

REPORT

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OF THE

COMMISSIONERS

APPOINTED TO ENQUIRE INTO

THE FAMINE IN BENGAL AND ORISSA

IN

1866.


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REPORT

OF THE

COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO ENQUIRE INTO THE FAMINE

IN

BENGAL AND ORISSA IN 1866.

ON receipt of the instructions of the Government of India, contained in the resolution of His Excellency the Governor General in Council of 4th December last (which was accompanied by an extract of a despatch from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India), we lost no time in assembling and making arrangements for the conduct of the important enquiry confided to us. His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General had expressed the opinion that it was desirable that the Commission should proceed to make a local enquiry in Orissa without delay, and immediately on our assembling we proceeded to that province.

2. Mr. Dampier had held the office of Commissioner of the Nuddea or Presidency division, and, before joining the other Commissioners, had already made a local enquiry in the districts of Maunbloom, Bancoorah, Hooghly and Burdwan, under the instructions of the Government of Bengal, dated 5th November 1866. We had, however, had no previous opportunity of studying the whole correspondence regarding the famine in Orissa, and that correspondence not being then available in a complete or easily accessible shape, we left Calcutta with very fragmentary information. The correspondence was not complete in our hands till much later. Altogether, then, we commenced our enquiry with a very imperfect knowledge of the official history of the great calamity which had befallen the province. There was this advantage that we acted with minds that were perfectly fresh and unbiassed, but, on the other hand, there was the disadvantage that we were not from the very first able to apply ⁵¹ourselves without fail to all points which a perusal of the correspondence might have shown most to demand scrutiny. On the whole, we hope that the circumstances have not been unfavorable to a due elucidation of the truth.

3. It must at once be understood that it is impossible that our report on the extent and circumstances of the famine can be, in any way, of the same character as that of the late Colonel Baird Smith, to which allusion has been made by the Right Hon'ble the Secretary of State. Colonel Baird Smith made his report regarding a country where the very amplest statistical information was available. The districts of the North-Western Provinces are provided with very large establishments, brought, by long habit and close supervision, to a high state of efficiency, and by which the Magistrate and Collector is kept in intimate communication with every part of his district. The Tehseeldars and their subordinates, the Canoongoes and the Putwarees furnish from year to year fiscal and agrarian returns of the most minute description, and can supply, on a very short notice, special information which the occasion may require. Colonel Smith was, therefore, able, by availing himself of the information to be found in the Collector's offices, to give most precise information respecting the famine of 1861, and to embody it in precise maps and figured statements.

4. All such establishments and all such information are entirely wanting in the Lower Provinces. The Collector has no establishments whatever of the character to which we have referred. He may be said, as a rule, to have

no executive establishments of any kind, and to be possessed of no statistics. Of late years districts have generally been more or less partitioned into sub-divisions in charge of Assistants under the Magistrate and Collector, but these officers are much more judicial than executive in their functions; they cannot be said, in executive matters, to take the place of Tehseeldars. And there are few districts in which the number of sub-divisions is yet considerable. The permanent settlement of the land revenue of Bengal with the Zemindars, and the invariable rule of sale in case of default, have been supposed to have rendered unnecessary any further information than the great book of the Collector showing the revenue payable for each estate held direct of Government. Most districts have been surveyed of late years as respects only the exterior boundaries of these estates, but nothing like an exact census of the population has been attempted.

5. In Orissa the settlement is not permanent, and remissions of revenue are not unfrequently granted. Thirty years ago a temporary settlement, almost more minute and careful than that of the North-Western Provinces, was made by most able and experienced men. But, nevertheless, the Bengal system of administration has been followed. There are no Tehseeldars; the Putwarees have, for the most part, fallen into abeyance; the Canoongoes, though still existing, have been long almost entirely disused, and the annual returns, which they and the Putwarees were originally bound to furnish, have not only been neglected, but have been of late years absolutely prohibited. Consequently, in such a crisis as that which has just occurred, recent statistics are almost as little available in Orissa as in Bengal, and throughout the whole scope of our enquiry, we can nowhere pretend to give any thing like exact or even approximate statistical information.

6. This distinction, which may be broadly said to exist between the system of administration in the Lower Provinces of the Bengal Presidency, and that followed in all other parts of India, must be particularly borne in mind as affecting the subject of our enquiry much more deeply than the mere character of our report,—as being in fact the main cause of the lack of reliable information which prevented very many officers from reporting in a confident and positive manner, in sufficient time for the application of a remedy, the degree of failure of the crops and the full extent of the distress which culminated so disastrously.

7. To return to our report, it must differ essentially from that of the late Colonel Smith, not only in the information which it does not supply, but in that which it does supply. In 1861 there was no question as to the conduct of the officers of Government and the sufficiency of the measures taken by them. On the present unhappy occasion these have been impugned, and we understand it to be a principal object of our enquiry to ascertain whether all that should have been done was done. Indeed its present form may have been given to our Commission in some degree with reference to that part of our enquiry. We have thought then that, where such questions were involved, it was proper that our investigation should take a somewhat judicial form. That may not be the best mode of speedily acquiring the most full and minute information on every part of a subject affecting so great a tract of country and so many millions of people, but we have deemed it the most satisfactory mode of arriving at a conclusion respecting the main issues. We have thought it necessary, under the circumstances, that we should not only ascertain the truth, but also exhibit the evidence on which our conclusions are founded. We have desired that the most competent persons should have the fullest opportunities of speaking out, and that their statements should remain on record. We have, therefore, though vested with no legal power of taking evidence, formally examined the most competent of those whose testimony was available. We have been met in the best spirit, and have found the persons, official and non-official, from whom we have sought information, most willing to give it. Unfortunately we were not provided with a professional reporter during our visit to Orissa, but we have endeavored to record the substance of each examination, and in every instance

during our tour the statement so taken down was read over to the person examined, and where necessary corrected. The evidence then on which this part of our report is founded, is composed of two parts,—the official documents and correspondence, and the statements recorded by us. With a view to form an opinion on remedial measures and broader questions, we have, of course, availed ourselves of every mode of information, but as respects personal questions we shall rely almost entirely on the recorded and documentary evidence.

8. Our colleague, Mr. Dampier, acting alone before the appointment of our Commission, had not followed the quasi-judicial form of enquiry in the districts visited by him; but as our joint investigation has embraced the country in which the famine was most severely felt, we have thought that we may well use the information already obtained by him in the remaining districts, both during his special enquiry and as Commissioner of the Presidency division. We have further requested the attendance, before us, of some of the persons best acquainted with the history of the famine so far as it affected those districts.

9. We have visited each of the districts of Orissa and also the district of Midnapore.

10. In Calcutta we have fully examined the heads of departments, and also some non-official persons whose action in, or knowledge of, the subject of our enquiry was important, as well as the several officers and others, both from Orissa and from other districts, whom we found there or whose attendance we requested. Finally, we have asked His Honor the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal to be good enough to give us an opportunity of putting some questions to him, and he has at once complied with our request. A paper explanatory of His Honor's action had already been communicated to us, and, considering the nature of our instructions and the circumstances of His Honor's position, we have not thought it necessary to seek in the form of examination (as in the case of all other officers) detailed explanations of the action of the Government of Bengal; but we deemed it indispensable to inform ourselves on points which affected the conduct of other officers, more especially as regarded the information supplied by them to Government.

11. This was the more necessary on account of the absence of two of the officers whose evidence would have been most important,—the late Mr. Cockburn, Officiating Member of the Board of Revenue, and Mr. Barlow, Magistrate and Collector of Pooree. Mr. Cockburn, when accompanying the Lieutenant Governor to Orissa in the early part of 1866, was unhappily seized with illness which eventually proved fatal. Mr. Barlow, after filling, in fact, the most important place in the whole history of the famine, left for England in October 1866. He is indeed so much the central figure in all the early part of these unhappy events, that our whole enquiry is unfortunately much crippled by his absence, and considerable doubt is thrown over our conclusions respecting an important passage in the history of the famine.

12. It was notified that our sittings were open to those who wished to be present during the examinations conducted by us, on the condition only that the statements made should not be reported and published till the whole enquiry was complete.

13. All the records and the correspondence, official and demi-official, both of the local officers and of the Board of Revenue, have been freely placed at our disposal, and we have been furnished by the Government of Bengal with copies of the public correspondence, and with extracts from the demi-official letters which could be found, so far as they related to the famine. With respect to local offices, however, we must observe that there is a great want of uniformity in the mode of keeping the correspondence, and we cannot always be quite sure that our papers are absolutely complete, though we are sure that nothing has been knowingly withheld. We have, in fact, by local search and enquiry

obtained much that would not have been found elsewhere, and we feel tolerably confident that we are possessed of all that is very material of the correspondence existing on record.

14. We have not hesitated to seek for and make use of demi-official letters, because we thought it probable that in such a crisis much of the business might have been done in that form, and we feel sure, that though the expressions used in these communications are sometimes not such as are studied in view to publicity, they will be judged by the substance rather than by the form of expression, the circumstances in which they were written being remembered. This correspondence is not now to be found in anything like a complete shape, but the fact seems to be that in the early part of the famine less of such correspondence passed than we had expected.

15. The Resolution of the Government of India states our duty to be in brief to report—

- 1.—The causes of the famine.
- 2.—Whether timely measures were taken to meet the evil, and if not, whether valid reasons exist to account for their absence.
- 3.—In what way such visitations may be prevented or mitigated in future.

On this distribution of the subject, we would observe that the natural causes of the famine lie in very brief space, and are, it may be said, patent, while it is equally certain that sufficient measures of relief were not taken at so early a period as it would have been proper that they should have been taken, if the facts had been sufficiently known and the magnitude of the calamity had been earlier understood. The only cause, then, of increased suffering, which can admit of very serious question, is the delay which occurred in respect to measures of relief. We therefore propose, as most convenient, first to treat of the whole history of the famine, and then to give our opinion regarding the measures fit to be adopted in the future.

16. It was in the province of Orissa that the great calamity of the past year was felt in by far its widest extent and in its greatest intensity; and it is to Orissa that the attention of the Government and the public has been most strongly drawn. To prevent, therefore, the complication which results from embracing too wide a surface in a single narrative, we propose, in the first instance, to follow the history of the famine in Orissa from beginning to end, noticing generally, as we proceed, the condition of the rest of the country in so far only as it necessarily bears upon the course of things in Orissa, and leaving the particulars of the other districts affected to be noticed after Orissa.

Our account of the past will naturally divide itself, for the most part, into two main heads—the course of affairs till the time when Government took action in the matter on a large scale, that is in the end of May 1866, and the measures of relief then, and subsequently, taken.

17. The natural cause of the scarcity and famine may be simply stated to be the premature cessation of the rains of 1865, throughout the Lower Provinces of the Bengal Presidency, in the middle of September 1865. Speaking generally, it may be said that no rain of any consequence fell after the middle of that month. A portion of the Madras Coast to the south-west of Bengal was also similarly affected. The total quantity of the rain-fall for the year was not unusually small in most of the districts of Bengal, but it fell abnormally and out of time. Much rain fell early in the season before the usual time for sowing had arrived and when its continuance could not be depended on, while the latter rains, which are usually expected in the end of September and October, failed.

18. Speaking still in general terms of the countries on the northern coast of the Bay of Bengal, it may be said that the rains brought by the south-west monsoon commence earlier and fall in greater quantity and more regularly to

the east, and diminish both in quantity and still more in regularity towards the west, so that the eastern countries are altogether more humid than those to the west. Rice is the staple of all those countries. And the same crop which in the more humid districts of the east ripened in 1865 notwithstanding the unusually early cessation of the rains, was prematurely cut off in the drier and tardier districts of the west; the more so as it seems that in part of Orissa the total fall was much below the average, and the period from June to the middle of September was specially deficient prior to the total cessation of rain from the last-mentioned date.

19. It cannot be said that the country generally had suffered from decidedly short crops in previous years. The general impression seems to be that on an average of some years past the crops have not been very large in Bengal, and it is a question whether the great rise of prices which has taken place is in any degree due to a yield below the average, or whether it is solely owing to increased demand. That the latter cause had largely operated to enhance the price of grain, and in some degree to drain the country, is certain. Not only have the countries round the Bay of Bengal become of late years more and more the source of supply of rice to Asia and Australasia, but within India recent movements have greatly tended to increase the drain on those same countries. The increased cultivation of more valuable products in some provinces has caused them to draw largely for supplies of grain on others where grain had hitherto been comparatively cheap, and it may be said that the price of food grains has largely risen throughout India. Thus then it has happened that although cotton is little grown in Bengal, and the demand for jute may scarcely have affected to any dangerous extent the supply of rice, still prices have been continually becoming dearer and dearer. And although the wages of labor have also, in some degree, increased, especially in the Metropolitan districts, every thing is much regulated by custom in this country, and it can hardly be said that in most districts the rise in the price of labor has been equal to the rise in the price of grain. Hence the position of the man depending solely on money wages has by no means improved, and the class represented by such a man probably felt the effect of a season of failure at least as quickly as would have been the case in times when the country was not so far advanced.

The following table, obtained from the Board of Revenue, shows briefly the exports of the Lower Provinces of Bengal for last few years, and the price of rice in Calcutta :—

Years.	LOWER PROVINCES OF BENGAL.						Approximate average price of rice in Calcutta in each year.
	QUANTITY OF RICE AND PADDY EXPORTED IN MAUNDS.						
	Calcutta.		Out-ports.		Total.		
	Rice.	Paddy.	Rice.	Paddy.	Rice.	Paddy.	
1855-56	89,11,500	2,705	5,61,137	20,734	94,75,637	23,439	Rs. 1 2 3 p. md.
1856-57	89,08,088	18,795	7,58,506	48,865	96,66,594	67,660	" 1 13 6 "
1857-58	72,74,174	5,113	3,24,204	62,724	75,98,378	68,142	" 2 2 2 "
1858-59	43,80,998	1,113	1 23,066	4,712	45,03,764	5,825	" 2 7 0 "
1859-60	47,34,715	10,756	7,01,771	5,00,408	54,36,486	5,11,164	" 2 13 0 "
1860-61	75,27,556	4 112	5,08,939	3,51,197	80,36,495	3,55,909	" 2 3 2 "
1861-62	1,06,86,378	13,447	7,60,555	2,25,701	1,14,16,933	2,44,148	" 2 0 9 "
1862-63	1,14,87,707	6,518	11,02,566	2,28,929	1,25,90,273	2,35,447	" 2 2 0 "
1863-64	1,52,47,048	20,906	11,76,430	2,80,414	1,64,23,478	3,01,320	" 2 4 0 "
1864-65	1,75,55,250	23,710	16,31,272	2,41,150	1,91,86,522	2,64,860	" 2 15 10 "
1865-66	86,16,497	1,405	8,13,721	1,71,929	94,90,218	1,73,331	" 3 8 7 "
1866-67 up to February	46,37,147	3,685	6,01,880	39,645	52,39,027	43,330	" 4 7 7 "
Up to 12th March for Calcutta only	1,92,950	...	...	...	1,92,950	...	

N B.—The exports from the out-ports can only be given up to February 1863-67. For Calcutta they have been entered up to the latest date to which the returns have been made up, viz., 12th March 1867.

20. The result of the rice crops of the autumn of 1865 may be said in brief to have been as follows:—

In the eastern districts (beyond the Delta of the Ganges in that direction) material injury was not sustained. In the central districts of Bengal, that is the districts of the Delta and those to the north of the Ganges, although there was, on the whole, a very serious shortness of crop and consequent enhancement of price, and a good deal of alarm was experienced in several quarters, scarcity amounting to famine did not result, except in a comparatively minor degree and in a comparatively limited tract in what may be described as the most western section of the Delta, not far from Calcutta. This was chiefly in the Nuddea district. It lies in the midst of a rich and accessible country; timely and liberal measures of relief were adopted, and happily all considerable mortality was avoided.

21. The low lying alluvial portions of the districts to the west of the Hooghly escaped with comparative impunity. It was only in the still more western districts of Orissa and the higher parts of the western districts of Bengal, where the alluvium gives place to a laterite soil, that the full extremity of famine was reached.

22. The shortness of the crops and consequent scarcity extended to the north, beyond Bengal, into the province of Behar, and it is believed into part of the Benares province; in fact, it may be said to have reached the whole country of which rice is one of the main staples. But those last-mentioned countries lie beyond the scope of our immediate enquiry, and they are only here mentioned to show that the rice crops of Bengal could not be supplemented from thence.

23. Although the direct effect of the early cessation of the rains upon the crops of different districts was, as has been mentioned, very unequal, the circumstances were such that prices were equalised to a singular degree over a very wide range of country. Not only did Calcutta and the Metropolitan districts draw on the surplus produce of the eastern districts of Bengal, with which there is very easy water communication, but much of the export trade by sea is of a character which must be supplied from some source at whatever price. Sugar-planters of the Mauritius and coffee-growers of Ceylon and Bourbon must eat. The total cessation of export from Orissa and the enhanced prices in Bengal necessarily threw an increased demand on the eastern districts and on what are called the rice ports, the ports of British Burmah, of which rice is the staple trade. Prices, therefore, were so generally enhanced as greatly to curtail the relief afforded by the natural course of trade to the districts which had most suffered. In those districts which had yielded good or tolerable crops, the enhanced price, in giving an unusual profit to the agriculturist and throwing money into the country, enabled the community generally to absorb the labor of the non-agriculturists to such an extent that though they may have suffered they did not starve. But in the districts where the failure of crops had been greatest, although the cessation of export and scarcity of money at first prevented the rise, to the highest famine prices, of such stocks and crops as there were, prices, nevertheless, very rapidly reached a point, which, though not famine point in Calcutta, was really such in districts where rural cheapness of food had been hitherto combined with very low wages of labor; and the labor market being in no way relieved, the laboring and landless classes were very soon thrown out of employment and reduced to a state of extreme destitution.

24. To the west of Bengal the country rises and eventually merges into the hilly and jungly regions of Central India. Towards the south-west the line of hills soon takes a somewhat definite shape, and the whole range may then be described as forming a part of the system of the eastern ghats.

The flat alluvial country between the most northern section of these hills and the sea constitutes the regulation districts of Orissa.

25. Near Balasore (the head quarters of the most northern of the Orissa districts) the line of hills may be said to turn inland to the north, while the coast line runs thence nearly east. Within the hills the cultivation being at best scanty, jungle abundant, and means of irrigation easy, the hardy population suffered less than in the plains. But, between the proper hilly country and Bengal, lies a sort of intermediate tract, that already alluded to as the laterite portion of Western Bengal. This may be described as a partially raised and undulating country abounding in beds of laterite. The laterite soil is not unfertile, but it is dry, and the water easily runs off the undulating surface. The rains, too, of the west being more scanty than those of the east, the cultivation is precarious, and the whole of this tract suffered very severely in the famine. It comprises the greater part of the Orissa tributary mehals of Mohurbhunj and Nilgherry (the remainder of these mehals being more hilly); about half of the great district of Midnapore; a considerable portion of Bancoorah, or West Burdwan; and the Raneegunge country; most of the district of Maunbhoom, and part of that of Singbhoom in the Chota Nagpore division. The station of Balasore may be said to be on a kind of outlying spot of laterite soil, and the town of Midnapore is just on the edge of the laterite plateau, a low and fertile district extending to the sea on one side, while a dry jungly country touches the station on the other. This dry tract then,—extending from a point 10 or 15 miles north of Balasore all the way to the hills forming the higher plateaus of Chota Nagpore, and bounded by alluvial plains on one side, by a decidedly hilly country on the other,—may be described as that in which, taken as a whole, the famine reached an intensity second only to that in Orissa, and in some portions of which it reached a degree which may be compared with that suffered in Orissa.

26. The district of Beerbhoom to the north-east of this tract is also somewhat undulating and dry, but we are informed that most of the crop grown there is of an earlier description which was less affected by the failure of the latter rains. The railway, too, has given very large employment to the people, and altogether this district escaped with comparatively little suffering.

27. In the famine tract of the second degree, which we have just described, the scarcity did not, very early in the season, take the shape of enhancement of prices to a degree which seemed extraordinary when compared with those prevailing in other districts, but early in 1866 there was very extensive evidence of the existence of a poor class unable to buy, in the shape of plundering outbreaks of gangs of men in whom hunger had destroyed all respect for property. In fact in the spring of the year this country was disorganised by grain robberies which did not diminish, till the rains and the exhaustion of men and stocks caused such violent crime to subside from inanition. It has been necessary to mention so much in this place because the Balasore district lying near this tract (though itself of a very different character) was to a considerable degree affected by it, and in respect to its famine history had some analogy to it. In Balasore also prices were not high in the extreme in the first part of the season, but they soon became so, and the district was very early disorganised by plunder. This symptom, indeed, usually characterises the early period of famine in India. Starving people from the Mohurbhunj country also much contributed to swell the earliest crowds of emaciated wretches who assembled in the town and station of Balasore. In Southern Orissa the pressure of extreme high prices and extremity of suffering to certain classes came earlier, but there was not so early, or so extensive, a disorganisation from lawless plunder.

28. It has been mentioned that the low land, between the hilly country and the sea, forms what are called the regulation districts of Orissa. These are three in number,—Balasore, Cuttack, and Pooree, lying, in the order in which we have named them, from north-east to south-west. Nearly the whole of this tract is of an alluvial character, a flat rice country. The hills do not run down

to the sea as on some parts of the coast, although in some portion near Balasore the flat strip of country is of no very great breadth. The whole tract is intersected by a large number of streams crossing it in their passage from the hilly country to the sea. These are generally large water-courses; great torrents in the floods of the rains, broad sandy beds nearly dry during the dry seasons of the year. They obstruct intercourse greatly in both shapes, and little assist it, being scarcely navigable except in the lower parts of some of the larger rivers. In Central Orissa or Cuttack a large river, the Mahanuddee, though in some degree of the same character as those already mentioned, has brought down diluvium on a large scale and formed a very fine delta, to which some of the larger rivers immediately to the north have also contributed. It may be said then that from the town of Pooree (containing the great Temple of Juggernaut, conspicuous from the sea) to the Dhamrah River in the south of the Balasore district, there is a great Deltaic tract fully 50 miles broad, and which comprises nearly the whole of the Cuttack district (much the largest of the three), great part of that of Pooree, and a portion of that of Balasore.

29. The fall of rain in Orissa is much larger than that in many parts of India, and is generally sufficient for the successful cultivation of rice; but it is precarious, and the yield is subject to great variations according to the season. The province is also extremely subject to the opposite evil of inundations. The rivers are always liable to overflow to an extraordinary degree, causing more or less destruction according to the chances of each season. The sea also is an enemy, occasionally still more destructive. The low lands are embanked against it, but great storm waves have carried everything before them, and, especially in the Balasore district, have done frightful mischief.

30. The waters of the rivers had not been turned to any considerable account for purposes of irrigation, and excepting some petty water-supply obtained by the industry of the ryots of some particular sections of the country, these districts may be said to have been without any artificial irrigation whatever beyond that to be drawn in an unusual crisis of drought from natural water-courses and the petty tanks and water lodgments of the country. They depended almost solely on the supply of rain from above.

31. The province of Orissa comprises, in addition to the low districts just described, an enormous tract of the hilly country of the interior, the population of which is partly Ooryah and partly aboriginal; but this latter portion is not directly administered under the ordinary British law. It is what is called "non-regulation" and under Chiefs exercising hereditary jurisdiction in subordination to the Commissioner of the division. Among these tributary mehals are those of Mohurbhunj and Nilgherry already alluded to.

32. The whole province is geographically isolated to an excessive degree. To the north-west and west the hilly tracts merge into countries still more hilly, wild, and inaccessible, by which they are separated effectually from Central and Northern India. There is only a precarious traffic with Sumbulpore by boats of a peculiar construction which navigate the difficult river Mahanuddee in the rainy season and for a month or two after; for the rest of the year this communication is closed. On the other side, the nature of the coast and the sea is such as effectually to stop all Native traffic for the major part of the year, while during the remaining four or five months the traffic, such as it is, is conducted in rude and barbarous vessels which have deteriorated from the model of an ancient age of European adventure, but which are capable of crossing the shallow bars and entering the narrow rivers. In fact but few of these rivers are capable of so much use, and they are all inaccessible to the ordinary class of modern European vessels. For these latter, with one exception, there is no protected anchorage of any kind, and the one exception (False Point—a place of great importance in our narrative—) may be said to be in some sense almost a recent discovery. It does not afford any inlet to the interior for Native sea-going vessels, while the anchorage is so many miles from any landing place,

and so far from any civilised and populated part of the country, that without very special appliances prepared beforehand it is of little use. At any other point of the coast large vessels must lie in the open roads. It may be here mentioned, however, that one of the rivers of Orissa—the Dhamrah—has proved to be capable of receiving vessels drawing 12 to 14 feet of water, even at the worst season of the year, provided they enter with the aid of steam, and that the old river harbor of Balasore (very early frequented by European mariners) can similarly receive vessels drawing 8 to 9 feet. Steam, however, had not been available, and practically these harbors were only used by Native craft in the fine weather. The traffic of Balasore so carried on seems to have been still considerable; in the other districts it was very small.

33. Such being the difficulties on either side of the length of Orissa, the only ordinary mode of communication with the outside world is by the route traversing its length. That, however, is so much intersected by the streams already mentioned, and has been hitherto so little rendered practicable by art, that it is comparatively little used by wheeled carriages; pack bullocks still predominate at all times; in the rainy season wheeled traffic is quite impracticable; and when the rains are heavy, even pack bullocks cannot be used. At this day the European officer who cannot obtain a special steamer must find his way into Orissa slowly and tediously, as ancient officers may have travelled in the days of Asoka, and the very post takes several days between Calcutta and Cuttack.

34. The people of Orissa are also separate and distinct, of a character and language peculiar to themselves. Their personal character has been a subject of much discussion during our enquiry, and opinions are much divided about it. The Ooryahs are, we should say, physically somewhat larger-boned and not so slight looking as the average Bengalee, though they would be at a disadvantage compared with other Indian races. Their features are, on the whole, good, and both features and language indicate that they are to a great degree Aryan in race. Most of them are very Hindu in religion and have much caste prejudice. The truth respecting their character is probably to be found between the two extremes of opinion. They seem to be certainly less quick and pushing than the Bengalees, and the higher classes have had much less education, it may almost be said no education; in fact they are altogether more Boeotian. On the other hand, we do not see reason to believe that they are in their own way less industrious; they have a certain intelligence of their own, and are thought to be less skilled in fraud and in some respects more reliable. They come freely to Calcutta for service, and may be said to bear a good character there. In short those who are accustomed to them and have become habituated to their obstinate and prejudiced ways generally like them; those who are not accustomed to them cannot endure them. The well known Ooryah bearer, so common in the European domestic service of Lower Bengal, is probably a very fair type of his countrymen.

35. The ethnological province of the Ooryahs somewhat exceeds the present political boundaries, and it is a singular fatality that the most intense famine tract seems to have been nearly that of this unlucky race. They extend into a considerable part of the Ganjam district of Madras, and it was the Ooryah portion of that district that was so severely affected. On the other side the only part of the low lying portion of the Midnapore district which suffered greatly is more Ooryah than Bengalee. We think, however, that the distinction in this respect between Bengalee and Ooryah land is due to nature and geographical position, not to race. To the Telengahs, their neighbours to the south, they are reputed to be inferior, but we are informed that in the Ganjam district, their greater suffering cannot be in any degree attributed to this inferiority. We shall have occasion to notice, however, as one of the causes which increased the severity of the famine, the absence among the Ooryahs of any energetic trading class such as we have both in Northern and Southern India. The want is, to a great degree, common to Orissa and Bengal

36. The proper province of Orissa is about 200 miles long; the country of the Ooryah people may be said to have a length of about 250 miles.

The following is the area of the districts of the Orissa provinces:—

Pooree	...	...	...	2,697 square miles.
Cuttack	...	...	...	3,062 ditto.
Balasore	...	...	...	1,890 ditto.

The area of the tributary mehals is about 15,000 square miles.

The following is all that is known regarding the population as reported to us by the Commissioner.

At the time of settlement, the population of two regulation districts was put down as follows:—

Pooree	...	...	...	500,963
Cuttack	...	...	...	553,673

As respects this survey estimate, the numbers for Cuttack seem far too small in proportion to its larger area, and it should be observed that a large portion of this district was not settled, and is therefore, no doubt, excluded from the computation. A subsequent rough census was made of all the districts by the Police in 1854-55 by counting houses and taking an average of persons in each house. The result was—

Pooree	...	...	...	613,536
Cuttack	...	...	...	1,293,664
Balasore	...	...	...	494,056

On this occasion the Cuttack estimate seems to be somewhat disproportionately high. In his recent report of 1st November 1865, Mr. Ravenshaw says that the Balasore population has since been estimated at 800,000. Perhaps this is a clerical error, but seeing the large productive power of that district as evidenced by the export of about 30,000 tons of rice in the year before the famine, the previous estimate does seem low.

Altogether, speaking very roughly, and allowing for increase of population in the ten prosperous years, 1854-55 to 1864-65, we may estimate the population of the three districts to have been, before the famine, above $2\frac{1}{2}$ or perhaps not far short of 3 millions. As respects the population of the tributary mehals nothing in the least degree reliable is known.

37. In all this part of India, there is but one monsoon. Where, however, the early rice can be sown or planted with the first rain, it ripens before the end of the season, and there is, therefore, room for a succession of sowings, so that the whole crop does not come to maturity at the same time. It, for the most part, divides itself into two—the minor early crop which ripens in August and September (principally grown on the higher lands), and the major or late crop which ripens in December. In Orissa the early crop is called Beallee, the later Sarud, while in Bengal one is called Aaos, and the other Amun. In Orissa the early or Beallee bears an extremely small proportion to the late Sarud crop. What are called the cold weather crops, the grains and seeds of temperate climates grown after the rains, are extremely scanty in that climate, and a small rice crop, called the Dalua, grown at that time, in places where water lies, is also very scanty and depends on late rains. Hence, in most parts of the province almost the whole food of the season is grown in the one December rice crop. The country seems to be sufficiently well fitted for cotton and sugar-cane, and both these staples are grown to some extent, but not so much as to furnish any large exports. Rice is in every way the main staple of the province.

The climate in some respects approximates to that of the south. Cotton, for instance, is sometimes grown in the summer, to reap in the autumn, as in Northern India; sometimes in the cold season to reap in the spring as in the south.

38. That Orissa is a very ancient Hindoo country, its monuments testify, and it is known in comparatively modern times to have flourished under Hindoo rules.

Notwithstanding its subsequent conquest by the Mahomedans and the introduction of many Mahomedan terms in substitution for old Hindoo words, stronger traces of Hindoo institutions seem to have come down to our time than in many other provinces, and especially much more than in Bengal. The old district and village-hereditary offices and the tenures of land as they are described in the early days of our rule, seem more to resemble those of Western India than those of this presidency, and perhaps it is so all the more since after a period of Mogul and Pathan (or Affghan) rule, the province was for some 50 years subject to the Mahrattas of Berar.

39. It had no doubt been much harried and broken by many vicissitudes when it came into British hands in the beginning of the present century, and as usual, under such circumstances, many semi-independent chiefs had sprung up. The country was then divided into the Mogulbundee or Mogul-settled districts, and the Gurjats or Killajats, that is the territories held by the chiefs, possessors of gurlis or forts, who paid a sort of quit-rent. The latter comprised, first, the hill country, and, second, the jungly country near the mouths of the great rivers. All the chiefs seem to have become British subjects, but the hill tracts were left to them on the old terms, being by law exempted from the ordinary regulations. The chiefships of the low lands have been annexed to the Regulation districts, but the chiefs have remained in possession of the land revenue, subject to the quit-rent, being placed in fact in the position of zemindars at a low permanent assessment. The rule of primogeniture which attaches to offices and chief-ships has also been continued to them.

40. In the Mogulbundee also there were some chiefs and rajahs and others in the capacity of hereditary zemindars; where there were not, the headmen of villages were dealt with; and the province being attached to Bengal, the usual Bengal system was followed of recognising a proprietary right in the person who dealt directly with Government, with a general reservation of all subordinate rights. The latter rights, however, not being recorded, and the judicial machinery not being in those early days sufficient to reach them, the usual result followed, that the man whose right was definite held a stronger position than his whose rights were indefinite, and the inferior ryot-holders were very generally much rack-rented.

41. Of the original zemindarees, some have survived to the present day; a few have lapsed to Government, owing to rebellion and other causes. Of these latter, the most important was the greatest zemindaree in Orissa, that of Khoorda, held by the representative of the ancient rajahs of the province. His mismanagement seems to have created a rebellion of the people of the most serious character, which finally led to his expulsion, and the estate, with some others, is still held in direct possession, or "*khas*," as in some sense the property of Government. In fact Government have all along refused to recognise in these estates subordinate proprietary rights. It has even been proposed to sell the superior estates; but rights or claims, such as have been recognised elsewhere, do practically exist to such a degree that the late Commissioner, Mr. Shore, reported that to turn out the claimants would simply cause a rebellion, and indeed settlements have been made with the ryots and heads of villages under which Khoorda seems to have attained a prosperity unknown in any other part of the province.

42. As respects the remainder of the Mogulbundee, it seems to have been admitted that the early management had been unfortunate, but a settlement of revenue and rights was made 30 years ago for a term which is now about to expire, the quit-rent estates being excluded from its operation: this settlement is that to which allusion has already been made. Perhaps, more than any settlement which has ever been made in India, it stereotyped the rights of all classes, high and low, as they actually existed. First a settlement was made with each Thane,* sthane, or standing ryot (corresponding to

* Thane, more properly "Sthane," may be rendered without translation, "standing," coming from the old Sanscrit word "sthan," a fixed place, and being identical with "sto" "stand," and other forms expressing the same idea.

the "Meerasedar" of Western and Southern India); then a contract was given to the village headman (where, as is generally the case, a hereditary headman existed) for the gross village rents; and finally, where there was a superior zemindar, he had a contract for the gross rents of his district or pergunnah. Where there was only one holder above the ryot, he received the whole of the regulated margin of profit, whether he was the large zemindar, or the headman called by that title; where there were the two grades of holders, the profit was divided between them. All the future profit to be derived from increase of the rents of the non-proprietary ryots and extension of cultivation during the term of settlement was left to the contractors in their degree.

43. In a few instances the persons entitled to the superior contracts declined the responsibility, preferring to receive the percentage reserved as the right of proprietors so declining, and these latter estates, together with those already mentioned as having lapsed to Government, constitute the "khas" mehals frequently alluded to in the correspondence annexed to our report. In fact, however, these bore but a small proportion to the whole area, and settlement being almost invariably made with some contracting sub-holder, there was scarcely any case in which the Government received the rents direct from the ryots, although the settlement was in its nature to a great degree ryotwar.

44. The record of rights made at the settlement seems to have given great satisfaction to all parties, and the apportionment of the assessment appears also to have been good according to the ideas of those days. At the same time we think it must be considered that it was not very light according to modern ideas. As respects the holdings of the Thanees ryots, although their assessments were in some sense reduced or equalised, the truth seems to be that many of them had been really paying more than the value of their assessable lands. It appears that they were possessed of an extraordinary number of rent-free plots; that they had also the sites of their houses and gardens rent-free, and other privileges. They had also, of course, the best lands of the village. And the superior holders, unable to deprive them of their privileges but possessed of a general power of screwing (little restrained in those days), had in Native fashion made up for what they lost in one way by raising the payments on the assessable land. Under the regular settlement the rent-free holdings were scrutinised, and many of them resumed, while the assessment on the remaining land was equalised; but the result was, it may be feared, to leave it little short of a rack rent. The margin of profit seems to have been generally very small.

45. As respects, again, the superior holders from Government, the rule of those days was not the liberal one of half assets only to Government, but two-thirds to Government and one-third for profit and expenses to the zemindar. At different periods of the settlement this margin was variously fixed at from 30 to 40 per cent. There seems, however, to be some doubt whether in a province so peculiarly subject to vicissitudes of season this was a sufficient margin to cover the risks of the most exposed estates in the hands of poor and improvident zemindars. It is no part of such a settlement that remissions should from time to time be granted; on the contrary, the object is to secure a uniform payment for a long period, although, on occurrence of very great calamities, some remission may be granted as a favor and not as a right, and in fact to preserve the country from ruin; just as an English landlord may on such occasions give remissions to his tenants. In Orissa the settlement made no provision for remissions, but in practice they were, during the earlier part of its course, granted to a very large extent, and though they have since been much contracted, they have continued to be a good deal more than nominal. They have been granted both for drought and inundation, but chiefly for the latter. Mr. Moffat Mills, a very great authority in Orissa revenue matters, and no doubt partial to the Ooryahs, stated publicly in a report of great weight that the claim to remissions on such occasions, though not expressed, was implied in the settlement, and that report, having been published by Government, may be considered to have been substantially accepted. So late

as 1865 the Board of Revenue laid down the principle that remissions were to be restricted to occasions of general calamity, with the further restriction that enquiry was not to be made on the subject without their previous sanction.

The practical result has been that the zemindars are always avid of remissions, and in the absence of any sufficient revenue machinery, there is a constant struggle between zemindars asserting extreme losses and Government officers distrusting their assertions (generally with reason); while the truth can only be ascertained by special enquiry.

46. The settlement being such as has been described, the country enjoyed great general peace and contentment under it; but the rents of the ryots being, as has been said, high, the zemindars naturally improvident and unenterprising, an active trading class wanting, and the province isolated, wealth did not for some time rapidly accumulate. Grain was cheap and generally abundant, but wages were very low, and the condition of the people rather tolerable than good.

47. Within the last few years, however, since the price of grain has increased throughout India, there has been a decided improvement in the position of the agricultural classes in Orissa. Although the people themselves have not undertaken any large mercantile operations, their surplus grain has been sought by others. The energetic Telingah "Koomtees" of the Madras territory have scoured the country to buy up the grain, and an enterprising French house (Messrs. Robert, Charriol, and Company) have exported largely by way of False Point. The land has acquired a value unknown before, and the province seemed to be entering on a decided course of advancement when the late great calamity came upon it. The following Table shows the export of grain by sea during recent years:—

Export of Rice and Paddy from the Districts of Orissa, in maunds of 80 lbs., 1855-56 to 1865-66.

YEARS.	BALASORE.	CUTTACK.	POOREE.	TOTAL.
1855-56	142,616			142,616
1856-57	188,658			188,658
1857-58	34,232			34,232
1858-59	52,970			52,970
1859-60	536,382			536,382
1860-61	354,074	23,044	83,936	461,054
1861-62	327,504	69,880	46,780	444,164
1862-63	407,622	36,696	4,816	449,134
1863-64	520,052	29,464		549,516
1864-65	806,576	72,128	58,824	937,528
May to July 1865 ...	39,871	21,962		61,833
August to October 1865	8,894			8,894
November 1865 to January 1866	20,606	220		20,826
February to April 1866...		40		40

There has also been a considerable export by land from Southern Orissa to the Madras district of Ganjam and Port of Gopalpore, of which we have no statistics; and Northern Balasore has, when the season favored, exported to Midnapore, Hidgellee, and Calcutta.

Still it may be generally stated that, though rice has of late years borne a good price in Orissa as compared with former excessive cheapness, it remained cheap as compared with most other provinces up to the end of the year 1864.

48. As usually happens under our system, there has been from the first a large transfer by sale of zemindaree rights, and the purchasers have been almost universally monied men of the older-settled and richer province of Bengal with whom the purchase of landed rights is the favorite form of investment. The result is that the zemindars are now divided into two classes, the old Ooryah zemindars and Bengalee purchasers, the latter being almost always absentees. A very unfavorable opinion respecting both classes has been freely expressed throughout our enquiry. But the truth seems to be that they are not much worse than the circumstances of the province might have led us to expect in India, where agricultural development and the investment of capital in improving the soil have never been generally recognised as a function of the superior landholder. The old zemindars as being resident are described as, on the whole, the better class of the two. They are generally neither rich nor provident, and they never think of improving the land, but many of them have been in the habit of storing grain, and have, to some extent, performed the function of the much abused but very necessary *bunneah* of other parts of India (so wanting, it has been said, in Orissa) by advancing grain to the ryots though on exorbitant interest at the time when they are most in want of it. They seem frequently to have as kindly a feeling towards the ryots as is consistent with making as much as possible out of them. The absentee proprietors, on the other hand, though probably personally a much superior and generally an educated class, have as little idea of practical improvement of the soil, look only to make the most of the rents as the return for their money, and do not perform to the same extent either the function of grain lenders or that of patriarchal landholders. Yet the Bengalees in their own country do not seem to be generally very oppressive landlords; they are generally content to let things be regulated by custom.

49. It should here be noticed that the Government manufacture of salt had long been carried on upon the coasts of Orissa and gave employment to a large number of people. It was found, however, not to be really profitable—the cost of the salt was greater than of that made on the Madras coast, and imported salt was driving it out of the market. Finally, the Government manufacture was wholly discontinued in the early part of 1863. There only remained considerable stores of the salt previously manufactured, of which it was proposed gradually to get rid. The Molunghees or salt manufacturers do not seem to have depended quite exclusively on their salt earnings. Like most people in India, not inhabitants of towns, they were also more or less agricultural, but their holdings had not been sufficient to support them—the wages of their labor was their main reliance. Still the rise in the value of grain, and consequent agricultural prosperity, seem to have led to their absorption in the general community so long as the seasons were favorable, and they had apparently merged in the mass without very serious complaint. The effect, however, was, in the parts of the country in which they resided, to increase the class of agricultural laborers whom any derangement would throw out of employ and out of food.

50. That class seems to have been somewhat large in Orissa generally. Some went to a distance to seek employment on great works and in Calcutta, and they every where did the ordinary work of coolie laborers, but they may be principally described as agricultural laborers. Many of them had small patches of land, but not enough for their subsistence, and they chiefly depended on working for others. As upon this class the utmost severity of the calamity has

part of this district, lying comparatively inland, was not so much affected by the general export drain, and grain was both cheaper and probably more abundant before the famine than in the other districts.

In Balasore the amount of exportation seems conclusively to show that the crop of 1864 must have been very good, as is indeed stated by the Collector.

The amount of rice exported by sea from that district in the year 1864-65 may be in fact described as enormous, being about 800,000 maunds or about 30,000 tons.

55. The demand for exportation, generally, may be said to have reached its utmost height in the early part of 1865.

56. In 1865 the rain-fall in Pooree had been very deficient even before September, as the following table shows. We do not know how far the return of the rain-fall is to be depended on, and it certainly shows some immense inequalities, but, as a register has been kept for at least 15 years, we cannot think it altogether unreliable.

Pooree Rain-fall.

Average rain-fall for the year about ...	...	...	60 to 65 inches.
Fall of 1864 about	...	...	41.8 "
" 1865 "	...	...	36.3 "
" 1866 "	...	...	77.2 "

					Average fall in inches of the 13 years preceding 1865.	Fall in 1865.
May	...	...	...	...	2.1	13.
June	...	...	...	...	9.2	5.6
July	...	...	...	...	12.2	4.3
August	...	...	...	...	17.3	5.6
September	...	...	...	...	16.8	5.2
October	...	...	...	...	9.4	0.0
November	...	...	...	...	1.8	0.0

It will be seen that while there was a wholly abnormal, and comparatively useless, fall of 13 inches in May, the total registered fall of the usual rain months, June to September, is 20.7 inches, or an average of about 5 inches per mensem. This seems alone enough to cause an extreme failure in a hot rice country, even without looking to the subsequent entire absence of rain in October; and accordingly we find that in September, before there was any alarm whatever in the country generally, the Pooree rate is given at what may in fact be said to have been (in Orissa) already a famine price, *viz.*, 13½ Calcutta seers per rupee.

fallen, it may be well to mention (with reference to much of the evidence regarding the modes of relief) that they are generally of the lowest castes who would be least affected by caste prejudices.

51. Another kind of retrospect it is necessary briefly to make. Historical records show that Orissa has at various times suffered from terrible famines. Great famines are said to have occurred in the 14th, 15th and 16th centuries of our era, in the reigns of Raja Kahil Indro Deo, Raja Rai Ooryah, and Raja Pertab Muda Deo. The great famine in Bengal of 1770 was felt grievously in Orissa, and a few years later in 1774-75, another great scarcity is stated to have occurred. But it is important to bear in mind that none of a general character and at the same time of the most extreme severity had happened in the present century. The last great famine, of the traditions of which the old men speak, was in the Native year 1200, corresponding to A. D. 1792-93, in the time of the Mahrattas; and even of that the memory seems to have almost faded away.

52. The most intense calamity of the present century seems to have been the inundations of the sea on the Balasore coast in 1831-32, and the area of that disaster was of course limited. As respects the floods of the rivers, there is a very extensive system of embankments, maintained, partly by Government, and, partly by the zemindars, but it seems to be formed on no uniform or efficient plan, and has never been wholly effectual in great floods. Hence great injuries from inundations have been common. These are necessarily, for the most part, confined to comparatively limited tracts, the people of which may be said to be in some degree habituated to them, and general famine has not resulted. That can only be caused by drought, and drought of the most severe character the last two or three generations had been fortunate enough to escape, although it has occasionally caused great losses, and no doubt much poverty and suffering, and has been the occasion of large remissions of revenue. It may be said that for upwards of 20 years before 1865, the province generally had not suffered from calamities of season to any very unusual extent.

53. The result has been that a great famine of the most intense and desolating character was not a thing distinctly present to the minds of the people of the present day. It was something that they did not realize, and hence it happened that when a great calamity was coming on them, although many talked vaguely of famine, and all of want and suffering, there was not that clear and universal perception of the nature and degree of that which was before them, which in countries where such things are comparatively recent and well known would have forced the subject on the attention of any administration. The people cried loudly that grain was not to be had, and that when procurable it was getting dearer, and dearer beyond all precedent and beyond all means of the poor, and that something must be done; but what was coming or what should be done, of that most of them had no definite idea.

54. The statements made to us regarding the crops of the year previous to the famine are rather vague; but looking to the prices in the early part of 1864, we should judge that the crops of 1863 were not below an average in any district of Orissa.

The following is what we have been able to gather respecting the season of 1864, immediately preceding the fatal season of 1865.

All the testimony seems to show that in the autumn of that year the crop in Pooree was considerably below the average, and the price lists bear out that statement, the price rising instead of falling as the crop matured. The increased general demand at that time may have in some degree aided the rise. Rice which in July 1864 was at 35 seers per rupee, in July 1865 was at 18½.

In the Cuttack district the prices seem to show that the crop of 1864 had been by no means bad, and so late as August 1865 purchases were made by Agent of the French house at 30 to 35 seers per rupee. In fact, the greater

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in the parts of the country which we have seen. It cannot be there said that one-fourth of the land has generally ceased to be cultivated, nor probably that one-fourth of the families have ceased to exist. But, on the other hand, the mortality has undoubtedly been so great among the old and the young of so many families which have escaped total destruction, and in so many parts the great mass of the proper laboring population (as distinguished from farming ryots) seems to have been really so much swept from the face of the earth, that we cannot take on ourselves to say that the estimate of one-fourth is too high, even in parts which have not suffered much from the floods of 1866.

70. We have not yet been able to obtain any details of the great famine in Bengal of 1770; but comparing the recent famine with anything which is known to have occurred in India in the present century, we incline to the opinion that this in Orissa has been, while it lasted, the most intense. By far the severest Indian famine which is widely and well known, and probably in truth quite the severest of the century till the present, is that in the North-Western Provinces in 1837-38, and that may therefore be taken as the standard of comparison. It was spread over a wider surface; the natural calamity was probably greater; the injury to the agricultural community more severe, and the fiscal effect more lasting; but the people had much greater facilities of emigration, and especially there were very much greater facilities of importation of grain, and an energetic trading class to avail themselves of those facilities. The famine in Orissa stands almost alone in this, that there was (till a comparatively late period of its history) almost no importation, and the people, shut up in a narrow province between pathless jungles and an impracticable sea, were in the condition of passengers in a ship without provisions. Things came to that pass that money was spurned as worthless. Prices were constantly merely nominal; where rice was to be bought at all, it reached the rate of 5, 4, and even 3 Calcutta seers (of 2lbs each) per rupee at the chief stations where the external relief afforded was greatest, and in the interior of the districts still higher rates are reported, even to 1 seer per rupee. These rates are far beyond those known in any famine in this century of which we have information.

71. The famine of 1837-38 is so well known an event that it is singular how little connected account of it is to be found, as may be judged from the references to it in Colonel Baird Smith's report. That it was very terrible there can be no doubt; the famished people seem to have wandered far in a most miserable state, and it lives in men's minds in most painful characters. But a very large proportion of the sufferers seem to have dragged on their existence to die of disease the following year, which is said in that shape to have been almost more fatal than that of the actual famine. In Orissa the work of destruction seems to have been more speedy. The more rapid course of the calamity sooner eventuated in death or life, and while, as we believe, a larger proportion died in a few months, we found that in December and January last the mass of the surviving population of the country visited by us seemed to be already in comparatively good case and free from remarkable disease, if we except small-pox, which is hardly a famine disease. During the famine people seem to have survived for a time as living skeletons reduced to a state which would have been impossible in a colder climate; but we fear that almost all these unhappy people died at last, and that of the poor creatures whom we saw still maintained at the relief centres, and whom we may call the residua of the famine, many will never really recover.

72. Colonel Smith's information regarding the famine of 1837-38 was avowedly very incomplete, and even allowing for the difference in the general scale of prices in these days, it seems now hard to imagine such severity of suffering if prices were never and nowhere dearer than those mentioned by him. Yet he says that after careful enquiry, he had not been able to ascertain that in any instance the price of wheat rose higher than $11\frac{1}{2}$ seers per rupee. The ordinary price of wheat in the 12 years preceding that famine seems, from

Colonel Smith's tables, to have averaged at Agra about 30 seers per rupee. It was cheaper to the north, dearer to the south-east; and 30 seers may be taken to have been about the average of the country. In Orissa the average price of rice, as shown in returns for each district (ranging over 4 to 7 years immediately preceding the famine) which we have obtained from the Commissioner, may be taken to have been about—Pooree, 32 seers per rupee; Cuttack, 34 seers; Balasore, 32 seers; or for the whole province say about 32 to 33 seers;* so that it is evident that in Orissa in 1866, the pressure of prices both actual and comparative was very much more severe than in the North-Western Provinces in 1837-38. On the other hand, a fixed and good settlement, the receipts in payment of grain exported, and the absence of any widely extended succession of bad years, had probably made money more abundant in Orissa. Colonel Smith mentions that the daily burials by the Police at Agra were at one time reported to average nearly 400, which is greater than at any station in Orissa, the largest number of bodies disposed of by the Police at Balasore in any one day being 245; but Agra is a much larger place; it was the centre of a much larger country, the metropolis, not only of the country, but as it were of the famine, to which people flocked from all quarters, upwards of 80,000 working paupers being maintained from public funds at that one station alone; and the means of the Police at Balasore were unable to reach the bodies of those who died in the fields and bye-ways; many skeletons in fact lie there to this day. The order, quoted by Colonel Smith, from the books of the station of Cawnpore (also one of the worst places in 1837-38), directing the hire of a boat and small establishment to remove the bodies, seems hardly to equal the exigencies which occurred in Orissa.†

* The Cuttack prices given by the Commissioner are stated to be exact, being taken from account of actual purchases made by the French merchants in the years preceding the famine. Probably they may have purchased at the times and places most advantageous to themselves, but, at any rate, it seems clear that even after the enhancement of recent years the rate of rice in Orissa did not average less than 30 seers per rupee, and was generally cheaper.

† Since this was written, we have obtained, by the kindness of a private gentleman, a report of the Agra Local Relief Committee for the months of April and May 1838, probably nearly the worst period of the famine at that station. The following extracts will give some idea of the state of things. The last paragraph extracted shows that there was no difficulty in buying flour to those who had the money to buy. And the numbers employed on public labor at a single station shows the immense scale of the relief given by Government:—

“From its position and the early measures of relief which were adopted, Agra became one of the chief, if not the principal resort of the famishing population of these provinces.

“The abstract of the two months gives the following result:—

Total admitted in April and May into the hospital department of the Asylum	8,082
Sent to hospital direct	622
Discharged or left the Asylum	2,814
Died	3,049
Remaining on 1st May 581	
Ditto 1st June 1,016	1,597

“But the benefits of the Asylum have not been restricted to these 8,082 cases alone; they form only a small portion of the total number relieved, and the Society, beg attention to the following abstract statement, showing the numbers of persons of all classes who have applied to and been relieved at the Asylum during the months of April and May—

	April.	May.
Purdsoes	57,029	63,905
Laborers	2,962	6,485
Blind, lame, and infirm receiving rations	6,563	11,057
Sick as per above statement	1,076	7,006
Or a daily average	67,630	88,453
	2,254	2,884

“To enable a comparison to be made between the number relieved at the Asylum, and the total of destitute who have flocked to Agra during the months of April and May, the Society have obtained from official records the returns of paupers employed on public labor on the following dates:—

	April.	May.
1st	55,390	77,993
8th	62,142	85,979
15th	66,575	81,833
22nd	71,702	81,718
		31st 72,175

“The Society regret to state that for several months past sickness has been very general in and about Agra, and that the mortality has advanced steadily from 121 on the 15th April to 173 on the 30th idem, and has ranged at an

73. The famine in the North-Western Provinces in 1861 cannot be compared in respect of the intensity which it actually reached with either of those which we have been contrasting. Colonel Smith indeed supposes the natural calamity in 1860 to have been nearly as great as in 1837-38, although he does not estimate the failure of the crops in 1860-61 to have been by any means absolute, and total throughout the distressed country. The high prices which occurred in 1860-61 in the early part of the season were relieved by enormous and most energetic private importations. The gentleman who was then Commissioner of Delhi tells the President that the grand trunk road was said to have been worn out in 15 days by the enormous use of it, and the President himself saw the railway stations between Allahabad and Cawnpore blocked up with grain awaiting transport, and every cart, bullock, camel, donkey, in short every means of conveyance available in the country in active use to transport grain from Oude. Public works were early undertaken on a great scale under special arrangement to make them expressly available to the starving, and public subscriptions flowed in with such liberality that the overplus remained of which so valuable use was made in the famine on which we now report.

74. A most important lesson is, we think, distinctly to be learned from the study of Colonel Smith's report. We are not quite sure whether, in estimating the losses he takes fully into account the great destruction of the inferior grains of the rainy season, which depend solely on rain, or chiefly refers to the subsequent crop of which he saw the failure before him—the wheat and other main staples, a great portion of which is always kept alive by artificial irrigation; but his estimates seem to show that in his opinion the failure, taking broadly the whole of the distressed districts, did not exceed that which was from the first admitted in the most sanguine estimates to have occurred in Orissa in 1865, viz., half the produce. He specifically states the loss in several of the bad districts at about 4-10ths; in some it was more, in some it is estimated to have been less. The famine country of 1861 is, generally speaking, a grain-producing country; with the exception of a good deal of cotton in some portions of it (and the cotton cultivation had not then been abnormally extended), food grains may be said to be the main staple throughout, and in good years there must no doubt be a large surplus produce. Particular estimates apart, it is plain that the failure of the produce of the whole tract was not complete—that there was in parts (good and bad being intermixed) a very considerable yield. Yet it is abundantly evident that if there had been no importations and no relief works, the famine would have been frightful and very fatal. It may be assumed then as the result of Colonel Smith's enquiry that in the ordinary modern condition of things in India, something much short of the entire and absolute failure of the whole crops of a year in any province will suffice to produce that state of extreme famine when food is scarcely to be had for money, if the market be not relieved by importation from provinces more abundantly supplied. Still more will this be the case when either by previous short crops, or by exportation, or both, the stocks have been already reduced below average; and as respects a famine caused by absence of grain as distinguished from one caused by absence of money, the effect of previous short crops and of exportation is much the same. Modern enterprise and means of communication, in relieving countries insufficiently supplied, drain those in which grain is more abundant to an extent which probably did not

average of about 227 per diem in May; happily disease has not assumed a contagious form: cholera for a time raged destructively, latterly fevers with rapid cerebral affection, the causes of this in some cases producing coup de soleil, also dysenteric disease, have proved most fatal.”

“To no particular cause can be assigned the peculiar degree of unhealthiness which has this year been apparent at Agra beyond the very oppressive heat which has been experienced, and the extraordinary state of the atmosphere. The impossibility of restraining the Natives from devouring unripe fruits, green mangoes, melons, &c., prevents the adaptations of measures of medical treatment with that precision and success which might be expected in more controllable patients. The emaciated starving pauper may be seen at any moment expending his pittance in the purchase of a slice of melon, rather than in buying atta (flour) which would sustain him. To prevent this and to ensure to him wholesome food, the only remedy would be the substitution of rations for pice, but this the Society cannot venture to undertake until at least the amount of paupers falls down to some manageable number. The subject is one which continues to occupy much of their attention.”

occur in the old days of Native hoarding. In fact, in India, where famines have generally been present to the memories and traditions of the people, the want of means of communication was much counteracted by the disposition to hoard largely the grain for which little could be got in years of abundance. An unhappy combination of circumstances which renders exportation in time of abundance large, but brings no importation in time of want, produces such terrible calamity as has just occurred in Orissa.

75. We think it quite impossible to distinguish between the mortality directly caused by starvation, and that due to disease, directly or indirectly, connected with starvation, want, and bad food. Not only do our remarks regarding the want of statistics apply to this subject also, but in truth want and disease run so much into one another that no statistics and no observations would suffice to draw an accurate line. The death of the emaciated and exhausted from cold, exposure and bowel diseases, either before receiving or upon receiving food (the last is a very common form), may in fact be considered the direct result of starvation. The principal disease of a destructive character, in respect to which it is often impossible to say whether it has been caused by want, is cholera. We believe we are correct in saying that, even where there is no epidemic cholera very generally spread, it has constantly happened that the famine-stricken have been carried off by that disease, or by something presenting similar appearances. It is also certain that, independent of famine, cholera prevails in Orissa in the early part of almost every year. The Juggernath Temple seems to be a focus from which it constantly spreads. And, in the early part of the famine, it was undoubtedly difficult to distinguish between two causes of death—cholera and starvation—which in fact we find in the early reports to be generally coupled together. The truth we take to be simply this, that the ordinary out-bursts of cholera were aggravated and extended by want and bad food. The first effect of the scarcity, universally, was to drive the people to subsist on unusual and unwholesome food, jungle roots, and such like, and we find that cholera constantly accompanied want. We have it first in the districts of Southern Pooree, where excessive want first appeared; then about Pooree itself and Gope; and later in the eastern portions of Cuttack. At Balasore also it appeared at the same time as starvation. It depended very much on the idiosyncrasy of the narrator whether the mortality was ascribed to cholera, or to want, or to both; and as in ordinary times cholera is sometimes called by milder names, so starvation may sometimes have passed for cholera. The presence of cholera seems at any rate to have had a material effect in rendering less palpable and undeniable the whole effect of want in the early stages of the famine, but was certainly to a great degree the result of want. We have heard comparatively little of fever during our enquiry.

76. Cholera is, of course, more impartial in its blows than simple want, making less distinction between rich and poor, and where the want among the poor had aggravated the epidemic into a great intensity, the classes a degree better off also on many occasions suffered severely from the disease, especially those in what may be called a state of semi-want; the poor ryots who did not starve but whose food was rendered unusually scanty and poor. But in other respects the testimony is universal that the calamity of the famine fell with by far the greatest severity on the workers for wages, the agricultural laborers, coolies, and small artizans; especially, among the latter, on the weavers, already plying a declining trade.

77. Still more remarkably than in the North-Western Provinces (as noticed in such striking terms by Colonel Smith) was the advantage possessed by all the classes having any sort of rights in the land. In this instance, not only they had better means and better credit than the laboring classes, but being to a considerable extent in the habit of keeping grain for home consumption, those who had crops of some kind were better provided than the non-agricultural classes, when grain was not to be bought.

78. There was, of course, very considerable variation in the degree to which the crops failed in different parts of the country. But besides the entire want of any accurate statistical information on the point, the fact is that the tide of famine eventually surged so high all over Orissa that local inequalities may almost be said to have been submerged and lost sight of in one wide-spreading sea of calamity. It can only be said that famine was felt by far the earliest in the Pooree district, and in that major portion of the district which lies nearest the sea, as distinguished from the greater part of the sub-division of Khoorda, where an active irrigation had saved much of the crop. In Cuttack grain was more abundant and cheaper till the failure in October, and the effect of the money, labor, and grain of the Irrigation Company has been noticed as retarding the evil in what may be called the higher parts of that district; while in the lower it may be assumed that a good deal of grain was produced in the moister alluvial lands; so that, altogether, that district was reached by the most intense famine later than the others. In Central Balasore and the adjoining Mohurbhunj country the failure seems to have been greater and starvation earlier than in other parts of the district, even it appears, than in the Bhudruk sub-division, where the distress was afterwards extreme. Beyond this general statement, and the details to be gathered from the examinations, we do not think that we can with advantage attempt to depict and mark out with precision the comparatively good and bad tracts.

79. It will be self-evident in the whole of our proceedings that there is an extraordinary discrepancy in regard to the use of the word "famine" by different persons. In some of the earliest papers the word was freely used; but the failure having been early called in official documents "scarcity" and not famine, it seems as if, as the scarcity and want became more intense, the official use of the term "famine" was gradually pushed back into narrower and narrower limits. The Board of Revenue, in their Administration Report of 20th August 1866, under the heading "the scarcity," seem to maintain that there was no "famine" in Orissa till the very last days of May; and they appear in fact to desire to restrict the word to the case when there is not food to be had for money as distinguished from suffering from dearness and want of means to buy. In that sense it might be said that there was no famine in the North-Western Provinces in 1837-38 or in 1861. One gentleman holding a high appointment, which gave him special means of obtaining information, has gone the length of telling us that he does not remember to have heard of general famine till the floods of August occurred. We shall use the word "famine" in its ordinary and popular acceptance of suffering from hunger on the part of large classes of the population.

80. With reference to the statements and opinions just noticed, we are reminded that His Honor the Lieutenant Governor has in recent reports expressed the opinion that the greatest mortality in Orissa was caused by the floods in the latter part of the season, and it may prevent confusion in our narrative at once to say that we have found no one who shares that opinion. The greater part of the suffering, if not the greater part of the mortality, occurred before the floods; of the subsequent mortality much occurred in tracts which did not materially suffer from flood, and much would have everywhere occurred even had there been no floods. The floods, therefore, were altogether a secondary cause of the mortality in 1866, although, undoubtedly, in extensive tracts, it was considerably increased by that cause. It has been stated to us, probably with truth, that in some of the flooded tracts, although the greatest positive mortality was independent of floods, the highest rate of mortality was during their prevalence. The necessity of large measures of relief in the latter part of the season was very greatly increased by the same cause; and, in respect of the lasting exhaustion of the tracts most especially effected, it may be said that the floods coming after the previous drought have not improbably left still deeper traces from

which recovery will be slow and painful. In the other parts of the country we trust that, the sad loss of population apart, recovery under the influence of good crops will be rapid.

81. Having thus stated so much of the facts, and of our opinion on matters which may, we think, be considered as for the most part beyond dispute, the most important section of that part of our report on which we are now engaged is to trace the gradual rise and progress of the famine, with special advertence to dates; to consider how far information on the subject was available, and how far it was made use of; how far proper measures were taken to meet the growing evil; and how far the want of more effectual and timely measures was, on the one hand, inevitable, or, on the other, due to causes within human control.

82. We have thought it right to print the whole correspondence, which has come into our hands, having material bearing on the famine in Orissa from the time of its commencement to the end of May, when it may be said to have become an acknowledged fact, and the subject of measures of direct relief undertaken by Government. From the beginning of June and the commencement of importation of grain, the correspondence becomes so voluminous that we do not think that it would be possible to burden our report with the whole of it. We have therefore confined this part of our Appendix to what may be called general correspondence on matters affecting the general character of the famine and the system of relief. But we append in narrative form an account of the history and results of the relief measures adopted, and of the whole course of that part of the famine in each separate district. For these we are principally indebted to our colleague Mr. Dampier.

83. We commence the proper history of the famine in Orissa in the beginning of October 1865. The first series of the correspondence in our Appendix relates to the period from this time till the date of the Board's report, submitted to Government in the end of the following month. We place the Pooree correspondence first, then that of Balasore; while local Cuttack matters are so mixed with the Commissioner's general reports that we have given them together. We have then, as has been explained, the Pooree district considerably exhausted and alarmed by very insufficient rains following a previous indifferent year, and prices not far short of rates which the poor would call famine rates; that is rice was about $2\frac{1}{2}$ times the average price. We have Cuttack prosperous, rice as yet tolerably cheap, and the crops generally promising. We have Balasore prosperous in the profit of a good crop and large exportations of the previous year, but prices enhanced so as considerably to affect the very poor in a district where wages were particularly low.

84. About this time the absence of rain would, no doubt, begin to alarm the cultivators, and so early as the 10th October we have an alarming report from the south of the Pooree district. The falls of rain in this latter part of the season are usually intermittent, and in most parts of the country, where the crops had not previously suffered, people hoped on for some days longer.

85. It was, however, the peculiarity of this occasion that a very few days made all the difference between good crops and the most extreme failure. When the middle of October passed without signs of rain, the alarm became serious, and when the 20th was passed, the whole country was in a panic; the rice trade was stopped; the country ceased to supply the towns; at both Cuttack and Pooree the bazaars were closed, and everywhere the alarm and inconvenience may be said to have been extreme.

86. Throughout this famine, from the very first, it was symptomatic of its character, as rather due to scarcity of grain than scarcity of money, that each fresh accession of alarm constantly took the shape of stopping sales at the regular marts altogether, rather than of mere sudden enhancements of price.

The fact seems to be that the dealers, timid and liable to panic, felt themselves very much bound by custom, and at that season of the year a large portion of their transactions were really sales on credit or advances to be repaid at customary rates, exorbitant enough in appearance but really hardly remunerative under the special circumstances. In the bazaars some dealers had really no grain, others were unwilling to sell on the old terms, and were afraid to raise the terms too suddenly; and the remainder felt themselves unable to meet the demands which would have been thrown on them if they had kept their shops open when those of others were closed. Hence the dealers following one another—general closing movements took place, which were only got over when the supply had a little accumulated, and the alarmed public were glad to accept very enhanced rates. These movements were too general, and the classes of traders had too little bond of union over so large a tract of country to admit of the explanation of mere wicked combination, even if the subsequent result had not been conclusive on the subject. Mr. Barlow (Magistrate and Collector, Pooree) seems to have taken a much more correct view than the Commissioner, see his letter of 8th November (Appendix page 14).

87. In the latter part of October Mr. Barlow held his office at Cuttack, and was living with Mr. Ravenshaw. The Police of the Pooree district, it will be seen, gave a very gloomy view of things, as did Baboo Ramakahoy, the Native Deputy Magistrate in charge of Pooree. The "impending famine" was spoken of by both, and rice, where procurable at all, was selling at real famine rates. Mr. Barlow, from the first, exhibits his active interest in the matter, and in the beginning of November he returned to Pooree. He found things better; the chiefs of the monasteries (about Juggernath) had been induced to open their stores of grain, and the enhanced prices had brought in a certain supply; although he said to Mr. Ravenshaw "we have no really heavy dealers with large stocks as you have." His communications may have been slightly tinged by the more sanguine views of his superior the Commissioner, to whom he was writing, and he does not seem to have represented the prospects of the crop in the most gloomy colors: while the Commissioner was *certain* it would not be less than half, Mr. Barlow *was disposed to hope that not more than half would be lost, but of this he would report further*. The Police accounts, he said, are bad, if *you believe them*, but he thought some of the Police officers inclined to exaggerate, and he did not think "*badly, that is very badly*," of any except certain parts of his district. On the other hand, he explained that to the poorer classes the present rates were "*absolutely prohibitive*." In his first letter from Pooree, he said, "*the general appearance of affairs is favorable, until you examine further down, and remember that there is a large class of people, the bouries, coolies, and chasees, to whom the prohibitive rate is equally starvation with the altogether non-existence of grain at all. I confess I see no remedy for this, for with (as there must no doubt be) a vastly short crop, not even the gathering of the new harvest can possibly make rice less than 3 annas a seer in the town, while the mofussil will be, and is, actually denuded altogether to supply the large markets. The accounts from the mofussil as regards present condition are deplorable, especially in the localities of Nubbah, Gope, and around the edge of the Chilka via Hurridas and Boosoonpoor, where it is stated that food is altogether not procurable, and people are either living on roots, &c., or emigrating to Cuttack and elsewhere. By also last reports no rice had been offered for sale at the bazar at Lattaharun, a largish mart of Kodhar, for a fortnight, which indicates the nakedness of the land. This would be bad enough as a last extremity could it be hoped that relief with the harvest was near, but, as I have already said, I do not anticipate reduction of price, and so the distress must increase.*"

88. In a subsequent demi-official letter, which has been lost, he reported the existence of extreme distress in Mallood and Parricood, two estates between the

Chilka Lake and the sea, and it is to be gathered from the Commissioner's letter reporting the matter to Government (No. 280 of 14th November 1865, Appendix page 6) that "the Collector anticipates that as the season advances similar distress will spread." It will be observed that both the Collector and the Police speak of distress as particularly bad in Nubbah (the Police sub-division comprising Mallood and Parricood and the southern part of the district), in the country all round the Chilka Lake, Hurridas, Boosoonpoor, &c, and in Gope, the Eastern Police division of the district. To this may be added the central division Rahang, in the immediate vicinity of Pooree, which is mentioned by the Commissioner (no doubt on the authority of Mr. Barlow's lost letter) as one of the parts where the loss of the rice crop has been most general, and where, in fact, serious distress very early appeared. These early notices are of some importance, since it will be found that much misconception arose from the belief of the superior authorities that extreme distress was confined to Mallood and Parricood. Those estates were first visited and described, and were probably the scene of the most severe early distress; but the expressions "Mallood, Parricood, &c.," or "Mallood, Parricood, and the Lake districts" seem to be used by local officers in a much wider sense to express the south-western portions of the district, while that distress early extended to the central and eastern portions also, is certain. Mr. Barlow seems at this time to have recommended the importation of a ship load of grain to the Mallood Coast. The Commissioner did not support the recommendation, considering it the duty of the zemindars to relieve the distress; but he asked for permission to relieve distress in the neighbouring Government estates as distinguished from those of private landlords.

89. The first report from the Collector of Balasore is dated the 26th October (Appendix page 18), and encloses a petition from certain zemindars, praying for time to pay the revenue on the grounds—

- 1.—That the crops are ruined.
- 2.—That the ryots, unable to get advances, cannot pay their rents.
- 3.—That the poor ryots blindly disposed of all the produce and kept no stock for this year owing to too much exportation last year.

On these Mr. Muspratt, the Collector, observes—

- 1.—The rice crop of the district does not promise to reach to one-eighth of the crop of the last year.
- 2.—The ryots are forced to borrow rice and not money.
- 3.—The statement is but too true, and he gives figures to prove the assertion.

He expresses the intention that he and his subordinates should visit the district to examine what estates have suffered, and solicits favorable consideration to the petition.

The Commissioner, however, did not support it, and the Board of Revenue rejected it as "inadmissible" on the 9th November.

90. On the 31st October, in reply to a memorandum of the Commissioner, the Collector again reported regarding the stocks and markets, explaining that the merchants had no large stores in hand. He shows how last year's crop was carried off by "Telinghee" merchants from the south, how the price rose in consequence, and how this year the Telinghee vessels having arrived as usual were unable to obtain cargoes; he stated that though rice was brought to market in small quantities, it was dear and obtained with difficulty. In fact, about this time, the price rose to a point which made export on any large scale impossible, and with the exception of a comparatively small quantity already bargained and sold (as explained in the evidence) none was exported. Mention is made of some

cases of arson and robbery in consequence of the dealers' refusal to sell or rather advance grain. On the 9th November, the Collector reported rice to be selling at 11 to 16 seers per rupee and exportation nil. It should be mentioned that at Balasore, the Calcutta seer of 80 Rupees weight is used; at Cuttack and Pooree the local seer is 105 Rupees weight.

91. In Cuttack, as early as the 21st October, so serious a stoppage of sales occurred that the Commissioner telegraphed and wrote to Government. The shops, however, re-opened next day. The Commissioner attributed the difficulty to combinations among the dealers, and was desired not to interfere with the natural course of trade. The closing movement was shortly repeated, and the Commissioner received letters from the Officer Commanding the Cantonment and the heads of various departments, complaining of the difficulty experienced by the soldiers and public servants in obtaining food. The Collector of Ganjam also wrote, stating that a similar panic had occurred in his district, owing to cessation of the usual imports from Orissa, and mentioning a rumour that the Bengal authorities had prohibited export. On the 27th October the Commissioner reported to the Bengal Government at some length, see his letter of that date, Appendix page 24.

92. On the 6th November, he again reported to Government and to the Board, stating the price of common rice at Cuttack to be then 8 (local) seers per rupee, but supplies procurable; in Pooree the greatest distress, rice not procurable. As respects Balasore, he mentioned the Collector's estimate of the crop, but thought it considerably below the mark. He also repeated the Collector's statement regarding exportation. On the 11th November the Commissioner again reports to the Board of Revenue regarding Cuttack—much as before; crops on low lands near coast believed to be good; Balasore accounts conflicting, crops very bad in some places, fair in others; at Pooree, rice procurable by those who can afford to buy at 7 (local) seers per rupee, but not procurable in some of the local marts of the interior; Collector anticipates a very short crop; deplorable accounts from *Rumbah*, *Gope*, and the borders of the *Chilka*; people either living on roots or emigrating. The letter to Government of the 14th November regarding Mallood, Parricood, &c. (already alluded to in paragraph 88), followed, and was referred by Government to the Board of Revenue for report.

93. On the 11th November, the Collector of Cuttack asked the orders of the Board whether regular enquiries into losses by drought are to be instituted throughout the district this cold season. There was no doubt, he said, that a large portion of the crop would come to nothing, and petitions for enquiry and remission were pouring in. Should an enquiry be sanctioned, the Collector proposed deputing officers for the purpose, and he took the opportunity of representing that the services of another officer with full powers were urgently required. The Commissioner opposed the proposal to make enquiries except in the few cases in which ryots held direct of Government without the intervention of any middleman or farmer of any kind (see letter 13th November, Appendix page 30). On the 20th November, the Board approved of the Commissioner's views, and the correspondence was communicated both to the Collector of Cuttack and to the Collector of Pooree also.

94. On the 18th November, the Commissioner submitted a resolution of the Committee to postpone the intended agricultural exhibition on account of failure of crops and general scarcity of food. The Government approved.

95. Throughout all this correspondence, it will be seen that the Commissioner was inclined to take a more sanguine view than the Collectors.

He tells the Collector of Pooree (letter of 14th November, Appendix page 15) that though the accounts from all parts are full of grumbling, he is certain that, with the exception of a few fields, the crop will nowhere fall short of half*

* It should be explained that most of the estimates are in the parts of a rupee 16 annas being 1 rupee; therefore 8 annas is half, 12 annas {ths, and so on.

and in many places will be nearly a full crop. "Don't let the people get down-hearted," he goes on, "even with half a crop there ought not to be a famine. Get the people to help themselves, a somewhat difficult matter in Orissa, but there is nothing like trying." The Collector of Balasore he tells "I have no doubt there is more rice in your district than you imagine, and further that the crops of the current year will suffice for the year's supply." In the memo. of 27th October, circulated to the Collectors, he speaks of combination among the dealers, is "informed that large stores are in their hands," there is "nothing in the prospect of the crop to warrant apprehension of a total absence of food."

96. That these expressions were not merely used for the purpose of giving encouragement and allaying panic is evident, for Mr. Ravenshaw reported in no less sanguine terms to the Board and Government. In submitting the very worst reports, he said that, with small exceptions, the crops would yield fully half, that this might cause high prices and some distress but not starvation. "There is," he said, "a general disposition to make the present season's crop appear worse than it really is." On the 27th October, while anticipating a half crop, he adds—"There are large stores in the hands of dealers, probably enough to supply the market for a couple of years." And further he is "confident that sooner or later, it (the grain) will find its way into the market." This was no doubt hastily written at a very early period; but the idea of large stocks and a full half crop, the two together quite sufficing to feed the people, seems to run through his correspondence. His personal opinions apart, he seems to have fairly represented those of the Collectors. But he showed his confidence in his own opinions since he does not seem to have considered further personal enquiry in the Regulation districts necessary, and started on a long tour in the hilly tributary mehals on November 20th. In this view, taking Mr. Ravenshaw's opinions as fully formed and acted upon, we think that they were rash and founded on wholly insufficient information. He was entirely new to the division, had never seen the districts, and was not in a position to form confident opinions opposed to those which he received from the Collectors, who in fact themselves had as yet no sufficient opportunity of forming complete opinions. It is fair, however, to say that as respects the stocks in hand, Mr. Ravenshaw was to a great extent supported in his opinion by the majority of those about him in the town of Cuttack.

97. On receipt of Mr. Ravenshaw's letters of 22nd and 27th October, the Government of Bengal sent them to the Board of Revenue, and requested the Board "to report specially on the present state of the crops and markets and the prospects of the country throughout the Lower Provinces," and "to suggest any measures by which it may appear to them the Government can aid with advantage with a view to mitigate the effects of the present scarcity." The Lieutenant Governor, it was stated, was unofficially aware that the attention of the Board was directed to the subject, and that they were in possession of regular and late information from all the divisions. The time, His Honor thought, had come when this information should be made the basis of a comprehensive consideration of the question upon which it might be determined whether any and what measures of relief are called for and practicable.

98. We have not been able to find that the Board really were in possession of all the information which the Government supposed, or that they procured it before writing their report. Moreover, the crop does not ordinarily fully ripen till December, the Board made their report in November on information scarcely extending to the middle of that month, and that information was, it has been avowed, "very imperfect." We have already mentioned the information supplied from Orissa. As respects the other divisions to which our enquiry has extended, we are aware that information was demi-officially

sought from the Commissioner of the Presidency division, and the Board seem to have had some sort of communication with the Collector of Midnapore, but we have not been able to find that the Commissioner of the Burdwan Division was asked to furnish any report regarding Western Bengal, nor that information was obtained from the province of Chota Nagpore. The Commissioner of Burdwan remembers no such enquiry, and after a special reference to the Board, we can find no correspondence. Any information, verbal or otherwise, received from the Burdwan and Chota Nagpore divisions (Midnapore excepted), must therefore have been of the very slenderest kind, and thus it happened that Maunbhoom (eventually one of the worst districts) and Bancoorah were at that time, for the most part, overlooked. Mr. Chapman, the Secretary to the Board, seems to have seen in Calcutta a merchant and land-holder of Balasore, and he says that there were other similar means of intelligence. He explains that the object was to make a rapid report on the materials then available. It was made accordingly on the 25th November, and is an important document to which we would beg attention (see Appendix page 31).

99. The Government of Bengal, on the 11th December (Appendix page 38), quite approved of what the Board had done, and concurred generally in the opinions expressed. The provision of public works would be considered in that department. Permission was given to expend money in estates belonging to or in charge of Government for relief of the helpless poor and by giving employment to those willing and able to work, but otherwise unable to obtain work. Every endeavor was to be made to induce the landholders to do the same. Relief Committees were recommended in districts where distress prevailed. "It is on the exercise of private liberality, His Honor believes, that in an emergency of this kind the chief dependence must be placed."

100. On receipt of the orders of the Government of Bengal, the Board circulated their report and the Government reply to all Revenue Officers as "*an easily accessible record of the principles upon which the Government considers itself at liberty to afford assistance in times of scarcity*," and it is this use of the report which gives it its greatest significance and importance. We must, therefore, examine what the Board laid down for the guidance of all the officers subordinate to them.

101. As respects the facts, the Board, while avowing the estimates of the out-turn of the crop to be altogether uncertain and conjectural, do not themselves seem to have taken a very favorable view. Indeed they appear to have rather anticipated about a half crop throughout the greater part of the lower provinces, the divisions of Dacca and Chittagong (where the crop was not much under the average) only excepted. Such a result might, we think, if realized, have led to starvation more wide-spreading than that which has actually come to pass. As respects the whole of the country within the scope of our enquiry, they said that the worst districts were undoubtedly the Cuttack division (especially Pooree) and Midnapore. With regard to Orissa (which is called the Cuttack division), the estimate of the Commissioner of a half crop is mentioned, "but perhaps he is rather too hopeful."

102. Speaking generally, prices throughout the country were stated to be almost double the ordinary rates, and "it may be assumed, from the high prices which have ruled of late years, that the stock of grain held in the country is not very large."

103. They go on—"Even if this be so, the Board see no reason to doubt that the present crop will suffice to provide food for the actual necessities of the people. This is a very important point, for, if this opinion can be relied on, there will be no *famine*. The Board fully believe that it can; and they have some hopes that prices will not be very materially more unfavorable throughout the year than they now are."

104. We cannot concur in the opinion expressed in this paragraph that short stocks followed by so universal a failure of the rice crops throughout the lower provinces (the eastern portion of Bengal excepted) and the surrounding countries, as is described in the Board's 11th paragraph, justified the confident expression of a belief that there would be no famine. No exception is made in respect of Orissa, the alarming accounts respecting which had led to the report, which was known to be worse off than other divisions, the crop in which, the Board feared, might not amount to a half crop, and the peculiar geographical and other circumstances of which do not seem to have been taken into account. Read by the light of Colonel Baird Smith's report (as respects the effect of such a degree of failure as the Board describe), we think that such a state of things demanded further and more careful enquiry. The report was issued as a sort of handbook and guide, after extreme distress in parts of Pooree had been reported, and seems calculated to restrain the apprehensions of officers whose districts might possibly yield something less than a half crop.

105. The bulk of the population being agriculturalists would, the Board thought, obtain compensation for short crops in high prices. For the laboring population not in a position to profit by the high prices, "suffering, though the Board humbly trust not generally famine, is in store this year."

106. To mitigate this evil, the Board relied on the following measures:—

First, the early and regular publications of the retail prices current in each district. This, the Board thought, would ensure the application of the ordinary laws of political economy, which could alone, in a case of so widespread scarcity, afford real relief. "All that the Government can do is to encourage and facilitate their operation. There can be no doubt that it is altogether beyond the power of Government to mend matters by any extraordinary operation in contravention of those laws. Even if it be true, as has been often asserted (though the Board are by no means prepared to admit that it is certainly the fact), that the operation of these natural laws is in this country slow and uncertain, it follows only that it is the more clearly the duty of Government to do nothing that can clog or impede their working, and that it must direct its efforts to the removal of obstacles and to the promotion of confidence among grain dealers."

They proceeded,—“All that the Government can really do, certainly all that it is necessary for it to do at present, is to encourage and assist in the employment of the laboring classes, especially in those districts where the distress is greatest.” The Board further proposed that Government should set an example to all the great landlords by acting with liberal public spirit in all Government estates. As respects the landlords, they said—“It was the hope of their feeling bound to assist, and interested in assisting, the agricultural population at such a time as this, that was one considerable motive with the Government of 1793 for the creation of these powerful land-owners. It must always be an important object of public policy in Bengal to encourage and, by every moral force, compel these gentlemen, who make, many of them, enormous profits, in ordinary years, to assume, when occasion arises, the obligations and responsibilities that undoubtedly lie upon them.”

107. The Board conclude—“At present the Board do not think any further measures called for; and if their hopes are realized, nothing more will be called for. It is of the utmost consequence to wean the people of the country from the habit of relying upon Government for help, in circumstances in which no one but themselves can really materially help. In this view it is important that the Government should leave no expectation outstanding that it will be prepared to make an attempt at general assistance which, in the present case, it could certainly not render to any good purpose.

“Even where famine actually supervenes, the chief, if not the only, reliance must be upon the efforts of local private liberality.”

108. The means of mitigating the suffering expected, and even famine if it unexpectedly supervened, as laid down by the Board, were then briefly—

1. The publication of official prices current.
2. The provision of labor for the poor by public works.
3. A liberal expenditure on Government estates, and the use of every possible means to induce the land-holders to follow the example.
4. As “the chief, if not the only, reliance” in more extreme cases, local private liberality to be exercised through local relief committees.

It has been pointed out to us that whatever may be the merits or demerits of the principles enunciated by the Board and generally adopted by the Government of Bengal, they were laid before the Supreme Government in India and the Government in England, and were published at the time, without eliciting expressions of disapprobation. This is dwelt upon in a note by Mr. Chapman published in the Appendix.

109. Subsequent to the report of the Board, circulated as above described, we do not find that any further systematic attempt was made to obtain conclusive information regarding the out-turn of the crops and the probable effect on the country. It is true, as stated by the senior Member of the Board, that the condition of part of the Pooree district immediately forced itself on the attention both of the Board and of Government; but the unfortunate mistake seems to have been made of supposing the distress, known to exist there, to be confined to a very isolated and limited space, and no general report regarding the state of any of the districts of Orissa, or of any other of the districts within the scope of our enquiry, seems to have been then called for.

110. This seems to us to have been an extremely unfortunate omission, and we have some difficulty in forming an opinion on the question to whom it is to be attributed. The Board were certainly charged with the execution of the measures which Government had approved, with the exception of those relating to proper public works, and the nature of the Orissa settlement threw on them certain further functions. But no further general report was called for by the Government, and the question how far the duty of ascertaining the state of the country and people, and watching systematically the progress of the scarcity, was directly that of the Government or primarily that of the Board, would depend very much on the general distribution of functions. It will be observed that neither the Members of the Board nor the Lieutenant Governor have been able to refer us to any very distinct rules defining the functions of the Board. According to the regulations the Board are bound to supervise and control the revenue officers in the performance of their duties, and to observe all orders which they may receive from the Government, but there is nothing more definite affecting the present question.

The view of the Board, as expressed in the statements made to us by the Members and Secretary, appears to be, in general terms, that they were bound to carry out the orders of Government and to take notice of everything regarding the scarcity and famine which was reported to them or brought to their knowledge; but that they were not responsible for obtaining general information on matters not specially brought before them. It is somewhat technically explained that “famine” was not in the early months a special and separate subject in the Board's office, as it afterwards was, and hence it was not treated generally, but only with reference to particular reports and letters submitted to the Board, each of which was dealt with separately.

The local officers, it will be observed, throughout the correspondence, seem sometimes to address the Government, sometimes the Board, no clear rule being followed.

We think that there was an absence of definite rule on the subject, which is to be regretted.

111. The circular publishing the Board's report and the reply of the Government of Bengal was, we think, calculated to impress the local officers with the following:—

That the facts regarding the crops, so far as ascertained, were not such as to justify the expectation of severe and wide-spread famine.

That Government would not interfere directly, but must leave the ordinary laws of trade to work a remedy, and could only assist in the employment of the laboring classes and in respect of estates directly in the hands of Government; that there should, therefore, be no expectation that Government would attempt general assistance. And that even in case of actual famine, the chief, if not only, reliance must be on local private liberality.

112. At this distance of time, and without any statistical record whatever, it is impossible to form any accurate estimate of the out-turn of the crop in Orissa in the end of 1865. It is very clear that the peculiar nature of the failure was such (owing to absence of the rain required to fill the ear) that the actual yield was much less than the appearance in the straw, and the whole extent of the loss was probably not known, even to the agriculturalists, till the grain was threshed out in January. On the whole evidence, it seems to us that the crop, taking the province generally, was certainly less than the Commissioner's estimate of a half crop. Singularly enough, the principal adherents to a different opinion are the officers of the Balasore district, who, in the first instance, took the very worst view; the Collector having reported the crop to be one-eighth of the previous year, and the Superintendent of Police described it as an "utter failure." The Collector's first opinion was, no doubt, extreme, and he afterwards changed it, having induced the Superintendent of Police to alter his report from "utter failure" to "partial failure;" but looking to the large producing powers of the Balasore district (as evidenced by previous exports), and to the total and extreme want in that district many months before the following crop was due, we feel sure that the Collector's present estimate is too high. The truth seems to be that taking considerable tracts together as a whole, those more favorably situated may have yielded about a half crop, or perhaps, in some few instances, slightly more, while those less favorably situated yielded very much less. If we were to hazard a general average upon the whole evidence as to the total yield of the province, perhaps we might say about a third of a full crop, but this estimate is in truth conjectural in the extreme.

113. It may here be stated, as respects the greater part of Orissa, that not only may the circulation of the Board's report have in some degree tended to allay official anxiety, but also in December the reaping and coming into the market of the new crop, such as it was, to a considerable extent mitigated the prevailing alarm and distress among the people. In India grain is always very much cheaper at harvest time than at other times, and it is said that on this occasion the unflinching enforcement of the demand for revenue and rent contributed greatly to produce that effect by forcing the crop into the market. Comparing the result as respects prices in the season 1865-66, when the demand was enforced, and that in 1866-67, when it was suspended, we can believe that there is much truth in this statement. Towards the end of December the coarsest rice is quoted at about 14 Calcutta seers per rupee in Pooree, 15 in Cuttack, and 15 in Balasore. In Pooree the local market was probably in some degree favorably affected at this time by local circumstances, the opening of the stores of the monasteries, and the wreck of a grain ship on the beach. Harvest time, besides making grain cheaper, also gives employment to the agricultural population. In Orissa it is from

the end of January to the beginning of the agricultural year at the commencement of the rains that the laboring classes are least employed, and that in ordinary years the poor may suffer most. In 1865-66 there was a sort of lull in December and January as respects the alarm in the Cuttack and Balasore districts. In the Pooree district only did the alarm and distress continue with little abatement.

114. Before going further we should mention that in November Messrs. Gisborne and Co., of Calcutta, strongly urged on Government the necessity of importing and storing grain to meet the "famine which is now an acknowledged fact in several of the western districts, of extent and severity daily increasing." The correspondence is published at page 129 of the Appendix. It appears that Messrs. Gisborne and Co. had in fact no special knowledge of or business connection with Orissa, and that Orissa was only mentioned among several other western districts. The proposal was to buy rice in British Burmah and to ship it partly to Port Canning, and partly to Orissa. Speaking of the proposal as a whole, we do not think that the information then possessed by Government would have justified its acceptance. As respects the former (and in some sense the main) part of the plan, the importation into Port Canning, the result showed that it was not necessary. Rice never failed in Calcutta which throughout the year exported. Whether information shortly afterwards received would have justified the partial acceptance of the proposal as regards Orissa, we shall soon consider.

115. We would also here draw attention to another correspondence immediately following the Board's report, and printed at page 132 of the Appendix. First, on the ground of the general scarcity and distress in the country, and again on the ground of distressing accounts received from Pooree, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal (in December 1865) applied to the Government of India for special grants of five lakhs in aid of local funds for railway feeders, and one lakh for works in the Pooree district. After some correspondence regarding details, the Government of India replied to both these applications together by granting (on the 24th January 1866), "five lakhs as a general grant-in-aid to local funds for famine works including the feeder roads in Cuttack and Behar." There were in fact no railway feeders in the Cuttack division, and the works in the Pooree district were provided for from other sources. The sum of five lakhs granted by the Government of India was applied exclusively to railway feeders in other districts, and not in a shape that would ordinarily be called "famine works," inasmuch as they were not all in proper famine districts, and were not conducted upon any special system of famine relief. The fact was (as explained in the first letter of the correspondence) that the local funds of Bengal had been reduced by failure of income and excessive expenditure previous to 1865-66, and without special aid these works must have been very much curtailed. The five lakhs was applied to carry them on, and thus a certain employment was continued throughout the country generally which would otherwise have ceased, without its being made apparent that there were famine works in operation. The mode in which the money was applied was reported to the Government of India in very general terms on the 14th April 1866, a list of the works being furnished; and on the 21st May the Government of India, in the Public Works Department, replied that the instructions issued appeared to be proper and called for no remark.

116. The circumstances under which the zemindars of Orissa claim and obtain remissions of revenue have been already stated, and it has been noticed that the Collectors of Balasore and Pooree applied very early in the season for permission to make enquiries respecting the failures of 1865; but that both applications were summarily rejected, the Commissioner and Board of Revenue concurring in opinion. More pressing applications to the same effect were made by the Collector of Pooree in the end of November and beginning

of December, and the correspondence on the subject is printed in our Appendix page 39. We have prefixed the orders of the Board of the previous season to which allusion is made. Mr. Barlow sent out officers to make enquiries, but had doubts if he was justified, since, as he said, it was the peculiar effect of the Board's instructions which refused to allow any enquiry prior to orders, that it became impossible to furnish information from which it might be known whether the prescribed test of "general calamity" was reached, and therefore he could only say that by report it was understood that the losses in some pergunnahs had been very heavy. On this occasion the Commissioner sanctioned enquiry and report in special cases of extreme loss, on the understanding that no promise or expectation of remission was to be given, the matter being kept perfectly open for the Board's orders.

The Collector of Balasore seems also to have been making some general enquiries at this time, and a diary submitted by him is inserted. He has explained in his evidence that the prices there quoted by him are not expressed in the ordinary seer, but in a smaller seer of local use.

117. On the Collector of Pooree's application, with the Commissioner's orders upon it coming before the Board, they negatived it in very decided terms (Appendix page 43). They regretted that the Commissioner had instructed the Collector to enter upon any investigation of claims of zemindars to remission, as such enquiries tended to raise expectations which, not being realized, must result in discontent and disaffection. No remissions were to be granted, and all hope of receiving any were to be positively barred.

This order was signed by both Members of the Board, Messrs. Grote and Cockburn. It has been shown to us that it was first drafted by Mr. Cockburn, who had known Orissa well. On the other hand, he had very recently returned from England, and had not taken part in the previous enquiry regarding losses.

On receipt of the Board's orders, the Commissioner desired the Collector to observe that the Board had disapproved of the permission even to satisfy himself of actual loss in zemindaree estates, expressed his entire concurrence in the orders, directed the Collector to consider them final and conclusive and to cancel his proceedings, and sent a copy of the orders to the other Collectors for their guidance.

118. We think that the Board of Revenue were not justified in passing these decided orders. Their own orders of a few months previous distinctly recognised the claim to remission on account of *general* calamities of season, and there was certainly no ground for assuming that the failure of 1865 in Orissa, and more especially in Pooree, did not amount to a general calamity. Whatever the previous profits of the zemindars, there was not the least reason to suppose that, in the particular year, they would spare the ryots if they were not themselves spared. We are told on all hands that the difficulty has always been rather to obtain for the ryots the concessions given to the zemindars. But the zemindars themselves always base their applications on the ground that the remissions are required to enable them to remit to the ryots. The circumstances of Orissa are such (the claim to remission for general calamity being admitted) that it is wholly impossible to make detailed enquiry regarding the effect, on the crops, of general calamity of season, without creating some expectation of remissions. We think that the effect of the orders necessarily was to stop all such enquiries in whatever form and with whatever object. It did so stop them. The Collector of Pooree at once desired the officers making enquiries to discontinue operations; the result of the partial enquiries already made was never reported; and the extent to which the crops had failed and the consequent failure of the supply of food on which the population had to rely, were not made known to the higher authorities.

119. The next correspondence which we have printed (Appendix page 44) is that regarding the establishment of Relief Committees. The Commissioner suggested them on the 3rd December. The Collector of Pooree replied that he was already at work, and his proceedings will soon be mentioned in full. The Collector of Balasore called a meeting, formed a Committee, and collected some small subscriptions, but reported that relief was not immediately required. "It is expected that the fund will have no calls made on it before February." The Collector of Cuttack also called a meeting, though he reported, 29th December, that it was not nearly so fully attended by the zemindars as he would have wished. He concludes, "I have now travelled over a considerable portion of the district, and am not of opinion that just immediately any great amount of distress prevails in the district, but I fear that the spring of the coming year will find things changed for the worse, and that the poor non-agricultural class composed of artizans, &c., will feel the scarcity very much. It is well to be prepared, therefore, and to have matters put in train, that when the season of distress comes, timely aid may be at hand."

The resolution of the Cuttack Committee, which accompanied the letter, points to more severe distress in Pooree and the Tributary Mehals. There was delay in collecting subscriptions as they were not immediately required, but all the correspondence speaks of more severe distress to be expected as the season advances.

120. Next in order (Appendix page 48) comes a correspondence regarding the Commissioner of Orissa's tour. On the 18th Nov. he reported his intention to proceed to the Tributary Mehals, and proceeded there accordingly. In reply the Government presumed that he had made his arrangements "with due regard to the present scarcity of provisions in the Cuttack division, and the probability that special measures may have to be taken for the relief of the people."

To this the Commissioner (being already far on his tour) replied on the 14th December—"There are no arrangements in connection with scarcity of provisions that I am aware of likely to necessitate my immediate return to Cuttack. With the exception of some portion of Pooree bordering on the Chilka Lake, there is no such scarcity as need create necessity for any extraordinary measures." On this explanation the Government approved of the tour, and the consequence was that the Commissioner was absent for upwards of two months, and did not visit any of the Regulation districts that cold season. In his original scheme he had said that he should be at no great distance from head quarters, and prepared to return at a moment's notice, but we now learn from his examination that in fact he penetrated very far into the hill country, visiting parts scarcely seen by any European before; and it is evident that his correspondence was delayed many days.

We think the absence of the head of the division at such a time very unfortunate. A few days with Mr. Barlow might have been more useful than all the correspondence carried on at such a distance. The Government eventually ratified the Commissioner's plans, but that again depended on an estimate of the condition of affairs, which has since proved to have been very erroneous, and which was not, we think, at the time warranted by sufficient information. It does not appear that there was any political matter of really great importance requiring the Commissioner's presence in the mehals visited by him at this time.—See the Lieutenant Governor's statement. (Examination page xcvi.)

121. Allusion has been made to the prices current which were called for and published. The Government, after communication with the Chamber of Commerce, seems to have made the suggestion, and the Board of Revenue called for weekly returns from each district and regularly published them. On the one hand, the Board seem to have placed an almost superstitious reliance on them as a panacea for all evils, and on the other, their accuracy has been much questioned. We would, therefore, here notice the whole subject before proceeding with the history of the famine. As respects accuracy, it is now admitted that the

official returns cannot be relied on as exact. Such tables prepared by persons unaccustomed to the work are apt to be occasionally loose and inaccurate, and this is especially so when, owing to shortness and irregularity of supply, there can hardly be said to be any well sustained market rates. It is stated by the Secretary to the Board (Mr. Chapman) that the column "ordinary price at this season" turns out to have been generally inaccurate, and a comparison with the averages calculated on the returns furnished to us, as well as the extreme discrepancies in the returns of neighbouring places, seem to show the fact to be so. For the rest, in the Native mind, it is above all things difficult to disconnect the two ideas of returning actual prices and fixing a price. The Police and others who made the returns may sometimes have returned rather prices as they ought to be than those at which rice was actually available; and even if the prices were real, Government servants could sometimes get rice when others could not. Error was then probably more frequently made in representing the rice to be cheaper than the reality rather than the contrary.

122. In the head quarter stations of districts such error was not likely to be large, but there is another source of discrepancy which has been made very apparent in the Cuttack returns. The Board have throughout taken the "cheapest sort" as the standard of the price of the food of the people. But it appears that in fact there is generally in the market a minor quantity of fine rice on the one hand and of a red imperfectly husked variety on the other, while the mass of rice in the market, in fact the ordinary food of the people, is an intermediate kind more properly designated as "common rice." The statements of the officers of the Irrigation Company founded on actual transactions seemed at first hopelessly irreconcilable with the Board's prices current; but we discovered that while the Collector of Cuttack was furnishing prices of two sorts of rice, dearest and cheapest, according to the Board's forms, the Commissioner was at the same time sending a price current of his own stated by him to be carefully prepared from personal observation. He gives three kinds, and his intermediate kind called "common rice" does not very materially differ from the rates given by the Irrigation Company, although he explains that the supply and sales were so irregular that the price varied from hour to hour and from one street of Cuttack to another.

123. In truth, all minor differences apart, the main point in respect of which the prices current were, it proves, wholly misleading, is that they were very frequently (in fact through the greater part of the season, and in most places it may be said most frequently) wholly nominal, rice not being procurable. It is most certain that it was not procurable at the quoted rates in any quantity. Even when the shops were open, any attempt to buy more than ordinary daily rations, it may be said, the slightest rumour that purchases were to be made, at once sent prices up to prohibitive rates.

124. It also seems to us that supposing the tables to have been reliable, the Board of Revenue hardly made consistent use of their own materials and their own principles. Prices in districts of cheap grain and low wages were too much judged by a metropolitan standard, and were on that basis supposed to be reasonable when they were really extreme in relation to the ordinary local prices; allowance was not sufficiently made for the cheapening at harvest time, and the invariable enhancement as the season proceeds; and even, it may be said, that when prices rose to rates more and more distinctly famine, throughout February, March, April, and May, both the Government of Bengal and the Board, deserting their own principles of political economy, seem to have actually or tacitly acquiesced in the explanation that the rates were no true index of the supply, and that the dealers were only combining to hold back stocks with a view to artificial enhancement of prices.

125. The fact that even prices apparently tolerable are no sufficient index to the state of the people, if other local circumstances are put out of view, is well stated in the following extract of a letter from Lieutenant Money, Deputy Commissioner of Maunbhoom—a remote and uncivilized district:—

"I must make another attempt to try and convince you that there really is famine in the south-east of Maunbhoom, and that the returns I have sent up from a few grain marts cannot be taken as indicative of prosperity in Raipore. Our resources were weak when the failure of crops came on us. The immediate sufferers are of two classes,—those who cultivate just enough for themselves and families to live on from one harvest to the other, and those who live by labor, working mostly for petty farmers, who pay them in food. The first of these two classes lost their crops, and not only so, but have by this failure been plunged deeply into their mahajuns' books, as most of them borrow grain for sowing on promise of repayment at exorbitant interest when the crops are ripe.

"This is not a class who have money with which to buy food, and being already deep in their mahajuns' books, the latter do not care to lend them rice now. The second class are starving, because the petty farmers who at this time of year, as a rule, employ them, will not do it, having themselves no rice with which they could pay them.

"I must maintain, as a fact, that the price currents at one or two bazaars are no criterion of the real state of any particular spot some little distance from them."

126. The Board of Revenue, especially, seem to have taken every cheapening of price as an indication that their first expressed opinions were right. On the 24th January 1866 they reported that prices in Pooree were "happily insufficient to tempt exporters from the opposite coast." It is true that the last Pooree price current then before them, that of January 15th, showed rice to be from $11\frac{3}{4}$ to $13\frac{1}{4}$ Calcutta seers per rupee, but about that very time the Collector (as we now find) was elaborately explaining to his immediate superior that it really was not to be had, and the Pooree prices current of the two following weeks, ending 23rd January and 29th January, showed a very rapid fall first to $10\frac{1}{4}$ and then to $8\frac{3}{4}$ seers, in fact to about four times the average price of food. Such a rate in any country means famine, especially if a long period must elapse before another harvest. Yet we cannot find that the Board corrected the impressions which their letter of 24th January might have created, or that the subsequent enhancement in all the districts to 8, 7, 6 seers in March and April, and still further enhancement in May, caused any special enquiry on the subject till it was too late.

127. For convenience of reference we here give a table of the price of common rice throughout the season at Pooree, Cuttack, and Balasore respectively, made as approximately correct as we can by collating the different returns:—

Approximate prices of common Rice in Pooree, Cuttack, and Balasore, given in seers of Rupees. 80 weight per Rupee.

	Pooree.	Cuttack.	Balasore.	Average.
Latter part of October 1865 ...	8 to 13	8 to 15	11 to 16	12
Week ending the 13th November 1865 ...	8	12	15	$11\frac{1}{2}$
Ditto 20th ditto ...	10	11	15	12
Ditto 27th ditto ...	$11\frac{1}{2}$	$10\frac{1}{2}$	16	$12\frac{1}{2}$
Ditto 4th December 1865 ...	12	$11\frac{1}{4}$	16	$13\frac{1}{4}$
Ditto 11th ditto ...	12	$11\frac{1}{4}$	16	$13\frac{1}{4}$
Ditto 18th ditto ...	13	13	16	14
Ditto 28th ditto ...	14	14	14	14
Ditto 1st January 1866 ...	14	14	13	$13\frac{2}{3}$
Ditto 8th ditto ...	$13\frac{1}{2}$	14	13	$13\frac{1}{2}$
Ditto 15th ditto ...	$12\frac{1}{2}$	12	13	$12\frac{1}{2}$
Ditto 22nd ditto ...	10	12	11	$11\frac{1}{3}$

	Pooree.	Cuttack.	Balasore.	Average.
Week ending the 29th January 1866 ...	8½	11½	10	10
Ditto 5th February 1866 ...	8½	9½	11	9½
Ditto 12th ditto ...	9½	8½	9	9
Ditto 19th ditto ...	8½	9	9	9
Ditto 26th ditto ...	9½	9½	9½	9½
Ditto 5th March 1866 ...	8½	9½	9½	9
Ditto 12th ditto ...	8	9½	10	9½
Ditto 19th ditto ...	8½	9½	10	9½
Ditto 26th ditto ...	8	8½	7½	8½
Ditto 2nd April 1866 ...	7½	7½	7½	7½
Ditto 9th ditto ...	6½	7½	7½	7½
Ditto 16th ditto ...	7½	6½	8½	7½
Ditto 23rd ditto ...	6½	6	8½	7
Ditto 30th ditto ...	6½	6	8	6½
Ditto 7th May 1866 ...	6½	6½	8	7
Ditto 14th ditto ...	6½	6	8	7
Ditto 21st ditto ...	6½	5	6½	6½
Ditto 28th ditto ...	6	4½	6	5½
Ditto 4th June 1866 ...	6	4½	6½	5½
Ditto 11th ditto ...	5½	4½	6	5½
Ditto 18th ditto ...	5½	4	5½	5
Ditto 25th ditto ...	5½	4	5	5
Ditto 2nd July 1866 ...	6½	4	5	5
Ditto 9th ditto ...	6½	4	5½	5½
Ditto 16th ditto ...	5½	4½	5½	5½
Ditto 23rd ditto ...	5½	4½	6	5½
Ditto 30th ditto ...	5½	5	4½	5
Ditto 6th August 1866 ...	5½	5½	4½	5½
Ditto 13th ditto ...	5½	5	3½	4½
Ditto 20th ditto ...	5½	4½	4½	5½
Ditto 27th ditto ...	5½	4½	4½	4½
Ditto 3rd September 1866 ...	5½	5	5	5½
Ditto 10th ditto ...	6½	5½	5	5½
Ditto 17th ditto ...	7½	6	6	6½
Ditto 24th ditto ...	7½	7	6	7
Ditto 1st October 1866 ...	7½	7	7	7½
Ditto 8th ditto ...	8½	7	8½	7½
Ditto 15th ditto ...	7½	7	9	7½
Ditto 22nd ditto ...	7½	7	9	8
Ditto 29th ditto ...	7½	8½	9	8½
Ditto 5th November 1866 ...	...	8	11	9½
Ditto 12th ditto ...	...	11	17½	14½
Ditto 19th ditto ...	...	13½	17	15½
Ditto 26th ditto ...	...	15½	20	17½
Ditto 3rd December 1866 ...	...	15	20	17½
Ditto 10th ditto ...	...	15	19	17
Ditto 17th ditto ...	...	10½	19	14½
Ditto 24th ditto ...	...	10½	19	14½
Ditto 31st ditto ...	...	12	15	13½

It will be observed that, though there are some local oscillations, the downward course of the average rate is singularly regular. The result of the price table is that for the space of five months in the best supplied markets, and those most aided by Government sales, the price of food, supplied in a very intermittent way, ranged from five to ten times the ordinary or average rate. In the interior of the districts food was generally not to be procured for money, and when sold, ranged up to about thirty-five times the ordinary price.

128. We now proceed with the history of the famine from the date of the Board's Report; and our next series of papers (commencing page Appendix 49) comprises the period from 25th November to the Lieutenant Governor's visit in February. There being, as has been said, a sort of lull in the alarm in Cuttack

and Balasore, it refers almost exclusively to Pooree, till the very end of the period. The letters are perhaps placed too exactly in chronological order for easily following the correspondence in each matter, but in truth the whole correspondence is very much intermixed, and the perplexities caused by the chronological order of the letters is a good reflex of the complication which in fact resulted from the concurrent action of so many authorities. The Commissioner is far away in the hills, and though, so far as concerns writing letters, he is most attentive, his letters come far behind time, and are of comparatively little use; while the Board of Revenue, Government in the General Department, and Government in the Public Works Department, seem all to be maintaining a sort of parallel correspondence. It is only to be regretted that so many letters, so many projects, and so much zeal, should have ended in so little practical result as we shall find to have been the case, and that so much should have failed owing to the want of a common understanding between the different authorities engaged.

129. The Commissioner then being, as we have said, absent on his tour, on the 25th November 1865, the Collector of Pooree sent to the Board of Revenue the following telegram:—"Starvation at Parricood, Mallood; deaths increasing. District Superintendent viewed distress. Men deserted and families destitute. Organization of local relief attempting, but difficult from general scarcity. Ask public aid. Grain shipped to Metacooah better than money. Parricood zemindar behaving well."

The facts being thus plainly and decidedly put, the Collector's communication met with prompt and earnest attention, as the correspondence shows. The matter at once occupied both the Board of Revenue and the Government, and a succession of demi-official notes will be seen to have passed in a single day—(See Appendix, pages 49 to 52). We shall briefly review all the correspondence immediately following the first telegram taken together.

130. It may be at once said that the proposal to renew the salt manufacture (to the cessation of which the local distress about Mallood, Parricood, was in great measure attributed) recommended by the local authorities was at once rejected as inadmissible. But other measures were resolved on as follows:—

In the first instance no objection seems to have been made in principle to sending rice, and after a good deal of discussion on the question of ordering 500 tons from Burmah, it was resolved to send 250 bags* (about 18 tons) by the coasting steamer. It was also determined to ship salt from the local depôts, and sell it at Chittagong, partly to give employment in loading and despatching the salt, and partly in the hope that the vessels employed would bring back rice. Finally works for the employment of the distressed were sanctioned.

131. Eventually, however, the rice was not sent. It has not been made very clear why this was not done; it is only stated that the steamer could not take it; but we apprehend that even if room might have been made in the steamer for so small a quantity, on an emergency, her owners would not have been willing to stop, especially on a difficult shore, for so small a despatch, since later in the season in May we find that a despatch on Government account of 600 bags to False Point was refused, the Steam Company declining to send the vessel with less than 3,000 bags to a port at which they did not usually touch. Mr. Barlow went out to land the rice, the people even assembled to eat it, but it never came.

132. As respects the salt, on consideration, the Lieutenant Governor thought it better, before shipping on Government account, to "invite" Chittagong merchants to come and buy it, the price of the salt being much reduced to

* Each bag is two maunds, and a maund is 80 lbs.

the rate at which it was sold on the adjoining Madras Coast. The merchants were invited, but never came, and so that plan also came to nothing. There is much correspondence regarding the salt scheme, but such being the result, it is of little interest.

133. The public works only remain, and their history must be traced in greater detail. Meantime it may be stated that at the Collector's request Rs. 5,000 was at once sanctioned from the Government Estates Improvement Fund, to enable him to give employment to the poor at Satparah—a Government estate not far from Mallood and Parricood. The other works were of a more important character, requiring greater arrangement, and were not put in hand till the following month.

134. It was soon very apparent that the distress could not be effectually met by local private charity, which was not forthcoming with any liberality, except in one most praiseworthy instance of a man of very limited means—the zemindar of Parricood. In one of his first letters, however (27th November, Appendix page 53), Mr. Barlow says that, while he cannot guarantee that as time goes on, Government may not, as a last resource, be obliged to come forward more generally to keep the people from absolute death and starvation, still the general conditions of the district did not lead him to anticipate that such would actually be the case. In the present instance he said the circumstances were peculiar. Writing demi-officially to the Commissioner the same day, he gives an account, quoting the District Superintendent of Police, which referring to several pergunnahs in the eastern part of the district seems to show them to be almost as bad as those in the west. It is as follows:—

“Lacey says that at Sonakullah (one of the surburakaries in Khoorda, on the road before you get to Banpore,) loss of crops is complete, and the people are suffering as badly. And from what I hear of the pergunnahs of Poorubdohae, Attais, Korloo, Domarkhund, and Utrol, that the crops are all gone, coupled with the fact that there has been a heavy and unusual case of dacoity and plundering twenty-eight bullocks carrying grain on the road at a village near Gope in that direction. I am afraid that distress is great in some other parts of the district besides Parricood, &c.; but these places are connected with the general condition of the country, and have better means of obtaining extraneous help to a degree which, I have said in my letter, prevent the cases being exactly comparable. Every thing is perfectly quiet all over the district. Lacey noticed in his report that the Parricood zemindar is relieving very liberally, but his stores of grain are nearly done.”

135. On the 29th November Mr. Barlow submitted (Appendix page 56) a definite scheme for relief works on a large scale in roads running across the district. From the very first it was stated, as a necessary part of the scheme, that wages in food should be given and grain stored for the purpose, importations being again recommended, and on the 6th December the Commissioner (who had already in his No. 305½ of the 2nd December, page 57, recommended the importation of “a few ship-loads of rice”) strongly recommended the road scheme, adding that advances should at once be made for the purchase and storing of rice (No. 315¾, page 64). The Commissioner had also, on the 5th December (311½, page 63), under demi-official sanction from the Board, authorised works on Government estates, and recommended another road across the great Khoorda estate, to be paid from the Government Estates Fund, and the works were sanctioned and commenced in the following month. Mr. Grote (then alone in the Board) had, on the first mention of a road project (page 59), approved of payment in rations, and on the 12th December (page 69) the Board formally directed that on the Satparah works labor should be paid in grain, enough being given to support the laborer and those dependent on him in health. These instructions were specifically approved by the Lieutenant Governor on the 21st December (page 74).

136. Early in December (Appendix page 67), we find Mr. Barlow urging on the Deputy Magistrate another work for relief, the restoring a sacred tank at Pooree called the Naraindra Tank, to be paid for by pious Hindoos, and this work was prosecuted with considerable success.

137. Mr. Barlow's scheme for roads was urged by him with great zeal. He enlisted in the cause the Superintending Engineer, whom we find (16th December, Appendix page 70) promising that the laborers should be paid by daily labor and not by contract, and who, on the 18th December, recommended the scheme, including the payment of the laborers in rice.

138. On the 19th December (Appendix page 73), the Lieutenant Governor issued orders for the prosecution of the road works proposed for the relief of the distressed population, *viz.*, the portion of the Calcutta and Madras road running through the Pooree district between Cuttack and Ganjam, and the Cuttack and Pooree road, the latter being part of the great pilgrim route to Juggernath. Two sums, of Rs. 44,000 and 25,000, total Rs. 69,000, were assigned for these roads respectively. It does not appear that any special officers were appointed; but it was impressed on the Superintending Engineer that the matter was urgent, and that it was of great importance that the relief of the distress should be put on a proper footing. He was desired at once to proceed to the spot, and to furnish the local Executive Engineers with detailed instructions. Further, “the judicious management of large bodies of starving poor will require especial attention, and you are requested to see that proper arrangements are made.” Then follows an instruction to which attention is necessary, as it is the germ of an unfortunate policy, and in some degree misunderstanding, which destroyed the efficiency of the whole scheme:—

“It has been suggested that the relief should be given in the shape of wages paid in grain; but it is not desirable that the officers of the Public Works Department should be concerned in any arrangement of this kind. The ordinary rates of money wages should be paid to all who seek work on those terms, and any further relief required must be supplemented by the Committees formed for the purpose and by such action as the Civil Authorities can take. The Lieutenant Governor wishes you to put yourself in free communication with the Commissioner, and to arrange with him all matters that are not purely professional.”

139. On the 22nd December, the Board (No. 172 A, Appendix page 76), in reply to the Commissioner, refer him to the above orders, and add—“the Board do not think that the Government need import grain at present, as suggested by Mr. Barlow.” This letter was submitted to Government in the Public Works Department, and the Lieutenant Governor seems at that time to have been of the same opinion as respects the importation of grain. A recommendation was also made by the Board, supporting the Commissioner, to carry on the works on the road between Cuttack and Midnapore; but it does not appear that at this time this portion of the road was worked up to the ordinary estimates, or that works of any special famine character were undertaken upon it.

140. In support of the opinion that it was not then necessary to import grain Mr. Chapman has produced a letter written by Mr. Barlow from Camp (No. 1 A, Appendix page 70) on the 13th December, when he first heard that the expected supply of grain (referred to in our 130th paragraph) was not to be sent to his district. He seems to have supposed that the supply was to be sent to Gopalpore, in the Madras district of Ganjam, and to be transported by him from thence. On this supposition he applied for permission to sell it there, stating that it was not worth while to transport it by land from such a distance, and that it could be procured on the spot on rather more favorable terms as to cost. This letter may have been written under some feeling of disappointment; but it is also to be noticed that in Mr. Barlow's letter of the 22nd December (No. 298, Appendix page 75) recommending importations, he treats it a good deal as matter

of price. He there adds that the presence of the cargo of the wrecked ship which was likely to be offered for sale, alone prevented his "*decisively* asking that grain may be ordered for me by ship." Again, on the 24th December (No. 307, Appendix page 75), after reporting the result of telegraphic enquiries from Chittagong, and still treating it as matter of price, he says—"under present conditions, therefore, of the local market, it would be useless to order the grain to be imported." It appears in the early part of the correspondence that it was expected that any grain sent should be paid for from local sources, and it may be assumed that at this time, in December, just when the crop was coming in, either rice was to some extent to be had in the Pooree district, or Mr. Barlow had not yet discovered that it was not procurable.

141. This correspondence also makes clear why it was that in this part of the season rice was not imported by private merchants. In fact it did not appear that it would have paid to do so, while prices were quoted at the rates which were published in December and part of January. Prices in all the neighbouring provinces were so generally enhanced that even rates which in Orissa, usually so cheap, approached to famine rates, did not suffice to bring in grain. It seems to have been principally with reference to the December correspondence that the Board afterwards, on the 24th January (when in truth things had wholly changed), made the report already alluded to, that prices in the Pooree district were "happily insufficient to tempt exporters from the opposite coast." Supposing the facts to have been as the Board supposed, we think it might have been much more properly said that prices generally were unhappily too high to admit of profitable import.

142. In December Mr. Barlow had been making a tour in the most distressed part of the south-western portion of his district, and on the 29th December, he submitted to the Commissioner a full report and diary, containing details of an extremely distressing character, which will be found in the Appendix, page 78. He seems to have felt bound to be very careful not to exaggerate or too highly color his picture; but nevertheless, he gives his "revised opinion as to the prospective condition of the people" in the brief words of a previous telegram, *viz.*—"Destitution general and complete," and he added, "it is that to which I most distinctly hold."

143. The above specially refers to the pergunnahs visited by Mr. Barlow; but he goes on:—"I think I may properly accompany this report with a brief notice of the measures that have been suggested or put in operation for the relief of the distress in the district. I speak of all parts of the district, for I have received several reports from the Assistant Collector engaged in duty in Chowbeesood Khas Mehal and the neighbourhood, announcing that the most serious distress is prevailing in that part of the country surrounding the lake, east, and that many deaths by starvation have occurred." The reports of Mr. Livesay, the Assistant Collector, will be found in the Appendix, page 111, and a letter from him to Mr. Barlow, of the 13th January, at page 96, shows very clearly that famine was prevalent at that time, and that mortality had resulted in the eastern part of the district in the Gope division. Mr. Barlow concludes his letter of the 29th December by reviewing the various measures proposed for relief. We may here say that nothing could be more active or devoted than his action in the matter.

144. The Commissioner forwarded Mr. Barlow's report to the Board on the 12th January; but about the same time (being himself still far away in camp), he seems to have thought it necessary somewhat to restrain the Collector's zeal with respect to the expenditure of money on Government estates. In his letter, No. 333A of the 11th January (Appendix page 94), he says—"I would, however, deprecate the commencement of too many works of any sort at the same time; where people are starving, they will go ten to twelve miles to procure work and food, and it appears unnecessary, in order to afford relief, to undertake works of questionable

utility in any village merely because there happens to be a scarcity there; the people must go to the works and not the works to the people. The orders of the Board contained in the latter paragraph of their letter to you, should be carefully adhered to."

145. The state of the country at this time is further shown by Mr. Barlow's letter to the Commissioner, of the 16th January (No 47, Appendix page 97), recommending the Government to induce people to refrain from visiting Pooree by "making widely known the fact of famine existing in these parts." He added that if people congregated as usual, "cholera, among other diseases, working upon the starving and reduced mass of human beings, must produce destruction and loss of human life to a degree fearful to contemplate." The Commissioner seems to have somewhat softened the report of present famine into—"cholera is unusually prevalent in Pooree, due probably to scarcity of food," but he also dwelt on the risk of famine and the disastrous consequences which might result from an influx of pilgrims, and in that shape his communication was widely published.

146. On the 30th December, in a letter to the Superintending Engineer, referring to his suggestions that the laborers on relief works should be paid in rice, the Secretary Public Works Department says (Appendix page 92)—"The Lieutenant Governor does not approve of any part of the wages of the laborers who may be employed on the works above referred to being paid in kind; the payments should be made in coin at the usual rates, and anything that may be necessary to enable these wages to purchase food advantageously will be carried out under local arrangement." On the 6th January the Superintending Engineer writes to the Commissioner (page 93)—"as it is very necessary to provide food for so many coolies, and as this will not be within the power of the department to arrange for, I have directed the Executive Engineers to communicate with the Collector, soliciting his aid in obtaining an ample supply of rice at a fair market value." And on the same date, reporting to Government to the same effect, he says—"I am afraid that no bunneahs will come forward to sell grain at any fair rate." On the 11th January (No. 333 D, page 96), the Commissioner directed the Collectors of Pooree and Cuttack to afford every assistance in procuring food. In case of necessity, he authorised them to "purchase rice at the cheapest available market" and retail it. For this purpose he suggested that the Public Works Department might advance money from the sums sanctioned for the roads.

147. Whatever may have been the case in December, it is abundantly clear that in January rice was not to be had in any quantities in the Pooree district. Mr. Barlow (ever actively anxious about the measures of relief in progress, whether under himself or in another department), on the 15th of that month wrote a letter to the Executive Engineer with reference to the proposal for purchasing food for the laborers, to which we solicit attention. It will be found at page 99 of the Appendix. He speaks of "*a danger likely to interfere materially with, if not actually put a stop to, the works,*" *viz.*, the want of food. He shows that while as yet but 300 persons employed near the town make great complaints of the difficulty of procuring grain, and express great anxiety to receive their wages in kind instead of money, when the numbers increase, and the distance from the town becomes greater, supplies will not be procurable, since "*it is one of the features observable in the famine*" that "*the city is the only place where a certain supply (small though it be) of grain is to be found, while in various parts of the interior, none at all is procurable.*" He goes on—"the difficulty foreseen must be met, since under no circumstances whatever must this opportunity of relief, which the liberality of Government has provided through your department, be allowed to fail or become crippled, whether it be from want of energy or fear of responsibility;"

and he proceeds to give details of a plan for purchasing and storing grain; the Public Works to advance money, with which he would import rice and deliver it at the works.

Prices were then still quoted in the latest returns at the cheaper rates which they had reached during the harvest, but Mr. Barlow explains;—"it is a fact that these quoted rates are profitless, and only mislead where they are taken as a guide, and for as much as Rs. 500 worth (or one might say Rs. 100 worth), the supply of 1,000 or more coolies for a day, could not be obtained perhaps on a single occasion (and most undoubtedly not kept up for any time) in any place where there is a bazaar in the district, it is obvious that so far as the benefit in supporting your laborers is concerned, the quoted rates might be just as well a rupee a seer. In either case the article is not procurable." While thus in the district a large supply could not be procured at all, and any action in the way of intercepting the small supplies procurable would extend the distress in the country generally, he "*makes it a condition*" that the rice required should be imported, and would do so even if the cost does not compare favorably with the present quoted rates of the district. He puts it then specifically whether the Public Works Department would—

1. Agree to his plan of importing.
2. Agree to it without limit of price.

Or 3. Agree to it with a limit of price.

148. The Executive Engineer, Lieutenant Nolan, received the proposition in the best spirit, at once agreed to it, and without delay reported the matter and forwarded the correspondence to his superior the Superintending Engineer, requesting permission to make the required advances, with the brief but emphatic declaration—"not only our works, but the people's lives are depending on an early supply of rice." (Appendix page 102).

149. Both Mr. Barlow and the Commissioner had derived the idea from the prices current that rice was to be had on better terms at Balasore, and they both wrote for it. The answer, however, was decisive—"No rice had been purchased, since none was procurable." At Balasore also the quoted rates seem to have been quite nominal, as regards at least any considerable supply.

150. Meantime, however, another difficulty had arisen. The higher we go, the greater seems to be the respect for the departmental rules usually called "red tape." The Superintending Engineer, though zealous in the cause, thought the proposal that his department should advance funds for rice quite contrary to the orders which he had received, and telegraphed to Calcutta on the 24th January,—"Commissioner and Collector of Pooree wish me to advance twenty thousand rupees for purchase of rice. I object, considering that your orders leave the onus of providing rice on the civil authorities. Orders requested at once."

The order was decisively conveyed on the 26th January by the Secretary to Government of Bengal, Public Works Department, under instructions of the Lieutenant Governor* in the following terms:—

"Your proceedings in refusing advance approved. This department cannot have any concern with providing rice."

151. On that very same day, the 26th January, the Board of Revenue issued the following order to the Commissioner:—"You will have observed from Government Order (Public Works Department), dated the 30th December last, forwarded to you with No. 6179, that His Honor the Lieutenant Governor does not approve of the payment *in kind* of the wages of the laborers employed on the public works undertaken in your division, to afford relief to the people

* See His Honor's statement, answer No. 8, Examination page xcii.

who are suffering from the scarcity of food. I am desired, therefore, to request that you will instruct the Collector of Pooree to pay *in cash* instead of *grain*, as previously ordered by the Board, the wages of the persons engaged in digging a tank in the Government estate Satparah in that district—(vide Board's No. 705A, dated the 13th December last). The cash payments should be fixed, however, upon the principle of their previous orders, *i. e.*, so much only should be paid as will provide food sufficient to sustain the laborer and his family in health."

152. These orders, reversing the previous orders for payment in food, and strictly limiting all payments to cash, are stated to have been in pursuance of a principle laid down by Government. It does not seem to us that the Government did lay down any principle, but rather only a departmental and professional rule of the Public Works Department; and since the true meaning of the orders in the latter department was not that laborers should not be fed, but only that this duty should fall on the civil department exclusively, the order seems inapplicable to works carried on by the civil officers themselves. It was, however, carried out to the great detriment of the local measures of relief. A copy of the Board's order was communicated to the Government of Bengal in the General Department; but His Honor the Lieutenant Governor does not recollect that it was brought to his personal notice, and states that if his attention had been attracted to the matter, he would certainly have disapproved of it. There seems, in fact, in this whole matter to have been an unfortunate misunderstanding between the Public Works Department and the Revenue Department of the Government of Bengal, which lasted for months, in fact till the full outburst of the famine, and produced very injurious consequences. The Public Works Department threw the provision of food on "the civil authorities," while the civil officers being wholly prohibited from purchasing food by the Board of Revenue, acting on what they supposed to be the views of the Government, were unable to supply the laborers.

153. It does not very clearly appear on the correspondence up to the 31st January, nor in the evidence (most of the above correspondence came to light after the evidence was recorded), how intelligence of the state of things was conveyed to the Commissioner leading to his telegram of the 31st January which we are about to notice. The explanation must be sought in Mr. Barlow's letter No. 338, though officially, dated the following day, 1st February (Appendix page 103). It appears that the executive Engineer was to have provided Rs. 20,000 and Mr. Barlow Rs. 10,000, making a total of Rs. 30,000, available for importation; but that Mr. Crommelin, the Superintending Engineer, having demurred, and having been finally prohibited from making advances as already stated, Mr. Barlow had seen Mr. Crommelin, who himself took charge of the letter regarding importation addressed to Mr. Nolan, for the purpose of laying it before the Commissioner. In fact the correctness of Mr. Barlow's views regarding the rates had been already proved by the very rapid enhancement of prices, the quoted rates having gone up from 13 seers for the week ending 15th January to 8½ seers for the week ending 29th January, or, as we have already said, to decided famine prices. "It is not necessary for me to repeat here," says Mr. Barlow to the Commissioner, "the various arguments which I made use of (in his letter to Mr. Nolan) to show the absolute necessity of carrying out the arrangements at once for storing grain to feed the laborers on the various works, if it is intended to give practical effect to the Government orders for giving relief by employment to the distressed people of the district at this time. I will only, therefore, add that further enquiry has made it more certain than ever that grain for storing cannot be obtained in this district, and consequently, whatever is done, recourse must be had to importation from other districts."

154. Mr. Ravenshaw returned to Cuttack from his tour on the 31st January, and it is evident that immediately on his arrival, either through the officers of the Public Works Department or otherwise, the substance of the above information, and something more, reached him. A critical time had arrived, and he despatched, that very day, the following telegram to the Board of Revenue, which seems to us of a very important and emergent character:—

“Famine relief is at a stand-still. Public Works Department refuse to advance money to Collectors to purchase rice. Pooree must get rice from elsewhere. May I authorise advance for this purpose for* Cuttack, Balasore, or Pooree.”

The answer received was very decisive, as conveyed in the following telegram from the Board, dated the 1st February:—

“Your message received. The Government decline to import rice into Pooree. If the market favors importers, rice will find its way to Pooree without Government interference, which can only do harm. All payments for labor employed to relieve the present distress are to be in cash.”

155. The result of that unfortunate telegram seems to have been to stifle and put an end to discussion regarding the importation of rice, from that time till a period when the state both of the weather and of the people rendered it too late to import it with successful effect.

156. Mr. Ravenshaw, accepting to the full the principle of action imposed on him, issued a series of orders in that sense. On the 2nd February he wrote to the Collector of Pooree—“You will have learned from copy of Board’s letter, No. 16A, dated 26th January 1866, that not only on works undertaken by the Public Works Department, but also those sanctioned as measures of relief from local and khas mehal funds, labor is to be paid for in cash, and not in grain; this will not only vastly simplify your arrangements, but will prevent any possible interference with the ordinary course of trade in grain.

“I feel convinced that you will, after probably some difficulty at first, find that where there is money to pay for food, it will be procurable at the ordinary market rates, and any attempt to undersell the market would even, in the case of extensive charity, produce very serious confusion and complication.” He went on to suggest that endeavors should be made to procure shopkeepers to sell grain by paying them a monthly salary, to be defrayed from the local relief subscriptions.

On the 5th February, in answer to Mr. Barlow’s letter, No. 338 of the 1st February, he wrote to the same effect—“Both Government in the Public Works Department,” he said, “and the Board of Revenue have decided finally that the wages of laborers employed in famine relief works are to be paid in money and not in grain. It is considered that to supply grain will interfere with legitimate trade.”

157. On the same date he goes still further. On the 1st February Mr. Barlow had reported (see his letter No. 339, Appendix page 104) that works had been commenced from private subscriptions on the Naraindra Tank, and that the subscriptions to the relief fund paid or promised amounted to Rs. 5,000. He added,—“I do not anticipate much further increase to the amount subscribed to the relief fund. We are now endeavoring to purchase rice for storage, and it is the idea of the Committee that the mode of relief should take the form of distribution of cooked food regularly at certain principal places central to the localities where severest distress prevails.”

Mr. Ravenshaw’s reply, No. 375 of 5th February, (Appendix page 109) approves of all “with the exception of distributing cooked rice.” He proceeds—“It is the object of the Government and the Board of Revenue, in the recent orders

* The word is so written; but we think that “from” must have been intended.

connected with works commenced under Government control, to provide means of subsistence to the destitute who will take the trouble to work for it; but the distribution of rice or payment in grain has been disapproved as bad in principle and inconvenient in practice. The Board’s opinion, referred to, undoubtedly applies to works undertaken by the relief subscription fund; where the people employed are capable of work they should be paid in money.

“I altogether disapprove of distribution of cooked food, even to the most destitute, or you will soon find the whole population thrown on your hands. Work is exceedingly distasteful to the majority of the population, but it is hoped that they will prefer it to the only other alternative—starvation.”

158. We think there can be no doubt that these orders were most mistaken and unfortunate. It is probably due to them (though we had not the order at the time and did not sufficiently sift the point in examination) that the Pooree Committee, departing from their previous intention, adopted a system of out-door relief by allowances in money to distressed families at their own houses. For that system, administered by Native subscribers themselves, very much is to be said in the case where food is procurable; but in the present instance it had this peculiar disadvantage that it prevented the full extent of the distress from becoming unmistakably apparent. Nothing is more clear than this that, though, on the one hand, many will not resort to relief centres for cooked food till the last extremity, on the other, the misery among the very poorest is never properly known till the offer of food brings out from their hiding-places the poorest and most miserable objects. This was very evident in other districts where relief in food was given. Balasore presented terrible famine scenes long before the district was nearly so bad as Pooree, and in Midnapore Mr. Herschel, the Magistrate and Collector, tells us how the existing misery was suddenly brought to his knowledge when food was offered. In Pooree, while the distress was becoming deeper and the mortality greater day by day, it was not concentrated and brought to view by the distribution of food. If the Committee had been left to act as they originally proposed, they might possibly have imported and distributed rice, and set an example which would have led to earlier measures on a larger scale.

159. On the 10th February, Mr. Ravenshaw sends a second reply to Mr. Barlow’s letter, No. 338 of 1st February, and after referring to the Board’s “final instructions,” he says—“It will, therefore, not be necessary for you to take any further steps to purchase rice or to supply it to the people beyond affording every encouragement and facility to private mahajuns and dealers to open stores and sell at current rates to the people.

“I have to acknowledge with thanks the well directed and vigorous exertions you have made in the matter, and can only regret the impossibility of carrying out your proposed arrangements regarding payment for labor in grain.”

There in fact the correspondence regarding relief by supplying food seems to have ended, till it was afterwards revived in a terrible shape.

160. After visiting the works, the Superintending Engineer addressed detailed instructions to the Executive Engineers, and communicated them to the Commissioner and to Government. The correspondence is printed in Appendix page 105. The Executive Engineer, Pooree division, was told that the work on the Pooree road was intended “for alleviating the distress of the suffering population round and about Pooree,” and “the chief distress being at and to the south of Pooree,” he was to commence work on the part of the road nearest Pooree. The following portion of the instructions must be quoted:—“Taking into consideration the limited extent of work to be executed by this department in the distressed districts, and the almost certainty of the distress becoming far more extended a few months hence, and the drain on our resources

consequently greater and more urgently necessary, I consider it incumbent upon us to, as far as possible, husband our available resources so as to be able to meet any necessity that may hereafter arise.

"To enable us to do this, we must now only employ those who are really in distress, and not extend an offer of employment to all and every one who may apply for it. In many places the population is comparatively well provided, and by no means in actual want. By employing men from such localities at the present time we are not relieving actual distress, but are spending funds which may and probably will be most urgently required hereafter.

"Keeping in view then the fact that no really distressed man, woman, or child is to be turned away from the work, I rely on your at present keeping your gangs as small as possible. I am perfectly aware of the difficulty in distinguishing between those who are or are not in actual distress, but a little discrimination will prevent much imposition. The districts from which people come will be a very fair guide in regulating employment.

"If these instructions are fairly carried out, I think your gangs will not at present exceed 1,500.

"You will, of course, pay the laborers daily, or allow them piece-work if they wish for it; but you will bear in mind that it is not your duty to have anything to do with the providing of food for the people, as this duty falls entirely on the civil department; at the same time, if it be in your power to do anything to assist in the matter, I need hardly say that you should do so."

161. It should be explained that though the work on the Ganjam road was in the Pooree district, it is in the Cuttack division of public works. The instructions to the Cuttack Engineer were to the same effect; but there is one important order which is omitted in the letter to the Pooree Engineer—"Daily payments or piece-work, if preferred by the laborers, must be insisted on. No petty contracts can be allowed." Under these instructions considerable relief was for a time afforded on this road by daily payment to people not strong enough to work by the piece.

162. The Superintending Engineer's instructions to both Engineers to keep the gang as small as possible on the ground of "the almost certainty of the distress becoming far more extended a few months hence" seem to us to have been altogether a mistake. We do not know what ground he had for assuming that more money might not be had; on the contrary he had been told that, if necessary, applications for additional funds would be favorably considered; and in fact it will soon be seen that the money granted was not expended. Relief in the form of regular public works is only effective in the early stage of distress, and by way of preventing the people from lapsing into extreme distress. In fact it may be said to be the relief of the able-bodied, and little effective for those already far reduced by starvation. From February to May is the season when such relief is most wanted. From the commencement of the rains it is for the most part impossible and ineffectual, as it proved in the present instance. Little work can then be carried on, and moreover, if distress has not passed a certain point, labor is absorbed in agricultural operations; if it has passed that point, it is for the most part beyond effectual relief by works.

163. In communicating his instructions to the Commissioner, Mr. Crommelin says that they "are based on the conclusions arrived at by us both, viz., that though there is doubtless a great deal of distress among the generality of the population, yet that actual want is restricted to but a small tract of country," while, "in all human probability, the effects of the present scarcity will be more severely felt a few months hence, and will require, of course, a larger amount of relief." As respects the supply of food, he says:—"The subject of providing food for the people is one of great difficulty, and I do not venture to

offer any decided opinion on the subject, as the district officers and yourself are so much better acquainted with the resources of the district. However, I think, I may say that I fully agree with your opinion, expressed to me personally, viz., that it would be better to pay bunnahs a certain monthly salary to induce them to supply food than for Government to interfere and purchase and sell on its own account, provided, of course, there is grain in the country. If there should not be, it would seem absolutely necessary for Government to purchase rice at once for retail sale. Whatever decision you may arrive at on this point, I trust you will give the necessary orders to the district officers to see, if possible, that the people employed both on the Ganjam and Pooree roads are properly supplied, as I am of opinion that, unless the civil authorities do make such arrangements, the people will be supplied in no other way, and the efforts made by this department will fall to the ground."

164. In reply, the Commissioner (No. 36 of 11th February, page 110) fully concurs in the opinions expressed, and approves of the orders issued, adding—"You will observe, from the enclosed copy of the Board's No. A, dated 26th January, that it has been finally determined not to pay for labor in grain." There that correspondence seems to end. It was reported to Government with Superintending Engineer's (1636 of 3rd February, page 108), in which it was likewise stated that other works were not required at present, but that should further expenditure be afterwards necessary, it would be duly reported.

165. It has been explained to us that this correspondence was not laid before the Lieutenant Governor before His Honor's visit to Orissa, and that after his return it was disposed of by this endorsement—"No orders; these matters were discussed during Cuttack tour." We have not been able to obtain any exact information regarding the nature of these discussions. Mr. Crommelin (examination page xl) does not remember any consultation, had no conversation with the Lieutenant Governor regarding rice or relief works, but the subject was probably mentioned in conversation with Colonel Nicolls. Mr. Ravenshaw (examination page lxii) does not recollect any discussion on the special subject of the difficulty regarding relief works for want of grain. Colonel Nicolls (Secretary to Government of Bengal, Public Works Department) (examination page clxxvii) knows that His Honor was aware of the question. He says that the general subject of the relief works was discussed in Orissa, and the result was that the arrangements made were satisfactory; does not remember anything particular about the supply of food; that rested with the Commissioner and Relief Committees; had no reason to suppose that they had not made sufficient arrangements, but did not make special enquiry, "the duty of seeing after this arrangement not being in our department." Never heard of the Commissioner's telegram; his attention was never attracted to the subject. His Honor the Lieutenant Governor (examination page xciii) does not remember any actual discussions on the subject with Mr. Crommelin. Mr. Crommelin was in constant communication with Colonel Nicolls. The impression derived by His Honor was that the works were going on satisfactorily.

166. The result was that no further orders were issued till June. Mr. Barlow did all that he possibly could; but there can be no doubt that the works were rendered to a very great degree inoperative for want of rice to feed the laborers. Mr. Ravenshaw's own statement is to that effect (examination page lxii). He says that the local officers were directed to make arrangements to enable the laborers to procure food, but it was found impossible to do so, the Collector having neither rice nor agency at his disposal, and finding it impossible to attract shop-keepers. Mr. Crommelin says—"I think the want of grain excessively diminished the efficiency of my works as measures of relief." Mr. Nolan, the Executive Engineer, says "there were great fluctuations in the number employed, and the scarcity of rice was the chief cause." And even about Cuttack, Mr. Levinge, Executive Engineer of the Irrigation

Company, tells us (examination page xlv.) "in the end of February there was great difficulty in procuring rice for money," and "on the 14th March at Kendraparah, Cuttack district, there was an almost absolute impossibility of procuring rice." He states that in the early part of the year, "the supply of laborers was greatly affected by the scarcity of rice, the numbers fluctuated exceedingly. We were only able to keep together the imported laborers by paying them in rice. I introduced this system about the middle of January, immediately after we imported rice from Calcutta." He explains, however, that they had not rice enough to feed all the laborers, and goes on—"I attribute the diminution of the number of laborers from January to February and from February to March entirely to mortality and the difficulty in procuring food. I consider that this system of part payment in rice should have been applied also to the Government works, and I think that the efficiency of the works undertaken and the relief of the distress was greatly diminished by the neglect to adopt this system."

167. There was another cause of difficulty not peculiar to Orissa—the attempt to enforce task-works. The professional officers have a natural dislike to disbursing money for insufficient works; even when daily pay is given, they are expected to show an out-turn in proportion to the disbursement, and their ordinary rates and professional character are put in jeopardy when exceptional systems grow up. On the other hand, whether in Orissa, or in Ireland, or in most other countries, people employed from charitable reasons have the greatest possible objection to task-work. At first, on the Orissa works daily pay was given; but the out-turn proved quite insufficient, and then the officers in charge enforced task-works.

168. In January, when food was not so scarce as a little later, and task-work was not enforced, people came freely to the works; but under the Superintending Engineer's directions they were not all received, only selected persons. This difficulty, however, soon disappeared. On the Pooree road task-work at rates which seem, under the special circumstances, insufficient was introduced early in February, and the want of food and task-work together seem to have almost stopped the works. The number of persons employed in February averaged only about 100, the Superintending Engineer having hoped to limit the gangs to 1,500 (see paragraph 160). That was, we gather, the condition of things during the Lieutenant Governor's visit, and it seems the more surprising that it should not have provoked special discussion.

On the other road, in the Ganjam direction, food seems to have been easier to procure, and both daily pay was given for a longer period and task-work was offered at better rates, so that some considerable relief was there afforded, to about 1,200 persons, we are told. There, however, the works were subjected to two unfortunate interruptions, and later, just when things were getting to their worst, the rule of task-work was introduced.

169. Altogether, there can be no doubt that these works failed to fulfil their original intention of giving relief to "large masses of starving poor," since they only employed comparatively small numbers of persons paid in a form which scarcely enabled them to live.

170. We are decidedly of opinion that in the beginning of February 1866 the time had come when the Government might properly have imported rice into the Pooree district, and we think that the telegrams of Mr. Crommelin and Mr. Ravenshaw of the 24th and 31st January mark the point when either importation should have been ordered to render effective the public works contemplated for the relief of the starving, or special enquiry should have been made which, in all probability, would have brought to light the deficiency of grain and the necessity of importation for purposes still more extended. If grain had been ordered for the works, they might have been immensely extended. Pro-

bably the Pooree Relief Committee would have sought to be supplied from a similar source; the want would have been made apparent by the rush of consumers; from other quarters demands would have been freely made; and much might have been done in time which was unfortunately only attempted out of time.

171. But it now appears that the facts never fully came to the knowledge of the Head of the Government of Bengal; and we may properly here—

1st.—Enquire how this defect of information occurred.

2nd.—Enquire how the belief arose that there existed in the country stocks sufficient to feed the people.

3rd.—Explain why private enterprise did not suffice to meet the demand, and why it would have been, in our opinion, proper that Government should, as an exceptional duty, import food.

172. We have attributed great importance to Mr. Ravenshaw's telegram of the 31st January and the Board's reply of the following day.

The Board do not seem to have looked at the matter in the same light.

It is pointed out that the correspondence of Mr. Barlow and Mr. Nolan, which we have quoted, was not laid before the Board, that the telegram was in some sense a single and isolated communication, and that the usual official practice would be that an important telegraphic communication would be followed by a full report, which, in this instance, never was sent. So much is true. But, on the other hand, we think that the telegram was on its face of extreme importance, and that coming in an isolated and sudden way immediately on the return of Mr. Ravenshaw from his tour, it should have received especial attention. If Mr. Ravenshaw had been what we may call a stronger officer, more experienced, better acquainted with the condition of affairs, and more confident in the opinions which he hastily telegraphed, no doubt he would not have been content with a single refusal, but would have pressed the matter; in fact, we think, he should have pressed it. It must be remembered, however, that but a short time previous, he had received the Board's orders of the 10th January, disapproving of his conduct in permitting enquiry into losses by a drought in very decided terms. About the same time he received the Board's letter of the 26th January, desiring that wages should be paid in cash and not in grain, as a rule settled both by the Board and the Government. His own opinions had generally been that large stocks of grain existed, and his telegram of the 31st January was, as it were, extorted from him by the pressure of the moment. The reply, short, sharp, and decisive, came so quickly as to leave little time for report. On the whole, then, we can hardly be surprised that Mr. Ravenshaw accepted the order as conclusive, though we must regret that he carried it out with such unflinching zeal, and even went considerably beyond it.

173. It appears that the words of which the Board made use in their telegram—"the Government decline to import rice into Pooree"—were not founded on any special communications with the Government, after receipt of Mr. Ravenshaw's telegrams, but only on the Board's general knowledge that it was not the policy of Government to import. As the wording of the telegram was calculated to convey the impression that the particular order was the order of Government, and the result may have been unfortunate in preventing remonstrance at the time, or discussion when His Honor soon after visited the province, we have thought it necessary to enquire under what circumstances it was issued. We find that, on receipt of Mr. Ravenshaw's telegram, the Secretary to the Board made the following note:—"We may tell Mr. Ravenshaw that the Government has no intention of importing rice into Pooree. If the prices are such as to make the import of rice profitable, it will find its way there naturally."

Upon this Mr. Grote noted—"Quite so. I presume Mr. Ravenshaw has just returned from his tour, and knows nothing of rice being sold at 12 seers per rupee in Pooree, and has not heard of our disapproval of paying in rice for labor."

1-2.

A. G.

Under this Mr. Cockburn's initials are appended; and the telegram went in the form already given.

174. We are compelled here to make the observation that, as long as Mr. Ravenshaw's reports and opinions were in accordance with those of the Board of Revenue, he was considered a most reliable authority; in fact he has been described by that body as "sagacious"; but it seems to us when he expressed opinions of a contrary tendency, they were sometimes treated without the same respect. In the present instance, his ignorance of that which he ought to have known seems to have been too readily assumed.

175. We have no doubt that the telegram of the 31st January ought to have been communicated to the Government of Bengal. But it is stated that the Members of the Board were then in intimate communication with the Head of the Government, and it is pointed out that within a few days of that time, the Lieutenant Governor himself proceeded to Orissa, accompanied by a Member of the Board, who had signed the Board's order, so that, in communication with Mr. Cockburn and the local officers on the spot, His Honor had the opportunity of becoming much better acquainted with the facts than the Board were. This brings us to the Lieutenant Governor's visit to Orissa, which we have made the concluding point of the correspondence which we have been analysing.

176. To show what information regarding the famine was in possession of the local officers at that time, we have here placed in the Appendix (pages 111 and 113) an abstract of notices in the reports of Mr. Livesay, Assistant Collector, engaged in making enquiries into losses by drought previous to receipt of the Board's orders, and further reports of the District Superintendent of Police. Of the latter those made to the Magistrate seem to have been generally communicated to the Commissioner; those made to the Deputy Inspector General were not formally communicated either to the Magistrate or the Commissioner; but Mr. Lacey states that he was living next door to Mr. Barlow, and in constant communication with him; that in fact Mr. Barlow was in full possession of his views. The reports of Mr. Livesay and Mr. Lacey establish with precision the fact (which is also to be generally gathered from the evidence) that throughout the period up to the middle of February, famine of a distressing character may be said to have been constantly present in parts of the district other than Mallood and Parricood, the divisions of Chowbeesood, Rahang, and Gope being much affected.

177. On the 2nd February the Superintendent of Police makes a record of his opinions, which subsequent events have proved to be singularly correct—"Rice 7 seers* per rupee. I fear it will be 3 and 4 seers before we have got through the next six months. A terrible famine is now certain." Some reports of the local Native officers in the early part of February also suggest a prospect of extreme gloom at a time when so many months of want lay before the people.

178. At this time starvation had appeared at Balasore also, and a great outburst of lawless plunder (from the first attributed to want) had taken place in the district. There is nothing to show that the influx of starving people to the town and station of Balasore had been brought to the Commissioner's notice at the time of the Lieutenant Governor's visit, but we have given a list of gang robberies in the Balasore district from the beginning to middle of February, because these cases are reported to the Commissioner, and much of this must have been known to him. The general plunder of grain and the circumstance

* Local seers of 105 rupees.

that in every case the plunderers were recognized or are said to have been recognised by the plundered as persons well known to them, sufficiently indicate the character of the crime.

179. The Lieutenant Governor's visit to Orissa was a short one, and occurred in the middle of February. It will be seen that Mr. Cockburn and Colonel Nicolls were of the party. It seems to have been understood on the spot that the principal objects of His Honor's visit were to see the irrigation works at Cuttack, and hold a durbar to receive the Native chiefs and zemindars; but His Honor informs us that his objects were of a more general character, and that, so far as his visit had any specialty, it had reference to the famine. His Honor made very little stay at Pooree, having landed there one day (13th February), and left for Cuttack the following evening. At Cuttack His Honor remained from 15th to 19th (one day being a Sunday), and in that time he held a levee and a durbar, visited the public offices, missions, and schools, visited the Irrigation Company's works and anicuts one day, and the Kendraparah canal another; was entertained at a banquet by the Irrigation Company; and was throughout most accessible to the Natives of all classes (Mr. Ravenshaw's examination, pages lxii-iii). On the evening of the 19th, His Honor left for Calcutta, travelling by way of False Point.

180. We have mentioned these particulars inasmuch as there seems to have been an unfortunate misunderstanding throughout the visit, the effects of which were very serious. His Honor tells us neither before nor during his visit did the special difficulty regarding the procuring of rice for the laborers, the opinions on the necessity of importing entertained by some of the local officers, nor the correspondence which had passed on the subject, come in any shape to his knowledge. His Honor seems to have remained under the full impression that satisfactory arrangements had been made. He does not remember to have had much conversation with Mr. Cockburn on the subject of the famine, and the misapprehensions of the Board remained undiscovered. Mr. Cockburn was well the day on which the party were at Pooree, but was taken ill that night, and seems never again to have been fit for business. His illness was, we believe, of a peculiarly depressing character, which disinclined him for business and even for conversation.

181. It is clear that the local officers did not press the facts within their knowledge on the Lieutenant Governor, as they might and should have done. But, on the other hand, it is to be remembered that they had already received what they conceived to be decisive, peremptory, and final orders. Mr. Ravenshaw had, as has been seen, accepted those orders in the fullest degree. He tells us "the idea of a general famine had not at that time entered my head," and though he says that during the Lieutenant Governor's visit the prevailing scarcity and general difficulty in procuring grain were constant topics of discussion, and that His Honor spoke to him several times on the subject, he adds that he (Mr. Ravenshaw) expressed an opinion that there were probably sufficient stocks of grain in the country, and that though it might be dear, it would be procurable for money. The subordinate officers may possibly have thought that it was not for them to volunteer information in the presence of their chiefs, and the head of the Public Works Department seems to have thought that the duty of providing food having been altogether put on the civil authorities, it was not for him to make representations on the subject. The fact seems to be that only officers of official boldness were likely to speak voluntarily under the circumstances, and the subordinate local officers do not seem to have had that boldness.

182. Our greatest difficulty is to understand why Mr. Barlow and the other local officers of the Pooree district did not make the state of affairs fully known to the Lieutenant Governor. Mr. Livesay and Mr. Lacey, who had seen and reported the distress, and the latter of whom had so recently

expressed such strong opinions of the certainty of terrible famine, were both present, and seem to say that, not being asked, they did not speak. The local officers of public works were also well aware of the distress and difficulty about rice. Mr. Nolan's letter of the 16th January has been quoted, and Mr. Crane, Overseer of the road close to Pooree, says that when he took charge in the beginning of February, the people were in a wretched and emaciated state; that when the Lieutenant Governor passed, the famine was bad, but not at its worst. Native officers and others had interviews with the Lieutenant Governor, and seem to have spoken generally of the state of the country as bad, and to have said that people were dying, but not to have specifically urged the importation of rice; the fact being that they had not the least hope that Government would undertake such a duty. His Honor has explained that the visible appearances of famine mentioned by some Native witnesses were not really of the precise character which their statements would imply.

183. As regards Mr. Barlow himself, it is in respect of his reticence at this time, and the character and want of urgency and frequency of his reports in the period immediately subsequent (when the famine was certainly greatly increasing), that we are much embarrassed by his absence; and as he is in England, we would suggest that in justice to an officer who has so honorably distinguished himself in this great crisis, an opportunity should be given to him of explaining his own views and motives. At present we can only conjecture them. He constantly repeats in his letters that he can only state facts, and cannot pretend to be a judge of questions of political economy. The orders which he had received in reply to his proposals to import rice, pay for labor in food, and distribute cooked food regularly at certain central places, were, as it has been seen, of the most decided and final character, and apparently conveyed on the express authority of Government and the Board. It appears that the Board had, in some degree, misapprehended the Government, and failed to apprehend the Commissioner, while the Commissioner had, as it were, over-apprehended the Board, and had in consequence issued to Mr. Barlow the orders quoted in our 156th, 157th, and 159th paragraph. The consequence seems to have been that Mr. Barlow did not venture to recur to the subject of importation. Still we cannot but think that the Lieutenant Governor must be mistaken in supposing that Mr. Barlow in any degree acquiesced in the opinion that the stocks in the country were ample. His recent written statements to the contrary were so forcible and so reasonable that this seems impossible. Mr. Crommelin also could hardly have expressed any such decided opinion, see his letter quoted in our 163rd paragraph.

184. As respects the general distress in the Pooree district, it is mentioned by the Lieutenant Governor in the minute communicated to us that it was represented to him that things had not changed for the worse since Mr. Barlow's report of the 29th December was written. In truth that report gave a very gloomy view of matters, and in one respect there certainly had since been a change for the worse, *viz.*, that rice was very much enhanced in price, and the difficulty of procuring it greatly increased. It was in fact in February at complete famine price, as we have before shown. It will be observed, too, that almost every one seems to have concurred in the view (derived from universal experience of the course of the seasons) that whatever distress there was in February, it must increase as the season advanced; the most sanguine justified delay and the husbanding of resources on that ground.

185. The Lieutenant Governor, however, informs us that when he visited Pooree, Mr. Barlow's view was not gloomy; that he went over the report of the 29th December, and was told that there was a decided improvement in every place except Gope, and that all that was required was employment for the distressed.

We can only suppose that Mr. Barlow, not seeing as we now see, that the full tide of famine had about this time begun to flow in, after the slight relaxation (if it can be called relaxation in Pooree), of the harvest season, and accepting the doctrine of political economy laid down by his superiors that demand for food would create a supply, was ready to hope that the offer of labor would mitigate the distress.

186. At Cuttack the state of things was different. As we have before explained, the money and labor (to some extent paid in rice) of the Irrigation Company, and perhaps the smaller export of grain, had rendered the distress later, and there was as yet no actual famine. But even there the latest official return (12th February) gave the rate of rice 7 to 9 Calcutta seers per rupee, a decided famine price, and one which unexplained would distinctly point to severe famine as the season advanced. The opinions entertained regarding the existence of stocks held back by combination, we shall afterwards notice. Meantime it is enough to say that the present existence of these famine prices fully attracted His Honor's attention; so far the people themselves loudly appealed to him by their cries.

187. Of the written petitions presented to His Honor and placed at our disposal, only one seems distinctly to pray for provision for feeding the poor as its sole object. Most of the others, while describing the distress forcibly enough, make it a ground for asking remissions of revenue. All were referred to the local authorities.

188. His Honor mentions that in Cuttack he scarcely saw any other of the people than the urban population, and among them the great complaint certainly was against the grain dealers; the cry was "cheapen rice," "fix a rate!" In this shape it was that the matter was principally noticed in His Honor's durbar speech, which was printed and circulated to officials and non-officials. He spoke of the calamitous effect of drought, and added—"Such visitations of Providence as these no Government can do much either to prevent or alleviate." He explained that Government could never interfere with prices. "If I were to attempt to do this, I should consider myself no better than a dacoit or thief." His Honor proceeds to say that the duty of relieving individual distress peculiarly rested on zemindars and landed proprietors, and finally added that employment had been given to many thousand persons both on the Irrigation Company's works and on the public roads; "much has thus been done and will continue to be done to avert the more serious consequences of a great calamity."

189. We think it certain that the existing state of things was not fully brought to the Lieutenant Governor's knowledge during his visit to Orissa. It will be seen that His Honor's time was very fully occupied during his short stay. The very facility of access which he afforded to the Natives may have had an unfortunate effect in preventing any general and full consultation with the officers of Government; for we are told that there were no such consultations held. The statements of the zemindars, always aiming at remissions already refused, were naturally regarded with distrust, the urban population gave vent to their feelings in a shape which provoked a just reply, and none had any definite ideas of the duties of Government on such an occasion.

190. Wholly just as was the Lieutenant Governor's reply to those who cried out to cheapen grain by fixing a price, there seems to be no doubt that the general effect of his speech was to create a very considerable feeling of dissatisfaction. The declarations which it contained seem to have been taken by both officials and non-officials as a final exposition of the policy of Government not to interfere otherwise than by providing labor in the mode already arranged. Although, therefore, owing probably to the want of a sufficient understanding, His Honor's visit was not positively important in the history of the famine, it occupies a prominent position in the popular memory and has a

negative importance as having seemed, by what His Honor did not do, to settle the policy of the Government. The idea of the possibility or probability of a widely extended and very severe famine does not seem to have been brought home to His Honor's mind, and no special instructions with a view to such a contingency were left behind him. From that time in fact, although it is abundantly evident that the famine grew daily, the reports and appeals from the quarters from which they had before been so frequent and so urgent, appear to become less frequent and less urgent. There is no more question of importing rice or paying the laborers in food. The system seems to be more settled, the distress more accepted as a necessary evil, and the reports made to Government and the Board are; till May, principally occupied with details.

191. While we greatly regret that the views of those officers who were aware of the scarcity of rice and of the severity of the distress, present and apprehended, were not properly represented to His Honor, we must also express our opinion that it is an extremely unfortunate circumstance that the information which those officers possessed was not elicited at this time, and that the circumstances which were known did not suffice, as it were, to put the Government of Bengal on enquiry with respect to those which were not known. It is, we think, a subject of great regret that, both at the time of the Lieutenant Governor's visit and subsequently, a more intimate relation between the superior and the inferior officers did not bring them more completely into accord; that in consequence most important information possessed by the inferior officers should not have reached the head of the Government. This was the more the case when the local officers were not possessed of special official boldness; and boldness of that sort is the exception, not the rule. There are many things which an officer, if encouraged to speak freely and unofficially, will say, and which he will yet not take upon himself to volunteer. Mr. Ravenshaw distinctly tells us that he discouraged demi-official communications when Mr. Barlow proposed them, and that he had little such communication with his superiors.

It seems especially surprising that the Lieutenant Governor, placing the reliance which he did on public works as the means of relieving the acknowledged distress, should have left the province without discovering that there were circumstances which rendered those works quite ineffectual for the purpose.

192. As respects the existence of ample stores of grain in the province (the second question mentioned in our 171st paragraph), it has been shown that Mr. Ravenshaw originally held the opinion that grain would be forthcoming, and that, notwithstanding he had subsequently recommended the importation of grain, he repeated his former opinion during the Lieutenant Governor's visit. It seems to have been supposed (and we gather that the Right Hon'ble the Secretary of State so supposed) that this opinion was held by the "local officers" generally. We cannot find such to be the case except perhaps at Cuttack. We cannot think that it was generally held by the officers of the Pooree district, so many of whom had recorded facts and opinions in a contrary sense. In the very commencement in October, the Native Deputy Magistrate used the expression that he was informed that the chiefs of the Pooree monasteries and zemindars had stores "so much so that they can supply the whole district with rice for two years", and (though it does not directly appear) this may in some degree have led to a similar expression on the part of the Commissioner. But it is clear that, within a few days, the Deputy Magistrate satisfied himself by personal inspection of the stores of the persons supposed to be the chief holders, and entirely changed his opinion. Mr. Barlow, in his very first letter from Pooree, distinctly tells Mr. Ravenshaw that the stores supposed to exist in Cuttack have no existence in Pooree, and his subsequent letters already quoted speak for themselves. Again, nothing can be more distinct and clear than the Collector of Balasore's early expositions of the way in which his district had been drained of stocks, and though at a very much later period (long subsequent to the time of the

Lieutenant Governor's visit), he seems on one occasion in some degree to have held somewhat different language, this was when the Commissioner had made some stay in his district, and he may not improbably be supposed to have been influenced by the opinions of Mr. Ravenshaw, with whom he seems to have been on terms of personal intimacy. As the Lieutenant Governor mentions, there was no Collector at Cuttack during his stay, and we see no trace of any opinion regarding the existence of stocks left by the Collector who had just quitted the district. The gentleman (Mr. Cornell) who soon after assumed charge did, in a letter written very much later, say—"There is sufficient grain concealed or stored for this season I hope," but he avows that coming new to the district, and being occupied with office details, he made no special enquiries regarding famine, and that having constant communications with the Commissioner, he considered it rather his duty to act in accordance with the Commissioner's instructions than "to originate views of my own."

193. As respects non-official opinions, there can be no doubt that the general idea that the dealers were keeping back their stocks in order to enhance the price was held very strongly by the great majority of the people of the town of Cuttack, and probably of other towns. The populace held it very decidedly, and very many or perhaps most people of respectable classes shared in it. Yet, on the other hand, most of the more trustworthy persons disavow it. Mr. Ravenshaw can give no express authority for it, and we cannot see that any sufficient basis for the opinion can in any way be shown. Some of the subordinate officers of the Irrigation Company may have shared the popular notion, but it is quite shown that their superiors did not; on the contrary, they had imported grain for the use of their own laborers, and both they and the missionaries seem to have written to England accounts pointing strongly towards famine. In almost all countries in time of dearness and scarcity, the popular feeling is excited against the grain dealers, and they are accused of trafficking on the necessities of their countrymen. We must think that Mr. Ravenshaw's view was rather a yielding to this popular feeling than a well balanced opinion supported by that of officers of greater local experience than himself.

194. The truth we take to be that, in some shape, there must have been a considerable quantity of grain in the country. If there had not been this, then, in the absence of any extensive importation, almost the whole population must have perished, and the fields must have remained unsown; that so many survived and that most of the land was sown can only be attributed to the existence of certain stocks in certain hands. But that there were stocks in the sense of ample stores for all, only kept back by artificial combination, was an idea wholly opposed to the *prima facie* probabilities of the case (as noticed in the Board of Revenue's first report), which only the best evidence could justify, and for which in fact there was no real and substantial evidence or justification whatever. Popular opinion accused certain classes of keeping back grain, and even among those classes some excused themselves by pointing to others as the persons who should properly be attacked; but with the exception of indicating four or five well known persons who had stores, large in themselves, but a mere trifle as respects the whole country, no man could really put his finger on the real holders of the supposed great stocks.

195. The third question for discussion remains. Our reasons for thinking that in February 1866, supposing the Government to have been in possession of the information which was in fact possessed by the local officers, it would have been proper for Government to take measures for importing grain into the Pooree district, or to make more special enquiries on the subject, are the following—

Great destitution certainly existed in the Pooree district, giving rise to extreme suffering and considerable mortality. It was evident that this distress must increase as the season advanced, unless effectual relief were afforded.

The papers now brought to light clearly show that rice was not to be had in the district in any considerable quantity, and, already at famine prices, any attempt to buy to any extent sent it higher. The possibility of relieving the people by public works on a large scale entirely depended on a supply of rice. Without rice to supply the laborers, such works were nearly useless. Government, therefore, accepting the duty of affording relief in some shape in time of famine, the only question should have been whether the want of rice would be relieved by private importations, or whether Government must undertake the duty.

196. We have already said enough of the position of Orissa, of the character of the people, and of the very wide range of the dearness of the season 1865-66, to explain why importations did not from the first flow in. It was not in fact till the end of January or February that the quoted prices would have justified an enterprising trader in importing rice into Pooree. The local traders are wholly unenterprising, and they were wholly unaccustomed to such a trade. The mercantile faculty seems to be very much a matter of race; both among Bengalees and Ooryahs that faculty appears to be extremely wanting. Neither are the proper bunniah castes or races of Northern India found in Orissa in any numbers, nor is their place taken by any other energetic class. The principal mistake of the Orissa traders seems to have been a negligence which permitted prices to become somewhat unduly cheap (the circumstances considered), when a part of the small crop was thrown into the market by the demand for rents. Their only idea seems to be to buy as cheap as possible at that season, and sell dearer or advance on exorbitant terms as the season advances. When the season advanced and prices rose, these men had not, as a rule, the energy to attempt to import from a distance. And in fact import was far from easy. On the land side there was nothing considerable to import, and that little the rajahs would not permit to be taken away. The Mahanuddee would be closed for several months to come. To the south there was famine in Ganjam, itself a district which usually imported. Pooree cannot be called a port; there are no ships. Unluckily, as we may almost say, Balasore, the only port in Orissa where something might have been done by Native merchants, was the last place to experience the extreme rise in prices. The local traders there were at this time doing nothing or next to nothing. Again, the news of the rise in prices at Pooree would take some time to reach more distant traders, unaccustomed to import grain into Orissa; they would take further time to think about it, and ascertain that the rise was certain and lasting. But in the end of February or in March, the monsoon changes, the south-west winds commence, the surf becomes heavy, access from the north and east difficult. In short, in March, the Native trade in that coast absolutely ceases. Nothing material was to be looked for from that source.

197. There remains the question whether European merchants might have been expected to import in European vessels. Trade does not very easily adopt new channels. Such unaccustomed operations on such a coast, with no agencies, and no facilities for landing and storing, would be at all times difficult, and from the time of the change in the monsoon becomes especially so. The difficulties increase till the proper monsoon bursts in June, and then (as a sad experience has now proved) they become overwhelming. Importations, therefore, in European vessels, were hardly to be expected, certainly not to be depended on, and in fact none took place.

198. In truth all question of interfering with private trade is set at rest by the simple fact that there was at this time none to interfere with, and the very small trade, which extreme necessity subsequently created, was not really interfered with when Government importations commenced. The demand was very far more than could be satisfied by any means.

199. We may here explain what this subsequent trade was.—Gopalpore, in the Madras district of Ganjam, and about 60 or 90 miles from Pooree, seems

to be a place of considerable commercial activity, and when the scarcity and famine occurred in that district, and the usual supplies from Orissa were cut off, there seems to have been considerable private importation by sea to Gopalpore. But if the necessities of the Ganjam people were great, those of the Pooree people were greater, and as the season advanced, the richer people of Pooree drew from thence some supplies of sea-borne rice, small indeed and not enough to reach the mass of the people, but which still seem to have had the effect of keeping prices one degree better than the point which they reached when at their worst in Cuttack and Balasore. One convoy of Gopalpore rice even reached Cuttack. It is evident, however, that when necessity caused the better classes of Pooree to draw in this indirect way these small foreign supplies by competing against another famine district, rice might, with great advantage, have been landed at Pooree. The Gopalpore Roadstead, it may be mentioned, seems to be just as exposed as Pooree, and when the season farther advanced, the supply from thence became even dearer and scarcer than before.

200. At Balasore, late in the season, one or two attempts to import were made, but with very little success, and some of the Native ships employed were wrecked. It was not till the end of the season, when the monsoon subsided, that there were considerable imports to this port. In May and June, when prices had reached a high famine point, there was a small import on bullocks' backs down the road from Midnapore (also a famine district), and the Collector very properly let this trade take its own course, declining to hire the bullocks till they were stopped by the rains.

201. The only European firm which might perhaps have been expected to import by way of False Point was that of the French merchants already alluded to, Messrs. Robert and Charriol, who had formerly exported by that route. Their last cargo had been exported in June 1865; some grain subsequently purchased for export was re-sold in Orissa when prices rose. They had laid up their boats, put aside their gear, and given up the trade. As the season advanced and prices became higher and higher, they did think of importing, but the difficulties of landing and transporting grain were then excessive; the country was disorganised by famine and plunder, and nothing was done till Government guaranteed and bought their cargoes.

202. Here we may mention a sad and curious episode. When the Board did not send rice to the distressed part of the Pooree district in the beginning of December, they mentioned that a vessel was leaving on private account for Gopalpore. The name of that vessel we have not learned, but about that time one vessel we know did leave Calcutta with rice for Gopalpore and Madras, the French ship *Philaneme*, belonging to Messrs. Robert and Charriol, who, however, did not own the cargo. It seemed as if a kind Providence had destined for Pooree the rice of which that district had been disappointed, for the *Philaneme* was wrecked on the beach at Pooree on the 11th December, and the cargo was got safely ashore with the exception of a small portion somewhat damaged. It was long guarded from the famishing people by a Police Force, and it was the expectation that it would be sold, which has been mentioned as at that time somewhat deranging the Pooree market. But unfortunately there was a dispute between the owners and insurers whether the cargo should be treated as a total loss, and though Messrs. Charriol were well aware that the most advantageous course was to sell, and strongly advised it, neither party would take upon himself to give the order to the Captain of the vessel, since that might have been to accept the loss. Mr. Barlow, looking to his own price currents, and perhaps expecting to buy cheap under the circumstances, proposed to buy at 13 Calcutta seers per rupee; but that price would have involved a loss on the whole transaction, which no one would accept, and he was told by the owners of the ship that the rice could not be sold. It now appears that there was a very simple mode of getting over the difficulty, *viz.*, to have offered

such a price as would have covered the whole cost and left no loss to any one. In the beginning of February the prices quoted at Pooree (to say nothing of the necessities) would have amply justified such an offer, and though the Captain on the spot could not sell a grain, if the Government and the Board (who had both been informed of the matter) had been then disposed to buy, they might no doubt have arranged the question in Calcutta; but they were then altogether opposed to buying on Government account; the opportunity was lost, and the cargo of the *Philaneme*, after lying at Pooree till the end of February, was actually carried away to Madras in a steamer (on account of the Captain, who, in the absence of instructions, was forced to act on his charter party), and sold at a heavy loss to all concerned.

203. It seems to have been in some quarters considered that the importation of food by Government, either directly or through contractors, would have been a proceeding of an almost unprecedented character, as in fact one which involved the sweeping away of the established landmarks of society. That seems to be the view taken by Mr. Chapman in a memorandum which he has communicated to us. In a paper on famine relief by Mr. Strachey, submitted by the Board of Revenue to Government in February 1866 (Appendix page 137), and of which they recommended the publication as calculated "to dissipate some of the ignorant prejudices that are so prevalent just now," Mr. J. S. Mill is quoted as follows:—"Direct measures at the cost of the State to procure food from a distance are expedient when, from peculiar reasons, the thing is not likely to be done by private speculation. In any other case they are a great error. Private traders will not, in such cases, venture to compete with the Government, and though a Government can do more than any one merchant, it cannot do nearly as much as all merchants."

The exception when "from peculiar reasons the thing is not likely to be done by private speculation" seems entirely applicable to the case under discussion, and to have been entirely overlooked. In fact, however, Mr. Strachey's note was not published as the Board proposed, but was rejected by the Government of Bengal (Appendix page 143) on the 11th February, as containing only principles familiar to every educated person, and relating to a state of things which did not then exist, and likely to lead to misapprehension.

It is true that, so far as we know, in the North-Western Provinces, in 1837-38, and certainly in 1861, Government did not import grain. But there again the quotation from Mr. Mill fully applies. An energetic trading class was willing to do and did do the work (for which there were also much greater facilities than in Orissa) very much better than Government could have done it. It is also the case that Colonel Smith, having no doubt in view the state of things in Northern India, publishes an old order of the Government of India during a former scarcity, by which bounties were offered on importation, as (it may be assumed) an example of the false ideas of former days. But, on the other hand, in Ireland, so near all the resources of British commerce, on the very first symptoms of famine, the Government seems to have imported food, and throughout the Irish famine administrations composed from either side of politics appear to have largely undertaken the supply of food to the starving people.

It is, we think, by applying general principles without regard to local circumstances that error arises in such matters. If only as an employer of labor in Orissa, we think that Government would have been justified in taking the most effectual means of paying that labor in the shape most effective for the object in view; and if so much had been done in February, we believe, as we have said, that the matter would not have stopped there; the ice being as it were broken, many and great necessities would have been pressed

with irresistible force, and much might have been done in the months which elapsed before the setting in of the violent monsoon in June.

204. We understand that after the Lieutenant Governor's return from Orissa, the question of importing grain into that province was the subject of discussion between His Honor and His Excellency the Viceroy. It is mentioned by the Lieutenant Governor that His Excellency was strongly inclined to do so, but yielded to the opinion of the Lieutenant Governor and others that it was not expedient or necessary. We have no details of the personal communications which passed between the Members of the Governments of India and Bengal, and as no official communication seems to have been made to the Government of India in February, we need not further allude to matters within the knowledge of that Government to whom our report is submitted.

205. But as we shall have little more to say of local applications for the import of grain in the ensuing months, we may here notice a suggestion of the same kind shortly afterwards received from another quarter. We allude to the letter addressed by Major General Sir A. Cotton to the Under Secretary of State for India, and transmitted to the Government of India, who on the 12th March 1866, called on the Government of Bengal to "report whether the Hon'ble the Lieutenant Governor considers it necessary for the Government to take any further steps than those already authorized with a view to relieve and assist the people."—see the correspondence, Appendix page 143.

206. Sir A. Cotton's suggestions had reference to "the immediate prospect of famine in Bengal," meaning, it may be gathered, the territories subject to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal. After explaining the nature of the arrangements necessary for the efficient conduct of public works on a large scale as measures of relief, General Cotton alludes to the extensive works planned and in course of partial execution by the East Indian Irrigation Company, states that their operations are only limited by want of funds, and strongly recommends that money should be advanced to them, to enable them to extend their operations as the famine placed labor at their disposal. He then goes on to recommend the immediate construction of a large flotilla to provide for the carriage of enormous masses of food from the eastward.

207. There can be no doubt of the great advantage of the measures of precaution in regard to public works recommended by General Cotton. But it so happened that the great roads running through the length of Orissa had been long ago designed, and useful employment for almost any quantity of labor might have been found on them, in raising great embankments, collecting metal, and such like works eminently suited to famine relief. Superintendence and other means might probably have also been found sufficient to enable the Government to employ all who would come upon the works; food only was wanting. We also believe that the Irrigation Company were not directly prevented by want of funds from employing all the labor that offered on their works. But a larger supply of food would have enabled them to employ more labor on their existing works and possibly to extend their works, and it seems probable that the offer of funds would have led to their importing food at this time. The whole question, therefore, is in this instance narrowed to one of food. On this point the suggestion regarding a flotilla has now a melancholy interest, for, although we do not think that even then the information available to Government and the time and circumstances were such that the Government could well have undertaken the construction of a great flotilla, we now know that if but a few cargo boats and two or three light steamers and vessels had been taken up in the port of Calcutta, and sent down to the coasts of Orissa, incalculable good might have been done. Not only might an immediate supply of rice have been landed for public works and other most pressing necessities, but when the greater necessity arose in the monsoon season, large quantities of grain might have been very quickly conveyed

from False Point into the interior in several directions by river steamers towing good boats, when, as it happened, small quantities were very slowly and painfully and with much loss conveyed by miserable boats struggling inefficiently against wind and current. Light steamers and Native vessels might also have been engaged, and might have well supplied the Dhamrah and Balasore Rivers.

208. But we have already explained the circumstances which led the Government of Bengal to think importation unnecessary. We have shown that the Government had, in the first instance, generally, and the Board of Revenue afterwards more expressly and particularly, declined to import,—that the special circumstances rendering such action on the part of Government proper were not brought to the Lieutenant Governor's notice, and did not attract his attention during his visit to Orissa, and that the Commissioner and townspeople of Cuttack had a confident belief in the existence of stores of grain, only kept back by grain dealers to enhance the price. Hence it happened that the Government of Bengal reported on the 28th March (Appendix page 146) that there was no prospect of famine in Bengal; that in Orissa, where the scarcity was greatest, the wants of the people had been materially relieved by public works and those of the Irrigation Company; that the case was not so pressing as to justify the Government in advancing money to the Company, and that as respects food, there was "no reason to suppose that the stock in the country is insufficient for the consumption of the people."

209. There is one statement in the letter of the Bengal Government of the 28th March for which we cannot in any way account. It is this—"the natural fluctuation of prices has been found sufficient to attract food to the districts in which it was scarcest." This was certainly not the case. It may have been so in Behar—a Hindostanee country full of the energetic bunnecahs of Hindoostan. We believe that Gya—one of the districts in which there was much alarm in the early part of the season—was relieved in this way (there were great complaints in some of the adjoining Bengalee districts that their sufferings were aggravated by the export of grain to Gya), but it was not so either in Bengal or in Orissa. There was no doubt large trade from the eastwards to Calcutta, but the most suffering western districts of Bengal were never relieved by any sufficient private trade, and to Orissa there was scarcely any import whatever. About this time very small quantities of grain began to find their way from Gopalpore to Pooree, but that was then a mere drop in the ocean, and does not seem to have been reported till much later. In their report of the 25th November, the Board of Revenue had said generally: "The Board hear everywhere of grain being in movement, and they have no doubt that the laws of demand and supply are everywhere in full and active operation," but as regards Orissa, their only subsequent report on the point was that in which they stated prices in Pooree to be insufficient to attract importers. We cannot find anything in the reports to justify a belief that in March a sufficiency of food had been attracted from elsewhere to the districts which were most suffering.

210. Our next series of local correspondence, beginning at page 140 of the Appendix, comprises the period from the time of the Lieutenant Governor's visit to the end of May. All the statements show clearly (what is also to be gathered from the correspondence) that during this period the famine grew and spread throughout Orissa till it reached enormous proportions. The price of grain increased to more and more severe famine rates, it became scarcer and scarcer, and starvation became more and more general. In April the price of the very coarsest rice had reached 6½ Calcutta seers per rupee both in Pooree and in Cuttack,—fully five times the average ordinary price of food; yet in the whole three months, from the middle of February to the middle of May, the subject of public importation by Government is scarcely mentioned and

never directly applied for in the local official reports. That subject seems to have been regarded as completely settled and disposed of. We have put together the local correspondence of this period, regarding each district of Orissa separately, reserving the general correspondence respecting the province as a whole for another series.

211. In the Pooree series the first paper shows that the District Superintendent's opinion of the probability of severe famine was reported to the Inspector General of Police.

212. The Lieutenant Governor had left directions for a report regarding cholera, and also, it appears, regarding relief measures, the latter direction being officially conveyed in a letter of the 21st February, desiring "a further report, up to the present date, as to what has been done and what more is required." The report on cholera was submitted in the shape of a letter from the Superintendent of Police, who concluded as follows:—"In a time of scarcity and distress like the present, when unwholesome food, such as 'lotus stems,' the core of the screw-pine, and various wild roots and fruits are resorted to, and in many instances wholly depended on, as food, and when the great majority of the people are reduced to short allowance and have to deny themselves many small matters necessary to health, a disease like cholera is intensified, and there is reason to apprehend that, as the distress increases, which is apparently unavoidable, the sickness will increase."

In reply to the call of the 21st February, Mr. Barlow, on the 5th March, asked for time till he could see for himself, and adds this sentence, certainly remarkable after his former very urgent representations—"I may at once state that for the present time, at any rate, I do not consider any further remedial measures on the part of Government are necessary." It will shortly be seen that in some degree he explains this himself; but we think that it must be considered as written under the feeling that the importation of rice had been conclusively negatived, rather than as indicating that he did not consider it desirable; and that the general expression of opinion is materially qualified by the words "on the part of Government," is evident from the cotemporary proceedings. On the 25th February, we have the first formal proceedings of the Pooree Relief Committee drafted by Mr. Barlow's own hand, in which he speaks of general gratuitous relief as "impracticable both in view of the magnitude of the distress prevailing and the smallness of the funds available." Local funds being thus insufficient, it seems to have been arranged that an appeal should be made to a wider public. At first, we are told, it was settled that the Native Deputy Magistrate should write to the Native papers and the European officers to the English papers; but the latter measure was not at the time carried out.

The Deputy Magistrate, as a Member of the Relief Committee, did write a strong, and it may be called an official appeal to the *Hindoo Patriot*, and Mr. Barlow approved of his conduct. Baboo Ramakhoy's appeal was published by the *Hindoo Patriot* on the 5th March, and strongly supported by the paper.

The Baboo says (Appendix page 150)—"Starvation, in its literal sense, is to be seen in every part of the district. When such is the state of things seen during the harvest season, it is impossible to imagine what disastrous consequences will follow in a short time;" and he makes a very touching appeal for aid. Mr. Barlow's allusions to "a prompt result" seems rather to be to the publication and earnest support of the paper than to pecuniary result, since money appears to have come in with extreme slowness. Indeed, it may be generally observed that all local appeals to the general public failed; nothing but a general fund seems to satisfy the general public. Later, when the Magistrate and Collector of Balasore made an appeal for his district, referring

contributors to Mr. Chapman, Secretary to the Board of Revenue, we find Mr. Chapman shortly after announcing that only Rs. 10 had been received, not enough to pay for the advertisement.

213. Mr. Barlow himself wrote to Mr. Schaleh, then Chairman of the Calcutta Municipality and Commissioner of Police, asking if he knew of any fund from which relief could be given. Mr. Schaleh has not kept the letter, but remembers the circumstance, and that he wrote to Mr. D. Cowie, asking if there was any balance of the Cyclone Fund. Mr. Cowie does not remember the circumstance; but there was no balance of the Cyclone Fund available for the purpose, and the matter dropped. It was certainly unfortunate that the balance of the North-West Fund was not then discovered and used.

214. We have next details regarding sanction for the sums required from the Government Estates Fund* to carry on the Khoorda road, already authorised and commenced, and to make an advance of Rs. 1,000 for seed grain to the ryots of a Government estate, which last proposal the Commissioner opposed, but the Board and Government sanctioned. The letters regarding the works are full of the usual struggle about task-work which the local officers tried to enforce and the laborers resisted. Liberal task rates were offered by Mr. Barlow and Mr. Barton (the Assistant in charge of the Khoorda sub-division), who were both very zealous and active about the works; but many refused the terms, and the numbers were reduced in consequence. The Commissioner says:—"It will be observed, in connection with Mr. Barlow's paragraphs 4 and 5, that the rates allowed for piece-work give fully two annas per day to each workman, and, notwithstanding this, many have absconded, the piece-work system not being agreeable to them. This would lead to a supposition that either the people are not really starving, or that they can get more remunerative employment elsewhere. This is, I think, a healthy sign, showing that the work is answering the purpose for which it was undertaken, *viz.*, to afford means of subsistence to the really destitute."

And the Board "concur with the Commissioner that the work now in progress upon the road is answering the purpose for which it was undertaken." Mr. Barlow, however, explains (Appendix page 156) that the earth is at that season terribly hard; that starving people come in from famine localities (Khoorda was not yet very bad) who "simply can't live on what they could make by piece-work; their condition shocks Barton, and there is not one soul among them fit for piece-work;"—the "incapables are multiplying"—and for them he found it necessary to provide lighter work. The Commissioner agreed that from such people full work could not be expected for a time, and promised that money should not be wanting. Mr. Barton tells us that the average number of persons employed on this road was 763. The great difficulty and hindrance, he says, was want of rice; but the people were scattered in small gangs over a great length of road to enable them to forage for themselves in the villages, and up to a certain point managed to get food though with great loss of time.

215. On the 30th March Mr. Barlow submits his general report (Appendix page 158); but he does not seem to have considered that the whole state of the district was his subject, and in fact confines himself to details of relief works and operations. The Local Famine Fund made a small money allowance to 376 distressed families, but the result of a canvass among the landholders for funds was very discouraging. There was a considerable subscription for building the Naraindra tank. The works on the Government estate of Satparah seem to have afforded very great relief of a purely local character; but the money was fast going in maintaining "an indiscriminate mass of men, women, and little children" doing "a miscellaneous, and pardoned

* This is a fund formed by a percentage on the rents reserved for improvements in Government estates.

it must be, if often it be, but nominal work." Some of the "comparatively" able-bodied were struck off and told to go elsewhere, who again, on coming to the Khoorda road, were those whose condition shocked Mr. Barton as above-mentioned.

216. As respects the works of the Public Works Department, the employment on the Pooree road was still confined to about 100 persons, and this was then principally attributed to the introduction of task-work. Mr. Crane, who was in charge, however, tells us (examination page xxii) that in the emaciated condition of the people, the rates did not suffice to enable them to earn a livelihood. On the Ganjam road things seem to have been at their best in March, when Mr. Barlow reported, and to have employed a considerable number of people. Rice was not so scarce to the north of the Chilka Lake (near the hills and on the Ganjam road) as in other parts of the district, and with much trouble the laborers managed to live. But the cholera, alluded to by Mr. Barlow, frightened the establishments, and unhappily this work suffered a considerable interruption about this time.

217. Mr. Barlow concludes his report as follows:—"To the question asked by the Government order, what more is required, I have already returned an anticipatory answer to the effect, that, as matters stand at present, I do not consider that anything further in the way of assistance is required, and I cannot feel that such an answer as this on my part is likely to be misunderstood, or to be the means of tying my hands hereafter if necessity compels me to come forward with further and new proposals for assistance on the part of Government. By saying that nothing further is now required, I do not mean to say that suffering and distress is completely at an end and the country enjoying even a comparative degree of prosperity; again, neither do I imply that if I were to follow up many of the suggestions that have been offered me, I could not recommend various subjects for outlay and expenditure under the general plea that relief would be occasioned to some or other in scattered localities; but this is not the course which, I understand, it behoves me to take under present conditions. Government, in the pursuit of a liberal policy (the wisdom of which and the great advantages obtained to the district thereby are better perceived each day that the condition of affairs become more apparent), having been pleased to entertain many of the propositions which I have ventured to make for the object of affording the needed relief, I feel bound in every manner to exercise the strictest caution, and if I may so explain it, keep myself under the strongest restrictions in the matter of advancing suggestions as to what may be required from time to time, and it is my desire to propose nothing unless I can show at the same time how the measure is required for the support, extension, or substitution of the regular system of operation now in hand. It is in this view, then, and as seeing no particular measure at present called for, that I reply, as I have done, to the query of Government, implying, as it appears to do, a promise of further assistance at such times as it may appear necessary."

It seems to us that at this time Mr. Barlow honestly, accepting the policy, and rules of action laid down for him, threw himself heart and soul into the system of works, and sanguinely hoped to mitigate the distress by their means. His ideas were not sufficiently large, and he did not frame his demands on a sufficient scale. They were inadequate to the magnitude of the object in view. But he made the most of all that was then in his power. As Mr. Barton tells us, his head was full of roads.

In truth it may well be doubted whether, without importation of rice, public works could have been extended with any advantage whatever. The difficulty which was barely, to a certain extent, got over in Khoorda and north of the Chilka Lake would have been insuperable in other parts of the district. On the subject of importation of rice, Mr. Barlow is again, we see, silent.

218. In forwarding Mr. Barlow's report, Mr. Ravenshaw says:—"The difficulty in obtaining even a salaried retailer of grain is almost incredible. I had suggested to Mr. Barlow to give a monthly salary to a moodee or grain-dealer to sell at current market rates to coolies, opening a temporary shop near their work, paying the moodee from the subscribed relief fund; but this, it appears, has been found impossible. This disinclination to sell rice is very remarkable, and results, I am inclined to suppose, from fear of a crush of purchasers, and inability to satisfy them, which might lead to loss, and certainly to some confusion and annoyance."

The Board and the Government think Mr. Barlow's report most satisfactory, and entirely approve of the measures adopted by him.

219. From the 30th March, for nearly six weeks, there is a singular blank—in fact an entire cessation of reports from Pooree; and yet this was the period during which the famine was gradually assuming its largest dimensions, as shown both in the evidence and in the subsequent reports. In the Pooree district it both commenced earlier and progressed more gradually and steadily than elsewhere. The officers became, as it were, more habituated to it, and, as has been already said, the system of money relief did not bring starvation to view so much as did food at Balasore. The policy was considered to be settled. Mr. Ravenshaw went far away to Mohurbhunj. Mr. Barlow was not in personal communication with any of the higher authorities, and till things had reached a very extreme pitch, he kept silence.

220. In April we have in the papers but very small glimpses of the state of things. A note of the 16th of that month, which we found in the Magistrate's office (Appendix page 163), seems to suggest large mortality of some kind in Pooree itself. Trenches are being dug to receive the bodies. We have inserted (page 164) an abstract of reports (up to end of April) of the local Police officers and of notices volunteered by some of the Canoongoes who had been ordered to report the price of food. These seem sufficiently to show the progress of the distress and the increasing scarcity of rice. On the 30th April the Superintendent of Police notes in his departmental Police diary—"No steps are being taken that I am aware of by the Government in the matter of the famine in this district. I cannot doubt that scores of men, women, and children have died of absolute want, and many more must die, for matters are proceeding from bad to worse day by day. In the town there are a few hundred beggars of both sexes, who have come here as a last resort. They get supplied with a small pittance now and then by the muth people, and eke out a belly full by snatching at shops and passengers with anything eatable. One, two, and three of these wretched specimens of humanity are now and then picked up dead in the streets—dead of starvation. Can nothing be done? A few ship-loads of rice landed at Pooree would work wonders, and interfere with no one's trading operations, as we have next to none. It would make rice cheap at Pooree and stop the drain to supply Pooree from the mofussil. When it is said the poor people are fast consuming their seed rice, so as to ensure beggary for another season, dacoity and thefts by large gangs of poor men are increasing, altogether, I think, a very gloomy time is coming." It is remarkable, however, that even he did not then seem to realize the full extent of the calamity present or close at hand, for he concludes—"If there is any failure of crop this year, a dreadful famine will depopulate the district." We may here, indeed, say that, although many people anticipated very severe famine, we do not think that any single person anticipated anything like the full degree to which it actually reached before the harvest of 1866.

221. Early in May, an extreme pitch of misery having been reached, Mr. Barlow broke silence, and a series of long letters from him, giving full details, will be found in the Appendix, page 169. He first, on the 9th May, addressed the public press, seeking the aid of the charitable public. On the 10th, he addressed

a full report to the Commissioner; but this time we have no more emergent telegrams or direct appeals to the superior authorities in Calcutta. The report followed Mr. Ravenshaw to the distant wilds of Mohurbhunj, and by that circuitous route did not reach Government till near the end of May. Mr. Chapman having (individually, not as Secretary to the Board) sent some money collected by him, and sought information, another long letter was addressed to him on the 15th May, and was published by Mr. Chapman in the *Englishman*. In all these letters Mr. Barlow explains that he may have erred on the side of excessive caution; he had feared to excite public alarm by accounts which might prove exaggerated. He followed "the principle of resisting mere rumour and speculation" till the facts were quite assured by the state of things before his own eyes, so that there could be no danger of his misleading; but while willing to accept the blame of the delay, if blame there was, he asserted his caution to be "only a basis for claiming greater confidence" in his present accounts. He said that not less than half the area of the district had reached that state of exhaustion "wherein death by starvation is of common occurrence," and gave further accounts in detail of the past history and progress of famine in his district, the substance of which we have in great degree anticipated. There can be no doubt that in May the Pooree district reached a state even worse than Mr. Barlow's description. In the other districts, the worst of the famine certainly came later; but with respect to Pooree, there is, it will be seen from the examinations, considerable difference of opinion as to whether May and June were not as bad or worse than July and August. In truth the Pooree district suffered, on the whole, more than any other district, not so much from greater, or even perhaps so great extremity, at any one time, as from the longer continuance of very fatal suffering.

222. As respects remedial measures, Mr. Barlow, after describing the total inadequacy of the local means "which at the most may have availed to save a few amongst many from destruction," and mentioning his appeal to the public press, says—(on the 10th May, Appendix page 172)—"It will take time to ascertain what result can follow this action. Meanwhile, I have to consider what recommendations it becomes my duty to submit for the orders of Government."

"The fullest and most anxious consideration of the subject has failed to help me out of difficulty here, and I must at once own that I am unprepared with any definite and comprehensive proposal. When the labor system, that is as a general medium of relief, is at an end, and the only remedy is to support a starving population by gratuitous charity, I do not know what, in a political economical point of view, are the exact duties and responsibilities of Government. I must, therefore, leave that question to be decided by higher authority; but in a few matters of detail, I venture respectfully to submit suggestions which I trust may be received with favor.

"I see clearly that a most urgent call for aid exists in the direction of Gope. It has been so from the first; but owing to the circumstance that the property in that direction being zemindaree has not afforded opportunity for such works as have been undertaken in Government estates, nothing has yet been done there."

And after saying that he will push on a road in the Gope division, he adds—"The next thing I have to urge is that something be done to meet the wants of the homeless poor, who are wandering in a starving condition about the country, and have in numbers found refuge in the town. It is a different question from that of the general system of relief for the whole country which has been referred to above. When want is brought before the very eyes of Government in the form of starving people, besieging the houses of its officers, such a position is hard to be maintained. The Local Relief Committees, most anxious to afford relief, are helpless, as with 435 families at a monthly outlay of more than Rs. 1,000 to support, their funds are already appropriated, and

there is no hope of sufficient increase to the fund by subscriptions from local sources. Will Government consent to supplement our efforts by an allowance not exceeding Rs. 500 a month, to be expended in the special object of supporting orphan children and such other cases of real and deserving distress as may be ascertained to exist at the head quarters of the district? I ask the favor of an early answer to this question, as the matter is pressing.

"I must not omit to call attention to the difficulties which, in looking forward to the coming prospects of the district, may be foreseen in one respect. It is plain that the setting in of the rains, by putting a stop to the public works operations that are at present affording some relief to the distress, will, by throwing those employed out of work at once, bring a large addition to the paupers now prevailing; how are these persons to be supported? I can see no alternative, unless they can be supported altogether by charity."

223. Mr. Ravenshaw had already reported to Government in vivid terms the distress in Balasore; but the following passage from his report (of 18th May, Appendix page 173), forwarding that of Mr. Barlow, will here show that he too had now recognised the extent of the calamity, and the necessity of Government action.

"What Mr. Barlow describes as to the utter prostration of the people is amply confirmed by my own observations in other parts of the country, and I fully support Mr. Barlow's opinion that the time has now come when it will be necessary for Government to step in to save these helpless objects from a lingering and miserable death.

"Our action hitherto has been confined to affording an adequate wage for labor, and in so doing, I am of opinion, we have adhered to a sound and proper principle; but the state of affairs now is quite exceptional, and the relief works, even in connection with private charity, have been found totally inadequate to avert a famine, or to save a large class of people from actual starvation.

"I can fully corroborate Mr. Barlow's account of the condition of the people in Pooree from my own observations in Cuttack, Balasore, and in the tracts situated in the southern portions of Mohurbhunj and Nilghery tributary estates, where there are swarms of destitute and mendicants physically incapable of any description of labor, absolutely without the means of subsistence, and whom nothing can save from destruction but an extended system of gratuitous charity.

"The most miserable objects are the women and children, many of their husbands having succumbed either to famine or cholera, or emigrated in search of employment. They are left totally unprovided for and incapable of providing for themselves.

"Letters daily coming in from Balasore and Cuttack speak of the uncontrolled crowds of mendicants who swarm in the streets, either begging or stealing, and to many of whom a drink of water in which rice has been boiled, obtained from those who are fortunate enough to have rice, is nearly the whole means of supporting life.

"I am now in camp in Mohurbhunj, and have no reason to suppose the state of distress here is so great as in the Regulation districts; having been encamped here in a large mangoe tope for some days, the accumulation of beggars, men, women, and children in the last stage of hunger, disease, and attenuation, is so great that the very air is polluted. They have no life or energy, and are entirely subsisting, to the number of upwards of 400, on a small supply of rice I have daily distributed. Even the distinctions and prejudices of caste have given way to the pangs of hunger, and every particle of food from my own table is eagerly devoured."

His ideas, however, of the aid to be expected from public sources are still very limited, for, as respects remedial measures, in addition to Rs. 3,000 sanctioned from local funds for the Gope Road, he seems only to have proposed as follows:—

"I appeal to the liberality and sympathy of Government to support these Relief Committees by a monthly grant of Rs. 500 to each district of Pooree, Balasore, and Cuttack. Such support would doubtless encourage local subscriptions, and I will personally guarantee that no efforts will be spared by the Local Committees to distribute the funds thus afforded for the support of those only who are legitimate objects of charity.

"In connection with the District Relief Committees, I propose to establish separate orphanages for destitute children, to whom I consider special attention should be directed, and to which a proportion of available funds can be devoted. For these orphanages, the Missionaries at Balasore, Cuttack, and Piplee in Pooree, will, I have every reason to expect, give their assistance in organizing and superintending."

224. On the 28th May the Government of Bengal (Appendix page 176), acknowledging the reports of Messrs. Barlow and Ravenshaw, say that the Commissioner had been already informed that funds had been placed at the disposal of the Board of Revenue for the relief of the distressed districts, and that a further sum had been placed at the disposal of the Public Works Department. Further mention of these grants will be made; suffice it here to say that no rice was sent by Government to the Pooree district, though a grant of money was made. There had been, it will be seen, no direct application for the importation of rice even at this time, although it was applied for from and sent to other districts.

225. It may be here well to summarise briefly, so far as our materials will permit, the relief afforded in the Pooree district by the different public relief works from January to the end of May. We have generally no exact account of the number of persons employed on the various works, no such returns being made, and we are obliged to make an approximate calculation with reference to the amount of money expended. Of the sum of Rs. 69,000 granted in December for special relief works of the Public Works Department, but Rs. 25,000 had been expended to the end of May; and it will be seen that the whole amount of employment afforded is (looking to the greatness of the distress among a great population) of a very petty description, the average number of persons employed in both departments being under 2,500.

Special Relief Works, and when commenced.	Average No. of persons employed daily.	Amount expended. Rupees.
Pooree road, commenced in January 1866 ...	382	8,645
Ganjam road, commenced in beginning of February 1866 ...	800	16,449
Total Public Works Department ...	1,182	25,094
Khoordah road, commenced end of January 1866 ...	763	about 12,000
Satpara tanks, &c., commenced December 1865, say ...	500	about 6,000
Total Government estates ...	1,263	18,000
Grand Total ...	2,445	43,094

226. It has been mentioned that both starvation and plunder had appeared in the Balasore district before the middle of February. It had previously been also mentioned that the Relief Committee when first formed calculated that they would commence operations in February; and they were right. The first starving people seem to have come into the station in the last days of January, and in February very miserable objects were there in considerable numbers. To them the Relief Committee then began to supply small daily rations of rice. It was at this time said that the majority of the starvelings came from the semi-independent and mismanaged Mohurbhunj estate,—three-fourths it was at one time stated. Later in the season in May, the proportion was reversed, and it was then stated by Mr. Muspratt that nearly one-fourth of those relieved at Balasore came from the neighbouring Hill States. But throughout the famine there is no doubt that there was a very considerable influx into Balasore from thence. Mr. Ravenshaw's accounts prove that Mohurbhunj suffered very severely.

227. The Police reports (see Appendix page 117) show that the excessive outbreak of the crime of open plunder was made known in February and early in March, and that it was in forcible terms attributed solely and entirely to want. The Magistrate and the Commissioner also made reports in the beginning of March.

228. On the 27th of February, the Superintending Engineer (Appendix page 183), writes to Mr. Muspratt, the Magistrate and Collector—"I hear there is great distress in the district hereabouts. I see some frightful objects about the station. Should we be doing good by spending more money on works in the neighbourhood?" The correspondence which included this latter proposition will be found in the following series. In writing to Government on the 5th March (Appendix page 228), Mr. Crommelin says—"Great distress and misery is but too apparent everywhere in the neighbourhood of Balasore, and the Magistrate and Collector is most anxious that work should be freely offered to all, as the means at his disposal are very far from adequate to relieve those even who are actually starving. I beg you will bring the urgency of the case to the notice of His Honor the Lieutenant Governor." A delay occurred in answering this letter, the cause of which is not clear, and further correspondence caused some additional delay. It will suffice to say here that no special relief works were undertaken in the Balasore district, till in the end of May the grant of money brought the emphatic telegram—"sixty thousand rupees no good, we want rice."

229. On the 28th February Mr. Muspratt applied to the Commissioner for a grant-in-aid from a charitable fund at Cuttack, but it was found that no money could be given.

230. On the 22nd March the Deputy Inspector General of Police, on tour at Balasore, reports, in his diary submitted to the Inspector General (Appendix page 183)—"I don't think we can look for crime diminishing in the least for the next six months. The state the district is in for want of food is beyond conception. Cholera is also doing its work in a terrific way. In going about one cannot help being struck by the half-starved look of the majority of the people." We have not learnt that the Inspector General specially brought this report to the personal notice of the Lieutenant Governor as he might properly have done. In fact at this time cholera and want were working together at Balasore to a very sad extent. So early as the 4th March the District Superintendent had said—"cholera is committing great havoc amongst the poor, who have flocked to the town to be recipients of the distribution of food by the Famine Relief Fund. The Police have to remove ten or twelve corpses every morning;" and in his letter of the 27th March he somewhat oddly says, "were it not for the frightful havoc made by cholera, the sufferings from starvation would have greatly

increased," which he explains in the next paragraph by saying—"many have been carried off by disease instead of being left to combat with want and hunger."

231. In the early part of the season the European officers being much out in the district, the Relief Committee was principally composed of Native officials and residents of the town of Balasore with a very old European resident, Captain Bond, Master Attendant, as President, and they seem to have exerted themselves in a very creditable manner. They especially pressed for Government aid in their resolution of the 4th March (Appendix page 188); they resolve as follows, alluding, no doubt, to the principles of action laid down, and pointing to the existence of a large Government estate in the neighbourhood:—"It was proposed by Baboo S. N. Kur, and seconded unanimously by the Members, that the Collector be again written to, to solicit Government aid to the fund; for, notwithstanding that the Nowanund Khas Mehal revenue is to be spent on the Mehal itself, yet the Committee sanguinely hope that the Government as zemindars will not hesitate to extend as usual a liberal and helping hand to their indigent and famine-stricken subjects."

A little later we have simultaneous letters, from both the President and the Secretary, to the Collector. The former says—"We have the honor to report that the small amount receivable from the subscribers to the charitable fund for the relief of the poor will not suffice to feed such a number as are now coming in from the mofussil. We, therefore, hope that Government will come forward in time with a *bonus* (before the ruination of the zemindars) to assist the ryots, till the new suttia paddy is reaped (which will not be for four months), otherwise crime will increase to a fearful extent."

While the Secretary says (Appendix page 189)—

"The fact of the revenue of Nowanund being intended to be applied towards the improvement of the estate itself, is, in the Committee's opinion, no reason for Government to refuse their usual liberal aid for the relief of their distressed subjects.

"The principal trade of the wealthy mahajuns of this district consisted of the export of the rice and Government salt. But now both these sources of gain are stopped; they find it difficult to collect rent and pay revenue. Besides, they have to provide their tenants with paddy seeds, and advance money for the next crop. Under such circumstances, they can hardly afford sufficient relief to the hundreds of the famine-stricken poor who throng daily in the town.

"The Committee find that since the last one month and twenty days relief has been administered to no less than 2,000 persons of every age and sex, and, moreover, the number is increasing daily with the enhancement of the price of rice. Hence the Committee think that no less than Rs. 100 will be required for the daily administration of relief, and they regret to find that in spite of their efforts the monthly subscription at present amounts to no more than Rs. 1,000.

"The Committee also beg to remark that the irrigation works not having yet come into here, labor is scarcely available, and consequently the poor are constrained to resort to the Relief Committee for aid.

"Further, the Committee beg to say that the sooner the works of public utility are opened in the district the better."

232. The Collector's answer, No. 157 of the 4th April (Appendix page 189), addressed to the President, seems to have principally reference to what may be called the zemindar's point of view. The merchant members of the Committee had in fact considerable landed property. The answer amounts to this, that the zemindars as a body have entirely failed in their duty to their

ryots, and that therefore they cannot fairly ask for Government aid. With reference to the allusions to the Nowanund estate, it may be here mentioned that there was a proposal for, and a correspondence regarding, a considerable work on that state; but eventually the levels proved unfavorable, and it came to nothing. We only find that on the 28th April, Government sanctioned the sum of Rs. 540, from the Government Estates Fund, to construct one mile of road on Nowanund. With respect to Mr. Muspratt's omission to forward the appeal of the Relief Committee, we would observe that at this time he showed his entire personal earnestness by contributing a large proportion of his own salary to the relief fund, and was throughout exceedingly active and earnest in the matter, doing in fact all that local means admitted of his doing. But he also had not much official boldness. He seems to have heard generally that proposals to import made by the Collector of Pooree had been negatived, and says (examination page clxxxiv)—“my impression was that we were not to look for the importation of grain by Government, and that it was expected that relief for the distress was to be provided from local subscriptions alone.” It will be seen that he soon after submitted a full report on the state of the district.

233. On the 16th March, with reference to the early Police reports, the Government had desired the Commissioner to call on the Magistrate of Balasore for a report on the state of crime in his district. The Magistrate asked the Superintendent of Police to make a report. He did so on the 27th March, and the Magistrate forwarded it to the Commissioner with a letter from himself on the 2nd April. Nothing can be more uncompromising than the report of the Superintendent of Police (Appendix page 192). He explained the failure of the crop, the exhaustion of the stocks from previous exportation, the want of employment caused by the cessation of the salt manufacture, the great outburst of plunder and its exact character. “The social condition of the current year is unprecedented; the people have been impelled to crime solely through want.” He goes on to say that the local relief fund is insufficient to feed the starving poor, and “I can, as I have remarked above, foresee no prospect of amelioration or of abatement in crime until the next crop has been gathered, *i. e.*, November next, and thus a period of suffering and want for seven months is staring us fixedly in the face.” He added a recommendation for works to afford labor to the starving population.

234. We are told that Mr. Muspratt was at the time somewhat inclined to think Mr. Shuttleworth's report a little highly colored; but except procuring the alteration, already alluded to, of the words “utter failure” in the 2nd paragraph (which have been shown to us in the original of the report) into partial failure, he does not seem to have acted on that feeling, and his own report of April 2 shows no traces of it (Appendix page 190). After looking back to the events of the autumn, he says that at that time “the supply of rice was not small,” but “the holders of grain, seeing a prospect of famine, there have been frequent panics, during which no paddy or rice could be purchased at any price.” Then “the season has passed in which Native craft can venture to cross the Bay of Bengal to bring rice from Dacca, Chittagong or Arracan. Had the irrigation canal been completed, grain might have been imported without risk of loss.” So that he explains that Native importations are not to be looked for, without proposing Government importations.

Mr. Muspratt doubts (paragraph 5) if public works would effect the object, since he says “the influx of money into the hands of the poorer classes would tend rather to raise the price of rice higher than it is now selling.” The price was then 7 to 8 seers per rupee. He sees no prospect of improvement while the present scarcity exists, or till after the next crops have been reaped, and his solution is—“it is, I consider, only by emigration that the state of the district can be ameliorated.” He seems to have thought that as rice could not be got into the district, the only course was to get the people out of it.

In fact many of the starving people from Balasore did emigrate to Calcutta; but as will presently be seen, the authorities there took a different view of the matter, and money raised there was expended in sending them back again; a detachment of paupers from Calcutta was landed at Balasore on the 18th September, when the famine there was still at its height. The zemindars, Mr. Muspratt concludes by saying, one and all refused to undertake the improvements suggested by him in order to employ the poorer ryots, unless Government supplied them with the necessary funds.

235. It will be seen from the above that, although the famine began later in the Balasore district, its state was at this time more distinctly and unambiguously reported than was that of the Pooree district at the same time. But there was a very lamentable delay in submitting these reports to Government.

236. From a letter of the Government of Bengal of the 7th April (No. 2367, Appendix page 194), it appears that “later accounts demi-officially received by the Lieutenant Governor show a further increase of crime and an outbreak of cholera in the jail.” We have not been able to discover what these demi-official accounts were; but they do not seem to have made the Government aware of the full extent of the starvation. The Commissioner was, however, desired to proceed to Balasore and to “submit a special report on the state of the district.” He seems to have been already preparing to go there, and arrived at Balasore on the 11th April. In this month the starvation at Balasore had become much aggravated, and on Mr. Ravenshaw's arrival he became himself a witness to very extreme famine scenes described in his subsequent reports. He was himself almost trampled under foot by a starving mob, “the crowd getting so thick, they absolutely lay one on the other in a writhing mass of disease and distress as painful to witness as it was impossible to relieve.”

237. Meantime a disturbance had occurred in the Mohurbhunj country, and on the 13th April the Bengal Government telegraphed—“You had better go yourself to Mohurbhunj.” The Commissioner, under these instructions, left Balasore on the 20th April without having submitted his official report, and the division remaining for upwards of a month without a local head.

238. The Lieutenant Governor had already left Calcutta for the Hills on the 15th April. Mr. Ravenshaw says that he was not aware of His Honor's intended departure, and it unfortunately happened that the Lieutenant Governor left before the exact state of Balasore had been fully communicated to him. It seems peculiarly unfortunate that not only no special measures were taken, but no arrangement was made to ensure the immediate transmission of information, at this time, although both in the Police and the Public Works Department and from other sources much crime, misery and starvation had been reported. Balasore is much nearer to Calcutta than the other districts of Orissa; the distance is only 141 miles, for more than half of which there is a good metalled road, and there is direct telegraphic communication. Yet it would seem that for some weeks the authorities in Calcutta were ignorant of the state of extreme famine so visible at Balasore. At the time of the Lieutenant Governor's departure, no special arrangement was made with the Board. His Honor says (examination page exxvi) “I had not any information on the subject of famine of a severe character at Balasore before I left Calcutta”; and Mr. Schaleh, then alone at the Board, says, in reply to the question put as follows:—

“Q.—Did the Lieutenant Governor leave behind him any instructions to the Board in any shape?”

“A.—I had no private or unofficial communication with him on the subject, and I am not aware of any official instructions. If there were, they would be on record.”

We find no official instructions on the subject at that time. It is to be observed too that it so happened that for some time the reports went to the

Government at Darjeeling, and not to the Board at Calcutta. The Balasore report was in the Criminal Department, and the Pooce report being considered emergent was (in the absence of any exact rule on the subject) sent to Government. In the Board famine was still not a special subject, and not making special enquiry, the Board received no reports.

239. We think that the state of Mohurbhunj may have fully justified Mr. Ravenshaw's departure on this occasion. At that moment, when the country all around was disorganised by famine and plunder, any outbreak of the aboriginal tribes allied to the Sonthals might have spread and produced the most embarrassing results. Certainly no man would have gone into such a country at such a season except from a sense of pressing duty. But we must consider that Mr. Ravenshaw was much to blame for not submitting the report on Balasore before his departure. On the 20th April he "hopes to finish it and get it despatched to-day or at latest to-morrow"; but in fact he takes it to Mohurbhunj; it is dated the 2nd May, and, with the very important reports of the local officers of the 27th March and the 2nd April, does not seem to have come before the Government of Bengal till the 11th May. We think, moreover, that some special arrangements were necessary during the Commissioner's absence, having regard to the state of the Regulation districts.

240. It must, however, be here noticed that Mr. Ravenshaw did, on the 20th April, writing demi-officially to the Lieutenant Governor, communicate much of the state of things at Balasore. He says (Appendix page 197)—"Large subscriptions have been raised in Balasore to support the starving. I visited the distribution of food this morning, and never witnessed a more painful sight, and the people are naturally such a clamorous and unruly set, it is almost impossible to distribute even food with any degree of order or regularity; they throng the place of distribution, and so crowd and press on each other that the weak are positively in danger of being crushed. I was myself nearly knocked down by the importunate mob. There is a good working Committee here, and food is distributed only on tickets and to those who can't work. There are many, I fear, who can, but won't exert themselves, and with such, one must be hard-hearted. Things will not mend, I fear, until the harvest of next season, and there are some four months coming during which distress will be frightful. Every one is doing his best. With all this it is difficult to get labor unless the labor be brought to their door; the people won't go a mile to work for food. The Executive Engineer now wants 100 men, and can't get them. I think the only thing Government can do is to provide labor."

The subscriptions raised were certainly not large when compared with the distress; the total raised in the district to the end of May was Rs. 3,623.

241. Several letters of Mr. Ravenshaw, written about this time (Appendix pages 196-7), show that he was now very much alive to the distress, and he, too, evinced his own personal feeling for it by distributing food largely to the starving on his march and during his stay at Mohurbhunj; but his ideas of the extent to which Government would interfere were, as we have remarked, limited in the extreme. He now tells us that if he had been aware that any fund was available, he would certainly have applied for it.

242. Mr. Ravenshaw's observations regarding the question of labor require some notice. In the first local application for Government aid, the necessity of supplying labor to the poor of Balasore was much insisted on. Mr. Muspratt only doubted, fearing that the supply of rice would in consequence be more run upon, and in his letter of the 2nd April he makes a statement which is worthy of attention. He says—

"The class of men by whom the dacoities have been chiefly committed are 'Pans' and 'Kandras,' who hold but little, if any, land of their own, and eke out their support by working for the better class of ryots. Owing to the scanty

crops, these men obtained but little employment at the last harvest, and consequently did not receive the payment in paddy they have been accustomed to earn. Although these people saw no hope of finding sustenance in their own villages, they will not go elsewhere to seek employment. During my tour in the cold season, I strongly urged them to go to the Irrigation Company or to Calcutta for work, assuring them they would be able to get employment at remunerative wages. The only reply I received was—'Let the irrigation works commence near our villages, and we will readily work in cutting the canals, but we will not leave our homes. Our ancestors never went from their villages to seek work, and we will not.' They consider it a disgrace to work as coolies, and it is a common saying of the women—'Let our sons die rather than become coolies.' They call themselves 'muzoors,' i. e., laborers."

We think there is much truth in this passage, more so than in some of the more extreme views regarding the unwillingness of the people to work which Mr. Ravenshaw has sometimes expressed.

Again, Mr. Manson, the Assistant Magistrate and Collector, endorses, on another letter, the following observation:—

"I asked many of the zemindars and other landholders at Soroh, especially those to the west of the Juggernath Road (in August), why more coolies did not come and take labor on public works. Their continual answer was, of the men who remain most prefer to die at home, and the few who could be tempted to take unusual employment would run away to Calcutta when they had a few pice. They have not houses near the road, and know it is death to live in the rain."

This last refers to a later period; but with more especial reference to Mr. Ravenshaw's assertion that men were not to be had to do the ordinary road work we must explain. Although there were no special works for relief, the ordinary work on the road was carried on in the usual manner. That mode is to work by a system of petty contracts, wholly unfitted for relief in times of famine. The contractors make their profit, and under them the work is carried on by gangs, who do hard task-work. Neither under the contractors, nor when working direct under the Government officers, is it possible to measure the work of each individual laborer. He or she must belong to a gang who work in common. Their common work is measured, and the money is divided. Hence an individual wishing to earn a livelihood must first obtain admission to a gang; the gangs will not admit a laborer who from weakness is unable to do a full day's labor, and, above all, they will not or cannot admit more than a certain proportion of women and children, since these ordinarily do not dig, but only carry. Throughout these events by far the greater number of the applicants for relief have been women and children. Many of the able-bodied men went away to seek more profitable labor in less famine-stricken districts, leaving their wives and families behind them. For people so situated the ordinary form of public works is of little avail. Mr. Windle, the Executive Engineer of Balasore, distinctly tells us that the ordinary task rates allowed did not suffice to provide a sufficiency of food when rice became very dear and the people emaciated. His work was not in the station, but at a distance, where it is admitted that it was very difficult to procure rice. It is evident that for the relief of famine, works must be very specially arranged. And our opinion is, that obstinate and prejudiced as in some respects the Ooryahs are, those of them who are accustomed to labor have not, as has been sometimes supposed, shown as a rule, an extraordinary determination to refuse work when it has been offered to them under favorable conditions, though many have starved without seeking work at a distance, and some unaccustomed to labor may have starved rather than accept labor close at hand. We apprehend that in England, the classes unaccustomed to manual labor would suffer much before turning out with their wives and their daughters to carry earth, especially

if they must live in gangs on some distant road-side. It was still more so in Orissa. The truth is that Government employment was at this time offered under very unfavorable conditions.

In Mr. Shortt's report of 1st September he says—"Plenty of labor can be had for rice. Reports are sent that labor is not to be had in sufficient quantity; the meaning is simply that those who require the labor have only money to offer in payment, and money is valueless since it is unable to provide the recipients with the necessaries of life."

243. In the *Englishman* of the 24th April appeared a somewhat modest appeal for aid from the Balasore Relief Committee, saying little of the extent of the distress. Mr. Muspratt asked Mr. Chapman, as a private friend, to receive subscriptions, and Mr. Chapman consented, only objecting to the use of his official designation.

244. Mr. Ravenshaw's report of the 2nd May (Appendix page 198) endorses most of the statements of Messrs. Shuttleworth and Muspratt, but repeats his own previous views regarding the presence of grain in the country. He says again that he estimates the crop at half the average. "Supposing that the whole of this finds its way into the market, there is doubtless sufficient grain in the country to support the people; but owing to the extraordinary rise of the price of rice, it is now and has been for some months beyond the means of the poorer classes to procure a sufficiency to support life. They have eked out a miserable existence by digging jungle roots, gathering berries and leaves." After saying that many starve without making the smallest attempt to earn a living he goes on,—“Those who have not taken to dacoity have lapsed into the most abject state of misery and distress, having become too weak, for want of food, either to work or rob. They absolutely swarm in the station and villages, either dying of cholera, dysentery, or hunger, or picking up a bare subsistence by begging on public charity. The Balasore European residents and wealthy Natives have done much to provide food for these poor wretches, and daily distribution is made to those not in a condition to work; but the relief is insufficient, and from the nature of the people, and their excessively disorderly and utterly unmanageable conduct, it is nearly impossible to afford anything like systematic relief. Pinched by hunger and disease, as soon as a door for relief is opened, the rush of applicants is so great as to nearly overwhelm the persons appointed to distribute food. I went myself and witnessed such a scene as will never be effaced from my memory.”

He describes the occasion, already alluded to, on which he was mobbed and rifled; then continues—

“There is a very general tendency on the part of zemindars and dealers to hoard grain; such a thing as free-trade or competition in the market is unknown. The system appears to be the result partly of avarice and partly of ignorance and timidity. The action has been to withhold grain from the market until the stock in hands of retail dealers was exhausted, and then to sell secretly and by dribblets, so as to enhance not only the price, but the trouble of procuring rice.

“There is also a vague idea that next year may turn out an insufficient crop, and those who hold more than enough rice for their own use during the current year withhold the balance for next in place of throwing it into the markets.

“I believe every care and precaution have been taken by the district authorities to promote confidence and unrestricted trade, and at the same time to interfere in no way with the prices or rates at which grain is or has been sold.

“No one appears to allow or to wish it known that he possesses rice in any quantity. I was present at a meeting of the chief Native landholders and

merchants at Balasore, where liberal subscriptions were freely offered to the relief fund. The question then turned on where rice could be procured for the money subscribed. The result was that each individual accused the rest of possessing stores of grain. The imputation being indignantly repudiated after a long discussion, some began to offer to supply a certain quantity, say 100 maunds, if a second person named would supply 200 maunds; the latter retorting that he was willing to give 200 maunds if the first speaker would give 400, an amount he professed himself unable to supply. No rate or price for the rice was attempted to be fixed; it was to be sold to the Committee at whatever price the possessor might demand. The meeting broke up, and no definite arrangement for procuring rice for the money subscribed was arrived at. I merely note this as an illustration of my expressed opinion that there is food in the country sufficient for the present, were it only readily procurable for money. For this I can suggest no remedy, though I believe in time such prejudices will be overcome, and that the grain market will assume a more healthy tone. I have myself, in repeated communications with district officers, under instructions from the Board, enjoined entire non-interference with trade, which it would be impolitic and impossible to force. I believe these instructions have been most implicitly adhered to.”

It does not appear that any very immediate action was taken by the Government on Mr. Ravenshaw's report. The answer is dated the 23rd May (No. 694 T, Appendix page 212). It approves generally of the measures adopted, refers to the grant of money just made, Rs. 10,000 from the North West Famine Fund, and promises attention to the Cuttack road in the Public Works Department. The report seems also to have been sent to the Board, by the Government, at this time.

245. On the 12th May the Balasore Relief Committee made a more urgent appeal to the public press, representing the largeness of the calls upon them and the exhaustion of their own fund. It was in his letter as Secretary and Treasurer (Appendix page 209) that Mr. Muspratt made the statement that, in spite of enormous exports of the previous year, “yet the stock of rice in the district, aided by imports from Arracan received and expected shortly, will suffice to feed all the inhabitants. All that our Committee needs is the money to purchase the rice from the merchants for distribution to the starving poor.” It is to be remembered, however, that this letter (written after the Commissioner's visit) was an appeal to the general public, who could give money and not rice. Allusion is made to expected imports, and Mr. Muspratt now explains that the merchants had promised to import both from Arracan and from the Madras Coast, from which last quarter the south wind might have brought sea-worthy vessels of small draught. In fact the merchants then led him to suppose that if he would find the money, they would somehow get the rice. Within a very few days he found that these expectations were wholly fallacious. The merchants then avowed that rice could only come from the east by steamer, and that their expected supplies from the south had failed. Just then came a telegram offering the surplus flour of the Bhootan Expedition at cost price. And on this hint Mr. Muspratt at last spoke out, recommending importation of rice. He replied “Attah is not eaten in Balasore, and no one would buy it. Rice required for free distribution to about 3,000 starving of all ages; might be sent to mouth of Balasore River, and could be unladen by aid of sloops of this port.” He followed up the telegram by a letter sent to Government on the same day (Appendix page 211), in which he explained how sloops might be sent down in tow of a small steamer, and added—“The number of persons relieved daily now exceeds 2,500, and a more pitiable collection of skin and bone it has never been my lot to see. More than one-fourth of the number have come in from the Gurjats of Mohurbhunj and Neilgherry. The Com-

missioner informs me that the distress in Mohurbhunj is most appalling." In fact about this time we find in the Police Reports "numbers are daily dying of disease and starvation, and the municipal sweepers have plenty to do in removing the corpses"; and again, it is said that of the recipients of relief, "numbers die daily and have to be removed." In the week ending 25th May, the price of rice at Balasore was from 5 to 6 Calcutta seers per rupee. With great difficulty and much effort, it was procured, and the distribution of food was never interrupted. It was, however, at this time that the Public Works officers reported that money was absolutely useless without rice.

246. In the latter half of May great distress appeared in the Bhudruk sub-division, which had previously appeared to be better off. On the 1st May the Collector, visiting Bhudruk, had not seen special signs of distress, but in the middle of the month, Mr. Shortt reported that rice was selling at $3\frac{1}{2}$ seers per rupee, and that numbers of people were starving. From that time the distress in this part of the Balasore district became extreme.

247. The only special relief work commenced in this district to the end of May was the one mile of road in the Nowanund estate, for which we have mentioned that the sum of Rs. 540 was sanctioned on the 28th April,—say 50 to 100 persons may have been thus employed in May. There was, however, a considerable expenditure on the ordinary public works of the Balasore division, principally on the Calcutta and Cuttack Trunk Road. No return of the number of persons employed is made, but Rs. 1,13,233 having been sanctioned in the budget for 1865-66, the sum of Rs. 1,18,224 was expended; also Rs. 11,931 for repairs, total Rs. 1,30,855. So that after all, in spite of all the difficulties of the contract system, a good deal of work must have been done by the people of the Balasore district.

248. The Government referred Mr. Muspratt's proposal to import rice to the Board. It was yet a few days before that body consented to import; but at the end of May importations were ordered.

249. As respects the Cuttack district, from February to the end of May, the official correspondence is almost a blank. It has been already explained how it happened that the famine came later in the Cuttack district than in the other districts, and later in Cuttack proper than in other parts of the district. In March rice is quoted in Cuttack from 8 to 10 Calcutta seers per rupee. The Irrigation Company were giving rice to their laborers in part payment, and people seem to have contrived to live. In the end of March rice got dearer, and there was a decided change for the worse. Mr. Ravenshaw has put in, as supporting his views as to the existence of stocks of rice, some papers of a sort of Joint Stock Company affecting a European model, formed on the 1st April by Native officials and other residents of the town. They were to supply rice not for profit, but for the good of the community, since they said (Appendix page 215) "no measures having been taken for the alleviation of the distress, something should be done to save the lives of the poor." They, therefore, proceeded to make a kind of rice assessment of the district, and issued a circular, in which they stated that the "scarcity has been caused by combinations of the avaricious merchants and not by failure of crops, and estimating the quantities supposed to be held by each person (which were very considerable), they call on each zemindar and mahajun to furnish a certain quantity of rice to them at a fair rate, and so to defeat "the wicked grain merchants encouraged by the speech of the Lieutenant Governor." The persons assessed, however, by no means responded to the appeal. A few gave or promised money, none rice, and the Company came to a speedy end.

250. Mr. Ravenshaw himself does not seem to have been seriously alarmed up to the time of his departure for Balasore, and eventually Mohurbhunj, on

the 9th April. On the 8th, in writing demi-officially to the Lieutenant Governor, he says (Appendix page 223)—

"Famine matters are in 'statu quo'; rice very dear, and a wonderful disposition on the part of dealers to hold back their stores of grain, which they sell by dribblets and in quantity insufficient to supply the demand. I hear everywhere that there is a large store still in hand, and it must be forthcoming ere long. There has been a movement among several wealthy men in the town, who have got up a Company to buy and sell rice at a reasonable price, say 12 seers per rupee, or even 10 would be a boon; but, like all Native movements, there is division among the members, and one says I will supply 200 maunds if so and so will give 400. And so and so objects that if he is to supply 400, the first party should give 250. This is one of the peculiar features of the people here. I hope they will come to terms, as such a supply thrown into the market would cause the more legitimate dealers to sell.

"Meanwhile, rice is sold in the shops, and there has been no recurrence of the total closing movement."

251. No doubt if implicit reliance were placed on Mr. Ravenshaw's expressed convictions, the fact of the existence of grain was frequently stated by him. But we cannot think that, under all the circumstances, and in so very grave a matter, it was safe to rely entirely in him alone; the more as his assertions were of a very vague character, were opposed to the symptoms of a market rising steadily all over the country, and were supported by no cited authority whatever.

252. The Superintendent of Police at Cuttack was an officer wholly ignorant of the language, who has, in the famine operations, shown little zeal, and whose great object seems to have been to get away from the district. There has not been much accord between him and the Magistrate, and from that source very little information was derived. Mr. Cornell, new to the district, as has been said, and deeming it sufficient to follow the Commissioner's views, made no enquiries. He tells us in answer to our questions as follows:—

"Q.—You had, as you say, heard of the failure of crops in the district; on taking charge of the district as Magistrate and Collector, did it occur to you that it was necessary to make particular enquiries from your predecessor as to the state of the district?"

"A.—I understood that the Lieutenant Governor had lately visited Cuttack; that the whole question had been considered by him and the Board of Revenue; and that the necessary instructions had been issued and arrangements made.

"Q.—Did you find any such instructions recorded in your office?"

"A.—I found a circular of the Board two or three months old, to the effect that no detailed enquiry into the failure of the crops was needed for the purpose of allowing remission of revenue, and that in the scarcity which was anticipated, the chief reliance must be placed on local charity. I found also some letters of the Commissioner regarding local charity and the operations of the Relief Committee. I found also a record of the speech of the Lieutenant Governor, and found no other record of the Lieutenant Governor's instructions, proceedings, or policy. No other communication of the policy of Government was made to me; nor am I yet aware that during his visit the Lieutenant Governor laid down any course to be followed except that he rejected petition spraying that the price of grain be fixed. I only presumed that the Lieutenant Governor had fully considered the subject, and that he had confirmed the policy of the Board's Circular to which I have alluded, and which he had formally approved before it was communicated to this district. I was in daily personal communication with the Commissioner, who was then in the station. Under those circumstances, I considered it rather my duty

to act in accordance with his instructions than to originate any views of my own. He expressly drew my attention to the arrears of office work, which were considerable. The scarcity and possibility of a famine were not specially pressed upon me by the Commissioner as matters demanding my immediate attention."

In truth Mr. Cornell seems to have been a good and intelligent man in office, but to have devoted himself to that solely.

253. Looking to the evidence of the officers of the Irrigation Company and others, we can have no doubt that in April the Cuttack district began to suffer from actual famine and starvation. The pressure was as yet less so in the town than elsewhere, but prices reached $5\frac{1}{2}$ to $6\frac{1}{2}$ seers, at which rate the people could not long survive, and starving objects began to appear. Several private charities were opened, and there was an old established public charity, but it was not till the end of April that the Relief Committee commenced regular operations. The distress was aggravated by the failure of the Irrigation Company's rice, which came to an end at this time; their funds, their agent tells us, were at the time scant; they did not import more rice till June; and meantime food becoming scarcer and scarcer, the relief afforded by their works was greatly diminished. It is quite clear that Colonel Rundall and Mr. Boothby entertained strong opinions of the severity of the distress and the scarcity of rice, and it is much to be regretted that the Commissioner and Collector did not more weigh their opinions against those of the towns-people. The agents of the French house too—Messrs. Fressanges and DelaGatinais, persons the best qualified to judge—seem to have been very well aware that there was not grain in the country. Mr. DelaGatinais was examined (page lxxxiii). Mr. Fressanges was absent, but Mr. DelaGatinais and others tell us his views, and the Commissioner quotes him as the only person opposed to his own view. Mr. Geary (examination page cxvii) was warned by Mr. Fressanges to provide his own stock against a famine, so early as the end of 1865. It has been before mentioned that the French merchants did not export after June 1865.

