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
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*The Indian Economic and
Social History Review, Vol. XIV, No. 2*

**The Working of the *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* System in
the Mughal Provinces of the Deccan (1707-1803 A.D.)***

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In this paper an attempt is made to analyze the working of the *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* system within the Mughal provinces of the Deccan which resulted in the parallel functioning of the dual Mughal-Maratha land revenue administration in the Mughal territory. The grant of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* by the Mughal Emperor to the Marathas not only had political implications but its working had far-reaching economic consequences in the provinces of the Mughal Deccan. The collection of the levies by the agency of the Marathas right from the interior of the Mughal territory involved serious economic and administrative problems. This virtually created an *imperium in imperio* as rightly remarked by Professor Satish Chandra.¹ The working of this system can be analyzed under the following heads:

- I. Quantum of maratha levies and the basis of assessment.
- II. Modes of collection and payment
 - (a) Collection through the agency of the Maratha collectors stationed in the Mughal provinces.
 - (b) Exactions by the Maratha troops.
 - (c) Collection through the agency of the Mughal officials and the problems that confronted them.
 - (d) Mode of payment to the Marathas.
- III. Division of the right of collection of *chauth* between the two houses of Maratha rulers.

*Summary of Sections IV-VI of this paper was read at the Seminar on "Socio-Economic Problems of the Deccan History," organized by the Indian Council of Historical Research and Dept. of History, University of Poona, in March 1976, at Poona. Published by the kind permission of A.R. Kulkarni, Professor and Head, Dept. of History, University of Poona.

I am grateful to S. Venkataramaiah, I.A. S., Director, State Archives, Hyderabad, for kindly permitting me to use Archival documents.

¹Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, 1707-40*, Aligarh, 1959, p. 132.

- IV. Dual Mughal-Maratha land revenue administration within the Mughal provinces.
- V. Sub-divisions of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi*.
- VI. Impact on the Mughal economy.

INTRODUCTION

Before analyzing the working of the system, it is essential to describe the historical background and terms and conditions of the Agreement of 1718 between the Mughal Viceroy of the Deccan, Hussain Ali Khan and the Maratha ruler Sahu, which was the prelude to the issuance of Mughal *sanads*² in 1719 granting *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi*.

In 1707 Prince Azam Shah,³ at the suggestion of the *subedar* or Viceroy of the Deccan, Zulfiqar Khan, granted to Raja Sahu the right of realizing *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* for the first time from the six Mughal provinces of the Deccan. However, no formal *sanad* or *firman* seems to have been issued regarding the Maratha levies.⁴ But the Marathas did make collection of the levies for some time till 1712.⁵

With the assumption of the viceroyalty of the Deccan by Syed Hussain Ali Khan in May 1715, circumstances so developed that he was compelled to appease the Maratha ruler Sahu. On the one hand the Emperor Farrukh-Siyar sought Hussain Ali's destruction; on the other the Marathas grew more troublesome. Hussain Ali thought it prudent to win over the Marathas to his side to strengthen his position in the Deccan to oppose the Emperor. Through the diplomatic manoeuvres of his adviser Shankerji Malhar, Hussain Ali opened negotiations with Sahu by deputing him to Satara early in 1718. The Maratha ruler grasped this mission to establish peace and to get official recognition of his claims to *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi*, as the negotiations were carried out in the name of the Emperor.⁶

²For historical background regarding the *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* and the text of the *sanads* issued by the Mughal Emperor, see A.C. Pawar, "Some Documents bearing on Imperial Mughal Grants to Raja Sahu (1717-24)," *Indian Historical Records Commission Proceedings*, XVII, December 1941, p. 204 ff. Also see N.F. Hingorani, "Origin and Character of Chauth as Maratha Institution," *Proc. of the Indian History Congress*, 1961, 175; R.V. Oturkur, "Dynamic Contents of Chauth and Sardeshmukhi," *Proc. I.H.C.* 1959, 288; M.G. Ranade, *Rise of the Maratha Power*, Bombay, 1900, p. 219 ff; S.N. Sen, *Administrative System of the Marathas*, Calcutta, 1928, p. 97 ff.

³Apparently Azam Shah made these concessions to enlist the support of Marathas in the war of succession that ensued after Aurangzeb's death on 3 March 1707. Azam ascended the throne but later on he was defeated by Shah Alam. See Satish Chandra, *op. cit.*, 12 ff.

⁴Khafi Khan, *Muntakhabul Lubab*, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, II, pp. 625-26, 742-43; G.S. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, II, p. 12.

⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 742-43.

⁶Syed Ghulam Hussain Khan, *Seir Mutaqherin*, Calcutta, IV, 17 ff; Khafi Khan, II, p. 784.

A treaty of peace and goodwill and an agreement with definite terms ensuring the interests of both the parties was advocated. The Marathas were called upon only to stand by the side of Hussain Ali. The terms agreed to by Hussain Ali and Sahu were:⁷

(1) that all territories known as Shivaji's *swarajya* (original dominions) together with the forts therein, be delivered to Sahu in full possession;

(2) that such territories as had been recently conquered by the Marathas in Khandesh, Berar, Gandamara, Hyderabad and Karnatak as detailed in the annexure to the treaty, should also be ceded to the Marathas;

(3) that the Marathas should be allowed to collect *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* from all the six Mughal provinces in the south. In return for the *chauth* the Marathas were to serve the Emperor with a contingent of 15,000 troops for his protection; and in return for the *sardeshmukhi* the Marathas were to be responsible for maintaining order by preventing robbery and rebellions;

(4) that Sahu should do no harm to Sambhaji of Kolhapur;

(5) that the Marathas should make a cash payment annually of ten lakhs of rupees to the Emperor as *peshkash*; and

(6) that the Emperor should release and send back from Delhi, Sahu's mother Yesubai, his wife and his brother Madan Singh with all the followers that were detained there. Hussain Ali delivered a *sanad* containing the above terms, under his seal, to the *Vakils* or agents of Sahu and made no delay in writing to the Emperor for a royal *firman* confirmatory of his *sanad*.

Farrukh-Siyar refused to ratify the agreement made by Hussain Ali as *subedar* of the Deccan with the Marathas. Hussain Ali marched to Delhi with an army of his new allies (Marathas) in February 1719. Farrukh-Siyar was deposed on 17 February 1719 and Prince Rafiuddarajat was enthroned. He reigned for few months and himself deposed on 24 May 1719. It was during this period that royal *firman*s confirming the grants to Sahu were issued. The *firman* for *chauth* was issued on 3 March 1719, and that for *sardeshmukhi* on 15 March 1719.

QUANTUM OF MARATHA LEVIES AND THE BASIS OF ASSESSMENT

Balaji Vishwanath, who is considered to be the author of the scheme for collecting the *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi*, based his scheme of appropriation of revenues on the standard assessment of Aurangzeb's times when the annual estimated revenue was calculated to be about Rs 18 crores.⁸ But the Marathas did not expect to get straightaway one-fourth of this estimated revenue. The Marathas were to get a fourth part of what the Mughal officials collected as

⁷Sardesai, *op. cit.*, p. 39 ff; A.C. Pawar (*op. cit.*) gives texts of the *sanads*.

⁸Yusuf Hussain Khan, *Nizamul Mulk Asaf Jah I*, pp. 103-4.

mal (land-revenue) and as *sair*⁹ from the *khālisa* (crown lands) and *jāgir lands*. It was settled that, in addition to the fourth share which they were to get from the receipts of the jagirdars, they were to receive from the raiyats 10 per cent as *sardeshmukhi*. Also the Marathas were to receive *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* from the *abwabs* called *faujdari*, *shiqdari*, *ziyafat*,¹⁰ and other charges, as shown in the gross account of the collections.¹¹ Further the Marathas exacted *rahdari* transit duties in each district of the Mughal provinces at the rate of half a rupee or one rupee, for each bullock and cart from merchants and whatever they pleased from other persons.¹² This was in contravention to the agreement and strict injunctions of the Viceroy of the Deccan.¹³

Altogether the Marathas were to receive 35 per cent of the total Mughal revenues from the *subah* of Deccan as *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi*. However different documents give different rates of actual collections. A single document¹⁴ alone gives various rates for the period 1730 to 1775 for three different parganas (Table I). For the pargana Sandwara for 1730 to 1759, the document states the rate of the Maratha levies at Rs 28/2/9 for Rs 100 in some cases and Rs 29/2/3 in others. The share of sarkar (Mughal government) is quoted at Rs 69/3/3 per Rs 100. For the pargana Pattan, the rate for 1749 to 1760 is stated at Rs 31.1 and for the years 1761 to 1775 at Rs 27/8/9 per Rs 100. And for the pargana Dawarwadi, the rate for 1749 to 1760 is stated at Rs 29.7; while for the years 1761-75 it is stated at Rs 29/5 per Rs 100.

Another document¹⁵ of 1775-76 shows the rate of the Maratha levies per Rs 100 at Rs 46.6 and Rs.31.8 (Table II). Out of the total amount of Rs 112/8 the share of the sarkar varied from Rs 50, 56/4, 60 to Rs 75 (except in the case of S. No. 3, when the total amount was at Rs 110, the share of the sarkar was Rs 75); while the amount of the Maratha levies varied from Rs 42/8, 45/14, 52/8, 56/14 to Rs 62/8 (except S. No. 3 where the total amount was Rs 110 the Marathas share was Rs 35). The percentage of *sardeshmukhi* was

⁹All sources of revenue accruing to the Mughal government, other than the land tax, this includes a variety of imports, as customs, transit duties, licences fees, house-tax, market tax, etc. *Wilson's Glossary*, pp. 725-26.

¹⁰*Abwabs*—heads of taxation imposed in addition to the regular assessment on the land, *Wilson's Glossary*, p. 4.

Faujdari—A tax levied for the support of the police. An *abwab* exacted by the *faujdar*.

Shiqdari—revenue receipts at the office of the collector called *shiqdar* (*Wilson's Glossary*, pp. 247, 710). An *abwab* levied by the *shiqdar*.

Ziyafat—a feast, an entertainment (*Wilson's Glossary*, p. 902), Hence an entertainment tax.

¹¹Khafi Khan, II, p. 786

¹²*Ibid* (for the amount of *rahdari* exacted see Table III, and Appendix Document VII).

¹³Khafi Khan, II, p. 785. Hussain Ali Khan was the viceroy of the Mughal provinces of the Deccan.

¹⁴Document No. 94, R.P.P., State Archives, Hyderabad.

¹⁵Document No. 103, R.P.P.,

TABLE III
STATEMENT SHOWING DIVISION OF THE REVENUE OF *mal rahdari* FROM SOME PARGANAS IN
AURANGABAD PROVINCE BETWEEN THE MUGHAL GOVERNMENT (SARKAR) AND
THE MARATHAS FOR 1775-76

Pargana	Mal (per Rs 1000)				Rahdari (per Rs 1000)			
	Mamla-daran	Sarkar	Sardesh-mukhi	Chauth and babit	Mamla-daran	Sarkar	Sardesh-mukhi	Chauth and babit
Pattan	318/3	681/13	90/15	227/4	545/7	454/9	90/15	454/8
Jalna	318/3	681/13	90/15	227/4	318/3	681/3	90/15	454/8
Kandapur	318/3	681/13	90/15	227/4 (only chauth)	545/7	454/9	90/15	454/8
Byzapur	545/7	454/9	90/15	454/8	545/7	454/9	90/15	454/8
Dawarwadi	318/3	681/13	90/15	227/4	318/3	681/13	90/15	227/4
Sundarwada	"	"	"	" (only chauth)	"	"	"	227/4 (only chauth)

SOURCE: Document No. 89, R.P.P.

¹⁶*Mamladaran*—from *mamladar*—representative of the Peshwa in the districts (S. Sen: *Administrative system of the Marathas*, pp. 224, 249); See also Satish Chandra: *Ideas in History* (ed. B. Prasad), Asia, 1958, p. 187.

around 11.1. whereas another document¹⁶ of the same period 1775-76 states the rates of the Maratha levies exacted on *mal* and *rahdari* at Rs 31.8 and Rs 54.3 per Rs 100 (Table III). However, the rate of *sardeshmukhi* was at Rs 90/15 per Rs 1000 (i.e., 9 per cent) for both *mal* and *rahdari*.

Two other documents¹⁷ which seem to lay down the principle for the distribution of the Maratha levies into their sub-divisions, and apparently of 1775-76, state the rate of the Maratha levies at Rs 32/8 per Rs 100 of the Mughal revenues. The balance (i.e., Rs. 67/8) out of Rs 100 is stated as the sarkar's share. Out of the total amount of the Maratha levies (Rs 32/8) the percentage of *sardeshmukhi* is stated at 10; and the balance of the amount (Rs 22/8 i.e., 25 per cent of Rs 90) is stated for *chauth*. (Appendix, Doc. No. I and II.)

Thus, we may conclude that the quantum of Maratha levies exacted varied both with time and place, though documents do not mention any reasons for this.

Besides the exactions upon *mal*, *rahdari* and *abwabs*, the Marathas sometimes exacted their levies upon *siwai*,¹⁸ collected 5 per cent on account of *kaodana*¹⁹ (or *ghasdana*, fodder money) for the horses of Raja Bhonsle, (Table VII) and sometime exacted *nazr*²⁰ in the name of the Peshwa²¹ (Table I). Further, the villages which had been laid waste by the Marathas, and which had been again brought into cultivation under special agreements, as in the districts around Nandurbar in Khandesh and other places in Berar, the Marathas recognized only three shares one for themselves, one for the jagirdar and the third for the raiyats. This arrangement overlooked the actual agreement the Marathas made with Hussain Ali Khan in 1718.²² Thus in revenue

¹⁶Document No. 89, R.P.P.

¹⁷Document Nos. 8, 11265. See Appendix, Documents I and II.

¹⁸Extra revenue derived from all taxes, except those raised from land, and exclusive of customs and transit duties. The amount of *siwai* was not included in the *jamabandi* (Wilson's Glossary, p. 780; Aziz Jung, *Mustehlat-e-Deccan*, 1310F, Hyderabad, p. 191).

For the exaction of the Maratha levies on *siwai* see Appendix Document VII and IX. There are instances (Tables IV and V). The amount of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* for the parganas in Table IV has been derived (in Table V) as in the document by not taking into account the amount of *siwai* (in col. 4, Table IV). For instances for pargana Wadhun (Table IV), the total amount is given at Rs 635 (col. 2) is sum of the revenues from *mal*, Rs 394/4 (col. 3) and *siwai*, Rs 43/8 (col. 4) and the amount paid for the Maratha levies *chauth*, Rs 131/8 and *sardeshmukhi* Rs 65/12 (Table V). But for calculating the Maratha levies the amount of *siwai* (Rs 43/8) has not been taken into account. Same method is adopted in the case of all the parganas given in Table IV.

¹⁹S. Sen, *Military System of the Marathas*, Calcutta, 1928, fns 47 and 52. In *Administrative System of the Marathas* (p. 61) Sen says that *ghasdana* was a contribution like the *chauth* levied by the Marathas. The rate of *kaodana* is not mentioned in any document. They exacted it illegally as it was not authorized by any treaty or *sanad*. See fns 38 and 45 *infra*.

²⁰Present or offering. The Marathas were not entitled to exact on this account.

²¹Document Nos. 94, 89, 915.

²²Khafi Khan, II, p. 786.

matters the orders and actions of the Marathas prevailed over the authority of the Mughal *faujdar*s and jagirdars.²³

But as a result of wars and depredations after Aurangzeb's death the yield of revenue had considerably diminished. In these circumstances 'to have collected even one-fourth of the standard assessment would probably at this period have been impossible; but the Marathas, in all situations endeavoured to secure, in lieu of this *chauth* at least 25 per cent of the real balance. But although they seldom could collect it, they always stated the *chauth* as due upon the *tankhwah*²⁴ or the standard assessment, because even should a day of retribution arrive, no claim on *peshkash* could be made by the Mughals on that head, as none was specified on the deed.²⁵

However, whatever be the amount and percentage, the collection of the Maratha levies was not so simple as it appeared. The total amount of *chauth* for the entire province of the Deccan on the basis of the assessment arrived at was not paid in a lump sum to the Marathas from the Mughal treasury. The Marathas were allowed to exact the amount of *chauth* from the individual zamindars and jagirdars.

Whenever the Marathas approached for exacting the levies the *muqaddams* and zamindars hastened out to meet them and undertook to pay the *chauth*. But instead of showing the full value of their revenue they tried to show only half or one-fourth of the actual assessment. Whatever sum was settled, they promised payment of one-fourth part as *chauth* and gave sureties for the payment.²⁶

After the settlement of *chauth* with Sahu through the Treaty of Mungi Shevgaon of 6 March 1728, Nizamul Mulk tried to systematize the collecting of *chauth* by the *jamabandi chauth* held in 1728-29 throughout the Deccan. The fixation of the assessment of *chauth* was arrived at by first making the general *jamabandi*²⁷ of the land revenue and taking into consideration the *tankhwah kamil* of the jagirdars. After the *jamabandi chauth* Nizamul Mulk ordered the enhancement of the *chauth* amount by two and a half annas per rupee excluding the expenses of the *sih-bandi* or the irregular infantry employed to exact the levies. The enhanced assessment was effected strictly from 1728 and the differences between the old and the revised rates of *chauth* were recovered from the jagirdars and zamindars.²⁸

²³*Ibid*, Ghulam Hussain in *Seir Mutaqherin* says "the Imperial [Mughal] commands ceased to have any energy all over the Deccan" (p. 18).

²⁴Though it is mentioned by Grant Duff and Yusuf Hussain Khan (*op. cit*) *tankhwah* is no longer equated with the standard assessment of the revenue (*jama*).

²⁵Grant Duff, *A History of the Mahrattas*, I, p. 375; Yusuf Hussain Khan, *op. cit*, pp. 103-4.

²⁶Khafi Khan, II, p. 782.

²⁷For the system of general *jamabandi* see Dr Irfan Habib, *The Agrarian System of the Mughal India*, 197 ff.

²⁸Document No. C 40 (Omalan), State Archives, Hyderabad (hereinafter abbreviated as

In some places in the extreme south like Jinji and Tanjore the *jamabandi-chauth* was not implemented; not only did the old rate of *chauth* continue but there was a disparity between the *jama* figures for the exaction of *chauth* and *peshkash*. In one document of 1734-36, pertaining to Ped Naik, zamindar of Nusratabad (Sakkar), the *jama* for the purpose of *chauth* is stated at Rs3,09,503; whereas for the purpose of the *peshkash* it is given at Rs 4,42,553.²⁹ Perhaps two sets of figures were kept because the collection of the Maratha levies drained the Mughal resources.

The assessment of *chauth* made during the times of Nizamu'l Mulk became outdated about fifty years later due to a considerable increase in the receipts of the Mughal resources. The Marathas were not satisfied by the low figures of

S.A.H.). Since this is a very important document giving administrative procedure followed in the *jamabandi* of land revenue, *jamabandi* of *chauth* and assessment and fixation of *tankhwah kamil* of the *jagirdars*, it is reproduced in full here. It is a memorandum of investigation of assessment of land revenue and fixation of *chauth* on the basis of revised *jamabandi*. It bears the endorsement *manzoorshud* of the *diwan* sanctioning the issuance of a *sanad*.

Yadasht tashkhees mahalat chauth jagir

Mubariz Khan, etc, province of Furkhundabunyah, Hyderabad, 1139 F. (1728).

Nine mahal

Fixed *tankhwah kamil* Rs 842796/8/6

Fixed *jamabandi* Rs 129883/12

Fixed *chauth* (as per the contract) Rs 32470/12

Actual (*asl*) of previous year

Rs 28181/4

Jagir Mubariz Khan Bahadur
pargana Kohir, etc.

Five mahal

Enhancement

Two and half annas per rupee

Rs 4289/8

Jagir Khajan Quli Khan Bahadur

Pargana Kohir, etc.

Three mahal

Fixed *Tankhwah kamil*

Rs 332720/1/9

Jagir Hussain Quli Khan

Rs 39635/2/3

Mohammed Iqtiyar Rs 135/3/6

Jagir Mohammed Tahir Rs 4000/-

Qila Kolas (*Ahsham*)

Rs 18147/12

Fixed *jamabandi*

Rs 49443/10

Fixed *chauth* Rs 12358/10/6

Asl of Previous

Enhance

year

Rs 2000/-

Rs 289/8

²⁹Document No. 2009, Asafia Record (S.A.H.). See also my article, "Mughal Documents Relating to the Peshkash of the Zamindars of South India," *The Indian Economic and Social History Review*, December 1975.

jamabandi chauth. Therefore in 1776 Peshwa Madhav Rao submitted to Nizam Ali Khan a detailed report with revised *jama* figures. The complaint of Madhav Rao was genuine. There was really disparity between *jama* and *hasil* figures assessed during the times of Nizamu'l Mulk (1724-48) and those actually prevailing a few decades later in 1775-76. This will be evident from the data relating to a few selected cases in Tables IV-VI.

A comparative statement of the Maratha levies fixed during Nizamu'l Mulk's times and the revised estimates, based on the contemporary receipts, submitted by Madhav Rao in 1775-76, for the pargana Pattan Aurangabad is given in Table VI. On the basis of the disparity between the two figures the Marathas claimed an additional amount of Rs 8251/8/7. Originally the Maratha levies for the pargana Pattan was fixed at Rs 6,85,516/5; the Marathas claimed Rs 253,188/12/6. Further the Mughals paid a huge amount on account of the expenses of the Maratha troops; this amount was taken into account as part of the Maratha levies (Table VI).

The Marathas were not satisfied by bringing to the notice of Nizam Ali Khan the gross figures of increase in receipts of different parganas. They submitted detailed accounts of every pargana of various Mughal provinces in the Deccan, except province of Hyderabad.³⁰ One such example is given in Table IV from a *kaifiyat-e-daul jamabandi*³¹ (statement of particulars of the total revenue assessed) of the villages in pargana Bid. Table IV and V give details of the increase and decrease in receipts for the year 1774-75 over the figures of 1773-74 on account of different heads of receipts, *mal* and *siwai*.

Consequent upon increase in the receipt of *mal* the Marathas demanded increase in their levies. In order to satisfy the Marathas Nizam Ali Khan directed his revenue officials to verify the figures of Nizamu'l Mulk's time and compare them with those submitted by Madhav Rao. He further ordered that until the verifications of assessments were made throughout the province, payment of *chauth* be made on the basis of Madhav Rao's report. He agreed to adjust differences in the figures after verifications.³²

The assessment issue dragged on for a few years and differences with regard to the provinces of Bijapur and Bidar persisted for some time as the Marathas would not agree to long-term assessments. Sukaram Bapu, *karbhari* or agent at Poona was adamant that the levies should be determined on the basis of periodical re-assessment as agreed upon by Nizamu'l Mulk. The *karbhari* had posted Jiwaji Raghunath at Hyderabad in 1779 and Margo Girmaji in 1781 to settle the *chauth* affair.³³ In 1781 Nawab Moinud Daula (Arastujah) made alternative proposals that pending the re-assessment, the *chauth* due should

³⁰In the province of Hyderabad the system of Marathas themselves collecting *chauth* was discontinued from 1727 (See Sec. II (c), para 5, *infra*).

³¹Document No. 223 (R.P.P.)

³²Document No. C 252 (S.A.H.). See Appendix, Document III.

³³Poona Akhbars, State Archives, 1953, I, p. 16.

TABLE VI
COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF THE MARATHA LEVIES FIXED IN 1728-30 DURING THE TIMES OF
NIZAMU'L MULK AND REVISED ACCOUNTS SUBMITTED BY PESHWA MADHAV RAO FOR THE
PARGANA PATTAN, ETC. AURANGABAD PROVINCE FOR 1775-76

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Total amount	Amount of chaith, babti and sardesh- mukhi	Nazr to the Nizam when he visited the place—deduc- ted	Fixed share of the Marathas	From the villages of the Jagirdars and Sih- bandi	Expenses towards the troops of Pandit Pradhan	Tankhwa paid to the Mokasadars of the Marathas ²	Paid to Harnaji Nayak (agent of Peshwa)
<i>Rs/las/ps</i>							
Nizamul Mulk's 187045/10/6 (fixed)	685516/5	168311/-/-	157045/10/-	30000/-/-	129488/2/3	39383/4/6	1778/14/6
Peshwa Madhar-Rao's 253188/12/6	781114/11	168311/-/-	223178/12/6	30000	129489/2/3	39383/4/9	1778/14/6

SOURCE: Document Nos. 87 and 88, R.P.P.

¹The pargana Pattan was under the occupation of the Marathas during 1184-85 F (1774-75). It was transferred to the Nizam in 1185 F. (1775-76). Expenses of troops are those claimed towards the vacation of the pargana (See Doc. III, Clause VI, Appendix).

²The tankhwa of the mokasadars of the Marathas is claimed for the period of occupation of the pargana by the Marathas.

NOTE: The Marathas claimed an amount of Rs 82518/7/- for (1775-76. Out of this, Rs 16385/5/- were due in accordance with the rate fixed during the times of Nizamul Mulk; and Rs 66133/2/- were now claimed due to the increase in the receipts of the revenue as per the estimates submitted by the Peshwa, as shown in the above statement. (Source: Document No. 86, R.P.P.).

be estimated on the basis of the accounts rendered by the zamindars and these claims should be balanced against the remissions promised to be allowed on the collection of the levies due in the provinces of Bidar and Bijapur.³⁴ The Marathas would not accept; they were only willing to accept the previous offer that after the verification of claims, both parties should come to a final settlement.³⁵ Nizam Ali Khan then suspended payment of *chaith*; and in June 1781 ordered the jagirdars not to remit the *chaith* to the agents of the Peshwa.³⁶ And in the province of Bidar the *kamaisdars* or revenue collectors of the Peshwa were expelled by the local *amils* of the Nizam on alleged delay in fulfilling the terms of the Treaty.³⁷ The *Poona Akhbar* of 9 July 1781 reported that "the *karbharies* do not want to be straightforward in matters of *chaith*. . . The *karbharies* do not settle the accounts regarding *chaith*. They have sent for Peshwa's Vakil Moro Girmaji. Receipts covering the second instalment have not been given to Azimud-daulah."³⁸

At last the Peshwa deputed Krishna Rao Ballal to the court of Nizam to settle the *chaith* affair and was advised to adopt a conciliatory attitude in view of the growing English menace. He was further advised to spare no effort to persuade the Nizam into a military alliance against the English even at the cost of yielding some ground in regard to the settlement of the *chaith* claims.³⁹ Early in October 1781 Krishna Rao met the Nizam and Moinud-

³⁴*Ibid.*, 25.

³⁵*News Letters (1767-1799)—Nawab Mir Nizam Ali Khan's Reign*, State Archive, s 1955 p. 15.

³⁶*Poona Akhbars*, I, pp. 29, 45. The *mamlatadars* were the representatives of the Peshwa in the districts. The Nizam had stopped one-fourth portion of *chaith* and *sardeshmukhi* for the three provinces of Aurangabad, Bijapur and Berar-Balaghat for the period 1782 to 1785. Document No. 924/1, R.P.P.

³⁷*Ibid.*, I, p. 44; Document Nos. 11174, 11176/1, 924/1-5, R.P.P.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 132, p. 44. Besides the settlement of re-assessment; another disputed issue was with regard to the maintenance of accounts of *chaith* and *kaodana*. The Maratha *karbaries* wanted and insisted to combine the amount accruing from *chaith* and *kaodana* into one head. Whereas the Nizam's officials were vehemently opposed to this proposal on the grounds firstly that there is no imperial sanction for *kaodana* and secondly because it was not proper; and moreover because Rao Pandit Pradhan has already agreed to continue the practice as prevalent during the times of Nizamul Mulk. The Nizam opposed the very idea of exaction on account of *kaodana*. Consequently due to the differences settlement dragged for several years. Document No. 4908—letter of Rai Haibat Rao Gopal, *Akhbar Navis* (News Reporter) at the court of the Peshwa to his son Raghutam Rao, 22 July 1781; Yusuf Hussain Khan, ed., *News Letters (1769-1799)—Nawab Mir Nizam Ali Khan's Reign*, State Archives, Hyderabad, 1955, p. 20 (Persian text).

³⁹*Ibid.*, I, p. 32, p. 44. The *Akhbar Navis* attributes in his letter that the Nizam-British relations is the cause for the delay in the settlement of *chaith* affair and unfavourable attitude of the Marathas towards the problem and the rift between the Nizam and the Peshwa (*Poona Akhbars*, II, p. 32). It may be mentioned that about this time the Nizam-British relations were not very cordial. In his letter to Sir Eyre Coote, (16 January, 1781), the Nizam recalled the unfriendly attitude of Sir Thomas Rumbold and his successor Whitehill and the violations

TABLE VII
STATEMENT SHOWING THE PERCENTAGE OF *karkuni* (ACCOUNTANCY) CHARGES BY THE
MARATHAS ON THEIR LEVIES OF *chaugh*, *babit* AND *sardeshmukhi*

Year	1	2	3	4	5	6
	P—Pargana S—Sarkar Subah— Mohammadbad	Total amount of the Maratha levies Rs/as/ps	Mokasa-chaugh Ain Karkuni	Babit Ain Karkuni	Sahotra Sardeshmukhi Ain Karkuni	Percentage of Karkuni levies
1782—83	P—Peta Jalalpur S—Nanded	3527/—/—	2100/—/— ¹ 1900/—/— 200/—/—	767/—/—	60/— 450 150	20.41
1785—86	Peta Jalalpur S—Nanded	1730/13/—	900/—/— 800/—/— 100/—/—	158/8 133/8 25	55/— 425 (including karkuni)	15.6
"	P—Srekunde S—Nanded	1793/8/—	1050/—/— 950 100	383/8 338/8 50	60/— 225 75	19.57
1786—87	P—Otkur S—Muzaffarnagar	12968/12/—	10118/12 ² (Chauth and babit) 7819/12 2200	— (Karkuni)	600 550 50	18.39
"	P—Kankarti S—Muzaffarnagar.	10700/—/—	5250 5000 250 (including karkuni) ³	5000	450 400 50	8.75

1787—88 Maoza Rudra P—Kotgir S—Nanded	1356/—/— (including <i>karkuni</i>) 187 50	1000 220/8 50/—	537/8 437/8 100	19.05
" Maoza Sherwar P—Indur S—Nanded	2393/12 550/— 50/—/— (including <i>karkuni</i>)	600/—/— 1316/11 100/—	1175 1075 100	9.6

SOURCE: Document Nos. 894/3, 901/2, 110/4, 855/64, 1095/1, 962, 855/57.

¹Out of the three sets of figures, the upper figures in the centre indicate the total amount of the Maratha levies including *karkuni* figures in the left indicate the actual (*Ain*) amount of the levy; while those in the right are the charges towards *karkuni*.

²Here the document does not give separate figures of the two levies. Hence the amount is given in the centre of the two columns.

³The document do not mention separate amount for *karkuni*. They mention total amount "including *karkuni*."

daula at Hyderabad and tried in vain to effect a rapprochement between the Nizam and the *karbhari*.⁴⁰

The negotiations for a settlement dragged on for a few months. The Nizam desired that the claim of the Maratha levies in the province of Bidar should be waived as was being done in the case of the province of Hyderabad.⁴¹ However, the Maratha *karbhari* turned down this on the basis of the existing royal *sanads* of the Mughal Emperor.⁴² The rift continued and the *chauth* affair remained unsettled till 1784 when it was partially resolved after the war between the Nizam and the Marathas through the Treaty of Yadgiri. Nana Farnawis met Nizam Ali Khan and settled all outstanding issues relating to the Maratha levies. The Nizam agreed to pay all the arrears on account of the Maratha levies.⁴³

In 1791 Govind Rao Kallay and Govind Rao Pingley, envoys of the Peshwa at Hyderabad formally requested Nizam Ali Khan to appoint *amils* for investigating and settling the outstanding Maratha claims regarding assessment and arrears of the levies. Nizam Ali Khan countered this move by making a set of demands regarding contributions unjustly exacted and the revenues of different places improperly taken or withheld by the Marathas. To this Nana Farnawis promptly demanded the adjustment of the Maratha claims. The Nizam was compelled to acknowledge some of these demands while others he evaded. But he promised in general terms to appoint some officials to settle the whole affair soon after the war with Tipu Sultan was concluded.⁴⁴

of the Treaty of 1768 in respect of *peshkash* and the cession of Guntur. In order to foster and promote friendship and amity, the Nizam laid great stress on the payment of the arrears of *peshkash* and the restitution of Guntur to Basalate Jung. In 1768, the Nizam and the British entered into an engagement to render mutual help and assistance, to consider the enemies of one, the enemies of both and the friends of one, the friends of both, as the British promised thereby to pay a fixed sum of *peshkash* to the Nizam from the revenues of Northern Sarkars leased to the British. When Whitehill was Governor of Madras he withheld payment of *peshkash* and did not comply with the request of Nizam Ali Khan to send British troops to his assistance against the Peshwa Raghunath Rao in 1774. (Letter of Nizam Ali Khan to Sir Eyre Coote in *Diplomatic Correspondence between Mir Nizam Ali Khan and the East India Company 1780-98*, ed. Yusuf Hussain Khan, State Archives, Hyderabad, 1958, pp. 67.) Thus the apprehensions of the *Akhbar Navis* against the Nizam-British relations is wrong.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, II, p. 23.

⁴¹Doc. No. 4908, *News Letters*, *op cit.*, p. 20 (Persian text).

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 66. The reference is to the Mughal *firmans* of 1719.

⁴³Treaty of Etgeer (Yadgiri), 5 June 1784. Clause 6. Persian text, Mohd. Sirajuddin Talib, *Nizam Ali Khan*, (Urdu), II, p. 237. Though the Nizam agreed to pay *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* by this Treaty, the Marathas claimed it from 1782 when these were suspended, as evident from the documents.

⁴⁴Sirajuddin, *op. cit.*; Grant Duff, II, pp. 240-41.

Another deputation of the Peshwa, Govind Rao Bhagwant and Bhawani Shankar, came to Hyderabad and met Mir Alam, Minister, to settle the arrears of the levies from Adoni from 1773 to 1794. During the discussion Mir Alam and Sham Raj Bahadur urged the deduction of a proportion of the claims equivalent to the sums of money realized by Hyder

TABLE VIII
STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENSES OF PARGANA KALLAMNOORI ETC. AURANGABAD
RELATING TO *sardeshmukhi*, *mokasa*, *babli* AND *sahotra* FOR 1788-89

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Pargana or village	Receipts by <i>mamladars</i>	<i>Sardeshmukhi</i>	<i>Mokasa</i>	<i>Babli</i>	<i>Sahotra</i>	<i>Kaadana</i> for the animals of <i>Bhonsle</i>	Expenses of <i>Mamladars</i> <i>Sardeshmukhi</i>	<i>Sih-bandi</i> for <i>Amils</i>	Receipts by <i>sarkar</i>
Kallamnoori	64795/-	17165/-	12300/-	5625/-	1/-	21,000/-	7140* 2800 4340	21900	36710
Dudhara and Banna	26666/12/-	6500/-	4500/-	1075/-	350/-	6100/-	3000 1000 2000	6600	1458/4
Natha	26213/4/-	2505/-	3000/-	1075/-	215/-	2500/-	1600 800 800	4900	11518/4
Jharni	10895/-	1650/-	1500/-	700/-	200/-	1500/-	500/-	1560	292
Kinwat	7310/-	3780/-	2700/-	1500/-	375/-	2500/-	1200 500 700	2000	9345
Koranthia	24000/-	1000/-	-	550/-	180/-	3600/-	300	3600	2770
Sindhed and Sambha	2500/-	600/-	-	150/-	60/-	600/-	-	900/	190
Chinur	6764/-	1000/-	-	500/-	160/-	3400/-	140	2040	476
Bhod	5200/-	830/-	600/-	75/-	25/-	800/-	-	3970	9350
	6300/-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1300	
	11250/-	-	-	-	-	-	-		

SOURCE: Document No. 915 R.P.P.

*Figures in the centre indicate the combined amount of expenses; while those on the left side indicate the expenses of *Bhonsle's* agents and these on the right side that of *Sardeshmukhi's*.

However the problems were not settled until the Treaty of Khardla, on 30 March 1795 Nizam Ali Khan agreed to clear all arrears of the levies and to consider the *chauth* of the province of Bidar as *wutun* or private hereditary property of the Peshwa, Nana Farnawis.⁴⁵

Consequently, the Marathas submitted detailed account of the arrears for 1781-89. The Marathas claimed from the Nizam an extra amount towards *karkuni* (accountancy charges). The documents give the exact amount (*ain*) of the Maratha levies and indicate separately the amount of *karkuni* in each case of the sub-divisions of the levies (Table VII). No *karkuni* was charged for *sahotra* as none of the documents mention it. The average percentage of *karkuni* for *chauth*, *babti* and *sardeshmukhi* works out to 16 per cent (Table VII). Apparently the Marathas had charged the Nizam for the maintenance of accounts of the arrears for the period when one-fourth portion of the levies were withheld by the Nizam due to the dispute in the case of the province of Muhammadabad-Bidar only. In some cases the Marathas charged the Nizam the expenses incurred on their *mamlatdars* (Maratha agents in the districts) and their *sardeshmukhs* which amounted to several thousands, as evident from the details furnished in Table VIII. The Marathas not only collected their levies but also exacted huge amounts towards *kaodana* (feed of the animals of the Raja Bhonsle), expenses incurred towards the establishments of their agents. Also the *amils* of the Nizam incurred huge expenses in making collection. Finally out of the total receipts of huge amounts a small portion remained for the Sarkar (Table VIII).

MODES OF COLLECTION AND PAYMENT

a. Collection through the Maratha Collectors Stationed in the Mughal Provinces

From 1707 the Marathas directly collected *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* from the zamindars and jagirdars of every district. But in 1712 with the arrival of Nizamul-Mulk as *subedar* of the Deccan, the Marathas were prevented from

Ali Khan in the districts of Bellary, Anagundi and Kanchan Katak. Govind Bhagwant insisted that as the Peshwa's claim was mainly confined to the districts of Adoni, Raichoor, Kotal Bednore and the fort of Sauger, payment of arrears in instalments was not acceptable as the Peshwa had to meet considerable demands of bankers and others owing to the delay in the payment of his dues by the Nizam. But as the amount of the total claim of the levies was not specified, on the insistence of Mir Alam, Govind Rao unofficially disclosed that it amounted to Rs 175,000 per annum, excluding the amount of the *mokasa* of Daulat Rao Gorphade. However, the settlement was not reached. Document No. 7792; *News letters*, op cit, p. 19.

