial audit, are published; that even this statement is not circulated to all subscribers and is not in a form intelligible to men unaccustomed to deal with financial problems.
- (c) That the subscribers, whose money forms the funds, have no voice whatever in its management.
- (d) That the rule under which a wife who divorces her husband loses all benefits from the fund is unjust.

We put forward the following suggestions:—

- (1) We understand that the rate of interest is for the present to be $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. instead of 4 per cent. We recommend that any benefits which may accrue from this or subsequent increases should be devoted to increasing pensions rather than decreasing subscriptions, and we are in a position to say that this is the general feeling in the Indian Army.
- (2) A simple and intelligible annual balance sheet should be published as soon after the close of the financial year (31st March) as possible; and the opportunity should be taken of explaining very briefly the principles on which the funds are managed, the advantages compared with those obtainable from an insurance company, and mentioning also the benefits admissible under the Royal Warrant.
- (3) It would be a source of satisfaction to the officers of the Indian Army if a small committee, nominated officially from among their own number, were given facilities to examine the affairs of the funds once a year at the India Office, and so be in a position to inform their comrades that they are satisfied (as far as laymen can be) that the funds are being managed in the best interests of the officers of the Indian Army. This committee might consist of the Secretary, Military Department, India Office, a pensioned officer to be nominated by the Secretary of State, and an officer on furlough to be nominated by the Government of India. Their report should be included in the same document as the balance sheet, and a copy of the complete document should be sent to every subscriber to the funds.
- (4) We agree that the rule mentioned in clause (d) above is inequitable. We suggest that a clause should be included in the regulations, providing that in such circumstances the surrender values of the pension of the wife, and of the children if committed to her charge, should be paid to the wife.

SECTION II.

APPLICABILITY TO INDIA OF A UNIFORM SCALE OF PAY OF BRITISH OFFICERS.

20. In paragraph 2 of Section I of this Part we referred to the existence of certain anomalies in the pay of British officers of the Indian Army. It has been suggested that the British officer at home, in the Colonies, in India, or in the Indian Army, should be paid, under Royal Warrant, a universal rate of pay (which may be called A), with an automatic overseas allowance when serving out of the United Kingdom (termed B), and an Indian allowance, to compensate for service in the Indian Army (which may be called C). Thus the British service officer serving in India would receive A *plus* B; while the British officer in the Indian Army would receive A *plus* B *plus* C.

Three main difficulties stand in the way of the complete adoption of this system. *Firstly*, fluctuations in the sterling exchange value of the rupee render it practically impossible to express A in terms of rupees: consequently it would be necessary to adopt an arbitrary rate of exchange which might, in the course of time, differ materially from the actual market rate, and this would almost certainly give rise to doubt and misunderstanding as to the equity of the process of calculating Indian rates of pay. *Secondly*, the basic British rate, A, is liable to periodical revision with reference to the rise or fall in the cost of living at home; and it might thus happen that an officer's pay in India was automatically raised or lowered with reference to conditions at home which did not affect his expenses in India to any marked degree. *Thirdly*, it is impossible to secure a uniform system of pay so long as promotions in the British service depend on regimental vacancies, and in the Indian Army are governed by a time-scale.

These objections appear to be so valid that we are forced to reject the proposal, in the form in which it has been placed before us.

21. In effect, however, the system under which the scales of pay of British officers serving in India have recently been fixed is based to a large extent on the principle referred to in paragraph 20. That is to say, although pay is consolidated and expressed in rupees, the amount has been fixed with reference to the sterling rates of pay at home, increased in recognition of such factors as service in India, loss of home allowances, and, in the case of the officers of the Indian Army, with the addition of "staff pay". That element of the consolidated rupee pay which represents the excess over the home scale of pay is not, however, "automatic", but varies from rank to rank. Taking the rupee at 2s. for the purpose of illustration and comparison, and converting the authorised rupee scale of pay into sterling at that rate, element (B) ranges from £190 in the case of a second-lieutenant of the British service to £736 in the case of a lieutenant-colonel in command.

22. We consider that the method of fixing scales of pay in India, as described in the preceding paragraph, is the only practicable one, in view of the difficulties already referred to, and that the pay must, as in the case of the other services, be fixed on a rupee basis. But an analysis of the consolidated scale of pay of the British service officer in India, and of the pay of rank (exclusive, that is, of "staff pay") of the British officer of the Indian Army, indicates certain anomalies which it is desirable to eliminate. It will be seen that the rates vary only in the following ranks, the scales in all other ranks being the same for both classes of officers.

Ranks.	British service (consolidated pay).	Indian Army (pay of rank).	REMARKS
	Rs.	Rs.	
Captain on promotion	750	700	Indian Army officer is worse off by 50
Captain after 15 years' service ..	850	750	Ditto ditto 100
Major	950	900	Ditto ditto 50
Major after 5 years' service as such ..	1,050	950	Ditto ditto 100
Lieutenant-Colonel	1,250	1,150	Ditto ditto 100

In a few years there will be no captains in the Indian Army with less than 9 years' service, at which period an officer, if a captain, will draw Rs. 750 a month, or the same as the British service captain from date of promotion until he attains 15 years' service. In the other four cases, the relative inferiority of the Indian Army Officer is compensated for by the higher staff pay which he is probably drawing by that time, *viz.*, Rs. 200 a month as company commander, instead of Rs. 100 as company officer.

The system, however, under which "staff pay" is drawn by British officers of the Indian Army requires examination. It is not properly "staff pay", since most of the officers are holding regimental and not staff appointments; in effect it is an additional allowance for serving in the Indian Army. Every officer, from the most junior upwards, draws it; but its real nature has been obscured by the fact that, although every officer on joining the Indian Army draws this so-called "staff pay" of Rs. 100 a month (in the infantry) as a company officer, the "staff pay" is increased to Rs. 200 a month in the case of a company commander, Rs. 250 in the case of the second-in-command, and Rs. 600 in the case of the commanding officer, while the adjutant and quartermaster draw Rs. 200 and 150 a month respectively, in lieu of their Rs. 100 as company officers.

23. We consider it desirable to separate the present "staff pay" into two elements, *viz.*, (1) an Indian Army allowance of Rs. 100 a month, to be drawn by all British officers of the Indian Army (excluding departmental or staff officers on consolidated rates of pay) up to and including lieutenant-colonels commanding regiments, and by Indian Army officers serving in departments (other than those on consolidated pay), and (2) command, or additional regimental pay, at the following monthly rates:—

	Rs.	
Commanding officer	400	} Command pay.
Second-in-command	150	
Company commander	100	
Adjutant	100	} Additional regimental pay.
Quartermaster	50	

24. Coupled with this proposal, we recommend an exact assimilation of the pay of rank of the British officer of the Indian Army with the consolidated pay of the British Service Officer.

The following table shows the effect of those proposals in respect of infantry officers of the Indian Army:—

44AD

RANK.	British service consolidated pay.*	PRESENT SCALE.			PROPOSED SCALE.				Increase on present rates.
		Indian Army pay of rank.	Staff pay.	Total.	Pay of rank.	Indian Army allowance.	Command pay†.	Total.	
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
2nd-Lieutenant	425	425	100	525	425	100	..	525	..
2nd-Lieutenant after 2 years' service	475	475	100	575	475	100	..	575	..
Lieutenant	550	550	100	650	550	100	..	650	..
Lieutenant after 7 years' service	750	750	100	850	750	100	..	850	50
Captain	750	750	100	850	750	100	100†	850	..
Captain after 9 years' service	850	750	200†	950	850	100	100†	950	..
Captain after 15 years' service	850	750	200†	950	850	100	100†	950	..
Major	950	900	200†	1050	950	100	100†	1,050	50
Major after 5 years as such	1,050	950	200†	1,150	1,050	100	100†	1,250	100
Lieutenant-Colonel	2,150	1,150	200†	1,400	1,250	100	150†	1,500	100
Lieutenant-Colonel in command	1,600¶	1,150	600§	1,750	1,250	100	400§	1,750	..

*Includes company command pay, where applicable. †If company commander. ‡If second-in-command. §Command pay. ¶The adjutant and quartermaster will draw Rs. 100 and Rs. 50 a month respectively, in addition to Indian Army pay of rank and Indian Army allowance. ¶Includes Rs. 350 command pay.

Officers serving with Indian cavalry draw a higher rate of "staff pay" than officers of the infantry branch. The rates are as follows:—

	Staff Pay.
	Rs.
2nd Lieutenant	150
Lieutenant	150*
Lieutenant after 7 years' service	150*
Captain	150*
Captain after 9 years' service	150*
	250†
Captain after 15 years' service	150*
	250†
Major	150*
	250†
Major after 5 years as such	250†
	300‡
Lieutenant-Colonel	250†
	300‡
Lieutenant-Colonel in command	700§

* As squadron officer. † As squadron commander. ‡ As second-in-command. § As commanding officer.

The adjutant draws Rs. 250 a month and the quartermaster Rs. 200 a month, as compared with Rs. 200 a month and Rs. 150 a month in the infantry.

It will be seen that the "staff pay" of cavalry officers is Rs. 50 a month higher than the corresponding rate in the infantry, and Rs. 100 higher in the case of the commanding officer. These higher rates are presumably due to the fact that cavalry officers have to maintain two chargers each (three in the case of the commanding officer), whereas infantry officers have to maintain only one. Incidentally, we recommend that in future the commanding officer of an Indian cavalry regiment should be required to maintain only two chargers, instead of three as at present.

We have already recommended that Government should relieve all infantry officers of the cost of upkeep of a charger, for which a sum of Rs. 30 a month is included in their pay, and all cavalry officers of the cost of upkeep of two chargers, for which a sum of Rs. 60 a month is included in their pay. The evidence which we have received shows that the cost of maintaining a charger is not less than Rs. 60 a month at the present time. We consider therefore that cavalry officers, who under our proposals will be relieved of the cost of maintaining two chargers, should be treated exactly the same as infantry officers in respect of pay of rank, Indian Army allowance, command pay, and additional regimental pay.

The following comparative table shows the effect of these proposals, in typical cases of each rank in the cavalry:—

RANK.	PRESENT.				PROPOSED.			Total.	Difference.
	Pay of rank.	Staff pay.	Deduct cost of keeping chargers.	Nett emoluments.	Pay of rank.	Indian Army allowance.	Command pay.		
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.		
Lieutenant (squadron officer) ..	475	150	120	505	475	100	..	575	+ 70
Captain after 9 years' service (squadron officer).	750	150	120	780	750	100	..	850	+ 70
Major (squadron commander) ..	900	250	120	1,030	950	100	100	1,150	+ 120
Major after 5 years as such (second-in-command).	950	300	120	1,130	1,050	100	15	1,300	+ 170
Lieutenant-Colonel (in command) ..	1,150	700	180	1,670	1,250	100	40	1,750	+ 80

25. In the foregoing paragraphs we have shown *inter alia* how it is proposed to effect an assimilation of the pay of rank of the British officer of the Indian Army with the consolidated Indian pay of the British Service Officer. There will, however, be in the future a certain number of Indian officers serving in the Indian Army and holding the King's commission; and it is necessary to consider what difference, if any, should be made in their pay as compared with that of British officers.

26. The Secretary of State has laid down the principle that the pay of European officers of the civil departments in India should include an item to be called "overseas or expatriation allowance", which will be drawn by Europeans only whilst serving in India, and by Indians only when serving outside India. This allowance ranges, in the revised scales of pay of the Indian Civil Service, from Rs. 150 to Rs. 250 a month, and in those of the Indian (Imperial) Police Service from Rs. 125 to Rs. 250 a month. The periods on the various rates of overseas allowance are shown in the following table :—

Indian Civil Service.	Rs.	Police.	Rs.
7 years	150	6 year's	125
4 years	200	4 years	150
Thereafter	250	3 years	200
		Thereafter	250

In both services there are appointments above the time-scale, which are filled by selection, and the holders of which draw the same rates of pay, whether Europeans or Indians.

27. It appears impossible to resist the view that a similar principle should be applied in the case of the Indian Army, that is to say, that Indian officers with King's commissions should receive rather less emoluments in India than the British officer. At the same time, it is undesirable to make any great reduction in the emoluments of Indian officers, in view of the fact that they will have to live in the same style as the British officers, pay the same mess subscriptions, and conform generally to the same standard in respect of entertaining, sports, games, social obligations, etc. To this extent their standard of obligatory expenditure is perhaps more definitely fixed than is the case with Indian officers of other services, such as the Indian Civil Service and the Police, who can regulate their style of living, within certain limits, to suit their own tastes and pockets.

28. For these reasons we recommend that the overseas allowance of British officers of the Indian Army, which will not be drawn by the Indian officers with King's commissions, should be at lower rates than in the case of either the Indian Civil Service or the Police Service, and we suggest the following :—

2nd Lieutenant	Rs. 100 a month.
Lieutenant	
Captain	
Major	Rs. 150 a month.
Lieutenant-Colonel	Rs. 200 ..

In staff appointments and commands, the pay of which is consolidated, Indian officers will draw the full pay equally with British officers. In departments in which the emoluments are regulated by Indian Army pay of rank *plus* departmental pay, Indian officers will draw the pay of rank admissible to them while in regimental employment, that is, without the overseas allowance, and departmental pay in addition. Indian officers will also draw the Indian Army allowance under the same conditions as British officers.

29. We also recommend that the Indian pay of British service officers should be expressed in similar terms, so as to indicate what portion of the excess of their Indian pay over the sum of their pay and allowances at home represents overseas or expatriation allowance. The balance of this excess represents roughly the estimated difference in the cost of living in India as compared with that at home, taking into account the various allowances admissible at home but not drawn in India.

30. The following table shows the pay of rank and overseas allowance admissible under this proposal to officers of various ranks, in both the British Service and the

Indian Army. It omits Indian Army allowance, command pay, and additional regimental pay, which will be admissible to British officers and Indian officers with King's commissions alike, as shown in the table in paragraph 24 :—

	Pay of rank.	Overseas Allowance.	Total.
2nd Lieutenant	325	100	425
2nd Lieutenant after 2 years' service	375	100	475
Lieutenant	450	100	550
Lieutenant after 7 years' service	650	100	750
Captain	750	100	850
Captain after 9 years' service	800	150	950
Captain after 15 years' service	900	150	1,050
Major	1,050	200	1,250
Major after 5 years' service as such			
Lieutenant-Colonel			

31. We recommend that British officers of the Indian Army, serving temporarily with Indian troops outside India, should continue to draw the overseas allowance, which should of course be admissible in all cases to Indian officers with King's commissions when serving outside India.

Effect of the Foregoing Proposals.

