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Report of the Rev. Affairs
of Malabar and Canara

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A
REPORT

ON THE

REVENUE AFFAIRS OF MALABAR
AND CANARA.

Dated 7th September 1807.

BY

WILLIAM THACKERAY.

Printed for Convenience of reference

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1911.

Not for Sale.

REVENUE DEPARTMENT.

TO THE COLLECTOR IN
MALABAR.

SIR,


I am directed by the President and Members of the Board of Revenue to transmit, for your information, and for the purpose of being placed in the records of your Office, an Extract from a report dated 7th September 1807, made by Mr William Thackeray on the revenue affairs of Malabar and Canara.

Fort St. George,
11th April 1814.
Despd. 19th July.

I am
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
J. HAUBURY,
SECRETARY.

ExD.
E. Balfour.

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செப்பனெடுபவர் பெயர் **Sh. Sengodan**
 செப்பனெடுவதற்கான கருத்துக்
 சொல்லப்பட்ட நாளி **26/9/94**
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 சரிபார்க்கும் **சுமந்திரன்**
 மு. ப. **சுமந்திரன்**
 கையெழுத்தம் **சுமந்திரன்**

~~XIII-A~~

EXTRACT FROM MR. W^m. THACKERAY'S REPORT

DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1807.

Malabar extends from Kuwai to Cochin about * miles. It contains about 7,249 square miles of which Wynad may contain about 1250, Cochin about 745. The country along the sea coast and the banks of Rivers is well planted and peopled, but under the Ghats is hilly, woody, and thinly inhabited. Malabar is intersected with better roads perhaps than any other province in India. One road extends down the sea coast from Kuwai to Cochin, another from Palghat thro' Tambacherry to Kotiary, another from the Kotiary Ghat to Calicut. These are the chief roads which run up and down North and South. There are others which cross the country East and West, one from Palghat to the sea, one from Calicut to Tambacherry together with others in different directions. Trees, chiefly Jack, are planted on each side. Repairs are however necessary, and a few more bridges and some choultries in so rainy a climate would be convenient.

Over the numerous rivers there are good ferry boats. These roads however are more useful to the state as Military highways than to the Inhabitants for the conveyance of trade. The inland navigation is so extensive that the trade of the country may be in a great measure conveyed by water. Some improvement might be made in the navigation by new cuts. The Beypoor and Calicut rivers for instance may be joined. There are no Villages and few towns in Malabar except along the sea coast; every man lives on his estate or his farm. The gardens are usually enclosed with a high bank and deep gully like a rampart and ditch. Their houses are built within these enclosures under the shade of Jack, Coconut and Soopari trees. The high grounds are scarped into terraces one above the other for the cultivation of dry grains. The valleys are laid out in rice fields; the houses of the cultivators are built on the rising grounds which surround the valleys; the prospect of a valley laid out in this manner surrounded with rising grounds embellished with cottages and plantations and then again overtopped with hills cut into terraces is pleasing. There are many varieties of rice grown according to soil and season which are chiefly watered by the rains. They plough but slightly, burn the roots and the grass turned up, manure with ashes, leaves, and in some places with salt mud. The seed is sown from March to July but chiefly in April and May. The Harvest time is from July to January. The accounts of produce are not to be depended upon. Some lands are said to produce but three, some sixteen fold, on the seed sown. On some lands two, on some even three Crops are annually produced. The first crop may be sown in April; after a month it is weeded. It undergoes three weedings and in four months the grain is ripe. For the second crop they plough from July to September and sow the seed which in a month is transplanted weeded twice and in three months the grain is ripe. The third crop is perhaps bad husbandry, but when it is resorted to, they plough and sow in December or January, weed every month, and for want of rain are at last obliged to have recourse to small reservoirs of water.

* Blank in the Original.

° This has since been done.

The dry cultivation is of little importance. The soil on the hills is gravelly and stoney, that along the sea coast sandy light poor soil, about the ghats more mixed with rich vegetable mould. The heavy rains of Malabar and Canara seem to tear away the soil and leave nothing but stones and sand. A few valleys are rich because they become the receptacles of the finer particles of mould which stop where they can be carried no further. On the whole the soil of these provinces is poor.

There are a great variety of casts in Malabar. The Brahmuns are fewer and less civilised than those of other provinces. They live by agriculture priestcraft and other occupations but are not employed as public Revenue servants. Malabar is the only Province I have heard of in which the Brahmuns do not keep the accounts. The Nairs are divided into several classes of whom four seem to be of superior rank. The Nairs proper—The Menwan Nairs who are scribes and accountants—The trading Nairs and Chakiar Nairs who trade, fight, and cultivate the earth. There are three lower classes who follow arms and agriculture and when not otherwise employed any lower occupations. The Nairs do not marry like other Hindoos it is said, and in point of chastity, and sobriety they seem inferior to many other casts; but their courage and fidelity seem to compensate in some degree for the want of those virtues. The Kolkar corps composed chiefly of Nairs have distinguished themselves very much.

The towns along the coast are chiefly peopled with Mapillahs who originally came from Arabia, and who have probably conducted the trade with the Red sea since the time of Alexander the Great. They were early converted to the faith, but tho' they are fanatics they have retained or adopted some Malabar customs which seem contrary to the Laws of the Prophet. They are cunning traders, and desperate robbers. They serve as Peons, possess land and turn their hand to every thing. They are said to hate the Hindoo Idolaters by whom they are equally detested.

The Teers and Mugwas are very industrious people who turn their hand to any thing. The Teers have land and are a very useful set ashore; the Mugwas are boatmen, fishermen and equally useful on water.

There are few Christians in Malabar and no weavers or manufacturers that deserve much attention.

There seem to be six species of Chermurs or slaves who are like our Pariars. No other cast are bought and sold as slaves in Malabar. They are said to have been caught and domesticated by Parseram for the use of the Barhmuns. They are most likely the descendants of the Aborigines who were conquered by the Chola Kings and who fled to the woods, but were at last driven by their wants to prefer slavery and rice to starving freedom. They are generally but not always sold with the land. A pair of slaves may be worth four pair of Buffaloes. They are also let out, and pledged. They get an allowance of rice and a cloth. They some times run away but still remain in their servile condition. If reclaimed the children they may have had during their stay, are divided between the old master from whom they fled and the new master to whom they resorted. I see no means of easing them immediately like our Pariars. They will by degrees be converted into labourers.

The little enquiry I could make and the Timber which I saw in the Calicut River convinced me that there is a great deal of valuable teak in Malabar. The value of the tree as it stands is small the expence of carriage by coolies and Elephants tho' it be brought but a little way is what enhances its price. The forests are claimed by Nairs who pretend to the proprietary right in the soil or trees, and have actually exercised this right by selling and mortgaging the trees to Mapillah Merchants. In order to establish the Monopoly on sure grounds and just principles the Company ought to buy up the rights of individuals if there are any private owners whose claims it is likely that the Court of Judicature will acknowledge. Having purchased up their rights and either bought up or relinquished the trees which have been actually sold or mortgaged to the Merchants the Company will possess the sole property in the soil and in the trees. They may then cut, preserve, sell or keep for their own use, or for the Navy what they please. The Native Merchants at Calicut complain of the Monopoly because they are likely to lose the profits of the Trade but it appears to me that they could have no right to complain if the Company were to buy up all the properties, rights, and compacts which the Courts are likely to recognize. They presented a Petition to me but I referred them to the Court and told them that the Company itself could not do them any injustice. The forests produce but little revenue to the persons who now claim the property in them because their poverty and ignorance keep them from making the most of the timber—the wants, the means, and the capital of the Company will make it highly valuable—but the Company should secure the property if they wish to keep up the Monopoly, because the claimants may get rich and cunning enough to make the most of the forest, and to defend their claims in the Court, so that unless the arrangement is at first securely concluded some difficulty may attend the Monopoly. Had orders from home not actually arrived perhaps it would have been as well to leave the forest in the hands of the Natives, to give a good price for the timber, and to prohibit the felling trees under a certain size; a good price for good timber would make the preservation and plantation of Teak an object to those who pretend to be proprietors of the forest.

Almost the whole of the land in Malabar cultivated and uncultivated is private property and held by Jenm right which conveys full absolute property in the soil. Many conjectures might be formed about the origin of landed property in these countries. The Natives have many fables of God creating, or rather raising Malabar and Canara out of the sea, and giving them to the Brahmuns. Without going so far back into antiquity it may be only necessary to observe that we find the Land occupied by a set of men who have had possession time out of mind. We find that they have enjoyed a Landlord's rent, that they have pledged it for large sums which they borrowed on the security of the land, and that it has been taken as good security so that at this day a very large sum is due to creditors to whom the Land is mortgaged. Had the creditors ever doubted the validity of the Jenm title or imagined that Government would have called it in question, it is not probable that they would have resigned their money on so precarious a security. There are rules established time out of mind for the transfer, lease, and mortgage of land and where a regular system of common Law has been established and observed time out of mind and where it appears in general reasonable and applicable it may be inferred that the object for which such a system was formed

must exist. There is obstinate opinion and general tradition to confirm the validity and antiquity of the title. The neighbouring countries of Travenkore, Bednore, and Canara have the same institution and nearly the same rules regarding private property which seem never to have been called in question. Every public and private authority except Tippoo appear to have admitted this right. The British Government appear to have recognised it, and the people of Malabar have shewn that they are able and willing to defend it with stronger arguments than words and at all events whether the right existed or no, it would be now impolitic and unjust to call it in question—so that I think it will be admitted that the Malabar Jelmkars do possess the full property in the soil. It is almost certain that the Lands originally belonged to the Pagodas and at a very early period were largely alienated and from the Pagodas the present Jelmkars or proprietors derived their title. There is no doubt but that many lands have been usurped since Hyder's invasion. The Mappillahs under the Mysore, the rajahs under the Company's Government, have probably possessed themselves of Lands to which they had no right but their individual usurpations do not affect the general rights of the Jelmkars who consider their rights as valid and sacred as the country Gentlemen in England.

The Jelm right conveys full absolute property in the land is not liable to become extinct by laches or desertion. The Jelmkar or proprietor can dispose of his Land as he pleases—by executing the deeds of transfer he transfers it to an Individual—by treason he forfeits it to the sovereign. If he dies intestate without heirs it escheats to the state; but as the Jelmkars claim the right of adoption and the power of devising their Lands to whom they please but chiefly to Pagodas, Land seldom reverts to the state for want of heirs.

The Jelmkar may dispose of his estate in a variety of ways. By Kyoedoo Otti he pledges his Land and delivers it over to the Mortgagee. In this case the proprietor receives from the Mortgagee two thirds of the value of the estate, but retains a certain quantity of Interest in the Land, which may be valued at one third of the whole value. He must alienate this remaining quantity of Interest in the Land before he loses the character of a proprietor. Rules are established for the adjustment of rent and interest between the parties, and for the redemption of the land on the payment of the sum received by the proprietor.

Otti is another contract nearly the same; or rather another term for the same transaction. In both cases the Mortgagee or tenant in possession pays the surplus of rent above his interest to the proprietor.

Otti Koolly Kanum is nearly the same, if there be a difference, it seems to exist respecting the rules for the redemption of the Land. These three contracts appear to be nearly the same. When the proprietor has once dipped his estate in one of these ways he is often unable to pay off the incumbrance; the same indolence extravagance or bad luck which forced him at first to incumber his estate will probably oblige him to borrow again. In this case he executes another contract termed Oti Kempoorum and receives a further sum from the tenant the amount of which is regulated on a certain proportion of the whole value and he resigns a further proportionate quantity of interest in the land. The chief ad-

vantage which the tenant appears to derive from this second transaction is that he keeps the whole rent without accounting to the proprietor, for the second advance is supposed so great that the whole rent can go no further than discharge the interest.

If the necessities of the proprietor require a further advance of cash he executes the Ner Moodul, as it is termed, and receives a further percentage on the whole value of the estate and resigns so much more of his interest which becomes so faint that there is little chance of redemption. There appears to be some difference in different places in the conditions of the Ner Moodul. In some the option of redemption seems to reside with the tenant, in some the original proprietor still seems to have the option of redeeming the Land upon the payment of a fine in addition to the debt. The KoodimaNer seems to be nearly the same as the Ner Moodul. Where the option of redemption has gone, the long possession of the tenant has converted the tenure by pledge into a kind of freehold.

There seem to be some varieties and niceties in the terms and conditions of these transactions in different places which can only be ascertained in the Court. All these deeds do not seem to be in use every where, nor does the same percentage appear to be universally paid. There is another deed termed Jelmum Ponnunum which usually follows the Ner Moodul and approaches nearer than any of the others to actual transfer. On executing this deed the proprietor receives a further advance and parts with almost his whole interest in the Land. All these transactions are in reality transfers of property because the tenant acquires a greater interest in the land than the original proprietor but in order to complete the sale another transaction follows. The Ottiper as it is termed is executed which irrevocably and completely transfers the property.

The Ottiper must follow the other deeds and appears to be invalid unless they are previously executed so that in those parts of the country where the three consequential deeds, the Ottikimpoorum, and Ner Moodul, are usual the two last are some times executed at the same time with the Ottiper, merely to observe forms but in some places it would appear that the execution of the Ner Moodul is the only necessary preliminary to the absolute transfer of the property by Ottiper. The Ottiper seems to be in general use and known by the same term from Kurwar to Cape Comorin.

In this manner the proprietor gradually divests himself of his interest in the land as his necessities oblige him to execute these preliminary acts until by the Ottiper he loses the character, as he had before lost the most essential attributes of a landowner. Originally this final contract was usually executed with sundry forms and ceremonies with the consent of the next heir, the knowledge of the prince and in the presence of a certain number of witnesses.

There are various modes of letting land on lease. Kaunumpatom is where the land-lord lets his land receiving a sum in advance from the lessee which may be considered either as a loan, or as security for the due payment of the rent—the tenant retains so much of the rent as will discharge his claim for interest and pays the remainder to the proprietor.

Ponnyumpatum seems to be nearly the same. It is a lease where the rent and interest of the sum advanced by the tenant seem security for each other.

Another mode of leasing land is where the rent of so many years is calculated and advanced by the tenant to whom the Land is made over for as many years as will repay him.

Warrumpatum is plain lease, *Kaori Kanum* is a lease on favorable terms for the improvement of land, and the rules established for the cultivation of waste, and improvement of cultivated land seem well adapted.

These may be called leasehold tenures. There are others or perhaps other terms for the same transactions—*admi Jennum* seems to be where low people such as artificers hold small spots of ground from Rajahs and great men. It seems the genteel way for Rajahs and great men to alienate ground. The other terms and tenures I do not understand the Vukkeels in the Zillah Court will have an ample field in arguing and explaining these tenures which it would require many years practice to understand thoroughly. The gentlemen who have written on Malabar, especially Major Walker have amply discussed these tenures, all these transactions combine the natures of lease and mortgage which most likely arose from the deficient administration of Justice. In former times when once a man got possession, it was difficult to turn him out again, except by force of arms. The proprietor therefore insisted on a sum in advance by way of security for his rent. The deeds which serve to record these transactions are drawn out in a peculiar character which may be termed the black letter of Malabar. The Rajahs have a peculiar character and rules in their transactions.

The lands are so deeply involved and alienated by these contracts that in many cases the Jelmkar or original proprietor only receives an handful of grain or measure of ghee as an acknowledgment of his title. In some cases the Jelmkar, in others the tenant, in others the cultivator pays the land tax. The value of land varies, but it is said that land sells for 20 years purchase reckoning on the clear rent. If this is the case land sells for more than in Canara which is owing either to the less improved state of the Malabar land or to concealment of the real rental. If land is capable of improvement it is more valuable in proportion to rent it. If the real rent is greater than the ostensible, it will appear to sell for more in proportion to the ostensible rent.

The difficulty of absolute transfer may perhaps injure the interests of agriculture, and the Courts may hit on some methods of simplifying the rules and transactions relating to land. The incumbrance on the land has been considered a Clog upon improvement. The Mopillers are the great purchasers and mortgagees; their industry, wealth and habits of business seem to give them some advantage over the Nairs; however it is perhaps in a great measure the money of the Mopillers which gives such value to the lands in Malabar. Government having nothing to do with the *kanum*, or incumbrance on the landed property except that care must be taken to prevent any collusive management by which the collection of the land tax may be impeded.

Land seems to be more valuable in the northern than in the southern districts because the land tax is lighter. In Cotiote and the northern districts they are said to pay only 50, in the southern districts 80 per cent. of the rent to Government. In both cases the proportion paid as land tax may be exaggerated

however they must still pay more to the southward. This inequality is owing to the nature of the country. The southern districts are more open where armies can act, and most likely in a few years Tippoo would have forced the people there to have paid the whole rent to the Sirkar—they would then have lost their property in the land and have virtually become farmers like the Ryots in the Ceded district. But Cotiote and the Northern districts of Malabar were never thoroughly subdued by the Mysore Government and it is only now that we are beginning to establish our authority there—the strength of the country has enabled the people to defend their rent, and remain Landlords. Perhaps the strength of the country along the ghauts is the true cause of the existence of private property in the soil which the Inhabitants of Bednore, Canara, Malabar and Fravancore not only claim but have been generally ready to support by force of arms. It would most likely have existed every where but in other parts of India armies of horse could carry into immediate execution the order of a despot, who never admitted of private property because his wants incited, and his power enabled him to draw the whole landlords rent.

The succession to landed property is guided by the same rules which govern the succession to other real property. In these casts in which the sisters son performs the funeral ceremonies he succeeds as heir. In those where the succession follows the common Hindoo law the sons perform the ceremonies, and succeed to the estate. The same rules seem generally to prevail except perhaps with some slight differences respecting the elder brothers portion in dividing estates among coheirs. In the one cast the Estate is divided among the sons, as it is in other parts of India, in the other among the sisters or rather among their sons. The succession of the sisters son has no particular effect upon, nor does it arise particularly from the institution of private property in the soil. It probably arises from the ancient privilege of the Brahmins to visit the women, for when they established their Hierarchy they probably wanted soldiers and mistresses. They introduced the Nairs—and they have continued the custom ever since—the head peons most likely became Rajahs as they have in most other places, and by degrees got possession of the lands—as the fathers of the children were uncertain the succession followed the mother about whom no mistake could arise. This appears to me to be the origin of this extraordinary custom, which when once established among the Polite Nairs became fashionable, and was adopted by the other casts, even by the fanatic Mopillers who are followers of the prophet; the Nair is said never to marry like other Hindoos—he forms a temporary connection with any young woman that pleases him, which lasts while they continue faithful. The children he has nothing to do with; they belong to the family of the lady. This aversion to wedlock so contrary to the usual customs, ideas and religion of the Hindoos has probably given rise to a rule of succession as contrary to their general customs.

At a very early period it is probable that Malabar was conquered by a king from above the ghauts who established the Pagodas and Malabar was governed by a Theocracy. The Nairs may have been established at the same time by the conqueror or called in by the Brahmins as a Military body to support the Government in the same manner that the Velmah Dhorahs were introduced into the Northern Sirkars. In process of time they obtained settlements on the land—the

head Peons probably took advantage of opportunities of aggrandising themselves and became Rajahs at a remote period—they continued to govern Malabar like independent princes but still as Deputies of the Gols who resided in the Pagodas until Hyder's invasion A. D. 1760. There is no proof that any regular land tax existed in Malabar previous to that event—tradition and general opinion seem to deny it—the state of Travankore where it is said there was no regular land tax gives probability to this opinion, while the former state of Canara where there has been a regular land tax for many centuries renders it somewhat doubtful. The proprietors of land were certainly bound to render military service, and most likely to contribute 20 per cent, in case of invasion. The pagodas and the Rajahs had lands of their own. The Rajahs had other sources of revenue from fines, royalties, impost, personal taxes and plunder which were sufficient to support them. There was no army besides the Militia, nor any expensive establishments to support, so that there does not seem to have been any necessity for a general land tax, nor had the Rajahs power perhaps to collect one. It is only great states that want, or in India can collect the land revenue easily.

Hyder sent an army into Malabar in 1760 and came himself in 1766—he subdued the country, and according to his custom drove out most of the Rajahs except those who conciliated him by immediate submission—during the war of 1769 the Rajahs occasioned some disturbance, but in 1771, he came down himself and re-established his authority. In 1782 Asshud Beg Khan was appointed his deputy who made considerable progress in subduing and settling the Country. His settlement of the revenue is said to be the foundation of that of the Commissioners, but there are some doubts about his assessment and collections—for as Malabar was never thoroughly subdued and settled like the countries long subject to the great Governments which have existed in the peninsula, there is no regular establishment of Village Registers. Even the *Menwans* who now keep the *Hobly* accounts are not on the same footing as the hereditary *Curnums* of the other Provinces—nor are they so skilful at accounts.

In 1787 it is said that things were going on pretty well but in 1788 Tippoo came down and proposed to the Hindoos the true faith and not content with empty propositions about religion he levied a contribution on his infidel subjects and began the pious work of conversion by forcibly circumcising a great many Brahmuns, Nairs and others whom he thought were deserving of Paradise—this produced a serious rebellion but he sent a large force, returned himself next year and so vigorous was his administration that in spite of religion he drove out the Rajahs and re-established his authority—he fairly bullied the chief of Tellicherry and circumcised all the natives he could get hold of. It is not to be supposed that much revenue could be collected, or financial business arranged during this scene of confusion.

The war between the English and Tippoo broke out in 1790, when we encouraged the Refugee Rajahs who collected followers, sallied into Malabar and raised contributions in the name of allies of the Honorable Company. They received Cowle from our Officers which seems afterwards to have puzzled the Commissioners who were appointed on the conquest of the province and who did not know whether the Rajahs were to be considered as allies or subjects—some

of them set up lofty pretensions to independent authority. However at last a settlement was formed with them and they were put into the management of their districts. It may be safely said that the Rajahs were either too weak to manage their districts, which happened to the southward chiefly, or too strong to submit to our Government which happened to the northward chiefly, and to this cause most of the subsequent disturbances may be attributed—a scene of confusion and an accumulation of balances ensued which has only been lately changed for a better order of things. Commissioners, Superintendants, Committies and Collectors succeeded each other, but however zealous and able they might have been, order was not established in Malabar. The Revenue was inadequate yet not collected. The Government was lenient yet rebellions ensued. The Mopillah rebellion to the Southward, the Cotiote rebellion to the Northward were civil wars which distracted the country and prevented any financial arrangements. This deplorable state of affairs may be in great degree attributed to the installation of the Rajahs, for the Mysore Government seem to have managed pretty well when they got rid of the Rajahs, and we have only begun to establish our authority since the Rajahs have been shut out from any interference with the Revenues. The balance against the province of Malabar when it was transferred to the Madras Government is stated at Pagodas 3,25,841-,-, which was due on the 30th September 1801, being according to Major Macleod an average balance on each year of Pagodas 36,204-26-52 for nine Fusly years commencing with Fusly 1202.

				Settlement.	Balance 1st Sept. 1801.
Fusly 1202 .	...	...	...	2,64,326 9 50	46,706 25 30
" 1203	...	...	...	5,19,122 12 45	87,323 14 90
" 1204	...	...	...	3,81,286 14 20	21,169 2 19
" 1205	...	...	...	3,92,379 7 16	31,624 23 17
" 1206	...	...	...	4,02,524 3 34	10,844 15 10
" 1207	...	...	...	4,12,526 31 2	5,774 16 46
" 1208	...	...	...	4,47,548 11 41	47,524 6 41
" 1209	...	...	...	4,64,743 37 62	17,046 37 55
" 1210	...	...	...	5,08,399 23 39	31,140 41 15
			...	37,92,956 24 24	8,25,841 29 72
Average	...	...	...	4,21,428 21 29	36,204 26 52
Deduct balance	...	...	...	36,204 26 52	
Average Collection	...	...	...	3,85,223 36 57	

As the principle of assessment recommended in Mr. Rickard's letter of the 22nd February 1804 has been adopted and confirmed by your Lordship's Minute of the 22nd April 1804, The Board of Revenue informed Mr. Warden, the Collector, of the resolution of Government on the 5th May 1804 and Mr. Warden issued a proclamation in consequence as the principle of assessment has been fixed and in respect to rice fields is in every respect just and politic it only remains to carry it into execution.

The land tax is to be fixed at 60 per cent. of the land rent derivable to the owners of rice fields.

The Inhabitants have given in a statement of the rent of their rice fields calculated in the following manner:—

Suppose the land requires 10 seers to sow it and that it produces 12 fold the produce will be ...	...	...	...	120.
The seed grain is deducted ...	...	...	...	10.
		remains	...	110.
Amount equal to seed is deduced for charges ...	...	...	...	10.
		remains	...	100.
Of this remainder the land owner takes 3rds the tenant 4 which is			...	33 1/3.
The landlord's clear rent is ...	...	...	...	66 2/3rds.

Their accounts of seed and produce are no doubt false—therefore the statement of rent given in by the Inhabitants must be checked by survey—by examining the agreements between landlord and tenant—by actual experiment, by sowing and reaping certain fields—by putting the parties to their Oath in cases where fraud is suspected.

By these methods the Collector will be able to ascertain the rent of the rice fields with sufficient accuracy—the complete measurement and survey of the paddy lands of the country would no doubt be very satisfactory, because there is no register of lands and because the uncertain estimate by seed might be set aside for the more accurate actual square measurement of the land.

The acre might be substituted for the para of seed and a greater degree of accuracy be introduced into the public as well as private accounts. The survey of some districts has been made and the survey should be continued—however I think that a survey is more the business of the proprietor than the Sovereign. Where the Sovereign is proprietor as in the Ceded Districts a survey is necessary, but it would seem that in countries where land is private property a survey is not so necessary.