254. The statements made to us show that there was great starvation and suffering, and considerable mortality, in the Cuttack district in May. But still in the town the mortality was not excessive; there were not the famine scenes described at Balasore, and through the greater part of the month, a district officer who did not look abroad or beyond seems not to have been very seriously alarmed. Prices still rising were in the middle of the month about $5\frac{1}{2}$ to 6 Calcutta seers per rupee, but in answer to an enquiry from Mr. Chapman, Mr. Cornell wrote on the 16th May—"If we can get another Rs. 1,000 besides the current subscription, I think we shall be able to continue feeding the poor for the next three or four months, but it is very difficult to make calculations; it is so contingent on weather and imports from Sumbulpore, &c. There is sufficient grain concealed or stored for this season I hope, but if a bad harvest follows, the results will be serious."

255. From Cuttack, however, also the offer of the Bhootan flour drew out a reply that rice would be preferred. But the crisis had now come; from 5 and 6 seers prices went in the latter part of the month to 4 and 5 seers, about seven times the average price of food. They rose still higher, and did not materially fall during the following three months. From the middle of June to the middle of July the price (when rice could be bought at all in the town) was $3\frac{1}{2}$ to $4\frac{1}{2}$ Calcutta seers, say eight times the average price, and in most places rice was not to be had at any price. In fact in the end of May the Cuttack district was suddenly discovered to be in a state of a terrible famine. The popular urban confidence in stocks only ended in more sudden and complete exhaustion and ruin, and in respect of price Cuttack suffered more than any other district

station. Rice was dearer for a short time at Balasore, but the most extreme pressure of prices lasted for a longer period at Cuttack than at either Balasore or Pooree.

256. On the 27th May Mr. Ravenshaw returning found the troops and Government establishments on the point of starvation, and on the 28th he sent the telegram which led to importations. On the 29th the Relief Committee also telegraphed to Government urgently praying for rice.

257. Up to this time there were no Government relief works in the Cuttack district, but the works of the Irrigation Company afforded employment to vastly greater numbers than did the Government works in Pooree. We cannot speak too highly of the humane endeavors of the officers of this Company to render their works beneficial to the destitute. In January, when rice was procurable, the numbers were at their highest, and from that month till June, employment being freely offered and more and more needed, the decrease in numbers was, we understand, solely due to the scarcity of rice. In the rainy months, from July to August, the work was for the most part stopped by the season. We subjoin an approximate statement of the average number of persons employed in the Cuttack district by the Irrigation Company in each month from January to June 1866—

MONTH.				AVERAGE NUMBER EMPLOYED DAILY.
January	...	...	...	14,666
February	...	...	...	10,763
March	...	...	...	7,808
April	...	...	...	9,146
May	...	...	...	8,120
June	...	...	...	5,238
General average				9,290

The ordinary public works of this division do not seem to have been largely prosecuted, for we find that of Rs. 1,12,483 allotted in the Budget for 1865-66, only Rs. 29,982 was spent.

258. The important series of papers regarding Orissa generally (subsequent to the Lieutenant Governor's visit in February) will be found at page 228 of the Appendix. The correspondence is given, as before explained, in full to the end of May, and thence continued by a selection of the most important papers only.

259. The result of the correspondence regarding additional public works has been already mentioned. The letter (No. 2514 of 31st May), which may be said to close this stage of that question, will be found at page 261.

260. It does not appear that Baboo Ramakhoy's appeal from Pooree, published in the *Hindoo Patriot* in the beginning of March, much attracted the public attention. It was not till April, when the pressure of most extreme high prices was felt at Cuttack, and extreme starvation was visible at Balasore, that the attention of the European press and public can be said to have been fully aroused. From the middle of April it may be stated that the subject began to be generally discussed in the public prints. On the 12th of that

month the *Friend of India* published a letter from the Reverend J. Phillips, missionary at Jellasore, a place in Balasore near the border of the Midnapore district, and not one of the earliest reached by extreme famine. The paper also alluded to accounts of famine received from the Collector of Ganjam.

261. And at this time Mr. G. S. Sykes, a young merchant of Calcutta, who had business correspondence with the missionaries in different parts of Orissa, but was not in any way directly prompted by them, conceived the idea of establishing a general subscription for the relief of the sufferers by the famine prevailing in that province. With a boldness which the result amply justified, he advertised an Orissa Famine Fund on the 14th April (Appendix page 229), and immediately putting himself in express correspondence on the subject, with those from whom he could best obtain information, he followed up his first appeal by several letters to the newspapers, and energetically urged the fund. His own Firm assumed the position of Secretaries. On the 2nd May, having received more precise information from his missionary correspondents, he circulated extracts in Calcutta (Appendix page 230). It is very remarkable, as showing the greater success of anything in the character of a general fund as distinguished from a local appeal, to observe the success of Mr. Sykes's fund contrasted with the very scant success of the strong appeals for aid for local purposes made by the Official Committees of Pooree and Balasore. Mr. Sykes and his partner were young and little known; it seemed unintelligible that if things were so bad, the proposal should come from them, and many people hesitated. Yet they collected upwards of Rs. 18,000, and we are bound to say that they distributed it most impartially. Coming as this aid did in the most timely manner, the first drops of comfort, as it were on the ocean of misery, the fund is everywhere in the course of our enquiry mentioned with a prominence and remembered with a gratitude quite out of proportion to its actual amount. Its originator deserves the very highest testimony to the successful result of his benevolent efforts. And we think that his success shows that notwithstanding the tightness of the money market, a similar appeal, supported by greater authority, would have been still more successful.

262. On the 28th April, Mr. Chapman, who is personally a man of well known active benevolence, in writing to the *Englishman* newspaper in support of the official prices current which had been impugned in that paper, said,—“There can be no doubt that the suffering both in Orissa and in some other parts is very great. Indeed for some months past the aged and the feeble have been dropping off* for want of proper food. It is time, I think, that measures were taken to collect a general fund for the relief of this general distress.”

And on this hint a good deal of money was sent to Mr. Chapman also. It is explained, however, that the latter part of his letter which we have quoted was written solely in his individual capacity and not in that of Secretary to the Board, which, as already mentioned, at this time took no official action in connection with the famine in Orissa, and was little informed of the state of things.

263. A short correspondence between the Inspector of Jails and the Master Attendant (Appendix page 231) is printed, as showing the first attempt to send rice to Orissa on public account (for the Jail at Cuttack). The Bengal Marine has been reduced to a very low point, and no Government vessel was available. It was proposed to send the rice by the private coasting steamer, and it was on this occasion that the Steam Company refused to touch at False Point with less than 3,000 bags (Captain Howe's examination, page cxxxv). The quantity authorized was only 1,200 maunds, and the rice did not go.

* This expression seems to be taken from a communication of the Collector of Midnapore, dated April 25th.

264. In May the first communication is from the Madras Government, which, having apparently heard from the Ganjam local officers of the distress in Orissa, telegraphed to the Government of Bengal (Appendix page 231)—“Please mention whether any and what measures have been adopted by your Government for relief of distress in Cuttack and neighbouring country.” In reply copies of the previous correspondence were sent, and it was stated that money was being raised in Calcutta by private charity in aid of the sufferers.

265. On the 5th May the Lieutenant Governor called on the Commissioner of Orissa for “a general report on the state of the whole of your division, the scarcity of food, and increase of crime.” On the 19th of that month, the Commissioner, still detained at Mohurbhunj, referred the Government to his separate reports on Balasore and Pooree, which we have already noticed.

266. The public prints were now very full of letters and notices on the famine; but we have only reprinted two letters to the *Englishman*,—one (Appendix page 232) published on the 2nd May, on the occasion of an enquiry from the Government of India, and another (Appendix page 233) dated 30th April, but published a few days later,—as very directly bearing on the importation question, and very well worthy of attention. With reference to the first mentioned letter, the Government of India, on the 10th May, directed their Secretary “to invite the attention of the Lieutenant Governor to the letter in the *Englishman* of the 2nd instant, headed “The starving poor of Orissa,” and to enquire whether the distress in that province is as severe as represented therein, and if so, what steps His Honor has taken or would suggest for its relief.

267. On the 12th May, Mr. R. Scott Moncrieff, of the firm of Messrs. Gisborne and Co., which had first proposed importation in November (and who has been individually most active in the whole matter), wrote (Appendix page 235) to the Private Secretary of the Lieutenant Governor at Darjeeling, suggesting the application of the balance of the North-Western Famine Fund, and strongly urging importation of rice into Orissa from Arracan. He also informed His Excellency the Viceroy at Simla of his proposal.

268. On the 14th May Colonel Macpherson, Commissary General, made the offer of the surplus flour of the Bhootan campaign, which the Government accepted, and which has already been mentioned as having elicited from the local officers an expression of their wish that rice should be imported.

269. On the 16th May the Government of India not having received information telegraphed:—

“The Governor General is anxious about the famine at Orissa, and wants to know what is being done. He will be ready to give, if needed, any portion of the North-Western Famine Fund that may be still in hand. Is the distress in Nuddea also as great as is represented?”

And the Lieutenant Governor telegraphed in reply the same day:—

“District Relief Committees have been formed and subscriptions raised for the relief of the distressed poor in all the districts of the Cuttack division, in Midnapore, and in Nuddea. We are spending as much money as we can on roads in the Cuttack division and in Midnapore, and the Irrigation Company's works afford employment to great numbers. I think the balance of the Famine Fund might well be employed in relieving the distress in Orissa and Midnapore through the agency of the District Relief Committees, and I beg that His Excellency will place it at my disposal for the purpose. The distress in Nuddea is partial. The Commissioner has asked for an additional allotment of Rs. 50,000 to be expended on roads there. I have authorized the Board, if on enquiry they think it likely to answer, to arrange for the shipment of a cargo of rice from Akyab to Orissa.”

The sum of two lakhs (£20,000) was thereupon placed at the disposal of the Government of Bengal from the surplus of the North-West Famine Fund. From this sum the Lieutenant Governor assigned Rs. 10,000 to each of the three districts of Orissa, and Rs. 5,000 to each of the districts of Midnapore, Bankoorah, and Nuddea.

270. At this time the Lieutenant Governor had written demi-officially to the Board, forwarding Mr. Moncrieff's communications, and suggesting importation (see his letters of 16th and 17th May, Appendix page 238), and on the 21st May His Honor sent a telegram, placing Rs. 45,000 at the disposal of the Board for the purpose ("if the Board see fit"), which probably reached Calcutta about the same time as the letters.

271. The Board upon this considered the matter. On the 22nd May they wrote declining to import for the present (No. A, Appendix page 241), pending further enquiries, which they promised immediately to make.

They say—"His Honor is aware that the Board have, on general grounds, a very strong objection either to interfere with the course of trade or to take any steps that may appear to pledge the Government to the impossible task of supporting the whole population of the distressed districts, and so dry up the springs of private charity and paralyze the exertions of the people themselves.

"The Board are very clearly of opinion that the importation of rice into Orissa on Government account would be justifiable only in the extreme case of its being ascertained definitely that the stock of food in the province was insufficient to feed the people, and that food was not likely to be imported through the usual channels.

"The information at present at their command does not, by any means, lead them to suppose that this is the case. Mr. Muspratt, Collector of Balasore, and the Commissioner, Mr. Ravenshaw, have both reported specifically that there is food enough in the country, and so has Mr. Cornell, Collector of Cuttack, in a private letter to my* address that is published in the *Englishman* this morning.

"The reported detail prices point, the Board think, to the same conclusion. In the interior of the district of Pooree rice is even now selling at 9 seers 13½ chittacks the rupee, and it is at Pooree itself only that there is extreme pressure. It is very doubtful, indeed, whether rice imported from Akyab in the manner proposed would not, in fact, be found more costly than what could be bought on the spot, except at the point of landing. The Board are decidedly averse to putting any pressure upon the local dealers by underselling them or in any other way. Their local experience and means of local information is a far better guide to what is a proper price under all circumstances than any facts at the command of the public generally or even of Government officers. No doubt the present high prices are partly due to the possibility of a renewed failure of the crops this year—a legitimate cause that may rightly and safely be left to produce its own effect.

"The Board will, however, immediately enquire at each place whether there is reason to suppose that relief will be more effectually and wisely given by importing grain into the province than by furnishing to the distressed population the means of purchasing that which finds its way there naturally. Until they receive a reply to this enquiry, they will abstain from taking any measures to carry out Mr. Moncrieff's suggestion."

272. The statement that rice was selling in the interior of the Pooree district at nearly 10 seers per rupee was a mistake, the prices having been long quite nominal; and in fact on referring to the returns we find that no such

* The Secretary's.

prices had been returned for several weeks from any part of the Pooree district except in the small outlying portion north of the Chilka Lake, on the Ganjam Road, where small supplies from Gopalpore may possibly have been received. No returns were made from other places in the interior, probably because there was no rice for sale. The statement, therefore, that "it is at Pooree itself only that there is extreme pressure" seems to us to have been unsupported by sufficient facts, and directly opposed to Mr. Barlow's published letters. In fact, as we now see that the local officers had explained to the Commissioner, it was at Pooree that the least pressure was felt, there being money there to buy up whatever small supplies were anywhere to be had, and something being obtained at a high price from Gopalpore.

273. We have before (paragraphs 192, 245, 254,) noticed the circumstances under which the letters of Messrs. Muspratt and Cornell, referred to by the Board, were written, and the former is hardly correctly quoted, since Mr. Muspratt did not say that there was food enough in the country, but that the stock of rice, aided by imports from Arracan, would suffice if money was forthcoming.

And in truth five days before the date of the Board's letter, abandoning his expectation of private imports, he had both telegraphed and written to Government in strong terms to ask for the importation of rice for the starving. The telegram, at least, seems to have been at the time in the Government Secretariat Office at Calcutta, and the day after the Board's letter was written, the Government telegraphed from Darjeeling—

"Magistrate of Balasore writes:—Rice required for free distribution to about three thousand starving of all ages. Might be sent to mouth of Balasore River, and could be unladen by aid of sloops of this port."

But the determination of the Board was not then altered.

274. There is no doubt that this determination caused a most unfortunate delay of a week in respect of importation at a time when minutes were precious, and when days made an enormous difference in the result; for the burst of the monsoon was rapidly approaching. We think that the determination was dictated by a too long and rigid adherence to a principle good in itself, but very injurious when local circumstances are disregarded; the more so if in zeal for the principle the facts are viewed with some bias. It is, however, fair to repeat that the Board do not seem to have been at this time so well informed as the Government of the details of the distress in Balasore, the reports having been made by the local officers direct to Government. They had not the official report of the 10th May regarding Pooree, but Mr. Barlow's letters of 9th and 15th May had been published in the newspapers. That they had as yet failed to understand the nearness of a great crisis is, we think, apparent, since the junior Member, who alone, in the Board's establishment, had the knowledge of Orissa so necessary when importations were commenced, left for Darjeeling immediately after the despatch of the letter of the 22nd May.

275. Although the Board had not officially made enquiries during the period which we have been reviewing, Mr. Chapman, as an individual, seems in May to have sought information from the Collectors with a view to ascertain the necessity for a general subscription, and he received in reply the letters from Mr. Barlow and Mr. Cornell of 15th and 16th May, to which reference has already been made.

On the 18th May Mr. Chapman, referring to the second appeal of the Balasore Committee, had written to the *Englishman*, disclaiming any public character when he consented to receive subscriptions on their account, saying that "pressing as is the need at Balasore, it is more pressing at Cuttack, and still more pressing at Pooree," and more decidedly urging a general Famine Relief Fund. Meanwhile he expressed his readiness to receive subscriptions. On the 21st May, Mr. Chapman sends to the same paper for publication the letters which he had received from Messrs. Barlow and Cornell.

276. A day or two later, Mr. Chapman again writes to the *Englishman*—

“Will you let the public know that the Government has assigned Rs. 10,000 to each of the Collectors of Pooree, Cuttack, and Balasore to meet the immediate distress. This will make contributions from the public for the present unnecessary. I am not sure whether the money is from the unexpended balance of the North-West Province Famine Relief Fund ‘or from Government Funds.’ The money is to be spent under the orders of the Board of Revenue, who have further authority to import rice, but I do not think that they incline to do so. Rice is now selling in the interior of Pooree at nearly 10 seers the rupee; it is at Pooree itself that there is the chief pressure. Ten thousand rupees will help on each district well for some time to come.” It also appears that Mr. Chapman, for some time, returned all subscriptions, sent to him in consequence of his previous suggestions. He has explained that his action was solely as an individual, and that he was actuated by the consideration that having, since his previous letters, discovered the existence of a large balance of the North-West Famine Fund, he thought that people would not have subscribed if they had been aware of this fact, so long as the former fund remained unexhausted, and therefore did not think it fair to take their money. We have no doubt that Mr. Chapman was actuated by the best motives, but in his communications his public character (or at least information derived from official sources) is so much mixed up with his individual character, that the letter certainly had at the time much of the effect of an official declaration that subscriptions were not required; and indeed, as both the Board and the Government of Bengal soon after that time determined not to appeal to the public, the conclusion was practically not far wrong. The letter, however, bore so much the appearance of a want of appreciation of the whole severity of the crisis as to call forth loud reclamations from the local committees in Orissa.

277. With reference to the expression regarding the Pooree district—“it is at Pooree itself only that there is extreme pressure,”—contained in the Board’s letter of May 22nd, we may remark that it may be doubted whether Mr. Barlow’s extreme caution secured for him that amount of confidence, when he did speak out, which he expected. It would rather seem that his previous reticence caused his letters to be received with some distrust. That his letters of this period, as well as those of Mr. Ravenshaw, were regarded with some degree of doubt, is farther to be gathered from Mr. Grote’s letter to Mr. Ravenshaw of the 29th May (Appendix page 258) and the Lieutenant Governor’s to Mr. Chapman of the 11th June (Appendix page 287). The diffuseness of some of Mr. Barlow’s letters may explain one expression used by His Honor, but the allusion to “random statements” seems to imply some doubt of the facts. We must presume that the head of the Government had taken a more sanguine view than the local officers, and that the Board of Revenue were with difficulty induced to believe that their previously announced opinions were mistaken.

278. The Lieutenant Governor’s instructions for the disposal of the sums allotted out of the two lakhs of the former Famine Fund are dated 21st May (No. 632 T, Appendix page 240). The full amount of the balance of the North-Western Fund does not seem to have been yet known, and the Lieutenant Governor reserved one lakh of the two lakhs received, for public works; but this order was afterwards cancelled by direction of the Government of India, the whole of the fund being devoted to purely charitable relief, and the cost of public works being defrayed by Government.

279. On the 22nd May the Board had also (on telegraphic intimation of the grants made to the districts) issued instructions (Appendix page 243), and at the same time they desired the Commissioner to consult the Collectors, and after due enquiry to report, as soon as possible, on the question whether it would be really advantageous to import rice.

280. On the 23rd May the Government of India, referring to a communication from the Chamber of Commerce, request “that the Lieutenant Governor

will furnish the Government of India with some authentic information as to the actual condition of the people in the districts of Orissa and Midnapore, the only information at present possessed by the Governor General being derived from the public prints, and some indirect communications from private persons.”

We have not traced any immediate answer to this letter; but on the 10th June the Government of Bengal sent to the Government of India the first of a series of narratives regarding the famine, which were from that time continued.

281. On the 26th May, in reply to various grants at this time made for public works, came the telegram from the Superintending Engineer, Cuttack, already alluded to:—“Sixty thousand rupees no good as far as Balasore is concerned; we want rice. Workmen all leaving the works in Balasore division, because rice is not obtainable for their money. Something should be done immediately. Things are as bad at Cuttack and Pooree.” And on the 28th the Lieutenant Governor sends a letter with this telegram to the Board (No. 769 T, Appendix page 248), requesting them to “give their renewed and immediate attention to the question of importing rice into the distressed districts, and to add that the Lieutenant Governor is not at all satisfied that the information in the Board’s possession is such as to support their confident opinion that such importation is unnecessary.”

282. On the 27th May the Commissioner reports fully to the Board, and on the following day to Government also. He sends a number of enclosures, making fully manifest the state of things; the whole will be found in the Appendix page 250. Mr. Ravenshaw still thinks that the rice is in the country, but as people do not understand free trade they will not sell it; the laws of supply and demand do not avail, and as the troops and public establishments must live, he recommends importation for their use.

On the 28th he telegraphs to Government as follows:—

“Rice with utmost difficulty procurable in insufficient quantity at 4½ Cuttack seers per rupee. Bazaars again partially closed. Only one day’s rations in store for troops, who are reported discontented. Commissariat have refused assistance; crime increasing daily. Public works and relief works stopped for want of food. I recommend immediate importation of rice for use of troops, for jails, and to feed laborers on relief works, and supply food to starving through Relief Committees.

“Rice can be landed at Balasore River, False Point, or mouth of Dhamrah River for Cuttack. I will arrange to do so.

“Mahajuns would supply on their own account if Government give a tug steamer to tow ships down the coast; no rain, and the early sown rice crop in danger.

“Send copy of this to Board. Full particulars by dāk.”

This is followed up by the Cuttack Local Committee’s telegraph to Government on the 29th:—

“The Committee, observing that the market price of the very coarsest rice is 3½ Cuttack seers per rupee, and supplies to any amount even at that high price are not procurable, resolved that an urgent application be made to the Government of Bengal for importation of one lakh rupees’ worth of rice direct from Calcutta to False Point by steamer.”

283. On this day, the 29th May, the Lieutenant Governor telegraphs to his Secretary in Calcutta—“Request the Board to send rice down immediately to False Point and Balasore. Send the *Arracan* or any other available steamer; let no time be lost;” also, “tell the Board that, if necessary, they can indent on a second lakh for the purchase of rice;” and to the Board, “I have received alarming accounts from Ravenshaw of the state of things in Cuttack. Ascertain particulars from Geoghegan. The Board should at once arrange for sending rice from Calcutta to Balasore, Dhamrah, and False Point as proposed by Ravenshaw.” Importations were then immediately commenced.

284. From this time it may be said that, for a few days, the famine was, if it may be so expressed, half realized. Letters to which we have already alluded seem to evince this feeling, and the officers who were in the hills did not immediately return; but the Lieutenant Governor's note to Mr. Chapman of the 31st May (Appendix page 262) shows a strong conviction on His Honor's part of the necessity of importation, and great exertions were made by the Board, through their energetic Secretary, to get rice off from Calcutta to False Point and Balasore. None was sent immediately to Pooree, nor to the Dhamrah, but a cargo was ordered from Burmah, to be disposed of when it arrived as circumstances might require, and eventually, a month later, it went to Pooree.

285. On the 2nd June Mr. Ravenshaw (Appendix page 264) repeats his belief in the existence of stocks, though they cannot be made available. On the 4th of that month, having gone to Pooree, he there recommends (Appendix page 269) to Mr. Barlow to be cautious not to open too many centres of relief, and to the Board not to import to Pooree for the present. Mr. Barlow, however, succeeded in getting a small supply of sea-borne rice from Gopalpore, with the famine money first allotted for relief, and the distribution of food on a small scale was commenced. In his letter of June 2nd (Appendix page 269), after alluding to a demi-official letter to Mr. Chapman to a contrary effect, which has not been found, Mr. Barlow admits that so considerable a trade with Gopalpore had at this time sprung up that for the present it may not be desirable to import for sale to the public. But describing the pitiable state of the "masses of crippled and starved persons staggering to get relief," he pleads hard for importation of grain to feed them, since, he says, the rice not being intended for sale, the measure can interfere with no laws of political economy. Even as respects the private trade, Mr. Barlow's view proved far too favorable. The Gopalpore supply was soon very much reduced, and his hope that it would be maintained until, with the fall of rain, grain from the Mahanuddee districts should relieve the market, proved wholly fallacious. The Mahanuddee supplies, when they came, afforded but a very little relief to the immediate neighbourhood of Cuttack; there was not a grain to spare for Pooree. In fact it soon became apparent that importation by sea to Pooree was indispensably necessary.

286. On the 9th June, the Lieutenant Governor, having asked the Government of India for the balance of the North-West Famine Fund, authorized the Board to arrange for the importation of another two lakhs worth of rice into Orissa; but the Board replied—"Your telegram received. The Board do not think it necessary to order more rice from Rangoon at present. They will wait to see the effect of what has been done already and of the rains which may be expected daily. Another cargo of twenty thousand maunds destined for Bourbon has been offered to them upon a guarantee, and they will accept it if prices do not fall at once. It is anxiety on account of the rains holding off that is keeping up prices, which are still reported 5 Bengal seers the rupee." On the same day, 9th June, the Government of India telegraphed to the Lieutenant Governor—"The Chamber of Commerce has sent the following message:—'Accounts of famine in Orissa most appalling. Chamber entreat that the balance of Famine Fund may be immediately given for purchase of rice.' The Governor General begs for an immediate communication from you on this subject. Your latest advices have not led him to suppose matters at all so bad as the Chamber represents. His Excellency is ready to grant the fullest aid that the local Government reports to be required." And the Lieutenant Governor, in reply, quotes the Board's telegram just mentioned, and adds, "the accounts which I have received do not support the statements of the Chamber, but it will satisfy the public to know that the whole of the Famine Relief Fund is available, and will be expended as required in relieving existing distress."

On the 10th June His Honor directed the Board to accept the additional cargo offered.

On the 11th the Board were authorized to expend the whole balance of the North-Western Fund on importations of rice.

287. On the 16th June the Lieutenant Governor returned to Calcutta. Mr. Schalch immediately followed him. On the 19th a consultation took place between His Honor, the Members of the Board, and two leading Members of the European and Native community, and from that time it may be said that, if the whole severity of the famine was not completely known, at any rate it was recognised to be of a degree sufficient to require all efforts, and all was done that could be done by any ordinary means. A Government steamer was telegraphed to bring a cargo of rice from the Madras Coast to Pooree, and arrived before the end of the month. Arrangements were shortly afterwards made to send rice to the Dhamrah, which, after a good deal of delay in preparing a Government vessel otherwise employed, and for other causes, were carried out in the latter part of the following month. From this time, then, till the occurrence of a certain break late in the season (which will be afterwards noticed), it may be said that rice was never wanting at False Point or Pooree. An advance of twenty lakhs for importation was sanctioned by the Government of India. The supply was only, unhappily, delayed and limited by the extreme difficulty of landing it and conveying it into the interior at that season of the year, no appliances having been prepared beforehand. More rice was procurable in Calcutta and elsewhere than was required, several cargoes having been offered and declined; some of these were cargoes shipped for, and eventually taken to, foreign ports.

288. The details of the relief operations will be shown in the District Narratives; but, as owing to the peculiar features of this famine, every thing else is wholly subordinate to the supply of rice by sea, which formed the exact limit of the relief afforded, we may here briefly summarise what was done. It may almost be said that every maund of rice landed from June to October saved a life, whether it was sold, given away, or stolen.

289. We have just said that everything depended on importation by sea. In fact the rains and hill torrents rendered the route by land beyond Midnapore wholly impracticable, and whatever was to be had from Sumbulpore came down the Mahanuddee in the rainy season by private boats without Government interference, this trade affording but a small pittance of relief to Cuttack Proper.

290. On all the coast of Orissa, False Point excepted, vessels of the ordinary class could only lie outside, exposed to the full force of the sea, and unload, very slowly and with extreme difficulty, during breaks in the boisterous monsoon weather. Rice was sent into the Balasore River early in June, by a Government steamer of very light draught (the *Nemesis*) towing a small sloop; but the quantity thus conveyed during the early months of importation was but small, about 8,000 maunds up to the last days of July.

291. The difficulty of landing and conveying the rice from the False Point anchorage has been before noticed (paragraphs 32 and 207). Nothing can be better protected than is this anchorage during the south-west monsoon. Large steamers lie in complete protection covered by a sandy island. But there intervene between the anchorage and the shore of the main land several miles of shallow water; the ill-found country boats often struggled for several days against wind and current before making the landing place, and not unfrequently went to the bottom. The first supply of rice in a tug steamer towing a ship reached the False Point anchorage as early as the 4th June, and partly by water, partly by land in carts, a very small quantity began to arrive at Cuttack about the 20th June. But then there was some delay, the main cargo having been sent on a price guaranteed at False Point, where there was no

one, at the moment, to buy it; and the freshes coming down interrupted the land transport and delayed the boats so much that they were sometimes five or six weeks in reaching Cuttack. Although several vessels arrived in succession, we find it stated that it was not till the beginning of August that a good and continuous supply began to reach Cuttack.

At Pooree the landing was so difficult that after a comparatively small supply had been obtained from the *Arracan*, it took seven weeks (from 9th July to 30th August) to unload one steamer, the *T. A. Gibb*.

292. In the latter part of July a large cargo, sent from the Madras Coast in the Government vessel *Tubal Cain*, was anchored outside the Balasore River, and it was hoped to unload her with the aid of the *Nemesis* and sloops. But the *Guide* was about the same time despatched from Calcutta to the Dhamrah. She waited some days at Hidgellee for a steamer to tow her. Eventually the *Nemesis* was taken for the purpose, and was delayed by the *Guide* getting aground for some days in the little known channel of the Dhamrah. When the *Nemesis* was again available, the *Tubal Cain* had been obliged to leave by stress of weather. She eventually suffered so much in a gale, that, after throwing over part of her cargo she was obliged to make for the rice port of Akyab on the opposite coast. Thus disappointed of a supply, Balasore suffered terrible extremities in August, and rice was there sold at less than 3 seers per rupee. In that month, too, the distribution of rice into the interior of the Cuttack and Pooree districts was much interrupted by floods of unusual magnitude. It was not till September that the relief operations attained anything like efficient proportions and to some extent reached the mass of the people.

293. We consider it to be established that if, throwing aside all commercial and pecuniary considerations, and looking only to the extreme character of the emergency, some of the steam tugs available in Calcutta had been taken up to tow the best of the sloops to be found in the Hooghly and Balasore river, more rice might probably, at much expense and risk, have been thrown into Balasore; as one of the witnesses says, if one steamer could do so much, three steamers might not improbably have done three times as much. It is clear that tug steamers of the Hooghly, of a larger class and capable of carrying a very considerable cargo (though drawing a good deal less than the *Guide*), might have been taken up and sent to the Dhamrah, the country about which suffered perhaps more terribly than any other part of Orissa, and which to the last was never liberally supplied. But at first there was no one acquainted with that river; and the Master Attendant tells us that his orders were limited to the use of Government vessels. We have not clearly ascertained why no attempt was made to employ the small private steamers which might have been hired in the Hooghly, in June and July. We cannot but think that there was some lingering fear of unremunerative expense, and perhaps still some want of knowledge of the extent of the distress.

294. It is on the evidence extremely doubtful whether, at this season, it would have been in any way possible to get a steamer and cargo boats to False Point and efficient boats to some of the other ports. If, with great difficulty and risk, it were in any way possible to have sent them at the end of May and beginning of June (which we are far from asserting to be the case), this last possibility seems to have passed away during the period which we have described as that in which the famine was half-realized. From the middle of June the monsoon was in full force.

295. With respect to the landing arrangements generally, it is to be observed that they were wholly and entirely made over to the Commissioner and local Civil Officers. Now False Point is practically very much nearer to Calcutta by sea than to Cuttack by land. It may be said to be within 30 hours run of the former place, while the communications between False Point and Cuttack take several days, no proper postal arrangement having been estab-

lished throughout the operations; during the rainy season, important letters sometimes took an incredibly long time. All the early letters regarding landing arrangements show that Mr. Ravenshaw's knowledge of the matter was then extremely small, and that False Point in particular was, at Cuttack, almost an unknown land separated from the civilized country by watery wastes resembling the Soonderbuns. There could be no greater mistake than to suppose it to be the easily-used port of Cuttack, because it was in that jurisdiction. And we cannot but think that if a military campaign had been in question, some attempt would have been made to send professional and other persons who might at least have tried to improve the landing arrangements, and assist generally at False Point and Pooree, as did, in the Dhamrah, Mr. H. A. Harris, who went to buoy that river, and who seems to have volunteered most admirable general assistance. We can only find mention of one person described as a "gunner" sent to False Point to assist in landing operations at the Light House. "Three officers of the Public Works Department" have been described as sent to Orissa for another purpose, but the evidence (see examinations of Messrs. McNeile and Muspratt, pages 1 and xci) describes the three persons who arrived at Balasore in no very useful light.

296. In the Civil Department an officer of high character (Mr. McNeile) was sent to Orissa, but he seems rather to have been employed as an Assistant to the Commissioner than to relieve the executive officers, and the latter were not sufficiently reinforced. A Covenanted Assistant was sent to each district, to assist in relief operations, but these were all extremely junior officers and quite new to Orissa. There was a want of experienced assistance to the Magistrate and Collector in the great district of Cuttack, and in Pooree a large proportion of the civil staff was constantly employed in the mere landing of the rice, to the exclusion of everything else. Mr. Ravenshaw remained at Pooree for a considerable time in June. We could have wished that he had, under the emergent circumstances, more identified himself with the executive of the Cuttack district, the Magistrate and Collector of which, Mr. Cornell, had already shown that action was not his strongest point, and in which some dissatisfaction with the early landing and transport arrangements was expressed and some difference of opinion arose between the Commissioner and the Relief Committee. But after a supply of rice imported by the Irrigation Company for their own people had been sent forward, a staff of their officers was placed at the disposal of the civil authorities for landing operations at False Point, and eventually the whole of the landing and transport service became much more effective.

297. Money was given and discretion allowed to the local civil officers, and eventually, the first difficulties surmounted, they did, as a rule, throughout Orissa all that men could do. Mr. Ravenshaw is universally described to have been indefatigable, and the civil officers, as a body, exerted themselves with all that energy and devotion which the appalling scenes round them demanded. They were generally well aided by the officers of Police.

298. In the Public Works Department, from the end of May and beginning of June, there was no stint of money, and most liberal rates and rules, such as the relief of famine demands, were freely accorded; but in truth the time had passed for effective action in that department, and works of every kind were, in the following months, little more than a kind of check on, and test of, the comparatively able-bodied applicants for food, and used as a means of discipline and occupation.

299. In June all Orissa was plunged in one universal famine of extreme severity. Although there never were such crowds of starving people and such mortality in the town of Cuttack as in Balasore and Bhudruk, the state of that district, in which famine had been so recently discovered, was already as bad as possible. Mr. Kirkwood says that in June, at Taldunda, the distress

could not be exaggerated; it was impossible to keep any sort of order among the famishing crowd, and "for miles round you heard their yell for food." The relief afforded by importation was as yet extremely small, in fact, except in the town of Balasore, hardly appreciable. In Balasore several thousand persons were fed throughout the months, but at Bhudruk and in the interior of the district the unrelieved distress was very great. In Pooree there having been no importation by sea the relief afforded was very small. There was not, at this time, the same visible rush of starving masses as in the other districts, a fact due, no doubt, in part to the inability of the Collector to offer food, and in part attributed by Mr. Barlow to the greater exhaustion of the people and the greater mortality which had already occurred.

300. The only redeeming circumstance was that the rains had commenced very favorably, the agricultural classes (who set apart the seed-grain as something sacred and keep it in a different shape from that intended for food) had still seed to sow most of their fields, and, for those who could hope to live till harvest, there was a prospect of relief in the distant future. Perhaps, on the whole, among all but the better classes of ryots, there was as much quiet suffering in June as in any month of the year. But in the Cuttack and Balasore districts the mortality was certainly not so great as in July, when the suffering had lasted longer.

301. In July some centres for the distribution of cooked food had been established in the interior of the districts, more were established in August, and in September nearly the full number of feeding places were in operation. The following were the numbers of these centres eventually established in each district:—

Cuttack	...	...	...	...	43
Balasore	...	...	...	...	22
Pooree	...	...	...	...	23

The most frightful suffering visible at a European station was at Balasore, where great masses of people congregated in a most wretched condition. The numbers at Bhudruk were also enormous.

The mortality may be said to have reached its culminating point at the beginning of the second week of August, during the heavy rain and storms which preceded and caused the floods. The people were then in the lowest stage of exhaustion: the emaciated crowds collected at the feeding stations had no sufficient shelter, and the cold and wet seems to have killed them in fearful numbers. The defect of shelter was then remedied, but the people, throughout, evinced great dislike to occupy the sheds erected for them. The floods which followed these rains were unusually high, and though considerably less so than those of 1855, they were more frequently renewed, the lands were laid longer under water, and the damage to the tracts lying near the rivers in the central portions of Orissa appears to have been excessive. In those parts the difficulties and isolation caused by the floods were such that, as we have before said, the *rate* of mortality was probably, there, greater during their continuance than at any other time.

302. In September there was some relief, not only by the greater extension and better supply of the feeding centres and sales, but also in most parts of the country from the ripening of the small early crop of rice; for there being comparatively little land suited to it in Orissa, and a portion of that having suffered by flood, it was but small, and little was brought to market. At best the distress was still but a degree less than before, rice still sold at 5 and 6 seers per rupee; and it may be doubted whether the results of previous suffering, joined to its present continuance, and the effect of food on those who were much reduced, did not cause the mortality to be almost as great as ever. Many who had lived so long died when they received the meals to which they had long been strangers.

303. In the flooded parts, the loss of the expected crop not only added to the present, but terribly increased the prospective, sufferings of the people. Looking to their means of landing, transport, and distribution, the local civil officers had previously indented for, in round numbers, about 250,000 maunds of rice, and the Board of Revenue, prudently leaving a margin for contingencies and losses (which in the sudden, unprepared, and disorganised state of things were necessarily large, both by accident and theft), had ordered 300,000 maunds. The local officers had originally calculated on a great abatement of their requirements from the end of September, but when they saw the effect of the floods, they raised their estimate by 100,000 maunds. The Board then (in September) ordered a further supply, and it was principally in the supply of this additional quantity that the unfortunate break, to which we have alluded, occurred. The additional quantity did not, in fact, arrive on the Coast till November (much of it not till very late in November) when it was of little use, and consequently the supply of rice to the people was much curtailed in October, while it was still greatly wanted. The feeding centres were largely supplied, but sales were in very many places almost stopped at a time when the press of purchasers was immense.

304. The deficiency in October has not been sufficiently explained. There seems to have been a want of sufficient understanding between the local officers and the Board. The improved arrangements in September caused a larger expenditure in that month than the Board expected, and the losses proved to be greater than had been known. The Board do not seem to have supposed that the rice would be required so soon as the local officers found to be the case, and the local officers imagined that vessels, announced to them, were at hand when in fact they were a long way off. Mr. Chapman, who had, at first, very efficiently managed these matters, was absent on leave, and Mr. Schalch, after ordering the additional quantity through Messrs. Gisborne and Co., returned to Darjeeling to rejoin the Lieutenant Governor there. Messrs. Gisborne proceeded to obtain the supply from Burmah in mercantile manner. But there was just then an extraordinary demand for cotton in China, and most of the ocean steamers of the port were taken up to go to China. One very large steamer, the *Asia*, was engaged, after she had started for China, to bring rice on her return, when she could not possibly be back till the very end of October, and in fact did not arrive in Burmah to take in rice till November; and other delays occurred.

305. Meantime it seems to us that there can be no doubt that, by incurring extraordinary expense for tug steamers, rice might have been sent from Calcutta or even obtained from Burmah (see Captain Howe's examination, pages cxi-cxli); and just when the difficulty was at its greatest, a cargo shipped by the French merchants for Bourbon in the *Charles Maureau* was taken to False Point and offered for sale. The Board, apparently expecting Messrs. Gisborne and Co.'s supply, authorized the Collector to take only a daily quantity. The communications from and to False Point occupied an excessive time, the letters directing the purchase miscarried, and after waiting 20 days and writing some strong letters on the subject, the French Captain set sail for Bourbon—an event justly described by the local officers as one of the most unfortunate of the whole famine. When, later in October, another French vessel, the *Pie IX.*, discharged at False Point a smaller portion of cargo which the Board had bought, and the remainder was offered for sale, the time was again spent in communications, and when the order of the Commissioner to buy arrived, the vessel was gone.

Meantime the feeding centres close at hand in the tracts which had suffered from the floods, were almost denuded of supplies, and no rice could be sold.

The Board must have been under great misapprehension as to the probable date of arrival of the *Asia* and other vessels. In their report to

Government of October 18th, they speak of the *Asia* as "under despatch with 28,000 maunds to False Point," when in fact she was in China; and so late as the 3rd December, in a summary of famine operations, they speak of the *Asia* and *Dundas Castle* as having been calculated to reach their destination about the 10th October. The *Asia* was about that date due at Hong-Kong on her voyage thither, as might have been learned from Messrs. Gisborne and Co., and in fact she arrived at False Point on the 27th November. It is very much to be regretted that such an unfortunate break in the supply should have occurred so late in the season. Both the Cuttack and the Pooree districts suffered, and for the former was diverted the *Coringa*, which was under orders for the Dhamrah, where there was still extreme distress and great want of rice.

306. The effect of the October shortness of rice in the Cuttack district is thus described by the relief officer, Mr. Kirkwood—"In the month of October, I believe, we could have sold ten and twenty times as much, with immense good. People used to flock in, in crowds, especially at Taldunda, and we had no rice to give them. There was no bazar at Taldunda, and rice, as far as I know, was not procurable about there. I have never seen such scenes as I saw in Taldunda in October. When it became known that it was the last day of the sales, the rush and the struggle to buy were fearful. In October we were perfectly destitute of rice for sale. At the end of September we heard supplies were not coming, and I issued an order, with the approbation of the Relief Committee, that no sales should be made, unless there was a reserve of 200 bags at least, at any centre. Up to the present time we have never, since the check at the end of September, obtained regular supplies for sales; but gratuitous relief has never been checked. The present amelioration in the condition of the people is owing chiefly to the coming in of the crops, which has made rice so cheap that we could not have sold at our rates for the last month."

The stocks in hand happily sufficed to maintain (with great difficulty) the feeding centres, and though, in some parts of the country, the stoppage of sales was very much felt, in others the market was somewhat eased in the course of October; some new grain became available, and the crop on the ground was no doubt somewhat discounted, the small remaining stores being brought out.

307. In November the new crop began to come into the market in considerable quantity, and then the general famine may be said to have come to an end. The people returned to their avocations, leaving only the very emaciated, the orphans, and the widows. There still continued to be more general distress in the unfortunate tracts which had suffered a second calamity by the floods.

308. Throughout all the operations of the whole famine season the distribution of food to the starving at the relief centres was, with little exception, never interrupted. During by far the greater part of the season these centres were not numerous enough, but it was a proper prudence not to establish more than could be maintained with safety, for if, after crowds of famishing creatures had been assembled, the supply had failed, the consequences would have been painful beyond measure.

309. Wherever rice could be spared from the charitable distributions of food, it was sold; and the difficulties and disadvantages of the gratuitous distributions were so great, the famine was so much more one of food than of money, that it may be almost said that the rice sold did more real good than that distributed. The system was to sell at two rates, one at or near market rates (so far as there were market rates), and the other cheaper; the former sales being conducted by Government officers, the latter limited to selected persons intermediate between the very poor and those

better off, to whom tickets were to be given by the Members of the Relief Committees. This last system, however, though it sounds well in theory, seems practically to have everywhere for the most part failed. The Committees were very unwilling to exercise an invidious discrimination, the privilege was sometimes given to classes (old women, boys, &c.), which led to imposition, and altogether there was much confusion and abuse and sometimes terrible crowding and struggling. There seems to have been almost no limit to the quantity of rice which might have been sold at very high prices, if it had been available.

310. With respect to the whole system of distribution, the difficulties of obtaining trustworthy superintendence are said to have been extreme. Possibly they were somewhat exaggerated in consequence of the very unfavorable opinions of the Ooryahs which have been entertained, and if there had been more rice, perhaps it would have been better to have trusted the people more and submitted to the necessary abuses. But this question, as well as all those connected with the possibility of establishing more centres and more extended relief are, as we have said, rendered of little avail as subordinate altogether to the supply of rice, on which everything depended, and which being limited, more gratuitous centres would but have involved smaller sales.

311. In the management of the feeding centres it may be said that there were three main difficulties—First, the test of admission. So sudden were the arrangements, so overwhelming the crisis, and so small the official staff, that it is to be feared that, with a consideration for sex and age, the only general test applied was that of extreme emaciation; and of those sufficiently emaciated to obtain admittance, too many never recovered. For those not so bad, the attempt was generally made to provide some kind of labor, real or nominal, and food was given in return for labor. But when rice was short at the more distant centres, those who seemed tolerably able-bodied were turned out of these gangs and told to go elsewhere. The works of the Irrigation Company were nearly stopped during the rains, and the returns of expenditure show that the numbers employed by the Public Works Department at that season were small. It was almost impossible to carry on works then. Second, it was seldom possible to establish the centres within such a moderate distance of one another, that the recipients of food could come daily for it from their houses, the more so as it was the season of the rains. The centres became, therefore, the temporary homes of crowds of houseless mendicants, and the recipients of relief lived in a manner which must have been demoralising and debasing in the extreme. Third, there was much caste prejudice, and many were deterred by that most insuperable of Native feelings from seeking food till it was too late; some died without seeking it at all.

312. There can be no doubt that all these causes exercised a very deterrent effect, and that of those who eventually sought and obtained relief, a very large proportion unhappily died. Every sort of bowel complaint carried off great numbers. Dr. Jackson, who was at the time Civil Surgeon of Balasore, and who honorably distinguished himself by his humane exertions, describes, in his examination (pages lxxxv-vi), the effect of extreme emaciation, even where food is obtained before death actually results from direct starvation. We are told on all hands of many who, ravenous with hunger, ate food uncooked and very rapidly succumbed. Of those who survived for a time, the intestines of very many have been found to swarm with parasitical creatures to a degree which prevented their recovery—no doubt a result of unwholesome food.

313. It seems to us that a too complete prominence is given to the third of the causes which we have mentioned as deterring people from coming for food, viz., caste prejudice to the exclusion of the other two, and still more to the exclusion of the fact that the relief came too late. To say nothing of that which

our former observations will have shown, that if much larger numbers had come to the centres, either they could not have been fed at all or could only have been fed by stopping the sales and starving the better classes, it is abundantly clear that the harm had, for the most part, been done before feeding places were within reach of the mass of the population. And that, in truth, it was not caste or prejudice that was the main cause of mortality, is, we think, very evident from the fact that it is stated on all hands that by far the greatest loss of life has fallen on those lower castes who had least caste prejudice, whose manner of life least unfitted them to avail themselves of public relief, and who were most accustomed to labor.

314. The system followed at almost all the centres was that of giving food ready-cooked to the crowds assembled at meal-time. The quantities allowed were various, as were the details of the diet. Every effort was made to introduce good and uniform system, but the exigencies were such that it was impossible in practice to do so completely. There was, therefore, no doubt some variety. The scarcity of rice was so great, the demand so enormous, and the fear of abuse so constant, that the general tendency necessarily was to make the allowance somewhat scant, but on the whole great good was done by much praiseworthy exertion.

315. The Members of the Relief Committees, at all the stations, deserve the greatest credit for their exertions. It was in every way the wisest and best policy to enlist in this great service of humanity all the best of those who were willing to aid, European and Native. Much was thus done which an official agency alone could not have achieved, and the public confidence and concord thus secured were of the greatest possible advantage.

316. It is very difficult to trace exactly how much food from time to time reached the mouths of the people. The supply was always so uncertain, the transport so intermittent, and the necessities so undefined, that at every depôt there was a constant fear of running short, so that not only is the quantity of rice which had arrived on the Coast at any particular time far in excess of the quantity landed, the quantity landed in excess of the quantity transported to the chief depôts, that quantity again in excess of the quantity made over for actual relief operations, but again this latter quantity is in excess of that actually brought to use. At every centre it was found necessary to keep up a reserve stock. All these deductions being made, it will be found that the relief afforded throughout the greater part of the famine was painfully small in proportion to the population. By far the largest quantity of rice was distributed at the greatest number of places in the Cuttack district. In Pooree the relief was positively later and relatively to the commencement of the distress very much later than in other districts, and the whole quantity distributed was smaller. In Balasore, owing to the failure of supply in August, most of the centres in the interior were established comparatively late. The Bhudruk sub-division, supplied from the Dhamrah, being distant from both Balasore and Cuttack, may be considered as for famine purposes almost a separate district; the Dhamrah supply came, as we have seen, very late, and it was never sufficient to admit of sales to the public, being barely enough to supply the great feeding centres where the numbers were enormous. It was in this part of the country at Damnugger, that the highest quoted prices are mentioned (1 seer per rupee), and notwithstanding the admirable energy and management of Mr. Shortt, the suffering was very great.

317. The following extract from Mr. Kirkwood's evidence shows the general result of the relief operations in the Cuttack district, the one, as we have said, most abundantly supplied:—

“When I arrived, there were only four centres—Cuttack, Jajpore, Kendraparah, and Taldunda. I myself opened the other centres subse-

quently. By the end of July there were twenty-three centres open in the district. These centres were only just opened by the end of July, and were not abundantly supplied. Until then relief was not upon a large scale. In August things got worse owing to the floods, which prevented the boats coming up, and we hadn't enough rice, scarcely enough for Cuttack. More centres (*i. e.*, new ones) were opened during August, and at the end of August I think they were comparatively efficiently supplied. In August operations were, on some occasions, it is understood, almost entirely suspended at several centres, owing to want of rice. For the first three weeks in September the centres were well supplied. About the 20th, sales had to be checked, as above mentioned, by me. The result is that there was a tolerably sufficient supply of rice at relief centres through the district only for about three weeks in the whole season, *viz.*, from about the end of August to the third week in September. I attribute the deficiencies of relief in July principally to want of supplies, and it may be partly to want of agency, which was only then being constructed. In August I attribute the deficiency to the floods which impeded the boats, and in October and November to deficiency of supply.”

In truth, as Mr. McNeile tells us, even including the better general supply in September and the greater feeding operations of all the latter part of the season, the rice imported was scarcely enough to feed a twentieth part of the population, on full rations, for six months. If by supplying a certain quantity to a larger number and supplementing their means, one-tenth of the population was saved (being about, as we said before, a life for every maund imported), a great work was done; though unhappily the number saved would be still much smaller than that of those who died.

318. The whole quantity of rice which had reached the Coast up to the 31st October was about 138,000 bags, which are reckoned as 276,000* maunds or about 10,000 tons. It may be roughly said that the quantity which arrived after that time was not brought into use for the actual famine.

The total quantity of imported rice returned as issued from the Government depôts (that is, either made over for sale or entrusted to the Relief Committees) is thus given in maunds at different dates:—

UP TO	DISTRICT.			TOTAL.
	Pooree.	Cuttack.	Balasore	
June 30th		2,532	2,376	4,908
July 28th	7,130	16,804	8,512	33,500
September 1st	16,000	44,000	21,000	81,000
November 17th	47,300	1,48,700	74,000	2,70,000

But it should be explained that owing to hurried and loose packing, leakage, and pilfering in the repeated transfers, and other causes, the bags seldom on an average yielded two maunds; and an allowance of at least one-eighth must be made for short weight. Making this deduction, and also deducting the quantities in store in the shops and minor depôts (of which we have no exact

* Mr. Ravenshaw's report of the 1st November gives the total quantity thrown into the country as maunds 2,57,000. But perhaps he had not heard of the arrival of the latest ships, or excluded some rice not landed. The cargoes of the ships now returned as having arrived up to the 31st October amount to about the quantity which we have stated. Deducting losses, &c., it may be generally said that up to that time, there was supplied about the quantity indented for by the local officers before the floods. The full 3,00,000 maunds ordered by the Board on that indent had not arrived on the Coast till the early part of November, and the further supplies ordered after the floods arrived in the latter part of November and in December. The total supply was eventually made up maunds 3,98,147, but a large portion of the latter supply was not then consumed.

account), we may state the quantities actually brought into consumption at the different dates to have been in maunds roughly about as follows:—

Up to	DISTRICT.			TOTAL.
	Pooree.	Cuttack.	Balasore.	
June 30th		1,000	2,000	3,000
July 28th	5,500	13,000	7,500	26,000
September 1st	12,500	34,500	17,000	64,000
November 17th	40,000	1,22,000	63,000	2,25,000

or say up to 30th June about 108 tons
 28th July about 930 „
 1st September about 2,300 „
 and total to 17th November about 8,000 „

319. The actual relief accounts do not exactly tally with those of the importation, because some small quantities were obtained from local sources. But the following tables give as nearly as possible the quantities issued for relief stated in the nominal quantities at two maunds per bag, but subject to the deduction for short weight already noticed. The issues for sale can only be given to the point when the rice was made over to those in charge of the shops, &c., but the figures of rice distributed for relief are derived from the account of bags actually expended in feeding the people. The numbers relieved are also given, but with respect to the entry for June it must be observed that of the daily average of 12,773 persons relieved, no less than 11,472 are taken from the Balasore return, while the quantity of rice issued for relief in that district was only 1,852 maunds, not enough to feed so many. Some rice previously obtained from local sources was in hand and was used in the early part of the month.

Statement showing the extent of Relief Operations in the Province of Orissa in each Month from June to November 1866.

[The quantities are shown in maunds, assuming each bag to be two maunds.]


In the month ending	Quantity of rice received in local stores and by Relief Committees.	QUANTITIES ISSUED FOR CONSUMPTION.					DAILY AVERAGE OF PERSONS RELIEVED.		
		For Government sales.		By Relief Committees.		Total consumed or passed out for consumption.	Without labor.	In return for light labor.	TOTAL.
		To Government departments.	To public.	For sale at cheap rates.	To be given to the starving.				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
June 30th	4,908	384	1,636	316	1,976	4,312	9,378	3,395	12,773
July 28th	28,540	2,796	8,439	7,331	4,700	23,269	25,293	6,321	31,614
August 25th	45,757	1,249	19,623	8,405	11,033	40,311	29,634	11,651	41,285
September 29th	96,153	2,538	30,841	17,336	30,708	81,423	52,741	19,391	72,132
October 27th	62,346	1,786	15,259	13,087	38,268	68,401	59,725	25,416	85,141
November 17th	33,872	30	3,454	2,626	29,321	35,431	48,414	24,762	73,176
Total	2,71,577	8,783	79,253	49,103	1,16,007	2,53,146	37,531	15,155	52,686

Statement showing the extent of Relief Operations in each of the Districts of Orissa from June to November 1866.

DISTRICT.	Quantity of rice received in local stores and by Relief Committees.	QUANTITIES ISSUED FOR CONSUMPTION.					DAILY AVERAGE OF PERSONS RELIEVED.		
		For Government sales.		For Relief Committees.		Total consumed or passed out for consumption.	Without labor.	In return for light labor.	TOTAL.
		To Government departments.	To public.	For sale at cheap rates.	To be given to the starving.				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Cuttack	1,48,767	3,282	49,754	31,520	52,565	1,37,121	12,381	7,177	19,558
Balasore	75,427	4,473	10,526	11,643	46,816	73,458	21,945	4,552	26,497
Pooree	47,383	1,028	18,973	5,940	16,626	42,567	3,205*	3,426*	6,631*
Total	2,71,577	8,783	79,253	49,103	1,16,007	2,53,146	37,531	15,155	52,686

* For uniformity with the rest of the statement these figures give the daily average of Pooree operations calculated over the six months from June to November, but in fact operations did not commence in Pooree till July. The averages calculated on the five months only from July to November give—

DAILY AVERAGE OF PERSONS RELIEVED IN POOREE.		
Without labor.	In return for light labor.	Total of Columns 1 and 2.
1	2	3
3,846	4,111	7,957



320. Regarding the effect of the famine in the Tributary Mehals of Orissa, we can give no details. No relief measures were there undertaken by the Government, and we have very little information regarding those tracts, beyond that which we have already given, viz., that the more hilly parts to the west suffered less than the low country of Orissa, but that the suffering in the undulating laterite tracts to the east, the Nilghery and Mohurbhunj Mehals, was very great indeed. Mohurbhunj is a very large territory, covering an area of upwards of 4,000 square miles, and the greater part of this tract must be included in the area of most severe suffering; but we cannot give even the roughest approximate estimate of the mortality; the population is thin, but in so large a territory the loss of life must have been in all considerable. In the smaller western mehals some of the rajahs behaved well, particularly the Rajah of Dekkanal. In the east they did not, and in the parts lying north of Balasore the only relief seems to have been a resort to the Balasore feeding places.

321. Due north of Mohurbhunj is the British territory in which, next to Orissa, the suffering was the greatest, the adjoining portion of the Chota Nagpore division, that is to say great part of the district of Maunbhoom or Purulia, and a part of that of Singhbhoom called Dulbhoom. Commencing then with these districts, we shall briefly review the history of the famine in the affected districts, other than Orissa, to which our enquiry extends. A more full account (from the beginning) will be given in the separate narratives of these districts, and the general circumstances under which the famine com-

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menced, as well as the general principles laid down for relief, have been so fully discussed in connection with the events in Orissa, that we need not recur to them. We shall therefore be concise.

322. Maunbhoom and the adjacent part of Singbhoom similarly affected are, like Mohurbhunj, part of the laterite country which we have described as the famine tract of the second degree, forming with Mohurbhunj the western and largest portion of that tract.

323. Maunbhoom is in fact a very large district, and though remote, backward, and rude, the survey officers have estimated the population at so much as 700,000.

The parts most affected by the famine were to the south-east of the district, but it is stated that the greater part of the area, and a population of upwards of 500,000, suffered very severely.

324. The failure of the crops in these parts in 1865 seems to have been very great, but it does not appear that any special reports on that subject were called for or made.

Prices do not seem to have risen to the most extreme dearness in the bazars of Maunbhoom so early as in Orissa. In March 1866 rice was quoted at 14 and in April at 13 seers per rupee. But plunder early appeared. It seems that the people of Maunbhoom and Singbhoom are very poor and had suffered from short crops in the previous year. They are partly Bengalees and partly aboriginal Sonthals and Coles. Here, too, there is not the energetic trading class of Hindustan, and in those parts of Maunbhoom which produced any considerable crop, dealers from other districts carried off the produce.

325. Maunbhoom has the benefit of the permanent settlement of Bengal, and the assessment is light in an extreme degree; but the zemindars are described as generally bad of their class. They have not profited by good years, and little assistance was to be expected from most of them in a bad year.

326. Lieutenant Money, Deputy Commissioner in charge of the district, soon took the alarm, and in the early part of the season, he represented his apprehensions of famine to the Commissioner. It was during his temporary absence on leave that the Superintendent of Police reported his serious apprehension and recommended the expenditure of money on works to help those who otherwise must live by robbery. The answer of the Acting Deputy Commissioner Mr. Westland, dated 19th March, is very singular; he declines to recommend measures of relief, not because they are not wanted, but because he thinks that no measures can be taken large enough to meet "such an universal famine as the present." His letter must be quoted—

"I have also observed with regret the increase of crime in the district, and cannot help tracing it to the same cause as that to which you refer it. The greater proportion of crime at present consists in theft of paddy and of rice, and a large number of the defendants, when charged, tell me frankly that they were reduced to such straits as to be obliged to steal the means of subsistence. * * * * *

"I am sorry that I cannot recommend the adoption of your proposal to relieve the wants of the population by the prosecution of public works beyond the extent to which they are being executed at present. The 'few thousands' mentioned in your letter are being expended in the construction and maintenance of roads at present, and besides this, works are being carried on within the district at Burakur Bridge and on the Luckeeserai Line, and on the Grand Trunk Road.

"But the distress is so widely spread that all this hardly produces any effect, and to effect the relief of the people would require an enormous outlay of money. There has been a loss, a deficiency, of at least a rupee upon each

beegah of land under cultivation, and a little calculation will show how enormous this is. Public works can relieve only a very small section of the population.

"Besides this, it is to be remembered that it is the want of food rather than that of money that is felt. Ryots and others who have been accustomed to draw their means of sustenance direct from the soil, cannot be much relieved by having a few pice thrust into their hands. The most practicable means of relief would be importation and, if necessary, distribution of food, which might be joined with carrying on of public works. But a step such as this is both extremely difficult at present (for the distress is common to this district, with all the rest for a very large circuit of country), and also it is one that can be adopted only at the last extremity of famine. * * *

"On the whole, I think that for the present the people must be left to fight with the calamity that has fallen upon them, and that Government assistance, however advisable in the case of local distress, is impracticable in such an universal famine as the present.

"A copy of your letter under reply, and of this letter, will be forwarded to the Commissioner, that he may be informed of the present state and prospect of the district."

It will thus be observed that a copy of the correspondence was sent to the Commissioner of the division, Colonel Dalton, but he does not seem to have taken any action upon it.

327. Subsequently, Mr. Money, having returned, on the 10th May pressed on the Commissioner the alarming state of the district, forwarding another letter from the Superintendent of Police, and earnestly asked for Government aid. The Commissioner, however, seems still to have been strongly imbued with the principles originally laid down by the Board of Revenue. He did not consider that there was any extreme case to lay before Government. He relied exceedingly on the official price lists. For the class who could not buy, he approved of local subscriptions, recommended that the attention of the zemindars should be specially invited to the matter, and suggested that emigration should be encouraged. He also now desired the Deputy Commissioner to bring to notice any public works that could be undertaken in the most distressed part of the country. He forwarded the whole correspondence for the information of the Board of Revenue. In reply to a reference from Government regarding the prevalence of robberies in the Midnapore border, he reported that he did not consider the general pressure to be extreme, and thought that the people were bearing up well against their difficulties.

328. In reply to the Commissioner, Mr. Money then wrote, demi-officially, the letter regarding the fallaciousness of price lists as a test of famine which we have quoted in our 125th paragraph; urged the existence of famine; and again sought Government aid. In fact the price lists now supported the Deputy Commissioner. We find coarse rice quoted at 9½ seers in the end of May, 8 seers in June, 6 seers in July, and 4 and 5 seers in August.

329. The Deputy Commissioner continued to press the matter, and when it was known that money had been assigned for relief from the balance of the North-West Fund, the Commissioner applied for Rs. 4,000 for Maunbhoom and Singbhoom, Rs. 3,000 being for Maunbhoom. On the 28th May the Board of Revenue sent Rs. 2,000 to Maunbhoom. Some local subscriptions had been raised, and the money devoted to works for the employment of the poor, and on receipt of the Government grant, measures were taken to open feeding depôts.

330. Early in June the state of things was found to be getting very much worse, and the distress to be vastly beyond the means at the disposal of the Local Committee. The lower classes were dying of starvation, and the

country was becoming disorganized. The Deputy Commissioner, who had before been in favor of importation of rice, now very strongly urged the necessity of that measure, since rice was not to be had at many places in the district. On the 14th June the Commissioner wrote to the Board supporting this view. The Government of Bengal also recommended the application to the serious consideration of the Board, and the Board promised to send from Calcutta 5,000 maunds of rice and dall. But in truth things turned out very much as they did in Orissa. Maunbhoom is separated from the railway by several rivers most impracticable during the rain floods, and when importation was commenced, it was most tedious and difficult. The first instalment of rice did not reach Purulia till the 17th July; in that month the floods were unusually heavy in all that part of the country, and the communications were interrupted to an unusual degree. The price of rice in August sufficiently shows the intensity of the famine; under these circumstances, and when it is mentioned that the local rate in August 1863 (a very plentiful year) was 43 seers per rupee, in August 1864, 32 seers, and in August 1865, 19 seers, the sufferings of the people may be imagined. In fact it may unhappily be said that the history of the famine in Orissa is here repeated on a smaller scale and in a somewhat less intense degree.

331. The state of disorganization from crime seems to have been greater in this part of the country than in any other. In the three months from April to June, not less than 360 gang robberies for the plunder of grain were committed in the Maunbhoom district, and the poverty of the district and short-crop of the previous year seem to have caused greater agricultural failure than in other districts. A very large proportion of the land lay unsown for want of seed in 1866.

332. In June a special grant of money was made for the employment of the poor, and although there was a good deal of the same difficulty as in Orissa, the laborers being unable to obtain rice, they were paid in food as soon as arrangements could be made, and the labor was employed on a system more calculated to give relief than to yield a good return of work. Thus during the following months much money was spent and much relief afforded in this way. Feeding centres were established in many places (the number at one time reached as high as 32), and considerable grants were from time to time made. The relief, however, came too late to prevent terrible distress and mortality. In July and August the suffering was very great. The want of rice was very much felt; it was not procurable at all in most places, and where it was, the prices rose to $3\frac{1}{2}$ and $4\frac{1}{2}$ seers per rupee. The quantities with difficulty imported from Calcutta were very small compared with the necessities of so large a district.

333. Caste seems not to have been the only feeling which has deterred people from seeking relief, for we are told that in this district the casteless Sonthals would not come to the feeding places. They "looked on begging and receiving alms as more disgraceful than man-stealing," and especially objected to be in any way associated with Hindoos.

334. In the course of September, a little new rice began to come into the market, and it was as the season advanced that the relief measures received their full extension, the largest grants of money being then made. The daily average numbers of persons gratuitously relieved at the feeding depôts were—

In June	...	...	322
July	...	...	1,303
August	...	...	2,924
September	...	...	5,824
October	...	...	9,950

but this is exclusive of a large number employed in labor who were treated with much consideration by the Deputy Commissioner.

335. The total quantity of grain imported by Government was 6,000 maunds, and the public money assigned was—

In June	...	...	Rs. 5,000
July	...	...	„ 3,000
August and September	...	...	„ 5,000
October and November	...	...	„ 28,000

of which last sum Rs. 23,000 was given by the Calcutta Relief Committee.

336. The course of affairs in the affected part of Singhbroom was very similar to that in Maunbhoom, and we need not here give the particulars, which will be found in the separate Narrative.

337. The mortality from starvation in this part of the country was certainly very great. The number of deaths, from that cause, reported in Maunbhoom, was about 33,000, which would not give a very large percentage compared to Orissa; but minute local enquiry in small sample tracts in the part of the district which most suffered, makes it clear that the actual mortality was there very much greater, being upwards of 18 per cent. In Singhbroom the Deputy Commissioner estimates the total mortality over the whole district at $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., or one-eighth, which he calls double the ordinary rate; but this latter statement can hardly be correct, and the former is no doubt a very loose estimate.

On the whole, we fear that in the worst parts of Maunbhoom and Singhbroom, mortality has occurred at a rate which may bear some comparison with that which took place in Orissa.

338. Next in point of intensity of suffering, as well as next in geographical position, taking the country from west to east, comes the district of Midnapore, the western part of which, it will be seen from the map, to some degree protrudes between the Orissa and Chota Nagpore territories. Midnapore is one of the largest and most important districts of Bengal, and by its position may be called metropolitan. The town is 69 miles from Calcutta by a good road. The population of the district is estimated at 1,200,000. But severe famine was chiefly confined to about half the area, and most of that was the jungly and least populated part, west of the town of Midnapore, and known as the Jungle Mehals.

339. In the lower country there was very great suffering about Dantoon, the corner of the district next to that of Balasore, and somewhat similarly affected, though rather later in the season. As long as the road was open, Dantoon was within reach of Midnapore and followed the fortunes of that district; but after the commencement of the rains, the road (which is not metalled much beyond Midnapore) became impracticable, and Dantoon, to a great degree cut off and isolated, in some sense shared the fate of Orissa. It is, however, principally as respects the Jungle Mehal country that the Midnapore district requires more special notice.

340. There was a good deal of panic and alarm in this district in the autumn, and prices then for a short time rose to high famine rates. Mr. Herschel, the Magistrate and Collector, took the alarm, raised subscriptions for relief, and contemplated opening feeding centres; but his attention was chiefly directed to the lower country, which had suffered terribly from the cyclone of 1864, and had then been the scene of relief measures. The popular feeling there had also risen strong against the attempt to export grain. It often happens that, with deficient information, there are great alarms which are not realized and little alarm where great suffering afterwards occurs. In Midnapore the crops

of the low lands turned out much better than was expected, and (Dantoon excepted) there was, as we have said, no general famine there. Prices too were everywhere eased in the harvest season.

341. But in truth the failure of crops in the Jungle Mehals was very great. The Collector estimates the main rice crop to have there been about one-third of a full crop, and adds that the usual cold weather crops completely failed; but it does not appear that there were at the time any special local enquiries or reports on the subject. Crime made its appearance in that country very early indeed; in fact in January, earlier than in any other district; and its character was from the first apparent, being as usual directed to the plunder of grain. This country always is somewhat lawless, but the robberies soon became so general as necessarily to attract attention. The Commissioner of the Burdwan division, to which the district belongs, was ordered by Government to report on the matter. He accordingly visited the district in April, and was quite satisfied that the crime was entirely caused by want.

342. On the 15th April Mr. Montresor reported very fully on the subject. He said that at harvest time "there was a general rumour, if not a prospect, of impending famine," and that to this *cause alone he unhesitatingly attributed the crime*, the character of which as directed to the plunder of grain he described. He explained that it was in the Jungle Mehal country that this want and the crime caused by want existed, and showed that in that poor country the pressure of prices was more severe than elsewhere, having already reached the rate of 10 seers per rupee. He hoped, however, that the rate of 8 seers would not be reached, and was informed by Mr. Terry, the Agent of Messrs. Watson and Co.'s extensive property, that he did not apprehend famine, and that as soon as rain fell, prices would immediately go down and employment in cultivation would put a stop to further plunder. The late Judge, he said, seemed to have been under the impression that there was no such severe distress as to palliate the crime, and inflicted severe sentences, but said Mr. Montresor "if his opinion be such as I have stated, I must differ with him altogether, and there is not a single person with whom I have conversed on the subject during my stay at Midnapore, that does not agree with me, that there is ample evidence to prove that hunger is the origin and cause of the augmentation of crime." Mr. Montresor does not, however, seem to have proposed any special remedy except that, with reference to the apprehended spread of dangerous tendencies among the wild jungly tribes who were "easily led to believe that plunder is the surest corrective to want and hunger," he strongly recommended that the Police should be strengthened; and since he thought that, to the wild people whom he had mentioned, the jails were not disagreeable, but on the contrary were with "the food and shelter that is provided rather agreeable and genial," he recommended the introduction of the Whipping Act.

343. On the 27th April Mr. Montresor submitted to Government a further report of the Magistrate of Midnapore, of the 25th idem, in which Mr. Herschel stated that the price lists showed a continued enhancement. At Dantoon bad rice was 9 seers per rupee, and stories were afloat of the lower castes taking to raw cow's flesh and human corpses, the latter tale originating in the act of a mad man. Mr. Herschel also stated that there was great alarm in the minds of the people, and that the old and infirm were beginning to die from insufficient food. He now explains that he used this expression in a very general manner, as indicating an increase of general mortality rather than direct and visible starvation.

344. He said, in the concluding paragraph of his report of 25th April, "I have still hope that the rain may bring forward cultivation, and that the granaries will then open more freely." The effect of the previous happy issue of the alarm on the other side of the district was to cause delay and hesitation, and Mr. Herschel tells us that he had resolved not to attempt relief till the rate got as low

as 8 seers per rupee, because rates had fallen to that point in the autumn without causing mortality. In fact the pressure of prices had been on the previous occasion very brief during a short panic, and a similar price, when some months must pass without relief, is a very different thing.

345. Rice was still not so dear as in Orissa in any part of the district, and never was so dear as in both Orissa and Maunbhoom. The following shows the Midnapore prices:—

Months.	1866	...	...	...	Seers per rupee.
January	...	...	...	...	12 $\frac{1}{4}$
February	"	...	...	...	11
March	"	...	...	...	10 $\frac{3}{4}$
April	"	...	...	...	10 $\frac{3}{4}$
May	"	...	...	...	9 $\frac{3}{16}$
June	"	...	...	...	8 $\frac{1}{16}$
July	"	...	...	...	7 $\frac{6}{16}$
August	"	...	...	...	6 $\frac{1}{4}$
September	"	...	...	...	7 $\frac{1}{4}$
October	"	...	...	...	9
November	"	...	...	...	17 $\frac{1}{4}$
December	"	...	...	...	24

346. On receipt of the reports of the Commissioner, the Government of Bengal, on the 28th April, directed that the repair of the roads in the district should be pushed on, in order to give employment to the distressed population. This does not seem to have led to any very special arrangements of a relief character on those roads, but on the 30th April the Government sent a telegraphic order to commence work on a great tank which had been designed for the jail, and on the 17th May the work was commenced as a special relief work. Liberal rates for daily labour were then given, and about 500 people were beneficially employed. But here, too, the result not being commensurate to the expense, task-work was subsequently introduced. And although in the subsequent months more money was sanctioned and many works commenced, the result was small, the number employed on relief works in the district by the Public Works Department averaging but about 484 persons daily.

Later in the season some part of the money sanctioned was usefully diverted to enable the Collector to make district roads; but in Midnapore, too, it must be said that relief works came too late, and coming late were not till still later put upon a footing sufficiently adapted to the then reduced state of the people.

347. On the 12th May the Government of Bengal sent to the Government of India copy of the Commissioner's report on Midnapore, and reported the increased Police force which had been sanctioned; also that the Whipping Act had been extended to the Jungle Mehals; and mentioned that reports had been called for from other divisions.

348. In May Mr. Herschel went to meet the Commissioner of Orissa at Mohurbhunj on business not relating to the famine. In passing through his own district, his attention was not attracted by excessive distress, but in Mohurbhunj he was a witness to acute famine, heard what had come to pass in Orissa, and saw Mr. Ravenshaw feeding the starving. This excited his apprehensions as to the eventual result in his own district, and on his return he stopped at a place in the Jungle Mehals, and offered food to the starving. The result was to bring the famine-stricken and emaciated in numbers from their hiding places, and Mr. Herschel at once became aware of a state of things which he had not known before, and ascertained that there was already mortality directly resulting from starvation. On his return from Midnapore he immediately organized relief operations under a local committee.

349. On the 19th May he noted on his weekly price current that deaths from starvation were occurring, and on the 26th he made a full report. Meantime, on receipt of the two lakhs of the North-West Fund, the Lieutenant

Governor had, on the 21st May, made one of the first assignments to Midnapore, Rs. 5,000, and apparently before receipt of the letter (upon the telegraphic assignment of funds), the Junior Member of the Board had, on the 23rd May, sent the same sum. The distribution of food was then commenced, and gradually a number of feeding centres were opened in the interior of the district. Eventually they were twenty-three in all, and a large number of persons were relieved. The average daily numbers were as follows :—

June	...	...	...	...	5,155
July	...	...	...	...	7,442
August	...	...	...	...	9,606
September	...	...	...	...	8,752
October	...	...	...	...	6,476
November	...	...	...	...	4,274

But the scale of rations allowed in this district was very small; at first very much too small.

350. In the end of June, a European Assistant (Mr. Man) was sent out to report, and described a state of things much worse than had been before understood. Up to this time the Collector's estimate of the aid required had been very moderate, but on Mr. Man's return, he became much more seriously alarmed, and he sought and obtained larger funds for more extensive relief than had been at first attempted. The Board declined to import rice, the road to Calcutta being open, but even at such a place as Midnapore and with such a demand, the Bengalee traders were not equal to the task, and the Committee imported rice from Calcutta on their own account for relief operations, and sent it forward on bullocks to the feeding centres, the officers of Police managing the transport operations. There were no sales to the public in this district, and an attempt late in the season to make charitable sales at low rates, was not successful and was not long carried on. The relief operations were, therefore, almost entirely in the shape of supplying small rations gratuitously to those actually starving. During the greater part of the season the rice was given raw.

351. It is now clear that the nature and degree of the distress was not known, and operations were not commenced sufficiently early. Comparatively large as was the relief at last afforded, Mr. Herschel does not think that, at the best, it reached half the starving population, and there was unhappily a large mortality which he estimates at about 50,000; say one-tenth of the whole population seriously affected. But in some of the more remote parts the mortality was, it is to be feared, larger. Mr. Terry's statement seems to show that in some parts the labouring population died in larger proportion, and it is said that in one jungly tract the population of stone-masons and iron-smelters has almost disappeared.

352. Late in the season rice was imported by the Board of Revenue, but it was too late; it then proved that the Collector's latter estimates of the amount of relief required exceeded the eventual necessity. The new crop was excellent; from October the famine very rapidly abated, and when the crop came in, there was cheapness and plenty. The only complaint since made has been of exportation.

353. Although there were exceptions, the Collector tells us that, notwithstanding the wealth and resources of the district, the Natives, as a body, did not assist till pressed to do so. The zemindars, who did much, were the exception. The superior classes of ryots seem to have suffered very little, but grave doubt has been thrown on the voluntary character of some subscriptions for the sufferers realized from them. Part of the district is permanently settled, and part, owing to liability to floods, is held under temporary settlement. The permanently settled part suffered most in the famine, and the same was the case in Orissa; but this is attributable in Midnapore altogether, in Orissa chiefly, to natural causes only.

354. We may here briefly dispose of Beerbhoom, the most northern district of the Burdwan division. Distress did not appear till late. The work on the railway running through the district afforded ample employment to the poor, and the floods, which in July were very heavy in that part of the country and caused great injury to many, benefited others, for the railway embankments being broken through, and the urgency to repair them being great, very liberal employment was given to many thousand women and children (especially those of the aboriginal and semi-aboriginal classes) in carrying earth—the species of labor of all others most suited to them. The President saw them at that time working like ants in immense numbers, apparently very happy and in excellent condition. In August, however, it seems that some distress appeared at Sooree, the head quarters of the district, and on the 18th of that month the Collector reported the formation of a Committee and the raising a fund of Rs. 1,648 in donations, and Rs. 283 monthly subscription, and that 200 or 300 persons were being relieved daily. There was also distress in the most remote part of the district away from the railway, and a second centre of distribution was opened at Tateeparah, and a road undertaken from Chanderpore to Buckessur, to supply work.

355. On the 18th September, Mr. Collector T. Grant reports on his inspection of the distressed parts of the district :—

“The distress was severe at Nuggur, on the borders of Sonthalia, and is increased by the influx of Sonthals; it is severe all along the Sonthal frontier. Full half of the distressed people on the Beerbhoom side of the frontier are Sonthals.

“Sooree is also a centre of distress; there is distribution of food with careful exclusion of those who can work; nevertheless, numbers have increased to 546. One-half are Sonthals. Eighteen people died of ascertained starvation in August; distress attacked only the laboring classes.

“Crops promise well; much land cultivated which before lay waste; very little Aaos in the district; good crop of Jonera or Indian corn.

“Sheds for housing homeless erected by Committee at Sooree; cooked food distributed; rice, curry, vegetables, &c. Two roads set in hand, but not one pauper works on them; only 40 work at all. Magistrate will not abandon the labor test.

“Committee have Rs. 2,900 to spend; expect Rs. 2,000 more; propose to establish a depôt at Nuggur, under Assistant Magistrate to be deputed there.”

No Government aid was given here, and no further reports had been made to the Commissioner up to November, when Mr. Dampier visited Burdwan. The local means seem to have well sufficed to meet the partial distress.

356. Next we take the district of Bancoorah, also in the Burdwan division. It lies between Midnapore, Maunbhoom, and Beerbhoom. The town of Bancoorah is, as the crow flies, somewhat more distant from Calcutta than Midnapore, but it is within 30 miles of the railway, from which, however, some hill streams, very difficult to pass in the rains, separate it. Bishenpore, the place which most suffered, is about 70 miles from Calcutta.

357. Much of the district is a dry laterite soil, and the crops suffered very much.

On the 28th February the Magistrate, Mr. Wells, reported to the Commissioner and to the Government direct—“The inhabitants of Bishenpore and of the district generally are suffering from the greatest destitution. The scarcity of labor and dearness of provisions is such that many are dying from starvation, and others eat such rotten and bad stuff (for the food can hardly be termed provisions) that numbers are daily dying from cholera, and the bodies lie on the roads unburied.”

He then proceeded to Bishenpore, and on the 3rd March reported that his previous statement was a mistake; that the Native doctor had got frightened, and falsely reported the deaths to be due to starvation, when in fact cholera was the cause.

He added, however, "there can be no doubt that the cholera is aided by, if not consequent on, the extreme scarcity of food, and as the assistance required must be immediate to be effectual, the Judge and I have subscribed a sum which will be sufficient to alleviate in some measure the distress till the meeting which I have called assembles."

358. Mr. Wells begged that the railway works on the new chord line in the neighbourhood of his district might be pushed on in order to give employment, and a copy of his letter was sent to the Agent of the railway. The Commissioner was also called upon to report the cause of scarcity.

359. In reply, on the 26th March, the Commissioner sent another letter from the Magistrate, stating that scarcity was in great degree caused by exportation to Midnapore and Cuttack, where the pressure of prices was still greater. The unburied bodies were the result of a panic regarding cholera, but it was abating. The sufferers were the poor and middle classes. Among these the weavers were in great distress. "Thread is dear, and the demand slight; these men are thus robbed of their employment, and cannot compete in coolie labor with ordinary coolies, who also are dying for want of earnings, and, consequently, of food." Six hundred persons, he said, were employed by the Local Relief Fund, and by a liberal Native who was digging a tank. There the correspondence seems to have ceased for some two months, and the distress was dealt with by local means only. Mr. Wells was soon after transferred to another district. Local relief was, however, pushed on.

360. The price of rice became very high, and, the dealers failing to import, the Local Committee imported from Calcutta, and supplied the laborers employed by them with rice at cost price or 10 seers per rupee. The local means, however, became very insufficient, and great difficulty was experienced.

361. The distress was general throughout great part of the district, but beyond some very small works which some zemindars were induced to undertake, it was not possible to afford any general relief. In and about the town of Bishenpore the distress was of a peculiar character, that place being the head quarters of the weavers alluded to by Mr. Wells. In fact, the weavers generally in all that part of the country, including those in the Hooghly district, and in parts of Midnapore, are known as "the Bishenpore weavers". The whole class suffered very severely. In April a small subscription was made on the spot for the employment of the Bishenpore people, and part of the money was actually collected, but from some neglect of the local officers, it was not used during several months in which the distress was greatly increasing.

362. In May the Judge of Bancoorah, Mr. W. T. Tucker, who has throughout been most unwearied and most liberal in the cause of the famine-stricken, and who, after Mr. Wells' departure, seems to have taken the lead in all that was done, addressed the Government, representing the necessity of assistance, and the Local Committee (of which he was President), hearing of the grant of the North West Famine Fund, made application for Rs. 10,000 for relief. It appears that Rs. 5,000 had been already granted among the first assignments, of which the Committee were not aware. No more was received at that time. The Local Committee devoted the money to the importation of rice, and throughout the season they carried on an active and successful importation from Calcutta, by which they were enabled to sell to needy persons and others, at rates much more favorable than those at which rice was, with much difficulty and very irregularly, to be obtained from the local dealers. No doubt much good was done, and the success of the measure is alone proof that

the dealers had failed to do what they might have been expected to do on any ordinary trade principles. Whatever difference of opinion there might be as to the propriety of the course adopted, as respects sale to the public, there can be no doubt that the Committee of this district deserve very great credit for that in which they stand alone, *viz.*, their having early in the season and from their own funds rendered their relief works really effectual, so far as they went, by procuring the means of paying the laborers in the wages most acceptable to them, that is in food.

363. In July the Committee applied for an additional grant of Rs. 10,000 for direct relief, and for another Rs. 10,000 for works. They received Rs. 5000. The means available had still not admitted of general relief in the interior of the district, and the Committee directed their attention too exclusively to the local distress before their eyes.

364. In August the Board of Revenue called on the Committee to take steps to prevent the Bishenpore weavers from flocking into Calcutta. An additional grant was given for this purpose, and relief operations were set on foot at Bishenpore.

Considerable grants were made to this district later in the season, but the distress seems to have been mitigated by the early crops of new rice sooner than in most other parts of the country with which we have had to deal. There is much high land suited for early rice, and it seems that in the end of August there was a sensible amelioration which was continued in September. The new crop then on the ground is described as having been magnificent.

365. There was much distress in the Raneegunge sub-division, into which many people flocked from the west. Of the relief operations there mention will be found in the District Narrative.

366. There can be no doubt that up to August sufficient funds were not supplied to the Bancoorah district for relief purposes, and that the measures of the Local Committee were cramped and limited in consequence. The weavers, unlike their brethren in Hooghly, seem to have gladly accepted labor, and it is the more to be greatly regretted that extensive employment was not offered to them early in the season.

367. There seems to be still considerable difference of opinion as to the character and extent of the mortality in Bishenpore and its neighbourhood, and the local officers are inclined to think that in the district generally the mortality from direct starvation was not great. No doubt there were greater facilities for emigration than in most of the severely distressed districts, and the earlier cessation of the most extreme pressure must have saved many. But the scarcity was so great for several months that very many must have suffered. We cannot form any estimate of the mortality.

368. The district of Burdwan is rich, and the failure of the crops was not sufficient to cause very severe distress among the agricultural population, except in some limited tracts which suffered from flood in 1866. But high prices, of course, caused distress among the non-agriculturists, and there was a great influx of poor people from the western districts into the town of Burdwan, especially when measures were taken to prevent their resort to Calcutta. They were, to some extent, relieved by local charity, and in July a regular Relief Committee was formed. In August the Board of Revenue granted money, but in the beginning of September the Maharajah of Burdwan, who is superior landlord of almost the whole district, very munificently undertook to feed the whole of the poor in the town, and from that time he did so, the proceedings of the Committee being then limited to hospital accommodation and other subsidiary matters. Relief was also, somewhat late in the season, given at a few out-stations.

369. The Hooghly district does not seem to have generally suffered from the drought to a very excessive degree, but so much of the soil is devoted to the fruits and more valuable products (sugar-cane, jute, potatoes, plantains and fine rice), that coarse rice is always imported from other districts, and those supplies having been curtailed by the failure in the adjoining districts, the price of the food of the people was very greatly enhanced. The greatest consequent suffering was in the west of the district adjoining Midnapore, where both the effect of the failure of crops was greatest, and a large population of the weaver class, already alluded to, struggled with difficulty against adverse circumstances. This distressed portion of the district forms the sub-division of Jehanabad, and comprises the Police divisions of Chunderkonah and Ghattal, in which there was the greatest suffering. The falling off in the business of the weavers, joined to the very high prices, must have caused a very heavy pressure on that class from an early period of the year, but it does not seem to have attracted attention at the head quarters of the district, for although, on the 24th May, a meeting was held in aid of the sufferers at Balasore, the subscriptions promised were not collected in consequence of Mr. Chapman's letter before alluded to, and local relief was not attempted.

370. In the middle of June, however, the Deputy Magistrate of Jehanabad reported the existence of severe distress in the western part of his sub-division, and in the beginning of July, he followed up his report by a figured statement, showing 2,235 men and women destitute and unable to work, and 3,750 able to work, but destitute for want of employment. A flood had increased the local distress, and destitute persons were flocking in from the districts on the west and passing on to Calcutta. The Magistrate and Collector directed the Deputy Magistrate to raise local subscriptions for the relief of the destitute, and to push on work on certain roads for which funds were already available from ordinary sources. Late in July, the Collector asked for a Government grant, but up to that time the Commissioner thought the local means sufficient. Meantime local Relief Committees had been formed in the distressed tracts, and some considerable sums collected.

371. On the 14th July, Mr. Turnbull, Manager at Ghattal for Messrs. Watson and Co., (already mentioned as large landholders in Midnapore) reported that since May poor people had been flocking into that place, that the Native merchants and others had been feeding them, but that the numbers exceeded the local means. It being understood that ample food was provided for starving people in Calcutta by the rich Natives there, and being known that many were proceeding in that direction, Mr. Turnbull and the Local Committee despatched 235 women and 149 children to Calcutta by boat, paying their boat-hire and providing them with food for the road.

The Collector, on this, pointed out that it was undesirable to do anything which should tend to collect paupers in Calcutta; and in fact the immigrants from this part of the country had already attracted attention there. The Commissioner of Burdwan was soon after summoned to a meeting, which will be again noticed when we come to the Calcutta relief operations, and on his return he issued a circular, (9th August), strongly urging the Magistrates of his division, by every means in their power, to dissuade the poverty-stricken from going to Calcutta. It may be broadly stated that no public relief measures (other than those of a character purely local to the distressed parts of the district) were taken till the matter was brought to notice by the influx of starving and emaciated people into Calcutta.

372. On the 8th August a grant of Rs. 5,000 was made by the Board of Revenue for the purpose of affording local relief to the helpless, and at the same time a special allotment of Rs. 6,000 was made in order to employ the able-bodied. On the 13th August the Deputy Magistrate of Jehanabad was relieved of all other duties, and exclusively employed on relief opera-

tions. Cooked food was distributed and employment offered. The towns in which the weavers were numerous were the chief centres of the distress. The ryots did not seek relief. On the 21st August the Board of Revenue recorded their opinion that the relief measures taken had been insufficient, and that if the necessity had been sooner reported, they might have been taken on a more extended scale. It was then arranged between the Calcutta authorities and the Board, that the paupers in Calcutta should be, as far as possible, induced to return to their own part of the country. Local arrangements were made for their reception, and large numbers were despatched for Ghattal and other places. They were at first very unwilling to leave Calcutta, but being supplied with sustenance for the journey and with money and brass vessels, they were induced to go. Many, however, disappeared on the journey, and many subsequently returned to Calcutta. The weavers who remained in their own localities refused to attempt ordinary manual labor on the roads, and insisted on going to Calcutta. Eventually an attempt was made to supply weaving work to these people, but it was not very successful, and the Board disapproved of any measure which might seem to prop up a decaying trade.

Further sums of money were granted for relief, and the number of persons fed in the Jehanabad sub-division at one time reached nearly 6,000. But still very few were induced to work on the roads. The thriving agriculture of the season no doubt absorbed the ordinary labor, and the weavers never consented to change their habits, relief in Calcutta or on the spot being in fact available to them at the last extremity.

373. In Hooghly relief was given too late, but late in the season it was no doubt liberally given, and was probably somewhat abused, since it was impossible to be too strict consistently with the object of keeping the people from Calcutta. The amount of relief given by private persons at the principal towns in this district may be stated to have been large; it was in fact on a smaller scale of the same liberal character as that which we shall soon notice in Calcutta, of which these towns are now in some sense suburbs, since the railway communication is so easy. But the distressed tract was that most remote from the larger and richer towns.

374. Howrah, immediately opposite Calcutta on the other side of the Hooghly, is the head quarters of a separate magistracy. For purposes of revenue and civil justice it is part of the Hooghly district, and its famine history followed somewhat the same course, except that the paupers were almost exclusively immigrants from Hooghly and other districts. There also the only assistance given was from local sources (except at Oolaberreah, to be shortly noticed,) till the 8th August, when the Magistrate attended the same meeting to which the Commissioner of Burdwan was summoned for the purpose of stopping the influx of paupers into Calcutta, and then some public relief was given.

Oolaberreah in this district is on the high road from Midnapore and Balasore, and the poor struggling creatures trying to get to Calcutta reached the place in large numbers. Many could go no further, and the scenes of misery were very painful. In July Mr. Sykes, before so honorably mentioned, organised a special fund for Oolaberreah, and going there himself with the Reverend Mr. Payne (already notable for his exertions after the cyclone) established a feeding place in charge of Mr. Scott, of the Irrigation Company, who exerted himself most creditably. Later in the season the Government adopted and took over this charge.

The number of persons who died by the road-side cannot be given, but 1,235 deaths are reported as having occurred at the feeding centres of this district—chiefly, as most frequently happens, among those who were admitted in an extreme stage of exhaustion, and who died within the first week. Further particulars will be found in the district narrative.

375. Allusions have already been made to the resort of the starving people of the western districts to Calcutta. Early in the year a marked increase in the numbers brought to the pauper hospital was observed, and the Medical department having called the attention of the Government to the increasing destitution, the Chairman of the Justices was asked to report on the subject by a letter of the Bengal Government dated 20th February 1866. This letter was not answered till the 11th June. A Sub-Committee of Justices had reported that destitution did not exist to the extent supposed by the medical officers, but on this report being brought before a meeting of the Justices on the 11th June, they resolved that—"though at the date of its being written the report was correct, a vast number of destitute sick persons have, within the last few days, arrived in Calcutta from the famine-stricken districts; the Justices, therefore, desire to bring to the notice of His Honor the Lieutenant Governor the strong objections which exist, on sanitary grounds, to allowing this influx of persons to continue unchecked, and they would therefore respectfully suggest the expediency of extraordinary measures being adopted for preventing persons afflicted with contagious disease from proceeding to Calcutta." The Lieutenant Governor replied on the 29th June that there was nothing whatever in the state of the country which would warrant him in interfering with the free communication of the inhabitants of the surrounding districts with the metropolis. Additional hospital arrangements were promised. In the end of May and in June, the influx had become very large. The paupers in Calcutta soon reached a number which is estimated at from 15,000 to 18,000. Nothing could exceed the munificence of the rich Native gentlemen of the town in feeding these poor people, and the food given was in quality and quantity all that could possibly be desired. It may truly be said that throughout the famine, of all the poor people who came to Calcutta none have remained without ample food, except those poor creatures who arrived too weak to crawl to the places of distribution (see Mr. Davis' evidence), and were picked up by the Police dead or dying. That the great majority of those who sought this charity were those who had suffered the last extremities of starvation before obtaining it is sufficiently proved by the miserable and emaciated condition in which almost all arrived, and by the great mortality which occurred among them. The mortality was due partly to the results of past starvation, partly to the effect of abundant food on these enfeebled frames, and partly to the want of sufficient shelter; for, in the first instance, little shelter was provided, and the people so liberally fed at many places lay about the town in a wretched and mendicant condition. They were chiefly stricken by bowel diseases, cholera and dysentery, although throughout the rainy season there was comparatively little cholera among the resident population of Calcutta, and the general health remained good. A large proportion of the paupers taken to the hospitals died shortly after admission.

376. On the 19th June, Dr. Francis, Principal of the Medical College Hospital, had drawn special attention to the great number of moribund cases brought in, rendering it quite impossible to make provision for them in the ordinary hospitals. The floors, he said, were "crowded with poor creatures, who stricken down by want have fallen victims to disease." The Government, in consequence, called for a report, and on the 25th June the Health Officer, Dr. Tonnerre, reported. He said that nearly 12,000 persons were daily fed in the most liberal and unostentatious manner by the charitable Natives; that their charity was in respect of food amply sufficient to meet the wants of all the destitute, but that shelter, clothing, and proper medical attendance were required. The only fault found in regard to the feeling of the poor was, and has been throughout, a want of sufficient discrimination between the really destitute immigrants and the ordinary vagrant beggars of the town and neighbourhood. Everywhere the liberal Natives have evinced an extreme repugnance to apply

very strict tests, both in their private charities and as members of Relief Committees. Their view seems to be that it is a good work to feed the poor of all sorts, and that in time of famine a distinction cannot be made between the poor and the poorest.

377. The Health Officer recommended that sheds should be erected on the vacant ground on the banks of the Hooghly, and that the immigrants should be collected in depôts, as near as possible to the places where they were fed; that they should be examined, and the really destitute provided with tickets; that clothing and medical attendance should be supplied, and that conservancy arrangements should be made.

378. In July the Justices voted Rs. 8,000 to erect sheds in the town, and conservancy and hospital arrangements were to some extent made. Some clothing was also at this time supplied to the Health Officer by some liberal merchants, and a large number of Commissariat blankets were, at his request, given by the Government of India.

379. On the 8th of August occurred the meeting between the Commissioner of Police, the Board of Revenue, the Commissioner of the Burdwan division, and the Magistrate of Howrah, with a view to prevent the influx of paupers into Calcutta, to which allusion has already been made. The circular issued by the Commissioner of Burdwan on his return was as follows:—

CIRCULAR No. 25.

From C. F. MONTREŠOR, Esq., Commissioner of Burdwan, to all Magistrates,—dated Burdwan, the 9th August 1866.

SIR,

OWING to rumours having been spread abroad in the mofussil that food and clothing to any extent may be procured in Calcutta by merely asking for it, large numbers of people, more or less affected by the present high prices of food, have been induced to proceed to the metropolis, and there congregated with a view to remaining there till more favorable times show themselves in the interior of the country.

I should be obliged by your endeavouring, by every means in your power, to prevent such wholly unfounded reports gaining ground, and by your dissuading, as far as possible, those who may be poverty-stricken, from going to Calcutta, where they will be certain to be disappointed.

380. About the same time Mr. S. Hogg, Chairman of the Justices and Commissioner of Police, commenced the organization of a Relief Committee. A movement was also made to call a public meeting, and in the Committee which was nominated by the meeting, Mr. Hogg's Committee was merged. The meeting was held on the 13th August. For reasons to be noticed in another place, the measures of relief were for the time confined to Calcutta and its neighbourhood, but a discretionary power of extension was reserved, and appeal was made to the general public throughout India in terms which no doubt brought in much money for the relief of the general famine. At the meeting it was stated by the Commissioner of Police, who represented the Government on the occasion, that "it is not intended to interfere in the slightest degree with those Native gentlemen who have so nobly taken the lead in supplying food to the starving multitude."

A large General Committee was nominated, but it is stated that on the first occasion of their being called together, owing to a delay of the post office in the delivery of the notice, the attendance was small. On that occasion an Executive Committee was nominated. The occasional meetings of the General Committee appear to have been throughout but thinly attended, and in fact the whole duty devolved on the Executive Committee, of which the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police were the working executive members, and Mr. H. W. I. Wood, Secretary Chamber of Commerce, charged himself with the financial business. The Executive Committee met once a fortnight, and the members are stated to have been very attentive.

381. The provision of shelter and hospital accommodation was now rapidly pushed on, and the most liberal arrangements of every kind were made. At Mr. Hogg's suggestion the Native distributors of charity agreed to confine their distributions to fit persons, to whom they were to give tickets, and who would be accommodated in the sheds provided for them in the town. In addition a pauper camp was formed in the out-skirts, to which it was desired to draw as many as possible, and where, in addition to food, shelter, and care, distributions of clothes were made as an additional attraction. The same feeling, however, which has been observed elsewhere, against using the places of shelter provided by the officers of Government was apparent in Calcutta, and the great majority of the paupers seem to have preferred the Native charity available in the town. There can be no doubt that the presence of large bodies of poor people affected the cleanliness of the town, and the river bank in the neighbourhood of the pauper sheds became very offensive. On the 30th August, the Executive Relief Committee resolved that "the time has arrived when all desultory relief afforded by individual benevolence should cease, and that a strong recommendation be sent to the proprietors of the various temporary private charities within the town either to cease the distribution of food, or else to remove their private charities to Chitpore, where they would be worked in communication with the Committee." Further, "that subsidiary to the plan of operations which is being prosecuted by the Committee, the Commissioner of Police be requested to put in force, with judicious rigor, the vagrant law within the town."

382. The policy of as much as possible inducing the poor people to return to their own neighbourhoods had already been adopted, and it was stated that the first detachments were to leave the next day under arrangements concerted with the Board of Revenue.

383. There seems to be no doubt that, immediately subsequent to these resolutions, the town was cleared of the poor immigrants by the Police, and they were conducted to the Chitpore camp. Mr. Hogg, however, states that this regime lasted for three days only, and that they were not afterwards actually prevented from returning. In fact, however, most of the Native charities in the town were then closed, and excepting a pecuniary donation from one liberal gentleman, they were not transferred to Chitpore.

Baboo Rajendro Mullick, Hadjee Zekariah, and many others, were very remarkable for their liberality during the period in which reliance was placed on private charity.

384. We believe that nothing could have been better than the management of the Chitpore camp under the indefatigable superintendence of Mr. Davis, the Deputy Commissioner of Police. The utmost credit is due to that gentleman, as well as to Mr. S. Hogg, for the efficiency of the arrangements there made.

The people entertained in the camp were, without doubt, in reality better off than they could have been in the town, and though their previous sufferings, and perhaps the change of climate, caused a large mortality, those who had not passed the fatal point were brought into excellent condition. But it is certain that the result of the policy adopted was much to diminish the whole number of poor people fed in Calcutta. The number at the camp never exceeded 5,000, and during the three months of its existence, the average number was 3,593 persons.

385. It does not seem possible to give an exact statement of the mortality among the famine population, as they were not distinguished from the ordinary paupers in the earlier months.

From August onwards the number sent to the famine hospitals was 10,769, of whom, up to November 9th, 3,761 had been cured, and 1,276 had died. But

this last figure does not include some additional numbers who died in the pauper camp or in the streets, without going to hospital.

The total number despatched to their homes by the Committee was 11,515. But the fact seems to be that, of those belonging to not very distant districts, many returned and may have been reckoned twice.

386. No direct relief operations were undertaken by the Calcutta Committee in the towns and villages in the neighbourhood, but grants of money were made in aid of the Local Committees. On the 21st September, at the request of the Lieutenant Governor, it was resolved to extend these grants to all districts where they might be required, and a fresh appeal was then made to the public.

387. On the 22nd November, the operations in Calcutta ceased, and there remained only the destitute orphans collected in an asylum, where they were excellently cared for under the superintendence of the Health Officer and tended with unremitting diligence by some devoted nuns. Eventually, the sum of Rs. 1,00,000 was set aside for the permanent support of the orphans.

388. The financial result of the operations of the Calcutta Committee is as follows:—

	Rs.
Total amount received	6,01,861
Spent in Calcutta	1,65,768
Placed with Mr. Hogg to meet sundry expenses	50,000
Assigned for the foundlings	1,00,000
Sent to other districts and paid over to the Board of Revenue	2,80,550

389. We next proceed to notice the districts east of the Hooghly and the Baghiruttee, affected by famine.

We have said that the principal of these was Nuddea. This is a large and important district near Calcutta. It is intersected by navigable rivers, and has been for some years traversed by a railway bringing it into very intimate communication with Calcutta on the one hand and with Eastern Bengal on the other. It is, in every sense, one of the most metropolitan districts, and one of the most advanced. It has a college and large means of education, very large numbers of professional men are thence supplied to Calcutta and to other districts, and much of the land is owned by men successful in all departments of life. It is also a great field of European enterprise, and produces some of the finest indigo in the world. The district has always received much attention from the Local Government, and a very large share of the local funds, which the Lieutenant Governor annually distributes at his discretion. The railway is supplemented by feeder roads completed or in course of construction, and a good deal of the five lakhs granted for famine works and devoted to these feeders was spent in the district and the neighbourhood, though it has been explained that, the former expenditure being only continued in the ordinary manner, these roads were not recognized as relief works. On enquiry by the Commissioner in the beginning of July, it appeared that about 660 persons were employed on these works in the most distressed parts of Nuddea.

The official staff is also unusually large, the system of sub-divisions being carried farther than in other parts of the country. Nuddea has five sub-divisions, besides the head quarter division, in each of which an Assistant to the Magistrate resides.

390. The tenures of the immediate holders of the soil are, however, not of so good and valuable a character as is often the case in Jessore and some other neighbouring districts, and Nuddea has been the scene of much unhappy litigation between the superior and inferior holders of land. Hence it would appear that the valuable sugar-date cultivation and some other crops which require

time and capital have not been so much extended as in the neighbouring country, and that the mass of the agricultural population are still poor and little advanced. The cyclone of 1864 did great damage to the district, sweeping completely across it. In the autumn of 1865 a large portion of the district suffered extremely from the effects of the drought, and the yield of rice was diminished by a large proportion. At that time the Collector reported "very serious scarcity and something of a famine already." But things got better, for the time, when the crop was reaped. The most acute suffering eventually occurred in the two sub-divisions of Chooadangah and Kishnaghur, but the Collector does not think that this was due to a very much greater failure of the crops (as compared with some other parts of the district) so much as to the poorer condition of the people, who had especially suffered both from the cyclone and from litigation. In the course of 1866 the distress in a portion of this tract was also aggravated by flood.

391. Lord Ulick Browne, the Magistrate and Collector, tells us that he first observed some signs of distress in February 1866, and in March a missionary, resident in the district, addressed the Lieutenant Governor on the subject, upon which a report was called for. The Collector then made full enquiry, and on the 30th April he reported the probability of extreme distress.

Lord Ulick Browne has not that want of official courage which we have attributed to the Collectors in Orissa; in fact he possesses that quality in an eminent degree, and although the necessities of his district were much less than in the worst of those previously noticed, he has throughout framed his demands on a much larger scale, and has succeeded in getting more money than other Collectors, and enough for his purposes. In his first report he estimated the sum which would be required of Government at a lakh of rupees. The Commissioner of the division at once authorized him to spend Rs. 20,000 from an available local fund, in order to find immediate employment for the poor. His instructions were that work should be provided "for all who desire it without obliging them to go to any great distance from their homes." He would apply to have the money replaced, but if not, although the ordinary works of the year must suffer, "the circumstances justify some sacrifice in this respect, in order to alleviate the immediate suffering of the people." The Government eventually replaced the sum thus spent. Relief Committees were also then formed both at the head quarters station, Kishnaghur, and at other places in the district, and local subscriptions were commenced.

At the end of May Rs. 5,000 was assigned to the district by Government from the North-West Famine Fund.

392. In June the distress became very severe, and the money was rapidly expended both in giving employment to those who could work and feeding those who could not. On the 18th June the Commissioner roughly calculated that about 2,500 persons were employed on the special relief works, and that on public works of all kinds nearly 4,000 persons were employed in the district. The people eagerly sought employment, the deterrent circumstances described as existing in Orissa not here interfering with the supply of labor, and above all rice being more easily procurable for money or provided by local arrangement. More money was applied for, and the Collector again pressed that a lakh of rupees should be assigned by Government for relief works, to be drawn upon as required. On the 20th June he received another Rs. 5,000, and further sums from time to time, to assist in the relief of the starving. In the beginning of August another Rs. 30,000 was, at the request of the Commissioner, granted for works under the Magistrate's superintendence, of which Rs. 20,000 was spent, and Rs. 10,000 eventually remained a surplus. In the same month work was undertaken by the Public Works Department on the Moorshedabad road, for the relief of the people in a tract which had suffered from flood

on the western side of the district, and Rs. 23,000 seem to have been usefully and efficiently expended on that work. Feeding centres were established at different points, and in some few instances allowances were made to a limited number of people at their own homes. Weaving work was also given to the weavers of Kishnaghur. And this measure is stated to have been even financially successful, no loss being incurred. At the worst time the number of people fed amounted up to above 10,000, and the quantity of food allowed seems to have been sufficient. The result of the various measures adopted was that (as we have before said) all mortality beyond that which is inseparable from a period of unusual scarcity was in this tract happily avoided, and a good crop following, the condition of the people was soon restored to its former condition.

393. Throughout the operations in the Nuddea district, the greatest assistance in the administration of relief has been derived from the educated and intelligent Native gentlemen there to be found in every part, and who have taken a prominent part in the local Relief Committees. At almost every local centre were to be found one or more retired lawyers, or school-masters, or doctors, or other educated men of superior classes; and their action was excellent.

394. But as respects pecuniary means, the result of the subscriptions obtained in such a district, to relieve distress of considerable magnitude, was wholly insufficient for the purpose. Out of the total sum devoted to direct charitable relief (works apart, and they were paid for from public sources exclusively) less than one-third was obtained by local subscriptions, or not quite Rs. 11,000 in all (Lord Ulick Browne's examination, page cci, answer 50). A large proportion of the superior landholders, both Native and European, are non-resident, and no doubt gave their charities rather in the places of their residence than in those where their estates are situated. As respects the distribution of food after the Native method, we are told that considerable relief of this kind was given at only one place, Ranaghat; other relief of the kind at some other places was small and exceptional. The zemindars did not, as a body, recognize any obligation to support the poor of their estates. It is evident that without external aid there must have been much severe suffering and mortality.

395. Even in this district the want of any enterprising trading class is so great that there were the most abnormal and extreme differences in the price of rice at places but a few miles apart, and with a railway and rivers carrying through the district the produce of Eastern Bengal, the local markets could not, without excessive derangement, supply the rice required; and the Relief Committee found it profitable to import rice from Calcutta and other places.

396. In the district of the 24-Pergunnahs, also in the Nuddea or Presidency division (and in which Calcutta is situated), severe distress appeared, somewhat late in the season, in considerable tracts, principally those in which damage had been done by the cyclone of 1864. But this distress was efficiently met by a large expenditure of public money amounting to Rs. 50,000 (of which Rs. 35,000 was given by the Calcutta Committee), and we refer to the district narrative for details.

397. The district of Moorshedabad is in the Rajshahye division, but adjoins Nuddea on the north. The pressure of high prices was much felt in this district, rice selling at from 7 to 9 seers per rupee, in part of June, July, and part of August.

But very great relief was afforded by Native liberality. The rich Hindustanee merchants settled in the neighbourhood of Moorshedabad (Rai Dhanpat Sing and others), and several of the wealthier residents of that city and of the sister town of Berhampore, distributed food largely to the poor, and a rich

and benevolent widow proprietress, the Rancee Surnamoye, distinguished herself by great liberality at several different places. Up to a certain point it was hoped that there would be no actual famine, but in the course of July it was found that much local distress was beginning to appear in the south-eastern corner of the district adjacent to Nuddea. The Local Committee, presided over by the Commissioner, immediately sent out food, and an active Native officer was specially deputed to ascertain the facts and superintend the operations. The distress was for a short time very considerable, but it was relieved by an ample distribution of food. Eight feeding centres were established, and at one of these the number receiving rations was at one time as high as 1,800 persons, mostly women and children. The plan was adopted of giving to each three days' uncooked rations at a time, and thus much of the inconvenience of the feeding centres was avoided. But, of course, this required fuller supplies and better superintendence than was available in the districts where the famine was most severe. The indulgence does not seem to have been abused, for as soon as the early rice crop was cut, the distress ceased, and the relief operations were discontinued. The relief in this district was entirely supplied from private funds without any aid from the North-West Fund, the Government, or any other external source.

398. The Government of India has alluded to the uncertainty in the public mind regarding the facts of the famine; and the Secretary of State, to the omission to form a general Public Committee and invite the aid of the general public. These two subjects are in truth very intimately connected, and we shall notice them together.

399. We have already said that till a very late period of the famine, in fact we may say till it was nearly over, there had seemed to be a considerable divergence of opinion regarding the facts. Private statements had appeared, representing the suffering and mortality to be of the most extreme description, but it was supposed that the official opinions did not to the full support that view. The great mass of the public remained without a clear and decided impression on the subject. In fact it may be broadly said that, till a late period, the general public in Calcutta and elsewhere in India never did realize the full extent of the calamity.

400. That the Government of Bengal took a too sanguine view is evident from the reports made. We have mentioned that on the 10th June the Lieutenant Governor informed the Government of India that his accounts did not support the statements of the Chamber of Commerce regarding the appalling character of the famine. That opinion was again recited in the narrative of the 20th June, and in that narrative it is stated that "the general state of the districts suffering from the high price of grain is improving."

The narrative of the 10th July commences by reciting this statement, and adds "His Honor is now glad to observe that this improvement continues."

The narrative of the 18th July commences as follows:—"Since the date of the last narrative the accounts from the mofussil, though showing that great distress still exists in Orissa, and in parts of Midnapore, Maunbhoom, Chumpan, and Tirhoot, are full of promise as to the future. Prices are already falling even in Orissa;" and after explaining the good prospects of the agricultural season, then commencing, and dwelling especially on the prospects of the early rice crop, it is added—"fortunately in Balasore this is the chief harvest of rice, though in other districts it is only a subsidiary crop." This last statement is an entire and singular mistake.

The narrative of the 24th July commences:—"During this week, the accounts received from the distressed districts continue to be favorable."

On the 8th August the accounts are stated to be "very cheering."

The narratives of 8th and 20th August are principally occupied with details, but in the latter it is mentioned that "from Balasore the accounts were less favorable."

On the 27th August it is briefly mentioned that "great distress had been caused by the inundations, which had swept away whole villages. Food had been sent out in boats." This last and the subsequent narratives do not give much detail, except in contradiction of certain charges in the public prints.

On the 6th September the Lieutenant Governor, calling for a report on the mortality in Orissa, enquires "of what disease the generality of the poor people are at present dying, whether from cholera or from the direct effect of want of food?"

It is not till the 25th September that the great damage from flood, and consequent necessity for extended operations, is explained in the narrative forwarded to the Government of India.

Comparing the accounts submitted to the Government of India in June, July, and August, with the facts now ascertained by us, we cannot doubt that the view taken by the Local Government was too favorable.

401. It appears that early in June the Government and the Board determined that it was inexpedient to publish in full all the accounts received; that it was better to publish only a concise narrative of ascertained facts. Mr. Chapman explains this matter. (See his examination, pages cxxxii-iii).

There can be no doubt that as respects the mortality and all facts relating to the progress of famine in the interior of the districts, the ascertained facts were very different from the actual facts, for the simple reason that, as we have shown, there was no machinery to ascertain the whole, and for one death and one case of distress ascertained there were probably ten or twenty unascertained. At Cuttack the fullest degree of misery was perhaps not visible at the station. At Balasore and Pooree none of the local officers could or did fail to be most fully sensible of the hideousness of the suffering by which they were surrounded, but they had more than sufficient employment for all their energies in most praiseworthy and energetic endeavours to relieve that suffering, and had little occasion to paint all its details in writing. The tone of some of the letters (especially that of the Lieutenant Governor of the 11th June) and Government narratives which we have noticed would not induce us to suppose that they had been much encouraged to write general descriptions as distinguished from ascertained facts. On the 10th June the Commissioner was desired to telegraph daily "the state of things in the three districts," and told to mention "price of grain, state of the weather, prospects of harvest, effect of recent measures of relief, and any other particulars of interest." But his telegrams seem to have generally been of a very meagre character, and to have been largely occupied by the state of the weather, price of grain, date of arrival of supplies, &c.

402. The Board of Revenue did, however, submit to Government and publish in the newspapers weekly narratives in which the ascertained facts are fairly stated. We think that from an early period after the commencement of the relief operations, the tone of these narratives of the Board is much less sanguine than those of the Government.

In regard to the probable expenditure of money, in particular, the Board seem very early to have warned the Government of the probability that the funds in hand would soon be expended, and that more would be required.

403. This then brings us to the question of appealing to the general public for aid.

Mention has already been made of the first attempts of the kind made or suggested by individuals and Local Committees in the early months of the famine. The discovery and appropriation of the surplus North-West Famine Fund brought all these to an end, except Mr. Sykes' Fund.

On the 30th May, the Chamber of Commerce of Calcutta proposed the appointment of a Central Relief Committee for the management of the North-West Fund, but they did not then propose a fresh subscription (see Appendix page 258).

On the 6th June the Lieutenant Governor declined the proposal, saying "that the funds were in course of distribution by the Board of Revenue to the Local Relief Committees; that great hopes were entertained that it would not be necessary to make any further appeal to public charity; that if this should be necessary, His Honor would gladly avail himself of a Special Committee" (Appendix page 288).

On the 8th June the Committee of the Chamber of Commerce urged by telegraph that the whole of the North-West Famine Fund should be granted, and added, "no appeal to public likely to succeed at present or while Government holds any balance of the Famine Fund." The whole balance of the North-West Fund was at that time made available for relief.

On the 14th June the Chamber of Commerce again, in reply to the letter of the 6th, urge—"But as the character and extent of the distress which it is the duty and anxious desire of all to mitigate to the utmost, do not appear to be sufficiently defined to enable the Chamber of Commerce to arrive at the conclusion that farther assistance will *not* be needed, and as official reports and private advices vary materially as to the intensity of distress and its probable continuance, the Committee are of opinion that it is extremely desirable to appoint a Special Committee in Calcutta without delay."

On the 20th June the Government of India expressed the following opinion in a resolution forwarded to the Government of Bengal (Appendix page 302):—"His Excellency in Council earnestly trusts that the Lieutenant Governor will urge the local officers to continue to do all in their power to mitigate the great distress which prevails in a portion of His Honor's jurisdiction, and to enlist the aid of private charity in the promotion of this object. While the Government give the means of relief by actively prosecuting public works on which those who are willing and able to work can readily obtain employment, private benevolence must be looked to to supply means for helping those who cannot work. The six lakhs of the North-West Famine Fund which have been placed at His Honor's disposal for purely charitable purposes, will soon be exhausted, when private subscriptions must prove of great value. His Excellency in Council feels assured that the Lieutenant Governor will do all in his power to induce the public to come forward and give their aid, which, the Government of India has not any doubt, will be liberally afforded by all classes, Native and European, who have the means to do so; and His Excellency in Council would suggest whether this object may not be promoted by means of the mixed Committees which have been appointed by His Honor, of the official and non-official classes, English and Native, presided over by the Commissioner of the division and the Magistrate of the district. By these Committees the local knowledge and public spirit of private individuals may be utilized and made available for the general purposes of relief to the suffering population." No mention is made in this resolution of a General Committee.

On the 21st June the Board report as follows (Appendix page 309):—"As already reported, the actual sum available as balances of former Relief Funds in Calcutta is Rs. 6,06,000. There may be a little more up-country, but not much. Appended is a memorandum of the sums actually expended by the Board to date, and of the amounts for which the Board has entered into engagements. The Board cannot at present venture

to estimate the amount that will be needed for purely charitable distribution. They fear that may prove to be much above 2½ lakhs of rupees. It will be long before any thing like an exact account of this matter can be given." And a little further on, as respects the more general import operations, they say—"The Board desire to warn the Government against expecting that anything like *all* the expenditure incurred in importing rice will be recovered. Larger quantities will have to be placed at the disposal of the Relief Committees, and the Board dared not themselves estimate the *net* recoveries at more than *half* the outlay, though it is impossible at present to make anything like an accurate conjecture upon the subject." In further letters, at several subsequent times, the Board submitted statements of estimated expenditure, all showing that large sums would be required, and that as the famine advanced, the wants were found to be larger and larger.

On the 9th July, in reply to the letter addressed to Government on the 14th June by the Chamber of Commerce, the Secretary Bengal Government says—"The Lieutenant Governor does not see what grounds the Chamber of Commerce have for supposing that a Central Relief Committee, appointed by Government, would have any better means of information regarding the character and extent of the distress which at present exist in Orissa and other districts in the Lower Provinces than Government now has at its disposal." His Honor therefore adhered to his former opinion. As he had before said, if it should be necessary to raise fresh funds, he would avail himself of the services of a Central Committee. "At present the expenditure is being carried on by means of advances from the general revenues of the country, for the proper administration of which the Government is and must be responsible." Throughout June and July, then, the Lieutenant Governor did not think proper to avail himself of the suggestion for a Central Relief Committee, nor to appeal to the public for aid, but two gentlemen were invited to assist the Board of Revenue, and no doubt gave valuable counsel.

404. When the distress visible in Calcutta having very greatly increased, a public meeting was to be there held, the Lieutenant Governor (on the 9th August by his letter No. 1398 T) desired the Board of Revenue to give every encouragement to the objects of the meeting. His Honor recited the reasons why he had not hitherto consented to a Central Committee, nor appealed to the general public, and then goes on—"If, however, it should appear to the meeting, upon any information that may be brought before it, that the balance of the Famine Fund will not be sufficient to supply rice to the poor of the rural districts gratuitously or at a cheap rate, during the probable continuance of the scarcity, and if a strong feeling should be expressed in favor of raising additional funds, the Lieutenant Governor would gladly take advantage of such a desire and welcome the appointment of a mixed Committee, who would undertake the collection of general subscriptions and the administration of the united funds." A copy of this letter was sent to the Local Commissioner of Police, and at the meeting the Government was represented by him. The Members of the Board of Revenue did not take part in the proceedings.

The appeal made by the Commissioner of Police had reference to his local charge, and, although the subject was discussed, the question of undertaking the general relief of the country was placed in such a form that eventually the meeting decided to confine their efforts for the present to "the poor that have for the last few months been flocking into Calcutta from all parts of Lower Bengal, and also for assisting the suburbs and the towns and villages in the vicinity of Calcutta." But it was further resolved to appeal to the Public in all parts of India "to send their contributions to the Committee, to be disbursed at their discretion."

An appeal was made accordingly, and was supported by most of the Local Administrations in different parts of India.

It was not till late in September, when most of the expenditure had already been incurred, that the Government of Bengal appealed to the public. On the 19th September the Lieutenant Governor asked the assistance of the Calcutta Committee, and on the 24th September he addressed all the Administrations in India. An official appeal for general assistance was then everywhere made. By that time, however, there was a considerable feeling on the part of many of the public that the appeal was made too late for practical benefit. The amount of the subscriptions was no doubt in some degree limited by this feeling.

405. We are decidedly of opinion that a Central Relief Committee might properly and with advantage have been formed when first suggested by the Chamber of Commerce. The nature of the fund which was first used for relief, derived as it was from public sources on another occasion and for another part of the country, seems to us to have been a reason for preferring that it should be administered by a public body rather than by the Government alone, and we think that such a body might have done good and would not have been practically disadvantageous. We do not suppose that the funds would have been more efficiently administered than the Board of Revenue administered them. In India practical men have their own business to do, and can seldom devote much time to public matters. A public Committee would probably have delegated their executive functions to a Sub-Committee constituted very much as was the Board of Revenue when Mr. Moncrieff and Baboo Digumber Mitter assisted it. But the mode of arriving at such an executive body would have secured the confidence and concord of the public, and might not improbably have attracted information and suggestions not volunteered to a proper official body. We think that a public Committee would, under such circumstances, have become better acquainted with the severity of the famine than was actually the case when the public were not represented in the matter; that such a body would have been better qualified to judge of the public feeling and the monetary state of the country; and that an earlier appeal would probably have been made for general public aid. We think that, notwithstanding the considerable commercial pressure (which, however, never caused any such ruin and panic in Calcutta as in Bombay, and in fact was never of the most severe character any where in India except in the Bombay Presidency), such an appeal to the general public ought to have been made at an earlier period, before the Government was so far committed to expenditure and the famine had so much passed its climax that the public felt, to some extent, that subscriptions might rather go to reimburse the Government for expenditure already incurred than to extend the relief afforded to the poor.

406. We may here properly review the effect of the measures for the relief of the famine which the Government did adopt.

I.—*The publication of Prices Current.*—This subject has been already sufficiently discussed.

II.—*Local charity by the agency of local Relief Committees.*—Experience has very amply proved that, although this may suffice to meet small, or even, in some cases, considerable local distress, it is a resource wholly inadequate to meet any thing approaching to severe or general famine. Where the circumstances are favorable, and rich and liberal residents are to be found within the district, as at Moorshedabad, local distress of a somewhat severe character may be met, as it was met in that district. But the examples of Nuddea and Midnapore conclusively show that, in the best ordinary districts, the efficient relief of famine or of very general distress affecting considerable portions of

such districts, cannot be approached by the means to be obtained from this source. Where general and excessive distress spreads over such districts, the resources of local charity are completely overtaxed and paralysed.

III.—*Liberality in Government estates.*—It is evident that this must be but an extremely local and limited relief when great tracts of country are subject to distress.

IV.—*Reliance on the landholders to fulfil the obligation resting upon them to assist the people of their estates.*—It appears as if much of the policy of the Government of Bengal and of the Board of Revenue was dictated rather by the theory than by the practice of the zemindaree system. The theory is that, in return for the benefits conferred on them by Government, the zemindars are to be, in patriarchal fashion, the fathers of their people. The practice of nearly 80 years has shown the contrary. The zemindars also do not perform the functions of European landholders, and they are certainly not better than any men might be expected to be under the circumstances. No obligations enforced by legal process compel them to support the poor of their estates in time of famine, and they do not recognise any sufficient moral obligation to do so. Putting aside for the present various practical difficulties in the way of general improvement, it will be seen that in Bengal and Orissa, they are generally divided into old resident proprietors comparatively poor, and rich proprietors frequently non-resident. In most parts of the world the pretensions of the old lords of the soil are generally greater than their income and their prudence. And, suffering themselves in many ways from the effects of a year of agricultural failure, they are not likely on such occasions to be in a position easily to do much to help others, if no obligation compels them. The rich absentee proprietors, again, regard charity as rather a personal obligation of morals and religion and a thing tending to their reputation than a duty especially appertaining to the character of landholders which they have generally assumed as a mere investment of money. And liberal relief in Native fashion is given by such men rather in the great cities where they reside than in the districts where they have made such investments. The rulers of petty Native States are not unfrequently quite conscious of their duty, as rulers, to assist their people in times of distress; but the same obligation does not attach in the Native mind to rights of property. In practice the reliance on the landholders, as a body, proves to be a wholly fallacious resource in times of great distress and famine, although there are in most districts some meritorious exceptions. It is much to be regretted that the feeling that the landholders ought to support the poor has in any degree deterred the Government from giving that liberal aid which they have always given on occasions of great calamity in other parts of India, for the result is that the poor have starved. It is of all things desirable to press to the utmost the wholesome rule that the people must do their best to help themselves, and not learn to rely too much on the Government; and it is well that all that is possible should be done to elicit the charity of the Native rich towards their poorer neighbours. But such maxims may be, and in practice and on this occasion have been, pressed too far, since the object for which they were intended has not been attained, and meantime the aid of Government and of the general public has been intercepted. We cannot suppose that the higher officers of Government were ignorant that, on all occasions of severe famine in India, the British Government has in fact invariably come forward and spent in various shapes very large sums for the relief of the people, and farther, that the efforts of Government have been largely supplemented by the liberality of the general public both throughout India and in England. Colonel Baird Smith mentions the aid given by Government, in early days, in the shape of bounties on importations and such like. In both the famines in the North-Western Provinces, in 1837-38 and 1861, the Government spent very large sums and the public very largely contributed. Sir A.

Cotton mentions the large sums expended on similar occasions in the Madras Presidency. Yet, on the present occasion it would appear that the result of the general action and utterances of the Local Government and the Board was not only to incite the people to help themselves, but to persuade most of the local officers of Government that in fact no one else would directly help them, till at least the very last extremity. We have seen the earnestness of Mr. Barlow's early appeals, the reticence of his later reports, and the extreme scantiness of the aid which he ventured to ask when he reported the people in his charge to have reached the last stage of exhaustion. Still more remarkable is this feeling in Mr. Ravenshaw, the Commissioner, who, after a most harrowing description of frightful famine, limits his request for aid to a contribution of Rs. 500 per month to each district. He had evidently not the least idea of obtaining such aid as Government and the public have rendered on other occasions.

V.—*Public works*.—Very great reliance was placed on this means of relief, but our remarks have already shown that in the districts west of Calcutta they were wholly ineffectual to prevent extreme famine. It was before the districts had lapsed into extreme and general famine that such works might have been carried on in a way at once useful to the State and beneficial to the people. In all those districts it may be said that both the state of the people and the nature of the seasons required that anything effectual that was to be done in that way should be done before the 1st June. We must pronounce that up to that time nothing effectual had been done. Works were not attempted on a sufficiently large scale; those that were attempted were not conducted on a footing calculated to relieve the famine-stricken; and above all, food was not supplied.

407. We may summarise the total number of persons actually employed by the Public Works Department on works specially undertaken for relief before the 1st June, thus—

Orissa—Average daily number from January and February				
to end of May	...	...	...	1,182
Midnapore from 17th May	...	...	...	500
Total	...	...	...	1,682 persons.

The numbers employed in Orissa from funds specially granted in other departments from December to end of May, we may take to be on an average daily:—

Pooree	...	...	...	...	1,263
Cuttack	...	...	...	...	0
Balasore in May	...	...	...	say	100
Total	...	...	...	...	1,363 persons.

If to these we add say 1,000 persons employed in Nuddea during part of May, we have a grand total of about 4,000 persons employed on special relief works.

When these numbers are compared with those employed at the same season in the North-West Provinces during the two famines there; with the 80,000 maintained by public labor at the single station of Agra in 1838; with the 143,500 persons employed daily on special relief works in the North-West Provinces in 1861 at a total cost of 25 lakhs of rupees; and with the 700,000 similarly employed in Ireland at the end of February 1847; it is evident that in practice the means taken, in the shape of public works, to anticipate and obviate famine in Bengal and Orissa were truly insignificant.

We have omitted mention here of the 5 lakhs granted for railway feeder roads, because, as we have explained, the money was spent in continuing previous expenditure in the ordinary manner in various districts, and it is impossible to specify any number of persons as specially employed for the purpose of relief on those works.

From 1st June to 31st October, the expenditure on special relief works carried on by the Public Works Department was, so far as we can obtain an account from that department, as follows:—

Pooree	...	...	...	Rs.	45,535
Cuttack	...	...	...	"	3,604
Balasore	...	...	...	"	4,567
Midnapore	...	...	...	"	10,561
Burdwan	...	...	...	"	2,743
Nuddea	...	...	...	"	9,435
Total	...	...	...	Rs.	76,445

and we may take the average number of persons employed to have been about 3,500. It will be seen that most of this expenditure was in Pooree, where the direct gratuitous relief was comparatively small. But Mr. Barlow, by establishing grain depôts on the roads, rendered the works practicable.

The works undertaken by the local officers at this later period were, for the most part, as we have said respecting those in several districts, mere tests of the reality of the necessity of relief, or designed to keep the relieved paupers occupied. The result was usually very inadequate to the expenditure. The people fed in return for such work are sufficiently shown in the relief statements, and the money expended, in the statements of expenditure. We have no more accurate returns, nor do they seem to be readily available.

408. On a review of the whole subject, we are of opinion that the delays and deficiencies which have occurred in regard to the adoption of effectual measures to meet the great calamity which has afflicted the country must be assigned in part to each of the following causes:—

- I. Inevitable circumstances.
- II. Peculiarities of the system of administration in the Lower Provinces of the Bengal Presidency.
- III. Certain errors and shortcomings on the part of different individual officers, none of which were alone sufficient to cause the greatest degree of evil, but which, coming together in an unfortunate combination, did greatly retard measures of relief.

409. Looking to the greatness and extent of the natural calamity; to the peculiar isolation of Orissa and some other portions of the afflicted country, and to the difficulties of communication; to the want of any recent experience of great famines on the part both of the people and of the officers of Government; to the impossibility of obtaining any accurate knowledge of the quantity of stocks held in reserve at any particular time; and, if we cannot say to the suddenness of the famine, at least to the rapidity of its extension in the month of May and the suddenness of the extreme collapse in regard to the food-supply which occurred at the end of that month;—looking to all these things, we think that under no system of administration could the effects of this great natural dispensation have been met by complete measures of relief. We do not think it probable that the most watchful administration would have thrown into Orissa, in the early months of the year 1866, a quantity of grain sufficient to meet the whole wants of the inhabitants during the following months, or that food and employment could in any way have been provided sufficient to reach the whole mass of the people. Much suffering and mortality must, we believe, under any circumstances, have occurred. With respect to the importation of grain into Orissa, it should, however, be understood that the omission to import in the early months of the year had unfortunately a double effect. If moderate quantities had been then imported, the machinery for landing and distributing which must have been prepared, and the knowledge of these operations which would have been obtained, would have rendered it pos-

sible to throw vastly larger quantities of rice into the province in June, July, and August, than was the case when importations were suddenly commenced in June without preparation of any kind, and just at the season when it had become nearly impossible to send boats and light river steamers from Calcutta. We have before said that if these had been at False Point, almost any quantity of rice might have been landed and sent into the interior in the season of the rains.

410. With respect to the system of administration, we have already indicated some of the peculiarities which stood in the way of early and effective intelligence. In truth we may say that in practice no two systems of administration could be more different than that followed in Bengal, and that which, in general terms, may be said to prevail throughout the rest of India. In all other provinces the country is actively governed, with a strong hand, but, it may be said, in direct communication with the people, somewhat after the fashion of most of the Governments of Europe. The Government makes itself felt everywhere, and undertakes corresponding responsibilities. It is represented in every quarter by a large establishment of executive functionaries. It will not be unfavorably representing the Bengal system to say that it is based rather on an English than on a European model. It may be said that the country is administered judicially and not by the executive power. The executive reigns but does not govern. It has little executive machinery, and it may be said that it, on principle, avoids interference with the affairs of the mass of the people. The settlement of the revenue with the zemindars has been supposed (as we have before said) to have transferred a large portion of the responsibilities of an Oriental Government to the zemindars, and any executive interference with their ryots, or executive attempts to ascertain rights or even facts, has been regarded as an infringement of the principles of the settlement. The officers of Government are subject, like every one else, to fixed laws and the action of the courts; and in Bengal the personal responsibility thus thrown on them, not being counteracted by great administrative power and influence, has become, in a rich and litigious country, a heavy burden. They are constantly subject to prosecution for every act, and the knowledge of their legal rights possessed by the people and their readiness to resort to the courts renders executive officers little disposed to acts, the legality of which may admit of question. As respects the duties of Government, in districts where Government does not enjoy that full share of the revenue which it obtains elsewhere—where, under a low permanent settlement of the last century, rights have been delegated to others in the expectation that they would undertake the correlative duties, there is a not unnatural unwillingness to undertake the whole of the functions which devolve on Government in other parts of India.

411. A weak, or at any rate abstinent, executive may involve little injury and imply great advantages in a country where the indigenous institutions supply the means of local self-government; but these again are more wanting in Bengal than in any other part of India, and, the zemindars failing to do that which the Government has ceased to do, the country is in fact governed, for the most part, only by the action of the courts of justice, to which the people resort in a degree not known in most countries.

412. The Bengalees are a peculiar people; the system which we have described has long taken root among them; it would at any rate be very difficult to change it; and there is this to be said, that if they have not yet learned much self-government, they have at least learned to make their wants known to the Government. Education has progressed very greatly among them; a large proportion of them are extremely acute and intelligent; they have a large and very free use of the press; and they have among them several influential associations. It is not probable that any great calamity could come upon

the people of the civilized portions of Bengal without being in some shape forced on the attention of the Government. But, however the present system may or may not be well suited to civilized Bengal, it is, we think, in many respects unsuited to remote, inaccessible, and uneducated districts such as those in which the famine of the past year has been chiefly fatal; the more so where, as in Orissa, the tenure of the land and whole history of the country are totally different from those of Bengal.

413. Probably due to the feeling that the Executive Officers are less directly responsible for the management of the people, is the circumstance that in Bengal the superior officers of Government seem to feel less bound to make personal enquiries and inspections than is the case in other parts of India. We think that in most other Administrations, on the first occurrence of the earliest fears of any such wide-spread calamity as that which has happened, superior officers would have made personal enquiry in the various districts most threatened. This was not done in the past year, in most instances.

414. As respects the head of the Government of Bengal, it is also to be observed that while he is assisted by no Council and by no such staff of superior Secretaries, as are the smaller Administrations of Madras and Bombay,* he has in Calcutta to deal with a great European community, and with many difficult and embarrassing subjects and many conflicting interests which are hardly known to the other provinces administered by Lieutenant Governors. Consequently, it is not possible that he should look so minutely into the local affairs of the districts under his charge, as do some of the heads of Administrations otherwise situated.

415. We think that the system of administration caused a defect of information and an unwillingness to take direct action on the part of Government, which materially retarded measures of relief, and which could not have occurred in any other part of India.

416. Finally, with respect to individual conduct, our opinion is as follows:—We think that the local officers of districts generally did their duty quite as well as could be expected under the circumstances—most of them with a personal devotion beyond all praise. But it unfortunately happened that neither of the officers in charge of the two districts in which severe famine first appeared, though most praiseworthy in all other respects, had that exceptional official persistence which might have surmounted the difficulties which stood in their way. Those officers who pressed their case with sufficient boldness obtained the relief which they sought; those who asked little or asked it modestly got little till the famine had reached a great extremity.

417. The Commissioners of divisions seem to have been, in most instances, more impressed with the necessity of resisting a too great disposition to rely on Government aid, than ready very freely to encourage applications for aid.

The action of the Commissioner of Orissa has been sufficiently described. We must think that that action was generally (up to a certain point) unfortunate, and that in particular Mr. Ravenshaw yielded injudiciously to a mere popular cry regarding the existence of stocks kept back by wicked grain-dealers.

* The Lieutenant Governor has 1 Secretary, salary	Rs. 36,000
The Government of Madras has in the purely Civil Department	
1 Chief Secretary, salary	Rs. 50,000
1 Revenue " "	" 40,000
" " " "	" " "
The Government of Bombay has 1 Chief Secretary	" 40,000
1 Secretary, salary	" 35,000

Looking to the recentness of Mr. Ravenshaw's appointment, and to his want of knowledge of the people and want of experience of the duties thrown on him; looking also to the very decided negatives which he received when he did on certain occasions direct enquiry into the loss of crops and urge the necessity of importing grain; we think that the greatest possible allowances are to be made for him personally. But nevertheless, in our opinion, the fact remains that his want of local knowledge, his mistake regarding the stocks of grain, and some errors and omissions on his part, produced a bad effect. We would especially instance his failure to take any farther steps to make known the evils resulting from the want of rice, subsequent to the receipt of the telegram mentioned in our 154th paragraph. We cannot believe that if the case had been fully explained to the higher authorities, they would have resisted the evident necessity of providing food for the laborers—a duty which the Government in the Public Works Department had distinctly thrown on the civil authorities. We gladly acknowledge Mr. Ravenshaw's unwearied exertions from the time when the crisis was recognised and large relief measures commenced. In these he was also efficiently aided by Mr. McNeile.

The Commissioner of Chota Nagpore seems to have too much distrusted the representations of the Deputy Commissioner of Maunbhoom without himself sufficiently ascertaining the real state of the country. As we have said, he was too much imbued in May with the principles laid down in November.

The Commissioner of Burdwan seems to have very fairly, we might even say emphatically, represented the facts, so far as he could ascertain them, in the early part of the season. But he cannot be said to have continued to watch and enquire so carefully as his reports of the state of the country would have led us to expect.

As respects the Commissioner of Nuddea, it seems to the President and Colonel Morton that the practical issue of his administration of that division sufficiently shows that he did all that was proper to be done. For obvious reasons they refrain from saying more in this place.

418. We cannot distinctly throw on the Board of Revenue the duty of ascertaining the state of the country and the blame of having failed to discover it, because it is not made out that either by their constitution and the general rules for their guidance, or by express orders, was this duty clearly and distinctly delegated to them. But we think that, having made a report upon very imperfect information, they adhered too tenaciously to the opinions which they had expressed, when circumstances brought to their knowledge might well have caused doubt and suggested further enquiry; and that they too long maintained general principles laid down by them, when they might have known that the circumstances were very exceptional. We also think that they wrongly applied to Orissa principles of administration which were at any rate applicable only to the permanently settled districts of Bengal. Adhering too much to their own views, they too readily seized upon every thing which tended in that direction and too much overlooked circumstances tending the other way. They sometimes incautiously reported to the Government circumstances of the former character without sufficient enquiry. We would particularly mention the letter of the 24th January, regarding the price of grain in Pooree. And they omitted to report or draw attention to other circumstances. We would cite particularly Mr. Ravenshaw's telegram of the 31st January as to the stoppage of public works in Pooree for want of rice, and the rapid rise in the price of grain both about that time and in April. They resisted, we think, too long the evidences of the necessity of importing grain into Orissa. Care, thoughtfulness, and humanity are generally apparent in their proceedings; but nevertheless their too fixed adherence to their

opinions when combined with want of boldness on the part of the local officers in pressing views opposed to those of their superiors, tended much, we fear, to an unfortunate result.

Although it does not appear that it is in Bengal (as in the North-Western Provinces) an ordinary duty of the Members of the Board to visit the districts of the interior, we think that if it was possible to depute a Member of that body to Darjeeling in May and again in September, it would have been equally possible and more desirable to depute one to Orissa.

419. One large force is at the disposal of the Executive Government of Bengal,—the organized Constabulary partaking in some respects (like the Irish Police) of a semi-military character, but performing throughout the country the duties of a Civil Police. It has been said that in respect of its discipline and personnel, this force is independent of the local Magistrates, and it has in fact a superior staff of its own, the chief of whom is the Inspector General, a highly salaried officer immediately subordinate to, and in constant communication with, the head of the Government of Bengal. While we should, of all things, deprecate any attempt to govern the country through such a force, and think that it is in every way the wisest policy to restrict that force to its proper function of dealing with crime, it has been evident in our narration that the Police, scattered about each district, had far the best opportunity of being early acquainted with the state of the people, and that by several District Superintendents their position was in this respect well utilized. The outburst of crime of a special character, as among the very earliest symptoms of the famine, also rendered the Police Officers peculiarly alive to the existing want of food; while the Constables, men receiving a small fixed monthly pay, and themselves suffering, lost no opportunity of making representations on the subject. The Superintendents of Police, for the most part, properly communicated what they knew to the Magistrates, but we have seen how, through various channels, the information was much delayed, diluted, or lost, before it reached the Government. It would, we think, in other countries have been expected that the head of the Police Force, having the means of collecting and concentrating the information possessed by so many local Police Officers, would have been in the position most likely to enable him to inform the Government of the wide-spreading want and increasing starvation. We cannot find that the Inspector General, Colonel Pughe, made any such use of his position. We would call attention to his own description of his functions when examined by us. He seems to consider that he is chiefly the head of a mere office of distribution and account, rather than expected to deal with crime, and that he is rather to advise the Government on Police questions coming before it, than to inform it of what is going on in the country. We will only say that this view is entirely different from that entertained in some other provinces of India. On the present occasion the Inspector General did not visit any of the districts disorganized by crime, and we have not been able to ascertain that any Inspector General ever did visit Orissa, or even the great district of Midnapore, within a few hours of Calcutta, and one of the districts in which crime is at all times most heavy. In May the Inspector General retired to Darjeeling to be near the Lieutenant Governor, but we cannot find that he gave much warning or information to His Honor. We observe, however, that the Lieutenant Governor seems to concur generally in the view of his position and duties taken by the Inspector General, and in fact it seems to have been the instruction in Bengal, that the Commissioners of divisions should remain principally responsible for the criminal administration.

420. The administration of the Department of Public Works is somewhat peculiar. The Chief Engineer was, under the Government, the departmental head, in each Administration. But he is now also the Secretary to the local

Government in the Public Works Department, and thus has a sort of double character. This was the arrangement in Bengal. It brings the head of the Government personally into intimate relations with the department, since the same man who takes his orders as Secretary has, as Chief Engineer, full information regarding details, and seems to act for the most part as Secretary, the former powers of the Chief Engineer having been of late in great measure delegated to Superintending Engineers. We have seen that Mr. Crommelin, the Superintending Engineer in whose Circle the Orissa districts lie, was, in the early part of the operations, evidently concerned about the sufferings of the people, and anxious that his department should do all that was possible to relieve them. When after several references it had been finally decided that the department should have no concern with the provision of food, and that this should lie entirely with "the civil authorities," he seems to have submitted to that departmental and professional disposal of the question, and not to have pressed on Government the fact that the works were rendered to a very great degree ineffectual. We think that, under the peculiar circumstances, instead of simply obeying the orders received, he might have more urgently represented the facts of the case to the Government. We also think that the Secretary, Public Works Department, might have informed himself of the state of things more exactly, when he visited Orissa, and subsequently might have earlier discovered and brought to the notice of the Lieutenant Governor the failure of the works to give large employment to the poor.

421. Such then being the deficiencies of the information furnished by various departments, and such the shortcomings which caused the misunderstandings and practical failures mentioned in our report; which on some occasions caused the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue to misunderstand one another, the local officers to misunderstand the intentions of the Government, and the Government in the Civil Department to misunderstand the Government in the Public Works Department; we must consider it very unfortunate that the head of the Government should not have been able to give that personal attention to the subject which might have remedied these misunderstandings and brought these miscomprehensions to light; and that, perhaps taking a too sanguine view, His Honor was not induced by the information which did reach him to seek more urgently for that which did not reach him. Especially we think it unfortunate that the opinions held by some of the local officers regarding the extreme deficiency of food, and the facts known to them as to the effect of that want on the system of works designed for relief, were not elicited during the Lieutenant Governor's visit to Orissa; that on the occasion of the reference by the Government of India in March (on Sir A. Cotton's letter), and again on the occurrence of a great rise of prices in the beginning of April, and with reference to the great outbreak of crime known to be caused by want, more urgent and direct enquiry was not made; and that before His Honor's departure from Calcutta and the Commissioner of Orissa's nearly simultaneous departure from Balasore under the instructions of the Government, there was no more special arrangement for the early communication of intelligence of the daily progress of events. We think that on the vital question of the existence of sufficient stocks of grain His Honor placed a reliance on the reports and opinions of Mr. Ravenshaw, Officiating Commissioner of Orissa, greater than was warranted by that officer's general experience and knowledge, and too easily accepted assertions opposed to all the ordinary laws of trade and political economy and to all the general indications from which an opinion can best be formed. On the other hand, we think it unfortunate that Mr. Ravenshaw's demi-official letter of April 20th, announcing extreme starvation at Balasore, did not lead to urgent inquiry, and that his official letter of May 2nd did not cause the most immediate action. The same remarks may, in some degree, be made regarding the communications

of the Commissioner of Burdwan and the Magistrates of Bancoorah and Midnapore in the months of March and April. We feel sure that if the facts had been brought with sufficient fullness to His Honor's knowledge, neither any fear of responsibility nor any too rigid regard for general principles would have prevented the Government of Bengal from taking the largest and most timely measures for the relief of the sufferers. We think that rice would in that case have been imported into Orissa early in the season, to render effective great works for the relief of the poor, and that for the general population also food would have been provided as soon as the deficiency was ascertained. In fact it will have been observed that His Honor pressed the expediency of importation on the Board of Revenue before that body could accede to the propriety of the measure. But on that account we must the more think that the circumstances which caused the defect of knowledge acted very prejudicially in retarding measures of relief.

422. We would guard ourselves against the supposition that in passing an opinion on many points in the course of our report, we at all think that it was reasonably to have been expected that all should have been done which our enquiry now shows to have been possible and desirable. We are well aware that in no great events is it found that everything has been done which might have been done. We have thought it our duty to point out every deficiency which our present information has brought to light. But the difficulties which surround men placed in new and exceptional circumstances, and the imperfection of all machinery, must be well remembered. The warning notices which preceded the famine, although they now look very striking when placed in array by us, were in fact scattered over an immense mass of reports and papers on very many other subjects in several departments, and did not carry the same significance to men unacquainted with famine. Our enquiry has been of a character under which few undertakings of any administration could pass without the discovery of many defects. We have omitted nothing which could tend to show the facts, and in doing so we have made public much that was never meant for publicity. We have passed nothing which has seemed to us defective. But we are sure that every man will be judged by his conduct as a whole, and not merely by certain deficiencies or errors. While many have much occasion to look back with very great satisfaction on the result of their meritorious exertions to save life on this terrible occasion, we are sure that all whose errors of judgment have in any way rendered their labors less efficacious than they might have been, must regret that detraction from their success in such a cause with feelings more acute than can be those of any who were not actors in these events.

423. With reference to the wish expressed by the Secretary of State, and communicated to us by the letter of the Government of India, No. 1393, of 11th February, that all those individuals who distinguished themselves by their liberality and activity in the relief of the suffering people should be mentioned when our report is forwarded to the Government in England, we have already stated that our investigation was more directed to the conduct of classes than of individuals. Under all the circumstances, we think that, without special enquiry directed to the point, it would be invidious for us to particularize the individuals among the community who have most distinguished themselves by their exertions, farther than by referring to the mention made in the course of our Report, and in the District Narratives, of Mr. Sykes, Mr. Moncrieff, the officers of the East India Irrigation Company, and other European gentlemen, and of many liberal and benevolent Natives, among whom, on reviewing our Report, we think that the Rajah of Paricood in Pooree should have been more prominently noticed. As respects only the officers of Government to whose conduct our enquiry has been more directed, we cannot conclude this part of our Report without here particularizing the

following gentlemen as those whose exertions have more especially come to our notice as most conspicuous among many deserving of much praise :—

Mr. Barlow, Magistrate and Collector of Pooree.
 Mr. Muspratt, Magistrate and Collector of Balasore.
 Mr. Shortt, Assistant Magistrate and Collector, in charge of the sub-division of Bhudruk in the Balasore district.
 Dr. Jackson, Civil Surgeon, Balasore.
 Mr. Harris, Assistant Surveyor, employed on the Dhamrah.
 Mr. Barton, Assistant Magistrate and Collector, in charge of the sub-division of Khoorda, district of Pooree.
 Mr. Kirkwood, Relief Manager in Cuttack district.
 Lieutenant Money, Deputy Commissioner of Maunbhoom.
 Lord H. U. Browne, Magistrate and Collector of Nuddea.

424. We find that the accounts of expenditure on account of the famine are not yet made up sufficiently to admit of our giving them with precision; but an approximate statement will be placed in the Appendix.

GEORGE CAMPBELL,
 W. E. MORTON,
 H. L. DAMPIER.

Calcutta, April 6th, 1867.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO ENQUIRE INTO THE FAMINE IN BENGAL AND ORISSA IN 1866.

Part the Second.

Before touching on more general questions respecting the means by which the area devastated by famines may be diminished and their effects mitigated in future, we propose to submit a few remarks on the measures which seem to us to be more immediately necessary for the restoration of prosperity. In the districts where the distress has been partial, we trust that, with good crops, things are rapidly returning to their normal condition, and it is only in respect to the country where the injury has been the greatest, that the question of remedial measures is very pressing. This description principally applies to Orissa. As regards parts of other districts which have suffered to an extreme degree, our remarks regarding Orissa will *pro tanto* apply. We shall, therefore, address ourselves to the state of Orissa.

2. The rapid withdrawal of the people from the relief centres, as soon as the new crop supplied the means of subsistence, sufficiently shows that the relief afforded in the latter part of the season had not as yet generated any general disposition to abuse it by seeking an assistance no longer necessary. It seemed to us that the relief which continued while we were in Orissa was confined to classes of helpless sufferers by the previous events, whose condition gave them the strongest claim on public charity.

3. Great as must be the desire of all to afford the largest amount of succour to the poverty and distress to which attention has been so powerfully drawn, we think that, looking to the condition of society in India, and to the burden already borne by the Government in this country, it is not desirable that any feeling of regret for the delay which unhappily occurred in providing sufficient measures of relief in the past year should lead to any such excess of liberality in the present season as might tend to diminish a due reliance of the people upon themselves, or hastily to abrogate that wonderful social poor-law which, in the absence of any system recognized by positive law and administered by the State, induces the people of this country voluntarily to support their own poor to an astonishing extent.

Leaving aside for the present the parts of Orissa most devastated by the floods, and also the emaciated and helpless persons thrown on the care of the public when the general famine ceased, our hope is that, in the greater part of the country, that which is now wanted for recovery is rather that measures should be taken for facilitating its progress than direct aid on a large scale.

4. With regard to the physical condition of the people we have said that those who had not passed an extreme point of exhaustion seem to have rapidly recovered. Severe diseases of the bowels generally end soon in death or cure, and to the somewhat singular infrequency of the excessive fever which has

been remarkable in other famines, and which so long hangs about the constitution, we may probably attribute the rapid recovery of the people of Orissa. The last accounts which we have seen appear to encourage the hope that in reality little disease of a severe and wide-spread character has been left behind among the general population.

5. As respects exhaustion of resources, although we have described the famine as much more one of food than of money, still the long continuance of excessive prices must have greatly drained the means of almost all classes. All the testimony shows that many a poor agriculturist, who has struggled through the crisis, has done so by sacrificing his convertible property; and it has doubtless been still more so among the non-agriculturists.

But we hope that, in the present year, good crops and good prices may have already done much to restore the former class, the more so as the revenue demand has been remitted on condition of remission of rents; and as respects those whom we have described as the proper laboring classes, and even the artisans, it may be supposed that so soon as agricultural and general prosperity return, the sad diminution of their numbers will, in a considerable degree, improve the condition of the remainder. Already the demand for labor exceeds the supply, and the Irrigation Company were importing laborers from a distance when we were in Cuttack.

Our hope, then, is that, special localities excepted, little direct aid will be required for any other than the helpless persons already alluded to, or at least that a moderate expenditure in providing labor near their own homes for some of those who are not likely to seek it elsewhere, and only till the agricultural season has fairly set in, will suffice.

Comparing our observation of Orissa with all the accounts of very severe famines in other parts of India, the apparent escape of the greater part of the province from agricultural disorganization of a very lasting character appears very remarkable, and may, we think, be in great degree owing to the definition and protection of the rights of all classes under the settlement which had lasted nearly 30 years. On the present occasion the agricultural effects of the famine seem to be of a more lasting character in some other districts; for instance, in Maunbhoom, and, we are told, in some parts of Behar. In the latter province the rents paid by the ryots are, we believe, much higher.

6. With regard to the laws of trade and political economy, we may say that in most parts of India, there is a trading energy probably exceeded in no country in the world. We have shown that in Orissa it can be said that a want of experience of famine and other circumstances led to the sale of rice in December at a price less extreme than would have been the case if the degree of the scarcity of June had been fully and distinctly foreseen, and that the province is exceptionally deficient in energetic traders, a want which it shares with Bengal. But we have also shown that the wide extent of the scarcity clearly militated against early importations on private account, and that later in the season, the physical obstacles were almost insuperable to Native means. Even as it was, the traders of Pooree and Balasore then did what they could, and private enterprise brought down the Mahanuddee the surplus of Sumbulpore. That the petty and unenergetic traders of Cuttack failed to undertake the purchase of large cargoes at False Point, and their transport to Cuttack at a time when all the resources of Government hardly availed to accomplish that operation, is a circumstance which does not seem to us surprising. A Jotee Pershad might have done so; but that the traders of Orissa, such as we now know them to be, should have undertaken the task, was not to be expected.

7. It has been in some quarters supposed that exportation was carried on to an excessive and imprudent degree at a time when famine was impending. We cannot find this to be the case. No doubt the exportations of 1864-65

were large; we have noticed the quantity exported from Balasore as a great drain on a somewhat small district; but that was the legitimate result of great demand and high prices, in a country where there was then no expectation of famine. We have shown that, after the failure of the crops of 1865 was known, there were scarcely any sales for exportation by sea.

As respects the exportation by land from district to district and from one place in a district to another, it must be remembered that the areas and boundaries of agriculture and trade are not the same as those which artificially constitute districts and divisions. The parts where there is grain must supply those where there is not, and the country must supply the towns in times of scarcity as in other times; perhaps in greater proportion in times of scarcity, because there is more wealth in the towns. Miscalculations will occur, and more energetic traders may sweep particular tracts before the less energetic arrive; but, local exceptions apart, trade seems in 1865-66 to have followed very much its legitimate course.

8. In the present year 1866-67 much has again been said about imprudent exportation. It has been alleged that while Government was importing grain into Orissa, the people were exporting. We have even heard it suggested that they were exporting it to Calcutta to sell to Government for the purpose of importing it back again. All this seems very much to arise from a confusion of terms. Orissa is, as we have explained, a very long narrow country. In the south the floods having destroyed part of the crops, and the people having been rendered cautious by past experience, prices were, in the cold season, still very high. In the extreme north of the province, there had been scarcely any damage by flood, and there was a splendid crop. Rice became there as cheap as in any part of the Lower Provinces, and the situation favoring export, export naturally resulted. We ourselves saw large quantities exported on bullocks to Southern Orissa, and there was likewise some export by sea, and, it may be, to the Hooghly. The fact is that, under these circumstances, the line where the trade divides itself, where on the one side it is more profitable to export down the road towards Cuttack, and on the other to supply the metropolitan and export demands of Calcutta and the Hooghly, is about the boundary of the Balasore and Midnapore districts; and it may be that, from Jellasore, to carry rice down the road or to take it the other way to the seaports and thence to False Point or Pooree, would be about equally profitable. The whole question of export seems to be not so much one of interference with any local trade as to merge in the broader question whether, under any conditions, it is proper to preserve the food of the people by prohibiting or burdening its export to foreign countries.

9. We think it quite clear that the importation of rice into Orissa by Government during the famine interfered materially with no private trade, there being very little with which to interfere, and that little having continued simultaneously with the Government importations. The only real interference which has occurred has been subsequently. Probably there would have been some private import by sea into Southern Orissa during the favorable season of 1866-67, and this the large Government imports may have prevented. That is to a great degree a necessary evil; after the terrible events of the past season, it was impossible to risk any farther delay in supplying the tracts denuded by the floods, and doubtless it has been a wise policy to make provision against all possible contingencies. It may probably prove, in any case, not disadvantageous, to a province so exhausted, to supply in some degree the deficit caused by the second misfortune of flood following a greater calamity. But it is desirable to avoid, as much as possible, either a glut of the market or too great an expectation that in future the work of importation will always be undertaken by Government. It seems to be rather an object to establish such conditions that the obstacle to trade, at the season when it is now closed by

natural causes, may be overcome, and we venture to think that the anxieties of the Government regarding the sufficiency of the supply for the coming season may be greatly obviated if it be thought proper to adopt the measures which we shall shortly propose in respect of the arrangements at, and in connection with, the harbour at False Point, by which we anticipate that, not only may the general trade of the province be facilitated and enlarged, but it may be rendered comparatively easy to import, and distribute during the season of the rains in the parts of the Cuttack district which have suffered from flood, any quantity of rice which the turn of events may then render necessary.

10. Regarding the condition of the tracts desolated by flood, we must speak with much diffidence, because we were not able ourselves to visit them, and it appeared to us that at the time of our visit, no precise or exact information respecting the extent of the injury done was possessed by any one. The evidence taken by us was upon this subject somewhat perplexing, the destruction being shown to be in some parts very extensive indeed, while as respects others (in the Pooree district), one gentleman, who had the best means of observation, assured us that the greater part of the flooded crops had eventually recovered, and that in his opinion, within the limit of his observation, quite as much good as harm had on the whole been done by the inundations. There can be no doubt, however, that all along the course of the larger rivers in the great deltaic area from the Dhamrah to the Deves, great tracts have been desolated. Shortly before our arrival, a member of the Board of Revenue paid a visit to the stations of Pooree and Cuttack, and submitted a report on this subject, but we imagine that his report was founded on information of an extremely general character. Detailed enquiry was about to be made, and may probably have been submitted to the Government of Bengal, but we are not at present informed on the subject. We can, therefore, only make some very general observations.

From the maximum of injury which may be supposed to have resulted from the floods, and the consequent requirements, the following deductions may probably be made.

We hope it will prove that a good deal of the lowest land produced exceptionally good crops in 1865, having suffered comparatively little from the drought, and that the occasional occurrence of devastating floods being, as it were, one of the normal conditions of these tracts, the cultivators may be able to re-occupy their lands.

Again, it will, we trust be found that the crops on the lands which were submerged only during the comparatively brief periods of the very highest floods survived, and that, benefited by the silt, these lands may also continue to be cultivated.

But there must remain along the course of the larger rivers intermediate tracts, neither so low as to escape the effects of the drought of 1865, nor so high as to escape the fatal continuance of the submergence of 1866, on which the effect of the calamities of two successive years must be overwhelming. In these tracts, the sad deduction to be made from the present misery is only that they seem to be to a very great extent depopulated by death and emigration. To those of the people who remain, some special assistance must no doubt for the present be given. But even in these tracts we cannot but think that, since the depopulation of the whole country has so much increased the general demand for labor, as soon as the agricultural season commences, the remedy is to be sought rather in restoring an agriculture which will in that case rapidly absorb all available labor, than in the continuance of more direct measures of relief.

11. Our view, then, in brief, is, that exceptional cases apart, the duty of Government now is to promote and restore agriculture rather than to give direct relief in any other shape.

12 The residua of the famine to which we have alluded may be divided into temporary, and in some sense permanent, charges on the public.

The weakly and the convalescent form the temporary charge. The emaciated invalids must be tended till they are restored to health, or their sufferings are ended in death. The convalescents are employed in the convalescent gangs till they are well enough to be absorbed in the labor market of the country. Of these classes little more need be said.

13. The more permanent charge may be generally divided into the widows and the orphans. The condition of the latter is obvious; they must be supported. The class of widows requires some explanation. They are in considerable numbers at all the relief stations. Many are those who have been left destitute by the death in the famine of their natural protectors. But it must be admitted that a large proportion of them are not exactly in that position. They are generally elderly women who, in ordinary times, were maintained by relatives (often comparatively distant) who were not legally bound to do so, under that indigenous social poor-law to which we have alluded. When the pressure of the famine became severe, and it was a struggle for life, people so situated were turned out in large numbers. The very old of both sexes have probably succumbed. But there remain a large number of elderly women who have survived by the aid of public relief, and who are now (either physically or by habit) unable to earn a livelihood by labor. Strictly speaking, they have just as much claim on their distant relatives as they ever had before the famine, and when the country is restored to its normal state, some of them may again find an asylum. But, on the other hand, they are people who, in any country in which there is a distinct provision for the poor, would have, in the absence of immediate relatives bound to support them, a clear claim to public relief; and in practice, now that they are established as pensioners of the public, it would be extremely difficult to get rid of them. They may fairly say that, having saved their lives in the famine, we cannot let them die now, or turn them out on the chance of their being supported by others on whom their claim was never quite clear, and who, having once seen them otherwise supported, may now, under all the circumstances of their own condition, not improbably shut their doors against the return of these poor creatures. On the whole, then, without here expressing any opinion as to the degree to which it is proper to assume the charge of the general pauperism of the country, it seems to us that these poor women, that is the individuals now receiving relief, must be maintained till they can be otherwise provided for. The rolls may be weeded of undeserving objects; they may earn something by spinning and similar work; but for the most part their maintenance must fall on the public. To the widows must probably be added some helpless and diseased cripples who have similarly become public pensioners.

14. We think it extremely desirable that a line should be drawn between the duties which Government will undertake and those which devolve on the voluntary efforts of a charitable public. Under all the circumstances of the past famine, we would recommend that, in addition to the temporary continuance of direct relief, where it may be required, which we understand to have been undertaken by the General Relief Committee, reliance should be placed on the charity of a liberal public for the support of the permanent charges left by the famine,—the widows and the orphans.

15. To the Government we would submit the following measures, in addition to the provision of local employment in special cases and in special localities till the time of general agricultural operations.

We shall not, in this place, express any opinion on the general question of permanent settlements; suffice it here to say that Natives, excepting only those of an especially educated and improved type, look much more to the present than to the future, and much prefer a low assessment secured for the

present generation to one a little higher, secured for ever, so far as the Government of the day can secure it. In Orissa the subject has been so much discussed with the zemindars that they have come to look on the acceptance of such a settlement on the usual conditions as if it were a favor on their part towards Government, in consideration of which they may make extremely exorbitant demands. For the purposes of the present day, we have no doubt that a liberal assessment for a long term is almost as effectual as a permanent settlement, and we think that the continuance of the present settlement of Orissa is the best possible arrangement for that province, since the circumstances are now such that a sufficient revision is impossible, and the settlement, made with much minuteness and care, if equitable without being very light 30 years ago, must now be, generally speaking, light as well as equitable. We would only venture to suggest that the object of giving security for a generation would be better secured by a term of 30 than by one of 20 years. The whole revenue of the province is not so great as to make its increase 10 years sooner or later a matter of vital importance to the empire, and under all the circumstances of a province recovering from so great a calamity on the one hand, and on the other the scene of the first great work of improvement undertaken by private enterprise, without a Government guarantee, we think it would be well to secure fixity for such a term as we have mentioned. The measure would not interfere with the prospective determination for ever of the public demand, if that should eventually be deemed proper. Such a step might be taken at any time in regard to estates which had fulfilled the necessary conditions, should such be the policy of the Government.

16. But whatever be the terms and conditions of the settlement, this we would beg earnestly to lay before the Government, that it is of all things desirable and necessary that the settlement should be finally concluded and placed beyond all doubt and question at the earliest possible moment, and before the commencement of the rapidly approaching agricultural season. It is most particularly to be deprecated that the minds of the agricultural community should remain disturbed at such a time. The engagements of the proprietary cultivators provide that their payments, as fixed at the last settlement, shall continue till another settlement is made, but we could find no such provision in the engagements of the superior proprietors. It will, therefore, be necessary either to extend the term by law or to take fresh engagements from each zemindar. Eventually, no doubt, they will, generally speaking, acquiesce in the very liberal terms offered to them. But the Ooryahs are an obstinate people. The zemindars have become, of late, very much impressed with the idea that the most extravagantly liberal terms (or almost any that they choose to ask) are to be conceded to them, and many of the estates are, of course, at the present moment, much depressed and broken. Hence it seems not improbable that there may be some delays and difficulties. In the estates which have especially suffered, not only may the zemindars be really unable, for a time, to take them up at the former revenue, but the only means of obtaining that consideration and aid which the ryots of such estates must at such a time require, would be to take the management, for the time, into the hands of Government.

17. Worst of all, in respect both of past mismanagement and present suffering appear to be the permanently settled estates or killahs, chiefly in the lower part of the Cuttack district. Of these, it has been recommended that Government should take temporary charge, with the consent of the embarrassed proprietors; and if in truth it be no great object "to preserve these old families," the representatives of which are officially represented to be "steeped in debt and debauchery, the former a lunatic, the two latter entirely and hopelessly in the hands of their designing amlahs and creditors," it certainly appears that such a step is necessary for the sake of the wretched remnant of the people.

18. The following course is that which we would suggest. Seeing how very pressing the matter is in respect of time, we think that the very fullest powers might, with advantage, be given to the most qualified officer to be found in the country, who should be located on the spot and should have complete control of all the local arrangements. A law to extend the present settlement might, if it be found necessary, be passed. At any rate, the officer on the spot should be empowered and required at once to arrange and conclude the extended settlement in every case except those in which, from special circumstances, he thinks that the former rents and revenues really cannot be immediately paid. In these he should have full authority to make exceptional arrangements without further reference.

19. At this point, we would draw particular attention to the unvarying and decided character of all the evidence taken by us regarding the zemindars of Orissa. It cannot be said that there are two opinions on the fact that the great body of the zemindars have lamentably failed in the duties expected of them. We have described the evil which has resulted, in the past year, from a reliance on them for duties which are theirs in theory, but which the practice of generations has shown that they ignore in fact. And we think it necessary to recur to the subject here, because it appears that this theory of the Bengal administration is still, to a great degree, made the basis of measures for the future. In the previous letters regarding the settlement, the Board of Revenue recommended fixity of the revenue, to the exclusion of remissions for bad seasons, on the ground that the profits of good years would enable the zemindars to give the ryots the necessary remissions in bad years, as if they thought that the zemindars, being under no legal obligation, would really do so. And in the very letter (No. 5002 B, dated 20th November 1866, to the Government of Bengal) with which they submit the report showing the failure of the zemindars in the past year, they say "whatever capital may still be in the hands of the wealthier zemindars will be severely taxed to meet the calls of their tenants for assistance during the coming year," apparently still imagining the zemindars to be benevolent and enlightened landlords ready to share with their tenantry the last shilling of their capital. We observe, too, from the published reports, that it seems to be proposed, in the most distressed tracts, to make advances not to the ryots but to the zemindars for the benefit of the ryots. It is impossible to subordinate facts to a theory. The ryots in the broken and impoverished estates which cannot without assistance recover their ground, must, we think, be directly assisted by Government, except in special cases of particularly good zemindars. Where, therefore, the estates are so reduced by the past calamities that neither zemindars nor ryots can at once assume their old responsibilities, we think that the course which the law in that case permits should be followed, and that the estates should be taken for a time into the hands of Government, subject to the usual allowance of a percentage to the proprietors. The killah estates, already alluded to, might be similarly managed in virtue either of the formal consent of the proprietors or of a special law. These arrangements would be the more easy, because most of the estates so damaged as to require such measures would probably be found to lie within a moderate circle round the estuaries of the Delta, in which also the killahs lie; and a temporary special Collectorate might be formed at some central place, for the management of that country under a sort of modified ryotwar system, something like that already followed in Khoorda, for a description of which see Mr. Barton's examination, pages xxxii-iii. It might probably be necessary to station a separate Deputy Collector in the southern corner of the Pooree district, which has suffered so much, and where there are already some Government estates. The persons who have suffered so severely from the cessation of the salt manufacture would require special consideration, with a view to render them capable of supporting themselves by agriculture. The nature of the settlement with the Thance ryots

uch (their payments being fixed), that as soon as they have recovered their situation, they would not much suffer from being again made over to the zemindars, if the latter are able to resume their responsibilities; and the Orissa temporary settlement has this advantage, that when remissions are given to the zemindars for extraordinary calamities of season, the concession can always be made, as on the present occasion, conditional on the remission of the payments of the ryots also. It appears, however, from the opinions expressed to that much care will be necessary to secure the practical enjoyment by the ryots of this benefit.

20. In the permanently settled estates, a temporary Government management would have this good effect that the rights of all subordinate holders would be ascertained and a record formed for permanent reference, as in the estates already settled under Regulation VII of 1822.

21. In the broken and depopulated estates of which Government may take charge, we have no doubt that it will be necessary to make advances to the ryots to enable them to sustain themselves and their laborers and to carry on cultivation till the next harvest is reaped, and that they must be treated together with much liberality and tenderness; but in matters of this kind, if people are well managed by competent European and Native officers, they are far from faithless. If only Providence should give favorable seasons, there need, we think, be little apprehension of great pecuniary confusion or loss. If fair remissions of the accustomed rents be made for a time, there will probably be little further loss, and (circumstances favoring) comparatively small bad debts; while the mere pecuniary return from the restoration of estates, which without such care may remain desolate, will many times repay the moderate expenditure. That expenditure may, of course, be charged to the ryots, and the Government may retain them till it is recovered, if it be deemed proper to do so.

22. The settlement question is intimately connected with that of irrigation. If the settlement is concluded, fair scope cannot be given to the irrigation works so rapidly coming to the point which will admit of their extensive use. We do not propose here to attempt to say in what degree a certain unwillingness to take water is due to the impending settlement, or how far it may be necessary to exempt the ryots by giving them water in the first instance on very liberal terms. It is sufficient to say that till the settlement is quite concluded, there must always be some doubt as to the motives of zemindars and ryots, and it cannot be said that the Irrigation Company has a fair field. When doubt on that subject is removed, the Company will, we are sure, consider in a generous spirit how far both the good of the people and their own interests alike require temporary concessions within the maximum scale of rates, which may be agreed on with Government under the terms of their contract.

23. It is very difficult to eradicate from the Native mind the old system of assessment in the country, by which revenue rates are graduated for wet and dry land. The solution under our system is, we think, to fix the revenue without relation to the description of wet or dry, or reference to the amount of the produce in any shape, but solely with regard to the prevailing rent-rates, from which the water-rates of an Irrigation Company must be distinct. But in the present instance, the only practical remedy for all misunderstanding is, without any delay, absolutely to fix the revenue payable by the zemindars, as well as the rent or revenue of the Thanee ryots, for a generation to come.

24. The Government has already adopted the policy of advancing money to the East India Irrigation Company, in order to enable them to prosecute their works for the irrigation of Orissa without interruption from the present condition of the money market, and such is exactly the course which we are disposed to recommend. The works already executed, especially the head works on several branches of the Mahanuddee at Cuttack, are of that large

and substantial character, and have cost such large sums, that they both afford an ample guarantee of the substantial character* of the undertaking, and will suffice to secure the advances which may be made.

25. The completion of the Kendraparah canal will not be long delayed, if it is actively prosecuted, and it will give not only irrigation to a large tract of country, but a most important and much needed means of communication between Cuttack and the Sea, to which we shall shortly more particularly advert. It would be especially desirable that the canal from the Katjoree, on the other side of the Delta of the Mahanuddee, should be undertaken, both for the irrigation of the Pooree district (that which we have shown to have most suffered from drought) and to establish an easy inland water communication to the great Chilka Lake and through the lake to the Ganjam district, where, we understand, the Madras Government has undertaken a canal to connect the lake with the Ganjam river. Other canals will permeate the Delta, and every mile of the high level canal to the north-east (which has been already commenced) will supply a link of communication between the different portions of this province so wanting in such means.

26. While we should be very sorry to see any arrangement which should deprive the Irrigation Company of its character of a perfectly independent and unguaranteed undertaking, or throw any doubt on the free working out of the first great experiment of the kind, we are sure that, in that character, the East India Irrigation Company deserves, and will meet with, the most special and liberal consideration, the more so as the calamity which has overtaken the country, if it shows the value of its water, also impedes its operations, and the expiry of the settlement at such a moment has been unfortunate. In addition to the temporary advance of money on liberal terms, we would suggest that hereafter any direct advantage derived from the works of the Company might be considered, and an allowance equal to the direct saving of public expenditure might, under certain circumstances, be made. We would instance the Katjoree regulating weir which takes the place of a very imperfect Government work, and the probable effect of some of the canal embankments as a protection against floods, thus forming a substitute for the expensive works which Government must otherwise undertake. Any allowances of this kind, being a voluntary concession on the part of the Government on equitable grounds, need only be made when the actual benefits have been assured by the completed works. But it might tend to the encouragement of the enterprise to let it be known that any such benefits will be considered.

27. We have shown how completely the greater part of Orissa is, as it were, cut out of the world; how inaccessible it is to ordinary trade, and with what fearful results that inaccessibility was attended in the past unhappy year. We now proceed to indicate the mode in which we think that this defect may be remedied. We may also notice that the town of Cuttack, besides being the capital of the province, and of a great district the importance of which must every day immensely increase with the progress of the irrigation works, is also now the residence of a large European and Christian community to which the great establishments of the Irrigation Company are constantly bringing fresh accessions. Nothing can be more complete than the present isolation of this community during a great part of the year, when it is impossible, in case of the severest illness or other necessity, to move a family even by the slow and cumbersome methods possible at certain seasons.

28. The Trunk Road from Calcutta to Cuttack and thence onwards is a great work, and its prosecution will be extremely useful both as connecting different parts of the districts through which it passes, and as being the grand route for pilgrims to the temple of Juggernath. But the difficulties on this road, crossing, as it does, an immense drainage of the most difficult character, are

extreme. Without an enormous expenditure, it can never be made easy either for very heavy traffic or for rapid carriage travelling; see on this subject Mr. Crommelin's evidence, page xli. We hope that it will be pushed on, especially the portion between Midnapore and Balasore, the remaining works on which, as now proposed, are not excessively heavy. The early completion of that part of the road would place in permanent communication with Calcutta the Balasore district, which, though so much nearer, is by sea less accessible to ordinary European vessels than the other districts. Possibly a steamer of very light draught might be used to run into the Balasore river, and thence to take pilgrims arriving by way of Raneegunge and Midnapore to Pooree. By land a perfect communication beyond Balasore seems yet distant; we trust it will eventually be completed.

29. Again, the high level canal, which is intended to connect Cuttack with Calcutta by a long series of internal water communications, is that part of the Irrigation Company's projects which involves the farthest extension into districts yet hardly approached. Even when completed, the evidence tends to the opinion that for through traffic in heavy goods the sea route will be preferred.

30. We come, then, to the sea route by way of False Point, which place we have described as within 30 hours' steam of Calcutta. We have also mentioned how well the anchorage is protected. The place may, without exaggeration, be said to be by far the best harbour on the whole coast of India between the Hooghly and Bombay. The depth of water, though not very great, is quite sufficient for a very large class of steamers, and there is this great advantage that the bottom is so soft that the Commanders of vessels are indifferent to running aground, although they have usually no occasion to do so. The place must, without doubt, be the harbour and outlet of the whole system of water communication which will be utilised and systematised by the canals of the Irrigation Company. Of these, the most advanced will reach the tidal waters in direct communication with False Point, next year. There will remain only two things; *first*, the means of disembarking cargo and passengers at the anchorage; and *second*, the communication thence to the mouth of the canal. If these be provided, we cannot doubt that the enterprising Company which runs coasting steamers twice a month along the coast will gladly make False Point a port of call; other communications will spring up; and the dreary uninhabited waste at False Point will become alive with traffic. One day we may hope that there will be shipped from thence a great surplus produce of rice and other staples grown by the help of irrigation. Seeing, then, the importance which False Point must inevitably assume as soon as the Kendraparah canal is open, and the absolute necessity which will then exist of doing that which Government will always do under such circumstances; looking further to the very large importations of grain which are now being made by that route, to the proximity of the tracts in which relief operations on a large scale are still going on, and to the facility of access to them by this route, also to the general importance of the communications with Cuttack, we submit the very great advantage of doing at once that which must shortly be done, with a view to make the route immediately practicable.

31. The measures which we suggest are no more than the following, all of which will come within the compass of a very moderate expenditure.

We think that a dismantled vessel should be anchored at False Point as a receiving ship for goods and passengers, accommodation for the latter being provided; and we would have a suitable small steamer of light draught to run between the receiving ship and the mouth of the canal. From the latter place, passengers can now reach Cuttack by ordinary palanquin travelling in a night. Next year they will travel more easily by the canal.

Proper postal communication must, of course, be established, and we think that a telegraph is an altogether essential part of the scheme. Without the means of communicating the arrival and departure of vessels, the effect of the whole arrangement would, in great part, be lost.

By these simple means an incalculable benefit would be immediately conferred on the inhabitants of Cuttack, communication with the distressed tracts would be rendered easy, and the way would be prepared for a very much larger traffic.

It would be farther desirable that the whole of the rivers communicating with those which debouch at False Point should be searched out by small steamers. At present they are hardly known, but there is a congeries of rivers, and the country may be completely opened up. It will be a question for practical men whether the steamers used on the Ganges are of a kind best suited for the Cuttack rivers. The Irrigation Company's small steamers are of a very different build, but have not power sufficient to tow fleets of boats. The steamer sent down from Calcutta at the end of the season went 25 miles up two different rivers towing Native boats, in November. Efficient boats should be provided for the purpose of landing and distributing the cargoes brought to False Point. The entrance to the Dhamrah river may probably be improved.

32. We annex a memorandum regarding various important roads in Orissa drawn up by our colleague Colonel Morton, to which he would solicit the early attention of the Government. A map exhibiting the roads also accompanies this Report.

33. We have not discussed the means of protecting the country from inundations, because that is one of the most difficult of engineering problems which has already been referred to a Special Committee. We can only say that the subject is one of the utmost importance, demanding the most careful attention.

GEORGE CAMPBELL,
W. E. MORTON,
H. L. DAMPIER.

Calcutta, April 16th, 1867.

ROADS IN ORISSA.

I would recommend that the following roads, imperial and local, be surveyed, and estimated for as early as possible, and that funds be assigned to as large an extent as possible yearly for their construction or repairs:—

1. *Madhub to Kulkutpore, in the Pooree district.*—Madhub and Kulkutpore are two important marts; the former lies on the Cuttack, Gope and Pooree road, the latter is isolated; the proposed line would not only connect the marts, but bring Kulkutpore into communication with both Pooree and Cuttack. The length of road would be eight miles.
2. *Cuttack via Ungool to the boundary of the Central Provinces.*—This road, an imperial line, gives direct communication between Cuttack and Sumbulpore; it is described as being in very bad order; it should be thoroughly repaired and kept in repair. For the present it may remain an earthen line, and no large bridges need be built.
3. *Taldunda to Parradeep.*—The imperial line from Cuttack to Taldunda ends at the latter place, which it is extremely desirable to connect with tidal water. This may be done by prolonging the line about 20 miles to Parradeep.
4. *Cuttack to Machgong.*—This is an earthen local fund road, 35 miles in length, in the Cuttack district. The Commissioner proposes to make this an imperial line and metal it throughout. Like the Cuttack and Taldunda road, if prolonged, it will form a very important line of communication between Cuttack and the tidal water of the Davee river.
5. *Kendraparah to Bulrampore, in the Cuttack district.*—This short line of four miles is greatly required to connect the imperial Cuttack and Kendraparah road and Kendraparah itself with the tidal water of the Cheeturtallah river. It should be constructed from imperial funds.
6. *Jajpore to Sydpore, and thence to tidal water on the Kurooah river, continued over Government embankments to Singpore, in the Cuttack district, length about 20 miles.*—This is considered by the Commissioner a very important line of communication; it will connect the town of Jajpore with a tidal channel.
7. *Jajpore to Chettabar, in the Cuttack district, eight miles long.*—This is a local funds earthen road, partly completed; more earthwork and bridges are required. This line connects Jajpore with the trunk road, and is much required. It should be completed at once, if possible, from local funds; if not, these should be aided by a grant from imperial funds.
8. *Bhudruk to Tulgope, via Bishenpore, in the Balasore district, seven miles long.*—An important line required to open out the Government estate of Noanund; should be constructed from imperial funds.
9. *Kooloo to S. Balliapal and thence to the Dhamrah, in the Balasore district, 22 miles long.*—This line would connect Bhudruk with the sea; it might, at first at all events, be made an earthen road.
10. *From S. Balliapal to Buroo, Mudaree and Basodeepore, in the Balasore district.*—Six miles of road are required from Balliapal to Buroo, whence to Basodeepore is a good fair weather road. This line should be undertaken at the expense of local funds.
11. *From Bhudruk to Rooknadaipoor direct, in the Balasore district, seven miles.*—Required to join Bhudruk with the coast road,—a local fund line.
12. *Soroh to Anundpore, in the Balasore district, five miles in length.*—Will connect Soroh with the coast road.
13. *Jellasure to Neez-Napoo and thence to Kamoorda, 10 miles in length.*—Required to connect the extreme north-east part of the Balasore district with the trunk road; a local funds line.

REPORT

OF THE

COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO ENQUIRE INTO THE FAMINE

IN

BENGAL AND ORISSA IN 1866.

Part the Third.

1. We now come to considerations of a more general character as respects the liability of the country to famine and the means of mitigating such calamities; and first, it may be desirable to consider how far Bengal and the adjacent countries may be deemed to be liable to extensive famine within the range of ordinary probability.

2. Perhaps the prevailing feeling now is that a country so moist as Lower Bengal is comparatively free from risk of the terrible scourge which has, within living memory, so grievously afflicted the Upper Provinces and other parts of India. If we compare the rain-fall and the nature of the soil and climate, there might at first seem reason to expect that the drought which causes famines elsewhere is much less to be apprehended in Bengal. But, on the other hand, it must be remembered that rice is the almost exclusive food-staple, that it requires a supply of water many times greater than that which suffices for the more hardy cereals of Upper India, and that the artificial irrigation is infinitely less. We know that Bengal did suffer in the year 1770 from famine more wide-spreading and terrible than any which has ever befallen any other British possession, and which Colonel Baird Smith deemed to have been the most intense that India ever experienced. A reference to all the early regulations and records will show at a glance that, in the earlier days of British rule in Bengal, famine occupied a place in men's minds at least as prominent as that which it has held in the minds of the present generation in the North-Western Provinces; in fact we may say more so. It is true that Bengal has not experienced terrible famine for nearly 100 years. But we must not forget that an exemption of upwards of 70 years had rendered the Ooryahs forgetful of that which their forefathers had suffered in previous centuries, and we believe that we are correct in saying that the Punjab, which would seem of all countries the most liable to such desolations, has not suffered famine of an extreme character for upwards of 80 years, since, in 1783, it was desolated by the scourge to a degree which may fitly compare with the Bengal calamity of 1770. It may, we think, possibly be a question whether the sufferings in the present century of the North-Western Provinces of the Bengal Presidency, and of some other provinces, have not been to some extent dispensations which have fallen on particular parts of the country at particular times, rather than evidences that those provinces are very much more liable than some other countries of India to such scourges.

3. It may be doubted whether the natural calamities which have yet occurred in the present century are equal to those known in former centuries. The famines of modern days have been of a comparatively partial character. The well remembered famine of 1837-38, which is really the only calamity of the kind, before that on which we have reported, which has actually reached a very extreme degree of intensity in any part of this Presidency, in the present

century, was confined to a tract which may in some sense be deemed limited. It chiefly affected the Lower Doab, part of Bundelcund, and some part of the country on the Jumna about Agra and Delhi. But we believe that both at Loodianah (which may be taken to represent the nearer Punjab) and at Jubbulpore (representing the nearer portions of the Central Provinces), grain was in that year exceedingly cheap, and both the Upper Doab and Oude (in which last country there has been no great famine in the present century) exported to the distressed tracts. In fact, although a succession of adverse circumstances and great local failure caused very intense distress and much agricultural disorganization, we have noticed in the former part of our report that, on that occasion, the price of food never reached a very extreme point, speaking comparatively. We may say that it scarcely anywhere reached three times the ordinary price, taking the average of a number of years preceding.

There has often been a difference in the course of the seasons in the upper and lower portions of the North-Western Provinces, perhaps due to the varying effects, yet to be traced, of the branches of the monsoon coming up from the Bay of Bengal on the one hand, and from the western coast on the other; and in 1861 the Lower Doab was prosperous, while the Upper Doab and part of Rohilcund suffered, together with one unhappy tract about Agra and Delhi, which suffered on both occasions. Previous to 1860, the price of wheat in the upper portions of the North-Western Provinces may be taken to have been about the same as the rates quoted before 1837-38, and as those for rice in Orissa before 1865. At Allygurh, the cheapest place for which prices are given by Colonel Smith, the average was nearly 35 seers per rupee; but that place was probably somewhat exceptionally cheap. In 1860-61 the price in the worst localities of the famine rose to $7\frac{1}{2}$ and $8\frac{1}{2}$ seers per rupee, say to four times the ordinary rate, but that rate did not last long, for in February, March, and April, vast importations brought it down to 10 and 11 seers, say to three times the ordinary rate.

4. There have also been two modern famines of a partial character in the Madras Presidency.

In 1832 the rains failed below the Eastern Ghats, which caused great distress in the Coast districts, from Madras northwards, in that and the following year. The suffering was indeed continued into 1834. The most severe suffering was in the Guntoor district, 200,000 of the inhabitants of which are stated to have perished from hunger and disease. Large bodies of the starving poor found their way into Madras; but there, as in Calcutta, measures were taken to get them back into their districts. Local works were provided for their employment, and bounties were paid on the importation of grain—a system alluded to as having been previously adopted in 1824. As in Orissa, the price of salt was lowered to induce merchants to export it and bring back grain. The agricultural disorganization and loss of property and revenue seem to have been very great, and it was principally this disaster which led to the great irrigation works on the Kistna and Godavery, in imitation of the ancient works on the Cauvery, improved by modern skill, which had preserved the delta of that river.

In 1852-53, again, there was great failure of rain in the country above the Ghats, the Bellary district being chiefly affected. That is a dry country where, in a hotter climate, the rain-fall hardly equals that of the driest districts of the North-Western Provinces, and in the famine year only about one-third of the usual quantity seems to have fallen in the cultivating season. We have not found mention of a difficulty of procuring grain for money on this occasion; but immense numbers of the people were supported by public works. In the single large district of Bellary as many as 100,000 persons were at one time employed, and for five months the number seems to have averaged about 80,000 persons, employed at a total cost of between 12 and 13 lakhs of rupees. The value of the

work done was estimated to be between 3 and 4 lakhs. Mr. Maltby, a member of the Board of Revenue, went as Special Commissioner for the distressed tracts, and superintended operations in consultation with the Collector of Bellary. The result of the measures adopted in saving the people is stated in his report to have been successful; since he says that, with the exception of some severe outbreaks of cholera, no great loss of life occurred.

We have not the means of exactly comparing prices as expressed, in Madras local measures; but from Mr. Maltby's report, it would appear that "Cholum," the ordinary food of the people, rose at Bellary from 39 to 15 measures per rupee, or not quite to three times the ordinary rate, and he mentions that the Bellary maximum rate of that season was nearly as high as that which obtained in the Guntoor district in the previous famine. He says that in the part of the Bellary district which suffered most, the price rose from an ordinary rate of 50 seers per rupee to 14 seers. If that be a seer at all equal to the Bengal seer, the maximum rate would not seem very excessive when judged by the standard of recent events; and we may generally gather that in neither of the Madras famines did the price ever rise beyond four times the ordinary price, if so high.

5. Colonel Baird Smith has remarked on the rough periodicity of famines, and it may be said that these local famines recur in one part of the country or other every 5, 10, or 15 years. The following we know to have happened in the range of enquiries to which our subject has led us, within the memory of the present generation:—

	Interval.
1832-33.—Lower parts of the Madras territory; food supposed to have reached three or four times the ordinary price.	
1837-38.—Lower Doab and some adjoining districts of the North-Western Provinces; food reached three times the ordinary price	5 years.
1853-54.—Higher parts of the Madras territory; food reached three and four times the ordinary price	16 "
1860-61.—Upper Doab and adjoining districts of the North-Western Provinces; food reached four times the ordinary price	7 "
1865-66.—Orissa and part of Western Bengal; food reached eight and ten times, and in particular places thirty or thirty-five times the ordinary price, and was not procurable for money in many places	5 "

It will be seen that, with comparatively small exception, the same area has never been twice very severely affected in the last 40 or 50 years, while many provinces, which are probably equally liable to the calamity, have not suffered during this time.

6. But if we look to the greater famines of a more far-spreading character, both the cycle of periodicity and the areas of their range are very much larger; the difference is almost like that between comets of the smallest and those of very large orbit. The greater famines occur in successive centuries; instead of 5, 10, or 15, we may say at intervals of 50, 100, and 150 years. We have not had the opportunity of studying historical records as we could wish, but we see vague mention of great famines in the 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries, notably one in 1471; and without going beyond the more recent centuries, we may mention that there seems to be no doubt that one of the great historical famines affected India about the year 1631, in the reign of Shah Jehan. Notwithstanding the liberality of the Emperor, "it was found that money could not purchase bread, and a prodigious mortality ensued. Disease followed famine, and death ravaged every corner of India." This famine is said to have extended over a great part of Asia.

Another mention is made of terrible famine in the year 1661. We have not learned its exact extent, but it was not universal, for, though it raged in several different parts of India, both Bengal and the Punjab must have

escaped, since the Emperor Aurungzebe imported grain for the relief of the people, on a very large scale, from both those provinces. He sold part at a moderate price, and part was distributed gratuitously. The historian represents these operations to have saved many millions of lives, and to have rescued many provinces from total destruction. Indeed his exertions on this occasion seem to have mainly contributed to establish the reputation of Aurungzebe in the early part of his reign.

7. In the 18th century we do not find mention of any famine on the greatest scale till that of 1770 swept all the lower parts of the Gangetic countries, and we know not how much besides. To this we shall shortly recur; but for the present, we pass on to the great famine of 1783-84.

That was undoubtedly one of the greater famines. We have not at present the means of ascertaining whether it extended west and south, but as respects the great plains of the Ganges and Indus water-systems, we have the authority of the then Governor General, Warren Hastings, who says, writing on the 15th October 1783 (as quoted by Mr. Gleig)—

“We are here under great apprehensions of a famine. The solstitial rains have failed in all the western parts of Hindustan from beyond Lahore to the Karumnassa. It has raged most violently in the countries most remote; our province of Behar has suffered greatly by the failure of the last harvest and by the artificial want caused by the apprehensions of greater. The complaints and fears of it have already extended to Bengal, where we have great plenty.”

The apprehensions of the Governor General were justified, for, as the season advanced, and the necessities of Behar and the neighbouring provinces increased, Bengal was drained of its food supplies, and a considerable failure of the crops occurring in the latter province in the subsequent year 1784, it also was involved in famine in that year, although in a less degree.

This famine may then be described as having extended from the Punjab to Behar, both provinces inclusive, and eventually to Bengal also. That it proved fearfully severe in and in the immediate neighbourhood of the British territories of that day, that is, in Behar and the adjoining provinces, is sufficiently apparent from its historical importance in our annals, and that it was still more severe in the then remote Punjab is equally true. Twenty years ago, when this event was scarcely beyond the memory of the most aged, the President lived in very intimate relations with the people of the Upper Sutlej, and both the popular accounts and clear historical traces seemed to him distinctly to point to more complete and permanent desolation than anything known in modern times. A new era and a new population seem to reckon from that date, the Native year or Sumbat 1840. It is evident that a famine so widely extended affected an area many times greater than any which we have mentioned in this century, and it seems that a greater area necessarily involves a greater intensity also, since less relief is obtained by importations from neighbouring provinces. The apprehensions which arise in the mind are whether great famines such as occurred in the first half of the 17th century and the last half of the 18th century, may not, in the dispensations of Providence, be possibly still to come.

8. The observations in the earlier part of our report rather tended to the opinion that with all our modern progress, we are perhaps not better prepared to meet these great natural calamities than was India 100 years ago; that the improvement of our communications may be counteracted, for the purposes of this question, by the diminution of the tendency to hoard the grain of years of abundance, formerly in such times so valueless; the increase of cultivation, by the increase of population and by the increased proportion of the soil devoted to other products than the food of the people; the increase

of wealth, by the increased demand for both necessities and luxuries. Our best means of communication would be sorely taxed to supply food to 50 or 60 millions of people, and if they could convey such quantities, they would not be effectual, unless sufficiently abundant sources of supply actually exist. It has been the common Native belief that great famines are never the consequence of a single bad year; that they occur only when a bad year or years are followed by one of extreme failure. The idea seemed to be that the old hoarding system, combined with the ordinary course of trade, ensured a sufficiency of grain to carry the population of any province through a single bad year, and that it is only when the stocks have been already much diminished before such a year, that the most absolute starvation has resulted. Whether or not this belief may have been true in former times, the experience of the Cuttack and Balasore districts seems conclusively to prove that a long course of peace and prosperity and previous good years, afford, under modern conditions, no sufficient resource against a single year of failure, when there has been much exportation and circumstances render importation exceptionally difficult.

9. Partial, or what we may call provincial, famines may be best mitigated by improved means of communication, which may enable the abundance of one province efficiently to supply the deficiencies of another. If we pre-suppose good Government and stable rights of property enabling the people to save or to borrow the money with which to buy in bad years, this remedy may, in such cases, nearly suffice.

But what shall we say as to the effect of one of the wider famines under modern conditions; one of the famines so wide that the food supply of India generally may fail?

10. As regards climate, India is, to a very great extent, one country, and the course of the seasons is similar in character, if not in degree. Almost everywhere in India it may be said that in the spring season of other countries of the northern hemisphere agriculture is nearly suspended owing to the total absence of rain. In June and the following months, the universal monsoon usually refreshes the earth throughout by far the greater part of the country. It deluges all the western coasts of the Peninsula, as well as the eastern shores of the Bay of Bengal, and some of the eastern districts of this Presidency are, as we have before said, most abundantly supplied. On the western side of the Peninsula, the abrupt Western Ghâts much obstruct its course, but it thence finds its way to a moderate extent into all the table-lands of the Deccan, to a greater extent into Central India, and perhaps to some extent into Northern India. Even the low country of the Madras Coast, to which it does not directly reach in considerable quantity, is supplied by the waters of the rivers taking their origin in the west, and which are at this season filled to the brim. The greater part of the Lower Provinces of the Bengal Presidency (excluding the more abundantly supplied districts of the extreme east) have a liberal but not excessive monsoon supply. We may take the average annual rain-fall of these countries to be from 50 to 80 inches. Thence the southerly breeze turned by the Himalayas to the south-east carries a gradually diminishing supply to the countries of the north-west. From Behar to Lahore, the annual fall may be said to average, in various parts of the plains, from 50 to 20 inches. Towards the end of the season the monsoon trends to the east, and from that quarter most countries of India hope to receive the final falls of the season, while, when the wind has still further veered to the north-east, the residuum of the rain supply is thrown more abundantly on the hitherto exceptionally dry Madras Coast.

The Punjab depends, for a certain hot weather crop and for the sowings for the spring crop, on a very precarious and scanty share in the ordinary rains, and a larger share of the latter rains of October; but so much being secured, it in

some degree depends for the maturing of its main staples on early spring rains, which it shares with Western Asia, rather than with India. This last seems to be the only exception to the statement that India is throughout governed by one climatic system.

Partial disturbances of the different branches and currents of the monsoon cause partial famine. But general peculiarities of the whole monsoon are not unfrequently to be noticed. It sometimes appears that throughout India the monsoon is unusually early or unusually late, unusually abundant or unusually scanty, and when a general disturbance of this kind takes the form most unfavorable to agriculture, then no doubt it is that one of the greater famines result.

11. The principal mitigation of such wide-spread disturbances may be found in the fact of the contrast between what we may call rice and non-rice cultivation. It sometimes happens that a short general supply, which spreads ruin in the drier countries, will nevertheless, if favorably distributed, suffice for the rice crops of the lower and moister countries; while, again, a failure at the season critical to the rice crops may be consistent with early rains sufficient for the quick early crops of Northern India and the Deccan, and late rains which bring to maturity fine crops of wheat and barley in the countries where those grains are the staples. Accordingly, we have not learned that the famine of 1770 appeared in the severest form in the most northern portion of India, while we have seen that the famine of 1783-84 was not felt in Lower Bengal to the same degree as elsewhere.

12. Supposing, however, that for any reason the general food supply of India should at any time prove insufficient for the whole population, there is this very serious fact, to bear in mind, that there is absolutely no other country to fall back upon for supplies. In case of general scarcity of cereals in Western Europe, we have on one side Russia and parts of the Turkish dominions, on the other America;—great producing countries under such entirely different climatic conditions that simultaneous failure in all is hardly within the bounds of possibility. But in all the South-Eastern Hemisphere, India is the only great country which ordinarily produces a surplus supply of food. In China, the permanent conditions of the country are distinctly the other way; the tendency of China is habitually to import food, and the demand more than absorbs any surplus of the comparatively small food-producing tracts of Siam, Cochin China, and ultra-Eastern Asia, and generally causes a drain on India. The coffee and sugar producing countries of the equatorial and southern regions more and more require importations of food, for which they more and more lean on India. The countries of South-Western Asia are at present poor, and can supply little or nothing. Great natural barriers separate us from the countries of Central and Northern Asia, also themselves poor. Whatever our want of food may be, it must, under almost all possible circumstances, be met within India, or it will not be met at all. We cannot but think that all these things supply material for very anxious consideration.

13. We now more particularly address ourselves to Bengal and the rice-eating populations. We have been able to obtain extraordinarily little information regarding the circumstances of the great Bengal famine of 1770. Unfortunately, the official records of that period have not been preserved in Calcutta, and it is only by a search of the records and libraries of the India Office in England that the details (which undoubtedly exist) of so great an event in the history of British administration, may be obtained and turned to account. Bengalee education and literature are of such modern creation, and the great Native families of the present day are of such recent date, that little authentic information has been furnished to us from Native sources. But by the assistance of the same enlightened Native gentleman of Calcutta, Baboo Rajendra Mullick, whom we have mentioned as conspicuous for his

charity in the recent famine, and of his active and intelligent sons, we have been enabled to ascertain enough to serve as a basis for some general observations.

14. Colonel Baird Smith mentions in a note that he had heard that this famine was caused not by drought, but by excessive rain-fall. We find, however, that the fact is certainly the other way. Not only is Native opinion decided that the physical conditions of Bengal are such that, though great rain-fall and flood might cause much injury and local damage, a general failure of an extreme character could not thus be caused, but Native tradition is distinct that the famine of 1770 was mainly due to drought. The truth, however, is that in countries so situated, flood and drought frequently or generally co-operate in any great destruction. Great drought is generally followed by excessive rain-fall, and *vice versa*.

A passage has been pointed out to us in Hamilton's Hindustan, which confirms the view that drought was the main cause of disaster in 1769-70, as does also a passage in a Bengalee publication of 1820.—a time when the event itself must have been within living memory.

15. From such sources then as are at present accessible to us we glean the following. From the tables of Mr. G. Herklotts, Fiscal of Chinsurah, republished by Colonel Baird Smith, it is to be gathered that during the last 150 years there had been no great general increase in the price of food grains in this part of Bengal, till within the last few years. The quotations from 1700 to 1716 seem to show cheaper prices, but from the last mentioned date the price of coarse rice appears to have pretty constantly varied between 15 and 50 seers per rupee, and generally between 24 and 40. The average of the ten latest quotations for years previous to 1769 is from 32 to 33 seers. The ten years further back include some scarce years and would give a dearer rate, but, on the other hand, the quotations are stated to be generally for the month of August, probably rather a dear month of the year. On the whole, the prices before the famine of 1770 may have been not far different from those in Orissa before the late famine.

16. Like most Indian famines, that of 1770 was not exclusively the result of the failure of a single crop. The crop of 1768 was a bad one, and the early crop of 1769 is also said to have been bad. Mr. Herklotts quotes the price of coarse rice in 1769 at 11 seers per rupee, and if this quotation is for the month of August, it would seem to indicate an excessive failure thus early in the season, that being in fact a famine price which we find but once reached in all the years previously quoted from the beginning of the century. Possibly, however, the quotation may be from a later date in the year, when the apprehensions were more serious. From this point the course of the famine appears to bear a curiously close resemblance to that which we have recounted in Orissa. The main or late rice crop of 1769 failed in an excessive degree, owing to the premature cessation of the rains. In October not a drop of rain fell; and in November serious famine commenced. There was hope of some partial relief from the cold weather crops, but no rain fell in the cold weather or early spring, the country was burned up, and the herbage withered away. Before the end of April 1770, the famine had spread universal desolation. Rice rose gradually to four and at length to ten times its usual price. In respect of prices, the coincidence with the Orissa famine is remarkable. Even the highest quoted price is identical with that for the dearest week at Balasore—3½ seers per rupee, while tradition tells of rates of 1 and 1½ seer per rupee in some localities, corresponding to those known to have been paid on the Dhamrah in the past year. The miserable results were much the same, or coming on a poorer population, they were perhaps even more terrible in degree, as they were certainly much more wide-spreading.

17. This famine extended into Eastern Bengal. It was severely felt about Dacca. Mr. H. Beveridge, c. s., in an interesting note, with which he has favored us, tells us that he has traced allusions to it in the records of that Collectorate, from which he gathered that the Court of Directors had called for and obtained a full report regarding it. In Dr. Taylor's topography of Dacca, though the famine is attributed mainly to drought, it is stated that, in the early part of the season, a great inundation destroyed the crops of the low lands, and that this was followed by great drought with intense heat and high winds, destroying all vegetation. It would seem, however, that the famine was not so severe in the east as in the northern and western districts of Bengal. The western part of the country, as the driest, naturally suffered more, and allusion is made to the northern districts as having been among the earliest and most severely afflicted. We have before mentioned this famine as extending to Orissa.

18. Hamilton says that the calamity extended to Upper Hindustan also, and that no adjacent country was capable of furnishing an adequate supply of food. We have no information to show exactly how far it extended to the west, but several local notices make it clear that it was felt with the most extreme severity in Behar, where the year 1770 is the era of traditional depopulation, more so, it appears, than 1783. Probably if there was anywhere abundance, it must have been in the country north of Agra and in the Punjab, regions far too remote to give very material assistance, as communications stood in those days.

19. There was consequently, it may be gathered, the same absolute want of food as in Orissa, so that, in most places, it was not procurable for money. In the western districts, half the population are said to have perished. In Mills' history, it is stated, on the authority of a letter of the Governor in Council to the Court of Directors, dated the 3rd November 1772, that more than a third of the inhabitants of Bengal were computed to have been destroyed, while the most favorable statement is that, at the lowest computation, at least one-fifth of the inhabitants of the British provinces perished. Importation from abroad on a sufficient scale was probably quite impossible. In one respect the Government servants of those days were accused of being *too* active, for most serious charges were brought against them of fore-stalling the market by purchasing up the grain, and thus in fact causing the famine,—an accusation which is explained as having its origin in timely purchases for the supply of the public departments. Evidently then, as now, the popular belief turned to the existence of stores of grain monopolised for wicked purposes. Mr. Beveridge calls our attention to a passage in the evidence of Sir H. Strachey before the House of Commons in 1812, in which, in reference to this famine, that gentleman speaks of "all the information that has been got and all the plans that have been suggested," from which we may presume that the whole subject is very fully on record.

20. It is perhaps now generally supposed that extreme failure of the rice crops in Eastern Bengal is almost impossible; but not only was the contrary the case in 1770, so that, notwithstanding means of communication by a system of rivers almost as easy as in the present day, the eastern districts were wholly unable to supply food to mitigate the sufferings of the rest of the country, but the fact seems to be that, in the last century, Eastern Bengal was peculiarly unfortunate. Mr. Beveridge supplies us with the annexed picture of the effects of combined drought and flood in 1784, in Sylhet, one of the most eastern and moistest districts, as drawn by Mr. Robert Lindsay, the well known Collector of those days, in a report, dated 3rd September 1784:—

"In addition to the total failure of the grand crop, not one grain of which has been saved, two-thirds of the cattle have already died from want of nourishment, and I see very little prospect of saving the remainder, for not a tuft of grass or verdure of any kind is to be seen from one end of the district

to the other. The low lands, though always overflowed at this season of the year, produced luxuriant crops of grain and pasture for cattle, but the late rise of the water has been more rapid than has ever been known in the memory of man, and overwhelmed the whole province in general ruin. The country through which I passed on my way to Sylhet, exhibits the appearance of an open sea, in the midst of which a few small islands appear." Again, he says—"Not only their crop, their cattle, and houses, but the grain intended for seed is gone. I observed and listened to their lamentations as I passed along with a degree of sorrow and compassion I never before experienced, which communicated to my feelings the more forcibly, because it was totally out of my power to afford the smallest assistance or alleviate their present distress. Both men and women were employed in endeavouring to save the lives of the few cattle that still remained by diving in this open sea and scraping from the bottom roots of grass and weed for their food." The loss of cattle from the absence of vegetation in that luxuriant country is a curious feature, and one which did not occur to the same extent in Orissa in 1866.

In 1787, again, there was a very serious famine in Eastern Bengal, which is attributed to great inundations.

21. The impression which we derive from the very general account which we have been able to give of the great disaster of 1769-70 is, that in the very similar year 1865-66, Bengal generally was much nearer to the brink of a similar catastrophe than is generally known; that in fact if the failure of the rains of 1865 had been but a little more complete, the disasters of Orissa might have been repeated on a scale ten times as large.

It may be that without such a previous partial failure as occurred in 1768, the unusual exports of the preceding years had reduced the stocks of 1865 in an almost equal degree. The export of rice and paddy from the lower provinces of Bengal in the two years preceding 1865-66 was, in round numbers, 1,300,000 tons. We must repeat that such a degree of failure as the Board of Revenue contemplated in November might have had terrible results, and we think that at that time, before the actual out-turn could be known, the apprehensions of Sir A. Cotton and Mr. Moncrieff were far from ill founded.

In respect of wealth, there can be no comparison whatever between 1769-70 and 1865-66; the question is whether there might not have been, as in Orissa, such a failure of food that money would have been useless.

After all, although, as we have said, the country becomes gradually drier towards the west, the difference in rain-fall and climate between Orissa and the greater part of Bengal is not very excessive. The Orissa returns of rain-fall may not be very accurate, and one or two years show an abnormal excess, but the average annual fall of the province may be taken to be from 55 to 60 or 65 inches. That of Calcutta is stated to be not quite 69 inches, say at most 70 inches. In Bancoorah and the extreme west of Bengal, it does not exceed the Orissa fall, and in most of the districts east of Calcutta, the increase seems to be small till the extreme east of the province is reached. The information on these subjects is, however, very imperfect. The Board of Revenue can give us no information of any kind regarding the rain-fall.

22. The cereal agriculture of Bengal has probably in no way materially improved in its character in the last century, or at least we may say that in no part of India is there so little improvement in the mode of cultivating food grains. Artificial irrigation is less common than in other provinces. There are no wells; tanks there are, and a few bunds or dams, but they are little used for irrigation, nature usually giving the means of a tolerable crop without such assistance. Any wealth which has accumulated in the hands of the higher classes of ryots, who exist in some districts, has been principally turned to the

cultivation of sugar (both date and cane), red pepper, and other luxuries, and of the mulberry for feeding silk worms, and jute or oil-seeds, for purposes of exportation. The cultivation of food has increased with the population, but it may be said that in every way rice is cultivated exactly as it was a hundred or a thousand years ago, and the yield is probably not larger. In the north, the south, and the west of India, the people, during periods of peace and prosperity, have made wells and other works, which gradually add to the productive power, and *pro tanto* ensure its constancy; and in both the north and the south, Government has contributed great works of irrigation. In the east it has not been so. The climate does not, in ordinary years, stimulate to the same exertions which are required in more arid countries; the people are less energetic, and the tenures of the land are not generally in all respects favorable to improvement.

23. The holders from Government under the permanent settlement are now, not unfrequently, separated by two or three removes of middle-men from all those who have any practical connection with the agriculture of the country, and the establishment of their proprietary character has led to a devolution of rights, without reference to fitness, to men, women, and children, and to a sub-division and complication of interests which is absolutely bewildering, and which, while it renders improvement very difficult, makes litigation the chronic condition of the tenure of land in Bengal. If fixed property of a superior degree is in some respects an improvement on the condition of a hereditary office-holder, in other respects the proprietary family is less favorably situated than the office-holders selected from among the family. There is no system of management by selected representatives of families and communities as in Northern India.

24. Passing over the various kinds of intermediate tenures, it may be said that, in large estates, so far from the actual management being in the hands of persons whose interests are more permanent and whose action is more considerate than in other parts of India, it is just the other way. Where not infeudated in the manner which we shall shortly describe, the estates are generally let out in considerable portions, for a limited number of years, to speculative farmers of the rents which may be realised from the ryots. Indeed so established has this custom become that when such estates of minors, and others come into the hands of Government in the Courts of Wards, they are thus let in farm as a matter of course. The tenures of the ryots again have not been settled and recorded, in the Offices of Government, in Bengal as in Orissa. They have been the subject of very much uncertainty and litigation, and in most cases the present mode of improving an estate is simply by enhancing rents, without any attempt at improvement of the soil on the part of the superior holders; excepting only the grant of favorable leases in jungly estates to persons who clear jungle at their own expense. The duties of a landlord are not those of a British landlord. No portion of the expenses necessary for successful cultivation are borne by the landlord. The only capital invested by him and his middle-men is sunk in litigation.

25. With all this, the great extension of the breadth of cultivation is beyond doubt. The area cultivated has certainly enormously increased. But the general opinion is that the population has also very greatly increased, and the mass of people to be fed is thus much larger than before.

It may further be a question whether the modern conditions of society are more favorable, than those which before existed, to the case of extreme scarcity. Sir H. Strachey puts it thus in the evidence, from which we have already quoted—"During a great famine, dependence, slavery and captivity are for the poor highly enviable," and, without going quite so far, we may say that the creation of a body of, in some sense, independent laborers for wages,

increases the difficulty of abnormal seasons. We doubt if English laborers could as well resist a season in which food should be two and three times its ordinary price, as do the people of India.

Such then being the conditions of agriculture and population in Bengal, it may be that a failure of the rains, such as has before occurred, would leave the province without a sufficiency of food for its inhabitants.

26. If this had happened in 1865-66, could the void have been supplied? We fear not. Probably, if the full extent of the actual calamity of 1866 had been anticipated by the Government in the end of 1865, the sufficient supply of rice to the population of Orissa would have fully taxed all the resources of Government. If nothing had been available from Bengal, we very much doubt whether a sufficient supply could have been obtained from Burmah and the limited surplus-producing districts of the Madras Coast; without absolutely stopping exportation to other countries it might have been impossible, and in that case Mauritius, Ceylon and other places would have starved. If these importations by sea would scarcely have sufficed for Orissa, much less would they have sufficed for all the population of Bengal and Behar. We may say broadly that rice could not have been found to supply a great deficiency in those provinces. Behar would certainly have been included in such a calamity, as we know that it was included in the great failure of 1769-70. In fact it may be said to have its supply of rain from Bengal, and a failure in Bengal involves a failure in Behar. Such being the course of the rain supply, we may presume that, as in 1769-70, the countries next to Behar would not have supplied any surplus in such a failure. A return, furnished to us by the North-West Board of Revenue, shows that at Allahabad, in 1865, there was of rain, in the latter part of the season, but 1.9 inch in September, and none at all in October or November. It is marvellous that this should not have led to greater failure than actually occurred, but, at any rate, we may presume that, in a season a little drier still, there would have been dearth and not surplus. In the farther or extreme northern portion of the North-West Provinces, there were, we believe, good crops in 1865-66, and in the Punjab they were certainly excellent. But the portion of the North-West Provinces alluded to is that where an unusual extension of cotton cultivation had taken place. Both on this account and by the demand from the west, grain was reduced in quantity and enhanced in price. In the Punjab, where it was abundant, the surplus supply of a population so much smaller than that of the Lower Provinces would probably have been very insufficient, and would have been, with very great difficulty, conveyed over 1,200 or 1,500 miles of intervening distance. In truth we believe that the single line of railway, on which cotton was then largely carried, was quite insufficient to convey the grain which was offered in the upper part of its course, and that like the lower stations in 1861, the stations near Delhi and Meerut were in 1866 blocked up with grain awaiting transport to the south. A sufficient quantity to supply the partial scarcity in Behar was not carried, much less a supply for Bengal and Orissa. If it had been carried to the latter countries, there would have been the same difficulty which was experienced in Ireland in changing the food of the people from an inferior article to which they are accustomed, to one much superior to which they are not accustomed. As in Ireland there would have been difficulty about grinding wheat and Indian corn; when ground there would have been difficulty in teaching a rice-eating population to eat the food; and when from hunger they ate it, it would probably have caused the diseases of the bowels which, in such circumstances, are so fatal.

27. Altogether, gloomy as the view may seem, we must express our belief that if the same calamity, which happened in the last century to Bengal and last year to Orissa, had happened last year to Bengal also, the failure to supply by importation, which resulted in Orissa from want of information

and other causes, would have occurred in Bengal from the want of any adequate source of supply, and that rich Bengal with abundance of money would have perished for want of food. That country is probably less liable to partial famines than drier countries, but it may be that it is equally liable to great famines. It is much easier to state the evil than to supply a remedy for this state of things; but it is best to look the evil fully in the face, since the natural calamity which has happened in one century may happen in another, and if we cannot prevent it, we may probably, in some degree, mitigate it.

28. First as respects the promotion of agricultural improvement, must be placed the tenure of the land.

The question of a permanent settlement of the Government land revenue only arises, in these provinces, as respects Orissa and some small tracts or isolated estates in Bengal. We have already said enough to show our opinion that a permanent settlement is not very eagerly sought for by the Ooryah zemindars themselves, who look more to lightness of assessment in the present generation than to a promised permanency for future generations and in times the events of which they do not pretend to foresee.

There can be no doubt that a permanent settlement, limiting for ever the demands of the British Government, must greatly increase the private wealth of the country, and render the zemindaree rights a more stable investment for capital than in provinces where the demand is liable to increase. But, on the other hand, there is, we apprehend, equally little doubt that, under the existing circumstances of India, this increase of private wealth is to a great extent gained at the cost of the public exchequer.

It is, we think, to be considered whether, in all permanent settlements which may be made, the proprietor should not be called on to prove his real appreciation of the advantage by paying a higher proportion of the assets than under the present liberal system he would have paid when accepting a settlement for a limited period only; and farther, whether the revenue payable from the land might not, as in many other parts of the world, be expressed in grain, as are corn rents, to be converted into money according to the average of a series of seasons struck at intervals of 10 or 20 years.

29. It appears to us that the question is not only whether a permanent settlement is good in the abstract, but may also be whether it is so good a thing, that it is desirable to obtain it by substituting other taxes for the progressive land revenue which is surrendered. That is a political question with which this Commission may be hardly expected to deal, but the President proposes to submit a note on the subject.

It follows, almost necessarily, from the facts which we have before stated, that a permanent settlement, which should fix the payments of only one of several parties interested in the soil, and be the one most remote from all practical concern in its improvement, while the actual possessor of the "dominium utile" should remain, as much as ever, subject to uncertainty and extortion, would not give the full advantages of the system. A permanent settlement, to be effectual, must fix or regulate for ever the rights and payments of all parties having rights in the soil, be they who they may, not of one only. Such a settlement would certainly have immense advantages and would lead to great agricultural improvements; and if made on a system of commuted corn rents calculated on the average prices of a series of years, would, in our opinion, be that which would most combine permanency of tenure with a prospective increase of land revenue to the State in some degree commensurate to its claims and its necessities.

30. In Bengal and Behar, the permanent settlement is, of course, a fact which we must accept taking the good and the evil together. But much may be done to give certainty and security to the under-proprietors where they exist, and a clear title to the landlord where he is sole owner.

The question of the settlement and record of under-tenures is, however, one of very great difficulty and importance, which it is quite impossible sufficiently to discuss in a small compass.

31. In Behar and other provinces, where the mercantile spirit prevails among the people, the mode of managing large estates by farming the rents to speculative middle-men for short terms is almost universal, but among the less speculative Bengalees there has also sprung up another system known as that of putnees. That is in fact a great system of permanent sub-infeudation, by which the superior holder, in consideration of a sum of money down and a rent somewhat in excess of that paid by himself, grants lands to be held of himself in perpetuity. The grantee, having thus become practically proprietor, soon follows the same course, and the repetition of tenures sometimes becomes very great. There are also many ancient tenures of a similar description, and in fact there is every sort of variety in the names and incidents of such tenures, and much complication of every kind. The result, however, is that the feud-holder of the last remove has, saving accidents and litigations, a substantial proprietary title. Much land has thus usefully come into the hands of men of the middle classes and many putnees are held by enterprising Europeans. But even these men have not yet as a rule attempted practical farming, the cultivation of indigo excepted. In India no large farmer has held his own against the small farmer, the single man who cultivates his plot of ground with the assistance of his family and of such occasional labor as he may hire. The nearest approach to a considerable farmer is not the educated man or capitalist who has adopted that profession, but the substantial ryot, who occasionally expands into the possessor of two or three ploughs capable of cultivating 20 or 30 acres. Still, in the putneedars and under-putneedars of Bengal, we have a class who may some day themselves utilise those of their lands in which rights inferior to their own do not exist, if science and progress should hereafter render it possible.

32. Last in the scale come the ryots. There can be no doubt that it was the intention of Lord Cornwallis and his advisers to give to this class also the benefit of his famous settlement. Although it was not found possible, as at first intended, to record all individual rights, the clearly expressed provisions that the zemindars should not take more from the ryots than the established rates of each pergunnah, and should not eject them, seem distinctly to confer on the ryots permanency of tenure and general fixity of payment. For 70 years the only ground of enhancement recognized by the Courts was that particular ryots were paying rates exceptionally low and under the established and legal rates. Even as respects such ryots, the Courts had held that possession at the same rate of rent for 12 years before the settlement gave a right to hold at that rate for ever, however low it might be, and Act X of 1859 has so far extended this right that all who have held at the same rate since the settlement are entitled so to hold for ever. In theory, therefore, the ryot of the time of the permanent settlement has by law as permanent and fixed a tenure as the zemindar; and the law has further protected him against the difficulty of proving his holding by providing, that if he can prove a holding at a uniform rate for 20 years, he shall be presumed to have held from the settlement, unless the contrary be proved. But in practice there are several difficulties. The knowledge of a right to hold at fixed rates, in a country where till then no payments, superior or inferior, had been fixed beyond the reach of despotic interference, but slowly reached the lower classes of the people; the zemindars, themselves in those days highly assessed, as peace and prosperity increased

the resources of the ryots irregularly pressed either for increased rents or for various unauthorised extra cesses and benevolences, such as in India constantly crystallize into fixed payments; and many compromises were made under which they were bought off by somewhat increased payments. The holder of the most ancient tenure may any day find his fixity utterly destroyed by the exhibition, in his zemindar's books, of some small unexplained varieties in his actual payments, in the time of his grandfather 50 or 60 years ago. The case is also frequent in which holdings are declared variable, not because the rent is shown to have varied, but because the holder cannot give that amount of proof of 20 years' unvaried holding, which satisfies the local Courts. So great is the unreliability of evidence, as it is taken in this country, that many Judges consider oral evidence always worthless and documentary evidence generally worse. Except in the case of those men who have already successfully run the gauntlet of all the Courts, it may be said that the most painful uncertainty exists, whether each man is proprietor of valuable land or a mere tenant. In some districts there are many ancient and valuable ryot tenures at fixed rates, but in other parts of the country all depends on the tendency of the litigation, much of which is yet, we fear, to come.

33. The remaining class of rights is that of those ryots who have right of occupancy, but not right of holding at a permanent fixed rent. Till the passing of Act X of 1859, the only standard of enhancement for these men was that of the *pergunnah* rates, which had become extremely vague and ill-defined. By the last-mentioned enactment, the principle was introduced that these ryots should be liable to enhancement of rent on account of enhancement in the value of the produce of their lands, arising from causes other than their own industry and improvements. It has been ruled by the highest Court, that this entitles the zemindar to enhance in proportion to the increase in the market value of the staples of production; and the effect is, so far, to put the ryot somewhat on the footing of a permanent holder on a fixed corn rent. If adequate machinery be provided for working out this principle, it will admit of a tenure beneficial to a considerable degree, and we think that such machinery should be provided something after the fashion in which the 'Fiars' prices are struck in Scotland.

This, however, is not all. The old provision for enhancement to the rates payable by the same class of ryots for lands of the same class still remains as an additional instrument of enhancement, and the *pergunnah* rates having much fallen into desuetude, there is still much uncertainty, not yet fully dealt with judicially, on the question what constitutes a *class of ryots*; while the provision to save improvements effected by a man's own labor and money not being separately introduced into this clause of the law, it is still doubtful whether a man who by his own industry has converted barren land into first-class garden land may not be charged first class rates.

34. All these uncertainties are rendered doubly harassing by the farming system, under which the profit of the farmer largely depends on successful enhancement.

It may be added that a new class of tribunals having been suddenly created under recent changes of the law, a large proportion of the officers employed to decide questions of rent and other matters affecting the lower grades of agriculturalists, are not so experienced and efficient as might be desired.

35. On the whole question we can only here say that the great necessity of Bengal is, to render certain and definite the rights in the land, and thus to enable a man with money in his hand to deal confidently with some one person as the absolute owner of at least the '*dominium utile*' over the field which he wishes to buy. At present there are so many various interests,

and so much uncertainty regarding all, that most dealings in land are a species of gambling, and comparatively few have an interest so complete and secure as to enable them to improve with prudence, if otherwise willing to do so.

By an Act passed in the year 1859 a system of voluntary Registration was introduced, but in practice it has been surprisingly little used, up to this time.

36. The most wide and general improvements in the land must, in all countries, be those of the people themselves; the area of the greatest of those, which the Government can effect or directly promote, must after all be comparatively limited. Perhaps, therefore, next in importance to the tenure of the land, in the scale of those things which may tend to mitigate famine, are those great arterial communications which connect one province with another, and one group of provinces with more distant groups.

37. Already a great system of railways has far advanced towards this object, but in great crises the carrying powers of any railway must be over-taxed, and it is the peculiarity of the condition of things in India that the demand on their resources must always be somewhat irregular. Like the physical condition of many things in India, like her rivers which are sometimes so flooded and sometimes so dry, it probably must always happen that the flow in the arteries of communication must sometimes be excessive, and sometimes not so; and this must be the more the case while the local habits and means of the people are adapted to systems in which traffic must be regulated by the seasons. Gradually we may hope that local arrangements and modes of transport and storing will adapt themselves to a system of communication which knows no interruptions of season. But meantime the whole demand for carriage will also doubtless increase. And in all ages the excessive demand for the means of transporting food, which must occasionally result from great irregularities of season, must, in a great degree, remain unabated.

We believe that the maximum carrying power of the railways may be increased many times at an expense very much less than the original cost—a mere fraction in fact of that cost—by doubling the lines; and we would earnestly urge that Government action and Government credit should be used to the utmost to obtain, at as early a period as possible, this increase of the power of all the lines which are in any sense arteries connecting different provinces of large productive powers, whether the present traffic be or be not sufficient to render immediately necessary such a step for every day use.

38. We would also ask to be allowed to suggest, for the consideration of those better acquainted with the subject, whether a system of differentiated charges for goods, to vary according to season and to demand, might not tend to promote such a system of local traffic and storing as would lead to more free use of the railways in the dull seasons, and diminish the struggle for their use at other seasons and the unseemly difficulties which must always arise, when the supply of carriage is not equal to the demand, and when the accommodation afforded is really much more valuable than the money paid and can only be given to those selected either by rule or favor.

39. We think it desirable that all future canals should, if possible, be adapted to purposes of navigation to a greater degree than has hitherto been the case in Northern India. Especially in low countries, where the money value of irrigation may be smaller than elsewhere, the levels and the character of the traffic are generally very favorable to canals of navigation, which can also be maintained at all seasons with a comparatively small minimum supply of water, and by the profits of navigation may compensate for any deficiencies of irrigation in ordinary years. The rivers of India are probably less suited for navigation than almost any rivers in the world, and the value of canals is, therefore, increased, provided they can be combined with profitable irrigation, or made

at such a reasonable cost that they may supplement more rapid means of communication, or feed railways at a season when local traffic by land is difficult.

40. The importance of feeder roads to connect the local marts with the great arteries of communication is so evident and so well recognised, that we need hardly dwell on that subject. We shall only here say that the difficulty and expense of maintaining substantial metalled roads is, in many parts of India so great, and such roads must, of necessity, be in flat countries so much like railway embankments without rails, that, looking to the constant progress of iron, we think that all considerable roads should, wherever the nature of the country admits of it, be scientifically laid out, as if for light railways, so that they may at any time be converted into railways.

41. We have before said that so long as the food supply of India, as a whole, suffices, and famines are confined to particular provinces, it may be hoped that efficient means of communication will go very far to save peoples prosperous under peace and good government from the worst effects of seasons of failure. But we have noticed that of late years there has been some reason to fear that throughout India generally we have trenched to a dangerous extent on our food reserves, and that it is a question whether the concurrence of many demands on our agricultural resources may not in fact render food permanently scarcer and dearer. We have also suggested our fears that more general climatic derangements than any which have been experienced since the British Empire in India attained anything like its present extent, may be expected to recur at long intervals; and the experience of all countries seems to show that the tendency of an increasing cultivation, and the denudation of natural forests and jungles, is to render the seasons more extreme, droughts more severe, and floods more rapid and extensive.

If all this be so, the question of increase in the food general supply seems to assume an importance greater than some might have been inclined to attribute to it in a country where the supply has generally exceeded the needs of the inhabitants, and in one quarter or another the markets have not unfrequently seemed to be glutted by excessive plenty. Probably the only mode in which the Government can directly aid in increasing the food supply is by great works of irrigation, to which in fact its attention is now so much given.

42. At the present moment perhaps the most pressing question in this branch of our subject is that of increasing the supply of rice and what we may call rain crops. When rice can be effectively irrigated, no irrigation is, it may be said, so essential. In respect of other crops, water is but one of several conditions of successful agriculture. Wheat and such grains require both capital and industry, manure and laborious care, as well as water. They also require much agricultural skill and a good rotation of crops. In rice cultivation, water alone seems to be the alpha and the omega. No rotation is required and no manure is necessary. Water seems to supply for that grain a continually renewed means of fertility, and with water alone the same field appears to yield abundant crops for hundreds of years in succession; still more is it so if the water bears with it a fertilizing silt.

43. Our brief historical retrospect seems to show that the years in which all the wheat-producing countries are similarly affected by drought, are very far apart; that in all the ordinary famines, such as those of which we have modern experience, the abundance of one province may (the means of communication sufficing) supply the deficiencies of another. The experiences of 1661 and 1783 appear to show that the case in which there should be a simultaneous failure in the wheat and the rice countries together, is of all things most rare, and that if such unhappy events do occur, their cycle is probably to be looked for rather in successive thousand years than in successive centuries. In great part of the wheat-growing countries there is already much irrigation both by the people and by means of great public

works; much would probably be saved in any famine. Rice, though not a main staple, is everywhere known, and it seems probable that inferior as it is, rice might more effectively supplement the food of the wheat countries than would wheat that of the rice countries, where it is utterly unknown to the people, whose diet is of so exclusive and so uniform a character that they would have great difficulty in changing it, and where wheat will not grow.

The demand of foreign countries in Asia is for rice much more than for wheat and barley. Rice is the food of all the tropical populations, and while throughout the circuit of the Indian Ocean, those populations seek their supply in India, other sources are open to those more distant places where there is a demand for wheat.

44. The same cause, which much tends to hinder petty works of artificial irrigation in the greater part of Bengal, must greatly militate against the successful undertaking of great works in that country by Government. That cause is simply that the failure of the natural supply of water is so rare that the urgency does not seem to be great, and as an unenergetic people would not ordinarily pay very high for water, very expensive works might probably not be financially remunerative. Looking, therefore, to the necessities of improvement in other provinces, where water being more scanty must be more ordinarily remunerative than in Bengal, we could hardly recommend the Government to undertake at present any very general system of irrigation throughout the whole of Bengal Proper. It is rather, we think, by increasing the rice supply of neighbouring provinces, that occasional deficiencies may be mitigated.

45. We would, however, recommend that an examination should be made of the plan suggested by Sir A. Cotton for supplying water to some of the western districts of Bengal, to Nuddea and Moorshedabad which suffered in the past year, and to Calcutta. It is true that the scheme has never gone beyond the stage of the most general suggestion. No attempt to ascertain its practicability has yet been made, and we can by no means venture any opinion that it will be found practicable. But, on the other hand, the whole matter lies in a very small area. An examination of the Ganges at Rajmehal might well determine the question, whether an attempt might be made to dam that great river, as the southern rivers have been dammed, with reasonable probability of success and within the compass of a practicable expense. If so, there would remain only the farther question of crossing the Bhagiruttee and one or two other rivers by aqueducts. Supposing all this could be done, we cannot doubt that in part by irrigation, still more perhaps by navigation, the canal would be very successful and advantageous.

The supply of pure water to Calcutta would be a further very great advantage. And we may suggest a still larger view of that phase of the question. There seems to be little doubt that the stream of the Ganges once flowed in the channel now called the Bhagiruttee, and that the tendency of the changes of recent periods in the world's history has been to throw the waters of the main stream to the east, and deprive Western Bengal of its perennial streams. Mysterious as are still the sources of malaria, one thing the experience of centuries does seem to show, that it is much due to stagnant water; perhaps it may be not so much to the surface water exposed to the free action of the air, as to the water which saturates the earth below. Nothing seems to tend so much to healthiness as running streams which drain this water and cause it to percolate freely from its sources, and nowhere is malaria so often generated as in those places where streams have ceased to flow. May it not be possible that the fearful unhealthiness which has of recent years depopulated so many portions of the districts adjacent to the Hooghly and Bhagiruttee, is due to the greater and greater cessation of a sufficient percolation through those western districts, and that an artificial supply of water would, as it were, restore the circulation. A flourishing capital of Bengal has perished by malaria before the

present day, as is testified by the ruins of Gour, standing in the midst of the Gangetic plain, but deserted by the Ganges, and now surrounded by malarious forest, and the home of the tiger and the hyena.