32. It will be observed that the first effect of the foregoing proposals will be to increase the emoluments of five officers in each regiment, holding the appointment of company or squadron commander or second-in-command, by Rs. 100 a month (or in some cases by Rs. 50 a month), and the emoluments of captains of less than nine years' service (a rapidly disappearing class) by Rs. 50 a month. We think that there are good grounds for recommending such increase, since the present scale is open to the criticism that it does not provide for a sufficient periodic rise during the years between attaining nine years' service and promotion to lieutenant-colonel. For instance, a captain of nine years' service, who is also company commander, draws Rs. 950 a month, and receives no increase till he is promoted major at eighteen years' service, when he gets Rs. 1,100. He then waits five years for a further rise of Rs. 50 a month. For purposes of comparison, the following extract from the table showing the revised rates of the Imperial Police service is instructive :—

Indian Army.	Police.	Rs.
	After 9 years ..	800
	10 ..	850
	11 ..	900
	12 ..	950
	13 ..	1,000
Captain after nine years' service and company commander, Rs. 950.	14 ..	1,050
	15 ..	1,100
	16 ..	1,150
	17 ..	1,200
	18 ..	1,250
	19 ..	1,250
	20 ..	1,300
Major and company commander, Rs. 1,100 ..	21 ..	1,300
	22 ..	1,350
	23 ..	1,350

It will be seen that while a captain of nine years' service and company commander may remain for ten years on Rs. 950 a month, and on promotion to major will draw Rs. 1,100 a month for the next five years, the police officer will rise during the same period from Rs. 800 to Rs. 1,350 by annual increments of Rs. 50 up to Rs. 1,250 and then biennial increments of the same amount.

We consider that the relative advantage of the Police service during the above-mentioned years affords a strong ground for supporting the slight increase in the emoluments of the British officers of the Indian Army which we have proposed in paragraph 24.

33. Our proposals will, however, have other consequences which require careful examination.

In the first place, it will affect the total emoluments of officers, both of the British service and of the Indian Army, holding staff appointments in India. At present, under paragraph 14, Army Regulations, India, Volume I, a British Service Officer holding a staff appointment in India draws the Indian Army pay of his rank *plus* the staff pay of the appointment, as laid down in paragraph 1, Army Regulations, India, Volume I. As Indian Army pay of rank is in some cases lower than the British service rate of Indian pay, this method of calculation involves certain inconveniences. The result, however, of adopting the proposal to level up Indian Army pay of rank to the British service scale of pay of the corresponding rank would be to increase the total emoluments in each case (British service and Indian Army) of the officer holding the staff appointment. For example, we take the case of a lieutenant-colonel appointed to be general staff officer, 1st grade (staff pay Rs. 700).

He now draws Indian Army pay of rank = Rs. 1,750 *plus* Rs. 700 staff pay = Rs. 1,850. If the Indian Army pay of rank were assimilated, as we propose, to the scale of Indian pay of the British service, a general staff officer, 1st grade, would receive, if a British service officer, Rs. 1,250 *plus* Rs. 700 = Rs. 1,950, and if an Indian Army officer, Rs. 1,250 *plus* Rs. 100 Indian Army allowance *plus* Rs. 700 staff pay = Rs. 2,050. Therefore there would be an increase in emoluments of Rs. 100 in one case and Rs. 200 in the other case, for which there appears to be no justification; and the rates of pay would be different for the two services, which is undesirable.

34. For these reasons, we propose that the pay of staff appointments should be consolidated, at the following monthly rates:—

		Rs.
Present rate of staff pay, Rs. 700	General Staff Officer, 1st grade	1850
	Assistant Adjutant General	
	Assistant Quartermaster-General	
	Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General	
Present rate of staff pay, Rs. 400	General Staff Officer, 2nd grade	1,350
	Deputy Assistant Adjutant General	
	Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General	
	Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General	
Present rate of staff pay, Rs. 400	Brigade Major	1,200
Present rate of staff pay, Rs. 250	General Staff Officer, 3rd grade	1,000
	Staff Captain	

These consolidated rates are, with one exception, the same as those which a lieutenant-colonel, a major after five years as such, and a captain of nine years' service or over would draw respectively under the present system, and are, in our opinion, adequate. A brigade-major at present draws Indian Army pay of rank *plus* Rs. 400 staff pay. We recommend that, in accordance with the home practice, a brigade-major should receive rather lower emoluments than a general staff officer, 2nd grade, and we propose a consolidated pay of Rs. 1,200 a month.

35. The next point to be examined is the effect which our proposals will have on the emoluments of Indian Army officers, serving in departments, whose pay is governed by Indian Army pay of rank, *plus* departmental staff pay. The departments affected are:—

Cantonment Magistrate's Department.
Judge Advocate General's Department.
Remount Department.
Supply and Transport Corps.

The rates of departmental staff pay admissible in addition to Indian Army pay of rates are laid down in Army Regulations, India, Volume I, paragraph I (a), (d), (g) and (h).

As we do not recommend an increase in the total emoluments of departmental officers, it will be necessary to reduce the rate of departmental staff pay, with reference to the facts that every officer in the Indian Army will, in future, draw Rs. 100 a month as Indian Army allowance, and that the pay of rank has in several cases been increased. We consider that departmental staff pay should in future be termed "departmental pay", if indeed it is not found possible hereafter to consolidate the rates of pay in these departments.

36. Next, the question of the effect of the foregoing proposals on the leave pay of officers requires consideration.

We have examined this question and find that in no single case will the leave allowances, out of India, of an officer of the British service or of the Indian Army be affected, except that those officers of the Indian Army whose emoluments we propose to raise (*vide* paragraph 24 *ante*) will of course benefit to that extent while on privilege leave.

37. There remains for consideration the case of the officer who acts for another officer, whether in staff or regimental employ, absent on leave*.

A.—Indian Army.—

During the privilege leave portion, the officiating officer draws no extra pay. During the furlough portion he draws his Indian Army pay of rank, *plus* half the staff pay of his own appointment *plus* half the staff pay of the officiating appointment.

We recommend that this rule be altered, and that the officiating officer should draw, during the furlough portion of the absentee's leave, the full consolidated pay of the officiating appointment, and that the full command pay of his own regimental appointment be similarly available for the officer acting for him, and so on all down the chain of acting appointments. The same principle should govern all kinds of command pay, that is, the officer acting for an officer holding a higher regimental appointment should draw the full command pay of the latter's appointment.

An examination of this question shows that our proposal would not add appreciably to the cost of furlough arrangements, and that the higher cost will be chiefly due to the increased remuneration proposed for certain classes of officers, not to the effect of granting one officer, acting for another officer absent on furlough, the full consolidated or command pay of the appointment.

B.—British Army.—

The extra cost to Government would be somewhat greater in the case of a British service officer officiating in a staff appointment, the pay of which we propose to consolidate. The following instances illustrate this point:—

	Present. [Indian Army pay of rank <i>plus</i> half staff pay of officiating appointment.]	Proposed.
	Rs.	Rs.
Lieutenant-Colonel acting for a G.S.O., 1st grade	$1,150 + \frac{700}{2} = 1,500$	1,850
Major after 5 years, acting for a G.S.O., 2nd grade	$950 + \frac{400}{2} = 1,150$	1,350
Major acting for a Brigade Major	$900 + \frac{400}{2} = 1,100$	1,200
Captain after 15 years' service acting for a Brigade Major	$750 + \frac{400}{2} = 950$	1,200
Captain of 9 years' service acting for a G.S.O., 3rd grade	$750 + \frac{250}{2} = 875$	1,000

* Throughout this section we employ the term "furlough" to cover all forms of leave other than casual and privilege leave.

38. The examination of these matters has, however, led us to investigate the necessity for granting furlough to an officer holding any of the above staff appointments, during his tenure of them. We have come to the conclusion that there is no reason why an officer in a staff appointment should, subject to the exception noted below, be allowed to absent himself on furlough while holding the appointment. If he requires leave in excess of the privilege leave admissible to him, we consider that he should vacate the staff appointment, and revert to the scale of furlough allowances admissible under the rules governing his case.

The exception referred to is that staff officers should, we consider, be permitted once during their tenure of the appointment to take two months' privilege leave combined with one month's furlough, the latter on the allowances admissible to officers of their rank.

The increased cost to Government of the acting arrangements consequent on the absence on furlough of the permanent incumbent of a staff appointment would therefore be negligible.

39. There are, however, other officers of higher rank whose claims to combined leave are governed by Army Regulations, India, Volume I, paragraph 344, and Volume II, paragraph 226. Typical examples are army, divisional and brigade commanders, and all officers holding major-general's appointments.

There is a good deal to be said for the view that officers of and above the rank of major-general, and brigade commanders of lower rank, should not be altogether precluded from taking furlough during their tenure of command or staff appointments, since they are men of considerable seniority who may require a period of rest and recuperation and change of climate. We therefore recommend that they should be permitted to take furlough once during their tenure of a command or staff appointment, but not at the end thereof, that it should be permissible to combine privilege leave with this furlough, but that the total period of absence on furlough or combined leave should not exceed eight months. If an officer holding one of these appointments finds it necessary to take leave for more than eight months at a time he should vacate his appointment.

The existing rule (paragraph 344, Army Regulations, India, Volume I), which regulates the allowances of such officers while on furlough, is inoperative under the revised scales of pay. In every case it gives a rate of allowance in excess of the maximum admissible (£ 1,000 a year). We recommend that a furlough rate of allowance out of India be fixed for the officers under consideration.

We also recommend that, as in the case of other staff appointments, the officer appointed to officiate for the absentee should draw, during the furlough portion of the latter's leave, the full pay of the appointment.

40. Finally, we recommend that all officers of the Indian Army below the rank of major-general should draw, while on furlough out of India, the British pay and allowances admissible to officers of the British service of corresponding rank while on furlough out of India. We see no reason why these rates should not be made applicable to officers of the Indian Army also, thus removing one more existing anomaly.

41. Our attention has been called to the rule in paragraph 358, Army Regulations, India, Volume I, which dates back to 1886, and which permits the grant to officers of the Indian Army of leave in India for one year at a time, extensible to two years, on full military pay and half staff pay of appointment. We do not consider it necessary to grant furlough in India in excess of six months (which might be combined with privilege leave to the amount due, but subject to a maximum limit of 8 months' absence); and we recommend that during such furlough officers should draw Indian Army pay of rank *plus* Indian Army allowance, but not half the staff pay of the appointment.

42. We recommend that in future leave be of three kinds only—

- (1) Casual leave (or station leave).
- (2) Privilege leave.
- (3) Furlough, which may be granted either on private affairs or on medical certificate.

We also recommend that the right to accumulate privilege leave up to ninety days be abolished, and that such leave be limited to two months a year (instead of sixty days as at present); except that when an officer in regimental employ has been refused privilege leave on public grounds for two consecutive years, he may be granted three months' privilege leave in the third year, the grant of such leave being at the discretion of the divisional commander.

Summary.

43. The various recommendations made in this section are summarised below:—

- (a) That the present system of fixing the pay of officers of the army in India in rupees be continued.
- (b) That the pay of rank of officers of the Indian Army be assimilated in all cases to the consolidated pay of British service officers in India of corresponding rank and length of service.
- (c) That all officers of the Indian Army be given, in addition to pay of ranks, an Indian Army allowance of Rs. 100 a month, except when serving as departmental or staff officers on consolidated rates of pay.
- (d) That all regimental officers of the Indian Army, both in the cavalry and in the infantry, should draw in addition "command pay" or "additional regimental pay" at the rates shown in paragraph 23.
- (e) That the present "staff pay" of the Indian Army be abolished.
- (f) That the consolidated pay of British service officers in India, and the pay of rank of British officers of the Indian Army, should be considered to include an element of "overseas or expatriation allowance", at the rates proposed in paragraph 28. This allowance to be drawn by all British officers while serving in India, and by Indian officers with the King's commission while serving out of India; and by British officers of the Indian Army serving temporarily with Indian troops or formations outside India (*e.g.*, in Mesopotamia or Palestine).
- (g) That the pay of staff appointments be consolidated, and fixed at the rates proposed in paragraph 34.
- (h) That the present rates of "departmental staff pay" be revised, with reference to the proposed increase in the pay of rank of certain officers of the Indian Army and the proposed grant of Indian Army allowance, so as not to entail higher emoluments than are drawn by such officers at present.
- (i) That "departmental staff pay" be termed in future "departmental pay," but that the question of consolidating the pay of departmental officers be considered.
- (j) That the present rules governing the pay of officers officiating in furlough vacancies be rescinded; and that in future the officiating officer should draw, during the furlough portion of the absentee's leave, the full consolidated pay of the officiating appointment, or the full command pay of the regimental appointment, as the case may be, and so on all down the chain of officiating appointments. The absentee officer to be restricted, during the same period, to the furlough allowance admissible under rule.
- (k) That officers holding staff appointments should be ineligible for furlough during the tenure of their appointments, subject to the exception stated in paragraph 38.
- (l) That certain officers of high rank should, however, be permitted to take furlough or combined privilege leave and furlough, not exceeding eight months, once during (but not at the end of) their tenure of their commands or staff appointments.
- (m) That a rate of furlough allowances be fixed for the officers mentioned in clause (l).

- (n) That all officers of the Indian Army, below the rank of major-general, should draw while on furlough out of India the British pay and allowances admissible to officers of the British service of corresponding rank while on furlough out of India.
- (o) That officers of the Indian Army be restricted to furlough in India not exceeding six months (which might be combined with privilege leave up to a total maximum of eight months), and that these officers draw during such furlough their Indian Army pay of rank *plus* Indian Army allowance.
- (p) That leave in future be of three kinds only :—
 - (1) Casual (or station) leave.
 - (2) Privilege leave.
 - (3) Furlough, either on private affairs or on medical certificate.
- (q) That, subject to the exception stated in paragraph 42, privilege leave be limited to two months a year.

44. We think that the proposals which we have outlined have the following advantages :—

- (1) The assimilation of the British service Indian pay with the pay of rank of the British officer of the Indian Army will result in closer relationship between the two services, and will remove certain existing anomalies.
- (2) The slight increases in the total emoluments of certain officers of the Indian Army are desirable, having regard to the slow rate of augmentation between ten years and twenty-four years of service, and to the very slight advantage which the Indian Army officer has, under the new scales of pay, over the British service officer.
- (3) The separation of the present "staff pay" of the Indian Army officer into the two elements of "Indian Army allowance" and "command pay" is in accordance with the object for which this additional pay is given, and will remove the confusion resulting from the two being merged together as at present.
- (4) The introduction of the elements of "expatriation allowance" into the Indian pay of British service officers and into the pay of rank of British officers of the Indian Army is necessary, in view of the principle applied to other services, and also affords a simple method of regulating the pay of Indian officers with King's commissions.
- (5) The proposal to grant to an officer, acting in a staff appointment in place of an officer on furlough, the full consolidated pay of that appointment, and to a regimental officer acting as a commanding officer, company commander or second in command, the full command pay of the appointment, will tend to a simplification in the calculation of pay admissible, and will do away with the present cumbrous rule under which an officer draws half the staff pay of his substantive and officiating appointments.
- (6) The proposal to make furlough inadmissible (with one slight exception) during the tenure of staff appointments, up to and including those of general staff officer, first grade, and analogous appointments, is a corollary to the above, and will lead to a simplification of the leave rules.
- (7) The proposal to regulate the leave allowances of British officers of the Indian Army in the same way as those of officers of the British service will also lead to simplification of rules and reduction of clerical and accounts work, and will be a further step towards the establishment of closer relations between the two armies.