If the proprietor and tenant have accounts on which they can come to a settlement about the rent, the Sovereign may upon that same accounts be able to fix his land tax. The probable amount of land tax on rice fields on these principles will it is estimated be 3,40,000 Pags. This is the sum which appears to be 6/10th of the rental of Malabar from the enquiries hitherto made, but the Collector must take every method by which the rental may be ascertained and when he is pretty well satisfied with the report, he ought to divide the whole land tax first upon districts, then upon Villages then upon individuals. The revenue Officers should proceed in concert with the principal Inhabitants to divide the assessment—or rather the Inhabitants ought to be left to assess themselves so that it be done fairly. In the assessment of districts, if one district is rated too high the people will complain and point out others where it may be too low—because the people of each district will endeavour to shift off their own shoulders as much

of the public burthen as they can. The people of highly assessed districts will therefore point out any frauds which may have been practised in other districts to conceal the true rental. In Villages a similar jealousy of their neighbours and a desire to relieve themselves will produce the same enquiries, and bring out the same information about the rent—and the Individual proprietors of each Village will endeavour to relieve themselves by throwing the burden on their neighbours—they will tell of each other's rents, and by a proper use of all this information the Collector may be enabled to equalize the land tax. If after promoting this kind of jealousy no complaints of partial assessment should be made he will have the satisfaction of thinking the settlement equal. It may be objected that this plan of making the people as it were assess themselves or rather divide the land tax fixed by Government on the province among themselves is unnecessary because the amount of rent may be ascertained by other means, and impolitic, because leading men in each district thro' the connivance of the Revenue servants may contrive to ease themselves, by shifting part of the burthen on their simpler neighbours, but I consider that every possible means should be resorted to which promises to equalize the assessment, and I suppose that the activity of the Revenue servants will prevent any abuses. At all events this plan promises to equalize and prevent abuse in the settlement, and it is usual I believe in Europe, and I know it is common in India where many Villages are rented in bulk it may be termed, and the farmers divide the assessment among themselves according to their means. I therefore recommend to the Collector to pursue this plan or any modification of it which circumstances may render necessary.

Respecting garden productions which are a considerable object of revenue in Malabar I cannot entirely concur with Mr. Rickards. Garden productions are Cocoonut, Betel, Pepper and Jack.

There have been long discussions about the produce of cocoanut trees. Mr. Rickards makes it out that they produce on an average 19 nuts, Major Macleod 42 nuts. The Ryots admit that they produce 24 nuts annually from each bearing tree. The truth is that it is impossible to ascertain the produce. Some good trees, well taken care of in a good soil and situation may yield five hundred nuts in a year, others in a bad soil and neglected will not produce a dozen. It is calculated that there are about thirty lac of good trees in Malabar. The young trees are termed shishoo or pupils until they bear, and together with the old are deducted. 1000 good bearing trees are said by the Ryots to produce 25,000 nuts annually which at By*Pagodas 2-5-., per 1,000 are worth Pagodas 62-5-., and may produce a rent of By*Pagodas 42-5. It is probable that the produce and rent is greater, because in Canara where plantations are not so great an object it is confessed that they produce more. I think that it is an absurd attempt for the sovereign to endeavour to count the cocoanuts of a large province and to fix a tax on such an account. Some other general grounds must be resorted to, to correct it.

It was proposed that one third of the gross produce of gardens should be taken as land or tree tax in Malabar. As this principle has been adopted it would now be wrong to alter it, and as the Inhabitants will always conceal a great deal of the produce it may not be necessary to mitigate the rate. But what reason is there for adopting one principle for rice fields, another for gardens? The tax on

* By = Bahaudry. Gold Pagodas were issued by the Rajah of Ikkaury near Seringapatam, and were adopted by Hyder Ali under the name of the Bahaudry Pagoda. [vide Madras Manual of Administration Vol. III. Page 643.] Ed.

rice fields has been fixed as it ought to be on the rent or neat produce, the tax on gardens on what it ought not to be one would imagine, the gross produce. The gross produce can never be a just standard either for rent or tax because not always the same in proportion to the expence and labour bestowed in raising it. The excellent principle adopted by your Lordship in respect to rice fields should in my humble opinion have been extended to gardens but with some reserve. Gardens may be taxed at the share of the rent which Government may choose to take as land tax but the interest of the sum originally expended and the risque to which money invested in nice plants is always liable ought to be considered and deducted. However as the principle has been fixed, as the Inhabitants have consented and will conceal part of the produce I think that the Collector may assess the gardens on the principles recommended by Mr. Rickards.

Note.—I hear that 16,000 coconut trees have been hewn down since I left Canara in the Cundapeor district.

The tax on gardens will it is computed amount to 1,20,000 Pagodas but I imagine that instead of being one third it will not be more than one fourth or one fifth of the gross produce, that if Government get 1,20,000, the total produce is not less than 5 or 6 lac of Pagodas, that the People neither will, nor can perhaps afford to pay more than one fourth or one fifth. The Collector must ascertain the amount of garden produce and as his enquiries may turn out must either fix on 1,20,000 or more according to the result of his investigations. If the Collector finds that any district or garden pays less than 1/5th the tax ought to be raised. When the Collector has fixed the sum for tree tax he ought to report to the Board of Revenue, and under their orders assess the amount on the districts and Villages with their own consent and cooperation in the mode I have recommended.

Pepper should not be directly taxed, I should think any more than any other species. In Malabar Pepper is chiefly propagated from cuttings, and as much as is supported by one Jack tree is termed a vine. It requires much care especially while young, during the hot weather it must be watered and its roots must be sheltered with leaves. It has been proposed to set it against poles instead of Jack trees. I should think that trees were best because trees grow, produce Jack fruit, and perhaps afford some nourishment to the vine whereas poles rot, produce no fruit, nor even give shelter to the vine. The vine bears about the 4th or 5th year and produces, some calculations make it 3 some 7 pounds weight—but the truth is that it varies according to the number of vines and size of the supporter according to soil and culture that it is difficult if not impossible to ascertain the quantity of pepper produced on one vine. It has however been usual for Government to take a share of the supposed produce and it has been proposed that this share shall be 1/4, 1/3, 1/5th some plans recommend an annual inspection some a supposed average of productiveness.

Any direct tax upon the produce must act as a check on the production of pepper. The tythes in England which are reckoned at 1/10th only were found so great a check upon the cultivation of some valuable productions that the legislature interfered in regard to some species and the farmers were said to keep their lands under grass for pasture in some parts of the country merely to avoid the tythe. 1/4, 1/3 or even 1/5th taken in the way of a tythe on the gross produce of pepper must consequently discourage its growth more than the 1/10th which is

taken as a tythe. In England such taxes or tythes are always odious and discourage cultivation. Besides 1/4 or even 1/3rd of the gross produce are more than the cultivator can afford to pay altho' levied in a more unexceptionate manner. The interest of the money originally expended in making the pepper garden must be deducted from its rent and Government have a right to take a share of what remains of the ground rent—perhaps they have no right to participate in that part of the rent which is appropriate to pay the profits of the capital invested in the plantation—at all events they have no right to share in that which goes to compensate for the risque to which stock invested in nice plants is always liable. The original expence, the annual charges, the risque from accidents to the garden, the loss from the want of a market for the pepper make any direct tythe or tax on the produce impolitic and unjust. But in whatever shape it be levied it ought not to exceed 1/5th of the produce. Indeed the Ryots will never pay more because they will conceal the real produce, and while they agree to pay 1/4, 1/3 or any other proportion they will take care that it shall in reality amount to no more than 1/5th or 1/6th or they will relinquish the culture.

It appears to me needless for Government to afford any particular encouragement for the growth of pepper, or any other production. If they take a fixed land tax on the ground rent they afford the owner the means of cultivating what he pleases. If the demand for pepper be great the owner of the land will cultivate pepper, if the demand is less he will cultivate some thing which is in greater request. By relieving the land appropriated to any particular produce from all tax Government in reality offers a bounty for its production, and may thus promote the culture of what is not wanted and discourage the production of what is in great demand and would have otherwise been cultivated. Government should tax the land equally whatever it may produce and if they wish to draw a separate revenue from the article they should do it by a duty or a licence. At present I believe there is no great demand for the pepper of Malabar and sondah* when it is in greater request it will be cultivated with more spirit. Pepper therefore should not be taxed direct, the land on which it is grown should be taxed like similar contiguous land, nothing but a tax on the ground rent should be levied direct and Government may make up the deficiency by a duty.

The proprietor in that case would neither be urged to the culture of a particular kind by a bounty, nor deterred by a tythe. Pepper is an article of which but a small proportion will be consumed in the country, its surplus must be exported. A duty on exportation is much less burthensome than a direct tax on production especially so heavy a tax as 1/4 or 1/3 which has been proposed. Collectors have had no scruple to propose to take 1/4 or 1/3 of the gross produce in the shape of a tythe, and the proposal does not seem to have raised many objections, but when a duty of 30 or 50 per cent. is proposed there is an outcry against it as an intolerable oppression. Yet on considering the subject it will appear that a duty of 30 or 50 per cent. is infinitely less oppressive than a direct tax or tythe of 30 or 50 per cent.

The quantity of pepper exported and likely to be exported must be estimated and a duty be laid upon it at such a rate as shall make good any loss which may

* Sic. some day?

be incurred by the remission of the tythe. If the land on which pepper is grown be found taxable as rice land a considerable sum will be raised as land tax; less would therefore be necessary to be taken in the shape of a duty: but if the land on which pepper grows be unequal to a land tax that is if similar contiguous land pay no land tax, more must be taken in the way of a duty, pepper is cultivated in such a scattered irregular manner that a land tax will perhaps produce little or nothing: a duty therefore must be levied. It may be said that it is difficult to prevent smuggling, but with proper attention it might be prevented, half the year they could not smuggle out any article either by sea or land, because the ports and passes are equally shut up by the monsoon: neither ships nor bullocks can pass from May till September. The vexation which custom house offices occasion is much less than the assessment of each vine would produce, the embezzlement of customs than the frauds of a tythe.

Respecting the high lands, their produce is trifling and revenue unimportant. It has been computed at 8000 Pagodas. It is proposed to take half the rent of such lands making an allowance for those years during which the high lands are left fallow.

When the permanent settlement has been concluded on these principles the people are to pay whether they cultivate or no. I should wish to adopt a plan to which some objections have been raised in India but which seems common in some part of Europe, and even to obtain in some cases in England. If any deficiencies should happen, and the estate of the defaulter should from circumstances not sell for the amount of the arrear the balance ought in my opinion to be levied on the Village in which it occurs in case it does not amount to more than 10 per cent. of the land tax of the whole Village. If the deficiency amounted to more than 10 per cent. it should be assessed in the district, but should not exceed 10 per cent. of the district land tax, that is the superindiction on the Village should in no case exceed the 10 per cent. on its whole land tax, the superindiction on the district should not exceed 10 per cent. on its land tax.

The Government should in no case interfere between the proprietor and the tenant any further than to secure the due realization of their own land tax from the person in actual possession of the land.

Respecting the Church lands Government ought to manage the estates and expenses of the churches, the persons who hold church lands ought to pay their rent to the Collector, who must see that the repairs, ceremonies, &c. are properly performed.

The Rajahs who have lands of their own ought to be subjected to the same land tax and the same rules as the other proprietors.

A Register of lands and land tax due upon them ought to be carefully kept and annually corrected—the name of the Estate, its owner, the amount of rent, of land tax, seed *Beejam** requisite to sow it, measurement, should be all registered—the amount of the land tax should be calculated in money in veroy fanams, rupees and Star Pagodas.

* "*Beejam*" is Sanskrit for seed. The exact meaning of *Beejamin* has not been traced. Ed.

No deeds, transfers or transactions regarding landed property ought to be valid in the Court of Judicature unless recorded in this Register.

The lands of Rebels may be given up to their next heirs, or sold according to the circumstances of the case.

The Collectors ought to begin immediately and assess two or three Villages in each District upon the new principle, correct the inequalities, and then submit a statement of the whole to the Board as soon as possible. I do not foresee any difficulty in regulating the Revenue rate of exchange. The rent in kind must be converted into money at an average of the prices of at least 10 years and the Land tax on each estate be calculated in Veray Fanams, Rupees and Star Pagodas; then if the Viray fanams should disappear in the course of time no mistakes will arise respecting the coins. At present the Veray fanams if converted into Star Pagodas in the public accounts at a rate higher than they ought to bear the consequence is that the revenue is nominally higher than it is in reality. The Company however do not lose, even nominally unless the Malabar coin is carried out to some other Province, because their disbursements are made at the same rate as their collections. The troops indeed lose in some cases. This inconvenience exists in some degree in every part of the Company's Territory, because the revenue rate of exchange at all Catcheries and pay offices is not the same. The only way to remedy this inconvenience generally would be to have a new coinage, or if that be not done to assay all the coins in the country, and order all Collectors and Pay Officers to receive and disburse at the same rate. This general principle has been explained in Major Munro's letter to the Board of Revenue dated * and to the Committee of Finance dated *. In the mean time the partial inconvenience felt in Malabar may be remedied by adopting a new table of revenue rates of exchange. This might be done by comparing the Coimbatore, Malabar and Canara revenue rates with the bazar rates, and making an average of them; but this would be a slovenly way. Twenty of each coin might be sent to Madras, and assayed, or be assayed in Malabar, and the revenue exchange fixed as this assay; but this would also be a slovenly way. A general rate if not a new coinage ought to be introduced immediately.

In Major Macleod's time the uproar against his rates of exchange arose from two circumstances which he perhaps did not sufficiently consider, from interfering with the Bazar rates, and from rectifying the Revenue rates without making a deduction to the Ryots equivalent to the loss occasioned by the difference between the old and new rates. The Ryots paid in Fanams which were carried to account as Pagodas at too high a rate so that the nominal revenue in Stars was higher than the real revenue in fanams. Major Macleod made the Ryots pay the difference between the new rectified rate of $1\frac{1}{4}$ and the old inadequate rate of $1\frac{1}{4}$ —but he ought to have first fixed the amount in fanams or other current coin, and then have converted them into Star Pagodas; as Star Pagodas were not the common coin it would not have signified to the Ryots at what rate their payments were turned into Stars. The Sepoys indeed might have had cause to complain if too few fanams went to a Star Pagoda, or to rejoice if too many went to a Star

* (blank in the original.)

Pagoda because their pay is calculated originally in Stars-but the payment of the Ryots ought to be fixed on an average money price of the share of the produce which Government takes as rent or tax. The coins therefore which they pay in as revenue ought to be received as an equivalent for a certain quantity of the produce of their lands, not for a certain quantity of Star Pagodas.

The only difficulty relates to the coins which may be in the treasury at the time of the operation of rectifying the exchange because as the Government have hitherto received and disbursed at a rate higher than the true rate they will lose the difference between the high rate which prevailed before, and the true rate which is to be adopted. The nominal revenue will be decreased, while the actual disbursements will be increased in some degree. The profit however which Government have derived from these high rates, or rather the loss which they have avoided is not fair. The profit arising from converting coins in the public accounts into the public money at too high a rate is not substantial and the profit derived from issuing the public money in coins at too high a rate is not fair.

The revenue is paid in fanams we will say, and it was the full revenue. Government got neither more nor less by converting those fanams into Stars at a high or low rate, but when they came to disburse, indeed these same fanams at too high a rate, they got a profit by the loss of those whom they paid. They received $12\frac{1}{4}$ as the equivalent for a certain proportion of the produce of the earth and it was a just equivalent, or they ought to have gone to the bottom, to have taken a just proportion and converted it into money at a just price. But when they come to palm $12\frac{1}{4}$ fanams on a Sepoy as the equivalent for a Star Pagoda they did not do him justice; because $14\frac{3}{4}$ not $12\frac{1}{4}$ is the equivalent for a Star Pagoda tho' $12\frac{1}{4}$ may be equivalent for the share of the produce which it represents when paid in as revenue. The only loss which Government therefore will incur will be nominal in respect to receipts, and in respect to disbursements that they must pay the real sum which they agreed to pay. After a regular coinage is established it may be expedient to fix the exchange of their new coins generally, but in no other case ought Government to interfere with the Bazar rates of exchange. Any attempt to fix or force the bazar rates are like attempts to fix or force the price of Grain which always aggravate a scarcity.

The people of the town of Calicut gave me a Petition representing the hardship of a house tax which has been introduced there. A House or Shop tax considered as an House or Shop tax merely should be fixed on the rent not upon the cost or value.

A decayed family may find it convenient to occupy one corner of a large house which may be the only property which they have inherited from ancestors once opulent. In a town where trade and population have decayed it may be impossible to rent a large house or warehouse. If they are taxed at a percentage on the valuation the poor proprietor may be forced to pull them down. A tax on the rent would not have so oppressive an effect because the poor proprietor might let the large house and pay the tax and furnish himself with another lodging out of the rent; but a tax on the supposed value is hard, unequal, and fundamentally wrong and in a decayed town where houses and warehouses cannot perhaps be let at all, ruinous.

I therefore recommend that the tax of $1\frac{1}{2}$ percent on the value of warehouses, and 1 per cent on that of houses be abolished. But I shall propose a general property tax which I think ought to be introduced into Malabar and Canara and which will, I should hope, produce more, and be more equal.

A true Extract.

J. HANBURY,
Secretary.

Examined.
W. GRANT.

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EXTRACT FROM MR. THACKERAY'S REPORT

Dated 8th September 1807.

Canara, the sister province of Malabar may contain about 4622 square miles below the ghauts and 2758 may be comprised in Bilghi, Soondah and Soopah above the ghauts. The province usually termed Canara may therefore contain about 7380 square miles. It is wild rocky uneven. The ghauts approach in some places near the sea; branches of rocky hills stretch in some places from the ghauts towards the sea occupying great part of the country; the Valleys are however well cultivated with rice, especially those through which a river or arm of the sea runs up. But where there is no inland navigation there is little improvement. The rugged surface of the country renders it difficult to transport the produce of the earth which is carried on the heads of the peasantry; bullocks are seldom used, and I was unable to hire any from Mangalore till I got above the ghauts. The climate and soil are much like that of Malabar. The rains set in about the middle of May, fall heaviest with squalls of wind in July and continue to the end of September; during this season all trade ceases; ships leave the coast and insurances are not in force till the end of September during this season * is performed, bargains and accounts settled. When I was in Canara they were laying up their monsoon stock of firewood and provisions. The people like those of Malabar live every man under his own tree, however there are some Villages inland, peopled chiefly with Brahmans and shopkeepers. The roads are passable, however they are not like the Military high ways in Malabar; they are the less necessary since the trade of the country is in many places conveyed by water and population and cultivation usually follow the course of rivers. One good road however down the coast parallel with the sea, cross roads from the sea to the principal passes, and one good road from Mangalore to Seringapatam ought always to be kept up.

I am decidedly against making roads by corvee on general grounds, but particularly in Canara, because Government rather than the people derive the chief benefit from roads. It is an hardship on the people to be forced to work on the high roads unless the advantages which they are likely to derive from them are equal to the labor and expence which they are forced to bestow upon them; even then it would be an hardship to make them work against their will. In Canara and Malabar roads would be very useful for Troops, and serve as a topic of conversation to travellers, but they cannot be of much use to the people who have hardly any bullocks and no carts.

* (blank in the original.)

The noble road through Mysore has effected the two ends for which it was intended. One, the facility with which troops, guns and stores are transported; the other is the reputation which no doubt justly redounds to the Minister who formed the roads. They are like many institutions in Mysore which contribute to the ease and pleasure of travellers especially Europeans, and to the advantage of the Government; but it will be many years before the commerce of the country could make or keep up such roads in repair. A Turnpike toll could not defray the expence unless indeed it was on the guns and stores of Government, the carts of the Arrack contractor, or of Messrs. Hope & Co. The country people derive but little advantage and therefore have but little cause to care about these roads. It is therefore unjust to make them form or repair these roads. It is said that at one season of the year the peasantry have nothing else to do, however to make them work on the roads is to make them pay an extra assessment, it is to exact labor instead of money. A military road is meant to facilitate the march of armies for the general defence; a general assessment must therefore be made to defray the expence. The treasury therefore not the unfortunate Villages which happen to lie on the tract thro' which the great road is to be carried should be the fund from which the charge is defrayed; a corvee is productive of much oppression especially in India. If an extra assessment of either labor or money be once admitted, the door to abuse and petty tyranny is opened. If therefore high roads are considered for commerce, the trade, the bandies should pay; if as Military high ways the public treasury ought to pay. The people of the Villages thro' which they pass have no more to do with them than those of Villages five hundred miles off, except that they are more exposed to the inconvenience which travellers and detachments usually occasion. One would think that the Villages in India ought to get rich from being situated in the neighbourhood of a great road, that the troops and travellers would enrich them by taking off many articles which they require, and which would be soon produced in plenty because the people would find it their interest to keep them always ready. In England where the king has lost his privilege of purveyance a Village gets rich by becoming a stage on a great road, but in India a Village is some times so molested by the applications or rather the exactions of travellers and troops that the Ryots threaten to desert it. If therefore the Villages are ever obliged to mend and make roads in addition to the other inconveniences of the neighbourhood of an high way they must have their Village in Enam.

* It is often supposed that the Inhabitants sometimes refuse to supply the wants of travellers from obstinacy, but it will appear that they are as anxious to get a little money by the sale of articles required by travellers as these are to supply their wants. A Ryot in the Ceded District generally makes something by the sale of milk, &c. and sell 20 Pags. worth in the course of the year his sheep produce part of the milk his sheep are also let out for their dung the wool is also valuable, the wool of 100 sheep may sell for 2 or 2½ Pags. annually; for this reason he naturally objects to part with his sheep unless a good price is offered; respecting eggs and fowls about which I have heard travellers complain so much, the Ryot keeps fowls for sale he makes perhaps one Pagoda per annum by his fowls. All this contributes to his income and enables him to pay his rent. Indeed he could not in general pay were it not for his live stock it therefore seems evident that he must be as anxious to sell his milk, &c. as the Traveller, however hungry he may be, is to get them.

Canara is supposed to contain 5,76,640 souls of whom the Brahmins are computed at 98610. This great number of Brahmins if there really be so many is probably the cause of the civilization of Canara compared with its sister province.

The jains in Canara are more numerous than in most other provinces: they are a remarkable tribe and flourished, formerly excelling in art and literature. Their temples are of superior workmanship and their tenets more philosophical than those of the Brahmins; this superiority brought upon them a general persecution, so that their numbers are small, tho' they are said to be again raising their heads.

The slaves of Canara are like those of Malabar. The Christians are pretty numerous, but they neither profess so pure a faith, nor are they so respectable as the Christians of Travancore are said to be.

The climate of these provinces will never permit them to have manufactures, but Canara will always export a great deal of rice. The policy of the export duty on grain has been so amply discussed by Major Munro; his reasoning is so strong and so fully justified by experience that I need say no more on the subject, except that the prohibition on the export which the local Officers right or wrong have occasionally thought it incumbent upon them to resort to, to prevent a famine in Canara shews that the trade can bear a still higher duty. They have actually forced the people to keep this heavy duty in their pockets by not permitting exportation. The duty is not the same all down the Coast. It is 2 Pagodas the Corge at Mangalore, but decreases as it goes North to Sidashigur down to 3 Rupees the Corge. If any regulation be enacted regarding this export duty on grain I think it ought to be fixed at not more than 25 per cent on the export price. I am convinced that this duty might be increased without any danger of checking the exportation. In Tippoo's time the duty amounted to from 20 to 25 per cent., according to Major Munro's letter. It is now much less; yet the security which our Government affords to agriculture, and our Navy to navigation surely will enable the exporters to pay a heavier duty than in Tippoo's time when property was insecure and navigation interrupted by pirates; the export price is raised since his time, yet the local Officers have on some occasions prohibited the export, or at least limited it. This shews that it could pay an higher duty. I propose therefore 25 per cent. as the limit, but it is not necessary to raise it at once. 25 per cent. is the utmost which should be the proportion or percentage enacted by the Regulation. The Collector under the orders of the Board might fix a Tariff and manage it so that the duty should fall neither too heavy nor unequal. A duty on the export of grain is apt to startle considerate persons who have observed the general good effects of a free trade in grain, but

the peculiar climate and situation of Canara make it the granary of the Western Coast and in spite of a heavy duty it must continue to supply the Arabian, Bombay and Goa Markets. The duty on grain is one of the best taxes ever levied. It is making foreigners contribute to our revenue; taxing the rich Arabs who can afford to eat the rice of Canara. If the duty were doubled I do not think that the export would be diminished, but any interference of the Civil power in prohibiting or limiting exportation will certainly drive away the merchants. They do not mind a little rise in the price, but the uncertainty of getting the grain which the interference of the Magistrate always occasions will effectually drive the traders to some other part. Even though the great exportation may occasion alarm about a famine, yet the exportation should not be limited till certain symptoms of scarcity appear; even in that case, even tho' famine should stare them in the face, the export to other provinces belonging to the Company should never be prohibited, nor limited. The Officers of Government are more likely in their zeal for the safety of the people under their immediate jurisdiction to make a mistake and prohibit exportation when there is no necessity for so strong a measure, than the grain Merchants are to export too much. It is more their business. They are more in the habit and have more interest to become acquainted with the state of Crops and Markets than any other persons even Judge, Collector and Commander. They will form a right judgment of the grain required to feed Canara thro' the monsoon and they will not export more than the Country can spare because it will be more their Interest to export only just as much as the Country can spare than to export more. They will rather sell it on the spot than export it if they can get as good a price, and when there is a probability of a scarcity being felt in Canara itself, the bazar price and the export price will be equal and find their true level, unless kept down by an embargo, or other impolitic interference. When rice is so dear at Madras that a famine is expected the price ought and would rise in Canara if there was a free communication and no interference. The high price at Madras would immediately occasion a great exportation in Canara, which would again occasion an alarm about the home supply; the alarm about the home supply would raise the price and keep the grain in Canara, for the Merchants would expect as great a profit by supplying the home Market till the next harvest, as they could get by exporting the grain to Madras. They would therefore reserve what they considered necessary for the home supply and export the surplus only to Madras. They would most likely do this with the accuracy with which traders usually judge of these matters and the price of grain would in consequence fall as near the same level at Madras and in Canara as the carriage duties and obstacles would admit. By these means the inconveniences of scarcity would be equally shared by the common subjects of the Company, but when an embargo is laid upon grain in Canara the market there will either be over stocked or much better stocked than that at Madras, so that the people of Canara may be eating

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themselves into surfeit while their fellow subjects at Madras are starving. If the prohibition takes place when there is no real danger of a famine in Canara, when perhaps not even any inconvenience would result from exporting more grain the lives of the people at Madras may be sacrificed to the groundless fears of the local Officers in Canara, and the fear of starvation generally magnifies the danger and the prohibition takes place before it is necessary. Besides even tho' a famine should be the certain consequence of great exportation from Canara to Madras, that is nothing to Government; they ought to have an equal regard for all their subjects. It is all the same to the Madras Government whether the subjects of the Company at Madras or in Canara die of hunger. If a squadron of Ships run short of water and one ship has plenty the admiral would act very imprudently if he did not make her share it fairly with the others; so the Government ought to make the abundance of one province supply the scarcity of others, more particularly because a free communication is likely to prevent the inconvenience of dearth altogether; when there is a scarcity at Madras the people of Canara ought to be put on short allowance too. A free export would do so, because it would tend to lower the price at Madras, and raise it in Canara to the highest level which circumstances would allow; while grain was so scarce at Madras the people between Mangalore and Cundapoor complained of not being able to get their grain sold at so good a price as they expected. It is also an infringement on private property. It occasions a double loss of Revenue, of Customs and land Revenue. I therefore think that it should be laid down as a fundamental principle and inculcated into all Judges and Collectors in the most positive terms never to interfere with Bazars, prices, or exports and imports of grain without positive orders from Government, and Government itself should never interfere to prohibit the exportation from one province of the Company to another. In some cases it may interfere to prohibit exportation to foreign states.