⁴⁵Sirajuddin, p. 182; Grant Duff, pp. 204-41, 260-61, 248. Further, by a separate agreement, Nizam Ali Khan ceded territory yielding three lakhs and eighteen thousand rupees, in lieu of Raghuji Bhonsle's claims for *kaodana* in Gungthuree (Gangthadi-tracts adjoining the banks of river Godavari) estimated at three and a half lakhs annually, Duff, II (1921 edn.) p. 248.

collecting especially in the neighbourhood of Aurangabad, the headquarters of the Mughal *subedar*. Nizamul Mulk wrote orders to the *faujdar*s and *zildars*, directing them to oust Maratha collectors from several places dependent on Aurangabad.⁴⁶ In the remaining territory of the Mughal Deccan however, they continued to operate.

The Maratha organization for collecting revenues in the Mughal provinces was further strengthened after the issue of the Mughal *firman*s in 1719 granting *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi*. The Viceroy of the Deccan Hussain Ali settled with Sahu that two Maratha officers Balaji Bishwanath and Jamnaji should stay with a suitable escort at Aurangabad as deputy and *vakil* of Sahu, so that all civil and revenue matters could be settled through them.⁴⁷

In every *mahal* of the six Mughal provinces of the Deccan Raja Sahu appointed two collectors one with the title of *kamaishdar* for collecting *chauth* and other that of *gumashta* for collecting *sardeshmukhi*.⁴⁸ Besides these, there were two separate collectors of the *rahdari* (road duties) in each *mahal*.⁴⁹ Thus in every *mahal* of the six Mughal provinces of the Deccan there were three types of regular collectors of Sahu, with parties of horsemen and footmen stationed at their office. Further, in each of the six provinces of the Deccan, a Maratha chief was appointed as a *sarsubedar* (provincial head) for the administration of the collectors and their work in the same way as Mughal *subedar*s were appointed. For example one Maratha official Khandu Pahariya held the province of Khandesh.⁵⁰

⁴⁶Khafi Khan II, pp. 742-43.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, II, pp. 786-87.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, Gulam Ali Bilgrami in *Khazane-i Amera*, (p. 41) states that in every pargana the Marathas appointed one *mokasadar* to collect *chauth* and one *naib-sardeshmukh* for collecting *sardeshmukhi*.

⁴⁹Khafi Khan, II, pp. 786-87.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, II, p. 777.

A brief analysis of the Maratha's plan of collecting and appropriating the revenue of the levies, will afford insight into the working of the system. During the times of Balaji Vishwanath the Marathas divided arbitrarily the Mughal provinces and other parts of the Deccan into zones for the realization of the levies and the same system continued later on. There were district agents for realizing the *babti* and *sardeshmukhi*, for the *sahotra* of the Pant Sachive, for the *nargunda* of the assigns to whom it belonged, for the *mokasa* to different officers for maintaining troops. *Mokasa* was distributed against a great number of chiefs as military *jagir*.

There were particular quarters of the country assigned to the principal officers, which, as far as they can now be ascertained, were as follows: The Peshwa and Senapati charged with the command of a great proportion of the Raja's personal troops, were ordered to direct their attention to the general protection and defence of the territory. The former had authority to levy in parts of Balaghat, the latter was vested with similar authority in Bagh-lana, and the right to realize the dues established by usage in Gujarat. Kanhoji Bhonsle, the Sene Sahib, had charge of Berar payanghat, and was privileged to make conquest and exact tribute from Gandwara to the eastward.

For collecting the levies the Maratha collectors stationed in the *mahals* sent messengers with bills demanding payment from the zamindars or the Mughal officials (text has *Hakim*) stationed in the respective parganas.⁵¹ The Marathas also submitted to the Mughal Government detailed account of their levies as due from different provinces of the Deccan. They also submitted *sanads* of *iqarnama* (agreement bond) after settling the levies as due from a place. In 1749-50 the Maratha leader Fateh Singh submitted to Nasir Jung, a *sanad* of *iqarnama* regarding the settlement of *bilmuqta* (stipulated) amount of Rs 7,25,000 *chauth* due from the Karnatak.⁵²

The Maratha collectors also exacted *chauth* from the caravans as *rahdari*. The leaders of the bands did their best to settle the amount of *chauth* to be paid, while their men on the contrary strove to prevent any settlement. Because if an agreement was arrived at, without plundering, it belonged to the chiefs, and the men got nothing. But, if it came to plundering, each man kept what he could lay hands upon, and the chiefs did not gain much.⁵³

b. Exaction by the Maratha Troops

If the Maratha armies were strong enough to prevail, they enforced their demand of the levies, and when the amount was in arrears they enforced the claim more rigidly, threatening destruction if not complied with,⁵⁴ as the following three instances illustrate.

In 1709 a Maratha woman named Tulasi Bai with about 15,000 horsemen came to the town of Ranwir near Burhanpur. Having surrounded the *sarai* of Ranwir, in which travellers and villagers had taken refuge, she sent a message to the *subedar* Mir Ahmad Khan, demanding payment of eleven lakhs of rupees as *chauth* to save the town and the men who were besieged in the *sarai*.⁵⁵

In 1741 Raghuji Bhonsle and Fateh Singh, two Maratha leaders, invaded Arcot with a large army to exact *chauth*. When battle was imminent Safdar

The *surlushkar* had Gungthuree (Gangthadi) including parts of Aurangabad. Fateh Singh Bhonsle was appointed to the Karnatak, with general charge of the old territory from Neera to Varna. And the collection from Hyderabad and Bidar was left to the *pratinidhi* and the immediate agents of the Raja. Chitnis and Kanhoji Angre were in charge of Konkan (Duff, 1912 edn, 371 ff). Documents corroborate this practice. As far as Mughal Deccan was concerned the territory was divided into five zones. Documents give detailed account of the levy from different provinces and districts under different Maratha chiefs. Document No. 148, R.P.P.

⁵¹ Yusuf Hussain Khan, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-4.

⁵² Document C.40, (S.A.H.); See Doc. IV, Appendix.

⁵³ Mir Abu Turab Mir Alam, *Hadiqatu'l-'Alam*, II, p. 140; Mohd. Mahbub Junaidi, *Hayat-e-Asaf*, p. 164.

⁵⁴ This policy of the Marathas was in contravention of the agreement with Hussain Ali Khan and later on stipulated in the Mughal *firman*s, viz. that the Marathas would preserve the tranquillity of the Deccan. Sardesai, II, p. 41.

⁵⁵ Khafi Khan, II, p. 666.

Ali Khan, son of Dost Ali Khan governor of Karnatak, thought it prudent to make peace and consented to pay forty lakhs of rupees as *chauth* in instalment.⁵⁶

From *Tuzak-i-Walajahi* we learn that in 1742 when Nizamu'l Mulk was busy in settling the affairs of Karnatak Payenghat, Raghunath Babu Nayak, a Maratha chief on the advice of the Peshwa marched at the head of one lakh horses towards Hyderabad. He collected large sums as *chauth* from the subjects as well as Mughal officials, and the disturbances reached as far as Hyderabad.⁵⁷

C. Collection Through the Agency of the Mughal Officials and the Problems that confronted them

When in 1709 Daud Khan Panni, deputy of the viceroy Zulfiqar Khan, entered into an agreement with Sahu, the Mughals took up the responsibility of collecting *chauth* and the Marathas were not allowed to post their collectors in the Mughal provinces.⁵⁸ This arrangement did not work and Maratha agents were active in the Mughal provinces collecting *chauth*.

Nizamu'l Mulk from the very beginning of his first viceroyalty of the Deccan was opposed to the presence of the Maratha collectors in the Mughal provinces. Soon after his arrival at Aurangabad in 1712 he tried to suppress the authority of Maratha collectors. He repudiated the obligations created by the convention entered into by Zulfiqar Khan and Sahu, alleging its observance to be impossible and inconsistent with the authority invested in the viceroy of the Deccan.⁵⁹ However, due to the short tenure of Nizamu'l Mulk's first viceroyalty of the Deccan he could not successfully implement his schemes.

When Nizamu'l Mulk returned to the Deccan in 1720 and again in 1724 he was anxious to whittle down the Maratha's right to the levies. However, in the light of the Mughal Emperor's *firman*s to Sahu, Nizamu'l Mulk could do nothing to get the system changed. He next tried to get the province of Hyderabad exempted from the direct collection of the levies on some compensation.⁶⁰ Following this policy Nizamu'l Mulk, after the battle of Palkhed in 1727, proposed to the *pratinidhi* or the envoy of Sahu, that he would make cash payment towards arrears of *chauth*, on condition that the Maratha collectors were withdrawn from the Mughal provinces. Sahu was almost on

⁵⁶ S. Mohd. Husayn Nainar, *Tuzak-i-Walajahi*, p. 46.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73; Yusuf Hussain Khan, p. 250.

⁵⁸ Khafi Khan, II, p. 625; Yusuf Hussain Khan, p. 50, 55.

⁵⁹ Khafi Khan, II, p. 743; Yusuf Hussain Khan, 68-69. Study of Nizamu'l Mulk's letters in *Gulshan-e-Ajaib* and *Munshat-i-Musavi Khan* (MSS) reveal that he was very much opposed to the Mughal grant of the Maratha levies. He endeavoured to impress on the Emperor the need to abolish the levies.

⁶⁰ *Hayat-e-Asaf*, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

he point of accepting the proposal, when Baji Rao returned and remonstrated with him strongly on the subject. Consequently on 13 October 1727, Sahu declared war upon the Nizam.⁶¹ After the war the issue was resolved through the Treaty of Mungi-Shevgaon of 6 March 1728 between the Nizam and Sahu.⁶² But the terms of the Treaty do not say anything about the cash payment about the mode of payment of the *chauth*. A study of archival documents reveals that the system of cash payment of *chauth* for the province of Hyderabad was implemented forthwith from 1727 when an agreement was made between the Nizam and the *pratinidhi*.⁶³ This is also corroborated by *Hadiqatu'l Alam* and *Tarikh-i-Fathiyah*.⁶⁴

Following the arrangement of 1727, Nizamul Mulk devised and organized an administrative machinery for the collection of *chauth* from the province of Hyderabad. He created a new post of *tahsildar chauth*.⁶⁵ Besides, different Mughal officials such as *faujdar*,⁶⁶ *amanatdar*,⁶⁷ *shiqdar*,⁶⁸ *qiladar*,⁶⁹ *tahsildar*,⁷⁰ *amin*,⁷¹ *amil*,⁷² and *rahdar*⁷³ were also entrusted with the additional duty of *tahsildari-chauth*. Even jagirdars, *inamdars* and *mansabdars* were entrusted with the collection of *chauth*.⁷⁴ Generally the jagirdars themselves came forward voluntarily to take up the responsibility of collecting *chauth* within their own jagirs. This was with a view to avoid outside collectors.⁷⁵

⁶¹Sardesai, II, p. 95

⁶²*Ibid.*, p. 99.

⁶³Document No. C.29, S.A.H. Until 1722 the revenue collectors of the Mughals used to deduct the amount of *chauth* before crediting the total revenue in the Government treasury. This amount was later on paid to the Maratha collectors, as evident from Mughal documents, S.A.H.

⁶⁴*Hadiqatu'l Alam*, II, p. 138; Yusuf Mohammad Khan, *Tarikh-e-Fathiyah* (MSS), State Archives, Hyderabad, 12; translation in *Eighteenth Century Deccan* by Setu Madhava Rao, p. 25. Yusuf Hussain Khan (p. 186) is wrong when he calls "Hyderabad, the new Capital of Nizamul Mulk." It was not the "new capital" alone that was exempted from the direct collection of *chauth* by the Marathas but the entire "Subah of Hyderabad" *Hadiqatu'l Alam*, II, p. 138), *Tarikh-e-Fathiyah*, op. cit., p. 25. This is corroborated by documents.

⁶⁵Document No. C11, C36, C29, (Omala), S.A.H.).

⁶⁶Document No. C 201, C 801 (S.A.H.). See Document XI-XIV, appendix. See Zahiruddin Malik: "Documents Relating to Pargana Administration in the Deccan under Asaf Jah I," *Medieval India—A Miscellany*, Aligarh. Vol. III (1975), 161 ff.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*

⁶⁸Document No. C 456 (Omala), S.A.H.

⁶⁹Document No. C 79 (Omala), S.A.H.

⁷⁰Document N. C 891 (Omala), S.A.H.

⁷¹Document No. C 900 (Omala), S.A.H.

⁷²*Ibid.*

⁷³Document No. C 921 (Omala), S.A.H. See Zahiruddin Malik, "Documents Relating to *chauth* collection in the Subah Hyderabad." *Proceedings of Indian History Congress*, 1970, p. 343.

⁷⁴Document No. C 121; C 103; 189 (Mal), S.A.H.

⁷⁵Document Nos. C 29, C 52, C 83, 162 (Omala), S.A.H.

The usual practice was to assign the collection of *chauth* on contract (*ijara* or *ta'ahhud*) for a few years.⁷⁶ If during this period any *tahsildar chauth* was transferred or removed another person was assigned the contract.⁷⁷ The contractor (*ijaradar*) who undertook the contract of collecting *chauth* had to submit a *qabuliyat* or deed of acceptance.⁷⁸

To ensure prompt collection, the *tahsildar* generally engaged irregular infantry (*sih-bandi*). The Nizam allowed service charges of 7 per cent of *chauth* amount as *sih-bandi* and *haqq-i-tahsil* to the collector.⁷⁹ Sometimes this amount was not allowed to jagirdars and *mansabdars* in view of their higher status.⁸⁰ Moreover some jagirdars voluntarily agreed to forego the expenses towards *sih-bandi*.⁸¹

To ensure regular flow of *chauth* amount into the Mughal treasury, Nizamul Mulk compelled all the *tahsildars* of *chauth* to execute a formal bond of surety called *muchalka*. It contained the terms of service, amount of *chauth*, service charges and their deductions, particulars about the *parganas* or *mahals* for which *chauth* was to be collected, in case of a jagir the name of the jagirdar and the period with specific years. When this *muchalka* with the petition of the prospective *tahsildar chauth* reached the office of the *diwan*, the office used to make its remarks and submit it to the *diwan* for orders. The *diwan* then endorsed the petition for the issuance of a *sanad* in case of approval. Before the *sanad* or appointment orders could be issued the agent (*vakil*) of the principal (*muwakkil*) had to execute a surety bond and deliver it to the office of the *diwan*.⁸²

In default of non-payment of *chauth* for considerable period the jagirs were confiscated.⁸³

The system of *tahsildar chauth* organized by Nizamul Mulk continued after his death as his successors too adopted it. This is evident from several documents between 1748 and 1800.⁸⁴

The system of cash payment to the Marathas in lieu of *chauth* by the Nizam was also introduced in the *Khatisa* or Crown lands in the Deccan. The Nizam appointed his own revenue officials to collect it from the Crown lands

⁷⁶Document Nos. C 7, (Mal), S.A.H.

⁷⁷Document No. C2, C 72 (Omala), S.A.H.

⁷⁸This was in accordance with the general practice for any contract. For patent terms of a contract see Munshi Nand Ram: *Siyah Nama*, Lucknow 1879, pp. 28-29.

⁷⁹Document No. C 41, C 31, C 48.

⁸⁰Document No. C 73, 79, S.A.H.

⁸¹Document Nos. C 51, C 250, S.A.H.

⁸²Document No. C 11, C 89, C 93, 136, 154, 161, S.A.H. The terms of a *muchalka* were patent. The same form was adopted in the case of *tahsildari-chauth*. See *Siyah Nama*, p. 69.

⁸³Documents No. 907/3, R.P.P.

⁸⁴Document No. 333, C 344, R.P.P.

and paid cash to the Marathas.⁸⁵

d. Mode of Payment to the Marathas

When the Marathas collected the levies directly through their own agents, they used to exact whatever amount they could at a time in lump sum or in instalments.⁸⁶ They used to send bills periodically, usually twice or four times in a year to the jagirdars and zamindars. The bill gave details of the amount of the levy due. The Marathas accepted a portion of the amount readily available on account.⁸⁷

During the time of Nizam Ali Khan, the Marathas reported that the collection of *chauth* at the end of every year usually lapsed to the next year. As such Nizam Ali Khan ordered that the *chauth* amount be collected at every *fasal* (season or harvest), that is, three times in a year. But it was paid to the Marathas in a lump sum once at the end of the year by the Mughal treasury.⁸⁸

When the provincial Mughal officials failed to remit the amount in time from the places where the Nizam undertook to collect the Marathas claimed it direct from the provincial headquarters of the Mughal government in the Deccan. Sometimes they threatened that the amount be paid by the sarkar within a stipulated time and suggesting the Sarkar to take over the administration of the places from where the *chauth* amount was not forthcoming in time.⁸⁹

DIVISION OF THE RIGHT OF COLLECTION OF *Chauth* BETWEEN THE TWO HOUSES OF MARATHA RULERS

The right of collecting the levies became a disputed issue between the two Maratha rulers, Sahu and Tarabai, and later on her son Sambhaji. Both professed to be rightful claimants and demanded equal division of the revenue. Both the factions in dispute now looked openly upon the Mughals as the supreme arbitrators and paramount power to grant or deny the right. During the second regnal year (1707-08) of Bahadur Shah, Tarabai sent emissaries to the Mughal Emperor seeking recognition for her son Sambhaji as the Maratha king and demanding a *firman* in his name. In an astute move to make her claim more attractive to the Mughals, she asked for only 9 per cent as *sardeshmukhi* without any reference to the *chauth*.⁹⁰

In the Mughal court her side was taken by Munim Khan, while Zulfiqar

⁸⁵Document No. 1072 to 1076, R.P.P.

⁸⁶Document Nos. C 12, C 271, S.A.H.

⁸⁷Poona Akhbars, I, p. 29; Document Nos. C 3, 39, (S.A.H.).

⁸⁸Document No. C 252, S.A.H.

⁸⁹Document IV, Appendix.

⁹⁰Khafi Khan, II, p. 626.

Khan took the side of Sahu. A great controversy arose upon this matter between the two ministers. Bahadur Shah did not wish to displease any one and directed that *firman*s be issued in compliance with the requests of both the ministers, that is both Sahu and Tarabai were granted the right of *sardeshmukhi*. But due to the tussle between the two ministers the orders remained inoperative.⁹¹

In an endeavour to check the power of Sahu, Nizamu'l Mulk declared Sambhaji as Chhatrapati in February, 1728.⁹² Nizamu'l Mulk, at his own initiative, without Emperor's sanction dismissed all the revenue collectors of Sahu from the Mughal territory and in their place appointed those of Sambhaji.⁹³ Thus according to the prevalent custom Nizamu'l Mulk sequestrated the property in dispute by dismissing Sahu's collectors from the Mughal provinces of the Deccan until their respective rights were equitably adjusted.⁹⁴

The dispute was resolved through the Treaty of Mungi Shivgaon of 6 March 1728 between Nizamu'l Mulk and Sahu. Nizamu'l Mulk recognized Sahu as the king of the Marathas, entitled to *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* in the provinces of the Deccan at the same time allowing Sambhaji to levy *chauth* in the Mughal territory south of river Krishna.⁹⁵ The territorial extent of Sambhaji's kingdom was demarcated by the Treaty of Varna of 13 April 1731, between Sahu and Sambhaji.⁹⁶ River Varna formed the dividing line between the kingdoms of Sahu and Sambhaji. However so far no document has been found giving details of the levies collected by Sambhaji or paid to him by the Mughals.⁹⁷

DUAL MUGHAL-MARATHA LAND REVENUE ADMINISTRATION IN THE MUGHAL PROVINCES

The network of three types of revenue collectors of the Marathas in every *mahal*⁹⁸ along with their supervisory staff at the headquarters of the

⁹¹*Ibid.*

⁹²Syed Md. Ali al-Hussaini, *Tarikh-e-Rahat Afza*, Hyderabad, 1947, p. 115; Sardesai, II, pp. 90-91.

⁹³*Hadiqatu'l Alam*, II p. 139; *Tarikh-e-Rahat Afza*, pp. 115, 119; Khafi Khan II, p. 742.

⁹⁴Grant Duff, I, p. 412.

⁹⁵*Hadiqatu'l Alam*, II, p. 140; *Tarikh-e-Rahat Afza*, p. 119.

⁹⁶Manohar Malgaonkar; *Chhatrapatis of Kolhapur*, p. 149.

⁹⁷Mir Alam in *Hadiqatu'l Alam*, (II, p. 139) mentions appointment of *gumashdars* of Sambhaji in the Mughal provinces for the collection of the levies, while *Tarikh-e-Rahat Afza* mentions *mokasadors* of Sambhaji (p. 115, 119).

⁹⁸The total number of *mahals* in the six provinces of the Deccan during the eighteenth century was 1271 as detailed below: (1) Aurangabad, 147; (2) Khandesh, 136; (3) Berar, 61; (Balaghat) and 191 (Payanghat); (4) Muhammadabad Bidar, 76; (5) Bijapur 148 (Bijapur) and 104 (Karnatak Bijapur); (6) Farkhunda Buniyad, Hyderabad, 213 (Telengana), 60

Mughal provinces (except in the province of Hyderabad for which the Nizam paid cash from 1727 onwards) seems to have operated simultaneously along with their counterparts in the Mughal government.

Mughal Chronicler Khafi Khan informs us that on the rolls (*baraurd*) of the collection of land revenue the signature of the Maratha official *sarishtadar* of the *sardeshmukhi* was placed first.⁹⁹ This practice which was prevalent during the early eighteenth century might have continued throughout the century.

The Maratha collectors went to the fields in the Mughal provinces and settled the assessment of *jama* and *hasil* on the basis of the standing crop and fixed the amount of the levies and took sureties for its payment from the zamindars.¹⁰⁰

The fixation and revision of the levies was made as and when the Marathas desired in order to get a higher amount due to the increase in the receipts of revenue.¹⁰¹ Thus the Marathas exerted their authority to get the *jamabandi* of any place revised as and when they liked.

During the time of Nizam Ali Khan, the Marathas claimed higher amount of *chauth* on the basis of higher receipts and desired periodical re-assessment of the *jama* and *jamabandi-chauth*. Nizam Ali Khan appointed *amils* or *amins* for investigating the *jama* and *hasil* figures. Along with the Mughal *amils* one representative of the Marathas was also appointed to accompany them during the investigations. Thus in 1783 when Nizam Ali Khan appointed Mir Mohsin Ali Khan Bahadur to investigate the assessment report of Madhav Rao, one Maratha official, Rao Jevaji, was also appointed to accompany him to the Jagir of Tej Singh of Narsi.¹⁰²

The direct mode of collection of the levies had given the Marathas unrestricted freedom to roam about in the Mughal territory along with their troops. Without this freedom the *sardeshmukhi* was meaningless. The Marathas controlled the gates of the Mughal provinces and collected *chauth* on transit duties. The Maratha claims of revenue were met first, enforced as they were by an armed authority and the Mughal revenue collectors were given secondary importance.¹⁰³ Consequently the influence of the Mughal revenue officials was gradually paralyzed and power fell into the hands of the Marathas who had established a quasi-military control over the Deccan in order to protect their collectors. All these practices resulted in the unique system of dual Mughal-

(Karnatak Balaghat and 131 Karnatak Payanghat)—*Swaneh Deccan*, MS, State Archives, Hyderabad; Junaidi, *op. cit.*, 467 ff.; Sir J.N. Sarkar, *India of Aurangzeb*, p. lxxvii ff.

⁹⁹ Khafi Khan, II, p. 786.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, II, p. 782.

¹⁰¹ Document C 252, R.P.P.; see Document III, Appendix.

¹⁰² Document Nos. C 36, C 37, R.P.P.

¹⁰³ Yusuf Hussain Khan, *op. cit.*, p. 103; Grant Duff, I, p. 375.

Maratha land revenue administration in the Mughal Deccan (except the province of Hyderabad and Crown lands in the Deccan in which places the Nizam undertook to collect and pay cash to the Marathas).

SUB-DIVISIONS OF *Chauth* AND *Sardeshmukhi*

The proceeds of *chauth* which the Marathas collected from the Mughals were divided among themselves into the following shares:¹⁰⁴

1. *Babti*: 25 per cent, reserved for the Maratha ruler;
2. *Mokasa*: 66 per cent, granted to the Maratha *sardars* for maintaining troops;
3. *Sahotra*: 6 per cent, granted to the Pant Sachive; and
4. *Nadgounda*: 3 per cent, awarded to various persons at the ruler's pleasure.

The proceeds of the *sardeshmukhi* also was similarly divided.

The distribution of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* into sub-divisions was the internal administrative arrangement of the Marathas. The Mughals in the Deccan were not concerned with these divisions. Nor was any reference to these divisions made in the Mughal *sanads*. However, surprisingly enough, we find mention of these sub-divisions and payment by the Mughals on these accounts in the Persian documents. The documents give details of the amount allotted against the various sub-divisions of *chauth*.¹⁰⁵ The sub-divisions mentioned are *mokasa*, *mokasa-chauth*, *babti*, *sahotra* and half (*nisf*) shares as *nisf-mokasa*, *nisf-babti* and *nisf-sahotra*.

In the Treaty of Yadgir of 5 June 1784, mention of these sub-divisions—

¹⁰⁴ S. Sen, *Administrative System of the Mahrattas*, 242-43, *CHI.*, V, 394. The percentages given by Sen are traditional and not based on documents. Prof. Satish Chandra gives an interesting background for the system of division of the Maratha levies between the Maratha ruler, the Peshwa and other military chiefs, etc. He says that the rise of a new nobility consisting of military chiefs were required to raise their own troops and were paid by the assignment of *mokasa* and *saranjams* out of the Maratha claim of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* from the Mughal territories. A part of the levies were reserved for the Maratha government, but the individual *sardars* had to be assigned their responsibility for collecting this also. The *sardeshmukhi* was reserved for the Maratha king and was to be realized by him directly from the peasants. Out of *chauth*, three quarters were to be assigned to the various chiefs as *saranjam* for their own expenses and the expenses of their troops. Another 6 per cent called *sahotra* was reserved for the Pant Sachive, while 3 per cent (*nadgaunda*) was at the king's disposal for granting to any one at his pleasure. The remainder, or 16 per cent was reserved for the king. *Ideas in History* ed., Bisheshwar Prasad, Asia, 1968, p. 184.

¹⁰⁵ Document Nos. 899 to 1100, (R.P.P.) *Nadgaunda* is not mentioned in these documents. But we find mention of *narkondi* (expenses towards fodder, etc). Document No. 1072/21. *Narkondi* may be considered to be same as *kaodana*.

chauth with *babti*, *sahotra* and *sardeshmukhi*—is made.¹⁰⁶ But this mention is in a different context, regarding the principles to be adopted in the conquest and mutual division of the revenue of the territory beyond the river Tungabhadra, between the Nizam and the Marathas. The Nizam and the Peshwa agreed that if the Nizam conquered the territory of the river Tungabhadra by his own men and material, then he would pay the Maratha levies as usual; if the territory was conquered independently the Maratha would pay *peshkash* to the Nizam; and if conquered by the joint efforts of the Nizam and the Marathas, then in that case territory would be divided equitably and the Peshwa would not demand "*chauth*, etc." from the Nizam.¹⁰⁷ Here "etc." in the text of the Treaty signifies the sub-divisions of the Maratha levies.

The Treaty does not mention *mokasa*, *mokasa-chauth*, nor *half shares* as found regularly in the documents. In the documents *half shares* (*nisf*) of *chauth*, *mokasa*, *sahotra*, *babti*, *sardeshmukhi* are mentioned without any explanation. A study of the documents reveals that the terms *chauth*, *mokasa* or *mokasa-chauth* have been used interchangeably in a careless manner. Some documents mention in the caption "Balance of *chauth*, *babti*, *sahotra* and *sardeshmukhi*" but a detailed examination of the texts reveals that instead of *chauth* only *mokasa* is mentioned.¹⁰⁸ These details mentioned in the documents emanating from the offices of Peshwa go against the administrative principles of the Marathas. As *chauth* and *mokasa* cannot be equated, *mokasa* constituting only 66 per cent of the total amount of *chauth*, we may say that the terms were wrongly used by the accountants.

The following extracts from a few documents would illustrate the different sub-divisions of *chauth* and the amount claimed under different heads and the amount towards the *karkuni* or accountancy charges.

A document¹⁰⁹ gives details of the amount of *mokasa-chauth* as due from Petah Sarkonda and *pargana* Kolas, *sarkar* Nanded, *subah* Muhammadabad. It is dated 10 January 1789.

Total amount of <i>chauth</i> , etc.	Rs 1,739/8
One-fourth deductions withheld by the Nizam's government	Rs 448/6
Net payable to the Marathas	Rs 1,345/2

¹⁰⁶Clause 14, Persian text, *Treaty of Yadgir*, Sirajuddin, *op. cit.*, 237-38.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.* The text of the Treaty has "*Chauth wagairah*" (*chauth*, etc.).

¹⁰⁸Document No. 1707/23, R.P.P., S.A.H.

¹⁰⁹Document No. 11011, R.P.P., S.A.H. It is a letter from Azamul Umar Bahadur in the name of Raja Shankar Rao.

Rs 1,345/2							
Mokasa-chauth		Babti		Sahotra	Sardeshmukhi		
Ain ¹¹⁰	Karkuni	Ain	Karkuni	60	Ain	Karkuni	
950	100	333	50		225	75	
One-fourth deductions withheld		95/14		15	75		
Net payable to the Marathas		287/10		45	225		
787/8							

In a document¹¹¹ giving details of the amount of *chauth* due from the *pargana* Kankar, *sarkar* Muzaffarnagar, *subah* Muhammadabad for 1787 the amount of *sahotra* is not claimed and the one-fourth deductions are shown in lump sum against each division. From the document it is also evident that the Nizam withheld the one-fourth deductions up to 1787-88 which was made from 1781-82.

Total amount of <i>chauth</i> , etc.	Rs 10,700
One-fourth deductions withheld	Rs 2,675
Net due to the Marathas	Rs 8,025

Rs 10,700							
Chauth with karkuni		Babti with karkuni		Sardeshmukhi with karkuni			
5,250		5,000		450			
Chauth	Karkuni	Babti	Karkuni	Sardeshmukhi	karkuni		
5,000	250	4,750	250	400	50		


The document¹¹² is arrears bill for the *khalisa* lands of *subah* Muhammadabad. A portion is extracted here, showing the amount of arrears due for

¹¹⁰Here it means actual amount or specific sum or value of the levy.

¹¹¹Document No. 11014, R.P.P., S.A.H.

¹¹²Document No. 1072/3, R.P.P., S.A.H.

1787-88 from the *parganas* Hanur and Udgir. under the administration of Sazaul Mulk Bahadur.



It will be noticed from the extracts that half-shares, *nisf-mokasa* and *nisf-babti* have been claimed only in regards to the pargana Udgir and not for the other pargana. And *chauth* does not find mention; *mokasa* is recorded to have been claimed instead. *Sahotra* also has not been claimed. And since the Nizam took the responsibility of payment cash for the claims of the levies from the Crown lands we find no claim towards *karkuni* in this document.

The purpose of half-*mokasa* or half-*babti* is nowhere mentioned in the documents. Nor is any reference made to these in the works dealing with the administrative system of the Marathas. Since the amounts of half levies is mentioned only in the documents giving details of arrears due, it is possible that full amounts of the levies were not claimable from the particular area and only half the amount was claimable, i.e., half the amount of the levies might have been paid earlier and as such the balance of half the levy was claimed. The terms *nisf-mokasa*, *nisf-babti*, might have been applied to distinguish the half amounts.

A document¹¹³ clearly states the rate of *sardeshmukhi* at Rs 10 per Rs 110 (*sardeshmukhi yak sad deh ra deh rupia*), or 9 per cent. Though the document is dated 1776-77, on the top of every page it is stated that the rates and amounts are according to the prevailing practice during the times of Nizamul Mulk (*Muafaq Ma'amul Bandegan Hazrat Makhfarat Ma'ab*).

A document¹¹⁴ gives details about the distribution of *rahdari* into different

¹¹³Document No. 95/8, R.P.P., S.A.H.

¹¹⁴Document No. 94/3, R.P.P., S.A.H.

heads of *chauth*, *sardeshmukhi*, *babti*, *rusum* (perquisites) of the *zamindars* and the percentage of the division. The period covered is from 1748 to 1774. Out of 25 per cent of the levy, two-thirds (2/3) was towards *chauth* and one-third (1/3) for *babti*. That is, the allocation of the one-third portion of the amount

TABLE IX
STATEMENT SHOWING THE RATE OF PERCENTAGE OF DISTRIBUTION
OF *chauth* AND *sardeshmukhi* INTO THEIR SUB-DIVISION

1	2	3	4	5	6	
Maratha levies Rs as ps	Chauth Rs as ps	Mokasa Rs as ps	Babti Rs as ps	Sahotra Rs as	Sardesh- mukhi Rs as	Source
32/6/9	14/10— (45%)	—	7/3/9 (22%)	—	10 (32%)	Table I
27/8/9	—	13/3/3 (47.2%)	4/12/6 (18%)	—	9/9 (40%)	Doc. No. 94 R.P.P.
35/—/—	—	16/14 (48.3%)	5/10 (16%)	—	12/8 (35.7%)	"
29/—/—	14/15/— (51%)	—	7/6/— (25%)	—	6/11/0 (23%)	"
32/8/—	22/8/— a) — b) (69%)	15/13/6 (70.4%) (47.9%)	5/4/6 (23%) (16%)	1/6 (6%) (4%)	10 (4%) (4%)	App. Doc. II
32/8/—	22/8/— a) — b) (69%)	15/14/3 (70.6%) (48.8%)	5/4/9 (23%) (32%)	1/5 (6%) (5%)	10 (4%) (4%)	App, Doc. I
52/8/—	30 (57%)	—	10 (19%)	—	12/8 (24%)	Table II
37/8/—	18/12 (50%)	—	6/4 (16%)	—	12/8 (33%)	"
28/2/9	15/0/9 (62%)	—	5/— (18%)	—	8/2 (20%)	Table I
32/11/—	17/— (79%)	—	5/11 (17%)	—	10 (3%)	"

¹Figures in Columns 2-6 are actual amounts of the individual levies; while below them, within the paranthesis indicate the percentages.

²At S. Nos. 5 and 6, the percentage of (a) indicate that calculated for the amount of *chauth* (i.e., for Rs 22/8) and those of (b) for the total amount of the levies (i.e., Rs 32/8).

for *babti* is against the usual practice of the Maratha administration. As mentioned above the share of *babti* was 25 per cent of the total amount of *chauth*. This is disproved by the rate in several documents. It implies that $33\frac{1}{3}$

per cent was reserved for *babti* and not 25 per cent. This upsets the standard percentage of divisions mentioned above which needs revision (see Table X). In this document the Nizam's share is given as two portions, since one portion was allotted for *sih-bandi*. But in other documents 75 per cent or three portions of the total receipts is mentioned as Sarkar's share.¹¹⁶ Some documents give

TABLE X
COMPARATIVE STATEMENT TO ILLUSTRATE THE INCONSISTENCY IN THE
DIVISION OF MARATHA LEVIES IN SOME PARGANAS OF *khalisa* IN
THE SUBAHS OF BIDAR AND BIJAPUR FOR 1789-90. THE TOTAL
AMOUNT¹ OF ARREARS IS Rs 3, 39, 713/15/6, OF WHICH
Rs 57350/1 IS FROM *khalisa* AND Rs 92, 885/4/3
FROM JAGIRS.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Pargana	Amount Rs as	Chauth Rs as	Babti Rs as	Sahotra Rs as	Sardesh- mukhi Rs as
Bardapur	3825	325 (M) ²	2350	1150	
Q. Khed	1485/—	900	175	60	325
Nilanga	15122/8	4211	3125	386/8	5400
		2000 (M)			
Naldurg	1464/12		464/14		1000/—
Kalimungi	18927/4	10125	3000	750	5062/1
		725 (M)			
Owsa	15521	450 (M)	3628/8	1200	7700 ³
	(after deducting one-fourth)				
Odgeer	3602/—/3	1630/8		139/8	687/8/3
		Half-chauth ⁴ and babti = 972/—			
		Half-chauth 631/8	Half- babti 631/8		
Hasnabad	3135/12				
	(after deducting one-fourth)				
Q. Ankeli	416/2		145/8	17/2	233/8
Aland	14643	10,323/8	3441	887/8	—

SOURCE : Document No. 1072/15-17, R.P.P., S.A.H.

¹Only a small portion of the document relating to the *khalisa* on the Crown lands is given here.

²M = *Mokasa*.


³Here Rs 25428/—/— towards *kaodana* are mentioned.

⁴Here *nisf* (half) is mentioned in the document.

¹¹⁶Document No. 94/2, 3, 5, R.P.P., S.A.H.

even less share to the Sarkar, and it varied as already mentioned above.¹¹⁶

A document¹¹⁷ of 1781 gives percentage of the Maratha levies payable to the Peshwa at Rs 32 and 8 annas per Rs 100 and the rate of distribution into other sub-divisions is given below:



From an analysis of the these documents the following facts emerge about the inconsistency in the rate of the percentage of distribution of the Maratha levies into its sub-divisions. In actual practice the proceeds of the *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* were divided as follows:

(1) *Mokasa*: 75 per cent and not 66 per cent. Since three portions of the amount of *chauth* (after deducting 6 per cent *sahotra*) were allotted as *mokasa* and one portion as *babti*, (Appendix Documents I and II). But this rate too was not constant. The rate of division varied as evident from Table IX.

(2) *Babti*: 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ per cent (i.e., one-third of the *mokasa*) and not 25 per cent (Documents I and II appendix). But slight variation in this rate is also found as indicated in Table IX.

(3) *Sardeshmukhi*: Varied from 9 per cent to 11 per cent—not uniform. Some documents clearly state the rate of *sardeshmukhi* at 10 per cent, some at 9 per cent while some state at Rs 10 per Rs 110, i.e., 9 per cent, (Tables I and III, Appendix Document IX). Another document give the rate of *sardesh-*

¹¹⁶Document No. 94 and 103, R.P.P.