SECTION III.

BRITISH TROOPS.

We turn now to the question of improving the conditions of service of British troops.

Troopship Accommodation.

45. We would bring to notice the conspicuous difference that exists even now-a-days between the accommodation on board troopships for officers and their families and for the non-commissioned ranks and their families. Troop decks are often below water line, crowded, and ill-ventilated. Meals are served in an uninviting way. Family quarters are cramped and afford little privacy. Latrine, lavatory and bath accommodations, especially for families, is often insufficient, and deck space for exercise is inadequate.

This sharp contrast with the comfort of the officers' accommodation is not in accordance with the spirit of the times, and is undesirable at such close quarters as obtain on a ship. War conditions have no doubt been responsible for much of the discomfort described above; but we consider that, when regular trooping arrangements can once more be made, it will be well to take steps to place the accommodation and comfort of the non-commissioned ranks on boardship on a considerably higher level.

Accommodation in Barracks.

46. We have visited the lines of British troops in several parts of India, and have made enquiries from a considerable number of witnesses as to the conditions under which British soldiers and their wives and families serve and live in India. As a result we express the opinion that, generally speaking, the standard of accommodation for single men is not as good as in England; and that the institutions for their general welfare and recreation are by no means so good as to compensate for the discomforts of life in barracks in India. Married soldiers and their families are worse off than in England in respect of comfort, as well as in pecuniary matters.

47. We make the following recommendations as regards barracks :—

- (i) That it should be recognised that the British soldier in India must, especially in summer, spend a large portion of each day in his barracks, and that therefore the barracks cannot be regarded solely as dormitories. A portion of each barrack (or group of barracks close together) should be set apart and furnished as a reading and writing room, well lighted, and furnished with fans for the hot weather. At present a man can neither read nor write after dark anywhere in most barracks, and there is no inducement for him to stay there. We consider that in India, where the British soldier is cut off from the ordinary amenities of civil life, it is the duty of the Government which he serves to see that his immediate surroundings in and around barracks shall be on at least as high a level of comfort and efficiency as in England and more, that the matter is, in our opinion, one which cannot be postponed without the risk of undesirable consequences.
- (ii) The washing and bathing facilities in India are (as a rule) markedly inferior to those in England, and this is the more to be deplored in a country where good arrangements for such matters are an absolute necessity. The bathing arrangements as they existed in the British cavalry lines at Risalpur when first occupied appear to be exactly what is wanted.

Married Quarters.

48. In no cases seen by us do married quarters come up to the home standard; in most cases they fall much behind.

The number of rooms is inadequate, as a rule, even for a married couple without children. The bathroom accommodation is too small, and no store-rooms or cupboards are provided. Quarters are often dark and gloomy. The kitchens which

we have seen are either so far from the quarters that they cannot be used, or so small that the two families (for whom they are often meant) cannot cook in them at the same time.

The scale of furniture provided is far below the scale allowed in England. As a result, married men either have to hire inferior furniture at exorbitant rates from local shops, which they can ill afford to do, or see their wives and children living in conditions not differing much, except in the matter of fresh air, from slum lodgings in London.

Families in India do not draw rations; and the allowance for a soldier's wife is Rs. 8 (16s) a month, with Rs. 2-8 (5s) for each child.

We strongly recommend that kitchens should be improved; that wives and families of soldiers in India should receive free rations on a suitable scale; and that the planning and furnishing of married quarters should be brought up to a standard approaching as nearly as possible to that which obtains at home.

Regimental Institutes.

49. The state of regimental institutes in India is far from satisfactory. The Army Institute Fund has no money at present, because the territorial units which garrisoned the country during the war would not subscribe to it. The consequence is that the furniture is decayed and in adequate, and funds are not forthcoming to meet the large capital expenditure that would be necessary to put matters on a satisfactory footing. The institutes are often gloomy and unattractive, the lighting allowance being inadequate. The library allowance of Rs. 176 a year is not sufficient to do much more than keep existing books in repair.

There appears to be a consensus of opinion that the Royal Army Temperance Association is no longer necessary for the class of men who now fill the ranks of the British Army, and that the space it takes up in barracks could be more usefully employed.

At the same time, the young soldiers of the present day are very dependent upon outside amusements and recreation. It seems to be agreed that the kind of institution that appeals to them is something of the type of a Gymkhana Club, having facilities for outdoor games attached to it, and with a cinema theatre and dancing room as part of its internal attractions. We venture to suggest that opportunity should be taken to apply to the army in India the system introduced at Aldershot, to which His Majesty the King referred in the Royal Message to Lord Rawlinson on the 25th May 1920. His Majesty wrote:—

“I have been struck by the advance made in providing for the recreation and amusement of the troops. The Queen and I were especially pleased to find that steps are being taken to include the married families in these schemes. The provision of clubs for the married women and playgrounds for the children is a new and admirable development.”

We recommend that there should be a room for sergeants, and that a part of the club, or perhaps a room in the regimental institute, should be set apart for the married families. It is very important that such an institution should be as central as possible and entirely undenominational; that there should be no religious meeting or services in connection with it; also that, with proper safeguards, it should be managed by soldiers for soldiers.

General Remarks.

50. We have had the advantage of seeing the proceedings of a committee, held under the presidency of Major-General J. M. Walter in October 1919, to consider matters such as those referred to above, and wish to record our complete agreement with the recommendations made therein.

We consider, however, that, while it is clearly the duty of Government to see that the soldiers and their families are comfortably housed, properly fed, and have in their own lines and quarters such means of recreation and employment (apart from works) as will assist them to get through the long Indian day, the provision of such elaborate and initially expensive institutions as garrison clubs is more perhaps than

it can be called upon to undertake. We suggest that the Government of India should make a loan sufficient to meet the initial expense of starting these institutions on a satisfactory footing, and we urge that this be given. It would then be the business of the local authorities, with the aid of an Indian Canteen Board, to keep them in good order.

We should like to mention here that everyone with whom we have conversed on these subjects has represented that obligatory “church parade” service is a fruitful source of discontent. This result may be due in some measure to the fact that the chaplains who minister to the troops are not always selected with reference to their special qualifications for this duty, a matter which we deal with in Section IV of Part VIII of this Report. The general view, however, is that attendance at church should be voluntary.

We wish, in conclusion, to point out that the outlook of the present-day soldiers upon life is widely different from that of their predecessors of the old army. They have neither their deep-seated discipline nor their long-suffering patience. They and their wives look for a higher standard of comfort and a somewhat different class of recreation. Their reasonable aspirations must be met, and their idiosyncrasies must be sympathetically studied, if they are to be contented army while serving in India.

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family with the land, and its corporate organisation and system of mutual support. In reply, it may be argued that the recent flood of casualties from war and disease has swept away these props, and has, at all events in the Punjab, produced so many widows and orphans that old customs have failed to prevent a large number from coming perilously near to great poverty, and sometimes to actual hunger. The veil which hides Indian family life from outside intrusion is a bar to that perfect knowledge which should precede decision; but we feel strongly that any Government which sends a married soldier of any race to a war in which he loses his life should be actually responsible for providing a pension sufficient to keep his widow and children from want, and should not make its contribution dependent upon the intricacies of a family system into which it cannot penetrate.

As regards the Indian officer's family pension, we recommend that there should be only one rate, *viz.*, the higher; for we can see no good reason for a variation in pensions, whether the officer (or soldier) died of disease contracted on service, or attributable to the effects of service, or was killed in action.

We also recommend a small pension for each child of the deceased officer till a boy is 18 years of age, and in the case of a girl till she marries.

We make a specific recommendation in Appendix I (Item 4).

Our recommendations as to the family pensions of other ranks will be found in the next Section.

House Accommodation; etc.

62. It has been represented to us by several Indian officers that they are not consulted when standard plans for regimental lines are evolved or altered. We have no doubt that their predecessors were consulted when these plans were originally drawn up, but we agree that Indian officers should be kept in touch with any proposed improvements, and consulted as to local variations. We think that this might be done, as regards the men's lines as well as the Indian officer's houses, by means of a standing station committee of Indian officers, to be presided over by a staff officer in each cantonment. We recommend that lighting in all Indian officers' houses should be free, on an approved scale, and that the necessary furniture should be supplied free, and kept on Government charge. Where there is a piped water-supply, it should be extended to Indian officers' houses. We have inspected the room allowed in the latest pattern of Indian lines as a meeting place for Indian officers, and we found it suitable. We recommend the addition to it of a kitchen, to enable Indian officers to dine together, or to extend hospitality to their friends. We desire to draw attention to a plan for an Indian officer's house, prepared by our colleague, Major Sir Umar Hayat Khan, and reproduced in Appendix II.

Rewards for Languages.

63. We consider that it will be to the advantage of the army for Indian officers to be encouraged to learn English; and several have expressed the opinion that they should be treated in this matter somewhat on the same lines as British officers who learn oriental languages. We agree, and make specific recommendations as to rewards for passing examinations in English in Appendix I (Item 5). In view of the large proportion of the Indian Army which is now, and will be for some time to come, serving overseas, it is for consideration by the Government of India whether this system of language rewards for Indian officers might not be profitably extended to other languages than English.

Indian Officers to be represented on Committees.

64. It seems to us desirable that Indian officers should be represented on committees which deal with administrative matters affecting them and other Indian ranks.

We have already recommended their serving on barrack committees. We consider that they also should be nominated to cantonment committees and to station hospital committees.

Status of Pensioned Indian Officers.

65. We have been impressed by the fact that every Indian officer who has appeared before us has expressed his opinion that the status of the pensioned Indian officer in his native district is no longer what it was, and that he now often meets with discourtesy from subordinate civil officials who are natives of his own country. Several officers have stated that, while British officials are too hard worked to give much time to their requests, their affairs and those of their men receive but scant attention from subordinates.

In these days, when the Indian Army is taking a far larger share than hitherto in overseas military duty on behalf of the Empire, it is all the more necessary that the affairs of absent soldiers should be promptly and sympathetically dealt with. They should also be treated with courtesy in their own districts.

66. With these objects in view, we make the following recommendations:—

- (i) That in districts with a considerable military population, the lists of registrars, honorary magistrates and honorary civil Judges should include a liberal proportion of retired Indian military officers.
- (ii) That in such districts, if nomination to district boards obtains, a pensioned military officer should be nominated to each board.
- (iii) That the relative position of Indian military officers in civil or mixed *darbars* should be enhanced and regulated.
- (iv) It is understood that, in the Punjab, a military officer has been nominated to the Provincial Legislative Council to represent the army. It is suggested that this principle might be adopted in other Provinces which have an adequate military connection.
- (v) We have made enquiries as to the vitality of the branches of the "Indian Soldiers Board" and their activities in rural districts. We are doubtful whether these branches generally are yet doing the good work which was expected of them. We consider that this board and its branches, if the latter function properly, should do much to remove the feeling of Indian officers and soldiers that their interests are not well cared for by the civil authorities of their districts, both when they are absent on duty and after they retire.

67. We understand that it is proposed to reorganise the whole of the Indian Army on what will be, as far as practicable, a territorial basis. Under this scheme, units will be grouped much in the same manner as at home. The training or *depôt* organisation of each group will be permanently located in the territorial area from which the classes composing it are, in the main, recruited. Should this scheme materialize, these *depôt* organisations, working in close co-operation with the local branches of the Indian Soldiers Board, should be able materially to further the object which we have in view.

Order of British India.

68. We conclude this section by remarking that it seems to us that the close of the great war is a suitable time to increase the establishment of the Order of British India, to which it is the ambition of every Indian officer to belong. We recommend that this should be done, either by increasing the numbers in its two present classes, or by creating a third class of the Order.

SECTION V.

INDIAN OTHER RANKS.

Pay.

69. All witnesses belonging to the Indian Army, British and Indian, whom we have seen urge that the pay of the Indian non-commissioned officers and men should be raised. The pay of the sepoy on enlistment is Rs. 11 a month, and has been at this rate since 1911. In addition to this sum, he gets at present Rs. 4 a month war bonus, making a total of Rs. 15 a month. We understand that, when serving overseas or on service on the frontier, he draws in addition field *batta* of Rs. 5 a month, making a total of Rs. 20. Before the war he got free rations only on service; he now receives them always.

70. The Rs. 4 bonus is a temporary war allowance, specially extended beyond the period of the war. It may be taken to represent the increase in prices, or the fall in purchasing power, of the sepoy's basic rate of pay. It was given in April 1918, and so has been drawn for two years. We recommend that it be made permanent, and that it be incorporated in the pay of the sepoy. It remains to be considered whether any further increase is necessary. It is to be remembered that prior to 1917, while the sepoy's pay was Rs. 11, Rs. 3·8 of this sum was reckoned to be the cost of his food; and that to prevent his having to spend more than that sum on his food he received compensation (in cash) when the cost of the staple articles of his diet rose above Rs. 3·8. Thus Rs. 7·8 represented his actual nett pay in cash. On the universal grant of free rations the sepoy retained the Rs. 3·8, so that his pay in cash (with the Rs. 4 war bonus) became exactly double what it was in 1914. The value of the ration, at present prices, adds another sum of about Rs. 14 a month to the total cost to the State, making in all a minimum sum of Rs. 29 a month.

71. The Indian soldier has seen the world during the last six years in a way he never has before. His ideas of comfort have risen, and he has acquired certain tastes to which he was previously a stranger. He is well aware of what has been done for the British soldier in the way of amelioration of conditions of life and pay since the war began, and he is now apt to compare his own pay with that of his British comrades.

72. We have not found that recruiting generally is languishing, except as regards one or two classes, though it is doubtful whether the physique and social status of the men joining now are what they were before the war. But we have to reckon with the fact that Indians, especially Sikhs, are taking to work as mechanics in large numbers. Pay far beyond that which the army can offer is obtainable now by Indians with even a small knowledge of machinery. There are many well-paid openings in the Far East of which they are taking advantage; while India has before her a period of industrial and agricultural development which will attract many thousands of young men of the martial classes.

73. Our enquiries have made us aware that there was a general expectation that the end of the war would be made the occasion of a definite rise in actual pay over and above the war bonus, the inclusion of which in pay had been somewhat discounted. This expectation was, we think, a natural one, and should not be left out of consideration.