46. Again, on the western borders of Bengal, where the supply of rain is less than elsewhere, where drought must always be more felt, and where an undulating surface offers facilities for storage and irrigation, we think that a most careful examination of all possible means of irrigation should be made. The plans for utilizing the Damoodah appear to be promising, and it might be considered whether the opportunity might be taken of bringing to the right bank of the Hooghly, and passing under the river to Calcutta by iron pipes (if not over it by taking advantage of the bridge which may possibly be constructed), a supply of drinking water as pure and good as any in the world, such as it filters from the hilly country into the bed of the Damoodah. The minimum dry-season flow of the Damoodah appears to be about 700 cubic feet per second, quite enough for such purposes.


47. There are some other streams from those western hills, and if their water supply is very intermittent, it might not improbably be utilized by some system of storage.

As respects, indeed, the whole of the undulating tracts of the west of Bengal, it is very well worthy of consideration whether a system of embanked tanks or lakes, such as exist in similar countries in Southern, Central, and Western India, might not be constructed. The principal problem requiring solution would probably be, how to arrange for their construction and maintenance, and the distribution of and charge for water with reference to the Bengal system of tenures. It is to be feared that few zemindars could be induced to undertake such works, and, with many conflicting interests in the lands to be watered, the arrangements would no doubt be more difficult than in provinces where there is but the Government on one side and the ryots on the other. With care and trouble, the means of arrangement might, however, not improbably be found, and if Government would undertake the duty and sell the water, the difficulty might thus be solved.

48. Orissa and great part of Midnapore are already the field of the East Indian Irrigation Company, the success of which, we may confidently hope, will be equal to the greatness of their undertakings.

On the other side of Bengal, in Behar, is an extensive rice country with a supply of water very scanty for that staple. Both the Soane, already the subject of a great scheme, and some minor streams, seem to supply means of irrigation on the south of that province. We would especially recommend that, if possible, the works should be so constructed as to supply a large rice cultivation over extensive areas. The cold weather supply of water must be very limited, but in the monsoon season it is boundless.

In the north of Behar the greatest scarcity from drought seems to have been repeatedly experienced in the tracts nearest to the Himalayas. There are in fact, very commonly, near the foot of those mountains tracts where the soil is excellent, and rice may be, and sometimes is, produced in large quantity and of excellent quality, but where the water is sunk deep under the thick deposits from the hills, and there are very scanty means of local irrigation. On the other hand, the river supply issuing from the hills in the vicinity of those tracts is inexhaustible, and the facilities for making canals from the smaller streams are very great. In some parts of the country (notably in Rohilkund) such tracts are by these means turned into beautiful gardens. We would recommend that the northern frontier of Behar should be carefully examined with the view of ascertaining what facilities exist for utilising the large and small streams.



49. The necessity of increasing the production of rice suggests an allusion to the difference between two systems of irrigation, which have been adopted in different parts of India; since one has been chiefly applied in Southern India to rice cultivation requiring more abundant water, and is now about to be brought into use in Orissa, while the other affords a less abundant supply to the wheat and other produce of the drier seasons of more northern regions. The one mainly deals with rivers when they are in flood. In the south, the copious supply of water brought down, in the monsoon season, from the Western Ghats to the arid Eastern Coast is dammed and distributed over large rice-producing areas. In Northern India the perennial supply brought by the great rivers from the interior of the Himalayas is utilised with greater difficulty; for flowing, at the season when it is most required, in comparatively small streams in the lowest part of the large beds, it is led from the point where it issues from the hills by long and expensive works, over the difficult sub-montane country, to the lower plains, and the minimum supply is the limit of the capacity of the canals.

50. The Himalayas appear to be so arranged in transverse ridges, that the waters do not freely issue from their interior in many streams. They are generally, within the mountains, collected into great rivers fed by perpetual snows, and these burst through the outer range at intervals 50 to 100 miles apart. In the intermediate space the only streams are those of a short, shallow, sudden character, which rise on the outer face of the outer ridge, and after every fall of rain run a rapid and headlong course, generally falling into the larger rivers within a comparatively short distance.

The water system then may be said to be arranged somewhat thus:—

The canals are usually taken from the point where the river issues from the hills, without very expensive head works, by taking advantage of one of the several channels which the water has formed, guiding the stream, when low and tractable, by temporary annual embankments of a petty character into that channel, and then leading it away. But, generally speaking, in the early part of the course of such a canal, great difficulties are encountered. The torrents of the outer hills must be crossed by great aqueducts and other works; in other places great deposits render necessary very heavy cuttings; in others a too rapid fall involves very expensive works to control the downward course of the stream. It is not till the more level plains are reached, that the course becomes easy. This kind of canal is shown in the sketch A. B. C. D.

51. The essential engineering difference between this and the southern system consists in the absence of any attempt to control the main stream in floods. In the summer the river flows on its course without opposition, and the canals are only supplied by its overflow. Some rice is thus grown by canal water and some irrigation of other kinds is supplied to supplement the deficiencies of the rainy season; but the quantity of water required for each acre of rice is at that season much greater, and the area then irrigated by the canal is much less than in the cool season. In this latter, which is the wheat-growing season, the embarrassing circumstance is this, that, when there are showers irrigation is not much wanted, and when there are none, the want is universal just at the time when long droughts have sometimes reduced even the Himalayan sources below the point on which the calculations are based, so that every one cannot be fully supplied.

52. The best of these canals can never irrigate the whole country into which they run; they are a great, but still only a partial, mitigation of famines caused by extraordinary drought.

53. The southern canal works control the main streams by masonry dams carried completely across their beds and command a larger supply of water when the rivers are full. The dams are raised only to a certain height, so that the water in excess of the required level passes away without obstruction. But they are so regulated that the water can be raised to a level sufficient to enable the Engineers to carry it through the high lands near the river, and its subsequent distribution over great areas is then extremely easy.

54. This system has been chiefly applied at the point where the southern rivers issue from the Eastern Ghats late in their course, and have formed deltas by encroachment on the sea. The deltaic tracts are those watered by the canal. But if similar dams can be constructed at any point of rivers flowing through great plains, there seems to be no reason why a similar system of irrigation should not be pursued. For instance, in the sketch which we have given, if we suppose a dam to be built at L. M. below the point of junction of the hill torrents and clear of the broken sub-montane country, large rain season canals might be supplied as E. F. G. and H. I. K. We think, however, that for practical reasons, it would, as a rule, be necessary to keep inundation canals distinct from those which are used throughout the year.

There seems to be no doubt that the Southern Engineers have succeeded in making stable foundations in the sand and constructing effective and substantial dams in the beds of great rivers at a cost moderate for such works, and which might not before have been thought possible. On the other hand, a great part of their success appears to depend on the possession of large stone of a suitable character which, almost by its own weight, when skilfully placed, forms a solid and durable barrier. In places where the ordinary brick and mortar must be used, the cost of such works rises to a point which may be deemed prohibitory, and unfortunately this is the case in great part of the alluvial plains of the North-Western Provinces.

55. We would recommend, as the only prospect of rendering irrigation in Northern India a sufficient preventive of famine, that careful enquiry should be made as to the possibility of obtaining the material for controlling the streams by dams, and so utilising the monsoon supply and largely supplementing the present irrigation. At Delhi and some other points on the Jumna, suitable stone is known to exist, and it is possible that at other places in the North-Western Provinces sufficient deposits of the stone-like material known as block kunker may be found. Similar deposits of stone and kunker may not improbably be found in the vicinity of the Punjab rivers.

All the rivers, even the most northern, are abundantly supplied in the monsoon season, and most of the northern rivers have this additional advantage that they rise from the melting of the snow at a very much earlier period, and retain a full supply from March or April to November. The Sutlej is notably of this character, while some of the nearly rainless tracts in its neighbourhood are, in soil, perhaps the finest in India, from which, wherever irrigation can be had, are raised wheat crops not surpassed in the world, and where Indian corn and other valuable grains and perhaps rice, as well as cotton and such costly products, might be grown to a very large extent with monsoon irrigation. That the Punjab is not too far north for rice, is amply proved by the fact that rice, grown almost entirely by irrigation, is the staple of Cashmere, and in a great degree of the Himalayas generally, and that the finest rice in India is produced in the Peshawur valley.

56. The following Table shows approximately, so far as we can gather from very imperfect information, the average annual fall of rain in different districts or places, from which the advantage of monsoon irrigation may be gathered:—

PLACE.	AVERAGE RAIN-FALL IN INCHES.	REMARKS.
Delta of the Cauvery	30 to 35	} The greater part of the fall is in the north-east monsoon in October and November.
Madras	30	
Godavery and Kistna Deltas ...	40 to 45	} These districts share partially in both monsoons.
Orissa	55 to 65	
Western Bengal	55 to 65	} Most of the rain falls in the south-west monsoon, but there is generally a considerable burst in October and often some rain in November.
Calcutta	69	
Districts east of Calcutta	70 to 75	
The most eastern Districts of Bengal	90 to 110	} The chief fall is from June to September.
Eastern Hills	450	
Behar	45	
Benares	40	
Allahabad	38	
Agra	27	
Delhi	23	
Ferozepore	16	
Lahore	18	} Monsoon fall is extremely uncertain.
Peshawur	14	
		Most of the rain falls in the spring.

57. If great irrigation works must be undertaken directly by the Government, we would urge the necessity not only of forming provincial irrigation departments, but of establishing a general irrigation service for the supply of officers thoroughly instructed in and devoted to that department. In the Lower Provinces, especially, all schemes of irrigation have had but the slightest attention from officers burdened with many other duties, and a distinct irrigation department is very much required. The great disadvantage under which the Government public works establishments labor, is that the officers are generally not devoted to particular branches, and it may be said almost never to particular undertakings. For many reasons constant changes occur, so that it scarcely happens that any man has ever carried out to completion any great work. The subordinate establishments, also, are far from being so effective and trustworthy as they might be made by sufficient training and the superintendence of more permanent superiors possessed of special skill. At the same time the Indian Military Engineer service is dying out, and for local civil purposes, its place can never be sufficiently taken by officers of the Royal Engineer Corps or of the general British service.

58. A regular service has fewer and less valuable prizes than the free market of the world; perhaps it is apt to be, as a body, less enterprising and original than would be men whose advancement and profit more entirely depend on their individual forwardness. But it has, on the other hand, considerable advantages in point of economy and reliability. If a Government cannot have the full benefit of unrestricted freedom, if all its employment must in some shape take the form of some sort of service, regulated by general rules, it seems better that it should have a regular service, so arranged that it may have, to the full, the advantages of such a service, than that it should have that sort of semi-service which fails to give it the same advantages, while the Government is still in practice debarred from the absolute freedom of the private employer.

The demands of the State for engineering talent and labor in many departments become larger and larger every day, and the necessity of a well-considered system for the supply of a large body of Civil Engineers is daily more apparent. Like the Indian Civil Servant, the Indian Engineer, to be efficient, must learn much beyond his purely professional education. A knowledge of the language and habits of the Natives and the circumstances of the country, and a willingness to do many things beyond the limits of strict professional etiquette, are of all things required, and the needs of the service can no more be supplied by professional men engaged from time to time for the occasion than could the Indian civil administration be supplied by filling each appointment from Westminster Hall. We cannot but regret the disappearance of the Corps which has supplied so many distinguished men. The existing system of supplying the service by young men sent out periodically from England is good in principle, but we think that its efficiency is marred by certain defects. It seems to us that higher tests of general as well as of professional education should be exacted from candidates, and that on the other hand greater inducements to take service in this country should be held out. We think that the rules which regulate salaries and pensions require revision. The salary on which a young Civil Engineer commences his duties seems to be too low, the more so as in the lower grades there is an invidious distinction between the allowances of Civil and Military Engineers, although holding the same appointments. The test of knowledge of the languages should be rather directed to colloquial than to book knowledge.

59. Doubtful as it may be whether any measures which can be taken would wholly supply such a deficiency of rice as occurred in 1770, we have no intention of proposing the prohibition of exports under any circumstances. If it be granted that the cotton crisis and the extraordinary demand of the

years 1863-64-65 did diminish our stocks to a dangerous extent; that in a country where, most of the grain, being consumed by the producer, is never brought to market, any extraordinary demand affects the market in an excessive degree; that the normal food demands on India of the intertropical and semi-tropical countries to the south is increasing and will increase, and that for the present the result may be, on the whole, injurious to the poorer labourers in this country, still we feel that in the end an increased demand will probably create an increased supply; that the proportion in which food and other staples are respectively grown will adjust themselves according to natural laws; that a surplus produce of food grown for exportation will in the end act, in some degree, as a reserve to fall back upon in time of scarcity; and that it may be hoped that eventually labour also will have its adequate share of the profit.

Even in time of extreme scarcity, we do not think that it would be proper, by any absolute prohibition, to run the risk of starving British colonies and other friendly countries whom we have accepted as our habitual customers in ordinary times. Exports must, generally, be left to contract themselves so far as contraction is possible, when the price rises so high as to reduce exportation.

We do not here enter on the financial question of export duties.

60. In this part of the globe, the currents of the air are so much more regular, that there is, we think, reason to hope that practical meteorology might be more successful than where they are so broken and irregular as in England. We would strongly recommend that systematic effort should be made to obtain such a chart of the course of the rain-bearing currents as does not, we believe, as yet in any shape exist, and that their variations should be noted with a precision which may probably enable us to gather early indications of peculiarities of season, and to make preparation for coming misfortunes. In particular, we think that it is desirable to mark the course, limits, and effect on one another, of the two monsoon currents of the summer months which, coming from the south-west and south-east, must meet somewhere in Central and Northern India, and to the varying relative intensity of which the climatic disturbances of the North-Western Provinces and of Northern India generally may not improbably be found to be due. If so, it may likewise be that Bengal is affected by the degree to which her rain-bearing currents either have free course to the North-West under certain circumstances, or may be dammed up by a strong transverse stream under other circumstances. It seems to us that these currents should be mapped out at least as precisely as the currents of the ocean are mapped. Possibly we may learn to distinguish between heavily charged and lightly charged seasons, and more especially between low flying clouds which pour down on the countries near the sea, and high flying clouds which passing over those countries seem not unfrequently, in the latter part of the season, to go on to discharge themselves in the more distant north, and to dash themselves on the faces of the farther Himalayas.

61. Local registers of the rain-fall should certainly be kept at as many places as possible in the Lower Provinces. They are already kept in other parts of India, but we fear that the accuracy of most rain-returns has hitherto been more than doubtful, and we have had extraordinary difficulty in obtaining any reliable information on this subject. Nothing can be more simple than rain gauges, and yet it is wonderful how incorrect and discrepant the registers are often rendered by carelessness and misunderstanding of the most elementary rules. If the district officers are sufficiently impressed with the importance of a correct observation of the rain, and will give an intelligent attention to the subject, we cannot but think that they must succeed in obtaining tolerably accurate returns.

62. The importance of agricultural statistics, for many purposes, is very great, and we trust that every effort will be used to introduce a system which will supply them; but everything depends on the machinery to be employed for their collection; and after all we apprehend that to discover the general out-turn of the food crops of any season, the personal observation and enquiries of a few active and intelligent men, thoroughly acquainted with the country and the people, will avail more than any formal statistics which we are likely to obtain for many years to come. The whole question then rather pertains to that of the administrative machinery, which may be reserved for separate notice, and we shall not further discuss it here.

63. All precautions taken and all improvements made, poverty, scarcity, and famine must still, as the world is now constituted, recur, and it remains to consider how these misfortunes are to be dealt with.

We have already alluded to the effect of changes which, while rendering the person more free, society more advanced, and labor in one sense more independent, may also, by loosening the ties of personal inter-dependence, render the poorer classes less capable of withstanding calamities of season. We must repeat a doubt whether the laboring classes of England or France could withstand a general enhancement of the price of food to twice or thrice its ordinary price, as do the Natives of India. Suppose the price of wheat to be suddenly raised to 120 or 150 shillings per quarter, beef and mutton to half a crown a pound, and all other articles of food in proportion, what would be the state of things then or even long before that point had been reached? That is in fact much the same thing which occurs in India when rice in Orissa or wheat at Agra rises to 11 or 12 seers per rupee, and yet up to that point the people of many districts of India seem to be now, under favorable conditions, prepared to bear up for a time. But we must not blind ourselves to the fact that every step in advance, in the modern sense, tends to render them as dependent on daily wages as more civilised laborers. Under the purely Native system, almost every man is more or less a farmer, or the immediate personal dependent of a farmer who has his banker and his banker's book and the credit which enables him to live from year to year, rather than from day to day. But all our commerce and our enterprise, our great works and improved systems, create or increase the class of laborers depending on regular wages; and all increase of private wealth, enabling the richer to entertain laborers who are no longer slaves or serfs, adds to the class. If we should succeed in simplifying property in land in the hands of sole proprietors of considerable estates, the mass of the peasantry must either become laborers for hire, or tenants-at-will whose rents are regulated on commercial principles, and who have no longer the beneficial interest in the soil on which their present credit is founded. It may be that, with the increase of general wealth, the laborer will eventually be, in ordinary times, better off than he ever was before, but that he will as well resist extraordinary seasons, we do not deem probable. There is, we believe, reason to expect a gradual increase in the classes who may hardly withstand a scarcity not amounting to that extreme famine which involves the whole population.

64. On the other hand, if the accumulation of wealth increases the number of rich and charitable residents of large towns, the need on the part of the rich for luxuries before unknown very largely increases; the feudal inter-dependence of the people diminishes as Native rulers are exchanged for proprietors, and the Native public endowments and charities diminish in number and in efficiency when no longer supported by Native governments and official superintendence. On the whole, the sources of voluntary relief of the poor are probably diminished.

65. The disadvantages attending any poor law are so great that we would still not recommend that resource in ordinary seasons. We have several times

alluded to the wonderful way in which Natives recognise the personal obligations of supporting their own poor. As long as any of a family, it may almost be said any of a clan, have the means of supporting their indigent relations and connections, they do so in a marvellous and admirable way. Only when calamity either reduces whole families and classes to starvation, or brings them so low that, on the principle of two on a plank, some must inevitably be sacrificed, large numbers are cast out either to die or to be saved by public charity. So long as the social feeling which dictates the sacrifices enabling the Natives to support one another may suffice, hard as the system may appear on the poor, we would not interfere. Any action which should endanger the present ties might bring with it other and greater evils.

66. But when this point is once passed, and, if we are right, it will be more and more frequently over-passed, some system of relief becomes necessary. It would be inexpedient to encourage a too frequent appeal to the general public for local objects; these might be multiplied till the public becomes callous, and the resource so necessary on great occasions might, in a great degree, be lost. Experience proves that the voluntary local charity of rural districts is insufficient to meet heavy calls on it. It would be too heavy a burden on the Government that it should be required to afford the relief necessary on every such occasion, and the facility of obtaining the aid of Government and of the public funds would be still more liable to abuse than a too frequent appeal to a charitable general public.

67. It may be apprehended that one of the effects of the recent unhappy events, and more especially of the unfortunate errors which have occurred on the side of too much discouraging or resisting applications for public aid, will be that such applications may in future be made very constantly and very freely; perhaps too much so; and that being made, men in authority will have great difficulty in resisting them, and will feel it a very heavy risk and responsibility to do so, even when they are not quite convinced of the certainty of the necessity.

68. On the whole, looking at present circumstances in every view, it appears to us that the time has come when to relieve, not ordinary poverty, but the wider poverty of extraordinary occasions, it is necessary to institute some system of local taxation, by which the richer persons of each neighbourhood, who are best able to test the reality of local distress, may be made to bear the burden of local and partial famine, so far as local means will suffice, before, as a last resource in graver cases, resort is had to the general taxation and the general charity of the country. In the abstract, it might be most fair that all should bear alike any visitations of Providence in any part of the empire; but, on the other hand, there is, all over the world, so great a tendency to be over-charitable to our neighbours with other people's money, that it seems to be absolutely necessary in some way to localise all taxation for the poor, except in case of the most extreme calamity surpassing every local means.

69. It has yet to be shown that the charity which takes the shape of distribution of food in times of scarcity, and which the Natives consider a cardinal virtue, will not, if well used and guided, suffice to support the poor of towns. Excepting only the special case of large bodies of people following a declining trade (as in some of the weaver towns), we believe that this town charity will generally suffice for the town population, and even for much of the permanent poverty of the surrounding tracts; it is only when masses of the population of the country are thrown on the towns that, under ordinary conditions, the resources of these latter are over-burdened. The question is how to deal with rural distress. The obligation of the zemindars, holding under the permanent settlement, to support the poor of their estates has always been asserted by the officers of Government, and has never, we believe, been denied by the organs of the zemindars, although sufficient effect has not been given

to the obligation by precise law, and we have seen that in practice it has been ignored or evaded. The obligation is in fact one which attached to the Government while the Government was the great landholder of the country, but which has been transferred with its correlative rights to the zemindars.

70. We cannot make any recommendation of universal application, because the circumstances of different provinces are so different, and in many the Government, as still in some sense superior landlord, receives its revenue direct from the cultivators, either individually or in corporate self-governed communities. But as respects the permanently settled provinces, our opinion is that the obligation which the zemindars accepted with the permanent settlement, but which they have now failed to fulfil, should be put into practical operation, and that local taxation for the poor should take the shape of a charge on zemindaree rights to be enforced by law. We would recommend that on the occurrence of scarcity of such degree that the population are unable to support themselves, the zemindars shall be bound to support the poor of their estates by supplying food in return for labor to the able-bodied who are unable to obtain employment, and by feeding gratuitously the helpless, unable to labor; that in the event of their failing to do so, the officer in charge of the district shall be empowered to call together a fairly constituted Jury to decide whether or not the distress is such as to require relief, and if it is, to assess on the pergunnah the amount required to enable the public officers to afford the relief which the zemindars have failed to afford. Arrangements might be made for enabling any body of zemindars willing to fulfil the obligation thus thrown on them to do so by a self-imposed rate and to manage both the tax and the expenditure of the money.

71. It might be provided as on similar occasions in England and Ireland, that when the rate thus assessed exceeds a certain proportion of the rental, an assessment on the district should be made, and that when the charge on the whole district exceeds the prescribed maximum, assistance should be given from the public exchequer. It would also be fair to provide that the zemindar should be entitled to recover from all persons holding a permanent transferable interest at a fixed rent intermediate between himself and the ryots, a share of the rate assessed, proportioned to their respective shares in the profits of the land. To provide against too great pressure on those deriving their income from the land, in a year of scarcity, the Government should be empowered to advance money to be recovered as Land Revenue by a rate spread over several years.

72. The result of an arrangement such as we have described would be somewhat as follows—

Ordinary poverty would still be left to private charity.

Extraordinary poverty and want affecting considerable classes of the rural population who ordinarily support themselves, would be a charge on the land enforced by law.

The most extreme famine affecting the majority of the people would be a charge on the general revenues of the country, and the subject of appeal to the charity of the general public throughout the country.

73. As respects the distribution of the duties thrown in the last case on Government and the Public, we think that there can be no better rule than that which has hitherto obtained, *viz.*, that Government should supply employment by means of public works, and that the Public should supply the means of gratuitous relief to the helpless.

74. To render public works, undertaken on occasions of famine, permanently useful, it is essentially necessary that the plans should have been prepared beforehand. Works undertaken in the hurry of the moment are generally rather conceived to *make* employment than deliberately determined as the best, and they are, for the most part, badly designed, badly

executed, and worth but a very small fraction of the money spent on them. Looking to the great liability of this country to famine, and to the multitude of useful works which yet remain to be undertaken, we think that in every district a systematic scheme of works fit for times of famine should be drawn up with all the necessary working details, and should be kept prominently in view. These works would be principally roads. The permanent demarcation of the great arteries of traffic, by the construction of grand lines of railway, has now rendered much more easy and simple than before the design of roads of permanent utility, and has created great new wants of this kind. We have before recommended that such roads should be embanked in the form of railways, and such embankments are of all works those which afford the best employment to masses of men, women, and children, such as it would be desired to employ in times of famine. In many districts irrigation works might be similarly designed. Our recommendation is simply this that designs and practical working plans for works spread over many parts of the country should always exist, much in advance of the immediate means of execution, but in such form that they can be executed on any emergency arising which throws the population on the hands of the Government. It is very important that such works should be scattered in many different places, as experience shows that people unaccustomed to such work will often suffer terrible extremities without seeking it at a distance from their homes.

75. In case of moderate scarcity which affects only the habitual workers for wages, increased public works in the ordinary form may do good, but it is most amply shown by experience that the moment there is anything approaching to general famine—the moment in fact that serious want is at all widespread—public works conducted in the ordinary manner, by contract at ordinary task rates, are quite inappropriate and unavailing. In every such case there should, we think, always be a special and entirely distinct arrangement for famine works, under which the wages, whether in the form of daily or of task-work payments, the provision of food, and the whole of the system, should be adapted to the employment of large masses of people to whom such labor is *not* habitual. Especially things should be so arranged that every individual who applies, and especially every woman, should have immediate employment without reference to any gang system which may render them dependent on the will of others, excepting so far as they voluntarily accept such an arrangement. We think that such works should never be placed under the same executive officers who at the same time superintend other works conducted in the ordinary manner. Special works should be superintended by special officers, who must fully understand that they must divest themselves of preconceived notions, and must adopt an entirely different standard of professional duty.

76. Above all things it must be remembered that, as we have said in the former part of our report, all substantial public works are the relief of the more or less able-bodied; that if a certain point of suffering is passed before special works are made effective for relief, they are useless. In that case either the attempt to obtain any considerable return for the money expended drives away the starving, or the work that can be required is nearly nominal, and the money spent is almost as much lost as if given away gratuitously. Much care and discretion and foresight will always be required to ascertain the point at which special works should be commenced. They are, however, in this country probably less liable to abuse than in some other countries. We doubt if, without great laxity, it would ever be found that in India, as in Ireland, the whole population would desert agriculture for easy public labor, and would resist a return to the ordinary labor to which they are accustomed, when there is a demand for it. It will therefore be better to make special arrangement too early than too late. By judicious tests the abuse of public labor in doubtful cases may, we think, be prevented.

77. It might perhaps be expected that we should frame a set of rules by which the indications of famine may be measured, and relief, when famine arrives, may be undertaken. We believe this to be wholly impossible. The subject is in some respects not a very wide one, that is to say, many of the same features seem constantly to recur in all famines. Human nature is to a great degree the same in all countries with which we have any intimate acquaintance or respecting which we have means of information; and the same conditions constantly give rise to the exactly same questions and to similar phenomena, whether in Bengal, in Madras, or in Ireland. But, if we may so express it, the same circumstances are differently combined on every separate occasion, just as a few pieces of glass in a Kaleidoscope, although in themselves always the same, are combined in an infinite variety of grouping with every shake of the instrument. Everything so much depends on the particular conditions of the occasion, that any standard that we could frame would probably mislead, and might induce officers to substitute a too mechanical obedience to rule for that intelligent apprehension of the subject which we believe to be not difficult. For we repeat that the elements of famine are much the same everywhere. It is entire ignorance of the whole subject which produces disaster. We would recommend that the most essential parts of the reports on great famines, both in India, in Ireland, and elsewhere, should be collected and circulated in an easily accessible form, and that reliance should be placed on intelligent officers, to whom the gravity of the subject will now, we trust, be apparent, to acquire that knowledge which will enable them to work out in practice results far more satisfactory than could be obtained from any rules or models of conduct.

78. As respects the signs of coming famine, a vast deal depends on the previous condition of the country and people. A prosperous people will resist hard times under which a poorer people will succumb. Perhaps still more important is the duration of scarcity. If scarce years be followed by one still scarcer, the people are found with exhausted means, and succumb under a year which, if it had come after years of ease and plenty, would have been borne without a murmur. Particular classes may have suffered from other causes, like the weavers, and may be ready to succumb to the first pressure. In some cases, as we have shown in our account of the past famine, exports may have diminished the food supply to a degree which makes a partial failure ruinous to the classes who have not profited by the exports, and a more considerable failure ruinous to all. Our previous remarks have shown that, in our opinion, if the food supply be already for any reason below the average, a failure which involves the loss of any thing like half the crop of a single season may probably involve an absolute deficiency of food, which may be disastrous in the highest degree, if it be not supplied by great importations.

79. After all no indication is so good as that of prices, provided local circumstances are fully considered, and it is remembered that, as we have shown, prices which may seem moderate in one district are death in another. As a general rule, we should say that in prosperous parts of India prices may rise during any season to double their ordinary price, and even higher for a time, without the occurrence of real famine. But there are, we think, few parts of the country in which the people can resist trebled prices for more than a very short period. Food at three times its ordinary price, at a season when some months must elapse without relief, means famine in the great majority of cases—while in some cases famine comes long before that rate is reached. When the rate rises to four times the ordinary standard, it is probably accompanied by famine of a very severe description. But we must repeat that no rules will generally apply. So many circumstances, but above all the duration of the pressure, affect the question in practice, that we do not for one moment pretend to say that even these very general suggestions may not be falsified on the very next occasion.

80. We trust that in the majority of cases, the most extreme pressure of prices will be obviated by great private importations, and therefore we have not mentioned the importation of food as a part of the ordinary duty of Government on such occasions. The simple rule seems to be that which we have already quoted, *viz.*, that Government should import only when, the want existing, from special circumstances no one else is likely to do so, or the merchants cannot do so to a sufficient extent. Those special circumstances must generally be either physical obstacles, or an extraordinary want of efficient traders. In this last respect, both Bengal and Orissa especially require watching. But we trust that the physical difficulties of communication with Orissa will be overcome while the risks of her climate are also very greatly reduced by irrigation. And in Bengal the extraordinary want of Native trading energy is in great degree compensated by ready access from the sea, internal water communications unrivalled in India, and the presence in Calcutta and in some other places of a great and energetic mercantile element, composed of Europeans and Hindostanees, and many other nationalities. It is now difficult to suppose the case in which it would be the duty of Government to import for Bengal, but the time may come when all energies, public and private, will be over-taxed. In Upper India such a case is still more improbable; private enterprise there has hitherto only been limited by the means of transport, and as Government could not suddenly increase those means, its interference in trade could only do harm. Its duty is rather by every possible means to increase the means of transport of which use may be made on an emergency.

81. In case it should again be necessary for Government to import food into any province, our opinion is that experience shows that it is better that it should be sold to the public at market rates only, and that no attempt should be made to sell at different rates to different people according to the degree of their ability. Large importations will of course lower the market rate, and so doubly benefit the people. By market rate we mean, it should be well understood, the highest price which the grain, sold freely, will fetch, not that it should be kept back till purchasers are found at any particular rate. Any assistance to be given to those who are not objects of unreserved charity had better be given in the form of money, or in any other way, leaving them to buy food at the ordinary rates. To the starving, food must of course be given gratuitously, and for the public labourers it must be provided in such a way as best suits the circumstances of each case.

82. Our impression is that, although scarcity and hardship increase gradually, there is generally a tolerably distinct line between scarcity and famine. If the people be sufficiently known, it will, we rather believe, generally be found that there is a time when, within a few days or at most weeks, considerable numbers of persons, who have hitherto lived without resort to begging, are almost suddenly thrown up on the surface of society in a starving state. They may be concealed for a time from those who know little of Native village life, but there is, we imagine, a distinct change in the ordinary conditions of that life. Sometimes we hear of a sudden outbreak of famine in a particular locality something after the fashion of an outbreak of cholera. It is doubtless often most difficult to foresee whether a scarcity will or will not become famine, and the very greatest care and skill will be required to form an opinion, but when famine has once appeared, it is a thing which may be easily recognized by those who look for it in the remote parts of the country where the poorest people are generally to be found, and the offer of food makes it very visible at the centres of the better classes, as was the case at Balasore in February 1866.

83. If famine can be anticipated, it may in great degree be forestalled by the judicious provision of public labour, and when it has actually appeared in the form which we have indicated, measures of direct relief must be taken.

When relief has commenced, the skill and intelligence of local officers must always be again tried to the utmost. The conduct of the measures required in famine seems in all parts of the world to involve a constant nice steering between Scyllas and Charybdes of a character many times repeated. If special relief works are commenced too early, the ordinary labor market is disturbed without necessity; if too late, this most legitimate of all modes of relief becomes, as we have said, nearly useless. If daily pay be too freely given, the people of all countries when employed for charity will struggle to do next to nothing. If task-work is rigidly enforced, without the means of making it practicable to all, the object of relief may be defeated. If task-rates are too hard, they are injurious; if easy in the extreme, it is probably impossible to vary such rates according to the capacity of individuals, and the stronger labourers are enabled to earn far too easy gains, from which it is difficult to wean them. We cannot say that any one system should be followed under all circumstances. Every thing must depend on individual skill and discretion.

84. It is very important that sufficient shelter should be provided for people working at inclement seasons, and that as far as possible, the arrangements should be such as to admit of decency among gangs, a large proportion of whom will always be women not accustomed to such a life. If it could be so managed as to prevent abuse, a small allowance to enable the people to hut themselves might, under some circumstances, be the most effective and acceptable arrangement.

85. As respects again gratuitous relief, the first great question is between the two modes which would be called in England in-door and out-door relief, although in this country the terms might be reversed. If abuses could be prevented, there is no doubt that in times of the greatest distress when the labor test is little more than nominal, and at all times as respects the helpless poor, there would be the greatest possible advantage in giving relief to the people, either in money or food, at intervals of a few days, and allowing them to take it to their own homes. Probably they would make the same quantity go farther; certainly it would do them infinitely more good, and all the evils of the feeding centres would be avoided. But again, in case of partial famine, such a system would probably present too many temptations, and unless there were the means of obtaining a real personal knowledge of all applicants, great abuses might result; while in more universal famines, the means of managing such a system on the largest scale could scarcely be found in most districts. It can only be said, still, that all must depend on the circumstances of the particular famine and the particular locality. Sometimes relief may best be given to the people at their own homes; sometimes and perhaps more frequently the feeding centres are a necessary evil. If these centres can be established at so many places that the people can daily resort to them without sleeping away from their homes, most of the evil is avoided.

When that is the system, the distribution of cooked food is the method which is followed at Native charities, and seems on the whole the best and the least liable to abuse. Care should be taken to provide cooks who will not interfere with caste prejudices. The provision of some sort of labor for those capable of working must always be the best check on unnecessary applications for food. But effort should be made to provide labor suited to them for those who are really unfit for rude out-door work.

86. The scale of diet has been a subject of much discussion. And on this subject there is more room for general rule. Even here, however, a good deal must depend upon circumstances. When the degree of famine is doubtful, and it is an object to guard against too free a resort to the feeding places, it may be proper to give only so much as may support life when eked out by any thing that the people can pick up; but when unhappy creatures are

reduced by long suffering, a liberal diet is necessary to restore them, provided it is not given in large quantities too suddenly, for then, as we have seen, it does harm. We must also consider this question to be one requiring more medical knowledge than we possess, for the difference in the scale of different dietaries a good deal puzzles us. Throughout the famine, opinions seem to have varied between 4 and 8 chittacks, that is between $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. and 1 lb. of rice for an adult, and the Board of Revenue appear to have favored the scale of $\frac{3}{4}$ lb. But we find that the Bengal Jail Dietary prescribes 14 chittacks of solid food for a non-laboring Native prisoner, and 16 chittacks for a laboring prisoner, that is $1\frac{3}{4}$ lbs and 2 lbs. We should imagine the jail scale to be excessively liberal, the more so since we find the scale prescribed for a European prisoner in Bengal to be

Meat	...	...	...	...	1 lb.
Bread	...	...	...	...	$1\frac{1}{2}$ „
Vegetables	...	...	...	...	1 „

Total ... $3\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. solid food,

besides butter, sugar, tea, milk, and condiments; whereas the regulations for Relief Committees under Act X Vic. Cap. 7, appear to prescribe for a starving Irishman only $1\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of bread, or 1 lb. of biscuit.

We believe that rice is quite nutritious, saving that one chemical element is wanting in it. In Orissa the nitrogenous element was, we understand, a good deal supplied by snails and such creatures; but every effort should always be made to add to rice either the nitrogenous grain called 'dall' or 'fish' or 'ghee', i. e., clarified butter. The food being thus composed, we should say that 1 lb. or 8 chittacks would always be sufficient for people receiving gratuitous relief without hard labor, but an additional allowance might be made when substantial labor is exacted.

87. In those far reduced by starvation, quality of food is more important than quantity, and care more so than either. Good hospital accommodation is therefore a very essential part of all famine arrangements.

88. We have recommended that reliance should be placed on the public for the means of gratuitous relief, and this would of course involve the management of the operations by Relief Committees. Even if that were not so, we should have no doubt of the advantage of inviting officials and non-officials to co-operate in such a work in that form, and of thus enlisting much indispensable aid and sympathy. On every occasion, the freest and fullest use should be made of this voluntary assistance. As much as possible should be done for the people through the people, and perhaps by more relying on them the difficulties felt in obtaining superintendence may be in great degree obviated. But on all occasions of famine, the official machinery also should be strengthened to the greatest possible extent.

GEORGE CAMPBELL.

W. E. MORTON.

H. L. DAMPIER.

Calcutta, April 20th, 1867.

DISTRICT NARRATIVES,

DISTRICT NARRATIVES.

[REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 82 OF THE REPORT.]

In our general Report we have dealt fully with the history of the Famine in Orissa, as a whole, up to the end of May, when measures of relief were adopted by the Government; and we have rapidly sketched the operations after that time. We have also given the outline of the circumstances connected with the districts of Bengal which suffered.

In the following Narratives we shall, as promised in the 82nd paragraph of our Report, describe in more detail the course of events and relief operations in each district, taking it up from the end of May as regards the district of Orissa, and a little earlier as regards those of Bengal.

DISTRICT NARRATIVES.

CUTTACK.

1. Before the end of May Rs. 10,000 had been assigned, from the balance of the North-West Provinces Famine Fund, for the relief of the Cuttack district, as stated in paragraph 276 of our general Report

Grant of Rs. 10,000.

2. On the 29th May the Lieutenant Governor having received at Darjeeling Mr. Commissioner Ravenshaw's telegram of the 28th, quoted in paragraph 283 of our Report, announcing the total failure of rice in the town of Cuttack, and recommending immediate importations for the use of the troops, for the Jail, for the laborers on relief works, and for supply to the starving through the Relief Committees, at once issued instructions by telegraph, directing the Board of Revenue to send down rice immediately to False Point, Balasore, and Dhamrah as proposed by the Commissioner.

Receipt of telegram announcing failure of rice in the town of Cuttack.

Importation ordered by Government.

3. On receipt of these instructions, the Board promptly despatched the steamer *Court Hey* with a cargo of 3,000 bags (nominally 6,000 maunds) of rice to False Point. This cargo had been purchased for the Government, and was placed at the disposal of the Commissioner for sale at the cost price of Rs. 5 a maund to the different Government departments. The Commissioner was authorized to sell any surplus, which might not be required for these departments, at cost price, to the Relief Committee, and even to the general public, provided that such sales should not interfere with the disposal of the cargo of the *Jacques Fourestier*, which was being sent down on private account. The Board had found this ship ready laden with 8,600 bags of rice intended for a foreign port, and they induced the owners, Messrs. Robert, Charriol and Co., to divert her to False Point by guaranteeing a minimum price of Rs. 5-10 per maund. The *Jacques Fourestier* was towed down to False Point by the *Court Hey*, which carried the Government rice. In announcing the despatch of these cargoes, the Board promised further imports from Akyab as soon as possible, and intimated that they were, at the same time, despatching 2,400 bags to Balasore in Native sloops to be towed by the steamer *Nemesis*.

Steamer *Court Hey* and ship *Jacques Fourestier* sent to False Point with first consignment of rice.

4. The Port and Light House of False Point are situated in an isolated spot, above 60 miles from Cuttack in a direct line, and separated from villages and cultivation by miles of dense jungle, so that it is most difficult to procure men, conveyance, and supplies in the neighbourhood. The anchorage for ships is at the confluence of two branches of the Mahanuddee, the Jumboo and Bakood; it is well sheltered from the south-west, and ships can lie in it with safety at all times of the year; but it is at a distance of seven miles from the Light House, which is the Government station. The depth of water does not admit of ships coming closer to the Light House; the passage of these seven miles must be effected in boats. Half a mile nearer to the anchorage are the store-houses of Messrs. Robert, Charriol and Co., French merchants; those of the Irrigation Company are a little way up the Jumboo river. In ordinary years, some export trade is carried on through False

Port of False Point.

Point in Native vessels, but as these cannot face the south-west monsoon, the operations are at an end by March; the boats are then laid up, and the crews disbanded. The French merchants have also exported much by this route of late years.

Arrangements for receipt of the rice.

5. When the arrival of the *Court Hey* was announced, the agency available to the Collector at False Point consisted of Mr. Geary, the Superintendent of the Light House, who is also Assistant to the Collector of the district in the Customs department, his Assistant, and M. De la Gatinais, Assistant to M. Fressanges, an Agent of Messrs. Robert, Charriol and Co., who, although not a Government servant, was prepared to give all assistance in his power to the Collector. Immediately on receipt of the Board's telegram of the 29th of May, announcing the intended despatch of the *Court Hey* and *Jacques Fourestier*, the Collector requested Mr. Geary to arrange for the landing of the Government rice from the *Court Hey*; he also called on M. Fressanges and on the Irrigation Company to assist him by lending their boats. At the same time he deputed a Native officer of his establishment (the Naib Nazir) with money to collect boats, carts, and men at False Point for the landing of the rice and its transport to Cuttack. Public notice was given that the cargo of the *Jacques Fourestier* was available for sale on private account.

Difficulties of the landing.

6. The only communication between Cuttack and False Point being by the district post, or by special messenger, intelligence of the despatch of the rice did not reach Mr. Geary till the 2nd of June. He had only one small boat at his disposal. M. Fressanges, who had been instructed by his principals in Calcutta to make all his establishment available for the unloading of the *Court Hey*, postponing that of the *Jacques Fourestier* till the *Court Hey* was discharged, had promised three boats, but had warned the Collector that as the season for their use had long passed, they were all laid up and required repair, and that he could not collect crews for them in less than a week. The Irrigation Company had only one boat available, and that was 30 miles from False Point; they sent down one of their European Assistants to find a crew for it.

7. The Naib Nazir and Mr. Geary endeavoured to collect Native craft from the country round; but sea-worthy boats fit to ply between the anchorage and the landing place at that season of the year could only be procured with great difficulty.

The consequence was that when the *Court Hey* and *Jacques Fourestier* arrived at False Point on the afternoon of the 4th June, not a single boat was ready to unload them. On the 5th Mr. Geary began work with his own Light House boats; and on the 6th, M. Fressanges' boats arrived: no other boats of any size were procurable.

8. Up to the 7th, 791 bags only had been landed. At this time rice was selling in Cuttack at the rate of $3\frac{1}{2}$ seers of 105 tolahs per rupee.

9. On the 11th, Mr. Geary reported that 2,526 bags had been landed. He had got six boats, besides his own, at work; but when boatmen and coolies were collected, they were in such a state of emaciation that they could do scarcely anything until they had been fed up for a few days. The weather was described as awful. The boats could make not more than one trip a day to the ship under any circumstances; subsequently, it was reported that several days

were often occupied in one trip. Mr. Geary himself was suffering from fever and ague. On the 13th the *Court Hey* was cleared out.

10. The rice, when landed, was sent off as fast as possible to Cuttack, and to other points in the interior of the district; but there was great delay in the transport. The greater part of the cargo was received at Cuttack early in July, though, on the 12th, some little still remained *en route*. The rice was sold to the Government Departments and others at cost price according to the Board's instructions. Before this, the boatmen, cartmen, and establishments engaged in the landing and transport operations had been allowed to buy the rice for their own use.

Transport of rice to Cuttack and the interior.

11. The cargo of the *Jacques Fourestier* remained. The Board had guaranteed a minimum price of Rs. 5-10 a maund to the proprietors on the condition that their Agent, M. Fressanges, should use all diligence to dispose of it to the public on more favorable terms. The Collector reported, on the 6th of June (before the news of the ship's arrival at False Point had reached Cuttack), that the merchants of Cuttack were unwilling to buy any considerable quantity of rice, as some little (about 1,200 maunds) had come into the district by carts from the south, and there was a tendency in the market to fall. At any rate the merchants did not come forward at once to buy the cargo, being probably deterred by the enormous difficulties of transporting it inland at that season of the year. The Relief Committee, however, wished to have the whole cargo made over to them for gratuitous distribution and for sale to all comers at Rs. 5 a maund.

Cargo of the *Jacques Fourestier*.

12. On the 4th of June, the Commissioner had suggested to M. Fressanges that the most likely and most beneficial mode of disposing of his rice would be to offer it for retail sale in shops to be opened at Cuttack and elsewhere. To this M. Fressanges replied that he had no authority from his principals to remove the rice from False Point for sale, and that the Board's guarantee of Rs. 5-10 referred to the price of the rice laid down at False Point. On this the Commissioner at once gave an additional guarantee for the cost of transporting to Cuttack any of the rice which could be more readily sold there. On receiving the report of these proceedings, the Board authorised the Commissioner to purchase the whole cargo of the *Jacques Fourestier* at the guaranteed price for the Relief Committee, and to sell it at any places and prices which he thought best with the object of easing the market.

Purchased on account of Government.

13. The *Court Hey* having been discharged on the 13th, the boats at False Point were employed in unloading the *Jacques Fourestier*, which was discharged on the 1st of July. Delivery of 7,266 bags ex *Jacques Fourestier* was taken on account of Government in Messrs. Robert and Charriol's storehouse, which was, from that time, placed at the disposal of the Collector for the storage of Government rice. The remaining 1,334 bags had already been sold by M. Fressanges. The arrangements for landing and transporting the rice had been placed in the hands of the Collector by the Commissioner, who proceeded to Pooree on circuit on the 3rd of June, and remained there till the 19th.

Responsibility for delay in collecting boats.

14. With regard to the delay which occurred in collecting boats to unload the *Court Hey*, the Commissioner at first expressed much dissatisfaction at the imperfection of Mr. Collector Cornell's arrangements, notwithstanding the notice which had been given. It was urged in reply that the notice at Cuttack preceded the arrival of the vessel at False Point by no more than six days; that it could have reached False Point three days only before the vessel; that the ordinary river boats could not go out to the anchorage at sea; that it was a difficult matter to find sea-going boats; that, when found, they were not fit for use without repair, having been laid up during the three months which had passed since the close of the season at which it is usual to send such boats out to sea; that a Native official had been sent down on the special duty of collecting boats and men; that a European Inspector of Police, with a force of Constables, had been deputed to guard and escort the rice; that the Collector had, at the time, no European Assistant who could possibly be detached from head quarters for the duty; but that in fact there were two European officials (Mr. Geary and his Assistant), and one volunteer (M. Fressanges' Assistant, M. De la Gatinais) on the spot to superintend and push on the operations.

15. On a consideration of the circumstances, we agree with the opinion which the Commissioner subsequently expressed in a report to the Board, dated 19th June, that the agency and supervision which had been provided at False Point were as much as could reasonably have been told off for this duty; and that it was practically impossible for the Collector to make more complete preparations on the very short notice which he had received. The Collector had strongly pressed on Captain Fisher, the District Superintendent of Police, the importance of sending down the Assistant Superintendent, Mr. Crouch, to help in the operations, instead of Mr. Inspector Hall, who knew nothing of the language, and was not used to the sea; but the District Superintendent replied that Mr. Crouch could not possibly be spared, and that Mr. Hall was capable of managing the business satisfactorily. Mr. Hall was accordingly sent. We think the Assistant Superintendent should have been sent from the first. A little later he did go down.

16. With regard to the refusal of M. Fressanges to send the rice ex *Jacques Fourestier* for sale to Cuttack, on account of his principals, the Board explained that it had been their intention that the rice should be transported and sold on account of the owners at whatever place the best market could be found. The wording of the agreement, which their Secretary made with the owners of the rice, was, however, to the effect that the Board guaranteed the minimum price at False Point; no reference was made to the contingency of removing it elsewhere for sale.

Collector and Commissioner recommend no further immediate import.

17. On the 5th and 6th of June, Mr. Collector Cornell recommended to the Board and to the Commissioner that the present consignment should be disposed of before the proposed further cargo was sent from Akyab; he also gave his opinion that, with reference to the existing state of the market, the Board should not, for the present, guarantee a minimum price for another cargo; but he wrote that if the Board were willing to bear the loss which would be involved, several cargoes might readily be disposed of, and much relief given to the classes who could not or would not come to the relief centres for gratuitous relief by

selling rice at the rate of 7 or 8 seers per rupee. The present opinion of the Collector, however, was that the Government should undertake the relief of the totally destitute only, the numbers who were reduced to one meal a day being so great, that any attempt to relieve them by selling at a cheap rate would be "a serious and expensive undertaking."

18. On the 19th of June the Commissioner recommended to the Board that no further shipments should be made to False Point till the *Court Hey* and *Jacques Fourestier* had been cleared.

19. On the 12th of June, however, the Steamer *Moulmein* came in with 4,174 maunds of Commissariat rice for the troops; and before the 11th of July, four other ships arrived in quick succession with rice sent by the Board.*

Arrival of the *Moulmein* and four other ships.

20. The landing of the *Moulmein's* cargo was accomplished under difficulties as great as those which had attended the clearance of the *Court Hey*. Sufficient boats could not be procured; the weather was bad, and no storage was available except some small rooms in the Light House. At this juncture a brig was driven into False Point by stress of weather; she was at once hired as a receiving ship, and the cargo of the *Moulmein* transferred into her, by which means the steamer was discharged, and the heavy demurrage which would have been incurred by her detention was saved.

21. At this time the Irrigation Company had imported a cargo of rice for the use of their people. As soon as the steamer *Electric*, which had brought it, was unladen, the boats which had been employed on her cargo were made over for the landing of the Government rice. This was early in July. At the same time, Mr. Burgess, an Assistant in the employ of the Irrigation Company, and others were placed at the disposal of the Collector for the purpose of superintending the landing operations. Mr. Fressanges had made over to the Collector his store-houses, which were about half a mile nearer to the anchorage than the Light House was. The Irrigation Company also gave up their store-houses at the mouth of the Jumboo river, which were still nearer to the anchorage, and at these all rice was landed throughout July and until the 20th of August; more boats had been procured, and altogether during the month of July the arrangements for landing the rice were brought into such a state of efficiency as was practicable with the means at the disposal of the local officers. Nevertheless, the ships already named gave full employment to the landing boats and establishments up to the 3rd of August, for, with one or two exceptions, the fleet at Mr. Burgess' disposal consisted of Native craft which were not fit for sea work at this season of the year, and were

Improved arrangements for landing in July.

Still insufficient.

* NAME.	DATE OF ARRIVAL.	DATE OF CLEARANCE.	NO. OF BAGS OF RICE.
<i>Gustave</i>	20th June ...	25th July ...	10,000
<i>S. S. T. A. Gibb</i>	1st July ...	6th July ...	2,630
			(Rest of cargo sent to Poojee).
<i>Pushire</i>	8th July ...	15th July ...	7,500
<i>Charles Maureau</i>	11th July ...	3rd August ...	8,500

never intended for it. The trip from the store-houses to the anchorage and back—about 14 miles—frequently occupied four or five days as reported by Mr. Kirkwood on the 28th of June, the boats having to contend with a rough sea and a strong wind.

Supply of rice to the port as great as could be utilized in August.

22. The rice supplied from the beginning of June to the 3rd of August being as much as the landing establishments at False Point could cope with when raised to the highest state of efficiency of which they were capable with the appliances at the disposal of the local authorities, any larger supply at the port would obviously have been useless during that period, unless the landing arrangements could have been strengthened from without—a point to which we propose to revert hereafter.

Relief operations extended till October; then contracted for want of rice.

23. In August and September, two ships only arrived, bringing 31,800 bags of rice.* On the 5th of August a violent gale wrecked or injured one-fourth of the sea-going boats, but they were promptly repaired, men and materials being sent down from Cuttack, so that when the *Asia* arrived, she was discharged at the rate of nearly 1,000 bags a day. In September the landing establishments were not fully occupied, and before the *Sparkler* had discharged her cargo early in October, the local authorities brought to the notice of the Board that, owing to the great extension of relief operations which they had been able to make in September, the rice which had been imported to False Point would quickly be exhausted. Up to this time the Collector and Relief Committee had been able gradually to extend their operations in the interior for the distribution of the rice to the people; but in October the failure of the supply rendered it necessary to contract them. At this point, therefore, the action taken by the local officers and the relief committees for distributing the rice to the people may be reviewed.

Proceedings of Relief Committee.

24. A meeting of officials and non-officials had been called together on the 23rd December 1865, at which it was resolved to raise subscriptions to meet the want which was expected to prevail in the following April. Three of the Engineers of the Irrigation Company stated that they were prepared to employ 5,000 laborers, and in addition to the payment of their regular wages, to supply them with rice at half a seer per rupee below the market rate. On the 5th of March the Commissioner urged the Committee to collect the subscriptions. On the 27th of April they set operations on foot. Rice was purchased from zemindars and merchants, who sold it to the Committee very much cheaper than the market rate in view of the object to which it was to be devoted, and it was distributed in the shape of cooked food to the indigent at the place at which the pilgrims were ordinarily fed, known as the unnochatro, under the superintendence of the Civil Surgeon, Dr. Coates. The allowance to each recipient was 6 chittacks of rice of the local weight, nearly equivalent to 16 ounces, besides vegetables or pulse (dall), and this was considered by the

* NAME.	DATE OF ARRIVAL.	DATE OF DISCHARGE.	NO. OF BAGS.
S. S. <i>Asia</i> ...	10th August ...	3rd September ...	20,092
<i>Sparkler</i> ...	13th September ...	15th October ...	11,000

medical officer to be sufficient to support life in health. The distribution was restricted to those who were really unable to earn their own livelihood. Gratuitous relief was refused to the able-bodied, for whom ample employment was provided by the Irrigation Company, much of the labor being offered near the station.

25. Up to the 29th of May, the subscriptions had amounted to Rs. 2,449, of which Rs. 500 were contributed from the fund which had been raised in Calcutta by Messrs. Sykes and Co., and Rs. 1,097 were collected by Mr. Chapman also in Calcutta. The number receiving gratuitous relief daily had risen to 1,222, and it was evident that the calls on the Committee would increase rapidly. They had been able to send 30 maunds of rice to the Deputy Magistrate of Kendraparah for the relief of his sub-division, lying to the east and south-east of the district, but had been unable in April to comply with an application for aid from the Assistant in charge of the Jajpore sub-division, lying in the north-east. At the end of May, when an allotment of Rs. 10,000 was made to the Cuttack Committee by Government from the balance of the North-West Famine Relief Fund, it was found impossible to convert this money into food on the spot. Although rice was nominally selling at the rate of $3\frac{1}{2}$ local seers (about 9 lbs) to the rupee, it was practically not procurable in any quantity even at this prohibitory price. The Committee, therefore, on the 29th of May, telegraphed to Government, requesting that 100,000 maunds might be bought for them and sent down to False Point. They recorded their opinion that the prospects before them were such that the allotment of Rs. 10,000 would last but a few weeks, and they resolved to send a letter to the public prints, contradicting the opinion which had been published by Mr. Chapman, that no further subscriptions were for the present required. The Committee were anxious to open centres of relief in the interior of the district; but with money in their hands, they were helpless until rice could be imported. On the arrival of the *Jacques Fourestier* at False Point early in June, the Committee wished that the whole cargo should be made over to them to be disposed of by gratuitous distribution and by open sales to all comers at the rate of Rs. 5 a maund (about $1\frac{1}{2}$ a pound). They also applied to Government for Rs. 1,00,000 more to be applied to the purchase of rice for sale at low rates, or for another cargo of rice, proposing to meet out of the funds at their disposal the loss which would accrue from such sales. Pending the reply of Government, the Committee purchased 500 bags at Rs. 12 a bag out of the *Jacques Fourestier* with which operations were carried on.

26. To the Committee's application, the Board replied that they might buy as much of the *Jacques Fourestier's* cargo for their own purposes as their funds would admit. These instructions were followed by the Board's letter, No. 891B of 5th June, to the address of the Commissioner of Cuttack, in which the following principles were laid down for the guidance of all concerned, under instructions from the Government of Bengal:—

1st.—That all grain imported by the Board should be kept under the charge of the Collector of the district as distinguished from the Local Committee;

2nd.—That he should make arrangements for sale of the rice to all comers at as many depôts as possible at cost price, or (when the market rate was lower than cost price,) at a price

Principles laid down for disposal of the rice.

a little above the market rate; but that in these operations there should be the least possible interference with trade, and especially that the traders should, on no account, be under-sold for less than market price;

3rd.—That these sales at cost price to all comers should be entirely distinct from the operations of the Relief Committee, and the accounts kept separate;

4th.—That the Collector should sell no rice at lower rates than those fixed above; but that the Relief Committee should have full discretion to supply rice gratis, or at any low price, to those who might be considered deserving of such relief;

5th.—That the Relief Committee should be freely supplied by the Collector with rice from the imported stores for their distributions and sales, being debited at full cost price for any rice they might take.

Committee remonstrate.

27. On the 29th of June the Cuttack Committee passed a resolution, remonstrating against these orders; they recorded that as all the rice which the Government imported was derived from funds which were the property of the community, the Committee "will be exercising its legitimate functions in undertaking the charge of all arrangements of transporting rice from False Point to Cuttack and elsewhere, there to be held in store by the Collector and issued to the Committee."

Remonstrance unsuccessful.

28. The Board's instructions were, however, ratified by the orders of the Government of Bengal, No. 1933, dated 26th June, in which it was strongly insisted upon that the rice imported by Government should, on no account, be sold from the Government stores to the general public below the ruling market price, and that rice should be sold on more favorable terms only through the agency of the Relief Committee. It was observed that no other system would be compatible with the obligation that rested upon the Government to administer the relief fund economically, and not to interfere with private trade further than might be absolutely necessary for the relief of the necessitous; "and it was pointed out that while it is perfectly true," as the Board observe, "that the distress of the people will range through all grades from actual destitution up to the full power to purchase food at the market price, and that the Relief Committees must suit their operations to each class, from gratuitous distribution up to sale at any thing less than full price, it is incumbent upon the Committees to be most careful in their proceedings and not to extend relief to any who can provide for themselves."

Committee repeat their protest.

29. On receipt of these orders, the working Committee took action on them in anticipation of their being accepted by the full Committee at their next meeting; but the full Committee objected strongly to the principles laid down, and at a meeting held on the 6th of July, recorded a resolution that the instructions were calculated to aggravate distress, and to act as a premium to private traders to keep up the price to the present rate of $3\frac{1}{2}$ seers to the rupee, and that the destitution was so universal that any attempt at partial gratuitous relief by selection was impossible. A protest to this effect was telegraphed to Government, and, pending a reply, the Committee reverted to their system of sales to all comers at the rate of 5 seers per rupee. It was recorded to be "practically inconvenient"

that the operations of the Committee should be conducted by a working Committee consisting of a number of Government officials; and it was resolved that they should in future be in the hands of the Committee's Manager only; measures were also taken for extending the sales.

30. On receipt of the Committee's protest, the Board, after communication with the Government of Bengal, telegraphed that "it would be contrary to the principles of the instructions of the Government of India to under-sell the traders from the Government stores. The Committees have, however, full authority to sell rice to any one whom they think entitled to receive it at less than cost price. But the Government cannot relieve them of the duty of making some selection, or act upon the assertion now made for the first time that the whole population is reduced to a common level of destitution." With reference, however, to the unsettled state of the market, the Government gave the Commissioner discretionary power to fix the selling price of rice from the Government stores to the general public at half a seer or a seer cheaper than the current market rate; but with such sales, the Committees were to have nothing to do. At the meeting of the 11th of July, the Committee resolved to act on these orders. The shops which had been opened for sales to all comers were transferred to the charge of the Collector, and the Committees' sales at low rates were restricted to such persons as might be specially admitted as entitled to such a privilege. The arrangements which had been made, and the establishments which had been organized for landing the Government rice and transporting it from False Point to Cuttack and elsewhere, were already in the hands of the Collector.

Principles adhered to by Government.

31. Meanwhile, the Committee had been extending their operations for gratuitous relief. In the course of June orders had been issued to send 500 maunds of rice to the Kendraparah subdivision, and to raise the daily allowance to each pauper there. Gratuitous distributions had been commenced at False Point; six branch relief houses had been opened in Cuttack town; and it had been resolved to open centres at Jajpore, Taldunda, and two other places in different parts of the district, besides that already opened at Kendraparah. Rice was also entrusted to the officers of the Irrigation Company for the relief of destitution in the neighbourhood of their lines of works. The Superintending Engineer had promised to provide light labor for the employment of those who were not up to full work, but whom the Committee might consider capable of doing something. These were to be remunerated for their labor by a daily portion of food from the Relief Committees' centres.

Proceedings of Committee in June.

In the week ending before the 22nd of June the number receiving gratuitous relief had been diminished by the introduction of light labor, but the daily average of the week had reached 1,539. In the week before the 29th it had fallen to 1,263, of whom 792 had done light labor; in the week before the 6th July, a daily average of 860 only were fed gratuitously, and 315 received rations in return for light labor. Mr. Assistant Collector Kirkwood, who had been appointed to the district on account of the pressure of work caused by the famine, was placed in special charge of the operations as Relief Manager. His duty was to superintend the charitable distribution in Cuttack; to supervise the light labor operations and the payment of the laborers in

Relief operations in June and July.

grain; to establish, control, and occasionally to visit the centres in the interior keeping them supplied with rice; to keep all accounts, and to report his proceedings to the Committee at their weekly meetings. For the purposes of more immediate supervision, the centres in the district were divided between the Relief Manager and the Sub-divisional Officer of Kendraparah and Jajpore.

Refusal of Committee to distribute uncooked rice.

Wisdom of the refusal considered.

32. On the 11th of July, the Committee rejected a recommendation which was laid before them that stores should be opened for the gratuitous distribution of uncooked rice to those whose feelings of caste prevented their attending at the public distribution of cooked food. The Committee had already declined to act on this suggestion at their meeting of the 29th of May when it was made by a Native gentleman, the ground of their refusal being that, as the food at the feeding places was cooked by Brahmins, caste could not be affected by eating it, and that, therefore, those who were too proud to accept it were no objects of charity. Had the quantity of rice been sufficient, we have no doubt that many more persons who were deserving even of gratuitous relief would have been reached by the distribution of uncooked rice. We fear that the number of persons was considerable who had not the means of buying rice even at the low rates at which it was sold by the Relief Committee, and yet who deliberately preferred starvation up to an extreme point to appearing at the centres as recipients of public charity, and eating the ready cooked food which was doled out there.

But the quantity of rice available was not sufficient. We find that at many places and times the exhaustion of the supply made it necessary to discontinue the Government sales to the general public, the Relief Committees' sales at low rates to selected individuals, and on a few occasions even the gratuitous relief to the helpless applicants. If, therefore, the Committees had been in the habit of using their rice for the purpose of out-door relief to those who refused to come to the centres of distribution, there is no doubt that on many more occasions the supply would have entirely failed, and the stoppage of even gratuitous distribution would have been entailed; the immediate and direct consequence of which would have been the death of the helpless creatures who were entirely dependent on the gratuitous supplies of cooked food which they received from day to day at the centres.

Looking at the insufficiency of the supply of rice for such relief as should reach the entire starving population, we are of opinion that the Committees in Cuttack and other districts acted wisely and secured the greatest good by restricting their gratuitous distribution to the mode which was least open to the chances of abuse, and to the possibility of the rice being diverted from its legitimate object, and certainly, the distribution of cooked food was that mode.

Further measures taken in July.

33. At different meetings in July, resolutions were passed that in the light labor yard a certain minimum of daily work should be required from each pauper, to be fixed according to his powers; that the performance of this task should entitle him to

his rations; and that any work done in excess of the minimum should be paid for at a rate so fixed that an industrious man might earn an anna a day in addition to his rations; that no person who was in receipt of more than Rs. 10 a month should be admitted to the privilege of purchasing rice at the Committee's low rate sales; that sales at low rates should continue to be made to individuals selected according to their wants at the rate of 5 seers to the rupee, but that no greater quantity than four annas worth should be sold to each person daily; and that sheds should be erected in the town of Cuttack and at Taldunda for the light labor and for distribution of food.

34. At the meetings of August it was resolved that labor should be paid for in uncooked rice; that the Manager and the Relief Overseers should search for and take charge of all orphans and stray children, and should feed and clothe them, pending final decision as to their disposal; that in the town of Cuttack such children should be placed in charge of certain Native Members of the Committee; that sheds should be erected for the shelter of the paupers; that the Manager should introduce a system of supplying yarn to be spun in their houses by widows and respectable females who should be paid for their labor in rice, in which arrangements the Manager should be assisted by a Sub-Committee of three Native Members; that clothes should be provided for the naked; that different Native gentlemen should undertake the duty of taking charge of the sick poor who might be found in different quarters of the town, and of sending them to the hospital, for which purpose litters had been provided, and that a special charitable in-door hospital should be opened in Cuttack under the Civil Surgeon.

Measures taken in August.

35. Up to the 17th of August, the Relief Committee had consisted of Europeans, official and non-official, with one Native gentleman only, Deputy Magistrate Hurro Chunder Ghose, as their Secretary. On that date, a number of Native gentlemen were added. It is stated that the question of the constitution of the Committee had not been raised earlier; but looking at the great object of enlisting the cordial co-operation of the Native community generally in the measures which were being taken for the relief of distress; to the more intimate knowledge which Native gentlemen naturally possess of the feelings and ideas of their fellow-countrymen, and to the valuable assistance which they have given in the conduct of relief operations in other districts, and indeed in Cuttack after their aid was called in, we consider that the Committee would have done well if they had strengthened their hands by availing themselves of the aid of Native colleagues at the earliest stage of their proceedings.

Native Members added to the Committee.

Should have been done earlier.

36. On the 10th of August, the Committee resolved to raise the allowance of cooked food to 7 chittacks (18 ounces) for an adult and 4 chittacks for a child, and to add 8 seers of pulse and 2 of salt to each maund of rice. The rates of relief sales were also fixed at 6 seers of good and 9 seers of inferior rice for the rupee; on the 7th September they were lowered to 7 seers of good and 11 seers of inferior for the rupee.

37. Thus the Committee's arrangements were gradually matured, and the establishment of additional centres in the interior was rapidly pushed on. The extension of the operations is shown in the following table compiled from a statement furnished by

Comparison of extent of operations in the last week of each month.

Mr. McNeile, which compares the relief given in the last week of each month :—

Last week of	Number of centres in operation.	Number of bags of rice given for gratuitous relief.	Number of bags sold at cheap rates.	Daily average number of persons relieved.	Number included in the previous column who did light labor.
June	4	54	113	1,301	220
July	23	258	628	8,164	1,665
August	32	736	821	20,562	5,503
September	41	1,793	1,374	32,000	15,000
October	43	2,556	841	33,210	13,449

38. At every centre either sheds were built or houses hired to give shelter to the paupers; and at most places mattresses of gunny cloth stuffed with straw had been provided, which were found beneficial in saving them from the bad effect of lying on the damp ground; clothes also were largely supplied.

Mr. McNeile organizes the Government sales at market rates.

39. On the 17th of July Mr. McNeile, who had been specially appointed by the Government to assist the local authorities, arrived in Cuttack, and turned his attention to the organization of the system of Government sales (as distinguished from those of the Relief Committee), which was ordered by the Government order of 26th June. He drew up a set of rules for the storage and sale of the rice by the Collector. In the regulation of these sales, the object was to increase the supply of food which was available to the people *in exchange for money*, by supplementing the very small trade which existed; and yet to avoid the dangers of supplanting that trade, or of checking any increase of imports on private account, which, under ordinary circumstances, would naturally have been attracted by the prevailing high prices. At the same time the very exceptional state of things which had compelled the Government to enter the market as a trader, rendered it legitimate and proper to counteract, as far as possible, any extreme abuse of the powers of combination which that state of things had virtually given to the few dealers who carried on the trade. With a view to meet these objects, it was determined to fix the price at which rice should be sold at the Government shops slightly below the current market rate, varying the price with each rise and fall of the market. It was hoped that this course would have the effect of gradually drawing down the market price, for which the inordinate profits which the few dealers were making left ample margin, without giving rise to the danger of discouraging them from further ventures. At the same time, in order to exclude the higher classes from the Government sales as far as possible, and to prevent abuses in the shape of purchases being made for re-sale in the open market, it was decided that no greater quantity than one rupee's worth should be sold to each applicant daily.

40. On these principles, shops were opened in the town and elsewhere. In the matter of drawing down the market price, they were found to succeed in Cuttack; that they afforded much practical relief is certain, for these sales reached a different and higher

class of people, who had money to give in return for rice, and whose feelings would not have allowed them to appear as applicants for public charity at the relief centres, at least until they had reached such a state of debility as to place them beyond the hope of recovery. The number of these shops was, however, always limited by the supply of rice, and whenever the supply at any place was in danger of running short, it was properly made a rule to restrict or discontinue these sales rather than to contract the operations of the Relief Committees, on which the issues of life and death more directly depended.

41. The Government sales at rates just below the market price might well have been increased fifty-fold with the greatest benefit to the people, had rice and trustworthy agency been available, and even such an extension as this would not have interfered in any perceptible degree with private trade. Indeed the operations of private trade were so limited as to be scarcely appreciable. Whatever may have been the extent of the stocks in the district, all reliance on them as a source of any considerable supply to the public was at an end by the month of July. Those who held grain naturally retained it for the consumption of their own families and dependents. The quantities derived from private import were utterly insufficient to meet the demand. A trifling quantity found its way from Ganjam through the Pooree district into Cuttack in June. This was sea-borne rice which had been landed at Gopālpore, a Madras port of some importance, below Pooree, and it was hoped at first that a considerable supply might be derived from this source. The expectation, however, was not realized, for the Ganjam district required all that was landed there, and the floods cut off communication. Late in June, as soon as the communication by the Mahanuddee river was opened, the merchants began to import from Sumbulpore; and on the 12th of October, the Commissioner reported that eight or ten boats were arriving daily, but that the merchants were manœuvring so as to keep up prices by allowing small quantities only to find their way into the market at one time.

Sales at market rates might have been increased fifty-fold with advantage.

Private imports inappreciable.

42. It does not appear that the merchants of the Cuttack district made any attempt to import rice by sea; indeed, when the cargoes of the *Jacques Fourrestier* in June and the *Charles Maureau* in October were brought in to False Point on account of a Calcutta firm, the Cuttack merchants did not come forward to purchase, being evidently deterred by the risk of buying at such high prices as were demanded for the rice laid down at False Point, and by the extreme difficulty of transporting it from that port to Cuttack, or the more populous parts of the district.

At the end of June the Board, hearing that the crops in Nagpore had been plentiful, indented on the Deputy Commissioner of Sumbulpore for a large quantity of rice to be sent to Cuttack, if it could be purchased at a maximum price of Rs. 5 a maund; but the Deputy Commissioner declared himself unable to procure any thing like the quantity required; and could not get any at a lower rate than Rs. 7 a maund.

Rice dear at Sumbulpore.

43. Till the end of September, the quantity of rice imported by ship at False Point was as much as could be utilized with the appliances at the disposal of the local officers and relief committee. Unfortunately, these appliances utterly failed to convey the rice to the town of Cuttack and to other

Inundations.

centres in the interior of the district in sufficient quantities to meet the requirements. In August the mountain streams which intersect the province of Orissa rose to a height almost unprecedented; the embankments were topped and breached in all directions, and the whole of the low-lying country was flooded by an inundation which lasted for an unusual time, causing terrible aggravation of the distress. Mr. Kirkwood wrote to the Collector—

"The houseless poor looked in vain for shelter from rain that penetrated everywhere. The *known* deaths from diarrhoea and dysentery and other similar diseases increased greatly; it is feared that the unknown deaths must have been still more numerous, for persons could not reach the unnochatros, to which alone they looked for support. In most of the low-lying lands, the Beallee crop that would have been reaped in another week or fortnight was almost entirely destroyed, and the young cold weather crops suffered much from protracted immersion.

"Although these new centres were opened, yet, in several cases, it was found quite impossible to supply those already opened with rice, owing to the boats from False Point being unable to make any way against the powerful current that then obtained; and at several centres operations were altogether suspended.

"The result of this was a great aggravation of the already existing distress, for those who were congregated at the centres found, when the stock of rice ran out, that they were cut off by the floods from other aid, and many died from sheer starvation.

"I did every thing I possibly could to prevent this, as far as rice was procurable; but it will be in your recollection that at this critical period, the stock of rice in the Government godown here was barely sufficient to supply the wants of the sudder station, much less to supply the ordinary mofussil demands." During the month of September, the increase of the supply of rice enabled the Relief Manager to extend his operations largely.

44. We have already expressed our opinion that the agency and supervision provided at False Point by the Collector for the collection of sea-going boats and for the landing of the cargoes of the *Court Hey* and other ships in June were as much as could reasonably have been told off for this duty from the staff at his disposal, and that the arrangements were as efficient as was possible, with reference to the short notice given of the arrival of the rice, and we have stated that the agency was still further strengthened early in July by the special appointment of Mr. Burgess for this duty. We are satisfied that at first Mr. Geary, and his Assistant, and subsequently Mr. Burgess did all that was possible with the means at their disposal for expediting the landing and despatch of the rice throughout the operations. But the daily average of bags landed amounted to 700 only up to September, although, in a report dated the 22nd June, the Collector had estimated 2,000 or 3,000 as the number which could be landed daily under favorable circumstances. Some idea of the difficulties to be contended with is obtained from the following extract of a report from Mr. Kirkwood, who landed at False Point about the end of June:—

"The boats at the anchorage are utterly unfit for any sea work, being quite unmanageable, and shipping water whenever

"there is the slightest ripple. They are unsafe, and, let alone their leaky state, ought never to go out of the river. There were some ten or a dozen boats then lying at the anchorage, which had been loaded with rice from the *Jacques* some three days before, but in that time had scarcely proceeded 100 yards owing to a slight south-west breeze. Their average time for going up from the anchorage to the French godown and back is four or five days, and the distance but 7 miles, 14 miles both ways."

45. To remedy these delays, Mr. Kirkwood recommended to the Collector that he should apply for a small tug steamer, which should tow the boats from the landing place to the anchorage and back; doubtless, the services of such a steamer would have been most useful from the first, and would materially have shortened the time during which the boats were engaged on each trip; doubtless also, the landing would have been much expedited, if cargo boats could have been supplied from Calcutta and used from the first; but referring to a recommendation made by the Commissioner on the 3rd of September, the Board wrote to Government on the 17th of September, that "hitherto the weather did not permit of the employment of a steamer of small draught in towing boats backwards and forwards, and no other boats would be useful in going over the Bay." When the weather became more settled in September, the steamer *Teesta* and some cargo boats were sent down from Calcutta; but as the difficulties of wind and weather, which had caused the delay in the transit of Native boats, were then at an end, and as the steamer could only work on the flood-tide, it was found that no time was gained by using her to tow. Subsequently, however, she was usefully employed in taking boats up the rivers.

Employment of a tug steamer recommended by Mr. Kirkwood.

Not practicable then to act on the suggestion.

46. But the difficulties to be contended with were by no means at an end when the bags of rice were landed on the shore at False Point; it remained to convey them by land and river to Cuttack and other places in the interior at which the rice was required for consumption. The principal despatches were to Cuttack. In the beginning of June, the Mahanuddee was open to Taldunda only, a distance of about 20 miles through jungle. Forty-two miles still remained, along which the rice was carried in carts over an unmetalled road. Mr. Hall, a European Inspector of Police, was deputed to Taldunda to superintend the transfer of the bags from the boats to the carts. Mr. Kirkwood, who visited Taldunda on the 29th of June, wrote—"Mr. Hall, the European Inspector there, informed me that on an average eight boats arrive daily from False Point. They are, however, very irregular, some days none arriving at all, other days come fourteen or fifteen. On an average each boat brings some 20 or 30 bags. Up to the 24th some 2,500 bags had arrived from False Point. From ten to twenty carts daily arrive from Cuttack, and are despatched with five bags each. Now, however, that the river is rising, boats are able to go up to Cuttack. They are the more expeditious means of transit (considering the amount of cargo) and much less expensive, and while not neglecting carts, special attention should be paid to the boats. About 80 bags of the 2,500 had been damaged on the way up. These were disposed of by the Nazir at a reduced price. Carts take about five days, boats about seven, making the journey to

Difficulties of transport inland.

Irregularity of supply to Cuttack from Coast.

Difficulties of landing operations.

Suggestions for expediting transport.

"Cutlack." Notwithstanding the greater facilities which were afforded by the opening of the river, the transport operations were not successful at first. In August, Mr. McNeile proceeded on a tour of inspection to False Point, and reported that many of the boats had taken five or six weeks in performing the journey of 65 miles. It was, of course, a matter of some difficulty for the Native boats to make way against the strong current of the Mahanuddee at that time of the year. But it was suggested that if a few coolies were attached to each boat, they would be able to tow the fleets up at the rate of 10 miles a day from the skirt of the jungles to Cutlack—a distance of 40 out of the 60 miles, along which the tow paths were dry; and that, after the crews had been so strengthened, they and the constables in charge of the boats should be fined for every day beyond fifteen, which the boats might occupy on the road.

Deficiency in weight of bags delivered.

47. The deficiency in the weight of the bags of rice when received at Cutlack and at the relief centres attracted serious attention. It was commonly rumoured that the crews and police constables in charge of the boats sold the rice on their way from False Point; indeed, it could scarcely be expected that they would resist the temptation, to which they must have been subjected by the starving villagers along their line of route. The accusation could not, however, be satisfactorily proved against them. On the other hand, it was an established fact that many of the bags were found deficient in weight when taken out of the ship. Some of the Burmah rice had been so badly packed that the grains poured out of the seams of the bags into the hold of the ship, and on every occasion of transfer from one means of transport to another. Again, it was reported by Mr. Burgess that the boats employed in landing sometimes delivered two or three bags less than they had received over the ship's side; the inference was, that the boatmen had disposed of them in some of the narrow creeks which they had to pass between the anchorage and the landing place. Any remonstrance with the boatmen was met by a threat to strike work and abandon the boats. The existence of frequent deficiency in weight when the bags were delivered over the ship's side having been established, as well as the dishonesty of the landing crews, the only possible means of fixing on the constables the responsibility for any part of the total deficiency which was found to exist on delivery of the bags at Cutlack, would have been to weigh each bag and to register its weight when it was handed over to the constable's charge, and this course was suggested by the Commissioner; but it was found utterly impracticable. Mr. Burgess reported that if he had to pass every bag through the scales instead of transferring it at once over the side of the sea-going boat into the river boat, his despatch operations would be reduced to 200 or 300 bags a day, and under the circumstances, the remedy would have been more injurious than the evil.

48. It was also urged on behalf of the police that as the boats of a fleet were frequently separated, and only one constable allowed for several boats, it was impossible for him to exercise any control over the boats' crews; but the great number of boats employed made it impossible to assign one constable to each boat, although the district police force had been strengthened by the addition of a large number of men.

49. The relief arrangements were imperfect at first, and the imperfections were prominently brought forward with regard to Cutlack and Taldunda.

50. When Mr. Kirkwood, in company with Mr. Crouch, the Assistant Superintendent of Police, passed through Taldunda in June, he found that the Collector's Nazir had been deputed to that place to open sales, and also to distribute gratuitously to deserving objects; but the rice was given to the latter uncooked, and was "invariably devoured at once," raw as it was. Mr. Kirkwood wrote—"The state of distress at Taldunda cannot be exaggerated; many die daily from starvation, and mehters are entertained for the purpose of removing their bodies. All ties of kindred or natural affection are at an end, and many a mother I saw tearing the food given out of the hands of her starving child. The starving crowd there consists of some thousand people, nine-tenths of whom are women and young children, and for miles round you hear their yell for food." With the assistance of Mr. Crouch, Mr. Kirkwood endeavoured to introduce improved arrangements. A hut was secured and an establishment entertained for cooking and distributing the rice; barriers were erected to control the crowd, but the first day's precautions failed. The operations are thus described:—

Defects in relief arrangements.

Taldunda.

"About 4 P. M., we began to distribute the cooked rice; but after we had given to some forty, the impatient crowd would wait no longer; they rushed on those to whom the rice was given, when too emaciated and weak to make any resistance to the rush, they fell down in heaps tearing at one another, and many of them too weak to rise again. All our efforts were unavailing, so we tried a ruse. We declared that the distribution was stopped, and walked off. This had the effect we anticipated of bringing the greater part of the crowd with us, leaving the worst cases behind, as they were unable to move. The Native officials were then able to distribute to some of these more quietly.

"All Tuesday night men were busily employed erecting strong barriers with some 800 bamboos, and I myself superintended the work. By mid-day the fences were sufficiently advanced to try again. We then gave with some success to about 500 people.

"On Wednesday evening, on leaving Taldunda, the whole of these gratuitous relief arrangements were left by us in the hands of one John, a Native Christian, who had been indefatigable in aiding us.

"Neither on the way up from Taldunda, nor in Cutlack, have I yet seen anything to equal the misery and destitution of the poor wretches at Taldunda."

51. Although operations were thus early organized at Taldunda, the results were not successful. In the month of August, attention was drawn by a letter published in the *Englishman* to the scenes which were to be witnessed there. On the 16th Mr. McNeile, and on the 20th, Mr. Kirkwood, again inspected the place. It was found that the inundation had swept away the cook-sheds and store-houses, and the misery which ensued was aggravated by the inefficiency and dishonesty of the Native store-keeper and manager of relief operations, who was found to be neglectful and heedless of the paupers. He was removed, and arrangements made

by Mr. Kirkwood for better management in future. Two hospitals were opened, and a Native doctor placed in charge. Sales at cheap rates were held daily from 7 to 10 A. M., during which 20 bags of rice were disposed of, no more than 4 annas worth being sold to each applicant.

52. The mortality had been terrible, but enquiry showed that the deaths had not occurred among the inhabitants of Taldunda itself. The population of the country round, reduced by starvation to the last stage of emaciation, had crowded into the place to benefit by the relief sales and gratuitous distribution. Many of them lay down and died of exhaustion before they reached the relief house, and more of disease after they had reached it and been fed. The exposure to the inclement weather, and the inundations in the beginning of August, intensified the sufferings of the paupers; diarrhoea and dysentery raged, defying the exertions of the Native doctor, and on the 10th of October Mr. Kirkwood reported that the mortality was only then diminishing in consequence of the fine weather.

Defects of arrangements
in Cuttack.

53. At the beginning of September the Commissioner inspected some of the relief centres in the town of Cuttack, and expressed much dissatisfaction that although litters had been provided for the immediate removal of the sick to the hospital wards, numbers of sick paupers were allowed to remain in the sheds which were intended for shelter only, and in which he found dead and dying men while food was actually being distributed to others. The sheds were also in a state of filth. The Commissioner further found fault with the disorder and confusion which prevailed at some of the places of distribution, and at the delay and irregularity in supplying the afternoon meal at others. The sanitary arrangements at the centres were also unfavorably commented upon.

54. These remarks of the Commissioner were communicated to the Relief Committee, who took them up as reflecting on their own arrangements, and on those of Mr. Kirkwood their Relief Manager. A warm discussion took place, in which the Committee strongly supported their Manager. Explanations of some of the circumstances on which the Commissioner had commented were recorded; some of his remarks were ascribed to misapprehension, and the impropriety of the Commissioner's finding fault with the proceedings of a Committee of which he was himself a Member, and which consisted in part of Members, "who are not in any way officially connected with the Government, and consequently not amenable to such reprimand," was animadverted on by some of the non-official Members. We do not think ourselves called upon to go minutely into these discussions, the tone of which was perhaps owing, in some degree, to the form which the Commissioner had adopted for giving expression to what he had observed. It is sufficient to state that the general result was satisfactory, that, on the 18th September, the Commissioner reported to the Board that there had been "a very marked improvement in the administration of relief generally throughout the district," and that on the 26th September he wrote to the Collector, acknowledging in detail the improvement of the arrangements in the town of Cuttack, which he had again inspected.

Improvement.

Supersession of Mr. Cornell.

55. The Commissioner had, however, submitted to the Board copy of the remarks in which he had expressed dissatisfaction, and had at the same time reported on the defects in the transport

arrangements which are the subject of paragraphs above. He had written—"Though fully aware that there has been much difficulty to overcome, I am not satisfied that all has been done that might have been done by the district authorities, or that a little more energy in enquiring into and remedying these abuses might not have resulted in greater facility in loading and transport and in better protection to Government property. The whole management of importation and relief arrangements in Cuttack has been far inferior to either Balasore or Pooree, and the results are decidedly unsatisfactory." The consequence was, that Mr. Cornell was superseded in his appointment, and that, after weighing the strong representations in his favor which were submitted by the Board of Revenue, the Commissioner, and the Cuttack Relief Committee, the Government of Bengal declined to withdraw the orders. On the 3rd of November, the Secretary to Government wrote to the Secretary to the Board of Revenue—"The facts laid before the Government, in your letter No. 2905 B., dated 17th September, left no room to doubt that Mr. Cornell, notwithstanding his many good qualities as a public officer, was unequal to this particular emergency, and rendered it imperative on the Government, without waiting for any explanations, to appoint another officer in his place. The Government would have been much to blame if it had neglected to apply an immediate remedy, or had allowed Mr. Cornell to remain in charge of the district of Cuttack a day longer than could be helped." The case was subsequently made the subject of a memorial by Mr. Cornell to the Supreme Government, and with reference to the dissatisfaction which was expressed regarding the administration of relief measures in the town, we need only observe that the circumstances of the case appear to suggest the expediency of laying down some definition of the respective responsibilities of local Government officers, and of mixed local Committees consisting of officials and non-officials, when the aid of such bodies is called in. In the present instance, the details of the relief measures in the town were certainly in the hands of the mixed Committee, of which the Collector was President and the Commissioner a Member. The services of Mr. Kirkwood (a Government officer who had been sent down expressly to relieve the Collector of the pressure which was occasioned by the famine, in addition to his ordinary duties) were placed entirely at the disposal of the Committee, and he was employed as their Manager; and yet, when the manner in which details had been carried out in the town created dissatisfaction, the full weight of responsibility was thrown on the Collector in his character of a Government official as heavily as if no Committee with a Government servant as special Relief Manager had existed; for in the last paragraph of G. O., No. 2845, dated 3rd November, the Secretary to Government conveyed the Lieutenant Governor's assurance that he imputed no blame to the Members of the Cuttack Relief Fund Committee, either individually or collectively. The Committee was, however, as it appears, fully prepared to accept the responsibility of the state of things in the town, and met the unfavorable remarks which had been addressed to the Collector on the different points by his official superior.

The respective responsibility of Government officer and mixed Committees should be defined.

56. In the course of this correspondence, and on other occasions, it has been alleged that the relief operations might have been more successful, if the agency at the disposal of the Collector had been increased, so that he might have employed the

Agency at disposal of Collector.

additional officers either in superintending relief operations or in relieving him of some of the ordinary judicial and executive duties, thus giving him more leisure for out-door personal superintendence of the relief operations. We find that the staff at the disposal of the Collector of Cuttack in 1865, and in January 1866, consisted of two European Covenanted Assistants, one European Deputy Collector, and two Native Deputy Collectors at the head quarters, besides two officers in charge of outlying sub-divisions; so that this may be assumed to be the normal strength of the staff which was allowed. At the time when the import operations began in June, the staff was below that strength owing to the absence of one officer on leave, so that the arrival of Mr. Kirkwood, at the end of the month, merely raised it to its original strength again. In July, the absent officer returned from leave to his duties and a new European Deputy Collector joined the district; but these did no more than fill up the vacancies which were created in that month, by the death of Mr. Deputy Collector C. W. Mackenzie, and by the transfer of a Native Deputy Collector to another district; so that in fact the staff of Government Officers in the district was in no way raised above its ordinary strength until the month of October, when Mr. Oldham, an additional Assistant, joined.

Board recommend appointment of a Joint-Magistrate.

57. In their letter, No. 2905 B, dated 17th September, when reporting on the defects of relief administration for which the Commissioner had found fault with Mr. Cornell, the Board strongly urged the appointment of an additional Joint Magistrate and Deputy Collector, or Assistant with full powers to each of the three districts of Orissa, and observed that the district officers could not look after the relief operations in addition to their own duties, as they should do; and also that "although they have some additional assistance, this is clearly insufficient."

On the 29th September they again wrote to Government—"The services of an additional officer to assist him (Mr. Cornell) at the present juncture are urgently required, and as pointed out in Mr. Cornell's 27th paragraph, he has not been hitherto supplied with a sufficiently strong staff."

The Government met the application by an arrangement which amounted virtually to the augmentation of the staff of Cuttack by one Joint Magistrate and two Assistants, Mr. Cornell himself becoming the Joint Magistrate, remarking, however, in a letter dated the 27th September—"It is to be observed that the Officiating Commissioner has not asked for this further assistance."

On the 17th of October, the Commissioner wrote to the Board:—

"In the matter of assistance, Government and the Board have promptly responded to all reasonable calls on this head by the appointment of an additional Assistant, Mr. Kirkwood, and by the speedy deputation of Mr. Taylor immediately after Mr. Mackenzie's decease."

We have, however, shown that as far as the Cuttack district is concerned, no real increase to the ordinary staff was made till October.

duties; but it is evident that he was chained down to his office by the ordinary duties of a Magistrate and Collector. He was not the right man for an extreme emergency of this particular character, but he had not sufficient aid. He was not relieved by his successor until the crisis had almost passed.

59. Mr. McNeile, although attached to the division exclusively for famine operation duty, gave little direct assistance to the Collector of Cuttack. He was employed rather as a supervising officer to assist the Commissioner in the famine administration of the whole province, than as an executive officer aiding the Collector of each district. He, however, undertook the daily personal superintendence of the Government sales at the sudder station for some weeks.

60. It is to be wished that the necessity of making such an addition to the staff as was made by the orders of September, had been pressed upon the Government in June. We may here observe that whatever may be the requirements of Balasore and Pooree, we have little doubt that the services of a Joint Magistrate will be found to be permanently required in the Cuttack district. In June the Collector, at the suggestion of the Relief Committee, did apply for two Deputy Collectors to superintend the landing and transport of rice and to manage the relief operations generally; but the Board replied that no Deputy Collectors could be spared for famine service, that competent agency should be provided from local sources at the charge of the Relief Fund, and that salaries lower than those of the Deputy Collectors would probably suffice.

Staff should have been earlier strengthened.

61. It has already been said that landing operations were managed at first by Mr. Geary, the Superintendent of the Light House, and his Assistant, in addition to their own duties, and that in July they were placed in the hands of Mr. Burgess, whose services were entirely placed at the disposal of the Collector by the Irrigation Company, as well as those of two other Assistants in subordination to him, to whom landing and transport operations below Taldunda were entrusted. A gunner was also sent from Calcutta to assist in the landing.

Agency for landing and transport.

62. For the distribution of relief the Committee availed themselves largely of the services of volunteers, such as the officers of the Irrigation Company, missionaries, and in some instances of zemindars; but the centres entrusted to the zemindars appear generally to have been unsuccessfully managed. The Canoongoes, Police officers at out-posts, and other subordinate officers of Government were also employed in their respective neighbourhoods. Eleven centres, besides those in the town of Cuttack, were immediately under European superintendence; for the rest it was soon found necessary to organize a system of supervision which should act as a check on the Native clerks who were unavoidably left in charge. A Native inspector was appointed to each of the sub-divisions, and the rest were thrown into groups of four and five, to each of which a sub-inspector and a Native doctor were attached, the sub-inspectors being placed under an European inspector. The paid agency which it was necessary to employ throughout the operations was hurriedly raised; the duty to be performed was laborious, disagreeable, and not free from danger. The appointments were known to be of very brief duration, and the staff was not relieved. Under these circumstances

Supervision of relief centres.

or to be altogether proof against the heavy temptations to which it was unavoidably subjected; accordingly, several cases of dishonesty were brought to light.

Employment of labor.

63. Throughout the operations the test for admission to gratuitous relief may be said to have been inability to earn a livelihood by work, as evinced by outward signs of emaciation. It is obvious that the propriety of this test depended on the facilities which existed for obtaining such employment as should yield wages sufficient for the support at least of the laborer himself.

By the Irrigation Company.

In the early part of the season the Irrigation Company offered any amount of employment in the town of Cuttack and along its lines of works running eastwards and northwards. Their rates of pay were liberal, and at first the Company imported rice for the use of its laborers.

The average daily number of laborers employed up to the end of June is thus given by the Officers of the Company :—

January ...	...	...	...	...	14,666
February...	...	...	...	...	10,763
March ...	...	...	...	...	7,808
April ...	...	...	...	...	9,146
May ...	...	...	...	...	8,120
June ...	...	...	...	...	5,238
Total ...					55,741

64. The public works carried on in the Cuttack district, as in the other districts of Orissa, during the years 1865 and 1866 were of two kinds,—work executed by officers of the Public Works Department, and those supervised by district officers. These will be dealt with separately.

Works under the Department of Public Works.

1st.—Public works under departmental officers;—

On its being brought to the notice of the Government of Bengal, in the Public Works Department, that the increasing distress in Orissa rendered it necessary that more extended relief should be afforded by the execution of public works, a sum of Rs. 69,000 was assigned, on the 19th December 1865, for carrying on the earth-work of the Cuttack and Ganjam, or Madras frontier road (Rs. 44,000), and of the Cuttack and Pooree road (Rs. 25,000). This grant was in excess of the ordinary Budget allotments for public works in the province. Both of these lines of road, however, lie throughout nearly their whole length in the Pooree district, a few miles of each only falling within the Cuttack district; and it will therefore be more convenient to exhibit the expenditure that took place from the grant when treating of the Pooree district.

It may be said that the Government, relying on the ample employment for labor which the Irrigation Company offered, and not wishing to draw away the laborers from these important works, did not undertake any special public works in the Cuttack district.

65. The following Table shows the amount in rupees of the several ordinary Budget allotments for work in the district, and

the expenditure on each during the last seven months (October 1865 to April 1866 inclusive) of the official year 1865-66 :—

No. 1.

BUDGET ALLOTMENT.	Amount in Rupees.	EXPENDITURE.							Total expenditure.
		1865.			1866.				
		October	November.	December.	January.	February.	March.	April.	
Remodelling the trunk road between the Mahanuddee and Byturnee rivers (north-eastern part of the district)	15,000	...	41	...	...	339	...	8,652	9,032
Metalling Cuttack trunk road (ditto ditto)	70,000	1,678	1,298	1,264	64	795	187	596	5,877
Improving and opening out permanently the Cuttack and Sumbulpore road (north-western part of the district)	15,000	...	10	1,460	413	2,567	2,454	220	7,124
Sundry minor works over the whole district, each costing less than Rs. 2,500	12,483	1,198	920	261	783	334	1,760	2,693	7,949
Total	1,12,483	2,876	2,264	2,985	1,260	4,035	4,401	12,161	29,982
Repairs expenditure	...	822	1,584	2,475	6,925	6,944	5,84	17,433	42,032
Grand Total		3,698	3,848	5,460	8,185	10,979	10,250	29,594	72,014

It thus appears that of the aggregate amount available for expenditure on new works advantage was taken of little more than one quarter during the last three months of the year 1865, and the first four months of the year 1866, the period in which the famine first showed signs of its approach, and gradually increased till it nearly reached the full height of its severity. It must be noticed that the expenditure above shown is that for seven months only; but it is during these months that ordinarily the chief portion of work on roads is done, and there can be no doubt that causes arose which prevented full use being made of funds which the executive officers held at their disposal, and the disbursement of which, at a period of wide-spread and daily increasing distress, was so urgently demanded.

66. The main cause of the failure to make use of the available funds was the unfortunate omission to carry out the condition which the Government in the Department Public Works had imposed when directing that the wages should be paid in cash, i. e., that the Civil Authorities should make arrangements which should enable the laborers readily to procure rice for the money which they received as wages. The causes of this omission have been fully explained in our General Report, paragraphs 150 *et seq.*

Cause of failure to employ the available funds.

67. The system of getting the work done under petty contracts, which was, to some degree, rendered necessary by the weakness of

the supervising staff, was probably another reason which deterred men, in the condition of weakness to which the population generally was then reduced, from flocking to the works in greater numbers. In various places, at a later period, however, attempts were made to pay for daily labor and not by task-work, but they were grossly abused and failed entirely; the workmen doing so little that the cost of the work rose even up to sixteen times the price at which it is ordinarily done.

Allotment and new works executed from May to November 1866.

68. The assignments above shown ceased to be available on the close of the official year 1865-66; and from the 1st of May 1866 the Budget of the year 1866-67 came into operation. The Public Works grants under this Budget and the expenditure from them during the seven months ending 30th November, when the pressure of the famine had begun to pass away, are exhibited in the Table below:—

No. 2.

BUDGET GRANTS.	Amount in Rupees.	1866.							Total Expenditure.
		May.	June.	July.	August.	September.	October.	November.	
1. Improving and opening out permanently the road from Cuttack to Sumbulpore (north-western part of district)	14,712	97	18	209				301	625
2. Raising the Kendraparah and Patamoondee road (eastern part of the district)	7,008					479	334	1,010	1,823
3. Completing earth-work of the Taldanda road, eastern part of the district	7,437				804	849	1,138	2,867	5,658
4. Sundry minor works over the whole district, costing each less than Rs. 2,500	2,171	1,617	1,436	1,992	1,763	1,511	1,634	528	10,481
Total	31,328	1,714	1,454	2,201	2,567	2,839	3,106	4,706	18,587
Repairs expenditure	...	3,246	4,713	2,334	3,159	4,790	8,104	10,598	36,944
Grand Total	...	4,960	6,167	4,535	5,726	7,629	11,210	15,304	55,531

Of the new works shown in the Table, items 2 & 3 were special famine works.

Number of laborers employed.

69. Laborers employed on all public works were, with few exceptions, remunerated by task or piece-work under petty contractors, so far as roads and embankments were concerned, and it was on these, as has already been observed, that the largest numbers of people were collected. No daily or other register of the work-people was kept, and the amount expended is the only means of forming any idea of the number which was actually employed on these works. As the rates varied at different times and places, no figures even of approximate accuracy can be deduced.

70. Besides the imperial works above mentioned a sum of Rs. 13,595-4-9 was expended between October 1865 and November 1866 on works which were carried on out of the ordinary and special assignments which had been made to the Magistrate from the amalgamated local funds of the Lower Provinces of Bengal, as follows:—

			Rs.	A.	P.
1865. October	...	...	346	1	4
" November	...	...	235	0	0
" December	...	...	200	0	0
1866. January	...	...	611	1	3
" February	...	...	2,934	10	5
" March	...	...	2,217	5	6
" April	...	...	4,009	1	5
" May	...	...	0	0	0
" June	...	...	0	0	0
" July	...	...	328	6	4
" August	...	...	400	0	0
" September	...	...	1,550	0	0
" October	...	...	400	0	0
" November	...	...	353	6	0
Total	...	...	13,585	0	3

71. The different Relief Committees also employed on light works of different kinds those who were capable of doing something, although unable to do such a day's work as would earn a subsistence in the ordinary market. The task required was suited in each case to the powers of the individual; and as might have been expected, the work, in return for which each man received his daily food, was little more than nominal. Light labor under the Committee.

The system adopted and the co-operation which the Committee received from the Irrigation Company and the Public Works Department is thus described by Mr. Kirkwood:—

"At each centre all those capable of doing light labor are now employed. If any Public Works Department or Irrigation works are going on in the neighbourhood, they are made over to work on these. They receive raw rice as pay. This rice is given by the Relief Committee, and the department credits the Relief Committee with the actual value (at their ordinary rates) of the work done by these kangalees. Each laboring adult now gets 12 chittacks of coarse rice or 8 chittacks of fine rice.

"This allowance of rice they do not entirely consume, but sell or barter some of it for other commodities. This transaction is not carried on in the moodees' shops, but with the vidagers in general. The amount of relief thus afforded is considerable and wide-spread.

"When there is no departmental work in the neighbourhood of a centre, those capable of doing work are employed in cleaning the village roads and such like useful work. In such case they get their two meals of cooked rice per diem, it being reasonably feared that unchecked powers of giving raw rice would open to the mohurrirs a door for speculation."

72. In the way of medical assistance all was done which was possible with the means at the disposal of the local officers. It cannot be said that the medical staff was by any means sufficient; but looking at the circumstances of Bengal, we doubt whether it

Medical assistance.

would have been possible to meet so sudden a demand for such a number of Native doctors as would have been able to render medical assistance accessible to the bulk of the distressed population. More than one of the Native medical men died during the famine. At Cuttack a special charity hospital and a small pox hospital were established, and measures taken to ensure the removal to them of sick paupers. The number in hospital was generally about one hundred. These hospitals were superintended by the Civil Surgeon. At the two sub-divisional head quarters—Jajpore and Kendraparah—hospitals also existed; and special hospitals were established at twelve of the relief centres. The Civil Surgeon has written—"Ordinary sickness is always unusually prevalent during famine, and to this has been super-added cholera. As regards dysentery, which has been by far the more fatal disease, I consider it to have been almost entirely due to starvation. The people have also been infested with intestinal parasites, giving rise to various and complicated forms of disease, and though the inhabitants of Orissa are at all times more or less obnoxious to this affection, the mortality from this cause is almost entirely attributable to the want of proper food, and to the consumption of improper articles of food, such as raw grain, unripe and unwholesome fruits and vegetables by half starved persons."

Difficulty of transport from False Point causes dearth of rice in August.

73. In his tour of inspection in August and September, Mr. McNeile visited Kendraparah, and reported that the supply of rice was totally inadequate to meet the demands, but that it was impossible to supply more without stinting other centres; and on the 5th of October, Mr. Kirkwood reported to the Committee that the shortness of the supply had obliged him to discontinue relief sales at low rates at Taldunda. Indeed, throughout the district much more rice than was available could have been advantageously disposed of, if means of transport had been available for distributing more rapidly to the centres the rice which was lying at False Point.

Supply of rice at False Point falls short.

74. It was not till October that the supply of rice at False Point was insufficient to keep employed the available means of landing and internal transport. On the 6th of October the Commissioner telegraphed to the Board that his stock of rice was running short, and asked permission to buy the cargo of the *Charles Maureau*, which had just put in to False Point, laden with 17,000 maunds on private account, and on the 8th, Mr. McNeile wrote an explanation, under instructions from the Commissioner, showing by calculation that at the rate at which the rice was then being distributed by sale and gratuitously, the supply, including the quantity which was still on the *Sparkler* at False Point, would last to the end of October only. According to intimation given by the Board, the next vessel, the *S. S. Asia*, was not to be expected at False Point till the end of October. "If then," Mr. McNeile wrote, "we do not procure stock meanwhile from some other source, our whole relief operations must be discontinued for at least a fortnight, for no boats despatched from the Coast at the end of this month can be expected in Cuttack from 15 to 20 days afterwards. Under these circumstances, the purchase of the *Charles Maureau's* cargo has appeared to the Commissioner an absolute necessity. We shall endeavour to make arrangements by which as large a portion as possible of

Purchase of cargo of *Charles Maureau's* recommended.

"this rice shall be sold, and as little as possible distributed in charity; and as the cost price of the cargo at the Coast (Rs. 11-8 per bag) falls short of the price of the cargoes previously imported under the Board's orders by Rs. 1-12-10½ per bag (see memo. of the 4th instant) it is to be hoped that the purchase will not result in any great loss to the fund over and above that already estimated upon the whole of our operations."

Not accepted in full.

75. In reply, however, to the Commissioner's telegram of the 6th of October, the Board telegraphed—"Government sales to public should be made at higher rates of Rs. 5-8 per maund to restrict the demand till *Asia* arrives. Meanwhile where present stock is gone, buy only enough from *Maureau* for few days at a time. Government steamer will bring ship with cargo, of which 4,000 maunds will be brought for you, and will reach False Point about the 17th. Balance of her cargo and *Maureau's* should be left to go into the market;" and on the 11th, their Secretary wrote in explanation:—"To tide over the interval you propose to buy the *Charles Maureau's* cargo of 8,000 bags, at Rs. 11½ per bag, = Rs. 92,000. This rice, delivered at False Point at Rs. 5-12, would cost at least Rs. 6-8 a maund at Cuttack, where the market prices are quoted at from 7¼ to 7½ seers per rupee = Rs. 5-5 per maund. Supplies are also coming down the *Mahanuddee*. Under these circumstances, the Board do not consider it advisable to buy the *Charles Maureau's* cargo, a step which would have the effect of keeping the market in an artificial state longer than is absolutely necessary. They would much prefer seeing this rice enter the market on private account."

"The Board observe that the Government rice is now being sold at Cuttack at Rs. 4-14 per maund, which is lower than the market rate. They do not consider it expedient to continue to undersell the market; accordingly, they authorize the price of Government sales being raised to Rs. 5-8 as long as the *Maureau's* cargo is unsold. This will probably at first entail great pressure on the relief sales and on the gratuitous distribution, but the Board authorize you to supplement, if necessary, the Government stock by buying in small quantities from the *Maureau* till the *Asia* arrives." He added that the Board had made arrangements under which 11,000 bags of Kuzla rice from Chittagong might be expected at False Point by the 20th of October, of which the Board would buy for Government 3,000 or 4,000 bags at Rs. 9-12 a bag, including all charges; by this arrangement, which would be less expensive than buying from the *Maureau*, 5,000 or 6,000 bags would be thrown into the market on private account."

76. The difficulty of communication with False Point made it impossible for the officials in Cuttack to buy the quantity required from day to day. The Commissioner, therefore, directed that the supply for despatches inland should be kept up by buying out of the *Charles Maureau*, and transmitting to Cuttack, 500 maunds a day, until any Government rice should arrive, when the purchases should be discontinued, and the establishment employed in landing the Government rice. If the Captain of the *Maureau* should decline to sell on these terms, the Collector was directed not to buy rice out of her at all.

Commissioner's action.

The Commissioner also pointed out to the Collector that the Board's order not to sell Government rice to the public, except at a price very much above the market rate, was tantamount to an order to discontinue sales altogether; the order was not carried out.

77. These instructions were communicated to the Captain of the *Charles Maureau*,* together with a telegram from Messrs. Robert and Charriol, requesting him to make over to the Commissioner whatever quantity he might require; and intimating that the Board of Revenue would pay the price to them in Calcutta. The Captain had, in the first instance, offered to sell his cargo on either of two alternative conditions which he stated as to price and risk. The Collector, believing that the terms would be settled in Calcutta between the Board of Revenue and Messrs Robert, Charriol and Co., made no allusion to the price in his letters communicating the instructions of the Commissioner, who indeed had given no precise instructions as to the acceptance of one or other of the alternative conditions which the Captain had offered. In reply to the Collector the Captain wrote a letter, pointing out that no assurance whatever was given as to the price which would be paid for his rice; and refusing altogether to allow his ship to be treated as a granary from which supplies were to be taken or not just as it might suit the convenience of the purchasers. He had already waited 16 days at False Point in the hope of concluding this transaction, and would wait no longer. He sailed for Bourbon on the 18th of October.

Charles Maureau leaves False Point with her cargo.

78. It is much to be regretted that the opportunity was lost of securing this cargo.

Grounds of Board's refusal to sanction the purchase.

The Board's unwillingness to purchase it on the part of Government was founded on the expectation that the *Asia* would be in at the end of the month; but she did not arrive till a month later, and it appears that she was on a voyage to China, and that there were no means of forming any exact opinion as to the time at which she might return, except that it was impossible that she could arrive at the Orissa ports before November. The Board also hoped that the cargo of the *Maureau* would pass into the district on private account, if it were not bought on the part of Government; but the expectation was not realized, and the cargo was lost to the district. Although, in their telegram of the 9th, the Board had advised that 4,000 maunds of rice destined for the Collector might be expected to arrive at False Point about the 17th in a ship towed by a Government steamer, no such consignment arrived till the 26th of October, nor did any further consignment which was intended for False Point reach that port till the 15th of November; but on the 5th of October the *S. S. Coringa*, with 5,061 bags, put in to False Point, and, in the dearth of rice, was at once unloaded there by Mr. Burgess. The relief, as reported by the Commissioner on the 10th of October, was most opportune for the Cuttack district, but the *Coringa* had been intended for the supply of the Bhudruk sub-division through the Dhamrah port; her arrival there was hourly expected and with great anxiety, as calculations and estimates of supply had been founded on the supposition that she would arrive at a given time. The

S. S. Coringa.

* Vide letter from Captain of the *Charles Maureau* to Collector of Cuttack, dated 16th October 1860, put in by Mr. Charriol, printed at page 400 of Appendix.

failure of this expected supply at Dhamrah was disastrous to the Bhudruk sub-division, and, indeed, to the whole of the Balasore district. Nor was the cargo of the *Coringa* sufficient to prevent a lamentable contraction of the Relief Committee's operations in Cuttack. On the 19th of October, the Relief Manager reported to the Committee that the supply of grain was running short in Cuttack, and that, as there was no certainty as to when more would be received, strict economy was necessary in every department. No less than 3,500 persons, who had up to this time been admitted to the light labor gangs, were now excluded and left to earn their livelihood on the works of the Irrigation Company, who offered employment to any number on terms which would enable them to earn from 2½ to 3½ annas a day. Mr. Levinge, the Engineer of the Company, however, reported that those who had been discharged by the Relief Committee generally refused to take employment on ordinary works. On the 22nd, the Commissioner telegraphed to the Board for more rice, and on the 23rd a demi-official letter was received by the Board from the Commissioner, in which he reported that he anticipated no very great difficulty, as the *Coringa's* cargo would help them out until the *Asia* arrived; that fearing a deficiency of rice, he had stopped Government sales during the Doorgah Poojah holidays, and this had had no bad effect on the market, which seemed to be fairly supplied from Sumbulpore and private stocks.

Contraction of operations in October.

79. On the 27th, however, the Commissioner telegraphed, asking permission to buy the whole of the cargo of the *Pie IX*, which had brought from Chittagong the rice to which reference has been made in paragraph above; but the Board, on the assumption that the *Asia* and *Dundas Castle* would both reach False Point between the 8th and 13th of November, directed him to take out only the 4,000 bags which had been purchased by them on account of Government, and then to let the ship go on to Ceylon, if the Captain wished it. They further instructed the Commissioner to continue the restriction of sales until the arrival of the *Asia* and *Dundas Castle*.

Commissioner recommends purchase of whole cargo of the *Pie IX*.

The Board decline.

Although the Board had issued these orders in opposition to the Commissioner's proposal to buy the whole cargo of the *Pie IX*, the Commissioner felt himself justified by existing circumstances in acting on his own responsibility. On the 1st of November, he reported to the Board that rice was urgently needed; that heavy demurrage was being incurred for boats and establishments at False Point, which were doing nothing for want of rice to land, and that on the Coast line no rice was procurable; that unless rice was provided at once, Government sales would be stopped throughout the district, and that the lower part of the district would suffer severely. He had, therefore, notwithstanding the orders of the Board, directed the Collector to go on taking 500 bags a day out of the *Pie IX* until any ship should arrive with Government rice; but before the Commissioner's orders were received, the ship had left False Point, the owners having sold the rest of the cargo in Ceylon for a better price than was offered at False Point.

80. In order to ascertain the causes of the failure in the supply of rice at False Point in October, it is necessary to review

Causes of failure of supply at False Point in October.

the arrangements which the Board of Revenue had made from the first for the shipment of rice, and the estimates on which those arrangements were founded.

Arrangements made by the Board for the importation of rice.

81. When at the end of May, it was first determined to import rice into Orissa, the Board accepted the generous offers of Messrs. Gisborne and Co. to make purchase of rice for relief operations without charging the usual commission. No estimate of requirements had been or could have been formed at that time; but when the *Court Hey* and *Jacques Fourestier* were despatched to False Point, the Board authorized Messrs. Gisborne and Co. to buy a cargo in Arracan or Burmah, and to forward it to False Point. On the 20th of June, the Firm were authorized to purchase rice until further orders, provided they could get it for Rs. 3 a maund, and to arrange for its transport across the Bay to False Point. On the 6th July, they were again asked to arrange for the early shipment of the rice in equal portions to Pooree and False Point, but to use discretion in not purchasing too great quantities "just at present." On the 11th of July, they were requested to purchase at Akyab and Rangoon "in any quantities" within a maximum price of Rs. 3-8-0 per maund.

82. On the 23rd of July, the Board had called on the Commissioner for some estimate of the quantity of grain which would be required for Cuttack, which must obviously be limited by the amount which could be landed and transported inland with the local appliances.

Commissioner's estimate of requirements.

On the 28th, in a report which reached the Board on the 6th of August, the Commissioner wrote that, weather permitting, the local appliances would admit of the landing of 1,000 bags a day at False Point, and that the same quantity could be transported inland and distributed in sales and relief.

He anticipated that it would be necessary to carry on both Government sales and relief operations to their full extent till the end of September; that then the harvesting of the early crop would enable him to discontinue the Government sales, but that the Relief Committee's operations could not be stopped till the end of November, by which time the late and main crop would be in. He recommended, therefore, that arrangements should be made for importing grain to False Point, so as to meet a consumption of 1,000 bags a day till the end of September, and then to leave a stock in hand from which the Relief Committee's operations might be carried on until such arrangements could be made as should then be found advisable for their future supplies.

83. In their letter, No. 1981B, dated 11th August, the Board replied that the orders already issued for the importation of grain into Orissa would, as far as could be foreseen, secure a sufficient provision until the market should be relieved by the accession of the early crop; but their Secretary wrote—"You are requested to consider whether the stock as above described will suffice to enable you to carry on relief operations by distribution of food gratuitously, or at low rates during the months of October and November. It is of importance that the Board should learn your full requirements on this account during the present month, as, in September, it would be too late for them to issue fresh orders for further importation."

84. On the 8th of August the Commissioner adopted and submitted to the Board a memorandum drawn up by Mr. McNeile,

in which an estimate of the requirements of each of the three districts was based on the principle that sales at market rates should be maintained at the highest possible mark throughout August, reduced in September, and discontinued after the beginning of October; that relief sales should continue for the same period, but without curtailment in September, and that gratuitous distribution should go on without material relaxation till the end of November. The requirements for the Cuttack district were estimated as below:—

	No. of maunds required for Government sales.	No. of maunds required for Relief Committee sales at low rates.	No. of maunds required for gratuitous distribution.	Total.
August	36,000	12,000	12,000	60,000
September	24,000	12,000	12,000	48,000
October			12,000	12,000
November			12,000	12,000
Total	60,000	24,000	48,000	1,32,000

Of which there was in hand at the end of July, about ... Mds. 63,732
Balance remaining to be imported for total requirement ... " 68,268

In laying this estimate before the Board, the Commissioner wrote—"But the Board must understand that unfavorable weather may interfere with the Beallee harvest, and that we have to bear in mind the possible contingencies of flood or drought as affecting the main Sarud crop."

85. Out of 68,268 maunds still required, the *Asia* brought 40,184 on the 10th of August, and the *Sparkler* 22,000 on the 13th of September. This gave a supply which, according to the estimate of the 8th of August, would have sufficed till the end of October, leaving a surplus of 5,916 maunds for November. To this it was only necessary to add 6,084 maunds to make up the entire requirement of the estimate.

86. In August, however, unusual inundations occurred, and on the 7th September the Board telegraphed—"What will be the effect of the floods on this estimate? reply quickly, so that Board may take necessary steps." Increase of estimates of requirements in consequence of inundations.

87. The Commissioner replied on the 13th September, adopting and submitting a revised estimate, drawn up by Mr. McNeile, in which it was calculated that the disastrous effects of the inundations would render it necessary to continue both Government sales and relief sales up to the full extent till the end of November; and to keep up the gratuitous relief till the end of December. At the same time it was intimated that the bad weather (which had retarded the landing) and the delay in transit from False Point had been such that during August 21,170 maunds of rice only had been used in the Cuttack district, instead of 60,000 maunds, the quantity estimated in the calculation of the 8th August. The same causes, it was believed, would reduce the consumption of September from 48,000 maunds, as originally estimated, to 36,000 maunds.

The estimate to provide for the extended operations now stood thus:—

		Govt. sales.	Relief Committee's sales.	Gratuitous distribution.	TOTAL.
September	...	12,000	12,000	12,000	36,000
October	...	24,000	12,000	12,000	48,000
November	...	24,000	12,000	12,000	48,000
December	...	...	...	12,000	12,000
Total	...	60,000	36,000	48,000	1,44,000

And to meet this demand, the Commissioner asked for 39,500 maunds in addition to the quantity already received at False Point in the vessels of which the *Sparkler* was the last. Of this quantity, according to the estimated rate of consumption, 12,000 maunds would be required for the consumption of December; the remaining 27,500 maunds would be required for use at the centres from the second week in November, for which use it must have been at False Point before the end of October, to admit of its being transported to the centres of consumption by the date on which it would be required.

Supply.

88. The Board had been led to expect that Messrs. Gisborne and Co. had made arrangements in August to send down a further supply to be delivered at False Point in all September. On the 19th of September, in anticipation of the Commissioner's increased estimates, Messrs. Gisborne and Co. were requested to ship 20,000 maunds more for False Point.

Messrs. Gisborne and Co. unable to secure ships to carry rice.

In the latter part of September, Messrs. Gisborne and Co. intimated to the Board that the arrangement for chartering the *Mahratta*, by which they had intended to send down part of the October supply, had broken down; on the 25th they wrote that they had been unable to get a sailing vessel at Rangoon, or a steamer in Calcutta, adding that their Rangoon Agents had orders to secure tonnage, as soon as they had an opportunity, and that they themselves would not fail to secure a steamer at Calcutta if they could.

On the 28th of September, Mr. Scott Moncrieff (a member of the firm of Messrs. Gisborne and Co.) wrote a note to Mr. Lane, the Officiating Secretary to the Board of Revenue, announcing that the *Arabia*, which he had intended to take up, would not be back from China till far on in November, but that he was offered the *Asia*, which could be at Rangoon "about the 20th October" (i. e. to take in rice), and would "be at False Point by the end of "October," if taken up.

The same day a formal letter was addressed by Messrs. Gisborne and Co. to the Board, announcing that they had arranged to take up the *Asia*, which "should be at Rangoon by the end "of October."

The *Asia* was to take 40,000 maunds, and thus more than the full amount of the Commissioner's estimates of the 13th September, for the period extending to the 31st of December was considered to have been provided.

Arrives at False Point a month later than was expected.

89. If the *Asia* had reached Rangoon on the 20th of October, as the Board expected, she might perhaps have taken in

her cargo and have been at False Point in time to replenish the centres as the supplies ex *Sparkler* ran out. But the *Asia* did not reach False Point until the last days of November instead of the end of October. The engagement taking her up for this service had been made in Calcutta after she had started for China, and the orders were communicated to her Captain by telegraph and letter to China. There were no means of communication by which the Board or Messrs. Gisborne and Co. in Calcutta could ascertain from time to time what progress she was making, and whether she was likely to reach Rangoon by the expected date.

90. Moreover, the management of the local transport arrangements had hastened the crisis in Cuttack. The Kendraparah and Jappore sub-divisions, as well as the station of Cuttack, drew their supplies direct from False Point; as long as the consumption of rice was far below the estimate, the proportion in which rice was sent to each place mattered little, but in September the relief operations throughout the district took a sudden and great stride. Then as the aggregate supply was only just sufficient to meet the aggregate consumption, it was of importance that the supplies to the several places in the district should be in exact proportion to the requirements of each. At this juncture, by some misunderstanding, despatches from False Point to Cuttack ceased for 14 days, all the rice being sent off to the sub-divisions; this was not discovered at Cuttack until so little remained at False Point on the *Sparkler* that the deficiency in the Cuttack store houses could not be made up. Hence the danger of the tract which was relieved from Cuttack being stinted some days before the supplies at sub-divisions would be exhausted.

Irregularity of supply from Coast to different parts of districts hastened crisis in Cuttack.

91. On the 5th of October, when the urgent telegram was received from the Commissioner, anticipating that his supply of rice would run short towards the end of October, Mr. Scott Moncrieff again wrote to Mr. Lane that the *Asia* could not be at False Point before the end of the month, but that the *Coringa* might be expected there any day. On the 13th Messrs. Gisborne and Co. reported that the *Dundas Castle* was also on her way from Madras to Bassein to take 20,000 maunds of rice wherever they might be required.

Measures taken to remedy the shortness of rice caused by the delay in the arrival of the *Asia*.

92. In the 78th paragraph we have mentioned that the *Coringa*, which had been intended for Dhamra, was unloaded at False Point, and have referred to the attempts which were made to eke out the supply till the arrival of the *Asia* by the contraction of sales and the despatch of 8,000 maunds by the *Pie IX*.

According to the intimation given by the Commissioner to the Board on the 5th of October, a stock of rice was urgently required—a fresh supply would be—to come into consumption, from the beginning of November. The rate of consumption, as calculated in the estimate of the 13th September, was 1,200 maunds a day; but the Commissioner had announced that that estimate was being exceeded. Indeed, in that month, 55,496 maunds were actually passed out for consumption, the estimate being for 36,000 maunds only. At the rate of 1,200 maunds a day, the quantity of rice which had been received ex *Coringa* and *Pie IX* (maunds 18,122) would have lasted 15

days only. No further supply was received at False Point till the *Thurso* arrived on the 15th November, from which time the supply was ample.

By diverting the *Coringa* from the Dhamrah and by the help of the 4,000 maunds ex *Pie IX*, a supply of rice at False Point was kept up equal from week to week to meet the Commissioner's estimates; but these estimates were so avowedly uncertain that it would have been well to have been in advance of them, so that an ample margin should always have been available to provide for irregularities of consumption, delays, and accidents. In consequence of the excess of consumption over estimate in September, even if the *Asia* had arrived at the end of October as expected by the Board, her cargo would not have been in time to meet the requirements. It could not have been distributed to the different centres till some days after the cargo of the *Sparkler* had been exhausted; but in fact it was impossible that the *Asia* should have been at False Point by the end of October. She left Calcutta for China on the 22nd of September; under no circumstances could she have returned from China, taken up her cargo of rice at Rangoon, and carried it across to False Point within the 39 days which remained up to the end of October, still less was it possible when the order for her to go to Rangoon, in the event of her not being previously engaged in China, only followed her by a subsequent mail.

Causes which led to the necessity of contracting operations in October.

93. The dearth in October and the necessity of contracting the operations from the scale which they had reached, occurred only in that part of the district which received its supplies through the town of Cuttack, and were attributable to two causes—

1st.—That the scale of operations in September largely exceeded the Commissioner's estimate;

2nd.—That the sub-divisions had been over-liberally supplied in proportion to the town of Cuttack, for both sub-divisions were far better supplied in September and October than in preceding months.

The necessity might have been prevented.

94. The purchase of the whole cargo of the *Charles Maureau*, when it was available at False Point at the beginning, and of that of the *Pie IX*, at the end of October, would have counteracted the unexpected deficiency in October and November respectively. The reasons which prevented the purchase have been given in paragraphs 78 and 79 above.

Increased estimates of requirements in November.

95. On the 9th of November the Relief Committee accepted a further estimate of increased requirements which had been made by Mr. McNeile, and they applied for 22,000 bags in addition to the quantity which they had previously estimated for November and December. They announced to the Government that in consequence of almost total failure of crops in certain parts of the district, the necessity for relief measures would continue throughout the early portion of the ensuing year. Three centres which had been closed were re-opened; the Manager being directed to purchase rice when necessary from the bazaar. Further arrangements were made with the Public Works Department and the Irrigation Company for continuing the employment of labor on a large scale, to be paid for in rice.

96. In the course of November, four ships* arrived, bringing 29,132 bags of rice. The harvesting of the cold weather crop had caused a marked fall in prices; mortality in the hospitals was reported to be decreasing. Supply.

97. On the 23rd, Mr. McNeile succeeded in bringing 900 bags of rice to Taldunda in a flat towed by the *Teesta*; but the market rate had fallen so much that the Burmah rice could not be sold for 11 seers or the better rice for 7 seers to the rupee.

98. The following table, compiled from statements furnished to us by Mr. McNeile up to the 17th November 1866, shows the manner in which the rice had been disposed of up to that date, and the extent of the relief operations carried on in each month:—

Table showing the extent of relief operations at different periods.

MONTH ENDING	QUANTITY OF RICE ISSUED.				OUT OF QUANTITY IN COLUMN 4.		DAILY AVERAGE OF PERSONS RELIEVED.		
	For cash to Government department at full cost price.	For cash sold to Public at market rate.	Transferred to Relief Committee.	Total of Columns 2, 3 and 4.	Quantity gratuitously distributed.	Sold at cheap rates to selected individuals.	Number from whom light labor was exacted.	Gratuitously relieved.	Total of Columns 8 and 9.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
June 30th	Mds. 294	Mds. 1,636	Mds. 612	Mds. 2,532	Mds. 124	Mds. 316	220	1,081	1,301
July 28th	1,770	4,187	8,305	14,272	1,295	2,946	884	3,905	4,789
August 25th	390	15,296	12,094	27,780	4,282	5,602	3,172	10,918	14,090
September 29th	594	17,427	37,476	55,497	13,964	11,942	10,231	17,655	27,886
October 27th	220	9,128	23,210	32,558	19,928	9,520	14,306	20,398	34,704
November 17th	24	2,070	14,034	16,128	12,972	1,294	14,252	20,329	34,581
Total	3,282	40,754	95,731	1,49,767	52,565	31,520	7,177	12,331	19,558
							Daily average from 16th June to 17th November.		

99. On the 30th of November the Commissioner having visited the Kendraparah sub-division, reported to Government that it would be necessary to carry on relief operations there at least throughout the year 1867. It was resolved to continue importations, and Mr. Schalch, a member of the Board of Revenue, was deputed to the districts of Orissa to make the necessary arrangements for the coming year, to which this report does not extend. Necessity reported of continuing relief operations for another year.

* NAME.	DATE OF ARRIVAL.	DATE OF DEPARTURE.	NO. OF BAGS.
<i>Tauroo</i>	15th November ...	15th December ...	9,878
<i>Rohomania</i>	22nd " ...	17th " ...	3,550
<i>Dundas Castle</i>	29th " ...	26th " ...	6,954
<i>Asia</i>	29th " ...	28th " ...	8,750

100. Among the officials, Mr. Assistant Kirkwood, and the Civil Surgeon Dr. Coates, and Mr. Deputy Magistrate Taylor, took the most active part in the relief. Invaluable assistance was given by the executive officers of the Irrigation Company; and the members of the Committee, consisting of the principal officers of that Company, of missionaries and Native gentlemen, took a warm interest in the operations. Among the zemindars, Radhasham Narindra, of Kendraparah, and his brother Goureesam Jena, took the lead in making their stocks of rice available for the poor of their estates and others. The Rajah of the tributary estate Dhenkanal was conspicuous by his liberality, and by the care which he took of his own subjects.

POOREE.

1. We take up the narrative of the progress of events in this district from the month of May, to which it has been brought in paragraph 225 of our General Report.

2. The distress in the town had reached such a pitch that it was no longer possible to leave it to the unorganized charity of the *mohunts* or heads of religious houses. The Reverend W. Miller, a Missionary of the Baptist Mission, came down from Cuttack to Pooree early in May, and saw what was going on. He brought with him Rs. 500, which had been placed at his disposal out of the fund which Messrs. Sykes and Co. had raised in Calcutta. At this time also the Committee received Rs. 500 more, which was subscribed in Calcutta and sent through Mr. R. B. Chapman.

3. With this aid a relief house was opened in the town, at which cooked food was supplied. Mr. Miller took charge of it, and before he left Pooree, about the end of the month, 300 paupers were being fed daily. Want of funds prevented the Committee from giving relief to a larger number. After Mr. Miller's departure the distributions were transferred to the charge of Baboo Ramakhoy Chatterjee, another Member of the Committee.

4. On receipt of the grant of Rs. 10,000 from Government at the end of May, the Committee appointed Mr. Ward Lacey to superintend the mofussil relief operations on a salary of Rs. 100 with Rs. 50 travelling allowance. They resolved to give up the system of out-door money relief which they had been following, and to adopt that which the Board had indicated. They accepted the principle that the impotent only should receive gratuitous relief, and that all others should be required to work according to their powers.

The daily allowance was fixed at $\frac{1}{2}$ a seer of rice for each adult and $\frac{1}{4}$ seer for each child. Wherever the wages of labor were paid in money, the daily allowance was fixed at $1\frac{1}{2}$ anna for men, $1\frac{1}{4}$ anna for women, and $\frac{3}{4}$ th of an anna for children. Sheds capable of accommodating 200 working people were to be erected at each centre, so that when the rains set in the paupers might be employed in mat-making, basket-making, and similar light in-door work. The centres were placed under a Mohurrir on a salary of Rs. 15 a month, with whom was associated the Canoongoe of the pergunnah. Fourteen places were selected as sites for centres to be opened on these principles. Soon after this the Committee procured Rs. 6,000 worth of rice from Gopalpore.

5. At this time the Commissioner, Mr. Ravenshaw, visited Pooree. In laying the proceedings of the Committee before him, the Collector announced that a healthy trade had sprung up with the south; that during the last four months nearly a lakh of rupees' worth of rice was imported; the district had been supplied by private enterprise with rice imported by the Chilka Lake from Gopalpore; and that he expected further supplies to come down the Mahanuddee as soon as it should be open for navigation. At present every one who had money could buy rice with

Distress in the town in May.

Relief house opened.

Grant of Rs. 10,000 received.

Principles of relief adopted.

Plan of operations.

Commissioner's visit.

Trade with south springs up.

it, and, therefore, the Collector withdrew a recommendation which he had lately made in a demi-official communication to the Secretary to the Board of Revenue, to the effect that rice should be imported by Government into Pooree for sale to the public; he was, however, still of opinion that rice should be imported for the use of the Relief Committee.

Collector withdraws recommendation to import rice for sale to general public.

But recommends importation for the Committee.

Recommendation not supported by Commissioner.

Imports by Koomtee merchants.

6. The Commissioner did not support this recommendation, as he did not believe that rice could be landed at Pooree at a price so low as to warrant the risk of interfering with the private trade.

7. The rice from the south was being brought up from Gopalpore by the Koomtees—a class of Madras merchants who were settled in Pooree; and the supply was dependent on the imports to Gopalpore from the ports still further south. In the middle of June there was a cessation in the imports in consequence of the non-arrival of a ship which was expected at Gopalpore, and on the 16th, the Magistrate and Collector reported that rice was scarcely procurable in the district even for the prisoners, and called on the Commissioner to send him a supply from the rice which had been sent by Government to False Point, in order to avert the impending crisis.

The selling price in Pooree was below 6 seers of 80 tolahs weight to the rupee. It was not till the 27th that the district was eased by the renewal of the supply from the south; the price then fell to $7\frac{1}{4}$ seers for the rupee.

Contraction of Committee's plan of operations; recommendation by Commissioner.

8. The Commissioner, in communicating his general approval of the plans which the Committee had formed at their meeting of the 1st June, expressed his apprehension that they were starting operations on a scale which they would not be able to keep up with the funds at their disposal. He recommended that the number of proposed centres should be reduced, and that some money should be sent to Mr. Barton, the Assistant Magistrate and Collector in charge of the Khoorda sub-division, for the relief of his sub-division, as the works which were going on there could not reach all classes.

Partial modification of plans.

On this the Committee recorded an opinion that the fourteen centres on which they had fixed were no more than were really required; but with reference to the doubt as to the sufficiency of funds, they resolved to open eight centres only at first, postponing the rest until they should know whether they could expect further grants of money; Rs. 200 were sent to the Khoorda sub-division.

9. For the first few days the laboring paupers in the town had been remunerated in raw rice; but on its being reported that the crowd of professional beggars set on them and robbed them of the raw rice, the Committee resolved to give cooked food only.

Deserted children.

It was also resolved to make over the charge of all orphans to Mr. Miller as a provisional arrangement, as their ultimate support would fall on the Government.

Further grants promised by Board.

10. In the middle of June the Collector received an assurance from the Board that more money would be forthcoming if required.

Centres opened in district.

By the 17th of June, five centres had been opened in the interior exclusive of the Khoorda sub-division; the opening of others was delayed for the receipt of rice which had been ordered by the Committee from Gopalpore.

By the end of June six were established; two were added in July; four in August, and the maximum number thirteen was reached in September.

Besides these, Mr. Barton, the Assistant Magistrate and Collector in charge of Khoorda, was establishing centres in that sub-division with funds and rice which were supplied to him by the Committee. He had opened nine by the end of July.

In June the Committee resolved on the erection of a hospital shed in Pooree capable of accommodating 60 sick paupers and of open sheds for the shelter of 300 paupers at feeding time, which could also be used for light in-door works in the rains.

Sheds for hospital and shelter.

In the week preceding the 1st of July, 7,871 persons had been fed, giving an average of 1,124 daily.

Daily average fed.

11. The Board having resolved upon importing into Pooree, requested the Madras Government to purchase rice on account of the Bengal Government and to ship it from the southern ports to Orissa. A small quantity only was procurable, as the scarcity had affected the Madras Ports; but 2,549 bags were sent up in the Government Steamer *Arracan*, which reached Pooree on the 30th of June.

First importation by Government in the *Arracan*.

12. The Collector then began to make sales of rice to the public in Pooree town at the rate of 6 seers of 105 tolah weight (= $7\frac{1}{4}$ th seers of 80 tolah weight), that being about the market rate on the 5th and 6th of July. Rs. 5,140 worth of rice was sold; and then the Collector raised the price to 5 seers for the rupee, which had the effect of stopping the sales for a time. The market price was then $7\frac{1}{4}$ th seers of coarse and $5\frac{1}{8}$ of finer rice for the rupee.

Government sales to the public at market price.

Much difficulty was experienced in unloading the *Arracan*, and she was not discharged till the 7th of July.

The Relief Committee supplied themselves from this cargo, being debited with the cost price by the Collector.

13. On the 7th of July the Steamer *T. A. Gibb* arrived with a cargo of 12,476 bags, and there was every prospect of a full supply of rice with which to carry on operations for some time without stint.

Arrival of the *T. A. Gibb*.

14. The Committee then started a system of selling rice at cheap rates to those who could not afford to buy at the prevailing excessive price, and who yet were not so utterly reduced to pauperism as to have a claim to gratuitous support; the sales were to be made at the rate of 8 seers for the rupee. The members of the Committee were authorized to give tickets to deserving persons entitling them to such relief, it being provided that no one person should buy more than three rupees worth at one time.

Committee's sales at cheap rates.

The object of this measure was to reach distressed persons who belonged to other than the ordinary laboring classes.

15. On the 23rd of July, the Committee established a separate hospital shed for small-pox patients, that disease having broken out among the paupers in the town.

Small-pox hospital.

16. At this time the Committee communicated to Mr. Barton their willingness to provide means for carrying on as many centres as were required in Khoorda and could properly be supervised, expressing their opinion, however, that six would suffice for the sub-division.

Centres for Khoorda.

Cooked rations substituted for uncooked rice throughout the district.

17. At the centres in the interior of the district the relief had been given in the shape of uncooked rice till the end of July. As in other districts it was found that the paupers having no facilities for cooking it, and famishing with hunger, devoured the rice raw, which brought on fatal bowel complaints, it was also found that the raw rice was forcibly taken away from the weak by the strong; first, Mr. Ward Lacey and then Mr. Barton urged the distribution of rations of cooked rice, and the system was generally adopted from the beginning of August, the option of receiving the rice raw being given to the paupers at the head quarter centres.

Clothes distributed.

18. In July clothes were distributed by private subscription to the paupers, and by the end of the month, Mr. Livesay, the Assistant Collector, and Mr. Lacey reported a marked improvement in the condition of the people in the north-eastern part of the district.

Difficulty of unloading the *T. A. Gibb*.

19. But the expectation of an ample supply of rice which the arrival of the *T. A. Gibb* had held out was not to be realized. Pooree is an open and unprotected roadstead; a surf rolls off the shore which cannot, in the quietest season, be crossed by any ship's boat. The transit must at all times be made in the peculiar masula boats, of which the pliable planks yield and bend to the buffets of the waves. The number of these masula boats ordinarily kept up at Pooree is very small, being calculated only for shipping the treasure, and for landing the stores which are occasionally sent down by Government steamers; the imports and exports on private account are little or nothing.

20. Soon after the *Arracan* arrived bad weather set in. In unloading her two of the surf boats had been lost.

21. The bad weather continued after the arrival of the *T. A. Gibb*. On the 12th of July 40 bags, and on the 16th one boat were lost. On the 17th and 18th the work was stopped altogether by a gale; it was resumed on the 19th, on which day one boat was overturned and another broken up. On the 20th the Collector reported that the boatmen were becoming "demoralized" from seeing their boats constantly upset and broken to pieces, and this went on week after week. A score or two of bags was lost almost every day; every second or third day a boat or two was broken up or lost. On the 27th three boats were broken, and the number of nineteen boats with which the Collector had begun operations was reduced to six only remaining in working order. On the 28th it was still further reduced to four, and then, in the beginning of August, the weather was so boisterous and the surf so tremendous that all attempts to send out the boats were out of the question for ten days.

22. During the interval the Collector repaired his shattered fleet and fed up 31 starved boatmen, whom he had brought in from the interior of the district, to a condition in which they could work. On the 11th he recommenced work, but he had to contend with the same bad weather and difficulties till the 22nd, from which time the rice was rapidly landed, and the *T. A. Gibb* was cleared on the 31st, having lain off Pooree no less than seven weeks.

23. During this period the officials did all which personal energy and supervision could effect. The duty of remaining on the shore to superintend the landing was undertaken by several

officers for a week at a time. Owing to the extraordinary powers of swimming and of saving themselves in the water with which the Native boatmen are endowed, the crews of the wrecked boats were saved, but it is not a matter of surprise that the boatmen became "demoralized" and required considerable pressure to induce them to embark on each trip. Mr. G. M. Currie, the Assistant Collector, has said—"We went almost so far, I may say, as manslaughter in having induced the boatmen to go out in such weather. Two lives were lost, and some men were sent to hospital injured. They behaved very well, never being accustomed to go out at that season; they did all they could. The number of boats, when I first came, was about seven or eight, and two or three new boats were made. Eventually, we sometimes started with as many as ten after repairs; but that number was soon again reduced to three or four owing to the damages the boats received."

24. During the bad weather a brig with 1,500 bags of rice on private account had arrived from Gopalpore, but she was damaged and had eventually to leave the port with her cargo, although the owner had brought up boats and boatmen on purpose to unload her.

25. The period during which the *T. A. Gibb* was off Pooree was one of distress to the district in general and of anxiety to the officials. The quantities which they were able to land from day to day were so small that there appeared to be no hope of carrying on the relief operations without a break.

On the 20th of July the Collector restricted his sales at market rates to one rupee's worth to each applicant in the town. In the market the rice was then selling for less than 6 seers to the rupee.

On the 25th the Collector reported that thirteen Relief Committees' centres and six Government shops for sale at market price were open, and that Mr. Bond, the Executive Engineer in charge of the works on the Cuttack and Ganjam road, and Mr. Barton, the sub-divisional officer at Khoorda, were both applying for rice, but that he feared to meet their demands lest other operations should break down.

On the 26th, however, the Collector did send 250 bags to Khoorda. At this time the daily consumption was 400 maunds, and 2,000 maunds had been despatched to the centres in the interior during the preceding week.

26. On the 27th of August the Collector made an urgent call on the Commissioner to send rice to Pooree by land from Cuttack. At this time a gale with rain had been blowing for three days, and on the 8th the weather was so boisterous that all transports into the district had been stopped. Fortunately the Relief Committees' godowns were well stocked at the time; but it was necessary to stop sales at market rates to the public from the 13th of August. Although the Collector of Cuttack was at this time much hampered for want of rice, he responded to Mr. Barlow's call, and sent off 300 bags to Pooree on the 13th of August. This supply was received on the 16th at Pooree; 100 bags had been despatched from Cuttack to Khoorda, but these were destined to be delayed.

27. During the continued down-pour of rain the rivers had swollen, and on the 9th the Bargovy burst an embankment; the

Brig from Gopalpore on private account.

Effects of short supply of rice in July and August.

Sales restricted.

Indent on Cuttack for rice.

Inundations.

water was held in a basin two miles in length, inundating five or six villages.

In a day or two another embankment was breached and the floods of the same river submerged the Pergunnahs Puschim-dohai, Attais, and part of Oldhar. The river Noon also breached its embankments to the west of the station, which was surrounded by water. The water was on the face of the country four days, and the Collector anticipated that the crops which had been submerged would be ruined. The floods had risen $4\frac{1}{2}$ feet above the maximum safe level for the Pooree district.

These floods stopped the progress of the rice which was on its way from Cuttack to Khoorda, and as Mr. Barton had not a single bag left, the Collector was obliged to send 100 bags from Pooree, leaving 500 only landed and in store at Pooree.

On the 20th the Collector reported that the waters were running back into the river through the breaches in the embankments, which were being cut in several places to allow them to escape freely.

Condition of people.

28. The condition of the people was described as desperate; all that could be done in the way of relief being but a drop in an ocean.

Nevertheless coarse rice was selling at this time in the market at Pooree for $6\frac{3}{4}$ seers for the rupee.

29. The inhabitants of Mallood and Parricood had contrived, notwithstanding the ruin which the loss of the previous crop had brought upon them, to sow a little land for the crop of 1866. But during the inundation the Chilka Lake burst its embankments and the salt water destroyed all. It was found that a bar had gradually been formed across one of the outlets from the Chilka Lake into the sea, which had dammed in the water till it burst the embankment.

Committees' operations never interrupted.

30. Although the dearth of rice in August had rendered it necessary to discontinue sales to the general public at market rates, the Relief Committee were able to keep their centres in full operation, and indeed four new centres were opened during the month, raising the entire number to fifteen. They were prevented from opening not so much by the want of rice as by the sickness of their Manager, Mr. Ward Lacey, and the difficulty of transit caused by the inundations.

31. The Committee had found it necessary to adopt a still lower rate of sale than that at which they had been selling (8 seers for the rupee); a second class of selected persons were, therefore, allowed to buy at the low rate of 16 seers for the rupee.

32. In the town small pox had been checked; but the mortality had been terribly increased by the inclemency of the weather.

Paupers removed from town into a camp on the sands.

33. At the end of the month it was resolved to remove the paupers out of the town into a camp on the strip of sand which separates the town from the sea; and here sheds enclosed by mats were erected to accommodate 1,500 persons.

Operations in Khoorda restricted in August.

34. During the month of August the Khoorda sub-division did not fare so well as the rest of the district. Mr. Barton was at one time left without a single bag in store; the Tanghy centre, on which 1,000 paupers were dependent, was closed for want of rice. Mr. Barton has told us that a number of deaths was the

immediate consequence of cessation of distribution at any centre; and indeed this must necessarily have been the case.

35. On the 31st August, the day on which the *Gibb* was cleared, the *America* arrived with 7,453 bags of rice; and during September operations were rapidly extended, the shop-keepers being employed as agents for the sale of the Government rice through the district. Rice from Gopalpore again began to come into the district on private account.

Arrival of *America* with rice.

Extension of operations in September.

36. Distress was, however, still at its height. On the 10th of September the Committee recorded that the class whom they had hitherto allowed to purchase rice at the rate of 16 seers for the rupee had now merged into the pauper population, having sold all that they possessed. They therefore discontinued their sales altogether, supplying the destitute gratuitously, and leaving those who could pay to purchase at the Government shops.

Change in operations.

On the 25th the Collector wished to open no less than thirty-four shops.

Opening of thirty-four shops proposed.

In reply, Mr. McNeile warned him of the necessity of keeping close supervision over these shops; and conveyed the Commissioner's sanction to his opening a few at central places, engaging the services of Europeans or Natives on Rs. 100 a month to supervise them.

37. On the 28th September Mr. Barlow left the district, and Mr. Livesay, the Assistant Collector, took charge until the arrival of Mr. Collector Raban on the 6th of October.

Not only did they find it impossible to increase the number of sale shops, but they found that there was danger of the stocks of rice being insufficient to carry on operations on the existing scale.

But found impossible.

38. In September 18,440 bags had been issued, against 8,861 bags in August; and these issues exceeded the estimates which the Commissioner had sent up to the Board in September by 6,000 maunds. On the 10th of October 5,607 maunds only remained in store at Pooree.

Exhaustion of Collector's store of rice.

Under orders of the Commissioner the Collector reduced his sales at market rates by allowing each purchaser to take 8 annas worth only instead of 1 rupee worth which had been the limit.

Sales restricted.

39. The shortness of the stock took the Commissioner by surprise; for Mr. Barton had sent up his statements showing quantities in maunds and not in bags.

The out-turn of every bag was to a greater or less degree short of the nominal quantity (two maunds); but Mr. Barlow debited his stock account with the full nominal weight of the number of bags received, and credited it with the actual weight of the rice which he issued in the town; thus each week's statement showed an erroneously large balance as remaining in store, and the error increased week by week.

This was discovered by Mr. McNeile, who was at once sent down to look into the matter. He found that although there were stocks at the relief centres, the quantity at Pooree was insufficient to last until another ship should come in. The Collector's sales at market rates were, therefore, entirely stopped, and the nine depôts which had been opened for the purpose were closed.

Government sales stopped.

Estimates and supply of rice.

40. At this time Pooree had received the full amount of the Commissioner's estimate less 9,000 maunds. For the next supply the Authorities looked to the S. S. *Asia*, which had been announced by the Board of Revenue for the end of October. The causes which delayed her arrival have been explained in the narrative of the Cuttack district.

The next supply was received by the *Arracan* on the 1st of November.

41. The Committee were able to carry on their operations with the rice which was stored at their different centres, supplemented by the purchase of 15,000 maunds of old unhusked rice, which was supplied to them by the *mohunts* of one of the *muths*, and which they sold at low rates.

Mr. McNeile's report on Pooree arrangements.

42. Mr. McNeile reported that the Committee's arrangements at Pooree were excellent. Besides the pauper camp on the sands, where the rice was distributed and light in-door works carried on, the Committee had established in the town a colony of families who had come from the interior of the district; for these houses had been provided, and the members of each family earned their livelihood by labor.

43. One abuse was, however, brought to light. Since the Committee had discontinued their sales at low rates on the ground that the class which these sales had been intended to relieve had merged into the pauper population, each member of the Committee had been vested with unlimited authority to give tickets, entitling the holders to a supply of uncooked rice.

Some of the Native members of the Committee had made use of this authority to an extreme and unreasonable extent. Tickets were given to priests of Juggernath's temple and others who had no claim whatever to such relief, 20 and even 30 seers being carried off under one ticket. From his own observation Mr. McNeile stated that the really deserving persons formed a small minority in the crowd of recipients. At his suggestion the Committee readily discontinued these promiscuous issues, and made a strict revision of the list of ticket-holders, impressing on the members the necessity of greater discrimination in the issue of such tickets in future.

44. During Mr. McNeile's visit the rice depôt was moved into the Circuit House, where it was almost under the eye of the authorities, and arrangements were made for separating the light laborers from the impotent, and for paying the former in rice and cash instead of cooked food.

Returns of number employed in light labour worthless.

On examining the weekly statements sent in from the different centres, the Committee found reason to pronounce the returns utterly unreliable as regards the number of men who were employed in light works; there was no reason to believe that any fraud had been committed by showing a greater aggregate number of men than had actually received relief; but it was suspected that the *Mohurrirs* and Native Officers in charge of the centres had attempted to make the Committee believe that they had been more strict than had been the case in insisting on all working who were capable of it.

Recommencement of Collector's sales.

45. The Collector's sale at market rates could not be resumed till the arrival of the *Arracan* on the 1st of November with 3,177 bags of unhusked rice, and from a statement furnished to us up to the 17th November it appears that 1,251 bags were sold up to that date.

46. The recommencement of these sales, together with the appearance of the new rice in the market (which took place about the same time) had a marked effect on prices. Prices fall.

Coarse rice, which, on the 1st of November, had been selling for 7½ ths, rapidly fell in price till, on the 23rd, 21 seers were sold for the rupee.

47. On the 25th of November the *Asia* arrived and delivered 10,000 bags at Pooree. Arrival of the *Asia*.

48. During the latter part of the month the Collector, Mr. Raban, visited the interior of the district, and found the condition of the people much improved, on which the Committee directed Mr. Currie, who was now in charge of the relief operations, to close the centres cautiously and to centralize the paupers in a smaller number. It was observed, however, that although the condition of the rural population was fast improving, there was still much distress among the poor but more respectable families in the town of Pooree, especially those which depended on widows for support. Gradual closure of operations.

The system of giving out cotton to be spun by these women in their own houses, the thread being bought by the Committee, was therefore introduced; and in special cases it was determined to give house relief in money.

49. On the 1st of December the *Prince Arthur* brought 437 bags. Arrival of the *Prince Arthur*.

50. On the 13th Mr. Schalch, the Member of the Board of Revenue, who had gone down for the special purpose of making arrangements for the future, met the Committee; it was thought probable that it would be necessary to continue gratuitous relief till February at least, and in some places even till the end of the year 1866. Mr. Schalch's visit.

On the 17th of December H. M. S. S. *Feroze* took the Commissioners to Pooree, and also delivered 900 bags of rice; so that they found the Collector with an ample store. The visit of the Commission.

51. The following statement shows that up to the 17th of November 47,383 bags of rice imported by the Government had been distributed; and exhibits the extent to which operations were carried on in each month:— Extent of operations in each month.

Statement showing the extent of relief operations at different periods.

MONTHS ENDING	QUANTITY OF RICE ISSUED.				OUT OF QUANTITY IN COL. 4.		DAILY AVERAGE OF PERSONS RELIEVED.		
	For cash to Government department at full cost price.	For cash sold to Public at market rate.	Transferred to Relief Committee.	Total of Cols. 2, 3, and 4.	Quantity gratuitously distributed.	Sold at cheap rates to selected individuals.	Number from whom light labor was exacted.	Gratuitously relieved.	Total of Cols. 8 and 9.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
July 28th	Mds. 626	Mds. 2,446½	Mds. 4,058	Mds. 7,130½	Mds. 223½	Mds. 2,600	1,818	1,026	2,844
August 25th	92	3,220	5,549	8,861	2,064½	1,067½	4,172	2,427	6,599
September 29th	280	8,934½	9,226½	18,440½	5,395	2,098½	4,853	4,159	9,012
October 27th	30	3,117½	5,065	8,212½	5,324	173½	5,082	5,764	10,846
November 17th	...	1,254½	3,484	4,738½	3,619½	...	4,632	5,853	10,485
Daily average from 30th June to 17th November.									
Total	1,028	18,673	27,382½	47,383½	16,626½	5,940	4,111	3,846	7,957

Works under the officers
of the Department Public
Works.

52. No provision for original works in the Pooree district was made in the Public Works Budget of 1865-66, except for a few minor projects costing less than Rs. 2,500 each.

Early in December 1865, intimation of the severe distress then existing in parts of the district was received in the Public Works Secretariat of the Bengal Government, and on the 19th* of that month the Lieutenant Governor sanctioned the following grants of money:—

For earth-work on the Cuttack and Ganjam or Madras frontier road	Rs. 44,000
For ditto on the Cuttack and Pooree road	„ 25,000

Both these lines of road run for a few miles of their length through the Cuttack district, but as by far the greater portion of each lies in the Pooree district, for the special relief of which the assignments mentioned were made, it has been considered most correct to notice them in this section of our Narrative.

Both these works were judiciously selected for the expenditure of money designed to afford relief to the distressed district. While the completion of the lines in question is itself a matter of importance, they both run through or in proximity to the parts of the district which were affected at the earliest period of the famine, and throughout suffered with an intensity not surpassed elsewhere.

53. Work on the Cuttack and Pooree road commenced in January 1865: that on the Ganjam road in the following month. Unhappily, owing to the causes explained in paragraphs 152 *et seq.* of our General Report, the expenditure during the remainder of the official year which expired on the 30th April was much smaller than had been anticipated, aggregating only Rs. 3,899 on the Pooree road, and Rs. 9,965 on the Ganjam line. Thus of the liberal funds placed at the disposal of the department by the Government, about four-fifths lapsed on the expiration of the year for which the grants had been made.

54. In 1866-67 provision to the extent of Rs. 33,000 was made for the Ganjam road, of which about Rs. 19,400 had been expended up to the close of November 1866. The work is still in progress. For the Cuttack and Pooree road, a sum of Rs. 50,000 was provided in the Budget, of which the whole was disbursed by the 30th November. No special relief grant was made for the district during the year, but the above works having been commenced in the previous year as relief works may be considered to have been really of that character, and they have been so treated in our report. On the Cuttack and Pooree road, the Executive Engineer has stated that work commenced about the 3rd January; laborers were then paid by the day,—an arrangement which continued to exist for about one month. The people are described by the overseer in charge “emaciated and looking as if they had already suffered.” The usual result followed: the work done was disproportionate to the expenditure of money, and departmental rates rose inordinately. The system of working by petty contracts was then introduced, the rate fixed being Rs. 1-8 per thousand cubic feet of earth-work excavated and removed. This was at once found to be insufficient; the laborers, in their debilitated state, being unable to earn more than four pice or one anna, which, at the prices then

* Secretary's letter, No. 6062. Appendix page (73.)

ruling, could not procure them even one meal a day. Large numbers of the work-people deserted; many of those who remained refused to work, and intimidated others who came for employment. Accordingly, a rate of Rs. 1-12 was substituted about the end of March; this brought a few people to the works, but the rate was still found too low. In May it was again raised as high as Rs. 3-8 per thousand cubic feet, but the want of rice still rendered unsuccessful the attempt to attract laborers. The officers of the department were not permitted to supply their work-people directly, and the local authorities, on whom they were directed to rely for the provision of food, were unable to afford any efficient aid. Not till June, when arrangements to some extent were made for supplying the working parties with food, and the prohibition laid on the Executive Officer was removed, did the high rate of remuneration offered attract work-people to any beneficial extent. Some check was again experienced in August during the heavy rains which fell in that month, but the number again rose in September, and continued to increase to the end of November.

55. The work on the Cuttack and Ganjam road was put in hand early in February 1866. The Executive Engineer has stated in his evidence that laborers at once began to flock in in large numbers, but “those who came across the (Chilka) Lake” (that is from its southern shore), “were in a very emaciated condition; “not so those from Banpore.”

“The able-bodied were paid by the job; the weaker by the day. For the first two months there were about 600 able-bodied and 600 feeble-bodied people; we found the latter doing so little work, and the rates running so high,” that payment by the day was stopped about the beginning of May. The rate for task-work, which had up to that time been Rs. 2-8 per thousand cubic feet, was raised to Rs. 3-12; “this was for “the medium description of soil only.” It was found that even at this rate the women and children, always the first to suffer, could not work. “They were dispersed,” says the Executive Engineer, “and I do not know what became of them.”

56. Of the following Tables, No. 1 shows the expenditure on original works and repairs during the last seven months of 1865-66, that is, from the 1st October 1865 to the 30th April 1866; while No. 2 supplies the same information for the seven months of 1866-67, between the 1st May and 30th November 1866:—

No. 1.

DESCRIPTION OF GRANTS.	Amount of Grant in Rupees.	1865.			1866.				Total expenditure in Rupees.
		October.	November.	December.	January.	February.	March.	April.	
Special grant for improving the Cuttack and Ganjam road (western and north western parts of district)	44,000					2,337	4,636	2,792	9,965
Special grant for metalling the Cuttack and Pooree road (central and southern parts of the district)	25,000				1,234	590	693	1,382	3,899
Minor works costing less than Rs. 2,500 each (over the whole district)	2,395			336		12	572	1,303	2,223
Total	71,395			336	1,234	2,939	6,101	4,477	16,067
Repairs		174	807	1,806	1,443	3,318	2,960	4,479	14,988
Total expenditure		174	807	2,142	2,678	6,257	9,061	8,956	31,073

No. 2.

DESCRIPTION OF GRANTS.	Amount of Grant in Rupees.	1866.							Total expenditure in Rupees.
		May.	June.	July.	August.	September.	October.	November.	
Remodelling and metalling the Cuttack and Ganjam road	33,000	6,464	1,554	1,967	3,217	1,503	2,438	2,280	19,413
Remodelling and metalling the Cuttack and Pooree Road	50,000	4,746	5,617	9,411	5,535	7,061	7,021	10,509	49,906
Minor works costing less than Rs. 2,500 each				122	53	46			221
Total	83,000	11,210	7,171	11,480	8,805	8,610	9,459	12,789	69,534
Repairs		3,106	3,061	2,222	4,310	7,508	7,129	6,325	33,661
Total Expenditure		14,316	10,232	13,702	13,115	16,118	16,588	19,094	1,03,195

Works under Magistrate and Collector.

57. Of the works carried on under the supervision of the Magistrate and Collector and his subordinates, the earliest undertaken were the Satparah tanks to give employment to the people of Malood and Parricood. The money, about Rs. 6,000, were provided, as has been stated, from the fund known as the Government Estate Improvement Fund, which is formed by setting aside 3 per cent. of the annual rents received from those estates.

Then the Narendra tank, in the town of Pooree, was improved by private subscriptions.

Khoorda and Piplee road.

In the end of January, Mr. Barton, the Assistant Magistrate in charge of the Khoorda sub-division, began works on the road which connects Khoorda and Piplee. Laborers flocked in to the work from the distressed parts of the district. A special grant of Rs. 10,000 was made for this road, also from the Government Estate Improvement Fund, to which about Rs. 10,000 were added about the end of May.

At first a limited number of persons only had been employed, and they were paid by the day: subsequently, work was given to all comers, to the able-bodied on the task system at the rate of Rs. 2-5 per thousand cubic feet of earth, and to the weak on the system of payment by the day at the rate of two annas a day for an adult. The arrangement of task work was resisted at first and was not introduced without some difficulty and exercise of firmness, but the plan eventually succeeded.

Difficulty of procuring rice.

58. Till the end of April a daily average number of 763 persons was employed on this road; from that time to the end of August the average number was 800. Mr. Barton has given his opinion that in the early part of the famine work was always available for those who chose to come to him for it. There was always, however, a difficulty as to procuring rice; the Collector not being allowed to buy rice and to store it for sale to the laborers near the works, they had to forage for themselves. To facilitate this, they were spread in small gangs over 20 miles of road. But the difficulty of procuring rice, and the necessity of wasting time which should have been spent in earning money to searching for it over the country, materially interfered with the efficacy of the work as a measure of relief.

Road from Balighai to Madhub.

59. In May, when the famine in the eastern part of the district had become very severe, the Magistrate set works on foot, on a road running from Balighai to Madhub, through Gope, and a grant was assigned for the purpose.

60. At Pooree a special pauper hospital and a small-pox hospital were established; at Khoorda, the head quarters of the sub-division, the sick were treated in the existing charity hospital. Late in the season, a hospital shed was erected at Piplee, and a Native doctor sent out there.

Medical arrangements.

Nothing whatever appears to have been done to provide medical aid at any other place in the district owing to want of agency.

Orphans and deserted children were collected from wherever they could be found, and sent to the orphanages of the Baptist Mission.

Deserted children.

61. The greater failure of the previous crop, the drought and the inundation, all combined to make the famine more terribly felt in Pooree than in any other district. In the southern and north-eastern parts of the district the scarcity had become a famine some months earlier than in Cuttack or Balasore, but unfortunately no rice was imported till a month later than to Cuttack. Certainly private trade was importing something from the south; but from all we have been able to collect, we cannot think that it was adequately supplying the wants of the people in the interior of the district. By June the famine had reached its height, and continued unabated throughout July and August.

Greater suffering than in other districts.

62. We believe that the greatest mortality occurred during those months, and that it was intensified by the bad weather and floods of August.

Mortality.

On this point, however, we find some diversity of opinion among observers, some of the Native gentlemen having stated that the worst was in the hot weather of May and June, and that after that time it was checked by the distribution of the imported rice and also by the jungle fruits and produce which ripened in the rains. In September mortality had fallen to its normal rate in the town of Pooree, but it continued high in the interior of the district for some months.

We fear that the present Collector's estimate of one-fourth as the proportion of the population which has been carried off may possibly be too low for this ill-fated district. It is, as we have before said, impossible to form any estimate which can be confidently pronounced even to approximate to the truth. But we give a Statement, which has been compiled from returns made by the Police in October 1866, which shows a mortality, from all causes, of no less than 35.81 per cent. in the year on a population estimated at 5,88,841 persons, but we are far from relying upon it as at all exact.

*Statement of Mortality in the District of Pooree compiled by the
Police in October 1866.*

NAMES OF PERGUNNAHS.	Number of inhabitants in 1272 U. S.	Number of persons dead.	Percentage of death to population.
1.	2.	3.	4.
Malood	3,329	1,517	25.56
Bujarkote	3,848	1,896	49.33
Parricood	10,235	5,802	56.68
Manikpatna	6,104	4,477	73.34
Chowbeesood	28,654	18,927	66.05
Seeraen	11,384	7,418	65.16
Rahang	48,182	27,519	57.12
Limbhai	41,896	4,000	9.54
Kotrahag	30,889	3,000	9.71
Puschimdoae	18,326	1,498	8.11
Poorboodoae	13,829	5,434	39.29
Kotdes	93,424	39,821	42.62
Banchas	10,067	4,286	42.57
Uttais	13,447	5,886	43.77
Antorodh	20,683	10,020	48.44
Asturang	2,293	1,548	67.50
Kurlo	10,920	5,687	52.07
Kodhar	14,102	7,480	53.04
Murichpore	7,449	4,227	56.74
Domarkhund	12,445	6,913	55.54
Oldhar	8,400	4,104	48.85
Matkutpatun	1,039	436	41.96
Khoorda and Punchgur	1,45,708	29,343	20.13
Rorung	7,176	4,719	65.76
Town of Pooree	25,017	4,908	19.61
TOTAL	5,88,841	2,10,866	35.81

Mortality ascertained by
Mr. Assistant Currie.

Mortality from inundation.

General review.

Possibly some of those who are reckoned among the dead may have emigrated, and may return to their homes. Mr. Assistant Currie has told us that in Kakutpore, he personally ascertained that, out of 309 persons, 92 had died, giving a percentage of 29.77. Most of the houses in this village were occupied by Brahmin families, and the village was well to do. Mr. Currie, therefore, reasonably inferred that in the neighbouring less prosperous villages, the mortality must have been still greater, and indeed he found this to be the case in two other villages in which he made enquiries, but of which he could not give us the particulars. As a specimen of the effects of the inundation, where it cut off villages from their supplies, we refer to the statement made by Mr. Currie that in one village on the Chilka, which had been so isolated by the floods, two persons only remained alive out of the occupants of twenty-eight houses. Doubtless the inundations very materially raised the percentage of mortality.

63. In reviewing the period embraced by this Narrative, it is to be wished that rice had been sent to Pooree as it was sent to Cuttack early in June. When the *T. A. Gibb* did arrive, her cargo, if it could have been promptly landed, would have fully occupied all the means which were available to the Collector for transporting rice inland; the dearth caused by the difficulties of landing was absolutely unavoidable. Everything which was possible was done to remedy it by indenting on Cuttack for rice

imported *via* False Point. The dearth in October might have been anticipated by the local officers in the course of September, and might have been prevented if they had given timely warning. It was unfortunate that the omission to make deductions for short weight and wastage from the amount of stock in hand shown in the weekly statements which were furnished to the Commissioner had the effect of so long disguising its insufficiency; it was also unfortunate that the rice which was actually imported to Pooree before November was not such as to leave margin to meet such contingencies.

We have noticed the liberality of the Rajah of Parricood, and his exertions to help his tenants when they were beggared and starving; and we recognize with pleasure the devoted exertions of Mr. Barlow, the Collector, and the valuable assistance given him by Baboo Ramakhoy Chatterjee; also the action of Mr. Lacey, District Superintendent of Police, who called attention to the prospects of a famine at an early date; Mr. Barton also was judicious and successful in the management of operations in his sub-division.

BALASORE.

The state of the district and the indications of approaching and existing famine up to the end of May have been treated of in our General Report. It is only necessary here to refer to them so far as may be unavoidable in reviewing the measures of relief which were taken.

First organization of Committee and distribution of food.

2. In accordance with the Commissioner's suggestion, a meeting had been called at Balasore in December 1865, at which 400 persons attended; a Committee was appointed consisting of 10 Native gentlemen, with Mr. Bond, the Master Attendant, as their President. The Committee came to the conclusion that no measures of relief were then required in the district, and that there would be no call on them for funds till February. Early in the year an extraordinary increase of violent crimes against property took place; the houses of those who were supposed to possess grain were attacked and plundered by their neighbours, evidently for the purpose of getting food.

3. At the end of January, the Committee, finding the poor flocking into the town, resolved to invite subscriptions and to purchase a store of rice; and on the 13th of February, gratuitous distribution of food began at the pilgrim's rest house known as the dhurmsala; the allowance for each person was 16 ounces of rice, which was soon after reduced to 12 ounces, besides *dāl* (pulse) and vegetables. The number of applicants for relief was at first 1,300, but it fell to 841, as soon as the Committee insisted on making those do light labor who were capable of it. Subscriptions* had been raised in the town, to which additions were made from Calcutta.

State of things in April.

4. In March and April the number of starving people in the town rapidly increased; and on the 2nd of May the Commissioner reported that owing to the extraordinary rise in prices, it had been for some months beyond the means of the poorer classes to procure rice sufficient to support life; and that they were eking out a miserable subsistence by eating roots, herbs, and leaves. The general population had fallen into a state of dejection and had lost the energy necessary to do any thing for themselves. They were swarming into the villages and there dying of cholera, dysentery, or hunger. Even in Balasore the organized relief was utterly insufficient to meet the destitution. A distribution, which the Commissioner had witnessed in April, was a scene of utter confusion; the starving crowds were beyond management; they seized the food as soon as they saw it; and even fell on the Commissioner, snatching from his hands and pockets the pice which he intended to distribute. In the rushes of the crowd many went down, and then they lay on one another, "a writhing mass of disease and distress." So uncontrollable was the attack of the paupers on the pots of cooked food that for a time the Committee were obliged to give out uncooked rice; but in this as in other districts it was soon found that the rice so given was

Distribution in Balasore.

* Up to the end of May, the local subscription amounted to Rs. 3,623, and those raised in Calcutta to Rs. 1,653.

devoured raw, and therefore the Committee reverted to cooked food. Above 5,000 pieces of cloth were distributed in May at the expense of Baboo Shamanund Dey.

Increase of mortality.

5. The crowd of paupers at Balasore contained many strangers, who had come in from the neighbouring tributary estates, Mohurbhunj and Nilghiree. In spite of the efforts of the Committee, the mortality among the paupers was great, and increased terribly in the course of May. On the 17th of May the Magistrate reported that all attempts to make the people work for their living failed. The Ooryahs, he wrote, would rather die than go even a few miles from their homes to procure work.

6. Soon after learning this state of things, the Government of Bengal, in the middle of May, assigned Rs. 10,000, for the relief of the district, from the balance of the North-Western Provinces Famine Relief Fund, which had been placed at its disposal by the Government of India.

First grant of money from the balance of the North-Western Provinces Famine Relief Fund in middle of May.

7. On this Mr. R. B. Chapman, the Secretary to the Board of Revenue, who had in his private capacity been receiving subscriptions in aid of the districts of Orissa, caused a letter to be published in the newspapers, intimating that this grant and similar allotments which had been made to other districts would render further private subscription unnecessary for the present. The Balasore Committee at once recorded their regret that such a letter had been published, as it was evident to them that the grant would be very insufficient to meet the wants of the district. At this time the Government proposed to send down 4,000 maunds of attah which the Commissariat had offered; but the Collector represented that attah would be useless to the people of Balasore, and that they would not buy it; he therefore urged that rice should be substituted, and that it should be sent at once to the mouth of the Balasore River, as food was required for distribution to 3,000 starving people. He added that the Committee were in urgent want of money, and would require at least Rs. 3,000 a month besides the private subscriptions, which amounted to Rs. 1,500 a month.

8. On the 26th of May, the Superintending Engineer, in acknowledging an allotment of Rs. 60,000 for works, reported to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal in the Public Works Department that the assignment was useless for Balasore, as the laborers were all leaving the works because no rice was procurable for the money they earned; that things were as bad at Cuttack and Pooree, and that something should be done immediately.

Employment of labor impracticable for want of rice.

9. On the 30th the Board announced that the *Nemesis* would start in a few days for the mouth of the Balasore River, towing two sloops with 5,000 maunds of rice. The cost price was Rs. 4-8 per maund, and the Collector was directed to take over at this price whatever was required for the Public Departments and the Relief Committees, and to sell the rest to the public. The consignment reached Balasore town on the 9th of June; the rice was at once unladen, and the steamer discharged, the Collector at the same time urging that she be sent down again with a further supply.

First supply of rice.

10. On the 28th May, in reply to a call from the Board, the Commissioner had recommended that rice be imported, through the ports of Balasore, Dhamrah, and False Point, for the use of the

Importation for Public Establishments recommended.

Public Departments and of the Relief Committees, but not for sale to the general public, adding that the general tightness was due to indisposition to sell rather than to an absolute absence of grain in the country.

11. On the 2nd of June, however, the Collector reported that from enquiries which he had made he felt positive that there was not then a supply of rice in the district sufficient to support the people until the reaping of the next crop, and urged importation from Arracan, but only for the supply of the prisoners and for sale to persons in Government employ. He further stated that rice would meet with ready sale everywhere south of Balasore and 20 miles north of it. Other suggestions were made in this report similar to those contained in the Commissioner's report of the 28th May to the Board.

Failure of attempt to induce local merchants to import from Calcutta.

12. At the end of 1865, when the scarcity was foreseen, the merchants of Balasore had declined to sell their grain for export, and 65 sloops, which came from the Madras ports to fetch rice, left Balasore empty. The merchants had also imported some little rice (3,580 maunds only) in four vessels from Chittagong and Arracan. In May the Commissioner and Collector had advised that assistance should be given to traders who wished to import rice from Calcutta, by allowing them a steamer to tow their sloops to the Calcutta and Balasore ports free of expense, but it appears that the owners and crews of Native crafts were averse to sending them to sea at that time of the year; and no application was ever made in Calcutta to the Board of Revenue for a steamer to tow down rice on the private account of the Balasore merchants. The Collector, however, wrote on the 7th of June that the merchants had on their own account ordered 16,000 maunds to Balasore from the Madras ports.

Private imports by land from the north.

13. At this time the importations by land from Midnapore and Hidgellee into the north of the Balasore district were considerable, but hardly sufficient to meet the demand from day to day. Traders were beginning to import from Calcutta through the Hidgellee river, and thence to Balasore, on pack-bullocks; but this was stopped in the middle of June by the rain which made the unmetalled roads impassable, and this was reported by the Collector when giving his opinion that the Board's proposal to import rice into the Balasore district by way of the Hidgellee river was impracticable. Of the grain which the merchants ordered from the Madras Ports, a portion was despatched from Coringa, but some of the sloops being wrecked, the rest did not dare to start till fairer weather set in. Thus the rice did not arrive till September after the greatest urgency was past, and too late to produce much, if any, profit to the speculators.

Failure of expected private imports from southern ports.

Balasore town and port.

14. Balasore is situated seven miles up the River Boorabulung, which falls into the sea at Bulramguree, about 85 miles above False Point. Vessels drawing nine feet of water can, under favorable circumstances of tide, enter the river and go up to Balasore; those of greater draught cannot cross the bar, and must lie three or more miles from the entrance to the river at Bulramguree; at the mouth of the river is a sandy and desolate tract.

Rice supplied by the *Nemesis* in June and July.

15. To this port the *Nemesis* came on the 20th of June with a second cargo of rice; as she could not then go up the river, she was unloaded by lighters which took the rice up to Balasore.

The *Nemesis* then returned to Kedgerree, on the Hooghly river, and brought back the *Dolphin* (a Government vessel) with another cargo. The *Dolphin* was similarly unloaded. The *Nemesis* was thus employed to the end of July.

16. Early in June the Collector had reported great distress in the Bhudruk sub-division, which formed the southern part of his district. In reply to an enquiry from the Board, whether it would not be possible to supply the sub-division by importing through the mouth of the river Dhamrah, which falls into the sea about 50 miles below the Balasore river, and 35 above False Point, the Collector wrote on the 22nd of June that as the mouth of the river was full of dangerous sand banks and was not buoyed, and as no pilots were procurable, it would be impossible to import by that route. He described the arrangements by which he proposed to bring up to Bhudruk in boats and carts, and on pack-bullocks, the rice which he wished to be consigned to him at False Point. He required 15,000 maunds by that route for the supply of the southern part of the district, which was suffering the greatest distress, and which it was impossible to supply by land from Balasore.

Supply for Bhudruk sub-division.

Proposal to send rice into the Dhamrah river.

Collector's first estimate of requirements.

The north of the district was being fed by private importations from Midnapore. The Collector, on another occasion, before the roads became impassable, opposed a proposal to import rice by land through Midnapore, as private trade was already exporting along that route to an extent which kept all available carriage employed.

For the supply of the centre of the district the Collector required 1,500 bags a week to be sent to the mouth of the Balasore river, which he engaged to land and distribute for use in the district.

17. On the 25th June, he wrote again to the Board, revising his demand for the mouth of the Balasore river to 1,000 bags a week, and still asking for 15,000 maunds to be sent to False Point for the supply of the south of the district. In case the rice could not be sent to False Point, he now suggested that it should be sent to the mouth of the Dhamrah in vessels drawing not more than 10 feet of water.

Revised estimate of supply required.

18. Up to the end of July 5,998 bags (nominally 11,996 maunds) had been supplied to Balasore from Calcutta by the *Nemesis* and *Dolphin*. The *Tubal Cain*, with 10,000 bags from Negapatam, was also advised by the Board as likely to arrive on the 20th. On the 21st July, the Collector reported that he hoped to use up her cargo in four weeks; and on the 25th the Commissioner wrote to the Board, on the authority of the Collector, that, in addition to the rice ex *Tubal Cain*, 15,000 maunds more would be required to be landed at Balasore for the supply of the central part of the district, besides 5,000 to 10,000 maunds to be landed at a port further south for the Bhudruk sub-division.

Tubal Cain advised.

Commissioner's estimate.

19. Some time before the receipt of the grants of Rs. 10,000 in May the Relief Committee at Balasore had been re-organized and strengthened by the addition of several European gentlemen, official and non-official. They sent out money and rice to the Bhudruk sub-division and assigned small sums for distribution by the Missionaries at Jellasore and other places; they opened relief centres at Bustah and Soroh; they placed Rs. 1,000 in the hands of the Executive Engineer for the purpose of affording

Relief operations in June.

employment on a road in the interior of the district; at the station they set on foot special works for the purpose of employing those who were capable of more or less labor, and resolved to pay these laborers at the rate of one seer (two lbs.) of rice a day; they determined that the distributions of food, which had up to the 5th of June been made at two places in the town, should in future be at the dhurmsalah only, and that cooked food only should be given. They placed Mr. Police Inspector Green in charge of the distributions at the dhurmsalah; they made arrangements, with the assistance of the Magistrate and Police, for the immediate removal of the sick and helpless from the town and roads to the pilgrim hospital; and they entertained a special conservancy establishment for the removal of corpses.

Employment for women.

Arrangements were set on foot and placed under the direct management of Deputy Collector Moulvie Abdoollah for employing the destitute Mahomedan women by giving them cotton to spin, and for feeding them.

Deserted children.

Provision was made for the care of orphan and deserted children; the charge of a certain number being undertaken by Mr. Muspratt, the Collector, by the Reverend Mr. Miller, a Missionary, and by Moulvie Abdoollah, Deputy Collector.

Shelter for paupers.

The construction of sheds near the dhurmsalah for the shelter of the paupers was taken in hand.

Disposal of the dead.

The bodies of the dead had at first been buried in a pit outside the town; but this plan not succeeding, it was resolved to throw them into the river, which quickly carried them out to sea.

Defects in the arrangements at first.

20. All these arrangements were made in the course of June. As in other districts, abuses and defects were brought to light, and gradually remedied as far as was possible.

Failure of ticket system.

21. The system of giving tickets once for all, which should entitle the holders to daily relief, broke down altogether; it was found that school boys and sub-inspectors of Police were employed to forge tickets; that those who received tickets sold them in the bazar for two pice, and then presented themselves again as applicants. Among such a crowd of persons unknown in Balasore there was little fear of recognition; many were robbed of their tickets, which thus passed into the hands of those who had no claim on charity, and so, among the destitute and helpless, able-bodied men gained admittance into the enclosures in which distribution was made. The issue of tickets was, therefore, abandoned, and a rough system of daily selection and rejection at the time of distribution became unavoidable.

Complaints against management of distributions.

22. Complaints were made that the distributions were disorderly and ill-managed; that the lives of the weak were endangered by the overpowering and uncontrolled crush of the crowd, and that those who were employed to keep order maltreated the applicants for relief.

It was replied that there was no possibility of keeping anything like order in such a crowd or of controlling their movements without some show and even some use of force; that in fact it was necessary to turn the rejected able-bodied applicants out of the enclosure by main strength, but that there was no maltreatment, and no use of force beyond what was absolutely necessary for the public safety. As to the

danger to which the weak and infirm were exposed, of being borne down and crushed, it was pointed out that provision had been made to keep such persons out of the general crowd of applicants, and for their immediate removal to the pilgrim hospital, where they were housed, cared for, and fed daily under the superintendence of Dr. Jackson, the Civil Surgeon.

23. The mortality in the town was lamentably great, but it was explained that nine-tenths of the deaths were of strangers, who had come in from a distance and who were beyond recovery when they reached the town. Mortality.

24. On the 27th of June it was reported that 700 infirm and sick were being fed daily at the hospital, 5,000 were receiving cooked food at the dhurmsalah, and 2,000 were employed on light labor under the superintendence of the Executive Engineer and of a Sub-committee; these were paid daily in uncooked rice. Numbers receiving relief at end of June.

25. At a meeting held about the end of June it was proposed that the paupers, instead of being massed together at the dhurmsalah, should be broken up and distributed into several camps outside the town in different directions. The objection to carrying out this proposal was that there was no agency for the superintendence of operations at more than one centre. Proposal to break up the mass of paupers into several camps rejected.

26. The paupers, therefore, were fed at the dhurmsalah and pilgrim hospital only, till late in the season. So vast a crowd as was allowed to congregate at the dhurmsalah daily, amounting at one time to above 7,000 persons, was obviously beyond control, and although we find no instance of any person having lost his life in the press,* it was certainly no unusual thing for a pauper to be more or less hurt either by the crush, or by those who endeavoured to control the crowd.† So large a crowd unmanageable.

27. Nevertheless there was a gradual improvement in this respect. Dr. Jackson has stated that at first the paupers were ravenous, and having no confidence that the food would reach them in due course, were perfectly uncontrollable; but that the struggling became somewhat less latterly, when they had more confidence that they would be fed in their turn. He adds, however, that there was always a crowding and struggling at the dhurmsalah which made it impossible for all to get food. Gradual improvement.

In the middle of July Mr. McNeile gave a more favorable account, particularly noticing the good order which prevailed at the distributions which he saw.

28. Another objection to the collection of such numbers in one spot was the difficulty of enforcing cleanliness and of keeping up any thing like conservancy in the camp. Difficulty of preserving cleanliness and enforcing conservancy arrangements.

Dr. Jackson has stated that the conservancy was very bad both in the Committee's sheds and in the hospital, and that the hospital was almost unapproachable from filth, for the removal of which he could not get a sufficient number of men. Such work can be done in this country by men of one class only, who are not numerous in Orissa; every available man of that class had been engaged on extraordinary wages, and the mere work of collecting and burying the dead bodies was

* In one instance a child was killed during a distribution; but this was not in the crush: its death was caused by a forcible attempt made by one man to snatch away from the mother food which had been given to her.

† Vide statement of Moulvie Abdoollah, No. 106, p. cxlviii.

frequently more than they could get through. Dr. Jackson, however, believed that the conservancy difficulty at the hospital and sheds might have been diminished if the paupers had been distributed over more places.

Paupers should have been distributed from the first into several camps.

29. We are of opinion that the suggestion which was made for breaking up the mass of the paupers into several camps should have been carried out when it was first made at the end of June. Its advantages were great, and the difficulties of finding agency available for the superintendence of such camps might have been overcome then as was done later in the season.

Government shops for open sales of rice at about the market rate to public in general.

30. Early in July shops were opened in several places in the town for sale of rice to all comers at a price only just below the market rate. Mr. Assistant Magistrate and Collector Rampini, who had been posted to the district specially for the superintendence of relief operations, managed these successfully. From the 9th of July, when these shops were opened, to the 18th, when Mr. McNeile wrote, the daily average sale had been 54 maunds.

Committee's shops for sale at cheap rates to selected persons.

31. Three shops were also opened by the Committee for sale at low prices to those who were considered to be in need of such relief, at which the sales averaged 60 maunds daily.

The time of sale and the rice available daily being limited, the struggling at these low price sales appears to have defied all attempts to control. Dr. Jackson, whose devotion and indefatigable personal exertions were remarkable, held such sales daily at his house after he came in from his medical duties at the hospital. He has told us that the door of his house has been broken in, and the coat torn off his back by women, who were eager to buy the rice.

Shops opened in the interior.

32. Before the end of July, Government shops had been opened at several places in the interior, and Mr. Manson, Assistant Collector, had been sent out to Soroh, 22 miles south of Balasore, to superintend the operations there.

Operations receive a check.

33. On the 27th of July the operations received a check. The Collector reported that the rice in his store would last but a few days longer.

On the 30th Government sales were stopped in the town for the want of rice, and the market price at once rose in consequence to five seers for the rupee. On this the Collector borrowed 1,000 maunds from the Jail store, and with this supply managed to prevent the entire stoppage of relief operations.

Closure of Government sales.

The closure of the Government sales from the 2nd to the 20th August was, however, unavoidable, although the Collector was anxious to open many more shops about the district.

34. The *Nemesis* brought up two sloops with rice on the 4th, but the Collector reported on the 9th that his stock was exhausted, and that of the Jail reduced to a very low ebb; and on the 13th and 14th, that the people of the town were subsisting principally on a grain called kultee.

Cause of dearth of rice.

Difficulty of unloading the *Tubal Cain*.

35. This dearth of rice continued till near the 20th of August; at the very time when it began, a Government vessel, the *Tubal Cain*, was lying off the mouth of Balasore river with a cargo of rice consigned to the Collector. She had arrived on the 21st of July, but her draught of water was so great that she

could not come within eight miles of the shore; the country boats and sloops could not get out to her without the assistance of a steamer to tow them.

36. Had the *Nemesis* been available, the unloading would have been quickly done; but that steamer had left Balasore a day or two before. The authorities had been duly warned to make arrangements for unloading the *Tubal Cain* about the date on which she actually arrived, but at this time the Bhudruk subdivision was in an extremity for want of rice, which had been promised early in July, and the *Guide* was lying at Hidgellee with the rice on board, and had been waiting several days for the *Nemesis* to tow her down. When at last the *Nemesis* was released from Balasore duty to take the *Guide* to Dhamrah, it was hoped that she would be back in two or three days to discharge the *Tubal Cain* at Balasore, where the need at that time was not so urgent. Unfortunately the *Guide* ran aground in the Dhamrah river, and the *Nemesis* was detained several days till she got off. She returned to Balasore on the 1st of August, but by this time the weather had become so bad that the Captain of the *Tubal Cain* no longer dared to remain in his position, and left in tow of the Government S. S. *Agitator*, with the intention of lying at Hidgellee, between which place and Balasore the *Nemesis* could run backwards and forwards and unload her.

The machinery of the *Agitator*, however, went wrong, and she was obliged to cast off the *Tubal Cain*, which was driven by stress of weather across the Bay into Akyab.

37. Thus the supply of rice was unexpectedly snatched away almost from the mouths of the people of Balasore, the result of which was much misery throughout the first half of August. *Tubal Cain's cargo lost to Balasore.*

38. It was during this dearth that the mortality among the paupers in Balasore reached its appalling maximum. In the first twelve days of August the Police removed 1,013 corpses from the town. *Mortality in the town reaches its maximum.*

Bad weather set in on the 8th of August, and on that day no less than 245 deaths took place, followed by 151 on the 9th. The Police, both officers and men, exerted themselves to the utmost in removing the bodies; but three days passed before they could clear the town of the effects of the terrible mortality of these days. The Collector has stated that the average number of deaths at this time was 126.

39. The deaths were not the immediate consequence of starvation alone. Mr. Shuttleworth, the District Superintendent of Police, whose Inspector managed the distributions of the dhurmsalah, has stated in his evidence that relief was never refused in bad weather; but the state of debility and disease to which the paupers had been reduced by insufficiency of food was such that they succumbed at once when exposed to rain and cold. *Deaths due to debility and exposure.*

Long before August, however, sheds had been built, which, with the dhurmsalah, would have afforded ample accommodation to all; but the majority of the paupers would not take shelter in them, and preferred wandering about the town begging and picking up what they could, and then lying about under trees or in the verandahs of houses, in which they were exposed to the wind and rain. They kept nothing which was given to them for comfort or protection from the weather. The clothes supplied by the liber-

Sheds had been erected; but were not much used.

ality of Baboo Shamanund Dey, and the hoods made of palm leaves which were served out to protect their heads from the rain; were at once sold, and opium was often bought with the proceeds.

State of the Bhudruk sub-division from May to beginning of August.

40. In the mean time, the distress in the Bhudruk sub-division, in the south of the district, had been most severe. It had come suddenly upon the people, as on the 1st of May, when the Collector visited Bhudruk, no signs were apparent; indeed, as stated by Mr. Shortt, crops had been better in that sub-division than in the centre of the district, and the exports had been less. In March and April, however, grain dacoity and incendiarism had increased fearfully. Mr. Shortt constantly discussed the prospects with intelligent landholders; their opinions varied, but very few, if any, anticipated a great famine.

First relief operations in Bhudruk.

41. In the middle of May, while out on settlement duty, Mr. Shortt observed that the supply of rice at the markets was unusually small and that it was greedily bought up. He reported to the Collector that rice was selling at $3\frac{1}{2}$ seers of 80 tola for the rupee, and that numbers of people were starving. The Collector at once sent down Rs. 100 and 100 maunds of rice for the use of the Jail, for sale to public servants, and for gratuitous distribution in relief.

On the 12th of June a further sum of Rs. 1,000 was sent.

The Commissioner directed the establishment of a branch Relief Committee at Bhudruk, and that rice should be supplied from the cargoes which had been imported to Balasore.

Committee appointed.

A Committee was appointed on the 7th, and commenced distribution at Bhudruk. Many able-bodied were denied relief, unless they would work. At first they refused; but gradually accepted the employment which was offered, and by the 30th of June 1,276 were working and 84 receiving gratuitous relief.

Difficulty in finding trustworthy Agency at Bhudruk.

42. Mr. Shortt had to contend against great difficulties. At first he employed every person who had any pretension to respectability, such as his ministerial officers, and the attorneys practising in his Court, to assist in the distribution of relief; but several cases of peculation and fraud were detected. Those to whom he entrusted the selection of persons who were deserving of relief tickets made money by selling the tickets.

Rice supplied to Bhudruk from Balasore.

43. On the 1st of July Mr. Shortt sent an urgent request for rice from Balasore, wherewith to open relief centres in the interior of his sub-division, which were urgently required, as the people died on the road in attempting to come into the relief house at Bhudruk, or arrived so far reduced that food could not restore them. The number relieved had risen to 2,500 daily who were able to work, and 800 idlers who were cared for at the hospital. Sheds were being put up for the shelter of the paupers.

Two hundred and fifty bags, nominally 500 maunds of rice, were supplied to Bhudruk from Balasore, but from the beginning of August the stock in Balasore did not admit of any further supplies being sent.

Mr. Shortt's estimate for Bhudruk.

44. On the 21st Mr. Shortt reported that he would require 500 maunds a week. Mr. Deputy Collector Woodward had been sent down to assist him in his operations.

First attempt to supply Bhudruk through the Dhamrah.

45. In June the Board determined to supply the Bhudruk sub-division, if possible, by rice imported through the mouth of the Dhamrah River.

46. Mr. Branch Pilot Stout, who had a personal knowledge of the port, acquired years before, volunteered to take in the pilot brig *Guide*. She was unfortunately laid up at the time, and could not be got ready for some days; at the end of which she was laden with 5,000 bags and despatched on the 10th July. She had to wait till about the 22nd at Hidgellee near the mouth of the Hooghly, until the *Nemesis*, which was supplying Balasore, became available to take her in tow. Thus, although preparations had been made for landing her cargo in accordance with the Board's advice of the 30th of June, she did not arrive at the mouth of the Dhamrah river till about the 24th of July.

Pilot brig *Guide* sent to Dhamrah.

47. On the 11th Mr. Shortt had written that his stock of rice was running out, while applicants for relief were rapidly increasing in number, and on the 18th that there was no rice left at Bhudruk, and that if any further delay occurred in the arrival of supplies, no population would remain within 15 miles of the sea-shore. He also wrote that 100 boatmen whom he had collected, some from a distance of 50 miles, were awaiting the arrival of the *Guide* in idleness. Indeed from the middle of July till the arrival of the *Guide*, Mr. Shortt, who was at the mouth of the Dhamrah expecting her constantly, pressed on the notice of the Collector, officially or demi-officially, the state of destitution to which his sub-division was reduced for want of rice. When the *Guide* did arrive, she ran aground, and the *Nemesis* could not get her off for some days; and during this unexpected delay Balasore was being starved for want of the *Nemesis* to take the rice out of the *Tubal Cain*, as she lay in the roadstead. At last 2,500 bags were taken out of the *Guide* and despatched to Bhudruk, which they reached on the 10th August, from which time only centres were opened in the interior and relief given on a considerable scale.

Mr. Shortt's representations of want of rice in July.

Guide runs aground.

48. In examining the causes which led to the failure of the supply to the town of Balasore and to the entire of the district, we observe that even while the *Guide* was laying at Hidgellee waiting to be towed to Dhamrah, the *Nemesis* was kept engaged in supplying Balasore for some days. She was not diverted from this service to tow down the *Guide* until Balasore had been so supplied that the stock was considered sufficient to last during the four or five days at the end of which her return was expected. At this time the *Tubal Cain*, though daily expected, had not arrived at Balasore. The grounding of the *Guide* in the Dhamrah, which detained the *Nemesis* some days, and the bad weather which prevented her unloading the *Tubal Cain* on her return, were circumstances which could not be foreseen. We must remark, however, that Balasore was absolutely dependent on the services of the *Nemesis*, and of the *Nemesis* alone, for the continuity of its supply, and looking at the disastrous results which a failure must have entailed, and at the issues which depended on her return exactly at the time, we think that it was a hazardous step to divert her from this service to another, more specially to such a service as towing a ship into the mouth of the Dhamrah. In making such an attempt of avowedly doubtful success, delay from unforeseen causes might fairly have been anticipated; moreover, as was illustrated in the case of the *Tubal Cain*, it would have been prudent at that season of the year to make allowances for the very possible contingency of bad weather.

Examination of the cause of the failure of supply to Balasore town.

Employment of *Nemesis* to tow the *Guide* not unavoidable.
Conqueror available.

We do not find that there was any absolute necessity for employing the *Nemesis* on Dhamrah duty; the *Conqueror*, a private steam vessel, drawing 9 or 10 feet of water, and other vessels of her class, might have been hired in July.* The *Guide*, which was to be towed down, drew 13 or 14 feet. The *Conqueror* was actually hired and employed on Dhamrah duty late in the season.†

The *Guide* was not ready for despatch for 10 days after the Board had resolved to send her to Dhamrah. This gave ample time to secure the *Conqueror* or any other such steamer; but it appears that the Master Attendant was not authorized to engage private vessels for the import duty till August,‡ and in fact the expediency of taking up any other steamer for the purpose does not appear to have occurred to any of the authorities concerned.

Conqueror should have been engaged for import service throughout the operations.

49. Nor was it for this one trip only that the *Conqueror* could have been advantageously employed. The *Nemesis* was very fully occupied from the beginning of June in supplying Balasore, and indeed had more to do than she could get through.

We think that even if the *Conqueror* could not without hazard have crossed the bar at Balasore, there would have been ample work for her had she been taken up in June, as she subsequently was in August. She might have plied between Calcutta and the Balasore Roads as well as between Calcutta and the Dhamrah. Later in the season she did actually pass over the Balasore bar.

50. Had she been engaged, not only would the interruption of the supply to Balasore, at the end of July and in August, have been avoided, but the ten days' delay, during which the *Guide* was waiting for the *Nemesis*, would not have occurred, and the Bhudruk sub-division would have been saved as many days of appalling distress and starvation.

Measures taken to supply Balasore when the *Tubal Cain* was driven away.

51. As soon as it was known that the *Tubal Cain* had been driven to Akyab, and that her cargo was lost to Balasore, the Board sent down two small Government steamers, the *Celerity* and *Teesta*, with rice to Hidgellee. These steamers could not go to sea at that time of the year; they were, therefore, met at Hidgellee by the *Nemesis*, which carried the rice to Balasore. The first instalment arrived there on the 18th of August; and on the same date a sloop brought in a cargo on private account, but before this the Collector had been obliged to buy rice in the local market to carry on his operations. On the 17th he had reported it to be scarcely procurable, and the market price to be above one rupee for four seers.

52. From the 18th August the *Nemesis* was running backwards and forwards between Balasore and Hidgellee.

The *Arracan* arrived before the end of the month, and the *Royal Bride* early in September; still up to the middle of September the period was one of much anxiety, and close calculation as to how the rice should be distributed to the different centres so as to make it last till the next consignment should come in. On the 17th of September the Collector wrote that the day before 82 bags had been sold, which brought down the market price from 3 seers to 5½ for the rupee.

At this time three vessels arrived on private account with 7,800 maunds of rice from Coringa.

* Vide Captain Howe's statement, No. 105, p. cxxxv.
 † Ditto answer 25.
 ‡ Ditto answers 25 and 77.

53. About this date the Calcutta Relief Committee sent back to Balasore by ship 250 paupers belonging to that district who had been found in Calcutta. They had been well fed up in Calcutta and quickly dispersed to their homes; but we think that the Board acted wisely in remonstrating against the return of any more Ooryah paupers to their districts; no more were sent back.

Paupers from Calcutta.

54. On the 9th of September the Collector wrote demi-officially that three new shops had been opened in the interior; that 117 bags had been sold in one day, and that the district was then beginning to recover from the effect of the dearth which followed the departure of the *Tubal Cain*. He complained that the rice supplied to him had been insufficient to keep employed his means of landing, and that the craft which were employed for landing had done no more than one week's work out of six.

Operations fully resumed.

55. On the 28th, however, he wrote demi-officially to Mr. McNeile that the sales were falling off; that early in October 30,000 maunds had arrived, and more was pouring into the district, brought up on private account from the Madras ports, the weather being favorable. On the 10th of October the Madras rice, or rather the rice imported from the Madras ports (for some of it was recognized as grain which had been grown in the Balasore district and exported) was selling at about 13 seers for the rupee; but little was being sold at the Government shops. It was, however, considered desirable still to keep them open so as to prevent the market price from flying up again. On the 18th, rice of the early crop was selling freely in Balasore, but the Collector would not buy it for the paupers, as rice is unwholesome when so new.

Falling off in demand for Government rice.

Importation by merchants.

56. Although after the middle of August the supplies of rice to Balasore were sufficient to carry on the operations of the Relief Committee and the Government sales on a very considerable scale throughout the centre of the district to the middle of October, when imports on private account began to supply the market, the case had been different in the Bhudruk sub-division. Two hundred and fifty bags of rice had been supplied to that sub-division from the first appearance of distress up to the middle of July; from that time to the 10th of August, when the cargo of the *Guide* reached Bhudruk, the Collector could assist the sub-division with money only, and urgent as were the requirements, nothing could be done in the way of relief except at the head quarters of the sub-division.

Supply to Bhudruk and relief operations in August.

57. Soon after the *Guide* arrived, the rivers rose as in Cuttack and inundated the country about them to an unusual extent. In the eastern part of the sub-division the early crop was injured; houses were swept away; the people were perishing of cold, exposure, and hunger, being cut off by the flood from access to supplies. The grain dealers had closed their shops, declaring truly or falsely that they had no rice left. On the 25th August rice was sold at Dhamnuggur, 10 miles south of Bhudruk, at the rate of one rupee per seer, the highest price which we find mentioned as having been reached at any time and place throughout the famine.

Effect of inundation.

Centres of gratuitous relief opened in the interior.

58. On receipt of the cargo of the *Guide*, Mr. Shortt established relief centres in all directions throughout the sub-division. Within a fortnight six had been opened; four more were soon added; the maximum number was eleven.

No sales of rice in Bhudruk.

59. Although these eleven centres were established for gratuitous distribution to the destitute, the scanty supply of rice did not admit of anything being done, as in Balasore and elsewhere, towards supplementing the want of rice in the markets by selling the imported rice to those who were in a position to give money in exchange.

On the 12th Mr. Shortt reported that if such sales were to be made he would require a further supply of 10,000 maunds, otherwise that the cargo of the *Guide* would last till November for the mere purpose of gratuitous relief to the destitute. He recommended further importation through the Dhamrah.

60. On the 16th August, the Board gave notice of another despatch of 3,500 bags to the Dhamrah; on hearing of which the Collector, on the 17th, wrote to the Commissioner that no more would be required at the Dhamrah for a month.

Supply to Dhamrah by *Twinkling Star* in tow of *Conqueror*.

About the 23rd of August the *Conqueror*, with the *Twinkling Star*, brought 2,600 bags to the Dhamrah, and from this time these two vessels were employed in supplying the Bhudruk sub-division from Calcutta through that port.

61. The *Twinkling Star* was a little sailing ship drawing not more than 7 feet of water; she was engaged by the Government immediately she was launched in August; and from that time was continuously employed on the rice import service. After the *Guide* had found her way into the Dhamrah in July, there was no longer any difficulty in the matter; a few buoys were dropped which guided all subsequent ships. In September, Mr. Harris was deputed by the Master Attendant to make a regular survey of the river, which he accomplished.

Mr. Shortt's increased estimate of requirements.

62. On the 1st of September, Mr. Shortt had increased his estimate of requirements to 30,000 maunds, as the very least which would be required up to the end of December, to carry on gratuitous relief only. This estimate was supported by the Collector on the 17th.

State of Bhudruk in September.

63. To enable him to make sales, much more would be necessary. There was little or no rice in the country; the number of starving applicants was increasing; the middle classes even had long before bartered or sold off every thing they possessed, and the owners of crops were unable to pay for the labor necessary for their cultivation. Any quantity of labor was procurable for payment in rice, but none for money wages.

On the 4th of September, when rice was selling at Balasore for 6 seers, the price at Dhamnuggur was a rupee for 2½ seers.

Supply of rice to Bhudruk insufficient.

64. On the 7th the Collector reported to the Board that the small supplies furnished by the *Conqueror* and *Twinkling Star* were insufficient for the Bhudruk sub-division; he recommended that the *Guide*, which could carry a much larger cargo, should be sent in tow of the *Conqueror*, and urged the necessity of opening Government sales to the public.

He was trying to send rice by land from Balasore to Bhudruk, but bullocks were scarce, as those which had not been sold to travelling merchants were employed in agricultural opera-

tions. On the 10th he estimated the full requirements of Bhudruk, if Government sales were opened, at 50,000 maunds.

65. On the 14th of September, it was reported that a holder of 10,000 maunds of paddy in Bhudruk had thrown his stock into the market. This had the effect of bringing down the price to 4½ seers for the rupee.

On that date, however, Mr. Shortt reported that his supply was so scanty that he had been obliged to stop issues to the Police and to Government Establishments; the Government rice was all required for the payment of labor and for gratuitous relief.

66. The Board had engaged to supply in full his indent for 50,000 maunds in all October, but the promise did not meet the immediate want.

67. At this time a second inundation swept the south-eastern portion of the sub-division. The unusual floods of August had done considerable damage to the early rice crop. In the middle of September, the Brahminee and Byturnee rivers rose again. Mr. Shortt travelled from Bhudruk to the Dhamrah, passing over the inundated tract; the country was a sea as far as the eye could reach; the villages only appeared above the waters. In his statement before us, Mr. Shortt estimated that the crops over one-ninth of the area of his sub-division had been destroyed by the inundations of the season. As long as the inundation was over the country, the distress and difficulties of the people were terribly enhanced. In the last days of September, it was reported to the Board that the rice in the Bhudruk depôts was running out; distress was increasing; another cargo at the Dhamrah was urgently required. The Board replied on the 29th that the *Coringa*, with a cargo of 5,000 bags, would reach the Dhamrah in the first week of October, and would be followed by the *Arracan* with 7,400 bags. So great was the want of the sub-division, however, that the Collector was obliged to send rice by land from Balasore to Bhudruk.

Second inundation in south of district.

Announcement of the probable arrival of the *Coringa* at Dhamrah.

Rice supplied to Bhudruk from Balasore.

68. On the 9th of October, two sloops were sent down to the Dhamrah in tow of the *Conqueror*, that they might be ready to unload the *Coringa* and the other promised ships as soon as they should arrive; but no vessel made its appearance.

On the 13th the Collector reported that he was sending 1,200 bags from Balasore to the Dhamrah by land and in sloops in tow of the *Nemesis*.

69. Up to the 13th the *Conqueror* was detained at the Dhamrah on demurrage of Rs. 300 a day, in the daily expectation of the arrival of the *Coringa*, which had been advised for the first week in October. The *Coringa*, as has been stated in the Narrative of the Cuttack district, had actually arrived off the Coast at the expected time; but had put in to False Point. At that moment the pressure in Cuttack for want of rice was very great, and the officials at False Point had at once unloaded her and appropriated her cargo to their own district. As soon as this was known at Bhudruk (which was not till the 12th), the *Conqueror* was sent away.

70. On the 17th of October the *Arracan* arrived with 3,000 bags; but this supply was soon exhausted, and the Collector repeated his urgent calls. Early in November new rice was selling in Bhudruk at 24 seers for the rupee. When the price was 20 seers, Mr. Shortt had tried to buy in the market for his relief

Arrival of the *Arracan* at Dhamrah.

centres; the immediate effect was to send the price up to 9 seers per rupee: he therefore gave up the attempt. During this dearth Mr. Shortt successfully protested against a proposed arrangement to send some of the rice which was imported at the Dhamrah over to Jajpore for the supply of that sub-division which forms the northern part of the Cuttack district.

State of Bhudruk sub-division at the end of October.

71. On the 25th of October Mr. Shortt reported that the distress was still very great; that the country bore traces of famine, inundation, and pestilence. Unsown lands, ruined houses, and living skeletons met the eye everywhere. In the preceding week the daily totals of persons who had received gratuitous relief at the eleven centres which had been established in the district amounted to 2,03,000, giving a daily average of 29,000.

Arrival of the *Robert Henderson*.

72. About the 4th of November, the *Robert Henderson* arrived at the Dhamrah with 10,636 bags; but by that time the new crop had rendered it no longer necessary for the Government to sell to those who had money wherewith to buy. In transporting the rice from the Dhamrah by boats and land to Bhudruk for storage, Mr. Shortt had again to contend with very great difficulties from the dishonesty of his agency. By the time the rice was delivered at Bhudruk, 60 seers were rarely to be found in a bag which should have contained 80. Mr. Shortt wrote—"Boat-men, bullock drivers, cartmen, Police and paupers vie with one another in rascality; and harsh and gentle measures are alike unavailing." He succeeded, however, in checking the pilfering, at the expense of much labor, by causing the bags to be weighed at every place at which the responsibility for their safe custody was transferred from one person to another.

Difficulties of transport from the Dhamrah to Bhudruk.

73. The arrival of the *Royal Bride* early in October had kept Balasore and the centre of the district well supplied till the latter part of the month; but at the time the drain of rice from Balasore to Bhudruk began to be seriously felt, as it had disturbed the Collector's estimates for the centre of the district.

Supply at Balasore scanty at end of October.

On the 19th the Collector reported this to the Board, and called for another supply. He was obliged to buy in the local market both for Balasore and Bhudruk, although the price was rising. He also procured a supply from the Collector of Midnapore. As, however, the state of the market was now such that the Collector could buy on the spot what the Committee required, and he had been authorized by the Board to do so, the operations were not materially checked; and by the middle of November, the Committee refused an offer of more imported rice, as they were purchasing at all the centres as much as they required. The Government sales at market rates had been finally closed on the 5th of November, on which day the Collector reported that public health was improving and trade reviving. Soon after the majority of the paupers dispersed and returned to their homes, so that 1,500 only remained in Balasore.

Gradual recovery of the district in October and November.

74. The recovery of the Bhudruk sub-division was slower. On the 10th of November, the Board, learning that rice could be bought at a rupee per 20 seers in that sub-division, directed the Collector to buy 7,000 maunds and to send it round to False Point with the utmost despatch. It was, however, found impracticable to purchase any such quantity. The want of the Cuttack district was met by sending round to False Point the *Thurso*, which had arrived at the Dhamrah.

Extent of relief operations.

75. The total quantity of imported rice received in the Balasore district up to the 24th of November (the date to which the statements furnished to us by Mr. McNeile are made up) was 38,105 bags, nominally 76,210 maunds. The following Table shows in what manner the rice had been used, and also exhibits the extent of the relief operations in different months:—

MONTH ENDING.	QUANTITY OF RICE ISSUED.				OUT OF QUANTITY IN COLUMN 4.		DAILY AVERAGE OF PERSONS RELIEVED.		
	For cash to Government Department at full cost price.	For cash sold to Public at market rate.	Transferred to Relief Committee.	Total of Columns 2, 3, and 4.	Quantity gratuitously distributed.	Sold at cheap rates to selected individuals.	Number from whom light labour was exacted.	Gratuitously relieved.	Total of Columns 8 and 9.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
June 30th	Mds. 100	Mds. ...	Mds. 2,276	Mds. 2,376	Mds. 1,852	Mds. ...	3,175	8,297	11,472
July 28th	400	1,796	4,942	7,138	3,182	1,885½	3,619	20,362	23,981
August 25th	767	1,107	7,242	9,116	4,687	1,736	4,307	16,289	20,596
September 29th	1,664	4,480	16,071½	22,215½	11,349½	3,295½	4,307	30,927	35,234
October 27th	1,536	3,013	17,026½	21,575½	13,016	3,394	6,028	33,563	39,591
November from 1st to 24th..	6	130	12,870	13,006	12,730	1,332	5,878	22,232	28,110
Total	4,473	10,526	60,428	75,427	46,816½	11,643			
							Daily average from 18th June to 24th November.		
							4,552	21,945	26,497

76. The maximum number of centres open for gratuitous relief, including the eleven in the Bhudruk sub-division, was twenty-two, the distance between them ranging from five to twenty-two miles, but averaging twelve miles. Shops for the sale of rice to those who had money were opened at seven places besides Balasore town, in which three shops were established. At the relief centres, up to the 12th September, one meal a day was given; the quantity was first fixed at 5 chittacks of rice in addition to pulse and vegetables; subsequently, it was raised, at the recommendation of the Civil Surgeon, to 8 chittacks, and from September it was served out in two daily meals.

Relief in rice by gratuitous distribution and sales.

77. To the relief from the supply of grain was added the disbursement of a considerable sum of money in the district. From a return furnished to us by the Board of Revenue it appears that the following sums were made available to this district in the year —

Relief in money.

From balance of N. W. P. Relief Fund	...	Rs. 1,81,000
Granted by Calcutta Relief Committee	...	" 51,000
From subscriptions	...	" 20,920
Total		Rs. 2,52,920

The Collector informs us that of the money placed at the disposal of the Relief Committee Rs. 1,26,000 were paid to Government as the price of imported rice supplied to them, which being deducted would have left Rs. 1,26,920 available for expenditure on local relief.

Private charity.

78. Something was also done by private individuals in different ways towards relieving the poor, especially their own dependents; but it is impossible to measure the amount of good done in this way. The universal opinion appears to be that the leading Native merchants and gentlemen at the towns of Balasore and Bhudruk acted liberally, but that the zemindars, as a body, neither did nor cared to do anything appreciable for their tenantry.

Light labor.

79. The paupers who were capable of light labor were employed by the Committee in erecting huts, carrying water, cleaning tanks, making and repairing roads, spinning thread, weaving cloth, &c., the works being superintended by members of the Committee in person. The work done was, in many cases, little more than nominal; but it was an object to give the paupers the semblance of earning their own livelihood.

Rice provided for laborers.

80. Towards the end of May, the Executive Engineer reported that, on certain special works at Bhudruk and Jajpore, food could not be obtained, and that to prevent the work-people from deserting, he had been compelled to send rice in small quantities for their use. This arrangement was permitted to continue undisturbed on the special works referred to, but was not extended to the works of the division generally until the end of July. The Government then authorised the public works officers to purchase rice from the district officer, and to sell it to their work-people at cost price. At no time do any of the works appear to have been actually suspended for want of rice, although that result was more than once threatened.

Works under the Department Public Works.

81. No special works were undertaken by the Public Works Department during the official year 1865-66 expressly in consequence of the famine, nor until July 1866; and the cost of such works which were then undertaken was estimated at less than Rs. 5,000. The works for which funds were allotted in the ordinary Budgets were, however, considerable, and were actively prosecuted by the Executive Engineer Mr. Windle and his subordinates. He has told us that the people were unwilling to work, and that his subordinates "used every effort to induce people in want of employment to seek it." The opinion that the people were unwilling to work seems to have been entertained by several officers; but the Revd. Mr. Miller, speaking from his own experience, has stated—"I do not think that it is the case that a large proportion of them died because they would not work. I was in the working Committee. I had no difficulty in getting those to work who could work. I think that the Executive Engineer has been deceived in the matter. The people said that on the public works they were required to work by contract and paid weekly on Saturday night: that they were too weak to keep soul and body together on the rates allowed, and could not subsist during the week till paid. I made enquiry at the time, and was convinced of the reasonableness of what they said." As a fact we find that the Executive Engineer was able to obtain labor enough to use up the full amount of money which was placed at his disposal for new works in 1865-66, Rs. 1,18,224 besides Rs. 11,731 for repairs. The total Rs. 1,30,155 probably, represents a daily average of something like 3,500 laborers employed throughout the seven months of 1865-66 which constitute the ordinary working season.

82. In May 1866, the number appears to have been about the same; from June to October it may have averaged 2,500 daily;

but as the rates varied and no record of the number of laborers was kept, the estimate is little better than a guess founded on the amount expended. Whatever backwardness existed was no doubt due, in a great measure, to the rates prevalent in the division, under the petty contract system described in our General Report, although they were about 30 per cent. above ordinary rates. For earth-work Rs. 2-8 was allowed per 1,000 cubic feet with a lead of about 100 feet. The Executive Engineer has recorded that this was insufficient to provide each laborer with a proper quantity of rice at the prices then ruling. On his application, the Superintending Engineer, on the 31st May, directed that such rates should be introduced as would enable an able-bodied man to earn money sufficient to buy $\frac{1}{2}$ seer (1lb.) of rice per diem, women and children being paid in proportion. On the 13th June, this quantity was increased to 1 seer (2lbs.) for each able-bodied man. The rate for earth-work was accordingly raised to Rs. 3-2 per 1,000 cubic feet. These enhanced rates continued in force until November 1866, when the improved state of the country and better condition of the laboring population admitted of their being lowered about one-sixth. The rate for earth-work then became Rs. 3-2 per thousand cubic feet; still later in the year, a further reduction took place as regards ordinary works, but on relief works the November rates were still maintained at the close of 1866.

In this district, as throughout Orissa, payment in cash for piece-work was the rule, with very rare exceptions. It was attempted to pay for work by the day on a branch road to the old town; but it was found that the out-turn cost about sixteen times the ordinary price, and it was necessary to revert to payment by piece-work.

83. The following Tables show the expenditure on ordinary and special works, and on repairs; No. 1 for the last seven months of 1865-66; No. 2 for the first seven months of 1866-67, or from the 1st May to the 30th November inclusive:—

No. 1.

DESCRIPTION OF WORKS.	Amount of Grant.	1865.			1866.				Total Expenditure.
		October.	November.	December.	January.	February.	March.	April.	
ORDINARY WORKS.									
Remodelling the Cuttack Trunk Road, between Rajghât and the Byturnee river (in the whole length of the district)	72,000	3,230	3,854	5,362	7,842	12,654	23,096	33,257	94,295
Metalling ditto ditto	40,662	1,401	3,824	2,334	4,399	2,571	5,120	4,027	23,676
MINOR WORKS.									
Costing less than Rs. 2,500 each, over the district	571	90	37					126	253
Total	1,13,233	4,721	7,715	7,696	12,241	15,225	28,216	42,410	1,18,224
Repairs		284	927	605	1,091	1,631	2,753	4,640	11,931
Total Expenditure		5,005	8,642	8,301	13,332	16,856	30,969	47,050	1,30,155

No. 2.

DESCRIPTION OF WORKS.	Amount of Grant.	1866.							Total Expenditure.
		May.	June.	July.	August.	September.	October.	November.	
ORDINARY WORKS.									
Remodelling the Cuttack trunk road throughout the division	48,754	10,303	9,029	7,866	3,853	2,212	4,825	2,075	40,163
Metalling ditto ditto	50,276	2,047	2,320	3,258	3,936	2,633	3,925	5,428	23,547
MINOR WORKS									
Costing less than Rs. 2,500 each over the district		48	21		78	..		127	274
SPECIAL WORKS.									
Loop road from Soroh to Kansbans (centre of district)	2,000			293	335	52	711	422	1,813
Metalling road from river bank to the salt golah (town of Balasore)	1,012			107	568	170	204	27	1,076
Excavating tank at the circuit bungalow (town of Balasore)	1,643			52		658	1,417	671	2,798
Arrah Bazar road (ditto ditto)									
Total	1,03,685	12,398	11,370	11,576	8,770	5,725	11,032	8,750	69,355
Repairs		1,169	217	229	977	9	259	825	3,685
Total Expenditure		13,567	11,587	11,805	9,747	5,734	11,341	9,575	73,040

Works under the Magistrate and his subordinates.

84. Besides the works under the officers of the Department Public Works were those which were carried on by the Magistrate and his subordinates. Of these we have not been able to get any particular accounts. From a memorandum furnished by the Magistrate it appears that during the year 1866 Rs. 4,305 only were expended from the ordinary Budget grant from local funds, which amounted to a much larger sum. A special grant of Rs. 12,450 was also made by G. O. No. 3227, dated 10th August, from imperial funds for works on seven lines of road and one tank in the Bhudruk sub-division, to superintend which Mr. Glasson was sent out to Bhudruk. It appears that, in the four months between the assignment of the grant and the end of 1866, Rs. 5,085 only had been expended from it. A further expenditure of Rs. 11,200 on roads in Balasore was made in November 1866, of which but little can have been used before the close of the year.

Medical arrangements.

85. The arrangements made in the town of Balasore for removing the sick and the most feeble to the Pilgrim Hospital,

where they were cared for and fed under the superintendence of Dr. Jackson, have already been mentioned. Extra Native doctors were appointed to assist in the town.

At most of the centres of relief in the interior, temporary hospitals were established. Additional Native doctors were sent to Bhudruk, Jellasore, Bustah, and Metrapore. They were directed to visit the different relief centres, and, if possible, to bring in the sick to the hospital camps at which the different classes of cases were, as far as practicable, kept separate. Sago and rum were supplied to the hospitals.

We observe that the local authorities were satisfied with the sufficiency of the medical agency, for, on the 3rd of September, the Collector reported that no more doctors were required. We fear, however, that the passing visits of the Native doctors to the outlying centres of their circles can scarcely have been productive of much good; every centre must have required the full time and attention of at least one medical officer. We have already observed, in connection with Cuttack, that the medical agency of Bengal, as available to the Government, is not sufficient to supply the demand suddenly created by such an emergency as had arisen in Orissa.

86. English and American ladies, Roman Catholic and Baptist Missionaries, Mahomedan and Hindoo gentlemen, came forward to take charge of the orphans and deserted children. As in other districts, many of the children strayed away from the orphanages, and returned to the life of beggary, which they appeared to prefer.

Care of orphans and deserted children.

The final arrangements for the support of the children who remain in the hands of Government and their disposal are still under consideration.

87. As in Cuttack, the local authorities complain that their operations were crippled by the want of trustworthy superintending agency. The staff of superior officers was strengthened in June by the appointment of Mr. Assistant Collector Rampini, whose time was devoted exclusively to the relief operations. When the number of dacoity cases for disposal had accumulated, an officer was specially deputed to relieve the Magistrate by disposing of them. When a Native Deputy Collector took leave, his place was supplied by an experienced European. The operations in Balasore were more concentrated in the town itself than those of Cuttack.

Agency.

The powers of every officer were certainly taxed to the utmost; but the same want of superior agency was not felt in Balasore town as in Cuttack. The district being smaller, and the ordinary duties lighter, the pressure on the officials was probably not so great.

Insufficiency of superior agency not much felt.

88. In the interior of the district the Cuttack arrangements were, we think, brought under more systematic and successful control by Mr. Kirkwood, assisted by the sub-divisional officers and the officers of the Irrigation Company, than was the case in Balasore.

89. We were specially struck with the earnestness and energy with which the gentlemen of Balasore, official and non-official, threw themselves into those portions of the relief operations which were assigned to them respectively.

Good services of officers.

Dr. Jackson.

Mr. Shuttleworth and Mr. Smalley.

Of Dr. Jackson's invaluable exertions at the hospital and in the rice shop which he opened at his own house, we have already spoken. Mr. Shuttleworth, District Superintendent of Police, and Mr. Smalley, his assistant, were most energetic in superintending some of the light labor, road-making, and the feeding at the dhurmsalah, although the police and town conservancy, which were their own more immediate duties, called for and received unusual personal attention.

Mr. Inspector Green.

Universal testimony is borne to the excellent service done by Mr. Police Inspector Green, who was in immediate charge of the distributions at the dhurmsalah.

Mr. Windle.

Mr. Windle, the Executive Engineer, also gave efficient assistance to the Relief Committee in undertaking the personal superintendence of some of their light labor works in addition to the regular works of his own department.

Moulavi Abdullah, the Deputy Magistrate and Collector, took a laudable and active interest in the operations.

Co-operation of non-official gentlemen.

From the other officials at Balasore, as well as from the Revd. Mr. Miller, Baptist Missionary, from Baboo Shamanund Dey, and many Native gentlemen, the energetic and praiseworthy action of the Collector Mr. Muspratt received hearty and active co-operation.

Mr. Shortt conspicuous.

90. Among all, Mr. T. H. Shortt stands conspicuous by the severe nature of the duty which fell to his lot, and the manner in which it was performed. Being in charge of the Bhudruk sub-division, this officer had to superintend the landing operations at the Dhamrah; much of his time was spent there in waiting for ships which had been announced, and in unloading them. His tent, pitched in a scarcely inhabited country, surrounded by pestilential swamps, jungle, and inundation; such of his servants and officers as were induced to accompany him, prostrated with fever; Mr. Shortt succeeded in landing and transporting promptly and efficiently the rice which arrived. His action, as well as his co-operation, at this time, evinces a remarkable power of resisting the depression which surrounding circumstances were calculated to create. Though repeatedly struck down by fever and ague, he never left his post as long as there was work to be done. Mr. Shortt received great assistance from Mr. Harris, the Commander of the *Agitator*, who was sent down to survey and buoy the mouth of the river. The services of this officer, also performed under circumstances of great difficulty, and in spite of his prostration and that of his men by fever and ague, deserve special mention.

Mr. Harris.

Deficiency of agency to superintend works.

91. While the personal energy of the gentlemen of the Balasore district prevented the want of superior agency being more seriously felt in the town, there was a deficiency of subordinate agency competent to superintend light works and relief operations. In compliance with a demand made by Mr. McNeile at the end of July, the Government, in the Public Works Department, appointed and sent down three special overseers; but they were of little use;—one fell ill and resigned immediately, declaring himself unable to face such terrible sights as those among which his work lay; another also fell ill and returned to Calcutta; the third was too old for the active personal duties which were required.

92. Among the measures taken to facilitate the operations, must be noted the opening of telegraphic communication between Balasore and Bhudruk, thus completing the connection between the latter place and Calcutta. Had the Dhamrah been similarly connected with Bhudruk, and False Point with Cuttack, so that prompt information of the movement of ships might have been sent to those ports, the benefit would have been great, and much money and valuable time would have been saved.

Telegraphic communication between Balasore and Bhudruk.

93. In reviewing the progress of events in the Balasore district, we observe that after the famine had unmistakably declared itself, the local endeavours to meet it were crippled by want of funds. Until May the possibility of obtaining assistance on such a scale as that on which it was subsequently obtained from the balance of the North-West Famine Relief Fund and from Government, was never contemplated; nor, indeed, was any adequate idea entertained of the dimensions which the requirements for aid would assume. "There were starving people in April," Dr. Jackson has said; "but we did not realize that they would come pouring in in such thousands." Nor, indeed, could these numbers have been anticipated by the residents of Balasore, for many of them came from other districts and from the estates of the tributary rajahs.

General review.

As the distress became more apparent, the Local Committee were cramped in their action from the necessity under which they supposed themselves to lie of economizing their resources, and from their want of knowledge that more money could possibly be had than they could themselves raise.

After importation of rice was undertaken, it was more than once necessary to restrict the district operations in consequence of the scantiness and uncertainty of the supply of rice. This would, to some extent, have been avoided and much additional relief given to the Balasore district in general if the *Conqueror* and any other similar private steamer had been engaged from the first and employed to assist the *Nemesis* in supplying the district.

94. The mortality in and about Balasore town, and the famine sights to be seen there were more terrible than at any other place in Bengal or Orissa. The mass of paupers assembled was larger than it was elsewhere. The town lay in the way of many who left their homes in hopes of reaching Calcutta. Of these, many, exhausted and disabled by hunger and disease from going further, remained to swell the number who were fed by the Relief Committee. Subjects of the neighbouring tributary rajahs also flocked in to share in the relief. These, as well as the travellers generally, arrived in such a condition that they were beyond recovery. In the early months, cholera, and subsequently, other bowel complaints, caused by bad and insufficient food, carried off hundreds; the least change of weather to cold or damp was immediately fatal to scores. Many who were caught by bad weather at a distance from the places of distribution had not strength to crawl back to get their meal, and so died where they lay in out-houses, or by the way-side. Even in fine weather many were found dead in the mornings, where they had lain down to sleep at night; others, when they went to drink, fell into the water through sheer debility, and were drowned. Most of those who received the

Mortality.

imported rice in June and early in July were probably too far gone to be saved.

95. The number of paupers ascertained to have died in the town of Balasore is as below :—

MONTH.	Number of bodies removed from the town by the Police.*	Number of deaths in the Pilgrim Hospital.†	TOTAL.
June	973	398	1,371
July	1,403	573	1,976
August	1,874	819	2,693
September	1,306	644	1,950
October	576	334	910
Total	6,132	2,768	8,900

The rise and fall of the mortality in the town may be taken as an index of its fluctuations in the district generally. The mortality culminated in August, and was, to some extent, affected by the rains and inundations of that month.

96. At Bhudruk also vast crowds of paupers were collected; but there was not so great mortality among them as at Balasore.

Looking at the fact that no relief was given in the interior of the Bhudruk sub-division till the middle of August, we fear the mortality in the villages, among those who could not make up their minds to go to a long distance from their home, or who were physically incapable, must have been greater in some parts of this sub-division than in the central portion of the district which derived its supplies from Balasore; although over the sub-division, as a whole, the crops of 1865 were better than in the centre of the district.

97. Much as it is to be wished that the operations in the interior of the Balasore district and Bhudruk sub-division had been on a scale more nearly approaching to those which were carried out in the Cuttack district, we are sure that the local officers left nothing undone which could be effected with the appliances and supplies which were placed at their disposal.

* Figures taken from the diaries of the District Superintendent of Police.

† Taken from the figures furnished by Dr. Jackson.

MANBHOOM.

1. Manbhoom is the most eastern district in the division of the Commissioner of Chota Nagpore, whose head quarters are at Ranchee, nearly 70 miles due west of Purulia, the civil station of the Manbhoom district.

Purulia lies about 140 miles to the north-west of Calcutta in a direct line, but a branch of the East Indian Railway runs to Raneegunge, 50 miles from Purulia.

From Raneegunge the Grand Trunk Road runs north-west through the districts of Hazareebagh and Gya into Benares and the North-Western Provinces; Purulia is connected with Raneegunge and Burrakur to the north of the district, and with Ranchee to the west, by roads which the Deputy Commissioner describes as "in good condition," and with Bankoora to the east and Chybassa (the civil station of the Singbhoom district) to the south, by other lines said to be in a very bad condition. The favorable description must, however, be taken in a relative sense. The best of the roads can scarcely be termed passable for any faster wheeled traffic than that of Native bullock carts; pack bullocks are much used.

2. The roads and the district generally are intersected by mountain streams, the Damooda, Burrakur, Kosai, Sooburnrekha, Seiai, and Darikessur. None of these are navigable; beds of sand in the dry weather, with a narrow fordable stream in the centre, in the rains they assume the dimensions of torrents so suddenly that carts and travellers are occasionally overwhelmed while crossing the sandy bed. When these rushes of water come down, traffic is frequently impeded for three or four days at a time. In the rainy season it is always extremely difficult.

3. The soil of the district is laterite, the northern portion is undulating, the southern hilly. Besides rice, the district produces Indian corn, the ordinary pulses, common grain, oil seeds, and forest products. Tussers, lac dye, and oil seeds are exported in considerable quantities. A small quantity of indigo is grown. From the nature of the soil, a large proportion of the area, estimated at above one-half, is unculturable; the cultivation is most luxuriant in the depressions between the ridges.

The population of the district before the famine was estimated by the Revenue Survey Department at 700,000, and the area at 5,400 square miles, giving 129.74 persons to the square mile.

4. The Manbhoom district, in common with the rest of the Commissioner of Chota Nagpore's division, is "non-regulation," in which the officer who discharges the function of Magistrate and Collector is styled "Deputy Commissioner." In the administration of each district, the executive government is guided by the general spirit of the Regulations and Acts; but it is vested with a wide discretion to make such modifications as appear to be required by the undeveloped state of the country. Under this discretion, an order is in force that landed property in the district shall not be sold either in satisfaction of private debts or of the demands of the State, without sanction previously obtained in each case from the Commissioner of the division. Under

Situation of Manbhoom.

Communications.

Rivers.

Products.

Area and population.

Manbhoom a non-regulation district.

Land not sold for debt or arrears.

the administration of the present Commissioner, such sanction is not readily to be obtained. The restriction was originally imposed as a political measure. The old landed proprietors were then, as they are now, extremely improvident and involved, but many of them possessed great feudatory influence over their tenants, and it was feared that a measure which would have the effect of transferring many estates, and of throwing the old families on the world, impoverished and embittered, might lead to disaffection and outbreaks, the repression of which among the hills and forests would then have been an embarrassing task. The Commissioner is of opinion that this argument is still of some weight; the Deputy Commissioner considers that the policy of protection is carried too far.

5. When a landholder becomes so far involved that his creditors are obliged to apply for aid to recover their dues, the estate is taken under attachment by the Deputy Commissioner with the sanction of the Commissioner. He manages it as economically as he can, makes an allowance to the proprietor, and devotes the surplus to the liquidation of debts. Many estates are now, as always, under attachment, and the management of them is a severe tax on the time of the officers of Government.

Perpetual settlement very light.

6. The district enjoys a permanent settlement, the amount of which was fixed at a time when (according to the principles which have lately been adopted) the district was quite unprepared for such a measure.

But development slow.

The annual land revenue is little more than Rs. 91,000. of this above one-half is paid by the estate of the Rajah of Pachera; this sum is excessively and disproportionately light in comparison with the assessment borne by other districts. With such an advantage, rapid advancement and development might have been expected, but in fact little or none has taken place.

7. It is a question for serious consideration how far these results are attributable to the policy which has been adopted with regard to forced transfers of land.

Opinion of Sir Henry Ricketts in 1855.

8. Sir H. Ricketts expressed his opinion very forcibly on the subject in his report on this district, which was published in 1855. He wrote—

“Were these zemindars the honest unfortunate victims of adverse circumstances, they might be entitled to sympathy, but (there may be exceptions) as a body, they are ignorant, savage, selfish, vicious, and corrupt, without one single redeeming virtue. Instead of being in any respect a useful meritorious body, it would be good for the country, for traders, and all classes but thieves, if all were to be at once dispossessed and replaced by those who would improve. There is but one single reason for maintaining them in possession, and there never was but one reason, and that is, lest, if dispossessed, they should incite their ignorant ryots and followers to create disturbances. Even their mischievous rule is preferable to anarchy. If disturbances are not now likely to be the consequence of dispossession, whether from decrease of their influence or the increased knowledge and independence of the inhabitants, there can be no reason why the claims of creditors should not be satisfied by the sale of estates.”

9. Whatever conclusion may be arrived at, it is very certain that the present policy could only be abandoned very gradually

and cautiously. Much depends on the nature of the particular tenures. Where there are large proprietary bodies of war-like caste and habits who must remain on the land, their deprivation of the rights which they have inherited is a source of much political embarrassment; where single individuals or single families possess far extended rights, their deprivations generally reduce them in a short period to insignificance, a few instances of families of very peculiar position and influence perhaps excepted.

10. In ordinary years the district exports rice to some extent; travelling merchants come into the district in search of it from the north-western and from the eastern districts, generally bringing other commodities in exchange. The exports are believed to have increased within the last few years. Although the cyclone of 1864 did not reach Manbhoom, it affected the district by creating a drain of rice towards the districts to the east of it which had suffered.