The inland customs in Canara are hard upon the people because they are levied in no other part of the Company's territories; they ought to be abolished and a frontier duty substituted for them. The frontier duty might be collected on the same principles and at the same rates as in other provinces, except indeed any duty be levied on pepper in Malabar when the same duty may be extended to the pepper of Canara. If the expences of the Company allowed of any reductions I would propose to abolish the frontier duties between the Mysore and Company's territories, and make a condition with the Rajah to abolish duties on his frontier also. I would also remove all duties on the coast trade; were the trade of the whole peninsula free it would be one great bazar. The Rajahs who have independent authority might easily be induced to agree to it, but the immediate loss of Revenue will perhaps not be compensated by the future contingent advantages.

The Haulet duty in Soonda and Bilghi is a heavy duty like the Sea customs

Vide Statement No 7.

Haulet customs produced		
Fusly 1209	...	43340.
" 1210	...	53284.
" 1211	...	44439.
" 1212	...	50870.
" 1213	...	46147.
" 1214	...	5.059.
" 1215	...	47914.
" 1216	...	...

Beetel nut exported		
	Kandies.	Strs.
in Fusly 1209,	9673,	value 159884.
in Fusly 1215,	9699,	value 18285.

Pepper exported		
	Kandies.	Strs.
in Fusly 1209,	836,	value 28369.
in Fusly 1215,	861,	value 25538.

on rice, and draws a considerable Revenue from the pockets of strangers. It is levied on pepper, beetelnut, cardamoms, &c. I see no necessity for altering the rates or the mode of collecting this duty which have existed for a long period and experience has shewn that the articles subject to this duty are so good, and so cheap that they can afford the duty. The consumers of them like the consumers of the rice of Canara can pay the duty, and yet get the articles better and cheaper than by going to any other market. The subject has been amply discussed by Major Munro and experience has shewn the truth of his opinions. From the conversation I had with the people in that part of the Country I am convinced that the decreased demand for these articles is entirely owing to the confusion in the Maharatta States. This is the evident cause of the diminution of the demand and the revenue derived from the Haulet. The trade has paid the duty and thriven under the duty for a long period, even during the wars which have distracted that part of the peninsula for so many years but those countries where it may be said the source of this trade rises have lately been impoverished by war and famine-of course the trade has decayed. The beetle nut of Soondah used to go as far as Nagpoor, and when peace and plenty again visit those Countries the trade will again flourish; a temporary reduction, or if the duty produces no revenue, a temporary remission of the duty might perhaps have a good effect, but the duty is fundamentally good; a trifling revenue is derived from a toll on ferries, which ought to be abolished. In India no body travels for pleasure it is therefore a tax on industry. A revenue from shark fins which produces little revenue and some trouble ought also to be abolished.

The passes ought to be kept in good repair to encourage the Lambadies who bring down Sandal and other articles, and carry away Salt.

The soil of Canara is red and gravelly on the high grounds, sandy near the sea; but the Valleys are well adapted to the culture of rice; but it is the climate rather than the soil which makes it so fertile. The same mode of reckoning by seed is used which they have in Malabar, but the produce on one measure sown is estimated at not less than 15, and is some times 30 fold. In the Mangalore district it is reckoned 30 fold, in Bekul, Buntwal and Barkoor, Kundapoor and Konawar from 20 to 23. In Ankolah, Sonda, Bilghi 15, averaging 21, which is more than double what they average, the produce on the seed in Malabar to be. The crops are watered by the rains, however the streams are sometimes dammed up, and small reservoirs made to preserve water for the later Crops. The land is divided into Classes-the first kind may produce two or even three Crops of rice. The second a Crop of rice, and one of other grain, the third a Crop of rice only. Cattle and manure are deficient. The rain and wet, the want of good pasture keep down the breed of Cattle which are not much bigger than our long legged goats. They sow and plant rice from the middle of May till

The Estates of 16 Landholders examined by Mr. Thackeray.	Land holders about 1 Pagoda per acre.	650	6	15
	Key Koghiza, standard asst. of Tippoo.	618	...	10
	Collections of Government in Fusly 1209.	510	1	10
	Collections in Fusly 1215.	567	7	9
	Clear share of the rent engaged by the owners in Fusly 1215.	89	9	6
	$\frac{4}{10}$ of the rent to go to the owners.	260	2	4
	$\frac{4}{10}$ to the Sircar as land tax.	390	4	11
	Loss to Government on this settlement below Fusly 1215.	177	2	14 *

July, and reap from September to December. By an estimate which seems pretty right an acre of good land may require 83 Seers of seed, may produce* 1269 Seers, the landlords rent out of which in kind may amount to 510 Seers which may be worth By. Pagodas 2-4-13. It is very difficult for a Collector who has been making observations assisted by a Cutcharie and the whole revenue host for several years, to come to any satisfactory decision on these questions. If the Collector cannot do it who has so much business and intercourse with the Ryots it cannot be expected that an itinerant investigator can do much, who calls a man in on purpose to be interrogated and who comes in prepared to tell a parcel of stories. In England Statistical enquirers complain that it is difficult to get information, because the farmers will not keep regular accounts. Here the Curnum keeps an account of the public revenue, but the Ryots seldom keep any of their own profits and expences. He can therefore seldom tell, and if he can guess, he will be on his guard especially where he is led into the tent for the sole purpose of being interrogated; he will magnify the losses and charges, and depreciate the profits. If one goes into a field it is the same thing; exaggeration of loss and absence of profit are put in so strong a point of view that one is surprised to find the man alive and in good case under such terrible circumstances. There are Cocoon gardens in Canara not so many however as in Malabar; rice is justly thought the surest and most valuable production; rice land there is like corn land in Europe; however some sandy ground along the beach and banks of Rivers is when not too wet peculiarly fitted for the growth of cocoanuts. In such situations the trees are planted either in a scattered manner when they ought to be left without tax at all and have hitherto been untaxed in most places or in regular gardens. In either case when planted by a tenant he pays the usual land rent until the trees are productive which happens from five and eight to twelve years after they are planted. The ground rent is then discontinued and a tree rent taken. When the proprietor plants a garden he generally manages it

himself, letting a few trees to a Toddy drawer who pays a Pagoda annually for 10 or 12 trees or perhaps 15 trees and looks after the others: the trees are frequently changed, lest they should be exhausted.

Generally speaking a thousand good trees may be let for 62 Pagodas; the unbearing trees are deducted, the good trees are rented, the best sort at 12, the second at 20 for one Pagoda, averaging 10 for 1 Pagoda. Good trees are said to yield from 50 to 100 nuts a year in four Crops one every three months; weak ones only less than 50; this makes me imagine that the accounts of the produce of cocoanut gardens in Malabar are very fallacious; however all estimates of this kind are uncertain.

Beetel and Pepper are produced above the Ghauts where the soil and climate are perhaps more fitted for their production than those of Malabar. In Soondah after deducting the unbearing trees they make a further deduction of two thirds, and reckon on the remaining one third; these are termed true trees and pay rent. 1000 of these trees may produce 6 Kundies of Beetel nuts of which 2 Kundies worth 18 Pagodas, but less at present may be reckoned, the rent or neat produce; the pepper which grows round the Beetel trees may be about 2 Kundies. The expence however of such a garden is very great; some accounts make it one Pagoda for each tree from first to last so that a garden of 1000 trees will cost 1000 Pagodas by the time it is mature; the first charge of levelling, digging and enclosing may be $\frac{1}{4}$. The annual expence for maure and extra labor $\frac{1}{4}$, the regular wages of 3 gardeners for 11 years, $\frac{1}{2}$ of the whole expence*. The trees in

* Expence of a garden of 1000 trees.

1st year:—	6th year no expence.
Levelling, digging and preparing the ground ... 135	7th year:—
Plantains ... 25	Covering the roots, replacing earth, &c. ... 50
Grass, &c. to shelter the young trees from the Sun ... 15	Dung 10 per cent leaves 15 ... 25
Entrances, ditch, &c. all round ... 50	Total 7th year ... 75
Pickaxes, tools, &c. ... 10	8th year no expence.
Total 1st year ... 235	9th year:—
2nd year:—	Removing earth to the roots of the trees and replacing the earth ... 25
Raising the beds with new earth ... 25	Dung and leaves ... 30
Dung, &c. ... 5	Total 9th year ... 55
Leaves at the roots of the plants ... 7 $\frac{1}{2}$	10th year no expence.
Total 2nd year ... 37 $\frac{1}{2}$	11th year the same as the 9th year ... 55
3rd year:—	The expence of 3 Gardeners for 11 years at 5 Rupees monthly for all expences ... 495
Digging pits 3 feet square 3 deep planting and covering beetel plants ... 25	Grand Total Pagodas ... 1019 $\frac{1}{2}$
Removing the leaves which covered them and laying on manure ... 5	
Placing new leaves on the dung ... 12	
Total 3rd year ... 42	
4th year no expence except wh n part of the 3rd year's work remains unfinished.	The 12th year the trees bear.
5th year:—	
Dung ... 10	This account is perhaps too high, and as the planter gets part of the sum expended as wages for the labor he and his family contribute, the work is done cheaper the real expence is less felt.
Jungle leaves ... 15	
Total 5th year ... 25	

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such a garden are private, but the soil Sirkar property; however the tenant preserves his right by keeping up the plantation. In taxing gardens no part of the produce which goes to replace stock, and compensate for the risque should be taken; however it must be considered in some cases a favourable rent for the first ten or twelve years has in a great measure reimbursed the planter in the original expence. The ground rent of a garden of 1000 trees may be about 2 or 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ Pagodas were it under rice.

The greater part of the lands in Canara are private property. The former and present state of private property has been so amply discussed by Major Munro that it leaves me little to say on the subject. Original inscriptions on stone and copper prove the antiquity of this venerable institution. They consist of grants of ancient princes to Pagodas &c. granting the land tax derivable from certain lands and Villages, thus transferring the land tax from the treasury to the Individual grantee, but the property in the soil was not granted because not possessed or claimed by the prince; when he gave the absolute property in the soil the Sunnud expressly mentions the previous purchase of the right.

Altho' black books, papers, leaves, or even copper plates are often forged yet these inscriptions so generally found could not have been forged; they therefore are unquestionable evidence to the antiquity and validity of the institution. The black books however are very curious records, and as inscriptions, black books, tradition, annual Settlements and revenue accounts all concur to show what the ancient land tax was to show that it was light and fixed—they shew that the lands were private property. The Sunnuds and inscriptions on stone, and copper are to be found in every part of Canara in every Pagoda. They together with the revenue accounts, the black books, tradition, and the state of the Country afford undeniable proof of the antiquity of the institution. A complete investigation of their ancient inscription would throw great light on the former state of the Country—perhaps of the ancient history of India. The different princes of Bednore, Beyanagur and even Mysore, never seem to have questioned the general rights of the people, tho' an arbitrary assessment and individual acts of oppression may have rendered some private estates less valuable.

The power to sell and mortgage lands all along exercised by the landholders in Canara, the readiness of others to buy or take them in pledge shew that the people at large have a good opinion of the validity of the title. This practice prevails indeed in those provinces where the Sirkar is proprietor, but is not so general. The culture they have bestowed on the land shows that they confided that Government would respect their rights; indeed this culture as it has chiefly rendered the lands valuable gives them a right in them according to the general principles of natural Justice. The attachment which they shew to their Estates is a proof of the validity of their titles and the rules which exist for the sale and mortgage and lease of land shew that it has been long private property. It may be said that Original grants conferring the rights of property to the primitive grantees should be produced, that it should be shewn what prince originally granted the land to Individuals; but it may be answered that perhaps in no country at least in no country long settled and civilized do such original grants or title deeds exist. The sovereign may have granted away escheated estates, or unclaimed lands, and such grants are to be found in Canara and in Europe, but if

the rights of Individual proprietors at large were traced up or rather if private rights in certain lands were traced up they would soon be lost in antiquity and prescription would be found the general original title. Deeds transferring land are to be found in Canara and in England. Grants conferring Sirkar lands are forthcoming in both countries, but perhaps in neither Country original grants or deeds conferring or establishing the primitive right of private property in the soil could be found, for the most likely never existed. A man cultivated a certain field, mixed his labor with the soil, and in process of time obtained a title by prescription which is the best of all titles. Indeed no person who has seen Canara or considered the subject can doubt the antiquity and validity of the titles of the Canarese landlords, and any Government, that should attempt to overturn it would act like the French Government when it confiscated private Estates of the Nobility and Church.

The land is frequently pledged and is generally speaking deeply incumbered, one species of mortgage is when the land is merely pledged, and the deeds and papers relating to it are put into the hands of the Mortgagee. This transaction is termed *Tooradhi*. In this case the mortgagee merely receives a quantity of rice equal to the interest due on his loan, but has no interference in the management of the Estate. When it happens that the proprietor not only being unable to pay the principal also fails to pay the interest regularly, he is obliged to make over the land itself to the Mortgagee, who takes possession, and becomes a fixed tenant, manages the estate, and pays the land tax; however on receiving the full amount of his debt, he must deliver up the land. This transaction is termed *Bhogyadi* or pledge in possession, and is the more common kind of Mortgage. Rules exist for the redemption of the land, and adjustment of accounts. The proceeds of the Estate and the improvements which have been made are usually settled by an arbitration. The general use of pledging land renders the sale of it less common, however notwithstanding the aversion felt at totally alienating their ancient patrimony there are many instances of actual sale. Land generally sells for from 8 to 12 years purchase money on the clear rent (near *Bekell* they said it only sold for 4 years purchase tho' they admitted that they got about $\frac{1}{2}$ the rent clear) that is money laid out in the purchase of land ought to bring 10 or 12 per cent. interest. The inequality of the land tax and the distance from great towns perhaps makes the value of land vary; in some places it is not saleable. In some cases estates bought 90 or 100 years ago for a considerable sum would not as the owners say sell at all now on account of the extra assessment which has been laid on since the purchase; the land tax is heavier than in the Northern parts of Malabar, and land is perhaps more completely cultivated which seem to be the causes of the higher price at which it is sold in Malabar.

Land is leased to tenants at will or to fixed tenants. The tenants at will usually pay a certain quantity of rice or sometimes money upon the quantity of seed supposed to be requisite to sow the land. The lands are classed into first, second, and third sort, and each field is reckoned and called a field of so many *Morahs*. Tho' the proprietors have power to turn out or, raise the rents of the tenants at will, they seldom do so, but go on content with the customary rent. The rent lies between $\frac{1}{2}$ and $\frac{1}{3}$ of the gross produce, but in general near one half. I should imagine seldom more than one half seldom less than one third; hands and stock are scarce, as the Country gets more populous rents may be raised.

The fixed tenants are a kind of proprietors, and are in some respects more independent than the proprietors from whom they hold. Major Munro has described the two tenures of *Nair Moolgueni* and *Sheed Moolgueni* so that I need say little on the subject. These fixed tenants some times again let out their Estates to tenants at will. If the fixed tenants die without heirs the land reverts to the original proprietor. The landlord and tenant sometimes dispute about the nature of the tenure. The landlord asserting that he is merely a tenant at will, the tenant contending that he is a fixed tenant, and the general loss of deeds and written documents renders it a doubtful question. The jealousy which must exist to produce these kind of disputes between the Landlord and tenant would afford one way of ascertaining the rent. Few *Moolguenis* or fixed tenants have, it is said been created since the Company's Government. This is attributed by the Collectors to their confidence in our Government; this is one cause, and the increasing stock of the Landlords which enables them to cultivate more of their own Estates is perhaps another. The *Moolguenis* or fixed tenants have not been obliged to contribute any thing when the proprietor has been extra assessed; however I should think that they ought to contribute in the same manner in proportion to the value of their Estates. If it be just to equalize the assessment on the landlords, it ought to find its level on the fixed tenants.

On the whole the state of landed property is nearly the same in both these provinces; the property in the soil rests in individuals, or rather in families; transfers, mortgages, and successions to lands are generally regulated on the same principles, and by similar rules, except where violence may have rendered property less valuable, or the different rules of cast and place may occasion different customs. Land is valuable in proportion to the clear rent, and loses its value when the land tax becomes so heavy as to absorb the whole rent. Under the Mysore Government few landlords choose to avow the full extent of their property and some part was held in the name of a relation; some private lands were held in the name of *Pagodas*, because church lands were favored; some lands were held in the name of one person who managed for several copartners and some lands were held by the Revenue servants under feigned names to avoid suspicion.

The great difference between the lands in these two provinces and those in other provinces is that here it is vested in individuals, there in communities. The Villages above the ghauts are like corporations, Communities, Municipalities, Republics, who are the proprietors of the whole lands of the Village-at least they and the Sirkar share the quantities of property between them. They have cleared and cultivated the Village lands from time out of mind, and there is none but the Sirkar who can claim any share in the property from them. The Village community only wants a fixed land tax which shall leave them some part of the rent to become joint proprietors of the Village lands: they are at present however only common tenants, because in most places the Government draws the whole landlord's rent. If the Government exacted the whole rent from Canara and Malabar the present proprietors would not be common, but individual tenants.

The Enams in Canara are of two kinds; one kind consist of actual property in the soil, but in this case the Government or the individual donor either bought

the land previous to the grant, or granted away his own land; there are also incorporeal Enams of the nature of a rent charged upon the Estates of Individuals or clubs and of assessments of the public land tax due from Estates or whole Villages.

This practice of the Sovereign granting Enams by assessing the land tax due from certain Estates, and of individuals by charging their Estates with an annuity for the support of the Enamdar is the surest proof of the antiquity and validity of the titles of the landlords of Canara. These Enams were usually granted to Brahmins and others for ministering in places of worship. The advowson or presentation as it may be called sometimes resided with the donors, sometimes the Ministers could transfer the Enam and the Ministry; however it was scandalous for the Minister to transfer, or for the original donor in case of his demise when the service and emoluments reverted to him to resume the emoluments and abolish the Office.

Major Munro has given so complete an account of the ancient state of the Land Revenue in Canara that I have only to make a short abstract of his report to introduce my observations on the future Settlement of the province.

From the earliest times to the middle of the fourteenth century the land was assessed at a quantity of rice equal to the quantity of paddy supposed to be necessary to sow it, so that a field which required 10 kundies of paddy to sow it paid a land tax of 10 kundies of rice, which was paid in either in money or kind.

Between the years 1334 and 1347 Kurryhur Roy, king of Beejanuggur, made a new assessment on the principle laid down in the Shaster where the produce is supposed to be to the seed as 12 to 1; agreeably to this computation he supposed that $2\frac{1}{2}$ Kutties of seed yield 30 Kutties of paddy which he divided as follows:—

To the landlord $7\frac{1}{2}$ or 25 per cent.

To the laborer 15 or 50 per cent.

To the Sirkar $7\frac{1}{2}$ or 25 per cent.

and still following the Shaster he divided the Sirkar share as follows:—

To the Sirkar $\frac{1}{3}$ of the gross or 5.

To Churches $\frac{1}{6}$ of do. 1.

To Brahmins $\frac{1}{6}$ of do. $1\frac{1}{2}$.

7 $\frac{1}{2}$.

This settlement was concluded upon a rough estimate of the quantity of seed usually sown and it remained without any alteration till the country was transferred to the Bednore Government about the middle of the seventeenth century. The Bednore Government had levied an additional 50 per cent. and in 1660, the Bejunuggur and Bednore assessment together formed the Shistor standard which amounted to in Canara 2,02,229-29-47.

in Soondah 44,393-20-45.

Total standard Kist 2,46,623-14-12.

This remained for near a century the land tax of Canara but in the eighteenth century the Bednore Government laid on additional cesses and raised the land tax to ... 3,14,007 4 52

Hyder laid an extra assessment and raised the revenue to ... 5,33,202 4 17

Tippoo by extra assessment and new heads of revenue raised it to ... 8,68,678 25 16

But from this must be deducted additions never likely to be collected amounting to ... 2,52,589 22 76

Leaving Tippoo's assessment ... 6,16,089 2 20

Of this sum the Shistor standard came to 3,59,752 32 35, the rest consisted of impositions and extra assessment.

This sum was however merely a nominal assessment for he never collected more than 4,72,550-3-12 and of that about 25,938, arose from the sale of grain and items not properly of land revenue.

Major Munro took this settlement as the basis of his assessment of Fusly 1209. He added some fresh items and new heads of Revenue but deducted 1,50,940-4-36 on account of waste land, heads of revenue lost, and the balance constituted the Settlement of Fusly 1209, and amounted to 4,65,148-33-64.

Of this sum ancient Shist was ... 2,84,604 28 45

Shamil or extra assessment ... 1,53,458 30 30

New heads of Revenue ... 16,580 ... 67

Village taxes ... 10,505 10 2

4,65,148 33 64

The Collectors of Canara have ever since gone on lowering or raising the rent according to circumstances upon Tippoo's standard; each Ryot's payment to Government consists of two parts—Shist and Shamil. The Shist is the old land tax and is easy; the Shamil is the extra assessment which is sometimes more, sometimes less than the Shist. Few individuals pay the full sum including shist and Shamil, but while the Collector keeps the full standard 6,16,089-2-20 in view the Ryots have to look forward to pay it according to the Kykaghiz as it is termed. This standard is too high, but the annual settlement is made with a view to it, and the amount is regulated by circumstances.

It may here be proper to observe that tho' the standard of Tippoo be too high for the country, yet that the settlement of Fusly 1209 was concluded and regularly collected under great disadvantages. Canara had been almost desolated by many years of oppressive Government and latterly by the confusion which the war with the English had occasioned. Major Munro was appointed Collector after the fall of Seringapatam and did not enter Canara till late in 1799 when the Mysore troops were still in possession of the forts which they did not give up for some time, until a force had entered and laid siege to the fort of Jumalabad. No sooner had they evacuated the province than Dhoondiah's people took possession of the country above the Ghauts, and several adventurers sprung up in different parts of the country who occasioned great confusion till the middle of 1800. Some

of these adventurers surprised and took the strong fort of Jumalabad, others got into other districts, and a general scene of confusion if not civil war took place. Notwithstanding all this confusion, notwithstanding the low state to which former bad Government had reduced the province the revenue of Fusly 1209 was collected, and the people so far from murmuring universally supported the Collector and enabled him to seize or drive out the adventurers who had occasioned so much trouble. The people paid the revenue regularly and turned out with arms in their hands wherever there were intruders or disturbers of the peace, and by their own exertions restored order. If therefore the revenue of Fusly 1209 was so cheerfully and readily paid it may be inferred that they can pay more, at all events that they ought not to pay less now after so many years of mild Government.

I shall now state my ideas respecting the Settlement of Canara.