Times are changing rapidly in India, as elsewhere. At such a juncture it is well to have a contented army.

74. We regard this question as one of the most difficult with which we have to deal. We have indicated briefly some aspects of the problem. It is, however, of such importance that it is desirable to state briefly the principal considerations which we think may be urged against the grant of increased pay to Indian other ranks.

75. The arguments which may be used to show that no further increase is necessary are as follows :—

- (a) That, with the addition of the war bonus of Rs. 4 a month, which we recommend should form a permanent addition to pay, the sepoy will

receive in cash just double the nett pay which he drew up to 1916, and that this is sufficient.

- (b) That it would be unwise to grant a permanent increase of pay in order to meet a possibly transient increase in the cost of living.
- (c) That in any case the serving sepoy is not himself much affected by a rise in prices, since he is fed and to a large extent clothed by the State; and that as regards his dependents, it has never been contemplated that the pay of a youth of 18 or 19 to 24 or 25 should suffice for the entire maintenance of a wife and family, who in practice usually rely for support largely upon their share in an agricultural holding, cultivated by other members of the family. It is not the case, again, that all sepoys are married; and it is probable that the proportion of unmarried sepoys will be higher in the future.
- (d) That recruitment since the war has not shown signs of falling off, in spite of the abnormal numbers recruited during the war. It must also be remembered that the terms still offered hold out no definite promise that the war bonus will be made permanent. Those who are now enlisting do so, therefore, for Rs. 11 a month *plus* a temporary addition of Rs. 4 a month, paid six-monthly in arrears.
- (e) That an increase to the pay of the sepoy would inevitably result in an increase to the pay of other employees of Government, such as police and forest subordinates and the like, thus imposing a further heavy burden on Indian revenues.

76. We admit the force of these arguments; but in order to present a complete picture we think it desirable, even at the risk of repetition, to recapitulate briefly the main considerations which tell in favour of an increase of pay. These are :—

- (a) That the Indian Army expects a substantial increase, and that it would be impolitic to disappoint this expectation, especially at a time like the present when political agitators aim at undermining the army's loyalty.
- (b) That the general rise in the cost of living renders the present scale of pay insufficient to enable the sepoy to support a wife and family, or other dependents.
- (c) That the industrial and agricultural development of India offers other and more lucrative employment to youths of the martial classes, and that this competition will adversely affect recruitment for the army, unless better terms are offered.

77. After the most earnest consideration, we have formed the conclusion that it is necessary, in order to secure the contentment of the Indian Army, to improve the terms of service of Indian other ranks, and our specific recommendations will be found in Appendix I (Item 6).

Good Service and Good Conduct Pay.

78. We consider it desirable to quicken up the scales of good service and good conduct pay. We make specific suggestions in Appendix I (Item 7).

Family Pensions.

79. Most of the considerations which we have stated in the preceding Section, in connection with the family pensions of Indian officers, apply to other ranks also. We consider that the present rates of family pension for sepoys are inadequate. We recommend the abolition of the lower rate, and think that there should be one flat rate for all other ranks, *plus* an allowance for each child, on the same principles as for Indian officers. Our complete recommendation will be found in Appendix I (Item 8).

Several Indian officers have pointed out the great inconvenience to holders of family pensions, especially women and old folk, who have to appear at the nearest treasury, often a considerable distance from their homes, in order to draw their

pensions. It is for consideration whether these pensions might not be everywhere paid through the agency of the Post Office, under the supervision and with the assistance of the village authorities and the local branch of the Indian Soldiers Board.

Railway Concessions.

80. We support a request that has been put forward by several Indian officers that Indian non-commissioned officers should be given "intermediate" class warrants instead of 3rd class, when travelling alone on duty. This follows the rule under which a British non-commissioned officer, under the same conditions, travels on a 2nd class warrant in India.

It has been brought to our notice that at present an Indian soldier is entitled, under paragraph 78, Volume X, Army Regulations, India, as amended by Indian Army Order, October, Appendix, 1917, to free passage by rail to his home for his family, if he is going on pension; but that this is not permitted to men who resign the service at their own request. This bears hardly on men who are obliged to resign the service for urgent private reasons, and who may be, and often are, a very long way from their homes, as, for example, the men of the Gurkha regiment stationed at Quetta. In view of the necessity for proving strong reserves for the Indian Army, we think that this concession might be granted on two conditions—(i) after not less than 4 years' service; and (ii) to the families of those men only who undertake to join the reserve.

Station Hospitals.

81. We find from the evidence given before us that the institution of the station hospital system is not generally popular with the Indian ranks of the Indian Army. The Indian soldier misses his old friends, the regimental doctor and his assistants, and dislikes being placed in a ward in the station hospital with men of other units and classes. He feels also that he has no one whom he knows and trusts and to whom he can apply for medical advice for his family. While these objections to the new system are natural, we consider that the advantages of the station hospital far outweigh its disadvantages. When the system was introduced into the British Army, a good many years ago, almost the same objections were raised. It has long survived its unpopularity in the British service, and we believe will do so in the Indian Army. In India it is still in its infancy, and station hospitals are not as yet fully equipped, so that the advantages are not as obvious as they will be later on. We recommend, however, that a medical officer, detailed from the station hospital, should be "attached" to each regiment, and changed as seldom as possible. We consider that all regimental lines should contain a dispensary, which should be visited daily by this medical officer or by a sub-assistant surgeon, that families should be treated from this dispensary, and that the "daily sick" should be seen there. We hope that, if these arrangements are made, the present dislike to the system will disappear.

Lines.

82. We have heard a great deal from witnesses as to the shortcomings of Indian lines, and we are aware that there are still many which are much below modern standards of living accommodation. On the other hand, we have inspected lines constructed on the latest sanctioned plans, and we do not find that these leave much to be reasonably desired. We recommend, however, that the reconstruction programme, initiated some ten years ago by General Sir O'Moore Creagh, should be vigorously pursued and completed as soon as possible. This is so important that we suggest that special financial arrangements should be made to carry it into effect.

83. The following improvements, which are not included in the latest standard plans, should be introduced, and we place them in what we consider to be their order of urgency:—

- (i) A *charpoy* and kit box (or locker) to be provided for each man.
- (ii) Free lighting, on an adequate scale, throughout the lines.
- (iii) Increase in the number of family quarters, which is all the more necessary as the Indian Army now spends so much more time overseas than formerly. We recommend an increase up to 90 and 120 married quarters in cavalry and in infantry respectively, and in other units in proportion.

Religious Teachers.

84. It has been generally represented to us that the status and emoluments of the religious teachers of units of the Indian Army are insufficient to ensure their possessing, and exercising, the requisite influence over the sepoy in moral and religious matters, as well as in the encouragement of a spirit of loyalty. We entirely agree, and make certain recommendations on the subject in Appendix I (Item 9). In the past these teachers have been treated as "followers." We think that they should have relative rank with, but junior to, jemadars, and that there should be one for each class of the strength of a company or over.

Regimental Offices and Clerks.

85. The contract allowance system, under which regimental offices, etc., are administered, was never easy to manage, and has now become unworkable, owing chiefly to the higher rates of pay of skilled clerical labour, and the increased cost of all office material. As a result, the office fund is usually in debt, and has to be assisted by other funds which should be employed for the direct benefit of the men. We recommend that the contract allowance should be abolished, and that all clerks should be enlisted and given reasonable allowances in addition to their regimental pay; that actual office rent paid should be refunded by Government, in cases where no office is provided rent free; that hot and cold weather charges should be borne by Government, and that the necessary office furniture should be supplied and kept up by Government. Stationery should be provided free on a suitable scale; also type-writers should be supplied and maintained free of charge, in the proportion of two per regiment.

We recommend a more extended installation of telephonic communication between military offices, and between civil and military offices.

We consider that the arrangements made for the training of Indian military clerks for units during the war should be continued as a permanent measure.

Regimental Schools.

86. Indian Army schools are at present quite inefficient. The reasons are not far to seek, viz.:—

- (i) The want of an educational policy.
- (ii) The absence of any system of training for teachers.
- (iii) The inadequate pay allowed for the teaching staff; the head teacher is paid Rs. 25 (£2-10s.) a month.
- (iv) The insufficient allowance—Rs. 30 (£3) a month—for text-books, prizes, stationery and equipment.
- (v) The failure of the State to provide proper school accommodation, library, lighting, etc. The present allowance for all these is only Rs. 10 (£1) a month.

We consider that this condition of affairs should be remedied as soon as possible. A badly paid and therefore discontented teacher can do infinite harm. It is of great importance to the State that the young soldier and the children of soldiers should be educated on sound and loyal principles. As things are, there is little to prevent the regimental school being a centre for discontent and even disloyalty.

87. We recommend that the principle already laid down in the case of the British soldier—that education is to be a part of military training—be accepted in the Indian Army; and that while the responsibility for this education, as for other military training, should be placed on the officer commanding, he should be given the means to discharge it, as recommended above. It is also suggested that an Indian wing of the proposed Army Education Corps should be created; the personnel of this wing to consist of Indian officers and non-commissioned officers, trained as teachers, and posted to units, as at home. Sons of soldiers, preferably, or other boys of martial races, should for the present be educated and trained as teachers at suitable schools and colleges, and some of these should be posted to Army Headquarters and to commands and divisions, for inspection duties.

Eventually the proposed Kitchener College and similar institutions should provide most of these teachers. The adoption of these proposals would provide, *inter alia*, for the elementary education of the sons of Indian soldiers, who would be sufficiently well grounded to proceed, with the help perhaps of military scholarships, to higher educational institutions.

Canteens.

88. It has been suggested to us that an Indian Army Canteen Board might be started for the Indian Army, either as a branch of the Army Canteen Board or as a separate institution. We recommend experiment on a cautious scale.

Grants of Land.

89. We are aware that land-hunger is no new thing, but we have been impressed by the intense desire to acquire land which now pervades all the Indian ranks of the army, particularly in northern India. We understand that 178,000 acres in the canal colonies of the Punjab are about to be distributed among those Indian officers and other ranks who have rendered distinguished service during the late war. In the Punjab grants are being made of 2 rectangles (1 rectangle=25 acres) to Indian officers, and 1 rectangle to other ranks. A certain amount of land is also being given in other provinces; and where land is not available *jangi inams* are substituted. These assignments are of the value of Rs. 10 a month for officers and Rs. 5 a month for other ranks, and continue for three lives. We recommend that deserving cases from the great war, which have not been included in the present distribution, should be noted for land grants in parts of the country to be opened up for cultivation by canal projects now under execution or consideration. We are of opinion that any such grants made in the future should be on "service terms." We also recommend that the matter of grants of land abroad to deserving Indian officers and soldiers should be kept in view by the Government of India; and that if, as seems possible, grants of land in British Guiana or East Africa are to be made to Indian settlers, any deputation sent to these, or other, countries to make enquiries should be accompanied by one or two selected Indian officers.

Clothing.

90. We have heard many complaints of the khaki clothing, which is now a free issue. It is alleged that in some cases it is of inferior material, that it is badly cut, and that the dye is not fast. We have made enquiries into the matter, and we are of opinion that, while the complaints are justified, the present inferior quality is due to the necessity, on grounds of economy, of using up war stocks of varied kinds, and we believe that, when these stocks are exhausted, the present grounds of complaint will disappear. We recommend, however, that the allowances for refitting clothing in regiments should be on a more liberal scale than at present. We also consider that a return to the pre-war system, under which units purchased and made up their own khaki against a cash allowance, would be a retrograde step and very undesirable.

Hindustani Clothing.

Before the war it was the custom in most regiments to have an order of dress, which was not recognised by regulation, for "walking out" and for hot weather drills and duties, except guard duties. This dress usually consisted of a white cotton coat and trousers, or *dhoti*, of the same material, with either a white cotton or khaki regimental pattern *pagri* and boots or Indian shoes. It has been represented to us by several Indian witnesses that this custom, if revived now, would, owing to high prices, involve a great expense to the Indian soldier.

It must be remembered that before the war the sepoy paid for all his khaki clothing, receiving a grant in aid, and therefore the then comparatively cheap cotton suits saved his khaki, and so his pocket. But now the khaki is a free issue, and the cotton suits would mean additional expense to him. We consider this very undesirable. We recommend that it should be forbidden to institute, or to cause to be worn upon any duty whatever, any unauthorised pattern of dress of this kind. As however, a hot weather fatigue dress of some sort is required in order to save the more expensive and thicker khaki uniform, we suggest that it might well consist of what has been widely introduced during the war for this purpose—*viz.*

thin khaki shirts and khaki drill shorts. The regimental *pagri* and regimental *putties*, with boots or Indian shoes, complete this "fatigue order" of dress. It should be issued and maintained by Government free of cost to the soldier.

Injury Pensions.

91. It has been represented to us that the regulations governing the grant of injury pensions produce discontent and in some cases actual hardship. A reference to Army Regulations, India, Volume I, paragraphs 1058, *et seq.*, will show, we think, that they are too limited in scope and lack elasticity. A comparison between these regulations and those contained in the Royal Warrant, dated 6th December, 1919, for the pensions of soldiers disabled in consequence of the great war, confirms this view. For example, we find that the schedule attached to this Warrant provides for no less than nine degrees of disablement, each degree in turn being sub-divided into many classes of "specific injuries." The Indian regulations provide for three degrees only, and these are so expressed as to afford little guidance to medical boards when classifying injuries. They do not take into consideration the effect of disablement on the dependents of the disabled men, by providing for compensatory allowances for his family.

92. We have discussed this question with a representative of the Ministry of Pensions, to whom we are indebted for certain valuable suggestions, and who has placed at our disposal the pension schemes devised to meet the needs of such special units as the King's African Rifles, certain West Indian corps, and the Maltese Active Service Battalion. It is true that the recent Royal Warrant and the above-mentioned schemes were framed to meet an exceptional situation caused by the late war, but the experience gained has been so wide that the principles evolved from them must be of value.

It does not, however, follow that it would be wise to apply to India in detail the Royal Warrant as it stands. For instance, in the Indian Army many of our men are recruited from countries outside India, *e.g.*, the Gurkhas from Nepal, and to enforce attendance at periodical boards, involving long and tedious journeys would be vexatious.

Again, it must be remembered that caste restrictions, and not the physical capability of the individual, govern the selection of a trade; and that it would be unjust, for instance, to assume that because a man possessed two sound arms he could add to his livelihood by learning a trade requiring only the use of his arms.