¹¹⁷Document No. 801, R.P.P., S.A.H.

mukhi at 11 per cent (Table II).

(4) *Sahotra*: 6 per cent.

(5) Half-*Mokasa* and Half-*Babti*: The principle of their division was same as mentioned above for their full shares.

However, if we consider the documents¹¹⁸ giving the principle adopted for the allocation of the Maratha levies into its various sub-divisions the following percentages are derived.¹¹⁹ It will be noticed in the chart that the amount of *chauth* (69.2 per cent) is again re-distributed into *mokasa* (69.2 per cent of the *chauth* amount), *babti* (24.8 per cent) and *sahotra* (6 per cent).



But the standard rates for the distribution of the Maratha levies do not always hold good. Great inconsistency is found in the distribution of the levies of some parganas of the Crown lands and jagirs in the province of Bidar and Bijapur for 1789-90, as is evident from the portion of the document, giving details of the arrears, extracted in Table X.¹²⁰

IMPACT ON THE MUGHAL ECONOMY

The Mughal *sanads* granting *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* stipulated that the yield on this account would be four and a half crores of rupees out of the total estimated revenue of about eighteen crores of rupees. But the country had been so devastated by wars that after Aurangzeb's death the actual yield was about half the estimated revenue. The proportion of 25 per cent for *chauth* was apparently fixed upon the understanding that local expenses of the Mughal Government were about one-fourth of the entire collections. The *chauth* collection was conceded to the Marathas who undertook to collect on the understanding that it involved no real loss of the net revenue which

¹¹⁸Document Nos. 11265, 8, R.P.P.

¹¹⁹The percentages are derived on the basis of the amounts given in the document 1 of the Appendix.

¹²⁰Document No. 1072/15-17, R.P.P.

reached the central authorities at Delhi, being 75 per cent of the total collections.¹²¹

However, owing to the generally depressed state of the country the Maratha levies absorbed nearly the whole of the actual receipts and left but little that could reach the Mughal exchequer. It exhausted the paying capacity of the zamindars and others and the Mughal agents were unable to recover any amount.¹²²

To the Mughal grants of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* the Marathas later on added 5 per cent for *kaodana*. This amounted to 40 per cent of the total receipts of the Mughal treasury. But this too was only on paper, as actually it worked out to be much higher, about 50 per cent of the estimated revenue of the Mughals and almost whole of the *hasil* or actual receipts. This will be evident from the following analysis.

At places where the Mughals or the Nizam undertook the responsibility of collecting the Maratha levies and paid cash to the Marathas, they had to incur additional expenses towards the following heads: *tahsildari-chauth*¹²³ (6 per cent); *haq-e-tahsil*¹²⁴ (6 per cent); *havaladari*¹²⁵ (6 per cent); *rusum-i-zamindar*¹²⁶ (2 per cent); *sih-bandi*¹²⁷ (7 per cent); and *karkuni*¹²⁸ (15.97 per cent); (Table XI). This works out to 32 per cent of the amount collected. But all these expenses were not incurred simultaneously.

So, let us consider that at least half of these, i.e., 16 per cent were incurred on an average. Since where *tahsildari-chauth* was paid; *havaladari* was not paid.¹²⁹ Sometimes *sih-bandi* was not paid to the big jagirdars who undertook to collect *chauth*.¹³⁰ Further, the Mughal government had to incur expenditure towards periodical *jamabandi* or assessment whenever and wherever the Marathas desired by appointing special investigating officers to settle the dispute. But these expenses cannot be estimated. So, on an average we may say

¹²¹Ranade, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

¹²²Yusuf Hussain Khan, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

¹²³Document No. C 391 (Omalan), S.A.H.

¹²⁴Document No. C 46, C 406 (Omalan), S.A.H. Sometimes *Haq-e tahsil* and *sih-bandi* were combined and paid at the rate of 7 per cent, Document No. C 41, C 59 (Omalan, S.A.H.). Sometimes the combined rate was 6.5 per cent, Document C 51.

¹²⁵Document No. 94/1, R.P.P. *Havaladari*, a charge made to the villages for the expenses of subordinate revenue officials sent to watch or to attach the crops (*Wilson's Glossary*, p. 317).

¹²⁶Perquisites or commission allowed to the zamindar usually at 2 per cent. Document No. 94/6, R.P.P.

¹²⁷Document Nos. C 10, C 21, C 56, (Omalan), S.A.H.

¹²⁸Mughal government paid *karkuni* to the Marathas at this rate as evident from the several documents cited above. Similarly, same figure may be taken into account for calculating approximate expenditure incurred by the Mughals on this account. However, this amount was not claimed nor mentioned in the documents as expenses of the Mughal government.

¹²⁹Document No. C 98, S.A.H.

¹³⁰Document No. C 73, 79, S.A.H.

that 16 per cent were spent for the collection and maintenance of accounts of the Maratha levies. This plus 40 per cent of *chauth*, *sardeshmukhi* and *kaodana* works out to 56 per cent of the total receipts when collected through the agency of the Mughals.

And from places where the Maratha collectors made direct collections they sometimes charged expenses of their *mamlatdars*¹³¹ (11.7 per cent), expenses of troops¹³² (82.4 per cent), *sih-bandi*¹³³ (33.8 per cent) *tankhwah* of *mokasadars*¹³⁴ (21 per cent) and *karkuni* (15.97 or 16 per cent) towards the maintenance of accounts of arrears (Table XI). But again all these expenses were

TABLE XI
STATEMENT SHOWING THE EXPENSES INCURRED AT DIFFERENT
TIMES FOR THE COLLECTION OF THE MARATHA LEVIES

(A) Expenses when collection was made by the Marathas—per cent of the total Maratha levies collected :

Expenses of Maratha Troops	Expenses of Mamlatdars	Karkuni	Sih-bandi to Amils of Mughal Government	Tankhwah of the Mokasadars
82.4% ¹	11.7% ²	15.97 ³	33.8% ⁴	21% ⁵

(B) Expenses when collection was made by the Mughal officials for the province of Hyderabad and all the Crown lands in all the provinces of the Deccan, per cent of total Maratha levies collected:

Tahsildari-Chauth	Sih-bandi	hav-e-tahsil	Havaldari	Rusum-i-Zamindari
6% ⁶	7% ⁸	6% ⁸	6% ⁹	2% ¹⁰

SOURCES : ¹Document Nos. 87 and 88, R.P.P. (See Table VI.).

²Document No. 915, R.P.P. (See Table VIII). Here Percentages are calculated on total amount of the Maratha levies.

³See Table VII.

⁴Document No. 915, R.P.P. (See Table VIII.) Percentage derived from cols. 2 and 10

⁵Document No. 81 and 88. (See Table VI).

⁶Document C 391, S.A.H.

⁷Document Nos. C 41, 31, 48, S.A.H.

⁸Document C46, C 406, S.A.H. (Sometimes *haq-e-tahsil* was combined and paid at the rate of 7 per cent only. Document C41, C59, S.A.H.)

⁹Document IX Appendix.

¹⁰Document 9416, R.P.P.

¹³¹Document No. 89, R.P.P.

¹³²Document Nos. 87 and 88, S.A.H. See Table VI

¹³³Document No. 915, R.P.P. See Table VI.

¹³⁴Document No. 87 and 88, R.P.P. See Table VI.

not met nor charged simultaneously. The expenses toward troops were charged only on one occasion. So, this may not be taken into the account of regular expenses. Similarly expenses towards *sih-bandi* and pay of *mokasadars* may be excluded as these were also charged on one occasion. We may consider expenses towards *mamlatdars* and *karkuni* only which works out to 27.97 per cent. But both these expenses were not charged simultaneously; so, as in the previous case, we may take into account only half of this i.e., 14 per cent on an average. That is, the total collections of the Maratha levies and their expenses amount to 54 per cent (25 per cent *chauth*, 10 per cent *sardeshmukhi*, 5 per cent *kaodana* and 14 per cent expenses) when collected through the agency of the Marathas themselves.¹³⁵

The average percentage of the Maratha levies and expenses incurred for collection through the two modes works out to 55 per cent of the total receipts of the Mughals. And even if we consider the Maratha levies at the rate of Rs 32.5 per cent as given in some documents¹³⁶ the percentage would be 52.5 per cent.

Now in the light of this analysis the statement of Khafi Khan that "they [Marathas] were to receive nearly half the total revenue [of the Mughals] recorded in the government rent-roll,"¹³⁷ seems to be no exaggeration. Though this statement of Khafi Khan pertains to the first quarter of the eighteenth century it is equally true for the entire period of the century, as the documents on which basis the percentages have been worked out pertains to the whole of eighteenth century.

Thus, "owing to the depressed state of the country, the *sardeshmukhi* and *chauth* revenue nearly absorbed the whole of the actual receipts [the *hasil* which was far less than the *jama*], and left but little that could reach the Imperial [Mughal] exchequer"¹³⁸ and this ruined the Mughal economy.

The *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* system (including *ghasdana*) came to an end on 17 December 1803 when the Marathas renounced their claims on the Nizam's (Sikandar Jah Asaf Jah III) territories through the Treaty of Devgaon with the British. The Treaty further provided that all the differences between the Nizam, the Peshwa and the Sena Sahib (Porsarji Bhonsle) were to be arbitrated by the British Government.¹³⁹

¹³⁵Document Nos. 894/3, 901/2, 11014, 855/64, 1095/1, 962, 855/57, R.P.P. See Table VII.

¹³⁶Document Nos. I and II, Appendix.

¹³⁷Khafi Khan, II, p. 786.

¹³⁸Ranade, *op. cit.* 1966 edn., pp. 102-103.

¹³⁹Grant Duff II, 1921 edn., p. 361. The settlement of Maratha levies dragged on for several years and the British arbitrated between the Nizam and the Peshwa. This is evident from scores of documents at the State Archives like Document Nos. 11237, 1106, 11273, etc., of 25 December 1817.

APPENDIX

DOCUMENT I

Statement Defining Suraj¹ (Maratha Levies)

<i>Sardeshmukhi</i>	<i>Mokasa or chauth</i>
10%	Rs 15/14/3
Details of <i>chauth</i> , <i>babti</i> , <i>sahotra</i> and <i>sardeshmukhi</i> per hundred rupees. For example, from Rs 100 of <i>jamabandi</i> after deducting <i>rusum</i> of zamindars.	
Share of the sarkar	— Rs 67/8
<i>suraj</i>	— Rs 32/8
<i>Sardeshmukhi</i>	<i>Mokasa or chauth</i>
10%	Rs 100
Rs 10/—	Rs 10 <i>sardeshmukhi</i>
	Rs 90
	Rs 22/8 (<i>chauth</i> —one-fourth of Rs 90)
	Rs 1/5 <i>sahotra</i> (6% of the <i>chauth</i> amount)
	Rs 22/8)
	Rs 5/4/9— <i>babti</i> (one-fourth of Rs 21/3)
	Rs 15/14/3 <i>mokasa</i>

SOURCE: Document No. 11265, R.P.P., S.A.H.

DOCUMENT II

Amount of *mamladaran* (representatives of the Peshwa) in the districts of Rao Pandit Pradhan. For example one hundred rupees is equal² to Rs 32/8

¹The word *suraj* implies Maratha levies of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi*. Appears to be corruption of *swaraj*—the share of the revenue claimed by the Marathas from any conquered country, the same as the *chauth*—Wilson's Glossary, p. 795.

²The text has "Raaham Mamladaran Rao Pandit Pradhan maslan sad rupia ra se bist rupia hashat anna meeshawad."

Sardeshmukhi
Rs 100
(total amount after deducting
sih-bandi fixed Rs 10)

"chauth, etc."
Rs 100
(total amount after deducting
sih-bandi)

Rs 10 less *sardeshmukhi*
Rs 90
Fixed one-fourth *chauth*
Rs 22/8/
sahotra *babti*
per hundred Rs 6 Rs 22/8/
Rs 22/8/ less Rs 1/6
fixed Rs 1/6/ *sahotra*
Rs 21/2/
mokasa Rs 15/13/6 Rs 15/13/6
mokasa
Rs 5/4/6

SOURCE: Document No. 8, R.P.P., S.A.H.

DOCUMENT III

Following are the *Irshada't* (Orders) of Nizam Ali Khan Asaf Jah II regarding the settlement of different aspects of the *chauth* affair given on the report of Peshwa Rao Pandit Pradhan Mahadeo Rao. The document is dated 1186 F. (1786-87).

I. "Ordered that the amount (of *chauth*) fixed during the times of *Maq farat Ma'ab* (Nizamu'l Mulk) will be compared (with those submitted by Mahadeo Rao) and will act according to the investigations. For the remaining of the *mahalat* for which comparative figures are not received, investigations will be made by appointing an *Amin*."

"If investigations were not done satisfactorily then again they will be investigated (for fixing the amount of *chauth*)."

"Three methods are provided, one of them may be adopted:

"Firstly, certain amount has been written in the *sarkar* (Mughal records) from the times of Nizamu'l Mulk. This amount (of *chauth*) will be compared (with that of Mahadeo Rao's Report). If found correct, it will be continued. Otherwise, as per the rules, investigations would be made. If any difference, it will be adjusted mutually."

"Secondly, what you (Maratha) have fixed should keep it up. After investigating whatever amount, whether less or more, will be adjusted."

"Thirdly, until the figures of Nizamu'l Mulk's time are agreed upon, the

figures given by Mahadeo Rao are accepted."

"The question of one-fourth (*chaharrum*) share withheld by the *sarkar* will be decided later on after the investigations.

II. "From places in Berar Balaghat which are thinly populated the amount of *kaodana*, etc., is not being received even though *kaodana* is available during the season. And the amount which was fixed during the times of Nizamu'l Mulk is due from the jagirdar to the '*suraj*' (Maratha ruler) has not been paid. It is ordered that those areas may be distributed equally (for the purpose of repopulating and for the collection of the arrears) between the clerks of the Rao Pandit Pradhan and those of the *sarkar*.

"Until the receipts of the total amount from the *tahsil* of the *mahalats*, half the amount be given to the jagirdar and half to the Marathas, including that realized from the *Kaodana*, etc., when the amount equal to the *jama kamil* of Nizamu'l-Mulk's times is received then the distribution will be shared equally between the *sarkar*, *suraj* and the jagirdar. If the amount received by the *Sarkar* is in excess or less, it will be adjusted."

III. "Ordered that the case of Holkara of Pargana Nilanga be disposed off according to the official papers in the office of Ganghadhar Bhat. If any amount received in excess to be returned back."

IV. "Settlement to be made regarding the amounts of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* from the *mahalat* of Narsi which was under the administration of Fazil Beg Khan (late)."

V. "Though at the time of the submission of the petition the amount demanded was Rs 5,30,000 from late Fazil Beg Khan, later on an amount of Rs 20,000 was paid as per the decision of Hari Pandit." "Ordered that if Balaji Pandit gives a petition, necessary action will be taken in this regard.

VI. Collection of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* for the current year extends to the next year. It was ordered to collect the due amount at every season (*fasal*) and arrears should not be allowed."

VII. "In 1185 F. *mahalats* of Pattan, etc., were transferred from the possession of Rao Pandit Pradhan to the *sarkar* (Nizam); but decision about the collection of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* from these places for 1185 F. (1785-86) has not yet been made."

"Ordered to find out whether the amount of Maratha levies (*raqam-e-suraj*) due from Pattan is with the *gumashtadarans* of the Pandit or with the *amils* (of the Nizam). Any excess or deficiency in the amount would be adjusted."

VIII. "Ordered to send papers regarding the Adoni case to Nawab Azimud-daula for settlement."

DOCUMENT IV

"Translation of the *Sanad of Iqrar Nama* (Agreement-Bond) with the seal of

Fateh Singh³ in Hindi regarding the stipulated (*bilmuqta*) amount of *chauth*, etc. for 1158 F. (1749-50) for the Zilla Karnatak, as detailed below":

Rs 7,25,000

Arcot Mahal	Qhamar Nagar
Sewal (Batul) <i>Sarkar-e Aali</i>	Rs 70,000
Rs 3 lakhs	
(to be given every year from the treasury)	
Cuddapa (<i>Karpah</i>)	Adoni
Rs 1,20,000	Rs 1,25,000
Sera	
Rs 1,20,000	
6 Mahals	
Sera, Balapur, Hawaskota	
Kothar Beem Koti	

"Total Rs 7,25,000 from the *mahalat* mentioned above, to be given from the *Sarkar's* treasury. Arrears of the previous year is claimed. For its claim instructions be issued that the *ta'aluqdars* (collectors) of every place be advised to remit to Mahadeo Rao. If the arrears are not received within four months then this amount should be given to us from the *sarkar* and in lieu of this, the *mahalats* mentioned may be taken over by the *sarkar*."

"Mahadev Janoji Jaswant Nimbalkar who is mediating in this case will collect money from the treasury and remit us (to the Marathas)."

"Whatever the *kamajshdars* have collected, will be deducted from the total amount."

"Next year, the *ta'aluqdars* of every place; except that of Arcot will be liable for punishment" (if they fail to remit the amount of the Maratha levies). And from Arcot which is mahal of *Sarkar-e-Aali* (*khalsa*), the amount will be collected as agreed upon and no deviation will be made on the side of the Marathas. Attention of *Bandeagan-e-Aali* (Nasir Jung) is necessary to whatever has been agreed."

"An amount of rupees one lakh has been fixed towards *kaodana* (grass and grain for horses) as the responsibility of the zamindars. Since this amount has not been paid for the last two years necessary orders be issued in this regard also for payment."

"Amount towards present (*tawazo*) to Raja Sahu, has not been received from the zamindars. Orders may be issued for payment."

"This has been written on Jamdi'ussani 1158H (1745) in accordance with the agreement."

SOURCE: Doc. No. C401, S.A.H.

³Fateh Singh was Maratha chief responsible for the collection of the Maratha levies in the Karnatak. See *f.n.* 50 (last para) *supra*.

DOCUMENT V

Statement of estimated amount of *babti*, *sahotra*, and *sardeshmukhi* payable to the Rao Pandit Pradhan from the *subah* of Khujistabunyah (Aurangabad).

Rs 1,27,84,121/9	— total <i>kamil</i>
Rs 2,49,216/10/9	— towards Rao Pandit Pradhan
Rs 70,82,725/9	— total
Rs 9,33,508/14/3	— deducted due to the wrong entry by Mahpat Ram
P. Kandapur	P. Jalnapur
Rs 3,90,964—	including <i>mamladaran</i>
<i>mamladaran</i>	without <i>mamladaran</i>
Rs 3,48,093	Rs 43,671/3/9
P. Antar	P. Ellora
Rs 3,34,379/2/6	Rs 50,159/1/3
(with <i>mamladaran</i>)	(without <i>mamladaran</i>)
Balance Rs 66,34,904/14/3	<i>kamil</i>
Old <i>mahalat</i>	<i>mahalat</i> of Holkar, etc.
Rs 57,01,396/3/6	(confiscated by the <i>sarkar</i>)
<i>jagirdars</i>	Rs 9,33,508/14
Rs 34,75,677/1	
<i>khalisa</i>	
Rs 40,72,000/2/6	
Rs 9,72,070/11/3	<i>kamil</i> without Chauth, etc.
<i>Sair</i> , etc.	Darul Zarab
<i>Subah</i> Khujistabunyah	(Mint)
Rs 4,35,989/15/3	Rs 15,432/—/3
<i>Sair</i> Daulatabad	villages of Pargana
Rs 6,690/7/—	Kandapur (<i>Mahal</i> Holkar)
P. Ellora, <i>Mahal</i> Holkar	Rs 43,671/3/9
Rs 50,159/1/3	P. Akni, <i>Mahal</i> Holkar
P. Karin (need verification)	Rs 3,34,379/2/6
Rs 1,943/3/6	Villages <i>waqf</i> (endowed) for
Rs 56,62,834/6 <i>Kamil</i>	Raoza Munnavar
Rs 19,23,588/8/9	Rs 83,805/9
<i>Mahalat</i> and <i>Srisad</i> , etc.	fixed amount of <i>chauth</i> ,
Rs 50,27,695/13/6	<i>Sardeshmukhi</i> , etc.
<i>kamil</i>	<i>Bilmuqta</i> P. Bir
(P. = Pargana)	Rs 6,35,138/5/6
	<i>kamil</i>

Chauth and Sardeshmukhi System in the Mughal Provinces of Deccan

Rs 27,89,523/8/8 different accounts fixed amount *bilmuqta*
Rs 1,34,055

Fixed estimated amount including *sth-bandt* expenses.

Rs 9,72,894/2/3

Estimated amount *bilmuqta*
Rs 17,89,523/8/8 *kamil* Rs 1,34,055

Amount fixed as per the verification and details below:

Rs 8,38,839/2/3

Rs 4,47,380/14 *kamil* Rs 4,47,380/14 *kamil*

Rs 3,35,535/10/6 Rs 4,47,380/14/6

Rs 4,47,380/6/— fixed *charrum*

kamil

Rs 1,67,767/13/3 Rs 1,11,845/3/6

SOURCE: Document No. 921, R.P.P.

DOCUMENT VI

"Arrears of *chauth*, *babti*, *sahotra* and *sardeshmukhi* of Rao Pandit Pradhan due from the *Mahalat-e-Khalisa*, *subah* Mohammadabad, as per the account papers in Hindi for the period beginning from 1191F to 1191F."

Rs 1,19,371/8/6

Now to be given by the *sarkar*.

Rs 53,090/1/6

P-Haveli Bidar	P. Mannur, <i>Amal</i> Raja
<i>Amal</i> ⁴ Balaji Pandit.	Ishwant Rao and Narayan Rao
Rs 34,724/9/6	Rs 9860
<i>Taraf</i> Mirak P. Odgir, etc.	<i>Mokasa</i> <i>Babti</i> <i>Sardeshmuki</i>
<i>Amal</i> Raja Ishwant Rao	Rs 8918 Rs 1242 Rs 600
Rs 8330/8	
<i>Amal</i> Jadu Rao	<i>Amal</i> Raja Ishwant
from 1193 to	Rao
1195F.	<i>Taraf</i> Lokri (P. Mannur)
Rs 8226/12	<i>Amal</i> Pandhora—1193F
	Rs 103/12 Rs 175
	Rs 66,281/7
Saza war-ul-Mulk Bahadur	From Munnavar Ali Khan
Rs 24409/2	Rs 8765
P. Hayur <i>Amal</i>	P. Odgeer 1197-98F
Sazawar-ul-Mulk	P. Mukat
Rs 6271	Mudkhed
	Rs 6025
	P. Ardhapur
	Rs 2740

⁴*Amal* implies administration of.

Mokasa	Babti	Sardeshmukhi	Half-babti	Mokasa and babti	Mokasa	Babti
				1197 and 1198F		
Rs 5270	Rs 126	Rs 5818/8	2887/14	Rs 3875	1075	Rs 900
Sardeshmukhi	Half-babti	Half-	Sardeshmukhi	Sardeshmukhi		
Rs 5818/8	and	mokasa				
	Half-mokasa					
	Rs 1059	Rs 2990/12	Rs 2150	Rs 765		
		P. Orad	P. Parwapur			
		Amal Anta Pandit				
		Rs 900	Rs 5082			
		Babti	Sahotra			
		1196-98F	1198F			
		Amal Mangha				
		Rao				
		Rs 3607	Rs 1150			
		Mokasa				
		(Maoza Kam-khed				
		—1198F)				
		Rs 325				
From Mahd. Hussain Khan Bahadur		From Raja Shankar Rao				
		Bahadur				
Four Mahals. P. Makthal, Kadichor,						
		Rs 4784/13				
Amarchanta and Dudiya.						
		Maoza Sirpur, etc.	Taraf Narkarkura			
Mokasa and Babti—1198F.		P. Endur				
Rs 11000/—						
		Rs 1585/10	Rs 1333/9			
Mokasa	Babti 1198F	Babti	Sahotra			
			1198F			
Rs 770	Rs 740/10	Rs 726/1	Rs 45			
Sahotra	Sardeshmukhi 1198F					
Rs 75		Rs 562				
Taraf Jolakunta	Qabza Bisaka					
P. Bhasar						
Rs 180/10		Rs 1685				
Mokasa	Sardeshmukhi	Mokasa	Sardesh-			
1198F	1197-98F	1192-93F	mukhi			
			1191-93F			
Rs 63/12	Rs 116/14	Rs 700	Rs 985			

From Alkaji (Naib-deputy P. Otkur (Uroof Tokapalli) Rs 15462/8 Mokasa and Babti 1198F	From Azam Beg Khan— P. Thamseri Rs 1860 Sardeshmukhi 1191-98F Rs 1462/8
Rs 1400 paid by the sarkar— Enhanced (eezaf) Rs 12968/12	Rs 1131/4

SOURCE : Document No. 94, R.P.P.

DOCUMENT VII

Details of the amount of *Chauth*, *Babti* and *Sardeshmukhi* from the Parganas Kandapur, Jalnapur and Byzapur (*Subah* Aurangabad) for the year 1185F (1775-76).

I. Pargana Kandapur

A) Mal	Rs 144559/8
Less due to the poor conditions of the ryot	Rs 5000
	Rs 139559/8
	Rs 4661/8
	Rs 134888/—/3
Fixed	Rs 48223/11
Sardeshmukhi	
Rs 17209/7	
Maoza (village) 129	
Rs 144519/8	
Less <i>Rusum zamindars</i>	Rs 1,12280/12
Patti Aisi ⁵ from Sardeshmukhi	Rs 1013
Rs 109267/12	
Rs 39089/2	
Chauth and Babti	
Rs 31114/4	
Maoza — 29	
Rs 23215/4	
Less Rs 3299	
Sarkar/Sardeshmukhi/Chauth	
Rs 1048 1687 564	
Rs 577/4	
Less <i>Rusum of Zamindars</i>	
Rs 19318/2	
Rs 7870/9	
Sardeshmukhi	Chauth and Babti
one-ninth share	Sardeshmukhi Chauth and Babti
(Nahum Hissa)	(one-ninth share)
Rs 98904	Rs 2146/8
	Rs 5724/1

⁵Patti means occasional or extra import or cess. *Wilson's Glossary*, p. 655.

Rs 12362/15		Chauth	Rs 24726/3	
Patti Aisi from			Patti of Nine villages	
Sardeshmukhi			Rs 2251	
Rs 1013			Sardeshmukhi Chauth	
			Rs 1687/— Rs 564/—	
B. Siwai			Rs 5550/15	
Rs 17254/8		Sardeshmukhi	Chauth and balti	
		Rs 1222/8	Rs 4323/7	
			Rs 9323/7	
Chauth and balti			Rs 3376/11	
Rs 8232/4				
Rs 2144/4				
Rs 8222/4		Villages	129 villages 29 villages	
		Rs 1424/12		
Havaldari ⁸		Fatodari ⁷	Rs 4747 Rs 10618	
Rs 6997/4		Rs 525 fixed one-third	Rs 787/— less Rs 154 less	
		portion	arms arms	
			Rs 3960 Rs 264/7	
Maseleh ⁸		Patti	Rs 2088/12 Kao Patta Kao	
Rs 700/—			Rs 1119/4 264/12	
Rs 1424/12		Inam ⁹ Arnaku ¹⁰ Inam Arnaku	Rs 2088/12 Rs 502 Rs 30 Rs 1060	
Rs 3799/8		fixed Rs 230	Rs 300	
Rs 1699/6		Rs 1320		
		Sardesh- Chauth and Sardesh- Chauth and		
		mukhi Balti mukhi Balti		
		Rs 440/8 Rs 880 Rs 265 Rs 99/8		
Rs 2,10,571/12				
Less Nazr to the sarkar Rs 38000				
Rs 1,72,571/12				

⁸Havaldari—the office of tenure of a havaldar—a charge made to the villages for the expenses of subordinate revenue officers sent to watch or to attach the crops. *Wilson's Glossary*, p. 317.

⁷Fatodari—Fotadar—Poddar—a treasurer or cash keeper. Here it implies the tax collected by the Fotadar. *Wilson's Glossary*, p. 249.

⁸Maseleh—implying various materials used in the preparation of anything. Here it means expenses towards the preparations. *Farhaing-e-Anand Raj*, p. 333.

⁹Inam is revenue fee also gift of any thing, *Wilson's Glossary*, p. 338.

¹⁰Rusum of Zamindars—perquisites of the zamindars.

Usual deductions Rs 4640	
Rs 167931/12	
less arms—Rs 931	
Deduct Rusum of zamindars ¹¹ —Rs 4661/12	
Rs 16299/4	
Sardeshmukhi	Chauth and balti
Rs 20439/15	Rs 4724
C. Mal etc.	
Rs 25,425/12	
Deduction due to the poor conditions of the	
Ryots	Rs 5000
Rs 2425/12	
Less nazr on royal appearance Rs 38000	
Rs 162425/12	
Usual deductions Rs 4640	
Rs 157785/12	
less arms	
Rs 971/—	
Rs 1,56,814/12	
Less Rusum of zamindars—Rs 4661/8	
Rs 1,52,153/14	
Rs 3,5774/10	
Sardeshmukhi	Chauth and balti
Rs 18431/10	Rs 3594/11
II. Pargana Jalnapur	
Rs 2,29,241/13	
As per the previous daul	
(account paper)	Increase due to rahdari
Rs 228598/6/9	
less shortage Rs 55286	
Rs 634/12/3	
Chaldu ¹²	Madiya ¹³
Rs 4493/13	Rs 548/13
Karorgiri, etc. ¹⁴	Kotwali, etc. ¹⁵
Rs 11,000	Rs 3243/4
	Kotwali, etc. Sokula ¹⁶
	Rs 2718/15 Rs 524/5

¹¹Arnacu—might be from urmansiyar—implying cess derived from village free land—*Wilson's Glossary*, p. 854.

¹²Chaldu—Chaltu Land in cultivation. *Wilson's Glossary*, p. 154.

¹³Madiya—madi—a rice-field a garden bed—here revenue accruing from such rice-fields. *Wilson's Glossary*, p. 495.

¹⁴A tax collected at the markets *Wilson's Glossary*, p. 467.

¹⁵It implies tax or cess collected by the Kotwal (Chief Police Officer or a superintendent of market). *Wilson's Glossary*, p. 464.

¹⁶Not identifiable.

Rs 1,73,955/13	
Less due to the poor condition of the ryots	Rs 5955/2
Rs 168000/11	
Less nazr on royal appearance Rs 45000/—	
Rs 123000/—	
less sih-bandi to sarkar Rs 800/—	
Rs 122200/11	
fixed Rs 27387/—	
Sardeshmukhi Rs 11125/5	Chauth and balti Rs 13261/11
Mal, etc. Rs 1,53,000	Sair rahdari Rs 20953/13
Less due to the poor conditions of the ryot	Rs 5955/2
	Rs 1,47,046/14
less Nazr on Royal appearance Rs 15000/—	
Rs 102046/14	
Rs 2,2524/4	
Sardeshmukhi (One-ninth share per hundred)	Chauth and Balti Rs 92769/14
Rs 9277	fixed Rs 13247/3
Siwai	
Pargana Kandapur	
	Bhatt ¹⁷ Rs 880
	Mehantana ¹⁸ Rs 3294/12
	fixed Rs 1098/3
Sardeshmukhi Rs 317	Chauth and balti Rs 276/8
	Sardeshmukhi Rs 366
	Chauth and balti Rs 732/13
Sair Rahdari Rs 10,080	
As per the previous daul	increase
Rs 9600	Rs 480
fixed Rs 7389/5	
Sardeshmukhi	Chauth and balti
One-fifth portion	Rs 8072
Rs 2008	fixed Rs 538/15

¹⁷ Bhatt here implies land rent derived from the lands assigned to the Brahmins at a low rate (Aziz Jung: *Azamu'l Atiyat*, Hyderabad 1300 F. 70-72 and *Sityaq-e-Deccan*, 1313 F., Hyderabad, 54.

¹⁸ Commission.

IV. Pargana Byzapur

As per the previous Daul	Rs 48187/15/9	Increased sair
Rs 148105/11/6		Rs 82/4/3
Less due to the poor condition of the ryots Rs 7000		
Rs 141187/15/9		
less nazr on royal appearance Rs 18000/—		
Rs 123187/15/9		
Less rusum of Zamindars Rs 1100		
Rs 121187-15-9		
Less patti Rs 726/4		
Rs 120461-11-6		
fixed Rs 66118/13/9		
Sardeshmukhi Rs 13308/0/3		Chauth and Balti Rs 53810/14
Mal, etc. Rs 1,43,605/11		Sair Rahdari Rs 43586/4/9
less Rs 1000		Sardeshmukhi Chauth and Balti Rs 432/9/7 Rs 43149/11/6
Rs 36605/11		Rs 2308/13
Nazr Rs 18000		
V. Pargana Byzapur		
Rs 118605/11		
Less rusum of zamindars Rs 2000		
Rs 116605/11		
Less forth patti of Jivan Rao		
Deshpandia Rs 726/4		
Rs 115879/7		
fixed Rs 64377/7		
Sardeshmukhi One-ninth share		Chauth and Balti Rs 103004
Rs		fixed receipts Rs 51502
VI. Pargana Dawarbadi		
Rs 39213/2/9		
Less due to the poor condition of the Ryots Rs 700		
Rs 38523/2/9		
Nazr on royal appearance Rs 4811		
Rs 33712/2/9		
Less Kaodana, etc. Rs 700		Abwab Rs 65
Nazr Subedar Rs 1038		
Rs 31919/2/9		

Less <i>rusum</i> of zamindars	Rs 687/5	
	Rs 31231/13/9	
fixed	Rs 9992/14	
<i>Sardeshmukhi</i>		<i>Chauth and Babti</i>
One-ninth share		per hundred Rs 32/8
Rs 3470/2		Rs 6522/12
<i>Mal</i> , etc.		
Rs 39000		
Less due to the poor condition of the ryot	Rs 7991/5	
<i>Maughoo</i> (Stopped)		<i>Nazr</i>
Rs 700		Rs 4811
<i>Patti Kaodana</i> ²⁰		<i>Abwab srideh</i> ²¹
Rs 700		Rs 65
<i>Patti Sar Subah</i> ²¹		<i>Rusum zamindars</i>
Rs 1028		Rs 657/5
	Rs 3109/11	
fixed	Rs 9921/16	
		<i>Sardeshmukhi Chauth and babti</i>
		Rs 3445/7 Rs 6476/8
		<i>Siwai</i>
		Rs
Rs 25785		less Rs 1715/5
less Rs 1445		<i>Rusum zamindars Nazr ser subah</i>
Stopped	<i>Patti kaodana</i>	Rs 687/5 Rs 1018
Rs 700	Rs 700	
<i>Abwab</i>		fixed Rs 2139/12
Rs 65		
		<i>Sardeshmukhi Chauth and babti</i>
		as per the after deducting
		above rates <i>Sardeshmukhi</i>
		Rs 743/4 Rs 396/8
	fixed Rs 7782/3	
<i>Sardeshmukhi</i>		<i>Chauth and babti</i>
one-ninth share		Rs 32/8 per hundred
Rs 2702/3		Rs 21617/93
		fixed Rs 5080
<i>Rahdari</i>		
fixed	Rs 222/2/9	
	Rs 70/15	

¹⁹ *Abwab Sarwan*—Monthly or yearly balance of the imposed.

²⁰ Cess of *Kaodana*.

²¹ Cess of the *subhedar*.

²² Taxes of the village.

	<i>Sardeshmukhi</i>	<i>Chauth and babti</i>
Fixed	Rs 24/11	Rs 187/7/9
		fixed Rs 46/4
<i>VII. Pargana Sandwari</i>		
less due to the poor condition of the ryot	Rs 244/7/3	
	Rs 12975/9	
less <i>nazr</i> on royal appearance	Rs 2500	
	Rs 9875/9	
Less <i>rusum</i> zamindars	Rs 259/2/9	
	Rs 9615/14	
	fixed Rs 3059/6/3	
	<i>Sardeshmukhi</i>	<i>Chauth and babti</i>
	Rs 873/14/6	Rs 2185/7/9
	<i>Mal</i>	<i>Rahdari</i>
	Rs 12244/7/7	Rs 119/8
Less stopped	Rs 244/7/3	Rs 37/10
Rs 12000/—/4		<i>Sardeshmukhi Chauth and babti</i>
		Rs 10/5/6 Rs 109/2/9
<i>Nazr</i> on royal appearance	Rs 12500	Rs 27/4/9
Rs 9755/8/9		
<i>Rusum</i> zamindars	Rs 259/2/9	
Rs 9496/6		
	Rs 6021-12-3	
<i>Sardeshmukhi</i>		<i>Chauth and babti after deducting</i>
Rs 863/9		<i>Sardeshmukhi</i>
SOURCE: Doc. No. 85/7, R.P.P.		Rs 2158/3/7

DOCUMENT VIII

Qabuliyat (Deed of acceptance) with the seal of Khwaja Inayatullah Khan *Diwan-e-Badshahi*, *subah* Hyderabad, dated 29 Safar 1173 H (Oct. 1759), that I myself agree to take the contract (*ta'ahud*) for the collection of the share of the sarkar and *chauth*, amounting to Rs 2658/11—from the villages of pargana Pattanchura etc. *subah* Hyderabad which is the *jagir mashrut Diwani*²³ of mine. I take the responsibility of depositing the said amount in the treasury of the sarkar. Orders for the issuance of a *Sanad* of *Ijara* for the year 1169F (1760-61) may be issued.

Rs 11276-6 (*kamil*)

²³ *Jagir Mashrut Diwani*—conditional assignment for the remuneration of the fiscal duties as a *Diwan*. Aziz Jung: *Azamul Atiyat*, pp. 36, 102; *Wilson's Glossary*, p. 577.

