

EAST INDIA (TIBET).

FURTHER PAPERS

RELATING TO

TIBET.

PART I.

TELEGRAMS TO AND FROM THE VICEROY.

No. 1.

*From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the
4th February, 1904.*

(Telegraphic.)

I have received a telegram from Colonel Younghusband, dated Thuna, the 31st January, in which he describes the present situation as follows :—

“ All authority has been taken by the Dalai Lama into his own hands. He has ignored the Chinese, has thrown his Councillors into prison, and has defied us. His confidence in his ability to maintain the traditional policy of keeping us absolutely at arm's length and in his power to remove us from Tibet is complete. Officials and people share this confidence in the strength of Tibet and the impotence of the British Government. In consequence of this feeling, the monks and generals sent from Lhasa as delegates by the Dalai Lama refused with supreme superciliousness to negotiate at any other place than Yatung, and demanded our withdrawal from Thuna with insolent assurance. At the same time I am unable to detect on the part of the people as a whole any sign of national opposition to us. Even the officials display great indifference, while the common people are perfectly friendly. The real opposition we are encountering is that of the Dalai Lama and his followers, the monks at Lhasa, who declare that they are concerned for the preservation of their religion, in other words, of their priestly influence by which the Tibetans are at present strangled. The influence of the Chinese has vanished completely, the present weak Amban being confronted with a young and headstrong Dalai Lama ; nor is it likely to be revived when the new Amban arrives at Lhasa (which he is expected to do within the next few days) as he is not supported by Chinese troops. To influence the Dalai Lama, therefore, we must rely on our own efforts. Advance is necessary, at least as far



as Gyangtse; but I am informed by General Macdonald that it will be the middle of March before this can take place. Opposition is probable when we reach Kalatso but it cannot be serious, as the Tibetan soldiers are so poorly armed, and their generals are so devoid of military experience and so lacking in nerve. It is possible that the Tibetans may be more amenable upon our arrival at Gyangtse when they have realised how powerless they are to resist our advance. Except for the Madras Sappers and Miners who were sent back yesterday the health of the troops is good, although Thuna is 15,019 feet above sea level and the minimum temperature recorded is -16. The worst month is now over. The Tibetan Camp upon our flank has been precipitately evacuated by its occupants, and our dak and convoy now pass without hindrance between this place and Phari. Grass sufficient for some weeks to come and any quantity of fuel are obtainable."

I had an interview yesterday with the Prime Minister of Nepal. He too informed me that the Tibetans were determined to oppose the Mission; and he expressed the opinion that we might be compelled to advance to Lhasa to conclude a treaty, unless the Tibetans made an attack upon us and received severe punishment, in which case they might be willing to negotiate at Gyangtse.

No. 2.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 11th February, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Colonel Younghusband telegraphs from Thuna, on the 9th February, as follows:—

"On the 7th February two Tibetan captains came to me bringing a message from the Lhasa delegates to the effect that I must retire to Yatung, if, as I had declared, I wished to settle matters peacefully. My reply was that I had come in order to negotiate, but that none of the officials at Guru had brought letters from the Amban or from the Dalai Lama giving them authority to negotiate with me; nor, I added, did it seem that they possessed sufficient authority, as they had declined to send their Government a report of what took place during my conversation with the generals from Lhasa when they visited my camp. I sent a letter to the same effect yesterday by my Tibetan Munshi, who, however, on his return reported that the Lhasa officials refused to receive it. The Munshi also informed me that the Lhasa delegates stated their intention of sending other messengers to me, with a request that I will fix a day on which to retire from our present position. It appears that certain generals are pressing the generals from Lhasa to make an attack upon us and that the Tibetan armies are experiencing difficulties in supporting themselves."

No. 3.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 12th February 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Colonel Younghusband telegraphs from Thuna, on the 10th February, as follows:—

"The Lhasa delegate yesterday sent two messengers to me to enquire when I would withdraw to Yatung, and to inform me that there could be no peaceful settlement if I did not retire to that place. Upon my asking what was the

precise meaning of the phrase 'no peaceful settlement,' the messengers replied that the matter would be handed over to the Generals, who would make military arrangements. In reply to a further question from me whether that statement meant that war would be declared upon the British Government, the messengers said that the Generals would do what they would do. I then delivered the following message, which I told the messengers to take back to the delegates :— That I had no intention of retiring from my present position ; that I had come to Thuna in order to negotiate, and that if the Tibetan Government declined to enter into negotiations but meant to declare war upon the British Government, some high official ought to inform me of the fact, either by letter or by word of mouth. I would simply give them warning that I had with me at present only that number of soldiers which was required for my protection while peaceful negotiations were going on, but that there were thousands more soldiers ready to come from India if the Tibetans declared war upon the British Government. We have nothing to fear even if the Tibetans do attack us ; but I doubt if they have the nerve to make any serious attack."

No. 4.

*From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the
23rd February, 1904.*

(Telegraphic.)

Colonel Younghusband telegraphs, on 22nd February, from Thuna, as follows :—

"The Bhutanese envoy, who is returning to Phari to-day, has at his own request been visited by the delegates from Lhasa on two occasions, when he asked them to come to a settlement peacefully. The Lhasa delegates, however, persisted in their demand for the withdrawal of our Mission to Yatung. They have decided, the Bhutanese envoy says, to oppose us if we advance, but not to attack us here at Thuna."

No. 5.

*From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the
19th March, 1904.*

(Telegraphic.)

Information has been received to the effect that special orders to proceed in person and meet the Mission were received by the old Amban from the Chinese Emperor, but that the Tibetans refused to supply him with carriage when he attempted on several occasions to carry out his instructions. When the news reached Lhasa of the arrival and halt of the Mission at Phari, the Amban endeavoured to collect carriage himself and make a start, but the Tibetans peremptorily refused to allow him to carry out the orders of the Emperor. Colonel Younghusband has now been authorised by us to advance without further delay to Gyangtse, and he will start in a few days' time. He is first to apprise the new Amban of his intended advance and to remind him of the statement which he (the new Amban) himself made in January 1903 to Mr. Townley, and of the orders which he received from the Wai-wu-pu.

No. 6.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 24th March, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Colonel Younghusband telegraphs from Thuna on the 23rd March as follows :—

“I am informed by Captain Parr that the new Amban is making a great effort to bring the Dalai Lama to reason. In a letter written by Captain Parr to the Amban, warning him that the situation is extremely serious, the latter has been urged to use every possible coercive measure with the Dalai Lama, and Captain Parr believes there is a chance of his succeeding; he has therefore requested me to defer for ten days our advance from here. In reply to this request I have agreed not to advance for ten days from the 19th March, which is the date of his letter; and I added that I should be glad if he would renew his efforts for a peaceful settlement, as Government were anxious to avoid the necessity of fighting, though we should certainly do so, if opposed. I am regaining hope that we may get the Mission to Gyangtse without fighting, as our own accounts also show that the new Amban is stronger than his predecessor.”

No. 7.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 27th March, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Colonel Younghusband reports that he has received information from Chinese official that there is no unusual gathering at Lhasa or Gyangtse, and that the number of armed Tibetans available between Thuna and Kalatso is less than 3,000. The Amban is endeavouring to come to meet Colonel Young-husband, but he is having difficulty with the Dalai Lama.

No. 8.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 31st March, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Younghusband, telegraphing on 31st March, reports as follows :—

“Advance was made to-day by our force towards Guru. I was met by Lhasa General, who asked us to retire to Yatung for negotiations. My reply was that for 15 years we had tried to make a settlement at Yatung, and I had waited in Tibet for eight months. I said that the Amban had lately been informed by me that Mission was going to advance to Gyangtse, and that I was going to-day to Guru. General Macdonald would have to clear a passage for Mission if they opposed us. Thereupon Lhasa General retired and force advanced. I asked General Macdonald to issue orders that, unless Tibetans fired, our troops were not to fire. The advance to Guru is now being continued.”