In whatever way it be done I think that a direct Settlement with the proprietors is the only rational mode of managing the land revenue of Canara and Malabar, but it still remains a question whether the land tax of Canara at least should not be allowed to remain as it is. Whether an attempt to equalize it by a new assessment be proper or no. It may be argued against the equalization of the land tax in Canara that it might shake the tenures and the confidence of the proprietors; that the owner of an highly assessed Estate got it so much the cheaper on that very account, while the owner of an under assessed Estate got it so much the dearer. Therefore that equalizing the land tax would be an act of injustice towards the owner of the low assessed Estate, and be in reality taking so much from the interest of his capital, that by the same reasoning it would be taxing the industry of those proprietors who had increased the value of their estates by superior culture, or greater expence, for that where the value of an Estate has been greatly raised by the labor and expence bestowed upon it, so much money is actually invested in the land; the produce of such improvements, are merely the interest of the money, or in other words profit of the stock expended in the improvement. That it would therefore be a kind of robbery, at all events a tax on stock which might check the future improvement of land since people would vest their capitals where there was less danger of taxation. That for the same reason the Moolgenuies or fixed tenants would have cause to murmur if the new land tax affected the fruits of their industry. That innovation is dangerous, and that the old land tax which has stood with a few additions for ages must not be set aside for the sake of any supposed contingent advantages; nor should a venerable old building be pulled down that modern and perhaps inferior architects may have to erect another which may not prove so commodious. It may be further said that the present land tax is not so unequal as to injure the interests of agriculture, since cultivation has been improved and extended under it, and it has been at least the reduced current Settlement the *Wussooli Bereez* as it is called has been regularly realized without complaint; that with whatever care the new assessment be conducted great inequalities must arise in a few years at least, for that the idleness or industry, the bad or good luck, the folly or prudence of individuals will soon affect the value of the land, and of course produce inequalities in the land tax, even tho' they be avoided at first, of which however there is little hope since all taxes, all human calculations must be in some degree erroneous and

finally that the complaints of these on whose estates the land tax was raised by the new assessment would drown the thanks of those whose burthens were lightened—such and many general arguments might be used against altering the present land tax, however they are to be combatted by others no less strong. It may be said that the present inequalities arise more from fraud and partiality than from industry and capital expended, from the land-lords having managed to lower their tax by intrigue than from their having raised the value of their Estates by superior industry or greater expence. That few estates have changed owners since the assessment became so heavy—on the contrary that estates purchased for considerable sums by the ancestors of the present possessors have nearly lost their value from the land tax being raised by extra assessment since the purchase. That amidst the revolutions and confusion of an Indian Government it is difficult to ascertain the rules, and the fairness of the present assessment, but that it may be supposed that no fair rule was observed. That in respect to its being a tax on stock, and an infringement on private property, that all taxes, even the land tax, are taxes on stock, because no land at all improved is without some share of capital which was originally expended upon and invested in it. The first clearing for instance is an original, and in India, the principal expence by which stock is embodied in the land—all arable lands paying revenue are cleared therefore original stock has been invested in them, therefore the land tax is in some measure a tax on stock. In gardens indeed as I have observed the original expence and the risque is so great that it must be considered however generally neither in England nor in India do we calculate so nicely as to distinguish between the soil and the stock invested in it. If the land tax be light and fixed, people will not be deterred from expending their stock in agricultural improvement by the fears of taxation. It may also be urged against the present land tax that it is arbitrary and unfixed. That the standard of Tippoo 6,16,089—2—20, in Column 71. of Major Munros' Statement is at least a Lac of Pagodas more than the country can pay, and that while the Collector makes his Settlements on so inadequate a standard, his Settlement is in reality arbitrary, and finally it may be said that an equal assessment in itself is so just that every body will or ought to acquiesce in it, and that if a few do murmur the majority will be satisfied. Several modes of permanently settling the land tax of Canara have been suggested. To measure and survey the lands ascertain the gross produce, and take a certain proportion of it as the sirkar share seems at one time to have been thought of. I am for examining men and papers rather than ground to get accounts of its rental. The survey of the whole province would be useful would form a doomsday book of Canara, but it would cost a great deal of money, and take up a great deal of time which might not be compensated by equivalent advantages. It would be impossible to make a just assessment merely on the measurement and estimate of the gross produce, because the varieties of soil and situation, the relative advantages of water carriage, the wholesomeness of the air the capability of improvement the contingent expences and advantages of each estate must be taken into the calculation in fixing the land tax on the gross produce.

Major Munro proposed a reduction of 36,164 Pagodas from the settlement of Fusly 1209 calculating all the circumstances of each District, so as to reduce

the assessment where it was heavy, and generally equalize it. He thought it difficult to ascertain the landlord's rent, and proposed this mode of reduction which he considered necessary to give that spirit to agriculture which former ages never saw. This opinion seems to have been justified by experience. The Fusly 1209 Settlement has been in some measure increased, and tho' the country has improved those rapid advances which a reduction might have produced have perhaps not taken place.

I propose taking the *gueni* the rent or neat produce, and taxing it at about 60 per cent. This may be ascertained by examining deeds and leases, by putting the landlord and tenant on their Oath, by occasional inspection and survey. In cases where the landlord manages his own land by computing what tenants would pay for such land were it let. There are in general some accounts or documents by which the *gueni* may be ascertained the custom of the place, or former accounts, will enable the Collector to ascertain the rental in doubtful cases. I have no doubt but that by patience, care and proper management the rent may be ascertained with sufficient exactness. There are tenants on most estates who are not backward to tell the state of their farms and the rent they pay—forgeries and perjury might be punished with severity, and the landlords would probably give in true accounts of their rental, because they would be in danger of losing their rent if the amount was concealed—that is if proper regulations were enacted in this respect. In cases where the landlord managed part only himself the Collector might estimate the rent of that part by calculating the rent paid by the tenant on that part which he let out where he managed the whole himself, by computing the rent by what the tenants of his neighbours paid for such land. Every field as I have observed is called and estimated as a field of so many Morahs or measures of seed, and the rent in rice upon the seed is well known. There might be an hundred checks upon the landlords. It might be enacted that all leases, mortgages and transactions relating to land should be registered in the Cutcherry. Such a regulation would I should imagine be of equal use to Government as a means of assessing the land tax, and to Individuals to prevent imposition; when the rental is once ascertained there remains nothing more to do than to fix on a proper proportion to take as land tax. There would be no need to calculate all the circumstances of fertility, the advantages of situation and other circumstances which affect the rent because the landlord and tenant had already done that, and the rent was fixed upon a calculation of all those circumstances, and many years experience of the profits and loss of the farm.

In converting the rent in kind which is the most common payment of rent to the landlords, or rather in converting the Government share of the rent in kind into money some attention must be paid to the price of grain—because water carriage and other circumstances make it vary in different places, but every other consideration may be left to the mutual agreements between the landlord and tenant. There would be no necessity to abolish the ancient terms. The Shist should be kept; where the Shist and Shamit or old land tax and extra assessment amounted together to the share of the rent which Government are to take as land tax, nothing ought to be added or reduced. Where the Shist and Shamit together do not amount to that share it ought to be raised to it, except in some particular cases; gardens ought perhaps never to pay above the *Kye kaghi*

and perhaps some other lands whose value is not intrinsic, but in general ricelands which now pay less than the proportion of rent which is fixed on as land tax ought to be raised to that proportion. In particular cases the Collector should exercise a discretion in calculating rent, he should consider the permanent rent, rather than that which arises from temporary extrinsic sources, such as particular valuable species of plants.

Respecting the proportion which ought to be taken from the rental as land tax I should think that it ought to be moderate because Government have, and can hereafter raise a great revenue from customs, and similar sources, and because such modes of drawing a heavy revenue are less burthensome to the landed interest than a heavy tax direct, when the customs are heavy they are not paid till the grain is sold, when the land tax is heavy it is paid perhaps before the grain is sold. I have discussed the sea customs which ought I think to be heavy, but the land tax of Canara light—Canara should be considered the Granary of the Western coast and every encouragement ought to be given to its agriculture. Canara has a thin population and tho' most of the land fit for rice is cultivated yet great improvement may still take place. The ancestors of the land-holders have reclaimed and cultivated their estates at great expence and labor. It would therefore be unjust and impolitic to take too much of the rent from them. Government have adopted and the Court of Directors seem to have approved of a light tax in the neighbour province of Malabar and as Major Munro observes the ancient Hindoo Princes who possessed Canara were very moderate in their assessment, and the Company ought not to impose heavier taxes on their subjects than any native Government; a light land tax is the greatest spur, or rather it acts as a bounty on production. Government have fixed on 60 per cent of the rent in Malabar as the share for the land tax. Major Munro wished that the Government share should be fixed at half the rent. I think that about 60 per cent of the rent would pay the present assessment, which is about the sum which Government ought to take from Canara in the shape of a land tax.

The settlement of Fusly 1209 was easily realized, it amounted to 4,54,643 Pagodas and was fixed by deducting from Tippoo's imaginary settlement of 6,16,039 Pagodas what the country could not possibly pay. I think therefore that Canara should now pay more than what it easily paid in Fusly 1209, but as other sources of revenue have produced great sums in another shape, and as still more may be raised from those sources I think that Canara ought not to pay much more than the settlement of fusly 1209 that the standard is certainly above one Lac of Pagodas too high. The Collector has gone on since Fusly 1209, raising or lowering the payment of each Individual according to circumstances, and by these means has raised the revenue 23,275—33,30 Pagodas nearer the standard—about half of this increase however arises from the increased cultivation of sirkar lands, about half from raising the assessment towards the standard, at the same rates of increase it will require at least 30 years to raise the revenue to Tippoo's standard and therefore the present assessment is arbitrary and so far a check on improvement and the standard is consequently too high to take as the amount of land revenue.

† so in the original

In Burkoor the standard averages by an account which seems pretty correct star Pagodas

1—34—45 per. acre

but the land lords rent averages only star Pagodas

1—27—48 per. acre *

it would seem therefore that the standard exceeds the land-lords rent the land tax exceeds the rent.

In Bulsawar the standard average star Pagodas 1—30—72 per. acre.

The land-lords rent averages star Pagodas 1—31—64 per. acre so that rather less than a fanam would remain as clear rent to the land-lords if the full standard assessment was levied.

Major Munro proposed a reduction of 36,164—0—0 Pagodas but instead of being reduced the settlement has been increased to 4,97,120—13—64. This assessment is unequal, but in the aggregate is perhaps about the sum which the country can afford to pay. The object is therefore to equalize and fix a land revenue of about from 4,75,000 to 5,00,000 Pagodas, about the equalization some observations may be urged, about the fixing it, at least the payment of each individual, none.

In Canara the best mode therefore seems to be to fix on such a share of the land rent as shall leave enough for the proprietor, and yet pay the land tax which ought not as it appears by experience, to fall below 4,75,000, nor to exceed 5,00,000 when however correct accounts of the rent be obtained it will perhaps be necessary to lower, or it may be practicable to raise the amount of the land tax a little higher. I should think that rather less than more than that sum ought to be taken, but at present there is not enough to pass a decisive opinion upon. Some endeavors have been made to get the rent roll of some districts. The Collectors must proceed to get the rent roll of the whole province by the means which I have stated as likely to obtain it. When the rent roll is ascertained it will be easy to tell whether 50 or 60 per cent will pay the sum which ought to constitute the land tax. When the accounts are procured, and an estimate of the percentage on the rent necessary to be taken is made, the Collector ought to make a settlement of two or three villages in each district upon these principles, assessing them at that proportion of the rent which from the estimated rent roll of the whole province may appear to be adequate to pay the land tax. If for instance the estimated rent roll of all Canara comes to eight lac of Pagodas, 60 per cent on the rent will nearly pay 5,00,000 the land tax. The Collector must therefore assess those villages at 60 per cent of their rent and collect at that rate for one year. This would make the people think that he was in earnest; he ought to go on the first year or two in this way getting further information, and correcting the rent roll of the whole province, but conducting the settlement as usual in the old way, except in respect to the two or three villages in each district which he had experimentally assessed on the new principle. The second or third year when the rental has been pretty

* Vide statement No.

† so in the original

accurately ascertained the Collector may settle a few more villages or even districts, but this must not be considered permanent. About the third year it may be supposed that sufficient information has been obtained to assess the whole province on the new principle, and it ought to be done however it should not be declared permanent immediately, because it may be necessary to correct any errors, or reduce any inequalities which a little experience may disclose. The Collector will thus have three or four years to obtain the rental—to assess on the new principle and to equalize his assessment. The people will have three or four years to expect it, and point out any partial errors. I would have the Collector take the same steps which I have recommended for Malabar he ought to make a division of the 5,00,000 or the sum which is fixed upon after obtaining the rent roll, and assess it upon districts in the proportion which, their rent roll may make it fall. In doing this he should assemble the most respectable proprietors of each district the first year after getting the true rental, he should explain to them the principles of the assessment, inform them at how much their district was rated, and desire them to state their objections. The land-lords of the district would object if the share of the land tax allotted to them was heavier than that assessed upon the neighbouring districts, while the land-lords of neighbouring districts would object if any particular district was too lightly assessed, whereby they conceived their own burthens increased. The people of contiguous districts know each others circumstances, and the proportion which they do and what they ought to pay. For instance the people in a village of the Mulki or Burkoor district complained to me that they were assessed higher than the people of Mangalore, and objected to the inequality upon general principles. The inhabitants of each district in Canara will in the same manner object to their own assessment, and attempt to shift some part of the burthen on their neighbours, by shewing that they got a greater rent, and therefore ought to pay more, than they are rated at. The Collector by managing this kind of jealousy may obtain the true state of the rents, and by proper enquiries may rectify any inequalities in the assessment of Districts. The Canara people know nothing about the Country above the Ghats perhaps, but the people above the Ghats may be brought to give the same information against each other. When the amount of districts has been pretty accurately ascertained the Collector may subdivide the district assessment on maganis and villages in concert with the Chief Inhabitants. The people of one will in the same manner object to the light assessment on other maganis, in the hope of easing themselves. The Collector may go on assessing Individuals or rather superintending the assessment which the Inhabitants may settle among themselves. As the assessment will be actually made and collected for two or three years in two or three villages or more in each district the people at large will believe him in earnest, will know what their district magani and village is rated at, and will avail themselves of the opportunity which the delay offers of getting any inequalities levelled. The proprietors of land know very well what their neighbours ought and can pay. They will not consent to pay more than their share, and even shame may induce them to tell the truth, and not prejudice their neighbours, by withholding the account of their own rents. If they do their neighbours will most likely inform against them. The settlement and the discussions relating to it ought to be conducted in public. The Cutcherry servants the chief Inhabitants should meet in a sort of assembly in order to prevent partiality, and in cases of disputes the Inhabitants of the neighbouring district

magani or village ought to be called to mediate between Individuals, and between the Collector, and the parties.

After the Collector has got a correct rent roll of the whole province he must send it to the Board of Revenue and after the proportion has been fixed and the settlement has been approved by Government it should be generally introduced, but still it ought to be actually collected for two or three years before it be declared permanent.

The percentage will depend on the amount of the rental. If the rental of Canara is below ten lac, something more than 50 per cent must be taken as land tax. If it be above ten lac something less than 50 per cent must be levied. I should imagine * that about 60 or 65 per cent, will pay five lac of Pagodas as land tax, but if 60 or 65 per cent will not pay it 70 or 75 per cent must be taken; however I imagine that 60 or 65 per cent will pay five lac of Pagodas which including *Mulwasee* I consider the just amount of land tax derivable from Canara, and will make up for any deficiencies occasioned by not assessing gardens and particular estates above the kye kaghiz. When the Collector has collected the new land tax for a year or two it will be seen whether it answers, and may then be declared permanent. Respecting gardens they should perhaps never be rated above the *Kye kaghiz*. The rice lands above the Ghats being public not private property a remission of eight or ten thousand Pagodas may perhaps be necessary to give the Rayets up enough of the rent to constitute them proprietors 25 per cent of the rent might be enough for them, for as they are mere tenants like the people in the Carnatic it is not necessary to allow them so much as the proprietors of Canara.

I think that I have now explained my ideas of assessing a permanent land tax in Canara, but to prevent mistakes I will concisely state what I mean.

I think then that experience has shewn that Canara can and ought to pay five lac of Pagodas (including *Mulwasee*) as land tax. Government therefore must fix on this sum as their demand on the lands now occupied and in cultivation in Canara and that the Collector must as far as possible leave the people to divide this sum among themselves. If any person thinks this plan romantic or impracticable none can think it unjust. I have only to answer that in Europe as well as in India it seems very common to fix the amount, and leave the payers of the tax to settle the sub assessment among themselves. In India it is very common in every province villages are farmed out by the sirkar or the zemindar, and the Rayets settle among themselves how much each man is to pay—and in general this mode of settlement is thought fairest, and most satisfactory contributions are I believe usually levied in this manner. The people under their own municipality settle among themselves the distribution of the amount which is ordered to be paid, and by this method the hardship of a contribution is alleviated. Indeed it is evidently so fair that the people should as far as possible assess themselves, and is so common, in India that I do not think it will be objected to.

Respecting the amount I have stated my reason for thinking that it should be about five lac of Pagodas. The country has paid near that sum under disad-

* Vide statement No. 6.

vantages which do not operate at present. The people have paid this sum in the aggregate tho' perhaps in unequal proportions. It is not probable that any great changes will be necessary in equalizing the tax. The Collector must keep as near the old assessment as possible, and after all his enquiries, and the representations of the people it will probably appear to be necessary only to lower the assessment of a small proportion of land-lords who are too much burthened, and collect that sum from others who at present pay less than their proper proportion. The chief good to be expected from the measure will arise from the demand being limited on each estate. Those land-lords indeed who paid more than their share of the public burthen will have to rejoice at the equalization, but those who are forced to pay their share will have no just reason to complain. Respecting Government I think that as they have other sources of Revenue such as the Sea Customs in Canara they ought to be content with about five lac as land Revenue.

Lands which are parcels of private estates and formerly paid shist, but now are free because uncultivated ought to be rated, or to be relinquished by the present owners. To make all private lands pay encourages agriculture, for if the Proprietor only pays for part he concentrates his stock and labor on that part of his land, lets the rest lie waste and thus by avoiding tax gains more by raising a smaller produce on a smaller quantity of ground, than he would by raising more produce on a greater quantity of land.

The amount of advances for Tank repairs ought to be deducted from the land tax, or rather from the rent in calculating the land tax on estates where they are required.

All sirkar lands ought to be given up or sold to proper persons who will agree to take them and pay the land tax.

I would resort to the same means of recovering balances in case the estates of the defaulters will not sell which I proposed for Malabar. The deficiency when it did not exceed 10 per cent should be assessed on the village on the district where it exceeded 10 per cent of the village land tax, but did not exceed 10 per cent of the district land tax.

Respecting, remissions I see no human means which can be adopted to prevent the necessity of sometimes granting them—until we can command the elements it will be necessary to grant remissions in particular cases.

This appears to me to be the only way in which a permanent settlement with each proprietor can be concluded in these provinces. In this way I imagine that it might be done, but it will require great attention for two or three years to assess the lands equally at a proportion of the rental, any estate in which there is a clear profit or rent to the proprietor of 40 per cent of the neat produce will always be saleable property, and therefore the revenue will be always realized, in fact 40 per cent of rent in India is more than the clear share of the rent enjoyed by Land lords in England if taxes be calculated. The land-lord in India pays so little in any other shape that 40 per cent of the rent is more to him, than the share of the neat produce drawn by the land-lords at home, who pay for everything they consume in a variety of ways.

A plan for the settlement of the Kundapoor district was drawn out in Mr. Gowan's Cutcheri on the Malabar principles. It is not entirely to be depended upon because drawn out in a hurry and upon materials some what doubtful, but it shews the general tendency of the plan, and the rental is probably below the truth rather than above it. The loss to Government in this district will be 5,725-8-11½ Pagodas but this sum will go at once to the land to secure the future Revenue and, perhaps increase it, and it will be made up in other districts which are now not so heavily assessed as Kundapoor. If however the rental of Kundapoor should not turn out more, or the rental of other districts should not make up for the deficiency a greater percentage on the rental must be taken by Government.

1. ESTIMATE of permanent land tax on the Estates in the district of Kundapoor supposing that 60 per cent on the rental of Canara will pay the sum taken as land tax, say five Lac for the whole province. The standard of Tippoo for this district composed of two parts shist and shamit.

Shist or old assessment	42,231—9—15
Shamit or Extra	13,706—0—2
Total Tippoo's standard	55,938—0—1
The revenue settlement of fusly 1,216 is	46,450—6—¼

ESTIMATED permanent land tax at 60 per cent of the rent.

RENTAL of Rice fields cultivated.

24,407—22¼ morahs of seed land, the rent calculated on an average at 3½ morahs of rice in kind for 1 morah paddy sown will come to 85,893—36¼ morahs in kind, which at ½ pagoda per morah is	42,904—2—8
Rent in ready money where customary is	2,631—5—2
	45,535—7—10
of uncultivated supposed rental in kind to come to	2,168—7—7
in money where customary is	135—5—8
	2,304—2—11
Total Rental of Rice fields	47,890—0—5

RENTAL OF GARDENS.

Total cocoanut Trees	3,35,903
Deduct unbearing	1,64,125
remain	1,71,778

The rent is fixed in two ways.

The first kind of Trees at 12

Pr. Pagoda.

The second kind at 20 Pr.

Pagoda.

*The medium therefore is 16

Pr. Pagoda, and the whole

rental on bearing Trees is 10,736—1—4

Total beetel nut trees 5,85,106

Deduct unbearing 2,63,740

Bearing Trees 3,21,366

But of these trees only ½ pay

and therefore are deducted and

remain bearing trees 1,07,122

of these are reckoned three

sorts.

The 1st sort pay 3 kundies as rent for 1,000 trees.

The 2nd sort pay 2 kundies.

The 3rd sort pay 1 kundi.

The medium to 3,000 trees

is 6 kundies, and therefore the

medium rental of 1,000 Trees

may be reckoned at 2 kundies

which at 9 Pagodas per kundi

is 18 pagoda for 1,000 trees,

and for 1,07,122 Trees is 1,928—2—0

BLACK PEPPER RENTAL.

17,756 Vines produce it is said

650 maunds 16 seers valued at

Pagodas 487—8—9

The rent may be taken at 162—6—3

CARDAMONS may rent for 4—3—2

Total Garden rental 12,831—2—9

SALT.

¶ 625 Bunnies of salt grounds

each bunny contains 80 muddies

or beds of salt pans, the rent

is, for the first kind per bunny 10—0—0

* N.B.—Garden lands should in no case pay more than the kye kaghiz 60 per cent is too high 50 per cent on the rent is the utmost they ought to pay 16,000 of these Cocoanut Trees have been blown down it is said since I was there.

¶ N.B.—a bunny is 80 small compartments and is as much as two people can manage.

(24)

42	
for 2nd Ditto.	8-0-0
for 3rd Ditto.	6-0-0
Average rent per bunni	8-0-0
at which rate the salt Grounds	
now manufactured may rent for	5,000-0-0
32½ bunnies of unmanufactured	
grounds may rent for	264-0-0
Total Salt rental	5,264-0-0
Total rental of rice lands—Gardens and salt	65,985-2-14
of which cultivated and Manu-	
factured is	63,417-0-3
Uncultivated and manufactured	
is	2,568-2-11
	65,985-2-15
*Of this rental the proprietors	
are to keep 1/10th or	26,394-1-0
balance 9/10th remain as esti-	
mated land tax	39,591-1-14
Add moturpha etc.	1,123-5-7
Total land revenue	40,714-7-5
Settlement of fusly 1,216	46,450-6-1/4
Estimated new land revenue	
as above	40,714-7-5
Loss to Government	5,725-8-11 1/4

2. I will now state an estimate for the district of Honawur including 16 Maganis 167 villages, 3,556 proprietors 713 Sirkar tenants. Total 4,269 proprietors and Tenants. It is estimated according to some experiments made by the district servants in Fusly 1,215.

RICE FIELDS.

Moras 28,330½ of seed land of which the rent in kind is reckoned 3¼ morahs of rice to each morah of seed, valued at By Pagodas 1-6-4 pr. 1 morah of seed or 3¼ rent is 46,037-0-10

GARDENS.

Cocoanut Trees	3,28,960
Deduct unbearing	54,033
bearing Frees	2,74,227

* N.B.—This revenue is estimated too low probably because it is below the ancient ~~shist~~, it will turn out that the rental is taken too low if the rental be the true rental and there be no other way of making up for the loss a greater percentage must be taken.

which at 1 Pagoda for 16 trees is	17,139-1-14
Beetel nut trees	5,19,233
Deduct unbearing	1,17,560
Bearing Trees	4,01,673
Which at the rate 18 Pags. per 1000	
good Trees is	2,410-0-8

BLACK PEPPER.

Kawns or grounds	55
Vines or roots 31,389 which pro-	
duce kundies 28½ which may be	
valued at 573-1-0 of which the	
rent is	300-0-0
Total garden rental	19,840-2-6

SALT.

122 agger or grounds producing 52,968½ morahs or 650 Garce at per Garce of 81½ morahs and at 1½ Garce per each bunni is 433 bunnies each bunni may rent for By Pags. 8-0-0 and the total rental of salt ground is 3,464-0-0

WASTE LAND.

On a rough estimate may rent	
for when cultivated	4,000-0-0
Total rental of the district	73,350-3-0
Deduct Rayets 1/10th	29,340-1-0
Remains as land tax to the Sirkar	44,010-2-0
Add ready money collections house tax &c.	308-5-8
Total expected revenue	44,318-7-8

COMPARATIVE VIEW.

Tippoo's standard	58,236-4-11
Present estimate	44,318-7-8
Decrease or loss	13,917-7-3
Present Settlement	47,286-5-9
Present estimate	44,318-7-8
Decrease	2,967-8-1

3. Ankolah another district contains.

11. Maganis—135 Villages.

RICE LANDS CULTIVATED.

27,650½ 3 morahs of seed land
the rent in kind may be taken
at 3 morahs rice for 1 morah of
seed which at By Pags. 1-3-0
per 3 morahs rent in kind is

35,945-6-7

GARDENS.

Cocconut trees bearing 1,35,047
at 16 trees for one By Pagoda is 8,440-4-6
Beetel nut Trees bearing 1,85,872
at 5 By Pags. per 1,000 Trees is 944-7-8
Black Pepper Vines 2,20,335
producing kundies 46½ which may
be valued at 995-9-13 Pagodas of
which the rental is

500-0-0

Total Garden rental 9,885-1-14

SALT.