Share of the sarkar Rs 2518/11		<i>Jagir Mashrut Diwani Subah</i> Rs 8757/11	
From <i>Maoza</i> Aminpur	From <i>maoza</i> Kangra Buzurg	From <i>maoza</i> Aminpur	from Pargana <i>haveli</i> Hydera- bad
P. Pattancheru	P. <i>Haveli</i> Hyderabad Rs 5938/12	P. Pattancheru Rs 12260/12	Rs 3843/13
Tarkapalli Rs 2770		Kangra Buzurg Rs 1498	
Deduct share of the sarkar	Rs 1498/12/3		
Deduct share of the sarkar	Rs 1019/4/9		
Fixed <i>ta'ahud</i> for the whole year	Rs 2658/11		
Original (<i>Asl</i>) Rs 2408/11		Increase (<i>Izafa</i>) Rs 250	
From Pargana Pattancheru and <i>maoza</i> Aminpur			
Share of the sarkar Rs 1019/14/9		<i>Jagir Mashrut</i> Rs 4918/13/3	
Fixed <i>ta'ahud</i> <i>Asl</i> Rs 1493/3	Rs 1763/3	<i>Izafa</i> Rs 250	
Sarkar's share Rs 1019/14/9 (<i>Kamil</i>)		<i>Chauth Jagir Mashrut</i> Rs 4918/13/3	
Fixed <i>ta'ahud</i> Rs 493/3		(fixed according to the investi- gations of Venkat Kishna Desh- mukh) Rs 1250	
From pargana <i>haveli</i> Hyderabad Rs 5342/10			
Rs 5942/10 (<i>kamil</i>)			
Sarkar's share Rs 1498/12/3		<i>Jagir Mashrut</i> Rs 3843/13/3	
Fixed amount of <i>ta'ahud</i> as per the previous, Rs 915/8			
Sarkar's share Rs 1498/12/3 (<i>kamil</i>)		<i>Chauth jagir Mashrut</i> Diwani Rs 3843/13/3 (<i>Kamil</i>)	
Fixed <i>ta'ahud</i> Rs 600		fixed <i>Chauth</i> Rs 315/8	

SOURCE: Document No. C/101, Omalan, S.A.H.

Price-making and Market Hierarchy in Early Medieval South India

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Historical scholarship on trade in ancient India has attempted to identify the place of commerce within a society which was primarily not trade oriented. But even in such an agrarian society, trade seems to arise naturally as a result of the geographic dispersal of the products of the soil, due to their different requirements of temperature, humidity, soil quality, etc. For example, wet rice agriculture is confined to areas meeting the requirements for its growth, areas with large amounts of water readily available, while areas with little water adapted their agriculture to accommodate their habitat. Only certain areas of the Indian subcontinent produced spices, pepper for example, necessitating trade to articulate their distribution to non-producing areas.¹ Similarly, areca-nut, an item seemingly used throughout the subcontinent even in early times, was the product of a palm tree that required a specific habitat.² Thus, although ancient Indian society was essentially agrarian, historical sources present evidence that within this society trade flourished.

Among the available sources stone and copper plate inscriptions have proved invaluable in the reconstruction of India's historical past. Inscriptions from south Indian temples, for example, record not only gifts to a temple, usually land or money, but also interaction between the temple and its community. Though temple inscriptions were primarily religious documents emphasizing actions which affected the temple itself—events which were often reported using a good deal of culturally symbolic vocabulary—by the analysis of key words and phrases, both political and economic activities as well as degrees of social interaction, though ill-reported, may be established. This essay, as with other scholarship which is based on these incomplete and fragmentary sources, is necessarily speculative. While recognizing that the sources impose limitations, we have formed certain impressions of the data and intend to suggest ways, using the available inscriptional records, in which early Indian

¹For a brief summary of commerce in early India see A.L. Basham, *The Wonder That Was India*, New York, 1959, pp. 215-31.

²Areca-nuts are a product of a type of palm, which grows best in areas which are not subject to heavy rainfall. See Sir George Watt, *The Industrial Products of India*, London, 1908, pp. 86, 920.

trade and the market centres which came to dominate it may be examined.

This essay is based on the author's examination of Tamil inscriptions dating to Cōla times (A.D. 850-1279), the golden age of early medieval south Indian civilization. An important feature of south India's political landscape during this period was administratively autonomous village and regional assemblies known as *ūr*, *nāḍu*, *brahmadāya*, and *nagaram*, which had remained stable despite the rise and fall of several imperial dynasties. This study focuses on the assembly of regional commercial centres, known as *nagaram*, and this institution's administrative and marketing functions. By examining the position of trade and traders within south Indian society this study proposes that commerce was institutionalized to mitigate its more harmful effects. An analysis of the distribution of *nagaram* suggests that there was a maximum of one *nagaram* in each traditional unit of regional administration (*nāḍu*), and that this was intended to contain the commercial penetration of foreign merchants within the region's designated market, usually a *nagaram*.

By the late twelfth century international traders considered Coromandel coast emporia among their regular ports of call. The nature of the commodities these traders acquired in south Indian ports—pearls, areca-nuts, spices, and cotton products³—required a regular, ongoing relationship with the hinterland to allow locally produced goods to reach the coastal centres of international exchange.⁴ Various stone and copper plate inscriptions dating to Cōla times suggest that there was considerable commercial activity in the south Indian hinterland and that well-organized trade networks supplied the commodities demanded by the foreign traders.

THE SETTING

Local commercial centres provided the setting for the exchange of goods and services in the Cōla domain. Such centres had streets of permanent shops (*aṅgāḍi*) where exchanges were continuously transacted.⁵ *Kaḍai* are distinguished as being a different sort of commercial area which are probably best characterized as "bazaar." In one such bazaar street (*kaḍaitteru*) those from

³See F. Hirth and W.W. Rockhill, *Chau Ju-kua: His Work on the Chinese and Arab Trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries entitled Chu-fan chi*, St. Petersburg, 1911, p. 96.

⁴Although pearls were available along the south Indian coastal region, areca-nuts and cotton were definitely not agricultural products of the delta regions adjacent to the major ports. For the distribution of cotton production in southern India see *Economic Atlas of Madras State*, New Delhi, 1962, p. 52. On the growth of areca-nuts see Watt, *op. cit.*

⁵See, for example, *Annual Report on Epigraphy*, Archaeological Survey of India (henceforth cited by sequence number alone), 40 of 1895 (*South Indian Inscriptions*—henceforth SII—5, 597), where the *nagaram* at Tillaisthānam, Tañjāvūr, collected the *aṅgāḍikkālī* (a tax on shops) in that town's shop district. As per convention of the Archaeological Survey of India references to all inscriptions are by the modern village and district of the inscription's source.

outside the community were said to have offered paddy, rice and other commodities which were sold by measuring, articles which were placed on the ground and sold, heaps of commodities which were sold by weight, and other goods which were sold from baskets.⁶ Another feature of local commerce was the fair (*tāvaḷam*). Local inscriptions indicate that market centres held periodic fairs which convened in another area of the community. Uttaramēṇṇūr, Chingleput, for instance, held a periodic cattle market⁷ while Jambai, South Arcot, was the scene of a weekly fair.⁸ A thirteenth-century inscription notes that in one community which held a fair each Tuesday, "whatever official exacts tolls, firewood, grain . . . ornaments and clothes, or commissions on sales, has transgressed the order of the king . . .,"⁹ providing a clue to the variety of commodities exchanged at such a fair.

In the various inscriptions we have examined, it is our impression that within these early medieval south Indian markets the prices of standard commodities were set and were not allowed to undergo the fluctuations one encounters in a modern "price-making" market of free exchange economies.¹⁰

⁶321 of 1910 (SII, 3, 90).

⁷74 of 1898 (SII, 6, 359).

⁸440 of 1937-38.

⁹*Epigraphia Carnatica*, 5, Arkalgud 21 (A.D. 1274).

¹⁰The work of Karl Polanyi and other modern anthropologists has indicated a difference between modern "price-making" markets and the markets of the ancient world. Ancient markets were of two types: "primitive" and "administered" (see Karl Polanyi, "The Economy as Instituted Process," in Karl Polanyi *et al.*, *Trade and Market in the Early Empires*, Glencoe, 1957, pp. 243-270). In Polanyi's model, primitive markets were governed by social gift exchanges in which there was no sense of profit. One person exchanged goods with a neighbour according to certain standards of local tradition; another reciprocated in fear of losing dignity. If one individual cultivated grain and another raised livestock, these two would exchange grain for livestock within the context of the local social system of which they were both members. Such reciprocity sustained the local community. As Marshall Sahlins has expressed it: "bargaining was done with strangers" (Marshall Sahlins, "On the Sociology of Primitive Exchange," in Marshall Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics*, Chicago, 1972, pp. 185-275). In what he labels the "generalized reciprocity of primitive exchange," there was not an effort to establish values within a local community. Similar goods moved against each other in different proportions as an exchange of "gifts." It was only as one moved outward, from "gift" exchanges of equals to those between different "communities," that one encountered haggling and bargaining. That is, theories of value came from external spheres of transactions. Yet external exchange was also institutionalized by recognizing that this was a discrete relationship between "communities" on a less personal basis.

Exchanges with external communities within the context of an "administered market" were recognized by Polanyi as being closely connected to and regulated by government intervention. Here the representatives of two or more distinct social groups exchanged goods. One was recognized as being the local cultural unit, the others were visitors or "guests" who had come to exchange external commodities for local goods. The local government imposed its jurisdiction over these transactions, establishing rules for exchange, setting standards for weight and measure, and in some instances negotiating the price given to the commodities exchanged.

For instance, as suggested in an inscription from Cidambaram which dates to the reign of Rājendra I (A.D. 1012-1044), there was a standard local price index on certain commodities¹¹:

one measure of pepper=5 *nāli* of paddy (*padl*) and 5 *ūri* of āli (a spice)
(2 *ūri*=1 *nāli*)
5 *pala* of puli (tamarind)=4 *nāli* of paddy
5 sticks of *mañjal* (turmeric)=5 *ūri* of paddy
one *ūri* of ghee=5 *kurunl* of paddy (8 *nāli*=1 *kurunl*)
one full measure (*ūr.*) of curds=3 *kurunl* of paddy
2 1/2 . . of betel leaf and 100 areca-nuts=5 *nāli* of broken paddy
one bundle of firewood=3 *kurunl* and 4 *nāli* of paddy
one *ūri* and one *ālakku* of oil (4 *ālakku*=1 *ūri*) =5 *kurunl* of paddy¹²

This inscription also notes that the yearly cost of supplying a temple cook with cloth amounted to eight *kalam* of paddy (1 *kalam*=12 *kurunl*).

One faces the problem of how to treat such inscribed price indexes. Were they merely lists of exchange values set for a normative purpose, as for example duties or taxes (the means of payment of a tax, the ratio for computing a tax, or a basis for wealth and estate evaluation) or contributions to temples? An inscription from Tanjāvūr is of interest because it provides evidence that often such inscribed prices did relate to actual market place transactions during the Cōla age and may well relate closely to actual market prices.

In this inscription dating to the reign of Rājārāja I (A.D. 985-1016), when the Rājārājēśvaram temple reassigned a large grant of gold and livestock it required that the shepherds receiving gold and cows were to exchange these for ewes in the local market place, i.e., they were to negotiate these exchanges at the prevailing rates of market exchange. The local cash standard for ewes, as reported in the inscription, was three ewes per *kāśu* gold, although ewes of less quality appear to have been purchased at the rate of four ewes per *kāśu*. In barter exchanges one cow sold for two ewes, one she-buffalo sold for six ewes, one heifer sold for one ewe, as did one calf.¹³ The donations, redis-

¹¹See K. A. Nilakanta Shastri, *The Colas*, Madras, 1955, p. 624, for a table of Cōla weights and measures.

¹²118 of 1888 (SII, 4, 228). One of the best examples of the stability of local market rates is a series of inscriptions from Alāṅgaḍi, Chingleput, where the price of one *nāli* of ghee remained at 1/3 *kalam* of paddy for a period of 31 years. See 506 (A.D. 1094), 518 (A.D. 1116), 515 (A.D. 1117), and 512 (A.D. 1125) of 1920.

¹³SII, 2, 95, as discussed in George W. Spencer, "Temple Money-Lending and Livestock Redistribution in Early Tanjore," *The Indian Economic and Social History Review*, V, No. 3, 1963, p. 284. Spencer suggests that these prices were determined by the milk output of each of the animals, as one she-buffalo's output was equal to that of three cows or six ewes (p. 281). It is of interest, with this scale in mind, that the temple preferred to receive ghee from ewes as indicated by its pattern of investment.

tributions, and exchanges may be represented as follows:

DONATIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS OF EWES IN TANJAVUR INSCRIPTION 95

Commodity and local rate of exchange	Ewes directly assigned by temple*	Ewes purchased by the assignees using assigned money or cows
<i>Money</i> (3 ewes/ <i>kāśu</i>)		
Total Donation	594 <i>kāśu</i>	
Assignment	128 <i>kāśu</i> ** =	384 (approx.)
Difference	466 <i>kāśu</i> =	1398 (approx.)
<i>Cows</i> (2 ewes/cow)		
Total Donation	1620	
Assignment	1248*** =	2496 (approx.)
Difference	372 =	744 (approx.)
<i>She-Buffalo</i> (6 ewes/buffalo)		
Total Donation	40	
Assignment	0	0
	40 =	240 (approx.)
Approximate Total of Ewes Purchased	2392 (approx.)	2880 (approx.)
<i>Ewes</i>		
Total Donation	2563	2563
Assignment	4896	4896
Approximate Total of Ewes Purchased in the Market By Those Assigned Money or Cows	2880	
Approximate Total of Ewes Reassigned as a Result of Grant	7,776	

*Including those purchased by the temple in money, cows, or buffalo.

**Assigned to shepherds with the stipulation that the money be used to purchase ewes.

***To be immediately exchanged for ewes.¹⁴

The fact that our estimates, using the market standards quoted in the inscription, and the actual total are so close would indicate that the market standards noted in the inscription were, indeed, the actual local price index.¹⁵

¹⁴This table is based on Spencer, p. 283.

¹⁵One would expect that the difference between the number of ewes the temple was capable of assigning and the number it did in fact directly assign (a difference of 59 ewes) reflected the temple's policy of retaining part of a gold endowment for its temple treasury.

This analysis may be duplicated in other inscriptions, and allows us to suggest that many prices quoted in the inscriptions of the Cōla age did, in reality, closely conform to the prices in the market places of the communities where the records were inscribed.¹⁶

It is significant that most of the price lists we have examined fix the prices of the various commodities in paddy and not in cash,¹⁷ attesting that rice was the standard of value, and perhaps also the medium of exchange in small transactions within the local market. Another inscription from the Tañjāvūr temple complex indicates that only precious articles, the staples of long distance trade such as cardamom seeds, champaka buds, khaskhas roots, and camphor (all aromatics used in temple ceremonies) were given a cash value, while prices for standard market commodities like pepper, ghee, and areca nuts were stated in paddy equivalents:

COMMODITIES AND PRICES IN TANJAVUR INSCRIPTION 27

Commodity	Quantity	Price
cardamom seeds	1 <i>kuṇṇi</i> and 4 <i>nāli</i>	1 <i>kāṣu</i> of gold
champaka buds	1 <i>padakku</i>	1 <i>kāṣu</i> of gold
khaskhas roots	605 <i>palam</i>	1 <i>kāṣu</i> of gold
dhal	1 <i>nāli</i> , 3 <i>ulakku</i> , and 1 <i>ālakku</i>	5 <i>nāli</i> , 1 <i>ūṇi</i> , and 1 <i>ālakku</i> of paddy
pepper	1 <i>ālakku</i> and 1 3/4 <i>cevidu</i>	5 <i>nāli</i> and 1 <i>ulakku</i> paddy
mustard	1 <i>ālakku</i> and 1 <i>cevidu</i>	2 <i>nāli</i> and 1 <i>ulakku</i> paddy
cumin	15/16 <i>cevidu</i>	1 <i>nāli</i>
sugar	3 <i>palam</i>	1 1/2 <i>kāṣu</i> of gold
ghee	1 <i>ulakku</i> , 1 <i>ālakku</i> , and 3 3/4 <i>cevidu</i>	1 <i>kuṇṇi</i> and 1 <i>nāli</i> paddy
tamarind	1 <i>palam</i>	1 <i>nāli</i> of paddy
curds	3 <i>nāli</i>	1 <i>kuṇṇi</i> , 1 <i>nāli</i> of paddy
gram	3 <i>cevidu</i>	1 <i>ulakku</i> of paddy
plantains	18	5 <i>nāli</i> of paddy
salt	1 <i>ulakku</i> and 1 <i>ālakku</i>	1 <i>ulakku</i> and 1 <i>ālakku</i> paddy
tender leaves	12	2 <i>nāli</i> of paddy
areca-nuts and betel leaves	30	
camphor	60	4 <i>nāli</i> and 1 <i>ulakku</i> paddy
	3 <i>kaḷañju</i>	1 <i>kāṣu</i> of gold ¹⁸

¹⁶We have used the inscriptional data noted in this section with extreme caution, guarding that values of exchange quoted in the inscriptions were not, in fact, exchange values set for normative purposes.

¹⁷See 175 of 1915, 273 of 1910, 91 of 1892, 263 of 1912, and 249 of 1910, which quote local market standards for various commodities such as oil, ghee, salt, sugar, areca-nuts, etc., and equate each commodity to an appropriate quantity of paddy.

¹⁸SII, 2, 27, Rājārāja I, 29th year.

An inscription dated A.D. 1012 from the marketing centre of Mummudičōlapuram (Kālahasti, Chittoor) states the exchange rate for ghee in gold equivalent, with nine *kuṇṇi* of ghee equal to one *kaḷañju* of gold and fifteen *kalam* of ghee equal to twenty *kaḷañju*,¹⁹ but records the price of curds in paddy (one and one-half *nāli* of curds purchased one *nāli* of paddy) and concludes with the note that seven *kalam* of paddy sold for one *kaḷañju* of gold.²⁰ The reason for the two systems of pricing, i.e., in gold and in paddy, may be indicated in the previously noted inscription from Tirumeynanam, Tañjāvūr, in which the inscription seems to state that gold was realized from the sale of paddy and rice, but that gold was the unit of exchange for other commodities is not specifically stipulated.²¹ This inscription, the Tañjāvūr inscription, and the Mummudičōlapuram inscription suggest that surplus rice was brought into the market place where it was sold for cash, the cash then being used to purchase either non-agrarian or luxury goods, or to be exchanged for other agricultural commodities.²²

One is particularly impressed by the seeming uniformity throughout the Cōla heartland of the rice standard. A survey of inscriptions dating to the eleventh century reveals that one *kaḷañju* of gold was equal to sixteen *kalam* of paddy measured by the Rājākēsari standard at Tirumukkūḍal, Chingleput,²³ seventeen *kalam* at Cidambaram,²⁴ sixteen *kalam* at Tiruppugalūr, Tañjāvūr,²⁵ and fifteen *kalam* at Paṇḍāravāḍai, Tañjāvūr.²⁶ Some fluctuations of the rate may be seen in more remote areas, as at Kālahasti, Chittoor in 1012 when only seven *kalam* of paddy could be exchanged for one *kaḷañju* of gold.²⁷ The reason for this discrepancy is not evident. One can only speculate that there may have been a local difference in the unit of measure or that less rice was cul-

¹⁹See also 146 of 1912 (Tiruvorriyūr, Chingleput) where an inscription dated 1038 states that 50 *nāli* of ghee cost one *kaḷañju* of gold.

²⁰229 of 1904 (SII, 17, 328).

²¹321 of 1910 (SII, 3, 90). A tax of one *nāli* of paddy was charged on each *kāṣu* realized from paddy sales.

²²This situation may be contrasted to that in Mughal times as described by Irfan Habib in his book *The Agrarian System of Mughal India* (London, 1963), in which the Mughal government's requirement that taxes be paid in cash and not in kind forced farmers to sell part of their crop in the city for cash, which then went to the government's tax collectors and was not used to purchase goods produced in the city. The Indian countryside, Habib argues, received nothing from the commercial centres in return for the various provisions the hinterland provided. Such a system of exploitation was not the case in early medieval south India as there is considerable evidence that the agricultural community was not exploited but benefited from the activities of commercial centres.

²³182 of 1915, Virarājendra.

²⁴118 of 1888 (SII, 4, 223), Rājendra I.

²⁵68 of 1928, Rājārāja I.

²⁶232 of 1923, Rājākēsari-varman.

²⁷299 of 1904 (SII, 17, 328).

tivated in the Kālahasti area, hence its higher price.²⁸ Inscriptions suggest that the supply of gold may have contributed to such a price variance, although it is likely that the price of rice was more subject to fluctuation and gold offered a more stable exchange standard. In two inscriptions from Tirumukkūdal, Chingleput, one states that in 1015 one *kaḷaṇḍu* bought thirteen and one-third *kalam* of paddy²⁹ while the second records that in Virarājendra's reign (1063-1069) the same amount of gold purchased sixteen *kalam* of paddy.³⁰ At the end of Kulōttuṅga I's reign in the early twelfth century thirteen *kalam* of paddy sold for only one *kāṣu* (two *kāṣu* equated to one *kaḷaṇḍu*) in the Tañjāvūr area.³¹

Since the inscriptions give the distinct impression that local prices were not subject to significant fluctuations, one must ask how these rates were established and if, as seems the case, they were closely supervised—if these prices were fixed by local merchant groups or whether prices were set via negotiation among local institutions which held administrative jurisdiction over a market. For instance, an inscription from Arakaṇḍanallūr, South Arcot, suggests that local markets were governed by a set of laws.³² This inscription reports that due to a period of famine local residents had sold their local house sites and had gone off to other places. As a result the community's assembly redistributed twenty-five shares in the village to new persons on the condition that no sale or barter of local production to outsiders was permissible. If anyone was found to have broken this rule he was said to be subject to a fine of sixty-four *kaḷaṇḍu* of gold and in addition lost his local

²⁸Cōla inscriptions record standards of measure which were named in honour of Cōla kings, as the *Rājarāja-kāṣu-niraiḷ* which was the standard for testing the weight of gold at Tiruvārūr near Nāgapaṭṭinam in Rājendra I's reign (680 of 1919), the *Parakēsarikaḷ* standard for testing gold in various areas of the Cōla domain in the same reign (190 of 1920), and the liquid measure *Rājakṣari* (149 of 1942-43). One inscription recording the testing process included the statement that gold had the proper impress and weight, suggesting that a seal or stamp was applied—possibly the tiger impress which is found on Cōla copper plates and which was also said to have been given goods passing through Cōla ports—which guaranteed the quality of the gold (*loc. cit.*). The importance of establishing a legal unit of measure is shown in an inscription from Rājārāja I's reign when as a result of measuring paddy by the *Vidaividāṅga* instead of the *Rājakṣari* standard a surplus remained (21 of 1922; see *Colas*, pp. 613-27, for a discussion of Cōla weights and measures). By establishing the value of goods by a legal standard of measure it would have been easier for merchants to determine a fair price in trade negotiations and was probably a critical factor in trade negotiations between local and itinerant merchants.

²⁹176 of 1915.

³⁰182 of 1915.

³¹44 of 1891 (SII, 4, 445). An inscription from Tiruppanandāl, Tañjāvūr (46 of 1914) informs us of the standards of metal equivalence: one *kaḷaṇḍu* of gold was said equal to two *kāṣu*; bronze sold at 35 *palam* per *kāṣu*, 30 *palam* of copper equated to one *kāṣu*, 26 2/3 *palam* of silver equalled one *kāṣu*, and 70 *palam* of tāra (an alloy) was worth one *kāṣu* of gold.

³²151 of 1934-35.

right to land possession.

To deal in such a local market external merchants would have been forced to negotiate through local institutions. Thus it is not unusual to find references to merchants who were given a local monopoly in certain specified commercial commodities. We may note, for instance, an agreement by the regional assembly (*nāḍu*) of Kōṇḍu selling the authorized brokerage (*taragu*) in betel leaves to two itinerant merchants, who were the only merchants allowed to transport betel leaves into that area.³³ Such trade may be seen as being built around a series of networks in which local institutions, representing their local communities, formed alliances with external merchants. Trade between such different communities was potentially explosive. Itinerant merchants were often regarded, and probably with good reason, as armed robbers. For example, an inscription from Kāṭṭūr, Chingleput, notes that itinerant merchants sometimes extracted trade by force, threatening people with drawn swords, capturing them, or depriving them of their food.³⁴ Trade was a meeting of two people who owed each other nothing and a misunderstanding could well have led to such violence.

MARKET ADMINISTRATION

Major Cōla inscriptions of the tenth and eleventh centuries which record royal communication are usually addressed to the members of the various local assemblies of that period, who are categorized into four groups:

1. *Nāṭṭār*
2. *Brahmadēyak-kiḷavar*
3. (a) *Dēvadāna*
(b) *Paḷḷiccandam*
(c) *Kaṇimurruṭṭu*
(d) *Vēṭṭappēṭṭu-ūrkaḷilār*
4. *Nagaraṇkaḷilār*³⁵

Nāṭṭār identifies the members of the *nāḍu* assembly, the regional unit of political administration in that time³⁶; the second category recognized the

³³Inscriptions of the Pudukkottai State (henceforth IPS), No. 125.

³⁴256 of 1912.

³⁵"Larger [Leiden Grant of Rājārāja I" (A.D. 1006), *Epigraphia Indica* (EI), 22, 34, p. 243, ln. 2-4; "Tirumālpuram Inscription of Uttamacōla" (A.D. 984), SII, 3, 142, ln. 2-8; "Anbil Plates of Sundara Cōla" (A.D. 960), EI, 15, p. 64, ln. 124; SII, 3, 205, p. 402, ln. 2-5.

³⁶See S. Subbarayalu, *Political Geography of the Chola Country*, Madras, 1973. Subbarayalu suggests that local village assemblies, known as *ūr* (not to be confused with the *ūrkaḷilār* of these inscriptions) were represented in a *nāḍu* assembly by prominent landholders who are identified with the terms *veḷḷānvagai* or *araiyakal* and also as the *nāṭṭār*, the

hinterland and was held responsible for the collection of fees on shops (*aṅgādikull*, *aṅgāḍippaṭṭam*) and bazaars (*kaḍal-iṭal kaḍaippaṭṭam*)⁴¹ and often collected agricultural cesses on surrounding lands as well.⁴² *Nagara*, using the Sanskrit form of *nagaram*, are described in ancient Indian literature as fortified cities of the interior which served as centres of government and commerce. The *Arthaśāstra*, the north Indian treatise on statecraft, indicates that administrative responsibility over a *nagara* was held by a "City Superintendent," whose job did not encompass jurisdiction over trade.⁴³ *Nagara* trade was administered by a "Supervisor of Markets," whose chief responsibility according to the *Arthaśāstra* was to keep merchants and artisans from cheating their customers.⁴⁴ In comparison, we do not encounter a similar jurisdictional separation between city administration and the administration of the market in the inscriptions which record the activities of the south Indian *nagaram*. In its south Indian context, *nagaram* designated a commercial area as distinct from agricultural communities such as *ūr* and *brahmadāya*. As *brahmadāya* were governed by a *sabha* assembly and *ūr* were governed by an *ūr* assembly,⁴⁵ the *nagaram* also held certain delegated rights of administrative autonomy. The *nagaram* assembly, which according to Cōla epigraphy was composed of local merchants,⁴⁶ generally functioned as one among several assemblies of an urban area, though it sometimes existed as the only assembly in important regional trade centres. Inscriptions inform us that various merchants, artisans, "those who work for hire," as well as "plowmen" were subject to a *nagaram*'s authority.⁴⁷

As depicted in contemporary epigraphy, the most important function of a *nagaram* was the administration of its local market. That the *nagaram* dominated important regional markets may be seen in their control over fees levied on commercial transactions. For instance, each load of paddy brought into the *nagaram* of Mummuḍicōlapuram (Kōvilūr, Tañjāvūr) was subject to three cesses: some rice was taken as payment for service (*nilakkūli*), a fee was collected for police protection (*pāḍikāval*), and the *nagaram*'s right (*kaivāṭi*) to receive a percentage of those goods sold in the local market was exercised.⁴⁸

⁴¹SII, 3, 90; 5, 597; 4, 223; 8, 252, 288; 1, 59, 11, 62; 7, 912.

⁴²388 of 1939-40; IPS, 170; SII, 1, 40. The author has discussed the indigenous evidence of the administrative functions of a *nagaram* at length in Kenneth R. Hall, "The *Nagaram* as a Marketing Center in Early Medieval South India," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1975.

⁴³The *Kautilya Arthaśāstra*, trans. R. P. Kangle, Bombay, 1963, 2, 36.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 4.2.

⁴⁵See Karashima, "Allur and Isanamangalam. . ." *op. cit.*

⁴⁶118 of 1888 (SII, 4, 223), 308 of 1913 (SII, 12, 154), 297 of 1904 (SII, 17, 326). Four types of merchants, *viyāpārīgaḷ*, *cāliyar*, *saṅkarapāḍiyar*, and *vāṇiyar* are identified as members of *nagaram* assemblies.

⁴⁷118 of 1888 (SII, 4, 223), SII, 1, 40.

⁴⁸204 of 1908.

Similar fees for usage (*cirṇṇāḍi*) were collected from both local and foreign merchants who "sold at a profit" in the market at Iraviskulamāpikkapuram.⁴⁹ In these examples and others the local *nagaram* had attracted traders into its market place by providing services normally associated with a city government such as police protection, street cleaning, garbage collection, etc., and had charged merchants for these services.⁵⁰

A *nagaram* seems to have become an important commercial centre because it was able to link surrounding villages into a community of exchange in which it monopolized its own sphere of interest. We would speculate that the *nagaram* was a member of the local social system and was regarded as the natural sector within this society where certain types of commercial transactions could be negotiated. The *nagaram* would have been recognized for its expertise in commercial affairs; it served the local community by connecting their own commercial zone to others.⁵¹ Trade with foreign merchants was thus transacted in a designated market, i.e., a *nagaram*, at the extreme edges of the social nucleus where its more harmful effects could be contained.

One may show that this was the case by mapping the distribution of *nagaram* in the Cōla domain. This we have done for Cōlamanḍalam, the Cōla heartland. Using those inscriptions which make clear reference to the existence of a *nagaram* at a specified place, one definite pattern of distribution becomes perceptible: that there was a maximum of one *nagaram* per *nāḍu* in Cōla times.⁵² If, as has been argued in recent studies of regional administration under the Cōlas,⁵³ the *nāḍu* was the most important regional political unit during these times, then we may suggest that it is more than coincidence that there was

⁴⁹213 of 1904 (SII, 17, 235).

⁵⁰Although there is little evidence of the daily expenditures of a *nagaram* we may speculate that local tax cesses and other *nagaram* income would have been utilized to pay for urban services. Inscriptions do record that *nagaram* regularly employed clerks, accountants, and overseers [285 of 1959-60; 83, 84, 86 of 1889 (SII, 3, 15, 16, 18); IPS, 112]. Other employees of a *nagaram* would have included sweepers, policemen, and market officials.

⁵¹See, for example, 77 of 1906, where a merchant who was probably associated with the Tirunāmanallūr, South Arcot *nagaram* was active in the Tiruvādaimarudūr *nagaram*'s market.

⁵²I have used Subbarayalu's map of *nāḍu* boundaries in Cōlamanḍalam as the basis for my survey. The pattern of one *nagaram* per *nāḍu* is consistent except in one instance where a *nagaram* was associated with two separate *nāḍu* at different times (indicating that *nāḍu* boundaries were subject to change over time) and in another case where a second *nagaram* was established much later than the first. In this second case the fact that dated references to the two *nagaram* do not overlap probably indicates that the second replaced the first as the *nāḍu*'s *nagaram*. While my map of *nagaram* in Cōlamanḍalam accompanies this article, my supporting tables and maps showing *nāḍu* boundaries appear in Hall, "The *Nagaram* as a Marketing Center." Inscriptions from Pāṇḍimanḍalam and Tōṇḍaimanḍalam, the regions south and north of Cōlamanḍalam, indicate a similar pattern of none *nagaram* per *nāḍu* in the remainder of the Cōla domain during these times.

⁵³Subbarayalu, *op. cit.*

only one *nagaram* per *nāḍu*.

In his article "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China," G. William Skinner speculated that "central places are readily analyzed on the assumption that the economic function of a settlement is consistently associated with its position in marketing systems which are themselves arranged in a regular hierarchy."⁵⁴ Establishing what he believed to be the traditional hierarchy of the Chinese rural marketing system, Skinner mapped communities of exchange, market towns, and their dependent territories.⁵⁵ He then overlaid contemporary units of government administration to establish relationships between marketing structures and government.

In Skinner's analysis market towns are seen as the economic centre for a group of approximately fifteen to twenty-five villages. This "cell" was an autonomous economic system with its own transport, trade, artisan industry, and credit mechanisms, and was organized spatially and temporally as a network of periodic markets. This economic system also constituted the social world of the area's inhabitants, as marriage networks, voluntary associations, and clientage relationships usually corresponded to the dimensions of the marketing area. Marketing centres drew to their centre of social action the representatives of village households from throughout the system, facilitating the homogeneity of the local cultural unit as well as minimizing external contacts and thereby fostering cultural isolation and differentiation. Skinner's argument suggests that the cohesive nature of this local marketing system became an asset to the local domain in times of political crisis as the village networks, which were less tolerant of deviation and suspicious of foreign elements, easily withdrew their participation in external exchange networks and fell back upon their ability to sustain themselves economically.

The distribution of the *nagaram* in the Cōḷa domain, as well as supporting epigraphic evidence, suggests that the south Indian *nagaram* functioned similarly to Skinner's market centres, serving a series of local villages by connecting them to the upper levels of a developing marketing system.⁵⁶ In the early Cōḷa period, especially, certain constraints seem to have been imposed on

⁵⁴G. William Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China," *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXIV, No. 1, 1964, p.5. The three parts of this article have recently been republished together by the Association for Asian Studies, Ann Arbor. Skinner demonstrated that when the central government attempted to restructure the traditional hierarchy of rural markets in Szechwan, the normal flow of trade was disastrously disrupted and that only when the old market structure was restored was the orderly movement of agricultural products to urban centres restored.

⁵⁵Skinner's analysis suggests that a peasant could walk only a limited distance to reach a market in the nineteenth century—about six to ten miles—which Skinner then applied to his mapping of regional economic units.

⁵⁶An inscription from Tiruppaccūr, Chingleput, for example, suggests that twenty-four *nagaram* were associated with Kāñcīpuram's *nagaram* (120 of 1920).

overland trade which prevented the commercial penetration of itinerant traders below the *nagaram* level.⁵⁷

This does not mean that the commodities exchanged by itinerant merchants did not reach local villages. Rather, itinerant merchants participated in exchange at the designated *nagaram* of an area. Here local merchants acquired the commodities offered for sale by the itinerants, which they, in turn, exchanged within the subordinate marketing network of the *nagaram*. The *nagaram*, we would speculate, acted as a centre for wholesaling where merchants negotiated the exchange of locally produced commodities for either commodities which were not locally produced or for cash.⁵⁸ Even within the *nagaram* market it would have been uncommon for itinerant merchants themselves to participate in the market place, although they supplied goods of foreign origin to local merchants. Itinerant merchants seem to have been wholesale specialists who dealt primarily with other merchants. Locally based merchants acquired goods from these itinerants at wholesale in a *nagaram* and then sold these goods at retail within the various village markets of their marketing region. An example of this process is provided in the Kōṇāḍu inscription cited above in which the *nāḍu* conferred the brokerage in betel leaves upon two itinerant merchants.⁵⁹ These two itinerants were the only merchants authorized to sell betel leaves at wholesale to local merchants. Locally based merchants would therefore have acquired betel leaves from these two merchants, and would then have retailed this commodity within the various village markets of their *nāḍu*.

A key figure in this process was a *nagaram* merchant who acted as the local broker in specified commodities. Within the local marketing system they, rather than externally based itinerant merchants, made certain commodities available to village merchants. This these *nagaram* merchants did at the same time they were acquiring commodities of local production which they would, in turn, sell in the *nagaram*'s market. An inscription from Kāñcīpuram, for instance, records that each year a brokerage (*taravukoḷ*) in some commodity (probably rice) was sold to a merchant who was likely authorized by the local *nagaram* as the legitimate wholesaler in that commodity.⁶⁰ Another inscription states that the *nagaram* Edirilicōḷapuram (Kuḷikkari, Tañjāvūr) controlled various local brokerage fees (*taragu*) which it presumably levied on *nagaram* wholesalers.⁶¹ Thus, as we have noted above, inscriptions recording commercial activity in a

⁵⁷Inscriptions stipulate that foreign merchants were to be subject to very specific regulations—in most cases more than those imposed on local merchants. The inscription from Arakaṇḍanallūr cited above, for example, goes so far as to forbid all external exchanges (151 of 1934-35).

⁵⁸Thus, as we have noted above, inscriptions recording commercial activity in a *nagaram* make frequent reference to the exchange of surplus rice.

⁵⁹IPS, 125.

⁶⁰Who sold this brokerage is not clear. 54 of 1893 (SII, 4, 867).

⁶¹82 of 1911.

nagaram make frequent reference to the exchange of surplus rice. This surplus rice was brought into the *nagaram* market by local wholesalers who then used the proceeds from the rice's sale either to purchase non-agrarian or luxury goods, or to acquire other agricultural commodities which they could then peddle to the village markets they serviced. The *nagaram* may thus be compared to the intermediate markets in Skinner's analysis: a *nagaram* was a designated centre of exchange where itinerant and local commercial networks intersected.

Criticism of Skinner's model has been based on the suggestion that itinerant merchants, who likely had the goods a community needed, could penetrate his neatly drawn marketing regions, withdrawing the necessity of dependence by local peasants on a specific market. In medieval south India the ability to deal directly with the sources of supply would have eliminated the problem of facing the rules and cesses of the *nagaram*. Why, then, was it necessary for the itinerant merchants to deal with the *nagaram*? It is our impression that the local political structure prevented this penetration of non-local peoples. Above all else, the *nagaram*, as part of the *nāḍu*'s political structure, dominated the marketing operations of its hinterland such that it was not worth their while for external merchants to deal directly with the local villages.⁶²

Interaction between the *nagaram* and the *nāḍu* (*kūrṇam*, *kōṭṭam*) administration is especially noticeable in contemporary epigraphy, suggesting that a special relationship between these two institutions was the key to a *nagaram*'s prosperity. We may cite, for instance, a joint resolution of the *nāḍu* and *nagaram* assemblies which was made at Tiruppaḷanam, Tañjāvūr, transferring dues collected from farmers as well as duties levied on commercial products such as pepper, areca-nuts, bales of cloth, and bags of rice to the local temple.⁶³ In Kōṇāḍu, as we have noted above, it was the members of the local *nāḍu* assembly who authorized the brokerage (*taragu*) for all betel leaves brought into Kōṇāḍu.⁶⁴ In another community the *nāḍu-kaṇkatci*, an overseer employed by the local *nāḍu* assembly, and the *nāḍu-vagai*, a *nāḍu* revenue collector, approved a decision by twelve merchant families to support a festival honouring the Cōja king Rājarāja I.⁶⁵

At Jambai, South Acrot, the *nagaram* and *nāḍu* representatives met together to judge several legal cases. In one the tribunal determined that a *nagaram* merchant could not be prosecuted for stabbing to death a visiting merchant

⁶²We are particularly impressed with the *nagaram*'s dominance over the exchange of local commodities for goods coming from outside the local marketing area. Although there are numerous references in contemporary epigraphy to the usual commercial commodities such as pepper, cotton, various cloth goods, and oil, the *nagaram* seems to have in particular dominated the exchange of grain commodities – i.e., the products of local agriculture,

⁶³187 of 1928.