Export of rice.

11. The crops of 1863 and 1864 were somewhat short, and the early rice crop of 1865 was injured by excess of rain-fall. Thus when the district met the scarcity and famine caused by the drought which followed the excessive rain, its stocks had been reduced below their usual quantity. The following Table, furnished by the Deputy Commissioner, shows that, comparing each month with the corresponding period of other years, the price of coarse rice had been steadily rising since 1863, which was a cheap year as compared with 1862:—

Short stocks.

Gradual rise in prices since 1863.

Prices of coarse Rice in Purulia.

MONTH.	YEAR.				
	1862.	1863.	1864.	1865.	1866.
January	28	34	35	23	13
February	28	38	35	22	15
March	28	45	36	20	14
April	28	45	37	20	13
May	27	45	37	20	9½
June	27	45	35	20	9
July	27	44	32	20	6½
August	28	43	32	19	4
September	29	40	31	18	6
October	29	40	28	18	10
November	30	38	25	18	22
December	30	36	25	16	26

12. The cultivators irrigate their fields to some extent from tanks and by ponding up the water in depressions between the ridges.

Irrigation.

13. The rain-fall having been so plentiful as to injure the early crop of 1865 suddenly ceased; a failure of the main and cold

Drought of 1865.

October 1865. Petition presented that prices should be fixed.

weather crop was anticipated, and at the end of October 1865, a petition was presented to the Officiating Deputy Commissioner, praying that exports be stopped and price of rice fixed. Considerable exportation was then going on, but prices did not rise as high as in many other districts of the division. On receiving this petition, the Commissioner replied pointing out the impolicy of such interference as was prayed for. In November, however, Lieutenant Money issued a notice to the zemindars, recommending them to use their influence to check the export of rice. He writes—"Short of stopping exportations, every thing was done that could be to discourage it, but without any good effect; the people, as a rule, are deep in their mahajun's books, and the latter, as has been above stated, have a lien on more than half the crops in the district. It was to the interest of these local moodies and mahajuns to sell all they could in order that, owing to the scarcity which would follow, they might raise the price of provisions, and to do this they exerted all their power. I noticed about this time that an increased activity was being given to the attachment of crops in execution of decrees, and, guessing the cause and probable result if in any way encouraged, I would not sanction some of the lower courts entertaining extra peons when it was represented to me that the actual establishment was not sufficient for the work in hand."

Out-turn of cold weather crop.

14. The out-turn of the cold weather crop all over the district is estimated by the Deputy Commissioner to have been between one-third and half of a full crop; but it varied much in different parts of the district. Over a considerable tract, the yield could not have exceeded one-fourth.

Lieutenant Money's proposal to form the nucleus of a Relief Fund in December 1865

15. In December 1865, the Committee of the Agricultural Exhibition, which had been contemplated, met and abandoned the idea of the Exhibition. Lieutenant R. Money, the Deputy Commissioner, wished to use the subscription (Rs. 800) as the nucleus of a fund to meet the famine which he anticipated, but the Commissioner considered that there was then no necessity for the formation of such a fund. He thought that if distress should increase, the landholders might be called upon to assist their ryots, and Government might be solicited to give the means of employing the people as much as possible.

Rejected by the Commissioner.

March 15th.—District Superintendent of Police reports increase of crime occasioned by want, and recommends works.

16. On the 15th of March Captain Judge, the District Superintendent reported great increase of crime in the district and the evident distress which was the cause of it, and recommended the expenditure of a few thousand rupees on public works, which would give subsistence to thousands who were being driven to gain a meal by dacoity and robbery.

Proposition rejected by Mr. Westland, Officiating Deputy Commissioner.

To this Mr. Westland, who was then officiating as Deputy Commissioner, replied on the 19th March, concurring with the District Superintendent in ascribing the increase of crime, which was chiefly in thefts of paddy, to want and distress; indeed, most of the accused at once admitted that they were driven to commit the crimes by the straits to which they were reduced. The Officiating Deputy Commissioner, however, declined to support the proposal of the District Superintendent to relieve the wants of the population by the prosecution of public works beyond the extent to which they were already being carried on. He wrote that some thousands were already being expended on works in and about the district, at the Burrakur bridge, on the Luckeserai loop-line of railway which was under con-

Reasons for rejection.

struction, and on the Grand Trunk Line of Road, but that the expenditure produced no perceptible effect. The loss in the district amounted to a deficiency of at least a rupee on each beegah of land under cultivation, which was enormous. Public works could relieve only a very small section of the population. Further, the people were suffering from a want of food in the district, and this want could not be much relieved by thrusting a few pice into their hands. The most practicable means of relief would be importation, and distribution of food simultaneously with employment on works; but such a step would be extremely difficult at the time being, and could only be adopted at the last extremity of famine. With reference to the recommendation made by the District Superintendent that the zemindars should be induced to help their ryots, the Deputy Commissioner expressed himself loth to believe that they did not in some measure recognize the responsibilities which fell on them in a crisis like the present; but bearing in mind that a good deal of generosity would be forced upon them by the withholding of rents due, he deprecated any authoritative interference in the direction suggested.

On the whole, the Deputy Commissioner was of opinion that, for the present, the people must be left to fight with the calamity that had fallen upon them, and that Government assistance, however advisable in the case of local distress, was impracticable in such an universal famine as that with which they then had to deal. The correspondence was submitted to Colonel Dalton, the Commissioner of the division, and was mentioned by him in a letter dated 14th May, to which reference is made below.

17. On the 7th of May, the Assistant Superintendent of Police reported from Raipore, in the south-east of the district, that unless something were speedily done to supply the poorer classes of that part of the country with food, the lives and properties of persons possessing "dhan or any other grain fit for food will be greatly endangered, as there can be but little doubt that unless some immediate provision is made, the people will rise in a body and commit all sorts of depredations." He wrote, "those in possession of 'dhan', &c. will not sell because they are afraid that if it is known that they possess it, they will be relieved of it by dacoits. The dacoities that have taken place lately are entirely owing to the scarcity of all provisions. This may be proved by the fact that the property stolen consists of nothing but eatables: any valuables in the possession of the persons whose houses have been broken into being left by the dacoits as useless."

May 7th.—Assistant District Superintendent of Police reports distress and unsettled state of south-east part of the district.

"Dhan* is now selling 18 or 20 seers for the rupee, choul† at 7 and 8 seers, and that only when the possessors choose to sell, and lately they have refused to sell at all; the consequence is that not only the very poor, but even the more respectable Natives have been forced to eat 'mawur' and the like; numbers of the people have complained to me that they are actually starving and have to subsist on 'mawur' and grass or any thing they can get, and that they cannot get dhan or choul for love or money."

18. In submitting this report to the Commissioner, Lieutenant Money, who had by this time resumed charge of the district, gave his opinion that the account given was by no means exagger-

Deputy Commissioner Lieutenant Money's views.

* Paddy or unhusked rice.
† Husked and cleaned rice.

ated; there had been a marked increase of dacoities in which paddy only was taken; the plunderers generally admitting that they had been driven to the crime by starvation.

He calls a meeting,
Asks for subscriptions from
other districts of the division,

And for a grant of money
Government.

Commissioner's reply.

19. The Deputy Commissioner had called a meeting to take measures for the relief of the distress; he asked the Commissioner to cause subscriptions to be raised in other districts, and to move the Government to assign a grant of money for the same purpose, as a large sum of money would be needed for really sufficient relief, and the zemindars of the district were not wealthy, except the Rajah of Pashete, from whom no co-operation towards such objects was to be expected.

20. In reply, on the 14th of May, the Commissioner pointed out that the selling rate of rice in the Manbhoom district was lower than in the other districts of the division (being 14 seers at Manbhoom bazaar, the nearest to Raipore, whence the Assistant Superintendent of Police wrote the account), and that it was rather below than above the average of districts in Bengal. No application for aid had been made from other districts in the division, and even from Dhulbhoom (the north-eastern corner of Singbhoom), where grain was quoted at 8 seers, and robberies had increased, no demand for extraordinary relief had been made.

Distribution of food not to
be resorted to till the last
extremity.

The Commissioner expressed his entire concurrence with the views expressed in Mr. Officiating Deputy Commissioner Westland's letter of 19th March, that relief by distribution of food should only be resorted to in the last extremity of famine. The people must not be led, under any circumstances, to suppose that it is the duty of Government to supply them with food. Even if it were not so, the Commissioner had clearly no extreme case as yet to lay before Government. He stated that he would forward the correspondence for the information of the Board of Revenue, but would not recommend an application to Government for charitable aid for the district.

The Commissioner, however, approved of the meeting to take into consideration the state of the district and the measures to be adopted. Bearing in mind that persons who hold grain during times of scarcity often hesitate to open their stores for sale through fear of a rush being made on them, he recommended that the protection of the Police be given to such holders of grain, that they be guaranteed against loss from the subscribed fund, if they would consent to sell by retail; and that if these measures should prove insufficient, that their stocks should be bought up and other means taken for disposing of the rice to the public.

The Commissioner further observed that the robberies were generally committed by a class very numerous in Manbhoom, who gain their livelihood by miscellaneous work, and raise no grain; that they always live precariously on wages, and had now naturally fallen into distress. Any measures which the Deputy Commissioner could take to help them would meet with every encouragement from him. It was recommended that agents for the collection of emigrating laborers should be encouraged to recruit among them, and the Deputy Commissioner was requested to report whether any works could be undertaken immediately for the relief of the suffering class.

21. With Government order, No. 300 T of 5th May, a letter from the Commissioner of Burdwan was forwarded to the Commis-

sioner of Chota Nagpore, reporting that the villages of Midnapore bordering on Manbhoom were in great alarm, as Sonthals of the latter district were going about in gangs armed.

The Commissioner replied that, although Baorees (not Sonthals) had been committing numerous grain robberies, "many convictions had ensued, and there had been no disturbances; nothing with which the ordinary Police had been unable to cope." The Deputy Commissioner was organizing measures for the relief of the most distressed class, but the Commissioner did not consider that the general pressure in consequence of the scarcity of food is specially severe in the Manbhoom district. He had heard of no armed gangs. He wrote—"The inhabitants of Singbhoom and Manbhoom appear to me to be bearing up very well against their difficulties."

22. In reply to the Commissioner's letter referred to in paragraph 20 to his address, Lieutenant Money pointed out demographically, and subsequently in an official communication of the 5th of June, that the prices quoted at the marts were no criterion of the state of things in the south-eastern part of the district. In fact there was so little grain, and transactions were so scanty even at the few marts which existed as to be inappreciable. The people ordinarily lived on the grain which they had themselves raised. There being no transactions, no rates of sale had been reported for Raipore.

Ruling market prices of
rice little more than nomi-
nal, and no true criterion of
distress.

23. Later in the year, the Deputy Commissioner wrote his views on this subject at fuller length. He pointed out that in the interior of his district, comparatively little use of money was made; even in the markets, the transactions were by barter. The farmer who grew the rice supported his own family on it, and paid his laborers in grain. Other necessities of life were obtained by the rural population from the shop-keepers in exchange for quantities of rice. What the shop-keepers thus accumulated, they kept in store to be lent later in the season at high interest payable in kind, or they made it over to the travelling merchants who came in search of rice from other districts. But even these export transactions did not bring money into the district, for the equivalent of the rice was generally given in goods which the travelling merchants had imported.

Money but little used.

As a proof that little use of money was made, the Deputy Commissioner pointed out that the copper coins which he had received from Calcutta for circulation in his district lay untouched in his treasury from year to year.

24. While detained by the difficulties of travelling at a considerable village within six miles of Purulia, Mr. Dampier had an opportunity of observing the dealings between the village *moodie* or grocer and his customers. As soon as the shop opened, purchasers thronged to it, and as the *moodie* supplied the tobacco, pepper, salt, &c., which each required, a certain measure of rice was added to a heap which lay before him; not a coin passed in the transactions.

25. Towards the end of May, the Deputy Commissioner reported that the increase of crime was most rapid and unprecedented in the south-east. Hardly a night passed in which some house about Raipore was not attacked by large bodies of armed men and grain plundered.

Increase of crime.

Asol

Asol
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Commissioner's opinion that District Superintendent's report does not show that Government interference is yet called for.

26. On the 21st May, the Deputy Commissioner forwarded a report by the District Superintendent on the state of things in Burrabhoom; but the Commissioner replied on the 25th May that it did not reveal a state of things which called for any interference on the part of Government officers, but he hoped that the zemindars and mahajuns would attend to Captain Judge's advice. He pointed out that prices are affected by the demand elsewhere; they cannot be expected to rise and fall in exact proportion to the out-turn of local harvests. In the Loharduggah district, the harvest had not been, on the whole, a short one, but prices there were as high or higher than in Manbhoom.

Commissioner applies for grant from N. W. P. Famine Relief Fund.

27. On receipt of the Government order of 21st May to the address of the Board of Revenue, announcing that a sum of money from the balance of the North-Western Provinces Famine Relief Fund had been placed at the disposal of the Government of Bengal for relief purposes, out of which grants had been assigned to Cuttack, Nuddea, and other districts, the Commissioner applied for Rs. 3,000 for Manbhoom and Rs. 1,000 for Singbhoom. The latter application was founded on his own knowledge that the poorer classes of Dhulbhoom, a large estate in the north-eastern extremity of the Singbhoom district, were subsisting to a great extent on jungle produce and mowah flowers, and that it was desirable to lose no time in organizing means for assisting them with more wholesome food.

First grant of Rs. 2,000.

28. On the 28th of May, the Board sent Rs. 2,000 to the Deputy Commissioner of Manbhoom direct, to be employed through the agency of the local Committee, and to be used as a stimulant to private liberality.

The Board suggested that the Committee should endeavour to bring the relief as near as possible to the seat of distress. Permission was given to them to import grain, but it was pointed out that they could not compel dealers to sell otherwise than as they pleased. The same principles were laid down as for other districts, that gratuitous relief should be given only to the really helpless, and that labor should be provided for the able-bodied.

First meeting of Committee.

Two schemes proposed.

29. The first meeting of the Committee was held on the 2nd May before the grant was received; Lieutenant Money proposed to raise a subscription for the purpose of buying grain in the cheapest market and opening depôts for sale below the market rates. Mr. DaCosta, the Principal Sudder Amcen, objected that this plan would not relieve the suffering classes, and proposed that the subscriptions be devoted to works. All the non-official members took this view, which was carried.

The Board pronounced Mr. DaCosta's plan to be the more sensible and likely to be the most efficacious.

30. From the reports which had been made of the state of the southern and south-eastern portion of the district, as well as from the general features of the country there, it appears to us that Lieutenant Money's proposal indicated a more correct appreciation of the measures which were required at least in that quarter. Not only money but rice was required. Both the suggestions might well have been acted upon simultaneously.

Works resolved upon.

31. On the 22nd, the Committee, having Rs. 3,000 at their disposal, resolved to begin works at different points between Raipore

and Ameenannuggur, running through the most distressed part of the district, on such a scale as to employ 500 men and 500 women daily on them. At a meeting held on the 30th May, after receipt of the grant of Rs. 2,000 from the Board, the Committee resolved to open depôts for gratuitous relief in the south of the district; they determined to devote the Government grant to these, while the subscriptions were devoted to the employment of labor. Mr. Police Inspector MacDougal was sent out to organize the centres of relief, and to explain to the zemindars, under whose charge they were to be placed, the principles on which they should be conducted. It was resolved that at each centre 150 persons should receive half a seer of rice each daily. He established three such centres, and was then obliged to return to the station dangerously ill with sun-stroke.

Second meeting and disposal of grant.

32. Up to the 5th of June employment had been provided for 1,000 persons, and gratuitous relief for 450; this was pronounced to be little in comparison with the requirements, but the funds at the disposal of the Committee would admit of no more. On the same date, Lieutenant Money reported to the Commissioner that distress in the south-eastern part of the district was increasing rapidly, and that the means at his disposal were totally inadequate to meet it. In Burrabazar, the chief market in Burrabhoom, prices had suddenly risen from 11 to 9 seers for the rupee.

Centres of relief opened and works started.

Means reported insufficient; distress increasing in the south of the district.

The grain-dealers were buying up all the rice they could get, and then shutting up their shops until the people were reduced to such a state that they would pay any price asked.

Action of the grain-dealers.

This conduct was causing excitement; grain dacoities were taking place at the rate of four every night, and Captain Judge, the District Superintendent of Police, had been sent down into Burrabhoom to take the necessary measures.

In the station of Purulia also distress was increasing, but the appearance of it was to some extent kept down by private charity and by the employment which was to be procured. No grain was coming into the town, and on the preceding market day, scarcely any was exposed for sale.

No rice at Purulia.

The shop-keepers had at one time refused to sell at a cheaper rate than one rupee for four seers. This caused so much excitement that they became alarmed and sold for a while at 10 seers, but they had just raised the price again to 7½ seers.

33. On his return from Burrabhoom, the District Superintendent reported on the 8th of June—"The want down at Burrabhoom and all along the south of the district is very bad indeed, and the poor people are more like walking skeletons than living men; the children appear to be the worst. The Police tell me that further south than Burrabhoom, the people are literally starving, and have to go without food for days. I have not heard of any deaths from starvation, but I have no doubt that they do occur."

June 7th.—District Superintendent's report on state of Burrabhoom.

He recommended an extension of the line of road on which works had been commenced, and urged the necessity of a further grant being made to the district.

34. On the 11th of June, the Deputy Commissioner reported to the Committee that in his opinion the means at their disposal would not effect one-twentieth part of what was needed. Distress was rapidly increasing all over the district; the number of beggars in the station was increasing rapidly; a boy had been found

Meeting of Committee on June 11th.

Distress in Purulia.

breaking up a well picked bone which had been thrown away, and eating the pieces; a woman had offered her child for sale to a member of the Deputy Commissioner's family; and one case at least of death from starvation had occurred.

Depôt opened in Purulia.

The Committee determined to open a depôt for gratuitous relief at the station, and to erect a shed for the lepers who were numerous.

Mr. Onasch, a Lutheran Missionary, undertook the management of the Purulia distribution, as well as the duties of Secretary to the Committee.

Committee's application for further grant.

35. The Committee made an earnest call on Government for further assistance, and resolved to make a similar appeal to the public.

The Deputy Commissioner, in sending up the proceedings of this Committee to the Commissioner on the 12th of June, represented that the lower castes, the Sonthals, Bhoomyes, Baorees, &c., who were known under the general name of "Chooars," were now generally subsisting on grass, roots, leaves, and seeds; that many had died of starvation and disease; that crime was rife; that hitherto the Police and the Ghatwalee or rural Police had behaved well; but that they depended entirely on the produce of land and on payments made by the people for their subsistence, both of which sources had now failed, and that it was to be expected that unless other means of subsistence were found for them, a starving Police would sympathize with and join a starving people in committing crime. He strongly urged the necessity of importing rice, which should be sold cheaply to the people in general, and given to the rural Police, which numbered 2,000 or 3,000, for their subsistence. He was of opinion that, although considerable stocks were hoarded in the district, they would not, even if brought into the market, be nearly enough to supply the requirements of the district.

Lieutenant Money recommends importation.

Commissioner applies for further grant.

36. In submitting these reports to the Board, the Commissioner wrote on the 14th of June—

"If this be so, more money relief will only the more speedily bring us to the end of our resources, and it would be right to relieve the pressure on the store by importation; but in the surrounding districts, there is no hoard to draw from, and I do not think there is any market from which a large supply could be procured nearer than Calcutta. Ever since last harvest, grain has been steadily flowing out of Chota Nagpore Proper (Loharduggah), and the price* at which it is now procurable shows that there is not much in reserve."

He announced his intention of proceeding to Purulia so as to form an opinion as to the expediency of importing rice; in the mean time he hoped to be able to provide for works on two roads out of a sum of money which the Superintending Engineer had been directed to place at his disposal, but supported the application of the Committee for a further grant of money; as to the rural Police, the Commissioner obtained from Government a grant of Rs. 4,000 to be distributed among them so as to enable them to live honestly while they performed their duties.

Gratuitous distribution at once led to a decrease in grain dacoities.

37. The immediate effect of the opening of the depôts in the south of the district was a marked decrease in grain dacoities.

* Ten to twelve seers.

38. Before the end of June, the Board had allotted a further grant of Rs. 5,000, and had promised to send up 5,000 maunds of rice at once. This resolution appears to have been taken by the Board on their being requested by the Government to take the Deputy Commissioner's application into their serious consideration.

Second grant of Rs. 5,000.

Board promise to send rice.

39. On the 25th of June, Mr. Yardley, the Assistant Magistrate in charge of the Govindpore sub-division in the north of the district, on the Grand Trunk Road, reported a sudden rise in the price of rice from 11 to 7½ seers for the rupee. Rs. 500 were sent to him by the Manbhoom Committee.

Rise of prices in north of district.

At this time Mr. Onasch visited the south-eastern part of the district. The people generally were living on the seeds of the sal tree, on the chaff of rice, on oil cake, &c.

Mr. Onasch's tour of inspection.

He visited the centres of relief which had been opened. He noticed that deaths from starvation had occurred; the people who had been employed on works showed him the pice which had been paid to them as wages for several days; they remained unused, as no rice was to be bought; they begged for payment in rice. The complaints against the grain-dealers were universal. The recruiters of laborers for emigration had thinned some of the villages of men, leaving the women and children destitute. Mr. Onasch noticed that land which was ordinarily cultivated had been allowed to lie fallow for want of seed grain; evidently the rice which the Board had promised to send into the district, but of which the first instalment was not received at Purulia till the 17th of July, was urgently wanted.

40. In a letter dated June 25th, the Deputy Commissioner wrote that in the three months since the beginning of April he had tried 360 grain dacoities. We have been unable to reconcile this statement with certain Tables of violent crime which have been furnished to us by the Deputy Commissioner, in which a far smaller number of dacoities and robberies is entered.

Three hundred and sixty dacoities in three months.

41. In the course of June, the Government, in the Public Works Department had granted Rs. 4,000 for the employment of labor on the roads about Raipore and Burrabhoom; and the Executive Engineer had set works in hand on the road running northwards from Purulia to Rughconathpore.

Grants from Government in the Public Works Department for works.

42. Mr. Onasch's report was laid before the Committee at a meeting held on the 5th of July, at which the Commissioner was present. The Committee determined to open a relief centre at Manbazar, and also to send out a quantity of seed rice for sale in the most distressed part of the district.

Action taken on Mr. Onasch's report.

43. The Deputy Commissioner had already made arrangements for sending down 1,000 maunds of rice, purchased in the district, to the works for distribution to the laborers as wages, for it had been reported that the men were leaving the works owing to the difficulty of getting rice for their money.

44. In the middle of July, the number of persons receiving gratuitous relief daily at all depôts had reached 1,900, and it was found necessary to remove the limit which had, up to that time, been placed on the quantity of rice to be distributed each day; the laborers were being paid in rice instead of in money. Deaths were taking place in the streets of Purulia; the Committee therefore determined to open a special hospital.

State of the district in July.

45. On the 3rd of July Mr. Yardley went over from Govindpore to the railway terminus at Burrakur to despatch the rice

Receipt of rice from Calcutta.

which the Board had sent from Calcutta. There were no facilities for storing at the station, and unfortunately heavy rain had set in; Mr. Yardley found the railway station full of rice bags, and some of the vans still unloaded.

The roof of the railway station had leaked, and much of the rice had been wetted. Mr. Yardley moved the bags into a hired house, but much damage had been done.

Difficulties of transport.

46. There was great difficulty in procuring carriage; 500 carts would be required before the whole consignment of 5,000 maunds could be sent in, and Mr. Yardley could obtain 45 only. The rising of the Damoodah had interrupted communication; and the rains had rendered the roads so bad that the carts could hardly make way.

On the 9th of July the first despatch was sent off from Burrakur; it was not received at Purulia till the 17th. So great were the difficulties and delays caused by bad roads, heavy rains, swollen torrents and insufficient carriage, that the last batch did not reach Purulia till the 22nd of September. Some of the rice was sent to the Govindpore sub-division, where it was distributed cooked by Mr. Yardley.

Increase of distress and mortality in August.

47. In August, in spite of the efforts of the Committee, distress and mortality were increasing rapidly all over the district.

As in the other districts, the rains and bad weather of that month were fatal to many. The Committee resolved to raise the number of their depôts to ten, and to place them under better supervision than that of the zemindars, who were found to be apathetic. At the end of August rice was selling at Purulia at the rate of 4 and $4\frac{1}{2}$ seers to the rupee; at other places it was even dearer.

Deputy Commissioner sells rice at $7\frac{1}{2}$ seers for the rupee.

48. The Deputy Commissioner found himself obliged to sell at the rate of $7\frac{1}{2}$ seers from his stores to save the poorer respectable classes, who were falling victims to cholera from eating bad food. This was not in accordance with the rules which had been laid down by Government for Manbhoom in common with other districts, and which required that open sales to the general public should be made at market rates only, and that sales at a price considerably below the ruling rate should be made only through the agency of the Relief Committees, and by them to such persons only as were selected as being in need of such relief.

Land left uncultivated.

49. The prostration of the people and want of seed rice was so great that at this time it was reported that over half the district no more than one-third of the usual area had been sown for the next crop. Stocks in the district were exhausted, and the Deputy Commissioner earnestly urged the necessity of more rice being sent from Calcutta by the Board.

Further importation from Calcutta urged.

Inspection of centres.

50. In the early part of August Mr. Inspector MacDougal, and in the latter part Deputy Collector Baboo Rakhal Dass Haldar were deputed to visit the centres and the south-eastern portion of the district generally.

Mr. MacDougal reported that the distress was very bad, and that the zemindars (called rajahs) at Burra Bazar and Raipore were doing what they could for the people. Rice was scarcely procurable for money, as all was bought up for relief purposes. New rice was, however, coming into the market and selling for 15 seers to the rupee.

Deputy Collector Baboo Rakhal Dass Haldar visited the Umbicanuggur depôt. He reported that the number of applicants for relief did not represent the full extent of the distress. Many would not come to the centres of relief through fear lest they should be made to work. Although the Sonthals were known to be suffering severely, not one was to be seen at the depôt. They looked upon begging and receiving alms as more disgraceful than stealing. The Rajah in charge of the depôt stated the number of deaths among the paupers to average ten daily. The Deputy Collector believed that number to be below the mark; whole villages appeared to have been depopulated; many of their inhabitants had, however, emigrated.

State of south-east part of the district as reported by Deputy Collector Rakhal Dass Haldar at end of August.

Rice was selling at $3\frac{1}{2}$ to $4\frac{1}{2}$ seers for the rupee; the people had eaten much of the early crop in the field before it reached maturity. The promise of the later crop was good, but much land was left unsown.

51. At meetings held early in September, the Committee recorded an opinion that about Burra Bazar one-fourth of the population was dead and another fourth dying; they moved the pauper camp at Purulia into a place about a mile from the town, and directed the establishment of three new centres in the western part of the district, and the erection of sheds for the shelter of the paupers at the out-centres.

September meetings of Committee.

52. On the 3rd of September, the Deputy Commissioner made an application for a further grant of Rs. 5,000, and on the 22nd strongly urged that more rice be sent from Calcutta, recommending that it be sent *via* Raneegunge and Bankoora, so as to avoid the difficulties which had attended its transport from Burrakur to Purulia.

Further application for rice and funds.

The Commissioner, however, opposed the application for grain, as rice was selling in the district for 15 seers to the rupee, and no more was sent from Calcutta.

53. At a meeting held on the 11th of September, distress was for the first time reported to be decreasing, although deaths were still very numerous in the south-east.

Distress begins to decrease.

54. On the 14th of September the Board intimated to the Committee that they were prepared to supply funds to meet any thing which was required, and that they looked to the local Committee to establish a sufficient number of depôts, and to keep them fully provided with food and shelter. On this the Committee at once recorded that they had not up to that time been aware that they would be supplied with money up to the full extent of what they considered necessary for the district. Having funds thus placed at their disposal, they considered it necessary to open ten more depôts at once, and asked for a remittance of Rs. 10,000. But for operations on the scale on which those of the Committee would now be placed, efficient supervision was absolutely necessary; the Committee therefore applied for the services of an officer for this special purpose; they also urged the necessity of such an appointment being made, when, in a letter dated the 27th September, the Board expressed a doubt whether the Committee availed themselves to a sufficient extent of the assistance of Government officers, such as the Police, for purposes of supervision.

Board intimate that unlimited funds can be supplied.

Committee resolve upon opening many more centres of relief.

And apply for an officer to supervise.

55. The Commissioner disapproved of the opening of so many depôts as had been resolved on by the Committee. He considered

Commissioner disapproves of the opening of so many depôts.

ed that some would be too near to others; dépôts should not be nearer to one another than one day's journey. It appeared to him that two or three new centres in the Govindpore sub-division would suffice. He supported the application to the Board to the extent of Rs. 5,000 only.

Deputy Commissioner urges necessity of opening all the proposed dépôts.

The Deputy Commissioner, however, strongly advocated the establishment of the full number of centres proposed by the Committee. The sites had been selected on the result of experience. It had been found that the people dreaded the journey to a distant relief house; many perished at their homes rather than undertake it; many others died of exhaustion on the way. If life was to be saved, relief must be carried as near as possible to their doors; some of the dépôts were placed very near one another, but this was in consequence of the nature of the country. Where a swollen river intervened, communication with a centre (however near it might be) was effectually cut off for days together. The able-bodied were required to work, but the labor appeared to be distasteful, and the works provided on the road in the south-east did not attract many.

Commissioner's reply.

In reply the Commissioner held that five new dépôts would suffice, and urged the Deputy Commissioner to insist on the able-bodied doing work, and not to encourage such idleness as he had described.

Full number of dépôts opened.

56. The Committee had, however, already directed the opening of the ten additional centres, and they remained in operation as long as was necessary. The maximum number of dépôts open at any one time is stated by the Deputy Commissioner to have been thirty-two.

Govindpore sub-division in September.

57. Early in September, Mr. Yardley reported that the scarcity was now beginning to be felt in the Govindpore sub-division. The Ranees of Pundra was distributing rice to 3,748 people, most of whom were her own tenants, but some were travellers. He recommended that 100 maunds of rice be placed at her disposal for distribution. He also proposed to make over some rice to the Rajah of Jherria, who wished to purchase it for the same purpose.

The Board disapproved of the recommendations, as the two zemindars in question would distribute their rice indiscriminately, whereas the Government rice could only be supplied to those who were selected as being really in want of relief.

New crop comes into market.

58. During October the Commissioner sent some rice from Ranchee to Manbhoom; but by the end of the month, the harvesting of the new crop had enabled the Deputy Commissioner to supply himself at sufficiently moderate rates in his own district. The same cause led to a diminution in the number of applicants for relief.

Deputy Commissioner visits south-east of district.

In the latter part of the month, the Deputy Commissioner took advantage of the holidays to visit the south-eastern part of the district. He found that mortality had much decreased since the opening of so many dépôts. He made elaborate personal enquiry as to the extent of mortality, the estimates of which had been questioned by the Commissioner and Board. To these, further reference will be made below.

Money required.

59. The application for Rs. 10,000 had been made about the 29th of September, and the Deputy Commissioner had again asked for money on the 2nd of October; none, however, was received

till the last week of October, and in order to keep operations going, the Deputy Commissioner was obliged to make an advance to the Committee from his private funds.

60. The prospects of a good cold weather crop were now assured; the early crop was in the market, and rice was selling in the Purulia bazar at 16 seers for the rupee. On the 31st of October care was taken to send every man from the gratuitous relief to the works as soon as he was capable of labor, nevertheless, the Committee were of opinion that, in addition to the Rs. 5,000, which were still unsupplied out of the Rs. 10,000, for which they had applied in September, Rs. 12,000 more would be required to keep all the dépôts open as long as was necessary.

61. On the 3rd of November rice was selling at 20 seers, and distress rapidly decreasing.

62. As the main crop was coming in, the Deputy Commissioner issued a notification to the land-owners, pointing out the importance of leaving this year's crop, as much as possible, in the hands of the ryots. He urged that, although the zemindars had the right to distrain for rent, it would be to the benefit of all parties to exercise that right sparingly. Many complaints were made that mahajuns were sweeping off the crop in repayment of loans as soon as it ripened. The land-owners were requested to explain to the ryots on their estates that a mahajun has no "right of distraint, and that the ryots are in no way bound to repay advances out of this year's crop. If the mahajuns will not wait payment till next year, they can only enforce it by legal process."

Deputy Commissioner issues notification to land-owners, urging them to leave crops in ryots' hands.

And pointing out that the mahajuns could not enforce repayment of loans of rice except on decree obtained.

63. On the 5th November an urgent call for money was made, and Rs. 8,000 were received from the Calcutta Relief Committee on the 14th.

64. On the 16th of November the Committee resolved to close some of the dépôts which could be spared. Whenever the number of applicants fell below 50, the dépôt was to be closed, the remaining paupers being either sent to their homes or transferred to another dépôt.

Committee begin to close dépôts.

65. On the 19th of November the Deputy Commissioner reported that he had, up to date, spent Rs. 15,037 on works; very little had been done for the money, but much relief had been given, and now the number of laborers was rapidly falling off. They were returning to their homes. On the roads about Purulia the number had fallen in a fortnight from 1,400 to 500, and at the dépôts the applicants for gratuitous relief had diminished from 2,000 to 400.

Number of laborers on works falling off.

66. In the latter part of November the Deputy Commissioner again visited the south-eastern part of the district. Finding that the Sonthals would not go to the dépôts for food, he endeavoured to overcome their prejudices by taking some of them to see the feeding arrangements, and promising that they should eat in a place apart from all other paupers the food which the Brahmin cooks had prepared. The attempt, however, was not successful.

Second tour of Deputy Commissioner.

67. At this time the dépôts were being rapidly closed; but from what he had seen, Lieutenant Money anticipated that distress and the necessity for relief would continue for some months in the hilly and jungly tracts, in which, owing to the want of

Centres being closed, but necessity of continued relief in some tracts anticipated.

tanks and means of irrigation, nearly two-thirds of the crop of 1865 had been lost; and in which, for want of seed, little more than one-third of the land had been sown for the crop of 1866.

68. This brings us to the point at which our enquiry closes; but from the published reports, we observe that about twenty depôts were still open in the middle of December.

69. The following Table shows the extent of gratuitous relief given in each month:—

Extent of gratuitous relief in each month.

1 Month.	2 Aggregate number of persons gratuitously relieved.	3 Daily average number.
June	9,689	322
July	39,106	1,303
August	87,748	2,924
September	174,744	5,824
October	298,520	9,950
November	127,583	4,252
December	59,660	1,988
Total ...	797,050	Daily average from June to December 3,794

70. Four places of distribution were opened and supplied by private liberality at Pundra, Jheriah, Katras and Burrakur, at which numbers were fed. The private subscriptions amounted to nearly Rs. 6,000, and up to the 15th of November Rs. 41,000 had been received from the Board and the Calcutta Relief Committee for the gratuitous relief of the district; besides the cost of 6,000 maunds of grain which had been sent up.

71. Work was also provided for the able-bodied on the trunk lines running through the district, and in the south-eastern part of the district, where the distress was most intense, several roads were taken in hand for the express purpose of giving employment to labor.

72. The Deputy Commissioner estimates that the work executed cost three times as much as if it had been done under ordinary circumstances. The number of men employed daily is estimated at an average of 4,000. The numbers fell off in September, but rose again in the middle of October.

73. To enable us to form an idea of the mortality in the south-eastern part of the district, which suffered so severely, we have the result of very careful personal enquiries which were made on the spot by the Deputy Commissioner.

At a meeting held on the 1st of September, the Committee recorded that Deputy Collector Baboo Rakhal Dass Haldar, who had lately visited the most suffering part of the district, found the mortality about Burra Bazar to be terrible; the accounts given by

Works.

Mortality.

the zemindars and police corroborated his statement; it was said that one-fourth of the population was dead and another fourth dying. At one centre, Umbicanagpur, Baboo Rakhal Dass Haldar considered that the report of the zemindar in charge of the depôt, giving ten a day as the death-rate at the centre, was too low. The Committee recorded an opinion that the returns of the zemindars and police rather under-stated than over-stated the mortality.

74. The Commissioner of the division mistrusted Deputy Collector Baboo Rakhal Dass Haldar's estimate as based on figures which had not been sifted. The Board of Revenue expressed a belief that the Deputy Collector accepted every report of mortality estimated in round numbers by hundreds, which the zemindars and mohurrirs made to him; and the Deputy Commissioner adopted his figures without hesitation. It was to bring this question to the test that the Deputy Commissioner personally made enquiries and notes while on his tour of inspection.

75. In October and November he made enquiries in 21 villages containing 636 houses, and ascertained the name of every person who had died during the scarcity; the total number amounted to 579.

Allowing an average of five persons to each house (which we think to be high), the figures give a mortality of 18.2 per cent.

Of the total number of deaths, 73 were ascribed to disease and 506 to starvation; but it is impossible to make the distinction.

76. The Deputy Commissioner has also furnished us with a statement showing in detail 26 pergunnahs which were affected by the famine. It gives the following result:—

Area in square miles.	Number of houses.	Population.	Deaths.
3818.68	122,045	511,777	33,296

The first three items are taken from the survey returns and the rest from returns given by the police and zemindars.

77. The percentage of deaths to population here is only 6.55; it must be borne in mind that these figures embrace a large portion of the district where the famine was felt in different degrees, whereas Lieutenant Money's enquiries were made among villages in that corner of the district which suffered most intensely, and therefore show a much higher death-rate. Obviously, the figures compiled from the returns of the zemindars and the police have not the same claim to reliability as those which are founded on Lieutenant Money's personal enquiries. Moreover, they can only be taken to give a very rough general idea, as the figures for each pergunnah are not made up to the same date; for some the returns reach to August only, for others to November.

78. As early as December 1865 Lieutenant Money proposed to take measures to meet the distress which he anticipated; and throughout the year he and the members of his Committee took a view of the distress and of the extent of relief measures which were required, far more serious than that which the Commissioner entertained.

General review.

79. We consider that in this instance, as in the case of the Orissa districts, there was an absolute dearth of rice in a country which is difficult of access, and that the importation of rice from Calcutta was a wise measure.

Imported rice insufficient.

80. As in Orissa, owing to the lateness of the season at which the importation was made, the difficulties of transport delayed the utilization of the rice, and restricted the importations to a quantity which was far below the actual requirements of the district. We have no reason to doubt that the wide extension of operations, as soon as the Committee were made aware that the Board were prepared to supply unlimited funds, was a judicious measure and productive of much good. It is to be regretted that the Committee were not aware earlier in the season that they were in a position to make such an extension. It does not appear, however, that (after once the principle of receiving relief grants had been acted upon) the Committee had ever been led by superior authority to believe that sufficient funds could not be made available for the full measures of relief which might be considered necessary.

Delay in utilization of available funds.

Supervision.

81. An opinion was expressed that full use was not being made of the services of Government officers in supervising the relief centres.

The Deputy Commissioner and his staff were, however, overwhelmed with their ordinary duties; the pressure on Mr. Money himself was extreme from the number of dacoity cases; it would have been well if his applications for assistance had been complied with. But we are of opinion that the supervision kept up was as efficient as possible with the available agency. An European Inspector of Police, Mr. MacDougal, was constantly on the move in the tract which suffered most. Tours of inspection were also made by Baboo Rakhal Dass Halder, a Deputy Collector, by Mr. Money himself on two occasions, and by Mr. Onasch, a volunteer. Baboo Isshur Chunder Ghosal, a retired Deputy Collector, also gave his assistance in inspecting the centres.

Attacks in public prints.

82. Letters appeared at different times in the public prints attacking the Committee and Mr. Money. Due enquiry was made at the time into the allegations. It is clear that the attacks upon Lieutenant Money were prompted by personal feelings of animosity, and they call for no further notice from us.

Opinion on action of Deputy Commissioner and Committee.

83. We are of opinion that the action of Lieutenant Money and of the Local Committee throughout the famine, and the measures which they adopted, were marked by good judgment and energy. Baboo Isshur Chunder Ghosal gave valuable assistance in the general business as well as by taking charge of an orphanage; and Mr. Onasch, in addition to his duties as Secretary to the Committee, gave much time daily to the personal superintendence of the distributions at Purulia.

84. Among the zemindars, the Rancee of Pundra and the zemindar of Jheriah were conspicuous by their liberality in feeding thousands. In the extensive estates of the Rajah of Pachete, several relief depôts were established by the Committee. This landholder, who is wealthy beyond comparison with any other in Manbhoom, and who owns estates paying half the land revenue of the district, gave a subscription of Rs. 350 for relief operations when specially addressed on the subject by the Deputy Commissioner.

SINGBHOOM.

1. This district lies to the south of Manbhoom, and is also within the division of the Commissioner of Chota Nagpore. It is non-regulation. The southern and south-western parts of the district are known as the Colehan, and consist of a number of Peers or Pergunnahs, peopled by Coles, who are among the least civilized of the Indian races under British rule.

Singbhoom in the Chota Nagpore division.

The Colehan.

2. These Cole Peers were brought under the direct management of the British Government in 1837, it being found that the Chiefs of Singbhoom and Mohurbhunj, to whom the Coles were subject, could not control them, and occasionally made use of them to injure their neighbours.

3. With this part of the district, we have little to do. The famine and scarcity were certainly felt over the whole district, but the effects were trifling in the south-western half as compared with the north-eastern, and especially with Dhulbhoom. The reason assigned by Dr. Hayes, the Deputy Commissioner of Singbhoom, for the greater suffering of the people of Dhulbhoom, as compared with other parts of the district, is "that the people who are of a better class live chiefly on rice; in other parts of the district they have resources in jungle fruits," and being less civilized, their wants are fewer. The drought was also worse in Dhulbhoom than in other parts of the district.

Famine severest in north-east of the district.

4. Severe throughout Dhulbhoom, the famine reached its intensity in the north-east corner of the pergunnah east of the Kopergadhee range of hills, where it adjoins Burrabhoom, the south-eastern and most suffering tract of the Manbhoom district.

5. Here at the best of times the majority of the people, cultivators and others, live from hand to mouth, and grain is rarely stored. It is only in a few villages in the very extreme eastern portion of the pergunnah, where it adjoins Midnapore, that any grain-stores are kept up and that grain-merchants are found. The ordinary farmers raise very little more than is sufficient for their own consumption, and to enable them to pay a portion of their rents in kind according to the custom of the country; and if there be a surplus, it is sold to enable the farmer to pay the cash portion of his rent.

Character of Dhulbhoom.

6. The stock of grain with the majority of the people, at no time very great, had been decreasing since 1862, the harvests since 1861 having been scanty. Then came the apprehension caused by the short rain-fall of 1865 that the next season would also be bad, and whoever held a little stock began to use it sparingly, and to eke it out by meals of jungle fruit, satisfying himself with one meal of ordinary food in 24 hours. Under this unusual restriction and diet, the health of the people naturally broke down and their sufferings commenced. In the part of Dhulbhoom which suffered so severely, the price of rice in September 1865 had risen to 16 or 20 seers for the rupee, far above its price in the rest of the district. The invariable answer to enquiring purchasers was, that there was no grain to sell, and this caused very great alarm and despondency. The few mahajuns held back to take advantage of the certain rise in the prices that would occur. Among those who had no stock of their own, and had to depend

Short stocks in store.

Restraint on consumption of rice.

Price of grain rising.

for their subsistence on their daily earning, money soon became scarce, as no employment was to be had. An early and important indication of the scarcity was a falling off in the excise revenue on spirits and drugs, showing that the people were denying themselves their usual indulgences, and this was noticed by the Deputy Commissioner in December 1865. Grain robberies soon occurred, and the little stock of grain that existed was still more reduced by fires probably caused by incendiaries. The distress increased gradually till it culminated in July, in which month a terrible epidemic of cholera swept the district. As matters became worse, the zemindars began to assist the people by undertaking the excavation of tanks and other works, employing 1,000 people as estimated by the Deputy Commissioner.

Grain robberies.

Height of distress reached in July.

Cholera.

Gratuitous relief given in Chybassa in June.

Subscriptions and grant of money.

Four centres opened by Deputy Commissioner in July.

And two by zemindars.

Works undertaken.

7. In June a number of destitute persons had strayed into Chybassa, the civil station of the district, and a centre was opened for their gratuitous relief with cooked food. The Deputy Commissioner collected subscriptions amounting to Rs. 381, and obtained from the Board of Revenue Rs. 1,500, with which he carried on the gratuitous relief through the season. The allowance of cooked food to each adult was about 10 chittacks, but a discretion was left in the matter to the Revd. Paul Struve, the Lutheran Missionary, who managed the centre. In July, when distress was at its height in the north-east of the district, the Deputy Commissioner opened four centres there, of which the Zemindar of Dhulbhoom took charge. Soon after, the Rajah of Seraikela and the Thakoor of Khursawan (whose large estates lie along the northern boundary of the Singbhoom district, to the west of Dhulbhoom) opened centres at their own expense, so that in September seven centres were in operation in the most distressed part of the district at distances of 20 miles apart.

8. Relief was also afforded in the shape of employment on public works. A special grant of Rs. 4,000 was made for the third or southern portion of the Burrakur and Chybassa feeder road. A pending proposal to build a new Court House at Chybassa was carried out for the purpose of employing labor at this time.

9. The Deputy Commissioner had at his disposal an allotment of Rs. 5,312, and out of this he undertook a line of road which he selected for the special purpose of employing the sufferers from famine. He appears, however, to have expended no more than Rs. 1,800 up to the end of December 1866. The aggregate of the daily number of laborers employed was 2,24,521; the daily wages paid to men varied from 7 to 5 pice a day according to the price of grain; the ordinary rate of wages being 4 pice.

Mortality.

10. It is reported that the deaths at Chybassa during the trying months were 337, of which 50 only were among the stranger paupers.

11. The Deputy Commissioner Dr. Hayes estimates the mortality over the district during the year at $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., that being, in his opinion, double the ordinary rate. No special arrangements were made for giving medical assistance, and no deserted children were thrown on the hands of the Deputy Commissioner.

Private gentlemen who exerted themselves in giving relief.

12. The Rajah of Seraikela, the Thakoor of Khursawan, and the Zemindar of Dhulbhoom deserve credit for their exertions towards relieving the distress. The Revd. Paul Struve also devoted himself to mitigate the sufferings of the people. He accompanied Dr. Hayes into the north-eastern part of the district while cholera was raging, was himself attacked, and died.

MIDNAPORE.

Midnapore district.

1. The district of Midnapore has an area of 4,834 square miles, with an estimated population of 1,200,000. It is within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of the Burdwan division. The western portion of the district, comprising about one-third of the whole, with an extreme length of about 80 miles and an average breadth of about 20 miles, is called the Jungle Mehals, a name which will occur frequently in the course of the following narrative.

2. The eastern and southern parts of the district, known as the sub-divisions of Hidgellee and Tumlook, suffered severely during October 1864, when a large extent of crops was destroyed by an irruption of the sea, due to the great cyclone which visited Lower Bengal in that month. The crops of that year in the parts of the district not affected by the inundation are described to have been of a fair average kind.

3. The early rice crop in the central and eastern parts of the district bears a very small proportion to the later crop reaped in December. The Collector has estimated this proportion at only one-fourteenth. But in the western portion or the Jungle Mehals, it rises to as much as one-fourth. This crop was in 1865 a failure.

4. The main rice crop of 1865 is estimated to have been about a half crop, taking the whole district: in the Jungle Mehals it is said to have been about six-sixteenths; in the eastern parts somewhat better. The cold weather cereals are little cultivated in this district; these, in the Jungle Mehals, however, are usually found to a somewhat greater extent than in the rest of the district, but in the cold season of 1865-66 they proved a complete failure.

Crop of 1865.

5. During September 1865 distress first manifested itself in the eastern and southern portions of the district (Hidgellee and Tumlook) by the occurrence of grain robberies. In pergunnahs Doro and Goomghur, of which nearly three-fourths of the population had been swept away by the cyclone of 1864, high prices began to prevail, and indications appeared of a belief in approaching famine in the emigration which then set in. Of pergunnah Doro it was reported, on the 21st September, by the Deputy Magistrate of Tumlook, that one-fourth was lying waste from want of hands to cultivate, although in the northern and north-western parts of the same pergunnah the crops were promising; that not less than 1,000 persons, sufferers from the cyclone inundations, were receiving charitable support, and that until the main rice crop was gathered, that is about the middle of November, no relief could be anticipated. The mahajuns or grain dealers wanted for themselves such rice as had been saved from the inundations, and they were unwilling to sell. No anticipation of drought, however, was entertained by the Deputy Magistrate, although he suggested that funds for the relief of the distressed might be supplied.

Commencement of distress.

6. It is a somewhat singular fact that, on the 25th September, the Deputy Magistrate of Nugwan (the Hidgellee sub-division) reported that the high prices prevailing in Calcutta were drawing away large quantities of rice, and expressed his fears that this circumstance alone might produce famine in his

neighbourhood, while, at the same time, in the central and north-eastern parts of the same sub-division, which had chiefly suffered from the effects of the cyclone, the cultivators were severely experiencing the want of grain. A splendid harvest was anticipated, however, later in the autumn, and the Deputy Magistrate, while asking for money in aid of the prevailing distress, did not consider that a state of famine had been reached.

7. The rains broke up unusually early; no fall of any consequence occurred later than the 15th September, and as time wore on and the drought still continued, the aspect of affairs became more serious. Early in October, the Magistrate Mr. Herschel proceeded on a tour through his district, with a view to ascertain what foundation existed for the anxiety which began to be felt, and the rumours of impending famine which became rife. The result of this investigation was to confirm the accounts given of present, and apprehension entertained of future distress.

8. On the 13th October, the Deputy Magistrate reported the drought as becoming serious; that one-fourth of the rice crop had already perished; and that if no rain fell soon, "he had no doubt that there would be a famine the like of which had not been seen or heard of for many years."

9. The autumn drought, succeeding the inundations of the previous year, led the grain dealers (*mahajans*) to refuse to make advances to the cultivators, except in exchange for personal property. The middle and next lower classes, who were possessed of articles that they could pledge, were saved from want; but the poorest classes, who were accustomed to live on daily wages, as well as the old and infirm, widows and orphans, dependent on the charity of their neighbours, began at this time to be driven to extremity. It was not by any means that rice was absolutely wanting: large imports were at that time taking place from the Balasore district, and was being brought from the central parts of the Midnapore district, down the rivers flowing through the very tracts where distress was most severely felt. But the price which then ranged from 12 to 16 seers (24 to 32 lbs) per rupee, was quite beyond the means of the poorer classes in Hidgellee. A few deaths were reported about this time, but were not clearly established.

Measures proposed by Magistrate.

10. On the 17th October, the Magistrate, in reporting the distress in Hidgellee to the Commissioner of the Burdwan division, proposed at once to open six or seven rice kitchens, to be supported partly by private subscriptions, and partly by contributions from the Government, as proprietors or zemindars of the greater part of Hidgellee.

Commissioner's recommendations.

11. The Commissioner replied, on the 4th November, that he formally approved of the Magistrate's proposals, but pointed out that the Government was acting only as holder of proprietary rights, and not as the ruling power. He recommended that relief works should be put in hand, and that all who were capable of giving labor in return for food should be required to work,—only those who were really helpless receiving aid gratuitously.

Subscriptions.

12. On the 7th November, the Deputy Magistrate of Nugwan convened a meeting of the residents, at which monthly subscriptions aggregating Rs. 300 were promised. The Deputy Magistrate of Tumlook also succeeded in collecting a like amount. The residents of Midnapore had already promised to contribute Rs. 600 monthly.

13. With December, however, came a certain amount of relief from high prices, in consequence of the gathering in of the great rice crop of the district, and on the 20th of that month, a meeting was held at Midnapore by the Magistrate and Collector to take into consideration the propriety of realizing the promised subscriptions, in anticipation of an expected renewal of rise in prices in March and April. It was thought desirable, too, to ascertain how far relief from private sources could be relied upon. The unanimous opinion of the meeting was that the promised contributions should be called in, but when measures to this end were taken, not more than Rs. 370 could be obtained.

State of things in December.

14. The Deputy Magistrates of Tumlook and Nugwan were directed to convene similar meetings and to report the result.

15. The Deputy Magistrate of Tumlook reported, on the 28th December, that the subscribers to whom he had appealed had expressed themselves willing to pay up two months' subscriptions at once, and that three months' subscriptions, amounting in all to Rs. 1,850, had been promised. Of this sum Rs. 534 had been realized. The meeting at Tumlook was further of opinion that rice should be purchased at once while it was comparatively cheap, and stored against the time when it would be required, and when it would be selling at a dearer rate.

16. The Deputy Magistrate of Nugwan, on the 21st December, reported that he had collected Rs. 500 out of Rs. 1,500 promised, and that the balance was then coming in. At Contai also the subscribers recommended the purchase of rice while it was cheaper than it would be a few months later.

17. It is worthy of note that throughout this correspondence the "impending famine" is habitually spoken of.

18. On the 7th January 1866, the Judge of Midnapore declined to pay up his subscription at once, because, from the evidence given before him in the course of trials, it appeared that there was rice in the district, money to purchase it being alone wanting on the part of certain classes. He was opposed to giving money alms until absolute necessity for relief came, since he was of opinion that such a measure tended to cause demoralisation of the people.

In January.

19. The several sums collected, as above related, were kept in hand: no rice was purchased, and no further active measures in connection with relief were adopted until the month of May, when they became imperative.

No further action taken till May.

20. During the months of January and February *dacoities* increased to an extraordinary degree; crimes of this nature are commonest in those months, but they prevailed to an unusual extent in 1866, and were, without doubt, due to the scarcity. The Collector was urged by a Native, who came from Jhargaon—a place about 20 miles due west of the town of Midnapore, in the northern part of the Jungle Mohals—to initiate relief measures in consequence of the increasing distress. Mr. Herschel*, however, had laid down as a rule for his own guidance that it would be time to take action when the market price of rice rose to 8 seers per rupee. At the time referred to rice was selling at

Increase of crimes.

* See the evidence, page 10.

Jhargaoon at 14 to 15 seers for the rupee. He had reason, he has told us, to think this determination erroneous afterwards, but he adhered to it until the end of April.

State of things in February.

21. In the latter part of February, on his return from Mohurbhunj, where he had noticed considerable distress, the Collector passed through the extreme southern portion of the Jungle Mehals, and found that no indication existed of a similar state of things within the boundary of the Midnapore district. His attention was greatly taken up by disputes connected with the payment by zemindars of their rents, and although the season was known to have been very unfavorable, he attributed to these disputes the complaints made to him by the people.

In March.

22. During the month of March the Collector was at Contai, adjoining the sea coast on the south of his district. The season had been extremely dry, and complaints of scarcity were largely made to him by the cultivators. A settlement was, however, impending, and as this is always a favorite time for bringing forward every cause of discontent that, it is hoped, may lighten the assessments, the Collector naturally did not lay much stress on all that he heard. He noticed that with the exception of the number of beggars being greater than usual, there were no apparent signs of the condition of the people being worse than usual.

Asylum opened in Midnapore in March.

23. In March, while the Collector was absent from headquarters, Mr. Trevor Grant, Joint Magistrate of Midnapore, and Mrs. Grant took the first steps to relieve distress in and about the civil station and town of Midnapore. Their scheme, which consisted in the establishment of an asylum, where shelter, clothes and food to the indigent might be provided, was warmly taken up by the residents.

The asylum was opened on the 21st March, and about 60 persons were admitted, whose condition was described as extremely miserable.

State of things in April.

24. During April Mr. Herschel noticed signs of distress on all sides, such as people eating water plants and roots not usually considered fit for food. The price of rice in Midnapore itself rose to 9 seers per rupee. On the 20th he visited Dantoon, in the south-western part of the district, where an authenticated account of cannibalism was brought to his notice; but on investigation it appeared that the man concerned was a well-known lunatic, and it was not supposed that he had been driven to the act by hunger.

25. Prices continued to rise throughout April all over the district. In the neighbourhood of Soobong, a Police station to the south east of Midnapore, nearly half way between that town and the sea, rice sold at 8 seers (16lbs.) the rupee. The country around Soobong is ordinarily very fruitful, and exports rice to a large extent. It might, therefore, have been supposed that such a price, if existing over the district generally, was indicative of great pressure, but on enquiry it proved to be not so, and it was shown that the rate was an abnormal one, due only to excessive exports.

Visit and report of Commissioner.

26. At this time, the Commissioner of the division, Mr. Montresor, under special orders from the Government, visited Midnapore, and on the 15th of April reported on the increase of crime.

From the latter part of 1865, dacoity and robbery by open violence had been increasing, owing to the general distress and to a "rumour, if not a prospect, of impending famine." From November to April, 34 dacoities had been reported in the four western thannahs adjoining Mohurbhunj and the Manbhoom district, which are inhabited principally by a rude class of people of the Sonthal and Bhoomij tribes, and which may be said to be in jungle. In the three next thannahs, two of which are about half in jungle, the dacoities had been 16. The remaining 15 Police sub-divisions of the district had produced 17 only out of the aggregate total of 67. In the seven jungle thannahs, grain had generally been the object of the plunder, whereas in the others silver and metals had been carried off. The accused invariably confessed, and pleaded that they had been driven to the commission of the crimes by sheer want.

27. The Commissioner wrote—"In the month of November last, as I have already noticed, under a more sudden and alarming prospect of famine than is now entertained, the prices were generally 20 per cent. higher than they are at present; in Midnapore rice was at 8 seers for the rupee, and even now prices are exactly double what they were before the cyclone in 1864.

Commissioner's views on increase of crime.

"In the year 1766 the price of rice was as high as 4 seers for the rupee, equivalent to about $1\frac{1}{2}$ seers at the present time; but with rain to encourage sales, of which there seems every prospect at present, I have every hope that 8 seers will not be reached again. Mr. W. Terry, the Manager of Messrs. Watson and Co.'s extensive property in this district, informs me that he has no apprehension of famine, and that, as soon as rain falls, prices will immediately fall, and employment in cultivation will put a stop to further plunder.

"It will be apparent from the return showing the number of occurrences, arrests, and convictions attached to paragraph 4 of this Report, that there has been no want of activity on the part of the Police or of severity on the part of the Courts. The punishments have invariably been heavy; but in my estimation not too severe for the offence which has gradually become, no matter for what cause, habitual, and which must be put down by example.

"I believe that the late Judge, Mr. C. P. Hobhouse, who has tried many of these cases with the greatest possible care, was under the impression that there was no such grievous distress as to palliate the offence, and looked upon the plunder of other property simultaneously with the rice as evidence that it is general lawlessness rather than hunger that leads to these dacoities. In one case, however, of rice plunder, in which hunger was pleaded before the Judge, and a sentence of six months' imprisonment was awarded to the offenders, the High Court animadverted on the inadequacy of the sentence, and I think reasonably so, as in that case, as well as in most of the others that have come to my notice, there is clear evidence of the parties of dacoits going out armed with a view to resist opposition.

"I have unfortunately not had an opportunity of seeing Mr. Hobhouse and ascertaining from him precisely what his opinion was; but if it be such as I have stated, I must differ

"with him altogether, and there is not a single person with whom I have conversed on the subject during my stay at Midnapore that does not agree with me that there is ample evidence to prove that hunger is the origin and cause of the augmentation of crime—(1st), in the facts that such cumbersome property as rice is plundered in so many cases; (2nd), in the large number of persons that are engaged; (3rd), in the entire want of any organized scheme known to the professional dacoit; (4th), the readiness with which a majority of the accused confess; and lastly, the reason assigned for the commission of the crime."

Measures taken to check crime.

28. To check and deal with the increase of crime, the Police of the district was strengthened by the addition of two special Inspectors and 50 men in January and February.

The village Police were also apportioned into small bodies under the orders of the Constables.

Whipping Act extended.

29. The Commissioner wrote—"Another and equally efficacious remedy would be that of extending the provisions of Section 6 of Act VI of 1864, or what is commonly known as the 'Whipping Act,' to such parts of the frontier and jungle districts as require it. The zillah jails are, I believe, no punishment to the ignorant class of Bhoomij and Sonthals at this season; but are, I think, on the contrary, with the food and shelter that is provided, rather agreeable and genial. I would, therefore, strongly recommend that the terms of the Act be immediately extended, as far as regards the district of Midnapore, to the five jungle thannahs of Gopeebullubpore, Jhargoon, Bheempore (the Jungle Mehals), and those of Gurbetta and Sabunee." The Act was extended accordingly.

Magistrate's Report of 25th April.

30. Soon after submitting this report, the Commissioner sent up to Government a report from the Magistrate, dated the 25th of April, in which he reported that there was much alarm in the south and extreme north of the district.

He wrote—"From a private source I hear that the mahajuns of Bagree have been ill-treated, thefts from granaries are frequent, and one or two have certainly been burnt down.

"I have not heard of such malicious proceedings elsewhere, and I cannot help observing that nowhere else in the district than in Gurbetta had any interference between mahajuns and consumers been attempted to my knowledge. The export trade in rice was actually checked by the putneedars, and the mahajuns were actually pressed to sell to the ryots. The inevitable result is that the ryots are confirmed in their belief that the mahajuns are their enemies when they will not sell. The instance is a very marked one, and I have spoken to the putneedar about it, and have warned Baboo Hemchunder Kur not to give his countenance to any such one-sided benevolence. The putneedar has expressed his willingness to change his policy.

"In the Jungle Mehals and the two jungle thannahs, Gurbetta and Sabunee, as well as in Keshpore, grain dacoities and thefts are scarcely, if at all, on the decrease, and I am sorry to say the crime is spreading towards the plains.

"The distress is still not so great, judging by prices, as it was just before the harvest in Hidgellee and Midnapore, and I have not yet heard of any deaths among the able-bodied

"or even middle-aged. But the old and infirm are beginning to die from insufficient food. I have still hopes that the rain may bring forward cultivation, and that the granaries will then open more freely. Every one is watching for this. I am glad to be able to say that even at Dantoon, where prices are hardest, I was assured that very few ryots indeed had parted with their cattle, and that cultivation was going on very favorably to the laborers."

State of things in May.

31. In May the Collector again visited the Jungle Mehals, and found that a few deaths from starvation had actually occurred.

32. Mr. Adams, District Superintendent of Police, was also on tour between Gurbetta, in the extreme north of the district, and Gopeebullubpore, in the western and central part of the Jungle Mehals. He had observed an enormous increase of beggary and general distress; but he has recorded* that he does not think that in April there was "actual famine. The people said it was hard to get rice, complained of exports, and wanted to have a fixed price, but they said that people were not actually dying of starvation. Even the beggars did not appear to be starving; most of the women and children were in tolerably good condition."

33. In May, according to Mr. Adams, things were worse; but he does not consider "that what can properly be called the famine commenced till June." Here again it is obvious that the definition of the word *famine* differs greatly according to different interpreters. Mr. Adams's account, which generally agrees with that given by Mr. Herschel in a note with which he has favored the Commission, would go to prove that according to the meaning which we attach to the word, famine prevailed very generally over at least the western parts of the district of Midnapore even in May. Mr. Herschel, in the note referred to, says, alluding to his meeting Mr. Adams at Gopeebullubpore—"The people who gathered round us to receive food were very emaciated. Rice was still at 9 and 10 seers for the rupee, but I commenced at once to organise measures for general relief." He has further recorded in his evidence† that on the same occasion at Gopeebullubpore he "called together the poor people and distributed rice. I was surprised to find how many people came at the call. I only stopped at the place from morning till evening, and in that time 250 persons were assembled, who bore on their persons the marks of starvation."

34. The Collector returned to Midnapore on the 19th May, and on the 21st, in submitting to the Board the weekly price current, he noted, "there is no doubt now that deaths from starvation among the old, the weak, and the children are occurring." On receipt of this report, the Board granted Rs. 5,000 for relief operations in Midnapore, the senior Member, although he did not concur with his colleague in considering that the state of things called for such aid, not desiring to prevent the action which the junior Member desired to take.

Government grant of Rs. 5,000.

35. On Mr. Herschel's return to Midnapore rice was selling at 8½ seers; the starving people from the district generally had begun to flock in, and on the 24th May, when distribution of rice, purchased with the funds already in hand,‡ commenced, upwards of 200 persons applied for relief.

General relief commenced.

* See evidence, page cxi.

† See evidence, page cvi.

‡ Supra, paragraph 19.

36. On the 26th May the Collector reported to the Commissioner of the division that distress was most severely felt in the Jungle Mehals, as well as in the neighbourhood of Dantoon in the south of the district, and Gurbetah in the extreme north, close to the borders of Bankoora. The town of Midnapore was also stated to be suffering, but this was ascribed principally to the great influx of paupers from the surrounding district.

In Tumlook and Hidgellee, where the distress had been greatest before the harvest, the famine was not so severely felt at this time; the crops there, except in the extreme southern part of Hidgellee, having been tolerably good.

37. The Deputy Magistrates of Tumlook and Nugwan, who had already some funds at their disposal, were directed, on the 26th May, to make a beginning in the way of affording relief, and to report their proceedings to the Magistrate.

38. The Deputy Magistrate of Gurbetah was addressed to the same effect, but as he had no money in hand, he was desired to call a meeting and endeavour to raise subscriptions.

Meeting to organize relief.

39. On the 28th May a meeting was called at Midnapore for the purpose of organising systematic relief operations. This meeting was attended by the Magistrate, the Joint Magistrate, the Reverend Messrs. Batchelor and Phillips, Missionaries, and six of the most influential Natives in the town.

40. The following were the principal resolutions adopted at this meeting:—

1st.—That Sub-committees and Local Committees be appointed in the interior of the district, controlled by a Central Committee at the head quarters station, who should also have the management and disposal of the general fund.

2nd.—That with the view of avoiding indiscriminate relief, a Labor Sub-Committee be formed at Midnapore, who should exact light work from such applicants for relief as were capable of working in some form for their daily wages.

3rd.—That a Distribution Committee be appointed, also at Midnapore, to superintend the gratuitous distribution of food to those who were physically unequal to the performance of any labor.

4th.—That the following institutions be established and maintained from the General Famine Fund:—

(a). An infirmary, under the superintendence of a special committee, for the reception of such paupers as it was considered desirable to separate from the rest, in consequence of their suffering from loathsome, contagious, or incurable diseases.

(b). An asylum for the support of such paupers as were unable, from weakness due to starvation only, to attend the daily distribution of food in the town.

This asylum, which was originally started by Mr. Grant, Joint Magistrate, will be spoken of hereafter as "Grant's" Asylum. Mr. Grant having subsequently left the station, the Committee, with his consent, took charge of the asylum, and defrayed all expenses connected with it from the general fund.

41. For affording relief in the interior, it was further resolved that Messrs. Watson and Co., who hold large landed property in farm in the district, be asked to allow their assistants to co-operate by superintending the gratuitous distribution of rice at the factories of Chuttergunge, Goaltore, Gooteah, and Silda, under the control of the Central Committee. Further, that the Police officers be requested to afford every assistance in their power to paupers found by them within their respective jurisdictions, and who were unable to make their way to Midnapore, the Central Committee undertaking to defray all necessary expenses.

42. The resolutions thus passed were at once carried into effect. The management of the infirmary was undertaken by the Reverend Mr. Phillips, while Grant's asylum was placed under the care of the Magistrate.

Measures adopted.

The Reverend Mr. Batchelor charged himself with the duties of President of the Distribution Committee, and Baboo Gosain Dass Dutt with those of superintending the labor yard. Messrs. Watson and Co. at once consented to allow their assistants to afford the aid required of them, and letters were accordingly addressed to the several gentlemen named in the margin, inviting them to use their best endeavours to raise subscriptions. To each of them a sum of Rs. 200 was remitted from the general fund, to enable them to commence operations without delay. A smaller sum was also sent to the Moonsiff of Dantoon, who had volunteered to superintend relief operations in that town; and another to the Deputy Magistrate of Gurbetah.

Mr. J. A. Clark, of Chuttergunge.

Mr. T. Jeffray, of Goaltore.

Mr. J. B. Falls, of Gooteah.

Mr. F. Sheffield, of Silda or Belpaharee.

43. It will be convenient to enter here the names of the several centres of relief established from first to last, although some of them belong to a much later date than that which our Narrative has reached.

Relief centres.

Date of opening.	Locality.	Date of closure.
24th May 1866	Midnapore	16th November 1866.
19th "	Gopeebullubpore	30th "
31st "	Tumlook	17th "
2nd June	Gurbetah	14th "
" "	Gudapensal	30th "
" "	With sub-depôts of— Gurnul. Joypore.	
" "	Chuttergunge	19th "
" "	Goaltore	27th "
" "	With sub-depôts of— Amlagora. Pathurpara. Nyabussut.	
4th "	Contai	30th "
9th "	Belpaharee	" "
12th "	Dantoon	" "
" "	Gooteah	" "
27th "	Surdeha	23rd September
11th July	Beempore	24th November
4th August	Kesseearee	30th "
" "	Nyagaon	17th "
11th "	Rohineegurh	30th "
22nd "	Mahapal	20th "
26th "	Jambonee	30th "

44. In starting these depôts those who had charge of them were required to enforce the general rules regarding labor and gratuitous relief laid down in the resolutions* of the Midnapore meeting. The principles thus established were fully approved by Government.†

45. On the 7th June a census taken of the paupers fed by the Midnapore Distribution Committee showed that on that day out of 765 persons only 88 belonged to other districts.

A further grant applied for.

46. The reports received from the thirteen depôts and sub-depôts established up to the end of the first week of June showed that even without any extension of relief operations, the Government grant of Rs. 5,000 would not last long. The district not being a wealthy one, considerable difficulty was experienced in raising funds. The Magistrate accordingly wrote on the 12th June to the Commissioner to the effect that even if the Central Committee could succeed in collecting private subscriptions to the amount of Rs. 1,000, that sum, added to the grant from Government, would suffice for little more than to cover the outlay to the close of the month. Moreover, it was to be expected that the number of applicants for relief would increase, as it became generally known that Government had come forward to aid the starving. A further grant was therefore asked from Government.

Local appeals.

47. At the same time an urgent appeal for assistance was made to all landholders within 20 miles of Midnapore, to the Rajah of Jhargoon, and to several non-resident proprietors of estates within the district. This appeal was by no means fully responded to.

Public works grant.

48. On the 10th June the Collector received intimation that Government, in the Public Works Department, had assigned Rs. 30,000 for the purpose of being expended on works calculated to afford relief to the distressed.

Works proposed.

A meeting was accordingly held on the 15th for the purpose of devising the best means of carrying out the object of the grant.

49. In consultation with the Executive Engineer, it was resolved to put in hand the following special relief works:—

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| (1).—Cleaning and re-dressing an important drainage line in the town of Midnapore, known as Malet's khal, which had been allowed to fall into disuse; estimated expenditure ... | Rs. 4,000 |
| (2).—Excavation of new tanks at the following places:— | |
| (a).—At Samlee, about 4 miles south of Dantoon on the Cuttack road ... | 2,500 |
| (b).—At Doyjooree, on the Beempore road, about 16 miles west of Midnapore ... | 2,500 |
| (c).—At Satbancoorah, on the Raneegunge road, 20 miles north of Midnapore ... | 2,500 |
| (d).—At Gurbetah, 10 miles further up the same road ... | 3,000 |
| (3).—Cleaning tanks in the vicinity of the town of Midnapore ... | 500 |

The total estimated cost of the above works thus amounted to ... 15,000

* Supra, paragraph 40.

† Secretary Government of Bengal, to Board of Revenue, No. 632, dated 21st May 1866.
Secretary Board to Commissioner Cuttack, No. A, dated 22nd May 1866.

The balance of the grant, Rs. 15,000, was reserved for a large tank then in course of excavation close to the site of the new jail.

50. The whole of the above works, with the exception of clearance of Malet's khal, and the excavation of the new jail tank, were of a nature such as to be capable of being executed with ordinary agency. The two exceptions were under charge of the Executive Engineer.

51. The following extract from the examination* of Major Swayne, Executive Engineer, summarises the subsequent operations of his department in connection with the above works:—

Summary of works carried out.

“On these works and the central prison tank, as well as a few minor works in the station of Midnapore, from the 17th May to the end of November, about 48½ men and women were daily employed.

“At first I used to employ daily labor payments, viz., 2½ annas for men, 2 annas for women, and 1½ annas for children; but this plan was found to give so little work for the expenditure incurred, that to avoid excessive rates, I resorted to task-work. The rates were proportioned to the stiffness of the soil. As the excavations proceeded, the difficulty of digging increased, and I have given as high as Rs. 7-8 per 1,000 cubic feet. Even this rate will be increased at greater depths. I estimate that the rates throughout enabled an able-bodied laborer to earn from 3 to 3½ annas per diem, and women about 1½ annas each. The average rate at which rice sold between May and November was 7 seers the rupee, which, taking the average amount earned by men and women together at 2 annas each per diem, gave nearly 1 seer of rice per head carried daily. I never paid my work-people in any other way than in cash; but at each place when work was in progress, the Collector had a depôt of rice from which the laborers were supplied. When the rains set in, the excavated portions of the tanks filled with water, and the laborers could no longer dig; but, as far as possible, they were employed in working and dressing the banks.

“Out of the above grant of Rs. 30,000, I then made over to the Collector Rs. 7,400 for the purpose of constructing certain jungle roads, the expenditure on which was kept in his hands.

“No other relief works were carried on under my orders. I consider that if the relief works had been commenced earlier in the season, they would have done much more good; as it was, the people who applied for work were frequently so weak and emaciated that they were not fit for labor. After I commenced work on the central prison tank, the applications from women became much in excess of those from men, and as the women could not dig, and I required not more than two women to each man, I was obliged to refuse the women who were in excess. At first I got men in larger numbers, but as soon as agricultural operations commenced, many of the men went off, leaving the women. There was, however, some employment for women

* Evidence, page cix.

† From 17th to 31st May	...	...	...	7,235
In June	...	...	...	10,736
„ July	...	...	...	14,157
„ August	...	...	...	16,852
„ September	...	...	...	16,525
„ October	...	...	...	13,262
„ November	...	...	...	3,474

"under Mr. Verner, Assistant Magistrate. When the contract system was adopted, people often worked in families, men and women together, but women who had no men belonging to them, probably had difficulty in obtaining employment. It was only at the commencement of agricultural operations that the number of women seeking work was in excess of the men. I did not observe this to be the case later in the season."

Mr. Man deputed to visit the depôts.

52. By the 15th June, seventeen depôts had been established* in the district, and before the month closed, another was added (Surdeha). On the 20th Mr. Man, Deputy Magistrate, who had lately been appointed to the district, was deputed into the interior to visit the depôts, to ascertain and report whether the principles laid down for their management were observed, and to afford information generally on the state of the country and prospects of the crops.

His reports.

53. Mr. Man's tour occupied about two weeks. The reports received from him may be summarised as follows :—

That distress was on the increase, and deaths due to starvation were occurring, especially in the neighbourhood of Dantoon and in the Jungle Mehals, where rice, though nominally selling at the rate of 8 seers per rupee, was practically unprocurable.

That the depôts in the interior were, on the whole, working satisfactorily, though the sub-committees and gentlemen in charge of them were not, as a rule, disposed to carry out the principle insisted on by the Central Committee, that gratuitous relief should be given only to those who were physically incapable of all labor. The reasons for this were said to be,—*firstly*, that though many of the paupers were willing to work, there was no work for them at that season of the year; and *secondly*, that when applicants, capable of labor in some shape, were told to go to Midnapore, where work would be provided for them, they refused lest they should die on the road. For these it was obviously necessary to provide relief, if it was not desired that they should be left to starve.

The Deputy Magistrate further reported that the prospects of the Aaos or early rice crop were favorable.

Question of labor.

54. More than once, after the receipt of Mr. Man's report, the Central Committee endeavoured to impress on those in charge of the interior depôts the necessity of compelling applicants capable of even light labor to come to Midnapore, where work could be found for them. The practice in force at the depôts beyond the station of Midnapore, of giving gratuitous relief to all paupers, whether able to work or not, was maintained, and for the present the Central Committee ceased to press their views.

55. At the Midnapore depôt, however, labor continued to be strictly exacted from those able to give it; but at times considerable difficulty was felt in devising employment for all. In the then condition of most of the paupers, spinning was the only kind of work that the majority were fit for.

Census of paupers in June.

56. On the 27th June a second census of the paupers fed at the Midnapore depôt showed that out of 2,342 persons, 2,085 were residents of the district. It was thus proved that no influx of importance was taking place from other districts, nor did any such influx occur at any later period.

* Supra, paragraph 43.

57. At the beginning of July, rice was selling in Midnapore town at 6½ seers, and in the Jungle Mehals at nominally 7 seers per rupee. In the latter part of the district, however, it was not in reality procurable. The Police frequently reported that they could not obtain a sufficiency for even their own wants. The Collector has stated, in his evidence,* that he then became seriously alarmed. "We had a special meeting of the Relief Committee to consider the subject. The result was that we asked the Government to place Dantoon and the Jungle Mehals under Mr. McNeile. We also asked the Board of Revenue to import 4,000 maunds (nearly 143 tons) by land from Calcutta for our use. I remarked that that would be only a first instalment. Throughout the rains the land route from Calcutta is practicable, but from Naraingurh southwards to Dantoon the road is impracticable for heavy traffic at that season. The Board declined to import the rice on the ground that the import trade would be interfered with. Private funds were not very large, but we were using our funds, both private and public, in the purchase of rice in Calcutta and getting it up. My object in applying to the Board was that the grain might be sold at ordinary market rates, as in Orissa. Government did not import rice throughout the famine for sale at cost price. We had not much difficulty in making our own arrangements for importing rice for relief purposes. In this district, Hidgellee apart, there is no class of enterprising traders; travelling traders come and buy up the grain; the resident traders do scarcely anything beyond their own villages. Local traders store up grain for the benefit of the ryots, to whom they are in the habit of making advances. Zemindars also are in the habit of hoarding up grain. More or less we managed to supply Dantoon, Kesscaree, Nyagaon, and Rohinee by sending rice in carts to Naraingurh, and thence on bullocks. In July we applied for much larger funds; and early in August, I sent up a still larger estimate, desiring them to establish charitable sales in lieu of my former propositions, which had been disallowed. Up to that time we had only distributed rice gratis."

State of things in July.
Stocks of rice.

58. The opinion at this time seems to have been almost universal, that there was plenty of grain in the district, but that the mahajuns would not part with it except at exorbitant prices. It may be added that this opinion seems to have been, to some extent, subsequently verified by the fact that in November, when the prospect of a magnificent harvest became certain, reports were received from the interior depôts that old rice continued to be sold as well as new. The only mode of accounting for this circumstance, unless indeed the improbable supposition of imports be adopted, appears to be by supposing that the grain was hoarded earlier in the season, while dread of a continuance of famine survived.

Importations recommended.

59. Be this, however, as it may, it became clear to the Central Committee early in July that importation of rice on a considerable scale must be undertaken, if the depôts already established were to be kept at work. Accordingly, on the 6th July, the Collector submitted to the Commissioner an estimate of his probable requirements for the two and half months following. It was not then supposed that relief measures would have to be prolonged beyond the end of September, before which the Aaos,

* Evidence, page cvi.

or early crop would be reaped. Relief was at that time being afforded to nearly 10,000 people daily throughout the district, and instructions had been given to all the depôts to issue only 4 chittacks (8 ounces) of dry rice to each adult, and 2 chittacks (4 ounces) to each child. These rations the Central Committee considered that experience warranted them in pronouncing to be sufficient.

Question of sufficiency of amount of rations considered.

60. Before proceeding further, it becomes necessary to say a few words as to the sufficiency or otherwise of the daily allowances of food thus prescribed. It is evident from the evidence of both Mr. Herschel, and of Mr. Terry, Manager to Messrs. Watson and Co., that there was considerable difference of opinion in the Committee as to the quantity of rice that should be allowed daily to each pauper. Mr. Herschel says that "until the 17th July only 4 chittacks or $\frac{1}{2}$ lb was given to an adult. All the centres were authorized to give this quantity, but one of them, a very small one, gave only half the quantity. It was a debated point whether this was enough; the Civil Surgeon thought not, but the majority thought it was. Afterwards it was raised to 6 chittacks ($\frac{3}{4}$ lb) without *dall* (a species of vetch) and to that we adhered until close to the end of the operations, when we authorised 10 chittacks ($1\frac{1}{4}$ lb) to be given." Mr. Terry states—"I was on the Relief Committee here. I think relief operations were commenced as soon as might reasonably have been expected. When they were commenced, I do not think that the relief given was sufficient in quantity. The quantity allowed to each person was not sufficient. The Committee was formed very late, and the arrangements had then been made. I always thought the 6 chittacks allowed wholly insufficient, and said so. I think that the majority of the Committee thought so too. I do not think that the Government officers then realized the severity of the distress; in fact it was very difficult to get at the truth, accounts are very contradictory to this moment; we can't get at the truth. Even when the rations were increased to 6 chittacks I do not think it was enough. We gave to the people working for us 12 chittacks of rice and 4 of *dall*, besides 2 and 3 pice per diem. I think that a laboring man might eat that himself. Throughout the famine, I think that the women held out the best. We of the Committee wished to give relief in larger quantities, and my assistants in charge of centres repeatedly wrote in for it. The fact is that in the Committee the matter did not go by majorities. I only know of about three meetings of the Central Committee, and those were late in the season. I was, however, a good deal out in the district, and did not attend all the Committee's meetings. The Collector was the ruling man in the Committee, and my impression is that it was not a question of majority. I should have liked to have given 10 chittacks to the paupers. I think that those who got the smaller quantity, generally died in the end. I think that centres were established at a sufficient number of places and as early as might have been expected; the only error was, that enough food was not given."

61. We are of opinion that even 6 chittacks ($\frac{3}{4}$ lb) of rice daily, without any nitrogenous food,* is insufficient to maintain healthy existence in an adult: still more so the smaller quantity (4 chittacks or $\frac{1}{2}$ lb) first prescribed by the Midnapore Committee. The low scale was adopted on the belief that the paupers nearly

* See Dr. Jackson's evidence, page lxxv.

doubled their allowance by begging in the town, but we think it would have been better to avoid the risk of insufficiency by supplying to each pauper such a quantity of food as was considered by medical authority to be sufficient to support life in health. In the centres in the interior there was no such opportunity of supplementing the allowance by begging; and at one of these the quantity given was at one time as low as 2 chittacks or 4 oz. to each pauper. We have no doubt that in this district an unfortunate error was committed on this point.

62. To resume the Narrative. In making his estimate, the Collector assumed that rice from Calcutta, where it was selling at 8 seers for a rupee, could scarcely be delivered at Midnapore, certainly not at the depôts in the interior, at a cheaper rate than 7 seers per rupee. On these data, and supposing that the average daily number of applicants would not exceed 10,000, while the rations given to each would remain as before, he estimated that for the succeeding two and half months a total expenditure of Rs. 22,500 would be necessary. To meet this outlay, the Central Committee could command only Rs. 10,000; viz., balance in hand Rs. 4,000, and anticipated receipt Rs. 6,000. It was, therefore, apparent that an additional sum of Rs. 12,500 should be obtained from the Government.

Collector's July estimate of expenditure required.

63. Circumstances, however, combined to render this estimate of little value. The Board of Revenue issued instructions that the daily rations of adult paupers should be raised to 6 chittacks ($\frac{3}{4}$ lb) with half that quantity for a child. The Commissioner directed that the practice of issuing raw rice should be discontinued: starving people swallowed their allowance as they received it, and thus many died: others again were tempted to hoard it, apparently with a view to sale. Under these circumstances, the Commissioner required that cooked rice should be substituted for raw. Lastly, the number of people for whom relief was demanded rose considerably above the number assumed by the Collector as a maximum. It may be noted, too, although somewhat out of the order of time, that at the suggestion of the Board, it was resolved to introduce the system of charitable sales, in addition to that previously in force of gratuitous distribution.

Of little value.

64. Nevertheless, application was made on the 5th July to the Board for a further grant of Rs. 5,000, and at the same time a sum of Rs. 1,000 was remitted to Messrs. Sykes and Co., of Calcutta, for the purchase of rice, partly on account of the Department Public Works, and partly on that of the Relief Committee. The difficulty of procuring rice at all in any quantity in the district rendered prompt action necessary.

Importations ordered.

65. On the 9th July, the Collector, having occasion to visit Panchkoora, 27 miles from Midnapore, on the Calcutta road, made special enquiry into the state of the district in that neighbourhood. The following was the information obtained:—

State of eastern part of district.

1st.—That tolerably good rice was selling at all the *moodees'* (petty dealers) shops at 8 seers (16 lbs) for a rupee.

2nd.—That all the rice found in these shops came from the rice countries to the eastward, and had been obtained through Calcutta.

3rd.—That travellers and road-side residents appeared to be as well conditioned as they are in the most favorable years.

4th.—That neither the villagers nor the Police knew of any deaths having occurred on the road. In fact, during a four hours' drive, only four cases of actual distress from hunger came under notice, and of these none was extreme.

66. The above facts seemed to show that eastward of Midnapore there was no need for aid from Government, and that the importation of rice into that part of the country from Calcutta was providing sufficiently for local wants.

Of western part.

67. From the western portion of the district, however, accounts had been received of the continually increasing distress, until, on the 9th July, the Committee resolved to apply to Government to have the Police sub-division of Dantoon and the whole of the Jungle Mehals placed under Mr. McNeile, then recently appointed by Government as special Collector to supervise the relief operations in Orissa. This application was accordingly submitted, on the 12th July, through the Commissioner of the division, and a request was, at the same time, preferred to Government to despatch at once a first importation of 4,000 maunds of rice for sale in the distressed parts of the district above referred to.

General Relief Meeting held in July.

68. On the 11th July a general meeting was called at Midnapore by the Sessions Judge, for the purpose of raising subscriptions. Previously to this date, two attempts had been made to call such a meeting, but each had failed in consequence of the inclemency of the weather. To the present meeting, all the influential landed proprietors of the district were invited by letter addressed to each. Printed circulars were subsequently sent to many of the smaller landholders, asking their aid in collecting subscriptions in their several villages. In a few instances these were responded to, but the general results of this appeal were not successful.

Result.

Measures taken in July: special Deputy Collector applied for.

69. On the 13th July the Committee resolved, with reference to Mr. Man's report,* before noticed, that special measures were required to relieve the distress at Dantoon, and in the western portion of the district; that the Commissioner be asked to sanction the appointment of a special Deputy Collector, who should be employed in visiting the depôts, and superintending relief operations in Dantoon and the Jungle Mehals: that in the meanwhile, as large supplies of rice as the Committee's funds could afford to purchase be sent to those portions of the district with the view of extending the relief given them, and that measures be adopted for establishing, under trustworthy agency, additional depôts at the Police out-posts of Kessiaree, Mahapal, and Nyagaon.

70. It having been also brought to notice at this time that the dealers in Midnapore were deterred from importing rice into the interior of the district by the numerous robberies that had occurred, the District Superintendent of Police was instructed by the Commissioner to give all the aid in his power to intending importers by providing efficient escorts. Half-weekly reports of the rates at which rice was selling at each Police station and outpost were also called for, for publication in the

* Supra, paragraph 53.

bazar. Every facility was thus given to dealers to send rice into the interior of the district, but without any result. Trade appeared in fact to be paralysed.

71. In the meanwhile, a telegram, dated the 12th July, having been received from the Board of Revenue, directing the Collector to organise effectual measures for relieving the distress in the west of the district, reports of which had reached the Board, and authorising him to advance from the public treasury any amount that might be needed for the purpose, another meeting of the Central Committee was called on the 17th July. On this occasion it was resolved to extend considerably the relief operations at the various depôts at Dantoon and in the Jungle Mehals, and to ascertain what were the numbers of applicants expected to resort to these, if the Committee granted unlimited supplies. The question was also raised at this meeting, for the first time, whether an allowance to each adult of 4 chittacks (8 ounces) of dry rice was sufficient to support life. This question has been already sufficiently discussed in paragraphs 54 and 55 of this Narrative. It may, however, be explained here that the reluctance of the Committee to increase the daily rations allowed to the Midnapore paupers arose from a desire not to check public charity. It was ascertained that these paupers, after receiving their daily allowance of dry rice in the morning, were in the habit of going to the town, where, in the course of the day, they obtained from charity nearly, if not quite, as much more. The whole was then cooked and eaten in the evening. The Committee subsequently learnt that the rations at many of the district depôts could not be similarly supplemented, and at these they increased the allowance by one-half.

Telegram from Board authorizing advances.

Meeting of 17th July resolve on extension of relief.

72. At the meeting of the 17th July it was further resolved, as an experiment, to establish a kitchen at the Midnapore depôt, for the benefit of such paupers as might prefer to receive cooked food. It was not considered advisable, however, to extend this experiment to the district depôts, because of the additional work that would necessarily be entailed on those who were already sufficiently occupied.

It was believed, too, that the paupers generally employed themselves profitably in searching for dry sticks and other fuel, wherewith to cook their food, and it was not deemed desirable to enforce a system which would interfere with such wholesome employment, and foster idleness.

The Midnapore kitchen, however, failed. The Distribution Committee reported that nearly all the paupers preferred to receive raw rice, with the liberty of adding to their allowance by begging in the town. Discretion was, therefore, given to issue cooked or raw rice, as circumstances required.

73. On the 23rd July, with the sanction of the Board, who had informed the Committee that it was not possible to spare Mr. McNeile, who had ample employment in Cuttack, Deputy Collector Hem Chunder Kur, specially deputed by the Collector to superintend relief operations in the interior of the district, proceeded to Dantoon. Here he remained a week, collecting subscriptions and visiting in person several of the neighbouring

Special Deputy Collector appointed.

Summary of his reports.

villages. The reports submitted by the Deputy Collector on this occasion showed—

1st.—That of the applicants for relief at the Dantoon depôt, more than 90 per cent were residents of the pergunnah (sub-division) of that name.

2nd.—That the condition of the paupers urgently demanded the supply of cooked food to such as were not able to cook for themselves, and that the daily rations, whether issued cooked or raw, should be increased to 6 chittacks (12 ounces) for adults, and 3 chittacks (6 ounces) for children.

3rd.—That in the Dantoon pergunnah, the Sonthal women and children were suffering most severely, while those of the better classes were comparatively well off.

4th.—That many paupers were unable to attend the Dantoon depôt, in consequence of their inability to cross the Soobunreeka river, and that, therefore, a new depôt was urgently required at Nyagaon, an outpost eight miles from Dantoon on the opposite bank of the river. The Head Constable at this outpost represented the distress in his neighbourhood to be great, and it may be added, to his high credit, that he had for a month past been affording relief to about 100 persons daily, by means of subscriptions which he had personally collected.

5th.—That the excavation of the tank at Samlee* was not proceeding satisfactorily, in consequence of the Department Public Works officials rejecting all paupers who could not bring their own baskets and digging tools, as well as those who could not perform the full day's task of an able-bodied person, both of which exceptions it was clearly unreasonable, under the circumstances, to make.

The Deputy Collector, before leaving Dantoon, saw a labor yard started at the depôt there, under the supervision of a sub-committee, whose duty it was to select such of the rejected paupers as were best capable of work, and employ them for the present in clearing jungle in the neighbourhood.

6th. That rice was selling in Dantoon on the 30th July at 6½ seers (13lbs) per rupee, and that the crops were sadly in want of rain.

Before leaving Dantoon the Deputy Collector weeded the distribution yard of all paupers who were not fit objects of charity; he also saw the plan of distributing cooked food introduced.

74. The Central Committee at once proceeded to carry out the suggestions of the Deputy Collector; they sanctioned the establishment of a new depôt at Nyagaon, and placed it under the Head Constable.

75. On the 1st August the Board of Revenue wrote to the Collector, informing him that, after consultation with His Honor the Lieutenant Governor, they had resolved not to undertake the importation of grain into the Midnapore district, as they had been compelled to do into Orissa. The Board were prepared to supply such funds as were necessary to provide rice for gratuitous distribution, or for sales below cost price, leaving importations to the Central Committee. In a separate letter of the same date, the Board suggested to the Collector that either he should indent on the Collector of Balasore for the supplies of rice required for the Dantoon depôt, or establish a store of rice at

* Supra, paragraph 43.

Hidgellee, and they at the same time communicated a copy of the Government orders (No. 1933 of the 26th June), prescribing the rate at which rice purchased with public funds was to be sold.

76. The Collector of Balasore replied to an enquiry made by the Committee, that he had no rice to spare, and as regards the establishment of a store at Hidgellee, the Committee ascertained that it would be cheaper and better to import rice into Dantoon and the Jungle Mehals *via* Midnapore.

77. On the 7th August the Collector, in replying to the Board, submitted an estimate of what he considered would be the probable expenditure during the succeeding 30 days. Collector's August 7th estimate.

He pointed out that private trade was not supplying the Jungle Mehals, and that the dealers were not unwilling that Government should import on their own account. He regretted that Government would not undertake this duty, since the result would be that many more would be thrown on charitable relief, and cause the early rice crop (Aos) to be at once consumed or hoarded.

He added that since the last estimate, submitted to the Commissioner on the 6th July, was drawn up, the following points had been brought to the notice of the Board as tending to require increased expenditure—

1st.—That the pauper list had been steadily rising, and that under the then fast extending operations of Deputy Collector Hem Chunder Kur, the average of persons requiring relief would amount to at least 10,000 per diem.

2nd.—That experience had shown, and all Local Committees were agreed, that 4 chittacks (8 ounces) of rice, even with the additional ration sanctioned by the Central Committee on the 17th July for Dantoon and the Jungle Mehals, were not sufficient for adults. It was necessary, therefore, to increase the daily allowance to 6 chittacks (12 ounces) for adults, and 3 chittacks (6 ounces) for children. The only depôts where this rule was not to be followed were those of Tumlook, where the distress was not so great as to render this increase necessary, and Midnapore, where private charity supplied the deficiency.

3rd.—That charitable sales would give rise to a separate item of outlay, which had not been taken into account in any previous estimate.

78. The estimate now submitted to the Board assumed that, allowing for cash and stock in hand, as well as for such subscriptions as the Committee expected to realise, an expenditure for the succeeding 30 days of Rs. 5,000 would be necessary requiring the fourth part of that amount for gratuitous distribution. For charitable sales, the Collector professed himself unable to form any exact estimate, the Board's orders to introduce such sales having only very recently been issued. Roughly, however, it was calculated that 1,000 maunds (of 80 lbs each) a week would be consumed in sales, involving an expenditure of Rs. 20,000 for the month, assuming that rice was procurable at Rs. 5 per maund. The total expenditure, therefore, on account of gratuitous distributions and sales was put down roughly at Rs. 25,000, out of which it was hoped that from Rs. 12,000 to Rs. 15,000 would be recoverable from purchasers. The Collector expressed his regret for having made so low an estimate of the wants of the

The Board decline to import rice.

district, when he applied for the second grant of Rs 5,000; he had been misled by the very unreasonable anticipation that the enormous importations into Balasore, which were taking place, would have prevented famine from spreading into the southern part of Midnapore, where it was now severest.

Rice indented for.

79. Immediately on receipt of the Board's letter of the 1st August, the Collector telegraphed to Messrs. Sykes and Co., of Calcutta, to purchase without delay 2,500 maunds (of 80 lbs each) of rice, and on the 8th August, instructions were sent to the same Firm to proceed to despatch this rice in instalments of 500 maunds at a time, as opportunities offered, within ten days, and afterwards to supply the Committee with 1000 maunds a week until further orders. Due information of these proceedings was given to the Board by the Collector in a letter, dated the 11th August.

80. In the same letter, the Collector pointed out to the Board, in reply to a telegram from them, suggesting the advisability of purchasing on the spot from day to day, that such a course was quite impracticable, without running great risk of closing the depôts. The Board's suggestion was based on an anticipation that prices in the district would fall as the rice of the early (Aoos) crop came into the market; but the Collector showed that the produce of that crop, which in the Midnapore district covers but a small area, would not be offered for sale, for it would be consumed as fast as it was reaped. The district in fact was exhausted, and the Collector considered that more effectual assistance would be afforded by importing the whole quantity of rice required by the Committee, even if at a loss as compared with the local prices, than by attempting to buy up the Aoos rice for the benefit of the non-laboring poor.

81. On the 11th August, the Board ~~settled~~ the Collector's estimate of Rs. 25,000 for disbursements ~~estimated~~ for the month of September, and authorised him to procure the rice ~~up to the~~ Calcutta.

Special Deputy Collector's
proceedings August 1st to
15th.

82. Meanwhile the proceedings of the Collector Hem Chunder Kur in the district, during the first fortnight of August, were as follows:—

(1.) He established two new depôts, one at Kessiarree, 12 miles east of Dantoon, and the other at Rohineegurh, 9 miles from Kessiarree, the former under the superintendence of a local Sub-Committee of intelligent Natives; the latter under that of the Head Constable of the Police outpost on the spot.

(2.) At Kessiarree he succeeded in raising a monthly subscription of Rs. 300, and at Rohineegurh a sum of Rs. 188 for two months.

(3.) He found the distress at these two places quite as great as at Dantoon. Coarse rice had, for some time past, been selling at 6 and 7 seers (12 and 14 lbs) per rupee. Deaths were frequently occurring in the neighbourhood of his camp and were still more frequent in the villages. These deaths were due to the inclement state of the weather. The paupers, unable to find shelter, succumbed to exposure. Rain at this time fell heavily daily, and the rivers became unfordable. The Deputy Collector did all that lay in his power to provide shelter at the different depôts which he visited.

(4.) The Deputy Collector found that in the neighbourhood of Kessiarree and Dantoon, very little Aoos or early rice had been

sown. In that part of the district, rather more than half the area devoted to rice cultivation was usually reserved for the Aoos crop.

Aoos crop.

At Gopeebullubpore, in the northern part of the district, where the crop had been good, Aoos rice was being sold on the 11th August. Heavy rain had fallen during the whole of the first fortnight of that month, and had greatly improved the condition of the main crop, which was expected to reach to about three-fourths of an average crop. Unfortunately, however, the cultivators had not been able to procure seed to sow the whole of their lands.

83. On the 21st August, the Collector laid before a meeting of the Central Committee a carefully prepared statement showing—

Further estimates.

(1.) The estimated requirements of the depôts in the interior, in stock and cash for the succeeding month.

(2.) An abstract account of receipts and disbursements up to date.

(3.) An estimate of receipts and stock expenditure on account of gratuitous distributions and charitable sales by the Central Committee for the succeeding month.

(4.) An estimate of the Committee's cash receipts and expenditure for the same period.

84. This statement showed that *for the purpose of gratuitous distribution* the Committee would require to supply twelve depôts, out of the total number of seventeen then at work, with rice obtained from Calcutta, while for the remaining five depôts, which could procure rice in their respective neighbourhoods, cash advances would suffice.

Secondly.—Owing to the increased distress, and the establishment of new depôts by the Deputy Collector, the daily applicants for relief had increased from 10,000, the number hitherto estimated, to nearly 12,000.

Thirdly.—That assuming that the price of rice in Calcutta, during the following month, did not exceed Rs. 5 per maund (80 lbs), the average estimated cost of the rice at the depôts would be Rs. 5-11-0 per maund.

Fourthly.—That on these data, the total estimated expenditure up to the 21st September could not be put down at less than Rs. 19,654.

Fifthly.—That *for charitable sale purposes*, the Committee might, as an experimental measure, estimate the probable number of purchasers at all the depôts in the district, where it was proposed to sell rice, at 8,150, excluding the depôts of Contai and Tumlook, where such sales were not considered necessary. It was not improbable, however, that before the end of the month to which the estimate referred, the number of purchasers might be doubled.

85. At the same meeting, it was proposed that the daily allowance of rice to be sold to each purchaser should be 12 chittacks (1½ lb) for men, 8 chittacks (1 lb) for women, and 4 chittacks (½ lb) for children.

At these rates, and supposing that the total number of purchasers did not exceed 8,150, the further expenditure to be

incurred in supplying stock, or cash where rice might be unprocurable, was taken at Rs. 16,617. If, however, the number of purchasers doubled during the latter half of the month, this amount, it was assumed, would be raised to Rs. 24,975.

86. Thus, then, the total expenditure for the month ending on the 21st September was estimated at Rs. 38,871, if the sales were not extended, and Rs. 47,229, if the sales were doubled during the latter half of the month.

These estimates did not provide for contingencies, or for a sum of Rs. 4,500 due to Messrs. Sykes and Co., for rice purchased in July.

To meet this outlay, there were only Rs. 4,352 in hand, and Rs. 2,000 more might be expected from private subscriptions.

87. The Committee approved of this estimate, and on the 25th August it was submitted to the Board with an application for the requisite funds, and the orders of the Board were requested as to the propriety of extending the charitable sales as experience might show to be necessary.

Submitted to Board.
Commissioner directed to visit Midnapore, and revise estimate.

88. To this communication no reply was received from the Board, but they appear to have telegraphed instructions to the Commissioner of the division to proceed to Midnapore, and ascertain whether the Committee's estimate was not capable of considerable reduction.

Proceedings of special Deputy Collector in latter half of August.

89. We may now resume the proceedings of Deputy Collector Hem Chunder Kur, and notice them up to date.

On the 18th he visited Mahapal, an outpost about 8 miles from Rohineegurh, in the northern part of the district. He found that although relief centres had been established at Rohineegurh and Gopeebullubpore, 6 miles distant, the emaciated condition of the people, many of whom were unable to walk one mile, and the fact that several unfordable streams intervened between the above centre and Mahapal, rendered it absolutely necessary to place a new centre at the latter point. Rice was selling at 6 seers (12lbs) per rupee: but the Aaos crop was then (18th August) ready for the sickle.

On the 26th August, the Deputy Collector proceeded to Gopeebullubpore, where is a Police station in charge of a sub-inspector. The Central Committee had placed the relief operations under his supervision; but owing to his illness, and frequent absence on duty, the work had not been conducted as satisfactorily as might have been wished. Arrangements were placed on a more efficient footing by the Deputy Collector before his departure.

The crops, both early and late, were described by him as most promising, and he was of opinion that as soon as the rice of the former came into the market, no further necessity for charitable sales would remain. At Mahapal the Deputy Collector succeeded in getting subscriptions amounting to Rs. 200, and at Gopeebullubpore, a further amount of Rs. 127, with promises of like payments for the ensuing month.

Small-pox breaks out in Midnapore.

90. On the 26th August, small pox broke out among the paupers at Midnapore, and a special hospital for all affected with the disease was established in an isolated position. A Native doctor was placed in charge, and all expenses on its account were defrayed by the Central Committee. These measures were effectual in preventing the disease from spreading.

91. On the 30th August, Mr. Jenkins, the Officiating Commissioner of the division, arrived at Midnapore, and on the following day, at a conference with the Magistrate and Joint Magistrate, the state of affairs, and the several items of the Committee's estimate, submitted to the Board on the 25th August*, were explained to him. Deputy Collector Hem Chunder Kur was also summoned to the station to afford in person such information as he possessed.

The Commissioner's visit.

92. From the instructions given by the Commissioner, it became apparent that both the Collector and the Central Committee had misunderstood the intentions of the Board, in proposing the introduction of charitable sales rather than an import trade into the district. The estimate of the 25th August was framed on the supposition, that, by the introduction of charitable sales, substantial charity was intended *for the sole benefit of the very lowest money-earning classes*, by selling rice to them only at cheap rates as distinguished from the wider measures adopted in Orissa, by which rice was supplied at a trifling loss, or perhaps even at a profit, *to the whole population*. It was under this supposition that the Committee had fixed their cheapest selling price at 12 seers (1½lb.) to the rupee.

His instructions.

93. The Commissioner, however, representing the views of the Board, instructed the Collector to raise the lowest rate at these sales to 10 seers (1¼lb.) per rupee, and to adopt even higher rates at any depôts, where circumstances seemed to warrant them.

He suggested the establishment of charitable sale shops close to the works, on which the laborers of the Public Works Department were then employed. Further, that the Local Committee in the interior of the district should be instructed to confine gratuitous relief to a limited number daily, not exceeding throughout the district the existing average of 12,000 non-laboring adults, the reduction being effected by rigidly demanding labor from all who were able to give it. Lastly, that the issue of cooked food should be introduced at all depôts as a compulsory measure, the Commissioner being of opinion that, by not allowing the paupers the option of taking the rice raw or cooked, many would decline to accept any relief at all.

These instructions of the Commissioner were forthwith carried into effect by the Central Committee.

94. For the convenience of the gang of laborers employed under the orders of the Executive Engineer in excavating tanks at Samlee near Dantoon, Deyjoorée, and Satbancoora, charitable sale shops were established at each of these places. The plan adopted was to require the public works overseer over each gang to give a ticket to every laborer at the close of his day's work. These tickets were shown at the sale-shops as vouchers, entitling their holders to purchase rice at the fixed rate, which, with reference to the state of the market, was 10 seers per rupee. Each laborer was permitted to purchase any quantity not exceeding 1 seer per diem. A strict watch was kept on the salesmen at these shops, and according as their sales were more or less frequent, they were allowed to remain stationary, or moved to the neighbourhood of other works, where their services were likely to be more beneficial.

Sales to laborers.

* *Supra*, paragraphs 79-80.

95. As regards the reduction of charitable sales recommended by the Commissioner, no action on the part of the Committee was necessary. The very act of raising the lowest rate to 10 seers per rupee operated to reduce sales, since in the vicinity of many of the centres the Aaos rice could be purchased cheaper in the market.

Cooked food, effect of.

96. Strict instructions were issued to all the depôts, that cooked food alone was to be supplied to the paupers, and at the same time the necessity of introducing some sort of labor amongst them was urgently pressed upon the several Local Committees. With the exception, it is believed, of two or three instances, the rules regarding the issue of cooked food were strictly carried out at all the depôts, and the result was soon perceived to be a considerable reduction in the number of applicants.

It was alleged that the paupers preferred starving to losing their caste, as they believed they would do if they ate the cooked rice offered to them. It may, however, be doubted that any such preference was really entertained; it is more probable that the refusal to receive cooked food arose from a desire to cause the issue of it to be discontinued. There is nothing to show that a single pauper sacrificed his life on account of this prejudice. The class of people to whom gratuitous relief was given belonged to the very lowest, people who are not ordinarily very punctilious about caste observances.

Labor at relief depôts.

97. Considerably greater difficulty attended the attempt to introduce a system of labor into the depôts in the interior. Baboo Hem Chunder Kur, after the departure of the Commissioner, used his best efforts to induce the several Local Committees in the western part of the district to establish labor yards. The Central Committee also issued instructions to the same effect to Local Committees, but the scheme was not successful to any great extent.

At Midnapore.

98. At Midnapore itself the Labor Committee had been met by the difficulty that not more than 10 or 12 per cent. of the adults were found capable of even the lightest labor. The men, for the most part, were either cripples or enfeebled by old age: the young and able-bodied either cripples or enfeebled by old numbers, and seldom remained applied for relief in only small recruit their strength. The need longer than was necessary to labor yard, too, were women: a great majority of the paupers in the probably gone off to Calcutta, whose male relatives had most

ion of the Board.

99. In the meanwhile this Calcutta, explained to the Board the Commissioner, on his return to of the 21st August, and on the 5th September communicated to the Collector demi-officially the Board's sanction to the full amount stated to be required on the assumption that the expenditure on account of charitable sales was not to be extended. Intimation was also given that the Board had despatched the Government steamer for the Feroze to Rangoon for rice to the value of Rs. 30,000 for the Midnapore district.

Effect of Aaos rice on charitable sales.

100. The raising of the lowest rate at which charitable sales were to be made, from 12 to 10 seers per rupee, rendered unnecessary, in the continuation of the shops at Gopeebullubpore, Bishnecgurh, and Surdeeha. The Aaos rice, which was expected to be abundant, and its effectual sale in the neighbourhood of the places referred to

would be considerably cheaper than the Government price. Again, it was found that owing to the delay in the distribution of the sale tickets, the stocks of rice at the several depôts, which had been supplied from Midnapore regularly every week, in anticipation of their requirements, had considerably accumulated. Shorter remittances would therefore suffice for some time to come. A consideration of these two circumstances induced the Collector, on the 12th September, to submit to the Board an amended estimate of expenditure for the succeeding month. Including contingencies, this estimate was framed for Rs. 32,693.

Inundations.

101. On the 17th September, information was received by the Collector that the River Soobunreeka had overflowed its bank near Nyagaon, and serious apprehensions were entertained that, if the water remained any length of time on the fields, the crops which were then being cut would be destroyed; but the water subsided, and about three-fourths of the crops were saved. There is not, however, any large extent of Aaos cultivation about Dantoon and Nyagaon.

102. The charitable sales during September made but slow progress, except at Dantoon and Kessiarree. At Goaltore and Mahapal no purchasers came forward, and at other depôts little was sold, but that was at the rate of 10 seers. The price of Aaos rice in the market put any higher rate out of the question.

The sale shops at the depôts named in the margin were accordingly closed during the month, on dates shown in the statement appended to this Narrative.

Sale shops closed.

Surdeeha.
Beempore.
Goaltore.
Midnapore.
Gooteeah.
Belpaharee.

Godapeasal.
Gopeebullubpore.
Gurbetah.
Robineegurh.
Chuttergunge.

103. The proceedings of Deputy Collector Hem Chunder Kur, during September, may be briefly summarised as follow:—

Special Deputy Collector's proceedings in September.


He visited nine depôts, and stated that in every case the crops in the neighbourhood were very fine. On the 11th, he reported that already a portion of the Aaos rice, which covered one-eighth of the entire area sown with paddy in the Jambonee pergunnah (sub-division) had been reaped. The Aaos rice was then selling in Jambonee at 8 and 9 seers for the rupee, and old rice at 6 seers. At the Deputy Collector's recommendation, Jambonee was formed into an independent depôt under a Local Committee composed of respectable Natives.

104. Of pergunnah Jhargah, the zemindaree (estate) of the Jhargah Rajah, the Deputy Collector ascertained that more than half the area was covered with jungle. Of the cultivable land one-fourth was lying fallow for want of seed. Although dist was visible in this pergunnah, it was not so great as in other parts of the district which the Deputy Collector had visited. On the 14th September the Aaos crop was being reaped and was selling at 7½ seers for the rupee.

105. Of Deckullianpore, a Government khas mehal, which has been let out in farm, the Deputy Collector estimated that about one-eighth the area was uncultivated. Of the cultivated portion one-eighth was estimated to be under the Aaos crop. This crop on the 18th September was being harvested, and its rice was selling at 9 and 10 seers for the rupee.

106. In the Sildah pergunnah, the Deputy Collector's enquiries led him to believe that about one-eighth of the land under cultivation was covered with the Aaos crop; but a consi-

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derable tract in the western part of the pergunnah was lying fallow from want of seed. New rice was selling at 12 to 15 seers to the rupee.

107. At Belpaharee the Deputy Collector visited the depôt, and at once recommended a considerable reduction in the numbers fed there by Mr. Sheffield, an Assistant of Messrs. Watson & Co., in charge of the depôt.—

Mr. Sheffield's action in regard to subscriptions raised by special Deputy Collector from the ryots.

He complained that Mr. Sheffield had opposed his attempts to collect subscriptions. It appeared that the gentleman had issued an order to his ryots, directing them not to subscribe, and intimating that any one who might disobey this order would not be allowed to benefit by a promise which had been held out of remission of rent to all who had suffered from the famine. Mr. Sheffield considered that if the ryots had money to spare, they should devote it to the payment of their debts before giving it in charity.

Mr. Sheffield was subsequently addressed by the Central Committee, who expressed a hope that if the depôt was again visited the pergunnah, he would consent to a prohibitory order. In his reply, Mr. Sheffield said that he had issued the order above mentioned, and that he was sorry to hear of the measure, threw out certain hints of oppression, and that the Deputy Collector in collecting subscriptions had given before the Central Committee to give further details. Mr. Sheffield declined to do so.

Mr. Terry's evidence on same subject.

108. On this subject Mr. Terry has said as follows—"I was very much dissatisfied with the way in which Hem Chunder Kur, Deputy Collector, raised subscriptions. He levied them through the Police, that is to say, he got the ryots of Jamporee through my Naib to put down their names for subscriptions, and then sent Police Constables to collect the money. I believe that many of the ryots were unwilling to pay up, and would not have done so unless the Police had been sent to collect. I was informed that some of the ryots were put to difficulties to meet the demand, and actually sold their bullocks for this purpose. My Assistant, Mr. Sheffield and Mr. Falls, gave me the information, and they could particularize the instances. Thirty or forty of the ryots gave a petition to the Magistrate to the effect that the subscriptions had been levied from them by intimidation, and asking for repayment. The petition was thrown out by the Magistrate without any enquiry, as the petitioners were said to be out of time. I dismissed the whole of my establishment on that estate for the part they took in the matter; they took advantage of the opportunity to reap a harvest for themselves. I heard of the Police using threats to enforce payment, but I know of no definite instances." Mr. Herschel, the Magistrate and Collector, gives the following account of the matter.—"A number of ryots from Jamporee, Messrs. Watson's estate, came to me in a body, about the middle of September, to complain that they had been forced to subscribe for the sufferers by the famine. Each gave an identical petition to say that Hem Chunder had forced them, set the Police at them, and threatened to tie them to the legs of an elephant. They asked to have the money refunded. These men had all paid up one month's subscription early in July, and not a breath of complaint had then reached me against Hem Chunder, though he had raised

Effect of Aoo. charitable sales

"such subscriptions at many places before. They had paid a second time in August in accordance with promise, and without complaint. It was not till after a sharp correspondence between Mr. Sheffield and the Committee on the subject of his preventing subscriptions that these men came in a body a full month after paying their second monthly subscriptions. I appealed to the men themselves whether they really expected me to act on such petitions, and whether they really claimed their money back. They one and all made their salaams and walked away."

The statement of Baboo Hem Chunder Kur was taken by us in Cuttack, in which district he is now employed, before we had heard of this incident; we were unable, therefore, to give him an opportunity of offering any explanation.

109. To return, however, to the Deputy Collector's tour. In pergunnah Lalgurh, the zemindar of the Lalgurh Rajah, the people were found to be tolerably well off; there had been distress before the Aoo harvest, but the Rajah had for some time past been giving gratuitous relief to about 200 persons daily, which seemed sufficient to meet the emergency. The Rajah is not a wealthy proprietor, but he had dispensed his charity to the utmost of his means.

One-fourth of the paddy lands of the pergunnah had been cultivated with an Aoo crop; but one-fourth of the area usually under Amun or late rice cultivation had lain fallow for want of seed. New rice was selling on the 26th September at 10 to 12 seers, and old rice at 8 seers to the rupee.

110. In pergunnah Ramgurh, the zemindar of another Rajah, the Deputy Collector reported that on the 29th September scarcely any sign of famine was visible. The Aoo had given effectual relief to the people. Here too, however, the want of seed had caused land to be left fallow.

111. At Goaltore, in pergunnah Bogree, the Deputy Collector visited the depôt established under charge of Mr. Jaffrey, another of Messrs. Watson and Co.'s assistants. To this depôt were attached three sub-depôts at convenient distances from each other. At these also considerable reductions were found necessary in consequence of able-bodied paupers having been admitted to relief. The Aoo crop had, on the 30th September, been already reaped. Means of employment in the field had opened out; alms-giving had been resumed; and the Deputy Collector here first expressed his opinion, that all relief measures should be discontinued by the middle of October. At each of the places above mentioned as having been visited by the Deputy Collector during September, excepting Goaltore and Belpaharee, subscriptions were raised. The total amount collected, inclusive of that from Dantoon and Kessiarce, was Rs. 2,150.

112. On the 24th September, the *Feroze* arrived at Diamond Harbour from Rangoon, bringing 4,628 bags of rice for the Midnapore district. Arrangements had been previously made by the Collector for unloading the vessel, and by the 1st October, the rice was on its way to Koila Ghat, the point where the Calcutta and Midnapore Trunk Road crosses the Roopnarain, thence to be conveyed to Midnapore town and the interior.

Arrival of rice from Rangoon.

113. The arrival of this rice dispelled all further anxiety on the part of the Central Committee, whose supplies had lately fallen short in consequence of the failure on the part of their Calcutta agents to despatch the quantity ordered weekly. The reason of this failure was that boats could not be procured in Calcutta to take the rice to Koila Ghat, but no serious results ensued, as no centre ran short of its stores even for a single day.

October estimate.

114. The Committee's subsequent money expenditure was considerably decreased by the arrival of the supply in the *Feroze*, cost of carriage and contingencies alone having to be provided for. Accordingly, on the 9th October, an estimate of probable cash and stock expenditure up to the 9th November was submitted to the Commissioner. This estimate reduced the average daily number of adults to be fed throughout the district from Rs. 12,000 to less than Rs. 10,000, and showed that the probable cash outlay during the coming month would not exceed Rs. 4,000, excluding a cash balance in hand of Rs. 2,500, and the value of the cargo of the *Feroze* put down by the Board at Rs. 30,000.

It was considered that the stock of rice now in the hands of the Committee was more than sufficient to last out the famine. The estimate further showed that the receipts on account of charitable sales up to date amounted to Rs. 4,000, while an additional amount on the same account of Rs. 3,000 was expected.

State of things in October.

115. During the month of October, all the sale shops that remained open at the end of September were closed, with the exception of those at Dantoon and Kessiarree, and the public works shops at Khurruckpore, Samlee and Jalboree. The distribution of gratuitous relief, however, proceeded without interruption, the number of applicants gradually decreasing.

Special Deputy Collector's proceedings.

116. On the 13th October, Deputy Collector Hem Chunder Kur brought his tour to an end. After visiting Goaltore, he returned to Dantoon, and thence proceeded a second time to inspect the depôts at Kessiarree, Rohineegurh, Mahapal, Gopeebullubpore, Gooteeah, and Jambonee, collecting from each place where subscriptions for the second month had become due. The total amount thus realised was Rs. 1,390-1-6. His reports of the proceedings of the several Local Committees were most satisfactory. Cooked food had been regularly issued, and some labor, though not of course on any extensive scale, had been exacted at all the depôts. The crops on the high lands were suffering somewhat from want of rain, but happily all fears on this score were removed by a heavy fall, which opportunely occurred towards the latter half of the month.

Remaining sale shops closed.

117. During the month of November, the charitable sale shops still remaining open were closed. The prices in the market were rapidly lowered, as soon as the rain, which fell in October, rendered certain the prospect of a splendid harvest.

118. The total amount realised from charitable sales has been ascertained to amount to Rs. 7,114-11-0; all contingent expenditure, such as salesmen's pay, hiring of shops, and cost of carriage, were defrayed by the Central Committee out of the general fund.

119. On the 6th November, the Central Committee met and resolved to bring their relief operations to an end by closing all the depôts after the 15th. State of things in November.

The last reports received from the interior showed that rice was selling at prices ranging from 9 seers at Gopeebullubpore to 11 seers at Dantoon, 13½ seers at places to the northward, and 16 seers at Kessiarree. In Midnapore itself, the prices varied with the quantities exported, from 11 to 14 seers. As these rates clearly indicated that the famine was at an end, it was resolved to close the smaller depôts at once, giving to each adult pauper cloth, cash to an amount not exceeding 8 annas, and rice sufficient to support him at 8 chittacks a day up to the 30th November. Children were to receive half the above. The Local Committees of the larger depôts, it was resolved, should be requested to adopt the same measures, if they approved of them, or otherwise to propose some other plan not involving on the whole a greater outlay. Famine at an end.

120. In regard to Grant's Asylum, Dr. Phillips's Infirmary, and the Small Pox Hospital, at Midnapore, and a Hospital established at Dantoon, where continued sickness prevailed, it was resolved that for the present all these should be maintained. Hospitals, &c., maintained.

121. These resolutions having been communicated to the several Local Committees in the interior, they all adopted in the main the plan proposed by the Central Committee, and closed their depôts. Depôts closed.

122. The following Table shows the charitable sale shops established in the Midnapore district during 1866, with the date on which each was closed:— Table of sale shops, &c.

Names of Golahs.	When opened.	When closed.	Quantity sold.		
			Mds.	Srs.	Ch.
	1866.	1866.			
1. Midnapore ...	27th August ...	27th September ...	144	13	4
2. Soojagunje ...	27th ditto ...	27th ditto ...	112	23	...
3. Goodapeasul ...	27th ditto ...	29th ditto ...	117	27	4
4. Surdecha ...	29th ditto ...	16th ditto ...	18	26	8
5. Gootea ...	30th ditto ...	28th ditto ...	53	2	...
6. Dantoon ...	30th ditto ...	20th November ...	546	12	6
7. Beempore ...	29th ditto ...	23rd September ...	...	24	...
8. Belpaharee ...	29th ditto ...	28th ditto ...	85	37	8
9. Nyagram ...	29th ditto ...	2nd October ...	101	31	8
10. Kessecaree ...	30th ditto ...	15th November ...	349	3	8
11. Chutturgunje ...	29th ditto ...	30th September ...	40	14	5
12. Rohineegurh ...	31st ditto ...	30th ditto ...	35	2	8
13. Gopeebullubpore ...	31st ditto ...	29th ditto ...	45	30	4
14. Goaltore ...	29th ditto ...	24th ditto ...	...	...	...
15. Gurbeta ...	29th ditto ...	30th ditto ...	165	22	...
16. Mahapal ...	31st ditto ...	29th ditto ...	...	...	...
17. Satbancoorah ...	22nd ditto ...	2nd October ...	1	38	...
18. Khuruckpore ...	29th ditto ...	14th November ...	6	...	...
19. Samlee ...	3rd October ...	14th ditto ...	39	...	...
20. Jalharee ...	16th ditto ...	14th ditto ...	37	...	...
		Total ...	1,901		

sealers with-
stocks from
uried or burnt.

Average of paupers relieved daily.

123. The following is a return of the average number of the paupers relieved daily from June to November 1866 inclusive:—

June ...	...	...	...	5,155
July ...	...	...	...	7,442
August ...	...	...	...	9,606
September ...	...	...	...	8,752
October ...	...	...	...	6,476
November ...	...	...	...	4,247

Mortality.

124. No accurate statistics of mortality can be procured. The Collector, however, states that he estimates that in the western part of the district, from 10 to 15 per cent. of the population have died of starvation and diseases induced by it; that in the central portion and Nugwan (Contai) 2 to 3 per cent., and in Tumlook $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. have perished.

As stated at paragraph 351 of our general report, his estimate of the total mortality in the district amounts to 50,000.

Mr. Terry has stated that the worst suffering was in the parts of the district adjoining Manbhoom. "There the stone-masons and the iron-smelters one and all died. I don't think that any relief reached them. They kept to the hills and jungles and never came to us. Some relief was sent out to a place called Bul-Bahanee for them; but it was too late, and when it was sent was insufficient in quantity; they did not get enough."

Relief Funds.

125. According to figures furnished by the Collector, Rs. 77,350 were received from the Board and the Calcutta Relief Committee, to which Rs. 23,735 were added by subscription. Besides this, 14,300 maunds of rice were supplied to the district by the *Tubal Cain* and *Feroze*, at a cost of Rs. 53,034, part of which must have been recovered by the sales.

126. Rs. 73,736 were at the disposal of the Magistrate for the employment of labor on works, of which Rs. 43,128 were expended up to the date of the statement furnished by the Magistrate.

127. Rs. 1,68,195 were placed at the disposal of the officers of the Public Works Department for ordinary and special works, of which Rs. 1,04,596 are shown as expended.

Action of Relief Committee: non-officials and officials.

128. We have already noticed the assistance which was given to the Relief Committee by Messrs. Watson and Co.'s assistants in the interior. The Reverend O. R. Batchelor and the Reverend Mr. Phillips also gave valuable assistance. Of the officials, the operations, after they had commenced, were actively controlled by Mr. Herschel; the work of Secretary to the Committee fell on Mr. W. E. Ward, who succeeded Mr. Trevor Grant as Joint Magistrate. In this district, the Police gave active and cordial co-operation, for which, as well as for the efficient manner in which all arrangements entrusted to his charge were carried out, great credit is due to Mr. Adams, the District Superintendent.

Baboo Hem Chunder Kur has received high commendation from his superiors for the part which he took in the operations. His action was marked by energy, and his organization of the relief in the interior of the district was successful and efficient.

BANKOORA.

1. The southern and western portions of the Bankoora district are undulating, with a laterite soil, partaking strongly of the nature of Manbhoom and of North Midnapore, on which the district abuts. The north-eastern portion adjoins the Burdwan district, which suffered little from the effect of the famine. As might have been expected, the western part of the Bankoora district suffered most severely. The civil station of Bankoora is connected with Raneegunge to the north by 30 miles of good road; from Raneegunge to Calcutta the communication is by the East Indian Railway. Between Raneegunge and Bankoora, the road is intersected by the Damoodah and Dalkessur rivers, which, as in Manbhoom, are fordable in the dry weather, but swell into torrents in the rains.

Position and soil of the Bankoora district.

2. In ordinary years the district exports some little rice from the east, primarily into Ghatal, a large mart in the Hooghly district. After the cutting of the cold-weather crop of 1865, much more than usual was carried away to supply the deficiency in Midnapore and Manbhoom. Those who, as in ordinary years, had kept stocks for their own consumption through the coming year, were tempted by the high prices to sell, for which they suffered severely a few months later.

Export of rice.

3. The price of rice had been high throughout the year 1865 as compared with the previous years. In January, coarse rice was selling at 25 seers for the rupee instead of 31 or 32 seers, which is the usual price in that month. In August the price was 22 seers as against 32 of previous years, and in September, when the failure of the coming crop had become a certainty, a sudden rise in price took place to 15 seers.

Rice dear throughout 1865.

In January 1866 the same price ruled.

4. In February a violent outbreak of cholera took place at Bishenpore, an old and decaying town, the former seat of the Rajahs of the Pergunnah of that name, about 20 miles to the south-east of the civil station.

Cholera at Bishenpore in February 1866.

A Native doctor was sent out. Mr. Wells, the Magistrate and Collector, accompanied by the Civil Surgeon of the district, also went out. Considering the filthy state of the town to be one of the causes of disease, they took stringent measures for cleansing it. Early in March the death-rate in Bishenpore had fallen to 11 per diem. Being of opinion that the cholera had been promoted by the extreme scarcity of food, if indeed it was not consequent thereon, the Collector caused the indigent to be fed on subsistence allowance, and to be employed in clearing the town.

Attributed to filthy state of town.

5. The scarcity was attributed to the vast exportation of grain towards Midnapore and Cuttack, to which it had been attracted by the famine prices which ruled there; and to the merchants holding their stores in expectation of the rise of prices in the Bankoora district, to which the exportation would naturally lead.

Scarcity attributed to increased exports.

And to the dealers withholding their stocks from market.

6. When the cholera burst out, the people of Bishenpore, paralysed by panic and poverty-stricken to such a degree that

Dead not buried or burnt.

they could not pay the cost of burning their dead, threw down the corpses just outside the town. Prompt measures were taken for removal of them and cholera was checked.

Distress of middle and lower classes.

7. But the distress of the middle and lower classes from want of the necessaries of life was severe.

Weavers.

8. The town of Bishenpore and the villages about it are full of weavers. Deprived of the market for the produce of their ordinary labor, and unable from their habits to compete in the field with those whose daily occupation was agricultural labor, the condition of these artisans in this, as in the Hooghly district, was miserable. That of the agricultural laborers who live by wages was but a few degrees better, even their labor, when employed, scarcely yielded enough for the support of the working man himself, there was no surplus for wife and children.

Distress among agricultural laborers.

Distress extended over great part of the district.

9. The distress was not confined to Bishenpore; it extended, though in a lesser degree, over the south and west of the district.

First meeting called.

10. In this state of things, the Collector and Magistrate, in the month of March, called a meeting in the market place of the civil station, at which much indignation was expressed by the Native speakers at the conduct of the shop-keepers, who had combined not to sell rice below the rate of 6 local seers (equivalent to $7\frac{1}{2}$ Calcutta seers) for a rupee. Subscriptions were raised, and the shop-keepers invited to join in a measure for importing rice wholesale from the cheapest market; with one exception they refused.

Subscriptions raised, and works started in the station in March.

11. Out of the subscriptions raised, employment on earth-work adapted to the age and strength of the applicants for relief was provided at the station on the construction of a tank. A second tank was also undertaken in the station for the same purpose by Baboo Gudhadur Banerjee at his own expense. All were required to labor, so that none might eat in idleness. Rice was imported from Calcutta by the Committee at a cost price of 10 seers per rupee, and retailed at the same price to those only who worked. An average number of 500 men were employed from the 18th March to the 24th April in Bankoora, and allowed to purchase from the Committee's store of rice. These operations had, however, no effect on the market rates, which remained at $7\frac{1}{2}$ Calcutta seers per rupee.

Rice imported by Committee.

Five hundred men employed daily.

Market rates not affected.

Funds insufficient.

Committee's works discontinued.

Laborers sent to railway works.

12. It soon became evident that the funds would not hold out, and as it had been ascertained that labor was required on the loop line of railway under construction between Raneegungee and Luckeeserai, the Collector discontinued the Committee's relief works at the station, and offered to all subsistence-money enough to take them to the railway works. Four hundred had availed themselves of the offer up to the 8th of May.

At the same time the Magistrate and Collector called on the landowners to undertake works on their estates, to which several responded by digging tanks.

No relief from employment on railway works.

The measure of sending the laborers to work on the railway did not, however, succeed. The men returned in batches, complaining that the payments were made by the piece, and that the standard of work was so high that in their emaciated condition they found it impossible to earn more than two annas a day,

which was not sufficient to support them at the ruling price of rice; thus these laborers were again thrown on to the Bankoora Committee and district for support.

13. At the same time subscriptions were raised or rather promised at Soonamookhee, in the north-east of the district, for the employment of labor in making a market place. This part of the district, however, suffered so little that the subscriptions were never collected. Subscriptions promised in Soonamookhee, but not raised.

14. At Bishenpore Rs. 1,506 were promised for a similar purpose, of which Rs. 506 only were collected; but nothing was done with the money up to the end of the year. Subscriptions raised in Bishenpore, but nothing done.

We think this was much to be regretted; undoubtedly there was urgent need for employment in this quarter, and it was due not only to the suffering people, but also to those from whom the subscriptions were raised, that the money should be expended for the purpose intended. It is stated that the failure in the early part of the year was attributable to Baboo Hem Chunder Kur, the Deputy Magistrate in charge of the Gurbetta sub-division, within which Bishenpore is situate. The Baboo has admitted that the work was under him, but that he had no time to look after it, and that although the money which he had collected was lying in his hands, nothing was done from April to July (when he left Gurbetta), as there was no agency at Bishenpore capable of carrying on such work. He also admits that he made no special report to the Collector of Bankoora as to the necessity of executing the work. If he had done so, agency might have been provided even if it had been necessary to obtain it from Burdwan or Calcutta; at any rate Baboo Hem Chunder would have relieved himself of the responsibility which now rests on him of having allowed this means of relief to fail through his lukewarmness. It is to be regretted that the supervision exercised over the sub-divisional officer in this matter by his superior, Mr. D. Cunliffe, who in May succeeded Mr. Wells as Magistrate and Collector, was not such as to put an end to the inaction which continued through so many months. Omission to make use of the money raised.

15. On the 30th of May Mr. W. T. Tucker, the Judge of the district, addressed the Government of Bengal, explaining what had been done. This gentleman, as well as Mr. Wells and Mr. Weathrall, had been most liberal in their contributions; but it was now found impossible to provide from local resources the capital which was necessary for expanding the import and sale operations to the scale which was required in order to alleviate the "fearful distress now prevailing". Mr. Tucker asked for Rs. 5,000 only from Government, which he hoped would be "the means of saving much distress and death, of checking the enormous increase of crime, and of preventing serious injury to the Government revenue". Mr. Tucker addresses the Government.

The Government at once granted Rs. 5,000 from the balance of the North-West Provinces Relief Fund. The grant crossed an application of the Committee for Rs. 10,000. 5,000 Rs. granted.

Considering that it was not desirable to draw labor away from the agricultural operations at seed-time, the Committee resolved to devote these funds entirely to the importation of rice from Calcutta for sale at cost price, with the object of drawing down the artificial price which ruled in the market, and to bring out the abundant stores which were supposed to exist in

the district. The rice was purchased through the agency of Messrs. Mackillop, Stewart and Co., and Messrs. Gillanders, Arbutnot and Co., of Calcutta, who gave their services gratuitously. The East Indian Railway Company carried the rice to Raneegunge at half the usual rates.

Sales continued from June to November.

16. From June to November these sales were carried on in the town of Bankoora. With the exception of one month, from 23rd of July to 24th of August, when it was sold at 8 seers, the rice was sold at the rate of 10 seers for the rupee, even when this rate did not cover the cost price. The number of seers which sold in the market for a rupee in each month is shown below :—

June.	July.	August.	September.	October.
7½	6½	6	5½	15½

The fall in price from September to October was extraordinarily sudden.

Exertion of members of Committee.

17. The members of the Committee spared no personal trouble; most of them were present daily at the sales; the object, of course, was not to admit any to the benefit of the Committee's sales who were in such a position as not to require such relief; but no system of tickets was found practicable. The members of the Committee exerted themselves to exclude the unworthy from the sales of each day; but we gather that their endeavours were eminently unsuccessful; and that practically any one got the rice who chose to send for it. The sales were limited to four annas' worth daily to each applicant.

Attempt to select purchasers unsuccessful.

Payments for labor at first in rice.

Then in cash.

Gratuitous distributions first in uncooked, then in cooked rice.

No rice procurable in Bankoora bazars.

Application for further grant.

Of Rs. 10,000 for importation and sale; and Rs. 10,000 for works.

State of things in latter part of July.

Committee's imported rice falls short.

18. Up to July payment for labor on the Committee's works in Bankoora had been made in uncooked rice; in that month the system was changed, and money payments made, the laborers having every facility for purchasing rice at the Committee's sales. At first the gratuitous distributions to the helpless were made in raw rice, but, as in almost every other district, the Committee were soon driven to adopt the system of cooked rations, six chittacks of rice being the allowance to each adult, besides spices, pulse, &c.

19. In July the ample stores which had been supposed to exist in the district failed at least to supply Bankoora town, for, on the 13th, the Committee recorded "there is actually no rice in the Bankoora bazar, and the people are entirely supported at present by the rice which they purchase daily from the Committee, imported by the Committee from Calcutta."

20. Up to this time, Rs. 5,000 only had been received from the Board, and the Committee applied for a further grant of Rs. 10,000 to be devoted to purchasing rice for sales; and also for a grant of Rs. 10,000 to be applied to the employment of labor in works at the rate of Rs. 2,000 a month. To the second item of this application, we shall revert hereafter.

21. On the 23rd of July it was reported that things were no better; 4,880 persons were purchasing daily at the Committee's sales; 320 were receiving gratuitous relief in the town from the Committee, and 300 from private charity. The necessity of the grant of Rs. 10,000 was urged on the Commissioner by the Magistrate.

22. At the end of July Rs. 237 worth of rice were being sold each day, when suddenly the sales were stopped for want of rice, and much suffering occasioned. The market price rose at once

from 8 to 6½ Calcutta seers for the rupee; it fell again immediately the sales recommenced. It appears that when the stoppage took place, Rs. 1,560 worth of rice was actually on the way to Bankoora; the rising of the rivers always caused considerable delay in transit.

23. The application of the 13th of July for Rs. 10,000 to be devoted to purchase of rice for sales was met by a grant of Rs. 5,000 which did not reach the Committee till the first week in August; hitherto the actual loss on the sales had amounted to Rs. 2,755 only. Up to this time, the Committee had taken no measures of relief except in the town of Bankoora.

Second grant of Rs. 5,000.

24. On the 3rd of August it was brought to the notice of the Committee that the weavers of Bishenpore were in terrible destitution, on which a private and distinct subscription was raised for the purpose of supplying them with capital to carry on their trade, and purchasing the produce of their manufactures. The measure was carried on till November out of this subscription, as the Board did not approve of the General Relief Fund being applied to this purpose.

Special subscription raised for Bishenpore weavers.

25. On the 13th of August the Board called on the Committee to take more extended measures of relief about Bishenpore, so as to prevent the pauper weavers from flocking into Calcutta as they were doing. On this the Committee recorded that their object had always been to discourage immigration, as the district could not afford to lose its population; they doubted whether the great number of immigrants into Calcutta, who described themselves as Bishenpore weavers, really came from the neighbourhood of that place, as the weavers from the west of the Hooghly district were in the habit of describing themselves as belonging to Bishenpore, that being a well known emporium of the silk trade. The Committee made a demand for Rs. 5,000 for the relief of the Bishenpore weavers specially, and received Rs. 2,000 before the end of August.

Board call on Committee to take more extended measures at Bishenpore.

Demand of Rs. 5,000 for the weavers of Bishenpore.

26. On the 23rd it was reported that Mr. H. L. Weathrall (the son of the Superintendent of Police) had given his services as a volunteer, and had taken rice to Bishenpore for sale and gratuitous distribution on the system which had been adopted in Bankoora.

Mr. H. L. Weathrall goes out to Bishenpore to manage relief operations.

On the 7th of September Mr. Weathrall reported that his operations were attended with success. The people were very willing to work for their food; money was now allotted for the erection of shelter.

27. About the same time rice was sent out to Gourangdihee, a Police station 24 miles to the west of Bankoora, and operations commenced by its being supplied to 640 persons daily.

Rice sent to Gourangdihee.

28. In fact little or nothing had been done even at Bishenpore before Mr. H. L. Weathrall went out at the end of August.

As early as in June the Committee had formally recorded a resolution, recognizing the necessity of sending out rice for sale at Gourangdihee, Rughonathpore, and Bishenpore, but none was sent to Gourangdihee or Bishenpore till late in August, and up to November none had been sent to Rughonathpore. We think that this delay was most unfortunate.

Nothing done except in the town of Bankoora till latter part of August.

Mr. Tucker, the Judge, has stated that no doubt there was very great want in Bishenpore at the beginning of May; that

Early measures in the interior of the district were required.

the famine in the district from March to May was not within the compass of local relief; that in June the misery was very great,

Mr. H. M. Weathrall, the District Superintendent of Police, has told us that in April and May the distress in the district became very bad; that crime due to want increased much; and that in June "the famine was very bad." Certainly Bishenpore was amongst the places which suffered most. Some relief was given by the gratuitous distribution of a zemindar, a few miles from the town; but we have little doubt that there existed intense suffering which might have been alleviated by the adoption of earlier measures; all the circumstances are such as lead to the impression that the distress, mortality and emigration must have been above the estimate which was formed by the Committee and local officers. Mr. Tucker has said—"I have heard contradictory accounts as to the degree of mortality among them" (the residents of Bishenpore). "Some people say that they have not died largely, but do not explain this," and certainly it is difficult to accept the opinion without explanation. Mr. Tucker has further told us that "there never appeared to be a want of money, it was only a want of rice." At Rughonathpore and other places the distress was not intensified by the circumstance that the population consisted chiefly of a class whose trade was failing them as a means of support, independently of the dearth of food.

Explanation of the delay in beginning operations elsewhere than in the civil station.

29. It is explained that although the Committee had passed a resolution to send out rice to several places in the district, the funds at the disposal of the Committee did not admit of this being done. All the capital which the Committee had at their command was fully occupied in providing rice for the wants of Bankoora town only. It is much to be regretted that when in May the Committee asked for Rs. 10,000, they were supplied with Rs. 5,000 only, the amount which had been sent on receipt of Mr. Tucker's letter to Government, and which crossed the application of the Committee for Rs. 10,000. We can scarcely suppose that the full amount would have been denied in June if the Committee had at once pressed the matter on the Commissioner with a clear explanation of the requirements of the interior of the district, and if it had been specifically brought to notice that failure to comply with their indent in full absolutely precluded them from doing any thing except at Bankoora, for we find that in the general instructions which the Government issued when the grants were assigned to different districts, of which Bankoora was one, it is distinctly enjoined that the relief shall not be restricted to the civil stations. Mr. Tucker has stated that he is not aware that it was ever brought specifically to the Commissioner's notice that nothing could be done in the interior of the district with the means which had been placed at the Committee's disposal, and Mr. Montresor, the Commissioner, has told us that his attention was not drawn to the fact.

Application in August for a third grant.

30. On the 23rd of August the Committee a third time resolved to apply for a grant of Rs. 10,000 as distress was increasing on all sides, and many were dying from sheer exhaustion, not being able to reach the existing depôts, of which there were four open (exclusive of those in Raneegunge sub-division), one at Bankoora, a second three miles from it, the third at Gourangdihee, 24 miles to the west, and the 4th at Bishenpore, 20 miles to the south-east.

In reply to this application Mr. Jenkins, who had succeeded Mr. Montresor as Commissioner of Burdwan, pointed out, on the 7th September, that the Board had already granted—

	Rs.
For Bankoora ...	10,000
„ Bishenpore ...	2,000
„ Raneegunge ...	2,000

Rs. 14,000

And that the private subscriptions had amounted to Rs. 3,000 only. He had no returns of the number of paupers fed, and, without further details, hesitated to apply to the Board for further relief funds; but would do so if necessary on receipt of further details.

He urged, however, the prosecution of works to give employment to labor, and offered to apply for Rs. 15,000 for this purpose on receipt of detailed proposals for works.

31. In reply the Committee, on the 14th September, strongly urged the necessity of a further grant of Rs. 5,000 to enable them to carry on the centres in the interior of the district of which the requirements were increasing. Committee press the application for Rs. 5,000.

32. The Commissioner then supported the application, and Rs. 4,000 were soon afterwards received from the Calcutta Relief Committee.

33. As to works the Committee referred to their resolution of the 13th July, in which they had made specific proposals for the execution of certain works, and had asked for a grant of Rs. 10,000 for the purpose in monthly instalments of Rs. 2,000; of this application, no notice had been taken. Committee refer to their previous recommendation as to works.

34. The circumstances under which no communication had been made by the Commissioner to the Committee or to the officers of the Bankoora district on the resolution were as follows.

In July a circular of the Government, asking what special assistance was required for each district in the shape of works, was forwarded by the Commissioner to the Magistrate of Bankoora for report; and it was on a consideration of this circular that the Relief Committee recorded their resolution of the 13th of July, recommending the execution of certain specific works. These works were the bridging of the Gundessurree near Bankoora, and the pushing on of works on a railway feeder from Radhanuggur to Bishenpore, and on a road between Bankoora and Bishenpore. The first of these works was one requiring scientific engineering skill, and was properly disapproved by the Commissioner, as in no way calculated to afford the prompt and extensive employment of unskilled labor which was required for the occasion. The other two works were on lines of road which were in the hands of the Public Works Department, and with reference to these the Commissioner, Mr. Montresor, wrote an order on the margin of the copy of the Committee's resolutions which had been sent to him, directing that a copy of the resolution be sent to the Superintending Engineer of the circle, with a request that the subject might meet with his early attention. Unfortunately this order of the Commissioner was overlooked in his office, and we now find that the communication to the Superintending Engineer was never made. It appears, how-

Nothing done in the way of providing employment for labor, although works were recommended.

ever, that the two proposed lines had been abandoned by the Department of Public Works before July, and another alignment of the road decided on, on which nothing could be done until the survey had been made. Regarding the specific application of the Committee for Rs. 10,000 for the works, the Commissioner passed no order, probably because the provision of funds for the works recommended rested with the Department of Public Works.

The Magistrate, to whom the call for a report on the subject of necessary works had been specifically addressed, should certainly have made a specific reply from his own office, giving his opinion on the subject; but he omitted to do so, and relied on the Commissioner taking action on the Committee's resolution. It appears from the Magistrate's office that a letter was written to the Commissioner on the 23rd of July calling attention to the resolution; but the Commissioner has informed us that no such communication can be traced as having reached his office.

35. On the 10th of October Mr. Commissioner Jenkins forwarded to the Magistrate, for report, a second letter from Government on the subject of special works, and called for detailed estimates of any works which might be proposed. In reply, the Magistrate again referred to the former resolution of the Committee on the subject, and recommended a number of works. He was unable to submit estimates, and could not say whether they would be completed in the period during which the distress was expected to last. Five works, in addition to those already recommended by the Local Committee, were proposed, and a grant of Rs. 50,000 was demanded.

Correspondence followed, in which the Commissioner disapproved of some of the works as unsuited for the occasion, and asked for further particulars and rough estimates of the rest. Early in October Mr. Jenkins also called the attention of the Superintending Engineer to the advisability of pushing on the works under his charge and of employing labor. The Superintending Engineer gave instructions in this spirit to the Executive Engineer, but little was done. It is unnecessary for us to follow the subject further, as by this time the period at which such works would have been beneficial had passed.

36. The early crop had come into the market and brought down the price of rice to 12 seers for the rupee. The Committee resolved, however, to keep open their shops for sales at 10 seers, so as to prevent combinations among the dealers to raise the price.

37. In September another outbreak of cholera took place at Bishenpore, and a Native doctor was sent down to assist Mr. Weathrall. Early in October a letter appeared in the *Englishman* newspaper, containing a terrible description of the state of Bishenpore, and complaining of the want of shelter and of due provision for the care of the deserted children. The Commissioner at once directed the Magistrate to make enquiries on the spot, which was done. There was reason to believe that the article, though written by a Government official who was passing through the district on duty, was highly wrought up with the object of producing an effect, but attention was at once directed to the points which were indicated as defective. By the middle of November the daily number of applicants for relief at Bishenpore, which had once reached 2,000, had fallen gradually to 250. The relief was therefore discontinued; 11 deserted children being

New crop comes in and prices fall.

State of things at Bishenpore.

sent to the Missionary schools. Up to the end of December this district received Rs. 12,000 from the Board of Revenue and Rs. 10,000 from the Calcutta Relief Committee, besides Rs. 2,000 which were sent direct by the Board to the Raneegunge sub-division. The private subscriptions amounted to Rs. 8,446.

38. The aggregate of the weekly totals of persons who received gratuitous relief is stated at 47,040, including the Raneegunge sub-division. Besides this, a quantity of rice which realized Rs. 17,425 was sold at cost price and even below cost price.

In reviewing the operations in this district, we have found something to regret. The Local Committee were most energetic and unsparing of themselves, and their efforts were entirely successful as far as the town of Bankoora was concerned; but it is unfortunate that their exertions did not extend beyond the limits of their own view.

Undoubtedly relief should have been given at several places in the interior of the district from May. We have expressed our regret that the first grant of Rs. 5,000 was not immediately supplemented by the full amount required to make up the Rs. 10,000 for which the Committee first applied, and that the application was not at once pressed with more urgency, and supported by a fuller representation of the facts of the case. It was also unfortunate that the communications regarding the prosecution of public works ended in so little. We think that on both these points the result might have been different, if the Magistrate and Collector had shown more energy and personal interest in the matter; but Mr. Cunliffe appears to have left all the active and executive action to Mr. H. M. Weathrall, the District Superintendent. That Mr. Cunliffe did not appreciate the situation is evident from his failure to press each point of importance on the Commissioner, and even to suggest the application to works in connection with relief of a considerable sum which he held at his disposal from the annual allotment from local funds. The existence of this sum appears never to have been mentioned to the Relief Committee, and Rs. 13,000 remained unexpended at the end of September; Rs. 7,200 only having been spent in July, August, and September.

Mr. Tucker, the Judge, was prominent by the interest he took in the relief operations as President of the Committee, and by his personal liberality; the suggestion to import rice from Calcutta and to sell at cost price originated from him.

Mr. H. M. Weathrall, the District Superintendent, took the lead in the executive duties, and the excellent services done by Baboo Bogulanund Mookerjee, Inspector of Police, were recognized by the presentation of a watch from the President of the Committee. Especially must be noticed the conduct of Mr. H. L. Weathrall. This young gentleman placed his services at the disposal of the Committee as a volunteer, and was sent out to Bishenpore, where he lived alone for two and half months for the sole purpose of superintending the relief operations. Baboo Gudadhar Banerjee was prominent in undertaking works to employ labor and by his charities. Baboo Radabhullub Sing also distinguished himself by his liberality.

Extent of relief given.

Review.

RANEEGUNGE SUB-DIVISION.

Raneegunge sub-division.

1. This sub-division, which lies to the west of Burdwan and to the north of Bankoora, is in the jurisdiction of the Magistrate of the latter district. The town of Raneegunge is situated on the Grand Trunk Road leading to Gya and the North-Western Provinces, and on the East Indian Railway. To this position, and to the collieries in the neighbourhood, it owes its rapid recent development. It is a centre at which travellers from the north-west and the south congregate on their way to Calcutta. It contains several depôts at which the Emigration Agents collect the coolies whom they have recruited; in the first four months of 1866, no less than 17,000 emigrant coolies left Raneegunge by rail.

Emigrant coolies.

Recruiting stopped by Government.

2. In the middle of June, Mr. Hopkins, the Assistant Magistrate and Collector in charge of the sub-division, had moved the Government to stop recruiting, as small-pox had broken out among the coolies, and was being imported into the town. The order was issued accordingly.

First signs of destitution.

3. Mr. Hopkins mentioned, at the same time that in consequence of the drain on the male population from emigration, Raneegunge was full of women and children who were following carts laden with rice, and picking up the grains which fell.

First grant of money.

4. Soon after this, numbers of destitute people flocked in from the Manbhoom district. On the 30th of June, the Assistant Collector received Rs. 500 out of the grant of Rs. 5,000 which had been assigned to Bankoora. A meeting was called in the middle of July, and organized relief measures resolved upon. Subscriptions were raised amounting to Rs. 1,300, besides contributions of Rs. 400 a month.

Committee formed and measures organized.

Distributions begin.

5. On the 20th of July the distributions began; uncooked rice was given gratuitously to the destitute, and sold at 10 pice a seer (about two seers below the market price) to all comers.

As a check which was expected to deter any but the really indigent from availing themselves of these sales, not more than one anna's worth was sold to each applicant.

Paupers flock in.

6. As soon as these distributions and sales began, the people from the country round thronged into Raneegunge in masses, and the Committee, not knowing what means would be at their disposal, were obliged to limit the quantity of rice distributed daily. As usual the Committee soon adopted cooked rations instead of raw rice for gratuitous distribution.

State of things in August.

7. Early in August, the Assistant Magistrate reported to the Magistrate of Bankoora that the state of things was most distressing. The miners and others employed about the collieries were deserting their families and leaving them to starve. The owners of the collieries, and notably the Bengal Coal Company, were relieving their workmen by selling rice to them below the market rate. Musammat Durramba Dibya, widow of Govind Pershad Pundit, was doing the same, and was feeding a number of

destitute persons (which at one time reached 2,000) at Searsole. But all this was insufficient. The bodies of 30 stranger paupers had been found in the villages belonging to the Bengal Coal Company. The means at the disposal of the Committee were inadequate, and application was made for a further grant of Rs. 3,000, of which 2,000 were received from the Board of Revenue on the 23rd of August; Rs. 1,000 were also received about this time from a Relief Fund, which had been subscribed by the servants of the East Indian Railway Company;* and Rs. 500 more from the Bankoora Committee.

Further grants of money.

8. On this the Committee opened centres of relief at four places in the interior of the sub-division, where gratuitous distributions and sales below the market rates were made.

Four centres opened in the interior.

9. A pauper hospital was at this time opened at Raneegunge, and soon afterwards a small-pox hospital. The mortality about the town was considerable, as might be expected from the large number of destitute who came in from the neighbouring country worn out and emaciated beyond all hope of recovery. The Assistant Magistrate has estimated the number of deaths in the streets and hospitals at an average of 15 a day in July, August, and September. In the beginning of October it fell; but at the end of that month three days of heavy rain took place which caused much sickness throughout the sub-division. No less than 66 paupers were found dead in Raneegunge town after the first night of rain, and 29 after the second night. Shelter had been provided for about 360 paupers in the hospital, in hired houses and in sheds erected for the purpose; but the people would not take shelter in the hospital; and they had, as has been the case in almost every district, pulled the thatch off the sheds, and used it for fuel.

Special hospitals opened.

Mortality.

Shelter.

10. On the 8th of September the Assistant Magistrate reported that plenty of employment was to be had, but that the immigrant paupers, notwithstanding their debilitated condition, held out for full wages which the masters refused to give.

Employment for labor.

11. On the 17th of September the Assistant Magistrate had employment for 1,500 men on the roads, but was afraid that the works would be stopped for wants of funds, as certain estimates which he had sent up had not been returned duly sanctioned. On this the Commissioner authorized him to commence on earth-works in anticipation of receipt of the formal sanction.

Employment provided by the Assistant Magistrate.

12. Mortality was still great, the paupers flocking in from the Bankoora, Manbhoom, and Deoghur districts in a state of utter prostration, and dying soon after they arrived of the effects of starvation, dysentery, and diarrhoea. Numbers of children were deserted by the immigrant coolies; these were sent to the orphanage of the Revd. Mr. Stern at Burdwan, to which the Committee gave a grant of Rs. 100.

Children deserted.

13. In October a second instalment of Rs. 1,000 was received from the East Indian Railway Fund; and distributions and sales were carried on till the 19th of November, when operations were discontinued, the price of rice having fallen to 14 seers for the rupee. The Committee's pauper hospital and small-pox hospital were, however, kept open for some time longer.

Second grant from East Indian Railway Fund.

Operations discontinued.

* This fund amounted to Rs. 14,353, as shown by a memorandum of the Railway Company, dated 18th September.

Total expenditure.

14. The total amount expended on relief in this sub-division was—

From the balance of the North-West Provinces Relief Fund	Rs. 3,000
Private subscriptions	„ 2,568
From East Indian Railway Company's Relief Fund	„ 2,000
Total	Rs. 7,568

The money realised by sales of rice amounting to nearly Rs. 7,000 was made use of again by the Committee for the purchase of further supplies of rice.

Number of persons relieved.

15. The aggregate of the daily totals of persons who benefited by the measures of the Committee is stated to have been 3,48,296, giving a daily average of about 2,902 during the four months, from the middle of July to the middle of November, during which the operations were in progress. These numbers include all who purchased at the cheap sales, as well as those who received food gratuitously or in payment for such light labor as the Committee required.

BURDWAN.

1. The Burdwan district lies on the right bank of the river Hooghly, to the north of the Hooghly district. The civil station of the same name is 60 miles in a direct line to the north-west of Calcutta, with which it is connected by the East Indian Railway. The general condition of the district is prosperous. The greatest portion of it is the property of the Maharajah of Burdwan, who has, however, parcelled it out in putnee leases, which may be said to confer on the holder all the risks and rights of proprietorship in perpetuity, subject to the punctual payment of a fixed rent. Many of the putnee tenures are in fact estates of considerable extent. The Putneedars are generally wealthy, and some of them are advanced and enlightened Native gentlemen, well known in Calcutta.

Burdwan district.

2. The district exports fine rice to Calcutta and elsewhere, to the extent perhaps of one quarter of the produce of the cold weather or main crop. On the banks of the Damoodah and Adjye, potatoes, tobacco, onions, and cotton are grown.

Exports.

3. The early crop of 1865 was full; widely differing estimates are made as to the yield of the cold weather crop. Over the whole district, it probably did not average less than two-thirds of a full out-turn. By March, however, coarse rice, which ordinarily sells from Rs. 1-4 to Rs. 2 per maund at that time of the year, was realizing Rs. 4-8 a maund. In June the price was Rs. 5 against Rs. 2-2 a maund, the usual rate in that month.

Out-turn of crop of 1865.

4. In the beginning of July 1866, there was a sudden influx of paupers into the town of Burdwan, principally from the weavers' towns of Chunderconah in Hooghly, and Bishenpore, and from the Bancoorah and Manbhoom districts. This appears to have been caused by the rise of prices consequent on the injury which was done to the early crop by the heavy fall of rain in June. The paupers were attracted to the town by the distributions of rice, which are habitually made by the Maharajah and the Mohunts. The Maharajah increased the daily quantity of rice, but the number of applicants soon made it impossible for all to gain access to the existing relief houses.

Influx of paupers into the town of Burdwan.

5. On the 11th of July a meeting of Native gentlemen was held. Their chief manager, Baboo Chunder Shikur Banerjee gives a graphic description of the state of things in the town at this time. He writes—"In a few days the distress thickened, scenes of starvation and wretchedness presented on every side; the doors of private gentlemen thronged with beggars to whom it was in the power of no single man to afford relief; a wretch might be seen here and there by the side of a public street in a dying state, uncared for alike by the Police and the Municipality. In a few days more, famine was stalking in our street. For want of any other food, men were seen feeding on roots and leaves of trees, never used as food in ordinary times, and many were seen to pour down their throats liquified mud to satisfy the cravings of hunger and fatigue. Children again were thrown

Meeting of Native gentlemen.

"away by parents on the public roads, and mothers parted with their offspring for consideration of a few annas; nay for a day's meal only."

Relief house opened.

6. Subscriptions were raised, and on the 15th of July a relief house was opened at which cooked food was distributed; the number of applicants rose rapidly, and on the 27th the Committee applied to the Commissioner for assistance from Government, representing that about 6,000 destitute persons were being fed, although care was taken to admit none to the benefits of the charity who had other means of livelihood.

Maharajah's special unno-
chutro.

7. On the 23rd of July the Maharajah opened a special unnochatro, or feeding-house, for the express purpose of supplying the famine paupers; the daily number of attendants at first was 1,200.

Grant of money.

8. On the 17th of August the Commissioner applied for, and on the 27th the Board of Revenue granted Rs. 3,000; soon after they sent Rs. 2,000 more.

Mixed Committee formed.

9. On receipt of these funds, the Commissioner, under instructions from the Board, caused a Committee to be formed, consisting of officials as well as of private gentlemen, of which Dr. Cayley, the Civil Assistant Surgeon, and Baboo Chunder Shikur Banerjea were appointed Secretaries. The Commissioner also urged the adoption of a system under which those who were capable of light labor should be employed.

Maharajah undertakes the
cost of feeding all paupers in
the town.

10. At the first meeting of the Committee, a letter was read from the Maharajah of Burdwan, offering to provide for all the destitute paupers in Burdwan town entirely at his own expense, the arrangements being subject to the supervision and approval of the Commissioner. This munificent offer was at once accepted, and from the 6th of September the work of gratuitous relief was made over to the Maharajah.

Hospitals opened.

11. Relieved of all expenditure on this account, the Committee opened a pauper hospital; and municipal carts were set apart for the conveyance of the sick to the hospital and the removal of the dead from the streets. During the two months between September 6th and November 6th, 232 cases had been treated, of which 101 had died; the majority of deaths was from starvation and dysentery caused by want of food. There were a few cases of cholera and 35 of small-pox, of which 10 died. On the 2nd of October a second pauper hospital was established by the Maharajah, in which 141 cases were treated and 40 died.

Relief to Mymaree.

12. The Relief Committee placed a small sum at the disposal of the Reverend Mr. Neile for relief at Ishapore near Mymaree, south-east of Burdwan. On the 14th of October they opened a light labor yard for basket and rope making, cutting jungle, &c.

Maharajah's agents unwill-
ing to insist on labor.

13. It is understood that at first, as usual with Native gentlemen, the Maharajah's representative was unwilling to make labor a condition of relief; but he eventually saw that the number of applicants could never be expected to decrease as long as all who asked were fed gratuitously; and that the continued attraction of such a crowd to the town must be injurious. Out of the 6,000 daily applicants who were being fed by the bounty of the Maharajah, 3,000 were selected as deserving of gratuitous relief; the remainder were required to work; the remuneration allowed

being 1½ anna to an adult. At first the laborers were few, but the number soon rose to 300, who were employed in repairing roads, clearing 30 tanks and cutting jungle.

14. Clothes were distributed in all to 2,183 persons.

Clothes distributed.

15. In October the number of applicants fell gradually; on the 31st the returns showed only 1,206 persons as being fed daily.

Decrease in applicants for
relief.

16. The total expenditure of the Maharajah, up to 4th November, was Rs. 14,550.

Total expenditure of Ma-
harajah.

17. On the 21st November Mr. Dampier visited the Maharajah's distribution. According to the returns made by those in charge of the operations, only 500 or 600 were then receiving gratuitous relief there; but Mr. Dampier saw above 1,000 people being fed. The women and children were far more numerous than the men, but there were many men. The people did not, as a body, show any signs of emaciation or starvation. Men and women were stout and in good case. There appeared to be no limit to their rations. Several of them had been for months subsisting on this charity, and though probably stronger and haler than they ever were in their lives before, had not done a day's work. Not a man was being employed in the labor yard. In fact it seemed that labor had been almost optional and not compulsory. It was explained that the returns of persons receiving gratuitous relief did not show the entire number fed, because 600 only were "ticket holders," and the remaining 400 or 500 were admitted at the discretion of the managers when they "cried out very much." The numbers who were being fed daily were doubtless decreasing rapidly, but entirely at their own desire; they received subsistence money to take them home when they chose to go, but the Maharajah's agents were inclined to feed all who chose to apply as long as they wished to be fed.

Distribution visited by
one of the Commissioners.

18. Lieutenant W. B. Birch, the district Superintendent of Police, having visited the country opposite Burdwan on the right bank of the Damoodah (which is unprotected by embankments), reported that the late inundation had not done much injury to the rice crop, but that some 3,065 houses had been destroyed, of which the inhabitants had left the place in search of food in the towns. At his recommendation the Committee determined to open a centre of relief at Khund Ghose. A Local Committee was formed, and the depôt was frequently visited by Lieutenant Birch, Dr. Cayley and the Rev. Mr. Neile. Distress was found to be severe even up to November. At Roynah, on the same side of the Damoodah, it was found that the zemindars, and especially Baboo Saroda Pershaud Roy, of Chuckdiggee, had done much to assist their tenants by giving gratuitous relief and employing labor.

Injury to country on right
bank of Damoodah from
inundation.

Centres of relief estab-
lished.

19. On the report of the same officer, the Burdwan Committee also opened a centre of relief at Mymaree, to the south-east of the civil station, which was, however, closed early in November, as not being required. Both at Khund Ghose and Mymaree relief was given in the shape of three pice to each adult, there being no facilities for distributing cooked rice at those places. This amount of relief can only be looked upon as a supplement to the charity of private individuals.

Centre of relief at
mymaree.

20. Lastly, assistance was sent in October to the head-quarters of the sub-division of Boodbood, in the extreme west of the district, at which Mr. Clark, the Assistant Magistrate, had been

Boodbood.

feeding from 60 to 100 men at his own cost; and at Mankoor, not far off, Baboo Hitalal Misser had been feeding 300 or 400 people daily for two or three months.

21. On the 9th of October the Deputy Traffic Manager of the East Indian Railway was obliged to apply to the Magistrate for the assistance of the Police in keeping the Mankoor station premises clear of the paupers who pressed round each train as it arrived. On receipt of this letter, the Burdwan Committee sent funds to the Assistant Magistrate of Boodbood for distribution of relief in the shape of money.

Five centres established in connection with the Burdwan Committee.

22. Thus the Burdwan Committee were connected with the distribution of more or less relief at five centres—

Burdwan,	Khund Ghose, and
Ishapore,	Mankoor.
Mymaree,	

Cutwa sub-division.

23. On the 28th of July the Deputy Magistrate of Cutwa, which is situated on the north-east of the district, on the right bank of the Bhagiruttee, reported that he had, of his own motion, convened a meeting and raised subscriptions, and he asked for a grant of Rs. 2,000 from Government, suggesting that several public works should be taken in hand at once.

Subscriptions raised and grant applied for.

Applications for grant not supported by Collector and Commissioner.

The Magistrate replied that the able-bodied should be referred to the Executive Engineer for work, and called for more particular information. The Commissioner, Mr. Montresor, wrote on August 4th that it was very unlikely that the Government would assist Cutwa or any of the rich districts along the Bhagiruttee.

State of things in the sub-division.

24. According to the Deputy Magistrate's report, the chuars, bagdees, haris, and other low castes, who have no land, were the principal sufferers, the wages which they earned being quite insufficient for the support of their families. The poorer ryots, with a few beegahs of land were also suffering, having consumed the rice they had, and having no money; but as the prospect of the crop was good, the mahajuns were advancing rice to them. The mahajuns would not, however, advance to those who held no land. Petty traders and those living on small fixed incomes were much straitened; they had nothing left to sell or mortgage.

25. The Deputy Magistrate estimated that 35 per cent. of the population were suffering from the effects of the famine to the extent of not getting regular and full meals, but the people were not in a starving condition; with the assistance which they were receiving from private charity, they would live to see better days; many laborers had flocked to the special work on the road between Nuddea and Plassey, which is only 10 miles from Cutwa; 400 more had taken employment on ordinary work.

Employment.

26. No further application was made for Government aid. The Magistrate gave instructions that those who were fit for labor should be made to work; but Mr. Commissioner Jenkins pointed out that, as the charity consisted entirely of private funds subscribed by the Deputy Magistrate and other gentlemen, the Government officials could not interfere authoritatively.

Number fed.

27. The daily number fed at the Cutwa centre reached the maximum of 900 on the 26th of August, from which date it gradually fell to 310. On the 13th of October the relief operations were closed, as the Nihalee crop was rapidly coming into

the market. In the course of October and November the price of coarse rice fell to Rs. 4, Rs. 3-8 and Rs. 2-8 a maund.

28. In the sub-division of Culna, in the south-east of the district, the Deputy Magistrate collected subscriptions amounting to Rs. 1,500, with which relief was given in the shape of cooked food and clothes to a number of persons, the aggregate of the daily totals amounting to about 30,000. No external aid was given to this sub-division.

Culna sub-division.

Besides the distribution at the special relief house, some hundreds of poor people were fed daily at the Maharajah's temples at Culna, at which uncooked food is at all times given out.

29. To the Burdwan District Rs. 5,000 was granted from the balance of the North-Western Provinces Relief Fund, besides Rs. 4,834 for the employment of labor in special works.

Amount of funds expended.

The amounts subscribed were—			Rs.
At Burdwan ...	...	...	3,545
At Cutwa ...	...	...	1,752
At Culna ...	...	...	1,500
At Kanoo ...	...	...	791
By a Mohunt ...	...	...	2,000
			Rs. 9,588

This was in addition to the expenditure incurred by the Maharajah, and other private individuals in giving relief.

30. Baboo Joykissen Mookerjee, who holds large putnee tenures in the district, has written to us:—

Baboo Joykissen Mookerjee's account.

"I am not aware of any of our tenants dying from starvation in their houses. There was good deal of privation and suffering in many thousands of families, but no actual death. A large number of these sufferers would not have applied for public charity at a relieving house had there existed any at hand, but none were in existence except those at Culna and Cutwa, and those were established at a very late period and with very limited means.

"I am not aware of any deaths simply from starvation, as I have already stated in answer No. 59. Although there have been about 500 cases of deaths in our estates in the Burdwan district since September 1865, all these cases, I have been informed, are traceable to malignant fever and other diseases and partly from an emaciated state arising from insufficiency of food."

And again—

"The cultivating tenants have suffered great distress and privation, but they managed to remain at home and maintain themselves and their families, however scantily, by taking advances from mahajuns and zemindars. Many of them were obliged to sell or pawn the most part of their household furniture, and some even their bullocks and cows. Two or three years' good harvest will be necessary to place them in their former position. Very few, if any, of this class applied for public charity, and contented themselves with their scanty meals once a day and sometimes in two days.

"The laboring class suffered most by the famine. They had no credit to fall upon, as the first class did, nor many

"household things to sell or mortgage. In consequence of the drought they had little or no employment in agricultural fields, and many were compelled to seek for employment at a distance from their homes. Their rates of wages fell 25 per cent. below that of ordinary years on account of the want of demand for labor. It was from this class that persons applied for public charity in relieving houses. In our estates we provided work for as many persons as I could, but in such a vast field of distress individual exertions could only partially relieve it."

General review.

31. Speaking comparatively, the people of this district did not suffer severely. The generally prosperous condition of the land-holding ryots, caused by their proximity to the Calcutta markets, enabled them to oppose a greater resistance to famine than that which could be offered by the ryots of the less advanced districts to the west and south, and they received much support from their landlords. Laborers were driven into the towns to seek for subsistence, and there swelled the crowds of paupers who had come from the districts which had suffered more severely. In these times of distress, deaths and disease were unavoidable. Although the relief granted to this district was small, we think that it did not fall short of the requirements. It would, however, have been well if the organized relief at the different points in the interior of the district had begun earlier in the season.

32. Lieutenant W. B. Birch, the District Superintendent of Police, Dr. Cayley, the Civil Surgeon, and Baboo Chunder Banerjee were prominent by their activity in relief measures.

33. The munificence of the Maharajah of Burdwan was worthy of his wealth and position. Baboo Sharoda Pershad Roy, of Chukdiggee, signalized himself by his charities.

HOOGHLY.

1. Hooghly, the civil station of the district of that name, lies on the right bank of the river about 20 miles above Calcutta. It is on the line of the East Indian Railway. The district is in the division of the Commissioner of Burdwan.

Hooghly.

2. The Hooghly district exports rice of the finest kind to the Calcutta market; but so much land is devoted to potatoes, jute, sugar-cane, plantains and other more valuable products, that it has to import coarse rice largely from the neighbouring districts for the consumption of its people. The scantiness of the crop of 1865 in the districts from which the supply ordinarily was drawn, raised prices in the Hooghly district; but that nothing like famine or destitution requiring organized charitable relief was anticipated in the early part of the year is evident from the fact that on the 24th of May 1866 a meeting was held at the station for the relief of the sufferers from famine at Balasore, and a considerable sum was promised. In consequence, however, of Mr. Chapman's letter, which soon afterwards appeared in the public prints, the subscriptions remained uncollected as not being required for Balasore.

Exports and Imports.

Severe destitution not anticipated.

3. In the middle of June, Baboo Issur Chunder Mitter, the Deputy Magistrate in charge of the sub-division of Jehanabad, which forms the western part of the district, replied to an enquiry from Mr. R. V. Cockerell, the Magistrate and Collector, that there was much distress in the western part of his sub-division, which bordered on the Midnapore district, and that it was most severe about Chunderkonah, the south-western extremity. On the 7th of July he gave a figured statement showing 1,130 men and 1,105 women as destitute and unable to earn their own livelihood, and 2,580 men and 1,170 women as destitute but able to work if they could find employment, and stated that these figures referred to portions of thannahs Chunderkonah and Gogat only. In some parts of the tract which would not have suffered so much from the general effects of the drought and scarcity, much distress had been occasioned by the late heavy inundation especially in thannah Ghatal. The Deputy Magistrate added that 100 or 150 destitute persons of other districts passed through the sub-division daily on their way to Calcutta, and that Baboo Shib Narain Roy had been distributing gratuitous relief at Jehanabad. The Deputy Magistrate strongly and earnestly urged the Magistrate to apply for some external aid for the supply of food to the weak and helpless.

The Deputy Magistrate reports distress in Jehanabad sub-division.

And asks for external aid.

4. On these reports the Magistrate and Collector directed the Deputy Magistrate to form Committees to raise subscriptions for the relief of the destitute who were incapable of working for their own livelihood, and to set in hand works on certain lines of road which run through the distressed tract, on which all who could work should have employment. The Magistrate had at his disposal sufficient funds for this purpose from the ordinary grants for public works. He did not at this time consider any application to be necessary for assistance from without.

Magistrate and Collector directs the raising of local subscription and commencement of works.

5. The Commissioner, Mr. Montresor (on the 27th of July), considered that the Collector and Magistrate had done all that was really requisite, and that no further orders were necessary at present.

Commissioner considers Collector's action sufficient.

Relief Committees formed.

6. Accordingly Relief Committees of Native gentlemen were formed in July, and subscriptions raised as below—

Subscriptions.

Name of place.	Amount subscribed.	Number of persons to be gratuitously relieved daily.
	Rs.	
Chunderkonah	2,134	500
Ramjibunpore	2,250	500
Shambazar	1,000	250
Khirpai	1,989	500

Collector applies for a Government grant.

7. At the urgent repetition of the Deputy Magistrate's request, the Collector, on the 23rd of July, asked for a grant from Government, anticipating that, notwithstanding the liberality of the local subscriptions and of those which he was collecting at the station, the fund would be insufficient for the support of the helpless.

Commissioner does not support the application.

It appears, however, from a note recorded by the Commissioner on the Magistrate's letter that he considered any application to Government for aid to be still unnecessary.

Subscriptions raised at Hooghly and Serampore.

8. At this time the Collector made an appeal to the residents of Hooghly and Serampore, and out of the sum raised assistance was sent to the Jehanabad sub-division.

State of things about Ghatal.

9. On the 24th of July Mr. Turnbull, manager of Messrs. Watson and Co.'s factories at Ghatal—a gentleman who gave valuable assistance throughout the relief operations—reported that since May paupers had been flocking into Ghatal from Midnapore and Chunderkonah, to whom cooked food had been supplied by the merchants of Ghatal, and other relief by Messrs. Watson and Co., their servants, the Native Judge, his officers and others. Finding the number of destitute increasing Mr. Turnbull called a meeting and raised monthly subscription to the amount of Rs. 72 and a donation of Rs. 200. As the support of the numbers who poured in was beyond the local means of Ghatal, such of the destitute as did not belong to the neighbourhood were induced to go to Calcutta, where it was supposed that they would be cared for by the munificence of the Native gentlemen of the town; 235 women and 149 children were thus despatched, their boat hire being paid, and the cost of sustenance as far as Calcutta being given to them.

Ghatal Committee assists paupers towards Calcutta.

Collector objects to the paupers being sent to Calcutta.

10. Mr. Park, who had now succeeded Mr. Cockburn as Magistrate and Collector, at once pointed out how undesirable it was to do anything which should tend to collect paupers at Calcutta; and from that time Mr. Turnbull and his coadjutors at Ghatal endeavoured to dissuade them from passing on.

The Board and Commissioner take the same view.

The Board of Revenue and the Commissioner of the district also pressed on all district officers the expediency of relieving paupers in their own districts.

11. In August it was found that the distress and the number of strangers wandering about the west of the district were increasing. Relief Committees were therefore organized at Jehanabad, and at two other places in the sub-division.

12. Seven Committees and centres of relief had thus been organized in the Jehanabad sub-division before the end of August, in addition to that at Ghatal, the merchants of which place kept up a liberal distribution till November without any external aid.

Seven centres open.

13. On the 2nd of August it was reported that 200 men were at work on the roads and others would be employed at once.

Works.

14. On the 8th of August, the Board of Revenue allotted the first grant of Rs. 5,000 for gratuitous relief to the helpless in the sub-division; apparently this assignment was made in consequence of verbal representations made by the Commissioner at a meeting which was held at the Board's office.

First allotment by the Board of Revenue of Rs. 5,000 for gratuitous relief.

15. At the same time Government, in the Public Works Department, engaged to supply any funds which might be required for the purpose of employing the able-bodied, and soon after made a special allotment of Rs. 6,000.

Special grants for works.

16. On the 13th of August Baboo Issur Chunder Mitter, who had hitherto been looking after the relief in addition to the discharge of the ordinary duties of the Jehanabad sub-division, was relieved of all other work so that he might give his whole time to those operations.

Baboo Issur Chunder Mitter specially appointed for relief operations.

17. Each of the Local Committees gave their relief in the shape of rations of cooked food doled out at the head quarters of each. It was not found necessary to open centres of distribution at other places. The towns in which the weavers lived were in fact the centres of distress. The quantity of food allowed to each recipient at this time is stated at about one seer and a half to each person, a most liberal allowance as compared with other districts; but a system of graduation was adopted under which many received "half a meal only," on the assumption probably that they were not entirely dependent on the Committees for their daily food. It cannot be said the inhabitants of the Jehanabad sub-division were suffering the hardships of a general famine. The drought of 1865 had considerably reduced the out-turn of the rice crops, and the importation from other districts, and the high price of food, gradually threw out of employment the poorer classes who live by labor, but the ryots as a body never came on the relief funds at all. On the 13th of June Mr. Turnbull, who has had long experience of that part of the country, wrote—"Actual want does not prevail in the immediate vicinity, though, as a matter of course, these high prices for food press upon all classes, the poor in most cases being obliged to be content with one meal a day instead of two."

Cooked food distributed.

The Jehanabad sub-division not suffering from general famine.

18. At a later period the class of laborers who subsist on wages suffered; the result of the high prices of necessaries was naturally to diminish the demand and to reduce the wages of agricultural labor to a point at which they did not suffice for subsistence of the laborer himself, much less of his family. But the crowds who thronged round the relief houses of the Jehanabad sub-division consisted principally of cloth weavers and their families. In November 1865 the Collector of Hooghly reported that the weavers of the Jehanabad sub-division had turned out cloth valued at Rs. 7,65,000 in 1864-65, but that the estimated out-turn of 1865-66 was Rs. 6,25,812 only. On the other hand the demand for English piece-goods was stated to be rapidly increasing, the estimate of 1865-66 being 57,371 pieces against a

Sufferings of laborers.

Weaver

Rapid decay of the trade.

consumption of 48,648 pieces in 1864-65. Since then the English had continued to drive out of the market the local manufacture; the weavers could not compete with the English machinery; and their earnings were reduced to a minimum. The sudden rise in the price of necessities hastened the crisis, and the profits of their trade became altogether insufficient for their support; they shut up their looms, and wandered about the country with their families in search of food.

They flock into Calcutta.

19. When the Native gentlemen of Calcutta began their distributions of food, numbers of these Jehanabad weavers were found who had been attracted to the city by the intelligence. The Magistrate of Hooghly estimated the number of those who had emigrated to Calcutta at 5,000 or 6,000.

Board consider measures taken to have been insufficient.

20. On a narrative of the proceedings up to date being laid before the Board of Revenue, they expressed an opinion on the 21st of August that the measures taken for the relief of the distress in the Jehanabad sub-division had hitherto been insufficient; and that if they had been reported sooner the Board might have afforded relief on a more extended scale.

21. No written report of what was going on in the district appears to have been submitted to the Board till the 16th of August; but from the Commissioner's letter of that date it would appear that he had made a verbal report of the measures adopted at the meeting of the Board which he had attended, to which reference has been made above.

22. The Board's expression of dissatisfaction at the insufficiency of these measures appears to have been elicited by their disapproval of the influx of weavers into Calcutta. Looking at the indiscriminate munificence with which the Native gentlemen were at this time feeding all who chose to apply, it is a question whether any amount of relief would have kept the Jehanabad weavers in their own country, unless it had been given without any of those conditions and restrictions of which the imposition is indispensable to the proper exercise of public charity.

Paupers encouraged and assisted to return to their homes.

23. The Board and the Calcutta Relief Committee at once resolved to encourage these persons, as well as others from outlying districts, to leave Calcutta and to return to their homes. It was arranged that the Calcutta Committee should send the immigrants from Jehanabad by boat to Ghatal, where they would be received by the Deputy Magistrate of Jehanabad, and sent on to their homes in the interior of the sub-division. These arrangements were made known to his tenantry by Babo Thokerjee, in whose estates most of the weavers were

Arrangements for return of paupers to their homes.

of sustenance. Temporary sheds were erected at Ghatal for the reception of paupers from Calcutta; the able-bodied were to be sent to work from Ghatal to the works which had been in Calcutta on the old Benares road; the weak were to be sent to Ghatal, where they were fit to be passed on to their own homes. The arrangements would be made over to the charge of the Local Committee. It was, however, subsequently explained that paupers or sickly men would be sent.

25. On the 24th of August the Collector reported arrangements for the receipt of paupers at Ghatal to be completed, and on the 3rd of September the Deputy Magistrate received the first consignment at Ghatal. From this date the pauper

sent off in batches from Calcutta, Ghatal and other places as they could be induced to go, for they were at first very unwilling to leave the good things which were supplied to them in Calcutta. On being despatched each pauper received from the Calcutta Committee sustenance for the journey one rupee, and a brass water vessel and plate.

26. In course of transit from Calcutta to Ghatal many of the paupers disappeared; probably they looked back with longing to the comparatively comfortable fare which they had left behind them, and could not resist the desire to return; others disappeared after they had been housed at Ghatal; some even left behind the new drinking pots and plates which had been supplied to them in Calcutta.

27. As to those who remained a great difficulty arose. On the 20th of August Mr. Turnbull had reported from Ghatal that the weavers who had not yet been to Calcutta refused to do any road-work, and insisted on going to Calcutta, although they were informed that their brethren were being sent back thence. The weavers who returned from Calcutta also positively refused to do agricultural labor. They insisted on all being sent to their houses, whence it is believed that many again found their way to Calcutta to be supplied afresh with brass vessels after having sold those which were given to them on the occasion of their first despatch. But it was impossible to trace them, as they constantly gave different names.

They refuse to work.

28. The Collector writes in reply to our questions:—"The men who came back from Calcutta were utterly demoralized by their treatment there, and almost to a man refused work scornfully;" and again, in replying to a question put as to the rates which were paid to those who did work, he writes—"I am about to give an almost incredible answer to this question. The rates paid were from half to one anna more than in ordinary times, so that we positively bribed men to save them from distress. There was one justification; it was considered very desirable to prevent people leaving the district, and so exceptional means were resorted to to get the pampered fellows who returned from Calcutta laughed at the bare idea of doing any work."

Rates paid for work.

The Collector appears to have overlooked the fact that if the works were to be efficient as a means of keeping alive the laborer and those dependent on him, it was absolutely necessary to fix the wages of his labor at a rate which would at the existing prices buy enough rice for their support without any reference to the rates in "ordinary time."

Englishman.

29. All other attempts to induce the able-bodied weavers to work having failed, the Deputy Magistrate suggested that weaving work-shops should be set up for them.

The Magistrate and Commissioner approved of the project. Such shops were started at five centres of relief. On the 12th of November the Deputy Magistrate reported that 213 men, women, and children were employed in them; but the earnings of each man ranged between 2 and 4 annas a day, and each woman earned only two pice. The return was insufficient to procure even one meal a day.

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The Native gentlemen were not in earnest about making the weavers work; the scheme was not successful, and was not carried out to any considerable extent.

Board disapprove of prop-
ping up a decaying trade.

30. The Board, however, disapproved of the policy of doing anything which should have a tendency to prop up a trade which was fast decaying, and of which the annihilation was inevitable. They directed the Collector to endeavour to induce the weavers to take to agriculture, or, as no land was available in their neighbourhood, to brick-making, road-work or service. In reply to a call to consider carefully whether any special measures could be taken to re-establish the weavers as a class, the Commissioner and Collector replied that the English manufacture must infallibly drive their products out of the market. The weavers must doubtless go through severe suffering such as falls to the lot of all whose trade is ruined by competition, but it was impossible to do anything special for them as a body distinguished from the general mass of sufferers from the famine. They must, therefore, be warned to make arrangements for their own support from the cessation of the relief operations. These views were finally adopted.

Offer of immigration and
of land in the Central Pro-
vinces unanimously rejected.

31. In the course of September an offer, which had been made by the Chief Commissioner of Nagpore, to supply with land any number of families who might choose to immigrate to certain parts of his province, was communicated to the weavers (as well as to the ryots in general) through Baboo Joykissen Mookerjee, the zemindar of many of them, and every facility for immigrating was offered; but the zemindar replied that the cultivators had been enriched beyond their most sanguine expectations, and that the weavers had not the energy to immigrate.

Attempt to insist on light
labor where possible.

32. Every attempt was made by Government officers to restrict the gratuitous relief to those who were really incapable of work and to insist on all others doing light labor in proportion to their powers. The Officiating Commissioner, Mr. Jenkins, drew up an elaborate scheme with this object; the plan was to establish a labor yard and divide the applicants for food into classes; at one end of the scale there would be the really feeble people from whom no work could be expected, at the other the able-bodied men who could do the hardest sort of labor. Between these extremes there were to be so many classes, from each of which a certain amount of work was to be exacted daily in return for their food; as paupers daily recovered health and strength they would be removed into the next labor class, and so on until they reached the road-work division. The idea was that the paupers would thus learn to think about their future prospects, and not fall so utterly into a state of dependence. The Collector writes—"No doubt the theory is perfect in itself, but it is opposed to a Bengalee gentleman's idea of the fitness of things, and as they did not assist us, the result was a complete failure."

Emph.

Collector objects to
being sent to Cal.

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33. The Deputy Magistrate in charge of the operations went round to each centre, and explained the arrangements to the members of each Committee. After some opposition a show was made of carrying them out; but when he next visited the place he generally reported that nothing had been done. In fact the feelings and ideas of the private gentlemen who composed the committees were entirely opposed to refusing relief to any one who chose to ask for it, and as by refusing to labor the paupers did no

forfeit their meals or incur any other penalty, it was scarcely to be expected that they would take to the work.

34. Up to the middle of September the district had received Rs. 17,000 from Calcutta. Work had been offered on two roads, the old Benares line and that between Burdwan and Midnapore; but the daily average number employed had been 136 only, to whom Rs. 859 had been disbursed. Grants for relief and works up to September.

35. At this time the Collector expressed to the Deputy Magistrate his expectation that the money already received should suffice to carry him through; but on this the Board at once intimated that as much money as might be required was available. Local misapprehensions of to a limited supply of money.

36. The passage in the Collector's letter, however, appears to have led to a rumour that the local officers would provide no more money, for Baboo Sarodaprosaud Gangooly, a member of the Kherpai Committee, wrote direct to the Calcutta authorities stating that the Commissioner had declared such an intention, and urgently demanding a further grant of Rs. 5,000 for the relief of the Jehanabad sub-division, without which the relief operations must come to a stand-still. Rs. 13,000 had been voluntarily subscribed in the sub-division, which had as yet received Rs. 5,000 only from Calcutta.

To this the Calcutta Committee replied, as the Board had done to the Collector, that ample funds would be made available.

37. On the 6th of October, the Collector applied for a further grant of Rs. 1,500 or 2,000. He has informed us that all his demands for money were promptly complied with. At the close of the operations he had money in hand which was not required.

38. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned repudiations of any intention to stint the Jehanabad Committees, the impression does not appear to have been altogether allayed that there was an inclination on the part of the local authorities to withhold funds, for early in November Pundit Issur Chunder Bidyasagar, an esteemed and well-known gentleman, who is connected with the Jehanabad sub-division, brought to the notice of His Honor the Lieutenant Governor that the Deputy Magistrate in charge of the relief operations had said that he dare not ask the Collector for more money which was required at Chunderkonah. That these apprehensions stood on no valid grounds is, we think, proved by a letter from the Collector to the address of the Deputy Magistrate, dated the 7th September, in which he writes emphatically, "let no 'mistaken idea of economy prevent your naming what is 'really required.'"

39. In October the article in the *Englishman* appeared which has been mentioned in connection with Bishenpore in the Bankoora district. It gave a harrowing description of the scenes to be witnessed on the roads by which the paupers found their way to Calcutta. Article in the *Englishman*.

Under instructions from the Commissioner the Magistrate of Hooghly made general enquiries on one part of the road between Jehanabad and Calcutta, and the Deputy Magistrate on another.

Their personal observations and enquiries left little doubt that the writer had overdrawn the reality, at least as far as that road was concerned; deaths naturally occurred among travelling numbers, who were much reduced before they left their homes,

but in the course of their journey to Calcutta the wayfarers would pass very near to several centres of relief, at which they had only to apply for their daily food.

Centres of Pundooah and Mahanund.

40. In addition to the relief centres in the Jehanabad sub-division two were opened in September at Pundooah and Mahanund, on the east of the district. In November, 150 persons were being fed daily at Mahanund, and 280 (chiefly strangers and resident weavers) at Pundooah.

Relief at Hooghly town.

41. In Chinsurah, a part of the station of Hooghly, a Committee of Native gentlemen raised Rs. 6,000, and fed the paupers from the 14th of July to the 16th of October, at the house of Baboo Jeebunkishen Pal. The leaders in this liberal movement, besides Baboo Jeebunkishen Pal, were Baboos Doorga Churn Law and Shib Chunder Doss. The daily totals of the numbers fed during this period are reported to have aggregated above 100,000. The funds becoming exhausted in the middle of October were supplemented by a grant of Rs. 1,000 from the Board, and more was promised if required.

Private charitable relief.

42. Baboo Joykissen Mookerjee is reported to have assisted his own ryots liberally, and Baboos Shibnarain Roy of Jarah, Madhub Lall Khan of Shamgunge, and Beharilal Mookerjee of Banchee, as well as Pundit Issur Chunder Bidyasagur of Beer Singha, were prominent in affording private charity.

Ooterparah and Serampore.

43. At Ooterparah and Serampore also, considerable towns on the south-east of the district, organized measures for supplying food, clothing, and medical assistance to the indigent were carried by Native gentlemen without assistance from public funds, Baboo Joykissen Mookerjee taking a leading part in the Ooterparah operations. The distributions were almost indiscriminate. The Collector writes of that at Hooghly—"Our municipal coolies "would go to be fed, running away from their work. Many were "ryots from surrounding villages with splendid crops coming up, "and the very feeble and crippled had a difficulty in getting to "the spot. This was the reason our smaller relief depôt was "opened. At Pundooah an English gentleman mentioned to me "that he saw prostitutes coming to be relieved. Families who "were supposed to be doing well, sent, it is believed, their "decrepid relatives or young children to be fed for nothing. "The belief among the Hindoos that he who can afford aid to "a beggar and refuses will incur punishment hereafter, is a fatal "obstacle to a discriminating distribution."

44. The average number of persons who were fed daily at the eight centres in the Jehanabad sub-division up to the 7th of October is returned at 5,694.

From a return furnished by the Collector, the daily average of persons who received gratuitous relief from the Relief Committees throughout the whole district is as follows:—

July	...	...	...	...	645
August	...	...	...	...	3,242
September	...	...	...	...	5,700
October	...	...	...	...	6,000
November	...	...	...	...	4,900

45. The total amount granted to the Hooghly district was—

From balance of N. W. P. Fund	...	...	Rs. 6,000
By the Calcutta Committee	...	...	„ 16,500
Total	..	„	22,500
The private subscriptions amounted to	...	Rs.	14,970

46. The only special work for which a grant was made was the old Benares road; it was at first intended to reserve this employment for the numerous weavers who were expected to flock to it on their return from Calcutta; but when, as has been shown, these men would not take work, the employment was thrown open to the public. No more than Rs. 2,250 of this grant was, however, made use of up to the time when the relief operations terminated. Rs. 3,311 were also expended on another road in Jehanabad out of the ordinary local fund grant of the year.

Special grant for works.

47. At seven of the eight centres in the Jehanabad sub-division the sick were treated by Native doctors resident on the spot or near to it; but it does not appear that sickness prevailed to an alarming degree.

Medical arrangements.

At Hooghly a special hospital was opened, where the sick were treated under the directions of the Civil Surgeon.

48. No more than two or three unclaimed children were thrown on the hands of the Collector.

Unclaimed children.

49. Unusual mortality occurred in the Jehanabad sub-division from the bowel complaints and other diseases which are brought on by deprivation; it seems to have ceased early in September; it does not appear that many deaths were the direct consequence of want of food to eat. Baboo Joykissen Mookerjee estimates the mortality for the Jehanabad sub-division from all causes in July and August at 10,000, being nearly 2 per cent of the whole population of the district. It is impossible to test the correctness of the estimate.

Mortality.

50. In October the Ooterparah Committee closed their operations, and declined an offer of a pecuniary grant on the ground that no further relief was required. The approach and cutting of the cold weather crop rapidly improved matters every where; the centres were gradually closed, and by the end of November relief operations had ceased throughout the district.

Close of relief operation.

51. From the time of his assuming charge of the Magistracy and Collectorship in July, Mr. Park alone, and unaided by other Government officers, controlled the whole operations, in communication with the Deputy Magistrate Issen Chunder Mitter, as chairman of each of the Committees in Jehanabad; and in the case of Pundooah and Mahanund, in communication with the Local Committees. His action was prompt and judicious.

HOWRAH.

1. The Howrah district lies on the right bank of the river, opposite to Calcutta and the 24-Pergunnahs. The civil station is immediately opposite to Calcutta, of which indeed it is a suburb. Here is the terminus of the East Indian Railway. The district is included in the fiscal jurisdiction of Hooghly; but the magisterial jurisdictions are distinct.

First indications.

2. The first indications of approaching scarcity observed towards the end of April or beginning of May, when the price of rice rose rapidly from Rs. 3-6 to Rs. 4-8 per maund, (80 lbs). Towards the end of May a few paupers from Jehanabad, in the western part of the Hooghly district, were noticed in the town of Howrah.

Kitchens opened in Howrah town.

3. The influx of paupers gradually increased, and early in June the Magistrate established a pauper kitchen in the Ramkistopore quarter of the town. This was supported by Native gentlemen, and a few European subscribers.

4. The daily number of poor people fed at this kitchen at first ranged from 300 to 350, gradually increasing to 810 on the 20th August, when the Howrah Relief Committee was formed, and other modes of giving relief being substituted, the kitchen was abolished.

5. A second kitchen, on a similar footing, was formed at Sulkea, the northern suburb of Howrah, on the 24th June, funds being supplied for its maintenance by the European and Native residents of the town. At this kitchen the average daily number of paupers fed stood at first at 302, and rose to 450 by the 20th August, when it also was discontinued. The daily average total for two months of people relieved at both these kitchens was about 700. The total amount subscribed for the support of these kitchens was Rs. 2,200, of which the whole was collected and expended.

6. In addition to these two public kitchens a private one was opened by Baboo Ram Sing, a mahajun (merchant), since deceased; it was kept up for about three weeks, feeding daily 75 persons on an average.

Meeting of August 8th.

7. Previously to the 8th August no official report of the distress in the district was made to either the Board of Revenue, or the Commissioner of the division. On the 8th August, the Magistrate of Howrah was summoned to attend the meeting of the Revenue Board, at which the Commissioner of the Burdwan division was also present; and of which mention has been made more than once in our Report and Narratives.

Oolaberreah.

8. In the beginning of August, in consequence of reports of the distress prevailing at Oolaberreah, a village 24 miles south of Howrah, on the River Hooghly, at the point where the river is crossed by the Midnapore and Calcutta road, the District Superintendent of Police was ordered to proceed to the place, and make enquiries. On the 9th August the District Superintendent, 700 that about 40 or 50 persons, from Cuttack, Balasore, 6,000 pore, were being fed daily by Mr. Scott, of Oolaberreah.

few of these were very much emaciated; and that on an average four or five dead bodies, evidently of travellers, who had died of starvation, were discovered weekly in different parts of the bazar or market place of the village.

Grant of Rs. 500 for Oolaberreah.

9. On the 13th August, as the result of the verbal communications made by the Magistrate at the meeting which he attended on the 8th of that month,* the Board of Revenue granted a sum of Rs. 500, which the Magistrate was directed to place at the disposal of Mr. Scott, for the purpose of organising a system of relief measures under the supervision of a Local Committee directly controlled by the Magistrate himself. It was laid down as a rule that food was to be given gratuitously only to those who were too weak to work, and that the comparatively able-bodied were to be employed and paid for their labor. The Magistrate was informed that arrangements had been made for deputing to Oolaberreah a Native doctor, duly provided with requisite medical stores.

10. On the 31st August, a further sum of Rs. 1,000 was granted, to be expended on general relief measures at Narit, a place about 30 miles from the sudder station. Here, too, a Local Committee was formed under the control of the Magistrate.

Narit.

11. As far as the district generally was concerned, no apprehensions were entertained of any failure of the available supply of rice before the succeeding crop was reaped, and no recommendations in regard to importations were therefore made by the district officers. The paupers seeking relief at different places were ascertained to be, with very few exceptions, famine-stricken people from other districts.

No want of rice.

12. The Howrah Relief Committee was organised on the 20th August,† and consisted of 29 official and non-official members. Of the whole number, 22 were Europeans, and 7 Natives. Baboo Nobin Chunder Banerjee was made manager of the pauper camp established by the Committee at Howrah. Here the mode of relief adopted was to issue daily tickets of admission to such applicants as were shown, to the satisfaction of the manager, to be really in distress, and destitute of all means of livelihood.

Relief Committee constituted in Howrah and their operations.

13. Measures of a generally similar nature were adopted by the sub-committees of Narit and Oolaberreah, but there were differences in details. At Howrah and Oolaberreah, relief was given by the distribution of cooked food only; $\frac{1}{4}$ seer ($\frac{1}{2}$ lb) of raw rice, and one chittack (2 ounces) of curry or dall was allowed as an average for each pauper, adult or child. The whole was then cooked and apportioned to the whole number, adults being allowed a larger share than children, but the rations were not re-weighed. At Narit, $3\frac{1}{2}$ chittacks (7 ounces) of uncooked rice, and half a pice, in lieu of curry or dall, were given to each pauper without any distinctions as to age.

14. Of these modes of affording relief, the former was found to be the more successful. The point was fully considered when the first kitchens were established, and it was then decided that only cooked food should be issued. Why the Narit sub-committee deviated from this resolution, has not been explained. It

* Supra. paragraph 7.

† Supra. paragraph 4.

was found that although cooking the rice entailed more trouble, the distribution of it in that form prevented it from being hoarded and sold, or eaten raw, by the famishing recipients.

Little labor exacted

15. Very little labor, indeed none worthy of mention, was obtained in return for the relief given.

Pauper hospitals.

16. Pauper hospitals were established at each of the three relief centres, under the immediate supervision of Native doctors, each of whom, to a certain extent, was under the orders of the Civil Surgeon of Howrah. No measures for the treatment of sick, or the prevention of disease, were taken at any other places in the district, for none were found to be required.

Mortality.

17. Of the deaths that occurred at the several pauper hospitals, the greater number took place within one week of admission. All persons who arrived at the relief centres in a sickly state were at once transferred to the hospital. Of these many were in too advanced a stage of starvation, and recovery was from the first hopeless. The death rate was found to be higher among women and children than men.

18. There are no means of ascertaining the total mortality due to famine in the district. Many must have died on the part of the Midnapore and Oolaberreah road (16 miles) which lies in the district, but of these no sort of record was kept. Among the paupers, however, who reached the kitchens first established, and the relief centres which replaced them, including the whole period from June to the end of December 1866, the number reported was about 1,235.

Classes of paupers at different centres.

19. At the Howrah centre, the majority of the paupers were weavers from Jehanabad, in the Hooghly district, and its neighbourhood. At Oolaberreah, the persons relieved came chiefly from the districts of Cuttack, Balasore and Midnapore. At Narit the applicants for relief consisted, for the most part, of persons of the poorest classes from the Howrah district.

20. The total amount granted to this district was—

From the balance of the North Western Provinces	
Relief Fund	Rs. 1,500
By the Calcutta Relief Committee	„ 17,400
Total	Rs. 18,900

to which Rs. 3,190 were added by private subscriptions.

21. According to the figures given by the Collector, the aggregate of the daily totals of persons who were relieved from the 25th of August to the 31st December amounted to about 1,00,000, giving a daily average of 1,047.

* Supra., paragraphs 9 and 10.

NUDDEA.

Nuddea district.

1. The Nuddea district lies on the right bank of the River Hooghly, which is known as the Bhagiruttee in that part of its course, and extends northwards from the 24-Pergunnahs (the district which encompasses Calcutta) to the Ganges. The district is intersected from south-west to north-east by the Eastern Bengal Railway. Kishnagur, the civil station, lies 12 miles from the railway station of Bugoolah, which is 60 miles from Calcutta. Kishnagur and Bugoolah are connected by a good metalled road. Some 50 miles further north is Kooshtea, the terminus of the railway, to which much rice and other produce from the eastern districts of Bengal are brought in boats for transmission to the Calcutta market.

2. The general condition of the district has been described in paragraphs 389, &c., of our General Report.

3. Till within the last few months the division, in which this district is comprised, was styled the Nuddea division; but the designation has now been changed to the Presidency division, as the head quarters of the Commissioner were transferred to the Presidency several years ago.

4. On being called upon at the instance of the Board of Revenue, to report on the promise of the rice crop in his district, the Collector, Lord H. Ulick Browne, stated, on the 31st October 1865, that the out-turn would not be quite half of that produced in ordinary years, and that apprehensions were entertained of something like a famine. Prices of rice were double those which had ruled in the corresponding period of the preceding year. It was said that there was a general disinclination on the part of the ryot to pay rent under the idea that every pice would be required to buy food. The Collector had been asked to fix the price of rice. He wrote to the Commissioner—“I, of course, explained that it is an established principle of Government, that all the principles of free trade and absence of restrictions on commerce that are in force in England, shall be adopted in all her dependencies throughout the world, whatever may be their condition and circumstances, and that such a thing was quite out of the question.”

Prospects of crop and state of things in October 1865.

Grain merchants were beginning to raise prices by storing rice, and it was not easy to get grain even at the existing high prices.

5. The following extract from the Collector's report was confirmed by what occurred later in the season:—

“Moreover, though theoretically under the principles of free trade, the great difference between prices here and at places far off ought to produce an immediate importation, practically, whether it be from the national want of energy, disinclination to take trouble, or to be considered as dealers in grain, or for any other reason, grain selling at Kooshtea for Rs. 2-4-3 a maund is not brought here by the public, though the price of grain of a similar quality at Kishnagur is Rs. 3-4, and though the cost of transit is only 4 annas a maund. These,

"it will be observed, are two places, between which the means of conveying grain are exceptionally easy."

6. The state of things in the part of the district about Kishnagur had very suddenly assumed a serious aspect. Numbers of poor people had complained to the Collector that they were without food, and had asked him to move the Government to do something for them; symptoms of distress were also beginning to appear in some other parts of the district. The Collector endeavoured, by precept and example, to induce respectable people to bring in rice from Kooshtea, on their own account, as it could be done at a cost so very much below the price at which the grain dealers chose to sell. He set about informing himself thoroughly of the state of every part of his district. At the same time he suggested the publication in the newspapers of the prices at which rice was selling in different districts; and ended his report by expressing his fear that, if no more rain should fall, it would be necessary to give the people some employment before very long.

7. The report was, we find, sent up to the Board of Revenue with a demi-official letter from Mr. R. N. Shore, who was at that time officiating as Commissioner of the division during Mr. Dampier's absence on leave, and was evidently among the materials on which they founded their report of the 25th November to Government.

Appeal of the Missionaries.

8. Soon after this report was written the cold weather crop was reaped, which naturally arrested the progress of the distress; but in March the Missionaries of the Church Missionary Society began to move on behalf of their Native Christians. They drew up an appeal from which we extract the following passages:—

"The Native Christians of the Kishnagur missions are unhappily in a locality where the scarcity amounts almost to a famine. Being mostly day-laborers, or cultivators of very small holdings, the 1,000 Christians of the district are exposed to the full severity of the present distress, and for the next five months, until the autumn rice crop is gathered, there is no hope of any improvement in their condition.

"At present a certain measure of rice, which some years ago cost 3 or 4 pice, sells at 13 or 14 pice, which alone is sufficient to account for the present distress of the poor. Were I to tell you instances of how long many must go without food, and what sort of materials they contrive to convert into food, you could not believe it, for it is really incredible, and yet it is true nevertheless. Cholera, I feel sad to say, is again amongst us, and nearly every one that is attacked is carried off by it; only three or four have recovered during last week.

"Respectable farmers are so much reduced in circumstances that they cannot employ by far as many day-laborers as they used to do in former times; consequently the laboring class is reduced to the point of death by starvation.

"They are now able to glean a little wheat, grain, &c.; but after a month all the crops will have been gathered in, and therefore nothing can be obtained by gleaning in the fields. They are now thrown upon roots, berries, &c., for their chief

"support, and when that supply is exhausted, they will be forced to eat the rind of trees, grass, &c. I never witnessed such misery in my life.

"The crops have been failing for the last five or six years more or less, so the peasantry are in debt to the mahajuns or money-lenders; consequently they are not inclined to advance much on credit, though they do advance a portion of what the people used to obtain from them; but this is barely enough to keep them from dying of hunger.

"There are few means of earning a livelihood now; for the people being generally in distress, they cannot afford to spend money in employing others. So the houses are left unrepaired, consequently the thatchers sit idle, having no call to work. The agriculturists were sitting idle whilst the soil was as hard as a rock, and now after this latter rain they ploughed as much of the fields as they themselves could afford, avoiding the employment of hired labor as much as possible from want of capital. Those who have bamboos or thatching grass to sell realize little, because there is no demand, the people being too poor to repair their houses. Other branches of industry the people at large are unacquainted with, and there is no demand."

A subscription of Rs. 5,000 was asked for; with which the missionaries proposed first to relieve about 200 widows and then to collect 600 or 700 children who, under the pressure of want, had been removed from the schools, and to make a small allowance to them for their attendance.

9. On this appeal being laid before the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal through his Private Secretary, His Honor at once, on the 31st of March, called for a report on the condition of the poor in the Nuddea district in general, and of the Christian villages alluded to in particular.

10. On this a very thorough enquiry was made by the Collector as to the condition and prospects of every part of his district, for which he had unusual facilities through the sub-divisional officers, and intelligent European and Native land-holders, and employers of labor, who are scattered over its length and breadth.

Enquiry by Collector in April

The replies to the Collector's enquiry showed that the high price of rice was causing distress which varied much in degree in different parts of the district; the prices, as mentioned in the correspondence, ranged from about 15 seers (at Kooshtea) to 10½ seers for the rupee; a considerable portion of the population had been obliged to deny themselves their usual quantity of food; in some cases the privation and destitution were very severe, approaching a state of starvation.

No cases of death from starvation had come to the notice of any of the non-official gentlemen; but Mr. Pawsey, the Assistant Magistrate of Bongong, wrote—"there is no doubt that deaths have occurred from illness consequent on insufficient food among the classes which live from hand to mouth." Baboo Mohima Chunder Pal, Deputy Magistrate of Ranaghat, wrote—"I have also heard from many that dead bodies are now and then found on public roads and streets, &c., and it is described that the causes of such deaths are nothing but starvation." On

the other hand, Baboo Sree Gopal Pal Choudhry, of Banaghat, the proprietor of large estates, a gentleman who takes an active interest in all that is going on around him, and who subsequently distinguished himself by his liberality, writing from the same place as the Deputy Magistrate, stated that no account of actual death by starvation had reached him from that part of the country.

11. Opinions were divided as to the propriety of the Government taking any measures of relief at present; but it was the universal opinion that matters would get gradually worse for the next three or four months, till the early rice crop, which is an important crop in the Nuddea district, should be reaped.

12. In laying the reports of the Collector and of his informants before the Government, the Commissioner (Mr. Dampier) thus summarized the result of the enquiry;—

“The distress appears to be less in the Kooshtea sub-division and in the north portion of Chooadangah than elsewhere. It is most severe in the middle of the district.

“The Christians who form Messrs. Schurr and Lincke’s congregation are located in the most distressed part.

“Naturally the distress is least in those parts of the district in which much of the land is covered by date trees, chillies, tobacco, &c. It will be observed that chillies sold this year at a rate 50 per cent. higher than last year’s prices. The fact that this crop is extensively grown about Chooadangah and in the northern part of that sub-division may account for the difference between the reports of Messrs. Towers of Chooadangah and Anderson of Katcheekatta, who are decidedly of opinion that the state of things calls for no general measures of relief; and the description of the prevailing distress which is given by Mr. Hills of Nischindpore, Mr. Schurr of Kapasadangah, and Mr. Harvey, who are further south.

“The late rain brought considerable relief. The agricultural operations have supplied work, and the good prospects of the next season’s crop have made the mahajuns less unwilling to make advances than they were before.”

13. The Magistrate and Collector advocated the immediate commencement of works for the purpose of giving employment to alleviate the distress. He wrote that “when distress has reached the stage at which it now is in Nuddea, the Government must be prepared to face these questions boldly, and to alleviate it in several districts if necessary.”

14. Time being of so much importance, the Commissioner, agreeing with the Magistrate and Collector, directed him at once to set on foot earth-work repairs to the roads, and the construction of tanks, at as many points as possible in the most affected parts of the district. He wrote that the great object should be to provide work for all who desire it, without obliging them to go to any great distance from their homes. The funds were to be primarily taken from the annual allotment for local roads, out of which the Collector was authorized to divert Rs. 20,000 to these special works, in anticipation of the sanction of Government, to whom the Commissioner would apply to replace the sum so diverted from its original purpose. It was suggested that the Collector should avail himself to the fullest extent of the

co-operation which the land-holders and European residents about the district would doubtless readily give in superintending the relief works.

Further, as it appeared that private charity was almost exhausted, the Commissioner directed the formation of a Relief Committee, as “the time had arrived for making some organized effort to save from starvation those who, from natural causes, are unable to earn their own livelihood.” To enable the Collector to commence relief operations at once, the Commissioner placed at his disposal Rs. 500, from the small balance of the Cyclone Relief Fund, which had been made over to him for disposal at his discretion, when the Cyclone Relief Committee was dissolved.

15. These measures were approved by the Government, who subsequently replaced the Rs. 20,000 which had been borrowed from the Local Fund by a special grant to that extent.

16. In the course of May, meetings were held and subscriptions raised in Kishnagur, and at the head quarters of the Banaghat and Bongong sub-divisions. At the head quarters of the Chooadangah sub-division a meeting was held, but the general opinion was that no subscriptions were necessary; nevertheless, the southern part of that sub-division was among the tracts in which the greatest distress prevailed, and in June subscriptions were raised at the head quarters of the sub-division. Relieving depôts were opened at several places in Kishnagur where uncooked rice was gratuitously distributed; small sums were sent out to the sub-divisions to meet cases of immediate want; and the Relief Committee (having reason to believe that the stocks held by the grain-dealers, who generally supplied the ryots, were running out, and were not being replenished,) determined to import rice from Kooshtea and Calcutta for local sale, it being considered that this course would be more beneficial than to send out money, which would only have the effect of raising the selling price of grain in the different localities.

17. In reporting to the Board, the Commissioner remarked that the price of coarse rice had nowhere been quoted higher than 10 seers for the rupee in the district; he had, therefore, requested the Relief Committee to ascertain from the most reliable sources whether stocks were really running out and were not being replenished by imports. “If that point be established,” he wrote, “the fact with which the Relief Committee have to deal is, that although rice is procurable in plenty in the east of the next district, Jessore, and in Calcutta, yet private enterprise is not importing it into Nuddea, and is not making it available to the people fast enough to prevent their starvation; and in their deliberation as to what is to be done, this ascertained fact must take the place of any surmises, however reasonable, and however well supported by experience, as to what private enterprise and the ordinary action of merchants may be expected to effect under similar circumstances.

“As to the danger of private imports being checked, if the Relief Committee bring rice into the district, and thus force down the selling price, it will not be the object of the Committee to let their rice compete with that imported by private enterprise; their endeavour will be to supply it to those localities which (as an ascertained fact) the private enterprise does not attempt to supply. Again, the

Relief Committee.

Meetings held and subscriptions raised in May.

Commissioner’s remarks.

Magistrate recommends works.

Measures adopted.

Rs. 20,000 assigned for relief works.

"first general and natural relief for which we may reasonably look is not in the shape of increased imports, but of a crop produced in the district itself.

"I think the Committee have done wisely in resolving to import rice."

Rs. 15,000 allotted for gratuitous relief in June.

18. Before the end of May works had been started at different parts in most of the sub-divisions; Rs. 5,000 were also allotted from the balance of the North-West Provinces Relief Fund, as soon as it was placed at the disposal of Government, and were sent to the Relief Committee in June, when the fund raised by local subscriptions was exhausted; a further grant of Rs. 10,000 was subsequently allotted before the end of June.

Operations in June.

19. During that month relief centres were opened, and the Magistrate's works pushed on in all directions throughout the distressed part of the district. Much employment was also afforded for labor on the railway feeders.

Abstract of operations to the end of June.

20. The distress was most severe in the central part of the district. In the sub-divisions of Bongong to the south-east and Kooshtea to the north-east, the Committee considered it unnecessary to do anything more than was being done at the head quarters of the sub-divisions. Over the rest of the district nineteen centres of relief had been opened before the 30th June, and the number was increasing rapidly. Up to the end of June the Committee had received Rs. 8,522 in subscriptions, and Rs. 5,500 in grants, making a total of Rs. 14,022; of this Rs. 5,712 had been distributed to the different centres at which cash and grain representing Rs. 2,275 remained unexpended; about Rs. 8,000 remained in the hands of the Central Committee.

20. The average daily number of persons who received gratuitous relief in the last week of June was 2,569, besides a large number (which averaged 1,653 daily in the middle of June) who received one pice each from Mr. J. Hills, of Nischindpore, from funds provided by the Committee.

Number employed on the relief works.

21. The average daily number of laborers on relief works in four out of the five sub-divisions in which they were going on during the same week was 3,500, and including the Ranaghat sub-division, from which no return had been received, it may be estimated at 4,000, showing a rapid gradual increase.

Number employed on works under the Executive Engineer.

From a return furnished by the Executive Engineer of the Nuddea local road division for the first week of July, it appears that the daily average of 1,360 men were employed on the feeder roads and works of the Public Works Department at this time in and close to the Nuddea district.

Committee's estimate of requirements.

22. The Committee now endeavoured to make an estimate of their requirements founded on those of the different Sub-divisional and Local Committees; but these were so widely inconsistent with one another that this basis had to be abandoned, and the District Committee founded their estimate on the actual results of the last week of June with calculations of probable increase of applicants.

23. The estimate of future requirements from the 1st of July amounted to Rs. 36,660 for gratuitous relief and for payment of such manual light labor as the Committee could insist upon from the feeble-bodied. To meet this the Committee and Sub-committees held an unexpended balance of about Rs. 10,000.

Early in July the Board, acting under the special orders of Government, assigned a further grant of Rs. 10,000 to the district, of which Rs. 5,000 were made over to Mr. J. Hills, of Nischindpore, for the purpose mentioned below.

24. The Committee at this time prescribed a uniform standard of gratuitous relief to be adopted throughout the district, viz., $\frac{1}{8}$ seer of rice and one pice to each pauper. Uniform standard of relief.

25. Mr. James Hills, an Indigo Planter of Nischindpore, in the southern part of the Chooadangah sub-division, had brought to the notice of the Collector the severity of the distress in his neighbourhood, and had especially pressed the case of the ryots or cultivating class. He urged that they were obliged to devote their whole time to rice cultivation, and could not therefore earn any money by daily labor without sacrificing their prospects of a crop. Mr. Hills had been doing all in his power to assist them, but the calls for relief were increasing so fast that his means were inadequate to meet them. He now suggested that advances should be made to the ryots by Government through the zemindars, who should stand security for repayment of the amount advanced, which, if they were Indigo Planters, they could recover by deducting the amount due in settling their indigo accounts. The District Committee were of opinion that this course might eventually prove objectionable, as tending to give the Government an interest in indigo cultivation and probably in rent suits between landlords and tenants. Rs. 5,000 advanced to Mr. Hills for the relief of his ryots.

The Commissioner concurred with the Committee that the proposed course would be open to objections; but under the special orders of Government, communicated through the Board, Rs. 5,000 were made over to Mr. Hills for employment as advances to the ryots of his concern in the manner suggested by him, Mr. Hills undertaking to repay the amount a few months later. Besides this the Committee were instructed to supply Mr. Hills with the means of feeding the absolutely destitute population of his neighbourhood.

26. In the course of June the Committee also submitted an application that Rs. 1,00,000 might be placed at their disposal for the purpose of importing rice, storing it in golahs, and selling it to mahajuns and other substantial persons on credit, who would disseminate it by retail through the district; the stocks so supplied being paid for by the mahajuns after November. The Commissioner supported this application on the ground that it had been ascertained that stocks were nearly exhausted, and that private enterprise was doing nothing in the way of importation. He, however, suggested that a proviso be added, that every shop-keeper so deriving his supply from the Committee should be bound to sell at a certain price to be fixed by the Committee to all comers who offered cash, thus placing him in the position of an agent of the Committee receiving commission on all rice sold. With those to whom he chose to sell on credit the shop-keeper was to be allowed to make his own terms. This measure did not, however, meet with the approval of the Board or of Government, and the agency of the regular shop-keepers was never made use of in this district for distributing rice. We observe, however, that in the districts of Orissa such agency was employed. Proposal to import rice to be sold by merchants.

27. Early in July the rivers began to rise with unprecedented rapidity, and the inundations did much injury to the early crop, Inundations.

in the western part of the district, along the banks of the Bhagiruttee. Before the extent of the damage done was ascertained, the floods had caused a panic in certain parts of the district, and the prices rose to 6½ seers for a rupee. The Collector wrote referring to Kishnagur—"Numerous grain boats are passing down the river, but only a few stop here, and the occupants being unable to come to terms with the four dealers who have combined to keep up prices, while no one else will purchase wholesale, the boats have, in almost every instance, passed on. The first result, therefore, of the opening of the rivers, combined perhaps with apprehensions as to the effect of the inundation on the crops, has been a decided rise in prices in some places.

"It is unfortunate that the principles of political economy do not work a little more freely and quickly in this country. If, for instance, seeing the great difference in price between grain in the boats passing by and in the bazar in Kishnagur, a co-operative society were formed among the Natives of the town not to deal in grain, but to supply themselves with it for the next two months, it would soon have an effect on the market here. Before the commencement of the rains there was a difference of eight annas a maund in the price of the same kind and quality of rice in Kishnagur, and at a place 10 miles off with a good road for carts connecting the two places.

"So apprehensive were the four dealers of Kishnagur of the possible effects of the Committee obtaining 800 maunds of rice that they offered Baboo Judoonath Roy a profit of two clear annas a maund for the whole quantity with a view to keep up high prices."

28. In this report the Collector took a view of the future which the Commissioner considered to be too gloomy. The Commissioner wrote—"A town must surely be either very badly off for money, or not very badly off for food, if the inhabitants allow boats-full of rice, which the owners are willing to sell, to pass by unbought, simply because four mahajuns have combined to keep up prices. Certainly, Kishnagur is not so poor as to be unable to buy up a few cargoes of rice for immediate consumption."

The Board and the Government were also of opinion that the prices ruling in the district did not bear out the Collector's fears for the future.

29. Deputy Collector Baboo Srees Chunder Bidyarnath was deputed by the Collector to ascertain the extent of the damage done by the flood of the Bhagiruttee. He reported that about 18,000 acres of rice and 7,000 beegahs of indigo had been submerged, and were almost wholly destroyed. The state of the people in the inundated tract was deplorable; they had no food but leaves and roots of wild plants.

30. In some few cases death had occurred from sheer starvation; 15,000 persons were roughly estimated to be suffering from want of provisions in this tract of country. Nevertheless, when the Deputy Collector went out, rice was selling at 8 seers for the rupee, and small supplies were coming in from Cutwa across the river in the Burdwan district. Something was being done by village relief committees and private individuals to relieve the sufferings of the people; and on receipt of the Deputy Collector's report five new relief centres were opened in the inundated country,

Inundated tract on the left bank of the Bhagiruttee.

and the Deputy Collector's suggestion to provide employment on the Kishnagur and Moorsshedabad road was adopted by the Collector and Commissioner.

31. This is an imperial line of road running through the Nuddea district from Kishnagur north-west to the field of Plassey, a distance of about 30 miles. It had been much neglected and was in a very bad state. Running directly through the length of the flooded tract, it was exactly suited to afford employment to the distressed villagers. The Government, in the Department of Public Works, caused the Executive Engineer to take in hand the repair of the earth-work along its whole length. Rs. 22,900 were assigned for this purpose, of which, the Collector informs us that about Rs. 16,000 were expended up to the end of November, employment having been given to an aggregate of 94,406 laborers; which, spread over three months, gives a daily average of about 1,000.

Works on Kishnagur and Moorsshedabad road.

32. During July the relief works under the Magistrate had been actively carried on in all directions; a sum of Rs. 30,000 having been granted for this purpose by the Government, in addition to the first grant of Rs. 20,000.

Relief works under the Magistrate.

The average daily number employed on these works in the last week of July was 2,128.

The return of the Executive Engineer, Nuddea local road division, shows a daily average of 1,489 men employed on the feeders and other ordinary public works under his charge at this time in and near the Nuddea district. The works on the Kishnagur and Plassey road had not then been begun.

Employment on feeders and ordinary public works.

33. The daily number of paupers receiving gratuitous relief at the end of July was 12,059, excluding the Meherpore sub-division, from which no return had been received; or say 12,500 for the whole district. Of these 2,271 were relieved at the different depôts in Kishnagur town, of whom 96 were employed in spinning jute, weaving, making clothes, &c., and 860 in light earth-work.

Number of paupers receiving gratuitous relief.

At the Murragatcha centre also and perhaps at one or two others light employment was given by the Committees.

34. During July the Commissioner, under instructions from the Government, inspected the relief operations at Kishnagur and other places in the district. He found that the quantity of rice which was being brought from Kooshtea for consumption was increasing weekly. He reported in the highest terms of the manner in which the operations at Kishnagur were managed. The real condition of applicants for relief was carefully ascertained by the Sub-Committees, among whom the town was divided for this purpose, and when the Sub-Committee pronounced a pauper to be deserving of the Committee's relief, it was decided whether he or she should receive absolutely gratuitous relief, or should be required to do light labor. The recipients of gratuitous relief were told off to the depôt nearest to their homes; but those who were required to do some labor were dealt with only at the house of Baboo Judoonath Roy. This gentleman is a relative of the Maharajah, and undertook the direct management of the relief operations in Kishnagur. The good judgment with which he arranged every thing, and the manner in which he and his family and dependents gave up their own time, and the privacy of their residences to these operations, is worthy of the highest praise.

Commissioner's visit of inspection.

Arrangements at Kishnagur.

Baboo Judoonath Roy.

35. In Baboo Judoonath's court-yard the distribution of uncooked rice to the helpless began daily at 9; the out-laborers presented themselves at 12; and the in-door workers (the women to whom yarn was supplied, which they spun in their own houses) came at 3. The daily number who were relieved at the Baboo's house was 1,242.

At the other four depôts in the town the relief was similarly given under the superintendence of volunteers.

Six families of weavers, consisting of 31 members, were being supplied with work, and supported at a daily cost to the Committee of 8 to 12 annas. A few respectable purdanasheen women were also supplied with yarn, which they were allowed to spin at home, and for which work, out of consideration for their position, they were paid without appearing in person at the relief house. The test of admission to relief was judiciously strict.

The great majority of recipients of charity here, as in the centres in the interior of the district, consisted of women.

36. The Commissioner next visited Chooadanga, where prices had been very high, and the grain dealers were still struggling to keep them up; but the rivers being open the bazar was already easier. Thirteen hundred persons were receiving relief daily, under the superintendence of the Assistant Magistrate, with the help of the officers of his Court, and his private servants; but the centre having been recently opened no checks had been imposed, and no system of selection was adopted. Proper arrangements were made for the future. The establishment of a pauper hospital was ordered.

37. The Commissioner next proceeded to Nischindpore, where he found that Mr. Hills was distributing relief at the rate of one pice a day to all applicants, who numbered 4,800, about a mile off, at the Kapasdangah mission premises. The Reverend Mr. Schurr was similarly distributing one pice to each person, his fund being made up of subscriptions raised by the mission supplemented by the Relief Committee.

38. It was evident that a large number of the recipients of these charities were persons who had no claim to gratuitous relief. The laboring women who were working on Mr. Hills' estate used to run away from their work and present themselves at Kapasdangah, where they received the pice. Generally speaking, all who presented themselves received a pice at Kapasdangah and at Nischindpore; Mr. Hills' argument being that the mere fact of a person coming for a pice was sufficient proof that he was suffering distress and required relief. The Commissioner wrote—

"It seemed to me, however, that under this system of promiscuous distribution, the increase of applicants would be unlimited, and that out of the sum distributed daily, the greater portion went to those who could obtain the means of support (though scanty) elsewhere, while the allowance to those who were absolutely destitute was altogether insufficient to keep them alive. I therefore determined to change the arrangements."

39. The neighbouring landholders were addressed, and requested to furnish with tickets such of their tenants as were in such a position as to be deserving of relief; and they were

requested to send in lists of those to whom they might give tickets. Light labor was introduced, and those who were capable of it were required to work. The allowance for each helpless pauper was raised from one pice to four chittacks of rice and one pice; that to the light laborers to six chittacks and one pice. The experience which he has gained during our enquiry has satisfied him that the smaller allowance at any rate was too low, although probably (owing to the district not being exhausted) the paupers were readily able to supplement the allowance from private charity. A Deputy Collector was left to carry out the arrangements which had been set on foot; and when that was done, the operations were again made over to Mr. Hills and his establishment.

40. In reporting to the Board the Commissioner wrote that it was clear that there had been great want of rice in the parts which he had visited. At Chooadanga even the constables had been obliged to live for some days on gram, and they were the last persons who were likely to go without rice when it was procurable. The want of rice within a few miles of a railway station and even at the railway station itself (Chooadanga), while quantities of the grain were coming daily to the railway terminus at Kooshtea, and even passing down the line, is an extraordinary instance of the exceptional and tardy working of the accepted rules which regulate supply and demand. The Commissioner wrote—"From enquiries which I made on the railway, it is evident that rice is coming down from Kooshtea in quantities to the different stations and passing into the villages. But it is clear that, under existing circumstances, the retail dealers of each village are able to keep up the price at any figure which they may arbitrarily fix. The distance of the village bazars from one another, and the unwillingness of those who are not dealers by profession to import rice from elsewhere, check the action of free competition which should make the wholesale price the datum, with reference to which the retail price is fixed; at Nischindpore bazar rice imported from Kooshtea by rail to Raneegunge station, and then carried over six or eight miles of country past Lokenathpore, was selling at Rs. 4-8 a maund; at Lokenathpore, which is only two miles from the station, the same rice, imported at the same time from the same place, was selling at Rs. 5."

Irregularity in the supply and in the prices of rice.

41. In a report lately published the Collector gives another striking instance of the irregularity in the price of rice—

"For some time there was a difference of 10 annas a maund in the price of rice not only of the same quality generally, but exactly the same, bearing the same name at Kishnagur, and at a place ten miles off with good means of communication; at the outside the cost of transport from one place to another would have been 2 annas a maund, leaving a handsome margin for profit until prices became more equal; but though the difference was well known and a subject of loud complaint in the dearer place, no one thought of undertaking even a trifling speculation. It was not the custom."

42. Early in August another grant of Rs. 5,000 was made to the Relief Committee, and soon after another allotment of Rs. 4,000.

Grant of Rs. 5,000

43. During August the early crop of rice, which is a very extensive crop in the Nuddea district, came gradually into the

Early crop of rice comes into the market.

Relief measures gradually discontinued.

market; the out-turn was unusually good. Prices fell rapidly, and a few centres in the interior were closed as no longer required. In the beginning of September the Collector and Committee took measures towards contracting the relief operations gradually; all were sent to the Magistrate's relief works who were capable of labor; for the rest the daily relief was gradually reduced so as to offer no inducement to those who could support themselves elsewhere, or who could subsist on private charity, which was beginning to revive with the fall of prices. The number of applicants for relief at the centres rapidly fell off, and in October three or four centres only remained open with small attendance in the part of the district which had suffered most.

Amount expended on gratuitous relief.

44. The total amount allotted to the Nuddea Relief Committee by the Board of Revenue was Rs. 24,000; Rs. 500 were assigned by the Commissioner from the balance of the Cyclone Relief Fund, and Rs. 10,988 were raised by subscription, making a total of Rs. 35,488.

Abstract of relief operations.

45. Throughout the district twenty-four principal centres of relief were in operation; besides these there were about sixteen minor centres, places at which gentlemen aided the Committee by distributing relief at their residences, when these happened not to be near any principal centre. The Reverend F. Schurr distributed relief on a considerable scale at Kapasdangah, chiefly, as has been said, through subscriptions raised by the mission.

46. The aggregate of the daily numbers who received gratuitous relief throughout the operations is stated by Lord Ulick Browne at 6,01,123. The average number employed daily different periods is as follows:—

Last week of	Numbers.
May	550
June	4,415
July	12,059
August	5,163
September	460

47. The aggregate of the daily numbers of those who were employed on the relief works was 3,37,059; but this includes all employed up to February 1867, when operations were still going on to finish up some works of great public benefit. From the 10th of October the works were suspended by the Magistrate and Collector, as he felt sure that the customary private charity of the Natives would do all that was required as long as the doorga poojah festival lasted; but it was found necessary to resume them on the 5th of November, as the reaping of the cold weather crop did not afford as much more employment as was expected. The expenditure on these works up to the break was about Rs. 33,000 and about Rs. 15,000 afterwards. Of these works Lord Ulick Browne has reported—"The relief works consisted of repairs and construction of roads, tanks, and bunds. The first object was to provide employment for those in distress without requiring them to go to any great distance from their houses, and that being carefully borne in mind, the next object was to get as good a return for the expenditure as possible. It so happened that there was a good field for improvement at each of the principal centres of distress, so that no money was expended in one place which I should have preferred to spend at another, no wholesale contractors were employed; the work people were paid direct, generally by a daily wages, which varied

"according to sex and age from 3 to 10 pice, but sometimes by task-work. Payment in food was attempted once or twice, but it was found that the charitable relief gave quite enough to do in that respect, and money payments prevailed everywhere." He estimates the return of work at one-half of the quantity which would have been obtained had none but able-bodied laborers been employed.

48. On the special work on the Kishnagur and Plassey road the aggregate of the daily number employed amounted to 94,406. Besides these the ordinary public works gave much employment; it has already been stated that the daily average number of persons employed on them was 1,360 at the beginning, and 1,489 at the end of July.

At the close of August the number was about the same, and at the end of September it had risen to 1,602.

As has been already stated in our General Report, we have every reason to believe that no mortality beyond that inevitable to times of scarcity occurred in this district. The relief was timely and sufficient.

The co-operation and assistance which the Magistrate and Collector received from the European and Native gentlemen in every part of the district, were remarkable and honorable to the district. The interest taken in the operations was universal; some superintended relief works; others gratuitous distributions. The names of the gentlemen who chiefly assisted have been laid before the Government by the Collector; among them Baboo Jodoonath Roy, of Kishnagur, whom we have already mentioned with all praise, and Baboo Bhuputty Chatterjee, of Murragatcha, are prominently noticed.

Co-operation of residents of the district.

The duties of Secretary to the Relief Committee, which entailed much labor in the direct supervision of the details of operations in so many quarters, were ably performed by Mr. Graham, the Joint Magistrate, in addition to his ordinary duties.