151½ Garce 20 morahs make 10½ Bunnis
which according to the customary rent of
8 Pagodas per Bunni makes the whole
rental in salt grounds

808-0-0

Total rental of cultivated 46,638-8-9

Estimated rental of uncultivated 2,000-0-0

Total estimated rental 48,638-8-9

Deduct Rayets share ¼th 19,495-5-4

Balance to the Sirkar ⅔th 29,183-3-1

Add ready money collections 80-6-2

Total estimated expected revenue 29,263-9-3

COMPARATIVE VIEW.

Tippoos standard	38,123-3-6
Estimate	29,263-9-3
Decrease	8,864-4-3

Settlement of fusly 1216 25,904-3-13

Estimate as above 29,263-9-3

Increase 3,359-5-6

4. Bilghi contains 13 Maganies 74 villages 782 Proprietors 281 Sirkar tenants.

RICE LANDS.

6,600 kundies of seed land the

rent where of or gootta may
be 32,562½ kundies which at
per kundy is
Uncultivated per Estimate

8,390-6-4

2,250-0-0

Total Rice rental 10,640-6-4

GARDENS.

Cocconut trees 161 at 1 By Pags. for 10 Trees is 16-0-10

Beetil nut trees 13,81,195

Deduct unbearing 31,195

Bearing Trees 13,50,000

On which the rent calculated on
account taken in Fusly 1215
from 10 persons who had 8,400
Trees the rent of which was pa-
godas 67-3-5 or ps. 6-0-0 per 100
Trees but as pepper and carda-
moms are including the rent of
1,000 Trees is calculated at 8 in-
stead of 6-0-0 Pags, 8,100-0-0

PEPPER.

8,910 roots or vines not included in
the above the total produce of
which may be 7,200 maunds or 360
kundies which at 18 Pagodas per
kundi is 6,480 Pags. the rent of
which may be estimated at one-
third and amounts to 2,160-0-0

CARDAMONS ESTIMATE.

1,26,585 Trees producing 1,265 maunds at
9 Ps. per maund is 11,385 ps. the rent of
which may be taken on guess at one third or 3,795-0-0

Total Garden rental 14,071-0-10

COMPARATIVE VIEW.

Tippoo's standard	19,481-8-15	Total Rental	24,711-6-14
Estimate	15,377-0-14	Deduct Rayet ¼th	9,844-6-12
Decrease	4,104-1-0	Sirkar land tax at ¼th	14,827-0-2
		Add Hill etc. sundries	550-0-12
Settlement of fusly 1,216	13,664-1-0	Total expected revenue	15,377-0-14
Estimate	15,377-0-14		
Increase	1,712-9-14		

5. Soondah contains 30 maganies 578 villages 3390 Proprietor 3196 Sirkar nants, total 6586 their rental and payment at the rate of $\frac{1}{10}$ th may be calculated follows.

RICE LANDS.

24,310 $\frac{1}{2}$ kundi of seed land, on which the rent may be taken at 3 kundi of Rice to 1 kundi of paddy sown, and 3 kundies may be valued at By Pagodas 1-5-0 which comes to

37,215-7-8

GARDENS.

Cocoanut Trees 28,150
the rent of which at 1 Pagoda for 16 Trees is

1,759-3-12

Beetil nut Trees 44,42,853
from which $\frac{2}{3}$ rd must be deducted and there remains 14,80,951 which may be reckoned to yield rent at 2 kundies per 1,000 which at 9 Pagodas per kundi is 18 By Pagodas per 1,000 trees and on the above number 14,80,951 comes to

26,657-1-0

PEPPER.

22 kawns or grounds or roots 27,77,322
producing neg 936 $\frac{1}{2}$ valued at 18 Pagodas per neg is Pagodas 16,857. The rent where in is calculated at one half or

8,000-0-0

CARDAMOMS.

Total maunds 1,124 seers 11 at 8-5 0
pagodas per maund is 9,556-1-4 pagodas the rent of which may be guessed at

5,000-0-0

Total rental on Gardens	41,416-4-12
Total rental of cultivated	78,632-2-4
Waste on guess	4,000-0-0
Total estimated rental	82,632-2-4
Deduct Rayets share $\frac{1}{10}$ th	33,052-9-0
Leaves land tax at $\frac{1}{10}$ th	49,579-3-4
Add House tax etc.	1,067-1-11
Total expected revenue	50,646-4-15

COMPARATIVE VIEW.

Tippoo's standard	66,157-5-10
Estimate as above	50,646-4-15
Decrease	15,511-0-11

Settlement of fusly 12 16	46,532-4-9
Estimate as above	50,646-4-15
Increase	4,114-0-6

TOTAL OF 5 DISTRICTS ABOVE STATED.

1. Kundapoor	19 Maganis	140 Villages
2. Honawar	16 "	167 "
3. Ankalah	11 "	138 "
4. Bilghi	13 "	74 "
5. Soondah	30 "	578 "
	89	1,097

TOTAL RENTAL OF THE ABOVE.

5 Districts	2,95,318-3-5
Deduct Rayets $\frac{1}{10}$ th	1,18,127-3-0
Balance being $\frac{1}{10}$ th to the sirkar	1,77,191-0-5
Add House tax etc.	3,129-9-8
Total expected revenue	1,80,320-9-13

COMPARATIVE VIEW.

Tippoo's standard or Ky kaghiz as it is called consisting of two parts.	
Shist or old land tax	1,65,016-4-12
Shamilet or extra assessment	72,925-7-15
Total Ky kaghiz	2,38,002-2-11
present estimate as above	1,80,320-9-13
Decrease	57,681-2-14
Settlement of Fusly 12 16	1,72,838-0-15 $\frac{1}{2}$
Present estimate as above	1,80,320-9-13
Increase	482-8-14

By this estimate it appears that the Government will gain pagodas 482-8-14 by the new land tax on these 5 Districts, but as they contain a good deal of garden and are poor districts it may turn out that the Sirkar must remit a little more which may be made up in other richer and lower assessed districts.

Estimate for Permanent Settlement of Canara taking the rental on such materials as I could collect and adopting the Malabar Plan of assessment.

SOUTHERN CANARA.

Cultivated rice lands,—

1st kind of land

60,000 moras of 60 Kanis Beejwarie
or pukta seers 51 and 34 Rs. weight
at a rental of 3—6—0 per morah 2,16,000—0—0

2nd kind of Land,

46,000 Moras
at a rental of 2-0-8 per morah 94,300-0-0

3rd kind of land,

70,000 moras.
at a rental of 1-0-8 per morah 73,500-0-0

1,76,000 morahs. Total 3,83,800-0-0

UNCULTIVATED RICE LANDS.

1st kind of land,

1,400 morahs at 3-3-12 per morah 4,725-0-0

2nd kind of land,

1,800 morahs at 1-7-8 per morah 5,150-0-0

3rd kind of land

3,600 morahs at 0-9-6 per morah 3,375-0-0

6,800 11,250-0-0

1,82,800 Total morahs of land Total Pagodas 3,95,050

ADD GARDEN

On rough Estimate

Cocoanut Trees 9,12,000

at 16 trees rent per one Pagoda is Pags. 5,700-0-0

Scoopari trees 3,61,000

at 7½ Pagodas per 1,000 Trees is 2,707-5-0

Black Pepper 28,000 roots

at a produce of 105 kundies at 15 Pags.
per kundi is ½ as rent is

525-0-0

Total Garden

60,232-5-0

BUNNIES OF SALT.

400 manufacturing bunnies

at 8 Pags. per bunny is

3,200-0-0

130 Bunnies not in present use is

1,040-0-0

4,240-0-0

Total rental

4,59,522-5-0

of which rent of cultivated land is

4,47,232-5-0

Do. of Waste

12,290-0-0

Total

4,59,522-5-0

Deduct Rayets share 1/4th

1,83,809-0-0

Remains to sirkar 1/4th

2,75,713-3-0

Nugdrat

4,502-1-10

2,80,215-6-10

• Ky Kaghiz or standard of
Tippoo on the above Vis.

Settlement of fusly 1215. 2,54,789—5—15

Present estimate 2,80,215—3—10

Increase 25,446—0—11

Shist 1,62,957—9—4

Shamilet 1,26,298—5—5

2,39,254—4—9

Present } 2,80,215—6—10
Estimate }

Decrease 9,088—7—15

Rental of Northern Canara 2,95,318-3-5

Deduct 1/4th 1,18,127-3-0

1,77,191-0-5

Add house tax etc. 3,129-9-8

Northern Canara Total 1,80,320-9-18

Southern Canara as above 2,80,215-6-10

Total 6/10th of the whole 4,60,536-6-7

or star Pogodas 5,26,327-12-72

* Deduct amount which it may be

necessary to remit on the rent of Gardens

50,000-0-0

4,96,327-12-72

Settlement of fusly 1215 4,97,128-13-0

Proposed settlement 4,96,327-12-72

Decrease 801-0-8

Rental of southern Canara 5 Districts

4,59,522-5-0

do. of Northern Canara districts

2,95,318-3-5

Total rental of Canara

7,54,840-8-5

When the permanent land tax on each estate has been fixed it is possible to introduce the Mootadari system with some modifications nearly in the mode suggested in Major Munro's letter of the 9th November 1800. In this case Government would do to the Mootahdars what the former sovereigns of Canara did to Enamdars—assign to them the land tax payable from such and such lands without giving them any interference with the land-holders, a commission of 6 per cent would perhaps be sufficient to cover the risque and expence of the Mootahdar, where one Maganie is large enough to constitute a mootah it might be made over to the chief man in the magani, where the maganies were small two or three might be united, so as to make the Mootahs run from four to five thousand Pagodas annual jumma, however the larger the Mootah the greater the security of

* This estimate is on guess but may be compared with statement No. 6,

the land tax, just as the man who insures a great many houses or ships will care less for petty losses, and be less likely to fail, so the great will be less likely to fail than the small mootahdar. Major Munro's plan appears in every respect well adapted to the purpose except that the commission of 2½ per cent seems hardly enough. The mootahdar must keep peons and accountants and a Shroff he must collect and remit the money to the Cutcheri, he must stand all losses and defray contingent expences 6 per cent would be necessary at least to enable him to do all this easily. It seems also contrary to the plan which has been introduced elsewhere to oblige him to pay any increase upon the extension of cultivation. With these exceptions a mootahdari settlement might be introduced into Canara and Malabar. It would be a financial operation something like the mortgage or sale of the land tax or rather it would be farming the land tax and attended with all the advantages and disadvantages of the farming system, except however that as the farmers are to be hereditary they will not be so oppressive as temporary farmers usually are, and who always ruin a country. The chief advantages would be that the Board of Revenue and the Collector would be relieved from a good deal of trouble which the detail now occasions, that the Collector will be less liable to be sued in Court by the Land-lords whose property he may distrain, or whose persons he may confine for arrears, that Collectors will not be so skilful nor take so much pains as mootahdars in the management of the revenues that all men of talents and experience will look to Judicial situations, and that as none perhaps but young men will be found to take Collectorships attended with so much risque and trouble the business will perhaps not be so well conducted, and that suits and arrears, and confusion will ensue which the mootahdars would have prevented that the vexatious interference of sirkar servants will be precluded, that the people will have greater confidence in the permanency of the tax, that the Mootahdars will exert themselves to get the waste land cultivated, that a good deal of the capital of the towns which are in the hands of soucars and rich merchants will flow into the country and produce improvement, that the land tax on each estate, having been previously fixed no interference nor danger can result to the land-lords, that the sovereigns of Canara have often assigned the land tax of certain estates or villages to Enamdars, and that they have had Rajahs in Malabar Soonda and in the Southern part of Canara and that therefore the Mootahdari system is not entirely inconsistent with former usages and finally that it would assimilate the revenue administration of Canara and Malabar to that of the other provinces.

These are advantages certainly which demand attention, however it may be right to state the disadvantages of such a system. It is impolitic to limit the land revenue of a great province especially of one in which there is much waste land, tho' it may be absolutely necessary to limit the demand on Individual estates. It may be expected that a good deal of land may be brought under cultivation in 50 years of our mild Government and become liable to pay a land tax like those estates now assessed. In the event of War of the public necessities increasing, the Government under the Mootah system will be prevented from levying an additional and equal land tax. If in such a case they lay on two annas in the rupee as they laid on two Shillings in the pound in England it will fall very heavy on the lands now under cultivation, but be nothing comparatively on those which may hereafter be brought under culture. Government will be forced to double the


burthen of those who now pay to make up for the deficiency on these lands which do not pay the old land tax. This objection however applies to the whole country and has therefore been considered and replied to; however I must confess that I see no easy way of raising an additional land revenue from the provinces already settled in Mootahwari.

Another objection to the mootahdari system is the influence and patronage which it gives the mootahdar to the diminution of the interest and authority of Government. Both Malabar and Canara are very strong wild countries which have frequently been the theatres of dreadful Civil wars and rebellions and the traveller passing thro' the Country wonders how they are kept in subjection. This objection has been already amply discussed, but it applies with such peculiar force to those two provinces that I cannot help mentioning how it operates on my mind—another objection is that the revenue would not be so secure. The land which pays a light fixed land tax is the surest pledge for its due realization, but when the land tax is transferred to a farmer the security is weakened because the pledge is put into his Hands, and the money passes thro' an additional channel. The whole value of the whole lands of a mootah will be a more valuable pledge than the rent, personal, and constructive property of the Mootahdar. Besides as the situation of the Mootahdar is rather an office than a solid estate the division of it among his sons according to the Hindoo law would cramp the efficiency and weaken the security which Government originally expected from the office. This is an argument generally applicable to mootahdars but in Canara and Malabar where the mootahdar would so especially be a farmer of revenue, and hereditary Tassildar, that it is particularly applicable to these provinces. This objection has been fully stated before.

The argument in favor of Mootahs that the stock of the Towns will flow into the Country by the speculations of soukars is not strong. When a land tax is once fixed, and the people are sure that only a certain known light share of the rent will be taken by Government every man who has spirit, and means to speculate in agriculture will do so. He will not consider whether he (if he improves himself,) or the Rayet to whom he lends (if he does not mean to improve land himself) pay the land tax direct to Government, or thro' a Mootahdar. He will only consider the expences and the probable profit, and will accordingly turn his attention and his capital to agriculture, or other pursuits as they may promise advantages. The Soukars now lend money upon the Security of the lands even tho' the land tax be not absolutely fixed—no mootahdar can give them greater security nor will they be more inclined to lend, nor the Rayets more able to borrow because Government have farmed the land tax.

In respect to the objection that men of abilities will get into the Judicial line I think that good salaries will secure the service of men sufficiently able to carry in the business of a Collectorship.

Respecting the vexation occasioned by the interference of Sirkar servants may be easily believed that the heart burning and Jealousies which would arise between the mootahdar and his former equals over whom he would probably shew his importance, and disgust by the insolence of office, would more than counterbalance the vexation occasioned by sirkar servants.



The easiest but the worst way of settling these provinces would be to divide them into mootahs at once, to take an average of the collection of former years, and fixing the Jumma on that average, sell the mootahs without any more ado, as we have done in the sirkars and Baramahal. But in this case if the land tax were not previously fixed we should in reality give the mootahdar legislative powers, if not confer upon him the actual property in the lands of those who are now independant proprietors. Such a measure would be I should imagine as unjust, as it would be impolitic, indeed it would be impossible unless we at least established a rate at which the lands were to be assessed. But even where a rate was fixed and it were left to the mootahdar to carry into effect no body can suppose that he would do it impartially the Mootahdars if they were left to assess the land tax would favor their own friends, relieve the greater and richer, and throw great part of the burthen on the lower proprietors, and manage in such a way that their own lands and that of their friends should go tax free—a scene of iniquity, and at all events of altercation, would ensue, which could never be so well settled in Court, as it could be prevented in the Cutcherry of the Collector. If the Collector cannot in the first instance fairly settle the tax on each state, there is little hope of its ever being done in Court after every thing has been thrown into confusion by the alteration of the parties—as I have sat a long time in a Zillah Court I may be supposed to know how difficult it is, what delays ensue in settling Revenue causes—as a Collector, a man may settle more in one day than as a Judge in a month perhaps. The forms, and appeals occasion a great delay. The simpler and poorer sort would be ruined, the richer and cunning would shield themselves behind the ample target of a rejoinder. There is at present no standard in either Malabar or Canara which could be prescribed to the mootahdar as a rule for him to make his sub-assessment. If Government fixed his Jumma at an average of former years collections it would be but fair that he should be guided by the same rule in subdividing it among the proprietors, but this latitude would give him an arbitrary power which Government alone should exercise. The present proprietors would most likely consider the mootahdars as men put over them eventually to engross their rights. The settlement of Malabar is not yet made, and there would be ample scope for the arbitrary proceeding of a mootahdar. The settlement of Canara is made annually upon an imaginary settlement of Tippoo which is at least one lac of Pagodas more than the country can pay and as the Collector annually raises or lowers the assessment according to circumstances, and to the means of the Rayets upon this inadequate standard, his settlement is as arbitrary as if there was no standard. The assessment is also very unequal in the whole and in the parts of which it is composed, so that whether the shist, the shist with a percentage of the Shamit, or a percentage of the standard be taken as a general rule the inequality will still exist, the only rule which could be prescribed to the mootahdar would be a percentage of the rent *gueni*—and if Government think that the mootahdar could settle the land tax on this principle better than the Collector, I think that they ought to mootahdari these provinces immediately, but in my humble opinion the land tax ought to be formed direct with the Landlords, I wish to untie, not cut this Gordian knot. If Government are resolved to have mootahdars it may be done hereafter, but to do it at once would I should imagine strike at the root of private property. But if Government wish the Collector to settle the land tax

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direct. If they wish to have a just and equal assessment levied they ought I think to encourage and support the Collectors as much as possible. The Courts of Justice ought not to interfere until the land tax is fixed and declared permanent by Government. If the Collector is checked, discouraged or alarmed by prosecutions, his zeal will damp, his caution will degenerate into timidity, while personal responsibility and the fear of the Court hangs over him, he will it is true go on the best way he can so as to avoid being removed: but no vigorous exertions without which this kind of land tax cannot be introduced can be expected from him. The poor will pay more, the rich less than their share, the cunning will escape, the simple will pay. The chicanery, delay and multiplicity of causes will prevent the Court from being useful while they will act in terror to prevent the Collector venturing on measures which may be highly equitable and expedient. The Collector has an immediate interest in protecting the Rayet and there is little danger of his oppressing them; and if he cannot prevent the temporary oppression of Native servants it is not likely that the Court will be able. For these reasons I think that the Court ought to have no interference, ought to take no cognizance of revenue affairs until the permanent land tax is confirmed, then indeed they will be absolutely necessary to defend the rights of the proprietors, the Courts have a great deal of business in deciding causes between Individuals—there are many such relating to land which are objects properly cognizable by them but for the Collector to be interrupted in the middle of an intricate settlement such as I have described will not only be very inconvenient, but will defeat the plan. The Courts have a great deal of business, which even the zeal and industry of the Judges cannot entirely keep down because private property in the soil is not so readily admitted nor well established in other zillahs indeed the people complain generally of the delay which seems an unavoidable attendant on Courts of Justice, however everything ought to be done to settle the Civil suits. The people of Sondah, Bilghi, and Wynaad, complain of the hardship of going below the ghats. I should think that the Court might benefit agriculture by gradually adopting rules which may facilitate the alienation of land, the registry of all deeds, leases and mortgages of land would also be proper for the reasons I have already stated. The Regulation * 1802 does this in some measure it is true, but it may not be sufficiently vigorous. I would have all such deeds invalid unless registered in some public office—a merchant has a plea for complaint if he is forced to register his transactions but not (one would think) a landlord whose property is seen known palpable, no one can be mistaken respecting his income, the general value of his estate, and the amount which may be safely advanced upon it, secrecy does not seem necessary unless the land-lord means to deceive by a secret alienation or double mortgage. The Court might also simplify the various deeds; conditions, and gradations, of mortgage, lease, and sale and establish certain forms which would facilitate decisions, and render transactions more certain, the Gentlemen in Malabar can do this the more easily, since they are so well acquainted with the language, customs, agriculture, and laws of the Country.

* as in the original.

The atrocious deeds which were formerly so frequent in Malabar and Canara are said to be less common. The rebellions of Malabar were not objects of police but Civil wars which burnt with a raging or smothered flame ever since the Company got that province. Mr. Baber cannot be too lightly commended nor rewarded in my humble opinion for his zeal, activity, and success in suppressing the Pyche rebellion which has cost the lives of a great number of brave officers and troops, and enormous sums of money, all which loss and destruction must have continued had not Mr. Baber finished the rebellion by surprizing the Rajah. The Moplah rebellion was suppressed by the true partizan talents and activity of Captain Watson and his kolkar corps which has suffered more and merited more than perhaps some regular corps. Indeed considering the strength of the Country, the dreadful effects of the climate, and the long impunity I may say which the rebels enjoyed, I think that the present tranquil state of the Country reflects the highest credit on every person connected with the administration of Malabar. Canara is like Malabar and has been the scene of frequent rebellion and civil War. It has been quiet since the first year of the Company's Government because Major Munro took proper measures to secure tranquillity when the province was first subdued; had he not acted in so prompt and prudent a manner it would have been the scene of the same confusion which has distracted Malabar since it came under the Company's Government.

The police of Canara has therefore been excellent as well as that of the ceded districts altho' travellers may some times have waited half an hour for their eggs and milk, and even then have got stale ones, considering the former state of these countries the property and persons of the people are secure, no person who has conversed with the people of these provinces can have failed to observe their general opinion on this subject. This good police arises from the rigorous prosecution of offenders, and from the co-operation of the body of the people who have been brought to support the Civil Magistrate. The Collectors ought as has been already proposed to superintend the police, but I should think ought not to be too much burthened with minute ordinances. If they are distracted with minute regulations they cannot attend to the more important parts of their duty. The Judges would then be relieved from the vexatious and tedious duty of the criminal department, and would have more time and a more collected minds to attend to the decision of Civil suits, which is certainly more difficult and perhaps more important than enquiring into thefts and robberies. If the decision of Civil suits is delayed, property becomes less valuable the collection of the revenue may be impeded *. The courts in the ceded districts have but few causes which is partly owing to the poverty of the people partly to the attention which has been paid by Colonel Munro to the decision of suits the Courts ought to postpone the consideration of causes in which the Rayets are concerned during those months in which they cannot leave their fields without loss.

* There is no immediate necessity for deciding Civil suits and they are sometimes put off on this account but the Court of circuit come round and keep the Zillah Judge so alert about the Criminal Department that the Civil Judication is apt to become a secondary business. Indeed it seems as if every thing was to be sacrificed to the execution of the Laws respecting thieves and robbers.

So much has been said on the subject of police that it seems unnecessary to say any thing more on the subject except to observe that as far as I can see the police of Malabar, Canara, and the ceded districts, is very well managed. Considering the former state of the Country, the persons and property of the people are secure, and that this happy state of security is owing to the wisdom of Government and to the talents and exertions of the Gentlemen who have governed those provinces. The few persons with whom I had an opportunity of talking, and the observations I was able to make convinced me that the people are very well pleased with the administration altho' in the ceded districts they complain about the bad seasons. If they murmur any where, it arises from ill humour occasioned by idleness and scarcity—a fine rain would give them employment and good spirits.

On the whole the situation of the provinces which I have visited has appeared such as to give me great satisfaction, altho' I did not stay long enough nor perhaps take the proper means to acquire minute information. I think that the local officers ought to collect and digest and a member of the Board might then go and give an opinion on the accounts and Statements prepared by the Collectors. I shall if Government approve of it revisit Malabar and Canara when the rental has been ascertained and divided, and the plan of assessing it which I have suggested is in a state of forwardness. All enquiries however regarding the produce, population and customs of the country, can be ascertained and reported upon, only by the local officers. I have refrained from going into detail so much as I intended and have proposed merely general principles because no one but the Collector can undertake to state matters of account which ought to go thro' all the channels of the Tahsildars and the Cutcherri to prevent mistakes. I must here observe that I got every assistance from the Collectors especially Mr. Gowan at Kundapoor * whose answer to your Lordship's queries accompanies this report and from whom I acquired a great deal of information.

If any body supposes that it would be good policy to sacrifice the rights of the present proprietors to the supposed advantages of great land-lords or extensive farms, I beg that he will consider the subject deeply. It will be found that those provinces when settled in the way proposed, will be in that situation which the soundest authors the greatest political economists, and wisest statesmen have ever thought best suited to produce general happiness, and the greatest agricultural improvement—they will be divided among a yeomanry, a great number of small proprietors. I shall not attempt to quote because I have no books at hand and because those who take the trouble to read my paper have I dare say read more and remember more than I do—however I cannot help observing that ancient Egypt, China, and India, under its native princes, Italy under the ancient system, have been most celebrated for agriculture and great population, and that all these countries while they flourished were cultivated by a number of small proprietors or by small farmers who paid so light a rent that they were nearly on the same footing as proprietors, because their favourable tenures were secured by custom. Italy when conquered by the Romans was full of people and cultivation fell off when great citizens engrossed great estates. When rivers which had formerly divided

* Vide appendix.

independent states became the boundries of private estates, the Roman is said to have supported his family on the produce of an acre ¶—two Jugera was the allotment to early settlers.