93. The following points should be considered when revising the existing regulations:—

- (a) The adoption of the percentage method of assessment. This has been followed by all other countries, and has proved easy of working.
- (b) The preparation of a schedule of specific disabilities to which definite assessments can be assigned.
- (c) For disabilities other than those specified, assessment should be made according to a percentage, based on comparison with the normally healthy man.
- (d) In cases where—
 - (1) the disability is scheduled, or
 - (2) the disability is not scheduled, but the condition is permanent and can never improve,

a life pension should be awarded at the then appropriate rate. In such cases, if the condition gets much worse, it would be open to the pensioner to apply for a higher rate on this ground.
- (e) In all other cases, even though it is possible that the condition may subsequently improve, a life pension should be given at the appropriate rate.

(f) There should be a basic rate of disability pension, in respect of each scheduled disability, sufficient for a pensioner of the lowest rank, to which should be added—

- (1) an allowance for service graded according to length of service,
- (2) a graded allowance for higher rank.

Corporal Punishment.

94. Our two Indian colleagues would like to add a recommendation to abolish corporal punishment in the Indian Army, on the ground that it was abolished many years ago in the British service. We understand that it is a question which is now receiving the attention of Army Headquarters, from which we are confident that it will receive sympathetic consideration.

PART VI.

The Territorial Force.

PART VI.

POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING A TERRITORIAL OR SECOND LINE FORCE IN INDIA.

This is one of the questions on which the Secretary of State laid special emphasis when he met the committee on 9th October 1919. He then asked us to consider the alternative of developing from the existing Indian Defence Force (Indian section) established on a temporary basis during the war, something comparable to a "second line" or territorial army.

We have had the matter under earnest consideration. We have discussed it with His Excellency the Viceroy and various heads of provinces, with the military authorities, with retired Indian officers, with prominent Indian politicians and publicists, with the chief organiser of the Bengali Battalion, which is drawn from classes not hitherto enlisted, and with the commandant of the Calcutta University Corps, admittedly the most successful of the Indian Defence Force units so far formed.

3. Compulsion for the regular army was ruled out during the war in spite of the gravity of the case, and there is no question of introducing it as the basis of any territorial force. There is, however, a strong feeling among educated Indians that they should be given greater opportunities of organizing themselves voluntarily for the defence of their country. That feeling has been stimulated by the spectacle of the citizen armies raised in Western countries during the war, by the recent facilities given for the grant of King's commissions to Indians, and by the increased control of large branches of the civil administration which the Reforms Scheme offers to Indians. It is, therefore, expedient to test the strength and endurance of that aspiration, which is an honourable and legitimate one, and if possible to utilise it for the gradual creation of a force which would be of practical assistance to the regular army, both in maintaining internal order and in combating external aggression. Unless it can be made in time to serve one or both of those objects, it would be a useless and expensive experiment.

At this stage it may be well to examine the facilities hitherto given to the classes in question, both in the regular army and in the auxiliary forces. Up to and during the first half of the great war, the regular army was recruited almost exclusively from the rural agricultural population and mainly in Northern India. Little effort was made to enlist the urban classes as combatants, because they showed no keenness to serve and were regarded as not likely to furnish good material. As the war progressed and the drain on the rural classes became more and more severe, the field of recruitment both in town and country was steadily extended; and in the last two years of the war, in Northern India at least, practically every-one outside the lower menial classes was eligible for enlistment.

The following statement shows by provinces (a) the total population, (b) the number of combatant recruits raised during the war:—

					Population in millions.	Number of recruits raised.
Punjab	..	..	..	..	20	326,000
United Provinces	..	..	..	..	47	142,000
Madras	..	..	..	..	40	46,000
Bombay	..	..	..	..	20	36,000
North-West Frontier and Baluchistan	..	..	..	..	3	33,000
Burma	..	..	..	..	12	13,000
Behar and Orissa	..	..	..	..	33	8,000
Bengal	..	..	..	..	45	7,000
Central Provinces	..	..	..	..	13	5,000
Assam	..	..	..	..	6	1,000
Ajmer	..	..	..	..	$\frac{1}{2}$	7,000
Total	..	..	..	..	240	624,000

Some of the new rural classes made good, others did not, and the experience gained will be most valuable for future guidance. The urban classes, though they supplied many men for auxiliary services, failed to produce any appreciable number of combatant recruits, and the military authorities were on the whole not satisfied with the few that came forward. This was not unexpected, for these classes had no military traditions, no previous connection with the army, and were as a rule reluctant to undertake a career novel to them and involving hardship and danger.

5. It was probably the expectation of such a result that led the Government of India to provide another means of helping in the defence of the Empire by the formation, early in 1917, of the Indian section of the Indian Defence Force. The conditions governing that force are set out in the Army Department communiqué of 27th March 1917.

The main conditions were:—

- (a) Enrolment to be voluntary, for general service in India, age limit 18 to 30; physical standards, as in the Indian Army; the menial classes and also, in order not to interfere with regular recruitment, the classes from which the Indian Army is ordinarily recruited, were excluded.
- (b) Six units, each of 1,000 men, to be raised at Calcutta, Madras, Poona, Allahabad, Lahore and Rangoon.
- (c) Recruitment to be open for six months, up to 28th August 1917; the recruits to undergo 90 days' continuous training in companies of 250 at a time under a British officer and an instructional staff from the Indian Army; to receive while under training pay and allowances, uniform and rations as in the Indian Army, and to be subject to the Indian Army Act and the rules and regulations under the Indian Defence Force Act.

His Excellency the Viceroy, in referring to the scheme at the closing of the legislative session in March 1917, said:—

"The Act is confessedly a war measure and therefore temporary, but it will prove a most valuable experiment. We shall have to reorganize our Indian Army after this war, and some form of second line will probably be required. In the Indian Defence Force raised temporarily during the stress of war, there may be the germ of such new second line."

6. During the first two months from the passing of the Act only 300 men were enrolled. The Government of India, in their Resolution of 21st May 1917, recorded their disappointment "that such a scheme.....should, in spite of its modest dimensions, prove a hopeless failure at such a time and in a country which, whatever its deficiencies, is not lacking in man power," and called on the leaders of public opinion to take all possible steps forthwith to make the recruitment worthy of the name and aspirations of India. This appeal gave some stimulus to recruitment, and by 28th August 1917, when the 6 months' period closed, the number enrolled had risen to 2,432, of whom, however, over 70 per cent came from Madras and Burma. The 6 units already mentioned, and the Bengal Light Horse Squadron, were organized between August 1917 and January 1918, and commenced training. To complete the strength of units, recruitment was reopened on 12th April 1918, at the gravest crisis of the war; and when the King-Emperor and the Premier appealed to India to arm itself against the Turco-German menace from the west, the Government of India, Local Governments and many prominent Indians again appealed to patriotic sentiment. The Government of India agreed to the strength being raised to 12,000, and explained that the primary duty of the force would be to support the civil power in the event of internal disorder, but that, when the units attained their full strength and the requisite degree of efficiency, it was hoped that they would be able also to assist in securing internal communications in the event of general mobilisation. The response was again disappointing, and up to June 15th 1919, the total applicants were 11,316, of whom only 3,699 were found fit for enrolment, or about half of the sanctioned establishment of 7,232 (Madras having been raised to a strength of 2,000). Of the 3,694 enrolled 1,621 were in Madras and 868 in Burma, none of the other provinces having furnished more than a company. The total number actually trained was 2,200.

7. It must in fairness be said that the condition of three months' continuous training created considerable difficulty for men with fixed occupations. However, the scheme cannot be regarded as other than a failure, the main causes of which probably are those already mentioned at the close of paragraph 4, and in one case racial or sectional feeling, which made it necessary, we are told, to withdraw ammunition from a company under training, lest the rival sections might open fire on one another. The conclusion to be drawn from the experiment is that some at least of the more enthusiastic advocates of the territorial movement probably overrated the practical strength of the desire of the urban classes to share in the burden of defence, and underrated the difficulties of arousing a military spirit and creating a sense of discipline and sacrifice among those classes.

8. The history of the Bengali regular battalion has a practical bearing on the general question. It had long been the ambition of patriotic Bengalis to remove the reproach that Bengal was lacking in fighting qualities. Accordingly during the war when the field of recruitment was extended, sanction was given in 1916, at the instance of many leading men of the Presidency, to the raising of a regular battalion in Bengal. The task was one of great difficulty owing not only to the absence of military traditions but to the ignorance of military needs and conditions. But a band of enthusiastic and high-minded Bengali gentlemen set vigorously to work, and by June 1917 the battalion was raised and training began. In all, nearly 7,000 men were enrolled but owing to the inferior physique of many of the recruits, their breakdown in training, resignations, etc., it was not found possible to maintain more than a single battalion.

To stimulate martial feeling, the battalion was sent to Mesopotamia in August 1917, and every effort was made to render the experiment a success, by specially selecting the officers and enlisting the sympathy of the military authorities at the front. Unfortunately, owing to internal jealousies (which led to the murder of two Bengali officers), the unfitness of many of the men for hard work in the field, susceptibility to disease and the difficulty of enforcing discipline, the battalion was never fit to be sent to the front during the war.

The question of disbanding the battalion is now under consideration, and nearly all the men are anxious to be discharged.

9. Another experiment, which so far promises better results, has been made since 1917, when sanction was given to the formation of six university corps, varying in strength from 1,125 in Calcutta to 125 in Patna, in the areas served by the Universities of Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Allahabad, Lahore, and Patna. The total sanctioned strength is 2,625; there were 2,916 applicants up to 15th June 1919 and 1,823 enrolments, viz., Calcutta 533, Bombay 485, Allahabad 309, Lahore 496. A total of 980 men has been trained.

The Calcutta University Corps is the strongest in numbers and most forward in training. It appears that, even with an insufficiency of officers and instructors (now being made good), the corps has made healthy progress; the men have improved much in physique under the training, are quick to learn from European instructors (whom they prefer to Indian non-commissioned officers), are steadily overcoming the caste difficulties which stand in the way of training, are becoming more amenable to discipline, and turn out smartly on parade. We have not had information as to the progress of other university corps, but having regard to the failure of the non-university corps in Bengal, and the very meagre success of the Bengali Battalion, we consider the success attained by the Calcutta University Corps a hopeful indication that these corps are likely to furnish the best material, as well as the surest foundation on which to build.

10. We have dwelt in some detail on the position in Bengal, because it is undoubtedly the province in which the martial spirit is regarded as most backward, and because it illustrates the difficulties of forming a force of any value in areas where the military spirit has never existed or has died away.

We found some differences of opinion on the question whether recruits should be given the option of enrolling for local service in their provinces or for service anywhere in India. It was stated, though with some hesitation, that territorial units might be employed in the last in helping to suppress local disorders, and

even in repressing religious riots; and that, as they would be drawn from the well-to-do classes, they would have a strong interest in maintaining security and public order. We confess to some scepticism on this point at the present time. We have been informed that some students who were members of the Indian Defence Force took part in the Punjab disorders of last year; on the other hand, we were told that, during the similar riots in Calcutta, several of the students in the Calcutta University Corps offered their services, which it was not, however, necessary to accept. Obviously the attitude of the men will depend on the extent to which a sense of discipline and obedience has been instilled by training, on their confidence in their officers and their *esprit de corps*; and we are here again drawn to the conclusion that those qualities will be more readily forthcoming, and more speedily developed, in university corps than in the miscellaneous aggregation of individuals collected in a general territorial unit.

11. When the question was discussed with the heads of provinces, their general view was that the force would be of little or no practical utility, and might be a source of embarrassment; that one or two corps could be raised in each province, especially if they were not to be called on to serve outside the province; that for some years to come they would not be sufficiently disciplined to be relied on for internal security, and therefore could not relieve regular troops; that there would be difficulties in working the scheme in rural areas, where also it might prejudice regular recruiting; that the formation of university corps offered the greatest prospect of success; and that they would be willing to see the experiment tried of raising a few territorial units, including university corps, in urban areas, provided that they form part of the military organization, and are administered by the military authorities, and that no financial responsibility is thrown upon provincial governments.

As to the last point, we agree with the military authorities that the money to be spent on this experiment should not be regarded as money spent on the army from the standpoint of military efficiency, and that the military budget should therefore be increased proportionately.

12. Informing our conclusions, we have been impressed by the fact that the highest military authorities in India accept the principle of a national defence force and are of the opinion that it is one to be encouraged. They have told us, however, that we must not shut our eyes to the practical difficulties. They add:—"Not only have we to bear in mind the risks that we run in organizing a force that may be used against us in one way or another, but we have to create or revive the necessary military qualities in a collection of different races who are striving under our control to evolve a common nationality, and with it the ideal of national participation in the defence of their country. . . . We do not want to run more risks than is necessary; we do not want to interfere unduly with religious or local customs and ideals, and we do not want the country generally to get tired of what is admittedly an experiment before the desired result is attained."

13. After full consideration, therefore, we recommend the creation of a territorial force on cautious lines as a measure of education; and we proceed to indicate the lines on which the experiment might be made, having regard to the results of past experience and of our present enquiries:

- (1) The proposed force must not impair the efficiency of the regular army, or compete with it in recruiting among classes from which the army has hitherto been drawn. While it will primarily be limited to the urban population and the universities, other classes on which the army has hitherto not drawn will not be excluded.
- (2) The formation of the force should not be made a reason for reducing the strength of, or expenditure on, the regular army.
- (3) It should be co-ordinated with the regular army and be under control of the military authorities; the establishment of a unit should be the same as that of a regular unit; the organization and training should be carried out with a view not only to aiding the civil power in maintaining internal security, but also to sharing eventually in the duty of defence against external aggression.

- (4) The co-operation of provincial Governments should, as far as possible, be secured, and local advisory associations should be established to assist in recruiting and in providing funds and facilities for subsidiary purposes which cannot be met from the military grants.
- (5) Enlistment should be voluntary, between the ages of 18 and 30, with liability for general service in India, and for a period of four years which may be extended if recommended by the commanding officer.
- (6) Training of cadets in schools should be limited to physical training and drill without arms.
- (7) University companies should be encouraged, but strictly limited to the students and staff; the men should take their discharge on completion of the university course, but should be eligible for transfer to a non-university unit. Rural units or companies should be discouraged, if likely to compete with regular recruiting.
- (8) Liability for general service in India should be insisted on from the start; without it, there is little prospect of this force ever becoming an asset of any military value.
- (9) Training should be arranged for all units by the military authorities in consultation with the advisory committees, so as to interfere as little as possible with normal avocations or studies.
- (10) Pay and allowances should be at Indian Army rates during periods of annual training or embodiment; in the case of university corps, for the period of the annual camp only.
- (11) A limited number of specially selected British officers—*e.g.*, commanding officers, second-in-command and adjutant—with an instructional staff of non-commissioned officers, should be attached to each unit. The commanding officer and second-in-command might be replaced by Indians as the latter become trained; and in time Indian officers holding King's commissions and possessing military experience might also be employed with these units. The adjutant and instructional staff should always be drawn from the regular army. Special facilities should be given by the military authorities for the training of officers for appointment to, and promotion in, commissioned ranks, on lines similar to the Indian Defence Force (British section).
- (12) The force should be under the Commander-in-Chief, general control being exercised through a Director of Auxiliary Forces at Army headquarters and the local military authorities; it should take the place of the present Indian Defence Force (Indian section) which being only a temporary war organization, disappears. Local Governments and associations should be consulted as regards the recommendations for commissions and promotions among officers.
- (13) The form of the commission to be granted in this force is a matter that will require careful consideration. Advanced political opinion which in this respect is strongly supported by our colleague Sir Krishna Gupta, asks for the grant of King's commissions to the territorial officers; but Indian officers now holding the Viceroy's commission, would undoubtedly resent the grant to these officers of a status which for good reasons is withheld from themselves. We feel that it would be premature to make any definite recommendation at this stage, as so much must depend on the manner in which the experiment develops.