No. 9.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 1st April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Younghusband telegraphs, on the 31st March, to following effect:—
“Some resistance was offered at Guru, but we have occupied the village, and will establish there an advance supply depôt, the force returning here in the evening. Our casualties consisted of only a few wounded, of whom only Candler, the correspondent of the “Daily Mail,” is severely hurt; we have none killed. The losses of the Tibetans amount to 300 or more killed and many wounded and prisoners. Amongst the killed are the Lhasa General and another General. The scene of the fighting was a post, which had been recently constructed by them actually on the road; they were surrounded to such a degree that our men were pointing their rifles into the camp over the walls. No violence was used by our men who showed very great self-restraint; O'Connor told the Lhasa General that, if his men would surrender their arms, they would be permitted to retire. This, however, had no effect, and General Macdonald then ordered our men to begin disarming the Tibetans, who resisted and attacked our troops with swords and with firing. We then returned the fire. This result was wholly caused by the complete inability of the Tibetans, even when our troops absolutely surrounded them, to take in the seriousness of the situation.”

No. 10.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 1st April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram received from Macdonald :—

“Thuna, 31st March. I moved to Guru this morning to establish a supply depôt at that place, taking the following force with me: Two guns, No. 7 Mountain Battery, two 7-pounders 8th Gurkhas, one-and-a-half companies Mounted Infantry, three companies 23rd Pioneers, four companies 32nd Pioneers, two companies 8th Gurkhas, machine gun Norfolks, and section Field Hospital. We moved out of Thuna at 8 a.m., the ground being covered with snow, about two inches of which fell last night. Colonel Young-husband accompanied me. When we had moved about four miles across the plain we were met by a deputation of Tibetan leaders, who demanded our retiring to Yatung, and threatened trouble if we advanced. Colonel Younghusband replied that we would proceed to Guru, and asked if they were prepared to oppose us, to which no definite answer was given; Colonel Younghusband accordingly asked me to refrain from firing till fired at. A large number of armed Tibetans, estimated at about 2,000, were observed on a hill jutting out into the plain some four miles short of Guru, where they occupied sangars and a high wall commanding the road. I advanced in attack formation, shouldering the Tibetans off the hill, and outflanking them on the plains, without firing, the troops exercising the greatest restraint. The result was that 1,500 Tibetan troops collected behind the high wall, blocking the road, and refusing to budge. They were informed that they would have to lay down their arms, and an attempt was accordingly made to disarm them, a portion of the reserve being moved up for the purpose. The Lhasa leaders then incited an attack upon us, the Lhasa Depon firing the first shot and the Tibetans firing point blank and charging with swords; they were, however, so hemmed in that they could not make use of their numbers, and after a few minutes were in full retreat under a heavy fire of guns,

Maxims and rifles, which caused them heavy loss. The 2nd Mounted Infantry were despatched in pursuit, and the balance of the troops reforming pushed on to Guru. The two eastern Guru villages were evacuated, but the western one was held, and, after being shelled, was taken by the 2nd Mounted Infantry and Burkhas, the garrison surrendering. This ended the engagement, except that the 1st Mounted Infantry continued the pursuit for some miles further. Our casualties are—Major Wallace Dunlop slightly wounded; Mr. Candler, 'Daily Mail' correspondent, severely wounded, and seven sepoy wounded. The enemy's loss is nearly 500 killed and wounded, and 200 prisoners, all their camp and baggage, about 60 yaks and 30 mules, with 2 gingalls and a large number of matchlocks and swords, together with a few breechloaders, two of which were of Russian make. Amongst the Tibetans killed was the chief Lhasa Depon and the Lama representative of the Gaden Monastery; also one Chigatse Depon, whilst the Phari Depon was captured, severely wounded. Two companies 32nd Pioneers and the 2nd Mounted Infantry are established at Guru, as an advanced post, the remaining troops returning to Thana by 7 p.m., after a long and trying day, having marched 21 miles and fought two engagements. Fuller details follow. Writing report. All Tibetan wounded have been brought in, and are being attended to."

No. 11.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 4th April, 1904

(Telegraphic.)

Casualties, action Guru, 31st March, with Tibetans, are as follows:—Major Wallace Dunlop, wounded severely, lost two fingers; Candler, dangerously wounded, left hand amputated, besides other serious sword wounds; native ranks, two wounded severely, eight wounded slightly.

No. 12.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 4th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Younghusband telegraphs from Thana on 1st April: "Appears from reports of officers who first approached Tibetan post on road that Tibetans were just commencing to stream away when Lhasa General rode through them and made them remain. Troops in clearing sangars on hill-side only made Tibetans move on, but allowed them to retreat without firing. It was when a report was brought to General Macdonald that Tibetans in the area which actually blocks the throughfare were refusing to retreat, though surrounded at point-blank range, that Macdonald and I agreed they must be disarmed. Lhasa General himself tried to prevent disarmament, and shot sepoy with his revolver. This is believed to have been the first shot. The Lama representative of the Gaden monastery was among the killed. He was the insolent of three Lamas I saw at Guru in January, and a thorough-going actionist. I trust the tremendous punishment they have received will prevent further fighting, and induce them at last to negotiate. The ordinary soldiers were before this only half-hearted, and I doubt if Lhasa authorities will be able to induce them to face us again. We shall advance from here in three days."

No. 13.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 5th April, 1904. 5019

(Telegraphic.)

Reconnaissance 2nd April last ascertained 2,000 (?) more Tibetans were blocking Gyangtse road at Hram, but retired to Kalatso hearing Guru defeat. It is believed that Tibetans have retired Gyangtse. All wounded doing well.

No. 14.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 5th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Younghusband wires from Thana, 3rd April:—

"I have received despatch from Amban in reply to mine. He says he was most anxious to come and meet me on his first arrival, but Dalai Lama refused him transport. He now intends to come and meet me as soon as possible. In view of Tibetan obstinacy he says there is no help for it but we must go to Gyangtse, though Dalai Lama has written to him that we should go back to Yatung. I have written to Amban giving him short account of fight, saying I shall be in Gyangtse in another week's time and hope to meet him with high Tibetan officials there to make a settlement and prevent further bloodshed."

No. 15.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 5th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Mission arrived Guru 4th April last without opposition.

No. 16.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 8th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram received from Younghusband, dated Guru, 4th April:—

"Ma, delegate from Amban, in place of Ho, Chao, and Li, arrived here from Lhasa, with request that we should return to Yatung. He says he saw 200 Tibetan troops between here and Gyangtse."

No. 17.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 8th April 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Younghusband, telegraphing from Kalatso, on the 6th April reports that a Lhasa Major, who is in hospital there, informed him that at engagement at Guru Tibetans had orders not to fire, but were told that if they retreated, or did not stop us, they would have their throats cut. He believes this is probably correct account. There are no signs of serious opposition between Kalatso and Gyangtse. There are several villages in the neighbourhood of Kalatso whose inhabitants, including women, are now returning to their homes. They are friendly, and are bringing in fodder, on payment.

No. 18.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 8th April 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Macdonald moved to Chalu 5th April, established post there, and reached Kalapangko 6th April. Mounted Infantry on reconnaissance discovered about 300 Tibetans at Samuda, 13 miles beyond Kalapangko, who opened fire. No casualties.

No. 19.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 9th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Macdonald reached Salu 7th April. Enemy retired to position eight miles to the north of Kangma. Tibetan casualties, Samuda: killed, six; wounded, three.

No. 20.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 9th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Younghusband reports Amban delegate Ma who has come to meet us says the property of Generals and Lama killed at Guru has been confiscated by Lhasa Government because of their failure to stop us.

No. 21.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 11th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Macdonald reached Langma, two miles to the north of Khangma, 9th April. Three thousand enemy, after few shots fired, retired five miles to the north of Changra. No casualties. Enemy reported to be receiving reinforcements from Gyangtse.

No. 22.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 13th April, 1904.

Following from Younghusband, dated Chalu, 13th April:—

“Gyangtse, 11th, by Chinese couriers. General Macdonald has brought Mission here without loss single man. Tibetans who opposed us highly demoralised. This valley covered with well-built hamlets; cultivation everywhere and numerous trees. Inhabitants mostly fled, but few who remain say this is on account of heavy demands of their own Government. News just arrived Tibetans are fleeing from fort. Two Tibetan generals have left, and Chinese delegate Ma, with Tibetan Jongpen, have come in. Ma says Amban will come as soon as he can arrange with Dalai Lama, and that four Tibetan delegates of unknown position are on their way. Jongpen is in great fear, and will doubtless surrender fort to-morrow.”