24-PERGUNNAHS.

24-Pergunnahs.

1. The 24-Pergunnahs district lies on the left bank of the Hooghly and surrounds Calcutta. Its civil station is Alipore, a suburb of Calcutta. The district stretches from the southern boundary of Nuddea southwards to the Bay of Bengal, and includes a large tract of Sunderbun forest. It is, of course, in the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of the Presidency division, and like Nuddea is parcelled out into numerous sub-divisions, at each of which a magisterial officer resides.

Effects of the cyclone.

2. In October 1864, the district suffered severely from a cyclone; Saugor Island and the southern part of the Diamond Harbour sub-division having been submerged and devastated by the storm-wave. The crops were injured, houses and stock of grain swept away, and cattle drowned; there was great loss of life. Relief in the shape of food and money was then sent down from Calcutta to keep the remnant of the inhabitants alive until they could re-establish themselves.

First enquiries.

3. In October 1865 the Secretary to the Board of Revenue had asked the Commissioner for a report on the prospects of the crop in this district in common with the rest of his division. About the same time the Government called on the Commissioner direct for a similar report with reference to an article in a very popular paper as to the failure of the crop to the south of Calcutta.

District Superintendent's report on distress.

4. On the 31st of October, Mr. Stack, the District Superintendent of Police, spontaneously brought to the notice of the Magistrate and Collector that he had "heard general complaints, observed very palpable signs of great distress amongst the people, in consequence of the failure of the rice crop owing to want of rain."

The north-east of the district was in the worst plight, and places were named in which the rice crop had entirely failed. Rice was reported to be selling at double the price which prevailed at the same time in the preceding year all over the district, and the price was rising rapidly. Thefts were increasing in the north-east, in many of which food only was taken. It was estimated that even if rain were to fall, the out-turn of the crop would not be above half that of an ordinary year; if no rain should fall, the out-turn would not be above one-eighth.

The District Superintendent wrote—"As all accounts agree that this failure of the rice crop is very general throughout Bengal, it is impossible to disguise the fact that the distress which now prevails is only the commencement of what promises to be a famine."

Result of enquiries.

5. The result of the enquiries which the Magistrate and Collector made throughout his district was that a failure of half the crop was expected; that in some places the people were selling their ornaments and brass vessels. With regard to one sub-division, it was anticipated that "while actual distress will not be general, individual cases of extreme distress will be numerous," and as to another that "distress will be generally felt, but not acute distress except in individual cases."

6. As a measure of relief, the Magistrate suggested that in villages in which the chowkedaree tax for the maintenance of the village watch and conservancy had been introduced, the lower assessments should be reduced or remitted.

The Officiating Commissioner, Mr. R. N. Shore, sanctioned the proposed reduction, and on the 28th of November reported to Government, giving his opinion that, "though there will be a good deal of general distress, particularly among the poorer class, there will be no actual famine." In this, as in other districts, the reaping of the crop in November and December naturally gave temporary relief to the distress.

7. On the 10th of February, the Commissioner, Mr. Dampier, who had resumed charge of the division, called on the Collector to report whether he could recommend that any special works be undertaken in the wards or other estates, which were directly under his management, for the purpose of giving employment to labor. The Collector did not recommend the commencement of any work beyond those which were already in hand.

Special works in estates under direct management of Collector suggested.

8. On receipt of the report from the Collector of Nuddea of the distress prevailing in his district at the end of April, the Commissioner called demi-officially on the Magistrate and Collector of the 24-Pergunnahs to make enquiry and report on the state of that district.

Enquiries in May.

The report, embodying the information supplied by the sub-divisional officers and other gentlemen who were acquainted with the interior of the district, was submitted on the 22nd May.

On the whole, the Collector was of opinion that "there was an necessity for immediate relief in the district; but the rising prices and the uneasy feeling in the district give cause for anxiety."

Immediate measures not considered necessary, but vigilance enjoined.

9. The Commissioner came to the same conclusion, as stocks were not exhausted, and as there was no want of employment for those who sought it; but he wrote—"We have still, however, some trying months to go through. I request that you will keep yourself well informed of the state of affairs, and that you will let me have a report on the subject every fortnight." He authorized the Collector to begin works at once on certain roads in the southern part of the district if any want of employment should arise, and pointed out that he held above Rs. 2,000 of the balance of the old Cyclone Relief Fund, which would be available if required. The Government approved of these instructions.

10. From the Diamond Harbour sub-division, the report of the 22nd of May had been—"The distress is comparatively small and confined to few, chiefly to the class of agricultural day-laborers. The crop generally has been a half crop, domestic stores of grain are not exhausted, and the late rains have sent the cultivators to the fields and provided sufficient demand for labor;" but in the middle of June, the District Superintendent of Police (Captain Parsons), who had just come in from the south of the Diamond Harbour sub-division, reported that great distress prevailed along the river to the south of Diamond Harbour. There had been an increase of crime in the south of the district, to check which an Assistant Superintendent of Police, with a small extra force, was stationed at Joynuggur. The different police stations had already been reinforced.

District Superintendent reports distress and crime in south.

11. On hearing of the distress, the Collector at once deputed Mr. Deputy Magistrate and Collector Black to assist Mr. Sevestre, the Deputy Magistrate in charge of the Diamond Harbour sub-division; and called upon Mr. Sevestre to report particulars after making full local enquiry. Rs. 300 were placed at his disposal for the relief of any cases of distress which might appear to require it during the progress of enquiry.

The Magistrate authorized the immediate commencement of works and of relief if found necessary.

12. The local enquiry was entrusted to Mr. Black, who, on the 1st of July, reported great distress; many were living on leaves and roots of the plaintain tree; grain which had been reserved for sowing was being consumed.

Mr. Black wrote—"The distress is general all over the sub-district, but more especially about three miles along the river bank, extending from Rangafulla to Harall, and also to the southward on the borders of the Sunderbuns, judging from what I have myself witnessed from Rangafulla to Banstolla Khal."

Mr. Black recommended the continuance of relief in cash payments (such as he was making), until depôts of rice could be established at four places, which he named, and the sale of rice at a moderate price. On re-consideration, he recommended gratuitous distribution and not sales.

A further sum of money was at once sent out to Mr. Black, to be distributed by him in relief until other arrangements could be completed.

13. The second general report on the state of the whole district was submitted by the Collector and Magistrate to the Commissioner on the 18th of July.

In Busseerhaut sub-division, to the east, the information received from the zemindars "was not cheering;" they reported very little rice in the hands of the mahajuns.

Into Barripore, to the south, a large influx of starving Ooryahs had taken place, which had aggravated the distress; "and many families were reduced to one meal in the 24 hours." Many of the Ooryahs had been provided with employment through the instrumentality of the Reverend C. E. Driberg. This gentleman, from his own observation, reported that the promise of the crop then on the ground was excellent.

In the northern part of Satkheera, the most eastern sub-division, matters had suddenly become worse.

On the 16th of May the Deputy Magistrate had reported that unhusked rice was selling at 25 seers for the rupee in the northern, and 35 seers in the southern, part of the sub-division (equivalent to 12½ and 17½ seers of husked rice), and he had added—"In this part of the year, the demand for labor is great amongst the cultivators, and relief measures in any shape do not seem to me at present called for." This opinion was supported by the prices quoted. Till the middle of June, rice was selling at 11½ seers. It then suddenly rose to 8 seers.

When the Collector wrote on the 18th of July, people had begun to emigrate to the Sunderbun grants; and on the 12th the Deputy Magistrate wrote that he had heard from a respectable source that a few deaths had occurred from starvation, and that

State of things in the district in July.

Busseerhaut.

Barripore.

Satkheera.

In May.

In July.

numbers of famishing persons visited the Kalarooa Police station seeking relief. The prospect of the standing crop was excellent; but there was no hope of raising subscriptions from the zemindars to give relief till it should be reaped.

The severe distress appeared to be very local, being confined to Kalarooa, the northern Police station of the sub-division.

14. As regards the Diamond Harbour sub-division, reference was made to Mr. Black's reports, which have already been mentioned; but as the pressure of the distress was first felt in the extreme north and in the extreme south of the populous part of the district (the intermediate tract suffering less severely), and as the character of the distress and of the measures of relief taken in the north was distinct from the features presented in the south, of which the sufferings were enhanced by the fact that it produces no early crop, it will be convenient to follow the history of the north to the end before taking up that of the south.

15. On the report from the Satkheera sub-division being laid before the Commissioner, he directed Rs. 300, from the balance of the Cyclone Relief Fund, to be sent out at once to the officer in charge of the sub-division, who was ordered to take up his position at Kalarooa, to enquire into the extent of the distress and to administer relief where necessary. The Commissioner transferred a second Deputy Magistrate to the sub-division to take charge of the current duties at the head quarters.

Measures adopted in Satkheera sub-division.

The system of relief adopted by the Deputy Magistrate at Kalarooa was, that inspectors of Police, overseers and others visited the villages in the interior, and enquired into the condition of the inhabitants, furnishing those who required relief with tickets, on presentation of which at the depôt in Kalarooa, six chittacks of rice and one pice were supplied daily to each applicant. The head master of the vernacular school superintended the distribution.

System of relief at Kalarooa.

The rice was bought by the Deputy Magistrate unhusked, and the husking of it supplied employment.

Up to the 2nd of August, a total of 4,107 persons had been relieved, giving an average of about 243 daily; a second instalment of Rs. 400 was sent out to the Deputy Magistrate.

The operations continued throughout August, at the end of which 233 were being relieved daily; but by this time, the price of rice had fallen to Rs. 4 a maund, and the Deputy Magistrate discontinued relief operations, except in individual and exceptional cases, as being no longer required.

Operations at Kalarooa closed.

16. On the 16th of August, the Commissioner reported that application had been made to him for assistance by Baboo Saroda Prosonno Mookerjee, the zemindar of Goberdangah, in the northern part of the Baraset sub-division, which lies to the west of Satkheera. This gentleman had been liberally carrying on relief operations on a large scale. Further to the west, and still in a line with Kalarooa and Goberdangah, a committee of Native gentlemen at Jagoolce, in the southern part of the Nuddea district, had been giving organized relief to numbers. No application for assistance had been received from them; but these movements at different points on the northern boundary of the 24-Pergunnahs district appeared to indicate the existence of distress along that line of country. The Commissioner, therefore, sent out Deputy Collector

Distress along the northern boundary of the district.

Deputy Collector sent out to enquire.

Baboo Shivapershad Sandyal to make enquiries, with a sum of money in his hand to meet immediate requirements.

Jagoolee.

17. The Deputy Collector found that the respectable residents of Jagoolee had been relieving above 1,100 persons daily for a month from the subscriptions which they had raised, but that the fall in the price of rice had now enabled them to discontinue their operations.

Goberdangah.

18. Further east Baboo Saroda Prosonno Mookerjee was still giving relief at Goberdangah, to which the poor from the neighbourhood were attracted. The Deputy Collector expended a small sum of money himself, and made over another sum to Baboo Saroda Prosonno, who, however, returned most of it to the Collector early in September, with an intimation that as the early crop had come into the market, and the price of rice had fallen to Rs. 3 a maund, no further relief was required in his neighbourhood.

Distressed tract in Diamond Harbour and Barripore sub-divisions.

19. We now resume the history of what is commonly spoken of as the southern portion of the district, more properly the tract lying north of the Sunderbun line in the two western sub-divisions, Diamond Harbour and Barripore.

Measures taken.

20. On receipt of the Magistrate and Collector's report of the middle of July, the Commissioner placed what remained of the Cyclone Relief Fund, Rs. 1,400, at his disposal, with directions to establish three or more convenient centres of relief in the Diamond Harbour sub-division within a few miles of the bank of the river, Culpee being one of the places selected. The Commissioner also directed that relief should be given on the standard of eight chittacks of rice and one pice to each adult daily, and called on the Collector to make an appeal to the landholders of the Diamond Harbour sub-division for subscriptions, with which to carry on these operations.

Before the end of July the whole sum placed at the disposal of the Collector had been sent out to different officers and non-official gentlemen, principally for distribution in the south of the district.

Prospect of damaged crop by want of rain.

21. By this time want of rain in the Diamond Harbour sub-division had made the ryots despair of the crops which had so lately been exceptionally promising. The possessors of grain were withholding it from the market, and the ryots were coming into the Deputy Magistrate for relief.

Water admitted.

22. Wherever an immediate supply of water could be given, the crop might be saved. The Commissioner, therefore, proposed to the Board that the Executive Engineer be sent down with full discretionary powers to cut the Government embankments, and to let the river water (which at that time of the year was fresh) into as many channels as he thought would do good to the crops. There was no time to make the usual terms with ryots and zemindars as to their paying the expense of re-filling the gaps in the embankments before the salt water should come up, so the cuts were made in numerous places on mere informal promises from the ryots to assist in the repairs with their labor. The water was then distributed over the country through the channels, and the measure was attended with the best effect. The necessity of it suggested the expediency of undertaking an organized and permanent system of irrigation in this part of the district with regular sluices and connected channels. The

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Collector and Executive Engineer were directed to take the scheme into consideration without delay, and the project is still under consideration.

23. At a meeting held at Alipore on the 26th July, a mixed Committee of official and non-official gentlemen was appointed, who at once raised subscriptions, and applied to the Board for Rs. 10,000. They resolved to adopt a system of out-door relief similar to that with which the Pooree Committee commenced their operations. The relieving officer was to ascertain the requirements of different families, and then to give tickets entitling the holders to receive a sum of money calculated to support them for a month. The adoption of this system was recommended to Mr. Black for the Diamond Harbour sub-division.

Meeting held at Alipore and subscriptions raised in July.

24. The distress had extended eastwards into the south of the Barripore sub-division, and the Collector sent down Rs. 200 to Baboo Jugdishnath Roy, the Assistant Superintendent of Police, who had been temporarily located at Mozilpore in consequence of the increase of violent crime in that neighbourhood. In sending the money, the Collector urged the Assistant Superintendent to collect subscriptions if he could.

Barripore sub-division.

On this the Assistant Superintendent called a meeting. The Native gentlemen of Mozilpore took up the matter with a praiseworthy interest. They subscribed and formed themselves into a committee, for the relief of the country round them. They determined on opening centres at Mozilpore and three other places; the out centres to be managed by sub-committees working under them. The system of relief was to be a distribution of eight chittacks of cooked food and one pice.

Committee organized at Mozilpore.

25. The Board, on hearing of the increase of distress in the 24-Pergunnahs, assigned Rs. 2,500 to that district.

First grant of money.

26. The distressed tract was now divided into three portions, —the eastern being under the Mozilpore Committee, the north-western (round Diamond Harbour) under Mr. Sevestre, the Deputy Magistrate and Collector in charge of the sub-division, and the south-western under Deputy Collector Sreesh Chunder Bidyarutna, whom the Commissioner transferred to the district for the special purpose.

Arrangements for distribution of relief.

In accordance with the instructions which the Board had given for Nuddea, the uniform standard of relief was to be six chittacks of rice and one pice to each adult daily.

27. On the 13th of August, the Collector reported that the extreme distress was in a tract extending about twelve miles northwards from the Sunderbuns boundary, and four miles inland from the river. Outside this tract, there was no actual want, but the people were taking advantage of the distress to commit wholesale plunder. The local stocks in this tract were exhausted.

State of affairs in August.

The Collector pointed out that rice was urgently required in the tract above described, and recommended that some should be imported from Kooshtea to Calcutta and sent down by steamer to Culpee.

Importation of rice recommended.

28. At this time the Mozilpore Committee reported that they had provided a house for the shelter of the homeless and sick; a Native doctor, with an allowance for medicine, was also appointed, as many Ooryahs came in sick and were dying without

treatment. The Committee were attempting to act on the system of giving tickets after due enquiry; but so many starving people thronged the gates of the relief house without tickets, that it was impossible to refuse them immediate food.

The Committee asked for more money. A suggestion was made that some of the members (being holders of land in the neighbourhood) should give lands rent-free for a certain number of years, on which the Committee should erect huts and establish the starving immigrant Ooryahs.

Alipore Committee recommended importation.

29. The Alipore Relief Committee strongly supported the proposal of the Collector as to the expediency of importing rice into south of the district, and they applied for a further grant. They also resolved to provide shelter, where necessary, for the paupers, and Baboo Joykissen Mookerjee liberally offered to give 100 blankets for their use.

30. In reporting to the Board, the Commissioner approved of the scheme of importing rice; but suggested that the import arrangements should be left to the Committee, as their headquarters were close to Calcutta. He asked for a further grant of Rs. 5,000.

Importation approved of.

The Board approved of the proposal to import the rice, and gave the Rs. 5,000 applied for.

Outbreak of crime.

31. At this time (the middle of August), a sudden outbreak of plunder and violent crime took place in and about the distressed tract in the south of the district.

Mr. Sevestre, the Deputy Magistrate in charge of Diamond Harbour sub-division, had, by his mode of dealing with one of the earliest cases (if not by some incautious remarks which he had let fall) shown that he did not, under the circumstances, consider the offence as one of gravity. The rumour spread like wild-fire that the authorities looked upon grain-robbery as a venial offence or no offence at all in the existing distress, and above 20 cases of such plunder were reported from the jurisdiction of two Police stations within 19 days. The bad characters had taken advantage of the movement, and had extorted money as black-mail for immunity from plunder.

Magistrate visits Diamond Harbour.

32. The Commissioner reported the circumstances to Government, and directed the Magistrate and Collector to proceed in person to the south of the district to check this state of lawlessness, and also to set in order the relief arrangements which appeared not to be progressing vigorously and satisfactorily in the tract which was placed immediately under Mr. Sevestre.

And restores order.

33. The Magistrate, Mr. Bainbridge, found 31 cases pending for trial, many of which he disposed himself on the spot; and the crime ceased as suddenly as it had burst forth. The policy of pardoning offenders who were convicted of having committed such crimes during the famine, the pardon being given after the cessation of the exceptional state of things which led to the crimes, is unquestionable; but the occurrences in the Diamond Harbour sub-division prove that while the country was unsettled, it was absolutely necessary for the safety of property that no sign should be allowed to appear that the offences would be looked upon with leniency.

34. On his return to the station on the 25th of August, the Collector reported on the relief operations and state of the

district. Where the water which had been let in through the cuts penetrated the crops looked well; where there was no water, they were miserable.

At Joynugger, the head quarters of the Mozilpore Committee which has been mentioned above, and at Diamond Harbour, relief was being given in cash, as rice was procurable in the neighbourhood. At Culpee, on the banks of the river, eight miles below Diamond Harbour, and at Tengra-bitchee, four miles lower down, rice, of which a store had been purchased by Mr. Black, was being distributed.

At all the centres, the recipients of relief were generally beggars, infirm persons, and women.

Condition of applicants for relief.

The Collector reported that few of those who were not infirm showed signs of emaciation; most of those who were emaciated came from across the river (from Midnapore and Orissa).

In the country about and to the south of Culpee only was want of rice to meet the local consumption reported; even here, however, there was a conflict of opinion as to the existence of stocks, and the general appearance of the people did not bear out the conclusion that they could not procure rice.

Want of rice.

35. To be on the safe side, and in order to put to a practical test the question of the existence of stocks, the Collector, under instructions from the Commissioner, bought 600 maunds of rice at Kooshtea for the Relief Committee, and sent it down to Culpee by the Government S. S. *Teesta*. The Commissioner wrote—"I have requested the Collector, after setting aside so much as is required for gratuitous supply to the really destitute, to sell the rest at a price six annas below that at which the old Amun is selling in the south of the Diamond Harbour sub-division. This probably does not nearly represent the difference of market value between the two classes of rice, where they are in competition with one another; but we have no wish to compete with other rice. If the stocks of Amun rice can supply the demand of those who have money to offer in return, by all means let them refuse to buy our Aaos rice, as being priced too high, at six annas below the better article. On the other hand, we wish nothing better than that the private trader should avail himself of the ample margin which our price will leave, and should undersell us with rice imported by himself. This cargo will, I think, enable us to judge whether there really is a dearth of rice in the neighbourhood; if so, we shall be prepared to send down more."

Rice imported.

36. No one came forward to buy, and the whole was eventually used for gratuitous distribution, and thus it was established that those who had money could buy in the ordinary market.

37. While at Joynugger, the Collector received a telegram from the ryots on Saugor Island, announcing that they were starving, and asking for assistance. Three or four settlements exist amid the jungle of this island. Enquiries made from the agents of the proprietors showed that money was being sent down by them from month to month to relieve the tenants; but the alarm had been created by an announcement that the proprietors did not care to keep up Mud Point—one of the settlements—and by the sudden stoppage of relief there.

Saugor Island.

On receipt of the telegram, the Collector sent 100 maunds of rice to the island, which were distributed by the Police and the proprietors' agents to 838 persons. The receipt was opportune, as the condition of the ryots at Mud Point was

Measures adopted for Mud Point.

reported to be deplorable. The immediate necessity of these people was thus provided for, and due warning given that they could not be supported at that place, and must make their own arrangements. At this time the Collector estimated that relief in the south of the district, where there is no Aaos crop, would be required for three months longer till November.

Relief at end of August.

38. At the end of August, the daily number of paupers relieved was about 220 at Culpee and Saugor Island, 70 at Diamond Harbour, and 113 in the centres under the control of the Mozilpore Committee. This Committee had been introducing labor as a test of want, where the applicant was capable of working. They had been supplying work to respectable purdanasheen women in reduced circumstances, and had directed the erection of sheds for the shelter of the homeless strangers. In the country under their care, the price of rice was going down; rain had fallen, and famine was very little feared.

Distress to south of Calcutta enhanced by cessation of agricultural operations.

39. It was reported in September that in the villages between Calcutta and Diamond Harbour, the cessation of agricultural operations had caused great distress, and that in almost every village between Alipore and Diamond Harbour, many families had been reduced to roots and herbs for food, and were beginning to desert their villages for Calcutta. To prevent this, three centres of relief were opened by the Reverend Mr. Driberg and the Reverend Mr. Payne in the country within 12 or 14 miles south of Alipore. At one of these—Behala—a committee of Native gentlemen was organized, who distributed the gratuitous relief, and employed the able-bodied on works. Rs. 1,000 were obtained from the Calcutta Relief Committee for these centres, and further funds were promised.

Deputy Collector Coomar Harendra Krishna sent out.

40. Early in September, Deputy Collector Sreesh Chunder having fallen ill, Deputy Collector Coomar Harendra Krishna was sent out to organize the working of the centres in the south of the district, which had not already been set in order by his predecessor.

Native doctor sent out.

41. A Native doctor with medicines was sent out with him, whose services were found very useful. The Deputy Collector organized labor gangs at different centres, put things in order, and returned to the station.

Employment for laborers.

42. Up to the middle of July, work was available for all who wanted it on the embankments and roads in the Diamond Harbour sub-division. In the week ending with the 14th of July, 2,360 were at work daily; then the fall of the rains brought the embankment repairs to a close, and the number of laborers employed by the Public Works Department fell gradually to about 300 daily, at which it remained throughout the rainy season. This discontinuance of works enhanced the distress at first; but the reaping of the early crop gave employment for some weeks, and such work as the Relief Committees could provide was going on; but, as already mentioned, the cessation of the agricultural operations in September threw the people out of work again. An increase in the number of applicants for gratuitous relief took place as a matter of course. In the first week of October, a daily average of 2,144 persons was being fed gratuitously at all centres, excluding Lukhikantpore, at which alone the daily average appears to have been above 1,100, raising the aggregate daily total of the district to 3,244. In consequence of the

increasing distress which had been caused by the cessation of agricultural operations, it was resolved to open two new centres in the Diamond Harbour sub-division, and one at Kharee, on the edge of the Sunderbuns, to the south of the Barripore sub-division. Of these, the Reverend Mr. Harrison, of Barripore, took charge.

43. On receipt of the very unfavorable accounts which the Reverend C. E. Driberg gave of the country immediately to the south of Alipore, the Commissioner inspected it on the 9th of October in company with Mr. Driberg. He visited some of the centres of relief which had been or were being opened by Mr. Driberg, Mr. Payne, and Mr. Long, to a distance of 14 miles down the Diamond Harbour Road, and returned by the Kourapooker Khal, six miles to the east of that road. The applicants for relief were very numerous; but those from the neighbourhood did not bear an emaciated appearance.

Commissioner's inspection of the tract south of Calcutta.

The Commissioner wrote—"From what we heard and saw, it might be generally stated that, throughout this tract, the classes who ordinarily live by daily labor and wages, as well as those who live on alms are now subsisting, not on rice, but on the roots of the bunkutchoo and the leaves of the sujna, the tamarind and other trees boiled down. Nevertheless, there was not that universal appearance of attenuation among the population which might have been expected. In this respect, the people from Orissa and from Midnapore stood out in striking contrast to the local population.

"Almost every laboring man whom we met complained that no work was to be got, and the prospect of work was universally received with delight, and with an urgent request that it might be immediate.

"From the state of the country at present, it is most difficult to carry on any sort of public work, but it must be done."

He then directed the immediate commencement of works at as many places as possible, on three or four lines of road running through the distressed tract, and authorized the Magistrate to undertake any other works which he could devise. Rs. 10,000, which remained unused from the grant to the Nuddea district for works, was placed at the disposal of the Magistrate.

• Works ordered.

44. It was pointed out to the Magistrate and Collector that, as soon as these works should be in full operation, it would be possible very largely to reduce the expenditure of the Relief Committee by refusing gratuitous relief to the numerous able-bodied men to whom it was impossible to deny it while no employment was procurable. The expediency of assimilating the standard of relief throughout the district was also pointed out to the Committee.

At the end of October, thirteen centres of relief were in operation, and the daily average number of those who received relief had risen to 8,716, although work had been commenced on several roads.

45. In October an inundation took place on Saugor Island; some alarm was created, but it was ascertained by enquiry that it had done no permanent damage to the crops.

Inundation on Saugor Island.

STATEMENTS

RECORDED BY

THE COMMISSIONERS

FOR

ENQUIRING INTO THE FAMINE.

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STATEMENTS

RECORDED BY

THE COMMISSIONERS

FOR

ENQUIRING INTO THE FAMINE.

No. 1.—BABOO DOORJODHUN DASS, *Deputy Magistrate and Deputy Collector of POOREE.*

[Examined at Pooree, 18th December 1866].

I have been Deputy Collector, in charge of Kendraparah, Zillah Cuttack, for seven years, and was there during the famine. I have been here three or four months. I am an inhabitant of Orissa, and have been in it all my life, and 35 years in Government service. I remember a scarcity in 1841, also in 1829. In one of those years the zemindars were allowed to pay their rents in kists extending over three years, but there was not actual famine such as there has been lately. In the Hindu year 1200, so far as I can judge from tradition, the distress was as great as it has been lately. Cannibalism is reported to have existed. Distress has been common from inundation, but has never reached in intensity that produced by want of rain: it has always been comparatively local.

In Kendraparah the crop of 1865 was about a quarter crop. By crop I mean both the Sarud and the Beallee; the latter, however, only amounts usually to one-fifth of the former. The Beallee suffered from want of rain, and its out-turn amounted to a three quarter crop, and the Sarud crop was less than a fifth of an average yield. The Dalo, which is a rice crop, grown in the spring, and very small, also failed, because the rain in the previous year had failed. In one part of Kendraparah there is some Rubbee; there may be a thirtieth of the whole out-turn in the sub-division. There was about a half crop of Rubbee.

In my opinion the whole out-turn of the season 1865-66 may be rated as a quarter crop. Deaths from starvation commenced about March 1866 in Kendraparah; but the people were in great straits in December 1865 and January 1866. In April deaths were more frequent, but no cholera or epidemic raged; in July cholera began; mortality increased in May; grew worse in June, and in July deaths were augmented by cholera. In August the rain checked the cholera, but the deaths from starvation were as frequent. The cholera I attribute mainly to the people eating the fruit of the Bhur, which ripened in June and July.

In September things began to amend chiefly owing to the Beallee crop. In October the Assina crop came to hand, and since then a steady improvement set in. Before I left Kendraparah in August the inundations had commenced. Half the Beallee crop was swept away, and I fancy nearly three-fourths of the Sarud, that is to say, in Kendraparah.

The Government relief came to Kendraparah *via* Taldunda: to Taldunda *via* False Point, in May or June. Before the Government importation began, some two hundred rupees and 40 or 50 maunds of rice were received from Cuttack, and given in gratuitous relief. The Government rice came from Taldunda to Kendraparah by the rivers.

In July, a story of cannibalism was reported to me by my chuprassees and burkundazes as having taken place in Kendraparah, in the north division of the town. The story was that a Hindu of low caste had seized the corpse of a child which was floating in the Gobree, cooked and devoured it. Low caste Hindus also ate cows commonly, sometimes raw.

In Kendraparah I believe 25 per cent. of the population have died. Kendraparah was one of the districts which has suffered most, but not the very worst. Ullabar was as bad; Jajpore not so bad, owing to its proximity to the Balasore district. Patamonddee was better off as far as the crop of 1865 went, as the crops along the river bank were mostly saved; but in 1866, owing to the inundation, the loss has been very severe. Juggu Singpoor was much about the same as Kendraparah, Salipoor, a little better off, and so was Dhurm, also Cuttack Thannah was worse, as far as I can gather, than Kendraparah, and suffered more early than any division in the district, but opinion severely as the Tributary Mehals, Dh. of the Altighur, and Bankee, where the want of persons of was more acutely felt. their keys,

The reports on the subject of the famine reached me; they were at first by the quantities. I was a Committee of at Kend, but I was in was set on foot 1866. other opinion. scriptions (150 rupees all) were Native Mem-Sham Nurendra, large zemine Secretary. There Kendraparah, gave 25 rupees all became convinced the jail prisoners with rice, when stores began to

months, first at 12 Cuttack seers, then at 9, then at 6. He was selling (that is to Government) at a lower rate than the Cuttack market rate. This was for the reputation of the thing. He also opened an unnochatro, and gave uncooked rice, at first 25 seers a day, and eventually 50 seers, but never more. About 100 men may have been fed daily. Ghosain Jenna, his younger brother, also gave a little cooked rice. Nobody else came forward. The mahajuns are chiefly ryots of substance. There are no regular bunniahs or people who subsist entirely by trade in Kendraparah, but there are sonars. They, however, merely work in gold and silver, and have nothing to do with lending rice. The entire business of rice advances is in the hands of the agricultural community. The zemindars also are mahajuns. Almost every caste, except the tantes, are agriculturists as well. In Cuttack itself there are a few bunniahs—traders—who came from the west (North-Western Provinces). In Pooree there are koomtees, who come from Madras and Ganjam. One quarter in the seer is the rate of interest on the Dhan advanced. Every body was saying that the great mahajuns were keeping back their stores; but there was no such great mahajun in Kendraparah to my knowledge, and I never said so. I reported coming distress in March and April. At that time the mahajuns were holding back in hopes of higher prices. When prices got to their height in June and July the mahajuns sold. Their stores were small, and it is my opinion that if the merchants, instead of holding back, had gone on selling, their stocks would not have lasted more than two or three months from March. The stocks in the whole district, under no circumstances, could have lasted till the Beallee crop. In the Madras territory the high castes and the middling castes had more share in, and benefitted more by, the Government relief. In Cuttack and the towns, these castes may have been relieved, but in the isolated villages they stayed at home and died, because the centres of relief were in the towns. It was not ordered that relief should be sent into the villages; we only had orders to open unnochatros and to sell rice. Later on, in July, seven centres of relief were established, but the above remark about the castes applies even here. Government was selling grain then at 5 seers a rupee at the time the distress was severest. When I left it was so selling, but was sold cheaper afterwards. I believe these ochatros should have been opened at several times in February: many lives would then have been saved; but we had at that date no idea Government would give us relief, and so we applied for it. In former famines no such scheme was ever adopted. Mr. Fressanges did not come after October 1865. He did not know why should he? Every one knew he got. Since I came to Pooree I have been in the district twice. The second time I came to see the seed for the Rubbee crop. I believe the famine to have been in Cuttack. More than by the Beallee crop is one-half

of the Beallee crop of 1866, certainly not more than has been swept away, and about (perhaps less) 40 per cent. of the Sarud. What has escaped, however, is extremely good owing partly to the fertility of the ground being increased by its having produced little or nothing during the preceding year, and partly to the abundance of rain that fell in 1866. In Pooree the district that has suffered least throughout the famine is Kotdes. Khoorda has suffered more than Kotdes, but less than Chowbeesood.

The rivers from which the country suffered most in Kendraparah are—1st, the Brahminee, 2nd, the Noon, 3rd, the Mahanudy. In Pooree—1, the Katjoree, 2, the Dia.

In the year 1864 the crops suffered from floods, but otherwise the out-turn was a full one. In February, if I had received *carte blanche*, I should have given rupees, food, and clothing from house to house, and I should have imported grain from Calcutta as the Government did afterwards.

The ryots of this part of the country are not usually very deeply in debt, but they seldom go through the year without debt. They generally manage to go on with the produce of their crops till say July; for the remaining months they get advances from the mahajuns, that is to say, the people whom I have described as doing mahajunee business.

No. 2.—BABOO RAMAKHOY CHATTERJEE, Deputy Magistrate and Deputy Collector of POOREE.

[Examined at Pooree, 18th and 21st December 1866].

My home is in Burdwan; but I have been in Pooree three or four years. I was appointed Deputy Magistrate in 1861. I am conversant with agricultural matters.

I was at Pooree at the time of the failure of the crop of 1865, and have been there since throughout the famine. The first alarm about the crop and the shortness of the grain-stocks was at the end of September 1865. On the 26th October the mahajuns and shop-keepers suddenly stopped their sales. I reported this to the Magistrate, who was then holding his office at Cuttack, according to the usage by which the Pooree office is transferred to Cuttack from July to October. The Magistrate returned at the end of October. In the mean time many people had come into Pooree from the interior owing to the want of grain. I got a list of people said to have stores of grain, and I induced some of the richer merchants to sell at 30 Cuttack seers of unhusked rice to the rupee. Mr. Barlow, on his return, went out to visit the most distressed parts, i. e., Parri-cood and Malood. Many orphans came in from that quarter. I managed to raise something from the dhurmsala, and afterwards, when the number became too large, I distributed them amongst the mohunt. of the muths. In the mean time the Sarud crop came into the market, and for nearly two months there was an amendment. There were no cases of starvation in the town; but reports of deaths

from starvation, and the people having to feed on roots, came in from the mofussil. Famine began to be felt in the town in the beginning of February, just after the Lieutenant Governor came. He came on the 13th and stayed one day. After he passed through, things got worse. Mr. Barlow tried to raise subscriptions, and raised Rs. 5,000. When Mr. Barlow returned from the mofussil, a meeting was called on the 25th February, and it was resolved, but I can't say whether it was taken down in writing, that the local subscriptions were inadequate, and that an appeal should be made to the public. The European members agreed to write to the English papers, but afterwards changed their minds, thinking that the distress was not such as to necessitate the measure. I was requested to write to the Native papers, and I wrote this letter* to the *Hindoo Patriot* the same day. I don't know if others wrote to the Bengalee papers.

The meaning of the term "house relief system," which occurs in that letter, is that each family in each village should be relieved by a monthly money payment at their own houses. The result of my letter was that we got something from the *Patriot* and something from Lahore.

In March there was a considerable immigration of women and orphans; now and then a case of actual death from starvation occurred; and in April deaths became more frequent. Cases of shop-looting and of people being robbed as they were bringing muhaprosad from the temple in broad day-light were common in March and April. I personally made no more appeals. Mr. Barlow had obtained some grants from local funds in the mean time. In May, with the grant of Rs. 10,000 obtained by the Collector, an unnochatro was opened in Pooree and several centres in the interior. Things were getting worse day by day; but it wasn't till the end of May that the extreme point of famine was touched. In consequence of Mr. Chapman's letter, announcing that no more subscriptions were wanted, I wrote a second letter to the *Hindoo Patriot*, asking directly for subscriptions. I know Mr. Barlow reported the state things were in, but I can't say whether he telegraphed. There is no telegraph from here to Cuttack. At the mofussil centres relief was given in uncooked rice and here in cooked rice. We got some rice from Gopalpoor through Udkar Narain—a rich koomtee mahajun at Ganjam, and some we bought here. In June the famine was very bad. Since then I have been in charge of the unnochatro here. The first batch of rice (Government rice) came from Coconada. It came, I think, in June, July, and August. In September and October the mortality decreased. Cholera began in February, and lasted till May, when it abated; but in the rains there were many deaths from exposure, want of clothing, and small-pox. In July especially there was a three days' fall of rain, and many paupers died.

* Produces a note of Mr. Barlow to show that he approved of the witness writing to the *Hindoo Patriot*.

† The rice from Gopalpoor came via the Chilka Lake, not by sea.

In September, as far as Pooree went, the mortality was diminished one-half, I believe, by the famine relief operations. After July no want of supplies of Government rice was felt in Pooree. From the beginning of October, mortality from starvation ceased in Pooree itself; but I have heard that in November numerous deaths occurred in the interior from disease consequent on want.

Statement showing the mortality in Pooree district, exclusive of Khoorda, compiled by the Police up to October 1866, put in by Baboo Ramakhoy Chatterjee, Deputy Collector.

Name of Pergunnah.	No. of inhabitants in 1271 B. S.	No. of inhabitants in 1273 B. S.	No. of persons died.
Malood ...	3,329	1,913	1,517
Budgercote ...	3,943	1,947	1,896
Pargh. Parri-cood ...	10,235	4,433	5,802
Manikpotona ...	6,104	1,627	4,477
Chowbeesood ...	28,654	9,727	18,927
Seersee ...	11,384	3,996	7,418
Rahan ...	48,182	20,683	27,519
Limbhai ...	41,896	37,896	4,000
Kotrahag ...	30,889	27,889	3,000
Puschimdoote ...	18,326	16,828	1,498
Poorboodasee ...	13,829	8,395	5,434
Kotdes ...	93,424	53,603	39,821
Banchas ...	10,067	5,781	4,286
Uttals ...	13,447	7,561	5,886
Antorodh ...	20,683	10,683	10,020
Asturang ...	2,293	745	1,548
Kurlo ...	10,920	5,233	5,687
Kodhar ...	14,108	6,623	7,480
Murichpoor ...	7,449	3,223	4,227
Domarkhand ...	12,445	5,532	6,913
Total ...	4,01,501	2,34,145	1,67,356

I have drawn up this statement (put in) which I prepared from tables sent in by the Police; it includes deaths up to the 1st October, and not after. I think that special application was not made to Government earlier because there was a difference of opinion as to the severity of the crisis, and also because there was an idea—which was held by nearly all the officials—that there were large stores held back by the mahajuns. I did not hold this opinion for the following reason. I had got a list of the stores said to have been kept by rich persons of this place. In October 1865 they gave me their keys, and I examined their stores and satisfied myself that they had not stores in any large quantities. I expressed my opinion in Committee, but I was in a minority. The majority held the other opinion. At that time there were only three Native Members—myself, the Moonsiff, and the Secretary. There were stocks; but subsequently all became convinced that they would not suffice when stores began to

strained for rice. In June, July, and August, had we had more rice, I think we might with our arrangements have sent more into the mofussil. Supplies were sent into the interior both by carts and boats. I believe the floods in August impeded operations; but I desire to add that I was never in charge, and can only give my opinion. Last cold weather there was a good deal of talk about the rice stocks; but as far as I know, there was no formal discussion in Committee, or investigation into the state of the stocks in the country, as to whether they were sufficient to feed the people till the cutting of the next crop. I know the Collector recommended an importation of rice for the Department of Public Works for the coolies, and hence I infer he thought there was not sufficient rice in the country. I am inclined to think that the Collector's opinion throughout was that rice ought to be imported; but I won't be certain. In consultation with the Executive Engineer, Mr. Nolan, I remember hearing Baboo Ramakhoy Chatterjee say that he thought there was not much rice, as he had himself examined the mohunts' stores. I don't recollect any body by name holding a strong opinion on the other side; but a Native, whose name I don't remember, stated that Raghunath Chowdhry had large stores. The prosperity of the salt districts all round the Chilka Lake was much affected, no doubt, by the stoppage of the salt manufacture. Towards the north coast a slight falling-off may have resulted from the same cause. The salt districts used not to grow their own supplies: they haven't much land in cultivation; but in an ordinarily good year they can support themselves. These districts, however, are peculiarly liable to bad seasons, besides being naturally unproductive.

[Papers put in by Mr. Livesay—Resolution of the 25th July; Mr. Livesay's English reports and Vernacular roobocarees].

No. 5.—BABOO NURSING CHURN DASS, *late a Deputy Magistrate.*

[Examined at Pooree, 19th December 1866].

I am an inhabitant of Cuttack, and have been in Government service since 1824. I was employed for three years continuously in Pooree, and took my pension last July. I remember a famine in 1837, but nothing like this; rice sold at 8 Cuttack seers; it lasted only two months. In all my life I have never seen or heard of a famine such as this, in which men ate one another. This time I have heard from many sources that they have done so. I heard a man was going about Pooree eating the arm of a corpse raw; he may have been an idiot. Many have eaten grass. I have heard of a great famine in 1200. Last December I went on a tour in Khoorda Panchghur, Pergunnah Serace, and remained out two months. I didn't go out after that. I saw that in some villages 70, 80, 60 per cent. of the crop, and so on, was lost; that great distress prevailed; and that people were living off a certain tree. Khoorda was the

best off; perhaps only one-third of the crop was lost; in Panchghur about one-half; and in Serace nearly two-thirds. The two pergunnahs first mentioned were, as far as I can judge, the best off in the zillah. The average crop in all Pooree was about one-third of a full crop; but in the salt districts things were much worse. I returned before the Lieutenant Governor arrived, and was here when he came. When I came in no one was dying in Pooree, but they had begun to die in the mofussil. When the Lieutenant Governor came, some of the mofussil poor had already come in. From March they began to die in Pooree, and from March the famine began to be severe. From October 1865 we said the crop would fail. In April the number of deaths increased; it was larger in May; and in June the famine reached its height, and remained bad till November. The worst months were August, September, and October 1866. When I came in from the interior, I became a Member of the Relief Committee. I came to the conclusion that the people who had grain wouldn't sell, and that those who were poor would die; that if Government didn't help us, we shouldn't be saved. I told the Collector and the Commissioner that Government aid was required, and reminded them that it had been given in 1837. I had an interview with the Lieutenant Governor when he came, and told him what I have now told the Committee; but I made no application for aid. Many zemindars made representations to the Lieutenant Governor; but it was chiefly to obtain remission of their revenue. The paupers cried out in Ooryah; but none of the higher people, that is, the zemindars, represented their case. The general impression was that the mahajuns had grain and wouldn't sell; but in point of fact there are no mahajuns that have so much as a year's stock in hand. They may have had supplies for twenty days or so. As the famine got worse Ooryah newspapers at Cuttack used to publish accounts. The famine in Cuttack was, I think, less by one-eighth than in Pooree.

No. 6.—BABOO RUGHOO NATH CHOWDHRY, *Zemindar and Trader of Zillah CUTTACK and POOREE.*

[Examined at Pooree, 19th December 1866].

I live chiefly in Cuttack. Most of my lands (zemindary) are in Cuttack. I have some lands in Pooree; also a house in Kotdes, and one in the town of Pooree. In the whole zillah of Pooree, the out-turn of 1865 was one-third; Khoorda was the division best off; and the famine was somewhat less severe in Cuttack than in Pooree. The total crop was smaller in Cuttack than in Pooree, because the Khoorda crop was comparatively good. The mortality in Cuttack was less than in Pooree. Some of the Khoorda grain was exported to the south, and Cuttack got some relief from Sumbulpoor. We knew there was going to be a famine in October 1865, and were still more sure from November 1865. Up till January people managed to get

on; but from March deaths were frequent both in Pooree and Cuttack. In April people died very fast. In June famine reached its height. In Orissa there are no very large grain-holders; some have from 1,000 to 3,000 maunds. Previous to the failure in 1865, there was about the usual amount in hand; but after the crop was cut, the amount in store was much less than usual, as we didn't get back our ordinary advances. In 1270 (Ooryah year beginning in Badro) there was a good crop; in 1271, a smaller one; in 1272, a short one; and in 1273, almost total failure. In 1271 and 1272, a good deal of grain was exported from the districts near the sea, by sea, and from the interior a good deal went south by carts to the Chilka Lake from the parts which are approachable by carts from the Chilka. I had about 30 to 50 thousand maunds of unhusked rice in Falgoon and Chait (up to March). I sold some and advanced some up till July last, and I have kept enough of the rice of 1272 to last me through the next year. All this year's crop has been washed away. I have still 8,000 maunds (Cuttack) in store. I might have made more by selling that three months ago; but where should I have been if rice had not got cheaper and if supplies had failed. When the Lieutenant Governor came everybody represented that people were likely to die, and that something must be done. The Collector of Cuttack wouldn't even take our petitions. The Collector of Pooree did what he could. I don't remember that any special suggestions were made to the Lieutenant Governor; only we said something must be done to save the lives of the people. Had there been no imports, and had everybody brought what he had into the market, the rice would never have sufficed till the Bealee crops came in; independently of the question of floods, the people would have died. If Government had not imported grain, there would have been double the amount of deaths, and had Government importation taken place two months earlier, not one-fourth of the deaths would have occurred. From February we began ourselves to say that rice ought to be imported as it had been in 1837. Government imported rice, I believe, in 1837, but it's a long time ago. There was a subscription and an unnochatro in Cuttack, but not in the mofussil. Rice then was never sold lower than 8 Cuttack seers a rupee. Then very few people died. The famine in 1200, I have heard, was very bad, but not so bad as this. This is the worst there has ever been. I have heard of cannibalism and Hindus eating cows, but I have never seen such cases. In my opinion not less than 44 per cent. of the population in Pooree have died, and 37 per cent. in Cuttack. The excess in Pooree was in the salt tracts. I ceased to give out grain when the floods commenced, because my crops were swept away, and I began to fear for myself. In Badro my nephew went to sell grain and died, and since then I have sold nothing. Out of those who have died up to date 75 per cent. would have died but for the floods. 25 per cent. of the deaths are attributable to the floods. This last mortality was owing—*firstly*, to the difficulty there was in getting at the

sufferers in the inundated tracts; and, *secondly*, to the failure of the Bealee crop in those tracts.

I know little about the salt districts, and can't speak to the mortality there. I have never been in the habit of importing by sea, though I am in the habit of trading in rice, and I knew prices would be high.

No. 7.—MR. J. W. LACEY.

[Examined at Pooree, 19th December 1866].

I have been in Pooree only a year. I came in November last. I wasn't then in an official capacity. I was with my brother the District Superintendent, and was appointed to the relief operations in June. I accompanied my brother into the district about November last, and was out most of November, December, January, and February. We started from Cuttack, and went first through Khoorda, and thence along the Chilka. The state of the paddy near the Chilka I noticed was bad; but I didn't remark any deaths. Most of the time I was in a boat on the Chilka. Afterwards I saw some of the people looking as if they were starving. After Christmas we went into the Khoorda district, and up to the time I came back in February I don't remember seeing many signs of famine. The famine began to be felt in Pooree in January and February. It got really bad about April. I have been engaged in establishing centres and superintending them. We commenced with uncooked rice and afterwards gave cooked rice. We were very seldom short of rice. We drew our supplies from Pooree. Many died because they would not come to the mofussil centres for fear of losing their caste. Another reason was the distance of the centres from the villages; and a third, the state of debility in which the paupers who came were. Most of them in fact died, and only the more robust survived. The mortality continued till about the end of October. The worst months were July and August. The people died chiefly from starvation and diseases directly induced by starvation. A large number died from eating uncooked rice. They had the means of cooking, but were so ravenous that they wouldn't wait to cook it. Cholera and small-pox also contributed to the total of deaths. I believe that if the relief had been more lavish, fewer people would have died, and had centres been established in November, the famine would have been staved off. I even think that if the centres had been established in March or April, the famine would have been in a great measure staved off. I was connected with the operations from the beginning. I had instructions to open from six to twelve centres. Six were opened in June by me; afterwards six more were opened. Twenty-four were proposed. I don't know why the whole twenty-four were not opened. The distance was from ten to twelve miles from depôt to depôt in the districts in which they were established; but I think eight miles should have been the maximum distance. When we began with cooked rice, Brahmans were always employed to cook.

No. 8.—BABOO KHETTER MOHUN BOSE, *Head Clerk, Magistrate's Office, and Secretary Relief Committee, POOREE.*

[Examined at Pooree, 20th and 21st December 1866].

Subscriptions were collected at the beginning of this year, and an informal meeting was held on the 15th January; but no resolutions were recorded. On the 25th February a formal meeting was held and proceedings recorded. There was first distress in October. In December and January, when the new crops had been cut, things were a little better. In February we heard of great distress in the district, and there was also great distress in the town. A few paupers, principally orphans or deserted children, began to come in from the interior in the end of January; in February more came in, and in March the influx became very large. It was in March that deaths from starvation were first to be seen in the town. There were many to be seen dying in March. At this time no provision was made for relief in the town; but out-door relief in money was afforded by the Committee to distressed families in the interior. The town was then omitted, because here there were many mohunts of the religious establishments, and they used to give alms. At this time, in March, I don't think people died in the town directly from being unable to get any particle of food; but they came in in so bad a state that they died because they could not get from the alms of mohunts and others sufficient food to recover them. In April the number of paupers and of deaths very much increased, and the Reverend Mr. Miller opened an alms-house and fed with cooked food the famishing people who were so reduced as to be unable to work. In May things got still worse. Mr. Miller made over to us Rs. 500 from his fund; but it was expended by him under our directions. The Relief Committee did not give direct relief in Pooree till the 2nd June. [On referring to papers finds that Mr. Miller did not open a regular alms-house to distribute food till the 12th May]. He also wrote to the *Friend of India and Hindoo Patriot*. He bought the rice in the bazar. From the 2nd June we opened an unnochatro in Pooree, and bought rice and distributed, it at first uncooked, then cooked, because where it was uncooked people were hurt by the crush. From this time centres were also opened in the interior. Up to the 17th June five centres had been opened in the interior, and a sixth on the 24th June; they have continued throughout. In July the number was increased by two more, exclusive of Khoorda. The Committee had resolved to establish thirteen; but this was not carried out at first. In August the number was increased to twelve (exclusive of Khoorda), and in September to thirteen. I remember it being proposed in discussion in February that we should write to the English and Native papers; but Mr. Barlow changed his mind and did not write. About this time the koomtee merchants settled in the town, who are south country-men, and began to import rice from Ganjam and Gopalpoor in small quantities. That trade continued till June. When rice was the dearest it came in considerable quantities in this way by the route

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of the Chilka Lake. This trade continued till August. In June the Local Committee imported 1,050 bags from Gopalpoor, and distributed it partly gratuitously and partly at low rates, and this mode of distribution was the system followed throughout. The Government rice was available from the beginning of July. I managed the despatch of rice into the interior. From that time we had enough for the relief centres in the interior; they sometimes fell short from scarcity of carriage and delay in the supplies reaching, but not for want of rice. It would have been better if there had been more centres of relief, as the people were too weak to come five or ten coss. I can't say why more were not established. There was rice enough, but carriage was short, especially from the commencement of the rains in June, because the country was inundated. From June to August it was very difficult to send supplies, and if we had established more centres, I doubt if we should have been able to forward the grain to them. If we had had grain in April and May before the rains, we could then have sent it, and we could then have fed many, if not all, the starving people. At that time it was impossible to buy any considerable quantity in the bazar without enormously raising the rates. In September we were able to supply all the centres, though with difficulty. In October the Collector's supply of rice became short; but we had enough to go on with, and we bought a small quantity in the bazar. The relief operations were never stopped for want of rice. The Collector's sales to the public may have been stopped, but not the relief of the indigent; that was not interfered with.

I remember the question of stocks being discussed. I remember a petition in October 1865, in which it was stated (to the Deputy Collector Ramakhoy Chatterjee) that people who had rice would not sell it. Baboo Ramakhoy personally investigated the matter. I can't say whether Mr. Barlow believed him or not. I heard that Brindabun Marwaree informed Mr. Ravenshaw that there was a large amount, two or more years' consumption, and asked him for a monopoly of all the rice that came into Cuttack town, saying he would supply rice at 12 seers all the time. The mahajuns closed in November and of October about six days, because they had a panic. I don't think it was wickedness; they didn't think it wise to give any "deri dhan." Advances are then given for food. It is called "deri dhan"—50 per cent., but only 20 per cent. is taken.

Dated 20th December 1866.

The Relief Committee's resolutions of February 25th 1866 were drafted by Mr. Barlow, and then copied by me into the book. The resolutions of May 16th, June 1st, and others are in Mr. Barlow's own hand. I wish to add that I was sent out in June, and in the Pergunnahs of Chowbeesood, Malood, and Parric the state of things was as bad as possible. I estimate that up to that time more than half the people of those parts were

dead. There were not then sufficient measures of relief. Relief measures were soon after adopted; but only the homeless and deserted were relieved: the people in their houses were not relieved. Larger measures were not taken, because more rice was not brought from other districts. If the Committee had had rice earlier, it would have been sent, and later in the rains, it might have been sent to Parricood by boat by way of the Chilka; but there was not even then rice enough to supply every one. Later, there was rice enough; but it was never resolved to give out-door relief at people's houses, and it has not been given. In the town, at first, the rules were very strict; only people reduced to skeletons were relieved. It was not till September that more general relief was given, when the mortality had become excessive. In answer to Baboo Ramakhoy's appeal to the *Hindoo Patriot*, we got Rs. 78-8 collected by the *Hindoo Patriot*, and Rs. 250 from Lahore, also from some other quarters [produces list].

Dated 21st December 1866.

No. 9.—MR. G. M. CURRIE, C. S., *Assistant Collector of POOREE.*

[Examined at Pooree, 20th and 21st December 1866].

I am Assistant Collector, in charge of the relief operations. I came on the 1st or 2nd July 1866. When I arrived, the famine was at its height. The *Arracan* sailed the morning I arrived, and the *Gibb* had arrived the day before. The unnochatros were at work. I was then employed in landing operations. I landed a good deal of the rice from the *Gibb*. I and the other officers took the duty in turn by weeks. The weather was then very bad, and there was great difficulty. The work was stopped for ten days once, and afterwards for two or three days at a time. I think all was done that could be done, and we went almost so far, I may say, as manslaughter in having induced the boatmen to go out in such weather. Two lives were lost, and some men were sent to hospital injured. They behaved very well, never being accustomed to go out at that season. They did all they could. The number of boats, when I first came, was about seven or eight, and two or three new boats were made. Eventually, we sometimes started with as many as ten after repairs; but that number was soon again reduced to three or four owing to the damages the boats received. During the time these stoppages in landing occurred, the Collector closed his sales, fearing that the relief operations might be stopped owing to rice running short. I believe the relief operations were never stopped for want of rice. We always managed to land enough to keep them going. We had a serious fear of running out altogether once when Mr. McNeile came down. It was found that the real balance was less than what the books showed. The reason was this—the nominal weight was two maunds per bag, and the real weight was much less, and the sales were according to actual

weight. The cause of the discrepancy between the nominal and real weight was that the rice on the *Gibb* was packed in single gunny bags; a good deal may have leaked, a good deal was stolen, and almost all the bags were wet and had to be turned out and re-filled. I heard this. I had nothing to do with the sales godown. [It was here pointed out to Mr. Currie that the balance in October and November 1866 was very small as shown by the sales stock book.] I remember that the *Arracan* was very much delayed, and so was the *Asia*. When the camp was formed, I was put in charge. I began building it about the first week of September 1866, and we got the paupers in about the 24th, just before the Collector, Mr. Barlow, left. Mr. Livesay was then in charge for some three weeks. I was out in the Gope direction about the 17th November last for a week. I didn't remark any mortality from famine then. I remarked a few emaciated persons at the unnochatros, who had probably been suffering from dysentery owing to the setting in of the cold weather.

Dated 20th December 1866.

I went out to Kakutpoor in the latter part of November 1866. It is chiefly inhabited by Brahmins. It consists of 92 houses; of these 57 are occupied by Brahmins. I made enquiries at each house as to the mortality since the famine set in. Out of 309 persons, 92 had died. These deaths were attributable entirely to the famine, not to cholera or inundation. I made special enquiries on this point. Several men of the lower classes had deserted their families. Kakutpoor being a Brahmin village, and the zemindar supporting a muth there on which many subsist, I infer that the mortality there must have been much lower than in neighbouring villages which are not so favorably circumstanced. I made enquiries similarly in two other villages; but cannot remember particulars. I do remember, however, that they were not Brahmin villages, and that the death-rate per cent. had been very much higher than at Kakutpoor. I also visited a village near Manung, on the Chilka, about the 8th instant, and I found there that out of 28 houses, 2 people only remained alive. The mortality in that village and many others in that neighbourhood was owing to the villagers having been cut off by inundation from getting supplies.

Finding that at a place so favorably circumstanced as Kakutpoor, the mortality has been above 29 per cent., I conclude that the mortality in the district, including the town of Pooree, must have been at least 50 per cent. of the population.

Dated 21st December 1866.

No. 10.—BABOO BAGOBAT MOITEE, *Tehseeldar of KHOORDA.*

[Examined at Pooree, 20th December 1866].

The famine commenced in November and December 1865. There were hopes of rain in October, but in November we gave up all hopes of more rain. December was better as far as prices went, and so was January owing to the dhan such as it was coming in. February was much the same here as in January, but things were worse in Malood and Parricood. March wasn't a very bad month here; but in April people began to die in Pooree. We knew that there was going to be a heavy famine in November when the crop failed, although prices were a little easy in January. I did not think the mahajuns could have had much grain. There are two or three large dealers who may have had some. I was here when the Lieutenant Governor came for one day. When he came people agreed to apply to him to do something for us; but I can't say whether any application was made. I went away to Satparah with Mr. Barlow, and didn't return till May. A grant of Rs. 5,000 had been made, and people there (only Satparah people were employed) were much benefited, but there were deaths. From the subscriptions, relief in money was sent to Parricood and to Malood. Works were only going on in Satparah. The Malood and Parricood people did not come to the works. The money sent was not enough to save all the people; only particular cases were selected. Satparah is a khas mehal, Malood is not. There were works in Barcool, Banpoor, to which the Malood and Parricood people went. This was the Executive Engineer's work. The piece system and day system both prevailed; people who went to get work got it; people who stayed at home must have died, but a hard working man may have supported his family. When I came in in May, things were very bad; I then left for Khoorda and became Tehseeldar. Khoorda was not so bad as this, but there too people were dying. When I was in Satparah, mahajuns from Gopalpoor were bringing rice there, and some of them were taking it on to Pooree. Rice began to come from Gopalpoor in February, and ceased about May or June. When the Government rice came, it ceased almost entirely, and the mahajuns made no more efforts to import. I heard there was a famine also in Ganjam. The rice was brought in ships to Gopalpoor. I understand that the landing at Gopalpoor is easier than here, and that ships can unload at all seasons. In Khoorda there were eight relief houses. The famine abated from September, and may be said to have almost ceased in November, but still there is great distress amongst the poor. There was a good crop in 1863; in 1864 a somewhat short one, and also in 1864-65. The usual supplies didn't come in from Sumbulpoor, because prices had risen in Sumbulpoor, and there had been a great deal of exportation to the south; for all these reasons, stocks were very short in 1865. The cause of the want of grain was not a combination on the part of the mahajuns, but simply short stocks. I can't say how

or why the Commissioner imagined there was a large supply withheld. There is one killa, that is a permanently settled estate, Murichpoor. Malood is a jagheer. In Balbuddurpoor, there are 34 mouzahs which suffered from inundation. No considerable amount of Beallee is grown there. I estimate that out of the whole population, six-sixteenths have died from the effects of the drought, four-sixteenths from the effects of the inundation and the cholera which followed it, and that the rest are alive.

I am of opinion that six-sixteenths of the whole population of the Government estate of Khoorda have died, and that if there had been no Government importation, one-eighth more would have died, and that if importation had commenced in February, the mortality would have been much less.

In the Khoordah estate, the inundations have damaged above one-sixteenth of the crop, chiefly to the south.

No. 11.—MR. J. MACCULLOCK, *Road Overseer.*

[Examined at Pooree, 20th December 1866].

I have been in the district for four years, and more than two years Overseer of the Roads. I have been a good deal in the district, but have not been employed in relief operations, except lately to look after the work of a gang. Last year the crops were pretty good about Piply; at other places I saw signs of famine about June or a little before. People may have been dying before that, but I did not see them. Towards the latter end of June, I saw a good many about Nealee and Gope, especially at Nealee. Mortality continued till October and even later. Nealee is twelve miles from Gope. I don't know why relief was not sent to Nealee; that did not come within the line of my duties. There was at first a report that the mahajuns at Cuttack had large stocks of grain, and would not sell; but afterwards that did not turn out to be so true as at first supposed. I can't tell who originated the report; but at Cuttack most of the Natives and the generality of the Europeans believed in it. Mr. Fressanges, French merchant, believed in it to a certain extent, though he discredited it afterwards. I heard Mr. Fressanges say so, but I can't give the exact date. It was in Mr. Money's time, for I know that Mr. Fressanges made a proposition to Mr. Money, offering to supply the market, provided he was granted a monopoly for at least two years, and the merchants who had kept back the grain were excluded. He said he would sell it two seers cheaper than they would. I heard, but don't know, that Mr. Money reserved this proposal for a certain time, in order that if the merchants did not open their shops, he might accept it. After that they opened their shops again. In June and July people generally were satisfied that the supposed large stocks did not exist. I believe that Mr. Fressanges did no business, or nearly none, last season.

Rughnath Chowdhry was supposed to be the man who had the great quantities of grain. At last he produced a good deal that he had hoarded for several years, and it was so bad that it injured people. The other large Zemindar Bagwan Dass, who was supposed to have a great deal, turned out to have very little; his own people were dying. The Ferry Fund Road at Khoorda saved the population there to a great extent; the mortality, therefore, was comparatively less. I do not believe in the alleged cases of cannibalism, but husbands commonly deserted their wives.

No. 12.—BABOO SHOSHEE BHOOSUN MOOKERJEE, *of POOREE.*

[Examined at Pooree, 20th December 1866].

Last year the harvest in the Kote Rahan Pergunnah may have been about three-sixteenths; in my estate there was nothing. This year there may have been one-third in the Pergunnah. All the rest was carried off by floods. In my zemindaree this year also, there is nothing. People began to die in January and February; in March and April they died in greater numbers; in May and June the famine became extreme, and continued so during July and August; the last two months it was less. The zemindars gave what they had to the ryots; two or three zemindars had a great deal, and have much still, but the small zemindars had not. I know two men who had much—Rughnath Chowdhry and Bagwan Pal, of Kotdes. They always hoard from several years. Rughnath has sold much. I don't know of his giving away. I don't know if Bagwan Pal has sold. The mohunts of Pooree had grain, and they sold. The zemindars took counsel, and applied for remission of revenue, on the ground that we can't collect it from our ryots, and if they are let off, we must be let off too. They did not apply to Government to import rice.

No. 13.—MR. W. R. GREEN, *Assistant Superintendent of Police, POOREE.*

[Examined at Pooree, 20th December 1866].

I am Assistant Superintendent of Police at Pooree. I have been in the district a year, and came about 15th November 1865. When I arrived, there was an apprehension of famine. Things got rather worse in the course of the next two or three months. As far as I can judge, people were beginning actually to starve a month after I arrived. Last cold weather, I wasn't out in the district, and didn't go out till June. About the beginning of this year, but I can't say in what month, deaths became frequent. I think there were a considerable number of deaths in the first three months of the year. About May or June, the

famine reached its height. I was employed in landing rice, but was not regularly upon the Relief Committee. I think most certainly that as regards landing rice, all was done that could be done. There was a good deal of difficulty in finding carriage for sending rice into the interior, but I did not see much of it myself. With regard to the stocks, I merely understood last cold weather that, in consequence of the failure of the crops and owing to scarcity, the mahajuns were holding back their stores. I didn't hear of any combination then; but it has appeared since that there was a great deal of grain. In the later months, down to June and July, a great deal of grain was forthcoming. When I was in Khoorda in June and July, there was no rice for the prisoners; but eventually it was forthcoming in the bazar. I can't form an opinion as to whether there was sufficient to feed the people without Government importation; but I think there was sufficient if it had all been brought out, to prevent anything like an extensive mortality; there would have been deaths, but not many, till now. I don't know of any particular instances of merchants who possessed large stores. I used to dine with Mr. Barlow during last cold weather. I remember his talking of the necessity of forming a Committee, and of collecting local subscriptions, and of writing to the papers. I don't remember hearing him say why he did not write to the papers; but he fancied, I think, that he would be able to collect a sufficiently large sum in the district. He promised a large sum himself, in the hope that others would subscribe a sum equally large. He did not collect the sum he expected; but I can't say why he didn't make a more extended appeal at an earlier date.

No. 14.—BABOO KISHEN MOHUN ROY CHOORAMONY, *Treasurer, POOREE.*

[Examined at Pooree, 20th December 1866].

I am a Kaist. I am also a zemindar, and do a little mahajunee business. I am not a large dealer in grain. Only two or three persons in Pooree had large stores; Rughnath Dass had large stores; Mohunt Mohun Dass had large stores, and has sold them. In fact there was not in the district enough rice to feed the people. There was a common report that there was a great deal of grain, but that the holders would not sell their stores. This report was spread chiefly by the lower classes, who were in difficulties. In 1864 the crop was short, and there was some exportation, though less than usual that year. People had no good reason for saying there were large quantities of grain. I heard that the Commissioner was told at the end of 1865 of good crops and a great deal of grain in Hurrispoor Killa. I remember the shops all closing in October, and Ramakhoy Baboo went round and prevailed on the principal holders to make some sales. I do not know that the Collector accused the holders of keeping back the grain. The people began to die in February, and still more in March, especially in the interior. People did not come in in great numbers till the *unnochatro* was established in

Pooree. I took three months' leave at the end of February soon after the Lieutenant Governor came, that is, one week after. I went to my own house in Gope. People were there dying mostly from hunger, some from cholera. As I went I saw many bodies on the sides of the road. When the Lieutenant Governor came, the starving people came and showed him the roots, &c., on which they were feeding. Mr. Cockburn was with the Lieutenant Governor, and showed the Lieutenant Governor the things which the people said they were feeding on. The Lieutenant Governor looked over the offices and saw the school. We talked of our state to Mr. Cockburn, and he told us we had wasted our money on marriage ceremonies. The zemindars applied for remissions, as did the ryots of khas mehals, but were refused. At that time people were not lying dead on the roads; they had just begun to die. In Cuttack I heard that great numbers applied for aid. Nobody suggested, when the Lieutenant Governor came, that importation in ships was necessary. In April, May, and June the mortality was greatest in Pooree. When the grain came in July or August the mortality in Pooree decreased, as did the mortality in the mofussil. The rains caused difficulty in transporting the rice. No district officer (*hakim*) went to make arrangements in Gope. In February Mr. Livesay went to enquire into the state of the crops. Since then till now no Officer has been to Gope. Two *unnochatros* were opened in Gope division by Mr. Lacey, who was appointed to look after the centres; and Mr. Currie went a month ago. The arrangements in the *unnochatros* were good, but certain castes would not go to them. Sometimes when all the rest of a family were dead, the last survivor would go, and the low castes went. In my opinion, if a good officer had gone, he might have made better arrangements; *ex. gr.*, he might have given people grain at their houses if he had seen their state. I have heard that in the Madras (Ganjam district) officers went about from village to village giving grain. If the grain in Pooree had run short, more might have been sent for; but the season was very unfavorable for importation. If rice had been imported earlier in February and March, half of the people who died would have been saved. There would have been deaths no doubt. A great deal of grain came into the districts from Gopalpoor. It came to Gopalpoor by sea, and the trade is still going on. It commenced in January or February. Most of it came in June, July, August, September and October. There was no cessation of this importation owing to the Government importation. In my opinion, the operations should have commenced when the Lieutenant Governor came; but they were delayed for three months, and the most disastrous consequences, arson, dacoities, &c., ensued.

In 1863 the crop was good.

No. 15.—BABOO POOROSOTUM PATNAIK, *Sheristadar, Collectorate, POOREE.*

[Examined at Pooree, 21st December 1866].

I am an inhabitant of Khoorda, in Pooree zillah, and have been for 28 years Sheristadar of Pooree. I have never known such a famine. Once there was scarcity, but people didn't then die from want. I believe there was an *unnochatro* in Cuttack, but in this zillah there was no Government aid then. I know nothing of what happened then in Cuttack. I never heard of the famine of 1200. The crops of 1865 failed almost entirely (loss = three-fourths) owing to draught. At that time there were not large stocks, but here and there some few people had large stores. There were not enough stores to feed the people. It wasn't believed that more than two or three persons had large stocks. Mr. Barlow sent out Mr. Livesay, Assistant Collector, and the Deputy Collector to enquire into the losses in the khas mehals, but not in the whole district. There was no investigation into the state of the produce of the whole zillah; only into that of the khas mehals. No order came from the Board to enquire into the general state of the crops; on the contrary, an order came forbidding us to make such enquiry. We were only told to enquire into the state of khas mehals in the actual possession of Government. We were forbidden to enquire into the state of khas mehals in which zemindars had refused *kaboolyats*, and which were settled with *surbrakars*, as well as into the state of zemindaree estates. This enquiry was forbidden, because the Board decided that the *malgoozars* had no claim to remission. There was no enquiry with a view to ascertain whether there was enough rice for the population. In the khas mehals works were opened to give employment to their inhabitants. From November we thought people would die. In January prices got a little easier on account of the grain coming into the market, but then we didn't think people would escape. In March and April people began to die fast. In February also some died, towards Gope, from starvation and also from cholera. In Chowbeesood and Rahan they also were dying in February; but not in Pooree city itself, at least not more than one or two. In October we all made a representation to the Deputy Collector Ramakhoy. The Collector then was in Cuttack. When he came we told him. In the months immediately following we made no special representations; but the officers were then alive to the state of the country, and Mr. Barlow made a report. I don't remember the exact date. When the Lieutenant Governor came, there was no regular enquiry into the state of things here. Some people had interviews; amongst them I. Mr. Cockburn was standing in the verandah of the cutcherry, knew me, and called me. The poor from Chowbeesood also raised a cry, and showed the roots, &c., they were living on. Mr. Cockburn took the roots and showed them to the Lieutenant Governor. The Lieutenant Governor talked to me of the former and present state of the district. I told him that we had never had such a famine. I said the people were

now dying. I did not specially say what proportion of the crop had failed. I merely stated generally that there had been a failure of the crop, and that people were dying. I didn't talk about the stocks, whether they were large or not. I don't know of any suggestion having been made to import grain. I made no such suggestion; nor did any one, as far as I heard, assure the Lieutenant Governor that there were large stocks. The Lieutenant Governor only remained here one day, and there was no special investigation into the question of scarcity. A subscription was after that got up by the Collector. That was in February.

(Being asked if he could suggest why it was that the Collector, in the Relief Committee of the 25th February, represented the distress as of great magnitude, and the funds as small and not enough to meet the same, but on the 5th March following reported that no further aid on the part of Government was necessary, says:) The Collector did not explain this to me. The only reason which occurs to me is, that there was some importation of grain from Ganjam at that time. I am unable to explain why it was that the Collector was excessively hot about relief measures, and sent emergent telegrams in November, but did not do so later in the season when matters were getting worse. I don't know whether Mr. Barlow sent any emergent telegrams or letters in March or April; but I have heard that afterwards he wrote to the papers. The worst of the famine was in May and June, in the hot weather. The subsequent mortality was less than in the two previous months. In the rains, some jungle fruits and such like were produced; some people, doubtless, suffered from eating them, but others managed to survive on them. In the Khoorda district, people managed to survive for three or four months on jungle produce. The Government rice had also then arrived. When the Government rice arrived, it was sent into the interior promptly, and the mortality abated in consequence, but did not cease altogether. The arrangements were not such as that every body could benefit by the relief. Some of the people were distant from the centres, and there was great trouble owing to the breaking down of the carts. There were, comparatively, few places which boats could reach, and carts were difficult to get in sufficient quantities, and to get them along was difficult owing to the state of the roads and the rains. Later, when godowns were well established, more relief was given. Things got better, and deaths abated somewhat in September; in October and September some grain of the Beallee and Sarud (*chota dhan*) came into the market. I never knew of any want of Government rice being felt from the time when the first ships came, except for about fifteen or twenty days on one occasion. There are only two large zemindars in the district, and the rest are small. There is no permanent settlement except in one estate (*Murichpoor*). The ryots are good and hard-working. The zemindars, with the exception of two or three persons, generally spend what they have got; they don't save much. Before the famine, the ryots

generally were not much in debt. They generally only got advances for the year, and paid them off at the end of the year, and a few—perhaps two out of sixteen—had something saved. It wasn't possible, from the difficulty of carriage, which I have explained, to make better arrangements for bringing the relief to the people than were made. I have heard that the Governor of Madras went about, and wherever he found four paupers in a house, he estimated what they wanted for a month, and ordered it to be given them, and gave them *charpays*; he went from house to house. I have heard of this from people who came from that quarter, and from the mookhtear of the Ranees of Goomsar. In this district there is very little Beallee, but much Sarud crops. I estimate that five-eighths of the Beallee of the present year was lost by floods, and three-eighths of the Sarud. I conjecture that half of the people of the district have died [produces a Police estimate exclusive of hospital deaths]. Many people died late in the season from injury to their stomachs when they got grain. If there had been no inundation, perhaps one in sixteen of those who have died would have been saved. The mortality from cholera I reckon to have been double that from the same cause in an ordinary year. The better castes of people who were fed at the *unnochatros* will not be re-admitted to the privileges of caste; but those belonging to lower castes will be able to get theirs back again by giving feasts.

No. 16.—MR. THOMPSON, *District Superintendent of Police, POOREE.*

[Examined at Pooree, 21st December 1866].

I have been here since October last [produces the diaries kept by Mr. Lacey, the former District Superintendent]. I wasn't out into the district on the 18th November. The famine had then, it seemed to me, ceased. The people were crowding to some of the *unnochatros* and others were closing. The country appeared to me very much depopulated. In some places I remarked scarcely twenty out of a hundred houses standing. The worst place seemed to be the shores of the Chilka. There, however, some of the population have survived; taking the whole district, so far as I have seen, three-fourths of the whole population have gone, but I have only seen the parts to the west. There, however, they have had a good harvest this year; but still many fields appeared to be untilled, I suppose from want of population and want of seed.

No. 17.—MR. H. C. B. C. RABAN, C. S., *Officiating Magistrate and Collector, POOREE.*

[Examined at Pooree, 21st December 1866].

I am Magistrate and Collector (Officiating) of Pooree. To the best of my recollection I landed on the 6th October.

The famine operations were actively being prosecuted. The system had slightly suffered from

Mr. Barlow's absence, as the control of them had almost entirely been concentrated in his hands. The department of accounts was in some confusion, and there was some giving of relief to improper objects in the town; but there was no diminution of actual relief as far as the mass of the people was concerned. When I arrived, there was an apprehension of the stores of rice in hand falling short but; our relief operations were never checked generally. The only thing that was checked was the Government sales. At one or two relief centres, a temporary difficulty was felt owing to the carelessness of mohurrins in not giving timely notice of requirements, and the difficulties of transport and communication. There was heavy rain about the 23rd October. I have been to Cuttack and to Khoorda, and up to the boundary of the district on the sea-coast on the Cuttack side. When I arrived there was actual starvation amongst the people coming in, and when I returned from Cuttack on the 28th October, I saw three cases of persons by the road-side who would have died had they not been helped. I also heard reports of deaths.

From what I have seen, I should say that the relief operations in this district have been very successful, and have saved numbers of lives. Besides the unnochatros, *Government grain shops* were established at several places in the interior, and I am satisfied, from what I heard in every village, that this measure was productive of the best consequences by enabling persons who had money to buy. On the east side of the district, near the sea, I noticed great signs of depopulation. I have been informed by Mr. Currie that about Gope there are many signs of depopulation, but I myself have not struck so far inland. In a small tract in the eastern corner of the Gope Thannah, which I examined, I estimated the deaths at one-half of the population, but that was a bad case. It had suffered severely both from drought and flood. I should say that, taking the whole district, 25 per cent. have perished. I can only speak confidently as regards the tract I myself visited. The information, on the whole, is very imperfect. In those villages which had been affected by the flood, I was informed that the greatest positive mortality occurred previous to the flood; but that the most rapid rate of mortality was during and immediately subsequent to the floods.

I cannot form an estimate as to the exact proportion of deaths due respectively to the droughts and floods.

No. 18.—BABOO RAMBUGGUN RAM, of POOREE.

[Examined at Pooree, 21st December 1866].

I am a Marwaree merchant. I have been twenty-five years in Pooree. I deal in cloths and rice only. I have dealt in rice this year only since April. Finding rice very scarce at Pooree, I went in April to Gopalpoor, which is a large rice mart, and bought 100 two-maund bags of coarse Arwa rice (Calcutta weight) at Rs. 8 a bag. I brought it

by cart from Gopalpoor to Rambah on the Chilka Lake; from Rambah to Nursingpatna in a boat, and thence to Pooree in carts. I sold it in bags and in small quantities at Rs. 9 and 9-4 a bag (4-8 or 4-10 per Calcutta maund). It was all sold the very day I arrived in Pooree.

In May I went to Gopalpoor again, and bought 100 bags at Rs. 9 and 9-9 a bag. I sold them at Rs. 10 a bag in Pooree. I had no capital with which to buy more at a time, otherwise I should have done so. This was also sold immediately. There was no rice in the bazar. I did not go to Gopalpoor again till August, when I bought 100 bags at Rs. 10 a bag; some of this was wet in transit, and some stolen. On that investment, I lost 50 per cent., so I did not import any more. The new rice of the early crop had come in, and prices were lower at Pooree. I know that many merchants lost in the same way when the new crop came in. Before this year, the merchants from the south used to carry off rice from this district; but this year in February they began to import it into Pooree. They went on importing regularly till September, when the new crop (Beallee) came in. Mahajuns from Pooree used to import also in the same way from Gopalpoor. These imports saved the people from starvation. The imports made by Government in no way interfered with these imports. Both the Government rice and that imported by traders was eagerly consumed at once. There was no attempt to limit the rate at which merchants should sell. In Pooree there was no considerable mortality from want till May. I cannot say whether the mohunts and other such people held any considerable quantity of grain; certainly they did not give it out in great quantities.

There is no rice of last year selling in the bazar now. There has been none at all selling during the last month or six weeks. I believe there is none or scarcely any in the place.

No. 19.—BABOO LATCHUA PATUR, of POOREE.

[Examined at Pooree, 21st December 1866].

I am a Koomtee by caste. My country is Ganjam; but I have been in Pooree twenty years. I import grain, &c., from Ganjam district. I have never imported till this year. This year I imported rice from March till April. In March and April I bought rice in Ganjam at Rs. 8 per bag of two maunds, and sold it at the rate of Rs. 8-8 and 9-8 a bag. The price rose gradually up to Rs. 11 in September. I lost considerably by the last investment, because the new rice had come into the bazar. Government rice had also come into the town. I lost about Rs. 100 in an investment of Rs. 1,000. From March to September, there was a considerable import from Ganjam, both by Ganjam and Pooree merchants. Till September, the rice I brought was immediately sold; there was a rush for it. I heard that mohunts and rich people in town had some rice, but cannot say how much. There was no attempt

made to interfere with the rates at which I sold. The Government importation did not check our imports. In Assin (September 1866), the only rice of 1865 to be got in the bazar was that which had been imported in the course of the year from Ganjam. There was no local rice to be got. At the end of Kartick (October, November,) the new rice crop having come into the market, a small quantity of Pooree district rice of the crop of 1865 was also brought into the market; but no great quantity. I do not know what it was in the second half of November; but I know that there is very little old rice of the district to be got in the market now. In December, after the new crop came in, some of the old rice which had been imported from Ganjam was taken back to Ganjam.

No. 20.—BABOO GOOPEE PUNDAH BRAHMIN, of POOREE.

[Examined at Pooree, 21st December 1866].

I have been ten years in Pooree, and trade in cloth. This year I have imported rice from Ganjam, I bought it at first at Rs. 8 a bag, and imported 4,000 bags (about) and sold the rice readily. In September the only old rice in the bazar was Ganjam rice. I do not know whether any old rice of the Pooree district has since come into the market, nor whether there is any to be got in the market now, as I have given up the rice trade. There was no attempt at any time to interfere with my rates of sales.

No. 21.—BABOO KHETRIBUR BHUGWAN, RAT SING, Zemindar of KOTDES.

[Examined at Pooree, 21st December 1866].

I pay a revenue of Rs. 81,000 per annum. My estate contains 71,000 acres of cultivated land. It has 699 villages. In September 1865, they contained 1,03,500 men, women, and children. This has been ascertained by census in September 1866. Out of this number, 30,500 had died up to September 1866, and 73,000 remained. The ryots began to die in March; they are still dying in small numbers now (in December). Mortality was greatest in June and July. Inundations took place in August. About three-fourths of the entire mortality had taken place before the inundations. If there had been no inundation, I believe nearly one-fourth of the deaths would not have occurred. In 1863 the crop was good. In 1864 about sixteenths of the crops were lost through want of rain. In 1865 three-fourths of the Beallee crop were lost through drought; and the same proportion of the Sarud crop was also lost all over my estate. There was no cold weather crop at all in 1865-66; it was not even sown on account of want of rain; for the Beallee crop of 1866 only half the usual breadth of land was sown for want of seed and of men. Of the

quantity sown, about half was ruined by the inundations. For the Sarud crop of 1866 only three-fourths of the breadth of land was sown for the same reasons. Out of the crops sown much was lost by inundations. The crop has been about half of an average crop. Antorodh suffered more than Kotdes from drought. The people who died from cholera were not more than in an ordinary year. There was not much rice stored about my estate by any one.

In consequence of the short crop in 1864, I had less rice in my stores just before the Sarud crop of 1855 was cut than I usually have at that time of the year,—about one-fourth the usual quantity,—because the ryots to whom I had advanced rice were not able to repay me out of the crop of 1864. In April, May, and June 1866, I gave some for seed to be re-paid without interest, some I gave to be re-paid at 25 per cent. interest out of the Sarud crop, and some I sold to pay my revenue. I gave a little in charity to the paupers. My rice lasted about three months, and then I was obliged to stop issues, as I had no more left than enough for my own requirements.

The Government rice saved lives, but it came too late. I am of opinion that five-eighths of the whole mortality had taken place before the Government rice arrived in the district. In my estate nothing was done till August; then a centre of relief was established at Roir Bazar. About 100 paupers only went there for food. Before that the rest had died or migrated to Gope, Cuttack, and other centres. These were people of the lower castes and classes; The more respectable, who would not seek food at the centres, died in their houses. The centre at Roir Bazar should have been opened in April or May; then 600 or 700 would have attended it. In September about 200 maunds of rice were sent for sale to Neemapana. Beside this nothing was done in my estate, which is twenty-four miles in length and twenty in breadth. More should have been done in the way of relief centres and sales. The census was made by my farmers, holders of under-tenures, &c. They did not give in lists of names, but each returned the population and deaths of each village.

The mortality in Thannah Gope, in the north-east corner of the Pooree district, was, I hear, much greater than in my estate. I understand that about half the population there have died. Paupers from that quarter came wandering into my estate, about March and April. Next to Malood and Parri-cood, the greatest distress was in Gope.

West of my estates, in Khoorda, things were better than in my estate.

I caused the enumeration of deaths and population to be made for the purpose of giving an account of the state of things in a petition to the Collector in connection with remission of revenue.

No. 22.—BABOO SHIB PERSAUD SING, *Moonsiff*,
KENDRAPARAH.

[Examined at Cuttack, 26th December 1866].

I am an inhabitant of Balasore district, and have been a Moonsiff nineteen years, principally employed in Orissa. I was appointed to Pooree in 1862 and remained there till April 1866. From October 22nd to November 22nd, I was on leave at my home in Pergunnah Katyah, in the sub-division of Jajpore. I knew that the crops had failed before I left Pooree; but heard no serious apprehensions of a famine either at Pooree nor while on leave at Jajpore. The state of things which has occurred was not then anticipated in either district. On my return to Pooree, I heard of the scarcity in Malood and Parricood, and that people were beginning to die there for want of food. The Collector Mr. Barlow was at that time raising a subscription for relief purposes. I told the Collector my opinion that such a subscription would be totally insufficient for the requirements, and suggested that measures such as were taken by Mr. Ricketts in Balasore in 1239 and 1240 should be adopted, *viz.*, that works should be undertaken on a large scale, centres for gratuitous relief opened, and rice imported from Calcutta for sale. I was in Balasore in 1239-40, and witnessed these measures. Tuccavee advances were then also given to the zemindars for the benefit of their estates, and recovered by instalments. The scarcity of 1240 was caused by inundation. I also recommended that labor should be paid for in grain rather than in cash. The Collector made recommendations to Government in accordance with these suggestions. The Government ordered the Public Works Department to take in hand the metalling of the Khoorda and Ganjam Road, and tanks were also commenced in the Satparah Government estate, which is about four miles from Malood and Parricood. These were undertaken towards the close of February. The people began to leave Malood and Parricood late in November, and flocked into Pooree. There were a few deaths before February; but the great mortality began in that month. The mortality in Satparah did not begin till late in March. The people there found employment and support in loading and weighing salt, which was then being purchased in quantities by dealers from Cuttack, in which district the stores of Government salt have been used up.

The mortality in Chowbeesood, Seraee, Limbhai, and other pergunnahs in the south of Pooree district cannot be said to have set in till late in March or beginning of April. In those pergunnahs the Beeree (Kelaie) and Dalo rice crops had done something to support the people; but in Malood and Parricood no crop but the cold weather rice is grown, and that had been entirely destroyed by the drought. In parts of the north-east of the district (Thannah Gope), the mortality began about the same time as in Chowbeesood; but the famine was never so severe there as in Malood and Parricood. The money collected by subscriptions was dealt out to the families who were reported deserving of relief by the canongoes and zemindars.

The people who had flocked into Pooree began to die at the same time; but there had been no great mortality before I left in April. The re-digging of the Nurendree tank had been undertaken in the town by popular subscription in order to give employment.

Up to the time when I left, no relief houses had been opened, the subscription money only was distributed to families. The mohunts also fed paupers on mohapershad. Some of the mohunts had considerable stores of rice, and I believe have them still; but I do not believe that all the grain in the Pooree district would have supported the whole population till the early crop was cut. There was still more rice stored in the Cuttack and Balasore districts, and I believe if that had all been made available it would have sufficed to support the population not only for one year, but for two. I can point out persons even now who have large stores of old rice—Roghnath Dass, of Cuttack and Kotdes, Mohunt Mohun Dass, of Pooree, Mohunt Chuckerbutty Dass and Gowresham Jena, of Kendraparah. Gowresham Jena and his brother Radhasham Narindra used to give grain out to their tenants all through on loan. Roghnath Dass sold a little; so did Mohunt Mohun Dass. I never had any conversation with the Commissioner of Cuttack on the subject of the stores of rice till about a month ago when he visited Kendraparah. The cause of the scarcity was that the ryots had sold so much of the crop of previous years to exporters; those near the sea particularly had drained themselves. The crop of 1865 being so short but little was exported; very little more than what was due to the exporters on advances which had been made before. I believe that the zemindars who held their rice did so *bona fide* in the apprehension that their supplies might run short for their own requirements and those of their tenants and dependents. When I reached Kendraparah in the Cuttack district on the 30th April, I found matters worse there than I had left them. In Pooree Koojung and Atkhuntah pergunnahs were, in my opinion, as badly off as Malood, or very nearly. The portions near the sea had produced no crop at all. Many of the people were migrating to Killa Dhankanul, where there had been good crops, and where the Rajah was trying to attract settlers. Many people from the interior had also flocked into Kendraparah, which is a considerable bazar, and where several rich people reside. In the interior people began to die in May, chiefly in consequence of feeding on unwholesome leaves and weeds. In Kendraparah itself they did not begin to die till June. In July and August there was great mortality in Kendraparah. I did not hear of much mortality in the mohussil. The population of the parts which were worst off had migrated to Calcutta and elsewhere. Till June nothing was done for the Kendraparah sub-division. No labor was provided either by Government or by private individuals. The Zemindars, Deputy Collector, Moonsiff, and others were feeding the poor on cooked rice; but there was no organized relief. In my opinion 400 or 500 people had died in Kendraparah town before the end of June. There was cholera;

but it was confined almost entirely (though not quite) to the destitute, who were living on unwholesome food.

Just at the end of May about 30 carts of rice were sent to Kendraparah from Cuttack, and a Relief Committee was organized in the town. Cooked rice was distributed perhaps to 500 or 600 people. We could only give them very little each, as we had not enough rice. About the middle of June we received a supply of rice from False Point; some little for sale at 5 seers per rupee, and a good deal for relief operations. We opened no other centre till August, when Mr. Kirkwood came out and selected six other places within eight miles of one another, at which centres were then opened.

It would have been more convenient for the people if these centres had been opened earlier; but I cannot say that the want of them caused any loss of life. Those who were really destitute could always come, and I believe they did come to Kendraparah. As the season progressed, the number of persons who had parted with their all and become paupers increased. Hence there was greater necessity for a number of centres scattered about the interior. Notwithstanding that the people were fed better than was their wont at the centres deaths were numerous, and even now are going on in spite of all that is being done in the way of medical care, &c. The reason is that Ooryahs cling so closely to caste and respectability, they would not come to the centres for public charity until they were in the last stage of debility, so far gone that they could not be recovered. Many people of other than the lowest castes, and even many women of the lowest castes, died in their houses rather than come out for relief. For the future welfare of the tracts which suffered most in Pooree and Cuttack, there is absolutely no expedient except the revival of the salt manufacture by Government. Nothing was done, or could be done, in the Kendraparah district till the end of the rains to give employment to the people, the country being under water. A month ago the Commissioner went out and started many relief works.

Kendraparah is under water every year; but this year it was much worse than usual. The Aul Rajah does not keep up his embankments properly, hence the country was flooded this year. Some of the Executive Engineers' embankments also broke. In Koojung, Atkhuntah, and Teekan I am of opinion that three-fourths both of the Beallee and Sarud crop of 1866 have been ruined by the inundation. In the rest of Kendraparah sub-division not more than one-fourths has been injured. If there had been no inundation this year, perhaps one-sixteenth of the people who have died would have escaped. I was in Pooree to April 14th, but did not go out towards the Chilka. My knowledge of Chowbeesood, Limbhai, and Seraee is derived from what I heard from the Deputy Collector in charge of the Government estate and others. More of the lower classes died than of the higher, because, when driven to support themselves on roots and unwholesome things, the more respectable people ate sparingly, but the lower classes ate plentifully and died in consequence.

No. 23.—MR. W. C. LACEY, *District Superintendent of Police*, CUTTACK.

[Examined at Cuttack, 26th December 1866].

I was in Pooree as District Superintendent from 1863 till October 1866. I am thoroughly acquainted with the country and language of Orissa. I was in Cuttack on duty in the first part of October 1865, and commenced my cold weather tour in the Pooree district in November. I went *via* Khoorda to Tanghy and into Banpoor, and thence round by Malood and Parricood, and so into Pooree, which I reached about the 25th November. I remained in the station all December, and went out again early in January to the north-east of the District Gope, &c. Was out about twenty days, and then returned to Pooree, and accompanied the Lieutenant Governor to Cuttack about the middle of February. Remained there about ten days, returned to Pooree, and towards the end of March, or early in April, went out towards Khoorda on police duty and was out a week. During my first tour in November, I did not find the crops about Khoorda so bad as I saw them in other places, nor was so much distress apparent. In Malood and Parricood there had been total destruction of crops. The people were starving; but up to that time there had been but little mortality. From Parricood I came into Pooree along the sands, and did not see the crops. I sent in bi-weekly reports to the Magistrate. I sent these to the Magistrate of my own motion during my first tour, and my impression is that I sent some during subsequent tours; but I am not certain. I also recorded what I saw in my Police diaries, which are submitted to the Deputy Inspector General. The Deputy Inspector General sends any extracts which he thinks proper for the information of the Inspector General, and returns the originals to the District Superintendent with his remarks. Major Gordon is Deputy Inspector General of this Circle, which comprises all Orissa, and also several districts in Bengal. He succeeded Major Paterson towards the end of 1865. My impression is that the Deputy Inspector General visited Orissa in 1865, or in the early part of 1866; it was after the tightness in prices had set in. I do not know for certain where the Inspector General was during the hot weather, but I believe in the hills. When I returned to Pooree in December, paupers in small numbers were dropping in. All through December I received bad accounts from Malood, Parricood, and other pergunnahs on the Chilka Lake. Distress was also beginning to be felt in other parts. dacoities, as a general rule, do not occur in the Pooree district, but they began in November. They went on continually from that time, and did not cease in December and January. I do not remember how prices were in those months; but the Police made special periodical returns of prices at certain marts to the Magistrate. When I went out in January towards Thannah Gope, distress was beginning to be felt, as also in Kotdes. I did not go through the worst part of Gope. They had some crops in the part which I visited; but I could not then judge how much Kotdes was better off than Gope.

I do not remember to what particular quarter of the district my report of the 24th January regarding distress and starvation refers. I can't explain how it happens that on the 24th January, I reported rice to be selling at 6½ Cuttack seers, while the Board returns for the week ending 27th January give 10½ Calcutta seers, but I believe my own figures to be correct. At that time the feeling of the people in the country, as far as they expressed it to me, was that a famine was certain. The allusion to "famine and pestilence decimating that part of the country" in my diary dated Tuesday, the 30th January, relates to the Gope division. The following passage in the diary of the 31st January—"the town is full of wandering beggars coming from the mofussil to beg or steal as may be; lots of children in the same condition"—relates to people driven in by famine. Many cases of arson occurred about that time in Khoorda and Banpoor, actuated, according to my impression, by malice against the holders who refused to advance or sell rice. When in my diary, 2nd February 1866, I used the words—"rice 7 seers per rupee; I fear it will be 3 or 4 seers before we have got through the next six months; a terrible famine is now certain"—it was based on my opinion formed from what I had heard and seen. I think that opinion was shared by the Native community to a very large extent, but not universally. Some of them talked as if they thought there were large stores of grain. Those who talked in this way were the poorer classes anxious to buy grain, and who could not get it.

I don't think the other European officers took so serious a view as I did. I think the general impression among them was that there was grain in the country. In February things were going on from bad to worse. In the Lake Pergunnahs they were very bad. In Gope not so much so, but still very bad. In my diary, 27th February, I record great mortality. There were many deaths in Pooree which were put down to cholera. I have no doubt that starvation accelerated that disease. I went to meet the Lieutenant Governor when he arrived at Pooree in February. I did not report personally to His Honor the state of the district. I was not asked any questions about it by him.

Q.—Did you not think it your duty, holding so strong an opinion, as you did, regarding the famine, present and impending, to bring that opinion to the notice of the Lieutenant Governor?

A.—I was in constant communication with Mr. Barlow, and he was fully in possession of my views. I also had some conversation on the subject with Mr. Cockburn. I cannot, however, say that I expressed my opinion to Mr. Cockburn in the precise terms used in my diary; but I am quite sure that I had not altered that opinion. The general tenor of my remarks must have been in accordance with those expressed in my diary of 2nd February. As far as I could gather, Mr. Cockburn's impression was that my opinion was too strong, and that there were stores of grain in the country.

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I do not know that Mr. Barlow gave any opinion contrary to mine: I did not hear him express any decided opinion at that time.

I was a member of the Relief Committee. I did not recollect any special discussion or resolution regarding the existence or otherwise of large stores in the country.

I have no means of estimating with any approach to accuracy the yield of the crops of 1865; but in my opinion a yield of one-third may be taken as the maximum; the Khoorda crop being tolerably good; but in other parts of the district, the crop was very much worse. I recollect a discussion in the Relief Committee regarding the necessity of appealing to the public for aid. So far as I remember, it was settled that Mr. Barlow was to write to the English papers, but he did not do so for some time. I cannot account for the delay; my impression is that it was due to an oversight.

In March things became worse than in February; but the transition from scarcity to famine was so gradual that I cannot undertake to fix the period at which the line was passed. When I went from Pooree to Khoorda at the end of March, I travelled by night. I do not recollect much about the country between those places. Beyond Khoorda, I heard a good deal of the famine, but did not see many signs of it. Crime continued spread in March and April.

Q.—In the Police diaries for March and April, which have been received by us from Pooree, as containing the allusions to the famine, we have found less frequent and decided references to the famine than in the months previous to the end of February, can you account for this?

A.—The previous diaries were written when I was on tour in the country, and personally aware of the state of things. In March and April, I was not much out, and I had also much office work; but I was always in constant communication with the Magistrate. My opinion certainly was that matters were then getting worse and worse.

Q.—On the 30th April you made some very strong remarks in your diary, urging the absolute necessity of Government acting in the matter, recording the great mortality and great increase of dacoity by large gangs of starving men, expressing your opinion that a gloomy time was coming, and suggesting import of grain—was that record of your opinion carried to the Magistrate of the district?

A.—Not to the Magistrate of the district, but direct to the Deputy Inspector General. I don't know where the Deputy Inspector General then was, nor where the Inspector General then was. Most certainly the substance of all I then wrote was then communicated to the Magistrate. I can't exactly say what the Magistrate's view then was. The Magistrate was then living next door to me. Having communicated to the Magistrate and Deputy Inspector General, I did not think that any further special communication was necessary. I was not aware at the time that in

March, Mr. Barlow had written to Government to say that no further remedial measures were necessary. I cannot say when the European officers became convinced that a serious famine was impending over the country. I think the worst period of famine was that before the Government stores of rice had arrived. I think the Government rice to a very great extent abated the famine; but I should say that it would be found from first to last that of those who received it as many died as were saved, in consequence of their previous exhausted state. From the time when the Government rice arrived, I do not think there was enough for the whole district; but there was sufficient for the operations then being carried on. Had there been more rice, the operations might have been largely extended. Had there been more rice, I should have extended the number of shops for the sale of rice, and I should have sold below market rates. I think the relief centres for the gratuitous distribution of food to the indigent were sufficient. I think that if there had been more shops for the sale of cheap rice, more people would have found means of purchasing. So far as I ever saw at the relief centres, food was always given to the really indigent who came for it; but I had nothing to do with the management of these centres, or with the arrangements for forwarding the rice. If there had been more rice, I think there might have been difficulty in forwarding it; possibly with great efforts it might have been overcome, but I cannot say for certain. I had a good deal to do with the landing of the rice. I think that all was done that could have been done. I don't know enough of the means used for forwarding the rice into the interior of the country, to give a general opinion whether the arrangements were efficient. I visited at different times the several relief centres. I consider that the arrangement connected with them were generally efficient. Some weeks before I left, the Magistrate desired me to make enquiries regarding the mortality, and a rough census of the previous and present population was made by the Police. Police officers were sent to ascertain, as well as they could by local enquiries, what the number of families was before and after the famine. I have no means of judging how far the returns were correct. When I came back to Cuttack, these returns had been sent in. I do not think these were so carefully prepared for that district as the Pooree ones.

If there had been more relief centres, the lives of some people, who could not reach the existing centres, might have been saved; but I think the disadvantages on the other side would have preponderated, owing to the difficulty of supply and management. But in the early days of the famine, I advocated out-door relief by an allowance of money to destitute families: and although I was in a minority and ceased to urge that measure after it was stopped, I have throughout continued to be of opinion that that mode of relief might have been advantageously adopted. I think the distribution of money would have been much easier than the distribution of rice, and that the recipients might have bought from the Government shops.

During the famine the greatest mortality has been among the lower classes, i. e., the classes who are not themselves farmers but labor for others.

The mortality among the ryots has also been large, but not nearly in so great a proportion: the mortality among them occurred later in the season, as they had some stores of grain. In July I think that most of the cultivators had not sufficient rice for their own use. Most of the ryots here are Thannee ryots: I can't say whether there was any distinction between these and the Pye ryots.

I think that the measures started early in the year for relief were efficient so far as they went. The Khoordah and Piply Road afforded a great measure of relief to the people of that and the surrounding parts. At first there was nothing started in Gope, but afterwards a road was put in hand. Some of the lower classes—the Baoores and such like—seem to me to be almost extinct, in the Pooree district.

Q.—Much of the mortality has been attributed to the prejudice of the better classes against leaving their homes for labor and against going to the unnochatros for food, it might thence have been supposed that the better castes would have suffered more than the lower; when labor in the early part of the season, and both labor and food in the latter part, were available to the classes not influenced by caste prejudices,—how do you account for the excess of mortality in those last-mentioned classes?

A.—The mortality among the lower classes commenced much earlier, and my opinion is, that among them a great deal of the evil had been done before efficient measures for relief had been organised. Even later in the day, great mortality continued among these classes; they came to the centres in large numbers, but still great many of them died.

I think that the ryots of this part of the country labor tolerably well, but that they are generally on the whole very improvident; but I have not had an opportunity of comparing them with the ryots of the other parts of the country. There is, however, a proportion of provident men among them. The general character of the zemindars is, in my opinion, very bad. I cannot compare them with the ryots, because they are very bad in a different way. They are very fond of squeezing every penny of rent out of the ryots at the earliest hour, and are guilty of a great many other exactions at the same time. They do not assist their ryots in any way. I should say the old Orissa zemindars, and the proprietors of what are called the Killa-jat, are, without exception, grossly improvident; many of them have been sold out. Among the new zemindars, that is to say, the purchasers, there are some who are rich; but most of them are also improvident and partake of the same character as the others.

The surburakars and mokuddums are also very fond of squeezing the ryots. In the famine, so far as has come to my knowledge, very little assistance has been given by the zemindars to the pauper

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population, or to their own ryots. The only exception to my personal knowledge, as far as I can recall, is the Rajah of Parricood. I was born at Pooree, and with the exception of a few years in England, I have been in the Pooree and Cuttack districts all my life. The remarks in the latter part of my examination apply equally to both those districts. It would be very difficult to trace any improvement of their estates due to the zemindars during all the period that I have known these districts.

I don't think that if it had been possible to throw into the market and distribute all the rice of the Pooree district, it would have sufficed to carry the people through until the Beallee crop came to maturity, even if that crop had not been destroyed by the inundations. I am not aware that old rice has come into the market largely since the Sarud crop was cut. Comparing the ryots in the Killa-jat with those in the Moghul-bundee estates, I should say that those in the latter are on an average better off. The Killa-jats are the estates on a permanent quit-rent; Moghul-bundee estates are those temporarily settled. I attribute the inferior condition of the ryots in the Killa-jat estates to the greater license possessed by the zemindars and rajahs of those estates. These latter have no actual legal power; but there is an absence of law, there is no settlement, and they practically exercise much greater power in the matter of ousting tenants and in all matters. The Thanee ryots have not the same security in their own estates that these ryots have in the Moghul-bundee estates.

No. 24.—REVEREND WILLIAM MILLER.

[Examined at Cuttack, 26th December 1866].

I am a Missionary of the Orissa Baptist Mission, and have been a resident of Cuttack and Pooree districts for twenty years. I have been in Orissa during the whole of the famine.

In January 1866 I went out in the east of the Cuttack district; was out 14 days; was out again in the end of January and part of February in the tributary mehals, west of Cuttack. In March and April was at Cuttack, and visited Piply monthly; was at Pooree from 6th May to 7th of June.

About the end of October no rice was procurable in the Cuttack bazar. On the 28th Mr. Buckley and I went to Jobra, about a mile out of the town, and found two boats half loaded with rice; found a large crowd collected there trying to buy, but the mahajun was afraid to give it out, as the quantity was limited, and the crowd disorderly. Mr. Buckley and I succeeded in inducing the mahajun to sell at 8 Cuttack seers for the rupee to the people. Altogether there was a great want of rice in Cuttack all through November. In December, when the crops were cut, a little more came in; but in that month even and January the quantity available was very limited. I estimate

the crop in the Cuttack district at about one-third of a full crop. There was no doubt among the Natives that the crops of 1865 had failed. Up to a certain time the promise was very good (up to the end of September); after that they were ruined by the drought. Soon after the end of September I remember hearing the people in a village say that two or three days would decide whether the crop would be a first-rate one, or a complete failure.

As to whether there was a large supply of old grain in the Cuttack district, the opinion of the Natives was divided; but I think the belief that there was a large supply of grain preponderated, and that it was generally said that it would be forthcoming if the Government would put on a little pressure.

This opinion was not confined to the lowest orders; it was also held by respectable persons, such as the better members of our Christian community, on whose judgment I place reliance. It was not generally believed that the stocks in the Pooree district were as large as those in Cuttack. My own opinion was that there were considerable stocks of old grain in the district. Roghoo Nath Chowdhry, especially, was known to hold large stocks in different parts; but I never thought that the stocks would suffice to carry the people through till the next crop should come in. In January it was generally anticipated that matters would get worse in the spring, because rice ordinarily is at its lowest in January, and from the rate which ruled in that month we drew the conclusion. In January and February people felt the pressure of high prices severely; but there was no actual famine and no mortality from starvation, as far as I am aware, in Cuttack or about Piply. I did not observe any emaciation in those months. In March things were worse; and by the beginning of April, deaths from starvation had begun about Piply, in the north-west of the Pooree district; but I do not recollect that any such deaths were brought to my notice as having occurred in the town of Cuttack up to the end of April. By the end of April, I was shocked by the altered general appearance of the people about Piply. My opinion decidedly is that there was much active famine about Piply and the Pooree district during the month of April. In the Cuttack district even, when I was out, in January, I believed that the existing state of things was very near a famine. I do not remember having any direct communication with the Commissioner on the subject up to April; possibly Mr. Buckley, the senior Missionary, communicated with him. I believe that the first appeal to the public was made by Messrs. Sykes and Co., on information originally derived from Mr. Buckley and from Mr. Phillips of Jellalore. Looking back at circumstances as they occurred, I now believe that I and all others who thought seriously of the matter must have been impressed as early as the beginning of February, or even the end of January, with the idea that it would be necessary that rice should be imported by some agency to enable the people to exist until the next crop came in; but I do not remember any formal discussion

being held among ourselves as to the necessity of moving the officials to act towards importing. We thought that they had full information on the subject, and that they were minding their own business. I was not aware up to May whether the officials were or were not taking steps to import rice. I do not remember ever urging on any of them the necessity of importing, nor do I remember any remarks being passed among ourselves as to their backwardness in making arrangements towards importation. I was not then aware that they were backward.

When I reached Pooree on the 6th May, I found things much worse than I had left them in Cuttack. There were in the town a large and increasing number of people who had come in from the district. I never saw such objects in my life. I saw many who were at death's door, and many deaths were occurring. These were paupers who had recently flocked into Pooree from the mofussil. A day or two after my arrival, I communicated with Mr. Barlow. I think he was fully alive to the fact that a great famine was upon the country. I had just received Rs. 500 from Messrs. Sykes' Fund, and discussed with Mr. Barlow and Mr. Lacey the best means of disposing of it. We determined to open an unnochatro at once. I am not aware whether Mr. Barlow adopted any special measures in the way of appealing direct to Government. I was, however, under the impression that he had done so. At that time, in consequence of the importation from Gopalpoor, rice was cheaper in Pooree than in Cuttack, although the number of starving people was much greater in Pooree. During the whole month that I was at Pooree, the state of things got worse and worse. I took charge of the unnochatro while I was at Pooree. About 300 were being fed there daily. We ought to and should have fed a much larger number if we had had the means. In addition to distributing food at the unnochatro, I was relieving the poor by money.

From Pooree I went to Piply, where I established an unnochatro under the Pooree Relief Committee. Matters were quite as bad then at Piply as at Pooree in proportion to the population. The Baorees and Tantees were suffering principally. The ryots were not suffering so much, probably because they had a little rice which carried them on a little time. I stayed at Piply one day only, and returned to Cuttack about the 9th of June. Things were not as bad there as I had left them at Pooree; indeed I never saw such dreadful objects in Cuttack as I did at Pooree. The famine in Cuttack began later than in Pooree, and hence the relief measures in Cuttack were taken earlier in relation to the beginning of the famine, although in point of date they were undertaken later. In my opinion, when once operations commenced in Cuttack, all was done that could possibly have been effected by the existing official agency; but there was a great scarcity of public officers, and I do not know what we should have done without the aid of the Irrigation Company's officers. From the time that the importation commenced, I do not

think that the supply of imported grain was sufficient for the wants of the district. More might have been done if there had been more grain and more officers; carriage might have been found on which to despatch it to the interior. If there had been more grain, I should have advocated the opening out of a few more centres for gratuitous relief; but more especially the extension of places for sale of rice at cheap rates. I think that this would have diminished the number of paupers, and have enabled a number of people to remain in their houses and carry on their occupations instead of becoming absolutely destitute. If the sales had been more extensive, of course close supervision would have been necessary to prevent abuse. I visited some of the relief centres, and on the whole was of opinion that they were as efficiently managed as could be expected under the circumstances. I believe that the Government sales at market rates were more extensive than the sales made at lower rates by the Relief Committees. The whole amount sold was not large as compared with the requirements of the district.

On several occasions the supplies of rice in the relief shop which I superintended ran short, and I had to stop sales at rates below the market price, because I could not get any more rice, the grain in the Collector's store being insufficient. I am aware that other members of the Committee were occasionally similarly stinted in the relief shops.

I am of opinion that the Government relief materially diminished the mortality; but that a large number of the people who came to the relief centres were so far gone that they eventually died. The cause of this was that the relief centres were opened too late. Even after the unnochatros were open, many people of their own free will kept away from the unnochatros out of fear of losing caste. The Relief Committee, however, took every precaution in this respect which was practicable, such as selecting Brahmin cooks. Of the works which were going on, I only saw the Cuttack and Pooree Road in May. I was disappointed as to the number employed, and I ascertained the reason of the paucity to be that the people were paid by task-work, and that the payments were so low that none but an able-bodied man could obtain a subsistence. The people would not take the work. I heard at the time that people were better paid on other works, such as the Khoordha and Ganjam Road. Subsequently, at the end of May, the Pooree Relief Committee started works on which all applicants for relief were made to work in proportion to their powers, and were paid in rice. I mentioned to Mr. Barlow what was going on in the Pooree Road, and it is my impression that he wrote on the subject to the officers of the Public Works Department. I think the famine was at its worst in August and part of September, after which the cutting of the Beallee and private importations from Sumbulpoor, as well as the Government importations, mitigated its severity. There was considerable private importation from Sumbulpoor. Although the Baorees and lower classes had less prejudice against applying

at the centres for relief, and also had less objection to labor, yet the mortality among them was much greater than among the more respectable classes. I attribute this to the fact that the relief measures were adopted too late. Even the Baorees do not readily leave their houses for employment at any distance. Again, the Baorees live on daily wages from hand to mouth, whereas the ryots had their bullocks and brass vessels to sell before they were pauperized. I consider that the Ooryahs are tolerably industrious cultivators, but rather improvident. I think that where water is available, they would work night and day to save their crops by it. They manure their land to some extent. I consider that the zemindars are bad landlords, hopelessly bad; they take advantage of the ryots in every possible way. Most of them are improvident and in debt. I do not believe that they have made the slightest attempt to improve their estates in any way since I have been in Orissa. I instance the Kotdes zemindaree, of which the landlord is very much in debt, and the estates of Rughnauth Chowdry, who is very rich and well off, as estates in which the ryots are treated with notable hardship, and in which nothing has been done for improvement. Rughnauth Chowdry has even allowed the roads which his father-in-law made to go to ruin.

I think that there is no hope of improvement until the rights of the ryots are secured and a permanent settlement made. By a permanent settlement I mean one under which the rights of the ryots are fixed as well as those of the zemindars. A permanent settlement which should fix nothing but the revenue payable to Government by the zemindar would not, in my opinion, do the slightest good to the country. The ryots would be more at the mercy of the zemindars than ever.

I think that the main reason why the water of the Irrigation Company is not more freely taken is that the zemindars are using their influence to prevent the ryots taking it, under the impression that the assessment on their estates may be raised if the lands are irrigated. Were it not for this influence, I believe that the cultivators would readily take water at reasonable rates. I have no knowledge as to the rates which are now demanded by the Irrigation Company; but Rs. 5 an acre seems to me very high. I doubt whether the ryots would readily agree to take water for rice crops annually without reference to seasons. They would prefer waiting for the rains, which are ordinarily sufficient to mature the rice; but if they could get water for irrigation from December to April, they would sow the Dalo rice, which is cut in April. With water available exactly when they require it, I am sure they would grow cotton, sugar cane, and many other crops.

No. 25.—MR. HENRY PLACID CRANE.

[Examined at Cuttack, 26th December 1866].

I was appointed to the Cuttack and Balasore Road, stationed at Bahmuny, in the Cuttack district, in January 1866. There was great scarcity, but not actual famine at that time. In February I was employed on the Pooree and Cuttack Road, in charge of the six miles immediately north of Pooree. When I took charge, the people were in a wretched state. They were emaciated, and looked as if they had already suffered; but I don't think there had been many deaths up to that time. After that matters continued to get worse. Before I went there, the work was carried on by daily labor. At my suggestion, this was changed to task-work, the rate fixed being Re. 1-8 per 1,000 cubic feet. This was too low. I tried it, but found that the men in their emaciated condition could not earn more than four pice each a day. While daily labor was in operation, the laborers were obliged for a fixed payment to turn out a certain quantity of work, which only able-bodied men could do. I thought that task-work would be better if the rates were liberal. This I tried to obtain, suggesting Rs. 1-14 per 1,000 cubic feet. The Executive Engineer at first objected to any increase, but ultimately raised it to Rs. 1-12 per 1,000 cubic feet. This was at the latter end of March or beginning of April. The result was better; but I found this even too low. No further change was made till May, when it was raised to Rs. 3-8 per 1,000 cubic feet. In March the country was in a very bad state; many deaths occurred. In April it grew worse, and continued to do so until June, when it reached its maximum. I have still charge of the above road; also of certain embankments in the Pooree district, to the east and west of Pooree. At Kurmulla things were very bad, the country being almost deserted. I was at Pooree when the Lieutenant Governor passed. The famine was then bad, but not at its worst. When the rate was increased to Rs. 3-8, it brought in a large number of work-people; but I think the measure came too late. Those who came in, and were not too far gone, obtained some relief from the increased rate, and those who could not benefit by it were sent to the relief centres. On the six miles of road I had under me, I had as many as 700 men at work, but never more; but when I had a larger section of the road, I had as many as 2,000. I employed all who could work and were willing. As soon as the rates were increased, large numbers flocked to the works; but when the rains came, i. e., when the embankments were breached, the great majority were dismissed, as we could employ them no longer. I imagine they went to the relief centres. They were not transferred any where else by us. About the latter end of October, the works were re-opened; but then we couldn't get so many. A great many who had worked were dead or gone elsewhere, and those who had not worked were averse to task-work. There is no metal nearer to that part of the Pooree and Cuttack Road than about 40 miles, to the best of my knowledge. It is nearer towards Cuttack. About Piply, it would be comparatively easy to procure metal.

No. 26.—ISAN CHUNDER, *Vakeel*.

[Examined at Cuttack, 26th December 1866].

I hold zemindary in different parts of Cuttack. I have one zemindary on the Irrigation Company's works at Chandwar on the Kendraparah Canal. No water was taken for the crop of 1865. I think, but am not sure, that the reason was that the water was not then ready. At any rate no arrangement had then been made as to the rates and details of taking it. In that state no Beallee is grown, only Sarud. The greatest injury from drought was in the north-east of the district. I estimate loss of crop of 1865 in one district at 50 per cent. The high prices in March and April last were much enhanced by the Dandeedars, who have the whole command of the market.

It is my impression that if all the grain in the district had been carefully made available, it would have supported the people till the harvesting of the Beallee crop; that is, it would have been enough to save their lives. In this estimate I include all the kalye, dhal, as well as the rice which was in the hands of mahajuns, zemindars, &c. I estimate that 20 or 25 per cent. of the population of my estate have died from all causes during the year. I do not think that any appreciable proportion of the mortality is due to inundation; many died from cholera. In the mofussil cholera was much worse than in ordinary years. This was attributable to the greater heat and to the people being driven to feed on unwholesome things. Mortality was greatest in June, July, and August. The cause of this was the cholera, on which, of course, the importations had no immediate effect. The importation of Government rice saved many lives. I heard that people were dying from starvation, as well as cholera, in the mofussil before the rice arrived. I did not hear that any number of deaths had occurred from starvation in Cuttack before that time. The things which the people had to sell were supporting them to some extent in May and June. I can form no estimate of the proportion of the mortality which would have been avoided if Government rice had come two months sooner.

No. 27.—RUSOOL BUX, *Zemindar*.

[Examined, at Cuttack, 26th December 1866].

I was fourteen years Darogah in the Cuttack district and then Tehseeldar of Kengur. I am a resident of Burdwan. I have estates in Pergunah Sonna, north-east of Cuttack town. Not more than two or three sixteenths of the crop was saved in 1865. During the year 1,300 people died out of about 5,000. Cholera set in in March and continued to June; many died of it. People began to die of starvation in March. In May and June they were dying in great numbers; whole villages were cleared. The mortality diminished in Bhadro August September. I have stated the number of deaths in my estate from actual examination. Two relief centres were established in my estate. They saved many lives. Many men died at the unnochatros also from eating rice. It was said that the rice which was supplied by Government had been washed in lime-water, so as to preserve

it from insects. I cannot vouch for it, but it was said that this was the cause of the dysentery which often ensued after eating the rice. Afterwards, the Medical Officer of Cuttack gave instructions that ghee and good vegetables should be given with the rice, and this had the effect of stopping the dysentery. In my estates no great damage was done by the inundation of 1866. I have myself seen about the close of the month of Jaith (Jnne) that the Government rice, which was being sold at 5 seers per rupee (the bazar price being about 3 or 4 seers) at the Lunatic Asylum, was partly damaged. Two fingers' breadth at the top of some of the bags had been wet on the journey, had rotted and dried again. This was mixed with the rest and sold to the applicants. I know that people used to pick out the damaged rice before eating. People complained of this; but I did not hear of any deaths from eating this rice. This dried rice did not come in the first ship. This rice had been a long time on the road from Taldunda. The Commissioner reprimanded the Collector for the Naib Nazir's delay in bringing it in. I do not consider that any fault could justly be found with Mr. Cornell, the Collector, for this. All that was possible was done. Carts were collected from my estates among others. Of the 50 cartmen, 20 died on the way of cholera, and the remaining 30 returned to their homes deserting their carts. The cartmen from other estates died or deserted their carts in the same way. The Naib Nazir died of cholera. No works were undertaken in my estates. If Government rice had arrived two months earlier, one-eighth or one-fourth of the whole mortality in the district would have been avoided. When the Lieutenant Governor came to Cuttack, and gave out that he would not interfere with the rates of selling rice, the dealers raised the price immediately. They had rice then, but not much. One zemindar had a good deal; three or four had large quantities. I am very decidedly of opinion that if all the rice in the Cuttack district had been made gradually available, it would not have sufficed to support the population of the district till the Beallee crop was in. As early as the end of January, we began to think and talk among ourselves that the rice in the district was insufficient to carry us through, and that it would be necessary to import. We then thought that, as a matter of course, the dealers from Sumbulpoor and other places would meet the requirements. No one then supposed that they would fail to do so when prices rose, and that the duty would fall on Government. The idea that Government would import, or should import, never entered the thoughts of any one with whom I had communication, until the Commissioner applied to Government for it. The Dandeedars have got the entire command of the market. They make enormous profits, and always keep the market high. The Sumbulpoor merchants arrived with rice at Cuttack about the same time as the Government rice came in. The Government rice, in which some paddy was mixed, began to be sold at 10 and even 12 seers for the rupee. This brought down the prices, and the Sumbulpoor merchants were

disappointed in obtaining the prices they had expected. They sold what they had brought, and then as went away. After that their imports were very trifling.

Great immigration has been taking place from Koojung, Aul, and Kunika estates on the sea-side towards Dhenkanul and the Tributary Mehals, west of the district, where the people settle. The immigration is going on still.

No. 28.—MR. W. CORNELL, C. S., late Magistrate and Collector, CUTTACK.

[Examined at Cuttack, 27th December 1866].

I was officiating as Magistrate and Collector of Balasore from 1861 to 1863, and returned to Orissa as Magistrate and Collector of Cuttack, which appointment I joined on the 28th February 1866. In passing through Balasore I heard that cholera was rather bad there, and that grain scarcities were rife, and that there had been a failure of crops. My predecessor at Cuttack had been Mr. W. J. Money; but he had left Cuttack before I joined. I never saw him, and he left no memorandum for me as to the state of affairs in the district, and I ascertained that there was no diary of the tour which he had lately made in the interior. There was only a bill in which the places which he had visited were named. Mr. Webster, Assistant Magistrate, had accompanied him on the tour. When I joined there were two sub-divisions in the district. Mr. Armstrong was in charge of Jajpore; he is still there; and Baboo Doorjodhun Dass was in charge of Kendraparah; he is now at Pooree. At the sudder station were three Deputy Magistrates; Mr. Mackenzie, deceased—Baboo Hurro Chunder Ghose, and Baboo Rang Lal Banerjee; there were also two Assistants Mr. Webster, now at Kendraparah, and Mr. Ward, who is still here. Supnessur Dass was Manager of the attached estate Kanika, in the north-east of Cuttack on the sea; he had the powers of a Deputy Collector, but no criminal powers. There was also a Tehseeldar in charge of Durpun, which was then under the Court of Wards. Supnessur Dass is still at Kanika. The Tehseeldar of Durpun is, I believe, now in Cuttack. Captain Fisher was District Superintendent of Police. He was transferred about the beginning of August. He had two Assistants, Mr. Crouch and Mr. Poole, who are still here. Mr. Poole has been in charge of the Gurjats. I have no reason to believe that Captain Fisher was transferred for any reason other than his own wish. I believe he asked to be transferred, because he found the work becoming so heavy in consequence of the increase of crime. I relieved Mr. Barton, who was in temporary charge of the office. I received from him no particular information as to the state of the crops or prospects of a famine. I do not remember asking for any such information.

Q.—You had, as you say, heard of the failure of crops in the district; on taking charge of the district as Magistrate and Collector, did it occur to you that it was necessary to make particular enquiries from your predecessor as to the state of the district?

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A.—I understood that the Lieutenant Governor had lately visited Cuttack; that the whole question had been considered by him and the Board of Revenue; and that the necessary instructions had been issued by arrangements made.

Q.—Did you find any such instructions recorded in your office?

A.—I found a circular of the Board two or three months old, to the effect that no detailed enquiry into the failure of the crops was needed for the purpose of allowing remission of revenue, and that in the scarcity which was anticipated, the chief reliance must be placed on local charity. I found also some letters of the Commissioner regarding local charity and the operations of the Relief Committee. I found also a record of the speech of the Lieutenant Governor, and found no other record of the Lieutenant Governor's instructions, proceedings, or policy. No other communication of the policy of Government was made to me; nor am I yet aware that during his visit the Lieutenant Governor laid down any course to be followed, except that he rejected petitions praying that the price of grain be fixed. I only presumed that the Lieutenant Governor had fully considered the subject, and that he had confirmed the policy of the Board's circular which I have alluded to, and which he had formally approved before it was communicated to this district. I was in daily personal communication with the Commissioner, who was then in the station. Under those circumstances, I considered it rather my duty to act in accordance with his instructions than to originate any views of my own. He expressly drew my attention to the affairs of office work, which were considerable. The scarcity and possibility of a famine were not specially pressed upon me by the Commissioner as matters demanding my immediate attention.

Q.—You say that the Board's letter prohibited enquiries with a view to remission; but was there any prohibition of such enquiries as might have been made as to the condition of the people in connection with the existing scarcity?

A.—The crop was supposed to be one-third or a half of a full crop, and the idea of extreme distress was not contemplated. Such an idea did not occur to me, nor, as far as I am aware, had it occurred to any one else at that time; at least no one had brought it to my notice. I remained in the station till the beginning of May, when, under special instructions from the Commissioner, I went out to look into the state of the offices in Kendraparah and Kanika. I went out solely for that purpose.

Q.—During the months of March and April did any one bring to your notice the probability of a famine?

A.—No one did so specifically, nor did I see any indications of it in the town. I received no alarming report from the district. I did receive an application for cholera pills, which is an annual thing. There was also an increase in crime, especially in dacoities, about the end of March. The

above remarks will not apply quite to the end of April. Till that time I made no special enquiry into the state of the interior of the district. The first serious mention which I heard of the probability of a famine was in a conversation with Colonel Rundall and Mr. Boothby, in which the Commissioner took part, and at which I was present. I cannot be certain whether this took place in April or in May; but my impression is that it was in April, just before the Commissioner left Cuttack for Balasore. Before this time I had heard, as a common subject of conversation among Natives, that the Brahmins predicted three years' scarcity. I was aware of a great rise in the price of grain in the town from the end of March to the end of April. I had no knowledge of the state of the country market. I was receiving weekly price reports from one or both sub-divisions. I do not now recollect whether these showed rising prices; probably they did so. The Police gave no information on the subject.

Q.—From the Board's return of price currents received by them, it appears that on the 22nd April rice in Cuttack had reached the price of 6½ Calcutta seers (about 5 Cuttack seers) per rupee; did not that tightness of price create very severe distress, and warn you that a famine had arrived or was close at hand?

A.—The gradual rise of the prices induced me to open some relief towards the end of April; but it did not lead me to make any special enquiries or reports, because the town prices are always exceptionally high on account of the interference of the Dandeadars and the presence of troops. I had no particular knowledge at that time that grain was cheaper in the interior than in the town. I did not enquire; but grain always is cheaper in the interior. The Commissioner at this time was absent from Cuttack. Before he left Cuttack he told me that if it should happen that the bazars were closed, as it had been once in November, and that the Commanding Officer should apply to me for assistance in procuring grain for the troops in the bazars, I was to give no direct assistance in obtaining grain for them. These were verbal instructions given in reply to a question put by me. While the Commissioner was absent, communication with him in Mohurbhunj was so uncertain, and his stay was expected to be so short, that I avoided communicating with him more than was absolutely necessary. I wrote two or three demi-official letters, and I probably mentioned the state of the bazar and the scarcity.

Up to the end of April I certainly had had no direct communication with the Government or with the Board on the subject of the scarcity. I am aware that a fund called Sykes' Fund was established in Calcutta for the relief of the distress. One or two funds had also been started by Natives in the town of Cuttack. I think this was in April. I believe they distributed uncooked rice. Nemy Churn Newgee, Head Clerk of the Magistrate's office, was one of the distributors. At that time I knew the Revd. Mr. Buckley slightly. He certainly did not bring the probability or existence of a famine to my notice in April. I cannot

recollect that my attention was drawn to any statement in the public prints regarding famine in my district in the month of April. At the end of April, in consequence of a comparatively slight influx of paupers at the permanent unnochatro, and of the rise of prices, we opened a special unnochatro. The record of the proceedings of the Committee in which this was resolved upon is dated the 27th of April.

About the 6th of May I went out by dawk to Kendraparah, where I stayed a day and a half inspecting the office, and on my return recommended that a more efficient officer be sent there. I then went to Kanika via Patamoondee. I think that journey was made in the day. I stayed a day and half at Kanika, and returned to Cuttack about the 14th of May. During this tour I saw no signs of actual famine, nor did I receive any information of the existence of actual famine, although there was scarcity and cholera. On the contrary, I learned that there had been a better crop near the coast than in the interior. I met a large number of ryots at Kanika. They asked for remissions of rent; but I saw no particular signs of distress about them, nor did they ask for relief other than remission of rent. I should mention, however, that Radhasham Nurendra, a zemindar at Kendraparah, was feeding a few beggars. When I returned to Cuttack I found that grain had become dearer. It was difficult to get rice in the town. The sepoys found it specially difficult. Nothing which I saw during the first week after my return led me then to form the opinion that a great famine had come or was coming, although, after the experience which I have now had, I should recognize the signs which then occurred as indicating the approach of famine. Up to the time when the Commissioner returned, I had made no special communication to any authority. In May I received some subscribed money from Mr. Chapman, and in acknowledging it I gave him my opinion as to the probable demand for funds. I think I then under-estimated the requirements, and that I named Rs. 10,000 as likely to carry the relief up to the harvesting of the Beallee crop, i. e., in addition to the resources we already had. For a week before the Commissioner's return I was in daily expectation of his arrival.

I did not realize that a famine existed before the Commissioner returned to Cuttack; but did realize the necessity of providing special Government supplies for the troops and for the jail, and made an application for those immediately the Commissioner returned. Up to that time the means at the disposal of the Relief Committee were between Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 3,000, collected in the district, and a little grain and some subscriptions received from Mr. Chapman in Calcutta.

I believe that the Commissioner having seen famine at Balasore recognized it at Cuttack on his arrival. That was before I had realized it. Immediate measures were then taken to import grain for the troops and jail. 3,000 bags were sent from Calcutta and arrived at False Point early in June. It was all brought to Taldunda, 42 miles from Cuttack, where it arrived about the 19th of June. By

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that time there was evidently a famine in the district; but it had certainly not reached an extreme point. From the time the grain began to arrive, there was a constant importation of rice up to about October. The transport to Cuttack was delayed occasionally by want of means, especially at first, as the whole arrangements for transport were then imperfect. Of the first instalment of grain received, part was made over for the use of the jail and troops; some was made over to the Cuttack Relief Committee; some was sent from Taldunda to Kendraparah, and some was distributed at Taldunda. By the beginning of July the supplies began to be larger, but they were not abundant, and we began to establish other centres in the interior. By the end of July there was a tolerably large supply of grain, but it was by no means adequate to the requirements. We continued increasing the number of centres up to September. By the end of July I suppose twenty centres had been established, and they were fairly, but not fully, supplied with grain. August was a bad month on account of the rain and floods, but we established about ten more centres. The chief difficulty in August was in getting the rice from False Point into the interior. The whole country was then under water, and the boats had to come against the stream.

It was not till September that we got into good working order. The number relieved nearly doubled in September. The landing and despatching operations at False Point had been superintended, since the beginning of July, by Mr. Burgess, a servant of the Irrigation Company, who was lent for the purpose by Mr. Boothby. At Taldunda was Mr. Miller, of the Irrigation Company. Several other servants of the Irrigation Company were lent to us as Inspectors and Store-keepers. In July the famine was extremely bad all over the country, especially to the north, where supplies had not reached to the same extent. It was worst of all in August, and the mortality the heaviest. In September the mortality abated somewhat, but still remained heavy. Towards the end of October it had become a good deal less. In the first week of November I made over charge of the district. I think about one-third of the whole mortality was due to the effect of the floods. Up to the end of May no special works were undertaken to give relief to the poor in this district, but some were afterwards. The chief mortality was among the artisans and the low caste agricultural laborers not cultivating on their own account. I think that from one-fifth to a fourth of the whole population have died from famine and disease. Perhaps one-fourth of the whole mortality was directly caused by cholera. There is cholera every year in this district, and looking back, I now think that the excess of cholera in March, April, and May may be attributed to bad or deficient food. The people then did not complain, but no doubt suffered. I believe many died simply because they would not take help, or rather they did not make their state known. These are principally of the higher castes. Nevertheless, as I have said, the lower castes died most because they had not private stores, nor funds, nor

credit. I think that the mortality was less among those who had land of their own and had a little rice in hand—that class always has a little rice. The class I allude to are Lakirajdars and Thane ryots. I think they are more saving and frugal in proportion than the laborers. I think the Ooryah ryots are poorer than those of the eastern districts of Bengal, and more superstitious, also more idle. The zemindars, on the whole, have behaved very badly during the famine; but I have heard of several who have sold or given rice to their tenants and others. Baboo Rughoonath Chowdhry sold largely, and has made much money. They are generally not frugal or provident, and not good landlords. Many of them are non-residents. The Killah estates, having a permanent Government rent, were all more or less involved in debt when the famine began, and those on the sea-coast have suffered much from floods. Independently of the floods, I have not sufficient experience of the district to say whether the people in the Killah estates, as compared to those of other estates, suffered more or less.

I have now formed the opinion from what I have heard, that the early estimate of a third or half crop was an excess estimate, and that it certainly did not exceed a quarter crop. I have also formed the opinion that though there were some stocks of grain, they were insufficient. I think the amount of grain hoarded has been exaggerated. The people, probably up to July and August, certainly up to May, had a belief that the zemindars and rice-dealers could supply more than they did. When I came to the district it was the popular belief that they had enough to supply the district for a year or more. There was no official inquiry or consultation on this point. I believe the Commissioner derived his information on the point from popular opinion. The omlah and mooktears and such like people held that opinion, and the zemindars and merchants, when questioned, generally admitted having some grain, and said that others had more. Colonel Rundall, in the conversation already alluded to, expressed an opinion that there was not grain enough in the country to feed the people.

I wish to state that I think the Police have been insufficient in number to cope with the crime and assist in famine matters; and after Captain Fisher's removal, his successor was not sent for two months. Captain Fisher was at first averse to giving me the assistance of the Police in regard to transport and such matters. Up to the end of May, the Police gave me no information regarding the impending famine, but grain dacoities were certainly reported. I think it a pity that rice was not sold cheaper about the end of June and beginning of July. Although the stock was not very large, what was sold dear might have been sold cheaper. I think that there was also a deficiency of officers under the Magistrate, and that in consequence the supervision of relief operations was not so efficient as it might have been, especially towards the coast. I was unable to give it all the attention I could have wished. Other work, and especially criminal work, weighed on me, and I had a large correspondence regarding importation. I had also not a sufficiency

of clerical assistance. I postponed ordinary works for relief operations as far as I possibly could; but the examination of witnesses and such work could not be postponed, and I was unable to leave the station. I applied for extra officers, and so did the Committee, but we did not get them; except one man, while another was removed. I think that the number of centres eventually established was sufficient. In October there was a break in the importation of rice, in consequence of which sales were contracted and relief operations somewhat impeded. Our means of transport were then in excess of the supply. In July the landing and transport means were (but not at all times) equal to receive the rice then in the ships. The operations were also impeded by bad weather and by the distance of the ships from the shore. The rice received from Burmah was not thought by the doctors very wholesome, and there was much loss from deficient packing.

No. 29.—MR. T. H. H. SHORTT, C. S., *Sub-Divisional Officer, BHUDRUK.*

[Examined at Cuttack, 27th December 1866].

I was appointed Assistant to the Magistrate and Collector of Balasore in March 1863, and took charge of the Bhudruk sub-division on the 17th February 1866. When I left Balasore, there were indications of approaching famine. Prices were getting up a little in the bazar; crime was increasing, and people were saying generally that a famine was impending. When I reached Bhudruk, I found the state of things much better than at Balasore. There had been a better crop there and less exportation, Bhudruk being more inland. I estimate the crop of 1865 over the Bhudruk sub-division at half an average crop. I was travelling about the sudder sub-division of Balasore in December 1865, and from what I saw, I estimate the average of the crop over that sub-division at three-sixteenths of a full crop. I was out with the Collector, but not for the special purpose of estimating the crops. We did, however, look very particularly at them. After joining Bhudruk, I did not go out of the station, except for a day or so, till May. Crime increased fearfully in March and April, principally grain dacoities and arson. I did not perceive any other signs of famine. Rice was becoming dearer gradually. In March I was directed by the Collector to keep him informed if any signs of famine appeared. I discussed the subject with respectable and intelligent zemindars and others. Their opinions differed as to the prospects of a famine. Very few, if any, thought there would be a great famine. This was the state of things up to the end of April—nothing but twelve hours' criminal work a day. In the course of my enquiries, I came to the conclusion that the crime was caused by want. There could be no doubt on the subject. The Magistrate knew this perfectly well. I was in constant communication with him. The dacoities were generally committed by low caste men, coolies and weavers. In May I had settlement work in Khas Mehal Nowanund

About the middle of May I went to two haunts on purpose to ascertain the state of things. There were only two or three bullock loads of rice to be seen which were snapped up at once. I saw roots of plantains and jungle produce (which are not ordinarily sold) exposed for sale in the market. In consequence of this, I at once returned to Bhudruk, and wrote off to the Collector for assistance. I asked for money at once, and rice as soon as possible. From what I saw at the haunts, and what I heard there, I formed the conclusion that there was no sufficiency of rice in the country. Before that I had been watching the conduct of the mahajuns, and observing that, although prices were rising, these men, whose sole trade is in rice, made no attempt to import, I concluded that they had stores. All the zemindars whom I consulted were of the same opinion. I still believe that they had considerable stores, which have never even yet been thrown into the market. The merchants of the Bhudruk sub-division are of all castes. I received Rs. 100 from the Collector, by return of post, to my application, and at once called a local committee. At that time I had raised no private subscriptions. I failed to get the zemindars together for that purpose till the 23rd of June. On that date they assembled, and I got a subscription of about Rs. 600 a month for four months.

The day I received the Rs. 100 from the Collector, on the 13th June, I opened a relief centre. We had 210 applicants the first day. In ten days the number had risen to about 900. In the beginning of June the famine had become very severe. It continued getting worse till the end of September. In September about 40,000 were being relieved daily at different centres. In the end, the famine was worse at Bhudruk than in any other parts of the country of which I have information. I do not believe that the population of the Bhudruk sub-division have actually suffered more than others, and I am of opinion that there was less mortality among them than among the population of other parts of the country. I have said that matters were worse in my sub-division than elsewhere; because so large a number of starving paupers flocked into it from outside. They came from all directions, but principally from Jajpore. The relief operations were not commenced in Jajpore as soon as in Bhudruk. For a long time after I was feeding all applicants with rice, the Jajpore sub-division was only issuing relief to a limited number. Jajpore is the northern sub-division of Cuttack. From the time when I began giving relief, I gave it either in pice or rice to all who applied. At first sometimes I had no rice, and had to give pice. Up to the 23rd June I had received about Rs. 2,000 in cash. Before that I had received 700 bags of rice from Balasore, which had been procured from Calcutta. This lasted to the 19th of July, when I went to the mouth of the Dhamrah to land rice. The *Guide* went ashore, as almost all the buoys had been sunk, but she was got off. We landed 2,500 bags, which I took to Bhudruk partly by land and partly by water. It was all at Bhudruk by the 10th of August. Up to that time no centre had been

established except at Bhudruk. I had no rice before that wherewith to establish them. Then we rapidly opened centres. Within a fortnight we had six established, and soon after we established four more. From that time I have been constantly supplied with rice *via* Dhamrah. The relief operations have never been checked. At first we gave cooked rice; when the numbers became too large for that, we gave it uncooked; eventually we reverted to cooked rice. I never sold any rice, with the exception of a few bags, because I never had more than I considered it absolutely necessary to keep for the safety of those whom I fed. A large proportion of those whom I fed were employed in light labor: the coolies were making roads, the tantes were employed in weaving, the carpenters were putting up sheds, &c. If I had had more rice, I could have sold it to the advantage of the people. I could even have sold it at a profit and done good. I would have sold it slightly below the market price so as to draw down the market rate; but the market rate was almost nominal, as there was scarcely any rice in the market. I got all the rice which came into the Dhamrah port, all in fact which was despatched to that port. The port was considered a very difficult one. It is naturally difficult, and the difficulty was then increased by the want of buoys. Buoys had been laid down eight years ago, but most of them had sunk. Since then Captain Harris and I have surveyed and buoyed the port, and now a vessel drawing 11 feet of water can come in.

I had ample means for landing and sending into the interiors very much more rice than I got. In fact I applied for 25,000 bags in August; but up to the 6th November, I had received 8,400 bags only. The sub-division had required four times the quantity, and I could have utilized that quantity. Most of the people who came to the Bhudruk centre came in a very emaciated condition. I believe many died on the way; but we saved most of those that arrived. We never had very heavy mortality. It was nothing in comparison with Balasore. The greatest mortality was from exposure to rain. We got up sheds for them, but they would never go into the sheds. They got up a story that we wanted to cut their throats. We found at one time that they used to sell the rice that they got from us, and after that used to die of starvation. We have found men dead of starvation with rupees about them. We have also found men dead of starvation with two or three seers of rice on them, which, it is supposed, they were hoarding for the purpose of sale. The cooly and weaver classes suffered most. Except where the inundations occurred, I do not believe any considerable number of ryots died. During the inundation, there was large mortality among those ryots who had remained in their homes and were cut off from supplies by the water. I consider the ryots to be improvident and lazy. If they had not neglected irrigation in the beginning of 1865, they might have done much to save their crops. They did not make use of the water afforded by the tanks and wheels until it was too late and the water began to fail. The zemindars of Bhudruk

are superior to those of Balasore, and have behaved very well. They contributed fairly to the Famine Fund after a little persuasion on my part. Some of them helped me in persuading others to subscribe. I am not inclined to think they did much for their ryots in other ways. Generally, the zemindars do not do much to improve their estates; but they are better than the Balasore men. One of them—Moonshee Abdool Ghunnee—has made a sluice, and has completed it with the assistance of some of the laborers, who were remunerated from the Relief Funds. There is one Killah zemindar in my jurisdiction—the Rajah of Dyanparah; he behaved well and did what he could, but he is not well off.

At one time I paid for all labor in rice; the laborers absolutely refused to accept money; now they will not accept rice.

Most of the sub-division is held by zemindars; part of it belongs to Government, and is managed by surburakars, who are removable at will by Government. Most of the zemindaree estates are let in farm. There are not very many Thannee ryots; most of them are tenants-at-will.

About one-ninth of the whole area of my sub-division to the south suffered from the inundations of the Brahminee and Byturnee, so as to destroy the crops. I attribute one-ninth of the deaths which have actually occurred during the year to the inundation. Altogether, I estimate the total mortality at about one-sixth of the whole population of my sub-division.

Looking to the information which I had at the time, I think that if I had had my own way, should not have begun to import rice above a week earlier than the importations did begin.

No. 30.—MR. F. BOND, *Executive Engineer, Cuttack Division.*

[Examined at Cuttack, 27th December 1866].

I have been in Government employ for the last ten years in this province, also spent my childhood in Orissa, know the language and people; throughout the famine have been in my division, which comprises the Imperial Road from Cuttack to the Madras frontier, the Calcutta Road from Cuttack as far as the Byturnee River; the Sumbulpoor Road as far as the Central Provinces; and the station of Cuttack. In October 1865, I returned from Balasore to Cuttack, and since then have been constantly moving up and down my division. Had no opportunity of ascertaining the yield of the crops in that year. Cannot form any notion of the out-turn. Last cold weather a famine was generally expected, but there were many conflicting statements. The majority of people thought that there was grain in the country. On the Madras frontier road, nothing had been in progress up to the end of December 1865, when Government issued orders that the road, which had been deteriorating for some years, should be taken in hand as a relief work, remodelled, raised, and metalled, and some bridges, still unbuilt,

completed. The work was put in hand in February 1866, and is still in progress. The rough estimate amounted to Rs. 44,000, and that amount was sanctioned for 1865-66. Further provision to the extent of Rs. 33,000 has been made in the current Budget, and out of the whole, Rs. 30,000 have been expended up to 30th November, of which Rs. 25,000 may be taken as having been disbursed in payment of labor. Metal has been collected for ten miles towards the Madras frontier, and the metalling of one mile has been completed. At the time the orders came, the Superintending Engineer was in another part of his circle, and the work was not put in hand until he arrived, when we went down together. Up to the 1st May about Rs. 10,000 were expended on labor and supervision, and about Rs. 5,000 more to the 1st of June. From the time the work was commenced, laborers flocked in large numbers, and those who came across the lake were in a very emaciated condition; not so those from Banpoor. The able-bodied were paid by the job; the weaker by the day. For the first two months I had about 600 able-bodied and 600 feeble-bodied people. We found the latter doing so little work, and the rates running so high, that I reported the matter to the Superintending Engineer, who, I believe, took the orders of the Government, and the system of payment by the day was stopped, I think about the beginning of May. The rate for task-work was then raised. The weaker-bodied then left us. The rate for task-work first adopted was Rs. 2-8, latterly increased to Rs. 3-12 per 1,000 cubic feet; this was for the medium description of soil only. Most of the feeble-bodied were women and children, who could not work at even this rate. They were dispersed, and I do not know what became of them. It was thought that those who could not work were fit objects of charity, and should apply to the relief centres. The task-work system continues up to date. There were no special famine works on any of the other roads under my charge, nor was any other system than that of task-work adopted on any other road works in my division; but we were obliged to raise the rates. Cholera broke out twice on the Madras frontier road, early in March and again, I think, in April. Several of the supervising establishment died, and the rest ran away, and the works were on each occasion closed for a fortnight. On the first occasion, this was done by my orders. Up to the time that the change of system was made, I had a large number of work-people. I was also a member of the Cuttack Relief Committee, and from August to November inclusive, I had the supervision of two of the working gangs, which I paid in rice. One of these gangs I put on task-work. The weaker-bodied got their food at the relief centres in Cuttack; the able-bodied worked. In the course of my tour, I first observed symptoms of famine in February last, in the neighbourhood of the Chilka Lake.

No. 31.—BABOO HURRO CHUNDER GHOSE, *Deputy Magistrate, and Secretary, Relief Committee, CUTTACK.*

[Examined at Cuttack, 28th December 1866].

I have been in Orissa six years, and in Cuttack five years. Know the country well, but was not in the district last cold weather. From hear say estimate the yield of the crop of 1865 at ten-sixteenths. In October grain became very dear. In the month of December it became evident that great scarcity, if not actual famine, was not far distant. This struck the then Collector, Mr. Money, who called a meeting of a not very public character, as only three gentlemen attended. The Natives were not invited to attend; but the meeting decided to invite the zemindars to co-operate, and they were asked to attend a meeting on the 28th December. Few of them came, but many of the people of the town and bazar came. The proceedings were recorded. The general feeling of the Native members of the meeting was, that a famine was not far distant, and that it would be more severely felt from the middle of April. Grain is generally cheaper in the cold weather when the crop is cut, and dearer in the hot weather and till the Beallee crop is cut. The records of the last settlement show 1,39,025 acres Beallee cultivation to 5,30,021 acres Sarud. It was agreed to collect subscriptions for relief, and it was arranged that many persons should find employment on the irrigation works. I don't know that any other works for the purpose of relief were started. In the course of a fortnight Rs. 1,479 was subscribed, and most of it was paid in March following. Nothing was done in January and February. The price of rice got higher. Till the time of the Lieutenant Governor's visit, public opinion about the probability of famine remained in the same state as I have already described. It was generally believed that zemindars and mahajuns had large stocks of grain, but it was not available for the market. I myself then thought there was grain enough to last till the next crop, if it could only have been got at. I do not now think that it was so. It was not at that time thought that the distress would be so severe as it has turned out to be. I am not aware of any consultations on the subject when the Lieutenant Governor was here. I only know that petitions were presented, requesting His Honor to fix the price of grain, and he declined. People became somewhat discontented because a rate was not fixed. I did not perceive any other change of opinion. People had then no idea that Government would help. In March prices continued to rise; but nothing particular was done. In April grain got much dearer and was selling at 5 or 6 seers per rupee, and people then thought a famine was at hand. In the fourth week of April (24th), I wrote to the Collector, Mr. Cornell, proposing to commence relief operations and to buy some rice. A meeting of the Relief Committee was then, for the first time, called, and relief operations were commenced. There had been none before. An unnochatro was then opened at Cuttack only. An application for aid from Jajpoor was refused for want of funds. In the

latter end of May, money was sent to both Jaipoor and Kendraparah, and some grain to Kendraparah. I think that in this district distress was first severely felt in the eastern parts in Killahs Koojong, Kendraparah, Aul, and Kanika. It was, I believe, towards the end of May. Till that time it was not very bad. I believe that there were not till then very many cases of death from starvation. In April there was not bad famine, only apprehension of it. Up to May we had only succeeded in getting about Rs. 1,400 from the local public. We became aware that Messrs. Sykes had got up a subscription, and in May we applied to them for aid. In June, July, August, and part of September things were at their worst. On the 31st May, Rs. 10,000 was received from Government. The first Government grain came actually to hand for relief on the 21st June. From that time it continued to come in. We had a full supply from that time forward. There was never any limit or stint as far as regards relief operations with which only I was concerned—I mean giving food gratuitously to the actually starving. I did not continue in charge of the actual relief. Mr. Kirkwood relieved me; but I think that at Cuttack no starving object was turned away. The sales at relief, *i. e.* cheap rates, were occasionally stopped for want of rice, the boats having been delayed. I don't know about sales at market rates. It was, I think, a matter of regret that sales at cheap rates could not be more largely made. The famine abated when the Sarud crop made its appearance.

In the early part of the season, when famine was expected but had not actually arrived, I know nothing of any application for Government aid. The greatest mortality was among weavers and low caste laborers; not to the same extent among the ryots. I can't say what class of ryots died most. The Ooryah ryots don't work so hard as the Bengal ryots, and they are more constantly in debt. The Ooryah zemindars are not much in debt. The Bengalees, who hold zemindarces here, are more frequently in debt. I don't know any thing of the Killah holdings. Till a letter appeared in the *Hindoo Patriot*, only one Native was on the Relief Committee. Most of the Rs. 1,400 mentioned by me was collected from Natives. Most of the European gentlemen gave small monthly subscriptions.

No. 32.—BABOO DWARKANATH CHUCKERBUTTY,
Deputy Inspector of Schools.

[Examined at Cuttack, 28th December 1866].

Last year I was master in the Pooree Government School. Since September last I have been Deputy Inspector, and residing at Cuttack. In February and March last I officiated as Deputy Inspector. I left Pooree on the 8th February, and went first to Piply, Cuttack, Bhowanipoor, Khoorda, Beegoonca, Balghan (in the extreme north-west of the district), then to Sorapalla, in Banpoor, and back through Khoorda to Pooree. In March I was out again in the eastern part of the district, to Gope and other places. I was travelling by dawk. I was at Gope on the 27th March, and returned to Pooree on the 30th March. Before I left,

there were a few, but not many, starving people in the town: they had come in from the interior. I heard bad reports of the state of the district. When I went to Piply there was distress, and a few people, but not many, were starving. In Khoorda there had been some crop, but I heard that the zemindars and mahajuns were holding it back. There were a few starving people about Khoorda itself. There was much cholera. At Piply and other places on my way to Balghan I saw many people dying of starvation, especially about Balghan. No relief was then being given near Balghan, and no works were in operation. There is not even a road between Khoorda and Balghan. At Khoorda works had been commenced. At Sarrakulla I saw many people dying from cholera, which was the result of scarcity; but I cannot say I saw any one dying of actual want of food. At Tanghy and Jenkya I saw persons dying both from cholera and starvation. In Gope, when I visited it, the distress was greater than I had seen elsewhere. Hundreds of people were dying both of starvation and cholera. In Bhadelo, in the Gope division, the distress was particularly bad. No works were going on, but some families were being relieved in money by the Pooree Committee; that relief was wholly insufficient. On my return to Pooree, at the end of March, matters were much worse than when I left. A large and gradually increasing number of people had come in from the interior. No people were dying of starvation in the town, although they came in in a very emaciated condition. The mohunts were giving private relief. Cholera was very prevalent, and that may have carried off the emaciated people. I mentioned what I had seen in the interior to my friend Ramakhoy Baboo (Deputy Collector) and others, who, I believe, communicated it to the Collector. I did not myself speak to the Collector on the subject till the middle or end of May. In April things got worse in Pooree. More people were coming in from the interior. The private charity was sufficient to keep most of them alive through April; some died. In May things became much worse. I knew the Collector; but did not think it necessary to communicate specially with him about the distress, until I accidentally met him in May, because I supposed that the state of things was known to him. In April subscriptions were being raised for the Narendra tank. The laborers were paid by the day. Men, women, and children were employed, all who could work. At that time (April and May) I thought that more ought to be done, and that importation of rice was required. I wrote a pamphlet on the subject in April. It was first published in the *Bengalee* newspaper on the 23rd June. In May, I think, I showed the manuscript to two friends of mine.

I estimate the Sarud crop of 1865 over the whole Pooree district at four or five sixteenths. It was rather better in Khoorda, and worse in Gope, Malood, and Parricood. The cause of the disappointment, alluded to in page 17 of my pamphlet, as following the Lieutenant Governor's visit, was that no relief measures were adopted, and no hopes of relief held out. I did not write to the papers

on the subject before my pamphlet was published. I think that May and June were the worst months for distress. May was the worst, as some relief was being given in June. The relief improved things in July and August in the town. In the interior, I believe, things were very bad from May to October; in the latter part of this period the relief measures did some good. In page 21 of my pamphlet I have alluded to the inaccuracy of the price currents of grain published by the Board of Revenue; these were derived by the Collector from the Police. Baboo Ramakhoy Chatterjee, Deputy Collector, proved the inaccuracy to the Collector on one occasion. I found rice dearer in the interior than in the Pooree town. In the interior the zemindars had much grain; the mahajuns a little, and the ryots had none. I heard that the zemindars were endeavouring to raise the prices. In Pooree, for a time, the mohunts were selling, and some stores had been laid up at the time of the harvest. In the cold weather, the fact of the French ship having stranded with a rice cargo induced the mahajuns to lower their rates to 8 Cuttack seers, as long as they thought that the cargo would be sold. Most of the cargo was, however, taken away again, and then the dealers raised their prices again. The cheapest rate at which rice sold at any time by retail after the Sarud crop was cut was 10 Cuttack seers the rupee. At this time a ryot bringing in a bullock load or two of rice into Pooree would have sold to the retail dealer at about the rate of 12 Cuttack seers for the rupee. Perhaps the Police constables were able to get rice cheaper than other people, and returned to the Collector the rates at which they were able to buy.

No. 33.—MR. E. J. BARTON, C. S., *in charge of*
KHOORDA.

[Examined at Cuttack, 29th December 1866].

I have been in Orissa for two years and upwards. For the last fourteen months, I have been in charge of Khoorda, a sub-division of Pooree, except for about a month from the beginning of February 1866, when I was in temporary charge of the Cuttack district. Last cold weather, I had no permission to make a regular tour, but generally went out the first few days of each month. I examined the crops. In my opinion, in my sub-division, taken alone, there were nine or ten sixteenths of a crop; but all round the north of the Chilka Lake, which belongs to my jurisdiction, it was very bad,—not more than one-eighth or one-fourth. I was round all that part. In December, about Tanghy, the ryots were making loud lamentations about loss of crops. I then saw no visible want; but it was plain that distress would soon come. Further west, towards Khanpoor, things were somewhat worse, but there was not actual starvation. In January things were much the same. In the end of January I saw Mr. Barlow at Khoorda. We were agreed that great scarcity, if not famine, was coming, and it was determined to open works to employ the poor. A grant of Rs. 10,000 was got from Government, and works commenced on the Piply and Khoorda

Road on the 30th January. I don't know from what source the money came. We began on the day labor system, paying in money to men and women alike, and to children at a smaller rate. At that time the employment was limited, and was given in preference to people coming from the distressed quarters—Chowbeesood, Mallood, Parricood, &c., also from Tanghy and other places round the Lake. At that time, that is, during the first month, there was very little real distress about Khoorda itself, and Khoorda people were only admitted when well known to be in real distress. Distressed people also came in small numbers from Bollghur; but the distress there was not, and never has been, so great as near the Lake. In March distress was plainly spreading among the poorer classes throughout the subdivision, but speaking generally, not real starvation; there may have been exceptions. The country was then in a bad state; famine was clearly coming. On this account the policy of limiting the number employed was abandoned, and employment was given to all who came to the Khoorda and Piply Road,—to the able-bodied on the task system at a liberal rate, Rs. 2-5 per 1,000 feet, and to the weak on the daily system at the former rate of 2 annas a day for each adult, and less for children. That system succeeded and was continued. Till the 27th April, the daily average was 763 persons employed, and to the 22nd August, 800. The Khoorda and Ganjam Road was also of much use in giving employment. I can say that at the commencement of the famine in my sub-division, there was always work for all who chose to come to my road, and I myself personally decided whether each individual should work on the day or task-system. From the first, there was great difficulty in getting rice for the laborers. Mr. Barlow tried to buy rice and establish godowns along the road, but this practice was prohibited by superior authority. The laborers had to forage for themselves. To enable them to do so, they were scattered in small gangs over twenty miles of road, and up to a certain time they there got rice; but the difficulty interfered much with the work as a means of relief, and probably deterred people from coming. It was not till towards the end of May that the difficulty of getting rice reached its maximum. I don't think I was in the Lake Pergunnahs in March or April. In February I was away, and Mr. Webster, who acted for me, was in bad health. I don't know of his going anywhere. In the early part of April I was up nearly to Bollghur, and saw symptoms of hunger in individual instances, but not general famine; but Mr. Barlow afterwards told me that in more remote parts of Bollghur, he had noticed signs of distress before I was there. In the great body of my subdivision, there was no general appearance of starvation in the faces and bodies of the poor till towards the end of May; but in April and in the early part of May, the distress was steadily increasing, and it was, of course, still more plain than in March that famine was coming. In March I saw a good deal of Mr. Barlow. I don't think I did in April. I had a good deal of demi-official and official correspondence about the famine roads, and much conversation about the famine. I did not keep copies of demi-official letters, but I may have some

received from Mr. Barlow. I believe they are exclusively regarding details connected with the road. From my conversation with Mr. Barlow in March, I think that he was then fully aware that a famine was coming. Beyond starting relief works, he did not seem to me to have other measures in contemplation. His head was full of relief works to employ the poor, and he took a great interest in them. I cannot suggest any explanation of his writing on the 5th March, that no further remedial measures on the part of Government were necessary, nor of his altering his mind about appealing to the general public on the 25th February. In my sub-division, up to the end of May, excepting my Khoorda and Piply Road and the public works on the Ganjam Road, there were no other measures of relief. In the end of May, I first commenced gratuitous relief in money and grain from funds supplied by Mr. Buckley and raised in Calcutta by Messrs. Sykes and Co., and from local subscriptions. From that time gratuitous relief was continued, but not at first to all applicants, only to a selection of the most miserable. In June things got bad, and in July worse; but in my sub-division the worst months of all were August, September, and up to 15th October. Government relief commensurate with the district never came to my sub-division. The first grain that came had been bought by Mr. Barlow and the Relief Committee at Gopalpoor, 250 bags. I think that this was in June or beginning of July. The Government grain did not come till later. I established nine centres altogether. Up to the end of July I had nine; up to end of August the seven; to the end of September, eight, and the last in October. I could have established many more centres with great advantage if I could have depended on the supply of grain. I was always afraid of its running short, and that if I had collected people and then not been able to supply them they would have died. Occasionally, some of the centres did run short, and then it always happened that some died. I should also have liked to have established sales both at market and cheap rates, but was unable to do so, except to a very small extent at Khoorda, and to an extremely small extent at two or three relief centres. While the centres were in operation, decidedly most of those who came in survived. I never turned away any except those who could plainly work for themselves, and in fact, in the height of the rains, I accepted all known to be needy when there was no work. I attributed the short supply of grain to the fact that it could not be spared from Pooree, and in the height of the rains our difficulties of transport were also extremely great. Generally, I had barely enough grain to keep my centres going. I was better supplied in September than in July and August, and in fact better in August than in July. In October I had enough for my centres. Towards the end of October the famine began to abate, and it may now be said to have disappeared, with the exception of a residuum of destitution and disease. There is scarcely any Beallee crop in my division, and half of what there was destroyed by floods.

I wish to add to what I have said that at Khoorda I always got all that I asked for, for the purpose

of giving relief by employment on roads. Up to the end of May I had got Rs. 20,000 for my road, and since then I have had Rs. 6,000 more. I have spent Rs. 23,000. In May the work was at its maximum. In March, although I anticipated famine, I did not think it would be so bad as it turned out. There were then ample works in my sub-division to supply all who wished to work for their living, and I did not then think other measures necessary. The want of rice was the only difficulty. I have struck an average of the task-work done, and find that taking men, women, and children together, the average earning of each individual was 2½ annas per diem. Strong men I have known to earn 4 or 5 annas per diem. Up to this time the ryots were living on their crops, and they are much better off than in other parts of Orissa. Even now there is no previously cultivated land out of cultivation. The laboring population only were in distress in the early part of the season. Throughout the famine, starvation was principally confined to them, but latterly the poorer classes of ryots suffered. The richer ryots were only impoverished. Khoorda is a very large Government estate. The revenue is collected by surburakars, who are allowed certain profits; but the settlement is in fact ryotwaree; the ryots hold pottahs direct from the Collector. They are mostly what are elsewhere called Thanee ryots, but they call themselves "Khalee-pottah" ryots, meaning I suppose, that they own the Government only for, their master. They value the Government pottah very much. There are comparatively very few Pye ryots. The poorer class of ryots are mostly those who hold sub-leases under the Government ryots, and ryots who hold pottahs for reclaimed waste land from the surburakars. Of this last the surburakars have the profits. These last classes of ryots are generally tenants-at-will. I estimate the mortality in my sub-division at about one-ninth of the population, including deaths from cholera and small-pox. In May and June cholera was very bad and destructive towards the Lake. There is no zemindaree in my sub-division, but one large jagheer of the Pooree temple. It is not well managed. The managers are always quarrelling with their surburakars and ryots, and in the famine gave them no assistance. In the whole of my sub-division, no considerable assistance was given by any one except Government. There is little distinction of rank in my sub-division; they are all on one comfortable level. There are traders, but none very wealthy. The ryots work well, and resisted this famine wonderfully. Many of them are in debt, perhaps one-fifth of them, but very few ruinously. During the famine there was a good deal of mortgaging of Khalee-pottahs, but comparatively few sales. As respects improvement of their holdings, their chief aim is to acquire new land by breaking up the jungle, and in the Government estate they also dig tanks and form irrigating channels. They manure to a very large extent, and produce very fine crops. I have no doubt that if irrigation was brought to their doors they would buy water, provided they got it at reasonable rates; but they themselves have also numerous contrivances for storing up water, and in fact they have

No. 34.—REV. JOHN BUCKLEY.

[Examined at Cuttack, 29th December 1866].

a good system of irrigation. They hold on a thirty years' settlement, an excellent one. The principal crop is the Rice crop. They don't grow very much Rubbee crop, but still a considerable quantity of various small grains, oil-seeds, &c., little wheat, or barley, tobacco only for the local bazars, sugarcane, cotton, and jute only for local use, not for export. They export little beyond rice. They irrigate the rice largely. Everything that was possible to be done was done last year to save the crops by irrigation.

When I first joined, my Court was filled with ryots quarrelling about tanks, springs, and water-courses; there were also many breaches of the peace on the same subject. A great part of the crop saved was altogether due to irrigation. There is still much jungle in the sub-division, which the ryots are rapidly reducing, and I don't think it is yet ready for a permanent settlement. So far as I know, the ryots who hold pottahs direct from Government are perfectly content with the present arrangements. The holdings of the others are very insecure. Before going to Khoorda I had been about two years in the Cuttack district. In that district also I should say that the ryots were then tolerably, but not very, industrious, and in a state of comfort, though much inferior to the Khoorda people. The zemindar of Kendraparah is a good man, and treats his ryots well. He is one of the best; but as a whole I don't think the Ooryah and other zemindars unkind to their ryots. The Rajahs of Koojung and Awl are in difficulties, and the former has been deprived of his estate. I have heard that he did not use his ryots well. The Ooryahs are kinder to their ryots than the Bengalee purchasers, who are generally absentees and manage by naibs, which is never satisfactory.

When I was in charge of the Cuttack district in February, the state of things as regards scarcity was about the same as in Khoorda, but just then the bazars became suddenly somewhat easier. The Lieutenant Governor was then expected, and I think the dealers were afraid of his fixing a price. There was no difficulty of getting rice in the bazars just then. When the Lieutenant Governor came, I had no opportunity of discussing famine matters with His Honor. I went back to Khoorda soon after this. The bazar again became tighter, but I can give no particulars. I had no reports of starvation. The Natives seemed to think that the scarcity was caused by combination among the mahajuns and grain-holders, zemindars and others. Every one—Europeans and Natives—saw that a scarcity, perhaps famine, was coming, but no one anticipated the greatness of the calamity. I also at that time shared the belief that there was combination among the mahajuns and holders of grain. There were no local works that I know of then in operation for the relief of the poor; in fact, there certainly were none under me. The alarm was not sounded so soon in Cuttack as in Pooree. When I took charge from Mr. Money, he communicated to me nothing whatever regarding the state of the district.

I have lived more than twenty-two years in Orissa, with one break. I am intimately acquainted with the people and the language, and am the senior Missionary and Secretary of the Orissa Mission. I was in Cuttack last cold weather, and went about part of the district. Up to the beginning of September I thought it likely that we should have a remarkably good harvest, although the prices of rice were very high. Towards the end of September we felt considerable apprehensions. We have about 300 Christians engaged in agriculture. Our anxiety increased as no rain fell. About the 20th of October, we began to despair of the crop. From that time things went from bad to worse, with the exception of a short period, from the middle of December to the end of January, when the harvesting of the crop improved matters a little. During that period I think that the people were comparatively less depressed. The crops were some better and some worse, but on an average I estimate the crop at a quarter crop in the country about Cuttack. I do not think that in this part of the country the idea of a famine is one which readily occurs to the people. They have had nothing of the kind for twenty-nine years. In 1837 what was called a famine (but I should call it a scarcity) occurred. I was not here at the time; but I have heard that the prices reached 8 seers about July and August. It only continued about two months. During the last cold weather the general feeling was that dark and gloomy days were impending. There was nothing very definite. At the time when the bazar was closed, the general impression was that it was the result of a wicked combination among the grain-dealers. At that time I was not acquainted with the Commissioner. I knew Mr. Money, the Magistrate and Collector, slightly. On the 26th of October I wrote to the Secretary of our Society in England, stating that a frightful calamity had overtaken us. I produced a printed copy of my letter. By the beginning of February, prospects were beginning to look more gloomy again than they had done in December and January. About the middle of February the Lieutenant Governor was here. I had no conversation with the Lieutenant Governor on this subject. The address presented by the Native Christians spoke of the time as one of great and general distress. The address was printed with other papers by the Irrigation Company. There was certainly a feeling of disappointment that the Lieutenant Governor had not done more on the occasion of his visit. The Natives were principally discontented that he had refused to fix the selling price of grain, for which they had petitioned. I thought their expectations were unreasonable. I do not remember ever hearing the Natives make any special suggestion (among themselves) as to any other measure which the Government might undertake. I think the Natives would naturally look to Government for assistance in the case of a famine. On the 1st of March rice was selling at 6 and 6½ Cuttack

seers per rupee. From my own observation, I am of opinion that the price currents published by Government were not always very accurate. I cannot say whether they were generally inaccurate in under-stating or over-stating the prices. Things got worse and worse till the end of March. On the 31st March I wrote another letter, beginning—"The state of things is truly awful, the famine is sore in the land." My remarks in that letter referred to the state of things in the Cuttack and Pooree districts; things were very bad in Cuttack. From my own observation and the appearance of the people, I was aware that there was much distress about the town of Cuttack, but things were still worse in Pooree. On the 16th April, I wrote another letter to our Secretary in England. At the time I was in frequent correspondence with Messrs. Sykes and Co., who are my agents, and I may have mentioned the distress, but did not do so with the deliberate intention of leading to an appeal to the Indian public. Some time before the Sykes' Fund was established, I discussed with my Missionary brethren the propriety of making an appeal to the Indian public. We resolved not to do so, as we considered it was the duty of Government to make such an appeal, and also because we were not in a position to contribute to any general subscription, as might have been expected from us if we had started it. We had great difficulties in carrying on our own operations. At that time we did not communicate with the Government officials. The Commissioner was absent from the station, and with Mr. Cornell, the Magistrate and Collector, we had a very slight acquaintance. I am not aware that any general consultation as to the state of things and measures to be taken was held about that time, although the subject was discussed in private conversation. I think that the Europeans and Natives were then generally convinced that a famine existed. I am not aware that any one took a leading part in urging a general movement to induce Government or the general public to take active measures to relieve the famine. We Missionaries were desirous of doing all we could for others, though naturally our first care was for the orphans and suffering Native Christians. A meeting had, I know, been held in December on the subject. My impression is that the result of the meeting was unsatisfactory. I was in the interior of the district at the time. No other general movement was made, nor any measures of general relief undertaken till April. We Missionaries had, however, been making our own arrangements to meet the coming distress, and relieved cases of distress among our own people. In April, Mr. Phillips, of Jellalore, in the Balasore district, wrote to me to the same effect as his letter to the *Friend of India*, published in the issue of 12th April. I advised his making an appeal to the public through the *Friend of India* as suggested by him. I received a letter from Messrs. Sykes and Co., dated 19th April, announcing the establishment of their Relief Fund, and sending me a little money. Two days after I received another on the subject which I put in. Sykes' Fund was liberally supported to the end of

May. At first the fund was chiefly, though not exclusively, intended for the relief of the Native Christians; but it was largely subscribed to by Native gentlemen as well as by Europeans, and from the beginning, by far the larger portion was devoted to the relief of the non-Christian population. In the distribution of that fund, the officers of the Irrigation Company and Baboo Koylas Chunder Ghose gave great assistance.

I saw no manifestation of an appreciation of the calamity among the officials till a few days before the Commissioner's return to the station. At that time I received from Mr. Cornell, the Collector, a letter which the Commissioner had addressed to him, regarding the destitute children in the province, in which the Collector was requested to communicate with us on the subject. Except that letter, I saw no other signs of the officials waking up. In modification of my previous remarks, I must mention that some extra work had been undertaken on the roads for some months. The Irrigation Company's works also saved many from starvation. In the early part of May the state of things appeared to me as bad as it could be; but it became much worse afterwards. Early in May the evidence of famine, furnished by the appearance of the people, was exceedingly distressing; but as relief was being administered in the town from various private sources, I did not hear of many deaths from starvation in the town, though I believe many were occurring in the district. Things went on getting very much worse till the middle of June, or even till the 20th of June, when the Government imported rice began to arrive. On the 1st of May I wrote a strong letter to England, but I have no copy of it here. On the 17th I wrote another, which I put in, giving my impression of the terrible state of things then existing.

I find from a letter of mine, dated the 21st of June, that it was then hoped that prospects had just begun to look a little brighter. The rivers had opened, and some boats began to arrive from Sumbulpoor with merchants' grain, and the rice imported by Government was on the point of arriving. On the 16th of July, I wrote another letter, from which it will be seen that our hopes of improvement were not realized, as the rice came in at first very slowly. My impression is, that the Government relief has been very considerable. Sad as the distress has been, it would have been much worse without it. I was pleased to hear Natives expressing their gratitude for the Government relief. After the Government rice arrived, the very great difficulty which we had previously experienced in buying rice for those whom we supplied, disappeared; we were able to buy rice for money. I believe that in the town the mortality was never so great as in the interior.

If the magnitude of the crisis had been appreciated earlier, in my judgment very much more might have been done for the relief of distress in the district. After the Government supply became larger, the floods interfered with its distribution in the interior. I believe that the mortality

in August about Cuttack was greater than in any other month. The people who had been temporarily cut off from supplies by the inundation, came in in a terrible state, and many of them died. About the end of September, things became better; they improved as the harvest of 1866 approached.

My opinion is that after the full magnitude of the calamity was once appreciated, every officer did all that lay in his power, and all was done which under the circumstances was possible. The great defect was that the officials did not become sensible of the magnitude of the calamity in time.

I think that the visitation of God was so great, that no amount of Government aid, however early given, could have prevented great mortality; but if it had been given two months earlier, much of the mortality which did occur might have been avoided. I have seen and heard much of Mr. Kirkwood, the local relief manager, and am of opinion that he did all in his power. I wish to mention that by the mercy of God, during this awful calamity, not one Native Christian in Orissa has, to the best of my belief, died of starvation. In Orissa and Ganjam, there are about 1,400 Christians scattered about.

Q.—You have said that you did not observe any manifestation that the officials at Cuttack had realized the full magnitude of the impending calamity till towards the end of May; but your letters show that you did realise it long before, and it is your impression that some others realised it. Do you know whether any one attempted to wake up the officials to the danger?

A.—I am not aware of any official and formal representations being made to that effect. I had rather not refer to private conversations not my own.

Q.—Was the conduct of the Government officials, or any of them, such as to discourage the communication to them of information of this sort?

A.—I am not aware that it was; but I knew very little of the Government officials, and they are constantly changing them. I know that from the time when the magnitude of the calamity was known, Mr. Ravenshaw invited suggestions in a spirit for which I honor him, and worked heart and soul. He was absent at the most critical time in April and May, and I did not know his address. As far as I am personally concerned, nothing in the conduct of the Government officials deterred me from communicating with them. I supposed that they had many sources of information denied to me, and must know the state of things better than I did. I never had been introduced to Mr. Ravenshaw, who was new to the division, till the Lieutenant Governor came in February, and I do not remember to have seen him again till after his return. Mr. Cornell joined in the end of February. I had barely been introduced to him. Nothing repellant on the part of any of the officers prevented me from communicating with them on the subject of the famine.

I think that the mortality has been greatest among the Bowrees, Chassas, and other caste

short of the lowest who feed on offal. The better classes had more to part with to keep them alive. I think that the distress was increased by the fact that a settlement; was impending, that is to say, I have always heard that it is customary to reduce cultivations before a settlement, but I have no particular information on this point at present. I think a permanent settlement would be of great advantage. By a permanent settlement I mean a fixing of the rents both of zemindars and ryots, not of zemindars alone. Whatever is done for the zemindars, respect should be had to the rights of the ryots, otherwise there will be fearful oppression. The zemindars will take every thing for them. To give irrigation and improvement fair-play, I think a permanent settlement desirable. I think that if the ryots saw that it would be for their gain to take water, they would take it.

No. 35.—BABOO LUKHEE NARAIN CHOWDHRY,
Zemindar.

[Examined at Cuttack, 29th December 1866].

I am a Bengalee settled in Cuttack; have considerable estates in Kendraparah. People out there were living on roots, got dreadfully emaciated, and began to die of starvation in March; considerable numbers died in March and April. Did not specially represent this at the time, because it was patent to all the world. Government relief was not commenced till later in the end of May. Government relief altogether came two months too late; but when it did come, it was liberal, and people have been very grateful for it. It was efficiently administered, and saved many people. If it had not come, no one would have been left alive. For the future I can only recommend storing of grain. Ooryah ryots are less wicked and troublesome than Bengalees, but also less laborious and more indebted.

No. 36.—BABOO JONARDAN SEN, *Sheristadar*,
Collectorate.

[Examined at Cuttack, 29th December 1866].

Last year the crop amounted to four or five sixteenths. No enquiry was made. When the Lieutenant Governor came zemindars petitioned for remissions of revenue. The lower people cried out that they had nothing to eat. They were disappointed that nothing was done. They expected that a price would be fixed. Every one thought that the grain-holders had some grain in hand; but it was not generally believed that they had really large quantities sufficient to last the whole year. People generally did not know what would come; but many who thought about it said, if things are bad now, they will be much worse when the season advances. From that time things got worse; but there was not mortality from actual starvation till the end of May. There was cholera earlier. In the end of May many were dying from starvation. Finally, the Government grain arrived and saved many. If it had not come, many more would have died.

No. 37.—BABOO WOOMA CHURN NEOGEE, *Sheristadar and Head Clerk, Magistrate's Office.*

[Examined at Cuttack, 29th December 1866].

Famine commenced immediately after the Lieutenant Governor's visit, but deaths from starvation not till the end of May. In March I got up a subscription, and in April commenced relief in the town of Cuttack. I got about Rs. 1,200. In March I thought a bad famine was coming. Poor people were begging from door to door; they were coming in from the district. In April day by day things got gradually worse. It was not till June that the whole extent of the calamity was realised. It was either in the first or second week of April that I commenced operations. Before Mr. Ravenshaw went, I asked him to assist me in getting rice for any charity. He told Roghmoonath Chowdry to sell me grain, and I got some. I did not say there was famine, only that there was scarcity, and that charity was necessary. I had no conversation about the probability of more severe famine afterwards. In the end of May I printed and circulated an appeal to the principal zemindars and merchants in Bengal, and to leading men all over India. I got nothing from any one, except the Maharajah of Burdwan.

No. 38.—DHANU BEARA AND TWENTY-TWO OTHERS.

[Examined at Cuttack, 29th December 1866].

In Jeyt (May) last a quantity of grain was brought by private merchants in carts from Gopalpoor and saved many people. Next month (Asarh) when the rains fell, that communication was stopped, but it came from Sumbulpoor; 10 or 12,000 maunds of rice came and other grains besides. More grain came for mahajuns than for Government, and more good was done. Government supplied jail, troops, &c., and sold a little in town for two hours only, and there was this good that the merchants were induced to sell cheaper. Eventually they sometimes sold cheaper than Government. Throughout the famine the Government rice was sold very sparingly, and much more was done by the merchants, who bought grain from the four quarters of the globe. The zemindars have still much old grain stored up in the hope of selling at famine prices. If they are properly dealt with, things will be easier.

No. 39.—MR. T. K. WEBSTER, C. S.

[Examined at Cuttack, 1st January 1867].

I have been in Orissa since December 1864. Was Assistant at Cuttack till 1st February 1866. Was in the sudder station during September, October, and November 1865. Knew, as early as September, that the crops about Cuttack and towards the Western Gurjats would be bad, but thought the failure was partial. Had no idea of the actual state of things until I went out into the district with Mr. Money the Collector. Having had no experience before in crops, did not even then realize the serious nature of the case. Went out with Mr. Money early in December, first northwards

along the Calcutta Road, thirty miles, then eastward to Jajpoor, thence to Patamonddee and Killah Kanika, and thence back through Patamunddee to Kendraparah and Cuttack, about the 15th of January 1866. Believe that Mr. Money's special object was to visit Kanika. Am not aware that his tour was particularly intended for the purpose of inspecting the crops or the state of the people in connection with the scarcity and high prices which were then prevailing. I had no special business assigned to me. The Collector spoke of sending me to enquire into the losses of crop in Darpan, which was then under his management, but did not do so. As we went along, the state of the crops was naturally a subject of occasional conversation between Mr. Money and me, principally with reference to remission. I was over a good deal of Pergunnah Darpan, and saw that the crops there were very bad. Estimating them with the experience which I have since gained, I should say there was not more than six sixteenths of a crop. Most of the crops had been cut, and my attention was not particularly attracted to them during the rest of the tour, till we got back to Puddumpoor, about eight miles east of Cuttack. I observed that the crops there were about the same as about Darpan. In the condition of the people I saw no indication of distress during that tour. They were dying of cholera about Aul and Patamonddee. We lost several men out of our camp. I saw no indication of people being driven to feed on roots or other unwonted food, and do not ascribe the cholera to that cause. In Kanika our servants complained that they could not get rice, although we were told (by others than our servants) that the bazar price of rice was 20 seers for the rupee. I believe the Deputy Collector got rice for them. There was rice there. I did not hear this complaint from the servants, except in Kanika; but throughout the town there was great difficulty in getting Kullee and Kelaie, or any of the Rubbee grains for the horses. Did not hear any complaints from the people of the difficulty of getting grain, but did hear complaints of the high prices. Do not remember, in the course of the tour, having heard Mr. Money express any serious apprehension as to the distress or scarcity which was impending. Mr. Armstrong, the Assistant Magistrate in charge of the Jajpoor sub-division, was with us, and may have heard Mr. Money express some such opinion. After this tour I remained about a fortnight in Cuttack, and on the 1st of February took charge of Khoorda.

I remember that a meeting was held in Cuttack about the difficulty of getting rice, at which I was present. I cannot remember whether this was before our tour or after it. There was no Europeans present, except Mr. Money, and the zemindars and mookhtears were there. Baboo Haran Chunder Ghose, the Deputy Collector, was present. Mr. Money urged the zemindars and mookhtears to use their influence to get rice into the market, but nothing definite was decided on.

I remember nothing else in particular which came to my notice in connection with the distress during the fifteen days I remained in Cuttack. I did not know of any relief measures having been undertaken up to the time I left Cuttack.

On taking charge of the Khoorda sub-division on the 1st February I found a very different state of things. The repair of the Khoorda and Piply Road had just been sanctioned as a measure of relief, and I started it. When I took charge people were coming in from the south for work on this road; people of the neighbourhood also came to work. We admitted to that work those only who were not in a fit condition to earn their subsistence by the ordinary labor. The able-bodied we referred to the Irrigation Company for employment. The people of the neighbourhood were beginning to show slight signs of want; those from the south were in a very bad state of emaciation. I was only there fifteen days, so cannot say that there was any appreciable change in the condition of the people during my stay; but the number of applicants for work increased to about 800. At that time I got each person to do as much as he could, and paid him a day's wages for it. I forget the exact rate of wages fixed for men, women, and children; but I remember that they were fixed by Mr. Barlow, so as to suffice for the support of the laborers, with reference to the market price of rice. Rice could be got in the bazar, but with difficulty. Mr. Barlow proposed to import rice from Kanika (the cheapest market) for the laborers; but the proposal was disapproved by superior authority, I cannot say by whom. I am not aware of deaths occurring among the coolies, nor among the people about Khoorda, I mean deaths from want. A few cases of cholera occurred, but not among the laborers.

No absolutely gratuitous relief was being distributed then at Khoorda. Much of the work on the road was, however, nominal.

I did not have it brought to my notice that the people about Khoorda were at that time eating uncooked food. I got a sun-stroke, and returned to Cuttack about the 15th of February; was ill for about a month, and can give no material information of what went on during that time. Do not remember being struck by any particular signs of destitution during March or April beyond the difficulty of obtaining rice. I heard from servants and others, that rice absolutely could not be got in the bazar. Do not remember having any special conversation with Mr. Cornell, the Collector, on the subject. On the 15th of May I went out to take charge of the Jajpoor sub-division. On my way out, going along the Calcutta Road, I heard that the people were eating roots. Relief measures had been begun. Some zemindars had been prevailed on to sell paddy below the bazar rate. No money nor rice had, I believe, been sent from the sudder station. Very soon after I got to Jajpoor I saw people dying in the streets here and there from starvation. Before this, there had been a local subscription. Rice had been bought from the holders and sold somewhat cheaper as a measure of relief. Soon after I arrived, I began distributing cooked food out of the subscribed money, and applied to the Collector for assistance. Mr. Buckley, of Cuttack, first sent me Rs. 150 from Sykes' Fund, out of which I continued to distribute cooked rice to 400 or 500 people. The number did not increase much during my two

months' stay at Jajpoor. After Mr. Buckley's instalment, I received money from the Collector. Early in June I got orders to send to False Point for rice, and to give notice that rice was to be got there. I accordingly sent a man with a letter to the officer in charge of the ship, probably the *Jacques Forestier*. My instructions were, I think, to buy it at the rate of Rs. 11 a bag. My man brought back a letter from the officer of the ship, to the effect that I could not have the rice at a lower rate than (I think) Rs. 12-4 a bag. This answer reached me about the 20th June (twelve days after I had sent the rice), and I immediately dawked into Cuttack. Although I published the notice that rice was to be had at False Point at Rs. 11 a bag, not a single mahajun or other person from my neighbourhood would send to buy, although rice was extremely scarce in Jajpoor. Having received instructions in Cuttack, I sent an indent and boats to False Point,—about seventeen boats. Those boats did not till after I left Jajpoor on the 15th July. They were despatched, I think, on the 26th of June. The boats could not have been back under fifteen days. Before I left Jajpoor I got rice by cart from Cuttack, sold part, and distributed a part gratuitously. People crowded in to buy it, in spite of the relief I was giving. The number of deaths from starvation was increasing the whole time I was at Jajpoor. I attribute this to the fact that the paupers were beyond recovery when they came in for relief. I gave 5 Cuttack chittacks of rice to each applicant. Do not think I was giving vegetables or dhal besides. I consider that this was just sufficient to support life. I had no sufficient supply of rice, and therefore could not give more. I never had absolutely to stop the distribution of relief. Cannot estimate the daily rate of mortality. No relief work was going on in the sub-division while I was there, and the centres of relief in the interior of the sub-division were on the point of being opened when I left Jajpoor. On my way back to Cuttack, I saw numbers of people dying and dead along the roadside. During the fifteen days I was attached to the sudder station, I was principally out near Dyalpoor, about ten miles to the east of the station. I saw people dead and dying along the road from starvation. They were, I suppose, people who could not get into Cuttack for relief. I do not believe any centre had been opened near Dyalpoor. I sold several hundred bags of damaged rice there, and distributed some gratuitously. The rice had been wet and dried again; it was quite unwholesome, but unfit for carriage. I suppose that on going down that road 10 miles to Dyalpoor, I must have seen eight or ten persons either dying or recently dead. There were no special arrangements along the road for their care or removal. The same state of things must have existed then on all the roads about Cuttack. Went out to Kendraparah on the 1st, and went on at once to Patamonddee and Oolabar. I went out to visit the relief station at Oolabar. I found very great distress; sales of rice were going on, and gratuitous relief in cooked food was being distributed. Sales were crowded and disorderly. The distribution of cooked food was orderly. Above 500 were receiving food. On the day I passed through Kendraparah, I saw ten dead bodies lying

in the streets. The deaths had evidently been from starvation. On the road from Kendraparah to Oolabar, and in Oolabar, I saw dead bodies. In Aul, great mortality had occurred. It was reported that out of 500 families of Mussulmans, 100 only remained. On the 8th of August I took charge of Kendraparah. Uncooked rice was being given to light labor coolies in payment of labor; cooked rice was gratuitously distributed. The Government rice had been sold; but there was so little in store when I arrived that sales had been stopped. Road-work was going on, paid in rice. I sent off all the able-bodied to the Irrigation Company for employment. By a mistake of the Deputy Collector, Doorjodhun Dass, the rice had been weighed out in chittacks of 80 tola weight, instead of 105 tola weight, on which the quantity allowed to each man had been calculated. I am decidedly of opinion that 5 chittacks of 80 tola weight was insufficient to support life. Mr. Odling and the Deputy Ferry Fund Overseer, Bhaghut Churn Mookerjee, had remonstrated with the Deputy Collector on the insufficiency of the rice when I went out, but without effect. I rectified this error. About the middle of August, some rice came up from False Point, which enabled me to re-commence Government sales; but I had to discontinue them soon after, so that the gratuitous relief might not be stopped. I sent boats again to False Point at once. The boats were delayed on the road; I do not know how; probably by the violence of the stream. The rice did not come up till the middle of September. In August a Government store for sale was started at Patamondee; that was always kept supplied; there was also a relief centre there, it is ten miles from Kendraparah. In the part of my sub-division above the Mahanuddee, there were eight centres at distances eight or ten miles from one another. The relief centres south of the Mahanuddee were under Mr. Kirkwood's management. I think the centres were sufficient in number. On one occasion, late in August, the supplies at two of the centres ran short, and relief had to be stopped for two or three days. The reports did not show any marked increase of mortality during these days. I do not know whether any previous notice was given to the people that distribution would not be made on these days. At that time I had not rice enough to send from Kendraparah; but I could have supplied rice from other centres if the communication had been better. The country was then under water. In September, October, and November the rice was sufficient for the gratuitous relief, but by no means sufficient for the requirements. Very much more ought to have been sold at cost price by Government. I consider these sales were of far more use than the gratuitous relief. At first, many would not come for relief, they preferred dying in their houses; afterwards, many gave in, and came in and did light labor, taking uncooked rice in return. There was considerable mortality at all the centres; it was heaviest in September. In August sheds were built for the coolies and paupers. Before the sheds were up, the mortality was considerably increased when heavy falls of rain occurred. The inundations came on about the 9th August. The

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highest was in the first half of August. There was a second high inundation about the beginning of September. The whole sub-division, with the exception of two or three pergunnahs in the south, was submerged. This caused almost the total destruction of the Beallee crop. It swept away the whole Sarud crop miles and miles. I estimate the Sarud crop, which was left and re-planted, at about four or five-sixteenths over the sub-division. The greatest mortality occurred before the inundations; but I estimate that the mortality of the year would have been less by one-fourth or one-fifth if no inundation had occurred. Since the new crop came in, very little old rice has come into the bazar of Cuttack.

No. 40.—MR. A. CROMMELIN, *Superintending Engineer, CUTTACK Circle.*

[Examined at Cuttack, 1st January 1867].

I came here in October 1865. My circle includes the whole of the Cuttack division, the whole of Midnapore, and a small portion of Hooghly. I went up the Grand Trunk Road towards Calcutta early in December, and marched up all the way. I was in Cuttack in November. I then left Calcutta, and went round the Selai embankments in the Tumlook division. I received orders to go down to Cuttack on the 24th December, that is, I heard personally from the Chief Engineer that orders had been issued to start the relief works in Pooree. I issued demi-official orders from Calcutta at once. In the mean time, with the consent of the Chief Engineer, I went down to look at the Selai embankments—an important work, but not connected with the famine operations. Got to Cuttack from Midnapore on the 24th January. Met Mr. Barlow at Cuttack. Left on the 29th or 26th by dawk for Pooree. From Pooree, having inspected the arrangements that were already made, I left for Khoorda. Nothing was going on actually at Khoorda then under me. From Khoorda I went down the Ganjam road as far as Barcool. I got there about the 30th January, and was back at Cuttack on the 1st February, and stopped there till after the Lieutenant Governor went away. I then went up the road again towards Midnapore to finish my inspections of the Hidgellee and Tumlook divisions, and returned about the 12th April. On the 23rd May I went again to Pooree to inspect the Pooree road and embankments. I marched down and came back by dawk. After that I stayed in the town till towards the end of June.

When I went up the road early in December, I thought the crops looked bad; but I am not conversant with Bengal crops. I saw no distress either then or up to the time I got back to Cuttack in January. When I went over to Pooree on the first occasion I saw distress, that is to say, people were making great complaints of the dearness of rice and the difficulty of getting it, and some of the work-people who came from the Chilka Lake quarter looked emaciated, but not so much as to stop their work.

After that, when I went down the Ganjam road I saw very few people at work near Barcool. I noticed nothing very particular about the state of the people. When I went up the road after the Lieutenant Governor left, I observed nothing like famine. In the course of my tour in the Balasore and Hidgellee divisions I did not see any thing in particular. I think I heard of dacoities. I was in Balasore early in April. Every one was talking of the scarcity, but not of famine, as far as I can remember. Up to the time I returned to Cuttack I remarked nothing in particular. On the occasion of my second visit to Pooree I saw several dead bodies lying about the country. I was then aware that there was famine. The first absolute famine work was started by Mr. Nolan on the 1st January 1866 on the Pooree road, close to Pooree. All the work was confined at first and for some time to the neighbourhood of Pooree and to the first six miles out of Pooree. That work has been continued till the present time.

The work on the Ganjam road was commenced by Mr. Bond, I believe, in the middle of January. I believe Mr. Bond is in error in saying it did not begin till February.* When I went down in the end of January 1866, I found some work going on, perhaps not so much as there should have been. Up till the end of May there were no other special famine works under my control. The ordinary works were pushed on more energetically than usual. I spent more money than usual with a view to give relief. The first system introduced in both of the famine works was payment by the day in money. There were decided orders that they were not to be paid in grain. After that it was found that the cost of the work exceeded the ordinary rates at which I was authorized to offer work. I was especially ordered at first to offer the ordinary rates, and the rule of the Department is that the cost of the out-turn must not exceed the ordinary rates. I consider I was bound not to exceed the ordinary rates, even at such a time, as I considered that the Government order was issued with a view of not raising the rates of the country generally, but to offer employment to all who wanted it, the actual relief being given through the Civil authorities as pointed out in my orders. On my afterwards reporting my having raised the rates on the Ganjam and Pooree roads, I was not found fault with for not having increased the ordinary daily pay of coolies before. I asked the Civil authorities for aid in carrying out my orders, to supplement my rate of wages, that is to say, I ordered the Executive Engineers under me to put themselves in communication with the Civil authorities.

I did not, as far as I remember, directly make any representation to Government; but in my letter to the Commissioner, dated the 3rd February, a copy of which was forwarded to the Chief Engineer, I did mention the extreme necessity of the Civil authorities making proper arrangements for supplying rice, without which I was of opinion that our works could not be carried on. It was

* Mr. Crommelin has since written, giving the date as "on or about the 20th January."

never understood that the supplement should be in money; but merely that rice should be supplied at such a rate as to enable our coolies to purchase sufficient food to support themselves with the money they gained from us. On the 14th March I authorized an increase on the Pooree road from Rs. 1-8 to Rs. 1-12 per thousand cubic feet on my own responsibility, and on the 28th May an increase on the Ganjam road from Rs. 1-8 to Rs. 3, which was an extra rate to allow for the employment at daily labor of the women and children. Daily labor was almost entirely stopped after this on the Pooree road, but not on the other road. The result on the Pooree road was a diminution of the number employed. On the other road I do not think there was any diminution. This system was persevered in till I received orders from Government to increase rates early in June (9th June). Meanwhile there was no correspondence about rates beyond this that I represented that I was not assisted by the Civil authorities in procuring rice.

The orders issued by me on the for "husbanding resources in view to the almost certainty of the distress becoming far more extended a few months hence," were issued after consultation with the Commissioner, and copies of the letter* were sent to the Commissioner and to Government. From both I received approval of my orders. I have not been able to find the letter, and consequently I can't be quite certain whether I actually got a letter from Government approving, but certainly no intimation of disapproval reached me. Besides the difficulty about rates there was another great difficulty in getting rice for the laborers. That difficulty was felt from the first starting of both works, and continued to be felt throughout. I think the want of grain excessively diminished the efficiency of my works as measures of relief. On the 3rd February I made a representation to Government about this enclosing a copy of my letter to the Commissioner. I had previously telegraphed about the advance of money for the purchase of grain, and on the 26th January I received a telegram prohibiting any advances.

After that Mr. Ravenshaw suggested that shopkeepers could be got to supply the work-people by paying them so much a month, but this plan failed. The orders of Government that wages should be paid in money and not in grain were most positive; but on the 31st May, I exceeded my authority, in consequence of representations from the Executive Engineers of Balasore and Cuttack, that important works were at a stand-still for want of laborers, as men would not go to the works unless rice was supplied to them, and I then sanctioned the purchase of rice to be conveyed to the works for the laborers to purchase with the wages they received, and I reported my action to Government, and it was approved of by them, as a special measure. At Balasore the Executive Engineer got a little grain and sent it to the works at Jajpore. The Pooree Engineers were unable to purchase grain. The work on the Pooree road went on continuously,

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though limited by the cause above mentioned; but the work on the Ganjam road was stopped late in February or early in March for a fortnight on account of cholera breaking out, and the Executive Engineer ordering the work to be closed. It was closed a second time towards the end of April.

On the 26th or 27th May I got a telegram, informing me that Rs. 60,000 had been specially sanctioned for famine works on the Balasore and Midnapore divisions, and that I was to arrange, in communication with the Commissioner, what works should be put in hand. The works were put in hand. I sanctioned them all in anticipation. The result was not successful. The relief came too late. We got some labor, but not in such large quantities as we ought to have done. In the month of April ordinary works were going on at Balasore. The works were then carried on there by petty contract, and job work, as usual, at the average ordinary rates for earth-work varying from Re. 1-8 to Rs. 2 per 1,000 cubic feet.

Q.—On the 20th April, the Commissioner, writing from Balasore, stated to the Lieutenant Governor that the Executive Engineer now wants 100 men and can't get them; to what do you attribute this?

A.—I can't say unless I know what and where the work was; but I should say that the ordinary rates were not then sufficiently high to attract labor. Rice was very dear; but as far as I know procurable though in very small quantities. In the works started after May the system of pay was task-work. Rates were increased by me to Rs. 3-12 and to Rs. 4 per 1,000 cubic feet. On the 9th of June I received orders to raise the rates. The effect of the increased rates in no part of the circle was to attract labor in large quantities in consequence of the impossibility of procuring food, the coolies saying they couldn't eat pice. During the rains the works were carried on as far as possible; but they must have been contracted necessarily, as the country was under water. I went on leave of absence to Simla on the 1st August, and returned in November. I had no conversation with the Lieutenant Governor, when here, on the subject of the difficulty of getting rice for the workmen, nor regarding relief works generally. The Chief Engineer accompanied the Lieutenant Governor as far as I remember, I can't be positive. If I had any conversation with the Chief Engineer, the subject must have been mentioned. I did not think it necessary specially to address the Lieutenant Governor on the subject of relief, as I considered this to fall more specially within the province of the Civil authorities, and as I had already specially written to the Secretary on the subject on the 3rd February. I am not aware of any consultation on the subject being held when the Lieutenant Governor was here.

I think if the Irrigation Company's works are successfully carried out that they will go very far to obviate the risk of famine. I am sanguine as to the success of these works. The only doubts that occur to me are the difficulty of regulating the rivers in the floods and the scarcity of the water

in the dry weather. I do not apprehend any engineering difficulties in the actual construction of the works.

I think, when constructed, that they will suffice for the irrigation of a very large area, equal, I should say (including Balasore and Pooree), to the whole area of the district. This is to be taken in a general way. The irrigation during the monsoon may be carried on quite independently of any question of reservoirs in the upper waters. My knowledge of the district and of the system of rice crops is limited; but roughly speaking, I should say that in ordinary years there would not be a large demand for water between the 15th June and the 15th September; but whenever the local rains fail, I believe the supply of water in the rivers during that season will be sufficient to water a very large area indeed. In the event of an early cessation of rain from the 15th September, such as occurred in 1865, I think there would be a sufficiency of water in the rivers to supply all the canals as now projected till the 15th November, if not later. I am now having the discharge of the rivers measured. The rains were later than usual this year.

Q.—In your opinion has the question of embankments, as a whole, any necessary connection with the irrigation scheme, except so far as the cultivation benefited by the canal is liable to injury from floods in common with all other culture?

A.—No, I don't think it has.

Q.—Will the irrigation canals in part serve as embankments for the protection of the country?

A.—Certainly.

Q.—Can the irrigation works at present be carried out without any material hindrance on account of the doubt which exists regarding the embankment system?

A.—Certainly.

I am a member of a Committee for considering the whole question of embankments. I certainly do not expect to be able to report on the subject, that is, to send in our report, till after the end of the rains.

I have read the correspondence regarding the cost of land involved in a scheme put forward by Mr. Levinge and Colonel Rundall, and I think the damage to the land is very much over-estimated. I think the land would be very valuable owing to the silt occasionally deposited on it. The silt brought down by these rivers is of an ordinarily good quality as far as my experience goes. I don't think the rivers bring down sand in such quantities as to cause material injury. Sand is deposited in quantities such as to cause damage in the places near the breaches, but in the lands at a greater distance the silt is such as to cause an excellent effect. If irrigation water is obtainable, I imagine that a crop could be grown after the subsidence of the floods. From December to March, I think the rivers would supply water enough to irrigate a considerable area.

The principal works of communication now being carried on in my circle are roads. There are no canals under the department. The principal roads now under me are—the main road from Calcutta through Midnapore and Balasore to Cuttack, from Cuttack to Ganjam, and from Cuttack to Pooree or Juggurnath.

Sanction has been given to metal the whole line from Cuttack to Midnapore, and an estimate has been called for for metalling the line from Cuttack to Ganjam. From Pooree towards Cuttack metalling for six miles has been sanctioned, and an estimate for metalling the remainder of that line is in preparation. There is an earthen road from Cuttack to Taldunda, on the right bank of the Mahanuddee, and another from Cuttack by Kendraparah to Patamonddee, the extension of which to Aul has been sanctioned. From Aul to Taldunda, respectively, there is tidal communication with the sea. It is not at present proposed to metal these lines, nor are they completely bridged. There are also some local roads in the Midnapore district. It is my opinion that when the system of canals of the Irrigation Company is complete, there will be efficient communication between Cuttack and the sea at all seasons. The anchorage at False Point will, I think, afford cover sufficient to enable ships to unload during the south-west monsoon; but steam power and proper boats will be required to take cargoes into the river. I do not know anything about the mouth of the Dhamrah. I think that when the Irrigation Company's canals are completed, there will be water communication all the way from Cuttack to Ganjam, through the Chilka Lake.

Q.—To what extent is it proposed to make the road from Cuttack to Ganjam, and that from Cuttack to Midnapore, passable for heavy traffic on carts all the year round?

A.—Both these roads will be metalled and bridged throughout, with the exception of one stream on the Ganjam road, which may be eventually bridged, and of twelve large streams between Cuttack and the end of my circle. The estimates for all other bridges, not already completed, have been sanctioned.

Q.—Can the large unbridged rivers be conveniently crossed by ferries capable of carrying large numbers of heavy carts during the rains?

A.—These rivers can be crossed by ferry boats, except during very heavy floods, when they may be occasionally impassable forty-eight hours at a time. At other times in the rains ferries can always ply, and large number of boats might be carried across, provided the boats are in sufficient numbers and kept in proper order.

Q.—Will the ordinary traffic be such that it may be expected that a sufficient number of boats will be kept up in proper order to meet the occasional pressure of very heavy traffic in the rains?

A.—No, I should say not.

Q.—In the dry season, are the obstacles caused by the sandy beds of the river very serious, and such as to render it necessary that wheeled carriages using the roads should be provided with extraordinary means of draught?

A.—Yes, they are.

Q.—Have you ever tried the plan of metalling these sandy beds as is now done in the North-Western Provinces?

A.—No, I have not.

Q.—Are you sanguine as to the probable success of the Irrigation Company's high level canal, from Cuttack to Midnapore, as a means of transit?

A.—Yes, I consider that when completed it will carry a large quantity of the traffic of the country. I see no engineering difficulties to obstruct the project for carrying a continuous line of navigable canal from Cuttack all the way to Calcutta. I am not, however, sanguine of its speedy completion, and I am further of opinion that it would not be advisable to leave the trunk road in its present inefficient state, and trust to the canal for the conveyance of the entire traffic of the country.

Q.—If the canal were completed and in efficient order, do you consider that much traffic would be carried by the road?

A.—This is a point on which I can scarcely venture to give a decided opinion.

Q.—In your opinion, supposing the road, as at present sanctioned, to be completed in due course, would any traffic in grain between Calcutta and Cuttack be carried by it, or by sea to the ports of the Mahanuddee, and thence by the Irrigation Company's canals?

A.—I think that the sea route would be preferred, even in the monsoons, were it only for the absolute saving of time. I would, however, recommend, under all the circumstances of the case, that for purposes of internal communication the trunk road from Cuttack to Midnapore should be completed. The estimate for metalling this line amounts to a little over 6 lakhs of rupees. I consider that the road will be completed, including every work that can be required, except the bridges for the large rivers already referred to, for an expenditure well under 10 lakhs from the present time. As to time of completion, much depends on the supply of funds, and the efficiency of the establishment allowed to me. Supposing these are not stinted, I consider that the work may be completed in three rainy seasons. The Ganjam road may perhaps be finished in a shorter time. On it metal is easily obtainable, and the work will be comparatively cheaper. On the Pooree road metal is expensive. The cost of completing the line will probably be between 4 and 5 lakhs of rupees.

Q.—Does Government now incur a heavy expenditure on account of embankments in Orissa?

A.—Yes, it does. I put in a statements showing the expenditure during recent years. In the Madinapore district also, some expenditure on the same account is annually incurred.

Q.—Are any embankments kept up by the zemindars in connection with your embankments?

A.—Yes, there are, and others are maintained by us at the expense of zemindars. Those kept up by the zemindars are indifferently maintained. I have, however, the power of taking charge of them if I find them at any time very greatly neglected, and the present system is not found productive of much serious inconvenience in that respect. In an engineering point of view, I consider the existing system of embankments extremely inefficient.

Q.—With reference to the opinion recorded in his evidence by Mr. Levinge, as to the condition of the trunk road between Cuttack and Midnapore, and which has been read over to you, have you any further remarks to offer?

A.—He states that it is liable to interruption during the rainy season. This has already been allowed by me with reference to the larger rivers. In addition to this, temporary stoppages of traffic may be expected at the several causeways; but these would not be of such long duration as those at the rivers, so that no additional inconvenience would be experienced from them. During the dry season, causeways like that on the Soane, or some modification of the same, would be advantageous, and I should recommend them. The only difficulty in maintaining them would be due to the constant changes of the river channel. This road, as well as all other engineering works, is of course liable to unforeseen injury; but as far as present experience goes, the waterway which has been provided, and which was minutely calculated and determined on in 1863, and for which an estimate has been sanctioned, has proved perfectly sufficient, as no injury, either in breaches, or in carrying away of bridges, has occurred in any portion of the completed road. I may here mention that nearly the whole length of the road has been embanked and bridged at the present date, with the exception of a few unimportant bridges in the Balasore district. During the late floods, which have been excessive, no injury whatever has taken place, with the exception of a trifling breach close to Cuttack, which will be provided for before the floods of the ensuing season. Two or three wing walls of bridges have been carried away; but this was not occasioned by the direct action of the floods, but from the rush of the water down the side excavations, which have been made continuous. This error is now in course of being remedied. This experience, I consider, proves that sufficient water-way can be and has been provided to obviate any possible injury that can be foreseen.

Q.—Will you be so good as to give a brief resume of the orders issued to you in regard to the mode of employing and paying public works laborers; in what manner these orders were carried out, and the results as regards increase or diminution of the number of people who sought relief on your works? State also what orders were first issued to you as to paying work-people in money and not in kind, and when and to what extent these orders were modified, and with what results?

A.—My first orders were dated 19th December, these did not reach me for some time, as I was in Calcutta. Demi-official orders were issued from Calcutta somewhere about the 26th December. Official orders were issued on the 6th January. Government orders were that work should be pushed on the Ganjam and Pooree roads, giving employment to all who came, and paying at the ordinary rates of wages in coin and not in grain. These orders were again repeated in Secretary's No. 6178, dated 30th December, in reply to my No. Z28, dated 18th December. In both letters it was strictly enjoined that payments should be made in coin at usual rates, and anything that might be necessary to enable these wages to purchase food advantageously should be carried out under local arrangements. Copies of my orders were sent to the Chief Engineer. On the 3rd February, after having visited the Pooree and Ganjam roads, more specific orders were again issued to the Executive Engineers based on the same principle of ordinary daily wages and coin payments. These were submitted to the Chief Engineer and to the Commissioner, and were approved of by letter on 12th February in his No. 36. The Chief Engineer never disapproved of these orders. The Commissioner, in his No. 243½, dated 4th June, represented to me that our rates were insufficient, and requested me to raise them. I replied on the 8th June, in my No. 2601, that I had already raised rates beyond what I was authorized in doing, and considered it was for me now to expect that assistance from the Commissioner which had been ordered by Government to be given, viz., the supplementing of our rates as above noted. Nothing towards this, except what was done by Mr. Barlow at Pooree, had hitherto been apparent. On the same day I forwarded copy of this letter, with my No. 2602, to the Chief Engineer, saying that I could evidently expect no assistance from the Civil authorities, and so I requested orders by telegram. To this I received a telegram on the 17th June, referring me to a letter No. 97T, dated 2nd June, giving further instructions concerning rates, &c. These letters must have crossed. I may here remark that Government found no fault with my arrangements mentioned in my No. 2601, to the Commissioner.

The orders contained in No. 97T were that rates were to be subservient to the wants of the people, and were to be regulated according to their physical strength and the price of grain; but that when the amount of work done fell to merely a nominal quantity, the people were to be made over to the charitable relief centres. On

this I fixed my rates, making a limit of from Rs. 3-12 to Rs. 4 per 1,000 cubic feet, as the average rate for good and bad, some receiving more and some less. These rates and arrangements were approved of by the Commissioner in his No. 122, dated 16th June, in the following terms—"the rates and tasks you have fixed appear to me to be in every respect fair, and in accordance with the spirit of the instructions you have received from Government" also by Government in Officiating Secretary's No. 2411, dated 3rd July. The success of the whole of the above arrangements, however, depended entirely on the supply of rice to the work-people by the Civil authorities—a measure ordered by Government in Public Works letter No. 6062, dated 19th December, and No. 6178, dated 30th idem, and this was pointed out by me in my No. 1635, dated 3rd February, to the address of the Commissioner, a copy of which was sent to the Chief Engineer on the same date, in the following terms—"Whatever decision you may arrive at about this point, I trust you will give the necessary orders to the district officers to see, if possible, that the people employed both on the Ganjam and Pooree roads are properly supplied, as I am of opinion that, unless the Civil authorities do make such arrangements, the people will be supplied in no other way, and the efforts made by this department will fall to the ground." The same warning was again repeated by me to the Commissioner in my No. 2654, dated 13th June, as follows—"Undersigned is much afraid that this increase of rates now sanctioned will not be of much avail, as rice cannot be obtained without the greatest difficulty by the comparatively few laborers now employed. In fact, at some places, namely, on the Motelyaon road, Burra Olundee embankments, the Byturnee at Jajpore, and the Bhudruk sub-division, no rice whatever is obtainable. It will be of no use, therefore, offering higher wages unless the markets are opened or arrangements made for the supply of rice by the Civil authorities." Copy of this was also sent to the Chief Engineer on the same date.

Rice was, with the exception already noted, viz., the small assistance rendered by Mr. Barlow, never supplied to the Pooree, Cuttack, and Mahanuddee divisions whilst I was in the circle, viz., to 31st July. In Balasore some small quantity of rice was obtained from the Balasore Collector, on my sanction for its purchase before the arrival of the Government sanction. The sanction is of the Government sanction. The sanction is conveyed in P. W. letter No. 2538, dated 6th July, when the Officiating Secretary wrote as follows:—The Lieutenant Governor has been pleased to authorise your purchasing rice from the Civil authorities for the working parties of the distressed poor in your circle. It will rest with you to determine whether the wages should be paid in rice, or whether the rice being conveyed to the spot and arrangements made for its sale, the people should be left to purchase as they like, with the wages given." This sanction came very late; but had it been accorded at the earliest date at which our work-people were employed, it

would have been of no avail, simply because there was not rice to be supplied. The success of the arrangements initiated for affording relief by carrying on public works depended mainly on the work-people having supplies of rice made available to them, and as this could not be done, the arrangements in question never did provide that measure of relief which they might otherwise have done. The actual number of work-people employed between the 1st May and 31st October in our famine relief works will be seen from the abstracts which I put in.

Q.—Had the rains any effect, and if so, to what extent, on the number of people who resorted to your works for employment?

A.—Of necessity they had a serious effect, inasmuch as the country being more or less under water, there was a greatly diminished facility for working. The certainty of this result occurring was pointed out by me in my No. A 84, dated 17th July, when I wrote—"I am, therefore, much afraid that it is not in our power to do very much, more especially as the rains will soon submerge the whole country, rendering earth-work impossible, and the carting of metal nearly impracticable. Still His Honor may rely on every effort being made by this department." The interruption to work caused by the rains will be clearly exhibited by the abstracts above referred to.

Q.—Did you provide work for every person capable of working, who applied to you, or were any such people turned away?

A.—Generally, the orders already issued concerning limits of rates were carried out, and consequently some people coming under the denomination of "capable of only nominal work" must have been turned off; but no person who could work up to the minimum rates approved of by Government was ever refused employment where the execution of work was practicable.

At no time, so far as I know, were the laborers employed on daily pay. It was possible for an able-bodied man to work at our rates in the rains, but not for an emaciated man; but I can't say much of the rains, because I left on 1st August, and work must have been sometimes impracticable. Mr. Leonard acted for me. He took charge in Calcutta. Mr. Barlow at first induced bunnials to open shops, but they did not continue.

No. 41.—LIEUT. G. NOLAN, *Executive Engineer, Pooree Division.*

[Examined at Cuttack, 1st January 1867].

In November and December 1865, I was out on my ordinary tours in the Pooree district. The crops seemed to me very inferior and light. Distress came under my notice, and I began to employ the people about the Chilka Lake on the embankments and wherever I could, in

December. In January I got orders to commence re-modelling the Pooree road, and having no overseer, I superintended the works myself. I began about the 3rd January. The system was that of daily payment. There were about 1,000 people employed. There were more applicants than I could entertain. I turned away the able-bodied applicants and employed the weakly. When task-work was introduced about the 6th February, I was not there. Mr. Crowe was in charge. The people refused to work almost entirely. Few came; the others threatened them. On the 1st March I took my office down to Piply, and carried on the works from within six miles of Pooree up to Cuttack. On that part of the road they worked at the lower rates, but on the sixth mile near Pooree, they wouldn't. The rise to Rs. 1-12 brought a few people, but not the full complement. I had not enough to support them. Those that were very emaciated did not and couldn't work at those rates, and many preferred living on sag and jungle produce to working at any rate in the absence of rice. There were great fluctuations in the number employed, and the scarcity of rice was the chief cause. I had a good many people at work in March; they diminished in May in consequence of the want of rice; again in June they increased in number, and I had then a much larger number than at any other season of the year. In that month Mr. Barlow established rice depôts on the road. On the 4th March I went down to Piply, and remained there till June. The people were dying on that road as early as April. I don't think many were dying in February and March. In and after April the numbers increased. As far as I know, the famine showed earlier towards Pooree than towards Cuttack. I should say that the famine set in about six weeks earlier in Pooree than in Cuttack.

The map put in by me represents the effect of the inundations as noticed by me on going round the embankments after the floods. The floods caused great loss of life by cutting off access to Pooree. The loss to crops was not so great as I had at first estimated and reported. Many of the crops came out improved, and this on a large scale, so much so that it is my opinion that, taking the whole aggregate of the lands in the Pooree division, the crops were improved by the flood. On the dark blue lines in my map, the crops were entirely destroyed, but in other parts improved. The rains had been irregular, and the crop was poor before the inundation. The water brought down by the floods of the Mahanuddee is very fertilizing. The rains are not, as a rule, sufficient for the crops, and the soil is such that it requires flooding once a week.

In September 1865 I allowed the people to cut the bunds on the condition of their repairing them, and they were glad to do so in order to get the water.

I only asked the Collector to supplement my rates by procuring and selling rice at a reasonable price. I did not apply for money to supplement my rates.

No. 42.—Mr. D'SOUZA.

[Examined at Cuttack, 2nd January 1867].

I have been in Orissa since my tenth year (from 1823-24). I remember a famine in 1837-38. It wasn't felt so severely. Mr. Mills was Collector; Mr. Ricketts Commissioner. No rice was imported. Only a subscription was raised, and large quantities of rice were bought up in the district, and people were fed in one place—the salt compound. A good many died, as it was the rainy season. This famine was very much worse. It never was so in Cuttack in my experience. It began to be bad a month after it broke out on the 21st October. People began to die at the end of November and December, and things gradually became worse and worse.

It was very bad when the Lieutenant Governor came. I was here in Cuttack. The Lieutenant Governor did nothing for us. The order he passed made things worse. The order he passed was that the merchants and dealers were at liberty to sell according to their own option. People only asked him to make a rate, and to compel sale. From that time it became worse and worse. In 1831, when the great cyclone and irruption of the sea took place in Balasore and Pooree, rice was imported for the Molungees; they, however, had to buy it at prime cost. The rice came from Calcutta. On two or three other occasions rice was imported for the Molungees in 1840 for the last time.

No. 43.—Mr. H. LEVINGE, Executive Engineer, KATJOREE Division, East Indian Irrigation Company.

[Examined at Cuttack, 2nd January 1867].

I have been in the Cuttack district throughout the famine. I had opportunities of noticing the state of the crops in the autumn of 1865, along the line of canal towards Kendraparah. In the high lands they seemed to me in October to be a total failure; in the lowest lands about a three quarter crop appeared to be saved; on the average I should say that there was about a half crop. I did not particularly notice, at the time of threshing, whether the yield of grain was less than might have been expected from the straw. There is a great deal of low land in the part of the country which I have had an opportunity of seeing. Last cold weather there were obvious signs of distress among the people. The first death from absolute starvation that came under my observation occurred about the 20th November. It was a case of a bricklayer drawing Rs. 6 per mensem, but who had a large family to maintain, and was unable to provide for them. From that date the distress went on increasing, and a good many cases of death were brought to my notice. During February and March there were great many deaths, even among people who were drawing ordinary pay. In March the most casual observer could see that there was severe famine in the country. In the latter end

of May there was a marked increase in the distress. On the 8th March I went into camp, and returned on the 28th April. During that period I saw a great deal of mortality. People like walking skeletons came constantly round my tent in large numbers. In the end of February there was great difficulty in procuring rice for money. On the 14th March I was in camp at Kendraparah with Colonel Rundall and Mr. Glass. There was then an almost absolute impossibility of procuring rice, and what was procured was excessively dear and bad. I have a memorandum dated February 26th that rice at Kendraparah was selling at 6 Cuttack seers for the rupee; and on the 19th March, at Raisomga, it was selling at 4 seers, and very bad. It may have been at that time a little cheaper in Cuttack itself, but I cannot speak for certain. There were frequent fires in the villages in April; these were attributed to arson, and supposed to have been caused by desperate people with a view to create confusion and plunder the rice where it was known to have been stored. But, on the whole, the people seemed to me to bear their sufferings with astonishing patience.

About the beginning of the year I had large parties of laborers employed on my works. I put in a statement showing the number employed in my division of the canal. The supply of labor was greatly affected by the scarcity of rice. The numbers fluctuated exceedingly. Within two or three days, they varied from 4,000 to 1,000. We were only able to keep together the imported laborers and skilled artificers by paying them partly in money and partly in rice. I introduced this system about the middle of January, immediately after we imported rice from Calcutta. We were obliged, however, to confine this mode of payment to a small portion of our work-people. Our supply of rice failed, I think, about the middle of April, and there was then a break from April to early in July, when a fresh supply of rice was obtained by our private importation.* I attribute the diminution of the numbers of laborers from January to February and from February to March entirely to mortality and the difficulty in procuring food. I consider that this system of part payment in rice should have been applied also to the Government works, and I think that the efficiency of the works undertaken and the relief of the distress was greatly diminished by the neglect to adopt this system. When the scarcity of food became great, we increased the rates of pay from Re. 1-12 to Rs. 2 per 1,000 cubic feet of earth-work; this was for the first lift only, and all others rates were raised proportionately. The whole of our unskilled labor was employed on job-work. I find that the supply of labor has now been enormously diminished; the ordinary laborers and people of the lower classes are nearly all dead. With respect to what I have said above about the rice crop of 1865, I wish to add that the ensuing cold weather crop was almost an entire failure. Usually there is in the cold season a very

*The Irrigation Company obtained the rice from Calcutta via False Point.

large quantity of the grains called *kullai* and *koollee* grown in the part of the country which came under my observation. I consider that the famine was at its height in the end of July, and the cold wind, accompanied by rain, which occurred about the 10th August, was the climax of the calamities which fell on the country; the people at that time died at a more rapid rate than at any other. I do not attribute much of the mortality which I observed in August to the inundations, as distinguished from what was actually due to the inclemency of the weather. The villages in the part of the country where I was are high and protected from floods. Damage was done by the floods to the crops growing in the lowest lands, chiefly along the banks of the Gobree; but the proportion of the early rice crops destroyed by floods in that part of the country was, I think, very small, a great portion of the country being protected by the canal embankments.

As regards measures of relief adopted by Government, I think that the first and greatest error lay in not adopting them earlier. The local officers must have observed the approach of famine in November, and I think things were very little easier in December and January; prices of food continued at famine rates. They must have seen in February that matters were becoming very serious, and in March and April the most casual observer must have noticed that famine was in the land; but I consider that the local officers were deterred from taking action by the accounts that they received of the stocks of grain in the country. My own servants informed me that one man, Rogoonath Chowdree, had enormous stores of grain in his possession, and I believed the statement. My belief then was that individuals held large stocks, but not that there were any large stocks in the country generally, because I know that in 1864 there had been a short crop, and that in 1865 it was extremely short. I do not consider that a prudent employer of labor could have trusted to the existence of stocks of rice in the country. This is the only cause that occurs to me to account for the Government officers not having taken more active measures when they realised the state of affairs. All the European officers then in Cuttack were new to the country. When the time came that Government took active measures to relieve the famine, I then thought that they were as effective as, under the circumstances, could reasonably be expected, there being very many difficulties to contend with. But looking back to that period, I do not hold this opinion. I consider that more efficient measures might have been adopted, such as sending a steamer of light draught and boats to False Point. I also think that the means of transport up the river might have been greatly improved; if more money had been spent in mooring the boats better and urging them more rapidly up the rivers; also in providing against pillage. I have seen boats detained for want of men and supervision, one policeman only being in charge of a whole fleet quite insufficiently manned to stem the current. I think that the local officers exerted themselves to the utmost; they had not only their ordi-

nary work, but all the extra work thrown on them by the famine, and there was certainly a deficiency of officers when their services were most wanted. Additional assistants were sent afterwards, but not until the great pressure was over. Up to the month of August, in the interior of the country, I do not think that the Government relief had made much impression on the mass of suffering. There was an improvement in this respect in September and October; but still I do not consider that the great mass of suffering was reached. I have been very lately through the district, and I think that the condition of the people has been much improved since the new rice came in, and that there is now no actual starvation, nor any unusual disease, except among the people who have been relieved throughout at the unnochatros. I think that great numbers of people have, during the famine, lain down and died, without making any attempt to go to the centres of relief; also that many might have survived, if they had sought labor and labored steadily during the early days of the famine. There was, however, a considerable interval during which rice was so scarce that it could not be purchased, and the laborer could not obtain food by his labor, and when relief centres also had not been established. Afterwards, if a much larger number of men had gone to these centres, I do not think there was rice enough to have supported all.

I am sanguine in thinking that within two or three years, the irrigation works will be so far forward as to recover the district of Cuttack from famine, provided that the settlement question is speedily determined. I consider that very essential, and that the only thoroughly effectual remedy is to be found in a permanent settlement. By a permanent settlement, I mean one of the revenue paid by the zemindars. I do not think, however, that the object will be so effectually gained if the revenue paid by the zemindars only is fixed, while the rent paid by the ryots remains liable to be increased. From what I have seen, I am of opinion that if the zemindars obtain a permanent settlement, they would improve their estates; but I am not aware whether they have effected any improvement under the thirty years' settlement which is now expiring. I think, however, that they are fully alive to their own interests, and that the waste land, of which there is much, would be speedily brought into cultivation. The object at present is to keep this land waste, pending a settlement. I think that up to the present moment, the want of a declared policy on the part of the Government has materially affected the sale of canal water, and at this present time, when grain is at famine rates, we are unable to dispose of all the water available, and it is running to waste. We could have supplied water for a spring crop of rice of about 32,000 acres, while water for only 2,800 acres has been taken up, and the season for sowing the spring crop has nearly expired. I think the want of a permanent settlement is the chief cause, because the zemindars are not co-operating with us, and the ryots, who would be glad enough to take the water, are prevented by the zemindars from taking it. The ryots are

fully aware of the value of water; they have no prejudices against its use; no doubt if they got it at low rates, they would take it more readily than they are doing. At the same time I am of opinion that the rates now fixed are not too high even for the commencement of operations. I think that the soil, when watered by the muddy water of the river, could bear two and three crops annually. I have not seen good sugar-cane growing in this district; but I believe that in portions of it, it might be grown under irrigation and with good cultivation. I also think that both soil and climate are adapted to the country cotton, which is already grown successfully, and might, with the aid of irrigation, be largely extended. There is a little jute in the district, but I am not in a position to say whether its cultivation could be increased. I do not think that the embankment question is so intimately connected with irrigation, that a little delay in its settlement will interfere with our operations. If it is settled before next working season, those operations will not be impeded; but if there be greater delay, I think that the progress of our works may be delayed. If canals and embankments could be carried on together, the earth excavated from the one could be employed in raising the other, and time would thus be saved. By the end of next working season there should be water communication by the Kendraparah canal, between Cuttack and tidal water. Our canals are all to be made capable of providing for navigation, which is a main portion of our schemes; the fall in the beds is little, and the velocity of the stream will not be higher than $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile an hour. If proper arrangements be made for landing cargoes at False Point, I think that goods may then be conveyed all the way from Calcutta to Cuttack at any season of the year. I do not think that the completion of the communication with Calcutta by the high level canal can be looked for at any very early date, as the speedy carrying out of it must depend on the financial success of the first works. I do not, however, see any engineering difficulties in the way of its execution. I do not think that the road from Cuttack to Calcutta will be efficient for the transport of heavy goods at all seasons. During the rains it will be always liable to interruption. During the dry season, I think it may be made efficient by constructing causeways across the sandy beds of the large rivers, similar to that across the Soane. Interruption during the rainy season will, I consider, be due to the liability of the road to be breached, as it is not possible to provide water-ways with any degree of certainty for the spill waters of the rivers. The road crosses the whole drainage of the country, and since I have been here, bridges have been carried away continually. The high embankments of the road, which are very costly, are liable to be constantly breached. I think that the rivers should be embanked from the point where they begin to spill down to the road, and that then the road might be metalled without any new bridges being constructed. The road would then be efficient, and for light traffic, and as a means of internal communication, I would advocate its retention.

I had charge of a portion of the operations carried on from Sykes' Fund, which was started much earlier than the Government relief operations. From about the middle of May to the end of June, an average of 218 people were daily relieved from this fund under my supervision.

I put in a statement showing the disbursements under this head.

No. 44.—MR. J. G. H. GLASS, Assistant Engineer, East Indian Irrigation and Canal Company.

[Examined at Cuttack, 2nd January 1867].

I was in the Cuttack district throughout the famine, from Cuttack to Kendraparah. I think that the rice crop was about ten-sixteenths of a crop that part of the country, and that there was also a pretty fair Rubbee crop. I was not in the country the previous year. I had no reason to believe that there were large stores in the country, but every ryot had rice to a certain extent. In November and December I first noticed famine. Those who had rice would not sell, and those who had not suffered. Things were easier than before, just when the crop was reaped, but not materially. Prices were then cheaper in the interior than in Cuttack, but afterwards they were dearer in the interior. In the end of January things began to get tighter, and in February they were very bad. On the 26th February I wrote from Kendrapattan (19½ miles from Cuttack) to say that rice was at 6 seers, and not procurable in any quantity; that my laborers were leaving owing to inability to procure rice. In February I heard that people had died of starvation, but I did not see any. I observed, however, that people were in worse condition than usual, and that a smaller number came for work. In March I have a distinct remembrance of seeing very many people reduced to fearful skeletons, and I saw some bodies of persons lying about whom I presume to have died of starvation. In April I was able to purchase some rice in small quantities for my coolies, and I paid them in rice. In that month there was an increase of famine-stricken people, and in the early part of May things were very bad. I then commenced distributing relief from Sykes and Co.'s Fund. In the beginning of June there was a very marked change for the worse. I then saw most horrible scenes; I think worse in that month than at any other time. Till the month of August there was very little change. I had charge of three Government centres of relief; the first opened in July. I gave gratuitous relief, and was allowed to sell a small quantity, ten bags daily, at each place. This supply was maintained throughout, except that for three days the sale was stopped for want of rice. From August I think that the relief made a very sensible impression on the whole mass of suffering. The people who had no means came in large numbers for relief. But the sales were not a hundredth part sufficient to meet applicants

who had money to buy. I made all applicants sit down, selected those who seemed most in want, and gave them the preference. I did this in person at Kendrapattan whenever I could. When I was not there Native overseers made the selections. I had complaints that they could not get grain for persons who had not been relieved, principally for persons who had come from a distance for grain. I think the Native overseers behaved very well indeed. The Police were not there. I never was able to meet all comers for purchase. But the gratuitous distribution of food to the indigent was never stopped. On one occasion, in November, the Government rice ran out, and I lent some Irrigation Company's rice. I think that from June all was done that could be done to supply Government rice. But I think that if a small steamer had been sent to False Point, it might have taken much more rice up the rivers; the local carriage could not have taken more. The bears on the river were sufficiently manned. I saw them; scores of them. They passed my house. But the guard was insufficient; they connived at the theft of rice.

During the season I was several times in Cuttack. When I came in I used to live with Mr. Webster, and was in the habit of seeing all the Government officers. I certainly think that in the early part of the famine I must have mentioned the sights that I had seen. It did not strike me that they were incredulous of the famine, but they thought that there was rice in the country. It struck me that nothing was doing when something ought to have been done. I attributed the want of action to the belief of the officers that there was rice in the country. I never formally pressed on any of the Government officers the necessity of action, nor do I know whether any one else did, though I have heard that they did. I am not aware of any other reason for the want of action than that above stated. When action was taken, I certainly think that the officers did what they could. I don't think that better officers could have done more. I don't think there were enough of them. I estimate that about one-fourth of the population died, and more of the laboring population, say 30 per cent. For ten men that we got to labor last year, we get about two now, but they have not necessarily all died,—some may have emigrated, and many are working on the fields. A good deal of mortality was due to the inundations; many were drowned, and a great amount of the crops perished. Bullocks also were carried away. Roughly I should say that of the whole deaths, about five per cent. are due to inundation. I never had any complaints of favoritism or maltreatment on the part of the Native overseers at my centres, nor had I reason to think that there were abuses at other centres. I have several times witnessed the distribution of relief at Kendraparah. I never saw any violence. I think that a great deficiency was want of shelter and clothing in the rainy season. I proposed to erect sheds in August, and the measure was immediately sanctioned. They were up in a few days. Many had died of exposure. I never had authority to give clothing. I did not apply

for it, but gave it out of Sykes' Fund in September and October. There were also a want of medical comforts. There was a dresser, and he had none such comforts belonging to the Irrigation Company.

No. 45.—MR. D. J. POOLE, *Assistant Superintendent of Police.*

[Examined at Cuttack, 3rd January 1867].