⁶⁴IPS, 125.

⁶⁵274 of 1910.

who seems to have been associated with the Tirunāmanallūr, South Acrot *nagaram*⁶⁶ and had attempted to rape the local merchant's concubine. To soothe the feelings of the *nagaram* of the deceased, the offender was directed to combine with a relative of the merchant he had murdered in making an endowment in honour of the deceased to the local temple.⁶⁷ At Aragalūr, Salem, the *nāḍu* assembly arbitrated a potentially disruptive conflict, stepping in to resolve a serious dispute between the local *nagaram* and another group of merchants over the proper management of temple business.⁶⁸ The *nāḍu*'s involvement in *nagaram* affairs is particularly perceptible in an inscription from Ūṭṭatūr, Tiruchirapalli where the *nāḍu* and *nagaram* met to convert a local village into a "merchant town" and therefore renamed it Tayilunalapuram.⁶⁹ Similarly in Uttaramērūr we find evidence of a merchant community inhabiting a quarter known as Nāḍuvilaṅgāḍi, "the market area of the *nāḍu*."⁷⁰

Seemingly not only the *nagaram*'s marketing position would have been challenged by the penetration of external merchants into the hinterland, but also that of the local landholding elite, the *nāṭṭār*, whose monopoly over local production would have been endangered as well. Our suggestion is that it was the indigenous administrative institution known as the *nāḍu* rather than a centralizing government which originally integrated the *nagaram* into the political system of southern India by making it the community's representative in external commercial dealings. If, as recent historians have argued,⁷¹ the *nāḍu* assembly was the representative body of the most powerful landholders in the regional political unit, then the relationships between the *nagaram* and this local elite, as symbolized in their considerable interaction, may well suggest that the *nagaram* was given a commercial monopoly over the *nāḍu*'s production and was the authorized arena for the wholesaling of the local *nāḍu*'s production to outside merchants. As shown in the inscription from Arakaṇḍanallūr cited above, a local institution such as the *nāḍu* was quite capable of legally excluding itinerant merchants from local markets by forbidding local residents to transact business with them.⁷² A *nagaram* would then have assumed a "banker's role," collecting, storing, and protecting local goods and utilizing them to conduct trade with itinerant merchants and other *nagarams*.

⁶⁶77 of 1906 and 225 of 1939-40.

⁶⁷77 of 1906. One should note the weak legal position of the visiting merchant.

⁶⁸432 of 1913.

⁶⁹521 of 1912.

⁷⁰52 of 1898 (SII, 3, 195).

⁷¹See Subbarayalu, *op. cit.*

⁷²151 of 1934-35.

THE LOCAL MARKET AND ITINERANT TRADE

It is the hypothesis of this study that the *nagaram* towns functioned as points of redistribution where certain commodities of foreign origin were made available for a local *nāḍu*'s consumption. These local economic networks in turn were serviced by itinerant trade groups who specialized in exotic commodities ranging from gems to elephants. Contemporary inscriptions categorized such groups as *samayam*, associations of long-distance traders who established permanent exchange relationships with the local economic systems and represented the local marketing networks within the larger system of Asian trade.

Among the south Indian *samayam* in Cōḷa times the *tīcāiyāyirattaiñṇūṟṟuvar*, "the five hundred merchants of the thousand directions," was the most prominent; records of its commercial activities include inscriptions found in northern Sumatra and Pagan.⁷³ An inscription from Pirāṇmalai, Ramanathapuram, leads us to believe that *nagaram* were an integral part of the *tīcāiyāyirattaiñṇūṟṟuvar* organization. This inscription, dating to late Cōḷa times, is unique in that it defines the membership of the *tīcāiyāyirattaiñṇūṟṟuvar samayam*.⁷⁴ The inscription commences with a eulogy of the group and describes the organization's territory of operation as:

- (a) the eighteen *paṭṭinam* (emporia) with their streets having terraced buildings as high as to touch the moon
- (b) the thirty-two *vaḷarapuram* ("prosperous coastal towns")
- (c) the sixty-four *kaḍigaitāvaḷam* ("periodic market centres") which were inhabited by *ceṭṭis* (merchants) who flourished.

The *Arthaśāstra* clearly distinguishes commerce transacted in a *nagara* from that transacted in designated centres for international exchange, known as *pattanam*.⁷⁵ Commodities of distant origin were apparently not a regular part of local commercial exchanges, as the *Arthaśāstra* suggests that when such goods came into *nagara* markets the "Supervisor of Markets," the official who administered *nagara* trade, had to call in the "Director of Trade," an expert in determining prices on such goods, who then fixed a price on commodities of foreign origin after calculating the investment, production, duty, interest,

⁷³See K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, "A Tamil Merchant Guild in Sumatra," *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land-, and Volkenkunde*, LXIII, No. 2, 1932, pp. 314-27.

⁷⁴154 of 1903 (SII, 8, 442). The text has been translated and discussed in K. V. Subrahmanya Aiyar, "Largest Provincial Organisations in Ancient India," *Journal of the Mythic Society* (Bangalore), LXV, No. 4, 1954-55, pp. 270-86, and LXVI, No. 1, 1955, pp. 8-22. The interpretations of this inscription which appear in this study are, however, quite different than those of Subrahmanya Aiyar.

⁷⁵The *Kautilya Arthaśāstra*, Book Two.

rent, and other expenses which contributed to the "fair price" of such commodities.⁷⁶ This "Director of Trade" was normally associated not with *nagara* administration but with that of the *pattanam*.⁷⁷ He is specifically listed as an administrative subordinate to the "Commissioner of Ports," whose duty it was to set regulations for the port town.⁷⁸

In the terminology of the *Arthaśāstra*, a *pattana* was a "port," a place officially designated as a centre for the exchange of goods which arrived by boat or by caravan.⁷⁹ Such "ports" were principally located either on sea coasts or on river banks of the interior, although in a broader sense *pattanam* could also include major hinterland commercial centres which were visited only by merchant caravans. As we have noted above, the "Director of Trade" was said to have been an expert in determining prices on commodities of distant origin, suggesting that such commodities were regularly exchanged in a *pattanam*, and only rarely in the *nagaram*, whose trade was largely local.

In its south Indian context this broad definition of "port" seems to have been somewhat modified. During Cōḷa times *paṭṭinam* was generally attached to the names of towns where international commerce was allowed, both port cities of the coast (*vaḷarapuram* in the Pirāṇmalai inscription) as well as important emporia of the hinterland. Itinerant merchants in some instances developed special relationships with major hinterland emporia and symbolized this relationship by the application of the distinctive title *erivirapaṭṭinam* to the emporium's name. Translation of this phrase reflects the commercial implications of such an arrangement: *erī*, "the road"; *vīra*, "heroes"; and *paṭṭinam* becomes "a place where the heroes of the road conduct trade." One such *erivirapaṭṭinam* is described in an old-Kanarese inscription of the *Ayyāvoḷe* itinerant traders as "a merchant-town situated in the centre and the first in importance among the twelve [towns] in the glorious Kūṇḍi Three-Thousand, adorned with villages, towns, and chief cities, with elegant mansions, palaces and temples. . ."⁸⁰ It is our impression that these *erivirapaṭṭinam* assumed a commercial stance between the *nagaram*, which were primarily centres for the exchange of goods of local origin and were periodically involved in the exchange of foreign commodities, and the *paṭṭinam* (*vaḷarapuram*) of the coast, which were clearly centres for the exchange of foreign merchandise, a position which allowed *erivirapaṭṭinam* to participate in both realms of commercial exchange.

As noted in the various inscriptions recording the activities of itinerant merchants, itinerants depended upon an assortment of relationships beyond the coastal ports to support their commercial activities. Their local presence

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, 4.2.36.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, 2.16.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, 2.28.2; 2.16.25.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, 2.1.19; 7.12.21; 2.28.

⁸⁰*Indian Antiquary*, 14, p. 25, ln. 58 (A.D. 1182-83).

Kaḍalaḍaiyātilāṅgaigoṇḍacōḷa-vaḷanāḍu Ūṇattūrkuṇṇam Koḍumballūr mānigrāmam nagarattōm, a group of itinerant merchants which was apparently encompassed within the larger organization.⁹⁴ The tenth group was said to have been comprised of twelve *nagarams* "including the Jayaṅkondacōḷapuram nagarattōm," while the eleventh group included the Karuvūr, Kaṇṇapuram, Paṭṭāli, Talaiyūr, Rājarājapuram, Kiraṇūr, and several other *nagarams* of Koṅgu-maṇḍalam.⁹⁵

Using this inscription and its tally to test our earlier hypotheses we may first note that only one *nagaram* per *nāḍu* unit is mentioned as each *nagaram* of Pāṇḍimaṇḍalam is catalogued in association with a different *nāḍu* or *vaḷanāḍu*.⁹⁶ We have speculated above that there was a close relationship between the *nāḍu* and merchant activity, particularly in terms of controlling external commercial contact with the local community of exchange. Supporting our position is the fact that the signatures to the Pirāṇmalai inscription include those who are stated to have represented each of the affected *nāḍus* and whose names conspicuously end with the designation—*vāḷār*, likely indicating that they were members of the *vāḷār* landholding elite of that area. Such an alliance between *nagaram* and members of the local landholding elite, as we have suggested above, would have reinforced the *nagaram's* local commercial monopoly and forced itinerant merchants to trade in the *nāḍu's* authorized market.

Thus, we have argued that it was the *nagaram* which provided the arena for local commercial contact between local and itinerant merchants. The Pirāṇmalai inscription's reference to the three levels of itinerant activity, the *paṭṭinam*, the coastal ports (*vaḷarapuram*), and the periodic markets (*tāvaḷam*) of the hinterland, followed by its list of the specific *nagarams* with which the itinerant organization had contact, is a detailed account of the group's commercial activities.⁹⁷ While in the coastal ports and *eṇivīrapaṭṭinam*, as we have noted, itinerant merchants enjoyed a very special status, in the hinter-

used to identify one sector of a town. *Nagarattōm* is the first person plural of *nagaram* and may be translated "we the people of the *nagaram*."

⁹⁴Inscriptions from Koḍumballūr make reference to "two types of *nagarattār* (third person singular or plural of *nagaram*)" as if there was a local *nagaram* and a separate community which could be identified as the base of operations for the Koḍumballūr *maṇigrāmam*. See IPS, 82.

⁹⁵Koṅgumaṇḍalam was located in the modern Coimbatore and part of Salem districts, west of Cōḷamaṇḍalam.

⁹⁶A *vaḷanāḍu* was an artificial grouping of several *nāḍu* units. *Vaḷanāḍu* were created by the Cōḷas in an attempt to facilitate the more efficient collection of state revenues. See Hall, *op. cit.*

⁹⁷The formula of 18, 32, and 64 is in itself ambiguous and, as with other such formulas which are frequently encountered in Indian epigraphy, probably was more symbolic than concrete.

land their position was more dependent on forming alliances with local institutions as is symbolized by the specific references in the inscription to the *nagaram* assemblies with which the group interacted.⁹⁸ It should be expected, then, that except for the single designated *paṭṭinam* the named *nagarattōm* of this inscription inhabited *tāvaḷam* which formed the marketing cycle of the itinerant organization.⁹⁹

CONCLUSION

The existence of such a marketing system allows us to conclude that supra-village levels of social integration were important in this period of south Indian history. Local, social and economic units, as represented by the *nāḍu* and *nagaram*, did not exist in isolation but were integrated into a system which articulated the distribution of agricultural and high-order commodities throughout the hinterland.¹⁰⁰ Itinerant traders, we have argued, connected the externally oriented high-order market centres, identified in the inscriptions as *paṭṭinam*, to *nagaram*, regional markets which served as the downward terminus for high-order "foreign" goods and wholesaled locally produced commodities in return. While the origin of the *nagaram* may well have been due to practicality—such as a strategic geographical position—the continued prominence of the *nagaram* in Cōḷa times was reinforced by its ties to the indigenous political system, the regional unit of administration known as the *nāḍu*.

We have suggested that itinerant trade in early medieval south India was conducted under "partnership" agreements between *nagaram* and groups of merchants who periodically visited the *nagaram* to exchange high-order goods for locally produced commodities. During Cōḷa times, as the Pirāṇmalai inscription expresses so well, long-distance traders found it profitable to institutionalize such commitments. In the face of strong and administratively autonomous political and economic units like the *nāḍu* and *nagaram*, it was

⁹⁸This inscription notes that there were five assemblies of *ṭicalyāyirattaiṇṇūruvar* including one group which supervised or regulated the conduct of traders engaged in exports and imports who were settled principally in coastal ports and another group who engaged in trade with *nāḍu* and *nagaram*.

⁹⁹This interpretation is supported by another inscription of the *ṭicalyāyirattaiṇṇūruvar* from Kōvilpaṭṭi, Tiruchirapalli, in which it is stated that the organization's local representatives were the *nagaram* of Sundaracōḷapuram *alias* Deśiyugandappaṭṭinam, the Koḍumballūr *maṇigrāmam*, and the *nagaram* of Teliṅgakulakālapuram *alias* Kulōttuṅgacōḷappaṭṭinam and Koṇṇaiyūr *alias* Uttamacōḷapuram (286 of 1964-65).

¹⁰⁰Re-emphasizing our opening statements, the incomplete and fragmentary nature of our sources does not allow us to prove the existence of a Skinner style system of high-order and low-order markets, although it is our belief that the presented evidence certainly suggests such patterns. The available inscriptions have not, for instance, allowed us to follow the exchange of specific commodities from their point of origin to the coastal ports.

to the itinerant's advantage, we would speculate, to deal as a representative of an organized body. Membership in an itinerant merchant organization seems to have provided the basis for one's local economic status; in a similar way *nagaram* merchants were usually identified by their own *nagaram* when their activity took them elsewhere—as if this gave them an advantage in establishing a local trade relationship. The significance of a local commercial centre within this larger system depended on its ability to organize trade within its own community of exchange and to keep goods flowing to the authorized markets. Here locally produced commodities entered the commercial networks serviced by itinerant merchant associations. These itinerant organizations, in turn, kept goods flowing to the coastal ports where south Indian commodities entered the well-developed routes of Asian maritime trade.

Illegal Extortions from Peasants, Artisans and Menials in Eighteenth Century Eastern Rajasthan*

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In the context of increasing attention being paid by historians to problems of medieval Indian rural society, an attempt has been made in this paper to examine the illegal extortions made from the peasants, village menials and artisans by the dominant groups with whom they come into immediate contact, viz., the jagirdars, the zamindars, the *ijaradars* (revenue-farmers) and state officials like the *amils*, the *faujdars*, etc. The term "illegal" denotes such extortions as were made in contravention of the custom accepted by the victims as well as by the state; and "extortions" might be in the form of forced labour (*begar*), carrying away of peasants' bullocks in lieu of labour or taking away the goods manufactured by the artisans without payment and in various other forms. Incidentally, light is also thrown on the "legal" forms of forced labour and other obligations owed by the lower sections of village society to the dominant groups.

The evidence on which this paper is based is in the form of copies of *chithis* (letters) preserved in the Jaipur Records section, *Daftar Diwan Huzuri*, Rajasthan Archives, Bikaner. The *chithis* were written by the *Diwan* of the Jaipur state to its officials, particularly the *amils*; each *chithi* contains the substance of a complaint received by the *Diwan* and his instructions thereon.

We were able to trace 48 *chithis* pertaining to extortions after a fairly intensive search. Our evidence, therefore, does not constitute a selected sample; this is all the evidence we could lay our hands upon for our region and period.

This paper has been divided into two sections. In Section I the evidence has

*I am extremely grateful to my colleague Dilbagh Singh for introducing me to the documents on which this paper is based and for generously helping me with many suggestions as well as sharp criticisms. I have also drawn considerably on his unpublished doctoral dissertation "Local and Land Revenue Administration of the State of Jaipur (c. 1750-1800)," submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University in 1975. I have had the benefit of discussing an earlier version of this paper with my colleagues at a faculty seminar and with Amit Bhaduri separately; their criticisms have been of great help.

I am deeply obliged to the Director and the staff of the Rajasthan Archives, Bikaner, for extending the maximum co-operation for my work there.

been arranged and presented without much comment. However, notice has been taken of the widening scope and increasing intensity of illegal extortions from peasants, artisans and menials from about the middle of the eighteenth century. In Section II an attempt has been made to explain the causes of this intensification in terms of changes in the agrarian economy as well as the devolution of administrative authority from the state's capital to the parganas.

While the phenomenon of extortions, legal as well as illegal, was widespread within the region, its exact forms had considerable sub-regional variations. Our documents clearly indicate that extortions considered customary in one pargana faced resistance for being illegal in another.¹ Incidentally, this fact limits the utility of single documents to a certain degree, for each document reflects at best the conditions in the pargana from which it had originated and therefore no wider generalization regarding the prevalence of specific forms of extortions can be based on individual *chithis*.

Some degree of forced labour, or *begar*, and some other extortions were sanctioned by custom and recognized by the state (of Jaipur) in the territories directly or indirectly under its control as well as by those subjected to such extortions. Custom subjected the village menials, socially and economically the most depressed section in the village,² to the largest burden of extortions particularly in the form of *begar*. Whereas the artisans were usually exempt from

¹Thus, for example, while the peasants were obliged to render *begar* to the jagirdar at harvest time in village Chatrpura, pargana Chatsu, *Chithi* dt. Chaitra Sudi 6, Vikrami Samvat (V.S.) 1825/A.D. 1768, the jagirdar at village Khuruala, pargana Ghazi ka Thana was denied such *begar* *chithi* dt. Magh Sudi 1, V.S. 1811/1754. Similarly, while the zamindar was entitled to *kotri ki begar*, (forced labour at the harvest-time and sundry other services) in the area settled by him in some regions, *chithi* dt. Chaitra sudi 15, V.S. 1825/1768 addressed to the *amil*, pargana Ghazi ka Thana, in others he had no such entitlement *chithi* dt. Sawan Vadi 12, V.S. 1811/1754 pertaining to village Khuruala, pargana Mauzabad. Indeed, even within the same pargana, Mauzabad in this case, *kotri ki begar* was not allowed in some villages, *ibid.*, and allowed in some others, *chithi*, addressed to *amil* dt. Paush Vadi 7, V.S. 1827/1770. The instances of village-level variations in custom are, however, rare.

²Socially, the menials belonged to the lowest rungs of the caste-hierarchy. Economically, for rendering assistance to the peasants at sowing and harvest times, they received a paltry share of the produce. In two rare documents of 1752 and 1766 of parganas, Malarna and Tonk, their share has been estimated at 0.6 per cent and 0.9 per cent respectively. See Dilbagh Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 53. Besides they had to render *begar* to various sections of society as will be discussed below. Significantly, the menials were also known as *begaris*, *ibid.*; also Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System of Mughal India*, Bombay, 1963, p. 150n., and H. Fukazawa, "A Note on the Corvée System (Vethbegar) in Eighteenth Century Maratha Kingdom," *Science and Human Progress* (Essays in honour of the late Prof. D.D. Kosambi), Bombay, 1974, p. 123.

any form of extortion³ and the cultivators were subject to rendering a few specified services like providing milk and curds to the jagirdar at the time of harvest or for entertaining his guests,⁴ or inviting the zamindar and his family to a feast on the occasion of a wedding in a peasant house⁵ or paying him a cess for permission for such a marriage⁶ or providing cots and beds for his guests or on the occasion of a wedding in his family⁷ or in some areas rendering *begar* to the jagirdar at sowing and harvest times.⁸ the menials were required to render it to all dominant sections of the village society gratis. Their readiness to flee their villages on a number of occasions owing to excessive *begar* also suggests its high incidence.⁹

The extortions could be divided into two categories: those used for the purposes of (agricultural) production; and other non-productive forms.

Under the first category, the cultivators (indifferently called *raiya* or *paltis* in our documents¹⁰) were required to render *begar* to the jagirdar in some areas,¹¹ though in other areas the imposition of any kind of *begar* on cultivators was disallowed by custom and therefore by the state.¹² The zamindar was entitled to the *kotri ki begar* though not everywhere, as noted earlier. It is possible that in cases where the cultivators did render *begar*, both the jagirdar and the zamindar were entitled to it. There is a large number of complaints from the village menials being harassed with demands of *begar* by the jagirdar, the zamindar, the *amil* and the *faujdar*, etc., beyond the customary limit.¹³ Possibly part of the customary *begar* rendered by them might have been in

³In all our documents pertaining to the artisans, their claim to exemption from any extortion has been upheld by the state. Only in one document the porters are required to carry water for the village watchman, *Chithi* dt. Asadh Vadi 13, V.S. 1799/1742 relating to villages Dhingraya and Bahmanvas in pargana Ghazi ka Thana.

⁴*Chithi* dt. Vaisakh Sudi 15, V.S. 1826/1769 pertaining to village Mundawari, pargana Malarna.

⁵*Chithi* dt. Sawan Sudi 1, V.S. 1811/1754 pertaining to pargana Mauzabad, quoted in Dilbagh Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

⁶*Chithi* dt. Paush Sudi 14, V.S. 1820/1763 pertaining to pargana Chatsu.

⁷*Chithi* dt. Sawan Vadi 12, V.S. 1811/1754 pertaining to village Khuranala, pargana Mauzabad.

⁸*Chithi* dt. Chaitra Sudi 6, V.S. 1825/1768 pertaining to village Chatrpura, pargana Chatsu.

⁹Five of our documents mention actual desertion by the menials and artisans and in nine others the threat of flight by various groups is implied in their declarations that "they cannot carry on any longer" on account of the burden of extortions. The menials complained only of *begar*; at any rate they had nothing else to give.

¹⁰For a discussion of these terms, see Dilbagh Singh, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-43.

¹¹*Chithi* dt. Chaitra Sudi 6, V.S. 1825/1768 pertaining to village Chatrpura, pargana Chatsu.

¹²*Chithi* dt. Magh Sudi 1, V.S. 1811/1754 pertaining to village Khurnala, pargana Ghazi ka Thana.

¹³The evidence for this will be cited below.

the form of agricultural labour on the zamindar's and perhaps the others' lands and another part in some other forms like carting.

We have earlier noted the non-productive forms of extortions like the provision of milk and curds, cots and beddings, etc. The village menials were *inter alia* required to carry the jagirdar's and possibly the others' belongings up to a distance of 5 *kos* (about 10 miles) from the village.¹⁴

Besides, almost anybody could be compelled by the *amils* to purchase agricultural products collected by them as revenue in kind.¹⁵ Refusal to buy these could result in the imposition of a tax or a cess. Another minor form of extortion was forcing the barbers of the village to supply *pattal* (a kind of plate made by joining together large leaves on which food is served), *datun* (twigs to serve as tooth-brushes) and earthen lamps to the *amil* and other officials.¹⁶

The eighteenth century witnessed an attempt by the officials as well as other dominant sections in the village to extend the scope and intensity of extortions. Whether such an attempt is exclusive to that century or is a continuation of earlier efforts, it is difficult to say categorically. However, the number of complaints begins to grow considerably from the 1730s and particularly rapidly from around the middle of the century as the following table would show:

Period	Number of Complaints
1700-10	Nil
1711-20	1
1721-30	2
1731-40	6
1741-50	17
1751-60	6
1761-70	16

NOTE: Our documents do not go beyond 1770.

The peasants and village menials increasingly complain of transgression of the customary limits by almost all dominant sections in almost all forms of extortions. Apart from excessive *begar*, they complain of other undefined forms referred to as "different kinds of harassment" (*tarah tarah ki khechal*).

¹⁴*Chithi* dt. Magh Vadi, V.S. 1820/1763 pertaining to *qasba* Baswa, pargana Bahatri. Also Irfan Habib, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

¹⁵For a definition of such forced sale, known as *padna*, see *chithi* dt. Asoj Sudi 6, V.S. 1794/1737 addressed to the *amil*, pargana Niwai. The agent of the jagirdar of village Sakarkhawda, pargana Chastu, complained in 1749 that the *amil* was imposing *padna* (probably on the village), *chithi* dt. Maghshri Vadi 5, V.S. 1806; the tailors of *qasba* Toda Rai Singh lodged a similar complaint against their *amil* in 1764, *chithi* dt. Jeth Sudi 6, V.S. 1821.

¹⁶*Chithi* dt. Asoj Vadi 7, V.S. 1783/1726 pertaining to *qasba* Phagi and villages in pargana Phagi; *chithi* dt. Paush Sudi 13, V.S. 1799/1742 pertaining to *qasba* Toda Rai Singh, pargana of the same name.

Thus, the zamindar in village Niworo, pargana Chastu, was forcing the peasants to render *begar* in 1753, even though the village custom did not entitle him to it.¹⁷ The peasants of village Khurnala, pargana Mauzabad, complained in 1754 that whereas custom required them to provide cots and beddings for the zamindar's guests or on the occasion of a wedding in his family, he was forcing them to render *begar* and was carrying away their bullocks in lieu of it presumably for cultivating his own land.¹⁸ The same zamindar was also trying to extort *kotri ki begar* from the village to which he was not entitled.¹⁹ A complaint against the extortion of *begar* from the cultivators by the zamindar in village Kheri Ram ki, pargana Mauzabad, is recorded in 1770.²⁰ Apparently, the zamindar was committing serious enough violation of the custom to be ordered to give an undertaking that he would not resort to it in future. In another instance the local zamindar also began to harass the peasants in an indirect way: by extorting *begar* from the menials who were supposed to serve only the peasants.²¹ His own customary entitlement to the menials' *begar* extended only to the area settled by him. His attempt to stretch this right had resulted in the flight of the menials from the village and the complaint by the *patel*, the *raiya* and the *mahajan* was followed by orders to the *amil* to reassure the menials and bring them back.

The jagirdar on his part was also trying to extend his right to customary extortions in various petty ways. Apart from his attempt to extort *begar* from groups like the peasants and even *mahajans* to which he was clearly not entitled,²² he tried to force the village menials to render *begar* to him round the year, though he was entitled to it only for specific jobs on specific occasions.²³ He also tried to ensure regular supply of milk and curds throughout the year from the peasants though they were required to provide him with these only at the time of harvesting or to entertain his guests.²⁴ Even in areas where the jagirdar was entitled to *begar* from the peasants at harvest-time, he was making an effort to convert it into a constant feature the year round.²⁵ And whereas the zamindar, in one case, mentioned earlier, had carried away the peasants' bullocks, the jagirdar in village Kherla, pargana Paonta, carried away some of the peasants themselves and held them in captivity to extort *begar*

¹⁷*Chithi* dt. Maghshri Sudi 3, V.S. 1810.

¹⁸*Chithi* dt. Sawan Vadi 12, V.S. 1811.

¹⁹*Chithi* dt. Sawan Sudi 1, V.S. 1811.

²⁰*Chithi* dt. Paush Vadi 7, V.S. 1827.

²¹*Chithi* dt. Jeth Sudi 7, V.S. 1825/1768. The complaint pertains to village Todah, pargana Ghazi ka Thana.

²²*Chithi* dt. Magh Sudi 5, V.S. 1819/1762 relating to village Khurnala, pargana Mauzabad.

²³*Chithi* dt. Vaisakh Sudi 15, V.S. 1826/1769 pertaining to village Mundawari, pargana Malarna.

²⁴*Ibid.*

²⁵*Chithi* dt. Chaitra Sudi 6, V.S. 1825/1768 pertaining to village Chatrpura, pargana Chastu.

from them.²⁶ In another case the jagirdar forced the *chamars* to carry his belongings beyond the customary limits of 5 *kos*.²⁷

The *amil* was entitled to "customary" *begar* from the village menials.²⁸ But when in one case he forced the *chamars* to go to the neighbouring village and render *begar* there, they took to flight. The *amil*, with supreme indifference to the finer points of caste-status, forced the Brahmins, the Mahajans and the Meenas to substitute for them.²⁹

Besides the *amil*, the *faujdar* also had a right to the menials' "customary" *begar*.³⁰ But these officials, taking advantage of what might have been their general entitlement to *bejar* from the *menials*, were trying to extend it to areas which had been specifically exempted from it. Thus in 1762 when the menials had fled the village Kherli, pargana Bahatri, due to famine, and others from some neighbouring villages had migrated there, the *amil* and the *faujdar* tried to extort *begar* from them even though the menials of that village had been exempted from it as per *sanad* given to them.³¹

Even the *ifaradar* (revenue-farmer), whose official position allowed him only the right to collect revenue on a short- or long-term contract with the state,³² was confident enough in *qasba* Pahari in the pargana of the same name, to carry away the peasants' carts and bullocks in *begar*.³³

Among the village menials, the barbers as a caste appear to have been the greatest sufferers from illegal demands of *begar* made by almost everyone in a position to dominate over them. Thus in 1726 the barbers of *qasba* Phagi and some villages of pargana Phagi lodged a complaint against "all officials" who were forcing them to provide *pattal*, *datun*, and earthen lamps to a limit that they found unbearable.³⁴ Similarly in 1742 the barbers of villages Dhigraya and Bahmanvas in pargana Ghazi ka Thana complained against the jagirdar and the *patel* for making them carry water for them and against government officials for extorting *begar*.³⁵ In the same year the *amil* of *qasba* Toda Rai Singh in the pargana of the same name was accused of extorting excessive *begar* from the barbers apart from coercing them to provide *pattals*

²⁶ *Chithi* dt. Vaisakh Sudi 15, V.S. 1821/1764.

²⁷ *Chithi* dt. Magh Vadi 7, V.S. 1820/1763.

²⁸ *Chithi* dt. Jeth Sudi 13, V.S. 1820/1763, pertaining to village Abhaneri, pargana Lalsot.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ This is implied in the specific exemption granted to the menials of village Kherli, pargana Bahatri from rendering *begar* to the *amil* and the *faujdar*, *chithi* dt. Bhadon Vadi 6, V.S. 1819/1762.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² See Dilbagh Singh, "Ijara System in Eastern Rajasthan (1750-1800)," *Proceedings of Rajasthan History Congress*, vol. VI, 1973, pp. 60-69.

³³ *Chithi*, dt. Sawan Sudi 3, V.S. 1817/1760.

³⁴ *Chithi* dt. Asoj Vadi 7, V.S. 1783.

³⁵ *Chithi* dt. Asadh Vadi 13, V.S. 1799.

to him so much so that they threatened to desert the *qasba*.³⁶ The *amil* was instructed by the *Diwan* of the state to desist from making such demands. In 1751 the same complaint was repeated against the *amil* on the plea that the barbers of the *qasba* had never rendered *begar* and the *sanad* to that effect notwithstanding, the *amil* was persisting with his demands.³⁷ Possibly sometime between 1742 and 1751 they had acquired a *sanad* of exemption from *begar* as a counterpoint against the *amil*'s persisting extortion. Interestingly, the agents of the Marathas, who were in possession of *qasba* Toda Rai Singh in the middle of the eighteenth century, had extended similar claims to *begar* from the barbers as the *amils* under the Rajput rulers had done.³⁸ In all probability the Marathas' demands were in addition to those of the *amil*, for the instruction given to him on the barbers' complaint required him not only to refrain from demanding *begar* for himself but also to prevent the Marathas from doing so. Even so, the barbers of that *qasba* appear to have got no respite, for there is still another repetition of the complaint four years later, with similar instructions again being sent down to the *amil*.³⁹

It is vis-a-vis the artisans that the extension of the scope of extortions is the most spectacular, perhaps because this category of village inhabitants had been by custom exempt from such extortions with a few minor exceptions like the potters who were required to carry water for the village watchman.⁴⁰ Significantly over one third of the complaints in our documents originate from the class of artisans. Whereas in the case of the peasants and menials (except the barbers) an established custom was being stretched here and there, groups like the artisans faced an utterly new phenomenon likely to turn into "custom" unless resisted at the outset. For the absence of customary obligations of any kind, apart, of course, from the payment of taxes, on the part of the artisans, might precisely have been the reason why almost every local official—the *amil*, the *faujdar*, the *kotwal* and "all officials"⁴¹—made an attempt to lay claim to the artisans' goods and services gratis whenever an opportunity arose. They also tried to extend their hold over practically every group among the artisans in one way or another—goldsmiths, calico-printers, tailors, oil-pressers, cotton-carders, carpenters, tanners, blacksmiths, potters, etc.

The extortions from the artisans were either in the form of *begar* or of coercing them into parting with their products without payment; quite often it was both. *Begar*, again, could be either in the form of service rendered by

³⁶ *Chithi* dt. Paush Sudi 13, V.S. 1799.

³⁷ *Chithi* dt. Sawan Sudi 2, V.S. 1808.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Chithi* dt. Phagun Sudi 8, V.S. 1811/1754.

⁴⁰ *Chithi* dt. Magh Sudi 5, V.S. 1789/1732 relating to *qasba* Niwai, pargana Niwai.

⁴¹ The potters referred to in the preceding footnote complained against "all officials" who were forcing them to carry water whereas custom required them to carry water only for the village watchman.

them according to their profession, or a different kind of service altogether.

Thus in 1737 the oil-pressers, the carpenters, and the potters along with the barbers of *qasba* Gijgarh, pargana Gijgarh, lodged a complaint against the local *kotwal*.⁴² While the oil-pressers were being forced to supply 10 *seers* of oil every month without being paid for it, the others found the burden of *begar* having "now become unbearable." The *amil* was accordingly instructed to prevent the *kotwal* from extorting any *begar* and for paying the artisans both for their goods as well as services. In 1739 the goldsmiths of *qasba* Niwai, pargana Niwai, reported that the *faujdar* had issued a warning that anyone wishing to get ornaments made should do so with his prior permission.⁴³ No reason for this extraordinary order has been mentioned. However, since the state refused to uphold the order, it had presumably been issued on the *faujdar*'s own initiative possibly to punish the goldsmiths for refusing to accept some of his unreasonable demands or to pressurize them into acceding to such demands.

The *faujdar* of pargana Pidani was, however, a little more circumspect in making demands on his *qasba*'s calico-printers and tailors for rendering him *begar* and supplying him with chintz gratis: he first falsely charged them with committing rape.⁴⁴

In 1741 the tailors of *qasba* Chatsu were being forced by the *amil* of the pargana to clean the fortress and the local pond, besides rendering other kinds of *begar*.⁴⁵ At the same time the oil-pressers of the *qasba* were being subjected to rendering *begar* to an unbearable degree.⁴⁶ The oil-pressers, besides carrying on their caste-profession, were also engaged in the privileged *gharuhala* cultivation⁴⁷ and were on both counts exempt from *begar*. Complaints of excessive *begar* were also received from the oil-pressers of *qasba* Phagi, similarly engaged in *gharuhala* cultivation (1741),⁴⁸ cotton-carders of pargana Phagi (1741),⁴⁹ both against the *amils*; two carpenters of village

⁴²Chithi dt. Phagun Sudi 12, V.S. 1794.

⁴³Chithi dt. Magh Sudi 12, V.S. 1796.

⁴⁴Chithi dt. Chaitra Sudi 9, V.S. 1798/1741.

⁴⁵Chithi dt. Paush Vadi 2, V.S. 1798.

⁴⁶Chithi dt. Asadh Sudi 8, V.S. 1798/1741.

⁴⁷The *gharuhala* cultivators, also known as *riyayatis* or those allowed concessions, paid substantially less revenue to the state than the ordinary cultivators, the *riyati*. See Dilbagh Singh, "Local and Land Revenue Administration," pp. 16-17. His statement that the *gharuhala* concessions were confined to the higher castes such as the Brahmins, the Rajputs and the Vaisyas (Mahajans, taken as a caste not as a profession) and holders of superior rights such as the *patels*, the *zamindars*, etc., when engaged in agriculture, *ibid.*, pp. 11-12, needs to be slightly qualified in view of two of our documents' reference to oil-pressers being *gharuhala* cultivators. Of course, the available evidence still overwhelmingly supports Dilbagh Singh's conclusion.

⁴⁸Chithi dt. Sawan Sudi 3, V.S. 1798.

⁴⁹Chithi dt. Sawan Sudi 6, V.S. 1798.

Choru of the same pargana against the *faujdar* and the *amil* (1743)⁵⁰; carpenters of *qasba* Toda Rai Singh against the *amil* (1742)⁵¹; tailors and calico-printers of village Manoharpur, pargana Sawai Jaipur against the *amil* (1742)⁵²; carpenters, blacksmiths and potters of *qasba* Ghazi ka Thana and some neighbouring villages against the *faujdar* and the *amil* (1742)⁵³; and the *panchas* of the caste-panchayat of the calico-printers of *qasba* Pidayan against the *faujdar* and the *amil* (1743).⁵⁴ The last mentioned complainants also reported that their cots and beddings were being carried away by the *walahis*⁵⁵ presumably on orders from the *faujdar* and the *amil*. Similarly there are cases of harassment of artisans on other counts. A goldsmith of *qasba* Amer, pargana Amer, complained of a cess being imposed on him in 1740 which no one in his family had paid during the past four generations.⁵⁶ The tailors and calico-printers of village Manoharpur, pargana Sawai Jaipur, were being forced by the *amil* to pay tax on their huts along with having to render *begar* in 1742 though they had never been subject to either.⁵⁷ The tailors of *qasba* Toda Rai Singh were compelled in 1764 to purchase agricultural goods by the *amil* who had collected these as revenue in kind.⁵⁸ This in addition to their cots and beddings being carried away.

An interesting indication of carting as a form of illegal *begar* is given in an early document of 1726. The *chithi* to the *amil* of pargana Sanganer instructs him to arrange carts for transporting bricks and lime for constructing a fort there. "The charge for transport," it says, "must be settled with the cart-drivers with their full consent; no compulsion should be used, though you should try to save the government's money."⁵⁹ Obviously, the *amils* were a little less likely to be so considerate to the cartmen when their own goods were to be transported.