No. 23.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 13th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Younghusband has sent a full report of incident at Guru, of which the following are the principal points. Younghusband met Lhasa general 1,000 yards from spot where sangars had been erected by Tibetans, and in conference with him told him that we did not want to fight, and would not do so provided that no opposition were offered, but the Tibetan soldiers must be removed from position, or our troops would have to clear a way. Reply of Lhasa general consisted of familiar appeals that we should withdraw to Yatung. When the conference had proved abortive Younghusband asked Macdonald to advance troops, but to order them not to fire unless fired at by Tibetans. The troops advanced with perfect discipline, not a shot being fired, though they expected a heavy fire from the sangars at any moment. Great hesitation was shown by Tibetans, but being eventually outflanked they left the sangars. A party occupying post on plain were an exception, being made to return by Lhasa General, and they declined to leave wall built across road, although surrounded. Younghusband decided, with the concurrence of Macdonald, that the only resource was to disarm them and let them go, and Captain O'Connor, who speaks Tibetan and was on friendly terms with the General, was accordingly sent to inform him that the men would be disarmed. The General received this sullenly, and at first took no action, but when, after a short time, the process of disarming began he rushed at a sepoy, and drawing his revolver shot him in the jaw. The Tibetans immediately fired other shots, and a rush

was made by their swordsmen. It was not until this moment that the British troops commenced firing. Younghusband adds that he deeply regretted the occurrence, to avoid which he had laboured incessantly. The stubborn hostility of the leaders from Lhasa and the ignorance of the Tibetans themselves were entirely responsible for the occurrence. The Tibetans were treated with the utmost consideration as soon as the firing was over; the wounded were collected and cared for, and the prisoners were released. Our entire medical staff was sent out to attend the wounded. We join Younghusband in deploring what has occurred, for we had exhausted every diplomatic effort, and delayed for months, in our desire to avoid it; but we exonerate our troops from all blame, and we consider that exemplary patience and fortitude have been displayed by them in circumstances of unequalled rigour and difficulty, where, with the temperature below zero, and at an elevation at which no fighting has ever before taken place, they have had to be on the watch night and day against assault. Further, the advance without firing a shot right up to the position held by 2,000 armed Tibetans involved risk of military disaster to the British force, which they were willing to incur owing to their supreme desire to avoid bloodshed, though they would certainly have been blamed for it. The force arrived at Gyantse two days ago, and in its unopposed* advance are seen the effects of the Guru incident.

No. 24.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 13th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of to-day. Please report number of Tibetans killed and wounded respectively in fighting at Guru.

No. 25.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 14th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Macdonald, in advance to Gyantse 10th April, met with strong opposition, estimated number 2,000 Tibetans. The enemy was defeated and dispersed. Enemy's loss was 190 dead, many wounded, 70 prisoners. Our casualties were three wounded. Gyantse Jongpen visited Macdonald desiring peace. Large numbers of Tibetans reported fleeing towards Shigatse.

No. 26.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 14th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

The word "unopposed" in my telegram of yesterday was based on a telegram from Younghusband making no mention of resistance. The telegram in which Macdonald describes action arrived later. Please therefore delete word.

* See correction in Viceroy's telegram of 14th April, No. 26.

No. 27.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 15th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyantse surrendered 12th April last. Fort has been occupied by two companies of 32nd Bengal Infantry without opposition.

No. 28.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 15th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram received from Younghusband :—

"Gyantse, 12th. With surrender of the fort this morning resistance in this part of Tibet is ended. Neither generals, nor soldiers, nor people have wished to fight. Demeanour of inhabitants is respectful; no scowling looks are seen; they bring in supplies for sale, and their wish is not to fight us, but to escape being commandeered by Lhasa authorities. Attitude of monks here is, of course, submissive, but I cannot, at present say anything regarding their real feelings. The local Chinese are naturally making the most of the situation for their own benefit. The Amban makes no signs of coming to meet me, and I am writing to him an urgent letter expressing my surprise at not finding him here. Two Tibetan members of Council, with two subordinates, are said to be on their way here, but I cannot vouch for the truth of this report. Lhasa authorities are quite silly enough to continue obstruction, but Government may consider Mission absolutely safe, in a fertile valley, full of supplies, and amidst a population certainly not actively hostile to us, and whom I will guarantee we will, in three months' time, have thoroughly well disposed. We already have released prisoners of war asking for employment."

No. 29.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 15th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 13th April. Guru incident. Macdonald's full report just received states total of Tibetans killed, and wounded left on field, 628. Prisoners, some of whom were slightly wounded, 222, and doubtless a number, slightly wounded, escaped. This includes total casualties during fighting at wall and in subsequent pursuit and attack on Guru village. Tibetans numbered 3,000, of whom 2,000 were actually engaged, half being regular troops.

No. 30.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 22nd April, 1904.

(Telegraphic).

Following telegram received from Younghusband, dated Gyangtse, 18th April:—"Lhasa delegates, who were reported to have been coming, are of low rank, and since receiving news of fighting have halted on their way to receive orders. Headmen here express willingness to sell supplies, which are beginning to come in regularly. There is every sign of this district quieting down."

No. 31.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 22nd April, 1904.

(Telegraphic).

Please telegraph any available information regarding sickness and frost-bite among escort since advance to Chumbi.

No. 32.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 23rd April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Macdonald left Gyangtse 20th April last for Chumbi to arrange communications. Two guns and six companies at Gyangtse intrenched.

No. 33.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 24th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic).

Your telegram of 22nd April. General Macdonald reports deaths up to date:—Combatants, 35; followers and coolies, 45. Frost-bites, approximately, combatants, 61; others, 68. Considering altitude and exceptional severity of winter, mortality and sickness wonderfully low, thanks to liberal supply of warm clothing and extra rations. General health has been fair to good, combatants suffering more than followers owing to night duties. Health of force now good.

No. 34.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 25th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following from Younghusband:—

"Gyangtse, 22nd April.—I have received a despatch from Amban in which he says he will certainly arrive here within the next three weeks, that he has insisted on the Tibetans giving him transport, and that they have agreed, and that he has insisted also on competent and trustworthy Tibetan representatives accompanying him. He does not state specifically what representatives will accompany him, but the official who brought the despatch says that one of the Councillors acting in place of the Councillors imprisoned at Lhasa is coming. This official also says that among the common people at Lhasa there is not much excitement, as they are aware that even if we did go there we would not harm them; but that the Tibetan officials at Lhasa are greatly perturbed, and are begging the Amban to come here and settle the matter. The official saw 700 Tibetan troops about sixty miles from here, and another camp nearer to Lhasa. Excepting these there was no sign of military preparation. The Amban's despatch says that the Lhasa general was the aggressor in the Guru affair, but that my compassion in releasing the prisoners and in caring for the wounded, and my humane motives, have conferred incalculable blessing on Tibet. He says the Dalai Lama is now roused to a sense of our power; but since the former councillors are imprisoned, there are few capable Tibetan officials to negotiate. The Amban adds that he does not speak insincerely. Everything here is very quiet. The general attitude is acceptance of the inevitable, combined with relief at the flight of the oppressive Lhasa officials. Sick and wounded are also coming in to be treated by Wilton. Camp is besieged with Tibetans selling country produce, carpets and trinkets. A daily bazaar is now established outside the camp. To-day 177 Tibetans, mostly women, were selling their goods there. The scene presented was very remarkable and significant—British officers and soldiers, Sikhs, Gurkhas, and Bhutias bargaining away peaceably with their foes of a fortnight ago, and giving the sharp Tibetan traders exorbitant prices for vegetables, eggs, condiments, watches, cigarettes, carpets, trinkets, cotton goods, cooking utensils—even penny whistles. The Tibetans are evidently born traders, and they are already sending to Phari for more goods from India. Two hundred and twenty-three maunds of bhoosa and 560 lbs. barley were also brought to-day for sale to the commissariat by sixteen different villagers."

PART II.

CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED FROM THE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

No. 35.