Europe which was so fertile under the Roman Government became a wilderness when shared out among the northern Chiefs who conquered the provinces on the fall of the Empire. This may be attributed in some measure to the destruction of men and Stock during the invasions of the Barbarians, but Adam Smith attributes the continued discouragement of agriculture from the fall of the Empire to very late times to the law of primogeniture and entails which kept great estates united—the wisest politicians have condemned all laws which tend to fetter the free alienation, and check the division of land, the grandure of England is in a great degree to be attributed to the wisdom of Henry VII whose whole reign was employed in depressing the very great, and raising the very low—the Law of ejectment, the evasion of entails, the invention of long leases, the conversion of subtenants into sub-proprietors, the emancipation of the smaller land-holders from feudal services which all seem to have been effected between the time of Henry VII and Charles II are supposed to be the Chief causes of the prosperity of England. The agriculture of France and other continental countries has been confessedly checked by the laws which enabled the great to keep together vast estates—where estates are very large they must be managed either thro' the agency of rapacious bailiffs, or leased to farmers—the great land lord is usually a proud noble, an expensive trifler, or an idle squire, and they are full as likely to be so, and where they exist are as much so in India as in Europe. If such a land-lord manages any part of his estate himself he generally does it badly and consequently occasions a loss both to himself and to the public, because the better a farm is managed the greater the produce and greater the rent, the farming of Gentlemen is a losing concern. In England indeed some Noblemen and Gentlemen of great estate are not only skillful farmers but Philosophic improvers who have brought down all the secrets of chemistry to assist mother Earth in performing her task, where there are such land-lords no doubt the argument does not hold good, but in general few such men will be found on great estates, especially in India—they in general either farm badly thro' the agency of bailiffs or they let their lands to farmers. Farmers are not so anxious to improve the land as proprietors, even long leases do not give a man such an interest in the soil as actual property. If long leases are allowed to be the great source of improvement how greatly must actual property excite industry. When a man knows that the land is his own, that his son will succeed to it that he has no lord, no superior, none to share in the fruits of his industry, that he and his posterity are to reap the full harvest of his labors his exertions must be greater than that of the farmer whose lease expires in a few years. In India especially where professions and that of husbandry are hereditary, where a man's first duty is to get a son to succeed to his place in society, the hereditary possession of a small estate has every charm that human passions and Indian prejudices can inspire. In other provinces the only land-holders are Enamdars who shew the greatest attachment to their Enam lands. The Laws and Customs which keep great estates together originated in pride and fear—they were only suited to, and

¶ about 3 acres.

admitted into countries where the sovereign power was weak, the great improvements in the police as well as agriculture of Europe have chiefly resulted from breaking up those overgrown Estates. It may be said that great estates never existed in India but the same kind of policy which kept them united so long in Europe produced Poligars Rajahs and Zemindars—Force—official convenience and defence under weak Governments seem to have produced these monsters in Civil society but as they were all officers of Government or pensioners or petty Princes, they seem neither to have claimed nor exercised the right of property in the soil, nor did they interfere further than to receive the sirkar rent from the Rayot. They affected and still affect the style of princes. Where such people existed, it was very prudent to keep them quiet, and convert a dangerous Chieftain if possible into a country Gentleman of large estate; but it was in itself certainly inconsistent with prospects of agricultural improvement. It might be state policy but it was not of itself immediately adopted to increase the produce of the land, or the general opulence—to make a petty prince a great military or police officer the landlord of an immense tract of country, including Towns, and rivers, and forests, and mountains, and roads, might have been prudent, just as war, as expence, as sacrifices, of territory are sometimes prudent, but it could never immediately affect the improvement of agriculture or increase the general prosperity, except indirectly by securing the state from the opposition, and even rebellions which those Chieftains might have excited. It indeed produced advantage to the country by limiting the demand of Government but demand may be limited without creating great landlords or rather great farmers of revenue. To convert an hereditary office—a Jurisdiction—a Military district, an office which at most could be considered a kind of incorporeal property, into a parcel of land, into absolute partible property in the soil, appears to be doing what the policy of Europe has been labouring for ages to undo.

It would be equally contrary to that policy to introduce mootahdars into these provinces with a view to condense property, to unite small and create great estates, except that the policy which may have justified the measure in the sirkars where those chiefs existed directly opposes it in these Districts, and that no great advantage, but very great disadvantages would probably result from so unjust an operation.

Unless the right of the present proprietors are secured by a fixed land tax assessed by Government itself they must fall into vassallage, they will become mere tenants, instead of proprietors; instead of cultivating their own—they will cultivate their master's lands, and according to the usual course of things will cultivate worse.

Some people may imagine that mootahdars are better than small proprietors, because large farms are supposed by some writers and farmers in Europe to be better than small; but the slightest attention to the subject convinces one that this great question which has employed the pens of theorists and the ploughs of practical speculators in Europe is not connected with the subject of mootahdari and Ryotwari. Whether there are Mootahdars or no the same cultivators who have cultivated the earth hitherto must go on cultivating it hereafter—the Mootahdar is a farmer of Revenue not a farmer of land—he may have some bullocks and be a Ryot himself too, but as a mootahdar he can never cultivate, and hardly ever superintend even the cultivation of his own mootah; he must and will let out his

land to the present occupants, even tho' he were constituted by law lord of the soil; no others could pay so much rent because they could not generally speaking cultivate with so much success—therefore even tho' he could and were to turn them all out, and undertake the cultivation with his own bullocks, slaves, and laborers, (had he stock to do it) he would be ruined most likely. Agriculture has been extended and improved in Europe since cottagers were turned out of their small farms. I believe that one skilful industrious farmer with good implements and cattle and half a dozen able labourer could do more than an hundred families of idle Highland cottagers could do formerly; but this is because the cottagers in ancient Europe and now in some parts of it were idle ignorant people whose farming was bad; they did not make the land produce half what it could, and has since produced by better management; yet they consumed more than a few better farmers could require but the improvement did not result from the mere union of small farms. It arose from turning out ten people who could produce but little, and putting in one good farmer whose skill industry—and stock enabled him to raise more produce than all the ten could do before at so much less expense, and therefore to pay so much more rent, these cottagers were originally slaves and retainers of the great landlord, and were a very ignorant, idle, turbulent set of people, from whom no great exertions could ever be expected; but the proprietors in Malabar and Canara are a very different set of men who have reclaimed Waste, pared away the sides of hills planted fine gardens, and practised husbandry with skill and success from the most remote period. The Mootahdar could not pretend to teach them their business, and instruct them in that noble art which is their patrimony, the hereditary profession of husbandry and occupation of certain lands gives them an hereditary knowledge of the soil and seasons and proper mode of culture, which no stranger could possess—the mootahdar has no more skill than any of them, and could not therefore improve the husbandry by superior knowledge.

Another advantage usually attributed to great farms is the scope which a great capital affords—the great farmer may keep certain fields under particular crops and management—he may have fallows and routines of crops, he may reserve his grain for a good price, he may make every thing turn to account—the great farmer no doubt in India as well as in Europe has great advantages, and is enabled to make a greater profit in proportion to his rent than the small farmer*.

A farmer for instance in the ceded Districts who pays 200 Pagodas per annum makes a greater profit and raises a greater produce in proportion to that rent † than the poor farmer who only pays 100 Pagodas. However in this case the profit of the great farmer will not be more than the interest of his capital employed in

* About 400 acres in the upper country of India as well as in Europe seems the best size.

† N.B.—In the Ceded Districts the farmers may get a share in the following proportions a Ryot of the first class cultivating 217½ acres of land & paying sirkar Rent Rs. 243—4—0 Ms. Pags. gets by one average 42½ per cent of the gross produce after deducting merahs etc. a Ryot of the second class cultivating 176½ acres and paying Sirkar Rent Ms. Pags. 178—0—8 gets by the same average only 45 per cent after deducting merahs.

A Ryot of the third class cultivating 142 acres and paying sirkar Rent Rs. 131—2—0 gets by the same average only 38 per cent after deducting merahs etc.

This shews the greater profit derived by the Wealthy or rather the less indigent farmer.

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his farm, the poor farmer has no stock of value employed at least none to signify while the great farmer has a great many bullocks a great deal of stock, a good deal of ready money to pay his expences—all which constitute his stock, and which must be replaced with a profit—his original stock must be renewed his annual expences repaid with interest so that were the accounts of the great and small farmer fairly balanced it would most likely be found that in proportion to the stock skill and labor employed the great farmer had not raised more produce nor derived a greater profit than the small farmer. If a farmer has stock sufficient for the field he occupies his produce and profit will be in the same proportion whether his farm be small or great, the earth generally produces in proportion to the labor and expence bestowed upon it, the division of labor so important an advantage in manufactures has little effect on agriculture. If this is the case in Europe and the best authors especially Adam Smith seem to think so, great capitals can do little in Indian husbandry by promoting the division of Labor—even in Indian manufactures circumstances render the division of Labor almost unnecessary at least there are few manufactures, in which the division of labor is carried far. If therefore the division of labor which does so great things in the manufactures of Europe is in a great degree unnecessary in the manufactures of India, and if the division of labor does so little in the agriculture of Europe how shall we expect any great advantage from it in the husbandry of India. It seems evident indeed that in Europe great farmers have improved the breed of cattle, have gone to great expence in manures and improvements—they may do so here too as they get gradually and naturally wealthy by the increase of their stock under a light land tax, but they will perhaps never be like the great farmers of England who are like great ship owners the one have agricultural stock the other nautical tonnage—it is the same to both in what parish or in what port, they find employment their stock will find employment and the other will take care of it, but to such farmers and ship owners the sea and earth are alike indifferent †—perhaps it is farmers of this kind that are the greatest improvers and breeders of Cattle. Their stock and spirit excite them to improve—here stock and spirit are in general depressed by a heavy rent or tax, improvement is therefore slow.

But even did great Capitals lodged with a few promote improvement more than the same capital shared among many small farmers, it would not signify in respect to Canara and Malabar where they are proprietors not farmers. I will admit that had I a large estate I would rather let it out to a few rich than to many poor farmers, not so much because I thought that they could raise a greater produce as because my rent might be more secure—but the question is whether great proprietors are better than small, and I think it evident that a number of small proprietors are better in every respect than the same land and capital in the hands of a few great land-lords.

Where a great noble or a great Rajah draw the rent or even great part of it from a large estate it enables them to live in leisure and affluence and to employ

† The Land-lord is sometimes obliged to stipulate for a certain course of crops during the last years of the lease, lest the farmer should make the most of his time and exhaust the soil—on taking a new farm the farmer is often obliged to expend a good deal in manures etc. for the first two & three years because his predecessor had exhausted the soil.

many Idle servants and consume many foolish articles of luxury, the whole rent which they draw goes to feed the idle and unproductive, for footmen and Peons opera girls and dancing girls giving great dinners to country parties and giving treats to Brahmins are expences which bring back nothing—they are all sheer consumption there is no reproduction, and they are consumption in a great degree upon worthless domestics and in waste—so it is if their rent is spent in trifling articles of luxury because they feed those artists, the manufactures of those trifling articles which they delight in so much, but it were better that such artists received no encouragement, for if they did not, they would be forced to betake themselves to other more useful occupations—thus rent enjoyed by great nobles and great Rajahs is spent on menials and ministers of luxury and ostentation, and the country is doubly impoverished—it is impoverished by being obliged to support this swarm of drones, it is impoverished by having so many hands withdrawn from useful labors—keeping 5,000 of these idle hands is as great a burthen as keeping 5,000 soldiers—many of our provinces groan under this burthen, the Land-lords rent in the northern sirkars is divided between the Government and the Zemindars, the Government expends a great part of this rent in supporting the Judicial Revenue and Military establishments but besides the Country supports an host of Rajahs with all their dependant relations, Brahmins, peons, elephants, Chobdars and servants—they are supposed to render an equivalent by their skillful management, and clever arrangements respecting the landed property of which they are termed proprietors but did their share of the rent, be it great or small, did the sums which are idly expended or hoarded by them go at once to the tribe of husbandmen the Ryots, how great an increase of general comfort agricultural stock, and improvement would ensue § where the rent goes to a small proprietor it is immediately added to the agricultural stock, and applied to the improvement of the land, to the support of productive industry. It is the great advantage of small estates—by small I mean such as can be managed by their owners that the rent is not diverted from the land, I have attempted to trace the expenditure of the rent drawn by great land-lords, I will try to shew how it will most probably be disposed of by a small proprietor.

The farmer pays his Rent, the neat produce of the land to the great Land-lord from whom he rents, and begins his next years' cultivation with the same or at least with but a small increase of stock. The Rent would be spent by the Land-lord—would not in general be added to the agricultural stock—not at least until the ostentatious or frivolous wants of the great Land-lord had been supplied, but the proprietor (were this farmer a proprietor of the same land for instance) would keep the Rent himself and dispose of it according to his disposition—frugality and moderation are in general among the virtues of a small land-holder at least there is more chance of finding those virtues among a set of men who have been celebrated in all ages and nations for them, than among the great who are notorious for the contrary vices.

§ I do not imagine that it can ever go to them now. It will enable the Rajah to keep an elephant perhaps if he had none before, or half a dozen where he had but one before but it will not go to increase the stock of the Ryots, the Rajah will to the end of the Chapter get as much from them as ever. It must be always kept in mind that remissions granted to Rayots are like money lent out at interest it must come back with a profit—but given to those chiefs, is only expended on useless objects of luxury or ostentation.

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If the small proprietor is very frugal he will save the whole land-lords Rent not spend one farthing on his personal expences, but invest it in that kind of stock which he considers most profitable and secure, and in his situation agricultural stock will be the most obvious—he will therefore apply the land-lords' rent to the purchase of more Bullocks if he wants them, he will plant a few trees, he will give his land a better manuring, or clear a field of Waste. Knowing the certain profits which must arise from his secure possession of the land he will most likely expend all the rent upon his land as far as it is susceptible of improvement. If he has saved more than he can readily and profitably employ in increasing his Stock or improving his estate he will lend it to some others to employ in the same way—for a man of his turn will not lend to a spendthrift

If the proprietor should not be quite so frugal, or rather so penurious as the one I have described he will expend part of the land-lords' rent in wearing a good cloth, in purchasing joys for his children—he will marry his Daughter and thus get rid of half his stock in a way which tends to general advantage because the wants and enjoyments of a man of his moderate circumstances are not luxurious nor ostentatious—he encourages and employs manufacturers of articles of necessity. The half of the rent which such a man may save will be vested in agricultural stock or in the improvement of land, or if his estate and stock are not susceptible of improvement, will be lent out to some other who may want it. The generality of small proprietors will be of this way of thinking, and will most likely act in this way.

If the small proprietor be idle and extravagant he will no doubt spend the whole rent in personal gratifications, and this habit will at least ruin him and force him to sell his land to some thrifty proprietor such as I at first described who will take better care of it—but among small proprietors whose moderate circumstances oblige them to habitual economy such spendthrifts will seldom be found—circumstances form habits, and small estates would form frugal swains.

Here are three probable results from the dispositions of three small proprietors whose estates were just large enough to employ their skill and stock, and the farmers' profit and wages of labor on which would be sufficient to support them as tenants.

If the estates be much larger than the small proprietor can manage from want of stock he will let part, and apply the rent to the accumulation of stock which will soon enable him to cultivate the whole himself, or if it be too large to be managed by one person he must continue to let part until the Hindoo law of succession or other event may cause a division and diminution of it.

If the estate be very small so much so that the wages of labor, profit of stock and reward of skill be not sufficient to support the proprietor he must whether he be prodigal or frugal break in upon the Rent and endeavor by great frugality and industry to improve his land and his condition. If he has bad luck and can go on no longer he must like poor proprietors, poor tradesmen and poor farmers in all countries sell his land and stock and turn labourer—but while a man has a spot of his own to labor upon nothing but very great imprudence, or unusual misfortune can reduce him so low. The climate in Malabar and Canara will generally secure him from the misfortune which usually ruin farmers in other parts of India, bad seasons—and it may be expected that his habits of frugality and prudence which

all small proprietors and especially Indian proprietors have will generally preserve him from the bad effects of folly and extravagance. Altho' the Ryots are liberal if not profuse, they care little about money because accustomed to pay the sirkar and because an industrious Rayet can always borrow, he can always pledge his labour—Mortgage his skill in husbandry and borrow money—his industry is a stock which seldom fails he has therefore credit, but this is no reason for drawing a heavy rent from him his charity is great and in most parts of the Country a certain proportion of his profit is supposed to be expended in charity, and an allowance it accordingly made, but charity begins at Home and he will take care of himself and not expend his whole profit when he has the means and the incitement to increase his stock, and add to his own comforts.

If great Land-lords are better than small on account of the capital, Government must be best of all, because no Individual however wealthy can vie with Government in point of capital, nor will any Individual be more inclined or better able to promote extensive plans of improvement, but it is confessed on all sides that any thing is better than to have Government the land-lord—and by the same reasoning it would appear that as a great Land-lord is better than the greater sovereign, so the small proprietor is better than the great land-lord. The economy and attention of the great Land-lord is supposed to be superior to that of the sovereign so that of a small proprietor will be greater than that of a great Land-lord. The economy, attention and intimate knowledge of the soil, its capability, the proper mode of culture are much greater advantages in husbandry especially Indian husbandry than a great capital—where there are Tanks indeed a capital is necessary—but Government must superintend great Tanks at all times, but in Canara and Malabar the small proprietor will pick up every stone, root out every weed which can stand in the way of, or draw nourishment from a plant, he will cut away the sides of the hills—he will dig manure, turn the soil plant a cocoa nut here, a pepper vine, or pumpkin there as petty convenience may suggest, he will bestow on his little spot all that minute labor and attention which is so important in Indian husbandry, and especially the husbandry of these provinces. Each man lives on his estate and the enclosures the neatness the culture of each small spot shew the attention with which the proprietor improves I may say embellishes his little ground, in the vicinity of great towns on the Malabar coast where there is a good market and property is secure the estate of each proprietor is enclosed with high banks formed at a great expense and all within this mud boundary shews that every inch has experienced the care of its master. I never saw so much neatness, attention, and enclosure in the neighbourhood of our largest towns on this side the peninsula. I have indeed some times seen fields enclosed with briars as the crops were rising, and (in the ceded districts particularly) the remains of Milk hedge enclosures for a long way round the village shew its former prosperity. These enclosures however generally surround the Enam lands of the village officers, and are consequently private property, but I never went far without seeing spaces overrun with grass between the field and the Road, sometimes great clumps of bushes and long grass in the middle of a field, sometimes a solitary field overrun with bushes altho' as fit for cultivation as the cultivated fields which surrounded it. All these marks of slovenly husbandry shew that it is sirkar land, not private property. That the lands are cultivated by farmers not by proprietors.

But to return to the question of great and small farmers, or great and small

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estates for the next argument I shall use will apply to both. It will be found that all over India it is want of stock not want of land that keeps down improvement. Indeed it appears so absurd to discuss the question of great and small farms in a country where farms must be small because farmers are poor, that I do it merely to convince people who may suppose that it applies to India. It neither applies to Indian husbandry nor to Zemindars and Mootahdars for tho' I have indulged myself in arguing against great land-lords, yet Zemindars are never either great land-lords or great farmers. Few Zemindars in India have ten bullocks employed in cultivation || I beg every man who takes the trouble to read my paper will remember this all thro'. The Zemindar is merely a farmer of Revenue, not of land.

In Canara the proprietors have not capital to manage their Estates small as they are—they are obliged to let out part, tho' they admit what is evident that it would be more profitable to keep them in their own hands. They now keep as much as they can, and if they had stock they would keep more, so that it would seem that the estates small as they are, are already too great in some instances, and that a further division and diminution rather than an union of estates would promote improvement. It is the general want of stock rather than an improper distribution of the little there is, which keeps down improvement. A light land tax in Canara and Malabar is the only thing to increase the stock of the country, to make those who are now thriving proprietors opulent,—and those who are now poor thriving. In other provinces a light assessment which shall leave to the farmers a share of land-lords rent will have the same effect ¶. If indeed the sunnud (of permanent possession) Milkiyat-i-istimrar had a magic operation, if it at once doubled the agricultural Stock of the country, it would be far superior to the philosophers stone and I should acquiesce in its immediate and general introduction into these provinces, but no person will mistake so far as to believe that we can create property by a stroke of the pen without making some sacrifice, we must either give up a share of the advantage now drawn by Government, or we must transfer individual rights to do any material benefit to the Mootahdar. If we set up a Golden calf to be worshipped in each Mootah we must gild it, either at the expense of Government or of the Rayets. If it be done at the expense of Government the capital of the country will be increased in proportion to the sacrifice made by Government, if it be done at the expense of the Rayets the general Stock and property may be in some measure transferred, but not generally increased.

In Malabar and Canara where there are no tanks I do not see how great capital could be employed even tho' we could make them—some expence is incurred by damming up Rivers to prevent their flooding, or to preserve their water for cultivation. This expence should be considered and deducted from the Rental of the estates in which it is usually incurred. The land tax will consequently be lighter. Stock may be expended in planting gardens in particular situations, but

|| The Zemindar or mootahdar ought not to farm himself because he would in that case unite two professions, that of a Collector to receive, that of a farmer to pay rent.

¶ but collecting the Rent thro' the medium of an hereditary bailiff such as the Mootahdars who seldom has half a dozen Bullocks of his own—who is a mere farmer of Revenue can do no good to the country, by increasing Agricultural stock.

of all kinds of husbandry gardening is best managed by a small proprietor—the minute attention local knowledge, and petty hand work which a garden requires can be given much better by a small proprietor than by any other person the same cause which makes the labor of hired laborers cheaper and more efficient than that of Slaves makes the exertions of the farmer still more efficient than those of the Labourer, and the proprietors' labors again more efficient than those of the farmer. The more their interest is concerned the harder they work and with the greater effect will their labor be applied, whether it be that of the head, or of the hand.

The issue of Tukkavie in Malabar is not usual tho' it is in Canara but there it would become unnecessary if the proprietors were not in some cases overburdened with the land tax, but if the old custom of receiving Tukkavie should still make the people expect it I see no good reason why Government should not assist its poorer subjects with an occasional loan. The issue of Tukkavie does not prove that great farms are necessary—that Mootahs are great farms or great estates and therefore better than small. It only proves that there is but little stock in the country, that poor men have no money and must either borrow or beg, that the assessment is too high, for if the land tax of a poor proprietor who is forced to take Tukkavie was lowered, his rent which he himself keeps would be increased so that he could do without Tukkavie. It cannot be said of such a man that he would spend any remission of rent in extravagant pleasures, nor save it to carry on his cultivation; for the Collector is satisfied with his industry and frugality before he trusts him with an advance of Tukkavie—and the same honesty and frugality which gives him credit to borrow of the Sirkar would make him apply his increased share of the rent to the accumulation of stock. Where the land is private property and the proprietor draws a good share of the rent the issue of Tukkavie is not absolutely necessary because he could always borrow of an Individual on the security of his land, as a great many land-holders now do—but even tho' he can borrow of an Individual he will sooner apply for Tukkavie because there is no interest to pay, as Government are interested about the case of the people, and always have a few thousand Pagodas lying idle in the cash chest, and as they must have collectors and accountants, whether they advance it or no, and as such Collectors and accountants have hitherto safely transacted the business relating to Tukkavie I see no reason why Government should refuse a loan to its poor subjects when they have money lying idle in their cash chest. I fancy that some of the petty princes and even the great King of Prussia did not think this piece of Policy beneath them in Europe.

I have said a good deal about great and small farms and estates not because it relates to the question of Ryotwar and Mootahwar but because from the inaccuracy of the English Language the term farm applies to farmers of revenue and farmers of land—one of our Chief faults in India is the considering things according to their English terms, which are indeed ambiguous as applied to English affairs, but when applied to Indian concerns are sometimes unintelligible. A farm in some of our regulations seems to be judged of by the same rules whether it be a farm of land, or a farm of Revenue the arguments applicable to a farm of land are used in respect to a farm of Revenue—those applicable to a farm of Revenue to a farm of land, and those applicable to either of them, to great and small Estates.

As we generally see Indian affairs with English eyes and carry European

notions into Indian practice, it may be necessary to say a little respecting the gradation of ranks, or in other words the inequality of condition which is supposed by some to be necessary in a well ordered society and may be urged, as an argument against the general distribution of land among a great number of small proprietors. Our veneration for wealth is very proper perhaps because it tends to the security of property but some times we seem to carry it so far as to imagine that opulent men enrich society instead of society enriching them. When a man has acquired wealth by superior industry or talents or good fortune or when his ancestors have acquired it, his wealth entitles him to respect—it is the great end of civil compact to secure it to him; were it not secure industry would not only be damped but a general confusion would take place. This is all evident but for us to sit about a scheme to make a certain set rich at the expence of the public with a view to public benefit is to commit injustice without obtaining any equivalent advantage, and the least evil it will occasion will be the hastening perhaps the chief evil of opulence—the inequality of conditions; for tho' the rich and great especially in the East may some times imagine that their wealth and grandeur promotes the public prosperity, yet it will be found without any very close enquiry that this inequality of condition is an evil altho' a very necessary evil which always accompanies and is therefore by superficial observers thought to be the cause of national prosperity—but altho' it be like some other evils the constant companion of opulence it is still an evil both in India and Europe. If one rich man engrosses many of the good things of life, many poor must go without them—one fat Rajah supposes fifty poor Rayets. These inequalities are the consequence of opulence, and are on the whole evils, which will follow of themselves as far as the custom of the Hindoos will allow them. We need not hasten them. If any of the landed proprietors of Canara or Malabar and the rest of the peninsula (if we make them all landlords) should by industry and good fortune increase their Estates, so much the better. I heartily wish they may—I should never propose an Agrarian law—I would never interfere with their estates acquired in this natural and gradual manner, but when we are settling a country, we must not try to introduce inequalities by positive regulations—we must let them all start fair, and leave the rest to fortune and their own industry. If any become rich, buy land, and raise a great estate it will probably be divided at their decease, and as many more estates as there are heirs will spring up from the ashes of the rich old man; but the generality will remain more nearly on an equality than in most other countries, because the climate of Malabar and Canara yield a surer harvest than in other countries, and because their industry and parsimony are nearly the same.