These extortions often led to a conflict of interest not only between the victims and the dominant groups but even amongst members of the dominant groups themselves, for extortion by one would lead to denial of it to another; in the case of a jagirdar or *ijaradar* it may even cause a decline in his revenue. In the process some of them would appear to champion the cause of the peasants, artisans and menials against exploitation by other groups. Thus in 1741 one Abhai Singh Naruka, who was jagirdar of a large part of a village

⁵⁰Chithi dt. Chaitra Vadi 12, V.S. 1800.

⁵¹Chithi dt. Asadh Vadi 7, V.S. 1799.

⁵²Chithi dt. Asoj Sudi 5, V.S. 1799.

⁵³Chithi dt. Kartik Sudi 14, V.S. 1799.

⁵⁴Chithi dt. Phagun Sudi 8, V.S. 1800.

⁵⁵"Walahis" skinned the dead animals.

⁵⁶Chithi dt. Sawan Sudi 9, V.S. 1797.

⁵⁷Chithi dt. Asoj Sudi 5, V.S. 1799.

⁵⁸Chithi dt. Jeth Sudi 6, V.S. 1821.

⁵⁹Chithi dt. Phagun Sudi 9, V.S. 1783.

and *ijaradar* of the remaining part, complained that the *amil* was causing him harassment by extorting illegal *begar* from his village.⁶⁰ Similarly the jagirdar of village Niworo in pargana Chatsu complained against the zamindar's extorting *begar* from the cultivators in 1753.⁶¹ The jagirdar of village Kherli in pargana Bahatri reported that the menials of his village having fled due to famine, their brethren from some other villages had migrated there. The *faujdar* and the *amil* were trying to extort *begar* from them, from which the menials of that village had been exempt.⁶² Obviously, the *amil* and the *faujdar* were interpreting the exemption to apply to particular persons belonging to menial professions, whereas the jagirdar felt that the exemption was granted to the village as such. The state upheld the latter's interpretation. Interestingly, the *patel* almost invariably sided with his village in the complaints against extortions.

The conflict of interests among the dominant groups could at times bring some relief to those subjected to extortions. In an interesting case the zamindar in village Subrai, pargana Ghazi ka Thana, complained in 1765 that the *ijaradar* of his village had threatened to impose fine on any menial who rendered *begar* to the former.⁶³ His complaint was, however, admitted by the state and *begar* was resumed. The respite to the menials was, therefore, short-lived.

II

Irfan Habib mentions that the zamindars and the state officials in the Mughal empire were entitled to *begar* rendered by the menials in the form of carrying their goods and acting as guides, besides assisting the *madad-i-maash* grantees during their *shikar* expeditions.⁶⁴ It was, however, "as a rule an exceptional form of labour imposed upon some inhabitants by the authorities, rather than a regular part of productive work."⁶⁵ In our region and period, however, there is both a slightly greater variety as well as greater intensity even in the "customary" *begar*, for not only the peasants, besides the menials, are subject to it in some areas but the participation in agricultural production is also a form of forced labour. It is not possible to determine the share of forced labour relative to hired, family or tenant labour in agricultural production and it is likely that this share was not decisive. But as a phenomenon it did exist.

⁶⁰Chithi dt. Phagun Vadi 1, V.S. 1798, relating to village Rudaheli, pargana Paunkhar.

⁶¹Chithi dt. Magh Sudi 3, V.S. 1810.

⁶²Chithi dt. Bhadon Vadi 6, V.S. 1819/1762.

⁶³Chithi dt. Jeth Vadi 6, V.S. 1822.

⁶⁴Irfan Habib, *op. cit.*, pp. 150 and 248.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p. 239; H. Fukazawa, *op. cit.*, p. 121, for similar nature of *begar* in the Maratha kingdom during the eighteenth century.

The complaints, particularly of *begar*, originate from territories under almost every form of administration in eastern Rajasthan—territories that formed the *watan* of Jaipur's rulers, those given in *jagir* to them and those taken by them from the imperial *jagirdars* on *ijara*. This fact, along with some variation in the forms and incidence of extortions compared to the Mughal empire (as well as the Maratha kingdom), would perhaps suggest that such extortions had preceded as well as survived the integration of the Jaipur state with the empire. The state in its turn appears to have accepted the local custom in this regard instead of formulating a uniform law for all its territories.

Once the extortions in the form of forced labour and other forms were built into the social and administrative structure to ensure the predominance of the dominant sections of society, an attempt by them to extend the "customary" limits became almost inevitable. A study at the level of political and administrative institutions and policies is likely to ignore this aspect, for the extension of the limits takes place primarily at the local or village level where the peasants, artisans and menials as the producers of society's wealth come into immediate contact with those who appropriated their surplus.

As we have seen above, some degree of *begar* and a few other minor extortions like the supply of milk and curds and cots and beddings on specific occasions were sanctioned by custom. The scope and intensity of these extortions registered an upward trend as the century advanced. It is likely that the actual incidence of this developing trend was far greater than has been recorded. For, it may perhaps be assumed that the number of complaints made, on which this paper is based, would be considerably smaller than the actual number of cases of illegal extortions. One may also assume that the complaints would be made by and large in cases of gross violation of the custom; the milder violations would have gone unreported.

It is important to note that the intensification of exploitation of the peasants, artisans and the menials in these forms of extortions took place at the hands of almost everyone in a position to make a demand whether he was the *amil*, the *faujdar*, the jagirdar or the zamindar or even the *ijaradar* at the local level. However, the largest share in this process of intensification was taken by the state officials. Two-thirds of the complaints are against the *amil* and other officials whose responsibility it was to check any excesses on the inhabitants within their jurisdiction. The attitude of the state was at best lukewarm except where actual flight of peasants, artisans or menials, or even a threat of such flight, occurred. In a case of flight of peasants or artisans the revenues of the state declined directly, and when the menials fled, the decline was indirect on account of fall in production owing to the non-availability of their labour. However, in no case is there any punishment mentioned against illegal extortions. It may be suggested that the state policy was likely to have been to control the exploitation of the peasants, etc., by any one

socially and politically dominant section in the interests of the entire ruling class. Whether the state was actually able to exercise this control would depend on a number of factors at any give time, primarily on the state of the economy and the degree of political and administrative control.

The agrarian economy of eastern Rajasthan appears to have witnessed two phases from c. 1650 to the end of the eighteenth century. The first phase covers nearly a century and the second roughly half that period.

The first century of this period registers a degree of advance both in terms of agricultural production as well as of an upward price mobility.⁶⁶ There is a certain increase in the production of cash crops in the *kharif* (summer) season; but the proportion of crops of the *rabi* (winter) harvest grows as compared to the *kharif* harvest as a whole. The *rabi* crops in this region require a considerable scale of investment. The availability of additional investible surplus would thus be indicated. The price-rise, similarly, tended to benefit the peasantry, though the benefits would naturally be shared unequally by its different sections. The preference of the cultivators to pay the revenue in cash during the first century of our period (by shifting to *zabt* crops, the revenue from which was collected in cash)⁶⁷ and the substitution of kind for cash (and a shift back to *jinsi* crops for which revenue was paid in kind) during the latter half of the eighteenth century when prices were on the decline⁶⁸ is an interesting testimony to the additional surplus left with them by the price-rise.

The second phase of the agrarian economy saw a reversal of these happy trends. Both the scale of agricultural production and the prices suffered a decline. The prices register a downward trend from the 1740s.⁶⁹ The decline in production is slightly harder to pinpoint in the time-sequence, but the trend is unmistakable during the second half of the eighteenth century.⁷⁰ The decline in the production of commercial crops in the *qasbas* is particularly marked and this in turn would adversely affect the artisans.⁷¹

The change in the economy must have affected the entire countryside in

⁶⁶See S. Nurul Hasan, K.N. Hasan and S.P. Gupta, "The Pattern of Agricultural Production in the Territories of Amber (c. 1650-1750)," *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 28th Session at Mysore, Aligarh, 1966, pp. 244-64; S. Nurul Hasan and S.P. Gupta, "Price of Food Grains in the Territories of Amber (c. 1650-1750)," *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 29th Session at Patiala, Patna, 1968, pp. 345-68. A summary of S.P. Gupta's conclusion to the same effect in his unpublished doctoral dissertation, "Land Revenue System in Eastern Rajasthan" is also given in Dilbagh Singh, *Local and Land Revenue Administration*, p. 161.

⁶⁷S. Nurul Hasan, K.N. Hasan and S.P. Gupta, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

⁶⁸Dilbagh Singh, *Local and Land Revenue Administration*, p. 151.

⁶⁹S. Nurul Hasan and S.P. Gupta, *op. cit.*, p. 353 and *passim*; Dilbagh Singh, *Local and Land Revenue Administration*, p. 154.

⁷⁰Dilbagh Singh, *Local and Land Revenue Administration*, pp. 106, 110-11, 113, 161.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, p. 112.

this region, though, once again, the impact on various classes, and sections within each class, would be quite differential, the worst shock falling on those who were in the least position to absorb it. For this half century bears unmistakable testimony to growing poverty in the countryside and increasing indebtedness of the small peasants and possibly other poorer sections.⁷² A preliminary analysis of the innumerable documents of this period also suggests that famines began to make their appearance with greater frequency during the latter half of the eighteenth century in our region.⁷³ It is significant to note, however, that the decline in prices accompanies an overall decline in agricultural production including food grains.⁷⁴ This would indicate a fall in demand owing to a fall in the purchasing power even as the goods were becoming scarcer. It should not be far fetched to assume that the first to suffer from the fall in purchasing power were those who needed it most for their sheer survival.⁷⁵

Consequent to these developments, the relationship between the various classes and between their sections in the countryside would have been considerably altered leading to a greater independence of the small peasants, artisans and the menials on those who could provide them the means of subsistence.

This was perhaps the setting to the attempt by almost all the socially and politically dominant groups to extend the "customary" limits of extortions. To this the decline of the state's control over its administrative apparatus also contributed.

Even as the Mughal empire was declining, some of its constituent units showed remarkable tenacity in retaining intact, in varying degrees and for varying periods of time, the administrative system they had inherited from the empire. The Jaipur state was one of these units. During the reign of Sawai Jai Singh (1700-43), the state extended the territory under its jurisdiction by various means, attained great cultural heights and retained a degree of control over its administrative machinery.⁷⁶ After his reign, however, the state declined steeply. The successful Maratha raids into this territory were both a reflection and a partial cause of this decline.

⁷²*Ibid.*, p. 113. Also, Dilbagh Singh, "Rural Indebtedness in Eastern Rajasthan during the Eighteenth Century," *Proceedings of Rajasthan History Congress*, vol. VII, 1974, pp. 83-89.

⁷³S.P. Gupta and Dilbagh Singh, "Famines in the Territories of Amber (c. 1660-1770)," *Proceedings of Rajasthan History Congress*, vol. VIII, 1975.

⁷⁴Dilbagh Singh, *Local and Land Revenue Administration*, p. 161.

⁷⁵It is not necessary to go into the causes of this development in the economy, for we are here concerned merely with the fact of economic decline in the countryside. Dilbagh Singh has, however, attributed it to the Maratha invasions and consequent disinclination on the part of the peasants to invest in the *rabi* season; see his *Local and Land Revenue Administration*, p. 111.

⁷⁶For a detailed and competent, though a little biased, study of this reign, see V.S. Bhatnagar, *Life and Times of Sawai Jai Singh, 1688-1743*, Delhi, 1974.

The consequent laxity in central control within the state led to a localization of administrative authority. It is perhaps a reflection of such localization of authority that the *Diwan's* instructions to the *amils* on complaints of excessive extortions from peasants, etc., were at times disregarded and complaints had to be repeated.⁷⁷ Even in the normal course the local officials would not scrupulously refrain from taking advantage of the growing vulnerability of the peasants, artisans and menials accompanied by the officials' growing autonomy; a further temptation was added by the frequent transfers, particularly of the *amils*. On an average the *amil* stayed in one pargana for three years.⁷⁸ The *amils*, who mostly belonged to the caste of *sah* (*sahu*, money-lender), possessed an additional influence on the higher echelons of administrative authority on account of money lent to many of the local nobles.⁷⁹ It would therefore have required a man of exceptional integrity not to take advantage of his brief stay in a pargana in every way including stretching the limits of extortions which custom had sanctioned him. It is to be expected that the gains from illegal extortions would be shared unequally among the various strata of the dominant sections, the most influential getting the largest share. Of the 48 complaints, 32 are against the *amils* and other officials like the *faujdar* and the *kotwal*; of these 32, twenty had originated from the artisans in *qasbas* where the *amils* usually resided. The *amils*, and to an extent his junior colleagues, the *faujdar*s and the *kotwal*s, were most admirably situated to derive full advantage from the growing dependence of peasants, artisans and menials and their own increasing authority.

The nature of the economy also perhaps favoured the *amils* and other officials as far as the distribution of additional extortions among the various dominant sections was concerned. The agrarian economy of medieval India was essentially a free peasant economy⁸⁰ and the use of forced labour for agricultural production was perhaps marginal at best. It is possible that labour-scarcity was not a crucial problem in medieval Indian agriculture which might have necessitated the institutionalization of forced labour; such labour as was required could be obtained from the class of menials—among them the landless agricultural workers such as the *chamars*—in return for meagre payment in kind. The primary form of enhanced extortions could therefore be in using forced labour for unproductive purposes and taking away of goods

⁷⁷ Among our documents there is only one case of actual repetition of a complaint, that by the barbers of *qasba* Toda Rai Singh against the *amils*, extortion of *begar*, referred to earlier. But eight other documents give a warning against such repetition suggesting that the incidence of repetition was considerable.

⁷⁸ See Dilbagh Singh, *Local and Land Revenue Administration*, pp. 416, 464-69.

⁷⁹ Dilbagh Singh, "The Role of the Mahajan in the Rural Economy of Eastern Rajasthan during the 18th Century," *Social Scientist*, May 1974.

⁸⁰ Irfan Habib, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-15; S. Nurul Hasan, *Thoughts on Agrarian Relations in Mughal India*, Delhi, 1973, p. 18.

without payment. And the *amils* and other officials, being in possession of administrative authority, and with rare direct involvement in agricultural production, were most favoured by the situation to take the major share of illegal extortions, though the other groups also benefited from these.

The growing inability of the state to check its officials from making illegal demands left the peasants, artisans and menials with their own capacity of passive or active resistance to put a brake on these demands. The resistance could take the form of either actual flight from the village or a threat to that effect. It is interesting that in case of flight, the *Diwan* invariably issued stiff instructions to the officials to bring the fleeing groups back obviously by accepting their conditions. The humiliation of its officials implied in this was of little concern to the state where its basic economic interests were involved; in the bargain it could appear as the defender of its underprivileged subjects.

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Marriages among the Christians of Goa— A Study Based on Parish Registers*

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The importance and feasibility of conducting scientific investigations of ecclesiastical records in the field of historical demography has now been fully accepted, and valuable research work is being done in several European countries utilizing such data. So far no attempt has been made to utilize Indian ecclesiastical records for highlighting demographic and social characteristics of the past. This is due to difficulties in obtaining records comparable to those maintained by church authorities in Europe.

Goa, ruled by the Portuguese from 1510 to 1961, is one place in India where ecclesiastical records are available. These records are very useful for demographers and social scientists seeking to study the long-term trends in Goa's population.¹ The parish records on marriage can be utilized to determine marriage patterns and other associated social characteristics of the Catholics of Goa.²

The present paper attempts to use data obtained from parish registers of marriage to shed light on the demographic and social characteristics of the Goan Catholics in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Many analysts have used marriage registers as a data source. Buckatzach³ used parish registers of marriages to find out the occupations of most of the bridegrooms and

*This paper was presented in the Anthropological and Archaeology Section of the 63rd Session of the Indian Science Congress Association held at Waltair in January 1976. The author is grateful to Dr J.R. Rele, Director, I.I.P.S., Bombay, for his candid comments on the earlier version of this paper. However, all the shortcomings in the paper are exclusively attributable to the author. Thanks are due to the late Dr S.N. Agarwala, former Director of the Institute, for providing all the facilities and encouragement throughout the preparation of this paper.

¹Harish C. Srivastava, "Registration of Vital Events in Goa—A Study of the Current System in Retrospect," *Artha Vijnana*, Vol. 13, No. 4, December 1971, Poona, pp. 450-68.

²For details see Harish C. Srivastava, "Birth and Death Rates in Goa—An Appraisal of Parish Registers," International Institute for Population Studies, Bombay (Mimeographed), 1972, pp. 1-46.

³E.J. Buchatzach, "Occupations in the Parish Registers of Sheffield, 1655-1719," *Economic History Review*, 2nd Series, I, 1949, pp. 145-50.

fathers recorded between 1665 and 1719 in Sheffield. By comparing the occupation of the bridegroom with that of the bride's father, he established the predominance of the cutlery trade in Sheffield during the period 1665-1719. Similarly Smith,⁴ Peter Walne,⁵ Knodel,⁶ etc., have made use of parish registers of marriage.

The parish of Taleigao, nearly five kilometres south-west of the city of Panjim, the capital of Goa, Daman and Diu, was selected for the study. It is situated within Goa which occupies almost the centre of India's western coast line, about 368 kms to the south of Bombay and is sandwiched between the ranges of the Western Ghats and the Arabian Sea. Several considerations were taken into account in the selection of the parish. The parish should be inhabited mainly by Christians; it must be an area of reasonable size and, as far as possible, should be a parish of Catholics so that under-registration is minimum. In addition some other factors have also been taken into account, e.g., the parish should be one for which registers of marriage are available for all the years under study.

The parish of Taleigao is believed to be an ancient one with fairly complete ecclesiastical registers. However, a few gaps in the availability of data have been observed. Prior to 1830, marriage records are highly disparate both in physical completeness and in comprehensiveness. Therefore, the study is restricted to the period 1830-1909.

Relevant details pertaining to the marriage partners available in the marriage records, viz., names, date, year and place of marriage, age, profession, residence, native place, place of baptism, marital status, etc., were noted down on forms specially designed for the purpose. The place of baptism of the brides and the bridegrooms was recorded under three heads: (a) baptized in the same parish (the parish in question); (b) baptized in the adjacent parish (any other parish situated at a distance of five kilometres from the parish of Taleigao); and (c) baptized in a distant parish (any other parish situated at a distance of more than five kilometres from the parish of Taleigao). In order to highlight changes in the demographic and social characteristics of marriages, the whole time span for the study has been divided into decades.

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

In all 1971 entries were collected for the period 1830 to 1909 from the marriage registers. A linear function was fitted to the observed data on the


⁴T.E. Smith, "Cocos-Keling Islands: A Demographic Laboratory," *Population Studies*, Vol. XIV, 1960-61, pp. 94-129.

⁵Peter Walne, "Parish Registers and Registration of Births, Marriages and Deaths in England and Wales," *Archivum*, VIII, 1958, pp. 79-87.

⁶J. Knodel, "Infant Mortality and Fertility in Three Bavarian Villages: An Analysis of Family Histories from 19th Century," *Population Studies*, Vol. 22, 1968, pp. 297-318.

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number of marriages in each year and the figures were estimated for the years for which the data were not available. These estimated figures have also been employed for plotting the graph which shows an increasing trend. The 1860s, 1870s and 1890s had fewer marriages. The reasons for this are not entirely clear, it may have been due partly to political disturbances in Goa. During this period there were a number of revolts: Custoba's revolt in 1869, the army revolt of Volpoi Matasheli in 1870 and Dada Rane's revolt in 1895.⁷



Measures of the age at marriage of brides and bridegrooms in different decades have been given in Table 1. It is only for the post-1860 period that information regarding the age at marriage could be obtained from the old records. Even after 1860, age at marriage is not recorded for all the couples in the parish records. Hence, the measures have been calculated only for those whose age at marriage could be obtained. This affects the pre-1890 estimates; after 1800 there was a reasonably good coverage of age of marriage parties.

The mean age at marriage for brides and bridegrooms are virtually constant over time. While girls were marrying at about 18 or 19, boys were marrying

⁷For details see Antonia De Figueiredo, *Portugal and its Empire: The Truth*, London, 1961; B.K. Boman-Behram, *Goa and Ourselves*, Bombay, 1955; C.P. Saldana, *A Short History of Goa*, Goa, 1957; A.K. Prioiar, *Goa: Facts Versus Fiction*, Bombay, 1962.

TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF SPOUSES BY THEIR PLACE OF BAPTISM

Years	Brides				Total	Bridegrooms				Total
	Same Parish (%)	Adjacent Parish (%)	Distant Parish	N.A.		Same Parish (%)	Adjacent Parish (%)	Distant Parish	N.A.	
1830-39	144 (76.5)	18 (9.57)	25 (13.30)	1 (0.53)	188	184 (97.88)	1 (0.53)	2 (1.06)	1	188
1840-49	89 (68.99)	2 (1.55)	35 (27.13)	3 (2.33)	129	129 (100.00)	—	—	—	129
1850-59	161 (57.50)	26 (9.29)	93 (33.21)	—	280	279 (99.64)	—	1 (0.36)	—	280
1860-69	121 (50.84)	25 (10.50)	92 (38.66)	—	238	226 (94.96)	1 (0.42)	11 (4.62)	—	238
1870-79	151 (60.16)	24 (9.56)	76 (30.28)	—	251	224 (89.24)	6 (2.39)	21 (8.37)	—	251
1880-89	270 (86.53)	19 (6.09)	23 (7.38)	—	312	292 (93.59)	7 (2.24)	13 (4.17)	—	312
1890-99	194 (72.39)	20 (7.46)	53 (19.78)	1 (0.37)	268	242 (90.30)	—	26 (9.70)	—	268
1900-1909	212 (69.28)	23 (4.79)	68 (22.22)	3 (0.98)	306	216 (70.59)	19 (6.21)	71 (23.20)	—	306
	1342 (68.05)	157 (7.96)	465 (23.58)	8 (0.41)	1972	1792 (90.88)	34 (1.72)	145 (7.35)	1 (0.05)	1972

DISTRIBUTION OF SPOUSES ACCORDING TO THE MARITAL STATUS OF THE BRIDEGRROOMS AND BRIDES AT THE TIME OF CURRENT MARRIAGE FOR DIFFERENT DECADES

Year	Bridegroom Bachelor			Bridegroom Widower		
	Bride Spinster	Bride Widow	Total	Bride Spinster	Bride Widow	Grand Total
1830-39	182	—	182	1	—	183*
1840-49	129	—	129	—	—	129
1850-59	280	—	280	—	—	280
1860-69	221	3	224	11	3	238
1870-79	237	1	238	10	3	251
1880-89	310	—	310	2	—	312
1890-99	265	—	265	3	—	268
1900-1909	294	—	294	11	1	306
	1918 (97.51%)	4 (0.20%)	1922 (97.71%)	38 (1.93%)	7 (0.36%)	45 (2.29%)
						1967

* Information for five couples was not available in the decades 1930-39; therefore, these cases have been excluded from the grand total which is 183.

on an average, at 26 or 27. The mean age at marriage for boys declined from 30.46 in the 1860s to 25.95 during 1900-09. Median and modal ages at marriage along with their variance are also provided (see Table 1).

It is evident from Table 2 that almost all the brides were marrying for the first time and widow remarriages were rare. Most of the bridegrooms were also marrying for the first time. A remarkable feature was that not even one case of remarriage of a divorced person could be found during the whole period of study. Divorce was not sanctioned by the Catholic Church, and cases, if any, are unlikely to have been reported to, or recorded by, the parish.

While most of the couples were baptized in the parish of Taleigao (Table 3), the proportion of bridegrooms baptized within the parish was higher than of brides. It appears to have been the social practice that the bridegroom's parish was generally the one where wedding took place. Of course, some brides and bridegrooms had been baptized in other parishes, the number being higher for brides than for grooms.

Results reported in Table 4 indicate that out of 1967 marriages considered, 97.51 per cent were between never-married persons, i.e., these marriages were contracted between the spouses who were bachelors and spinsters. Widow remarriages appear to have been mainly in the 1860s and 1870s, while widower remarriage was concentrated not only in these two decades but in the 1900-09 decade as well.

A Note on the Malayali Origins of Anti-Brahminism in South India

ROBIN JEFFREY

Two schools of argument have developed about the nature of anti-Brahminism in south India in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The first has seen south Indian politics in terms of social conflict between Brahmins and non-Brahmins. It has been argued that between 1916 and 1919

nationalist politicians—largely Brahmans . . . were challenged by a group of non-Brahmans who had recently begun to take an active part in the politics of Madras. . . . The conflict that developed between the Brahmans and the non-Brahmans in south India at this time was the articulation of pre-existing social rivalry.¹

On the other hand, a second school has contended that by the late 1920s "the communal issue was finally obvious for the hoax it had always been."² According to this school, politics in the south was about factional rivalry among magnates and their clients for the patronage available within British-created institutions.

The aim of this paper is a very modest one: to add to our knowledge of anti-Brahminism in south India a few details that have hitherto been overlooked. At the same time, I would like to suggest that the process taking place in the south was perhaps not so "very novel" as has been contended.³ Educated elites seeking to mobilize wider support—whether to take part in electoral politics or simply to extract recognition from governments or reigning cliques—often employ "ethnic" rallying cries. They turn to a "pool of symbols" and choose the symbol they deem most appropriate for the time and

¹Eugene F. Irschick, *Politics and Social Conflict in South India*, Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. xiv. S. Saraswathi, *Minorities in Madras State*, Delhi, Impex India, 1974, pp. 38-39.

²D. A. Washbrook, *The Emergence of Provincial Politics. The Madras Presidency, 1870-1920*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 323. See also C. J. Baker, *The Politics of South India, 1920-1937*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976 and Baker and Washbrook, *South India: Political Institutions and Political Change, 1880-1940*, Delhi, Macmillan, 1975.

³Washbrook, *Provincial Politics*, p. 287.

situation.⁴ This is part of a process by which "ethnic groups"—groups which are "objectively distinct but whose members do not necessarily attach subjective importance or political significance to that fact"—are "transformed into subjectively conscious and politically oriented communities."⁵ This process has gone on not merely elsewhere in India but throughout the world, and seems to me to be closely related to the decay of traditional political and social organization. In south India, once the "little kingdom" or "locality," in which men's lives were regulated by the nature of their relations with their local land-controller, began to break down—once the land-controller's authority began to be undermined regularly from outside, once men began to travel regularly and freely over a wide area, once new market forces began to govern the sorts of crops men planted and what they did with them, once western-style education began to make men aware of possibilities beyond the "little kingdom"—men were forced to look for new ways to aggregate. Where previously they had lived in interdependence within a small circle of caste superiors and inferiors and had married within a small group of caste-fellows, they now began to see that there were other men similar to themselves—sometimes even sharing the same caste name—in "little kingdoms" distant from their own. Possibilities opened up for marrying with the daughters of such men or combining with them for political or social purposes. There was nothing hard and fast about these potential new groups. The choice of symbols made by the elites who first transcended the boundaries of the "little kingdom" was often crucial in shaping—or failing to shape—group identity.⁶

The gist of this paper may be briefly summarized. On the Kerala coast, non-Malayali Brahmins—Tamils and Marathas—had appeared in increasing numbers from the early eighteenth century. Working as administrators for centralizing rulers, they had often usurped the position of Malayalis, particularly of Nayars (Malayali Sudras), and had used their ritual status to take advantage of the privileges previously reserved for the revered Malayali Brahmins. From the eighteenth century, there is evidence of Malayali resentment against the interloper. By the 1880s, a small western-educated elite of

⁴Bernard S. Cohn, "Regions Subjective and Objective: Their Relation to the Study of Modern Indian History and Society" in Thomas R. Metcalf, ed., *Modern India*, London, Macmillan, 1971, p. 49.

⁵Paul R. Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1974, p. 6.

⁶Brass has made his view clear: "Political organizations and voluntary associations do not arise spontaneously to reflect the demands of a 'natural' ethnic group. They often precede the existence of a widespread sense of group identity and they play a critical role in shaping or failing to shape it." *Ibid.*, p. 38. Anthony Low has often suggested the importance for the rise of "communalism or 'tribalism'" of the breakdown of localized, traditional social and political organization, both in South Asia and in Africa.

Nayars had emerged in Travancore, but found itself excluded by non-Malayali Brahmins from the influence it thought it deserved, both in the Maharaja's palace and in the administration. A campaign against Brahmin dominance was conducted in the press of Madras city and through public meetings and petitions in Travancore. The Nayar elite made its point, and by the 1890s had reached a comfortable accommodation with official Brahmins. The tone of the agitation, however, remained and was to be revived by other groups at the turn of the century and thereafter. The young Nayars of the 1880s were friends and relatives of other Nayars who were to use the anti-Brahmin war-cry in similar circumstances in Madras city in the decade of the First World War. These men were making use of objective social differences that they had already seen successfully exploited in Travancore 25 years before.

G. PARAMESWARAN PILLAI

The career of G. Parameswaran Pillai (1864-1903), a Travancore Nayar, illustrates the nature of anti-Brahmin feeling in Kerala, the way in which that feeling was used in an elite-organized political campaign and how that feeling became a useful symbol in the elite politics of Madras city.

Parameswaran Pillai was born in Trivandrum, the son—and this point cannot be too strongly emphasized—of a Tamil Brahmin. Nayars were matrilineal, and many families until well into the twentieth century considered it an honour to have their young women visited by men of higher Malayali castes. Tamil Brahmins were also able to take advantage of this hypergamy, though there was always some Malayali resentment against the practice. "If there is none [to wed]," a Malayalam proverb advised, "then a Pattar [Tamil Brahmin]; if there is nothing [to eat], then greens."⁷ Even in the eighteenth century, when they began to enter Travancore in large numbers as servants of a conquering Maharaja, Tamil Brahmins were regarded with a mixture of awe and derision.⁸ Their appearance was clearly distinct from most Malayalis: they wore the sacred thread; they tied their *kudumi* (tuft of hair) at the back of the head, not in front; they spoke Tamil, not Malayalam. Malayalam proverbs concerning their cupidity were common:

If there be want in the Brahmin's house, you must not expect to find anything in the king's palace.

The Pattar who hears of a rice feast and the pig of a chase run equally fast.⁹

⁷*Report of the Malabar Marriage Commission*, Madras, Government Press, 1891, Appendix III, p. 4.

⁸Krishna Chaitanya, *A History of Malayalam Literature*, Bombay, Orient Longmans, 1971, p. 120.

⁹*Madras Mail*, 5 July 1894, p. 4.

They took advantage of many institutions that were closed to non-Brahmins.¹⁰

Parameswaran Pillai's father was—according to Parameswaran Pillai's son—"an orthodox Brahmin, meticulous in the observance or [of] all caste conventions. It was therefore but natural that young Parameswaran found himself in the caste-ridden atmosphere of social inequalities even in his own hearth and home. . . ."¹¹ It was not uncommon for a Brahmin, once a young Nayar girl had conceived, to give up all interest in her; in a matrilineal system, the child was the responsibility of the mother's house.¹² In any event, after his mother died while he was still a child, Parameswaran Pillai was brought up by his mother's aunt. He had no brothers or sisters, and seems to have had no further connection with his father.¹³

The Travancore into which Parameswaran Pillai was born presented a rapidly changing scene as a result of a series of administrative and educational innovations vigorously prosecuted from the 1860s.¹⁴ A first-grade college, affiliated to Madras University, granted degrees in Trivandrum from 1870, and Parameswaran Pillai entered it in the late 1870s to study for a B.A. In the 1870s the college produced 60 graduates, 31 of whom were non-Malayali Brahmins; from 1880-89 it turned out 157 graduates, 77 of them non-Malayali Brahmins.¹⁵ In the 1870s virtually all these graduates were easily absorbed into the expanding government service, where they found the administrative careers they considered worthy and respectable. Parameswaran Pillai's teachers included a number of the earlier graduates, among them P. S. Sundaram Pillai (1855-97), whose theories about the ancient history of south India were to be taken up for political purposes. Sundaram Pillai attacked the *Ramayana* as a story distorted by Brahmins to explain their unjust domination of south India and suggested a counter-version in which Ravana emerged as the hero, the beleaguered defender of Dravidian civilization against north Indian hordes.¹⁶ For nearly 20 years, Sundaram Pillai influenced the students who passed through the college and provided an overlay of

¹⁰The institution that rankled most with Malayalis was that of the free feeding house attached to temples where Brahmins were able to dine once or twice a day.

¹¹G.P. Sekhar, ed., *Select Writings and Speeches of G. P. Pillai*, Trivandrum, Radh-Ind Publications, 1964, p. 175.

¹²Mannath Padmanabhan, *ente jivltasmaranakal*, Trivandrum, NSS Press, n.d. (c. 1957), p. 2. *Hindu*, 8 August 1905, p. 3 and *Madras Mail*, 1 November 1911, p. 3, for cases in which Nayar women sued Brahmins for child support.

¹³Sekhar, *Writings*, p. 175.

¹⁴Robin Jeffrey, *The Decline of Nayar Dominance: Society and Politics in Travancore, 1847-1908*, London, Sussex University Press, 1976, pp. 70-103.

¹⁵Jeffrey, *Nayar Dominance*, p. 110.

¹⁶Irschick, *Politics and Social Conflict*, pp. 282-83. T. Ponnambalam Pillai, "The Morality of the *Ramayana*," *Malabar Quarterly Review*, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (June 1909), pp. 83-88. *Madras Mail*, 14 May 1894, p. 5; 4 May 1897, p. 5. Jeffrey, *Nayar Dominance*, p. 345.

scholarly legitimacy to a view that was to have growing political utility.

There was a third element—in addition to Sundaram Pillai's theories and the long-held Malayali resentment of non-Malayali Brahmins—in Parameswaran Pillai's early experience that brought home the potential usefulness of an anti-Brahmin symbol. Since the 1850s, European Protestant missionaries had proselytized vigorously in Travancore. In their endeavours to acquire caste-Hindu converts, they had adopted two stratagems. In conversations with Nayars, they had dwelt on "the cunning of the Brahmins in imposing upon the Nairs laws that are favourable to the Brahmins and disadvantageous to the Nairs. . . ." More specifically, they had ridiculed the matrilineal system, the absence of marriage among Nayars and the way in which this system was exploited by Brahmins. The jibe was increasingly heard: "No Nayar knows his father."¹⁷ The matrilineal system was in consonance neither with western notions nor ideas of classical Hinduism; the continuance of the system was increasingly linked to "the cunning of the Brahmins."

From 1817 to 1914, with one three-year exception, the Dewans of Travancore were non-Malayali Brahmins, and throughout Parameswaran Pillai's youth, non-Malayali Brahmins held between 25 and 30 per cent of the positions worth Rs 10 or more a month in the government service. The rulers of Travancore, and other Kshatriyas in Kerala, were deeply reverential towards Brahmins. As one Maharaja wrote, "Travancore is perhaps the most priest-ridden Native State in the whole of India . . . the ruler himself is not his own master in religious matters. Certain heavy expenses have inevitably to be incurred in the performance of appointed ceremonies, besides the current one of feeding gratis all Brahmins all the year round."¹⁸ In Parameswaran Pillai's youth, there were more than 40 free feeding houses exclusively for Brahmins and costing four lakhs of rupees a year to maintain. As another Nayar of a later generation wrote, ". . . the Brahmin boys in our school [c. 1905] were not particularly liked by the others . . . every day they could get a free meal in the *uttupura* [feeding house] attached to the temple."¹⁹

In the 1870s, while the bureaucracy was expanding steadily and the college in Trivandrum was producing graduates at the rate of only a dozen or so a year, the aspirations of the young graduates could be met, and there was little reason for the western-educated Nayar elite to object to the influx of non-Malayali Brahmins. By the 1880s, however, this situation had begun to change. Increasingly, young Nayars were capable of—as has been written of

¹⁷Rev. Jacob Chandy, "Journal," 13 June 1850, London Missionary Society Archives. See also "Journal," 2 March 1853, 12 May 1853, 28 January 1859. Chandy recorded that his attacks on Brahmins got ready agreement from Nayars. See also *Madras Mail*, 28 March 1882, p. 3.

¹⁸[Vishakhram Tirunal], "A Native Statesman," *Calcutta Review*, Vol. LV, 1872, p. 251.

¹⁹K. P. S. Menon, *Many Worlds*, London, Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 24.

similar circumstances in north India—"identifying oppressors and cultivating a sense of grievance against them."²⁰

In 1882, while still a student in the college of Trivandrum, Parameswaran Pillai began to give vent to such grievances. Doubtless influenced by his teachers and immediate seniors who had formed a Malayali Social Union and then a Malayali Sabha to discuss the problems of Nayars, Parameswaran Pillai began to attack the Brahmin Dewan, V. Ramiengar, and his alleged policy of employing non-Malayali Brahmins at the expense of Malayalis. The articles, published anonymously in English in the *Cochin Argus* and *Western Star*, appear to have been subtle and revealing. The complaint was not put in terms of Nayars vs. Brahmins. If the appeal was to have any hope of gaining its aims, it was essential that it have the approval of the Maharaja, and his reverence for Brahmins was well known. Instead, the grievance was stated in terms of Malayalis vs. Foreigners.²¹ Parameswaran Pillai and his contemporaries were choosing their symbol carefully.

In spite of their apparent caution, however, the Dewan was enraged. Inquiries revealed Parameswaran Pillai to be the author of the offending articles. He and two college mates were expelled, and Parameswaran Pillai had to flee to Madras city to avoid arrest.²² He was befriended in Madras by Malayali students, and eventually graduated from Presidency College in 1888. In the meantime, he took up various jobs to support himself and began to contribute regularly to the Madras press.

A CAMPAIGN FROM MADRAS CITY

We need, I think, to know much more of the Madras city of the 1880s in which Parameswaran Pillai arrived. Its importance as a focal point for the western-educated of the Madras Presidency has perhaps been understated.²³ Although it did not compare to Calcutta or Bombay as a burgeoning industrial city, it was the administrative, legal, educational, journalistic and railway centre of the presidency. It had a significant western-educated elite, drawn from every district of the presidency, and was developing a modest cosmopolitanism and perhaps a distinctive south Indian cultural synthesis.²⁴ For a young, ambitious writer like Parameswaran Pillai, the city had a striking

²⁰Brass, *Language*, p. 414.