14. The next question is, how many units should be raised? In this case as in that of the selection of Indian cadets for King's commission, it is most important that the first experiment should be on lines that promise success, and success will be undoubtedly endangered if the scheme is started on too ambitious lines. The representatives of educated opinion whom we have consulted generally recognise this danger, and do not ask for more than a few units in the

larger provinces. It has also to be remembered that the cost of the regular forces is absorbing a rapidly growing share of the public revenues, and it would be unfair to the taxpayer to spend in addition large sums on what is admittedly an experiment undertaken mainly for its political or educational value. Moreover the experience of the war goes to show that no great rush of applicants for enlistment is to be expected. From a consideration of all the circumstances we suggest that to start with, some 12 units, mounted or dismounted, might be raised in the following areas:—

Bombay, Madras, Bengal with Assam, United Provinces ..	2 each.
Punjab, Bihar, Burma and Central Provinces ..	1 each.

In each of the four large provinces one of the units might be a university corps and in the remaining provinces the single unit might be composed partly of university and partly of general companies. The force might be styled the "Indian Territorial Force."

15. We do not think that any new unit should be sanctioned till the first units have been reported adequate in numbers and efficiency for the immediate purpose in view, viz., assisting the civil power in maintaining internal security, and are also capable of helping the regular forces in a grave emergency by taking over some of the duties of furnishing guards, protecting communications, etc.

The principle laid down in the Reforms announcement of the 20th August 1917, and embodied in the new Government of India Act, is especially applicable here, viz., that the British Government, upon whom lies the responsibility for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples, must be the judge of the time and measures of each advance, and it must be guided "by the co-operation received from those on whom new opportunities of service will be conferred, and the extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility." If loyal and public spirited Indians, whose active co-operation is essential to the success of the scheme, keep these principles steadily in view, then, in time, the force may develop into an asset of no small military value, and capable of playing a worthy part in the defence of the Indian Empire.

PART VII.

The Royal Indian Marine.

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The Royal Indian Marine.

1. The Indian Marine Service Act of 1884 defines the purposes for which the Royal Indian Marine Service exists, *viz.*, the transport of troops; the guarding of the convict settlements; the suppression of piracy; the survey of coasts and harbours; the visiting of lighthouses; the relief of distressed and wrecked vessels; and other local objects. The suppression of piracy has, however, never been handed over to the service as a definite duty.

2. As regards the transport of troops, the Royal Indian Marine is responsible for, and has always successfully performed, what may be called the interior transportation work of the Indian Empire by sea, and in addition assists in trooping work as far as Suez. The Indian Marine Service Act is not in force west of Suez; and this is a defect which should be remedied, since any disciplinary action taken by the commander or officers of a Royal Indian Marine ship west of Suez is *ultra vires*.

Royal Indian Marine vessels are also used to convey political officers and other high officials to and from the Persian Gulf and islands off the Indian coast, both when proceeding to take up appointments in such places, and on inspection duty.

3. The Royal Indian Marine manages the great dockyard at Bombay, and the smaller ones at Kidderpore and Mandalay. The Bombay dockyard is largely used by the ships of the East Indies Squadron of the Royal Navy. The Royal Indian Marine also builds customs and police launches and tugs for the Government of India and provincial Governments, and even when it does not undertake the building, is always consulted as to plans and construction. The Royal Indian Marine has charge of the marine survey of India, with headquarters at Bombay and a survey ship with a ship's company of 110. The actual survey party consists of 10 officers and 4 men, and is in charge of marine survey from the Persian Gulf to the Mergui Archipelago, exclusive of Ceylon and Aden. The service also keeps a vessel for police duty at Port Blair, the convict settlement on the Andamans. The service is in charge of the lighthouses on 1,200 miles of the Madras coast, on a portion of the Calcutta coast, and on the whole of the Burmese coast, and is also responsible for the floating lights in the Persian Gulf. The officers of the Royal Indian Marine are particularly well qualified to undertake this work on account of their knowledge of the coast and of Indian conditions. It would probably be advantageous if the lighting of the whole coast were handed over to them.

4. The service contains about 225 officers of all ranks, executive and engineering, recruited from training ships such as the "Conway" and "Worcester," and from the mercantile marine, by nomination of the Secretary of State. The officers of this service, as a result of their having been employed as naval officers during the late war, have recently received the privilege of having their commissions signed by the King and recognised by the Admiralty. Some took their part in front line combatant work with credit. Officers of the service are normally employed in peace time as Port Officers and Assistant Port Officers at all the principal ports of India.

The subordinate part of the service consists of about 2,000 Indians, who man the vessels belonging to the Royal Indian Marine. This does not include dockyard hands at Bombay, Kidderpore, or Mandalay.

5. We have seen the scheme prepared by Lord Jellicoe, as a result of his recent visit to India, in which he advocates the expansion of the present Royal Indian Marine into an Indian Navy. This proposal is, we understand, under the consideration of the Government of India, and is, in any case, outside our terms of reference. We have been informed, however, that the Government of India, while unable, at present, to accept the scheme for an Indian Navy as put forward by Lord Jellicoe, recognise that the Royal Indian Marine should be expanded so as to enable it to undertake certain fresh responsibilities, the most important of which is the policing of the Persian Gulf.

Whatever the decision on this point may be, we feel bound to consider the position of the Royal Indian Marine in the scheme of Indian government, and the administrative arrangements for its control.

6. At present the executive head is the Director, who is usually a senior officer of the Royal Navy, nominated by the Admiralty with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India. The Director has to submit his proposals to the Secretary in the Army Department, who is a soldier, and who takes his orders on marine questions from the Army Member. He resides at Army Headquarters (Delhi and Simla), while the Director lives at Bombay. The Admiralty have no responsibility for the training and efficiency of this Service, though by the Indian Marine Service Act of 1884, Section 6, they are authorised to take it over, if considered necessary, in time of war.

The budget of the Royal Indian Marine is controlled by the army authorities, as a separate section of the military budget.

7. It is clear that the Royal Indian Marine is, and must remain, an Indian service so long as it is paid and maintained by the Government of India. But it would be much to its advantage that the Admiralty, who have furnished its head, and who took over its ships, and directed much of its work, in the great war, should view the service with favour and be ready to give it all the assistance in their power.

8. In Part II of this Report we have discussed two alternative proposals for the administration of the Royal Indian Marine. Whichever scheme is adopted, we recommend the following reorganisation :—

- (i) The officer appointed to be Director, Royal Indian Marine, should be a rear admiral on the active list. His headquarters and official residence should be at Bombay. He should have the status of a Secretary to the Government of India. He would thus be directly subordinate to the proposed civilian Member of Council for Munitions and Marine or to the Commander-in-Chief, as the case may be, and like other Secretaries would have the right of direct access to the Viceroy.
- (ii) The office of the Director should be in Bombay but there should be a Royal Indian Marine officer, holding the appointment of Deputy or Assistant Secretary to Government, with a small clerical establishment, at the headquarters of the Government of India.
- (iii) The Director should have two Deputies, both officers of the Royal Indian Marine; one his second-in-command, the other the Superintendent of the Dockyard at Bombay.

It would be the duty of the Director, or one of his Deputies, to attend at the headquarters of Government, when any sufficiently important case was under consideration. In other cases the Director would depend for liaison, and for the transaction of ordinary business, upon his representative at headquarters.

We believe that this arrangement would satisfy both the Royal Indian Marine Service and the Admiralty, and would obtain for the former a much higher status in the Government of India than it has hitherto possessed, while it would ensure its constitutional subordination to that Government.

9. The pay of the officers of the Royal Indian Marine has recently been considerably improved. The rules for their leave and pensions require reconsideration.

10. It is evident that if this service is not only to maintain its past standard of usefulness, but is to develop in the future, the conditions of recruitment, training, service, pay and pension of the Indian personnel must be radically altered and much improved. At present recruitment for both deck hands and engine room is without any system whatever. Crews and stokers are engaged haphazard in Bombay; or the *serang* (boatswain) of a ship is entrusted with the duty of collecting a crew, which is becoming more and more difficult. Both crews and stokers are discharged whenever a ship is laid up; the only training is picked up at sea; the pay is inferior to that of the merchant service; and though a certain percentage of the men are supposed to be pensionable, they never earn a pension in practice, as their service is broken up by periods between discharges and re-engagements. It is not surprising that it is becoming increasingly difficult to get men for both deck and

engine room, and ships often have to held up for want of hands, or go to sea short-handed.

We recommend that men should be regularly recruited by an agency for the purpose, as in the army. The headquarters of recruiting should be at Ratnagiri on the Bombay coast, but the agency should also investigate the possibility of finding new classes of men for sea-going service. As far as possible, lads should be taken on young to join a training ship and for training ashore; and later they should be drafted to ships by a Royal Indian Marine central agency at Bombay. Their pay, pension, and leave rules (the last being very important) should be thoroughly revised, and the question of a reserve should be examined. Good conduct pay and special qualification pay should be given. The question of uniform and of its upkeep should also receive attention.

Further, we consider that suitable Indians should be given opportunities for education in the higher branches of seamanship, marine engineering, etc., with a view to qualifying themselves for admission to the superior ranks of the marine service. It is only by methods such as those described above that Indians can become efficient sailors, and that a judgment can be formed as to how far they should ultimately rise in their profession.

11. We think it desirable that the policing of the Persian Gulf should be taken over by the Royal Indian Marine. The climate is enervating, and the nature of the duties is such as can be performed by Indians, thus setting free British sailors. The Indian, trained and led by British officers, will be a match for any enemy that he is likely to encounter there. A few British naval ratings, such as first-class petty officers for gunnery and drill instructors, supplied by the Admiralty, will be necessary for a few years.

12. We consider that, if the status of the Royal Indian Marine were raised as suggested, and the conditions under which its Indian personnel is enlisted, trained, paid, and pensioned were improved, the Government of India would have a service well suited to undertake all present requirements as regards marine work in peace time, and well adapted for any development in the direction of becoming a fighting service, should this be found desirable hereafter.

PART VIII.

Miscellaneous.

SECTION I.—Future Conditions of Service in the Indian Army Reserve of Officers.

SECTION II.—Conditions of Service of "Followers."

SECTION III.—Military Staff Clerks.

SECTION IV.—Chaplains.

SECTION V.—Class Composition of Units.

SECTION VI.—Silladar Cavalry.

SECTION VII.—The Burma and Assam Military Police.

PART VIII.

MISCELLANEOUS.

1. We were authorised, before the Committee proceeded to India, to report, without waiting till our return to England, on such matters as required an early decision and could, in our opinion, be dealt with in India. We therefore examined in India a number of questions which were referred for our advice, and acquainted the Government of India with our views. We propose to summarise briefly in this Part the recommendations which we made. It is understood that Lord Esher and Lieutenant-General Sir J. Du Cane, who did not accompany the Committee to India, have no responsibility for these recommendations.

SECTION I.

Future Conditions of Service in the Indian Army Reserve of Officers.

2. At the outbreak of the war the Indian Army Reserve of Officers contained only some 40 officers. During the war it was greatly expanded, and at the time of the armistice with Germany numbered 4,470. This vast expansion represented India's contribution towards Imperial requirements in the matter of officers, rather than a reserve limited to the needs of the Indian Army.

3. The regulations under which these officers were commissioned were framed at a time when expansion to this extent was not contemplated. They not only fail to provide for the systematic training of officers, but are defective in many other respects. They divide the Indian Army Reserve of Officers into only two branches—cavalry and infantry. A long period of service in the reserve, with promotion on a time-scale up to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, irrespective of military training and efficiency, is open to serious objection. The existing reserve would, if the present regulations remain in force, consist, after a few years have elapsed, chiefly of field officers, while the requirements of the army are limited mainly to junior officers.

4. At the present time India contains a large number of officers who have relinquished temporary commissions in the regular army. This number, for some years to come, will continue to increase. Such officers, owing to their training and experience, form a potential reserve of great value. They retain the rank they held on demobilisation, while officers of the Indian Army Reserve, under extant regulations, not only retain their commissions on release from army service, but are also automatically promoted in rank according to the Indian Army time-scale. No valid reason can be adduced for the retention of this difference of treatment, and we accordingly advised that those who obtained temporary commissions in the United Kingdom, and those who received commissions in the Indian Army Reserve of Officers during the war, should be placed on an equal footing in this respect.

5. The matter has acquired prominence owing to the proposal of the Government of India to perpetuate the existing liability of all European British subjects in India under the Indian Defence Force Act. We accordingly recommended that the regulations relating to the Indian Army Reserve of Officers should be recast on the following lines, which follow closely proposals which were put before us by Army Headquarters :—

(1) All officers now holding commissions in the Indian Army Reserve of Officers should be required to relinquish their commissions on release from army service; and on such relinquishment should be permitted to retain their ranks, on conditions similar to those laid down for ex-officers of the regular army who held temporary commissions during the war.

Officers of the Indian Army Reserve of Officers who are thus asked to relinquish their commissions should be clearly informed of the reasons for this course, and that those who are still within the age limit and otherwise qualified should be eligible for appointment in the new reserve of officers or other suitable formations. We recommended also that the *Gazette* notifying relinquishment of commissions should be followed with the least possible delay by the *Gazette* notifying admission to the new Indian Army Reserve of Officers.

(2) A new reserve of officers for the army in India should be formed, with a fixed establishment to be calculated for each arm and branch of the service on the basis of the probable requirements in the event of war, viz.:—

Staff.	Indian cavalry.	Ordnance Department.
British cavalry.	Indian infantry.	Army Remount Department.
Artillery.	Supply and Transport Corps.	Miscellaneous duties.
Engineers.	Medical services.	
British infantry.	Veterinary service.	

It will be seen that the new reserve of officers would be organised with reference to the needs of the army in India, whereas the existing reserve is for the Indian Army alone.