Letter from Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., Commanding Sikkim-Tibet Mission Force, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Camp, New Chumbi, the 24th December, 1903. (Received at India Office, 13th February, 1904.)

(Extract.)

I have the honour to report that, by the occupation of Phari on the 19th instant, we have completed our hold on the Chumbi Valley, increased the confidence of the natives of the Valley in our power, and have thus facilitated the collection of the supplies necessary for the further advance. By the 10th instant I had concentrated at Gnathong:—Two guns, No. 7 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery; Machine-gun section, Norfolk Regiment; two guns, 7-pr., 8th Gurkhas; half company, 2nd Sappers; eight companies, 23rd Sikh Pioneers; six companies, 8th Gurkhas; two sections, No. 7 Native Field Hospital, with the Engineer Field Park, Ammunition Column, Telegraph, Postal, and Survey Departments. The whole of these troops, with the exception of two companies 8th Gurkhas, who were to garrison Gnathong, were intended to move into the Chumbi Valley in three successive columns. The first column was to consist of the guns, machine-gun section, half company sappers, seven companies 23rd Sikh Pioneers, and 4 companies 8th Gurkhas, one section of No. 7 Native Field Hospital, and a portion of the Field Park, and was completely equipped with pack transport carrying five days' rations. The remaining details were to follow equipped mainly with cooly transport. The non-arrival of certain locally purchased transport animals necessitated my leaving an additional company of Pioneers at Gnathong to follow later. In spite of the difficulties caused by the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease amongst the pack bullocks, and of sickness and desertion amongst the Nepalese Cooly Corps, and rinderpest amongst a section of the cart train, Major Bretherton, D.S.O., Chief Supply and Transport Officer, had succeeded in accumulating at Gnathong 35 days' rations for the troops and 10 days' grain and forage for animals. Thus, although owing to the causes mentioned above our communications with our base at Siliguri were not altogether satisfactory, and although certain units had not been completely equipped with warm clothing, I considered that further delay in the advance was undesirable in view of the lateness of the season, and accordingly issued orders for the first column to move from Gnathong on the 11th instant, assisted for the first march by a portion of the 1st Cooly Corps carrying additional rations. On the 11th instant the first column, consisting of 1,150 fighting men, with four guns and four maxims, 820 followers, and 1,400 horses, mules, or ponies, made a short march of six miles to Kup Up. It was found that during the night a large proportion of the local drivers of the Tibetan Pony Corps and a number of the Nepalese coolies had deserted. This threw the Tibetan Pony Corps into confusion, and it was late at night before the rear guard got into camp, and then with the loss of a certain amount

of stores and gears. Major Beynon, D.S.O., commanding 1st Cooly Corps, rode into camp to report that his coolies, on whom we were depending to forward supplies across the Jelap, had struck work. The extra rations which they were to have carried for the force to Kup Up were also very short. I directed Major Beynon to take summary measures to reduce his corps to order, and to endeavour to push supplies over the Jelap. Meanwhile, although we were reduced to five days' rations, I determined to continue the advance into the Chumbi valley, and thence send back as many animals as I could to bring on supplies from Gnathong. On the 12th instant the column crossed the Jelap and encamped in three bodies near Langram. The march was a very trying one and the rear guard got in very late. The Tibetan Pony Corp being so short of drivers was responsible for much of the delay, and again lost on the road many loads and part of their gear. Leaving one company of the 23rd Pioneers to garrison Langram and to work on improving the road, and leaving a detail and 50 mules to bring on the baggage and stores left on the Pass on the previous night, the main body advanced on Yatung. The local officials protested strongly against our passing the wall and suggested our marching by a hill road which turned the wall. As the Commissioner passed through the gate at Yatung a final protest was made, but there was no show of resistance. The column continued its advance to Rinchengong, where it obtained a supply of forage. One section of 2nd Sappers was left at Yatung to improve the bridge. From Rinchengong a large portion of our transport was sent back to Gnathong to bring in supplies, sufficient being retained to equip a flying column of about 700 men with which I proposed to advance on Phari later. On the 14th I advanced with the guns, Gurkhas and half company Sappers and Maxim gun section of the Norfolks to Chumbi, and sent the transport back to Rinchengong. The following day the remainder of the force moved from Rinchengong to Chumbi, leaving one company of 23rd Pioneers at Rinchengong as a garrison to work on the road and watch the main road from Bhutan which crosses the Amo Chu at Rinchengong. On the 16th instant the main body, accompanied by the Mission, moved at a site more suitable for a permanent camp at the fork of the Amo Chu and Rilo Chu Rivers, which the Commissioner called New Chumbi; the movement was made in two bodies, the transport animals making two trips in the day. The following day the road to Phari was reconnoitred for 12 miles, and orders issued for a flying column to start for Phari on the 18th. On the 18th a flying column of 795 fighting men, including British and Native officers, 334 public and transport followers, and 912 horses, ponies and mules started for Phari, the occupation of which appeared essential to establish confidence amongst the natives of the Lower Chumbi valley. It was reported that there were considerable supplies at Phari which would greatly assist our further advance, and that there was a Tibetan force prepared to oppose us. Half the regular drivers were left at New Chumbi and their places taken by fighting men, thus strengthening the column to the equivalent of 160 rifles. The first march was easy and uneventful, but the second march was over a very bad road, ascending steeply through a narrow wooded gorge, where a few determined men could have greatly delayed the advance of the column. The march was very trying to both men and animals, and the hardships suffered by all ranks were increased by the almost total absence of fuel at Kamparab camping ground, which was two miles beyond the wood limit. A certain amount of fuel had been carried on spare mules, and this with the yak dung in small quantities had to suffice. On the 20th I sent the mounted infantry forward independently to reconnoitre Phari, and if there was no collection of Tibetan troops at that point to reconnoitre the Tangla. The main column followed over open country, where the only obstacle to rapid marching was the great altitude and the numerous frozen streams, over which crossing for the baggage animals had to be prepared by spreading earth on the ice. *En route* we were met by a Chinese official, who said there were no troops at Phari and that supplies would be furnished and any orders we choose to give carried out. He pressed me not to move beyond Phari, but was told that this depended entirely on the reception I received. After riding down our column for some distance, the Chinese official returned to Phari to make ready for our reception. Shortly afterwards our mounted infantry reported that Phari Long was unoccupied. On

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approaching Phari Jong, which was strong and a lofty masonry castellated structure at the junction of the road to the Tangla with a road to Bhutan, and which completely commanded the surrounding country and Phari villages which nestled underneath its walls, we halted to receive a deputation of local headmen, for whom the Bhutanese Agent at Phari acted as spokesman. On my being asked where I would be pleased to put up, I saw the opportunity of obtaining peaceable possession of the Jong, the military importance of which was very great, and accordingly replied in the Jong. The spokesman said he would go to communicate my wishes, and I sent Captain O'Connor and Lieutenant Bignell, with a few sepoy with them, to arrange matters, while I halted the remainder of the force in order of march short of the village, in order that there might be nothing on our part resembling a hostile demonstration against the fort. Captain O'Connor sent back Lieutenant Bignell to report that the local officials were protesting, but that there was no opposition to our entering the Jong. I then marched up our main body to suitable camping ground, arranged certain details with Major Iggulden, and received a deputation consisting of the Depon and two Jong. Pa. These officials said there were no soldiers in the Jong, but asked me not to enter it, as they would lose their heads if I did. I asked them whether their heads were not already forfeited owing to our having entered the Chumbi valley, and they laughingly replied that it was so. We then strolled over to the fort and entered it together, the local officials making no protest on the threshold as they did at Yatung. The Chinese officials in Phari made no sort of protest at all, and appeared to consider it natural that I should occupy the fort. The other Tibetan officials expressed a desire that they and their personal attendants might continue to reside in the Jong. This I at once agreed to. Two companies of the 8th Gurkhas formed the garrison I told off for the night. The following day this was increased by six mounted infantry and one British non-commissioned officer and six gunners of the 8th Gurkhas with one 7-pr. gun. On the 21st I arranged the details and orders of the garrison at Phari and received a deputation of local Chinese and Tibetan officials, to whom I explained my position that I was only safeguarding the road for the advance of the Mission and guarding against the regrettable display of force with which the Tibetans have endeavoured to intimidate the Mission at Khamba Jong, and that all political questions must be referred to the Chief Commissioner, a position which they appeared to consider clear and natural. The Chinese officials wished to present me with several loads of grain and seven or eight sheep, but I declined the gift politely, as I understood the Chief Commissioner does not consider it desirable, under existing circumstances, to interchange presents. The cold during the two nights at Phari was intense, registering about 40 degrees of frost at night. The ground was frozen so hard that a working party of twelve men only succeeded, after two hours' hard work, in excavating some 33 cubic feet of earth; as the turf was also frozen, it was impracticable to build turf walls; and as no stones were procurable, I had to forego any sort of an entrenchment or even wind protection for the tents. Officers and men bore the hardships with considerable patience and with less sickness than might have been expected; but had we not had the good fortune to be able to lodge the garrison in the empty Jong, I should have hesitated to leave a force in camp on the Phari plain for any length of time exposed to the intense cold in a situation where it was so difficult to improvise any system of entrenchments, a hesitation fully shared by the senior military and medical officer of my force. The village is quite unsuitable for a military garrison, being a collection of wretchedly dirty half underground huts, all huddled together without regard to sanitation, and affording no isolated quarter, as at Rinchenpong, where a small garrison could defend itself, and leaving out of account that the whole village was completely commanded at short range from the Jong. Having established the garrison at Phari, and having settled the rates to be paid for supplies, I left Major G. R. W. Row, 8th Gurkhas, in command to garrison Phari and collect supplies, and commenced my return march to New Chumbi on the 22nd, and reached this place on the 23rd instant. The first march from Phari was again very severe; but as we were now travelling light with spare transport, we were able to reach the wood line and shelter the troops to some extent. We reached New Chumbi with a loss during the six days of ten mules, while eight men