This equality of condition in respect to wealth in land, this general distribution of the soil among a yeomenry is therefore most adapted to agricultural improvement and it will be found still more adapted to the situation of a country governed by a few strangers where pride—high ideas—and ambitious thoughts must be stifled. It is very proper that in England a good share of the produce of the earth should be appropriated to support certain families in affluence to produce senators—sages and heroes for the service and defence of the state or in other words that great part of the rent should go to an opulent nobility and gentry who are to serve their country in parliament, in the army and navy, in the departments of science and liberal professions. The leisure independence and high ideas which the enjoyment of this rent affords has enabled them to raise Britain to the pinnacle of Glory, long may they enjoy it—but in India this haughty spirit independenc

and deep thought which the possession of great wealth sometimes gives, ought to be suppressed. They are directly adverse to our power and interest. The nature of things the past experience of all Governments renders it unnecessary to enlarge on this subject. We do not want Generals—Statesmen and legislators, we want industrious husbandmen—if we wanted rank Rajahs and ambitious spirits there are enough of them in Malabar to supply the whole peninsula—but these people are at least an incumbrance, if nothing worse they can never do good, and at all events consume a great deal without rendering any equivalent service to the public. We must therefore avoid the creation of more—tho' we submit to the necessity of supporting those who now are considered politically therefore the general distribution of land among a number of small proprietors who cannot easily combine against Government is an object of importance. The power and patronage and receipt of the sirkar rent, will always render Zemindars formidable, but more or less so according to the military strength and reputation of the Government. It is difficult to foresee what may happen in the course of a few years and it is our interest to retain in our own hands as much power and influence as is consistent with the preservation of the rights of the people by retaining the administration of the Revenues in our own hands. We maintain our communication and immediate connection with the people at large, we keep in our own hands the means of obtaining information. The knowledge on which alone the resources of the country can be drawn out. The police administered with effect and perhaps the body of the proprietors secured in their possessions our first object is to govern India—then to govern it well—and in these provinces it would seem that both these objects, a strong Government, and the security of private rights would be attained by a Settlement such as I have proposed.

The general distribution of land among a great number of small proprietors will also contribute to the general happiness of the people. I say happiness because it is our duty to consider the happiness of the mild industrious race which providence has placed under the British Government before revenue or any other object. The domestic happiness, independence, and pleasure of a country life which the general distribution of landed property alone can confer on the multitude makes this far superior to any system. It may be considered an Utopia by some, however I think that Government can and ought to extend this happy system to these provinces. The people of this country are peculiarly adapted to thrive as small proprietors and their customs, opinions, and virtues are suited to this sort of life and adapted to make them succeed in it; no people are fonder of a house, ground and place of their own, of their families, of fame among their equals of their hereditary occupations and of the profession of agriculture than the Hindoos. Had they a field for the display of the industry which their feelings would excite, this great country would have a different appearance.

The Rayots are laborious and in some respects parsimonious, inherit their skill and attachment to husbandry. We sometimes especially those among us who knew least of them affect a contempt for the natives—they are indeed objects of pity if our contempt for their character suggests ideas of arbitrary Government, but considered as husbandmen who have understood and carried to perfection that primeval business of man, the cultivation of the earth for thousands of years, they are very respectable. A few centuries ago the peasantry of England and even now the peasantry in many parts of Europe are considered as inferior beings by their

proud masters the great land-holders—the Zemindars who urged their idleness, ignorance, and brutality as a reason for keeping them in Vassalage. Some great Philosophers have affected to attribute indolence not to be excited by any inducement, want of mental and bodily strength which fitted them only for Slavery to the people of hot climates. They attributed to climate what is rather owing to the nature of the country, open and subject to invasion—rather to the natural character of the people. It would be impertinent to shew that the people of hot countries have been conquerors sages and statesmen merely to prove that the Rayats are capable of becoming independent proprietors, but I cannot help observing that Europe now so industrious, when abused by petty tyrants, distracted by civil Wars, and invaded by barbarians, was worse cultivated than this country perhaps ever was since the days of Manu who is said to be Minos and this is carrying their cultivation far enough into antiquity. The farmers of Europe seem to have been far less skilful, industrious or respectable for many centuries than those who have survived the calamities which have now for so many years been heaped upon these provinces. The people of India cannot be accused of neglecting their own interest; we see instances of industry and parsimony which Jews might boast of. The people of the towns in which property is secured by Courts of Justice take as much pains run as great risques and succeed as well as any people in the World in acquiring property. It would be monstrous in us to lay it down as a rule that they must be stimulated to industry by an heavy assessment driven like slaves not led like men by a sense of interest, that they are incapable of property, and must be urged by a heavy rent, and then justify our rule by a quotation from Montesque's or Aristotle's that the natives of hot countries are only fitted for slavery—several wise statesmen and fine scholars have thought otherwise when they knew their languages, works, and qualities. Their superstitions may be lamented but it is the superstition of Government not of the people that ruins or depresses national prosperity; the same desire of gain, the same self interest which urges Jews and Turks and Christians, will stimulate their industry. The Moors of Spain were, and the Moplas of Malabar are, a most industrious people, the Turks of Europe, the Moormen of the Carnatic, are a most lazy people, yet they are of the same religion. The Hindoos who formerly embellished, were a different set from those who now vegetate in many parts of this country. Whether they worship domestic devils as they do in Canara, or big bellied Gods like Gunnes, or Monkey Gods, as Hanooman, they will attend to their own interest as soon as security and property are bestowed upon them. The innocent polytheism of the Vulgar Hindoo, the sublime metaphysical system of the Bhramins, encourage morality, marriage and the domestic virtues, which produce population and opulence; the same kind of superstition promoted the agriculture and population of ancient Egypt, and China and India. Those sages whose works are read in our schools, whose books in a great measure form the minds of our statesmen learnt their wisdom from India and Egypt—we judge of the high spirited Rajah, the ferocious Poligar, the Metaphysical Achari, the long headed Nizam shaki accountant, the industrious Rayat and ingenious artificer from those wretches who are introduced to our first acquaintance at Madras. The natives have clear heads; powers of application and perseverance in a greater degree than Europeans relaxed in India—and these are qualities peculiarly suited to business, and calculated to produce individual and general opulence, our superiority is more acquired than natural—when they were a polished people we in Britain were savages. The Romans would have thought

the people on the banks of the Ganges far superior to those on the Thames. Those Golden days may return if we take the proper measures and we may derive the ultimate advantage. I have been led into this Episode on the Hindoos from observing how common it is for us to undervalue their virtues and exaggerate their vices.

In whatever way it be done, the settlement ought to be moderate—as long as the people are not oppressed with a heavy land tax, it little signifies how it be collected. Whether a light land revenue be collected thro' the medium of Collectors or mootadars the Country will thrive; but no systems, no coohery can make an heavy land revenue easy and under any system a light land revenue will produce improvement and prosperity. This is a truth which every enquiry I could make only serves to confirm, if it ever wanted confirmation.

Having now I think said enough respecting these sister provinces, Canara and Malabar, I shall proceed to the ceded Districts and begin with some general observations on the Revenue system which have hitherto prevailed in this peninsula. So much has already been written respecting the provinces of Malabar and Canara by people of greater abilities and more local experience than myself that I am loth to treat a subject already so much better discussed than I can possibly do it; I have gleaned what little they seem to have left, and have compared and considered their opinions wherever I found it convenient.

All this peninsula it may be said except perhaps only Canara, Malabar, and a few other provinces, has exhibited from time immemorial but one system of land Revenue. The land has been considered the property of the sirkar and of the Rayets, the interest in the soil has been divided between these two, but the Rayets have possessed little more interest than that of being hereditary tenants. If any persons have a claim to participate with Government in the property in the soil it is the Rayets the men who originally reclaimed and cultivated the lands—this country is divided into Villages. A village considered geographically is a tract of country comprizing some thousand acres of waste and arable land, considered politically it is a little Republic or rather corporation having its municipal officers and corporate artificers. Its boundaries are hardly ever altered. There it stands for centuries, and tho' occasionally injured or even desolated by war or famine the same name, boundaries, interests and perhaps even families remain in the hereditary tenantship of the lands for centuries.

The Government collects the rent of the village from the farmers who cultivate it, some of these farmers have 1000 but generally less—often under 100 acres. There seems to have been at all times three temporary modes in which Government collected its rent, and one permanent which we have introduced—of the three temporary modes the first is the Rayotwar Kulwar or Individual settlement, the second is the Mowzawar Gamgana or village settlement, the third the Ijarah or farm of several villages; these are the temporary, the fourth is the Mootahdari permanent settlement introduced by us.

Under the Rayetwar settlement where Government is supposed to settle and collect the rent from each farmer the Rayets usually under native Governments pay a rack rent, or at least so heavy a rent that at the end of the year they are

(27)

little better if not worse than they were at the beginning under the companys' Government the whole landlords rent, that is, the whole net produce is usually paid by the Rayets. In the Zemindari countries the Rayets did not pay so much perhaps to the sirkar, but they paid a great deal in Bajah Kherch or village expenditure. This is considered by some persons to be usually an indulgence but it has every where been carried such lengths that it in reality became a fraud on Government by a deduction, or an oppression on the Rayet by an addition to Rent.

In Districts under the immediate management of able Collectors this expenditure took place in a smaller degree—not more than 5 or 6 per cent perhaps—in the sirkars and other districts it might, and perhaps now exceeds 10 per cent. In Polaveram I remember the private expenditure exceeded the public rent. In the ceded districts there is probably but little private expenditure—but whether it was brought to account as revenue or privately expended it was all the same to the Rayets since the Revenue and the village servants took care at any rate to get the full rent out of him. The Government however suffers by this clandestine expenditure, not so much perhaps on account of the actual loss sustained as because as it is kept in ignorance of the real resources and expences of the state, it is supposed that the revenues are collected in one province much cheaper than in another and Government is sometimes apt to blame the most frugal Collector as extravagant because he has been more vigilant or candid than others in having every thing publicly brought to account. I formerly thought that by a proper investigation into unauthorized collections and disbursements that a considerable sum which is now spent in this way might be partly added to sirkar rent, partly remitted to the Rayets in the Northern sirkars, but that is now impossible. When the revenue administration is vigorous private assessments are small; when it is weak they are heavy and frequent, sometimes enormous, as I have instanced in the case of Polaveram. This is one strong reason to wish that the Courts have no interference till the permanent settlement is made and that the Curnums be kept under the control of the Collector—any Regulations checking Collectors in this respect seem adopted to shield speculators of Revenue—between the Courts and Cutchery there will be no means of stopping private collections unless the Curnums be kept under the Collector. To return from this digression to the rent of the Rayets it is evident that in a country where stock and populations are at a low ebb a greater share of the produce should go to the Rayet to encourage agriculture. In some parts of the Companys country they may perhaps keep 10 or even 20 per cent of the Landlord's rent \$ but very seldom so much of the rent sticks to the land, and if bad seasons during which the Rayet can raise no produce at all are to be taken into the account it will perhaps be generally found that he pays the full Landlord's rent. Even tho' the rent of bad season be remitted the Rayets still looses by them because he must subsist himself and his stock in idleness upon the profit of the former year.

In many places the trouble and difficulty of settling with each farmer induced the officers of Government to let out the lands of the whole village in a lump to a farmer who again subrented each field and settled with each Rayet, or to the community of the village who settled among themselves the amount of their respective

\$ Where this is the case the land becomes saleable property or if considered sirkar land the officers of Government get something for permitting the farmers to hold it.

rent. The farmer might be partial in distributing the Rent of the whole village among the Rayets, but they generally settled among themselves pretty fairly.

This custom for the village community to farm the whole village for a certain sum is common in the sirkars, and seems the best mode of management they have there. The Zemindars frequently let a whole village in this manner to the village community and now sometimes for a term of years.

In some cases neither Individual nor village settlements were resorted to. The sirkar or Zemindar farmed out tracts comprizing several villages for one or more years, to great farmers frequently unconnected with the land—they were often soukars who had advanced money to the sirkar or persons whose profession it was to live by concerns of this kind and who were like Revenue servants except that their services were compensated by the profits of the farm instead of Wages. The Zemindars themselves were farmers of this description for their leases were generally annual, and their rent was liable to increase, at the renewal of the cowl. They were generally more attentive indeed to the interests of the country than mere farmers because as Government generally continued them, or were unable to remove them from their situations they considered themselves more interested in the prosperity of the country. Under the great Zemindars this practice will always continue perhaps because it is the cheapest way of managing large tracts of country in size and other circumstances more like principalities than private estates; such Zemindars if they do not farm out in this mode usually have Tahsildars on the footing of those in the companys own districts. In some cases the men who were Tahsildars under the Cutcherry remained in the same situation when the country was made over to the Zemindar—on such large estates therefore it would seem impracticable that the Rayets will derive any benefit from the permanent settlement any further than that as he is free to remove his stock and labor to another Zemindary he will probably do so, unless he is well treated. The Court is a check also to the exactions of the amildars and farmers*.

† These three seem to be the only systems which have ever been adopted previous to the permanent settlement and under none of them did the country rapidly improve. This slow advance to improvement was owing to two causes high rent, and annual settlement. These are the real causes of the general depression of agriculture and while they exist no great improvement can be expected. The Government seeing the evils of these temporary settlements with a view to remedy them introduced the permanent or Mootahdari settlement which in the case of Zemindars who were in actual possession at the time of the settlement, seems to admit of little objection, but where the country was divided into mootahs and sold, it may be urged against this system that it was an ingenious attempt to confer advantages without making sacrifices, that it was an attempt to create landed property without rent. It is said by the enemies of this system that it did not constitute private property in the soil for that Government merely farmed out the Landlord's rent to certain contractors who undertook to collect and

* so in the original.

† These great Zemindaries however succeeded better than the small Mootahs partly becomes (sic) the Jamma of lower, partly become (sic) the introduction of the permanent system was only following and fixing the former customs and arrangement of the country. It was only fixing what had been before uncertain but the introduction of Mootahdar was an innovation.

pay it regularly for a certain commission—that the waste lands and some sundry advantages were it is true, ceded to the Mootahdar but that Government were determined to get a compensation for these advantages which they transferred—so they sold the Mootahs—that the price at which they were sold might be considered high to the farmer who bought, but low in respect to Government which sold, because the waste the chief advantage disposed of is like Bales in the Company's godown when there is no demand in the market. In such a case it may happen that no private merchant can afford to give the companys price but still it may not be worth their while to sell for less because they have perhaps better means of keeping and of disposing of them than any individual. The sum was therefore inadequate to the Company, but very heavy to the purchaser and must at all events have diminished his means of improving his new purchase—some sensible natives who have been for years in revenue situations under our and under native Governments and have had concerns in Mootahs seem at a loss to understand the policy of selling the Mootahs which they say gives rise to such a scheme of gambling that ruins many individuals and must occasion a loss to agriculture—low people, shop-keepers, gomastahs and others often borrow clubbing their credit together and pledging the future profit of the Mootahs for the security of the loan. This money so borrowed they pay to Government and are obliged to strain every nerve to repay their creditors. The natives are at a loss to guess what we should be at. Government used formerly to find it their interest to issue tukkavie, or a sudden without any apparent increase of stock in the country they not only refuse tukkavi, but (say the natives) by a gambling scheme drain great part of the ready money out of the hands of those very persons to whom they had entrusted the lands in order to improve them by increased industry and capital. Whatever system be adopted, let us not sell the Mootahs. This bargain are termed the permanent settlement but it was in reality a contract, an insurance, a farm—it was like a young landlord (say the opposers to the system) who to save trouble or ease himself of a burthen which he could not support, exchanged the solid property in his estate for a sum of money paid down, and a rent charge, or annuity secured upon the land. In such a case the new purchaser might manage better than the first proprietor and the estate might be improved—so far the public and even the first proprietor too might benefit, because as he was unqualified to manage his estate himself—his rent might have been less secure than his annuity—but every one would condemn the laziness which prompted or the inefficiency which made such a bargain advantageous to the landlords.

The necessities of Government it would appear obliged them to reserve the whole landlord's rent their supposed incapacity to manage made them exchange their solid property for a rent charge secured on the land, that is, on the rent payable by the Rayets.

But the Government did not transfer the actual property in the soil to the Mootahdars and at once make them landlords because they kept as much rent as they could and only remitted so much as seemed absolutely necessary to ensure the realization of the rest. The price at which the Mootahs were sold shews that the property disposed of was not valuable. The Salem Mootahs originally sold for 19 per cent on the annual Jummah. What kind of an estate is that which sells for 19 per cent of the land tax of one year? In England when the rental is £ 2000 the land tax at 4 shillings in the pound is £ 400. What would be said to a man

who sold such an estate per £ 76 which is 19 per cent on £ 400. But the land tax of England in many cases—is not in reality six pence in the pound—so that the estate in England is a very different thing from the Mootah in India—as different as a farm is from an estate—many of these estates will not sell at all—our system of landed property is like transubstantiation—we set out with declaring in the preamble to Regulation XXV the mootahdars and Zamindars proprietors, we say 'Hoc est corpus,' but by the decisions of the Courts, and general sentiments held on the subject it appears that they are merely hereditary farmers of revenue that the qualities of property at least in the valuable part of the estates are divided, and that the Mootahdar who is held out in the Regulations as the proprietor, has but a very limited interest in the land.

The percentage drawn by the Mootahdar is a commission to ensure him against losses and to compensate for his trouble and skill of superintendence. Until the neat produce of the Mootahs is nearly doubled, there will be no landlord's rent for the Mootahdars. When it is doubled the Mootahdar will pay half to Government and keep half himself as rent. This increase may not take place these 50 years, and until it takes place the Mootahdar cannot be a Landlord properly speaking, because he will not enjoy half the rent, but the neat produce. The rent must be trebled before the Rayets can possibly become small proprietors and draw a share of the rent—the first increase must certainly go to the Mootahdars to give them a rent—and even tho' the neat produce be trebled it is not likely that the second increase will go to the Rayet to give them a landlord's rent.

The Mootahdar cannot alienate land, he cannot even legally let land for a term of years at less than the customary rent; because did the law allow him to do so he might clandestinely transfer the pledge which Government must always keep as security for the due performance of his engagement to them—the rents of the lands are the security for the Government demand, and they cannot be alienated. The Rayet has therefore no chance of ever becoming a small proprietor in the way in which soc—tenants and villains became copy holders—there are other circumstances which concur to keep the body of Rayets in their present dependant state under Mootahdars and render their situation very different from that of the tenants in Europe who have become freeholders. They became freeholders or copy holders in Europe by encroachments upon the landlords, or by improving their lands to such a degree that the old service—or fee—or rent became trifling in comparison to the neat produce raised on the land, and which became the copy holder's rent, and gave him so great an interest in the land that he became the actual proprietor. But here the Government by drawing the rent which is now the full landlord's rent will prevent the Rayet from raising a rent for himself by improvement, and will oblige them to interfere by laws—to prevent the alienation of rent from the Mootahdar who is answerable for their rent †. The Government must

† Cultivated land in survey rent of the ceded Districts per Pags.
Deduct 15 per cent for Mootahdars

2119158—8—8½
317974—0—0

Balance being sirkar rent

1801184—8—8½

The Mootahdars cannot give up a farthing of their share of the rent 317974 because they require it to maintain themselves and reimburse them in their expences and insque Government can never allow it their giving up any part of the 1801184 because it is the Government rent 2119158 is now the landlords rent of the occupied land it must be doubled therefore to give the Mootahdars a landlord's rent in those lands equal to the present rent—trebled to give the Mootahdars and Rayet a rent and still pay the same sum to Government—but while there is so much waste it is not probable that the rent will be raised.

oblige the Mootahdar to keep the rent even against his own consent for he being but an hereditary farmer his mootah being security for his rent to Government he can never—ought never to be permitted to alienate land, or what is the same thing remit rent. He may indeed do it for a time. He may do it as long as he holds the Mootah but as the favored lessee will be always liable to the full rent he can never consider himself fixed on his land as a proprietor. Thus the Mootahdari system (say its enemies) clinches the farming system, and crushes the hope of ever making the body of the people small proprietors, and fixing them on estates such as those in Canara and Malabar; as it stands at present it certainly is a farming system from top to bottom—but of hereditary farming. The smaller tracts of country disposed of in this way, are termed Mootahs, the larger Zemindaries. There is no other difference but in respect to their extent. The mootahs must by the operation of the Hindoo law divide and in time would dwindle to small freeholds did not the Regulations prevent the division. Mootahs would in time come down to Rayetwari estates were it not for this arbitrary law. If the Regulations did not interfere a Mootahdar who had 4 sons and a Mootah paying 1000 Pagodas annual Jummah would divide it among them, and each would according to the law take a portion from which 250 Pagodas were payable to Government but the Regulations prevent the existence of any independent estate paying less than 500 Pagodas annual Jummah. This arbitrary law (say those natives who disapprove of the system) tends to fetter the division and alienation of land. It is true that it will not prevent entirely the division of estates because it will be done underhand but it has that tendency. The four brothers will in spite of the law divide the estate and two of them will club together—enter their estate under one name—and pay the 500 Pagodas rent conjointly but say the objectors to the system the land will be less valuable which is subject to the difficulties, disputes, and intricacies which a law imposing such a forced copartnership must produce.

Indeed the objections urged against this limitation of 500 Pagodas annual rent seem pretty well founded. It acts apparently like those feudal laws—like entails and other institutions destructive of improvement which the wisdom of England has been gradually abolishing. Indeed this law seems dictated by principles very different from those which suggested every popular law in support of the yeomanry of England. What would be said in parliament if it were proposed to have no independent landed estates paying a less land tax than £ 200 per annum? All the endeavors of the popular party in parliament since Edward III time seem to have tended to remove the obstacles to the free transfer of land—and in this country where the landed property must be divided as fast as the multiplication of mankind proceeds where prosperity must produce the general distribution of property as it produces families of children. In this country a law which limits, or even tends to limit the division and transfer of land is contrary to the nature of things. It is to make the immutable nature of things give way to supposed official convenience. It is trying to make things fit themselves to laws, instead of trying to make laws adapted to circumstances—such a regulation might answer perhaps in Poland where none but a great nobility hold vast estates; but in this country the interests of agriculture and population must, one would imagine, be injured by so arbitrary a regulation. By thus fixing a maximum or rather minimum of 500 Pagodas annual Government rent, we prevent many of the better sort of Rayets from becoming Government tenants—they would often take 1000 acres at once from Government in perpetuity; but that this Regulation restrains them, and throws the

Mootah into the hands of an adventurer. I therefore think that whatever system be adopted in respect to the unsettled provinces this regulation ought to be revoked—that the country may have the benefit of a free unlimited division transfer and alienation of landed property without any check or impediment.

The Mootah as it stands at present comprises an unnatural mixture of corporeal and incorporeal of occupant, and proprietary rights as they are termed or rather it is a division of the substance a separation of the attributes of property which (its enemies say) must produce confusion law suits and a progeny of tenures more intricate than those which sprung up in Europe from the absurdities of the feudal system. Why it may be said, must we introduce a bastard kind of feudal law when we have so simple a system as that which has at all times existed in this peninsula? as Government still remains the landlord the Mootahdar for many years at least will be nothing more than a fixed farmer—real substantial ownership in the soil cannot therefore exist—a farmer can never bestow proprietary rights. The Rayets therefore do, and will consider themselves as much tenants as ever—they will wander about perhaps more than ever. The advantage which they derive from the system seems to arise from the market, from the competition among the Mootahdars for their labor—for the Rayets now can remove from one Mootah where they think that bad terms are offered them to one, where they get better they can carry their labor and stock to a fair market which they could not do under any native, not perhaps under the company's Government in some places—but it seems to be the general protection which the husbandmen in common with the other subjects of the company derive from the justice of Government that secures them this fair market for their stock and labor. In the Barramahal the Rayets have this way extorted better terms from the necessitous Mootahdars, those who were rich indeed and could afford to lose a years revenue, it is said, would not remit a dub from the customary rent, but those who were poor were obliged to offer good terms, and the Rayets consequently may be said to have derived advantage from the system—but still it seems doubtful whether this frequent removal this migration from farm to farm may not on the long run do as much harm as good terms to the Rayets may produce advantages, because temporary farmers can never raise so much produce from the same land as fixed tenants, still less than small proprietors. From all my enquiries this seems the chief advantage resulting from the system to the bulk of the Rayets. It secures them the free full enjoyment of their limbs—their skill in husbandry—they have a fair market for their labor and stock—this is a great advantage it is true, and has tended to increase cultivation in the mootahdari districts—but this free market may be secured without farming the land revenue—a fixed rent, and liberty to throw up, or cultivate what land they please would secure it; but this is not enough to give them that spirit which I am anxious to see diffused among them, they must have increased means of supporting their families, and augmenting their stock, if humanity to which we pretend so much, be the spring of our actions. If policy which we equally boast of direct our measures let us remit to the Rayet such a portion of rent as shall fix him at once to his field—as shall put him above the uncertain forced indulgence of a Mootahdar. It is admitted that a remission if not absolutely necessary to the existence of the Rayets would increase their comforts and augment their stock; why then shall we refuse it to them and grant it to a set of men to be created on purpose to enjoy it in the hope of their giving up a little of it to the Rayet? Let us do it direct. Why must we take the round

about, instead of the straight road? It is admitted that upon the industry and stock of the Rayet the hereditary farmer not only the public revenue but the public subsistence depends why then must we refuse to them what we give up so freely to the Mootahdar in the hope of its reaching them by that round about course—under the Mootahdari system the remission will perhaps filter thro' Mootahdars, renters, and subrenters, and a little of it may reach the Rayets, but had we not better pour it upon their heads at once? The Rayet pays 45 per cent of the produce in the ceded districts, give him up 12 or 15 or even 25 per cent more and he will become a proprietor—at least his interest in the land—his situation will make him more like what we usually call a proprietor than the Mootahdar—he will then buy another bullock, then dig a well, and apply the share of the rent which he draws to the increase of his stock and improvement of his land, for he feels fixed in it—he feels a property in it. The remission is applied immediately to increase and encourage his stock and industry. It is vested in the soil—it is made direct. If therefore we pretend to be guided by humanity there is no disputing the advantages of this system, if by policy, to my mind, there seems little doubt, except as to the immediate diminution of Revenue.