In advocating this change, we were influenced by the consideration that, as officer reinforcements have to be provided from some source or other for all units serving in India, British and Indian alike, it would be cheaper and more convenient to provide them from India, especially as, at present, a supply is likely to be available from amongst the large number of ex-officers now in India. The question of incidence of cost will be one for adjustment between the Home and Indian Governments.

(3) Selection should be made in the first instance from ex-officers who are of military age, as defined in the Indian Defence Force Act or in any enactment which may take its place, and are considered suitable for, and desire to serve in, the reserve. Establishments should be completed and maintained from ex-officers and others suitable for training as officers.

(4) The new reserve should consist of two categories, the first including only those who undertake to be available on mobilisation of the field army in India; and the second, those who are willing to undergo training as officers, but who cannot be regarded as available except in a grave emergency.

(5) All officers selected for the reserve should be appointed, so far as practicable, to units or formations, and should be required to undergo the periodical training prescribed for the arm or branch to which they are allotted. Training for the reserve should exempt an officer from liability to undergo the periodical training required under the Auxiliary Forces Bill, should this become law.

It was strongly represented to us that ex-officers should not be compelled, without their own consent, to serve in any rank below that of officer, except perhaps in the case of specially constituted units, e.g., an Officer's Training Corps or a corps such as the Bihar Light Horse. We felt that there was much force in this contention, and we were glad to learn that the Government of India shared this view and were endeavouring to give effect to it.

(6) Officers should not ordinarily remain in the cavalry, field artillery or infantry reserve after the age of 31, since, although in some cases it may be advantageous to retain officers of merit and experience beyond that age, it is necessary to provide for the steady recruitment of younger men. An officer after the age of 31, if specially qualified, might be permitted to join the second class of the reserve; or to accept a commission in some local forces, if such be constituted; or to continue in the reserve, but undergo the training required for one of the administrative services.

(7) Officers now holding higher substantive or retired rank than that of lieutenant should be eligible for retention in their rank in the reserve; but, ordinarily, rank in the reserve should not be higher than that of captain, and this should be attained according to the time-scale in force for the Indian Army.

(8) Officers appointed to the reserve should receive the present outfit allowance, if not already received, and should, for each year in which training is undergone, receive either the pay and allowances of their rank or, preferably, a lump sum, which it has been suggested should be 750 rupees for a period of training, ordinarily of one month.

(9) Officers belonging to the cavalry, field artillery and infantry should be trained annually till 31, and thereafter, if retained, every other year; officers of the garrison artillery, ordnance, remount, veterinary, and supply and transport services should receive training every second year; and officers of the engineer and medical reserves should be trained every third year.

SECTION II.

Conditions of Service of "Followers."

6. We had the advantage of seeing certain proposals on this subject, which were under the consideration of the military authorities and the Government of India. With these we were in general agreement. Our specific recommendations were that the term "follower" should disappear, and that the duties hitherto performed by them should be allotted as follows:—

(A) Regimental Followers.

(1) Those individuals who have hitherto been termed "regimental followers" should become enlisted and attested men, who should be borne on the establishment of the unit, and should be trained to arms sufficiently to be able to defend themselves should wear uniform, and should serve under the same conditions as regards pay and furlough as the fighting men of the unit. Men of this class should not, however, be entitled to pension after so short a term of service as fifteen years; the minimum should be twenty-one years, and in some cases might be twenty-five years. Provision should also be made for these classes to be passed into the reserve.

(2) The term "sweeper" should be abolished. The necessary personnel for sanitary duties should be enlisted from low caste men, and trained as soldiers. Under this scheme, each unit would be self-contained in respect of its sanitary personnel, who would form an integral part of the unit establishment, and might be called the "sanitary squad."

An alternative proposal has been put forward for the formation of divisional sanitary companies, each consisting of four sections (one for headquarters and three for brigades). The cantonment authorities, under this proposal, would be responsible for the general sanitation of the area, while the brigade sections, each under a brigade sanitary officer, would be attached for duty to units. On mobilisation, the brigade sanitary sections would accompany the units into the field, and all cantonment sanitary work would fall on the cantonment authorities.

We expressed no opinion on this scheme, but suggested that the Government of India might consider it as an alternative to the arrangement mentioned above.

(3) With the introduction of piped water supply in certain stations, the necessity for *bhistis* (water-carriers) has, to some extent, disappeared; and we recommended that the Indian soldier should be trained, in the course of time, to draw his own water from the pipes and to convey it in *pakhals* (buckets). It is believed that the soldiers of all other armies perform these duties, and when once the *mussak* (water-skin) has been got rid of, there appears to be no reason why Indian soldiers should not draw water for themselves.

In stations where there is no piped water supply, and in the field, the water arrangements should, we considered, be superintended by the medical authorities, who should arrange for chlorinating tanks, etc., and should have, under their control, enlisted drivers to drive the water carts, or to lead pack animals carrying water tanks. These drivers should be attached to units for duty.

(4) *Dhobis* (washermen) should be eliminated from unit establishments. If the men choose to employ them in peace time, it should be by private arrangement, and the *dhobi* should not be paid by the State. We considered, however, that it was necessary to retain barbers as part of the unit establishment.

(B) Departmental Followers.

With reference to "departmental followers," we pointed out that the term "follower" is a misnomer, and that these men are, properly speaking, the subordinate Indian personnel of various departments and services. We were informed that various schemes were already under the consideration of Government in respect of the non-combatant personnel of the Ordnance, Remount, Veterinary and Mechanical Transport Departments and in Fort Armaments; also in respect of the tindals and lascars employed on coast defences, and the non-combatant personnel of artillery, British infantry and cavalry units. We recommended that the latter three classes should be treated, so far as possible, on the same lines as in Indian units. With regard to the remaining classes, the terms and conditions of service

of the subordinate personnel of each department should be considered on their merits. All such personnel should be attested and paid at suitable rates, with reference to the nature of their duties. We expressed the opinion, however, that it is undesirable to increase the number of subordinate Indian ranks who receive free rations, and we suggested that the rates of pay of these classes should be consolidated, and that free rations should not be given, except to those classes which will be required on mobilisation to proceed on field service. For men of these classes, it is desirable to provide for the issue of free rations in peace time, since they must receive free rations on service. Suitable scales of clothing should be laid down where necessary, and clothing should be issued free, with reference to the nature of the duties to be performed. Finally, we advised that it is unnecessary to grant to the subordinate personnel of departments the same pensionary terms as are applicable to the combatant ranks in fighting units.

SECTION III.

Military Staff Clerks.

7. We found that a Committee had been appointed by the Commander-in-Chief to examine the existing clerical organizations and conditions of service, and various cognate matters, and had recently submitted its report. We found ourselves in general agreement with its recommendations, which we do not think it necessary to reproduce.

We laid emphasis on the desirability of ensuring that British soldier clerks should be most sparingly used for clerical duties in the various military offices, in excess of the authorized establishments proposed in the report. We observed that the existing practice of engaging soldier clerks for temporary duty in these offices, in practically unlimited numbers, constitutes a grave danger to the fighting efficiency of the British Army in India.

With regard to Army Headquarters, we observed that if the clerks in the principal branches, such as that of the C.G.S., A.G., and Q.M.G., are to be paid at the same rates and enjoy the same status and privileges as the assistants and clerks in the Government of India's civil secretariat offices, it should be possible to effect, by degrees, a very considerable reduction in the numbers employed. A relatively small establishment of well-trained clerks, serving under favourable conditions, should be able to deal with work more efficiently and expeditiously than a much larger establishment of clerks who are for the most part untrained. We expressed doubt, however, whether so high a grading or scale of pay is necessary in the case of the departmental offices subordinate to the principal staff officers, *e.g.*, that of the Director of Supply and Transport, the Director of Ordnance Inspection, etc.

We recommended that the Clerks' School of Instruction, which was established at Kasauli during the war, should be developed into a central school of training for military staff clerks. For the present, a fair knowledge of shorthand and type-writing should be an essential qualification for admittance to the school, and ultimately a first-class school certificate. No soldier should receive any clerical employment, other than temporary, until he has qualified by passing through the training school.

SECTION IV.

Chaplains.

8. During our stay in India we were asked for an expression of our opinion on a scheme for the formation of a Corps of Army Chaplains in India, which had been prepared for the consideration of the Government of India. We heard a good deal of evidence on the subject from chaplains of various denominations and from others well qualified to offer advice.

9. It had been brought to our notice that the present arrangements for spiritual ministrations to British troops are in many cases defective, owing to the following facts: firstly, that the Anglican and Presbyterian chaplains ministering to troops are borne on the civil establishment and are but little amenable to military control; secondly, that chaplains who have to minister to the civil population as well as to the troops are apt in some cases to give insufficient attention to the latter; and thirdly, that the more favourable treatment in the matter of pay, pension, etc., extended to those two denominations, as representing the established churches, is a cause of some dissatisfaction to the chaplains of other denominations, whose pay is undoubtedly inadequate for whole-time servants of Government attached to troops and who enjoy no leave or pensionary rights.

10. We expressed the view that the spiritual interests of the British Army as a whole would benefit from the adoption of the principles underlying the scheme submitted for our criticism, namely—

- (1) Equality of treatment for military chaplains of all denominations, as now accepted by the War Office.
- (2) The provision of an adequate staff of army chaplains to meet the needs of the various denominations.
- (3) The organization of an Army Chaplains Department in India to administer the service so created.

11. We considered a suggestion that this Chaplains Department should be placed under the Chaplain-General at the War Office, and also that the chaplains should be supplied, as required, from the home establishment. We formed the conclusion that the first suggestion was quite inapplicable to Indian conditions since the instructions of the Chaplain-General might conflict with the control of the Government of India over its own officers, and would also probably lead to friction with the various ecclesiastical authorities in India.

On the other hand, we saw no reason why Government should not arrange with the War Office for the supply of a certain number of army chaplains of various denominations from the home establishment to fill up vacancies in the proposed Indian cadre. Indeed, we considered that in this way the Indian Government would be likely to secure for their enlarged cadre chaplains who are already in close touch with British troops and able to exercise a healthy influence over them, and that the chaplains of the Royal Army Chaplains Department, who now provide the personnel for all foreign military stations except India, would welcome the opportunity of extending their sphere of duty to India.

If this arrangement were approved, chaplains would be detailed for tours of service in India for periods of five years, as in the case of the Royal Army Medical Corps, Royal Engineers, etc., the extension of the term in individual cases being a matter for the home and Indian authorities. While serving in India, they would receive the same pay and allowances as members of the Indian Army Chaplains Department, and they would also be eligible for permanent appointment to that department.

12. The Army Chaplains Department in India, constituted partly of men from the home establishment doing tours of duty in India, and partly of men already serving or to be selected by the Indian Government, might, we considered, be administered by Army Headquarters through a Principal Chaplain at headquarters, as proposed in the scheme. The Principal Chaplain should be selected from the 1st class chaplains, irrespective of denomination. Questions of ecclesiastical discipline

would be referred to the ecclesiastical heads of the diocese or district, whose spiritual authority would thus be maintained.

13. We recommended that, wherever the number of troops is sufficient for the whole-time service of a chaplain of any denomination, a whole-time chaplain should be appointed for army work alone, and should be relieved of all duties to the civil population. In many of the smaller cantonments it would no doubt be possible, as at present, to combine both duties, and in that case the civil Governments might be required to pay a contribution.

14. The proposal to differentiate between the pay of married and unmarried chaplains appeared to us to be desirable. We laid stress upon the importance of securing chaplains of British nationality (including men from the Dominions) for British troops, especially for the Roman Catholics, who are now mainly served by priests of other nationalities. Priests of other nationalities, whose services may be necessary, should while employed be classified as temporary chaplains.

SECTION V.

Class Composition of Units.

15. On this subject we expressed the opinion that the class squadron or class company system is preferable to the class unit.

16. We recommended, however, that, so far as is consistent with the prospects of recruitment to meet the strain of a normal war, and with existing plans for the reorganization of the Indian Army, the cases of certain pre-war class regiments should be favourably considered.

17. We observed that, if recruitment of a particular class falls short of requirements, the best solution is to dilute existing class units, rather than to withdraw a class company or half company of the class in question from a class company regiment.

18. Finally, we expressed the hope that it might be found possible to arrange that some class units should remain to each class which furnished class regiments before the war.

SECTION VI.

Silladar Cavalry.

19. While stating that we were in favour of the abolition of the silladar system in Indian cavalry, proposed by the Government of India, we recommended that the change to "non-silladar" should not take place while the unit affected is absent from India; that *asamis* should be paid on conversion, unless the soldier concerned expresses a wish that his credit should be left with Government until his discharge, in which case he should receive a suitable rate of interest; and that the committees, which the Government of India proposed to set up to consider the details of the conversion scheme, should be thoroughly representative of the interests of all ranks concerned in the change.

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SECTION VII.

The Burma and Assam Military Police.

20. A question on which we were asked for our advice related to the future of the Burma and Assam military police forces, with special reference to (1) the incidence of cost of their maintenance, and (2) their relation to the military authorities in connection with the defence of the north-east frontier.

We felt that it was outside our province to express an opinion on the incidence of cost between the Government of India and the local Governments concerned. With regard to the second point, we expressed our concurrence with the views of the General Staff in India, namely :—

- (a) That the transfer to the army of responsibility for policing the north-east frontier, involving a large increase of expenditure, could not be justified on grounds of military necessity.
- (b) That the circumstances of the case necessitated the location of the military police in a number of small posts, scattered all over the frontier. This dispersion is opposed to military principles and incompatible with a sound system of military defence, though doubtless suited to the purpose for which the force is primarily employed, namely, the policing of the frontier. For such duties it is desirable to employ local forces, which can be split up into detachments and moved about by the local civil authority without the delay involved by references to superior military officers.
- (c) If regular troops co-operate with the military police, it is essential that the operations should be conducted under military direction. But this affords no justification for the suggestion that the military police should be brought permanently under military control. On the contrary, the present system, under which the military police are controlled by the local Government, suffices to meet all normal requirements, and should not be changed.

PART IX.

Conclusion.

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We have now completed the task assigned to us. We have examined the conditions obtaining in the army in India at the close of a war of unprecedented magnitude. Many changes are needed, and they should not be postponed. The army in India is not immune from the general unrest prevailing throughout the world. Liberal and sympathetic treatment at the present time, and the removal of such grievances as we have shown to exist, should go far to secure contentment for the future.

2. In our proposals relating to the higher command and to the organisation of Army Headquarters, our main endeavour has been to relieve the Commander-in-Chief of all work that can equally well be performed by his subordinates. We have followed in many respects the organisation of the Headquarters Staff of an army in the field, since we consider that the work of Army Headquarters in India approximates more nearly to field conditions than is the case at the War Office. We have limited, so far as is consistent with efficient working, the number of officers with direct access to the Commander-in-Chief.