were admitted to hospital, suffering from the effects of exposure. Throughout these operations, both officers and men have given me the most loyal support, and have cheerfully undergone the vicissitudes of climate to which they have been exposed. Their health on the whole has been singularly good. So far no opposition has been encountered. Our communications have improved somewhat; and whereas we entered the Chumbi valley with five days' rations, we have now eleven days' in hand, but I trust that in a few days we shall be in a position, if the snow holds up, to more rapidly accumulate a reserve of supplies for the further advance to Gyangtse, as our own communications are improving and Mr. White's Coolie Corps will begin work *via* the Nathu La in a few days.

No. 36.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Chumbi (Tibet), 31st December, 1903. (Received at India Office, 25th January, 1904.)

I have on more than one occasion expressed my conviction that the opposition of the Tibetans to intercourse with us comes from the Lhasa authorities, and that the people themselves are perfectly ready to have dealings with us. I have just had absolute proof that this is the case.

2. From the first day that we entered this valley the people have sold supplies to the Commissariat; in each camp even women may be seen bringing in eggs, butter, and milk to sell to the sepoy individually, and any day now numbers of coolies may be seen descending into the valley from the Sikkim side carrying loads of cigarettes and little luxuries which the traders of Chumbi have ordered over to sell to the troops.

3. But since our arrival one high lay and three high ecclesiastical authorities from Lhasa have reached Phari, and have at once forbidden the inhabitants to sell us anything—even wood. And this action has been taken, though Colonel Chao, whose permanent post is Commandant at Phari, and who is for the time being the representative of the Chinese Government, assured me yesterday that he had given orders at Phari that everything was to be supplied us, as we paid liberally for what we got.

4. Such action, moreover, is only a counterpart of what took place at Khamba Jong. There were thousands of sheep there; the people were anxious to make money by selling them at a good price to us: the local official was no less anxious to derive a little pecuniary advantage from the transaction. Colonel Chao also promised Mr. Wilton—and sincerely as Mr. Wilton thinks—to see the sheep provided for us, but only a few were forthcoming, and Colonel Chao told me yesterday that the reason was that the Lhasa representative had absolutely forbidden the people to sell them.

5. This being the policy of the Lhasa authorities, and the provision of supplies being a necessity to us, and of no harm but of only advantage to the people, I am insisting that the people shall *not* be prevented from dealing with us.

No. 37.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, dated Camp Thuna, the 11th January, 1904. (Received at India Office 13th February, 1904.)

(Extract.)

The general attitude of the Tibetans has lately become distinctly unfavourable. Before I left Chumbi reports had reached me that the representatives of the three great Lhasa monasteries and the Depon (General), who had recently arrived at Phari from Lhasa, were intimidating the people, and preventing them from selling supplies or hiring out transport to us, and I spoke to Colonel Chao about this, and asked him to see that the people were not prevented from dealing with us. Colonel Chao readily consented to do this, but frankly acknowledged that he had little power over the Tibetans. He said that at Khamba Jong he had tried his best to get supplies for us, but the Lhasa officials had thwarted him; and he went on to say that the Tibetans had during the last few months assumed a most truculent attitude and openly taunted the Chinese with their weakness, and assured them they no longer looked to them for protection, but looked instead to the Russians. On my arrival at Phari, General Macdonald told me that Major Rowe, who commands the detachment there, had reported to him many cases in which the inhabitants had expressed their willingness to deal with us, but feared to do so on account of the threats of the Lhasa functionaries. Our experience all the way through Chumbi, and even at Phari before the arrival of these Lhasa men, had been that the inhabitants were most anxious to make money from dealing with us. There was not, therefore, any doubt that the Lhasa monks deliberately put obstacles in our way, and prevented the people from reaping the benefit of our presence. I accordingly sent Captain O'Connor to see the Lhasa men—who, it may be remarked, made no sign of visiting me—and to ask them to come and see General Macdonald and discuss the question of supplies and transport for the troops with him. They absolutely refused to come, and denied that they had prevented the people from dealing with us. Captain O'Connor reported that the three monks were exceedingly surly, and said they would discuss nothing whatever until we went back to Yatung. Shortly after Captain O'Connor's return, Major Li, who had been deputed by the Amban to take Colonel Chao's place on the Commission, came to visit me, and I told him of the surprise with which I had found Colonel Chao's orders that the Phari people should be allowed to sell us supplies had been thwarted by the Lhasa monks. I informed him that they had refused to come and see General Macdonald, and I asked him, therefore, to take action to see that Colonel Chao's orders were given effect to. He said he would write at once to the Lhasa officials, and get from them an assurance that they would not prevent the people selling. But he also, like Colonel Chao, said they were a most obstinate people, and at present would pay no respect to the Chinese, as they were so fully relying on Russian support. Captain O'Connor tells me that the whole demeanour of these Lhasa monks—who are the men who really guide the destinies of Tibet—was impracticable in the extreme. They made no advance in civility, though I instructed Captain O'Connor to be studiously polite in his behaviour, and they adopted the high tone of demanding our withdrawal to Yatung before any discussion could take place. All I asked of them was an assurance that they would not prevent willing people from selling supplies to us, and even this little they refused both the Chinese and me. The worst feature of the situation is, though, that the local people and even the Chinese think that in advancing into Tibet we are advancing to our destruction. They are not impressed by our troops; they know how few they are; they know of thousands of Tibetan troops on this side of the pass; and they believe that these new Lhasa-made rifles and the new drill will prevent them from incurring the loss they did in the last campaign against us. Numbers of our camp followers deserted, and local men in our

employ all brought in stories of the numbers and prowess of the Tibetans, and how they intended to attack us in the night and swamp us. We have, in fact, as I have so often remarked, not one ounce of prestige on this frontier. I have, therefore, nothing to work with in making a settlement. Rather than being afraid of us, the Tibetans up here in Tibet think we ought to be afraid of them, and the retirement from Khamba Jong, has, I fear, done much to convince them that we are.

No. 38.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, dated Camp Thuna (Tibet) the 15th January, 1904. (Received at India Office, 13th February, 1904.)

(Extract.)