In regard to the cheapness and facility of collection the Mootahdar system is no doubt a little cheaper than even a fixed Rayetwari settlement but still (say its adversaries) we could suggest a cheaper and simpler still. Suppose for instance Government divide the ceded districts or any other large province into great farms of two or three lac of Pagodas each and advertise for sealed proposals promising to give these farms to the highest bidder. Many adventurers would come forward and would not only offer, but would perhaps actually collect and pay the revenue at a much less expence than it can be collected under any other system; such a plan would also (say the friends of Rayetwari) be attended with many other advantages attributed to the Mootahdari system—accounts would be simplified, the Board of Revenue and the Collectors would not be plagued with settlements, with the troublesome detail of Tuccavie and Tank repairs. If the Mootahdari system is good because simple this plan is still better because more simple still. If good because cheap this is better because cheaper still. That a Rayetwari system is attended with some detail and that Revenue Officers must think and act a little to carry it on well is true—but all Government, all human affairs are attended with some difficulty and trouble—and the more pains that are bestowed upon them the better are they in general conducted—however (continue the advocates for Rayetwari) a fixed Rayetwari system will not on the whole be more difficult or intricate than the Mootahdari system when estates begin to diminish by the operation of the Hindoo law of succession. The various intricate tenures, law suits, the distribution of Government rent upon divided portions of Mootahs will at last produce as much trouble in one shape or another to one person or another as the Rayetwari. If the Collectors are a little relieved the Courts of Justice will be overwhelmed and law suits and delays will tend to lower the value of land. There indeed seems to be some reason for this objection to Mootahs and for the representations of the advocates for Rayetwari who say that when the rent of each field is fixed at so low a rate that the Rayet becomes a fixed farmer and in time a proprietor the register of the Collector will in time be like the roll of an army, he will collect as easily from 20,000 small land owners as the paymaster pays 20,000 soldiers at least allowing for the difference between the difficulty of getting men to

pay, and easiness of getting them to receive their proper quota of money. In England the land tax is light and fixed and I believe does not involve much detail or difficulty—but the window tax, the excise, the customs, must be full as intricate, must require as many accounts, must involve as much trouble as a Rayetwari settlement—even now the customs in any frontier District require more attention to accounts, and more intricate details than the whole Rayetwari detail of land revenue. It appears extraordinary to many people and among others to me that under a Government like ours where there are so many Boards, Secretaries, Collectors and Civilians, so many Gentlemen of the pen well paid and well qualified to conduct this formidable detail, men who have conducted it successfully for some years that the trouble should be urged as an argument in favor of Mootahs. I have often heard men very able and with proper encouragement and support willing to conduct any detailed settlement, object to the Rayetwari settlement on this very account. But the commander-in-chief might as well order family chits, monthly abstracts, or any other useful documents to be discontinued on account of the detail as for a Civil Government so well furnished with officers, and with such means of making their officers zealous and able to object to a system because it involves a good deal of trouble and detail; our Government must be a more enlightened, civilized Government than that of the Natives and therefore more able to carry on the detail by which alone any taxes can be equally and correctly assessed and collected—a Gothic chieftain on the conquest of a province might have objected to the forms of a Roman prefecture and might have ordered the Revenues to be collected without any accounts at all—but the Tartars who conquered India, barbarous as we may term them, were more politic than to do so. They were very particular about accounts, established wise regulations and checks upon the different revenue officers, and it is their system which now exist in most parts of this peninsula as well as in almost every part of Asia. A man (it might be said) might as well object to any curious piece of Machinery in a great manufacture that it was liable to get out of order, that it was very intricate, and that it would therefore be better to break it to pieces, and carry on the work without it. In every Department in war—in trade in revenue too, there must be accounts and detail. The Company might as well burn their books on account of the detail and trouble attending the keeping them as order a Mootahdari system because their servants cannot manage the detail. The sales of tea at the India house I dare say involve more detail more difficulty respecting accounts than all the detail of the land revenue of the Rayetwari Collectorates on the coast. Government have only to give their Revenue servants good salaries, to turn out those who are idle or incapable, to support and encourage those who are clever and industrious and men will easily be found to manage this formidable detail. Annual settlements are, it is true, very troublesome but when each Rayet has a fixed and light rent there will be but little difficulty. The expence after all is nearly the same in both cases. We must either keep Revenue servants of our own or must make an allowance to the Mootahdar to keep them in respect to the trouble; I own that every person has an interest in introducing the Mootahdari system because it saves every body a great deal of trouble. I consider that I need not have made this long journey nor written this long paper, had not your Lordship suggested the possibility of making a permanent settlement direct with the Rayets—but I am sure that with the generality of my brother civilians the trouble will not be a reason for opposing any system.

It is supposed by some considerate persons that Government ought not to collect its rent at once from the actual cultivators—that some one should stand between the mighty sovereign and lowly cultivator—and they are therefore led to approve of some middle man, some go-between. In this peninsula however the Rayets appear to have been always the Tenants of Government. Whether Government collected its rent thro' the medium of hereditary officers of different descriptions but all classed under the term of Zemindars, or thro' temporary Collectors merely termed amils or Tasseldars or Tanahdars the Rayets were still Government tenants and will be so still and therefore this system from being general, and from having produced general prosperity seems to be well adapted to the country. In this peninsula the Rayet is both landholder and farmer, the poor Rayet is labourer too in some districts; general poverty occasioned by bad Government and exactions have reduced the great body of Rayets to this threefold condition, however the division of property among all the sons in a family will always perhaps render the bulk of the Rayets either small farmers or small proprietors; any set of men introduced between them and the Government which receives their rent must be a description of bailiffs—stewards contractors—by whatever name they be called under whatever conditions permanent or temporary they may act. It signifies little either to the Government or the Rayet whether the rent is paid direct to a Collector or thro' a Zemindar to a Collector so long as the proper rent and neither more nor less be paid—that mode of payment which promises most security to Government and to the Rayet is the best—but all middle men, farmers, contractors and other intermediate agents must get a profit and generally a very great one either openly or clandestinely and the more of them there are the greater sum must be divided among them. But in India particularly they are hardly ever content with their legitimate profit, they will always keep a little of the money that passes through their hands. In the same way that the benefits of the permanent settlement must filter thro' the intermediate objects before they reach the Rayets so must the public revenue pass thro' many channels before it reaches the public treasury. The more channels, the more hands thro' which it passes the greater is the danger—the less the security of Revenue. In the same way that they intercept the benefit of the remission, so may these intermediate farmers intercept the public revenue. The lands are no security for the public revenue unless they are occupied by Rayets with industry and stock to cultivate them. There is land enough to afford ten times our present revenue perhaps but Rayets and stock are wanting, and the security of Revenue must depend on their prosperous condition. The Mootahdar as I have observed is seldom a Rayet—if he is a Rayet, has stock—and cultivates, he is neither more nor less a Rayet, he has neither more nor less stock, he neither increases nor diminishes the stock of others by his becoming a Mootahdar—but properly speaking a Mootahdar is a man to manage settlements and collections—he is a revenue officer—he cannot therefore introduce more stock than there was before. The system appears to effect agriculture no further than as a financial measure. It is not even imagined by any person however inattentive to these matters that the Mootahdar on purchasing the Mootah comes down with a team and a thousand pounds to improve his farm like a great Nor folk farmer to take possession of a large farm which he has rented. No he perhaps may think his dignity now that he has become a Mootahdar requires an equipage. If therefore he formerly walked a foot he may take possession in state mounted on a pariah horse—sit down in the choultry of the village and settle the rents with the Rayets

just in the same way that the sirkar officers settled them before—perhaps (for this is some times the case) he was a Goomastah or sirkar officer before on 5 or 10 Pagodas Monthly pay, and settled the rents and managed the collections of the Mootah before, and thus being acquainted with its resources had been induced to purchase it. Revenue cannot be secured by the intermediate agency of such a man as this. The land it is said is the security for the Government rent, but so it was before. The Mootahdar appears to offer no collateral security. The poor wretch must go to Jail if the Mootah has been so impoverished during his management that it will not sell for enough to pay his arrears to the sirkar. If he by bad management drives away the Rayets who will buy the ruined Mootah? It is the stock on the Mootah that makes it so valuable; this stock belongs to the Rayets very seldom to the Mootahdar. It is only when a great Rayet becomes a Mootahdar that he has stock and land of his own, but as it has been already observed the law which keeps Mootahs above 500 Pags. annual rent prevents the Rayets from taking Mootahs because so great a concern as a farm above 500 Pagodas is considered a revenue farm—a Durbar concern—and attended with greater risque, and management than an individual Rayet can undertake. The greatest Zemindar offers no better security than the rent of the Zemindari, or a private fortune derived from those very rents which will generally be out of reach. How are the arrears against the Zemindaries which have not paid regularly to be recovered but from the Zemindari lands but the lands were there before, and the Rayets who render them valuable. Before nobody but the Rayet could fail, now not only Rayet, but the Mootahdar may fail. The rent may stop between the Rayet and the cash chest. If the Mootahdar fails it may be said that the security consists of the incorporal property of 15 per cent of the rent clogged with the service of collection and the rescue of the farm—and of the property in the waste; this property has not been clearly defined nor is it as yet clearly understood; but whatever it may be it is put up to auction and sold for the recovery of arrears, but it would seem that the remission ought if possible to go to the Rayets to be applied to the land in such a way that each farm might as nearly as possible be gradually converted into a little estate. It ought to go in detail to the Rayets, not in whole sale to the Mootahdar. In such case the land of each Rayet would in time become saleable and the whole lands of the whole Rayets of a Mootah would be far more valuable than the Mootahdars interest in the same lands with the same remission under a Mootah as now constituted. Two hundred little estates the actual property of two hundred small proprietors who enjoyed the solid property—the full rights privileges and powers which constitute absolute property even tho' it consisted of only 15 per cent of the landlords rent would be more valuable than two hundred such plots of land where the qualities of property are divided between Government the Mootahdar and the Rayet, and where (say the adversaries of the system) Government is forced by an unnatural farming system to impose arbitrary restrictions upon the transactions relating to land supposing the lands to be equally valuable the full absolute property in the one case would render them more valuable than the divided property in the other—but the great point is to fix the Rayet to his farm—to marry him as it were to a certain field—to give him such an interest in it as to improve it to the utmost—the two hundred small proprietors would improve their lands much more it may be supposed than the temporary farmers under the Mootahdar would theirs—the estates of the small proprietors would therefore be more valuable and

afford greater security to the Revenue. It must I should imagine be always kept in view that this peninsula is almost depopulated—that under our Government a great increase of population may be expected in this mild climate among a people with whom marriage is a religious duty—that luckily for the Government of the country the great body of the people are husbandmen by profession—I may almost say by instinct—men who consider agriculture their only business the only thing they came into the world to perform.

The men will always extend and improve the cultivation if properly encouraged, and therefore a great Revenue may be expected from the waste lands when the stock and population of the country has increased to such a degree as to occupy them—Government by keeping this waste in their own hands may manage the market of land just as the Dutch are said to have done that of spices—by refusing waste they will raise the value of occupied land, by giving it up they will keep down the value of occupied land, they may manage this way until the improvements which it may be supposed will take place under our Government have given certain lands an intrinsic value—for if the Rayets once find that they are settled on certain fields by a light fixed rent they will set about improvements—digging wells will be the chief improvement—wells in the high and dry parts of the country are the chief object of husbandry for they not only increase the usual rent but in time of draught they in a great degree alleviate the distress of scarcity at all events unless times are very bad indeed they avert the danger of famine. Suppose a Rayet who has a field for which he now pays 40 Pagodas annual rent gets the perpetual lease of it for 34 Pags., he gets 15 per cent of the landlords rent supposing that he paid the full rent before—he will first set about increasing his stock to give his land the best culture of which its susceptible in its present shape—he will next set about improving the land itself where the situation allows of it, digging wells will be the most obvious way—when his wells are dug he fears bad seasons but little, they must be bad indeed to exhaust his wells. He will most likely raise produce enough to pay his land tax to Government to feed himself and cattle for tho' he raises less in a bad season he gets a better price. It may be supposed that the Mootahdar will do so too, however it will be found most likely that neither he nor his tenants have so palpable an interest in improvement as the small proprietor would have. The tenants would not, and tho' the Mootahdar might feel as much anxiety for the general improvement of his Mootah as any small proprietor could do for that of his estate—yet he is but one man—he could not over see every thing—do every thing—know, or apply his judgement to every thing. He and his Rayets might be quarrelling about the Rent while the independent proprietor or rather the whole body of them would be silently and seriously setting all their wits, their labor, and their stock to the grand work of improvement because each man would be tied down to a certain spot in which he would possess and feel the full ownership. In short to divide the qualities of property in the soil between the Government, the Mootahdar, and the Rayet in the way proposed by this system is treating mother Earth like a Nair lady and giving her half a dozen husbands to neglect her, while one good man would cherish her with affection. However notwithstanding all these objections which may perhaps be justly urged against the Mootahdari system there is no doubt but that it will produce improvement by fixing the demand and giving Individuals a greater interest in the land than they had before. The limitation of the demand of Government is so great a blessing, that it compensates for the faults of the system; however it would seem that

Government might fix the demand direct, without the intermediate agency of Mootahdars. The fixing the demand is independent of the farming principle of the system, and therefore does not prove it altogether a good system any more than some very good institutions prove the Mahomedan law an excellent system of Jurisprudence.

Another advantage of the Mootahdari system is the cheapness of it. It might be necessary to allow the farmers a greater remission to constitute them small proprietors than to enable the Mootahdars to carry on their Mootahs successfully. If we give 15 per cent to the Mootahdars, it may be necessary to give perhaps 20 or more to the bulk of the Rayets with the view of making them small proprietors to pay regularly. It will therefore be right to weigh well whether or no the loss which this difference will occasion will be compensated by any equivalent advantages. The chief pecuniary advantage which will arise from a Rayetwari system would be the increased revenue derivable from waste as the stock and population increased in consequence of the light rent.

§ After the lands at present occupied are completely cultivated the Rayets will turn their superfluous stock to the improvement of waste—perhaps for eight or ten years their present lands may afford sufficient occupation for all the labor and stock of the country but after that period it is likely that the public Revenue will be rapidly augmented by the occupation of waste—revenue increased from those genuine sources of stock and population is more to be depended on than that raised from the lottery like resource of Mootahs. || We are perpetually talking about our justice and humanity and the benefits which we confer on those who fall under our dominion, and we really mean to benefit them, and they really admit the justice and humanity of the Company's Government tho' perhaps they sometimes might wish it exercised in a different way—this is the time—the opportunity where we may shew the reality of these fine sentiments; our conduct in regard to these—I may take them at six millions of persons who are concerned in the decision of this question—will shew our principles. There are perhaps six millions of persons engaged in agriculture who will be affected by the settlement which is made with them—these persons must live by agriculture—their instinctive application to husbandry I may say is what supports the scheme of Government—without it this country had long ago been reduced to a desert, by war, bad seasons, and bad Government; these husbandmen pay our armies, support our costly establishments, provide our investments, and under good management could support a British army in Germany to fight the battles of the state. Shall we leave these men to struggle under an heavy, in some cases, a Rack Rent—shall we transfer them with this burthen on their shoulders to the Mootahdars like so many cattle or shall we excite their industry and increase their stock by giving them a share of the rent, and look for a

§ Waste since 20 years in the ceded Districts	acres. 2133363	survey rent in kz. 669250
old waste overgrown	4129953	545430

|| But the revenue may in time be augmented from other sources perhaps and it seems politic to throw the burthen from this land as much as possible—the 32 Millions annually raised in England would ruin the country if levied direct upon the land or even that part which is indirectly paid by the land.

compensation in an increased revenue derived from augmented stock population and industry. This may be said to be all theory not to be put in practice but it is as practicable—the result will follow the cause as certainly as any other moral effects result from their causes. It is a perfect syllogism. A light rent increases the comforts and stock of the farmer—comforts and stock increase population and cultivation—population and cultivation increase the public revenue—nobody will deny this, but there always seems some difficulty attending the practice ¶. We have instituted Courts of Judicature at a great expence to protect private rights, but where is there so great a cause to be settled as this between Government and the great Mass of cultivators. It little signifies either to Government, or to the body of the people whether Venkoo or Mootoo have their cause rightly decided, but it signifies very much whether many thousand hundred thousand farmers have a light or a heavy rent to pay—whether a light and equal assessment is made to the immediate benefit of the people and the ultimate benefit of Government or whether an high unequal rent is exacted by the necessities of the state, or imposed by a careless rigid or too cautious a Collector. The sources of prosperity are immediately affected by the conduct of the Collector, the effects of the Court are slow and circuitous. The one acts like a copious blood letting the other like the local application of a leech—that is, where too high an assessment, or an unjust decision occurs—the Courts indeed are perhaps at present a source of trouble to the Rayets, they are generally the debtors, the Banians and Townsmen the creditors, the Townsmen talk about and know about the Courts and bring forward their old Bonds, but the Rayet who lives in a distant village never thinks about Justice till he is served with a summons.

This operation of the Courts will perhaps in some degree impede the collection of the Revenue, and all I fear is that the Remission if granted may for some years go to the creditors rather than benefit the Rayets. In the end however this will not much signify because it will still increase the general agricultural stock whether it be borrowed and employed—or employed and enjoyed by the Rayets themselves, as the remission or rather share of the landlords rent will stick to the land, under all transfers it will be valuable property and will in the end fall into the hands of some industrious person.

Courts however are not only beneficial but actually necessary; however I maintain that a light rent in the present state of the country is still more necessary that Government ought to try to lighten the burthen as much as possible—that 10 or 15 or even 20 per cent is no object in competition to the improvement of the country; we must adopt that system which tends to promote general comfort and population to raise the greatest produce from the earth.

¶ A Rayet may pay sirkar rent M Pags. 178—0—8 upon a farm producing 354—8—0 a remission of 12 or 18 per cent will therefore be a great relief; he goes on new borrowing frequently; his reputation for industry is his paper money and he pays his rent some how or other living from hand to mouth; a remission might be thrown away on the idle and extravagant, but it would benefit the generality—the idle and extravagant would not retain their Lands, and most probably the land in which there was a property of 15 per cent of land lords rent would ultimately fall into the hands of the industrious. It is said by some that a high rent stimulates industry, and in the ceded Districts where the rent, if not very high, is the full Landlord's rent the people are exceedingly industrious. The women especially are constantly at the spinning wheel—but I think that these industrious habits would not be weakened by giving them a share of the rents.

If we flatter ourselves that we in reality increase the resources invigorate the agricultural stamina of the country by creating a set of farmers to collect this heavy rent that we thereby benefit in any great degree the bulk of people in as much as we grant a remission to the Mootahdars to ensure the payment of their rent and compensate for their risque and trouble of collection we are certainly deceived. It may be said that things go on well, that the Mootahdars pay—that the country improves—but under our Honorable Government defended by our army—a country so fertile—a people so industrious will thrive in spite even of a bad system just as a stout child grows, and becomes a sturdy youth in the midst of rags and poverty. I do not mean to say the system is bad, I only mean to say that in spite of its faults the country will improve because for many thousand years it has been a rich populous country whenever 30 or 40 years of peace allowed it to rise into its natural state. But if the country thrives it is from other causes—not because the Government have farmed the Land Revenue—our Government is so strong—so just so wise in comparison to Native Governments that almost under any system the country will in a certain degree prosper. Under the harshest tyranny the Rayets seem never to have totally relinquished the labors of husbandry. They consider themselves born to plough and they labor in this their vocation until their strength fails. The people in the ceded Districts continued to cultivate tho' exposed not only to most arbitrary exactions of their own Government but also of Banditti—men might be seen holding the plough with black stumps of fingers burnt off by the Officers of their own Government—shall we then take the same advantage of this instinct which the petty tyrants who have for fifty years usurped the Government of the country did—shall we exact, the same high rent which they exacted or their principles—for they always considered it enough if the Rayets had sufficient left to them just to live and keep up their stock—they exacted every dub besides their wants and uncertain existence I may say made them careless of future advantages—shall we continue this system or endeavour by economy, by management, by time to better the condition and nurse the Rayets into small proprietors.

We have every reason to believe that the great Hindoo and Mahomedan Empires under which agriculture was raised to so flourishing a state were very moderate in their assessment—on the decline of these great Empires the petty chiefs who usurped the sovereign power were forced by their wants to exact as much as they possibly could without directly exhausting the means of cultivation and consequently agriculture declined with the great states, under which it was protected. Rack rents have contributed more to ruin the peninsula than all the wars and tumults which have occurred—many countries have continued in high culture tho', exposed to constant wars and others have become desert in the midst of peace. The open violence of armies has done less injury to the peninsula perhaps than the fines—fees—exactions—and contributions which have been imposed by the tyranny, or permitted by the weakness of the state. The great Empires encouraged husbandry by a light assessment, the petty tyrants who usurped authority on their decline have discouraged, in some places ruined it by heavy exactions. The buildings, Tanks, Channels even ridges which separated former fields, the ruined villages—the general tradition—books—accounts—and sunnuds and inscriptions all combine to give us an high Idea of the former cultivation, and opulence of this peninsula. The great Hindoo Princes did not in fact want a very great Revenue they had no expensive establishments to keep up. Their simplicity of

manners required but little. The soldiers were supported by the Grant of Lands. The Prince and Nobility eat finer rice—and more ghee than ploughmen; religious ceremonies were perhaps the chief expence of the state, but they contributed to the pleasure, and advantage of the people—a fourth in time of need—a fifth and even only a sixth were the shares of the produce usually taken by the prince. The Ray Rakah of Canara was one sixth. The people of the ceded districts paid more to the Beezanaggar Government, but those Rajahs were only a kind of Lord Paramount Poligars engaged in perpetual Wars with the Mahomedans who at last over throw their Government. These wars made it necessary to exact and the plunders and massacres which the Mahometans exercised, perhaps, made the body of the people willing to pay a heavy rent to keep out those fanatic invaders—but on the whole I believe the land rent was lighter, and certainly it was expended in a manner more congenial and beneficial to the people than our land rent. It seems to have been this light rent that enabled the country to rise to such a pitch of improvement.

One advantage has been attributed to the Mootahdary system in respect to Government that I must confess I do not see that is that the revenue will be fixed. It may look well in the accounts to have the same certain sum always as the demand, and may save some trouble—however I should imagine ours to be the first Government in the world that ever considered it a material object to collect the very same sum each year if it does consider it so—the revenue of most countries—of England for instance fluctuates according to the exigencies of the state, deficiencies are made up by new taxes—surplus collections are accounted for—but among all the schemes for improving the revenue I never heard of a statesman recommending any financial measure merely because it promised to bring the very same sum each year. On the contrary they in general boast of a probable increase—at all events the revenue is made to suit the exigency. If 30 millions are wanted they are raised—they may perhaps form or fix the amount of any particular tax because it may be expedient to dispose of that one tax in that way, but as they have many other means of raising supplies, that signifies little.

In India the land is the chief source of Revenue—very little else goes to supply our Indian Budget. In England the land tax is only 1/16 of the whole revenue. § Here it is 16 of the whole revenue. The bad policy therefore of shutting up our only great source of supply is manifest. Altho' it be highly expedient nay absolutely necessary to limit the demand on private estates yet for Government to bind itself down to a certain sum for the whole country appears impolitic—as far as I comprehend the permanent settlement as hitherto introduced Government can neither ascertain whether their subjects can pay more revenue, nor can they without breaking thro' their engagements raise more land revenue. In the northern sarkars for instance, it will be impossible to till 10 years hence whether the country can bear four or five lac more, because Government have transferred the curruks to the Zemindars and apparently as impossible to buy it tho' the country might easily bear it because Government seem to have pledged themselves not to levy more land revenue * the Zemindars at least consider the

§ So in the original.

* We must herefore have recourse to other means of raising the public revenue from a late decision however it would seem that Government are precluded from raising a revenue from licences or duties which may ultimately affect the produce of the land.

subject in this way and expect to engross the profit, the rent which the natural increase of stock and population under our mild Government in these fine provinces will produce. It would seem that neither the state nor the Rayets can share those advantages—the state and the Rayets those objects of attention to the indolent Hindoos and barbarous Tartars who preceded us, and under whom India flourished in such a way as to astonish the world, and become proverbial for its industry fertility and population.

However urgent the necessities of the state may be, it would seem, that we can raise no more in the shape of Land revenue from the sirkars, the indulgences granted thus by the permanent settlement to the Zemindars must therefore be compensated for by burthens laid on the industrious subjects of the other provinces, this is a case of inequality and hardship and is one reason for the general extension of the permanent settlement—but tho' the Mootahdary system is better perhaps than an high uncertain rent, yet it seems easy to fix the demand without recurring to that system. In whatever way the country be settled the qualities of property—the Ashta Bhog or eight attributes, privileges, and powers which are necessary to constitute the full ownership in the land must as much as possible be vested in the same person. Whether the estates be large or small will depend on circumstances. If one great Rayet undertook for a whole village he ought to have it all unless others were injured by being rendered dependant upon him, where two three or a dozen Rayets engaged for a village they ought to have it. Whenever good men offered to take land in perpetuity they ought to have it, but there should be no restrictions—no rules calculated for official convenience rather than for general improvement—no estates should be sold no adventurers admitted. There seems no necessity for a hasty settlement but the sooner the Remission in those Provinces where the Rent is heavy be granted the speedier will be the increase of stock and the quicker will be the effect of the encouragement to industry, which the remission will produce.

A true Extract.

Compared with a copy.
W. G.

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