I have been in the district since April 1864. I was in charge of the Cuttack Police from the 3rd August to the 23rd October 1866. Last cold weather I was out in the Gurjat. I think that in the hills there was about a three-quarter crop; in the parts along the plains they were very bad, not even six-sixteenths. There was not much distress in the hills; in the plains there was great scarcity, but not much emaciation; and up to the present time there has been much less distress felt than east of Cuttack. To the west rice has always been procurable for money, while to the east it was not. In the Gurjat I think the rajahs kept grain for themselves and their ryots; they had better crops, and some of them prevented exports. In the hot weather also, I was not employed to the east of Cuttack. In the end of February and March I was out to the west, and I did not observe any actual starvation, although I heard that it was reported to the east towards the coast as early as January. I believe that such reports gradually increased from that time. At the time of the Lieutenant Governor's visit, there was great scarcity, and in my own mind I expected famine; but no one thought it would be so bad as it has turned out. I call it famine when I see people dying of hunger. When the Lieutenant Governor was here, many people presented petitions, and I heard that great crowds collected and besieged him; but I did not see them. In the early part of May I was out and dealt with a serious case in which a village containing grain was burnt, and with a serious grain dacoity later in the month. On the 11th May I was in Cuttack. The state of things there was exceedingly bad; very many paupers were about in a very emaciated state, and I think that some were dying of starvation. On the 27th May Mr. Ravenshaw returned. I was then here. I am Senior Assistant, and in charge of the District Office whenever the Superintendent is absent. I heard from the Police reports that Grees Chunder, Inspector, specially employed, reported deaths in December. During all the following months, constant reports of scarcity and of deaths from starvation were made. Captain Fisher was, I believe, out in the eastern districts. He kept diaries. He is obliged to do so. Captain Fisher took them away with him. When he made over charge to me I asked him for the diaries. He declined to give them, saying that the Deputy Inspector General, Mr. E. B. Baker, had ruled that these diaries were private property. I remonstrated and expressed my

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opinion that the diaries were necessary to the proper conduct of my duties, but he still declined. There may have been personal remarks in the diaries which he did not wish me to see.

After the transport of grain commenced, Mr. Crouch was employed in that department, and the Police generally were constantly so employed in escorting grain and on such duties. When I took charge 76 men were so employed, and 100 more afterwards. I know that Captain Fisher was transferred at his own request. While in charge, I constantly reported that there were not sufficient European officers to carry on all the duties. Mr. Crouch and Mr. Hall, European inspectors, were both laid up, and I was over-worked. Both in Captain Fisher's time and mine, there were considerable differences of opinion between the Civil and Police officers; but I think the whole arose from the want of men to do efficiently both the increased Police work and that required by the Civil authorities for famine work. I never had an available man. Extra men were sanctioned for extra jail duties and such like, but not enough. More men might have been entertained for famine work, to escort grain and such duties. In the town of Cuttack the relief authorities did all they could; but there was deficiency of European supervision, the number of officers not being enough, and at times there was scarcity of grain. Gratuitous relief was never stopped, and a great quantity was sold, not as much as was wanted. There were abuses in regard to the sales; in the struggle the poor and the weak were unable to get rice. When I was there, I gave the preference to the old hags; but at first, in the early days of the sales, I believe that the prostitutes of the town chiefly benefited; they used to hire women to go in and purchase, and then collected the rice. This was under Native management. Gratuitous relief was given only to the starving. The principal criterion was their being reduced to skeletons. Children were first cared for. In October no want at Kendraparah; and other centres. The famine was still awful; but then there was some shortness of rice. The relief measures were as good as the officers in charge could make them; at Kendraparah, very good. Sales were going on. There was always a great rush for the rice. The quantity was limited, and there was very little in the bazars. In Cuttack I have seen that when the struggle for rice took place, sticks were used to keep people back; the crush was very great. I don't think this was carried to any great excess; it was immediately checked when it came to the notice of the European Officers, and the persons struck were generally strong men pressing forward when the weak were behind.

No. 46.—MR. C. P. CROUCH, *Assistant Superintendent of Police.*

[Examined at Cuttack, 3rd January 1867].

I have been three and half years in the Cuttack district, and throughout the famine. Last cold weather I was in charge of the office in Cuttack while the District Superintendent was out. I received reports of distress in October and November 1865. I know of no reports of famine during the subsequent months till May. I was before that aware from what I heard that there was want, and that people were dying of starvation. I cannot give the dates. About February, it was spoken of that there was going to be a famine; some thought it would be very bad and some not; the last mentioned persons thought that there was grain hoarded up. When the Lieutenant Governor came, the people did not come up in a regular manner and complain, but every one was saying that there was going to be a dreadful famine. In my opinion, death from starvation commenced in January, and from that time got worse and worse. The Police should have reported this. I think it was their duty. I will examine the papers, and see whether they did; but Captain Fisher's diaries should be got. I was not out till June, except for two or three days at a time. In June famine was dreadfully bad at Taldunda, and during the floods it was frightful. The crops suffered much. I was employed in connection with the transport duties. The Police officers were then quite insufficient in numbers to carry on police and transport duties. If boats and a small steamer had been sent down from Calcutta to False Point, and there had been more men, the landing and transport operations would have been much more efficient. As it was, boats were twelve and fifteen days getting along nineteen miles; they were insufficiently manned. I was first at False Point on the 20th June. There was a difficulty about the sale of the cargo of the *Jacques Forestier*, and there was delay on that account. When the *Moulmein* was at False Point, she was delayed for many days, as there were no boats to take up the cargo. I engaged an empty brig, which had been accidentally driven in by stress of weather and was lying there. I trans-shipped the cargo to let the steamer go. I was again at False Point in August. The arrangements were then better; more boats had been collected from the interior. There are no surf boats at False Point. The landing was conducted in common country boats, not intended for sea-work. Calcutta cargo boats could have landed the rice very well. During the monsoon, at times there was a heavy sea and the boats could not go alongside, at other times they could. The longest interruption, while I was there, was four days. At that time I think a small steamer could have gone up almost to Cuttack and might have towed boats. In the end of June, very little was being despatched up the river, and that little took a long time to get up—twenty and twenty-five days to Cuttack. At False Point, in September, people were dying to such an extent that Mr. Burgess and I took the responsibility of issuing raw rice to them. They had collected on account of the rice landing there; but

no relief was given there till the end of August or September. The Taldunda relief, however, was opened in June. I do not think that the people got the food they should have got at the centres, there not being sufficient superintendence. At Cuttack, early in July, one morning, an inspector sent to collect the dead, buried upwards of 200 in the sands within a mile of the Cuttack Anicut. They died purely of starvation. Fifty men were buried on the opposite side of the river at the same point. Things began to get better when the new rice began to come into the market in November. In the town and neighbourhood, in August, the relief became efficient; but still many, who were much reduced, died from the effect of food: it made them ill and killed them. In the district also relief commenced to be good in August, and in the upper part of the district, I think, it reached the mass of the people, but not towards the coast. Much mortality was due to the floods in those parts in August and September. If it had not been for the floods, more centres might have been established, and more relief given. There was then rice at False Point. From what I have seen I should judge that the average out-turn of the crop of 1865 of the whole extent was from four to six-sixteenths.

I know that the French merchants bought and exported rice in July and August 1865. This was on the coast. I believe they did from Cuttack, but I am not sure. I am not sure whether they exported later.

No. 47.—MR. D. J. MCNEILE, *c. s.*

[Examined at Cuttack, 3rd January 1867].

I was appointed to assist the Commissioner of Orissa in relief arrangements. I arrived at Balasore on the 1st July and remained there making arrangements till the 19th idem; got to Cuttack on the 21st; on the 11th August went to False Point; returned on the 2nd September. From the 15th to 25th October, I was away at Pooree. I started for False Point again on the 10th November.

When I reached Balasore, things were very bad, but perhaps a little better than they had been. Government rice had been received by sea. Upwards of 1,100 bags of rice had been made over for relief purposes, and before that, the Local Committee had purchased a small quantity which, I believe, had come down the road from Hidgellee. As soon as the rains began, that route was effectually stopped, and was impassable throughout the rains. When I first reached Balasore, there were some sheds opposite the dhurmsala, but insufficient, and great numbers were lying about the town. Gratuitous relief was given to those in the worst condition, mostly to women and children. The number of starving people was enormous. There and in fact everywhere the great test of distinguishing the people to whom gratuitous relief should be given was personal appearance, *i. e.*, those who were most emaciated got it. I have seen six to seven thousand people fed at one time in the dhurmsala at Balasore. The feeding such a number took such a

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time (five hours) as to render it impossible to feed them more than once a day. My impression on arriving at Balasore was, that the arrangements made by the Relief Committee were as good as possibly could have been made at the time. The inferior European agency was insufficient. I applied for three European Assistants in the Public Works Department. They came down after I left and were found useless. Two fell ill, and the third either resigned or was dismissed. As respects the Magistrate and Collector and his Assistants, I had no complaints of insufficiency of hands. During the time I was at Balasore, eighteen days, the supply of rice in the Government shops was sufficient to supply all comers in Balasore itself. The shops were opened for six hours a day, and a barricade was erected which effectually prevented a crush. The landing operations were as follows—The rice was brought up all through the monsoons in small sloops, which were towed by the *Nemesis*, and besides two large vessels came. The sloops did not come up the river. They crossed the bar, and the rice was put over their sides into Native boats. I never heard of any difficulty in unloading from the sloops. As far as I saw, no time was lost in unloading the boats. The river boats were always ready. I did not return again to Balasore. From the reports I have received, I believe there was a sufficient supply of rice till the accident which happened to the *Tubal Cain* in August, when she was blown away to Akyab. Then there was an almost total collapse, and the Collector only kept the Government sales open and supplied the Relief Committee with what they wanted by borrowing from the jail. Supplies had been brought for the jail before the Government relief supplies came into use. This scarcity lasted three weeks; but in the week ending the 25th August operations were recommenced on a large scale. Since then the supplies have been sufficient so far as the sudder division was concerned, but Bhudruk has been insufficiently supplied till lately. The great difficulty in Bhudruk was inland communication between Balasore and Bhudruk, but I do not think there was enough rice in Balasore itself to supply Bhudruk with what was wanted there. Before the break in August, something like half the number of centres eventually established were started.

When I got to Cuttack there were no arrangements made for Government sales. The relief operations were going on, I believe, well. There was not a very large stock in hand in the first week, but in the course of the week ending 28th July large supplies arrived, and I immediately opened a Government shop. From that time we sold as much as could be served to customers during six hours a day. It was impossible to keep a Government shop open longer, as mohurrirs' accounts had to be settled, and the cash taken to the treasury daily. It might have been possible to open more shops, and eventually we opened two more. The first shop opened included seven stalls, the second opened soon after included five stalls, and the third in the circuit house compound opened in the end of September contained seven stalls. When I was in Cut-

tack there was a good deal of crowding and crushing, but no actual injury was done to the people. The barricades we put up were the only thing that prevented a serious riot taking place. Prior to my arrival an attempt had been made to sell, but was entirely put a stop to by the confusion and crushing that took place. The barricades stopped this effectually. We were selling very slightly below the bazar rates. We had a limit from Government of one seer in the rupee, but that limit I think, was never touched, certainly never exceeded. A great many people bought rice in the bazar at the somewhat higher bazar rates, because they got it on credit. Considerable quantities of grain arrived from Sumbulpoor. The Government importations would not have been sufficient to supply Cuttack had it not been for these private importations.

When I first arrived I remarked that people were not lying about the town as at Balasore. The general appearance of the latter place was much worse. The difficulties of bringing rice from the coast had not then been sufficiently overcome. It was to correct these shortcomings that I went down to False Point on the 11th August. As regards inland transport arrangements, European agency was never directly employed. If there had been more European assistants, we could have found good means of employing them. I do not think the Police did all that they might have done in this district. They were employed. My impression is, but I speak entirely from hearsay, that the District Superintendent did not do all he might have done. The transfer of the District Superintendent at such a time was, I think, injurious to the district. If there was one department more than another in which the Police failed it was the zemindaree dawk. Most serious consequences resulted on one occasion. A second letter sent to Mr. Burgess about the *Charles Moreau's* cargo, which might have had the effect of procuring the purchase of that cargo, was delayed. My impression was that Captain Fisher went because he wanted to go, not because it was thought we were better without him.

On my way to False Point I met several consignments of boats, and invariably found them moored. They had six manjees on each, sufficient to bring them up much faster than they came; more boatmen might have been put aboard. Nothing could have been worse than the Police supervision. Good supervision was what was most wanted. Some of the boats took from five to six weeks to come up from False Point. No European officer was told off to supervise the intermediate transit arrangements. We had a competent agent to start the boats at False Point, Mr. Burgess. The landing arrangements were as good as they could be under all the circumstances. The main difficulty was the strength of the stream. Ships were lying in fresh water, eight miles out. In ordinary weather there was no difficulty in unloading. Up to the end of August, from the time we opened operations, we landed an average of 700 bags a day. We had two fleets, one with keels—large boats—and a fleet of smaller flat-bottomed boats for inland

transport. Had we had a steamer and better boats, we could have worked much more effectively. I applied for a flat-bottomed river steamer to ply between the anchorage and the Jumbogodown. At that time the application was not complied with; there was no steamer available. There was no stoppage in the ship's supplies at False Point till the end of September. The transport up the river improved the last week in August, and became tolerably good in September. The stoppage at the end of September was this: I used to estimate the amount of rice required for a long period, and the Board used to supply what was estimated for with a little over. Two vessels disappointed us, the *Asia* and the *Dundas Castle*. I remember seeing a notice in the *Englishman* that the Steamer *Asia* had left the Hooghly on the 6th October. I think, and knowing she was one of the steamers engaged to bring rice, I supposed she was going to Rangoon to get rice. When I saw the Captain at False Point at the end of November I heard that the *Asia* had been to Hong-Kong before going to Rangoon.

When I got to Pooree, Mr. Barlow had shortly left. I gathered that his arrangements had been efficient; but that he concentrated them so entirely in his own hands, that there was a danger of a general collapse when he left. The landing arrangements there have always, I believe, been as good as it was possible for them to be. Mr. Barlow left before the arrival of his successor. He had not, as far as I know, broken down from sickness; he had been granted furlough from the Government of India, and he was, I believe, extremely anxious to see his wife, who had been an invalid for a long time. No representation as to the inconvenience of his absence was, I believe, made. I do not know whether the Commissioner asked him to stay. I think that the relief operations, generally, suffered temporarily from his leaving; but at the same time there was a shortness of rice owing to the non-arrival of the *Asia*. On three separate occasions, during October, we requested the Board officially to telegraph to Rangoon to hasten the *Asia*. The *Asia* belongs to Messrs. Mackinnon, Mackenzie and Co. We were once led to expect the *Arabia* was coming with a cargo of rice, but we never heard anything more about it.

As respects Cuttack (False Point), we helped matters out by stopping the *Coringa* steamer, which was bound for the Dhamrah river, and by unloading her at False Point. She arrived at False Point on the 5th October with 500 bags. The Board also immediately helped us out with a small consignment of 4,000 bags which arrived. The shortness of rice altogether lasted from the first week of October till the third week of November, and after that the prices began to fall in the market, and our sales were never raised again to the September mark. The *Charles Moreau* came down with a private consignment to False Point at the end of September, and the Commissioner asked leave to buy the whole cargo. This was refused; but he was authorized to take over day by day as much as was needed to keep up the

relief operations. We had heard of her arrival from her Captain, who offered to sell at Rs. 11-8 per bag. In the order sent down to Mr. Burgess, no special mention was made of the price; but he had instructions to take 500 bags a day so long as no Government vessel came. A second letter (alluded to above as having been delayed in transit by the Police) accepted the Captain's offer generally, but did not arrive in time. The Collector reported that the Captain would not break bulk, and Mr. Burgess mentioned verbally to me that it was because the Captain's price was not guaranteed. The result was that on the 20th October, just at the very time the need was at its height, the Captain took his whole cargo off. This was the most unfortunate thing that has happened during the whole operations. She had 8,500 bags on board. Mr. Burgess was the Government Superintendent in charge at False Point. The *Charles Moreau* belongs to Messrs. Robert and Charriol. The only thing that saved some of the larger centres, i. e., the gratuitous distribution itself, was my being able to bring up fleets of boats in tow of the *Teesta*. She was, in the third week in November, found comparatively useless for plying between the anchorage and the shore and towing boats out: boats could get out at night, when she could not steam at all, and as respects their coming in, I was told that on the one hand the difficulty of getting them in had abated, and on the other no time would have been saved owing to her having to wait for a number of boats at a time. For these reasons she had been lying at False Point for nearly three weeks inactive, and I was the first to attempt to take her up the river. I sounded the wreck, and took her twenty miles up the Mahanuddee, and twenty-five up the Noona. She could have got further up in the rains. Mr. Burgess was in the Irrigation Company's service, and was taken into Government service for landing operations. He is a very efficient man; but his hands were full, and the inland transport operations were not within the sphere of his duties.

If there was one department of the whole operations that did unmixed and incalculable good, it was the Government sales at very slightly lower rates than the bazar rates; and if we had been able to continue them through October on the same scale they were on in September, an immense amount of good would have been done. I think the relief sales, i. e., sales at cheap rates by the Relief Committees were, as sales at low rates, a comparative failure, because several persons not fit recipients got rice; in fact, the order for selection was impossible to carry out. The distribution of relief in food was efficient; but many came in such a bad state that they died in the unnochatros. I think that in all these districts, the labor that was exacted was almost nominal, and it was perhaps better that it should have been so, specially during the worst parts of the famine. In some few instances, considerable works were effected by large numbers. I believe that there was rice in the Dhamrah from the second week of September. There was no such want there as there was at Pooree and False Point, where there was actual stoppage.

[Re-examined, 7th January 1867].

Q.—In their letter No. 4408B, dated 11th October, the Board of Revenue gave their reasons for not allowing the Commissioner to purchase the whole of the cargo of the *Charles Moreau*, although you were running short of rice; they directed Government sales to be contracted so as to tide over the time till the arrival of the *Asia*, and also promised some Kuzla rice from Chittagong in a ship to be towed by the *Kwantung*; how soon afterwards did the *Asia* and the *Kwantung* arrive?

A.—The *Asia* was expected and promised by the Board for the last week in October. In a subsequent letter the Board wrote that she might be expected between the 25th October and the 10th of November. In point of fact, she did not arrive till the 25th of November. She was then sent on to Pooree to discharge half of her cargo. This she did, and returned to False Point on the 29th November.

No vessel in tow of the *Kwantung* brought any Government rice probably the *Pie*; IX, which arrived from Chittagong with 8,000 maunds on the 26th October, brought the rice, to which the Board's letter referred.

Q.—What was the result of the case of Kangalee Mahaputter, the Relief Agent and Store-keeper at Taldunda, whose misconduct and arrest on a charge of theft of the Committee's rice is mentioned in your report of the 3rd September?

A.—He was tried by the Assistant Magistrate of Kendraparah and acquitted of the theft; but he was never re-employed by the Relief Committee. I believe that one or two other prosecutions were instituted against servants of the Relief Committee for peculation or theft of rice, but I am not sure.

Q.—In the 10th paragraph of your letter of 3rd the September, you mention that the supplies which Mr. Webster had hitherto received are quite insufficient to enable him to afford relief on a scale adequate to the requirements of Kendraparah; did you mean by that, merely that he had not enough rice to sell to those who had money, or that he had not enough for gratuitous relief of the indigent?

A.—Mr. Webster had a certain number of centres open on the frontier of his sub-division, which remained in his charge for relief purposes. He had a sufficient supply of rice to give all necessary gratuitous relief at those centres; in fact he had some surplus which he was selling; but much more might have been sold, and more centres were required for gratuitous relief, which he could not open for want of rice. In fact, all through the operations five times as much rice as we had could have been disposed of with advantage by sales and in gratuitous relief (principally by sales). Our estimates and imports were limited solely by our capacity to transport inland and to distribute the rice, and not by the requirements of the people. With regard to the Cuttack district, the limit was exactly the amount which we could land at False Point. We could have sent more inland and disposed of it if we

had had means of landing more. The estimate at first was 1,000 bags a day, and while cargoes were continuously received at False Point, and until the weather cleared up, our daily average reached 700 bags only. The total amount imported by Government into the three districts up to the end of November was in round numbers three lakhs of maunds. The population of the province by the last estimate was rather less than two and a half millions. Allowing an average of five maunds a head per annum for adults and children, this importation supplied six months' subsistence for about one-twentieth of the population only.

Q.—In paragraphs 16 and 17 of your report, dated 26th October, you mention that it has been discovered that the returns made by the Relief Darogah of the number of laboring paupers employed on the relief roads were greatly exaggerated; do you know the result of the particular enquiry which Mr. Cornell made into the matter?

A.—It was discovered that the Darogah had entered as paupers doing light labor many of those who were supported gratuitously and without labor at the relief centre; but I believe that this involved no peculation or fraud, because the system at that time in force was to collect the laboring paupers after their day's work at the camp, and to feed them, together with the non-laboring paupers, on cooked rice. They received no payment in raw rice or in money. Thus the total number returned as paid was not in excess of the actual number fed. At my recommendation, the Relief Committee introduced the system of paying the laboring paupers in raw rice, and keeping them entirely separate from the inmates of the unno-chutro, and building separate huts in which they could sleep at night.

Q.—Among the rules for the management of the Government retail sales, is one to the effect that no sales shall be held on Sundays; was this rule carried out even when the number of applicants was greater than could be supplied each day?

A.—It was; the large majority of applicants could be supplied daily; it only occasionally happened that any considerable number of applicants failed to obtain rice. The limit of sale to each person was three rupees' worth. Those who bought at the Government sales were not in such a state of destitution that the stoppage of sales for one day with previous notice would distress them.

Q.—Was the agency of professional shop-keepers employed to sell the Government rice on a commission?

A.—It was to a considerable extent. They were bound to sell at the rate fixed for the Government shops in the same locality, and a certain percentage was allowed to them as commission. In Jajpore the Assistant Collector obliged them to sell close to his Cutcherry, and there the plan succeeded. It was also a real benefit as increasing the centres of sale, all over the Cuttack and Balasore districts. The system was, however, open to the abuse that the shop-keepers entered fictitious sales

in their books, and actually sold the rice in other places where the rates were higher; or that they hoarded the rice in anticipation of a rise in prices. There is a general rumour, but no actual proof, that this was done.

No. 48.—SUTTIYANUND SURRUNGEE AND 22 OTHERS.

[Examined at Cuttack, 3rd January 1867].

During the famine, much was done for the very poor, but nothing for the more respectable. Rice was sold, but all did not get it. There were not shops enough, and people were afraid to go for fear of being beaten. More rice should have been sold at more shops. Even in the country rice might have been got if the holders had been ordered to produce it, and a price fixed. Rice that might have been sold at four seers per rupee, has since been sold at eight or ten seers. When the Lieutenant Governor came, he said they might sell as they liked, and that made them worse. They held on in the expectation that there would be another bad year. The Brahmins had prophesied three years of scarcity. Now, from the collections being stopped, all the holders have shut up the grain in their own houses; formerly they were obliged to sell to raise the money to pay their revenue. The present crop has been capital; there is only a little injury from floods in some places. That there is always only a little more this year, and in the land which has been flooded, there are abundant Rubbee crops, mustard, khol, koottee, tobacco, &c. Nothing will be done for the Dandeeds and others are dealt with. They are ordered to sell in the Government shops at a price fixed. There are Government shops in one sells there; the grain is foregone before it is in. There is no limit to the number of Dandeeds; but they have a hereditary connection with the merchants, and we can't get rid of them, or if we did, they would soon be as bad as the others. Great injury was done by the Government declaration. Rice immediately became much dearer. Another remedy is to continue for a time Government sales, and to keep down the oppressive shop-keepers. There are no sales now, and rice is very dear.

No. 49.—MR. T. M. KIRKWOOD, C. S.

[Examined at Cuttack, 3rd January 1867].

I arrived here on the 27th June. I was immediately placed in charge of the relief operations, including the mofussil centres of the greater part of the district, excepting the Jajpore and part

of the Kendraparah sub-divisions. The worst parts were the parts towards the sea. In Cuttack town it was not nearly so bad as it was in other places. The greater part of those fed in the Cuttack unno-chatros are not for the most part Cuttack people. I attribute the less suffering in Cuttack itself to private relief and alms, and to the larger stores of grain in the town itself, and to the fact that much more Government grain proportionately was sold in Cuttack than in the mofussil. Even in Cuttack itself I do not think that the supplies were sufficient for the sales. I think that many respectable people would have bought at Government sales, but for the crush. As it was, I believe that they bought from the moodees, who themselves bought at the Government sales. In the month of October, I believe, we could have sold ten and twenty times as much with immense good. People used to flock in in crowds, especially at Taldunda, and we had no rice to give them. There was no bazar at Taldunda, and rice, as far as I know, was not procurable about there. I have never seen such scenes as I saw in Taldunda in October. When it became known that it was the last day of the sales, the rush and the struggle to buy were fearful. In October we were perfectly destitute of rice for sales. At the end of September we heard supplies were not coming, and I issued an order, with the approbation of the Relief Committee, that no sales should be made, unless there was a reserve of 200 bags at least, at any centre. Up to the present time we have never, since the check at the end of September, obtained regular supplies for sales; but gratuitous relief has never been checked. The present amelioration in the condition of the people is owing chiefly to the coming in of the crops, which has made rice so cheap that we could not have sold at our rates for the last month. When I arrived there were only four centres—Cuttack, Jajpore, Kendraparah, and Taldunda. I myself opened the other centres subsequently. By the end of July there were twenty-three centres open in the district. These centres were only just opened by the end of July, and were not abundantly supplied. Until then relief was not upon a large scale. In August things got worse owing to the floods, which prevented the boats coming up, and we hadn't enough rice, scarcely enough for Cuttack. More centres (i. e., new ones) were opened during August, and at the end of August I think they were comparatively efficiently supplied. In August operations were almost entirely suspended at several centres, owing to want of rice. For the first three weeks in September the centres were well supplied. About the 20th sales had to be checked, as above-mentioned, by me. The result is that there was a tolerably sufficient supply of rice at relief centres through the district; only for about three weeks in the whole season, viz., from about the end of August to the third week in September. I attribute the deficiencies of relief in July principally to want of supplies, and it may be partly to want of agency, which was only then being constructed. In August I attribute the deficiency to the floods which impeded the boats, and in October and November to deficiency of supply. At most of

the centres I think there were sufficient arrangements for shelter made. I think the greatest mortality occurred in May and June, as far as I can learn from Natives of all classes from whom I have enquired on the subject. The expression they have always used is that since Government has begun to sell rice they have been saved. In July I think the relief was considerable in Cuttack itself and as far as it extended; but it did not then extend very far into the interior. I should say from what I have heard that the mortality in July was checked, but it got worse again in August in the floods. The relief afforded in the early part of September was very great, and mortality fell off considerably, and in October mortality was much the same as in September. There was some rice, but not much, that came into the market at that time. I, however, have no trustworthy returns on which I can speak positively as to mortality.

The principle on which gratuitous relief was given was personal appearance, that is to say, people who looked emaciated and unable to do work got gratuitous relief, and they were gradually picked out as they improved and drafted on to some sort of work. Of the emaciated class, a great many died, but a great many improved. Relief sales were made at only one rate all through the mofussil, with the exception of the subdivisional stations and Ullabar. In the mofussil there were really no bazar rates. Sales were made at a rate fixed by the Relief Committee. Rice was sold at rates varying from Rs. 6 a Calcutta maund to Rs. 4-4 for cleaned rice.

I think the want of rice at the end of September and October was principally due to the following circumstances: Mr. McNeile had only just arrived and I also had just arrived, and he estimated the rice required with reference to the existing agency. This was at a Committee meeting, and the estimate was laid before and accepted by the Committee. At that time I distinctly objected to the amount estimated for sales, and said we could dispose of far more by sales, but the Committee accepted Mr. McNeile's estimate. In September we were expending more than the estimate. I think the deficiency in October was partly owing to this deficient estimate.

I think the staff of Civil officers in July, August, and September was insufficient; in fact till the first week in December. The officers in the sudder station were not above the ordinary average, and some were knocked up. The Police has been deficient or useless all throughout. Also the medical staff of Native class doctors was very insufficient; at present we have only three or four in the Mofussil; we ought to have ten at least.

I further wish to add that when I arrived at False Point on the 24th or 25th June, I was at once struck by the want of a steamer to tow up the rice boats,

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and I mentioned the matter when I arrived. I wrote about the steamer. It was discussed in the Relief Committee, but they did not approve of it.

Works for employment of the poor were carried on at all the centres. When people were convalescent, they were put to light and almost nominal work; afterwards, they were drafted on to irrigation and public works if available in the neighbourhood, and if not, they made roads, cut jungle, and such like works in the village where the centre was. All were supplied with rice from the relief centres—in the Mofussil with cooked rice, in Cuttack with raw rice. I believe that every man who came to the relief houses could find food either with labour or without,—certainly every woman and child; but in July there were not sufficient relief centres, and in August rice fell short, and also the floods prevented people coming. The system was to employ all on some useful work when we could, and any deviation has been the exception and against rule. Six weeks ago we had almost low people working in the town of Cuttack; they have now been sent off to the regular works.

No. 50.—MR. J. MACMILLAN, *Executive Engineer, Mahanuddee Division, E. I. I. & C. Co.*

[Examined at Cuttack, 3rd January 1867].

I have been in this district since November 1853, and employed on the East India Irrigation and Canal Company's works since the 1st January 1863, and prior to that was in Government employ. From September 1865 to November 1866, I was frequently in the district, within a radius of ten or twelve miles from the town of Cuttack; occasionally proceeded to greater distances. I observed the first symptoms of the coming famine about the beginning of October 1865. About the latter end of that month my coolies began to complain greatly of the want of rice. I did not observe any more marked signs in Cuttack or its neighbourhood at that time than that rice was selling at about 8 seers for the rupee—a high price here. From this time to the end of May the distress went on constantly increasing. I observed, however, only a few deaths in and about Cuttack during this interval. We began to import rice for our laborers some time in December; it came from Calcutta to False Point, and thence in country boats, aided by one of our own, up the river.

I think the distress and scarcity were at their height in July and August. I was a member of the Cuttack Relief Committee. The centres at Jobra, Futtehpore, and unnochatros were each immediately under charge of one of my subordinates. One of them was also constantly

employed in looking after the landing of Government rice at False Point and forwarding it up the river.

I also established a depôt in the beginning of July at my own house for the sake of gratuitous distribution of rice obtained from the Relief Committee. All the papers connected with these transactions I have made over to Mr. Kirkwood. The rice was sold a little below the bazar rate, with the view of encouraging the people to work for their living. The depôt at my own house has now been closed for some time. The relief centres have also been closed, with the exception of the unnochatros, one of which is still in operation. A godown belonging to the Company on their premises at Jobra was made over in June or July for storing Government rice, and formed the main depôt of issue for Cuttack: it is still so used up to this time.

In April, I think, a stranger coming into this country would have seen signs of famine in the appearance of the people. When the relief operations commenced we did what we could; but I do not think there was rice enough to give that measure of relief that was required to keep the people alive. I think that the officers here did all they could, but perhaps better arrangements might have been made for bringing up the rice from False Point, in causing the Police to look more carefully after the crews of the boats.

I do not remember specially any thing more that might have been done.

No. 51.—MR. G. W. BOOTHBY, *Agent, East India Irrigation and Canal Company.*

[Examined at Cuttack, 4th January 1867].

I have been in the Oorya speaking districts of Ganjam and Cuttack for many years. I have had a great deal to do with the people. I am now Agent for the East India Irrigation Company, and have been so since April 1862. I was, however, absent in the hot weather of 1865, and returned to Calcutta in November 1865, and to Cuttack in February 1866. I was then ill, and did not resume my duties till March. From what I learned in Calcutta, and from conversations with Colonel Rundall at Midnapore, I had reason to believe that there was scarcity in Orissa, and I formed the opinion that famine was impending. Colonel Rundall was much impressed with that idea, and had already ordered more grain from the Hidgellee district. This was in December, when I met Colonel Rundall at Midnapore. We returned to Calcutta, and then, from representations which we received from our Engineers, we were induced to

agree to what we called "famine allowance" that is, that all persons employed by us at less than Rs. 10 per month should receive an additional allowance in money. A notification to this effect was issued. The allowance was to be made whenever rice was below 10 Cuttack seers per rupee, and throughout the famine the allowances were paid. I met with a severe accident on the 13th January, and during the two following months I did no business. In March, when I resumed my duties, there was very great difficulty in feeding work-people. Rice was scarcely to be had for money. I am not sure that this point was reached in March; but I know that at Naraj, near Cuttack, in April, rice was not to be had for money. When I resumed charge, rice was sold by us to all our laborers at out-stations, and had been so for a short time, from, I think, the end of January or beginning of February. It was issued, and the price deducted from their pay. I understand that rice was going up to Naraj for our laborers when the Lieutenant Governor was here, and that His Honor saw the boats. In March we had a full supply of labor, but in April it fell off, because rice could not be got and we could not supply it. Our stores had fallen short. We had not then a sufficient supply to feed large numbers. It is certainly unquestionably my opinion that in March and April works were not effectual for the relief of the poor, when labor was paid in money and not in rice, because in those days money would not procure food at out-stations. At Cuttack itself rice was then to be had for money with difficulty, but no large quantity could be got, and the shops were occasionally closed from time to time. I put in a note of the cost of the rice imported by the Irrigation Company. The first importation was made in our own boats as far as tidal waters reach, and the cost of sea freight is therefore not included in my note of that importation. The rice thus imported was sold to our work-people at out-stations. The price was fixed with reference to the market price in Cuttack in December and January when the grain arrived, viz., 7 to 8 Cuttack seers per rupee, and that price was continued by us throughout, even when rice became much dearer in the bazar. The result of the sales was some gain to the Company in actual money.

Q.—According to the returns of the Board of Revenue rice was selling in Cuttack in the end of December and throughout January at from 13 to 15 Calcutta seers per rupee, say at 10 to 12 Cuttack seers—"the cheapest kind of rice in ordinary use." Your note makes the price 7 to 8 seers. Can you explain the cause of this difference?

A.—I cannot; but I feel certain of the correctness of my statement, because we were guided in our sales by it. I recollect to have subsequently noticed that the price currents officially published were incorrect. The question was so far raised that Mr. Chapman wrote an explanation in the *Englishman*; but we thought

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the explanation was not sufficient, and did not reconcile the discrepancy. The rice of which I quote the prices is what I should call common rice. The main portion of the rice sold in the bazars is of this quality; we call it coolies' rice; in fact, there generally is, as far as we know, only one sort of common rice. I am not aware that any cheaper rice is in ordinary and common use.

When our rice began to run short, we had not funds which we could readily divert for the purpose of importing more rice. It was the middle of our working season, and our money was fully employed. The question of importations was much discussed. We expected that Government would import. I had several discussions on the subject with Mr. Ravenshaw. I am not sure of the date; but it must have been before he left in April. I most strongly urged the importation of grain by Government, and most strongly said that money was of no use. At that time we had had reports of very severe distress. I won't be quite sure of having heard of deaths at that time. I had formed the opinion that things would be much worse, and regarded them with the most gloomy apprehension. Prices had reached a height which meant starvation to almost every laboring man. I had conversation with Mr. Ravenshaw on the question whether things were likely to get worse, or whether the high prices would bring out stores. I understood Mr. Ravenshaw to say that he had urged importations; but he always also said that he had information that there were large quantities of grain in the country. He mentioned as his authorities some Natives whose names I forget; but Colonel Rundall and I, especially Colonel Rundall, gave our opinion that there could not be stocks. We had understood from Mr. Chapman that there was not above a half crop all over Bengal, and that there had never been so universal and wide-spread a failure. We were also sure that there had not been more than a half crop in Cuttack, and we thought that there could not be a sufficiency of food. The question of exports was also discussed. I had not formed an opinion as to whether the stocks of 1864 had left more or less than the average of grain in hand in 1865 before the crop came in. I knew that there had been no export of the crop of 1865 from the Cuttack district; but I showed that the normal export was so small in proportion to the whole crop that its cessation would not make up for the deficiency of crop. While Mr. Ravenshaw was away, I used frequently to discuss this matter with Mr. Cornell; we used to meet two or three times a week at the Band. I was apprehensive of serious disturbances, and used to tell Mr. Cornell of the accounts I had from our canal works of the want of food and the dreadful distress causing people to live on roots. About that time I had commenced relief from Sykes' Fund. It seemed to me that Mr. Cornell did not appreciate the gravity of the state of things; he thought that the worst distress was in Cuttack, whereas, in fact, it was not nearly as bad as at other places. I

understood, however, that he was in favor of the importation of rice. Till the Relief Committee telegraphed, I did not communicate on this subject direct with Government.

In my opinion, after the Government relief did begin in June, every thing was done that could be done, allowing for this overwhelming fact that the imports were not commenced till the monsoon had burst. I considered that the officials did all that was possible. I heard reports against the efficiency of the Police; they urged that they had not men enough for the work which they were called upon to do. I do not think that any difference of opinion that I ever heard between the Police and other departments detracted from the efficiency of the service; but I thought it very unfortunate that the Commissioner was absent in April and May, the more so as the Collector was new to the district. After Mr. Ravenshaw's return, he was most energetic, and I consider that his action was efficient and all that could be desired. The staff of officers was insufficient for the work. The Irrigation Company lent as many of their officers as they could spare. We stopped our works as usual during July. I did not visit any relief outstation, but I was a member of the Relief Committee, which fixed upon the relief centres and managed the general organization. Mr. Kirkwood was our Relief Manager; he was constantly on the move, visiting centres, and did his work excellently. In Cuttack itself at first there was difficulty in organizing matters, but afterwards everything was got into good working order. I was of opinion throughout that, with a larger staff and a larger supply of rice, very much more might have been done. There was a fearful amount of distress which we did not reach. There was a period of great shortness of rice about October owing to vessels not arriving, as I understood. I think the famine had then slightly abated, some new rice of the Beallee crop having come into the market, and private importations from Gopalpoor and Sumbulpoor (principally the latter) taking place; but still I heard of great inconvenience at the centres from the want of Government rice. I do not recollect that the Committee were consulted or gave any opinion regarding the estimate made by Mr. McNeile of the quantity of grain required up to the coming in of the autumn crop of 1866. My impression had been that up to that time, if we had got all that was estimated for, it would have been sufficient, but this did not rest with the Committee. As respects the subsequent supply, the Committee were consulted, and then both I and Colonel Rundall and Mr. Kirkwood expressed our opinions that Mr. McNeile's view was too sanguine. I never heard complaints that people were roughly used at the relief houses, but I heard that there were great scenes of confusion at the sale of Government rice and that people were much hurt. This was afterwards remedied. In my opinion the greatest suffering was among the laboring population, both agricultural and town, and also I heard that very many Pyekhast

ryots and mechanics died. I heard that the Khoodkhist ryots nearly all had grain and did not die, but they have been much impoverished. Never heard of the zemindars as a class making any efforts to save their ryots or taking any active part in relief measures. It was generally remarked that they did nothing, but one or two were named as having fed their people—the Dekhanah Raja and Ragnath Chowdree. My impression is that the assessment of revenue on the zemindars is decidedly easy. I also believe that the rent paid by the ryots is easy. I think that before the famine, all the agricultural classes were comfortably off and contented. I never heard that the ryots were particularly oppressed. I should judge that the assessment was very even and fair, and I have heard no complaints against the correctness of the settlement record of the rights of the inferior classes. Before the famine I think that the Government assessment might have been greatly increased comparing these districts with other districts. I think that the zemindars might now bear an increase if they could get the money from the people below them; but that the agricultural population has been diminished and impoverished to so great an extent as seriously to diminish the resources of the country. I think that to increase the rents of the ryots at present would be a very harsh and inadmissible measure. I think it will be years before they are in a position to bear such a measure. I think that if there were no impediments in the way of an irrigation operation, they might be carried to such a point as to protect the delta of the Mahanuddee from famine by affording food within two seasons. The works at the head of the delta are completed by draining the main Mahanuddee and the Bairopa to that extent that we can lead the water into the canals. We do not yet control the waters of the smaller, or Katjoree branch. One large canal is carried to a point which will soon enable us to water a large tract of country, and will establish communications with tidal waters; another canal is also in a forward state.

The main and in fact only impediment to our progress is that people will not take our water, and hence it is, in consequence, impossible to raise sufficient capital to extend the works as far as they ought to be carried. We have been in a position to give water to a certain extent since early in 1866, but the water has been taken to a very limited extent. I am certain that the reason is that the zemindars have set themselves dead against irrigation till they know the whole of the consequences in reference to the impending settlement. I believe that the ryots would take the water if they dared, and many of them have done so; but these are principally independent Khoodkhist ryots. The remedy is some satisfactory disposal of the settlement question by some sufficient authority. Some plain declaration is required. I think that it must be made plain whether the assessment will be increased, and if so, on what conditions. In my opinion there would be no sufficient guarantee without a settlement for forty or fifty years. From what I have been told, how-

ever, by Government officers, I believe that a permanent settlement is obligatory in consequence of promises. I think that to make an efficient permanent settlement, it would be necessary to fix permanently both the revenue of the zemindars and the rent of the Khoodkhist ryots; without that I do not think that the settlement would work well. The Pyekhast ryots must necessarily be left to the ordinary laws of supply and demand; and after the diminution of population caused by the famine, I think that ryots will be in great demand, and that it will not be possible to enforce hard terms. I clearly understand the rent of the Khoodkhist ryots to be now fixed, and as between them and the zemindars to be unalterable; but if there is a general increased assessment of all parties interested in the land, I believe that they also are liable to enhancement, and that they would think that they must fairly bear their share of the burden.

I also think that measures to protect the country from floods are indispensably necessary, and should be carried out in a comprehensive scheme in connection with our irrigation works. I think that to render irrigation fully effective, the land must be protected from uncontrolled inundations. I should wish to add that I ordered a second importation of rice for our men in May—the latter part of May,—a little before the Government orders; but before it could be shipped, the Agra Bank broke and delayed us terribly. When it did come, it came much quicker than the Government rice, as we had better boats and more means at our disposal. I got the rice down in the tug steamer *Electric*, and then we put it into our own boats and brought it rapidly up with relays of coolies; I mean that we had greater local means on the spot; but I think that when importation began, Government might have used its general resources to a much greater extent by company boats and small steamers from Calcutta. It was a matter of astonishment to me that such means were not used. That was not within the province of the Local Committee; but as an individual, I was constantly expressing my opinion about it. I was surprised that the whole arrangements were not put into the hands of some practical man. It was obvious that the Board of Revenue knew nothing about it. Throughout I think that this defect continued.

No. 52.—COL. F. H. RUNDALL, *Chief Engineer, Irrigation Company.*

[Examined at Cuttack, 4th January 1867].

I have been in Orissa since July 1862, excepting a year in England. I was in the country throughout the famine. I have before had to do with an Oorya population in Ganjam. I think I understand their character pretty well. I do not understand the Oorya language. I first observed very high prices in October 1865. Prices rose till December, and there was then a slight relaxation. By the end of January, they rose again, and grain continued to get dearer from that

time. Prices were so high that we ordered grain in November from the country about Calcutta. In October I was convinced that famine was impending. I wrote home to that effect. I had seen the failure of the harvest in Midnapore, Balasore and Cuttack. In the end of July 1865 there was scarcely a field sown in Balasore. When I returned in September the fields were all sown; but after the 15th September there was not a drop of rain. I did not change my opinion in December and January, because I knew that the harvest had failed from Midnapore to Ganjam. I thought that the relaxation of prices was due to the small amount of harvest that was reaped coming into the market, and I anticipated that things would be worse in the spring. Towards the end of January, when prices got dearer, we began to dispose of our rice to our coolies. In February things got worse; it began to be almost impossible to procure rice. During the Lieutenant Governor's visit people petitioned him to fix a price. When he went down to our works and to the durbar, people petitioned him verbally; but with the exception of begging to have a price fixed they made no practical suggestion. There were, however, on our works, some Molunghees, who suggested re-opening the salt works. I can't call to mind whether I had any conversation on the subject of the famine with the Lieutenant Governor, but I understood that there was a consultation with the revenue authorities, and he spoke to us regarding the employment of labor. I should say that at the end of February, any person ordinarily observant of the country would have been aware that there was a famine. This would apply to the immediate neighbourhood of Cuttack. I was convinced there was considerable mortality from starvation at the end of March or beginning of April. I had no official discussions with the Civil authorities, but I talked over the matter personally with them. I had an idea that it would be a severe famine, but could not calculate the intensity. As far as I remember, I expressed the above opinion in my conversation with the Civil officers. I think they agreed as respecting the severity of the famine so far as the appearance of the people went, but they disagreed with me as to the total absence of food in the province. I held and often expressed that opinion; that was contested, and certain zemindars' names given who had large stores; but whatever the stores might have been, I thought that even if distributed they would have had no appreciable effect. The harvest was a short one in 1864, and a total failure in 1865, and I also know that Orissa cannot, under present circumstances, produce any great surplus, for the average yield of an acre of rice is not much more than sufficient to support a single person for a year. I think I had discussions with Mr. Ravenshaw and Mr. Cornell before the intensity of the famine was universally acknowledged. I was aware private appeals were made to the general public both in Cuttack and Calcutta in April. I think these were well founded.

I was most surprised not at the Civil authorities not appealing to the public, but at their holding to

the opinion that there were large supplies of grain in the country.

When the Government did take action, I think there were mistakes made. I think, for instance, it would have been better had the whole importation and the arrangements been put into the hands of mercantile men acquainted with practical arrangements. I think those who did carry out the importation did not carry it out as efficiently as it might have been carried out. The defects I noticed were these: want of certain information as to the time of arrival of the stores of grain, and apparently contradictory orders which succeeded each other (as far as I, as a member of the Relief Committee, could judge from what was laid before the Committee); another defect was the want of steam power for effecting the landing of the rice in the south-west monsoon; a third was the short-handedness of the local officials. The boats employed were defective, but I doubt whether it was possible, owing to the lateness of the season, to send down better from Calcutta. The result was that the rice which arrived, arrived irregularly and in insufficient quantities. At one time, in September, I think, we were getting as much as we could get out into the centres, but not at other times. There was a notable deficiency soon after in October. Till the end of August there was a deficiency in the means of getting up rice from the coast, and soon after the inland transport was rendered efficient, the rice at the coast fell short.

I think with their means the local officers did what they could. I do not think there was any want of union amongst them. More decidedly might have been done with more officers, especially in the inland transport, in quickening operations and also in supervising the distribution of rice. I think that towards the end of August and beginning of September there was real relief afforded, but till then I do not think that it reached the mass of the people in the interior. I think the Government sales and the relief sales both were efficient so far as they were carried. Owing to the scarcity in October, the Government and also the Relief Committee's sales at low rates were stopped, but the gratuitous distribution was not checked. I think that during the rainy months there were works that afforded relief to those who were not emaciated enough to be objects of charity. As far as the Irrigation Company's servants were concerned, almost every European servant was employed to superintend light labor operations as well as in gratuitous operations. In July and till the end of July food was not to be had for labor, but in August and September I think it was. I should say the mortality began to abate about the beginning of October, owing partly to the rice which had been distributed during August and September, and partly to the Beallee crop coming into the market. The greatest mortality has been among the laboring classes and petty artisans. Roughly speaking, I should say that 25 per cent. of the population of the district is missing. I think there is a considerable difference in the

effect the famine has had upon the agricultural population. I think the mass of the owners of land have been able to pull through with considerable sacrifices, no doubt, of their means. I mean thereby that considerable ryots have escaped, and that petty ryots and day laborers have not. From all I have heard and the little I have seen, I think the conduct of the higher zemindars has been unfeeling. They have shown the greatest indifference. I think the inundations greatly aggravated the state of things, and that the mortality was increased about 25 per cent. owing to them, not by the people being drowned, but by their being cut off from means of food. I think the destruction to crops caused by them has been very great.

I think the irrigation works will this season be in a sufficiently forward state to protect from famine the country between the Mahanuddee and the Brahminee,—an area of 3,50,000 culturable acres. Next season, this time twelve months, we shall be in a position to supply canal communication with the sea. The progress of the other canals will depend on the supply of funds, and that will depend, as far as I know, on the success of the operations as far as they have gone. The dams on the Mahanuddee are already sufficiently raised to supply much more water than all the canals designed can carry off. We have designed some more canals that are now in course of construction. The dams being constructed, there remains no engineering difficulty; it is only a question of money. As regards the whole scheme of irrigation and supply of water, I have put in a memorandum. In my opinion the only impediment to an early success of the canals is owing to the uncertainty in the minds of the landowners regarding the re-settlement of the province. At the same time I ought to add irrigation is progressing slowly, and I hope surely.

I think the settlement should either be a permanent one, or, if temporary, for a long period. The main object is to get the question determined quickly. From my previous experience in the Madras provinces, I think if the land question was settled, the ryots would take the water freely, as the circumstances of this province are almost identical. There are some zemindars in the Madras districts with whom I am acquainted, but in their zemindaree the ryots take the water, not the zemindars. I do not know if any zemindar contracts to take the water on a large scale. I do know a case of a zemindar a part of whose estate had come into the hands of Government, and had been during the Government administration fully watered, who on his subsequently getting it back forbade the ryots to take the water. Eventually, however, they took the water in spite of him. I found that the holders of rent-free lands took the water readily.

The immediate progress of the works is not now impeded by the doubt existing on the subject of embankments, but the works in the Pooree districts would be impeded if the question were indefinitely delayed. It would affect the projection of the

canals. In my opinion water communications and cross roads are the lines of communication most needed in this province. By cross roads I mean roads from mart to mart. I think the trunk road from Cuttack to Midnapore ought to be completed. It will, when completed, be an efficient means of communication for heavy traffic throughout the year till our canal be opened, when the heavy traffic will be taken by the canal; and even after the canal be opened, I would recommend its being kept up as a metalled road; but I think that communication with Calcutta will always be by sea and by the canals from the sea. I don't think that any class of works, besides those already mentioned, are wanted in the district; but protection from inundation is wanted, whether by embankments or some other system.

I think the waters of these rivers are, without exception, fertilizing.

The upper feeders of the Mahanuddee have been surveyed with a view to forming reservoirs with the double purpose of storing water for feeding the canals in the dry season and lessening the floods in the rains.

My impression is that, as long as food was procurable, people readily applied for labor. I do not think that the Government works on which the people working were paid in money were productive of much good as relief measures. If I had had abundant funds, I should have imported grain largely for the use of my own laborers on my own works to keep the laborers together. I think that for the sustenance of the laborers in the Government works grain should have been imported and distributed. I think the great mass of the people who have died have died because they couldn't help themselves, not because they wouldn't help themselves. I don't think a large proportion have died because they wouldn't work. I also think the people have been very much impoverished. The mortality amongst the women and children has been so great that it will take a long time before the province can recover.

I think the average assessment of the province is very low. I think the population is a tolerable industrious one. I don't think they have any prejudice against irrigation; quite the contrary.

I have heard the opinion often expressed that the Burmah rice, when first eaten, is unwholesome, but that this effect disappeared as the people became accustomed to it. It is said to have produced bowel complaints.

No. 53.—MR. T. E. RAVENSHAW, C. S., *Officiating Commissioner, CUTTACK.*

[Examined at Cuttack, 5th and 7th January 1867].

I entered the service in 1849; served in various districts in Bengal and Behar until 1859, as Assistant and Magistrate of Dinagepoor, Joint Magistrate and Deputy Collector of Pubna, and Dacoity Commissioner at Hooghly. I was also at one time an Assistant to the Sub-Treasurer in Calcutta. I proceeded to England in 1859, and returned to India in the end of 1862. Immediately on my

return I was appointed Officiating Judicial Commissioner of the Chota Nagpore Province, and continued to act there for fifteen months. I was then appointed Magistrate and Collector of Patna, and joined my appointment on the 28th March 1864. During the latter period of my service there, I was specially employed to prosecute certain Wahabee conspirators in Patna. I was then appointed to officiate as Judge of Beerbhoom, where I remained only a few weeks, when I was appointed Officiating Commissioner, Cuttack Division. I took charge in Calcutta on the 22nd June 1865. Up to this time, I had never been in Orissa. I did not know the Oorya language, but I was conversant with Bengalee, and found myself soon able to understand Oorya. I had never previously been in any district in which anything like famine had been known, nor had my attention been ever drawn to reports on the subject of famine in India. I had never seen Colonel Baird Smith's report on the famine in the North-West Provinces during 1860-61 until a month or six weeks ago when I found it in my office. I landed at Pooree from Calcutta on the 3rd July. I remained at Pooree only one day, and then came on to Cuttack, which I reached on the 5th July. On the 22nd July, I left for Balasore to hold Sessions, which duty I had to take alternately with the Sessions Judge. I returned to Cuttack on the 13th August, having been up to that date continually employed in criminal work. I then had no opportunity of going into Balasore revenue matters; and, moreover, the Collector Mr. Muspratt had recently joined the district, and found his office in considerable confusion. He was busily engaged at that time in putting his office in order, and I abstained, therefore, from making any inspection of it until later in the year. As far as I recollect I was not again out between August and November. Before my return to Cuttack in August, I formed no opinion of the state of the crops: I heard nothing either favorable or unfavorable about them. I called a meeting of the zemindars and principal inhabitants at Balasore, Bhudruk and Jajpore on my way back to Cuttack, for the purpose of arranging for holding an Agricultural Exhibition early in 1866. Had there been then any alarm about the crop, I should have certainly heard it. In the course of October serious apprehensions began to be entertained about the crops; but I do not think that up to the end of October these apprehensions were very grave. In the latter half of October the bazars were closed almost all over the country; but I do not think there was any real panic among the dealers. I attribute the movement to the existence of a belief among the dealers that there would be a short crop, and to a desire among them to raise prices by a combination. I do not think that all hope of rain was abandoned up to the end of October or well into November; nor that anything precise was known about the out-turn of the main or Sarud crop, until it commenced to be cut about the middle of November. Even then I do not think the worst was known. I also am of opinion that the crop when threshed out yielded much less than it promised to do in

the straw, and that that deficiency was not fully known until the ryots completed the threshing of the crops in December and January. During the Doorgah Poojah, early in October, I myself visited part of the country towards Bobaneepoor, in the Pooree district, and there I saw fine crops of rice, which bid fair to yield an excellent out-turn of grain.

Mr. Barlow was in Cuttack in October, and left for Pooree, I believe, soon after the examination which occurred in the end of October. During the time he was in Cuttack, he lived with me, and I was in constant communication with him. I have no doubt that all information of any importance connected with his district was communicated by him to me. I do not recollect that the Board of Revenue called on me in November for any report on the state of the crops and prospects of this division. If any such were called for, they will be on record in my office. I myself called for such reports from Collectors on the 6th November. Those reports, so far as I remember, were called for in a demi-official letter from the Secretary to the Board of Revenue, dated 1st November, and received on the 3rd idem. The Secretary's letter called for prices only; but I amplified it so far as to add "state of the crops, &c." Those reports were discontinued on receipt of the Board's printed circular No. 10 of October 1865, which reached my office on the 10th November. That circular prescribed a form for weekly reports of prices, and therefore the reports called for by me on Mr. Chapman's demi-official letter were discontinued. I do not remember if from that time any reports as to the state of the crops were called for. Were any such reports called for they will be found on record. It was the duty of the Collector of Pooree to keep himself informed generally of the state of the crops in his district, and I imagine that he did so. I have no special knowledge of his having made any minute or local enquiries on this point.

Q.—In your opinion was your letter No. 351 of 24th January 1866, with copy of Board's letter No. 10A of 10th January, calculated to put a stop to any detailed and local inquiries which the Collector had instituted?

A.—Certainly not as regards the Collector informing himself of the state of his district; but they would decidedly preclude him from making any enquiries with a view to granting remissions of revenue, as although the crops had been short, the prices of grain had been more than proportionately increased. I did not, therefore, consider that any enquiries with a view to remission of revenue were necessary, and in this opinion the Board concurred.

Q.—In your opinion then are the Collectors of Pooree and Cuttack wrong in alleging that correspondence as a reason for not making more particular enquiries and more particularly reporting the out-turn of the crops?

A.—Most decidedly so. Those orders referred to enquiries with a view to revenue remissions, and not to enquiries connected with the state of their respective districts.

Q.—Is it your opinion that the Board would not have been dissatisfied if it had been brought to their notice that any Collector had, after the receipt of their instructions, been making any thing like precise local enquiries as to the state of the crops in his district, even without holding out hopes of any remission of revenue?

A.—No. I do not think that the Board would in this case have been dissatisfied. Certainly I should not have been dissatisfied; on the contrary, I should have thought that the Collector would only have been doing his duty.

Q.—In your letter No. 255½ to the Collector of Balasore, dated 3rd November 1865, you expressed the opinion that there was more rice in his district than he imagined, and that the crop of the current year would suffice for the year's supply, the Collector having then given a very bad report of the crops in his district: will you mention on what information you founded your opinion?

A.—I cannot at the present moment recall to my recollection the precise grounds on which I formed that opinion, nor have I the correspondence before me that would enable me to state precisely on what grounds I founded an opinion that there was more rice in Balasore district, or that the crops would suffice for the year's supply; but speaking generally, I may say that I was aware that the people were in the habit of hoarding grain, and I hoped that they had more than the Collector had been able to ascertain; moreover, from the information which I had received from different sources, I was led to believe that the general out-turn, taking all lands together, would be half of an ordinary crop. As nearly as I can judge from the information which I now have, the actual out-turn of all Orissa was as near as can be to half an ordinary crop.

On the 20th November I went on tour into the Tributary Hill States north and west of Cuttack, and remained out till the 31st of January. I penetrated a long way into the hills in every direction. I did not pass through any considerable portion of the regulation districts. It is customary for the Superintendent of the Tributary Mehals to visit them during the year; and it was more than usually necessary at this time, as only one mehal known as the Khand Mehals had been visited in the preceding year. None of the estates which I visited had, I believe, been visited for years, and parts of them had never been visited by any British officers except a surveyor. There were also political questions, some of great importance, to be settled.

Q.—Were you not aware by the end of November and beginning of December that there was very serious alarm in the British districts regarding the failure of the crops, and had you not information that there was actual famine in part of the Pooree district; and having differed in opinion with the Collector of Balasore regarding the prospects of his district; did it not strike you that it was your first duty to visit the proper British districts of Pooree and Balasore with which you were personally entirely unacquainted, before proceeding to remote tributary mehals?

A.—At the time I started on my tour in the Tributary Mehals, I was aware that very great scarcity prevailed in and about the Chilka Lake districts in Pooree. I did not, however, anticipate anything approaching to general scarcity or famine throughout the district or province. I could as easily have superintended matters through correspondence from my camp as from head quarters. I was in constant communication with my Collectors. Although the letters were two or three days longer in reaching me in camp than in my sudder station, I could have returned to the spot within a few days at any time, if I had seen a necessity for so doing.

Q.—Did you at any time before June 1866 visit the Pooree district?

A.—I did not.

Q.—After reaching Cuttack in August did you visit the Balasore district before you were directed by the Government to do so in April 1866?

A.—I did not; but my intention was to visit Balasore on my return from the tributary mehals. My tour was interrupted by the intelligence of the Lieutenant Governor's intended visit, and also by my wife's unexpected return from England. After the Lieutenant Governor had left Cuttack, I found that my work had accumulated to such an extent that it was impossible to go out on tour again immediately. I had always intended to visit Pooree in May, if not earlier.

During my tour in the tributary mehals, I made a detailed report as to the state of the crops in them. On an average the crops were much better than in the regulation districts, particularly in the hilly parts. In the tributary mehals, with the exception of the low lying parts of Nilgherry and Mohurbhunj, adjoining Balasore, the distress was much less than in the regulation districts; but these parts I did not visit till May.

Q.—Did you in the end of 1865 and again on the 31st January recommend the importation of rice?

A.—On the 2nd of December, in my letter No. 305½, I recommended to the Board of Revenue the importation of rice into Pooree for the support of the starving population of Malood, Paricood, and other Lake Pergunnahs. But no rice was sent at that time. On the 6th December, in my letter No. 315½, I also recommended to the Board that I be authorized to purchase a store of rice with which to remunerate the laborers on works. On the 31st of January, the day after my return to Cuttack, I telegraphed to the Board—"Famine relief is at a stand still; Public Works Department refuse to advance money to Collectors to purchase rice; Pooree must get rice from elsewhere; may I authorize advance for this purpose 'from Cuttack, Balasore, or Pooree.'" On the 2nd February I received in reply this telegram from the Board (telegram read as follows):—"The Government decline to import rice into Pooree; if the market favors importers rice will find its way into Pooree without Government interference, which can only do harm; all payments for labor employed to relieve the present distress are to be in cash."

Q.—Did you consider that those orders were conclusive and final?

A.—I did, and to the best of my belief I acted upon them.

Q.—Did you consider that the orders as to payment of laborers in cash applied to local works as well as to works which were being executed by the Department of Public Works?

A.—Yes. I received a copy of the Board's No. 16 A, dated 26th January, in which distinct orders were given that payment for labor was to be given, not only in works under the Department of Public Works, but also on local works. Acting on these instructions, I wrote to the Collector of Pooree, No. 368, dated 2nd February, suggesting the employment of paid shop-keepers for the sale of grain to the laborers, but no shop-keepers could be induced to enter into the speculation of selling grain, even though a salary was offered to them as an inducement.

Q.—Did you think that these orders applied even to works which were undertaken out of private subscriptions, as expressed in your letter No. 375, dated 5th February 1866?

A.—As the digging of the Satparah tank was a work specially undertaken in that estate, which is the property of Government, for the purpose of affording relief, and as I had been ordered to remunerate labor on those at work by money and not by grain, I considered that the principle of the orders was applicable to all relief works carried on by the Collector, even though the funds were provided by private subscription. I subsequently found reason to change my opinion as to the inexpediency of giving relief in the shape of cooked rice. To the best of my belief, however, till June, all labor on Government relief works was remunerated in cash and not in food.

Q.—In your opinion, did the measure of remunerating in cash and not in food detract materially from the benefit of the relief works?

A.—I think it did, as at that time the difficulty of procuring rice in the neighbourhood of some of the works was excessive. I recollect that in another correspondence the local officers were directed to make arrangements which should enable the laborers to procure food in return for cash on the spot. There was considerable correspondence between the departments, but it was found impossible to make such arrangements, the Collector neither having rice nor agency for the purpose at his disposal, and finding it impossible to attract shop-keepers to the neighbourhood of the works, even by the offer of salaries in addition to the profits of the trade.

I believe the Lieutenant Governor reached Pooree on the 13th February 1866, but I did not meet him there. He reached Cuttack on the 15th, and was staying at my house. I believe that the principal object of the Lieutenant Governor's visit was to see the irrigation works, and that he took the opportunity of holding a durbar to meet the Native chiefs. I am not aware that one of the objects of the Lieutenant Governor's visit was

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to enquire into the scarcity. There was no official consultation or discussion on the subject during his stay here, that is, there was no gathering of public officers for the purpose.

Q.—Are you aware whether the subjects connected with the prevailing scarcity, which had been matter of recent correspondence, and especially the dearth in the Pooree district, and the difficulty in carrying on relief works owing to the order prohibiting the purchase of grain, were in any shape topics of representation and discussion during the Lieutenant Governor's visit?

A.—The prevailing scarcity and difficulty in procuring grain were constant topics of discussion; but at that time I believe it was not understood that we were on the verge of a famine. The representations made to the Lieutenant Governor were chiefly with the object of obtaining remissions of revenue, and complaints against the Dandeedars for withholding grain from the market. The fear of famine was not expressed. The general cry was to cheapen grain. I do not recollect that there was any discussion on the special subject of the difficulty caused to relief works by the order refusing to permit the purchase of grain, nor that I pressed that subject on His Honor. I believe that the Lieutenant Governor spoke to me privately several times on the subject of the scarcity, and I expressed an opinion that there were probably sufficient stocks of grain in the country, and that though it might be dear, it would be procurable for money. I believe that the Lieutenant Governor, throughout the time he was here, was open to an interview with any person of ordinary respectability, and that the greater portion of his time was taken up in receiving Native residents and visitors. I do not know the nature of his conversation, or whether any special enquiry regarding the scarcity was made from competent persons. The Lieutenant Governor was at Cuttack from the 15th to 19th February. He held a levee on the 15th, and visited the whole of the public offices. On the 16th he visited the Naraj Anicut and the Irrigation Company's workshops on the Mahanuddee Anicut. On the 17th a general durbar for Native rajahs and zemindars was held, and the same day the missions and schools were visited. The 18th was Sunday. On the 19th the Kendraparah Canal was visited, and a banquet given to the Lieutenant Governor by the Irrigation Company in the durbar pavilion. That evening he left by dawk for Taldunda; from thence proceeded to False Point.

Q.—You have mentioned that the rajahs and respectable persons were presented to the Lieutenant Governor. Had the poor also any opportunity of representing their grievances?

A.—I should say, certainly. I recollect at the cutcherry the Lieutenant Governor stopping and speaking to the people who were there, and also to a crowd of people outside the school-house; also on one or two occasions his stopping in the street when petitions were presented. I do not remember any occasions on which he was followed by crowds, nor on which any great outcry was made. The universal petitions were only to cheapen rice.

I do not remember whether orders were passed on any petitions. Here the Lieutenant Governor rendered himself particularly accessible to the public.

Q.—Are you aware whether the Lieutenant Governor was impressed by anything he had heard at Pooree regarding distress in that district?

A.—I had no conversation with him on the subject.

Q.—Are you aware whether Mr. Barlow had throughout been much impressed by the reports of distress in his district?

A.—I am unable to say, except from Mr. Barlow's official correspondence. I only saw him after his return to Pooree at the close of the rains on one or two days during the Lieutenant Governor's visit there. I had then little leisure, and what may have passed between us I do not recollect. Occasionally, there was demi-official correspondence between us, but a demi-official letter was, to the best of my belief, almost always covered by an official letter within a day or two, or as soon as it could be got through the office. To the best of my knowledge, every item of importance regarding the famine has been fully detailed in official correspondence, and all demi-official letters I have placed at the disposal of the Commissioner, excepting one private letter from Mr. Shore, dated November 2nd, 1865, which I now hold in my hand, and of which I will put in an extract. Should I find any further correspondence, I will put it in. I believe I did not again see Mr. Barlow during March or April.

Q.—Were you ever made aware from October to March or April that the District Superintendent of the Pooree Police held strong opinions regarding the probability of severe famine?

A.—To the best of my recollection, I received no such information.

Q.—Did you not consider Mr. Barlow's report alarming up to the time of the Lieutenant Governor's visit?

A.—Locally so I did. I refer particularly to the Chilka district. I had heard of some distress at Piply. I do not recollect anything at that time about Gope.

During the period between the Lieutenant Governor's visit and my departure for Balasore, which took place on the 9th April, I had no reason to believe that the distress was materially increasing or that famine was impending. I do not remember that during that period I had considerable private or demi-official correspondence either with Government or the Board, or with my subordinate officers other than that which is on record. As a rule, I have not adopted the habit of demi-official correspondence. I have always preferred official correspondence; and I believe that when Mr. Barlow proposed demi-official correspondence, I intimated that matters of public importance should be reported officially. I do not remember that up to my departure for Balasore any one expressed to me an opinion different from my own regarding the prospects of the country and the stocks of grain. My opinion, and I believe that of all

others, Native and European, with whom I conversed, was that there was grain enough in the country to supply the entire wants of the population till the new crops should come in. I had no reason to believe that famine was impending. I am not aware that either the Irrigation Company's Officers or the Missionaries, or any one else, held a contrary opinion. To the best of my belief, no contrary opinion was expressed to me.

Q.—Can you at all specify the authorities on which you founded your opinion that there were such large stocks of grain?

A.—I was in constant communication with zemindars, European and Native officers, the Irrigation Company's officers, and others, and the universal opinion was that the stocks in the country would be sufficient generally for the year. I had peculiar opportunities of enquiry, because, being new to the district, many zemindars and others constantly visited me.

Q.—Had you any reason to suppose that Mr. Barlow and Mr. Muspratt held that opinion at that time?

A.—I think they did. I think that with the exception of parts of the Pooree district, there was then no reason to apprehend general famine; but not having then had any personal or special communication with Mr. Barlow or Mr. Muspratt, I am not in a position to say exactly what opinions they held regarding the stocks of grain.

At that time, besides the relief works of the Public Works Department, the following local works from public funds I know to have been in operation to give relief to the poor:—

1. The Satparah works, the subject of a correspondence.

2. The Khoorda and Piply road (which is the same as the Khoorda and Pooree road alluded to in the correspondence), and the continuation of the same road to the west to Dalapadah. I do not remember any others.

When I got to Balasore on the 11th April, there was there a great congregation of famished paupers. I had then received the report of the Magistrate of Balasore, dated the 2nd April. I remained at Balasore till the 20th April. During that time, I was engaged in drawing up a report about the frightful increase of crime and the condition of the district. During my stay at Balasore, there was there famine on a large scale; there was frightful distress. I find recorded in my diary of the 19th April that I had then ocular demonstration of the abject distress suffered by the people. I believe that it was on that day that the scenes occurred recorded in my letter of the 2nd May. This was the first time that I had seen actual famine or believed that severe famine existed to any extent.

Q.—Did you then think that the time had come for emergent measures on the part of Government to relieve the frightful starvation and distress described by you?

A.—I certainly did so.

Q.—What emergent measures did you take to secure the aid of Government?

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A.—I described what I had seen in a demi-official letter to the Lieutenant Governor, but I do not recollect any other special measures of relief to have been either proposed or adopted. If there was any correspondence, it will be on record. I do not know when the Lieutenant Governor went to the hills, and I do not recollect any special telegrams sent to His Honor. Every endeavour was then made to push on local subscriptions, but I heard of no appeal to the general public, nor did I suggest any. During the nine days of my stay at Balasore, there were certainly in the station very large numbers of famishing people who had come in from the interior, perhaps 600 to 1000. The Relief Committees did their very utmost, and I daily visited the unnochatro. The people had enough given them to eat. The difficulty was to keep anything like order. They all suspected that there would not be sufficient for all, and they were consequently extremely eager to obtain it, but I believe that there was sufficient for all.

Q.—Did it not then strike you that the frightful distress witnessed by you must terribly increase in the long period intervening before the harvest?

A.—I was given to understand at that time that the majority of these people had come from the north of Balasore and the skirts of the Gurjat states, where the crop had almost entirely failed, and I had not even then reason to believe that the famine would extend to the enormous magnitude which it afterwards assumed. When I was at Balasore, there were several meetings of the zemindars for the purpose of raising relief subscriptions. They (the zemindars) did not lead me to believe that there was an entire absence of grain, or that the famine would assume the magnitude that it afterwards did. I believe that my opinion was principally formed on their representations. I think that the zemindars and Native residents in Balasore subscribed better than in other districts. I did not hear anticipations of famine on a large scale expressed by the Relief Committee.

Before my official report on the state of the district was ready, I heard of a serious outbreak in Bamunghatty in Mohurbhunj, Tributary State. The Rajah's omlah had so oppressed the aborigines that they rose in a body; expelled the Rajah's police and his omlah, and had plundered the whole of their property as well as that of all the Hindoo population (as distinguished from the aborigines). The Rajah had left his head-quarters, Barripudda, with an armed force, and was marching against the indigenous rebels. I sent an immediate order to recall him, and reported to Government. The Government directed me to go myself to Barripudda. I am not quite sure whether I received orders first to go to Mohurbhunj, or went there first of my own accord; the matter was urgent.

Q.—Did you not think the famine in the British districts at least as urgent?

A.—Quite as urgent; but I had already turned my attention to the famine, and done all that I considered necessary at that time.

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Q.—Were you aware that the famine was then raging to a large extent in the Pooree district as well as in Balasore?

A.—I had been aware before I left, that there was local scarcity and distress in the Pooree district, but I was not aware that there was any general famine there.

Q.—When you left the British districts, did you leave any instructions with the Collectors to communicate direct with the Board or with Government in case of emergency?

A.—I do not recollect whether any official orders were issued on the occasion; but all my Collectors were aware, that in any emergency they were quite competent, and would be justified in addressing the Board or the Government direct. I left instructions in the office that any urgent orders from the Government or the Board should be at once communicated to district officers by my assistant at head-quarters.

Q.—As a matter of fact, was either Mr. Munpratt's report of the 2nd April or Mr. Barlow's of the 10th May in any shape communicated to Government, till after you had gone to Mohambhary?

A.—I am unable to recollect whether either of the above letters or the information contained was reported by the Collectors to the Government direct.

Q.—Looking back, does it not seem to you that there was a very unfortunate delay in communicating some of the worst facts of the famine to Government, and is it your impression that there was no sort of communication other than that on public record?

A.—I believe, so far as myself was concerned, that all possible information was communicated to Government immediately on receipt; but no doubt, such delay as did occur was unfortunate. I am not aware of any defect in the official machinery that prevented Collectors from communicating direct to Government any information that they considered as of more than ordinary importance.

Q.—Do you think that either the Collectors or yourself at all understood the degree to which, as it has since proved, Government would be willing to assist in a famine to save the people from starvation?

A.—No, certainly not; I was not aware at the time that Government would have incurred so large an expenditure, nor was I aware that there was any balance over from a former Famine Fund. Had I been aware of this, I should have applied for aid from it.

Q.—Had you any European officers who might have been deputed to the tributary mehals, instead of proceeding there yourself?

A.—No, I had not, and I wish to add, with reference to the length of my stay in Mohurbhunj at this particular time, that I had originally intended to go as far as Barripudda, and there meet the Rajah and his disaffected sirdars, and

endeavour to settle their disputes without going into Bamunghatty. This course would not have taken me away from Balasore more than three or four days. I mentioned to the Secretary, Government of Bengal, in my telegram, 13th April 1866, that I intended visiting Mohurbhunj. The Government replied in their telegram of the 13th April that they approved of my intention of proceeding there in person. On reaching Barripudda, I learnt that not only Bamunghatty, but also Oopurbag Pergunnah had been plundered, and the whole country was in a state of uproar and disorganisation. This necessitated my visit to Oopurbag, and Dr. Hayes, Deputy Commissioner of Chyebassa, having simultaneously with myself, received orders to go to Bamunghatty, we succeeded rapidly in restoring the country to order, and I returned in the utmost haste to Balasore, where I arrived in the 21st May.

Q.—When the Lieutenant Governor visited the province, did he give you any instructions as to your conduct in the possible event of famine, or express to you his views in regard to the duties of Government in such an event?

A.—I believe that at that time neither the Lieutenant Governor nor myself anticipated famine; the idea of a general famine had not at that time entered my head, nor, as far as I know, that of the Lieutenant-Governor. The only opinion that I recollect the Lieutenant Governor expressed was that local demand created local supply; and the difficulty of procuring rice which prevailed, while he was in Cuttack, would be relieved by importations from other places, where supplies of grain existed. In the ordinary course of trade, he strongly advocated no interference with the market. He left no further instructions.

Q.—Was it at that time at all considered whether, after the change of the monsoon in March, the peculiar geographical circumstances of Orissa would admit of private importation from any source, from which large supplies might be derived, or whence could you expect to receive large supplies at that season?

A.—At that time no consideration was given to this subject. I think I expressed an opinion to His Honor that the scarcity was likely to be relieved by importations from Sumbulpoor as soon as the river opened. This does not occur usually until the 15th or 20th June. I also thought that the portions of the province which are highest would be supplied from those that are lowest, where the moisture lodged long enough to mature the crop of rice.

Q.—Was Mr. Cockburn ill or well during his stay in Cuttack?

A.—He was decidedly ill and unfit for business; he was in very low spirits.

Q.—On your return to Balasore on the 21st May, what was the state of things?

A.—The number of applicants for relief had increased, but the arrangements made for relieving the distress had been vastly improved.

I then first, from what I had seen in Mohurbhunj, and what I saw in Balasore, realized the fact that there was general famine throughout the land.

Q.—Did you then adopt any emergent measures before your return to Cuttack?

A.—I do not recollect that I did so but immediately on my return to Cuttack, on the 25th May, I represented the state of affairs urgently by both letter and telegram to Government and the Board to the best of my recollection. On the 21st May I attended the distribution of rice and clothing at Balasore by Baboo Shamanund Dey. I believe that at that time all the starving people were being fed by local charity. I did not hear at that time of any deaths from starvation in Balasore, but I had heard of some having occurred in Mohurbhunj.

[Re-examined, 7th January 1867].

Q.—We observe that in a letter to the Agent East India Irrigation Company, and printed by him, dated Balasore, the 19th April, you say: "The distress in Balasore is, if possible, even worse than in Cuttack." Does not this imply that you were aware that very great distress and famine existed in the Cuttack district?

A.—I cannot recollect what was the immediate occasion on which this letter was written, or what Mr. Boothby may have written to me regarding the distress in Cuttack; it was probably written with reference to some particulars which Mr. Boothby had communicated to me.

Q.—It is to be gathered from the main letter that you were at that time in demi-official communication with the Lieutenant Governor on another subject; do you not think that you had any communication with His Honor on the subject of the famine, except that which we have just seen?

A.—I have made a complete search throughout my office, and among my private papers, at the special request of the President of the Commission, to find any demi-official correspondence relating particularly to the early part of the famine; and the only letters that I have found bearing on the subject are one from Mr. Shore, which I filed the day before yesterday; another, a private letter from the Lieutenant Governor, dated 28th October 1865, and two from Mr. Grote, not dated, but one of which I received on the 6th June. I put in a copy of these. I also put in extract from the Lieutenant Governor's private letter. This is done in accordance with my promise that whatever demi-official correspondence I had in my possession should be freely placed at the disposal of your Commission. But I wish to record that I put in these documents solely in accordance with that promise, and not because I consider that I am bound to give up letters which are private and confidential, in regard to matters which are on record fully and officially. I am aware of no other correspondence with the Lieutenant Governor in any way touching the subject of the famine.

Q.—It appears from your letter to the Lieutenant Governor, dated the 20th April, that you

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were in correspondence with Mr. Eden, Secretary to Government, on the subject of Balasore matters; is it your impression that you had any considerable correspondence with him regarding the distress and famine?

A.—I certainly had not; nor with any one else connected with the Government.

Q.—You have told us that you first became aware of severe famine on your arrival at Balasore. We observe that, in the extract of your letter dated the 20th April, communicated to us by the Lieutenant Governor, you do not put the famine the first subject in order, but mention crime, cholera, and the inspection of the office before you come to the famine. Is it your impression that the Lieutenant Governor had or had not at that time from any source information regarding the existence of severe famine in the province?

A.—At that time I had gone to Balasore under special orders to make inquiries as to the great increase of crime in the district, and for that reason I probably made matters connected with increase of crime the first subject in my letter. I cannot say what information the Lieutenant Governor may have had in his possession regarding the famine at that time, but I can safely say that all the information forwarded to His Honor from my office has been placed at your disposal. I am not aware of any further or previous demi-official communication made by me on the subject of the famine. I may say that I was not in the constant habit of corresponding demi-officially with His Honor the Lieutenant Governor, and I can state with confidence that not more than five or six demi-official and private letters have passed between us from the date of my appointment to Cuttack to the present time.

Q.—May we take it that, from the 28th May, when you sent a very urgent telegram to the Government, you were aware fully of the severity of the famine?

A.—Most decidedly; as far as I recollect, I was fully aware at that date that the scarcity and difficulty in procuring grain amounted to severe famine, and that extraordinary measures were necessary.

Q.—From the time when you communicated to Government on the 28th May, is it your opinion that all was done that could be reasonably expected to be done in the way of Government aid to save the people from starvation?

A.—Certainly this is my opinion.

Q.—Were you satisfied that every possible means were used to forward a proper supply of rice from Calcutta to Cuttack and other places?

A.—Yes, I believe that every possible exertion was made to afford a sufficient supply.

Q.—Do you think that the delay in landing large quantities of rice on the coast was due altogether to causes beyond control, and that supposing the authorities in Calcutta to have been as fully convinced of the extent of the famine as

people on the spot were, nothing more could have been done in the month of June?

A.—Yes, I believe that the causes of delay in landing the rice were altogether beyond control. I do not think that more could have been done.

Q.—When the rice was first sent down to False Point, was any practical person deputed from Calcutta to superintend the landing, or any person having authority in respect to the cargo?

A.—As far as I recollect no person was specially deputed from Calcutta to superintend the landing of the rice; but there were on the spot Mr. Geary, Assistant Collector of Customs, and Light House Superintendent, and his Assistant Mr. Workman, both active intelligent men, who had they continued in health, would probably have conducted all the landing operations at first. Of course, when these assumed larger dimensions it was necessary to send further assistance, and this was effected by sending Mr. Burgess, who was lent to us by the East India Irrigation Company, a gentleman thoroughly acquainted with the coast and shipping and landing operations, who had been for some years employed in a similar capacity at Ganjam. The employment of Mr. Burgess was arranged here with the sanction of the Board; he was also provided with a competent staff.

Q.—Was there not considerable delay and difficulty regarding the bringing into use of the first large cargo despatched, that of the *Jacques Forestier*, which came down under a guarantee of a minimum price, in consequence of objections regarding the sale and price raised by the agent of the owners, and the want of any one on the spot who had sufficient authority to deal with him?

A.—There was no one at False Point capable of dealing with the agent, but I do not think there was any delay in bringing the cargo into use, because Mr. Fressanges, the agent, landed the cargo at his own godown at False Point, and assisted the Committee by arranging for its conveyance to Talunda.

Q.—Do you not think that if a small steamer had been sent to tow the boats from False Point much time would have been saved?

A.—I can only speak from hearsay; but I have heard that the depth of water on the bar there is so little that a steamer would have been of very little use except at full flood. I am not prepared with a decided opinion on this point.

Q.—Did you ever apply for a steamer, or was such a suggestion ever made to you?

A.—I applied for a steamer. I am not sure whether one was sent when I first asked for it, but one came subsequently.

Q.—Are you aware that there was a great scarcity of rice at both False Point and Pooree subsequently in October?

A.—Yes, there was a great deficiency at both places I believe. This was due to the non-arrival of the *Asia* and *Dundas Castle*. I am not aware of the cause of the delay, but in

consequence of these two ships being delayed, the Board sent some other supplies.

Q.—Did you ever apply for any boats?

A.—Yes, one or two were sent down by the *Teesta* after the close of the monsoon. I do not think that it would have been possible to have sent them from Calcutta earlier.

Q.—Up to the time of the arrival of the *Teesta*, were any Government agents or men or means of any kind sent from Calcutta for the purpose of landing or inland transit?

A.—Yes, the Board sent down an agent; I think a European, but I forget his name. He came to False Point with a supply of tarpaulins to protect the cargoes during the rains in transit. He remained some time, but I do not know how long. I do not remember that any other men or means were sent or wanted.

Q.—When there was a scarcity of rice in October, and the private cargo of the *Charles Moreau* was offered for sale, was not the opportunity of buying that cargo lost for want of authority to negotiate with the Agent or Captain?

A.—There was no one at False Point having express authority to treat with the Captain of that vessel, although Mr. Burgess would have been quite justified in doing so. The Captain wished for a guarantee, I believe, that a certain quantity should be purchased at a certain price, but there was no one who was authorized to give that guarantee, and of two letters despatched by my orders through the Collector, one was misunderstood, and the other miscarried altogether.

Q.—Would it have been possible for the Agent to sell that cargo at False Point privately to his advantage?

A.—I think he would have done so if he had landed it there and sold it by retail on the spot; but there was certainly no merchant at False Point or even in Cuttack who would have bought the cargo wholesale.

Q.—At that time could any private person have bought up rice from False Point, or had Government possession of the whole means of conveyance?

A.—I think that any private person would have had great difficulty in conveying rice in large quantities from False Point to Cuttack at that time.

Q.—In your opinion, was there a sufficient supply of European officers in the province, and particularly in the Cuttack district, in the early months of the famine and subsequently.

A.—I think the supply of officers was short; new men were sent, and others were removed. I applied for a Joint Magistrate for each district; but that request, I believe, was not complied with. I think, had it been complied with, the hands of the Magistrate and Collector would have been materially strengthened. I think that every other application was complied with.

Q.—In your opinion, was the Cuttack Police sufficient, and did the officers do all that could be done in assisting in transport and famine operations?

A.—The Cuttack Police Force was insufficient in numbers and was increased at my request; but the material obtainable was very inefficient. I do not think that the District Superintendent Captain Fisher entered heart and soul in assisting with his Police as the other District Superintendents did. He thought that the escort of rice and other matters connected with famine were not part of the legitimate duties of the Police. Taken departmentally, perhaps Captain Fisher had some grounds, but in my own opinion in such an emergency he was wrong. I am not aware of the circumstances under which he was removed to another district. I was not consulted about it. No one was sent to take his place for some time. I am not aware of the circumstances under which Mr. Crommelin went on leave. A successor was appointed, and I am not aware that there was any inconvenience. Mr. Barlow went on urgent private affairs after having done more than ninety-nine men out of a hundred could have done; it was near the end of the famine. His relief arrangement were thoroughly examined, and there was little or no inconvenience. Several other officers applied for leave, but I do not remember any that got it.

Q.—Were the arrangements for transporting the rice from False Point to Cuttack as efficient as they might have been?

A.—Yes, I think that they were as efficient as could have been expected under the circumstances.

Q.—Throughout the summer, was the supply of rice received at Cuttack sufficient for the relief of the population?

A.—The quantity of rice received throughout the famine was sufficient for feeding all who applied at the unnochatros that were established. If we had had more rice, we might have established more unnochatros at an earlier date. By September I think that the number of unnochatros was quite sufficient. Throughout the famine, we had not so much as we should have liked to have sold. I do not think that there was loss of life from the limit necessarily put to sales; there was always rice at the unnochatros for all who applied either with or without work. I think that it was so at every centre. No limit was ever placed upon the number to be relieved. I believe that the system in regard to distribution of food varied considerably at the different centres.

Q.—Did you think that the management of the Pooree and Balasore districts by the district Officers during the famine all that could be desired?

A.—Yes, decidedly, of both. Both Mr. Barlow and Mr. Muspratt were conspicuous for their zeal and untiring exertions, and were ably seconded by all their subordinates, particularly by Mr. Barton at Khoorda, and Mr. Shortt at Bhudruk.

Q.—In the Cuttack district, would you mention any one in particular?

A.—I believe that Mr. Cornell exerted himself to the very best of his ability. Mr. Kirkwood, though young, made himself active in a remarkable degree. Baboo Hurro Chunder Ghose and Mr. Crouch, Assistant Superintendent of Police, did particularly well, as did Mr. Webster, Assistant in charge of Kendraparah, whose arrangements were most excellent. I must also mention most prominently the assistance received from all the Officers of the Irrigation Company, small and great. Without their assistance, our operations must have very seriously suffered. I would add that Mr. McNeile assisted me most efficiently.

Q.—Are you aware that the official returns of prices rendered during the past year have been called in question, and that you yourself inquired into apparent discrepancies (see your letter to Collector of Cuttack, dated 7th February 1866), are you prepared to explain the discrepancies?

A.—I do not at present remember the result of my inquiries, but I will search my office.

Q.—It is observed that during some meetings at first, for some weeks, the Relief Committee of Cuttack consisted of a number of Europeans, and that there was one Native member only. Why were not more Native gentlemen asked to co-operate?

A.—The reason, I believe, is this. I had from November or December last instructed the Collector to raise subscriptions, and a general meeting was called for that purpose. At that meeting the European members of the Relief Committee as at first constituted and one Native member only attended. When the Relief Committee was again summoned the members who had attended that meeting again attended, but no regular Committee was formally appointed. This want of Native members did not attract notice for some time, and I brought it to the notice of the Committee, and some additional members were appointed.

The greatest mortality was amongst the laboring classes and artisans.

The ryots certainly suffered much less, the poorer ryots more but I am not in a position further to classify the ryots in regard to mortality. I think that the people of this province are excessively apathetic and indolent, and that they did not do all they might have done for themselves. They did not attempt to assist themselves by planting gourds or vegetables in any way out of their ordinary daily course. The zemindars as a body did absolutely nothing to relieve distress during the famine. There were some few exceptions,—two zemindars of Kendrapara Radhasham Narendra and his brother Gouresham Jenna, Rognath Chowdree and the Rajah of Parricood, and a zemindar in the town of Balasore named Shamanund Dey. I will hereafter specify any others who did well. The zemindars may be divided into residents chiefly old Ooryahs or permanent settlers, and non-resident purchasers chiefly Bengalees. The former are decidedly the better landlords and more considerate with their ryots. They habitually store grain and advance it at large interest to their ryots at the season

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when they most require it. They also occasionally assist with small loans of money on pledge of property or bullocks. The other class manage through Naibs or Gomastahs, who only take all they can get and give nothing; there are no advantages in their case.

The ryots in the permanently settled estates are, I should say, not so well off as the others; there is no record of their rights, and the rajahs exercise more oppression on their people than an ordinary zemindar could. The ryots' rents and rights are not so well defined, and they are liable to irregular exactions.

I believe that the Khoorda ryots of the Government estates are more prosperous and more contented than any in the whole province.

The last instalments of revenue of 1865 and the first instalments of 1866 were, I believe collected without material balance, and I believe that the zemindars as a rule collected in full from their ryots. They have as a rule not collected the autumn instalments of 1866, for the simple reason that it is known that the Government demand has been suspended and the ryots will not pay. I think that if the Government demand had been suspended, there would have been less grain in the market this time last year, and I am informed by every one that the suspension this year has caused grain to be held back. The effect of suspension of demand is that people retain their rice as capital to meet future wants. I think that without doubt the delay in regard to the settlement has had much effect in preventing people from taking the water of the Irrigation Company, and that notwithstanding the proclamation which has been issued, it is the general impression that by taking water they will render themselves liable to enhanced assessment. If the revenue payable by the zemindars was fixed, I think that the difficulty would be got over. I do not think that the ryots would be deterred; a Pahee ryot taking water might be liable to have his rents increased, but a Thaneer ryot is in a better position, having a fixed right, and can set his zemindar at defiance. At present, however, I think the zemindars prevent even some of the Thaneer ryots from taking water because they have the power of exercising innumerable petty oppressions. I think that the ryots are also afraid of the price at which the water is offered, but in my opinion that price is perfectly reasonable. I hold a very strong opinion that five rupees per acre per annum is not too much. I am not prepared to say that they would take water universally on these terms if the settlement was made permanent, but they would do so much more generally. I think that cotton and sugar-cane, in addition to rice would be very largely grown, especially cotton, which is already grown on the higher land of the delta, and I believe grows well. The sugar-cane grown is also good. In my opinion the conduct of the Irrigation Company's Officers has been such as most decidedly to conciliate the people. I have never seen a well used for the purposes of irrigation in Orissa; but I have occasionally seen water taken from tanks, but not extensively. There is direct irrigation by means of bunds in

Khoorda. I do not think that the question of embankments is such that it need interfere with a permanent settlement being made, pending a decision with reference to that question. The correspondence regarding the compensation for lands to be taken up for a new system of embankments on retired lands has not come before me. The improvement, in my opinion, necessary to protect the country from the recurrence of famine is an entire metalling and bridging of the trunk roads from Calcutta to Ganjam and from Cuttack to Pooree. I think also a system of roads should be carried from the grand trunk road connecting with tidal waters in Cuttack, Balasore and Pooree. I think if this be carried out, and the Irrigation Company's entire scheme of canals embankments escapes and distributaries be completed, such a famine could never again occur in Orissa. If we had had a good metalled road or a canal placing Cuttack in communication with Calcutta during the past year, it would have been an inestimable benefit.

As far as I understand a Thaneer ryot holds his share at a fixed rent from the settlement, and I am not aware this has ever been disputed.

Q.—Do you understand that the practice of this province has been to grant remissions of revenue with a view to remission of rent on occasion of any severe and general calamities?

A.—I believe it has been the practice to grant remissions of revenue; but I am most distinctly of opinion that this has seldom or ever led to remissions of rent to their ryots by the zemindars. I am also of opinion that the practice which has obtained of late years of granting remissions of revenue has led the people to rely on the Government exclusively, and tended to prevent their taking measures to protect themselves in times of difficulty.

After my return to Cuttack in the end of May, I went to Pooree on revenue circuit and chiefly to look after famine business, and was away from the 3rd to the 19th June. I did not leave Cuttack after that. I found decided famine at Pooree, and people were beginning to flock into the relief centres in Pooree. Those who had come in were in a very bad state and were daily fed at an unnochor then permanently established. The condition of the people who had come in was worse than was to be seen in Cuttack, but there was not the same difficulty in procuring rice in the bazaar. My sole reason for then recommending that grain should not be imported was that it was coming in considerable quantities from Ganjam. I thought Mr. Barlow's arrangements as good as possible; he was engaged from morning to night, and I assisted him. The measures which he had begun were developed and the relief centres increased. During the time I was at Pooree, I drew up the rules and forms of statements and accounts for the relief proceedings, which were afterwards adopted by the Board. Before I left Cuttack I put the arrangements for receiving grain at False Point and bringing it up the river into the hands of the Magistrate and

Collector of Cuttack under instructions shown in the correspondence. No one was especially appointed to assist him; but it was arranged that Mr. Geary, Superintendent of the Light House and Assistant Collector of Customs, as well as his Assistant Mr. Workman, should land the rice, and Mr. Fressanges promised to assist; but at that time it was not arranged on what terms the cargo of the *Jacques Forestier* was to be taken. There were no special arrangements made for Cuttack and Balasore while I was away at Pooree beyond what will be found in the correspondence and this that I told the Collector of Cuttack to keep me informed of all that went on and also if necessary to telegraph to the Board. I was very anxious to see what was the state of the country in Pooree, and I don't think that there was any inconvenience from my absence from Cuttack. When I returned to Cuttack, I was not satisfied with the way in which the transport of rice to Cuttack had been effected. I understood that the Naib Nazir who had been sent down had done absolutely nothing. The Superintendent of Police objected to Mr. Crouch's going down, and I ordered him to go. Mr. Burgess was subsequently sent down. I did not take any part of the executive duty out of the hands of the Magistrate and Collector; but I assisted him in every way I could, and almost daily went to his office. When Mr. McNeile came he did not relieve the Magistrate and Collector of any executive duties; his business was to superintend importation and relief business; he was to instruct and assist the Magistrate and Collector under my orders, but not to do executive work himself. A little later he was sent down to False Point, and there he did do executive work.

No. 54.—NOOR MAHOMED AND 22 OTHERS, Petitioners.

[Examined at Cuttack, 7th January 1867].

ABSTRACT OF CONVERSATIONS.

All we want is to have rice made cheap. The following modes are suggested—

To make people who have rice bring it out and sell it at a just price.

To sell Government rice cheap, so as to bring down the price.

To adopt a stricter revenue system. Formerly, the revenue was collected in four quarterly instalments and rice was forced into the market. Now the zemindars have time to pay. They make advances to the ryots, have time to get all the rice into their own possession, and won't sell it at reasonable rates. Formerly, to meet the Government demands, the rice was brought quickly and sold at reasonable rates.

To abolish the Dandeedars; not to allow their interference, and introduce direct dealings between the people and the shop-keepers. That the chowkeedaree tax assessment should be remitted till the city recovers itself.

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No. 55.—GRISH CHUNDER ROY, *Police Inspector.*

[Examined at Cuttack, 7th January 1867].

I am a Native of Nuddea zillah. I have served in this district since 1839; in the Police since 1863. I wasn't in Cuttack in December, January, February; I took leave for those three months. I returned by Midnapore. On my journey home I saw that the crops were only four or six-sixteenths of a full crop. I returned in March, and on the 27th March I was sent to take over charge of Jajpoor station, and was there during April and May. I went to Jajpoor by Kendraparah and Ullabar; I did not see any deaths, but people were much reduced and in great distress. A few began to die in April; but from the beginning of May I think they began to die faster, and from that time deaths increased. Up to the end of May mortality hadn't reached its height. In June, July, and August it was about maximum. From October it abated. From July Government grain began to be abundantly supplied; but the death-rate was not reduced, as the people were so pulled down that from eating rice they died more than ever. The rice given them was cooked rice. Things mended in October. The Beallee rice had come in. Then also, from eating new rice, many died. In November the famine was got under. The lower castes—Pan, Kentara, Tantee, Hansee, Gowca—suffered most; more than half these castes disappeared.

No. 56.—BABOO JUGGOMOHUN LALL, *Zemindar.*

[Examined at Cuttack, 9th January 1867].

My village is twenty miles from Cuttack, in Pergunnah Mathudnugger. The nearest relief centre to my village was about six or seven miles off. There is no road. Very few went to the centre. Very many of the lower and poorer classes died. The centre alluded to by me was not established till later in the season, and there people mostly died in June and July; they began to die in the end of April, and it got worse afterwards. I don't know if there was rice enough to have established more centres; but if a centre had been established near my village earlier, many persons would have been saved. In the rains the country is impassable, and people could not get to the centre.

Pearce Mohan, petitioner, confirms the above. If labor had been supplied many would have been saved. They were referred to the irrigation officers, but these latter ruined many, as may be seen by their reports; they had not sufficient funds. The labor would have been much more effectual if it had been paid in rice than in money, but perhaps if high wages had been given, people might have found rice.

No. 57.—MR. J. S. ARMSTRONG, C. S.

[Examined at Cuttack, 9th January 1867].

I have been in charge of Jajpoor sub-division since the rains of 1864, but was absent on leave from 15th May to 15th July 1866. In April people of the mechanic and laborer class and mendicants began to crowd into the town. There were deaths from cholera, and a few from starvation. The people who came in were not then in an emaciated state. I noticed that they did not show signs of starvation. The cause probably was that rice continued cheap in my sub-division longer than elsewhere; it was selling there at 20 and 22 seers in the eastern part towards Kanika and the sea-board, when the price at Jajpoor itself was between 8 and 9 seers, and still higher in Cuttack. They were exporting from Kanika when I was on tour with the Collector in February.

While I was on that tour the scarcity was a constant subject of conversation with Mr. Money; but I do not remember whether the probable necessity of importation for the support of the people was mentioned; certainly the idea never occurred to me that the Government would import. I thought merchants would be sure to do so. The crop of 1865 was generally over my sub-division a light and poor crop. The people did not do all they could to save their crops. I have seen Dalo crops allowed to wither away on the sides of tanks from which water could have been obtained with very little trouble, and have remonstrated with the owners, but without effect. The people are accustomed to trust entirely to the rain. I have also seen places left unsown in which the Dalo crop might have been sown with advantage. On remonstrating with them, the ryots replied that they did not sow these lands because the zemindars were in the habit of charging rent according to the area cultivated. It is my opinion that if the ryots had appreciated what was coming, they would have sown every inch of land.

In April I raised subscriptions for relief, and bought some rice which I distributed gratuitously. I also got rice from a zemindar and sold it to people who appeared in need of it at 16 seers to the rupee. I paid the money which I realised to the zemindar. The zemindar gave me out this rice for sale at this rate as a matter of charity, but I believe he was no loser, that is, that he had originally purchased the rice still cheaper. At that time several zemindars were giving and lending rice, some to their own tenants, others to the poor in general; none were giving cooked food. By the 15th May deaths from want of food were beginning to be frequent all about the sub-division. I was without assistance, and was tied down to my head quarters, so I could not go about the interior of the sub-division. I believe that the mortality in Jajpoor town was less than in the interior because of the relief operations and private charity. When I returned to Jajpoor on the 15th July I found that the Government rice had come;

it was being sold just below market price at Jajpoor, Ullabar, and Aul. Relief sales at lower rates were also going on in the same three places, and cooked rice was being distributed gratuitously. None of the regular annual and local works had been commenced upon, because the estimates for the year had only just been sanctioned. The Public Works Department were employing laborers in repairing embankments, especially in the town of Jajpoor. Special works were also going on in Jajpoor, Aul, and Ullabar on a small scale for the relief of those who were able to work; roads were being mended. There was no task-work, in fact it was impossible to get out of the people even as much work as they were capable of doing. They were paid in raw rice, and preferred this to cooked rice. These light relief works have been going on through the famine, and indeed are going on still; at one time 3,000 people were employed. Notwithstanding all this relief, in July the people were dying in numbers in the interior. Many more centres of relief should have been at work in the district, but want of rice made it impossible to do more than had been done up to that time. Soon after I arrived, 300 bags of rice arrived from False Point. I saw that this was insufficient to carry on; therefore, I was obliged to stop Government sales for about a fortnight, reserving the rice for charitable relief, which has never been discontinued up to this time. While Government sales were stopped, we were able to continue paying the laborers in raw rice. I have no reason to believe that the discontinuance of Government sales caused an increase of mortality; for by the exercise of influence and persuasion, I succeeded in inducing the dealers not to close their shops.

Just as our operations were on the point of collapse, we received about 3,000 bags of rice chiefly from False Point. I sent for it in boats. The rivers were then open, and it was easy to get up any quantity of rice. Before it was over, I had 100 large boats afloat, which brought up as much as they would give me.

I believe that I had to stop Government sales on one occasion only after July; do not remember in what month.

When I arrived in the middle of July, no accommodation had been provided by the Relief Committee, nor did the want lead to much exposure, because the residents allowed the paupers to sleep in their out-houses. About 200 paupers were then in the town, but they very soon increased in numbers. There was rainy weather in the beginning of July. Immediately on my return I erected sheds. Some used the sheds, but others preferred lying about the town in out-houses as before. The Native Doctor was of very little use; he was very ill, and shortly afterwards died. I forget when he died, but up to that time we had no other medical assistance. I applied for another doctor before he died; one came eventually, but I was without medical assistance for some time, perhaps a month. The doctor came from somewhere in the North-Western Provinces. We

had a very fair permanent hospital; it was very full of dysentery and diarrhoea patients during the famine. While there was no doctor, the hospital and dispensary were virtually closed. I did what I could myself to prevent and stop bowel complaints by giving mutton broth to the paupers who first came to the centre in a state of exhaustion. I found this course very successful.

There was no medical attendance provided in any other part of the sub-division than Jajpoor.

As soon as I got rice, that is in August, I opened new centres as fast as I could. Eventually, I had ten centres open, but not till October. At each of the seven new centres there was gratuitous relief, by cooked food, small sales at low prices, and light labor paid in raw rice.

If I had four times as much rice, I could have disposed of it with much benefit to the people. I would not allow the chuprassees at my centres to use canes. Latterly, I had fourteen Government shops open at once in the Government compound, so there was no crush; before this there used to be a fearful crush. Every one who applied to buy rice at the Government shops got it, although not in so large a quantity as he would have liked.

We made use of the agency of the regular shop-keepers only to sell Government rice within sight of my office. In one or two instances, I detected them selling rice to their relatives, who took it away and sold it again at higher rates; on the whole, the arrangements worked well.

There were heavy inundations in my sub-division; but I do not think they increased the mortality to any appreciable extent. In some parts of the sub-division both the Beallee and Sarud crops were almost entirely destroyed. Taking the whole sub-division, I consider that the crops of 1866 have been scarcely one-third of an average crop. There was a good deal of immigration from my sub-division to Calcutta; many have returned. I can make no estimate of the proportion of deaths to population.

No. 58.—BABOO RADASHAM NURINDER, *Zemindar.*

[Examined at Cuttack, 9th January 1867].

I reside in Kendraparah in the Cuttack district. My estates are principally in Pergunnah Jodh, Chandnulla and Altee, north of Cuttack. I was absent from September till February, when I returned to Kendraparah. On my return I had an interview with the Lieutenant-Governor at Cuttack. I brought to his notice that something should be done to save the country from the impending distress, but the Lieutenant-Governor did not say any thing special. I then went to Pooree. Whenever I sat down to eat beggars thronged round me. The people appeared in a very bad state, but they had not then begun to die. I saw no corpses on the road. On getting back to Kendraparah, I found that several of the poor from the neighbouring villages had come in to beg, but none then from a great distance. When the Lieute-

nant-Governor said in his speech that he would as soon commit a dacoity as fix rates, all the rascally mahajuns who had been selling at 7 or 8 seers to the rupee locked up their stores and sold only in dribblets. The movement extended to Kendrapara and widened all over the country.

This went on through March. At the request of the sub-divisional Deputy Magistrate Baboo Durjadhun Dass, I let him have rice during a month and four days at 12 seers to the rupee, for the use of the prisoners in the lock-up and his Amlah, and of the temporary visitors. I gave it to the prisoners because the Deputy Magistrate represented to me that he would get into trouble if the prisoners went without food, adding he could not get rice for money. He offered to buy at even 8 seers, but I refused to sell dearer than 12 seers to the rupee. This was 200 per cent. profit, and I considered it usurious to take more. The nominal bazar rate was then 8 seers, but rice was not procurable in any quantities at that price. At that time I sold 1,000 maunds to my ryots at easy rates. There had been no deaths up to this time (the middle of April). There was a large mango crop, on which the people subsisted. I have a permanent religious distribution of rice going on, and at that time the number of applicants greatly increased. The Deputy Magistrate was distributing a few seers of cooked rice daily, and my brother Gouresham Jenna was also distributing cooked rice. A meeting of Native gentlemen was held, at which it was proposed to subscribe a trading capital for the purpose of importing rice and selling it at cost price. The head of this movement was Bichitrando Dass, the Commissioner's Serishtadar, but he soon after left with the Commissioner and the movement came to nothing. I had an interview with the Commissioner before he left. He told me not to give my rice for the benefit of the Government officials and prisoners, adding that other arrangements could be made for them, but to give to the poor. On my return home I fed 300 destitute persons for five months, giving each 4 chittacks of uncooked rice daily. When I returned, the Deputy Magistrate again pressed me, and I gave rice for another month for the jail at the rate of 8 seers to the rupee; after that he pressed me again, and I let him have rice at 6 seers for another month. People began to die of starvation in Kendraparah itself and in the interior at the end of April. All through May people were dying in Kendraparah town, ten or twelve were found dead about the town daily. There was no organized relief before June, then some rice came, and the Deputy Magistrate began to distribute cooked rice to the poor. No labour was then exacted. Government rice was also sold a little below the bazar rate. He asked me to belong to the Committee, but I refused, because he would not, as I suggested, give relief in the shape of raw rice instead of cooked food. I objected to the latter arrangement, because it deprives people of their caste, and high caste people could not therefore benefit by it. The result of distributing only cooked food over the Cuttack district was that respectable people preferred dying in their houses to

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accepting relief. The sales of Government rice might just as well not have been held. There was very little rice, and it was only sold for two or three hours a day, and then only in small and insufficient quantities to each applicant. Crowds of people pushed and struggled to get some, and the chuprassees and constables beat them off. The Deputy Magistrate was hard-hearted, and his only object seemed to be to sell as little rice as possible. He wasted time in giving tickets, and made frivolous excuses to the effect that he hadn't rice enough. In fact there was a great want of rice, but he made too much of the difficulty. In July, I think, he was removed. The paupers had at that time reached the number of 500 or 600, and ten to twenty people were dying daily. About this time the Commissioner got a severe reproof from Government for not making better arrangements, and the Commissioner found fault with the Collector Mr. Cornell, and from that time the rice began to flow in to Kendraparah and Jajpore and other subdivisions. Mr. Webster, the officer who succeeded to the charge of the sub-division, immediately began opening relief centres in the interior—eight or 10, and started relief works. The recipients of daily relief rose to 7,000 or 8,000. He also sold a little, but he should have sold three times as much. He was obliged to reserve his rice for the gratuitous relief of the indigent. Mr. Webster's arrival did much good; but there was no decrease in the mortality,—in fact it increased; the greatest mortality was in August and September. Sheds were erected about September; they should have been erected earlier. The arrangements in this district were never equal to those made by Mr. Barlow. The real fault here was that the Commissioner is "stony-hearted"; he does not feel for the people. To me, personally, he is very affable, because I do whatever he asks me, moreover, I have plenty of patrons, but he is so hard on others that he will ruin them.

I asked him to give remissions of revenue to the zemindars. He replied that if he did so I should not let off the ryots any of their rent, but should still collect it. I told him that if he thought that I was prepared to collect from the ryots, and to make over the whole collections, the entire demand of a year to him, for him to re-distribute among them as he might think best. I consider him stony-hearted, because he will listen to no suggestions for the good of the people; he will not lower the selling price of rice; he will not make remissions of revenue; he does his best to make the ryots take the Irrigation Company's water at the exorbitant rate of Rs. 5 an acre. They will never take it at this rate; if the rate were reduced, they would gladly take it. At first the Irrigation Company wanted Re. 1-8 an acre. I do not think the ryots will ever pay more than 12 annas an acre.

I have caused an enumeration of the people on my estates to be made; there were about 30,000 people; 5,000 have died and 1,100 have emigrated. The people of my estates have died less than in other estates. The inundations destroyed crops, but caused no mortality.

Thanee ryots have no right to hold at fixed rates beyond the expiration of their settlement. They had pottahs for thirty years only. The zemindars desire to have a permanent settlement made with them, even though it should debar them of all claim to remission on any pretext whatever, provided that the Government take only 50 per cent. of the assets. There might be some enquiry, but I don't think the rents of the thanee ryots could be greatly raised. The land which has been brought into cultivation since the last settlement, and was not then assessed, should, of course, be assessed. For my part I should be quite content if the rates of the thanee ryots were permanently fixed at the settlement, but some other zemindars do wish to have the Thanee ryots left at their mercy, but they will not dissent from my views.

No. 59.—BABOO MOOKUND PERSHAD ROY BAHADOOR.

[Examined at Cuttack, 9th January 1867].

I am resident of pergunnah Mathnuggur, in zillah Cuttack; entered the Government service as a Police Darogah in 1818, and was appointed Deputy Collector in 1837; have been principally employed in Orissa, and took part in the settlement in 1837; have been principally in Cuttack since the beginning of 1866. In consequence of the drought and failure of crops in 1865, prices went on rising, and the scarcity became more and more apparent till March.

In March I first realized that it would be necessary for Government to import rice to support the people till the Beallee crop came in. In March cholera began, and people began to die in the interior from want of food. I had no conversation with any one on the subject of importing rice. In April I had about 300 bhurrs (3,000 maunds of paddy) stored in my mofussil zemindaree, and directed my agent to give it out to the ryots; they were to re-pay it with 25 per cent. more from the next crop. In April there was importation of grain by traders from the south and from Gurjats to the west, so people were not dying of hunger in Cuttack, but they were dying in the interior. Most people died in May, June, and July. When Government rice came into the district, people flocked in from the interior to buy.

From the time when the Government rice came in, people got as much as ever they wanted; who would be excluded from obtaining Government rice? The mofussil people also came into Cuttack, and bought as much as they wanted. I am not aware of any struggling or of any maltreatment of the people by constables, &c., at the sales. I did not go to them. There were no relief centres in my estates. I hold four estates. I have caused statistics to be collected, and found that the population consisted of above 4,000 people. Of these, 1,007 have died of cholera and starvation during the year.

I do not attribute any of the mortality to inundation. In the north-east of the district, and also in the south there has been much destruction of crops from inundation.

I have never seen or heard of such a famine as this. I remember hearing of one in 1211, or 1803 or 1804, when I was a child. I do not remember anything more about it.

There was also a famine in Orissa in 1837; it was caused by drought. I think it lasted four or five months only. Rice sold at 8 seers a rupee. 2,000 paupers collected in Cuttack. Mr. Ricketts was, I think, Commissioner, and Mr. Mills, Collector. There was a general subscription from which they were fed. I believe Mr. Atkinson, a merchant, imported rice from Calcutta in the course of trade, but Government imported nothing.

Before the settlement of 1837, in which I took part, the Thanee ryots occasionally had their rents raised and lowered by the zemindars. At the settlement they obtained leases, fixing their rents for the term of the settlement. The rates paid in those days by the Papee ryots were a quarter below those paid by the Thanees, because the latter got the sites of their houses for nothing; and in the first instance the houses themselves: that is the custom of the country.

Up to the present time, the Papee ryots pay less than the Thanee ryots pay for lands of the same description. I am clearly of opinion that it will never pay the ryots to take the Irrigation Company's water at Rs. 5 a beegah. I cannot say how much they can afford to pay.

Perhaps the ryots about the Godavery can afford to pay Rs. 8 an acre for water, because they are richer than the Ooryahs. I can assign no other reason.

I pay revenue to Government for my four estates, Rs. 3,425 a year. I have held the zemindarees since 1848. Since then I have received about Rs. 800 or Rs. 900 remission of revenue in consequence of drought and floods (the remissions of 1865 are not included); the remissions were distributed over four or five years. I have allowed about Rs. 2,500 remission to my ryots in the same period.

I desire a permanent settlement on the following conditions—

That Government take 50 per cent. of the gross assets of the estates as revenue.

That I abandon all claim to remission on any grounds whatever.

The Government to be bound to keep up the embankments as now.

The rents of the Thanee ryots to be permanently fixed. The land brought into cultivation since the last settlement to be assessed.

The assessment on all other lands to remain as at the last settlement.

In the last settlement, about half of the lands in my estates were pronounced incapable of cultivation, and entered as unassessable; of the remaining half, about four-fifths were cultivated, and one-fifth entered as capable of cultivation. Now a great deal has been brought under cultivation, perhaps (including the lands capable of cultivation) not more than one-sixteenth of the lands which were entered as unreclaimed.

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I heard of the possibility of a permanent settlement discussed at the time of the last settlement, but I know of no promise to make such a settlement.

Unless the Government make it a condition of the permanent settlement that they will keep up the embankments, in my opinion the majority of the landholders whose estates are affected by floods will not accept a permanent settlement. As far as I am concerned, if the Government took only 50 per cent. of the gross assets, I would accept a permanent settlement without any condition as to embankments. One estate would suffer extremely if the embankments were abandoned; the other three would suffer, but not much.

No. 60.—BABOO PUDDUM CHURN CHOWDHRY,
Zemindar.

[Examined at Cuttack, 9th January 1867].

I live in Cuttack, but my home is in Jajpore, sixteen miles north-east of Cuttack. I hold estates in that neighbourhood, and also in different parts of the Cuttack district. The distress began to be felt in September 1865; it gradually increased (abating a little in Pous and Magh) during the next months till the month of Assar (June and July), when it was at its worst. It was not till the second month of Jeyt or late in May (there were two months of Jeyt in 1865) that it became apparent to us that there was not sufficient rice in the country and that the people must be supported by imports. By that time people were dying in numbers both in Cuttack and the interior from starvation. I do not know of any one having told the officials that there was no sufficiency of rice in the country. I believe some zemindars had told them that the produce of the crop was sufficient for the wants of the country. Till the month of May, it was my own opinion, and I believe the opinion of every one, that there was rice enough in the district to carry people through till the Beallee crop came in. We were all mistaken. Since the second crop of 1866 came in, very little old rice has come into the market; it has all been used up; there is none left to come.

When the Government rice came in much good was done; many lives were saved, and those who were withholding their stocks of rice began to sell them. People did not get nearly as much as they wished to buy; the sales were held in few places. The sales should have been entrusted to respectable persons at intervals of six or eight miles. As it was, the applicants were in such crowds that people did not like to go for rice. The chaprasses and servants used to beat off the crowd. There was nothing of this kind in the distribution of the charitable relief, in cooked food. I can say this, or I have seen the centres from Pooree to Jajpore. There was sufficient rice to feed all who applied at the centres for cooked food from the time they were established in June; but there should have been twice the number of centres. Many people

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of the better castes died in their houses rather than go to the relief centres for food. Those who eat food at the centres lost caste because they ate with other castes to take their food. Brahmin cooks were provided. No arrangements were made for relieving respectable people and women who would not eat at the relief centres; they died at their houses.

I consider the relief operations should have begun in April. If that had been done, I believe one-half the mortality would have been prevented.

I pay Rs. 2,500 Government revenue for seventeen estates. In the last ten years I have received remissions once only, about one-eighth of the year's revenue.

I should be glad of a permanent settlement, Government taking 50 per cent. of the gross assets as revenue, but the Government must engage to keep up the embankments. I would give up all claim to remission after such a settlement. The rents of the Thane ryots should be fixed. In my estates the proportion of uncultivated to cultivated land at time of the last settlement was about one-eighth; now most of it has been brought into cultivation.

I have heard people say that perhaps there would be a permanent settlement when the current settlement expired, but I have never heard of any pledge having been given to that effect.

If no permanent settlement is to be made then the longer the better; but, in my opinion, no satisfactory settlement could be made now; the country has been ruined and depopulated by famine, and irrigation canals are being excavated. No fair arrangements could be made at present. I would extend the existing settlement for ten years. I do not believe that any landowner would object to this. I believe that the Irrigation Company's water would be taken and used every year for the Sarud crop if they could get it at a reasonable price. It will never pay the ryots to take water at Rs. 5 a beegah. I believe that if the question of permanent settlement were finally decided, and there were no obstacles on that score, the ryots would not pay more than 8 annas or 1 rupee per acre for the water. If they see that it pays them, they will of course pay more afterwards, but they will never give more than 8 annas or 1 rupee to take the water as an experiment.

No. 61.—BABOO SREEMUNT MOHAPATRA, Zemindar.

[Examined at Cuttack, 9th January 1867].

I live at Kusandahee, ten miles south-east of Cuttack; have estates in different parts of Cuttack and Pooree districts. People began to die first in April; the mortality increased till September; by that time only a few people remained, so, of course, the mortality decreased; they are dying still, one or two here and there. When Government rice arrived it did much good; but if it had come two or three months earlier it would have saved many more lives. Half of the whole population have died

about my neighbourhood; half of those might have been saved if the rice had come earlier. I believe that in pergunnah Banchas, in the north-east of the Pooree district, no less than three-fourths of the people are dead. In that pergunnah they have had three years of failure of crop; in 1271 there was a little; 1272 and 1273 there was none. There was no relief centre opened in my pergunnah Deogurh. One was opened about four coss off. I petitioned the Collector for a centre, but it was not given. There Government rice should have been sent. I pay Rs. 2,152 Government revenue on my estates. In the last ten years I have received about Rs. 100 remission. At the time of the last settlement, about half of the whole area of my estates was found to be incapable of cultivation, one-eighth waste capable of culture, and the rest cultivated. Some of the land which was waste at last settlement has since been cultivated; some which was then under cultivation has become sandy and has been thrown up.

I would not take a permanent settlement at the rate of the present settlement, but should be glad to have one at a lower rate.

If Government agrees to keep up the embankments, I would accept a permanent settlement, excluding myself from all claim to remission if 60 per cent. of the gross assets were allowed to me, the Government taking 40 per cent. only. I would not give up the claim to remission on account of calamities of season on any lower terms.

No. 62.—CHOWDHRY PEKLADHAN MOHAPATRA.

[Examined at Cuttack, 10th January 1867].

The famine lasted four months. One-third of the people have died, and another third are so reduced as to be good for nothing. We have had several misfortunes—1st, God sent no rain; 2nd, the Government gave us no remissions for our losses; 3rd, the traders bought at 25 seers per rupee and sold at 6 seers. Another is that the courts have sold up those who from the calamities of nature could not pay, and the constables of police are also a misfortune. I would shut the courts in these days of famine. If the Government only takes something for increase of settlement, and for the rest gives us 50 per cent. malikana on the old jumabundee, we should be glad to get a permanent settlement, and would not claim remissions after that, provided the embankments are kept in order. We have now no power over the Thane ryots; they sell, do what they like, and are quite independent of us. If we get a permanent settlement we are quite willing that the Thane ryots should get the same; and they should not be allowed to sell to others as they now do; if they do, powerful men are introduced in their place, who are to be subject to us, and we don't like that.

No. 63.—MOHUNT PUDDUN CHURN DASS.

[Examined at Cuttack, 10th January 1867].

I have a mut at Pooree, and another in this district; have jagheers. Last year was in Cuttack district. People began to die in the month of Jeth. The Government aid was good so far as it went, but was not given at the right time. The Officers did what they could to send out rice, but the superintendence was deficient. Things were better arranged in Pooree than Cuttack. I hear that the best of all the white officers was the Magistrate and Collector of Balasore.

(Here begs that his communications may be considered confidential; they are not important).

There are inequalities in the settlement. Some zemindars have become rich, some poor; they must be corrected.

No. 64.—BABOO RUNGOLALL BANNERJEE, Deputy Collector.

[Examined at Cuttack, 10th January 1867].

I have been four years in Orissa. I was employed in the Cuttack district during the famine. I was a little out in the district. The autumn crop of 1865 in the parts which I saw it (which were limited) may have been about a half crop. Famine was apprehended in October, and fears got worse in March. I heard of deaths by starvation in distant parts of the district in that month, but not in the town. From that time the famine grew worse and worse. There were more deaths in April than in March, and crime increased. Hindoos began to steal cows and eat them. When the Lieutenant Governor came, the populace prostrated themselves near the jail, and vociferated near the cutcherry that a famine has come, and beseeched him to fix the price of grain. They said they were dying of hunger. Rice was then selling at famine prices, and it always gets dearer as the season advances. The European officers were retarded from measures of relief by the idea that there were large stocks of grain. I did not share that belief. I think that when the European officers were convinced of the state of things, they did what they could, but there were not many enough. I think more relief centres should have been established, and the rice given uncooked, as the Ooryah caste prejudices are very strong. There would not have been rice enough if more had been given. I think that respectable Bengallee Deputy Collectors might have been got to supervise the centres where there were considerable abuses. The local authorities should have gone into the interior more. There was shortness of rice in October, and that caused injury.

The reasons why the people won't take the water of the Irrigation Company, are—1st, that they think the rates too high; 2nd, the distributaries are not ready, many ryots say that they would have grown Dalo rice (where it can be grown), had these been ready; 3rd, the Pahee ryots (who are in the majority) object that, though there is a guarantee from Government that the zemindars

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paupers came in from the interior from all directions. They were principally Sonthal women and children and old men; in fact those who, under ordinary circumstances, are supported by others, or who support themselves by selling wood. I do not believe that any deaths from starvation took place in the course of December. Nothing was done in December. In January the people began to die from starvation; isolated cases only here and there. Up to the end of May things went on getting worse. By that time the bulk of the jungle people, including bearers and laborers were living on roots, leaves and jungle produce; they eat up all the mowah flowers from which country spirit is distilled, and thus seriously affected the Government excise revenue. The ryots as a class were subsisting on rice up to June, but were much stinted; the majority of them had only one meal a day, some had not a meal every day. The mortality in May and June was considerable, but not extreme; people were not seen lying dead about the streets. I cannot remember exact dates, but I know that between January and June, I addressed the Collector of Midnapore three times on the subject, and recommended that the zemindars should be urged to help their ryots and to undertake works for that purpose. I received no replies; but I saw Mr. Herschel, the Magistrate and Collector, on the 30th of April, and he told me that Mr. Terry, Messrs. Watson and Co.'s Manager, complained that he could not get laborers for his works. I did not understand how in the existing state of things that could be the case. I am not aware that any works were undertaken either by zemindars or Government officers up to the latter part of July.

In my reports I brought to the notice of the Magistrate (I think in April or May) that the western part of my sub-division, which abutted on the Maunbhoom district, was altogether disorganized; grain robbery, arson, and theft of cattle were of nightly occurrence. People were afraid to go to sleep at night. The police of that part of the district was strengthened; but these outrages did not cease till July; arson and open plunder then disappeared, but grain da-coities continued to be frequent; they did not cease till the cold weather crop was cut. In May and June I could get rice at the rate of 5 or 6 pie per rupee, but there was very great difficulty in procuring it, even for money. Early in June the Collector wrote to me that a Relief Committee had been organized in Midnapore, and he promised to double whatever I could raise from the Government donation of Rs. 5,000 which had been received.

I had no communication with the Collector of Bancoorah regarding the distress in the part of my sub-division which belongs to his district till February. In that month, Mr. Wells, the Collector, himself visited Bishenpore, in my sub-division, for the special purpose of looking into the state of things there. He attempted to raise a subscription, but failed, and then asked me to go there and see what I could do. I raised about Rs. 500 for the erection of a market place to

give employment to laborers. I raised the money in February or March. The work was entrusted to Mr. Fretchley, Inspector of Police, and begun by him; but he was transferred almost immediately, and the work was at a stand still, and so it remained till I left Gurbettah in July. The work was under me, but I had no time to look after it myself, and no successor to Mr. Fretchley came to Bishenpore. The money was in my hands. Up to the time I left Gurbettah, there was no agency at Bishenpore capable of carrying on that work. In February and March a few men were employed in cutting jungle and clearing the town of Bishenpore. Mr. Fretchley superintended there. From Mr. Fretchley's departure till June, at least, and I think till August, no works were carried on at Bishenpore. I made no special report to the Collector about the necessity of works. At the end of May I found out that famine was at its height, and early in June I asked the Collector of Bancoorah for Rs. 1,500 for gratuitous relief in Bishenpore. The answer came in the shape of a resolution of the Bancoorah Relief Committee styling my application one for keeping up an army of beggars, and not assigning the money. Nothing was done for Bishenpore up to the 19th or 20th July, when I left Gurbettah. Operations, however, began in August, and the Committee did exactly what I had recommended and they had disapproved.

I visited Bishenpore in February or March, and again in April. The state of the people then was not as bad as in Gurbettah itself, but I saw the people were suffering. There were deaths from cholera in numbers, and perhaps a few from starvation among the beggars and Sonthal women and children, but there was no general destitution even among the weavers. Subsequently, Bishenpore became much worse than Gurbettah, and many of the weavers died. My special report contains particulars. In the beginning of June, at the request of the Collector of Midnapore, I raised a subscription of Rs. 150 a month for four months, which was doubled by the Collector from the Relief Funds; indeed, up to the time I left Gurbettah in July, about Rs. 800 had been received from the Collector. A local Relief Committee was appointed for Gurbettah, and we began doling out dry rice to the people at the rate of 4 chittacks (Calcutta weight) to an adult, and 2 chittacks to a child. This went on for about a fortnight, and then we found the quantity insufficient, and raised it to 6 chittacks of kulye and rice for an adult. We were feeding about 1,000 people at Gurbettah. At the same time Mr. Jaffrey, an Assistant of Messrs. Watson and Co., opened four depôts out of money supplied to him by the Relief Committee and from subscriptions; he was also feeding from 800 to 1,000 mouths. Mr. Clarke, of Chuttigunge, the Zemindaree Manager of Messrs. Watson and Co., also opened a depôt, at which he was feeding from 700 to 800 people; these were principally weavers, from Chunderkonah in the Hooghly district. No relief had then been organized in the Jehanabad sub-division of the Hooghly district. Generally speaking, these

depôts were at a distance of eight or ten miles from one another. Raw rice was distributed at all these centres as long as I was at Gurbettah. We had no works at Gurbettah till just as I was leaving, when a tank was sanctioned. We gave rice gratuitously to all whose personal appearance indicated that they were proper objects for relief. I do not believe any works whatever were going on in the Gurbettah sub-division in June and July.

In my second letter of October, I estimated the standing crop at one-half of an average crop; but subsequently the grain in the ears was attacked by an insect, and eventually the out-turn of the harvest was not more than one-fourth over my whole sub-division. Rice was, of course, very difficult to procure. Our Local Committee first obtained rice from Ghatal, in the Hooghly district, to which it was imported by traders from Calcutta; but we found the transport so difficult that afterwards we bought paddy about Gurbettah and cooked it ourselves. We also got some Kulye and mixed that with the rice as being cheaper. Some of those who were receiving relief died at the centre. I do not consider that even 6 chittacks was a sufficient allowance to support a person who had previously been reduced to a state of emaciation, especially during the rains, and when the individual was not properly clothed. Our Committee gave out no clothes. No sheds or other shelter were provided by the Committee for the paupers; but I built a shed in which the distribution was made during the rains. There was no shelter at any of the depôts in my sub-division. I think that deaths were occasioned by the exposure, for whenever a rainy night occurred, it was followed by unusually numerous deaths. I should say that three or four was the greatest number of bodies ever removed from the streets in one day up to the time I left Gurbettah. Probably, out of the 1,000 whom we were feeding daily, about 300 were paupers who did not return to their own houses at night; many of these had come from the Maunbhoom district.

On the 19th of July I was relieved of the charge of the Gurbettah sub-division, and placed in special charge of the relief operations in the jungle mehals of Midnapore and in Dantoon.

My instructions were to extend operations of existing depôts where necessary, and to raise local subscriptions, and to open new depôts where required.

On the 23rd July, I arrived at Dantoon, about thirty-two miles south of Midnapore on the Balasore road. The Moonsiff had charge of the relief centre. About 800 people were receiving raw rice, 4 chittacks of rice for an adult, and 2 chittacks for a child. I weeded out those who were not proper objects of charity, and finding some of the rest so reduced as to be unable to cook, I obtained permission to raise the allowance given from 4 to 6 chittacks, and to distribute cooked food to those who were unable to cook. This was done, raw rice being still distributed to those who could cook for themselves. The numbers soon rose to 1,600. A tank

was being excavated close by, by the Department Public Works. I sent the able-bodied to work there, and had nothing more to do with them. That work was undertaken as a relief work. Three other tanks had also been sanctioned in the district, and begun in the latter part of July.

At Dantoon I also raised subscriptions; but the zemindars about Dantoon neither fed any one nor subscribed as they ought to have done. When I was at Dantoon in July, the mortality was fearful at the centre. Many of the paupers had come from Balasore. I should say that six or seven were dying daily in Dantoon when I was there. When I revisited Dantoon in September, the number of paupers had been somewhat reduced from 2,000—the maximum of August—partly by the introduction of cooked food and partly by deaths—to about 1,000. The mortality was very great there; the place swarmed with dead bodies; the paupers were dying at the rate of ten and twelve a day. In accordance with a recommendation made by me during my July visit, a Native Doctor and medicines had been sent to Dantoon at the end of August; but when I returned in September, I found that the Doctor was absolutely without any English medicine, and I considered him too young and inexperienced for his duties. I represented this on my second visit, and then the Sub-Assistant Surgeon of Midnapore was sent out. Small-pox was then making its appearance.

Relief was being administered on the system which I had started in July, but rice was somewhat cheaper, as the Aaos crop had come in; I think it was selling at 8 or 9 seers per rupee; old rice could hardly be procured.

In July I went from Dantoon to Khosiaree—ten miles off. I raised a subscription of above Rs. 250 monthly, and started a relief centre under a Local Committee. The distress there was very great; people were dying of starvation at the rate of seven and eight daily in Khosiaree. The Committee refused to undertake the distribution of cooked rice there, and being non-officials they could not be coerced. They said that they had no time to look after distributions of cooked rice. If we had had money enough to employ servants with, we might have distributed cooked rice; but it was an object to manage things economically, so the Committee were left to distribute raw rice only. At Dantoon a light labor yard had been established; but none was established at Khosiaree. I saw paupers eating raw rice through impatience and hunger, and I believe that that brought on dysentery. Throughout August and September and part of October I went on establishing and visiting centres of relief; where possible I introduced the distribution of cooked food, and also light labor. We drew our rice for supply for all the centres from Midnapore. About the end of August, the Officiating Commissioner of the Burdwan division, Mr. Jenkins, visited Midnapore, and I was sent for to meet him. At that time rice was just being sent out to the centres by the Collector for sale;

but sales had not begun. Mr. Herschel, the Collector, had ordered the sales to be made to selected individuals at the rates of 12, 9, and 8 seers per rupee. A limited quantity was to be sold each day at each centre. The Commissioner reduced the rates to 10, 9, and 8 seers; but by that time the Aaos crop had come in, and I believe no sales were made except at Dantoon and Khosiaree, as the Aaos was selling at the same price. Mr. Herschel told me that the Board was dissatisfied with his estimate for the district as being excessive, and that I was to open no more centres; accordingly I did not open any more. I consider that one more centre only was required. Things were then improving in consequence of the harvesting of the early rice crop.

I consider that many of the centres should have been opened two months earlier. By June many of the people in the jungle mehals were dead of starvation; further, I consider that the test of emaciation which we were obliged to apply before admitting applicants to gratuitous relief was too strict. I was instructed not to admit any man or woman who was capable of obtaining a livelihood by working. I represented the hardship of this to the Collector without effect.

My objection was that no work was provided within a reasonable distance of their homes. Besides four or five tanks, I believe that no works were undertaken in the Midnapore district till September; then, at the Commissioner's suggestion, several roads were taken in hand by the Magistrate. I am not aware that the Department Public Works took any roads.

The road from Midnapore to Balasore was not in hand in the rains.

I did not put up shelter for the paupers at any centre, because I considered that our funds were limited. I know from demi-official correspondence with the Collector that he was aware that the paupers were dying from want of shelter. I never made any definite application to the Collector for money or rice which was refused, nor any suggestion which was not carried out on the ground of want of funds. We were never stinted for rice at the centres; it was supplied in accordance with my indents. Had I had unlimited funds at my disposal, I should have distributed rice twice a day, and should have provided shelter and clothes for the paupers. With the exception of doctors, no medical assistance was provided for the paupers at the relief centres.

I do not believe that, after the centres were established, any number of people died of starvation at their own houses, rather than come to them for food.

No means were provided of relieving women who could not leave their homes. There were not many women of that class in the jungle mehals.

The highest price which ruled at any time for rice was in the month of August, when 6 seers only of 72 tolahs weight could be procured for the rupee.

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I inferred that unlimited funds were not available for the Midnapore district relief from what I knew of the supply of funds to the Collector, and from the fact that in Midnapore town no more than 4 chittacks only of rice were being given out daily to starving paupers. Subsequently Mr. Herschel told me that the Board had considered his estimate excessive. From the beginning of September, under the instructions of the Commissioner cooked rice was distributed at all centres except at those under Mr. Jaffrey.

From what I saw myself I do not agree with an opinion which Mr. Herschel expressed to me in a demi-official letter that 40,000 of the population died in consequence of the famine. I should say that not more than 25 or 30,000 deaths occurred, which are owing directly or indirectly to the famine.

If a practicable road had existed between Burdwan and Bishenpore, and between Burdwan and Gurbettah, and between Ghatal and Gurbettah, I believe the famine would not have been felt half as severely as it was felt. While rice was selling at Ghatal for Rs. 4 a maund or less, it could not be bought about Gurbettah and in Pergunnah Bogree for less than Rs. 6 or 7 a maund, the distance being thirty-two miles only.

No. 70.—BABOO GOURÉE SUNKUR ROY.

[Examined at Cuttack, 11th January 1867.]

My house is at Assenessor, twenty miles from Cuttack, but I am now employed as Abkaree writer in the office of the Collector. Early in April, at the suggestion of Baboo Bechetranund Dass, a meeting of Native gentlemen was held at the Printing Company's premises, to obtain grain from the zemindars if possible. It was believed that they had large stores of grain; and were keeping it out of the market. It was resolved to subscribe, a fund, out of which grain should be bought from the zemindars and grain dealers and sold to the public at cost price in thirteen or fourteen places in the town. Subscriptions were procured. A rough estimate was made of the grain which each zemindar and mahajun was supposed to have in store, and a letter was addressed to each requesting him to sell one-fourth of his grain to the Committee for sale to the public. The zemindars and merchants were asked to give the grain at any price they might think proper. All refused to give any grain, saying that they had none, except Roghonaath Doss, Radasham Narrendra the rajah of Dhenkanal, and the zemindar of Enatra. The quantity offered was insufficient, and so the project fell to the ground. Subsequently, it was resolved to import the grain from Ganjam, but the subscribers did not pay up their money, so nothing was done. I remember that we estimated that the zemindars whom we addressed held 48,000 bhurs—about 3,84,000 maunds—of paddy. The estimate was founded on general rumour only. I now believe that this estimate was too high. The people began

to die in the mofussil in March; the mortality continued increasing till August; but there was no mortality in the station from starvation till the beginning of May, when the distribution of relief attracted paupers to Cuttack. Up to April my own belief was that there were in the country large stocks of rice, and that they would suffice to carry the people through until the Beallee crop could be cut. I am now convinced that I was mistaken. Among my friends and acquaintances opinions were divided on the subject up to April. I believe that great mortality took place in the mofussil in April and May. Government rice was not in full distribution in the mofussil till the beginning of August. I think the authorities should have taken action to import as early as February. If the rice had come earlier and in sufficient quantities, and distributions had commenced in March, and people had been provided with work near their own houses, I believe that no great mortality would have occurred. The sales of rice at market price were so insufficient as to be little more than nominal. I opened a shop myself for the servants of the Printing Company, &c. I manage a vernacular paper called the *Utkal Deepika*, and have drawn the attention of the Commissioners to a number of articles published therein bearing on the famine. Those articles generally express my views. I consider that the centres ought to have been opened much earlier. Had they all been opened in April, they would have been sufficient for the gratuitous relief of the indigent. I think more should have been done in the way of providing work. The light labor was started after the paupers had got into the habit of being fed for nothing.

I think the most important of remedial measures would be a permanent settlement of the land revenue. If the demand of Government were fixed, the landholders would take a greater interest on their estates and would try to improve them, so the produce would be increased. I consider that a temporary settlement is injurious, because, for some years before its close, they allow their estates to deteriorate, so that no increased assessment may be imposed on them at the re-settlement. I believe that this has been done lately in Orissa. The country is now improving rapidly, and I believe that, if a permanent settlement were now made, the sons and grandsons of the present zemindars would be more liberal-minded than they are, and would really improve their estates. I do not and would really improve their estates. I do not consider that the zemindars or rajahs, who hold the killahs or estates, which are permanently settled, and which pay very little revenue, have brought their estates into better condition than the zemindars of the Moghulbundee or temporary-settled estates. I believe this is owing to the fact that the rajahs are a different and less advanced class of men. The rajah of Dhenkanal is, however, an exception, and has much improved his killahs. I do not believe that the zemindars are exerting their influence to prevent their ryots from taking the Irrigation Company's water. I believe that the sole cause of the ryots holding back is the high price which is demanded, and

the fact that they have no experience of the advantages which will ensue from irrigation.

I believe that if a permanent settlement were concluded, the zemindars would use their influence to induce the ryots to take the water.

No. 71.—BABOOS JONARDUN SEN AND BECHETRA-NUND DASS, *Sheristadars of Collector's and Commissioner's Offices, respectively.*

[Examined at Cuttack, 5th and 11th January 1867.]

Originally the Thance ryots paid more, but now wherever there are many men and demand for ryots the Pahees have been increased to a higher rate. The reason the Thancees originally paid higher is that they got their Khanahbaree trees for nothing, and they had also chosen the best lands before the others came in. The Pahee land is generally the inferior land that the Thancees would not take. Up to this time the rent of the Thance ryots has never been altered except when on a few occasions the Government revenue having been found too light was raised, and the Thance rents at the same time.

The land of this district is tolerably good, but very uniform and not so good as in other parts. It may bear two crops of rice annually if irrigated, but would not produce such heavy crops as if cropped less often.

There is now a little sugar-cane grown, and more may be grown with irrigation, but it will never be first-rate; the land is not strong enough.

Cotton was formerly produced more than latterly. Up to 1863 it was grown; but then a report got abroad that a special tax was to be levied on cotton and tobacco, and on that account the cultivation was much reduced. The cotton grown is not so good as in the Gurjat and Balasore and other places. There are two cotton seasons—one sown to ripen in April, the other in the rains to ripen in October. Here most of the cotton is grown in the former season, in the Gurjat in the latter. It won't be much better here from the present seed; but from the American seed, the plants of which last all the year round, it may be better. Even now the ryots don't sow their own seed and get it from the Gurjat.

After the settlement, when prices were cheap, the Thance rents were very high and many of them were dispossessed. The zemindars had to get decrees against them and execute by dispossessing, putting Pahee ryots in their place. The last seven or eight years grain began to bear a much better price; the ryots to be better off, and they have held their grounds.

Jonardun thinks that in the whole of this district the Thance ryots may be to the Pahees about half and half, that is about equal. Bechetra thinks there may be more Pahees, but a Thance in one place often holds Pahee land in another.

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Mokaddams and Mouroosee Surburakars are in fact exactly the same. They have both transferable and saleable rights in the land, heritable and divided according to the ordinary laws. In the Pooree district it is believed that the same people are called Padham, and that it was there ruled that the right should not be divided, but they do divide among themselves and no one has objected.

The non-Mouroosee Surburakars are those who by long practice had established a sort of claim to engage for the villages, but not a proprietary right. They engaged for the term of settlement, and got pottahs from Government only to last so long as the settlement. The lease descends to heirs when a Surburakar dies, and it is believed that in Pooree the right of lease for the rest of the term of settlement has been sold in execution and for balances. In Cuttack if they don't pay they are liable to be dispossessed. In almost all large estates there are Mokaddams and Surburakars under the zemindars, but not in small estates. Much the largest number are Mouroosee men, the non-Mouroosee are few. In the Government estates also there are the same people, and they have universally leases; but it has been ruled by Government that they have not saleable rights, and they are not sold up, only dispossessed if they don't pay. They are called Surburakars, not Mokaddams. Generally Mokaddams and Surburakars have single villages, some times, but seldom, two or three. The villages here are generally small, paying Rs. 50, 100, or 200. There are never a large number of sharers in Mokaddam and Surburakar rights, generally not more than two or three, more frequently only one. There may often be three or four brothers who have the benefit of the profits when only one man's name is entered. Till 1859, successions and transfers were registered in the Government offices; since then it has been given up, and they are only recorded by the zemindars.

In this district the only two-crop land was that in which Beallee rice is succeeded by Rubbee. The only Dalo rice grown was that in low situations where there was too much water for the autumn crop. The crops of rice were never grown in the same land. The Rubbee crops are kulye, moong, mustard, &c.

The reason why the canal water is not taken from the Irrigation Company is principally that the price charged is too high, at least that is the ryot's reason. The zemindars have still more fear about the settlement, and discourage the taking of water. The rate is decidedly the principal reason why the water is not taken. The ryots would take it if they got it cheaper, and they would prefer to take water and pay for it when they want it rather than contract to take it, whether they want it or not. If the charge were 1 rupee for a crop, it would be taken. It is necessary to begin with low rates.

The zemindars would like a permanent settlement on the understanding that they are now to get 50 per cent. malikana. They think that for cultivated land the old rent roll should be assumed, but have no objection to taking into consideration

new cultivation. On those terms, getting 50 per cent. malikana, they would accept a permanent settlement even on the understanding that there would be no remissions. It may only be necessary to raise the estates which at last settlement were refused on account of recusancy, and which have been ever since a loss to Government.

Thanee ryots and almost all others pay money rents. The Thanee ryots have paid money rents from ancient times. Before the settlement the rates were not fixed, they were liable to be raised at the will of the zemindars; now they cannot bear an enhancement. They have had difficulty in keeping their heads above water the last thirty years, and they cannot bear more now. There are very few cases in which the zemindars would put in a claim to increase of Thanee rents now.

Subsequent revised opinion of JONARDUN, confirmed by some others.

On the whole the Pahce ryots are in the majority. In some villages there are no Thanees. Since the settlement, from dying out, over-assessment and other causes, the number of Thanee ryots has diminished say by one-third. The Thanee ryots sometimes sub-let their lands on division of grain, and often they cultivate Pahce lands besides. There has been no discussion of the question whether they can sell their lands, and no register of such transfer is kept unless in the regular Registry Office.

BECHETRANUND DASS.

[Re-examined, 11th January 1867].

The tenures of Thanee ryots are sold. The last eight or ten years in consequence of the rise of prices, they have become valuable, and the Courts have been selling them by auction in execution. They also sell among themselves. They are always sold in execution of decrees. One occasion, the ryot of a khas mehal had sold, and when he came to enter the name of the purchaser, the Collector objected that you have sold without my sanction, and refused to register. The Commissioner confirmed the order. There has been no objection to the sales by the Courts, and I also know well that many sell of their own pleasure without asking permission of any one. During the famine, in consequence of want of means, many tenures have been sold and mortgaged and the transfers have been registered.

The settlement of this province was made under Regulation VII. of 1822, and under that settlement was first made with the Thanee ryots, afterwards with the superior holders. The Thanee ayots may be reduced in number since the settlement by one-fifth or one-sixth.

There are still many estates held khas, and they are a loss. There was not sufficient regard to the chance of calamities of season. The zemindars refused; this is excepting Khoorda. All the khas mehals are settled with Surburakars, but remission for losses is very frequently given. Except in two or three villages of Khoorda, the settlement is never direct with the ryots. They are managed by Tehseldars.

No. 72.—MR. DE LA GATINAIS, *Merchant*.

[Examined at Cuttack, 12th January 1867].

I am Agent for Mr. Fressanges, who is himself Agent for Messrs. Robert, Charriol and Co., of Calcutta. I was in Ganjam district, not here, last cold weather. I came here in April. Mr. Fressanges was here. He did not export any rice last cold weather; on the contrary, some rice which Mr. Fressanges had at False Point was brought back and sold at Cuttack. I went to False Point at the end of May or beginning of June; I went to land rice, i. e., to land the cargo of the *Jacques Forestier*. After I arrived, the *Count Hey* and *Jacques Forestier* came in. I had some boats, and landed the cargo of both ships. The grain out of the *Count Hey* was sent up almost at once. After the cargo of the *Jacques Forestier* was landed, I sold part of it to private parties, and Government bought the rest. There was no delay about bringing into use the cargo, because, while I was selling, Government and Messrs. Charriol and Co. came to terms. So far as I can remember, eight or ten days passed after the landing of the *Count Hey* cargo had gone, before I had orders to deliver the cargo of the *Jacques Forestier*; there was, therefore, this much delay in sending it into the interior; some of it might have been sent eight or ten days earlier. Had it been bought at once, Government had very little means of sending up rice. There was great difficulty in sending up the small quantity of 3,000 maunds received by the *Count Hey* in small boats. If the people whose business it was to bring boats and make arrangements had been at their proper places, I think the Government rice might have been sent up better and quicker. I did not assist in sending it up to Taldunda; we gave up the trade. I returned to Cuttack after the cargo were sold.

When the *Charles Moreau* came to False Point, I went down again. She was sent to sell her rice at a certain price. I went down expressly about it. I had received orders from Calcutta to sell in any quantities at the price fixed. When I got down, I found that the Captain had offered his cargo, but there were no purchasers. The Captain had spoken to the Agent of the Famine Relief Committee, who had written to Cuttack, and he waited many days for an answer. The answer came that a message had been sent to Calcutta, and urgently requesting him to wait for an answer to that. Meantime, I received through the Commissioner (to whose care it was addressed) a telegram of Messrs. Robert Charriol and Co. directing me to make over any quantity that the Commissioner might require, but neither price nor quantity was mentioned, and the telegram was sent to me without any other communication whatever. I showed it to the Captain, who refused to land rice upon it. He waited a day or two. At last Mr. Burgess brought him a letter from the Collector, desiring him to land 500 bags a day as long as there was no Government vessel; neither price nor actual quantity was fixed, though I had orders to sell any quantity. The Captain was not bound to obey me. In fact he had himself a large share in

the ship and cargo. He refused the conditions offered, and went away, I don't know where, but he was bound for Bourbon.

I am sure that there were no considerable quantities of grain in the country in the early days of the famine. I heard some Baboos say that there was plenty of grain, and others that there was none. I think that Mr. Fressanges had communication with the Collector. I know that his opinion always was that there was no grain, that it was a great mistake to suppose there was. I have heard him say so repeatedly. Before I left Gopalpoor, rice was being imported there by private merchants. Cargoes can be landed at Gopalpoor at all seasons, but from June and July with difficulty. Rice was scarce in Ganjam, and suffering there was still earlier than in Cuttack; there was no rice to spare for Cuttack. I came here late in the month of April. The state of the country through which I passed was very bad. I saw people dying all the way along the road. When I went down to False Point, things were very bad on the road, and when I came back it was horrible.

No. 73.—MR. S. WAUCHOPE, C.B., *Additional Judge*.

[Examined at Cuttack, 12th January 1867].

I went to Midnapore from Hooghly on the 26th March 1866. At Midnapore I noticed that there were many starving and emaciated people about the station picking up berries and living on what they could get. This was the state of things immediately on my arrival, and people said that they had never seen such a thing before. I was only at the station three weeks and knew little of what was going on there. I had before me at that time a number of dacoity cases in which the crime had evidently been committed by starving people. That also was the opinion of the Commissioner, who was in the Circuit House with me, having come expressly to make inquiries on the subject. Many of the prisoners admitted the robberies, pleading want of food. The persons tried principally belonged to the jungle tribes. On the 17th April I went back to Hooghly. I did not there notice particular appearances of famine. I left Hooghly again for Balasore on the 19th May, and went back to Balasore arriving on the 22nd May. There was nothing, so far as I recollect, that particularly attracted my attention between Calcutta and Midnapore, and at Midnapore I was only a few hours in a house. On the road from Midnapore to Balasore, from about twenty miles out of Midnapore, I saw real signs of famine. The villages seemed to be nearly deserted; the men, women, and children seen on the road were literal skeletons, and wherever I stopped, I was surrounded by hundreds of these skeleton beggars. This increased in intensity from beyond Dantoon, all the way to Balasore. I saw nothing but starving skeletons all the way. I never had seen such scenes in my life. In passing through the villages, the men seemed to have

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despair in their countenances. I can't say when I first saw dead bodies. I saw so many eventually that I can't say when I first began to see them. At Balasore there were several thousand starving people collected, and they were fed daily at the dhurmsala. They were relieved from local subscriptions collected in the station, one of the smallest in Bengal, and from something received from Sykes' Fund. As far as I could judge, the Relief Committee had then no expectation of getting assistance from other sources, and they were therefore obliged to restrict themselves to giving just as much rice as would support life. I saw Mr. Ravenshaw there the day I arrived. I saw him only for a few minutes, and can't remember what conversation I may have had with him. But the state of things about Balasore was literally horrible. Every road and every part of Balasore was covered with living skeletons picking up bits of sticks to cook the rice given to them; hundreds of them were lying on the side of every road; they seemed as if black parchment were stretched over bones. Every one at Balasore saw this; they could not move out of the house without seeing it. Unquestionably, the chief want was rice rather than money; at least I know that about the beginning of June my servants were unable to procure almost the smallest quantity of rice in the bazar. In the first few days of my stay at Balasore, I had a great deal of work, and saw very little of the people at the station. There must have been some rice for sale when I arrived, as the Committee were buying rice to distribute to the people at the dhurmsala. As time passed, starving people kept pouring in from the interior, nearly all skeletons, and things got worse; deaths became numerous. It seemed to me that the greater portion of these people were beyond aid before they came in—that they were in fact at death's door. When the Government's rice arrived, it was distributed, and many people were kept alive, but at the same time others came pouring in, from every part of the district I imagine. The supply of rice was so limited, that it could not be sent out except to a few places. I remained at Balasore till the beginning of July; there was no amelioration; things continued to get worse. Great numbers of people were found dying in the roads in spite of everything that could be done. On the 2nd July I left Balasore and returned to Calcutta. The roads were almost impassable from the rains, and horrible as were the sights I had seen on my previous journey, they were ten times more horrible on my return. I saw numbers of people lying in the mud at the side of the road dead and dying. The worst part was between Balasore and Jellapore. As I got towards Midnapore, after passing Dantoon, the appearance of the people in every respect improved. I was not well and not out at Midnapore, and can't speak to the arrangements there. After what I had seen in Balasore, I did not see in the rest of my journey anything that appeared to be of any importance, comparatively speaking.

I went again to Balasore in the end of August by sea, the Magistrate being unable to

lay a dawk. Things were in some respects better, in some, worse. All the officials were knocked up with over-work and anxiety. There were an enormous number of people receiving relief, and their condition was considerably improved, although, I believe, that the number of deaths was greater; I think about 1,300 in the first week after my arrival. I was there till the end of September. Things were improved, and the neck of the famine was, I think, broken, but the whole air was saturated with horrible effluvia. There was, in fact, no great improvement in the appearance of the station while I was there, except that the relief was so organized that private houses and private persons were not so beset as they had been during my first visit. While I was at Balasore, I was made President of the Relief Committee, and saw what was doing on both my visits. I think that the executive officers did everything that man could do in their situations. There was, of course, at first some mismanagement and shortcoming on account of want of means and ignorance, but certainly no want of will, and eventually the arrangements seemed excellent. I think that Mr. Muspratt was wholly overworked, but he did all that he possibly could, and I think that Dr. Jackson deserved especial praise; when he was not among the dying, he was always engaged in distributing food. But I ought not to distinguish any one, for all did their utmost according to their means. When I say that there was some shortcoming from ignorance, I mean that no one at Balasore had ever seen a famine, and all were ignorant of the details of management necessary in a famine till they learnt by experience. Sheds were being built when I was at Balasore, but one great want was want of money, that is, during my first visit, and I think that when the sheds were built, the people refused to sleep in them. I believe that the very last people to come for relief were the ryots, the cultivators of land. Mr. Terry told me that though the ryots were reduced to one meal in two days, he believed that not a single ryot had left his land.

In November, after a visit to Madras, I landed at Gopalpoor, and came up by Ganjam to Cuttack, arriving there on the 22nd November. I was not struck by remarkable appearances of famine in Ganjam, but I was only there a few hours. The roads in that district were admirable; in Cuttack they were execrable; in one, the best of metalled roads, in the other, the worst of mud roads. In the Cuttack district, I was several times detained for want of bearers. I found very few people in the villages; many of the houses were broken down and deserted, but I did not see dying people there, nor in fact did famine seem then to exist. The crops seemed excellent all the way.

No. 74.—DR. N. JACKSON, *Civil Surgeon.*

[Examined at Cuttack, 12th January 1867].

I was a Medical Officer in charge of Balasore civil station. In the beginning of the year 1866, the jail began to receive an unusual number of prisoners; in March it was very full—most of them were convicted of grain dacoity; those who came in were in very bad condition. The number of beggars about the town was also large in March; they increased to such an extent that a Committee was formed to supply them with grain—this was in March or April. They used to receive 6 chittacks of 80 tolahs weight for an adult and 3 for a child; the rice was distributed at the dhurmsala. Some of the paupers used to eat the rice raw then and there, and died immediately afterwards at the side of the road; many whom I dissected had their stomachs full of raw rice. After two or three meetings I undertook to superintend the distribution of cooked rice. The weakly persons used to be sent to me to the hospital, where I fed them. Soon after, the Committee began distributing cooked rice to all. I recommended the jail laboring diet, and used to give this at the hospital. At the dhurmsala rice and dhal only were given. I began the distribution of cooked food at the hospital at the end of May with about 500; at the dhurmsala about 2,000 were then fed. In April people were dying about the streets; but at first the hopeless cases were not sent to the hospital, and consequently the deaths were not recorded in my hospital returns; I believe a record was kept by the Police. Towards the end of May the mortality was so frightful that it was resolved to send all the worst cases to the hospital. I put in a figured statement showing the number of admissions, discharges, and deaths from May to October. Out of 15,831 patients, 11,969 were cured and 2,782 died in the hospital premises.

In my opinion sufficient nitrogenous food was not given at the dhurmsala. I mentioned this several times to the Committee, and proved it by books; but the Committee did not seem to take to the suggestion. The people themselves indicated the want by always searching for and eating snails and crabs. I remonstrated very strongly in a public letter against the way in which the paupers were being fed. It was after this that dhal was served out with the rice and vegetables. I believe that many more might have been saved if this diet had been adopted earlier. In June people used to lie down under the trees at night to sleep, and to be found dead there in the morning. Cases occurred in which people fell into the water from debility when they went to drink. I have seen a woman lift up her arm and let it drop, while a dog was pulling at her entrails and eating them. I cannot say whether at that time Government relief had been received or not; but I know that there was a disposition to niggardliness on the part of the Committee, at first. I was a member of the Committee. We had no certainty at first as to what funds we should eventually have at our command, or where they would come from. Sheds were erected from nearly the beginning of

this state of things in which the homeless might have found shelter if they had chosen; but the paupers had a strong objection to going into them. I believe the objection was founded on considerations of caste. The conservancy was very bad, both in the Committee's sheds and in my hospital. Mehters are the only caste in the district who would touch the dead bodies. The mere occupation of throwing away the bodies into the pit behind the hospital, and covering them with earth, was more than enough to employ every mehter whom we could get. We paid them Rs. 10 each per month. My hospital was almost unapproachable from filth, which I could not get men enough to clean. When the rains came, the pit into which the bodies were thrown became a seething mass of corruption, and on my recommendation the bodies were thrown into the river and so floated out to sea. This improved matters, and the stench in the town was abated. I think that the conservancy difficulty at the hospital and sheds might have been diminished if the paupers had been distributed over more places.

I do not believe that at any time it could be said that every man who required the relief obtained it. There was always a crowding and struggling at the dhurmsala which made it impossible for all to get food; the maximum fed at the dhurmsala was about 7,500; at the same time about 3,000 were being fed at the hospital. The struggling became somewhat less latterly when the people had confidence that they were sure to be fed. At first they were ravenous, and having no confidence in us, perfectly uncontrollable, thinking that they had better fight for each meal, as it might be the last they would ever get.

I learnt, in private conversation, that many people who had money to buy could not get rice; so I offered to sell 20 bags a day at my own house; two Native gentlemen also sold 10 bags a day each. This was Government rice which had come from Calcutta. I sold one anna worth only to each person (15 chittacks). I sold to women principally; to all women who came. I avoided selling to the men as much as possible, telling them to work for their livelihood. There was plenty of work to be had under the Department of Public Works, certainly within ten miles of the town; but they would not go to live in the huts. An able-bodied man could have earned four annas a day; the rate of pay allowed was very high. Some of the men worked at tanks about the town. I employed some about the hospital. A road was also being made through the town of Balasore.

The Relief Committee endeavored to exclude from gratuitous relief all men who were capable of supporting themselves by labors. Mistakes may have been made in the application of the principle, but I should say generally that no man was refused gratuitous relief who was not able to earn his own living by working at the liberal rates which were then being given. The women and children were never refused gratuitous relief. I do not think that a large proportion of those

who came in were capable of work. At first I do not think that all who came in had the opportunity of getting food either with labor or without. We were taken by surprise at first; but from about the middle of May, I should say that no one was refused. The return put in by me represents only the mortality in my hospital, but not a tithe of the total mortality. People died in the roads and fields all about; many died who never were seen; one man died in my own compound with a crowbar in his hand, trying to work, that is, he fainted and never spoke or swallowed; he was kept in the verandah all night and died in the morning. In my opinion the cause of the excessive mortality was that the people were gone too far before they came in; they all died from starvation, not from sickness in the ordinary sense. Caste prejudice also interfered, as many people would not eat the food most necessary to their condition, *e. g.*, soup. When people are reduced in weight beyond a certain point, they almost invariably die. I do not think that there was any private importation of rice in the earlier part of the famine, except one ship which foundered at the mouth of the port. Some rice was imported from Calcutta by a Baboo late in the season.

From the time when the importation of Government rice commenced it never ran short except once. It was both given and sold. It was only sold for a limited time in the day; it was limited in that way, in no other; within that time it was sold to all comers. It was so sold at four places. I don't think that the time allowed for sale was sufficient; there was terrible struggling at the place of sale. At my place of sale I saw it every day. During most of the time I did not sell much to men. I generally sent them away to work, and sold to women. I have had the door of my own house broken in, and the coat torn off my back by women eager to purchase. Some of the work was paid in rice, some in money, and those who fared worst in the struggle to buy rice were those (the very poorest) who had to go to work and could not spare time. I think there was fear that we should run short of rice. I could only get 10 bags per day, and afterwards 20 bags. I think that the disposition to niggardliness continued throughout; there was always a desire to make the rice golas pay; that was the prevailing idea, and there was special niggardliness in the matter of clothes—they were not issued except to the extent of Rs. 500 which I got and some given by a Baboo. I sold rice at one anna for 15 chittacks, that is below the market rate. If I had had plenty of rice I could have sold twice the quantity that I did sell. I could have sold that much in my own presence. At other places I know no other reason than the fear of rice running short for limiting the time of sale. I think that the famine reached its height in June and July. The rice imported at that time had done good to the comparatively well-to-do people in the town, but on the mass of starving people it had made no serious impression and never did. They died sooner or later, that is my impression. The mortality outside, I should say, almost rose and fell with that

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shown in my hospital returns. It gives a good idea of the relative rate of mortality from 1st June onwards, but not earlier, as the people were not sent to the hospital. On one occasion, the rice very nearly ran short; issues were shortened, and my sales were stopped altogether for one day; but the distribution of cooked food was never stopped. That was when the *Tubal Cain* was blown away. I did not know that there was any marked difference in the famine scenes at that time as compared with other times. The famine continued at its height in August. In September it began to decrease a little. It was not till about the middle of October that I had as much rice as I should have liked to sell, and then only because people then ceased to wish to buy to the same extent as before, as the new grain was coming into the market. When I left, the mortality had very much diminished. I came to Cuttack in the beginning of November. I found here mortality going on in the hospital, but I have seen some outside. Both at Balasore and Cuttack the jails have been in a terrible state, and as much as anything show the state of the country. Many people died immediately after coming in, and in Cuttack six-sevenths of the deaths occurred within a fortnight of coming into hospital. Latterly, we discovered that a great part of the famine mortality is due to an extraordinary tendency to frightful worms which produce false appearances of cholera and other diseases.

I had nothing to do with the despatch of rice into the interior at Balasore. I cannot tell of my personal knowledge how far that was sufficient.

I don't like to give an opinion as to whether the prisoners ought now to be released, but I cannot hope to save them if they are kept in the jail. I have recommended that they should be cleared out and sent into camp, in which case, I hope to save a large number of them; but I have received no answer, and don't know what has been done.

The Arracan rice is differently prepared from that of Orissa, and at first the people did not know how to clean it, but it did not cause serious harm,

If the relief had been commenced two or three months earlier, thousands of lives might have been saved; but no one seemed to appreciate the gravity of the situation. I did not myself. I don't think we thoroughly understood all that was going to happen till the beginning of May. There were starving people in April; but we did not realise that they would afterwards come pouring in in such thousands as they did. I don't remember dates exactly; but when we were aware of the severity of the famine, we did not know where money was to be got, that is, we were not quite clear how much money we had at our disposal.

Abstract of sickness and mortality in the Balasore Charitable Dispensary for the months of May, June, July, August, September and October 1866.

DISEASES.	Remained on 1st of May.	Admitted.	Total.	Cured.	Result unknown.	Died.	Remaining.	Total.	Deaths to treated per cent.	Deaths.						Total 2,783
										May.	June.	July.	August.	September.	October.	
Ophthalmia	..	2,832	2,832	2,706	114	..	12	2,832	..	11	398	573	619	641	394	..
Fever	..	1,024	1,000	1,005	124	64	69	1,000	3.50	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Diarrhoea	..	2,809	2,809	2,002	15	155	37	2,809	6.45	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Cholera	..	20	20	10	..	10	..	20	50.00	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Dysentery	..	6,350	6,351	3,008	80	2,514	80	6,351	39.64	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Lung diseases	..	240	262	221	27	3	11	262	1.10	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Other diseases	..	1,620	1,637	1,107	470	32	29	1,637	1.90	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Total	23	15,908	15,831	11,009	842	2,782	238	15,831	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..

Put in by Dr. N. JACKSON, M. D.,
Civil Surgeon.

CUTTACK,
The 6th September 1866.

No. 75.—MR. H. MUSPRATT, *Magistrate and Collector, BALASORE.*

[Examined at Balasore, 18th January 1867].

In the autumn of 1865, I knew that the early rice crop had almost entirely failed. The reason was that the people could not sow owing to the early rains being too heavy, but the early rice crop bears a very small proportion to the whole crop. Subsequently, there was too much rain, *i. e.*, in August and September. Then the rain stopped, and we had no more rain, causing the out-turn of the main crop to be very small. In some parts, however, in the north and south, it was better than in the centre, and the rice near the salt lands was worse. My estimate of one-eighth was founded on what the zemindars told me. I had not then myself been out in the district. Afterwards, I had reason to modify this estimate, and visited the north of the district, and in some places—large maidans—I estimated the crop to be a half, perhaps a three quarter crop. My next tour was in the neighbourhood of Balasore, where there is a good deal of high land. The crop thereabouts I should estimate to be from a quarter to a half crop. My next tour was down the salt road, and there the crops had been reaped on all the fields; from what I could guess, it may have been from six-sixteenths to a half crop. The yield of the whole district, I should now say, was from eight to nine-sixteens, nearer to eight than nine.

Q.—You were aware, and have reported, that when there was a good crop, this district was able to export an enormous quantity of rice; you have also reported that, on the failure of the crop of 1865, exportation ceased; if then there was a crop of from eight to nine-sixteenths, how do you account for the frightful famine which occurred in April and May?

A.—There were exportations of the crop of 1865. These exports were by land from the northern pergunnahs to Midnapore and Hidgellee. There were no exports of the crop of 1865 by sea. The proportion of the crop of 1864, which was exported, though large, was not large relatively to the out-turn of the district.

Q.—In December and January, had you any reason to apprehend famine?

A.—No, I formed this opinion not only on my own observations, but also from what I heard from zemindars and persons resident in Balasore. A meeting was held in consequence of a letter from the Commissioner in December, at which the opinion expressed by every body was that there would be distress for three months, beginning in February, but not longer. About the end of January, however, about 200 beggars came in from Mohurbhunj.

Q.—Did you receive any orders, one way or other, relative to enquiries into the state of the crops?

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A.—I applied for permission to send out my assistants and deputies to make enquiries, but I did not receive permission.

Q.—In February had you reason to think that there was more severe distress?

A.—Yes, on the 2nd February we began to collect subscriptions. There was then great distress, but not what I should call famine. Even towards the end of February, the proportion of the beggars, about the station belonging to the district, was small as compared with that coming from Mohurbhunj and the Gurjats.

Q.—Was Mr. Crommelin right in saying to you, in his letter of the 27th February, which you have just put in, that there were frightful objects about the station; and if so, do you believe that these people were reduced to that state by starvation?

A.—Yes, but they were almost all people from the Gurjats.

Q.—What do you call famine as distinguished from distress?

A.—I call it famine when the ryots who are in the habit of cultivating sufficient land to support them and their families throughout the year without having recourse to other means of livelihood, become so poor as to be obliged to work as laborers. When those who only hold three or four beegahs of land, and also work as laborers for the richer ryots, suffer from want of food, I do not call it a famine, *i. e.*, speaking with regard to the Balasore district.

Q.—Was anything done in consequence of Mr. Crommelin's letter before May?

A.—I can't say; but I sent him an answer, saying that I thought it would be a great mitigation of the distress if extra assistance was given by the Government.

Q.—In March did the distress very much increase?

A.—No, not so rapidly as it did afterwards.

Q.—Is it your opinion that the description given by the District Superintendent of Police on the 27th, and forwarded on the 2nd April, was an exaggerated one?

A.—I did not think that the District Superintendent exaggerated wilfully what he saw; but I thought from what I heard and saw, that the description was too highly colored, and one taking too desponding a view of affairs. From the information subsequent events have afforded, I now think he was right. None of the leading zemindars or Native residents even then led me to suppose that the famine would continue over so many months.

Q.—It appears from the proceedings of the Relief Committee of the 4th March, and their President's and Secretary's letters to your address of the 22nd and 23rd March, that they made an urgent appeal to you for Government aid; what was the result of that application?

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A.—An application for Government assistance had been made by the Public Works Department, and I had been informed that the Irrigation Company wanted 2,000 persons for their works in the northern portion of the Cuttack district. I did not in consequence think it necessary to apply to Government, as zemindars of an estate yielding not more than 25,000 rupees a year, for a monthly donation of 500 rupees. At that time zemindars who held estates of more than double that value were prevailed on with difficulty to subscribe a fifth of that sum. Added to this, application had been made for extensive relief works to be undertaken on the Government estate, to be paid for out of the revenues of the estate. I have filed my official answers to the above applications.

Q.—What are the extensive relief works to which you allude?

A.—Application to cut a khall through the estate was made, I think, in January or beginning of February, certainly before Mr. Shortt went to Bhudruk; but the project fell to the ground because it was found when the levels had been taken that there was not sufficient fall.

Q.—Do your remarks as to the niggardly subscriptions of the zemindars apply to the people of the town or not?

A.—No; the people of the town subscribed liberally, but scarcely any thing was collected from the interior.

Q.—In April did things get much worse?

A.—Yes, the distress in the town increased more rapidly than in March.

Q.—In the Government letter No. 2367 of the 7th April to the Commissioner, it is mentioned that the Lieutenant Governor was in possession of late demi-official accounts regarding the state of your district; were any such accounts furnished by you, or are you aware by whom they may have been furnished?

A.—I am not aware, I had no demi-official correspondence, to the best of my recollection, with the Lieutenant Governor or his Secretaries.

Q.—In the month of April did you appeal to the outside public, and in what shape?

A.—Yes, by advertising in the Calcutta papers. I can't recollect the exact date of my first appeal. As long as we could furnish relief to all applicants, we did so from local subscriptions.

Q.—When you appealed to the public, did you appeal to or expect aid from Government?

A.—I expected to receive aid from the balance of the North West Famine Relief Fund. I believe I applied to Mr. Chapman about this; but I can't recollect the exact date, and I can't say whether I was the first to think of it. I incline to think that not very long time after I wrote about it I saw that application had been made. I wrote to Mr. Chapman merely as a private friend to ask him to collect subscriptions for me. I merely in my advertisement called Mr. Chapman Secretary

to the Board of Revenue, that people might know who he was, and feel sure that the money would be properly applied.

Q.—In April had you any reason to suppose that people were starving because they wouldn't work?

A.—I haven't a doubt about it. If we spoke to applicants about work, the number of the applicants diminished on the instant.

Q.—Do you think that the greater proportion of the applicants were then capable of work?

A.—About one-sixth were capable of doing able-bodied work, and fully one-third of the remainder were capable of doing the light work which the Committee then required and provided, *viz.*, to carry a basket holding two double handfulls of earth.

Q.—In May did things get much worse still?

A.—Yes, very rapidly; on the 12th May the Committee found themselves unable to cope with the distress, and it was resolved to make a more regular appeal to the public through the papers, the British Indian Association, and the Mahomedan Literary Association.

Q.—In the early part of the season you had shown how the stocks in the district had been reduced by exportation; will you explain on what you founded the opinion expressed in your appeal to the newspapers "that the stock of rice in the district, aided by imports received and expected shortly, will suffice to feed all the inhabitants; all that our Committee needs is money"?

A.—The principal mahajuns in the town came to me and said that they were prepared to supply me with as much rice as I required, provided I paid for it. They said they would send down large orders for imports from Coringa, and they were at the same time supplying the Committee from their stores.

Q.—Did you soon find reason to suppose that the mahajuns misled you?

A.—They came to me a few days after having offered to supply me, and said that they found they could not supply the Committee, as they were unable to make their contemplated purchases to the northwards, and adding that there would be delay in the supplies from Coringa.

Q.—As a matter of fact, up to this time had rice always been procurable in the bazar by all comers?

A.—We the Committee managed to get rice, there was some difficulty, and supplies were smaller than usual, but the difficulty was not so great as I heard it had been in Pooree and Cuttack. Purchasers could not buy in any thing like large quantities. I am not aware that public works were stopped up to that date because the coolies could not get rice.

Q.—When did you first experience the necessity of importing rice?

A.—About the time that the telegram offering to send attah for sale was sent (17th May).

Q.—Shortly after that did the difficulty of procuring rice become extreme?

A.—Yes, it did.

Q.—When was Mr. Shuttleworth, District Superintendent of Police transferred from this district?

A.—He left about the 2nd or 3rd September.

Q.—Are you aware why he was transferred?

A.—He was suffering from fever, and had been for some time previously, but he wasn't altogether incapacitated for work. In my opinion he ought not to have left before his successor arrived, but I think his health rendered it necessary for him to go away. If I remember a right, I gave my consent to his sending a telegram to say that I should not offer any objection to his going away if he got permission. This I did after consulting with the Civil Surgeon. Still I think it would have been better if he had not gone.

Q.—Was any reference made to you when he was transferred?

A.—I can't recollect.

Q.—Throughout the famine, had you a sufficient staff of officers?

A.—Speaking from my present experience, I should say not half enough. I had no Joint Magistrate. Mr. W. E. Ward, an assistant with full powers, was authorized to try criminal cases. I allowed him to go at a time when the criminal file had been very much reduced. I did this because no Joint Magistrate is allowed for this district, and by keeping him here, I was depriving him of promotion.

[Re-examined, 21st January 1867.]

Q.—In your opinion was the suffering and mortality in the district very excessive before the Government rice arrived?

A.—No, I think not.

Q.—Were the numbers receiving relief in the station then large, and were they in a bad state?

A.—I can't speak from memory as to the numbers, but many were in a bad state. Up to the date of the arrival of the Government rice, we had never refused help to the deserving poor who came to the town for relief.

Q.—In your opinion, when did the distress become excessive?

A.—In the middle of June, about the 10th or 12th June.

Q.—When the Government rice first arrived, did it arrive in sufficient quantities to afford efficient relief in the town and district?

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A.—Yes, I think it did, as the arrival of the Government rice caused the prices of rice to fall, and the dealers to sell.

Q.—With reference to an answer given by you above, the Commissioners remark that it was resolved by the Committee on the 3rd May that no relief be given to any man unless a cripple or blind; how do you reconcile that with the statement that no deserving person was refused relief?

A.—Because previous to that, work was provided for those who could do any work at all. The work demanded was exceedingly light.

Q.—When were centres of relief established in the interior exclusive of Bhudruk; and how many of them?

A.—29th of June, Meetpore; 5th of June, Jellapore and Santipore; 11th of July, Sohroh. The rest at different dates. I think there were ten altogether.

Q.—From the time they were established, had you sufficient grain to supply them with?

A.—No, not always; but I can't recollect the precise time at which there was difficulty.

Q.—Were you at any time able to sell rice freely?

A.—Yes, about the beginning of July I had plenty of rice, but very soon after that, supplies again fell short, and in fact, except at that time, I never was for more than three or four days together fully supplied. Later in the season, when the new rice was beginning to come in, the Telingeas were importing rice from the south, and purchased from them. From that time there has been plenty.

Q.—To what do you attribute the short supply of Government rice?

A.—To the *Tubal Cain* having been blown away.

Q.—Before that time do you think that more rice could have been imported by steamers of light draught from Calcutta?

A.—If one steamer could supply a given quantity, I suppose three steamers could have supplied three times as much.

Q.—Were you consulted about sending a vessel of such large draught as the *Tubal Cain* here?

A.—I think I was, and that after consulting with Captain Bond, I urged that vessels of large draught should be taken into the mouth of the Hidgellee river, and the cargo transhipped thence and brought round in light steamers and sloops.

Q.—What arrangements were made, when the *Tubal Cain* was expected, for landing her cargo?

A.—I had vessels, Native sloops, ready at the mouth of the river, capable of containing 12,000 bags; but these vessels could not get out or come in unless they were towed by a steamer. Our only steamer, the *Nemesis*, was not available. I don't recollect further particulars.

Q.—Do you know why there was delay in communicating with the *Tubal Cain* on her arrival?

A.—As soon as I heard what time the *Tubal Cain* might be expected, I gave notice to the Master Attendant. He proceeded at once to the mouth of the river, and after waiting there some days, fell ill with fever, and had to return. Besides this, we had no boats that we could send out. We had nothing but two jolly boats. We had no signal boat—it was lost many years ago, and the *Tubal Cain* lay eight miles out—too far for the signals to have been seen had there been a signal boat.

Q.—When it was determined to send rice to Balasore, were no arrangements made to supply proper boats and appliances?

A.—I had applied for surf boats from Pooree, but the Collector replied he had none to spare. There are no surf boats in this district. This is a port which is usually closed from March to November.

Q.—Do you remember if anything was done to attempt to unload the *Tubal Cain* between the 23rd July, when you announced her arrival, and the 31st of July, when you telegraphed to the Master Attendant, Calcutta, begging him to send the *Nemesis* back, as cargo boats couldn't get out?

A.—Nothing could be done until the *Nemesis* returned from the Dhamrah. We expected her daily.

Q.—Throughout the famine, was the *Nemesis* the only European vessel that came into the Balasore river?

A.—The *Nemesis* was the only steamer that came into the river with rice; but the *Conqueror* came in and coaled once, and the *Mary Grant* came in December with blankets. The *Agitator* came to the mouth of the river, but failed to get in. The *Dolphin*, sailing vessel, was towed in.

Q.—Were Native vessels towed by steamers able to come in all through the monsoon?

A.—Yes, if towed.

Q.—If steamers had dropped the Native brigs and sloops outside, and the *Nemesis* had been merely employed to tow them in and out, would not a sufficient supply of rice have been furnished?

A.—Yes, if a sufficiency of Native sloops could have been obtained for the purpose.

Q.—Could they have been obtained?

A.—I can't say. There were 300 in this port, but I should have been very sorry to have travelled in any but two or three. They have been high and dry for three years.

Q.—As a matter of fact were all available Native vessels kept constantly in use, or did they ever lie idle for want of steamers to tow them?

A.—The vessels I had here were lying idle for days and days.

Q.—Did you apply for more steamers?

A.—To the best of my recollection, yes. I can't say why I did not get them.

Q.—Do you know why the *Feroze* unloaded at Gopalpore instead of Balasore?

A.—No.

Q.—Do you know why the *guide* was delayed in getting into the Dhamrah on her first trip?

A.—Not exactly, but to the best of my recollection the *Nemesis* took the *guide* down as soon as she found her ready at Hidgellee.

Q.—Were any Europeans sent from Calcutta to assist in landing and marine operations?

A.—Mr. McNeile was sent to assist in landing operations, but no one was sent to Balasore for marine operations. Captain Bond was the only marine authority here. Captain Bond is, I should guess, about 65 or 66, and is not fitted, single-handed, to cope with the hard work and exposure of such a time as we experienced last year. I believe Captain Harris was sent to the Dhamrah, but very little information was given to me about the Dhamrah, as the Board corresponded direct with Mr. Shortt.

Q.—Were not some Europeans sent from Calcutta; for what purpose were they sent, and how did they turn out?

A.—They were sent to superintend works at the relief centres by Colonel Nicolls; one left immediately; Mr. Bancroft—he wrote to say that the sights he saw were quite sufficient, and that nothing would induce him to stay. Another got ill and left about a week afterwards, and the third was too old to do more than superintend the feeding at one centre.

Q.—How were your centres superintended, and, in your opinion, how did they work?

A.—We obtained the services of every one who was willing to superintend; at Jellapore and Santipore, Mr. Phillips and Miss Crawford superintended. The other centres were visited by European officers as often as possible, and they each had a Native superintendent. I think the centres were efficiently worked in the sadder subdivision. Mr. Shortt detected some abuses amongst the minor subordinates at his sub-division, but I do not think these abuses were excessive.

Q.—Do you think the relief really reached the great mass of people in the interior?

A.—Yes, I think it reached the larger proportion. If we could have got trustworthy agency, we should have opened more centres. In that case, I should have written more strongly for more rice in proportion, as I found my requirements greater.

Q.—Did you get all or nearly all you asked for?

A.—No, I think not.

Q.—Can you fix at all the date when private rice came in, and the market became easier?

A.—About the middle of September.

Q.—Had you not a difficulty again in October, when there was a demand for supplies at Bhudruk?

A.—I had sufficient for Balasore, but not enough to supply Bhudruk with.

Q.—Throughout the famine, did you get any Government supplies by land, or was there any private importation by land?

A.—We did not get any Government supplies till the end of October, when we got some from Midnapore; I think that must have come from Hidgellee. Rice was being imported privately into the north of the district from the beginning of March from Hidgellee and Midnapore. This continued throughout the year, except when the roads were too heavy for bullocks to move. When the Board proposed that we should import by land, I said that we could not get sufficient supplies by that route for Government relief, and that if Government took up the bullocks private importations would stop.

Q.—Was the conduct of the zemindars throughout as bad as you have represented it at the beginning?

A.—I do not think they did their duty; but I think that if there had been a remission allowed for the kist of November 1865, that they would have done much more, both by importing rice and assisting their ryots.

Q.—How did the ryots fare?

A.—Better, I think, than any other class. There has been a considerable mortality, however, amongst them. By ryots I mean ryots who hold sufficient land to support themselves and their families in an ordinary season. In some villages the ryots showed considerable pluck and self-reliance. The Thanees ryots fared better than the Pahee ryots.

Q.—At the end of May there was some correspondence between you and the Board on the subject of importations of rice on private account if the Government would furnish a steamer to tug the sloops down; had that correspondence any practical result?

A.—None. The merchants could come to no agreement on the matter.

Q.—How long were the shops for sale of Government rice kept open daily?

A.—Three to four hours daily.

Q.—Why so short a time?

A.—Because between these hours we could sell to all applicants, when our sales were not limited.

Question.—How long were the Relief Committee shops kept open daily?

A.—Until the supplies allowed to each shop were exhausted. There was no doubt struggling here, but this was because there were generally 5,000 applicants at each shop, and only 2,000 could be supplied; we were selling much cheaper than the bazar. There were four shops at which rice was sold to all deserving objects in small quantities, not exceeding one seer, and two shops for sales to ticket-holders. We sold at these shops enough to feed 17,000 daily. Some persons tried to forge tickets.

Q.—On the 8th August there was heavy rain and great mortality consequent on it; up to that time what shelter had been provided, and how far did the people avail themselves of it?

A.—Several huts had been specially built for the paupers, and the dhurmsala is capable of holding (with the huts) about 5,000 persons. The people did not avail themselves of the shelter to a great extent, but many went there. I know that about a dozen people of mixed caste lived under a bamboo clump in my compound for months, and would go nowhere else. I don't think one of them died.

Q.—At the meeting of the 27th June, it was proposed to break up the mass of paupers at the dhurmsala, and distribute them in camps of 500 to 1,000; was this carried out, and if not, why?

A.—Before any resolution was arrived at, we heard Mr. McNeile was coming down with special instructions, and we delayed coming to a conclusion in consequence. When Mr. McNeile came, we applied for the three European Superintendents from Colonel Nicolls. Before we heard of their coming, we had the camp at Akatpoor in course of erection. The camps at Akatpoor and at three other places were afterwards erected to lessen the crowd.

Q.—With reference to what you have said as to the difficulty of getting trustworthy agency, and also as to the difficulty of inducing the people to work, do you think the Ooryah character is much inferior to that of other Natives of India with whom you have had to deal?

A.—Yes, I think they are much inferior in their own country.

Q.—Will you be good enough to give your opinion of the conduct of the Police officers and men.

A.—The officers of Police have given us every assistance, and as a rule the inferior Police have done tolerably well.

Q.—Was there a difficulty about the conservancy of the town and dhurmsala?

A.—It was impossible to compel the poor to abide by sanitary rules; it was impossible to keep the place clean: you could smell it three miles off.

Q.—Did this affect the health of the station injuriously.

A.—Yes, I think it did.

Q.—How were the bodies disposed of?

A.—Endeavours were made to bury as many as possible until the river rose, and afterwards they were thrown in and floated out to sea.

Q.—Do you think any violence was used towards the paupers?

A.—Some degree of violence was absolutely necessary to prevent the people crushing one another to death during the distribution of food. There were always Europeans there to prevent any unnecessary violence. In fact the violence was on both sides. The crowd fell on the Commissioner

and rifled his pockets of pice. On another occasion, I and Mr. Shuttleworth were nearly thrown down and trampled under foot.

Q.—Did you consider that there was anything in the orders or action of Government which deterred you from applying for Government aid in the early part of the famine, or had you any other reason for not applying?

A.—Yes, it was my impression that we were not to look for the importation of grain by Government, and that it was expected that relief for the distress was to be provided from local subscriptions alone?

Q.—Whence did you derive those impressions?

A.—I should say from what I had seen in the newspapers; but I am not sure about this.

Q.—In this district what proportion does the early rice crop bear to the main or Sarud crop?

A.—The early rice two-fifteenths, the late rice thirteen-fifteenths; that is the result of my inquiry.

Q.—In your diary of December 1865, you speak of coarse rice as selling in certain places at 24 and 28 seers per rupee; is this husked and unhusked rice?

A.—It was husked rice; but I afterwards found that the seers were cutcha or small seers of 13 or 14 chittacks, and almost immediately after the rice became dearer, about as dear as in Balasore.

Q.—Had you any difficulty about money, or reason for restricting your operations for want of money enough during the famine, or rather after you got the first Rs. 10,000 of the North West Famine Relief Fund balance?

A.—No, I think not; but in October and November there was delay in receiving money applied for, and I made advances from the treasury to the Relief Committee.

Q.—Why was nothing done to give work when the Relief Committee first suggested it?

A.—I applied for money from the unno-chatro fund, in order to give work, but without success, as there were no funds, and Colonel Rundall offered work to 2,000 people either in Cuttack or Midnapore, but the people refused to go. We were also trying to get Rs. 7,000 to dig the canal in Noanund estate, which fell through because the levels turned out bad. I also fully expected that an extra grant would have been received in the Public Works Department.

Q.—Do you think that steamers drawing somewhat more than the *Nemesis* might have done any service towards supplying you with rice?

A.—I think that the *Agitator* could have come in to the river at certain times, and that steam vessels could have towed sloops close to the bar, and they might then have come in.

[Re-examined, 22nd January 1867].

Q.—On the 8th of October you explained to the Board the causes of the delay in unloading the *Royal Bride* in September, one of the causes being that the *Nemesis* was obliged to proceed three times to Hidgellee; for what purpose was she called away to Hidgellee?

A.—Once to obtain a supply of coal for her own use; once to ship stores for her own use, and once to fetch dhal for our relief. As far as I can remember, these were the objects. I had only six sloops available then, of which three had been sent to Hidgellee to unload vessels. I had also some lighters. Delay was also caused by heavy floods during the unloading, which made it impossible for the sloops to come up the river to Balasore unaided; the *Nemesis*, therefore, lost time in towing them all the way up. While she was absent, the sloops could not come in from the slip across the bar on account of the weather and wind. I was first informed that the *Royal Bride* was coming to Balasore. I then heard that she had gone from False Point to Hidgellee, and she had to be towed back from thence.

Q.—On the 21st September Mr. Shortt proposed to check the theft of grain during transit by introducing a regular system of weighing each bag when it was landed from the ship, when it was handed over to the Police for transport inland, and when it was delivered up by them, &c.; was the system carried out, and with what effect?

A.—It was carried out and with great success. After that, on one occasion only was there any loss of grain in transit from the landing place to its destination at Bhudruk.

On the 26th of October, Captain Bond wrote to me that a grab with rice from the *Royal Bride* had been towed by the *Nemesis* to the mouth of the river, and that there were no boats to unload her. The reason was this. All the available small craft were then up at Balasore unloading. I sent down boats as soon as possible.

The Bustah centre was opened in June; it was then under the charge of Mr. O'Flaherty, Assistant to the Executive Engineer. Gratuitous relief only was given at first. Mr. O'Flaherty left Bustah about a month afterwards; the centre was then left in charge of a Committee of Natives; Ramlal Baboo, Public Works Overseer, a Sub-Inspector of Police, and a Canango were in the committee. In the course of July, near the end, Mr. Rampini visited Bustah, and made a report to the Balasore Central Committee.

Mr. Rampini again visited Bustah at the end of September; he found that the Sub-Committee had not carried out the orders which the Central Committee had passed on the 11th September as to feeding the paupers twice a day, and as to the varied diet which they were to receive. We found the arrangements to be generally bad as detailed in his report of October 6th; that report was read at the Central Committee's meeting of the 10th. Mr. Rampini had himself passed the orders which were necessary to put things to right.

I cannot say whether the Bustah centre had been visited by any European officer, or by any officer from the sudder station, between Mr. Rampini's visit at the end of July and his visit at the close of September. I think it probable that it was visited more than once by the District Superintendent of Police or the Executive Engineer and his assistants; but I do not now remember their bringing any abuses to notice. If there are any reports from them among the records, I will send them in.

At the end of September, Mr. Rampini also visited the relief centre at Patna near Jellalore. He reported the arrangements to be excellent; but that the Native Doctor had only visited the pauper hospital once in two or three weeks, and did not treat the sick there himself. The Native Doctor had been specially deputed to Jellalore for the purpose of looking after the sick paupers. To the best of my recollection, the Native Doctor's misconduct was brought to the notice of the Civil Surgeon, but I do not know that I ever heard the result. I relied on Dr. Jackson to do what was necessary.

The Jellalore centre was under the charge of the Revd. Mr. Phillips, of Santipoor. The Bustah centre was not in the direct charge of any European after Mr. O'Flaherty left in July. I did not make over the supervision of the Bustah centre either to Mr. Rampini or to any other person. Whoever happened to be going out into the neighbourhood of any centre used to inspect it. I sent Mr. Rampini out whenever I could find time to do his work.

Q.—Was not Mr. Rampini relieved of all duties except those connected with relief; and if so, how was it that he did not more frequently visit the mofussil centres?

A.—He was relieved of all other office duties. After consulting with Mr. McNeile, I placed him in charge of the receipt, storage, issues, and sales of Government rice; he was also Secretary and Treasurer to the Relief Committee; it was therefore impossible to spare him more frequently to visit the relief centres. I sent Mr. Manson out to Soroh about the 15th of July for the purpose of starting the centres in that neighbourhood and procuring changes of bullocks on which to forward the rice from Balasore to Bhudruk. He was out there, I think, more than two months. The centres which he started—Tooreeghurria and Basdebpoor as well as Soroh—were under his special supervision; in the Bhudruk sub-division the centres were under Native management, with the exception of Bhudruk and Dhamrah, at which Mr. Shortt and Mr. Woodward were generally present. They also frequently visited other centres when they could do so.

About November some old rice came into the market, and some indeed is still being sold. In fact more or less old rice (that is rice of crops previous to 1865) has been sold in the Balasore bazar all through 1866. I do not believe that the quantity held was sufficient to feed half the population through 1866.

No. 77.—BABOO NITOI CHURN DOSS.

[Examined at Balasore, 20th January 1867].

I reside in Balasore; have an estate paying 700 or 800 Government rupees in pergunnah Dasmulung, six miles south of Balasore. In October 1865, I became aware that there must be a famine, and that the rice in the district would not suffice to support the people till the Beallee crop came in. The cold weather crop in my estate was not more than one-eighth of an average crop. Over the whole district, the out-turn was about one-fifth of an average crop. In the month of Pous (December), the poorer laborers and men of low castes began to die of starvation both on my estate and in Balasore town. In Maugh (January) beggars were flocking into the town. I cannot specify instances, but am certain that the people began to die of starvation in December. The mortality increased till August or September; the greatest mortality was in June, July, and August. In September 1865, I gave a petition to the Collector for remission of revenue; many other zemindars did the same; we represented the scarcity, but did not suggest importations. I had no rice or paddy with which to help my tenants. I had only enough for the consumption of my own family. I subscribed to the Relief Fund. The Government rice was first imported in June 1866.

From the 4th of February, local subscriptions had been raised, with which rice was bought in the bazar from mahajuns of Balasore. At first, cooked food was distributed; but there was such a rush, that we were obliged to discontinue this, and to issue uncooked rice; 6 chittacks a day were given to each person. When Government rice came, cooked food was distributed; and rice was also sold. Rice was at first distributed in Balasore, Bhudruk and Soroh, subsequently; in many other places; some of the centres were within my estate. At first there was only one centre in the town at Dhurmsala; some 8,000 or 10,000 were fed there daily; subsequently, in July or August, two other centres were started in the town.

From the first establishment of the distribution, every indigent person has been able to get food. In August the harvesting of the Beallee crop reduced the numbers of applicants for relief. The greatest mortality occurred after the Government rice arrived, because the people had then become wasted away by the want of the previous months, and had been living on roots and other unwholesome things. The higher castes did not come to the unnochatros; many of them died in their own houses. The Government rice ought to have been imported in November or December, and it should have been distributed in many centres about the district. If this had been done, the people would have been able to remain in their houses and follow their occupations, and mortality might have been avoided. Sheds were erected for shelter in Balasore; some remained in them, others did not. I have been to the distributions, but have never seen any maltreatment; some force was absolutely necessary to keep the crowd in order. In my estate the mortality has been 50 per cent. of the

population; details are given in the answers to the questions which I have put in. The inundations caused some damage on my estate, but no deaths. The corpses in Balasore were at first thrown into a pit; subsequently into the river. For eight months no one could drink the water of the river. No emigration from my estate has taken place.

No. 78.—BABOO MUDDUN MOHUN DOSS.

[Examined at Balasore, 20th January 1867].

I am a resident of Balasore, and a merchant; hold estates in pergunnah Mobaruckpore, twenty miles south of Balasore. The Amun crop of 1865 was about one-eighth or rather more of an average crop. From October 1865, it was evident to us that the rice in the district would not be sufficient to carry the people through till the next crop. In December a few people died of starvation both in Balasore and in my estate. My old stock of rice was all given out, lent or sold by the month of November 1865. The mortality went on increasing till September, and then diminished. In April I imported two sloop-loads of rice from Arracan. I also brought one ship load from the south before the Government rice was imported. After that, I also imported about 17,000 maunds of rice; this was in August and September. I bought the last instalment at Coconada at Rs. 8 a bag; it cost me Rs. 1 a bag to import. I had to sell it at Rs. 6-8 and 7 a bag; prices had fallen in consequence of the harvesting of the Beallee crop, and also because the Government rice had come in and was being sold on relief tickets, at 16 seers per rupee. From February a local subscription had been raised and rice distributed. Government rice was imported in June. At first this increased the mortality; people died from eating after having been so long without food.

From the time when the Government rice came, all the indigent who required food got it in Balasore. Centres were opened in the interior later. Government rice should have been imported in October 1865; three-fourths of the mortality would then have been saved. I am not aware that it was ever suggested to the officials that it would be necessary for Government to import rice. At first, in the town of Balasore, food was given out at the dhurmsala only; about a month after the Government rice came, two other centres were opened in the town. I was a member of the Relief Committee. I went to the distributions of food four or five times. As long as the food was distributed at the dhurmsala only, there was crowding and confusion. Subsequently, the numbers were reduced by death and by the opening of two other centres, and then the distributions were orderly. I never saw an unnecessary degree of force used towards the people by the chuprassies or police. The mortality in my estate has been ascertained to amount to seven-sixteenths or half the entire population. I have given details in the written replies which I have put in. The inundation in my estate caused no mortality.

Many ryots, both Thance and Pahee, died of starvation, as well as the daily laborers. One centre was established in my estate at Soroh. Many people

died there. Cholera was not worse than usual, but the mortality was caused by starvation. After the Government rice came, all that was possible was done; but the rice should have come earlier. We merchants could not import rice easily after the southwest monsoon set in. I lost one ship. Baboo Shamanund Dey imported before the monsoon; Baboo Puddolochun Mundle also imported three or four ship loads. No other merchant imported rice then by sea.

No. 79.—BABOO PUDDOLOCHUN MUNDLE, Zemindar.

[Examined at Balasore, 21st January 1867].

I reside partly in Hooghly and partly in Balasore town; but during 1866 was here only during the months of November and December. I cannot, therefore, speak of the famine from personal knowledge. I have a zemindaree in the Balasore district with a sudder jumma of between Rs. 16,000 and 17,000. I consider that over the whole district, about six-sixteenths of the people have died, consisting chiefly of the working classes. The principal village in the zemindaree is named Basoodeb-poor. An unnochatro was established there in September, but by that time great mortality had occurred; when relief was given, it did some good, but it was afforded too late.

If there be irrigation, I believe that water will be largely taken, but consider that the rate of Rs. 3 per acre is far too high, Rs. 1 would be enough. Water would be valuable in this district in consequence of the irregularity of the rain-fall; but no irrigation would produce more than one crop in the year; the soil is too poor everywhere.

I remember in Mr. Ricketts' time, when there was great calamity from inundation from the sea, rice was bought at Calcutta and brought here. Houses of relief were established every three or four *coss*, and such arrangements were made that every one could eat and then go to sleep at home. Things were better arranged than this time, so people did not die in any numbers. It was not such a calamity as the present, but there were 8,000 or 7,000 people to feed here. It was in 1831-32. For the future, the best remedial measure is to let off the revenue and save alive those who are left, also to improve the embankments; they are all in a bad state the last ten years. We also need a road to Seenglah Haut, where much rice is produced; now there is no practicable road.

No. 80.—BABOO MUTHOORA MOHUN PARBEE, Zemindar.

[Examined at Balasore, 21st January 1867].

I am a resident of Aukoorah pergunnah; my chief zemindaree lies in pergunnah Balikhund; it is of Rs. 3,000 sudder jumma. During 1866 I resided partly in that pergunnah and partly in the town of Balasore. In my zemindaree about half the inhabitants have died, and over the whole district about six-sixteenths. I consider that the importation of Government rice has done good in the town of

Balasore, but none whatever in the district. The rice came in June, before which great mortality had occurred, and of those who obtained rice at the unnochatros established in the district, nearly all subsequently died, because no one got as much as was required to preserve life. In November 1865 I observed that famine was coming over the country. I had stores of rice saved up, out of which I fed my own ryots; all of these whose lives were saved, with the exception of a very few fed with Government rice, were preserved by myself. Of my land, ten-sixteenths were cultivated for the Sarud crop, and six-sixteenths were left uncultivated from want of hands, so many of the people having died. Of the cultivated portion, three-sixteenths were destroyed by floods from the Kansbans river; and of the remaining seven-sixteenths one-half was ruined from want of laborers to look after the growing crop. Thus, of the whole area, only three to four-sixteenths yielded a crop. In my zemindaree only about 3 per cent. of Beallee is grown. Cattle have died to the extent of two-sixteenths. If canals be made, water will be largely taken, especially during the Rubbee, when crops not cultivated now may be grown, as sursoo, mory, vegetables; cotton and sugar-cane may be also cultivated. During the rainy season water would be taken only when the rain failed. The rate should not exceed 4 annas an acre. Navigable canals are very much wanted, and would be extensively used by the people, who would gladly pay any reasonable tolls for the power of conveying their goods towards Madras and Calcutta.

No. 81.—BABOO SHAMANUND DEY, Zemindar.

[Examined at Balasore, 21st January 1867].

I am a trader and land-holder and resident of Balasore. I had reason to believe that there would be famine on the failure of the crop in November 1865. In December I sent to Arracan for rice and paddy. It arrived in February, 3,600 maunds. I also got rice, &c., from Calcutta. Modhoo Mohun Doss also imported; no one else as far as I know. There was no export except of some of the previous years or crops which the Telingeas had. I belonged to the original (Native) Committee, which was got up in January 1866. In Cheyt and Bysack people began to starve to a greater extent. In February there was less distress. In the mofussil I heard people began to die from starvation in July. Things got worse in June and July up to October. I wasn't one of those who told the Collector on the 12th May that money was wanted, not rice. At the time of the Lieutenant Governor's visit to Cuttack, I was there, and told the Lieutenant Governor that Government aid would be needed, and presented a petition through the Commissioner. No body imported rice privately in May, June, and July, but in August or September merchants from the south did. The reason why there was no importation in June and July was that the wind then was too strong and some of the ships foundered. The Government aid did not come soon enough. When the Government aid did come

No. 85.—MR. R. F. RAMPINI, C. S., *Assistant Magistrate and Collector.*

[Examined at Balasore, 22nd January 1867].

I have been in India since December 1864. I joined my first appointment in August 1865. I arrived here on the 20th June 1866. I did not then understand the Ooryah language. I had passed by the lower standard in Bengalee. I was appointed Secretary to the Relief Committee, but not Relief Manager, though I had certain relief duties assigned to me. I had also at first current duties; but on the 6th July I was relieved almost entirely of ordinary duties, and I took over the selling of rice at the Government shops and the despatch of rice into the interior. I had also charge for some time of a relief shop. I had the accounts and the returns, and charge of the godowns, and I used sometimes to visit the centres in the interior. When I first commenced relief operations in June, there was enough rice for supplying the dhurmsala, but not sufficient to supply the interior adequately or for sales. The supply in July became more plentiful, and for a week or two I think it was adequate; we were able for two or three weeks to send rice freely into the interior, to the centres then established, which were not numerous. Afterwards, when the *Tabal Cain* was blown away, supplies of rice fell short, and continued short for about a month. About the middle of August we got supplies, and since then have been pretty well supplied. I think that if the importations had been larger the relief could have been more extended; but as it is, I think the relief has really reached a considerable proportion of the people. I think that the sales and the gratuitous distribution each did good, though to different classes. One class had no money to buy, and the other class, had they not had the opportunity of buying, would have been gradually reduced till they fell into the lower class. At Balasore I think food was given to all who really required it; but I can't speak positively as to the interior. The test of requirement was personal appearance; but a very liberal interpretation was put upon that rule.

As a matter of fact, a large proportion of those who received relief died. I attribute this to the fact that the majority had come in from the interior, and before they could reach Balasore, were so reduced that nothing but the most anxious tending and medical treatment could have saved them, and that with such an enormous mass of people was impossible. I have been often struck by the want of help afforded by Natives to the weak. The strong would take the food from the weak if they possibly could. There was a good deal of mortality during the rains from want of shelter. The erection of sheds was delayed somewhat by the scheme for the camps being deferred till Mr. McNeile's arrival. At the same time a good many sheds were erected, but we found the paupers were constantly pulling them down for firewood. The people who came in late in the season were, as a rule, in better condition than those who

came in earlier, being probably persons who had some property on which they had supported themselves up to that time. I formed a very bad opinion of the character of the Ooryahs generally. I think July and August were the worst months. The famine began to abate in September. Of four centres visited by me two were well managed, another, indifferently, and one badly at first. I think as many centres were established as could have been established with the means at our disposal. If there were another famine, I should apply for more rice, more European agency, and more supervision of the centres. I think the system of unnochatros demoralize the people to some extent; but I do not think that a system of out-door relief was possible with the small staff of officers we had here.

When I arrived, there were relief centres at the following places—Jellasure, Santipore, one being established at Bustah, and one at Bhudruk; Meetrapore was established afterwards.

No. 86.—MR. A. MANSON, C. S., *Assistant Magistrate.*

[Examined at Balasore, 22nd January 1867].

I have been in India since November 1864, and in this district since 7th September 1865. I was out in the north of the district in November and December 1865. In some parts, the crops seemed very much dried up; but I had never seen an average crop, and can't judge of the out-turn. In January I remember that the Collector of Pooree asked us to buy rice, and that being known prices began to rise. Shortly after that, starving people began to come in. In February and March there was a great deal of cholera, as well as starvation, and then the general distress seemed to be very great. In February, or early in March, I was in charge of the sudder station, and there people were being publicly relieved near the road, and the cholera was so bad that the Doctor wished to have the distribution removed to a distance. When the Magistrate came in it was removed to the dhurmsala. In April I went to the examination at Cuttack; there, so far as I saw, things were certainly not so bad. I think the famine became excessive towards the end of May, a little before the Government rice arrived. The worst I saw was at Soroh, twenty-two miles from Balasore, in the middle of July. I established a centre. People were dying on all the cross roads, apparently trying to get to the main road; they were dying in very great numbers. When the Government rice came it made a decided difference; but in the interior I don't think it was at first known that rice was available. Before the rice came it was reported that a great deal of rice—50,000 maunds—was coming to be given away, and the market became easier; but when it turned out that only a small quantity came, and much of that was required for the jail, there was great disappointment. In Balasore also things were, I think, very bad when I went down to Soroh. I stayed at Soroh two months. There, as long as I could keep open a shop for sale, things were

No. 87.—REVEREND A. MILLER.

[Examined at Balasore, 22nd January 1867].


better. I kept it open for about a fortnight, and then was obliged to close for want of rice; it remained closed for sixteen or eighteen days. It was then re-opened and kept open. At first I sold in small quantities as much as was asked for; afterwards I sold as much only as could be spared—20 to 30 maunds a day. These were sales at market prices. If I had sold to all comers, I should have sold about 40 maunds. I was not able to keep open beyond ten days a shop for cheap sales. I could not get the tickets given to the right persons. I gave gratuitous food to all who were unable to work, so far as I could carry out the principle. So long as the rice was plentiful none were refused; when it became scarce I limited the number to 800, and selected those who seemed most emaciated. On that principle I gave to men, women, and children indiscriminately. For those able to work there were public works going on under the Department of Public Works. The people worked in gangs and were paid in rice.

When I returned to Balasore on the 22nd September things were better than I had left them, and they continued to get better; but in October I had to go again to Cuttack to the examination. All the time that I was at Soroh there was great mortality, partly because the people came in too far gone, and partly because I could not give rice and shelter enough. The shelter was not sufficient; the people pulled the thatch off as fast as it was put on; they took it to lie on and to burn. It might have been prevented to some extent by supplying them with straw and firewood. I was not stinted for money. The people were not in a condition to get firewood for themselves, but the food was given cooked. They burned the thatch to keep themselves warm in the rains, and besides they would not generally live in the sheds, but preferred any deserted houses or other shelter. They were more their own masters, and could keep more together in families. Under the hills the famine was very bad. I had three more centres under me; two of them, however, were only established just before I came away in September. In none of those places was the famine much less than at Soroh; they were all very bad. It was almost impossible to get about on account of the state of the roads.

Throughout the famine I believe that every one was stinted in respect to food, except the very rich and the prisoners. I think that the numbers said to have died have been much exaggerated as regards the north of the district, which I have since visited. Of those who do little cultivation, say under five beegahs there, I should say that only an eighth or a ninth have died or disappeared; there are few who don't cultivate at all. Of the better classes of cultivators I think that comparatively few have died from famine. In some places many of the lower classes have run away. Soroh is in the south of the district, and the mortality there must have been very much greater. The famine was less severe in the north of the district; people went to Contai and Hidgellee.

In November and December 1865, I was itinerating in the south of this district. In January and February I was itinerating towards the sea-shore. I came into Balasore on the 1st March, and was there till the 22nd August, when I went away ill to Calcutta, and was away till the beginning of October. I noticed the failure of the crops during my tours. Taking good and bad together, I should estimate that the crop did not exceed one-eighth of a full crop. I observed particularly that, though there was often a good deal of straw, the grain did not come to maturity; it died in the milk and came to nothing. I do not think that the Natives generally appreciated correctly the extent of the failure; they knew of the failure each in his own neighbourhood, but did not know how general it was. In the month of January I think that the prospect of a famine became very apparent to the Natives. In this district, the idea of a famine did not occur to people till it forced itself irresistibly upon them. In January rice was difficult to get; starving people were to be seen, and the thing did force itself upon them. In February, things were worse. There was then a general crying out, and people were rushing into the towns, saying that they could not live; but I saw very few people suffering from actual starvation during my tours. When I came into Balasore in the beginning of March, I found that quite an army of starving people had congregated, and that a Committee had been formed for their relief; principally a Native Committee with Captain Bond for President. A few Natives of the town had come forward very nobly, but very few. The relief at that time was nothing approaching to sufficient for the starving people congregated; there may have been about 3,000 people in an actual state of starvation. I am not sure that there were so many in the beginning of March, but there certainly were eight or ten days before the Commissioner came, and starving people were still flocking in. Some were in a very bad state, and some not so bad; those from the Mohurbunj and Neilgherry territories were the worst, the land there being high. Deaths had then taken place, but few from actual starvation, principally women and children. There was fearful cholera besides, and many died from cholera caused by famine, as they had taken to live on roots and such like. I do not think that the relief was sufficient in this period till the Commissioner came. Mr. Muspratt was out in the district. Captain Bond, the President of the Committee, was generally absent in Calcutta, and the Natives wanted order and arrangement. When the Commissioner came, the suffering was great. A meeting was held. A new Committee was formed and subscriptions obtained. The Europeans and some residents of the town were liberal. Some of the residents of the town who behaved well hold land, but the proper zemindars of the interior did absolutely nothing, and so far as I can learn, have done nothing to the present day. Still the new arrangements afforded relief approximating to sufficient

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relief, because every day a fresh supply of starving people came flocking in like passengers from a railway station when a train comes in. I then constantly met the local officers. They were then quite convinced that an unprecedented famine was upon us; all classes, European and Native, official and non-official, were quite convinced; the fact was as clear as the sun in the heavens; no one could ignore it. At an earlier period they thought a famine probable, but they then fancied that there was rice in the country; even when the meeting was held Mr. Muspratt said so. I was under the impression that Mr. Muspratt had made some discoveries within a few days, and had formed an independent opinion to that effect. I did not agree with him, and publicly said that I thought he was quite mistaken. I recommended a committee of enquiry on the point. I think that Mr. Ravenshaw was just then awakening to the reality of the famine. It seemed to have come suddenly upon him, and he seemed much impressed and as it were overwhelmed. The question of seeking the aid of Government was mooted at the meeting, I suggested it myself, but the suggestion was not acted on. I thought, from the manner in which the suggestion was received, that there was some good reason for not adopting it. The next day the Committee met and organised working arrangements. I was a member of the Committee. After that some of the members were out, and there was not another meeting, for I think about two weeks. When we met we found that our funds were entirely exhausted, the distress had increased, and the price of rice also; but rice was still procurable for money from Shamanund Dey. The subscriptions were increased and paid in advance, and we were thus enabled to give small quantities of rice to each person in hopes of keeping them alive, but we discovered afterwards that we were only killing them by degrees, as the quantity was insufficient, and they had no fire-wood or cooking utensils. When our fences were all burnt up, they eat the rice raw. We then made a change and gave cooked rice. An appeal to the public was made by Mr. Muspratt through Mr. Chapman, and on the 2nd May I received a first instalment of relief from Messrs. Sykes' Fund, and handed it over to the Committee. There was great distress at that time in the interior in the parts of which I had information, and the poor were dying and selling their houses, bullocks, and ploughs. Throughout May the distress continued; towards the end of May people were dying very rapidly about the station, and I think that June, July, and August were the worst months. I think that the mortality was greater than was reported. Hundreds died in fields and out-of-the-way places, where no one saw them. If one chanced to cross the country, one saw the bodies lying about, and the jackals eating them. I should say, to be within bounds, that about one-fourth of the population of Orissa has died. In this neighbourhood I think the mortality has been about one-third, but I believe that in other parts of the province it has not been so severe. As to the number of deaths in a certain day, I have seen some exaggeration in the papers; it was said

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that 1000 had died in the streets of Balasore in one day; that was an exaggeration. I think that the worst day we ever had, about 290 or near 300 were carted off dead from the station and thrown into the river. But as respects the general misery and suffering, I do not think that it has ever been fully described; it would have been almost impossible to exaggerate it. The people bore their misery with an extraordinary quiet and submission. Nothing that I have ever read has enabled me to conceive anything equal to this famine. I have known no instance of the Hindoos eating dogs, or cats, or cows, but they did eat their own children when they were dead. I heard a well authenticated instance in which a mother and son were found eating a dead child. I know of nothing to surpass this famine either as to extent or severity. I think that the statements made by the local officers, so far as I saw them, were faithful, except that they did not know the extent of the mortality. I don't think that in this neighbourhood there were floods which added very materially to the distress, but I heard that towards Bhudruk there were serious inundations. I do not think that even there the floods could have added very seriously to the mortality at that time; the damage would chiefly affect the present year.

When the Government rice arrived, it was not in sufficient quantity; it was soon exhausted. All through June, July, and August, we were not sufficiently supplied; towards the end of the rains the supply became better. I think better arrangements might have been made by the employment of small steamers to land the rice. In Calcutta I gathered that there were there quite a number of small river steamers which might have been sent, and which might have done the work. The rivers, the Subunreeka and others, might also have been used to send up rice during the rains. I also gathered that it was a mistake to send here such a heavy vessel as the *Tubal Cain*. I think it possible that more might have been locally done to land rice, &c., if there had been more aid from nautical persons; but I am sure that Captain Bond did his very best. He was a man who thoroughly sympathised with the people and fed hundreds at his own expense. The rice was sent into the interior by carts and bullocks, principally by pack bullocks, especially in the rains. There was then, of course, much difficulty. Sometimes there was delay about bullocks. At other times, when there were plenty of bullocks, there was no rice. If much more rice had been sent, I think we would have managed to get it into the interior. In one sense we were all to some extent taken by surprise by the famine, that is, by its magnitude. Although I had good opportunities of seeing the signs of its approach, I did not at first imagine its ultimate magnitude. If in January and February we had made arrangements, every thing would have been much more efficient. As it was, we were unprepared. Even in the early part of the actual famine, the Committee did not contemplate sending the food to the interior; we were grappling with the distress at the stations, and thought that all the

very poor would come in to be fed. In March I hoped that the more independent ryots, &c., would have weathered the gale. I think that there was every willingness to do everything that was possible, and that the relief arrangements were as good as they could be under the circumstances. We have, of course, learned by experience. We should now, in such circumstances, have asked for more officers and established more centres and hospitals. The overcrowding at the dhurmsala was an unfortunate mistake. There were differences of opinion on the subject. We at first feared that people might have got double supplies from different places, and that other abuses might have crept in. It was well on in the season before we divided the masses and sent them to different places. I have been seven years in Orissa, never in other parts of India. I think the Ooryahs a very bad race of people, very deceptive and indolent; but I do not think that it is the case that a large proportion of them died because they would not work. I was in the Working Committee. I had no difficulty in getting those to work who could work. I think that the Executive Engineer has been deceived in the matter. The people said that on the public works they were required to work by contract and paid weekly on Saturday night; that they were too weak to keep soul and body together on the rates allowed, and could not subsist during the week till paid. I made enquiry at the time, and was convinced of the reasonableness of what they said. The mortality has chiefly fallen on the laboring classes. The old women and children have not, I think, suffered more than others; rather the contrary I should say, because any man who had a little muscle upon him was refused food, although he was starving; that is, when the quantity of rice was limited. Work was given to the able-bodied, but people came in from the interior in a starving state, and before they could find work they often died. I think that a large proportion of the ryots also have died. The poorer died most, and the consumers of opium and gunja. The Ooryahs consume a great deal of such drugs. The larger ryots survived better than the smaller ones. As cultivators I think that when the people have their own interests to serve, they work well. They have some local irrigation, and all understand it on a small scale, but I doubt if they will at once appreciate irrigation on a larger scale; it will require a few years to enable them to see its adaptation to their wants. I myself think that irrigation and roads would be of the greatest service. I think that the rice would be decidedly the better for irrigation, and that much untilled land might be brought into cultivation. At present I should judge that about a fifth of the land before cultivated has not been sown on account of the famine and decrease of population, and that some part of that which has been sown has not been weeded and cultivated to maturity.

The ryots must have kept enough rice for sowing; the sowing rice is usually, from the time of harvest, separated and kept distinct and sacred as it were. Many ryots who have survived by alms are

now totally without agricultural means and it will be very difficult to arrange the means, of setting them up again. I do not think that the zemindars, as a rule, have any idea of any mode of improving their estates except by raising the rents as much as possible. They show considerable energy in resorting to tricks and schemes to effect that purpose. They bring in farmers and such like persons to take the lands in order to frighten the ryots to consent to higher rates. I had experience of that myself. A zemindar offered to rent me 300 beegahs, and in perfect innocence I was on the point of accepting the offer when I discovered that a body of ryots claimed the land and objected to be turned out, having their houses and homesteads there. Eventually the zemindar succeeded in getting them to agree to four annas a beegah increased rent, and they were glad to make the compromise. As to improving their lands by irrigation or roads, or anything of that kind, I do not think that it enters into the plans of the zemindars. Cotton grows well in this district, and sugar-cane also. They could be much increased by irrigation; oil seeds the same; trebled they might be, I should say. I think that the rates mentioned as demanded by the Irrigation Company are unreasonable. I think that they would be inoperative, in fact, prohibitive; no one would pay them. They should be lower at first. After a time the rates might be worked up when people more appreciate the new mode of irrigation; the rates mentioned might probably be reached eventually. I wish to bear testimony to the zeal and earnestness of the Europeans of the station in doing all that they could do in this famine.

I believe that the Bhudruk centre was well managed, but that the Bustah one was badly managed after Mr. O'Flaherty left. I don't think that the relief ever reached the great mass of the people, but it did reach a great many and save a great many. Some people died at home rather than go to the relief centres.

No. 88.—BENGALÉE RAHMATOULLAH KHAN,
Zemindar.

[Examined at Balasore, 22nd January 1867].

I have been in Government service thirty years. I have heard of the famine of 1200, and believe that it might have been as severe as in the past year, but there was not so large a population in those days and the suffering was not so great. I remember the cyclones in Mr. Ricketts' times when the country was inundated. Mr. Ricketts sent for rice, established houses of relief, and gave tucavee advances to the zemindars, but the present calamity was much the most severe that ever occurred. About-seven sixteenths of the population have disappeared, especially the poorer laboring classes. Many ryots have died, and almost all have been reduced to poverty. Those zemindars who had the power assisted, and those who were in debt and difficulty couldn't. About three-fourths of the zemindars are in

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debt and difficulty. I believe the Ooryahs are inferior to other people of this country. Firstly, they are poor, which is the chief of their defects; they have no industry except agriculture. They are good agriculturists so far as their knowledge goes. They are not more fraudulent than Bengalees. The zemindars spend more than they receive, and they are improvident. The land is average land, but is subjected to injury both from too little and too much water. The last settlement was a fair one, and those who had the means of increasing their cultivation have profited; those who have not had the means have fared worse. What Government has done in the famine has been well done, but it should have been done earlier. The officials were new to the district. If Mr. Ricketts had been here, I think more would have been done, and it would have been done earlier. I am not aware of any other failure in the arrangements except that the aid came too late. After the Government rice came it was sent everywhere to the people, but notwithstanding many continued to die—some from sickness, and others because they were too far gone. I and others did what we could to alleviate the distress. I think that about one-eighth of the actual mortality was caused by the floods. In this district the great injury to crops was caused by drought, not by floods. This year people couldn't cultivate their lands, and a great deal has been left uncultivated; on what has been cultivated the crops have been good. In the present state of things, people can't pay their revenue, and the Government must make some allowance for them, and the zemindars and ryots who have been ruined by the famine must have some tucavee, and there must be Government godowns to supply rice to those who have nothing at all. For the future the revenue must be settled with reference to the actual cultivation. Unless the bunds are repaired, some of the zemindars won't be able to get on. Of late the Government bunds have fallen into disrepair, and now the zemindars who used to repair their bunds are unable to do so. Since the last settlement the zemindars may have got some little increase on the rent of the Pahee ryots, and some increase from increased cultivation, but what they may have gained is now all lost by the famine.

No. 89.—REV. J. PHILLIPS.

[Examined at Jellalore, 24th January 1867.]

It is thirty-one years since I first resided in Orissa; but I was away about ten years and returned in 1865. During the famine I was at Santipoor and Jellalore. I noticed the crops hereabouts in the end of 1865. There was a partial failure, but at the time I should not have supposed that more than half the crop had failed; when it came to be threshed out I judge that it proved to be somewhat less, much grain not being filled. I believe that among the Sonthals the crop was not very much less, but they are a good deal oppressed, and have small cultivations, and suffered more than the Hindoos. About the end of February and beginning of March, the Sonthals and other poor people were driven to great straights in regard to food, and were going about

collecting roots and such like. I had then serious apprehension of extensive famine. By the 1st of April the distress was very severe; we were then pressed by the poor who were about us, but there were then very few deaths from starvation, though in April the people began to look very much emaciated. I addressed an appeal on the subject of the distress to the *Friend of India*. I think my letter was written about the 7th April. I had no connection with Mr. Sykes in regard to his appeal, but he afterwards communicated with me regarding the expenditure of the funds received by him. I received from him in all Rs. 1,820. In May and June the famine became very severe. Those were the months in which there was most suffering for want of adequate aid. I was at Balasore on the 1st, June and the famine scenes there were terrific. I am not sure that the distress was less in this part of the country; I should rather think that it was equal, but there had not been the same public aid to draw the sufferers together. As soon as I opened a regular relief centre, the people flocked in in great numbers. In June I received some money from Mr. Muspratt for relief, and opened centres at Santipoor and Jellalore; but I received no grain till I think about the middle of July. I distributed the money I got, I believe that the recipients were able to buy at exorbitant prices, but I think that grain was never quite so dear here as at Balasore. I recollect one trader bringing grain from the north or east, but there was very little. I think that the famine was most severe in July and August. Little suffering in these parts was due to floods, it was almost entirely due to the drought of the previous year. But the heavy rains in August caused a great mortality among the people, who were then in a very reduced state and badly sheltered. Throughout the famine my supplies of grain at Santipoor were very small; it was difficult to transport it across country, and it appeared to me that the Relief Committee at Balasore expected to have more grain than they really were able to supply. I sent down bullocks which were kept several weeks waiting for the grain to be landed. I believe that the Jellalore centre, while Mr. Brooks was there, was more regularly supplied. I think that if grain had been better supplied, the suffering would have been much less, and what came, came too late. After the new crop had begun to come in, and the prices to come down, we then got a good supply; old grain was sent to us by way of Midnapore, and a portion of it is still in store. I doubt whether the relief touched the larger proportion of the starving people. I think it was principally confined to those living near the centres. But many Sonthals came in and remained with us through the season; we were not denied supplies, but the delays and difficulties in getting supplies were so great, that we were compelled to give applicants a very insufficient supply of food. Mr. Brooks was an honest industrious kind-hearted man, but in his dotage and in continual ill-health; he was in fact physically unfitted for such duty. We were not stinted for funds, but it was difficult to get them. The question of providing shelter was not thought of soon enough,

and shelter was not provided on a sufficiently extensive scale, when we did undertake it. Some sheds were erected, and I do not think that the people had any prejudice against using the sheds that I know. I could have done a great deal more, if, in the months of May, June, and July, I could have had the assurance of a continuance of supply; but as neither Mr. Sykes nor Mr. Muspratt could guarantee the continuance of large funds, I was obliged to economise. In September and October, we had supplies of money in abundance; there was then no want of money. The early crop in this part of the country is very small, and affected our prices very little—less than at Balasore; prices here were later of recovering.

In September and October the suffering was still great. I distributed money then more liberally, but did not buy grain except for the orphan children. I gave as high as 4 pice (1 anna) per diem to adults. In November things improved. I have no sufficient data to estimate the degree of mortality, but it has been very great. Most of the mortality was among those who came in from some distance. The mortality has been principally amongst the laboring classes. There was no work available on the spot in the early part of the famine. A few people went to Midnapore to the irrigation works, but generally returned dissatisfied, and said that by the time the pay reached them, it would not fill their bellies. The people have great objections to leave their homes for work, they are very ready to take it near their homes. Near us many of the people are very laborious. The better classes of ryots have generally pulled through I think. From all enquiries that I have made, I cannot learn that the zemindars have in any instance come forward to assist their ryots, nor have they remitted rents; on the contrary, I am told that they are this year trying to collect the balance of last year, the crops here being good. One man did, I believe, subscribe Rs. 100 to the relief fund, and one trader of the bazaar near Jellalore fed the starving to some extent. The people here have no artificial irrigation to any considerable extent. During the famine, I undertook relief works to supply irrigation. I think the people would readily avail themselves of irrigation. I hope by my works (damming a stream) to secure eight or ten villages from famine. I think that the soil is splendid, fit for sugar-cane, cotton, tobacco, date, &c. The zemindars are so narrow-minded that they will not undertake any efficient works of irrigation. The jute here is decidedly good, and the cotton, I should say, superior. I have seen also very superior specimens of foreign cotton grown here. Sugar cultivation might be carried on very extensively. The largest zemindar about here is an absentee, a resident of Calcutta. My impression is that the results of the famine are not yet over, and local works are very desirable, as many families are reduced to destitution, all their property being exhausted, and their prejudices are still such that they will not leave their homes for work. Although the harvest has been good, it is being rapidly exported generally to the south, and prices are rising again. The Ooryahs are a very perverse and deceptive people, and difficult to deal with.

No. 90.—MR. W. J. HERSCHEL, C. S., *Magistrate and Collector of Midnapore.*

[Examined at Midnapore, 25th January 1867.]

I have been in this district since January 1865. In the Hidgellee and Tumlook parts of the district, very much of the crop of 1864 was destroyed by the cyclone. There is very little cold weather crop in that part of the country, and no early rice crop as a rule. There is only one heavy crop. In the central part of the district, the early rice is about one-sixteenth of the whole, and the cold weather grain less than that. In the Jungle Mehals the early rice is more considerable, say one-fourth of the whole rice cultivation, and Indian corn and other grains of the rainy season are grown to some small extent. Cold weather cereals are also there grown to a small extent more than elsewhere in the district. In the part of the district not affected by the cyclone inundations, the crops of 1864 were a fair average. The early crop of 1865 was, I believe, a failure; but I am not at this moment prepared to say exactly why. I estimate the main crop of 1865 to have been about half a crop for the whole district; in the Jungle Mehals I should say about six-sixteenths, in Hidgellee better. In the Jungle Mehals the cold weather crops completely failed. In the latter part of 1865, I reported the existence of distress in Tumlook. When the new crop came in, things were better. But in January and February, crime broke out violently in the Jungle Mehals. I had reason to believe it to be connected with the failure of the crop. No general report on the state of the district was then made; but special reports of violent crimes were made, as they occurred, both to the Deputy Inspector General of Police and to the Commissioner through me. A large proportion of the violent crime had for its object the plunder of grain. The extent of crime attracted the attention of Government, who directed the Commissioner to come over and report on the subject. The Commissioner came about the early part of April, and was in personal communication with me and with the Police officers. I then expressed to him the opinion that the crime was caused by hunger, and he was well aware of the fact. I did not press on the Commissioner any measures as in my opinion desirable. In the end of 1865 I had realized some subscriptions, about Rs. 1,800, which had not been expended. I did not, when the Commissioner was here, think extraordinary measures of relief necessary, nor did I even up to that time think it necessary to expend the local subscriptions which had been realized. I did not think that the hunger which prompted crime had reached to that degree that interference in the way of charity was necessary. I fully expected that it would be eventually necessary to interfere; but I had all along made up my mind not to move till the market fell to 8 seers per rupee, and I had expressed this opinion to my subordinates. My reason was that the market had fallen to 8 seers before the harvest without any deaths occurring in consequence. I soon after had reason to change my mind; when I wrote my report of 25th April, I had not changed my mind.

Q.—You then reported great alarm in the minds of the people, did you think that this alarm was not well founded?

A.—I thought it was well founded; but I did not think that there was then existing such distress as to call for measures of relief.

Q.—You further reported, “the old and infirm are beginning to die from insufficient food,” did you not think that such a state of things called for measures of relief?

A.—No, I did not. The only instance of approach to famine which I had seen was at Tumlook in the previous October, when I was followed by crowds of hungry people. I then thought relief necessary, but the famine passed off without material injury. When I was at Dantoon, there were no such signs of general distress, and the mere fact that the old and the weak were dying did not seem to me to call for interference from the Government officials. My impression then was that the dry weather was the worst part of the year for the poorer classes, and that with the rains, relief came. I therefore thought that April and May would be the worst months, and that things would then improve.

Q.—Did you communicate the opinion expressed in your present answer in any shape to Government, and had you any demi-official correspondence about it?

A.—No, I did not, and I do not remember to have had any demi-official correspondence on the subject.

I intended to go on a tour in the Jungle Mehals, but Mr. Ravenshaw, the Commissioner of Orissa, recommended me to go to Bareepoda, the chief town of Mohurbhunj, for consultation with respect to the deportation of one of our subjects. I went out by dawk to Bareepoda, stopping one day at Gopeebullubpoor. On my route I did not notice excessive distress in this district. This was about the 15th May. The Mohurbhunj country through which I passed is not mountainous; it is of the same character as our Jungle Mehals, but somewhat more undulating, and much less cultivated. In the Mohurbhunj country, I noticed very great distress; to judge by the appearance of the people, I should think that many must have died. The Rajah seemed to be doing nothing at all for them. Mr. Ravenshaw was feeding some 400 starving people, and it was the sight of the Mohurbhunj people that first put the idea of the necessity of relief into my head. I had conversation with Mr. Ravenshaw regarding the Orissa famine. He read me extracts of some of his reports to Government. One of them gave a very bad account, particularly describing a scene of famine. I do not know that I had any consultation with Mr. Ravenshaw as to the measures proper to be taken in case of famine. I do not remember what relief he had asked of Government, nor that we talked of the duty of the Government under such circumstances. I came to the conclusion myself that if such a state of things occurred in my district, it would be

necessary to move. On my return journey, I enquired more particularly. I called together the poor people at Gopeebullubpoor, and distributed rice. I was surprised to find how many people came at the call. I only stopped at the place from morning till evening, and in that time 250 persons were assembled, who bore on their persons the marks of starvation. I do not remember that any one had previously reported to me the extent of the distress; in fact I am certain that no one had. As soon as I returned, I opened relief operations, and soon after I both reported fully on the subject, and had a meeting for the purpose (on the 28th May) of organising a regular system of relief. I returned on the 19th, a Saturday, and on the Monday I reported, in a note on the weekly price current sent to the Board, that deaths from starvation had occurred. My full report was dated the 26th. On the 25th May I received an official letter from the Secretary to the Board of Revenue, bearing on the top the name of Mr. Schalch, and dated Calcutta, the 23rd May, in which Rs. 5,000 were assigned to me for relief operations. The day before I had received a demi-official letter from Mr. Grote, which was cancelled by the Secretary's letter, and I tore it up. The purport of it was to enquire whether my report of the deaths having occurred referred to a greater number of deaths than in ordinary years, and asking me to explain this point. There was, however, nothing in it affecting my action which it was necessary to cancel. I received a telegram of the same date also from the Board to the same effect as the official letter; but in consequence of interruption to communication it did not arrive until after the letter.