In continuation of my telegram* of yesterday's date, I have the honour to make the following more detailed report of my visit to the Tibetan Chiefs at Guru. Though I had every right to expect that they should visit me here, and when they demanded that I should go out to meet them half-way, I refused, yet I did not wish to lose any opportunity of influencing them on the one hand and of gaining first-hand knowledge of them on the other. I wished specially to see them and judge of them in their own natural surroundings. I, therefore, determined, without any formality and without previous announcement, to ride over to their camp and talk over the general situation, not as the British Commissioner with a list of grievances for which he had to demand redress, but as one who wished to understand them and seek by friendly means to effect a settlement. I was only too well aware that such an attempt was likely to be mistaken by the Tibetans as a sign of weakness, still when I see these people so steeped in ignorance of what opposing the might of the British Empire really means, I feel it my duty to reason with them up to the latest moment to save them from the results of their ignorance. I was accompanied by Captain O'Connor and by Captain Sawyer of the 23rd Pioneers, but by no one else. On our way we were met by the messengers who had come to say the Tibetan Chiefs would not come to see me at Thuna. I was all the more pleased, then, that I had left Thuna before the message arrived. On reaching Guru, a small village under a hill, we found numbers of Tibetan soldiers out collecting yak-dung in the surrounding plain, but there was no military precaution whatever taken. About 600 soldiers were huddled up in tents in the cattle-yards of the village, without any defence, and a company of infantry might go out from here at any time, and by occupying the height above the village, annihilate the whole Tibetan force, for they are only armed with matchlocks and spears and have no breech-loaders. As we rode through the village, the soldiers all crowded out to look at us, laughing and smiling and with no ugly looks. They were not very different in appearance from the ordinary Bhutia dandy-bearer one sees at Darjeeling, or the yak-driver of this country. On reaching the principal house, I was received at the head of the stairs by the Tibetan General, who was very polite and cordial in his greeting. Other Generals stood behind him, and smiled and shook hands also. I was then conducted into a room in which the three Lhasa monks were seated. They made no attempt to rise, and only made a barely civil salutation from their cushions. The Lhasa General and Shigatse General took their seats on cushions at the head of the room opposite the monks. We were given three cushions on the right, and two Shigatse Generals and another Shigatse representative had seats on the left. Tea was served, and the Lhasa General, as the spokesman of the

* *Vide* Cd. 1920, p. 312, No. 174.

assembly, asked after my health. After suitable inquiries on my part, I said that, though they had not come to see me either at Phari or here, and I could not pay them a formal visit as British Commissioner, and had not in any case any intention of officially discussing the various points of difference between us, yet I was anxious to see them and know them, and to have an opportunity of freely discussing the general situation in a friendly informal way, so I had ridden over without ceremony and without escort, in my private capacity, to talk matters over with them, and see if there was no way of arriving at a settlement by peaceful means. I said I had been appointed British Commissioner on account of my general experience in many different countries; that I had no preconceived ideas upon the question, or no animus against the Tibetans; that from what I had seen of them I was convinced there was no people with whom we were more likely to get on with than with them, and I hoped now we had really met each other face to face we should find a means of settling our differences and forming a lasting friendship. The Lhasa General replied that all the people of Tibet had a covenant that no Europeans were ever to be allowed to enter their country, and the reason was that they wished to preserve their religion. The monks here chimed in that the religion must be preserved, and no European on any account allowed in Tibet, and the General went on to say that, if I really wanted to make a friendly settlement, I should go back to Yatung. I told him that for 150 years we had remained quietly in India and made no attempt to force ourselves upon them. Even though we had a treaty right to station a Political Officer at Yatung, we had not exercised that right. But of recent years we had heard from many different sources that they were entering into friendly relations with the Russians, while they were still keeping us at arm's length. One Dorjjeff, for instance, had been the bearer of autograph letters from the Dalai Lama to the Czar and his officials at the very time when the Dalai Lama had refused letters from the Viceroy of India. We could understand their being friendly with both the Russians and us or being unfriendly with both; but when they were friendly with the Russians and unfriendly with us, they must not be surprised at our now paying closer attention to the assertion of our treaty rights. The General assured me that it was untrue that they had any dealings with the Russians, and the monks brusquely intimated that they disliked them just as much as they did us. They protested that they had nothing to do with the Russians; that there was no Russian near Lhasa at the present time; and that Dorjjeff was a Mongolian, and the custom of Mongolians was to make large presents to the monasteries; and they asked me not to be so suspicious. I said it was difficult not to be suspicious when they persistently kept us at such a distance. I then addressed them in regard to religion, and asked them if they had ever heard that we interfered with the religions of the people of India. They admitted that we did not, but they maintained that, nevertheless, it was to preserve their religion that they adhered to their determination to keep us out. As the Buddhist religion nowhere preaches this seclusion, it is evident that what the monks wish to preserve is not their religion, but priestly influence. So far, the conversation, in spite of occasional bursts from the monks, had been maintained with perfect good humour, but when I made sign of going and said that I hoped they would come and see me at Thuna, their tone suddenly changed and they said we must go back to Yatung. One of the Generals said—though with perfect politeness of manner—that we had broken the rule of the road in coming into their country, and that we were nothing but thieves and brigands in occupying Phari fort. The monks, using forms of speech generally addressed to inferiors, loudly clamoured for me to name a date for our retirement from Thuna before I left the room; the atmosphere became electric; the faces of all became set; a General left the room; trumpets outside were sounded and attendants closed round us. It was necessary to keep extremely cool under these circumstances. I said that I would have to obey whatever orders I received from my Government just as they had to obey orders from theirs; that I would ask them to report to their Government what I had said, and I would report to my Government what they had told me—that was all that could be done at present. The monks continued to clamour for me to name a date, but a General relieved the situation

by suggesting that a messenger should return with me to Thuna to receive my answer there. The other Generals accepted the suggestion, and the tension was removed. Their faces became smiling again, and they conducted me to the outer door with the same geniality and politeness with which they had received us, though the monks remained seated and as surly and evil-looking as men well could be. The messengers have arrived at Thuna, and as a convoy with escort has also arrived, I have sent back a message to say that I have received orders to proceed on into Tibet. This my first meeting with really representative Tibetans after six months' waiting has led to no result as far as persuading them to any more reasonable attitude goes. But it has given me the opportunity I had long been wanting of absolutely assuring myself of the real attitude of the various parties in the State. My conclusions are that the monks are implacably hostile; that they have the preponderating influence in the State; that they are entirely convinced of their power to dictate to us and ignorant of their weakness; that the lay officials are much less unfriendly and more amenable to influence and less ignorant of our strength; that the military organisation is quite contemptible; and that the ordinary people and soldiers, though perhaps liable to be worked on by the monks, have no innate bad feeling against us. The desire of the monks to preserve their priestly influence is our only real obstacle.

No. 39.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Camp Thuna, the 22nd January, 1904. (Received at India Office 20th February, 1904.)

(Extract.)

As I had the honour to report in my telegram* of yesterday, the Lhasa General, known as the Lhi-ding Depon, visited me yesterday in company with a high Shigatse official and the Depon of the Chumbi valley who had met me at Yatung. The Lhasa General announced that, like me, he was most anxious to come to a friendly settlement, and, therefore, he would ask me to withdraw to Yatung where discussions could then take place in the most amicable manner. I told him I did not wish to say anything disagreeable to himself personally, as he had always been polite to me, but I would ask him to let his Government know that the time was past for talk of this kind, and to warn them that they must take a more serious view of the situation. They must realise that the British Government were exceedingly angry at the treatment that I, their representative, had received, and were in no mood to be trifled with. Far from going back or even staying here, we were going to advance still further into Tibet: and I expected to be met both by the Amban and by a Tibetan official of the highest rank who would have sufficient authority to negotiate a proper treaty with me in the place of the one concluded by the Amban, which the Tibetans repudiated. I had waited for six months for a proper representative to be sent to meet me, but even now none had arrived. The Lhasa General said that, if we went back to the frontier, all could be arranged, but that if we went on there would be trouble. I told him we were not afraid of trouble: that I had brought with me only a few soldiers now, but if trouble arose, there were

* Vide Cd. 1920, page 313, No. 175.