²¹*Kerala Mitram*, 28 May 1881 and (?) October 1812, in *Reports on Native Newspapers, Madras, Malayalam*. The files of neither the *Cochin Argus* nor the *Western Star* have survived.

²²Sekhar, *Writings*, pp. 177-79.

²³Baker, *Politics of South India*, pp. 22-23, places the growth of the Madras city as an important focal point for the presidency only in the 1890s.

²⁴Dr Susan Lewandowski, Amherst College, was working on these lines and exploring the notion of a cultural synthesis.

attraction: it supported four daily or tri-weekly newspapers.²⁵ There were also hostels run by Malayali students from all parts of Kerala, and regular weekly social gatherings and debating clubs, at which such heroes of the Madras bar as Eardley Norton occasionally appeared.²⁶

By 1891, there were more than 1,500 Malayalis in Madras city.²⁷ The majority of them were Nayars, and most of them came from backgrounds similar to Parameswaran Pillai's. This is not to say that Malayalis set the intellectual tone in Madras, but merely to suggest that they were well-represented among the city's educated elite and that their ideas were widely ventilated. Among the rising young Nayars in Madras at the time were C. Sankaran Nair (1857-1934), M. Krishnan Nair (1870-1938), K. P. Raman Menon (1866-1942) and T. M. Nair (1869-1919), the initiator of the "Non-Brahmin Manifesto" of 1916. T. M. Nair and Parameswaran Pillai became close friends.

A new Maharaja had come to the *gaddi* in Travancore in 1885, and Parameswaran Pillai's old college mates and teachers in Trivandrum soon saw the new ruler as a mere tool of his Tamil Brahmin favourite, an illiterate former cook. The favourite was said to sell his influence, and generally he was thought to work against aspiring, western-educated Nayars. From August 1887, Parameswaran Pillai began a campaign of stinging attacks on the Travancore government in the *Madras Standard*. He was kept well-informed of events in the state by his friends. These attacks culminated in the so-called Malayali Memorial of 1891, which bore 10,000 signatures and was presented to the Maharaja.²⁸

An analysis of the attacks on the Travancore government and the wording of the Memorial is illuminating, for it shows how—perhaps for the first time in the Madras Presidency—members of a western-educated elite sought the most appropriate symbols with which to attempt to mobilize larger numbers for a political campaign. The process involved trial and error. There were three considerations dictating the choice of symbols. First, they had to exclude the group—in this case, non-Malayali Brahmins in the Travancore government—against which the campaign was directed. Second, they had to reflect objective social differences clearly evident in Travancore. Third, they had to be in consonance with the accepted attitudes and conduct of the groups that held power—the Maharaja of Travancore and the British government in Madras, with which Travancore was in direct relations.

²⁵*Hindu, Madras Times, Madras Mail and Madras Standard*.

²⁶P. K. Parameswaran Nair, C. V. Raman Pilla, Kottayam, National Book Stall, 1959; first published, 1948, pp. 133-34n. R. Suntharalingam, *Politics and Nationalist Awakening in South India, 1852-91*, Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1974, p. 213.

²⁷*Census of India, 1891*, Vol. XIV, *Madras*, p. 149, gives 1,765 Kerala-born residents of Madras, though on p. 138 Malayalam-speakers are given as only 553.

²⁸The discussion of the Malayali Memorial is based on Jeffrey, *Nayar Dominance*, pp. 157-76.

To comply with the first criterion, the campaign could be directed against either "foreigners" or "Brahmins." To aim it at "foreigners," i.e., non-Travancoreans, gave it legitimacy with the Maharaja and the British government in Madras.²⁹ "Foreigner" too could be made to reflect social conditions: a person not born in Travancore. But here a problem arose: many non-Malayali Brahmins had been born in Travancore or had lived there from childhood. Similarly, to define "Travancorean" as someone who spoke Malayalam as his mother-tongue would have excluded the Tamil area in the south of the state from which the original Travancore had sprung in the eighteenth century. Such a definition would not have squared with the position of the Maharaja as ruler of a united Travancore.

By the first two criteria, the most useful form in which to present the campaign was as an anti-Brahmin crusade. Brahmins were exclusive, identifiable; there was widespread feeling against them, dating from the eighteenth century; and they clearly held jobs in the administration vastly out of proportion to their numbers, jobs that members of the English-educated Nayar elite coveted. In all this, however, there was one difficulty: neither the Maharaja nor the British government in Madras would look with favour on a campaign waged explicitly against Brahmins. The Maharaja was devoted to his Brahmin favourite and to the traditional hierarchy; British officials, yet to be confronted by the threat of Tilak and his followers in Maharashtra in the late 1890s, were not ready to encourage systematic assaults on Brahmins or other groups.

The Malayali Memorial, as the popular name implies, was finally developed around a "Travancorean" theme; but the anti-Brahmin aspect—because it was so close to the hearts of so many Malayalis—continued to intrude, even into the wording of the Memorial itself. That the organizers of the Memorial managed to mute the anti-Brahmin theme as much as they did demonstrates the importance of leadership in determining the way in which an ostensibly spontaneous social grievance is formulated.

The Memorial, circulated throughout Travancore in 1890 and presented to the Maharaja early in 1891, set out to inform the ruler of "the grievance which affects the most important classes of your Highness's subjects." That grievance was "the denial to them of a fair share in the government of their country and their systematic exclusion from the higher grades of its services." To eliminate the major competitors, the Memorial divided the population of Travancore into three categories: (i) Malayali Hindus, "meaning thereby all

²⁹In spite of Irachick, *Politics and Social Conflict*, pp. 280-81, I would argue that it was only at the turn of the century, after the rise of Tilak's influence in the Bombay Presidency, that Indian Civil Servants in Madras became generally suspicious of Brahmins. It was 1903 before there was any doubt about approving the appointment of Brahmins as Dewans of Travancore. R. S. Lepper to Curzon, 29 June 1903, India Office Library, Ampthill Papers, E/233/17.

Hindus who follow the Marumakkatayam [matrilineal] system of inheritance or a mixed system of Makkatayam and Marumakkatayam and whose *kudumi* or tuft of hair is in the front." They were said to amount to 60 per cent of the population; (ii) "Foreign Hindus," who included "the foreigners who have settled and domiciled in Travancore" (13 per cent); and (iii) Christians (21 per cent). The Memorial's preamble excluded Muslims, Jews and Europeans from consideration. Statistics were introduced to show the stranglehold of "Foreign Hindus" on the government service and the meagre representation of "Malayali Hindus" and Christians.

Towards the end of the Memorial, however, there was a glaring change: the problem was stated in clear, Nayar-vs.-Brahmin terms. Brahmin Dewans, it was claimed, had "not only introduced their relations, castemen and friends into the State, but tried their best to oust the Nairs and prevent them from filling any of the higher appointments." Brahmins were the sole beneficiaries of the free feeding houses and the charity of Malayali rulers, "yet Travancore certainly cannot be said to have been conquered by the foreign Brahmins; and they are in no way entitled to play the Englishmen in this state."

The organizers of the Memorial saw that there were weaknesses and dangers in the "non-Travancorean" angle of attack and had attempted to overcome these by including explicit charges against Brahmins. "The agitation is chiefly and mainly against these Tamilian Brahmins," concluded a correspondent of the *Hindu*. The *Madras Times* decided that "save us from the Foreign Brahmins" is the burden of the cry. . . . Moreover, a letter writer to the *Hindu* pointed out, if Travancore was to be solely for the Travancoreans, then Madras city should be only for non-Malayalis and the Travancoreans there should pack their bags and go home.³⁰

THE LEGACY OF THE MEMORIAL IN TRAVANCORE

The immediate outcome of the Memorial agitation appeared to be anti-climactic. Delegations met the Dewan in June 1891 and were fobbed off with the ritual promise that due consideration would be given to their representations. Officially, the agitation seemed ended. But it lived in the memories of thousands of individuals. In 1892 the elderly Dewan retired and was replaced by a Tamil Brahmin from the Travancore government service. This man immediately arrived at an accommodation with the official Nayars who had inspired the Memorial, and under him they advanced rapidly in the service. With this happy denouement, the Malayali Sabha of official Nayars dissolved and its newspaper ceased to publish.

The Memorial, however, had an important legacy in Travancore, one that

³⁰*Hindu*, 24 February 1891, p. 3 and 28 May 1891, p. 3. *Madras Times*, 20 January 1891, p. 3.

tends to confirm the contention that "political organizations . . . shape their environments and the identities of group members" as well reflecting those environments and identities.³¹ The English-educated elite of other social groups began in the 1890s to see the Memorial as a petition of "over 10,000 Nairs."³² They also began to see the potential of such campaigns. The Memorial, men reasoned, had ultimately worked well for those Nayers; why could such a technique not be made to work for them too? In the next 10 years members of the Syrian Christian and Irava elites attempted to organize similar petitions. The fact that these did not command the attention of the Malayali Memorial demonstrated, in part, the shrewdness of the Malayali Memorialists in choosing a "Travancorean" focus for their agitation. The Irava and Syrian Christian petitions could be dismissed as simply self-interested grievances.

There was, too, a crucial difference between the Nayar elite in 1890 and the Syrian Christian and Irava elites in the years to follow. Nayers were caste-Hindus and already held most of the positions in the government service. It took only the desultory volley of the Malayali Memorial to induce non-Malayali Brahmin officials to reach an understanding with their Nayar contemporaries. Syrian Christians and Iravas, however, were virtually excluded from the administration; members of their elites were seeking an initial entry, and this was much harder to effect. What was to be required for elites of non-savarna-Hindu groups was an alliance based on the symbol of caste-Hindu domination; but this did not begin to form until the end of the First World War.³³ In the meantime, however, the efforts of elites to mobilize their co-religionists and castemen on communal lines—with the example of 1891 clearly before them—went on apace.

Nor did anti-Brahmin feeling die in Travancore or in Kerala generally. The social differences between non-Malayali Brahmins and various groups of Malayalis were too evident and longstanding—and coincided too well with the immediate concerns of various elites. (Brahmins, after all, *did* have a huge stake in the government service.) *Malayala Manorama*, a Syrian Christian newspaper that found occasional satisfaction in setting a Nayar cat among Brahmin pigeons, summed up the situation in 1898:

For a long time in the past we have all been watching the progress of the strife between Brahmins and Malayali Sudras. This strife in itself is a product of modern times. . . .

³¹ Brass, *Language*, p. 367.

³² *Madras Mail*, 16 November 1816, p. 3.

³³ By the end of the First World War, the non-caste-Hindu elites, which had prospered through growing economic opportunities, numbered in the thousands. See Jeffrey, "Travancore: Status, Class and the Growth of Radical Politics, 1860-1940" in Jeffrey, ed., *People, Princes and Paramount Power: Society and Politics in the Indian Princely States*, Delhi, Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

. . . the leaven of English education has brought about a vast change. Though people in the country parts still retain the old notions [of deference to Brahmins] . . . the educated portion of the Sudra community in Travancore hate the whole body of Brahmins with a hatred that ever burns like a steady core of white fire within their breasts.³⁴

The journalistic clashes in Trivandrum at the turn of the century were fierce. Non-Malayali Brahmins by then had their own paper, whose only object, claimed one Nayar, was the "persecution of the Nair."³⁵ Brahmins were holding an annual festival to coincide and compete with the Malayalis' *Onam* celebrations.³⁶ "A Brahmin," another correspondent concluded, "strinks in the nostrils if [of] a Nair nowadays. . . ."³⁷ By the time of the First World War, however, elite Brahmins and Nayers were beginning to be seen and categorized by others as "caste Hindus." The elites of other groups, taking their lead from the tone already set, began to state their key grievance as the "caste Hindu" domination of the Travancore government.

THE LEGACY IN MADRAS

G. Parameswaran Pillai and others³⁸ had made known in Madras city the intensity of long-standing anti-Brahmin feeling in Kerala and its utility for elites seeking wider political support. His "friend, physician and guide,"³⁹ Dr T. M. Nair, with whom he travelled to Britain for the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria in 1897, was to be the leading protagonist in the "non-Brahmin movement" initiated in Madras city in 1916. Parameswaran Pillai's brother-in-law, S. K. Nair, a veteran lecturer with anti-Brahmin views, was the likely author of *Non-Brahmin Letters*, a booklet published in 1915 that enjoyed some popularity among elite non-Brahmins in Madras and expressed grievances that many felt.⁴⁰

³⁴ *Malayala Manorama*, 19 March 1898.

³⁵ *Madras Mail*, 2 November 1903, p. 5.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, and *Madras Mail*, 26 August 1905, p. 5.

³⁷ *Madras Times*, 21 March 1905, p. 3.

³⁸ C. V. Raman Pillai, the Malayalam novelist and Travancore government servant, was a close friend of Parameswaran Pillai and C. Karunakara Menon. Raman Pillai wrote for both the *Madras Standard* in the 1890s and Karunakara Menon's *Indian Patriot* after he established it in 1905. Karunakara Menon had been with the *Hindu* from about 1889; he was its editor from 1898-1905. P.K. Parameswaran Nair, *Raman Pilla*, pp. 277-80. V. K. Narasimhan, *Kasturi Ranga Iyengar*, Delhi, Publications Division, 1963, pp. 34 and 37.

³⁹ G. Parameswaran Pillai, *London and Paris through Indian Spectacles*, Madras, Vajjanti Press, 1897, p. i.

⁴⁰ For S.K. Nair and *Non-Brahmin Letters*, Madras, Indian Patriot Press, 1915, see Menon, *Many Worlds*, pp. 35-36, *Madras Mail*, 20 September 1960, p. 5; Irschick, *Politics and Social Conflict*, pp. 46-47; Baker, *Politics of South India*, p. 31; Washbrook, *Emergence of Provincial Politics*, p. 281; Sekhar, *Writings*, p. 205. I have found no explanation for the Indian

Parameswaran Pillai's later career did little to alter his earlier views about Brahmin dominance. In 1892 he took the *Madras Standard* on a ten-year lease, and in 1895 he converted it from a tri-weekly to a daily. It is unlikely we shall ever know what views Parameswaran Pillai was expounding in the 1890s, at a time when his newspaper briefly rivalled the three other Madras dailies (*Hindu*, *Times* and *Mail*) and had among its regular contributors Eardley Norton, Dinshaw Wacha, W. S. Caine and, on occasion, M. K. Gandhi.⁴¹ His career as a daily newspaper editor was short. In 1898, he was convicted of plagiarism in connection with his two books, *Representative Men of South India* and *Representative Indians*; in 1899 he was convicted of defamation. In both cases, the plaintiffs were Tamil Brahmins. It had been a Tamil Brahmin who had earned Parameswaran Pillai's rebukes in 1882 and who had ultimately forced the young Nayar to flee Travancore for Madras. Parameswaran Pillai's own father, who appears to have taken no interest in the offspring of his liaison with a Nayar girl, was also a Tamil Brahmin. Brought up in the ambivalent Kerala atmosphere of reverence and ridicule for such Brahmins, Parameswaran Pillai held anti-Brahmin views. No doubt he could work with Brahmins in Madras city when it suited his purposes; but in the Madras of those days, he had to do so if he wished to earn a living. That condition merely heightened the feeling of grievance: the Brahmin grip was difficult to escape.⁴² In the right circumstances, the resentment and suspicion of Brahmins could be an effective rallying point for a political campaign—as it had been in Travancore in the years before 1891. Malayalis felt such resentment more keenly than Tamils, for in the Malayali case a language difference reinforced the status cleavage between Nayars and non-Malayali Brahmins. But as has been pointed out elsewhere, there was similar resentment against Brahmins in a number of the districts of the Madras Presidency.⁴³ The cleavage between Brahmins and people who were not Brahmins was noticeable in varying degrees throughout the presidency. It was

Office Library catalogue's attributing authorship [of *Non-Brahmin Letters* to "S. Ranga Ayyar."

⁴¹Sekhar, *Writings*, pp. 185, 191. The India Office Library holds back numbers of the *Standard* up to 1889, but for the years thereafter, no set of back numbers appears to have survived.

⁴²*The Copyright Case*, Madras, Lawrence Asylum Press, 1898; *Madras Mail*, 7 July 1899, p. 6. Parameswaran Pillai was fined Rs 200 in the first case and Rs 500 in the second. Washbrook, *Emergence of Provincial Politics*, p. 281, makes the point that men can work with people they do not like, though he draws a somewhat different conclusion.

⁴³Baker, *Politics of South India*, pp. 28-29. Nor was social conflict unknown in south India in the early nineteenth century. See Brenda E. F. Beck, "The Right-Left Division of South Indian Society," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, August 1970, pp. 790-91; J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972, reprint of 3rd edn., 1906, pp. 24-27.

a symbol capable of being picked up and used in elite politics, just as religion was used in north India.

At the same time, as Brass has argued, elites, in choosing certain symbols, are shaping group identities. Thus Dr T. M. Nair's "Non-Brahmin Manifesto" of December 1916 was partly no doubt played as a card in the game of elite, factional politics centred in Madras city. But the objective social differences had always been there, and among Malayalis they had been perceived, and grievances articulated, even in the eighteenth century. Moreover, once these categories popularized by T. M. Nair and his associates became an accepted part of political rhetoric, they began to become self-fulfilling: group identities hardened in response to the appeals and organizational efforts of elite leaders. For T. M. Nair and other Malayalis, the anti-Brahmin rhetoric had a clear and widespread reality in Kerala. Its importance in the Tamil country was to grow steadily in the 1930s and 1940s.⁴⁴

Why did the "Non-Brahmin Manifesto" appear when it did and capture the imagination of a large section of elite politicians? In the wake of Tilak's campaigns in Maharashtra in the 1890s, anti-Brahminism had become fashionable among British administrators, and this was one reason for the appropriateness of the anti-Brahmin cry in 1916. As we have seen, anti-Brahminism was not respectable in 1880s, and the young Nayars in Travancore had had to wage their campaign against "foreigners." However, the precise timing of the "Non-Brahmin Manifesto" appears to owe a good deal to the effect of Annie Besant's Home Rule League in Madras and her evocation of Brahminic glories. The "Non-Brahmin Manifesto" was published on 20 December 1916—before the Lucknow session of the Congress and Muslim League that was to produce the Lucknow Pact. For elite politicians looking for ways to tilt balances, prudence would have dictated waiting until the Lucknow session had made clear the possibilities national politics held for Madras city politicians.⁴⁵ Resentment, anger and emotion were, I think, as important for the production of the "Manifesto" as political calculation.

The Malayali connection in all this was striking. T. M. Nair and Parameswaran Pillai had been close friends and travelling companions. S. K. Nair was Parameswaran Pillai's brother-in-law. "S.K.N.'s" *Non-Brahmin Letters* was published from the press of C. Karunakara Menon's *Indian Patriot*. Though a Malabar man, Karunakara Menon had studied for a time in Trivandrum, was a close friend of C. V. Raman Pillai, the Travancore writer

⁴⁴See, for example, E.S. Viswanathan, "The Political Career of E.V. Ramasami Naicker: A Study in the Politics of Tamilnad, 1920-1949," unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Australian National University, 1973, p. 100, which points out that the anti-Brahmin Self-Respect Movement had more than 60 flourishing branches within a year of its founding in 1928.

⁴⁵Irschick, *Politics and Social Conflict*, pp. 45-54; Baker, *Politics of South India*, pp. 27-31; Hugh F. Owen, "Negotiating the Lucknow Pact," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XXXI, No. 3, May 1972, pp. 561-87.

and government servant (who had, incidentally, been among the few friends to attend the last rites for Parameswaran Pillai) and had presided over a major meeting of Kerala Nayars in Trivandrum in 1911.⁴⁶ Although in Madras city politics Karunakara Menon was a foe not only of Mrs Besant but also of T. M. Nair, the dislike of Mrs Besant, her successful newspaper *New India* and her glorification of classical, Brahmin-oriented Hinduism briefly put Karunakara Menon and T. M. Nair on the same side of the fence. The pair well appreciated the depth of anti-Brahmin feeling in Kerala and the uses to which such feelings had been put in Travancore.

CONCLUSION

Elites seeking the support of wider followings have found it useful to take up ethnic rallying cries. In doing so, they have aimed to convert objective social differences into subjective awareness—the creation of a political community. In selecting particular symbols, elite leaders influence the development of ethnic identities (though obviously they do not create these identities from nothing). The case of the anti-Brahmin movement in the Madras Presidency appears to lend support to this thesis.

Within the arena of the polyglot, disparate Madras Presidency, appropriate symbols were difficult to find. There was, however, a noticeable cleavage between Brahmins and people who were not Brahmins. This was felt in varying degrees in different localities. It was most intense in Kerala, where resentment against non-Malayali Brahmins went back to the eighteenth century and where this resentment had become a major issue for the western-educated Nayar elite in Travancore from the 1880s. At that time, the anti-Brahmin symbol was not respectable either with British government or the Travancore Maharaja, and Nayar leaders had had to mute it. However, when Nayars in Madras city, aware of events in Travancore in the 1880s and 1890s, found themselves in a somewhat similar situation in the decade after 1910, anti-Brahminism had acquired respectability among British officials. The anti-Brahmin symbol could be invoked without reticence. It was a symbol for which Nayars could feel much sympathy, and it was they who demonstrated its utility to other politicians in Madras city.

BOOK REVIEWS

IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, Academic Press, New York, 1974, Pp. 409.

This book represents a new trend in the historiography of the early modern period which is generally taken to begin around the end of the fourteenth century and to last until the middle of the eighteenth. However, it deals only with the earlier century and it is the first of a series of volumes that promises to cover the subsequent historical development. The present volume touches only marginally with Europe's early contacts with Asia and its subject-matter is largely concerned with either Europe itself or the Hispanic expansion in the New World. Nevertheless, there is much in the book that is of interest and relevance to the historians of South Asia. The major work of interpretation and synthesis which is attempted here in the context of Western history derives its distinctive character from a very sharp analytical cutting-edge, expressed in the single-minded and at times relentless pursuit of the unitary theme, the evolution of a world economic system. The precise value of an intense intellectual and methodological preoccupation with the study of "systems," "structures" or other abstract forms of human activities may be questioned by some historians and even dismissed as an exercise in obfuscation. But few will deny that the proof of refutation enlivens the critic's awareness and feel for historical facts. Furthermore, the central thesis presented in Wallerstein's study of sixteenth-century Europe can be easily abstracted from its geography and chronology and used as a testable hypothesis for other areas and periods, including of course South Asia. Historians of pre-British India, with some notable exceptions, have directed their attention to political, administrative, or religious life of the country and the resulting empiricism has produced works that pay insufficient attention to the role of economic systems in the formation of political empires and other entities.

The overseas expansion of European people and the exploitation of global economic resources by them are unquestionably two interrelated phenomena that have played a critical part in world history during the last four hundred years. But so far only their nineteenth-century manifestation, imperialism, has been investigated in depth from a theoretical standpoint. For Marxist historians in particular imperialism as a special and advanced stage of capitalism was a later development. Although theories on economic imperialism are crucial to any Marxist analysis of contemporary political order, its

⁴⁶See Footnote 38. Saraswati, *Minorities*, pp. 59-60, 67.

historical origins or roots stretching back to the period before the Industrial Revolution probably only evoke academic interests. In many ways Marx's own interest in pre-capitalist modes of production and distribution as a social system was not actively sustained by later writers. But during the last two and a half decades the detailed studies undertaken by many European historians, sometimes described as the *Annales* School, have begun to shift the balance of interest to the earlier period. The most notable and spectacular landmark of this new historical tradition was the publication in 1947 of Fernand Braudel's *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*. As he acknowledges in the Preface, Wallerstein's own thinking and reading on sixteenth-century European history was profoundly influenced by Braudel's concept of "total history" and his book draws heavily on the research undertaken by Braudel's disciples and followers.

However, in spite of the wealth of details in the book and the vast ground covered in it, Wallerstein is concerned with a single problem, the identification and explanation of a world-economy in sixteenth-century Europe and the New World. The main part of the argument is set out in Chapter 2, entitled "The New European Division of Labour, c. 1450-1640." But it is characteristic of his methods that he cannot resist reducing long stretches of history into elegant trend analysis with its monotonic progress checked by periods of crisis. According to him, the medieval prelude was marked by an expansion in economic activities within a feudal system of production which lasted from 1150 to around 1300. During the next century and a half there was a contraction. The feudal system of extracting the economic surplus was running out of steam, and existing frontiers of technology were being increasingly circumscribed by a climatological change that affected both agricultural productivity and demographic health. The methodology used here relies on detecting and summing the positive and negative components of a secular trend, the phase A and B, made familiar by French historians. Having set out the feudal background, Wallerstein next turns to the conditions that are necessary for the creation of a world-economy based on capitalism. The essential requirements were an expansion on the area of capitalist operations, a system of controlling the primary producers of different kinds of commodities in various parts of the world, and the formation of political-administrative machinery strong enough to support and encourage the extractive mechanism.

The assumption of an expanding market area and sources of supplies provides the key to the whole argument of the book. The great political and demographic movements overseas, which began with the Portuguese exploratory voyages of the fourteenth century and culminated in the Spanish conquests of South America, enable the analysis to be developed in terms of central and peripheral relationships in a differentiated economic system. This was a point which Adam Smith strongly emphasized both in his theory of economic gain following from commercial exchange and the effects of the

European discovery of the West and East Indies. But Wallerstein's reasoning is very different from that of Adam Smith, and it has a much more specific historical construct. While the *Wealth of Nations* concerned itself mainly with the question of an increase in productivity resulting from economic specialization, the *Modern World-System* sees the division of labour as a process of social control over the means of production. The immense geographical expansion of Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth century created a highly favourable land-labour ratio which in its turn gave rise to a higher rate of capital accumulation and increased efficiency in agricultural production. The influx of bullion from the New World and its possible effect on the secular inflation in prices is discussed in detail, and the conclusion is that where it did not raise prices bullion at least prevented their fall. Combined with lagging wages, the sixteenth-century "Price Revolution" provided the means for a redistribution of income, favouring the landlords and stimulating private investment. The second part of the argument concerning the effects of inflation is that, as the author puts it:

there emerged within the world-economy a division of labour not only between agricultural and industrial tasks but among agricultural tasks as well. And along with this specialization went differing forms of labour control and differing pattern of stratification which in turn had different political consequences for the "states," that is, the arenas of political action. (p. 84)

The stratification among the producers in the world-economy was a tripartite one. The slaves working in the sugar plantations or the mines enjoyed the least share in the fruits of their own labour. European "serfs" were also part of the coercive system of labour employment. But the greater majority of the peasantry in Europe fell in the category of tenant farmers or wage labourers with a new class of yeomen producing cash crops. These three categories of workers in agriculture or the extractive industries are identified with three geographical zones. The slaves worked at the periphery together with the serfs, the remnants of a feudal order; wage labour was to be found in the centre states, while sharecropping prevailed in the semiperiphery. The economic surplus extracted through this geographical division of labour provided the main basis for the future development of capitalism.

The most difficult task for any historian who tries to apply such a model to sixteenth-century Europe is to explain the failure of the Spanish Empire to evolve into a capitalist economy. For whereas it was Spain who mined the silver in America and had the first claim on Europe's increased money supply, the full expression of commercial capitalism occurred in Holland and in England. Wallerstein's answer is that a world-empire is a weaker organization than a world-economy. The vast imperial possessions of Spain and her imperfect bureaucratic control over them explain partly the Spanish failure to

take full advantage of the opportunities available to her. The revolt of the Netherlands, on the other hand, not only set free Dutch resources from an excessive involvement with Spanish imperial preoccupations, it also gave an active encouragement to the development of Dutch shipping and maritime trade with the Baltic and southern Europe. Holland was independent of the political control of Spain but the Dutch remained a part of the economic system of the former Habsburg Empire. This gave her a massive advantage over other core states of Europe, and it was not until the seventeenth century that England and France were in a position to challenge the economic supremacy of Amsterdam. The new division of labour, the failure of an empire, and the gradual emergence of the north-western European states as leaders of a commercial capitalism, these are the principal themes in Wallerstein's abstract model of a world-system. The role of the New World, eastern Europe, and the core states of Western Europe provides the design for a vast historical canvas.

The book is not a product of detailed original research into primary sources. The author instead makes an exhaustive use of secondary works, most of them products of great scholarship by noted historians. The methodology is a novel one. Wallerstein has constructed an elaborate theoretical framework from his reading, but he does not present it as a unitary construct. Even the term "world-economy" does not receive any formal definition, and the reader is left free to gather its full attributes as the exposition proceeds through complex arguments and manipulation of details. When a particular theoretical or interpretative point is made, Wallerstein supports his arguments by direct quotations from the relevant secondary works. Controversial viewpoints are then discussed in detail, and the final balance-sheet is closed with a summary of the main conclusions. The question that is open to debate is whether we are justified in treating historical facts as intellectual building blocks to be constructed into the metaphorical images of the Pentagon or the Kremlin according to our own view of world history. To historians who have spent long years in archives in search of source material the book is bound to appear unreal. For he knows only too well the accidents, the disappointments, and the good luck which bring historical events to the light of day. He also knows that what he has to say must be qualified by the limitations of the evidence available to him. More than anyone else the historian has the least claim to infallibility. In this respect the *Modern World-System* suffers from an excessive use of other people's interpretation of primary material, and what is missing is a sensitive treatment of the actual processes of history, the mechanism through which historical events interact over the passage of time. But these are fundamental criticisms which can be levelled at any work that aims to extract the main components of historical trends. The problem of dealing with the deviations, the multitude of contradictory exceptions to the general movements, is still a very difficult one for historians to tackle. It is a

great strength of Wallerstein's methodology that one is forced to think about such questions, and after reading through the book his view of historical issues will not be the same as before.

K. N. CHAUDHURI

SARVEPALLI GOPAL, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, Volume One: 1889-1947, Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1976 (first published in Great Britain by Jonathan Cape, 1975), Pp. 398, Rs 100.

Sarvepalli Gopal's biography of Jawaharlal Nehru, of which only the first volume covering his life up to 1947 has seen the light of day, has already provoked widely diverging reactions ranging from bitter denunciation to effusive admiration. It has been summarily dismissed, in the *Times Literary Supplement*, as "neither a biography of Nehru, nor an adequate history of the nationalist movement from 1919 to 1947." The eminent litterateur who made the above observation describes Nehru's life as a tragedy and then adds, in a pointless quibble: "And now we have another tragedy—the present biography." Altogether different is the reaction of a professional historian who has compared the merits of this volume to Isaac Deutscher's biography of Trotsky. Deutscher's work of genius is identified as "one of the probable creative influences on Gopal's historical style" and it is also observed: "Gopal consciously emulates the quick simplicity and Anglo-Saxon straightforwardness of Christopher Hill's biography of Oliver Cromwell, God's Englishman, as well as the political emphasis and rich psychological elucidation of Isaac Deutscher's three volume biography of Trotsky—*The Prophet Armed*, *The Prophet Unarmed*, and *The Prophet Outcast*."

As will thus be evident, the book has aroused wide interest, and justly so. It is by far the most authentic biography of Nehru, the product of truly massive research and painstaking and far-reaching investigation. But nowhere is the prose heavy-going or ponderous. There are flashes of inspiration, but on the whole the book lacks the sort of magical touch that would justify a comparison with Deutscher's Trotsky. After all, Nehru was no Trotsky. The subject imposes limitations; and Gopal has wisely opted for producing an authentic biography rather than a literary masterpiece. That sort of inspiration which characterizes Deutscher's Trotsky is the product of a deep passion and a life-long commitment which is not at all appropriate to a professional historian's investigation into the life of Nehru, officially financed by a constituted fund.

The most impressive feature of Gopal's biography is his immense command over sources. Gopal's earlier works on British policy were well-researched pieces of writing. As in his earlier works, Gopal is good and detailed in

explaining official policies and motivations in so far as they affected Nehru and the Congress. What is more, he now shows himself to be equally good in explaining the policy of the nationalists, a natural ability that is exhibited, for instance, in his account of the Congress deliberations leading to the decision to launch the Civil Disobedience Movement in 1930. Gopal has delved deep into official records as well as private correspondence and, unlike other biographers of Indian national leaders, has also described how it looked from the point of view of the officials. This has enriched the portrait of Jawaharlal Nehru. In his use of sources, moreover, Gopal shows himself to be scrupulous. His writing, except in those portions where he deals with Nehru's opponents, is fair and balanced. He is critical and appreciative of Nehru at the same time.

Yet the book fails in the early stages to bring Nehru and his environment alive. In spite of the evident mastery over all sources, the book is curiously abstract. With regard to the social environs of Allahabad, the inner life of the Kashmiri Brahmin community, the personal relationships that bound Nehru to his father and Bapu, this biography brushes over lightly, without really going deep into the stuff of real, everyday, concrete happenings. These are areas in which a biography should score over a general history. Gopal's forte, it is evident, is political history, not biography. The book swings into pace only as Nehru enters a political career. Gopal maintains this pace, and the narrative is gripping, half way through the book. Thereafter, it tends to lose momentum and the decade that led to independence and partition is dealt with rather unsatisfactorily. Here Gopal is often unfair to individual British statesmen, to Subhas Bose, and to the Congress Old Guard, especially C. Rajagopalachari. As the book wears on, he becomes increasingly apologetic over those actions of Nehru which were criticized by contemporaries, tries to explain every doubtful action in the most favourable light, and in the process becomes distinctly uncharitable to his opponents.

It is not that Gopal is uncritical of Nehru himself. Indeed, in the earlier chapters he is sometimes harsh and biting, as on p. 69 where, describing Nehru's early political activities in the Non-Cooperation Movement, he comments: "Jawaharlal was so excited by the situation in which he found himself, so much in love with sacrifice and hardship, so self-conscious about the immediate context that he gave no thought to the way or the goal. He had made a cradle of emotional nationalism and rocked himself in it." In his desire to be an impartial and even critical biographer, Gopal falls into a somewhat hasty and predictably radical line, criticizing Nehru for not always living up to his professed principles. In the historical context, it would have been more appropriate to investigate why this was so—why genuine sentiments could not be translated into practical politics. It must be borne in mind that more uncompromising radicals, socialists and communists got nowhere at all. The easy assumption of an alternative to what actually happened—the assump-

tion of a more satisfactorily revolutionary alternative—needs examination. Whether any other strategy could have been adopted than the one put into application by Gandhi and the Congress High Command, needs to be objectively explored in terms of the then realities of practical politics. Where exactly the adopted strategy was at fault—where the Congress through its moderation failed to seize opportunities—needs to be convincingly demonstrated. An objective analysis on these lines might well show that at every point the Indian national movement advanced as far as possible within the constraints of existing realities—no further but never stopping short of that furthest practicable point. Arguably, this was a more effective, a more successful, a more advanced and organized colonial liberation struggle than any other contemporary movement in Asia and Africa before the Second World War.

Accepting that premise, the charge against Nehru would not be inability to practise what he preached, but a proneness to preach what could not be practised, that is to say, impractical, visionary idealism. But even that does not go deep. In his actions Jawaharlal seldom failed to show a sense of what was practical, and even his rhetoric had a practical significance. For it kept up the radical, youthful image of the Congress—an image that Gandhi valued so much as to keep him on his side in spite of fundamental differences. If as a biographer Gopal does not give sufficiently concrete details to bring Nehru alive, as a historian he makes no serious attempt to place his characteristic radicalism in the context of its inherent constraints and its practical functions. From Gandhi's point of view, an assertion of independence by Nehru would certainly have resulted in the emergence of a dangerous focus of all the dissidences that were continually cropping up within the ranks of the huge, sprawling Congress organization. On the other hand, Nehru's radicalism, kept within the limits of party discipline, could serve as a useful political asset for disarming and defeating these unpredictable dissidences. In his treatment of the revolt led by Subhas Bose, Gopal emphasizes the honourable intentions of Nehru in not countenancing the rebels. No doubt he is right. In objective historical terms, however, what is more important is that through the ensuing purge the Congress, with Nehru's support, emerged as a tightly knit, firmly led, almost monolithic organization. Without Nehru's participation, the tight discipline, unity of leadership and controlled energy of the Congress would certainly not have been possible. The purged Congress of 1938 was fundamentally different from the emasculated Congress of 1908 in that it retained its youthful radical image, its potential revolutionary appeal.¹

The standard radical criticism of the Indian national movement is that it was not sufficiently militant. Those among the leaders who adopted the most

¹On this point, see B.R. Tomlinson, *The Indian National Congress and the Raj, 1929-1942* (London, 1976), published after Gopal's biography of Nehru came out.

militant tone—such as Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Bose—were further criticized for failing to translate rhetoric into reality. What is often not realized is that a national movement could not have been run on the lines of pure militancy for so long a time in so many diverse circumstances. To adjust to these changing and diverse circumstances, the leadership evolved a triple strategy—mass agitation against the Raj, participation in its Legislative Councils, and constructive social work for the upliftment of the depressed. In consequence the movement was rarely at a loss as to what to do next—to each new and difficult situation it had a ready response. If the mood of the people was not favourable for a campaign of civil disobedience, then the Congress might fight in the elections and try to obstruct the Councils from within or to capture the provincial ministries. If such a programme stood in discredit for the moment, it was always possible to work among the Harijans, to try to improve Hindu-Muslim relations, to undertake sanitary improvements in villages, and generally to retain the moral initiative that would put the rulers at a disadvantage. Each technique was essential to the long-term unfolding of the underlying strategy; and none implied, in any sense whatsoever, “collaboration” with the rulers. Gopal, although at some points he shows appreciation of this overall strategy, does not firmly resist the temptation to indulge in stock criticism on predictable lines. After all, what is most striking about the movement on a long-term view is that, by a combination of different techniques, it maintained an unrelenting pressure on the British under Gandhi’s inspired leadership. At one point Gopal does say: “Gandhi was no different from the Moderates in his basic strategy of negotiating with the British for concessions: he only sought to build up greater mass pressures in his favour.” But this significant comment is not woven into his analysis; indeed, it stands at odds with that analysis.