From that time I carried on regular relief operations. We distributed raw rice at several centres, I think four at first. I turned my attention principally to the Jungle Mehals. Within three weeks I think we had nine centres opened. At that time I think there was difficulty in getting rice, at least some of the local committees experienced difficulty. At Midnapore we could buy rice. Eventually, however, all the committees succeeded in getting rice at that time. I think that in the month of June, I applied for an additional Rs. 5,000, and I hoped that that would suffice to meet our wants. I do not remember that I ever said that I was “sanguine” on the subject. On the 20th June I had sent out Mr. Mann to report especially on the distressed pergunnahs, particularly Dantoon. Early in July his first report came in, and I was then more seriously alarmed. I thought that we should want more money, and I also found that there was an actual difficulty in procuring rice in the Jungle Mehals. We had a special meeting of the Relief Committee to consider the subject. The result was that we asked the Government to place Dantoon and the Jungle Mehals under Mr. McNeile. We also asked the Board of Revenue to import 4,000 maunds by land from Calcutta for our use. I remarked that that would be only a first instalment. Throughout the rains the land route from Calcutta is practicable, but from Naraingurh southwards to Dantoon the road is impracticable for heavy traffic at that

season. The Board declined to import the rice on the ground that the import trade would be interfered with. Private funds were not very large; but we were using our funds, both private and public, in the purchase of rice in Calcutta and getting it up. My object in applying to the Board was that the grain might be sold at ordinary market rates, as in Orissa. Government did not import rice throughout the famine for sale at cost price. We had not much difficulty in making our own arrangements for importing rice for relief purposes. In this district, Hidgellee apart, there is no class of enterprising traders; travelling traders come and buy up the grain; the resident traders do scarcely anything beyond their own villages. Local traders store up grain for the benefit of the ryots, to whom they are in the habit of making advances. Zemindars also are in the habit of hoarding up grain. More or less we managed to supply Dantoon, Keshearee, Nyagaon, and Rohinee by sending rice in carts to Naraingurh, and thence on bullocks. In July we applied for much larger funds, and early in August, I sent up a still larger estimate, desiring them to establish charitable sales in lieu of my former propositions, which had been disallowed. Up to that time we had only distributed rice gratis. Till the 5th September the rice given at Midnapore was always raw. Until the 17th July only 4 chittacks or $\frac{1}{4}$ lb. was given to an adult; all the centres were authorized to give this quantity, but one of them, a very small centre, gave only half the quantity. It was a debated point whether this was enough; the Civil Surgeon thought not, but the majority thought it was. Afterwards it was raised to 6 chittacks of rice without *dhal*, and to that we adhered until close to the end of the operations, when we authorized 10 chittacks to be given. On the 11th August we had twenty-three centres open. On the whole, we managed to keep the Jungle Mehals supplied with rice; there were only two centres that at any time actually ran out of it. I think that even when we had all the centres in operation, the relief did not reach half the starving population: the centres might with advantage have been doubled. We found out only by trial that the number of centres was insufficient to do all that we desired. We had great difficulty in finding trustworthy agency for additional centres. We have very little education in this district, and have not such good agency as might have been got in any of the Nuddea districts. But after my experience, I should not now hesitate to trust more largely to local committees for simple purposes of relief. As a rule they did very well, and I think that our difficulties about agency have been somewhat overestimated. If at first we had frankly thrown ourselves upon the people, I think there would have been little difficulty; we should have found ample assistance. The official establishment was sufficient, as far as I knew, at the time. I should have sent out another officer, if I had known how much he was required. The transport of rice was entirely in the hands of the Police; they worked well, and their numbers were sufficient. In the distressed parts of the district there was no considerable aid afforded by the Public

Works Department's ordinary operations. Relief works were undertaken in June in the severely and intensely distressed parts; they were effective as far as they went, but the result was small. The works executed by the Public Works Department from their special grant of Rs. 30,000 were along the Trunk Road, with one small exception; people did not resort to these works in any large numbers. There was a want of proper supervising agency. The works were selected by Major Swayne and myself at a special meeting, to which I called three Natives. In September a sum of Rs. 7,400 was divested from the Public Works Grant and placed in my hands for construction of jungle roads. This was because the money was not being spent on the works near the Trunk Road. Payment was made for daily labor, and the only reason that I could find why people did not go to the works in larger numbers was that the overseers rejected those who could not do a full day's work. I did not press that point on Major Swayne until July; we then measured the work on a certain tank that was in progress to ascertain what rates we should give for piece-work. The alternative was whether we should raise the rate of daily wages irrespective of the quantity of work done, in order to attract laborers to the work, or whether we should give a remunerative rate of piece-work. We both thought that it was best to give out piece-work, and not to raise the rate of daily payments, which might be afterwards quoted as a precedent all over the district. I am satisfied that it would not have done to try to get over the difficulty by allowing the ordinary rate of wages to be paid for a very insufficient amount of labor; a system of that kind would require very careful supervision and the exercise of discretion, such as we could not expect from Native overseers. We afterwards tried the plan of paying the ordinary rate of wages and selling rice to the laborers at cheap prices; that plan succeeded well. Up to May, there was nothing in the way of relief, except what was afforded by the local district funds, the ordinary works of the Public Works Department, and the Canal Company's works. These latter were all in the eastern part of the district, which was but slightly affected by the famine.

On the public works women came much more than men, and in the ordinary mode of working women can only work in a certain proportion to the men. Consequently women were rejected to a considerable extent.

The only special arrangement made was that in laying out the local district roads, I gave as much simple earth-work as possible. I think that if the special relief works had been undertaken earlier, more good would have been done. When the famine had thoroughly set in, those who came to distribution compounds were not fit for labor.

When first I began the jungle roads, I ordered the overseers to allow each person to do so much work as he could, and to pay a full day's wages to each, besides this, I subsequently allowed the laborers to purchase rice at low rates. Until I did so, the overseers very unwillingly paid a day's

wages for less than a day's work. When the boon of getting rice at low rates was given to the laborers, the effect was to impress on the overseers that our principal object was practical charity, and then the overseers carried out our views more willingly.

The light labor, which was performed under the superintendence of the Relief Committee in the district, was almost nominal. The only piece of real work done was in the station. Notwithstanding the instructions of Mr. Commissioner Jenkins to insist on labor from all who could do it, the heart of the Relief Committees was not in the measure.

The only shelter provided was in the station, where we had six rest-houses, and at Dantoon, late in the season. There are, however, plenty of trees, under which the people lived. Of the six rest-houses the paupers only used four. I do not know that shelter was provided near the public works.

Shops were opened in some sixteen places about the district for sales at low rates, but they met with no great success. The first three were opened on the 27th August, which was too late; the Aaos crop came in soon after, and in the course of September, all our shops, except two and the three shops for the Public Works Department laborers, were closed. We sold altogether about Rs. 7,100 worth of rice, principally at 10 seers per rupee. In that work it was that the Local Committees broke down. They were very unwilling to take the responsibility of selecting the persons to whom the tickets for cheap rice should be given.

Prices became much easier towards the end of September, and somewhat later, in the southern part of the district. I attribute this entirely to the harvesting of the Aaos crop. There was no private importation into the district in September or October, and indeed earlier, but it did not go west of Midnapore. When the Government refused to import, the Central Committee tried to encourage trade into the Jungle Mehals; they published price lists, and I spoke to mahajuns, offering Police escorts; but after a fortnight's trial, in spite of their promises, I found that they had done nothing except one solitary despatch of 100 maunds. They then declared that they could not do it, that it was not in their line.

In the town of Midnapore the test for admission to the benefits of the Relief Committee's operations was inability to do a fair day's work. Any person able to do a smaller amount of work only was employed on light labor under the Labor Committee, and in return for such labor received his food or his day's wages as the case might be. In October the Board of Revenue sent us a cargo of rice from Rangoon by the *Perce* for the use of this district. It came from Diamond Harbour *via* Koila Ghaut. Very little of it was used; it came too late. The rice had been ordered on my estimates of August, when I expected that it would be necessary to continue relief operations much longer than was actually found necessary. We also got some Government rice for the south of the district out of the ship *Tubal Cain*.

The mortality was heaviest in July, August, and September. I have put in the best estimates I can frame of its extent during the famine. The people came in to the centres in such a state that many of them could not be recovered. I estimate that in the mofussil centres about half who came to the centres died. In Midnapore town and for ten miles round the proportion of deaths was much less. There was a large mortality among those who did not come to the centres.

Almost the whole of this district, except Hidgellee, is permanently settled. I did not see that the fact of any particular tract being permanently settled gave it any advantage over tracts which were not permanently settled. As a matter of fact, the greatest suffering was in the permanently settled parts; but I attribute this entirely to the crops.

I think the Natives, as a body, did not show the slightest desire to relieve, until officially pressed to do so; there were, of course, exceptions. A good many zemindars, several of the residents of the town, and in one instance a chowkeedar, relieved many spontaneously at their own expense.

I believe there was no mortality whatever among the superior class of ryots. On one occasion I took a classified census of about 3,000 persons who were being relieved in Midnapore, and out of the whole number there were only two or three who had any land.

The planters in this district are all assistants of Messrs. Watson and Co. Mr. Terry, the representative of Messrs. Watson and Co., employed a good deal of labor, which he would not otherwise have employed, in order to give relief. I know of no other large measure of relief being given by the Assistants in charge of factories in the interior. Mr. Terry himself subscribed liberally. His Assistants gave great help in managing the centres and administering the funds of the Committee.

The Rajah of Mysadal gave some relief to the poor in October 1865, and got credit for it in my reports; but he stopped as soon as the Deputy Collector's back was turned. This year there has been no occasion for him to do anything in his part of the country. I wish to state that relief commenced in this district as soon as it was certainly known that deaths from starvation were occurring. Up to the time when I visited the Jungle Mehals in May, no one had brought to my notice that deaths were increasing abnormally. The expression in my letter of the 25th April that the old and infirm were beginning to die was an English rendering of the vague and general statements of the Natives. I have still no reason whatever to suppose that 500 people had died of want of food in the district before the 24th of May when relief operations began. There was one instance of charitable relief commenced before this. Mr. and Mrs. Grant opened an Asylum by public subscriptions in March during my absence in the mofussil. On my return I inspected it, and from that drew the conclusion that the distress in the district could not be very severe. I don't think

that any Native had commenced any charity. When public relief commenced, prices were not below Rs. 8½ Calcutta seers anywhere in the district; and when we closed relief sales, they were at 10 seers. They have since been up to 32 seers in the mofussil. Since the crops came in, this has been the cheapest district in Bengal. A very excellent crop has caused things to be very much better than we had previously anticipated. I think that no extraordinary measures are now required.

[Continued, January 28th].

A number of ryots from Jambornee, Messrs. Watson's estate, came to me in a body, about the middle of September, to complain that they had been forced to subscribe for the sufferers by the famine. Each gave an identical petition to say that Hemchunder had forced them, set the Police at them, and threatened to tie them to the legs of an elephant. They asked to have the money refunded. These men had all paid up one month's subscription early in July, and not a breath of complaint had then reached me against Hemchunder, though he had raised such subscriptions at many places before. They had paid a second time in August in accordance with promise and without complaint. It was not till after a sharp correspondence between Mr. Sheffield and the Committee on the subject of his preventing subscriptions that these men came in a body a full month after paying their second monthly subscriptions. I appealed to the men themselves whether they really expected me to act on such petitions, and whether they really claimed their money back. They one and all made their *salams* and walked away.

I wish to state that the Brohmo Somaj branch at Midnapore fed from 100 to 120 persons for many weeks. It is the one instance in this district, during the famine, of charity privately organised on a considerable scale. Mr. Terry also sold a considerable quantity of rice at 12 seers to all comers.

No. 91.—MAJOR J. D. SWAYNE, *Executive Engineer, Midnapore Division.*

[Examined at Midnapore, 26th January 1867].

I came to this division in February 1860, and was present here throughout the years 1865 and 1866. My charge comprises the following works—the imperial line of road from Midnapore towards Raneeunge, 36 miles, completed before the famine commenced; the Trunk Road from Midnapore to wards Cuttack as far as the Soobunreeka River, 49½ miles; the imperial road from Midnapore to wards Calcutta as far as Panchkoora Ghât on the Cossye, 25 miles, also finished some years ago; the embankments on the Cossye and Kullinghye Rivers, called the Culunjole and Midnapore zemindaree embankments; and public buildings in the station of

Midnapore. My present chief work consists in re-modelling and metalling the imperial line of road towards Cuttack. On this line all the heavy earth-work and bridges had been completed previously to 1865, but during 1865-66 metalling and sectioning were continuously in progress. No special relief works in connection with the famine were undertaken until early in May. While out in the district, I received a telegram, dated 30th April 1866, instructing me to put in hand a large tank required for the central prison, which it was contemplated to build at Midnapore. I had the necessary levels taken and the site was selected in conjunction with the Magistrate and Civil Surgeon. Excavation commenced on the 17th May, and it was publicly intimated that any one in want of work might obtain it on the tank in question. On the 4th June I received an order from the Superintending Engineer, Cuttack Circle (No. 2498 dated 30th May), to the effect that the Government of Bengal had allotted Rs. 30,000 to my division for works on which the distressed population might be employed. I was directed to decide, in communication with the Collector of the district, what works could be advantageously undertaken. The Superintending Engineer suggested excavation of tanks and improvement of local roads. I was informed that the cost of excavating the central prison tank was to be defrayed from this grant. The Collector convened a meeting of zemindars to ascertain what works would be of the greatest benefit to the community, and would at the same time afford the greatest measure of relief. At that meeting it was resolved to excavate the following tanks,—at the village of Samla, about 4 miles south of Dantoon, on the Cuttack road; at the village of Doyjooree, about 16 miles west of Midnapore; at the village of Satbancoorah, 20 miles north of Midnapore, on the Raneeunge road, and at the village of Gurbetta, 10 miles further up the same road. On these, and the central prison tank, as well as a few minor works in the station of Midnapore, from the 17th May to the end of November, about 484* men and women were daily employed. At first I used to employ daily labor payments, *viz.*, 2½ annas for men, 2 annas for women, and 1½ anna for children; but this plan was found to give so little work for the expenditure incurred, that to avoid excessive rates, I resorted to task-work. The rates were proportioned to the stiffness of the soil. As the excavations proceeded, the difficulty of digging increased, and I have given as high as Rs. 7-8 per 1,000 cubic feet. Even this rate will be increased at greater depths. I estimate that the rates throughout enabled an able-bodied laborer to earn from 3 to 3½ annas per diem, and women about 1½ anna each. The average rate at which rice sold between May and November was 7 seers the rupee, which, taking the average amount earned by men and

* From 17th to 31st May	7,235
„ In June	10,736
„ July	14,157
„ August	16,852
„ September	16,525
„ October	13,262
„ November	3,474

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women together at 2 annas each per diem, gave nearly 1 seer of rice per head daily. I never paid my work-people in any other way than in cash, but at each place where work was in progress, the Collector had a depôt of rice, from which the laborers were supplied. When the rains set in, the excavated portions of the tanks filled with water, and the labourers could no longer dig; but as far as possible they were employed in working and dressing the banks.

Out of the above grant of Rs. 30,000, I then made over to the Collector Rs. 7,400 for the purpose of constructing certain jungle roads, the expenditure on which was kept in his hands.

No other relief works were carried on under my orders. I consider that if the relief works had been commenced earlier in the season, they would have done much more good; as it was, the people who applied for work were frequently so weak and emaciated, that they were not fit for labor. After I commenced work on the central prison tank, the applications from women became much in excess of those from men, and as the women could not dig, and I required not more than two women to each man, I was obliged to refuse the women who were in excess. At first I got men in larger numbers; but as soon as agricultural operations commenced, many of the men went off, leaving the women. There was, however, some employment for women under Mr. Verner, Assistant Magistrate. When the contract system was adopted, people often worked in families, men and women together; but women who had no men belonging to them, probably had difficulty in obtaining employment. It was only at the commencement of agricultural operations that the number of women seeking work was in excess of the men. I did not observe this to be the case later in the season.

No. 92.—JUGGUNNAUTH DOSS, PAHARAJ.

[Examined at Midnapore, 28th January 1867.]

I reside at Belyabera, 24 miles west of Midnapore. I hold an estate paying Rs. 500 to Government in that neighbourhood. Although it was evident that the Amun crop of 1865 would fail, there were no deaths from starvation, nor was there much suffering before that crop was cut; the Aaos crop of 1865 in my estate was a full crop; the Amun crop was one-third only of a full crop. In December and January, the poorest people supported themselves by gleaning the ears of rice which had been bitten off by the insects which had attacked the crop; these ears remained in the fields after the ryots had carried away the crop. In February and March, the poor subsisted on what they had gleaned and stored and on the cold weather crops. It was not till April that distress began to be felt. In ordinary years the poorer people begin to obtain their food from the mahajuns in April, and rely on them for support till August, when the early crop comes in. In 1866 the mahajuns had very little in store, and

therefore could only supply the people scantily. Their stores were very low, because, in consequence of the failure of the crop of 1865, the loans of rice which they had made in anticipation of being repaid with interest out of the crop of 1865, were not repaid to them. In February I began to dig two tanks in my estate, and to repair six embankments; 1,500 or 2,000 men were thus employed each day till April, when they found occupation in agricultural operations. At that time no one was dying in my estate; but in Mohurbhunj, on which my lands abut, deaths from starvation began in April. In May a centre of relief was opened at Gopeebullubpore, four miles from my house. A committee was appointed, and they gave out raw rice; some time afterwards, they gave cooked rice. About Gopeebullubpore people had died of starvation in April; notwithstanding the distribution of rice, they died in numbers till August. The people died to an unusual degree from cholera; they were so reduced by want of food, that they succumbed to the slightest attack. Many people died of mere starvation. The Gopeebullubpore Committee had at first to buy rice in the local market; it was very difficult to procure, not only on account of the scarcity of the crop, but because in January, February, and March, the houses and stores of rice merchants had been plundered and burnt down. The dacoits used to carry off the rice if they could, but if opposed would set fire to the granaries.

In consequence of the scarcity of rice, the Gopeebullubpore Committee could get but little rice, and therefore could give but little to each; they gave 6 chittacks to an adult and 3 to a child. Some days the rice was very short, and then all those who were deserving objects of charity could not be supplied. I did not hear that distribution was altogether stopped on any day. In July the Gopeebullubpore Committee were supplied with rice from Midnapore. Then the Committee gave 6 chittacks of rice cooked; from that time there was no want of rice: all deserving objects received it. After that time the people did not die of starvation, but they still died in numbers from bowel complaint, caused by eating after being so long starved.

Mohapul is in my estate; it is four miles from my house, and four miles from Gopeebullubpore. The relief centre there was not established till the month of Bhador. Up to that time the poor used to go to Gopeebullubpore, or used to take food at my house when I was distributing cooked food. The people about Mohapul never died of starvation; but many died from illness. At the Mohapul centre about 200 people were fed. There was no confusion. There was a Committee, of which I was the president. Six chittacks of old rice were given cooked; that was enough to support life; but when the new rice came in, the paupers used to get some by begging, and this made them ill in their then state, and caused them to die. We fed only those who were evidently not in a condition to earn their living by labor. No work was carried on by Government within

24 miles of my estate till the month of September; then some roads were started, but the people did not resort to them in great numbers, for they found employment in the harvesting of the Aaos crop. Good would have been done, if employment had been provided for the people in January, February, March and April, because in those months there was no demand for labor in the fields; but I believe that from May the people found as much employment as they required. No light labor was started at the Mohapul centre. The centre was closed in November. By that time the new Amun crop was coming in, and as the Aaos crop had been very good, distress had ceased. There was no emigration from my estate, but many emigrated with their families from the country round about. My estate has a population of about 6,000; of these about 350 are known to have died during the famine; besides this, about 50 families have emigrated, and I do not know what their fate has been. Rice ought to have been imported and distributed at the end of March or beginning of April, then much of the mortality would have been prevented. The famine was much worse in the territories of the Rajah of Mohurbhunj than in the Midnapore district.

No. 93.—BABOO NOBEEN CHUNDER NAG.

[Examined at Midnapore, 26th January 1867.]

I reside at Churuka, eight miles east of Midnapore. I hold estates, paying about Rs. 10,000 to Government, situated in the east and south of the Midnapore district. In 1865 the Aaos crop was full. The Amun crop of 1866 was about one-eighth of an average crop. The stores in the hands of the mahajuns were not replenished, as usual, by repayments from the crop of 1865 of the rice which they had lent; thus the stock in the district was very small in February and March, as compared with the corresponding period of other years. In the country about my residence, the laboring class began to suffer from want of food in April; in that month a few died of hunger; the mortality was at its height in August. No centres of relief were established in any of my estates. To my residence, Midnapore was the nearer centre. I doubt whether 6 chittacks is sufficient to support life; 16 chittacks is the ordinary allowance for a man. Of course the distributions did good and saved lives, but they were on a very insufficient scale. There should have been many more centres opened, and the relief should have commenced in April. The daily laborers were not the only class who suffered excessively from the famine; artisans and the class of ryots who had no other cultivation than rice also suffered much. Those who grew mulberry and who reared silk-worms did not suffer; they were very well off. Those who grew sugar-cane did not suffer so severely as those who only grew rice. I have filed a statement of mortality in my estates, but cannot now say how much it was. The Deputy Collector, Hemchunder Kur, went about parts of the district, collecting

subscriptions from the ryots, but not in my estates. One of my tenants, by name Ramdhun Rai, who is well off, has a house in the Jungle Mehals to the west of the district. I asked him to subscribe a rupee; he said that he could not do so, as Baboo Hemchunder had forced his brother to subscribe Rs. 80 or 100 in the Jungle Mehals. He was dissatisfied, and talked of giving a petition to the authorities on the subject. I advised him to speak to Hemchunder on the subject, instead of giving a petition. I do not know what he did.

From what I have heard, I am of opinion that many of the subscriptions were not given voluntarily. Some pressure was put upon the ryots to subscribe. The Police, as well as the servants of the Rajah of Kullianpore, who is a land-owner in the Jungle Mehals, assisted in the matter of raising the subscriptions. I did not hear of any specific instance of oppression except that mentioned by Ramdhun. I did not attend particularly to his story; but he said that they had threatened to place one of his family in confinement if he did not subscribe properly. I have no doubt that there was a good deal of undue pressure put on the ryots in the matter of these subscriptions.

No. 94.—MR. F. ADAMS, District Superintendent of Police, Midnapore.

[Examined at Midnapore, 26th January 1867.]

I have been in this district since July 1863. Last cold season I was on leave for a part of the time, and did not then see very much of the country. In April and May I was out in the Jungle Mehals—from Gurbetah to Gopeebullubpore. In April the people were distressed; there were many beggars, but I don't think actual famine. The people said it was hard to get rice, complained of exports, and wanted to have a fixed price, but they said that people were not actually dying of starvation. Even the beggars did not appear to be starving; most of the women and children were in tolerably good condition. In May things were worse; but I don't think that what can properly be called the famine commenced till June. In May things were worse at Gopeebullubpore than anywhere else that I had seen. That was when Mr. Herschel returned from Mohurbhunj. I met him there. I was not out in the district in the worst famine months. I was employed in managing the transport operations. Rice was principally sent out on pack bullocks; we succeeded in getting it out with very little failure. In the Jungle Mehals I think that there has been a very great mortality. In Dantoon, from its appearance since the famine, I doubt whether any very large proportion of the resident population have died. I should say that most of the deaths there were people from beyond the sub-division itself.

In Midnapore I think the labor given was useful so far as it went, but it did not seem to be on a very extensive scale.

the district, and did not attend all the Committees' meetings. The Collector was the ruling man in the Committee, and my impression is that it was not a question of majority. I should have liked to have given 10 chittacks to the paupers. I think that those who got the smaller quantity generally died in the end. I think that centres were established at a sufficient number of places and as early as might have been expected; the only error was, that enough food was not given. The relief was altogether confined to those who were very reduced in flesh; there was a great mortality among those who were fed, they eat their rice uncooked—it was gone in two minutes. I don't think that relief could have been given more generally with safety; if it had been, all rich and poor together would have come for relief. I saw that myself. I imported 2,000 maunds of rice and some dhal, and sold it at 12 seers per rupee. I found it impossible to discriminate between rich and poor; people sent coolies and women to buy, and it was all snapped up. This was in the station only. My impression is, that if the system of importing rice in such quantities as to serve all comers at say 12 seers per rupee had been followed, more good would have been done than by the relief system. The famine could not have been altogether tided over by this system alone; but to a great extent it might have been so in this district. I have no doubt that there was a great deal of rice in the country, and ryots got advances from the mahajuns; where they could not, we gave advances to our own ryots. I know that the mahajuns made advances throughout the famine, because I see the grain now being repaid. Grain was advanced to be repaid with 50 per cent. addition. The same rule was followed, generally speaking, in the famine year as in other years, because it was the custom, although it must have been a loss to the mahajuns. I know two or three mahajuns who could have made a fortune by selling their rice at the worst time, but they advanced to their clients just as much on the usual terms.

I think that a moderate importation on the part of Government would have been sufficient to keep down prices to 12 seers.

I gave the Collector a statement showing the mortality in one of the largest villages in each of my estates. I think those may be taken as fair specimens of the general rate of mortality in the parts of the district which suffered most. I should judge the rate thus shown to be as near correct as can be.

I think that the people employed on the public works were amply paid, and they could always get rice for their labor. Many worked on the tank here at first, but afterwards the tank got full of water and work could not be carried on. The coolies disappeared and are not now to be found. Labor is now very scarce. I am obliged to import coolies as monthly servants. My opinion is that the laboring people are dead, and that this is the chief cause of the present scarcity of labor.

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I have made enquiries about coolies who were working as late as September, and I now find that one-fourth of them are dead. Our work ceased about then. I think that the people were all along weak, and that when work ceased, they went to their houses and laid down, and eventually many of them died.

At present I think that the district is perfectly well off. I can recommend no remedial measures for the future. The Native is as wide-awake to the advantages of irrigation as we are. There is much irrigation in this district; if a man cannot accomplish irrigation himself, he asks me for it, and we give it. There is a system of bunds in the district, and I have made many. I can't say that the ryots get much assistance in other estates.

I have seen other seasons in which there were as great apparent failure of the crops as in 1865, but no such disastrous results followed. In many places in 1865 the appearance of the crops was no doubt better than the reality, there being eventually more straw than grain.

It is in the jungle tract that irrigation is most wanted.

I can't say why the result of the partial failure of crops was so much more disastrous than in other years. I don't think it was generally due to exportation, but in places no doubt there was over-exportation. I think the ryots as a body are decidedly industrious and very much alive to their own interests. The Sonthals are in some respects about the best; but they drink, and live beyond their income, and can't keep accounts. We have had no indigo difficulties here. We grow no indigo on paddy land. We only grow it on our own estates, and charge no rents for lands in indigo. We give the indigo lands for nothing, and pay a certain rate for the indigo. The indigo land here is principally high land, and has been brought into cultivation specially for the purpose. The system is quite different from that in any other district. The laterite soil bears first-rate indigo. The ryots have had an enormous indigo crop this year. We have also silk business, but not to a large extent, on our estates. Sugar-cane is very largely grown in the district, and there is a very large crop this year. Sugar-cane requires a peculiar kind of land and a considerable capital.

I believe that the part of Maunbhoom adjoining my estates was worse than this district. To the west, south and north of this district there is not a rajah or zemindar who is not irredeemably in debt in spite of the permanent settlement, and they can't give the least assistance to their ryots: I don't know about the east of the district; I have no interest there.

I was very much dissatisfied with the way in which Hemchunder Kur, Deputy Collector, raised subscriptions. He levied them through the Police, that is to say he got the ryots of Jampona through my nail to put down their names for subscriptions, and then sent Police constables to collect the money. I believe that, many of the

ryots were unwilling to pay up, and would not have done so, unless the Police had been sent to collect. I was informed that some of the ryots were put to difficulties to meet the demand, and actually sold their bullocks for this purpose. My assistants, Mr. Sheffield and Mr. Falks, gave me the information, and they could particularize the instances. Thirty or forty of the ryots gave a petition to the Magistrate to the effect that the subscriptions had been levied from them by intimidation, and asking for repayment. The petition was thrown out by the Magistrate without any enquiry, as the petitioners were said to be out of time. I dismissed the whole of my establishment on that estate for the part they took in the matter; they took advantage of the opportunity to reap a harvest for themselves. I heard of the Police using threats to enhance payment, but I know of no definite instances.

No. 97.—CAPTAIN G. B. FISHER, *District Superintendent of Police, Tipperah, formerly District Superintendent of Cuttack.*

[Examined in Calcutta, 2nd February 1867].

I was in the Cuttack district from November 1864 to the 3rd August 1866, that is to say, I gave over charge on the 3rd, left Cuttack on the 5th, and left False Point on the 23rd.

I was out in the district in the latter part of 1865. In the early part of 1866 I only made hurried tours, because I could not get provisions for a camp. I noticed the crops on the ground; many of them were left uncut because there was nothing but dust in the ear, the grain having dried up. This was the case on all the higher lands where water for irrigation could not be got. I think the crop was a complete failure so far as I saw, but I did not see the lower lands. I visited Jajpore and Kendraparah, and the parts of the district in that direction. I did not understand the Ooryah language, and Bengalee very little. I could not converse with the ryots. I did understand Hindoostanee and used that language as far as people understood it. I do not remember that people then said to me that there would be a famine; they only pointed to their dried-up crops, and said what should they do? I visited Kendraparah, Patamonddee, Jajpore, &c., later in the season, on the 30th and 31st March and 1st April. I then particularly noticed that the palkee bearers were scarcely able to carry me. I had to walk a great part of the way. The men looked emaciated and starved, and really unable to carry me; they said they could not get anything to eat. At the Police posts there were constant complaints regarding the scarcity of provisions. I did not then hear that people were actually dying of starvation; it was towards the middle and end of May that this occurred. I was out again twice in April. I did not observe any very marked change. In the beginning of May I was at Jajpore. I thought that the people there looked in good condition. I was at Kendraparah on the 19th May, returning on the 20th. Things were then very bad there.

My men complained much of the difficulty of getting rice. The palkee bearers were very weak. I had to walk the greater part of the way. I saw no actual cases of deaths by starvation at that time. On the 23rd May, in Cuttack, I was mobbed by my own men because they could not get rice. Up to that time I was in almost daily communication with the Magistrate, and told him everything that I saw. I can't remember exactly when my reports first led me to believe that the people of the district were dying of starvation in large numbers. I am aware that by the end of May there was the most serious alarm of famine. I was not out in the district in June. I am aware that on account of the famine grain was sent down to False Point for Cuttack in the early part of June. The Magistrate, in the end of May, applied for my Assistant Mr. Crouch to assist in bringing up the grain. I could not spare him. He and I were both hard at work in office, working ten or twelve hours a day, writing reports consequent on the increased crime, and in fact carrying on the routine work of the office, which was much increased by the famine. Dacoities had been very numerous in the district. May and June were, I think, the worst months in respect of dacoities. I could not send Mr. Crouch out to enquire into dacoity cases; there was so much office work. The work was so heavy that in June I applied to be relieved. I was ill from hard work, and applied to be exchanged to some other district in Bengal. I did not then say that I must resign if not transferred, but I afterwards did demiofficially say so; that I think was some time in July. The work continued very heavy in July. I believe that at that time I forwarded an application, for privilege leave, from Mr. Crouch, with my recommendation that it should be granted, and a statement that he could be much better spared in the rains than at any other time; but I think that the application was for leave from the 1st of September.

Q.—Do you think that your action in that matter was consistent with what you have said of the state of the criminal work, and the fact that a famine of unprecedented severity was then raging in the district?

A.—Yes, because I was of opinion that as Government was sending rice as fast as possible, and relief was being organized, crime would greatly diminish. I thought that the duty of the Police would only be to guard the rice against robbery and cope with crime, there being a staff of officers on purpose for the other famine duties. Mr. McNeile and Mr. Kirkwood were sent for the purpose, and I think some Deputy Collectors. I cannot call to mind that any general order was given by the superior Police authorities throughout the famine, directing the Police to assist generally and not to confine themselves to their own proper duties; at least I do not at this moment remember any such order.

I pressed the matter of my own transfer. I was ill from over-work. I was directed to furnish a medical certificate. Dr. Coates, who had attended me, was then temporarily absent from the station;

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but I was in a hurry, being ill, and hoping to catch a ship—the *Charles Maureau*—at False Point,—she was expected to sail on the 6th,—I therefore got a certificate from the Doctor of the Regiment, and made over charge the same day. I got to False Point, going down the stream of the Mahanuddee, on the 6th, but found that the *Charles Maureau* was delayed by a hurricane which had sunk the boats. She did not leave till the 23rd. I went in her. My health was not much better or worse for my stay at False Point. I had fever constantly. I was eight days in getting to Calcutta. When I got there I was better. I applied for leave, but stated that being better I should be unable to procure a medical certificate there.

When I left Cuttack, I considered that my health was such that it would be impossible for me to await the arrival of a successor, the more so on account of the excessive work going on, and because I thought that if I did not get away by the opportunity of the *Charles Maureau*, I might not have another opportunity for some time.

I wish to add that when I found myself unable to spare Mr. Crouch, I sent Mr. Hall an Inspector, but when I found that he did not carry on the work satisfactorily, I sent Mr. Crouch at considerable inconvenience to myself. I thought that Mr. Hall, drawing a high salary in the Department, should be competent. He was a European Sergeant; he understands Hindustanee but not Ooryah; nor does Mr. Crouch understand Ooryah. I sent Mr. Crouch myself on my own motion; I never was ordered to do so either by the Magistrate or the Commissioner.

No. 98.—MR. H. LEONARD, C. E.

[Examined at Calcutta, 22nd February 1867.]

I officiated as Superintending Engineer, Cuttack Circle, for the months of August, September and October 1866. I left Calcutta about the 7th August. I went to Cuttack by the Trunk Road, stopping at Midnapore a week; four or five days at Balasore; a day at Soroh, and a day at Bhudruk. I reached Cuttack about the 24th August. The first signs of the famine that I saw were at Oolaberriah, but they were not great. Between Oolaberriah and Midnapore, I noticed constant symptoms of famine. In Midnapore itself there were what seemed to me excessive signs of famine. Between Midnapore and Balasore things were very much worse than they were on the other side of Midnapore. Dantoon was excessively bad. Between Dantoon and Balasore it seemed to me that nine-tenths of the people whom I saw were famine-stricken, but some did not appear to be in that condition. I saw dead bodies constantly lying about. At Balasore I found the state of things very bad, but not much worse than at Midnapore. I do not think it could have been much worse. Between Balasore and Cuttack the state of the country was the same as I had seen between Dantoon and Balasore. In the town of Cuttack, things did not seem to me so bad as at Balasore; but I had no great opportunities of judging. I remained in Cuttack

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until about the 3rd or 4th September, and then went to Pooree. On the road to Pooree the state of things was much the same as I had seen before; but at Pooree itself I thought the state of the starving people was worse than any thing I had before witnessed. I do not myself know why they were worse off, but I told Mr. Barlow that such was my impression, and he seemed to be greatly astonished, as he appeared to anticipate that the contrary was the case. I believe he called a meeting of the Committee on this subject. I formed an opinion at the time that Mr. Barlow and the European officials at Pooree had their time so much occupied with the landing operations, and all the arrangements connected with the storing and forwarding the rice, that they had not sufficient leisure to look after those relating to feeding the starving people. But I wish to add that this was merely a casual opinion formed by myself, and that I am not prepared to support it with facts. I stayed five or six days at and about Pooree, and then returned to Cuttack, where I remained some time. About the middle of September, on the occurrence of the second high flood, I went again to the Pooree district, sailing down the Burgoree River into the Chilka Lake, and up the Dia River back to Cuttack. I remained there about a week, and then came up the Trunk Road again by Balasore to Calcutta, where I arrived on the 1st November.

When I first travelled from Balasore to Cuttack, the great floods of the early part of August had occurred; on the line of road between Soroh and Jajpoor some damage to the crops had been done, but it was insignificant as compared with the whole extent of the crops. During the course of my tour in the Pooree district, I saw great damage to the crops, especially in the vicinity of the Chilka. Between Cuttack and Pooree the proportion of the country injured was not very great. About the Chilka, however, that is, over a margin of eight or ten miles round the Lake, I should say that three-fourths of the cultivation were destroyed. I wish to add that these statements in regard to proportions are made purely on guess; I have no accurate data to guide me. While I was in Orissa, public works in any department were not in progress on a very large scale, partly because during the whole of that time it was the rainy season and the country was more or less under water, and partly because the majority of the people were not in a condition to work. At that time no great relief compared with the extent of the distress was afforded by the public works. I think that as a general rule all the Public Works officers did their best, during the time that I held charge of the circle, to afford relief by pushing on works. I did find fault with some of the Executive Engineers for not doing as much as I expected; but I believe that I was influenced to a great extent by my suddenly witnessing such an extremity of distress, and by my great anxiety to urge on measures of relief. I cannot particularize any district, in which I can say that generally more effective measures were adopted than in others. I thought, however, that the best arrangements both connected with public works and relief operations

that I saw, were at Bhudruk, in the Balasore district. At Balasore I think that the public works as relief measures were the least successful of any in the circle. Generally, the laborers were paid by piece-work throughout the circle. In this mode of working, there is always some difficulty in giving employment to all, particularly to women, as the people form themselves into gangs. Undoubtedly, by the daily labor system there is greater facility in providing employment for every individual who chooses to apply for it. We had unlimited power to spend money while I was in the circle; but for the reasons given above, there was not opportunity for spending much. I formed a general impression that the Ooryahs were less able to help themselves than any I have seen in other parts of the country. I myself saw people begging for relief actually on works in progress, and who, when work was offered to them, refused it, because they said they had never done that kind of work and would not do it now. I also saw people dying close to the relief stations, because they would not eat the food offered to them, as being against their caste. As regards the proper laboring classes, accustomed to work, I do not think the Ooryah coolies are worse than those of Bengal, as boatmen I thought them extremely good. I thought the soil of Orissa generally very good, especially that of the Pooree district. I saw more of that district than any other, and was struck with the depth and richness of the soil. I thought the silt of the Mahanuddee much richer than that of the Ganges: the former river brings down heavier sand, which deposits rapidly and over smaller areas, while the fertilising silt, as distinguished from the sand, is distributed over the country. I do not think that Orissa is in so much need of irrigation as other parts of the country, for instance, the North-Western Provinces, where the rain-fall is much less; nevertheless, I believe that irrigation would be of great service. I enquired from many ryots why they did not take the Irrigation Company's water, and the invariable reply was that they could not afford to pay the high water rate demanded; in no one instance was the impending settlement mentioned as a reason. I think the Trunk Road from Calcutta to Cuttack, if Government supply necessary funds and finish it properly, will be of great use and largely used; although for heavy traffic from Calcutta to Cuttack no doubt water carriage, if complete, will always have the advantage. I think it would be greatly to be regretted, if the Trunk Road were not to be completed.

No. 99.—MR. T. GEARY, Light House Superintendent and Assistant Collector of Customs at False Point.

[Examined at Calcutta, 2nd February 1867.]

I have been in my present situation since February 1863; before that I was Deputy Harbour Master in the Port of Calcutta. I was at False Point when grain was sent down in June 1866. The first Government vessel with rice arrived on

the 5th June. No rice had been exported from False Point that year; not a pound. The last ship went to Colombo in 1865. I do not recollect the date. It was Mr. Fressanges, the Agent of Messrs. Charriol and Co., who used to export from False Point. He lived at Cuttack, but used to come to False Point when ships arrived. He told me that there was every likelihood of scarcity of rice and a famine; and I consequently got from him a stock of rice for the Light House people and myself. This was in the latter end of 1865,—some six or seven months before the Government rice came. In consequence of this precaution, I had rice until the *Court Hey* arrived, that is, I had enough for myself and my servants. In the spring of 1866, the Government servants, for whom I had not provided rice, found difficulty in procuring it, and I reported the matter to the Master Attendant. When the first ship arrived on the 5th June there had been no arrangements made for landing the rice. I received orders to make arrangements some days previous, and was told that orders had been given to collect boats, but no boats had arrived. There were some boats of Mr. Fressanges' there, but they were not capable of floating; they had not been used for some time, and worms had got into their bottoms. I had three boats, but was only able to man two, and I used them night and day to land rice. Mr. Fressanges' boats were never brought into use; one was repaired afterwards, but it was never used; it never landed a bag of rice. I carried on work with the Light House boats until Mr. Fressanges' Assistant came down from the interior. I unloaded the better part of the *Court Hey's* cargo before he came. He brought a number of boats, but they were all out of repairs. He landed the whole of the *Jacques Forestier's* cargo. The boats were all employed in unloading; there were none to spare to carry the rice up the river. Boats can pass through up to Taldunda without unloading, but they ran great risk. It was always Mr. Fressanges' practice to unload, at his godowns, boats coming down the river with rice, and then send it on board vessels in other boats. After the *Jacques Forestier* was unloaded, there was delay in sending up the rice, because it did not belong to Government. After some time, I got orders that 500 bags had been paid for, and a little time later I was informed that the whole cargo had been purchased. I cannot say exactly what delay took place, or on what date the above orders were given. I believe the *Court Hey's* cargo was sent up the river by Mr. Delagatinais, in boats collected in the interior with the aid of the police. An elderly gentleman named Hall, belonging to the Police, was sent down. He could talk Hindoostanee, and appeared to be very energetic for his age. The *Jacques Forestier's* cargo was sent up in the same way. I think another vessel, called the *Gustave*, came in before the latter cargo was all off. From that time there were vessels continually arriving with rice. From the 6th September I was on a sick bed for three months, and cannot speak of the events of that time. I had an European Assistant, Mr. Workman, who was appointed long before the famine was

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20. Q.—Was there any general correspondence as regards the out-turn of the crops?

A.—I don't know that there was, on that specific subject.

21. Q.—Has it been the habit to grant remissions of revenue in Orissa on the occasion of great calamities?

A.—It has been the practice to do so, even without great calamities, in any severe season.

22. Q.—In 1865, did not the Board lay down the principle that remissions of revenue were to be granted in the case of general calamities as distinguished from special and local ones?

A.—Scarcely to that extent. The Board laid down two principles,—*1st.*, that no enquiries into losses from calamities should be instituted without their previous sanction; and, *2ndly.*, that when injury to the crops was confined to a few estates an enquiry was unnecessary.

23. Q.—Was not the principle fully admitted and accepted that when there was a general calamity, remissions would be granted?

A.—Certainly.

24. Q.—Was it not the case that all three Collectors in Orissa applied, in the autumn of 1865, for permission to make enquiries with reference to the crop?

A.—It might be said that the Collectors of Balasore and Cuttack did recommend such an enquiry. Mr. Barlow, of Pooree, only laid the question before the Board whether there should be such an enquiry or not.

25. Q.—Was it not the case that the Commissioner sanctioned Mr. Barlow's making enquiries provisionally, subject to the approval of the Board?

A.—He does not appear to have sanctioned that exactly; but he did sanction preliminary enquiries.

26. Q.—Did not the Board disapprove his having done so, and also negative the applications from Cuttack and Balasore?

A.—Yes, they did.

27. Q.—Had the Board reason to suppose, at that time, that the failure of the crops was not such as to amount to a general calamity, or to make it proper that remissions of revenue should be granted, or on what grounds did the Board negative the applications for enquiry?

A.—The grounds on which the Board came to their decision are contained in their letter No. 18A dated 10th January 1866, which is a verbatim copy of a minute by Mr. Cockburn, acquiesced in by Mr. Grote. Evidently, at that time, the Board were not aware of the extent of the calamity that had befallen the province.

28. Q.—Does it seem to you that it was possible to ascertain the extent of the calamity if enquiry was prohibited?

A.—I remember generally that there was, at that time, an impression at the Board that the high prices ruling in the province would, to a considerable extent, repay the landholders for the deficiency

of the crop. I cannot answer for the grounds on which the Members of the Board issued the order.

29. Q.—The report of the Board of the 25th November was made under a special order of Government; but as regards the general line between the duties of Government and the Board in respect to administrative matters, such as a famine, are you prepared to explain what are the relative functions of Government and the Board. What do you consider to be the duty of the Board in regard to such matters?

A.—I am not aware of any rules or instructions laying down the Board's duties in connection with such a thing as a famine. I can only suppose that, following the precedent of the North Western Provinces, the administration of the famine was placed in the hands of the Board. I had myself, at the time, grave doubts whether it was the proper duty of the Board; but it was, of course, the business of the Board to obey the instructions of the Government on the subject.

30. Q.—Can you point out any paper where the relative duties of the Board and the Government in administrative matters will be found to be defined?

A.—No; I cannot. But I look on the Board as a subordinate branch of the Government in the Revenue Department, which is administered through the Board.

31. Q.—As a matter of fact, after the Board had made their report, do you consider that the Board were instructed by the Government to charge themselves with the duty of looking after the state of the country with reference to the known scarcity and possible famine of which apprehensions had then been expressed?

A.—I think the tenor of the Government orders to the Board, on which their report was prepared, and of the reply of the Government to that report, showed, distinctly enough, that it was intended that the Board should undertake the charge of all measures for the relief of famine, and that it was so understood,—apart from public works generally, with which the Board had nothing to do, and which were under the Public Works Department.

32. Q.—Were not the Board charged with those public works which were under the Government Estates Improvement Fund?

A.—The Board were charged with the supervision of public works undertaken on account, of Government estates, of which they were in direct possession, or with the management of which Government was at the time charged.

33. Q.—In fact was it not the Board who, having first issued an order that these local works should be paid for in grain, afterwards, with advertence to an order of Government in the Public Works Department, directed that the works should be paid for in cash and not in grain?

A.—Yes, it was.

34. Q.—As a matter of fact do you consider that, notwithstanding the presence of His Honor

the Lieutenant Governor, the Members of the Board considered themselves charged with the famine administration?

A.—Yes, certainly so, in communication with the Lieutenant Governor.

35. Q.—Was it not the case that, immediately after the despatch of the report of the 25th November, a very emergent telegram was received from the Collector of Pooree, representing extreme starvation in his district, and begging of the Board to seek for public aid?

A.—Yes, it was.

36. Q.—And that in consequence an active and extensive correspondence resulted?

A.—Yes, referring to a special part of the district.

37. Q.—It appears from the correspondence that it was, at one time, the intention of the Board to send rice to Meetakooah for the support of the starving population of Malood and Parricood. Can you tell us why that intention was abandoned?

A.—The reason why the rice was not sent was that the coasting steamer that was going could not take it, and that a vessel was leaving for Gopalpoor with rice on a private account. Apparently, the telegram, intimating that the rice could not be sent, never reached the Collector of Pooree; but on the 13th December, expecting the rice to arrive, the Collector wrote to the Board, asking leave to offer the rice for sale at the port of arrival at the coast, instead of sending it to the interior, because he could then buy it cheaper. (Puts in letter of the 13th December from Mr. Barlow.) It appears from that letter that rice was supposed to be procurable in that part of the district at the time.

38. Q.—Is it not clear that that letter has reference to the sale of the rice which the Collector expected to be sent to Gopalpoor, in the Ganjam district, and which he wished to sell not on the coast of his own district, but because it had gone to another district, the transport from which would involve a large expense of carriage, &c.?

A.—The Collector had never been told, nor had it ever been designed, to send Government rice to Gopalpoor. Apparently, from his letter, he had misunderstood the telegram saying that rice was coming to Meetakooah to mean that it was coming to Gopalpoor; but still his letter shows clearly the very important point that rice was procurable on the spot, and that it was not worth while to bring it 50 or 60 miles to supply the market.

39. Q.—Can you tell us the Members of the Board who determined to send rice, and those who afterwards determined not to send it?

A.—I have every reason to believe that the orders were issued, after personal discussion, by both Members of the Board, but I cannot answer for both. I may say, however, that Mr. Trevor was very ill at the time, and frequently not at the Board. I remember, at all events, that Mr. Grote consented to all three telegrams; but I cannot say, for certain, about Mr. Trevor.

40. Q.—On the question whether all works should be paid in cash or in grain, was there any special consultation or discussion on the subject?

A.—There was, from the outset. In the note already put in I proposed specially that all wages for relief labor done should be paid in food; but it was resolved on a *viva voce* discussion not to include that proposal in the other proposals made in the Board's report regarding the relief of the distress.

41. Q.—Did not the Board, in the first instance, direct that wages should be paid in grain?

A.—They did on the 12th December 1865.

42. Q.—Can you give us any particulars as to how it came about that an order, directly to the contrary sense, was afterwards issued?

A.—In two different orders by Government in the Public Works Department, which were communicated to the Board, the Lieutenant Governor distinctly disapproved of wages of laborers employed on public works being paid in grain. The Board, therefore, withdrew their orders, which had been passed on a contrary principle.

43. Q.—Did the Board think themselves bound by the departmental rules of the Public Works Department?

A.—They certainly thought themselves bound to follow the orders of Government on a matter of principle of that kind. Mr. Grote was always opposed to payment in grain.

44. Q.—Is it clear that in the Public Works Department, the order was passed as a matter of principle and not rather as a matter of departmental convenience. Did you not find that in the order of the Public Works Department, the officers of that department were referred to the civil authorities for the provision of grain for the workmen, and does it not, therefore, seem that the principle, if it be a principle, will hardly apply to works carried on under the civil authorities themselves?

A.—The Board certainly did not so regard it at the time; and I think now that the orders, especially paragraph 3 of Government order, No. 6178 dated 30th December 1865, mean that all laborers paid for relief purposes should be paid in money, the question of arranging for the supply of food being kept entirely distinct.

45. Q.—By what Members of the Board were the orders to pay in grain originally passed?

A.—By Mr. Grote alone in the telegram dated 12th December 1865. Orders to the same effect were drafted in a letter dated 22nd December 1865, but were modified by both Members before the draft issued. Both Members signed the modified draft,—I mean Messrs. Grote and Cockburn. In the modified letter that issued on that date the previous orders were not withdrawn, they were simply not repeated.

46. Q.—By whom was the order prohibiting payment in grain issued?

A.—By Mr. Grote alone.

47. Q.—Do you remember whether there was any particular discussion. Is it usual that a matter of such importance should be decided by one Member without reference to the other Member?

A.—The subject had been discussed fully on the draft already alluded to. Mr. Cockburn does not appear to have seen the letter of the 26th January, which appears to me to do nothing more than carry out the orders of Government in accordance with the principle already resolved on by the Board.

48. Q.—What was the nature of the communication with Government which led to the issue of the telegram to Cuttack, dated the 1st February 1866, announcing the determination of Government not to import grain for the food of the people employed on relief works?

A.—There was no special communication with Government on the Commissioner's telegram, and, in so far as the telegraphic reply of the Board conveys an opposite impression, it is erroneous. The Board worded the telegram on the belief that, at the time, it was the established policy of Government to rely for the payment of relief labor on the local markets, and on the ground that the local reports showed that the retail price of rice in the interior was reasonable.

49. Q.—Who were the Members of the Board by whose order the telegram was issued?

A.—By Messrs. Grote and Cockburn. I put in the original order. I may observe that so little grave importance was attached to that special telegram that, until it was recalled to my memory, I did not know of its existence. There is nothing in the general correspondence of the time, as far as I know, that shows that the local authorities considered it necessary to import rice.

50. Q.—Is it your impression that the information conveyed by the Commissioner's telegram of the 31st January 1866 was, in any shape whatever, at any time, conveyed to Government?

A.—That special telegram was not; but, speaking generally, the Government were kept intimately informed of every thing bearing on the famine that the Board were aware of. As far as I remember, the Board did not attach any special importance to that telegram. They would certainly have expected a detailed and urgent report from the Commissioner to follow the telegram had it been really of extreme importance.

51. Q.—Was there at that time any system of official meeting between the Lieutenant Governor and the Members of the Board of Revenue?

A.—No; not at that time.

52. Q.—Do you know anything of any interview between the Members of the Board and the Government alluded to in a letter No. 1148½ dated 8th December 1865?

A.—I remember the fact of an interview, but do not know the particulars. It was solely on the question of exporting salt from Mallood.

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53. Q.—Do you remember any other special discussion between the Members of the Board and the Lieutenant Governor about that time, in the months before the Lieutenant Governor went to Orissa?

A.—There was none that I am aware of.

54. Q.—Do you remember in what health Mr. Cockburn was before he went down to Orissa with the Lieutenant Governor?

A.—In very fair health; quite able to attend to business. He fell ill in Orissa; and, from the time he came back, he was not in a state to attend to business.

55. Q.—Do you know if Mr. Cockburn went to Orissa for any special purpose, or merely to accompany His Honor the Lieutenant Governor?

A.—Only to accompany the Lieutenant Governor, at his special request. He did not go, as deputed by the Board, with reference to famine or any other matters. I don't know what the Lieutenant Governor may have had in his mind.

56. Q.—I suppose we may take it as a fact that when Mr. Cockburn went with the Lieutenant Governor, he was well aware that the Commissioner had reported that the famine relief was at a standstill for want of rice?

A.—Yes, from that one isolated telegram. But, as far as I remember, no serious impression had been made thereby on the Board's mind; and if it had, it was relieved by the knowledge that the Lieutenant Governor was personally then going to Orissa, when no doubt such subjects would be fully discussed.

57. Q.—Are you aware whether any information on the subject of the relief works and of the famine in general derived during the visit of the Lieutenant Governor and Mr. Cockburn to Orissa was in any way brought to the notice of the Board?

A.—I am not. As I have already said, Mr. Cockburn was, on his return, in a state of exceeding ill-health; but I was in constant personal communication with him, and certainly derived from my intercourse with him an impression that he was not seriously anxious about Orissa. I must no doubt have spoken about it constantly; but do not remember any special occasion.

58. Q.—Are you aware if the Lieutenant Governor made any special communications to the Board on the subject after his return?

A.—I do not remember any?

59. Q.—Do you remember to have heard from Mr. Cockburn that the starving population surrounded the Lieutenant Governor and him, showing the roots and jungle produce on which they were feeding, and praying for relief, and that Mr. Cockburn had taken those things and shown them to the Lieutenant Governor?

A.—I don't remember hearing any thing of the kind.

60. Q.—We find that, immediately after receipt of your telegram of the 1st February, Mr. Ravenshaw issued a series of letters to the Collector of Pooree, in which he informed him that the Government and the Board of Revenue had both finally decided that the wages of laborers should be paid in money and not in grain, in which he also, applying the same principle, forbade the Collector to pay in food labor employed by private subscription to clear the Narendra tank under the direction of the Collector, and in which, thanking Mr. Barlow for his well-directed and vigorous exertions, he informed him that it would not be necessary for him to take any further steps to purchase rice or to supply it to the people except by affording encouragement to private traders. Was that correspondence in any way brought to the notice or knowledge of the Board as far as you know?

A.—I am not aware that it was. In ordinary course, such a correspondence, if not directly reported to the Board, would come to their notice in the Commissioner's abstract of important proceedings (an abstract, that is to say, of all important letters of a Commissioner not specially reported). I find that, for several months, from February onwards, the Commissioner of Cuttack's abstract was returned blank, partly no doubt because almost every letter of importance at that time was reported directly, and partly because, from the pressure of work, his office must have been somewhat disorganized.

61. Q.—Can you tell us what was the occasion of a letter No. 34A of the 24th January 1866, from the Board to Government, with reference to prices of food in the Pooree district?

A.—It had reference to the scheme for the encouragement of a trade between Chittagong and the Pooree Coast in salt and grain, and was founded on a letter, No. 307 dated 25th December 1865, from Mr. Barlow, the Collector of Pooree, stating that he had ascertained that Chittagong rice could not be landed at Pooree at more than 10 or 12 Bengal seers per rupee, and that, therefore, under the then present condition of the local market, it would be useless to order grain to be imported.

62. Q.—We observe that that letter of the Collector of Pooree was dated the 25th December 1865, a month before the date of the letter to which we have referred. Was not the Board aware that intermediately rice had become much dearer than at Pooree. Are you aware that on the day on which the Board's letter was written (the 24th January) common rice was selling at Pooree at 6½ local seers per rupee?

A.—Seeing that, according to the return made to us for the week ending the 15th January, which must have been the latest return that the Board had, the price of rice at Pooree was 13 Bengal seers per rupee, and at all the markets in the interior of the district much lower, it is evident that the Board were not aware that rice was selling at that time at 6½ seers, and that, as far as the Collector's returns showed, it was positively cheaper then than at the time he wrote his

letter. I may add that Mr. Barlow's letter of the 25th December was not reported to Government at the time of its receipt; but that the subject was revived and the matter reported to Government on a demi-official letter from the Commissioner of Chittagong to Mr. Grote, stating that the Chittagong merchants were unwilling to import rice into Pooree, thinking they could get a better market in the Southern Ports, and that one or two vessels that had been to Pooree had spread a report that there was then, at all events, no scarcity and no chance of getting a paying price there. The date of this letter is torn off, but the post mark is apparently the 16th January, and Mr. Grote's order for the report to Government is dated the 19th.

63. Q.—Was the Board aware that at that time a French rice ship was lying stranded at Pooree, and that the presence of that vessel a good deal affected the local markets?

A.—I cannot say, from memory, whether the Board were aware of that or not. But the weekly returns of prices does not show any spasmodic effect on the Pooree market from any such cause.

64. Q.—Was any attempt made by the Board to purchase the cargo of that ship, the *Philaneme*, which came ashore in December, and the cargo of which, in consequence of the difficulty about the insurance, seems not to have been taken away till the beginning of February?

A.—The Board had no idea of purchasing at that time at all. The prices returned to them, periodically, showed no indication that it could be proper for them at that time to do so; nor did other circumstances lead them to suppose that, if it were profitable to purchase the *Philanemes'* cargo, there would not be a single merchant at Pooree willing to do so.

65. Q.—The Board had learnt that the relief works were stopped for want of rice; and there being no power to sell the *Philaneme's* cargo at Pooree, might not the Board have bought that cargo from the Agents in Calcutta with advantage to all parties, the price of rice in Pooree then being according to the returns, a little above 8 Calcutta seers per rupee?

A.—The prices shown by the latest returns at that time before the Board, being the week ending the 23rd of January, was, not a little over 8 seers, but 10½ seers, and in the interior of the district very much cheaper. However that may be, there was certainly, at that time, no thought of purchasing rice on public account, nor had any serious report been made to the Board that there was any such deficiency of rice in the local market that would make it proper for them to do so.

66. Q.—Had the Board reason to believe that grain was easily to be had in considerable quantities in the Pooree district at the prices quoted?

A.—At that time there was nothing whatever to lead the Board to distrust the returns. On the contrary, there had been correspondence not very long before, which I have already produced, which seemed to show that rice was procur-

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able in quantities. The returns were published as received, and on every occasion that the prices therein given were impugned, enquiry was made. They were only impugned, as far as I know, on two occasions, on both of which occasions enquiry was made.

67. Q.—Was the enquiry such as to satisfy the Board that the prices current received by them were reliable or not?

A.—The result of the earlier enquiry raised no suspicion in the Board's mind; but on the second occasion, Mr. Barlow acknowledged that the retail prices he had returned for Tangrah might be looked on as nominal prices, and that in fact rice was not procurable there in any quantity at all. In the same way, much later in the season, enquiry at Chittagong revealed that the market price there was no test whatever of rice being available in any considerable quantities, for, although it was returned at 16 seers per rupee, careful enquiry showed that there was no considerable quantity to be had; a single cargo was not to be procured. From that time, no doubt, the Board felt that only a very modified value could be attached to the retail prices current as a guide to stocks.

68. Q.—Is it then your impression that the prices current received and published by the Board are not to be implicitly relied on?

A.—My impression is that as regards the present price of rice they are reliable only to the extent of showing the actual price at which rice is retailed on the spot. They are no indication whatever of whether rice is procurable in quantities or not. As regards the "ordinary prices at this season," I believe the returns to be of no great value.

69. Q.—To the extent of indicating the prices, the actual retail prices, do you think the returns are in almost all cases perfectly reliable?

A.—Seeing the way in which these prices current have misled me, I can hardly venture to say that I have any absolute confidence in them even to that extent; yet it is extremely difficult to understand how the local authorities in the districts in which famine was impending should not have taken steps to satisfy themselves that a return on a matter of such vital importance was not at any rate nearly correct.

70. Q.—If you were a merchant, would you be willing to risk a large sum of money in making a contract on the faith of the Board's prices current, without further private enquiry on the point?

A.—Probably not; and I don't suppose any merchant would attempt to make a large venture without enquiry; but the Board's prices current would direct me in what places to make enquiries.

71. Q.—Are we to understand that no special instructions were received by the Board in consequence of the Lieutenant Governor's visit to Cuttack?

A.—No special instructions were received as far as I remember.

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72. Q.—From that time the price of rice got dearer and dearer. Did the Board in consequence make any special enquiry?

A.—Not, I think, till the end of April; but up to that time the rise of prices was extremely gradual and even fluctuating; it sometimes went back.

73. Q.—On what date did Mr. Schalch join the Board of Revenue?

A.—On the 4th of April 1866.

74. Q.—Did Mr. Schalch ever communicate to the Board that he, as Chairman of the Municipality of Calcutta, had received a letter from Mr. Barlow, asking if there was a balance of any famine fund available for the relief of the poor?

A.—Not that I know of.

75. Q.—Do you think that the special knowledge possessed by Mr. Schalch regarding Orissa, and especially regarding the winds and mode of navigation of the coast, which stopped private trade from the turn of the monsoons in March, at all altered the policy or the measures of the Board as previously constituted?

A.—I don't think so at all. It was not till much later than that that the Board began to think seriously of the expediency of importing. All my answers to questions of this character must be taken with the reservation that I speak for myself, and not on the part of the Members of the Board.

76. Q.—Do you think that in the course of the month of April, the attention of the Board was directed to the correspondence regarding the famine in Orissa which began to appear in the newspapers, and also to the appeals for aid from the public, which were made by Messrs. Sykes and Muspratt. Did you not in fact yourself, in an almost official letter regarding the prices of food in Orissa, officially published, express your opinion that the time had come to take measures to collect a general fund for the relief of the distress; and did you press that opinion on the Members of the Board of Revenue?

A.—No doubt the attention of the Board had been directed to those letters, and undoubtedly, from those letters, to the subject to which they referred. At the same time I may state that the portion of my letter which advocates a general public subscription was not written in my official character, nor with the privity of the Members of the Board of Revenue. I did not even then consider that the calamity was hopelessly beyond the reach of private charity on a large scale, and until the interference of Government to provide funds became absolutely necessary, I was of opinion that it was extremely desirable to afford help to the people from private sources supplemented by Government aid, but so as to preserve its private character.

77. Q.—Did not the Lieutenant Governor leave for Darjeeling in the month of April?

A.—I believe so.

78. Q.—Do you know whether there was any special consultation on the subject of the famine in Orissa before the Lieutenant Governor went, or whether any special instructions or directions on the subject were received by the Board?

A.—I am not aware that there was.

79. Q.—After the end of April, had the Members of the Board or you any special or demi-official correspondence with the Commissioner or Collectors regarding the increasing famine in Orissa?

A.—I cannot answer for the Members of the Board. I had myself a private correspondence with the Collectors and the Commissioner, if not at the end of April, at all events early in May. At that time, in common with other gentlemen in Calcutta, I was engaged in arranging the preliminaries for a public meeting to collect money, and I wrote to the Commissioner and to each Collector in the division, begging them to furnish me with details of the distress and an estimate of their requirements to place before the meeting. I regret that Mr. Ravenshaw's letter to me on the subject has been mislaid; but I remember well that he then estimated the requirements of the province at 2½ lacs of rupees, which he arrived at by a detailed, and apparently very liberal, calculation. The letters of the Collectors were published at the time in the *Englishman*.

80. Q.—Up to that time had not your reliance on Mr. Ravenshaw been very much shaken?

A.—No, I cannot say it was at all. On the contrary, I may state that in our preliminary report, Mr. Ravenshaw's administration was characterized as humane and sagacious, and that character fully accorded with my own personal experience of Mr. Ravenshaw, whom I have believed till now to have exerted himself most laboriously throughout the whole course of the famine.

81. Q.—Are the Board usually at all consulted about the appointment of Commissioners or about their movements?

A.—Not at all as far as I know as regards the appointment of Commissioners; but a Commissioner reports to the Board his departure from, and arrival at, each station. It is certainly open to the Board to overrule the arrangements of the Commissioner for his tour; but inasmuch as the Commissioner is subordinate in other departments to the Government, it would be unusual to do so.

82. Q.—Did the conduct of Mr. Ravenshaw, in absents himself entirely from his Regulation Districts in the early months of the scarcity, at all come under the consideration of the Board, and did not the circumstance that he had never visited those districts materially detract from the weight to be given to his opinion?

A.—The Board had no reason to suppose that the Tributary Mehals were not quite as badly off as the Regulation Districts, and they were made acquainted from time to time that Mr. Ravenshaw was occupied in enquiries bearing on the famine in those districts. I don't know if it struck them at

the time that Mr. Ravenshaw had not personally visited the Regulation Districts, but the Commissioner was in daily correspondence and in constant intercourse with the District Officers; and in any case, the Board had at the time no *a priori* reason to doubt or distrust the reports that reached them from the local authorities, including the Commissioner, who certainly throughout showed no sign of not being thoroughly alive to the serious nature of the calamity that had befallen the province.

83. Q.—Do you think that it did not strike the Board that Mr. Ravenshaw's reports regarding the large stock of grain in the province were of a very rash character, and that they were wholly unsupported by any details, or by the mention of any reliable authority for his view?

A.—I cannot say what struck the Members of the Board; but, personally, I certainly never placed any reliance on the estimates of stock made by Mr. Ravenshaw or any one else. On looking back, I consider it to have been rash and imprudent in him to have made them. At the same time, as far as the Board were aware, they were not made without enquiry. On the contrary, I can remember once, at any rate, if not oftener, Mr. Ravenshaw speaking of personal investigations in the houses of the people with the view of ascertaining the stock in each house.

84. Q.—Can you mention to what investigations you allude, because the only investigation apparent in our records is an investigation made at Pooree, which resulted in the very decided opinion of the officers concerned that the large stocks said to exist did not in fact exist?

A.—The investigation to which I refer was reported in a demi-official letter, on which I cannot lay my hands. It may have been the very letter lost, see Answer 79; but I well remember the fact, and that the result reported was that there were considerable stores of grain in each house, although the Commissioner could not procure supplies for his own establishment. I think this was from Mohurbhunj. At any rate, my impression was that Mr. Ravenshaw was making, in every direction, active personal enquiry.

85. Q.—Mr. Ravenshaw has given a most harrowing description of the scenes of famine which he witnessed in Balasore in the middle of April. He did not make the official report till the 2nd of May, and he was then at Mohurbhunj, and reported direct to Government. Had the Board at that time any knowledge of the state of famine existing in Balasore?

A.—The only source from which the Board were aware of the extremity was from the letters in the newspapers from Mr. Muspratt and others.

86. Q.—Were the Board aware that when the famine was becoming excessive, it had been found necessary for Mr. Ravenshaw to leave his district for Mohurbhunj, and that he in fact left Balasore on the 20th of April, and did not return for upwards of a month?

A.—The Board knew that Mr. Ravenshaw had gone to Mohurbhunj, but, as stated before, they

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were under the impression that he had gone there in connection with the famine enquiries and in communication with the Government.

87. Q.—In such a crisis was it not thought necessary to make some special arrangement for the charge of his district during his absence, or at least to direct the Collectors to make special reports to the Board regarding the famine?

A.—As far as I know, the Board had not at that time recognized the crisis as requiring any such special instructions; but any Collector would, under the circumstances, be expected, whenever any good could come of it, to address the Board or the Government direct, without special instructions on the subject.

88. Q.—With the knowledge which you obtained from subsequent reports of the state of the Pooree and Balasore districts in the month of April, does it seem to you that there was a break and as it were hiatus in the official communications, which has to be accounted for, and if so, how do you account for it?

A.—Judging by the event, certainly. Had the Board been aware that famine in its extremity was coming on, there is no doubt that full and extraordinary and careful precautions would have been taken. I account for this not having been done by the fact that, even at that date, famine in its extremity was not expected.

89. Q.—The Collectors of Pooree and Balasore seem to have been fully alive to the state of their districts; but to have been in some sense timid as respects boldly reporting their opinions. Mr. Barlow especially, who had telegraphed in a very uncompromising way early in the season, speaks in his later letters as if he felt reporting the probability of famine to be a very heavy responsibility, and instead of emergent telegrams, such as he had formerly sent, he sent only formal official reports by a very round-about channel. Can you at all account for this apparent feeling on the part of the Collectors?

A.—I cannot at all. I am perfectly certain that there was no principle or policy at work at head quarters that could justify any such feeling if it existed. But I may remark that from no official did more cordial acknowledgments come of the completeness of the assistance given than from Mr. Barlow. Throughout the correspondence, as far as money was concerned, there was, as far as I know, not the slightest disinclination to advance or expend it. It must be remembered, however, that the importation of food was, as far as I am aware, an unprecedented measure, and one fraught with dangers in every direction. I know that those who had the control at head quarters shrank not a little from the responsibility of undertaking such importations, and it may well have been that this shrinking communicated itself, more or less, to the subordinate local officers.

90. Q.—But as a matter of fact do you not think that it is now apparent that in the early part of the famine, the local officers of Pooree

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and Balasore took a more gloomy view of matters than the superior authorities. As respects Pooree, the question refers to the whole period from November to June, and as respects Balasore from February to June?

A.—To answer the question separately about Pooree, I do not think that the superior authorities did not fully share Mr. Barlow's apprehension regarding the early famine at Mallood and Parricood. I am not aware, as to Balasore, of any representations from the Collector which were looked on as alarmist or which did not meet with attention.

91. Q.—Is it then your deliberate opinion that the local officers of Pooree and Balasore were not at any time in any degree deterred from representing their apprehensions as strongly and early as they felt them by any belief that such representations would be received with some distrust, that in fact they might possibly be thought alarmists by their superiors?

A.—I can only repeat that I am aware of no cause which can have led them so to think, nor if any English gentleman in the position of a Collector had really foreseen the famine that was approaching, can I for a moment believe that any supposition that his report would be unwelcome would have induced him to withhold his information. My belief is that in common with, as far as I know, all the local residents and the superior officers, those gentlemen knew that a famine was possible, though they did not consider that there was sufficient evidence of its probability to take on themselves the responsibility of reporting its approach.

92. Q.—Might they not distrust their own opinions if they thought their superiors held different opinions?

A.—My impression is that their superiors had no different opinions. They knew that the famine was a possibility; but they did not think it probable; and they hoped it would not occur. It must be borne in mind that the scarcity extended through almost the whole of the Lower Provinces and even beyond its limits; in the early months of the year I certainly did not foresee that it would assume in Cuttack different proportions and a different character from what it would in the rest of the country affected. It was not a question of one separated province surrounded by a country well supplied with food, but of scarcity, verging on famine, extending through many districts.

93. Q.—Mr. Moncrieff, who on former occasions had urged on Government the propriety of importing grain, seems to have very specially urged the point on Government about the 12th May. Was Mr. Moncrieff in communication with the Board at that time?

A.—Not that I know of; but I was certainly well aware myself what Mr. Moncrieff's opinion was.

94. Q.—When, by instructions of the Lieutenant Governor, the question of importing rice into Orissa was considered, did both the Members of the Board take a part in the discussion, and were they unanimous about it?

A.—The letter was signed by both Members.

95. Q.—There was telegraphic communication between Calcutta and Cuttack and Balasore; were any measures taken to ascertain the state of those districts when that matter was decided?

A.—Not by telegraph, but a full letter of instructions and enquiries was on the same date despatched to the Commissioner.

96. Q.—On the 12th of May Mr. Muspratt and the Balasore Committee had made an appeal to the public for money, stating that there was reason to believe that rice could be obtained for money by private importation. But before the date of the Board's letter of the 22nd May Mr. Muspratt had discovered that the merchants who had promised importation had entirely failed. In fact, on the 17th, he had telegraphed to the Under Secretary to Government at Calcutta, and also written officially to Government, recommending the importation of rice; and he tells us that by the 20th it was very evident that rice was not to be had. Was the report of the Board of Revenue written in ignorance of these facts?

A.—Yes, as far as I know, the Board had not before them at the time any such information; nor had they any information of any change of Mr. Muspratt's opinion (which had appeared in the *Englishman* the day before the Board's letter was written) to the effect that all that they wanted was money, and that there was plenty of food on the spot.

97. Q.—Up to that time had the Collectors not received any orders to telegraph from day to day every important matter regarding the famine?

A.—They had received no special orders; but it was well understood that it was their duty to do so.

98. Q.—Did you observe that about this time there was an extreme uncertainty as to what letters were addressed to the Board and what letters to the Government. Does it not seem to you that there was a great want of definition in regard to this matter. Do you think that the Commissioner was in any way wrong in writing to the Government, which was at Darjeeling, and not to the Board?

A.—I think it was the correspondence about this time which ended, one week after that date, in importations being made. There was, no doubt in the anxiety of the local officers, little heed paid to routine; and, under the circumstances, I cannot myself blame them, nor do I see that any serious inconveniences resulted from the little delay that may possibly have been caused by the course pursued.

99. Q.—Are you aware what was the occasion of Mr. Schaleh's going to Darjeeling at that time?

A.—Only that it was the Lieutenant Governor's wish to have one of the Members of the Board with him. It was not expressed officially.

100. Q.—Did you subsequently gather that Mr. Grote had no personal knowledge of the ports and winds of Orissa?

A.—Perhaps not quite so full and personal a knowledge as Mr. Schaleh, who had been Collector of Balasore himself.

101. Q.—You have told us that, early in May, you wrote to the Commissioner and Collectors with a view to establish general relief operations and in preparation for a public meeting for relief purposes. Do you consider that you were in any degree doing so as the organ of the Board of Revenue?

A.—Not at all: but of course my official position enabled me to do so. I did not do so with the knowledge or concurrence of the Board.

102. Q.—Did you eventually bring the information received by you in reply, to the knowledge of the Board?

A.—Yes, every private letter of interest that I received was communicated to the Members of the Board.

103. Q.—On the 18th of May you distinctly urged general measures of relief. Was that in any degree with the knowledge or concurrence of the Board?

A.—No; as before explained, I considered it on general principles extremely important that such a movement should be, as far as possible, non-official.

104. Q.—Can you say whether the Members of the Board were individually favorable to such a movement?

A.—I did not, as far as I remember, communicate with the Members on the subject.

105. Q.—On the 23rd of May, on receipt of the balance of the North-Western Provinces Famine Relief Fund, you changed your opinion and recommended that private subscriptions should be discontinued. About the same time the Board also seems to have officially recommended to Government that subscriptions should not be called for. Was your communication of the 23rd of May in any degree as the organ of the Board?

A.—Not at all. The meaning of my letter to the *Englishman* was fully explained in a subsequent letter that I wrote on the 1st January 1867. I never thought that the balance of the old famine fund would suffice without subscriptions; but I did think that it would be, at that time, useless to attempt to call for subscriptions till those balances were approaching exhaustion. The Board's letter to Government of the 26th of May, to which the question refers, had for its object to ensure the assignment by the Government of India of the whole of those balances for expenditure in connection with the Orissa famine, not at all primarily or eventually to discourage subscriptions. It must be remembered that at the time that letter was written, the whole of the balances had not been made over to the Government of Bengal so far as the Board were informed.

106. Q.—Up to the time when the Government of India gave two lakhs of the balance of the famine fund for the necessities of Orissa and Bengal, had the Board of Revenue any knowledge whatever of the existence of such a fund?

A.—They knew of the balances before they were given; but up to the time that the application was made the Board had no such knowledge.

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107. Q.—Do you know what public officers were likely to have had information of the balance of the North-Western Provinces Famine Fund?

A.—I should think only the Offices of Account.

108. Q.—How did the Chamber of Commerce know of it?

A.—I believe the first suggestion came from Mr. Muspratt of Balasore.

109. Q.—On what ground did you, in your letter to the newspapers of the 23rd May, say that the pressure was chiefly felt in the town of Pooree itself and not so much in the interior of the district?

A.—On the authority of the prices current. That assertion of mine was contradicted in the newspapers, and that was what led to the correspondence with Mr. Barlow alluded to in a previous answer, the result of which led to the conclusion that the prices current were in some respects misleading.

110. Q.—What arrangement was made for the conduct of the Board's duties during the absence of Mr. Schalch?

A.—The current business in all departments was done by Mr. Grote; there was no formal distribution of business between the Members; important cases were sent up to Mr. Schalch; where time was an object, orders were issued by Mr. Grote before the papers were sent up. The famine business was entirely disposed of by Mr. Grote, constant reports being made to Government.

111. Q.—When, on the 29th May, orders were received to send grain to Orissa, what measures were taken?

A.—Before receipt of these orders, immediately on Mr. Ravenshaw's telegraph reaching them, the Board made arrangements for sending down grain to False Point and Balasore. The telegram from the Lieutenant Governor was not received till afterwards, probably the same day.

112. Q.—Why was no rice sent to Pooree at that time, as the Board knew that the distress had been greatest in that district?

A.—The most immediate pressure for which the Board had to provide was at Cuttack and Balasore. Enquiry was necessary as to means of landing, &c., before shipments could be made to Pooree; and the intention was to forward some of the Burmah shipments to Pooree, if need arose.

113. Q.—We have noticed that, in fact, Pooree was the only port at which no special arrangements for landing rice ever have been or perhaps could have been made, that being the only port where ships anchor within a moderate distance of the shore, where indigenous surf boats were ready, and where, when the bad weather was not excessive, rice could be landed and brought into consumption at once; we have also been told that on the Orissa Coast the monsoon did not burst till the 14th of June; did the Board then make any special enquiries from those who had personal knowledge of Pooree?

A.—The Board, from the time that importation was taken in hand, enquired anxiously in all directions available to them, as to the possibility of

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landing rice at Pooree as well as at other places on the Coast. The general character of the information which they received, was that the landing of rice at Pooree could be accomplished, if at all, only with extreme hazard; and so the result proved, when the *Gibb* was sent there.

114. Q.—Is it not the case, as a matter of fact, that no rice was sent to Pooree till some weeks later, after the monsoon had burst, and that even then, in the last days of June and first of July, the rice from the *Arracan* was much more quickly unloaded than that from the *Gibb*, which arrived a little later?

A.—Yes; because before the time came when the Board were in a position to divert a cargo from False Point to Pooree, information had been received from the Collector, in a letter dated June 2nd, that the supply of rice at Pooree was being freely kept up by local trade through the Chilka Lake. This information tallied exactly with information furnished to the Board about the same time by Mr. Minchin, a merchant of Aska, in the Ganjam district, who, in an interview with me, had offered to supply grain in large quantities, by the same route, for use in Pooree; moreover, about the same time, the Board were led to suppose that Pooree could be supplied, by the same route, through the Port of Gopalpoor, from the southern districts of Madras, more conveniently than by direct importation from Burmah, should importation on Government account be considered expedient.

115. Q.—Did the Board take advantage of Mr. Minchin's offer; if not, the reason?

A.—They did not, because they preferred supplying themselves from the same quarter through the agency of the officers of the Madras Government.

116. Q.—Did they then supply themselves from the same quarter?

A.—To some extent they did. On the 12th of June, they ordered 200 tons by the *Arracan* for False Point, which was eventually diverted to Pooree; again, on the 18th of June, the *Tubal Cain* was ordered to bring up 30,000 maunds to Orissa (False Point). No cargoes were specially ordered for Pooree because, from the first, False Point was treated as a port of call, from whence it was the intention to send the ships wherever they were most required; moreover, it was thought possible that means might be found for sending the rice by the internal channels of communication in case of need from False Point to Pooree.

117. Q.—If the emergency had been considered sufficient, would it not have been possible, at the end of May, to send down rice from Calcutta to Pooree in a couple of days; for instance, might not a large tug steamer have been taken up, and loaded with rice and sent down?

A.—Within a couple of days, certainly not; but it would have been possible within eight days. The emergency, however, did not appear such as to warrant an operation which was deemed hazardous even at that season, and I am not prepared to say that any owners of tugs would have consented to risk their vessels.

118. Q.—With reference to subsequent information from Pooree to which you have alluded, was not the Board aware that famine was raging in the Ganjam district, and that the supply derived from Gopalpoor was entirely sea-borne rice, and did not the Collector, in the letter you have cited, strongly urge the importation of rice by Government direct to Pooree for relief purposes, though not for sale to the general public?

A.—The Board knew nothing regarding Ganjam which would lead them to suppose that there could be any objection to their taking advantage of the port of Gopalpoor for the importation of rice for use in Pooree, or to their buying rice at that port, and so, in accordance with the natural course of trade, inducing further importations to that place on private account. It certainly never struck me that there could be anything injurious to the people of Ganjam in such operations. As to the second half of the question, though it is true that in the letter quoted by me, Mr. Barlow advocates the importation of rice for relief purposes as more economical than the expenditure of money in the purchase of rice on the spot, he does not say one word to make it appear that rice would not find its way to Pooree in full supplies without Government intervention; on the contrary, he expresses a most deliberate and carefully considered opinion that "so long as prices kept up, or, in other words, until the relief of scarcity came in due course," money would buy rice at Pooree.

119. Q.—Even as respects purchase by those who could buy at extreme famine rates, did it not strike the Board that Mr. Barlow was laboring under a total misapprehension in expecting rice from Sumbulpoor, when the monsoon interrupted the Gopalpoor supply, since the Board knew that a still greater pressure was experienced in Cuttack, which must inevitably absorb the Sumbulpoor supply before it could get to Pooree?

A.—Mr. Barlow spoke of the probable subsequent despatch of grain from the Mahanuddee district evidently as a subordinate element in his calculation, and only supposed that relief would come from thence to a portion of his district, if indeed to his own district at all. His reliance for the future was upon the early or Beallee crop; at least so I understood his letter. At the same time, the whole subject was new to the Board, and their information as to the extent of the supply available, viz. the Mahanuddee, too scanty to enable them to arrive off-hand at the conclusion that some supplies from that quarter might not possibly in due course even overflow Cuttack into Pooree.

120. Q.—Please mention what was done for the supply of Cuttack and Balasore, when operations were commenced on the 29th May?

A.—I went in person, under Mr. Grote's orders, at once, and engaged the *Court Hey* to proceed direct to False Point with a cargo of proceed direct to False Point with a cargo of rice, which I arranged for Messrs. Borradaile Schiller and Co. to supply. I then proceeded to Messrs. Gisborne and Co., and authorised them to telegraph for a cargo of rice from Akyab; and then I arranged with Captain Howe, Master Attendant, for the despatch of the *Nemesis* with a sloop or sloops loaded with rice to Balasore. On

the same day the Board arranged for the diversion to False Point, under a guarantee of a minimum price, of the *Jacques Forestier*, a ship with 16,000 maunds of grain, then on her way down the river, bound for Bourbon. Subsequently, the Board, further, agreed to provide a steamer to tow the *Jacques Forestier* to False Point. Eventually, the steamer that was to have towed her not being available, she was towed by the *Court Hey* herself. Both vessels arrived at False Point on the 4th June.

121. Q.—Subsequently, on the 9th June, the Government recommended the Board to send more rice, and placed two lakhs of rupees at their disposal for the purpose, in addition to the amount already expended. The Board demurred until the Government sent a further order. Whose doing was that?

A.—Mr. Grote was, at that time, the only Member present, and the telegram was sent under his orders.

122. Q.—Would it not have been possible to buy the cargo of the *Jacques Forestier* outright at the same price at which it was guaranteed?

A.—Certainly it would, and the Board eventually did so. Mr. Grote preferred the expedient of guaranteeing a minimum price, as, in his opinion, likely to draw rice to Orissa in a more legitimate way than by direct importation on Government account.

123. Q.—Supposing the guarantee system to have advantage, was it not a mistake to guarantee the minimum price at False Point, when there was no one to purchase the rice?

A.—If there was to be a guarantee at all, it was obviously necessary to specify some point at which the guaranteed price would apply. The intention of the Board was by no means to limit the sale of rice at False Point, but to guarantee to the owners the price named at False Point plus any expenditure incurred in conveying the rice to the actual place of sale, and this was understood by the Commissioner and explained to the importer's agent four days after the arrival of the ship and without any further explanatory instructions from the Board. In point of fact, however, rice *ex* the *Jacques Forestier* was sold at False Point above the guaranteed minimum, and at a later date, serious complaints were made to the Board because it was alleged that rice was not being sold at False Point.

124. Q.—Was, not the text of the agreement with Messrs. Charriol distinct that the minimum price was guaranteed at False Point, and no mention made of sending it beyond False Point, and is it not the fact that this agreement having been sent to Messrs. Charriol's agent, he found himself unable to send the rice beyond False Point, so that the communication between False Point and Cuttack being exceedingly dilatory, a number of days delay occurred before the difficulty was got over by the Board buying the cargo outright from Messrs. Charriol at Calcutta, and sending information of the purchase to False Point *via* Cuttack?

A.—I don't know what instructions Messrs. Charriol sent to their agent; but, on the 13th June, they wrote to me that they "were sorry to learn that Mr. Fressanges had misunderstood their

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instructions as to the delivery of the rice per *Jacques Forestier*; the price was fixed for delivery at False Point; and they knew that they were at liberty to sell it anywhere. As to the delay, as explained above, on the 8th June—four days after the vessel's arrival at False Point—the Commissioner gave Mr. Fressanges the authority intended by the Board, in terms admitting of no misconstruction; and on the 12th June—eight days after the vessel was reported at False Point—the Board telegraphed to the Commissioner to buy the cargo outright. The *Court Hey*, carrying 3,000 maunds, and in regard to the discharge of which great pressure was put on the local authorities, on account of the heavy demurrage, was actually not discharged till the 12th June, and her rice did not begin to arrive at Cuttack in a regular stream until long after. I cannot, therefore, conceive that the misunderstanding to which the question refers, caused any real delay whatever. The *Jacques Forestier* was not discharged until the 1st July.

125. Q.—When the Board made all these arrangements, were they aware of the extreme difficulty of communication between False Point and Cuttack, both in regard to transport and to postal communication?

A.—They were aware, no doubt, in a general way, that to carry heavy loads or even to keep up regular communication for 70 or 80 miles during the rains in any part of Bengal or Orissa, was a serious matter; they supposed that there was a road to False Point and a river; concerning neither route had they any special information; for that and for all arrangements possible for the improvement of the communication, they relied, necessarily, entirely upon the local officers, who well know that the utmost importance was attached to the subject, and that they had *carte blanche* to make any arrangements that were possible; at any rate, except by False Point, I do not even now know the Board could have sent rice into Cuttack.

126. Q.—When this great emergency arose, did the Board take any special measures to obtain information regarding the ports in the Cuttack and Balasore districts, and the means of communication from the sea to the district stations: did they consult any officers in Calcutta of local experience? The question is put as distinguished from your entire reliance on the Commissioner.

A.—In regard to the internal communication, and indeed in a measure on both points, the Board were dependent, chiefly, upon the information that the local officers could supply. Nevertheless, they did most anxiously endeavour to procure information on the subject in every other direction available to them. In regard to the ports, the Master Attendant was the Board's official adviser, and with him they held frequent and anxious consultation on the subject. He will be able to give the Commission the details of the information that he was chiefly instrumental in gathering for the Board.

127. Q.—Regarding internal communication, did you not consult any officer who might have been found on the spot, such as Mr. Harrison, who had been for some years Magistrate of Cuttack?

A.—We did not so far distrust the local officers as to suppose that an officer who had been many years ago in the province had more valuable information on the subject than they. Nevertheless, it so happens that I was, at the time, in almost daily communication with Mr. Harrison himself, and that naturally the subject of the famine and the measures taken for its relief were constantly discussed between us. Had Mr. Harrison at that time been possessed of any information on such subjects, that he considered at variance, I am quite sure that he would have communicated it to me. It must be remembered, moreover, that Mr. Schalch was possessed of as intimate personal knowledge of the province as any officer not then actually employed there.

128. Q.—Did Mr. Schalch come down from Darjeeling as soon as these operations were commenced?

A.—Not quite immediately, but at a very early date.

129. Q.—Was the Board aware that Mr. Ravenshaw, who in his telegram had undertaken to make arrangements for landing rice, immediately afterwards went away to Pooree—the only district at which rice was not being landed—making over the duty of landing and transporting rice, to the Collector of Cuttack—an officer of very limited official experience and of no local experience?

A.—If Mr. Ravenshaw did not report his departure to Pooree directly, the Board had, of course, reason to know indirectly that he had gone there. They presumed that he had, before leaving Cuttack, made all possible arrangements for the landing and transport of the rice, and upon a matter of such plain urgency, and where local knowledge was so indispensable, the Board would certainly not relieve a Commissioner from his responsibility by attempting to give him detailed instructions.

130. Q.—Considering that False Point is practically much more accessible from Calcutta than from Cuttack, and that the local officers were overburdened with work; did it not occur to the Board that it would have been of advantage to send down a Member of the Board or other high officer to obtain information on the spot, and to use some of the special means available in the Port of Calcutta, *e. g.*, cargo or ship boats and a river steamer to tug them?

A.—As to the deputation of a Member of the Board to procure information, in the first place, there was at the time only one Member present at the Board, and the occasion was considered one for action in every possible direction, not then for gathering information. As to using the special means available in the Port of Calcutta, that subject was most fully and anxiously enquired into in consultation with the Master Attendant. The result of the enquiries was to satisfy the Board that no steamer or boats such as could have been employed at False Point in the manner suggested were obtainable in Calcutta or indeed elsewhere. We satisfied ourselves in the best way available to us at the time, that for employment in the manner suggested, a steamer at once sea-going and of the very lightest draught would be alone of any use, and that even ordinary boats, much more

cargo boats drew too much water to be practically available for the discharge of vessels at False Point. Further, I venture to assert that no man in Calcutta would have risked his life in taking a river steamer to False Point at that season of the year, even if she would have been of use on her arrival.

131. Q.—As a matter of fact, was any material assistance, either in officers, men or means for landing and transport purposes, ever sent from Calcutta to the ports of Orissa?

A.—In regard to both Pooree and False Point, as explained in my last answer, our practical conclusion was, after careful consideration, that we had not the means of affording any material assistance from Calcutta; beyond, therefore, sending one gunner and a supply of tarpaulins to False Point, nothing was attempted. It must be remembered that as regards False Point we were told at a very early date that the difficulty had been, with the aid of the officers of the Irrigation Company, largely overcome, and that an average of about 4,000 maunds a day could be landed regularly. In fact, my own impression distinctly was, and I think the Board shared it, that, from a very early date, the difficulty was shifted from the landing to the forwarding operations. As to inland transport, it certainly never struck me that we could furnish any useful assistance from this place, nor was any such assistance, so far as I remember, ever asked for. As to Balasore no complaint was ever made of any difficulty in landing rice, and as far as I am aware, none was felt.

132. Q.—In your opinion, if a campaign had been going on in Cuttack, and if the safety of a European Army had been involved, do you think that no more effective means of transport could have been found, or, to put it otherwise, do you think that in the early part of the month of June the officers of Government realized the crisis on which hundreds of thousands of lives depended, and that every thing was done that it would have been possible to do had so great a crisis been thoroughly realized?

A.—I cannot answer such a question in behalf of any other officer superior or subordinate. For myself, as far as I can re-place myself now in the position that I then occupied, I conscientiously believe that I did realize very early in June the full extent of the crisis, and that I omitted no suggestion, no means, and no effort to the best of my ability to meet it. I am not even now able to point out any means that could have been then adopted with any hope of success and that were not adopted. I do not for a moment mean to claim that I made no mistakes, or that I did all that any other man could have done in my position; but I do assert that, relying upon the help of God, I did the best that I could.

133. Q.—Very little rice seems to have been sent to Balasore early in the season; in fact it appears that only 8,000 maunds were received there at a date many weeks after the commencement of operations; can you explain the cause of this?

A.—There was great difficulty about Balasore from the outset. The extent of the supplies that we sent there was limited only by the means at

our disposal for sending them. The means of putting rice into Balasore was carefully enquired into at the first, and we were advised by the Master Attendant (and every enquiry that I could make in other directions showed me that his advice was sound) that there was not, in the Port of Calcutta, at that time, another steamer besides the *Nemesis* that was sea-going and yet of so light a draught so to be able to cross the bar, into the Balasore river. There was also, from the first, anxious enquiry into the possibility of procuring sloops to carry rice to Balasore. It was found impossible to send sloops in any other way than in tow of steamers, and even so, only a vessel or two could be found fit to make the voyage, and those not without the most serious risk to the vessels themselves and to the lives of those on board. Careful enquiry was made whether any other possible route could be found for conveying rice into Balasore overland either from the Midnapore district or from any point nearer to Calcutta along the river bank, the idea being to form a dépôt to be supplied from Calcutta, at any such place or places that could be found, and thence to keep up the supply into Balasore. A suggestion to send rice by carts all the way from Calcutta to Balasore was even made; but all these means were alike found impracticable, and we were compelled to confine ourselves to the *Nemesis* only and to such sloops as could be found. There was a small Government schooner, the *Dolphin*, which the *Nemesis* towed down, as well as sloops.

134. Q.—Can you say what was the maximum draught of a steamer which, in the Master Attendant's opinion, might have attempted the Port of Balasore in such a crisis?

A.—I cannot state this from memory; but I know that the deliberate opinion which he gave to the Board was that the *Nemesis* was the only vessel in port capable of making the transit.

135. Q.—On the 29th June the Board telegraphed to the Commissioner to send down a responsible person to make arrangements for landing rice from the *Guide*, which was attempting to get into the port of Dhamrah. From a subsequent telegram, it appears that she had not started up to the 10th July, and she did not arrive at Dhamrah for some ten days or more; can you explain the cause of this delay, at a time when the Bhudruk sub-division was in urgent need?

A.—The detailed answer will be given by the Master Attendant. Briefly, his department was unable to prepare the *Guide* to start at an earlier date, although at first the Board were led to suppose that she would start on the date intimated in the telegram. The *Guide* started on the 10th, reached Hidgellee on the 12th, and was then, as the Commission know, a very long time in finding her way up the Dhamrah. It was on account of the distress which the Board knew to be prevailing at Bhudruk, that the experiment was made of sending the *Guide* into the Dhamra, concerning which river only the vaguest information was forthcoming at the time.

136. Q.—Did you then distinctly understand that there were not in the Port of Calcutta any steamers capable of getting as far as Balasore in

favorable weather, which drew as little water near as the heaviest of the sloops and brigs which resort to that port?

A.—Most decidedly.

137. Q.—By whose advice was the *Tubal Cain* sent to Balasore?

A.—The Master Attendant was the responsible professional adviser of the Board on the subject; but, at the same time, I wish to say that the Board understood thoroughly from him that a vessel of her size could only proceed, at that season, into Balasore Roads, with some considerable risk, the responsibility for incurring which risk the Board, in my opinion, shared with Captain Howe.

138. Q.—Do you know why it happened that the *Nemesis*, which was the only steamer capable of going into Balasore, was sent to tow the *Guide* to another port?

A.—The Master Attendant will answer the question more precisely than I can; but the Board gave their consent to the arrangement in the full expectation that the trip would occupy a very short time, that the *Nemesis* would be back at Balasore in ample time to discharge the *Tubal Cain*, and that she could not meanwhile be employed on a more urgent service.

139. Q.—Was it ever brought to the notice of the Board, when it was determined to anchor ships outside the Balasore River, that that port was entirely destitute of all sea-going boats and of all appliances for communicating with ships in the roads?

A.—I cannot say that it was; but at the same time, so far as I am aware, no kind of reliance was placed upon any such appliances for the contemplated unloading of the *Tubal Cain*; the intention was to unload her by means of sloops towed by the *Nemesis*. We were given to understand that sloops were procurable for that purpose.

140. Q.—Do you understand that neither the *Conqueror* nor the *Agitator* could attempt the Port of Balasore?

A. I do not remember the question being discussed as regards the *Conqueror*, though if that vessel can really go into Balasore in the monsoon, my impression of the inaccessibility of the port is certainly erroneous. The *Agitator* was sent to Balasore, I think, more than once. I cannot say whether she crossed the bar, but I know she was withdrawn from the service being found unsuitable for it.

141. Q.—What was the result of the correspondence between the Board and local officers late in May and early in June on the subject of supplying importation of rice from Calcutta to Balasore by private traders, in sloops to be towed down free of cost by steamers supplied by Government?

A.—It fell through. The sloops never appeared, and the agents of the merchants never presented themselves at the Board. I have no doubt that sloops could not be found to go to sea at that season.

142. Q.—Did the Board, in your opinion, receive all possible assistance from the Master Attendant?

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A.—Yes; I consider that Captain Howe and the officers of his department exerted themselves to the utmost of their ability.

143. Q.—In the month of June the Chamber of Commerce represented the famine to be appalling; but His Honor the Lieutenant Governor repeatedly expressed his opinion that the accounts received by the Board and the Lieutenant Governor did not support the statements of the Chamber of Commerce as to the extent of the famine. Does it seem to you that in fact the local officers did not report the full intensity of the famine and if not, why not?

A.—I believe that the Chamber of Commerce had probably no other means of forming a judgment as to the intensity of the famine, than the official accounts. I do not think, certainly, that the local officers wilfully withheld any information from their official superiors. I had no knowledge of the nature of the narratives submitted by the Government of Bengal to the Government of India.

144. Q.—From what date did the Board commence publishing accounts of the famine?

A.—From the first commencement of the distress, as far back, that is, as October 1865, the Board published freely every paper of interest bearing on the famine that they received. From the beginning of June, however, the publication of the detailed narratives and proceedings was not quite so full,—a general weekly narrative by the Board of Revenue being substituted.

145. Q.—Do you mean to say that, throughout, the worst accounts were always published at the time?

A.—As already stated, till about the end of May or the beginning of June, I do not remember that any paper, likely to be of interest, was knowingly or purposely withheld. I was, personally, very strongly in favour of publishing every detail which came to the Board's knowledge, and, without taking their special orders on the subject, I did, up to the period stated, place all the papers at the disposal of the press. At that time the Government and the Board interposed, and directed me to substitute, for the detailed accounts, the narratives that were afterwards published.

146. Q.—Do you think that this interposition was in any degree caused by an impression that the reports and letters published by you were often of an unduly alarming character?

A.—I think that the wish of the Government was that ascertained facts only should be made public, and not personal impressions.

147. Q.—Do you think that the result of the instructions given to you was that the most distressing and harassing accounts received from local officers were not published after that time?

A.—I do not remember any specially distressing official account that was withheld. One very sad narrative furnished to the Relief Committee at Maunbhoon by the Rev. Mr. Onasch was withheld; that is the only document of the kind that I remember that was not published. I continued to suggest the publication of every paper that appeared to me likely to interest the public, and many were published.

148. Q.—Are you not mistaken in saying that the early accounts were published at the time? Were not both Mr. Barlow's accounts of what he saw in December, and Mr. Ravenshaw's of what he saw in April, published only in the beginning of June?

A.—My answer had reference only to the general famine; I all along looked on the calamity in Malood and Parricood as special and local. I cannot say whether the reports of that calamity were published at the time or not, and if not, why not. I certainly did not, so far as I remember, publish in June any letter written by Mr. Barlow in December. In regard to Mr. Ravenshaw's letter, I have not got it with me, but my clear remembrance is that it was published as soon as the Board received it. That letter was addressed to the Government, and only reached the Board after long delay.

149. Q.—As a matter of fact, do you not consider that the result of the statements published by the authority of Government was to throw doubt in the mind of the public, on the more appalling accounts published by private individuals, and that in consequence, the public in general never did fully realize the intensity of the famine in Orissa?

A.—I very much doubt whether the public read a tenth part of what the Government did publish. I am not aware that there were many private accounts of importance published in the newspapers, and I am very certain that nothing in any official reports would, as a rule, induce the public to discredit private statements. The reports and papers published by the Government have been by turns characterised as *colour de rose*, and as full of such appalling details as should have impelled the authorities to immediate action at a very early date; which character is correct, if either, it will be for the Commission to judge. To answer the question upon its merits, I may perhaps say that none of the accounts and narratives, public or private, which I received or saw, conveyed to me the impression that the famine was so intense as I now believe it to have been. At the same time, I might say that nothing was omitted to be done on any such ground, and that I well knew that the famine was sufficiently appalling to be beyond the reach of our utmost possible exertions.

150. Q.—In the months of May and June, it was urged on the Lieutenant Governor from different quarters, that it would be desirable to appoint a mixed Central Committee of officials and non-officials, for the general arrangement of relief operations. You have seen the reason on which the Lieutenant Governor declined to adopt this suggestion. Are you of opinion, from what has since come to your knowledge, that the efficiency or extent of the relief would have been in any way prevented by the early appointment of such a Committee?

A.—The relief operations were, in fact, conducted in each district under the superintendence of precisely such a Committee, and I am not prepared to specify any particular point on

which the existence of a general Committee of the same character would have added to the efficiency of the management. I do think, however, that the appointment of such a general Committee, at an early date, would have led to the earlier importation of grain into Orissa. There would not have been the same grave objections to such a body importing grain, that there were to the measure being undertaken by the Government itself or one of its departments. I think, too, that such a Committee would have enlisted far more public interest, and would have obtained fuller private details, than ever reached the Government or even the local authorities. Moreover, as a matter of public policy, I always advocated the appointment of such a Committee, being of opinion that it would materially relieve the Government from the tremendous weight of responsibility that from the first lay before it.

151. Q.—Do you not think that the public, both in India and in England, would have subscribed for the relief of the famishing, and that the balance of the North-West Famine Fund might thus have been properly supplemented, instead of the charge being thrown wholly on the Government?

A.—As a preliminary I wish to assert distinctly that the Board had, at their disposal, from the outset all the funds that they required, and that the want of funds did not prevent the adoption of any measure that commended itself to their judgment. Had the balances to which you refer not been discovered, the appointment of a general Committee to collect subscriptions would have been a simple necessity, and measures were actually in progress, accordingly, on the part of the public. I did not personally think that the discovery of the balances ought to have prevented the appointment of a Committee, for I considered those balances to be the property of the public, and that their application would have been most fitly superintended by a public Committee. I was of opinion further, that unless such a Committee was appointed, further subscriptions from the public would never be obtained in large sums. I am not prepared to say that under any circumstances the proceedings for the relief of the famine could have been conducted without wholesale grants of public money; the necessity for such grants was, in my opinion, a political evil of great magnitude, and from the moment they commenced, private subscriptions would probably cease. But I do not see how the evil was to be avoided, and I do not think that the appointment of a public Committee would have prevented it.

152. Q.—Do you think that in any shape any of the local officers were led to think that Government or the Board were indisposed to receive alarming statements made in a random way, and that they should confine themselves to facts which they could substantiate?

A.—I am not aware of any instructions to that effect being given to the local officers, official or demi-official. There was some such feeling among some of the officers at head quarters, but I do not believe that it was communicated to any subordinate officer directly or indirectly, ex-

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cept on a single occasion. I think something was said to Mr. Herschel by the order of Government about some letters written by Mr. Man to the newspapers from the interior of Midnapore. I wish to say for myself that I had no feeling of the kind, and it is very unlikely that any letter written by me should have had any tinge or tone of the kind.

153. Q.—In the very commencement Mr. Barlow, in his telegram of the 25th June, begged of the Board to “ask public aid.” When the correspondence was officially published this telegram was omitted; was that in any degree because the proposition was disapproved?

A.—I know nothing about that. I believe that the correspondence was not published by me.

154. Q.—Were the local officers ever called on to state fully and freely all they knew and learned regarding the famine?

A.—Not, in terms, that I know of. I took it for granted that they would do so; but I believe it was not thought necessary especially to write and encourage harrassing details; there may have been in some minds a certain amount of reluctance to realize the fact that actual famine was raging.

155. Q.—We have been informed that in the early part of the famine, more rice might have been thrown into Balasore by employing the *Conqueror* and such vessels if it had been determined to do so regardless of expense and risk, and that when an offer was made to do so by the *Electric* at Rs. 2 per bag, you replied “out of the question”; how do you explain this?

A.—The expense was so far an element in the matter that it was thought that if it was found possible to employ such a vessel on such a service, it could be done as quickly and on better terms than those on which the *Electric* offered. Balasore was, at that time, supplied for the moment. Of course, throughout the operations, economy was considered whenever it did not conflict with more important objects.

156. Q.—When the *Tubal Cain* was taken away, what was done to supplying rice to Balasore?

A.—I think Mr. Lane will be able to answer this question precisely; but I know that the result of all our enquiries, at that time, was to make it clear to us that no steamer but the *Nemesis* could be used to supply Balasore.

157. Q.—What arrangements were made for importing the rice from Burmah?

A.—That part of the work was undertaken, from the first, entirely by the firm of Messrs. Gisborne and Co. Mr. Scott Moncrieff will be able to give the Commission full details of the arrangements made. He was himself generally present at the meetings held weekly at the Board's office, and acted upon the decisions arrived at in his presence at those meetings. I wish to bear my testimony to the indefatigable and unsparing exertions of Mr. Moncrieff in the matter. He was not indeed able to fulfil his own expectations or those which he held out to the Government either as to

the price at which rice could be purchased in Burmah, or the arrangements which could be made about freight, or the quantity of rice which could be got in Burmah and Arracan; but I am quite sure that he and the agents of his firm, Messrs. Mohr Brothers and Co., exerted themselves to the utmost.

No. 101.—CAPTAIN HOWE.

[Examined in Calcutta, 6th February 1867.]

1. Q.—Were you the official adviser of the Government regarding the despatch of rice to Orissa in the year 1866?

A.—Yes, on such points as were referred to me.

2. Q.—And was the business connected with the despatch of vessels from Calcutta done through you?

A.—Principally so; as regards the Government vessel especially.

3. Q.—What was the first occasion on which you were asked to despatch vessels on the part of Government to Orissa?

A.—On the 30th April, to send down 1,200 maunds of rice to Cuttack at the request of the Inspector General of Jails for the Jail at Cuttack.

4. Q.—Was that 1,200 maunds despatched, and if not, why not?

A.—I cannot recollect distinctly at this distance of time whether those 1,200 maunds were sent to False Point or not; but there was no Government vessel available.

5. Q.—Is it not the case that the only difficulty in respect of the despatch of that quantity of maunds was that Messrs. Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. said they could not send a steamer to False Point unless they had at least 3,000 bags of rice?

A.—Yes, it was not then desired to send more than 3,000 bags, and therefore the 1,200 maunds were not sent, there being no Government vessel available.

6. Q.—Was that the only occasion on which it was proposed to send rice before the 29th of May?

A.—That was the only occasion to the best of my recollection and belief.

7. Q.—On the 29th of May, did the Board of Revenue communicate to you the wish of the Government to despatch rice?

A.—Yes; and the Government also communicated with me direct.

8. Q.—Was the *Court Hey* taken up by you?

A.—No.

9. Q.—Had you anything to do with the despatch of the *Court Hey* with rice?

A.—Nothing whatever.

10. Q.—Throughout, did you send any rice to False Point, or despatch any vessels to that place?

A.—We sent the *Arracan* in October, but none before (with the exception of the *Moulmein**) to False Point.

11. Q.—What was the first occasion on which you took part in the despatch of rice to Orissa?

A.—On account of Mr. Chapman's application to me, dated 29th May, we sent the *Nemesis* to tow a sloop to Balasore on the 6th of June.

12. Q.—About the end of May, were there plenty of steamers and other vessels in the Port of Calcutta; was there any special pressure of private trade?

A.—There were plenty of vessels, and no special pressure.

13. Q.—Would it have been easy then to get a steamer to go to Pooree?

A.—No; except on their own terms.

14. Q.—What do you mean by saying “except on their own terms?”

A.—I mean that they would have demanded exorbitant rates.

15. Q.—Why would they have demanded exorbitant rates?

A.—Partly because the season was advanced, and partly on account of the necessities of Government.

16. Q.—Are you aware at what rate the *Court Hey* was taken up?

A.—I don't recollect.

17. Q.—Do you not think that as the Board of Revenue took up the *Court Hey*, they might also have taken up other vessels for Pooree in the like manner?

A.—False Point was a protected anchorage, and Pooree was an open one.

18. Q.—By giving very high terms, do you think that vessels might have been got without delay?

A.—Yes.

19. Q.—If, on the 29th of May, you received an order to take up a steamer to send to Pooree with rice, on the understanding that money was no object and that the case was very emergent, in how many days do you think the rice would have reached Pooree?

A.—In four or five days from the time I received the order.

20. Q.—Had you any special difficulty in sending rice to Balasore at that time?

A.—None, because we had a flat-bottomed steamer drawing little water.

21. Q.—On what day did you receive the order to send a steamer to Balasore?

A.—On the 29th of May.

22. Q.—Had you any difficulty about getting vessels light draught to carry the rice to be towed by the steamer?

A.—Yes, very great difficulty.

23. Q.—What was the difficulty?

A.—There were no light draught vessels procurable in the port, except two, only one of which was pronounced sea-worthy. There were sloops at Oolaberreah, but they refused to go at that time of the season.

24. Q.—Were there no other light vessels of any sort in the Port of Calcutta?

A.—Yes; the *Dolphin*, Government anchor boat, was launched and fitted, and I diverted her from her proper duty and sent her to Balasore. She was sent on the 15th of June, as soon as she could be fitted, and was kept running with the sloop in tow of the *Nemesis* throughout the season.

25. Q.—Besides the *Dolphin*, were there not other light vessels of any kind in Calcutta?

A.—Not till the schooner *Twinkling Star* was launched, when we immediately took her up to go to Dhamra. There was also the *Conqueror*, a light draught steamer, to tow the *Twinkling Star*; this was in August.

26. Q.—Why was the *Conqueror* not taken up before August?

A.—Because my orders were limited to the employment of Government vessels.

27. Q.—If you had had a *carte blanche* to take up any vessels available, could you have got the *Conqueror* at an earlier date?

A.—Yes, I could; she was in the river.

28. Q.—How much water does the *Conqueror* draw?

A.—Nine or ten feet.

29. Q.—Could she have gone into the Balasore river?

A.—She grounded on the bar in attempting it, and might have been lost.

30. Q.—If she had attempted it again, might she not have got in?

A.—Yes, if she had gone in, at proper time of tide, and when it was very smooth, but it would have been a risk at that season on account of the swell of the bar.

31. Q.—Is the bottom of the Balasore River soft or hard?

A.—On the bar it is hard sand.

32. Q.—Do you know what is the draught of the sloops and barges which frequent the Port of Balasore?

A.—Their draught is from seven to eight feet.

33. Q.—Do any of them draw more?

A.—I should say that ten feet is the outside of any of them, and such vessels never go in except in the north-east monsoon.

34. Q.—Was there any other steamer in the river drawing so little water as the *Conqueror*?

A.—I don't think there was any other sea-worthy steamer of that description that would take cargo also.

35. Q.—Was the *Conqueror* employed to take cargo.

A.—Yes, she took about 650 bags of rice. Possibly, if I had orders to take up another steamer, I might have found one.

36. Q.—If the *Conqueror* had gone without cargo, towing light vessels, do you think she might have gone into the Port of Balasore?

A.—Yes.

37. Q.—Do you think that by any expenditure of money it would be possible, either at Oolabereah or elsewhere, to hire vessels to go to Balasore?

A.—Neither love nor money could do it.

38. Q.—Could they not have been bought?

A.—I did not think of purchasing; I only tried hiring.

39. Q.—If you had purchased them, do you think you could have got them on high terms and sent them down with a reasonable chance of their arrival?

A.—We might have purchased some, but the doubt would have been of their sea-worthiness. The one we took we had to repair and caulk before despatch.

40. Q.—In the most extreme emergency, do you not think that you might have tried if your orders had been by any manner of means to send rice down?

A.—Yes; private parties chartered one and sent her down in tow of the *Electric*, and she was lost on the bar and sank with her cargo, but the men were saved. When she was lost, she had been cast off by the *Electric*, which could not cross the bar.

41. Q.—If there had been a steamer fitted to take that sloop into the river, and that steamer had been commanded by a skilful officer, do you think she might have been taken into the river?

A.—No, because she was not lost by striking on the bar; she was unseaworthy, sprung a leak, and sank on the bar.

42. Q.—What was the lightest class of sea-going vessels of any kind to be found in the Hooghly?

A.—The Government steamers *Nemesis* and *Proserpine*, and other vessels of the *Conqueror* class. Then, the steam tugs, according to their size and class.

43. Q.—Were there any small class of sailing vessels of any sort?

A.—None at all except the *Twinkling Star*, which we took up afterwards.

44. Q.—Was there any other class of Native vessels?

A.—None at that time of the year.

45. Q.—At any other season, is there any other class of Native vessels of small draught which might enter the Port of Balasore?

A.—Yes, the Maldiv boats; but they come in the north-east monsoon and go away, and are not to be seen at any other time.

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46. Q.—At the end of May, could it have been possible by any means to send down cargo boats to False Point?

A.—It was utterly impossible. I applied to Captain Patterson, the Agent of the P. and O. Company, to lend me a small steamer which he had of about 6-horse power. He promised the vessel, but there was an impossibility of getting her down at that time of the year. She could not be towed down on account of the heavy sea, and she could not be hoisted in. It was impossible to hoist in a cargo boat.

47. Q.—Why was it impossible to tow the vessel?

A.—On account of the heavy sea.

48. Q.—Just explain why the heavy sea makes it impossible?

A.—She would have been towed under water and swamped.

49. Q.—Have you any record of the state of the weather in the end of May and the first part of June?

A.—No; we know it was the usual monsoon weather. We don't keep any register of the weather. The logs of vessels only can show what the weather was.

50. Q.—Mr. Geary, of False Point, has told us that till the 14th of June the weather was very hot, close, and still, and the sea smooth, and that the first gale did not come on till the 14th of June, and that, in his opinion, the weather in the early part of June looked so settled that it must probably have been so all over the Bay of Bengal; can you say whether that statement is correct or not?

A.—It may have been correct as far as False Point was concerned, but it would afford no ground at all for judging of the weather at other parts of the Bay. On the contrary, I know that the statement was erroneous, because the *Nemesis* left this on the 6th of June, and the sea, in crossing the bar at Balasore, was so high that she was nearly lost from the risk of pooping. It should also be understood that in sending down vessels it is not so much a gale, as the ordinary south west monsoon weather, and the high sea which ordinarily prevails, which creates the danger in towing cargo boats down.

51. Q.—Would there be the same difficulty by the inner channel to Balasore?

A.—No; that was the channel we adopted for the *Nemesis* and sloops to Balasore, but there would have been the same difficulty beyond Balasore; there would have been no means of getting sloops beyond Balasore.

52. Q.—Do you know whether, in the rainy season, there is any internal water communication between Balasore and False Point?

A.—Not for steamers or heavy cargo boats.

53. Q.—Would it have been equally impossible to send down a river steamer to be employed in towing at False Point?

A.—Yes; I consulted many officers, and found that it was utterly impossible.

54. Q.—When was the subject mooted?

A.—After the first receipt of Mr. Chapman's note of the 29th of May.

55. Q.—Was there any river steamer then strong enough to have been sent down?

A.—I believe the Government river steamers are the strongest in the river, and I ascertained that they could not have been sent down with any safety. I consulted one of the most experienced officers, and the Builder and Surveyor.

56. Q.—You said that it was impossible to tow cargo boats and such like vessels in the south west monsoon. Was it not the case that larger vessels were towed by steamers in that monsoon?

A.—It could be done every day, but a small cargo boat would be towed under water and be completely overwhelmed.

57. Q.—Might not iron cargo boats, by being battened down, be towed?

A.—Yes, in a matter of life and death but some body must be on board to steer, and there would be almost a certainty that her tow ropes would part, and she could not carry a hawser like a big ship; she would have been strained to pieces and knocked to pieces by the sea.

58. Q.—Do you think such vessels might be got to Balasore?

A.—With great risk.

59. Q.—How far is it from Balasore to False Point?

A.—About 70 or 80 miles.

60. Q.—Would there have been any chance of getting them from Balasore to False Point by taking advantage of a favorable break in the weather?

A.—They might be started in the morning in a lull, but by the time they had got half way, there would most probably be such a heavy sea that it would be almost certain to swamp the vessels.

61. Q.—Was there not an attempt made to get light vessels from Madras?

A.—I am not aware; certainly none came.

62. Q.—Where was the *Proserpine*?

A.—At Akyab.

63. Q.—Was she not employed in the famine?

A.—She was employed under the Commissioner of British Burmah, and could not be spared; she had also been waiting her repairs for some months, and the *Nemesis* was to have gone to relieve her; but I diverted the *Nemesis* on account of the necessity of the occasion. If the *Proserpine* had come up, she could not have been employed because she was not sea-worthy.

64. Q.—Could the *Proserpine*, in an emergency, have come up to Calcutta?

A.—She could have come up *via* Chittagong and the Soonderbunds.

65. Q.—Could she not, in a short time, have been made sea-worthy to go to Balasore in an extreme emergency?

A.—No, her bottom was altogether gone and the machinery out of order too.

66. Q.—Was the *Guide* despatched to the Dhamrah under your instructions?

A.—Yes.

67. Q.—How much water did she draw?

A.—She drew between 13 and 14 feet according to the cargo put in her. We had only four pilot brigs employed for service at the Sand Heads, and this was the fifth and only vessel in reserve. On account of the emergency, we had diverted her from her proper duties, and if one of the regular brigs had been disabled, great inconvenience would have resulted.

68. Q.—Could any private vessels have been got drawing as little water as the *Guide*?

A.—I don't think there was a vessel in port. There was a little brig came up from Australia the other day. I tried to charter her, but she would not go under 3 rupees a bag, and has gone back again.

69. Q.—What was the cause of the delay that occurred in sending off the *Guide*, which seems to have gone a good deal later than she was first promised?

A.—I am not aware of any delay in despatching her, because she left for Dhamrah on the 10th of July, and I am not aware that I ever promised her earlier. Mr. Chapman may have written to me to send her off as soon as I could, but she was laid up, and it was necessary to get her ready and find her crew and fit her for sea, which necessarily took some time. There was much to do to her, and she could not have gone without it; being a pilot brig she had tanks on board, which it was necessary to take out before she could be used for cargo.

70. Q.—What was the occasion of the delay in her reaching the Dhamrah?

A.—The *Nemesis* was to take her from Balasore to the Dhamrah. The *Agitator* took her down to Hidgellee and had to come back, and the *Nemesis* took her on. The *Nemesis* was at Hidgellee with the *Dolphin* at the time, and there was delay before the *Nemesis* could come back to Hidgellee from Balasore to take on the *Guide*.

71. Q.—Why had the *Agitator* to return to Calcutta, and why was the *Nemesis*, the only vessel which could go into Balasore, taken from that duty to send her to another duty?

A.—The *Agitator* was required in Calcutta for port work, and she was also to tow back the *Dolphin* from Hidgellee for another cargo.

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72. Q.—If you had a *carte blanche* to spend money, could you not, by taking up vessels, have arranged that the *Guide* should be towed down to the Dhamrah without taking away the *Nemesis* from Balasore?

A.—I could have hired a tug if I had a *carte-blanc*, but it would have cost a great deal of money, because I should besides have had to insure her.

73. Q.—You have told us that till later, when you took up the *Conqueror*, your orders were restricted to the use of Government vessels. Had you in fact Government vessels enough for an emergency, or was the emergency in the early part of the famine not considered so great as to justify an unlimited expenditure in taking up private vessels?

A.—I had not a single Government vessel available. Those that I employed were not properly available, but were diverted from their proper duty on my own responsibility, trusting to the approval of Government, which was accorded. The emergency was apparently not considered sufficient to justify unlimited expenditure in taking up private vessels. For instance, when I submitted an offer on the part of the agents of the *Electric* to take down rice to Balasore at 2 rupees per bag, I received an answer from the Secretary to the Board of Revenue in the words "out of the question."

74. Q.—Did the *Electric* propose to go into Balasore?

A.—I think not. She was to anchor outside, and sloops were to take in the cargo.

75. Q.—Do you know how much the *Electric* draws?

A.—I should say 12 feet.

76. Q.—Was the *Electric* about that time taken up by the East India Irrigation Company?

A.—Yes, to go to False Point, and she had bitter weather. I have not heard what rate the Irrigation Company paid.

77. Q.—Can you tell us when your orders first went beyond taking Government sea-going vessels; when you were first authorized to expend large sums in taking up private vessels, or to take up private vessels at all?

A.—I think it was in August, when I took up the *Conqueror* and *Twinkling Star*.

78. Q.—Was the *Twinkling Star* taken up as soon as she was launched?

A.—She was offered to us, and taken as soon as she was launched, and before her registry was taken out.

79. Q.—From the time that the *Conqueror* was taken up, was she constantly in Government employ throughout the famine?

A.—We took her by the day, but kept her on for months. I recommended, as a matter of economy, that she be taken by the month; but it was preferred to take her by the day, because it was hoped that the necessity would soon cease.

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80. Q.—Did you ever try to get any other vessel like the *Conqueror*?

A.—No, I had no orders to do so, and there was then no necessity on account of the large importations of rice that were then making from the grain ports to Pooree and False Point and to Balasore also.

81. Q.—In your opinion, could rice be got in Calcutta in those days in large quantities?

A.—No; it was stated that rice could not be got at Calcutta, and that was the reason of getting it from the grain ports.

82. Q.—Was the *Tubal Cain* a Government vessel?

A.—Yes, a Government transport.

83. Q.—Was it through your advice that she was sent with rice?

A.—Entirely.

84. Q.—Did she arrive at the time she was expected?

A.—Nearly.

85. Q.—Was she laden deeper than she ought to have been.

A.—Rather. I should not impute blame, but considering her age she was somewhat overladen. She had been before to England at a deeper draught.

86. Q.—To what do you attribute the delay in communicating with her and unloading her?

A.—To the heavy weather that came on.

87. Q.—Have you got any papers regarding the weather at that time?

A.—We had regular reports from Mr. Wells, the Commander of the *Tubal Cain*.

88. Q.—Were you aware that Balasore was particularly deficient in means of communicating with vessels?

A.—No. I knew that there was a flag-staff at the mouth of the river, and I knew they had a sea-going schooner and boats fitted for ordinary weather. It was supposed also that there were sloops in the river which could go out in tow of the *Nemesis* and take the cargo from the *Tubal Cain*.

89. Q.—Was the Master Attendant at Balasore under your orders?

A.—Not immediately; he was to a certain extent, but specially and particularly under the orders of the Collector of Balasore.

90. Q.—Throughout the famine operations, was any use made of the schooner *Orissa*?

A.—None whatever. I enquired, and was told that it was too dangerous; that she would have gone ashore if she had got outside, and she also was not adapted for carrying cargo, but was only used for carrying a few cases of opium and stationery, and such like matters.

91. Q.—Do you think that by employing the *Conqueror* or any similar vessel, the *Nemesis*

might have been aided in unloading the *Tubal Cain*, or the absence of the *Nemesis* might have been supplied?

A.—Not to any effect on account of the weather; nearly the whole time the *Tubal Cain* was in the roads, I believe there was good weather for two days, but little could have been done in that time.

92. Q.—Had you anticipated better weather.

A.—Yes; I had.

93. Q.—In anticipation of better weather, might not the *Conqueror* or some such vessel have been sent?

A.—Yes, but we expected that the *Nemesis* would have unloaded the *Tubal Cain*, besides such general duty as running the *Guide* down to Dhamrah, and coming back again.

94. Q.—Was it not an extremely doubtful matter whether so small a steamer as the *Nemesis* could single-handed unload a large vessel like the *Tubal Cain* in the very heaviest time of the south west monsoon, and in an open roadstead many miles from the shore?

A.—The *Nemesis* could convey 1,000 bags each trip. It was supposed she would have sloops also to tow in. With regard to its being an open roadstead, Balasore Roads, in the south-west monsoon, was supposed to be a sheltered roadstead with good holding ground, unless the wind came from the eastward or south-east. It used to be the cruising ground of our pilot brigs in the south-west monsoon, and in consultation with experienced branch pilots it was decided that there was no danger in any ship going there at that period, so that there was every reasonable expectation of the *Tubal Cain* delivering her cargo in safety. The result to the ship proved that there was no insuperable danger. The ship left the roads in safety, when she found she could not discharge her cargo, and reached the Sand Heads in safety, when the steam pipe of the steamer towing her burst and she was cast off. The wind was to the eastward, so that she could not get in, and a gale of wind came on, in which she suffered considerably, and eventually got into Akyab Harbour.

95. Q.—What steamer towed up the *Tubal Cain*?

A.—The *Agitator* towed up the *Tubal Cain* from Balasore to the Sand Heads.

96. Q.—Did the *Agitator* ever try to go into Balasore.

A.—No; she drew too much water.

97. Q.—How much water did she draw?

A.—Nine feet. It was not impossible for a vessel of that draught to go in, if it was smooth water, over the bar; but there was such a swell in the south-west monsoon, that it was not safe.

98. Q.—In your opinion, was it absolutely necessary for the *Tubal Cain* to run from the Balasore Roads and to go to Akyab, and did she come back as soon as she could?

A.—It was not absolutely necessary for her to leave Balasore Roads. The Commander has himself reported to me that he would not have left his anchorage except for the presence of the *Agitator* to tow her into the Hooghly. His instructions from me were discretionary, that if he found bad weather coming on, he was at liberty to run for the Hooghly and to discharge his cargo at Hidgellee. When the gale came on and the ship was in distress, she had no other course but to make for the nearest port under her lee. The gale was one of the heaviest known, and I think the Commander was fully justified in acting as he did.

99. Q.—Did she come back as soon as possible.

A.—She came back contrary to the wishes of the Commissioner and the local authorities there.

100. Q.—On the 28th, the *Agitator* towed a sloop down to the Balasore Roads, and cast her off in sight of the *Tubal Cain* and returned. Would the Commander have been justified then in staying and helping to unload the *Tubal Cain*?

A.—His orders were to return to Calcutta.

101. Q.—On the 30th of July, you telegraphed to the Master Attendant at Balasore, that the *Agitator* would leave on the 31st, with the intention of going over the bar. Did she attempt to get over the bar, and what was the result?

A.—She did not go; she was afraid of the swell; and in my opinion she was justified in not making the attempt. About this time the weather was so bad that the *Nemesis* and *Dolphin* were obliged to remain outside in the Roads.

102. Q.—Was the employment of the *Agitator* in the channels of the river so necessary that she could not have been diverted more than she was?

A.—Most certainly; she was the only vessel available for clearing the channel, and she was used for the transport of rice whenever she could be spared.

103. Q.—Was the *Twinkling Star* retained in the Government service from the time she was first taken up?

A.—Yes, until she was discharged after the necessity was over.

104. Q.—Can you mention any steamers of the smallest class, such as the *Conqueror*, in the river, that you think might have been taken up?

A.—The smallest class of steamers were those belonging to Messrs. Gordon Stuart and Co., such as the *Frances Gordon*, *Mary Stuart*, and *Mary Grant*. There were also the *Columbus* and others.

105. Q.—Throughout the whole famine were the *Conqueror* and *Twinkling Star* the only private vessels taken up?

A.—Yes, with the exception of the sloop already mentioned, and a second sloop which was eventually taken up. But several despatches of rice were made by the Board of Revenue, independent of me, in Messrs. Mackinnon, Mackenzie and Co.'s steamers and others. I believe I did engage one vessel, the

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Moulmein, partly for the use of the Commissariat and partly for the Board of Revenue, to go to False Point. It was in the early part of the operations.

106. Q.—Did the Board of Revenue take up any other vessel to Balasore?

A.—They sent several despatches, independent of me, to False Point, but did not send any from Calcutta to Balasore.

107. Q.—Did the Board send any vessels, independent of you, to the Dhamrah or to Pooree?

A.—They sent to both of those places from Rangoon, not from Calcutta.

108. Q.—Was the Dhamrah a port known to you before this time?

A.—I knew of the existence of the port, but had no personal knowledge of it.

109. Q.—Was it a port frequented by any kind of vessels trading from Calcutta?

A.—Not of late years; but a few years ago it was a rice port, and had been buoyed.

110. Q.—Were the buoys in existence at the commencement of the famine?

A.—Some of them were, but not all. The absence of the buoys did not prevent any ships from going there. The buoys have been relaid.

111. Q.—When were they relaid?

A.—I think when Mr. Branch Pilot Stout went there in the *Guide* on his first trip. Mr. Stout took her in from his own knowledge and recollection from formerly cruising about, and the river has been re-surveyed and buoyed within the last two months by Mr. Harris.

112. Q.—Is it your impression that any steamer drawing 12 feet of water could have got into the Dhamrah during the south-west monsoon?

A.—Not when there was a swell on during the monsoon. The *Guide* was drawing not more than 12 feet, but she grounded, and it is not every day that we get so strong a ship and so good a pilot.

113. Q.—Could a steamer drawing 10 feet have got in?

A.—Yes, at high water and spring tides only.

114. Q.—In fact was the Dhamrah never attempted except in spring tide?

A.—I don't think so, except by the *Conqueror* and *Twinkling Star*. It would all depend on the smoothness of the water.

115. Q.—Had you at any time sent any vessels to the Dhamrah besides those which you have just mentioned?

A.—No but the Board of Revenue had sent some from the rice ports.

116. Q.—Did they not draw more than 10 or 12 feet of water, and did they arrive precisely at spring tide?

A.—They did not attempt to go in. They anchored outside of the roads, to be unloaded by sloops and small boats.

117. Q.—Was it not early in August that it was proposed to send the *Teesla* to False Point?

A.—It was proposed to send her down as soon as the monsoon was over.

118. Q.—On the 11th of August, did you not direct the Officiating Superintendent of the Dockyard to ship rice with the utmost despatch on the *Teesla*?

A.—Yes, but that was intended for Calpee, under the orders of Mr. Dampier, the Commissioner of Nuddea.

119. Q.—Does not the monsoon often break in August?

A.—No, I think not; August is a very stormy month, though there may be lulls.

120. Q.—When was the earliest date that it might have been possible to send down the *Teesla*?

A.—After the Board sanctioned the *Teesla* being sent down, it was left entirely to me to decide when she was to be sent.

121. Q.—You know very well that if such a vessel as the *Teesla* had been there, she might have done immense good?

A.—Yes. Immediately after the Lieutenant Governor's return from Darjeeling in June, Mr. Eden urged me to send down a small steamer if I possibly could; but it was impossible to do so at that time of the year.

122. Q.—And are you sure that it was equally impossible to do so in the end of May?

A.—It was equally impossible.

123. Q.—In April do you think that such vessels and cargo boats might have been got down to False Point?

A.—I should have tried it, if I knew there was such an emergency coming on. I might have taken advantage of a lull and tried in April, although I would not have tried it in May.

124. Q.—Had you any thing to do with the engaging of vessels to bring rice from the Burmese Rice Ports or from the Madras Ports for transport to Orissa.

A.—No.

125. Q.—And you know nothing of the cause of the delay of certain vessels in reaching the Orissa Ports in the end of the season?

A.—No.

126. Q.—About September was there any extreme difficulty in getting steam tugs in Calcutta?

A.—I should say no.

127. Q.—Was there not a sudden rise in the price of cotton in China, and a sudden desire to press cotton to China?

A.—I think I have heard so.

128. Q.—If in any part of September you had been told to engage steamers in Calcutta to fetch rice from Burmah, do you think that you could have done it?

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A.—Yes. I have no doubt.

129. Q.—Would it have been the same in the beginning of October?

A.—Certainly.

130. Q.—In the very height of the demand for steamers to take cotton to China, do you think it could have been done by offering high rates?

A.—I think there would have been no difficulty in getting as much freight as could have been wished—either steamers or sailing vessels.

131. Q.—Can you mention the kind of steamers that might probably have been got?

A.—Messrs. Apcar and Co. had several steamers. There were also tug steamers, which could carry a good deal of rice, and could besides have towed a sailing vessel which would have utilized them.

132. Q.—Would such vessels take a risk of a cyclone in the end of September or the beginning of October?

A.—They are sea-going vessels, and all come out round the Cape.

133. Q.—Unless there chance to be a cyclone, is the sea generally very smooth in the end of September and beginning of October?

A.—Yes, unless there was a cyclone or gale of wind, as a rule, there is fine weather at that time.

134. Q.—As respects the whole famine operations in June and July, is it your opinion that if a European Army had been in danger at Cuttack, and it had been necessary to send up European soldiers, any more effectual measures could have been taken or would have been taken than were in fact taken to send rice either in point of men or means?

A.—Yes. If I had been directed to take up private vessels, more might have been done here at first. We could have sent down as many men and officers as were considered necessary. The only difficulty was to send boats.

135. Q.—Would large ships' boats have been of any use?

A.—Yes, if they had crews.

136. Q.—Could crews have been found in Calcutta?

A.—They could.

137. Q.—Could large ships' boats have been bought at Calcutta?

A.—A few might have been bought, but there was the difficulty of getting them down.

138. Q.—If the emergency had been considered sufficient, could they not have been got down by some means?

A.—Yes, but they would have been open boats, liable to damage the rice in landing, from sea and rain water.

139. Q.—Do you think efficient officers sent from this would have been of use under the circumstances?

A.—We were applied to for one to send to the Light House, and we sent one.

140. Q.—Do you think if very efficient officers of a higher grade had been sent, that the landing and transport operations might have been improved?

A.—Certainly.

141. Q.—If the emergency at Cuttack had been considered as great as that at Cabul in 1841, could you suggest any thing more that could have been done besides what you have already stated?

A.—Nothing beyond sending rice down, and boats at an earlier season if possible. As far as my department is concerned, we might have hired steamers and ships sooner during the time that I was restricted to Government vessels. But I wish to add that during this very time the Board of Revenue were hiring large vessels which they engaged through other agency than my department. I have also understood that there was a difficulty in getting rice in the rice ports.

142. Q.—As respects Balasore, if the *Nemesis* had not been available, could nothing have been done?

A.—We should have sent sailing vessels round by the Sand Heads, to anchor in the roads, and we might have tried to send small steam tugs to attempt to enter the river. Sloops might have been employed to land the rice in the absence of steamers, and might, possibly, have been towed in on the flood tide over the bar by boats. I wish to add that I think it a lamentable and deplorable circumstance that the Government should have been left without a few vessels available to act in case of such an emergency. My very first letter on the file, dated 3rd May, states that the Government had not a single vessel capable of taking 1,200 maunds to False Point.

No. 102.—MR. H. A. HARRIS, Commander of the Steamer "*Agitator*."

[Examined in Calcutta, 6th February 1867.]

1. Q.—How were you employed last year?

A.—Last year I was River Surveyor on the Hooghly. From the 5th of June I was employed in the famine relief operations. My first trip was in pilotage charge of the *Nemesis*, which was going to Balasore with a sloop in tow. I understand the pilotage of the Coast. Mr. Thomas, the Chief Officer, was in charge as Commander. I had nothing to do with the procuring of vessels to be towed by the *Nemesis*. The *Nemesis* had one single sloop in tow.

2. Q.—Do you think that any other vessels capable of going into the Balasore river could, at that time, have been obtained in the port of Calcutta or elsewhere?

A.—Not in the port of Calcutta. The *Proserpine* might have been got from Burmah, if the Burmah authorities could have spared her. She was the only other vessel available.

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3. Q.—Have you surveyed the mouth of the Balasore river?

A.—Yes, merely a cursory examination whilst going in and out.

4. Q.—What do you consider to be the draught of water which is the maximum of vessels which can enter the Balasore river?

A.—On a very smooth day a vessel drawing 12 feet might get in, but it would be a risk.

5. Q.—At the end of May or beginning of June, what do you think the deepest draught of a vessel which it would be possible to take into Balasore?

A.—About 9 feet.

6. Q.—Do you know the *Conqueror*?

A.—Yes.

7. Q.—Do you think she might have gone into Balasore?

A.—With no cargo she might have gone in, towing vessels.

8. Q.—Could vessels capable of going into Balasore have been found for her to tow?

A.—Native sloops might have been found in the port of Calcutta, Oolooberreah, and other places in the river.

9. Q.—Do you think that Native craft might have been found sufficiently sea-worthy to be towed down at that season of the year?

A.—I do; some of them are very strongly built, though the generality of them are very weakly built.

10. Q.—Did you get safely into the Balasore river with the *Nemesis*, and by what channel did you go?

A.—We went down by the inner channel, and when we got to the mouth of the river we took Horsburgh for our guide, and it turned out a very fair guide indeed. When we got to the mouth of the river we signalled for a pilot, but no pilot came up until we got over the worst part of the bar. Mr. Thomas decided to take the steamer in.

11. Q.—Was any thing afterwards done to buoy off the channel?

A.—Mr. Thomas took a buoy down with him about two months afterwards and dropped it at the mouth of the entrance.

12. Q.—After the *Nemesis* came to know the way, did she go in and out without difficulty?

A.—Yes.

13. Q.—In Balasore did you see any sloops lying idle which might have been used?

A.—There were several lying there which were capable of being used with a little repair; but I believe the Natives had great objection to bring them at all, though they might have been brought.

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14. Q.—Is it your opinion that if in the month of June the emergency had been considered sufficiently, more rice than was taken and towed by the *Nemesis* might have been thrown into the port of Balasore by taking up small tugs and Native craft?

A.—Yes, I think so.

15. Q.—Are you quite confident that this is so?

A.—I am quite certain of it. The *Proserpine* would have been a most useful vessel; she is very much like the *Nemesis*, a sister vessel in fact.

16. Q.—Are you aware that the *Proserpine* was very much out of repair?

A.—I knew nothing about her except that she has just come up for repairs. I believe she has been running in Burmah up to the present time. She might have gone to Balasore without going to the bottom.

17. Q.—Do you know of any of the small tugs in the river, such as the *Conqueror*?

A.—The *Conqueror* is about the only one, but she would not have carried any cargo.

18. Q.—Do you think there were any other drawing as little water as the *Conqueror*?

A.—I think not.

19. Q.—After that first trip to Balasore, how were you employed?

A.—I made two or three other trips to Balasore, still in pilotage charge of the *Nemesis*.

20. Q.—Do you think that with the means at the disposal of the Marine Authorities in Calcutta, every thing was done in the way of sending down rice in tow of the *Nemesis* that could have been done?

A.—As far as the *Nemesis* could be used she was. She was constantly at work, and was never kept idle for want of vessels to tow.

21. Q.—Could she not have towed more than one sloop?

A.—In fine weather she could.

22. Q.—Do you think a second sloop could have been got for her?

A.—I think so. On the second trip the *Dolphin* was put in tow of her, and one sloop and the *Dolphin* were quite as much as she could do in fine weather and more than she could do in bad weather.

23. Q.—Do you think it would have been possible to send cargo boats down?

A.—By taking them round as far as Hidgellie and leaving them there until they got fine weather, they might have been got down.

24. Q.—Do you think they could have been brought to the Dhamrah?

A.—It was a larger distance, and there would have been more risk, besides they were not wanted there.

25. Q.—Could they have been brought to False Point?

A.—No, it would have taken them to the westward of Palmyras Reef, and there is always a heavy sea there.

26. Q.—Is there any inland communication between the Dhamrah and the Mahanuddee in the monsoon?

A.—I believe that in the height of the rains there are creeks through.

27. Q.—In the end of May do you think that by any means river steamers could have been got down as far as the Dhamrah?

A.—I think it could have been at great risk. If they got into any thing of a sea, they are apt to break into two.

28. Q.—Were you at False Point at all during the famine operations?

A.—I was there for about twenty-four hours only. I was not there on duty at all.

29. Q.—When was it that you were first employed to go to the Dhamrah?

A.—I left Hidgellie on the 22nd of July in pilotage charge of the *Nemesis*. We took the *Guide* in tow and proceeded to the Dhamrah.

30. Q.—Did you pass the *Tubal Cain* on the way?

A.—We saw her lying in Balasore.

31. Q.—Did you communicate with her?

A.—No.

32. Q.—Do you think any other steamers could have been got in the river which would have done to take the *Guide* into the Dhamrah?

A.—Yes, plenty of them.

33. Q.—Till the *Nemesis* was diverted to tow the *Guide*, had she been continually employed in taking rice to Balasore?

A.—Yes.

34. Q.—Do you know at all why she was diverted from that duty when other steamers could have been got?

A.—No, I don't know.

35. Q.—When you passed the *Tubal Cain*, did she seem to be in difficulty?

A.—No, it was fine weather, and she was lying quietly at anchor.

36. Q.—Were there any other vessels at anchor there?

A.—There was nothing in sight from the *Nemesis* but the *Tubal Cain*. There was nothing being done towards the unloading the *Tubal Cain*.

37. Q.—Should you think that in the absence of the *Nemesis* it was possible to do any thing towards unloading at that time?

A.—Yes, we had two or three days' very fine weather, and I think that with a very little exertion Native sloops might have been sent down and have been loaded and kept ready for the *Nemesis*

to take in. They might possibly have got in by themselves with a fair wind, but there was no wind at all for a day or two, and what there was was right off the shore.

38. Q.—If those Native vessels had been loaded, since it turned out that the *Nemesis* was detained, what would have become of them?

A.—They might have sunk, but with the wind as it was from the eastward when it did come they might have run in, and if it had not been from the eastward they might have laid at anchor, because the weather would then have been smooth.

39. Q.—Can you tell us the exact date when you passed the *Tubal Cain* at the mouth of the Balasore river?

A.—I think it was the 23rd.

40. Q.—Will you tell us how you got the *Guide* into the Dhamrah?

A.—I had heard from the Master Attendant of Balasore that there had been great alterations in the channel there, so I was afraid to trust altogether to my knowledge, and went in a boat for two Native pilots. But they knew very little about the channel, and I found that if I had gone by my own experience I should have gone right. As it was, I went by theirs, and we unfortunately grounded. After two or three days pulling at her, the *Nemesis* got her off.

41. Q.—Did the *Nemesis* then go back again?

A.—We first towed the *Guide* up into the Metai river and then we returned to Balasore.

42. Q.—When you returned, was the *Tubal Cain* there?

A.—The *Tubal Cain* was there, and also the *Dolphin*, in tow of the *Agitator* I think.

43. Q.—Are you aware that the *Agitator* was sent down to try to get into Balasore?

A.—Yes, but I don't think she tried to get in whilst I was there. I joined her there on the 4th of August as Commander. Immediately I joined her, I found there was a very heavy surf on the bar, and if I had attempted to run in with her drawing 10 feet, she would certainly have been lost.

44. Q.—Is it loaded or light that the *Agitator* draws 10 feet?

A.—With her coals only, she draws 10 feet; she cannot carry cargo.

45. Q.—In your opinion the *Agitator* is not capable of going into Balasore in the south western monsoon?

A.—Decidedly not.

46. Q.—After that, how were you employed?

A.—I returned to Calcutta in the *Agitator* after towing away the *Tubal Cain* as far as the Sand Heads, and there I was obliged to leave her.

47. Q.—Was the weather bad when the *Tubal Cain* was left?

A.—There was evidently bad weather coming on, squalls from the eastward, and we were very anxious about her.

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48. Q.—Was it owing to an inevitable accident that the *Tubal Cain* was obliged to run into Akyab?

A.—I was obliged to leave her on account of the bursting of the principal steam pipe of the *Agitator*, and it would have been unsafe to risk the *Tubal Cain* where she was.

49. Q.—How were you employed after that?

A.—I returned to Calcutta, and went down, directly our steam pipe was repaired, to look for the *Tubal Cain*, and found that she had gone to Akyab. After that I was employed in the inner channel I was speaking of; and then I was employed on the *Conqueror*. I received my orders as pilot of the *Conqueror* on the 21st of August.

50. Q.—Was that the first trip of the *Conqueror*?

A.—That was the first trip.

51. Q.—Had she cargo on board, or was she only towing?

A.—We had 600 or 650 bags on board.

52. Q.—How much water did the *Conqueror* draw?

A.—Between 8 and 9 feet with her cargo on board, certainly not more than 9 feet; and the *Twinkling Star*, between 6 and 7 feet.

53. Q.—Was it to the Dhamrah that you took the *Conqueror* and the *Twinkling Star*?

A.—Yes, we had a most successful trip.

54. Q.—If, on that occasion, you had been told to take the *Conqueror* and the *Twinkling Star* into the Balasore river, would you have done it?

A.—Yes, it was very fine weather.

55. Q.—On that occasion could vessels fit to go to the Dhamrah have been found in Calcutta?

A.—Both steamers and sailing vessels.

56. Q.—Up to what draught could vessels be taken to the Dhamrah?

A.—To what I call the outer anchorage vessels up to 15 feet could have gone, and could have there unloaded easily with boats.

57. Q.—Could boats have been got to unload there?

A.—Yes; Mr. Shortt had plenty of them.

58. Q.—Then in fact there was no difficulty in throwing any quantity of rice into the Dhamrah?

A.—No.

59. Q.—Was Mr. Shortt down at the Dhamrah when you arrived?

A.—Yes.

60. Q.—Had he any rice there, or was he very hard-pressed for it?

A.—He was very hard-pressed for it. I think he had only five or six bags left.

61. Q.—What was the largest draught of vessel that could have been taken up over the bar?

A.—A vessel drawing 12 feet could have gone as far as the Custom House, that was where

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Mr. Shortt and I were staying, and where all the rice was landing.

62. Q.—Did you then remain at Dhamrah, or come away?

A.—I came back to Calcutta soon after. I was just six days from the day I went to coming back. I went back again immediately with the *Conqueror* and *Twinkling Star*.

63. Q.—Did you continue running up and down?

A.—Immediately we were unloaded, we came back and ran again up to the 24th of September. At one time we remained there to unload the steamer *Coringa*.

64. Q.—What happened then?

A.—I went down in the *Conqueror* and *Twinkling Star*. I remained at the Dhamrah for the purpose of surveying and buoying off the river, and the *Conqueror* returned to Calcutta. The former buoys had all disappeared with the exception of three.

65. Q.—Had you occasion to assist in bringing in other vessels?

A.—No, not in the Dhamrah; on the last trip I made I took a pilot with me, and showed him the way in.

66. Q.—Did you assist generally in relief operations there?

A.—I assisted Mr. Shortt as much as I could while I was engaged in the survey. I assisted in unloading rice and despatching it up in boats, and also in the distribution of relief at the Dhamrah.

67. Q.—How long did you remain there?

A.—Till the 20th of December.

68. Q.—Was there any shortness of rice there?

A.—Once or twice we were running rather short, having to send to many centres from the Dhamrah, and we had to get rice from Balasore on account of the *Coringa* not coming in. The *Conqueror* was detained there at the rate of 300 Rs. a day, doing nothing, only waiting to unload the *Coringa*, which never came, but by some mistake went to False Point.

69. Q.—While you were in the Dhamrah, do you think that if there had been more rice, Mr. Shortt had the means of sending it up the country?

A.—A great quantity more might have been sent: we had from 100 to 150 boats there.

70. Q.—Did you visit Bhudruk, and what was the state of things there?

A.—I visited it once or twice. There were two centres at work in the town, one either side of the Salindee river.

71. Q.—Was the distress very frightful when you were there?

A.—Yes, but it was getting a little better. There were about 9,000 relieved every day.

72. Q.—Was there always enough rice to feed the starving population?

A.—They never ran out, but once or twice they were in great dread of being so. When I was there, no rice was being sold to the public.

73. Q.—If the emergency had been thoroughly realized, do you think that any thing more might have been done to throw rice into Orissa in the end of May and June and July?

A.—Yes, I should fancy that rice might have been sent across country by the Hidgellee river and by sea. I decidedly think that more rice might have been sent to False Point and by the Dhamrah and a little more might have been sent to Balasore.

74. Q.—Do you remember any thing else remarkable that you saw?

A.—I saw some very curious traits among the people of Orissa that made it very difficult to deal with them. Able-bodied men who were offered work would refuse it, and would sit down under a tree till they got thin enough to get gratuitous relief. I found dead bodies with actually 6 or 7 seers of rice on their persons. People would come into the dhurmsalah with 10 or 12 seers of rice on their persons; they would keep the cooked rice until it was absolutely rotten; people that were so bad that they had to be sent to hospital. We had great difficulty at the dhurmsalah in dealing with the people. We tried every way that we could think of, and found that they would steal, but would not eat. I think the Ooryahs are quite a different sort of people from those in all other parts of India where I have been.

No. 103.—LIEUTENANT F. DUNCAN, R. N. R., Commanding "*Kwantung*" Steamer.

[Examined in Calcutta, 7th February 1867.]

Last year I commanded the *Arracan* at the commencement of the famine. I was under the orders of the Madras Government, in June, employed to bring rice to Gopalpoor. I arrived at Gopalpoor on the 17th June. The weather was bad, so I had to wait till the 23rd to discharge cargo, after doing which I returned to Pooree, taking a cargo of 2,600 bags of rice. This I consider to be nearly a full cargo. I arrived at Pooree on the 30th June. It was at Gopalpoor I first received orders to load for Pooree, from the Madras Government, by telegram. I do not think Pooree a more difficult port to land rice in than Gopalpoor in the south-west monsoon; a vessel lies off the shore at about the same distance at both ports. The holding ground for anchors at Gopalpoor is not good. The cargo that I took to Gopalpoor was Government rice for the famine. There was a large private importation of rice for Gopalpoor at the same time; three steamers being there. At Gopalpoor there are a good number of boats, and they discharge cargo fast. At Pooree there are not so many boats as at Gopalpoor, and they cannot get through their work in the same time. I had landed treasure at

Pooree before. Native vessels frequent Pooree in the north-east monsoon, and since the British Steam Navigation Company started, their vessels have occasionally called there. We had beautiful weather whilst I was at Pooree for the season of the year. The sea breeze universally commences about 12 noon and raises the surf. I had discharged my cargo on the 7th. I could have discharged the cargo at Gopalpoor in one day in the same weather. I attribute this to the want of system, as the men only worked from 6 A. M. to 9 A. M., and did not recommence until the sea breeze came on again, thus losing the best part of the day.

I went from Pooree to Madras. It was fine weather for the south-west monsoon. Before this, in coming across the Bay from Burma to Negapatnam, we had heavy seas and boisterous weather. After returning from Pooree, we took 2,600 bags of rice from Madras and Coconada. Arrived at Gopalpoor on the 19th July. Fine weather. I landed cargo the same day and left for Coconada. I then took 2,582 bags and returned to Gopalpoor. The next cargo was partly for Gopalpoor and partly for Balasore. Landed a portion at Gopalpoor on the 20th August, and then proceeded on to Balasore. On anchoring at Balasore, no one paid attention to my signals. The day after our arrival, the *Nemesis*, with two Native crafts, came in, and with the assistance of our boats they took the rice on board, finishing on the evening of the 25th. Fine weather; water smooth; but always a surf over the bars. I have a general acquaintance with steamers in the port of Calcutta. Some tug steamers could have gone in to Balasore I think. This was my last trip with rice. I was shortly afterwards transferred to the *Arracan*. I do not know the port of the Dhamrah. The *Kwantung* is an armed vessel, not employed in carrying rice. I was sent to Chittagong to tow over the *Pio Nono* on the 10th September. I left False Point immediately. The *Teesta* was there, but I did not see her. She was at the Light House. This was my last trip. The *Arracan* draws 16 feet; the *Kwantung* about 9 feet without her ammunition. She came from Bombay in August, and was made over to the Bengal Government.

No. 104.—MR. E. G. WELLS, Chief Officer of the "*Arracan*."

[Examined in Calcutta, 7th February 1867.]

I was employed Commanding the *Tubal Cain*, bringing a cargo of rice from the southern ports of Madras to Balasore. I was expected at Balasore on the 21st, this being the day I should have arrived by the ordinary course; I arrived on the 22nd, as near as possible the right time. I found nothing ready on arrival. On the 23rd I hoisted signals and tried to send a boat on shore, but could not do so owing to the surf on the bar, and we did not know our way into the river. Weather fine for the season of the year up to the 25th. My Mate got on shore on the 24th. I sent a telegraphic message by him to Captain Howe. On my Chief

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homicide. By degrees, arrangements were perfected, barriers were put up to prevent the crush, and the people sat down and took their rice quietly. I think it would have been more conducive to order, if the people had from the first had several centres of relief, but there were objections to that, as many of them might have drawn their rice from several of the centres at once. On five or six occasions I saw the police using sticks, and I invariably dismissed these men at once. Those who were in an extreme state of debility were not obliged to form part of the crowd at the dhurmsalah; all such people were sent to and provided for on a large scale at the Pilgrims' Hospital under Dr. Jackson. I cannot say exactly how much was given at the dhurmsalah, but they certainly had a good meal, but the majority were so diseased and emaciated that no amount of food would have kept them alive. There were two or three cases in which constables were detected stealing rice in small quantities. I sometimes caught the cooks stealing it. I do not remember a case in which the higher grade servants of Government or the Relief Committee were detected, with one exception; in that case it was a baboo of the Public Works Department, who had been employed in furnishing rice to the laborers. From information received, I searched his house, and found two maunds of rice, several bags bearing Government stamps, and he had made away with more. There were some instances of cannibalism. I saw one man who admitted to me that he had eaten human flesh; he was in a very emaciated condition, having been seven days on the road without food. Some of the able-bodied men were refused relief gratuitously, but offered work in the station at once. Many took the work, but some would not do so. My belief is that they refused work through their laziness, but when they became weak and emaciated, they mingled with the crowd and received relief at the dhurmsalah.

In bad weather I never refused relief. In the beginning of August there was rain and cold wind. Above 245 bodies were found in one day (this was the 9th of August) lying about the town. The police were occupied three days in disposing of them. I was occupied three days myself on this duty. At the time the bad weather set in sheds had been erected, and I am confident that all whose homes were not in the town could have found accommodation in the dhurmsalah and sheds had they liked to do so. A large number of paupers would not go into these sheds; they preferred lying about the town, as they picked up small donations. There were, moreover, a large number of Sonthals, who did not like associating with the Bengallees.

No. 106.—MOULVIE MAHOMED ABDOLLA.

[Examined in Calcutta, 7th and 8th February 1867.]

I am a Deputy Magistrate and Collector attached to the Balasore district. I was appointed Secretary to the Relief Committee when it was instituted, and continued to act in that capacity till the Committee was reorganized in April.

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Then I was merely a Member of the Committee, one of the European Officers taking charge of the Secretaryship. In the northern part of the Balasore district the Sarud crop of 1865 failed but not completely; it was saved to a certain degree by irrigation from tanks, &c. In the southern and centre parts of the district the failure was very bad. Before the crop was reaped, we anticipated a scarcity but not a famine; but by the time the crop had been reaped, we expected a famine. The people first began to starve in February, in which month we raised a subscription among the Natives. Mr. Muspratt also subscribed. At first we served out cooked rice; but this being found impracticable, we gave out raw rice. We always gave rice, and sometimes added a pice; we never gave out-door relief in money. During my incumbency as Secretary, I used to register the names of those whom I passed as deserving of gratuitous relief and gave them tickets. This system lasted till the Committee was reorganized in the end of April. I used to give them from 6 to 7 chittacks of rice, and I gave them dhal and vegetables besides. I am not aware that any of the paupers eat the rice raw at that time. I only admitted the weak and those who were unable to work to gratuitous relief. I directed the able-bodied to apply for labor on the public works; but some of them got work, others were refused and returned to me. I brought this to the notice of the Working Committee, and eventually, the Executive Engineer took care that they were provided with work. Subsequently, in May or June, some of the paupers complained to me that they did not receive the full quantity of rice which was allowed for them, as the subordinates of the Public Works Department used to steal and embezzle the rice. Two sircars and a chuprassee of the Public Works Department were convicted of these malpractices.

When the Committee was reorganized about the end of April, I was feeding above 3,000 men. In the beginning of May Dr. Jackson reported to the Committee that in a *post mortem* examination he had found raw rice in the stomach of a pauper; he said that eating raw rice would lead to disease and mortality. On this the Committee resolved to distribute the food cooked, and a Cooking Committee was formed. I was frequently present at the distributions of cooked food at the dhurmsalah. A very large number of people were fed. There was great confusion at the distributions; the number was unmanageable. They used to be seated along the sides of the road; but they would not remain quiet. Those who had been served once used to eat their meal and then to present themselves in another place for a second portion of food. The paupers used also to struggle among themselves for the food after it was served out. The crowd was mostly made up of women and children; perhaps 10 or 15 per cent were men. I never saw any one knocked down or assaulted in the crowd; but I saw several women and some men at different times with marks of maltreatment which they had received in the crush. Every day that I went

to the place I saw two or three persons with such marks. On one occasion, the District Superintendent sent up a pauper on a charge of grievously hurting another. I have never seen the constables assault the paupers; I have heard of such instances. I know that the constables did not use their batons for the purpose of preserving order, but they used their sticks. It was quite impossible for them to keep any thing like order without menacing the people with these sticks, and even striking them lightly every now and then. I recommended to the Committee, in the month of July, that the large number of paupers should be broken up by opening twelve centres in different parts of the town and its suburbs. But the consideration of the question was deferred pending the arrival of Mr. McNeile. After he came, the question was discussed by the Committee; but they came to the conclusion that it was impossible to find trustworthy men to superintend distributions at so many places. It was resolved, therefore, to continue feeding at the dhurmsalah only. In October, however, five or six centres were opened in different parts of the town and its suburbs; Native darogahs were appointed, on salaries of Rs. 30 and 40, to take charge of them. The Government officers exercised supervision.

The agency under which these centres were eventually opened was as available in July as in October, and I consider that it was a great mistake in not opening these centres at the beginning of the operations. I believe that one of the causes of the great mortality was that men came in from a distance of several miles to the dhurmsalah, and died from exhaustion either before or after receiving the food. I do not believe that there was greater mis-management or theft of rice at the centres which were placed under Native darogahs than at the dhurmsalah. The mortality was much less after the centres had been opened in different places.

From the first the paupers used to lodge in the dhurmsalah, but that did not afford sufficient accommodation for all; so the Committee erected a number of sheds in June. These sheds would have accommodated all, but very few availed themselves of the shelter. The cause of this was that the food supplied to them at the dhurmsalah was insufficient, and therefore the paupers used to supplement it by begging from door to door; and at night, they lay down by the sides of houses and in the verandah of houses, wherever they happened to be. I do not believe that those who took food at the dhurmsalah had any objections to congregating in the sheds with other castes; all such scruples were given up when they came to the dhurmsalah for food. The numbers who came for food varied from day to day; it was impossible to make any exact estimate of the food required each day. But the principle was to allow 6 chittacks of 80 sicca weight for each person according to the estimate of attendance; in fact, however, the actual food provided fell considerably short of this allowance, because in making the calculation, a bag was taken as containing two maunds, whereas in reality there was a deficiency of 10, 15 and 20 seers in each bag.

Vegetables, dhal, &c., were supplied in addition to the rice. I considered that the quantity which was doled out to each person was not sufficient to keep them alive. Dr. Jackson, the Civil Surgeon, proposed to increase the allowance to 8 chittacks of rice. I agreed with him, but the majority of the Committee were against any increase, and none was made, in the centres generally. I, however, increased the quantity to 8 chittacks for adults and 6 for children in the centre which was under my immediate management. I did this on my own responsibility; the result decidedly was that the paupers gained flesh.

In my opinion, the medical aid was totally insufficient for the requirements of the town and of the district all through the operations, and I frequently brought this to the notice of the Committee in my weekly reports. Only two Native doctors were sent from Calcutta for famine purposes; besides this there were two Native Doctors on the permanent establishment, who were overwhelmed with their own work. The two doctors who were sent from Calcutta did little; they did not go about among the centres; they remained in their houses, and when I urged them to be more active, they replied that they had not sufficient medicine, and that even if they had, it was useless attempting to do any thing, as there was no hospital accommodation. The only hospital accommodation was at the Pilgrim Hospital, in which, I heard from Dr. Jackson, that 2,000 men were accommodated. The mortality there was terrible.

The two special Native doctors declined to treat the paupers at the centres, and the people at the centres would not go to the Pilgrim Hospital until they were so ill that we removed them in spite of their own wishes. I think the doctors should have treated them at the centres. By centres, I mean at the dhurmsalah and at the special relief centre for Mahomedan women which was placed under my charge. This was done in June.

Government shops were opened for the sale of rice to all comers in July. I do not think that there was any necessity for opening them earlier. Up to that time the district was supplied by private traders importing by land from Hidgellee and Balighur, in the Midnapore district. These sources of supply failed in July, because the roads became impracticable. The Government rates were at very little below the market price. There was little object, therefore, in buying it in order to sell again at a profit. But the Relief Committees' sales were made at low rates. They were intended for the benefit of those only who were deserving objects of such charity; but I believe that in many instances the non-official Native Members of the Committee were too lax in the exercise of their discretion in granting tickets for admission to the privilege of purchasing at low rates. The consequence was that a good deal of the rice was sold again at a profit in the bazaar. I think that all that was possible was done for the conservancy of the town, and the disposal of the dead bodies. The

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police did all they could, and large special establishments of men and carts were kept up; but sometimes, when the weather was inclement, the number of dead was so great that it was impossible to clear the town in one day. At first the bodies were thrown into a pit on the north side of the dhurmsalakh; subsequently, they were thrown into the river and floated out to sea. It was a remarkable fact that jackals, vultures and dogs did not eat the bodies of the paupers. This was a general subject of conversation; perhaps the reason was that the bodies were so thin. I am of opinion that the rice which we received after the beginning of June was as much as we could turn to good purpose. The roads were bad, and it was impossible to procure pack bullocks by means of which to distribute more rice in the interior of the district. If more rice had come we could not have utilized it. I except a few days at the end of July and beginning of August, when we expected rice from the *Tubal Cain*, but did not receive it; then the district was in a great strait. More ought to have been sent by Government as early as April, and then we could have done much good with it. In March, I wrote to the Collector on behalf of the Committee, asking for Rs. 500 a month from Government, as zemindar of the Nowanund estate, for the relief of the ryots on that estate. The Collector replied that no money was available from the fund for the improvement of Government estates. I again addressed, in March, the Collector, pressing the demand and going into other particulars. I know that we did not get the money. In April the Commissioner came to Balasore and inspected the relief arrangements; he promised to ask the Board for Rs. 500 out of the Government estate improvement fund. He presided at a general meeting, at which the mahajuns promised to import rice. At that time I did not know that the Government would assist us, and thought that we must do the most we could for ourselves.

The estates of the Balasore districts are held principally by small zemindars; there are no mahajuns; the only large zemindars are those who are also mahajuns. I think there are more Thanees than Pahee ryots in the district; the cultivating ryots are divided into these two classes. There are many Mokuddars and hereditary Surburakhars. The Balasore district is generally in revenue matters in the same circumstances as the Cuttack district; but the assessment in Balasore is lighter than in Cuttack. I am of opinion that by far the greater number of persons who have disappeared from their homes in the Balasore district are dead. The number who have emigrated is comparatively small.

Before the sarud crop of 1865 was cut, the mahajuns had almost cleared their stocks by selling to exporters. The crop of 1865 averaged one-half of a full crop over the district. Very little of it was exported; but very little found its way into the stores of the mahajuns. It was a general matter of surprise in the Balasore town what had become of the grain from the cold weather crop

of 1865. I did not see the crops myself; but it was the general opinion of the people of the town that the crop over the district was half of a full crop. By the month of March I was fully aware that the stocks of rice in the district had run out; but I then expected that rice would be brought in from other districts by private traders, and that so the price would fall below Rs. 2-8 a maund, at which it stood in the beginning of March. In fact, in that expectation I refused to pay Rs. 2-8 a maund for rice which was brought in, in March.

No. 107.—MR. H. S. THOMAS,

Chief Officer of the *Nemesis*.

[Examined in Calcutta, 7th February 1867.]

I commanded the *Nemesis* the whole time of the famine. In June and July I was running between Calcutta and Balasore. During the latter part of July, I was sent to the Dhamrah. On returning from the Dhamrah I went back to Balasore, and made another trip to Calcutta and back. I then remained at Balasore to unload the *Arracan* and *Royal Bride* at the mouth of the river, and came up again to meet the *Teesta*. I was constantly employed except when I was once weather-bound at Balasore, and once likewise for two days at Hidgellee. I always took the inner passage. On the first trip I left for Balasore on the 6th of June, and arrived on the 9th, returned on the 13th, left Calcutta again on the 16th, and entered the Balasore river on the 19th, discharged cargo on the 22nd, and left the same day with two vessels in tow. I had left the *Dolphin* at Hidgellee, and returned with great difficulty to Balasore with her on the morning of the 27th; left again on the 29th June, and arrived in Calcutta on the 30th. Left again on the 6th of July, taking the *Dolphin* and a sloop. Left the *Dolphin* at Hidgellee, towed the sloop to Balasore, and returned to the *Dolphin*; took her cargo of 1,997 bags on board, reached the Balasore river on the 15th July, discharged cargo, and left on the 19th. The first trip I took 1,500 bags, and on the second, the steamer, sloop and *Dolphin* took nearly 3,000 bags of rice. At first we ran into Balasore River at a venture; afterwards, when I came to know the way I did not conceive it difficult, and relieved the pilot. On the 3rd of August, I took in the *Dolphin*, laden with coals, drawing nearly 10 feet of water. I considered I was running a risk, but got safe in. At the spring tides and during the freshes, vessels drawing 10 feet may be taken in, but only during the time when the freshes and spring tides are combined. The *Conqueror* went in twice. She bumped on her way. Being a strong built vessel she did not take any harm. She went in for coals on both occasions. The *Conqueror* might have been employed to tow rice in, but she could not carry much cargo. I towed three different sloops in at different times. I think the *Conqueror* could have towed sloops as well as the *Nemesis* if the Collector could have found sloops. On the 18th of July I left Balasore to take the *Guide* in tow. I received my orders by telegram I believe, but I am not sure. The vessel had been two or three days waiting for us at Hidgellee. The *Guide* brought orders for

us to take her down to the Dhamrah; but I had to take the *Dolphin's* cargo down first. I then took the *Guide* down to the Dhamrah, arriving on the 24th of July. Had the channel of the Dhamrah been known, the *Guide* might have gone in well. Plenty of vessels in the Port of Calcutta might have gone to the Dhamrah. Any ship drawing 14 feet might have done so. When the wind is not east or south, the Balasore Roads are partially protected. When I first saw the *Tubal Cain*, I think that with the then state of the weather we could have taken her rice out of her. The *Nemesis* could not have lain alongside although sloops might have done so. If the *Tubal Cain* were to be again unloaded in July I might possibly do so, but it is doubtful. Ordinary ship boats would not do for the purpose. Masoola boats might do. I do not think cargo boats would be taken down at that season. Masoola boats would tow better than cargo boats. Later in the season, when the *Arracan* and *Royal Bride* were unloaded, it was done in sloops which we towed in. It was impossible to lay the *Nemesis* alongside of the *Royal Bride*. I do not think any thing more could have been done with the Government vessels under the circumstances. Perhaps, had the *Conqueror* been taken up, she might have done more. I had on board the *Nemesis* a gentleman, Mr. Smart, who stated "that there were other tugs adapted to the work, having the same draught as the *Conqueror*." I did not hear this until the *Conqueror* had been taken up.

No. 108.—MR. R. S. EVANS, Bengal Pilot Service.

[Examined in Calcutta, 8th February 1867.]

During the commencement of the famine, I was partly employed in piloting the *Nemesis*. In July I went to Balasore and the Dhamrah. Vessels with a draught of 9 feet 6 inches can enter the port of Balasore. The *Dolphin* drew that, but she bumped twice entering the Balasore river. In the month of August there is a heavy swell. I heard that the *Conqueror* went in, but I do not know for certain. I know the *Conqueror*. If desired, I would take the *Conqueror* in, weather permitting; but in the monsoon, I should have to take advantage of the weather. There are at least two steamers in the port of Calcutta which could enter the Balasore river, as well as the *Conqueror*. The steamers I allude to are the *Victoria* and the *Mary Grant*. They both draw about 7 feet 6 inches. I once piloted the *Victoria* when she towed the vessels, and she was drawing 7 feet 6 inches. The vessels above-mentioned are not adapted for steamers; they might perhaps carry 200 or 300 bags of rice, but are best adapted for towing ships into the Balasore river. Had money been no object, their services might have been procured in June or July, as they were then lying in the river. They would have gladly taken a chance of employment. The pariah vessel we towed down was only moderately good of her class; others could have been easily procured quite as good as she was. Vessels with a draught

of 12 or 14 feet might enter the Dhamrah. I do not know any vessels drawing so little in the port of Calcutta, except pariahs, pilot vessels, and tug steamers. All tug steamers could carry small cargoes, and I believe there were vessels fitted for that purpose unemployed here. I think boats adapted for the purpose of landing rice from outside the mouth of the Balasore river were not procurable. Surf boats might have been sent for, but they are unhandy vessels to get upon deck, though it might have been done. I went once to Pooree, but have not been to Gopalpoor. I do not think it would be safe for surf boats to tow them. I know False Point Harbour. There is a safe anchorage there during the south-west monsoon. For landing rice there, a flat-bottomed steamer would certainly have been of use. In the end of May and commencement of June, it would be impossible to get such a ship as the *Teesta* down to False Point.

No. 109.—CAPTAIN A. BOND, Master Attendant and Assistant Salt Agent, Balasore.

[Examined in Calcutta, 8th February 1867.]

I have resided at Balasore since 1831. I was there when the great inundations of the sea occurred in 1831 and 1832. Mr. Ricketts was then Collector. rice was imported by sea and likewise from the interior for sufferers by the inundation. The suffering was very great, but timely measures were then taken. We had a large number of sea-going vessels available in the Balasore port; 246 were then fitted for sea; now only 22 are available. This is on account of the abandonment of the Government manufacture of salt. The loss of life was in those days caused by the inundation of the sea. I took people out of trees, dead and alive. I think the loss of life on that occasion was much greater than by the last famine, but there was not so much loss by starvation, for we had rice down from Calcutta immediately. The rice was paid for by Government; some of it was sold and some given away gratuitously. I do not remember any famine intervening between 1832 and 1866. During the famine in Mr. Ricketts' time, the people were fed for nine months altogether. The inundation in 1831 was caused by the sea raised by a heavy gale, and likewise it happened again in 1832; both gales occurred in October, and there was then no difficulty in getting rice by sloops without the aid of steam. My first letter, dated 19th March 1866, will show the reasons I had for apprehending famine. I then represented that unless Government aid was given, serious consequences would ensue. I do not know why Government aid was not given. I suppose it was not represented. Two days before and two days after the full and new moon, there is sufficient water over the bar at the Balasore river for a vessel drawing 9 feet of water to pass over, but not for a vessel drawing more. When there are freshes, there is more water on the bar. The heaviest draught

of Native vessels frequenting the port of Balasore is 9 feet. Vessels drawing more unload outside; small deck boats are sent out to unload those drawing 6 or 7 feet; these can be used in the south-west monsoon. They were used to unload the *Royal Bride* and similar vessels. I remember the arrival of the *Tubal Cain*. I do not remember communicating with her. I sent a boat to her. I do not remember whether her boat or mine communicated first. My boat was a jolly-boat. The *Orissa* did not go out in the south-west monsoon. The *Orissa* could only have got out of the river in certain states of the wind. Whether she got out to the *Tubal Cain*, I cannot answer without reference to my books. If the *Orissa* had got out, she was quite fit for sea, although she could not have carried more than 300 maunds of rice. I cannot remember whether the *Conqueror* came into the river. I think she did. I think there were 15 or 20 sloops and brigs fit to be used in the Balasore river if there had been steamers to tow them. Three steamers like the *Nemesis* could have brought three times as much grain. Sloops could have been got ready immediately. I think small vessels carrying 1,500 or 2,000 maunds might have been sent to Cherawan, which is in the centre of the district south of Balasore. Nothing was sent to Cherawan. I should decidedly recommend this year the revival of the salt manufacture as the only thing to recover the inhabitants. It will employ 25,000 people. No dependence is to be placed on private manufacture. People taking licenses to manufacture salt will not make one-half the amount of their license. Mortality during the famine was very great, but many ran away; nobody tried to prevent their going. The district of Balasore has not improved since 1831. It has become much worse; large tracts of land are now lying waste. The ryots have deserted since the manufacture of salt has been stopped. The district has certainly gone back; before the salt manufacture was abandoned, it was doing well. The last year's famine has certainly thrown land out of cultivation through deaths and desertion. The question when the district will recover again greatly depends on what kind of settlement is made. I should not advise any steps being taken in the matter until the salt manufacturing is re-opened; but my observations have only reference to those estates near the coast where salt manufactories had been established. The state of the inland zemindarees is different. I speak from my own personal observations. If by re-opening the salt manufacture, the ryots were brought back, I think it would be advisable to give them a long term of settlement; I cannot say exactly how long, perhaps for 30 or 40 years; they would then be more likely to remain. I think if a settlement was once made, the zemindars would manufacture salt on their own account. The scheme of the zemindars is to get their estates to the lowest ebb before a settlement; after that they will let them rise again.

I do not think the character of the Ooryahs worse than the Bengallees. They are not more lazy, but not so sharp. If you only put a man in to show them the way to work, they would work too.

I think during the famine the paupers were in such a wretched state that they could not work, and I expect that what has been alleged of the difficulty of getting them to labor during the earlier part of the famine depended upon the parties themselves, whether they looked after their people properly to prevent their taking part of the wages themselves.

No. 110.—MR. E. H. PALMER, *Commanding River Steamer "Teesta."*

[Examined in Calcutta, 8th February 1867.]

I commanded the *Teesta* in 1866. She is a Government steamer. In the earlier part of the south-west monsoon, I knew of no question of sending her to False Point. I received no information on the subject. I think it possible on extreme emergency to get the steamer down to False Point in the end of May or beginning of June, but it would be running a great risk. I was sent down in October 1866, just after the break of the monsoon; we could not have gone down earlier, as before stated, without extreme risk. At False Point the weather was unsettled. At first we had nothing to do. My instructions from the Master Attendant were to run from the Light House to False Point. It was impossible to do so, except at high tide. We found the 29th, unloading on arrival. She was then left at there; she was unloaded with out a sloop. There were plenty of country boats. The sloop in the *Pie IX* was unloaded, the *Phoe* took her crew; she was likewise unloaded with Balasore assistance, as well as the *Romaine*. They were fully employed, almost all the time. Cargoes were landed at Light House creek, and from there sent up in smaller boats. I believe before I came down, some boats had gone up the Jhumboo and other creeks. I did not know whether there was sufficient water for the *Teesta*. I do not know whether rice especially was required. It was not proposed to me to tow boats up the Jhumboo. I have never been up it, but have been to its mouth. I have been over its bar, but not so far as the Irrigation Company's godown. I did not take the *Teesta* over the bar; she might have gone over in the spring tides and freshes, but probably not in the neap tides. The Irrigation Company's godown is on the Jhumboo. I do not know what route the Company uses.

I eventually went up the Barkood creek. Mr. McNeile and myself sounded it, and found it practicable. No steamer had been there before; only Native boats. There is a bar at the mouth of the Barkood and likewise of the Jhumboo; the bar across the latter is the easiest to get over. They both communicate with the Mahanuddee. They are both tidal rivers, and have fresh water

running through them during the freshes. I went up the Barkood creek in November after the freshes were over; the river had fallen, but not to its lowest. I went up between 25 and 30 miles, and took the *Teesta* from the Barkood into the Mahanuddee. I found it practicable, but had not much water to spare. In January I could not go up as far as in November. I towed up several large boats drawing 4 feet of water laden with rice; they were not proper inland boats, they go up as far as Patamoondee.

I was once up the Noona, another branch of the Mahanuddee; it joins the Barkood, and is perfectly navigable. I do not know of any communication between the Mahanuddee and Dhamrah. The *Teesta* is as strong a boat of her class as is to be found, but too long for shoal rivers.

No. 111.—MR. J. H. REILEY, *Deputy Inspector General of Police.*

[Examined in Calcutta, 8th February 1867.]

I visited Orissa in the beginning of November 1866; landed at False Point. Rice was being discharged from the *Pie IX*; but Mr. Burgess complained that there was not sufficient landed in Native boats. There was great difficulty in landing the rice owing to the bad weather. The *Teesta* could only be used once in twenty-four hours. This was at high tide and by day-light from the anchorage to the Light House. She could not be used at night. Mr. Macpherson and myself from enquiries thought we might have been able to go up the Barkood. I did not hear of boats going up the Jumbhoo to Cuttack. On arrival at Cuttack, I heard that that boat had been used by the Irrigation Company. We had not heard of the Jumbhoo at False Point. We heard of the Barkood from Messrs. Crouch and Burgess, and likewise from the manjees. Afterwards we went up the Barkood in a Police boat, and on arrival at Cuttack, informed Mr. McNeile, who proceeded to False Point.

Mr. Macpherson and myself offered to take the steamer up; but the officers objected to do so without an order, and we could not take the responsibility of giving one; so went in a boat to Cuttack, visiting the villages enroute, which we found in a bad state, up to within 30 miles of Cuttack. The distress was very great. The relief centres were still full of people, but they were generally well managed. I think all the people got sufficient food at the relief centres. At Cuttack distress had subsided. I went to Kendraparah along the road; the villages were deserted or almost so; the crops were completely destroyed from droughts and floods. There were likewise centres established here. All along the lower part of the Mahanuddee, the crops were destroyed for five miles on each side of the river. The fully five miles on each side of the river. The crops were good beyond the floods, and the lands well cultivated; but even there the country had

not returned to prosperity, although good crops were standing. In the Kendraparah direction, great damage had been done by the flood, but the crops had been fine until destroyed by the flood. I also went to Pooree, along the Juggernath road. The crops looked better in that district than in the lower part of Cuttack, but I did not go off the road, so could not see for certain whether they had suffered more than in the previous year. I was sent down especially to visit this division.

No. 112.—MR. A. GROTE, *Senior Member of the Board of Revenue.*

[Examined, 11th February 1867.]

1. Q.—Have you had any personal experience of Orissa?

A.—None.

2. Q.—Since when have you been a Member of the Board of Revenue?

A.—Since the year 1860.

3. Q.—Will you tell us, as distinctly as you can, what you consider to be the line between the duties of the Board of Revenue and of the Government, and how far you consider the Board to be an executive office under the directions of the Government?

A.—The Board of Revenue is the chief revenue executive authority.

4. Q.—In matters beyond strict revenue, what do you consider to be the functions of the Board: in such matters, for instance, as a famine, what special functions did the Board consider they were bound to undertake?

A.—The Board are bound to report to Government all that they hear regarding the general state of the country. Commissioners of divisions' reports submitted to the Board in the Revenue Department, and anything that came to the Board's notice connected with the state of the districts, would be laid before the Government.

5. Q.—Was it the Board's business to act (as regards a famine) without special orders?

A.—They would expect special orders to undertake any relief measures.

6. Q.—Can you refer us to any instructions in which the duties of the Board are distinctly laid down?

A.—Only to the Regulation (I of 1829) under which the Board is constituted.

7. Q.—Is there any class of officers connected with the general administration exclusively under the Board?

A.—The revenue officers generally are exclusively under the Board.

8. Q.—Are there any exclusively revenue officers?

A.—There are survey officers excise, customs, and opium officers who are exclusively revenue officers, but they cannot be said to be connected with the general administration.

9. Q.—Is the Board at all consulted regarding the appointment and posting of officers?

A.—Occasionally, but not as a rule: the appointment and posting of officers is not a part of the Board's proper functions.

10. Q.—Are the Board at all consulted as regards the higher officers?

A.—In regard to Deputy Collectors, we have occasionally been called on to nominate particular officers for a survey or a particular district.

11. Q.—Have the Board any personal control over the higher officers: can you order a Commissioner to go to any particular part of his division?

A.—If the Board expressed a wish for a Commissioner to go from one part of his division to another, he would be bound to go, unless he could assign any reason for not doing so.

12. Q.—From the time when a scarcity was apprehended during the past year, did you consider that all matters connected with the scarcity and famine impending were distinctly delegated to the Board?

A.—Only to the extent referred to in my answer to your 4th question; but from the month of June, the Board held their special sittings on matters connected with the famine.

13. Q.—From October 1865, when the first apprehensions arose, did you consider that the Board were required to take note of the state of the crops and the country?

A.—The duty was not formally delegated to the Board; but they thought it to be part of their duty without any formal delegation.

14. Q.—In the end of October the Government specially called on the Board to submit a report regarding the state of the crops and of the country?

A.—Yes, and we made that report on the 25th of November 1865.

15. Q.—It has been officially stated that that report was founded on very imperfect information, and in fact the information on which it was founded was of a date considerably prior to the reaping of the crops. Did the Board not consider it necessary to call for further reports in order to render their information more perfect and complete?

A.—The Board did not call for special reports, but they had an active correspondence with the different Commissioners. As regards Orissa there was no occasion to call for special reports, since, in the district of Pooree, the subject forced itself on the Board's special attention.

16. Q.—Orissa lying to the westward suffered more from the scarcity of rain than other districts, and we observe that in the report of the 25th November the Board considered the Commissioner's estimate of the out-turn probably too sanguine, also that his estimate of stocks was not well founded, and as you have mentioned, the state of the Pooree district immediately

afterwards forced itself on your attention; did you not then consider it necessary to obtain any complete information regarding the out-turn of the crops in all the districts of Orissa?

A.—We could have had no better authority than the Collectors, and we had reports from them,—from the Collector of Pooree especially.

17. Q.—Was it not the case that all the Collectors in Orissa asked for permission to make special enquiries regarding the state of the crops, and that in every case the Board negatived the application?

A.—I do not recollect any applications from the Collectors of Cuttack and Balasore, but I do recollect one from Pooree. This letter, dated the 15th January 1866, in which I concurred, explained the grounds for negativing the application. The letter was written by Mr. Cockburn. On Mr. Trevor's leaving the Board, Cuttack was primarily administered by Mr. Cockburn, as a matter of distribution between the Members of the Board. The letter of the 10th January was in consequence written by Mr. Cockburn, and sent to me for concurrence.

18. Q.—The Secretary to the Board of Revenue has told us that Mr. Trevor was disabled by sickness for a short time before his departure, so that probably, in any thing after the 25th of November, Mr. Trevor did not take a part?

A.—He could not come to the Board at that time; but I think papers used to be sent to him; though, of course, the greater part of the work was done by me.

19. Q.—We wish to know whether, after the report of the 25th of November, and before his departure on the 9th of December, the question came before Mr. Trevor, particularly as to calling for reports or doing any thing as regards Orissa?

A.—No, probably not.

20. Q.—Do you consider that the letter of the 10th January was issued under the impression that there was no such general calamity as would justify the Board in allowing enquiries with a view to remissions of revenue?

A.—The Board thought so, and gave the grounds of their thinking so in that letter. The calamity did not seem to be so extreme or general in character as to justify the zemindar's claim for remission. We had been in the habit of hearing of such claims every year from different parts of the province.

21. Q.—Do you now think that at that time you had information which would justify you in being satisfied that there was no such extreme failure in the crops?

A.—We only had the information that you see, and I think it justified us in writing that letter to the Commissioner.

22. Q.—Do you allude to the information forwarded by the Commissioner, or to any other?

A.—I allude to all the information which we had before us. We had no other than what was supplied by the Commissioner and the Collector.

23. Q.—Did the intelligence which was immediately afterwards received from Pooree attract the attention of the Board?

A.—Yes, it did as regards Mallood and Parricood.

24. Q.—Was the Board aware that the Commissioner at that time went away on a long tour in the most distant part of the Tributary Mehals?

A.—My attention was not, that I can remember, particularly directed to it.

25. Q.—Did you not think it necessary to make any representation regarding the necessity of recalling him?

A.—No; as Superintendent of Tributary Mehals the Commissioner is independent of the Board.

26. Q.—Do you remember by whom at that time a telegram was sent to say that rice would be shipped from Meetacooah on account of the starving population of Mallood and Parricood?

A.—I don't remember by which of the Members of the Board the order was issued. It was probably a proposal of the Secretary's, and sanctioned by me. Mr. Trevor was not likely to have been at the Board, as he was sick at the time. It was expected that a steamer would touch there, and we thought of sending down a small supply; the steamer did not touch there, and we did not send it.

27. Q.—In his telegram of the 5th November the Collector begs of the Board to ask for public aid. In the course of the discussion which ensued, did the Board consider the question whether it was or was not proper to ask for public aid?

A.—I presume the Collector's request to ask for public aid was discussed at the Board. We telegraphed in reply for particulars of the population of Mallood, and on receipt of these we considered that the local public works ordered would afford sufficient relief.

28. Q.—Did the Board consider that the measures adopted by Government for relieving the distress at Pooree were sufficient?

A.—Yes; the measures were mostly of our own recommendation.

29. Q.—About the beginning of the year, did the Board think it necessary to make any further special enquiries regarding the districts most affected by the drought?

A.—In October we called on the Commissioners of Bhaugulpore and Patna for a report on the prospect of the Rubbee crops.

30. Q.—You did not think it necessary to call for a report from the Commissioners of the other districts. Was it because the Rubbee crop was not important in the other districts?

A.—The Rubbee crop was not of that importance in Cuttack as in other districts.

31. Q.—Was there no general report called for regarding the state and prospect of Orissa?

A.—No.

32. Q.—Do you remember the circumstances under which the orders originally issued to pay for labor employed on local relief works in grain were cancelled, and the local authorities were strictly enjoined to pay in cash only?

A.—I remember that my own views were in favor of money payment in preference to grain.

33. Q.—Do you remember whether there was any special discussion or consultation with His Honor the Lieutenant Governor on the subject?

A.—It was discussed in the Board, but I do not remember that it was discussed with the Lieutenant Governor.

34. Q.—On the 31st January a very important telegram was received from the Commissioner of Orissa, to say that the famine relief was at a stand-still for want of rice, and that it was necessary to get rice for Pooree from elsewhere; do you remember that?

A.—Yes; our telegram in reply bears date the 1st February.

35. Q.—Do you remember whether there was any special discussion at that time?

A.—I suppose that the answer had reference to the decision of Government on our report on the 25th of November.

36. Q.—Do you remember that the fact that the relief work was stopped for want of rice, was brought to the notice of the Lieutenant Governor before he went down to Cuttack about a fortnight after?

A.—I think we must have reported the matter to the Lieutenant Governor, but I cannot say for certain.

37. Q.—In your letter of the 24th of January you had reported to Government that prices in the Pooree district were happily insufficient to tempt importers, and on the 1st of February you had declined to import rice on the part of Government; did not the price currents received within a few days show that at Pooree grain was very rapidly becoming dearer, and did not that suggest some necessity for modifying what you had already said?

A.—We did not consider it sufficient to modify our orders.

38. Q.—At that time, immediately previous to the Lieutenant Governor's visit to Orissa, was there intimate personal communication between the Lieutenant Governor and the Members of the Board, and was the scarcity and famine in Pooree the subject of discussion?

A.—Yes; it was the subject of discussion between the Lieutenant Governor and ourselves, and we were in intimate communication with His Honor.

39. Q.—Was Mr. Cockburn's visit to Orissa in any way connected with the famine?

A.—No; I believe the Lieutenant Governor asked him to go as an old Cuttack officer, more with a view to discussing irrigation measures than with reference to the famine.

40. Q.—We believe Mr. Cockburn was very unwell on his return; did you see him then?

A.—I saw him once or twice at his own house, but he did not come to the Board.

41. Q.—Did you gather from him that anything he had heard or seen at Pooree had caused him apprehension?

A.—No, I think if anything had struck him of interest in the district, it would have led him to tell me of it.

42. Q.—Do you remember whether the state of the Pooree district was in any way the subject of special discussion between you and Mr. Cockburn after his return?

A.—Not of special discussion. We talked about it naturally, and conversed generally about what he had seen during his visit.

43. Q.—What do you remember that Mr. Cockburn told you as respects the state of the Pooree district?

A.—I don't particularly remember anything. Whatever he did say was not of sufficient importance to draw my attention to the serious prospect of famine.

44. Q.—Did the Lieutenant Governor in any way draw the Board's particular attention to the subject of the scarcity and the risk of famine in Cuttack after his return?

A.—I don't recollect that he did specially call our attention to the subject. He probably talked on the subject to me.

45. Q.—For some weeks after the Lieutenant Governor's return, were any special apprehensions entertained of the approaching famine?

A.—None whatever.

46. Q.—Did Mr. Schalch join the Board on the 4th of April?

A.—Yes.

47. Q.—Mr. Schalch, I believe, has a very intimate personal acquaintance with Orissa?

A.—He was Collector of Balasore for many years.

48. Q.—On his taking charge, was the Orissa division specially made over to him as it had been to Mr. Cockburn or not?

A.—Not specially. The distribution of work might have remained the same, but for the last half of April, I went down to Madras, and consequently Mr. Schalch was for that month in charge of the whole of the duties of the Board. I went by the first steamer in April, and came back by the last, in order to rest my eyes.

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49. Q.—Do you remember to have heard from Mr. Schalch that, before taking charge of his duties as a Member of the Board, he had received a letter from Mr. Barlow, the Collector of Pooree, asking for assistance for the starving population, and whether there was not a balance of some fund available?

A.—I don't recollect Mr. Schalch's having told me anything of the kind.

50. Q.—Do you remember whether at that time Mr. Schalch's knowledge of the winds and coasts of Orissa, and of the circumstances which precluded private trade in the ordinary Native vessels after March, at all influenced the policy of the Board or of Government?

A.—I don't know whether Mr. Schalch's local experience would have given more knowledge in that respect than I had. I know what the monsoon is in the Bay. All our salt imports from Balasore to Calcutta used to cease from the end of March or the beginning of April. I don't think that consideration influenced our policy at all, because we did not see the necessity of importing for Government. Rice was being imported into Pooree by land by the Chilka from Gopalpoor, and such importations were being carried on throughout April.

51. Q.—When you returned from sea in the end of April, did you become aware that there was a very severe famine in Balasore?

A.—No.

52. Q.—The Commissioner, in his report of the 2nd May to Government, has described what he saw at Balasore before leaving that place on the 20th of April, and in that letter he seems to describe very severe famine indeed. Is it your impression that when you returned to the Board, information of starvation and famine at Balasore had not reached the Board?

A.—Not being a revenue matter, the Commissioner would have the option of reporting it either on the Revenue or on the circuit side of his office. I don't think that in the Board there was the knowledge that there was a state of famine in Balasore. There was no report to that effect. We were surprised when we got that letter afterwards. But I must observe that it is very difficult to speak regarding personal impressions so many months after the time.

53. Q.—May we understand that up to the time when Government first suggested the importation of grain, the Board were not aware to the full extent of the state of things existing in Balasore and Orissa generally?

A.—The picture before the Board was the picture drawn by the local officers. Comparatively few of the reports from the Commissioner came to the Board; such as were sent to Government on the circuit side came to the Board afterwards from Government.

54. Q.—In the early part of May, had you any intimate demi-official communications with the local officers?

A.—I don't think I corresponded demi-officially with the Commissioner at that time, or with any of the local officers.

55. Q.—Later in May, when the Lieutenant Governor first suggested importation of grain, did Mr. Schalch and you both concur in thinking that there was then no sufficient ground for taking that step?

A.—Up to the 23rd we concurred; after the 23rd I was alone in the Board.

56. Q.—What was the occasion of Mr. Schalch's going to Darjeeling at that time?

A.—He did not go on any special duty, but it had been the practice of the Members of the Board occasionally to attend the Lieutenant Governor at Darjeeling. I went up in 1864. I don't remember that there was any special reason for Mr. Schalch's going on this occasion.

57. Q.—Did it not appear to the Board that just at that time the question of importations for famine purposes was pending, and that it was very undesirable that the Member whose knowledge of the coast was complete should be taken away?

A.—The impression at that time was that things would improve from the first fall of the coming rain, and moreover we were not in that state of anxiety that suggested the expediency of retaining the two Members in Calcutta.

58. Q.—Was not the question of importation at that very moment pending further enquiry and local report?

A.—Mr. Schalch's presence with the Lieutenant Governor would have enabled him to dispose of the Commissioner's reply on a reference from me.

59. Q.—Were not the executive arrangements, as respects the famine, entirely in the hands of the Board in the absence of the Lieutenant Governor, and must not all shipping arrangements have been made by them?

A.—Yes; but during the Lieutenant Governor's absence, they would have been made as well by one Member as by two.

60. Q.—Has it ever been the practice for Members of the Board, on special occasions, to visit out-lying districts within their jurisdiction?

A.—Occasionally; but not while I had been in the Board. If a Member of the Board suggested the necessity of a Member's going, no doubt the Lieutenant Governor would sanction his going; but it was not the practice for any Member to go without some special order of Government.

61. Q.—In the middle and latter part of May, when the prospect of famine in Orissa became serious, and importations were contemplated, do you not think it might have been a fitting occasion to depute a Member of the Board to judge for himself on the spot?

A.—Certainly not; our presence was more necessary in Calcutta to superintend the shipping and general executive arrangements.

62. Q.—Up to that time, had you full confidence in the Commissioner Mr. Ravenshaw's judgment. Did you not think that in some respects he had been rash in his estimate of the large stocks and in not properly judging of the severity of the distress?

A.—My confidence was not shaken up to that time, as Mr. Ravenshaw had the best means of judging. My first expression of doubt and surprise, as obvious in my demi-official letter, was expressed about the time that we commenced importations.

63. Q.—If you then began to entertain doubts, did you not think it desirable that a Member of the Board should have gone to ascertain particulars, especially as regards the landing and transport operations in the different parts which were within a day or two steam of Calcutta?

A.—We had then commenced importations. What was then required was to keep the supplies of rice going into the province. The Board thought it more important to stay in Calcutta and superintend the purchase and shipment of rice.

64. Q.—Were not the Board aware that at that season of the year the landing and transport operations were most particularly and specially difficult?

A.—Of course they were.

65. Q.—Was it then considered sufficient to leave that duty entirely to the Commissioner, burthened with many other duties and practically as respects communication much further from False Point than in Calcutta?

A.—The landing duties devolved on the Master Attendant's Department, and were made between myself and Captain Howe. As to getting the grain up into Cuttack, the local officers were naturally much better able than we were to superintend the operations there.

66. Q.—Was it not then considered necessary to send down some experienced officer of the Master Attendant's Department or some one having special knowledge of those matters?

A.—There was a man at False Point at the Light House. We did ask Captain Howe to send some one down, but I don't recollect who was sent. The arrangements were made with Captain Howe mostly by Mr. Chapman, the Secretary to the Board.

67. Q.—In the beginning of June do you think that you really had sufficient information regarding the degree of famine and distress which it now appears actually existed at that time; or does it now strike you that the reports did not sufficiently represent the extremeness of the actual distress?

A.—I think that the local officers gave us all the information that they had at command.

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68. Q.—Do you think that there was anything in the tone of the superior authorities which had made the local officers unwilling to report more than what they could distinctly substantiate, and unwilling to hazard speculative opinions which might have been considered of an alarmist character?

A.—Certainly not.

69. Q.—Does not your letter to Mr. Ravenshaw of the 29th of May and the Lieutenant Governor's to Mr. Chapman of the 11th of June show that the superior authorities were inclined to take a somewhat more sanguine view of matters than the district officers, and may not such views have in some degree rendered the district officers more cautious in respect to hazarding opinions of the future?

A.—Certainly not; both letters were dated after importations had commenced, so that I don't see that they could have had the effect contemplated in the question. My opinion is that they conscientiously gave their opinions regarding their respective districts to the best of the means in their power.

70. Q.—We have been told that in the early part of June the Government and the Board came to the determination not to publish all the statements which might be made or hazarded by district officers, but only a concise narrative of ascertained facts. Do you remember the discussions on that point?

A.—It was quite my view that we should confine our publications to what came before us as facts.

71. Q.—Do you think that that determination was in any way conveyed to the district officers, and that they were in any way rendered somewhat more cautious of stating more than they knew as facts; for instance, to confine their reports of mortality to the cases of death which they had ascertained rather than to hazard statements of their impressions respecting the great mortality which we now know to have been going on unseen and unascertained?

A.—My belief is that the question arose as to the form in which we should communicate to the press the information we had. In discussing that question, we resolved to confine ourselves to a statement of the facts which we had. I don't think that any orders cautioning the district officers issued from us, and I am quite sure that they were not discouraged from speaking out their minds.

72. Q.—Looking back, do you now not think that, as matter of fact, a very imperfect impression of the whole extent of the suffering and mortality was conveyed to the public?

A.—No; I believe that our reports were as correctly prepared as the materials we had for preparing them could make them; and I believe that the materials supplied by the local officers were as correct as they could be made.

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Apparently, from recent information, the mortality was very much greater than we or they at the time supposed. As regards our communications to the public we communicated every thing that we knew.

73. Q.—Then, as a matter of fact, do you think that the Board themselves were at the time not fully informed of the whole extent of the calamity?

A.—Certainly not, if the later reports of November are correct, which we believe them to be, as they have been prepared on more complete and careful enquiry than the early reports.

74. Q.—To what do you attribute this defective information?

A.—I believe that the Collectors did their best to get information from every available source. They had no machinery for ascertaining more correctly the rate of mortality. If any body could have prepared returns accurately, the Relief Committees could have done so, as they were composed of official and non-official members.

75. Q.—If in the end of May or beginning of June you had realized the full extent of the calamity, do you think more might have been done by hiring steamers in Calcutta and pushing grain down?

A.—I doubt it.

76. Q.—Later in June, when the calamity was more fully realized, do you think that operations were in any degree restricted by financial considerations, that is, by the fear that the balance of the old Famine Fund would not suffice to meet the requirements. Had not the Board apprehensions on that point?

A.—I don't think we had in June.

77. Q.—At any time do you think that the operations were in any degree restricted by the fear that the money in hand would not suffice if rice were thrown in in the most expensive way? Was it not to some extent made an object to import on commercial principles rather than to throw in rice totally regardless of expense?

A.—I don't think so; I am not aware that any cargo was delayed on considerations connected with the expense of sending it there.

78. Q.—As the *Nemesis* was employed to take rice to Balasore, might not other small steamers have been hired to send rice in the same way?

A.—I don't think so; but on all questions connected with the steamers, we acted in communication with the Master Attendant.

79. Q.—The Master Attendant tells us that his instructions were solely restricted to Government vessels, and that not till August did he have instructions to hire private vessels?

A.—He had no *carte blanche* certainly. When a cargo had to go, we looked about us. If we had Government steamers, we took them. No cargo was delayed on any considerations of expense on account of hiring steamers, as far as I can remember.

80. Q.—We find that on the 15th of June and 3rd of July cargoes of rice offered by certain merchants were refused; was that because you did not think more rice was required?

A.—As far as I can recollect we refused the offers because we had bought enough in Burmah and elsewhere, and we only bought here for urgent occasions when it seemed necessary.

81. Q.—Might not rice have been sent to Pooree early in June; and altogether would it not have saved time if, expense being no object, rice had been sent by steam from Calcutta in the first instance instead of awaiting the Burmah supplies?

A.—Pooree was, I think, being supplied in small quantities by private trade by land from Gopalpoor.

82. Q.—Mr. Schalch returned from Darjeeling about the same time as the Lieutenant Governor; do you know why he went back to Darjeeling in September?

A.—He went back, I suppose, for the same reason that he went up before. I think he was only away a fortnight.

83. Q.—What was the occasion of the delay and failure in engaging the *Mahratta* and in the arrival of the *Asia* and *Dundas Castle*, which caused a failure of the supplies in October?

A.—The failure of supplies was not a necessary consequence of the delay. The delay, I apprehend, was in consequence of some misunderstanding between the British India Company and Messrs. Gisborne and Co.

84. Q.—If money was no object, why did you refuse to allow the purchase of the whole cargo of the *Charles Maureau*?

A.—The Commissioner had discretion to purchase daily according to his requirements, I believe about 500 maunds a day. We were in hopes that the cargo of the *Maureau* would be available on private account, and we thought that the Government stores would be independent of the *Maureau*.

85. Q.—Were you consulted on the question whether it was desirable to appeal to the public in May, June, July, or August?

A.—Yes, and was against the appeal so long as we had the six lakhs. That is on record in one of our letters to Government.

86. Q.—Were you also against the formation of a public Committee for the purpose of dealing with the balance of former subscriptions and of considering the question whether further subscriptions were required?

A.—That question was discussed in the Board with Mr. Moncrieff and Baboo Degumber Mitter on the return of the Lieutenant Governor from Darjeeling. We agreed that for the administration of this balance of the old Famine Fund, the Relief Committee, which had been organized under the superintendence of the local authorities, were better adapted to see relief properly given than any new non-official General Committee.

87. Q.—Did Mr. Moncrieff and Baboo Degumber Mitter concur in that opinion?

A.—I don't recollect at this moment whether they concurred or not, but I believe they did not press any opposition. I presume that they did not do so, as the question was decided on our view. I have no exact recollection of what each person said.

88. Q.—Do you remember anything of the question about the paupers being sent back to the districts from Calcutta. What was your opinion?

A.—I think that I opposed the general forcing them out of Calcutta.

89. Q.—What was the result. Do you think they were forced out?

A.—It was not done by the Board, but by the Commissioner of Police. I recollect that I said there was no law to compel them to leave. I don't think compulsion was used. It was on the occasion of hiring a steamer that I expressed my opinion. It was agreed not to send any detachments out of Calcutta until we were assured of the Local Committees being ready to receive them.

90. Q.—Are you now satisfied that they were not sent back too soon?

A.—Yes.

No. 113.—MR. V. H. SCHALCH, *Junior Member of the Board of Revenue.*

[Examined in Calcutta, 11th February 1867.]

1. Q.—Will you be so good as to tell us what experience you have had in Orissa?

A.—I was from May 1853 to December 1858 Magistrate and Collector and Salt Agent in Balasore. I have paid a visit of two or three days to Cuttack, but have never been employed there. Pooree I never visited till last December.

2. Q.—Have you never been employed in Orissa since 1858?

A.—No, I have not.

3. Q.—Are you well acquainted with the Dhamrah and False Point ports?

A.—The Dhamrah I once visited when Salt Agent at Balasore; False Point not till recently.

4. Q.—You are well acquainted with the winds and sea on the coast of Orissa?

A.—I know something of them.

5. Q.—Were you Chairman of the Justices and Commissioner of Police in Calcutta until the 3rd of April 1866?

A. Yes, I was.

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6. Q.—Do you remember at that time to have received a letter from Mr. Barlow, the Collector of Pooree, regarding the state of his district and asking for assistance?

A.—Some time previous to leaving that appointment, I received a private note from Mr. Barlow.

7. Q.—Do you understand that note was written to you merely as an individual, or as Chairman of the Justices?

A.—Merely as an individual. I have not got the note now; I did not keep it.

8. Q.—What do you remember of its contents?

A.—What I remember of its contents, speaking very generally, is, that Mr. Barlow said that there was a good deal of distress there, and asked if I knew of any fund from which relief could be given.

9. Q.—What did you do on receipt of that letter?

A.—I thought that there might have been some balance of the Cyclone Relief Fund, and wrote to the Hon'ble Mr. David Cowie on the subject, forwarding, I think, but cannot be sure, the note itself. I learned from him that there was no balance available, and I replied to that effect to Mr. Barlow.

10. Q.—When you took charge of your office in the Board, did you understand that the Board were specially charged with all matters connected with the famine and relief?

A.—No; papers came up and were disposed of as they came, or were passed on to Government when necessary.

11. Q.—Did you consider that everything connected with those matters was to come through the Board?

A.—I understood that all questions referring in any way to revenue matters came before the Board, public works matters went to the Public Works Department, but also came to us occasionally, as in the case of the Khas Mehals.

12. Q.—What do you consider to be the Board's duties as respects an approaching famine?

A.—To pass whatever orders might appear necessary, and to keep Government informed of what they did.

13. Q.—Did you understand that it was the duty of the Board to ascertain all that could be ascertained on the subject, or that that was the function of Government?

A.—I cannot say that I understood anything about it. We took up every thing as it came before us.

14. Q.—Do you think that it was the duty of the Board or of the Government to ascertain whether a famine was approaching or not. In

the month of April, was it your impression that it was the duty of the Board to keep themselves informed?

A.—My impression is that it was our duty to keep Government informed of every thing that came before us, and to ask for information where we thought information necessary for the subject in hand.

15. Q.—Did you, as a Member of the Board, think that it was the duty of the Board to ascertain what was the state of the country, and whether there was any reason to fear that the scarcity already reported would become a famine?

A.—We received information from separate districts and acted on that information up to our power as far as our power went, reporting all matters of importance to Government. We referred to Government for orders where our power ceased; but we had no distinct department for famine matters, as we subsequently had.

16. Q.—We believe that Mr. Grote left Calcutta, temporarily, on the 9th of April, and that you were then in sole charge of the Board till Mr. Grote returned?

A.—Yes.

17. Q.—Did you, at that time, think it necessary to make any special enquiries regarding the state of the districts of Orissa?

A.—We received information from the local authorities and acted on that information as we received it. I cannot say more from mere memory.

18. Q.—Do you remember whether reports were called for from the Collectors of districts in Orissa as to the state of the population of their districts whether they were starving or otherwise?

A.—I am not aware of any general circular being sent to that effect.

19. Q.—With reference to the division of duty between the Government and the Board ordinarily, do you consider that the responsibility of making sure that the Collectors and Commissioners fully reported all matters which it was important to report, in connection with the probability of a famine, lay with the Government in direct communication with the local authorities or with the Board?

A.—As far as all matters regarding which the Commissioners were subordinate to the Board, I consider it the duty of the Board to see that the Commissioners keep the Board duly informed, and on their part again to keep the Government duly informed of all important matters therewith connected; and I consider that as regards matters other than those specifically in the Board's Department, the Board are not responsible.

20. Q.—Mr. Grote or Mr. Chapman has informed us that public works of the Public Works Department excepted, they think it was understood in the past year that the Board were charged with famine matters from the end of 1865 onwards. Do you concur in that opinion?

A.—I did not understand that from the first nor until some time in May when active measures were discussed.

21. Q.—We observe that from the end of March prices were very rapidly rising. Did that cause any special anxiety to the Board?

A.—Prices were noted to be rising, and correspondence was going on with the Cuttack authorities regarding the general matters of the district in connection with it. My impression is that there was no special order given.

22. Q.—Were you aware of the severe famine which prevailed in Balasore in April?

A.—No; I was not aware of it.

23. Q.—Did you subsequently see the Commissioner's report of the scenes which he himself saw in Balasore in the middle of April, and did that account of the scenes of famine there take you by surprise?

A.—My impression is that up to the 20th or 22nd of May, the only report of severe suffering received by the Board was in Paricood and Mallood in Pooree.

24. Q.—Were you in communication with any of the European officers or residents of Balasore or Pooree?

A.—No; I was not.

25. Q.—On the 24th of April, Mr. Muspratt, Collector of Balasore, advertised for public aid, and referred subscribers to Mr. Chapman to receive the money. Did you not at that time become aware that there was severe distress?

A.—I merely knew that Mr. Chapman was collecting subscriptions towards the distress.

26. Q.—Was not your attention drawn to Mr. Sykes' fund, and to letters published by Mr. Chapman in the papers to the effect that he thought general measures of relief necessary; and did you not think it necessary to make any special enquiry with reference to these and other statements of the public prints?

A.—No special orders were passed up to the date I speak of as far as I can recollect.

27. Q.—Nor was any special encouragement given to the Collectors to state freely all that they might apprehend?

A.—No; nor could there have been in my opinion any necessity. The Collectors ought to have done so of their own accord.

28. Q.—Was the distress, present or impending, made a subject of special discussion between you and the Lieutenant Governor before his departure for Darjeeling?

A.—No; I don't recollect any discussion either private or unofficial.

29. Q.—Do you think that there was any personal communication with the Lieutenant Governor on the subject?

A.—I don't recollect that there was then.

30. Q.—Did the Lieutenant-Governor leave behind him any instructions to the Board in any shape?

A.—I had no private or unofficial communication with him on the subject, and I am not aware if there were any official instructions. If there were, they would be on record.

31. Q.—Was your attention called to the difficulty experienced in providing for the poor by labor in consequence of the want of rice?

A.—In Mr. Ravenshaw's letter, No. 472, of the 9th of April, allusion is made to the difficulty of obtaining even a slight retail of grain. My personal attention was not particularly drawn to the subject, but the correspondence was forwarded to Government by my orders.

32. Q.—You don't think your particular attention was directed to the difficulty of carrying on those works in the Pooree district on account of the want of grain?

A.—My attention was not specially drawn to the subject, and we did not take action on it.

33. Q.—Up to the early part of May, had you seen any reason to anticipate severe and extensive famine?

A.—Not in the shape of famine, although there would be great suffering.

34. Q.—Had your attention at that time been in any degree drawn to the previous correspondence regarding the importation of food into the Pooree district?

A.—No, it had not.

35. Q.—When the Lieutenant Governor, soon after the middle of May, suggested the importation of rice, did you, in common with Mr. Grote, give your full consideration to the subject, and concur that there was not then sufficient ground to justify such a measure?

A.—The suggestion of Government was not for the importation of rice generally into the province, but for the importation of a single cargo to be sold at cost price; and for the reasons stated in the Board's letter of the 22nd of May, both Members of the Board agreed in thinking it inexpedient.

36. Q.—Was the Government letter of the 21st May received while you were in Calcutta?

A.—I don't think it was.

37. Q.—The money offered for the importation of rice was famine relief money, and it appears from the Lieutenant Governor's demi-official letter of 16th May that he contemplated the use of such money for gratuitous distribution of rice

to the poor; the telegram also contains no restrictions regarding sale at prime cost; are you then correct in saying that the question discussed by the Board at that time was limited to the importing of rice for sale at prime cost?

A.—The telegram of the 21st, placing at the disposal of the Board 45,000 rupees to purchase rice, does not say that it was out of the Famine Relief Fund. The demi-official letter of the 16th was to the effect that if rice be bought with public money, it must be sold at cost price; if any part of the Famine Fund is available for that purpose, the rice can be distributed gratuitously. It was not stated that the 45,000 rupees were out of the Famine Fund, and that the rice bought out of it was to be given gratuitously.

38. Q.—Did you make any enquiry whether in fact famine money was available before deciding not to ship rice for the relief of the distressed?

A.—I cannot say. I don't know whether orders were issued or not.

39. Q.—On that action of the Government, did the Board call for further information from the local officers before deciding finally?

A.—Yes; the order doing so was dated the 23rd. I left on the evening of that date.

40. Q.—What was the occasion of your then leaving Calcutta?

A.—I went to join the Lieutenant Governor at Darjeeling. It was arranged that one Member should remain with the Lieutenant Governor and one at the Board. Mr. Grote was to have gone first, but he found it more convenient that I should go.

41. Q.—Your going with the Lieutenant Governor had no reference to the famine?

A.—No; before I went up, I had no discussion about the famine.

42. Q.—Just at this moment, when the question of importing rice for famine purposes into Orissa, was pending, did it not seem to you that there was some inconvenience in your going away?

A.—The Senior Member of the Board conducted the duties of the Board, and I was able to consult with the Lieutenant Governor at Darjeeling.

43. Q.—Was not the local knowledge which you possessed, and which was wanting to Mr. Grote and the Secretary, very important at that time in case the Board had to act on the matter?

A.—My local knowledge referred to Balasore more than to Pooree and Cuttack.

44. Q.—During your absence, did you take part in any discussion regarding famine operations?

A.—I was in occasional communication, during the short time I was at Darjeeling, with the Lieutenant Governor on the subject, and I immediately followed him down, leaving on the 16th, and arriving here, I think, on the 19th of June.

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45. Q.—When you arrived, did you think that the measures for importing grain were sufficient?

A.—When we arrived, all questions regarding importations were settled by the Board at their meetings. I wished to have a larger quantity imported, but found that importations must be entirely regulated by what could be landed.

46. Q.—Did you think that all had been done that could be done towards landing arrangements?

A.—The landing arrangements must, of necessity, remain under the control of the local authorities. We were in constant communication with them on the subject, urging them to do all that could be done; and the Board were prepared to, and to the best of my knowledge did, give them all the aid that they could think off.

47. Q.—Were you not aware that for all purposes of communication False Point is very much further from Cuttack than Calcutta is, and do you not think that some assistance might have been rendered from Calcutta, or information obtained by a qualified officer?

A.—I don't quite see that it was further from Cuttack and that communication from Calcutta was easy. We placed entire control of the arrangements with the Commissariat, who was our officer on the spot for the purpose. I have to state that if there was any assistance that we could afford, we certainly should have afforded it, and that we were prepared to afford any assistance that we were asked for.

48. Q.—Do you think that Mr. Raven had sufficient experience and sufficient local knowledge to justify you in relying wholly on him?

A.—I had joined my appointment about two months previously. I had little previous experience of Mr. Ravenshaw, but I should hold it my duty to consider any man appointed a Commissioner of a division to be competent to perform the duties of his office, unless the contrary were proved to be the case.

49. Q.—Were you aware that the Collector of Cuttack was an officer of limited official experience, and altogether deficient in local knowledge?

A.—Mr. Cornell, Collector of Cuttack, was Officiating Magistrate and Collector of Tipperah under me in 1861—five years before the date of which we speak; I had no reason to think that he was wanting in official experience. I don't know when he joined Cuttack, but he had been previously a long time at Balasore.

50. Q.—Do you think that if expense had been no object, more rice might have been thrown into Balasore in the early stage of the famine by employing private tugs of the smallest class which might have been obtained in the river?

A.—In all June the *Nemesis* was employed. My impression now is that we were then informed that the *Nemesis* was the only steamer fitted for the work.

51. Q.—Do you think that in June or July, or at any other time, famine operations were at all limited by considerations of expense. Do you think that if funds had been unlimited, anything more might have been done in Orissa?

A.—I think not. I never felt hampered for want of funds.

52. Q.—Was there not a considerable correspondence on the question whether the balance of the Famine Relief Fund would last or not. Was not the Government of opinion that it would, and did not you express apprehensions that it would not?

A.—I expressed apprehensions that after the requirements which were calculated to be met had been met, there would be large excess expenditure.

53. Q.—But still you think that those apprehensions did not lead to the adoption of more economical means of importing rice than might otherwise have been adopted if speed rather than expense had been only considered?

A.—Certainly not, as far as I am concerned. We based our importations on estimates received from the district officers, and endeavoured to take care that our importations should always be in excess of the requirements without regard to expense.

54. Q.—Did you not import rice from Burmah when it might have been more rapidly pushed down by steam from Calcutta?

A.—Probably, with any amount of money at disposal, rice would still have been imported from Burmah, because we supposed we could land it cheaper from there; it would be a cheaper market to go to, and there would be no object in speed after the first month, as our importations were in excess of requirements as estimated by the local authorities.

55. Q.—If the crisis had been fully realized from the first, do you think more might have been done in June?

A.—I think, as I said at first, importation depended on the means of landing the cargoes, as far as those means were not worked up to, more could have been done; not otherwise.

56. Q.—When was it first determined to send rice to the Dhamrah, and was that your proposition?

A.—When Collector of Balasore, the question of the navigation of the Dhamrah had come before me officially, and the entrance to the river had been buoyed off from the first. From my knowledge of the port, I strongly advocated its being made use of to import grain to the southern parts of Balasore. This was at first declared to be impracticable, until, on Branch Pilot Stout's opinion, it was declared practicable.

57. Q.—Was it before or after your return that you made this recommendation?

A.—On our first or second meeting, after my return from Darjeeling.

58. Q.—If the Dhamrah had been used from the very first, do you not think that much good might have been done?

A.—Yes; if grain could have been thrown in by it at the moment; but there was great difficulty in importing grain, as vessels of over 14 or 15 feet draught had to anchor out at sea beyond the mouth of the river.

59. Q.—Do you remember why the *Nemesis*, employed at Balasore, was taken away to tow the *Guide*, when a private tug might easily have been hired for the purpose?

A.—My impression is that at the time she could be spared from Balasore for two or three days, in which time it was expected she could do the business required of her.

60. Q.—The Master Attendant has told us that he had no orders to take up the *Conqueror* or any other private vessel till August; that if he had orders, he could have done so, and that he had in fact very insufficient means in Government vessels. Do you not think that this was in some degree due to consideration of expense?

A.—No, I don't think so; but only due to the fact that our importations in the Balasore district were up to the requirements.

61. Q.—Do you now think that in June or July they were up to the requirements?

A.—I think they were up to what was then considered the requirements.

62. Q.—When, in consequence of the *Tubal Cain* being blown away, frightful distress occurred in Balasore, was any attempt made to induce any small tugs to enter the Balasore river?

A.—No, under the impression that they were of too heavy draught.

63. Q.—Do you think that none of the operations were stunted by want of means?

A.—As far as the Board's operations were concerned, I knew of no instance in which a fear of want of funds crippled their action.

64. Q.—Do you not think that some competent person might with advantage have been sent to inspect the ports and the landing arrangements?

A.—I consider with the knowledge we then possessed that the local officers were capable of doing what was required of them, and we had here the advice and experience of the Master Attendant to guide us, and therefore we did not consider it necessary to send any special person to superintend the landing operations alone.

65. Q.—Do you now think that during the famine, the Board were sufficiently informed of the real magnitude of the calamity?

A.—No, I think that from the knowledge of what we now know to have occurred, the information at the Board's disposal did not lead the Board to believe that the famine was as severe as it has been.

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67. Q.—Do you think that the local officers of Pooree and Balasore, who constantly witnessed the most terrible scenes, did not themselves fully realize the famine?

A.—I think not as regards the general distress at first; but afterwards they probably did.

68. Q.—Do you think that at any time before November, the Board were fully informed of the severity of the famine?

A.—As far as the local officers knew of it. I think that from August the local officers did fully realize and did fully report the distress.

69. Q.—Do you think that at that time the public was made fully aware of the whole extent of the calamity?

A.—Yes, I think so.

70. Q.—Did you take part in a discussion as to the question how much should be published and how much not?

A.—Yes; it was determined that, instead of publishing separately the very voluminous correspondence received, a weekly narrative, showing the state of the different districts and the measures taken during each week, should only be published.

71. Q.—Did you publish all the worst apprehensions and conjectures of the local officers, or restrict yourselves to ascertained facts?

A.—Mainly, if not entirely, to ascertained facts.

72. Q.—Was the mortality reported that which was distinctly ascertained, or did you publish any estimates of the great mortality going on unseen and unascertained?

A.—The mortality returns seem to have been made from no reliable data.

73. Q.—Do you think that in the early months of the distress any of the local officers were in any degree deterred from stating their apprehensions in the deepest colors by any belief that the higher authorities were inclined to take a more sanguine view than themselves?

A.—I have no reason to believe so. Nothing that I am aware of ever went out of our office which could have led to such an impression.

74. Q.—Were you consulted on the question whether it was desirable to form a public committee and probably to appeal to the public for further aid?

A.—I had spoken to the Lieutenant Governor on the subject, and I was in favor of calling a public meeting for collecting subscriptions and for conducting relief operations through a general committee.

75. Q.—Holding these views, what benefits did you think would have been gained if that course had been adopted?

A.—I think that people generally would have come forward more heartily to contribute, and would have been more satisfied with the measures carried out by such a committee, and I

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believe that measures carried out by such a committee, even if less efficient than measures carried out by a purely official body, would have been accepted by the public as more satisfactory.

76. Q.—In all the early part of the famine, was it not made a special object to sell the rice at prime cost, so as not to be a loss.

A.—I think a little below the market rate or at prime cost, whichever might have been cheaper.

77. Q.—Do you think that some experienced civil officer might not have been sent to Cuttack, with advantage, to assist the over-burdened local officers, especially an experienced Joint Magistrate for the district of Cuttack?

A.—An experienced officer of good repute was sent down especially to assist in all matters connected with the famine, and on the Commissioner's application, three additional assistants were sent down to the province.

78. Q.—Do you think that justice was done to the great district of Cuttack under the circumstances in the way of staff, there being not a single covenanted officer of experience to assist the Magistrate and Collector?

A.—With reference to the Revenue Department every assistance that was sought for was given. I think it very probable that more assistance ought to have been sought for.

79. Q.—Did you leave Calcutta again in September?

A.—Yes, on the 23rd.

80. Q.—For what purpose did you then leave?

A.—For Darjeeling, in my position there as Member of the Board with the Government.

81. Q.—Do you remember what were the arrangements with regard to the supply of rice made at that time.

A.—Arrangements had been made for importations greatly in excess of the estimated requirements. I cannot give exactly the names of the ships employed and the quantities taken by them, but would be very happy to prepare a statement on the subject. Those arrangements were left to the Secretary.

82. Q.—Had you then estimated for the increased demand caused by the floods, and arranged for the importation of the rice required?

A.—Our orders already issued gave an excess over the quantity then required.

83. Q.—When did you return from Darjeeling?

A.—On the 28th or 29th of October.

84. Q.—Did you then find that the arrangements for importation already made had in some degree failed?

A.—I found there was an application from Cuttack for further supplies owing to the non-arrival, I think, of the *Asia*.

85. Q.—In Bhudruk, also, was there not a deficiency?

A.—I don't think so; I cannot exactly tell.

86. Q.—We certainly find that over large tracts, it was deemed necessary very much to contract the operations on account of the non-arrival of the rice and the apprehension of its falling short; to what do you attribute this deficiency?

A.—To the non-arrival of the vessels expected and to the expenditure being in excess of the estimated requirements.

87. Q.—What was the cause of the non-arrival of the vessels?

A.—I cannot say; the Secretary will be able to tell, as the arrangements were made through him, with the sanction of the Board, with Messrs. Gisborne and Co., who had undertaken the duty.

88. Q.—We find that some of the steamers which were expected to bring rice did in fact go to China with cotton, and the Master Attendant has told us that at that time abundance of tonnage might have been got at Calcutta; if not first class steamers, at any rate ships with powerful tugs to tow them. Can you tell us why this means was not adopted of getting rice from Burmah to obviate the delay which occurred?

A.—The delay must have occurred during my absence, and probably was not anticipated in time to admit of such an arrangement being made.

89. Q.—Can you say of your own personal knowledge that efficient arrangements had been made for procuring all the grain which you intended to despatch before you left Calcutta?

A.—When I left Calcutta on the 23rd of September, I was under the most firm conviction that we had ample grain in store, and orders had been given to meet all the requirements up to the end of the year, and that efficient arrangements had been made for the importations still due, which were in the hands of a commercial firm.

Since giving the above answer, I have looked into the papers, and find that as regards False Point, we should have had, on the 1st of October, an estimated quantity in store, including savings as reported by the Commissioner on previous shipments, of 67,000 maunds of rice, which was in fact further increased by the detention of the *Coringa* with 10,000 maunds, giving a total of 77,000 maunds, to meet an estimated demand for October of 36,000 maunds. This would leave a balance, on the 1st of November, of 41,000 maunds to meet the November demands of 36,000 maunds, still leaving a balance of 5,000 maunds on the 1st of December. Again, on the 10th of September, before I left, an order had been given to Messrs. Gisborne and Co. to supply an additional 50,000 maunds for Bhudruk, the circumstances connected with which are mentioned in the 20th and 21st paragraphs of Mr. Lane's minute.

90. Q.—While you were at Calcutta, had you special charge of the arrangements connected with the importation of rice?

A.—While both Members were at the Board, the famine letters were submitted to both Members as a separate department; that was subsequently to the middle of July; the papers, as a rule, being first submitted to the Senior Member for his remarks and then to the Junior Member.

91. Q.—Did you take any personal cognizance of the particular ships taken up for rice, or merely order a certain quantity from a certain firm?

A.—Orders were at first given to the firm to import rice up to further orders, provided they got it at a certain price. After that, supplementary orders were given for specific quantities, and they as our agents arranged for taking up ships for the conveyance of the same, and kept us informed of their arrangements, and most, if not all, the letters received from them on the subject have been sent to the Famine Commissioners.

92. Q.—Before you left Calcutta, did you satisfy yourself that the shipping arrangements for the conveyance of rice ordered by you had been completed, or was that done afterwards?

A.—I satisfied myself that there was rice sufficient to meet the estimated requirements for some considerable time to come, and at the time of my departure the firm were supposed by me to be making proper arrangements for the despatch of the remainder; but those arrangements apparently were not completed before I left.

93. Q.—The arrangements for the supply of rice being, as you have stated, considerably in excess of the estimated requirements, how do you account for the practical failure which we have learnt to have occurred in the Cuttack and Pooree districts and the Bhudruk sub-division in the month of October?

A.—It could arise only from two causes—either that in August and September they spent far more than their estimated requirements, or that their estimate of the savings effected up to September was erroneous.

94. Q.—Have you not yet satisfied yourself as to what was the real cause?

A.—No; since my return I have had my attention rather given to keeping up the supply than looking into back accounts.

95. Q.—It appears that there was in the Cuttack district an alarm of shortness of rice in the latter part of September, which led to the contraction of sales from that time. Was your attention drawn to it at the time, and can you account for it?

A.—I do not recollect anything of that being reported while I was here.

96. Q.—Before you gave up charge of the Calcutta Municipality, were there any signs in Calcutta of the starvation in the neighbouring districts in the shape of starving people coming in to the town?

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A.—The only sign I remember was that the number in the Pauper Hospital had largely increased. This was brought to the notice of Government, I think, by myself as Commissioner of Police, and I am certain it was reported to Government by the Medical Authorities. On that I, as Chairman of the Justices, was requested to ascertain the opinion of the Justices with regard to the increasing pauperism in Calcutta. The matter was under consideration when I entered the Board, and the final report was made by my successor subsequently, and has been printed and circulated.

97. Q.—Was your personal attention subsequently at all directed to the state of the town of Calcutta with regard to pauperism?

A.—I took no personal notice then, as I had ceased to be specially connected with the town.

98. Q.—Were you not a Member of the Relief Committee in Calcutta?

A.—No; Mr. Lane was appointed so as to keep the Relief Committee in communication with the Board.

99. Q.—Before you went to Darjeeling in May, had you taken no notice of the state of the town?

A.—I had nothing to do with the town then.

100. Q.—After the appointment of the Calcutta Relief Committee, did you, as Member of the Board, take some notice of their arrangements?

A.—As Members of the Board we were only connected with the Relief Committee as regards the despatch of the paupers who flocked into Calcutta from the neighbourhood, with the view to return them to their own homes, and also to prevent, as far as possible, in communication with the Commissioners, further immigration of paupers into Calcutta.

101. Q.—Were the above arrangements under the orders of Government, or had you, as an individual Member of the Board, formed an opinion that it was desirable to restrict the immigration of paupers into Calcutta?

A.—As a Board we acted under what we knew the wishes of the Government to be, whether officially or demi-officially communicated I cannot remember, which was, to assist the Calcutta Committee in every way we could.

102. Q.—Do you think that the relief arrangements in the districts of the interior were so perfect and so complete as regards the mass of the people, that it was desirable by any means to prevent poor people wishing to be fed from coming to be fed by the rich Natives of Calcutta who were willing to feed them?

A.—Supposing the question refers to all the districts of Bengal, our instructions were that every effort should be made to give them such assistance as would render it unnecessary for them to come to Calcutta, and I believe exertions were made, as far as possible, to render those arrangements as perfect as they could be, that

is, to extend the relief as far as possible. No application for funds for this purpose was ever refused.

103. Q.—But still we wish to know whether you think that the arrangements in the interior were so efficient that it was a good policy to prevent people coming from thence to be fed by those in Calcutta who were willing to feed them?

A.—I think it must have been, for this was the result of the orders that very few came to Calcutta; all those who wished to come were perfectly at liberty to come.

104. Q.—Do you think that any people were sent away from Calcutta until it was expedient to send them away?

A.—I think Calcutta was hardly pressed and unfairly asked to contribute to support people other than its own, and that it was proper that those people should be supported nearer their own homes.

105. Q.—Were the funds used contributed by Calcutta alone, or were they not obtained by an appeal from the whole of India?

A.—The funds given for the purpose of affording relief in the district neighbouring on Calcutta were given by Government, and supplemented by contributions from the Calcutta General Committee, and those funds again, I am led to believe, were received in terms of the Resolution passed at the Meeting.

106. Q.—Before you left Calcutta in May, had you received intimation of great distress in Midnapore?

A.—I believe that the first notice we got of the distress in Midnapore was received merely from noting the list of prices there, and from a remark on the retail of price list of the 21st May, in which the Collector of Midnapore noted that deaths from starvation among the old and weak and children were occurring. On that, the Board, at my suggestion, placed the sum of Rs. 5,000 at the disposal of the Collector of Midnapore out of the funds placed at the Board's disposal by the Lieutenant-Governor. This must have been about the 22nd or 23rd of May, as I find it reported to the Lieutenant Governor in letter from the Secretary to the Board of the 24th May 1866, No. A.

107. Q.—At that time had the Board received any information of the distress in Maunbhoon and other parts of the Chota Nagpore district?

A.—I think not; I cannot say without referring to the papers.

No. 114.—COLONEL J. R. PUGHE, *Inspector General of Police L. P.*

[Examined in Calcutta, 12th February 1867.]

1. Q.—Since what date have you held your appointment?

A.—I have held it officiating and permanently for about eighteen months.

2. Q.—Had you any experience in Bengal before your appointment as Inspector General?

A.—I have been in Bengal since the year 1857 as Inspector of Military Police Battalions, Private Secretary to the Lieutenant Governor, Deputy Inspector General of Police in Patna, and Inspector General.

3. Q.—Where were you in the cold weather of 1865-66?

A.—I was principally in Calcutta, but I was also in Behar, in Chittagong and in Backergunge.

4. Q.—In the early part of 1866, was your attention drawn to the increase of crime in the western districts of Bengal and in Orissa?

A.—It was, even before that.

5. Q.—Did you form any opinion as to what was the cause of the increase of crime?

A.—Yes; I considered that it arose from the high prices of provisions.

6. Q.—Did you take any special measures with reference to that increase of crime?

A.—An application was made to me, I think, first from Midnapore, on the 7th of February, for extra Policemen; on the 8th I sent the application to Government, and recommended that it should be granted; and from February to September there were several applications for increase of force and increase of pay.

7. Q.—Were such increases granted from time to time?

A.—They were.

8. Q.—In what mode were they granted?

A.—As long as we had men I sent them down. Afterwards the Commissioner of Cuttack was told directly by Government that he might enlist as many men as he thought proper as a temporary arrangement.

9. Q.—To what extent were you able to transfer experienced men?

A.—Two hundred and eighty-six in all, viz., 6 Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors, 17 Head Constables and 263 Constables. Some were ordered from Bhootan, others from Patna and Shahabad, as good men were more easily procured from these districts. No men could be spared from Lower Bengal, nor later in the year from Behar either. If the distress culminated in Orissa, food was very dear all over the Lower Provinces. The men sent were intended as guards, and the men who were on guard were sent on general duty. The extra men were sent to Midnapore, Balasore and Bancoorah, and a few to Burdwan and Maunbhoon.

10. Q.—Were those the districts in which the increase of crime was most conspicuous?

A.—Those were the districts which first applied for men. I think they were the worst districts; Pooree and Cuttack came later in the season.

11. Q.—Besides this increase of force, were any other special measures taken in your department to deal with the state of the country?

A.—The pay of the men was increased in the Cuttack division and in Maunbhoon. Extra office establishments were allowed. A troop of Mounted Police was, at my recommendation, retained instead of being disbanded, and the Deputy Inspector General was sent down in the commencement of October 1866 to report in consultation with the Commissioner as to what further was required. I do not recollect any other special measures at present.