thousands more who could follow after. I did not wish to say this in a threatening way, but that he might warn his Government that we are thoroughly in earnest. I claimed we had advanced in a reasonably friendly manner and had paid liberally for every ounce of grain, every blade of grass, and every pony, mule or yak we had taken and given handsome rent for every house we had occupied. The Lhasa General said he would report what I had said to the Lhasa monks at Guru and would communicate with me again. He maintained, when I told him that neither the Amban nor the Dalai Lama had informed me of any high Tibetan official having been appointed to meet me, that he and the Lhasa monks had been specially deputed to meet me and negotiate with me, but only at Yatung. I told him that while I was quite ready to talk over matters in an informal manner with him, as I had done, I of course could only enter into regular negotiations with men with proper credentials. The conversation then became general, and I asked why it was that while Tibetans went down to India without hindrance, travelled there as long and as far as they liked, traded there, resided there, and saw their sacred places duly respected and protected by us, not a single Englishman or native of India was allowed into Tibet. This did not appear to me either a very hospitable or a very fair arrangement. What was the reason of it? The General said the reason was the difference in religion. I told him I could not accept that, for I had carefully studied their religion and found that it inculcated the brotherhood of man, and hospitality and generosity to strangers—not exclusiveness. The General then said that the Tibetans were the "inner" people, implying that they were above the rules applicable to the rest of the world. I asked him if he would do me the favour to have their sacred books searched and send me any text sanctioning inhospitality to strangers. He replied that there was no text sanctioning exclusion, but that there was an agreement or covenant of the whole people that strangers should not be admitted to Tibet. I said in that case the matter was very simple: if there was no divine command that strangers should be excluded, but merely an agreement of the people all that had to be done now was for the people to make a fresh agreement more in accordance with the spirit of their religion and admitting instead of excluding strangers. The General laughed at this, but said that the agreement once having been made could not be altered. I told him I could understand a disagreeable people wishing to keep to themselves. What was so aggravating was that a pleasant and genial people like the Tibetans wishing to debar the rest of the world from the pleasure of their society. The Lhasa General looks very well bred, he has good manners, and speaks well. But he is not clever, he has little strength of character, and he is absolutely in the hands of his three monk colleagues.

No. 40.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, Thuna, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated Thuna, the 27th January, 1904. (Received at India Office 20th February, 1904.)

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa Depon says he has communicated to Lhasa monks substance of our last interview, and they say they are unable to make any report of my views to Lhasa Government until we have retired to Yatung.

No. 41.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., Chumbi, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated the 31st January, 1904. (Received at India Office 29th February, 1904.)

(Telegraphic.)

Convoy under escort two companies, 8th Gurkhas, and 20 mounted infantry passed over from Phari to Thuna on twenty-ninth, returning to Phari yesterday afternoon, crossing the Tungla under an icy gale. All reported quiet at Thuna and Phari. It snowed here lightly for four hours yesterday afternoon, and the sky is still overcast, and more is expected.

No. 42.

From His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Peking, to His Excellency the Viceroy, Calcutta, dated the 1st February, 1904. (Received at India Office 29th February, 1904.)

(Telegraphic.)

I have been informed officially by Prince Ching that Parr has been associated with the present Chinese Resident in Tibet in negotiations, which he has been instructed to carry on with Colonel Younghusband. Prince Ching asks that instructions may be given accordingly.

No. 43.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., Chumbi, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated the 6th February, 1904. (Received at India Office 23th February, 1904.)

(Telegraphic.)

All reported quiet at Thuna and Phari. Tibetans reported to be sending men back to Gyangtse from Guru for food. Snow fell on three consecutive days at Thuna, stopping work one day. The telegraph cut near Phari village fined 400 maunds yak-dung. Telegraph detachment has had 14 cases frost-bite from drifting snow and high wind.

No. 44.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., Phari Jong, to the Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 10th February, 1904. (Received at India Office 5th March, 1904.)

(Telegraphic.)

Phari, tenth. Am moving over to-morrow to Thuna with large convoy of month's supplies and fuel for garrison at Thuna, and return here on twelfth. Colonel Younghusband also returns here with me on twelfth to interview the Tongsa Penlop expected here from Bhutan.

No. 45.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., Phari Jong, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated the 12th February, 1904. (Received at India Office, 5th March, 1904.)

(Telegraphic.)

Returned with empty convoy to-day from Thuna, which place is now rationed to 15th March. Inspected fortified post at Thuna, which is quite satisfactory. Am returning to Chumbi, where arrive 14th, halting Gautsa to-morrow.

No. 46.

Letter from Yu, Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa, charged with the administration of Tibetan Affairs, Lieutenant-General of the Manchu Brigade, to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, dated at Lhasa, Kuang Hsü, 29th year, 12th Moon, 27th day. (Received at India Office 28th March, 1904.)

I have the honour to inform you that I arrived at Lhasa on the 26th day, 12th Moon, 29th year of Kuang Hsü (11th February, 1904), and assumed charge of my post.

No. 47.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Camp Thuna, the 22nd February, 1904. (Received at India Office, 21st March, 1904.)

(Extract.)

In continuation of my telegram* of to-day's date I have the honour to make the following report on the result of the interviews which have taken place between the Bhutan Envoy (the Timpuk Jongpen) and the Lhasa delegates. After I had explained to the Bhutan Envoy the position in which we at present stood in regard to Tibet at the interview, which took place on 18th February, he asked me whether he might see the Lhasa delegates, explain our views to them, and try and induce them to come to a settlement, for he said his Government were most anxious that a peaceful settlement should be arrived at. I had no hope that he would be able to effect anything, but I thought that the fact of his attempting to mediate might be the means of bringing the Bhutanese Government into closer relation with us. I, therefore, consented to his seeing the Lhasa delegates, and asked when he proposed to go to Guru. His answer surprised me. He said he found there was no one there of sufficient rank for him to visit them, so he would send over and invite them to come and see him. The Lhasa General, another General and one of the Lama representatives did come and see him, and this incident furnished sufficient proof of what we have all along contended that the men, whom the Lhasa Government have sent to

negotiate with me, are of altogether too insignificant position for me to meet in serious negotiation. After the first interview the Bhutan Envoy came to report the result to me. He said he had repeated to them what I told him, and the Lhasa delegates had replied that Yatung was the place appointed for discussions, and we ought to have discussed matters there, but instead of that we came with an armed force to Khamba Jong, and then had come into Chumbi; had occupied Phari Fort, had seized messengers and taken wood from houses, so they did not believe that we honestly intended to make a peaceful settlement, but they asked what were the terms of the settlement we wish to make. I told the Envoy that I would willingly go back to Yatung if I thought there was the slightest prospect of making a durable settlement with the Tibetans by doing so. But, as a matter of fact, we had tried for years to make a settlement at Yatung. Our Political Officers, Mr. White and Captain Le Mesurier, had met Tibetan officials and also the Amban there, but without result. The Viceroy had also tried to settle matters by writing to the Amban and to the Dalai Lama. And it was only when we found that it was impossible to make a settlement at Yatung that we had gone to Khamba Jong, and only when we found that a settlement at Khamba Jong was impossible that we had come on here. The Tibetans complained of certain actions of our soldiers, but we had restrained the soldiers from fighting, we had paid for everything, and if our soldiers had seized messengers that was a necessary military precaution when the Tibetans had a large camp on our flank. I had, however, released them the next morning, which was very different treatment to that accorded by the Tibetans to the two Lachung men seized seven months ago, and not released yet. As to what terms we would ask in the settlement, that was of course a matter which I would have to discuss with the high official, possessed of full powers to negotiate, as soon as one was appointed, but I might say in general terms that there were three main points we should want to settle with the Tibetans:—firstly, the boundary with Sikkim; secondly, the regulation of trade and the selection of a more suitable trade mart than Yatung; and thirdly, the means of communication between ourselves and the Tibetans. The Envoy asked what place we wished to select as a trade mart instead of Yatung, and I replied that we had not yet settled that point. It would be one to discuss when regular negotiations had commenced. The Envoy then returned to the Lhasa delegates who had been awaiting my reply. On the following day they had a full meeting at Guru to consider it, and yesterday the Lhasa General paid another visit to the Bhutan Envoy, the result of which the latter reported to me yesterday afternoon. The Tibetans said that as we were in the wrong, as we had advanced into Tibet, we should retire to Yatung, and then negotiations could take place; but as regards our wish to regulate communications with them they could only say that no communications would ever be allowed, as it was against the rule of the country. I thanked the Envoy for the trouble he had taken, and pointed out how unreasonable the Tibetans were, and how impossible it was to come to a settlement with them. We had left them alone for 150 years as we knew they did not like strangers, and we had no object in coming into their miserable inhospitable country which we saw around us here. But they had wantonly and without provocation invaded Sikkim territory in 1886, and now repudiated the settlement which the Amban made on their behalf at the conclusion of the war in which we drove them out of the territory of our feudatory. And what sort of a people were they when they refused all communications with a neighbouring country? We communicated with the Bhutan Government, and as a result we had been on cordial terms for years. We corresponded with every other Government in the world, and when a small country like Tibet refused to communicate with us, specially in regard to a settlement after a war which they had forced upon us, we could only look upon it as an insult, which we were not inclined to brook. The Envoy said he agreed, but asked me if I would wait here while he wrote to Lhasa, and tried to get the Lhasa Government to send a fully empowered representative. I said I had waited a long time already, both here and at Khamba Jong, and my patience would not bear out much longer, but I had no objection to his writing to Lhasa, as I was still anxious if I could to effect a peaceful settlement. At the close of the interview he politely thanked me for the hospitality I had shown him. He said he was returning to Phari,