3. We have laid special stress on the necessity for decentralisation in India, and for diminishing the detailed control exercised by the India Office. We hope, that if our proposals are agreed to, there will not only be a considerable decrease in correspondence, but that more rapid decisions will remove such discontent as is now caused by delay.

4. Our principal aim has been to promote the efficiency and contentment of the army in India, and to secure that the Government of India will have at its disposal a well-trained and loyal army, fit to take its share in the defence of the Empire.

5. In submitting our recommendations, we have borne in mind that many of them will entail increased expenditure. We are aware that the present cost of the army in India (1920-21) is already double the pre-war cost. We have therefore been actuated throughout by due regard for economy, but we have not refrained from recommending relatively costly measures, where we are satisfied that these are essential to the contentment and better administration of the army.

6. Our proposals will further increase the annual cost of the army in India. But although the immediate effect of adopting them will be to set up a higher standard of normal expenditure, we do not contemplate the probability of this standard being increased, at least for some years to come, above what can be met from the normal growth of Indian revenues. It is admitted that the first concern of any Government should be defence from external aggression, and the maintenance of internal tranquillity. With the prospect of industrial and agricultural development in India, the revival of trade, and the disappearance of freight difficulties, it is hoped that the revenues of India may expand sufficiently to enable the needs of the army to be satisfied without detriment to other claims.

7. Fresh standards have been set up; existing services require reorganisation, and new services have to be developed and equipped. There is much lee-way, too, to be made up in improving accommodation in conformity with modern requirements. All these will involve heavy initial expenditure. We venture to suggest that it might be advantageous, from the point of view both of finance and of military administration, to adopt a system somewhat on the following lines:—

- (a) The military authorities should first prepare a programme, showing the capital expenditure entailed by measures such as those indicated above.
- (b) The Government of India would thus be in a position to gauge their liabilities, and to decide to what extent they could be met, and over what period the programme should be spread; and could proceed to obtain the Secretary of State's sanction, where necessary, to the expenditure involved.

(c) The Government of India might then arrange to give a definite allotment (over and above the sum required for the ordinary yearly upkeep of the army) towards the carrying out of this programme of special expenditure. This allotment should be expressed in terms of a total sum, to be spread over a fixed number of years. Lapses in the yearly allotment should be carried forward into the following year's budget, and remain at the disposal of the military authorities for the carrying out of this programme. Within the amount of the special provision, the military authorities should have a free hand in deciding to which of the measures in the programme priority should be given. The accounts relating to the expenditure on these measures should *pro forma* be maintained separately.

(d) Subject to these conditions, the military authorities should be required to work strictly to the annual budget provision for the upkeep of the army, except in so far as this may prove impossible owing to unforeseen causes, such as military operations, or increases in the cost of food-stuffs, etc., occurring in the course of the financial year.

8. The Indian army is the instrument of the Government of India, by whom it is paid and administered, subject to the general control of the Secretary of State for India. We consider therefore that, subject to such control, the Government of India should be the final authority in matters connected with the pay and allowances of officers and men of the Indian Army, wherever they may be serving. We find it necessary to state this view, as we have been informed that the more liberal terms recommended by the Government of India have been rejected in several cases on the ground that all charges on account of officers and men of the Indian Army, serving overseas, are borne by His Majesty's Treasury. This does not appear to us to be a valid reason why terms of service should be prescribed which are at variance with the express recommendations of the Government of India, and which result in the creation of numerous inequalities in the rates of pay of officers serving overseas with formations containing Indian troops, or performing duties analogous to those of corresponding appointments in India.

The Government of India have no voice in deciding the rates of pay of officers and other ranks of the British Army, though increases in these rates materially enhance the cost of the army in India, which is entirely borne by Indian revenues. Just as the security of India demands the presence of these British troops, so the fresh military obligations devolving on the Empire as a result of the war necessitate the employment overseas of considerable numbers of Indian troops. We consider that the Government of India have the right to claim, as an essential condition of lending their troops for such duties, that they should be the final authority in all questions of pay and allowances, subject always to the control of the Secretary of State for India. This right needs to be explicitly safeguarded.

ESHER.

M. F. O'DWYER.

H. V. COX, Lt.-Gen.

H. HUDSON, Lt.-Gen.

G. FELL.

WEBB, GILLMAN, Maj.-Gen.

UMAR HAYAT.

K. G. GUPTA.

C. M. WAGSTAFF, Colonel,
Secretary.

22nd June, 1920.

Minute by Sir Krishna G. Gupta.

I have signed the Report, because I believe that the Civil Government of a country must have in the future, as it has had in the past, a potent and effective instrument in the army, for repelling external aggression and maintaining internal peace, and because I agree with my colleagues that our proposals, if adopted, will greatly increase the efficiency of the Army in India. I wish, however, to make a few observations, not by way of dissent, but rather as supplementing what has been said in the Report.

2. It seems to me that the great importance of the momentous declaration of policy made in the announcement of August 1917 has not been sufficiently realised. The British Government have, in clear and unmistakable terms, affirmed their future policy in the governance of India, *viz.*, increased association of Indians in all branches of the administration, and the introduction of responsible government with a view to place India on the road to the attainment of Dominion status; and this policy has been reaffirmed in the preamble to the Reforms Statute which was passed last year.

3. From the battle of Plassey in 1757, when the East India Company acquired for England her first footing in India, till 1858, when the Crown assumed the direct government of India, the principle underlying all measures was the maintenance of British domination and supremacy. In accordance with that principle all power, authority and control, whether civil or military, was concentrated in the hands of the British bureaucracy, and Indians were relegated to very subordinate positions.

4. As a legacy of the unhappy events of 1857, a feeling of distrust now further supervened and permeated the whole policy of army administration. Indians had always been excluded from the King's commission. A new restriction establishing a ratio of two Indians to one European was introduced into the rank and file.

5. Ever since the assumption of the government by the Crown there has been a steadily widening difference in policy between the civil administration and the army organisation. During the last half-century measures have been taken to extend the Indian element in the higher branches of the civil administration, and, in later years, to introduce the principle of representation in the Legislative Councils which culminated in the Statute of last year. On the military side, however, the tendency has been to make the grip closer and tighter, so as not only to keep the Indians out of all superior positions, but also practically to exclude them from the artillery and various other services, which form essential branches of the army organisation.

6. But now that a solemn declaration of policy has been made, such a distinction must no longer be observed, if that declaration is not to remain a dead letter or a mere pious wish. Distrust must now give place to confidence. It is not enough that the civil administration should be democratised and placed on a representative basis, but Indians should also be eligible for positions of trust and responsibility in the army. The adoption of measures which shall make the Civil Government responsible to the people does not, in itself, make a country autonomous and self-governing, nor can it ever become so, as long as the administration of the army remains in other hands.

7. In the covering letter of 3rd November, 1919, submitting Part I of the Report, it has been observed (page 4) that "we desire also to mention that we have been requested in considering our recommendations to avoid, if possible, framing them in such a manner as may hereafter prove inconsistent with the gradual approach of India towards a Dominion status." I was not a member of the Committee when that letter was written. If I had been, I should have urged that our recommendations should not only be not inconsistent with Indian autonomy, but that they should be so framed as to help India to attain the goal which had been set down for her. I should be failing in my duty to the British Government, and unfaithful to my country, if I did not take this opportunity to express my conviction that we can peacefully attain national unity and full responsible government only through the sympathetic help and guidance of Great Britain, and that it is therefore to our advantage to remain, so long as we can do so with due self-respect, a component part of the great British Empire. But if we are to achieve this goal of national unity and full responsible government, it is necessary that the British Government should completely change their angle of vision in regard to military administration

in India, and that they should be prepared to share the control of the army with the people of the country.

8. To that end several measures are urgently called for, and I shall briefly touch on them :—

- (a) The superior ranks of every branch of the army, including the Artillery, Air Force, Engineers, Transport and Supplies, etc., should be freely open to qualified Indians, and for this purpose the number of King's commissions to be given to Indians should be materially increased every year. A better method of selection than that which obtains at present should also be adopted, so that not merely the scions of wealthy families, but the best qualified candidates, irrespective of birth or creed, will have a chance of competing. As in every other country, so in India, it is the educated middle-classes which must furnish the largest contingent of officers.
- (b) Enlistment for the regular army should not be restricted to what are called martial races. The result of the present policy has not been completely satisfactory. It has thrown an unusually heavy military burden upon one province—the Punjab, the evil effects of which are already becoming apparent. It has taken the field of recruitment outside the borders of British India—bringing into the Indian Army men who are not British Indian subjects, such as the Pathans from the North-West Frontier and the Gurkhas from Nepal. The trans-frontier Pathans have been discredited, and no longer form any appreciable part of the Indian Army. The area of recruitment should, therefore, be extended to all parts of India and everything should be done to stimulate the martial and patriotic spirit, which decades of neglect and discouragement have depressed but never wholly extinguished.
- (c) No effort should be spared to make the Territorial Force a success and a real adjunct to the regular army.
- (d) The practice of officering the Indian Army by regular periodical drafts from Europe is not only very costly but it is harmful to the best interests of India in another way. The British officer leaves the country generally in the prime of life, so that all his ability, knowledge and ripe experience are lost to it.
- (e) Steps should be taken in due course to establish in India training and educational institutions for all branches of the army. At present almost all the training of the superior officers is done in England. This is an inconvenient arrangement for India and will become impracticable when more Indians get King's commissions. The best Indians may be prevented by cost alone, among a variety of reasons, from coming to England for training. The admitted success of the Quetta Staff College, and also of the Officers' College at Indore, shows that it is not a difficult matter to arrange for training in India. To start local institutions may appear costly at first but will be cheaper in the end. Besides, India must gradually be made self-supporting in every respect. We have advocated the adoption of this policy (Part II, Section I) as regards supply and munitions. The same reason holds good even with greater force for the application of that principle to the personnel of the army.
- (f) The imported article, whether personnel or material, must necessarily be more costly than that which can be obtained at home. The British soldier roughly costs three times as much as the sepoy. The proportion is not so high in the case of the officer, but the fact that the British officer has to be remunerated adequately tends to raise the scale of pay of the Indian officers and thus adds to the total cost of the army in India. Our proposals must add largely to the army expenditure, which is already high, and the only way of introducing economy without impairing efficiency is gradually to increase the Indian element in the ranks as well as in superior positions.

K. G. GUPTA.

22nd June, 1920.

Minute by Sir Umar Hayat Khan.

We have in Part III of our Report made certain recommendations on the subject of securing liaison between the civil and military authorities in obtaining information of attempts made by agitators to spread disaffection. I would go further and advocate drastic action against all such agitators, who should be rigorously excluded from all cantonments or districts where their activities may be a cause of possible contamination.

During the sessions of the Army in India Committee I was too busy to go to Sandhurst and make enquiries about the Indian cadets there. I have since learned that their progress, generally speaking, is far from satisfactory. It seems very doubtful whether all will qualify for commissions or will be suitable for commissions, and whether those who do qualify will be willing to serve for more than a short period in the army. The inference is that some at least of the cadets selected for Sandhurst were not of the right class, as I predicted in a note on the subject written in 1915 and placed before the military authorities.

If this mistake is not rectified in the future, the number of commissions allotted every year to Indians will fall far short of what it was intended to be, and public money, as well as the time of the cadets and their instructors, will be wasted. I would suggest that the shortage, which occurs owing to the selection of candidates of the wrong type, should be made good in the following years, so as to secure the full sanctioned number of Indian officers with King's commissions.

I have already pointed out that the army should not be allowed to be tampered with, as it is the only instrument in the hands of the Government to maintain internal peace and to cope with external aggression. I desire to emphasise this further, in view of what I have since learnt of the recent happenings in India. They force me to suggest that the reforms in the army should be introduced on more cautious lines. In the last disturbances attempts were made to tamper with the army, as was done in the Mutiny of 1857, but the bulk of the army was away, and, as many of the units had just returned from the war and had seen the might of the British Government, they were not, with very few exceptions, carried away by the intrigues of the revolutionaries.

Just as it is necessary, in the interests of efficiency, to have old and seasoned soldiers amongst the ranks of the Indian Army, it is equally essential to stiffen it by the British element, i.e., by British units, however expensive it may be. The necessity for this I have seen myself in various campaigns, especially in the last war. There have been occasions when it was only the presence of British units which kept the Indian troops staunch. It must not be forgotten that, while British troops are fighting for the integrity of the Empire, the Indian soldiers, gallant though they have often shown themselves, cannot have the same inducement to fight for a distant Raj, and therefore require the stiffening which British troops afford. I hope that reformers with Utopian ideas will not persuade the Government to depart from this sound and established policy. If the revolutionaries succeed in bringing about serious trouble, coupled with a mutiny and foreign aggression, before India is fit for self-government, it will cause a set-back to India which will be detrimental to all classes, particularly those who have any stake in the land.

To recruit from the classes which lack the martial spirit or military traditions would be a great mistake, as they would never stand the strain of war. If the line is broken on the weak spot where such troops are holding it, the other portions, even if held by the best troops, may have to be abandoned, and this may bring disaster in its train. This remark would equally apply to both officers and soldiers recruited from such material, and to enlist them would not only be a waste of time and public money, but would be inadvisable, as already illustrated by an experimental regiment of a certain class during the war.


I would strongly urge that any change in the composition or organisation of the army connected with the Reforms, or any other alteration in the angle of vision, should be only introduced when all these experiments have first been proved successful and have stood the test in every other department of Government.

UMAR, HAYAT.

22nd June 1920.

APPENDIX.

INDIAN OFFICER'S QUARTER.



Notes.—The following suggestions as to modifications and alterations in the standard plan of an Indian officer's house in regimental lines are the result of personal inspection in several cantonments :—

- (a) The latrine (A) has no roof ; protection during the heat of the day or from rain is necessary. It should be roofed.
- (b) The kitchen (B) faces the verandah and the sitting room, so that smoke enters both. The door (x) should be removed to (1), when (D) might be made into a store room.
- (c) The small room marked (E) and the verandah marked (F) are now only passages. Also the rooms (C) and (G) can only be used as a zenan khana. It is suggested that the room (E) and verandah (F) should be added to one of the two main rooms (C) and (G). The two former and, if necessary, one of the main rooms, can then be used as reception rooms for male friends. The aspect of the house would decide on which side the room (E) and verandah (F) should be added to the main rooms. One suggestion is made in the plan—*vide* chain-dotted lines.
- (d) Part of the roof should be flat for use as a sleeping place in hot weather, and steps should be provided up to this part.
- (e) Purdah walls should be made higher in cavalry lines.
- (f) The bathroom (H) is too small. The wall marked (2) is too low, and does not provide sufficient privacy for bathing purposes.
- (g) There should be a door connecting (C) and (G), the two main rooms of the house.