12. Q.—Was an increase made to the strength of the European officers?

A.—I offered to send down to Midnapore the best European officer in the department, but the local authorities replied that they only required men. I could not have furnished extra officers without leaving other districts unprovided.

13. Q.—Did you yourself visit any of the districts you have mentioned as most affected by crime?

A.—I did not.

14. Q.—Have you ever visited Midnapore and any of the districts of the Orissa division or Midnapore?

A.—I have not myself; but a Deputy Inspector General went down, by my orders, in March 1866, to Orissa.

15. Q.—Do you know whether any Inspector General has ever visited those districts?

A.—I do not; I don't think so.

16. Q.—When so extraordinary an excess of crime broke out in the western districts, did you not think it your duty, as Inspector General, to visit those districts with the view of informing yourself on the subject, and taking all measures which might seem necessary?

A.—If I had considered it my duty, I should have done so. The administration of the Police, by the orders of Government, is placed entirely in the hands of the Commissioner of the division.

17. Q.—What do you consider to be the functions of the Inspector General of Police?

A.—To arrange for the organization, disposition, strength and cost of the Police, to collate and revise all statistical returns, and generally to advise Government on the subject of the frequent applications that are made from all quarters on Police matters.

18. Q.—Do you consider that the personal inspection of districts, especially those in which crime prevails, is no part of the duty of the Inspector General?

A.—It is a part; but he is generally only able to do it through his Deputies: if he leaves the Government for any time, the more important work of the office is at a stand-still.

19. Q.—Where were you in the months of March and April?

A.—In Calcutta principally.

20. Q.—Did you leave Calcutta soon after that?

A.—I left Calcutta, I think, on the 19th or 20th of May.

21. Q.—Was crime then raging very severely in the western districts?

A.—Crime in general was not; grain dacoities were; but they were generally reported to be of a petty description.

22. Q.—For what purpose did you leave Calcutta, and where did you go to?

A.—I went to Darjeeling with the Lieutenant Governor. I am generally with him. I did not go till the month after the Lieutenant Governor, but I went with his permission.

23. Q.—Had the Lieutenant Governor expressed his desire that you should be with him?

A.—He asked me if I was going up to the Hills originally before I had made any arrangements at all to go, and I replied that if he had no objection I should be glad to go.

24. Q.—If, then, it was left to your discretion, was your going up to Darjeeling determined by personal considerations alone?

A.—It was not; I do not myself care much about the Hills during a service of 27 years, I had been there but twice. It had hitherto been usual for the Inspector General as well as other Heads of Departments to go with the Government, and if the Government had not gone, I certainly should not have gone on my own account.

25. Q.—Will you tell us why you went?

A.—Because it was more convenient that I should be near the Lieutenant Governor.

26. Q.—How long did you remain in the Hills?

A.—I remained until the end of June at that time.

27. Q.—Did you not go down with the Lieutenant Governor; and if not, why not?

A.—As soon as I heard that the Lieutenant Governor was going down, I wrote and asked if he considered it necessary that I should go with him, as I was prepared to leave at once. His Private Secretary replied that the Lieutenant Governor did not then deem it necessary for me to go down, but if it should be so hereafter, he would write and let me know.

28. Q.—Did the Lieutenant Governor afterwards express a desire that you should come down?

A.—He did not.

29. Q.—When you did come down where did you go to?

A.—At the end of June I came down to Calcutta on business quite unconnected with the distressed districts; in fact I was summoned down to a Court Martial.

30. Q.—How long did you remain in Calcutta?

A.—Till the beginning of August.

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31. Q.—Were you then engaged in Court Martial duty?

A.—I was nearly three weeks detained on that duty.

32. Q.—When you left Calcutta again, where did you go to?

A.—Darjeeling.

33. Q.—Did you then go for the same reasons as before?

A.—Yes.

34. Q.—How long did you stay there?

A.—Till the middle of October. I then went up to Agra, at the Lieutenant-Governor's request, on business connected with the Railway Police.

35. Q.—In the early part of the famine, or during the famine, did you issue any special orders to your Police officers to make themselves useful in famine matters in general, and not to confine themselves to their own proper functions, and, if so, will you state what orders were issued?

A.—I did not; as Magistrates and Commissioners have full authority to issue any orders whatever to Police officers, and Police officers are by standing circulars bound to obey them.

36. Q.—Are Police officers bound to obey Magistrates and Commissioners on all subjects however unconnected with their proper functions?

A.—On every subject. They are to obey orders, and afterwards appeal if the order is contrary to any regulation.

37. Q.—We have understood that there has been a great variety of practice in regard to the assistance given by Police officers to the Civil officers in famine matters; that while in some districts they have co-operated most heartily and entirely without the least regard to departmental limits, it has not been so invariably. Do you not think that some special orders would have been advantageous?

A.—It was never brought to my notice: in fact, although I heard nearly every month from the Commissioner of Cuttack, he never alluded to the subject; and in one of his letters, towards the end of the year, he says "we have all done our best."

38. Q.—Was it then never brought to your notice that there was a difference of opinion in the early part of the famine between the Magistrate and the District Superintendent of Cuttack regarding the extent to which Police officers were expected to assist in famine matters?

A.—It was not. The only instance which was brought to my notice was a difference about going out to investigate a dacoity.

39. Q.—Then I presume we may consider that in the month of July you had no reason to suppose that Captain Fisher's conduct was at all such as to create dissatisfaction?

A.—None at all with reference to the famine.

40. Q.—On the whole, from what has passed, do you think that Captain Fisher gave his cordial

assistance in famine matters, and worked as heartily to do his best as some of the other officers?

A.—I could not give an opinion on that point.

41. Q.—Will you state why Captain Fisher was transferred from Cuttack in the height of the famine?

A.—He wrote to say that both he and his wife were suffering from ill-health, and that if he was not transferred to a different climate he would be obliged to resign his appointment.

42. Q.—Do you think that the tone of that representation was such as properly came from an officer in charge of a district suffering under a tremendous crisis of famine?

A.—About that time, from all the accounts that I received, the pressure was supposed to be over, and matters were said to be mending. In fact, Mr. Shuttleworth in July wrote to say that he could dispense with the services of some of his extra men, were it not for the relief operations.

43. Q.—Do you allude to the crisis of famine or the crisis of crime being over?

A.—To both. Of course one followed the other.

44. Q.—Will you state whence you derived your impression that the famine was at that time on the decrease?

A.—From those letters of Mr. Shuttleworth; and further, in one of the Commissioner's notes he said, they had had a hard time of it, but he hoped the worst was over. He had, moreover, declined to sanction the increase of price proposed by Captain Fisher, on the ground that as rain had fallen, crime would probably decrease.

45. Q.—Did you then arrange for the transfer of Captain Fisher, and if so, what arrangement did you make for supplying his place?

A.—I recommended the removal of Mr. Lacey to Cuttack and Mr. Thompson to Pooree. I afterwards told Captain Fisher that he could only leave his post on medical certificate.

46. Q.—Did it not strike you that it was an inconvenient arrangement that in the midst of the famine, Mr. Lacey should be removed from Pooree to another district?

A.—Mr. Lacey himself applied for removal, and Cuttack being the more important district of the two, I considered it advisable to send an officer there who had been long resident in Orissa.

47. Q.—Did you make arrangements for Mr. Thompson's joining as soon as Captain Fisher should leave, or was there a delay?

A.—Captain Fisher was ordered to stop there until he was relieved.

48. Q.—Did he not apply to be allowed to leave at once, and was he not told that if he could get a medical certificate, he could go?

A.—He wrote saying that he was very unwell, and that it would be a great advantage for him to get away at once; but I either telegraphed or wrote to him that he was not to leave without forwarding a medical certificate.

49. Q.—Did you then make an emergent arrangement to supply another officer with the least possible delay, or was there delay?

A.—Mr. Thompson must have been at that time on his way to join. I had no officer at hand to send, added to which there were two Police officers still at Cuttack.

50. Q.—Did Mr. Thompson join immediately, or was there a considerable delay?

A.—I think he joined about the beginning of October, but I do not think there was any avoidable delay.

51. Q.—How then do you account for the delay which did occur?

A.—Lieutenant Wilkinson, who was in Calcutta at the time, was first ordered to Pooree, but he was suddenly attacked with fever and ordered to sea. Mr. Thompson was then directed to go, and Mr. Grant was ordered to relieve him; but Mr. Grant also fell ill, whence further delay arose. It was very difficult to get to Cuttack at all at that time of the year. I may add that some time previously Mr. Ravenshaw had reported that Mr. Poole, who was at Cuttack at the time, and who would take charge in the event of Capt. Fisher's leaving on medical certificate, was an energetic officer.

52. Q.—Did it strike you that Captain Fisher's medical certificate was of an unusual and not very strong character, and that he had got a certificate from a medical officer other than his own medical attendant, during the very temporary absence of the latter; and do you think that he was justified in leaving the district under the circumstances?

A.—I knew nothing at all as to who was in Medical charge of the station, and I am not aware that I saw the certificate. Captain Fisher telegraphed that he had got one.

53. Q.—Are you aware that on his arrival at Calcutta he applied for privilege leave, stating that he was then so far well that he could not get a Medical certificate?

A.—I don't recollect it, but he certainly applied to take temporary charge of the 24 Pergunnahs.

54. Q.—In July or August Captain Fisher forwarded an application from Mr. Crouch, the Assistant Superintendent of Police at Cuttack, for three months' leave, to take effect from 1st September. Does it not appear to you that his doing so shows that he did not fully appreciate the exertions which were required from every department to meet the distress and to assist in the relief operations; and that it was incompatible with the supposition that the Police agency in the Cuttack district was insufficient to meet the demands which were made on it for the furtherance of the relief operations?

A.—No complaints whatever were made to me with reference to such insufficiency of the European staff until the beginning of October. With reference to Mr. Crouch's application for leave, it was countersigned by the Magistrate, who thus took on himself the responsibility of forwarding it. It could not have reached me except it had

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been countersigned by the Magistrate. Under the then circumstances of the district, I did not think it proper to send the application on to Government.

55. Q.—Mr. Shuttleworth has told us that he had not at the time applied for his transfer from Balasore, though he had done so previously to the famine, but that the question having been put to the Deputy Inspector General, whether any District Superintendent wished for a transfer, and his health not being good, he was transferred. Do you now think that it was right to transfer an officer from a district situated as Balasore then was?

A.—Mr. Shuttleworth makes a mistake. No question of the kind was put. He himself had been most dangerously ill in the month of March, and as far as I recollect, in the June following, he wrote to say that his health was failing, and that he would be glad to be transferred to another district, and an opportunity shortly afterwards offered of sending an efficient officer to relieve him. Giving an *ex post facto* opinion, it might perhaps have been better that he had remained at Balasore, although, as a rule, an officer in good health is more efficient than one in failing health. As far as I recollect, he wrote to say that the ground of his wishing for a transfer was not only on account of his failing health, but also on account of the expense of living at Balasore to a man of his large family. I would likewise refer to the fact that in the month of July, about the time his transfer was sanctioned, Mr. Shuttleworth had reported, as I have said before, that crime was greatly on the decrease, and that, were it not for the relief operations, he could dispense with 40 or 50 men.

I would add that I am given to understand that it has been reported to this Commission that the Police had failed in guarding and escorting rice in Orissa. I hold in my hand a letter from the Commissioner of Cuttack dated the 27th of December 1866, in which he reported to Government as follows—"Much has been said about the custody and charge in transport of Government rice by the Police. The duty was performed willingly and efficiently in Balasore and Pooree and in Cuttack."*

I would add that no complaints whatever on this subject were received by me, except in a letter from the Board of Revenue in the beginning of October. This letter had reference to Balasore, from which district, I believe, no complaints of want of co-operation on the part of the Police have been made to the Commissioners.

56. Q.—Are the diaries of District Superintendents of Police sent up for your inspection?

A.—No.

* Note.—The original draft of this letter has been obtained by the Commissioners, and they observe there is no stop after "Cuttack." The whole sentence is appended and does not appear to them to bear the construction put upon it by Colonel Paghe—"Much has been said about the custody and charge in transport of Government rice by the Police. The duty was performed willingly and efficiently in Balasore and Pooree and in Cuttack it was also considered a part of the legitimate Police work which could not be so efficiently performed by temporarily hired peons who are not under Police supervision."

57. Q.—In the months of 1866, from January to May, was your attention ever called to any strong remarks of the District Superintendent of Pooree regarding the probability of famine?

A.—In the month of December 1865, the Deputy Inspector General had brought such a report to my notice, and it was sent on to Government.

58. Q.—Subsequently to that time was your attention ever drawn to such reports?

A.—My attention was drawn to it by the applications for extra men and extra pay to the Police. It was not brought to my notice officially; it was brought to my notice demi-officially by the Deputy Inspector General, with whom I was in constant communication. But I don't think the term "famine" was used generally, only that there was great distress: in Balasore it was brought to my notice officially; this I likewise sent on to Government.

59. Q.—Did you bring to the notice of the Lieutenant Governor what you had heard regarding the distress subsequently to the official report in December?

A.—I was in the habit of seeing the Lieutenant Governor weekly, if not oftener, and I mentioned to him all that I heard.

60. Q.—Did the Deputy Inspectors General furnish you with their diaries, and were those diaries confined to their own personal observations, or do they embody in their diaries remarkable reports made in the diaries of the District Superintendents?

A.—The diaries of the Deputy Inspectors General are forwarded to me; they are confined to their own personal proceedings, and extracts occasionally from the diaries of District Superintendents, in matters connected with the Force.

I wish it to be understood that I do not recollect to have heard, with reference to Orissa, that the crisis was generally designated as a famine till the occurrence of the floods in August. Before this Mr. Lacey was, I believe, the only officer who took so extreme a view of it.

No. 115.—MAJOR W. R. GORDON, *Officiating Deputy Inspector General of Police, 1st Circle.*

[Examined in Calcutta, 12th February 1867.]

1. Q.—What are the limits of your circle?

A.—They consist of all the districts along the Coast of Bengal and Orissa, from Pooree to Chittagong, including Chittagong. It is called the "Coast Range." It includes Midnapore.

2. Q.—Did you visit Orissa and Midnapore in the early part of 1866?

A.—Yes, I did.

3.4. Q.—Was it with special reference to the increase of crime?

A.—I went in the month of March 1866. My whole tour was in March. I left Calcutta by steamer on the 1st of March, landed at Gopaulpoor, dawked up to Pooree, and went to Ganjam, sailing by the Chilka in a Police boat.

5. Q.—What route did you then take?

A.—From the Lake to Pooree I travelled at night, and had no opportunity of seeing the state of the country.

6. Q.—At Pooree did you observe any particular signs of distress?

A.—I found that provisions were selling high.

7. Q.—Did you observe emaciated people or other signs of distress?

A.—No; because I was not thrown into contact with the people, and thus saw no signs of starvation.

8. Q.—Were you, from the reports of the local Police officers, made aware that there was great distress in the district?

A.—Yes; so much so that when I was at Pooree I wrote recommending an increase of pay to be given to the Police.

9. Q.—Did you become aware at that time that the District Superintendent held very strong opinions regarding the probability of famine?

A.—No; I was not aware of it. I only took charge of the office on the 11th of February.

10. Q.—In Mr. Lacey's diary of the 2nd of February, we find, "rice, 7 seers: I fear it will be 3 and 4 seers before we have got through the next six months. A terrible famine is now certain." Do you think that that diary did not come under your observation?

A.—I do not recollect. I only took charge on the 11th or 12th of February, and the chances are that those diaries had been disposed of by my predecessor. If I had seen them, I probably would have noted the remark in my own diary.

11. Q.—Do you remember to have had no conversation with Mr. Lacey on the subject?

A.—No; except with reference to the general dearth of provisions, which induced me to address the Inspector General for increase of pay to the men.

12. Q.—How long did you remain at Pooree?

A.—About four days.

13. Q.—Where did you go to then?

A.—To Cuttack.

14. Q.—Did you travel by night or by day?

A.—By night always, and had no opportunity of seeing the country.

15. Q.—Did it seem to you that the distress was less in Cuttack than in Pooree?

A.—Certainly; because I heard nothing there about the dearth of provisions, or if I did, it was not of such a nature as to induce me to make a representation.

16. Q.—Then where did you go to?

A.—To Balasore, still travelling by dawk and by night. On my way between Cuttack and Balasore I heard a great deal about the mortality both from disease and from want. Cholera was the principal cause of death, and that was probably caused by want, and the people also seemed emaciated.

17. Q.—At the station of Balasore what was the state of things?

A.—I recollect the District Superintendent pointing out a small field of rice to me, and saying, "this is a field that has never been reaped: it is so bad that they have put their cattle to graze on it."

18. Q.—Were not you aware that the starving people were being fed at that time?

A.—I don't remember to have noticed that the starving people were being fed at that time.

19. Q.—How long did you stay at Balasore?

A.—About four or five days. From there I went to Midnapore. On the way from Balasore to Midnapore I travelled by night. I did not see any particular distress, except that at the dawk bungalow where I put up some beggars came. They were principally children. When I was at Balasore, in communication with the Magistrate and District Superintendent, I submitted a proposition for the establishment of a number of outposts towards the Gurjat Frontier, as I thought an increase of Police in that quarter was desirable. The Commissioner of Cuttack, however, objected, and that proposition was never carried out.

20. Q.—In the course of your tour your attention, we suppose, was called to the great increase of crime?

A.—Yes; to the great increase of crime in Balasore and Midnapore. At Balasore certainly it was caused by want: at Midnapore it must be attributed to the same cause, but it was principally confined to one part of the district, as far as I recollect, without looking into the monthly returns. When I was at Cuttack matters were so quiet there that with the sanction of the Commissioner I sent a party of 22 men to Balasore to assist the Police of that district.

21. Q.—On your return from your tour, did you bring the state of the country to the notice of the Inspector General, and express an opinion of the cause of it?

A.—I brought to notice the dearth of provisions at Pooree by asking for an increase of pay to the Police there. I asked his sanction to send the 22 men from Cuttack to Balasore, which must have shown that matters were very quiet there, and Balasore was reinforced, by his direct orders through me, by no less than 30 extra constables; and 22 men being sent from Cuttack showed that there was a demand for more Police there.

22. Q.—Did you also mention what you had seen and heard of disease and mortality in parts of Orissa?

A.—I think I noted the mortality in one of my diaries in Balasore.

23. Q.—Had you much personal communication with the Inspector General after your return?

A.—I was in daily communication with him, as our offices were together.

24. Q.—Had you any interview with the Lieutenant Governor, or any conversation on the subject?

A.—None.

25. Q.—Did you visit Orissa in the course of the hot season?

A.—No; I did not. It was my intention to do it, but on the 9th of April a Court of Enquiry was ordered to investigate certain matters, on which I was appointed to watch the case for the Police. This enquiry ended in a Court Martial, of which I was prosecutor, and the proceedings did not close till about the end of July; so it was impossible for me to have left during the sittings of the Court.

26. Q.—Will you explain how you came to be involved in a Military Court Martial?

A.—The Court Martial was connected with the Commissariat Accounts of the Troop of Cavalry attached to the Police Levy which was on service in the Dooars. I had been there myself, and my knowledge of the matter induced the Inspector General to appoint me prosecutor: the Inspector General himself was a witness on the Court Martial.

27. Q.—Subsequently to your visit, was your attention, during the course of March, April, and the early part of May, drawn to any notes of the District Superintendent which led you to believe that famine was impending or increasing?

A.—Crime was very much on the increase, which we know to be caused by scarcity of food.

28. Q.—Don't you remember any special expression of Mr. Lacey, about the 30th of April, regarding the famine and mortality in his diary?

A.—During the time that I was employed in the Court of Enquiry and Court Martial, Mr. Reiley very often took up my work, though the office was not specially made over to him. In such cases, even when I saw matters of that sort which were beyond my province, I concluded that the District Superintendent had brought it to the notice of the Magistrate: such matters as the distress of a country being perfectly foreign to the Police Department, I naturally came to the conclusion that the District Superintendent must have brought them to the notice of the Magistrate.

29. Q.—Do you remember the circumstances of Mr. Shuttleworth's transfer?

A.—Mr. Shuttleworth met me at Bhudruk, between Cuttack and Balasore. He had then been out investigating a case and was far from well. His illness terminated in an attack of cholera, which delayed us three or four days at Bhudruk. I knew that his general health was impaired from the exposure and hardships he had under-

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gone of late, and on the 10th of July Mr. Shuttleworth wrote to me—"I am very anxious for a change. I have been here now more than three years; the price of every thing is very dear." Soon after, knowing that Mr. Chambers was to be removed from Jessore, I spoke or wrote to the Inspector General, recommending Mr. Shuttleworth for the appointment.

30. Q.—Was it brought to your notice in the early part of the famine that there was some difference of opinion between the District Superintendent of Cuttack and the Civil officers regarding the duties of the Police in famine matters?

A.—No; I have no recollection.

31. Q.—When the Lieutenant Governor came down from Darjeeling, did you receive any instructions from the Inspector General to communicate with His Honor regarding the Police arrangements rendered necessary by the famine?

A.—Yes. I received a telegram from Colonel Pughe, telling me to go to Belvidere with a statement of the extra men employed in the different districts. I did so, and made over the statement to the Private Secretary.

No. 116. Mr. W. C. SPAIN, *Commander of the Conqueror.*

[Examined in Calcutta, 12th February 1867.]

The Steamer *Conqueror* draws from 7 to 9 feet according to the way she is loaded. When carrying coals, without cargo, she would draw about 8 feet. In August I first took command of the *Conqueror*, and took her to the Dhamrah. At a subsequent time I had occasion to assist the vessel *James Crossfield*. In assisting her I ran short of coals. I then proceeded to Balasore for coals. In the month of September I think, I safely arrived in the Balasore river. I struck ground once or twice coming out, but did not hurt the vessel owing to the soft muddy bottom. She was drawing at the time 8 feet of water. I have also been to False Point and towed down the *Mandelay*. I believe the *Conqueror* was tugging in June and July in Calcutta; but I did not join her until the beginning of August. I think if Government had wished to engage her she could have been easily procured. When I was first employed to go to the Dhamrah I should have run a great risk in taking sloops to Balasore; but in a case of emergency I would have tried. There is a small steamer called the *Pilot* in the Port of Calcutta; she draws less than the *Conqueror*, and would have done better than the *Conqueror* for the Balasore river. She was laid up at the time, but the owner might have easily sent her in a short time if willing to do so. There are two or three other steamers of the same draught as the *Conqueror*, viz., the *Mary Grant*, the *Victoria*, and the *Columbus*. The *Mary Grant* went up the Balasore river in the month of December. The other sea going tugs are quite as capable of coasting as the *Conqueror*. I took the schooner *Twinkling Star* to Dhamrah. The *Conqueror* had 650 bags of rice on board her, and the *Twinkling Star* the same quantity, viz., 650 bags. We drew nearly

9 feet at the time. Captain Harris took me in. We struck the ground on soft mud; this was on the inner bar. Before getting to the Custom House, there is an outer bar over which vessels drawing 14 feet can pass; both anchorages are well protected.

I have been to the Custom House with the *Conqueror* likewise up the Muttai. I went about 45 miles up the river. The least water anywhere in the river was about 2 fathoms in December last. I think the Muttai is perfectly navigable for small steamers at all seasons,—I mean flat-bottomed steamers. There is another river going to Jajpore, but I have not been up it, so do not know how far it is navigable. I do not know whether there is any communication in the rains between the Dhamrah and the Mahanuddee. I was at False Point only a fortnight ago. I know the *Olga* has been up the Jumbhoo river and Barkood creek, and has towed flats up. I was once at Pooree in September about six years ago; it is a very difficult port to land goods at during the south-west monsoon. From what I saw I think the neighbourhoods of the Dhamrah and Balasore rivers were the scenes of the greatest suffering by famine. When I first went down to Dhamrah there were only about 500 inhabitants, but within a week 2,500 were daily fed. The people were dying at the rate of 15 or 20 a day. There was always rice on hand at Dhamrah.

No. 117.—MR. G. S. SYKES, OF MESSRS. SYKES and Co., *Merchant of Calcutta.*

[Examined in Calcutta, 12th February 1867.]

My attention was first drawn to the distress in Orissa in March 1866. We are in constant correspondence with the Missionaries, being Agents for both the American and General Baptist Missionary Societies, and from their correspondence I gleaned a good deal of information about the distressed state of the people. I have unfortunately mislaid my first letters. At the end of March I had reason to believe that the distress was acute, and that there was actual famine all over Orissa. In consequence of what I then heard, I proposed procuring all the relief I could for the distressed inhabitants of that district. I first wrote to the Governor General, and on the same day likewise sent a letter to the Lieutenant Governor, asking them to subscribe, which they both did. I also advertized in the papers. I do not remember the exact date; it was early in April. I called personally and by letter on the Editors of the Calcutta papers, and also wrote to the *Friend of India*, and urged them to take up the matter, which they immediately did. As the season advanced, I heard of the great increase of distress, and sent copies of my letters to all the papers. I also sent a printed circular containing extracts of Missionary letters to the merchants and others. We received large subscriptions and made daily remittances of money to the different stations in Orissa. We received at least 18,000 Rs. as I see by the books I have in my hand, likewise some money was sent after that.

As the season went on, the distress got far beyond our means; larger subscriptions were required. We urged Editors of papers to get up a more general relief.

Q.—On the question of getting up a general Relief Fund, did you hold any correspondence with high Government officials?

A.—No. We notified in the newspapers that if a Committee was formed we would hand over the Funds; but no public movement was made. I was not then aware of the existence of the old Famine Fund. We published the extracts of most of the distressing accounts in May. When we became aware of the balance of the Famine Fund we still kept our fund opened, and thought a public movement was required. We sent money, but the Missionaries sent back word "that there was great difficulty in purchasing rice." We sent some rice, but had not sufficient funds to send largely. We sent rice to Midnapore but not to Orissa. Dr. Bachelor and the Collector of Midnapore asked us to send rice, which we did. I did not look into the question of the Government importation of rice. I am not in a position to give an opinion on the subject; but from what I have learnt from correspondents in Orissa, the Government supplies were not sufficient. Mr. Chapman put a letter in the papers to say that further subscriptions were not required, which was followed by a perfect storm of letters regretting Mr. Chapman's proceeding.

Later in the season we heard that good arrangements had been made for relieving the people, but we did not hear it till November. We were the Agents for the Irrigation Company, but were not concerned in the shipment of rice for them; they had one of their own officers on the spot.

Q.—During the past year, do you think that the people of Calcutta have had means of realizing the distress in Orissa?

A.—I think they have had ample means of doing so, but were disheartened by Mr. Chapman's statement, and the want of action by Government.

I read the price currents published by the Board, and found several of them inaccurate. As regards the narratives, they were not full enough or colored sufficiently deep.

When I heard the distressing accounts of famine at Oolaberreah, I made a separate appeal and opened a separate fund for that place. I went down to Oolaberreah on the 28th of July, accompanied by the Revd. Mr. Payne. Paupers were lying about the streets, dying for want of something to eat; we gave them a good meal that day. They were all Ooryahs, trying to reach Calcutta, but they had not sufficient money to cross the river. I spoke to Mr. Scott, of the Irrigation Company, and he gave the people the use of a large bungalow. We established a relief depôt there, did not want the people to come to Calcutta, as there were already too many here. I arranged with Mr. Scott to give them daily rice, dhal,

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&c. Mr. Scott immediately gave work to the able-bodied men, and took a list of the helpless. We fed daily as many as 125.

This voluntary relief system at Oolaberreah was continued for two months, then Government adopted our arrangements, and carried them on. The balance of our fund was handed over to the Magistrate of Howrah through the chairman of the Calcutta Relief Committee. During that time, we had not applied for Government aid. There was a great want of medicine and medical aid at Oolaberreah, so I wrote to the Editors to take up the matter, and then Government sent down a Native doctor. Most of the people also came in here in a very reduced state; but I was not there to see whether most of them lived or died; but Mr. Scott took great care of them, giving sago, arrowroot, &c., to the sick. My attention was drawn to the crowds of starving people flocking into Calcutta. Many of them were Ooryahs. We took special notice of the Ooryahs. I was a Member of the 1st Calcutta Relief Committee. I have been in the Orissa districts. It was about the middle of June that I first received intelligence of the number of starving people in Calcutta. I immediately proposed to open a dépôt for them in the southern division of the town.

The rich Natives fed them very liberally, but there was no system adopted in their relief, and I wished for a regular organized plan. I was not on the Executive Committee, and therefore did not take an active part. I know there was an irregularity about the issue of the notices for the meeting by which the Executive Committee was appointed. I am not sure if I received any notice to attend, but I heard of the meeting and went. The meeting was not fully attended. I think it was at this meeting Mr. Hogg told the Natives, it would be better for them to stop their distribution of food, and establish some organized plan of relief.

No. 118.—BABOO DIGUMBER MITTER.

[Examined in Calcutta, 12th February 1867.]

I was first asked in June 1866 to take part in the deliberations of the Board of Revenue in the famine matters.

Q.—Are you of opinion that the steps which had been taken by Government at that time were as efficient as could be expected under the circumstances?

A.—I think up to that time no steps had been taken on a scale sufficiently large to meet the requirements of the country.

Q.—In what particular way were they less than they ought to have been?

A.—There was then some doubt as to the stock of food in the Orissa districts. The local officers thought that there was no want of rice in this country, and that it had been kept back from the

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market by a combination of the mahajuns. Hence I presume importation was not made on a scale commensurate with the requirements of the crisis.

Q.—Do you not think that rice might have been sent to Pooree at the end of May when it was sent to False Point and Balasore?

A.—No, for experience has shown that it was not advisable to send it to Pooree direct, owing to the difficulty of landing it there. All shipments for Pooree should have been made to False Point, and forwarded therefrom.

Q.—Was sufficient done at Balasore for the relief of the people?

A.—No. I think the condition of Balasore and Pooree was, if possible, worse than that of Cuttack. I wrote a letter to the Hon'ble Ashley Eden, expressing my views regarding Cuttack, early in June.

Q.—Did you form any opinion of what would be the most effectual method of landing and transporting goods in the Cuttack district?

A.—I have no knowledge on that subject.

Q.—Did you concur in the steps taken by the Board of Revenue?

A.—I did not concur in the price at which Government rice was determined to be sold in the suffering districts.

Q.—In other respects, were the arrangements satisfactory?

A.—I always thought that sufficient rice was not being imported. I afterwards yielded my point about the price of rice, as I found we had not a sufficient stock to meet the heavy demand which low price would have created.

Q.—In your opinion, were the operations of the Board checked by apprehensions that money might run short; or why were the operations limited as you describe?

A.—The Members of the Board were, I think, under an impression that there was a large supply of rice in Orissa. I believe the Lieutenant Governor shared that opinion. It was not until the end of June, that the Government and the Board seemed to realize the severity of the famine in Orissa.

Q.—Was much mortality known to have occurred about this time?

A.—Yes, but the authorities thought that it was chiefly confined to the artizans.

Q.—How do you account for that belief?

A.—I suppose it was from information derived from local officers.

Q.—Had you, during the period you were assisting the Board, access to all correspondence, and if so, did you see the letters of the local authorities of Pooree and Balasore?

A.—I did not see all the correspondence. The correspondence was not sent to me, and I did not ask for it. I was merely asked to be present every Monday at the deliberations of the Board.

Q.—Were you yourself then aware of the severity of the crisis?

A.—I was. I have property in Cuttack. I knew, since November 1865, that a severe calamity was impending, and I watched its progress, and at the meetings of the Board I stated what my impressions were.

Q.—Were you ever consulted on the question as to how far it was advisable to publish the accounts received?

A.—No, I was not.

Q.—Were you consulted on the question, whether it would be desirable to have a public Committee for managing the funds subscribed by the public on a former occasion, or to make a fresh appeal to the public?

A.—Before joining the Board I called upon Mr. Schiller on behalf of the British Indian Association, asking him to get up a meeting for the relief of the distressed. Mr. Schiller then informed me that he had telegraphed to Government on that subject, and was waiting for a reply. A few days after, I heard that Government had agreed to hand over the balance of the old Famine Fund, and Mr. Schiller thought a public subscription was no longer necessary. I was not consulted on the subject of the old fund, or of an application to the public for additional funds.

Q.—When did the Board fully realize the extent of famine in Orissa?

A.—Not before August; but at that time I ceased to attend. Mr. Moncrieff's attendance had been discontinued before this. It seemed that my attendance was not wanted, so I discontinued going.

Q.—During the latter part of the season, do you think sufficient measures were taken?

A.—I do not think much was done until the arrival of Lord Cranborne's telegram, authorizing the free expenditure of the Government funds; then great activity was shown in relief measures. My impression up to that time was that they had been stunted.

Q.—When did Government relief first reach the people of Orissa, and with what result?

A.—Nothing effective was done up to the latter part of July; some few relief houses had been established, but were not sufficient to aid the mass of the people. Gradually, however, assistance was extended, and in September it had become tolerably effective; but even then I do not think it was sufficient, for people then had not the means of buying rice. They were too poor. In respect of gratuitous distributions, labor of some sort was exacted from even women and children, and the work was generally of such a description that many people would not avail themselves of it; nor was such work provided within easy reach of the sufferers. I have never been in Orissa; but I believe the people to be more tenacious of caste than the Bengalees, and they are likewise more indolent.

Q.—Do you think then that, as a matter of fact, large numbers of people preferred starvation to doing ordinary earth-work as laborers?

A.—Yes. Few high caste people would work, except at the last extremity, and then food could do them no good, as they were too far reduced for active labor, and too weak generally to be restored to life by food. I believe that was the case with many. In the emaciated state that most of the people were in, diarrhoea was the usual consequence of taking food.

Q.—Where is your estate in Orissa?

A.—The name of it is Pergunnah Ootikun. It is situated in the Kendraparah sub-division; it is a low-lying estate.

Q.—Did these low-lying lands yield better than the high lands in the drought of 1865?

A.—They did; but even on my low-lying estate there was realized only a 6-anna crop. I consider that the high-lands were much worse off. The average yield for the whole district could not have exceeded a quarter crop.

Q.—Did the low-lands of Pergunnah Ootikun suffer more than the high-lands in 1866?

A.—Yes, I think more than three-fourths of the crop were lost by the flood. The lands were submerged for six weeks, and the result was great increase of distress and mortality.

Q.—When did you first become aware that famine had actually commenced in Orissa?

A.—About March 1866; but even in October and November 1865, rice was not procurable in sufficient quantities by the lower classes for money. During March and April I heard of much want, and of many deaths from starvation, but it was not until June the rate of mortality was high. In July and August there was the greatest mortality.

Q.—In the earlier part of the year, did it seem to you that there were sufficient signs of the approach of famine to attract the attention of Government?

A.—I do not know what accounts were sent to Government.

Q.—Was there sufficient in the general state of the country in the early part of 1866 to render it proper for Government to enquire into the matter?

A.—With regard to Orissa there was. The very fact of there having been only a quarter crop was sufficient to alarm any one; and in Orissa the means of importation after a certain month is extremely difficult and expensive. Perhaps I should here say respecting the existence of old stocks in every district, whether in Bengal, Behar, or Orissa, that they are always small; hence an 8-anna crop is barely sufficient to feed the people; less is sure to cause a famine.

Q.—We believe you would like to add something to your evidence as regards measures which you would recommend with reference to Orissa?

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A.—The settlement about to expire was made at the time on the basis of half the gross produce for the ryots, that is, if the produce for a beegah were 10 rupees, the ryots were to pay 5 rupees and keep the remaining 5. This was a very exorbitant rate of assessment, and in my opinion it tended to keep the whole province in a state of pauperism and helplessness. The rise in the prices during the last five or six years had, to a certain extent, mitigated, but not cured the evil. In the present settlement, there was great inequality in the rate of allowance to the zemindars; for by the settlements which were made up to a certain date, only 30 per cent. on the gross rental was allowed to the zemindar; but after that date 40 per cent. was allowed, without reference to the capabilities of the properties assessed, and only because the order for 40 per cent. was passed after a certain date. This was, I believe, brought to the notice of Government by Mr. Mills, the Settlement Officer, but the Government did not think proper to allow the increased rate of allowance to those with whom the settlement had already been made.

The temporary character of the settlement is another cause of evil. It leads to a large quantity of land being allowed to lie fallow for some time before every settlement. In this letter which I received from the manager of my property in Orissa (dated the 27th February 1865) my manager says that many zemindars there were keeping their lands fallow, so that in the ensuing settlement they might get a remission for those lands, and he asked me whether he should do the same. I peremptorily forbade it, but I believe many had recourse to it.

With regard to salt, it appears that in 1866 the price was very high, very nearly from 8 to 10 rupees a maund, and people were obliged to forego the use of salt in consequence of the increased price; and it might be that the dropsical swelling which was generally the fore-runner of death during the famine, was owing to want of salt. I merely hazard this as my individual opinion. I believe that even at the prices I have mentioned, salt was at the time difficult to be procured, because the Government golahs were situated at great distances from each other, and there were not many sellers.

No. 119.—COLONEL J. E. D. NICOLLS, *Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Public Works Department.*

[Examined in Calcutta, 12th February 1867.]

Q.—We believe that the attention of the Bengal Government, in the Public Works Department, was drawn to the necessity of providing labor for the people in the end of 1865 in consequence of the failure of the crops?

A.—It was.
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Q.—What measures were adopted to provide employment for the distressed people?

A.—About the beginning of December the distress in the Pergunnahs of Mallood, Paricood and Satparah, in the southern part of Orissa, was brought to notice by the general branch of the Bengal Secretariat. It appears that the relief of the distressed could be best provided for by putting in progress the earth-work of the roads of Orissa, the Pooree and Cuttack road and that from Cuttack to the Madras frontier. Orders were immediately issued to push on such work, and the usual restriction regarding estimates, &c., was set aside, and power given to the Commissioner and local Engineers to make such arrangements as might be necessary. They were especially directed to make preparations in view to the number of work-people who might be expected.

Q.—Will you be so good as to state what sums were obtained from the Government of India in 1865-66 for the purpose of famine relief?

A.—The report of the Board of Revenue having brought to notice the prospect of scarcity throughout Bengal, and a large sum having lapsed through an informality in previous years, application was made to the Government of India to cancel the adjustment of this sum, and give a sum of five lakhs. It was explained that the ordinary requirements of the Government of India could not be complied with regarding special works of relief; but it was proposed that this sum should be granted for railway feeders in which the Government of India were interested, and the funds thus released would then be available elsewhere, and the allotment for district roads of the current year would not have to be reduced. The Government of India granted five lakhs accordingly, and permission was given to assign further sums from savings in the General Public Works Budget.

Q.—The sum of five lakhs was assigned as a grant in aid to the local fund for famine works, including feeder roads, &c., in Cuttack and Behar. State in general terms how the five lakhs were appropriated?

A.—The five lakhs, to which afterwards Rs. 54,000 were added, was expended on feeder roads in communication with the Eastern Bengal and East Indian Railways.

Q.—Was nothing then given to the local funds of the Cuttack division, which had been especially mentioned in the applications for relief, on which was founded the grant of the Government of India?

A.—I must point out that the general applications to the Government of India were made in order to obviate the necessity of reducing the local fund expenditure, which was contemplated during the current year 1865-66; and the local works in Orissa were consequently not reduced. I must further point out that, although the application for assistance to the Pooree and Madras frontier roads was included by the Government of India

in their sanction, there were not what are technically called local works, but Rs. 69,000 was sanctioned for them, irrespective of the five lakhs.

Q.—The five lakhs was given exclusively as a grant-in-aid for former works; was its expenditure confined exclusively to those districts where famine prevailed, or is it the fact that the greater portion of the money was spent in districts in which there was no famine?

A.—As before stated, the expenditure of this money is shown against feeders for the East Indian and Eastern Bengal Railways, the result of which was the release of a similar sum of money which was expended throughout Bengal generally. As regards the feeders, the greater part of the expense was on the feeder roads of the Eastern Bengal Railway, which is situated within the Commissionership of Nuddea, where there was very great distress. The remainder was expended almost, if not entirely, in the Commissionership of Burdwan, where there was also distress.

Q.—After the commencement of the works on the Ganjam and Pooree roads, had you reason to suppose that there would, in any way, be difficulty regarding the rates and the procuring of food for the laborers?

A.—No, I had not, as far as this department is concerned.

Q.—Did not the Superintending Engineer report his fears that rice would not be procurable without the assistance of the Civil authorities, both by writing and telegraphing to that effect?

A.—He wrote his fears that the assistance of the Civil authorities would be necessary in regard to procuring rice; he telegraphed for permission to advance Rs. 20,000.

Q.—Was that subject brought to the notice of His Excellency the Lieutenant Governor at that time?

A.—Yes, both letters and telegram are on the records of Government, and the telegram was answered by me as Secretary.

Q.—You have no doubt but that the Lieutenant Governor was perfectly well aware that there was this question about the supply of rice?

A.—He certainly was aware of it.

Q.—In his instructions of the 3rd of February, which were communicated to you on the same date, the Superintending Engineer directs the executive officers to keep their gangs as low in number as possible, and not to offer employment to every one, but to confine themselves to cases of real distress, and he grounded his instructions on this view, that in all human probability the distress would be much more severe a few months later, and that it was, therefore, proper to husband resources. Did that instruction seem to you consistent with the purpose for which the grants were made, and was it at the time brought to the notice of the Lieutenant Governor?

A.—It seemed generally consistent. I cannot say that it was at the very time brought to the direct

notice of the Lieutenant Governor; in fact, it was not brought before me for some time subsequent to the date it bears. It reached my office on the 10th February, and we left for Orissa on the 11th. It was not forwarded after us. The general subject was discussed during our visit to Orissa, on which occasion I accompanied the Lieutenant Governor.

Q.—Be good enough to explain what passed on the subject of these operations?

A.—The general result was that the arrangements made by the Superintending Engineer and the Commissioner were satisfactory. To the south the works authorized on the frontiers and Pooree roads, we understood, would take up all the unemployed hands in that direction, the Irrigation Company's works and the Cuttack Trunk Road doing the same in the northern direction. The Superintending Engineer seemed to be carefully attending to what was going on.

Q.—Were there any arrangements for the supply of food settled during your visit, and with what result?

A.—I do not remember anything particular; the arrangement for the supplying of food rested with the Commissioner and Relief Committees.

Q.—Had you reason to suppose that the Commissioner and Relief Committees had made sufficient arrangements for the supply of food?

A.—I had no reason to suppose they had not, and I did not make special enquiry, the duty of seeing after this arrangement not being in our department.

Q.—The Commissioner had shortly before urgently telegraphed, apparently from information received from officers of your department, that relief works were stopped for want of rice, which was not procurable on the spot, and the officers of your department have informed us that in fact in the month of February, the works on the Pooree road, close to Pooree, were reduced to a minimum, owing to difficulties about rice and rates. Did not this subject attract the special attention of either the Lieutenant Governor or yourself?

A.—I never heard of any telegram from the Commissioner, nor of the stoppage of works. My attention was never attracted to the subject. I do not know what the Lieutenant Governor's might have been.

Q.—Did it not seem to you that in the then state of the people and market, the rates allowed on the Pooree road, which were the ordinary contract rates, were insufficient to afford special relief to the weak and emaciated?

A.—No.

Q.—Did relief works in any shape attract the special attention of the Lieutenant Governor or yourself during your visit, and were they made the subject of any full discussion with the local executive officers?

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A.—I cannot answer for the Lieutenant Governor, nor can I remember every word that passed; but, as I have already stated, the result was generally that nothing more was considered necessary.

Q.—During your visit to Pooree, did you observe the state of the people in that neighbourhood?

A.—I did not notice anything particular, nor did I hear remarks made on the subject.

Q.—Did you then observe no signs of distress?

A.—I did not.

Q.—Had you much conversation with Mr. Barlow?

A.—No special conversation on the subject, nor with any of the civil officers. I travelled from Pooree to Cuttack by night dawk, and had, therefore, no opportunity of observing the country.

Q.—On your return journey by way of Taldunda, did you observe any thing particular?

A.—No, I travelled by night up to Taldunda and by boat from thence.

Q.—Subsequently, when the correspondence of the 3rd of February came to your notice, were the instructions issued by the Superintending Engineer approved?

A.—Yes, no orders were issued, and from that it is to be inferred that they were approved.

Q.—Are any reports made to your office showing the number of laborers employed and the work done from month to month?

A.—We have no reports of the number of laborers employed. There was a progress report, which stated, more or less, generally what was done.

Q.—Did the reports for February and March lead you to suppose that the employment given by the relief works in the Pooree district, was adequate for the emergency for which they had been designed?

A.—I have no reason to suppose they were not. The exact amount of distress could only have been known to the local officers.

Q.—From the time of the Lieutenant Governor's visit to the middle of May, did the progress of the relief works engage the special attention of the Lieutenant Governor or yourself?

A.—There was no correspondence; I had every reason to believe that every thing was being done by the local officers for which they had full authority. My attention was not otherwise directed to the subject.

Q.—Did you make no special enquiries about the progress of the relief works?

A.—No; as already stated, I believed every thing was going on well, nor had I any reason to suppose such was not the case.

Q.—In the latter part of April, was there not an order given to find work for the employment of the poor in the district of Midnapore?

A.—Yes.

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Q.—What work was it?

A.—The work specified in the correspondence forwarded; there were orders to carry on a tank which had been in general contemplation and also for pushing on one of the roads in the district.

Q.—In the end of May, on account of the increase of famine, additional expenditure for relief work in Orissa was sanctioned, was it not?

A.—Yes, Rs. 60,000 was sanctioned.

Q.—And in the early part of June orders were given to the effect that the relief of the people should have preference over rates?

A.—Yes, as soon as it was realized that the rates were insufficient, the remark alluded to was made, and the Superintending Engineer was directed to proportion his tasks to the strength of the people, and regulate his payments by what would afford them the means of subsistence. He was also authorised, in cases where it was represented that the Civil authorities could not undertake the supply of rice, to take the arrangement into his own hands.

Q.—In the month of June, were the increased grants and more liberal rates very effective, or was the effect limited by the extreme difficulty of obtaining rice at that time?

A.—They were not very effective since the supply was limited.

Q.—Subsequently, during the rains, were the public works carried on on a great scale or not?

A.—There were ample funds available for carrying on what was necessary, but the season of the year was entirely against the prosecution of every suitable work.

Q.—Practically, then, has the result been that, throughout the famine, relief in the shape of public works of the Public Works Departments has not been given on a grand scale in Orissa, Midnapore, and Maunbhoom?

A.—I believe that practically the relief afforded by the public works has been ample to meet requirements.

Q.—Do you believe it has ever been given on one tithe the scale it was given in the North-Western Provinces in 1861?

A.—I am totally unaware of what took place in the North-Western Provinces in 1861.

Q.—It appears that in the month of July the General Department of the Bengal Government referred to your Department an application from Mr. McNeile for the services of two or three thoroughly respectable and trustworthy Europeans for service in relief operations; will you be so good as to explain what was done in consequence?

A.—Enquiry was immediately made, and three men were sent down as soon as they were obtained. I saw them myself, engaged them, and sent them down.

Q.—Were they men who had been employed in your Department before, or were they taken up for the occasion?

A.—Two of them had been regularly employed in the Department, and the third had been temporarily employed in the Controller's Office.

Q.—Were they in the Department at the time?

A.—No.

Q.—Had you known any thing of them personally?

A.—Mr. Brooks had casually come under my notice for some time past, and I had always heard of him as a thoroughly conscientious trustworthy man; Mr. Higgs had been temporarily employed in the Department and also on contracts, and I heard a good character of him; and Mr. Bancroft was the son of an old soldier, and was strongly recommended to me two or three years ago in Oude, and also latterly on my enquiring for persons to send to Balasore.

Q.—Was not Mr. Brooks a very elderly man, and, though trustworthy, was he not found physically incapable to do the work?

A.—Mr. Brooks was an old man and not fit for hard knocking about, but appeared to me quite competent to look after bodies of persons collected together, and to do such work as I understand he would have had to do at Balasore.

Q.—The other two Europeans who were sent down seem to have struck work almost immediately after their arrival. Can you in any way account for their doing so?

A.—I know nothing of it. Mr. Bancroft was quite a young man, and Mr. Higgs was a middle-aged man. I had great difficulty in procuring men at all, and enquired particularly about them. I went carefully over the letter with them, read those parts which related to the duties they had to perform, and asked them if they were willing and capable to undertake those duties; and I got from them satisfactory answers.

No. 120.—Mr. J. A. CHARRIOL, of Messrs. Robert Charriol and Co.

[Examined in Calcutta, 12th February 1867.]

Our house has been many years concerned in the grain trade. We have exported largely from Calcutta, Akyab and from Orissa, through False Point, principally to Mauritius, Bourbon, Ceylon and France. We have not exported to the East. There is, however, a large export trade from Calcutta and the Burmese Ports to China. It is a permanent trade; but is liable to occasional increase according to the state of the market. Our last exports from Orissa were made in June 1865.

In 1866 we exported largely from Calcutta. In the beginning of 1866 our agent at Cuttack informed us that a kind of famine was beginning, and asked for permission to re-sell the grain which he had stored for export. We authorized him to do so.

We were owners of the ship *Philaneme*; but the cargo belonged to Messrs. Borradaile, Schiller and Co., when the vessel went ashore at Pooree in

December 1865. A small portion of the rice which was damaged was sold. The Magistrate of Pooree wanted us to sell the rest of the cargo there; but as it was not ours, we were unable to authorize this; and afterwards we (acting as agents for the Captain) sent the steam ship *T. A. Gibb*, on which the rice was re-shipped and sent to its destination. The rice was originally despatched from Calcutta for Gopalpoor, or Madras. The Captain was to receive instructions at Gopalpoor. When re-shipped on the *T. A. Gibb*, it was sent to Madras and sold there on account of the parties concerned. The *Philaneme* was a French ship. The cargo was insured by an English office. After the wreck of the *Philaneme* there was a question between the owners of the cargo and the under-writers as to the cargo. The owners wished to throw it entirely on the hands of the under-writers, and the under-writers were not willing to accept the cargo as abandoned. I personally and repeatedly called both on the owners and under-writers of the cargo (Messrs. Gladstone, Wyllie and Co), and advised them to allow the Captain to sell the cargo at Pooree, as the rice was much wanted there and the price was remunerative. A correspondence passed between my Firm and those parties; but eventually neither party would accept the responsibility of giving orders in modification of the Charter Party. The Captain was, therefore, obliged to act according to the letter of the Charter Party, and the result was a heavy loss to the parties concerned. The Captain had no power to exercise his own discretion at Pooree unless it had been quite impossible for him to find a vessel on which to reship the cargo. The *T. A. Gibb* was sent down for the cargo, and shipped it on the 1st of March 1866. Bearing in mind the market price of rice in Calcutta at that time, I believe that if any one had offered Rs. 5 maund for the rice as it lay at Pooree, it would have been a very tempting offer. The parties might have accepted it; but perhaps they would have refused on account of the existing dispute. I think the cargo was about 7,000 bags. The Board of Revenue did not communicate with me at all on the subject.

As the season advanced, we heard of the progress of the famine from our agent at Cuttack. Our attention was particularly drawn to the dreadful state of things in the month of May, a little before I communicated with the Board regarding the *Jacques Fourrestier*. We were agents for the *Jacques Fourrestier*, and I proposed to the Captain to take the cargo of rice to False Point. I telegraphed to my agent at Cuttack to sell at the rate of Rs. 12-4 per bag, delivered at False Point. He telegraphed that he could not find purchasers on our terms at False Point. I therefore cleared the ship for the Mauritius and Bourbon. That day I heard from my agent Mr. Fressanges that the Commissioner of Cuttack was in great want of rice, and he advised us to communicate with the Board of Revenue on the subject. I went over to the Board's office, and saw Mr. Chapman the Secretary. I offered the rice for sale; but Mr. Chapman said that the Board preferred giving me a guarantee of a minimum price.

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I have never been at False Point, but I know the character of the place. As it turned out, our agent actually sold part of the cargo above the guaranteed price, and the whole would have been sold at that higher price. The people came and offered gold and jewels or any thing else for the rice. In the mean time a letter appeared in the papers to the effect that we were locking up the rice, and that the Board should have bought it up. I went over at once to Mr. Chapman about it, when he informed me that he had just telegraphed to the Commissioner of Cuttack to take over the whole cargo at the guaranteed price. The Captain objected to the arrangement, as he was getting 12 annas or a rupee per bag above that price; but as I had settled with the Board, he was obliged to deliver the cargo. A little after, we sold the cargo of the *Charles Maureau* to the Board, and she was sent down to False Point, where she arrived on the 11th of July. Subsequently (I think in October) I offered the whole cargo of the *Pie IX* to the Board (11,000 bags), but they would take 4,000 bags only. The remaining 7,000 were taken on to Galle. There was some mention of taking 500 bags a day beyond the 4,000, but I do not know why this was not done.

Q.—Will you tell us the circumstances under which the *Charles Maureau* went to False Point in October?

A.—We offered the cargo of the *Charles Maureau* to the Board of Revenue, and they refused to take it; and then, as we heard from our agent that the price of rice at Cuttack was very high, the Captain, who had been there before, proposed to call at False Point to sell her cargo there.

Q.—What did you understand was the result?

A.—The Captain remained there some fifteen or twenty days, and put himself into communication with the Collector of Cuttack. The Collector offered to take some of the rice, but not all. After waiting a certain time, and hearing no news, the Captain went away grumbling a good deal.

Q.—Did you understand that the Captain refused to break bulk, or not?

A.—He would have been glad to deliver any quantity, and did not refuse to break bulk.

Q.—Are you aware that rice had become somewhat cheaper in Cuttack in October?

A.—I am not aware of it.

Q.—Was there an immense demand for rice in Ceylon at that time?

A.—Just at that time I sold the cargo of the *Franklin* at 27 shillings a bag clear of every thing. There was a great demand for rice in Ceylon at that time.

Q.—Therefore, the taking of the cargo to Galle was no loss?

A.—The cargo was not taken to Ceylon: it was taken to Bourbon and the Mauritius.

During the famine I offered some other cargoes to the Board of Revenue, but they were not accepted. If the Board had wished to have more

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rice than they actually despatched, they could have got it. The rice which I offered was in Calcutta. I had it here on board of different vessels.

Before offering the *Jacques Fourestier's* and other ships' cargoes to the Board, we were obliged to wait till the vessels were loaded, and as these cargoes, intended for the Mauritius and Bourbon markets, consisted of best quality moonghy rice, we could not afford to offer them at less than we did. The Board was obtaining coarser rice at a lower rate and therefore declined our offers.

No. 121.—MR. R. SCOTT MONCRIEFF, *Member of the Firm of Messrs. Gisborne and Co., and Vice President of the Chamber of Commerce.*

[Examined in Calcutta, 16th February 1867.]

1. Q.—Was your attention called to the failure of the crops in Lower Bengal generally in the latter part of 1865?

A.—We had been purchasing rice, when our attention was first drawn to it in October, as I find from examining our correspondence. The first allusion to famine as being more than a probability is in a letter from my Firm to one of our correspondents, dated 18th October 1865.

2. Q.—When did you first bring the matter specially to the notice of the Government of Bengal?

A.—On the 3rd of November we wrote to the Government. I find that on the 24th of October we again mentioned the probability of a famine in writing to our correspondents, and on the 3rd of November we addressed the Government of Bengal on the subject.

3. Q.—Had you any personal communication with any of the Members of the Government at that time?

A.—Nothing beyond that letter that I remember. After that letter I had several conversations with Mr. Chapman, the Secretary to the Board of Revenue, but not, I think, with any of the immediate Members of the Government.

4. Q.—Were you aware that the failure was particularly severe in Orissa?

A.—I was aware from Mr. Chapman himself that the failure was particularly severe in Orissa. I must have seen the report of the Board of Revenue of the 25th November, and in December Mr. Chapman asked me to buy some rice for the support of the starving people near the Chilka Lake. There was a difficulty at the time in getting freight for the rice which I reported to him, and I understood that the cargo of the *Philaneme*, which had gone ashore at Pooree, would be purchased; the order given to me was then withdrawn.

5. Q.—We cannot find that any attempt was made by the authorities in Calcutta to purchase the cargo of the *Philaneme*. On the contrary, we have been told by the Secretary and Senior Member of the Board of Revenue that there was no thought of purchasing the cargo, and we learn

from Mr. Charriol also that no such proposition was made to him by the Board of Revenue; was your attention at all drawn to this subject?

A.—I remember that the order given to us to send some rice down, which was merely verbal, was withdrawn in consequence of its being understood that the cargo of the *Philaneme* would be available; but I don't say that I understood that Government was going to buy it.

6. Q.—The *Philaneme's* cargo in fact remained at Pooree till February; have you any particular knowledge of the matter?

A.—No; I have not.

7. Q.—In February, rice had approached what might be called famine prices in the Pooree district, and was not procurable in any quantity at that price, so much so that at the end of January, the Commissioner of Cuttack had telegraphed that relief works were stopped for want of rice; on the other hand, we learn that although it would have been advantageous to the owners of the *Philaneme's* cargo to sell it at Pooree, it was not so sold on account of a dispute between the owners and the under-writers of the cargo, and that the cargo was carried off and sold at Madras in one of the ships which was a little later employed to bring back rice to Pooree. The owners and under-writers of the cargo being both at Calcutta, do you think that the purchase of the cargo might have been arranged at Calcutta, or are questions of insurance so difficult as to obstruct very much any arrangement of the kind?

A.—I think that the question of insurance might obstruct seriously such an arrangement as purchasing the cargo, raising important legal questions which neither the agents nor owners of the ship might feel themselves in a position to settle.

8. Q.—In the early part of 1866, did you become aware that the chances of a wide-spread famine were increasing in Orissa?

A.—I remember very well that when the new crop was coming in, prices in Calcutta and Bengal were falling, and that I and others were in hopes that this would lead to the lowering of prices in Orissa and alleviation of the distress, so much so that we did not again at that time urge the views which we had held earlier.

9. Q.—When were you again more seriously alarmed?

A.—In March, after a conversation with Mr. Chapman on the subject, looking to the rising prices all over the country, and the fact that the new crop had fallen very far short of the expectation, I again urged importation from Burmah and Orissa, because the setting in of the monsoon would render importation very difficult after a time.

10. Q.—At that time did you think the circumstances of Orissa much more critical than that of other parts of the Lower Provinces?

A.—Most unquestionably.

11. Q.—Did you about that time have any personal communication with the higher Officers of Government?

A.—None.

12. Q.—Were you at all aware whether your opinions in any way reached the Government?

A.—I am not at all aware that they went any further than Mr. Chapman, with whom I was in the habit of having conversations.

13. Q.—Where were you in the months of March and April?

A.—I was in Calcutta up to the middle of April. I then went to Tirhoot for a fortnight.

14. Q.—Before you left Calcutta for Tirhoot, had you reason to believe that actual famine had commenced on a large scale, or was it only impending?

A.—I remember well, before going to Tirhoot, my attention being called to the prices in Orissa by Mr. Chapman as not being more than 9 seers for the rupee; and I was told at the time that the general belief was that there were stores in the hands of the grain dealers which such prices would certainly, if they rose, bring forth.

15. Q.—Did you gather that that was the belief of the Board?

A.—I was talking to the Secretary of the Board, and he seemed to have that idea.

16. Q.—Were you able to find out how he gathered that idea?

A.—My impression is that he had the idea from the local authorities. I thought it was quite possible that it might be so, from the very great difficulty we ourselves find to get at the facts as to stores, whether in grain or any other produce, in the hands of Natives.

17. Q.—Have you any personal knowledge of the local officers of Orissa?

A.—I used to know Mr. Ravenshaw intimately many years ago.

18. Q.—Were you yourself in any correspondence with Orissa at that time?

A.—No; I had no particular opportunities of judging.

19. Q.—Was your attention called to any correspondence in the press on the subject of the famine in Orissa before you went to Tirhoot?

A.—I cannot remember; but the matter was so much in my mind that I would have read any thing I saw on the subject.

20. Q.—When you returned from Tirhoot, had you any reason to suppose that the state of things either in Orissa or other districts in Lower Bengal was very much worse than they had been?

A.—When in Tirhoot I was amazed to find the extent of the distress there which had not been made public, grain robberies being reported in different parts of the district, and actual deaths from starvation. When I came down I immediately

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ly mentioned this to Mr. Chapman, and my attention was drawn to it more than before, and it struck me that there was a general amount of distress of which the public had no idea.

21. Q.—Did you then receive any special information regarding Orissa?

A.—I was aware of what was going on in Orissa, and was convinced that the distress there was undoubtedly of a very serious character.

22. Q.—Soon after you returned, you addressed His Honor the Lieutenant Governor; did you not?

A.—Yes, I did. On the 12th of May I addressed Major Raban, the Private Secretary of the Lieutenant Governor.

23. Q.—You made special allusion to the people dying in Orissa, and strongly recommended importation?

A.—Yes; I did.

24. Q.—Had you at the same time any communication with the Members of the Board or any other Government Officer in Calcutta?

A.—I don't recollect that I had.

25. Q.—You had not at that time in any way brought the matter to the notice of His Excellency the Governor General?

A.—On the 12th of May I wrote to Dr. Farquhar, with a copy of my letter to Major Raban.

26. Q.—What was the result of your communications to the Lieutenant Governor and the Governor General?

A.—It led to the reopening of communication between Mr. Chapman and myself, with reference to the importation of rice from Rangoon or Akyab to Orissa. I cannot remember now whether I received any direct answers to my letters. Very probably, the Government at that time did become alarmed. I find that I did receive a note from the Lieutenant Governor, dated the 16th of May, but I have not got the note. I replied on the 19th of May again, urging importations. I mentioned the existence of an old Famine Fund, and also a proposal for a public meeting, stating that I thought far more than the balance of that fund would be required, which at that time was supposed to be about Rs. 98,000.

27. Q.—Did you become aware that soon after that the Government recommended to the Board to import rice to Orissa?

A.—At the end of May I was authorized, if possible, to arrange with all despatch for the shipment of a cargo from the rice ports for Orissa.

28. Q.—We find that on the 22nd of May, the Board of Revenue, after deliberation, declined to import rice. Were you at all consulted on that occasion?

A.—I was not aware that the Board had declined to import rice.

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29. Q.—When you were first authorized to import rice from the rice ports, were you able to do so at once?

A.—There was no steamer available at either of the rice ports when the order was first given. I took up the *T. A. Gibb* in Calcutta, and sent her to Rangoon for a cargo. She was to leave on the 3rd, but did not leave till the 9th.

30. Q.—Why did she not leave till the 9th?

A.—I understand that she got some cargo for Rangoon, which was not contemplated when I took her up; but the owners having got the offer of some cargo availed themselves of it, and delayed the vessel.

31. Q.—In the end of May and beginning of June, did you consider it patent that a famine of a dreadful kind was raging in Orissa?

A.—Certainly; I had brought the matter before the Chamber of Commerce at a public meeting about the 24th of May.

32. Q.—In the early days of June, did you think that the Board and Government authorities realized the full extent of the famine?

A.—I did not think so then.

33. Q.—Do you think that they then did all that they might have done if they had thoroughly realized the famine?

A.—I think that by the end of June they seemed to have thoroughly realized the danger, and that they were doing all they could to meet it.

34. Q.—Do you think that they could not have done more?

A.—I think that at that time they could not have done more. I believe they were buying rice at Calcutta, and I had orders to buy at the rice ports.

35. Q.—Were you then at all consulted as regards the details of importation?

A.—No.

36. Q.—No rice was sent to Pooree at that time. Do you not think that some rice might with advantage have been sent there from Calcutta in anticipation of the arrival of rice from Burmah?

A.—If rice was not sent, I think it might have been sent. I was not aware that it was not being sent. My attention was wholly devoted to the importation of rice from Burmah.

37. Q.—Do you think that more than one cargo of rice might have been obtained from Burmah if it had been ordered in the last days of May?

A.—I don't think that they could have sent off more than one cargo of rice from Burmah between the end of May and the time of the despatch of the *Gibb*. On the 15th of June I was ordered to buy 15,000 bags, and on the 20th I was ordered to buy till further orders. There was a limited price; but I was under the impression at the time that price would not have been an object.

38. Q.—Have you any personal knowledge of the ports and coasts in Orissa?

A.—None.

39. Q.—And you have not at any time been consulted regarding the details of landing and such matters?

A.—When the Lieutenant Governor came down from Darjeeling it was urged on him to have a General Committee, official and non-official; but he preferred to invite two non-official gentlemen to sit at the meetings of the Board of Revenue for the consideration of famine questions. He invited Baboo Degumber Mitter and myself to act in the matter.

40. Q.—Will you describe the mode in which you co-operated with the Board?

A.—I attended regularly every Monday from the first meeting, when the Lieutenant Governor was present. The famine papers were not sent round, but they were placed on the table of the Board room, and I was at liberty to examine them and ask any questions that I chose, which I did to the fullest extent. The Lieutenant Governor gave every encouragement to the non-official Members present to afford information and to express their opinions. I supplied him with information from Tirhoot and other places with which we had connection.

41. Q.—Did it seem to you at that time that the local officers reported the full severity of the famine?

A.—No; I thought the reports very meagre, with the exception of those from Orissa.

42. Q.—Did it seem to you that the local officers in Orissa fully realized and fully reported the intensity of the prices?

A.—From the time when I first joined the Board I was satisfied that they really realized the full extent of the famine.

43. Q.—Did you think that the Board had then become aware of the full extent of the calamity in Orissa?

A.—I think that they were as regards Orissa.

44. Q.—We find that about that time the Lieutenant Governor, referring to the statement of the Chamber of Commerce that the famine in Orissa was appalling, stated that the accounts received by His Honor did not support the statement of the Chamber. Are you in any way able to account for that opinion of His Honor, or did it seem to you that any of the reports received were such as might give rise to an opinion that the crisis was not so severe as the Chamber of Commerce had supposed?

A.—No; and I cannot account for that opinion entertained by His Honor.

45. Q.—Had you at that time any personal communication with the Lieutenant Governor?

A.—Nothing, apart from these meetings at the Board, which His Honor attended. I had then most free conversation with him.

46. Q.—Did you express your views with regard to the intensity of the famine to the Lieutenant Governor?

A.—I have no doubt that I did, as I was deeply impressed with the subject at the time.

47. Q.—Taking the whole of the information of which you have become possessed, in what months would you say that the famine was experienced with the greatest severity?

A.—I believe in August and September, that is my present impression.

48. Q.—Did you continue throughout to co-operate with the Board?

A.—I ceased to attend their meetings after the formation of a General Committee which was appointed at the public meeting held in the Town Hall on the 13th of August.

49. Q.—What was the reason of your ceasing to attend the meetings of the Board?

A.—The whole conduct of the Famine Relief appeared to me to have been made over to, or assumed by, the General Committee, and it was very difficult for me at that time to attend, though I was always willing to do so; but I cannot recollect that I was particularly asked to do so. It was not the impression on my mind that I was not wanted.

50. Q.—Were you a Member of the Calcutta Committee?

A.—I was.

51. Q.—Did you take any active part in the proceeding of that Committee?

A.—No; I did not. My hands were quite full with the work at Rangoon, and I thought I was doing my part sufficiently.

52. Q.—While you were at the Board, did the subject of the landing and transport of the rice sent to Orissa attract your attention?

A.—It was frequently discussed when I was present, and various suggestions were made; but I never till then knew how difficult the matter was.

53. Q.—Did you become aware that for all purposes of transport and communication, False Point was practically very far from Cuttack?

A.—I then became aware of it as regards the rainy season.

54. Q.—Did it seem to you that the Board did wisely in leaving the whole matter to the local officers, who had in fact very little local experience?

A.—I urged a Special Commissioner being sent down to undertake the whole work, independent of the local authorities.

55. Q.—Was there any question of a Member of the Board or some other high authority going down there to see for himself?

A.—Not to my recollection.

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56. Q.—Do you consider that Mr. McNeile was a Special Commissioner of the character you would have liked to have sent, or was he sent in another capacity?

A.—I thought that he was a Special Commissioner of the kind that I myself would have liked to have sent, till I learnt that he was not to act independently of the Commissioner of the division. I thought that we wanted both a special report from a man free from local influences and also special authority vested in such a man to act as he might think necessary.

57. Q.—Did it seem to you that some kind of a practical man might have been sent with advantage to superintend the landing arrangements?

A.—I understood that they had such a man there, whose whole attention would be given to the matter.

58. Q.—Did any special arrangements regarding the landing of cargo suggest themselves to you, or were any such brought to your notice?

A.—As soon as it became evident that rice had to be imported in large quantities, I thought that receiving ships should be stationed at those places where rice was most required, and proposed it at the Board. It was not done, if I recollect rightly, because the Master Attendant considered that no ship could lie off the Coast with safety for any length of time during the south-west monsoon.

59. Q.—Was it not suggested that at False Point there was a perfectly secure anchorage where any number of ships might have lain with safety?

A.—I do not remember that it was particularly suggested; but I know that my proposition was discussed and negatived. I also suggested the employment of cargo boats and mussoollah boats, and was told that all the arrangements that could be made had been made.

60. Q.—While you were in communication with the Board, did it seem to you that they were doing all that could be done?

A.—I certainly thought so at that time and I think so still.

61. Q.—Did it seem to you that the operations were in any way restricted either as to quantity or speed by any fear that the balance of the Famine Fund would not be sufficient?

A.—No, certainly not.

62. Q.—Did you continue to be of opinion that it would be desirable to have a public Committee?

A.—I thought so all along. I recommended it to the Lieutenant Governor; but he was satisfied with merely inviting two non-official members of the community to attend.

63. Q.—Do you think that if an appeal to the European and Native public, backed by all the weight of the Government, had been made in April or May, the result would have been successful: that for instance if such an appeal as was privately made by Messrs. Sykes and Co., had

been publicly made by the Government and a public Committee, much money would have been raised?

A.—I don't think so, because already the commercial news was very bad and getting worse and worse, and as soon as it was known that there was a balance of upwards of six lakhs of rupees of the old Famine Fund in hand, it would have been hopeless under those circumstances to ask the public to subscribe, as it was then thought that six lakhs would suffice to meet the famine requirements.

64. Q.—Later in the season, when it was first understood that the famine was of such extreme severity that the six lakhs would probably not suffice, do you think that an appeal to the public would have succeeded?

A.—About the beginning of August the public became so impressed at the necessity of themselves coming forward with contributions, that not only Natives had been freely giving their assistance, but in European quarters the idea was very generally entertained that something must be done by the public, the result of which was that a Committee was formed in the beginning of August to invite subscriptions, and at the same time measures were taken which led to the meeting of the 13th of August for the same object.

65. Q.—Do you think that the public was even then fully aware of the intensity of the famine?

A.—By no means.

66. Q.—To what do you attribute that state of the public feeling?

A.—They had not at that time received the accounts, both public and private, which came pouring in from all quarters as the season advanced.

67. Q.—What do you think would have been the advantage of a public Committee early in the season?

A.—Had a General Committee been formed in the beginning of June with the view of inviting subscriptions, I believe the attempt would have been a failure for the reasons I have already given, and I do not think that such a Committee at that time could have done more than the Board itself was doing. But I think that it might have been very useful in bringing information from various private sources to the notice of Government which it was not likely to get through official sources. For the purpose of subscriptions, I think that the public meeting was held and the General Committee formed at the right time.

67a. Q.—Do you think that it was right to devote the efforts of the Committee in the first instance to Calcutta only?

A.—I always thought that the General Committee should have been formed to meet the distress all over Bengal. But there was a very wide difference of opinion on the part of the public as to this point, very many people thinking that the General Committee should not attempt to meet the distress beyond the limits of Calcutta.

68. Q.—After you ceased to attend the meetings of the Board, did you still act as their agent for the purchase of rice?

A.—Yes.

69. Q.—Did you receive orders to import specific quantities of rice, or was the general order continued?

A.—On the 16th of July I had an order to continue purchases; on the 13th to buy one or two more cargoes, with reference to the order of the 11th; on the 20th August to stop purchases, the reason being given that there was more rice likely to arrive on the Coast than could be at once landed. On the 13th of September 25,000 bags additional were ordered for shipment without delay. On the 14th September 10,000 bags more were ordered, and on the 2nd October another order was sent to make up a cargo of 20,000 bags for the steamer *Asia*; 15,000 bags had been already secured for that steamer under previous orders, the order, therefore, amounted to an order for an addition of 5,000 bags. It was understood that the whole of the cargoes were to go as quickly as possible.

70. Q.—Will you describe what arrangements were made for importing the cargoes which had been ordered from the 13th of September to the 2nd of October?

A.—On the 20th of August we had still to arrange tonnage for 15,000 bags of rice already secured, and I then engaged the *Mahratta* on the 24th of August for 7,000 bags from the British India Steam Navigation Company. But I wish it to be understood that, throughout, it was rather a matter of engaging tonnage than engaging particular steamers: it was understood that if the Company could not give us one steamer they should give us another. It was a positive engagement, but subject to the explanation I have just given, and I was quite willing to take another ship. We had also some rice at Bassein waiting for shipment. I find that on the 31st of August we wrote to our agents at Rangoon after communication with the Board here, authorizing them to allow the *Mahratta* to tow a sailing vessel across the Bay with rice to Gopalpoor for the Madras Government, if it should be required. On the 14th September we telegraphed to Rangoon that the Steamer *Coringa* would take the place of the *Mahratta*, as we had been informed in the interim that the *Mahratta* would be required to carry the mails to Madras in lieu of some other steamer which had broken down. The *Coringa* left Calcutta for Rangoon about the 22nd of September to take the *Mahratta's* place, and left Rangoon with a cargo for False Point on the 1st of October; she carried about 5,000 bags. Then there was very great difficulty in securing tonnage, both here and at Rangoon, for the service of carrying grain from Rangoon to False Point. We instructed our agents at Rangoon to take up tonnage as fast as possible: the rice which was required was secured and ready, and there was no delay for want of rice, the only difficulty being about tonnage. We were also ready to take up steamers here if we could get them, but steamers were not

to be got. The *Robert Henderson* was taken up at Rangoon by our agents, and so was the *Sparkler*: these were both sailing vessels and brought their cargoes without the aid of steam. We thought of employing the *Coringa* to tow a cargo over, but found she was urgently wanted in Orissa. The *Thurso* was also taken up by our agents at Rangoon. We were not deterred by expence from taking up ships: we were in hopes of getting both the *Oriental* and *America* sailing vessels, but were disappointed. About the end of September tonnage was required for the conveyance of a quantity of rice purchased in Rangoon, and we engaged the *Asia* to carry 20,000 bags, which would complete the importation. She was engaged under these terms. She was then on her way to China. A telegram was to be despatched to Galle, directing an order to be sent by the mail from Galle to Hongkong, that the *Asia* should return to Rangoon and load. It was arranged that if the *Asia* should prove to have been engaged before the order reached Hongkong for any other service, the steamers *Arabia* and *India*, carrying between them 20,000 bags, were to take her place in conveying the rice from Rangoon. It was not anticipated that the *Asia* would be back to Rangoon before the end of October, and it was possible that she might have been even later if engaged at all; but it was so arranged that if she should prove to have been engaged, the *India* and the *Arabia* were to be at Rangoon by the time the *Asia*, should have been expected there. The *Asia*, as it happened, did not reach Rangoon till about the second week in November, and left again on the 21st with a full cargo.

71. Q.—Do you know of any special reason why the *Asia* was later than she was expected?

A.—No, I am not aware of it.

72. Q.—Was the *Dundas Castle* also later than she was expected?

A.—She was: she was a sailing vessel, and had to go to Madras first to discharge, and took a longer time to discharge than we anticipated. I put in a statement showing the vessels in which all the rice ordered from us up to the 2nd October was imported.

73. Q.—After Mr. Chapman went on leave, with whom did you communicate at the Board?

A.—With Mr. Lane.

74. Q.—Did you communicate to the Board from time to time the difficulties about tonnage and the delays which occurred in the later part of the season?

A.—I did communicate it either by letter or word of mouth to Mr. Lane.

75. Q.—Were you in frequent communication with Mr. Lane?

A.—Only occasionally in communication with him when I found it necessary to write to him or to see him.

76. Q.—Did you receive from the Board any intimation that there was a very pressing want of rice in October?

A.—Yes; I remember Mr. Lane telling me so personally.

77. Q.—However great the emergency, and supposing money to be no object, could it not have been possible to obtain sailing vessels and tugs to tow them in Calcutta?

A.—Tonnage was not available at the time in Calcutta for that service, but it might possibly have been got at an enormous price. The reason of the unwillingness of ship-masters to take cargo for the Coast was the utter uncertainty as to how long the vessels might be kept discharging. The steamers were taken up to go to China before I was aware of the emergency, and there was also a great expectation that there would be more demand for tonnage after the holidays, which made ship-masters unwilling to go down the Coast.

78. Q.—The monsoon was in fact over by the end of September or the beginning of October; if there had been receiving ships, this difficulty would have been perhaps obviated?

A.—I believe it would.

79. Q.—Did Mr. Lane come to you to make enquiries about the progress of the *Asia* and other vessels that were expected during the month of October?

A.—He certainly made such enquiries, and seemed very anxious about it; but from the time that she was engaged through the telegraph to Galle, we could receive no information till her arrival in Rangoon, and therefore we could have no information till she actually arrived at Rangoon, where she was originally expected.

No. 122.—MR. F. SCHILLER, *Member of the Firm of Messrs. Borradaile, Schiller and Co., and President of the Chamber of Commerce.*

[Examined in Calcutta, 16th February 1867.]

1. Q.—Have you been for some years engaged in the grain trade?

A.—Yes.

2. Q.—Have you been concerned in the shipment of rice from Orissa?

A.—We have never shipped rice from Orissa except once, when we shipped paddy from the Dhamrah to Coconada, five or six years ago.

3. Q.—You have not yourself then any personal knowledge of the Coast of Orissa?

A.—No, I have never been there.

4. Q.—In 1865 were you at all engaged in grain trade?

A.—We have been shipping every year to various ports, chiefly to China and Colombo, and to Europe and the Western Coast.

5. Q.—Are the Mauritius and Ceylon entirely supplied from India?

A.—Mauritius is almost entirely supplied from India, because the Indian population like the Indian

rice, but a little comes from Madagascar, where, however, the exportation of grain is often prohibited as I observe it has lately been. Sometimes also there are importations from Java.

6. Q.—Does any grain go down to Australia from this?

A.—Yes, fine table rice goes from here, a little wheat and oats. Australia imports flour from Chilli and wheat from San Francisco.

7. Q.—Is the trade in rice from the ports of British India to China a large one?

A.—That entirely depends on the China crops. In ordinary times the exportations of grain from here to China are almost *nil*; but whenever a deficiency occurs in the China crops, India is called on to supply that deficiency, and therefore it sometimes occurs that China wants 100,000 tons of rice and gets it.

8. Q.—Are the exportations from Siam very large?

A.—They are very considerable. I don't think it is a country which produces as much as British Burmah, and the exportations of Siam are not large as compared with British India. The exportations of Calcutta alone exceed the whole exportations of Arracan and Burmah. 500,000 tons were exported last year.

9. Q.—Is the export trade in rice from Calcutta and Bengal generally one which is quite permanent, and does not depend, for the most part in bad seasons, on particular countries for the supply?

A.—It is permanent as regards certain countries; as regards Mauritius and the West Indies, for instance, where we have a certain amount of cooley population; it is permanent to the Cape of Good Hope and to a small extent as regards Australia; and it has been permanent latterly as regards Bombay, and some of the nearer ports where they are curtailing the production of cereals.

10. Q.—In the autumn of 1865; was your attention drawn to the extreme failure of the crops?

A.—My attention was drawn first to the failure of the crops on the western coast of the Bay of Bengal; and our correspondents at Madras, Messrs. Arbuthnot and Co., ordered us to ship a cargo of rice which went to Gopalpoor by the *Philaneme*. That vessel was wrecked at Pooree, and her cargo was afterwards transhipped by the Captain as the representative of all concerned. I believe that at the time an offer was made by the Collector of Pooree to buy the rice; but this offer not covering the cost of the rice and pending the consent of the under-writers, we could not accept it. Our endeavors to arrange with the under-writers were futile, and the cargo was finally transhipped to our own detriment and loss. A few weeks later this rice would have sold at a large profit on the very coast where it was wrecked.

11. Q.—Would it not have sold at a very large profit at the time it was taken away?

A.—Possibly; I had an idea that the offer made was more advantageous to us and the under-writers than was afterwards obtainable by the transshipment, but we, of course, could do nothing without the consent of the under-writers.

12. Q.—Besides the offer of the Collector of Pooree, was any proposition made to you in Calcutta to buy the rice?

A.—No.

13. Q.—The Collector seems to have offered about 3 Rs. per maund; if in Calcutta the Board of Revenue had taken active measures to secure the cargo, and had offered a much higher price, even 4 or 5 Rs. a maund, do you think the under-writers would have accepted the offer?

A.—No doubt, because an offer made on the Coast could not have been entertained. We had to deal with the under-writers on the spot, and if a fair offer had been made there is no question that we could have arranged for allowing the cargo to remain where it was.

14. Q.—We find that in the beginning of February, when we understand the *Philaneme's* cargo to have been taken away from Pooree, rice was there in fact nearly as high as 5 Rs. per maund; have you any doubt that it might have been sold at that price with great advantage?

A.—I have no doubt that 5 Rs. a maund would have paid well and settled all difficulties with the under-writers.

15. Q.—Do you know what was the price of rice in the Burmah ports in the early part of 1866?

A.—Prices were rather higher than usual; they ruled between 6 shillings and 6 pence free on board, and I believe that afterwards prices went even higher to 8 shillings and 6 pence per cwt.

16. Q.—In the course of March and April, was your attention at all called to the increasing distress in Orissa?

A.—My attention was first drawn to it by Mr. Long. That was about the end of April. The subject was also brought to my notice by Baboo Degumber Mitter, and I was urged to take steps through the Chamber of Commerce to obtain assistance for the distress, and a public meeting was suggested. Mr. Moncrieff likewise held certain information from indigo planting friends in Tirhoot, which he placed at the disposal of the Chamber, and he himself entered into communication with the Board of Revenue. In May we discussed the question whether a public meeting should be held, and the conclusion that we came to was, that the information we held, though indicating certain distress in certain districts, was not sufficiently decisive to induce us to take so important a step as calling a public meeting as it were in opposition to those who were responsible for the good Government of the country, and we decided that before doing this the proper plan was to address the Government, which was

done at the end of May. We then urged both on the Government of Bengal and the Government of India the importance of the impending famine.

17. Q.—Were you satisfied with the reason given by Government for not calling a meeting and not having a public Committee?

A.—I won't say that I was satisfied; but I considered that the Government had better means than we had of ascertaining the real state of things in certain districts, and particularly in Orissa, where no mercantile people resided. I blame the Government for not listening to private representations as regards the state of affairs in Tirhoot, where a great many planters sounded, I believe on an early date, the alarm. I did not consider the reply of Government by any means satisfactory. We felt that public assistance might be wanted, though, until the Government actually called for public assistance, we could scarcely blame them for carrying out the relief in the famine districts through their own machinery.

18. Q.—From the time when in the end of May Government took action, do you think that that action was sufficient?

A.—No; certainly not.

19. Q.—In what respect do you think it was deficient?

A.—They did not see the magnitude of the distress, and attempted to relieve it by small measures, which were inadequate.

20. Q.—Do you think, in the last days of May and beginning of June, more rice might have been obtained in Calcutta, and that it might have been sent down to Orissa without delay?

A.—I don't know as to the quantity that might have been landed in Orissa, but as for the quantity that might have been sent down, it was almost unlimited. The means of sending it down at that time were unlimited too, but the difficulty was in the landing arrangements. I have no knowledge of what has been done with regard to landing arrangements. I believe there were very great difficulties in that season of the year on account of the monsoon having set in.

21. Q.—Do you think that rice might have been sent to Pooree direct from Calcutta at that time?

A.—I question whether you could have done so in sailing vessels: it might have been sent down, but whether it could have been landed is another question.

22. Q.—Do you think that small steamers drawing not more than 9 feet could have been obtained to take rice into the Balasore river?

A.—There are very few such small steamers here; the inland steamers at that season could not have gone, and most of the tugs draw between 12 and 13 feet.

23. Q.—As time went on, did it seem to you that Government became convinced of the magnitude of the crisis, and did all that could have been done?

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A.—They gradually became convinced no doubt; they became fully convinced when the people had got into a state of extreme starvation.

24. Q.—Do you think that rice might have been sent to the Dhamrah by the end of May?

A.—I think it was possible with the aid of steamers, but I have not sufficient knowledge of the place to speak positively. Whether at that season the rice could have been sent to the Dhamrah, and whether, when it went there, it could have been despatched to the interior, are local questions.

25. Q.—When did it first seem to you that the balance of the old Famine Fund was insufficient to meet the whole crisis?

A.—We felt it when we wrote to the Government in the end of May. We first applied for the balance, and then wrote a letter that a Committee should be appointed, and said that the six lakhs would not be sufficient: it would be a drop in the ocean.

26. Q.—To what do you attribute the unwillingness of the Government to accept the aid of the public?

A.—I can only believe that the Government must have been misled by information given to them by those who were in charge of particular districts, and must, therefore, either have been entirely ignorant of the magnitude of the impending distress, or unwilling to accept the aid of the public from fear of acknowledging their inability to grapple with the difficulty.

27. Q.—In July and August did it seem to you that rice was being poured down to Orissa as fast as could reasonably have been expected?

A.—I was not here all the time and cannot tell you what occurred then. I went in the end of July to Simla. I can only say that what struck me was that the Government commenced on too small a scale, and only gradually increased their operations when it was too late.

28. Q.—Are you aware that Government might have obtained larger quantities of rice in Calcutta and Chittagong than they actually did?

A.—Undoubtedly; we purchased rice in Chittagong at a price that laid the cargoes down in the Mauritius at a cheaper rate than they could have been procured in Calcutta; and we were prepared to ship rice at that time from Chittagong to the coast ports, and I have no doubt that we could have obtained easily something like 60,000 or 70,000 bags. In Calcutta also large quantities could have been procured. In June I asked Mr. Moncrieff whether the Government would like to take one lakh of maunds of rice which was offered to me on the Berhampooter river, but I got no definite order, and the result was that within a week the same rice had been sold at an advance of 12 annas a maund. Mr. Moncrieff mentioned this to the Board, and I believe we were authorized verbally to purchase within certain limits, but rice could not be obtained within those limits, as the prices had rapidly risen in the districts.

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29. Q.—When you left Calcutta, did it seem to you that the public had been sufficiently informed of the state of the famine in Orissa?

A.—No, the public had no idea of what the distress really was.

30. Q.—To what do you attribute the ignorance of the public?

A.—To the difficulty of getting information from any part of India where there is no public; and I can only come to the conclusion that Government also had not sufficient information.

31. Q.—Have you considered the question what measures would be advisable to prevent the recurrence in the future of such famines as we have had in Orissa?

A.—In my opinion, the first thing to do is to make good roads; to restore those parts of Orissa that have been devastated by the floods; to improve the navigation of the rivers that intersect Orissa, such as the Mahanuddee and Brahminee; and to give encouragement to the fullest extent to the irrigation works now under construction in Orissa. I should likewise be in favor of a railway or tramway from Calcutta *via* Midnapore down to Cuttack, and *via* Sumbulpoor, Raipore, to Nagpore, which would open out in its latter course a country which, I may say, is almost unknown, which is very thinly peopled, but which has considerable natural resources.

32. Q.—Have not the Irrigation Company, working with private capital, undertaken a system of internal irrigation which will, to a great extent, supersede the use of the rivers of Orissa for purposes of navigation, and supply for heavy traffic much of the facility of roads and railways: and might not, then, the efforts of Government be more profitably bestowed in some other direction?

A.—There is no doubt that the irrigation works, if completed, as originally contemplated, and if extended as might become necessary, will provide in a great measure substitutes for roads; but the improvements that I more specially alluded to in the navigation of some of the rivers of Orissa might be carried out by a comparatively trifling expense. I allude particularly to the higher parts of the Mahanuddee and Brahminee.

33. Q.—You suggested a Railway from Calcutta to Cuttack; have you formed any sort of estimate of what such a Railway would cost, crossing, as it would, the large and numerous drainage lines?

A.—I believe there would be some considerable bridge works in the line from Midnapore to Cuttack; while the other line from Cuttack to Nagpore is in fact nothing but the old road to Bombay, and I believe there are only two large rivers to be crossed; but I have never considered the question of cost; I have merely looked at the map of the country, and to the desirability of connecting Central India by that route with the metropolis of Bengal.

34. Q.—As respects Bengal, are you prepared to suggest any measures by which the chances of famine might be averted and the country generally improved?

A.—Talking of Bengal and of the agricultural classes generally, I should suggest that they should be educated agriculturally and otherwise, that is to say, that they should be taught to be industrious, which they are not now. I would establish agricultural schools at some of the head districts, where the Natives could be taught to use all those appliances which have been introduced into the agriculture of other civilized nations.

35. Q.—Does it seem to you that people in the stage in which the Natives of this country now are, holding small tenures, are unfavorably situated as regards agricultural development?

A.—I certainly think that it is a mistake to split up properties, and to convert every peasant who has got perhaps only sufficient money to live from week to week, and in many instances is even indebted to a Native banker for his daily wants between crop and crop,—it is certainly a mistake to convert such a man into a land-owner, and to make him an independent farmer, because, in times of adversity, he has nothing to fall back upon.

36. Q.—Has not this been done in many parts of Europe, Prussia for instance?

A.—Yes; it has been done particularly in France, where property has been split up in a terrible manner; but not so much in Prussia: on the contrary, you have to deal there with estates small or large; but with a few exceptions the peasants themselves have no rights in those estates, but are merely tenants. They may not be able to turn the men out, but in most instances they have no rights in the land itself.

37. Q.—Have large farms been tried in India with any success within your knowledge?

A.—I have no personal knowledge of any example in which large farms have been successfully tried on this side of India; nor do I think that such are to be found in any part of India.

38. Q.—Is it your impression that rice could be grown successfully by a large farmer, supposing that he had the land and hired the labor?

A.—If a large farmer were to hire labor and cultivate his rice, and if he could get out of his laborers a fair day's work for a fair day's wages, I believe it would pay him; but in the present state of the country, and the present state of the law, it would be very difficult to get a fair day's wages out of a laborer.

39. Q.—Then you think that in the present state of the country and of the law, large farming will not succeed?

A.—Yes; I think so.

40. Q.—And if you must have small farmers, would the small farmers having no rights, have an advantage over small farmers having rights?

A.—I assume that small tenants without rights would be sub-tenants of a large landholder, either Government or a private individual, and it is clear that a large landholder, particularly an enlight-

ened Native or European, would have greater means of helping his tenants over their difficulties than if the tenant was left to himself.

41. Q.—Is it your experience that the majority of the Native landholders of Bengal are of that provident and enterprising class who develop the resources of their estates and support their tenants?

A.—On the contrary I think the zemindars of Bengal are not quite that enlightened class of men that we would like to see. There are a few laudable exceptions, but most of them do not belong to that class, and I would certainly endeavor to plant in the country as many European zemindars as possible.

42. Q.—Do you think that there is reasonable hope that Europeans will be induced to settle in this country in so permanent a manner as to give the country the full benefit of a fixed and settled landholding class?

A.—There are many natural difficulties against such settlement, and there is no doubt that Europeans come here for the purpose of making money and then retire. But that does not prevent them in many instances from remaining the best part of their lives, and sometimes during their whole lives, in the country; and during the time that a European is in the country he generally exercises a beneficial influence on those who immediately surround him, and in any case we should assume that when he does retire, he would have successors or heirs, and that his estate would then go to his children or be sold to some one else. If it were once satisfactorily proved that the holding of landed property, such as described by me, offered a fair field of profit to the European, there are millions of acres of land which would be taken up for the purpose. As a rule, I believe, from what has occurred and is daily occurring in India, that we may come to this conclusion, even the Natives themselves rather prefer to be under an European settler; and I would mention in proof of this that latterly some of the great rajahs and landowners have been employing European managers.

43. Q.—Do you think that an extensive change in the law or system of administration is necessary in order to give a fair chance to enterprising people?

A.—I have not looked into all the Acts; but I think that a good deal has to be done in the way of amending Act X of 1859. With reference to the actual judicial proceedings, what we much want is a short process by which a man can be compelled to perform what he has promised without having the opportunity of appealing through two or three successive Courts.

44. Q.—Do you think that in respect of the performance of contracts, the Natives of this country are worse than the people of other countries?

A.—I think there is a good deal of disposition in the Bengallee character not to fulfil their engagements whenever inconvenient to themselves.

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45. Q.—In ordinary commercial transactions, and in trades which are regulated by commercial principles solely, for instance the purchase of silk, do you think that there is a large amount of bad faith amongst the Natives?

A.—I should certainly say that they are more apt to deceive than Natives of other countries.

46.—Have you had any experience of any other people in India other than the Bengalees?

A.—No; I have only had experience of the Bengalees.

47. Q.—Is there any other class of remedial measures which it strikes you to suggest with the view of improving the agriculture of the country and of diminishing the chances of famine?

A.—I should certainly continue the system of holding agricultural shows, and I should even give greater encouragement by premiums on the production of certain articles than what has been done hitherto, for instance, with the view of introducing the cultivation of the finest description of cotton into Lower Bengal, with profit to India, (I believe that Bengal is quite capable of growing cotton as fine as Sea Island and Egyptian,) I should give a certain premium per bale on the first 5,000 bales that are raised equal in quality to fair Egyptian, with the view of tempting agriculturists to enter on the cultivation.

48. Q.—Have you thought of any system of irrigation for Bengal?

A.—The only scheme of irrigation that I can recommend is the great canal proposed by Sir Arthur Cotton some years ago, which would bring down the water of the Ganges from Rajmehal. I had a proposal myself before Government for a canal from the coal districts to the River Hooghly, which, though meant in the first instance for navigation only, I have no doubt, could be applied to purposes of irrigation also.

49. Q.—Have you informed yourself about the materials and cost of the canal from the coal districts which you have mentioned?

A.—The approximate cost is a million sterling. I can only add that if I were the Governor General, I would try to do every thing to encourage private enterprise, and get as many millions of money into the country as I could, and I think that the present time is a particularly opportune one, inasmuch as money is fast accumulating in Europe, joint stock undertaking of all descriptions are entirely at a discount in public opinion, and investors would gladly avail themselves of any scheme which has either directly or indirectly a Government guarantee, or something equivalent thereto.

50. Q.—Is it not rather the function of Government to give good laws and good administration, and trust to private enterprise for the rest.

A.—No doubt; but in a country like India, where the Government is every thing, and where there is no public, it is necessary that the Government should inaugurate all those measures which would be inaugurated by private enterprise in other countries.

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51. Q.—Does not a Government guarantee emasculate private enterprise?

A.—Government guarantees no doubt interfere with private enterprise, and while I certainly would not encourage Government guarantees in all descriptions of industrial undertakings, I do think that all those works which come under the class of public works of a reproductive character, such as canals for navigation and irrigation, railways, &c., should be constructed with the help of Government, and the Government having once inaugurated this system of guarantees, will find it extremely difficult to get rid of it.

52. Q.—You decidedly think then that the guarantee system must be further extended?

A.—The Government must either give guarantee or some thing equivalent to them. For instance, if I were to go into the London market, I must go with a distinct concession which I must show to the public, and be able to assure them that if they give their money, they will get certain things in return. If the concession is not obtained, but has to be applied for afterwards, people will not give their money; I may get a certain concession from the local Government, which is disapproved and modified by the Governor General, and finally it may come before the Secretary of State, who may say that he will have nothing to do with it. At least it is so at present.

53. Q.—Have there not been found to be in England inconveniences about the system of granting concessions before the money is found, and have not those inconveniences been felt in this country?

A.—There is no doubt that if concessions are given injudiciously for objects that are not wanted and to people who are unscrupulous, certain mischief may arise out of the system; but it is the duty of the Government in all such cases to discriminate whether a scheme is wanted, and whether the person proposing it means honestly. It must not be forgotten that in all instances parties making such proposals expect to receive some profits in return for what they consider their property, namely, their brains.

54. Q.—Is it not very difficult for Government to hold the balance evenly between different projectors, and to judge what projects ought to be accepted and what rejected before the projects are tested in the money market? Is there not great temptation to speculative projectors who feel that they cannot lose and may gain by obtaining concessions which bind the Government, but do not trust them in any way?

A.—If the Government have well considered the scheme in virtue of which they have granted certain concessions, and if they have no doubt as to the desirability of carrying out that scheme, they need not ask any questions as to whether the men who have proposed it are going to make any money or not; the country cannot be a loser, and the public are not likely to be duped quite so easily as is generally supposed.

No. 123.—THE HON'BLE SIR C. BEADON, K. C.
S. I., LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR OF BENGAL.

[Examined in Calcutta, 5th March 1867.]

1. Q.—Can your Honor be good enough to explain to us what is the line between the duties of the Government and of the Board, in such matters as collecting information with regard to a great impending crisis, such as extreme scarcity and famine?

A.—No definite line has ever been laid down; the course of the correspondence shows, I think, the view which I took.

2. Q.—Does your Honor consider that in the course of the scarcity, which eventuated in the famine of 1866, the duty of watching the country and ascertaining the state of the people was delegated to the Board?

A.—I think that in that point, the best thing I can do is to refer the Commission to the orders I issued to the Board when a scarcity was first known to have occurred in 1865. See my letter of the 31st October 1865.

3. Q.—As respects the actual results of the autumn crop of 1865, and the state of the country at that time, did your Honor consider that the report of the Board of the 25th November was a final one, or that the duty committed to the Board was of a continuing character, making it the duty of the Board to enquire and report further?

A.—I think my view of the continuing nature of the duty is sufficiently evident from the letter, which I addressed to them, dated the 11th December, in which I approved of what the Board had done and concurred in the opinions expressed by them. The view I then took of the duties of the Board was that they should keep themselves informed of the general state of the country, taking action so far as was within their power, and reporting to Government on all matters beyond their own competence. I thought that the attention of the Board would continue to be given to the state of things, as mine was given, as long as the scarcity lasted.

4. Q.—We find that with the exception of certain price currents, the Board did not call for any report of the out-turn of crops subsequent to their report of the 25th November. Does your Honor consider that it was the duty of the Board to have called for any such detailed reports?

A.—My impression is that they did call for certain reports on receipt of that Government order.

5. Q.—We believe your Honor is aware that towards the end of November Mr. Ravenshaw started on a tour to the Tributary Mehals. Does your Honor consider that, in the face of the warning conveyed in your Secretary's letter No. 6908 dated the 1st December 1865, Mr. Ravenshaw was warranted in leaving the Regulation Districts and going into a remote part of the country, where his presence did not seem to be so urgently required?

A.—The inspection of the Hill tracts has always been considered a very important part of the Commissioner's duties in his capacity of Superintendent of Tributary Estates. In his letter dated the 14th December the Commissioner wrote that he anticipated no necessity for special measures in connection with the scarcity, and on this assurance from him, I approved of his proceedings then and must approve of them now. Assuming that the circumstances in the Regulation Districts were as he then represented them, I think he was quite justified in going into the Tributary Estates.

6. Q.—Putting apart Mohurbhunj, which Mr. Ravenshaw did not then visit, does your Honor remember any political questions of an unusual and urgent nature which necessitated the Commissioner's visiting the Hill country?

A.—No, I do not.

7. Q.—We presume your Honor is aware that it has become the practice to grant remissions of revenue in Orissa in consequence of great calamities. The Board of Revenue had recognised that practice; but had directed that no enquiry with a view to such remissions should be entered upon without the special sanction of the Board. We find that all three Collectors of the districts in Orissa did apply for sanction to make such an enquiry, and that in the case of Pooree, the Commissioner gave a conditional assent to the institution of such an enquiry. Is your Honor aware that the Board had summarily prevented such an enquiry?

A.—I have no personal remembrance of the subject having been brought to my notice, nor was I aware that applications to make such enquiries had been made.

8. Q.—We find that in the months of January and February a very considerable correspondence was carried on regarding the difficulty of obtaining grain in Pooree, and more especially with reference to the public works which were then ordered by Government with a view to relieve the existing distress. We find that both the Collector of Pooree and the Officers of the Public Works Department represented in very strong terms that rice was not to be obtained in the market; that although there was a nominal price, rice was in fact not to be got in any quantities, and that to render the works practically operative, it was absolutely necessary that grain should be imported and stored in some shape. The Commissioner seems also, on two previous occasions, in a somewhat undefined manner, to have proposed the importation and storing of grain, and, on his return from his tour, the information which reached him was such as to induce him to send to the Board of Revenue a very emergent telegram in these words—"Famine relief is at a stand-still. Public Works Department refuses to advance money to Collector to purchase rice. Pooree must get rice from elsewhere." To that telegram the Board, on the 1st February, returned a very decided answer in the words—"The Government declines to import rice into Pooree." The consequence of which

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was that the Commissioner, considering that the Board of Revenue and the Government had finally and conclusively decided against the importation of rice and payment of labor in grain, issued a series of orders to the Collectors in that sense. The Secretary and senior Member of the Board of Revenue have informed us that the words "the Government decline to import rice into Pooree" were used on a general knowledge that it was the established policy of Government not to import rice, and in fact the senior Member said the matter had already been reported to Government, which declined to import rice. It has also been stated that the personal communication between the Board of Revenue and your Honor was at that time intimate, the senior Member especially being in frequent communication with the Government. Does your Honor remember that the general subject of the difficulty of procuring rice in Pooree and the consequent stoppage of relief works and the question of importation was at that time brought to your Honor's attention?

A.—The only ground that the Board could have for saying that the Government declined to import rice into Pooree was the answer given to those letters which Messrs. Gisborne and Co. wrote in the month of November. Certainly, I had several interviews with Mr. Grote at that time, and I have no doubt that I must have repeated, in my interviews with him, that the Government had determined not to import rice by sea into Pooree. When it was reported by the Officers of the Public Works Department that they had a difficulty in getting laborers because they could not obtain food with the money themselves, and when they proposed to purchase rice and pay the laborers in grain, the answer I authorized was that the Public Works Department had nothing to do with the procuring of rice, but that the supply of rice to the laborers must be managed through the Civil Officers, and the instruction I desired Colonel Nicolls to give to the Superintending Engineer was that he should arrange for the feeding of the laborers in communication with the Commissioner of the division. The system I supposed to prevail was that wherever public works were going on the Public Works Department were paying the laborers in money, and the laborers would be able to supply themselves from the shops established by the Civil Officers. The order that was actually issued by the Board, directing that labor employed by the Local Civil Officers should be paid in money and not in grain, so far from being in accordance with my wishes, was opposed to them; my wish was that the laborers should get their grain from the Civil Officers. The Board's orders were founded on an entire misapprehension of the orders I issued in the Public Works Department. I don't remember to have seen the letter which was issued; but if I did, the point must have escaped my attention; if I had observed it, I should have undoubtedly set the Board right.

9. Q.—Is it your Honor's impression that at that time the fact that the Civil Officers were unable to make arrangements for the supply of

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grain for the laborers employed in public works was not brought to your attention?

A.—I was under the full impression that such arrangements had been made.

10. Q.—We find that on the receipt of the telegram of the 1st February, the Commissioner not only issued orders to the Collectors of a very stringent and final character regarding the payment of cash wages on Government works of all descriptions, but also, conceiving it to be a matter of principle, ordered that relief works carried on from private funds under the superintendence and with the aid of the Collector, should not be remunerated with food, as the persons who had subscribed the money wished to do. Does your Honor consider that that was also an entire misapprehension?

A.—I think it was an unfortunate mistake, and so far as it was supposed to be founded on any order or opinion of mine, it was an entire misapprehension.

11. Q.—We believe that Mr. Cockburn, then a Member of the Board of Revenue, accompanied your Honor to Orissa, and it has been shown to us that to that order which finally decided the question regarding importation and payment of grain, Mr. Cockburn's signature was attached; did he not bring those circumstances generally to your Honor's knowledge?

A.—Not that I remember. At that time I had scarcely any conversation with Mr. Cockburn on the subject of the famine, and I never heard of the order.

12. Q.—Mr. Cockburn was in tolerable health up to the time that he left Pooree; was he not?

A.—Yes, and was quite capable of attending to business.

13. Q.—Did your Honor arrive at Pooree on one day, and leave the next?

A.—Yes, we arrived in the morning of one day, and left in the evening of the next.

14. Q.—Did Mr. Barlow, the Collector of Pooree, have full opportunity of reporting all that he knew or feared?

A.—The fullest opportunity. Besides being in constant conversation with him, he had a special separate interview with me for the purpose of talking over all matters of interest in the district. I was a guest in his house.

15. Q.—Did Mr. Barlow then take a very gloomy view of the state of his district?

A.—No, certainly not.

16. Q.—Did he not report that there was considerable mortality from want?

A.—There was a report of such a state of things previous to my arrival; but in every instance in which sickness and distress and mortality were alluded to, Mr. Barlow told me that by late accounts there was a decided improvement, with the exception of one place called Gope.

17. Q.—Did he not give your Honor to understand that the extreme want was more widely spread over the district than the pergunnahs of Malood and Parriood?

A.—Mr. Barlow's report, which I had read and which contained the report of the Superintendent of Police, referred to starvation and distress in other parts; but he told me that that distress had been greatly relieved, that funds had been subscribed for relief, and that still further subscriptions were expected, and that all that was wanted was employment for the distressed. And when I left, almost the last words I used to Mr. Barlow were that he should give me a full report of the state of the district before I left Cuttack. He did not do so; but told me at Cuttack that he had been unable to do so, and when he was there I spoke to him again, and he said he had not had time to prepare the report, because it depended on further reports from the Police, and that it should follow me to Calcutta.

18. Q.—Did Mr. Barlow bring to your Honor's notice that the Superintendent of Police entertained strong opinions regarding the approach of a severe famine?

A.—I don't remember Mr. Barlow's alluding to the opinion of the Superintendent of Police further than is expressed in Mr. Barlow's report. I saw Mr. Lacey, and heard what he had to say. He certainly did not impress me with the idea that he had any such opinion, nor did he represent to me the necessity of taking other measures than had been taken.

19. Q.—Was the difficulty experienced in obtaining grain for the laborers brought to your Honor's notice by any of the officers of Pooree at that time?

A. No; not that I have the slightest recollection of.

20. Q.—We find that in fact the employment of labor on the Pooree road was, during the month of February, reduced almost to a minimum by the difficulty of getting grain, and also by perseverance in the ordinary task-work rates; was that circumstance not mentioned to your Honor?

A.—I knew that they had a difficulty in getting laborers enough for the works; but it was not represented to me that the rates being insufficient was a reason, nor that the difficulty of obtaining rice was a reason.

21. Q.—Mr. Crommelin and other officers seem to say that they do not remember any special consultation on this subject; but we find that instructions regarding relief works in great detail had been issued by Mr. Crommelin on the 3rd of February, in which the executive officers are specially directed to limit their employment of laborers as much as possible on the ground that the distress must be much greater in future, and funds should be husbanded; and allusion is also made to the necessity of arrangements for procuring food for the laborers; Colonel Nicolls tells

us that in fact that letter was not brought forward till after your Honor's return from Cuttack, and then it was noted as having been discussed in Orissa and marked "no orders"; do you remember such a discussion?

A.—I don't remember having any actual discussion on this subject with Mr. Crommelin; but he was in constant communication with Colonel Nicolls, and I also had occasional conversation with him. But I cannot remember now when it was I first saw those instructions, whether when it was there or afterwards. I am quite sure I did not see those instructions when I was in Cuttack; but I was aware that full instructions had been given to the executive engineers to carry out the orders of Government in respect to the employment of people in public works. The impression I derived from Mr. Crommelin's conversations and all I heard there was that the works were going on satisfactorily.

22. Q.—Is it then decidedly your Honor's impression that the question of the difficulty of procuring grain for the laborers, and the consequent effect of that difficulty in rendering the relief works ordered by Government to a very great degree inoperative, was not pressed on your Honor's attention at that time?

A.—Certainly, it was not formally brought forward at all.

23. Q.—Some of the witnesses examined by us have informed us that people suffering from want, who had come in from the district to Pooree at that time, produced the roots and jungle produce on which they had been living, and that Mr. Cockburn took those things and showed them to your Honor. Will your Honor tell us the circumstances?

A.—I heard that story the other day. The only thing I can recollect was this. The circumstance happened at Pooree. We were walking along the road, and there were people with roots in baskets sitting near the Cutcherry. They said something in Ooryah which I did not understand. I asked Mr. Cockburn what roots they were, and he said that those were the roots the people live on, and he brought the roots to me. But that was not mentioned as symptomatic of distress, but rather as specimens of roots which form the ordinary food of the people at that season of the year. As far as I can recollect, the roots were a species of yam called *cuchoo*. But no representation was made to me that they were food to which they had been driven to resort from want of better food, and the people who had them had them for sale.

24. Q.—Some of the Native officials have told us that they were aware that considerable mortality was going on and was likely to increase, and that they had interviews with your Honor and said so. Will your Honor tell us if such was the case?

A.—I saw several of the Natives: in fact all who wished for an interview I saw and talked to; and what they said to me about the famine was

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very much the same as what Mr. Barlow had said to me. No doubt they said there had been a failure of the crops and that people were dying; but as far as I remember, they all seemed satisfied with what was done, and all I was asked to do was to fix a *nerrick* and prevent exportation.

25. Q.—Was it brought to your Honor's notice that in the three weeks or month preceding your Honor's visit to Pooree, the price of grain had enormously increased?

A.—Certainly; the state of prices was one of the things I enquired into while I was there.

26. Q.—Was it brought to your Honor's knowledge that the cargo of the ship *Philamene* was then on the Strand in Pooree, and that the agents would not or could not sell?

A.—Yes, I heard of it.

27. Q.—What was the special object of your Honor's visit to Orissa?

A.—As far as it had any specialty in it, it was with reference to the famine. I had not had an opportunity of visiting Cuttack before, and took the opportunity of going down to see the Officers and people there, and particularly also to see the irrigation works going on there.

28. Q.—During your Honor's visit to Orissa, was there any special discussion whether the stocks of grain in the province were sufficient for the food of the people?

A.—I had a great deal of conversation with Mr. Ravenshaw and others on the subject, and when we talked of it at Pooree Mr. Barlow was also present; but there was but one opinion expressed, which was that the stocks in the country were ample. Mr. Barlow certainly expressed no opinion to the contrary then. The burden of all that the Natives said to me was—"there is plenty of rice, but the mahajuns won't sell it."

29. Q.—Was not that opinion principally expressed by the urban population?

A.—I scarcely saw any other, except the laborers on the Irrigation Company's works.

30. Q.—Did it seem to your Honor that Mr. Ravenshaw had any good and substantial grounds for the confident opinion which he at several times expressed on that point, or that he had only listened to the popular cry of the people immediately surrounding him in Cuttack?

A.—I certainly relied on Mr. Ravenshaw. He did not show me any papers or returns to justify his opinions; but spoke of having made enquiries in all parts of the district; and one particular thing that he stated was that the prices were higher in Cuttack itself, and that they were lower the further you got from the station, and he certainly spoke as if his information was based on enquiry.

31. Q.—Does your Honor remember whether any other officer of local experience and standing did express any such opinion?

A.—There was no Collector in Cuttack when I was there. The impression I derived from all

whom I saw and spoke to, including Native zemindars and officials and gentlemen connected with the Irrigation Company, was that there was grain in the country, but that owing to the short crop, the holders of rice were keeping their stocks in hand. No one gave me a hint of the slightest intimation of holding the opinion that there was not rice enough to feed the people.

32. Q.—Was it not brought to your Honor's notice that the officers of the Irrigation Company had themselves imported rice, and were paying their laborers with it?

Q.—I don't think I heard of that till afterwards; it is one thing to import rice in small quantities for a particular purpose, and another thing to import rice in large quantities for the population in general. It is a very common thing for jail officers all over Bengal to purchase quantities of grain in the beginning of the season when it is cheap, and to keep it in store for the year's consumption. It would not be at all improbable if the Magistrate should ask permission to purchase grain at Calcutta for the jail there, and keep it in store for the year. I should not argue from that that there was no rice in the district, but that he would wish the jail accounts to stand well.

33. A.—Some of the civil and public works officers had in their correspondence, shortly previous to your Honor's visit, expressed very strong opinions regarding the necessity of importing rice; does it occur to your Honor to express any suggestions why, on the occasion of your Honor's visit, they kept silence or expressed different opinions?

A.—I can give no explanation, but only state the fact that no such opinions were expressed to me while I was there.

34. Q.—Did Mr. Ravenshaw bring to your Honor's notice that some of the officers in his division held the opinion that there were no sufficient stocks of grain in their districts; but that he, for such and such reasons, did not agree with them?

A.—No; he did not. It was never brought to my notice that such an opinion was seriously entertained by any one while I was in Cuttack.

35. Q.—Up to that time, had your Honor reason to think that Mr. Ravenshaw's conduct was reliable and prudent, or that he hazarded somewhat rash opinions, he not being fully cognizant of the state of his districts, inasmuch as he had not visited them himself?

A.—Mr. Ravenshaw is an officer of activity of mind and intelligence, a man who has always had the character of being well acquainted with his work, and his statements and opinions were supported by all those with whom I had conversation in Cuttack. It never occurred to me to question his opinions, because I had no ground to raise any objection to them.

36. Q.—Did Mr. Ravenshaw seem to be in some considerable degree credulous as regards the people amongst whom he was more immediately thrown?

A.—Not in the least.

37. Q.—About the latter part of February and early part of March, we find that the Deputy Inspector General of Police had brought to the notice of the Inspector General, from information derived from the Superintendent of Police at Pooree, that a famine was imminent then, and also, a little later when he visited Balasore, that a very great degree of distress amounting to starvation was visible in the Balasore district; was that circumstance brought to your Honor's notice?

A.—The Inspector General never brought to my notice anything connected with the famine, except what we find in his official letters.

38. Q.—We believe that it was generally brought to your Honor's notice, that the disorganization in the shape of plunder in the early part of the year was attributed to want?

A.—Yes.

39. Q.—The Inspector General has told us that such being the state of things, he did not consider it necessary that he should visit the disorganized districts; that in fact he had never visited Orissa or even the district of Midnapore; that the superintendence of the Police was entrusted to the Commissioners of divisions; that he considered that his own duty was confined to arranging the pay and distribution and such like particulars regarding the Police Force, and advising the Government. That seems a view of his duties entirely different from that which is taken in other provinces. Is it your Honor's opinion that the Inspector General is justified in taking that view of his functions and duties in Bengal?

A.—I think that his primary duty is to administer the Force from head quarters. It is equally his duty, either himself or through the Deputy Inspectors General, to visit such districts. I have no knowledge of what the rule is in other provinces; but I think the Inspector General is right in saying that his primary duty is "to arrange for the disposition, the strength and cost of the Police Force, and generally to advise Government on the subject of the frequent applications that are made on Police matters." I think that for the suppression of crime the Magistrate is primarily responsible, and over him the Commissioner. The Inspector General is, of course, responsible for the efficiency of the Force placed at the disposal of the Magistrate, and if any particular crime in any district is owing to the conduct of the Police, it would be equally his duty to go or send a Deputy to see that the Police were put on a proper footing. If there was no question of the Police, but simply an abnormal state of things altogether distinct from the organization of the Police, I don't think it would be the Inspector General's duty to go down to ascertain the state of things.

40. Q.—Does your Honor consider that the criminal disorganisation caused by want, and the degree of want which caused it in Western Bengal, was sufficiently brought to your Honor's notice by the superior officers of Police in the spring of 1866?

A.—The first intimation that I received was from the Inspector General, asking for additional Police, and it was on that that the Commissioner of Burdwan was directed to report. I forget when we first heard from the Commissioner of the state of crime in the Burdwan division. I cannot say at this time when the increase of crime began to show itself and when it was reported. I think that the state of the districts of the Burdwan division ought certainly to have been reported at an earlier period with reference to the famine.

41. Q.—Mr. Ravenshaw tells us that no special instructions were left with him regarding the conduct he was to adopt in the event of scarcity merging into severe famine, and that in fact neither he nor the Collectors were aware that Government would have incurred so large an expenditure. Will your Honor tell us whether that is a correct representation?

A.—The question did not arise as to any further expenditure. It was considered, when I was there, that the expenditure on public works was sufficient.

42. Q.—We find that on the 25th of February Mr. Barlow, on the part of the Pooree Relief Committee, drafted a resolution, in which he records that a system of general gratuitous relief was impracticable both in view of the magnitude of the distress and the smallness of the funds; and we are told that with his concurrence Baboo Ramakhoy, Deputy Magistrate, addressed an appeal to the *Hindoo Patriot*, in which he represented the state of the distress in very strong terms. We find that Mr. Barlow approved of that appeal, but almost at the same time, on the 5th of March, he reported that further measures were unnecessary on the part of Government. Does your Honor think that those proceedings on the part of Mr. Barlow are capable of being reconciled, and if so, how? Had Mr. Barlow reason to suppose that Government would not give direct aid?

A.—I cannot understand what reasons Mr. Barlow had for supposing so, because I repeatedly told him that he was to represent the state of things as occasion required.

43. Q.—The Board seem to have circulated their report of the 25th of November as a guide to officers regarding the principles on which Government considered itself at liberty to afford assistance in times of scarcity. Does your Honor think that the principles laid down by the Board were considered in any degree by the local officers to preclude them from expecting or asking direct assistance from Government?

A.—I was not aware that the Board had circulated that report. It was a very natural thing for them to do, and I suppose they circulated the orders of Government with it.

44. Q.—It appears that in pursuance of a determination of the Pooree Relief Committee, Mr. Barlow also addressed Mr. Schalch, then Chairman of the Calcutta Municipality, regarding the distress in his district with the view of obtaining assistance. Was that circumstance brought to your Honor's notice?

A.—I never heard of it.

45. Q.—Mr. Barlow's reports during March and April were much less frequent and much less urgent than those he had previously sent. Does it appear to your Honor now that he was laboring under a misapprehension as to what aid he might expect from Government?

A.—I have looked through his letters for the purpose of satisfying myself on that point, and I cannot find anywhere a trace of any feeling on his part that he was precluded from making any request, or that the Government would not accede to any request. He was repeatedly asked what more Government could do, and he replied that Government could do nothing more.

46. Q.—Was the crime and want in Balasore brought to your Honor's notice at an early date? There is an allusion in the letter of the 7th April that the Government had demi-official information?

A.—The first I heard of it was on the 2nd of March in Calcutta; but I do not remember the demi-official correspondence referred to.

47. Q.—Before your Honor left Calcutta for Darjeeling, was it by any one, as far as your Honor remembers, brought to your Honor's notice that there was a famine of a very severe character in Balasore?

A.—I had not any information on the subject before I left Calcutta beyond what is contained in the papers before the Commission.

48. Q.—Was the Commissioner's absence from Mohurbhunj from the 20th April to the 21st or 22nd May absolutely necessary?

A.—I think that the maintenance of the peace in Mohurbhunj and in the surrounding districts made it absolutely necessary for him to go there.

49. Q.—We find at the most critical period, when the famine was rapidly increasing, the reports, both from Pooree and Balasore, were forwarded to Government by an extremely round-about channel in a very dilatory manner. Does your Honor consider that the local officers were in fault for not addressing Government in a more emergent and direct manner. For instance, the Superintendent of Police at Balasore having reported in extremely gloomy terms regarding the prospects of the districts on the 27th March, it does not appear that the report reached Government till the 11th May, and the Collector of Pooree having made a report, in which he depicted things in a very gloomy view on the 10th May, that report did not reach Government till the end of May?

A.—No doubt the letters ought to have been forwarded at once to Government, but the reason why they were not was because the Commissioner was absent at Mohurbhunj, and his attention was entirely taken up with the state of affairs there.

50. Q.—Does your Honor think that the Commissioner seems to have made such arrangements as were necessary for putting the local officers into intimate communication with the Board and Government regarding the serious state of things which he admits that he realized before he went to Mohurbhunj?

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A.—It would depend on what his impressions were. He does not seem to have had an impression that there was such a serious state of things, or he would not have gone to Mohurbhunj.

51. Q.—When the local officers became thoroughly aware of the state of things, does your Honor think that they acted with sufficient promptitude?

A.—No, I don't think they did. I think they were bound to lay the whole facts of the case prominently before Government. At the same time, I think great allowances should be made for them. I don't think any of them realized the serious position of affairs till towards the end of May.

52. Q.—In the end of May and first days of June, does your Honor think things were sufficiently reported?

A.—I think after the 28th May there was no want of reports and information.

53. Q.—When your Honor returned from Calcutta, did your Honor think that all was done that it was possible to have done?

A.—All that I thought was that the importation should have begun somewhat earlier. I think the Board of Revenue carried on the importations as well and as expeditiously as it was possible to do after they received the orders.

54. Q.—Your Honor does not think that the local officers were at any time in any degree deterred from stating fully all the information that they might have afforded, by the feeling that they had not the machinery for substantiating all that they might hazard?

A.—I have no ground for supposing that they were deterred from representing what they knew by any circumstance whatever. I think that every encouragement was given to them to communicate their views both officially and unofficially.

55. Q.—Is it at all to be inferred from your Honor's letter to Mr. Chapman of the 11th June, that your Honor thought that some of the officers were inclined to make random statements of a too alarming character which were not supported by ascertained facts?

A.—No, what I think I alluded to in that letter was long unnecessary disquisitions. My impression now is that I objected to the publication of long disquisitions. I do not think I at all meant that they should suppose that I found fault with them for reporting. On the contrary, I had always encouraged them to report as fully as possible. What I objected to was the publication of irrelevant disquisitions. I said that what the public wanted were facts.

56. Q.—In the course of the relief operations ordered by Government, was your Honor satisfied with the conduct of them, that they were conducted as efficiently as they could have been under the circumstances?

A.—I think that, considering the difficulties under which the Board of Revenue had to act, the arrangements were as efficient as possible.

57. Q.—Was it brought to your Honor's notice that there was in October a considerable shortness of importations, which led to a curtailment of the supply of grain at that time, and did your Honor think it sufficiently accounted for?

A.—Yes; I had some conversation with Mr. Schalch about it, and he explained that it was owing to an unfortunate mistake, in which I think the contractors or shippers were concerned.

58. Q.—Was it with your Honor's express knowledge and consent that Mr. Schalch and Colonel Pugh left Calcutta in the latter part of May?

A.—Yes; it seems that previously to that time I had told Mr. Schalch that I wished him to come up to Darjeeling, as there were several matters that I wanted to discuss with him.

59. Q.—And again, in September, was it with your Honor's direction or consent that Mr. Schalch returned to Darjeeling?

A.—Yes.

60. Q.—Was it at any time brought to your Honor's notice by the Officers of the Public Works Department and by the Chief Engineer and Secretary, that as a matter of fact the public works started for the relief of the starving were carried on on an extremely small scale during all the early months of the year, and that the money granted was never expended?

A.—Certainly not. It was not till after we returned to Calcutta from Darjeeling that it was brought to my notice that the work done was so little, and then it was that fresh orders were issued. Nothing was reported at the time. There were general reports of Mr. Crommelin about the difficulty of getting laborers, which resulted in the order, that he was to pay in grain, on the 2nd June.

61. Q.—Does your Honor not think that throughout those operations the efficiency of the action of Government has been a good deal cramped by the fact that so many of the officers were new to the district and division in which they were acting; and do you not think that generally the efficiency of the administration would be improved, especially under extraordinary circumstances, if any scheme could be devised by which the experience of officers in their respective parts of Bengal might be increased?

A.—I have not the slightest hesitation in giving assent to that general proposition, and it has always been my view to keep officers in one district. If officers of local experience and knowledge had been in Cuttack, the result might have been different; but in the case of Orissa it was absolutely unavoidable. Mr. Shore, the Commissioner, had just retired from the service; Mr. Money had gone on furlough before the famine had at all developed itself, and Mr. Barlow also went home on furlough after suffering very severely in health; he did not go till October, and only stayed because he was anxious to do what he could. Mr. Fisher sent up a medical certificate, and we were obliged

to allow him to go. I am of opinion that it is impossible to make arrangements to keep officers in their districts on account of the frequency of changes from ill-health, retirement, and the like.

No. 124.—LORD H. ULICK BROWNE, *Magistrate and Collector of NUDDEA.*

[Examined in Calcutta, 18th February 1867.]

1. Q.—Please tell us what parts of your district were especially affected by the failure of the rains in the autumn of 1865?

A.—Of the six sub-divisions of the district the crops failed pretty generally in Kishnagur, Chooadangah, Ranaghat, and Meherpore, but not so much in Kooshtea and Bongong; the worst places were parts of Chooadangah and Kishnagur.

2. Q.—In what proportion of your whole district was the failure so complete as might cause a famine?

A.—The actual result in famine depends on several circumstances, beyond the mere failure of the autumn crop. I think that in two-thirds of the district the crop was a decided failure.

3. Q.—In those two-thirds of the district have you formed any estimate as to what proportion of the crop actually failed in the autumn of 1865 in comparison with an average crop?

A.—I have not formed any reliable estimate, as I think it impossible to do so; but I should say as a rough estimate that about ten-sixteenths of the crop failed.

4. Q.—And in the parts of Chooadangah and Kishnagur, which you describe as the worst parts, do you think that the failure was greater?

A.—In one or two other localities it may have been as bad as in the actually starving districts; other circumstances caused the parts to which I have referred to suffer more.

5. Q.—What are the other circumstances to which you allude?

A.—The people generally are not so well off in those parts; they do not raise such good cold weather crops. They had suffered more from the effects of the cyclone, and also in part from the litigation in connection with indigo and rent disputes. In Chooadangah certainly their resources were considerably diminished. But as regards the north-west of the Kishnagur sub-division, there was a special cause; in 1866 a great inundation caused great destruction to the early rice crop.

6. Q.—Have you been able to form an opinion whether, in the country immediately surrounding your own district, the failure was not as great as in your own?

A.—Certainly in Jessore there was no distress to speak of; I understand they have more extensive cold weather crops, and also date cultivation and other resources.

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7. Q.—Do you think that the failure of the crop in a great part of your own district was due to a smaller rain-fall than in the neighbouring districts, or that it was a higher and drier country?

A.—Nuddea is not higher than the western part of Jessore; but in the latter district, the people are much richer, and I attribute the difference in the two districts a great deal more to the wealth and resources of the people than to any difference in the rain-fall.

8. Q.—To what do you attribute the greater wealth and resources of the people in Jessore in comparison with Nuddea?

A.—Principally to the date cultivation. I do not know why the date cultivation has been introduced to a much larger extent in Jessore than in Nuddea: in those parts of Nuddea where there is a date crop, the people are certainly better off.

9. Q.—Have you any machinery in your district by which you can obtain information regarding the out-turn of crops and such matters?

A.—None whatever.

10. Q.—The system of sub-divisions has been introduced into your district more than in others; are the sub-divisional officers usually Native officers of experience, and in some sense at the top of their own profession, or are they more frequently European officers at the bottom of the tree as it were?

A.—They are generally European officers of from two to four years' standing.

11. Q.—Have you sufficient acquaintance with other parts of India to judge whether the Bengal sub-divisional officer in any degree supplies the place of the tehsildar in other parts of India?

A.—I have no sufficient knowledge of the duties of the tehsildar in other parts of India to enable me to answer.

12. Q.—How many sub-divisions are there in Nuddea?

A.—Five sub-divisions and a sudder sub-division in an area of 3,500 square miles, and a land revenue of 11 lakhs: the population is about one million.

13. Q.—When was your attention first drawn to the failure of the crops, and when did you first form the opinion that it would lead to famine?

A.—My attention was drawn to the failure of the crops long before I thought it would lead to famine. I had at first no reason to suppose that it would lead to famine. About February 1866 one or two incidents came to my notice which led me to think that there would be something approaching to a famine before the second rice crop of 1866 could be reaped.

14. Q.—What were the incidents which first led you to apprehend famine?

A.—For instance, about February it came to my notice incidentally that a woman had picked berries off a tree for food, in consequence of her neighbours saying that they were unable to give her

charity any longer. I also obtained a good deal of information of a general character.

15. Q.—When did you first take any measures with the view of obtaining the means of alleviating the distress?

A.—As soon as I thought there was any necessity for it. Mr. Schurr, a Missionary in the district, was the first to make a complaint in the matter. Either he or the Secretary to the Church Missionary Society wrote to Government in March, and complained of the great distress in Mr. Schurr's neighbourhood, and asked for some relief for the people. On this an enquiry was ordered and was instituted by me all over the district. The result was that I was of opinion that the time had come for relief works to be undertaken in some parts of the district.

16. Q.—In January 1866 five lakhs of rupees were granted by the Government of India to the Government of Bengal as a grant-in-aid to local funds for famine works, and this sum seems to have been principally appropriated to railway feeders. Were not many of those in your district, and were they effectual for the relief of the distressed poor?

A.—From the replies received from the Executive Engineers of Nuddea and Berhampore, I gather that no money was expended for special works on feeder roads, with a view to provide employment for the distressed, in addition to the ordinary grants for the year.

17. Q.—But in the early months of 1866, were feeder roads being actively carried on in your district, and were the arrangements such as to give employment to the poor?

A.—To the best of my knowledge, work was progressing on most of the feeders, and of course assisted materially in giving employment to the distressed.

18. Q.—Do you know whether the work just alluded to was carried on under the ordinary system of petty contracts, or whether any special arrangements were made to enable distressed people to obtain work with facility?

A.—I have no knowledge of the matter.

19. Q.—Will you state the result of your application for the special works for the relief of the distressed, and what works were undertaken for the purpose?

A.—On the 30th of April, in reporting the result of my enquiries as to the state of the distress, I roughly estimated that in one shape or another a lakh of rupees would probably be required before the crisis terminated, and asked for money at once for relief works. On the 3rd of May, the Commissioner of the division authorized the expenditure of Rs. 20,000 from the Annual Road Fund Allotment of the year 1866-67, and directed the formation of Relief Committees. With this sum surface repairs of roads were commenced all over the district where there was any distress. A Central Relief Committee at Kishnagur and several Sub-Committees in different

parts of the district were formed; subscriptions were collected on account of charitable relief to be given to those unable to work at hard out-of-door labor, and the Commissioner was asked to obtain assistance to this charitable fund from Government. On the 30th of May the Commissioner intimated that Government had sanctioned Rs. 5,000 for that Government had sanctioned Rs. 5,000 for the Board of Revenue, asking what the Relief Committee intended to do with the money if placed at their disposal; also intimating that no large sums could be allotted to any particular district. On the 1st of June I replied stating that the money would be spent in purchasing food, that the distress was getting worse and worse, and that the sooner money was sent, the better. I further stated that I had no doubt whatever that Government would have to give a great deal more money before the crisis passed over. On the 15th of that month a further application was made by the Secretary of the Relief Committee for Rs. 5,000. On the 16th I reported in continuation that things were getting worse, and that there was every probability of their becoming still worse later in the season; that the Rs. 20,000 granted for relief works was being expended fast, and that more would be wanted very shortly. I pressed the immediate commencement of all public works that would, in the ordinary course of things, not be commenced till the cold weather. I expressed a hope that there would be no more delay in sending the Rs. 5,000 for the charitable relief fund, as the local subscriptions were nearly exhausted. I repeated my recommendation that a lakh of rupees should be set aside for relief works, to be granted by degrees as the Commissioner might become satisfied that it was required, lest the delay between making an application and its being granted might be attended with serious consequences to the poor. On the 20th of June I received a cheque for Rs. 5,000 for charitable relief. On the 28th of June I recommended special expenditure on the imperial road to Moorshedabad. On the 9th of July the Commissioner intimated that the Board of Revenue had asked Government to give employment in public works. On the 12th the Commissioner sent me a copy of a letter from Government in reply to a letter from him asking for a further grant of Rs. 30,000 for relief works. Both Government and the Commissioner wished to know what works it was proposed to undertake with the Rs. 30,000. On the 17th I replied, stating generally what works were required, and explained that it was impossible to give any detailed estimates; that in order to give relief to starving and weak people, we must be prepared to make a sacrifice as to the value of the work done, in order to give relief to the people who needed it within a reasonable distance from their own homes. On the 4th of August the Rs. 30,000 were granted, on the Commissioner supporting my application, and further requisition for estimates was received. I did not expend the whole of the last grant, but the greater part of it; at a subsequent date part of it was transferred to other districts. Be-

sides the first grant of Rs. 5,000, further sums were subsequently received for charitable relief from the Board of Revenue. As respects the imperial road to Moorshedabad, the sum of nearly Rs. 23,000 was expended between August and November.

20. Q.—Are we to understand that up to August no special works were undertaken for the relief of the distress by the Public Works Department as distinguished from the local funds, and that from August and onward the work on the Moorshedabad road that you have mentioned was the only work undertaken for the purpose?

A.—I do not know what sum was sanctioned as the ordinary annual allotment for feeder roads during the years 1865-66 and 1866-67, nor what was expended, and I am consequently unable to say whether any additional grant was or was not expended during the season; but as I said before, I gather from the reply of the Executive Engineer that there was no such additional expenditure. Correct information on this point can be obtained from the Nuddea Executive Engineer.

21. Q.—Are you yourself aware of any works of an altogether distinctive character undertaken for relief by the Public Works Department other than the Moorshedabad road?

A.—I am not aware of any.

22. Q.—On the Moorshedabad road, were the arrangements specially adopted for the relief of the poor, and what was the nature of the arrangement?

A.—The Executive Engineer of Berhampore came to Kishnagur to consult with me on the way in which the repairs of the road should be carried out, and it was arranged so as to exclude contractors altogether, the work being paid for by contract with the actual laborers themselves.

23. Q.—Do you think that the work was in practice effectual to give relief to the starving?

A.—Yes, it was so to a very great extent. The works extended over about 18 miles through districts which had suffered severely from the floods of 1866, and gave efficient relief.

24. Q.—Will you explain the nature and amount of the local funds of your district applicable to road-making and such works?

A.—The funds are derived from collections from ferries, tolls, and cattle pounds, and also from the receipts of the Nuddea rivers and Calcutta Canal tolls. No portion of these funds is devoted exclusively to the district when they are raised, except in the case of the funds of municipalities. All the other funds from tolls, ferries, and pounds are united in a common fund for the whole of the Lower Provinces, and the money is allotted by the Government in two branches. One is the general branch for feeder roads and such works conducted by the Public Works Department, the other is the local branch for repairs and construction of roads and bridges by the district Magistrate.

25. Q.—About what amount is usually received by your district?

A.—I do not know what is spent in the general branch. In the local branch, last season (1866-67) the amount allotted was Rs. 45,000, and in the previous year (1865-66) Rs. 38,400.

26. Q.—Have you reason to suppose that the metropolitan districts, such as yours, obtain a much larger share of the funds than other districts, such as Orissa for instance?

A.—Yes, I understand that to be the case as a rule, subject to such exceptions as Tirhoot, which is at a considerable distance, but receives a larger amount than any other district.

27. Q.—To what do you attribute this disparity in the assignment of the funds?

A.—I consider it is all part of a system of advanced administration: that is to say, in the districts that have been fully sub-divided and fully officered, more is known of the wants of the district in the matter of communications as in other matters: there are also better means through the sub-divisional officers of seeing to the proper expenditure of money allotted for roads.

28. Q.—Do you think that districts which contain people capable of making their wants known, and urging them efficiently on the Government, get a much larger share than those whose wants are not thus made known?

A.—Yes, as a rule I believe that to be the case.

29. Q.—At the time when you first became aware of the existence of distress in your district, had you a good sum available for local works?

A.—The state of the case was this: the distress began about the end of March and beginning of April, and there was very little of the allotment of the current year in hand; but on the 1st of May the allotment of the next year became available. Under ordinary circumstances, the expenditure of that money would not have commenced till November, but the Commissioner authorized me to expend some of it at once.

30. Q.—Taking into account both your ordinary local fund income and the extraordinary grants you received, will you explain to what extent and in what manner local funds became available for the relief of the distress during the famine?

A.—The sum of Rs. 40,000 was expended under my special instructions on relief works. This sum consisted—1st, of an extraordinary grant of Rs. 20,000 given to replace a similar sum which the Commissioner had at first authorized me to expend from the annual road allotment, I believe it came from some imperial funds; 2nd, a further sum of Rs. 20,000, being a portion of the Rs. 30,000 subsequently granted for the same purpose, (the balance of Rs. 10,000 being as before stated transferred to other districts). Owing to these grants the annual road fund allotment remained available for the work for which it had been originally intended.

31. Q.—Were the ordinary works pushed on to an extraordinary extent between the months of May and November, or were they extended in the ordinary course?

A.—I began to expend the money, but being replaced, it became again available, and in November the ordinary income was nearly intact.

32. Q.—What was the system pursued by you in carrying on relief works from local funds?

A.—The money was expended under my own superintendence with the assistance of the sub-divisional officers and European and Native residents; it was expended in repairs of roads, and also in digging tanks and repairing bunds; one or two new roads were also commenced.

33. Q.—What was the system of paying labor adopted by you?

A.—I adopted the system of daily wages to each person either in money or food. Payment was chiefly in money, as it was found that we had enough to do in distributing charitable relief in food.

34. Q.—Did you find that the people worked willingly, and that the system was successful for their relief?

A.—Yes, certainly.

35. Q.—Did you find that under that system you got a large proportion of the value of your money?

A.—The value obtained varied considerably according to the means and superintendence available. In some works I got a much better return than I had thought possible considering how many weak people and women and children were employed; in other places, where close supervision was impossible, and above all in cases where the people had suffered from several months of privation, the return of work was small in proportion to the amount expended. But, on the whole, I can point to some very successful works as the result of employing people in distress.

36. Q.—Are you able to form an estimate as to what proportion of the full value of labor obtainable in ordinary times was obtained during the famine?

A.—On an average I think I got about half the value, but a great deal more in some places.

37. Q.—Was there much emigration from your district to Calcutta and elsewhere?

A.—I made no special enquiries on the subject. I believe there was not much emigration. A few more people than usual may have gone to cut grain in the Soonderbunds, and so on; but there was no general emigration as far as I heard.

38. Q.—Did you receive any instructions to prevent emigration as much as possible, or did you attempt to prevent or discourage it?

A.—I heard nothing about it as far as I remember; the subject was never mentioned to me in any letter, and there was no occasion to stop any body.

39. Q.—Will you explain the system of charitable relief adopted in your district?

A.—The ordinary system was to distribute at depôts a certain quantity of food and one pice to each person considered to be in distress. In a few cases of the more respectable people relief was given without requiring the recipients to come to the depôts, but these instances were extremely rare. Relief was also given in supplying materials to weavers and paying them daily for their labor,—this was chiefly in Kishnagur,—and the result was sometimes successful even in a financial point of view. In Kishnagur about 1,330 Rs. were spent in relieving, and purchasing materials for, weavers, and the whole of the amount was subsequently realized by sale of the cloth woven. The result was that about 300 people were relieved for two months without any real expenditure whatever.

40. Q.—Had you only these two system of labor and gratuitous relief, or had you any intermediate system of selling grain below the market rate?

A.—No; we did not sell at all.

41. Q.—In how many places and to what extent was gratuitous relief given?

A.—There were about sixteen depôts at which extensive operations were carried on, and about twenty-five other centres of relief through non-official residents scattered here and there in different parts of the district. In the worst weeks the daily average of persons under charitable relief was from 8,600 to 10,700.

42. Q.—What was the quantity of food given to each person?

A.—We at first fixed an average of half a seer of rice and one pice for each member of a family. Subsequently, in accordance with the orders of the Board of Revenue, the quantity of rice was reduced to 6 chittacks for adults and 4 chittacks for children, the pice being paid as before.

43. Q.—Did you think that this latter quantity was sufficient?

A.—No; I think that after so many months of privation, no smaller average than half a seer was sufficient; of course the lesser quantity would keep people alive.

44. Q.—What was the test of admission to gratuitous relief?

A.—Every effort was made by enquiries through village gomasthas, &c., to ascertain if applicants were proper subjects for relief, and when the relief was in full operation every one who assisted the Relief Committee at any depôt was particularly requested not to admit any body to relief without a certificate from the gomastha, unless the person admitting the applicant had personal knowledge of the circumstances of the individual.

45. Q.—Work being at the same time offered, were persons capable of working at any time systematically admitted to gratuitous relief?

A.—No; not systematically. I ascertained that in some cases Native gentlemen in charge of the

relief depôts were giving charitable relief to able-bodied men, but this was checked as much as possible. For a short time previously to the grant of 30,000 Rs. for relief works some persons quite fit for such work were relieved gratuitously. As soon as the grant of 30,000 Rs. was intimated, a circular was issued to every depôt, requesting that all persons able to work at out-of-door labor should be referred to the relief works. I should like to mention, with reference to the answers to the last few questions, that at first the system of selection for charitable relief was not what could have been wished at every depôt; but as soon as any thing was discovered, it was immediately rectified and enquiries were constantly made with this object.

47. Q.—To what classes of persons then was gratuitous relief given?

A.—Chiefly to the coolie or laboring class, but almost entirely to women and children, and only to men in cases of infirmity: and able-bodied men were employed on relief works.

48. Q.—Was gratuitous relief in any degree confined to those who had already become so emaciated that there could be no doubt of their starvation?

A.—It was not entirely confined to people who were emaciated, but as a rule there was no person receiving charitable relief who was not in such a condition as to show traces of having suffered privation for some little time.

49. Q.—Did you find that the gomasthas whom you have mentioned were reliable as instruments for finding the necessities of the people?

A.—No case came to my notice of their recommending unworthy objects. It is difficult to say whether, in some cases, a certificate might not have been given to a person not deserving of it.

50. Q.—In what proportion were the funds administered in charitable relief in your district derived from public sources through the Board of Revenue, and in what proportion from local subscriptions?

A.—Nearly Rs. 11,000 from local subscriptions, and Rs. 24,500 from the Board of Revenue.

51. Q.—As respects the local subscriptions, what classes subscribed most liberally?

A.—A few leading zemindars, Europeans, and some respectable Native residents of Kishnagur, Ranaghat, and other places.

52. Q.—Was much private relief given independent of the Relief Committees, and if so, by whom?

A.—In only one part of the district there was private charity extensively given, viz., at Ranaghat, where some leading zemindars spent Rs. 2,000 in feeding and clothing distressed people; but several indigo planters and European and Native zemindars did a little in this way.

53. Q.—Did not the wealthier residents of the towns distribute food as they did in Calcutta?

A.—I believe but little was done in that way, as far as I have heard.

54. Q.—Are there many considerable towns in your district?

A.—Not many, Santipore and Kishnagur are the only two towns of importance.

55. Q.—Was relief at any time given to the distressed in your district in other shapes than those already mentioned?

A.—Under the orders of Government, Rs. 5,000 were given to Mr. James Hills, of Nischindpore, to be lent to his ryots, and repaid by him on the reaping of the crop in October.

56. Q.—Is that the only instance in which such an advance was made?

A.—I was further directed by Government to send Mr. Hills such relief as he might require for distribution to the poor in his neighbourhood, and I did so.

57. Q.—What were the months in which most distress was experienced in your district?

A.—There was most distress during the period immediately preceding the cutting of the early rice crop, that is to say, in July. But I may say that from the 1st of June till near the end of August, the distress was severe.

58. Q.—Is the Aus cultivation large in your district, and was the crop abundant in 1866?

A.—It is not very large, but considerable; and in the year 1866 both a larger area was sown and a larger crop was reaped than had been known for a great many years.

59. Q.—Was there effectual relief throughout the district at the time the Aus crop came in?

A.—The Aus crop was not nearly sufficient wholly to relieve the distress, though it assisted materially in lowering prices.

60. Q.—In your district do you think the relief operations effectually reached the masses of the people?

A.—Yes, I think they did.

61. Q.—Was there any considerable class of people who endured great privation rather than work or come for relief?

A.—No, I believe not.

62. Q.—Do you think that in any shape in your district much mortality has resulted from the scarcity, either from the direct effect of want, or from disease induced by want?

A.—It is extremely difficult to reply with accuracy, as there are no statistics; but owing to my having obtained money in sufficient time and provided relief and employment, I think that there

were a very few deaths indeed from absolute starvation, and where such did occur, it was in out-of-the-way places, owing to people not having come to the relief depôts. But I believe there were more deaths than usual, owing to poor people having been reduced for some months to one meal (and that a poor one) a day. Such privation, of course, told on them in course of time, and they succumbed to illness that would not have been fatal in other years. Children in arms also died owing to their mothers' nourishment being too poor for them.

63. Q.—Was there at any time much visible mortality such as occurs in great famines; were unburied bodies of people who died from starvation any where to be seen?

A.—There was nothing of the kind in my district.

64. Q.—Had the population generally at any time a decidedly emaciated appearance?

A.—All about the worst places I think there was such an appearance; and in the worst time the majority of the people showed by their appearance that they had had insufficient food for some months.

65. Q.—Were you always able to buy rice in the district, or how did you procure it?

A.—We never attempted to buy rice and failed; but there being a general impression in the district that the stocks of rice were getting very low, and also in order to prevent a sudden rise in price at any market in consequence of the Relief Committee making extensive purchases, the Committee purchased rice at Calcutta and other places out of the district, and also from boats on the opening of the rivers.

66. Q.—Is there any enterprising bunniah class largely spread over your district?

A.—No.

67. Q.—In whose hands is the grain trade mostly in your district?

A.—There are a few large grain dealers at the principal towns and on the river banks; and throughout the interior the village mahajuns buy the crops from the ryots as soon as the crops are reaped.

68. Q.—Is the business of buying from the ryots and lending to them almost exclusively in the hands of these village mahajuns as a separate class, or do the zemindars do much in the way of buying grain, storing it, and advancing on interest?

A.—The business is chiefly in the hands of the mahajuns, but some zemindars also act in a similar way to the mahajuns.

69. Q.—Of what caste and class are most of the mahajuns?

A.—There is a considerable variety of castes and classes.

70. Q.—Are the ryots generally much indebted to the mahajuns, or are they well to do?

A.—They are almost always indebted to the mahajuns; the mahajun advances rice and money to the ryot as he requires it, and takes the whole of the ryot's crop as soon as it is reaped.

71. Q.—Are very many of the ryots deep in the books of the mahajuns, or are they merely, according to the ordinary custom, under advances which they repay at the end of the year?

A.—I believe the advances are, generally speaking, repaid at the end of the year, but of course there are some in debt to a greater extent.

72. Q.—Do you think that the failure of the past year has much affected the ryots, or have the enhanced prices obtained by them made up for the deficiency in quantity?

A.—I believe that the high prices obtained have not sufficiently made up for the failure, and that they have suffered as a class, but I should say not very severely. Altogether, the crops of this year have been remarkably good, and have made up to a great degree for the previous deficiency.

73. Q.—In your district is there a large proportion of ryots who have mokurree, gantee-daree, and other highly beneficial rights in the soil?

A.—I should say not as a rule.

74. Q.—Do you find that ryots who had such rights were able to stand bad seasons better than the others?

A.—There were no opportunities of observing this.

75. Q.—Is the proportion of ryots who have rights of occupancy very large?

A.—No; there is a good deal of Ootbundee cultivation: i. e., the cultivation is varied from year to year, is measured annually, and rent paid accordingly.

76. Q.—The Nuddea division being in the vicinity of Calcutta, is the land-owning class generally a wealthy one?

A.—No; I think the division, considering its position, is rather the other way as regards resident zemindars; certainly it is as regards the Nuddea district.

77. Q.—Is the greater proportion of the land held by the old landing-holding classes, or in the hands of purchasers?

A.—I believe there have been considerable changes of late years. Europeans have acquired a great deal of land in the district, and many Natives who have made money in different ways, have invested it in land.

78. Q.—Is most of the land held by resident or by non-resident zemindars?

A.—A good proportion is held by non-residents.

79. Q.—Are the non-resident zemindars generally wealthy men?

A.—I should say that the Native non-residents are, as a rule, wealthy. As respects Europeans, their estates are generally in the hands of managers, who are not themselves proprietors, but there are one or two remarkable exceptions.

80. Q.—Should you say that a poor resident proprietary or a rich non-resident proprietary is most beneficial to the country?

A.—I should say that very little is done for estates in Nuddea by either class, except perhaps the roads made by the European proprietors and managers.

81. Q.—Do you think that Native zemindars, in the capacity of zemindars as distinguished from mere ordinary wealthy men, recognize any moral obligation on the part of a zemindar to support the poor of their estates in times of famine?

A.—As a rule, I should say not.

82. Q.—And if they do not regard it as a moral obligation, is there any legal means of compelling them to support the poor?

A.—None.

83. Q.—But do you not think that wealthy Native gentlemen recognise the moral obligation of feeding the poor in times of starvation?

A.—At such times charity is undoubtedly given, and in some cases very liberally, without enquiring whether the applicants are proper recipients of charity; but there is no such thing as a zemindar enquiring into the circumstances of his ryots.

84. Q.—Then you think that, if, in the past year, aid had not been obtained through Government, it would not have been possible to relieve the starving by any local means at your command?

A.—Certainly, without such aid it would have been impossible.

85. Q.—Independently of charity, do the Native zemindars expend much money in the improvement of their estates?

A.—As a rule, I should say no. Sometimes they contribute towards digging a tank in a village for drinking water.

86. Q.—When they make such contribution, is it by way of investment of reproductive capital, or merely by way of taking a share in what is considered a good work in Hindoo estimation?

A.—They contribute as to a good work.

87. Q.—Have Native zemindars often undertaken works of irrigation and such like?

A.—I am not aware of any thing of that nature having been undertaken in my district; and it was remarkable that towards the end of 1865, when the crop was perishing for want of water, there was scarcely an instance of a well being sunk even in places where the operation would have been easy and inexpensive.

88. Q.—Have the better class of ryots not sufficient energy to undertake such works?

A.—I think they are entirely deficient in energy and much disinclined to do any thing that was not done by their fathers and grandfathers?

89. Q.—To what do you attribute the want of energy on the part of ryots in your district?

A.—I believe it natural to the Bengalee character among the lower classes.

90. Q.—Do you consider the Bengal ryots, as a rule, inferior to people of the same class in other parts of India?

A.—In comparison with the people of Behar, of whom I know something, I should say the Bengalee agricultural classes are very inferior.

91. Q.—Is it not the case that in Jessore, which you have mentioned as comparatively rich, the date cultivation and such like has been introduced by an energetic class of ryots, the ganteedars for instance?

A.—I do not know how the date cultivation was introduced into Jessore.

92. Q. Have you had much experience of other districts of Bengal besides Nuddea?

A.—I was at Hooghly for two years, and in other places for a short time.

93. Q.—Generally speaking, do you think that the nature of the zemindaree tenures as now existing is such as to admit of an energetic individual improving his estate without much practical difficulty in respect of the co-operation of shareholders and the like?

A.—I believe that the system of shareholders interferes very much with any such operations.

94. Q.—Is there not in Bengal Proper an extraordinary practical difficulty in respect of the division of estates?

A.—There are very few partitions in my district. I have never heard difficulties as to carrying them out given as a reason for their not being more frequent.

95. Q.—Do you mean that generally the zemindars are content to receive their shares in the old way, and have no wish for individual property in land?

A.—I believe that the great majority are quite content to hold property as shareholders with all its inconveniences. But the operation of Act XI of 1859, as to the opening of separate accounts, has probably had some effect in diminishing the number of partition cases.

96. Q.—In your own time have you known of the successful partition of any considerable estate begun and ended in Nuddea?

A.—No; but one was brought to a conclusion after I joined the district. The proceedings had been almost entirely completed before my arrival,

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and they were reported while I was in Nuddea; but owing to a flaw brought to notice by the officer who finished the proceedings, the case was returned to be done over again.

97. Q.—Do you know when those proceedings were commenced?

A.—I cannot remember; but I know that they lasted for some years.

98. Q.—Do not such proceedings usually last for generations?

A.—I do not know of any lasting so long as that.

99. Q.—Then in fact, in your own experience, you have never seen a butwarrah in Bengal brought to a conclusion?

A.—No; but I have only been a Collector in Bengal for two years. During that time, out of two cases pending, neither was brought to a satisfactory conclusion.

100. Q.—In addition to the difficulty on account of undivided shares in the same estate, is it not the case that there is much uncertainty regarding the rights of superior and inferior holders in the same land and in respect of contingent rights owing to a very extensive system of sub-infeudation, and the great frequency of widows' holdings and such like, and that in consequence it is sometimes hard to say who is practically the landlord of any particular land?

A.—Yes, it is often very difficult to say what the rights of different parties possessing interest in land really are, and great inconvenience arises in consequence, as, for instance, in cases of acquisition of land for public purposes, money given as compensation remains in deposit for years owing to conflicting claims and interests preventing all persons interested from giving a joint receipt or being able to prove satisfactorily to what share of the compensation each person is entitled.

101. Q.—Owing to the great complication of tenures, the absence of any authoritative record of rights, and the extent to which litigation is carried, is it not extremely difficult for any one wishing to invest money in land, to obtain a good title free from the risk or rather probability of endless litigation?

A.—Yes, I should say that there is considerable risk in investing in land in any case in which there are a number of shareholders and in which litigation has been going on.

102. Q.—What is the nature of the tenure of land usually acquired by Europeans?

A.—Chiefly putnee and sub-putnee tenures; but in some cases they are zemindaree.

103. Q.—Is not a greater proportion of the land held by Europeans in the lower provinces held by mere lease-hold tenures?

A.—I think in my district they are chiefly putnee. I cannot speak confidently about other districts. In Tirhoot villages are held in farm for

short terms of years, but I believe that putnee tenures prevail extensively in Bengal Proper in the case of European land-holders.

104. Q.—Do many Europeans hold land for proper agricultural purposes and invest money in developing agricultural resources as distinguished from the mercantile pursuit of certain special products?

A.—No. I believe very few.

105. Q.—What are the special products which are sought for for mercantile purposes?

A.—In my district indigo is the only produce in the cultivation of which Europeans are engaged, excepting perhaps a very small mulberry cultivation in connection with a silk factory.

106. Q.—Is almost all the land held by Europeans in your district for the purpose of obtaining indigo?

A.—Land is also held in the ordinary way of profits from landed property by means of rents.

107. Q.—Except in the cultivation of indigo have any Europeans embarked in considerable farms held directly by them?

A.—I am not aware of any.

108. Q.—Have they succeeded in showing their ryots improved modes of agriculture?

A.—I do not think that any symptoms of improved modes of agriculture are to be seen in my district owing to suggestions of European proprietors; but I believe that the ryots of Nuddea are exceedingly averse to any change.

109. Q.—Have you seen any improved modes of agriculture tried on a small scale which they might advantageously follow?

A.—No, I have not; none have come under my observation, though attempts may have been made on a small scale. I have seen a steam plough at a factory, but that of course would never be available to a ryot.

110. Q.—Do you think that a European, undisputed owner of the land, could grow rice with advantage by hired labor?

A.—I doubt very much; but I do not know the result of any experiment of that nature.

111. Q.—Up to what point in the progress of the people towards the cessation of distress, did you carry relief works, and on what principle did you regulate the point at which they ceased?

A.—I tested the necessity of continuing relief works at several places and at different times by reducing the remuneration and then seeing the result in the course of four or five days. In cases where the incoming Aus crop had benefited the people considerably they went away and did not return; in other cases they went away for perhaps three or four days, but then returned quite willing to work as before at the reduced remuneration. I consider this a good test of relief works being required.

112. Q.—Do you think that the system of relief by distributing food, as it has been pursued, has had a demoralizing effect on the people, using the word in its broadest sense?

A.—Where relief lasted for comparatively so short a time as it did in my district, I do not think any such effect would follow.

113. Q.—Judging from your experience of the past, in what form would you recommend relief of the distress in case of another famine?

A.—I think the different ways in which relief was given in Nuddea answered satisfactorily, and I think they would be equally applicable in cases where the necessity for relief might be still greater if applied in time, that is to say, if relief works are applied in time they will save the necessity of much charitable relief. Of course, the extent to which any particular class should be relieved indirectly, such, for instance, as giving employment to weavers, would depend very much on the numbers and necessity of those particular classes. At the commencement of a famine much might be done by the construction of new roads running through and across distinct areas. The great object should be to employ people without requiring them to go any great distance from their homes, unless any great work would enable employment to be given regularly for two or three months.

114. Q.—Do you think that it is not possible to attempt what might be called out-door relief on a large scale, that is to say, by relieving the really indigent at their own homes instead of requiring them to come to relief centres; or are the abuses which must result an obstacle altogether insuperable?

A.—I think it would be liable to very great abuse, and would never recommend its being attempted, except in the case of respectable families, who would perhaps rather die than come publicly forward to a relief depot to receive charity.

115. Q.—Is there any other form of relief than those which you have already mentioned which you could suggest?

A.—No other sort of relief occurs to me, except perhaps selling food cheap to people who are above the point of extreme distress.

116. Q.—The public feeling having now become so sensitive as respects the miseries of the poor, that it will be impossible for Government to stand by while great misery is endured, and the resources of local private charity having proved insufficient, do you think that it would be necessary to impose some special taxation for the relief of the poor, or that the object may be effected by voluntary appeals to the general public in India and England in the case of particular calamities?

A.—That is a question to which I have not given sufficient consideration to enable me to reply at a moment's notice.

117. Q.—Have you learnt any thing of the traditions of the people regarding the nature of the great famine in 1770, and judging of what

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you have seen in the past year, do you think that it is within the bounds of ordinary probability that Lower Bengal might be desolated by a famine caused by drought?

A.—I enquired from many people about the traditions of the famine of 1770, but could never obtain any information except that it was a calamity much worse than this one. With regard to the second part of the question, it would entirely depend on the extent over which the drought might prevail. I do not know over what area the famine of 1770 extended; but as long as a considerable portion of the country has good crops, I should think it would be sufficient, with the stocks in hand, to tide over a famine year without desolating the whole of Bengal.

118. Q.—Does it seem to you that of late years the price of rice has risen more rapidly than the wages of labor?

A.—In some districts more than others. In the districts near Calcutta the disproportion is the least from all that I have heard.

119. Q.—Should you say that, generally speaking, a man depending on daily wages is worse off now than he was a few years ago?

A.—Certainly not in my district as a rule.

120. Q.—Do you think the class dependent on daily wages is increasing?

A.—I have had no means of forming an opinion on that point.

121. Q.—In your district is there a large class of agricultural laborers who are not farmers on their own account?

A.—There are considerable numbers of that class: no difficulty is experienced in getting any number of coolies for road works when required.

122. Q.—In Bengal do you think that English cloths have superseded the use of Native cloths to a great extent amongst the lowest classes?

A.—I think they have supplanted the Native manufacture to a considerable extent.

123. Q.—Do you think that the trade of the Native weavers is dying out, and that their reduced state is more than a temporary cause of the cotton famine,—that their condition, for instance, is analogous, to that of the hand loom weavers in Great Britain?

A.—I am unable to give a satisfactory opinion on that point; but in the towns in my district, in which there are many weavers, the numbers engaged in that employment have certainly diminished.

124. Q.—Do you think that in Nuddea a large system of artificial irrigation would be attended with commensurate advantages?

A.—I should doubt if it would ever pay commercially: a famine is of rare occurrence, and when there is no famine irrigation is not required, excepting for special crops grown in very small quantities.

125. Q.—Have you heard of any partial famine to the extent of the past year occurring in the Nuddea district within the memory of man?

A.—I have heard it mentioned that about thirty or forty years ago there was similar distress for one year.

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No. 125.—MR. C. F. MONTRESOR, *Commissioner of BURDWAN.*

[Examined in Calcutta, 21st February 1867.]

1. Q.—Since when have you been Commissioner of Burdwan?

A.—Since June 1863.

2. Q.—Was your attention drawn to the state of the crops in the autumn of 1865?

A.—Yes; in the latter part of it, at which time I issued a circular to all Collectors, calling for weekly price lists of grain.

3. Q.—Will you tell us in general terms what you consider to have been the yield of the crops in the districts of the Burdwan division in that year?

A.—I might say that the crops throughout the whole of the six districts suffered more or less from want of water; perhaps more so in Midnapore and Bancoorah than in any other district. When I say Midnapore, I mean the western part of it. But my attention was attracted to the high price of grain in the south-eastern part of Midnapore, which in 1864 had been devastated by the cyclone. At that time a large quantity of rice was being exported, which was noticed by the Collector Mr. Herschel, who proceeded to that part to see how the ryots were able to pay up the instalment of the year previous, which had been postponed. The khas mehal farmers there had been allowed great indulgence, and it was left to them to regulate the remission in each village in accordance with the destruction caused by the Cyclone; that is, the terms which we offered them were not in respect to each particular village but to each particular circle, and consequently, we were not able, in offering those terms, to state precisely how the demand in each village should be postponed. The Collector, therefore, went also to see about this, and that was the time the rise in prices attracted attention. The result was that Mr. Herschel thought it necessary that we should grant some assistance to the people of that part by establishing kitchens for feeding the poor; and he suggested that some loans should be made out of the khas mehal funds. One of the zemindars especially assisted Mr. Herschel while he was there. I authorized Mr. Herschel, in anticipation of the sanction of Government, to make any loans he thought necessary out of the khas mehal funds, and to spend the money as an incentive to other landholders; but a Local Committee that had been formed in Midnapore thought it was wise not to spend the money. The harvest in that part of the country turned out very much better than we anticipated, and consequently no measures of relief were required. Our attention was directed not so much to the high prices at that particular time, but to the circumstance that that part of the country had previously suffered from the cyclone of 1864, and rather to the khas mehal farmers whose farms had been devastated by the hurricane.

I don't remember that there was any decided failure of crops in the greater part of the other districts, but prices had risen throughout the division. In Bancoorah the prices continued to rise, and though there had not been a material rise, and though there had not been a material failure of the crops in some parts of the district, there had been an exportation from the district. I was there myself in the month of January, and the crops were not so bad; they had all been reaped, and the produce had not been so very bad. I may say the same about Beerbhoom. The crops in the western part of Bancoorah and in Beerbhoom are generally cut earlier than in the other districts, and consequently, the crops there did not suffer so much from the failure of the later rain.

In the district of Burdwan, though there was not a full crop, and it suffered in a great measure from the drought, there was no great distress.

In Hooghly, with the exception of the western part which joins on to the north-eastern part of Midnapore, the crops were comparatively good, and in the part of the Hooghly Collectorate, which constitutes the Howrah Magistracy, the crops were almost as good as they generally are.

4. Q.—Did you visit Midnapore in the autumn of 1865, or the very early part of 1866, and are you able to say whether, in the western parts of the district, the crops were a total failure or not?

A.—I was at Midnapore in the month of January, and in parts adjacent to the jungle mehals. I saw that they had suffered very much from want of rain. There was not a total, but an extreme failure of the crops. The crops had all been cut. I did not, therefore, see them, but speak from what I heard.

5. Q.—Were you in the southern and western parts of Bancoorah, and did you form an opinion as respects those particular parts of that district, that there was an extreme failure of the crops?

A.—I was in the southern part of Bancoorah in the month of January, the crops were cut when I went, and I heard that the out-turn had not been so favorable as in previous years. I should think that the crop there about Bishenpore was what I should estimate about a half crop; but in the western parts of Midnapore I should think it was worse, because there they had less means of irrigation.

6. Q.—Will you state the condition of the parts abutting on Maunbhoom?

A.—I was not there, and received no special information about it. The part of the country immediately to the west of Bancoorah station is in the Collectorate of Maunbhoom (Pooroolia), and consequently did not come within my cognizance.

7. Q.—Is it the custom for Collectors in Bengal to take particular notice of extraordinary seasons and to make special enquiries regarding the state of the crops?

A.—I have never known them to make any reports regarding the crops.

8. Q.—In the autumn of 1865, did you receive any instructions to make special enquiries?

A.—No. I cannot recollect any such.

9. Q.—Have the Collectors any machinery for obtaining information of such sort?

A.—None whatever. Any allusions to such matters that they might make would be entirely from their own observation.

10. Q.—If a Collector was specially desirous of obtaining correct information, more complete than he could derive from personal observation, do you think it would be possible for a zealous officer to obtain it?

A.—I don't think that the Collectors, with the little time they have at their disposal, would be able to collect any information with any amount of accuracy.

11. Q.—Besides the enquiry made by Mr. Herschel in the tract previously devastated by the cyclone, do you know whether any of your Collectors did make any special enquiries regarding the crops at the time they were reaped and cut?

A.—I don't remember that any enquiry or report was made.

12. Q.—Did the Board of Revenue not call on you at that time, officially or demi-officially, for a report on the state of the crops and of the country?

A.—No, they only called for returns of prices, which I find I had called for from all the Collectors, before I got the orders of the Board.

13. Q.—Did you not receive any demi-official notes, in October or November, to say that the Board were making a report of the state of the crops, and wishing to know the nature and extent of the crops in each district; and did you make no report on the subject?

A.—I don't remember any special report being called for by the Board further than the information demanded in their circular regarding the prices current in each district received in November.

14. Q.—Subsequently to the reaping of the crops, what were the first signs of distress that came to your notice?

A.—The first signs were the increase of crime in Midnapore, which was in the months of January and February; in that district there is in those months generally an increase in the crime of dacoity, but these continued on till March and April and in comparatively greater numbers.

15. Q.—Was there also an increase of crime in other districts?

A.—Yes, in Bancoorah, about the same time, but not in Beerbhoom or other districts to any extent.

16. Q.—Did you give special attention to the increase of crime in Midnapore and Bancoorah, and did you form any opinion as to its cause?

A.—I went down to Midnapore in the month of April, and made special enquiries, and im-

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diately reported to Government. The cause was the high prices of rice and the facilities with which a body of people could plunder in that part the store-houses, which themselves were very fragile and ill-protected.

17. Q.—Did you visit the Bancoorah district at that time?

A.—Yes, and came to the same conclusion there.

18. Q.—When you were in Midnapore and Bancoorah, did you notice any signs of distress and suffering from want of food?

A.—I saw no cases of very severe distress, but I heard a good many complaints from the poorer classes, who were in the habit of receiving gratuitous food in the villages, that they could not get it any longer, and I found them moving about from place to place begging. It was subsequent to my leaving Midnapore that Mr. Herschel, after consulting me, proceeded to the southern part of the district towards Balasore, to ascertain whether the distress was increasing, and in the event of finding that it was so, it was proposed to establish the kitchens that he had contemplated starting in the month of November. The result was that the kitchens were immediately established, and the Deputy Magistrate was deputed by the Magistrate to go down and superintend them.

19. Q.—Was any thing done in Bancoorah in the early part of the season?

A.—Subscriptions were collected in the early part of the season at a meeting called by the Judge Mr. Tucker, and assistance was granted to all people in distress in the shape of offering labor. This was, I think, in March or April. Rice was also distributed to those who could not work.

20. Q.—When had you reason to suppose that the distress in Midnapore and Bancoorah was beyond the power of local charity to meet?

A.—I should think about May or June: it was about that time that I thought larger subscriptions than those collected on the spot were necessary.

21. Q.—Up to that time, that is up to May or June, had you heard of any particular distress among the weaving and non-agricultural classes in the Hooghly district?

A.—No, I had not in the Hooghly district, though I had known for some time that the weaver population there, owing to the introduction of English piece goods, had been in difficulties.

22. Q.—Had you learned that the weaving population of Bishenpore, in the southern part of the Bancoorah district, were specially distressed?

A.—Yes; I heard that a great number of the journeymen weavers, as distinguished from the master weavers, had been thrown out of employ for the same reason, and were seeking employment and provisions elsewhere. I might mention that these journeymen weavers had been in the habit of receiving small salaries and food from the

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master weavers, who, on account of the failure of their trade, were about to discharge them. The master weavers themselves, generally speaking, up to the present time are well to do, because they deal in English cloth as well, and also cloth manufactured in other districts, and they also possess land.

23. Q.—What is the system of weaving in the Burdwan division; are there large manufacturers, or what is the relation between masters and journeymen?

A.—There are no large manufacturers. When I use the term "master weaver," I refer to the proprietor of the looms. Some of them employ as many as six or eight or even ten weavers, and especially a great number of women. I think the business of weaving is usually carried on by people who employ such numbers, which include the members of their own family.

24. Q.—When did you first become aware that severe distress had extended to the weaving class in Hooghly?

A.—Directly the people began to come down to Calcutta. I heard that some of the weavers, who had been relieved by public charity in the Hooghly district, had left and come down to Calcutta.

25. Q.—Had relief in the Hooghly district commenced before the weavers came down to Calcutta?

A.—Yes; but it was not given specially to the weaver class.

26. Q.—What was the nature of the first relief that was given in the Hooghly district?

A.—It was given by local subscriptions, collected at the instance of the Collector Mr. R. V. Cockerell, by the Deputy Collector of Jehanabad Baboo Issun Chunder Mitter.

27. Q.—Was there not some private relief established by Mr. Turnbull before that?

A.—Yes; and by some Native zemindars in the district. Mr. Turnbull got up a subscription among the Mahomedans and Hindoos at Ghattal and took great interest in the matter.

28. Q.—Was there a great influx from the districts of your division to Calcutta?

A.—Yes; I heard a very large number came from the sub-division of Jehanabad, representing themselves to be weavers, many of whom had not been brought up to the trade; but who, on hearing of the sympathy for the weaver class in Calcutta, applied for relief, stating themselves to be weavers. This fact was ascertained on the return of gangs of those parties who, on being directed to weave cloth on looms that had been prepared for them, were found to be altogether ignorant of the trade.

29. Q.—When you first became aware that people were going down to Calcutta, did you think it necessary to stop them, or did you receive any instructions on the subject?

A.—I came down to the Board of Revenue, and consulted with them about it. I think that was on the 7th or 8th of August. The result was that they adopted some system here in Calcutta for returning those people to the sub-division of Jehanabad. The Board were of opinion that it was inexpedient that they should be allowed to remain in Calcutta, and many were sent back.

30. Q.—Up to that time, had any public money been granted for the relief of the distress in the Hooghly district?

A.—No; except money available from the local funds for affording labor.

31. Q.—Had any special relief works been opened from local funds?

A.—No; merely the ordinary works, which were carried on in the ordinary way.

32. Q.—Had you received larger grants than usual from the local funds?

A.—No; less was received in that year than usual; owing to there being a smaller surplus fund at the disposal of the Local Government.

33. Q.—Were there any railway feeders in your division carried on at that time for the relief of the distressed?

A.—There was only one road for which a special grant was made for the relief of people in distress.

34. Q.—What was that road, and when was the grant made?

A.—The road was the Laghatta road in Burdwan, and the money, I think, was given in July; but the Executive Engineer could not get laborers, and the whole of the money was not expended.

35. Q.—Do you know what system of paying laborers he adopted, or why he could not get labor?

A.—I don't know whether any increased rate was given or not. There were no people available for the work: the people who were in the habit of doing such work were engaged in agricultural pursuits, and none of the weavers would work.

36. Q.—But in the months of February, March, April, May and June, was work going on on railway feeders, and was that work in any way specially regulated to give relief to the distressed?

A.—There were railway feeders going on throughout four districts, but I cannot say that the work was regulated in any such way. There were no special relief works in any part of the division till the month of May, when the first works of that nature were carried on in Midnapore.

37. Q.—Did you take any measures to prevent people flocking to Calcutta?

A.—Yes, I issued a circular on the subject.

38. Q.—What was the nature of the measures taken to prevent people coming to Calcutta?

A.—I put in a copy of my circular; but I cannot say exactly what measures were adopted, nor am I aware that any direct measures were adopted

39. Q.—Do you think that any interference was exercised by the Police and the people in charge of ferries to keep people back?

A.—I don't think so.

40. Q.—Were people sent back from Calcutta?

A.—I think they were just beginning to be sent back when I went on leave. I left on the 23rd of August, and was absent till the 12th of December; when I returned, the whole operations were at a close or were just closing.

41. Q.—When the distress became more severe in Midnapore, in June and July, did you go there again?

A.—No; I did not go there after my visit in April.

42. Q.—Do you think that in Midnapore measures of relief were taken sufficiently early?

A.—Yes; I think they were.

43. Q.—Do you think the measures taken were sufficient, when they were taken?

A.—I think if they had had more money, more people might have been relieved, and the operations could have been very much enlarged if we had more funds available. I say this merely from what I have seen and heard since. I did not at the time have more money than I got?

44. Q.—That part of the Bancoorah district do you consider the most distressed?

A.—The south-eastern part about Bishenpore, and also that part about Bishenpore, in the north-west.

45. Q.—Do you think that the people were affected in both those parts, and suffer from the same causes?

A.—No; in the Bishenpore part, the artisans class especially suffered, not so much on account of the great failure of the crops there, as on account of the number of people thrown out of employ on account of the high prices of provisions. But in the north-west, which is the part bordering on north Maunbhoom, the distress was among people whom I call semi-agriculturists: they are partly laborers and partly agriculturalists; they cultivate the land under the regular cultivators, and receive as remuneration a part of the produce.

46. Q.—Under the system in your division, who finds the bullocks and other necessary cattle?

A.—The proprietor, that is the ryot finds the bullocks and such like. The "bhageedar" cultivator is merely a laborer, whose wages are paid by a portion of the crop. There are a great many of that class in that particular part, and they especially suffered.

47. Q.—Did the ryots, having some substantial rights in the land, fare better?

A.—Yes.

48. Q.—Do you consider that the distress was worse in and about Bishenpore than in and about Bancoorah itself?

A.—I should say that the distress was worse in the town of Bishenpore than in Bancoorah, but not in the immediate neighbourhood.

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49. Q.—Are you aware that at a meeting in June a resolution was passed recognizing the necessity of sending rice out to Bishenpoor, but that no rice was sent till the middle of August, the reason given being that there was none to spare from Bancoorah, as the Committee were using for relief in Bancoorah all the rice which could be imported with the small capital of Rs. 5,000 which had been granted to them by Government?

A.—I don't remember the circumstance.

50. Q.—When were the first public funds given for the assistance of relief in Bancoorah?

A.—On the 27th of May I sent to the Bancoorah Committee the orders of Government of the 21st instant, giving a grant of Rs. 5,000.

51. Q.—Before that, had unsuccessful applications for grants been made by the Bancoorah Committee?

A.—I think they applied for a grant from the old relief fund. I referred the matter to the Board of Revenue, and on that, I believe Rs. 5,000 was granted.

52. Q.—Were not some applications made a good deal earlier in the season?

A.—No, not for Government aid: I am quite sure of that.

53. Q.—On the 24th of May the Bancoorah authorities asked for Rs. 10,000, but up to the first week in August they had received only Rs. 5,000; and the second instalment of Rs. 5,000, which was sent in the beginning of August, was sent in compliance with another urgent application of the 13th July, repeated on the 23rd for a further grant of Rs. 10,000 for the express purpose of importing rice and selling it. Are you aware that this failure to supply the whole sum demanded prevented them from affording any relief whatever in the interior of the district to such places as Bishenpoor, Rugghonathpoor, and Gourangdeehee, which were recognized to be in urgent need of assistance?

A.—That matter did not attract my attention; but one month after the Committee received the Rs. 5,000 in their resolution of the 23rd June it is stated that the Government donation of Rs. 5,000 has not yet been taken up for the purpose indicated in the Government resolution.

54. Q.—Did you visit the district of Bancoorah in the months of May, June, July or August?

A.—Yes; I was in Bancoorah in June, from the 18th to the 20th, but not in July or August.

55. Q.—Did you then form the opinion that the sums demanded by the local authorities were or were not required?

A.—From what I have seen and heard recently, I think that the whole sum of money applied for could have been advantageously expended, although there was always a good sum in hand.

56. Q.—Did you at the time support the demands of the local authorities or not?

A.—The sums had been altered, but I sent all applications in original to the Board.

57. Q.—Who reduced the sum?

A.—I must explain that the first application for Rs. 10,000 and the first grant of Rs. 5,000 crossed each other. On referring to the correspondence I find that on the resolution of the Committee of the 23rd, I recommended that an additional grant of Rs. 5,000 be made.

58. Q.—Are you aware that in the last days of July and the beginning of August there was very great pressure in Bancoorah?

A.—The Committee said there was great difficulty in purchasing rice, and were therefore importing rice from Calcutta. I believe it was reported that there was at that time no purchased stock of rice for sale. My opinion is that the sales at Bancoorah were not very judiciously managed, that is to say, rice was sold at a low rate indiscriminately to persons who could have afforded to pay a higher price.

59. Q.—On the 13th of July, in addition to the demand of Rs. 10,000 for the purchase of rice, the Committee recorded a resolution, asking for Rs. 10,000 to be put at their disposal for the employment of labor at the rate of Rs. 2,000 per month; can you explain how it is that no such sum has ever been granted for works; certain specific works were also recommended which appear not to have been carried out?

A.—I may say that resolution was forwarded in original for the consideration of the Board of Revenue, who, for want of a distinct recommendation as to the works to be undertaken, stated they were unable to make any assignment. The Board's answer is contained in their letter No. 1765 B dated 21st July. They also requested the Public Works Department to take into consideration the subject of giving employment to people in distress. The Magistrate had also a large sum of money at his disposal for public works.

60. Q.—Before the issue of your circular of the 9th of August, had any communication reached you from Calcutta regarding the influx of people there?

A.—I think I must have heard of it in Calcutta. I was summoned down by a telegram from the Board of Revenue to attend a meeting.

61. Q.—Who took part in that meeting?

A.—The Members of the Board, Baboo Joykissen Mookerjee, who is the zemindar on whose property the weavers chiefly reside, Baboo Begum Mitter, the Collectors of Howrah and Hooghly, Colonel Nicolls and the Commissioner of Police for Calcutta. The meeting was held on the 8th or 9th of August.

62. Q.—Did you, at the meeting, gather that there were complaints of the influx of people in Calcutta?

A.—Yes, the Commissioner of Police complained, and I think Mr. Chapman, who was connected with the distribution of relief going on, represented to the meeting the large number of people who had flocked in. I know that it was brought forward as a complaint, and it was with a view of getting rid of them that the meeting was held.

63. Q.—Up to that time had any public relief been given in Bishenpoor or not?

A.—I am quite sure that some relief had been given from local subscriptions early in the season, and in July the Bancoorah Committee referred to their intention to send assistance, but I am not certain when it was sent. At one time the difficulty was to find a reliable person at Bishenpoor to whom to entrust the stores of rice: this is mentioned in the proceedings of the Committee in their resolution of the 13th of July.

64. Q.—Have you been able to form any opinion as to the extent of the mortality that has been caused, either directly or indirectly, by want in the Bancoorah district?

A.—No; I have heard different reports of mortality, but none that I think are reliable. I might mention that with a view to get some tolerably correct data, I enquired from the Magistrate and Police in those districts, where a large number of cases were sent up for trial connected with grain robberies, whether any of them broke down in consequence of the absence of witnesses owing to their death from starvation. Both in Bancoorah and Beerbhoom I could only hear of one case which fell through owing to the want of witnesses. I don't say that no witnesses died; but I came to the conclusion that mortality was not of such a wholesale nature as to cause the cases to break down from the absence of witnesses.

65. Q.—Do you believe that there was in fact a large mortality in the Bancoorah district?

A.—I do not think so.

66. Q.—In the early part of the season there seems to have been a question whether deaths were due to starvation or cholera; do you suppose that the cholera was in a great degree attributable to the want of food?

A.—I believe that cholera was caused a good deal by exposure, rather than from want, and unwholesome food. In Bancoorah, and especially in Midnapore, there are a very large number of people suffering from diseases of different kinds, who are in fact permanent paupers and cripples, and who have always been more than half starved. These are termed "kangalees." They were obliged to travel about in those hard times, and were consequently more exposed than usual to the inclemency of the rainy season.

67. Q.—To what do you attribute the existence of a larger class of permanent paupers in those parts than in others?

A.—I think that I can give no satisfactory reason further than that the people in those parts live in a very poor manner, and very much on the produce of the jungles, and there is a great mortality amongst that class.

68. Q.—Was the assistance rendered by private charity throughout your division very large?

A.—I should not say very large, speaking generally.

69. Q.—Did the zemindars as a body contribute very largely towards the relief?

A.—Certainly not as a body, but some of them did very well.

70. Q.—Did the monied classes in the towns distribute food?

A.—Some of them did, but not a large proportion of them; one man in Howrah named Ram Sing especially did so, and Jeebun Pal at Hooghly.

71. Q.—The Maharajah of Burdwan gave large assistance: did he not?

A.—Yes, he did, and volunteered to take into his hands the fund organized for the support of the poor of Burdwan, and carried on the relief operations with great liberality.

72. Q.—You had Rs. 6,000 sanctioned for works on a road specially to give employment to the distressed weavers; did they take that employment?

A.—There was very great difficulty in getting any body to take employment. The weavers in particular would not; they said that their caste prohibited them from taking such work, and they would not work.

73. Q.—Do you think that they starved in consequence?

74. Q.—Was relief given to that class of people although able-bodied?

A.—I believe it was: some of the Local Committees would not refuse relief to any body.

75. Q.—Are you aware that in Bancoorah some of the same class of people accepted earth-work?

A.—I heard some of them did, one village especially in Beerbhoom that I examined very lately, I found to be in a very flourishing condition: many of the weavers in that village employed themselves in agricultural labor as well as in fabrics.

76. Q.—What has been the result of the deliberations as to what should be done in the way of assistance to weavers in future?

A.—The weavers have been informed that the Government cannot continue to support them in their failing and unremunerative trade; but if they desired to work, Government would afford them every aid. The letter in which this determination was come to is a letter from the Board of Revenue, No. 175 B dated 11th January 1867.

77. Q.—Have you ever considered the possibility of improving the means of artificial irrigation in the Bancoorah district, and is there at present in that district any system of dams?

A.—At present there are no dams except of a petty nature made by the ryots. I have often thought that an extensive system of enclosing valleys in the undulating country might be very advantageously adopted.

78. Q.—Do the larger zemindars ever undertake such works?

A.—I don't know of any instance of their having done so.

79. Q.—Except for works on a very large scale, such as the Irrigation Company's works, would not the position of the zemindars make it difficult for Government to undertake such works?

A.—Yes, unquestionably; I should not be surprised if some of the zemindars were to oppose the execution of such works.

80. Q.—Do you think that the Irrigation Company's works will do a great deal of good?

A.—Yes, I think so if the assessment of the water rate is properly made, that is to say if fair rates are asked and carefully levied.

81. Q.—Looking back, do you think that the distress which actually ensued was not fully foreseen and not realized till it did actually occur?

A.—I don't think it was sufficiently clearly seen.

82. Q.—To what do you attribute this?

A.—To imperfect information; and to the information which we had not being precisely correct.

83. Q.—Do you think that there is any thing about the system of administration in Bengal which renders it particularly difficult to obtain information?

A.—All the information that a Commissioner can get is through the Collector, and the Collector has really no agency at his command further than his own observation, by which he can form any estimate of the state of the crops and people in his own district.

84. Q.—Do you think that the want of this kind of machinery is a fault, and that it ought to be remedied?

A.—I am sure it is, and it ought to be remedied.

85. Q.—How would you remedy it?

A.—I would introduce the system in operation in the North-Western Provinces; but I am not sure that I know exactly what that system is. I hear that they have means at their command through

tehseeldars and others, by which correct statistical information can be acquired, and the state of the crops and markets known.

86. Q.—Do you think that some such system is desirable here?

A.—Certainly, to meet such a case as we have had.

87. Q.—Do you think that the Bancoorah Relief Committee, on the whole, did well?

A.—Yes; I think they did very well, and were very ably superintended by the Judge, Mr. Tucker, who showed great liberality.

No. 126.—MR. W. T. TUCKER, Judge of Bancoorah.

[Examined at Calcutta, 6th March 1867.]

I have been at Bancoorah since the 14th March 1865, and was previously in the district of Backergunge. During the rains of 1865 it was evident that the crops of that year about Bancoorah would not be in excess of a six-sixteenth crop, that is to say, there was no alarm previous to September of that year, when the rains prematurely ceased, and the latter rain being altogether wanting, the rice crop dried up. In December I made the round of the civil jurisdiction of Bancoorah, visiting the Moonsiffs' Courts. About Kotulpore the crop was a little better, possibly half: about Sonamooke and Barjorrah it did not appear to be a quarter crop. In January and February 1866 there was much rain, and the rubber crop was entirely destroyed; this crop is, however, sown in very few places; when it was sown, it was destroyed by the incessant moisture. The chief rubber crops are kulye, mustard seed, a little barley, and sugarcane. I had not noticed any special distress during my tour, but I heard of it about February 1866. The district is a very thinly populated one, and unless one goes into the village, distress is not easily seen. On the 28th of February Mr. Wells, Magistrate and Collector, Mr. Wetherall, District Superintendent of Police, and myself met to concert measures of relief, and on that day I find that I have recorded in my diary in very large letters the word "Famine;" it was then we first understood that there was positive famine. Mr. Wells and Mr. Wetherall went out on that day to Bishenpore, to enquire about the sickness and great distress prevalent there. On the 1st March Messrs. Wells and Wetherall having returned, there was another Committee held to take measures against the famine. On the 6th March Mr. Wells called a famine meeting in the new bazar, and all the respectable inhabitants of the town assembled. Subscriptions were collected, and it was determined to import rice into the district. The Natives did not subscribe freely at that time; the principal subscribers were Europeans. The only Native who subscribed liberally was Godadhur Banerjee, Gomashta of the Indigo concern of Dr. Cheke, and who has himself acquired large landed property; he has been liberal throughout. On the 12th March, Messrs. Wells and Wetherall went to Sonamooke to endeavour to raise subscrip-

tions for building a market place, in order to give the people labor. At that time there were about 600 poor people employed in Bancoorah in digging a tank, for which they were paid from private subscriptions. At that time there was a regular Relief Committee, of which I was President. In conformity with our resolution above referred to, we then bought rice in Calcutta through Messrs. Mackillop, Stewart and Co., and imported it. So far as it went, it was advantageous, for we could not have bought any in the market; but it was a mere drop in the ocean; our fund, which was formed only from private subscriptions, not allowing of importation on a larger scale. There was at that time in the town of Bancoorah a very general idea that the mahajuns were keeping back rice; but this turned out afterwards to be false. It was very generally entertained: the people petitioned Mr. Wells to prevent export of rice from the district; there could have been no export from the town of Bancoorah itself, but there may have been a small export from villages in the part of the district adjoining Midnapore. We heard that at Midnapore pice was being distributed to the laborers, and that drew in grain. Mr. Wells left the district in May, and was succeeded by Mr. Cunliffe. Through March and April the distress increased; it became very visible in the town of Bancoorah. No application for aid was made to Government until we heard that the Governor General had sanctioned the expenditure of the balance of the North-Western Famine Fund for relieving the people of Bengal. Neither I nor any of the residents had any notion that the Government would assist in time of famine, and therefore we did not apply sooner. I was myself present in the Monghyr district some time between 1854 and 1856; when there was severe famine: there was some mortality: I myself saw the bodies of persons who had died of starvation. We got up subscriptions to relieve the starving people, and I believe no one died at Monghyr itself; but people coming from the interior of the district died from weakness, before they could reach the station. At that time there was no Government aid, and no one dreamt of applying for it. I mention the matter to explain why on this more terrible occasion we did not apply earlier. That famine at Monghyr was nothing like so severe as this one; and I think it was within the compass of local relief. The rice that we imported, we sold at first at twelve and afterwards at ten seers; in the bazar at that time the bazar rate was five-half to six seers per rupee. Up to the beginning of May, I did not observe any deaths from starvation in the town of Bancoorah. In Bishenpore there was much mortality from cholera, and it was a matter of discussion whether the cholera was caused in whole or in part by starvation. There is no doubt that at that time there was very great want at Bishenpore: had there been a good crop, I do not think the cholera would have been so bad. During the spring months of 1866, the people about Bancoorah were gradually deteriorating, as well as those who came in from the surrounding country.

The people who were employed on our tank were in a miserable state; it was begun in March; the numbers increased so rapidly that we had at last to exclude men and to employ women and children only. We paid them at first in money and subsequently in grain; and latterly in money, with which they were allowed to purchase at the Committee's cheap sales.

I believe that there was no time at which people working at our tank could not buy enough with their daily earnings to keep themselves alive. What they earned at the tank sufficed to keep body and soul together only, nothing more. Our funds were very limited till June, and our object was to spread the relief over the greatest possible numbers. From March to May the famine was not within the compass of local relief, and if we had thought we could get aid from Government we should certainly have applied for it. In June the misery was very great. I find in my diary of the 11th of June a note that the misery was intense, and that I went to see the sale of the last batch of rice which had been imported from private subscriptions. I wrote, "it was a terrible sight of misery." We applied first for 10,000 rupees and got 5,000 only. Most of the money thus received was applied to importing rice from Calcutta. From that time we devoted private subscriptions to the payment of labor only.

On the 25th of June the first batch arrived, and we had great difficulty in getting it across the rivers; it was partly spoiled in transit. On the 27th of June we commenced sales at sixteen shops close to one another on the Musafir Khanah. The crowd was tremendous; we have sold to upwards of 5,000 persons in one day; we sold at the rate of ten seers (80 sicca weight) for a rupee. We did not send rice into the interior for some time after we received Government rice.

I do not think that the public aid received was sufficient to meet the wants of the district. Our sales had on more than one occasion to be discontinued for a few days in consequence of the failure of the supply of rice; we had not funds enough to keep up a sufficient flow of rice; this was not the only cause of the failure of the supply; sometimes our rice was delayed in transit by the difficulty of crossing rivers. If we had had more funds we could have found means of distributing it to the people. After our first applications, we continued to apply for more money than we got; in fact we shaped our applications in view of the extent to which they would probably be complied with; that is, we applied for more than we expected to receive. If we had received the full sums for which we applied, I think we could have made good use of them; but with reference to the wants of neighbouring districts and the sums which were granted to them, we could not have expected all that we applied for. We did not get as much as we expected. On the second occasion on which we applied for money, we asked for Rs. 10,000 for importing rice, and Rs. 10,000 for works. We got Rs. 5,000 only for the importations, and we never got Rs. 10,000 for works at all at that time.

The Magistrate actually had money available from the ordinary approved assignment from local funds. He never mentioned this, and it was unknown to the other Members of the Committee. The Commissioner, Mr. Montresor, visited the district in June. He had to cross the river on a raft. There was, I think, no meeting of the Famine Committee while he was there. I cannot say whether he turned his attention to famine matters; the recent outbreak in the jail was then occupying all our minds. At the time the Committee were of opinion that sufficient attention was not paid to their applications; they have since ascertained that the Magistrate did not press each application as he should have done. He merely forwarded copy of the proceedings of the Committee without making the separate application regarding each matter which the Committee had directed to be forwarded. When Mr. Jenkins was in charge of the Commissionership, he did not visit Bancoorah. I do not remember any application of the Committee not being properly attended to after he took charge. The famine was then beginning to abate. As soon as it was apparent that the rice crop of 1866 would be magnificent things began to mend. The number of applicants to purchase rice began to decrease. On the 28th of August I have noted "not many payers; great relief," and on the 6th of September "distress evidently abating." Several weeks before rice was sent to Bishenpoor, it had been resolved to send it; but we could not do so as we had not more than enough rice for Bancoorah. I do not think that we were able to reach the mass of distressed people in the interior of the district until the month of August. From that month we did reach it by opening centres at different places; the district is very thinly peopled; it was difficult to select proper places for centres, and also to find trustworthy agency for superintending the operations. There were other places besides Bishenpoor to which the Committee wished to send rice long before they could do so. From August four centres were established in the district exclusive of Raneegunge; and I think that these were sufficient, as the distress was abating.

I am not aware that it was specifically brought to the notice of the Commissioner that we were unable to send out rice to the places at which it was required. We sold rice at a uniform rate of ten seers a rupee, from the time when we used the public funds. I do not remember any change in the rate, we sold at a loss. On referring to my diary book I find that in consequence of the shortness of rice; we sold rice dearer in the beginning of August. We made an attempt each day to exclude from the sales persons who were not properly entitled to the privilege of purchasing at cheap rates.

The quantity sold each day was not limited. It was most difficult to make selections. I think the result was that every one who chose bought. There was scarcely any rice being sold in the bazar; what was sold always commanded a higher

price than that sold by the Committee. I have known the rate to differ as much as seven to ten seers.

We gave no gratuitous relief in the shape of money payments. The works were never carried on on a large scale; they were almost entirely confined to the civil station of Bancoorah.

Subscriptions were promised, and some of them realized early in the season for employing labor in constructing a market place at Bishenpoor, which is in the Gurbettah sub-division. Hemchunder Kur, the Deputy Magistrate in charge, levied some of the subscriptions; but there was difficulty in getting any amount, and nothing was done. I have no doubt that much good might have been done by spending the money at Bishenpoor on the object for which it was raised.

What are called Bishenpoor weavers are the tussur weavers generally of the Bancoorah and part of the Midnapore districts. In the Bancoorah district they fared very badly. There was little opportunity of labour for them; public works were nil. I believe that they were perfectly willing to labor at earth-works, for I know that many of that caste worked at our tank. Their weaving trade was quite at a stand-still. I do not know if many of them emigrated. I am not aware that any encouragement was given to them to emigrate; on the contrary, there were complaints that they had been allowed to go to Calcutta for food and clothing. In February they suffered from cholera, that is, the residents of Bishenpoor. I have heard contradictory accounts as to the degree of mortality among them. Some people say that they have not died largely, but do not explain this; others say that the women of the better classes who did not like to go for relief died largely in their houses. I can't myself form an opinion. I think that there has been an increased mortality, but that the number of the population generally who have died from actual starvation has not been large. In my subsequent tours I did not perceive any very great reduction of the population so far as I could observe. I do not think that there was any very large emigration. Those who had property sold it, and the superior classes of weavers had funds. The journeymen weavers and laboring population generally must have obtained relief; but there never appeared to be an extreme want of money, it was only a want of rice; whenever rice was to be sold, the very poorest people seemed to be always ready to buy. The people seemed to be very stout and well off, when I first joined the district before the famine. Even now I do not think that the people are very much impoverished; the harvest has been magnificent, and they are recovering. But they live from hand to mouth. The weavers have been told that they must change their trade, as it is no longer profitable. There is no enterprising trading class in the district. The traders are very petty and not enterprising. There is no such trading class as there is in Behar. We offered to bring rice for them if they would pay for it, and even then

they would not. I do not remember that Hem Chunder Kur applied for money for gratuitous relief at Bishenpoor. One difficulty with Hem Chunder was that he would not have been able to superintend operations at Bishenpoor, his head quarters being at Gurbettah. We thought he behaved badly about the money not accounted for or made use of.

No. 127.—MR. H. M. WETHERALL, *District Superintendent of Police, BANCOORAH.*

[Examined in Calcutta, 6th March 1867.]

I have been about 16 months in the Bancoorah district. I had before been in Purneah. I know the Bengalee language fluently. I noticed the autumn crop of 1865. I should call it a total failure, but not so much to the south as north-east and west. The previous year the crop had been short, and prices were higher than usual, but crime was less than usual. In the latter part of 1865 prices rose not very rapidly, but steadily. It was not till April or May that they reached what I should call famine prices, Rs. 4-8 to 5 per maund. In February and March there was distress, but not amounting to starvation. The people of Bishenpoor did not suffer so much from famine as from cholera. I attribute the cholera principally to the unhealthiness of the town and surrounding jungle. In February the people still looked well to do. About April I think starving people began to come into Bancoorah. Famine meetings had been held before that and subscriptions raised. The people were told that nothing could avert the distress but large importations of grain. None of them would import on their own account, but one man bought up rice imported by the Committee. I account for the backwardness of the dealers by combination; a few people had a monopoly. They sold rice to cultivators only at very high rates, and took registered lands for repayment in kind; it was some of the zemindars who did this, and their ryots were preserved. Two of them established feeding depôts. The traders of the town had rice, which they sold at famine rates. They imported very small quantities to keep up their prices, but rice was always to be got at Bancoorah at famine rates. In April and May the distress in the district became very bad; crime also became very bad in those months; previously it had not been usually bad. This crime was due to want. In June the famine was very bad. There was mortality among those who came in to the feeding depôts, that is, soon after their arrival; the average was about 80 per month in Bancoorah itself, but we did not hear of much mortality in the interior of the district. In November, when Mr. Dampier visited Bancoorah, I took special pains to ascertain the mortality. I went from village to village, but could not find a single instance in which any person had died of starvation at his own home.

At the first sign of distress they flocked into the several centres of relief. Emigration was also

going on to a great extent. Large numbers emigrated to Cachar and Assam. Some few found their way to Calcutta. Few will leave their own districts. The ryots did not leave, only the laboring classes. There was great distress among the weavers, but it is a hopeless trade. Employment was given to them in their own trade early in the season. They are principally silk-weavers. Very few of them died; if they did die it must have been from natural causes; there was plenty of employment for them. The Relief Committee gave employment principally from private subscriptions. In the dearest part of the famine rice was about six local seers per rupee; that is a famine price. An ordinary laborer's wages will not suffice at that rate. Baboo Guddadhur Banerjee behaved well during the famine; he treated his ryots kindly. I should also like to mention Baboo Radhabullub Sing; he behaved well. The principal zemindars behaved well. I can't speak of the others. I think that the funds supplied by Government for relief were sufficient, abundantly so; we returned a surplus of Rs. 3,000 last month. We applied for more than we got, but what we got was sufficient. We might have imported more rice, but we wanted also public works; we did not get money for that purpose. We did not know that local funds were available, but in November we were given to understand that Rs. 20,000 of local funds had been in hand, and only Rs. 4,000 or Rs. 5,000 expended in ordinary repairs.

Comparing the statement of crimes for the last four years, that of 1866 is in excess of the total of the previous three years; the excess is principally in grain robberies committed without concealment, and in which the robbers confessed and pleaded starvation of whole families as the cause. They got provided for in jail. The families came to the feeding depôts. To prevent high prices, I think that the railway feeder roads should be completed by bridging the rivers.

No. 128.—MR. S. S. HOGG, *Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, and Chairman of the Justices of the Peace.*

[Examined in Calcutta, 1st April 1867.]

1. Q.—When did you take charge of your office?

A.—In the commencement of April of last year.

2. Q.—Mr. Schaleh has told us that while he was Commissioner of Police, a report had been called for by Government with reference to the influx of pauperism in Calcutta: was that report made by you?

A.—I think it was called for in January, and was still unanswered when I took charge of my office.

3. Q.—What was the result of that call?

A.—The subject was referred to a Committee of Justices, and they asked the Commissioner of Police for a report, and he informed them that

there was no pauperism to a great extent at that time in Calcutta. Subsequently, before replying to Government, there was a marked increase, and the Justices suggested that extraordinary measures should be adopted with the view of preventing the influx of pauperism into Calcutta. That was in the end of April or beginning of May.

4. Q.—By what body of Justices was that recommendation made—by the Justices in general meeting or by a Sub-Committee?

A.—The Justices at a general meeting assembled passed a resolution that the Government should be moved to take extraordinary measures to prevent the influx of pauperism into Calcutta.

5. Q.—What was the result of that representation?

A.—The Government wrote and said that it must be obvious to the Justices that their request could not be complied with, as Government could not take any exceptional measures to prevent paupers crowding into Calcutta.

6. Q.—What was the progress of events as regards pauperism in Calcutta?

A.—It commenced to increase rapidly about the commencement of June, and continued increasing.

7. Q.—Up to the early part of July, were no measures taken either by the Police or the Municipality regarding these paupers?

A.—In July the Justices, by spontaneous action, assigned Rs. 8,000 to provide shelter, and also hospital accommodation if necessary, and the Government allowed them to construct sheds on the strand bank, but the sheds were not actually constructed till August.

8. Q.—Was nothing else done in July?

A.—No. But the Lieutenant Governor, on several occasions, spoke to me, when he returned from Darjeeling, to know whether any extraordinary measures were necessary, and we came to the conclusion that no extraordinary measures were necessary at that time; the paupers that were in Calcutta and requiring food were being amply supplied by private charity.

9. Q.—What was the next measure adopted?

A.—As Commissioner of Police, I started a Relief Committee, and proposed to commence the administration of public relief. I subsequently heard of the movement for a public meeting before my Committee had actually begun operation.

10. Q.—When was that public meeting held?

A.—On the 13th of August.

11. Q.—Had you any instructions as Commissioner of Police to represent the Government on that occasion?

A.—I was told demi-officially by the Lieutenant Governor to state to the meeting what measures had been adopted up to that time, and to assure the meeting of His Honor's cordial support. I was the representative of the Government in some sense. I was Chairman of the General Committee started before the meeting.

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and continued to act as such subsequently. I was in fact the working member.

12. Q.—The General Committee appointed a Sub-Committee?

A.—Yes.

13. Q.—Was there some mistake in the issuing of notices to the General Committee, in consequence of which the meeting at which the Sub-Committee was appointed was very ill-attended?

A.—There was no mistake; the letters were posted, but were not delivered in time, and consequently the meeting was very badly attended.

14. Q.—After the Sub-Committee was appointed, did the General Committee continue to meet periodically or not?

A.—I think the General Committee used to meet about once a month. It was never very largely attended. The Executive Committee were the working Committee; they used to submit their proceedings to the General Committee for confirmation at their monthly sittings. The attendance of the General Committee was small, but the attendance of the Executive Committee was admirable.

15. Q.—Did the Executive Committee make any distribution of their business amongst themselves?

A.—Practically all the work was done by Mr. Davis and myself, and the collections were made by Mr. Wood, who had the entire management of the accounts. We were guided by resolutions passed by the Executive Committee.

16. Q.—After the meetings, were any steps taken to remove vagrants from the town?

A.—There were no steps taken, so far as I am aware, by the Police to interfere with the beggars of the town; but at the end of August I was very much impressed with the necessity of removing paupers from the town, and I accordingly brought the subject to the notice of the Executive Committee, who passed resolutions having for their object measures to remove paupers from the town. In accordance with those resolutions circulars were issued to the Native gentlemen who had *unnochattros*, requesting them to co-operate with the Executive Committee, and to remove their *unnochattros* to Chitpore, where suitable accommodation would be placed at their disposal for the gratuitous distribution of food.

17. Q.—It has been said that the very morning after the issue of that circular, the paupers sleeping at the strand sheds erected for them were seized by the Police and carried out of the town: can you tell us whether that is true or not?

A.—A day or two after the issue of those orders some trustworthy European Policemen were deputed to the strand bank, where the sheds had been constructed; they were desired to use their influence to remove the paupers to Chitpore, and accordingly about 2,000 of them proceeded there that day.

18. Q.—When you say that the Police were directed to use their influence, do you mean that they were told to remove the paupers?

A.—Only a few Policemen were sent. The Police undoubtedly told them to go, the strand bank being at that time nothing better than a public latrine, and it was in such a filthy state that it was almost impossible for any body to pass by; and the streets and bazars were so infested with paupers that there was a very serious apprehension of an epidemic breaking out. At night, in every hole and corner, paupers were seen begging about, and it was by no means of unfrequent occurrence that bodies were picked up on the strand bank either dead or in a dying state. I believe that, if the executive authorities had not adopted measures for the removal of the paupers, the health of the public would have been imperilled. Before removing the paupers ample accommodation was provided at Chitpore, and arrangements were made there on the most extensive scale for feeding them gratuitously. Chitpore is only two miles from the strand bank, and is just beyond the outskirts of Calcutta.

19. Q.—Had you previously arranged with the Native gentlemen who fed the poor that they should give tickets to the paupers whom they proposed to continue feeding, and that those persons should be allowed to remain?

A.—The managers of the *unnochattros* were invited to meet me, and were requested to issue tickets for the distribution of food at the different *unnochattros*, but this system really never was practically carried into effect, but was found to be almost impossible.

20. Q.—When the paupers were removed by the Police, was any exemption made in favor of the ticket-holders?

A.—No, none.

21. Q.—Was the Relief Committee consulted on the subject of removing the paupers, or was it done by you as Commissioner of Police?

A.—It was done with reference to the resolutions passed by the Committee. Executive action was taken in consequence of the resolution passed by the Executive Committee on the 30th of August.

22. Q.—Previously to that time, had any measures been taken to prevent the influx of paupers into Calcutta?

A.—I don't know that any action was taken before that, but I remember once having met the Commissioner of Burdwan at the Board of Revenue, and the expediency of directing the Magistrates to use their influence in preventing the influx of pauperism into Calcutta was discussed, and, at the same time, of taking steps to provide for them at the local centres of relief.

23. Q.—Soon after that time, were any measures taken to get the paupers out of Calcutta?

A.—Yes. In consultation with the Board of Revenue arrangements were made for assisting paupers to return to their own country.

24. Q.—Were efforts also used to induce the paupers to return to their homes?

A.—The only efforts used were by supplying them with food for the road and presenting each man with a small gratuity. No persuasion or force was used: they were all too ready to go.

25. Q.—Were not some paupers sent in a steamer to Balasore in the month of September?

A.—Yes; and each pauper was supplied with half a maund of rice and three rupees in cash, and also with some clothing. No paupers were sent by the Relief Committee without the previous sanction of the Board of Revenue, with the view to their making arrangements for their reception at the districts. When the Magistrate of Midnapore remonstrated against paupers being sent, the Relief Committee at once stopped sending paupers to their homes, and wrote officially to the Board of Revenue stating that they would not send them.

26. Q.—Was the Government of Bengal at all consulted about the policy of removing the paupers from the town and sending them to their houses?

A.—The Board of Revenue were the representatives of Government, and they entirely approved of the proceeding; and I imagine that I might have represented it demi-officially to the Lieutenant Governor.

27. Q.—Was the General Committee of the Famine Relief Fund at all consulted?

A.—All the proceedings of the Executive Committee were periodically submitted to the General Committee, and received their full sanction and support. I find that on the 24th of September, by their resolution, the General Committee approved and confirmed the proceedings of the Executive Committee. I don't think any persons were ever sent to Cuttack (except one shipment of people by a steamer supplied by the Board of Revenue), because the Board did not think it advisable to send paupers to that district.

28. Q.—We find it stated that at the meeting the following words were used by you: "It is not intended to interfere in the slightest degree with those Native gentlemen who have so nobly taken the lead in supplying food to the starving multitudes." Is that a correct report, and if so, do you think that the removal of the paupers from the town was consistent with that understanding?

A.—The report is quite correct. No interference was at any time exercised with private charity. The Native gentlemen were invited to remove their *unnochattros* to Chitpore, and in Chitpore every facility was afforded to them to distribute food gratuitously according to their own way.

29. Q.—Was not the effect of the action of the Police in removing from the town the paupers whom the Natives were accustomed to feed at their own houses, to cause the cessation of private charity?

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A.—To a certain extent it was. It was my intention to clear the town, as far as possible, of paupers, and I had no reason whatever to regret the action that I took.

30. Q.—Have you any knowledge what was the largest number of paupers in Calcutta receiving relief from private sources at one time?

A.—I think there were about 14,000 at one time.

31. Q.—Was the effect of the removal to Chitpore to diminish the number of paupers at all, or had you an equal number at Chitpore?

A.—The effect was decidedly to decrease the number. At Chitpore we used to feed between 4,000 and 5,000 paupers daily, of which about 2,000 used to reside there and the remainder used to come there for their daily meal. The action of the Police was confined to about three days, and after that no measures whatever were taken to remove the paupers, who were allowed to come in and go out as they liked. It was merely necessary to use a certain degree of compulsion at the first starting, but after the first action none whatever was taken by the Police, and free access to the town was allowed.

32. Q.—Do you consider that you were authorized by any law to exercise a certain degree of compulsion?

A.—I think the general law and public safety demanded it. Besides, begging about the town does come under the vagrant law, and every one of the paupers contravened that law. Begging in the town renders a person liable to be punished, and as every one of them spent their whole time in begging, they could legally have been convicted as vagrants.

33. Q.—Was the result that the feeding at the *unnochattros* was stopped at the town?

A. It was not stopped, but it was greatly checked.

34. Q.—Did any large proportion of the Native gentlemen who had formerly fed the people at their own houses feed them at Chitpore?

A.—Baboo Rajender Mullick was the only person who did so. He did not remove his *unnochattros* to Chitpore, but gave 100 Rupees a day to feed the paupers, and continued his donation as long as the camp continued, and he declared his approval of the measures adopted.

35. Q.—Had you reason to suppose that any serious injury had resulted from the presence of paupers in Calcutta, or was it that you only apprehended it?

A.—Had I waited till an epidemic had broken out, executive action on my part would have been useless. I considered it my duty to anticipate the evil results that might occur, and not quietly to remain passive until remedial measures would have been useless.

37. Q.—Will you explain what were the measures adopted at Chitpore for affording relief to the starving population?

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A.—A Kitchen Committee was formed of Native gentlemen, and they superintended generally the distribution of food. The direct executive management was placed under Mr. Graves, the best Police Officer at my disposal, who again was placed under the supervision of Mr. Davis. It was the duty of Mr. Graves to see that the conservancy arrangements were properly carried on and also to maintain order in the camp.

38. Q.—Do you consider that the arrangements were successfully carried out?

A.—I consider that the highest credit is due to Mr. Davis for the very efficient arrangements made at Chitpore. I do not believe it possible that better arrangements could have been made. I constantly visited Chitpore both morning and evening, and on no occasion had I any reason to believe that any improvement could be effected in Mr. Davis' arrangements. The Government also, with the view of providing labor for the paupers at Chitpore, ordered the digging of a canal, which had been previously resolved upon, to be at once commenced, and the persons entrusted with the execution of the work gave us every assistance in their power.

39. Q.—May we take it that about 5,000 was the maximum number fed at Chitpore, including laboring and non-laboring paupers?

A.—Yes.

40. Q.—At that time, throughout September, were there any *unnochattros* going?

A.—Rajender Mullick's was kept going to the last. In September I think about 2,000 persons were regularly fed in the town, but a great number were fed in twos and threes by the charitably disposed people. These small acts of charity did not come under public notice.

41. Q.—Can you give us an idea what was the average cost of each pauper kept at Chitpore from first to last?

A.—The average cost was about Rs. 4 per month, and of those in hospital about Rs. 6-10 per head. But, of course, in a camp hastily organized it was almost impossible to conduct arrangements with full regard to economy, or to maintain a close and careful supervision over the exact expenditure incurred for the poor.

42. Q.—Do you think the total expenditure in Calcutta exceeded or fell short of the local subscriptions?

A.—Mr. Wood, the Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce, was in charge of the accounts, and he received all the subscriptions, and would therefore be able to give information on this point.

43. Q.—Was the mortality amongst the pauper population great?

A.—Yes, from the beginning of August to the 2nd of December there were 10,769 received in hospital, of whom 4,276 died. That does not include those who died in the streets.

44. Q.—Have you any return from which you can give the actual number of persons who received relief?

A.—The total number sent to their homes was 11,515, at a total cost of Rs. 24,916, inclusive of carriage, clothing, and gratuities. The cost of each man therefore amounted to Rs. 2-2-7½. I should therefore fancy that the total number who received relief could not have been less than 20,000. The average daily number fed in the Chitpore camp from the commencement of August to the 2nd December was 3,593.

45. Q.—From what parts of the country did most of the paupers come?

A.—A vast number came from Jehanabad in the Hooghly district, and they were principally of the weaver caste. There were a good number also who came from Balasore, Midnapore, and Bancoorah.

46. Q.—Were there many from Nuddea and the neighbouring districts?

A.—Not very many.

47. Q.—What classes were there principally, other than weavers?

A.—I am hardly prepared to say. A great many were women, who said their husbands had told them to come and live on begging until the famine was over.

48. Q.—Did they generally arrive in an extremely emaciated state?

A.—Yes: until the camp was formed; and there was a very marked difference after the camp had been working for a month, and then they no longer bore the appearance of a famine-stricken multitude.

49. Q.—Do you think that the life they led had a bad effect on the habits and morals of the people?

A.—As far as possible we kept the women separate from the men: one shed was used apart for the women, and the men were not allowed to sleep there.

50. Q.—The original scheme of the Calcutta Committee was to give relief in Calcutta neighbouring towns and villages. To what extent was relief given in the neighbouring villages in August and September?

A.—At the time we commenced operations in Chitpore, we commenced simultaneously to assist Howrah, the 24-Pergunnahs, Oolaberreah, and Bancoorah in communication with the Board of Revenue. We supplied the funds, but the executive arrangements were made by the Board. Subsequently we extended our relief operations beyond the neighbourhood (that is, from the 21st September), but even the neighbouring districts were in no way entirely dependent on us for funds, as they were supported by Government, and the Government contributions were supplemented by our funds. No direct control was exercised by us out of Calcutta.

51. Q.—You also received and cared for the orphans?

A.—Yes; a foundling hospital was started on the Strand bank. The first arrangements were

made by Mr. Davis, the Deputy Commissioner of Police. Any orphans picked up in the street were sent to Sukea Street Thannah, where arrangements were made for their maintenance. Subsequently, it became necessary to have an asylum on a large scale. The Health Officer of the town, Dr. Tonnerre, kindly undertook the necessary arrangements, and a foundling asylum on a large scale was started, and at the request of the Lady Superioress of the Loretto House, nuns were perpetually in attendance to administer to the wants of the children.

52. Q.—There was a proposal to employ paupers on works in the Chitpore Canal: what was the result?

A.—Some hundreds of paupers, averaging from 400 to 1,000, were daily employed in digging this canal, but owing to their emaciated state and the difficulty of bringing the paupers under efficient control, very little work was got out of them. Inducements were held out to make them work by giving them extra meals, and each person also had four pice for a good day's work.

No. 129.—MR. W. P. DAVIS, *Offg. Deputy Commissioner of Police, CALCUTTA.*

[Examined in Calcutta, 15th April 1867.]

1. Q.—Were you Deputy Commissioner of Police last year?

A.—Yes; I was Officiating Deputy Commissioner.

2. Q.—Was your attention drawn to the influx of paupers into Calcutta early in the season?

A.—Yes; in the end of February and beginning of March, and it continued till about the end of October.

3. Q.—When did the charitably disposed Natives first commence feeding them?

A.—In small numbers early, but in the beginning of May, I took notice that they were being largely fed.

4. Q.—Of what classes were the people you noticed?

A.—They were mostly from Midnapore, and consisted more of women and children than men.

5. Q.—Did they arrive in an extremely emaciated and bad state?

A.—Yes.

6. Q.—Did you gather from them whether at that time measures of relief were taken in the parts from whence they came?

A.—I could not gather from them that any extensive measures of relief were taken.

7. Q.—When did the weavers of Jehanabad and Bishenpore first commence to come in?

A.—In large numbers in the end of May and beginning of June; they were all in a very wretched state, both weavers and others.

8. Q.—In May, June, and July, was ample food for all provided at the Native *unnochattros*?

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A.—Yes; I think so. But there were a great many who could not crawl to the *unnochattros*. All who went got relief. Those who could not crawl to the *unnochattros* were taken by the Police to the hospitals.

9. Q.—When were public measures first taken to relieve the poor?

A.—I believe the first measures were taken when sheds were built on the strand bank, and then I got some food sent down to the sheds. But all those lying in a state unable to take care of themselves were from the very first sent to hospital.

10. Q.—Throughout was any one ever left to die whom the Police could not carry to hospital?

A.—None that the Police saw. I never heard of any not being taken from want of hospital accommodation?

11. Q.—Was there much casual mortality in the streets in June and July?

A.—A great deal. I noticed a great deal of mortality amongst children, especially from over-feeding, after having been a long time without food.

12. Q.—Have you any return of the number found dead in the streets?

A.—I have not; but it could be got from Major Reveley, the present Deputy Commissioner of Police.

13. Q.—After the meeting of the 13th of August, between that time and the end of August, did the Police in any way interfere with beggars in the town?

A.—On the 18th of August, I went down to the strand bank, and told the people that there would be a distribution of cloth at Chitpore, and about 700 or 800 went. Previously to that I had personally distributed many thousand yards of cloth. The Police impressed on the paupers that they would be fed and clothed at Chitpore. The paupers remained in the town by hundreds till some time in the end of September, when the sheds were pulled down.

14. Q.—When were feeding arrangements first made at Chitpore?

A.—The 18th of August was the first day on which the feeding commenced at Chitpore.

15. Q.—Did you not find the people come willingly to Chitpore at the mere offer of food: was it necessary to bribe them with cloth?

A.—There was a rumour that they were going to be sent to Chitpore to be shipped to the Mauritius, and some management was required to disabuse them of the idea. The paupers did not come to Chitpore in large numbers till about the end of August.

16. Q.—We are told that immediately after the resolution of the Executive Relief Committee of the 31st of August, the Police were used to remove the paupers in the town; was that the fact?

A.—The Police went about the *unnochattros* and different places, and told the paupers that they were to go to the camp at Chitpore, as the feeding

would be stopped at the private *unnochattros*. The Police never laid hands on them, but told them to go.

17. Q.—We find a statement that one morning about the 1st of September, the paupers were all seized in their beds in the strand sheds and taken away: is that true?

A.—On the 30th of August the resolution to remove the paupers from the town was passed; on the 31st the circular was issued, and on the 1st of September about 2,000 paupers were taken so the camp at Chitpore. I went round on the night previous with tickets, and it was as much as I could do to prevent their crushing me for the tickets. All those who had the tickets were to appear the next day at the camp; the object of issuing the tickets was that impostors and the ordinary professional beggars of the town should not appear, but only those who were really paupers. I issued the tickets at night and explained to the paupers that the tickets would admit them, and I am quite sure that no force was used.

18. Q.—But in the morning did the Police say "go," or were they only ready to show the way to the paupers?

A.—The Police said "come," not "go."

19. Q.—Practically, was it not the fact that the town was cleared of paupers by the Police?

A.—They were so far cleared by the *unnochattros* being closed and no food being given in the town; but no measures of force were used. The *unnochattros* were closed at the request of the Famine Committee.

20. Q.—Did you say that after the removal in the beginning of September a good many still continued to sleep in the town?

A.—Yes, many hundreds. I had them counted every night: we had lamps and policemen at each of the sheds of the strand bank.

21. Q.—Finally, were the sheds pulled down?

A.—Not till the number of paupers sleeping in them diminished to less than fifty in the whole of the sheds together.

22. Q.—What were the arrangements at the Chitpore camp?

A.—We had two separate ranges of sheds on either side of the road. On one side the women and children used to sleep, and on the other the men. The sheds would accommodate about 4,000 persons. A pucca building at some distance from the sheds was used as a kitchen, and verandah sheds all round were built for the paupers to feed under during the rains. There was a Committee of Native gentlemen who superintended the kitchen arrangements. Floating latrines were built in the river, and the people kept as clean as we could. The paupers who volunteered were allowed to work, and had the preference in getting their food before the others and in larger quantities. The men got 4 pice each, the women 3 pice, and the children 2 pice, for a day's work. It was not till some time in October that the Committee would allow

us to make any difference. All who came were fed, unless we knew them to be professional beggars of the town.

23. Q.—Eventually, did the paupers get over their prejudice against the camp?

A.—Entirely. When the report about sending them to the Mauritius was spread, a great many went to Burdwan, where the rajah had established an *unnochattro*, but the whole of them came back. They never resorted to the camp in such numbers as they did in the aggregate to the private *unnochattros*. The number that were fed in the camp were told off and counted daily, but with regard to those resorting to the *unnochattros*, it was all guess work. But still I do not think that so many were fed in any one day at the camp as at the *unnochattros*.

24. Q.—We were told that there was still a very large mortality. Did large numbers go to hospital from the camp?

A.—We had two Native doctors at the camp in attendance alternately, and any persons whom they thought ill were taken to the hospital in *doolies* kept for the purpose. The 10,000 in all that were taken to hospital were not exclusively those from the camp, but included those from the streets. Those that went home went in very good condition.

25. Q.—What was the food of the paupers in the camp?

A.—They had *balam* rice, as much as they could eat; *balam* rice is the best common rice—not table rice. There was dall and vegetables; and at first on two days in the week, and latterly one day in the week, there was fish given to them.

26. Q.—Do you think the morals of the people were materially affected by living in large congregations?

A.—Yes, more especially when they were in the town.

27. Q.—Can you tell us of what classes the people were?

A.—The largest class were weavers, and the next were day-laborers.

28. Q.—Those that went home you think were thoroughly recovered as a rule?

A.—Out of a family of six or seven there would be a child or one or two of them not thoroughly recovered; but the great majority had recovered. Many who went home came back again, especially those from close by. A great many returned home during the holidays at the *doorga* poojah season, when we were not sending any home ourselves.

I should like to record that there was not a single accident in the camp from the first to the last. None were crushed or injured in any way.

No. 130.—DR. C. F. TONNERRE, *Health Officer of the Town of Calcutta.*

[Examined in Calcutta, 1st April 1867.]

1. Q.—You were Health Officer throughout the famine?

A.—Yes.

2. Q.—When was your attention first called to the influx of pauperism in the town?

A.—My attention was officially called to the circumstance by the Chairman of the Justices as Commissioner of Police on the 23rd of June in consequence of a letter addressed to the Commissioner by the Government of Bengal.

3. Q.—Before that, had your personal attention been called to the subject?

A.—My personal attention had been drawn to the increase of the begging population in the streets of Calcutta, consisting mainly of females and children of both sexes.

4. Q.—Had you found the sanitary state of those people to be very bad?

A.—It was bad, inasmuch as they did not know what place to resort to, and lay at the first place convenient to themselves. There was not a great increase of mortality in June; it was said to be very great, but I find that it was not so very great as it was supposed to be.

5. Q.—You think that up to the end of June the mortality amongst the paupers was not very large?

A.—I think so.

6. Q.—Up to that time had the health of the town not been affected? general

A.—No.

7. Q.—In July and August was the mortality amongst the paupers very great?

A.—Yes in August.

8. Q.—Was the health of the general population of the town then seriously affected?

A.—No; it was not.

9. Q.—Was the mortality amongst the pauper population due to great starvation or to disease?

A.—It was brought on by disease, the consequence of starvation.

10. Q.—What were the diseases from which the paupers generally suffered?

A.—Diarrhoea, dysentery, cholera, and low fever.

11. Q.—At that season and in the rainy season generally, was there a considerable degree of cholera amongst the population of the town?

A.—In July and August there was not much increase of mortality from cholera; there was not much mortality in July and August amongst the resident population.

12. Q.—Is it your experience that cholera amongst the poorer classes, such as these paupers were and such as the classes who are strangers to this climate, is not of an infectious character, and that it does not spread amongst the population?

A.—I think it does not spread, and is not of an infectious character.

13. Q.—Which were the months in which there was the greatest mortality amongst the paupers?

A.—I think the mortality was greatest in July and November.

14. Q.—To what do you attribute the excess mortality in November?

A.—I think it was from want of proper nourishment; there was not then a single private charity in the town. There was a great prejudice to going to the Chitpore camp. The change of season also affects greatly the pauper population of Calcutta.

15. Q.—What was the general sanitary state of the town throughout 1866?

A.—It was better than it has ever been since my appointment as Health Officer.

16. Q.—Have you formed any estimate of the number of distressed strangers who came into the town up to the end of July?

A.—Not less than 18,000.

17. Q.—Do you think that was the maximum of distressed strangers in the town in any season during the famine?

A.—I only form the estimate from those I saw fed at the *unnachatros* as well as at other private charities. I believe there were so many, but cannot speak definitely.

18. Q.—Did the Natives show great liberality in feeding the paupers?

A.—Yes; in fact too great liberality in some instances. Too much food was given to the paupers, and it was given in large quantities to adults as well as to children. The person most remarkable for his extensive charity was Baboo Rajender Mullick; then the Burra Bazar merchants and Bombay merchants; also some of the up-country merchants, and Hajee Zekariah. The *unnachatros* organized by Baboo Peary Churn Sircar in College Square and Moktearam Baboo's Street was also an extensive charity, and there was another charity organized by Baboo Peary Chund Mitter and his brothers and several others in Neemtollah Street. There was also a charity got up by Baboo Hurro Chunder Ghose, Judge of the Small Cause Court, and the Committee of residents in Bulloram Ghose's Street.

19. Q.—In August were you consulted on the question whether on sanitary grounds it was necessary to remove the paupers from the town?

A.—No.

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20. Q.—Have you formed any opinion that there was any necessity for a measure of that kind?

A.—If the location of the paupers had been properly organized, there would have been no necessity for it; but there never was any organization as to the lodging of the paupers.

21. Q.—Were not sheds erected on the strand bank?

A.—Yes; in two places; but that was not exactly sufficient. They were erected in other places also but were afterwards converted into hospitals. Space could have been found in the town for the whole of the paupers.

22. Q.—Were any sanitary arrangements made to obviate danger from the large number of paupers in June and July?

A.—The only measures taken were that the conservancy establishment were compelled to work three hours beyond their average time, and all the places intended for the location of the paupers were provided with latrines which offered every facility for the cleanliness and conservancy of the place.

23. Q.—Was not the result that at one time there was a very considerable amount of filth in the town?

A.—The strand bank from the first to the last was a great nuisance. I proposed an extra conservancy establishment for the purpose, which was granted, and that was effectual so far that the night soil was removed in the morning, and the ground was covered with filth again before the next day; and as the weather was very hot, the effluvia was most noxious. It would have been possible to abate the nuisance if the Police were put on watch to prevent the people soiling the place. The condition of the strand bank gave rise to a good deal of complaint; and if it had been allowed to continue in that condition, owing to the great heat of the season, it might have caused a good deal of harm to the town.

24. Q.—Was it possible to make arrangements at Chitpore with regard to night soil better than it was possible in the town?

A.—If it were possible to gather all the paupers in Chitpore, it was easy to make proper conservancy arrangements in the place. It was easier where the people were congregated than where they were scattered about the town.

25. Q.—When the Chitpore camp was established, was the sanitary state of the town then what it should be?

A.—It was worse. After the camp at Chitpore was established, the paupers went there to receive food and returned to the town; and it was this that created the nuisance.

26. Q.—Eventually was the difficulty got over?

A.—Yes, by the end of October, when there was nobody left; the Police had then succeeded in driving them out of the town.

27. Q.—Did the Police use any direct force to get the paupers out of the town?

A.—No; but I have seen the Police marching them off like a flock of sheep to the camp.

28. Q.—On the whole, do you think it was a bad and unnecessary measure to get the paupers out of the town?

A.—I say it was not necessary as far as the feeding of the poor was concerned, because the Natives were quite prepared to feed them. But on sanitary grounds it would have been good if it could have been carried out by detaining them at Chitpore.

29. Q.—Practically, was the result to stop the *unnachatros*?

A.—It was. Several of the Native gentlemen complained to me on the subject.

30. Q.—Was the result to provide better means of relief at Chitpore?

A.—I don't know if they could have provided better means of relief than at the *unnachatros*. They were better off as far as the shelter went, but as far as the food was concerned they were not better off. The food given at the *unnachatros* was as it could not have been better for the purpose.

31. Q.—Was the food the paupers got at the Chitpore camp as good as could have been expected for charity?

A.—Yes; but it was very inferior to the food given at the *unnachatros*. The paupers at Chitpore got better by degrees, but there was a very large mortality; 656 were sent to Casee Mitter's ghat to be burned; but this number did not include those who died in hospital.

32. Q.—Was the result of the removal to Chitpore to diminish the number of paupers that had been fed in the town before that?

A.—Yes; it diminished the pauper population of Calcutta by more than half. I am at a loss to account for what became of the remainder; they probably went out of the town. One of the charities on the Barrackpore road, that at Bailgurrah, was greatly increased by the establishment of the Chitpore camp.

33. Q.—Was there much fever amongst the paupers in the camp?

A.—Yes, there was a great deal of fever; I have no estimate of the mortality, as Chitpore is out of my jurisdiction.

34. Q.—Were there any other sanitary measures taken?

A.—None but an increase of the conservancy establishment to look after the *unnachatros* and prevent the accumulation of filth.

35. Q.—Did you take charge of the orphan establishment?

A.—Yes, from the 28th of August. When I took charge of it, it was a mere asylum offered to sick women and orphan children at the mint sheds. The inmates were lying on the ground on mats. They had medical attendance given to them by two Native sub-assistant surgeons from

the Medical College. It was a kind of lying-in asylum. In the beginning there was no definite classification of the patients admitted there. The women after confinement remained in hospital if they had no family or friends, they otherwise went away. Of the children those who were not claimed were kept in hospital until they were subsequently transferred to Ballygunge; the mothers with children who remained were also transferred. On three occasions, at their own request, they were discharged; once 24 women, another time 18, and again 18. Only four women remained, and they were kept until the asylum was transferred to the hands of the lady superioress and the nuns of the Convent, and the women who were turned out were taken charge of by the nuns; these were separated from the orphans.

36. Q.—Was the orphanage entirely composed of unclaimed children, besides the women?

A.—Entirely. Every one claimed was made over. Those who were claimed were under 8 years of age. Very few children were claimed, only about 40 or 50.

37. Q.—Among those who remained, did the elder children make any attempt to retain their caste?

A.—So long as I remained, I did every thing to prevent any infringement of caste. But the fact was that the children and even the women had no objection to mess in the same shed on the same mat, and the same plates were never given twice to the same persons; but still their caste was, as far as possible, retained. Baboo Rajendro Mullick gave me some money to purchase shoes for those who were suffering from cold, and several of them refused to wear shoes because they said shoes were not worn by their caste.

38. Q.—What was the sanitary condition of the orphanage?

A.—At Ballygunge it was very good. But at the beginning there was a great mortality, because they were so much emaciated and reduced, and they were only kept alive by medical comforts and great attention to diet. The greatest part recovered their health, and their constitutions were very much improved and re-invigorated.

39. Q.—Had you opportunities of judging whether most of the people sent to their homes from Chitpore had recovered their health?

A.—I had no opportunity of judging; the camp was beyond my jurisdiction.

40. Q.—Will you tell us generally what figures you have of the mortality amongst the paupers?

A.—The total number of deaths of paupers of all sorts from June is 6,993.

41. Q.—Is it your experience that people who have been reduced to a certain point of emaciation seldom recover by any means?

A.—The greatest care is required, and even then the majority will not recover—such care as could not be bestowed on the number of paupers in our hands.

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