* Vide page 3, No. 4.

but would come over here again whenever I wanted him, and if we did not meet again he would write to me from Bhutan, and hoped I would write to him some time. I am hopeful that from this beginning we may establish more intimate relation with Bhutan, for the Envoy is the first sensible man I have met on this frontier, and there may be mutual advantage in a closer intimacy between us.

No. 48.

Letter from E. H. C. Walsh, Esq., Assistant to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated Phari Fort, the 25th February, 1904. (Received at India Office 28th March, 1904).

(Extract.)

I have the honour to report, for your information, the results of an interview which the Timpuk Jongpen had with me this morning. I received him, as on the two previous occasions, in a tent which I had pitched for the purpose on the plain about three hundred yards from the fort. A guard-of-honour of half a company of the 8th Gurkhas were also in attendance as on the previous occasions. After exchange of compliments, the Timpuk Jongpen referred to the copy of the Kah-gyur or Buddhist Canon of Scripture, consisting of one hundred volumes, which is kept in the Lha-Khang or Chapel of the Phari Fort, and asked if he might be allowed to buy it for a new monastery he was building at Timpuk, or, if that was not approved, that he might be allowed to remove it to the Chatsa monastery for its safe custody to prevent its being removed or damaged by the soldiers. I informed him that we could not sell the Kah-gyur to any one, as we were only occupying the fort as a matter of necessity, and that we had not taken the Kah-gyur for ourselves, but were keeping it carefully for those to whom it belonged. I informed him that I had already inspected it to see that all the volumes were there in their racks, and that no one had interfered with it in any way, and that strict orders had been issued that no one was to meddle with it. He thanked me for this, and further asked that the Lha-Khang might not be occupied by soldiers; as in addition to the volumes of the Kah-gyur, it contained the Chapel altar with four images, which they might damage. I informed him that the room was only used as a hospital for the sick, for which it had been selected as being the only room large enough and suitable, and that as this was a work of mercy, I felt sure that he would agree with me that this was not an unsuitable purpose to use the Chapel for, and that the soldiers in hospital were always under supervision, and had strict orders not to touch the altar or its images, or the books in the racks on the wall on either side of it. I told him that the English never interfered with other people's religion, and mentioned the trouble which the English had taken to find out the birthplace of Buddha at Kapilavastu. I also told him how carefully the temple of Buddha at Gaya was preserved. He thanked me for the assurance that no damage should be done to the books or to the images. I then informed him that the Bhutanese were already bringing in stores from Bhutan for sale to the Commissariat, and asked if he would assist in obtaining further supplies. He said he would be very pleased to do so, and would issue orders that all supplies from Bhutan that came into Tibet are to be offered for sale to the Commissariat, through Ugyen Kazi, the agent for Bhutan, whom he wished to be entrusted with this duty. I thanked him for this assistance. I then said that I would pay him a visit at Chatsa monastery to see that he was comfortable there. He was very pleased at this, but asked me not to come to-morrow as it is an unlucky day. So I told him that I would pay him a visit on Sunday.

No. 49.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, Phari Jong, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 1st March, 1904. (Received at India Office, 28th March, 1904.)

(Telegraphic.)

Thuna, 1st March. Situation unchanged. Neither Tibetans nor Chinese show any signs of negotiations. Weather much improved, though maximum temperature still falls to plus eight. Persistent rumours of attack on us to-morrow, but as it is night of full moon, nothing to fear. Origin of rumour is probably arrival of Tibetan reinforcements below Guru.

No. 50.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, Phari Jong (Tibet), to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 3rd March, 1904. (Received at India Office 28th March, 1904.)

(Telegraphic.)

Thuna, 3rd March. Some specially high Lamas from Lhasa have visited Guru and cursed Mission camp for five days, but reconnaissance shows no increase in number of troops there.

No. 51.

From the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, Phari Jong, dated the 9th March, 1904. (Received at India Office, 5th April, 1904.)

(Telegraphic.)

Please refer to Walsh's letter to you, dated 25th February. Government of India consider that arrangements should, if possible, be made to evacuate the chapel in the Phari Fort and locate the hospital elsewhere.

No. 52.

From E. H. C. Walsh, Esq., Phari Jong, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 10th March, 1904. (Received at India Office 5th April, 1904.)

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram 9th March. Have informed Officer Commanding. Arrangements are being made to evacuate chapel in Phari Fort and remove hospital elsewhere.

No. 53.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, Chumbi (Sikkim), to the Adjutant-General in India, dated the 11th March, 1904. (Received at India Office 5th April.)

(Telegraphic.)

A fire occurred yesterday at Rorotang, destroying the post there and about 3,000 maunds supplies and forage, said to have been caused by lightning; enquiry being held. Very heavy snowstorm yesterday lasting nine hours. One foot of snow at Langram, Rinchengong, and Chumbi. Severe blizzard and four feet of snow reported from Gautsa and higher up the valley. Minimum temperature last night here plus one; Gautsa minus one.

No. 54.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., Chumbi, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated the 14th March, 1904. (Received at India Office 9th April, 1904.)

(Telegraphic.)

Snow continues. Passes closed for men and animals for the first time. Convoy with supplies and wood for one month reached Thuna 12th, and returned safely Phari 13th in spite of snow.

No. 55.

From Brigadier-General Macdonald, Chumbi (Sikkim), to the Adjutant-General in India, dated the 18th March, 1904. (Received at India Office 9th April, 1904.)

(Telegraphic.)

First company mounted infantry left Linganathang to-day for Phari, second company mounted infantry arrived Chumbi from Siliguri. Arrival of ekkas over the Nathu La being much impeded by landslips caused by snowstorms. One ekka driver and one cooly killed falling over the Khud. Half brigade cooly corps left Gnatong for Chumbi.

No. 56.

From the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, Thuna, dated the 19th March, 1904. (Received at India Office 9th April, 1904.)

(Telegraphic.)

Your proposal to advance is approved and authority has been given to General Macdonald either to move at once or to delay for a week if by so doing he can secure more transport and better weather. You can arrange actual date with him. You should now write to new Amban Yutai saying that you are glad to hear of his safe arrival and trust that he is ready to settle all matters in

dispute in accordance with the orders issued by Waiwupu in December, 1902, and with his own statements to Townley in January, 1903, when he said that he hoped to enlighten the Tibetans. You are therefore moving to Gyangtse to commence negotiations and hoped to meet him there and that he will secure the attendance of fully-empowered Tibetan representatives of suitable rank. The Tibetans should be warned by him that the consequences of resistance to the passage of the Mission would be very serious.

No. 57.

From General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., Chumbi, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated the 20th March, 1904. (Received at India Office 9th April, 1904.)

(Telegraphic.)

The second company mounted infantry proceeded yesterday to Lingmathang. Five hundred brigade coolies and three troops mules arrived at Chumbi yesterday from communications. Thirty-six ekkas should cross Natula to-day and arrive here to-morrow. Smart fall of snow last evening for about two hours.