For instance, Gopal is critical of the instructions of the Congress to the Kisans during agrarian disturbances in UP in course of the Non-Cooperation Movement. “These instructions, far from being revolutionary, were to the benefit of the authorities.” “Whether Jawaharlal was aware of it or not, his attitudes at this time implied informal collaboration with the Government in the maintenance of law and order.” Now it is true that in trying to bring the peasant movement under control, the Congress acted as a moderating influence on the spontaneous outburst of potentially violent, localized dissidences. The emphasis was on organization and restraint. That does not mean that Congress direction was “to the benefit of the authorities,” except in a narrow, immediate sense. Certainly it was not so if we take a long-term view of the steady growth of Congress influence and apparatus—and surely the authorities did not regard it in that light. The officials had in fact got the heart of the matter: they were not there to increase Nehru’s—and Congress’—prestige. Far from implying informal collaboration, the moderating role played by the Congress was making for a controlled, purposeful peasant movement that

fitted in with broader nationalist objectives. It might not have led to the radical solution of a social and economic problem; but the Congress was irresistibly emerging as the commonly acceptable, potential supplanter of the Raj—in fact, the sole representative of the Indian nation as such, a status that no other organization could claim. Such a thing could only happen by consensus; and necessarily radical aspirations had to be subordinated to the needs of maintaining unity. That, however, is not the view which Gopal seems to take of the matter. He compares unfavourably the Kisan Sabhas of the Congress with Mao’s peasant associations in China; and goes on to quote Fanon’s dictum that nationalist parties make no attempt to raise the level of the struggle of the country people against imperial oppression. Now surely the conditions in India and China—and the possibilities of peasant mobilization in a colony and a nominally sovereign country—are not to be assessed in comparable terms. Indian society was a deeply unjust and divided society, and the only way in which it could be held together under the banner of a national struggle was to emphasize the one injustice—foreign rule—which affected them all. Gandhi and other Congress leaders knew these limitations, and sought to bring the uncoordinated and often contradictory forces under a single control and to push them forward with definite sense of direction.

It was only after prolonged hesitation that Gandhi launched the Civil Disobedience Movement, holding out to the last minute the offer of cooperation with the rulers in return for a reciprocating gesture (the so-called Delhi manifesto). Having launched the movement, he halted it at the first sign of a willingness on the part of Irwin to come to an understanding (the so-called Gandhi-Irwin Pact). Predictably, Gopal calls the Delhi manifesto “a retreat by the Congress,” and the Gandhi-Irwin Pact a “loss of ground.” This does not agree with what he himself had to say on Gandhi’s compromises: “By giving some rope to those who favoured a compromise the ground for the coming struggle was being better prepared.” Gandhi did not move hurriedly to Civil Disobedience, as Nehru desired. Strength lay in holding the hand, in being able to negotiate at the psychological moment. Pressure and compromise were the twin inseparable aspects of a single strategy. During its long march to independence, the Congress under Gandhi’s leadership moved exactly as far² as it was strategic at any point to move. This was a game of power, as Nehru himself had pronounced in his Presidential speech at the Lahore Congress. Gandhi and his conservative lieutenants—Patel, Prasad and Rajagopalachari—were masters of that game. The Congress was so effective as a power because of its many-sided strategy under their leadership—satyagraha, working the reforms, constructive activity. By applying the technique which suited the moment, they retained the initiative, and never gave any true respite to the British.

²Except in 1942 when they went too far.

Irwin, it is true, was to claim in 1931 that by striking a compromise with the Congress Old Guard, he had built a break-water against the great agrarian forces which were being harnessed by Nehru. But where is the evidence for this? In the event, the agrarian disturbances of 1932 in UP were effectively suppressed by the police on their own and the British did not even have to call in the army for pacification of the countryside. When Gandhi called off the Civil Disobedience Movement, he merely recognized the reality that it was no longer there. Despite the agrarian crisis in UP and Nehru's rhetoric, the British could still hold India without resort to the ultimate weapon—the army. In what sense then, in calling off the Civil Disobedience Movement, did the Congress, "with Gandhi's assistance," succeed "in tying itself up into knots"? Wishfully thinking to carry on the struggle, Nehru refused to be distracted by such side shows as village uplift and the Harijan movement. "This kind of safe and pious activity can well be left to old ladies." But there he was mistaken. What was the Congress to do now that it had failed to sustain the satyagraha? Constructive work was the means by which Gandhi led the way out of the morass, until the Congress as a whole became ready to fight in the elections and capture the provincial ministries. Gopal, it seems, holds the contrary view: "The concentration on non-political issues and the personal and self-created entanglements which led Gandhi to desert his comrades in the middle of the struggle were amazingly casual and likely to be fatal to the movement." But if there was a radical, socialist alternative in the mid-30s, why was it that so few people were convinced of it? Why was it that "the socialists had no support among the people," and why did Nehru give the newly formed Congress Socialist Party such a wide berth?

From around 1936, Gopal in his account becomes increasingly defensive about Nehru and critical of his opponents. Although Nehru was the President of that year's Congress session at Lucknow, it was the Old Guard's policy which prevailed. The reactions of those who rejoiced in the defeat of his policy are described by Gopal in unflattering terms. Satyamurti "gloated"; G. D. Birla "crowed" with delight. To Nehru the price of office acceptance under the 1935 Act was surrender. In describing the 1937 elections as the "mimic war of elections," Gopal seems to adhere to that judgement. Gopal paints Nehru as an anti-capitalist Galahad leading the socialist forces against big business and his Congress opponents are portrayed as champions of capitalism. The real point at issue, however, was not whether the Congress was to be capitalist or socialist in its thinking; it was whether the Congress was to take advantage of the 1935 Act or to abstain from participating in the new constitutional structure set up by the Raj. By deciding to get hold of the new machinery, the Congress managed ultimately to defeat the objectives with which the British had set it up. Certainly the Congress leadership did not opt for contesting the 1937 elections with an eye on "the spoils of office."

They were not to know beforehand that the Congress would win in seven provinces outright; least of all did the British expect it. Of course the desire for office was there, in all ranks of the Congress. But the High Command opted for electoral contest for the over-riding motive which had always guided their various actions in various circumstances—to hold the Congress together and to keep it moving. This was certainly true with regard to Vallabhbhai Patel and Rajendra Prasad, but it was also true in the case of Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, about whom, with a southerner's bitterness for a southerner, Gopal has to say: "A self-proclaimed political ascetic . . . Rajagopalachari had now quietly put himself in the line for the Chief Ministership in Madras and was determined to take office." As he puts it, "in sight of the prize," Rajagopalachari and the right wing (here Gopal is extending the judgement on Rajagopalachari implicitly to other leaders as well) were not to be deterred by Nehru's arguments against office acceptance.

But it was no sophistry that Rajagopalachari was uttering when he told the convention of legislators that office acceptance was a means of wrecking the Act. As B. R. Tomlinson has recently pointed out in his incisive study of the subject, by taking office the Congress secured a stranglehold over the working of the 1935 Act, which had been specially designed to cut the ground from under the Congress and to mobilize the other political forces in India under the banner of the Raj. The British had extended the franchise to include the small landlords and the rich peasants in the hope of defeating the town-based Congress, but it was the Congress which captured this newly enfranchised element. Therein, indeed, lies the historical significance of the Civil Disobedience Movement. Outwardly it had failed in its professed objective of making it impossible for the British to carry on. Implicitly, however, it attained that objective by bringing the countryside into the Congress orbit. The electoral victory of 1937 was implicit in the Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930-32. By ensuring Congress victory in the elections, that movement had in the long run made the British position in India untenable. The Congress was now the effective spokesman of the nation as a whole, dealing on equal terms with the Raj. No longer was it conceivable for the British to negotiate without the Congress, as they had done in 1930. Nowhere does Gopal's analysis bring out the significance of the stunning Congress victory of 1937 which upset all British calculations.

In accepting office the Congress did not become "a responsiveness, constitutional organization avid for minor loaves and fishes of office." Within two years the Congress resigned from office when war broke out. It resigned as a united body, without casting wishful glances back. It did so because basically it had remained an opposition movement. It was Nehru, the radical, who showed the only hesitation on this occasion. He talked of preparing to resign from office; the High Command ordered the provincial ministries to resign at once. In Gandhi, Gopal concedes "a steely determination to press for India's

freedom." But that "steely determination" was characteristic of the entire Old Guard and of the High Command as a whole. On the other hand, as masters of the struggle for power, the Old Guard were acutely aware of the dangers of being out of office. Accordingly Rajagopalachari made "persistent suggestions" for a settlement, so as to make as much political progress as possible during the war. These "persistent suggestions" were, indeed, the only chance of a united India before the Muslim League became too strong, taking advantage of the Congress absence from office.

Indeed, the evidence presented by Gopal tends to show, although he does not draw this conclusion, that opposition by the Congress at this stage did not serve the national cause well. Had the Congress been a constitutional organization it would have derived crucial advantages from that fact. As Gopal has pointed out, in 1938-39 the British were having "a semi-honeymoon with the right wing of the Congress" and paid little heed to Jinnah. This in turn had made Jinnah anxious to reach an understanding with the Congress on the pattern of the Lucknow Pact, providing the Congress adopted a liberal moderate programme after his own heart and agreed to share office with the League in the provincial ministries. Naturally he lost interest after the Congress resigned from office; and the "semi-honeymoon" between the Congress and the Raj also came to an abrupt end. But had the Congress been a constitutional party and not an opposition movement, a pattern of cooperation between the Raj, the Congress and the League might well have been possible on the basis of a common war effort directed by British authorities with the help of Congress and League ministers. The pure logic of power demanded such a course of action on the part of the Congress. After some time, right wing leaders like Rajagopalachari realized this and started making those "persistent suggestions" which Gopal has condemned.

In this last stage of the struggle for freedom, more than ever before, it was (as Nehru had put it earlier) a struggle for the conquest of power. However, he showed no practical grasp of this theoretical point at this crucial hour. For the leadership of the Muslim League this was no less than a struggle for survival and they were bound to exploit the religious appeal to mobilize support. This attempt to play on the divisions of Indian society could not be dealt with by the Congress upon any basis other than a retention of control over the real levers of power and a wise agreement to share the control with those political elements who would not rest until they had got a share to their satisfaction. To repeat a point that cannot be too often made, this was a struggle for power and it could not be fought with economics—it could not be won by mass contacts on the basis of class issues. Rajagopalachari could appreciate this, but not Nehru. The result was disastrous: the League's "mass contacts" on the basis of religion made rapid headway while the Congress "mass contacts" on the basis of economics got nowhere at all inside the Muslim community. In response to the Congress call to the British to quit

India, the British ruthlessly suppressed its organization, giving the League all the opportunity that it needed to entrench its position within the Muslim community. After that there was no solution other than an agreement with the League. Gandhi and Rajagopalachari were clear-sighted enough to see this. Accordingly, Rajagopalachari canvassed for an agreement between the League and the Congress and Gandhi after his release held talks with Jinnah. Gopal has found evidence in these negotiations of the "short-sightedness" of the Congress leaders. But what chance remained of a united India but an agreed formula between the League and the Congress defining a loose federation with a grouping of Muslim states?

Nehru showed no appreciation, during the negotiations after the war, of the need to reach a negotiated settlement by satisfying Jinnah's aspirations for power within a framework of Indian Union. He stood too much on principle and frequently put his colleagues in difficulty, as Patel testified in a letter to D.P. Mishra, by "acts of emotional insanity." Gopal gives a confused account of these negotiations, nowhere clearly outlining the "historical forces" which, rather than Nehru's mistakes, he holds responsible for the partition. As in most other accounts, personalities are drawn in some detail, but not the long-term objective factors, nor the shifting moods of the population. It is not the ghastly Calcutta killing of 1946, but Wavell's reaction to it which finds greater prominence in Gopal's account of the moves that led to the partition. At this hour of history, the masses were more influential in shaping politics than ever before, and it is especially important to examine how the popular mood was shifting in each of the Muslim-majority provinces between 1945-47. An account of the negotiations would be impossible to interpret meaningfully without this background to the negotiations. The eventual outcome of the negotiations brought disappointment to all patriotic Indians. But the real gains which the Congress High Command secured in these negotiations should not be overlooked. Practitioners of power politics, the Old Guard had proved a match for Jinnah in the strenuous negotiations. The truncated Pakistan which emerged from the negotiations was a keener disappointment for Jinnah than was the divided India to Patel. Large portions of territory desired by Jinnah were awarded to India. If the League secured its demand for Pakistan, the Congress, too, secured a victory of sorts in the partition.

On the evidence presented by Gopal, it is possible—and it has been attempted here—to give a somewhat different interpretation of Nehru's pre-independence career and the Indian struggle for freedom. All historians, however, would be grateful to Gopal for finally presenting an authoritative biography of Nehru which has summed up a great quantity of evidence on the subject. No research on this scale has been attempted before on Nehru's life; and the first volume of this biography has incorporated an immense amount of fresh material, meticulously checked and examined, which constitutes a consider-

able advance on our knowledge of the subject. If Gopal sustains the same standards of research and objectivity through the next two volumes, his biography of Nehru will come to be considered as a major biographical and historical work of contemporary India.

RAJAT RAY

GEOFFREY BOLTON, *Britain's Legacy Overseas*, Oxford University Press, London, 1973, Pp. 168, £ 0.65.

Professor Bolton has written a concise account of Britain's relations with her former colonies, from the beginnings of her empire until its end. What a pity it is that not more historians confine themselves to the ample limitations of 168 pages! He has tried to break from the tradition of seeing the development of the British empire in legal and constitutional terms, and instead argues that in the long run the exact political and legal formula which the former dependences inherited will be less important than the spirit with which these institutions are adjusted to suit local conditions. That justice, democracy and fairness should be maintained will be more important than the preservation of the precise detail of the Westminster system. He also suggests that the lasting effect of the British imperial experience will be the fact that it linked numerous different cultures into the network of western culture, thereby bridging the insularity of both local and western tradition. This message obviously contains some truth, but the author's concentration on political, legal and artistic themes leads him to neglect to some extent economic and social issues. For the empire also harnessed many diverse cultures to the juggernaut of capitalistic economic development, with its attendant social individualism, which will also have long lasting effects. Nor does the author reflect upon that penultimate dismemberment of empire, the devolution of Scotland and Wales, leaving only the final separation to come in England itself, between Saxon and Dane.

A. J. H. LATHAM

BURTON STEIN (Ed.), *Essays on South India*, New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1976, Pp. 213, Rs 60.

If in the past South India has not received the scholarly attention it deserves, this slim volume of essays edited by Burton Stein will do much to correct the situation. Written by American scholars, these essays were originally presented to the second conference of the Society for South Indian Studies held in

Madison, Wisconsin in 1970. The stated purpose of the conference was the preparation of papers summarizing the current state of research and suggesting directions for future study. Represented are the fields of archaeology, history, geography, anthropology and linguistics. Coherence in such a collection is usually sacrificed to comprehensiveness, but the concern of the contributors to raise interdisciplinary questions gives these essays surprising unity of character.

If the first of three essays devoted to what may be broadly described as historical studies, Clarence Maloney examines the progress of South Indian archaeology in recent years. After a brief account of Stone Age, Chalcolithic and Iron Age sites, Maloney gives more extended attention to the archaeological evidence for the civilization of the *Sangam* period (1st-3rd centuries A.D.). The rapid transition from the pre-civilized Iron Age culture of the Tamil region to the *Sangam* civilization requires explanation, and the problem is made no easier by the skimpy archaeological record. Maloney makes a strong case, based in part on the excavations at Anuradhapura, that Sri Lanka was the source of formative influences on the civilization of the Tamil Coast. Given the slow rate at which excavation reports are published, Maloney's inclusion of information taken from his personal notes of conversations with archaeologists is particularly welcome.

Sangam society reveals itself more fully in its literature than in its material record. George Hart's examination of ancient Tamil literature shows just how valuable the *Sangam* poems are to the historian, for in contrast to the idealization of Sanskrit literature, the *Sangam* poems are concrete, vivid and realistic. Hart argues that since the *Sangam* poems show little Sanskrit influence and refer to many cultural and religious practices found in later post-Vedic literature but not in Vedic literature, these practices (e.g., tonsure of widows, *puja*, temple worship, and the pollution attached to the lower castes) must be considered originally Dravidian. The cultural dynamic of the first centuries A.D. did not possess a North to South direction as generally believed but rather a South to North direction. Deccan culture we know from archaeological finds to be particularly ancient. Thus it is of interest that Hart finds certain literary conventions and techniques shared by ancient Tamil and Maharashtrian, suggestive of a common antecedent in a pre-literate Deccan. It was only in the writings of the late fourth century Kalidasa that these conventions entered the Sanskrit tradition.

Burton Stein, in his essay, "The State and the Agrarian Order in Medieval South India: A Historiographical Critique," challenges the widely prevalent view of an earlier generation of historians that the medieval South Indian state was centralized and bureaucratic. Such a view is possible, he writes, only if the historian ignores "what is known of the social and cultural elements of the medieval agrarian order of South India" (p. 66). Symptomatic of this kind of historical writing is the isolation of subject areas into separate compart-

ments; polity and administration are discussed apart from society, religion and economy. Few historians today would quarrel with Stein's critique of the use of the centralized state as a model for medieval India. More difficult, as he realizes, is the replacement of this model by one which better fits all the evidence. Stein considers feudalism but finds that as the feudal model has been refined to apply more broadly to varying cultures and societies it has lost its explanatory power. Stein hints at still another alternative but this he saves for another forum.

A special merit of this collection is its inclusion of two articles on disciplines of value to social scientists generally but often overlooked: Brian Murton's "Geography and the Study of South India" and Franklyn Southworth's "Sociolinguistics Research in South India: Achievements and Prospects." Both are straightforward summaries of current work in their respective fields. Murton, who has done work in historical geography and is a colleague of Burton Stein's at the University of Hawaii, provides a real service in reviewing the large and highly specialized bibliography of the various geographical sciences, especially as he draws contrasts, where appropriate, between outdated methodology in Indian geographic studies and recent developments abroad.

Two essays treat South Indian anthropology. Both in their own way show the pitfalls which lie in wait for the writer of a bibliographic or historiographic essay. In his "Approaches to Changes in Caste Ideology in South India," Stephen Barnett reviews anthropological theory as it has been applied to the study of changes in South Indian caste ideology. He argues that increasing diversity and freedom in caste ideological formulations has arisen from a changing perception of blood—that potent symbol governing human relationships in South India—from a substance requiring purity for the maintenance of a caste code of conduct to the narrower question of the transmission of ancestry. Thus Barnett writes "as castes are substantialized, as blood purity becomes primarily a matter of natural identity, the ideological floodgates open" (p. 159). Barnett admits the difficulty of attempting theoretical revisionism in a bibliographic survey, but it is just here that his essay fails. While he is to be commended for his willingness to engage with serious theoretical problems, he must be criticized for attempting too much within the scope of a single essay. These difficulties are probably responsible for the occasional lapses in Barnett's prose and his tendency to resort to the shorthand expressions familiar only to those already read in anthropological literature. The second essay on South Indian anthropology, a review of literature concerning Kerala by Joan Mencher and K. Raman Unni, while a competent survey, does not display the imaginative grasp of the relevant issues characteristic of the other essays in this volume. If Barnett attempts too much, Mencher and Unni attempt too little.

These criticisms aside, the essays in this collection perform a valuable func-

tion. They are to be recommended especially for advanced students who should be acquiring knowledge of the literature in their field and in associated fields and should be considering promising areas for their own research.

JOSEPH J. BRENNIO

HUGH TINKER, *A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour Overseas, 1830-1920*, Oxford University Press, London, 1974, Pp. xvi+432, £ 5.75.

This book contains some excellent photographs, but few statistics. It is a curiously old-fashioned work, wordy and over-detailed in its narrative, and lacking any serious attempt at analysis. Its methodology is based upon the subjective selection of documents which dwell long and lovingly on the horrors and abuses of the system of migration of indentured Indian labourers. It outlines the history of this important movement of manpower to the Caribbean, Mauritius, Fiji, Ceylon, Assam, Burma, Malaya, and East Africa, so essential to the development of tropical plantation agriculture in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Essentially Professor Tinker takes the view that these indentured labourers not only replaced the West African slaves who preceded them, but also inherited the conditions under which the slaves had worked. Scotsmen come in for particular abuse as their masters. The author stresses that not many Indians saved anything from their wages, although the repatriation of funds to India would question this. He also argues that few returned, and that those who did, came only as worn-out shells to die. Certainly many did die on the outward voyage or in service, but these statements rather conflict with the figures for emigration and return quoted by Kingsley Davis in the standard work on Indian population and migration which is nowhere cited by the author. According to Davis, of the 30 million Indians who emigrated between 1834 and 1937, nearly 24 million returned. Furthermore, although the author does not examine the "push" factors behind the migration in much depth, he does accept that emigration increased in years of famine. So this reviewer finds it difficult to accept the overall implication of the book that the labourers in question would have been better off remaining in India to starve.

A.J.H. LATHAM

JOHN C.B. WEBSTER, *The Christian Community and Change in Nineteenth Century North India*, Macmillan India, Delhi, 1976, Pp. 293, Rs 65.00.

This impressive study of the American Presbyterian Mission in the Punjab and the United Provinces is something of a pioneering work. Too much earlier

writing on the history of Christianity in India has been adulatory and uncritical, or has treated the Christian community in almost total isolation, as if it interacted hardly at all with its social, religious and economic context and scarcely counted as part of the history of India. Some interesting work on the influence of Christian ideas in India has tended to treat these ideas as if they were free-floating rather than emerging from specifiable western origins and rooted in India in specific institutions and the life of small, but perhaps none the less important, communities. Dr Webster avoids such pitfalls and his book may be added to the short but growing list of sound historical monographs on Christianity in India.

The historical significance of a community is not merely a factor of its size or rate of growth. The particular Christian community with which Dr Webster is concerned grew, at times quite rapidly, but numerically never became a large element of the population. But he is right to examine it as a focus of cultural and religious interchange and meeting, and as presenting a new and inherently interesting avenue of social mobility. By studying the composition, leadership, and patterns of growth of the community alongside a careful account of the sources, modification, and impact of its theological and social ideas he is able to provide a detailed, balanced and informative study of its interaction over time with other social groups, and its influence on the broader society.

The early American Presbyterian missionaries, unlike most of the English missionaries of the same period, were solidly middle class and brought with them a rigid biblically-based theology which was only very slowly and partially modified in a liberal direction to accommodate Indian reality. But although the missionaries fought hard and on the whole successfully to maintain control over the church, the converts who gathered around them and shared in their work often called for changes of practice or theology which were unacceptable to the missionaries. Early leaders such as Gopi Nath Nundy and Kali Charan Chatterjee, both high caste converts from Alexander Duff's Institution in Calcutta, and other leaders of local origin, disputed with the missionaries mainly over the question whether the missionaries should have exclusive control over the church. Despite missionary intransigence, there was a gradual liberalization of theology and loosening of missionary dominance, particularly when the "mass movement" conversions from the ranks of the depressed class produced a rate of growth too fast for detailed missionary superintendence. Simultaneously the spontaneous springing up of Christian or quasi-Christian sects which were not formally part of the church raised the question of the boundaries of the community. Dr Webster notes that mass movement converts came in on their own conditions, facing the Presbyterians with the choice of rejecting the converts or accepting them on their own terms. In consequence there was a modification of the individualism of the missionaries and the acceptance of the inevitability, or even desirability, of group decisions and collective action. Even caste, so long regarded as a bugbear, was seen as having its uses in

evangelism. Within a few decades the church had become as a result of the mass movements a community of the economically and socially depressed, with a continuing attraction to such groups as a way of escape from degradation. This led to a variety of reactions in the broader society. As threat, challenge or example the Church had now to be reckoned with.

Dr Webster traces in detail the Christian community's complex and variable attitude to nationalism, a discussion which is of particular value as demonstrating that it is an oversimplification to portray the Indian Christians, or the missionaries for that matter, as unswerving and unquestioning loyalists to the British Raj throughout the nineteenth century. He also discusses the manifold implications of the integration of the American Presbyterian mission into broader Christian circles through the movement for church unity.

Granted that Christian ideas were in many ways influential in contributing to or sparking off movements of reform and renaissance in the nineteenth century, did a Christian community such as that with which Dr Webster is concerned have a distinct role in inducing change? Dr Webster's conclusion is that although the Christian community had a negligible direct role in changing political, social and economic structures it did have a measurable impact on "the primary structures of social and political life" through its relation to the emerging educated elite, particularly in the earlier part of the century, and through the direct and indirect effects of the significant accessions to the church from the depressed classes in the latter part of the century.

Dr Webster has made punctilious and comprehensive use of the abundant source materials for mission history available in India, Britain and the U.S.A. Further studies of other Christian communities of an equally scholarly sort are required if we are to test the more general validity of the patterns of influence and interaction which he describes. It is to be hoped that this book will both stimulate such studies and serve as a model for them.

DUNCAN B. FORRESTER

PRABHA DIXIT, *Communalism—A Struggle for Power*, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1974, Pp. xi+236, Rs 20 (Paperback).

Miss Dixit presents an arresting argument in this book which is neatly summed up in the title. She challenges the somewhat uncritical popular notion that communalism is a product of religious and cultural differences between the two major communities in India, Hindu and Muslim. She also challenges the view that communalism is a distorted version of class conflict, a thesis that was argued with great ability in the forties by W.C. Smith. In her view communalism was a consciously conceived political doctrine propagated by one section of the traditional elites to counteract the forces of nationalism

and democracy. That doctrine made use of religious and cultural differences to attain strictly political aims, that is to say, the maintenance or capture of a share in power.

Miss Dixit points out that the two communities were not monoliths and that the social solidarity of each should not be taken for granted, divided as they were by numerous divisions of caste, language and race. A monistic explanation in terms of religious antagonism not only restricts our vision of the present but produces a distorted view of the medieval past. The political conflicts of that period are then wrongly viewed as communal conflicts and the contemporary communal problem is explained away as an extension of a long-standing antagonism of medieval times. Drawing on the findings of some Aligarh scholars, she states: "Cross-community political alliances between the elite formed the most important feature of pre-British Indian history." The politics of the elite was motivated and governed by self-interest and ambition, not by religious sentiments of solidarity and antagonism.

It was the emergence of an electoral and representative framework of governance that led in the twentieth century to the emergence of an entirely new kind of politics, i.e., parties formed on the basis of religion. For within the new framework of governance, *sharif* or well-born Muslims who had hitherto enjoyed a privileged position were threatened with loss of their position, since they belonged to a minority community. A struggle for power in these altered conditions bred communalism as a new political phenomenon. "Communalism had thus emerged as a political phenomenon in India under the growing pressure of nationalism and democracy. It was not the result of religious hostility between the Muslims and the Hindus, but was evolved as a political doctrine and was closely tied up with the struggle for power."

The argument is both fresh and interesting and deserves close and critical attention. However, Miss Dixit makes little use of archival materials to sustain her argument. Drawing heavily as she does on secondary sources, she yet fails to take note of recent work on the subject by Seal, Hardy and Robinson. In some respects her argument bears a close resemblance to that of F.C.R. Robinson who starts from the premise that the Muslim community as such was hardly a political entity in the beginning and goes on to show that basically the communal movement arose from the pursuit of power by influential magnates for whom the community was simply a convenient constituency within a representative framework of governance and for whom British administrative and constitutional arrangements pointed a way to power through exploitation of that constituency by modern political means and tactics. Accordingly Robinson explains the marked shifts in the movement for Muslim separatism by major changes in the administrative and constitutional conditions in which power was exercised. Miss Dixit's explanation of the stages in Muslim political strategy is rather more uncertain. As she puts it, communalism is a struggle for power. As such, the evolving tactics in this

ceaseless pursuit of power were of course determined by changes in the conditions in which Muslim leaders sought to capture power. In the beginning they were with the British and against the Congress, then they were with Congress and against the Raj, finally they were against both the Congress and the Raj. These changes need to be more adequately explained in terms of the changing political equations of the struggle for power which Miss Dixit seeks to emphasize.

Miss Dixit has consciously made a choice for a "rigid unidimensional approach to Indian communalism," in full awareness that this is bound to invite criticism from all those readers who are firmly convinced that the true nature of this phenomenon can be understood only by viewing it in its multi-dimensional complexity. But in terms of her own analysis, the question remains: why did the Muslim political leadership succeed in mobilizing the masses of their own community behind the demand for separatism, since according to her formulation the Muslim community was by no means a monolithic political entity that was united behind its leaders? If at the level of leadership there was an increasingly desperate struggle for power, at the mass level there was an increasing awareness of communal identity that would go some way towards explaining the success of the leaders in mobilizing the masses. Miss Dixit makes the very significant point that the Khilafat movement in the twenties "heightened the sense of Muslim identity which proved a great psychological asset for the Muslim leaders in popularising their separatist ideology." What was the psychological process which gave birth to growing mass awareness of communal identity, making possible the mobilization of the Muslims as a community behind the issue of Khilafat? Forthcoming work by Miss Dixit may throw important light on the origins of the Khilafat Movement. The points at issue are rather complex and touch upon the changing role of the ulema. Faruqi's study of the Deoband ulema has indicated that many centres of Islamic learning were in fact opposed to the League's demands. If after 1937 the League succeeded in recruiting important sections of the ulema for its slogan of Pakistan, as Miss Dixit states, then a more painstaking study of the entire position of the ulema in Indo-Muslim society and the evolution of their political thinking is obviously needed. Why were the ulema in general aloof from the League and why did they in the last stages bring important support behind the demand for Pakistan? Why did the Congress, which included in its ranks outstanding doctors of Islamic learning, fail to hold the support which it had won from the ulema during the heady days of the Khilafat movement? What finally moved the masses of the Muslim community behind the banner of Pakistan and what imbued them with a consciousness of common destiny in spite of the many differences of caste, race and language emphasized by Dixit?

These issues require a multi-dimensional approach to the study of communalism, combining the logic of the struggle for power with the dynamics of

nagaram make frequent reference to the exchange of surplus rice. This surplus rice was brought into the *nagaram* market by local wholesalers who then used the proceeds from the rice's sale either to purchase non-agrarian or luxury goods, or to acquire other agricultural commodities which they could then peddle to the village markets they serviced. The *nagaram* may thus be compared to the intermediate markets in Skinner's analysis: a *nagaram* was a designated centre of exchange where itinerant and local commercial networks intersected.

Criticism of Skinner's model has been based on the suggestion that itinerant merchants, who likely had the goods a community needed, could penetrate his neatly drawn marketing regions, withdrawing the necessity of dependence by local peasants on a specific market. In medieval south India the ability to deal directly with the sources of supply would have eliminated the problem of facing the rules and cesses of the *nagaram*. Why, then, was it necessary for the itinerant merchants to deal with the *nagaram*? It is our impression that the local political structure prevented this penetration of non-local peoples. Above all else, the *nagaram*, as part of the *nāḍu*'s political structure, dominated the marketing operations of its hinterland such that it was not worth their while for external merchants to deal directly with the local villages.⁶²

Interaction between the *nagaram* and the *nāḍu* (*kūṭṭam*, *kōṭṭam*) administration is especially noticeable in contemporary epigraphy, suggesting that a special relationship between these two institutions was the key to a *nagaram*'s prosperity. We may cite, for instance, a joint resolution of the *nāḍu* and *nagaram* assemblies which was made at Tiruppaḷanam, Tañjāvūr, transferring dues collected from farmers as well as duties levied on commercial products such as pepper, areca-nuts, bales of cloth, and bags of rice to the local temple.⁶³ In Kōṇāḍu, as we have noted above, it was the members of the local *nāḍu* assembly who authorized the brokerage (*taragu*) for all betel leaves brought into Kōṇāḍu.⁶⁴ In another community the *nāḍu-kankatci*, an overseer employed by the local *nāḍu* assembly, and the *nāḍu-vagai*, a *nāḍu* revenue collector, approved a decision by twelve merchant families to support a festival honouring the Cōḷa king Rājarāja I.⁶⁵

At Jambai, South Acrot, the *nagaram* and *nāḍu* representatives met together to judge several legal cases. In one the tribunal determined that a *nagaram* merchant could not be prosecuted for stabbing to death a visiting merchant

⁶²We are particularly impressed with the *nagaram*'s dominance over the exchange of local commodities for goods coming from outside the local marketing area. Although there are numerous references in contemporary epigraphy to the usual commercial commodities such as pepper, cotton, various cloth goods, and oil, the *nagaram* seems to have in particular dominated the exchange of grain commodities - i.e., the products of local agriculture,

⁶³187 of 1928.

⁶⁴IPS, 125.

⁶⁵274 of 1910.

who seems to have been associated with the Tirunāmanallūr, South Acrot *nagaram*⁶⁶ and had attempted to rape the local merchant's concubine. To soothe the feelings of the *nagaram* of the deceased, the offender was directed to combine with a relative of the merchant he had murdered in making an endowment in honour of the deceased to the local temple.⁶⁷ At Aragalūr, Salem, the *nāḍu* assembly arbitrated a potentially disruptive conflict, stepping in to resolve a serious dispute between the local *nagaram* and another group of merchants over the proper management of temple business.⁶⁸ The *nāḍu*'s involvement in *nagaram* affairs is particularly perceptible in an inscription from Ūṭṭatūr, Tiruchirapalli where the *nāḍu* and *nagaram* met to convert a local village into a "merchant town" and therefore renamed it Tayilunalapuram.⁶⁹ Similarly in Uttaramērūr we find evidence of a merchant community inhabiting a quarter known as Nāḍuvilaṅgāḍi, "the market area of the *nāḍu*."⁷⁰

Seemingly not only the *nagaram*'s marketing position would have been challenged by the penetration of external merchants into the hinterland, but also that of the local landholding elite, the *nāṭṭār*, whose monopoly over local production would have been endangered as well. Our suggestion is that it was the indigenous administrative institution known as the *nāḍu* rather than a centralizing government which originally integrated the *nagaram* into the political system of southern India by making it the community's representative in external commercial dealings. If, as recent historians have argued,⁷¹ the *nāḍu* assembly was the representative body of the most powerful landholders in the regional political unit, then the relationships between the *nagaram* and this local elite, as symbolized in their considerable interaction, may well suggest that the *nagaram* was given a commercial monopoly over the *nāḍu*'s production and was the authorized arena for the wholesaling of the local *nāḍu*'s production to outside merchants. As shown in the inscription from Arakaṇḍanallūr cited above, a local institution such as the *nāḍu* was quite capable of legally excluding itinerant merchants from local markets by forbidding local residents to transact business with them.⁷² A *nagaram* would then have assumed a "banker's role," collecting, storing, and protecting local goods and utilizing them to conduct trade with itinerant merchants and other *nagarams*.

⁶⁶77 of 1906 and 225 of 1939-40.

⁶⁷77 of 1906. One should note the weak legal position of the visiting merchant.

⁶⁸432 of 1913.

⁶⁹521 of 1912.

⁷⁰52 of 1898 (SII, 3, 195).

⁷¹See Subbarayalu, *op. cit.*

⁷²151 of 1934-35.

mass awareness of communal identity. The possibilities of such an approach have been demonstrated by the recent work on Calcutta Muslims between 1918 and 1935 by Kenneth Macpherson. His close study of the growth of communalism in Calcutta clearly exhibits two processes at work: the raising of the stakes in the struggle for power during the process of constitutional reforms and the widening of the social horizons of parochial groups under the pressure of various social, economic and ideological factors. Miss Dixit's approach, while capable of giving important insight into the nature of communalism, will not explain all the facets of the communal problem. It will explain the political strategies of the Muslim communal leadership, but not the response of the Muslim masses to these strategies.

Regarding the communal situation in India today, Miss Dixit reaches the eminently sensible conclusion that communalism is based on political factors and will not vanish overnight by the expression of pious platitudes. "Political wisdom lies in treating communalism as a political problem needing a political solution." Miss Dixit has succeeded in the aim which she has set for herself in the Preface—her work should stimulate "new and more serious thought on Indian Communalism, beyond the existing clichés and naive explanations."

RAJAT RAY

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TABLE IV
STATEMENT OF THE TOTAL REVENUE ASSESSED (*kafiyat-e-dual jamabandi*) OF SOME
THE VILLAGES IN PARGANA BID, AURANGABAD PROVINCE SUBMITTED
BY EASU RAO, *gumshdar* (AGENT) OF THE PESHWA FOR 1774-75

	M A L		S I W A I		
	Kamil Amount for 1774-75 Rs/as	Fixed Amount for 1774-75 Rs/as	Receipt for 1774-75 Rs/as	Previous year's 1773-74 Rs/as	Less year's 1773-74 Rs/as
Wadhun	220/4	635	394/4	366/13	43/8
Hannegaon	901	928	578/10	630/2	62/10
Babalgao	450	586	361/14	392/14	44/4
Meenhali Cholka	2401	1888	1160/10	1157/13	145/14
Komti	509/4	435	270	209/10	27/8
Palon	2269/4	1579	846/10	912/—	—
Suri	440/9	1007/8	—	641/11/6	45/4/6
Annakola	238/7	201	118/5	106	20/4
Tandalbari	801	—	—	191/1	38/6

SOURCE : Document No. 223, R.P.P.

**Siwai* : Extra Revenue, derived from all taxes, except those raised from land and exclusive of customs and transit duties. The amount of *siwai* was not included in the *jamabandi* (*Wilson's Glossary*, 780; Aziz Jung: *Mushtahat-e-Deccan*, p. 191).

TABLE V
COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF *chaugh* AND *sardeshmukhi* DERIVED FOR THE
PARGANAS IN TABLE IV FOR 1774-75

Village	Chauth						Sardeshmukhi		
	Amount (1774-75) Rs/as	Original (Asl) (1773-74) Rs/as	Increase or decrease Rs/as	Amount (1774-75) Rs/as	Original (Asl) (1773-74) Rs/as	Increase or decrease Rs/as	Amount (1774-75) Rs/as	Original (Asl) (1773-74) Rs/as	Increase or decrease Rs/as
Wadhun	131/8	122/4	9/4	65/12	61/3	4/9	—	—	—
Hannegaon	192/14	212	19/2	96/8	106	9/8	—	—	—
Babalgao	120/8	130/14	less	60/6	65/9	5/3	—	—	—
Meenhali Cholka	2401/—/—	385/14	less	193/6	192/15	less	—	—	—
Komti	509/11/—	79/14	1/4	45	35	10	—	—	—
Palon	282/4	304	20/2	141/2	152	10/14	—	—	—
Suri	213/14	—	—	106/12	—	less	—	—	—
Annakola	39/7	35/5	4/2	19/12	17/11	2/1	—	—	—
Tandalbari	63/11	—	—	31/14	—	1	—	—	—

SOURCE: Document No. 223, R.P.P.